>icw YovU, 5a<sa 
 
 ■:^: / ^i 
 
Book_JlLl_ 
 
GENERAL H. W. HALLEOK'S 
 
 O 
 
 REPORT 
 
 ItMttoe^ ill t|e S^igljt flf Jfacts. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH, 
 
 No. 683 BROADWAY. 
 
 1862. 
 

 T, Pub, JUte, 
 
 Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1S62, 
 Bt ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH,'^, 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the Southern 
 District of New Yorlt. 
 
 •:.^v- 
 
 ,NG^o. 
 
 EDWARD O. JENKINS, 
 
 iSrintcr anli Stcrcotgpfr, 
 No. 20 North William St. 
 
GENERAL H. ¥. IIALLECK'S REPORT 
 
 REVIEWED. 
 
 I.— THE EVACUATIOJf OF THE PENINSULA. 
 
 So much of General Ilalleck's report as relates to the penin- 
 sular campaign, and that which followed it in Virginia and 
 Maryland, sounds more like the special plea of an ingenious 
 lawyer than like the frank soldierly statement of a military 
 man. Its suppressions of the truth are "too numerous to men- 
 tion," and its slurring statement of facts which would redound 
 to the credit of general and other officers, must strike the pub- 
 lic with great surprise. From this extraordinary paper it 
 would appear to one who is not familiar with the focts — it must 
 appear to the reader in foreign countries — that America pos- 
 sesses no soldier but H. W. Halleck, and that neither he nor 
 the President can find, in all the half million of American sol- 
 diers, one man who is worthy a good word or a commendation 
 in the summing up of the war! We have indeed fallen on 
 miserable times when the Greneral-in-Chief addresses to the 
 War Department a long labored report of the work of the Ar- 
 my, and cannot persuade himself into uttering a word of praise 
 of any one, but proceeds to load general after general with in- 
 sinuations of incapacity, if not with open charges of wrong. 
 
 What can be tlie explanation of this? Would it be wrong 
 to seek it in the facts set forth by the report itself? We think 
 not. 
 
 On examination we find this report commences with the call 
 of General Halleck to the chief command of the army, and his 
 
immediate visit to the peninsula. Wlictber the sudden eleva- 
 tion to position and power shook the intellect of the Gen- 
 eral, or whether jealousy and ambition combined to make him 
 suddenly incapable of correct judgment, or whether he was 
 indeed unable to advise in such terrible circumstances as then 
 environed the army and the capital, it does not fully appear. 
 But it does appear that lie staked his militcwij reputation at once 
 against that of General McClellan on the propriety of evacuating 
 the peninsula ; and that he lost the stake in the terrible disas- 
 ters which followed his awful error. The whole of this part 
 of his report therefore is devoted to explaining why it was that 
 he failed to sustain his own judgment, and why the event did 
 sustain the tremendous truths briefly, nobly, and sadly set forth 
 as existing facts, and prophecies certain to be facts, in the let- 
 ter of General McClellan of the 4th of August. For the report 
 of General Halleck amounts to just this: — "I said the army 
 must leave the peninsula; General McClellan protested and 
 said it would lead to disaster. lie was right. But it was not 
 my fault." 
 
 Let us see if it was not his fault. 
 
 The final ground on which General Halleck ordered General 
 McClellan to leave the peninsula, is stated in his report to bo 
 this — that it was impossihle to fiumish General McClellan with 
 35,000 fresh troops required by him as reinforcements. General 
 McClellan believed that if those troops were furnished him 
 Eichmond could be taken. But says General Halleck : It was 
 impossible to furnish them. We could give him 20,000. We 
 could not give him 35,000. So we ordered him to evacuate. 
 
 AVe pause astounded before the magnitude of this assertion. 
 Impossible ! Why, within six weeks from that fourth day of 
 August, General Halleck's strategy had sacrificed more than 
 thirtj^-five thousand of our troops along the Virginia roads, on 
 the bloody banks of the Rapidan and Bull Kun, on South 
 Mountain and Antietam ! Within six weeks from that time, 
 gallant new regiments like the Fourteenth Connecticut, fresh 
 from home, had been more than decimated on the Maryland 
 battlc-Helds, to save the capital from the disasters which this 
 withdrawal from the peninsula had brought upon it! Thirty- 
 five thousand men could not be found to reinforce the army of 
 
the Potomac, and insure the taking of Kichmond, when there 
 were at that instant in and around Washington not less than 
 ninety thousand men, and within thirty days fresh troops by 
 the hundred thousand were pouring down the avenues to the 
 capital from every portion of the land ! 
 
 We know no document in all the American history more 
 profoundly sad than that letter of the gallant McClellan from 
 the point to which he had so magnificently withdrawn his 
 abandoned, sacrificed army. In what splendor it shines, as we 
 look at the truths now presented ! It will be read hereafter 
 with even deeper emotion than now, when other facts in con- 
 nection with it come to be known, and when this history is told 
 by an impartial pen, not by the pen of one who seeks to estab- 
 lish his own reputation at the expense of another who he 
 knows well remains silent always, except when his country's 
 cause demands his utterance. In the presence of this grand 
 truth, that General Halleck staked his military opinion against 
 General McClellau's, and that the result proved the latter to 
 have been correct and the former most awfully in error, it 
 would seem unnecessary to review the minor points of the plea 
 of General Halleck. But we are compelled to notice one of 
 the main points, not hitherto brought forward, namely : the ac- 
 cusation that General McClellan was too slow in leaving the 
 peninsula, and the charge that Pope's disasters were to be at- 
 tributed to this delay. 
 
