A SHORT HISTORY NAPOLEON THE FIRST. SHORT HISTORY OF Napoleon the First. BY JOHN ROBERT SEELEY, Regius Professor of Modern History in the University op Cambridge, and Author of " Ecce Homo," etc. mitl) a Portrait. V BOSTON: ROBERTS BROTHERS. 1886. ^A BEmiitrBitD ^^ressB: John Wilson and Son, Cambkidgb. '9 ^ PREFACE. To write a life of Napoleon which shall be posi- tively short is uot possible. When I undertook to write one in twelve pages of the ' Encyclopsedia Britannica,' I thought I was attempting what was difficult ; but I was mistaken ; I was attempting what was impossible. I take this opportunity of acknowledging the liberality of the Messrs. Black, who, in compliance with my wishes, and, I believe, at considerable inconvenience to the arrangements of the Encyclopsedia, actually allowed me thirty- six pages, or not less than three times the space which had been originally allotted for the article. The same publishers now place me under another obligation in consenting to smooth ray way to the present ' Short History,' in which the substance of that article is incorporated. The Life of Napoleon now given to the public is, if not absolutely short, yet, measured by the space allotted in it to each incident, almost as short as the obituary notice of a newspaper. It dismisses more than one great campaign with a iv Preface. sentence, more than one famous battle with a line. In the Encyclo^^sedia this was unavoidable, but the reader may ask whether there can be any justifi- cation for issuing as a book a summary which must needs, he may think, be as jejune as a table of contents. I admit at once that for some purposes this Short History of Napoleon must be AvhoUy useless, but I flatter myself that for certain other purposes it may be all the more satisfactory for being so exceedingly brief. A bewilderment caused by the multitude of facts and details is the danger which chiefly besets the reader of history ; and where, as in Napoleon's career, facts are unusually crowded together, the danger is greatest, the bewilderment most overwhelming. I have held it possible to meet this difficulty by almost suppressing details, and thus diminishing to the utmost the demand made upon the attention and memory, but at the same time to atone for what is lost in coloring and light and shadow by clearness of outline. Nothing certainly could be more lifeless than a mere chronological catalogue of Napoleon's achieve- ments ; but I thought that a narrative almost as brief as a catalogue would not be uninteresting, and still less useless, if it successfully brought to- gether cause and efiect, traced development clearly, and showed convincingly the influence of the age upon the man, and of the man upon his age. Preface. v I have, therefore, subordinated everything to clearness and unity, and there are some aspects of the life which, to gain room, I have consciously omitted altogether. For instance, no attempt is made here either to describe or to estimate Napo- leon as a military commander. I do not write a soldier's history of him, and accordingly, though I endeavor to give the strategical outline of each campaign correctly, the battles will be found to be not only not described, but not even narrated ; they are merely registered. Again, I refrain al- most entirely from drawing upon the fund of pri- vate, personal, or domestic detail and anecdote, though it is upon matter of this kind that a biog- raphy commonly depends for its vividness. The Duchess of Abrantes, Bourrienne, Mme. de Eemu- sat, and many similar writers less well known, stood ready tfe supply such matter in no small quantity ; but I wished my narrative to be clear and short, and comparatively I cared little that it should be vivid, I thought such a plan feasible, but I did not flatter myself that it would be easy. It is partic- ularly difficult to gain a comprehensive view of those historical persons who have an international position. Napoleon is a leading figure in the do- mestic history of every great continental state, and the greatest foreign enemy in the history of England, yet most of his historians have regarded him almost vi Preface. exclusively from tbe point of view of a single state. They have written as Frenchmen or as English- men, not only with limited sympathies, but actually for the most part with most imperfect knowledge. Such an outline as I meditated, at once short and trustworthy, could not be produced by mere compilation from ordinary authors, or by hasty in- vestigations. I must ask the reader to believe that I have not studied Napoleon's life in order to write this little book, but that I write the book because I have for years studied the Napoleonic age from many points of view, and in many coun- tries. I need not ask him to take this entirely on credit. I have shown in my ' Life and Times of Stein ' (1879) that I have investigated thoroughly the revolutions produced by the Napoleonic wars in Germany. From my 'Expansion of England' (1883) he may satisfy himself that I have reflected on the relations of France and England in the Napoleonic age, and on the gradual growth through- out the eighteenth century of that quarrel between the two nations which reached such a height under Napoleon. But since the publication of that book and during the composition of this, I have pur- sued those inquiries further, being engaged upon a 'History of English Foreign Policy during the Eighteenth Century.' And I draw my information at first hand from the manuscript despatches pre- served at the Record Office. Preface. vii As to the French aspect of the subject, I have en- deavored here too to rest as much as possible upon documents. My chief study has lain, not in Thiers or Lanfrey, but in the Napoleon Correspondence. I may add that my view of the connection of Napo- leon with the Eevolution, and of the development of the Napoleonic out of the Eevolutionary age, is the result of much study of the latter as well as of the former. Beside original documents I have of course stud- ied the works founded on original documents which have appeared of late years. Among the recently opened sources to which this volume is indebted, I would mention particularly, on the earlier period, Jung's works ; on the period of the Directory, Hiiffer's, the later volumes of Von Sybel, and the study on the Egyptian expedition by Count Boulay de la Meurthe ; on the German wars, the genuine memoirs of Hardenberg, edited by Eanke, and Ranke's biography of him, Oncken on the ' War of Liberation,' and a long list of books already used by me in the 'Life and Times of Stein.' But some important works have appeared since that publica- tion, especially the second volume of Oncken, and Treitschke's history ; I may also mention the orig- inal researches which are now being made by A. Stern. Almost one-third of this volume is occupied by an essay on Napoleon, which is entirely new. It viii Preface. is designed to correspond with the History to which it is appended, and makes use of no materials but such as are furnished by the History. It could not therefore attempt either to analyze his character or estimate his genius. The question it deals with is rather his relation to his age, his place in the history of France and of Europe, and even on this question — I need hardly say — it offers only sug- gestions. It is only an essay ; it is not a treatise. Our portrait is from an engraving after a picture by Boilly, which represents Napoleon as First Con- sul, and bears date 29 Thermidor, an X. It was executed in mezzotint, and several impressions of it, all alike colored by hand (it is doubtful whether any uu colored impressions were published), are pre- served in the Bibliotheque Nationale at Paris. We give the head ; but in the original, which is on a considerably larger scale than our copy, the por- trait is enclosed in an oval frame, below which is engraved a review in the Place du Carrousel, with the inscription ' Eevue du Quintidi.' The cast of the face of Napoleon was taken in wax on the morning after his death. It was brought to England in 1855, and was excellently engraved in the ' Illustrated London News.' We are indebted to the proprietor for permission to reproduce the wood-cuts. CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. BUONAPARTE. § 1. Buonaparte's Birth and Family. — Military Edu- cation. — Early Authorship 9 § 2. Corsican Period 15 § 3. At Toulon. — Joins the Army of Italy. — Con- nection with the Robespierres. — Ordered to the Army of the "West. — Remains in Paris . 23 § 4. Checks Revolt of the Sections. — Marriage. — Commander of the Army of Italy .... 32 CHAPTER II. GENERAL BONAPARTE. § 1. Italian Campaign 37 § 2. Acts as Independent Conqueror. — Levying of Contributions. — His Italian Policy. — Ad- vance on Austria. — Preliminaries of Leo- ben. — Occupation of Venice. — Fructidor. — Treaty of Campo Formio 43 §3. The Revolution of Fructidor ...._... 57 § 4. Returns to Paris. — Egyptian Expedition. — In- vasion of Syria. — Return to France ... 62 § 5. Revolution of Brumaire 73 A X Contents. CHAPTER III. THE FIRST CONSUL. PAGE § 1. Becomes First Consul 83 § 2. His Jealousy of Morean. — Campaign of Maren- go. — Treaty of Luueville. — The Concordat. — Treaty of Amiens 88 § 3. Reconstruction of French Institutions. — Grad- ual Progress towards Monarchy. — Nivose . 97 § 4. Rupture with England. — Execution of the Due d'Enghien. — The Emperor Napoleon. — Trial of Moreau 105 CHAPTER IV. THE EMPEROR. § 1 . Designs against England and the Continent. — Napoleon Crowned 116 § 2. Campaign against Austria and Russia. — Capitu- lation of Ulm. — Battle of Austerlitz. — War with Prussia. — Jena and Auerstadt. — Eylau. — Friedland. — Treaty of Tilsit 123 § 3. Napoleon as King of Kings 135 CHAPTER V. REBELLION. § 1. French Army in Spain. — Popular Rising in Spain. — Napoleon in Spain 145 § 2. First German War of Liberation. — Ratisbon. — Aspern. — Wagram. — Treaty of Schonbrunn. Contents. xi PAGE — War with Russia impending. — Divorce of Josephine. — Marriage with Marie Louise . . 154 § 3. Annexation of Holland. — Dissolution of the Al- liance of Tilsit. — Invasion of Russia . . . 164 § 4. In Poland. — Niemen crossed. — Smolensk. — Battle of Borodino. — Burning of Mosco\^. — Retreat from Moscow 171 CHAPTER VI. FALL OF NAPOLEON. § 1 . Wars of 181 3-1814. — War with Russia and Prus- sia. — Relations to Austria 182 § 2. War with Russia, Prussia, and Austria .... 195 § 3. Invasion of France by the Allies. — Napoleon abdicates 201 § 4. He retires to Elba. — Disquiet in France. — The Hundred Days. — Battle of Waterloo . . . 211 §5. The Second Abdication. — Surrender to Eng- land. — Exile ia St. Helena. — Autobiography. — Death 224 NAPOLEON'S PLACE IN HISTORY. CHAPTER I. HOW FAR NAPOLEON WAS FAVORED BY CIRCUMSTANCES. § 1 . His Rise to Power 240 § 2. His Ascendency in Europe 243 § 3. His Conquests 245 § 4. Was he Invincible 1 249 xii Contents. CHAPTER II. HOW FAR NAPOLEON WAS SHAPED BY CIRCUMSTANCES. PAGE § I. His Lawlessness 254 § 2. His Impressibility 263 § 3. His Relation to Parties 265 & 4. His Signiticauce in French History 268 CHAPTER III. WHAT NAPOLEON WAS IN HIMSELF. §1. What was his Plan? 279 § 2. Origin of the Plan 286 §3. Exec.ntion of the Plan 291 § 4. Was he sucoessful ? 295 § 5. How far his Inlluence was Beneficial .... 299 §6. Napoleon judged by his Plan 303 A SHORT HISTORY NAPOLEON THE FIRST. CITArTER I. BUONAPARTE. § 1. Date of Duonapart<^s Birth. — Military Education. — Early Authorship, The family Buonaparte (so tlie name is written by Napoleon's father and by himself clown to 1796, tliough the other spelling occurs in early Italian documents) was of Tuscan origin. A branch of it was settled in Corsica at least as early as the sixteenth century, from which time tlie Buonapartes appear as influential citizens of Ajaccio. They had an ancient title of nobility from the Genoese republic, and Napoleon's grand- father obtained letters of nobility also from the Grand Duke of Tuscany, They liad therefore the right to sign De Buonaparte, but ordinarily dropped 10 The Buonaparte Family. [a.d. i769. the preposition of honor. Charles Marie de Buo- naparte (who was born in 1746, and studied law at tlie University of Pisa, where he took his doc- tor's degree in 1769) married at the age of eigh- teen Letitia Eamolino, who was not quite fifteen. The lady had beauty, but apparently neither rank nor wealth. In the children of this marriage the father, a somewhat indolent Italian gentleman with a certain taste for literature, seems traceable in Josepli, Jerome, and partly also in Lucien ; the energy of which Lucien had a share, which Caroline also displayed, and which astonished the world in Napoleon, is perhaps attributable to the Corsican blood of the mother. Thirteen children were born, of whom eight grew up. Tlie list of these is as follows : Joseph (king, first of Naples, then of Spain), iY«poZco?i, Lucien, Eliza (Princess Bacciochi), Pauline (married, first to General Le- clerc, afterwards to Prince Borghese), Caroline (married to Murat, became queen of Naples), Louis (king of Holland), Jerome (kiug of West- phalia). Of these the eldest was born in 1768, the youngest in 1784. Besides his brothers and sisters, Napoleon raised to importance JogcjtIi Fesch, half-brother of his mother, a Swiss on the father's side, who was after- wards known to the world as Cardinal Pesch. A.D. 1709.] Dafe of Napoleon's Birth. 11 It is the accepted opinion that Napoleon was born at Ajaccio on August 15, 1769. This opin- ion rests indeed on the positive statement of Joseph, hut it is certain from documents that on January 7, 1768, Madame Letitia bore a son at Corte, who was baptized by the name of Nabuli- one. And even in legal documents we find con- tradictory statements about the time and place of birth, not only of Napoleon, but also of Joseph. It has been suggested that all difficulties disap- pear at once if we suppose that Napoleon and Nabulione were one and the same, and that Jo- seph was really the second son, whom the parents found it convenient to pass off as the first-born. This they may have found convenient when, in 1779, they gained admission for a son to the mili- tary school of Brienne. A son born in 1768 would at that date be inadmissible, as being above ten years of age. On this supposition Napoleon was introduced by a fraud to that military career which changed the face of the world ! Never- theless it is certain from Liicien's memoir that of such a fraud nothing was known to the younger members of the family, who regarded Joseph as without doubt the eldest. After passing two or three months in a school at Autun for the purpose of learning French — he 12 His MUitcmj Education. [a.d. i785. had hitherto been a thorough Italian — Napoleon entered Brienne on April 23 or 25, 1779, where he remained for more than five years, and then in October, 1784, passed, as 'cadet-gentilhonnne,' into the military school of Paris. In the next year, 1785, he obtained his commission of lieutenant in the regiment La Fere, stationed at Valence. He had [already lost his father, who, undertaking a journey to France on business, was entertained at Montpellier in the house of an old Corsican friend, Madame Permou, mother of the celebrated memoir- writer Madame Junot, and died there of the dis- ease which was afterwards fatal to Napoleon, on February 24, 1785, at the age of thirty-eight years. The fact principally to be noticed about Napo- leon's extraction and boyhood is that he was by birth a noble, needy and provincial, and that from his tenth year his education was exclusively mili- tary. Of all the great rulers of the world none has been by breeding so purely a military special- ist. He could scarcely remember the time when he was not a soldier living among soldiers. The effects of this training showed themselves too evi- dently when he had risen to the head of affairs. At the same time poverty in a society of luxurious noblemen, and the consciousness of foreign birth ^TAT. 16.] His Character. 13 and of ignorance of the French language, made his school life at times very unhappy. At one time he demands passionately to be taken away, at an- other time he sends in a memorial, in which he argues the expediency of subjecting the cadets to a more Spartan diet. His character declared it- self earlier than his talents. He was reported as ' taciturn, fond of solitude, capricious, haughty, ex- tremely disposed to egoism, seldom speaking, en- ergetic in his answers, ready and sharp in repartee, full of self-love, ambitious, and of unbounded as- pirations.' So he appeared to his teachers, and iu some stories, probably exaggerated, he is repre- sented as a complete Timon, living as a hermit, and perpetually at war with his school-fellows. His abilities do not seem to have excited wonder, but he was studious, and in mathematics and geog- raphy made great progress. He never, however, so Carnot tells us, became a truly scientific man. He had neither taste nor talent for grammatical studies, but was fond of books, and books of a solid kind. Of the writers of the day he seems to have been chiefly influenced by Eousseau and Eaynal. He is now a lieutenant of artillery in the service of Louis XVI. The next years are spent mainly with his regiment at Valence, Lyons, Douai, Paris, 14 Early Authorship. [a.d. i789. Auxonne, Seurre, Auxonne again. But he takes long holidays with his family at Ajaccio, obtaining permission on the ground of ill health. Thus he was at Ajaccio in 1787 from February to October, again from December, 1787, to May, 1788, again from September, 1789, to February, 1791. During this period he is iDiincipally engaged in authorship, being consumed by the desire of distinction, and having as yet no other means of attaining it. He produces 'Letters on the History of Corsica,' which he proposes at first to dedicate to Paoli, later to Eaynal ; he competes for a prize offered by the Academy of Lyons for the best essay written ' to determine tlie truths and feelings which it is most important to inculcate on men for their liappiness.' Among his smaller compositions is ' The Narrative of the Masked Prophet.' Of all these writings, which are to be distinguislied from the pamphlets written by him Avith a practical object, it may be said that they show more character than literary ability. As the compositions of a boy they are indeed remarkable for their precocious seriousness ; but what strikes the reader most in them is a sort of suppressed passion that marks the style, a fierce impatience, as if the writer knew already how much he had to get through in a short life. But his sentiments, love of liberty, of virtue, of domestic ^TAT. 20.] Corsican Period. 15 happiness, are hollow, and his affectation of ten- derness even ridiculous. The essay, as a com- position, is positively bad, and was naturally unsuccessful § 2. Corsican Period. Meanwhile his active life had begun with the Revolution of 1789. The first chapter of it is separate from the rest, and leads to nothing. That astonishing career, which has all the unity of a most thrilling drama, does not begin till 1795. The six years which preceded it may he called his Corsican period, because for the greater part of it he may be thought to have regarded Corsica as the destined scene of his future life. It must be very summarily treated here. In 1789 the Italian island of Corsica had been for twenty years a dependency of France. But France had acquired it in a most unscrupulous manner by purchasing the rights of the republic of Genoa over it. She did this in 17G8, that is, when Corsica had contested those rights in a war of nearly forty years, and had been practically independent and happy for about thirteen years under the dictatorship of Pasquale Paoli. It was an act similar to the partition of Poland, and seems to mark a design on the part of France — 16 Corsica before the Revolution, [a.d. 1789. M'hich had just suffered great colonial losses — to extend her power by way of the Mediterranean into the East. Paoli was compelled to take refuge in England, where he was still living when the French Revolution broke out. In the fall of Corsica a certain Matteo Buttafuoco played a disgraceful part. He had been sent by Paoli to treat as plenipotentiary with France, was won over by Choisexil, declared against the national cause, and appeared in the island as colonel of Louis XV.'s Corsican regiment. He too was still living when the States-General met, and represented there the noblesse of Corsica, while Salicetti, a name of no lit- tle prominence in the Revolution, was one of the representatives of the Corsican tiers etat. The Revolution w^as almost as dangerous an event to the relation between France and Corsica as to that between France and St. Domingo. Would the island assert its independence, and if so, could the Assembly deny its right to do this ? The islanders and the exiled Paoli at their head took a moderate view. France must guarantee a good deal of local freedom ; on such conditions, they thought, the relation might continue, if only to prevent the republic of Genoa from reviving its pretensions. Accordingly, on November 30, 1789, Corsica was declared by the National jETAT. 20.] Principles of Buonaparte Family. 17 Assembly to be a province of France on the motion of Salicetti himself, and the protest against this decree made by Genoa was treated with contempt. Paoli left London, was received in France with an ovation, appeared before the National Assembly on April 22, 1790, where he received the honors of the sitting, and landed in Corsica on July 14, after an absence of twenty-one years. Thus was Corsica reconciled to France by the Eevolution of 1789 ; but the good work was undone by the Second Eevolution of 1792. Since 1769 the French power in the island had rested mainly on the noUesse and clergy. The Buonaparte family, as noble, had been on the un- patriotic side ; Napoleon's father appears always as a courtier of the French governor Marboeuf and as a mendicant at Versailles ; Madame Letitia in soliciting a place for her son Louis styles herself ' the widow of a man who always served the king in the administration of the affairs of the island of Corsica.' It is therefore a remarkable fact that, almost immediately after the taking of the Bastille, Napoleon hurried to Ajaccio and placed himself at the head of the revolutionary party with all the decision characteristic of him. He devoted himself to the establishment of a National Guard, of which he might hope to be the La 2 18 NitpitUon Ih'clarrs for Ju-rohi/ioii. [a.i>. 1700. FiiV(>ll(\ iiiul lu) ])ultlislu'(l a IcUi'v to lUittafuocn, w liii'Ii, |iiitiH'rlv iiiidcrsldod, is a sdlcuiu di'sciiion of till' luiiuiiilcs (if his raiuily, .siinihiv to that of ]\rii'al)i'Mii. This U'ltiT has all tlio intensity ol' his other early \vritin,!;n, bnt Jar more eireetivencss. It lashes r.iittafiioi'o for his treas >n of l7l)S, (.le- seribing hinj as a cynie, wlio IkuI no bi'liol" in virtue, but supposeil all men to bo jfuiiled by Bellisii inliTt'st. '.riie inveetive has lost its edgo l"or us who know that tlu' author soon after openly professoil tliis \tMy ereeil. In ileelarini^ for tho llevolution he obeyed the r(>al inelinalion of his fe(^lin;^3 at. tlu> time, as wi* may see from his M'riting'S, whieh are in the re\ ohiliiuiary toui^ of llaynal. Ihit had he net really, we nuiy ask, ail nltiM'ior t>bjei't, — vi.:. to make fort^iea inde- pvMnlenl of I'ranee, and to restore the old rule ol' Taoli, aimiu:;- liiuisi'lf at Paoli's sueeession ? Probably he wished to see sueh a result, but he had always two strini;s (o his bow. In his hotter to r.ullafuoeo he ean^'uUy avoids separating Cor- siean bbeity from tlie liberty olVered by the Freneh Kevolution, Had tho opportunity otVered, he might no do\ibt have stood forth at this time as the libevatof of t^orsiea ; bnt eireumstanees tlid not prove favorable, and ho drifted gradually in quite the opposite direction. iETAT. 21.] Forfeits his French Commission. 19 , In October, 1700, ho mot Paoli at Orezza, whoro Corsica constituted itself as a French department, Paoli bein;^ president, Salicetti procureur-;^6n(;ral syndic. Arena and Pozzo di Borgo (also from Ajaccio; members of, the Directorium. Paoli is said to have hailed Napoleon as ' one of Plutarcli's men.' As the only Corsican officer trained at a royal military school. Napoleon might aspire to become commander of a jiaid native guard which it was proposed to create for the island. But France had misgivings about the use to which such a guard might be put, and the Minister of War rejected tlie proposal. In the next year, however, he was .successful in a second attenipt to get the command of an armed force in Corsica, and betrayed in tlio oourio of this attempt how much more intent he was at this time upon Corsican than upon French affaiis. It was decided to create four battalions of national volunteers for Corsica, and Napoleon became candidate; fr^r the post of lieu- tenant-colonel in the district of Ajaccio. The choice was in the hands of the volunteers them- selves, and in pursuing his canvass Napoleon did not hesitate to outstay his furlough, and thus to forfeit his French commission by wilful absence from a great review of the whole French army which was appointed for the opening day of 1792. 20 His Restoration to the Army. [a.d. 1792. He was, however, elected, having, it is said, exe- cuted the first of his many couijs d'etat by violently imprisoning a commissioner sent down to superin- tend the election. We can understand his eager- ness when we remark that anarchy in Corsica was steadily increasing, so that he may have believed that the moment for some military stroke was at hand. He did not long delay. At the Easter festival of 1792 he tried to get possession of Ajaccio under cover of a tumult between the volunteers and the refractory clergy. The stroke failed, and he lied from tlic island. The European war was just breaking out, and at Paris everything was in confusion ; otherwise lie would probably have been tried by court-martial and shot. ^A rebel in Corsica, a deserter in France, wliat was he to do ? He went to Paris, where he ar- rived on May 21. The Second Revolution was at hand, and he could observe while no one had lei- sure to observe him. He witnessed the lOtli of August and the downfall of the monarchy. To him this revolution was a fortunate event, for the new Government, attacked by all Europe, could not dispense with the few trained officers whom the emitrration had left. On Ausjust 30 his name was restored to the army list with the rank of captain, a commission dated back to February G, iETAT. 23.] The Second Revolution. 21 and arrears of pay. lit; was saved from tlio most desperate condition to which he was ever in his whole life reduced. On September 2 (terrible date !) he is engaged in withdrawing his sister Eliza from St. Cyr (the House of St. Louis having been suppressed). The next step he takes is re- markable. The great war which was to carry him to the pinnacle of fame was now in full progress. By undeserved good luck his military rank is re- stored to him. Will he not hurry to his regiment, eager to give proof of liis military talents ? No, his thoughts are still in Corsica. On the pretext of conducting his sister to lier home ho sets off without delay for Ajaccio, where he arrives on the 17th. The winter was spent in the unsuccessful expedition, which may be called Napoleon's first campaign, made from Corsica against the island of Sardinia. On his return he found a new scene opened. The Second Kevolution was beginning to produce its effect in Corsica, which was no mere province of France, and in which everything was modified by the presence of Paoli. Elsewhere the Convention was able by its Ke])resentatives in Mission to crush opposition, but they could not so crush Corsica and PaolL There was thus a natural opposition between tlic Convention and Paoli, and the islanders began to fall into opposite 22 Revolution extends to Corsica, [a.d. 1792. parties, as adherents of the former or of the latter. It might have been expected that Bonaparte, who all his life had glorified Paoli, and whose early let- ters are full of hatred to France, would have been an enthusiastic Paolist. But a breach seems to have taken place between them soon after Napo- leon's return from Paris, perhaps in consequence of his escapade of Easter, 1792. The crisis came on April 2, when Paoli was denounced before the Convention, among others by Marat, and it was decreed that he and Pozzo di Borgo should come to Paris and render an account of their conduct to the Convention. Paoli refused, but, with the re- markable, perhaps excessive, moderation which characterized him, offered to leave Corsica if his presence there appeared to the Convention unde- sirable. The islanders however rallied round him almost as one man. There could be no reason why the horrors of the Second Eevolution should extend to Corsica, even if we consider them to have been inevitable in France. For a Corsican patriot no fairer oppor- tunity could offer of dissolving witli universal ap- probation the connection with France which had begun in 1769. Napoleon took the oj^posite side. He stood out with Salicetti as the leading cham- pion of the French connection and the bitterest ^TAT. 23.] Nivpoleons Dislike to the French. 23 opponent of Paoli. Was his motive envy, or the bitterness caused by a recent personal quarrel with Paoli? We cannot positively say, but we can form an estimate of the depth of that insular pa- triotism which tills the ' Letters on the History of Corsica.' Paoli summoned a national consulta at the end of May, and the dissolution of the French connection now began. The consulta denounced the Buonaparte family by name. Napoleon an- swered by desperate attempts to execute his old plan of getting possession of the citadel of Ajaccio. But he failed, and the whole family, with Madame Letitia and Fesch, pursued by the fury of the peo- ple, took refuge in France. With this Hijra the first period of Napoleon comes to an end. §3. At Toulon. — Joins the Army of Italy. — Connec- tion loiih the Robespierres. — Ordered to the Army of the West. — Remains in Paris. Up to this time Napoleon has regarded the French nation with dislike, French ways and habits as strange and foreign, and he has more than once turned aside from a French career when it seemed open to him. Henceforth he has no other career to look for, unless indeed it may be possible, as for some time he continued to hope, to make his way back to Corsica by means of French 24 At Toulon. [a.d. 1793. arms. A certain change seems now to pass over his character. Up to this time his writings, along with their intensity, have had a highly moral and sentimental tone. He seems sincerely to have thought himself not only stronger and greater but better than other men. At school he found him- self among school-fellows who were *a hundred fathoms below the noble sentiments which ani- mated himself,' and again much later he pro- nounced that ' the men among whom he lived had ways of thinking as different from his own as moonlight is from sunlight.' Probably he still felt that he had more vivid thoughts than other men, but he ceases henceforth to be a moralist. His next pamphlet, 'Le Souper de Beaucaire,' is entirely free from sentiment, and in a very short time he appears as a cynic, and even pushing cynicism to an extreme. It w^as in June, 1793, that the whole family found themselves at Toulon in the midst of the Corsican emigration. France was in a condition not less disturbed than Corsica, for it w^as tlie moment of the fall of the Girondins. Plunged into this new party strife, ISTapoleon could hardly avoid taking the side of the Mountain. Paoli had been in a manner the Girondin of Corsica, and Napo- leon had headed the opposition to him. In ' Le iETAT. 24.] ' Le Souper de Beaucaire.' 25 Soiiper de Beaucaire ' (published in August, 1793), wliich is the manifesto of this period, as the ' Let- ter to Buttafuoco ' is of the earlier period, he him- self compares the Girondins to Paoli, and professes to think that the safety of the state requires a deeper kind of republicanism than theirs. The immediate occasion of this pamphlet is the civil war of the South, into which he was now plunged. Marseilles had declared against the Convention, and had sent an army under Kousselet which had occu- pied Avignon, but had evacuated it speedily on being attacked by the troops of the Mountain under Carteaux. Napoleon took part in the attack, commanding the artillery, but it seems an un- founded statement that he specially distinguished himself. This was in July, and a month later the pamphlet was written. It is a dialogue between inhabitants of Marseilles, Mmes, and Montpel- lier and a military man. It is highly charac- teristic, full of keen and sarcastic sagacity, and of clear military views ; but the temperature of its author's mind has evidently fallen suddenly; it has no warmth, but a remarkable cynical coldness. Among the Eepresentatives in Mission recently arrived at Avignon was the younger Eobespierre, with whom Salicetti was intimate. Napoleon, introduced by Salicetti and recommended by this 26 Napoleon at Marseilles. [a.d. 1793. ]»:iiii|ilil('( , ii;i( iirnlly n>s(! liii^'li in his f;iv(»r. Wo must not bo misled liy tlio violciuHi with wliicli, us l^'irst, (\)iisul, ho iUinckod tliis ]);ivtv, and tJio lioi'i'or ho thou iii\)(ossod to loi'l fur (hoir oriuios, so us to oouohido that liis couuoctiou with liio daoo- bin«, and os])ooially tho IJobospiciros, was at the be- <;iuuiu;4 ])ur(.'ly uooidoulal awd |)r()l'ossioual. Wliat ooulouiporary ovitU'uco wo havo exhibits Buoua- ])a.rto Jit tiiis timo as hohliuij,' tho ]au!j,uai',o of a tor- rorisl,, aiul wo shall scHi how narrow ly ho osoapod juM'isliini;- witii tho liobos]norros in 'J'horniidor. or ('oui'si' it is iidt nooossary to clisbolii'vo Mav- mont, wlion lio says that llio utvocities of tho Ivobospiorrisls wovo iiovor to Napoleon's taste, and that lio did mueh to check theui within tho sphere o[' his iulhuMU'o. lie maiihed with Cartoaux into Marseilles late in August, and abtiut tho same time Toulon deliv- ered itself into the hands of the MiiL^lisli, Just at this niouionl ho was ])roniolod to tho rank of c/irf lie htlaillon, in tho second regiment of artillery, which gave him jtraclically the connnand ol" tho artillery in the I'oreo which was now lornied to l)Osioj;'o Toulon. Tho story ol" his relations with the generals who wore sent successively to conduct tho sie«;e, Cartoaux the ])ainter, Dopj'ot the physi- cian, Dugomniier tho bravo veteran, and of his JETAT. 24.] Joins the Army of Italy. 27 discovery of tlif, Li'iui wn,y to iako Toulon, lu'c iici-- haps somewhat \i.v^f',n{\;ivy, })ut lie inay ])n)|);i,l)ly have heen elofpient and ])f',r,siiuHiv(! at the comieil of war held on Novfirnher 2o, in wliifJi the ])l!ui of the siege was laid down. 'I'hat he distinguished himself in action is more certain, for Dugommier writes: 'Among those who distinguished tiieni- selves most, and wlio most ,'iid(;d me to rally the troops and push them forward, are Citizens Euona Parte, commanding the artillery, Arena and Cer- voni, adjutants-general ' (MunUcMr, I)(;ceTtd)er 7, ITl'.'i). J[e was now niiuied gfiueial of brigade. JI(i now ])as;;cs out of tli(! (;ivil into the foreign war. The military system (d' the Convention is by this time in full 0])eration. Distinct armi(!S face each enemy, and the gntiit milit;uy names of the devolution are already in nuin's mouths. The Army of the North has Jourdan, Leehirc, Yan- damnie, lirune, Mortier ; that of the Moselle has Hoche, Tie.ssi6res, Mor(;au ; tlKitoftln- liliinc;, l'i(;he- gru, iScherer, Berthier; that of the West, Marceau and Kleber. Buonaparte joins the Army of Italy as general of artillery and inspector-general; to the same army is attached Massena as general of division; ])um(irbion is gencral-in-chief. Tt is now that for the first time we find the young man's exceptional ability remarked. Itestless 28 Connection tvith the Robespierres. [a.d. 1794. pushing ambition he had shown all along, but that he was more than a mere intriguer seems to have been first discerned by the younger Eobespierre, who in a letter of April 5, 1794, describes him as * of transcendent merit.' In the brief campaign of the Army of Italy which occupied the month of July, 1794, he took no part, while Mass^ua com- manded in the illness of Dumerbion. But in July he made his first essay in diplomacy. Genoa was among the earliest of the many feeble neutral states which suffered in the conflict of the Revolu- tion with the Great Powers, and at the expense of which the revolutionary empire was founded. Bonaparte was sent b}^ the younger Eobespierre to remonstrate with the Genoese Government upon the use which they suffered the Coalition to make of their neutral territory. He was in Genoa from July 16 to July 23 ; he urged the French claim with success ; he returned to Nice on July 28. But July 28, 1794, is the 9th Thermidor, on which his patron perished with the elder Eobespierre on the scaffold. Probably the connection of Napoleon with the Eobespierres was closer than he himself at a later time liked to have it thought. ' He was their man, their plan-maker,' writes Salicetti ; ' he had ac- quired an ascendency over the Eepresentatives (i.e. especially Eobespierre junior) which it is iETAT. 25.] Engages in a Maritime Expedition. 29 impossible to describe,' writes Marmont. Accord- ingly after Thermidor the Representatives in Mis- sion who remained with the Army of Italy — viz. Salicetti, Albitte, and Laporte — suspended Bona- parte from his functions, and placed him provision- ally under arrest (August 6). He was imprisoned at the Fort Carr^ near Antibes, but fortunately for him was not sent to Paris. On the 20th he was set provisionally at liberty on the ground of ' the possible utility of the military and local knowledge of the said Bonaparte.' This spelling begins already to creep in. His escape was due, according to Marmont, to Salicetti's favor and to the powerful help he him- self succeeded in procuring ; ' he moved heaven and earth.' His power of attaching followers also now begins to appear ; Junot and Marmont, who had become acquainted with him at Toulon, were prepared, if he had been sent to Paris, to set him free by Ivilling the gens d'armes and carrying him into the Genoese territory. Marmont has graphi- cally described the influence exerted upon himself at this time by Napoleon ; ' there was so much future in his mind,' he writes. This was a passing check ; early in 1795 he suffered a greater misfortune. He had been en- gaged in a maritime expedition of which the object 30 ' A Good ArtillerUt: [a.d. 1795. was to recover Corsica, now completely in the l)o\ver of the English. On IMarch 3 he embarked with his brother Lonis, JMnrmont, and others on tlie brig ' Amitie.' On tlio lith the lleet set sail. It fell in with the English, lust two ships, and re- turned defeated. The enter]»rise was abandoned, and by the end of the same montli we fnul Lacondie Saint-Michel, nunuber of tiio Connnittee of Tub- lie Safety, sending orders to the Cicneral of Bri- gade r>onaparte, to proceed immediately to the Army of the AVest in order to take command of the artillery there. He left JMarseilles for Paris on May 5, feeling that all the ground gained by his activity at Toulon, and by the admiration he had begun to inspire, was lost again, that his ca- reer was all to reconnnence, and in peculiarly unfavorable circumstances. This may almost be called the last ill turn he , {\ ever received from fortune. It has been attributed to the (Jirondist S])itc of a certain Aiiltry against the Montagnard Bonaparte. Tlie I ruth seems rather to be that the Committee of Public Safety felt that the Corsican element was too strong in the Army of Italy ; they remarked that ' the pa- triotism of these refugees is less manifest than their disposition to enrich themselves.' Lacombe Saint-Michel know Corsica ; and the new general iETAT. 26.] Ill the War Office. 31 of the Army of Italy, Schdrer, remarks of Bona- parte just at this moment that ' he is a really good artillerist, but has rather too much ambition and intrigue for his advancement.' The anecdote told by Bonaparte himself of his ordering an attack of outposts in order to treat a lady to a sight of real war, ' how the French were successful, but necessarily no result could come of it, the attack being a pure fancy, and yet some men were left on the field,' belongs to the last months of his service in the Army of Italy. It is worthy of notice, as showing his cynical insensi- bility, that he acted thus almost at the very begin- ning of his military career, and not when he had been hardened by long familiarity with bloodshed. On his arrival at Paris he avoids proceeding to the Army of the West, and after a time obtains from Doulcet de Pontecoulant a post in the topo- graphical section of the War Office. Here he has an opportunity of resuming his old work, and we find him furnishing Doulcet, as he had before fur- nished Eobespierrc junior, with strategical plans for the conduct of the war in Italy. Late in Au- gust he applies for a commission from Government to go to Constantinople at the head of a party of artillerists in order to reform that department of the Turkish service. He sends in a testimonial 32 The Definitive Repuhlic. [a.p. 1795. from ])oulcet ^v]lich describes him as* a citizen who may he usefully employed whether in the artillery or in any other arm, and even in the de- partment of foreign affairs.' But at this moment occurs the crisis of his life. It coincides with a remarkable crisis in the history of France. § 4. Checks Revolt of the Sections. — Marriage. — Co7n- majider of Army of Italy. The Second Ptevolution (1792) had destroyed the monarchy, but a republic, properly speaking, had not yet been established. Between 1702 and 1795 the government had been provisionally in the hands of the National Convention, which had been sunnnoned, not to govern, but to create a new constitution. Now at length, the danger from for- eign enemies having been averted, the Convention could proceed to its proper work of establishing a definitive republic. But there was danger lest the country, when appealed to, should elect to undo tlic work of 1792 by recalling the Bourbons, or at least should avenge on the Mountain the atrocities of the Terror. To preserve the continuity of government an expe- dient was adopted. As under the new constitution the assemblies were to be renewed periodically to the extent only of one-third at a time, it was ^TAT. 26.1 Napoleon and Barras. 33 decreed tliat the existing Convention sliould ]je treated as the first Corps Ldgislatif under the new system. Thus, instead of being dissolved and making way for new assemblies, it was to form the nucleus of the new legislature, and to be re- newed only to the extent of one-third. This ad- ditional law, which was promulgated along with the new constitution, excited a rebellion in Paris. The sections (or wards) called into existence a revolutionary assembly, which met at the Oddon. This the Convention suppressed by military force, and the discontent of the individual sections was thereby increased. At tlio same time tlioir confi- dence was heightened by a check they inflicted upon General Menou, who, in attempting to disarm the section Lepelletier, was imprisoned in the Eue Viviennc, and could only extricate himself by concluding a sort of capitulation with the insur- gents. Thereupon the Convention, alarmed, put Menou under arrest, and gave the command of the armed force of Paris and of the Army of the Inte- rior to Barras, a leading politician of th(3 day, who had acquired a sort of military reputation by hav- ing held several times the post of Representative in Mission. Barras knew the Army of Italy and the services which Buonaparte had rendered at Tou- lon, and nominated him second in command. 3 34 * Vend4miaire.' [a.d. 1795. It does not seem that Buonaparte showed any remarkable firmness of character or originality of genius in meeting the revolt of the sections on the next day (Vendemiaire 13 — i.e. October 5) with grape-shot. The disgrace of Menou was a warning that the Convention required decisive action, and the invidiousness of the act fell upon Barras, not upon Bonaparte. Indeed in the official report drawn by Bonaparte himself his own name scarcely appears ; instead of assuming courageously the responsibility of the deed, he took great pains to shirk it. He appeared in the matter merely as the instrument, as the skilful artillerist, by whom Barras and the Convention carried their resolute policy into effect. ]Moreover, though his arrange- ments were able, there seems no truth in the story of his despatching Murat at two o'clock in the morning to bring up artillery from Sablons. It will be observed that on this occasion he defends ^.he cause of Jacobinism. This does not require to be explained, as at a later time he took much pains to explain it, by the consideration that, odious as Jacobinism was, on the particular occa- sion it was identified with ' the great truths of our Eevolution.' The truth is that in his first years he appears uniformly as a Jacobin. He was at the moment an official in the Jacobin Government, ^TAT. 26.] Napoleon's Marriage. 