Hi ,/y^/ E 474 .44 .H21 J 1 505 Copy 1 'USJ CORRESPONDENCE IN REGARD TO V'l Battle of Corinth, Miss, W October 3d and 4th, 1862. MAJOR GENERAL C. S. HAMILTON, . i Late United States Art/iy, ARTHUR C. DUCAT. ''^/ .J iFrcm Chicago Tribune, Oct. /Sih, jSSt.] At the anniversary of the Battle of Corinth^ which was appropriately celebrated bj the old soldiers of this citj and vicinity on the evening of the 4th inst., Gen, C. S. Hamilton, of Mil- waukee, gave a very vivid account of the en- gagement, which resulted in a victory for the Union cause. Mr. Hamilton was a participant in the fight, and his position was such as to give \ m every facility for seeing all of the engage- lent and thoroughly understanding the events ' at resulted in the battle. Owing to the crowded ,'jlumns of 77(e Tribune the following day, there |jpeared only a brief summary of Mr. Hamilton's /aper. It is now given in full, as it is of historic Value. CoMR.\DEs : You will allow me to premise that m what I am about to say of the battle of Cor- inth, if there is more or less that is personal to myself, it is not because of any personal vanity, but because I cannot state the facts that should be known without some personal reference. I should be reluctant to say anything that might be construed as claiming for myself what might be accorded to others — but what is desired is to get at the actual facts. I may further say that the chief reason other than the one given is that I have again and again been besought to make public the truths that I am about to relate, while there are those living who can corroborate them, and that the true history of one of the most im- portant battles of the great Rebellion may be un- derstood. Most of the otlicers who took part in that War are beyond middle-age; indeed, the greater part are fast reaching the period of aged manhood. Every year greatly decreases the number of those who were active in the War, and but few years coniparatively remain to gather facts from the living actors. In order to understand the importance of the victory of Corinth, and its bearing on the fortunes of the War, we must look carefully over the whole theatre of the war at that time. It is not sufficient that we take into consideration the situation in the Valley of the Mississippi ; we must go further and examine the status of the contending armies stretching through the bor- der .States from the Mississippi to the Atlantic, and see what had been gained or lost in nearly two years of w-ar, by the armies of the North. It was the last important battle of 1S62 and vir- tually closed the campaigns of both Union and Rebel armies for that year. These campaigns opened with the brilliant victories of Forts Henry and Donelson; followed by the capture of Island Number Ten, and by the great battle of Shiloh and the occupation of Corinth and Memphis. These operations in the West may be summed up as follows: The Confederate armies had been driven from tlie Ohio River, almost out of the States of Tennessee and Kentucky, a steady ing back for a distance of 200 miles, the Fe occupation reaching the Gulf States, whert chivalrous foes had been sure a Yankee would never set foot. Our lines stretched Memphis through Corinth and Nashvil Kno.wille, EastTenn. In the Eastthe cam had opened by the advance of the Army Potomac to the Peninsula and toward Rich Right here let me say that if the Army Potomac had been pushed from the time it ocop- ped before Yorktown, with a tithe of th - energy and courage shown by Gen. Grant from the mo-\ ment his forces presented themselves in front o Fort Henry, the Rebel Capital of Richmonc would have fallen into our hands, as would havi the State of Virginia; and the theatre of wai would have been removed to the Cotton States, where it belonged. BUT THE CHILDISH DELAY before the insignificant works of Yorktown gave ample time for the Confederates to concentrate their strength, and win back by hard blows what thev had held so long with wooden guns in front of "Washington, but which they had been forced to yield by the flank movement to the Peninsula. A week of energy from the day the army came in sight of Yorktown, instead of a month of use- less delay, and Richmond would have fallen like a ripe pear. The country had been full of hope — a hop changed almost to despair through incompeter generalship. McClellan and his army \ver driven from the Peninsula, and Pope, in the gal- lant but vain endeavor to stem the tide of Con- federate victories, had been overcome in the Wil- derness. Buell had been forced back from Mid- dle Tennessee to Louisville, so that on the day of the battle whose anniversary we celebrate the Confederate armies occupied the line of the Po- tomac, as they did the day .-f'-r the ^..-f >..