 General Halleck here sinks the soldier entirely in the special 
 pleader. His complaint would be dismissed in any court as ab- 
 surdly frivolous. Does he know the thousands of sick men, 
 the weight of artillery, the stores, the supplies, the immense 
 trains that lay at Harrison's Bar ? Probably he does not. As in 
 many other instances in this war, the newspapers must supply 
 information to the government officer. Had General Halleck, 
 in the hurry and confusion of his call to the chief command, 
 and the immense responsibilities which those first few days de- 
 volved upon him, remembered his own slowness in Western 
 campaigns, and paused long enough to consider the mere ques- 
 tion of the physical labor to be performed at Harrison's Land- 
 ing, he would have hesitated before he wrote of the long delay 
 of eleven days occupied in preparing to move an immense 
 
army with tlie heaviest siege train ever used in the history of 
 wars, in the face of an active, vigilant, and immensely super- 
 for enemy ! It is unworthy the pen of an American soldier thus 
 to underrate the achievements of the great army of the Poto- 
 mac. General McClellan wrote on the 4th day of August that 
 several days would be necessary to prepare for the movement. 
 He was then in his position at Harrison's Landing. His hos- 
 pitals were crowded with six thousand sick and wounded men. 
 His siege train, by far the heaviest metal which had ever been 
 used, was in position. It was to be shipped and protected, and 
 then the great supply trains, the vast accumulations which had 
 been so skillfully saved from the campaign, were to be got out 
 of the way, and finally the army was to be moved to Fortress 
 Monroe. All this was accomplished, without loss, in the most 
 able and satisfactory manner. The highest praise is due to all 
 the officers and soldiers concerned, but they receive no praise 
 from Washington. On the contrarj^, the General-in-Chief 
 growls at their slowness, and blames them for his own terrible 
 blunders (no less) in not knowing how long it would take to move 
 ninety thousand men and all their guns and supplies from a 
 distant position before the face of an enemy, some hundreds of 
 miles by water and land, and throw them again into the field 
 before the same enemy. 
 
 But there is something more culpable than the mere growl- 
 ing, in this statement of General Ilalleck that General McClel- 
 lan did not commence the evacuation of Harrison's Landing 
 until the 14th of August. 
 
 The order to remove the sick was, as General Halleck states, 
 made on the 30th of July; but it appears also that it was un- 
 accompanied by any orders to move the army. There were 
 six thousand men on the sick list at this time. Obviousl}^, if 
 the army was to remain at Harrison's Landing or on the penin- 
 sula, many of these ought to be retained there, being convales 
 cent or but slightly ill. The mere removal of these six thou- 
 sand sick men was a tremendous work. How much greater does 
 it seem when we know the fact that there were no transports in 
 the James liiver fitted to the duty. General Halleck says that 
 he subsequently gave General McClellan an order to use all the 
 immense fleet of vessels then in the river. He does not tell us, 
 
however, that that entire fleet was loaded to the water's edge 
 with supplies for the army, and with forage piled ten and 
 fifteen feet high above the deeks of a large portion of the ves- 
 sels ! He turns aside to pay a compliment to the rapidity with 
 which General Burnside transported his troops from Newport 
 News, He does not explain this by the fact, which he knew 
 well, that Burnside's corps was in camp at Newport News, by 
 the side of the vessels they had arrived in, all their baggage 
 and supplies still on board, and nothing to do but march on 
 board, get up steam, and continue their voi/age. This is a 
 most disgraceful suppression of the truth, by which it is 
 designed to draw a contrast between the rapidity of General 
 Barnside's movements, and the eleven days "delay" of General 
 McClellan ! 
 
 But there is a worse truth yet for General Halleck to meet. 
 We have stated that the vessels in the James River were loaded 
 with supplies, and in unlit condition to be used as transports^ 
 General Halleck states that Burnside's transports returned to 
 McClellan. Wot one of them ever returned to Harrison^ s Landing, 
 They came straggling back to Fortress Monroe two weeks later, 
 but none of them went above that point. 
 
 Nevertheless, General McClellan obeyed the order to eva- 
 cuate instantly on receiving it. 
 
 His heavy artillery, then at Harrison's bar, was the heaviest 
 siege train ever used in the history of war. It consisted of the 
 guns of the First Connecticut Artillery Regiment, under Col- 
 onel Tyler. The train was seventy-one guns and mortars, in- 
 cluding two 200-pound Parrotts, five 100-pound Parrotts, and 
 ten lo-inch sea-service mortars. The two hundred pounders 
 weighed 16,570 pounds each. The 13-inch mortars 17,120 
 pounds each. The weight of material for the service of these 
 guns landed on the peninsula was 857,417 pounds, besides 
 powder and stores of various kinds. The heaviest guns used 
 by the English at Sebastopol were 10,610 pounds each, and 
 their sea-service mortars weighed 11,300 pounds each. The 
 French artillery was not so heavy. These facts may give an 
 idea of the work to be done, on the shore of a river, with no 
 material for lifting and handling heavy guns, and with a vigilant 
 enemy watching the embarkation.. 
 
8 
 
 Still we repeat, General McClellau obeyed the order imme- 
 diately. It came, as General TIalleck states on the 3d of August. 
 
