CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON, 
 
 ATART FROM 
 
 HIS MILITARY TALENTS. 
 
 BY 
 
 THE EARL DE GREY, KG. 
 
 LONDON : 
 
 THOMAS BOSWORTH, 215 REGENT STREET. 
 
 KDOOCLIIL 
 
< 
 
 
 LONDON: 
 Printed by G. Barclay, Castle St. Leicester Sq. 
 
I' 
 
 6 V 
 
 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 (0 
 
 It may be thought, and not unreasonably, that another 
 work relating to the illustrious Duke of Wellington is 
 unnecessary ; more especially from one who had no pro- 
 nal or private connexion with him ; because all the 
 events of his public career, and, indeed, most things 
 connected with his private life, have been already col- 
 lected and laid before the world. 
 
 The press has teemed with his Memoirs in every 
 uise and in every form, and they have been published 
 t a cost calculated to bring them within the reach of 
 lmost the poorest reader ; and if the following sheets 
 professed to be merely a general memoir of his military 
 and political life, or a scries of anecdotes, however inte- 
 resting and well-authenticated, they would, indeed, be 
 superfluous. 
 
 But it has appeared to the writer that it would be 
 an act of justice to the memory of that great man, and 
 might be of service to his surviving fellow-countrymen, 
 to put together in a more condensed form some obser- 
 vations upon his private feelings and principles, as forming 
 a beautiful and touching part of his character, apart from 
 his public and professional position, winch is already 
 before the world. 
 
Z INTRODUCTION. 
 
 It may be fairly said, that no man's character was 
 ever subjected to so severe an ordeal during his life as 
 the Duke of Wellington's. 
 
 The actions of many former great men have been 
 published during their lives ; but it has been left to after 
 ages and subsequent elucidations to explain the motives 
 which led to them. Many a hero has received the 
 plaudits of his contemporaries, whose glory was perhaps 
 accidental, or whose success arose from unforeseen and 
 fortuitous circumstances, which were untold at the time, 
 and the concealment of which might have been dictated 
 by sound and honest policy. 
 
 But here every deed, and the ground upon which it 
 was founded, are shown at the same time. 
 
 Nothing but the most entire confidence in the honesty 
 and integrity of every public act of his life, could ever have 
 made a man consent to the exposition and publication of 
 all his motives, feelings, views, and wishes, which are 
 laid open in the wonderful collection of these Dispatches.- 
 He had that confidence. He knew that not one word 
 would be found in them of which he need to feel ashamed ; 
 and from them alone, sanctioned as they have been by 
 his own supervision, every argument and every deduc- 
 tion in the following pages will be drawn. 
 
 Brought forward in early life into a position of emi- 
 nence, and invested with an extent of authority during 
 all his Indian campaigns which would have been apt to 
 turn the head of most men, he seems, as we find by all 
 his correspondence of that period, to have shown the 
 same equanimity, the same patience under disappoint- 
 ment, and the same forbearance towards those whose 
 faults or failings had a tendency to thwart his own more 
 enlarged and energetic views, which we find him to 
 preserve to the end of his glorious career. 
 
[NTRODUCTION 3 
 
 It was. in fact, fl remarkable feature in his remarkable 
 life. Gifted by nature, as lie Beems to have been, beyond 
 the ordinary run of mankind, with forethought, and a 
 power of looking, not merely at the events passing under 
 his eyes at the moment, but at almost every possible 
 contiii2:encv which mi^ht befall him, he never seems 
 to testify impatience at finding that others were not 
 equally apt and ready ; or, at least, he never suffered 
 hi> consciousness of it to affect his conduct towards 
 them. 
 
 Another striking feature was his remarkable placa- 
 bility. Those who saw him only at a distance, deemed 
 him cold and austere. He has been called the " Iron 
 Duke," whom nothing could move; and it was said that, 
 though he acquired the esteem and respect of all, he gained 
 the affection of few. To a certain extent, as regards the 
 world at large, this might be true. He was, no doubt, 
 too cautious a man to lay himself open in ordinary con- 
 \ i nation to every one who might wish to engage his 
 attention, and afterwards to boast that he had been "in 
 the confidence of the Duke;" and his habit of forming 
 his own opinions, and acting upon them, without con- 
 sulting others in the early stages, or divulging his inten- 
 tions in the more advanced parts of his undertakings, no 
 doubt gave an idea to casual observers that it was not in 
 it urc to have friendly and confidential intercourse 
 with any one. 
 
 It is true, therefore, that he had few intimates, but 
 all who did enjoy that happiness entertained the warmest 
 feelings of affection and regard towards him. 
 
 He was, no doubt, stern and inflexible in the per- 
 formance of his own duty, and in exacting from others 
 the due performance of what belonged to them. Unfor- 
 tunately, he often had too much cause for apparent 
 
4 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 severity. The British army had never been assembled 
 in such numbers, and, in fact, had never seen service 
 upon such a scale ; and no doubt there were many 
 individuals of all ranks utterly unfit for the duties now 
 imposed upon them. Numberless instances may be 
 selected in the pages of his correspondence, of conduct 
 which, in any other military nation, would have been 
 followed by severe punishment, or instant expulsion 
 .from the service, which he, in the kindest and most 
 forbearing manner, notices with merely expressing a 
 hope that the honour, the good sense (?), and the gentle- 
 manly feelings of the delinquent will prevent a repeti- 
 tion ! In his confirmation of the sentences of courts- 
 martial, or in his comments upon the proceedings 
 of the court, and in his answers to letters (which we 
 do not see, but the nature of which we may fairly con- 
 jecture from the tone of his reply), his language is 
 always firm and unyielding ; but we find many in 
 which, though his sense of duty compels him to give a 
 reprimand, or to convey an unpleasant communication, 
 it is obvious that he does it with reluctance, and with 
 an anxious wish to hurt the private feelings of the person 
 as little as possible. 
 