•»' "f Bull Run, aiid of all the territory gained by the operations of our great armies there remained to us from the Atlantic to the plains only that con- tiguous to the banks of the Mississippi from Cairo to Memphis. Those were glorious victo- ries for the Confederate arms, and filled the Southern heart with swelling pride and the full confidence of ultimate success. These achieve- ments in the East were but the heralds of what was confidently expected in the West. The Un- ion armies must be driven back to their own soil, and a mighty eflbrt was made to concentrate an overwhelming force of Confederates which should thrust the invaders back to the banks of the Ohio. Alone of all the territory gained at so much cost there remained to us only that of Western Tennessee and Kentucky ; and right here I think I hazard nothing in saying that a defeat at Cor- inth twenty years ago to-day would have let"t no considerable obstacle in the way for the Rebel to occupy again the line of tlie Ohio, jh, being done, all the blood and treasure in irly two years of war would have been wasted, 1 the contending armies would have stood on ost the identical footing they occupied a year a half before. The hopes of the North had blasted by the failures in the East; the land filled with mourning, and the darkness of it and disappointment hung like a pall over ''ree States. was amid this gloom that the battle of Cor- .vas fought against much greater forces, and tory won. It was a single star gleaming gh the darkness, but lighting up the heart '. Nation with hope and gladness. In the "ical strength of the forces engaged it did :nd with the battles of the Peninsula, but importance of its results and the magni- tude of its consequences it loses nothing when placed s'.de by side with any of the great battles of the War, excepting alone that continuous bat- tle which forced Lee to the surrender of his brave umy at Appomattox. The bravery with which t was tbught I do not believe has been surpassed, and the preponderance of the Rebel forces, nearly :wo to one, rarely happened during the War. You are proud to have been of that band; I am "oud to have borne a part, and yours and my lildren for generations to come will be proud of the part each of us shared in that memorable fight. I have little to say of the details of the engagement. You are all familiar with its main features, and more familiar with your own im- mediate surroundings. THERE IS, HOWEVRR, ONE IMPORTANT FACT not generally known, but with those who do \now it personally there can be but one opinion s to its bearing on the results of the battle. The ilan of the battle as fixed by Gen. Rosecrans on he morning of Oct. 3, and as detailed in his offi- ;ial report, was for Davies' division to take the centre in front of Corinth; with McKean's divis- ion on his left, while Hamilton's division was thrown out on the Purdy road on the extreme right, as far as the outer Rebel intrenchnients, and nearly three miles from the town. Stanley's division was to the left and rear, and about as far from the town as Hamilton's, and held in reserve. Iluioliiuii i.as lO connect the left of his division with Davies' right, and tlius await the attack. Then when Davies' division was attacked, it was gradually to retire, and Hamilton and McKean were to fall on the Confederate flanks. In other words, the real battle was to be fought within a box, the front of which was open, and the enein3' was to be drawn in and crushed by the two sides. Now, there is no one so great a novice in war but will wonder at a plan of battle which, while it placed but a single division in the front of the enemy, with orders to retire when attacked, and thus allow an overwhelming force of the enemy to separate the other divisions, cutting the Fed- eral army in two parts. But such was the plan for the 3d of October and such was the plan for the 4th, but which was frustrated by the following incident: You all remember the change that was made in the positions of our troops during the night of the 3d; how Stanley's division was called in and occupied the earthworks ; how Da- vies' division was thrown back to and within the edge of the town; and that Hamilton's division was called in and occupied the rising ground on the north and northeast of the town, while Mc- Kean's troops were held partly as a reserve. And here is the way it happened. An attempt was made late in the afternoon of the 3d by Ham- ilton's division to attack the enemy's left flank, but which was thwarted by one brigade becoming separated from the other and becoming engaged with a watching party on the enemy's extreme left. The attack could not safely be made but by the whole division, and before the brigade could be withdrawn and got into supporting position night had come and the flank attack was frustra- ted. The threatened movement of the division had attracted the enemy's attention, and eft'ec- tually checked the forward movement of the Rebel army on Davies. The day closed then with Hamilton holding a position between tli Purdy road and the outermost Rebel intrencl ments, facing the enemy, but witli a dense fores tliick with undergrowth, between. Davies' di vision had fallen well back toward the town, am though fighting bra%ely, were forced back b many times their number. McKean's divisio. occupied a similar position on the extreme left, while between these