 Altliough newspapers were in the receipt of constant infor- 
 mation of all that was going on at that time, they were for good 
 reasons not permitted to publish it; but the AVashington au. 
 tliorities ought not therefore to suppose that the fiicts are buried 
 in the depths of the past. General Halleck says that McClellan 
 did not commence the evacuation till the 14th. Where then 
 did Burnside procure the artillery with which on that same 
 lith he was advancing from Acquia Creek? It was McClel- 
 lan's from Harrison's Landing. Where did he procure several 
 thousand men who had been added to his forces ? They were 
 the first whom McClellan sent after the order to evacuate ! The 
 truth is, that instantly on receiving the order of the 8d, McClel- 
 lan commenced to evacuate, and even before his sick were cared 
 for, he had forwarded all the soldiers and batteries that could 
 be spared from his army, holding, of course, the main body to 
 defend the position, cover the embarkation of stores, sick, and 
 heavy artillery, and ensure the final success of the movement. 
 What can be the explanation of this glaring misrepresentation 
 of facts by General Halleck ? Is it a mistake of the pen, like 
 others that we shall have occasion to show ? 
 
 Having dispatched at once all the troops and guns that could 
 be placed on transports, the heavy work of moving the sick 
 the artillery and the supplies, was accomplished with incredible 
 rapidity, the entire force working night and day through the 
 eleven days. Officers of the army have described to us the sad- 
 ness of that work. There was no interruption till it was accom- 
 plished, although the deepest depression reigned in all hearts. 
 They felt that the grand error of the war was in process of 
 enacting. They believed that ruin to the cause was imminent, 
 but they obeyed like soldiers, obeyed as their commander always 
 taught by word and example. 
 
 Dispirited and down-hearted the arm}'- in detachments was 
 sent to Acquia Creek, to Alexandria, wherever they could be 
 landed — not by order of their old general, for he was now 
 under orders and had no lono;er the control of his veterans. 
 They had been incorporated in the arm}'- of General Pope, and 
 now, through the inexcusable folly of some one (General Hal- 
 
9 
 
 leek claims the honor), that army of General Pope, -vrhich had 
 been stretched out to the Eapidan, was suffering the terrible 
 results of the evacuation of the Peninsula. 
 
 Why the army of the Potomac Tfas not ordered direct to 
 Alexandria, where the rail communicated with Pope's position, 
 does not appear. If General Halleck was so anxious for its ar- 
 rival to reinforce Pope it seems inexplicable that he sent a large 
 part of the army to Acquia Creek, whence it would require 
 several days' march over land to form a junction with Pope. 
 
 General McClellan arrived at Alexandria. 
 
 General Halleck does not venture to repeat or allude to the 
 stories which gained such credence through the columns of the 
 radical papers, and which were attributed to him or his staff, 
 that General AlcClellan refused to forward help to General 
 Pope. On the contrary, it appears that detachment after de- 
 tachment of the army of General McClellan was ordered forward 
 to Pope's help as they landed, and thus General McClellan was 
 left without a command. But what shall be said of the remark- 
 able statement of General Halleck that General Pope was acting 
 under his constant advice, and that it was on his (Halleck's) 
 responsibility that Pope was out on the Eapidan, his lines 
 extended and his position weak, and that the only excuse for 
 this is, that General Halleck thought he woukl have up from 
 the peninsula the army of the Potomac which was there 
 facing the enemy and retiring with its immense trains and ar- 
 tillery, before that enemy ! On this contingency all was risked. 
 
 Surely all this abundantly justified the apprehensions of 
 McClellan. It showed that precisely what he considered the 
 danger was the danger, and that General Halleck was not 
 awake to it. lieview the dates in this extraordinary history : 
 
 August 8. McClellan ordered to evacuate. 
 
 August 4. ]\IcClellan foresees disaster, protests, but obeys at 
 once forwarding troops and batteries to Acquia Creek. 
 
 Augusts. " About this time" General Halleck saj's he re- 
 ceived information that a large force was prepaiing to drive 
 Pope back. He still orders McClellan to leave the Peninsula, 
 thus eoiabling the tuhole force of the enemy to he hurled on Pope at 
 once and without delay. 
 
 August 9. Banks foue;ht at Cedar Mountain. 
 
10 
 
 Aufrnst 14. General McClellan finally evacuates Harrison's 
 Landing. 
 
 August 10. Ilalleek orders Pope to take a position in rear of 
 the llappaliannock, 
 
 August 18 to 30. Pope's disasters well known to history. 
 
 September 8. Pope's army returns to Washington. 
 
 September 14. McClellan fights at South Mountain, 
 
 September 16 and 17. Antietam. 
 
 These six weeks comprise within their hours the events on 
 which perhaps more than on any others the war has depended 
 for its results and its prospects. The statement of General 
 Kalleck to the country is, that he was right in ordering the 
 retreat from the peninsula, but that everybody blundered or de- 
 layed or did something wrong, and that therefore the awful 
 consequences ensued. The answer to the statement is in the 
 solemn prophecy of General McClellan, in his imploring demand 
 for the lives of his brave men and the safety of the great cause 
 he had at heart, in the unexampled rapidity of his movements 
 with so great an army and such stores and guns, in the sacrifice 
 (the responsibility of which it now appears General Halleck as- 
 sumes) of the army under Pope, in the return of McClellan to 
 the command, the rapid and glorious campaigns in Maryland, 
 the safety of the capital of the nation, the deposition, and now 
 the grand attack on the deposed and silent general, around 
 whom to-day the hearts of the nation are more closel}^ gathered 
 than around any other man since Washington. 
 