 The caution and apparent coldness to which allusion 
 has already been made, was an essential part of his cha- 
 racter ; and, perhaps, it is not too much to say that the 
 eminent success of some of his great military measures 
 may be mainly attributed to it. Secrecy — absolute 
 secrecy — in the midst of thousands, including, of course, 
 many who must be personally engaged, was not to be 
 looked for : but he preserved a nearer approach to it 
 than any other man. His officers might deem him close, 
 and some of them might feel that he did not show them 
 the confidence to which they might think they were 
 
INTRODUCTION. 
 
 entitled; but he acted upon principle. He knew by ex- 
 perience that every gossiping letter from the army to 
 friends in England was very speedily communicated to 
 the newspapers, who made use of this limited informa- 
 tion as best suited their own political objects, and 
 generally distorted the facts. He might occasionally feel 
 nettled at the malignant and violent party-feelings so 
 displayed, or the unjust and ungenerous comments passed 
 upon himself (though that was the part respecting which 
 he felt the least anxiety) ; but he knew that during many 
 years of the war. the principal part (indeed, at times, the 
 whole) of the information respecting the strength and 
 disposition of his force was conveyed to the French 
 army, solelv by the circuitous channel of the English 
 newspapers. 
 
 His forgiveness of positive injustice to himself is 
 also a remarkable feature in his character. We do not 
 allude to the noble disregard which he showed to 
 the ignorance, the vanity, and the presumption of many 
 individuals at home, in different high assemblies, whether 
 in the Houses of Parliament, or the Common Council of 
 the City of London : that was the natural and instinctive 
 disregard which the magnanimous Newfoundland shows 
 t<> tin- snarling cur; and he might have a fair reliance 
 upon the returning sense of justice from the majority of 
 hi- fellow-countrymen when the first effect was passed. 
 But we allude more especially to the way in which he 
 overlook.- the nnceasing attempts of so many members 
 both of the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, to 
 injure him in the estimation of their respective nations, 
 which he had no means of repelling or explaining; which 
 creating hourly dangers to the gallant men under 
 • mmand ; and which, with a weaker-minded or more 
 petulant man, must have inevitably made him throw up 
 
6 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 the cause for which he was making such marked and 
 extraordinary efforts. 
 
 The buoyancy of his hopes and expectations was 
 another most remarkable characteristic. Oppressed as he 
 was (more especially during the first years of the Pen- 
 insular war) by the consideration of questions which 
 belonged to the Statesman, the Financier, and the Diplo- 
 matist, rather than to the General, and to which we will 
 venture to say no general was ever before subjected ; 
 thwarted as he was, in all the more enlarged views which 
 he took of the means by which difficulties were to be 
 averted or overcome, he never flagged, he never gave way ! 
 If we were to be guided merely by his official dispatches, 
 published in the Gazette of the day, or such parts of them 
 as the Government at home thought themselves justified 
 in making public, we might never have ascertained his 
 own opinions. The reference would have been to the 
 past, and not to the future. We know that men in 
 such situations, whatever may be their real feelings of 
 doubt, or even despondency, must conceal them from the 
 world at large. It is impossible to deny that there were 
 times, at home, when the public were almost without a 
 hope of ultimate success. His withdrawal at that mo- 
 ment, although it would no doubt have been the cause 
 of much obloquy to himself, and of triumph to those 
 who had constantly predicted failure, would in all proba- 
 bility have been felt by the nation as unavoidable j and 
 he had difficulties to contend with that must have 
 weighed with the Government and the public if he had 
 recommended such a step. A sense of his own arduous 
 responsibility, a sense of duty to those under whom he 
 was acting, would compel him in his " private " commu- 
 nications to make known his private apprehensions, if he 
 had them. 
 
INTRODUCTION. / 
 
 How do we find this m his case, where every secret 
 thought and every private feeling is laid open to us? 
 No ignorance of the difficulties, no insensibility to the 
 dangers, no unconsciousness of what (to most men) 
 would have caused almost a hopelessness of success ! 
 but, with a full sense of all this, there is a self-con- 
 fidence, a belief, that as he was conscientiously acting for 
 the best, the result would ultimately turn out for the 
 best, which shows itself in every confidential commu- 
 nication. 
 
 Another very observable point in his character was 
 the openness and candour with which he admitted any 
 error which he might feel convinced at a later period 
 that he had committed. Xo man has probably passed 
 through life (not so eventful, or pregnant with deeds so 
 essentially affecting the interest of thousands, as his was) 
 who has not felt, that, if certain events were to occur 
 again, the conduct adopted would have been different. 
 But most men would wish, and would probably attempt 
 to make it appear, that they had done right. He, no 
 doubt, intended to do right, and thought at the time 
 that be had done so. But his sense of truth was such, 
 hm integrity was so great, that if at a later period he 
 believed that failure had resulted from mistake or mis- 
 calculation of his own, he had the honest, open, fearless- 
 to avow it. 
 
 His disregard of everything that could savour of self- 
 rank, or pecuniary advantage, is most strik- 
 ing. We do not Bay that men whose lives arc daily in 
 peril, and whose whole worldly interests are embarked 
 in the profession they follow, are to be called grasping 
 becaux- they do their beal to nun their position to ad- 
 vantage; but we believe that few instances can be ad- 
 
8 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 duced of a man starting in his profession with nothing- 
 bey on d a younger brother's portion (whatever that might 
 be) who so nobly and disinterestedly refused the allow- 
 ances and pay offered to him by the foreign nations in 
 whose service he was employed, and to which he was 
 fully entitled from the military rank which he held in 
 their armies, but which he knew the finances of their 
 country could ill afford. 
 
 The rewards afterwards bestowed upon him by the 
 Parliament of his own country were, of course, to be 
 regarded in a different light. He accepted them with 
 gratitude, as proud proofs of his country's approval ! 
 
 Ambition, avowed honourable desire of distinction, 
 no doubt formed part of his character. Nothing of this 
 shows itself in his conduct ; no artificial struggle for 
 elevation, no effort to place himself above those with 
 whom he was acting : but we cannot believe that he was 
 devoid of it. 
 
 Disappointment at being deprived of what he con- 
 ceived would have led to such distinction in his profes- 
 sion, is observable only once in his long career. His 
 letters upon what he felt to be superseding him in India, 
 when troops were sent from that country to Egypt, are 
 the only indication that he ever gave of such feelings. 
 And, of course, his mortification was connected with the 
 expectation of the professional reputation which he 
 should have gained by it. 
 