35 and speaks in his letters of tlie party of the sec- tions just as a Government official might be ex- pected to do. In this affair he produced an impression of real military capacity among tlie leading men of France, and placed Barras himself under a personal obliga- tion. He was rewarded by being appointed in suc- cession to Barras, who now resigned, commander of the Army of the Interior. In this position, political and military at the same time, he preluded to the part reserved for him later of First Consul and Emperor. He also strengthened his new position materially by his marriage with Joseph- ine de Beauharuais nee Tascher. His first choice had been the friend of his family, Mme. Permon, wdio, however, rejected him. The legend tells of a youth calling upon him to claim the sword of his father, guillotined in the Terror, of jSTapoleon treat- ing the youth kindly, of his mother paying a visit of thanks, of an attachment following. But even if he was really attached to Josephine, we must - .,:^ not think of the match as one of mere unworldly -^y^ affection. It was scarcely less splendid for the -^ young General Bonaparte than his second match ^ was for tlie Emperor Napoleon. Josephine was prominent in Parisian society, and for the lonely Corsican, so completely without connections in 36 The Act of Marriage. [a.d. i796. Paris or even in France, such an alliance ^vas of priceless value. She had not much either of char- acter or intellect, but real sweetness of disposition. Her personal charm was not so much that of beauty as of grace, social tact, and taste in dress. The act of marriage is dated Ventose 19, Year IV. {i.e. March 9, 1796), and is remarkable because it declares Napoleon to have been born in 1768 instead of 1769, and Josephine in 1767 instead of 1763. On this day he had already been appointed to the command of the Army of Italy. His great European career now begins. ^TAT. 27.] European Crisis. 37 \/ CHAPTER II. GENERAL BONAPARTE. ~~~^ § 1 . Italian Campaign. The fifth year of the Eevolutionary War was opening. It was already evident that this war would change the face of Europe, and almost cer- tain that it would create a new French ascendency. The Coalition, which in 1793 seemed to have France at its mercy, had been paralyzed by the reopening of the Polish question in its rear. Prus- sian troops were recalled from the Ehine to oppose Kosciuszko, and, at the same time, the mutual jealousy of Prussia and Austria, which had dom- inated German politics for half a century, was sud- denly rekindled. France reaped the benefit of this diversion. In the campaign of 1794 she expelled the Austrians from Belgium, in the following win- ter she overran Holland, expelled the Stadtholder, established the autliority of the so-called Patriots, and thus wrested this state from the Coalition. No similar blows had been struck by France since 38 Second Phase of the Coalition, [a.d. i796. the age of Louis XIV., ami, what was still more portentous, the Coalition, instead of rallying its forces, began at this moment rapidly to dissolve. Thus the system of ]<^urope was already broken up. A new age had begun in which France stood forth as a conquering Power, her territory already enlarged, her military spirit exalted, her army in- creased and disciplined, beyond all former experi- ence. J')onai)arte did not introduce, but found already introduced, the principle of conquest. Prussia, with most of the North German princes, had retired from the war in April, 1795 ; Sjjain followed the example in July. The Coalition as- sumes its second shape, which it was to keep almost till the pacilication of 1801 ; it is now a Triple Alliance of Eussia, Austria and England; and liussia as yet is an inactive, not to say a perfid- ious, member of it. Practically Prance has to deal on the Continent only with Austria, who in the campaign of 1795 shielded Germany against the invasion of Jourdan and Pichegru. The French are already conquerors, but in this campaign they meet with ill-fortune. At the moment when Ven- d(5miaire revealed Bonaparte to the world, Clerfait and Wurmser were striking blows which forced the French armies to recross the Rhine and for the moment saved Germany. But only Bonaparte ^TAT. 27.] Second Phase of the Coalition. 39 lias quite firmly grasped the truth that there is no real enemy but Austria, for, though all can see that Prussia Las deserted her on the IHiine, it seems that Sardinia still stands by her in the Alps. Bonaparte is sure that Sardinia will suHiuin Aus- tria as little as Prussia had done, and has as little interest to continue the war, now that she has lost Savoy and Nice, and sees France stronger than ever. Can Sardinia but be pushed aside, Austria may be attacked in Lomljardy, where she is an alien power. Bonaparte has long pictured himself rousing the Italian population against her, driving her across tlie Alps, and co-operating with the Army of the Rhine l)y an attack in Hank. Since Vendemiaire he had discussed this plan with Car- not, wlio was now one of the five Directors, and it was perhaps Carnot — at least so we are told in the Reponse a Bailleul — who procured Bonaparte's appointment to the Italian command. At the moment the French armies everywhere were paralyzed by financial need ; it seemed likely that in 179G France would achieve nothing for want of means. For this difficulty also Bonaparte had a resource. From the outset the French hail levied contributions in the territories they invaded. By frankly adopting this system, by making war support war, Bonaparte would turn poverty itself 40 Bonaparte's Idea. [a.d. i796. into a spur and a warlike motive. He announced to the army without the least disguise : ' Soldiers, — You are naked and ill fed ; I will lead you into the most fruitful plains in the world. Eich prov- inces, great cities will be in your power. There you will find honor, and fame, and wealth.' The French soldier thus received at the same time a touch of the wolf, which made him irresistible, and a touch of the mercenary, which made him in the end useful to Bonaparte. This order of the day was issued from Nice on March 27. The campaign began early in April. This, the first of Bonaparte's campaigns, has been compared to his last. As in 1815 he tried to sep- arate Blticher and Wellington, hoping to overcome them in turn, so now with more success he attacked first the Austrians under Beaulieu and then the Sardinians under Colli. Defeating the Austrians at Montenotte, Millesimo, and Dego, he turned on the 15th against Colli, defeated him at Ceva and again at Mondovi. Almost in a moment the calculation of Bonaparte was justified. Sardinia, which might have made a long and obstinate de- fence behind the fortifications of Turin, Alexandria and Tortona, retired at once from an alliance of which she was weary. She signed the convention of Cherasco on the 28th, yielding her principal iETAT 27.] The Idea Realized. 41 fortresses into the hands of France. What Bona- parte had so long dreamed of he accomplished in a single month, and turned himself at once to the conquest of Lombardy. The mouth of May was devoted to the invasion. On the 7th lie crossed the Po at Piacenza, stormed the bridge over the Adda at Lodi on the 10th, and, as the Archduke who governed Lombardy had quitted Milan on the 9th, retiring by Bergamo into Germany, Bonaparte entered Milan on the 15th. That day Bonaparte told Marmont that his success hitherto was nothing to what was re- served for him. ' In our days,' he added, ' no one has conceived anything great ; it falls to me to give the example.' June was spent in consolida- ting the conquest of Lombardy, in spoiling the country, and repressing the insurrections which broke out among the Italians, astonished to find themselves plundered by their ' liberators.' Prom the middle of July the war, as far as Austria is concerned, becomes a war for Muutua. Austria makes desperate and repeated efforts to raise the siege of this all-important fortress. In June she withdraws from the Pthine one of her armies and a general who had won renown in the preceding campaign, Wurmser. He arrives at Innspriick on June 26th; here in Tyrol he assembles 50,000 men. A 2 Occupation of Lomhardy. [a.d. i 796, At the ciul of -luly lie ikIvuiici'.s on both sides of Iho Liikc^ ol' (larda, uiid lliri'iit(nis l>()ii;i|):irti''s ('omiuu- niiMiUoiis by uccupying lU'csc-ia. Doiniparli! abiiu- dciu'd llio sioi;(i of Muul.ua, and broui^ht his w liolo i'orcc to uu'cL the cucuiy. 'I'ho ])()sila()U l\)r a uio- UH'iil, st'cnicd d(^s|)(•l•al(,^ llo I'allcd councils of war, and ilcclarcd in liivor of U'tn'atin;^' across the Adda. When AuLjcreau resisted this deterniinii- tion, he h'll the room (h'clariii,^' that lie would have iiothiiij^ to do with the mat tcr, and, when Au^creau iisked who was to givu orders, answered '\'ou!' The iles])(!i'alo course was rewarded with success. 'I'lie Austrians were dd'ealctl at ( 'ast ijdioiie on Au- gust ;!, uiid retii'ed into 'ryrol. IWit Muntua had bt'iai revictuall(Hl, and llonaparte had sul'lertMl the loss of Ids sie|;e-train. Ivuly in Se|>leinber jionapartc, lia\in;4 received reinforcements from i'Vauce, assumed the i)ffensive against Wurnist'r, and after defeating him at I>as- sano forced him to throw Inm.sell" with the remain- der of his army into I\lantaui (September If)). At (he end of October Austria had assembled a new army of nD.ODO men, mostly, however, raw rei-ruits. They were placed under the eonnnand of Allvint/,y. [Bonaparte was to be overwlu'lnu'd between tliLs army and that of Wurniser issuing from Mantua. lUit by a night nuireh lie fell upon iBTAT. 27.] War for Mantua. 43 Allvintzy's rear at Arcole. The surprise failed, and Bonaparte's life was at one moment in great dan- ger. But after three days of obstinate conflict the Austrians retreated (Novei^ber 15-17). From Ar- cole he used ever afterwards to date his profoimd confidence in liis own fortune. Mantua, however, still held out, and early in January (1797) a fourth and last attempt was made by Allvintzy to relieve it, but he was again completely defeated at Eivoli (Jan. 14), and a whole Austrian corps d'arm^e under Provera laid down its arms at Roverbella (Jan. 16). On receiving the intelligence of this disaster Wurmser concluded the capitulation by which the French were put in possession of Man- (tua Feb. 2). § 2. Acts as Independent Conqueror. — Levying of Con- tributions. — His Italian Policy. — Advance on Austria. — Preliminaries of Leohen. — Occupation of Venice. — Coup d^jStat of Fructidor. — Treaty of Campo Formio. Such was the campaign of Bonaparte against Austria, by which he raised his reputation at once above that of all the other generals of the republic, Jourdan, Moreau, or Iloche. But he had acted by no means merely as a general of the republic against Austria. He had assumed 44 Characteristics of Italian Campaign, [a.d. i796. from the beginniug the part of an independent conqueror, neither bound by the orders of his Gov- ernment nor by any rules of international law or morality. The commander of a A'ictorious army wields a force which only a Government long and firmly established can hold in check. A new Govern- ment, such as the Directory in France, having no root in the country, is powerless before a young victor such as Bonaparte. In vain the Directory devised a plan by whicli the Army of Italy should be divided between Bonaparte and Kellermann, while the whole diplomacy of the campaign should be intrusted to Salicetti as Commissioner. Bona- parte defeated these manceuvres as easily as those of Beaulieu and Colli. In truth the coujp d'etat of Brumaire was in his mind before he had been many weeks at the head of an army. But long before he ventured to strike the existing Government, we see that he has completely emancipated himself from it, and that his acts are those of an indepen- dent ruler, as had been those of Ca?sar in Gaul or of Pompey in the East, while the Eoraan republic was still nominally standing. As early as June, 1796, he said to Miot, ' The commissioners of the Directory have no concern with my policy; I do what I please.' ^TAT. 27.] Spoliation. 45 From the outset it had been contemplated to make the invasion of Italy financially profitable. Contributions were levied so rapaciously that in the duchy of Milan, where the French had pro- fessed to appear as brotliers and liberators, a rebellion against them speedily broke out, which Bonaparte suppressed with the merciless cruelty he always showed in such cases. He kept the promise of his first proclamation ; he made the army rich. ' From this moment,' writes Mar- mont, ' the chief part of the pay and salaries was paid in coin. This led to a great change in the situation of the officers, and to a certain extent in their manners. The Army of Italy was at that time the only one which had escaped from the unprecedented misery which all the armies had so long endured.' The amount of confiscation seems to have been enormous. Besides direct contributions levied in the conquered territory, the domains of dispossessed Governments, the revenues and property of churches and hospitals, were at Bonaparte's disposal. There seems reason to think that but a small proportion of this plunder was ever accounted for. It went to the army chest, over which Bonaparte retained the control, and the pains that he took to corrupt his officers is attested in the narrative of Marmont, 46 Bonaparte's Personal Policy, [a.d. irar.. who relates that Bonaparte once caused a largo sum to pass through his hands, and when he took great pains to render a full account of it, as the officers had then unejlciir dc delicaicsse, Bonaparte blamed him for not liaving kept it for himself. As he made himself iiuancially independent of the Government, so he Logan to develop an inde- pendent policy. Hitherto he has had no politics, but has been content to talk the Jacobinism of the ruling party ; now he takes a line, and it is not quite that of the Government. He had already, in June, 170G, invaded the Papal terri- tory, and concluded a convention at Bologna by which lie extorted lirieen millions from the Pope; immediately after the fall of Mantua he entered the States of the Church again, and concluded the treaty of Tolentino on February 10. We see how freely he combines dijilomacy Avith war ; he writes without disguise to the Directory, October 5 : ' You incur the greatest risk whenever your general in Italy is not the centre of everything.' But now in dealing with the Pope he separates his policy from that of the Directory. He de- mands indeed the cession of liologna, Ferrara, and the Eomagna, besides Avignon and the A"e- naissin, and the temporary cession of Ancona. l>ut he recognizes tlie Pope by treating with him, a:tat. 27.] Treatment of Neutrals. 47 and towards the Catholic religion and tho ]iriost- hond lie shows hiin.sclf unexpectedly inovcirul. lieli'non is not to be altered in the ceded Letja- tions, and Bonaparte extends his protection in the most ostentatious manner to the prelrcs inscr- ment^s, whom he found in large numbers in the States of the Church. This was the more marked as they were at this time objects of the bitterest persecution in France, Here is the first indication of the policy of the Concordat, but it is also a mark of I'onapavte'a independent position, the position ratlier of a prince than of a responsible official ; nay, it marks a deliberate intention to set himself up as a rival of tlio Government. His manner of conducting the war was as un- precedented as his relation to tlie Government, and in like manner foreshadowed the Napoleonic period. It was not that of a civilized belligerent, but of a universal conqueror. The Eevolution had put all international law into abeyance. By proclaiming a sort of crusade against monarchy it had furnished itself with a pretext for attacking almost all States alike, for almost all were eitlier monarchical or at least aristocratic. Bonaparte in Italy, as in his later wars, knows nothing of neu- trality. Thus Tuscany, the first of all states to conclude a treaty witli the French republic, is not 4S Developmcul of (Vi(tr((cU'r. |a.i>. irur. tlicr(>l)y saved from invasion. Bonaparte's troo]is inarcli in, sei/.e Le!j,lmni, wnd take i^ossession of all the Mn;j,lish ])roperty found in tli;it jiort. INIore renuiv];a1il(! still \h tlie treatment of Vi-niee. Tiio territory of the repnblie is turned uncennnoniousl}'' into a Held of battle between J''raiiet> and Austria, and at. tiie (Mid of tlu> ^\■ar the A'enetian republic is bhitted ont of the map. •'"urther is to bo riMnarked tlu^ enrious devidop- niciit w hich was t;iv(>n to tlie prineiple of plunder. 'rh(! rinaiiii;d distress of Franco and the inipover- ishnient of tlit> army at the o]H'ning of the cam- paign udi;ht aeeount for mnch simple spoliation, r.nt tlu' praetie(> was now inlrotlueed of transh'r- riiit;- ])ietiires and statues from the Italian ]\alaecs and galleries to France. This sinjj,ular revival of ]irimitivo barbaric nunlos of making war becomes na)ri' striking Avhen mc retlect that the sj)oiler of Italy was himself an It^alian. AltogetluM' these eamjKiigns brought to light a ]ierson;dily entirely without precedent in modern JMuuipean history. True, the lu'volution b(dniid him and the circumstances around him wi're abso- lidtdy unpreciHlentinl. ]\Iarmont remarked at the linu> tlu> rajtid and ('ontinual develo])ment which jnsl then showed itself in JVnia])arte's cliaractor. M*]verv day,' he wi'ites, 'he seemed to see before ^-TAT. 27.] Ilis Opinion of /he French. 49 liiiii II, new liori/oii.' An uiiiliifjoiis iiiiiii li:i,i| Sii(lil('iily h(ic()iii(i ;i.\v;in\ lli;il, u ciirtu'r ciilircly nii- ]);ir;ilK'l('(l wan open Lo liiiii, if only he (■oiild liml niularily und unsc'.i'ni)iil()nM energy l-o (Mitc^r ujton it. AiM In lliis I, hat- lie. had lived lur llire(i years in the mills!, of disordci'.s iiiid horrors siieh a,s ini^diL \V(!ll havo di,s,sij)aied all j)rinei|)l(!M, hidiiifn, nnd veslraints. Kvvm as (-arly as the l.'5Lh V(!n- demiairu \\'(! lind him imiircssed wilh a, lalalisl/ Lclicr in lii.s own luck (' 1 roc,(aved no liiiil. ; I a,m always Inek}',' he writes), and tliure are iiidientions that his wondcirfnl eseajx; at Arcole ji,reatly liei^ht- oneil Ihis l)eli('l" in a, mind niitnrally sonuiwliat superstitions. At this moinenl, as Honapartti's private ])olitieal views hoffin to apjxiar, his .lacohinism, even his i'e]iulilicanism, slips IVom him like a rolu;. As curly as May, 17i)7, Ik; said to I\Iiot and Mel/i, 'Do you HU])posu that I. trinmph in Italy lor the glory of the lawyers ol" tli(! Directory, a ('ariiot or a iJarras !^ l)o you suppose I mean l-o fniind a. re|)ublie ? What an idea! a repidilie of thirty millions of peoph; ! with our mnialM, our vices! how is Hueli a thin;,' possil)l(^ '! The nation wants a chief, a chief eovei'ed with ^loi'y, not theories of govcrnm(!nt, phrases, ideological essays, that the French dfj not understand. They want, some play- 4 50 Trcaiy of Tolcntino. [\.p. 1707. things ; tluit will bo cuougb ; they will play with them ami lot thouiselvos bo led, always supposing thoy are olovorly prcvonted from seeing the goal towards which they are moving.' His contempt for the French, such as they had become imder the inlluence of Versailles ami the salons of I'aris, and his opinion of their unfitness for republican in- stitutions, \vas sincere ; it was the opinion of a Corsican accustomed to more primitive, more mas- culine ways of life ; we meet with it in his earliest leiters, written before the thought of becoming himself the ruler of France had occurred to him. When the fall of IMantua had established the French power in North Italy, Bonaparte's next tliought was to strike at the heart of Austria from this new basis. Early in March, having secured his position in Italy by the treaty of Tolcntino witli Eomc and by a treaty with Sardinia, he set his troojis in motion. He sent Joubert with 18,000 men into Tyrol, while he prepared to march in person upon Vienna from Friuli through Carinthia and Styria. But Austria had still one resource. The year 1796, which had given Bona- parte to the French republic, had given her too a great general. The Archduke Charles, who had succeeded Clerfait in Germany, and who had been left by the departure of Wurmser for Italy utterly ^TAT. 27] Preliminaries of Lcoben. 51 unable to resist the French wJien tliey advanced in June under Jourdan and Moreau, acliioved in the autiiniii a masterpiece of strategy. About tlie same time that Bonaparte won the battle of 13as- sano, ho won that of Wiir/.burg, and by the end of October he had forced both French armies to re- cross tlie Iihinc. lie is now despatched to meet the other invasion, threatening Anstria from tlie south. But instead of being allowed lo take up a strong position ill tlic I'yrol ;iiid to iiwail rcinrorcAUiionlM, lie was instructed to atlvance to Friuli, tliough with iusuflicient and demoralized troops. lUma- parte dislodged him from the line of thoTagliamento, ihi'ii iVom ili;it of tliu Isoii/,o, und advaiiccul stead- ily until ho reached Leoben in Styria on April 13. ]>ut he too felt his position to be hazardous, espe- cially as he was not seconded by any forward move- ment of the Khine armies. Hence he had himself, as early as Miinsh 31, proposed negotiation to tlie Arcliduke. At Leoben an arniisticc of six days was concluded. The preliminaries of Leoben were now signed (April 18). This was the first step in a long and slippery negotiation, which led only to a renewal of the war at the end of 1708. The preliuiiiiaries afterwards suffered much modification in the treaty 52 Concessin)is to Austria. f.\.n. 1707. of Canipo l\)rniio. whioli was itsolT soon swopt ftway. Tlic jn-i/o of the Avar was Boluiuni, and lliis was now ihhUhI by Austria. In return wo might expect to lind the Italian conquests of ]>onaparto restored. Instead of tliis a Cisalpine rcinihlic is estahlishcd, nominally independent, Init nwUy, like the l>ntavian re]nihlie, under French tutelage. Nevertheless Inmaparte, as he said him- self, was in no position to dictate a peace. Accord- ingly he grants to Austria, as an indennn'ty. the (\)ntinen(al possessions o[' the \'enetian ri^jmblic as far as (he Oglio, with Istria and Palmatia. Here is a lu^w ]>artition of Toland ! The \\Mietian rciuiblic Mas a nculral state, hut its neutrality had been utterly disregarded by Inuiajnirte during the Mar, and as its territory had been freely trani]^led on by his troops, irritation had necessarily arisen anumg the Venetians, thence i[uarrels Mith the French, thence on the side o[' the French an attack on the aristocratic government and the setting \ip of a democracy. 0[' all this the residt was now found to be that the A'euctian empire was a con- quered territory, which in her next treaty V^'ancc could cede in exchange fiu" any desired advantage. So far the ]neliuuuaries did not afiect the Ger- manic empire, but ouW the liereditary possessions of Austria, Vmt they ilcalt also with the empire, a:tat. 27. 1 War with Venice. 53 find lievo tlioy wcro recklessly and, as it jirovcd, r;il;illy iuuhigiious. On tliu oni; side, i^'rancc cdn- cedcd tiie integrity of the empire, on the other side the Emperor agreed to recognize the limils of France as decreed by tlic laws of the re[)ublic. Perhaps neither party (piite knew, but perhaps both parties suspected, that these concessions were inconsistent with each otlier. After so many defeats this arrangomiMit, lawless as it was, must have seemed to Austria un('\])ect- edly satisfactory. Slio had been studying lor tliirty years how to exchange Uelgiuni for a pro- vince more conveniently situated. 15avaria had been her first object, but the Km[)eror Josopli li;i,d also cast his eyes on Venice. She had now lost Belgium by the fortune of war, but at the last moment the very equivalent she coveted was cast iniii her laj). The summer of 1707 was passed by Bonaparte at Montebello, near Milan. Here he rehearsed in Italy the part of emperor, formed his court, and accustomed himself to all the functions of govern- ment, lie was chielly engaged at this tune in accomplishing the dissolution of the Venetian re- pul)lic. I[(; had begun early in the spring by provoking insurrections in P>rescia and Bergamo. IuA[)ril the insolence of a I'rench odicc^r provoked 54 Revolution at Venice. [a.d. i797. a rising against tlie French at Sal 6, lor which Junot, sent by Bonaparte, demanded satisfaction of the senate on the 15th. The French now at- tempted to disarm all the Venetian garrisons that remained on the terra firma, and this led to a ris- ing at Verona, in which some hundreds of French- men were massacred (April 17). On the 19th a French sea-captain, violating the customs of the port at the Lido, was fired upon from a Venetian fort. Bonaparte now declared that he would be a new Attila to Venice, and issued a manifesto in the true revolutionary style. The feeble Govern- ment could only submit. A revolution took place at Venice, and French troops took possession of the town. On May 16 a treaty was concluded by Bonaparte ' establishing peace and friendship be- tween the French republic and the republic of A^enice,' and providing that ' the French occupa- tion should cease as soon as the new Government should declare that it no longer needed foreign assistance.' ' A iDrincipal object of this treaty,' as Bonaparte candidly explained to tlie Directory, 'was to obtain possession without hindrance of the city, the arsenal, and everything.' At the time that he was thus establishing friendship, he was, as we know, ceding the territory of Venice to Austria. iETAT. 28] Treaty of Campo Formio. 55 When we read the letters written by him at this period, we see tliat already, only a year after he assumed for the first time the command of an army, he has fully concei\'ed the utmost of what he afterwards realized. Had he been shown in vis- ion at this time what lie was to be at his zenith in 1812, when he was the astonishment and terror of the world, he would probably have said that it fell short of his expectations. In the preliminaries of Leoben such essential matters had been left unsettled or dependent on doubtful contingencies, that they were tacitly abandoned by both parties. The fall of Venice in May suggested a different arrangement. Austria might now have the town as well as the terra fir ma, and in return for this might make new con- cessions. As she ceased now to look to England, which was entering on a separate negotiation, she consented to accept a new basis. The second negotiation began at the end of August, and pro- duced the Treaty of Campo Formio in the middle of October. In return for Venice, Bonaparte is resolved to have the Ehinc frontier towards Germany, and that of the Adige instead of the Oglio in Italy. But at an early stage of the conferences occurred the Revolution of Fructidor, which had the effect 56 Revolution of Fructidor. [a.d. 1797. of reviving iu the French Government the war- frenzy of the time of the Convention. The negotia- tion with England was broken off, and imperious orders were sent to Bonaparte to exact the ut- most from Austria without ceding Venice. Much of the month of September is occupied with a struggle between the General and his Government. This ends, as might be expected, in the submission of the Directory, who are brought to see how much they need Bonaparte and how little he needs them. On September 27 begins a new diplomatic duel, that between Bonaparte and the eminent Austrian diplomatist, Cobenzl. Bonaparte is now residing at Passariano, in a villa belonging to Doge Manin, and the conferences take place at Udine, in the neigliboi'hood. Cobenzl contends for the integrity of the Empire, but his government is secretly pre- pared to barter this for a sufficient indemnity to the Austrian House in Italy. His instructions rather than Bonaparte's imperious manner caused him to yield at last, and yet the famous stor}^ of the breaking of the porcelain vase is perhaps not entirely groundless. At least the despatches of Cobenzl abound in complaints of his outrageous behavior and gasconades. At one time he 'kept on drinking glass after glass of brandy,' at another 2ETAT. 28.] Campo Formio. 57 he was 'evidently drunk/ at another he confided to Cobenzl tliat ' lie felt himself the equal of any king in the world.' In the end he overcame both his own Govern- ment and that of Austria, and the treaty which was signed on October 17, and takes its name from tlie little village of Campo Formic (more correctly Campo Formido) close to Udine, practically sealed the doom of the Holy Eoman Empire. It gave Venice, Istria, Dalmatia, and all Venetian territory beyond the Adige to Austria, founded the Cisalpine republic, and reserved for France, besides Belgium, Corfu and the Ionian Islands. A congress was to open at Eastatt, and Austria bound herself by a secret article to do her best to procure for France from the Germanic body the left bank of the Rhine. By retaining the Ionian Islands Bonaparte gave the first intimation of his design of opening the Eastern question. §3. The Revolution of Fructidor. ■/.- ■ -' /'' Meanwhile a new French Eevolution had taken place. A new reign of Jacobinical fanaticism had begun, which was to last till Bonaparte, who had done nmch to introduce it, should bring it to an end. This had happened in the following manner. The difficulty which Bonaparte had dissipated 58 The Five Hundred. [a.d. i:o:. by his cannon in A'ondeniiaive had quickly returned, as it could not tail to do. A Jacobinical regicide republic had to support itself in the midst of a nation which was by no means Jacobinical, and which had rejnvsentative assemblies. These assem- blies, renewed by a third for the second time in tlie spring of 17l'7. placed Pichegru. suspected of royalism, in the chair of the Five Hundred, and Europe began to ask whether the restoration of the luiurbons was about to follow, llonaparte at ]\Iontebello thought he perceived that the Austrian negotiators were bent upon delay. The rising party Avas not perhaps mainly royalist ; its most conspicuous representative. Carnot. the Director, was himself a regicide. In the main it aimed only at respectable government and peace, but a minority were open to some suspicion of royalism. This susjncion was fatal to tliC whole party, since royalism had at this time been thor- oughly discredited by the follies of the ('iniijn's. An outcry is mised by the soldiers. "We can meas- ure the steady progress which had been made by the military junver since Vendeniiaire ; it had then been a tool in tlie hands of the Governnumt. now it gives the law and makes the Government its tool. The armies oi' the IJhine. represented by Hoche. oppose the new movement ; as to Bonaparte, .KTAT. 28.] Increase of Military Power. 59 lio was driven into Uui same coui'.so l)y si'U'-dc- Ibnco. l)uiHulartl. a. tl('])ulv, had calU'd alliMilioii 1.(1 Ids monstrous Lrcatmciil. ot" llio Vcncliau repub- lic, and liad anticipated the judgment of history by oomjiarinij; it to tho partition of Poland. Bona- ]>arle had already divnli^eil to a li'iend the seiTt't that ho despised republicanism, but this attack nrado him onco more, at least in profession, a re- publican and a .lacobin. It is, however, ])robable that he would in any case ha.vi5 siiUul ^\•illl the majority of the Directory, sinci; anything which favoreil the r)ourbons was a hindranc(^ to his am- bit iiui. iVnd thus the armies of lh(> r(>]>ublie stood united against tho tendency of pul)lic oi)inioii at homo. Imperialiam stood op^iosed to parliamen- tary govornment, believing ilstdf — such was tho bewilderment of the lime — to be more in favor of tho sovereignty of the people than lh(> ])eoi)le itself, and not aware that it was jiaving the way for a military despot. Tho catastrophe came on 18tli l<'i'uctidor (Sep- tember 4, 1707), when Augercau, one of ]U)na.parte's generals of division, Avho had been sent by Hona- ])arto to Paris, surrounded the Corps liCgislatif with 12,000 UHiTi and arrested the most obnoxious reju'esentativGS, while another force marched to the Luxembourg, arrested the Director Barthelemi, and 00 The ISth Fnictidor. \x.v. kd:. woiilil have arrested (\\rnot had he not i"eceived AvaniinL:; in time to make liis escape. This stroke was tolUnved by an outrageous proscription of tlie new jxuty, of whiuu a large number, consisting ]>artly of nieiuhers of tlie Councils, partly of journalists, were transi>orted to die at Oayeinie, and the elections were annulled in forty-eight departments. Such was Fructidor. which may ho considered as the third o[' the revolutii>ns which compose the complex event usually known as the French l\ev- ohition. In ITSi^ the ahsi>lute monarchy had given place to a constitutional monarchy, which was deti- nitively established in 17;M. In 1 7 O'J the consti- tutional monarchy fell, u'iving i^lace to a republic which \\as detinitively established in 17i^">. Since 171^5 it had been held that revolution was over, and that France was living under a constitution. But in Fructidor this constitution also fell, and government became revolutionary onee more. It was evident that a third constitution must be es- tablished ; it was evident also that this constitution must set np a military form of government — that is, an imperialism; but two more yeai's passed be- fore this was done. The benefit of the change was reaped in the end by Inmaparte. Naturally he favored it and took a:tat. 2S.1 Result of Fructidor. Gl a great shave in contriving it. But it seems an ex- aggeration to roprosciit him as the exclusive or even the principal author of Fructidor. Hocho took tlic same side as Bonaparte ; Augereau outran hiui (and yet Angereau at this time was by no moans a more echo ot" Bonaparte) ; the division of the Army of Ualy conunanded by Berna(U)tte, which liad been recently detached from the Ariuy of Sambre-et-Meuse, and stood somewhat aloof from Bonaparte's influence, sided with him in this instance. The truth is that the rising party of ]\Ioderates gave offence to the whole military world by making peace their watcliwonl. Outside the armies too there was profound alarm in the whole republican party, so that the circle of JMadamo de Staiil was strongly Fructidorlan, and this certainly was not guided by tlu; influence of Bonaparte, though Madame de Staiil was then among his warmest admirers. When the blow had been struck, Bonaparte knew how to reap the utnuvst advantage from it, and to exliil)it it in its true light as mortal at the same time to the Moderates and to the republican CTOvernmont itself, which now ceased to be legal and became once more revolu- tionary, and as favorable only to the military ])o\vcr and to the rising imperialism. He congratulated tlie armies on tlie fall of the enemies of the soldier 62 Death of llochc. [a.h. iror. ami ospoeially of the Army of lUily/ but accorded only the faintest approval to the Directory. The death of Hoclie, occurring soon after, re- iiio\'ed from Bonaparte's path his only rival in the aiVections of the already omnipotent soldiery. JliK'ho alone among the generals beside Inniaparte had shown political talents ; had he lived longer, he might have plaj'cd with success the part in ■which ]\Ioreau afterwards failed. -§ 1. lictunis to Paris. — Kiji/ptian Expedition. — In- vasion- of Si/ria. — Jutnrn to France. Ixinaparte now left Italy, setting out from IMilan on Xovemlun- 17, made a living visit to liastatt, where the congress had already assem- bled, and reached Paris on December 5. "What next wiudd be attempted by the man who at twenty-seven had conquered Italy and brought — momentarily at least — to an end the most memo- rable Continental war of modern times ? From a s]>eech deliMMwl by him on the occasion of his reception by the Directory (Dec. 10) it appears that he had two thoughts in his mind — to make a revolution in France (' when the happiness of the French people shall be based on the best [or on better] organic la^^s, all Europe will become free ') and to emancipate C recce i^' the two most JET AT. 28.] Plans for the Future. 63 boautiful jKvrts of Europe, once so illustrious for arts, scieuces, uud the great men of whom they were the cradle, see with the loftiest hopes the genius of liberty issue from the tombs of their ancestors '). Ho had now some months in which to arrange the execution of these plans. The Directory, seeing no safety but in giving him employment, now committed the war with Eng- land to his charge. He becomes ' g6n(^ral-en-chef de I'armi^e d'Angleterre.' His study of internal politics soon landed him in perplexit}''. Should he become a Director, procuring an exemption from the rule wliit'h rciiuired the Directors to be more than forty years of ago ? He could decide on nothing, but felt himself unprepared to mingle in French party strife. He decided therefore that ' the pear was not ripe,' and turned again to the military schemes, which might raise his renown still higher during the year or two which the Directory would require to ruin itselll It seemed possible to combine war against England with the Oriental plan, which had been suggested to him, it is said, by Monge at Passariano. During the last war between Ivussia and Turkey some publi- cists (including Volney, an acquaintance of Bona- parte's) had recommended France to abandon her ancient alliance with the Turk and seek rather to 04 France and Egypt. [a.p. 1798. t^liavo Nvith Iviissia in his sp.>ils. Thus was sug- gostod to InMiaparto tho thought of sei/.iug Greece, and tlio dissolution of the A'enotiau Empire seemed to bring ii within tlie range o{ pmetieal polities. Now, as head o{ the Army oi Knghmd. lie ilxed his eyes on Egypt also. In India the game was not yet quite lost for Franee. hut England had now seized the Tape of Cuxul Hope. To save therefore what remained of her establishments in Imlia. Franee must oeeupy F.gypt. She must not only eotuiuer hut eoloni.:e it (^* if forty or fifty thousatid F.urojiean fannlies tixed their iuilustries, their laws, and their administration in Egypt, India would be presently lost to the English luueh more even by the foree of events than by that K^i anus 'V Sueh was the seheme. aeeording to whieh Turkey was to be partitioned in the eourse of a war with England, as Veniee had dis- aj^peared in the eourse oi a war with Austria. To this seheme it might be objeeted that it eould seareely fail to kindle a new European war nunv uni\-ersal than that whieh had just been brought to a elose. Pnit it was alivady evident thai the treaty of CamjKi Formio woidvl lead to no real paeitieatiou. For the tide of militarism in Franee eould not be arrested for a moment ; seareely a mouth psissed but was marked by some ^:rAT. US.] A(jw Continiuital war was already so great that he writes, for th(! benelit o^ Oeneral llrune, a phin for deri'nding Italy against an attack by a superior lurce of Austrians. Jhit if so, was it not iuadn(>ss in the Directory to banish llonaparte ait)ng with ;U),000 men and GeniMals Murat, rHMtiiier, Desaix, Ivk'ber, Lannes, anil Marmont on the eve of a new struggle with Europe ? To ns this criticism is irresistil)ly sug- gcsteil l»y the event. We can siu; that the Knglish licet barred Ihi^ n^turu of th(! expccUlion, and that ]ionaparte liimself only made his way b;ick by mi- raculous good fortune. Hut had the French (lov- ernment been able to fin'csce this, tliey would have 5 66 Failure in Egnpt. [a.d. 1:93. perceived that the undertaking was not merely rash at that particular niomeut, but essentially imprac- ticable. For the English fleet did not merely detain the expedition, but frustrated all its pro- ceedings, reconquered Egypt and Malta, and forced Bonaparte to retire from Syria. It appears that the energetic interference of England was not at all anticipated. From Bonaparte's letters ^v^itteu on board ' L'Orient ' it would seem that he scarcely realized the terrible risk he ran ; it is to be con- sidered that the superiority of the English marine had not yet been clearly proved, and that the name of Nelson was not yet redoubtable. But also it appears likely that the Avhole enterprise was based upon the assumption that England had retired from the Meditermnean. She had given up Corsica, and had been compelled by the alliance of the three maritime Powers, France, Spain, and Hol- land, to employ her whole naval force in blockad- ing the western harbors from Cadiz to the Texel. Meanwhile France had advanced as England had retired. She controlled Corfu, Ancona, Ceuoa, Corsica. So much she had acquired without op- position from England, and she proceeded now with confidence to complete her empire over the Mediterranean by establishing stations at Malta and Alexandria. Bonaparte certainly did not ^.TAT. 28.] Arrival at Malta. 67 mean to go into bauishnient ; tlic vast plans M'liicli lie paraded were not to be executed by himself in person, but only by the Egyptian col- ony which he was to found, for not only did he promise to return in October, but he actually di- rected his brother Joseph to prepare for him a country-house in Burgundy against the autumn. He set sail on May 19, having stimulated the zeal of his army, which he called ' one of the wings of the Army of England,' by promising that each soldier shoulil return ricli enougli to buy six ' ar- peuts ' of land (the Directory were obliged to deny the genuineness of the proclamation), and, eluding Nelson, who had been driven by a storm to the island of St. Pietro near Sardinia, arrived on June 9 before Malta, where a squadron from Civita Vec- chia and another from Ajaccio had preceded him. This island was in the possession of the Knights of St. Jolm of Jerusalem, who acknowledged tlie King of Naples as their feudal superior and tlie Czar as their protector. To attack them was the direct way to involve France in war both with Naples and Russia. Bonaparte, demanding ad- mission into the harl)or for liis ileet, and receiv- ing answer that the treaties which guaranteed the neutrality of ]\Ialta permitted only the admission of four ships, attacked at once, as indeed he had 68 Tlie Egyptian Campaign. [a.d. 1799. been expressly cominauded by the Directory to do. The people rose against the knights ; the grand master, Hompesch, opened negotiations, and on the 12th Bonaparte entered La Valctte. He is enthusiastic about the strength and importance of the position thus won. ' It is the strongest place in Europe ; those who would dislodge us must pay dear.' He spent some days in organizing a new Government for the island, and set sail again on the 19th. On July 2 he issues his hrst order in Alexandria. During the passage we find him prosecuting his earlier scheme of the emancipation of Greece. Thus from ]\Ialta he sends Lavalette with a let- ter to Ali Pasha of Jauina. His plan therefore seems to embrace Greece and Egypt at once, and thus to take for granted the connnand of the sea, almost as if no English fleet existed. The miscal- culation was soon made manifest. Bonaparte him- self, after occupying Alexandria, set out again on the 8th and marched on Cairo; he defeated the Mamelukes first at Chebreiss and then at Eniba- beh, within sight of the Pyramids, where the enemy lost 2,000 and the French about 20 or 30 killed and 120 wounded. He is in Cairo on the 24th, where for the most part he remains till February of 1799, But a week after his ar- ^TAT.30.] Invasion of Syria. 69 rival ill Cairo the lloet which had brought hini from France, with its admiral, Brueys, was de- stroyed by Nelson in Aboukir Bay. For the first time, in reporting this event to the Directory, it seems to flash on Bonaparte's mind that the English arc masters of the sea. The grand design is ruined by this single stroke. France is left at war with almost all Europe, and with Turkey also (for Bonaparte's hope of deceiving the Sultan by representing himself as asserting his cause against the Mamelukes was frustrated), and her best gen- erals with a fine army are imprisoned in another continent. It might still be possible to produce an im- pression on Turkey in Asia, if not on Turkey in Europe. The Turks were preparing an army in Syria, and in February, 1799, Bonaparte antici- pated their attack by invading Syria with about 12,000 men. He took El Arish on the 20th, then Gaza, and arrived before Jaffa on March 3. It was taken by assault, and a massacre commenced which, unfortunately for Bonaparte's reputation, was stopped by some oflticers. The consequence was that upwards of 2,000 prisoners were taken. Bonaparte, unwilling either to spare food for thena or to let them go, ordered the adjutant-general to take them to the sea-shore and there shoot them, 70 St. Jean d'Acre. [a.p. i799. taking precautions to prevent any from escaping. This was done. ' Now,' writes Bonaparte, ' there remains St. Jean d'Acre.' This fortress was the seat of the pasha, Jezzar. It is on the sea-shore, and accordingly England could intervene. Admiral Sir Sidney Smitli, commanding a squadron on the coast, opened lire on the French as they approached the shore, and was surprised to find his fire an- swered only by musketry. In a moment he di- vined that the siege artillery Mas to conre from Alexandria by sea, and very speedily he discovered and captured the ships that carried it. On March 19 Bonaparte is before Acre, but the place receives supplies from the sea, and support from the Eng- lish ships, while his artillery is lost. He is de- tained there for two whole months, and retires at last without success. This check, he said, changed tlio destiny of the world, for he calculated that the fall of Jezzar would have been followed by the adhesion of all the subject tribes, Druses and Christians, which would have given him an arm}' ready for tlie conquest of Asia. The failure had been partially redeemed by a victory won in April over an army which had marched from the interior to the relief of Acre under Abdallah Pasha, and which Bonaparte de- feated on the plain of Esdraelon (the battle is a;tat. 30.] Mount Tabor and Aboukir. 