 II.— THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 
 
 The army of the Potomac had ceased to exist. The Penin- 
 sular campaign was ended, and ended in mournful failure. 
 The noble article of the Prince de Joinville sufficientl}^ ex- 
 plains where the responsibility of that failure rests, and the rev- 
 elations of the McDowell Court of Inquiry verifj' his statements. 
 
 On the evening of Saturday, August 30th, General McClel- 
 lan was without a command, for the report, current in Wash- 
 ington that day that General Pope had won a great victory at 
 Bull Run, had strengthened the enemies of the young com. 
 mander of the army of the J'otomac, and his deposition was 
 accomplished by sending his army away from him, and pub- 
 
11 
 
 lishing to the world a despatcL, announcing in phrases brief, 
 curt and even contemptuous, that he had no longer any part in 
 the war. 
 
 September 1st was Monday. The country had been aroused 
 on tlie previous Saturday by two startling dispatches. The 
 first was the great victory reported by General Pope. The 
 second was an official dispatch, couched in language as follows : 
 
 General McClellan commands that portion of the Army of 
 the Potomac that has not been sent forward to General Pope's 
 command. General Pope commands the Army of Virginia, 
 and all the forces temporarily attached to it. All the forces 
 are under the command of Major-General Ilalleck, General-in- 
 Chief. B. D. TOWNSEND, Assist. Adjut.-Gen. 
 
 Thus the disgrace of McClellan was accomplished, and this 
 order, interpreted in plain language, means that on Saturday, 
 August 30th, General McClellan had no command whatever. 
 Not a hundred men obeyed his orders. lie had sent every- 
 thing to Pope. 
 
 The next page of history, (brought to light by the evidence 
 in the trial by court martial of General Porter) is the following 
 startling letter : 
 
 War Department, September 1st, 5.30 p. m. 
 Major- General Fitz-John Porter : 
 
 I ask of you, for my sake and that of the country and the 
 old Army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends will 
 lend the fullest and most cordial cooperation to General Pope 
 in all the operations now going on. The honor of our arms 
 now depends upon the cheerful cooperation of all in the field. 
 This week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same things to all 
 my friends in the army. This is the last request I have to 
 make — that for our country's sake you will give to General 
 Pope the same assistance you have given to me. I am in the 
 defences at Washington, and will render all protection in cover- 
 ing your retreat should it be necessary. 
 
 GEO. B. McCLELLAK 
 
 This is the text of a letter fi-om Major-General McClellan, 
 written after the utmost indignity had been offered to him by 
 the Administration, and when his veterans, taken from him, 
 were sent to the fatal fields under Pope. To say that it should 
 
12 
 
 be written in golden letters is saying little. It should be graven 
 with points of stocl on tbe bearts of all politicians and politi- 
 cal tricksters. It will be perserved in tbe bearts of loyal 
 men and recorded forever in tbe bistory of our beloved coun- 
 try. Whatever posterity may say of us, tbis letter will call 
 forth the deepest emotions of the American in all future years. 
 
 Starting with the point of time made memorable by this 
 "last request" of the General of tbe Army of the Potomac, 
 we take up the report of General II;dleck and read in new 
 wonderment its slurring story of the Maryland campaign. 
 
 The public learned the appointment of MeClellan to this 
 command by the following order, dated and published, not on 
 Monday, September 1st, but on Tuesday, September 2d. 
 
 Headquarters of the Army, Adjut.-Gen.'s Office, 
 Washington, September 2d, 1862. 
 
 By direction of the President, Major-General MeClellan will 
 have command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all 
 the troops for the defence of the capital. Bv order of the 
 Secretary of War. E. D. TOWNSEND, A. A. G. 
 
 It appears by the letter to General Fitz-John Porter, that on 
 Monday, by some verbal authority. General MeClellan was 
 called to the defence of the beleaguered capital. 
 
 What occurred on that Monday remains a sealed story, since 
 no one tells it. Kumors were abundant. It is asserted that 
 General Ilalleck despaired of the safety of the capital, in fact 
 gave it up, and that General MeClellan differed from him 
 again, as he bad on tbe peninsula. The ftictswill not be known 
 until General Ilalleck speaks the whole truth, or General 
 MeClellan breaks tbe silence which he has so firmly kept on 
 matters which concern himself alone. Now, however, we find 
 a remarkable statement in General Ilalleek's report. He says : 
 
 Seeing that an attack upon Washington would now be futile, 
 Leo pushed his main army across the Potomac for a raid into 
 Maryland and Pennsylvania. General MeClellan was directed 
 to pursue him with all troops wliieli were not required for the 
 defence of Washington. Several corps were immediately 
 thrown out in observation at Darnestown and Leesboro', and 
 most of his army was in motion by the 5th of September. 
 