 We must all feel how wisely and inscrutably Provi- 
 dence dispenses its arrangements ! Colonel Wellesley, 
 commanding a comparatively small body of troops 
 from India, which did not arrive in Egypt till too late for 
 any display of military prowess or distinction, might 
 have been cut off by disease or accident, and the world 
 
[NTRODUCTION. V 
 
 might then have been deprived of the greatest military 
 genius of our own or any other age ! ! 
 
 This, however, is beside our subject, except as a 
 further illustration of the command of temper, and of 
 the high sense of duty, which distinguished him thus 
 early in life, and which shone with increased lustre in 
 proportion to the brilliancy of his subsequent career. 
 The innate, natural, and honourable feeling of am- 
 bition did not desert him ; the disappointment of what 
 he felt to be well-founded expectation did not induce 
 him to retire in disgust ; and the age and the country 
 which he adorned have reason to be thankful for that 
 frame of mind which induced him to continue his pro- 
 ion. 
 
 Without, therefore, any attempt to repeat the often- 
 told but never weaning tale of our great Duke's etc- 
 pUnts t or to give a repetition of the events of his life, we 
 ly wish here to bring before his fellow-countrymen 
 proofs of his feelings and principles under various cir- 
 cumstances, as important characteristic points, and as 
 showing. — 
 
 1st. 1 1 is confidence in himself, and buoyancy under per- 
 sonal responsibility. 
 
 2d. His forbearance and forgiveness of injustice. 
 
 3d. His firmness under home and foreign annoyances. 
 
 1th. 1 1 i -^ natural feelings of secrecy and caution. 
 
 5th. His disinterestedness as to money or rank, and his 
 raJ candour and simplicity of character. 
 
 6th. His placability aa to the faults and failings of others, 
 evinced by his feelings connected with subordination 
 and courts-martial. 
 
 Those various points we shall establish by reference 
 to his dispatches written at the time, under the impulse 
 
10 INTRODUCTION. 
 
 of the moment, and often under circumstances which 
 might have caused the bravest mind to quail, or the 
 coolest head to be excited; and showing in its native 
 colors what, we believe we may venture to assert, was 
 one of the most noble, great, and glorious spirits that 
 ever existed in man. 
 
BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, AND SENSE OF 
 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 
 
 An attentive perusal of the private inward feelings laid 
 open before us in these Dispatches will prove to the reader 
 that the caution, and what his political or other oppo- 
 nents called his Fabian policy (which they, and indeed 
 many rash and wrong-headed men, in his own army, 
 at times almost considered as timidity), was combined 
 with a buoyancy of hope, and a glimpse, even under the 
 darkest cloud, of brighter though distant gleams, which 
 few men possessed. 
 
 The circumstances under which he was frequently 
 placed were, indeed, enough to have oppressed the most 
 cheerful mind, and at some moments the least prospect of 
 success might have been looked upon as chimerical : but 
 /lis spirit did bear up, and his hopes were eventually 
 realised. They were not founded upon the careless ex- 
 pectation or belief, which persons so often entertain, that 
 "tilings will all turn out for the best," or that " when 
 things are at the worst they must mend," and which are 
 the only resource or consolation of weak minds ; but, with 
 the hope, he always gives In- ground for entertaining it. 
 
 He had no doubt a xevy strong feeling of self-con- 
 fidence. II'' did not allow that feeling to precipitate 
 him into any unnecessary ri>k ; and his natural caution 
 led him to weigh and Consider well before he decided. 
 
 lie had too many instances amongst the Spanish ,L r ciior;ils 
 
12 BUOYANCY OE SPIRIT, 
 
 of the total failure which mast follow such displays of 
 arrogance, vanity, and presumption as they continually 
 exhibited, and indeed boasted of, as instances of national 
 courage and glory : and if at any time his own elastic 
 spirit quailed, it was when those vain -glorious men 
 destroyed whole armies, and wasted every resource, in 
 spite of his utmost efforts to prevent them. 
 
 But when the smallest prospect of success presented 
 itself, his spirit seized and took advantage of it ; and we 
 believe most firmly, that on more than one occasion he 
 was almost the only man in his army who did entertain 
 the feeling. 
 
 At an early period, and when, it is true, that the cir- 
 cumstances were not of such a pressing nature, we find 
 him possessed of the firmness to take, and the fearless- 
 ness to act upon his own views, and to carry out what he 
 believed to be right. 
 
 Troops were assembled at the Island of Ceylon with 
 a view to certain expeditions, which were afterwards 
 given up, in order to send a force to Egypt. Colonel 
 Wellesley, for reasons which he gives in detail, decided 
 upon sailing with those troops to Bombay, on their way 
 to the Red Sea, instead of remaining at Trincomalee to 
 await further orders. 
 
 This did not meet with the approbation of the Hon. 
 Frederick North, the Governor of Ceylon, and Colonel 
 Wellesley writes to him : — 
 
 " The existence of your public letter upon the records of 
 your government increases considerably my responsibility on 
 this occasion. However, notwithstanding that, I conceive the 
 grounds upon which I have determined to go to Bombay, and 
 the urgency of the measure, so great, that I persist ; and still 
 hope that it will meet with your approbation, and that of 
 General Macdowall." (i. 71.) 
 
AM) SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 1 3 
 
 The expedition under General Baird sailed to the Red 
 Sea from Bombay, and Colonel Wellesley returned to 
 Seringapatam. He was made a Major-general ; and in 
 L808 was appointed to command a portion of an army 
 destined to act against the Mahrattas. 
 
 He was invested by the Governor-general with con- 
 siderable extra powers, and appointed to the chief command 
 (subject only to General Stuart and General Lake) of all 
 tlie British troops, as well as to the general direction 
 and control of all the political and military officers within 
 certain limits. 
 
 These orders were communicated to the Government 
 of Bombay ; and in virtue of them, General Wellesley 
 opened a communication with that government respect- 
 ing some of the troops stationed in the Gnickwar ter- 
 ritory, within that presidency. He wrote again, more 
 than once, to complain that certain measures had not 
 been taken, and it is obvious that he had no great con- 
 fidence in the judgment of that government. 
 