71 usually named from Mount Tabor). lu the iniddle of May the retreat began, a counterpart on a small scale of tlie retreat from Moscow, heat and pesti- lence taking the place of frost and the Cossacks. On the 24th he is again at Jaffa, from which he writes his report to tlic Directory, explaining tliat he had deliberately abstained from entering Acre because of the plague wliich, as he heard, was ravaging the city. On June 14 his letters are again dated from Cairo. His second stay in Egypt lasts two months, which were spent partly in hunt- ing the dctlironed chief of the Mamelukes, Murad Bey, partly in meeting a new Turkish army, which arrived in July in the Bay of Aboukir. He in- flicted on it an anniliilating defeat near its landing- place ; according to his own account nearly nine thousand persons were drowned. Tliis victory masked the final failure of the expedition. It was a failure such as would have given a serious blow to the reputation even of Bonaparte in a state enjoying publicity, where the responsibility could have been brought home to him and the facts could have been discussed. For a year of warfare, for the loss of the fleet, of 6,000 soldiers, and of several distinguished officers (Brueys, Caffarelli, Cretin), for disastrous defeats suffered in Europe, which might have been 72 Total Failure of the Expedition, [a.d. 1799. averted by Bonaparte and his army, fur the loss for an indefinite time of the army itself, which could only return to France by permission of the English, there was nothing to show. No progress was made in conciliating the people. Bonaparte had arrived with an intention of appealing to the religious instinct of the Semitic races. He had imagined apparently that the rebellion of France against the Catholic Church might be represented to the Moslems as an adhesion to their faith. He had declared himself a Mussulman commissioned by the Most High to humble the Cross. At the same time he had hoped to conciliate the Sultan ; it had been arranged that Talleyrand should go to Constantinople for the purpose. But Talleyrand remained at Paris, the Sultan was not conciliated, the people were not deluded by Bonaparte's relig- ious appeals. Eebellion after rebellion had broken out, and had been repressed with savage cruelty. It was time for him to extricate himself from so miserable a business. It appears from the correspondence that he had promised to be back in France as early as October, 1798, a fact which shows how completely all his calculations had been disappointed. Sir Sidney Smith now contrived that he should receive a packet of journals, by which he was informed of ^TAT. 30.] Bonaparte Returns to Europe. 73 all that had passed recently in Europe and of the disasters which France had suffered. His resolu- tion was immediately taken. On August 22 he wrote to Kleber announcing that he transferred to him the command of the expedition, and that he^ himself would return to Europe, taking with him Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andreossi, Marmont, Monge, and Berthollet, and leaving orders that Ju- not should follow in October and Desaix in Novem- ber. After carefully spreading false accounts of his intentions, he set sail with two frigates in the night of the 22d. His voyage occupied more than six weeks, during which he revisited Corsica. On Oc- tober 9 he arrived in the harbor of Frejus. After his return the disastrous results of the ex- pedition continued to develop themselves. Egypt was reconquered l)y the English, and Malta passed into their hands. Thus a plan which had aimed at excluding England from the Mediterranean ended in establishing her power there and in excluding France. We shall see how far Napo- leon was ultimately led in the wild struggle to retrieve this failure. § 5. Revolution of Brumaire. From this moment the tide of his fortune began to flow again. His reappearance seemed 74 Failure of the Rcpuhlic. [a.d. 1799. providential, and Avas hailed with delight throngh- out France, where the Eepublicau Government was in the last stage of dissolution. Since Fructidor French policy had been systematically Avarlike. A great law of military service had been intro- duced by General Jourdan, which was the basis of the Napoleonic armies ; a series of violent aggressions in Switzerland and Central Italy had brought on a new European war. But this policy was evidently inconsistent w'ith the republican form of government established in 1795. A Directory of civilians were not qualified to con- duct a policy so systematically warlike. Hence the war of 1799 had been palpably mismanaged. The armies and the generals were tliere, but the presiding strategist and statesman was wanting. In Italy conquest had been pushed too far. Half the troops were locked up in fortresses, or occupied in suppressing rebellions ; hence Macdonald at the Trebbia and Joubert at Novi were defeated by Suwaroff, Mantua fell, and the work of Bonaparte in Italy was wellnigh undone. Government was shaken by these disasters. A kind of revolution took place in June. Four new members entered the Directory, of whom three — Gohier, Iioger- Ducos, and General Moulins — represented on the whole the revival of the Jacobinism of 1793, while ^TAT. 30] A New Revolution. 75 the fourth, Sicyes, the most important politician of this crisis, represented the desire for some new- constitutional experiment. The remedy which first suiTO'ested itself was to return to the warlike fury and terrorism of 1793. The Jacobin Club was revived, and held its sittings in the Salle du Manege. Many leading generals, especially Jourdan and Bernadotte, favored it. But 1793 w-as not to be revived. Its passions had gone to sleep, and the memory of it was a nightmare. Nevertheless a sort of Terror began. The hard- ship of recruitment caused rebellions, particularly in the West. Chouannerie and royalism revived, and the odious Law of Hostages was passed to check them. After seven years of misery France in the autumn of 1799 was perhaps more miser- able than ever. If 1793 could not be revived, what alternative ? Siey^s perceived that what was needed was a supreme general to direct the war. But, though he had ceased to believe in popular institutions, and had become a convert to a new kind of aris- tocracy, he did not wish his supreme general to control civil affairs. He looked for an officer who should be intelligent without being too ambitious. His choice fell upon Joubert, who was accordingly nominated commander of the Army of Italy, that 76 A Supreme General Wanted, [a.d. 1799. he might acquire the necessary renown. But Joiibert was killed at Xovi iu August. From this time Sieyes had remained uncertain. Advances were made in vain to Moreau. Who can say what might have happened in a few months ? Some general of abilities not very commanding would have risen to a position in which he would have controlled the fate of France. Perhaps Massena, whose reputation at this moment reached its highest point through the victories of Zurich, but who was not njade either for an emperor or for a statesman, might have come forward to play the part of Monk. Upon this perplexing gloom the reappearance of Bonaparte came like a tropical sunrise, too daz- zling for Sieyes himself, who wanted a general, but a general he could control. On October 16 he arrived at his old Parisian house in tlie Eue de la Victoire, and on November 9 and 10 (Bru- maire 18, 19) the revolution took place. Bona- parte had some difficulty at first in understanding the position. He found a Jacobin party clamor- ing for strong measures and for a vigorous prosecu- tion of the war ; at the head of this party he saw military men, particularly Jourdan and Bernadotte. As an old Kobespierrist, a Fructidorian, and a sol- dier, he was at first attracted to this faction. Sieyes, ^TAT. 30.] Bonaparte as an Anti-Jacobin. 77 the object of their most bitter attacks, he was at first disposed to regard as his principal enemy. Gradually he came to perceive that tliis time he was to rise not as a Jacobin but as the soldier of anti-Jacobinism, aud that he must place his sword at the service of Sieyes. For his part Sieyes could not but perceive that Bonaparte was not precisely the war-minister ho sought. But by the efforts of Lucien and Joseph Bonaparte, of Eoederer, and Talleyrand, a coalition was at last effected between them, though Sieyes continued to predict that after the success Bonaparte would throw him over. The movement which now took place was the most respectable, the most hopeful, as for a long time it seemed the most successful, effort that had been made since 1792 to lift France out of the slough. Instead of reviving Jacobinism the pro- posal was to organize a strong and skilled Govern- ment. A grand party of respectability rallied round Sieyes to put down Jacobinism. Ducos among the Directors (he had been converted), the majority of the Council of Ancients, Moreau and Macdonald, the generals of purest reputation, Bon- aparte and the generals personally attached to him, composed this party. On the other side the Jacobinical party consisted of the Directors Goliier and Moulins, the majority of the Council of Five 78 A Proposal of Reform. U.d. 1799. Hundred, Generals Jourdan and Beruadotte. Which party would be followed by the rank and file of the army, was an anxious question. It was determined to take advantage of a provi- sion of the constitution which had been originally inserted by the Girondists as a safeguard against aggressions from the municipality of Paris, and to cause the Council of Ancients to decree a meeting of the Councils outside Paris at the palace of St. Cloud. At this meeting it was intended to pro- pose a reform of the constitution. The proposal would be supported by a majority in the Council of Ancients, and by mauy, but probably not a majority, in the Council of Five Hundred. It was foreseen that the Jacobins might give trouble, and might need to be eliminated, as they had them- selves eliminated the Girondists. With a view to this, when the decree was passed on November 9, General Bonaparte, made commander of all the troops in Paris, was intrusted with the execution of it. It is carefully to be observed that he does not, like Cromwell, act of his own free will against the assembly, but is appointed by the assembly to act in its name. No one thought of destroying the republic ; the question was of introducing the famous perfect constitution of Sieyes. Bonaparte appeared, surrounded by the generals of his party. jETXT. 30.] Meeting of the Councils. 79 in the Council of Ancients, where he skilfully evaded taking the oath to the constitution. He then reviewed the troops, and it became apparent that he could count on them. From this moment Brumaire may be said to have been decided. The next step was that Sieyes and Ducos resigned their places on the Directory ; Barras was induced to follow their example ; but Gohier and Moulins were firm. Gohier was placed under ward of Moreau at the Luxembourg, while Moulins made his escape. It now only remained to deal with the Council of Five Hundred, the stronghold of Jacobinism. The revolution was consummated on the next day at St. Cloud. Bonaparte and Sieyes sat in a private room while the Councils began their delib- erations ; but being informed that it was proposed to renew the oath to the existing constitution, Bonaparte determined to interfere. There seems to have been mismanagement here. Sieyes, not Bonaparte, should have interfered, but probably he was rendered helpless, as often happened to him, by timidity. Bonaparte then entered the Council of Ancients, where he delivered a confused harangue, wliich did him little good, though the assembly was well disposed to him. His position was a false one, though he urged very justly that 80 Intervention of Lucien. [a.d. 1799. the existing constitution had been practically destro^^ed by the illegalities of Fructidor, Floreal, and Prairial. He then passed to the hostile Coun- cil of Five Hundred, where he was received with cries of ' Hors la loi ! ' 'A bas le dictateur ! ' He was seized by the collar, and attempts were made to pusli him out of the hall. He was now almost in despair, and no wonder ! I>y the backwardness of Sieyfes he had been pushed into the part of Cromwell. But Cromwell had soldiers devoted to liim, and of theocratic rather than republican ideas; the soldiers of l)onapnrte had only just been put under his command, and they were fanatical republicans. The false step must be retrieved. The soldiers must be per- suaded that Bonaparte was no Cromwell, but a stanch republican, and that they were not called upon to act against an assembly, but only against a traitorous minority, as at Fructidor. Lucien Bonaparte, who was president of the Five Hun- dred, perf(.)rmed this miracle. Bonaparte had sent grenadiers to rescue him. Lucien was at tlie tri- bune, where he was defending his brother amidst noisy interruption. At the appearance of the grenadiers lie threw off his official dress and re- tired under their escort. In the hall he mounted on liorseback and addressed the troops who were ^TAT. .30.] Provisional Consuls. 81 employed to guard tlie legislature, declaring that the council was oppressed by assassins, brigands paid by England; he charged the soldiers to deliver the majority from this oppression by clear- ing the hall. He brandished a sword and swore to stab his brother if ever he attacked the liber- ties of Frenchmen. On the clear understanding that no violence against the assembly was in- tended, and with the express sanction of its presi- dent, the soldiers then cleared the hall. In the evening at 9 o'clock Lucien reassembled a certain number of tlie members and proposed to them to nominate a committee which should report on the state of affliirs. This committee was at once named, and speedily presented a report to the effect that Sieyes, Eogcr-Ducos, and Bonaparte should compose a provisional executive under the title of consuls, that the legislature should adjourn till February 20 (1 Ventose), a committee of twenty-five members from each Council being left to deliberate along with tlie consuls upon the changes to be made in the constitution; at the same time, as in Fructidor, a certain number of members (fifty-five) were to be expelled from the Councils. Tlius the original plan was on the whole carried into effect. But it had been sadly marred by 6 82 Provisional Consuls. [a.d. 1799. the unseemly appearance of Bonaparte and by his gasconades, in which he bade the Council remem- ber that he ' marched under the escort of the god of fortune and the god of war.' An attempt was made to conceal these mistakes by publishing in the Moniteur a garbled report of his speech. ^TAT. 30.] Scheme of Sleyhs. 83 CHAPTER III. THE FIRST CONSUL. § 1. Bonaparte becomes Fijst Consul. Brumaire taken by itself is the victory of Siey^s rather than of Bonaparte. It raised Sieyes to the position he had so long coveted of legislator for France. The constitution now introduced was really in great part his work, but his work so sig- nally altered in one point that it resulted in the absolute supremacy of Bonaparte. We should es- pecially notice that it is Sieyes, not Bonaparte, who practically suppresses representative institutions. The long-expected scheme of Sieyes was at last promulgated, and we see with astonishment that the man of 1789, the author of 'Qu'est-ce que le Tiers-Etat?' himself condemns political liberty. In this scheme the assemblies, of which there are three, the Senate, the Tribunate, and the Corps Legislatif, are not chosen by popular election at all. The two latter are nominated by the Senate, and the Senate is chosen at the outset in part by 84 Slci/h Dcsfrni/s Libert ij. [ad. 1799. the provisional consuls and in part by co-optation. The Tribunate alone has the ri«;lit of public debate, which is separated from the right of voting. This latter is assigned to the Corps L(^gislatif. These arrangements, Avhich caused the nullity of parlia- mentary institutions in the Napoleonic period, were devisetl not by Bonaparte but by Sieycs, who confined popular election to certain lists of notabil- ity, out of which the assemblies were required to be chosen. By this sclieme Sieyes, who retained all his liatred for the old regime and the old no- hlcssc, passed sentence upon the M'hole constructive work of the Eevolutiun ; this sentence was but rat- ified by Bonaparte. But, while he absolutely condemned democracy, Sieyes did not want to set up despotism. The Senate was to be supreme ; it was to be a kind of hereditary aristocracy, the depositary of the tradi- tion of the Bevolution ; above it, and capable of being deposed by it, was to be a doge called Grand Elector, whose main function would consist in choosing two consuls, of whom one was to take the home and the other the foreign department. Here again Inniaparte acquiesced as far as he could. He adopted the consuls and the triple executive, even lowering apparently the Grand Elector of Sieyes by giving him the more republican title of First ^TAT. 30.] Bonaparte creates a Monarchy. 85 Consul. But he displayed signally the adroitness, rapid and audacious, which was always the char- acteristic of his diplomacy. He declaimed vio- lently against the feebleness of the Grand Elector and tlie Consuls in this scheme, feigning to over- look that it concentrated power intentionally in the Senate; then, instead of sending back the scheme for revision, he simply strengthened im- mensely the attributions of the First Consul, leav- ing the other consuls and the assemblies as weak as before. By this stroke a strong aristocracy was turned into a strong monarchy ; at the same time advantage was taken of the very peculiar character of Sieyes, who always when he met with opposition sank into an impenetrable silence. Bonaparte boasted afterwards that he had sealed his victory over Sieyes by a handsome bribe at the expense of the public. Perhaps, however, in his controversy with Sieyes Bonaparte had public opinion on his side. Not only were the arrangements he attacked really absurd, but he might just at that moment plead for a strong government without being instantly found guilty of ambition. The conviction of the time was that a strong and stable executive was needed, and that this must not be many-headed ; moreover the discovery had recently been made in 86 Bonaparte First Consul. [a.d. 1799. America that a Eepublic must have a President, and also that such a President might be without ambition. The^ provisional consulate of Sieyes, Ducos, and Bonaparte lasted only from November 10 to Decem- ber 13. Then through the promulgation of the new constitution it made way for the definitive consulate of Bonaparte, Cambaceres, and Lebrun, which lasted four years. By the constitution of 22 Frimaire, year VIII. (which was never debated in any assembly, but, after being devised by the two legislative committees meeting at the Luxembourg under the presidency of Bonaparte, and in the pres- ence of the other consuls, and after being redacted by Daunou, was introduced by a popular vote), Bonaparte became First Consul for ten years with a salary of half a million francs, with a sole power of nominating the council of state, the ministers, ambassadors, officers of army and fleet, and most of the judges and local officials, and with a power, in nominal conjunction with the other consuls, of initiating all legislation and deciding war and peace. Sieyes and Ducos retired, and under the new constitution the second and third consuls were Cambaceres, an eminent legist, and Lebrun, an old official of Louis XV.'s time. The party of Bru- maire had intended to set up a republic, but this ,T.TAT. 30] Religious Tolerance. 87 coustitutiou creaied_a^roug_monarchjjinder the thinnest disguise. For the moment it was much that France re- nounced Jacobinism and ceased to tear herself to jiieces. The civil war of the West and the foreign war were alike energetically taken in hand. A proclamation to the inhabitants of the West (December 28) breathed for the first time the spirit of tolerance, of respect for religion, and con- sideration for the clergy. It was a precursor of the Concordat, and attacked the civil war at its root. It was accompanied by the most imperious threats against the refractory, who are to be treated ' like the Arabs of the desert,' who are warned that they have to do with a man ' accustomed to riGjorous and energetic measures ' — an allusion apparently to the massacres of Jaffa and Cairo. This policy, accompanied by decisive military action, was speed- ily successful. By the end of February all was quiet in the West ; Frottd, the most active leader in ISTormandy, had surrendered at discretion, and had been shot, tliougli Bonaparte had expressly an- nounced that if he surrendered he might count on the generosity of the Government. In preaching a religious peace at home Bonaparte was sincere ; he was less so in announcing a policy of peace in Europe, for he well knew that he needed a victory 88 Overtures of Peace. [a.d. 1799. to cover his apostasy. Nevertheless the announce- ment was necessary as part of the national renun- ciation of Jacobinism ; and it was harmless, for the Coalition was scarcely likely to accept peace when they had the military advantage. Indeed they could not consistently do so, since they had gone to war on the ground that peace with the Direc- tory had appeared in 1798 to be less endurable than war, and the accession of Bonaparte could not but seem to them likely to make matters worse. In thinking thus they were substantially right, as the sequel proved, but they did not sufficiently understand that Bonaparte was not now the ' cham- pion of Jacobinism,' as Pitt called him, but had become its enemy and destroyer. When England \ and Austria refused his overtures, Bonaparte had the satisfaction of getting precisely what he wanted — viz. war — in precisely the way he wished, that is, as apparently forced upon him. § 2. His Jealousy of Moreau. — Campaign of Marengo. — Treaty of Lxmeville. — The Concordat. — T'reaty of Amiens. The campaign of 1800 is peculiar in the circum- stance that throughout its course Bonaparte has a military rival with whom he is afraid to break, and who keeps pace with him in achievements — ^TAT. 30.] Plan of the Campaign. 89 Moreau. To Moreau the success of Brumaire bad been mainly due, and be bad perhaps thought that the new constitution, as it did not seem to con- template the First Consul commanding an army, had removed Bonaparte from the path of bis am- bitioiL He now held the command of the principal army, that of the Rhine, in which post Bonaparte could not venture to supersede him. The problem for Bonaparte throughout the war was to prevent ^loreau, and in a less degree IMassena, who was now in command of the Army of Italy, from eclips- ing his own military reputation. Eussia bad now retired from the Coalition, so that, as in 1796, Austria and England were the only belligerents. Italy bad been almost entirely lost, and Massena, at the head of the Army of Italy, opposed to Gen- eral ]\Ielas, was almost where Bonaparte had been before his Italian campaign began. But France had retained the control of Switzerland, and Moreau, with more than 100,000 men arranged along the Ehine from the Lake of Constance to Alsace, stood opposed to ,Kray, whose bead-quarters were at Donaueschingen. It seemed that the campaign would be conducted by Moreau and Massena re- ceiving instructions from Bonaparte at Paris. That the decisive campaign would have been in Bavaria, seems so evident that the militarv writer Biilow 90 Army of Reserve. [a.d. isoo. conjectures that the French were afraid of alarm- ing Europe by a too decisive victory, which would have brought them at once to the walls of Vienna, and that they therefore transferred the campaign to Italy. But Bonaparte would have sunk into a President had Moreau won Hohenlinden in the spring of 1800, M'hile he remained ingloriously at Paris. While therefore in writing to Moreau he carefully adopts the language of one who, much to his own regret, has become a mere civilian, he plans the campaign so that both ]\Ioreau and Mas- s^na are confined to the task of holding the enemy in play, while an army of reserve descends from one of the Alpine passes into Italy. This army of reserve, wliich was so carefully concealed that few people believed in its existence, is to be com- manded, he writes, by some general ' to be named by the consuls ; ' a little later Berthier is nominated. As late as the end of ]\Iarch he told Miot that he did not mean to leave Paris. Moreau is also to detach 25,000 men under Lecourbe, who are to join Berthier in Italy; in this way security was taken that Moreau sliould not be too successful. On April 24 the campaign in Germany began by the passage of the Rhine at a number of jDoints at once. Up to May 10 Moreau is the hero of the war. He is victorious at Engen, at Mosskirchen, ^TAT. 30.] Passage of the Aljis. 91 and forces Kray to retire to Ulra. By those suc- cesses Switzerland is kept clear for the operations of Bonaparte. On May 9 Bonaparte is at Geneva, and it appears at once that he is commander, and Berthier only his chief of the staff. At the same time Carnot in person is sent with nnusual for- mality to demand from Moreau the detachment of troops. The campaign of Marengo was astonishingly short. On jMay 11 Bonaparte left Geneva, and he is in Paris again early in July. Since the beginning of A^jril Masseua had been struggling vainly against the superior forces of Melas. Since the 21st he had been shut up in Genoa, where Austria and England could co-operate in the siege. In Italy the affairs of France looked darker than ever, when Bonaparte threw himself on the rear of Melas by passing the Great St. Bernard between May 15 and 20. Other divisions passed the Little St. Bernard and the Mont Cenis, while the de- tachment from Moreau's array (under Moncey, not Lecourbe) descended the St. Gotthard. It seems that the Austrians had absolutely refused to believe, what nevertheless was openly discussed in the Paris journals, that Bonnparte intended to cross the Alps. Bonaparte had another surprise in store for them. Though Genoa was now 02 ]\I it, but tunii'd to the left, eiitt'red IMiiaii on .liiiu' 2, and took ])o.ssessioii of tlieMhdle lino ol' tlie Ticiiio and ilw. Vo. Meanwhile Genoa capitulaLeil to (ieneral Olt. Mela.s was now at Alessandria, \vheri> I'onaparte son^t^lit him on the liUli. On the 1 !lh i\h'las marched out, erossi'd tlit> r.oi'mida, anil arri\eil at Marengo. He found the .l''reneh \vi(U>ly dispersed, and I'airly defeated them. He had himself retired from the Held, and his solditMs M'ere iilundcrin'.;- llie dead, whiai the arrival df Desai.x'.s divisiiui i:;ave lionaparto a anie similar to that whieh had been witnivsseil at Kivoli. A i^vaxl Austrian vietovy was turiunl into u deeisive Aus- trian tlefeat.. Pionapavte was raised from the brink . of absiilule ii;noniiiii(iiis ruin to the very ]nunaclo of ij;lory. On the next day ]\lidas (havin*^', as it seems ipiite lost his head) signed a convention by which .Vustria saerilieed ahuost all North Italy, restoring- something' like the |)osition o[' Oami)0 l'\)rmio. 'Ihul he fi>u;4ht another battle,' says ^larmont, ' he would certainly have beaten us.' {'.ouajiarte returns to Paris, victorious at once ovm- Austria and over j\Ioreau and Massi^nti. He did *TAT. 31.] licsulls of Marcnyo. 93 not, liovvever, succeed in tearing from Moreau the honor of concluding the war. Marengo did not lead to peace ; this was won, where naturally it could only hu won, in Tiavaria l)y JVloreau'.s victory of llohenlinden (December 3), a victory perhaps greater than any of which at that time Bonaparte could boast. This, eampaigiL. j3 tjie. .culmination and close of what may be called the J5onaparte period, the period of war on a comparatively small scale and . ^ of victories won with small means. It exagger-^^^,.,. *' ates all the characteristics of TJonapartc's method — s tartling originality, cunning, and audacity. Genius is prodigally displayed, and yet an im- mense margin is left for fortune. Marengo may be called his crowning victory. The position given him by the new constitution had hitherto been most precarious. Sieyc^'s and the republicans were on the watch for him on the one side; Mo- reau seemed on the point of eclipsing him on the other. His family felt tluiir critical position: ' had he fallen at Marengo,' writes Lucien, ' we should have been all proscribed.' Perhaps nothing but a stroke so rapid and startling as tluit of Marengo could have saved him from these dilliculties. But this did more, and developed the empire out of the consulate. 94 Treaty of LunMlle. [a.d. isoi. His appeal for peace after Brumaire had not been purely insincere, though he wanted victory before peace. He proposes to Rouget de 1' Isle to write ' a battle hymn which shall express the idea that with great nations peace comes after victory.' After Marengo he devotes himself to giving peace to the world ; he did this by three great acts, so that in 1802 for the first time for ten years under the new Augustus ' no war or battle sound was heard the world around.' These three acts are the treaty of Lun^ville, February, 1801, the Concordat, July, 1801, the treaty of Amiens, March, 1802. It is worth noticing that the negotiator of all of them is his brother Joseph, as if he especially de- sired to connect his family name with the pacifi- \ cation of the world. 1. The treaty of Lun^ville gave peace to the Continent. Austria is now disarmed, not merely by defeat, but still more by the defection of llussia to the side of France. It is to be observed that here Bonaparte shows himself at least less rapa- cious than the Directory. He surrenders most of the usurpations of 1798, the Eoman and Parthe- nopean republics, and returns in tlie main to the arrangements of Campo Formio — a proof of mod- eration which must have led the cabinets to con- sider whether after all it might not be possible to ^TAT. 32.] The Concordat. 95 find a modus vivcndi with the Government of Bru- niaire. 2. By the Concordat he professed to close the religious war. In reality he crushed the national Galilean Church, which had been created by the Constitution Civile, and wliich had perhaps begun to take root, and restored the Papal Church, shorn of its endowments and dependent, so long as he lived, on the state. As part of the great pacifica- tion, the Concordat was perliaps mainly a stroke of stage effect, though its influence upon the later history of France has been great. For Bonaparte himself it was important as severing the clerical party from the Bourbons and attaching it to him- self, as giving him through the clergy an influence over the peasantry, upon whom he depended for his armies, also as in some degree welding together through the ubiquitous influence of the clergy the different states which were already subject to his government. In negotiating it with Cardinal Con- salvi, Bonaparte had recourse more tlian once to the_^Yulgar frauds and knavery which earned for \^im_the_title_of^ Jupiter-Scapiji. 3. It remained to make peace with England, but here the condition of peace, victory, was still want- ing. For a moment, however, it seemed within reach, for the Czar had gone over to France, and 96 Treaty of Amiens. (a.d. isoi. had become bitterly liostile to Euglaiul. This opened quite a new prospect. It enabled Bona- parte to revive against England tlie Armed Neu- trality of 1780. Not onl}^ Jiussia but Prussia was thus brouglit for the first time, along with Sweden and Denmark, into the French alliance, and the system of Tilsit was sketched out. But this phase lasted only till April. The bombardment of Copenhagen by Nelson dissolved the combina- tion, and the murder of Paul, followed by a recon- ciliation between Eussia and England, compelled Bonaparte to lower his pretensions. In the sum- mer his endeavors are confined to saving the French colony in Egypt from the English, and to snatching a little territory from England's ally Portugal by means of Spain. But Cairo capitulated to the English in June, in which month also Spain made peace Avith Portugal. Bonaparte was at last com- pelled to admit in this instance the idea of a peace Mdiich should not come after victory. Accordingly, in October, the preliminaries of London were signed, and the treaty of Amiens followed in March. The allies of France paid for her naval defeats, Spain losing Trinidad and Holland Cey- lon ; but France, though she lost nothing, acqui- esced by this treaty in the total failure of all her designs upon the East. ^TAT. 32.] Universal Peace. § 3. Reconstrnclion of French Institutions. — Gradual Progress towards Monarchy. — Plot of Nivose. The gjobe was now at peace, and thanked Bona- parte for it. The eq^uilibrium which had been destroyed by the Eevolution seemed at length to be restored. Meanwhile the legislative reconstruc- tion of France proceeded rapidly. This is the glorious period of Bonaparte's life, not, as has often been alleged, because he was as yet uncor- rupted by power, but simply because a strong intelligent Government was the great need of France and repose the great need of Europe, and Bonaparte at this time satisfied both needs. Tlie work of reconstruction which distinguishes the consulate, though it was continued under the em- pire, is the most enduring of all the achievements of Napoleon. The institutions of modern France date, not, as is often said, from tlie Eevolution, but from the Consulate. Not tliat Napoleon per- sonally was endowed with a supreme legislative genius; his principal merit was to have given to France the first secure Government, the first Gov- ernment capable of effective legislation, that she had had since the destruction of her ancient insti- tutions. ' The task of reconstruction fell to him of necessity ; his personal interference was in many 7 {' DS Xapoh'oiiic lih'idliitioiis. [\.v. isoi. ivsjHH'ts. !us wo shall soo, inisrhii'vous vatliov tliaii luMU'lirial ; it is, lii>\vi'vtM-, als*) [vnc that lu> apjMi*- riatoil (ho ^Toatnoss o[' tho work. ur;:i\l il on with vigtu', ouliMTvl into it. imprrssiHl il with tlio stauij) o\' his own ]HM-svMiality. ami lot't 11^011 it tlu> tnioos of his Uoon sngaoit y. Tho iiistitutiiMis iu>w ovoatovl. and whirh ionu tho ovgaiii.-ation of nioilovn IVaiuo. avo — (^O (ho I'ostoivd Churoh. ivstiiiLj mi [he Co\wo\\h\[ ; {'2) tho rnivoiNity, vos(in;,' on (ho law of 11 Moroal. An X. yMay I, 1v'>0L"i; i^,"^"! (ho juitioial svstoui. roni- niotuoil by thi^ law o[' "JT ^'ontoso, An \II1. (Maivh IS. ISiH^\ ami omnj^loloil by othor laws in Iv^lO ; ^^Otho C\h1os : — {^,1) (.\hIo Civil ^ooni- inissiou noniinatod LM rhonniilor. An \lll, August lL\ ISOl); i( ivooivod (ho nanio (.\h1o NaiH>loon on Soi>(onilvr o. 1S07\ \^l>) Codo do ConunoiYO i^in-onuil!4;v(od on SoptiMulvv \0. lSl^7\ {c) Code IVnal, t^d^ Code il" Inst motion rriniinoUo ^^oanio into t'oivo January 1. ISl H ; i^o^i tho systoni of looal ^ovornnuMU. vosting iUi tho law vif IS riuvioso. An \lll. (^Kobvuary 7. ISOO^; ^^t^^ tho r>ank of I'ranoo. os(ablishod "JS Nivoso. An \ 111. I^.lanuavy IS. ISiH^^ ; (^7'> tho l.ogion of Honor, ostablishod '29 Kloroal. An X. (^May \\\ 1S02). Thoso insti(u(ions. alon^:: wi(h tho military systom, havo in (ho main oon(inuod (o (lio prosoiU day af(or jE.TAT.:i2.\ liesults of lieconHlruclion. 09 the downfiill of fill lh<; Napoleonic iiiHUtuliorifj wliicli were purely political. It \h rather the fortune th.ui the merit of Napoleon that no uim- iiar ni.i).') of ](;giHlation can he uscribeiJ to any other Hovereij^n, Hinco no other Kfjvereign has ruled Hecurely over an ancient and f;ivilized country which has l^een Hudderjly d<;|)rivcd of all its innti- tution.s. \ It '\H aJHO a matter of couine that much of tliis IcgiHlatimi lias been beneficial, HJnco a tuhula ram relieves the lej,'i.slator of many liin- dranccB. In .several points, on the othf;r hand, we can see that J'Vance was Hacrific(;d to Najjoleon'a personal interest. Thus the Concordat restored the ancient I'apal Church, shorn of its wealth, and receiviii;.^ from the state a suixiidy of !d>ont £2,000,000. It was ri;^ht to restore reli;,don, and the Constitution Civile, which was cancelled by the Concordat, had becm an insane act, tlie prin- cipal caiise f>f tJie nn'.serjes of France \<)r ten years. Neverthel<;ss a grf;at opj^ortunity was lost of tryin;^ some new experiment, whirdi mi^ht have led to a genuine revival of reli;,'ion ; Ijut for tijis Napoleon cared nothing so long hs he could pose as a new Constantine, detach the Church from tlie cause of the liourfxms, and havf; the Pope at his beck. In like manner the freedom of local gov- ernment wa.s sacrificed to tlie exigencies of iiis 100 The University of France. [a.h. 1802. despotism. Among the most remarkable of his institutions was the University. The twenty-one universities of old France, including the great mother university of Paris, had fallen in the Eevolution along witli the Church ; nothing of the least efficiency had been established in their place, so that in March, 1800, Lucien Bonaparte could write, ' Since the suppression of the teach- ing corporations instruction has almost ceased to exist in France.' By laws of May, 180G, and March, 1808, was founded the modern University — that is, the whole teaching profession formed into a corporation and endowed by the state, a kind of church of education. This remarkable institution still exists. It has far too much centralization, and is in no way equal to the old system when that is intelligently worked, as in Germany ; many learned men have severely condemned it ; still it was an im[)ortant constructive effort, and gave Napoleon the occasion for some striking and original remarks. From the time of the battle of Marengo the system of Brumaire began to take a development Avhich perhaps had not been clearly foreseen. Sieyes had wished to confine Bonaparte to the War Department, Morcau perhaps had wished to keep him at Paris; in either case it had not been in- tended to create an august monarchy. But the /ETAT. 3:^.] Revival of Monarchy. 101 fabulous success of Marengo, joined to the proofs Bonaparte gave of a really superior intelligence and commanding character, turned the French mind back into that monarchical groove in vv^hich it had so long run before the Revolution. Popular liberty had been already renounced by Sieyes, and the disastrous failure of republican institutions, which in four years, from 1795 to 1799, had brought the country to bankruptcy, civil war, and almost barbarism, inclined all public men to agree with him. The choice then could only lie between some form of aristocracy and the revival of mon- archy either in the Bourbon family or in another. Napoleon's personal character decided this ques- tion. By the Concordat he wrested from the Bour» bons the support of the Church ; by his military glory he seduced the noblesse, as is seen in the case of Segur ; by the pacification of the world he half reconciled to liimself the foreign cabinets. But no sooner did this new form of monarchy begin to appear than Bonaparte found himself surrounded by new dangers. He was exposed to the hatred of the republicans, who had hitherto been appeased by the title of consul, and were now thrown into coalition with the defeated Jacobins, and also to the despair of the royalists, who saw themselves disappointed of restoration at the moment of the 102 Claims of the ^ Family .' [a.d. 1803. failure of republicanism. Nearer his person at the same time court parties began to spring up. His brothers and sisters with Corsican shamelessness began to claim their share in the spoils. While he doubted what form his monarchy should take, and whether some character greater and more unique than that of a hereditary king could not be invented, they urged the claims of the family. Thus arose a standing feud between the Bonapartes and the Beauharnais, who in the interest of Joseph- ine, already dreading divorce for her childlessness, opposed the principle of heredity. In grappling with the defeated parties Bonaparte found a great advantage in his position. The con- stitution of Brumaire itself gave him great powers ; popular institutions had been destroyed, not by him, but by the nation itself, which was weary of them ; under the Directory the public had grown accustomed to the suppression of journals and to periodic coups d itat of the most savage violence. Bonaparte therefore could establish a rigorous des- potism under the forms of a consular republic, mutilate the assemblies, and silence public opinion, he could venture occasionally upon acts of the most sweeping tyranny, without shocking a peo- ple which had so lately seen Fructidor, not to say the Reign of Terror, and had been accustomed to iETAT. .33.| Jacobinism Eradicated. 103 call them liberty. The conspiracies began imme- diately after the return from Marengo, when the Corsicans Arena and Ceracchi, guilty apparently of little more than wild talk, were arrested in Oc- tober, 1800, at the Thiiutre Franqais. But on December 24 of the same year, as he drove with Josephine to the opera, a sudden explosion took place in the Kue Saint-Nicaise, which killed and wounded several people and damaged about fifty houses ; the carriage of Bonaparte escaped. He was still in the first fervor of his conversion from Jacobinism, and had not yet become alive to the danger which threatened him from royalisra. He could therefore see nothing but Jacobinism in this plot, and proposed to meet the danger by some general measure calculated to eradicate what re- mained of the Jaco])in party. But before such a measure could be taken Fouchd convinced him that he had been in error, and that he was in the pres- ence of a new enemy, royalism roused into new vigor by the recent change in public opinion. Upon this Bonaparte acted most characteristically. By a singular stretch of Machiavelism he made use of the mistake into which he had himself led the public to crush the enemy which for the mo- ment he feared most. He arrested and transported one hundred and thirty persons, whom he knew to 104 Nivose. [a.d. isos. be innocent of the plot, on the general ground of Jacobinism, substituting for all legal trial a reso- lution passed by the servile Senate to the effect that ' the measure was conservative of the consti- tution.' This is Nivose, an act as enormous as Fructidor, and with a perfidy of its own. Making use of victory was almost more Bona- parte's talent than winning it. These plots, so far from impeding his ascent to monarchy, were con- verted by him into steps upon which he mounted. He drew from them an argument for heredity, which, in case he should himself fall, would furnish a successor. It had already been argued in the ' Parallele entre Cesar, Cromwell, et Bonaparte ' (October, 1800) that lieredity only could prevent the nation from falling again under the domination of the assemblies, under the yoke of the S (not Sieyes surel}^ but Soldats) or under that of the Bourbons. He also made the plot of Nivose the occasion of a constitutional innovation. The as- semblies devised by Sieyes had hitherto been simply useless, so much idle machinery. But in Nivose the precedent was set of giving the Senate a constituent power. To guard tlie constitution was its nominal function ; this was now converted into a function of sanctioning alterations in the constitution, since every innovation became legal ^TAT. 33.] Consul for Life. 105 when the Senate declared it to be conservative of the constitution. In the hands of Bonaparte such a principle soon became fruitful enough. The first open step towards monarchy was made at the conclusion of the treaty of Amiens. As pacificator of the globe it was declared in the tri- bunate that Bonaparte deserved some mark of public gratitude. Upon this the Senate proposed to re-elect him First Consul for a further term of ten years. Bonaparte, disappointed, declared that he could only owe a prorogation of his magistracy to the people; to them, therefore, the question was referred, but in the form, Shall Napoleon Bo- naparte be elected consul for life ? and in this form it was adopted. § 4. Rupture with England. — Execution of the Due d ^Enghien. — The Emperor Napoleon. — Trial of Moreau. In 1803 it might be perceived that the French Eevolution was over; Jacobinism was dead, the Church was restored, and it was plain that Bona- parte did not mean to be the first president of a republic, but^ the restorer of .monarchy. The new monarchy was seen to be similar to the old, but considerably more imperious. France is covered with an army of functionaries, servilely dependent 106 JRivalrj/ of England and France, [a.p. isos. ou the Oovornmont ; a strange silence has settled on the conutry which under the old rt^ginie had been noisy with the debate — if for the most part fruitless debate — of i>avHaments and estates. Europe might hope that, the volcano being ex- hausted, she would heuceforth be free from war. With Jacobinism the source of discord was re- moved. All depended on Bonaparte himself, who might be supposed to be satiated with military glory, and to have enough to occupy him in the recoustitution of Prench Government and society. Alas ! the new age, as it detlned itself in ISOo, proved even more terribly warlike than the age of unexampled discord which had just closed. France, indeed, had been left most dangerously strong, and yet it was not simply lust of conquest in Bonaparte that now darkened the face of aftairs, it was the rivalry of England and France breaking- out more liercely than at any earlier epoch. The crisis was such as to give this old rivalry a sharper edge than ever. It was unendurable for Bona- parte in his glory to submit to the total failure of his Egyptian scheme; on the other hand, England was obliged, considering the immense and threaten- ing ascendency of France in Europe, to cling convulsively to every advantage she had gained. Everything turned ou IMulta, that all-important jET\r. 3'5.] Rupture of the Peace of Amiens. 