two divisions of Hamiltoi and McKean lay the whole Rebel army, re, ^\• to spring upon the town in the morning. No orders had been received hv me from the General com- manding for several hours. About 9 p. m. his Chief of .Staff" brought me this order — to wit: "Place your batteries on the Purdy road at 10 p. m. and pla^' them tw-o hours in a northwest direction with shot and shell, where the enemy is massed, and at midnight at- tack them w'ith voin* whole division with the bayonet." The officer who brought that order and who took back my reply is Gen. A. C. Du- cat. I said, "Tell Gen. Rosecrans I cannot ex- ecute that order until I see him personally, and explain to him the difficulties in the way, and how it must result if carried out." An liour passed, and the officer who brought the order re- turned, l^ringing the commanding General. An officer of high rank (Gen. John B. Sanborn, of Minnesota), here to-night, and many others heard the following conversation : "Gen. Hamilton, what do you mean by diso- beying my order to attack the enemy.'" I replied: "Gen. Rosecrans, I am ready to ex- ecute your order; but there is too much at stake here to risk it by what must prove a futile attack, owing to the darkness and the dense forest, and it seemed a plain duty to explain to vou the posi- tion, and the result if your order is executed. The forest and undergrowth are so dense that my troops CANNOT RETAIN THEIR FORMATION for five minutes after they move. It is too dark to distinguish friend from foe, and my division once disorganized in the forest cannot be reformed for battle until morning. My troops are not in supporting distance of any others, and when the assault is made on the town your army will be cut in two as it is now, and will be destro3'ed. The troops should be drawn in and the divisions placed in front of the town within the earth- works, and in immediate support of each other. The position is a strong one, and if occupied we n shall win a viclorv ; if left as thev are now there is nothing before you but a terrible deleat." A moment of reflection, and then came tlie an- swer: "Hamilton, ^ou are right. Put your di- vision as your suggest; the others shall be placed accordingly." It w^as thus that the troops came to occupy the positions they did on the morning of this day twenty years "ago; thus that victory came where defeat was inevitable; thus that the territory to the banks of the Ohio was preserved to us, and the silver lining to the cloud showed itself to the whole people. It was but an incident, but big w'ith fate, and as such we must look back upon it with infinite satisfaction. And now before I close I must touch upon one jthtr matter— a matter of justice to those oflicers ind men who took part in the battle of luka. [All who fought at luka and lived were present \at Corinth, and so intimately were those battles Connected that I am not out of place in alluding /;o the former in what I now have to say. The .'battle of luka was fought on the lyth of .Sep- ' tember, just two weeks preceding that of Cor- inth. It was a fierce contest — none more so. •he long list of dead and wounded, compared iith the number engaged, shows that for an ac- tion of two hours in length it was hotly contested. The still longer list of the dead and wounded of the enemy, with the number of prisoners taken, speaks louder than words of the bravery of our men. If men do well in the heat of battle and other men speak of them, just words should be spoken; sneers are unjust and out of place. In the first volume of Gen. Sherman's Mem- oirs, page 261 (writing of the battle of luka, the following passage occurs: "Price perceived his advantage and attacked with vehemence the head of Rosecrans' column, Hamilton's division, beat- ing it back, capturing a battery, and disabling 736 men." And a little further on he says : "In my experience these concerted movements generally fail unless with the very best kind of troops," etc. Well, now, I believe Gen. Sherman is about the last man to do intentional injustice to any one, much less a soldier of the War of the P bellion; but look at it, turn it over, read it bai wards, any way, every way, and what does sound like, or look like, but a sneer. It is t this battle was not fought by him or his tro< He wa.s a hundred miles away; but if he fought it, or the men under his command fought it, there would have been at least a COMMENDATION OF THE BRAVERY SHOWI there would have been a memorandum, at ' to the effect that if a battery was lost, it w. captured, and was not lost. And further, I the troops were beaten back, they did not : them, or at any time, retire a half muske from where the line was formed and the fought. And as to the battery and the ,: men who worked it, he would at least ha the stoiv that e\"ery oflicer and nearly eve and horse w-as killed or wounded before t ^u fired the last shot, and fell into the enemy 'o' hands. And he would have further stated that, if he had 736 men disabled, the enemy lost 1,438 men, and that on the whole it was a gallant fight, and that our