o .H942 -opy 1 SPEECH OP R. M. T. HUNTER, OF VIRGINIA, ON The resolution of notice to Great Brilain to abrogate the convention oj joint occupancy relative to the Oregon territory. DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, JANUARY 10, 184C. Mr. HUNTER rose and addressed the Flouse as follows : Mr. Chairman: I was one of those who regretted that this debate should have arisen when it did. I regarded it as premature and unfortunate, and I feared that it might add to the difficulties in the way of a wise and dispassionate settlement of the que.s- tion before us. But, so much has now been said, that a yet fuller development of the opinion of this House is perhaps due to the country, and ourselves. For myself, I have been the more anxious to ex- press my opmions at an early stage of the debate, becau.se I foresaw that I should be separated from many, perhaps from most of my political friends upon the question before us. 1 am happy to believe, however, that the differences between us are not so wide and deep as to be irreconcilable. This dilfer- 'ence relalesnot somuch totheend which we all desire to attain, as to the means by which it is to be pur- sued. From what 1 liave gathered of the opinions of this House, I believe that all desire the pos- session of Oregon, not only up to the parallel of 49^, but to that of 54° 40.' Nearly all, so far as I am informed, believe that our title to this country is good, not only to the 49th parallel, but up to that of 54° 40\ I, for one, entertain that opinion. The whole question between us is as to the be.st. a wisest means of attaining an end which we al] equal- ly desire. Mr. Chairman, 1 have expressed the opinion, that, without regard to the distinctions of party or of sections, al! of us desire the pos.session of the whole territory in Oregon, to which we are entitled. There is no man with an American heart in lii^ bosom who could be insensible to the pros- pect of planting our flag and our settlements upon the shores of the Pacific. There is no such bosom which would not swell with emotions of hope and of pride at the prospect of the influence, commercial, political, and military, which we should derive from a position on the shores of Oregon and California, should we be so fortunate as to be able to obta.in the last by just and equitable means. Looking to the map of the globe, and taking the world over with a view to its social and political relations, and to physical characteristics, there is no such position for military strength and commercial suprpmacy, as we shall occupy if our settlements should cover the whole breadth of the continent from the Atlantic tO' the Pacific ocean, underourpresent form of govern- ment. In the centre, lies the vast valley of the Missis- sippi, destined to be no: only the hive, but the storehouse of nations, and impregnably secured be- hind tiie Alleghanies on the one side, and the Rocky mountains on the other. In time eaceful progress of our in- fant settlement in Oregon up to the 49th paraliel; and this being done, he might safely leave it to time nnd American enterprise to do the rest. But, Mr. Chairman, let me return to the inquiry into the probable consequences of giving thia notice. I have said that the best possible result would be an adjust- ment on the basis of a boundary along the 49th parallel; but I have seen nothing as yet to convince me that it was the most probable result. If the minister from Great Britain refused to consider this proposition, when made in the course of an amica- ble and courteous correspondence, is it very proba- ble that she will be more inclined to accept it when we give the notice, under circumstances which im- ply that she must either agree to our proposition, or go to war for the whole country? If the British minister represented the real views of his govern- ment, is it probable that with their dispositions that government will be the more inclined to accept our offer on account of the threat which it may suppose to be implied by our giving the notice? If she re- ally designs to go to war, rather than compromise upon the terms which we proposed, is there any- thing unreasonable in supposing that she might think the present time and circumstances as favora- ble as any likely to occur for striking the blow? If she really attaches the importance to her whole claim on Oregon, which many seem to imagine, and regards a war for it as inevitable, will she not think that the sooner she strikes the bio w the better for her? Or if, on the other hand, she is anxious to settle the question amicably, and desires nothing more than terms which may be regarded as honorable by her own people and by the world, will this spirit be conciliated by our giving the notice, and by the circumstances under which it will be given? To sum up the whole, is it not manifest, on the one hand, that if this step should lead to war, we give to Great Britain, in- stead of reserving it to ourselves, the advantage of choosing her own lime for it? If, on the other hand, this be designed as a peace measure, is it not niore likelj' to defeat, than to encourage a rericwal of ne- gotiations in a sensitive and hii;h spirited people? Such seems to me to be its probable ten- dencies; and unless Great Britain should tkink this disputed territory to be of little value to her, however important it might be to u.";, and unless shei'ntertains a strong desire for peace, I can see no other result to flow from this notice so probable af?