I°3 C 75 i V 1 <. A -i. ^ > ^ ^ ,^ ,A V v ? •*-. » f M 6 t : ^ ^. v**-' . ; ^ ,0- V Ar \V O0 % r ^ V kv v-. <*V v* THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, CONTAINING PRACTICAL RULES ACQUIRING A KNOWLEDGE ENGLISH GRAMMAR, WITH REMARKS ON THE PRINCIPLES OP SYNTAX AND COMPOSITION. BY WILLIAM CRAMP, AUTHOR OF "JUNIUS DISCOVERED." &c. Though Grammar be usually amongst the first things taught, it is always one of the last understood."— Tooke. LONDON:: RELFE AND FLETCHER, 17, CORNHILL. 1838. A< Ct t; LONDON : j. unwin, st. peter's alley, CORNHILL. PREFACE. Knowledge is the birthright of man; but the means and opportunities of acquiring it are available only to a very limited extent by the subordinate classes of society. These privations might be lamented, if the happiness of those who toil depended on a participation of that mental and refined pleasure which scientific pursuits afford. The lowly, however, are often bappy in their ignorance, because, in their rude and uncultivated state, their desires are circumscribed, and they feel less acutely the miseries of want and dependence. But there are many whose avocations are less constant and less laborious — many who have raised themselves by industry to comparative ease and affluence, and on the correctness of whose opinions the stability and good order of civilized society chiefly depend. These have sufficient leisure to cultivate their minds ; and it is a duty they owe to themselves— to their dependents — and to their country — to claim their right to a share of that stock of knowledge which the industry of past ages has accumulated for the common benefit of posterity. ^ But there is a preliminary and indispensable acquire- ment to be secured, before the treasures of science and learning can be opened to their view. Written Lan- guage must be understood; and it is not only necessary to become acquainted with those mute signs by which a2 IV PREFACE. thought is arrested in its fleeting progress, but every reader should also obtain a competent knowledge of the fundamental principles which regulate and determine the propriety of artificial language. Hence Grammar is a subject of more importance than most persons are willing to admit; and though it has not the attractions which many other studies possess, still it would perhaps be difficult to name a science more extensive in its application, or more generally useful in directing the conduct of the understanding. Even those who appear to pay least attention to the arbitrary rules by which lan- guage is often controlled, are nevertheless compelled to observe the fundamental laws of speech; and though they may affect to despise a knowledge of the use of words, they too often betray their solicitude for grammatical accuracy j by their hesitation and confusion — for they feel, though they do not perhaps know, that Speech is the Index of the Mind. It concerns every one, therefore, who is called upon to judge and act for himself, to possess the means by which alleged improprieties of diction may be corrected. This art grammarians profess to teach ; but do the works of those writers always afford the means by which the learner may be enabled to decide for himself, on subjects which, perhaps, no individual has a right to determine for another? In answering this important question, we shall, hereafter, have occasion to claim the indulgence of the candid reader. The primary object of this treatise on language is to render the principles of grammar easy, and the rules of syntax practically useful, to those who have in early life neglected the theory of speech. There are many, we feel convinced, who would willingly devote some portion of their leisure to the study of grammar, if the knowledge to be derived from works on that subject proved commen- surate with the attention the science necessrilya demands; PREFACE. V but there are few grown persons who will not rather depend on their own judgment, than voluntarily submit to learn the lessons of grammarians. To blend the philosophy of language with the best instructions of the best teachers is perhaps the surest means of attracting the attention of the self-educated reader. Such students do not wish to be taught, they desire only to be informed; and it may be presumed that one who has experienced similar difficulties knows better the kind of information they require than more learned writers on the subject. Whether we have supplied such information must be left to the decision of that class of our readers. The liberty we have taken with the writings of the learned, will probably subject us to still severer criticism; but we ask no favour for the errors we have committed. The works of writers on language are the fittest for the selection of grammatical inaccuracies, for grammarians at least ought to attend to the rules they inculcate. It was not, however, from any invidious motive, but from a principle of justice, that we in general gave their blunders the preference to those of less reputable writers. But there is one class of readers whose disapprobation we may expect, and whose commendation would be no proof of the practical utility of this volume. — We mean those persons who learn the principles of a science, as many learn the words of an Italian song, merely that they may be able to repeat a given number of sounds, without caring to understand the meaning of the writer. Such readers are impatient to became learned at an easy rate, and esteem that instruction the best which is soonest com- mitted to memory. They are unwilling to bestow the thought and attention which an abstruse subject demands, and without which scientific practical knowledge can never be acquired. It matters not, therefore, what system of grammar such persons adopt; for as they are too indolent VI PREFACE. or too incapable, to think for themselves, they must after all be contented to imitate the phraseology of others. But if the hitherto superficial reasoner should be inclined to apply himself seriously to the study of this indispensable science, he may still ask, "Must we be constantly thinking of our grammar whenever we speak or write?" It may be answered, certainly not. This mistaken notion has perhaps made more bad speakers and bad writers than a total want of a knowledge of grammar. The subject, and what he intends to say concerning it, ought solely to occupy the attention of the speaker or writer during the time he is employed in forming his sentences. Those who write best are probably those who think least about the choice of words or the structure of sentences while they are com- posing. The mind will in general suggest the preferable words and phrases; and the writer, having previously acquired a competent knowledge of the principles of language, will be prevented from committing gross impro- prieties. The practice of grammar is chiefly useful in enabling any one to ^correct errors that have been com- mitted in speaking or in writing. Those, therefore, who understand the theory of language, have acquired the means of applying the rules by which grammatical accuracy is regulated. But it is not essential that those rules should be "learnt by heart;" the anomalies only require to be committed to memory. In the arrangement of the Etymological Chapters of this volume, the syntax and construction of each part of speech have been connected with the etymology of the word. Whatever was considered useful to the uninformed student, has also been included ; and an illustration or two containing words classed under each particular part of speech have been added, in order that those who wish to acquire the science may have the means at hand of ascer- taining the progress they make in the knowledge of words. These lessons (if they must be so called,) are progressive, PREFACE. Vll and may be repeated as the learner proceeds with the subsequent chapters. The selections are such as will not, it is hoped, displease even our better informed readers. As regards the philosophy of this volume, we cannot reasonably expect a uniformly favourable opinion. Some may think that the remarks contain too much of the theory of language, and that the author has too often indulged in controversial disquisitions; but before his readers form their decided opinion upon these points, they are requested to examine whether the philosophy of the language has not been made subservient to the practical utility of the rules of grammar, and whether the controverted questions do not merit the calm consideration of all who desire to be informed on this subject. It would have been easy for the writer to have given a greater appearance of originality to this treatise, by adopting as his own the valuable extracts which he has selected from the works of his predecessors, but he feels well assured that such remarks will have more weight in their original language. Whenever it has been possible to trace the author, the benefit of his assistance has been acknowledged. This could not be always attended to in selecting the rules of syntax. These have long been con- sidered the property of every writer on language, therefore whenever they have been clearly expressed, they have frequently been taken verbatim from grammarians. As the principal design of this work is to instruct the English scholar, it would justly be considered inconsistent to refer for proofs and examples to the learned languages, or to aim at a display of deep research. That the latter might have been accomplished by one with very little pre- tensions to learning our classical readers will admit, for the author has found some difficulty in avoiding any appearance of this parade of learning. His constant en- deavour has been to simplify and render intelligible an abstruse science, and if possible to shew that a knowledge Vlll PREFACE. of English Grammar is not necessarily dependent on a previous knowledge of the structure or the grammar of any other language. We here feel it necessary to offer some excuse to our scientific readers for controverting opinions that have been universally received, and that are by grammarians con- sidered indisputably established. It is the general opinion that " the province of the grammarian is not to dictate what usages ought to be, but simply to discover what they are." This apology for not investigating the propriety of estab- lished usages may serve the compiler of Greek and Latin grammars. The dead languages must be learned with all their imperfections, since the anomalies are now a legitimate portion of those languages. But the circumstances are very different with a living language like our own — a language that has been progressively improving since its infancy, in spite of the restrictions of the learned. Here the grammarian has a higher duty to perform. He is regarded as the arbiter of taste in deciding doubtful and discordant idioms — as the dictator of propriety, and as the promulgator of the established laws of language. It is true he cannot enforce obedience, but it is his duty to resist useless innovations; and such resistance, seconded by sound argument and philosophical research, will seldom fail to overcome the prejudice of custom, and, though slow in its operation, must ultimately prevail. The rules of grammar owe their origin to written language. It was not till mankind began to use signs for sounds that the necessity of a strict conformity between the signs and the ideas intended to be expressed by them became obvious. In oral language the tone or the gesture of the speaker often supplied the deficiences and inac- curacies of speech, but in written discourse it became essential to attend to the grammatical structure of sen- tences. Hence originated among our first writers the PREFACE. IX office of the critic and grammarian. Those idioms which from their purity and general use were best understood were taken as a standard of propriety, and considered as forming a legitimate portion of the national dialect, in contradistinction to the anomalies of the ignorant, and the dialects of the remote and less cultivated provinces, and thus the language of the learned at first superseded that of the uneducated and vulgar. The established phraseology of our best writers, therefore, must ever be regarded with respect, even by those who may be disposed to question their unlimited authority, for it cannot be denied that our authors are the guardians of our language, and are amenable to ordinary criticism only when by their example they give currency and permanent existence to gram- matical improprieties. The anomalies of speech may be tolerated, but they cannot be, or at least they ought not to be, recommended; for when the union of right and wrong is attempted every effort to explain the consistency of the contradiction adds only to the difficulty of comprehending the commentator. The elements of artificial speech are arbitrary, and so are the forms or idioms of a language. Every one is at liberty to use what particular signs he may think proper in recording his own thoughts, and to accept or reject any form of words which may be suggested by another. Even the Roman tyrant admitted his inability to force a new word upon the people, though in other respects he was master of their wills, and their lives and liberties were at his disposal. But there is a more powerful inducement than the mandate of a sovereign, which will always ensure a cheerful submission to improvements in speech, and which among the rudest people at first gave currency to the elements of their language — it is the common interest of those who have occasion constantly to com- municate their wants and their opinions, to establish by tacit consent a uniform manner of expression, and to X PREFACE. avoid as far as possible the use of ambiguous words or phrases. Custom or use is said to give law to language, and has long been considered by the learned as the only stand- ard of propriety. He, therefore, who opposes the errors of popular usage, or questions the correctness of fashionable phraseology, will perhaps be treated little better than as an outlaw in the republic of letters — still as a disinterested inquirer, having no theory of his own to establish, and willing to admit the theories of others as far as they are comprehensible, the author may claim indulgence if he question the wisdom and justness of a decree which the law-makers themselves do not seem to understand. What (we have often asked) is " Reputable Usage?" Not, says an eminent critic, the usage of the multitude, nor the usage of the learned, much less the usage of the court, but a sort of compound ratio of all three. And this " compound ratio" as yet undefined, is nevertheless to be taken as the standard of propriety. Another writer declares that " Language is a species of fashion, and that every anomaly stands upon the same basis — custom having prescribed for it a particular rule." In addition to these authorities we are compelled to admit that writers on language invariably coincide in their opinions on this point; and grammarians, in particular, strongly inculcate implicit obedience to usage, unless in cases which custom has left dubious. It is not the desire to be thought capable of contro- verting the opinions of great men, deservedly esteemed for their talents and learning, nor any vainer motive, which induces the writer of this volume to oppose the universal assent of grammarians to a long established maxim. It is the firm conviction that the dictum is unphilosophical and dangerous — that it is the chief cause of the many difficulties which the study of language presents, and affords an un- PREFACE. XI answerable excuse for the little attention that is often paid to the more valuable instructions of grammarians. For who will spend much time in acquiring the rudiments of a science, the principles and rules of which are ever varying, since the knowledge of what is right must depend upon the capricious decisions of those who pretend to under- stand the precise limits of " Reputable Usage.'' But it may be asked, what then is the legitimate standard of propriety in language? Or rather, what is grammar? We shall answer without hesitation, because we can appeal to the experience of every intelligent writer, and to the practice of every grammarian, whenever he has been able to see clearly, and to correct with certainty, any impro- priety of long established usage. Grammar is the strict agreement between the signs and the ideas which such signs are intended to express. It was this concordance that first gave law to language, and currency to original forms of speech ; and it is to maintain this conformity between words and ideas that the rules of grammar are so useful. It is to the mind, and not to the vox populi, which the grammarian appeals when he is able to prove any gram- matical inaccuracy; it is only when a difficulty occurs, that custom is allowed to have the supremacy. The authority of reputable usage is perhaps less re- stricted in determining the propriety of single terms, than it is in regulating the laws of construction. An increase of knowledge necessarily demands an increase of means for the communication of that knowledge. In the progress of civilization new words are constantly required to express new ideas; and when ingenuity fails to invent suitable expressions a modification of some established term frequently supplies the deficiency; but even in establishing the arbitrary elements of language, the funda- mental principle of grammar is attended to by the learned, the fitness of the new term is ascertained by referring to Xll PREFACE. its etymon or derivation, and its propriety is estimated by the conformity which exists, or is supposed to exist, between the sign and the object it is intended to represent. If there be no real nor any imaginary resemblance dis- cernable, nor any circumstance to fix the meaning of the expression, it is generally left to the use of those who are contented to adopt the vague phraseology of the illiterate. Sometimes, however, from frequent application and general use, an indefinite word acquires at length a precise signification, and, when sanctioned by authority, is, after a time, incorporated in the language. So far does reputable usage ennoble that which was at one time justly condemned as belonging to the jargon of the vulgar. The authority which gives currency to single terms is also sufficient to sanction any improvement in the idioms of a language, but the laws of construction must ever be subservient to the principles of Universal Grammar. Nothing therefore, in our humble opinion, can justify an illogical departure from established grammatical usage. Why grammarians should wish to substitute custom for the unerring laws of the human mind, in determining the pro- priety of contradictory idioms, will perhaps be sufficiently shown in the subsequent pages of this work. It would not become the author to speak in extenuation of the defects of this volume, yet it will be readily admitted, by those best acquainted with works of this kind, that considerable difficulty must be experienced by him who endeavours to condense into one volume the Theory and Practice of an art so extensive in its details as that of Grammar. This difficulty suggested the plan of combining a technical Dictionary with the Index ; and it is hoped that the form in which the notes are there given will be more acceptable to the reader than that usually adopted. Among those who have assisted to render this volume deserving the notice of the public, the author may be allowed to distinguish James Henry Hurdis, Esq., PREFACE. Xll of Newtek , a gentleman ever willing to devote his highly cultivated talents, either to the service of the public, or to promote the welfare of a private individual. The engravings are intended to illustrate parts of the sub- ject that appeared to require attraction, but if they fail to instruct, they cannot fail (as specimens of art,) to be admired, and will give a value to this volume which its intrinsic merit may not perhaps entitle it to receive. SUBSCRIBERS. Abergavenny, the Earl of, Eridge Castle Amherst, Lord, Montreal Austin, Rev. J., Che vening Rectory Austin, Thomas, Esq., Reppington Austin, Mrs. H., Bellevue Auber, Rev, , Sevenoaks Anquetil, Mr., Sevenoaks Abbott, Mr., Lewes Adams, R. E. Esq., Sevenoaks Ashton, Mr. John, Sevenoaks Attree, Mr. John, Ringmer Burlington, the Earl of, Belgrave-sq« Buckley, Henry, Esq., Riverhill Botting, Mr. W., Blackbrook Botting, Mr. W., Westmeston-place Blaauw, W. H. Esq., Beechlands, Newick Blencowe, R. W. Esq., Chailey Bingham, Rev. R., Prebendary of Chichester. Bingham, Rev. Richard, Church House, Gosport Baker, Mr. H., Newick Bannister, Mrs., Fletching Baxter, Mr. John, Lewes Baxter, Mr. W. 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P., Chailey Vinall, Rev. E., Tonbridge Verral, Mr. B., Newick Verral, Mr. I., Lewes Wilson, Sir T. M., Bart., Searles Willoughby, Capt. Sir N., Chapel-st. Wilmott, E. Esq., Southover Whiteman, R. H. Esq., Ditchling Wilds, H. Esq., Brighton Whiteman, Mr. R., Lewes Walls, Mr. J., Brighton Weston, Mrs., Chailey Wood, Mr. C, Woodlands Wing, Mr. E., Chailey Weston, Mr. I., Newick Wilgroes, Rev. I. T., Riverhead Wagg, Mr. W., Chailey Willard, C. Esq., Sevenoaks THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. INTRODUCTION. " Language is an art, whose influence extends over all the others, and in which, finally, all science whatever must centre." — Horne Tooke. When we consider how inseparably Language is con- nected with man's happiness, and how much the successful development and improvement of his intellectual faculties depend on its resources, we may, without impropriety, inquire why the study of so important a science as grammar should be so generally neglected. Few acquire a competent knowledge of its rules, — a slight acquaintance being all that is usually considered essential by those who wish to speak correctly, and when this object has been attained, the study of language is too often abandoned in disgust. What, then, is the nature of this science, so repulsive to many, so imperfectly understood even by its professors? What are the advantages any one may expect to derive from the study of grammar? — and can the subject be rendered agreeable to the student by more efficient means than those hitherto adopted? These are questions to which we shall direct our attention; and should we fail in our purpose to render the subject more intelligible, our efforts may still be attended with advantage, for the hints of the unlearned some- times supply materials for the learned to work upon. Z PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. A modern writer asserts, "The success with which the principles of any art or science are investigated, is generally proportioned to the number of those whose labours are directed to its cultivation and improvement." This obser- vation may be very true, if it be limited to those who really investigate the principles of a science ; but if we include all who write upon any particular subject, the proportion of success may indeed be questioned. Grammar is one proof of the inverse proportion of labour to the success of its application. The writers on language are many; their dis- coveries few. The subject has been often handled, but seldom investigated, unless the repetition of rules, enforced by new authorities, can be called investigation. But what has authority to do with the rules of grammar? Usage may sanction inaccurate language, but the most reputable usage cannot alter the nature of the science. Its fundamental principles are unchangeable. Grammar should teach the correct use of words. Its rules should not be annulled by exceptions, nor should errors be palliated by quoting prece- dents from classical writers. This servile compliance with usage is the cause of the many difficulties which occur in acquiring a knowledge of grammar. Its principles are ren- dered obscure and uncertain, when the grammarian, instead of exposing erroneous phraseology, employs his pen in its defence; and until this method of treating the subject be exploded, there can be little hope of much permanent im- provement in our language. For when authority is per- mitted to supersede the principles of science, the most effectual barrier is fixed against the progress of improvement. Authority in language ought to extend no further than to the choice of words and phrases, in reference to their just application; and when this point has been established, the construction and modification of terms should conform to the principles of grammar. It is, however, confessed, that the structure of language, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. o ike the materials of which it is composed, is, in a great degree, arbitrary, and depends upon the order in which different nations are accustomed to think; as long, therefore, as the peculiar idioms and established phraseology of a par- ticular people are perspicuous, they cannot be deviated from with propriety. But the decisions of grammarians, deter- mined by the dictation of usage, should not be like the laws of the Medes and Persians, which altered not. The rules of grammar should be subject to revision, whenever they are found inconsistent with the principles of right thinking ; and the science should be made subservient to the mind, whence alone it takes its origin. A writer on grammar has, nevertheless, to contend against many difficulties. He is called upon to give proofs of his ability in the frequent exercise of the rules he inculcates. The prejudice of habit, the caprice of fashion, and the autho- rity of the best writers, conspire against his precepts. Axioms, founded on rational principles, are sometimes contemned, because they are not understood; while the idle and half- educated prefer imitation to originality, and adopt, without questioning, the errors of their instructors. "It is not," says Mr. Locke, "worth while to be con- cerned what he says or thinks, who says or thinks only as he is directed by another." Every attempt to exercise the judgment of such a learner is considered as a tax upon his exertion, and he resents the imposed condition as if it were an insult to his understanding. It is not for such that we have undertaken the task before us. Knowledge can never be acquired by rote ; — the reasoning faculties must be employed, if men desire to profit by and remember what they learn. The practice of grammarians has been to conceal those difficulties which they could not explain. They have dwelt, with tedious prolixity, upon the elementary principles of the science, while they have left the most useful branch of it b 2 4 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. comparatively unexplored. They content themselves with repeating, that language is the medium by which the mind communicates its thoughts; they confine themselves to general definitions, but they are cautious how they descend to critical investigation. " Sensible and learned men," says Mr. Brenan," conceal the truth, through a fear that too much knowledge may divert the pupil from a proper steadi- ness to the observance of rules." What is this but a tacit acknowledgment that the rules are founded in error, and will not bear the investigation which science, properly so called, should at all times be ready to undergo? Will such an apology satisfy the reader? Let him mark the consequences of this injudicious forbearance: "These scrupulous teachers," says the same spirited writer, "give directions that positively mislead, fill the mind with wrong notions, and throw a most prejudicial taint of doubt and error upon the future reason- ings of the learner." The science of grammar must be learned by studying lan- guage, in connection with the operations of the mind, for therein only are its principles to be found. Whatever know- ledge men acquire of the nature and use of words has been deduced from this source. It is well known that a good memory, and frequent opportunities of mixing in the best society, will teach any one to speak grammatically. It will do more. It will make some appear to reason correctly, who have no other pretensions to abilities than an aptitude to remember the sayings of others. They have perhaps heard or read certain phrases and arguments, and they adopt them, without observing their propriety, or examining their correctness. But when such persons are called upon to express their own thoughts, they feel the want of a know- ledge of the rules and principles of grammar. The facility with which men are able to receive and impart knowledge depends greatly upon the clear conceptions they have of the signs used for this purpose. The precise mean- PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 5 ing of words, and their proper order and distribution in a sentence, should be carefully attended to by the young student. The importance of these fundamental principles may be inferred from the remarks of an elegant writer on composition: — " All that regards the study of eloquence and composition merits the higher attention, upon this account, — that it is intimately connected with the improvement of our intel- lectual powers. For when we are employed, after a proper manner, in the study of composition, we are cultivating reason itself. True rhetoric and sound logic are very nearly allied. The study of arranging and expressing our thoughts with propriety, teaches to think as well as to speak accurately. By putting our sentiments into words we always conceive them more distinctly. Every one who has the slightest acquaintance with composition knows that when he ex- presses himself ill on any subject, when his arrangement is loose, and his sentences become feeble, the defects of his style can, almost on every occasion, be traced back to his indistinct conception of the subject ; so close is the connec- tion between thoughts and the words in which they are clothed." We shall conclude these preliminary remarks with a quo- tation from Mr. Murray, on the utility and importance of the study of grammar : — " As words are the signs of our ideas, and the medium by which we perceive the sentiments of others, and communi- cate our own, and as signs exhibit things which they are intended to represent, more or less accurately, according as their real or established conformity to those things is more or less exact, it is evident that in proportion to our know- ledge of the nature and properties of words, of their relation to each other, and their established connection with the ideas to which they are applied, will be the certainty and ease with which we transfuse our sentiments into the minds of one 6 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. another; and that without a competent knowledge of this kind, we shall frequently be in hazard of misunderstanding others, and of being misunderstood ourselves. It may, indeed, be justly asserted, that many of the differences in opinion among men, with the disputes, contentions, and alienations of heart, which have too often proceeded from such differences, have been occasioned by a want of proper skill in the connection and meaning of words, and by a tenacious misapplication of language/' CHAPTER I. ORTHOGRAPHY. " The conversation of men of rank and eminence regulates pronunciation : authors of reputation are our standard for all that concerns the con- struction and application of words." — Campbell. Grammar is usually divided into four parts — Ortho- graphy, Etymology, Syntax, and Prosody. Orthography and prosody treat of the nature and power of elementary sounds, and comprise rules for spelling and pronunciation. As these parts of grammar have been minutely investigated by others, and as every thing really useful in them may be soon learned, and easily understood, we shall confine ourselves to a few observations on modern refinement and improvement in orthography and pronun- ciation. Writers on language repeatedly complain that the cha- racters of the alphabet are both redundant and defective, yet they do not attempt to lay aside the redundant letters, nor supply a suitable number of characters for the elementary sounds. They acknowledge that the art of pronunciation might by these means be greatly facilitated and improved; but they have no authority to justify a deviation from long established usage. They are perhaps alarmed at the tem- porary inconvenience such changes might produce. The experiment is, notwithstanding, well worth the trial; and the man who, by his popularity and talent, could add a few new letters to the alphabet, would render an essential and lasting benefit to posterity. Precedents for such improve- ment might be quoted from the Greek and other languages. Volumes have, from time to time, been published respect- O PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. ing the precise powers of the elementary sounds. One specimen will perhaps content the reader: — Consonants. — "Here, then, are three things to be dis- tinguished. — 1st. The perfect mute, having no sound of any kind. 2ndly. The perfect consonant, having not only a pro- per but continued sound. And 3rdly. Between these extremes we find the letter b having a proper sound, but so limited, that in respect to the perfect consonant it may be termed a mute, and in relation to the perfect mute may properly be termed imperfect." Can we feel surprised that many should experience a dis- gust for grammar, when such are its introductory lessons? " It is the nature of a consonant to require the assistance of the organs of speech to give it utterance. " A vowel is a simple sound, formed by a continued effusion of the breath, and a certain conformation of the mouth, without any alteration of the position or any motion of the organs of speech, from the moment the vocal sound commences till it ends. " A consonant may be defined to be an interruption of the effusion of vocal sound, arising from the application of of the organs of speech to each other." Orthography, as the term implies, includes rules for spelling, though this part of grammar is chiefly occupied in nice distinctions between the nature and powers of letters. Spelling is the art of expressing words by their proper letters, and the best and only sure rule for dividing the syllables in spelling is to divide them as they are naturally divided, in a right pronunciation, without regard to the derivation of words, or the possible combination of conso- nants at the beginning of syllables. Every attempt to improve the English language must be ineffectual, while reason and common sense stoop to the dictates of fashion and caprice. The orthography and pro- nunciation of to-day, though perfectly consistent with ana- logy, may be denounced as vulgar and inaccurate to-morrow, if a popular character chance to deviate from established usage. The servile multitude are too apt to imitate the senseless eccentricities of some idol, and to be proud of a resemblance that might justly expose them to ridicule and PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. \) contempt. " Words," says an eloquent writer, " most fre- quently in use are most liable to be contracted, and they contract more rapidly in the mouth of the illiterate vulgar, and mincing courtiers and insects of fashion, than in the mouth of the learned professional man, and in the middle class of the people. Extremes, it is often said, meet; and when my ears were lately saluted with such pronunciations as Lunnun for London; gemmen (or something more like it than gentleman,) from the mouth of a royal duke, I could not help reflecting how very nearly high life and low life — the court and Wapping, or Petticoat-lane — are related." It is a certain indication of a weak and frivolous mind to seek distinction by imitating, or by introducing novel terms or phrases, or by altering, unnecessarily, the established pronunciation of a language. Words are the means by \ which men's thoughts are interchanged, and, like other f means, their beauty and perfection consist in their simplicity, and uniform application. Mr. Walker, in his " Critical Pronouncing Dic- tionary," has endeavoured to expose this fashionable ab- surdity ; and it is much to be regretted that the excellent remarks, interspersed throughout that work, are not better known. We quote one example of the triumph of common sense, as recorded by that writer. Authority. This word is sometimes pronounced as if written autority. This affected pronunciation is traced to a gentleman who was one of the greatest ornaments of the law, as well as one of the politest scholars of the age, and whose authority has been sufficient to sway the bench and the bar, though author, authentic, theatre, theory, &c, and a thousand similar words, where the th is heard, are constantly staring them in the face. The public ear is not, however, so far vitiated as to ac- knowledge this innovation ; for though it may with security, and even approbation, be pronounced in Westminster Hall, it would not be quite so safe for an actor to adopt it on the stage. I know it will be said that autoritas is better Latin ; that the purer Latin never had the h ; and that our word, which is derived from it, ought on that account to omit it. But it 10 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. may be observed that, according to the best Latin critics, the word ought to be written auctoritas, and that, according to this reasoning, we ought to write and pronounce auctority and auctor ; but this, I presume, is farther than these inno- vators would choose to go ; — the truth is, such singularities of pronunciation should be left to the lower class of critics, who, like coxcombs in dress, would be utterly unnoticed, if they were not distinguished by petty deviations from the rest of the world. We are persuaded that many of the existing improprieties of speech would be corrected if grammarians and writers on language did their duty by pointing out the inaccuracies, and were not quite so fond of quoting si volet usus.* May we not suspect they compromise their ignorance of the funda- mental principles of the science by granting a licence in favour of popular usage, and, more particularly, since they often acknowledge such usage to be at variance with perspi- cuity and correctness. What can we think of the propriety of a precept which forbids a man to do right as long as the majority of mankind persist in doing wrong ? yet this is the spirit in which most English grammars are compiled. The arbiters of polite pronunciation appear to delight in unmeaning deviations from correct and well established usage : those anomalies and defects which render the ac- quirement of the English language so difficult are held sacred, while the most unwarrantable violations in orthography and diction are tolerated because " fashion will have it so/' We are told that again and against should be pronounced agen and agenst ; haunt and taunt, hant and tant ; that docile should be pronounced dossel ; and many similar alterations are recommended in the works of modern orthoepists. It might be urged, in answer to these innovations, that the dipthongs ai and au are what grammarians call proper * Mr. Tooke is an exception : speaking of the author of this maxim, he remarks — " I do not think him of any authority whatever upon this occasion. He wrote divinely, and so Vestris danced ; but in this, our enquiry, we are not poets nor dancers, hut anatomists." " The polished attendants on a throne," says Mr. Walker, " are as apt to depart from simplicity in language as in dress and manners, and novelty, instead of custom, is too often the jus et norma loquendi of a court." PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 11 dipthongs, in, which both the vowel sounds should be heard, as in pain, gain, main, laudable. Whatever exceptions may exist should therefore be accounted as so many defects in the language, the orthography being at variance with the pronun- ciation : these improprieties might be obviated, either by new modelling the words, or by restoring the original sound to the letters. But our modern critics pursue a very different course. They take for a guide what they are pleased to call " reputable usage ;" and though, in many instances, they confess its insufficiency and danger, yet they persist in recommending it ; hence the orthography and pronunciation of the English language is becoming daily more fluctuating, incongruous and defective. This puerile fondness for error is often apparent in the absurd precision which many writers observe when they quote from the works of our earlier authors : they seem to feel a pride in giving the passage verbatim, though the intention of referring to it was to serve some more useful purpose than merely to gratify a silly curiosity, or to show how strangely our ancestors spelled and wrote. It may be asked of those who defend this practice, whether there is any thing wonderful in the change which a few centuries have produced in a science so fluctuating as language, and more particularly as regards that part of the science which depends so much on whim and fashion ? Those critics who, with a secret complacency, contrast their improved compositions with the rude specimens of their forefathers, will probably" in their turns be ridiculed by succeeding generations. But if they would have their writings descend uncorrupted to posterity, let them endeavour to fix the elementary sounds to appropriate characters ; for this is the first step towards establishing a permanent language. CHAPTER II ETYMOLOGY. " The essential parts of speech are the same in all languages. There must always be some words which denote the names of objects, or which mark the subject of discourse ; others which denote the qualities of those objects, and express what we affirm concerning them ; and other words which point out their connections and relations." — Blair. Before any one can apply the rules of syntax, or correct errors in composition, it is indispensably necessary that he should acquire, as far as possible, a knowledge of those differences which have induced grammarians to class words under the several denominations called parts of speech. Etymology explains the nature of the different sorts of words, and treats of their modifications and derivations. The parts of speech are variously reckoned ; but the following is the usual distribution : — the article, the noun, the adjective, the pronoun, the verb, the adverb, the preposition, the conjunction, and the interjection. When mankind converse, their discourse is always con- cerning the existence of properties, actions, states, or relations Of NOUNS. The article limits, or points out the noun. The noun denotes the subject, or some object connected with the subject. The adjective expresses a quality belonging to a noun. The pronoun is used instead of a noun. The verb indicates the existence, or the action or state of a noun. The adverb either qualifies an adjective or another adverb, or it more correctly defines the action or state attributed to the noun. The preposition connects, and shows what relation one noun bears to another. The conjunction joins two or more words or sentences together which refer to the same noun, or PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 13 it qualifies the clause or sentence which it connects. The > interjection is no part of artificial language, though it is often / used by poets and sentimentalists. The verb is usually denominated "the chief word" in a sentence ; but, as the noun denotes the subject of our thoughts, it may be considered of equal importance. The propriety of this remark will be more evident when we come to examine the nature of the verb, a part of speech which has hitherto been confounded with the predicate, and is seldom distinguished from it when they are united into one term. Before we enter upon the analysis of the several parts of speech, we shall hazard some general observations on the nature and properties of words, and, in doing this, it will be necessary to refer to a science which has hitherto been too little consulted by writers on grammar. The connection between ideas and the signs which repre- sent them is so inseparable, that the rudiments of Logic* appear essential in acquiring a correct knowledge of the nature and properties of words ; but while that science has been treated of by men of learning and abilities, the principles of language, and the rules of grammar, have too often been * We refer to those parts of logic which, treat of the connection between terms and ideas, and of the nature and formation of propositions, and not to the art of syllogizing ,- for we perfectly agree with Dr. Campbell, that " the rules are cumbersome to the memory, and unnecessary in practice. No one was ever made a reasoner who needed their aid. Ostentatious and artificial, they give that which is shallow the appearance of profundity." This writer has been considered singular in his opinion, but if we look into the writings of Mr. Locke, we shall find that he entertained nearly the same view of the subject. " Nobody is made any thing by hearing of rules, or laying them up in his memory ; practice must settle the habit of doing, without reflecting on the rule ; and you may as well hope to make a good painter or musician extempore, by a lecture and instruction in the arts of music and painting, as a coherent thinker or strict reasoner by a set of rules showing him wherein right reasoning consists." Nor does Dr. Watts, in his work on logic, appear to speak very highly of the advantages of those artificial means which teach men to reason by mode and figure. His testimony of the insufficiency of logic as an art may be con- sidered 'of more weight than any arguments which might be adduced in favour of Dr. Campbell's opinion. " The light of nature, a good judgment, and due consideration of things, tend more to true reasoning than all the trappings of moods and figures." — Watts' Logic, part iii., ch. 2, § 3. 14 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. left to the decision of men of ordinary endowments and capacities. Should these studies ever become united, there may then be some chance that the principles of both will be acquired with pleasure, and their practical advantages some- what better understood. It is a favourite maxim with the higher class of writers on grammar, that the noun and verb are the only essential parts of speech ; but they do not demonstrate in what manner a communication of ideas could be effected by these means. They should give a specimen of intelligible composition, con- sisting entirely of nouns and verbs, and not have recourse to those words which they profess to consider as only convenient, but not indispensable. If the verb be simply a word which affirms, and not the attribute which is affirmed of the noun, we do not hesitate to pronounce such a theory impracticable. But while grammarians mistake the predicate for the verb, because affirmation is frequently conjoined with the attribute, they may indeed deceive themselves and others in the belief that language might consist only of nouns and verbs. Per- mitting, however, the indulgence of this misconception, let us inquire in what manner they prove the subordinate utility of the other parts of speech. "The pronoun" says Dr. Crombie, "is clearly a substi- tute for the noun ; it cannot, therefore, be deemed essential. The adjective, expressing merely the property or quality in concreto without affirmation, may be dispensed with, the connection of a substance with a quality or property being expressible by the noun and verb. Thus, a good man is equivalent to a man with, or join, goodness. Adverbs, which have been termed attributes of the second order, are nothing but abbreviations, as here for in this place, bravely for brave- like ; these, therefore, cannot be considered essentials in language. In the same manner it might be shewn that all parts of speech, noun and verb excepted, are either substi- tutes or abbreviations, convenient indeed, but not indis- pensably requisite." We will not ask. whether the foregoing illustrations are proofs of the hypothesis, which the writer maintains, but we will proceed to examine the truth of that proposition which has hitherto misled some of our most reputable philologists. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 15 The pronoun appears the least essential part of speech \ but let any one, who has occasion to speak of himself, sub- stitute his proper name instead of the pronoun 7", and, in most cases, he would fail to make himself understood ; but the utility, if not the indispensable necessity, of personal pronouns is evident from the fact that the proper names of individuals who converse are not always known, and, if pro- nouns were abolished, the preliminary of fixing names must be settled before strangers could carry on a conversation. The indispensable use of adjectives and definitives can, however, be more clearly demonstrated. "If it were possible," says Mr. Locke, " that every par- ticular thing should have a distinct particular name, it would be useless, because it would not serve to the chief end of lan- guage. Men would in vain heap up names of particular things that would not serve them to communicate their thoughts. Men learn names, and use them in talk with others, only that they may be understood, which is then only done when by use, or consent, the sound I make by the organs of speech excites in another man's mind who hears it the idea I apply to it in mine. This cannot be done by names applied to particular things, whereof I alone having the ideas in my mind, the names of them could not be significant or intel- ligible to another who was not acquainted with all those very , particular things which had fallen under my notice." "Now from this necessity of general terms," observes Mr. Tooke, " follows immediately the necessity of the article* whose business it is to reduce their generality, and upon occasion, to enable us to employ general terms for particulars. The origin of the composition of ideas may be traced to that act of the mind by which it is enabled to attribute qualities or circumstances to nouns. Every simple propo- sition, whether true or false, is the result of comparison. Thus a man is called 'good or bad, in proportion as his conduct corresponds to the abstract notions of the speaker, in reference to the import of the terms goodness and badness ; * Notwithstanding this concession, Mr. Tooke adopts the principle that the noun and verb are the only necessary parts of speech. 16 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. he may possess the quality ascribed to him but he cannot be said to be that quality; for this, in every case where the terms were not synonymous, would imply a gross absurdity — as man is goodness, woman is gentleness. When we say virtue is happiness — vice is misery, — we speak figuratively, but not correctly, for happiness is the result of virtue, and misery the consequence of vice ; but if we affirm that virtue is amiable, and vice detestable, we speak correctly, for amiable and detestable are the names of attributes predicated as existing in the nouns, and these qualities not being made the subjects of affirmation, the mind does not recognise them as existing distinct from their substantives, but as inherent, and forming a part of the ideas represented by the words virtue and vice. Our knowledge of the nature of any object of thought can extend no farther than to the perception of the several attributes connected with such object, for we know and distinguish things only by their qualities. The composition of terms is the consequence of the composition of ideas, and thence the true source of abbreviation. The imperfection of language is, however, so great, that several terms are sometimes re- quired, in order to express a complex idea ; — as, " a man that has not music in his soul/' " a truly benevolent mind," " a virtuous woman." It is no argument against this subserviency of terms to ideas to say that single words which represent complex ideas may be resolved into more simple terms, each of which may represent a distinct idea, for the object denominated by the single term requires the whole of the simple terms to complete the sign by which that particular idea is to be represented: — thus, a holy man and a saint are equivalent names; "one who dies for religion " is a martyr ; and " a cruel and oppressive ruler " is a tyrant. Now Mr. Tooke affirms that the composition of ideas is merely a contrivance of language, and that the only compo- sition is in the terms. This opinion is so contrary to the experience of every one who has attentively considered the operations of the human mind, and the ideas with which it is impressed, that it would not deserve notice if it were not used by the author as an argument in favour of his Theory PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 17 of Language. It will be seen that Mr. Tooke considers ideas to be subservient to terms, whereas the converse of the pro- position is generally admitted, for " Language signifies the expression of our ideas by certain articulate sounds, which are used as the signs of those ideas." There are very few words which represent pure and un- compounded ideas, but this does not prove that the composi- tion of ideas is the result of abbreviation of terms ; for the names of complex ideas are as necessary in recording our thoughts as are the names of those simple ideas from which the complex are derived. Mr. Tooke affirms that " the only composition is in the terms, and that it is as improper to speak of a complex idea as it would be to call a constellation a complex star, and that they are not ideas, but merely terms which are general and abstract." In answer to the assertions of Mr. Tooke, we may remark that the words constellation, mob, city, &c, are the repre- sentatives of as distinct single objects of thought as the terms star and man, and it would be as absurd to call a mob a com- plex man, or a city a complex house, as it is to deny that constellation and city are the names of complex single ideas. For the word mob, or constellation, or city, represents the whole as a collection, without reference to the individuals which compose that collection. Hence the difference of agreement in nouns of multitude : when the complex idea is present in the mind of the speaker, the verb is singular, and agrees with the abstract noun which represents the idea, formed by viewing a collection of individuals as a whole or entire object. But it is by this kind of sophistry that Mr. Tooke has attempted to impose upon his readers. " All words/' says Mr. Tooke, " are the names of things ; for that is not a word which is not the name of a thing ; but a noun substantive is the name of a thing, and nothing more." If this reasoning be correct, then, the interjections are names of things, — for they are both sounds and signs ; yet few will allow that they represent objects of thought, even when they are artificially employed ; therefore, they (although signs significant of emotions) are not the names of things, nor do the words by which they are expressed denote distinct ideas. c 18 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Let us proceed to examine how Mr. Tooke makes the adjective " a noun and something more." "Good represents all the ideas signified by the term good- ness ; and all the difference between a substantive (as goodness) and its corresponding adjective (good) is, that by some small difference of termination, we are enabled, when we employ the sign of an idea, to communicate at the same time to the hearer that such sign is then meant to be added to another sign, in such a manner as that the two signs to- gether may answer the purpose of one complex term, and this contrivance is merely an abbreviation in the sorts of words, to supply the want of an abbreviation in terms. " Now this contrivance, which Mr. Tooke seems to think so lightly of, is just sufficient to signify that the noun adjec- tive means something less* as well as something more than it did when it stood only for the name of a thing, for it takes away the notion of the separate existence of the attribute, and by thus lessening its force of signification, renders it fit to be associated with a noun, and the noun and its attribute supply the want of a complex term ; and what but the com- position of ideas, and the impossibility of finding a distinct name for every individual object of perception, has produced this necessity for adjectives in language. The example given by Mr. Tooke, in proof that an adjec- tive and its noun are equally names of things, and convey distinct ideas to the mind, will perhaps convince the reader of the error of such an opinion. Ex. — " A holy man. Here is a difference of termination in one sign, holiness, to show us that it is to be joined to another sign, man, and that these two together are to serve the purpose of one complex term. In this last instance our language enables us to exchange them both for one complex term, which we cannot do with good man, and instead of a holy man to say a saint." We need scarcely here repeat, that whatever words are used to define a noun, these, with the noun, are equivalent to a complex term, and are to be taken as the sign of a complex idea. * " Quodlibet suhstantivum adjective positum df.gf.nkuat in adjeotivum." PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 19 Mr. Tooke proceeds: — " In some cases our language is so deficient as not to enable us to use either of these methods, when we want to express a certain collection of ideas to- gether, and we then have recourse sometimes to prepositions, and sometimes to another expedient. If we speak, we do it by joining the terms close in pronunciation; if we write, we do it by using a mark of junction, thus -, which mark is not a word, nor a letter, because it is not a sign of a sound, but is itself what a word should be, the immediate sign of an idea, with this difference, that it is conveyed to the eye only, not to the ear." Mr. Tooke here affirms that the hyphen, which is a sign only to the eye, is nevertheless the representative of an idea; now we all know that the hyphen is used merely to show that one word is to be joined to another, and that two or more terms so united form a complex term : but this sign of our intention or desire to have such terms united, is not the sign of an idea, and it is only necessary when we communi- cate our thoughts to others in writing. The predicating verb, or that word which simply affirms, is also a mere sign. It is neither the name of a thing, nor the representative of an idea; yet it is so essential to the communication of thought, that grammarians denominate it the "chief word" in every sentence. There can be no propo- sition without the sign of affirmation, but it does not follow that a distinct word is necessary when this sign is required. The juxta-position of the noun and the attribute, or a modi- fication of the latter, is often sufficient, and this union of the sign with a noun denotes activity, or state of being, and has given rise to that numerous class of words called verbs, so called because the force of affirmation is often included in the attribute, as he walks, for he is walking ; the horse trots, for the horse is trotting. Some grammarians," says Dr. Jones, " overlooking the force of juxta-position, and judging of the importance of the substantive verb from its frequent use in modern speech, have hence supposed it absolutely necessary to the existence of language, and that no proposition can be communicated without it. But if those critics had been conversant with, and drawn their inferences from, the more ancient lan- c 2 20 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. guages, they would not have advanced such a groundless assertion. In Hebrew the substantive verb is comparatively of rare occurrence, and its place is supplied by the colloca- tion of the terms to be connected, a principle in itself extremely simple, and suggested by the great law of the human mind. In those derived immediately from the Hebrew, it is used oftener, yet not so often as in modern tongues ; and I know not whether it be a fact, capable of proof, that the earlier Greek writers, whose situations enabled them to be conversant with the Egyptian or the Asiatic tongues, are less frequent in its use than the later Greeks. But, be this as it may, it appears to be certain that the usual collocation of the substantive verb, either in the begin- ning or end of a clause, and not in the middle, arose from a desire of keeping together words that are related as subject and predicate." From this we perceive that the word which denotes affir- mation is not so essential for the communication of thought as those terms expressing objects and attributes, and this is the case with all those words which are merely signs, or have no determinate meaning, being known only by their use. " No simple word," says Mr.Tooke, " can imply assertion. Till one single thing can be found to be a couple, one single word cannot make an ad-sersion, or an c^-firmation, for there is joining in that operation, and there can be no junction of one thing." Mr. Tooke appears to have fallen into the error of gram- marians, and has included the predicate or attribute with the sign that unites it with the subject; but surely a very slight knowledge of the structure of language, or the rules of logic, will inform us that the copula frequently implies nothing more than mere assertion ; nor can this sign mean a couple when it merely unites two terms, which the mind had previously associated in the composition of its ideas.* But the verb to be sometimes implies existence, and it is then the sign of that idea, and represents while it affirms that * This property of the verb to be has been noticed by grammarians. " It appears" says Mr. Lewis, " that this verb, when placed after or before a noun or pronoun, only places it in a situation or makes it capable of being joined to something else. " PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 21 attribute in the subject. " What is is," says Mr. Locke, " and it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be." In this example the copula implies existence, as well as affirmation, and may be supplied by that verb, viz. " What exists, exists, and it is impossible for the same thing to exist, and not to exist; but this exchange cannot take place when the predicating verb is used merely as a copula, and the notion of existence is not included. "By removing the sign," says Mr. Harris, "by which assertion is implied, the verb is destroyed." This proves that the essence of the verb consists in affirmation. The attribute is called a participle, when it is distinct from the verb, and when it includes the notions of time and activity. This can only be the case when the sign of affirmation is also expressed, as he is tired, they are travelling. When the attribute is joined to a noun it becomes an adjective, as tired horses, wearied travellers. The constant effort of the mind, while communicating its thoughts, is to express its ideas by signs, significant of the combinations of objects and their attributes as they exist in the mind, and to form complex terms for complex ideas; but in order to explain the different combinations, and the relation which one idea bears to another, or one collection of ideas to another collection, certain words are necessary, the most essential of which is the sign of affirmation ; next to this in importance, in the construction of sentences, are the pre- positions and conjunctions; but as grammarians have not attempted to show how these words may be dispensed with, we shall, for the present, decline the task of proving their indispensable utility. Adverbs follow the same rule as adjectives. They are added to other words to increase or diminish the signification, and thus supply the want of more appropriate complex terms. They denote, more accurately, the degrees of qualities, and the manner of action, and could not be dispensed with unless new words, or an increase of termination pointed out the addition made to or the modification of the original idea. Some authors imagine that because adverbs may be ex- pressed by a circumlocution, or be resolved into other parts 22 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, of speech, they are not therefore essential to language. But independently of the adverbial signification of the phrases, "in a high degree/' "in a bravelike manner," we find the noun and its attributes attended by a preposition, and this sufficiently demonstrates that the indeclinable parts of speech, or equivalent phrases, are essential to language. Mr. Tooke has laid great stress on the manner of signifi- cation, and intimates that we are to acquire our knowledge of the meaning and nature of words by attending to their manner of signification. But he should have explained what is meant by the manner of signification, and wherein it differs from the signification itself. The manner of signification, if it mean any thing, appears to amount to this, — a modification of an idea necessarily requires a modification in the term which represents that idea, and that the composition and modification of terms is the result of the composition and modification of ideas. For abbreviation in language, "for the sake of despatch," occurs only when some word or words are omitted, being (to use a grammarian's phrase) understood ; but this is a very different kind of abbreviation from that which arises from the com- plexity of ideas, where a complex idea includes many simple ideas, and is sometimes represented by a single word. Mr. Tooke was right in his observation, that all words were not immediately the signs of things or of ideas; but he seems to have erred greatly when he denied the necessity of the several parts of speech. Many words in common use are abbreviations, while some are signs of other words, used for the sake of despatch. Yet attributes require appropriate terms, significant of their limited force, and their peculiar manner of signification. Such words are comprehended under verbs, adjectives, and adverbs. Definitives answer the purpose of proper names, and pronouns are put for other words. Our perceptions steal upon us so early in life, and are so soon associated with words, that it is with difficulty we per- suade ourselves there is no necessary connection between ideas, and the signs which represent them. To give names to individual objects was probably the first step towards establishing a primitive language; but a mere catalogue of PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 23 names would not be sufficient to enable a man to communicate his thoughts; other signs are indispensably necessary; and those who tell us that " if we had a distinct name for every individual object of sensation or thought, language would then be composed purely of proper names," should show us how these names could be arranged, so as to render their several relations distinct and intelligible. Until this has been accomplished we may reasonably infer that the asser- tions of Mr. Tooke and others on this point are unfounded, and tend only to mislead those who wish to acquire a cor- rect knowledge of the principles and structure of language. We shall, therefore, adhere to the established classification of words, and proceed to notice, severally, the parts of speech, in the order which they have been given at the commence- ment of this chapter. CHAPTER III. THE ARTICLE. " Without the article, or some equivalent invention, men could not com- municate their thoughts at all." — Horne Tooke. " The use of the articles a and the in English is to convert general terms into particular ones. This idea of particularity, as a quality or property of a noun, ia one of the primary ideas suggested by these articles, and the other is that of its appertaining to some particular noun sub- stantive, without which it is not intelligible." — Darwin. A slight acquaintance with the principles of language will convince any one how vague the usual description of this part of speech is when confined to the terms a and the. " Articles," says Mr. Murray, " are words put before nouns, to point them out, and to show how far their signification extends." This definition applies to all words which restrict or point out a noun, and individuation cannot therefore be considered exclusively the characteristic distinction of articles. The specific properties of these words remain undefined. " Had we a distinct name for every individual object of sensation or thought, language would then be composed purely of proper names, and thus become too great a load for any memory to retain. Language, therefore, must be com- posed of general signs, that it may be remembered; and as all our sensations and perceptions are of single objects, it must also be capable of denoting individuals. Now, what- ever mode be adopted to render general terms significant of individual objects, or whatever auxiliaries be employed for this purpose, the general term, with its individuating word, must be regarded as a substitute for a proper name. Thus, man is a general term, to denote the whole of a species; if I say "the man," "this man," "that man," it is obvious that PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 25 the words the, this, and that, termed definitives, serve with the general term, as a substitute for the proper name of the individual."* From the preceding observations we learn that articles supply the place of proper names; but grammarians, over- looking the economy of words, have excluded many from this class, because the terms imply a more extensive mean- ing than the simple definitives a and the. The necessity of articles, or some equivalent invention, is generally admitted by Etymologists, though, at the same time, they deny the article to be a necessary part of speech. "The visible and individual substances of nature," says Mr. Harris, " are infinitely more numerous than for each to admit of a particular name. To supply this defect, when any individual occurs which either wants a proper name, or whose proper name is not known, we ascertain it as well as we can, by referring it to its species, or if its species be unknown, then at least to some genus. "f But this reference is not sufficient, for to whatever species or genus the object may be referred, it still wants an essential characteristic, by which it may be known from every other of its kind ; therefore when a general term is used to denote an individual, it is necessary first to attach some circumstance or quality to that particular object, by which it may be identified; this property or quality being affixed, the definite article will recal the circumstance, and will afterwards serve as a proper name to distinguish that particular individual from others of its kind. For the article causes a review in the mind, and refers to something previously known con- cerning the object represented by the general term. The use of the articles a and the has been thus explained and exemplified by Mr. Harris: — "A respects our primary perception, and denotes indivi- duals as unknown; the respects our secondary perception, and denotes individuals as known. To explain by an example — I see an object pass by which I never saw till now. What do I say? — There goes a man with a long beard. The man departs, and returns a week after; what do I say then? — * Dr. Crombie, — Etymology and Syntax of the English Language, p. 18. t Hermes, book ii. chap. 1. 26 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. There goes the man with the long beard. The article only is changed, the rest remains unaltered. Yet mark the force of this apparently minute change: — The individual once vague is now recognized as something known, and that merely by the efficacy of this latter article, which tacitly insinuates a kind of previous acquaintance, by referring the present perception to a like perception already past."* The indefinite articlef may be considered as a name appli- cable to each individual of a class or species, but attached to none. It applies to no particular object, comprehended under the general term. It cannot, therefore, identify the individual, since it refers to no peculiar property of the noun; for every tree may be called a tree, and every plant a plant, when the general notion of its genus or species is alone considered. But every tree is not understood when we say the tree, nor is every plant the plant, for the mind is directed by the article the to some particular individual of the species, which the speaker has previously denned, or is about to particularize by a subsequent definition, as— " The man that hath no music in himself, And is not moved with concord of sweet sound, Is fit for treasons. Here the words in italics define the noun, and justify the application of the definite article. The indefinite article is so called because it does not define the noun, nor does it refer the mind to any particular individual of the class, which the general term, in its unli- mited application, comprehends. In the example adduced by Mr. Harris, we find that the man and his beard had both been recognized, and therefore the definite article (the) is properly used before the two nouns; for there goes the man with a long beard, would imply that the man had been pre- viously known by some other circumstance, and that the beard was a new object, or primary perception. But let us * Hermes, book ii. chap. 1. t "It is the nature of both the articles to determine or limit the thing spoken of. A determines it to be one single thing of the kind, leaving it still uncertain which ; the determines which it is, or of many which they are." — Murray. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 27 illustrate the properties of both articles by another example, — "A critic is like a dog at a feast/' In this example the three nouns are spoken of indefinitely, and the general terms are only so far limited by the article that they may represent individuals, and not the classes to which those individuals severally belong; nor will the ad- dition of adjectives render their individuality determinate. Ex. 2.— A true critic is like a hungry dog, at a sumptuous feast. Here the general terms are limited to distinct classes by the adjectives, but the individuals are still undefined. The particular critic, dog, and feast, are unknown. They have received no particular names, nor have any circumstances been attached to them by which they may be distinguished from other individuals of the same classes, possessing the like qualities. Nor will the definite article identify the pre- cise individuals. Ex. 3. — The critic is like the dog at the feast. Here the definitions or peculiar characteristics of the nouns are still wanting, and the particular objects are there- fore not recognized. For it may be asked, — what critic? what dog? what feast? This leads us to conclude that the article the merely supplies the place of the definitive/either expressed or understood, and in this respect it bears a striking analogy to the personal and other pronouns. The article a separates a noun indefinitely from its class, and without any distinct reference to number, as a plant, a tree, a man. The expressions, one plant, one tree, one man, include the idea of quantity, and would therefore be felt to express more than the speaker intended. The numeral adjec- tive one, is however occasionally employed in the indefinite manner of the article, and without having any distinct reference to numbers, as " Whachum, according to Sir Roger L'Estrange, was one Thomas Jones, a foolish Welshman. According to another commentator, he is said to have been one Richard Green." This use of the numeral, however, cannot be recommended for its elegance. Dr, Crombie has, with his usual ability, demonstrated the difference between the numeral adjective one, and the articles a or an. " Though our words," says the learned writer, " are 28 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. general, all our perceptions are individual, having single existences for their objects. It is often necessary, however, to express two, three, or more of these individual existences, and hence arises the use of that species of words which have been called numerals, that is, words denoting number. To signify unity, or one of a class, our forefathers employed ae or ane, as ae man, ane ox. When unity, or the number one, as opposed to two or more, was to be expressed, the emphasis would naturally be laid on the word significant of unity ; and when unity was not so much the object as the species or kind, the term expressive of unity would naturally be unem- phatical; and hence ae, by celerity of pronunciation, would become a, and ane be shortened into an. The words a and an are now termed indefinite articles; it is clear, however, they are truly numerals, belonging to the same class with two, three, four, &c. , or, perhaps, more properly, these numerals may be considered as abbreviations, for the re- peated expression of the term one. By whatever name these terms a, an, may be designed, it seems evident that they were originally synonymous with the name of unity, or rather themselves names of unity, emphasis only distinguish- ing whether unity or the species were chiefly intended. Hence a or an cannot be joined with a plural noun." " Some grammarians, indeed, have asserted, that in every example where a or an occurs, the term one may be substi- tuted in its stead, without, in the least degree, injuring the sense. As far as the primary idea denoted by these words is concerned, this opinion is doubtless incontrovertible, for they each express unity; but with regard to the secondary or implied ideas which these terms convey, the difference is obvious. An example will illustrate this, — If I say, Will one man be able to carry this burden so far? I evidently oppose one to more, and the answer might be, No ; but two men will. Let us substitute the term a, and say, Will a man be able to carry this burden? Ts the idea nowise changed by this alteration? I apprehend it is, for the answer might naturally be, No, -but a horse will. I have here substituted a for one, the converse will equally show that the terms are by no means mutually convertible or strictly synonymous. If, instead of saying ' A horse, a horse, a kingdom for a PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 29 horse !' 1 should say, ' one horse, one horse, one kingdom for one horse;' the sentiment, I conceive, would not be strictly the same. In both expressions the species is named, and in both one of that species is demanded, but with this difference, that in the former the name of the species is the emphatic word, and it opposes that species to every other ; in the latter, unity of object seems the leading idea — ' one kingdom for one horse.' In this respect our language appears to me to have a decided superiority over those lan- guages where one word performs the office of what we term an article, and at the same time denotes the idea of unity. Donner moi un livre, means either give me one book, i.e. not two or more books, or give me a book, that is, a book, not something else."* A noun appellative, without an article to restrict its signi- fication, represents the whole class, without referring to the individuals comprehended under the general term, as " Lan- guage consists of intelligible signs." But when a proper name, or an equivalent adjective, is added to an appellative, the article is no longer required, as " English language consists chiefly of general terms." Usage, however, permits the article the to be placed before the adjective; but as there is but one English language, properly so called, the article is superfluous, unless the noun be thought to require an addi- tional term to render it more emphatic, or to distinguish the English language from its dialects. The adjective, English, serves as a definitive to language; but should the same lan- guage be again mentioned, the article the would sufficiently define it, as " English language is chiefly composed of general terms, and in this respect the language differs but little from other languages." The generally refers to some known object, or to some definitive, either expressed or understood ; by definitive, we mean that word, or combina- tion of words, by which a noun is separated and distinguished from every other of its species: for example, " It is by no means the same thing to assert that pleasure is a good, or the good; the first only makes it a common object of desire, upon a level with many others which daily raise our wishes ; * Etymology and Syntax, pp. 53, 54. 30 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. the last supposes it that supreme and sovereign good — the ultimate scope of all our actions and endeavours."* When no particular object, therefore, is referred to by the speaker, the indefinite article limits the signification of the general term to an individual. Individuation is the extent of its use, though its primary meaning may be that of unity. It separates, but does not particularise, the noun to which it is attached, while the both separates and limits the noun, and often supplies the place of a proper name. Both the articles may be applied to the same appellative in a compound sentence, but the indefinite can be used only once, and not after the noun has been associated with any circumstance, by which it may be known from others of its kind. Ex.- — A hare ran across a field, belonging to a farmer; but the hare had scarcely quitted the field before the farmer entered it, with a gun in his hand : the gun was loaded, and the hare would probably have been killed had it loitered in the field. Attempts have been made by some grammarians to class under the term definitive all words which are used to define nouns; — the words one, two, three, all, every, few, both, each, either, neither, whether, or, other, several, some, many, first, second, third, former, latter, this, that, are by them called definitives, because when these words are placed before nouns they serve to define or point them out; but if this arrangement were adopted, we see no reason why adjectives, and participles used as adjectives, should be excluded from the class of definitives; for these words are employed to describe nouns, and to limit the signification of general terms. An eminent writer has remarked, that "It would be advantageous if all words modifying nouns were classed under adjectives;" but the primary and more important use of adjectives appears to preclude the practicability of such an arrangement,, The peculiar force and advantages of the articles a and the have been pointed out by Dr. Hugh Blair, in his Lectures * Hermes, book i. chap. . 1 . PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 31 on Rhetoric, and the following extract from that work will convince the reader that, in this respect at least, our lan- guage excels the Latin: — " Articles contribute much to the clearness and precision of language. In order to illustrate this, remark what dif- ference there is in the meaning of the following expressions, in English, depending wholly on the different employment of the articles : — ' The son of a king, — the son of the king, — a son of the king's.' Each of these three phrases has an entirely different meaning, which I need not explain, because any one who understands the language conceives it clearly at first hearing, through the different application of the articles a and the. Whereas, in Latin, ' Filius regis,' is wholly unde- termined ; and to explain in which of these three senses it is to be understood (for it may bear any of them), a circumlo- cution of several words must be used. In the same manner, 'Are you a king?' ' are you the king?' are questions of quite separate import, which, however, are confounded together in the Latin phrase, 'Esne tu rex.' 'Thou art a man' is a very general and harmless position ; but ' thou art the man' is an assertion capable, we know, of striking terror and remorse into the heart.' "* SYNTAX OF ARTICLES. The indefinite article is used before nouns in the singular number only, as a woman, an angel, or before a noun of mul- titude, when the individuals represented by the term are collectively considered, as an army, a herd, a score, a thou- The definite article is used before nouns in the singular or in the plural number, as the army, the armies, the man, the men. A noun appellative, without an article to limit its signifi- cation, applies to the species only, and not to any individual or individuals, otherwise than as belonging to such species, as " Men are more courageous than women." * Blair — Structure of Language, Lect. viii. 32 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. "The natural associators with articles," says Mr. Harris, '■ are all those common appellatives which denote genera or species of beings. It is these which, by assuming a different article, serve either to explain an individual upon its first being perceived, or else to indicate, upon its return, a recognition, or repeated knowledge. Those are the men, means, those are individuals of which we possess some previous knowledge. Those are men, — the article apart means no more than they are so many vague and uncertain individuals; just as the phrase, a man, in the singular, implies one of the same number." Remarks on the use of the Indefinite Article. Many writers repeat the indefinite article when words joined by a conjunction require a different form of the article. Instead of saying, " Mary is an amiable and vir- tuous woman," it would be considered more correct to say, " Mary is an amiable and a virtuous woman." The last form of expression is also more emphatic. But when adjectives or nouns refer to the same individual, and the construction does not require a change in the form of the definitive, it is better to omit the article before the last noun or adjective, — as "A wise and prudent man," — The secretary and treasurer of the institution," — " The great moralist and philosopher." A rather unphilosophical method has been recommended by Dr. Irving, and other grammarians, in cases of impro- priety arising from ellipsis of the article : — " Sometimes," says that writer, " the ellipsis is improperly applied to nouns of different numbers, as — a beautiful field and trees. In this case, we should use another adjective, as — a beautiful field, and fine trees; or put the nouns in the same number, and say — beautiful fields, and fine trees." But it may be asked, What if the trees be not fine? or suppose the speaker has neither intention nor motive for describing them? or how can a field, with the least shadow of propriety, be made plural? This rule of grammar is as false in principle as it is in fact. A beautiful field with trees, obviates the difficulty. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 33 The indefinite article sometimes has the meaning of each or every, as ten shillings a bushel, i.e. each bushel; once a year, i.e. every year. The utility of this article as a definitive may be perceived in the following example: — " If miracles were again to be wrought in favour of humanity, the most beneficial would be a common faith and common language." It should be, a common language, i.e. a universal language. "The use of a" says Mr. Tooke, " after the word many, is a corruption for of, and has no connection whatever with the article a, i.e. one. Instead of this corrupt a, after many was formerly written of, without the corruption, as — 'Ye spend a great many of words in vain/ ' I have spoken a many of words,' and innumerable instances may be produced of the same manner of expression. As for the collective nature of the idea that is confined to the word many: — many is indeed a collective term, and may therefore be preceded by the article a; but message is not a collective term, therefore many a message is not right. It should be a many of messages." Notwithstanding the observations of Mr. Tooke, the phrase appears to be correct, and perhaps the only one that could express, in so few words, the meaning of many messages sent singly. The derivation of many, from miscere, to mix, to mingle, tends rather to obscure the meaning of this idiom, for the messages are neither mixed nor mingled, but sent one by one, and distinct from each other, and are thus scantled out by the writer, when he ingeniously places the indefinite article between the collective term many and the singular noun message; nor are the ideas of mixed, associated, or company, implied by many, but the collective quantity is alone referred to. Mr. Murray's observations on this idiom are to the pur- pose: — " The indefinite article is sometimes placed between the adjective many and a singular noun, as — ' Full many a gem, of purest ray serene, The deep unfathomed caves of ocean bear; Full many a flower is born to blush unseen, And waste its sweetness on the desert air.' 34 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. In these lines, "many a gem," and "many a flower," refer to many gems, and many flowers, separately, not collectively, considered. As the modification of the indefinite article is intended to assist pronunciation, it should occur in those cases where euphony requires it. A is now used before all words beginning with a conso- nant, and h aspirated, and likewise before words beginning with u, pronounced long, and the dipthongs eu, ew, sounded you; also before the word one, as a man, a heart, a union, a university, a European, a ewe, and such a one. It has been justly remarked, that sometimes a virtual consonant exists at the beginning of a word, without being written, as in union and once, where the ear catches the initial sound of y and w, as younion and wunce. Before such words it is customary to drop the final letter of the article, at least in pronunciation, and there can be no good reason for not writing — a union, a once beloved monarch. An is used before all vowels, except in the cases before mentioned, as — an essay, an island, an uproar. This primi- tive form of the article is also retained before words begin- ning with silent h, as — an hour, an honest man; and also before the h aspirated, when the accent is on the second syllable, as — an heroic action, an historical picture. Remarks on the use of the Definite Article. The definite article is sometimes used before an adjective, to denote an individual eminently distinguished for some particular quality, as— Aristides the just, John the divine, Charles the bad ; or to denote a class of individuals expressed by an adjective, used as a general term, as — the just; but if the adjective be not construed, as a general term, the noun understood is in the singular number, as — the just man. " The gods love the modest, but hate the arrogant." In this example the adjectives, modest and arrogant, with the article, are equivalent to " modest men," " arrogant men," and are thus construed in the original. The definite article is often used before a general term, to PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 35 distinguish an individual from others of the same name, as — John the baptist, John the evangelist, King Charles the martyr, Bruce the traveller. The epithets in these examples distinguish the individuals from others of the same name, and not from individuals of the same kind; as — the traveller distinguishes Bruce from other Bruces, not from other travellers, for in this case the proper name is sufficient. The definite article frequently indicates a general reference, and denotes the character of a species, rather than a parti- cular individual, as may be seen in the following examples: — " It is precisely the sort of work we should have expected from the author, in which the learning of the scholar and the fancy of the novelist blend to illustrate the genius of the poet." That is, the learning of a scholar and the fancy of a novelist blend to illustrate the genius of a poet. The is also used indefinitely, when an individual is taken to represent a species, as — "The poet, the moralist, and the divine, speak in the praise of virtue." That is, poets, moralists, and divines, speak in the praise of virtue. In the following example, also, the definite article has a more general reference than when it is applied to a known individual: — Read the grammar throughout often ; consult it on every difficulty. The particular grammar here alluded to is that used by the student, and the definite article might have been sup- plied by the more expressive definitive, your, — read your grammar often. Appellative nouns, restricted by this article, are occasionally used emphatically, to denote individuals, as — the city, means London; the speaker, a high officer in the British parlia- ment. Thus, among the Greeks, the poet meant Homer, and the stagerite meant Aristotle ; not that there were not many poets beside Homer, and many stagerites beside Aristotle, but none equally illustrious for their poetry and philosophy. The is used emphatically before adverbs in the compara- tive and superlative degree, as — the wiser the better; this is the best. Sometimes this article is used figuratively before d2 36 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE., proper names, to denote indefinitely a class of individuals, as — Goldsmith is a very pretty poet, but not to be com- pared to the Popes, the Drydens, and the Otways. It is occasionally put for a pronoun possessive, as — " Ambition, half convicted of her folly, Hangs down the head, and reddens at the tale." Blair. We shall conclude our observations on the articles, with a few examples of inaccurate construction, chiefly selected from Dr. Lowrh's Introduction to English Grammar: — Ex. — " And I persecuted this way unto the death." — Acts xxii. 4. The apostle does not mean any particular sort of death, but death in general; the definitive article, therefore, is im- properly used. It ought to be — unto death — without any article, agreeably to the original axpi $avarn. But when a particular death, or the death of an individual, is spoken of, an article is properly employed, as — " the death of a traitor;" " the death of the righteous." Ex. — " But Pythias were unjust, did he let Damon suffer a death that the tyrant prepared only for Pythias." Ex. — "When he, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he will guide you into all truth." — John xvi. 13. This translation signifies into all truth whatsoever, — into truth of all kinds; very different from the meaning of the Evangelist, and from the original, eig uxxaav tk]v aXrjdeiay, into all the truth; that is, into all evangelical truth. In the following passage, the distinction made by the article between a particular truth, and truth in general, is still more obvious. Ex. "Every one that is of the truth heareth my voice. Pilate saith unto him, What is truth."— John xviii. 38,39.