men slept on the field and the enemy didn't, and finally would have indeed been angry if any- body else had sneered at it if it had been fought by his men. What would Gen. Sherman think and how would he feel if his "march through Georgia,'' his capture of Atlanta, Savannah, Charleston, Columbia, and the great "concerted movement" of his chief. Grant, and himself, which cornered the armies of the Confederacv in North Carolina and Virginia, without hope of escape — if history should allude to it only by his having so many thousand men disabled.? But then Gen. Sher- man had really "the very best kind of troops." Now let me say that Gen. Sherinan had no in- tention to be unjust, though he was unjust. No General is more willing to accord everything that rightly belongs, none less envious of his brother Generals, none froin whom justice springs more spontaneously than he. LETTER FROM ARTHUR C. DUCAL [Ffvm Chicago TrU'utu\ Oct. ^^th, 1SS2.\ Down'er's Grove, 111., Oct. iS. — In your issue of to-day under the above heading you published a paper read by Maj.-Gen. C. S. Hamilton, late U. S. A., at the anniversary dinner of the sur- viving officers of the battle of Corinth. Gen. Hamilton is represented as having read as follows : [The extract is to long to publish entire. It is the statement made by the essaj-ist that the plan of the battle embraced the retirement of Davies' division, when attacked, when Hamilton and McKean were to fall on both flanks of the enemy. This would have cut the Federal forces into three separated commands. Gen. Hamilton goes on to say that this plan was frustrated, and that he re- fused to obey the order of Rosecrans "brought by Gen. A. C. Ducat " to charge the enemy at night until the commanding officer could look over the ground. Gen Rosecrans, he says, came to his headquarters, looked at the situation, and placed the troops as Hamiton had suggested.] The "one important fact" stated by Gen. Ham- ilton has not been "generally known" and in that he is very right. From none of the 17,000 men of our army at Cornith is there, to the knowledge of the writer, any w"ord of record e\'en suggesting that there was any such plan of the battle of Corinth as described by Gen. Hamilton, and it will be a great surprise to the officers, who, it is supposed, should have a pretty intimate knowl- edge of the plans of the general commanding. Gen. Hamilton had the right of the line of battle on the morning of the third. That line n. Rosecrans in his report clearly gives his sons for. He did not know just where tlie •■my would strike him, and his small force of "■'airy was fully engaged as stated by him. His ' I was therefore made to first check an advance °'i any of the roads leading to his position ^ to the enemy, from the west, north, and 'least, until the point of real attack could be ' determined. All troops within supporting 'Mce. As before stated, Gen. Hamilton was "■^e right, and it would be his duty to feel our "'f battle on his left and not lose it, and to use ^scretion of a Major-General commanding a '°and fine division of a small army not in sbn of orders. The position of Gen. Ham- '. command at the early stage of the battle ■'^important one. It guarded the right from '•"^k on a point where one might well be an- . .v.ip^. ';i, with no cavalry of our own on this front. "W-o attack having been made in that di- rection, there was still plenty of work for Gen. Hamilton, with his fine and brave division, even without orders, as the main body of the enemy had been hurled upon our center, held by the gallant division of Gen. Davies on the left of Gen. Hamilton, which he was supposed to have touched. The sight and noise of battle is always a pretty true guide to a soldier as to where he should go and where he belongs. Gen. Hamilton must not fall into the error that because Davies' division, after a most obstinate and gallant re- sistance, was obliged to fall back for awhile, that this was part of the "box" he describes, and a part of the plan he suggests as that of Gen. Rosecrans. If the foresight of the General commanding had been as good as Gen. Hamilton's backsight is now, and the enemy had been kind enough to inform him (Rosecrans)just what he was going to do, he might have made another order of battle, and it is possible, though not probable, that the enemy would have been repulsed on his first at- tacks, although he had the great advantage of being the attacking party, and an army of more than twice the number of men of ours. Tlie fact that the centre and left were being driven a little under vastly superior force, and the fact that Gen. Hamilton's division had not been and was not then engaged, was made known to the General commanding, and Gen. Hamilton "v" ""djrsJ. to ;.'tu^'K the enemy, the order reach- ing him in the afternoon. The attack was made with one brigade — Gen. Sullivan's — and did relieve the pressure on the left and centre, which were desperately fought and held by McArthur, Hackleman, Davies, Oglesbv, McKean, Stanley, Crocker, Mower, Smith, Fuller and others— fight- ing