^ that of war. One thing ia perfectly l clear; this measure must, either lead to a settlement | on the basis of a boundary along the 49th parallel, or it must produce war. Our western friends say tha: they will be content with nothing less than the whole extent of our claim; and if this be so, is not war inevitable, under present circum.stances? If war 13 to be the mode of settling thi.q question at last, it would seem to me that it would be far wiser to pre- serve the present state of affairs, that we may be able to choose our own lime for fighting;, and select a period when we were better prepared for the con- test, and when the attendant circumstances might be more propitious. Let us look, Mr. Chairman, into the circumstances under which this war would now be waged, and ascertain, if we can, it;i probable con- saquences. Have we made any of tlie military p.'-eparations necessary for such an even'J AVould one, or even two years, suffice tor the preparation proper for such a contest? If war be inevitable, is not our internal condition such as to make delay desirable.' The whole country is just recovering from a deep financial depression. Many of the Slates are either unable, or barely able, to pay their own debts. They are not in a condition to bear the v/eight of internal taxation, which must be one of the main resources of the v/ar. A few years hence, a different and more favorable state of things might be fairly expected. What, let me ask, would be our position in the public opinion of the world.' We brealc off the negotiation because our proposi- tion v/as not accepted, and we give the notice under circumstances which proclaim that there must be war, unless she will settle the question upon our own tc^ms. She has otTered us a mode of settling this dispute, now universally regarded amongst civilized nations as a fair and hono-'able method of adjusting national controversies — I mean arbitration. This we have already refused; nor do I disapprove of t}iat rcfu.'jal, under the circumstance.s then existing. She will probably offer it again, and we shall again refuse it. I do not stand here, ]Nlr. Chairman, as the advocate of arbitration; upon tliat question I have nothing to say at present; I am merely deal- ing in facts, with a view to the consequences. We shall again refuse arbitration, Mr. Chairman; and why? Because we .?ay there are nosie of the nations of the world whose governments are honest and im- partial enough to decide this controversy between us This may all be so; but will a refusal of arbitration for such reasons be likely to v.^in us much of the sympathy of the world? Under these circum- staniies, am 1 wrong in supposing that the world will be apt to regard us as the aggressor? The pub- lic opinion of Christendom would be thus defied at tlie time when Great Britain has a better under- slauding with the continental states of Europe than she has ever enjoyed at any previous period of her history, bo far as I am acquainted with it. The "cordial understanding" between herself and France, her ancient enemy and our former ally, is notorious throughout the world. Under these circumstan- ces, what chance should we have for cither sympa- thy or assistance from any of these powers in the cventof a v,rar? But this is not the whole view of the existing state of our foreign relations, and its connexion with our prospects in a war. If we have a war with Great Britain about this time, shall we not probably have Mexico also on our hands? It is knov/n that she is sore under recent occurrences, and it is equally notorious that she is much under Britijjh influence. We should probably have a war not ortly for Oregon, bat Texas also. The Indi Would her sa- gacious statesmen be slow to perceive that any treaty which branded her with the visible stamp of inferiority alter a war, would be the sure precursor of her downfall.' She knows that the hungry and expectant eye of continental Europe is fixed upon the prey which a division of her mighty cm- pu-e would afford. She is aware, too, that the cal- culation has already been made as to how far the invention of steam has destroyed the security of her natural defences— of her insular position. She r,o longer feels able to continue the proud boast that '•Britannia needs no bulwarks, no towers along the s;eep;" for slie is now engaged in constructing coast defences. She must feel that the whole charm of her powerhes in the idea of her invincibility on the s-as and in her colonial possessions. To destroy by her one act this idea, would be to hold forth the signal for tiie eagles to gather to the banquet, and would involve the loss of power, empire, and character itself. Can I be mistaken in supposing that a war which brought her to such a conclusion, would probably be the longest and bloodiest ever known in the annals of mankind } Gentlemen have promised that this thing shall be done. I do not stand her to dispute It. In the