Italy's Contribution to the 
 
 BY 
 
 An American Observer in !ta!v 
 
 "The writer of the following pages was an official in the 
 American Service who was stationed in Italy for a year and a 
 half during 1917 and 1918. His duties took him to all parts of 
 Italy and brought him in contact with all sorts and conditions of 
 men and women of that country. His opportunities for observ- 
 ing and for gathering accurate information were unlimited." 
 
 With a few zvords of explanation by Herbert L. Sattcrlee, 
 formerly Assistant Secretary of the U. S. Navy. 
 
 Sold for tho benefit oi the American Conuuitl^e 
 Helping Italian Blind 
 
 111 EAST 5STK STREET 
 NEW YORK CITY 
 
 PRICE FIFTY CEWTS 
 
NOTE. 
 
 Please be sure to read foreword on page 1 and 
 afterword on page 28. 
 
Italy's Contribution to the Great Victory 
 
Copyright 1919, 
 
 by 
 
 HERBERT L. SATTERLEE. 
 
 )CI.A5,'?B547 
 
 NOV 13 1919 
 
 J]szo 
 
 01 yX?^ 
 
FOREWORD. 
 
 The writer of the following pages was an official in 
 the American Service, who was stationed in Italy for 
 a year and a half during 1917 and 1918. His duties 
 took him to all parts of Italy, and brought him in con- 
 tact with all sorts and conditions of men and women 
 of that country. His opportunities for observing and 
 for gathering accurate information were unlimited. 
 He went to Italy a skeptic as to Italy's efficient 
 assistance to the Allied Cause. On his return to 
 America he was shocked to discover the general ignor- 
 ance of things Italian in his own country, but was 
 gratified to find a strong desire to hear the truth about 
 Ithem. Whenever he talked of Italy, he found inter- 
 ested and sympathetic listeners, who were amazed to 
 learn what he had to disclose. As a result, he was 
 asked to jot down the gist of these conversations, which 
 he has been most willing to do in the hope that thereby 
 he will reach a larger audience. 
 
 As will be evident, no attempt at literary composi- 
 tion, or an historic essay on Italy's contribution to the 
 war, has been attempted. It is more a connected re- 
 cital of random conversations, relying upon the vivid 
 impressions burned into his memory by the events nar- 
 rated, and supplemented by reference to personal letters 
 written at the time to his friends. While frankly and 
 purposely pro-Italian, the writer has sternly resisted any 
 temptation to exaggerate the truth as to facts and con- 
 ditions, and hopes and believes that he has recorded a 
 just and moderate estimate of Italy's attitude and ac- 
 complishments during the Great War. 
 
Italy's Contribution to the Great Victory 
 
 For one reason or another, it makes no difference 
 what, Italy's contribution to the Great Victory and her 
 enormous \acrifices and efforts have been very htte 
 annreciated at least outside of Italy. ihe ita lan is 
 nX?any extremely modest and I found hin-ontinualy 
 minimizing his country's achievements and lauding, 
 "en extra%agantly, the efforts and achievements of h^ 
 friends. It was my duty and S^eat privilege to be 
 closely associated with the Italians m Italy for a year 
 and a half during 1917 and 1918. I record some of my 
 impres ions, gained at first hand, in the hope that they 
 will enable otiiers to know, appreciate ^"d^ove Italy as 
 I learned to do during her hour of greatest trial and 
 durin- the moment of her greatest triumph. 
 
 Tdo not want to be understood as saying "Italy won 
 the war," for this is at once correct and incorrect It 
 would be absurd to make such a statement without 
 nualifications ; but it is nevertheless unquestionably true 
 ?hat the war could not have been won without Italy 
 anymore than it could have been won without England 
 France, Belgium, Russia or the United States A six 
 countries contributed in varying degrees o the victory 
 or the failure of any one would have spelled de eat for 
 the Allied cause. These countries were like links ot 
 various sizes and strength in a chain, the parting of any 
 one of which would ha?e meant the parting of the chain. 
 
 Italy's First Service. 
 It is a fact, known, but little appreciated that Italy 
 fr aved the war in July, 1914. refer to the fact 
 that the Italian Am.bassador in London informed Wm- 
 ctoii Churchill, then First Lord of the Admira ty, that 
 he effos to maintain peace would fail and that war 
 was inevi able and immediate. It was on the strength 
 of th^Tip that Winston Churchill kept the British fleet 
 ?nt.rt after the great naval review at Portsmouth the 
 end of July, 1914 Had the fleet been dispersed, as was 
 Dlanned and as the Germans counted on, the German 
 £t wouW have made an attack i" force with a air 
 chance in their favor of destroying the British fleet in 
 detail. 
 
Italy's Second S£rvice. 
 
 The second time that Italy saved the war for the 
 AlHes was in September, 1914, when Baron Sonnino, 
 the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, assured the 
 French Government that under no circumstances would 
 Italy join the Central Powers, and that France need 
 fear no attack by Italy on her southern frontier. This 
 information released 300,000 French troops who had 
 been guarding the Italian frontier, and formed the army 
 of maneouvre which won the first battle of the Marne, 
 and saved the war. Both these assurances of Italy's 
 friendship for the Entente were given freely and vol- 
 untarily and with no expectation of reward. The latter 
 assurance was given at a time when all the world be- 
 lieved that Germany was about to win a swift and 
 smashing victory, and when people less generous than 
 the Italian Government might have been expected to 
 throw all their weight with the winning side in the hope 
 of reaping a reward. Our debt of gratitude for this 
 unselfish act of Italy's can never be paid. 
 
 Italy's Third Service. 
 
 Italy's third great contribution to the Allied victory 
 was her declaration of war against Austria on the 24th 
 of May, 1915. This was an extremely courageous move 
 on the part of the Italians, for at that time the fortunes 
 of the Central Empires were still on the ascendant and 
 it looked as though nothing could prevent their com- 
 plete victory. 
 
 Tlie Reason for Italy's Delay. 
 
 Unthinking people sometimes criticize Italy for de- 
 laying so long in entering the war. These same people, 
 however, should remember that the United States de- 
 layed two years longer. It must also be considered how 
 much more difficult Italy's position was than ours. In 
 the first place, Italy is not by any means a rich nation 
 and war meant untold sacrifices in treasure and in blood. 
 Italy's territory adjoined that of Austria along the 
 frontier of some five hundred miles. All the mountain 
 passes along this frontier were in Austrian hands and 
 were strongly fortified. The Trentino was thrust like 
 a dagger into the very heart of the industrial section 
 of Italy. On the Italian side of the frontier were fertile 
 plains on which were located most of Italy's prosperous 
 
provinces and nearly all her manufactures. All this 
 was exposed to invasion by Italy's declaration of war. 
 For Americans, with three thousand miles of ocean be- 
 tween them and Europe, it is difficult to realize what 
 this means. Italy, however, well knew what it meant, 
 as she had experienced Austrian invasions many times 
 before, and she had had recent examples of what Hun 
 invasions could be. Poor Italy ! She was soon to see 
 for herself what Belgium and France and Servia had 
 felt and seen. 
 