13 
 
 Pope's army (as General Hallcck states) had arrived -witbiri 
 the lines of General McClellan's command on the night of the 
 3d of September. General Ilalleck's statement that McClellan 
 was then ordered to " pursue " Lee seems remarkable, we may 
 in fact say incredible. Such order, if given, must have been 
 given between the morning of the 4th and the morning of the 
 5th, for the army was " in motion by the 5th." Yet it was 
 only on the 2d that McClellan had been ordered to take com- 
 mand of the defences of Washington, and on the morning of 
 the 4th that Pope's army were safe within the defences. Does 
 General Halleck desire to assume to himself the credit of 
 General McClellan's Maryland campaign ? We have hereto- 
 fore taken it as confessed that the whole campaign was made 
 by McClellan, under the order of September 2d, and no other. 
 If he was specially ordered to " pursue," surely the order 
 exists. Where is it ? We believe the fact to be that McClel- 
 lan's restoration to the command was by no means agreeable 
 to Washington politicians, and that the idea of his taking the 
 field to fight Lee was not at all in their programme. But when 
 it became necessar}'-, he was allowed to go out and do it without 
 orders, on his own responsibility, and any defeat or disaster to 
 him ^ould have been followed by the most severe denuncia- 
 tion, court-martial and punishment. The flict is important, as 
 it may serve to explain some of General Meigs' statements in 
 regard to supplies furnished the army. It will appear here- 
 after that General Meigs' statements, especially that relating to 
 horses, included all the army in Washington, the forts, and in 
 Maryland, as the army still under General McClellan, b}^ the 
 order of the 2d of September. We have no doubt that the 
 assertion is strictly true, that General McClellan followed Lee 
 into Marj'land on his own responsibility, and not by any order 
 of General Halleck, or any one in Washington, notwithstand- 
 ing General Ilalleck's complacent statement that McClellan 
 was ordered to pursue Lee. And the point we now make as 
 to who ordered General McClellan to advance is important in 
 another regard, namely, to show how the battles of South 
 Mountain and Antietam came to be fought, and what was the 
 object, position and future duty of the army after the victory 
 in Maryland. For if McClellan had gone out to fight those 
 
14 
 
 battles under orders to save the capital, Maryland and Penn- 
 sylvania, lie not only accomplished his work, but, his work 
 done, the campaign was ended and the resulting position of 
 the army was accidental. It was not on a base for future 
 movements, but should have been withdrawn to Washington, 
 and the new campaign commenced from that point, or some 
 other to be judiciousl}' selected. We shall speak of this far- 
 ther. Enough now to remark that the bloody field of Antietam, 
 with an exhausted army, and no supplies, was the last place 
 under the sun from which to commence an advance on Rich- 
 mond, such as has since been going on under the orders of 
 General Halleck and the President. 
 
 We now come to Harper's Ferry. General Halleck says : 
 
 To withdraw him (Miles) entirely from that position, with 
 the great body of Lee's forces between him and our army, 
 would not only expose the garrison to capture, but all the 
 artillery and stores collected at that place must either be de- 
 stroyed or left to the enemy. The only feasible plan was for 
 him to hold his position until General McClellan could relieve 
 him, or open a communication so that he could evacuate it in 
 safety. These views were communicated both to General 
 McClellan and Colonel Miles. 
 
 If General McClellan was ordered to pursue Lee into Mary- 
 land, it is remarkable that Harper's Ferry with its large garri- 
 son of over 12,000 men was not at once placed under his 
 orders. General Halleck does not say that it was, and we are 
 of course left to conclude that it was not. But that that garri- 
 son could not go, with all its supplies and stores, excepting 
 only its heavy guns, to Hagerstown, is incredible — especially 
 incredible when we know that nearly two weeks later the 
 entire cavalry did go from Harper's Ferry to Hagerstown with- 
 out meeting an enemy on the way ! There is no room to doubt 
 that a gross error was made in not ordering this evacuation. 
 Lee's army of more than a 100,000 strong was pouring toward 
 it to surround it, occupying the south, west, north and north- 
 east, and Washington itself M'as in despair. Wisdom dictated 
 that the Harper's Ferry garrison should be made useful to pro- 
 tect Pennsylvania, and it ought to have been at once sent to 
 Hagerstown, where it would have been safe and useful, or with- 
 
15 
 
 urawn to McClellan's army, whom it would have reinforced by 
 12,000 men, and probably enabled him to win the field at An- 
 tietam with far less loss, and much more complete results. 
 
 General Halleck's defence implies that some one advised this 
 course. Who was it? McClellan again overruled for differ- 
 ing from Ilalleck ? 
 
 But General McClellan was still defending Washington ; and 
 his army, the worn out veterans of the terrible campaigns in 
 the peninsula and under Pope, were pressing towards Frederick 
 and South Mountain. From the 5th to the 14th, it does not 
 appear that General Halleck did anything for Harper's Ferry 
 except to order Miles to hold it till relief came. But how did 
 it come ? Says General Halleck : 
 
 The left of General McClellan's army pursued a part of the 
 enemy's forces to the South Mountains, where, on the Idtb, he 
 made"^ a stand. A severe battle ensued, the enemy being de- 
 feated and driven from his position with heavy loss. Lee s 
 army then fell back behind Antietam Creek. 
 
 Here is a singular suppression of truth — a gross omission, 
 and wrong to the whole army. Where were the right wing 
 and centre, General Halleck, whom you omit to name ? Is 
 this a slip of the pen, or was it designed to leave the President 
 with tlie idea that there was no movement of General McClel- 
 lan directed toward the relief of Harper's Ferry. The left did 
 pursue a part of the enemy to South Mountain, and the nght 
 and centre pursued other parts, and the loJiole army carried 
 Soutli Mountain in a glorious battle. The left were sent by 
 McClellan to Crampton's Pass, the centre and right to Turner's 
 Pass. Crampton's Pass was the way to relieve Harper's Ft^rry, 
 and Franklin carried the Pass magnificently, while Barnside 
 fought the passage of Turner's Gap on the right. Hooker led 
 up the old road at the right of the National Road, and Reno 
 fell in the gallant contest on the left. The battle of South 
 Mountain was won by Burnside at Turner's Gap, with the right 
 of the army, and Franklin won Crampton's Gap with the left. 
 This is a most remarkable omission in the report of the Gen- 
 eral-in-Chief, and its object must be left as a subject of conjec- 
 ture. 
 