107 position, wliich England iniglit have surrendered to some neutral occupancy had Bonaparte been less powerful and dangerous ; and yet it was gall and wormwood to Bonaparte to imagine his dar- ling conquest remaining in English hands. He had rather, he said, see the English in the Fau- bourg St. Antoine than in Malta. This rupture^ between England and France is the beginning of the Napoleonic age, and determines its whole character. It is somewhat difficult to understand, because in the eleven years of the war with England Bona- parte was never able to strike a single blow at his enemy, and because at the outset he candidly con- fessed to Lord Whitworth that he did not see what means he had of injuring England. Why did Bonaparte engage in a war in which he was con- demned to be so purely passive ? We are perhaps to suppose that his confidence in the favor of fortune had been vastly increased by his recent successes, particularly by Marengo, and that though to Lord Whitworth he spoke of the invasion of England as almost impossible, yet in reality he expected to achieve that impossibility, as he had achieved so many others. He had also in mind the indirect methods Mliicli lie afterwards em- ployed; he would use, if necessary, the fleets of lOS ' Des Bagatelles.' [a.d. 1803. other Powers, he woukl resort to the coinincrcial blockade ; in one way or another he felt certain of success. That he was really hent upon forcing a war ap]iears from his allowing Sebastiani's report of his mission in tlie Etist, full of hints of the intention of France to reoccnpy Egypt at the first opportunity, to apjiear in the Monitcur. This re- port, besides oflending England, caused her to keep resolute possession of Malta, and, wlien Bonaparte appealed to the treaty of Amiens, Eng- land reidied by j^ointing to the now annexations of France, whicli had just divided Piedmont into departments. ' Co sont des bagatelles,' Lord "Wliit- M'orth rc})orts ]>onaparte to have answered, but ho adtls in a parenthesis which has never been printed, ' The expression he made use of was too trivial and vulgar to find a place in a despatch, or anywhere but in the mouth of a hackney coach- man ! ' The rupture took place with extraordinary marks of irritation on the jiart of Bonaparte. He de- tained tlie English residents in France, he declared that lie would hear of no neutrality, and indeed the continental wars which followed, in the course of which the Napoleonic Empire was founded, had their origin mainly in this quarrel. It might perhaps have been expected that he would try to ^TAT. 34.] Seizure of Hanover, 109 conciliate the continental Powers until he should have settled accounts with England. But he thought himself able to summon them to his side and to make them enemies of England against their will. Indeed since Luncville he felt himself the master of Germany. By that settlement Aus- tria had lost her power within the empire, and the minor German princes now looked up to Is'apoleon, for Napoleon dispensed the mass of property, the plunder of bishoprics and townships, which had been decreed as indenmity to the princes dispos- sessed on the left bank of the Khine. Hence he does not hesitate after the rupture with England to take up a position in the heart of Germany by seizing Hanover. All this was done while Bonaparte was still nominally only consul in the French licpublic. But the rupture with England furnished him with the occasion of throwing off the last disguise and openly restoring monarchy. It was a step which required all his audacity and cunning. He had crushed Jacobinism, but two great parties re- mained. There was first the more moderate repub- licanism, which might be called Girondism, and was widely spread among all classes and par- ticularly in the army. Secondly, there was the old royal ism, which after many years of helpless 110 GironcUsm and Old Royalism. [a.d. 1803. weakness had revived since Brumaire. These two parties, though hostile to each other, were forced into a sort of alliance by the new attitude of Bona- parte, who was hurrying France at once into a new revolution at home and into an abyss of war abroad. England too, after the rupture, favored the efforts of these parties. Eoyalism from Eng- land began to open communications with moderate republicanism in France. Pichegru acted for the former, and the great representative of the latter was Moreau, who had helped to make Brumaire in the tacit expectation probably of rising to the consulate in due course when Bonaparte's term should have expired, and was therefore hurt in his personal claims as well as in his republican principles. Bonaparte watched the movement through his ubiquitous police, and with character- istic strategy determined not merely to defeat it but to make it liis stepping-stone to monarchy. He would ruin Moreau by flistening on him the stigma of royalism ; he would persuade France to make him emperor in order to keep out the Bour- bons. !g e a cbi£vedjtliis with the peculiar mastery which he always showed in villanous intrigue. Moreau had in 1797 incurred blame by concealing his knowledge of Pichegru's dealings with the royalists. That he should now meet and hold iETAT. 34.J Moreaii and Pichegru. Ill conversation with Pichegru at a moment when Pichegru was engaged in contriving a royalist re- bellion, associated his name still more closely with royalism, and Pichegru brought with him wilder partisans, such as Georges the Chouan. No doubt Moreau would gladly have seen and gladly have helped an insurrection against Bonaparte ; any republican, and, what is more, any patriot, would at that moment have risked much to save France from the ruin that Bonaparte was bringing on her. But Bonaparte succeeded in associating him with royalist schemes and with schemes of assassin- ation. Controlling the Senate, he was able to suppress the jury ; controlling every avenue ot publicity, he was able to suppress opinion ; and the army, Moreau's fortress, was won through its hatred of royalism. In this way Bonaparte's last personal rival was removed. There remained the royalists, and Bonaparte hoped to seize their leader, the Comte d'Artois, who was expected, as the police knew, soon to join Pichegru and Georges at Paris. What Bonaparte would have done with him we may judge from the course he took when the Comte did not come. On March 15, 1804, the Due d'Enghien, grandson of the Prince de Conde, residing at Ettenheim in Baden, was seized at midnight by a party of dragoons, brought to 112 77ie Due d'Enghien. [a.d. 1804. Paris, where he arrived on the 20th, confined iu the castle of Vincennes, brought before a military commission at two o'clock the next morning, asked whether he had not borne arras against the re- public, which he acknowledged himself to have done, conducted to a staircase above the moat, and there shot and buried in the moat. This deed was perfectly consistent with Bona- parte's professed principles, so that no misunder- standing or passing tit of passion is required to explain it. He had made, shortly before, a formal offer to the pretender through the king of Prussia, by whicli he had undertaken to pay him a hand- some pension in return for the formal abdication of his rights. This had been refused, and Bona- parte felt free. That the best course was to strike at the heads of the family was a shrewd conclu- sion. Neither Louis nor Charles were precisely heroes ; and then the whole revolutionary party in France would applaud a new tragedy like that of January, 1793. Accordingly Bernadotte and Curee were delighted with it. That the Due d'Enghien was innocent of the conspiracy, was nothing to the purpose ; the act was political, not judicial; accordingly he was not even charged with complicity. That the execution would strike horror into the cabinets, and perhaps bring about iETAT. 34] The Hereditary Empire. 113 a new Coalition, belonged to a class of consider- ations wliicli at this time Bonaparte systematically disregarded. Tliis afiair led immediately to the tliouglit of giving heredity to Bonaparte's power. The thought seems to have commended itself irresisti- bly even to strong republicans and to those who were most shocked by the murder. To make Bona- parte's position more secure seemed the only way of avertiuGC a new lieiun of Terror or new convul- sions. He himself felt some embarrassment. Like Cromwell, he was afraid of the republicanism of the army, and heredity pure and simple brought him face to face with the question of divorcing Josephine. To propitiate the army he chose from the titles suggested to him — consul, stadtholder, &c. — that of emperor, undoubtedly the most ac- curate, and having a sufficiently military sound. The other difficulty, after much furious dissension between the two families of Bonaparte and Beau- harnais, was evaded by giving Napoleon himself (but none of his successors) a power of adoption, and fixing the succession, in default of a direct heir natural or adoptive, first in Joseph and his descendants, then in Louis and his descendants. Except abstaining from the regal title, no attempt was made to conceal tlie abolition of republicanism. 8 11-i The Emperor Napoleon. [a.d. iso4. Bonaparte was to be called Napoleon, and ' sire ' and 'majeste;' grand dignitaries ^itli grand titles were appointed, the second and third con- suls becoming now arch-chancellor and arch- treasurer respectively ; and ' citoyen ' from this time gave way to 'monsieur.' Tlie change was made by the constituent power of the Senate, and the scnatus-consulte is dated May IS, 1804. The t itle of Emperor had an ulterior moaning. Adopted at the moment when Xapoleon began to feel him- self master both in Italy and Germany, it revived the memory of Charles the Great. To himself it was the \norc satisfactory on that account, and, strange to sav, it gave satislaction rather than offence to the Head of the Holy Itomau Empire, Erancis II. Since Joseph the Habsburg Emper- ors had been tired of their title, which, being elective, was precarious. They were desirous of becoming hereditary emperors in Austria, and they now took this title (though without as yet giving up the other). Erancis II. bartered his acknowl- edgment of Xapoleon's new title against Napo- leon's acknowledgment of his own. It required some impudence to condemn Moreau for royalisra at the very moment that his rival was re-establishing monarchy. Yet his trial began on Mav 15th. The death of Pichegru, nominally .ETAT. .34] Death of PicJicfjru. 115 by suicide, on April 6th had already furnished the rising sultanism with its first dark mystery. Moreau was condemned to two years' imprison- ment, but was allowed to retire to the United States. 116 Napoleon absolute. [a.d. 1805. CHAPTER IV. THE EMPEROR. § 1. Designs against England and the Continent. — Napoleon crowned. These changes destroyed all that remained of the political life of France. Jacobinism had been eradicated in Nivose ; republicanism and royalism M'ere paralyzed now. Henceforth there was no power or person in France but Bonaparte ; upon his absolute will a great nation and an unparalleled military force waited. He had undertaken to settle a dispute in which France had been engaged throughout the eighteenth century ; he liad under- taken to humble the might of England. "Would not, then, ordinary prudence suggest to him the expediency of postponing any aggressive designs he might have on the continental Powers ? He had done much since Brumaire to reconcile Eu- rope to his government ; it now became more obviously politic to tread the path of conciliation, ^TAT. 35.] His great Mistake. 117 while he assembled the forces of Europe under his leadership against the tyrant of the seas. Strange to say, he pursued the opposite course, and at the very time when his grand stroke against England was in suspense extended his power so recldessly in Italy, behaved with such insolence to the German Powers, and shocked public feeling by acts so Jacobinical, that he brought upon him- self a new European coalition. It was the great mistake of his life. He was not, in the long run, a match for England and the continent together ; he made at starting tlie irremediable mistake of not dividing these two enemies. He seems indeed to have set out with a monstrous miscalculation which might have ruined him very speedily, for he had laid his plan for an invasion of England and a war in Europe at the same time. If we imagine the invasion successfully begun, we see France thrown back into the position of 1799, her best general and army cut off from her by the sea, while Austria, Russia, and perhaps Prussia pour their armies across the Rhine ; but we see that the position would have been far worse than in 1799, since France without Bonaparte in 1805 would have been wholly paralyzed. As it was, the sig- nal failure of his English enterprise left room for a triumphant campaign in Germany, and 118 The Neiv Charlemagne. [a.d. isos. Ulm concealed Trafalgar from the view of the Coutinent. The European Coalition had been disarmed since Brumaire by the belief that Bonaparte's Government was less intolerably aggressive than that of the Directory ; this belief gave place in 1803 to a conviction that he was quite as aggres- sive and much more dangerous. England there- fore might hope to revive the Coalition, and in the spring of 1804 she recalled Pitt to tlie helm in order that he might do this. The violent proceed- ings of Bonaparte on the occasion of the rupture, his occupation of Hanover, his persecution of the English representatives in Germany, — Spencer Smith at Stuttgart, Drake at Munich, Sir G. Eum- bold at Hamburg, — created an alarm in the cabi- nets greater than that of 1798, and the murder of D'Eugjhien shocked as much as it alarmed them. Positive coni][tiest and annexation of territory too now went on as rapidly and as openly as in 1798. The new empire compared itself to that of Charle- magne, which extended over Italy and Germany, and on December 2, 1804, a parody of the famous transference of the empire took place in Notre Dame, Pope Pius VII. appearing there to crown Napoleon, who however took the crown from his hands and placed it himself upon his own head. jETKT. 35.] The Iron Croivn. 119 Meanwhile the Italian republic was changed into a kingdom, which at first Bonaparte intended to give to his brother Joseph, but in the end accepted for himself. In the spring of 1805, fresh from the sacre in Notre Dame, he visited Italy and received the iron crown of the Lombard kings at Milan (May 2G). A little later the Ligurian re- public was annexed, and a principality was found for his brother-in-law Bacciochi in Lucca and Piom- bino. By these acts he seemed to show himself not only ready but eager to fight with all Europe at once. It was not his fault that in the autumn of 1805, when he fought with Austria and Russia in Germany, he was not also maintain- ing a desperate struggle in the heart of Eng- land ; it was not his fault that Prussia was not also at war with him, for his aggressions had driven Prussia almost to despair, and only once — that is, in the matter of Sir G. Rumbold — had he shown the smallest consideration for her. And yet at first fortune did not seem to favor him. Had public opinion been less enslaved in France, had the frivolity of the nation been less skilfully amused by the operatic exhibitions of the new court and the sacre in Notre Dame, it would have been remarked that, after most needlessly mvolv- 120 Want of Success [a.d. i805. ing France in war with England, Bonaparte had suffered half the year 1803, all the year 1804, and again more tlian half the year 1805 to pass without striking a single blow, that after the most gigantic and costly preparations the scheme of invasion was given up, and that finally France suffered a crushing defeat at Trafalgar which par- alyzed her on the side of England for the rest of the war. In order to understand in any degree the course he took, it seems necessary to suppose that the intoxication of the Marengo campaign still held him, that as then, contrary to all expec- tation, he had passed the Alps, crushed his enemy, and instantly returned, so now he made no doubt of passing the Channel, signing peace in London, and returning in a month with a fabulous indem- nity in his pocket to meet the Coalition in Ger- many. To conquer England it was worth while to wait two years, but his position was very critical when, after losing two years, he was obliged to confess himself foiled. He retrieved his position suddenly, and achieved a triumph which, though less complete than that which he had counted on, was still prodigious, — the greatest triumph of his life. At the moment when his English scheme was ending in deplorable failure, he produced an- other, less gigantic but more solid, which he un- jETAT. 36.] against England. 121 folded with a rapid precision and secrecy peculiar to himself. In the five years which had passed since Marengo his position for the purposes of a Continental war had improved vastly. Then he had no footing either in Germany or Italy, and his new office of First Consul gave him a very precarious control over the armies, which them- selves were in a poor condition. Now his military authority was absolute, and the armies after five years of imperialism were in perfect organization ; he had ]Srorth Italy to the Adige ; and since the Germanic revolution of 1803 ]3avaria, Wlirtem- berg, and Baden had passed over to his side. Therefore, as the Coalition consisted only of Aus- tria, Russia, and England, he might count upon success, and the more confidently if he could strike Austria before the arrival of the Eussian army. It is strange that in this estimate it should be un- necessary to take Prussia into the account, since the Prussian army (consisting of 250,000 men) was at that time supposed to be a match by itself for the French. But for ten years Prussia had striven to hold a middle course, almost equally dis- trustful of France on the one side and of her old rival Austria, or her powerful neighbor Eussia, on the other. She still clung convulsively to her strange system o( immovable neutrality, and in 122 English and French Fleets. [ad. 1805. this war both sides had to put up with the uiicer- taiuty whether the prodigious weight of the army of Frederick would not be thrown suddenly either into its own or into the opposite scale. It was at the end of August, 1805, that Napoleon made his sudden change of front. At the beginning of that month he had been still intent on the invasion of England; ever since March nuiritime manoeuvres on an unparalleled scale had been carried on with the object of decoying the English fleets away from the Channel, and so giving an opportunity for the army of invasion to cross it on a flotilla under the protection of French fleets. But in spite of all manccuvres a great English fleet remained station- ary at Brest, and Nelson, having been for a mo- ment decoyed to Barbados, returned again. In the last days of August Admiral Yilleneuve, issu- ing from Ferrol, took alarm at the news of the approach of an English fleet, and instead of sailing northward faced about and retired to Cadiz. Then for the first time Napoleon admitted the idea of failure, and saw the necessity of screening it by some great achievement in another quarter. He resolved to throw his whole force upon the Coalition, and to do it suddenly. Prussia was to be bribed by the very substantial present of Hanover. ^TAT. 3G.1 Napoleons Second Period. 123 § 2. Campaign against Anstria and Russia. — Capitu- lation of Ulm. — Battle of Austerlitz. — War with Prussia. — Treaty of Tilsit. Five years had passed since Napoleon liad taken the field when the second period of his military career began. He now begins to make war as a sovereign with a bomidless command of means. For five years from 1805 to 1809 lie takes the field regularly, and in these campaigns he founds the great Napoleonic empire. By the first he breaks up the Germanic system and attaches the minor German states to France, by the second lie liumbles Prussia, by the third he forces Eussia into an al- liance, by the fourth he reduces Spain to submis- sion, by tlie fifth he humbles Austria. Then follows a second pause during which for three years Na- poleon's sword is in the sheath, and he is once more ruler, not soldier. It is to be observed that he sets out with no distinct design of conquest, but only because he has been attacked by tlie Coalition. Fortune then tempts him on from triumph to triumph, and throughout he has no other conscious design but to turn all the force of the Continent against England. Napoleon's strategy always aims at an over- whelming surprise. As in 1800, when all eyes 124 Plan of the Coalition. [a.d. 1805. were intent on Genoa, and from Genoa the Austrians hoped to penetrate into France, he created an over- whelming confusion hy throwing himself across the Alps and marching not upon Genoa but upon Milan, so now he appeared not in front of the Austrians but behind them and between them and Vienna. The wavering faith of Bavaria had caused the Austrians to jxass the Inn and to advance across the country to Ulm. It M'as intended that the Russians should join them here, and that the united host should invade France, taking Napoleon, as they fondly hoped, by surprise. It is to be remarked tliat of all the coalitions this seems to have been the most loosely combined, owing chiefly to the shallowness and inexperience of Alexander. Aus- tria was hurried into action, and found herself unsupported at need by the Russians, and disap- pointed altogether of the help of Prussia, upon whicli she had counted. Moreover, so often unfor- tunate in lier choice of generals, she had this time made the most \infortunate choice of all. Mack, who at Naples in 1799 had moved the impatient contempt of Nelson, now stood matched against Napoleon at the height of his power. He occupied the line of the Iller from Ulm to Memmingen, ex- pecting the attack of Napoleon, wlio personally lingered at Strasburc;, in front. Meanwhile the ^TAT. 3C.] Capitulation of Ulm. 125 French armies swarmed from Hanover and down the Ehine, treating the small German states half as allies half as conquered dependants, and disre- garding all neutrality, even that of Prussia, till they took up their positions along the Danube from Donauworth to Ratisbon far in the rear of Mack. The surprise was so complete tliat Mack, who in the early days of October used the language of confident hope, on the 17th surrendered at Ulm with about 26,000 men, while another division, that of Werneck, surrendered on the 18tli to Murat at Nordlingen. In a month the whole Austrian army, consisting of 80,000 men, was entirely dis- solved. Napoleon was master of Bavaria, recalled the elector to Munich, and received the congratula- tions of the electors of Wlirtemberg and Baden (they had just at this time the title of electors). It was the stroke of Marengo repeated, but without a doubtful battle and without undeserved good luck. After Marengo it had been left to Moreau to win the decisive victory and to conclude the war ; this time there was no Moreau to divide the lau- rels. The second part of the campaign begins at once; on October 28 Napoleon reports that a division of his army has crossed the Inn. He has now to deal with the Eussians, of whom 40,000 men have arrived under Kutusoff. He 12G March to Vienna. [a.d. isos. reaches Liiiz on November 4, wliere Gyiilai brought him the emperor's proposals for au ar- mistice. He replies by demanding Venice and Tyrol, and insisting upon the exclusion of Russia from the negotiations, conditions M'hich, as ho no doubt foresaw, Clyulai did not think himself au- thorized to accept. But Napoleon did not intend this time, as in 1797 and in 1800, to stop short of Vienna. Nothing now could resist his advance, for the other Austrian armies, tliat of the arch- duke John in Tyrol and that of the archduko Charles on the Adige, were held in play by Ney and Massena, and compelled at last, instead of advancing to the rescue, to retire tln-ough Car- niohx into Hungary. On November 14 lie dates from the palace of Schonbrunn ; on tlie day before Murat had entered Vienna, which the Austrian emperor, from motives of humanity, had resolved not to defend, and the Frencli also succeeded by an unscrupulous trick in getting possession of the bridges over the Danube. So far his progress had been triumphant, and yet he Avas now in an ex- tremely critical position. The archduke Charles was approaching from Hungary with 80,000 Austrians ; another Ixussian army was entering Moravia to join Kutusoff, who had with great skill escaped from the pursuit of Murat after ^TAT. 36 Treaty of Potsdam. 127 the capture of Vienna. Napoleon, though he had brought 200,000 men into Germany, had not now, since he was obliged to keep open his communications down the valley of the Danube, a large army available for the field. But, what was much more serious, he had recklessly driven Prussia into tlie opposite camp. He had marched troops across her territory of Ansbach, violating her neutrality, and in consequence on November 3 (while Napoleon was at Linz) she had signed with Russia the treaty of Potsdam, which practi- cally placed 180,000 of the most highly drilled troops in the world at the service of the Coalition. \, ,>J : ^^^Such had been Napoleon's rashness, for his auda- cious daring was balanced indeed by infinite cun- ^ ) ning and ingenuity, but was seldom tempered by prudence. In this position, it may be asked, how could he expect ever to make his way back to France ? What he had done to Mack Prussia would now do to him. The army of Frederick would block the Danube between him and France, while the Russians and Austrians, united under the archduke, would seek him at Vienna. As at Marengo, fortune favored his hazardous strategy. The allies had only to play a waiting game, but this the Russians and their young Czar, who was now in the Moravian head-quarters, would 128 Battle of Austerlitz. [a.d. 1805. not consent to do. He was surrounded by young and rash counsellors, and the Eussians, remember- ing the victories of Suwaroff in 1799, and remark- ing that almost all Napoleon's victories hitherto had been won over Austrians, had not yet learned to be afraid of him. Napoleon became aware of their sanguine confidence from Savary, "whom he had sent to the Czar with proposals ; he contrived to heighten it by exhibiting his army as ill- prepared to Dolgorouki, sent to him on the part of the Czar. The end was that the Russians (80,000 men, aided by about 15,000 Austrians) rushed into the battle of Austerlitz (December 2, 1805), which brought the third Coalition to an end, as that of Hohenlinden had brought the second. Nowhere was Napoleon's superiority more manifest ; the Eussians lost more than 20,000 men, tJie Austrians 6,000. The former retired at once under a military convention, and before the year 1805 was out the treaty at Press- burg was concluded with Austria (December 26) and that of Schonbrunn with Prussia (December 15). It was a transformation scene more bewildering than even that of Marengo, and completely altered the position of Napoleon before Europe. To the French indeed Austerlitz was not, as a matter of ^TAT. 36.] Fall of the Roman Empire. 129 exultation, equal to Marengo, for it did not deliver the state from danger, but^nly raised it from a perilous eminence to an eminence more perilous still. But as a military achievement it was far greater, exhibiting the army at the height of its valor and organization (the illusion of liberty not yet quite dissipated), and the commander at the height of his tactical skill ; and in its historical results it is gi-eater still, ranking among the great events of the world. For not only did it found the ephemeral Napoleonic empire by handing over Venetia to the Napoleonic monarchy of Italy, and Tyrol and Vorarlberg to Napoleon's new client Bavaria; it also destroyed the Holy Roman Em- pire, while it divided the remains of Hither Aus- tria between Wiirtemberg and Baden. In the summer of 1806 the emperor of Austria (he had this title since 1804) solemnly abdicated the title of Roman emperor ; the ancient diet of Ratisbon was dissolved, and a new organization was created under the name of Confederation of the Rhine, in which the minor states of Germany were united under the protectorate of Napoleon, much in the same way as in former times they had been united under the presidency of Austria. Bavaria and Wiirtemberg at the same time were raised into kingdoms. In all the changes which have 9 130 Unstable Equilibrium. [a.d. i806. happened siuce, the Holy Komau Empire has never been revived, and this event remains the greatest in the modern history of Germany. But Austeilitz was greater than Marengo in another way. That victory had a tranquillizing effect, and was soon followed by a peace which lasted more than four years. But the equilibrium established after Austcrlitz was of the most un- stable kind ; it was but momentary, and Avas followed by a succession of the most appalling convulsions ; the very report of the battle has- tenrd tlio dcatli of "William Pitt. A French ascendency had existed since 1797, and Napo- leon's Government had at first promised to make it less intolerable. Since 1803 this hope had van- ished, but now suddenly the ascendency was con- verted into something like a universal monarchy. Europe could not settle down. Tlie first half of 1806 was devoted to the internal reconstruction of Germany, and to the negotiation of jieacc with the two great belligerents who remained alter Austria and Prussia liad retired, viz., England and Ivussia. lUit these negotiations failed, and in failing re- vived tlu^ Coalition. On the side of England, Fox showed unexpectedly all the firmness of Pitt; and the Czar refused his ratification to the treaty which his representative at Paris, D'Oubril, ^-TAT. 37.] Signs of a new Coalition, 131 had signed. Evei7thing now depended on Prus- sia, and again Napoleon adopted the strange policy by wliich a year before he had armed all l^Airope against himself. Instead of detaching I'russia from the Coalition by friendly advances, he drives lier into it by liis reckless insolence. At a mo- ment when she found herself almost shut out of the German world by the new Confederation, Na- poleon was found coolly treating with England for the restoration of Hanover to George III. In August, 180G, just at the moment of the dissolu- tion of the Holy Roman Empire and the formation of the Confederation of the Khine, Prussia sud- denly mobilized her ai'iny, and about the same time Itussia rejected the treaty. This amounted practically to a new Coalition, or to a revival of the old one with Prussia in the place of Austria. On September 10 he writes, 'The Prussians wish to receive a lesson.' No one knew so well as Na- poleon the advantage given by suddenness and rapidity. The year before . he had succeeded in crushing the Austrians before tlie Ilussiaus could come up ; against Prussia he had now the advan- tage that she had long been politically isolated, and could not immediately get help either from Russia or England, — for the moment only Sax- ony and Hessen-Cassel stood by her, — while his 132 Defeat of Prussia. [a.d. isoe. armies, to the number of 200,000 men, were al- ready stationed in Bavaria and SwaLia, whence in a few days they could arrive on the scene of ac- tion. The year before Austria liad been ruined liy the incapacity of Mack; Prussia now suffered IVoin an incapacity diffused through the higher ranlvs bt)th of the military and civil service. Generals too old, such as Brunswick and ]\Iol- lendorf, a military system corrupted by long peace, a policy without clearness, a diplomacy without honor, had converted the great power founded by Frederick into a body without a soul. There began a new war, of which the incidents are almost precisely parallel to those of the war which had so lately closed. As the Austrians at Ulm, so now Napoleon crushed the Prussians at Jena and Auerstiidt (October 14) before the appearance of the Russians ; as he entered Vienna, so now he enters Berlin (October 27) ; as he fought a second war in Moravia, in which Austria played a second part to Eussia, so now from November, 1806, to June, 1807, he fights in East Prussia against the Russians aided with smaller numbers by the I*rus- sians; as he might then, after all his successes, have been ruined by the intervention of Prussia, so now, had Austria struck in, he might have found much diiliculty in making his way back iETAT. 37.] Fall of the System of Frederick. 133 to France; as at Austeiiitz, so at Friedland in June, 1807, the Eussians ran hastily into a de- cisive battle, in which they ruined their ally but not themselves ; as Austria at Pressburg, so Prus- sia at Tilsit signed a most humiliating treaty, while Russia, as before, escaped, not this time by simply retiring from the scene, but by a treaty in which Napoleon admitted her to a share in the spoils of victory. Here was a second catastrophe far more surpris- in^T and disastrous than that which it followed so closely. The defeat of Austria in 1805 had been similar to her former defeats in 1800 and 1797; Ulm had been similar to Hohenlinden, the treaty of Pressburg to that of Luneville. But the double repidse of Jena and Auerstiidt, which threw two armies back upon each other, and so ruined both, dissolved forever the military creation of the great Frederick ; and it was followed by a general panic, surrender of fortresses, and submission on the part of civil officials, which seemed almost to amount to a dissolution of the Prussian state. The defence of Colberg by Gneisenau and the conduct of the Prussian troops under Lestocq at Eylau, were al- most the only redeeming achievements of the fa- mous army which, half a century before, had withstood for seven years the attack of three 134 Treaty of Tilsit. [a.d. 1806. Great Powers at once. This downfall was ex- pressed in the treaty of Tilsit, which was vastly more disastrous to Prussia than that of Presshur\\t he seemed brought back to it now by another route. England had marshalled Europe against him ; might he not now marshal Europe against Eng- land ? Austria was humbled, Prussia Ijeneath his feet. Why should Eussia for the future side with England against him ? From the outset her interest in the wars of the West had been but slight ; under Catherine it had been hypocritically feigned, in order to divert the eyes of Europe from her Eastern conquests ; and perhaps Alexander, in 1805 and 1806, had not been free from a sim- ilar hypocrisy. The Russians themselves felt this so much that after Eriedland they forced Alexan- der to abandon the new combination so recently arranged at Bartenstein, and to make peace. But as Paul, when he left the Second Coalition, had actually joined France, Napoleon now saw the means of making Alexander do the same. Eng- land's tyranny of the seas had been attacked by the great Catherine and again by Paul ; on tliis subject, therefore, Russian policy might co-oper- ate with Napoleon, and, if its real object was only 136 Coalition against England. [ad. 1807. to obtain freedom in Turkey, tliis could be gaiued as well by a direct understanding with Napoleon as by giving occupation to his arms in Germany. Such was tlic basis of tlie treaty of Tilsit, nego- tiated between Napoleon and Alexander on an island in the river Niemen, with which treaty commences a new phase in the struggle between Napoleon and England. Russia not only abandons England, but comljines with France to humble her. Hitherto we have lieard of coalitions against France, of which England has been the soul or at least the paymaster. At Tilsit Napoleon founds a European coalition against England. A pause occurs after Friedland, during which Europe begins slowly to reali/c her position, and to penetrate the character of Napoleon. It took some time to wear out his reputation of peace- maker; at his breach with England in 1803 he had appealed to that jealousy of England's mar- itime power which was widely spread ; many thought the war was forced upon him, and as to the war of 1805, it could not be denied that Aus- tria and Piussia had attacked him. His absolute control over the French press enabled In'm almost to dictate public opinion. But the conquest of Germany, achieved in little more time than had sufficed to Bonaparte ten jETAT. 38] European Confederacy. 137 years before for the conquest of Italy, put liim in a new light. He h^l already passed through many phases : he had been the invincible cham- j)ion of liberty, then the destroyer of Jacobinism and champion of order, then the new Constantino and restorer of the church, then the pacificator of the world, then the founder of a new monarchy in France. ISTow suddenly, in 1807, he stands forth in the new character of head of a great European confederacy. It has been usual to contrast the consulate with the empire, but the great transfor- mation was made by the wars of 1805-7, and the true contrast is between the man of Brumaire and the man of Tilsit. The empire as founded in 1804 did not perhaps differ so much from the consulate after Marengo as botli differed, alike in spirit and form, from the empire such as it began to appear after Pressburg and was consolidated after Tilsit. Be- tween 1800 and 1805 Napoleon, under whatever title, was absolute ruler of France, including Bel- gium, the left bank of the PJiine, Savoy and Nice, and practically also ruler of Holland, Switzerland, and North Italy to the Adige, which states had a republican form. The title emperor meant in 1804 little more than military ruler. But now emperor has rather its mediaeval meaning of para- mount over a confederacy of princes. Napoleon 138 Napoleon King of Kings. [v.d. 1807. lias become a kiug of kings. This system had been commenced iu the consulate, when a king- dom of Etruria under tlie consul's proLecLion was created for the benclit of his ally, the King of Spain ; it was carried a stage further on the eve of the Avar of 1805, when the kingdom of Italy was created, of which Napoleon himself assumed the sceptre, but committed the government to Eugene Beauharnais as viceroy. But now almost all Italy and a great part of Germany is subjected to this system. The Bonaparte f;iuiily, wliich before had contended for the succession in France, so that Joseph actually refuses, as beneath him, the crown of Italy, now accept subordinate croM'ns. Joseph becomes King of Naples, tlie Bourbou dy- nasty having been expelled immediately after the peace of Bressburg ; Louis becomes King of Hol- land ; Jerome, the youngest brother, receiAes after Tilsit a kingdom of V>''estphalia, composed of terri- tory taken from I'russia, of Hanover, and of the electorate of llessen-Cassel, which had shared the fall of Brussia ; somewhat earlier ]\Iurat, husband of the most ambitious of the Bonaparte sisters, Caroline, had received the grand-duchy of Berg. By the side of these Bonaparte princes there are the German princes who now look up to France, as under the Holy Bomau Empire they had looked iETAT. 33] The Confederation of the Rhine. 139 lip to Austria. Tliese are formed into a Confed- eration in which the Archljisliop of Mainz (Dal- berg) presides, as he had before presided in the empire. Two of the princes have now the title of kings, and, enriched as they are by the seculariza- tion of cl lurch lands, the raediatization of imme- diate nobles, and the subjugation of free cities, they have also the substantial power. A princess of Bavaria weds Eugene Beauliarnais, a princess of Wiirtemberg Jerome Bonaparte. At its founda- tion in 1806 the Confederation had twelve mem- bers, but in the end it came to include almost all the states of Germany except Austria and Prussia. A change seems to take place at the same time in N'apoleon's personal relations. In 1804, though the divorce of Josephine was debated, yet it ap- pears to be Napoleon's fixed intention to bequeath his crown by the method of adoption to the eldest son of Louis by Hortense Beauharnais. But this child died suddenly of croup on May 5, 1807, while Napoleon was absent in Germany, and the event, occuning at the moment when he attained his position of king of kings, probably decided him in liis own mind to proceed to the divorce. It was impossible to give crowns and principali- ties to tlie Bonaparte family without allowing a 140 Revived of Nohility. [a.d. iso7. share of similar distinctions to the leading politi- cians and generals of France. He was tlierefore driven to revive titles of nobility. To do this was to abandon the revolutionary principle of equality, but Napoleon always bore in mind the necessity of bribing in the most splendid manner the party up- on whose support ever since Brumaire he had de- pended, and which may be described shortly as the Senate. When in 1802_lie received the life- consulate, he had proceeded instantly to create new dotations for the senators ; now he feels that he must devise for them still more splendid bribes. His first plan is to give them feudal lordships outside France. Thus Berthier, his most indispen- sable minister, becomes sovereign prince of Neuf- cliatel, Bernadotte sovereign prince of Pontecorvo, Talleyrand sovereign prince of Benevento. Espe- cially out of the Venetian territory, given to France at Pressburg, are taken fiefs (not less than twelve in all), to which are attached tlie title of duke. These innovations fall in 1806, that is, in the mid- dle of the period of transformation. But after Tilsit, when Napoleon felt more strongly both the power and the necessity of rewarding his servants, he cre- ated formally a new noblesse, and revived the majo- rat in defiance of the revolutionary code. In the end, besides the three sovereign princes just ^TAT. 38.] The Balance of Power. 141 mentioned, he created four hereditary princes (Ber- thier is in both lists) and thirty-one hereditary dukes. There were also many counts and barons. The system was prodigiously wasteful. Of public money Berthier received more than £50,000 a year, Davoust about £30,000, nine other ofiicials more than £10,000, and twenty-three others more than £4,000. After Marengo he had seen the importance of reconciling Europe to his greatness by making peace. After Tilsit it was still more urgently nec- essary that he should dispel the alarm which his conquests had now excited everywhere. But this time he made no attempt to do so ; this time he can think of nothing but pushing his success to the destruction of England ; and Europe gradually became aware that the evil so long dreaded of a destruction of the balance of power had come in the very worst form conceivable, and that her des- tiny was in the hands of a man whose headlong ambition was as unprecedented as his energy and good fortune. As in 1805 he had been drawn into the conquest of Germany in the course of a war with England, so now he assails all the neutral powers, and shortly afterwards violently annexes Spain, not so much from abstract love of conquest as in order 142 Dictafion to A'entrals. [a.d. 1807. to turn aoaiust EDoluud the forces of all the Conti- nent at once. As he had left Boulogne for Ger- many, he now, as it were, returns to Boulogne. His successes had put into his hands two new in- struments of war against England, instruments none the less welcome because the very act of using them made him master of the whole Conti- nent, He had hinted at the first of these "udien the war with England began in 1803, by saying that in this war he did not intend that there should be any neutrality. What he meant was explained in 1806 by the edict issued from Berlin. In ad- dition to that limited right, which the belligerent has by international law, to prevent by blockade the trade of a neutral with the enemy and to pun- ish the individual trader by confiscation of ship and goods, Napoleon now assumed the right of pre- venting such commerce without blockade by con- trolling the neutral governments. English goods were to be seized everywhere, and the harbors of neutrals to be closed against English ships under penalty of war witli Erance. Such a threat, in- volving a claim to criticise and judge the acts of neutral governments, and to inflict on them an enormous pecuniary fine, was almost equivalent to the annexation at one stroke of all the neu- tral states. The other instrument had a similar ^TAT. 3s.] Weakness of the Confederacy. 