 When Italy's situation is understood she should not 
 be criticized for not having entered the war immediately. 
 In addition to the physical risks of invasion, air-raids, 
 destruction of commerce, etc., it must be remembered 
 that for nearly two generations Italy has been in alli- 
 ance with the Central Powers. Almost the entire popu- 
 lation of Italy has been brought up with the belief that 
 these powers were her friends and that her salvation 
 lay with them. For generations many of her best fam- 
 ilies had intermarried with the Germans and Austrians. 
 The Central Powers had obtained an economic grip on 
 Italy which it was believed nothing could break. They 
 had sold Italy goods at low prices (often less than 
 cost) and on long credits; they virtually controlled the 
 banks and the hotels of Italy ; they had built many of 
 the railways, street car lines, electric light plants, etc. ; 
 hundreds of thousands of young Italian workmen were 
 induced by high wages to go to Germany, where they 
 learned their trades and then returned to their native 
 land completely under the inlluence of German propa- 
 ganda. During the eight months previous to Italy's 
 entrance into the war the German propaganda in that 
 country was almost unbelievable in its extent and per- 
 sistency. Their most astute diplomat, Prince von Bulow, 
 with his charming and popular Italian wife, was sent 
 to Italy in the endeavor not to induce Italy to enter the 
 war on the side of the Central Powers, but to induce her 
 itnerely to remain neutral. Austria offered to cede to 
 Italy practically the whole of the Trentino, Trieste, Istria 
 and part of Dalmatia, for Italy's mere neutrality. 
 
 In addition to these considerations there was another, 
 and a very strong factor working for Italian neutrality ; 
 I refer to the Italian Socialists and to the strong politi- 
 cal leader. Giolitti. If it is possible to conceive a j3olitical 
 organization having a nation-wide influence comparable 
 to the influence of Tammany Hall in New York, then 
 
one may imagine what the Giolitti machine was in Italy. 
 It practically controlled the politician from one end of 
 the country to the other. I have heard it estimated that 
 Giolitti could elect or defeat three-quarters of the depu- 
 ties in Parliament. Giolitti had been Prime Minister. 
 He firmly believed that the interests of Italy lay on the 
 side of the Central Powers and not on the side of the 
 Entente. He threw the enormous weight of his political 
 machine into the scales against Italy's entrance into the 
 war. He was enthusiastically supported in this by the 
 Socialists, who were particularly strong in the great 
 prosperous industrial centers of the north. 
 
 JVhy Italy Entered the War. 
 
 Those who are inclined to criticise Italy for her de- 
 lay, show a pitiable lack of knowledge of conditions in 
 Italy, or an unwillingness to read frankly and fairly of 
 these conditions. The wonder is not that Italy delayed 
 eight months, but that she entered at all. Why, then, did 
 Italy enter the war? No one reason may be assigned. 
 Italy's enemies have tried to make it appear thai she 
 simply sold herself to the h.ighest bidder. This is the 
 basest calumny and those who repeat it are consciously 
 or unconsciously playing Germany's game by sowing 
 suspicion towards a faithful ally. Such a belief, if hon- 
 estly held, displays an amazing ignorance of the facts, 
 or a refusal or inability to draw the clear and logical 
 conclusion from them. In the first place, Italy does not 
 raise sufiicicnt foodstufl:s to feed her population. She 
 has practically no iron, copper, lead, zinc, etc., and no 
 coal or oil. She must import these articles in large 
 quantities or else starve and see her industries absolutely 
 destroyed, her prosperity ruined and her industrial popu- 
 lation thrown completely out of employment. It is self- 
 evident that Italy must have these articles for her very 
 existence. It was not a question of the highest price 
 for her support — it was a question of who could and 
 would supply these necessities. Italy could not remain 
 neutral, for then neither of the belligerent groups would 
 have supplied her needs. The Central Powers certainly 
 could not supply Italy's needs, whereas the Entente 
 could, and would, in return for Italy's support. 
 
 But this motive, compelling as it is, does not account 
 for the courage and enthusiasm with which Italy poured 
 her whole soul into the war. Above and beyond all of the 
 
Giolittian arguments of self-interest, of the ancient feud 
 of Church and Stale, and of the traditions of the Triple 
 Alliance, there burned brightly in the Italian heart and 
 mind the memory of the wrongs suffered for centuries 
 at the hands of Austria, of the millions of Italian souls 
 unwillingly held under the Austrian yoke, and of the 
 teachings of Mazzini and the other Italian patriots who 
 preached and suft'ered and died for Italian unity. In a 
 word, it was "Italia Irredenta" which carried the day, 
 brought Italy into the war, and sustained her through 
 her darkest hours. No student of Italian affairs with 
 whom I have talked, whatever his nationality or political 
 creed, denies this. 
 
 Effect of Americas Entry into the War. 
 
 I cannot leave this point without mentioning the tre- 
 mendous effect on Italian morale caused by America's 
 entrance into the war. Practically every Italian family 
 has one or more relatives in the United States. The 
 letters from these relatives, and they themselves on their 
 return to Italy, have built up around the name, "America," 
 a tradition such as surrounds no other name they know. 
 America is invariably painted as a country of infinite 
 opportunity, infinite wealth and infinite justice. _ In the 
 minds of some Italians there may have been lingering 
 doubts as to whether or not Giolitti and his adherents 
 were right, and as to the wisdom of Italy's entrance into 
 the war, but all these doubts vanished when America 
 came in. Here was America dispassionately viewing 
 Europe's struggle from a distance, with no axe to grind,^ 
 with no age-long ambitions to fulfill, and with the vision 
 of three years of frightful warfare clearly before her 
 eyes— with all this, America voluntarily chose to enter 
 the war and to enter it on Italy's side. There could no 
 longer be any doubt as to the justice of Italy's cause be- 
 cau^se America had voluntarily espoused that cause. Nor 
 could there be any doubt as to the final outcome. This 
 absolute trust in America was one of the strongest evi- 
 dences of the genuine admiration with which our country 
 was regarded in Italy. When the American troops at 
 Chateau Thierry in June. 1918. stopped the fourth Ger- 
 man drive, and when they gave such a splendid account 
 of themselves in the Allied offensive which started the 
 following month, we Americans in Italy naturally felt 
 extremely elated, and, I daresay, showed it. It was a 
 
8 
 
 wonderful satisfaction to us, not to say relief, to find 
 that our hastily raised armies could meet the German vet- 
 erans on more than terms of equality. Much to my sur- 
 prise, I found little sign of this enthusiasm reflected on 
 the part of the Italians. At first I was unable to account 
 for this, until the reason was gradually, but unmistakably, 
 borne home to me. When the American troops at last 
 were face to face with the Germans in battle, the Italian 
 was never for a moment in doubt as to what the result 
 would be. He received our successes as naturally to be 
 expected and, therefore, with apparent unconcern, much 
 in the same way as he regarded the rising and the set- 
 ting of the sun ; both were perfectly natural phenomena. 
 
 Italy Entered the JJ'ar IVhole-Hcartedly. 
 
