LIBRARY OF CONGRESS , illlll 020 914 595 9 HoUinger Corp. (From the Philadelphia Kublic Ledger, August 20, 1919) Diplomatic Controversy over the Shantung Peninsula and The Harbor of Kiao Chau By WILLI.IM D. B* AINEY, \A.. D., I.. H. D. Forinei- Member l-'oroisii Aft'airs t'oiiiiiiittee of Cimgi-ess, Secre- tai.v Ja|>aiiese-Aiiierii'iiii (iioui) luierparliaiiieiiUiry Union Japan's ultiuiatuiu to Germany in 1!)]4 brought Kiao- chau into the foreground of publie attention, but before that for many years it had been an oli.jei-tivt- in lf into what is to a certain extent their sphere of influence. Moreover, if Germany is not deterred by protests on the part of the other powers, the occupation of Kiao-chau will form a very convenient excuse to ask the Reichstag to grant a further increase of the navy. "Russia especially can learn a lesson by the occupation of Kiao-ohau by Germau troops and it can well serve as an example. Russia stands greatly in need of a port free from ice in these regions. The Chinese Government will never of its own free will place a poi't at their disposal in gratitude for services rendered. If, therefore, Germany declines to evacu- ate Kiao-chau, Russia, on her side, wiU have evei\y right to occupy, in retaliation, some portion of Chinese territory." ■^Following the lease Germanj- began immediately to for- tify the harbor and make it her naval base in the Far Ea.st. The Reichstag granted 5.000,000 marks for that purpose and fol- lowed it shortly after with another grant of 3,500,000 marks. A German company. "Shantung Eisenbahn Gesellsehaft," with a capital of 50,000,000 marks, undertook the railroad construction in the Shantung peninsula. The leased area comprised about 117 square miles and a wider zone over which the Chinese might issue no ordinances without the consent of Germany. The port town of Tsing-tao wa.s soon connected by rail with Chinan-fu, a .iunctiou of Pekin. This seizure by Germany of Kiao-chau under a very tlimsy pretext, while as easily justifiable as the territorial aggressions of the other nations in China, was resented by Russia anti Japan and not liked by England. The opposition to Germany's act, it must be admitted, was not because it violated any code of ethics for which the other nations contended, but because they felt that the field for European activity in northern China had been preempted by them. The weight of this act in the world movement is, of course, impossible to determine, but it must be considered as influencing in considerable measure at least the attitude of Ru>ssia, Japan and England in the recent struggle. Japan vie\ved the movement of Germany with as nuicli disfavor as did Russia, for though Russia and Japan were eon- testing openly or secretly every step and inch of ground within the conflicting area of their self-determined zones of influence, they looked with more ill-will upon the advent of a third party than they did upon the claims of each othei'. This, so far as Japan was concerned, was none the less because Germauy, in company with Russia and France, had despoik'd lier of the fruits of victory in her war with China, by coiiiitelling llie surrender of Port Ai-thui', wliich Japan had by contiucst and ti'caty secured from China, Germany's aggressive manner being particularly objection- able. The "advice" whicli Japan (August, 1914) submitted to Germauy to give up Kiao-chau, by almost exact phraseologj', it is said, followed the "advice" which German^' gave Japan at an earlier date and which constrained the latter to cede back I'ort Arthur to Cliina. There is at least grim liumor in Japan's ultimatum. In tlie scramble for position following Germany's seizure of Kiao-chau, England (1898) obtained a lease of Wei Ilai Wei, situate on the Shantung peninsula near the entrance of the Gulf of Pechili. A secret agreement between Germany and China with respect to the Shantung province deprived England of any commercial advantages by this acquisition. "Wei Hai Wei was valueless. Germany having entrenched herself at Kao-ehau and Russia being thus blocked in her Far Eastern program, innnediately (1898) demanded and re- ceived from China the concession at Port Arthur, which Jai)an had been forced to surrender. With it Ru.ssia obtained the right to construct the JIanchiu'ia railroad to connect with the Trans-Siberian road at Harbin. Russia immediatel.v proceed- ed to make of Port Arthur what she had intended to make of Kiao-chau. The weight of Russia's forward movement was thus transferred from China proper to Japan. It, of neces- sity, placed a heavier pressure upon and no doubt endangered Japan's interests in Korea and the Liao-Tung peninsula of IManchuria. Japan viewed the encroachment of Russia with alarm, and this ultimatel.v brought on war. Tims the war be- tween Japan and Russia was influenced, if not precipitated, by Germany's act in seizing Kiao-chau. The victory of Japan w-as followed by the treaty of Portsmouth, under whicli Russia gave up her lease and possession of Port Artliur. Once more Russia's plan for an ice-free port was thwarted. The swing of Russia's pendulum was again toward China proper. 