143 character. The French fleet having been crippled at Tralalgar, he proposed now to reinforce it by all the other fleets iu Europe, and to get possession of all the resources of all the maritime states. His eyes therefore become now fixed on Denmark, I'ortugal, and Sjjain. Such is Napoleon as king of kings, and such are his views. This unique phase of European history lasted five years, reckoning from the treaty of Tilsit to the breach with liussia. Europe con- sists now of a confederacy of monarchical states looking up to a paramount power (like India at the present day). The confederacy is held together by the war with England, which it puts under an ineffective commercial blockade, suffering itself in return a more effective one. But Napoleon feels that Spain and Portugal must be brought under his immediate administration, in order that their maritime resources may be properly turned against England. It cannot be necessary to point out that this method of attacking England was essentially ill- judged, however marvellous the display of power to which it gave rise. The confederacy was held together by the weakest of bonds, viz. by sheer force. What was unsatisfactorily achieved by the miracles of Austerlitz, Jena, and Friedlaud, might 144 European Party of Iiisitrrcctiou. [\.v. iso7. have been accomplished far better without them by diplomacy acting on the Avide-spvead jealousy and dislike of England. Napoleon's confederacy might always be suspected oi' wishing to pass over to the side of England, as at last it did. Austria begins to meditate a new war on the morrow of Pressburg, and Prussia is humbled so intolerably that she is forced into plans of insurrection. Throughout these five years a European party of insurrection is gradually forming. It has two great divisions, one scattered through Germany, at the head of which Austria places herself in 1809, the other in Spain and Portugal, which is aided by England. Id Germany this movement is successfully re- pressed nntil 1813, but in the Peninsula it gains ground steadily from 1809. After 1812 both movements swell the great Anti-Xapoleonic Eevo- lution which then sets in. ^ Invasion of Portugal. 145 CHAPTER V. REBELLION. § 1. French Array in Spain. — Popular Rising in Spain. — Napoleon in Spain. Immediately after Tilsit Napoleon entered on his new course, whicli had heen arranged with Russia in secret articles. In August he required the King of Denmark to declare war with Eng- land ; hut here England, seeing herself threatened by a coalition of all Europe at once, interfered with desperate resolution. She required Denmark to surrender her fleet (consisting of twenty ships of tlie line and a number of frigates) in deposit, promising to restore it at the peace ; on receiving a refusal she took possession of it by force. At the same time he formed an army under Junot for the invasion of Portugal, with which state, as the old ally of England, Xapoleon used no ceremony. The feeble government consented to almost all his demands, agreed to enter the Continental system and to declare war against 10 146 Partition of Portugal. [a.d. i807. Euglaud; only the regent had a scruple which restrained him from confiscating the property of private Englishmen. From this moment Portu- gal is doomed, and negotiations are opened with Spain concerning the partition of it. But out of these negotiations grew unexpected events. For more than ten years Spain had heen drawn in the w'ake of revolutionary France. To Napo- leon from the beginning of his reign she had been as subservient as Holland or Switzerland ; she had made war and peace at his bidding, had sur- rendered Trinidad to make the treaty of Amiens, had given her fleet to destruction at Trafalgar. In other states equally subservient, such as Hol- land and the Italian Eepublic, Napoleon had re- modelled the government at his pleasure, and in the end had put his own family at the head of it. After Tilsit he thought himself strong enough to make a similar change in Spain, and the occupa- tion of Portugal seemed to afford the opportunity of doing this. By two conventions signed at Fon- tainebleau on October 27 the partition of Portugal was arranged with Spain. The Prince of the Peace was to become a sovereign prince of the Algarves, the King of Spain was to have Brazil with tlie title of Emperor of the two Americas, &c. ; but the main provision was that a French JETAT. 3P.] French Army in Spain. 147 army was to stand on the threshold of Spain ready to resist any intervention of England. The occupation of Portugal took place soon after, Ju- not arriving at Lisbon on November 30, just as the royal family vfith a following of several thou- sands set sail for Brazil under protection of the English fleet. At the same time there commenced in defiance of all treaties a passage of French troops into Spain, which continued until 80,000 had ai'rived, and had taken quiet possession of a number of Spanish fortresses. At last Murat was appointed to the command of the army of Spain. He entered the country on March 1, 1808, and marched on Madrid, calculating that the king would retire and take refuge at Seville or Cadiz. This act revealed to the world, and even to a large party among the Erench themselves, the nature of the power which had been created at Tilsit. The lawless acts of Napoleon's earlier life were palli- ated by the name of the French Eevolution, and since Brumaire he had established a character for comparative moderation. But here was naked vio- lence without the excuse of fanaticism ; and on what a scale ! One of the greater states of Europe was in the hands of a burglar, who would more- over, if successful, become king not only of Spain but of a boundless empire in the New World. 148 Condition of Spain. [a.d. isos. The sequel was worse even than this commence- ment, although the course which events took seems to show that by means of a little delay he might have attained his end without such o]Den defiance of law. The administration of Spain had long been in the contemptible hands of Manuel Godoy, supposed to be the queen's lover, yet at the same time high in the favor of King Charles IV. Fer- dinand, the heir apparent, headed an opposition, but in character he was not better than the trio he opposed, and he had lately been put under arrest on suspicion of designs upon his father's life. To have fomented this opposition without taking either side, and to have rendered both sides equal- ly contemptible to the Spanish people, was Napo- leon's game. The Spanish people, who profoundly admired him, might then have been induced to ask him for a king. Napoleon, however, perpe- trated his crime before the scandal of the palace broke out. The march of Murat now brought it to a head. On March 17 a tumult broke out at Aranjuez, which led to the fall of the favorite, and then to the abdication of the king, and the procla- mation of Ferdinand amid universal truly Span- ish enthusiasm. It was a fatal mistake to have forced on this popular explosion, and Napoleon has characteristically tried to conceal it by a ^TAT. 38.] Abdication of Charles IV. 149 supposititious letter, dated March 29, in which he tries to throw the blame upon Murat, to whom the letter professes to be addressed. It warns Murat against rousing Spanish patriotism and creating an opposition of the nobles and clergy, which will lead to a levee en masse, and to a war without end. It predicts, in short, all that took place, but it has every mark of invention, and was certainly never received by Murat. Tlie reign of Ferdinand having thus begun, all that the French could do was to abstain from acknowledging him, and to encourage Charles to withdraw his abdica- tion as given under duress. By this means it became doubtful who was king of Spain, and Napo- leon, having carefully refrained from taking a side, now presented himself as arbiter. Ferdinand was induced to betake himself to Napoleon's presence at Bayonne, where he arrived on April 21 ; his father and mother followed on the 30th. Violent scenes took place between ftither and son : news arrived of an insurrection at Madrid and of the stern sup- pression of it by Murat. In the end Napoleon suc- ceeded in extorting the abdication both of Charles and Ferdinand. It was learned too late that the in- surrection of Spain had not really been suppressed. Tliis crime, as clumsy as it was monstrous, brought on that great popular insurrection of 150 Ambuscade of Bayonnc. [a.d. I8O8. Europe against the universal monarchy, which has profoundly modi (led all subsequent history, and makes the Anti-Napoleonic Eevolution an event of the same order as the French Eevolu- tion. A rising unparalleled for its suddenness and sublime spontaneonsness took place through- out Spain and speedily found a response in Ger- many. A new impulse was given, out of which grew the great nationality movement of the nine- teenth century. Meanwhile Napoleon, having first offered the throne of Spain to his brother Louis, Avlio refused it, named Joseph king, retaining, however, a reversion to himself and heirs in de- fault of male heirs of Joseph, who had only daugh- ters. The royal council first, afterwards a jvnita of nobles assembled at Bayonne, accepted him on July 7. But it must have become clear to Na- poleon almost at once that he had committed the most enormous of blunders. Instead of <'aining Spain he had in fact lost it, for hitherto he had been master of its resources without trouble, whereas to support Joseph he was obliged in this same year to invade Spaiu in person with not less than 180,000 men. With Spain too he lost Port- ugal, which in June followed the Spanish example of insurrection, and had Spain henceforth for an ally and not for an enemy. Hitherto he had had ^TAT. .39.] Spanish Revolution. 151 no serious coDception of any kind of war not strictly professional. He had known popular risings in Italy, La Vendee, and Egypt, but had never found it at all difficult to crush them. The determined insurrection of a whole nation of 11,000,000 was a new experience to him. How serious it might be he learned as early as July, when Dupont, with about 20,000 men, surren- dered at Baylen in Andalusia to the Spanish General Castahos. In August he might wake to anotlier miscalculation of which he had been guilty. An English army landed in Portugal, defeated Junot at Vimeiro, and forced him to sign the convention of Cintra. By this he evacuated Portugal, in which country the insur- rection had already left him much isolated. This occurrence brought to light a capital feature of the insurrection of the Peninsula, viz. that it was in free communication everywhere with the power and resources of England. The Spanish affair is the best illustration of the insensate blindness which marks the imperial period of Napoleon. It shows him wedded to a system of violence which yields little gain when it is most successful, and causes prodigious loss when it is in any degree unsuccessful. On the whole, in 1808 he is not stronger than in 1803, 152 Invasion of Spain. [a.d. 1808. but far weaker ; for in 1803 he liacl in Italy, Ger- many, and Spain a prodigious ascendency, which did not require to be supported everywhere by armies, and did not yet excite hatred, but was regarded in Spain with enthusiasm, in Prussia with friendly equanimity, even in Austria with resignation. All he has done since is to convert this ascendency into actual government, but in the conversion more than half of it has escaped. Austria and Prussia are preparing for resistance to » the death; Spain has begun it already, and has passed over to the English from the French coalition. Thus the monarchy of Tilsit suffered within a year the most terrible rebuff. Napoleon himself now appears upon the scene. His first step was to revive the memory of Tilsit by a theatrical meeting with Alexander, which was arranged at Erfurt in September. The power of the duum- virate was there displayed in the most imposing manner, and the alliance was strengthened by new engagements taken by Napoleon with respect to the Danubian principalities. At the same time he checked the rising spirit of resistance in Prus- sia by driving from office the great reforming min- ister Stein. At the beginning of November he was ready for the invasion of Spain. Joseph had ^TAT. 39.] Entry into Madrid. 153 retired to Vittoria, and the armies of the insurrec- tion fronted him along the Ebro under the com- mand of Blake, Castailos, and Palafox. Between November 7 and 11 the army of Blake was dis- solved by Lefebvre, and Napoleon entered Burgos, which was mercilessly pillaged ; on the 23d Cas- tanos was defeated at Tudela by Lannes ; by De- cember 2 Napoleon, having forced the mountain passes, was before Madrid, and on the 4th he was in possession of the town, where, endeavoring somewhat late to conciliate the liberalism of Eu- rope, he proclaimed the abolition of the Inquisi- tion and of feudalism, and the reduction of the number of convents to one-third. He remained in Spain till the middle of January, 1809, but he was not allowed repose during the interval. Sir John Moore had advanced from Portugal as far as Sala- manca, and determined in the middle of Decem- ber to assist the insurrection by marching on Valladolid. Soult was at Carrion and was threatened by this advance, since the English force, after Moore had effected his junction with Baird, who arrived from Corunna, at Majorga, amounted to 25,000 men. Napoleon hoped to cut its communications, and so deal one of his crushing blows at the enemy with whom he was always at war, yet whom he never, except at 154 Austria Roused. [a.d. i809. AVaterloo, met in tlio field. He set out on the 22d with about 40,000 men, and marched 200 miles in ten days over mountains in the middle of winter. ]\loore saw the danger, retired to l^enaveute, and bknv nj) the bridges over the Ezla. Napoleon advanced as far as Astorga (Jan. 1) ; but he had missed his marjv, and pro- fessed to receive information which showed him that he was urgently wanted at Paris. He re- turned to Yalladolid, M'hence on Jauuary 17 he set out for France. The end of JMoore's expedi- tion belongs to Euglish history. § 2. First German War of Liberation. — JDadle of Wag- ram. — Treat)/ of Schonbriiiin. — War with Jxiissia impending. — Divorce of Josephine. — Marriage with Marie Louise. Another storm was indeed gathering. Austria had been reduced to despair by the blows she had received, first at rressbm-g, then at Tilsit, and the fate of the royal house of Spain seemed like a warning to tliat of Austria. But the year that followed Tilsit offered her a chance, which she grasped as a last chance. Spain, which formerly had given Napoleon help, now swallowed up 300,000 of his troops, so that in the autumn of ISOS he had been obliijed to withdraw from Pi'us- ^TAT. .39.] First War of Liberal ion. 155 sia the large army which he had kept for more than a year quartered on that unhappy country. Napoleon could spare henceforth only half his force, and there was now no douht that Prussia would be as hostile to him as she dared. True, the army of Frederick had ceased to exist, but the country was full of soldiers who had belonged to it, full of skilled officers, and Spain had filled all minds with the thouglit of popular war. Stein and Scluirnhorst had been preparing a lev^e en masse in Prussia and an insurrection in the new kingdom of Westphalia. Moreover the Austrian statesmen tliought they saw an opposition to Na- poleon rising at home under the leadership of Talleyrand, and they thought also that the Spanish affair had alienated Alexander. It was reported that Talleyrand had said to Alexander at Erfurt, ' Sire, you are civilized and your nation is not ; we are civilized and our Sovereign is not ; you there- fore are our natural ally.' Such considerations and illusions caused the war of 1809, which may be called the First German War of Liberation, under the leadership of Austria. It was welcomed by Napoleon, who wanted new victories to fetrieve his position. His superiority, though on the wane, was still enormous. Through the Confederation of the Rhine he had now a great German army at 156 War icith Austria. [a.d. iso9. his disposal, ■\vliicb he placed under French gener- als. His frontier was most formidabl}'' advanced through the possession of Tyrol and Venetia. Eussia was on his side, and, though slic did not actively' help him in the field, was of great use in holding down Prussia ; England was against him, but could do little for an inland state such as Austria now was. In these circumstances the attitude of Austria had something heroic about it, like that of Spain, and the war throughout is like a somewhat pale copy of the Spanish insurrection. But Austria has what Spain had not, the advan- tage of organization and intelligence. Since Press- burg she had passed through a period of reform and shown some signs of moral regeneration, Stad- ion and the arcliduke Charles doing ior her, though not so eflectively, what Stein and Seharidiorst did for Prussia. Few wars have begun with less osten- sible ground, or more evidently from an intolerable position. Napoleon accused Austria of arming, of wanting war ; Austria expostulated, but in vain ; and war began. It began early in April, and the proclamation of the archduke Charles was ad- dressed to the whole German nation. The watch- word of Austria against France was now liberty and nationality. A good general conception of the war may be obtained by comparing it with that .ETAT. 39.] Battle of the Marchfeld. 157 of 1805, which it resembles in certain large fea- tures. Again there is a short but decisive passage of arms in Bavaria ; in a five days' struggle, cele- brated for Napoleon's masterly manoeuvres, tlie Austrians are driven out of llatisbon (April 23), and the way to Vienna is laid open. Again ISTa- poleon enters Vienna (May 13). But the war in Italy this time begins farther east, on the Piave. Eugene Beauharnais, after an unfortunate com- mencement, when he was defeated at Sacile by the archduke John, makes a successful advance, and being joined by Marmont, who makes his way to him from Dalmatia by way of Fiume, drives the Austrian army into Hungary, defeats them at Eaab, and effects a junction with Napoleon at Bruck. Then, as before, the w^ar is transferred from Vienna to the other side of the Danube. But the Austrian resistance is now far more obsti- nate than in 1805. From the island of Lobau Napoleon throws his troops across the river in the face of the archduke. A battle takes place which occupies two successive days (May 21, 22), and is sometimes called the battle of the Marchfeld, but is sometimes named from the villages of Gross- Aspern and Essling. It stands with that of Eylau in 1807 among the most terrible and bloody battles of the period. In all perhaps 50,000 men fell, 158 Battle of Wagram. [a.d. 1809. among wLoin was Marshal Lannes, and the French were driven back into their island. Five weeks passed in inaction before Napoleon could retrieve this check, five weeks during which the condition of Europe was indeed singular, since its whole destiny depended upon a single man, and he, be- sides the ordinary risks of a campaign, was threat- ened by an able adversary who had recently brought him to the verge of destruction, and by outraged populations which might rise in insurrection round him. This is the moment of the glory of Hofer, the hero of the peasant war in Tyrol. Once more, however, Napoleon's skill and fortune prevailed. On the night of July 4th he succeeded, under cover of a false attack, in throwing six bridges from Lo- bau to the left bank of the Danube, over which more than 100,000 men passed before morning, and w^ere arrayed upon the Marchfeld. The obsti- nate battle of Wagram followed, in wliich, by a miscalculation which became the subject of nmch controversy, the archduke John came too late to his brotlier's help. The Austrians were worsted, but by no means decisively, and retired in good order. Austerlitz and Friedland had led at once to peace, because the principal belligerent, Eussia, had little direct interest in the war; Wagram jETXT. .39.] Armistice signed at Znaim. 159 ought to have had no similar effect. Austria was engaged in a war of liberation ; Tyrol was emulat- ing Spain ; there should therefore have been no negotiation with the invader. But Germany had as yet but half learnt the Spanish principle of war ; in particular the Austrian Government and the archduke Charles himself belonged to Old Austria rather than to ISTew Germany. In the campaign the archduke had fallen much below his reputa- tion, having allowed it plainly to appear that Xapoleon frightened him, and now, instead of appealing again to German patriotism, he signed at Znaim (July 11th) an armistice similar to that which Melas had so unaccountably concluded after Marengo, But it was by no means certain that all was yet over. North Germany might rise, as Spain had risen and as Tyrol had risen. The archduke Ferdinand had marched into Poland and threatened Thorn, with the intention of provoking such a movement in Prussia, and England was preparing a great armament which the patriots of North Germany, who now began to emulate the Spanish guerilla leaders, — Schill, Dornberg, Katt, Brunswick, — anxiously expected. There seems little doubt that, if this armament had made Germany its object, Germany would at once have sprung to arms and have attempted, perhaps 160 Treaty of Schonhriiim. [a.d. iso9. prematurely, what iu 1813 it accomplished. AVhat was expected in Germany had happened already in the Peninsula. Arthur Wellesley had landed at Lisbon on April 22, and in less than a month had dri\'en Soult iu confusion out of Portugal. Iu July he undertook an invasion of Spain by the valley of Tagus. Thus both the quantity and quality of resistance to Xa- poleon was greater than at any former time ; but it was scattered, and the question was whether it could concentrate itself. England was unfortunate this time in her inter- vention. Tlie armament did not set sail till August, when in Austria the war seemed to be at an end, and when Wellesley, after M-inning the battle of Talavera, had seen himself obliged to retire into Portugal, and it was directed not to Germany but against Antwerp. It was therefore a mere diversion, and as such it proved unsuccess- ful. It created indeed a great flutter of alarm in the administration at Paris, which saw France itself left unprotected while its armies occupied Vienna and Madrid, but by mismanagement and misfortune the great enterprise failed, and accom- plished nothing but the capture of Flushing. And so the last triumph of Napoleon was achieved, and the treaty of Schonbrunn was signed jETAT. 40] Alienation from Russia. 161 on October 14. By this treaty, as by former treaties, he did not merely end a war or annex territory, but developed his empire and gave it a new character. He now brought to an end the duumvirate which had been established at Tilsit. Under that system his greatness had been de- pendent on the concert of Eussia. He had had the czar's permission to seize Spain, the czar's co- operation in humbling Austria. Schonbrunn made his empire self-dependent and self-supporting, and thus in a manner completed the edifice. But he could not thus discard Eussia without making her an enemy, and accordingly the Eussian war appears on the horizon at the very moment that the Austrian war is terminated. Tliis trans- formation was accomplished by first humbling Austria, and then, as it were, adopting her and giving her a favored place in the European confederacy. She lost population to the amount of 3,500,000, besides her access to the sea ; she paid an indemnity of more than £3,000,000, and engaged to reduce her army to 150,000. But, thus humbled, a high and unique honor was reserved for her. We cannot be quite certain whetlier it was part of Napoleon's original plan to claim the hand of an archduchess, though this seems likely, since Napoleon would hardly break H 162 Marriage Negotiations. [a.d. isio. with Eussia unless he felt secure of the alliance of Austria, and yet in the treaty of Schoubrunn he does not hesitate to offend Eussia by raising tlie Polish question. What is certain is that after his return to France Napoleon proceeded at once to the divorce ; that at the same time he asked the czar for the hand of his sister ; that upon this Austria, alarmed, and seeing her own doom in the Eussian match, gave him to understand (as he may very well have calculated that she would do) that he might have an archduchess ; and that upon this he extricated himself from his engagement to the czar with a rudeness whicli might seem intended to make him an enemy. At the same time he refused to enter into an engagement not to raise the Polish question. We can under- stand the alarm of Austria, for the Eussian match would perhaps have riveted most firmly the chains of Germany. In Napoleon's conduct reappears the same peculiarity that he had shown in his treat- ment of Prussia and of Spain. It seems less like statesmanship than some malignant vice of nature til at he always turns upon an ally, even an ally who is most necessary to him. The sudden turn he now took, apparently without any neces- sity, involved him in the Eussian expedition, and caused his ruin. ^TAT. 41.] Marie Louise. 163 At an earlier period we saw Napoleon urged by his brothers to divorce Josephine, but refusing steadfastly and apparently resolved upon adopting the eldest son of Louis and Hortense. He had now quite ceased to be influenced by his brothers, but at the same time he had risen to such great- ness that he had himself come to think differently of the question. Fourteen years before he had been warmly attached to Josephine ; this attach- ment had been an effective feature in the character of republican hero which he then sustained. Mme. de Staiil had been profoundly struck, when, on being charged by her with not liking women, he had answered, ' J'aime la mienne.' ' It was such an answer, ' slie said, ' as Epaminondas would have given ! ' He is now equally striking in the part of an Oriental sultan, and when he discards his Josephine from motives of ambition he requires to be publicly flattered for his self-sacrifice by the officials, by Josephine herself, and even by her son Eugene Beauharnais ! The archduchess ]\Iarie Louise, who now ven- tured to take the seat of Marie Antoinette, seems to have been of amiable but quite insignificant character. Her letters are childlike. She became a complete Frenchwoman, but, owing to a certain reserve of manner, was never specially popular. 164 The King of Rome. [a.d. isio. On March 20, 1811, slie bore a son, wlio took the title of King of Eome, by which in the Holy Roman Empire the successor had been designated. France had thus become once more as monarchi- cal as in the proudest days of Versailles ; but the child of empire was reserved for what his father called ' the saddest of fates, the fate of Astyanax.' § 3. Annexation of Holland and Westphalia. — Dissolu- tion of the alliance of Tilsit. — Invasion of Russia. Y Arrived now at the pinnacle, Napoleon pauses, as he had paused after Marengo. We are disposed to ask, What use will he now make of his bound- less power ? It was a question he never consid- ered, because the object he had set before himself in 1803 was not yet attained; he was not in the least satiated, because, much as he had gained, he had not trained what he sought, that is, the humiliation of England. As after Tilsit, so after Schonbrunn, he only asks, How may the new re- sources be best directed against England? Yet he did not, as we might expect, devote himself to crushing the resistance of the Peninsula. This he seems to have regarded with a mixed feeling of contempt and despair, not knowing how to overcome it, and persuading himself that it was not worth a serious effort. He persisted in saying ^TAT. 41.] Annexation of Sea-Coast. 165 that the only serious element in the Spanish oppo- sition was the English army ; this would fall with England herself; and England, he thought, was on tlie point of yielding to the blockade of the Continental system. He devotes himself hence- forth therefore to heightening the rigor of this blockade. From the beginning it had led to con- tinual annexations, because only Napoleon's own administration could be trusted to carry it into effect. Accordingly the two years 1810-11 wit- ness a series of annexations chiefly on the northern sea-coast of Europe, where it was important to make the blockade more efficient. But on this northern sea-coast lay the chief interests of Eus- sia. As therefore in 1805 he had brought Austria and Eussia on himself by attacking England, so in 1810 he presses his hostility to England to the point that it breaks the alliance of Tilsit and leads to a Eussian war. The year 1810 is occupied with this heighten- ing of the Continental system and the annexations wliich it involved. That he had long contem- plated the annexation of Holland appears from the offer of the crown of Spain which he made to Louis in 1808, and the language he then used (' La Hollande ne saura sortir de ses mines '). He now took advantage of the resistance which Louis made 1G6 Holland and Westphalia. [a.d. isio. to his ruinous exactious. Louis was driven to abdicate, and the country was organized in nine Trench departments (July 9). In August the troops of the king of Westphalia were forced to make way for French troops at the mouths of the Elbe and Weser, and a few months later the whole coast between the llliine and the Elbe was annexed. At the same time Napoleon began to make war on nentral commerce, especially Ameri- can, affirming that in order to complete the de- struction of English trade it was only necessary to prohibit it when it made use of neutral bottoms. So thoroughly in earnest was he with his Conti- nental system ; and indeed it is beyond dispute that great distress and discontent, nay, at last a war with the United States, were inflicted upon England by this policy. But the pressure of it was felt even more on the Continent, and the ultimate cause of the fall of Napoleon was this, that under the weight of the Continental system the alliance of Tilsit broke down sooner than the resistance of England. That alliance had been seriously weakened by the Austrian marriage, and by Napoleon's refusal to give the guarantees which Kussia required that Poland should never be restored. In- deed, Napoleon had seemed to take pleasure iETAT. 41.] Alliance of Tilsit dissolved. 1G7 ia weakening it, but perhaps he had only desired to make it less burdensome to himself without destroying it. At the end of 1810 measures Avere taken on both sides which conveyed the impression to Europe that it was practically at an end. Alexander refused to adopt Napoleon's policy towards neutrals ; Napoleon answered by annexing Oldenburg, ruled by a Duke of the Eus- sian house ; Alexander rejoined by an ukase (De- cember 31st) which modified the restrictions on colonial trade and ^heightened those on French trade. In 1811 the alliance of Tilsit gradually dis- solves. Napoleon's Eussian expedition should not be regarded as an isolated freak of insane pride. He himself regarded it as the unfortu- nate effect of a fatality, and he betrayed through- out an unwonted reluctance and perplexity. ' The war must take place,' he said, ' it lies in the na- tufe'of things.' That is, it arose naturally, like the other Napoleonic wars, out of the quarrel with England. '^XJpon the Continental system he had staked everything. He had united all Europe in the crusade against England, and no state, least of all such a state as Eussia, could withdraw from the system without practically joining England. Nev- ertheless, we may wonder that, if he felt obliged 168 Plan of the Russian Expedition, [a.d. isu. to make war on Kussia, be should have chosen to wage it in the manner he did, by an over- whelming invasion. For an ordinary war his re- sources were greatly superior to tliose of Russia. A campaign on the Lithuanian frontier would no doubt have been unfavorable to Alexander, and might have forced him to concede the points at issue. Napoleon had already experienced in Spain the danger of rousing national spirit. It seems, however, that this lesson had been lost on him, and that he still lived in the ideas which the campaigns of 1805, 180G, and 1807 had awakened, when he had occupied Vienna and Berlin in succession, overthrown the Holy Eoman Empire, and con- quered Prussia. He makes a dispute about tariffs the ground for the greatest military expe- dition known to authentic history ! In this we see a stroke of his favorite policy, which consisted in taking with great suddenness a measure far more decisive than had been expected ; but such policy seems here to have been wholly out of place. He was perhaps partly driven to it by tlie ill success of his diplomacy. War with France meant for Russia, sooner or later, alli- ance with England, but Napoleon was not able to get the help of Turkey, and Sweden joined Russia. Turkey had probably heard of the .^TAT. 42.] Sweden gained hy Russia. 169 partition-schemes which were agitated at Tilsit, and was also iuHuenced by the threats and promises of England. Sweden suffered grievously from the Continental system, and Bernadotte, who had lately become crown-prince, and who felt that he could only secure his position by .pro- curing for Sweden some compensation for the recent loss of Finland, offered his adhesion to the power which would helj) him in acquiring Norway. Napoleon declined to rob his ally, Den- mark, but Alexander made the promise, and Sweden was won. Against Kussia, Sweden, and England (a coalition which formed itself but tar- dily) Napoleon assembled the forces of France, Italy, and Germany, and hoped to win, as usual, by the rapid concentration of an overwhelming force. Austria and Prussia had suffered so much in the former wars of the period, and especially in 1805-7, from the insincere and delusive alli- ance of Eussia, that they were driven this time to side at least nominally with Napoleon. The army with which he invaded Russia consisted of some- what more than G00,000 men, — the French troops mainly commanded by Davoust, Oudinot, and Ney, the Italian troops by Prince Eugene, the Poles by Poniatowski, the Austrian contingent (33,000 men) by Schwarzenberg, the remaining German troops 170 Magnitude of the Expedition, [a.d. I812. by Gouvion St. Cyr, Eeynier, Vandamme, Victor, Macdonald (who had the Prussian contingent), and Augereau. When we consider that the war of the Peninsula was at the same time at its height, and that Enghi,nd was now at war with the United States, we may form a notion of the calamitous condition of the world. Eussia had been defeated at Austerlitz and Friedland, where it fought far from home for a cause in which it was but slightly interested. Against an invasion it was as invincible as Spain, being strengthened by a profoundly national relig- ion and perfect loyalty to the government ; in addi- tion it had the strength of its vast extent, its rigorous climate, and the half-nomad habits of its people. By his prodigious preparations Napoleon provoked a new national war under the most difficult cir- cumstances, and yet he appears to have desired peace, and to have advanced most reluctantly. His campaign runs the same course as against Aus- tria in 1805 and 1809. There is the successful ad- vance, the capture of the fortress (Smolensk), the great victory (at Borodino), the entry into the capi- tal (Moscow) ; but of all this no result. No nego- tiation follows, and Napoleon suddenly finds himself helpless, as perhaps he would have done in 1805 and 1809 had the enemy shown the same firmness. ^TAT. 42.] Napoleon at Dresden. 171 § 4. Battle of Borodino. — Burning of Moscow. — Re- treat from Moscoiv. On May 16, 1812, he arrived with Marie Louise at Dresden, where for the last time he appeared as king of kings — the Emperor of Austria, the King of Prussia, a multitude of German sovereigns, Met- ternich and Hardeuberg paying court to him. On the 28th he set out again, and travelled by Glogau, Thorn, Dantzic, Konigsberg, Gumbinuen, to Vil- kowyski, where he arrived on June 21st. On the 24th the mass of the army passed the Niemeu at Kovno, and on the 28th Napoleon entered Vilna, wliich was evacuated by the Eussiaus. Here he remained till July 16th. In this long delay, as well as in other circumstances, the unwonted perplexity of his mind appears. Alexander, who has by this time gained greatly in decision of char- acter, refuses to negotiate while the enemy stands on Eussian territory ; Napoleon, in conversation with Balacheff, shows an almost pathetic desire for an amicable arrangement. He is embarrassed again when a deputation from Warsaw, where a diet had met, bids him only say that ' Poland exists, since his decree would be for the world equivalent to the reality.' This word he declines to say, alleging his obligations to Austria. From his 172 The Poles repulsed. [a.d. I812. conversations with Xarbonne (Villemain, Souvenirs) we find that he had deliberately considered and rejected what we may call the rational mode of waerincr war with Eussia, that is, throup;h the res- toration of Poland. He admitted that he might indemnify Austria, and, if necessary, Prussia else- where, but he argued that he could not afford to open the floodgates of republicanism : ' Poland must be a camp, not a forum.' He had in fact — perhaps mainly since his second marriage — come to regard himself as the representative of legiti- macy against the Revolution. It was thus with his eyes open that he preferred the fatal course of striking at Moscow. His judgment was evi- dently bewildered by the successes of 1805 and 180G, and he indulges in chimerical imaginations of delivering Europe once for all from the danger of barbaric invasion. It is to be ol^served that he seems invariably to think of the Prussians as Tartars ! In relating this war we have to beware of national exaggerations on both sides. On Na- poleon's side it is absurdly said that he was only vanquished by winter, whereas it is evident that he brought the winter upon himself, first by begin- ning so late, then by repeated delays, at Vilna, at Vitebsk, and most of all at Moscow. On tlie other JET AT. 42.] Russian Strategy. 173 side, we must not admit absolutely the Russian story that he was lured onward by a Parthian policy, and that Moscow was sacrificed by a solemn universal act of patriotism. Wellington's policy of retrogi'ade movements had indeed come into fashion among specialists, and an entrenched camp was preparing at Drissa on tlie Dwina in imita- tion of Torres Vedras. But the nation and the army were full of reckless confidence and impa- tience for battle ; only their preparations were by no means complete. The long retreat to Moscow and beyond it was unintentional, and filled the Eussians with despair, while at the same time it agreed with the views of some of the more enlight- ened strategists. As usual, Napoleon took the enemy by surprise, and brought an overwhelming force to the critical point. When he crossed the Niemen the Eussians were still thinking of an offensive war, and ru- mors had also been spread that he would enter Volhynia. Hence their force was divided into three armies : one, commanded by the Livonian Barclay de Tolly, had its headquarters at Vilna ; a second, under Prince Bagration, was further south at Volkowysk ; the third, under Tormaseff, was in Volhynia. But the total of these armies scarcely amounted to 200,000 men, and that of Barclay de 174 The Population called out. [a.d. I812. Tolly opposed little more than 100,000 to the main body of Napoleon's host, which amounted nearly to 300,000. Hence it evacuates Vilna and retires by Svenziany to the camp at Drissa. Barclay arrives at Drissa on July 9th, and here for the hrst time the emperor and the generals seem to realize the extent of the danger. Alexander issues an ukase calling out the population in the propor- tion of five to every hundred males, and hurries to Moscow, and thence to St. Petersburg, in order to rouse the national enthusiasm. The Drissa camp is also perceived to be untenable. It had been in- tended to screen St. Petersburg, and Napoleon is seen to look rather in the direction of Moscow. Barclay retires to Vitebsk, but is obliged, in order to effect his junction with Bagration, to retreat still further, and Napoleon enters Vitebsk on the 28th, The road to Moscow passes between the Dwiua, which flows northward, and the Dnieper, which flows southward, Vitebslc on the one river and Smolensk on the other, forming, as it were, the two doorposts. We expect to find Napoleon at this point cutting the hostile armies in two, and com- pelling that of Bagration to surrender ; he has a great superiority of numbers, and he might have had the advantage of a friendly population. But his host seems unmanageable, and the people are ^TAT. 4.1.] Capture of Smolensk, 175 estranged by tlie rapacity and cruelty to which it is driven by insufficient supplies. Barclay and Bagration effect their junction at Smolensk on August 3, and now have a compact army of at least 120,000 men. They evacuate Smolensk also on the IStli, but only after an obstinate defence, which left Napoleon master of nothing but a burn- ing ruin. Both at Vitebsk and Smolensk he betrayed the extreme embarrassment of his mind. Should he go into winter quarters ? should he press forward to Moscow ? It was a choice of desperate courses. His army was dwindling away ; he had forfeited the support of the Poles ; Germany was full of discon- tent; and yet a large part of his army was Polish or German ; how could he delay ? And yet if he advanced, since August was already running out, he must encounter the Eussian winter. He deter- mined to advance, relying on the overwhelming effect that would be produced hj the occupation of Moscow. He would win, as after Austerlitz and Friedland, through the feebleness and fickleness of Alexander. Meanwhile his unresisted progress, and the aban- donment by Barclay of one position after another, created the greatest consternation among the Eus- sians, as well they might. Barclay was a foreigner, 176 Battle of Borodino. [a.d. I812. and might well seem another Melas or Mack. A cry arose for his dismissal, to which the Czar re- sponded by putting old Kutusoff, who was at least a Eussian, at the head of all his armies. This change necessarily brought on a great battle, which took place on September 7, near the village of Borodino. More than 100,000 men with about six hundred pieces of artillery were engaged on each side. It ended in a victory, but an almost fruitless victory, for the French. They lost per- haps 30,000 men, including Generals Montbrun and Caulaincourt, the Eussians nearly 50,000, in- cluding Prince Bagration. Here again Napoleon displayed unwonted indecision. He refused to let loose his guard, consisting of 20,000 fresh troops, who might apparently have effected the complete dissolution of the hostile army, and ma- terially altered the whole sequel of the campaign. He said, 'At 800 leagues from Paris one must not risk one's last reserve.' This battle, the greatest after Leipsic of all the jSTapoleonic battles, was followed by the occupa- tion of Moscow on September 14, which, to Napo- leon's great disappointment, was found almost entirely empty. After a council of war Kutusoff had taken the resolution to abandon the old capital, the loss of which was held not to be so -STAT. 43.] Burning of Moscow. 