 Italy, having entered the war, entered it with might 
 and main. Within a month she had mobilized under 
 arms an army of 4,500,000 men, which is more than the 
 United States, with three and one-half times the popula- 
 tion of Italy, raised in a year and a half. Ninety per 
 cent, of the living male population born between the 
 years 1872 and 1900 were called to the colors at one 
 time or another, the remaining ten per cent, being people 
 in the civilian employ of the Government, in essential 
 industry or physically incapacitated. Italv's losses 
 amounted to 1,600,000, of whom 480,000 were killed or 
 died of wounds and disease. This death list is approxi- 
 mately eight times as large as the death list in the Amer- 
 ican army, so that, considering the relative population of 
 Italy and the United States, Italian losses in killed were 
 proportionately twenty-five times as great as those of 
 the United States. There is not one of us who has not 
 lost relatives or dear friends. If it were possible for 
 us in our minds to magnify this number by twenty-five, 
 we would have some idea of the losses Italy bore. I say 
 "seme idea," for the figures alone do not actually rep- 
 resent the loss. Italy, being a poor country, was unable 
 to extend adequate help to the families and dependents 
 of those wdio had made the supreme sacrifice, nor 
 should we overlook the fact that the average Italian 
 family has very little invested capital and lives largely 
 on the current earnings of its men. 
 
Caporetto. 
 
 When speaking of Italy's contributions and efforts in 
 the war only too often I am met with inquiries about 
 Italy's one great defeat. It would seem that the only 
 feature of the Italian war that has been heard of outside 
 of Italy is "Caporetto." Why should we forget the 
 three splendid campaigns in which the Italian army 
 faced a numerically superior force which held all the 
 strategic positions, and yet drove this force steadily back 
 into the mountain strongholds, while foot after foot of 
 "Italia Irredenta" was being redeemed? No more gal- 
 lant fighting against overwhelming odds, or stronger 
 natural defensive positions, was waged in the whole war. 
 It is a fact, though rarely appreciated, that Italians held 
 a line as long as the line in France, with almost im- 
 penetrable mountains before them and with their own 
 open plains, supporting the industrial life of Italy, behind 
 them. Advance for Italy was slow and costly. But let 
 her own line be pierced at one point and, due to the 
 unfavorable geographical position, a large part of her 
 line must crumble. This was clearly appreciated by the 
 Central Empires, and a stroke against Italy was care- 
 fully prepared for the fall of 1917. 
 
 The German General von Berthier had developed a 
 totally new system of attack against trenches, known as 
 the infiltration system. This had been used with phe- 
 nomenal success on the Russian front, particularly in 
 the capture of Riga. Von Berthier's veterans, flushed 
 with their victory, and confident of the success of their 
 new tactics, were transferred to the Italian front. The 
 Russian army had now completely collapsed and large 
 German reinforcements of men and materials were sent 
 to Austria. It was decided to concentrate the force of 
 the attack on the Italian Second Army at Caporetto. 
 Long and careful preparation for this attack was made 
 behind the Italian lines as well as in front of them. 
 Forged copies of leading Italian newspapers were print- 
 ed, containing the most alarming accounts of German 
 victories and Allied defeats. The German army was 
 even said to have landed in Sicily and to be ravaging 
 the country. Perfect forgeries of the London Daily 
 Mail were printed in Switzerland, containing accounts 
 of Irish rebellions and great general strikes throughout 
 England, as well as defeats of the British fleet. These 
 forged newspapers were widely circulated in the 
 
10 
 
 trenches, for, unfortunately, the ItaHans did not censor 
 the newspapers going to the front, beheving that censor- 
 ship at the place of publication was sufficient. The 
 families of soldiers at the front were induced to write 
 the most alarming accounts of conditions at home and 
 to beg the men to return to them. 
 
 In August the Pope issued his famous peace note. 
 This had a great effect on the soldiers. German agents 
 told them that the Holy Father wanted peace, that only 
 the capitalists and ruling classes wished to continue the 
 war for selfish purposes, and that it was their duty as 
 Christians to cease fighting. Italian-speaking troops 
 from the Trentino, Trieste, I stria and Fiume were placed 
 opposite the Second Army. It is probable that these 
 troops were not in the plot, but at any rate they fra- 
 ternized with the Italian troops, arguing, "It is all wrong 
 for Italians to be fighting Italians. We are brothers 
 and belong to the same race, and have no quarrel with 
 each other." The up-shot of it was that each side agreed 
 that should the other be ordered to attack they would 
 not resist. The night before the offensive, the Austrians 
 removed their Italian-speaking troops and filled their 
 places with Jugo-Slavs, who hated the Italians bitterly. 
 The following day, when the attack took place, at first 
 th.e Italians did not resist, believing that their Italian 
 friends were attacking. It was not until the Jugo-Slavs 
 were in the Italian trenches that they discovered that 
 tlicy had been trapped. 
 
 When the German preparations were quite complete, 
 the offensive was launched against the Italian Second 
 Army. The new infiltration tactics were used for the 
 first time on the western front. They took the Italians 
 completely by surprise, as they did the English Fifth 
 Army the following May, and the French at Chemin- 
 des-Dames tb.e following June. One of the first shots 
 tired, by bad luck struck the Italian telephone central and 
 put a large part of the communications out of commis- 
 sirn. Simultaneously with the attack, a large number 
 of Italian-speaking Austrian subjects, dressed in the 
 uniform of Italian officers and non-commissioned offi- 
 cers, swarmed through the Italian lines shouting con- 
 fusing and contradictory orders, ordering a retreat and 
 generally spreading confusion. When it is remembered 
 that the Italians themselves speak many dialects, it is 
 easy to see how such a ruse could, and did, succeed. 
 
11 
 
 Reports of wholesale treason among the Italians were 
 spread far and wide by the Austrian propagandists. No 
 one was considered too high or too loyal to be be- 
 smirched by these reports. In addition, hundreds of 
 false orders had been prepared in advance, and were 
 transmitted throughout the Italian lines. The result was 
 inconceivable. Armies that had been uniformly and 
 gloriously successful through three campaigns, suddenly 
 heard news of a tremendous defeat. They could hardly 
 believe it, until the reports of treason reached their ears. 
 These reports seemed to give the only clue to this 
 strange and sudden collapse. They spread like wild fire, 
 gathering momentum and color by the way. When 
 strange and conflicting orders were received, the officer 
 receiving them had no way of knowing whether or not 
 they were genuine orders or forgeries, and, if genume, 
 whether or not the officer issuing the order was loyal. 
 For a while everything was chaos. 
 
 General Cadorna, seeing the enemy pouring through 
 the gap in his line caused by the defeat of the Second 
 Army, had the choice of but two moves. If he at- 
 tempted to hold ground on either flank he ran the risk 
 of having his force divided and his entire army annihil- 
 ated. By dropping back the flanks he could still close 
 the gap and reform on a new defensive line. He chose 
 the latter and safer course. Many of the officers on 
 receiving orders to evacuate the strong positions which 
 had been torn from the enemy in three campaigns at the 
 cost of so much blood, refused to obey the order and 
 retained their positions until surrounded by the enemy. 
 They fought until the last man was killed, not one sur- 
 rendering. Leonidas at Thermopolae gave no greater 
 example'of personal courage. Many other officers, after 
 transmitting the order to retreat, broke their swords and 
 committed suicide rather than obey it themselves. 
 