event of a war, I wish that they may be able to make good tlieir words. But before this can be accomplished, we must track the British lion in his blood from the rising to the setting sun. We must hunt him from stronghold to stronghold, until we have pursued him throughout the circum- ference of the globe. Every sea, every clime must become familiar w'ah the noise of the terrific strife. Far distant people, nations to whom as yet we are scarcely known, must be startled at the apparition of this new power whicji is to struggle with Great Britain for the mastery in places where she had long reigned the most supreme. From Aden to the Ionian isles we must pursue iier over wave and through f >rtress, on one continuous line of blood and fire, until we have swept her flag from the seas, and buried her fleets in the ocean. We uiust throw down her places of strength; we must despoil even her gardens of "plea.saunce." Yes, su: to this dreadful extremity must we bring her^ ■ •efore slie can agree to conclude the contest upon terms which would destroy her most cherished sen- timent of national pride, and probably lead to the destruction of the mightiest empire which, as yet the world has known. ' ' If we are to obtain what gentlemen have promised us, such must be the war which we are to wage. What, Mr. Chairman, must be the con- sequences of such a war upon ourselves and our in- stitutions? Who can foresee these consequences in all their extent, or undertake to measure ihe results? How great would be the danger of a centrali- zation of all power in the fedeial govern- ment, and of an obliteration of the lines of State authonty? How many hundreds of millions of debt should we entail on ourselves and our posteri- ty.' How far should we fall into the lower depths of the paper system.' To how distant a day in the Greek calends should we postpone those great democratic reforms which we had fondly hoped we were about to introduce, and for which we have labored so long and often with such doubtful suc- cess? We should go into the war a free, happy, and moral people. Who can undertake to foretell the extent and na,ture of the transformations w hich we may undergo before we come out of it, or who can measure the waste of all the elements of hii- man happiness and social order which such a war would occa.'^ioii? Should we be justified in the eyes of God, or of mankind, for thus perilling the great interests of our country and of humanity for the sake of obtaining possession of Oregon a few years earlier, when we are sure of acquiring it a littie la- ter by honoral>Ie and peaceful means? Could we be justified in exposing the country to such ex- tremity if there be even a probable chance of ac- quiring the territory by means not only peaceful but cotnpatible with our honor? Or if war and such a war be inevitable, ought we not to postpone it un- til we have more men, more means, more resources, and more auspicious circumstances for its com- mencement? But, Mr. Chairman, it may be said that in my view of the probable consequences of such a war as that must be which should lead to such a conclusion as is promised, I have virtually admitted that the republican system of policy is practicable only in time of peace.' Such is not my opinion. We have not had time as yet to intro- duce or mature our system. The ideas upon which they rest are not fully possessed by the public mind. They require time and a period of peace for their full development. But if once matured and developed, I believe they would enable our govern- ment and people to stand the shock and pressure of war with far greater ease and buoyancy than under any other cour.se of policy. I, for one, am of the opinion that if wewere now to plunge into war we should fall into some of the worst forms of the paper system, owing to the remains of what I believe to be a wrong idea once implanted in the public mind; and yet I believe that the expenses of a war could be far better sustained without these abuses of that system than with them-. I have long thousht that we suffered almost as much in the iast war from such abuses s from the British troops. But, P.lr. Chairman, 1 have yet another answer. Tiie genius of our institutions IS pacific— they were not organ- ized for distant and offensive warfare. For defen- sive war I believe they are the strongest in the world, for they bring to its aid the united hearts of our peo- l)ic. We were not organized for a career of war and conquest, and 1 thank God for it; for then we should have required a far more despotic form of govern- ment, and we might have stood as fair a chance as any to become the curtc of mankind, instead of being ^^ their benefactors, as I maintain we liave been bv the example of our institutions and our progress We have always been proud to believe that ours was a higher and more glorious destiny: we have believed u to be our destiny to achieve our triumphs in the useful arts of peace, to subdue the difficuliies and master the secrets of nature, to adorn and culti- vate the earth, to mtroduce a new and a higher civili- sation, to develop better forms of social and political organization, and to minister to the progress and the universal peace and