177 irreparable as the loss of the army. But, as with Okl-Russiau craft he had announced Borodino to the Czar as a victory, the sensation produced upon the Eussian public by the fall of Moscow was all the more overwhelming. Nor did the next oc- currence, which immediately followed, at first bring any relief Fires broke out in Moscow on the night after Napoleon's entrance ; on the next night, by whicli time he was quartered in the Kremlin, the greater part of the city was in flames, and on the day following he was forced by the progress of the conflagration to evacuate the Kremlin again. But on the first intelligence of this catastrophe the destruction of Moscow was attributed in Rus- sia to the French themselves, and was not by any means regarded as a crushing blow dealt at Napo- leon by Russian patriotism. It is indeed not clear that this event had any decisive influence upon the result of the war. Nor does it seem to have been the deliberate work of the patriotism of Moscow. The beginner of it was one man, Count Rostopchiu, governor of Mos- cow, who is shown by many public utterances to have brooded for some time over the thought, and is proved to have made preparations for carrying it into effect before leaving the town. It is, how- ever, supposed that what was begun by him was 12 178 Constancy of Alexander. [a.d. I812. completed by a rabble which had no object but plunder, and partly by French soldiers. The im- mediate effect of it was to deepen the alarm of the Eussians, and, when this feeling passed away, to deepen their hatred of the French. Now came the critical moment. Would Alexander negotiate ? That is, would he listen to certain timid courtiers about him such as Komanzoff, or would he be in- spired by the partiotic ardor of his people and lean on his nobler counsellors, the German patriot Stein or Sir Eobert Wilson ? The pressure for a moment was great. We can imagine that had the Kussian army been dissolved at Borodino, it might have been irresistible. But he stood firm ; he re- fused to negotiate ; and Napoleon suddenly found that he had before him, not the simple problem he had soh-ed so often in earlier life, but the insol- uble puzzle he had first encountered in Spain. His failures in Egyj^t and in Spain had been more or less disguised. He was now in danger of a failure which could not be concealed, and on a far larger scale ; but had he retreated forthwith and wintered in Vilna, where he might have arrived early in November, the conquest of Eussia might have seemed only to be postponed for a year. In- stead of this he delayed five weeks in ]\Ioscow, and then complained of the Eussian winter ! ^TAT. 43.] Retreat from Moscoiv. 179 After planniug a demonstration on St. Petersburg, \veighing Darn's scheme of wintering in Moscow (which he called ' uu conseil de lion '), and wait- ing in vain for the Czar's submission, he set out on October 20, after blowing up the Kremlin. He marched southward to Kaluga, hoping to make his way through a richer and unexhausted country. But while his forces had dwindled the Eussian had increased. Peace with Sweden had released a Eussian force in Finland; peace with Turkey released the army of the Danube ; meanwhile levies were proceeding through the whole empire. Napoleon's plan was frustrated by a check he received at Malojaroslavetz, and he had to turn northward again and return as he had come. He reached Smolensk on November 9, when he might have been at Vilna. He marched by Orcza to the Berezina, which he struck near Borisoff. Here Tchitchagoff at the head of the Danube army con- fronted him, and two other Eussian armies were approaching. Napoleon on his side was joined by what remained of the corps of Oudinot and Victor, who had held the line of the Dwina. But what was the army of Napoleon which was thus rein- forced ? In July it had consisted of more than 250,000 men. It had suffered no decisive defeat, and yet 180 Destruction of the Army. [a.d. isis. it amounted now only to 12,000 ; in the retreat from Moscow alone about 90,000 had been lost. The force which now joined it amounted to 18,000, and Napoleon's star had still influence enough to enable him to make his way across the Berezina, and so escape total ruin and captivity. But De- cember came on, and the cold was more terrible than ever. On the evening of December 6th a miserable throng, like a crowd of beggars, tottered into Vilna. The corps of Macdonald, Eeynier, and Scliwar- zenberg (among whom were included the Austrian and Prussian contingents) had escaped destruction, having been posted partly on the Polish frontier, partly in the Baltic provinces. For these we may deduct 100,000 from the total force ; it then ap- pears that half a million had perished or disap- peared. They had perished not by unexpected cold ; ' the cold had but finished the work of dis- solution and death almost accomplished by the enemy, by hardship, and especially by hunger ' (Charras) ; nor is cold unusual in Eussia in No- vember ! Napoleon's error was one which may be traced as clearly in the campaigns of 1805 and 1806, the error of making no provision whatever for the case of ill-success or even success less than complete. ^TAT. 4.3.] Imperialism. 181 It was now the twentieth year that Europe was tearing itself to pieces. For some years past the pretence of revolutionary principles had been given up. There was now no pretext for war except the so-called maritime tyranny of England ; but yet the magnitude of wars had increased beyond all meas- urement. The campaign of 1812 left everything^ in civilized history far behind it. All the abuses of the old monarchy and all the atrocities of the Eevolution put together were as nothing compared to this new plague, bred between the Eevolution and the old monarcliy, having the violence of the one and the vainglory of the other, with a system- atic professional destructiveness peculiar to im- perialism superadded. -- --'' 182 Niqjoh'on's Position. [a.d. isis. CHAPTER VI. FALL OF NAPOLEON. § 1. TFcrrs of 1813-14. — War tvith Jiussia and Prussia. — lielations to Austria. But M'hat M-as Napoleon's position ! Any government but the strongest would have sunk under such a blow, but Napoleon's government was the strongest, and at its strongest moment. Opposition had long been dead; public opinion was paralyzed ; no immediate rising was to be feared. Should he then simply take the les- son home, and make peace with Alexander? Impossible; he must efface the disaster l^y new triumphs. But, as this was evident to all, Alex- ander could not but perceive that he must not lose a inoment, but must hasten forward and rouse Germany, before Napoleon should have had time to levy a new army. 1813 must be filled with a war in Germany, as 1812 with the war in Russia. ^TAT. 43.J Return of Napoleon. 183 Napoledn abandoned the wreck of his army at Sniorgoni on December 5 (as lie had left his Egyptian army thirteen years before), travelling in a carriage placed npon a sledge, and accom- panied by Caulaiiicourt and Duroc. He had an interview with Marct outside Vilna, and then travelled to Warsaw, where he saw his ambassador De Pradt, who has left an account of his con- fused talk. Here, as in the famous 29th bulletin, published a little later, we observe that he consoles liimself iov the loss of his army by reflecting that his own health was never better — he kept on repeating this. Then he said, ' From the sublime to the ridiculous there is but a step ; ' for the retreat from Moscow strikes him as ridiculous ! From Warsaw he passed to Dresden, where he saw his ally the King of Saxony, and wrote letters to the Emperor of Austria and to the King of Prussia. He then made his way by Erfurt and Mainz to Paris, where he arrived on December 18th. The bulletin had appeared two days before. He had said to De Pradt that he intended to raise 300,000 men and appear on the Niemen again in the spring. The first part of this intention he fuUilled, for in April he reappeared in the field with 300,000 men ; but the campaign 184 Rising of Prussia. [a.d. I8i3. was fought not on the line of the Niemen, nor of the Vistula, nor of the Oder, and he had to fiaht a battle before he could even reach the Elbe. For a great event took place less than a fortnight after his arrival in Paris, the defec- tion of the Prussian contingent under York from the grand army ; this event led to the rising of Prussia against Napoleon. York's convention with the Ptussians is dated December 30th. On January 22. 1813, Stein appeared at Konigsberg and procured the assembling of the estates of East Prussia, in which assembly the Prussian landwehr was set on foot. On February 27th he concluded for the Czar the treaty of Kaliscli with Prussia, by which the old Coalition of 1806 may be said to have been revived. Prussia now rushed to arms in a wholly new spirit, emulating Spain and Eussia in devotion, and adding to devotion an intelligence peculiar to herself At the same time measures were taken tb break up the Confed- eration of the PJiine. Tettenborn cleared the French out of the northern departments in March ; Saxony too passed into the hands of the allies, and it was hoped that the king himself might be induced to follow the example of the King of Prussia. But April came, and Napoleon took the field again. ;etat. 43.] Napoleon at Mainz. 185 By rapidity and energy lie was still able to take the offensive. Though Eussia and Prussia were now as Spain, yet the process of calling out and drilling their population was only just begun, and it proceeded slowly. Their united available force at the opening of the campaign scarcely exceeded 100,000 men. Austria and the middle states did not abandon Napoleon. With tact and with ju- dicious concession he might yet retrieve his posi- tion ; perhaps no one as yet had begun to think of his fall. He left St. Cloud for Mainz on April 15th. His object was Saxony, where Dresden, the scene of his last display of omnipotence less than a year ago, was now the residence of the Czar and the King of Prussia united against him. Eugene was maintaining himself on the lower Saale with an army of about 70,000 men, and Napoleon was to march by way of Erfurt to join him. Between Erfurt, Bamberg, and Mainz he had by this time about 150,000 men, troops indeed without disci- pline and with imperfect drill, youths, the last hope of France, but well ofticered and not want- ing in the enthusiasm which his name still in- spired. There was, however, a serious deficiency of cavalry. Meanwhile Davoust, stationed on the Weser with 30,000 men, was holding down the insurrection of North Germany. 186 Napoleon's strange Reverse. [a.d. isis. The war which now commenced ended not only to the disadvantage of Napoleon, but, unlike any former war, it ended in a complete defeat of France, nay, in the conquest of France, an event to which nothing parallel had been seen in modern Europe, Nor was this result attained by any political or revolutionary means, e.g., by exciting a republican or Bourbon party against Napoleon's authority, but by sheer military superiority. The great conqueror was in his turn completely conquered. This stransre reverse seems traceable to two O principal causes. (1) He had lost in Eussia the unparalleled army, which had been bequeathed to him by the Eevolution, and which had been the instrument of his military achievements. (2) He had succeeded in uniting against him- self Austria, Eussia, and Prussia. Upon the in- curable mutual distrust of these three Powers the greatness of France during the whole period had been based. This had driven Prussia from the first coalition, and held her aloof from tlie sec- ond and third. Moreover, the treacherous policy initiated by Catharine at tlie outset had passed to Alexander, and had been blended in him with char- acteristic frivolity. He had ruined Austria in 1805 and Prussia in 1806 by this mixture of frivolity ^TAT. 43] Tloo Principal Causes. 187 and treachery. In 1807 he had gone openly over to the enemy, and between 1807 and 1812 the Ger- man Powers had been lield in subjection as much by him as by Napoleon. Napoleon's insensate blindness had flung away this strong support, and had achieved what might have seemed impossible — had united the three Powers in a cordial alli- ance. In place of the old bitterness towards Prus- sia there now reigned in Austria the conviction, which Metternich was fond of expressing, that the restoration of Prussia was a vital Austrian interest, and it had become equally clear to Eus- sia that the restoration of Austria and Prussia was necessary to her. The war, though technically one, is really three distinct wai's. There is first the war witli Russia and Prussia, which occupies the month of May and is concluded by an armistice on June 4th. There is next a war with Paissia, Prussia, and Austria, which l)egins in August and is practically termi- nated in October by the expulsion of Napoleon from Germany. Thirdly, there is an invasion of France by the same allied powers. This began in January, 1814, and ended in April with the fall of Naj)olcon. In the first of these wars Napoleon maintained on the whole his old superiority. It has excited 188 Battle of Lilizen. [ad. 1813. needless admiration that with his raw levies he should still liave been able to win victories, since of his two enemies liussia had suffered as much as himself in 1812, and Prussia's army was at the be- ginning of the year actually to make. In the first days of ]\Iay he advanced down the valley of the Saale, making for Leipsic by Naumburg, Weis- senfels, and Liitzen. On the 2d Avas fought the battle commonly called from Liitzen, though the Germans usually name it from tlie village of Gross-GcJr.schen. By tliis battle, in which the great military refornier of I'russia, Scharnhorst, received tlie wound of which he died soon after, the allies were forced to retreat across the Elbe, and Dresden was restored to the King of Saxony. The Trussians attribute their ill-success partly to the insulTiciency of tlie Russian commander Witt- genstein, under whom they fought. Napoleon soon pursued tlie allies across the Elbe, and another bat- tle was fought on May 20 and 21 at Bautzen on the Spree. Here again Napoleon remained mas- ter of the field, thougli his loss seems to have been considerably greater than that of the enemy. The allies retired into Silesia, and a pause took place, which led to the armistice of Poischwitz, signed on June 4th. During this armistice Napoleon formed the resolution which led to his downfall. iETAT. 43.] Battle of Bautzen. 189 He might seem now to liave almost retrieved his losses. If he could not revive the great army of the Ecvolution, which lay buried (or unburied) in Russia, he had reasserted the ascendency of France. Politically he had suffered but one sub- stantial loss, in the rebellion of Prussia. The blows of Liitzen and Bautzen had arrested the movement which threatened to dissolve the Con- federation of tlie Rhine and to unite all Germany against him. They had also shaken the alliance of Prussia and Russia. Between the generals of the two armies there reigned much jealousy; the old question, raised after Austerlitz and Priedland, was beginning to be asked again by the Russians, Why should they fight for others ? At Tilsit Napoleon had dissolved the Coalition by forming as it were a partnership with Russia. It might seem possible now to form a similar part- nership with Austria. This course had indeed been entered upon at the marriage of the arch- duchess. Napoleon seems to have taken the alli- ance seriously. He conceived it as the final suppression of tlie Revolution, as a complete ad- hesion on his own part to conservatism. The language of the bulletins at this time is ultra- conservative. Thus tlie enemy is described as ' preaching anarchy and insurrection,' Stein is 190 Relations ivith Austria, [a.d. 1813, charged with ' rousing the rabble against the proprietors.' But though he had borrowed the Austrian tone, lie had not yet enlisted Austrian interests on his side. It was evidently in his power to confer on Austria the greatest advan- tages, and, as it were, to divide his power with her. Less than this he could not offer, since the losses of France and Russia had given to Austria a decisive weight, but it might seem that he could offer it without much humiliation, as the alliance with Austria had subsisted since 1810 and had been cemented by marriage. If he did not thus win Austria, he might expect her to adhere to the other side, for in such a crisis neutrality was out of the question. Could Napoleon then hope to overcome a quadruple alliance of England, Rus- sia, Prussia, and Austria ? Such a hope was not justified by the victories of Liitzen and Bautzen. The force of Prussia increased every day, and the Spanish enthusiasm with which her new army fought had been displayed even on those fields; the force of Austria had been impaired by no Russian campaign ; while France was evidently near the end of lier resources. The legerdemain by which, in 1800, 1805, 1806, Napoleon had made conquests was now worn out; his blows were no longer followed by abject submission ^TAT. 43.] Concessions to Austria necessary. 191 and surrender; he was not even able, for want of cavalry, to make his victories decisive. Thus ample concessions to Austria were indispen- sable; but, these assumed, his position might seem hopeful. He took the momentous resolution to make no such concessions, saw Austria join the Coalition, and after a campaign of two months found his army driven in tumultuous ruin across the Rhine. This step is the counterpart of Tilsit, and destroyed the work of Tilsit. To understand it we must in the first place weigh his own w'ords, spoken to Schwarzenberg : ' My situation is difficult ; I should ruin myself if I concluded a dishonorable peace. An old government, where the ties between sover- eign and people are old, may sign burdensome con- ditions, when the pressure of circumstances requires it. But I am new ; I must heed opinion mofSp for I need it. Were such a peace announced, at '1^- j^^"*! first, no doubt, we should hear nothing but jubila- tion ; but soon would follow loud criticism on the Government. I should lose tlie respect, and with that the confidence, of my people, for the French- man has a lively imagination ; he loves glory and excitement ; he is sensitive. Do you know what was tlie first cause of the fall of the Bourbons ? It dates from Rossbach.' This view is evidently 1 4^' 192 Napoleons View. '^ [a.d. isis. sound, but it does not explain why he did not at least try his utmost by bribes and promises to win Austria to his interest. aSTevertheless he seems not to have been attracted by this plan, though it was open to him for several months, and though the clamor for peace which his own army and his own marshals raised compelled him to profess to take it into consideration. lie continued delib- erately to contemplate in preference a war against Eussia, Prussia, and Austria united, and refrarded the armistice simply as a delay, which would en- able him to bring up new forces. Metternich has left us an account of the interview, lastinfj ten hours, which he had with Napoleon on June 28, in the Marcolini palace at Dresden. It reveals to us Napoleon's contempt for a power he has so often defeated, his inability to believe that Austria can still have spirit to resist; at the same time we be- come aware that he believes himself to be neces- sary to the Austrian emperor, as being the bulwark of all thrones and of monarchy itself against the Eevolution. Here too we meet with the famous dramatic passage, which we can hardly suppose to have been invented by Metternich, where Napo- leon, on being told that his troops were ' not sol- diers, but children,' answered, turning pale — 'You are no soldier ; you do not know what passes in a -ETAT. 43.] Conversation loith Metternich. 193 soldier's mind ; I grew up in the field, and a man like me troubles himself little about the life of a million of men ' (the actual expression he used, adds Metternich, cannot be reported), — and then flung his hat into a corner of the room. That this was a true description of his way of tliinking had become visible to most since the Eussian catas- trophe, and the audacious frankness with which he blurts it out is quite in his characteristic manner. We cannot but feel how difficult it is to follow tlie movements of a mind which has wandered into such strange latitudes. His judgment, too, which was naturally most correct, must have been bewil- dered by the strangeness of his career. He must have formed the habit of counting upon sudden interventions of fortune ; nay, he must have been well aware that he had risen so high not by fol- lowing probabilities, but by running enormous risks. But it is by no means certain, after all, that Austria was to be bought or bribed. Her course, so far as we can trace it, was firm and honorable ; it seems that the sacrifice of the Archduchess in 1809 ou'dit not to be regarded as Austria's final surrender of self-respect. She cj^uietly withdraws her auxiliary corps from the French army, and 13 |V(Mhrt|vs ho wrMiUI h;v\o grtuunl uwioh uu>\v — Tor oh«?^Hl u« iu\u\<\UA(o ^HNVoo {U this (>ruHV A ^NNUjiWA^t tuot rtl Tn^iiivv* \u Uio wvu"?!^^ of July. i\\«ko >vnv>u?4 |\<\y\\^^5^ llo |v\\vl nv> jutouiivm (v» s^i^lxsl of j».i\ jvnuvnjwl iA\u\htiov,$^ v^O IVrtitiou of tho IHiolvv' of Wax'^uv Ivnwon Avi^ni^K lV»t^\;» ; \^*^> \x\t(.itu(.\on (v> Tnu^s^i;* of Ur... ««vl ilss ix'TiUxMy; \^i^^ oiv^iou of tho U^vrirtU ^vrvn- UhHvs to Aux'^tm; ^-i^ t\^t\^v«t\o« to imio^vtulouvv v>f HVA1 M\ht> vxHvustntotiow of l\u?^i;» ou tho «!x\ilo vNf l{>iVv On tuuin^;;;,; of Au^^ist h^U tho a»uu?it.uv \>"As vUvhuwl ;x^ IV «t «« OWiiv «U\\l tho \KVU» of Nrt\\>UvU \V;V$ «»c>;v\t\l. It MA* A *t.>>!»\\^>iv» vlool*kx»x ou h\s jvuiv IhU ^y^^tj^iv^ h.o juvl^i^l n; ' ; l^o 1\HvI uo ohvMvv but IvtNxxHvn n.iu ar... ...,.., a iu^wss^.Mo viotvxrv ' «TAr. 44,| /'oniMtrn of f/ui Arrnirji. J 95 5 2. W'lr iiillli. iLnaRyi., I'runni.n, iiml, Annlri'i. KnropM /lovv plijn;4(;« a^ain i/if,'; », «f,ru;/!^|c, at! »l(!H|»«;r(if,-fipon;iil)lr', \i,r l-liii ruin ol all 'ivilizafJoti. M'-, fiurinol, any l')n;7«!r f»()<;ak ♦;vc,;i of Ui<; lil/nriy o( U)<5 Hfja?!, I'M- Ik- if< r(;rr;';;nf^y for wfiif;li \,\u; C*ont,(n<;ni?(,l wy^Uifn lia«l iiil alonw \)CMu \,\m \)Vt:U'.7.\,. f/if'af.naU''! Vmufc, liow«;v<;r, lia^ l>y Ifii?) \,\\w. rnrni;-.!)*;'! fnor*j than 400,000 rn«:n to \i<;\\:\\ in a. r;ont«!f5t wliofj tli\ri\})\\'\- iu;-A, of victory. Mi", ]u•^^^\-(\\\',\.^■^.^•.v^ arf) now at J)r«;H'l<:n, .'i.n'l lii;i ;i,rinii;;i ar*; /'i,rran;y;'l alon;^ tli'j wliolfj »;onri'! of (li<; Kll;«-. fron; liofxirnia to il^, nionlJi. Tlii-i (»of'.)tion fiaw l;>;«;n wni\i;w\\u.\, v/«;al<- f.wA \>y tli») a(|li«;;!ion of An^fria U> tfif; f/oalitif>n, for An^ito;), ni-'iJ',:'.';''. Ii'-,r tioop', on tJic, nortJi v/<;;',t i)\ Ilolx'fnia, tlir<;!it,<;ninj.^ I>r<:fi'l';n u.u'\ N'a(»o)r;on'K (;ornniiinif;ation?4 from tli»5 lf;ft ••,j(J<; of tf)<; I'',ll;f;. 'I'll*; fon;<; of tli<; alli«;;t ''aj>proaclii»ij^ .000,000 rn'-.n; ConniHtfJ of tlir<;»; yrcMl mi mi ■:■•,, of v/l»if;li tic; fir^jt, prin';iji;i,lly Aiiwtriafi, ari'l coni;naf»f|f,'l hy \'nnrAi H(;liwar/,<;nh<;r(^, in Htationf.fl on tJi^j I'/^cr in liolifj- irjitt ; tlifc (K/VfjnjignH am )inrti. The ol- 196 The Commanders. [ad. 1813. Eussian army, wliich had made tlie convention of Poischwitz, is still in Silesia. Tt contains more ]iussians than Prussians, bnt a Prussian officer is now pnt at the head of it. "JMiis is Bliicher, the dashing general of hnssars, now an old man of seventy years ; on his staff are some of the lead- ing theorists and enthusiasts of the new Prussian army, such as Gneisenau. But the bulk of the Prussian force is stationed in the Mark of Bran- denburg. In this linal muster of the armies of ]<^uro])c we see that the moral forces have passed over from Fninee to the allies. In the 1^'rench camp there reigns weariness and desire for peace, among the Prussians and llussians heroic ardor and devotion. P>ut the old mismanagement reap- pears on the side of the allies. In the Bohemian camp Schwarzenberg's authority was almost an- nulled by the presence of the sovereigns ; in Sile- sia the heroic Prussian general is in connnand of an army mainly Ivussian. l)ut in the Mark perhaps the greatest blunder was made, for here the main Prussian force was put under the orders of the Crown Prince of Sweden, the Frenchman Bernadotte, wholly alien to the German cause, and bent upon propitiating French public opinion with a view to the succession of Napoleon. Bernadotte is not the only member of the old republican -ETAT. 44.] Battle of the Katzbach. 107 opposition who is seen in the allied camp, now that Napoleon's fall begins to he thought of as possi- ble. Moreau, the man who helped in 1799 to found the consulate, desiring prol)ably to see France ruled by a series of Washingtons, each holding office for a .short term, appears in the Aus- trian camp. If Napoleon was to be dethroned, who had better right to succeed him ? The campaign opens with a blow aimed at Berlin, wliere perhaps Napoleon wished to extin- guish the popular insurrection at its source. Ou- dinot marches on it from Baruth, and is supported by a force from Magdeburg ; Davoust sends an- other corps from ITamburg. Bernadotte proposes to retire and sacrifice Berlin, but in spite of him Billow fights on August 23 the battle of Gross- beeren, within a few miles of the capital. Here first tlie laudwehr distinguished itself, and Berlin was saved. The attack from Magdeburg was defeated by Hirschfeld at Hagelberg on the 27th. IMeanwhile Napoleon himself, at the head of 150,000 men, had marched against Bliicher on the Katzbach. Bliicher retired before him, and he was compelled to return to the defence of Dresden, but he left Macdonald with perhaps 50,000 or 60,000 men to hold Bliicher in check. Almost immediately after his departure (August 26) Mac- 198 Four Defeats and One Victory, [a.d. 1813. clonald was defeated by BliicLer iu tlic liattle of the Katzbacli. Thus the campaign began with two l*russian victories. But when llie great army of Bohemia moved upon Dresden, Napoleon showed liis okl superiority. On August 27 he inflicted on it a terrible defeat. Here Morean, the liero of ITohenlinden, was mortally wounded by a cannon- ball. It seemed for a moment likely that this battle, followed uj) with Napoleon's overwhelming rapidity, would decide the campaign. He pre- jiared to cut off his enemy's retreat into Bohemia. ]>ut tlie news of CJrossbeeren and Katzbach ar- rived ; Napoleon is also said to have l)ecn attacked by illness ; he altered his plan in the moment of execution. The grand stroke of tlie cam])aign I'ailed, and, instead of cutting ofl' the retreat of the grand arnjy, Vandannne was taken prisoner with 10,000 men at Kulm after a battle in Avhich he had lost half that number (August 30). It was evident that the times of Marengo and .Austerlitz were over. Napoleon's ability and authority M^ere as great as ever ; he controlled larger armies ; he opl)osed a Coalition wluch was as unwieldy as former Coalitions ; and yet he had suffered four defeats in a single week and had won but one vic- tory. Within another week he suffered another blow. Ney, making a new advance on Berlin, was iETAT. 44.] Battle of Dennewitz. 199 defeated with great loss at Dennewitz by the Prus- sians under Billow (September 6). Here then ends Napoleon's ascendency ; hence- forth he fights in self-defence or in despair. Yet the massacre was to continue with unabated fury for nearly two months longer. He spent the greater part of September in restless marches from Dresden, now into Silesia, now into Bohemia, by which he wore out his strengtli without winning any substantial advantage. Towards the end of the month a new phase of the war begins. From the beginning the allies had given each other ren- dezvous in the plain of Leipsic. Hitherto Napo- leon had held the line of the Elbe, and had presented a single mass to the three separate armies of tlie Coalition. Now that his collapse begins to be visi- ble, commences the converging advance on Leipsic. The Silesian army crossed the Elbe at AVartenburg on October 3, and on the next days the northern army also crossed at several points. At the same moment the Confederation of the Tlhiue began rapidly to dissolve. A troop of Cossacks under Czernicheff upset the kingdom of Westphalia (Oc- tober 1). Bavaria abandoned Napoleon, and con- cluded the treaty of Itied with Austria (October 8). But for form's sake — we may almost say — a final massacre was still necessary. It took place 200 Battle of Lrijifiic. [a.d. I813. on a satisfactory scale between October 14 and 19, aud ended in the decisive defeat of Napoleon and the capture of Lcipsic. Perhaps nearly half a mil- lion of men were engaged in these final battles. It is reckoned tliat in tlie last three days the Prussians lost sixteen, the Pussians twenty-one, and the Austriaiis fourteen thousand men — total, fifty-one thousand. Napoleon left twenty-three thousand behind him in the hospitals, and fifteen thousand prisoners ; his dead may have been fifteen thousand. He lost also three hundred pieces of artillery. The sufTerings of the wounded almost exceed anything told of the rolrc>at from Moscow. It is a misfortune that the victors al- lowed him to cross tlie Ehine in safety ; had they pressed the pm-suit vigorously, helped as they now were by the I^avarians, they might have brought his career to an end at this j)oint. But for such a decisive measure perhaps even their political views were not yet ripe. However, as at the Berezina iu 1812, so noAv, he had to clear his road by an- otlicr battle. The Bavarians under Wredc met him at llanau, eager to earn some merit with the vic- torious Coalition; hut he broke his way through them (October 30, 31), and arrived at Frankfort. On November 1, 2, be carried tbe remains of his army, some 70,000 men, across the Rhine at JMainz. ^TAT. 44.] Liberation of Germany. 201 § 3. Invasion of France by the Allies. — Napoleon abdicates. The work of eight years was undone ; Napoleon was thrown back to the position he liad occupied at the rupture of the peace of Amiens. The Eus- sian disaster had cancelled Friedland ; Leipsic had cancelled Austerlitz. But could Napoleon consent to humble himself? If he could not make conces- sions in the summer, still less could he do so now. Could he return and reign quietly at Paris, a de- feated general, his reputation crushed by the two greatest disasters of history ? At least he might by abdicating have spared France, already mortally exhausted, the burden of another war. It is among the most unpardonable even of his crimes to have dragged his unhappy country through yet another period of massacre, though nothing that could even appear to l)e a national interest was at stake. In November advances were made to him by the allies, in which peace was proposed on the basis of the ' natural frontiers.' This would have secured to France the main fruits of the First Eevolution- ary War, that is, Belgium, the Left Bank, Savoy, and Nice. Such terms seem generous when we consider the prostration of France, and the over- 202 Manifesto of the Allies. [a.d. 1813. whelming superiority of the allies. But though the Prussian war-party loudly protested against them, and maintained the necessity of weakening France so as to render her harmless, Austria fa- vored them, being jealous alike of Prussia and of the spirit of liberty which the war was rousing in the German population. A little compliance on the part of Napoleon might at this moment have made the general desire for peace irresistible. But he showed no such disposition. He first evaded the proposal, and then, too late, accepted it with suspicious qualifications. After having been decimated, France must now be invaded aiid sub- jugated, for him. On December 1 the allies issued their manifesto from Frankfort, in Mdiich they declare themselves at war not with France but with Napoleon (an imi- tation of the Revolutionary principle ' Peace with peoples, war with Governments ' ), and the invasion followed with almost Napoleonic rapidity. The three armies remain separate as they had been in Germany. The great army under Schwarzeuberg passes through Switzerland, and makes its way to the plateau of Langres (the source of the Seine, Aube, and IMarne), where it begins to arrive about the middle of January; Bllicher's Silesian army crosses the middle Rhine to Nancy ; the northern JETAT. 44.] Invasion of France. 203 army, iiomiually under Bernadotte, passes through Holland. In the course of the march Switzerland and Holland were swept into the Coalition, the resources of which now became overwhelming. It would be difficult to state for what object Napoleon called on France to fight another campaign, particu- larly as the allies guaranteed to her a larger terri- tory than she had possessed under tlie old monarchy. His officers indeed wondered what personal object he could have. They were astonished to hear him talk of another campaign in Germany to be undertaken next spring, of being soon on the Vis- tula again, &c. He was no doubt a prey to ittrp' sions, iiis fortune having accustomed him to expect results ten times greater than the probabilities justified, but his confidence was founded on (1) the great force which still remained to him shut up in German fortresses, (2) the mutual jealousy of the allies, (3) his own connection with the Emperor of Austria, (4) the patriotism which would be roused among the French, as in 1792, by the inva- sion. But his calculations were confounded by tlie rapidity of the invaders, who gave him no time to call out the nation. The Senate did indeed grant him 300,000 men, but to levy, drill, and arm them was impossible, and he had neglected to for- tify Paris. In the armies which had returned 204 Campaign of France. [a.d. i8u. from Germany there hegan desertion of all who were not Freucli. The campaign opened at the end of January, and was over at the end of March. The scene of it was the country between the Marne, Aube, and Seine, partly also the depart- ment of Aisne. At first, though successful at Brienne, Napoleon seemed unable to resist the superior numbers of the enemy. He was defeated at La Eothiere. But the invaders were as yet irresolute ; they divided their forces. This gave him an opportunity. He attacked Bliicher, and, though Avith greatly inferior forces, won four bat- tles in four days, at Champaubert (February 10), at Moutmirail (11), at Cliateau-Thicrry (12), at Vauchamps (13). For the moment this brilliant success gave the campaign quite another charac- ter ; the hopes and patriotic feelings of the French were roused. A congress had already been opened at Chatillon, and under the impression of these victories it would have been easy to conclude a peace, had not Napoleon's position made a reason- able peace inadmissible to him. He felt this, and fell back upon illusions, and upon attempts to sever Austria from the Coalition. At the begin- ning of jMarcli the Coalition was strengthened by the treaty of Chaumont, in which each of the four powers bound themselves for twenty years to keep ^TAT. 44.] Siege and Fall of Paris. 205 150,000 men on foot. Directly afterwards Napo- leon received a crushing blow from the fall of Soissons and the junction of I)liicher's army with the northern army undijr TJiilow, which had entered France by way of Holland and Belgium. Their united force amounted to more than 100,000 men. The battles of Craonno and Laon followed, in which Na])()leo i, without suffering actual defeat, saw his resources dwindle away. On March 18 the conferences at Chatillon came to an end, the plenipotentiaries of the allies declaring Napoleon to have no intention but that of gaining time. About the 2-4th the allies came to the resolution to march on Paris. They had before them only IVIarmont and Mortier, for Napoleon himself had resolved to manceiivro in their rear, and had marched to St. Dizier. The marshals, after an engagement at Fere Champenoise, made good their retreat to Paris, where the enemy followed them on the 29th. Jo.seph Bonaparte withdrew Marie Louise and the King of Rome to Tours. On the oOth the allies attacked in three divisions — the Silesiau army on the side of Montmartre, Prince Eugene of Wurtemberg and Barclay de Tolly by I'antin and Pomainville, the Crown Prince of Wur- temberg and Giulay by Vincennes and Charenton. In the afternoon, after an obstinate resistance, the 206 The Political Struggle. [a.d. i814. marshals offered a capitulation, aud engaged to evacuate the town before seveu o'clock in the morning. Napoleon, advancing by forced marches, was too late. The military struggle is over; the political struggle begins. Since 1804 there had been no independent po- litical life in France. During the Eussiau expe- dition, indeed, a certain General Malet had spread a false report of Napoleon's death in Eussia, and had produced a forged decree of the Senate re- storing the republic. His attempt had for the }noment had so much success that Napoleon had painfully felt the precariousness of his dynasty, the purely provisional cliaracter of the monarchy he had founded. Laiu6 of Bordeaux again had been bold enough, when Napoleon made his last appeal for help to the Corps Legislatif, to conjure him, while he defended the country, to maintain the entire execution of the laws which guarantee to the citizen liberty, security, and property, and to the nation the free exercise of its political rights. Napoleon had replied with an outburst of indignation. But now at last it became nec- essary to take an independent resolution, for in the influential classes it began to be understood that Napoleon must fall, and in particular the generals asked themselves for what rational pur- ^TAT. 44.] The Political Struggle. 207 pose troops were still levied and battles still fought. But not even the germs were visible of any authority that could replace that of Napoleon. Should he be succeeded by another general, or by a regency for his son, or by the Bourbons ? The first course might have been possible had some IMoreau been at hand ; even as it was, Bernadotte, who, like Napoleon, was a Jacobin developed into a prince, made pretensions which were favored by the Czar. Such a course would have been a re- vival of the consulate, but it would not have satisfied the republican party, while it would have been rejected by monarchists of every shade. In favor of the regency, as against the Bourbons, there was much to be said. It would not begin with a fantastic transformation-scene, and it would have a hold on the popular imagination. The de- cision fell out by a sort of accident. To a regency the natural road was by an abdication, which would preserve the principle of inheritance. Such an ab- dication Napoleon gave. On April 4th he reviewed his troops at Fontainebleau, and announced his in- tention of attacking the allies in Paris. They re- ceived his words with enthusiasm ; but just at this point the mainstay of his power failed him. The military aristocracy, the marshals, refused to fol- low him, and Napoleon recognized in a moment 208 Deposition of Napoleon. [a.d. isu. that the end was come. Though in arguing with them he had said that a regency of Marie Louise, whom he called ' a child,' was impossible, yet he now abdicated on condition that his son should succeed under the regency of the empress. Ney, Macdonald, aud Caulaincourt set out for Paris to negotiate tlie establisliment of the regency. Napoleon's power rested first on the support of the great military magnates, but secondly on that of the great civil dignitaries, lavishly enriched by him, whose organ was the Senate. While the marshals forced him to abdicate, liis reign had been brouglit to an end in a wholly dilferent way by the Senate. Talleyrand, vice-president of this body, who had for some time been intriguing in favor of the house of Bourljon, pronounced openly in favor of it before the sovereigns wlieu they en- tered Paris. 'The regency,' he said, ' was an in- trigue ; tlie Bourbons alone were a principle.' He convoked the Senate on April 1st, and on April 2d it voted the deposition of Napoleon aud his family. Tliis decision was ratified tlie next day by the Corps Legislatif. Then occurrcid the alidication in favor of his family, which had the support of the army. The instrument was ])rought to Paris by not less than three famous marshal-s, Ney and Macdonald hav- ^TAT. 44.] The Marshals Disagree. 209 iiig been joined on their way from Fontainebleau by JMarmont. The two solutions were thus brought at the same time before the allied sovereigns) of whom Alexander was not favorably disposed to the Bourbons, and Francis was the father of Marie Louise. For a moment the balance trembled. But Marmont had been brought in contact, during his defence of Paris, with Talleyrand, and had committed himself to him before the marshals took their independent course. After evacuating Paris he liad been stationed on the Essonne. Here he had entered into an en- gagement to place liis corps at the service of the new provisional Government which the Senate had constituted; tlie arrangement was that on April 5th the corps should quit its position and march into Normandy. But when the marslials passing through his camp from Fontainebleau told him of tlieir commission, he had revealed the secret of this engagement with expressions of penitence : he had countermanded liis orders to the inferior oflicers, and had gone with the marshals to Paris. In his absence, however, General Souhanj, influenced by a fear that tlie plot had become known to Napoleon, gave orders to the troops to march on Versailles. This appearance of division in the arn)y was 14 210 Abdication of Napoleon. [a.d. 1814. fatal to Napoleon's family. It decided Alexan- der to declare for the Bourbons, and Caulain- court was instructed to demand from Napoleon an abdication pure and simple. In return he was to retain the title of emperor, and to have the island of Elba in sovereignty, while Marie Louise was to have a principality in Italy. The unconditional abdication was siu;ned at Fontaine- bleau on Ajail 11. By an irony of fortune the Government founded at Brumaire, in which everything had been sacri- ficed to military efiiciency, was the only one of the three Governments of France since 1789 which actually succumbed before an invader. The total result of so many conquests was that France, which, when Napoleon's name was first heard of, was in substantial possession of Belgium, the left bank of the Ehine, Savo}^, and Nice, had now lost the first two acquisitions ; and we shall see what measures he took to deprive her of the other two. His fatal power of bewildering the popular mind was already at work again. This last campaign, the most unpatriotic he ever fouglit, had seemed to redeem his faults, and had given him the name of a heroic defender of his country. It was a view which made way fast, as soon as he had the restored Bourbons for a foil ^TAT. 44-1 His Farewell. 211 § 4. He retires to Elba. — Disquiet in France. — The Hundred Days. — Battle of Waterloo. In the mean time however all the hatred, Ions suppressed, of individuals and of parties broke loose upon him. For the moment he seems to have utterly lost heart. On the night of April 11, after signing the uu conditional abdication, he is said to have taken a dose of a poison which ever since the Eussian campaign he had kept by him. But vomitings, we are told, came on and saved him. On the 20th, when he bade farewell to his soldiers, he had resolved to live, in order ' to re- cord the great deeds we have done together.' He soon found another object for life ; but a year later, after another downfall far more complete and ignominious, he clings to life, and he clings to it afterwards in captivity. The soldiers idolized hira still, and his parting scene at Fontainebleau, when he kissed the eagle, was pathetic ; but when he reached the south of France, he met with other demonstrations of feeling. At Avignon and Orgon the crowd attacked the carriages, and wanted to throw the tyrant into the Rhone. He was com^ pellcd to disguise himself At the coast he was met by an English frigate, which landed him on 212 liduni of llic lUnirbons. [a. u. 1814. May 'It.li at I'oito l''«'rrai(t, in l'!ll)a. It- seems (o liavo heeii ai'raii'_^('(l aiunii',- the S(i\ci'ei|^lis thai lii.s wife and cliilil weic nut \n icjoiii him, nor tliil h(! (•(iiiiplaiii (if this IMane Ldiiisi^ set (Mit I'ni- her old hmnc on .\|iiil llild, and was at Schdnhninn u^iiin heloic tlic end of l\lay. Ahoiit thti saniu time Jose|ihiiie died a( ^hdmais(ln, in tho uriiia of lier ('hddivM l'!ii"rne and I |(iit('ns(\ It must have oeeiirred lo Napoloon vory soon after Ids ani\al in Mlhu that he- waa not 3'et (liiNcn to aiil(iliio^ra|»hy. Never was a <^roat .state in a jHisdimi so untcnalih' and monstrous as l*'ninco al'tcr he ([uiltcd the helm. In twenty years of t.hrilliii"; events, in the cmolions lir.st of tragedy and then ol" epic |uiclr\, the I'Veut h had forgotten the Hoiirlion ennrl, when snddeiil)' the old Condi' lie I'niveuee (under the name 111' l.ouis Will "i anil the Comte d'Artois, Condi- and the I >ue d'Angouleme and the ( )r|)heline dn 'i'em]il(\ ro- uppeared and took possession of the eonnlry, liel'oro even a royalist party liad formed itself in I'Vaneo. Tolitieally indeed they l)ron",ht liherty, for they created a parliament, where all a.ssemhlies had been mule and ser\ ile for foiuteen years ; ]n\l they unsrtlled all domestie affairs, tho position (»f jinhlic men, the jirospei-ts of the army, the title of estates, in a manner so sudden and inloleralile, *TAT. 45.] Congress of Vienna. 