 Then followed the heart-breaking retreat of the Italian 
 army across the plains of the Friuli and the Veneto. 
 The very elements were against them. On reachmg the 
 Tagliamento, this river was so swollen by floods from 
 the mountains that the Italian bridges were swept away 
 and thousands were drowned in the crossing. An Eng- 
 lish officer who was there told me that the crossmg of 
 the pursuing Austrians could be compared only with 
 the historic crossing of the Red Sea. By the time the 
 Austrians arrived the flood had vanished as suddenly as 
 
12 
 
 it came and the Austrian army crossed the river bed 
 hardly wetting their shoe tops. Finally, the Italian 
 armies were rallied behind the Piave and on a line from 
 Mt. Grappa across the Asiago Plateau. They were liter- 
 ally fighting with their backs to the precipice, for when 
 they finally stopped the Austrian drive, they were on 
 the last ridge of the plateau. Four thousand feet below 
 them lay the Venetian Plain and beyond it the most 
 populous and prosperous sections of Italy, whose cap- 
 ture meant Italy's death knell, and for the Allies the loss 
 of the war. It was a tense and dramatic moment, and 
 one which I shall never forget, as we eagerly watched 
 for every word from the front. Mt. Grappa, the key 
 to the whole line, and often called the Gibraltar of 
 Italy, was captured and lost nine times. In the space of 
 about three weeks, Italians had constructed two roads 
 from the plain up the nearly vertical face of the hills 
 to the plateau above. These roads, marvels of engin- 
 eering skill which I have heard described by American 
 officers as the eighth wonder of the world, were prac- 
 tically the only means of supply for the armies on the 
 plateau. They were supplemented by steel suspension 
 cables on which little cars were hauled, carrying sup- 
 plies. 
 
 The First Battle of the Piave. 
 
 The first battle of the Piave I consider one of the 
 great military marvels of the war. The Italian army, 
 utterly defeated, with nearly all its artillery and am- 
 munition abandoned, its transportation destroyed, its 
 morale utterly shaken, with stories of treachery being 
 spread broadcast by its enemies, this army almost liter- 
 ally bare-handed and sometimes fighting knee-deep in 
 snow, stopped and held the Austro-German army, flushed 
 with its victory and with all the stragetic positions in 
 its hands. It was at this point that the historic phrase, 
 "di qui non si passa" was coined. "Mt. Grappa" is to 
 the Italian what "Verdun" is to the French — an eternal 
 glory. Why is it that we must remember only the un- 
 fortunate defeat and forget this splendid victory? That 
 the Italians fought hard is proven by the fact that their 
 losses the first day were 29.000 killed and wounded, 
 while for a month and a half their daily losses ran from 
 9.000 to 12.000. 
 
 There seems to be a general misunderstanding that 
 
13 
 
 the Austrian drive was checked, not by the Italians, but 
 by the French and British who were sent to aid them. 
 Without detracting one whit from the latter, I wish 
 to say emphatically that the drive was checked on the 
 line of the Piave, Mt. Grappa, and the Asiago, entirely by 
 the Italians before a single French or British soldier 
 arrived in Italy. The 100,000 British and 80,000 French 
 who were sent to Italy's aid were stationed, on their 
 arrival, at Padova, behind the Italian lines. 
 
 This was quite proper, as at that time no one knew 
 how far the enemy propaganda had succeeded in dis- 
 organizing the Italian armies, or if, and where, another 
 collapse would take place. The French and British were 
 held in reserve to be thrown into the line in case weak- 
 ness developed at any point. Such weakness did not 
 develop, and the battle was definitely over by the middle 
 of December when seven feet of snow in the mountains 
 made further fighting impossible. Two weeks later, and 
 not until then, the British and French troops took their 
 positions in the line to relieve exhausted Italians. 
 
 Reports were widely circulated that a large number 
 of Italians, even officers of high rank, were executed for 
 treason as a result of the defeat. Whether this be true 
 or not I have never found out. The fact is that the 
 Government has always denied it, and has in numerous 
 cases publicly prosecuted those individuals, including two 
 deputies, who spread the reports. In no case was the 
 defendant able to substantiate the report, and, there- 
 fore, we may safely say there was no truth in it. It was 
 another one of the damnable lies which the enemies of 
 Italv have been so industrious in circulating. 
 
 Italian Hardships. 
 
 Nearly all the food and winter clothing of the Italian 
 armies had to be abandoned at Udine. As a result, the 
 food conditions throughout Italy the following winter 
 were frightful. Stocks were reduced to the vanishing 
 point in order that the army might not starve. People 
 went from house to house, begging one blanket off each 
 bed to keep the soldiers in the mountains from freezing 
 to death. No coal was permitted for private consump- 
 tion, heating, etc. And what little could be obtained for 
 essential industries cost $200 per ton and was of very 
 inferior quality. No gasoline or petroleum could be 
 purchased at any price and the prices of food were from 
 
14 
 
 two to three times as high as in America. When one 
 considers how cheap the Hving was in Italy before the 
 war the effect of this can ahnost be imagined. To make 
 matters worse we had the coldest winter known in a 
 generation. Yet, through it all, there was never a mur- 
 mur of complaint, but only a grim determination to see 
 things through, cost what it might. Never a word of 
 recrimination was heard. With no fuss or feathers, 
 everyone seemed to get his or her shoulder to the wheel 
 and prepared for the spring campaign. As a sample of 
 the energy and ability of the people, I might mention 
 the fact that the Ansaldo Company, though frightfully 
 handicapped by lack of coal, steel and labor, was able 
 to turn out field artillery at a rate greater than that 
 reached in the whole United States, with all the re- 
 sources of our country and our 110,000,000 people. 
 
 As though Italy had not already suffered enough at 
 the hands of her enemies, nature had reserved for her 
 an even greater affliction. The Spanish Influenza broke 
 out during the winter of 1917-1918 and raged through- 
 out Italy with a severity probably not equalled in any 
 other country. The deaths from this scourge are esti- 
 mated at over a million. All public funerals were for- 
 bidden and all burials took place at night. So horrible 
 were the conditions that at times many bodies had to 
 be buried without coffins in a common grave. 
 
 How Italy got through this terrible winter without 
 collapsing will always be a mystery to me. Only 
 people with a stern determination and inspired by an 
 ideal could have persevered. It would be useless to 
 try to depict the suffering, but I wish that my pen had 
 power to draw a picture of the bravery and actual cheer- 
 fulness with which it was endured. By spring the army 
 miraculously had been re-equipped, thanks largely to 
 the foresight of the Perrone Brothers, those geniuses 
 who are at the head of the Ansaldo Company. 
 
 The Second Battle of tJie Piave. 
 
 With the opening of the spring campaign there was 
 comparative inactivity on the Italian front. The people 
 of America will probably remember the disheartening 
 news which was daily received from the French front. 
 On the twenty-first of March, the first great German 
 offensive of 1918 was launched, and for the next three 
 months it seemed that nothing could stay the onrush of 
 