* Pilate alludes to truth as opposed to falsehood, and not to the particular doctrine pre-eminently distinguished by the name of the truth. * Hag 6 &v k- THS AAH6EIA2, d/c«et /u« rfjg 0wvi/e. — Aiyu ahru) 6 UiXarog TV k^iv AAH0EIA. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 37 Ex. — Truly this was the son of God. — Matt, xxvii. 54, and Mark xv. 39. " This translation supposes that the Roman centurion had a proper and adequate notion of the character of Jesus, as the son of God, in a peculiar and incommunicable sense; whereas, it is probable, both from the circumstance of the history, and from the expression of the original, that he only meant to acknowledge him to be an extraordinary person, and more than mere man, according to his own notion of sons of gods in the Pagan theology. This is also more agreeable to St. Luke's account of the same confession of the centurion, — " Certainly this was Sacaio, — a righteous man," not 6 AtKaio, — the just one. The same may be observed of Nebuchadnezzar's words, (Dan. iii. 25.) — " And the form of the fourth is like the son of God;" it ought to be by the indefinite article, — like a son of God, b^ioia via) Qeu ; that is, like an angel, according to Nebuchadnezzar's own account of it, in the 28th verse, — " Blessed be God, who hath sent his angel, and delivered his servants." See also Luke xix. 9. " These remarks may serve to show the great importance of the proper use of the article ; the near affinity there is between the Greek article and the English definitive article; and the excellence of the English language in this respect, which, by means of its articles, does most precisely deter- mine the extent of signification of common nouns; whereas the Greek has only one article, and it has puzzled all the grammarians to reduce the use of that to any clear and certain rules." "The perpetual use of the article," says Dr. Darwin, " besides converting general terms into particular ones, con- tributes much to the force and beauty of our language, from another circumstance, — that abstracted ideas become so readily personified, simply by the omission of it, which per- haps renders the English language better adapted to poetry than any other, ancient or modern." The following proso- popseia from Shakespeare is thus beautiful — " She let concealment like a worm i' ' the' bud Feed on her damask cheek." And the following line, translated from Juvenal by Dr. 38 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Johnson, is much superior to the original, owing to the easy personification, of worth and poverty, and the consequent conciseness of it : — " Difficile emergunt, quorum virtutibus obstat Res angusta domi." — " Slow rises worth by poverty depressed." To these examples, given by Dr. Darwin, may be added the following, in which, also, by the omission of the article, adjectives are converted into nouns: — " The wise and active conquer difficulties, By daring to attempt them : sloth and folly Shiver and shrink at sight of toil and hazard, And make th' impossibility they fear." Illustration of the use of the Definite Article. As there are only two articles in the English language (an being considered a mere modification of a,) a rule is not requisite to distinguish these words from the other parts of speech : — THE MEDLEY OF THE GRAVE. " Here are the wise, the gen : rous, and the brave ; The just, the good, the worthless, the profane ; The downright clown, and perfectly well-bred ; The fool, the churl, the scoundrel, and the mean ; The supple statesman, and the patriot stern ; The wrecks of nations, and the spoils of time ; With all the lumber of six thousand years." Blair. Illustration of the Indefinite Article. BUTLER'S DESCRIPTION OF HUDIBRAS' TALENTS AS A LOGICIAN. " He was in Logic a great critic, Profoundly skilled in analytic ; He could distinguish and divide A hair 'twixt south and south west side ; On either which he would dispute, Confute, change hands, and still confute ; PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 39 He'd undertake to prove, by force Of argument, a man's no horse ; He'd prove a buzzard is no fowl, And that a lord may be an owl, A calf an alderman, a goose a justice, And rooks committee men and trustees ; He'd run in debt by disputation, And pay with ratiocination : — All this by syllogism true, In mood and figure he would do. Canto i. v. 65—80. These and other illustrations of the parts of speech are given for such readers as may be yet unacquainted with the classification of words. The foregoing illustrations will fur- nish examples to familiarize, not only the articles, but also nouns and adjectives, which, in the first quotation, are nearly the only kinds of words employed with the definitive. Before the practical part of grammar can be well under- stood, it is indispensably necessary to acquire a facility in distinguishing the different sorts of words. These extracts, therefore, may serve as progressive parsing lessons, for those who feel themselves deficient in this particular. In the first illustration, here and perfectly are adverbs; are, the verb, in the plural; and is a copulative conjunction; of and with are prepositions. These words being known, the nouns and adjectives will be readily distinguished, by those who have perused the preceding chapter. CHAPTER IV. THE NOUN. A noun is the simple or complex, — the particular or general, — sign or name of one or more ideas." — Horne Tooke. A noun, or substantive, represents some individual con- ception, and is either the name of an object which exists, or the sign of an idea, resulting from the operations of the human mind, as — man, life, immortality, virtue, army, par- liament. Every theme of men's thoughts, — whether it be an object capable of affecting the senses, a mere creation of the imagination, or a conception arising from abstract reason- ing, — belongs to this class of words, as—jire, dragon, goodness, temperance, reading, walking; to act, to work. A noun may- be also known by making sense of itself. " A noun may be considered to be at once the name of a thing, and the sign of the idea. But these may be separated. It may denote a thing without a correspondent idea, as when we repeat that which we do not understand; or it may denote an idea without a corresponding thing; such, for instance, are abstract terms, representing ideal not positive objects; such also are those words which express creatures of the imagination." From this it appears that nouns are the names of objects, whether such objects have a real or imaginary existence. They are likewise the arbitrary signs of ideas. Nouns represent either simple or complex ideas ; but in language they are. considered merely as the names of things, whether the ideas they stand for are simple, compound, complex, or collective. Nouns are either proper or common. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 41 A proper name is the sign by which an individual is dis- tinguished from the rest of the species to which it belongs, as London, Thames, England. A common name is applicable to every individual of the class which it denotes, and is the sign of that idea, as river, city, island, country. There is this difference between a proper name and an appellative, the former serves as a definitive, while the latter always denotes the subject of our thoughts. Thus, London is a large city, i.e. London City, where city is the theme and not the individuating word London. After a proper name has long been associated with a general term, the latter is commonly omitted, as London, Thames, England. The appellative is, however, sometimes added, as London city, Thames river. As these nouns are in apposition, they will not admit the sign of the possessive case. The city of London, the river of Thames, are inac- curate phrases, for the city is London, and not a city belonging to London. The inaccuracy is perceived when the relation is rendered more conspicuous, as London's city, Thames' river. But if we say the people of England, no impropriety is perceived, for people and England are distinct objects; and though the latter noun is used as a definitive, still it is not in apposition, but is equivalent to an adjective, and may be supplied by its derivative, — the English people. A name can no longer be strictly called proper when it represents more than one individual, at least it cannot serve the purpose for which proper names are given. When several persons are called by the same name, some circum- stance or epithet is necessary to distinguish one person of that name from others of the same name, as John Smith, the elder. Substantives become adjectives when they are joined to a noun, to qualify or define it, as — an oak tree, a gold watch, a silver spoon. Adjectives become nouns when used as names of classes of species, collectively considered, as — the English, the valiant, the wise, and the good. "The oak, the pine, and the ash, are names of whole classes of objects, each of which includes an immense num- 42 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. ber of undistinguished individuals. Here, then, it appears that though the formation of abstract or general conceptions is supposed to be a difficult operation of the mind, such conceptions must have entered into the very first formation of language. For if we except only the proper names of persons, such as Csesar, John, Peter, all the other sub- stantive nouns which we employ in discourse are the names, not of individual objects, but of very extensive genera or species of objects, as — man, lion, house, river, &c. We are not, however, to imagine that this invention of general or abstract terms requires any great exertion of metaphysical capacity, for by whatever steps the mind proceeds in it, it is certain that when men have once observed resemblances among objects, they are naturally inclined to call all those which resemble one another by one common name, and of course to class them under one species." — Blair. To nouns belong gender, number, and case. Gender. The simplicity of the rules for denoting the genders of nouns in English is an advantage few languages possess. " The English and the Chinese are the only languages," says Blair, " in which the distinction of gender is properly and philosophically applied in the use of words, and confined, as it ought to be, to mark the real distinctions of male and female." All nouns in English denoting males are masculine, those which represent females are feminine, and all inanimate sub- jects are neuter. Any departure from these rules is a breach of the true principles upon which language is founded, and tends only to cause misconception and error. For, surely, nothing can be more absurd than to apply, on ordinary occasions, the ideas of masculine and feminine to inanimate objects, when common sense declares such nouns are neuter. The ancients, who worshipped "stocks and stones," had some excuse for this practice. They believed that the sun was Phoebus, and that the moon was sister to that god, and therefore they might, with some propriety, call the one a he, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 43 and the other a she; but when we say of the sun, he is rising, or of the moon, she is waning, it not only causes a confusion in our ideas, but approaches very near to the style of the most illiterate, who commonly make hes and shes of things which a heathen would have blushed to rank among his gods. We cannot, therefore, agree with the grammarian who affirms that the practice of assigning anomalous genders to nouns, ''forms a singular and striking beauty in our language." In prose it generally mars the sense, the mind being diverted from the real subject while contemplating an imaginary creation. "It is evident that neither reason nor nature has any share in this matter, and that in assigning sex to inani- mate things, the determination is purely fanciful." A few examples will sufficiently demonstrate the absurdity of such deviations from reason and common sense. " It was reserved for Bacon to proclaim aloud to the ear of Science that she could only hope to be regenerated by first sacrificing herself on the altar of Truth, and that if ever she took an upward flight, she must pass the fiery ordeal, and rise like a Phoenix from her own ashes." This may be considered fine writing, but the sense of incorporating all the sciences into one, and forming a crea- ture who was to listen to the voice of Bacon, — to attend to his instructions, and ultimately to sacrifice herself at the altar of Truth, that she might rise from her ashes like a Phoenix, — is too unintelligible to pass for a poetical effort of the imagi- nation, and is altogether inconsistent with the sobriety of philosophical disquisition. The following examples are from Dr. Campbell's Philo- sophy of Rhetoric : — Ex. — "The sphere of demonstration is narrow, but her sway despotic ; her rival, with less power, has the empire of the world. Society would perish without her, and human nature become extinct." The sphere of demonstration is, in this sentence, converted into a female; and if the meaning of the writer has been obscured by the personification, he has perhaps a still greater claim to sublimity of expression. " For obscurity," says Dr. Blair, *' is not unfavourable to the sublime. Though it 44 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. render the object indistinct, the impression may be great; for it is one thing to make an idea clear, and another to make it affecting to the imagination, and the imagination may be strongly affected, and, in fact, often is so, by objects of which we have no clear conception." Ex. — " The natural division of man is into soul and body. Analogous to this are the sense and expression of discourse; in other words, the thought and the symbol by which it is communicated. It is by the sense that rhetoric holds of logic, and by the expression that she holds of grammar." Which of the sciences is here made feminine, or what the meaning of the last sentence, we do not pretend to unriddle. It is sufficient for our purpose to show that logic or rhetoric is personified, and that confusion and obscurity are the consequences. " I have attempted," says Campbell, " to explain what that use is which is the sole mistress of language, and to ascertain the precise import and extent of these her essentia] attributes, — reputable, national, and present; and to give the directions proper to be observed in searching for the laws of this empress" In one part of the foregoing sentence "use" is called a mistress, in another an empress. To show the facility which writers possess in personifying neuter nouns, we may quote another instance from a modern writer on language : — " Whatever may be -the future decision of usage — that great arbitress of all language (for at present she is divided,) Harris's arrangement seems more comformable to the strict meaning of the words, as well as to Priestley's own rule, than that which the latter recommends." We have remarked that the homage granted by gram- marians to usage — " the great arbitress of language," — is conferred only when some difficulty in composition compels the writer to decline its investigation; but when the error is palpable, and can be exposed, then usage — " the great arbi- tress," — is treated with very little ceremony. Dr. Blair, in his excellent lectures, observes, " that per- sonification is the boldest of all rhetorical figures; it is the style of strong passion only, and therefore never to be PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 45 attempted unless when the mind is considerably heated and agitated. A slight personification of some inanimate thing, acting as if it had life, can be relished by the mind, in the midst of a cool description, and when its ideas are going on in the ordinary train. But it must be in a state of violent emotion, and have departed considerably from its common tract of thought, before it can so far realize the personifica- tion of an insensible object, as to conceive it listening to what we say, or making any return to us." The poet may be allowed the licence of personifying what he thinks proper : his art teaches him to deal in fiction, and to please the imagination at the expense of reason. Orators, too, who wish to embellish their language, that they may awaken the passions, or conceal the truth, may be indulged the use of tropes and metaphors ; but let these " flights of fancy" be confined, as nearly as possible, within the limits of their proper spheres. Let not science and philosophy be incumbered by such vagaries, nor let the purity of the English language be infringed by allowing, in ordinary dis- course, so gross a violation of truth and consistency; for, be it remembered, that, " by following the order of nature in the distribution of gender, our language is rendered, in this respect, both simple and animated;" and it should also be borne in mind that the majority of mankind do not aspire to that subtle kind of reason which can discern, even in things without sex, a distant analogy to that great natural distinction. The genders of nouns are distinguished in the English language : First. By different words, as — boy, girl, brother, sister. Secondly. By difference of termination, as — lion, lioness, actor, actress. Thirdly. By prefixing a noun, pronoun, or adjective, to the appellative noun, as — a man servant, a maid servant, a he goat, a she goat, male descendants, female descendants. It has been justly observed, that nouns with variable terminations contribute to conciseness and perspicuity of expression. We have only a sufficient number of them to make us feel our want ; for when we say of a woman, she is 46 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. a philosopher, an astronomer, a builder, a weaver, we perceive an impropriety in the termination, which we cannot avoid ; but we can say, that she is a botanist, a student, a witness, a scholar, an orphan, a companion, because these terminations have not annexed to them the notion of sex. Dr. Crombie's remarks on this imperfection in the English language contain nearly every thing that it will be necessary to add concerning the genders of nouns. " It is to be observed, however, that the masculine term has a general meaning, expressing both male and female, and is always employed when the office, occupation, profession, &c, and not the sex, of the individual, is chiefly to be ex- pressed, and that the feminine term is used in those cases only when discrimination of sex is indispensably necessary. This may be illustrated by the following examples : if I say, ' the poets of this age are distinguished more by correctness of taste than sublimity of conception,' I clearly include in the term poet, both male and female writers of poetry : if I say she is the best poetess in this country, I assign her the superiority over those only of her own sex : if I say she is the best poet in this country, I pronounce her superior to all other writers of poetry, both male and female." " Spinning/' says Lord Karnes, in his Sketches, "is & female* occupation, and must have had a female inventor." If he had said a female inventress, the expression would have been pleonastic : if he said, "must have had an inventress," he would not have sufficiently contrasted the male and the female, he would have merely predicated the necessity of an inventress. He, therefore, properly adopts the term inventor, as appli- cable to each of the sexes, limiting it to the female by the appropriate term. When distinction of sex is necessary, for the sake of perspicuity, or where the sex, rather than the general idea, implied by the term, is the primary object, a modification of * An occupation can have no sex. The adjective is here improperly- used for the definitive, a female's occupation ; but an inventor may be male or female ; therefore a female inventor is correct. We have seen a similar error publicly exhibited near London, " A female school," instead of a school for females. School is a neuter noun, and no one can with pro- priety venture to call it a she, or attach to it the notion of sex. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 47 the noun must be employed to express the female, thus : " I hear that some authoresses are engaged in the work." If we perceive an impropriety in the terms, when we say of a woman, she is a philosopher, or a mathematician, it is, perhaps, because the notion of a particular gender was origi- nally associated with these appellations. Hence we may infer, that women were formerly otherwise employed than in studying the laws of nature or solving the problems of Euclid ; neither have we yet discovered an appropriate term for a female professor of political economy. Number. Appellative nouns being employed to denote genera or species, and these orders comprising each many individuals, hence arises that accident of a common noun, called number, by which we signify whether one or more individuals of any genus or species be intended. Appellative nouns have two numbers; the singular, which speaks of one as plant, the plural, which speaks of more than one, as plants. The general rule for the formation of the plural of appellative nouns is to add s to the singular, as — horse, horses. Compound words, used to denote quan- tities, are made plural by adding s to the final syllable, as — handful, handfuls ; cartload, cartloads ; spoonful, spoon- fuls. The apparent inaccuracy in some of these terms arises from the force of signification which the component parts of the compound words retain. Thus some persons are induced to write spoonsful, barrowsful, &c. The exceptions to the general rule for the formation of the plural of nouns are — I . Nouns ending in ch, sh, ss, or x, form their plurals by adding es to the singular, as — peach, peaches ; lash, lashes ; loss, losses ; fox, foxes. The reader will readily perceive the necessity for this deviation from the general rule. The plural of such nouns cannot be distinguished from the singular, unless a distinct syllable be added. 48 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Nouns ending in ch hard, are formed by adding s only to the singular, as monarch, monarchs. 2. Nouns ending mforfe, are made plural by changing f orfe into ves, as half, halves ; life, lives. 3. Nouns ending in o, preceded by a consonant, are made plural by adding es to the singular, as hero, heroes ; except junto, canto, tyro, grotto, portico, solo and quarto, which are formed by adding s to the singular, as junto, juntos. Nouns ending in a vowel, preceded by another vowel, form their plurals regularly, as — folio, folios ; die, dies. 4. Nouns ending in y, preceded by a consonant, change the y into ies, as — cherry, cherries. If a vowel precede the y, the plural is formed by adding s only, as day, — days ; and there is no good reason why all nouns in y should not be formed regularly ; the exceptions cause many errors in orthography, as — vollies, attornies, Anthonies, Henries. Nouns ending in ff, form their plurals by adding s, as — muffs, puffs, skiffs, cliffs. 5. The following nouns form their plurals in en, as — man, men ; ox, oxen ; child, children ; woman, women ; brother makes brethren, when persons of the same society or pro- fession are designated. Nouns, expressive of whatever nature or art has made double or plural, have no singular, as — lungs, scissors, bellows, ashes. " Many of those words which have no singular, denote things consisting of two parts, and, therefore, have a plural termination. Hence the word pair is used with many of them, as — a pair of colours, a pair of drawers." Some nouns have no plural; 1st, Those which denote things measured or weighed, as — sugar, tea, wheat ; unless when they express varieties, as — sugars, teas, wheats. Here not the unlimited appellative noun is signified, but different species or classes of the appellative are referred to, and in this sense the nouns are used plurally. 2ndly. Names of abstract and also of moral qualities, as — hardness, softness, prudence, envy, benevolence, have no plural. Several nouns in this class ending in y, when they do not express the quality or property in the abstract, but either its varieties or its manifestations, are used plurally. Thus we say, levities, affinities, gravities, &c. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 49 There may be different degrees and different exhibitions of the quality, but not a plurality. "Where displays of the mental quality are to be expressed, it is better in all cases to employ a periphrasis. Thus, instead of using, with Hume, the plural, insolences, the ex- pression, acts of insolence, would be preferable." Proper names admit the plural form when they are used to denote classes, or the names of families, as the Caesars, the Scipios, the Smiths, the Townsends, the Howards. In this sense the proper name ceases, strictly speaking, to be a definitive, and hence the necessity for surnames. Nouns from the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, French, and other languages, retain their original plurals, as — cherub, cherubim, phenomenon, phenomena, crisis, crises, beau, beaux. Some nouns are entirely anomalous, as — die, dice, penny, pence. Dice is commonly used both for the singular and the plural, and may be considered as belonging to the next class of nouns. Even our best writers occasionally disre- gard this useless anomaly. " When a dice,' 1 says Campbell, " is thrown out of the hand, we know its gravity will make it fall, and that its cubical figure will cause but one side to face upwards. This we know from experience ; but there is no principle which can lead me to conclude that one side rather than another will be turned up, unless the die be falsely loaded for the purpose of cheating." Penny makes pennies when distinct coins are spoken of, and pence when their value is denoted in computation. The last exception, or, to speak more correctly, anomaly, is, that some words are used alike in both numbers, as — deer, sheep, swine. Writers not having precise ideas to attach to the terms, mathematics, metaphysics, politics, ethics, and some other plural nouns, use them indiscriminately, and this inattention to precision causes much inaccuracy in the grammatical structure of sentences. The word, means, is a striking instance of the respect paid to authority and popular usage, in opposition to the dictates of common sense and the fundamental principles of grammar. If the word, means, had been uniformly used by our best writers, as a noun singular, this would be no argument for 50 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. continuing the practice ; for every time it is improperly applied, the thought and the term are at variance, and the mind is too often diverted from the subject of the sentence ; yet a teacher of language will say that it is idle and fastidious to propose a change : thus we are taught to continue an ac- knowledged inaccuracy, because classical writers have set us the example ; but for a writer of no ordinary abilities openly to sanction such abuses, is more mischievous than quoting a thousand authorities in favour of the abuse. The business of the grammarian is to point out the right road, and to leave to the choice of the reader to take the wrong if he thinks proper. Dr. Crombie concludes his remarks on this word with the following pertinent observations : — " As a general rule for the use of means, as either singular or plural, it might render the construction less vague, and the expression therefore less ambiguous, were we to employ it as singular when the mediation or instrumentality of one thing is implied, and as plural when two or more mediating causes are referred to." Ex. — " He was careful to observe what means were em- ployed by his adversaries to counteract his schemes. Here means is properly joined with a plural verb, several methods of counteraction being signified." " The king consented, and by this means all hope of suc- cess was lost. Here only one mediating circumstance is implied, and the noun is therefore used as singular." "While for the sake of perspicuity we offer this general rule, we cannot but remark that, though the term mean is at present, by general usage, confined to the expression of a middle between two extremes, we are inclined to concur with the learned Dr. Lowth, and to recommend a more extended use of the noun singular. A means is a form of expression which, though not wholly unsupported by analogy, is yet re- pugnant to the general idiom of our language, and seems so ill adapted to denote the operation of a single cause, that we should be pleased to see it dismissed from use. If we say, ' this was one of the means which he employed to effect his purpose/ analogy and metaphysical propriety concur in recommending a mean, or one mean, as preferable to a means. News, alms, riches, pains, have been used as either singular PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 51 or plural, but we never say ' one of the news/ • one of the alms/ ' one of the riches/ ■ one of the pains/ as we say ' one of the means/ we may therefore be justified, notwithstanding the authority of general usage, in pronouncing "a means" a palpable anomaly/ 5 — Crombie. The word news is sometimes construed as a plural, but more generally as a singular noun. It would be more cor- rect, as well as useful, to consider this noun as singular when only one article of intelligence is communicated, and as plural when several new things are reported, as — "no news so bad as this at home /' " the news of the day engage the attention of the idle/' Dr. Crombie observes that a celebrated grammarian has pronounced the noun, pains, to be in all cases plural ; but, says Dr. Crombie, this assertion might be proved erroneous by numberless examples. Now, the examples given do not prove the assertion to be erroneous, for they only prove that the plural noun, pains, has been used as a singular, but the sentences quoted do not demonstrate the propriety of the preference. Pains mean repeated efforts (collectively considered) of the mind or body, but should in no case be applied to signify a single exertion of either. When the word pains is followed by a verb in the singular number, it is considered as a collective noun, the words amount, aggregate, or such other term, being understood as the nominative, as — the pains they had taken was very great, i. e. not great in number, but in the aggregate, col- lectively considered. A proof that pains is sometimes used as a collective noun, may be adduced from the use of much before the term. Ex. — Much pains has been bestowed upon the work. Nouns in the plural, used without an article to limit their signification, resemble nouns of multitude, and are similar to those anomalies which do not admit the distinction of number. Nouns of multitude depend for their signification chiefly on the idea in the mind of him who uses them. If the collective idea be dwelt on, and be the subject of the attribute, the noun is construed as singular, as — the mob e 2 52 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. was large— the army has been defeated; but if the indi- viduals which compose a collective noun be referred to, then the noun is considered plural, as — the committee have agreed. It will be observed that collective nouns, used as plurals to denote the individuals which constitute such par- ticular associations, are generally employed figuratively, as — the House of Commons, for the members of that assembly. Case. Case denotes the relation the noun bears to the predicate, or the relation which one noun bears to another in a sen- tence, as — Dryden translated Virgil's poems ; in this sentence, Dryden is the nominative, Virgil's the possessive or genitive, and poems the objective case. In the analysis of every sentence there will be found some noun, pronoun, or phrase, equivalent to a noun, either ex- pressed or understood, which may be considered as the subject of the assertion, and to which "that which is asserted" pertains. This noun, or phrase, is the nominative case ; it governs the verb in number and person, and is thus dis- tinguishable from every other noun in the sentence, as — the horse draws the carriage. Here the act of drawing is attributed to the horse, and horse is therefore said to be in the nominative case. But there is another noun in the sen- tence connected with the nominative and its attribute ; it is the object acted upon by the nominative, but concerning which nothing is expressly affirmed. Carriage is therefore said to be in the objective case. But if carriage be taken as the principal noun, or subject of affirmation, it then becomes the nominative, or governing, case of the sentence, as —the carriage is drawn by the horse. Here the state or condition in which the carriage is placed by the horse, and not the act of drawing, is the predicate ; and this state or condition is attributed to the carriage ; the agent, therefore,, is connected to the predicate by a prepo- sition, and is said to be governed in the objective case. But the relations which subordinate nouns bear to each other in a sentence would, if denoted by change of termi- PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 53 nation, give rise to an unlimited number of cases. In English this inconvenience is obviated, either by position or by the use of prepositions, which denote the several relations of nouns connected with the subject and its attribute. Dr. Darwin, speaking of the cases of Greek and Latin nouns, observes, that " When to the variation of the termi- nations of nouns in the singular number are added those equally numerous of the plural, and the great variety of these terminations correspondent to the three genders, it is evident that the prepositions of our own and modern lan- guages, instead of the changes of termination, add to the simplicity of these languages, and to the facility of acquiring them." The only case in English which admits of modification is that which denotes possession, and in which case the mo- dified noun is used as a definitive to some other noun, as — the people's rights; the king's prerogative. The sign of the genitive case was for a long time con- sidered to be an abbreviation of the pronoun his, as — " the man his duty;" "the scholar his task;" but modern gram- marians contend this cannot be correct, because, although we may say — the man his duty, we cannot, with equal pro- priety, say — the woman his duty. But these writers seem to overlook the true character of this sign. The possessive pronouns his, hers, represent the nouns, and the relation of property also; they are, therefore, signs of complex ideas. But when it is necessary to mention the name of an indivi- dual, represented by a possessive pronoun, the pronoun becomes redundant, and the relation of property is all that remains to be expressed. Hence the impropriety of the primitive mode of expression, — "for Christ his sake;" "■ the children their bread." This tautology appears to have been at first obviated by uniting the pronoun masculine to the noun, by which means the repetition of the notion of gender, number, and person, was prevented, and the abbreviation served simply to denote the relation of property or posses- sion. The present mode of distinguishing the genitive may be considered an abbreviation of the original termination. By the modification, therefore, of the adjective pronoun, it no longer conveys the notion of gender or number, and it 54 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. is thus rendered capable of being affixed or added to any noun, simply to denote the relation of property or possession. We may further remark, that " the man's duty," and the duty of the man, are equivalent expressions, yet no one expects the preposition of, which is a substitute for the sign's, should convey the notion of sex, or agree in gender, with the noun to which it belongs. It may also be observed that the pronoun his was formerly used before neuter nouns, and this strongly confirms the opinion once entertained of this abbreviation. There is yet another case distinct from the nominative, at least as regards its power of governing the verb : — this is the vocative case; being, in its nature, interjectional, it simply names the object addressed, as — " sir;" '* men and brethren ;" "my lord;" "madam." Ex. — "Awake, awake, put on thy strength, Zion, put on thy beautiful garments, O Jerusalem." Grammarians, indeed, say, that the verb agrees with these vocatives in number and person; but where there is no government there can be no concord; besides, the verb in the imperative mood (awake) is, in fact, the object commanded, and not an attribute predicated of Zion, — " I command thee (O Zion) to awake." Ex. — " My Lord, — your lordship may be surprised at the liberty I take in writing to you." — Pope. In this example, " my lord," and " your lordship," mean the same person, but the latter is in the nominative, or governing case, and the verb and pronoun agree with it. The former is in the vocative, and has no power in regulating the construction of the sentence. These cases are, therefore, essentially different; for, "my lord," taken as the nomina- tive, would imply a person spoken of, and not a person spoken to, and the verb and pronoun must then agree with it in the third person. The nominative or governing cases of the first and second persons are always pronouns, and when nouns are used with these, they are said to be in apposition; but these nouns do not govern the verb. Ex. — " Now, I, Paul, myself, beseech you." Here the verb agrees with the pronoun /, though "Paul" and "myself" represent the same person as the nominative. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 55 SYNTAX OF NOUNS. Concord and Government. Concord and Government are so closely connected with the syntax of nouns, that the distinction between these terms may be most conveniently noticed in this chapter. Government is that power which one word has over another, to determine its gender, number, person, case, or mode. The word that yields to this power is said to agree with the word that governs it, and this agreement is called CONCORD. Rule 1. Two or more nouns, denoting the same indi- vidual, are in the same case, — David, son of Jesse, king of Israel; Hume, the historian; Johnsons, the Bookseller s. In these examples the additional nouns express or explain the principal nouns more fully, and are said to be in apposi- tion to those nouns. In the last example the sign of the genitive may be properly omitted after the second noun, as that term is explanatory, and serves as an adjective to its noun in apposition, as — Johnson's, the bookseller. Rule 2. A noun in the nominative case governs the verb ; that is, the nominative requires the verb to agree with it in number and person, as — the storm is past; the sun shines ; the husbandmen return. Here the verbs — is, shines, return, are in the same number and person as their several nominatives. The place of the nominative is before the verb. The word that governs maybe discovered by asking, who? or what? with the verb and its attribute, as — What is past? — the storm. What shines? — the sun. Who return? — the hus- bandmen. The words that answer to the questions are the nominatives to the verbs. This rule is violated in such examples as these, — " I likes," "Thou loves," "he need," "you was." "In reference to this last example," says Dr. Crombie, " the reader should observe that you is plural, whether it relate to only one individual or to more, and ought, therefore, to be joined with 56 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. a plural verb." As we do not admit the force and conclu- siveness of Dr. Crombie's argument, we shall risque a few remarks on the subject of this troublesome anomaly. It may be observed, then, that " you was" might indeed be called a solecism, if the pronoun did not serve for both numbers ; but in this case the pronoun is analogous to the substantives swine, deer, sheep; and when the pronoun denotes an individual, and the verb is in the singular, it is not a solecism to say "you was." But, "you were" is a. solecism when it is applied to a single object, because the verb is said to be changed to the plural, to agree with its nominative; but the nominative is singular, and by this change also the necessary distinction between a single and a plural subject is destroyed. It is a weak and fallacious argu- ment in support of this anomaly to say, that if we use the pronoun " you" as singular, we must use the second person of the verb "wast." The change in the verb to denote the first and second person is unnecessary, when appropriate pronouns are employed, and it can be considered correct only when the original pronoun is used. This agreement, from long association, may be thought necessary; but when the pronoun is alike in both numbers, a different form of the verb is requisite, to distinguish the singular from the plural. To produce one exception, to show the propriety of another, is no proof of the correctness of either. No sub- stitute but "you are" has been offered for " thou art." But this is not the case with " thou wast." Here there is a choice, and the question is which is the best grammar? Now, when any particular form of expression becomes obsolete, the people are at liberty to choose any equivalent phrase or term for the one which has for some cause been set aside. Where usage differs, the minds of thinking men generally determine the preference, and, by adopting that mode of expression which is most in unison with the ideas intended to be represented, establish, by their authority, the correct phraseology. It is this sense of propriety, in reflect- ing minds, that preserves the grammar of a language; and it is this sense of propriety that at first suggested "you was," as a substitute for the formal expression, "thou wast;" and which substitute would be now universally employed by PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 57 writers, if it were not for the constraint the mind imposes on itself, in order to submit to fashion, supported by the arbitrary law of the grammarian. For the truth of this last assertion we appeal to the experience of the reader. Rule 3. An infinitive mood is sometimes the nomina- tive to the verb, as — "to promise is easy, to perform and to satisfy are often difficult." Rule 4, A phrase or part of a sentence may be the nominative to the verb, as — "To be ever active in laudable pursuits, is the distinguishing characteristic of a man of merit." "As far as regards his interest, he will be sufficiently care- ful not to offend." That is, as far as it, or as far as offending, regards his interest, he will be sufficiently careful not to offend. As far as is an adverbial phrase, therefore as cannot, as Dr. Crombie and other grammarians suppose, be intended to supply the place of a nominative. The derivation which refers the reader for the meaning of as to the pronoun it, that, or which, is worse than useless, for in no instance does as now serve as a pronoun. Rule 5. A noun of multitude governs the verb in the singular or in the plural, according as the notion of unity or plurality is suggested by the attribute. When the noun re- presents an object formed by the union of several individuals, and the attribute refers to that individual as a whole, the verb will be singular, as — a committee is appointed; the parliament is dissolved. But when the individuals are referred to separately, the noun governs the verb in the plural, as — the committee are deliberating. The verb, therefore, shews whether the thing or the persons are referred to. It is often much better to use a periphrasis when the individuals composing a noun of multitude are the subject of the verb, as — the members of the committee are deliberating. This rule affords another instance of the insufficiency of usage as the standard of propriety. Here the grammarian is compelled to admit, that the mind must decide which form of expression ought to have the preference. The verb is to agree with the noun of multitude according to the sense. Ex. — The assembly which was composed of honourable men rejected the petition. 