8. Strange to say, the Russo-Japanese war left no apparent feeling of ill-will between the nations engaged in it; it was never popular in Russia and Japan could afford the generosity of the victor. Out of it one who looks deeper than the surface discerned evidences of a very close affiliation pre- dic-ted upon a probable agreement with respect to their futuro conti'ol of and activities in North China. Manchuria and Mon- golia. The ultimatiun to Germany was directly inspired by Great Britain and grew out of the obligations of the Anglo- Japanese alliance. The primary purpose, of course, so far as England was concerned, was to cripple Germany in the Pa- cifie and safeguard her own shipping and inisular and conti- nental colonial possessions in that part of the world by de- priving Germany of the necessary naval base from which to operate. A .second con.sideration in which Russia. Japan and England would, of course, be united was to drive Germany from a position where she could in any wise interfere with their commercial and territorial activities in the Orient. The third, of course, mu.st be left to the future, and concerns Japan and Russia and now for the moment Japan alone. That which was formerly a mere inference has become certain by the revelation made of Russia's diplomatic secrets. Rus- sia and Japan were in thorough accord and had so separated their plans with respect to China, Manchuria and Mongolia that the.v no longer conflicted. Russia's advance would be through ilongolia and Japan's in ]\Ianchuria. The old Russia would not have given up her age-long purpose to obtain an open port on the Pacific. Did the de- mand upon Germany to surrender Kiao-chau to Japan fore- shadow that the goal of Russia's ambition, through the as- si.stance of Japan, would be attained? Would Japan have surrendered it to Russia in exchange for Russian support in Manchuria and perhaps Korea? Now that the Russian revo- lution has made Russia no longer an immediate factor in the Far Eastern problems, will Kiao-chau be of greater or of less value to Japan? The Russo-Japanese agreement of 1910 was of far-reaching importauce; of its supplementary clauses not made public Mr. Bland says: "Japan has guaranteed to Russia a free hand in Mongolia in compensation for her an- nexation of Korea. On the whole it betokens a complete un- derstanding and harmonious purpose with respect to China. On June 11, 1910, Sir Edward Grey, in the House of Com- mons, seemed to put the seal of English approval on the Russo-Japanese entente by his announcement "that Russia iuid Japan has special interests in Mongolia and Manchuria." In ]911 northern Slongolia attempted to throw off Chinese sovereignity. How far the Russian traders at Urga and Kiakta influenced the tribal chiefs to this act cannot detin- itely l)e told. Russia mediated and secui'ed a recognition of north Mongolian autonomy; China's hold upon Mongolia was consequently weakened, while that of Russia was corres- pondingly .strengthened. In March, 1912, the so-called "Bel- gian"" loan was hurriedly made to China. It provided imme- diately for one million pounds sterling, and optionally for nine millions more. The security demanded and received was the Pekin-Kalgan Railroad, a part of the Mongolia line to Lake Baikal. It was soon disclased to the other powers and at all times known to China that the "Belgian" loan was really a Rus.sian undertaking, political in its origin. Says ]\Ir. Bland: "The Pekin representative of the Ru.sso-Asiatic bank stated openly at the time that, although the Belgian bank had been put forward to sign the agreement, he had in fact negotiated it himself under instructions from the Russian min- ister of finance." Be that as it may, the raili-oad project, which for many years appeared on the maps as in the course of constrne- tion. in which Russia, prior to the German seizure of Kiao- chau. was much interested, but which during Russian occu- pancy of Port Arthur lay dormant, was at the outbreak of the war being revived. It is still on China's program and in- volves when completed a railroad via Kalgan to Urga in Mon- golia (124 miles of the railroad were finished and opened for traffic in ]!)09). The rails for 120 miles north of Kalgan have 10 since been laid, although the road has not been formally op- ened for traffic. In July, 1914, carloads of rails were being shipped through the Nankow pass and Kalgan for this exten- sion. It is, of course, not possible to speak in other than terms of conjecture, but siich a railroad from Lake Baikal to Pekin, opening up Mongolia, would, both in time and miles, be shorter than the existing routes to Vladivostok or Darien. It would strengthen materially Rns.sia"s position in ^Mongolia and aid her advance to the open sea. That this railroad activ- ity was influenced by Russia need hardly be doubted. Mr. Skrine (Russia) says: "Russia again took up the survey of the TraiLS-Siberian Railroad to connect with some point 120 miles east of Lake Baikal." Russia safeguarded her interest in the Peldn-Kalgan Railroad by an understanding with China, that it shall not be submitted to foreign control. There appeared to have been an intimate connection between Rus- sia 's railroad and territorial activity in Mongolia and Japan 's ultimatum to Germany with respect to the port of Kiao-chau. The value of Kiao-chan to Japan either for retention or dis- liosition will depend upon the future of R.ussia and her in- fluence as a world power, but at present, at least, Japan does not need Kiao-ehau as a pawn with which to secure her hold upon ^lanchuria, for Russia is for the time being eliminated. It is the hazard of an opinion, but I ^■enture it, that Japan will not seek to retain for any considerable time control over Kiao-ehau or of the Shantung peninsula. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS niiiiiiiiiiiiiliilliillliliililiil 020 914 595 9