15 
 
 our enemies. Wherever they struck the Alhed line, it 
 seemed to crumble under their pressure. I can safely 
 say that the darkest days of the whole war were in 
 June, 1918. One never heard a laugh and rarely saw a 
 smile. People spoke in a subdued tone, and even those 
 who were about the streets seemed to walk as though 
 under a burden. We heard constant reports of an 
 Austro-German concentration on the Italian front. 
 Daily we were expecting the great drive and wondering 
 if the sad scenes being witnessed in France were to be 
 re-enacted in Italy. In the middle of June the long 
 expected news was flashed that the Austrians, heavily 
 re-enforced by Germans, had crossed the Piave. It 
 seemed to us behind the lines that the end was in sight, 
 but General Diaz was not a man to be easily discour- 
 aged. Through the tedious winter he had reconstructed 
 the Italian army and it was now to prove its worth. The 
 long heralded Austro-German drive was literally stopped 
 in its tracks, and the Huns were hurled back across the 
 Piave leaving 46,000 prisoners behind. Grim old Or- 
 lando embraced the messenger who brought the news 
 and kissed him, and then rushed to the Palazzo Monte- 
 citorio, where Parliament was in session and broke in 
 upon the deliberations, waiving the despatch and shout- 
 ing the glad news. I do not believe that anyone in 
 America can appreciate what this meant. This was the 
 first Allied victory in 1918, following a long and dis- 
 heartening series of defeats. The British division on 
 the Piave played a splendid part in the battle, but never- 
 theless the forces were overwhelmingly Italian and the 
 credit must be given to Italy. There was no question 
 then of fighting a demoralized enemy. The Huns were 
 flushed with victory, their morale at the highest, their 
 preparations thorough, their re-enforcements of Ger- 
 man troops, particularly artillery, formidable, and their 
 defeat was complete. What efl^ect this first defeat had 
 upon the enemy morale, and how great or small a part 
 it played in the final defeat of that year, I am unable 
 to say. But this I do know, had the enemy been success- 
 ful in putting Italy out of the war, seventy-four Austrian 
 divisions and numerous German divisions would have 
 been released for service on the French front. With 
 the forces as delicately balanced as they were until Au- 
 gust, I fear the chances would have been very greatly 
 in Germany's favor. Certainly the end of the war would 
 
16 
 
 have been indefinitely postponed. If this second battle 
 of the Piave did not save the Allied cause, it at least 
 very materially shortened the war and saved hundreds 
 of thousands of Allied soldiers and billions of dollars. 
 It is one more debt we owe Italy and one not always 
 appreciated, or paid. 
 
 The Summer of igi8. 
 
 Through the summer there was comparative inac- 
 tivity along the Italian front. On the eighteenth of 
 July Marshal Foch launched his first offensive, which 
 was destined to be converted into a triumphal march, 
 ending only in the complete defeat of the enemy. 
 Critics of Italy — many of them genuine friends of Italy 
 — wondered why there was no Italian offensive. One 
 heard the question on all sides, sometimes with friendly 
 concern, but often, unfortunately, with a sneer. The 
 reason was perfectly plain to anyone at all conversant 
 with the facts. General Diaz had at his disposal fifty- 
 one Italian divisions, two divisions of British and one 
 division of French, to which was finally added a single 
 regiment of American infantry and some American 
 hospital units. Opposed to him were seventy-four 
 Austrian divisions with a superiority of 1,250 guns and 
 with all the mountain passes and strategic points in their 
 possession. If one will turn to the map it will be seen 
 that the Italian line followed the line of the Piave from 
 the sea to the edge of the mountains at Mt. Grappa. 
 From here it turned westward along the southernmost 
 edge of the Asiago Plateau and thence to Lake Garda. 
 It is possible that the Italians might have crossed the 
 Piave and even progressed a considerable distance into 
 the Venetian Plain. Had they done so, however, we 
 nmst bear in mind that their entire line of communica- 
 tions was constantly threatened from the Asiago front. 
 From this plateau, if the enemy succeeded in break- 
 ing through the Italian line, it would have meant 
 the complete envelopment and disaster of any troops 
 beyond the Piave. It would have been military sui- 
 cide to have risked such a campaign. A drive into 
 the mountain regions to the north would have met with 
 certain defeat unless the Italian armies could have been 
 re-enforced so as to give them a superiority of numbers, 
 and especially of artillery. So long as they remained 
 hopelessly outclassed in numbers and supplies the oflfen- 
 
17 
 
 sive was utterly out of the question. The ItaHans re- 
 peatedly begged for some of the American re-enforce- 
 ments which were pouring into France in enormous 
 numbers, stating confidently that with 300.000 American 
 troops and a mobile reserve, they would go to Laibach 
 and thence to Vienna, thus ending the war by knockmg 
 Austria out of the fight and isolating Bulgaria and 
 Turkey. I confidently believe they would have done it. 
 The Supreme Council thought otherwise, so the Italian 
 army was doomed to an enforced inactive defensive 
 throughout the summer. I again draw attention to the 
 fact that all this time seventy-four Austrian divisions 
 were immobilized on the Italian front. Had Hindenburg 
 had these Austrian forces as a reserve, the victory could 
 not have been obtained in 1918. 
 
 The Victory of I'ittorio-Vcneto. 
 
 In the fall came the Bulgarian and Turkish collapse. 
 Although still outnumbered and outpositioned, Diaz had 
 been enabled to supply many of his deficiencies in artil- 
 lery and equipment, and determined on an ofifensive. 
 On the twenty-fourth of October this offensive com- 
 menced bv a crossing of the upper Piave and a drive 
 up the Brenta Valley. Once again one of those sudden 
 floods from the mountains caused the Piave to rise 
 sweeping away the pontoon bridges over which the 
 Italians had crossed. For more than two days they had 
 to be supplied by means of dirigibles and aeroplanes m 
 the face of a withering fire from the enemy. Finally a 
 crossing was made lower down the river, and General 
 Lord Cavan. commanding the Tenth Italian Army, 
 crossed with a force of Italians, British and French. 
 In the meantime the Italians had carried out one of the 
 most daring military feats of the war. A column had 
 forced its way up the Brenta Valley, hitherto considered 
 an impossible feat, and had succeeded in capturing 
 Belluno, thus cutting the Austrian forces in two A 
 general advance was now made along the whole Piave 
 front and the Austrians, after four days of desperate 
 fightincr, with their line of supplies severed, fell back in 
 comple'te disorder. The Austrian Empire crumbled and 
 her armies in the field, to the extent of over a million 
 men surrendered unconditionally to the victorious 
 Italians On the fourth of November the armistice was 
 signed Never in history has there been a more com- 
 
18 
 
 plete victory or one approaching it in magnitude. An 
 army approximately twelve times the size of Napoleon's 
 at Waterloo unconditionally laid down its arms on the 
 field of its defeat. The news of this defeat in Germany 
 was the last straw, and the German armistice followed 
 a week later. 
 
 The Victory Was Italian. 
 
 There has been a disposition on the part of some not 
 conversant wath the facts to minimize the achievement 
 of the Italian arms in the battle of Vittorio-Veneto. It 
 has been said that the Austrian armies were demoralized, 
 without fight, starved and lacking guns and munitions ; 
 that they were already dying and that Italy merely gave 
 the coup dc grace. This is untrue. That the Austrians 
 had sufficient men we know because we captured them ; 
 that they had sufficient guns and munitions we know for 
 the same reason ; that they were well clothed and fed we 
 know from the excellent condition of the prisoners and 
 from the enormous booty captured ; and that they still 
 could fight is attested by the fact that the Italian losses 
 in the first four days of this battle reached 70,000 in 
 killed and wounded — one-quarter the total American 
 losses in the whole war. As a matter of fact, the Aus- 
 trians at the front were in complete ignorance of the 
 collapse of Bulgaria and Turkey and of the internal 
 conditions of their own country, and at first refused 
 to believe the facts when they were informed of them 
 after the surrender. 
 