as they were with superior numbers — from early in the morning until late in the afternoon. The enemy made a partial change of front to resist Hamilton. As to the night attack mentioned by Gen. Hamilton as having been ordered by Gen. Rose- crans, the writer has no recollection of any such order or any such suggestion by the Gen- eral commanding. The only night attack he remembers being.talked of was the second night of the pursuit of the enemj', after the battle, when an attempt to overtake the enemy and attack him was talked of, but abandoned and not ordered. from the condition of the stock. Can Gen. Ham- ilton confound this with an order he supposed he received.' If Gen. Rosecrans ever contemplated a night atack on the night of the 3d surely his other Generals and commanding officers otherthan Gen. Hamilton, and some members of his staft', would be made acquainted with it. It is hardly probable that Gen. Hamilton's division, alone and unsupported would be ordered to make such an attack. Night attacks are not, under certain cir- cumstances, when well arranged and carried out, always such absurds things as Gen. Hamilton would lead his hearers and his readers to suppose. There were many times during our war when night attacks would have brought about good results. The proposed disposition of troops and plans of. battle for the 4th were made known to the writer' and other members of the staft" early in the even-1 ing of the 3d, and instructions were given to assist [ [)ersonally in the dispositions and formations. I, am not aware of any change in the plans of the) General commanding later in the night. , The truth of historv will never 'oe arrived at from I the savings and writings of special and interested! eulogists, norby the soundingof their own praiscy, and deeds by those who cannot find, even in thei' days, a special eulogist for them. It is small glory tiiat can be gained by attacking the dead whose voices are silent forever, or those who by misfortune, or the chapter of circumstance, or the falling oft" of butterfly friends, or the stabs of false and ungrateful ones, are not in a position to de- fend themselves, and who have not the popular ear. Gen. Rosecrans is a great and successful soldier and a generous friend. Rich Mountain, Carnifax Ferry, luka, Corinth, Stone River, Tul- lahoma, Chattanooga, and Chicamauga would be gloi'v enough for one man, and would entitle him to the respect and gratitude of a people for what he has done in almost any other country or any other time, and it is not his fault that devotion to his family, sore affliction, and the necessity of earning a support, together with the sensitive nature that is to be found in men of his bravery and genius, have prevented him from being in the field to resist the attacks of calum- niators whose chief object seems to have been to filch his glory and build up their reputations on his deeds — and it ill becomes any man now, after twenty-two years, at a convivial meeting of his comrades on the anniversar}' of one of his great victories, to turn the occasion into one of attack upon his reason and his fame. To none was Gen. Rosecrans more generous in his words of praise than to Gen. Hamilton, and no man was more anxious to gain his good opinion than was the man who attacked him under such unwar- rantable circimistances and at such an ill-chosen time and place. Gen. Rosecrans is not quite a dead lion, though he has been kicked at with the characteristic meanness of those who only spurn when they fear no danger. I regret the occasion that impels me to impose upon you this letter. To use a vulgarism it is "written from the shoulder," and I trust my friends will so con- sider it. Arthur C. Ducat. [Front Milwaukee Sundny Telegraph, Nov. 11th, ISSS, Upon reading General Ducat's letter, General Hamilton made the following reply. Both letters will be read with deep interest by all who were engaged in the battle and the campaigns leading to it, as well as by all soldiers. General Hamil- ton's letter is as follows : Milwaukee, Oct. 28, 1SS2. The Chicago Tribune of the 25th inst. contains a letter from Arthur C. Ducat — a reply, he deems it — to a statement of historical facts made by me at the meeting of the surviving officers of the battle of Corinth on the 4th inst. No candid man who took the trouble to read that statement can find a word or sentence in it that can be con- strued into an attack on General Rosecrans. It was a severe but just criticism on his official acts as connected with that battle, and as it is only I comparatively recently that earnest eflbrts have been made to get at the true history of the chief aotles of the rebellion, the one who is cognizant of such facts and can substantiate them, should be reasonably free from censure and malice, if the facts bear hard upon the official record of the commanders most interested. If Gen. Rosecrans is the man I take him to be, he will be prompt to recognize and acknowledge what he knows to be true, but which his staft" officer takes upon him- self to deny ; .\ND WHAT .