happiness of mankind bv the beneficent example of a free and happy people who were wealthy without rapine, strong without Jrime great without war, and peaceful without fear To- wards these great and benficent ends we have already done much; and in doing it we have won more true glory than if, like Tamerlane, we had left pyramids of human heads as the monuments of victory or hke Attila or Alaric, the scourge of God and the pest of nations, ravaged and desolated the earth in the ' storm of our warfare. Our thousand of miles of rail- roads and canals which have thrown down the har- riers of nature to the affiliation ©four people and to the common and kindly interchange of so much that ministers to the happiness of ma;}, are far nobler monuments to the genius of a people than the col- umn of Trajan or the palace of Blenheim. These are the monuments which are worthy our name and our destmy. But, Mr. Chairman, I return to the inquiry which 1 was pursuing. I have endeavored to give "-entle- raen the advantage of their own suppositions; and m whatever way I have turned the tapestry for them, the picture has st-emed to be forbidding But most so in that aspect which gave us the picture of war waged to such extremeties as some gentlemen have promised. But is there a real probability that the war would be waged to such extremities by two nations whose powers of mutual annoyance are so great, and whose capacitir^ for mutual benefit are so large." Is is not likely that both nations would tire of a contest so destructive and bloody and a-ree to^terminate it by an arbitration which, iii the uni'^er- saiopmion of the civilized world, is considered a fair and honorable mode of adjusting national differences' feir, 1 believe that if there should be war, it will most probably terminate in an arbitration, and thus we should have an arbitration and war, when we we might have had an arbitration without a war Could any man hesitate between such alternatives' iSut gentlemen here are against an arbitration 1 myself wish to avoid it. and I believe this may easily be done by means which most probably would secure us the whole territory in peace and honor. Let us refuse to give the notice; leave the negotiations to stand where they are; for we have novv' done all that it becomes us to do in the line of negotiation. We have offered a compromise upon liberal terms which has been refused, and we have manifested a proper desire for peace. Let us now rely upon our superior means of colonization, "brreat liritain has elected to leave the ultimate pos- session of ihe territory to depend on our relative ca- pacities lor settling it. In this contest, the advan- tages are on our side, and it must end in putting us in possession of all that we claim. We thus avoid the ciiance of losing the territory altogether. There are genilemin, I know, who are disposed to smile at this; but let me remind them that, in comparing our- selves wuh Great Britain, they must remember that there are some theatres where we are her superior there aie others where we are her equal ind I there are others, again, upon which peculiar and sometimes transient circumstances give her the su- periority. In a war for Oregon, at this time, she possesses superior advantages in her long-establish- ed and sedulously-cultivated influence over the In- dian tribes, in the command of the forces of the Hudson Bay Company which are at hand, and in the facility with which she could transport troops from her various stations on the Pacific. But if we wait a lew years, the balance of power must change. Circunristances will cast it on our side as they now do on hers; and in a contest— if contest there must be for Oregon— we sliall be found the stronger party in that territory. But it has been said that, if we refuse to give this notice, we shall violate our na- tional honor, liow.' Has our sensibility on thia point been just now awakened > From 1818 to this day we have never felt this joint occupation to be a stain upon our national honor. Has it ever been pretended until recently that it was a diso: done it heretofore, it is not likely that she will do it hereafter. She can have no stronger mducements to this policy for the future than she has already had in the past. Emigrants from the Old World would no more suit Oregon than Oregon would suit. them. It is only by a people trained like our west- ern pioneers, that this territory can ever be reduced, to the permanent use and occupation of man. T)>e superiority of our means for colonization is already' evinced by the dilference in the character of the .so tlements of the two countries. Our people do not go to Oregon to hunt and fish, and take up s. temporary abode there. They go to settle the country — to cultivate and improve the soil — and to leave an inheritanoe to their posterity. The Brit- ish settlements, on the other hand, are temporary and fugitive. They go their for hunting and for hs- dian trade. It is no part of the British policy to colonize Oregon, and it never will be. The fact that she rests her title on the Nootka Sound conventian, and claims nothing more than the right of joint oo-- cupancy under it, wouli seem to indicate that aiie' considers it as a