 That this overwhelming victory must in fairness be 
 credited to Italy is shown by the figures. Diaz's army 
 consisted of fifty-four Italian divisions, two British divi- 
 sions, one French division and one American regiment 
 of infantry. Op}X)sed to this army were sixty-three and 
 one-half Austrian divisions ; and while the numerical 
 strength of an Austrian division was less than that of an 
 Italian division, the enemy forces still outnumbered the 
 Allies. The Italians had on their side nine hundred and 
 twelve thousand combatants, while the Austrian divisions 
 totalled one million and seventy thousand fighting men. 
 The severest fighting took place around Mt. Grappa and 
 up the Brenta Valley, where none other than Italian 
 troops were engaged. As I have mentioned, Italian 
 losses in four days of this batde reached 70,000. The 
 British lost about 12,000, the French a smaller number, 
 while the Americans lost one killed and seven wounded. 
 
19 
 
 In the Mt. Grappa sector, the American Y. M. C. A. had 
 estabhshed some fourteen reUef stations, and during 
 the battle these stations attended to more than 8,500 
 ItaUan wounded. American motor ambulances evacuated 
 from this sector to the base hospitals on the plain below, 
 more than 2,200 Italian wounded. It must be remem- 
 bered that this number does not include the slightly 
 wounded, nor those too severely wounded to be moved, 
 nor, of course, does it include the killed. Neither does 
 it include the wounded handled by the Italian forces, and 
 it covered but one small sector of the line. Allied ob- 
 servers are of the opinion that the Italian losses actually 
 exceeded the 70,000 I have mentioned. 
 
 The Italians, high and low, were deeply grieved by the 
 lack of appreciation outside of Italy for their great vic- 
 tory. I never once heard any undue boasting, or have I 
 ever heard an Italian say, "Italy won the war," nor ex- 
 pressions similar to those heard only too frequently in 
 other Allied countries. But the Italians did say, and 
 from the bottom of their hearts, that where there was 
 so much glory it seemed there should be enough to go 
 around, so that each Ally might have her just share. 
 No one can deny the justice of this, and no one who 
 will examine the facts can deny Italy a very large meed 
 of praise for her part in the general victory. Neverthe- 
 less, Italy was not allowed to satisfy her wholly natural 
 pride by bringing the surrendered Austrian fleet into 
 Venice where her people might have an ocular demon- 
 stration of the victory, although this was expressly pro- 
 vided for in the armistice. 
 
 Reverence for President Wilson. 
 
 The Italian's gratitude to America was cumulative, it 
 increased from mouth to mouth, and, to them, all the 
 power and attributes of the country were personified in 
 President Wilson. The almost childlike reverence with 
 which the plain people in Italy regarded the American 
 president amounted in many cases practically to wor- 
 ship. The soldiers had his picture with them in the 
 trenches, and burned candles in front of it. Hardly a 
 farm house or small shop but had his picture alongside 
 an image of the Virgin Mary, and it was no unusual 
 sight to see one candle burning in front of the Virgin 
 and two in front of the President. He was referred to 
 in all seriousness and with the deepest reverence as "The 
 
20 
 
 American Saint" and "The Messiah from the West." 
 People everywhere believed that he was to bring a new 
 order of justice for all. On the occasion of his visit to 
 Italy, the enthusiasm of his reception amounted almost 
 to frenzy. Shopkeepers who told me they would not 
 walk across the street to see their own King (who, by 
 the way, is enormously popular) stood on the street 
 for hours and fought for places where they might have 
 a glimpse of "The Prophet of the Rights of Man." 
 People kissed the hem of his daughter's skirt on the 
 steps of St. Peter's, and held up their babies for her to 
 bless. Foreigners who had lived in Rome for thirty- 
 five years and upward and had seen most of the great 
 personages of the world come and go through the 
 Eternal City, all testified that never had such a genuine, 
 spontaneous outburst of enthusiasm been displayed as 
 the triumph of America's President called forth. 
 
 Ifaiy's .Waz'al J'ictories. 
 
 On the naval side, Italy's achievement was truly re- 
 markable. Since returning to America I have been sur- 
 prised on a number of occasions to have people ask me 
 why the Italian fleet remained inactive throughout the 
 war. The surprise of my questioners has been even 
 greater than mine when I have replied that the Italian 
 Navy sank more enemy naval tonnage than all the other 
 Allied fleets combined. Should anyone doubt this state- 
 ment, its accuracy can easily be substantiated by refer- 
 ence to the published reports. It is true that the Italian 
 battle fleet remained inactive in its base port, but so did 
 every other Allied fleet, with the one exception of the 
 British Grand Fleet. Even the Grand Fleet was com- 
 pelled to spend many months of watchful waiting for 
 "The Day" when the Germans would come out. The 
 fact remains that the Italian fleet accomplished its 
 strategic mission to the last degree. This mission was 
 to prevent Austrian ships, military or merchant, from 
 taking to the high seas. Not a single enemy surface 
 craft succeeded in escaping from the Adriatic. All the 
 navies of the world could not have done more. The 
 Austrian fleet refused to come out and ofifer battle, and 
 it was as hopeless to think of attacking this fleet in its 
 base ports as it would have been to attempt a naval 
 attack on the German bases. It is not to be inferred, 
 liowever, that the Italians allowed the Austrian ships 
 
21 
 
 to remain securely in their harbors. Attack after at- 
 tack was made in these harbors, giving the world in- 
 spiring examples of clever, scientific ingenuity coupled 
 with great personal initiative and daring. One officer 
 of my acquaintance succeeded in entering the Harbor 
 of Cattaro (one of the most strongly defended of the 
 Austrian bases) on four occasions and sinking six ships 
 in the harbor. Italian motor boats, only sixteen meters 
 long, constantly cruised at night among the Dalmatian 
 Islands and off the ports of Trieste, Pola, Cattaro, etc., 
 in attempts to locate and destroy Austrian vessels which 
 might venture to put to sea. Italian submarines con- 
 stantly blockaded these ports, while Italian destroyers 
 and torpedo boats cruised incessantly throughout the 
 length of the Adriatic. An Allied mobile barrage, con- 
 sisting of trawlers, destroyers, drifters, mine-layers, sub- 
 marine chasers, etc., all under the command of Commo- 
 dore Kelly, R. N., patrolled the Straits of Otranto day 
 and night and in all sorts of weather. Although they 
 were greatly hampered by a most serious lack of ma- 
 terial, especially wire cable, the Italians constructed and 
 succeeded in anchoring in the very deep waters of the 
 Straits of Otranto an explosive net to block the passage 
 of the German and Austrian submarines which used the 
 Adriatic as a base. 
 
 Some of the miost brilliant individual achievements 
 of the war, achievements worthy of being ranked with 
 the best deeds of daring and cool judgment to be found 
 in naval history, were performed by Italian naval offi- 
 cers. To record all of these would be beyond the scope 
 of this writing, but a few are so conspicuous as to be 
 worthy of special mention. 
 
 Commander Ric'so's Exploits. 
 
 In December, 1917, Commander Rizzo succeeded in 
 entering the closely guarded Harbor of Trieste in a 
 small motor launch, and torpedoed the Austrian battle- 
 ship "Wien," and then made good his escape. 
 