\ DENIAL. Part of it he forgets — does not recollect; an- other part cannot be so, forsooth, because, he does not know it to be so, and because he does not know it to be so, he is positive no one of the seventeen thousand officers and soldiers of the Corinth army ever heard of it. And not only does he take it upon himself to forget what he knows to be true, but in his sycophantic frenzy he bursts into a personal attack and talks blindly of "special and interested eulogists," "attacking the dead," 'butterfly friends," "false and ungrate- ful ones," "attacks of calumniators," "filch his glory and build up reputation on his deeds," "attack on his reason and his fame," etc., etc. Let all this go for just what Ducat thinks it is worth. ■ With reference to the time and place of my statement, I can conceive of no fitter time and place than an anniversary meeting where officers had gathered to talk over their campaigns. Especiall}' was this the case in a meeting called (as the letters of invitation read) "to put this bat- tle' in its true place in history. In that statement I made a mistake. I hasten to correct it. I alluded to Ducat as chief of staffi He was not. In one of his dispatches dated on the day of the battle, addressed to me, he signs himself "Lieut. Col. and general officer of grand guards, outposts and pickets." Few officers could bear such a title — except in sec- tions. The honorable position of chief of staff was filled by Col. Kennett, an able and gallant officer. THE FACTS. On the morning of Oct. 3d, Gen. Rosecrans called his division commanders together headquarters, and laid before them the p battle as I stated it at the anniversary mi That plan embraced a flank attack by eii both McKean's and my divisions, as c stances would admit. The box was used ' an illustration of the plan. I used it be^ was convenient, terse and expressive, palliate it. Ducat could not have been pr that meeting or he would have been coi with the plan. Indeed, it is certain, aim he was not present, and that Gen. Rosei not deem it prudent to trust him with it The meeting was not a council. No o ^i wa asked for an opinion. Each received his instruc- tions and departed to his command without other thought than to do his best to carry out the plan of the general commanding. Now, it often happens that plans are laid that do not meet the exigencies of the case, and are abandoned, and others acted upon, and those abandoned are not mentioned in the reports of operations. Thus it happened to McKean, who being fronted by forces vastly superior, came so near being outflanked himself, that not only was his proposed flank attack rendered impossible, but it became neccessary to draw support to him from Stanley's division, which it was remember- ed was on the far left. This exigency left the flank attack then solely to my division on the ex- treme right. This flank attack was held back by Gen. Rose- crans until after 5 p. M., and then ordered by him. It was thwarted, as stated in my official report, by one of the brigades getting a long way out of place, by mistaking a watching party of the enemy for the enemy in force; and before the brigade could be recalled and got into position for attack, night had fallen. The original orders and dispatches governing all these matters are in my possession, subject to the perusal of any one interested. Now, as to the plan of battle remaining the same for the next day, let us consult, not Ducat's memory, but his records. Tn I::- 'cttorl.; ■. ' " the following language: "The disposition of the troops and plans of the 4th were made known to the writer and other members of the staft" early in the evening of the 3d, and instructions were given to assist personally in the formations. I am not aware of any change in the plan of the general commanding later in the night." Here is a record: Headquarters, Army of the Mississippi. 7 p. M., Oct. 3d, 1S62. General: Throw out, promptly, videttes, pick- ets, grand guards, scouts in rear of (word il- legible) on your front and flanks. Pick up all the prisoners you can. Get all the information possible * * * During the night and coming daylight much will depend on the vigilance of outposts and guards. By order of Gen. Rosecrans. , Arthur C. Ducat, Lt. Col., chief of grand ' guards and outposts. To General Hamilton. es this look like a change of position early e evening? No thought of a change was intil Gen. Rosecrans came out on tlie heia p. M. e is another dispatch. II : 30 P. M. ERAL H.