 In a letter to the Secretary of Government, with 
 'lice to certain disposition of the troops there, he 
 Bays : — 
 
 " I object, upon military principles, to the separation of our 
 
 small forces in that quarter. If the Governor in Council thinks 
 
 r to adopt the suggestions of .Major Walker^ they must 
 
 ried into execution; and I hope that I shall not be con- 
 
 tnsible for the consequences." (i. 328.) 
 
 In a letter very soon after to the Private Secretary of 
 Governor-general at Calcutta, he says, — 
 
 " I have proposed a plan to Mr. Duncan (the Governor of 
 Bombay) for the organization of the troops and the general 
 detVnce of Giizerat : but although he cannot disapprove of it, it 
 interferes with hu little prejudices, and F see plainly it. will 
 
 never be carried into execution as it ought, ruder these cir- 
 
14 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 cumstances I had serious thoughts of writing to the Governor- 
 general, to request him to relieve me from the command in 
 Guzerat ; but I have refrained, and shall persevere as long as I 
 can." (i. 336.) 
 
 Again he writes to the Governor of Bombay : — 
 
 " I learn by your letter that you disapprove of my plan, and 
 you lay it upon my responsibility to carry it into execution. I 
 certainly am ready and willing to be responsible for any measure 
 which I adopt, and to incur all personal risks for the public 
 service : but I should be presumptuous if, after your opinion, I 
 were to persist; and I should deserve to incur the severest 
 responsibility for any misfortune that might arise/' (i. 342.) 
 
 In a letter to Colonel Murray, adverting to Mr. 
 Duncan's letters, he says : — 
 
 " After having objected to my plau, in principle as well as in 
 detail, he has called upon me to order its adoption, and has 
 thrown upon me all the responsibility for its consequences. / 
 am not afraid of responsibility, God knows ! and I am ready to 
 incur any personal risk for the public service : but under such 
 circumstances I should be mad if I w T ere to order this plan to be 
 carried into execution." (i. 343.) 
 
 And again he writes to Major Shawe • — 
 
 " I am sorry to tell you that I have been obliged to relin- 
 quish the command in Guzerat. After Mr. Duncan had 
 acquiesced in my plan for the defence of those territories, he 
 has written to say that acquiescence is not approbation : but that if 
 I choose to be responsible for the consequences it shall be carried 
 into execution. I should have no objection to taking upon 
 myself to be answerable for any measures that I have recom- 
 mended, provided I was certain that they would be carried into 
 execution. But I know that these would be impeded, and I 
 should incur blame when I should not deserve it." (i. 348.) 
 
 And yet, with all these well-founded grounds for 
 distrust, and conduct which had tended to break off 
 friendly and confidential intercourse, we find that when 
 
AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 15 
 
 his final departure from the army approached, consider- 
 ing Mr. Duncan as a public servant, whose authority 
 must be supported, such was his general disposition to 
 t and forgive, that he would permit no angry feel- 
 ings to prevail, and the following is the conclusion of his 
 official correspondence : — 
 
 11 Upon the occasion of relinquishing the command, and 
 jiicntly giving up the immediate communication which I 
 have held with your government, allow me once more to return 
 you my thanks for the many instances of your confidence, 
 favour, and kindness. Although at a distance, I shall ever be 
 anxious for the honour and prosperity of your government, and 
 I shall be happy to have any opportunity to evince my zeal in 
 your service." (ii. 307.) 
 
 He left that country on the 24th of June, 1804, and 
 went to Calcutta. He was again sent to Seringapatam 
 in the expectation of more service, but ultimately left 
 India, and arrived in England in September 1805. 
 
 A considerable time elapsed without his being again 
 in any situation that required correspondence upon pro- 
 ;ial subjects j but at last, in June 1808, he was 
 appointed to the command of that detachment of British 
 troops which opened the Peninsular war. His success 
 upon landing was brilliant ; but the arrival of more 
 troops, with senior officers, deprived him of the com- 
 mand, and he returned to England. Before his depar- 
 ture we have a proof, however, of the continued buoy- 
 ant of his ardent mind. Writing to Mr. Stuart, at 
 ( tporto, in Septeffib r 1st, he Bays : — 
 
 u \ do not know what Sir Hew Dalrymple proposes to do, 
 or l- instructed to do: but if I were in his situation I would 
 have 20,000 men at Madrid in less than a month." (iv. 121.) 
 
 He returned to England in October, and the inquiry 
 into the Convention of ('intra took place in November. 
 
1G BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 In March, 1809, he was again sent to command in 
 Portugal, where lie arrived on the 2 2d of April. His 
 military movements to Oporto were prompt and success- 
 ful ; when he turned his attention to the Spanish frontier, 
 and writes home with his usual cheerful anticipation of 
 success to Lord Castlereagh, — 
 
 " I think it probable that Cuesta and I shall be more than a 
 match for the French army on the Guadiana, and that we shall 
 force them to retreat. My instructions will then be important, 
 and unless they are altered I shall be obliged to halt at the 
 moment when my advance might be most important to the cause 
 of the Spaniards. I wish the king's ministers to give me a lati- 
 tude to continue my operations in Spain, if I consider them con- 
 sistent with the safety of Portugal." 
 
 His communications, personal or by letter, were 
 always cheering to those under his command. Major- 
 general Mackenzie had been left in charge of a small 
 corps of observation upon the frontier near the Tagus, 
 during Sir Arthur's expedition with the main body of 
 the army to Oporto, and had apparently been led to 
 expect an attack from the French upon his small force. 
 Sir Arthur writes to him, giving his reasons why he does 
 not think the attack probable, and having in his former 
 letters to him taken all contingencies into his calculation, 
 concludes with a short inspiring postscript : — 
 
 " Look at your instructions, my dear Mackenzie, — act 
 boldly upon them, and I will be responsible for all the arrange- 
 ments." (iv. 323.) 
 