 On the morning of the 15th, owing to the admirable plans 
 
16 
 
 of General McClellan and tlie brilliant success of the previous 
 day, Franklin, with his corps, was within six miles of Harper's 
 Ferry, where his guns were heard, as Genei'al Ilalleck states, 
 and the relief of that place was to be considered an accom- 
 plished fact, but it was on that instant mysteriously surrendered. 
 Thus in nine days from the day when, Washington being 
 garrisoned and calmed^ McClellan ordered troops into Mary- 
 land, he had in fact not only redeemed the awful error which 
 sent Pope out on the Bapidan and almost sacrificed the capital, 
 but he bad, on his own responsibility, also done all that human 
 foresight and skill could do to save the garrison of Harper's 
 Ferry, who seem to have been as recklessly exposed as had 
 been Pope and his brave army. 
 
 Then came Antietam. Its story has yet to be written. The 
 immense force of the enemy, flushed with the victories in Vir- 
 gin ia, had indeed fallen back before the returning presence of 
 McClellan, but they largely outnumbered him still, and chose 
 the most aduiirable ground, perhaps in all America, for a final 
 stand in Maryland. Height behind height, each crowning the 
 other, with the Antietam in front, gave them every advantage. 
 But McClellan was not now delayed by any orders,or withd rawals 
 or divisions of his forces. He was defending the capital, and to 
 do that he must drive the enemy from Maryland. Hooker 
 fought bravely on the right. Mansfield fell, bravely support- 
 ing him. Sumner, v.-ith Sedgwick, Pichardson, and French, 
 held the field gallantly till Franklin and Smith arrived to sus- 
 tain them. On the left Burnside contested that terrible passage 
 of the bridge, and gallantly carried it. Porter held the centre, 
 waiting a decisive movement on the left. Had the bridge and 
 heights beyond been carried earlier in the day, the centre (which 
 is called the reserve, but was in fact the centre) would have 
 crossed and the battle would have been won. That the bridge 
 was not carried earlier was no foult of Burnside or his brave 
 men. The force against him was tremendous. Its position 
 was grand. The rugged side of the ravine, covered with rifle- 
 pits and thundering with guns, swept down his gallant forces 
 all that fearful afternoon. Never in America was such a battle 
 fought — scarcely ever in modern times one so fierce and terri- 
 ble. Night indeed fell on a field won, but only just won ; and 
 
17 
 
 in the morning the shattered regiments, the unanswered roll- 
 call, told a fearful story. Those who ask, with General Ilal- 
 leck, why the battle was not resumed, should ask it of officers 
 and men who were present at that morning's mustering. We 
 have heard that the men lay in heaps in the woods, packed 
 closely man to man, sleeping off the terrible fatigue of that 
 awful battle. Why was not the battle fought? The men 
 were not there to fight it ! Hooker's corps, which four days 
 after the battle, when its stragglers and worn out men were 
 regathered, numbered 13,000, could not count, on the morning 
 after Antietam, 3,500 men I and so with the whole army of 
 which this is a specimen corps. We state this on the authority 
 of those who were on the spot, and whose testimony cannot 
 be disputed. These and similar facts, known at the time, could 
 not be published because of the public interests. But that 
 reason has ceased to operate, and truth requires the statement. 
 It was not till late that day, the 18th September, that fresh 
 troops arrived. The Pennsylvania men, as all know, did not 
 come at all. Orders were issued on the 18th to renew the 
 battle at daybreak on the 19th. In the night the enemy fell 
 back swiftly two miles, placing the Potomac between them and 
 their pursuers. 
 
 What shall be said of the historical value, or the trustworthy 
 character of General Halleck's report, when we look at the 
 next remarkable statement in it. The report of General Ilal- 
 leck contains numerous blunders besides those which we have 
 mentioned. In summing up the results of South Mountain 
 and Antietam, he says : 
 
 Our loss in the several battles of South Mountain and at 
 Antietam was 1,742 killed ; 8,066 wounded, and 913 missing, 
 making a total of 10,721. 
 
 Here is some unpardonable error of figures in an official 
 report. General McClellan's figures, given in the New York 
 papers of October 1st, in his dispatch to General Halleck from 
 Sharpsburgh, September 29th, were as follows : 
 
 At South Mountain, 443 killed ; 1,806 wounded ; 76 miss- 
 ing ; total, 2,325. At Antietam, 2,010 killed ; 9,416 wound- 
 ed ; 1,043 missing ; total, 12,469. Entire loss in both battles, 
 14,794, instead of 10,721, as General Halleck reports it. 
 
 2 
 
18 
 
 "We arc unable to account for General Ilallcck's detailed 
 error in killed, wounded, and missing, except on the theory 
 that he has added up only the casualties of a portion of the 
 corps and divisions, and omitted wholly a large part ; nearly 
 or quite one-third. Such mistakes in such a report render the 
 whole valueless for historical purposes, and for determining facts 
 of any kind. 
 
 Then follows the censure of General McClellan for not pur- 
 suing Lee after Antietam. 
 
 General Halleck is bold to tell us that Mississippi swamps 
 may justify an officer in not pursuing a retreating foe. He 
 alludes to Corinth. But he says notliing about crossing a river 
 in the face of an enemy. Burnside's recent position was pre- 
 cisely that of McClellan after Antietam, only Burnside had a 
 fresh and magnificent army, and McClellan had the exhausted 
 troops of a long month of hardships, battle, and suffering. 
 