\milton: The general command- ihes you to have your change of front exe- ■o-nieht and not by any means wait lor t The moon will furnish you snthcient Resp'y, S. C. Lyfokd, Act'g A. D. C. change was being made when this order Rosecrans, in his testimony before the »e on the conduct of the war, testihed as to_ f "I determined on a readjustment ol -'P- for a Hnal battle, making use ot what Jfront. .jtiie ;„ our new line of defense, (fortih- oations\".ose to the town) to prevent Hie e"emy from turning our right. Tins zcas nccomphshed by :> A. M. of the Mil.' . ^ , •- •^ But why repeat? There are living at least half a dozen officers who heard Rosecrans cen- sorious question on the field at 10 P. M. What do you mean by disobeying MY ORDER FOR A NIGHT ATTACK.'" heard the conversation that followed, heard the approval of this commander of the reasons for dec ining to make the attack until the interview could be had, and heard the orders given at tlie dose to put the wounded in the ambulance and start them with the ammunition wagons in ad- vance to be followed by the whole command, taking a circulitious route to conceal the move- ment from the enemy. . Ducat does not recollect any order for a mght attack It is passing strange that an officer can !"ryan order three^Biles after night, take back 1 reply and still later in the night bring back his chie'f lad sit by his side, listen to the censoi-ious nuestions to the division commandei, heai the orders for the movement resulting Irom the in- terview, and remember nothing about it. t-ven if the order had been sealed, and the reply sealed so that he could know nothing ot the_ contents, the conversation which took place in his hearing should have carried to his obtuse ears a tuU un- derstanding of the order which was disobeyed It might have helped his memory had he been present at the anniversary meeting and heard the corroborative testimony of a distinguished othcer there present, and also present at the interview on the field: that ofllcer heard it all and does not hesitate to tell the truth. One does not know which to admire most, the convenient memory, or the assurance wilh which he discusses the science of war. Read his lucid remarks on night attacks and judge. But then Ducat is authority on night attacks, and was evidently suffering from one when he gave vent to his "slraight-from-the-shoulder let- ter " Corinth was a fortified place, rather an in- trenched camp; made so that it might be held by a smaller force against a greater one. It was the depot of supplies for a great part of Grant s army, and was of the utmost importance. Now it was not only reasonable to suppose, but it was certain, if the enemy attacked it, he would do so with such a preponderance of force as to give reason- able hope of overcoming the garrison, and also ^ the fortifications. c ■ i In the li"ht of this fact, the wisdom of going ( outside the fortified lines to fight a battle, raav^ well be questioned. ^>;. The first dav's fight was in the open field, and . that the plan was to fight the battle there on the second day, Ducat's order is convincing. The whole plan of fighting in the open field was a mistake, but all honor to General Rose- crans for instantly abandoning his mistaken plan, and correcting liis error as rapidly as possible when he found it out, which he did not do until his order for a night attack had been disobeyed, and he was given the reasons therefor. It does not detract from Gen. Rosecrans ability that he made a mistake. "Show me the commander who never made a mistake, and I will show you a fool, or a man who never made war," was the utterance of one of history's greatest chieftains. Ducat savs: "Rosecrans is not quite a dead lion." Granted. But there must have been a dead lion around somewhere or the ^"thor of that phrase would not so readily have tound the skin of one to crawl into. ^ ^_ Hamilton. LETTER FROM ARTHUR C. DUCAT, [From Milwaukee Sunday Telegraph, Dec. lyt/i, /SS2.] Downer's Grove, Illinois, Dec. 7, 1S82. To the Editors of The Sunday Telegraph: Upon my return from an absence, my attention has been called to a letter from Maj. Gen. C. S. Hamilton, late U. S. A., published in your issue of Nov. 12, 1SS2, purporting to be a reply to an ar- ticle of mine in the Chicago Tribune of 25th Octo- ber, 18S2, under date of iSth of that month, and kindly republished b)' j'ou beside Gen. Hamil- ton's repl}'. The article was written in reply to a speech made, or a paper read, at an anniversary dinner of surviving officers of the battle of Cor- inth, Miss., at Chicago on the 4th of October, 1SS2, by Maj. Gen. Hamilton, and published in ■.the Chicago Tribune, Oct. iS, 1SS2. I have been {thus particular about the dates of the publication pf Gen. Hamilton's paper, or speech, and the pub- lications of the various documents since, that 3en. Hamilton's important contribution to the history of the war may not be lost sight of, but may be found and read hy all who are interested. Gen. Hamilton, with an utter want of the dig- nity that should characterize a major general, having stooped to personal abuse and vitupera- tion, should not have from me the consideration of a reply, were it not improper to permit that his outrage on historj- should remain uncontra- dicted in any record where it may have found place. Referring particularly to the documents men- tioned, let us take this letter of Gen. Hamilton's, published in your issue of 12th Nov., 1882, to pieces and see what it is made of. Gen. Hamil- ton finds that his attack on Gen. Rosecrans was not under the circumstances of time, place, oc- casion, or after twenty years, or in any other way, as