 In June it was believed that the British Minister at 
 Lisbon, the Honourable John Villiers, was about to retire. 
 Sir Arthur writes to him, to express his regrets, and 
 thanking him for the assistance which he had received. 
 He announces the expected arrival of reinforcements, 
 and the extension of his own authority, to advance if he 
 
AND SENSE or PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 17 
 
 (bought proper, and still retaining his characteristic tone 
 of cheerfulness, concludes with these words: — ■ 
 
 ■• So that the ball is now at my foot, and I hope I shall have 
 Btrength enough to give it a good kick. I should begin 
 immediately, but I cannot venture to stir without money." 
 (iv. 384.) * 
 
 He afterwards did advance, at the request of General 
 Cuesta, though evidently with a conviction that the 
 movements proposed were not the most advisable; and 
 he found it impossible to act cordially with him. The 
 battle of Talavera took place, but with little benefit, in 
 quence of Cuesta's retreat, which compelled Sir 
 Arthur to do the same. He was naturally much morti- 
 fied, as he felt that if Cuesta would have complied with 
 his >ns the prospect of success was good. 
 
 But, in spite of all. his hopes do not desert him ; and 
 rites thus in his private letter to Lord Castlereagh, 
 
 \ gust 1st : — 
 
 '' My public letters will give you some idea of our situation. 
 • 1 1 1 c embarrassment, but of which I think I shall 
 (jet the better; I hope, without fighting another desperate battle, 
 which would cripple us so much as to render all our efforts 
 38. I certainly should get the belter of everything if I could 
 manage General Cuesta ; but his temper and disposition are so 
 bad that that i> impossible." (iv. 52-j.) 
 
 Lord Wellesley had been appointed to succeed Mr. 
 i the British minister with the Central Junta, and 
 
 Srst letter to him from Sir Arthur, .after his arrival 
 
 .:• Seville, is one in which his buoyant spirit seems 
 ii to be breaking down : — 
 
 W I wish I could see you, or send somebody to you; but I 
 
 cannot. I think, therefore, thai the best thing you can do Is to 
 
 send somebody to me as soon as you can; thai is to say, if I 
 
 i, which I declare I believe to be almost impossible, 
 
 < 
 
18 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 notwithstanding that I see all the consequences of withdrawing : 
 but a starving army is actually worse than none. The soldiers 
 lose their discipline and their spirit ; they plunder even in the 
 presence of their officers. The officers are discontented, and are 
 almost as bad as the men ; and with an army which a fortnight 
 ago beat double their numbers, I should now hesitate to meet a 
 French corps of half their strength." (v. 15.) 
 
 A fortnight after we find, by a letter to Marshal 
 Beresford, that he had quitted Spain : — 
 
 " I think the circumstances in which the world, and this 
 peninsula in particular, will be placed in a short time, call upon 
 you to report at an early period the actual progress which has 
 been made, and the prospects which exist of forming an army in 
 Portugal. We owe this to the Government, in order to enable 
 them to determine how far they will go in expense, and how 
 much they will risk in an army to maintain Portugal. 
 
 " A great deal has been done, and Government may have 
 acted rightly in sending troops when they did, when the French 
 were involved in the Austrian contest. But the question is of a 
 different description, that contest being finished." (v. 56.) 
 
 The same state of affairs continued, and there was 
 certainly nothing to justify hope : but yet we find, in the 
 midst of his depressing circumstances, that bursts of 
 cheerful projects still break out. He writes to Lord 
 Castlereagh : — 
 
 " My dispatches will give you an unpleasant account of our 
 situation, than which nothing can be, worse : we want everything 
 and can get nothing. " But still he adds, — " I acknowledge, 
 however, that I go with regret ; and I wish that I had been able 
 to stay a little longer : not that I think I could have done much 
 good." And then, kindling with the feeling of what he might 
 have done, he continues, — " If we could have fed, and have got 
 up the condition of our horses, we might, probably, after some 
 time, have struck a brilliant blow upon Soult at Placentia, or 
 upon Mortier in the centre." (v. 73.) 
 
AND SENSE or PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 19 
 
 No events of importance took place for some months 
 In the meantime Lord Castlereagh had left his offibe in 
 
 England and was replaced by Lord Liverpool, to whom 
 Sir Arthur reports in November : — 
 
 u I am of opinion, that unless the Spanish armies should 
 meet with some great misfortune, the enemy could not make an 
 attack upon Portugal ; aud the force at present is able to defend 
 it. I conceive that till Spain shall have been conquered, and 
 shall have submitted to the conqueror, the enemy will find it 
 difficult, if not impossible, to obtain possession of Portugal, if 
 sty should continue to employ an army in defence of it, 
 and if the improvements in the Portuguese military service 
 should be carried to the extent ofwhieh they arc capable." (v. 268.) 
 
 " In respect to the embarkation of the British army, in the 
 event of failure in the contest which we may expect in Portugal, 
 I have no doubt that ice should be able to embark and bring away 
 the British army; not including the horses." (v. 275.) 
 
 " I do not think they will succeed with an army of 70,000, 
 or even of 80,000 men, if they do not make the attack for two 
 or three months, which I believe now to be impossible." (v. 310.) 
 
 • Daring the continuance of this contest, in which then 1 , 
 may be no brilliant events, and in which, after all, I may fail, I 
 shall be most confoundedly abused, and in the end I may lose 
 the little character I have gained ; but I should not act fairly by 
 
 I rovernment if I did not tell them my real opinion, — which is, 
 that they will betray the honour and interest of the country if 
 lo not continue their efforts in the Peninsula, which in my 
 opinion are by no means hopeless." (v. 353.) 
 
 Sir Arthur was created Viscount Wellington in 
 August L809. He had been always in the habil of 
 drawing up a memorandum of the operations of the 
 year; and a very valuable paper of that nature is placed 
 amongst the dispatches, dated December 9, 1809. h 
 sent to Lord Wellesley with MS. comments 
 Wellington's own, referring to the motives which 
 had influenced him, or to information which bad subse- 
 
20 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 quently reached him up to the period of his sending it, 
 together with his own feelings as respected the different 
 events. The concluding observations are not cheerful, in 
 consequence of the wretched conduct of the Spaniards ; 
 but the thorough-bred spirit breaks out. His very last 
 words in a note are : — 
 
 " If the Spaniards had not lost two armies lately, we should 
 keep up the ball for another year. But, as it is ! but I 
 
 WON'T DESPAIR ! -' ' 
 
 This is exactly the moment when we believe he was 
 nearly the only man in his army who did not despair. 
 