213 cspociiilly at a iiionieiit ■when the country had suffered conquest from without, tliat some new convulsion seemed manifestly innuinent. Dis- graced, l)(!\vildoro(l, and alarmed at tlio same time, the French could think with regret even of tho reign of Napoleon. The wludesale massacre of the last two years might have been expected to seem like a had dream as soon as the s})ell was snapped, lait it began to seem regrettable in com- parison with the present humiliation. Another event liappened which was like a new revolution. The prisoners and the troops shut up in Gernum fortresses returned to France under the treaty, per- haps not less than 300,000 men. What could be more evident than that, if all these soldiers could take the field again, and under Napoleon, Fi'anee might yet escape the humiliation of a Govei'ument ini])Osed by the foreigner, and perhaps also recover her lost frontiers ? The congress of Vienna en- tered ujion business in Septcunlier, and with this a new chapter of politics opened. Franco ceased to bo the general bugbear, and new alliances be- gan to be formed in order to check the aggressive spirit of Russia. The European Coalition, once dissolved, n)ight prove not easy to reconstitute. Internal politics also had altered. A wild party of ultras had sprung up among the royalists ; the 214 Return from Elba. [a.d. isis. church was beginning to give disquiet to the holders of national property; the army was en- raged by seeing dmigrcs, who had fought against France, appointed in great numbers to the com- mand of regiments. It was not the first time that Xapoleon had gone into a sort of exile. As he had disappeared in the East, and returned to make Brumaire, so he might come from Elba to rescue France. The situation was not l^ss intolerable than in 1799. As then, so now, nad he not returned, a revolution would nevertheless have taken })lace. Fouche was weav- ing a military plot, which would have carried to power perhaps the Duke of Orleans, perhaps the King of Eome. He entered upon the last of his thousand adven- tures on February 26, 1815, when he set sail from Porto Ferraio with Generals Bertrand and Drouot and 1,100 soldiers. On March 1st he reached the French coast at the gulf Jouan between Cannes and Antibes. Twenty days after he entered the Tuileries in triumph. He had judged the feelings of the army cor- rectly, and also the effect which would be pro- duced by his prodigious fame. These causes were more than enough to overthrow a Government so totally without root as that of the Bourbons. ^T.vT. 45.] Tlic Hundred Days. 215 From the coast lie took the way across the moun- tains of Provence by Sisteron and Gap to Grenoble. The soldiers sent from this town to stop him were disarmed when he uncovered his breast and asked, Which of them would fire on his emperor ? He was then joined by the royalist La Bedoyere. Macdonald at Lyons stood firm, but was deserted by his soldiers. Ney, who commanded in the east, at first declared himself violently against his old chief, but the military feeling afterwards gained him, and he joined Napoleon at Auxerre. The king left the Tuileries on the 19th, retiring north- ward, and on the next day Napoleon entered Paris. At Brumaire he had put down Jacobinism, and given the nation order and repose. Now he was summoned, in the name of independence, to pro- tect tlie acquisitions of the Ptcvolution, and to defend the national honor against the trium- phant foreigner. The Hundred Days are the period of popular or democratic imperialism. Those who sided with him told him frankly that he must turn over a new leaf, and he pro- fessed himself ready to do so. It would be rash to say that this was impossible. He was but in his forty-sixth year ; his return from Elba was an astonishing proof that he still possessed that elas- 216 Napoleon Liberator. [a.d. i815. ticity of spirit, that power of grasping the future, which lie had often shown so remarkably. Here then, as at a second Brumaire, might begin a third Napoleonic peiiod. The mad crusade against Eng- land and the world-empire which sprang out of it were now to be forgotten ; the oppressor of Tyrol and Spain was to stand out as a heroic representa- tive of the free modern people against the Holy Alliance. This last and most audacious of his transformations was already most prosperously --feegun. But at this point fortune deserted him once for all. Napoleon Liberator remained a poetical idea, transforming his past life into le- gend, and endowing French politics with a new illusion ; the attempt to realize it came to an end in a hundred days (March 13 to June 22). The ultimate cause of this failure seems to have been a cnangc in Napoleon himself. It had loug been remarked that the Emperor Napoleon was wholly different from the General Bonaparte of the Italian campaigns. Bonaparte had been lean, shy, laconic, all fire and spirit, the very type of republican virtue imagined by Rousseau ; the Em- peror M-as fat and talkative, and had his fits, ac- cording to Marmont, of indolent ease. Once or twice there liad been attacks of illness, by which he had been temporarily incapacitated ; but this jicTAT. 45.) Chiinyc in Nrqjoleon. 217 had 1)0011 liusluid up. On the whole ho had nover yot l)(HMi wuutiii;^' Lo hiiiisolf. In Iho cain[)iu;4n of 1814 his activity had boiui prodigious, and tho march lo I'ari.-i in twenty days, with which h(! liad o[)i'iiod iMlf), had boon a ^roat disphiy ol" vitror. lUit ho couhl not maintain himself at this h^vel. A physical de(!;iy had hegiin in him, an'oL'tiuL,' thi'ouj^h his body, not indeod his mind, but his will ami his ])o\\('r of applicaticm. ' 1 do not know him a;.;ain,' .said Carnot. 'Ho talks instead ol' acting', ho tiu^ man ol" iiqtid do cisions ; ho asks opinions, lui tho imperious dic- tator, who seemed insulted by advice ; his mind wanders, though ho used to have the power of attending to everything wluni and as lu; would ; he is sleepy, and ho used to bo able to sleep and wake at pleasure.' This last .symptom was the most striking; in some of tho most critical and tor- riblc monuuits of tho Waterloo (campaign lui seems to have been scarcely able to keep himself awake. The constitutional history of the Hundred Days may bo despatched summarily, since it led to nothing. On Mandi 13 an ini[)eiial de- cree was issued from I.yons dissolving the two chambers cstablishoil by the J]ourl)ons, and con- voking an extraordinary assembly in Field of May for the pur[t(jse 'of correcting and modil'y- 218 ' Acte AdditionneV [a.i>. 1815. iii;^' our coiistiLulioii.s, and of fis.siHl.in<>" at tlui coro- luiLioii of ilu! ICiiiprcss, our dear and woll-beloved spouso, and of our dear and wcll-hciloved son.' I'ut the iirospccl soon (•han;^a'd, and, as it was necessary that l\n\ cnipiro, liko tlui monarchy, sliould have iUi cliartcr, it sconicd iuipossihlc. to wait till JNIay. JMapolcou had recourse to lU'iijaniin Constant, that is, he marked his change of policy by sending for the leader of the oi)position. The ' Acte Addition- nel aux (Constitutions de I'Mmpire,' dated A])rii UU, was di'awn by (lonstanl, examined by a counuittee, and then ailopted by the council of state. Tho most remarkable feature of it is the preandde, in which he explains his change of attitude by say- ing that ' formerly lui had endeavored to organize u grand federal system in Europe, which lie had regai'deil as agreeable to tho spirit of the age anil favorable to the pn)gress of civilization,' that ' ftjr this purpose he iiad ailjourned (Jie iiil roduction of free institutions,' but that ' henceforward ho Lad no other object but to increase tho prosperity of France by strengthening ])ublie liberty,' This neat misi'ei)reseiitation deserves notice as having imi)oseil on many pei)i>le. For the rest it is to be observed that the act creates uu hereditary jieerage. The lueld of ]\Iay was lield, but not till .lune 1. Napoleon appeared in a granil costume iETAT. 45] Declaration of the Great Powers. 219 and distributed llag.s, l)ut the ' woll-belovcd spouse and son ' wore not there ; Europe had declared against him. On the 12th he set out lor the campaign. The Great Powers had issued, immediately on hearing of Napoleon's disembarkation (March liJLh), a dcelaration putting him outside all civil and social relations, and consigning Iiim to public vengeance as 'an enemy and disturber of tlie peace of the world.' On March 2r)th tlicy reconstituted the Coalition. Was this a disappointment to Na- poleon ? A war of liberation was perhaps neces- sary to him. To be freely accepted by the French people, and then to be rejected by Europe, gave him precisely the opportunity he sought of stand- ing forth as the heroic chamj)ion of national inde- pendence. He had now all the soldiers who at the time of his first fall had been locked up in fortresses or foreign prisons. His position was therefore such as it had been in 1813, not in 1814, and he proposed to defend not a vast em- pire but simply France, so that he had on his side patriotism and liberalism. All this, and his own genius ! Would not so nmch sufUce ? Probably he remembered Brumaire, how low the fortune of France at that time had been, and how suddenly Marengo had restored all. For the moment, how- 220 Napoleons last Campaign, [ad. 1815. ever, the inequality of numbers Avas great. In June the allies had in the field more than 700,000, Na- poleon little more than 200,000, men. There were already English troops in Belgium, where they were engaged in establishing the new kingdom of the Netherlands, and there wei'e Prussian troops in the Rhenish province which had just been given to Prussia. It was a question for Napoleon, whether he should assume a defensive attitude and allow the allies to invade France — this in itself would liave suited his new policy best — or carry the war into Belgium, a country long united with France, and attack the English and Prussians. He shrank from inflicting a new in- vasion upon France, especially on account of the strength of the royalist party in many regions, and thus it was that the scene of the campaign was laid in Belgium. The English had their head-quarters at Brussels, the Prussians at Li^ge. He formed the plan of dividing them and beating them in turn, as he had served the Austrians and Sardinians at the very beginning of his career. ]\Iany circunistances, however, were different. Wellington and Bliicher with Gneisenau were superior to Colli and Beaulieu ; the Napoleon of 1815 was vastly inferior to the Bonaparte of 1796. Of all the Napoleouic campaigns this proved by ^TAT. 45.] The Tii'o Armies. 221 far the most rapid and decisive. Even the Ma- rengo campaign had lasted a month, but this Avas decided in three days. Leaving Paris on the 12th, Napoleon "was in Paris again on the 21st, his own fate and that of his empire and that of France decided. Everything concurred to make tills short struggle the most interesting military occurrence of modern history : its desperate inten- sity, its complete decisiveness, the presence for the first and last time of the English army in the front of the European contest, the presence of the three most renowned commanders, Napoleon, Wellington, and Bliicher. Accordingly it has been debated with infinite curiosity, and misrepresented on all sides witli infinite partiality. Napoleon's army amounted to 122,401 men; it contained a large number of veterans, besides many who had seen tlie campaigns of 1813-14, and was perhaps the finest army he had ever commanded. That of Wellington was composed of Englishmen, Han- overians, BrunsM'ickers, Nassauers, Germans, and Netherlanders ; the total is stated at 105,950. But in the Netherlands of the newly established kingdom no confidence could be placed, and yet these amounted to nearly 30,000 ; the English too (about 35,000) were in great part raw recruits (the Peninsular veterans being mainly absent in 222 The Battle of Waterloo. [a.d. 1815. America) : altogether Wellington pronounced it ' the worst army ever brought together.' The army of Blucher numbered 110,897 disciplined troops, animated by an intensely wailike spirit. Napoleon's opening Avas prosperous. He main- tained so ]nuch secrecy, and used so much rapidity, that he succeeded in throwing himself between the two armies. On the IHtli he advanced and occupied Charleroi. On the IGth he engaged the Prussians at Ligny and the English at Quatrebras, desiring to block tlie cross-road between Quatre- bras and Sombreffe, and so to sever the two armies. Napoleon personally commanded against the Prussians, and here he gained his last victory. The battle was very bloody; about 12,000 Prus- sians fell, and Bliicher himself was woundeil. At Quatrebras Ney met Wellington, and was forced to retreat. But the defeat of TUiiclier made it necessary for Wellington to retiie on Brussels in order to effect a junction witli the rrussians. The 17th was spent in this retrograde movement, and on the 18th Wellington accepted battle on the heights of St. Jean, I'rom which the French name the day, while the English give it the name of Waterloo, a village four miles nearer to Brussels, where Wellington wrote his despatch. He ac- cepted battle in full reliance upon the help of the jETxr. 45.] The Battle of Waterloo. 223 Prussians, who are not therefore to be consid- ered as having saved him from defeat. Military writers point out several errors, some of them considerable, committed by Wellington, but their criticism of Napoleon, which begins by sweeping away a mass of falsehood devised by him and his admirers in order to throw the blame upon others, is so crushing that it seems to show us Napoleon, after his brilliant com- mencement, acting as an indolent and inefficient general. He first, through mere want of energy, allows the Prussians to escape him after Ligny, and then sends jMarshal Grouchy with 33,000 men in the wrong direction in pursuit of them. Owing to this mismanagement, Grouchy is at Wavre on the day of the battle of Waterloo, fighting a useless battle against the Prussian corps of Thielemann, while Bllicher is enabled to keep Lis engagement to Wellington. Everywhere dur- ing these days Napoleon appears negligent, inac- tive, inaccessible, and rather a Darius than an Alexander, so that it has been plausibly main- tained that he must have been physically incapaci- tated by illness. The battle itself was one of the most remarkable and terrible ever fouglit, but it was perhaps on both sides rather a soldiers' than a general's battle. It consisted of five distinct 224 Five Attacks. [a.d. 1815. attacks ou the English position: — (1) an attack on the English right by the division Eeille, (2) au attack on the left by the division D'Erlon (here Picton was killed), (3) a grand cavalry attack, where tlie splendid French cavalry ' foamed itself away ' upon the English squares, (4) a suc- cessful attack by Ney on La Haye Saiute (which Wellington is thought to have too much neglected ; it was after this tliat the Frencli prospect seemed briglitest), (5) the charge of the guard. In the middle of the third act of this drama the Prussians began to take part in the action. The battle seems to have begun about 11.30, and about 8 o'clock in the evening the cry ' Sauve qui pent ' arose from the guard. A general advance of the English decided the victory, and then the pursuit was very thorougldy accomplished by the Prussians under Gneisenau. Napoleon at first took refuge in a square. At Genappe he left this, and arrived at Charleroi about daybreak with au escort of about twenty horsemen. § 5. The second Ahdicntion. — Surrender to England. — Exile in St. Helena. — Autohiograxihy . He lost probably more than 30,000 out of 72,000 men, but the grand army M^as utterly dissolved. The whole loss of the allies was somewhat more ^TAT. 45.] Napoleon in Despair. 225 than 22,000. Had Napoleon been victorious, ho Avoiild but have opened the war prosperously, for half a million soldiers, in addition to those of Wellington and Bliicher, were on tlie march for France ; being completely defeated, he had no re- source, but was ruined at once. France was con- quered, as she had been conquered the year before ; but her second fall appears far more humiliating and dismal than her first, when we consider how enthusiastically she had rallied to Napoleon, and how instantaneously Napoleon and she had been struck down together. It was a moment of unre- lieved despair for the public men who gathered round him on his return to Paris, and among these were several whose fame was of earlier date than his own. La Fayette, the man of 1789 ; Carnot, organizer of victory' to the Convention ; Lucieu, who had decided the revolution of Brumaire, — all these met in that comfortless deliberation. Carnot was for a dictatorshij) of public safety, that is, for renewing his great days of 1793 ; Lucien too liked the Eoman sound of the word dictator. ' Dare ! ' he said to his brother, but tlie spring of that terrible will was broken at last. ' I have dared too much already, ' said Napoleon. Mean- while, in the Cliamber of Eepreseutatives the word was not dictatorsliip but liberty. Here La 16 226 The Second Abdication. [a.d. isis. Fayette caused the assembly to vote itself penna- nent, and to declare guilty of high treason Avho- ever should attempt to dissolve it. He hinted that, if the word abdication were not soon pro- nounced on the other side, he would himself pronounce the word ' decheance.' The second ab- dication took place on June 22d. ' I offer myself a sacrifice to tlie hati'cd of the enemies of France. My public life is huished, and 1 proclaim my son, under the title of Napoleon II., Emperor of the French.' On the 25th he retired to ]\lalmaisou, where Josephine had died the year before. Ho had by no means yet ceased to hope. When his son was passed over by the Chamber of Itcpresen- tatives, who named an executive commission of live, he protested that he had not intended to make way for a new Directory ; and, as Carnot and Caulaincourt were on this commission, the circumstances of l^rumaire seem to have flashed iuto his memory, lie saw again two Directors supporting him, and the other three (Fouche, Grenier, and (.^)uinette — 'a traitor and two babies,' as he expressed it) might remind him of Barras, Moulins, and G older. On the 27th he went so far as to offer his services once more as general, 'regarding myself still as the hrst soldier of the nation.' lie was met by a refusal, and left Mai- ^TAT. 45.] Napoleons Surrender to England. 227 maisou on the 29th for Rochcfort, well furnished with books on the United States. France was by this time entering upon another Eeiffn of Terror. Massacre had bes^un at Marseilles as early as the 25th. What should Napoleon do ? He had been formerly the enemy of every other nation, and now he was the worst enemy, if not of France, yet of the triumphant faction in France. He linj^crod some days at Rochefort, where he had arrived on July od, and then, tinding it impossible to escape the vigilance of the English cruisers, went on the loth on board the ' Bellerophon ' and surrendered himself to Captain Maitland. It was explained to him that no conditions could be accepted, but that he would be ' conveyed to Eng- land to be received in such manner as the Prince Regent should deem expedient.' He had written at the lie d'Aix the following characteristic letter to the Prince Regent: — 'Royal Highness, — A prey to the factions which divide my country and to the enmity of the powers of Europe, I have ter- minated my public career, and T come, like Them- istocles, to seat myself at the hearth of the P>ritish people. I place myself under the protection of its laws, which I claim from your Royal Highness as the most powerful, tlie most constant, and the most generous of my enemies.' 228 England's Treatment of Him. [a.d. i8i5. It was perhaps the only course open to him. Ill France his life could scarcely have been spared, and Bllicher talked of executing him on the spot where the Due d'Eughien had fallen. He there- fore could do nothing but what he did. His reference to Theinistocles shows that he M'as conscious of being the worst enemy that England had ever had. Perhaps he remembered that at the rupture of the treaty of Amiens he had studied to envenom the contest by detaining the English residents in France. Still he might rellect, on the other hand, that England was the only great coun- try which had not been trampled down and covered with massacre by his soldiers. It would have been inexcusable if the English Government had given way to vindictive feelings, especially as they could well afford to be magnanimous, having just won the greatest of all victories. But it Avas necessary to deprive him of the power of exciting new wars, and the experiment of Elba had shown that this involved depriving him of his liberty. The frenzy which had cost the lives of millions must be checked. This was the principle laid down in the declaration of March 15th, by which he had been excommunicated as a public enemy. It was therefore necessary to impose some re- straint upon him. He must be separated from ^TAT. 46.] Arrival at St. Helena. 229 his party and from all the revolutionary party in Europe. So long as he remained in Europe this would involve positive imprisonment. The only arrangement therefore which would allow him tolerable personal comfort and enjoyment of life, was to send him out of Europe. From these con- siderations grew the decision of the Government to send him to St. Helena. An Act of Parliament was passed ' for the better detainiug in custody Napoleon Bonaparte,' and another Act for subject- ing St. Helena to a special system of government. He was kept on board tlie ' Bellerophon ' till August 4th, wlien he was transferred to the ' JSTorth- umberland.' On October loth he arrived at St. Helena, accompanied by Counts Montholon, Las Cases, and Bertrand, with their families, General Gourgaud, and a number of servants. In April, 1816, arrived Sir Hudson Lowe, an officer who had been knighted for bringing the new-s of the cap- ture of Paris in 1814, as governor. The rest of his life, which continued till May 5, 1821, was occupied partly in quarrels with this governor, which have now lost their interest, partly in the task he had undertaken at the time of his first abdication, that of relating his past life. He did not himself write this narrative, nor does it appear that he even dictated it word for word. 230 His Autobiography. [a.d. 1815. It is a report made partly by General Gourgaud, partly by Count JMonthoIon, of Napoleon's impas- sioned recitals ; but they assure us that this report, as published, has been read and corrected through- out by him. It gives a tolerably complete account of the period between the siege of Toulon and the battle of Marengo. On the later period there is little, except a memoir on the campaign of 1815, to which the editors of the Corrcsjjondcncc have been able to add another on Elba and the Hundred Days. These memoirs have often been compared to the Commentaries of Caesar, and their value would indeed be priceless, if they related to a period im- perfectly known. But an age which has abun- dance of information, and takes history very seriously, is struck particularly by the elaborate falsifications which they contain. A vast number of misstatements, many of them evidently inten- tional, have been brought home to him, and in several cases he has tried to foist into history apocryphal documents. By dwelling almost exclusively upon the earlier period and on the Waterloo campaign, they helped forward the process by which he M-as idealized after his death. They reminded the ^^'orld that the Prometheus now agonizing on the lonely rock. JETAT. 46] The Napoleonic Legend. 231 who had lately fallen in defending a free nation against a coalition of kings and emperors, was the same who, in his youth, had been the champion of the First French Kepublic against the First Coalition, They consigned the long interval to oblivion. Hence the Napoleonic legend, which has grown np in the very midst of the 19th century, and would perhaps never have been seriously shaken but for the failure of the Second Empire. Look at Napoleon's career between 1803 and 1814, when it was shaped most freely by his own will ; you see a republic skilfully undermined and a new hereditary monarchy set up in its place. This new monarchy stands out as the great enemy and oppressor of nationalities, so tliat the nationality movement, when it begins in Spain and Tyrol and spreads through North Germany, is a reaction against Napoleon's tyranny. But in 1815 he suc- ceeded in posing as a champion and martyr of the nationality principle against the Holy Alliance. The curtain fell upon this pose. It brought back the memory of that Bonaparte, who at the end of the 18th century had seemed the antique republi- can hero dreamed of by Eousseau, and men forgot once more how completely he had disappointed their expectations. By looking only at the begin- ning and at the end of his career, and by disregard- 232 His Death. [a.d. is2i. ing all tlie intermediate period, an imaginary Napoleon has been obtained, ■\vbo is a repul)lican, not a despot, a lover of liberty, not an authoritarian, a champion of the Revolution, not the destroyer of the llevolution, a hero of independence, not a con- queror, a friend of the people, not a contemner of the people, a man of heart and virtue, not a ruthless militarist, cynic, and Machiavellian. This illusion led to the restoration of the Napoleonic dynasty in 1852. lie died of an ulcer in the stomach on May 5, 1821. In his will he declared himself a Catholic, wished his ashes to repose ' on the banks of the Seine, in the midst of the French people whom ho liad loved so well,' spoke tenderly of ]\Iaric Louise and his son, and of all his relatives except Louis, whom he ' pardoned ' for the libel he published in 1820, disavowed tlie Mannscrit de Sainte Iltlene, a mystification which had recently had much suc- cess, defended the execution of D'Enghien, imputed the two conquests of France to I\Iarmont, Auger- eau, Talleyrand, and La Fayette, whom he ' forgave,' and devoted the Englisli oligarchy, to wliom lie ascribed his premature death, to the vengeance of the English people. In a codicil he added a truly Corsican touch, bequeathing 10,000 francs to the subaltern officer Cantillon, ' who has undergone a JET AT. 51.] His Burial. 233 trial upon the charge of having endeavored to as- sassinate Lord Wellington, of which he was pro- nounced innocent. Cantillon had as much right to assassinate that oligarchist as tlie latter had to send me to perish upon the rock of St. Helena.' He was buried at Longwood in St. Helena; but in the reign of Louis Philippe his remains were re- moved by permission of the English Government to the Invalides at Paris, where a stately dome was erected over the sarcophagus that contains them. NAPOLEON'S PLACE IN HISTORY. NAPOLEON'S PLACE IN HISTORY. Aftkr reviewing the career of an historical per- son, we desire to form an estimate of his char- acter and abilities. Jiiit to find a measure for great men, that is, men whose energy ol' iicti(ju and whose sphere of action have been exce[)tional, is mucli more dillicult than is usually supposed; and how extremely dilhcult it is in the case of Napoleon may be judged fnjm the wide diver- gence in tlie estimates, whether of historians, such as Thiers on the one side and Laufrey on the other, or of intelligent and impartial contemporaries, such as Goethe or Hazlitt on tlu; oik; liand und Jeffer- son or Soutliey on th(; other; it may be judged, too, from the fact that no clear verdict of poster- ity has yet Ijeen, or seems about to be, pronounced upon him. lb; ]rAu]H liimscilf readily to unmeas- ured pan(^gyric or invective, but scarcely any his- toiical person is so (bllicult to nu)asure. It wouhl not be in accordance with the modest plan of this L-jfr-i*^ 238 Difficulty of the Question. volume to offer a formal estimate, but an essay towards such an estimate, or in other words some suggestions as to the way in which such an esti- \ mate should be formed, may be acceptable. ^ i The series of Napoleon's successes is absolutely Jthe most marvellous in history. No one can ques- tion that he leaves far behind him the Turennes, Marlboroughs, and Fredericks ; but when we bring up for comparison an Alexander, a Hannibal, a Cae- sar, a Charles, we find in the single point of mar- vellousness Napoleon surpassing them all. Every one of those heroes was born to a position of exceptional advantage. Two of them inherited thrones; Hannibal inherited a position royal in all but the name ; Caesar inherited an eminent position in a great empire. But Napoleon, who rose as high as any of them, began life as an obscure provincial, almost as a man without a country. It is this marvellousness which para- lyzes our judgment. We seem to see at once a genius beyond all estimate, a unique character, and a fortune utterly unaccountable. There can, indeed, be no question that the personality and the fortune were both alike surprising. But it is only the combination of both which is altogether overwhelming. The first step towards a calm judgment is to sepa- Division of the Subject. 239 rate the factors. I propose then to inquire how much and in what manner Napoleon was favored and shaped by circumstances, and afterwards to consider how much remains to be explained by personal idiosyncrasy. 240 Favored by Circumstances. CHAPTER I. HOW FAR NAPOLEON WAS FAVORED BY CIRCUMSTANCES. § 1. His Rise to Poiuer. There are times, and these are the most usual, when the most wonderful abilities would not have availed to raise any man from such a station as that in which Napoleon was born to the head of affairs. But the last years of the eighteenth cen- tury formed an exceptional period, in which such an ascent was not only possible in France, but — and this is carefully to be marked — was quite possible without very extraordinary abilities. That particular part of Napoleon's career to which the Alexanders and Hannibals can show nothing parallel is, in fact, just the part which, in that exceptional time, was within the reach of an ordinary man. The Eevolution had broken the fixed mould in which European history had run for a thousand years, and had introduced a different sort of gov- ernment, strange in the feudal world, but well His Rise to Power. 241 known both to antiquity and to mediseval Italy, and not difficult to comprehend — Imperialism. It is a form which appears almost invariably when the growth of a great army coincides with the downfall of an ancient government. For this reason it had appeared in England, when a stand- ing army had for the first time sprung up at the moment of the humiliation of the Stuart monarchy. For this reason it appeared now in France, when at the moment of the fall of the Bourbons the na- tion found itself plunged into an unprecedented war. Nothing short of a firmly established government can hold a great army in check ; where that is wanting, the army assumes the place of government at once and without resist- ance, and this is Imperialism. Its first form is usually republican, a clique of officers exerting a secret control over the Supreme Assembly. Such was the system between 1648 and 1653 in the Long Parliament, such at Eome in the ten years of the Triumvirate, and such in France under the Directory, especially in the years between Fructi- dor and Brumaire. But in all these cases alike, the system speedily became monarchical. Caesar pushed on one side alike the Senate and Pompey, Cromwell tlie Long Parliament, and Fairfax, and finally Bonaparte dismissed first the Directory, 16 242 Favored by Circumstances. and then Moreau. "When this change takes place the monarch created is always a success- ful general, and it is under tliis system that the fortunate adventurer is most frequently seen. The rise of Bonaparte was not very much more surpris- ing than that of Cromwell, and in the classical age of Imperialism under the Roman Emperors it re- peatedly happened that a rude soldier found him- self master of the world, as in fact the real founder of Imperialism, Marius, had done. -•Thus the miracle of Bonaparte's rise to power lies not so much in his personality as in the time. / The tradition of a thousand years had been de- serted, and what during that time had been un- heard of was now possible and natural. We have seen that before Bonaparte returned from Egypt, other generals had been sounded with a view to a chancre in the Constitution. Had he been detained ' a little longer on the other side of the Mediterra- nean, or had he been captured by an English cruiser, we can scarcely conceive but that a rev- olution like that of Brumaire would nevertheless have taken place, and that it would have elevated some other adventurer to supreme power. Some officer of considerable military ability, but other- wise not extraordinary, would then have stood forth as the most powerful man in Europe. His Ascendency in Europe. 243 Even if be failed, he too would have appeared to have a marvellous fortune. Perhaps a series of such adventurers would have arisen, like that of the American Presidents. Assuredl}"- none would have taken a position like that of Napo- leon, but a Moreau or a Bernadotte might have reigned with success and have won great victories. It is even most probable that not one would have failed so disastrously as ISTapoleon did in the end, and that Belgium and Savoy and the left bank of the Ehine would not have been lost again to France. § 2. His Ascendency in Europe. When it is said that Bonaparte by his genius gave France an ascendency in Europe, the chrono- logical succession of events is neglected, and far too much is attributed to Bonaparte, far too little to those who came before him. The war had raged for four years when Bonaparte began to command armies. Without the help of Bonaparte France had defeated and dissolved the Coalition, without his help she had become an ascendant Power, had conquered and parcelled out in departments Bel- gium, Savoy, and Nice, had occupied the whole left bank of the Rhine, and had reduced Holland to cojnplete dependence. It was in this time also. .^ 244 Favored by Circumstances. and without the help of Bonaparte, that an unpar- alleled military power had grown up in France, that a new military system had been devised, and a new period of military glory introduced. This wonderful revolution had been made before he ap- peared ; the military power was already becoming supreme, the age of conquest was already begun when he first became prominent. Jourdan, Piche- gru, Moreau, Carnot, not Bonaparte, directed the change. During the next four years the process continued without interruption ; Fructidor (1797) may be said to hav^e definitively established the military government; Lombardy, Central Italy, Switzerland, and the left bank of the Ehine were added to the practical conquests of France, and the Germanic system received a fatal blow. This, too, happened before Bonaparte rose to the head of affairs ; he had indeed a share, and the greatest share, in these changes ; but much was still done without him ; he did not give the impetus, but fol- lowed an impulse which had been given by others ; had he never appeared, the character of government in France, and the position of France in Europe, would have been substantially the same. Even af- ter Brumaire, it is to be remarked that the victory which decided the war and gave peace to the Con- tinent was not won by Bonaparte but by Moreau. His Conquests. 245 In his first years, then, Bonaparte is borne on a mighty tide. During this period we can see plainly that his career is only unprecedented, he- cause an unprecedented convulsion had introduced it. Eevolutionary times afford the occasion of exceptional careers, and if Napoleon's career was not only exceptional but absolutely unique, it was because the French Eevolution also was unique. § 3. His Conquests. A similar remark is to be made upon the un- paralleled series of triumphant campaigns which followed his assumption of supreme power. The Eevolution had created a vast machinery both of military and political power, which now fell ready- made into his hands. In his position, the same amount of energy would produce vastly greater re- sults than it could produce in the hands of Fred- erick or Marlborough. The genius of a leader is to be measured not so much by the actual results achieved as by the difficulties overcome. When we follow William III. in his contest with Louis XIV., Frederick in the Seven Years' War, Wash- ington in the American War, and Wellington in the Peninsula, we remark how they were over- matched, how insufficient were the means at their 246 Favored by Circumstances. disposal, and then how they supplied all deficien- cies from the resources of their own genius. The case of Bonaparte after Bruniaire is opposite to these. Never have means so vast, nor such abso- lute control over those means, been granted to any modern ruler. Look first at the means. France had in seven years of war gained a position of prodigious mili- tary advantage, and controlled the Continent as no Power had done before. Moreover, in these years slie had formed the habit and the taste for war on a large scale. The nation had adapted itself through necessity to the practice of putting vast armies into the field ; the soldiers were in- spired with heroism through the belief, which at the outset had been well grounded, that they were devoting themselves to their country, and through the belief, which was not entirely groundless, that they were the champions of great principles. By seven years of effort and hardship their valor had been tempered, they had acquired discipline. We may search history in vain for another military in- strument of such efficiency and potency as this French army. Eemark next how unreservedly this instrument was now put at the service of Bonaparte. In most states war is felt as a burden, and borne with pain His Conquests. 247 and reluctance ; it involves taxation, which op- presses the population ; it meets with opposition in assemblies and parliaments. In most states the skilled general is in the position of a servant, and has to render account either to a jealous sov- ereign or to a suffering and impatient community. Remember only how William was thwarted, how Marlborough was watched, calumniated, and at last overthrown, by the Opposition. As much as Napoleon's armies exceeded in number and effi- ciency those of Marlborough, so much was his authority greater, more easily and safely wielded. A number of causes had worked together for a long time to create in France an unlimited mili- tary authority. It was a country in which for a century and a half government had been despotic, and for a century great military enterprises had been undertaken, and had been unboundedly pop- ular so long as they were successful. In the Eev- olution despotism had only taken a new shape, and it had become more energetic than under the Bourbons. It had been since 1793 the despotism of a military dictatorship, justified at the outset by the pressing military needs of a country invaded by a coalition, and pressing especially upon the army, where Houchard, Custine, and Beauharnais, had fallen by the guillotine. Just before Brumaire, 248 Favored by Circumstances. the urgent need of 1793 had reappeared, for after a long course of victory the Eepublic had suffered reverses, and in 1799 France had been a second time threatened with invasion. The iron sceptre thus forged in the revolutionary fire now fell into the hand of Bonaparte, and for a long time all Frenchmen were glad to see it in such hands, for they could believe him to be more capa- ble than Carnot, while he abjured, at the moment that he took it into his hand, all the excesses of Jacobinism. Meanwhile, parliaments had been discredited in France by ten years of failure. After they had been decimated and purged in as many revolutions as there were months in the revolutionary calendar, the time was come when Frenchmen desired to hear no more of them. Their debates were now no longer reported, and hence it was that at the moment when the mighti- est and most disciplined army was put absolutely into the hands of the greatest military specialist, who was at the same time head of the State, the constitutional assemblies, which might have criti- cised his plans of war or checked his war budgets, were practically silenced. The result is that, whereas other great generals have exhibited what great things can be done by small means, the career of Bonaparte after the Was he Invincible ? 249 beginning of his reigu shows, on the other hand, the utmost extent of the performance possible to genius provided with unlimited means and facili- ties. This remark does not fully apply to his ear- lier campaigns, including that of Marengo ; nor, again, does it apply to the defensive campaign of 1814 ; but it applies to the whole unparalleled se- ries of triumphs that began with Ulm and ended with Dresden. § 4. Was he Invincible ? It has been frequently repeated that only in four of such a long and crowded series of battles was he defeated — that is, at Eylau, Aspern, Leip- zig, and Waterloo ; and it is added that of these defeats the first two were doubtful, that at Leipzig he was but ' pressed to the ground by thronging millions,' and that at "Waterloo the fault lay with Grouchy, who mistook his orders. By representa- tions such as these an impression is produced that in war at least his genius was unerring and unlim- ited, that it could even control fortune, and that it could but just barely be frustrated by the mis- take of a subaltern, or by the sheer impossibility of the undertaking. This is an illusion produced by the popular habit of regarding a war as consisting simply of a 250 Favored by Circumstances. series of pitched battles and each battle as a sort of duel between the two commanders. The best military judges do indeed regard Napoleon as one of the greatest of tacticians, and as possessing in the highest degree the coup cCceil, promptitude, presence of mind, by which battles are won. But wlien in a very long series of battles a commander meets with scarcely any defeats, the most obvious inference surely is that he had very good and highly disciplined troops. In many of his cam- paigns, especially those of Marengo and of Auster- litz, the admirable efficiency of the army formed in the Eevolution can be clearly discerned. Bo- naparte reaped the benefit of the period of war which preceded his advent, and this benefit he enjoyed till he threw away in Russia that incom- parable army. But a war consists of much more than battles, and indeed we should very much underrate Napoleon's own military genius if we regarded him simply as a winner of battles.""/ Com- pared with other generals, he shows his superiority less in tactics than in strategy and in the compre- hensive war-statesmanship by which a campaign on a large scale is planned. But if the highest genius may be displayed in strategy, the greatest mistakes may also be made in this department. It follows that a commander may suffer defeat. Napoleon's Failures. 251 and that on the greatest scale, without personally- losing battles ; nay, that he may Min all the battles of a campaign and yet lose the campaign itself. We have only to apply this principle to Napo- leon, and the illusion of his invincibility will dis- appear. We see in him a greater strategist than any that had appeared before him, but a strategist capable of great errors and failures. He achieves the most striking successes, but he also suffers the most complete and disastrous defeats, and his defeats are not less numerous than his successes. The most unfortunate general that ever lived,^ Xerxes, "is aller. His original plan luid been to engage England singly, and to crush her. The fall of the British Empire was to take place in the years 1803 and 1804 This was Napoleon's object. 284 Napoleon in Himself, This plan failed. The English naval power proved too great, and Pitt, recalled to office, brought into existence a new Continental coali- tion. Thereupon Napoleon put into execution his alternative plan. Instead of conquering England directly, he would conquer the Conti- nent, and by that means England. As Talley- rand foresaw, the first part of this plan proved not difficult to execute. He did conquer the Continent, and he niai'shalled all its forces against England. The enterprise \vas colossal, and the duel between a confederated Europe and the World-Empire of England was an un- paralleled spectacle. But difficulties arose which had been but imperfectly foreseen. The con- federacy, being held together by force, was but half efficient ; when required to sacrifice the English trade, it became mutinous ; gradually the idea of conquering England by means of a European confederacy showed itself to be — like that earlier conception of the same mind, a revolution of the East effected through a fusion of Mohammedanism with French Deism — merely a dazzling; chimera. Thus viewed, Napoleon appears not as a mere ambitious sovereign, aiming at universal empire, but as having a more definite plan. His Enemy England. 