 The following June, the submerged obstructions and the 
 mobile barrage (to which had just been added two squad- 
 rons of American UO-ft. submarine chasers) had become 
 so effective that the Austrians determined on a raid in 
 force to clear the Straits. Two Austrian superdread- 
 nau<^hts left Pola on the night of the 15th-16th of June 
 with the intention of making a rendezvous with the 
 
22 
 
 Austrian fleet off Cattaro, whence the combined forces 
 would proceed with the attack. Commander Rizzo in 
 a small sixteen-meter motor boat, accompanied by 
 Lieutenant-Commander Aonzo with a similar motor boat, 
 had been reconnoitering among the Dalmatian Islands. 
 Motor trouble had delayed them, and they found them- 
 selves in the middle of the Adriatic just before dawn. 
 Two large columns of smoke were observed, and Com- 
 mander Rizzo knowing that no large Italian vessels 
 were in those waters, accurately assumed that the smoke 
 came from major enemy units, and without hesitation 
 proceeded to the attack. These little Italian launches 
 carried two eighteen-inch torpedos on racks which could 
 be rigged outboard. They had a speed of twenty-four 
 knots. On approaching, Rizzo made out two large battle- 
 ships convoyed by numerous destroyers (subsequently 
 known to be ten in number). By skillful manoeuvering 
 and proceeding at low speed he succeeded in getting 
 through the escort of destroyers, and when within two 
 hundred yards of the leading battleship, the St. Stephen, 
 he launched both his torpedoes, scoring two hits and 
 having the satisfaction of seeing the target ship give a 
 great lurch and start to settle immediately. She sank in 
 a few minutes. Rizzo immediately turned and headed 
 away at full speed, pursued by the destroyers who had 
 picked him up with their searchlights and opened fire. 
 Making a neat calculation of the speed and distance of 
 the nearest pursuer, Rizzo set a depth charge and dropped 
 it in the destroyer's path. So nicely was it timed that it 
 exploded directly under the bow of the destroyer, thus 
 ending the chase. It was later reported that the destroy- 
 er sank. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Commander Aonzo, in 
 the second launch, proceeded to the attack of the remain- 
 ing battleship. WliCn about two hundred yards from his 
 target he fired both torpedoes. Unfortunately one stuck 
 slightly in the releasing gear and was deflected, passing 
 just astern of its target. The second struck the battle- 
 ship amidships, penetrating her, but as luck would have 
 it, failed to explode. Both Aonzo and Rizzo succeeded 
 in making their escape and returned to Ancona. 
 
 The news of this brilliant exploit reached the world 
 about the time that the Americans at Chateau Thierry 
 were writing a new chapter in history, and the Italian 
 army was hurling back the Austrians on the Piave in 
 ignominious defeat. Consequently, I am afraid that 
 
23 
 
 Rizzo's achievement is not as well known and recog- 
 nized in this country as it deserves to be. Coupled with 
 the magnificent victory of the second battle of the Piave, 
 it served enormously to hearten the Italians. Its de- 
 pressing effect on the Austrians was correspondingly 
 great. An eyewitness gave a graphic description of 
 the scene in the Austrian Admiralty in Vienna when the 
 news of the disaster was received. The Austrians were 
 open and violent in their denunciations of the Germans, 
 for it seems that the whole plan for the attack on Otranto 
 originated with the Germans, and the Austrians were 
 forced into it against their better judgment. Admiral 
 Horthy, commanding the Austrian fleet, was particularly 
 opposed to the attempt, as he knew that the Italian 
 scouts were so active that secrecy would be impossible, 
 and the element of surprise was counted on to carry 
 the effort through. Of course, with the sinking of the 
 St. Stephen and the disabling of the other battleship, 
 the whole attack was called oft'. Thus Rizzo by his 
 skill and daring not only destroyed the newest and 
 strongest unit in the Austrian fleet, but undoubtedly 
 saved many Allied vessels and lives as well. 
 
 The Italian Sea-Tank. 
 
 Meanwhile, a new type of vessel, which may be de- 
 scribed as a sea-tank, had been invented and built by 
 tlie Italian navy. This tank was of rectangular shape, 
 much resembling an ordinary scow or sea sled. The 
 propeller v/as housed in a channel in the stern of the 
 boat. On the outboard sides, fore and aft, ran two 
 continuous chains, one to starboard and one to port, 
 very much resembling the caterpillar treads of a land 
 tank. On these endless chains strong claws were placed 
 a meter apart. Commander Pellegrini, in command of 
 this tank, approached the Harbor of Pola one dark night 
 in July, 1918. On getting within earshot of the defense, 
 the gasoline motor was stopped and the tank was pro- 
 pelled at slow speed with an electric motor running 
 silently. On reaching the formidable boom obstructions 
 at the mouth of the harbor, the motor was geared to 
 the endless chains and the claws on these chains, en- 
 gaging the obstruction, caused the tank to crawl out 
 of the water and over the obstruction. In this way 
 three lines of obstructions were crossed without attract- 
 ing attention. Once inside the harbor, Pellegrini sue- 
 
24 
 
 ceeded in torpedoing a superdreadnaught. Of course, 
 he could not escape with his tank, so he sank it, first 
 firing a red rocket as a signal to his comrades watching 
 outside the harbor that he had been successful. Pelle- 
 grini was captured but subsequently released and re- 
 turned to Italy, where he most modestly received his 
 well deserved honors. I might mention in passing that 
 both Pellegrini and Rizzo have expressed privately and 
 publicly the highest admiration for the American navy. 
 
 A Feat of Ingenuity and Pluck. 
 
 The Italian navy had still another surprise to spring 
 on the Austrians. Major Pellucci, an Italian naval en- 
 gineer, so modified a specially constructed twenty-one 
 inch torpedo as to give it a speed of about a knot or 
 a knot and one-half, and a range of twenty miles. Two 
 handles were attached to its nose. It was also equipped 
 with an electro-magnet, and a time clock device for 
 exploding the charge. This strange apparatus was 
 launched a few miles off Pola one night late in October, 
 1918. Pellucci and a naval doctor, in rubber suits, swam 
 alongside the torpedo grasping the handles at the nose 
 and steering it through all the obstructions and into the 
 Harbor of Pola. Making out the flagship, a super- 
 dreadnaught, they succeeded in attaching the torpedo 
 to her side by means of the electro-magnet, and after 
 starting the clock, swam away. Just then a sentry on 
 the flagship detected them, and, taking them prisoner, 
 brought them on board. The Austrian Admiral came 
 on deck and questioned the prisoners, who kept him 
 in conversation until the torpedo was about to explode. 
 Pellucci then informed the Admiral of what he had done 
 and told him that he had just time to abandon ship, but 
 that he would not be able to find the torpedo before it 
 exploded. The Admiral, at last realizing that Pellucci was 
 telling the truth, and the instinct of the seaman rising 
 above his natural prejudices, congratulated the prison- 
 ers on having performed a very daring and gallant act 
 and told them he hoped they would be spared to return 
 to their country and receive the honors which were due 
 them. All hands barely had time to jump overboard 
 and swim away from the flagship when the torpedo ex- 
 ploded, completely wrecking her. The chivalrous Ad- 
 miral made no attempt to leave his ship but perished 
 with her. 
 
25 
 
 The complete collapse of the Austrian Empire, a few 
 days later, I feel sure prevented the Italian navy from 
 writing several more glorious pages to this history. I 
 hope that Americans will feel interested enough in the 
 work of this faithful Ally to devote a little time to the 
 study of her naval achievements in the late war. They 
 will find themselves amply repaid. 
 
 Italian Generosity. 
 