 The Common Council of the City of London thought 
 proper to pass judgment upon his proceedings, and 
 presented an address to the King praying that his conduct 
 might be inquired into. 
 
 The only effect which this produced upon him is 
 very tersely expressed in a letter to Mr. Villiers, as soon 
 as he had received the information from England : — 
 
 " You see the dash which the Common Council of the City 
 of London have made at me ! I act with a sword hanging over 
 me, which will fall upon me whatever may be the result of 
 affairs here : but they may do what they please, I shall not give 
 up the game here as long as it can be played." (v. 391.) 
 
 In his letter to Lord Liverpool he says, — 
 
 " I think it probable that the answer of the King to this 
 address will be consistent with the approbation of the acts 
 which these gentlemen wish to make the subject of inquiry, and 
 that they will not be well pleased. I cannot expect mercy at 
 their hands, whether I succeed or fail ; and if I should fail, they 
 will not inquire whether the failure is owing to my own incapacity, 
 to the faults or mistakes of others, to the deficiency of our 
 means, or to the great power and abilities of our enemy. In 
 any of these cases I shall become their victim ; but I am not to 
 be alarmed by this additional risk, and whatever may be the con- 
 sequences I shall continue to do my best in this country." (v. 392.) 
 
AND SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 21 
 
 In a letter very soon after to Mr. Villiers, in which, 
 from the great want of money for the payment of either 
 British or Portuguese troops, he expresses his feeling 
 that Great Britain had undertaken more than she could 
 execute, lie says : — 
 
 " I have no objection to communicate to you, that the army 
 
 in ita present state is not sufficient for the defence of Portugal ; 
 
 but the troops are recovering their health daily, reinforcements 
 
 from England are expected, and if I can bring 30,000 effective 
 
 British troops into the field, I will fight a good battle for the 
 
 --ion oi Portugal, and sec whether the country cannot be 
 
 I do not mean to say that more troops would not be 
 
 desirable ; but it must be obvious to you that the Government 
 
 could not irive more. Circumstances have certainly altered 
 
 since my letter of November, but the question for me is, Have 
 
 they so altered as to incline me to think that with 30,000 men, 
 
 which I have reason to believe I shall have in a few weeks 
 
 ther with the Portuguese army, which, by the bye, is better 
 
 than I ever expected it would be), I shall not be able to save 
 
 it all events, to sell the country dearly? 
 
 "We should hold our ground as long as possible; and, 
 
 G '1, / will maintain it as long as I can; and I will 
 
 neither endeavour to shift from my own shoulders on to those 
 
 of the Ministers the responsibility for the failure by calling for 
 
 18 which I know they cannot give: nor will I give to the 
 
 Ministers, who are not strong, an excuse for withdrawing the 
 
 army from a position which, in my opinion, the honour and 
 
 the country require they should maintain as long as 
 
 . I i 'J . 
 
 Thifl was not merely the tenor of his official letters 
 to the official authorities, either ;it home or in tin; 
 Peninsula, for. amongst other valuable corroborative 
 proofs, we find a private letter to his former friend 
 and associate in India, Colonel Malcolm: — 
 
 Palavers v.; ,ly tin- hardest-foughl battle of modern 
 
 ami the . result to our troops. It i.s 
 
22 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 lamentable, that, owing to the miserable inefficiency of the 
 Spaniards, the glory is the only benefit which we have derived 
 from it. If the Spaniards had not contrived, by their own 
 folly, and against my entreaties and remonstrances, to lose 
 an army about a fortnight ago, I think we might have brought 
 them through. As it is, however, / do not despair ! I have 
 in hand a most difficult task, from which I may not extricate 
 myself ; but I must not shrink from it. I command an unani- 
 mous army. I draw well with the authorities in Spain and 
 Portugal, [nothing but his own generous and ardent spirit, we 
 believe, would have thought so], and I believe I have the good 
 wishes of the whole world. In such circumstances one may fail, 
 but it would be dishonourable to shrink from the task." — Suppl. 
 India, 232. 
 
 In January, 1810, he writes home to Lord Liver- 
 pool : — 
 
 " I certainly think the army improved. They are better 
 than they were some months ago. But still, these terrible 
 continued outrages of the soldiers give me reason to apprehend 
 that, notwithstanding all the precautions I have taken, and 
 shall take, they will slip through my fingers as they did through 
 Sir John Moore's, when I shall be involved in any nice operation 
 with a powerful enemy in front." (v. 436.) 
 
 He was very much pressed by the Spaniards, through 
 Mr. Frere, to make a forward movement. He acknow- 
 ledges that it would be desirable, if it were practicable : 
 but he had not the means — he could not bring 20,000 
 men into the field. The Portuguese army was im- 
 proving, but still sickly from want of clothing and 
 provisions ; and therefore he says, — 
 
 " I have, with great reluctance, given up all thought of 
 moving at present." (v. 454). 
 
 But in a letter to Lord Liverpool, a few days after, 
 his hopes and wishes again show themselves : adverting 
 to the above proposal, and explaining the reason which 
 had induced him to write to Mr. Frere, he adds ; — 
 
\\n SENSE 01 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 23 
 
 w I have not, however, given up all thoughts of it, and 1 
 propose to carry it into execution hereafter, if circumstances 
 
 should permit/' {v. 466.) 
 
 Hut even he considered it a very doubtful question, 
 
 and it became necessary to consider what must be the 
 alternative. 
 
 " It is probable, that though the Spanish armies may be lost, 
 the war of partisans may continue. When the affairs of Spain 
 shall be brought to that state, and when all regular resistance 
 shall cease, and there will exist no probability of a renewal of 
 the contest in that country, — the question will arise, Whether 
 the continuation of the contest will afford any reasonable prospect 
 of advantage against the common enemy, or of benefit to His 
 Majesty's allir- : 
 
 •■ Adverting then to the probability, that the whole or the 
 greater part of the French will be disposable to be thrown upon 
 this country, I should be glad to know whether it is the wish 
 of His Majesty's Government that an effort should be made 
 t<» defend it to the last ; or whether I shall turn my mind 
 seriously to the evacuation of the country, and to the embark- 
 ation of as large a body of people, military as well as others, 
 - I can. 
 