temporary station, and looks foi^ ward to its ultimate abandonment. If this coimtry is fit for agricultural settlements, and our peopk should seek it for that jjurpose, then by a most, "manifest destiny" it must be ours. Mr. C- ,T. Ingersoll speaking across. How, if they should set up for themselves? The .honorable chairman has asked me v.'hether the people of Oregon will set up an itidependent gov- ernment for themselves. I have no idea that they will. If this nation shall proceed in its pre.qent course, gradually occupying and taking posseasion of the entire breadth of the continent, from the At- lantic to the Pacific coast, we shall possess a coiie- sive strength, from our social organization, and phys- ical and geographical position, which must bind us in an indi.ssoluble union. Instead of forming separate and independent communities, our population would present to the world the glorious spectacle of a re- public, the greatest and the widest that the eartfi ever saw, with interests different, but not hostik, with regions distinct, indeed, but not in oppo-^ition, each ancillary to the other, and all contributing lo the general strength and prosperity. iVir. C. J. Ingersoll, speaking across. Bat how, if there should be a black tariff? Mr. H. continued. Let this state of things once come, and I tell the gentleman that we shall hoar no more about the "black tariflV Open to us the vast; Pacific market in addition to that wliich we now enjoy on the Atlantic, let the productions of the country take their natural and unrestrictetl course to pour themselves into both, and there will be no danger of hostile rivalry, of separation, or of anew repul)lic setting up lor itself. The ties of union would strengthen with every hour — mutual beneiits and mutual interests wouldlink us indissolubly to- gether. There is no danger of disunion. Oar gnja:^ est present danger is from rushing into a war before we are prepared for it. Mr. Chairman, 1 again appeal to all candid a«A reflecting men from the AV^est — to those who go for Oregon, and the whole of Oregon — to those who might desire war for Oregon, but who do not desire Oregon for war — I appeal to these men to say if fiic course of policy which would lead to such a cow- summation as I have described, be not the proper line to be pursued? If wc would see this proapec' realized certainly, tbo>agh gradually, we must le.i thiti controversy remain as it is. Let us not renew the negotiation; make no more offers to Great Britain; but let us trust to the process of coloniza- tion now 80 rapidly in progress, and we shall quietly, peaceably, and certainly obtain the whole of whiit we claim. I care not how glorious the war may be, it would be better to avcia it: for it is in this way alone that we may reasonably hope to obtain what gentlemen so ardently desire "the whole of Oregon." Let things remam as they are. It would seem to be impossible that Great Britain shon'.d put an end to the joint occupancy as long as ehe rests her title on the Nootka Sound convention, under which she claims joint occupancy, and noth- ing more. In the meantime, let us go on and fill the country; let us pass such measures as, without violating the treaty, would contribute to that end: and then if we should find it necessary ultimately to go to war, we can choose our own time for do- ing it. Butmy western friends seem disposed to reproach the South in this matter, as if it were ungrateful in tiiem to resist that mode of obtaining Oregon which 30 many of them regard as the best. Nothing could pam me more than such an imputation. The South 'acknowledges its obligations to our western friends; ■we feel it, feel it deeply and strongly, and would raoat gladly requite it. This 1 believe we may do by pursuing such a course of policy as presents the Oi-iy hope of obtaining all Oregon, whilst it would save us from the dangers and sacrifices of a war for which we are unprepared, and into which we must enter under circumstances less propitious than they are ever likely to be hereafter. But whilst I advo- cate this as the wisest and most statesmanlike poli- cy, I trust that my western friends will understand rae. WhiLst in this matter I pursue the path which I have taken under convictions of duty quite as deep and strong as their own, 1 hope they will per- mit rae to follow it without reproach, so' long as I cast no reproaches on them for choosing a different route, which 1 regard as much more perilous, not oniy to the g; eat interests of the country, but to our chances for ttie ultimate possession of Oregon. 