58 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Ex. — The assembly who rejected the petition were honour- able men. In the first example the verb agrees with the neuter noun, assembly. In the last example the verb agrees with the noun men or members who composed the assembly. It would not be correct to say "the assembly who rejected the petition were composed of honourable men." Because the assembly, and not individuals who composed it, is the subject of the predicate. The assembly which rejected the petition was composed of honourable men. Rule 6. One noun governs another in the genitive when possession or property is intended to be expressed, as — the miser's gold; the King's ministers. The governing noun is either the nominative or objective of the verb, and the name of the possessor is used as a defini- tive, serving, in this respect, as an adjective to the principal noun. The nouns thus employed form a complex term, and denote an individual possessed by the definitive noun ; and, in this respect, the genitive differs from the common adjective; for qualities are possessed by or belong to the nouns, which they assist to define. So the quality, whiteness, is said to belong to snow, but the definitive, miser's, does not belong to gold, but that substance is particularised as being the pro- perty of the miser. Still the noun, miser's, is used adjectively, and does not represent the object as a distinct individual. And this is the reason why little explanatory circumstances are particularly awkward between a genitive case and the word which usually follows it, as — she began to extol the farmer's, as she called him, excellent understanding. It ought to be, "the excellent understanding of the farmer, as she called him." When neither possession nor property is implied, we say horse-shoe, dog-collar, &c; but when the idea of pertaining to is added to the noun, the possessive case is employed, as — the horse's shoe, the dog's collar. Yet where ambiguity cannot arise, reference is sometimes made to the genitive, as representing the noun itself; but in this case the sign of the genitive is generally exchanged for the preposition of,, which connects the subordinate noun. Ex. — "They flew to arms, attacked the house of Northum- berland, and put him to death." Here the pronoun him does not, of course, refer to the " house of Northumberland," which PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 59 was the object of the preceding clause, but to the definite noun, divested of its characteristic as an adjective, and con- sidered as the name of a distinct individual. But Northum- berland's House, and "the house of Northumberland," denote the same object, and neither can, with propriety, be referred to as the object represented by the pronoun (him). By employing the preposition, however, the mind more readily divests itself of the subordinate character of the noun, and ambiguity does not so frequently occur. But in some cases even this contrivance will not sufficiently conceal the impro- priety. Ex. — The reader of Caramuel {who, together with Cam- penella, may be found in the Bodleian Library,) will not be dis- appointed in him, but most egregiously by him," — H. Tooke. The relative (who) refers to " Caramuel," and not to "the reader of Caramuel;" but the latter is the noun first suggested to the reader. The following sentence, though pronounced by Mr. Cobbett as ungrammatical, is strictly correct: — "This determination led me to Metissa, the daughter of Chrysophilus, who was, at least, without deformity." — Johnson. The relative refers to Metissa, who is the only person mentioned in the sentence; the name of Chrysophilus is used as a definitive to the appellative noun (daughter), and forms a part of the complex term, used in apposition with Metissa. " When the noun," says Mr. Cobbett, " which is in the possessive case, is expressed by a circumlocution, that is to say, by many words, in lieu of one, the sign of the possessive case is joined to the last word, as — ' John, the old farmer's wife;' 'Oliver, the spy's evidence.' It is, however, much better to say, 'the wife of John the old farmer;' 'the evi- dence of Oliver the spy.'" But Mr. Cobbett has not shown why it is much better to say — the wife of John, the old farmer; nor did he seem aware that his examples are complete nonsense. For how can John be the old farmer's wife, or how can Oliver be his own testimony. If Mr. Cobbett had said, Joan the old farmer's wife, his readers would have understood him. 60 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. The circumlocution of which Mr. Cobbett speaks, is " the old farmer/' used in apposition with John, to limit that proper name; but this explanatory cognomen does not neces- sarily require the sign of the genitive, unless it be placed before the principal noun; but John is expressly intended as a definitive to wife, and the sign of the possessive case is indispensable, as — "John's, the old farmer's, wife; or, to avoid the repetition of the genitive — "the wife of John the old farmer." By this last arrangement the noun in apposition is governed only by John, and is not subject to the govern- ment of the principle noun, being thus properly confined to the purpose for which it was intended. If Mr. Cobbett, in copying Dr. Lowth's remark, had quoted the doctor's example also, he would not have been chargeable with the blunder he has committed. " When the thing to which another is said to belong is expressed by a circumlocution, or by many terms, the sign of the possessive case is commonly added to the last term, as — " the king of Great Britain's soldiers." — Lowth. In this example " the king of Great Britain" is a complex term, to denote an individual, and the nouns king and Britain, which compose the term, are not in apposition ; the sign of the genitive cannot, therefore, belong to both sub- stantives. Thus, we cannot say, with propriety, "Solomon's, the son of David, king of Israel's Proverbs;" but " Solomon, the son of David, king of Israel's Proverbs ;" or, as in the original, "The Proverbs of Solomon, king of Israel." " When," says Dr. Crombie, " I say, neither life nor death shall separate us from the love of God, it may mean either the love which we owe to God, or the love which he bears to us; for God's love may denote either the relation which the affection bears to its subject, or that which it bears to its object. If the latter be the meaning intended, the ambiguity may he prevented, by saying — love to God." We do not think Dr. Crombie was required to exercise his own or his reader's patience, by striving to explain a phrase which ought to need no explanation; for if writers say one thing, and mean another— if they say God's love, and mean the creature's love, a grammarian is not bound to countenance their blunders; for "language should be not such as the PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 61 reader may understand, if he will take the trouble to examine it carefully, but such as he cannot even without effort fail to comprehend." When no direct reference is made to property or posses - sion, the noun assumes the nature of an adjective, denoting a quality belonging to the subject, as — a summer-day, a horse-shoe, a dog-collar. " The English genitive," says Mr. Murray, " has often an unpleasant sound, so that we daily make more use of the particle of to express the same relation." The sound in this case is not unpleasant to the ear, but to the mind. The English genitive suggests the notion of property or posses- sion more vividly than the particle of, and hence the harsh- ness complained of by Mr. Murray. This writer has remarked, that "the preposition of, joined to a substantive, is not always equivalent to the possessive case. It is so only when the expression can be converted into the regular form of the possessive case. We can say — the reward of virtue, and virtue's reward ; but though it is proper to say— a crown of gold, we cannot convert the expression into the possessive case, and say — gold's crown." And the reason is clear, for, in this case, the noun, "gold," is used as an adjective, and the preposition serves merely to connect it with the noun. So we sometimes say — a man of activity, but cannot, with the least propriety, say — activity's man, because the preposition and the noun are equivalent to the adjective, active, and do not denote that "man" is the property of activity, but that " activity" is the property of the man; and this will, perhaps, explain the origin and distinct character of this class of adjectives. "When a single subject is expressed, as the common property of two or more persons, the last only takes the sign of the genitive, as — this is John, William, and Richard's house; that is — this is the house of John, William and Richard." "But when several subjects are implied, as severally belong- ing to various individuals, the names of the individuals are all expressed in the genitive case, as — these are John's, William's, and Richard's houses. In such examples as these, the use of the genitive involves an ambiguity, which it 62 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. is sometimes difficult to prevent. " Instead of saying — John, William, and Richard's house, or John's, William's, or Richard's, house, I should prefer — a house belonging in com- mon, or severally, (as the meaning may be) to John, William, and Richard." The double genitive is, in general, improperly employed. In all cases it would be better to use another form of expres- sion : thus, instead of saying — " this is a picture of my friend's," it would be less ambiguous, and, therefore, more grammatical, to say — "this is a picture belonging to my friend." Instead of — " a discovery of Sir Isaac Newton's," it should be — " a discovery by Sir Isaac Newton, or made by Sir Isaac Newton." " As the double genitive involves an ellipsis, and implies part of a whole, or one of a plurality of subjects, I think the use of it should be avoided, unless in cases where this plu- rality may be implied : thus, we may say — ' a kinsman of the traitor's waited on him yesterday/ it being implied that the traitor had several or many kinsmen. The expression is equivalent to a kinsman of the traitor's kinsman. But if the subject possessed were singular, or the only one of the kind, I should recommend the use of the simple genitive : thus, if he had only one house, I should say — this is the house of the traitor, or this is the traitor's, and not this is a house of the traitor's." — Crombie. The possessive case is distinguished from the plural num- ber of nouns by an apostrophe, as — books, book's. When the noun ends in ss the apostrophe only -is employed, as — for goodness' sake ; also in the genitive plural, ending in s, as — the commons' vote; the peers' dissent; the s is occasionally omitted, for the sake of euphony, as — for conscience' sake. Rule 7- A noun governed by a verb, participle, or pre- position, is in the objective case, as — Judas betrayed Christ ; Peter, having denied Christ, went out and wept bitterly ; they led him unto Pilate. When the relation is denoted by the attribute and verb, the objective noun is distinguished from the nominative by its place in the sentence, as — the lion killed the man. The noun " man " being placed after the verb, distinguishes that noun from the nominative or PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 63 subject, and shews the case or relation it bears to the attri- bute as its object. But enough has at present been said of the syntax of nouns, since the subject of concord and government must necessarily be referred to, when the construction of the re- maining parts of speech is examined, and more particularly that of the verb, to which this rule of syntax may be thought more properly to belong. "A noun," says Mr. Lewis, "may be distinguished by placing before it the words, I think of, or / think of a ; and though we cannot say, the good sobriety, yet we can say, / think of sobriety , without any violation of good sense. ILLUSTRATIONS OF NOUNS. On the importance of Grammar. "The structure of language is extremely artificial; and there are few sciences in which a deeper or more refined logic is employed than in grammar. It is apt to be slighted by su- perficial thinkers as belonging to those rudiments of knowledge which were inculcated upon us in our earliest youth. But what was then inculcated before we could comprehend its iwinciples, would abundantly repay our study in maturer years ; and to the ignorance of it must be attributed many of those fundamental defects which appear in writing." — Blair. Immortal gods, I crave no pelf, I pray for no man but myself; Grant I may never prove so fond To trust man on his oath or bond, Or a harlot for her weeping, Or a dog that seems a sleeping, Or a keeper with my freedom, Or my friends if I should need 'em. Shakespeare. Timon of Athens. "It is certainly as easy to be a scholar as a gamester, or many other characters, equally illiberal and low. The same 64 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. application — the same quantity of habit will fit us for one as completely as for the other ; and as to those who tell us, with an air of seeming wisdom, that it is men and not books we must study to become knowing, this I have always remarked, from repeated experience, to be the common con- solation and language of dunces." — Harris. Hermes, book hi. chap. v. CHAPTER V. ADJECTIVES. "'The true genuine sense of a noun adjective will be fixed to consist in this, that it imports the general notion of pertaining to." — Wilkins. Adjectives represent certain qualities or attributes, and are the concrete names of modes treated of by logicians. " A mode is that which cannot subsist in and of itself, but is always esteemed as belonging to and subsisting by the help of some substance, which, for that reason, is called its sub- ject."* An adjective, therefore, expresses a quality as subsisting in a noun, and does not represent the quality as having a distinct or separate existence, — as, good, wise, solid, virtuous. But when these qualities are considered without reference to the subjects which possess them, the terms which represent those ideas are called abstract nouns, — as, goodness, wisdom, solidity, virtue. Dr. Crombie defines an adjective to be "that part of speech which denotes any substance or attribute, not by itself, but as conjoined with a subject, or pertaining to its character. This conjunction is generally marked by changing the termination of the simple name of the substantive or attribute, as — fool, foolish ; wax, waxen. Sometimes no change is made, and the simple name of the substantive or attribute is prefixed to the name of the subject, as — sea fowl, race horse, corn field. In writing these and similar expres- sions, the conjunction is sometimes marked by a hyphen, as — sea-fowl, river-fish, wine-vessel." From this it will be * Dr. Watts — Logic, part i. ch. ii. sec. 3. F 66 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. seen that the juxta position of two nouns suggests that one denotes a quality of the other ; and hence the former, losing its own independent meaning, assumes the dependent cha- racter of an adjective. Mr. Tooke erred greatly when he affirmed that gold, brass, and silk, when conjoined with appellative nouns, were still the names of things, and denoted substances. Gold and brass, when not used adjectively, are the names of metals, and silk the name of that substance ; but when these appella- tives are used as adjectives, they denote the qualities only of those nouns to which they are joined. Mr. Tooke also asks whether golden, brazen, and silken, do not convey to the hearer's mind, and denote the same thing, as gold, brass, and silk. After amusing his reader for some time by trying to convince him that no difference exists between gold and golden, and . asserting that they are both substantives, he at length admits the fact that a noun with its attribute is a com- plex term, but he does not attempt to explain in what respect the noun and the attribute differ in their nature, or in the extent of their signification. Impressed with the notion that all words were nouns, or names of things, Mr. Tooke could perceive no difference between wood and wooden; he also affirms that " a perverse nature " and f a natural perversity " mean precisely the same thing. It may be maintained (notwithstanding the high au- thority of Mr. Tooke's name) that the adjectives perverse and natural denote species of different things — a species of disposition (for this is, we presume, what Mr. Tooke means by the vague expression — nature) and a species of perversity, namely, a natural perversity. Mr. Tooke was accustomed to confound his acquaintance by a subtilty of reasoning, and by a peculiar and confident manner in the delivering of his opinions, which frequently left his opponent nothing to say in reply to his arguments or assertions. This was, perhaps, done more for the sake of amusement than to gratify his vanity by a display of the acuteness of his intellectual powers. The same habit prevails in his treatise on language ; and since the publication of that work, few grammarians have ventured to dissent from any of his opinions : the consequence has been that his valuable PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 67 discoveries have never been rendered so practically useful in the science of grammar as they might otherwise have been. •The manner in which substantives may be converted into adjectives has been thus shewn and exemplified by Mr. Harris : — " When we say, — the party of Pompey ; the style of Cicero ; the philosophy of Socrates, — in these cases the party, the style, and the philosophy, spoken of, receive a stamp and character from the persons whom they respect ; those persons, therefore, perform the part of attributes ; that is, stamp and characterise their respective subjects. Hence, then, they actually pass into attributes, and assume, as such, the form of adjectives ; and thus it is we say, — the Pompeian party ; the Ciceronian style ; and the Socratic philosophy. It is, in like manner, for a trumpet of brass, we say a brazen trumpet ; for a crown of gold, a golden crown, &c. Even pronominal substantives admit the like mutation ; thus, in- stead of saying, the book of me, of thee, and of him, we say, my book, thy book, and his book ; instead of saying, the country of us, of you, and of them, we say, our country, your country, their country, which words may be called so many pronominal " In English," says Mr. Tooke, " instead of adjectiving our own substantives, we have borrowed, in immense num- bers, adjectived signs from other languages, without borrowing the unadjectived signs of those same ideas, because our au- thors frequently found they had occasion for the former, but not for the latter ; and notwithstanding the nature of the language, or the nature of the very benefit they were receiving, they did not, as they might and should have done, improve their own language by the same contrivance within itself, but borrowed from other languages abbreviations ready made to their hands. Thus they have incorporated into English — FOR THE THE FOREIGN SUBSTANTIVE. ADJECTIVE. Child .... Infant, infantine Boy .... Puerile Man . .. .Virile, human, masculine, male Woman . .Female, feminine, effeminate Mind . . . .Mental, magnanimous, pusillanimous, unanimous &c, &c. &c, &c. f 2 68 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. In the copious list of these borrowed adjectives, given by Mr. Tooke, it will be found that they chiefly denote qualities derived from nouns which have no corresponding verbs in the language, and that the notions attached to them are de- rived immediately from the nouns. Will not this lead to the conclusion that substantive nouns are the roots of adjec- tives ? and also that the mind must form an abstract idea of every quality before it can join that quality to a noun ? Hence some grammarians have concluded that there is not any accident whatever which has not a grammatical substan- tive for its sign, when it is not attributed ; nor is there any substance whatever which may not have a grammatical ad- jective for its sign, when there is occasion to attribute it. Participial adjectives are derived from verbal nouns : they are distinguished from participles as pertaining to nouns, and as being the means by which such nouns are characterised and defined, as — " a flattering tongue," " a contented spirit." The adjectives here lose their power as participles, and indicate a person possessed of an habitual quality. Some adjectives, having this participial termination, are derived from substan- tives, and have no corresponding verbs in the language, as — a wretched being ; a winged insect ; an aged horse. Mr. Tooke, in his remarks on certain adjectives which he terms official mood passive adjectives, observes, that " the words of this sort which we have hitherto adopted are barely these — legend, reverend, dividend, prebend, memorandum. We can hardly be said to have adopted deodand, multiplicand, sub- trahend, and credenda ; i. e., which ought to be given to God ; which ought to be multiplied ; which ought to be subtracted ; which ought to be believed. The first of these, legend, which means ' that which ought to be read/ is, from the early misapplication of the term by impostors, now used by us as if it meant ' that which ought to be laughed at,' and so it is explained in our dictionaries. How soon reverend, i. e. which ought to be revered, will be in the same condition, though now with great propriety applied to our judges and clergy, will depend upon themselves. Divi- dend, that which ought to be divided, is perpetually abused, while each man calls the share of the dividend which he has received his dividend, though he means to keep it all him- PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 69 self. Memorandum alone stands clear from abuse and free from danger, that which ought to be remembered." Numeral adjectives are such as denote number ; they are either cardinal, as — one, two, three ; or ordinal, as — first, second, third. The only modification which the adjective admits in English is to denote the degrees of a quality, as — white, whiter, whitest ; tall, taller, tallest. The degrees of comparison are three; — the positive, the comparative, and the superlative. " In all qualities susceptible of intension or remission, the number of degrees, from the lowest to the highest, may be accounted infinite. Hardness (for example), gravity, magni- tude, genius, wisdom, folly, are severally diversified by an infinitude of gradations, which it would elude the capacity of any language to discriminate : to denote these degrees is, therefore, utterly impracticable, as it is wholly unnecessary." — Crombie. The positive simply expresses the quality, as — white. The comparative degree denotes an increase of the quality, as — whiter. The superlative signifies the highest state of the quality, as — whitest. The comparative is formed by adding r, or er, to the posi- tive, as — long, longer ; tall, taller. The superlative is formed by adding st, or est, as — longest ; tallest. Some adjectives are formed irregularly, as — good, better, best; bad, worse, worst. These adjectives are generally of frequent occurrence, and this may partly account for their irregularity : like the substantive verb, they probably origi- nate from different roots. " Terminational comparison, as well as that denoted by more and most, does not, as some of our grammarians teach, increase or diminish the signification ; it always increases it. In shorter and shortest, the property of shortness is always increased, not made less ; the property of a thing is dimi- nished by less or least." — Grant. The termination ish denotes a degree of a quality less than that denoted by the positive, as — bluish. The terminations which mark the degrees of comparison 70 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. are equivalent to the adverbs more and most, as — wiser, more wise ; wisest, most wise. Words of one, and sometimes of two, syllables are com- pared by using the terminations. Words of two, and more than two syllables, by the adverbs more and most, as — correct, more correct, most correct ; fortunate, more fortu- nate, most fortunate. Some adjectives, from the nature of the qualities they represent, will not admit degrees of comparison, as — eternal, infinite, universal ; such also as refer to figure, as — circular, square, triangular, straight; and many others which denote the highest or lowest possible degree of a quality, as — chief, supreme, perfect. There are some writers who question the propriety of ad- mitting three degrees of comparison ; but since the adjective is used to distinguish appellative nouns, the positive may be considered as denoting an indefinite degree* of a quality, compared with the abstract notion of that quality as it exists in the mind. A common standard of any quality may be supposed to be taken as appropriate to the individuals of a species : thus, mountains are high, contrasted with plains ; but compared with individuals of their own kind, those only are called high which exceed the mean height : thus, also, a man, compared with the ordinary stature of men, and found to exceed it, would be denominated a tall man ; but should two men, possessing this quality in different degrees, be com- pared, there would be a direct comparison of the quality as to its extent in reference to the common standard. For example — a man five feet ten inches is a tall man, and so also is a man six feet in height a tall man, but when the ex- hibitions of the quality in these two individuals are compared and referred to the ordinary stature, the disparity in the heights is determined, and the excess is denoted, by modi- fying the positive term, as — tall, taller ; but when more than two individuals, possessing the like quality in different degrees, are compared, the one which exceeds the rest is * The very nature of the adjective implies compai-ison ; for it is by com- paring one object with another that we are enabled to predicate the existence of qualities in nouns : thus, one man is rich, another tall, and a third valiant, compared with the wealth, stature, or valour, possessed by men in ffeneraL PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 71 denominated the tallest, but if one should exceed the usual stature in an extraordinary degree, and the comparison be simply made between his and the ordinary height of men, then an appropriate adverb is employed to modify the adjec- tive, as — very tall, extremely tall, &c. This has been called, by some grammarians, the superlative of eminence ; we might as justly denominate "much taller" the comparative of eminence, and " rather tall " the positive of eminence * for what becomes of the superlative of eminence in such compari- sons as these — John is very tall, Harry is much taller, but Richard is the tallest. When nouns of different species are compared, there can be no precise standard to which the degrees of comparison can be referred ; thus — a lion is larger -than a mouse ; an elephant is larger than a lion, and is esteemed the most saga- cious of all animals ; where it may be observed that if there be a superlative of eminence, it is in those cases which ex- press the ne plus ultra of a quality. Mr. Lennie has assigned gender, number, and case, to adjectives, and would have the reader comprehend that sex, and case, and number, make part of the notion of qualities This supposed agreement between nouns and adjectives (which it is necessary to observe in the Latin and some other languages) is so contrary to common sense, and so totally inconsistent with the character of the English lan- guage, that it would be scarcely worthy of notice, if it were not to caution those who are desirous to understand the nature of speech to beware of such instructors. "Adjectives," Dr. Epps justly observes, "have no changes to point out genders, numbers, and cases. The reason of this is that ad- jectives are used to point out something particular in the person, place, or -thing, of which the noun is the name, not in the gender, number, or case, which are pointed out by changes of the noun itself. Thus — wise man, wise woman ; here the nouns change, but the adjectives do not, because the particular thing, wisdom, is common not only to the man, but to the woman." The only approximation to agree- ment in number and gender is either in the adjective pronouns this, that, and other, or in words derived from appel- latives, appropriated to a particular sex, as — this book, these 72 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. books ; a sluttish woman, a slovenly man. But the quality denoted by the adjectives, sluttish and slovenly, is the same quality, whether ascribed to the male or to the female. Syntax of Adjectives. Rule I. Every word used as an adjective belongs to some noun, either expressed or understood. Ex. " Few think these mad, for most, like these, Are sick and troubled with the same disease." The noun to which an adjective belongs may be ascer- tained by asking the question, who or what, with the adjec- tive, as — few what? — persons; these what? — these persons or people, &c. Rule II. Adjectives are generally put before the nouns they qualify. Ex. — A. faithful friend is tried in adverse fortune. Ex. — "The Bible, for the size of it, is the most accurate grammatical composition that we have in the English lan- guage." — Murray. Ex. — " My stronger guilt defeats my strong intent." — Shakspeare. Rule III. Adjectives are sometimes placed after the nouns to which they belong, either for the sake of variety or emphasis, or to admit, more conveniently, some modifying term or phrase. They also follow nouns when, by ellipsis, the relative and verb are omitted. Ex. " The present time's so sick, That present medicine must be ministered, Or overthrow, incurable, ensues." King John, act v. sc. 1. Ex. — "A man wise in his own conceit, i.e. who is wise in his own conceit." Rule IV. Double comparatives, or double superlatives, are improper; and- although they were formerly admitted and sanctioned by reputable writers, they were nevertheless as ungrammatical then as they are justly pronounced to be so now. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 73 Ex.—" Your wisdom should show itself more richer." — Shakespeare. Most, whether it precedes or follows the adjective, is a sign of the superlative, in the same manner as more is a sign of the comparative, degree, as — outmost, furthermore, fur- thermost. The definitive article cannot be correctly used before superlatives, unless it be to denote what, in the Latin, is expressed by quam maxime, or the highest possible degree of a quality. Ex. — "This distinction is the most precise and the most worthy of attention." — Crombie. There cannot, strictly speaking, be more than one thing most precise, or most worthy, of the same kind; still the article may be used for the sake of emphasis. Rule V. Adjectives, which do not admit either increase or diminution, cannot be compared, as — universal, infinite, chief. Ex. — ■ ' As no one has exercised the powers of speech with juster and more universal applause than youself." — Harris. It should be "more general applause." Ex. — " Being connected with that politer literature." — Harris. There can be no degrees of politeness in polite literature; the comparative is affectedly employed, instead of the posi- tive, and the sentence is thus rendered ungrammatical. It should be "being connected with polite literature." The affectation noticed in this last example is a very common refinement among polite writers. Ex. — "This deserves most particular notice." — Brenan. The adverb, most, in this example, is redundant. Ex. — " Our chief est courtier, cousin, and our son." — Shakspeare. Ex. — " With whom it was his chief est boast to say he had been acquainted." — Sir W. Scott. Chief is equivalent to highest, and does not admit the inflections of comparison: — " It was his chief boast to say he had been acquainted. Rule VI. Adjectives are often improperly used for adverbs, as — scarce ever, exceeding great, exceeding strong; 74 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. excessive good, extreme dear, excellent well; instead of — scarcely ever, exceedingly great, &c. Ex.—" The passions are the natural spurs to volition or action, and so need only to be right directed." — Campbell. It should be rightly directed, i.e. properly directed. Dr. Crombie, after having vindicated, or at least palliated, this grammatical inaccuracy, admits — that exceedingly strong, exceedingly good, are the preferable phraseologies. It is thus that grammarians assist to perpetuate error, and to increase the difficulties of a science, which it is their duty to simplify and defend against the corruptions of popular usage. The only instances in which the adjective form is to be pre- ferred to the adverbial, is when the word to which the adverb belongs ends in the same syllable, as — exceedingly lovely ; or when an adjective, ending in hj, is used as an adverb, as — wily, wilily; but even in these cases the inaccuracy may generally be avoided by using another adverb, or an equiva- lent phrase, as — "very lovely," "in a crafty manner." There is another case in which an adjective appears to be improperly used for an adverb. Ex. — " Etymology is that part of grammar by which we are instructed relative to the origin, kinds, and properties, of words." — Lewis. Relative is an adjective, and cannot properly qualify the verb, The phrase, " relative to," might have been obviated by using the participial preposition, concerning, — " by which we are instructed concerning the origin kinds and properties of words." The comparative is used when only two things are com- pared. The superlative, when one thing, or an aggregate number of things, are compared with the class to which they belong, or to which we refer them. Ex. — "Mad as the sea and wind, when both contend which is the mightier." Ex. — Socrates was the wisest of the Athenians. Ex. — Methuselah was the oldest man ; Solomon was the wisest. Rule VII. The comparative of adjectives is followed by than when opposition is signified, and by of when selection is implied. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 75 Ex. — Sorrow is better than laughter ; Heraclitus was therefore the wiser of the two philosophers. The simplicity and excellence of the English language is obvious in the etymology and syntax of its adjectives. " In the Latin and Greek languages," observes Dr. Darwin, " adjectives possess a great variety of terminations. Some of these, when declined through all their ca3es, and genders, and numbers, in their positive, comparative, and superlative degrees, enumerate fifty or sixty terminations ; all which, to one who wishes to learn those languages, are so many new words, and add much to the difficulty of acquiring them." An adjective may be known by its admitting or requiring an appropriate substantive with it, to complete the con- struction, as — few are happy, i.e. few persons. Illustrations of Adjectives. THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE GLOBE. These, our actors, As I foretold you, were all spirits, and Are melted into air, — into thin air, — And like the baseless fahrick of this vision, The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces, The solemn temples, the great globe itself, Yea all which it inherit, shall dissolve, And like this unsubstantial pageant, faded, Leave not a rack behind. Tempest, act IV. Consequences of the want of perspicuity in a writer. If we are obliged to follow a writer with much care, to pause and to read over his sentences a second time, in order to com- prehend them fully, he will never please us long. Mankind are too indolent to relish much labour. They may pretend to admire the authors depth, after they have discovered his meaning ; but they will seldom be inclined to take up his work a second time." — Blair. In these illustrations the words printed in italic are adjec- tives, and they pertain to some noun, either expressed or understood ; Thus, baseless denotes a quality belonging to 76 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. fabric ; cloud-capped, that which pertains to or distinguishes towers. The adjective all, requires the noun ". things" to com plete the subject, and the word long, limits the signification of the noun understood, as — " a long time/' The force and beauty of the adjectives, baseless and cloud- capped, in the illustration from Shakespeare, has been noticed by Mr Brenan in his chapter on synonymous words. We quote his suggestion and remark, for the consideration of those who are too fond of latinized English, and we would remind the unpractised writer, that if the Latin derivatives are to be preferred for their sound, the English synonyms are generally superior in their force of signification. "Should any foolish pedant annoy you about the superior beauties of the classical languages, desire him to translate into Latin or Greek "cloud-capped towers" or " baseless fabric." He may with many words give the sense in a round about way, but as to energy and conciseness, they are confined to the English." — Brenan, Composition and Punctuation, chap. xi. p. 207. CHAPTER VI. THE PRONOUN. The personal pronouns give information which no other words* are capable of conveying ; but the other pronouns may, in general, have their place supplied by the words or clause3 to which they relate." — M'Culloch. There are no words that have a juster claim to originality and indispensable use in language than personal pronouns. Even those who deny their necessity are compelled to admit their utility. "The rude savage/' says Dr. Crombie, "could not converse with his fellow without some sign to discriminate the person speaking from the person addressed ; and if visible signs (as is probable) would be first adopted we may reasonably presume, on several grounds, that these would soon give place to audible expressions." Notwithstanding this opinion, Dr. Crombie insists that nouns and verbs are the only indispensable parts of speech. The maxim — alterum est quod loquimur, alterum de quo loquimur, may indeed be serviceable in a treatise on logic, as distinguishing the subject from the predicate, but it cannot apply to the component parts of speech. It tends only to perplex those who wish to understand the cause and origin of the different kinds of words. A pronoun is a word used for a noun, to avoid the too frequent repetition of the same word. Pronouns are either personal or definitive. A personal pronoun denotes an individual, and necessarily includes the proper name or definitive by which that par- * Yet this writer asserts that the noun and verb are the only indispensable parts of speech. 78 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. ticular object is distinguished from others comprehended under the general term. The pronoun, therefore, does not supply the place of any noun, neither does it refer to the proper name only, but it refers to both ; — to the proper name, or other definitive, as denoting the individual, and to the general term, as denoting the class to which the indivi- dual belongs. The pronoun / denotes the person speaking, thou the person spoken to, and the pronouns he, she, and it, the person or object spoken of. Pronouns, as Mr. Lewis has observed, represent not only that single word which, in every specific description, is called a noun ; but they repre- sent, also, the adjectives, and all the adjectives and definitives which are connected with such noun ; thus, in the example, " a holy man is called a saint," and he is an object of religi- ous veneration ; the word he is used instead not only of man, or a man, but instead of a holy man. And if it were necessary to use the noun instead of the pronoun we should likewise be obliged to use also the definitive and the adjective. A definitive pronoun is a substitute for a definitive, and requires an appellative noun to be added to complete its signification, as — his, my, her, its, &c. These, by a slight modification, are made to include both the definitive and general term, as — mine, thine, ours, yours, theirs, &c. "That there is a near relation," says Mr. Harris, "between pronouns and articles the old grammarians have all acknow- ledged, and some words it has been doubtful to which class to refer. The best rule to distinguish them is this, — the genuine pronoun always stands by itself, assuming the power of a noun, and supplying its place. The genuine article never stands by itself, but appears at all times associated to some- thing else, requiring a noun for its support, as much as attributes and adjectives." After discriminating so clearly the properties of a definitive and a pronoun, it is rather surprising Mr. Harris did not arrive at the source whence the distinction originated, and that he did not ascribe to the difference of nouns the cause of the difference existing in their substitutes. Though pronouns are commonly considered as "words used instead of nouns, to avoid the repetition of the same PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 79 word/' yet it is evident that the pronouns / and thou imply something more than the nouns which they represent ; for if the nouns were substituted, the subjects would be of the third person, and no longer represent the person speaking, or person spoken to, but the person spoken of, and the verb would agree with the nouns in the third person. Dr. Crombie has noticed this peculiarity, and his remarks are so much to the purpose that we need make no apology for laying them before the reader: — ' ' I have said that pronouns are employed to prevent the tiresome repetition of names. It is not, however, to be hence inferred that even the repetition of the name would in all cases answer the same purpose, or denote the subject with the same precision as the pronoun. For as there is hardly any name, strictly speaking, proper or peculiar to one individual, the employment of a name belonging to more persons than one would not so clearly specify or individuate the object as the appropriate pronoun. Hence it would be often necessary to subjoin to the name some distinctive circumstances, to discriminate the person intended from others of that name, or the speaker would be obliged to point to the individual, if he happened to be present. Nay, though the person or subject designed might be thus sufficiently ascertained, it is easy to see that the phraseology would have nothing of that simpli- city and energy which accompany the pronoun. If, instead of saying ' I am the God/ we should say, ' the Lord is the God/ or instead of ' thou art the man/ — 'David is the man/ the energy of expression would be entirely destroyed. If any person speaking of himself, should distinguish himself from others of the same name, by subjoining the necessary discriminating circumstances, so as to leave no doubt in the mind of the hearer, it is obvious that this phraseology would not only be inelegant, but also feeble and unimpressive. To be convinced of the truth of this observation it is only necessary to compare the exanimate, stiff, and frequently obscure diction of a common card, with the freedom perspi- cuity and vivacity of a letter." Not only the utility, but the necessity, of pronouns, or some equivalent signs, is evident from the fact that the name of the speaker or the name of the person addressed may be 80 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE- unknown ; and so also may be the name of the person or thing spoken of, as — when it is asked, who or what is it? The pro* noun it stands in the place of the name of the unknown or undefined person or object ; and it may be here remarked, that the neuter pronoun it, when thus applied to persons, is more correct than he or she, because the word person is intended, and the sex being unknown, the use of the other pronouns would be absurd. The personal pronouns are, /, thou, he, she, it* and their plurals we, ye, or you, they. The pronouns thou and ye are nearly obsolete, the pronoun you supplying the place of singular and plural, nominative and accusative. " You, formerly was confined to the objective case, and ye exclusively used for the nominative." — Murray. The pronouns /, thou, he, she, we, and they, are changed when they represent a noun in the objective case, as — me, thee, him, her, and them. The possessive pronouns are definitives and do not make sense of themselves, but require to be joined to a noun to complete the signification. They are my, thy, his, her, (the same as the objective,) its, our, your, their. Those writers who give mine, thine, hers, ours, yours, and theirs, as the possessive cases of their several pronouns, appear to overlook the extent of signification applied to these modifications of the corresponding definitives ; for the pro- nouns mine, thine, hers, include not only the possessive noun, but the subject noun also, as — this book is mine, i. e. my book ; here the pronoun my stands in the place of the owner's name, and is the true possessive pronoun, or word put in the place of a noun in the possessive case. The pro- nouns my, thy, &c, do not, as Dr. Crombie affirms, express the subject, but only that part of the subject which distin- guishes an individual from others of its kind, the name of the possessor, or a pronoun in the same case, being used as a definitive to the subject noun, as— my book, thy book, her * The pronoun it is generally used for irrational or inanimate objects, and some grammarians scruple to class it among the personal pronouns, but since this pronoun is sometimes employed to represent persons as well as things, it may, without much impropriety, be permitted to retain its place among personal pronouns. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 81 book, their book. It is true the words mine, thine, hers, theirs, sound better in a grammar when ranged with the pro- nouns / and me, thou and thee, she and her, they and them, because they seem to correspond with the definition of a pronoun ; but it should be remembered that a noun in the possessive case does not make sense of itself, but requires to be joined to another word, as — this is the king's ; whereas mine, thine, hers, theirs, include the subject and its definitive, and may properly be denominated pronouns, for they stand for individuals, and the names of the individuals the nouns belong to also. Mr. Cobbett says the nouns denoted by the pronouns ours, yours, theirs, &c, are understood (subauditur) , and he misleads his reader by adducing this illustration — " this is hers, that is to say, her property, her hat, or whatever else." In the pronoun hers, thesubject noun is not only understood, but it is included in the same manner as adjectives and defi- nitives are included in the nominative and objective cases of personal pronouns ; but in the pronoun her, the subject noun, when omitted, must be supplied by the mind to com- plete the sense. The first abbreviation (hers) is employed to diminish the force of signification, the last (her, without its noun) for the sake of dispatch. " The notion," says Mr. M'Cullock, " that pronouns have been invented to prevent the too frequent iteration of nouns, seems erroneous. Even supposing the pronoun fit to stand as the representative of the noun in every case (which it ob- viously is not), it must be expressed as often as the noun of which it is the representative : and in what respect is the repetition of one class of words preferable to the repetition of another ?" This question can be satisfactorily answered only by re- ferring to that leading principle in the formation of language THAT WORDS SHOULD EXPRESS IDEAS AS NEARLY AS POSSIBLE WITH THE SAME FORCE, AND IN THE SAME MANNER OF SIGNIFICATION, AS THOSE IDEAS HAVE BEEN conceived in the mind. Hence the origin of the different sorts of words. For the purpose of denoting emphatically the relation of possession or property, the word own is frequently joined to G 82 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. the possessive cases of pronouns, as — my own, their own ; and to mark the person with emphasis, the pronouns are compounded with self, as — myself, himself, yourselves, them- selves. These pronouns also often represent that abstract notion which man forms of himself when he is the subject of his own thoughts, or when the mind contemplates its own operations. In the following example the pronoun yourself is used for both these purposes : — " Nay, we speak it with sorrow, even you yourself, whom we should least suspect of all mankind, can hardly acquit yourself of having given us some cause of complaint." — Spectator. So also a man is said to accuse himself — he being the accuser, and himself the culprit. But let not the reader imagine that we wish to defend the opinion that man is essentially composed of two distinct beings, or that such a chimera as an abstract man actually exists ; the proofs of these hypotheses must be left to metaphysicians : all that we aim at is to show that a man sometimes finds it conve- nient and agreeable to speak of himself and that language furnishes the means by which he may be enabled to do so. Pronouns of the third person singular admit the distinction of gender, but rather for convenience than from necessity ; for by means of this distinction a greater latitude is given to the use of the several pronouns. We concur with Dr. Crombie in his opinion on this point, and shall close our observations on the personal pronouns by quoting the words of that writer, in preference to giving the substance of his remarks as our own ; — " The pronouns of the first and second persons are either masculine or feminine ; the reason is, says Mr. Harris, because the sex of the speaker and of the person addressed is generally obvious. This explanation, which has been adopted by most grammarians, appears to me unsatisfactory and erroneous. Others have said that the pronouns of the first and second persons have no distinction of sex, because all distinction of this kind is foreign to the intention of the speaker, who, when he uses the pronoun I, means the person who speaks, be it man or woman ; and when he employs the pronoun thou, means the person addressed, without any regard to the sex of the individual. This matter seems suifi- PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 83 ciently plain : language, to be useful, must be perspicuous and intelligible, exhibiting the subject and its attributes with clearness and precision. If it should be asked why the pro- noun of the third person has three varieties, Mr. Harris would answer, 'to mark the sex/ If it were inquired, whence arises the necessity of marking the sex, he would answer, and very justly, * in order to ascertain the subject of discourse.' It is obvious, therefore, that to note the sex is not the primary object, and that the principal aim of the speaker is to discriminate and mark the subject. The pro- nouns of the first and second persons have no variety of form significant of sex, because the speaker and the person addressed are evident without it. Mr. Harris, therefore, should have said that the pronouns in question have no dis- tinction of gender, not because the sex of the speaker and of the person addressed, but because the persons themselves, are in general obvious without the aid of sexual designation. The intention of the speaker is not to denote the sex, but the person spoken of, whether male or female ; to ascertain which person, if absent, the discrimination of sex is generally necessary. The sex, therefore, enters not as an essential, but as an explanatory circumstance, — not as the subject of discourse, but to distinguish the subject. Where the person is present, and is either the speaker or the person addressed, discrimination of sex becomes unnecessary, the pronoun itself marking the individuals. When the person or subject of discourse is absent, the distinction of sex serves frequently to determine the subject. Hence the pronoun of the third person has three varieties, — he for the masculine, she for the feminine, and it for the neuter." Relative Pronouns. As all pronouns refer to some noun either expressed or understood, the characteristic of reference to an antecedent, appropriated to this class, does not comprehend any essential property by which relative pronouns may be distinguished. It has been observed that " relatives partake the nature of conjunctions, both as they are the instruments of linking the g 2 84 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. members of sentences together, and as they have no inde- pendent signification of their own." But it appears hitherto to have escaped the notice of grammarians that relatives, like many conjunctions, lessen the force of affirmation in the members or clauses which they connect, and leave the leading proposition of a com- pound sentence more emphatic and distinct ; for example — The man hath no music in himself, and he is not moved with concord of sweet sounds, and he is fit for treasons. Here are three distinct assertions ; but in the original there is but one, the force of affirmation being qualified by the relative. Ex. The man that hath no music in himself, And (that) is not moved with concord of sweet sounds, is fit for treasons. The first and second clause are definitive, and do not require a direct assertion. The same power is observable in other pronouns. Ex. — I desire to know whether you have finished your task. The pronoun whether (equivalent to a conjunction) quali- fies the last clause, and the sentence, though containing two verbs, expresses but one affirmation. The pronouns called relative are who, which, that, and the compound relative what. The pronoun who is either masculine or feminine, and refers to persons only ; the pronoun which is neuter ; that is common to the three genders ; what is equivalent to the de- monstrative that, and the relative which; — this is what I sought, i.e. that which J sought. The pronoun who is varied to denote the case of the noun for which it stands, as — nominative who, possessive whose, objective whom ; which is the same in the nominative and objective ; whose is com- monly, and without inconvenience, used for the possessive of which ; where obscurity is apprehended, the periphrasis of which should be employed. By the use of this licence, one word is substituted for three, as — " philosophy, whose end is to instruct us in the knowledge of nature ; that is, philoso- phy, the end of which is to instruct us. The pronouns who, which, and what are used as interroga- tes . PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 85 Ex. — Who first seduced them to this foul revolt ? Mr. Harris observes that, even when these pronouns become interrogatives, they do not lose their character as relatives, The difference is that, without an interrogation, they have reference to a subject which is antecedent, definite, and known ; with an interrogation, to a subject which is subsequent, indefinite, and unknown, and which it is expected that the answer should express and ascertain. In interrogative sentences the tone or emphasis distin- guishes whether the subject represented by the relative be known or unknown. The emphasis is indicated in writing by the note of interrogation. Adjective Pronouns. Adjective pronouns are used as definitives whenever they require a noun to complete their signification. In this respect (as well as in limiting general terms) they resemble adjectives. Ex. — Every man should act honestly towards his neigh- bour. Ex. — Do to other men as you would have others do to you. Ex. — All are not just because they do no wrong. The words usually assigned to this class of pronouns are — my your both some such no thy their either every latter thus his this neither other former few her that whether any another many our each all one none several " One method," says Mr. Harris, " of expressing parti- culars is that of proper names. This is the least artificial, because proper names, being in every district arbitrarily applied, may be unknown to those who know the language perfectly well, ancl can hardly, therefore, with propriety, be considered as parts of it. The other, and more artificial method, is that of definitives or articles, whether we assume 86 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. the pronominal, or those more strictly so called. And here we cannot enough admire the exquisite art of language, which, without wandering into infinitude, contrives how to denote things infinite; that is to say, in other words, which, by the small tribe of definitives, properly applied to general terms, knows how to employ these last, though, in number, infinite, to the accurate expression of infinite particulars." To explain what has been said by a single example : — "Let the general term be man. I have occasion to apply this term to the denoting of some particular. Let it be required to express this particular, as unknown, I say, a man ; known, I say, the man : indefinite, any man ; definite, a certain man • present and near, this man; present and distant, that man; like to some other, such a man; an indefinite multitude, many men; a definite multitude, a thousand men; the ones of a multitude, taken throughout, every man; the same ones, taken with distinction, each man; taken in order, first man, second man; the whole multitude of particulars, taken col- lectively, all men; the negation of this multitude, no man." — Harris. Hermes, book iii. chap. 3. With this view of the definitive, we conclude the etymo- logy of pronouns. Syntax of Pronouns. Rule 1. Pronouns agree in gender, number, case, and person with the nouns they are intended to represent. Ex. — " Answer a fool according to his folly lest he be wise in his own conceit." — Proverbs xxvi. 4. Ex. — "As to the book itself, it can say this in its behalf, that it does not merely confine itself to what its title pro- mises." — Harris. The frequent repetition of the pronoun in this example is scarcely perceived, but if the noun had been used the recur- rence of the more emphatic term would not only have been irksome, but would have rendered the other terms of the sentence less forcible. For example : — As to the book, the book's self, the book can say this in the book's behalf, that the book does not merely confine the book's self to what the book's title promises. Pronouns, therefore, are used to avoid the force of signifi- PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 87 cation which is attached to the noun, and not merely to avoid the repetition of the same word, for it is evident that the same pronoun may be repeated in cases where the repe- tition of the noun would be considered inelegant. The noun, however, should be repeated as often as the subjects are changed in a sentence, or whenever perspicuity requires the repetition. Ex. — "The bodies which we daily handle make us per- ceive that whilst they remain between them, they do by an insurmountable force hinder the approach of our hands that press them." — Locke. The pronoun them has no antecedent, and as both the sub- jects of the sentence are in the plural number, the pronouns should have been used more sparingly. — Thus, The bodies which we daily handle make us perceive that whilst they remain between our hands, they do by an insur- mountable force hinder the approach of our hands that press them. "When I see too many its in a page" says Mr. Cobbett, " I always tremble for the writer." — We are surprised that Mr. Cobbett did not detect and quote in justification of his fears, the following illustration from the pen of Dr. Lowth, for Mr. Cobbett seems to have studied Dr. Lowth's Intro- duction carefully, and with no small advantage. Ex. — "In English the preposition is more frequently placed after the verb, and separates it from it like an adverb, in which situation it is no less apt to affect the sense of it, and to give it a new meaning, and may still be considered as belonging to the verb, and a part it." — Lowth. This example may serve to exercise the ingenuity of the inexperienced grammarian, by supplying the appropriate nouns in the places of the neuter pronoun. Each personal pronoun has a corresponding plural, because, 1st. There may be many persons at once of the same sentiment, and the person speaking includes these under the pronoun we. 2ndly. An address may be made to many, as well as to one, the pronoun ye or you denotes the plural. 3rdly. The subject of discourse often includes many, and the individuals are denoted by the appropriate pronoun they. 88 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. In the arrangement of pronouns in a sentence the pronoun of the second person is generally placed before the pronoun of the third; but the pronoun of the first person ought always to be placed last. Ex. — You and he have quarrelled, i.e. ye have quarrelled; he and I are friends, i.e. we are friends. It was Mr. Cobbett's ignorance of the principles of gram- mar that caused him to condemn this construction. The first person is preferred to the second, and the second to the third, because the first person plural can represent the three persons singular, and the second person plural can include the third person singular ; whereas neither the second nor the third person plural can include the first person singular, nor can the third person plural include the second person singular. The neuter pronoun "it" is used to denote a. person when the sex of the individual is either unknown or not referred to. Ex. — Who is it ? — It is the person who called yesterday. The same pronoun is also used as an expletive to introduce a plural subject, whether the nouns represent persons or things. Ex.— "Tis they that give the great Atrides* spoils." — Prior. Ex. — "Tis these that early taint the female soul." — Pope. Dr. Crombie justly observes that "when a question is asked, the subject of which is totally unknown, there must be some indefinite word employed to denote the subject of the interrogation. The word which we use for this purpose is it, as — 'who is it;' ' what is it.' This being the case, there can be no impropriety in repeating, in the answer, the indefi- nite term employed in the question. We may, therefore, reply, 'it is I;' ' it is he ;' ' it is she/ " " Now if the term be admitted in questions and answers, where the subject may be either male or female, and of the first, second, or third person, it surely is admissible in those cases also where the subject is in the plural number; nay, to use in answer any other word to express the subject than that by which it is signified in the question, would be, in all cases, if not productive of ambiguity, at least less precise. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 89 Who is it ? says the master to his servant, hearing a voice in the hall. It is the gentlemen who called yesterday, replies the servant. Who sees not that, "they are the gentlemen," would be an answer less accordant* with the terms of the question, and would less clearly show that " the gentlemen," and "the subject of inquiry/' both being denoted by one term, are one and the same? Had the master known that it was the voice of a gentleman, and that there were more than one, and he accordingly said, "who are they?" the answer would have properly been, "they are the gentlemen," But when the question is, "who is \t?" I apprehend the only apposite answer is, " it is the gentleman," the identity of the terms (it being repeated) clearly evincing the identity of the subject in the question and in the answer; in other words, that the sub- ject of inquiry, and the subject of the answer, are one and the same."f The plural pronoun we is often employed to denote an individual, instead of the personal pronoun /. The writer of these pages has frequently had recourse to this excusable licence, because the pronoun we appeared to him less obtru- sive, and less likely to withdraw the attention of the reader from the subject, than the egotistic pronoun /. Under this impression we shall not hesitate to continue the practice. The pronoun thou, and consequently the pronoun thee, are now rarely employed on ordinary occasions. " Thou," says Dr. Ash, in his Grammar, " is used to denote the greatest respect, as — O thou most high; and, likewise, to denote the greatest contempt, as — thou worth- less fellow. It was probably some remark of this kind which assisted to bring the useful pronoun thou into contempt : — Mankind are too apt to credit the assertions of the learned, and to be overawed by the authority of a great name. The respect and contempt attributed by Dr. Ash to the pronoun is implied in * And therefore less grammatical. Phraseologies established by univer- sal usage are not, as Dr. Crombie asserts, unexceptionable because they are universal, but because such phraseologies are in general (if not always) grammatical idioms. It is their perspicuity and accuracy that cause them to be universally adopted. f Crombie. — Etymology and Syntax, pp. 86, 87. 90 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. the attributes highest and worthless. The pronoun is merely emphatic. But the agreement which grammarians require to be observed between this pronoun and the verb, and which the mind perceives to be unnecessary and formal, is perhaps the chief cause of its disuse, For, except in the irregular verb "to be," the variation of the second person of the verb might be dispensed with. But custom has so long associated the termination with the pronoun, that it will be difficult to persuade a scholar that " thou love" is as grammatical as " thou lovest." In fact, the former is better grammar; for the syllable est, in the latter, is redundant. The last, it is true, is conformable to usage, but the first would be in strict conformity with the principles of con- struction. We would, however, remind the reader that these remarks are not intended as practical, but as theoretical ; for, having shown, in another place, the inconvenience of using the pronoun you for both numbers, we have added these observations to prove that the abuse is not necessary. The pronouns my, thy, her, our, your, their, his and its, do not express the subject, but the subject's possessor. They are the possessive cases of their several personal pronouns. The pronouns mine, thine, hers, ours, yours, theirs, belong to a class sui generis, and they cannot, with propriety, be included in the declensions of personal pronouns. The possessives his and its end in s, and have not received the additional modification by which others of this class are distinguished, when they include, in their signification, the subject noun. Mine and thine were formerly used for my and thy before words beginning with a vowel. The pronoun her is used both as the possessive and as the objective case of the nominative, she. Rule II. The relative pronoun agrees with its antecedent in gender, number, and person. The relative is in the same case the noun would be in if used in its stead. Ex. — " He who renders full justice to his enemy shall have friends." Who is the nominative case to the verb renders, and agrees with its antecedent pronoun he in gender, number, and person. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 91 Ex. — Arrangement prevents trouble, which is always a consequence of confusion. The relative which is the nominative to the verb "is," and refers to trouble, as its antecedent, in the objective case. Mr. Cobbett asserts that the relative can never be the nominative or subject of the verb. It does not require much grammatical knowledge to detect the inaccuracy of this opinion. The last example sufficiently contradicts Mr. Cobbett's assertion. But in cases where ambiguity might arise, the noun should be repeated. The relative that is used sometimes either for who or which. Ex. — "The poor man who envies not the rich, who pities his companions of poverty, and can spare something for him that is still poorer, is, in the realms of humanity, a king of kings." The pronoun that refers to him, and the relative is the nominative to the substantive verb. Ex. — " The sweetest attribute of humanity, and that which affords the most solid and permanent satisfaction in social intercourse, is good nature." The relative which is the nominative to the verb " affords," and refers to the antecedent " attribute." The antecedent is also the noun belonging to the demonstrative that. The parenthetical clause is elliptical: — "That is the attribute, which attribute," &c, and not "which sweetest attribute of humanity." This double relative is called by grammarians the compound relative, when it is expressed by the single term what. What has a less determinate signification than "that which," and cannot, with propriety, always supply the place of those pronouns. In the above example it might be used, but it would, perhaps, be considered less elegant. Ex. — " Happy are they whose amusement is knowledge, and whose supreme delight is the cultivation of the mind." The relative whose, in this example, represents a noun, pertaining to another noun, as its possessor. The relative is, therefore, put in the possessive case. It may be observed that the pronoun they, in this example, is incorrect, as the 92 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. persons the pronoun represents are indefinite, and the relative clause merely contains the description of those persons who are happy. It should be — happy are those whose amusements, &c. Rule III. The relative is the nominative case to the verb when no nominative comes between it and the verb. Ex. — True philosophy, which is the ornament of our nature, consists more in the love of our duty, and in the practice of virtue, than in great talents and extensive know- ledge. When a nominative comes between the relative and the verb, the relative is governed by some word in its own member of the sentence. Ex. — He who preserves me, to whom I owe my being, whose I am, and whom I serve, is eternal. " In the several members of the last sentence the relative performs a different office. In the first member it marks the agent, in the second it submits to the government of the preposition, in the third it represents the possessor, and in the fourth the object of an action, and therefore it must be in the three different cases correspondent to those offices." — Murray. Rule IV. When the relative is preceded by two nomina- tives, it will govern the verb according to the antecedent it represents. Ex. — I am he who is condemned, but i" who have been condemned, am not the guilty person. The order of the clauses will determine the person or concord of the verb. Ex. — I am the man who commands you. Ex. — I am the man who command you. Of these two examples the first is correct, the last is not. It should be, "I who command you am the man." " The construction " observes Dr. Crombie, " is by no means arbitrary." If we say, "lam the man who commands you," the relative clause, with the antecedent man, form the predicate, and the sentence is equivalent to " I am your commander/' If we say "I am the man who command you," the man simply is the predicate, and " I who command you," the subject, thus " I who command you," or " I your commander am the man." PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 93 Ex. — I am verily a man who am a Jew. The relative stands in the place of the speaker as represen- ting the man the speaker is describing, and the verb should be of the third person, "aman who is a Jew." The relative that is used when the verb refers to persons and things. Ex. — The woman and the estate that became his portion, were too much for his moderation. "There are cases/' says Mr. Murray, "wherein we cannot conveniently dispense with this relative as applied to person;" but neither Mr. Murray, nor has any other grammarian attempted to explain the cause of this singularity. Ex. — Who, that has any sense of religion, would have argued thus? The relative that has the power of a conditional conjunc- tion, and is not simply the nominative to the verb. Ex. — Who (if that man has any sense of religion,) would have argued thus? The conditional clause connected by the relative may be as conveniently added by using the present participle of the verb without the relative. Ex. — Who, having any sense of religion, would have argued thus? The relative that is used in preference to who, after the words '■ same" and " all." Custom has decided this prefer- ence, since both are grammatical and equally perspicuous. The relative is sometimes made to refer to one of the terms of a complex noun, and as the term or phrase the relative refers to is the one used definitively or adjectively, the mind in general perceives an impropriety. This idiom is often the cause of ambiguity, and should if possible be avoided. Ex. — The object of this work, which is entirely new, is to comprise. The mind perceives that " work," only, is the antecedent to the pronoun, and not the whole subject of the leading sentence, but this is not always so evident. Ex. — " For this very remarkable success I am chiefly indebted to my anxiety for plain explanation, which I am highly gratified to perceive is every day gaining strength and popularity." — Brenan. 94 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. The logical or rather grammatical structure of this sentence, would induce the reader to suppose that the author's anxiety for plain explanation is every day gaining strength and popu- larity. The absurdity of this assertion alone makes the reader look for another meaning, when he discovers that the subordinate noun and its adjective, "plain explanation/' con- nected with the principle noun to form the subject is the only part of the phrase to which the writer refers. This construction sometimes obtains in the use of the personal pronouns. Ex. — "Had the opinion of my censurers been unanimous, it might have overset my resolution; but since I find them at variance with each other I can without scruple neglect them, and follow my own imagination." — Johnson. A remarkable instance of the liability to error arising from this mode of expression, occurs in the writings of Dr. Watts. " If the question be proposed whether excess of wine can be hurtful to him that drinks it, and the sophister should prove that it revives his spirits, it exhilerates his soul, it gives a man courage, and makes him strong and active, and then he takes it for granted that he has proved his point." The fallacy of this mode of reasoning is detected by the grammarian, for he perceives that the subject in the subse- quent part of the sentence is changed; for what is there stated refers simply to "wine," and not to the "excess of wine," as proposed by Dr. Watts in the question. Rule V. — When the relative refers to a noun of multitude, that represents a collection of individuals taken as a whole, the pronoun "which," should be employed, and the verb it governs should be in the singular number. Ex. — The crowd which was assembled in the street, was dispersed by the constables. But if the relative who be employed, the individuals are separately referred to, and the verb agrees with the noun in the plural. Ex. — "The crowd who were assembled in the street pelted the constables." — i. e. they, the persons, pelted the constables, not it pelted. This rule is opposed to the opinion of Mr. Cobbett, who PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 95 says that "the crowd which was," and "the crowd who was," are equally proper. Whose, is employed as the possessive case of which. Ex. — " In our ancient law books, a farding-deale of land means the fourth part of an acre, whose rent was in Richard the second's time so restrained, that for a farding-deale of land they paid no more than one penny."- — Horne Tooke. It may be remarked that in this example the personal pronoun they is used in the vague sense of the French pronoun on. The relative pronouns have a less definite signification when united to the adverbs so and ever, /'Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the catholic faith." Ever united to a relative is equivalent to the definitive any, whoever, which ever, that is, any who, any which. Ever, united to the adverb when has the meaning of the adverb always. This may be seen by the following example. Ex. — Always when you are examining a sentence, you will take into your view the words that are left out. i. e. Whenever you are. Rule VI. The demonstratives this and that, agree with their nouns in number, — as this man, these men ; that nation, those nations. The phrases — these kind of people, those sort of books, are therefore incorrect. "It is not always easy," says Mr. Murray, "to say whether a personal pronoun or demonstrative is preferable in certain constructions." Ex. — We are not unacquainted with the calumny of them, (or those,) who openly make use of the warmest professions. This doubtful point, so troublesome to many writers, has been decided by Dr. Epps, whose remarks are too well sup- ported by the principles of universal grammar to admit of contradiction. "There is an advantage which arises from considering these words as definitives, as by so doing we shall be prevented from falling into an improper use of the pronoun 'them," the objective case of the personal pronoun 'they.' Some writer says 'we ought to have great respect for them who are 96 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. wise and good.' This them should be those, and for this rea- son, that, in the sentence, no persons for whom them can stand^have been mentioned. These persons are to be defined, and therefore we should say ' those/ or, in other words, we should use the definitive to which the noun is added ; or, if not, is understood. However, we say ' some persons are wise and good ; I love them. Here, them is correct, because the persons are defined before hand, and therefore the pronoun may stand in their place, but it cannot stand in the place of nouns which have not been mentioned. This affords a striking difference between the pronoun and the definitive." Epps. The demonstrative pronoun this, refers to a present, near, or last mentioned subject ; that, to an absent, more distant, or first mentioned one. In the following example they are incorrectly applied. Ex, — "That national use might be opposed to foreign scarcely needs illustration; for the introduction of extraneous words or idioms from other languages, and foreign nations, is a greater transgression than the adoption into pure English of provincial terms, and cant phrases. This, is the error of the learned, that, of the vulgar." — Campbell. " The introduction of foreign idioms," being the first men- tioned subject, and the error of the learned, the demonstrative, that should have been employed, or the words learned and vulgar should have exchanged places. " This is the error of the vulgar, that of the learned." The adjectives/onwer and latter, and the phrases "the one" and "the other," are also used as demonstratives. Ex. — " When a speaker addresses the understanding, he proposes the instruction of his hearers by explaining some- thing unknown to them, or by proving some position they doubt. His purpose is to dispel ignorance, or to vanquish error. In the one his aim is their information, in the other their conviction. Accordingly, the predominant quality of the former is perspicuity, the latter argument. By that we are made to know, .by this to believe." — Campbell. Ex. — " Homer was the greater genius, Virgil the better artist ; in the one we most admire the man, in the other the work." — Pope. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 97 Mr. Brenan condemns the use of these convenient demon- stratives, and asserts that the one and the other are " sheer nonsense;" but is Mr. Brenan's practice consistent with his criticism ? Ex. — "As the colon retreated its half-brother declined so much in importance, that we are now independent of both one and the other." — Brenan. Mr. Brenan's language is both redundant and defective, and at the same time inconsistent with his avowed opinion. It is redundant because the pronoun "both" includes the one and the other. It is defective in the omission of the article before one, and its inconsistency is evident from what has already been quoted respecting the author's objections to the terms he himself uses in the foregoing example. The demonstratives, former and latter, are ambiguously employed in the following example. Ex. — " Language consists of intelligible signs, and is the medium by which the mind communicates its thoughts. It is either articulate or inarticulate; artificial or natural. The former is peculiar to man, the latter is common to all animals." Crombie. The " former" refers to articulate and artificial, the "latter" to inarticulate and natural; but there are few readers, ignorant of these distinctions, would so understand the meaning of the writer. The sentence thus corrected renders the passage intelligible. Ex. — Language consists of intelligible signs, and is the medium by which the mind communicates its thoughts. It is either articulate and artificial, or inarticulate and natural. The former is peculiar to man, the latter is common to all animals. Rule VII. The adjective pronouns each, every, either, neither, whether, agree with nouns in the singular number. Ex. — Each man was rewarded. Each of these deserves a certain degree of attention, Ex. — Every man must account for himself. Ex. — It is either day or night. Ex. — Neither of my friends was there. Ex. — Whether is greater, the gold or the temple? The pronoun either, from an affectation of refinement, is sometimes used instead of each. H 98 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Ex. — And leaning from the front window with a pistol in either hand. The writer meant to say the person had a pistol in each hand. Either refers to one object, each to several. The pronouns either, neither, and whether, are also used as con- junctions. All is used with a noun singular when it refers to quantity, and with a plural noun when it refers to number. The con- struction of the following sentence, therefore, though written by a grammatist is incorrect. Ex. — "For to all is a knowledge of his own language necessary." — Kenny. It should be " their own language," or rather— For to every one is a knowledge of his own language necessary. The former and the latter are sometimes used to denote the definitives and the subject noun, in the same man- ner, and by the same means, as the possessive cases of the personal pronouns our, your, denote their subjects by the addition of s. The apostrophe, or sign of the genitive, is unnecessary, and a departure from analogy. Ex. — " The participle is distinguished from the adjective by the former's expressing the idea of time, and the latter's denoting only a quality." — Murray. None, which originally signified no one, is now used as plural when it refers to number. Ex. — None of them are varied to express the gender. Ex. — None of them has attempted to show by what steps they proceed. It should be have attempted. "Any, the diminutive of ane or one, involves, in common with a or an, the idea of unity; but it is used still more indefinitely, being employed to denote whatever one of a num- ber it be." Many, few, several, some, denote number inde- finitely: many is opposed to few. Ex. — Many are called, few are chosen. "Both signifies two persons or things taken together." Ex. " We, Hermia, like two artificial gods, Have, with our needle, created both one flower, Both on one sampler, sitting on one cushion; Both warbling of one song, both in one key, As if our hands, our sides, voices, and minds, Had been incorporate." Shakespeare. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 99 Other is a definitive, and requires to be joined to a noun to complete the subject; it is used before singular and plural nouns. Ex. — " Milton uses the same manner of expression in a few other places of his Paradise Lost, and more frequently in his poems." — Lowth. The pronoun other should also have been used before the word " poems," for the Paradise Lost was one of Milton's Poems. Dr. Lowth's construction implies that it was a prose production. We shall conclude the syntax of pronouns with a short extract from Dr. Lowth's Introduction, on the importance of the relative and other pronouns. "The accuracy and clearness of the sentence depend very much upon the proper and determinate use of the relative, so that it may readily present its antecedent to the mind of the hearer or reader, without any obscurity or ambiguity. The same may be observed of the 'pronoun and the noun, which, by some, are called also the relative and antecedent." A pronoun may be known by its being the representative of a noun, either expressed or understood. Illustration of Pronouns. The Closing Scene of a Worldly and Selfish Character. " The obsequies of the dead were like the living character of the woman, cold, formal, and artificial. The sexton and his assistants had hardly commenced replacing the stone which covered the entrance of the vault, when a knot of elderly men set the example of desertion, by moving away in a body from the spot. As they picked their footsteps among the graves, and over the frozen ground of the church- yard, they discoursed idly together of the fortunes and age of the woman of whom they had now taken their leave for ever. The curse of selfishness appeared even to have fallen on the warning which so sudden an end should have given to those who forgot they tottered themselves on the brink of the grave. They spoke of the deceased, as of one who had failed to awaken h 2 100 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. the charities of our nature; and though several ventured con- jecture as to the manner in which she had disposed of her worldly possessions, no one remembered to lament that she had not longer continued to enjoy them. From this theme they soon wandered to themselves, and the whole party quitted the churchyard, joking each other on the inroads of time, each man attempting to ape the elastic tread of youth, in order not only to conceal from his companions the ravages of age, but with a vain desire to extend the artifice so far, if possible, as. to deceive himself." — Cooper. CHAPTER VII. THE VERB. " All those attributives which have the complex power of denoting both an attribute and an assertion make that species of words which grammarians call verbs." — Harris. " Of the whole class of words" says Blair, "that are called attributive, indeed of all the parts of speech, the most com- plex, by far, is the verb. It is chiefly in this part of speech, that the subtle and profound metaphysic of language appears, and therefore in examining the nature and different varia- tions of the verb, there might be room for ample discussion." Mr. Cobbett thought " it impossible to give a short and precise description of this part of speech, because there are so many properties and circumstances, so many and such different powers and functions belonging to it." Now, there is only one property or circumstance, power or function, that characterises the grammarians' verb, and this property is its power of predicating the existence of an attribute, for when any word ceases to have this power, it is no longer considered by grammarians to be a verb. Almost every writer, who has carefully examined the structure of language, admits that this power of affirmation is the only criterion by which a verb may be known, and that the essence of the verb consists in affirmation. But it is contended that in making a verb a mere sign it is degraded from its rank, and confounded with a species of words which are not even necessary to the communication of thought. In answer to this objection, it may be urged that words are not always to be valued in proportion to the extent of their meaning, for their value may arise from the importance of their use; thus, the verb, or sign of affirmation, 102 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. is as indispensable in communicating our thoughts, as is the noun which denotes the subject, or the term which denotes that which is affirmed of the subject, for without the affirma- tive sign, either expressed or understood, there can be no complete sentence or proposition ; but as light would not be less valuable if it could be proved to be a mere phenomenon, so this word cannot be " degraded" even when divested of its meaning. The verb, however, is rarely used without conveying the notion of an attribute, and this has induced grammarians in general to include the attribute in their definition of a verb, and some writers have, in theory, gone so far as to make the attribute the essential characteristic. Mr. Murray says, " A verb is a word which signifies to be, to do, or to suffer." He afterwards remarks, " In our defi- nition of the verb, as a part of speech, which signifies to be, to do, or to suffer, &c. we have included every thing either expressly or by necessary consequence that is essential to its nature, and nothing that is not essential to it. This definition is warranted by the authority of Dr. Lowth, and many other respectable writers on grammar." If Mr. Murray had said that his definition was warranted by the nature of the verb, and consistent with his own in- structions and practice, when he analyses a sentence, we should have paid more respect to his opinion ; but as we con- sider great names of no weight when opposed to the laws of language, and as we are convinced that the rules of every science are independent of authority, we venture to controvert the propriety of this definition, for Mr. Murray has omitted the very property which alone qualifies this word to be what he himself calls it " The chief word in every sentence." The proofs which Mr. Murray advances against the opinions of those who consider assertion as the essence of the verb are, that " The participle and infinitive, if included in it, would prove insuperable objections to their scheme, as they have, without hesitation, denied the former a place in the verb, and declared the latter to be merely a verbal noun. Now the participles are modifications of the infinitive or verbal noun, and they are, in fact, the words which signify being, doing, and suffering (to be, to do, and to suffer,); but PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 103 although these words answer precisely to Mr. Murray's defini- tion of a verb, Mr. Murray, notwithstanding, rejects them, and confines the term "verb" to those modifications of the attribute which affirm, and yet he denies assertion to be the essential characteristic of this part of speech. What consistency can be found in such a theory, or how are such instructions to be comprehended? " A verb," says Dr. Crombie, "has been defined to be that part of speech which signifies to be, to do, or to suffer ; or, more correctly, that part of speech which predicates some action, passion, or state of its subject Its essence consists in affirmation, and by this property it is distinguished from every other part of speech." "The verb to be frequently denotes pure affirmation, as — God is good, where the verb, or copula, as it has been termed, serves to predicate of the Deity, the attribute denoted by the following word." Here it expresses mere affirma- tion. Sometimes it predicates pure and absolute existence, as — God is, that is, — God exists. In the following example it occurs in both senses. Ex. — We believe that thou art, and that thou art the re warder of them who diligently seek thee. Notwithstanding Dr. Crombie's clear explanation of the nature of the verb, he still adheres to the usual definition. " As nouns denote the subjects of our discourse, so verbs predicate their accidents or properties. The former are the names of things, and the latter what we say concerning them." This is making no distinction between the attribute and the verb, and the writer contradicts his approved definition, for when the verb denotes pure affirmation, as — God is just, the adjective "just" denotes what we say of the subject, but this attribute has no pretention to the character of a verb, the word is maintains its rank unincumbered by any other meaning than that of simple affirmation. Mr. Tooke denies affirmation to be essential to the verb, and he also declares that no single word can imply assertion. This last opinion has already been proved by Dr. Crombie to be erroneous ; and we suspect, notwithstanding Mr.Tooke's decided tone, that he knew very little of the nature of the verb. It is true he promised to explain the character of 104 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. this important part of speech, but when he arrived at the question — what is a verb? he artfully evaded the discussion. The little he has incidentally said upon the subject is neither new, nor much to the purpose. "The infinitive, says this writer, appears plainly to^be what the Stoics called it, the very verb itself, pure and uncom- pounded, with the various accidents, of mood, of number, of gender, of person, and, in English, of tense, which accidents are in some languages joined to the verb by variety of termi- nation, and in some by an additional word, signifying the added circumstance." The infinitive mood is an abstract noun and does not affirm ; it simply denotes, or names, an action or state of being; it is not therefore the word or verb of a sentence. Mr. Lewis defines a verb to be a word which, when placed after a noun or pronoun, expresses something respecting it, and when placed before it either commands or asks a question. This does not inform the reader what a verb is, it merely directs him to the part of a sentence, where verbs are usually to be found. In another part of his grammar, Mr. Lewis alludes to the essential characteristic of a verb, — "Any num- ber of words, says he, thrown together by accident, convey a distinct sense or meaning in themselves, or, separately, excite certain ideas in the mind, but they do not inform us of the intentions and views of the speaker in using them, for it is the proper object of speech to communicate. In short, words so thrown together want the dictum; they want that which marks the intention of the speaker,— the word which is emphatically called the word, that is, the verb." Notwithstanding these pertinent observations, it is evident that Mr. Lewis confounds this dictum or sign of affirmation with the attribute, for he says, — " The verb represents the thing or action affirmed or denied of the subject." "Verb," says Dr. Russell, " means said of a thing." This definition, it will be seen, arises from the notion that a verb is "what we say concerning the subject;" but we say of many things that they are black or white, right or wrong; and every one knows that such words are not verbs ; they are not even participial adjectives. It is true, that what are called verbs may be formed from these qualities, by prefixing PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 105 the sign which gives to a word an active signification ; but the ideas such words are intended to express are very different from those which we attach to the names of the simple quali- ties. Thus from wrong may be formed the verbal attribute to wrong, and when this attribute is " said of a thing," as — " he wrongs his friend," the word is so far a verb as it serves to express the affirmation ; but that which is affirmed, " the act of wronging," is not the verb, but the attribute, or active participle. " Some attributes," says Mr. Harris, (who appears to have understood the true character of the verb better than his great opponent Mr. Tooke, or any of the little critics who have echoed Mr. Tooke's opinions,) "have their essence in motion, such are — to walk, to fly, to strike, to live. Others have it in the privation of motion, such are — to stop, to rest, to cease, to die. And, lastly, others have it in subjects which have nothing to do with either motion or its privation, such are the attributes of great and little, white and black, wise and foolish; and, in a word, the several quantities, and qualities of all things. Now these last are adjectives, those which denote motions or their privation are either verbs or participles, and these attributes having the complex power of denoting an attribute and an assertion, make that species of words which grammarians call verbs." Mr. M'Culloch, a modern writer on grammar, professes to take an original view of this intricate part of speech ; but, although he at first considers affirmation as the sine qua non of a verb, still, like his predecessors, he confounds that essen- tial characteristic with the predicate, and ultimately makes " that which is said of the subject" to be the verb. " Verb," says the writer, " is the name given to all words whose office is to predicate or assert, as — strikes, walks, is." " As the noun is the word in a sentence which names the thing about which we speak, so the verb is the word which asserts or declares what we say concerning it." " The verb, in common with the adjective, expresses the quality or property of a noun; but these parts of speech are quite distinct, the adjective merely expresses quality, as con- joined with the noun it affirms nothing; but the verb always affirms." 