 " Whatever may be the force with which the enemy may 
 invade Portugal, I am of opinion that, in all events, I shall be 
 able to bring away the British Army" 
 
 A change took place in the Spanish Government. 
 
 Lord Wellington writes to Lord Liverpool, Baying that 
 
 the new members of it are persons of integrity, and 
 
 acquainted with the aflairs of their country j but 
 
 he is apprehensive that they have been called too late 
 
 Bed much good. Referring to the probability of 
 any attack upon Portugal, he saws: — 
 
 "The enemy could not hem a situation for a considerable 
 
 time to attack tli ; and though the time may come 
 
 when it may be doubtful whether perseverance will hold out 
 any p fadvantag I r that it is a difficull ques- 
 
 tion i rnment at the distance to decide; 
 
24 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 That it must depend upon events in Spain, upon the spirit 
 and resistance of the people in Portugal, and in some measure 
 upon the season of the year; and adverting to the certainty that 
 the army can embark, it would, probably, be best to leave to the 
 officer commanding the period of evacuation as a military mea- 
 sure." (v. 483.) 
 
 The French had at this time received great reinforce- 
 ments, and had pnshed forward with a view to attacking 
 Cadiz. Lord Wellington sends many suggestions to 
 General W. Stewart who commanded there, and con- 
 cludes with the sort of cheering spirit that always dis- 
 tinguished him, — 
 
 "Every man who knows anything of the state of Spain, and 
 of the sentiments of the people, must be certain that if Cadiz 
 should hold out, and the Mediterranean islands continue in 
 possession of the patriots, the Bonapartes may have the mili- 
 tary possession of the country, but, sooner or later, they must 
 lose it." (v. 512.) 
 
 In another letter to General Stewart, after expressing 
 his regret at the little progress made by the Spanish 
 troops in their discipline, he adds j — 
 
 " We must not be discouraged by these untoward circum- 
 stances. The affairs of the Peninsula have invariably had the 
 same appearance — they have always appeared to be lost — means 
 have always appeared inadequate to objects — and the sole de- 
 pendence has apparently been upon us. The contest, however, 
 still continues, and is in its third year, and we must continue it 
 as long as we can, as it is obvious that Great Britain cannot 
 give us larger means than we have." (v. 578.) 
 
 His cheerful views continue, and we find him writing 
 to Col. Torrens, the Secretary to the Commander-in- 
 chief, — 
 
 " I am in a situation in which no mischief can be done to 
 the army, or to any part of it. I am prepared for all events ; 
 
AND SENSE OP 1T.RSONAI. RESPONSIBILITY, £6 
 
 ami if I am in a scrape, as appears to be the general belief in 
 England, although certainly not my own, I'll get out of it." 
 
 The necessity, however, continued, for being pre- 
 pared against any emergency ; his tranquillity remained 
 undisturbed, and on the 2d April we find him saying, — 
 
 "All my preparations for embarking and carrying off the 
 army, and everything belonging to it, are already made ; and 
 my intent ion is to embark it as soon as I find that a military 
 tu exists for so doing. In short, the whole of my conduct 
 shall be guided by a foil and cool view of the circumstances at 
 the moment." (vi. 6.) 
 
 He then discusses the different points for such, em- 
 barkation, giving his reasons for or against them, and 
 deciding in favour of Lisbon. It is foreign to our 
 purpose here to consider the military grounds upon 
 which he comes to that conclusion : but his fourth 
 
 - n is so characteristic of his buoyant (we had al- 
 
 Baid boyish) spirit, and is such a lively, playful 
 
 representation of the case to he taken by a man in his 
 
 anxious position, that we cannot refrain from quoting 
 
 it: — 
 
 " Fourthly, when we do go, I feel a little anxiety to go 
 like gentlemen, out of the hull-door (particularly after the pre- 
 parations which I have made to enable us to do so), and not 
 out of the back-door i or by the area ! 
 
 " I am willing to be responsible for the evacuation of the 
 country, under your instructions of February 27. Depend 
 
 it, what pie may tell you, I am not so doirous 
 
 a- they Imagine of fighting desperate battles: if I was, I might 
 day I please, Hut I have kept the army for six- 
 months in two positions} notwithstanding their ova de#irt and 
 of the Allies that I should take advantage of many oppor- 
 tunities which the enemy apparently offered. 
 
 "I am convineed, that if the Spaniards had followed my 
 advice Spam would now have been out of danger. 1 am (pine 
 
26 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 aware of the risks which I incur personally, whatever may be 
 the result in Portugal. All I beg is, that if I am to be re- 
 sponsible / may be left to the exercise of my own judgment. If 
 the Government take the opinions of others upon the situation 
 of affairs here, and entertain doubts upon the measures which 
 I propose, then let them give me their instructions in detail, and 
 I will carry them strictly into execution" (vi. 9.) 
 
 It is evident here that the Government were much, 
 alarmed : and this was the crisis of affairs. Officers 
 in his own army were apparently doubtful as to the 
 wisdom of his policy ; the Government were influenced 
 by public opinion at home; and one word of doubt 
 or vacillation, on the part of Lord Wellington himself, 
 would have sealed the fate of the Peninsula, 
 
 In tins last paragraph of his dispatch are displayed 
 two of the noblest characteristics of his nature : Indomit- 
 able courage, if left to himself/ Implicit obedience, if 
 controlled by others ! 
 
 It is obvious, towards the end of the summer of 
 1810, that in spite of his natural confidence, if duly 
 supported, he began to have doubts of what support 
 he should receive from home. 
 