285 His end is the defeat of England ; what we call his universal empire is but a means to it. He sees but one enemy, England ; he en- gages England alone, but England calls the Continent to her aid. He masters the Conti- nent, and turns its resources against England. Then again, after Tilsit, he has but one enemy, England. But his monstrous design requires monstrous expedients. As he has to deal with a colonial and naval Power, he finds it necessary to control all the maritime states of Europe. Hence the seizure of Spain and Portugal, which brought him ships and colonies ; hence the annexation of Holland and the Hanseatic towns. So much violence provoked mutiny. The rising of Germany in 1809 he was able to suppress ; but a little later the Czar placed himself at the head of the insurrection of Europe. The mutiny of the Czar could only be suppressed by a prodigious effort, and in this effort Napoleon failed. The point to be especially noted is that in this Ptussian war, as in all the violent annexa- tions which mark the years between the Russian war and the Treaty of Tilsit, the ground openly avowed is always the commercial system and the war with England. In truth, what we call 286 Napoleon in Himself. the universal empire of Napoleon would be more appropriately called the universal coali- tion against England. The territory actually ruled by Napoleon and his family by no means amounted to a universal empire ; and Prussia, Austria, and Russia always remained outside it ; but the coalition against England included these Powers too, and even in some sense the United States. § 2. Origin of the Plan. Regarded so, Napoleon's plan, though, as the event proved, unsound, appears intelligible — vitiated only, as a Napoleonic plan might naturally be, by extravagance and exaggeration. But this view suggests the further question. Why was Napoleon so bent upon compassing the fall of the British Empire ? The answer to this question is simple and natural, but shows perhaps tliat the workings of Napoleon's mind were more like those of an ordinary statesman than we are apt to think. After his return from Italy at the end of 1797 he had been appointed, as we have seen, general of the ' army of England.' It was at first expected that in 1798 he would invade Tha Invasion of Egypt. 287 England, but after due consideration he rejected this plan, and substituted for it an invasion of Egypt. This enterprise was directed ostensi- bly and in part, though only in part, really against England ; but England opposed it with a vigor which she has seldom displayed. The heroism of Nelson has always been duly recog- nized, but the immense greatness of his work seems to have been generally overlooked. At Aboukir he reconquered, as it were, the Medi- terranean for England. He dissolved, at a blow, all Napoleon's dreams of colonization and Oriental conquest. Soon afterwards he broke up the Armed ISTeutrality. Abercrombie crowned the work of Nelson in Egypt, and France had really no resource but to con- clude peace. As Eanke says, ' the man of the century had entirely failed. . . , Nothing re- mained for the First Consul but to recognize the maritime predominance of England.' At the very height of her greatness France had suffered a complete naval defeat at the hands of England. No further explanation surely is needed of the persistent hostility with which Napoleon hence- forth pursued England. The all-powerful master of France had not only been beaten, had not only 288 Napoleon in Himself. been forced to yield Egyj)t, but soon after the treaty had been concluded, he saw also that Eng- land was likely to keep Malta. It was too much for him that his darling enterprise should end not even in simple nothing, but in delivering over to the enemy one of the strongest positions in the world. The rupture of the peace of Amiens was not so much as it seems a deliberate new begin- ning in Napoleon's life. It was but the recom- mencement of a war which had never really ceased, the retractation at the last moment of a step which Napoleon found after all intolerable. And, war being once recommenced, it was not likely that lie would put up with failure. Yet he found all his maritime plans in 1803 and 1804 fail. In 1805 England met him with a European coalition, and he found himself drawn into the wild crusade above described, into the attempt to conquer England by conquering Europe. It appears, then, that Napoleon formed no de- liberate plan of universal empire, but in the first instance, merely took up the foreign policy of the Governments that had preceded him. He waged war with England merely because they had done so ever since 1793; he conducted the war with passionate and at last with insane persistency. Long Blvalnj between France and England. 289 merely because he could not conquer this enemy as he had conquered otliers, because he had naval defeats to wipe out ; because it was intolerable to him, and not even safe, to put up with failure. But his military resources being as enormous as his naval resources were insufficient, and the new coalition affording him an opportunity of striking England by striking Austria and Eussia, the war with England converted itself insen- sibly into a war with the allies of England, and Kapoleon consoled himself for not being able to enter London by entering Vienna, Berlin, and Moscow. In all this there was nothing really new except the immense magnitude of the mili- tary operations. If we trace the foreign policy of France from the beginning of the eighteenth century, we find, first, a naval and colonial rivalry with England, which grows steadily more intense; secondly, a constant disposition to interfere and play the as- cendant power in Germany ; thirdly, a proneness to spoil either game by trying to play both at once. The war with England, begun by Napoleon in 1803, was the fifth which France had undertaken in a period of sixty years. A generation earlier, Frederick the Great had spoken with impatience of the interminable quarrel of England and France, 19 290 Napoleon in Himself. which allowed no j^eace to Europe. But both in the War of the Austrian Succession and in the Seven Years' AVar, the rivalry had blended itself in a most confusing manner with other quarrels which France made for herself in Germany. This confusion had always proved most disastrous to France, and Chatham had been able, as he said, to conquer Canada in Germany. Nevertheless, the first step taken by the Convention was to repeat the old blunder by declaring war with England at the very moment when the French re- public was struggling for life against the Conti- nental Powers. If Napoleon had been able, as we are apt to think, to look down upon French politics from a superior height, if he had thought of inventing a new policy of his own, he would probably have begun by correcting this error, and would either have made peace with England, or, while he went to war with England, would have taken pains to propitiate the Continental Powers, But, like most statesmen, he was fettered by the past, and his career was spoiled in the end by the false policy which he inherited from the eighteenth century, and which he practised on an exagger- ated scale. He adopts the old methods of the eighteenth century, the armed neutrality and the occupation of Hanover; by placing a brother on Continued by Napoleon. 291 the throne of Spain he revives the family compact. But his exceptional position enables him to go be- yond the eighteenth century, and to form against the so-called tyrant of the seas a stronger coalition than she had formed against the ascendency of Louis XIV. But this coalition is formed by force, and is a greater tyranny than that against which it is directed. Accordingly in the moment of need it passes over to the English side, and France is once more found to have overreached herself by undertaking a war with England and a war with the Continent at the same time. § 3. Execution of the Plan. It appears, then, that the special and peculiar work of Napoleon is that colossal attempt to con- quer England by conquering Europe. Another ueneral, a Moreau, if he had been raised to su- preme power at Brumaire, would in like manner have found himself involved in war with England, would have met with the same difficulties, would have been equally reluctant to part with Malta, possibly would have felt himself impelled to break the peace of Amiens. But his ideas and his reso- lutions would have been less extreme ; he would have been less impatient of failure. When he be- came clearly aware of England's naval superiority, 292 Napoleon in Himself. he would have made peace, and contented himself with undermining it gradually. For Napoleon this does not suffice ; he presses the war against England's allies, as though his object was the sub- jugation of the Continent. And yet his power did not increase much after 1803, when his as- cendency, alike in Italy, Spain, and Germany, was unbounded, and, wisely handled, might have been raised much higher. He did but substitute for this an invidious tyranny, which could be maintained only by an unintermitted effort and uninterrupted good fortune. A Moreau, such as we have described iiim, might even have been more powerful than Napoleon. Had he witnessed the new coalition, he would have felt it as a fail- ure of his policy that the wild times before Bru- maire sliould be reappearing. He too, probably, would have won considerable successes against the German Powers, but he would not have ventured upon the enormous hazards of the Austerlitz cam- paign. The idea of conquering England by con- quering Europe would have struck him as insane ; he would have said, untruly, that it was impos- sible of execution, and more reasonably, that it was a reckless adventure. Accordingly, France would have had no Austerlitz, no Jena, no Fried- land to boast of, and her ruler would not have dis- ]Miat might have been. 293 triluited crowns among bis brothers, or married an arcbducbess. But be migbt without great diffi- culty have continued for many years to be incom- parably the greatest sovereign in Europe, and without actually entering Vienna be migbt have entirely eclipsed Austria within the empire, and have gathered the smaller German states round bim in a Confederation of the Ehine. For the ruler personally such a career would have been brilliant enough. Had be been Mo- reau, be would perhaps have imitated Washington, and handed the Presidency over to another after a limited term. But if we suppose bim less disin- terested, he might, like Napoleon, have established an hereditary throne. Along with Jacobinism, France might have given up all that belonged to the Second Revolution, and have returned to the Liberal Monarchy of 1791, correcting only the great mistake of that constitution, which consisted in giving too little power to the executive. With such a monarchy Europe would have been dis- posed to live at peace. It would have suited France, in which monarcbism bad struck far deeper roots than could be eradicated in a few years of republican government. The Bourbons would Iiave been forgotten, the monarchical party of France would have transferred its allegiance, 294 Napoleon in Himself. and, preserved from that double schism which afterwards ruined it, would perhaps have contin- ued to this day to form the vast majority of the nation. That nation would include at least Bel- gium, the left bank of the Ehine, Savoy, and Nice. We see, then, precisely how history was modi- fied by the exceptional character of Napoleon. He neither made peace with England, nor con- centrated his force upon her, carefully conciliating the Continental Powers, nor endeavored by dip- lomacy to form a European coalition against her, but plunged into the enterprise of forcing the Continent by arms into a confederacy against her. Yet he had himself, in 1800, shown the possibility of reviving by negotiation the Armed Neutrality ; nor would it have been difficult for lum, by mod- erate conduct in 1804 and 1805, to avert at least the third coalition. Evidently no political instrument can be less trustworthy than a confederacy held together by force. Tlie defection, first of S^oain, then of Prus- sia, then of Austria, could cause no surprise. And apparently it had been open to Napoleon in 1803 to create a voluntary confederacy, which would have reduced England to a great extremity with- out endangering Napoleon's power. Yet, not only His Perversity. 295 at the outset, but at every stage of his progress, he seems deliberately to prefer forced alliances, the result of a Avar, to any free combination of inter- ests. He had Prussia as an ally, but preferred to have her as a subject ; he was enthusiastically fol- lowed by Spain, but preferred to plunder and hu- miliate her; and he throws away his alliance with Russia, choosing deliberately to recover it at the head of 600,000 men. § 4. Was he successful 7 ' Better in a battle than in a war ' is the phrase which Livy applies to Hannibal. But the popular view regards only battles, and seems unable to embrace a whole war, still less a comprehensive political scheme in which even a war may be but an episode. Hence the prevalent notion of Napo- leon as a kind of incarnation of success. In what- ever way we conceive success, Napoleon missed it, and if the Cffisars and Alexanders may be called the gods of history, Napoleon is the Titan. If we ascribe to him a purely personal ambition, he would have been successful if he had established his dynasty in France. To any one who saw him about 1802, it must have seemed that such an object was easily within his reach, if only he could stoop to pick up a crown. He did stoop, 296 Napoleon in Himself. lie picked up the crown, but it dropped from his hauds again. Everything favored this ambition, the profoundly monarchical disposition of the country, the total failure of the Jacobins on the one side, and of the Bourbons on the other, his own military achievements, which, as early as 1802, were unrivalled in modern history. The success with which, a generation later, his nephew traded on his mere name, is a measure of the mis- takes which caused his own ruin and that of his son. But let us suppose that he had liigher views, that he thought of the greatness and well-being of France. What was the effect upon France of the specially Napoleonic work, of the attempt to con- quer England by conquering Europe ? As in the popular view the triumphant success which this enterprise had in its earlier stages, seems to con- ceal the total failure which it met with in the end, so it makes us utterly blind to the irretrievable disaster which it brought upon France. Much, it is true, has been said of the loss of life incurred, and indeed the statistics of the campaigns of 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815, are appalling. But the blood- shed fell upon several nations at once. What was peculiar to France was the loss of territory. And it was not merely the conquests made by Was he successful ? 297 Napoleon that were lost. We may indeed hold that France suffered no real loss by the dissolu- tion of the Confederation of the Khine, or by the expulsion of her armies from Spain and Italy, that the fall of the Napoleonic Empire was to France but the removal of an unhealthy excrescence. But France lost more than this; she lost not merely the conquests of Napoleon, but those of the Revo- lution ; and these stand on quite another footing. She had held Belgium for twenty years, and the left bank of the Ehine for nearly as long a time. None of the acquisitions made by France under the Bourbons seemed more solid and secure than these. They had cost France dear, and the loss of them had been felt as an almost incurable wound to Germany. But the transference had been ef- fected, the struggle was over, the European system had adapted itself to the change. Other questions had arisen since. For a long time after the Treaty of Lun^ville it was not thought likely that the re- sult of the revolutionary war would be undone a^ain, or that France could be forced back within her ancient limits. To a Moreau or a Bernadotte it would probably have been an easy task to defend these acquisitions, for there was no discontent, no indignant outraged patriotism in the annexed territories, and how 298 Napoleon in Himself. could Europe iu cold blood tear them by main force from such a Power as France ? Napoleon fouud the way to lose them. When we speak of Napoleon as a great con- queror, do we consider that he not only lost all his conquests, but left the territory of France ac- tually smaller tlian he found it when he became its ruler ? Belgium was no part of his conquests ; the left bank of the Ehine was an acquisition for which France thanked him only among others ; and this splendid tract of territory, which seemed as safely incorporated with France as Burgundy, was lost by Napoleon. The title ' Mehrer des Eeichs ' was deserved by several Bourbon princes. Henry II. won the three bishoprics, Alsace and Franche Comt^ are the tro- phies of Louis XIV., Lorraine and Corsica those of Louis XV. The struggle by which the First Ee- public had deserved the same title, and of which Belgium and the Left Bank were the trophies, was grander than any of these. What is the trophy of Napoleon ? Alone of all the modern rulers of France, he inflicted upon her a vast and irrepara- ble loss of territory. And yet not alone, for Alsace and Lorraine have gone since ; but they too have been lost in his name, and by recurring to his system. Influence, hoivfar Beneficial. 299 § 5. How far his Influence was Beneficial. The beneficial consequences which may be traced to Napoleon's career fall into two principal classes : (1) those caused not by him, but by resistance to him ; (2) those caused by him as the child of his age or the representative of the Revolution. (1.) It is said, Did not he carry a refreshing, re- generating influence wherever he appeared at the head of his armies ? Do not several European states date their modern period of progress and re- generation from a Napoleonic invasion ? This is true at least of Prussia, Eussia, and Spain ; but in what sense is it true ? In the same sense in which the greatness of ancient Greece is to be traced to the invasion of Xerxes. A pressing danger, the necessity of a great national rally, if it is followed by victory, is the most beneficial thing that can happen to a state. In Prussia the reform com- menced by Stein and Scharnhorst and the victories of the war of liberation which followed, in Russia and Spain the heroic resistance, had the effect of inspiring these nations as nothing had done before. But as the Greeks did not honor Xerxes for the great impulse they had received from the efforts which caused his defeat, so we ought to consider that it was not Napoleon, but resistance to Napoleon, 300 Napoleon in Himself. which had such a bracing effect upon Europe. Did he intend to rouse national spirit ? What he ulti- mately intended it is indeed difficult to say. Possi- bly he calculated that the military tyranny which he exercised would not be long needed, and that it would cease as a matter of course, when the fall of England should be accomplished. But he certainly did not intend to rouse in Germany and Italy a po- litical consciousness leading to national unity and liberty ; still less did he intend to create that re- bellion in Spain which was fatal to his empire. He intended in these cases tlie opposite result, as we see by tlie great impulse which he gave to des- potism in the middle states of Germany, and by the pains he took to prevent his Russian expedition from leading to a restoration of Poland. Had he been successful — that is, had English influence been destroyed and English liberties been over- thrown, had Prussia been reduced to a mere elec- torate, and Piedmont to a French province, had the system of French imperialism been consolidated in Germany, Italy, and SjDain, — all the movements wliich have since made the life and animated the liistory of this century would have been precluded. Napoleon's own direct influence tended to ruin and to the stagnation of imperialism, and was only ben- eficial in backward countries such as Spain and Influence, how far Beneficial. 301 Italy ; the regenerating influence of that age is the spirit of resistance to Napoleon. It was the great Anti-Napoleonic Revolution of Europe which, by- arming the peoples against tyranny, laid tlie foun- dation of European liberty. (2.) It is however true that he professed, in a vague manner, to be the champion of the liberal principles of the First Revolution, that is, of civil equality, religious toleration, and enlightened legis- lation. And it is possible to show that liberal reforms of this kind were introduced by his govern- ment in the Rhine provinces, in Westphalia, and in Italy, Naturally the expansion of France which followed the Revolution had many such beneficial consequences. But that expansion was not spe- cifically his work. It began before him ; it would have proceeded almost as far without him. Had Moreau reigned instead of Bonaparte, a similar influence would have flowed from liberal France upon the neighboring states ; it would have flowed more constantly and more uniformly, and it would have been followed by no similar reaction. Such liberal reforms are not specifically Napoleonic; they belong to the movement which bore him along, not to that which he himself originated. The same remark applies to his domestic reforms. "When he did only what IMoreau or Bernadotte 302 Napoleon in Himself. would have done in his place, he often did what was good in itself, and he did it with remarkable energy. Thus it fell to him, wielding the first strong government that had been seen since the destruction of ancient France, to found a whole system of national institutions. Army, Church, Uni- versity, Bank, Local Government, Code. Modern France dates from the Consulate. And it may be possible to show that in some parts of the new system his own mind has left its stamp, and also that no ruler less energetic would have met the needs of the time so fully. Still in the main this work was done by committees of experts, and it was done at that time and at no other, not because Napoleon was specially enlightened, but because the country found itself at last at peace and almost without institutions. A Moreau would have done perhaps not so much, but he must have done a similar work; audit is easy to show tliat, being disinterested, he might have avoided great le^isla- tive errors, into which Napoleon was led by his rapacity of power. A similar remark may be applied to that great work of discipline, for which he often receives credit. It is said that his firm will, vigilant eye, and indefatigable energy presiding for years over every department of administration, gave an im- Judged by his Plan, 30J pulse to the public service and a discipline to offi- cials, which, passing afterwards into a tradition of conscientious work, has upheld the French state ever since. No doubt the contrast is great between the stern martial energy of the Napoleonic gener- ation and the effeminacy of the age of Pompadour. But here, again, the reform had been begun and was even far advanced when Napoleon appeared. It had been set ou foot by the Convention : Mar- ceau, Klt^ber, Hoche, in the army, Carnot in the Government, had set great examples, which an organized imperialism could not but emulate ; and what Bonaparte did in this respect Avould have been done by a Moreau, with less energy no doubt, but with a purer spirit. § 6. Fapoleon judged hy his Plan. When we compare Napoleon's way of thinking with that of other rulers of the same class, even the most ambitious, we seem to see a difference. Louis XIV. and Frederick are thought ambitious, but they were scarcely ambitious in the same sense as Napoleon. Their course was unscrupulous and lawless, but in most cases they aimed at acquisi- tions which were really important, nay, often seemed indispensably necessary to the country. 304 Napoleon in Himself. Thus by the partition of Poland Frederick at once rescued Prussia from a position of extreme difficulty, and acquired a province which seemed almost in- dispensable for the compactness of the kingdom. Louis XIV. also had for the most part a serious public object in view. To fortify France on the side where she was weakest, to complete the in- corporation of Alsace, acquired during his minor- ity, were objects so important tliat we may suppose many of his aggressions to have seemed to him justifiable on the ground of necessary self-defence. The feverish impatience with which the Emperor Joseph presses his wild schemes of annexation, is certainly to be explained by the extreme and dan- gerous want of compactness which he found in the Austrian territory. Napoleon, in adopting the un- scrupulous maxims of the eighteenth century school of rulers, applies them not only on a scale which would have appalled the most cynical of these, but also in cases which they did not contemplate. They pleaded self-defence and public necessity for their annexations. The plea was insufficient, but for the most part it was urged in sincerity. The same excuse of necessity and self-defence might be offered for the lawless conduct of the French Gov- ernment in the first years of the revolutionary war. The country was at one time in extreme danger. Judged by his Plan. 305 and in addition the revolutionists sincerely believed that humanity itself was interested in their suc- cess. We may allow to Napoleon himself, so long as lie was Bonaparte, the benefit of this excuse. But it cannot be alleged for the wars of the properly Napoleonic period, that is, the wars after 1803. France was now in no danger, and could urge no plea of necessity or self-defence. Her territory was greatly enlarged, and it was compact. When Napoleon now continued to practise the doctrine of Frederick and Joseph, he applied it to a state of things for which it had never been in- tended. His language was less cynical than Fred- erick's, because it was less frank ; but his conduct was far more immoral. Frederick's ambition is sincerely for the state ; it is for the state he sins ; and he seeks for the state real, unquestionable, solid advantages. But for a state lilce France, at the height of prosperity and glory, to adopt in an ordinary colonial and maritime war against Eng- land the desperate maxims by which Frederick and Joseph had sought to found solid and defensible states in the midst of the confusion of Germany — this was not to follow a bad precedent, but to per- vert a bad precedent into something infinitely worse. It was portentous and unique in the Napoleonic pol- icy, that, while it far surpassed that of Frederick in 20 306 Napoleon in Himself. cynicisrn and waste of human life, it had no defin- able object ; for who could say what shape Europe would take, or how it would be governed, when the maritime tyranny of England should once for all be overthrown ? Moreover, while he exaggerates the bad maxims of the past age, he shows no sympathy for the bet- ter maxims which his own age was substituting for them. The Machiavelism of the eighteenth century marked the dissolution of the old system. Wliat better system was to arise ? Frederick and Joseph could not be expected to know, but Napo- leon might have known. His own unrivalled glory came from the leadership of a living nation- ality ; he better tlian any man of his time might have foreseen that the nineteenth century would make Germany, Eussia, Italy, Spain, organic, as France had been made organic by her revolution. This development would create a new European system, in which no doubt wars would still have a place and armies become larger than ever, yet far nobler than the family system of the seventeenth century or tlie international anarcliy of the eigh- teenth. I have said that Napoleon did not origi- nate the lawlessness he practised, that he only reflected the morality of his age ; unfortunately lie reflected only one part of it, and presented a Judged by his Plan. 307 rugged, dull surface to the better part. He had assimilated all that Frederick could teach, but the generous maxims of the first French He volution had made no impression on him. And yet he, a pupil of Paoli, a native of that Corsica which had been to Rousseau M'hat Greece was later to Byron — so that he had exclaimed, ' I have a kind of pre- sentiment that this little island will astonish Eu- rope ' — sliould have entered more than any of his contemporaries into all that is expressed by the word ' nationality.' It was indeed expected of him ; the primitive type of heroism, founded on devotion to the fatherland, seemed embodied in the Corsican soldier with his classical face. It is therefore a strikingly individual trait that he altogether dis- appoints these expectations. As in Corsica itself he turned against Paoli, so in Europe he will know nothing of the principle of nationality. He goes all lengths in warring against it, so that at last he becomes absolutely identified with the tyranny against which ' Plutarch's men ' fight. It is as if Tell should transform himself into Gessler, or Le- onidas into Xerxes. And no hereditary tyrant, warring on national independence in mere invin- cible ignorance of its nature, was ever more ruth- less and relentless than this tyrant, who had been bred in an atmosphere of national ideas. The op- 308 Napoleon in Himself. pressor of Tyrol and Spain is actually the same man who only twenty years earlier had written the ' Letters on Corsica.' But, forsooth, everything must yield to the par- amount necessity of bringing to an end the mari- time tyranny of England. We can enter into the frenzy of the ruler who, while he meets with no re- sistance elsewhere, finds himself steadily thwarted in the one direction in which from the beffinning he had resolved to move. Germany, and Spain, and Itussia felt the impatient force, Avhich could not find an escape at Brest and Eochefort. And as he grew accustomed year after year to war on a large scale, it became perhaps more and more an object in itself. The character, which had always been remarked for its lonely pride and egoism, be- came, thus indulged on the one side and thwarted on the other, cynically unlike that of other men — inhuman. The former generation had trembled at the hard cynicism of Frederick, but human life was now wasted on a vastly greater scale, liberty more ruthlessly repressed, public law more con- temptuously outraged, by one who sprang from the people. Frederick had pursued intelligible ob- jects, but Napoleon's objects were scarcely defina- ble. At last, when he sacrificed half a million of men in Russia to his crotchet of a commercial sys- Judged by his Plan. 309 tern, he seemed to pass out of the pale of civilized humanity, and to rank himself with Attila. The comparison was superficial ; but had Napoleon, or had Attila, the better right to complain of it ? The barbarian followed the maxims of his age and peo- ple, but we can only look with stupefaction on the Russian expedition. For we remember that this most monstrous of human sacrifices was performed by the person who twenty years earlier was pro- nounced ' a man of sensibility,' when he discussed in the style of Rousseau 'what sentiments it is important to inculcate upon human beings for their happiness.' Where it is possible, the best way to estimate the moral character of a man is to consider the general purpose and drift of his life. Particular acts usually admit of palliation or excuse ; in a time so revolutionary as that in which Napoleon lived, almost every act may be plausibly defended on the plea of an exceptional necessity. No one has ever accused Napoleon of purely wanton crimes, such crimes as springy from an unhealthy nature. His crimes are for the most part acts of lawless violence, done openly, avowed, and justi- fied by the reason of state. The language he uni- formly held shows that he had adopted early, and with great decision, the maxim so current in 310 Napoleon in Himself. the revolutionary age, that as long as the public good is our object, almost every act is permissible; or, as Mirabeau was fond of repeating, 'La petite morale est ennemie de la grande.' We may say that he elects to be tried by the standard of Fred- erick the Great. He does not profess to observe the morality of ordinary men ; as Frederick frankly maintains that for the public good trea- ties may be broken, so Napoleon will break any en- gagement and violate any law for the public good. This principle is terrible ; nevertheless it is a principle. Those who sincerely adhere to it will subject themselves to a certain restraint, will rec- ognize certain acts to be criminal, and certain other acts to be obligatory. For Frederick himself, per- haps, the principle had really its positive as well as its negative side. The public good was to him perhaps no mere pretext, no mere synonyme for his own interest. In his career, as we see the nega- tive working of tlie principle in such particular acts as the invasion of Silesia and the partition of Poland, so we see the positive working of it in the general tendency of the whole. "We see that at the beginning of his reign the Prussian state la- bored under great disadvantages, which exposed it to great dangers. We see that it is to remove these disadvantages that Frederick devotes his life Judged by his Plan. 311 and commits his crimes. Wheu he speaks of the public good he is serious, and we may, perhaps, acquit him on the whole of a purely selfish ambi- tion. Hence he is remembered with gratitude by the Germany of the present day. The attempt has been made here to apply the same method to Napoleon. It is the only method which is sufficiently compendious to be admissible in a work of this kind, and it is perhaps in itself the most satisfactory. All his lawless deeds were regarded by him as means to an end, justified by the goodness of the end. He was full of the idea that he had to deal with a revolutionary age, to which ordinary maxims are inapplicable. 'You understand nothing of revolutions,' was his con- temptuous comment, when some one related how he had yielded to a moral scruple at some crisis of French affairs. If this was his view, what can be gained by nicely sifting the evidence on which the special charges against him rest ? ' Such men as I,' he said, ' do not commit crimes ; ' that is, they do what is necessary, and what is necessary is right. But Napoleon, like Frederick, had so much free- dom and power that we are able to discover what general objects he has in view. We are able to apply to him the tests he himself accepts. 312 Napoleon in Himself. From about the middle of the period of the Con- sulate he begins to be as free from all pledges and all responsibility as Frederick had been, and therefore from this date onward lie reveals his own personal aims, whereas earlier he had been but an instrument of the aims of the French Revolution. In the former period, therefore, we see the man such as circumstances made him. He is the incar- nation of the vitality of a great people, made or- ganic for the first time. They have the instinct of subordination, formed in the time of despotism, and along with it the new feeling of life. Of such a nation he becomes the heroic king, in order to vin- dicate it and subdue its enemies. This period comes to an end in the Consulate, when Bonaparte accomplishes the pacification of the world. In the latter period we see the man such as he is in himself. He now no longer executes a commis- sion derived from others, but forms his own plans. In the execution of them he is, like Frederick, un- scrupulous. Both at home and abroad he makes slight account of engagements ; like Frederick, too, he is hard and careless of human life. Moreover, as his power is far greater, his reckless violence oppresses mankind far more than Frederick's had done. The carnage and horror of the Seven Years' War are utterly eclipsed on the fields of Borodino Judged by his Plan. 313 and Leipzig, and in the retreat from Moscow. And, still further, he is himself the prime mover in the incessant wars of this period; whereas Frederick, after the invasion of Silesia, had re- mained for the most part on the defensive. But, like Frederick, lie justifies his course by the plea of the public good. He pushes this wild morality to the utmost ex- treme. For it is scarcely possible to imagine any reform or improvement in human affairs so great as to compensate for all that Napoleon inflicted on mankind — for France decimated, for Eussia in- vaded, for Spain made for five years the scene of a barbarous civil war, for Germany trampled under foot, for England blockaded, for a whole generation sacrificed to war. Still, in estimating Napoleon's character, the essential question is. Had he really the public good in view ? Had he some object which, if it could be attained, might conceivably seem to him worth so many sacrifices, and which he might conceivably hope to attain by means of them ? If he had, we may regard his career as in a certain sense magnanimous, if also wayward, and even monstrous: we may regard him as a great spirit lalioring under a terrible but still sublime hallucination. Our conclusion is that he had neither any such 314 Napoleon in Himself. grand conception, nor yet, on the other hand, the bare desire for personal glory. He pursued simply the ordinary objects of the French Foreign Office, and only failure and the impatience caused by fail- ure led him to strain in such an unheard-of manner the enormous resources of his empire. His aim was to fight out the great quarrel with England which had occupied France throughout the eigh- teenth century, to avenge and repair the losses France had suffered in Canada and India, and on all the seas. This was what he promised to France ; and being unable to accomplish his object by a direct attack, he forced all Europe into the war, ' conquering Europe inW order to conquer England,' and offering nothing to Eu- rope in return but the old points of the Armed Neutrality. Tliis is what he promised ; and what he prom- ised he failed to perform, causing France to lose in the attempt all the dear-bought conquests of the Eevolution. When we review tlie career of Frederick the Great, we cannot refrain, however severely we may judge his crimes, from reflecting that after all his monument is modern Germany. That solid structure remains to honor the workman who did so much to build it. It is, in the main, just such Judged by his Plan. 315 a structure as Frederick would Lave desired to see, as he intended to found. For Napoleon, too, it may be said that modern France, in its internal constitution, is his monu- ment. Its institutions are in the main the work of his reign. But this is the monument of that earlier Napoleon who was the child of his age. The Napoleon wlio was himself, who executed his iron plans with almost unlimited power, has uo monument. All that he built, at such a cost of blood and tears, was swept away befor.e he himself ended his short life. t ^ • ^ 7 University Press : John V/ilson and Son, Cambridge. -y -^. ^^^^"''O^U/^-U , '>'^. "^ )\-r -/, J. R. SEELEY'S WRITINGS. ECCB HOMO. A Survey of the Life and Work of Jesus Christ. 161110. Price $1.00. " It will do a service among a very large class of readers, such as are assigned to hardly more than two cr three volumes in a century." — Rev. George E Ellis. "This remarkable book is one of those which iiermanently influence public opinion. The author has a right to claim deference from those who think deepest and know most, when he pleads before them that not philosophy can save and recl.iim tlie world, but faith in a divine person who is worthy of it, allegiance to a divine society which he founded, and union of hearts in the object for which he created it." — Tlit Guardian. " By general consent, the most remarkable book of recent years." — Christian Examiner. ROMAN IMPERIALISM, and other Lectures and Essays. 161110. Price $1.50. Contexts: Roman Imperialism- I. The Great Roman Revolution; II. The Proximate Cause of the Fall of the Roman Empire. — Milton's Political Opinions. — Milton's Poetry. — Elementary Principles in Art. — Liberal Edu- cation in Universities. — English in Schools. — The Church as a Teacher of Morality. — The Teaching of Politics, an Inaugural Lecture, delivered at Cam- bridge. "The author of ' Ecce Hemo ' has been pronounced the typical writer of the present time- Those who have read his former work — and who has not? — will give this a cordial welcome. The essays entitled ' Liberal Education in Univer- sities,' 'English in Schools,' and 'The Teaching of Politics,' challenge the attention of educators ; while ' The Church as a Teacher of Morality ' will excite some of the fierce criticism th.tt followed the publication of ' Ecce Homo.' " — St. Louis yournal o/ Education. NATURAL RELIGION. With a new E.xplanatory Preface. 161110. Price $1.25. "The author of ' Ecce Homo ' has now spoken again with the view of showing Christ as the creator of modern theology and religion, or rather of showing how far the republic of God, as set up in the world through the agency of Jesus Christ, fulfils its functions in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. The bold hand that stripped from the name of Christ the thousand superstitions that surrounded hi:n, here deals with Christianity as he then dealt with its originator; and the same strong criticism, the same fearless assertion of fundamental principles, the same comprehensiveness of view, the same desire to explain by natural what has so often been remanded to supernatural forces, the same grasp of the ethical con- victions of men, appears in ' Natural Religion ' that startled thinking people in the pages of ' Ecce Homo.' " — Sunday Herald. THE EXPANSION OF ENGLAND. Crown Svo. Price "Those who take even the slightest interest in historical reading cannot fail to be absorbed and delighted by Professor Seeley's book." — Washittgton Herald. "The ' Expansion of England,' by J- R- Seeley, M.A., consists of two courses of lectures delivered by the author at Cambridge University, where he is Regius Professor of Modern History. It is a brilliant volume, charming in style, and of the highest interest in the method chosen by the author for the marshalling and development of his subject. There are eight lectures in all, and th.ey show, with rare skill in the management and condensation of a vast amount of material, how and why England, from small beginnings, had reached her present position, and left the rest of Europe behind her in political and commercial progress." — Sat- urday Evening Gazette. % Sold by all Booksellers. Mailed, post-paid, by the Publishers, ROBERTS BROTHERS, Boston. IMPORTANT HISTORICAL WORK BY THE AUTHOR s OF "ECCE HOMO." •<0 Just reaJy, 2 vols., 8vo, with Portrait and Maps, price $7.50. \ LIFE AND TIMES OF STEIN; OR, Germany and Prussia in the Napoleonic Age. By J. R. SEELEY, M.A., Regius Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge, Eng. Tiiis book is drawn almost entirely from German sources which neither English nor French writers have yet explored, and it describes events which form the beginning of the modern history of Prussia, and others which are very important in the history of Europe. The author has kept students of history constantly in view. It is a favorite opinion of his that recent history ought to be introduced into education, and this book is intended to be such as can be intro- duced into universities and the higher forms of schools. From the Hartford Courant. "The ' Life and Times of Stein,' by Professor Seeley of Oxford, author cf ' Ecce Homo,' is a work of great importance to students of political history. The subject of it, we may remark by the way, is honored in Berlin by what is probably the finest statue made in modern times. And this consummate work of art is only a fit recog- nition of the pre-eminent service that Baron Von Stein rendered to Prussia. It 15 scarcely too much to say that Stein is the creator of modern Prussia, and that but for liim the successful career of Prince Bismarck, the architect of German unity, would have been impossible." From the London Atheneeum. ■ " In a notice of this kind scant justice can be done to a work like the one before us; no short rhniiU can give even the most meagre notion of the contents of these volumec, which contain no page that is superfluous, and none that is uninteresting. Every d.ay the interest attaching to the present political condition of Germany increases ; every day we see more and more clearly the outlines of the great constitutional struggles, possibly of the revolution, that must surely soon come about. To understand the Germany of to-day, one must study the Germany of many yesterdiys; and now that study has been made easy by this work, to which no one can hesitate to assign a very high place among those recent histories which have aimed at original research." 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