 Besides all this, wdiat was to be gained by crossing ? Here 
 the campaign loas ended. Was he to cross to fight Lee? If 
 Lee allowed him to cross at all, it is plain enough that he 
 would not have remained to fight. AYas it to pursue Lee, and 
 with what facilities, and to what point? The recent events 
 answer. Lee has fallen back — the pursuit results simply in 
 throwing the whole army over to Fredericksburg, and opening 
 a new campaign, with the Potomac, at Acquia Creek, as its 
 base. How much better would it have been to regard the 
 campaign in Maryland as ended, establish the defences of the 
 upper Potomac, begin the new campaign at Acquia Creek, thus 
 draw Lee down from the Shenandoah valley, and start the new 
 " on to Eichmond " with some hope of success. 
 
 The public are familiar with the letter of General Halleck, 
 censuring the delay of General McClellan after Antietam. The 
 censure is repeated in this new report, to which the letter is 
 attached. Why General Halleck gave this letter to the press 
 some time ago we do not pretend to know. His course is sin- 
 gular and not soldierly. But the country is no longer deceived 
 by the insinuations it contains. The army was in no condition 
 to move. General Halleck says : 
 
 General Meigs reported, on the lith, that the average issue 
 of horses to General McGlellaris army in the field and in front 
 
19 
 
 of Waslimqton for the previous six weeks bad been 1,490 per 
 week or 8,754 in all. In addition, that large numbers of 
 mules had been shipped, and that the number of animals with 
 General McClellan's army on the Upper Potomac was over 
 31,000. He also reported that he was then sending to the 
 army all the horses he could procure. 
 
 Now what does this expression "General McClellan's army 
 in the field and in front of Washington " mean, if not that 
 McClellan was still acting under the order of September 2d, 
 and was in command of the fortifications and troops for the 
 defence of the capital? And while the people demand to know 
 what supplies were sent to the army that fought at Antietam, 
 General Halleck puts them off ingeniously with the report of 
 all the^horses and supplies furnished by the Quartermaster 
 General to all the forces in and around Washington and in 
 Maryland, including all the new levies under the draft and last 
 call who were then pouring into the capital ? It is ahsohUely 
 untrue that the army with McClellan in Maryland had been 
 furnished with 8,751 horses. They had not received 2,300 on 
 that 11th day of October, when "General Meigs reported" 
 8,754 as furnished. Does General Halleck imagine that such a 
 statement can remain unexplained? Why the army on the 
 Eappahannock rings to-day with indignant voices explaining 
 this very " report " of General Meigs, and every soldier knows 
 that the Maryland army did not receive either the horses, or the 
 shoes, or the shelter tents, or the pontoons, or the ammunition, 
 nor other absolute necessities to an advancing army. And yet, 
 having found the army victorious at Antietam, exhausted, rag- 
 ged, without tents, without horses, without shoes, the Wash- 
 ington authorities profess grief that General McClellan did not 
 ad^'vance and drive the enemy down into Virginia, as if the 
 rugged heights of Antietam were the base of supplies for a 
 great army to commence a new campaign and pursue it success- 
 fully into the heart of the enemy's country. 
 
 The telegraph wires groaned with demands for these sup- 
 plies. Not a soldier, not a newspaper correspondent at Har- 
 per's Ferry or Shepherdstown, but wrote that the army was in 
 absolute want. Admit that Meigs and all AVashington filled the 
 requisition, and added up the columns of requisitions and called 
 
20 
 
 them the total of supplies ordered^ still tliej did not come. 
 The}'- lay in New York, in Philadelphia, in Harrisburg, in Bal- 
 timore, along the railways ever3'where, but that did not help 
 the army to cross into A-^irginia. 
 
 And here we pause to notice the remarkable departure from 
 truth which General Ilalleck makes in his letter, stating that 
 McClellan was peremptorily ordered to advance on the 6th of 
 October. The order is now public, and instead of being per- 
 emptory it is seen to be discretional with General McClellan. 
 In the order are these words: 
 
 The President directs that you cross tlie Potomac and give 
 battle to the enemy or drive him South. Your array must 
 move now while the roads are good. If you cross the river 
 between the enemy and Washington and cover the latter by 
 your line of operations, 3^ou can be reinforced by thirty thou- 
 sand men ; if you move up the valley of the Shenandoah not 
 more than twelve or fifteen thousand can be sent to you. The 
 Pi'esident advises the interior line between Washington and 
 the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that 
 your army onove as soo7i as possible. You will immediately re- 
 port what line you adopt, and ivhen you intend to cross the river : 
 also, to what point the reinforcements are to be sent. 
 
 On this the National Intelligencer forcibly remarks : 
 
 In directing General McClellan to move "«* soon as i^ossi- 
 ble,^^ the President necessarily remitted to that officer the re- 
 sponsibility of judging as to the time when and the circum- 
 stances under which a forward movement could possibly be 
 made. It obviously might be sooner or later, according to the 
 condition of his army, which, like that of General Burnside 
 at present, was waiting on the bank of a river (the enemy 
 being on the other side) for alleged needed supplies. 
 
 Is there need of any other evidence that General McClellan 
 is made the subject of misrepresentations, of absolute falsifica- 
 tion at the hands of General Halleck? 
 