popidar as he expected, but it is charac- terized by all true soldiers and gentlemen as cowardly, ungrateful and a wretched piece of egotism in the worst possible taste, and he says: "No candid man who took the trouble to read that statement can find a word or sentence in it that can be construed into an attack on Gen. Rosecrans." This has no argument in it. Every man who read the "statement" will think for himself; it will present itself to different minds in different ways, and has little to do with history. It would be interesting, however, to know what candid gentlemen would say of it, and it is to be hoped that they will record their opinions. "the facts." The plan of the battle, as stated by Gen. Hamil- ton at tire anniversary meeting, he does not even pretend to prove in his letter. The "box" may be "convenient, terse and expressive," (how could it be otherwise,) but the re-assertion of the general is good for nothing, now, without the proofs. It would be a mere contest as to who would have the last word, without proper court of inquiry, and the writer desires to say that he has neither the time nor tlie inclination to engage in such wars of words. Gen Hamilton, after waiting twenty tells the extraordinary and unsupported ofthe plan, "the box" and the proposec attack" which surprise the living actors inth, are contradicted by me, and the bi proof is squarely on his shoulders. I seen, too, that his statements go into th for history side by side with their re' Let us see what Gen. Rosecrans s. port dated 2Sth Oct. 1862, only twenty after this battle. Writingof the situation .01 battle he says: "There being indicatio-.s of apt sible attack on Corinth immediately, the follow ing disposition of troops will be made: Gen Mc Kean with his division will occupy the presen position. Gen. Davies will occupy the line be tween the Memphis and Columbus road. Ger Hamilton with his divison will take position bi tween the rebel works," (the writer will statt here, that when the rebel works, or breastworks, or fortifications are referred to, they mean the old works of the enemy constructed when they held Corinth,) "on the Purdy and the Hamburg roads: and Gen. .Stanley will hold his division in reserve at or near the old headquarters of Gen. Grant." Observe here that the division of Gen. Stanley in reserve was in Corinth. Did this look like an intention to fight the battle in the open field.' No. Gen. Rosecrans proceeds: "These dispositions were made, and the troops, at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 3d, occupied the position shown on the accompanying map. Hamilton on the right, Davies the center, McKean, the left with an advance of three regiments of infantry and a sec- tion of artillery under Col. Oliver on the Chewalla road." Here is the line of battle thrown out to develop and feel the attack of the enemy; Gen. Hamilton had the right ofthis line. General Rosecrans furthermore says: "The general plan which was explained to the division commanders verbally in ti'.e inut.iii.t;, %. .. j ,.^ hold the enemy at arms length by approaching him strongly," [Gen. Hamilton did not approach him at all] "and when his force became fully developed and had assumed a position, to take a position which would give us the use of our bat- teries," [our batteries were in the town of Corinth and some of them back of it from the front of the enemy's attack] "and the open ground in the vicinity of Corinth." Does this not carry with it conviction.' There was no open ground except in Corinth and im- mediately under the earthwork batteries in Cor- inth and such ground as had been cleared for their range. This disposes of Gen. Hamilton's "box" unless the one he has gotten himself into. But let us proceed. Referring to Col. Oliver's position, before men- tioned, and Gen. McArthur having been sent to the front and the widespread skirmishing in that direction reported by him, General Rosecrans says: "But it proved that Gen. McArthur had > 10 I up four more regiments from McKean's di- 1," (this means in addition to the tliree regi- « under Col. Oliver) "and was contesting the gjd almost for a hattle," (just like McArthur.) g s this which induced Gen. Davies to ask per- ,j,n to rest his right on tlie rebel entrench- p and to which I consented, adding the ver- g er to Lieut. Col. Ducat that he might use Igment about his leaving his present for j.iition." ;(,writer has given the abo\e paragraph to Q tliat if there was a "box" plan, he would 1; • have known something of it even thougli ^ytiilton indicates that Gen. Rosecrans •hfjvould not trust him. .jyej me details of the battle — it had now j{ .ijt and desperate resistance against a >(ierior force, Gen. Rosecrans says: "Or- , w_ {accordingly given for McKean to fall ack to the next ridge," (McKean was well out to .he front,) "beyond our intrenchments, to touch ,his right on Davies' left, for Stanley to move north- jward and eastward to stand in close echelon, but nearer town. Gen. Hamilton" (he had not been "^Migaged,) "was ordered to face toward Chewalla ](«(/ moi