 I have mentioned before, and wish to repeat, that 
 whatever Italy's national faults may be, bragging and 
 self-advertisement are not among them. I wish to add 
 most emphatically that cupidity was strikingly conspicu- 
 ous by its absence. Of course, travellers will occasion- 
 ally be robbed by cabmen, guides, small shop keepers, 
 and sometimes by an unscrupulous manager of a small 
 hotel. This happens to strangers in every country, what- 
 ever the country may be. and America most assuredly 
 is not free from this accusation. During a year and a 
 half in Italy in the midst of the war, I was forcibly 
 struck with the absence of extortionate charges to for- 
 eigners, or, at any rate, to Americans. I found that my 
 experience in this regard was not unique, but was shared 
 by many other Americans. Of course, prices were tre- 
 mendously high, but in the vast majority of cases there 
 was but one price for native and for foreigner alike. 
 At least one circumstance made me marvel at this ab- 
 sence of extortion. We had a number of American 
 flying cadets at an Italian aviation school at Foggia. 
 Officially, these cadets had but the rank of an enlisted 
 man. You can imagine the surprise of the Italians 
 when they learned that these private soldiers received 
 one hundred dollars per month pay. Many of these 
 young men had private means and received additional 
 money from home. They always stopped at the most 
 expensive hotels, dined in the most expensive restaur- 
 ants, always rode in cabs and were lavish with their tips. 
 Of course, many Italians thought that these conditions 
 were typical of conditions in the American army, and if 
 enlisted men had so much money to throw away, the 
 officers must necessarily come from the traditional Amer- 
 ican millionaire class. One could hardly blame some 
 shop keepers whose trade had been ruined by the ab- 
 sence of tourists, if occasionally one of them over- 
 charged, but I can assure you that such cases were of 
 
26 
 
 very, very rare occurrence, and when brought to the 
 attention of the authorities were invariably severely dealt 
 with. 
 
 The Italian Government was equally generous in its 
 dealings with the Americans, and I v/ish to emphasize 
 the fact that Italy is not by any means a wealthy country. 
 In fact, her national debt as a result of her allying her- 
 self with our cause has now reached the appalling figure 
 of more than sixty-four per cent, of her total national 
 v/ealth. Nevertheless, in the course of a long series of 
 negotiations I never once so much as heard of an at- 
 tempt on the part of the Italian Government to impose 
 any but the most fair and reasonable terms. For in- 
 stance, Italy was the only Allied nation where, so far 
 as I am aware, free transportation on the national rail- 
 ways was given to the American forces. They were 
 supplied with practically an unlimited number of blank 
 railroad warrants which could be filled in and used 
 gratis, at discretion. 
 
 For the training of naval aviators, a naval aviation 
 school was constructed on one of the beautiful Italian 
 lakes, where American aviators were trained absolutely 
 free, no charge being made for housing them, for in- 
 struction, for use or replacement of planes or their 
 apparatus, for gasoline, oil or anything else. The Amer- 
 icans were simply required to feed, clothe and pay their 
 own forces. At the naval aviation stations in Italy, 
 which were taken over or were to be taken over by the 
 American navy, the buildings and original equipment, 
 including planes, fuel and even motor cars, were sup- 
 plied free by the Italians. Again the Americans were 
 merely required to feed, pay and clothe their own forces, 
 with the further request that, owing to the great shortage 
 of aviation material in Italy, it was hoped that we would 
 replace the Italian machines if and when the American 
 machines arrived in sufficient quantities. But even this 
 was left entirely to the discretion and fairness of the 
 Americans. Visiting American missions (and their num- 
 ber was legion) were invariably the guests of the Italian 
 Government who paid all their expenses. American 
 tugs operating along the Italian coasts were furnished 
 with what supplies they needed at cost — frequently 
 free — and they were overhauled and extensively repaired 
 at the Italian navy yards absolutely without charge. 
 When the influenza epidemic was at its height and the 
 
27 
 
 sick at the newly established American base at Corfu 
 had no better shelter than tents, the Italian Government 
 generously turned over to us at cost, portable houses 
 which had just been completed for housing their own 
 sick, who in turn had to shift as best they could. Such 
 examples of generosity could be repeated, enough to 
 cover many pages. I have merely selected a few that 
 occur to me at random as typical of the unfailing atti- 
 tude of the Italians towards us. 
 
 Italian Courtesy. 
 
 This feeling towards Americans was not merely a 
 formal, official one on the part of the Government, but 
 was shared in every walk of society. If anything, the 
 reverence with which America and Americans were held 
 was strongest among the simple country people. In 
 traveling about the country, I have frequently been 
 given a meal when I knew my host had barely enough 
 m the house to keep body and soul together, but on 
 learning that I was an American, payment would be 
 refused. If an American inquired his way m the coun- 
 try, almost invariably the native would not only direct 
 him. but would accompany him to his destination or well 
 on his road. I have had a carabiniere (one of the mili- 
 tary police) carry two heavy traveling bags belonging 
 to another official and myself for nearly a mile up a very 
 steep hill, at night, to the door of our hotel, where he 
 saluted and indignantly refused any tip. I hardly think 
 Italian officials traveling in our own country have 
 often met with such treatment. Nor were my experi- 
 ences exceptional. I found always that the Americans 
 who know the Italians best, all told the same tale. 
 
 I have known many Americans m Italy. Some ot 
 them have resided there for nearly fifty years while 
 others have been there but a few months. They were 
 of every walk of fife— diplomats, business men, small 
 tradesmen, retired merchants, wealthy amateurs, ladies 
 old and young, officers of the army and navy, etc. 1 
 can state categorically that I have never met one of 
 these who knew Italy and the Italians well, and who 
 had taken the trouble to get their point of view, who did 
 not love them and their country. I wish to be included 
 in this number, and hope that perhaps these words of 
 mine may help to add many more. 
 
 AN AMERICAN OBSERVER IN ITALY. 
 
28 
 
 AFTER-WORD. 
 
 You, who have read the foregoing pages are perhaps 
 surprised to find how gallant and important a part Italy 
 played in winning the great victory over Germany and 
 her allies. We have heard little about it in America. 
 I have known the writer well for many years and know 
 him to be a truthful and fair-minded man who has 
 travelled extensively and is a close observer. I know 
 that he went to Italy rather impressed with the fact 
 that she was not doing her part in the great war, be- 
 cause he was ignorant of the truth. 
 
 You are perhaps sorry that you did not know of the 
 great struggle that Italy was making, so as to have 
 shown some expression of your appreciation of the 
 splendid valor of her army and navy and of the tre- 
 mendous sacrifices of her population ; but the war ended 
 before these matters were brought to your attention. 
 However, it is not too late to show such appreciation. 
 Italy is having a difficult time in her reconstruction 
 period. You can help her now. Her military and 
 civilian blind are numerous and need assistance. A 
 committee has been organized in this country to support 
 the work of Miss Winifred Holt, who is over there 
 helping the blind. Queen Elena, of Italy, has given 
 her patronage to Miss Holt's work. The "American 
 Observer in Italy" has written the foregoing account as 
 his voluntary contribution to the cause. Further in- 
 formation can be obtained from the American Com- 
 mittee for Helping Italian Blind. 
 
 You are requested to send a check for any amount that 
 you can spare to Mr. Samuel L. Fuller, Treasurer. 
 
 Ill East 59th Street, New York City. 
 
 If you are an American, I am sure that you will want 
 to testify to your admiration for these brave Italian 
 Allies who have contributed so much to the great victory. 
 If you are an Italian, I know you will be glad to show 
 your patriotism. 
 
 October 1st. 1919. 
 
 HERBERT L. SATTERLEE. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 021 394 270