 Why did not the army renew the fight on the morning of 
 the 18th, after Antietam? One fact alone is enough to answer 
 this : Benjamin^s battery ivas firing blank cartridges all the last 
 hour of the battle of the 17th, and actually repulsed one advance 
 of the enemy with the thunder of their harmless artiller}^ ! 
 
 Why did not the army advance until the last of October? 
 
21 
 
 Because the army was -without shoes, clothes, tents, and horses, 
 without which to move and advance into an'enemy's country 
 would have been the destruction^of the army. 
 
 We have devoted much space to this review of the Maryland 
 campaign, basing our remarks on the internal evidence afforded 
 by General Halleck's lawyerlike papers, and on facts outside 
 of them which cannot, and will not, be disputed. That the sub- 
 ject is worthy the space we give it, is abundantly shown by the 
 letter of General McClellan at the head of this article. Such a 
 man deserves something better of his government than these 
 carefully prepared " special motion affidavits " on which to ask 
 judgment against him, without hearing his defence. We meet 
 the affidavits with proof of their bad character, and the people 
 will wait patiently the day when General McClellan shall see 
 fit to speak. He will not undertake his own defence, even 
 then, for he seems wholly lost to selfish interest, while his 
 whole soul is in the cause of his country. 
 
 It appears from General Halleck's report that there was but 
 one alternative given to General McClellan at last. He was 
 ordered to advance either to Winchester or on the line he after- 
 wards took. No responsibility then attaches to McClellan for 
 this Campaign. Doubtless he believed, as every one now sees 
 was true, that that advance was a waste of time, men and treas- 
 ure. AVhen his army was in condition he at length went for- 
 ward with swift steps. Even then his rapidity and his rare 
 ability seemed on the point of bringing the enemy to a battle at 
 Culpepper, or near there, when the order relieving him came. 
 His answer to the first disgrace was the noble letter to Porter : 
 " This is the last request I have to inalce — that you will give to 
 General Pope the same assistance you have given to ??ie." His 
 answer to the second disgrace was in almost the same words : 
 " Stand hy Barnside as you Jiave stood hy meH'' 
 
 We look with intensest pain on the position of our govern- 
 ment and its executive men at Washington. It is hard for an 
 American to be ashamed of his magistrates and his soldiers, 
 but it is not for one moment to be disputed that the Ameri- 
 can people to-day are ashamed of the management of the 
 great army of the Union by civilians at Washington, aided by 
 General Halleck. We are diso-raced at home and dissrraced 
 
22 
 
 abroad ; and the attempt to throw off the responsibility of this 
 gross mismanagement, by accusing the innocent, the silent, the 
 patriotic and self-sacrificing, only increases the disgrace. Gen- 
 eral Hal leek should understand that there was hardly a house 
 in America after his report appeared in whicli there were not 
 people contrasting the rapidity of General McClellan's move- 
 ments in the East with the proverbial slowness of General Hal- 
 leck's movements in the West, inch by inch, day after day, yet 
 doubtless prudent and proper movements ; only they wondered 
 at the audacity of the criticism of the former b}'- the latter. 
 
 And this is certain — that the people are to-day in a state of 
 serious and solemn reflection on this stupendous f ict ; that we 
 are in tbe midst of the greatest of modern wars, and that the 
 annual period has arrived for reports of the 3^ear's results from 
 President and Departments; that the President finds no one to 
 commend in his message — no word of cheer for the army or 
 the country, nothing to give us for congratulation, no victory 
 to name, no success to recall, no patriots to eulogize, no brave 
 deeds to praise, no noble living men to bid us confide in. That 
 the Secretary of War is equally unable to give us any encour- 
 agement, or to speak a good word for our soldiers or their 
 cause ; that the General-in-Chief is also silent except to cen- 
 sure, and that the burden of his report is a labored defence of 
 himself against the consequences of disasters which followed 
 on his orders ; and that, in short, we are left to suppose that 
 our army is an army of cowards instead of soldiers, led by 
 some scores of charlatans instead of generals ! If this is not 
 so, then shame on the men at Washington who neglect at this 
 time to praise our soldiers, and hold them up to the admiration 
 of the world. 
 
 But political jealousies are triumphant. The day of small 
 men is our day. There is no wonder that the nation's heart 
 turns from such a picture as Washington city now presents, to 
 the solitary grandeur of the deposed soldier who never forgot 
 his brave comrades, never forgot the cause of the Union, and 
 will never be forgotten by his admiring fellow-citizens. 
 
 Let us draw the curtain over our national disgrace, and wait 
 the coming day for honorable soldiers and unselfish manage- 
 ment at Washington. 
 
23 
 
 Out of all this, men of America, let us learn a lesson, the 
 lesson taught by McClellan in that memorable letter to Porter. 
 Though the hour be one of darkness, doubt and disaster; 
 though the crisis of our national existence seems to be on us, with 
 leaders whose ability we doubt, whose past success and present 
 policy give us no encouragement ; though we are insulted, re- 
 buffed, even though we are charged with treason itself, still let 
 us stand by the government of the United States, the Consti- 
 tution and the nationality of the American people, — and if we 
 are not permitted to advise, to assist, to direct in the grand 
 work of saving the Union, let us abide calmly in the old, tried, 
 conservative fortifications which defend Union, Constitution, and 
 national life, ready to "render all protection in covering the re- 
 treat " of those who are now trying their plans, assured (as 
 firmly as McClellan was assured on the 1st of September with 
 his clear military prevision) that the day is close at hand when 
 such protection will be necessary. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 A^^-