1 will aid them in such measures as I believe wouldv «K»st certainly enable us to obtain possession of the whole country; but I cannot assist in those which -would probably defeat that object. Mr. Chairman, I am not one of those who have ever said or thought that Oregon was not worth a war. If it were a barren rock in the ocean, if it were a mere idle strip of seashore sand, the coun- try ought to fight for it sooner than suffer itself to be dispossessed by violence. To de|)ress the na- tional tone, to degrade the national spirit, would be far worse than war itself. I feel the solemn respon- aibiJay whicli rests upon us to defend by war, even, (if war should be necessary as the only means for that purpose.) every inch of American soil, through- out the whole length of our posse.ssions, from the ' e.Ktreme regions of the frozen north down to the sun- ny slopes which look to the burning line, through- out their wlioie breadth, from the rising to the set- ting sun, from the "steep Atlantic stream" to the far Pacific wave. But whilst we admit the truth of these sentiments, let us remember, at the same time, that war is never justifiable until it becomes necessary; and before that can be shown we must first have exhausted all honorable and proper measures to preserve our riglus in peace I niaintain, sir, that there are such means at our dis- posal, and by adopting them we may not only avoid the dangers of war, but probably the chance of Ic sing Oregon. Mr. Chairman, I will go farther. If from the ac- tion of this House, or from any other circumstances, war should occur, although there may be southern men who believe that it could have been avoided, yet I take this occasion to say to the West, that when it becomes clearly necessary and presents the only rem.aining mode of obtaining our rights, they will find the South standing by the country and by them with heart and hand. Yes, when that hour comes — and God grant that there may never be a necessity for ii— the maxim of the gallant Decatur will find one universal acceptation amongst the whole American people — "our country, right or wrong." Many may be found deeply deploring, in- deed, the mismanagement, or the necessity, which has plunged the country into war, but they will not pause to settle the question of responsibility until they have first done all that be- comes them to preserve national rights and honor. I must, however, here declare, in a spirit of entire frankness, that if, by giving this notice, we should ultimately either lose Oregon or be led into an unne- cessary war to obtain it, those who give this notice will be held responsible, at the proper lime, for all Us consequences. It is the undoubted duty of every section of this confederacy. North, South, East, and West, to defend the national soil, and protect the national honor. But we owe it to ourselves, to our posterity, and to the great interests of humanity, to exhaust all honorable means of peace before we plunge the nation into war. Wo to the people amongst whom war becomes a familiar and a household word, and wo to the statesman who cultivates a spirit of violence amongst those whom he influences, instead of cherish- mg a disposition to peace. In this connexion, Mr. Chairman, I must be permitted to express the profound regret with which I have heard some of the remarks made in this debate. There are ele- ments enough of strife abroad in the public mind without enlisting the passions further in the work of havoc and ruin. It was with the deepest regret that 1 heard members upon this floor taunting the admin- istration, and declaring the belief that it would "back out," and that it could not be "kicked into a war." These sounds fell on my ear like the echo«8 of something of which I had heard before, and which contributed to the same result upon another occasion — a result for which a necessity then ex- isted, however unfortunate it might be now. There never was, there never can be, an admin- istration elected by the people of this country, which could refuse a war, if national rights and honor required it. None but a timid administra- tion can be "kicked into a war" by domestic oppo- nents. It requires far more courage to resist a war- cry than to yield to it. It sometimes requires more moral firmness and greater and higher qualities of mind to withstand the first outburst of the war feeling, and calmly to appeal to the sober second thought of a reflecting people for ultimate in- structions, than to be the hero of a hundred fields. Mr. Chairman, I will now say, and I desire my words to be noted, that if any gentleman here be- lieves that this notice will lead to war, and yet votes fur it under the hope that the President will back out sooner than face the result, he is utterly mista- ken. This administration will not back out from any position which it has taken in the face of the world, and before the American people. Whoev- er, therefore, votes for this measure, foreseeing, but not desiring its consequences, will be far more res- ponsible for the result, in a moral point of view, than the administration which has acted, as I believe, from an honest though erroneous conviction of duty. Mr. Chairman, I will conclude by observing, that I am fully aware that notliing which I can say will influence the action of this House. I never ex- pected that it would. But I have presented my views upon this subject fully and frankly, in order that I may place myself fairly before my constitu- ents and friends, who alone feel an interest in my course. My sole aim has been to vindicate myself ■with them. Would to God that I had the power to reach the heart of the House and the nation ! Would to God that I could persuade them to be- ware, ere they precipitated themselves into a war, and exposed themselves to consequences which no eye but that above can measure or pur.