106 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. "Nouns and verbs are the only indispensable parts of speech; the one to express the subject spoken of, and the other the predicate or what is affirmed of it." This is a direct contradiction, for the author has affirmed that the adjective is a part of speech quite distinct from the verb, and now he repeats that the noun and verb are the only indispensable parts of speech ? The fact is, the adjective differs essentially from those attributes which admit the force of affirmation, therefore adjectives are as indispensable as either the noun or the verb. It matters not by what contrivance adjectives are supplied, whether it be by using a noun adjectively, as — sea water, or more awkwardly by employing a preposition, as — a man of wealth, instead of a more appropriate term, a wealthy man, in every instance the name of the quality in concreto differs both in the extent of its signification and in its application, from the correspondent abstract noun; for the adjective and its noun do not denote distinct objects of perception when thus associated, but they unite and represent a par- ticular individual. "A verb," says Mr. Lennie, " is a word that affirms some- thing of its nominative, or " — "A verb is a word which expresses being,, doing, or suffering." This author, as if conscious of the contradiction contained in his definitions, has had the former printed in a smaller type, he might however have given the approved definition the preference. " A verb," says Mr. Walker, "is a part of speech sig- nifying existence, or some modifications thereof, as — action, or passion." But the verb only predicates existence, action, or passion ; the word representing either of these attributes is the predicate. This definition is therefore perplexing and in- accurate. Dr. Lowth, being the authority of most English gramma- rians, has the merit of the definition, that — a verb is a word which signifies to be, to do, and to suffer. Grammarians say truly, that the verb signifies being and doing, for the verb is the sign by which abstract names of actions and states PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 107 of being are united as attributes to other nouns, but the sense in which grammarians use the verb " to signify," is equivocal, and as regards their meaning misapplied. For they generally suppose that a verb means "to be, to do, or to suffer;" but they find it more convenient to say that verbs signify these attributes. " That the participle is a mere mood of the verb," says Dr. Lowth, "is manifest if our definition of a verb be ad- mitted, for it signifies being, and doing, and suffering, with the designation of time superadded. But if the essence of the verb be made to consist in affirmation, not only the par- ticiple will be excluded from its place in the verb, but the infinitive itself also, which certain ancient grammarians of great authority held to be alone the genuine verb, denying that title to all the other moods." These objections by Dr. Lowth have been noticed in the preceding remarks on Mr. Murray's definition of a verb. The present participle is a mood of the abstract noun, and as such may be attributed to its subject. It denotes an existing action, and necessarily implies present time. The genuine verb of Dr. Lowth's great authorities is the abstract verbal noun : it will neither admit of a nominative, nor the force of affirmation, nor does the infinitive under any circum- stances lose its independent character as a noun. Dr. Ash, a grammatical follower of Dr. Lowth, varies the original definition, and calls a verb a word which signifies the action or being of a person or thing, as — the man calls ; the city stands-, the tree falls; I am. Dr. Johnson has not defined the verb in his Grammar, but in his Dictionary he has quoted a rather better definition than is usually given. Verb, — a part of speech signifying existence or some modification thereof, as — action, passion ; and, withal, some disposition or intention of the mind relating thereto, as of affirming, denying, interrogating, commanding. " Besides words which are names of ideas in the mind, there are a great many others that are made use of to signify the connection that the mind gives to ideas or propositions one with another. The mind, in communicating its thoughts to others, does not only need signs of the ideas it has then before 108 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. it, but others also to show, or intimate, some particular action of its own, at that time relating to those ideas. This it does several ways, as — is, and is not, are the general marks of the mind affirming or denying. But besides affirmation or negation, without which there is in words no truth or falsehood, the mind does, in declaring its sentiments to others, connect not only the parts of propositions, but whole sen- tences, one to another, with their several relations and depen- dencies, to make a coherent discourse." — Locke. "A verb," says Dr. Blair, " is so far of the same nature with the adjective, that it expresses like it an attribute or property of some person or thing. But it does more than this : for, in all verbs, in every language, there are'no less than three things implied at once : — The attribute of some substantive, an affir- mation concerning that attribute, and time. Thus, when I say — the sun shineth, shining is the attribute ascribed to the sun, the present time is marked, and an affirmation is inclu- ded that this property belongs to the sun; the participle shining is merely an adjective which denotes an attribute or property, and also expresses time, but carries no affirmation. The infinitive mood to shine, may be called the name of the verb; it carries neither time nor affirmation, but simply expresses that attribute, action, or state of things, which is to be the subject of the other moods and tenses. Hence, the infinitive often carries the resemblance of a substantive noun, and in English is sometimes constructed as such, as — to write well is difficult; to speak eloquently is still more diffi- cult. But as through all the other tenses the affirmation runs, and is essential to them, the affirmation seems to be that which chiefly distinguishes the verb from the other parts of speech, and gives it its most conspicuous power. Hence there can be no sentence, or complete proposition, without a verb either expressed or implied : for whenever we speak we always mean to assert that something is, or is not, and the word which carries this assertion or affirmation is a verb. From this sort of eminence belonging to it, this part of speech hath received its name, verb, from the Latin verbum, or the word by way of distinction." The preeminence ascribed by this writer to the verb arises entirely from its property of predicating, and not from the PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 109 active or passive signification of the attribute. For being, doing, or suffering, may be expressed by joining the active or past participle to a noun, as — an existing circumstance, a working man, a wounded soldier. The difficulty hitherto felt in comprehending this intricate part of speech appears to have arisen chiefly from the man- ner in which it has been explained. For grammarians have made no distinction between the word or sign which affirms, and the word which denotes that which is affirmed. They have treated them as idem et alter, and by endeavouring to prove that the verb and the predicate are the same, they have rendered the definitions vague, and their explanations unin- telligible. As the structure of language is so connected with the verb, the following remarks on the nature of a proposition may be advantageously perused by many, as preliminary to any further observations respecting the essential characteris- tic of this important part of speech. The reader who has not had the advantage of a liberal education will also be enabled to understand, more accurately, the terms used by gramma- rians, when those writers treat of the nature of the verb ; he will, at the same time, perceive the principle which regulates the construction of sentences. A proposition is a sentence wherein two or more ideas or terms are joined or disjoined by one affirmation or nega- tion, as — Plato was a philosopher; every angle is formed by two lines meeting; no man living on earth can be completely happy. There are three things which go to the nature and consti- tution of a proposition, (viz.) the subject, the predicate, and the copula. The subject of a proposition is that concerning which any thing is affirmed or denied, so — Plato, angle, man living on earth, are the subjects of the foregoing propositions. The predicate is that which is affirmed or denied of the subject; so philosopher is the predicate of the first proposi- tion; formed by two lines meeting is the predicate of the second; capable of being completely happy is the proper pre- dicate of the third. The subject and predicate of a proposition, taken together, 110 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. are called the matter of it, for these are the materials of which it is made. The copula is the form of a proposition; it represents the act of the mind affirming or denying, and it is expressed by these words — am, art, is, are, &c, or, am not, art not, is not, are not, &c. It is not a thing of importance, enough to create a dispute, whether the words no, none, not, never, &c. which disjoin the idea or terms in a negative proposition, shall be called a part of the subject of the copula, or of the predicate. Some- times, perhaps, they may seem most naturally to be included in one, and sometimes in another of these, though a propo- sition is usually denominated affirmative or negative by its copula. Where each of these parts of a proposition is not ex- pressed distinctly in so many words, yet they are all under- stood, and implicitly contained therein, as — Socrates disputed, is a complete proposition, for it signifies — Socrates was dis- puting. So, I die, signifies I am dying. I can write, i.e. I I am able to write. In Latin and Greek one single word is many times a complete proposition. These words — am, art, is, &c. when they are used alone, without any other predicate, signify both the act of the mind, judging which includes the copula, and signify also actual existence, which is the predicate of that proposition. So, Rome is, signifies Rome is existent. There are some strange monsters, that is, some strange monsters are existent. Car- thage is no more, i.e. Carthage has no being. The subject and predicate of a proposition are not always to be known and distinguished by the placing of the words in the sentence, but by reflecting duly on the sense of the words, and on the mind and design of the speaker or writer; as — if I say, " In Africa there are many lions," I mean, many lions are existent in Africa. Many lions is the subject, and existent in Africa is the predicate. "It is proper for a philosopher to understand geometry;" here, the word proper is the predicate, and all the rest is the subject, except is, the copula. The subject and predicate of a proposition ought always to be two different ideas, or two different terms, for where PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Ill both the terms and ideas are the same it is called an identi- cal proposition, which is mere trifling, and cannot tend to promote knowledge, such as — a rule is a rule, or a good man is a good man. But there are some propositions wherein the terms of the subject and predicate seem to be the same, yet the ideas are not the same ; nor can these be called purely identical or trifling propositions, such as — home is home, that is, home is a convenient or delightful place. Socrates is Socrates still, that is, the man Socrates is still a philosopher. The hero was not a hero, that is, the hero did not show his courage. What I have written I have written, that is, what I wrote I still approve, and will not alter it. What is done is done, that is, it cannot be undone. It may be easily observed in these propositions the term is equivocal, for in the predicate it has a different idea from what it has in the subject. "There are also some propositions wherein the terms of the subject and predicate differ, but the ideas are the same; and these are not merely identical or trifling propositions, as — impudent is shameless, a billow is a wave, or fluctus (in Latin) is a wave, a globe is a round body. In these propo- sitions either the words are explained by a definition of the name, or the ideas by a definition of the things, and there- fore they are by no means useless when formed for this purpose." — Watts' Logic, part ii. chap. 1 . Having endeavoured, in this chapter, to show the true character of that part of speech called by grammarians " the verb," and that its essential property consists in affirmation, we shall henceforth consider those words verbs that possess this property, whether such words include the attribute, or simply denote affirmation, and in doing this we shall be better able to adhere to the usual practice of grammarians. CHAPTER VIII. THE AUXILIARY VERBS. The verbs of this class have been called Auxiliaries by some grammarians, " because they help to conjugate other verbs." From this we are led to believe that their use extends no further than to the tables of verbs, given by grammarians. Other writers say that these verbs, "denote the time of the verb," but they have not shown how the time of one verb can indicate the time of another verb, nor that each verb does not denote its own time. We shall endeavour to show, in this chapter, that every word which affirms necessarily, denotes present or past existence, and consequently implies present or past time, and that these verbs are called auxiliary because, having lost their original force of signification, they are used nearly in the character of adverbs. The verb, " to be" is not only the most extensively useful, but is also the earliest of the auxiliaries, and is thus conju- gated. INDICATIVE MOOD. Present Tense. Singular. Plural. I am We are Thou art Ye or you are He, she, or it is They are Past Tense. Singular. Plural. I was We were Thou wast Ye or you were He, she, or it was They were PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 113 Present Participle. Past Participle. Being Been INFINITIVE MOOD. To be. The more regular form of the verb has been retained when a condition is implied by a conjunction, or otherwise, as — Present Tense. Singular, Plural. If I be If we be If thou be If ye or you be If he, she, or it be If they be Past Tense. Singular. Plural. If I were If we were If thou wert If ye or you were If he were If they were This is denominated the subjunctive mood. By a strange anomaly the plural of the past indicative is used both for the singular and the plural of the past subjunctive, and also for all the persons. This, however, proves that it is not essential to distinguish number and person by modifying the verb, and from a slight examination the distinction of mood will be found useless, because the condition is expressed either by a distinct sign, or by a change of position in the noun and verb. " If I am," and " If I be," differ not in meaning, but in their conformity or nonconformity with usage. The irregularity of this verb is perhaps one cause why its use has been so imperfectly understood. The third person singular of the two tenses, the participles, and the infinitive mood, are the only essential parts of the verb. The modifi- cations of an attribute, merely to denote number and person, are unnecessary, because in English the subject is expressed, or distinctly understood. The various forms of the present of this verb, be, am, art, is, are, have but one use, and but 114 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. one meaning, they simply affirm and imply the existence of qualities, actions, or states of nouns. But we beg the reader to understand that we do not point out these redundancies by way of suggesting any improvement which might be made in the form of this difficult part of speech, we do it merely to show what changes are essential in the modification of the verb. " In philosophical strictness," observes Mr. Murray, " both number and person might be entirely excluded from every verb. They are in fact the properties of substantives, not a part of the essence of the verb." The only exception to this important principle occurs in the third person singular, present tense, indicative mood. There a distinction is necessary, not because the verb should agree with its nominative, but to distinguish the manner of expressing the attribute, as — John smites Charles, for without some modification, the indicative mood could not in such cases be distinguished from the imperative, and both would then be expressed, by — John smite Charles. The force of affirmation is therefore expressed by the sign s, and not by the mere position of the noun and the verb. The most simple and essential attribute of a noun is its existence, and this is implied by the copula when no other attribute is predicated of a noun. Hence the origin of the substantive verb, to be; but when another attribute is predi- cated, that quality, and not the attribute of existence, is affirmed, for a simple proposition contains but one affirma- tion, and implies but one attribute. The existence of nouns and their attributes may be actual, and the verb which thus predicates their existence necessarihj implies present time, as — am, is, are. The duration of the existence of attributes or objects may be expired, and then existence can no longer be spoken of as actual, but as past, and the verb which denotes this past existence requires a modification, and the sign necessarily denotes past time, as — was, been; or, The existence of an attribute may be spoken of s contin- gent, and thus necessarily require a sign or modification to denote futurity, as — to be. Since existence may be predicated, as either present, past, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 115 or future, it follows, that the existence of any other attribute may be predicated in like manner, admitting, also, the various modifications implied by the auxiliary verbs, as— he is writing, he was Writing, he is to write. Time and manner are not attributes of the noun, but should be regarded as adjuncts of the predicate, whether expressed or implied. " Actions and states of being may be predicated as either certain or contingent, free or necessary, possible or impossible, obligatory or optional; in short, they may take place in a variety of ways. They may be spoken of as diversified in their modes of production. Hence arises another accident of verbs called a mood, expressing the mode or manner of existence. In English there is only one mood — the indicative. Conditionally, power, contingency, certainty, liberty, and duty, are denoted by auxiliary verbs." — Crombie. The attempt to form a subjunctive by modifying a few of the persons in the present and past tenses is as awkward as it is useless ; for if one person of a tense require a repetition of the subjunctive sign, why not give it to all, and to every tense when conditionality is implied. The only modification that the original tenses can admit of is the addition of an adverb denoting time, but this is usually accomplished by the auxiliaries and participles. Auxiliary verbs admit of two tenses, the past and the present, for the conditionality may be spoken of as pre- sent or past ; but the attribute joined to these verbs being contingent, always denotes the future action or state of being, as — I will write, i.e. I will to write, or I am willing to write. I may depart, i.e. I have liberty to depart. I can stay, i.e. I am able to stay. The auxiliary verbs require to be joined to a principal attribute before a complete sentence can be formed — I may, I must, I ought, they shall, &c, or, I can have, I might have had, &c, are incomplete sentences. The auxiliaries are now chiefly used as adverbs,* to modify the past or future existence * Numerous examples might be quoted in proof of the use of auxiliaries as adverbs — " I may have stepped beyond the exact line of palatable license," is equivalent to, — I perhaps have stepped beyond the exact line of palatable license. i 2 116 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. of some principal attribute. Some are regular verbs, and consequently have the participles, and the infinitive mood. The force of affirmation is in the auxiliary, because the will, power, liberty, &c, may exist, or may have existed, and, therefore, they can admit the predicating sign, but the exis- tence of that which is probable, or even certain, cannot be predicated as existing or actual, without implying a contra- diction, and, therefore, the word denoting future action or state of being will not admit the force of affirmation, as — to be, — to move, &c. This form of the verb has been de- nominated the infinitive mood, or name of the verb. We confess that we never have well comprehended the meaning of this term, infinitive, as applied to the verb. * We can easily conceive that the infinitive mood is a verbal noun, though modified by the preposition ; for this does not alter the independent character of the word, any more than good would alter the independent character of a substantive ; it only adds some quality to the word by which it may be known from another noun of the same name ; we also per- ceive that the infinitive mood will not admit the sign of affir- mation, but merely pointing out these peculiarities does not explain why the infinitive mood should be called the verb, nor does this definition show wherein the infinitive mood dif- fers from the present participle, which is the name of the existing action, or from the abstract noun of which the infini- tive is merely a modification, as — I act, or do an act ; I am acting, or doing an act ; I am to act, or to do an act. The attribute is the same, but the time of future action is denoted by a preposition, and with this modification the future action may be predicated, as — I intend to walk ; I mean to ride. What grammarians have, hitherto, called the passing or finished time, the imperfect or perfect time, is nothing else but the passing or finished action ; the imperfect or perfect action, or state, and these when predicated necessarily denote the times pointed out by the several modifications of the attribute ; hence, the adverb, denoting the precise time of the action or state of being, is seldom employed. The obscurity * " Some are contented to call to a mark of the infinitive mood ; but how or why it is so they are totally silent." — Tooke. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 117 and confusion in the explanations of this property of the verb may be ascribed to the erroneous opinion that time is purposely denoted by the tenses of the verb. We shall now proceed with the conjugations of the remain- ing auxiliary verbs — have, do, shall, will, may, can, ought, let, and must.* To do. INDICATIVE MOOD. Present Tense. Singular. Plural. I do We do Thou doest or dost Ye or you do He, she, or it does They do Past Tense. Singular. Plural. I did We did Thou didst Ye or you did He, she, or it did They did Present Participle. Past Participle. Doing Done INFINITIVE MOOD. To do. To have. INDICATIVE MOOD. Present Tense. Singular. Plural. I have We have Thou hast Ye or you have He has They have * Do is a regular verb, but when used as an auxiliary it denotes emphasis or a modification of the principal attribute, as— he does know the truth ;— does he confess ? — he did not repent. " To do is used for any verb to save the repetition of the word, as— I shall come, but if I do not, go away, that is, if I come not." 118 philosophy of language. Past Tense. Singula?*. Plural. I had We had Thou hadst Ye or you had He had They had Present Participle. Past Participle. Having Had x b INFINITIVE MOOD. To have. To have is also a regular verb, and signifies possession, as — he has the book ; they had the property. It is used as an auxiliary to itself, as — I have had the book. They had had the property. The use of this verb will be best seen when we come to examine the properties of a regular verb. Will. INDICATIVE MOOD. Present Tense. Singula? . I will Thou wilt He will Plural. We will Ye or you will They will Past Tense. Singular. I would Thou wouldst He would Plural. We would Ye or you would They would There can be little doubt but the regular verb to will, was originally used instead of this auxiliary, and that the future action or state of the noun was denoted by the preposition to, the sign of the infinitive, as — I will to come. That the meanings of most of these auxiliaries are obscure has been proved by the several unsuccessful attempts to fix their precise significations. When the root of any word becomes obsolete by the introduction of a synonymous term, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 119 or by an elliptical manner of expression, the derivatives of the original term often become corrupted in meaning, and are used in a vague or indeterminate manner, either as signs, or modifications of more significant words. This appears to be the case with auxiliary verbs. They are for the most part modifications of words which no longer exist in the lan- guage. Dr. Johnson's definitions of shall and will have been called perspicuous. Whether they explain the meaning of those words the reader can decide. "I shall love. It will be so that I must love. I am re- solved to love. Shall I love. Will it be permitted me to love ? Will it be that I must love. Thou shall love. I command thee to love. It is permitted thee to love. It will be that thou must love. Shalt thou love. Will it be that thou must love. Will it be permitted thee to love. He shall love. It will be that he must love. It is com- manded that he love. Shall he love? Is it permitted him to love?" The plural persons follow the signification of the singular. " I will come. I am willing to come. I am determined to come. Thou wilt come. It must be that thou must come, importing necessity ; or it shall be that thou shalt come, importing choice. Wilt thou come? Hast thou determined to come, importing choice. He will come. He is resolved to come, or it must be, that he must come, importing choice or necessity." An Irish gentleman has lately published his opinions respecting the import of shall and will. One example will suffice the English Scholar: — '■ Pray tell me what you mean by / think I shall, which you arid learned men, likewise, so often say? Is it not a kind of double doubting : — something like I think of think- ing? Does it not appear to you more correct to say — / think I will?** In answer to this, we ask Mr. Brenan what sense there is in " / think I will ;" for surely every one who is capable of knowing his own mind knows whether he will, though he may doubt whether he shall, do a thing. It is true, an Irishman says, I think I will die of this disease; but an 120 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Englishman being, perhaps, not quite so willing to die, would say — I think I shall die of this disease, i.e. I fear the disease is such as must, or ought, to produce that consequence, — I will not die, but I think the disease will kill me. Nearly the whole of Mr Brenan's observations on these words, " shall and will," is in opposition to their original meaning, and at variance with their application, by correct and well educated English writers. No man in his senses fears what he wills, though he may fear what is willed by another. The expression, oh assist me, I fear I willbe drowned, is an Irishism, and therefore inexcusable from the lips of an Englishman. An Englishman fears that the water will drown him, or that he shall be drowned by the water. Shall and will have, however, been so often misapplied, that considerable difficulty occurs when any one attempts to fix their precise signification. Still, perhaps, they retain a sufficient portion of their original meaning to enable the grammarian to decide when they are properly used. Will denotes power, inclination, and determination to act, and if these exist in the agent, we say, — I will, thou wilt, he will. The inclination and resolution in the second per- son, and the third, are either known or presumed, as — wilt thou ? — yes, I know thou wilt. But if the power, inclination, or determination of the agent, be subject to the will of another, the agent is spoken to, or of, as being impelled to the performance of the action without any reference to his will, as — thou shalt ; he shall. Ex. — "Nature has willed that its parts shall always remain subordinate to the whole." Here, will (used as a regular verb,) implies determination; shall, employed as an auxiliary, implies compulsion. The same distinction obtains when we speak in the first person, as — " I shall die." Here the state or condition is supposed to be inevitable, not voluntary. Shall and will are also used to denote intention, as — I shall go to town to-morrow, and my wife will accompany me : — or shall accompany me, if by chance the will of the husband predominates. Hence, shall and will, in many cases, seem to promise and foretel, as — I will assist him; they shall perish. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 121 Shall. INDICATIVE MOOD. Present Tense. Singular. Plural. I shall We shall Thou shalt Ye or you shall He, she, or it shall They shall Past Tense. Singular. Plural. I should We should Thou shouldst Ye or you should He, she, or it should They should " This verb," says Dr. Crombie, " is unquestionably a deri- vative from the Saxon sceal, / owe, or J ought, and was origi- nally of the same import. ' I shall/ denoted 'it is my duty/ and was precisely synonymous with debeo in Latin. Chaucer says, ' The faith I shall to God/ that is, ' the faith I owe to God/ ' Thou shalt not kill/ ' or thou oughtest not to kill/ In this sense shall is a present tense, and denoted present duty or obligation. But as all duties, and all commands, though present in respect to their obligation and authority, must be future in regard to their execution, so by a natural transition, observable in most languages, this word, significant of present duty came to be a note of future time." In the learned languages, and many of the modern, the present duty, will, or obligation, is united with the contin- gent attribute, and when the verbs are thus united they constitute what are called the future and conditional tenses of verbs; but in the English the obligation which exists and is present, is denoted by shall, and the performance of the duty, which is future, is expressed by the root of the verb, whether the verbal noun representing such performance be expressed or understood. " The faith I shall to God," is equivalent to, the faith I ought to render to God. The obligation is present, but the performance of the duty is to come. 122 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, Ought. INDICATIVE MOOD. Present Tense. Singular. Plural. I ought We ought Thou oughtest Ye or you ought He, she, or it ought They ought Ought implies present duty or obligation. The past tense is denoted by the past participle of the principal attribute, as — I ought to have written. The preposition cannot be omitted after this word, as, in those cases where the meaning of the auxiliary is less deter- minate, we connot say, " I ought write/' I ought have written ; but I ought to write, I ought to have written. On the other hand the auxiliary should, will not admit the preposition, because no definite meaning belongs to the word. I should to write, I should to have written, are as ungrammatical, as — I ought write, I ought have written. We cannot agree with Dr. Crombie, who assigns a past tense to this verb. Past duty is denoted by the regular verb, " I owed;" but ought, though derived from owe, always denotes an existing duty or obligation, whether the power to discharge that duty exists or not, for that which has not been paid is still owing, though the possibility of paying be hopeless. " I ought to have been more grateful to my benefactor while he lived, and I ought now to observe his precepts." Ought, in the first member of this sentence denotes, an existing duty unperformed; in the last clause an existing obligation. The duty and the obligation are spoken of as still having exis- tence, though the opportunity to be grateful is past, and the observance of the benefactor's precepts is yet to come. Let. Let is a perfect verb, though often used as an auxiliary in imperfect sentences, as — let me depart, that is, I desire you to let me depart. RTEGUIiAll, IMU-. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 123 Must. Must implies necessity to do, or to suffer, any action or state, and always denotes the existence of such necessity ; it cannot, therefore, be applied to the past or future existence of the idea the word represents. Conjugation of Verbs. " To conjugate, in its usual acceptation, means to join together, and, as used by grammarians, it means to place under one view all the variations in the form of the verb, beginning with the infinitive mood, and ending with the participle." — Cobbett. The attribute usually chosen by grammarians to exemplify the modifications of the verb is " love." * Why this desire has been so pertinaciously adhered to would be a more diffi- cult question if it were not well known that most English grammars are derived from the Latin, and are founded on the plan of Lowth's Introduction. Some writers, how- ever, have questioned the propriety of this trite illustration, and among these is Mr. Brenan, who, in his useful little work on Composition, remarks, — " I cannot forbear saying a word upon the subject of the verb, — ' to love,' of which all grammar writers, except Mr. Cobbett, are so fond. As it is of the greatest importance that things should as nearly as possible have their right names and functions, especially when we undertake instruction, this word is a most unfor- tunate selection, and, I am certain, that it much retards the improvement of the pupil. But grammarians too often work mechanically, not intellectually ; would they but mentally consider this word, through all its moods and tenses, its inefficiency, nay, its absurdity, as an explicator, must be manifest." Regarding affirmation as the essential characteristic of the verb, it will not be expected that we shall give what is called a complete conjugation. The present tense, and the past, are the only modifications admitted by grammarians to * Love is u passion or emotion, and, therefore, to love is not an appro- priate word to convey a distinct notion of an active transitive verb. 124 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, possess the verbal character,* because these alone corres- pond with the definition of a verb. A verb is called regular when the past tense and the past participle are formed by adding d, or ed, to the name of the verb, as — move, moved, command, commanded. The verb to Move. INDICATIVE MOOD. Present Tense. Singular Number. Plural Number. I move We move Thou movest Ye or you move He moves or moveth They move Past Tense. Singular Number. Plural Number. I moved We moved Thou movedst Ye or you moved He moved They moved Present Participle. Past Participle. Moving Moved Infinitive or Verbal Noun. To Move. The variation of the verb, on account of number and person, obtains only in the second and third persons of the two tenses of the indicative; but as the pronoun thou is seldom used, and the formal modification of the third person of the present tense is rarely attended to, this property of the verb may be considered as pertaining exclusively to the third person singular of the present tense ; an exception that is scarcely worth the parade of the conjugation of persons. The verb " to move/' like many other verbs in the English language, is sometimes employed as an active and some- times as a neuter verb. * " As the verb essentially expresses affirmation, without which there could be no communication of sentiment, it has been hence considered as the prin- cipal part of speech, and was, therefore, called, by the ancient grammarians, verb, or the word by way of eminence." — Crombie. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 125 Number, person, mood, and tense, are the principal accidents of a verb. Number relates to the unity or to the plurality of the subject to which the attribute is ascribed, as — he moves; they move. The distinction of person indi- cates that the attribute pertains either to the speaker, to the person spoken to, or to the person or thing spoken of, as — I move ; thou movest ; he, she, or it moves. But as the accidents of number and person are not, strictly speaking, properties of the verbal attribute, this brief notice of them here will be sufficient. Mood and tense will require more attentive consideration. Moods. Mood, or mode, is a particular form of a verbal attri- bute, showing the manner in which the being, action, or state of being is represented in reference to its subject. The verbal attribute is that term of the predicate which denotes some state or action pertaining to a noun ; in fact, all those words which (when the existence of the attri- bute they stand for is affirmed,) are capable of admitting the force or sign of affirmation. A verbal attribute may be variously predicated. It may be spoken of indefinitely. It may be commanded or desired. Its existence may be actual, or it may be predicated as possible or contingent. These circumstances, when included in the predicate, have given rise to the several moods, with which grammarians have encumbered the English conjugation. The modes of a verb are generally comprehended in the five following: — the infinitive, the imperative, the indica- tive, the potential, and the subjunctive. These, it will be necessary to examine separately, in order to understand in what respect the attribute differs in its several modifica- tions, and how far it is entitled to retain its character as a verb. The Infinitive Mood. " Of all the points," says Mr. Tooke, " which grammarians endeavour to shuffle over, there is none in which they do it 126 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. more grossly than in this of the infinitive." Having made this charge, Mr. Tooke promised to explain the nature of the verb, but he afterwards thought fit to decline the task, and by this great omission in his theory has left the structure of language, which ought to have been the principal object of his investigations, incomplete. We must turn, therefore, to a less popular writer for information concerning these attri- butes. "The Stoics," says Mr. Harris, "in their grammatical in- quiries, had the infinitive in such esteem, that they held this alone to be the genuine verb, a name which they denied to all the other modes. Their reasoning was, they considered the true verbal character to be contained simple and un- mixed in the infinitive only. Thus, the infinitive ' to walk/ means simply that energy, and nothing more." If the essence of the verb consisted in "being" and " doing," this opinion of the Stoics would be correct, for it is evident that many substantive nouns are used to denote the names of actions,* by the simple addition of the prepo- sition "to," which, according to Mr. Tooke's derivation, means act, and conveys that notion when connected with a substantive noun. But the idea represented by the substan- tive noun, and that represented by the verbal noun, are altogether distinct ideas. Thus, " to breathe," denotes an act; but "breath" denotes that portion of the air which is breathed. "To plant" means to fix in the ground; "a plant " means that which is fixed in the ground. The infinitive, then, is the name of an action or state of being. Its modifications denote that action or state of being as conjoined with a noun, and when the modifications of the attribute do not imply affirmation, they are called participles, or participial adjectives. Whenever the infinitive mood is employed in a sentence it denotes an action or state of being indefinitely, or it implies the existence of the attribute at some future period. If the action or state of being be spoken of indefinitely, * Mr. Tooke makes no other distinction between the verbal noun and the substantive than what is implied in the preposition. " The word to," says Mr. Tooke, " is merely added to distinguish the infinitive from the PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 127 without any distinct reference to its existence, the infinitive represents the notion which we form of the verbal attribute, apart from any subject, as — to walk is pleasant. In this case it is evident that the verbal abstract noun does not represent an act which has existed, or does exist, but it refers merely to the abstract notion of an action or state of being, which, from experience and recollection, is affirmed to be pleasant. But if the infinitive be connected with the primary attri- bute as its object, the future existence of the attribute, denoted by the infinitive, is predicated in connection with the actual or past existence of the principal attribute. Ex. — We are able to predict, with certainty, many of the changes which are to happen in time to come. The prediction here indefinitely referred to is not an act of the mind that has taken place, but an act that we have the power hereafter to exercise. The other infinitives in the example clearly denote the future existence of the attri- butes or states, which they are intended to represent. For what is to happen has not taken place, and what is to come has not yet arrived. The Imperative Mood. The view which has been taken of the infinitive will assist to explain the nature of the imperative mood. The verb in this mood is the attribute whose existence is desired, com- manded, permitted, or intreated; but the verb which desires, commands, permits, or intreats, is generally understood, as — depart ye, i.e. I command ye to depart. Listen to me, i.e. I request you to listen to me. Those grammarians who have justly considered the impe- rative as part only of a declaratory sentence, would have experienced no difficulty in proving the truth of their opinions, had they considered the verbal noun, when em- ployed as the object of an assertion, as always implying the future existence of the attribute denoted by the verbal noun. It is not what is called the imperative mood of the verb which commands or intreats, for that is what is commanded 128 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. or intreated, but it is the tone or emphasis which supplies the place of that verb which denotes the attribute pertaining to the nominative. Hence, the imperative mood does not always correspond with its name, for it sometimes petitions, in the most suppliant tone, as— forgive us our sins ; have mercy. Yet the imperative is a form of the verb distinguishable from the indicative. In the expressions — 'Love thy neigh- bour as thyself," "thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself," the same duty is inforced, but the manner of inforcing it differs. The first form is imperative, the last contains an assertion; the sentence is therefore declaratory, and pertains to the indicative mood. The Indicative Mood. The indicative mood is that form of the verb, or verbal attribute, which includes the sign of affirmation: — it declares the attribute to belong to the subject, as — he is wise ; she moves; they stand. The affirmation is included in those forms only of the verbal attribute which declare the present or the past exist- ence of the attribute, as— she weeps ; they smiled. When the future existence of an attribute is predicated, the force of affirmation is transferred to the auxiliary. For the will, power, or obligation, " to be," or " to do," may exist, while the attribute (which, in fact, is the object of the will, power, or obligation,) is necessarily contingent, and consequently pertains to future existences. Still, the auxiliary, and the object connected with it, are so closely allied, and, in general, the meaning of the former is so far obscured, that it and its object are usually considered as one attribute, and are in many languages expressed by a single term, as — Ibo, I will go, i.e. I will to go. In this declara- tion, " to go" is the object of the existing will or determina- tion, and the will to do that, denoted by the principal verb, is the immediate attribute of the subject. Mr. Harris, speaking of this property of auxiliary verbs, remarks, " The infinitive naturally coalesces with all those PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 129 verbs that denote any tendency, desire, or volition of the soul, but not readily with others. The reason is, that though different actions may unite in the same subject, and therefore be coupled together (as, when we say — he walked and discoursed), yet the actions, notwithstanding, remain separate and distinct. But it is not so with respect to volitions and actions. Here the coalescence is often so intimate that the volition is unintelligible, till the action be expressed, — I desire; I am willing; I want. — What? The sentences, we see, are defective and imperfect; we must help them, then, by infinitives, which express the proper actions to which they tend, — I desire to read; I am willing to learn; I want to see. Thus, is the whole rendered com- plete, as well in sentiment as in syntax/'* The indicative mood, by laying aside assertion, quits the name of indicative, and may, with propriety, be considered a distinct mood of the verb. Though the form of the indi- cative is not changed in asking a question, yet the place of the verbal attribute denotes that the essential characteristic of a verb is wanting, and the sentence is consequently incomplete. It may be remarked that, in many cases, position serves the purpose of modification: thus, a noun in the objective case is known by its place; and a verb derived from a substantive is distinguished from the latter by its position, in reference to the noun or pronoun that governs it. The Potential Mood. The potential mood is ascertained by the meaning of the auxiliaries employed in connection with the principal attri- bute. Thus, when any action or state of existence is con- sidered as possible, and not contingent, the auxiliaries may, can, might, and could, denote the power implied by those words; but when the opportunity of doing or being is spoken of as past, the auxiliaries to have and to he denote the past existence of the power implied by the words might and could, and the past participle of the principal verb is employed, as * Hermes, book i, chap. 8. K 130 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. if the action or state of being had been completed, as — he might have prevented the mischief; their lives might have been saved. In no case, however, in this mood, is the actual existence of the principal attribute predicated. It has been already observed that the auxiliaries are frequently employed to modify an assertion, and, losing the force of their original signification, they become little else than adverbs. ''Those verbs," says a modern writer, " which, in course of time, are used as auxiliaries, though originally as significant as any other verbs, lose something of their distinctive character; so that if the fuller form happen to disappear from a language, the corrupted auxiliary presents anomalies which it is not easy for the philologist to explain. This difficulty is increased by the circumstance that verbs used as auxiliaries generally throw off much of the distinctive meaning which they originally possessed." The Subjunctive Mood. The subjunctive mood implies that the existence of the attribute is spoken of conditionally. " When the thing expressed by the verb depends on something else going before or coming after it, whether the concessive conjunctions, if, though, unless, except, whether, &c. be used or not, the st or s of the second or third person singular is dropped at the end of the verb, that is, the verb is used in the same form as in the infinitive mood; thus, if any member absent himself he shall forfeit." In this example, it will be observed, that something is asserted to depend upon the act of any member absenting himself ; therefore the verb is employed without the usual termination, "and the reason of this is," says Mr. Lewis, " that there is an auxiliary verb understood," — if any member shall absent himself. The reason here assigned, by this writer, for the change of termination, to denote contingency, does not explain why the verb or attribute spoken of contingently should be of the same form as the infinitive mood; but if that mood denotes a future action, the difficulty is at once explained, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 131 for an action or state which exists cannot be spoken of as contingent, in whatever way it may be modified by a con- junction. In general, it may be observed, that when the thing spoken of is certain, whether the verb is preceded by a con- junction or not, the indicative form of the verb should be employed, — " though he were a son." Here there is no doubt expressed, and consequently were ought to have been was. I shall overtake him although he runs. Such assertions, though put with a concessive term, are not intended to con- vey doubt, the facts are considered as admitted. Tenses. In Mr. Locke's Essay on the Human Understanding, the reader is informed, that a great man being asked what time was, answered, Si non rogas intelligo. If any attempt were here made to demonstrate that there is such a thing as present time, it is probable that the proofs and arguments would be about as well understood as are the ingenious contrivances of those who have endeavoured to prove the contrary ; but it is fortunate for the greater part of mankind that such inquiries are as useless as they are inexplicable. Man may as reasonably imagine that he has the power to stay the planets in their course, as to presume that he has a mind capable of forming an adequate concep- tion of extension, or of the modes of duration. But it is not with the duration of time, but with the duration of transitory beings and their attributes, that the grammarian has to do. The tenses of verbs denote the actual or past existence of attributes, in reference to the subjects to which such attri- butes are said to belong. In English there are three tenses of verbs. The actual existence of an attribute is expressed by the forms of the present tense, and present participle. The past existence of the attribute is signified by the past tense, and the past participle. The future or contingent existence is implied by the infinitive mood, used in connection with a finite verb. k 2 132 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. In order to define, more accurately, the modes of existence in relation to the subject, or objects connected with it, the compound tenses have been constructed. The auxiliaries employed for this purpose modify the assertion, in reference to the existence of the attribute, but time is as inseparable from existence, as form is from substance ; hence, when the existence of an attribute is predicated or affirmed, the notion .of time is necessarily implied. Of the different kinds of Verbs. Verbs are of three kinds — active, passive, and neuter ; and, as regards their modifications, they are further distin- guished as either regular or irregular. Some few verbs are also called impersonal or defective, because they are not em- ployed in all the variations of moods, tenses, numbers, and persons, incident to a regular verb. A verb is called active transitive when the act of producing the attribute or state is attributed to the subject, as — the gunpowder splits the rock ; the master punishes the scholar. A verb is called active intransitive when the attribute itself, and not the act of producing it, is attributed to the subject, as — the horse trots ; the man walks. A verb is considered neuter when the attribute denotes an inactive state of being, or when no agent is referred to, as producing such state of being, as — he stands unmoved ; they lie in wait. These distinctions may be rendered more evident by a few examples. To build is an active transitive verb, and has properly no corresponding neuter in our language, " The house was building when the wall fell/' is much better expressed by employing the French idiom, " The house was being built when the wall fell." To lay is an active transitive verb, and denotes that act by which the attribute or state of being implied by the word is produced in an object. Ex. — The reader lays the book on the table, or laid the book on the table. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 133 The passive form of the verb denotes that the subject or nominative has been acted upon, as —the book is laid on the table, or was laid on the table. To lie is a verb neuter, and merely denotes the state of the subject, without referring to an agent as the cause of that state. Ex. — The book lies on the table, or the book lay on the table. The past participle of "to lay," is laid; the past participle of "to lie," is lain. The verb " to move" has an active signification when the cause of motion in an object is attributed to an agent, as the producer of such motion, as — " the wind moves the vessel." Here the word "moves" denotes the act of moving, and not the motion produced, since it is not the existence of the motion, but the existence of the act which is predicated. But the verb has a neuter signification when motion itself is attributed to the subject, as — " the vessel moves." In this case the attribute or state of existence, signified by the verb, pertains to the vessel, and the verb is called intransitive. The verb is said to be passive when the object acted upon, is made the nominative or subject of assertion, as — "the vessel is moved." The attribute denoted by the past participle " moved," represents that state of being which results, or has resulted, from the agency of a power acting upon the vessel. The vessel is therefore spoken of as a passive subject, receiving its attribute from an external agent, and the state of being (expressed by the participle " moved,") is not regarded as simply pertaining to the vessel, and origi- nating in itself, but as produced in the vessel by an efficient agent, either expressed or implied. Ex. — The vessel is moved by the wind. The verbal noun " to move," therefore, may either denote an act producing the attribute signified by the word, or it may denote the attribute itself, without referring to the agent which produced it. Lastly, the attribute resulting from the act of moving, may also be predicated as pertaining to a passive subject. Hence, the different kinds of verbs have been denominated, by grammarians, active, passive, and neuter. The passive, it is evident, cannot be said to belong 134 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. to the English language, for the phrases which constitute the passive verb differ from the neuter verb only in the manner of signification of the past participle, used in con- nection with the substantive verb. Verbs are called irregular when the modifications of the past tense and the past participle are not formed by adding d, or ed to the infinitive, as — am, was, been; drink, drank, drunk. Lists of the irregular verbs may be found in almost every grammar. A verb is called defective when it is not employed through all the forms of a complete conjugation. In concluding our observations on the verb, we shall briefly revert to the cause of the difficulty which many expe- rience in comprehending the nature of this important part of speech, and at the same time we shall offer a few remarks on the origin of the three auxiliary verbs, — to be, to have, and to do. It has been already observed that the difficulty experienced by the learner to comprehend the nature of a verb has arisen from making, "being and doing," it essential characteristics; and at the same time confining the character of the verb to those modifications only of the verbal noun which predicate "being or doing," thus contradicting in practice what had been established in theory. Nor are those who make affir- mation the essential property of a verb more consistent, for they still regard the predicate as the verb, and make no dis- tinction between the word which means " being and doing/ 5 and the sign which attributes " being and doing," to the sub- ject. If the essence of the verb consisted in " being and doing," and not in the power of predicating these and other attri- butes, then the words called verbs must, under every modification, retain their essential characteristic ; but since this is not allowed to be the case, even by those grammarians who make " being and doing" the distinguishing properties of a verb, it will be necessary to consider these words as mere attributes, even in cases where affirmation is expressed by the attribute. The verb is said to have derived its importance from the PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 135 necessity of its presence in a proposition or sentence; but whether we regard the verb as a mere sign, uniting the predicate to its subject, or as combined with the predicate, and implying ''being and doing," it is not in either case more essential to the formation of a sentence, than is the subject noun, or the term employed to denote " that which is said of the noun." But admitting the verb to be the chief word in every sentence, the repetition of that fact can in no way conduce to the knowledge of the nature of the verb. Existence is that attribute which claims precedence of all others, since it is essential to the very being of every other attribute, it is therefore either expressed or implied in every proposition : — expressed, when we say, " God is ;" implied, when we say, " the sun rises ;" which means, when resolved, " the sun is rising." The verb to be is also used simply as the sign of affirmation. In this case it does not suggest the notion of existence, but merely affirms, and by this affirma- tion unites the predicate to the subject, as — God is good. Existence, considered as an attribute, gives rise to the notion of pertaining to, hence, the verb to have appears to be essentially connected with the primary attribute, and is conveniently employed as an auxiliary to complete the com- plex modes of existence, as — I have been, he had been. Next in importance to the word that denotes possession is that which implies acting or doing, and its modification to, is employed to impart the signification, either of an act, or of a state of being to those attributes hitherto called verbs, as — to be, to do, and to suffer. Syntax of Verbs. Rule I. A verb personal must agree with its nominative case in number and person, as — I dislike, thou condemnest, he approves, they judge. The nominative or subject of a verb may be a noun, pro- noun, infinitive mood, or part of a sentence. Rule II. When two or more subjects are connected by a copulative conjunction, the verb refers to both, and is therefore plural. 136 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Ex, — " Honour and shame from no condition rise." Ex. — " The useful arts improved by science, and science itself improved by philosophy, confer power on civilized and instructed man, and enable him at once to triumph over his fellows, and over nature." Rule III. When a disjunctive conjunction connects the subjects of a sentence, the verb belongs to one of the sub- jects only, and is either singular or plural, the verb being governed by the noun or pronoun that is placed nearest to it. Ex. — Either they or I am to blame ; — either I or they are to blame. Ex. — Neither poverty nor riches were injurious to him. When two nominatives of different numbers are thus con- nected by a disjunctive, the same verb cannot agree with both. In this case the preference is commonly given to the plural, and the verb belonging to the singular is " understood," as — neither {was) poverty, nor were riches injurious to him ; — either I (am,) or they are to blame. Rule IV. A noun in the singular number, connected by a preposition to another noun, whether singular or plural, requires the verb to be in the singular. Ex. — " The general with all his officers has applied for redress." In this, and similar examples, grammarians are of opinion that the construction requires the plural form of the verb ; but a noun in the objective case, governed by a preposition, cannot, consistently with the principles of grammar, become a part of the nominative, and govern the verb. If this prin- ciple were once clearly understood, there would be no difficulty in determining the construction of the following sentences : — "The king, with the lords and commons, constitute, or constitutes, an excellent form of government." The side A, with the sides B and C, compose, or com- poses, the triangle. " My uncle, with his son, was, or were, in town yesterday." In all these cases the verb should be singular, but when the sense requires that the nouns should be joint subjects to the verb, the copulative conjunction ought to be used instead of the preposition, and the difficulty would be at once removed. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 137 The sides A, B, and C, form the triangle. The kins;, lords, and commons, constitute an excellent form of government. My uncle and his son were in town yesterday. There does not appear to be any difficulty in determining whether the verb, in the preceding examples, should be singular or plural, nor is it necessary to refer to authority, " especially as our most reputable authors use sometimes the one and sometimes the other form of expression;" — a proof of the insufficiency of referring to " authority," or " reputable use," as the standard of propriety in language. Rule V. The substantive verb " to be" requires the same case after it as before it, as — it is I ; it was he ; you believed it to be him. The neuter pronoun "it" means "person," as — "you believed the person to be him;" "the person was he ;" "the person is I." The pronoun in this case may be transposed, and the noun person may be em- ployed, instead of the neuter pronoun, as — I am the person; but it will be seen that the form of the verb is changed, because, although the cases are the same, the subjects differ in their manner of signification : this deserves attention, because the propriety of the following rule depends upon the principle which regulates the construction in this instance. Rule VI. A verb placed between two nominatives of different numbers agrees with its subject, i.e. with the noun that precedes the verb. Ex. — His meat was locusts and wild honey. Ex, — Death is the wages of sin. Ex. — The chief burden is the taxes. In these examples the nouns that come before the verbs are the subjects, and those that follow the predicates, of the sentences. Many of the difficulties that occur in determining the propriety of anomalous construction, would disappear, if the meaning of the word, that gave rise to the exception, were attentively examined. In the sentence, " The wages of sin is death," the word wages is figuratively employed, but men are not hired to commit sin, therefore the term wages is inappropriate. " The punishment of sin is death," " the 138 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. consequence of sin is death/' would be more consistent with truth and the meaning of the sentence. We cannot, with propriety, say, " the wages of sin are death," because the misapplication of the term " wages," is rendered conspicuous by the collocation, and the mind im- mediately perceives the disagreement, between the subject and the predicate; but we can say, " Locusts and wild honey were his food," " the taxes were the evil," because the terms " food," and " evil," are adequate expressions, and may be made the subjects, instead of being the predicates of the sentences. The verb, however, assumes the form singu- lar, to agree with its nominatives in that number, as — his food was locusts, — the evil was the taxes. Rule VII. When a noun of multitude conveys unity of idea, the verb and pronoun should be in the singular. Ex. — The army is disbanded. Ex. — The assembly is broken up. Ex. — The parliament is disolved. Rule VIII. When a noun of multitude conveys plu- rality of idea, the verb and pronoun should be plural, Ex. — Why do the heathen so furiously rage together, and why do the people imagine a vain thing. The verbs agree with the nouns heathen and people in the plural, because those words refer to the individuals, and not to the class under which the individuals are comprehended. Some grammarians assert that it is optional whether we say, " the people is mad," or " the people are mad ;" — they, however, acknowledge that the latter construction is more elegant. People is a noun, which is seldom, if ever, con- strued in the singular. Rule IX. Two or more nouns representing the same person or thing require the verb to be in the singular. Ex. — That able scholar and grammarian has been refuted. Rule X. A verb active governs the noun that follows it, and the noun or pronoun is said to be in the objective case. Ex. — The master punishes the scholar; he corrects him for obstinacy or negligence. Rule XI. When two verbs come together, the latter is in the infinitive mood; but the sign of the infinitive mood PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 139 is omitted after the verbs bid, dare, need, make, see, hear, feel, and let, as — he bade me do it; I heard him say it. A verb may be known by admitting the preposition to before it, or by making sense with the personal pronouns, as — to come, I come, thou comest, they come. Illustration of Verbs. " England is the worst country a proud man can exhibit himself in. A man may strut in Spain, vapour in France, or kick and cuff the vulgar, as he likes, in Russia ; he may sit erect in his palanquin in India, without dropping his eyes upon the earth he moves over ; but if he carries his head in the air here, and expects the crowd to make way for him, he will soon run foul of somebody that will make him repent of his stateliness. Pride, then, it seems, not only exposes a man to contempt, but puts him in danger ; it is also a very expensive frolic, if he keeps it up, as it should be kept, for what signifies his being proud if there is not somebody always present to exercise his pride upon? He must, therefore, of necessity have a set of humble cousins and toad-eaters about him, and as such cattle cannot be had for nothing in this country, he must pay them according to the value of their services; common trash may be had at a common price, but clever fellows know their own consequence, and will stand out upon terms. If Nebuchadnezzar had not had "all people, nations, and languages," at his command, he might have called till he was hoarse before any one would have come to worship his image in the plain of Dura. Let the proud man take notice, withal, that Nebuchadnezzar's image was made of gold, and if he expects to be worshipped by all people, after this fashion, and casts himself in the same mould, he must also cast himself in the same metal." — Cumberland. CHAPTER IX ADVERBS. " And here it is worth while to observe, how the same thing, participating the same essence, assumes different grammatical forms, from its different relations. For example, suppose it should be asked how differ honest, honestly, and honesty. The answer is, they are in essence the same ; but they differ, inasmuch as honest is the attributive of a substantive ; honestly, of a verb ; and honesty, being divested of these its attri- butive relations, assumes the power of a substantive, so as to stand by itself." — Harris. An adverb is a word or phrase added to verbs, adjectives, or adverbs, to increase or diminish the signification of those parts of speech, as— he rides well; a truly benevolent mind; a very small quantity ; more virtuously inclined. Mr. Tooke's observations on the nature of prepositions may be strictly applied to adverbs : — " As the necessity of the article (or of some equivalent invention) follows from the impossibility of having in lan- guage a distinct name or particular term for each particular individual idea, so does the necessity of the preposition (or some equivalent invention) follow from the impossibility of having in language a distinct complex term for each different collection of ideas which we may have occasion to put together in discourse. The addition or subtraction of any one idea to or from a collection makes it a different collec- tion ; and (if there were degrees of impossibility) it is still more impossible to use in language a different and distinct complex term for each different and distinct collection of ideas, than it is to use a distinct particular term for each particular and individual idea. To supply, therefore, the place of the complex terms, which are wanting in a language, is the preposition employed ; by whose aid complex terms PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 141 are prevented from being infinite or too numerous, and are used only for those collections of ideas which we have most frequently occasion to mention in discourse ; and this end is obtained in the most simple manner; for having occasion, in communication, to mention a collection of ideas, for which there is no one single complex term in the language, we either take that complex term which includes the greatest number, though not all, of the ideas we would communicate, or else we take that complex term which includes all and the fewest ideas more than those we would communicate, and then by the help of the preposition we either make up the deficiency in the one case, or retrench the superfluity in the other." The use of the adverb is here clearly pointed out by Mr. Tooke. The following passage from Dr. Watts will show how this part of speech originates, and in what respect it differs from an adjective: — " As modes belong to substances, so there are some also that are but the modes of other modes ; for though they subsist in and by the substance, as the original subject of them, yet they are properly and directly attributed to some mode of that substance. Motion is the mode of a body, but the swiftness or slowness of it, or its direction to the north or south, are but modes of motion. Walking is the mode or manner of a man or beast, but walking gracefully implies a manner or mode superadded to that action." When modes, therefore, are predicated, as subsisting in and by a substance, they are called adjectives, for they are no longer distinct objects, presented to the mind, and they thus lose their essential character as nouns, as — a good action ; an angry man ; modest behaviour. But when a mode or quality is attributed to the mode of a noun, as — the horse runs swiftly, or to the mode of a mode, as — he writes very correctly, the word is called an adverb. The difference between an adverb and an adjective is this : — the adjective modifies the noun, but the adverb modifies the adjective, or other attribute. Thus, the adverb corres- ponds exactly with Mr. Tooke's explanation of the use of prepositions, for when an adjective or other attributive word will not convey the exact notion of the quality or mode 142 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. predicated of a noun, the deficiency of meaning is supplied by an adverb, and if the word so employed be insufficient for the purpose, it may itself be modified by another adverb, to complete the signification. By this contrivance in lan- guage the want of a complex term for every complex idea is supplied. Hence some adverbs will admit degrees of comparison, for as certain qualities, which are attributed to nouns, may be more or less, when compared with other nouns, possessing the like quality, and thus require adverbs to denote the degree, so adverbs may require other adverbs to express more fully the degree of the quality or circumstance repre- sented by the principal adverb, as — often, oftener, or more often, oftenest or most often. A preposition joined to a noun, and thus restricting its signification, does, with the noun, often supply the place of an adverb, as — in fine ; by degrees ; in part ; &c. These phrases are equivalent in meaning to the adverbs — finally, gradually, partly. Ex. — " We see but in part, and we know but in part, and therefore it is no wonder we conclude not right from our partial views." — Locke. The difference between the adverbial phrase, or extended adverb, (if we may so call it,) and the adjective may be clearly seen in the foregoing example : — The phrase " in part," qua- lifies the verb; the adjective partial directly qualifies the noun. Adverbs are signs of complex ideas, and may be resolved into more simple terms ; but this method of explaining away the parts of speech is totally inconsistent with the science of grammar, which should teach us to understand the nature and use of words as they exist, and not as they might exist, if men thought fit to define more accurately by words their complex ideas. Many words, besides adverbs, are so con- trived as to express, compendiously, in one word, what would, in a definition, have required two or more terms. This is the consequence of the composition of ideas, and very different from that kind of abbreviation, which is used merely for the sake of dispatch, for by using an adverb, instead of an equivalent phrase, ambiguity may often be prevented. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 143 Ex. — " Somerville is the only one who has written on this subject to be understood." Who, we ask, would not prefer " written intelligibly on this subject V Again, the adverb bravely may he an abbreviation of brave - like, and mean in a brave manner ; but the word is differently attributed in its form, as an adverb, and becomes a distinct part of speech, from its being joined to an attribute, (the verb,) as — he fought bravely, instead of, to a noun, as — in a brave or bravelike manner. The termination ly, by which so many adverbs in English are distinguished from their corresponding adjectives, is sup- posed to be a corruption of like, but whatever might have formerly been the meaning attached to this syllable, it is now but little attended to. It seems to be used only to direct the mind to the manner in which the word is to be applied, and to show that the intention is to modify an attri- bute, which, by itself, would not otherwise sufficiently express the quality, action, or state, attributed to the noun, as — " a truly good man;" "the horse ran swiftly;" "the patient slept soundly " The sentence in which Mr. Tooke contends for the signi- fication of this syllable contains three adverbs, formed from adjectives by the addition of ly, none of which appear to have any reference to the meaning originally implied by this abbreviation. Ex. — "All adverbs ending in ly are sufficiently under- stood, the termination being only the word like corrupted, and the corruption so much the more easily and certainly discovered, as the termination remains more pure and dis- tinguishable in the other sister languages." In addition to those adverbs already noticed by italics, the word only occurs in the last example, and may be classed among the rest; for though Mr. Tooke has derived only from one-like, few persons now attach to the word that signification. Hitherto we have considered adverbs as qualifying only adjectives, verbs, and other adverbs; but we have now to submit to the reader a few examples, from which it may 144 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. perhaps appear that adverbs qualify every part of speech but the noun and pronoun. Ex. — " Let us, my dear James, get well through this letter." — Cobbett. In this sentence the adverb well qualifies the preposition through, and these words combined qualify the verb "to get." The expressions quite through, nearly through, completely through, sufficiently prove that the relation denoted by the word through will admit of various modifications ; but those who still doubt the propriety of attributing an adverb to a preposition need only compare the verbs '.' to get well/' " to grow well," '.' to write well," and they cannot fail to perceive that well, in these examples, qualifies the verb ; but not so in the example from Mr. Cobbett, for to " get well through this letter," would then imply that his own and his son's recovery were to be accomplished by that means. Ex. — " It treats merely of etymology and syntax." — Grant. The adverb, in this example, qualifiesthe preposition of, — " It treats merely of or concerning etymology and syntax." Ex. — " We too often charge that upon the wicked con- trivance and premeditated malice of a neighbour, which arose merely from ignorance." — Watts. Here the verb is not qualified but the noun through a preposition. If the position of the adverb be changed it will assume the character of an adjective, and the termina- tion ly will be unnecessary ; the sentence will have the same meaning, though perhaps more clearly and forcibly expressed, — " That which arose from mere ignorance." Ex. — " He went over sea for none other errand but to see Flanders, and to ride out one summer in those countries ; and having one in his company that told, by the way, many strange things of the pilgrimage, he thought we would go somewhat out of his way," &c. The first out, in this example, immediately qualifies the verb; the second out qualifies the preposition of, and is itself qualified by the adverb somewhat; these words joined to the noun and its definitive qualify, as a phrase, the verb "to go," PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 145 i.e. he thought he would somewhat deviate to see these strange sights, Ex. — " The first may be easily obtained from almost any of the common rudiments of that language, under the direc- tion of a judicious master, but the latter can only be collected from conversation/' — Dr. Ash. The adverb easily qualifies the participle "obtained;" almost qualifies the definitive "any;" but the adverb only should stand before the preposition " from," and through that word qualify the noun, — " can be collected only from conversation," for the author did not intend to say that it could be nothing more than collected, but that conversation was the only source from which it could be collected. Ex. — n I mean only such pleasures as arise originally from sight." — Addison. The adverb only qualifies the definitive such; the adverb originally is perhaps redundant; as it stands it qualifies the noun, and denotes that " sight" is the original source whence such pleasures arise. Ex. — " Some books are to be studied, others only to be referred to occasionally, as dictionaries, cyclopaedias, &c, and others to be read merely for amusement." — Jennings. If the preposition for be admitted to be a substitute for some more significant term, the adverb may qualify the term referred to by the preposition, as — merely to obtain or derive amusement, otherwise the noun is qualified through the pre- position, as — other books are to be read for mere amusement; though this may not seem to convey the precise meaning of the author, it is no doubt what he intended to express, i.e. "books to be read to obtain amusement, and nothing else." Ex. — Tn the present instance, merely for convenience, reference will be continually made to the English transla- tion of Telemachus. In this example the adverb qualifies the preposition for, and refers to the noun, •* convenience," as in the second example. Ex. — " Theism can only be opposed to polytheism." This sentence has been corrected by Dr. Blair, who places the adverb before the preposition to, " only to polytheism." 146 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Ex. — "This latter sound is only tolerable in colloquial pronunciation, and then only when used as a preposition." : — Walker. The first only should stand before the preposition " in," — " only in colloquial pronunciation." In denotes the relation of place by referring to the time when the sound may be used, i.e. in or during colloquial pronunciation. The adverb then also refers to the preposition, " and then only when used as a preposition." This example, if attentively considered, will convince any one that adverbs are sometimes used to qualify or restrict the meaning of prepositions. But it does not, however, follow that an adverb placed before a preposition always belongs to it. In the following example the adverb does not qualify the relation, but limits the difference between common discourse and music. Ex. — " Common discourse differs from music only in the number of sounds," i.e. the number of sounds is the only difference. The adverb obtains its place for the sake of em- phasis, or to avoid ambiguity, for if the author had said " only differs," it might mean " differs, and nothing more," which is not the meaning of the writer. Ex. — " I am only speaking of what they should do, who would deal fairly with their own minds." — Locke. Here the adverb should be placed before the preposition, i.e. only of, or concerning, what they should do. Ex. — Persons " who do not read merely with the intention of killing time." — Campbell. — i.e. merely having that in- tention, or with the mere intention of killing time. Ex. — " Such roots as have been naturalized in the form of entire or separate words, have been adopted into the lan- guage without almost any change." — M'Culloch. The adverb almost qualifies the definitive any. There are few readers perhaps who would not prefer the position of the adverb before the preposition; " almost without any change ;" with scarcely any change, is the preferable phra- seology. Ex. — " Our inquiry is solely about what may be imitated by articulate sounds." — Campbell.— i.e. solely concerning. Ex.—" Though he fall, he shall not utterly be cast down/' If the verb be considered a compound active verb, which PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 147 is usually the case when the preposition qualifies the verb, then the adverb may be placed before the participle, as — he shall not be utterly cast down. The adverb, however, does not modify the verb "cast/' but the preposition "down;" "he shall not be cast utterly down." Ex. — " And this you may very consistently do, even though you should consider them merely the avant couriers, to an- nounce the approach or entrance of a noun." — Tooke. The adverb even, in this example, qualifies the conjunc- tion " though ;" the adverb merely appears to qualify the article, but in fact it belongs to the noun, " the mere avant couriers." Ex. — " We do indeed see all the outward marks of respect bestowed upon persons, merely because they are rich and powerful." — Cobbett. The adverb " merely " qualifies the conjunction because, and the phrase, " merely because," is equivalent to " the mere cause being" they are rich and powerful. Ex. — " I conceived the notion, that Peter was in the no- minative, only because no action was mentioned at all in the sentence." — Cobbett, i.e. '* The only cause being." But we shall give one more example, in which the reader will clearly perceive the connection between the adverb and this conjunction. Ex.— We see daily, or rather weekly, that medical writers denounce, as unprincipled, such men as and because they held office in the central board, because, and apparently, merely because they occupied stations which were supposed to have attached to them valuable emoluments. It may be observed, that Dr. Johnson* appears to favour this opinion respecting the use of adverbs, before indeclinable words, and if Mr. Tooke's theory be correct, there seems to be no reason why any one should hesitate to admit the propriety of extending the application of adverbs to pre- positions, conjunctions, and definitives in general. Should our view of this subject be consistent with the principles of construction, and if the fact, that the adverb qualifies every part of speech except the noun and pronoun * " Out o/— prep. — of seems to be the preposition, and out only to modify the sense of it." — Johnson. 148 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. l*as been proved by the examples quoted, it may be presumed that the difficulties so often experienced by writers in placing adverbs in a sentence, will be in a great measure, if not alto- gether, removed. Besides those adverbs which are added to modify the attri- butes of a noun, there are others which denote order, time, place, distance, motion, relation, quantity, comparison, doubt, affirmation, negation, demonstration, interrogation — in fact, the diversity of words classed by grammarians as adverbs, fully justifies the "free translation of Servius," given by Mr. Tooke in his Diversions of Purley. "Every word," says that sarcastic writer, " quando desinit esse quod est, when a grammarian knows not what to make of it, migrat in adverbium, he calls an adverb." Syntax of Adverbs. This part of speech has no government ; the chief thing to be attended to is its position in a sentence, and it may be remarked, that no word requires more care in this respect than the adverb. Perspicuity of style, and force of expres- sion, depend in a great measure on the use of this necessary part of speech. The adverb being in its nature, so nearly allied to the adjective is in general subject to the same rule of position, it being commonly placed before the word it qualifies, as — " a very excellent discourse ;" " more viciously disposed." Ex. — "The subject has been thoroughly investigated, and the truth fully developed." The place of the adverb may in general be ascertained by considering what word it is intended to qualify. But not unfrequently, for the sake of emphasis, from usage, or to avoid ambiguity, the adverb follows the verb to which it belongs, or is placed at a distance from it. Ex. — " To express the degree of difference between things precisely and forcibly we must employ distinct phrases," In this example the adverbs qualify the infinitive mood at the beginning of the sentence. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 149 "We would recommend," says Dr. Crombie, "that when the adverb refers not to a word, but to a sentence or clause, it be placed at the beginning of a sentence or clause ; where it refers to a predicate, it precede the predicating term, and when it has reference to a subject, it follow its name or des- cription." Adverbs are often improperly used for adjectives, and adjectives for adverbs. Ex. — " He behaved himself conformable to that great ex- ample." Ex.— Their determination was conformably to the best usage. In the first of these examples the word conformable quali- fies the preterite, and requires the adverbial form, " con- formably." In the next example the word conformably is the predi- cate, and should be the adjective, " conformable." " An adverb may be generally known by its answering to the question how ? how much ? when ? or where ? as in the phrase. He reads correctly, the answer to the question. How does he read? is correctly." — Murray. Illustration of Adverbs. " Under the flattering prospects we adore There often lurks a danger, not perceived ; And were we never thwarted in our course Salvation must miscarry. Mercy, then, Is the foundation and effectual spring Of all events, which seem the work of chance. The man repulsed is but the child refused, The dangerous weapon which may wound himself." The above illustration, though containing but few adverbs, is judged sufficient, since this is a part of speech of such fre- quent occurrence, that examples may be found in the pages of every writer. CHAPTER X. PREPOSITIONS. ' 'Tis easy for men to write, one after another, of cases and genders, moods and tenses, gerunds and supines. In these, and the like, there has heen great diligence used. But though Prepositions and Conjunctions are names well known in grammar, and the particles contained under them carefully ranked into their distinct subdivisions, yet he who would shew the right use of particles, and what significancy and force they have, must take a little more pains ; enter into his own thoughts ; and observe, nicely, the several postures of his mind in discoursing." Locke. <•& Convinced of the importance of fixing, as nearly as possi- ble, a determinate signification to the indeclinable parts of speech, we will not assert, in treating of prepositions, that " it is not so much their* meaning with which the gram- marian is concerned, as their syntactical character, their capacity of affecting other words, or being affected by them." This would be declining a point of the utmost importance, and the neglect of investigating which has, hitherto, caused the difficulty of ascertaining the use and just application of these words. Mr. Tooke was the first who attempted to expose the method of explaining the origin and nature of these particles. The celebrity his work on language has acquired is perhaps the best proof of the success of his investigations. That writer, with a spirit of inquiry, evincing at once the strength and independence of his mind, and his zeal for the true principles of science, disdained to adopt the opinions of * "The grammarian says it is none of his business, but that it belongs to the philosopher, and for that reason, only, he omits giving an account of them. Whilst the philosopher avails himself of his dignity, and when he meets with a stubborn difficulty which he cannot unravel, (and only then,) disdains to be employed about words, although they are the necessary channel through which his most precious liquors must flow". — Tooke. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 151 others, because they were established. He boldly ventured to question the truth of those instructions which he did not comprehend, and he has set before us an example which may serve as some excuse for freely examining the opinions of even so reputable a writer as himself. Prepositions may be conveniently divided into two classes. First. Those which denote the relations of place, and which, when thus employed, have always a determinate and uniform signification. These have been aptly called local prepositions ; they are often used adverbially to modify the signification of another word, as — to walk about ; to laugh at ; to bear out ; to cast up ; to carry off. The meanings of local prepositions are so evident, and are, in general, so clearly understood, that examples to illus- trate their several significations can scarcely be considered requisite. To those, however, who are not accustomed to inquiries of this kind, the following poetical list of English prepositions may be of service ; and it is hoped, (with the assistance of the spirited engraving, illustrating the relations denoted by the greater part of these words,) that their meaning will be readily imprinted on the mind of the impractised reader. List of Prepositions. " Along, among, above, about, Against, amongst, concerning, out, After, at, behind, before, Below, beneatb, beside, and for, Besides, between, betwixt, and by, Beyond, off, unto, over, nigh, During, from, within, and through, For, near, since, of, in, into, Till, to, with, without, upon, Until, under, toward, on." Relations, it has been observed, are the most abstract and metaphysical ideas of any which men have occasion to form, when they are considered by themselves, and separated from the related object. It would puzzle any man to give a dis- tinct account of what is meant by such words as of or 152 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. from, when it stands by itself, and to explain all that may be included under it. But this difficulty does not extend in an equal degree to all prepositions ; thus, in the local preposi- tions before and near the relations of priority and proximity are sufficiently evident, even when the prepositions are unconnected with the objects to which they may be applied. The second class of prepositions denote less obvious rela- tions, and being less determinate in their signification are commonly used with greater latitude. Among this class are included many of the local prepositions employed in a figu- rative sense. For example, the preposition m was originally designed to express the circumstance of place, as — " the man was killed in the wood." " In progress of time," says the writer who furnishes this example, " words were wanted to express men's being connected with certain conditions of fortune, or certain situations of mind; and some resemblance or analogy being fancied between these and the place of bodies, the word in was employed to express men's being so circumstanced ; as — one's being in health, or in sickness; in prosperity, or in adversity ; in joy, or in grief; in doubt, or in danger, or in safety. Here we see this preposition in plainly assuming a tropical signification, or carried off from its original meaning, to signify something else which relates to or resembles it." In sometimes denotes the relation of time, as — in the mean time. Ex. — In the beginning God created, i.e. during that period called the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. The prepositions which we purpose more particularly to examine are, by, with, without, from, to, on, off, near, at, of, and for. By. By is a modification, or, according to Mr. Tooke's theory, a corruption of the imperative of the verb beon, to be. It is a substitute for the present participle " being," and in its primary signification it connects the agent or doer to the passive form of the verb. By has, however, less force of PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 1 53 signification than the verb, and simply unites the agent to the object and its attribute, without suggesting the notions of affirmation, time, or existence. Ex. — England was invaded by Julius Ceesar, i.e. the invader being Julius Csesar. And here it may be observed that as the force of signification in the connective is increased, the union becomes less perfect. Thus, if existence, time, and affirmation be added, and the preposition be superseded by the verb, a distinct sentence is formed, and the union is destroyed. England was invaded. The invader was Julius Caesar. That the preposition has a separate manner of significa- tion, distinct from the participle, is obvious, from the fact that it is often used in connection with it. Ex. — " How can a thing be said to rest or stop by being in one place for one instant only". — Harris. By is sometimes used for during, as— by day, and by night, i.e. during day, and during night. With and Without. Mr. Tooke derives with from "withan" to join, as — a house with a party wall, i.e. a house join a party wall. We do not dispute the correctness of this derivation, we merely question its utility. For no one now applies that meaning to the preposition, neither does any one attribute to it the imperative manner of signification which it formerly possessed. With has generally the power of a present parti- ciple, as — a house with, or having, a party wall ; a man with a clear conscience, or having a clear conscience ; a soldier with a musket, or having a musket ; I wrote these sentences with a pen, or having a pen. Without, when it does not denote the relation of place, is equivalent to not having, as — a house without a party wall, i.e. not having a party wall ; a picture without a frame, not having a frame ; an assemblage of words without a verb, i.e. not having a verb. Much of the intricacy of composition is connected with this indeclinable part of speech. When a writer or speaker 154 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. wishes to include under one affirmation any object or cir- cumstance not immediately connected with the principal subject and its attribute, he in general has recourse to this kind of abbreviation. Ex. — " The sale of twelve very large impressions, within a few years, of the Eton Latin Grammar, with notes, for the use 0/ schools, is the best evidence of the continued appro- bation o/'the public." — Mavor. The connection of the foregoing sentence, in which several nouns are introduced, is chiefly maintained by prepositions. When we form a sentence, says Mr. Harris, the substan- tive, without difficulty, coincides with the verb, from the natural coincidence of substance and energy — the sun warmeth. So likewise the energy with the subject on which it operates — warmeth the earth. So likewise both substance and energy with their proper attributes, — the splendid sun genially warmeth the fertile earth. But suppose we were desirous to add other substantives, as, for instance, air and beams. How would these coincide, or under what character could they be introduced ? Not as nominatives or accusatives, for those places are already filled ; the nomina- tive by the substance sun, the accusative by the substance earth. Not as attributes to these last, or to any other thing, for attributes, by nature, they neither are nor can be made. Here, then, we perceive the rise and use of prepositions. By these we connect those substantives to sentences which, at the time, are unable to coalesce of themselves. Let us assume, for instance, a pair of these connectives, through and with, and mark their effect upon the substances here mentioned. " The splendid sun, with his beams, genially warmeth through the air the fertile earth. The sentence, as before, remains intire and one ; the substantives required are both introduced, and not a word which was there before is detruded from its proper place." With is often used for by to connect the means or instru- ment by which a state of being or an effect is produced ; as in the above example, the sun is the agent, and his beams are the instrument by means of which the fertile earth is warmed. Had by been used instead of with, the direct agency of the sun would have been less forcibly expressed. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 155 This nice distinction between by and with has been noticed by Blair in his Lectures on Rhetoric. "Both these particles express the connection between some instrument, or means of effecting an end, and the agent who employs it ; but with expresses a more close and immediate connection ; by a more remote one/' Ex. — The criminal is bound with ropes by the executioner. We have shown under the preposition by that the force of signification is increased, and the connection diminished, by employing the participle, or the verb, instead of the pre- position. We will now endeavour to shew that when the signification in the connecting parts of a sentence is dimi- nished, the union is rendered more compact : — A house that has not a chimney is incomplete. A house not having a chimney is incomplete. A house without a chimney is incomplete. There is no difference in the meaning of these sentences, but the first contains two assertions, and the connection is maintained by the relative pronoun that ; in the last the object is connected by the preposition, and included with the subject and predicate under one assertion. The same connection is effected by using the participles instead of equivalent prepositions. Ex. — The fears of my printer do not permit me to expose the circumstances, producing, preceding, accompanying, and following my strange trial of six days for high treason ; that is, the circumstances of, and those which occurred before, at, and after my strange trial of six days for high treason. From and To. From denotes the relation which a nominative bears to an object, from which it has been separated, or has a tendency to leave ; it also directs the mind to the object with which the nominative was formerly associated, and refers to it as the source whence the nominative originally proceeded, as — rain comes from the clouds ; the bird flies from the nest. 156 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. " From relates to every thing to which beginning relates, and therefore is referable to time as well as to motion, without which, indeed, there can be no time." Ex. — From morn till night th' eternal larum rang. To denotes the relation which the nominative bears to an object towards which it is directed, or has a tendency to approach, as — the king is travelling to Brighton ; the bird is flying to its nest. Ex, — He went from London to York. These prepositions are opposed to each other, and have a general reference to past and future. From denotes that the relation of possession or co-existence between the nomi- native and its source is past. To denotes that the approach of the nominative and its object is to come. Since. Since refers to an event or circumstance, and denotes the lapse of an era as yet incomplete, and from which period, to the present moment, the existence or non- existence of some event or circumstance is affirmed, as — corn has been cheaper since the peace. On and Off. On denotes contact and support, as — on the ceiling ; on the ground. Off implies separation, as — off the shoulders. These prepositions are opposed to each other. For example, the statue is off the pedestal, and on the ground. Are spirituous liquors to be drunk on the premises, or off the premises ? Off is more commonly used as an adverb than as a pre- position ; but whether used alone, or in composition, it means, either literally or figuratively, disjunction, absence, privation, or distance. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 157 Near and At. Near denotes the relation of proximity, and the propriety of its use depends on the objects compared. Thus, the sun is near the earth if its distance be compared with that of some of the fixed stars. But the sun is not near the earth if we compare the earth's distance from the sun with that which separates terrestial objects. A person may, perhaps, be said to be near home when within a hundred yards of his habitation, but if he be terminating a long journey, he would probably consider himself near home, though distant some miles from the place of his abode. Hence, this preposition admits degrees of comparison, as— near, nearer, nearest, and is therefore considered by some grammarians to be an adjective. Ex. — Turnham Green is near London, Kensington is nearer, but Knightsbridge is nearest. Near is sometimes used for the adverb nearly. At denotes the place which terminates the approach or approximation of one body to another. It denotes the pre- sence of the subject in the immediate vicinity of its object ; thus, we arrive at a town before we enter. Ex. — He arrived at the door, and entered the house. At also denotes the boundaries which include a period of time, as — he came at nine, and left at four. At is frequently used instead of a more significant term, as — he is at the play, i.e. seeing or hearing the play ; at supper, i.e. eating his supper. This preposition is likewise used adverbially to restrict the signification of the verb, as — the plaintiff was struck at, but not struck by the defendant ; the bird was shot at, but not shot by the sportsman. Ex. — " Colloquial pronunciation, which is perfect, is so much the language of solemn speaking, that, perhaps, there is no more difference than between the same picture painted to be viewed near and at a distance." — Walker. The prepositions near and at in this example, denote the relation of place, and may, with propriety, be denominated local prepositions. 158 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Of. Of, in its primary signification denotes the relation of property or possession, as — the crown of the king of England ; that is, the crown belonging to, or possessed by, the king. When the names of two objects are used to designate one individual, the noun, governed by the preposition, becomes, a definitive to the principal term, and thus loses its inde- pendent character as a noun, as — the letters of Cicero. The preposition of is here equivalent to that sign by which the English genitive is expressed ; for, instead of — the letters of Cicero, we may, with equal propriety, say — Cicero's letters." But if a property or quality be inherent, or supposed to be inherent, in the noun, the noun itself is the possessor, and the definitive cannot, with propriety, be put in the possessive case, for the quality pertains to the noun. This relation, therefore, is more correctly expressed by an adjec- tive. Thus, instead of — a man of virtue, we say — a virtuous man; a mind of activity — an active mind. That is, a man possessing virtue, and not possessed by, or belonging to, virtue. For we cannot say — virtue's man; activity's mind. This figurative mode of expressing these qualities would now scarcely be tolerated. Of has a variety of less determinate significations than that which implies property or possession, as — a glass of wine ; a cup of coffee ; a hogshead of sugar. Here the nouns containing denote the quantities of the substances which they contain. The name of the substance is joined by the preposition, to show to what class of substances the quantity belongs. The wine-glass, the coffee-cup, and the hogshead, are not the subjects spoken of, but the quantities of wine, of coffee, and of sugar, which those vessels contain. We cannot, therefore, say — the wine's glass, the coffee's cup, the sugar's hogshead ; since wine, coffee, and sugar, are not used as the definitives of the nouns to which they are united. In the following example of is used strictly as a con- nective, for in no instance can it, with propriety, be turned into the English genitive. Ex. — " Of some of the books of each of these classes of literature, a catalogue will be given at the end o/*the work." PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 159 Of sometimes means producing, or which produced. Ex. — "The causes of great events are often regarded with more intense interest than the events themselves;" i.e. the causes producing, or which produced, great events are often, &c. Of sometimes means concerning. "Of man's first disobedience, and the fruit of that for- bidden tree." The first of means concerning, the second belonging to. " Of is so vague in its signification that it may be used for many of the other prepositions. Thus, we can say — a descendant of or from ; a friend of or to ; hatred of or for ; an associate of or with; beloved of or by, &c. But pos- session is probably its original signification, in common with that of the termination of the possessive case, to which it is equivalent." — M'Culloch. For. Mr. Tooke has pointed out an error committed by some grammarians who have attempted to explain the meaning of prepositions. These writers either attribute to the preposi- tion the signification expressed by the verb which accom- panies it, or they transfer to the preposition the meaning of some other word in the sentence. " If," says Mr. Harris, " we say — that lamp hangs from the ceiling, the preposition from assumes a character of quiescence; but if we say that lamp is falling from the ceiling, the preposition in such cases assumes a character of motion. So in Milton. — 1 To support uneasy steps Over the burning marie'. Here over denotes motion. Again. — ' He, with looks of cordial love, Hung over her enamoured.' Here over denotes rest." The reader will perceive that over refers simply to the relation of place, and that motion is suggested in the first 160 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. example by the noun steps, and that, in the last instance, rest is implied in the verb hung. But Mr. Tooke seems to have committed as great an error respecting the true charac- ter of these words, when he ascribed one and the same meaning as invariably denoted by the same preposition. The word for, says Mr. Tooke, means cause, and among other examples, taken from Johnson and Greenwood, he adduces the following : — "Christ died for us (i.e. cause us or we being the cause of his dying/') "To fight for the public good, (i.e. cause the public, or the public good being the cause of fighting.") " I cannot for my life, (i.e. my life being the cause,) or to save my life being the cause why I should do it, i.e. though my life were at stake." " Chelsea hospital was built for disabled soldiers, i.e. dis- abled soldiers being the cause of its being built." "The soldier fights for the king, i.e. the king being the cause of his fighting." " Ofor a muse of fire that would ascend, The brightest heaven of invention." "That is, O! I wish for a muse of fire &c, i.e. a muse of fire being the cause of my wishing." " Some of the philosophers have run so far back for argu- ments of comfort against pain, as to doubt whether there were any such thing, (i.e. arguments of comfort against pain the cause of running so far back.") " It were not for your quiet nor your good, Nor/br my manhood, honesty, and widom, To let you know my thoughts." " That is, your quiet is a cause, your good is a cause, my manhood, my honesty, my wisdom, each is a cause, why it is not fit or proper to let you know my thoughts." We shall content ourselves with the foregoing examples, although Mr. Tooke has occupied newly fifty pages of his first volume with extracts and remarks on this single preposition. For is a preposition which has in itself no fixed meaning. It resembles a pronoun, and is put in the place of another word. It is generally employed to suggest an infinitive or PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 161 verbal noun, as — " Christ died for us," i.e. " to save," or "to redeem" us. Here, the preposition for does not mean cause, but refers to the object to be attained by the sacrifice of Christ, viz., the salvation of mankind. To fight for the public good, i.e. " to protect," " to pro- mote," or " to preserve" the public good. The preservation of the public good being the object which induces honourable men to fight. I cannot for my life, i.e. if it were " to save" my life ; but "my life" is not the cause why I cannot ; nor does for in this example indicate, in the remotest degree, the cause of the impossibility. Chelsea hospital was built for disabled soldiers, i.e. " to contain" " to shelter," or " to succour" disabled soldiers. The soldier fights for the king, i.e. "to protect," or "to support'' the king. " Ofor a muse of fire that would ascend The brightest heaven of invention." That is, O ! "to obtain" or " to possess" a muse of fire. " Some of the philosophers have run so far back for argu- ments of comfort against pain, as to doubt whether there were any such thing," i. e. " to obtain," or " to procure" argu- ments against pain. " It were not for your quiet nor your good, Nor^br my manhood, honesty, and wisdom, To let you know my thoughts." That is, "to secure," "to restore," or "to ensure" your quiet nor your good; nor " to prove," or " to evince" my manhood, honesty, and wisdom, to let you know my thoughts. In this example, the infinitive " to let," may be repre- sented by the preposition for, as — "for you to know my thoughts." The emphasis is now removed to the subsequent verb, and the sign of the infinitive becomes necessary, — "for you to know my thoughts." We shall add a few more examples in disproof of what has been advanced by Mr. Tooke, respecting the primary signifi- cation of this preposition. M 162 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Ex. — "A motion was made for an order for a writ/or the election of a burgess for to serve in parliament for the borough of Old Sarum." However plausibly the several objects might be assigned in this example as causes, it is evident that the preposition for is not intended to express that relation. The motion was " to obtain " an order ; the order " to procure " a writ ; the writ " to authorise" an election ; the election " to enable" a burgess to serve in parliament, " to represent" the borough of Old Sarum. Ex. — " The prepositions were originally, and for a long time, classed with the conjunctions." — Tooke. Ex. — He has every thing he wishes for, and still he is not satisfied. For, in these sentences, cannot mean cause ; in the latter it is used to avoid the repetition of the verb. He has every thing he wishes to have, and still he is not satisfied. For, when used as a conjunction, means because, and it was this signification, probably, that induced Mr. Tooke to attribute the meaning of cause to the preposition. When we say that prepositions supply the place of more significant terms, we do not intend to assert that the more significant terms are present in the mind of the speaker, or are suggested to the hearer by the use of prepositions. So vivid a representation of the significant term would be in- consistent with the character assigned to this part of speech. It is the peculiar property of " words, used for other words/' to express the idea less distinctly ; they are, therefore, used with greater latitude, and have commonly a variety of significations. Syntax of Prepositions. Rule I. Prepositions retain the power they originally possessed as participles, and, like active verbs, require the noun or pronoun to be in the objective case, as — " between you and me ;" " before him or her ;" " after them." Rule II. Prepositions should be placed as near as pos- sible to the words they govern. By not attending to this PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 163 rule, the construction is often rendered obscure arid in- elegant. Ex. — The ignorance of the age, in mechanical arts, ren- dered the progress very slow of this new invention. It should be, "rendered the progress of this new invention very slow." In some cases, however, the preposition follows the word it governs, and is placed at the end of the clause or sentence; but this construction is commonly avoided by accurate writers. Ex. — This is the subject which they differed on, i e. on which they differed. Prepositions often serve to modify verbs, and when thus employed, they may be classed among adverbs, as — to smile on, to laugh at. "Verbs," says Mr. Murray, "are often compounded of a verb and a preposition, as —to uphold, to invest, to overlook ; and this composition sometimes gives a new sense to the verb, as — to understand, to withdraw, to forgive ;* but, in English, the preposition is more frequently placed after the verb, and separately from it, like an adverb, in which situa- tion it is not less apt to affect the sense of it, and to give it a new meaning, and may still be considered as belonging to the verb, and as a part of it." The obscure signification attached to the indeclinable parts of speech, renders them very liable to misapplication ; and the want of uniformity, among good writers, in the use of some of these words, furnishes the grammarian with a pretence to refer to authority in cases of doubtful construc- tion, and to consider reputable use as the only standard of propriety in language. The utility of prepositions, and the inconvenience of omit- ting them, has been humorously exemplified by Shakespeare, and the passage may not be considered an inappropriate ILLUSTRATION OF PREPOSITIONS — * Compare this sentence with the example from Dr. Lowth, page 87. M 2 164 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. PETRUCHIO AND GRUMIO. Pet Verona, for a while, I take my leave, To see my friends in Padua ; but of all My best beloved and approved friend Hortensio ; and I trow, this is the house ; Here, sirrah Grumio ; knock, I say. Gru — Knock, sir? whom should I knock? is there any man has rebused your worship ? Pet. — Villian, I say, knock me here soundly. Gru. — Knock you here, sir? why, sir, what am I, sir, I should knock you here, sir 1 Pet. — Villian, I say, knock me at this gate, And rap me well, or I'll knock your knave's pate. ******** A senseless villian! — Good Hortensio, I bade the rascal knock upon your gate, And could not get him from my heart to do it. Gru Knock at the gate? O heavens! Spake you not these words plain. — Sirrah, knock me here, rap me here, knock me well, and knock me soundly ? Taming of the Shrew, Act I. sc. 2. In this illustration, the reader will perceive that the omis- sion of the preposition for, causes the ambiguity complained of by Grumio, — " Knock for me at the gate." CHAPTER XF. CONJUNCTIONS. " The words, whereby the mind signifies what connection it gives to the several affirmations and negations that it unites in one continued rea- soning or narration, are generally called particles,* and it is in the right use of these, that more particularly consists the clearness and beauty of a good style." — Locke. The character of conjunctions is taken from their power to connect the phrases or members of a compound sentence. Their primitive forms were the present and past participles, and the infinitive and imperative moods of verbs. Some of these parts of the verb are still employed in connecting words and phrases to the affirmative clause of a sentence. Ex. — I think myself happy, KingAgrippa, because I shall answer for myself this day before thee, touching all the things whereof I am accused of the Jews. It has been shown that many of these participial conjunc- tions, divested of their verbal character by modification, have been retained in the language after the verb, in its primitive form, ceased to be employed. These are the inde- clinable conjunctions, and they, for the most part, admit a variety of significations. Mr. Tooke, however, denies that conjunctions are a sepa- rate sort of words or part of speech, for, says he, " they have not a separate manner of signification, although they are not devoid of signification." That conjunctions have a separate manner of signification (however nearly they may be allied to their primitives in * Most grammarians content themselves with calling the indeclinable parts of speech particles, — " A good convenient name," says Mr. Tooke, " for all words which we do not understand ; for, as the denomination means nothing in particular, and contains no description, it will equally suit any short word we may please to refer thither." 163 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. meaning,) we think it will not be difficult to prove, and though it be admitted they are not entirely devoid of sig- nification, still we agree with Mr. Harris, that many of these, and other indeclinable words, have, at best, but an "obscure signification." Those who echo Mr. Tooke's assertions, and contend that an obscure signification is no signification at all, would do well, first, to show the precise meanings of these words. If they are unable to do this, we may conclude that Mr. Harris had at least some foundation for his opinion respecting these particles. Having briefly stated the opinions of Mr. Tooke and Mr. Harris, we shall proceed to notice the greater part of those words which have been classed by grammarians as inde- clinable conjunctions. And. The use of the conjunction and corresponds more nearly with the name given to this part of speech, than does any other of its class. It serves to connect words and sentences, and is equivalent to the verb add. The reader will, however, observe that it has not the s&me force of signification. Ex. — " A sentence is an assemblage of words expressed in proper form, and ranged in proper order, and concurring to make a complete sense." By substituting the more significant term add, in the fore- going example, the members or clauses will be rendered less connected, and the repetition of the imperative conjunction becomes displeasing, add ranged in proper order, add con- curring &c. Ex. — In the beginning God created the heaven add the earth, add the earth was without form add void, add darkness was upon the face of the deep. The tautology in this example is not perceived in the original, because the mind is not called upon to supply the force of signification to the conjunction. The principal ideas are also more readily united by the conjunction, than they would have been, if the verb had been used. " And the earth was without form and void, and darkness was upon PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 167 the face of the deep." But if the emphasis or meaning of the conjunction were rendered more conspicuous, it would necessarily detract from that rapid enunciation of ideas which is so desirable in the communication of our thoughts. One example more will, perhaps, sufficiently prove the in- convenience of using a more significant term, in place of the conjunction. Ex. — Add we have greatly benefitted by those languages, add have improved our own language by borrowing from them a more abbreviated add compact method of speech ; add had our earlier or later authors known the benefits we were receiving, we might have benefitted much more. This example will, perhaps, be sufficient to satisfy the reader that conjunctions are almost, if not altogether, indis- pensable in the communication of our thoughts. The conjunction and joins words as well as sentences. Ex. — Two and two are four. Ex. — A B, and B C, and C D, form a triangle. The power of and, as a conjunction, is, perhaps, more clearly seen in the foregoing examples, (adduced by Mr. Tooke, to disprove its separate manner of signification,) than when the word is employed to connect sentences. If and An. " The conjunctions if and an, " says Dr. Darwin," are shown by Mr. Tooke, to be derived from the imperative mood of the verbs, "to give," and "to grant;" but both these conjunctions, by long use, appear to have become the name of a more abstract idea, than the words give and grant suggest, as they do not now express any ideas of person, or of number, or of time, all which are generally attendant upon the meaning of a verb ; and, perhaps, all the words of this class, are the names of ideas much abstracted, which has caused the difficulty of explaining them." These few remarks contain, perhaps, more of the philoso- phy of language, than will be found in many of the best attested derivations of the author, who has attempted to affix to these indeclinable words determinate ideas. For, when 168 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. the force of indeclinable words is increased, the application of such terms becomes restricted, and it may well be doubted whether it would be advantageous, or tend to promote the freedom of discourse, if the primitive signification of these indeclinable words were again more generally and clearly understood. The particle an being now obsolete, or nearly so,* we shall confine our remarks to the conjunction if. "lF,"says Mr. Tooke, "is merely the imperative of the Gothic and Anglo-Saxon verb gifan, and accordingly our corrupted if has always the signification of the English imperatives^, and no other." Mr. Tooke quotes the following example, — My largesse Hath lotted her to he your brother's mistresse. Gif she can be reclaimed; gif not his prey. "And here," says Mr. Tooke, " as an additional proof, we may observe, that whenever the datum upon which any conclusion depends is a sentence, the article that, if not ex- pressed, is always understood, and may be inserted after if, as in the instance produced above ; the poet might have said — gif that she can be reclaimed, &c." " For the resolution is — she can be reclaimed, •' Give that my largesse hath lotted her to be your brothers's mistresse, she cannot be reclaimed.' — Give that my largesse hath lotted her to be your brother's prey." The reader will perceive that Mr. Tooke, by his method of resolution, has taken away the manner of signification from the conjunction ; and by giving it the force of an imperative, he has altered the construction of the poet's sentences. There is no one can doubt but the derivation of if from gif en is correct, but the manner of signification is not the same, for the conjunction ceases to be a verb when it is no longer used imperatively. It has also received a modification which so far obliterates its primitiye meaning as to render it fit for the purpose it now serves. If qualifies an assertion, and renders it conditional. It also connects the condition on which the assertion depends. * " An for if is still retained in our address to royalty — ' A n't please your majesty.' and in Scotland is in general use." — GjROJiSIE. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 169 Ex. — I will go to-morrow, if it do not rain. Ex. — If we say we have no sin, the truth is not in us. In the last example the condition is first expressed, and then followed by the assertion it modifies; but the first member of the sentence is not affirmative, being modified by the conjunction if, and the last is only conditionally nega- tive, depending on the contingence, that " we say we have no sin.." The conjunction if is often used improperly for conjunc- tions which qualify and connect the tenses of the indicative mood, as — if it rains, I shall not go, instead of since it rains I shall not go, or seeing it rains I shall not go. In the following examples, from Mr. Harris and Blair, the conjunction if seems incorrectly employed. "If men are by nature social, it is their interest to be just, though it were not so ordained by the laws of their country;" it should be, — since men. are by nature social, &c. Ex. — "And if this was the case, as they have shown." — Blair. The if should be as, or some other affirmative conjunc- tion ; — "and as this was the case, &c." Unless. — Lest. Mr. Tooke attributes the same meaning to lest as he does to unless, yet any one, with an ordinary knowledge of the nature of prefixes, may perceive that unless has a negative signification, which lest has not. In two of the three examples quoted by Mr. Tooke from G. Douglas, the word les is followed by the negative than; and in the first example les has the affirmative signification of still. If Mr. Tooke had perceived the force of the particle than, and its connection with les, he would probably have given a different interpretation to the verb lesan, which has no prefix to entitle it to the same signification as oralesan or dismiss. Unless has nearly the same meaning as the conjunction if with the adverb not. 170 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. Ex. — I will go unless I be ill, i.e. I will go if I be not ill. Ex. — Ye shall die unless ye repent, i.e. ye shall die if ye do not repent, or ye shall die, but not if ye repent. The con- junction but is necessary when the adverb is put before the conditional conjunction, for the negative then obtains its full force as an adverb, and is rendered unfit to connect the conditional clause of the compound sentence. " Ye shall die not if ye repent" would be abrupt, though the meaning would be precisely the same as " ye shall die unless ye repent." Lest is affirmative, and connects the cause, or anticipated contingency, with the prior member of a compound sentence, but it does not, like unless, render the prior assertion con- tingent or conditional. Ex. — " There is danger lest it be new without novelty." — Johnson. Ex — Ye shall die lest ye be polluted. Ex. — Yea speedily was he taken away lest that wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his soul. The reader has only to vary the conjunctions in the fore- going examples, and he will find that they have not an equiva- lent signification. For " ye shall die unless ye be polluted," would signify that ye shall not die, if that contingency exist; whereas, in the example, the assertion is peremptory, not- withstanding the cause itself is spoken of indefinitely, as a probability, and not as a circumstance actually existing, but as one that may exist, therefore "ye shall die lest ye be polluted. Less may formerly have been used as an abbreviation of unless, in the same manner as till is now used for until, but the signification of less, when thus employed, is not equiva- lent to lest. Ex. — " But will not bide there less yourself do bring him." Unless is also said to be used sometimes as a preposition. Ex. — The commendation of adversaries is the greatest triumph of a writer, because it never comes unless extorted. Than. " Than," says Dr. Crombie, " which Mr. Tooke does not seem to have noticed, is supposed to be a compound of the PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 171 definitive tha, and the additive termination en ; thus, tha en, thce?ine, then, are now spelled than." And this is all we have been able to learn respecting the character of this word. The conjunction than generally denotes comparison, and is put before the negative clause of a compound sentence. When correctly used, it has the power of a negative, and is equivalent to not, or and not. Ex. — The latter marks the object more emphatically than the former, i.e. the latter, and not the former, marks the object more emphatically. Ex. — I like, him better than you, i.e. not you better. Ex. — It is the fate of those who toil at the lower employ- ments of life to be rather driven by the fear of evil than attracted by the prospect of good, i.e. and not attracted by the prospect of good. Ex. — " More men fall, generally, in a battle than (not) in an engagement, because a greater number are opposed to each other in the former than (not) in the latter." As a proof that than has a negative signification, we may quote an example in which another negative has been used in the compound sentence ; here it will be seen that the two negatives are equivalent to an affirmative : — Ex. — " The positive has been thought by some writers to be improperly termed a degree of comparison, as it seems to be nothing more than the simple form of an adjective." " As it seems to be only " would have expressed the writer's meaning. The phrase " nothing more than " is adverbial and affirmative, and equivalent in meaning to the adverb merely. The phrase "no sooner than" is equivalent to "as soon as." Ex. — " The play no sooner opens than every auditor knows how it will conclude," i.e. as soon as the play opens, &c. The use of the double negative, however, often varies the expression, and denotes a shade of difference when opposed to the affirmative sign of comparison. Ex. — John will arrive no sooner than Charles. Ex. — John will arrive as soon as Charles. The mind perceives a difference between these sentences, 172 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. though they both express the simultaneous arrival of the persons. Than is often employed as a mere disjunctive, and does not denote comparison ; in these cases it loses its negative signification. Ex. — "Who, under the pretence of reform, have really no other object but the subversion of our happy constitution." " Here," says Mr. Cobbett, " we have ' no other object but,' instead of ' no other object than.' " Now, as there is no comparison implied in the foregoing sentence, (the word other being a definitive,) we see no reason why the disjunctive but should not be employed. If authority shall decide when usage is at variance, we may safely affirm that many of our best and most correct writers will be found to favour the phraseology which modern gram- marians have thought proper to condemn. Ex. — " If men do find a difficulty to see the agreement or disagreement of two angles which lie before their eyes unalterably in a diagram, how utterly impossible will it be to perceive it in ideas that have no other sensible objects to represent them to the mind but sounds," i.e. except sounds. — Locke. Ex. — "What now is the cure? — No other but this, — that every man should let alone other's prejudices, and examine his own." — Locke. Ex. — " And that for no other reason but because it has pleased our grammarians." — Horne Tooke. The phrases, " no other but," " no other than," are syno- nymous and equivalent to the adverb " merely." Ex. — "The grammar of any language is no other than a collection of general observations." — Campbell. That is, merely a collection of general observations. Nor. Nor is a substitute for not, and serves as a conjunction when placed between words or sentences. Like the demon- strative that, it loses its force of signification from its position. Ex. — There is not a word in any language which has not a complete signification. It is not possible there should be. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 173 Here are two distinct sentences ; but, if it be desirable to unite them, the position of the last sentence must be changed, and the adverb, being modified, becomes a conjunction. Ex. — There is not, nor is it possible there should be, a word in any language which has not a complete signification. The reader will observe that whenever nor is used to con- nect the subsequent or second member of a compound sentence, the nominative is placed after the verb, in order that the verb may stand as near as possible to the conjunc- tion which continues (though less forcibly) to modify it. " It is not, nor is it possible." The definitive no (not any) is sometimes changed into the conjunction nor, and by that means sentences, otherwise unconnected, become united. Ex. — None could exceed him in candour. His benevo- lence was equally remarkable. He had no affectation what- ever. In this example there are three distinct sentences ; but by separating the adverb from the definitive, and by using in its stead the conjunction nor, the last two sentences may be united thus — None could exceed him in candour ; his benevolence was equally remarkable ; nor had he any affectation whatever. Or. Or is a substitute for either, (and supposed to be a con- traction of other) having less force of signification, and therefore better adapted to join either words or sentences. Ex. A fleece To match or those of Sicily or Greece. Ex. — Manners must be reformed, or liberty will be lost. " Here," says Mr. Harris, " the conjunction or, though it join the sentences, yet, as to their respective meanings, is a perfect disjunctive. And thus it appears, that though all conjunctions conjoin sentences, yet, with respect to the sense, some are conjunctive, and some disjunctive ; and hence it is that we derive their different species." 174 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. The disjunctive power of this conjunction may be traced to its original signification as a definitive. It indefinitely implies election or choice, and consequently denotes separa- tion The attribute or verb, therefore, refers only to one subject, and is required to be of the singular number,— as, negligence or ignorance has caused this mischief. Or denotes diversity either of name or subject, and some- times connects the definition only, as may be seen in the following examples, adduced by Mr. Harris : — " It may be observed through all the species of disjunctives that the same disjunctive appears to have greater or less force, according as the subjects which it disjoins are more or less disjoined by nature. For example, if we say — every number is even or odd ; every proposition is true or false, — nothing seems to disjoin more strongly than the disjunctive, because no things are in nature more incompatible than the subjects. But if we say — that object is a triangle, or figure contained under three right lines, — the or in this case hardly seems to disjoin, or indeed to do more than distinctly to express the thing first by its name, and then by its definition. So if we say — that figure is a sphere, or a globe, or a ball, — the disjunctive in this case tends no farther to disjoin than as it distinguishes the several names which belong to the same thing:' Neither. The conjunction neither is a modification of not and either ; by the union of which words the force of signification is diminished, and the adverb and definitive, when united, serve to connect the members of a sentence, which would otherwise require a conjunction. Ex. — He desires neither poverty nor affluence. Without the conjunctive form of the negatives this sen- tence would be abrupt ; and although the force of the words would be increased, the sentence would not be equally per- spicuous. — He desires not affluence, not poverty either. The negatives are disjunctive, in as much as they separate the predicate from the subject. This property of the adverb PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 175 has not been sufficiently attended to by those who dispute the propriety of disjunctive conjunctions. The verb unites, while the adverb disjoins, the parts of such sentences. Ex. — " Neither you nor I are in fault." This idiom is pronounced correct, because it corresponds with the Latin — " id neque ego neque tu fecimus." But we, who do not feel the necessity of referring to a dead language in order to decide the propriety of modern phraseology, give the preference to the following ; — Neither are you nor am I in fault. This is an English idiom, and not only better adapted to our manner of expression, but it is more correct than the Latinized construction. The negatives nor and neither qualify the verb in different persons, and the conjunction, being disjunctive, requires the verb to be expressed or understood when the nominatives are of different persons. The con- struction — neither you nor I am in fault— is preferable to the one commonly recommended. For. For, used as a conjunction, signifies cause, or rather be- cause, i.e. the cause being. Ex. — " They are delighted with the stories that are told, and perhaps can tell them again, for they make all they read nothing but history to themselves." — Locke. Ex. — "Perhaps man may be more properly distinguished as an idle animal, for there is no man who is not sometimes idle. It is, at least, a definition from which none that shall find it in this paper can be excepted, for who can be more idle than the reader of the Idler?"' — Johnson. For is sometimes rendered emphatic by the addition of the conjunction that, and it may be observed that the latter conjunction is often employed for a similar purpose with other conjunctions. Ex. — "My Essays, of all my other works, have been most current, for that, as it seems, they come home to men's business and bosoms." — Bacon. The difference of signification between for, used as a con- 176 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. junction, and the preposition for, has already been shown. Additional examples can, therefore, scarcely be considered necessary to prove the uniform meaning of this word when employed as a conjunction. Because. The meaning of this conjunction is evident from the words of which it is compounded. Its power to connect sentences may be seen in the following example ; — Ex. — Rome was enslaved. Caesar was ambitious. Here is no connection between the sentences : they are both independent assertions ; but if the latter be attributed to the former as the cause, then the sentences become united, as — Rome was enslaved because Ceesar was ambitious, i.e. the cause beiny, Csesar was ambitious. The conjunction is, however, preferable to the present participle, because it is less emphatic, and does not suggest the notion of time. Therefore. Therefore, though classed by Dr. Johnson among adverbs, is commonly used as a conjunction. It refers to the premises, and at the same time connects the deduction or inference. Ex. — "Riches are for spending, and spending for honour and good actions, therefore extraordinary expence must be limited by the worth of the occasion." — Bacon. " A nice distinction of the sense," says Mr. Murray, " is sometimes made by the use or omission of the article a. If I say — he behaved with a little reverence — my meaning is positive ; if I say — he behaved with little reverence — my meaning is negative ; and these two are by no means the same, or to be used in the same cases ; by the former I rather praise a person ; by the latter I dispraise him." The copulative conjunction in this sentence should be therefore. We have given this example at length, because it contains a useful remark on the indefinite article. PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. 177 Though. The signification attributed to this conjunction by Mr. Tooke appears to coincide with its general meaning, viz. — allow, grant, permit, yield, assent. Ex. — Troy will be taken, although Hector defend it. This conjunction does not necessarily require the subjunc- tive mood after it. Ex. — You still carry with you your old humour in politics, though your subject is different. Here the conjunction is followed by the indicative, but in the preceding example the verb is conditional. Save. Save is generally classed among adverbs, though it may perhaps more properly be considered a conjunction. Mr. Tooke considers it the imperative of the verb "to save;" but he is compelled to admit that it sometimes has a different manner of signification : his illustration proves this, — " God save you all, save this friar." Since. " Since, in modern English," says Mr. Tooke, "is used four ways ; two as a preposition connecting, or rather affecting, words ; and two as a conjunction affecting sentences." " "When used as a preposition it has always the significa- tion either of the past participle seen joined to thence (that is, seen and thenceforward) , or else it has the signification of the past participle seen only." " When used as a conjunction it has sometimes the signi- fication of the present participle seeing, or seeing that, and sometimes the signification of the past participle seen, or seen that." Since, used as a conjunction, has generally, if not always, N 178 PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE. the same signification as" the present participle, whence it is derived. Ex. — " Since speech, then, is the joint energy of our best and noblest faculties, being withal our peculiar ornament and distinction as men, those inquiries may surely be deemed interesting as well as liberal, which either search how speech may be naturally resolved, or how, when resolved, it may be again combined/' i.e. seeing speech is, &c. Seeing is here used to denote a mental perception. But the present participle seeing will not always admit of being exchanged for the conjunction. Ex. — Seeing an unclaimed spot, which is a thing not to be found every day, I have taken possession. Here we cannot say, since, &c, without altering the construction. When since is used to denote an era from a given epoch to the present or current time, it is usually called a preposi- tion, and shows the relation there is between an event and the action, state of being, or circumstance, connected with that event. It serves to point out the time which has already elapsed from a given period, as — since the creation ; since the birth of Christ ; since yesterday. Ex. — "The range of useful literature has been considerably enlarged since that selection was made." — Mavor. Ex. — " What follow are only such as have since presented themselves to my recollection." — Brenan. In these examples the preposition may, with propriety, be called an adverb. It is significant of time, and does not govern the subsequent noun. When a definite era is expressed by referring to two events as marking the commencement and termination of the era, the prepositions from and to are used to shew the relation, and denote the duration, of the period. Ex. — " From morn to night th' eternal larum rung." But. But generally implies contrast or opposition in the clauses or sentences which it connects. Ex. — He is rich, but he is not generous. c^Aa& its&e&bvf- 0^7%^£/y&frv