 " Nothing can be more irksome to me than the operations 
 of the last year ; and it is obvious that a continuance of the 
 same cautious system will lose the reputation which I had 
 acquired, and the good opinion of the people of the country. 
 Nothing, therefore, could be so desirable to me personally as 
 that either the contest should be given up at once, or should 
 be continued with a force so sufficient as to render opposition 
 hopeless. 
 
 u In either case the obloquy heaped upon me by the ignorant 
 of our own country, as well as of this (who, after all, would be 
 but imperfectly protected in their person and property), would 
 fall upon the Government. But seeing as I do more than a 
 
\M> SENSE OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. '21 
 
 chance of final success, if we can maintain our position, 1 
 should not do my duty if I did not inform the Government 
 
 of the real situation of affairs, and urge them with importunity 
 even to greater exertion. 
 
 " I acknowledge that it has appeared to me, till very lately, 
 that the Government felt no contidence in the measures they 
 were adopting towards this country; and not an officer has 
 come from England who has not told me that it was generally 
 expected that he would, on his arrival, find the army embarking ; 
 and some have said that this expectation was entertained by 
 of the King's Ministers. 
 
 "This is not encouraging, and I acknowledge that I have 
 attributed the little excrtiou to the want of contidence of the 
 rnment in the result of the contest. 
 
 w If Government are really in earnest, I recommend the fol- 
 lowing measures." (vi. 326.) [Which he proceeds to detail.] 
 
 He writes to Admiral Berkeley, in reply to certain 
 suggestions : — 
 
 " I am much obliged for the opinions you have communi- 
 to mc. I must consider not only what is desirable, but 
 what is practicable; and I must first look at the facts of the 
 . and consider the means in my power. 
 
 u In case of the occurrence of a great disaster, it will be no 
 
 justification for me to say that the plan was that of the Portu- 
 
 Government, and that I would not oppose it, or that 
 
 you approved and urged it. Jn the existing temper of the 
 
 ij and for me particularly t such a justification will not be 
 
 allowed.- v. 569.) 
 
 Tin- state of responsibility in which lie was placed 
 
 indeed, perilous, under which none but a mind of 
 
 the firmest i old have borne up. His care was 
 
 not confined merely to the military charge of his own 
 
 army ; he W88 looked to, in great measure, by his own 
 I rnment, and entirely by the half-informed British 
 
 public, and the ignorant Spaniards 'ill a> llu\ snp- 
 
 d him . as tli« person upon whom everj arrange- 
 
28 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 ment depended. And with this weight upon him he 
 writes to Mr. Wellesley: — 
 
 "The security of the Balearic Isles is of the utmost im- 
 portance. You and I (/, probably, more than you) will be 
 considered responsible for everything that occurs, although we 
 have no means in our power, and no power to enforce the 
 execution of what is necessary. It is desirable that we should 
 advert to everything, and recommend to the Spanish Govern- 
 ment those measures which appear to us to be necessary." 
 (v. 580.) 
 
 In a correspondence with Mr. Frere a short time 
 before, referring to a renewed application from Don F. 
 de Saavedra, the Spanish War Minister, for British co- 
 operation, he gives his reason for declining • and he con- 
 cludes by saying, — 
 
 " With respect to the blame that will be transferred to us 
 for the misfortunes which there is reason to apprehend will be 
 the result of these operations, I am too much accustomed to 
 receive blame for the actions of others to feel much concern upon 
 the subject, and I can only endeavour not to deserve any for 
 my own." (v. 291.) 
 
 He says, in one of his letters to Mr. Villiers : — 
 
 " Men in your situation and mine must look at all ques- 
 tions with a very different view, which is the main cause of any 
 difference which may appear to exist between us. In my situa- 
 tion I am bound to consider not only what is expedient, but 
 what is practicable ; and no general officer in these days can 
 venture, even in a confidential dispatch to a minister, to specu- 
 late upon advantages which it is not practicable to accomplish. 
 If he ventures upon such speculations, the tables are imme- 
 diately turned upon him ; and although none of the conditions 
 or requisites of his speculation may have been performed, he is 
 asked for what reason he did not acquire those advantages 
 which he had described in his dispatches." (v. 326.) 
 
 In his own notes upon the memorandum which he 
 
AND SENSE OV PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 29 
 
 divw up of the transactions of the year 1S09 he 
 says : — 
 
 •• All the discussions upon this subject (Talavera) show the 
 difficulty of serving the British public, and the small degree of 
 satisfaction which any foreign officer has in co-operating with 
 the British troops. General Cuesta chose to delay the attack 
 to the 2 1th [for which there were good reasons), but no such 
 reasons are conceived or allowed to exist. A lie is invented 
 and circulated, viz. that the 23d was a Sunday, and Sir A. W. 
 is abused for being the author of the lie." (v. 343.) 
 
 Admiral Sir George Berkeley seems to have made 
 some communication to LorcnVellington about supplies; 
 3 lys in lvply : — 
 
 " I am concerned that you should imagine that the measures 
 taken for the supply of the army occasion an useless expense. 
 If ever there was an officer at the head of an army interested (I 
 say personally) in keeping down expense, it is myself; for 
 I am left wholly to rhy own resources, and am obliged to supply 
 the Allies as well as the British from what I can get : and if I 
 fail, God will, I hope, have mercy upon me, for nobody else 
 will.- .. 11. 
 
 We have already given a letter addressed to Major- 
 
 ral Maekenzie (p. 16) in an earlier period of his 
 
 operations, as an instance of the cheering and cheerful 
 
 nature of hi- instructions to his officers. We meet with 
 
 another of the same character addressed to General I X ill, 
 
 which we cannot help inserting : — 
 
 "The plot seems to thicken in some degree, but with pru- 
 management and decision I do not <I<>uht that we shall (jet 
 through, 
 
 " If any point OCCUra to you on winch you think you are not 
 fully instructed, or you entertain any doubts, let me know it, 
 and I will communicate my Opinion immediately; and if you 
 are obliged to act in any manner without waiting for my 
 opinion, do to with confidence that 1 have every disposition to 
 approve of f-vcrvthinir vou do. 
 
30 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 " I consider all my letters, though in a private form, to 
 convey official instructions and authority upon every point." 
 (vi. 82.) 
 
 After the unexpected fall of Almeida, in the latter 
 part of August 1810, the public confidence in Lisbon 
 began to flag, and some disapprobation seems to have 
 been expressed by the Governors there at his not- 
 having moved to succour the place. He replies : — 
 
 " I request permission of the Governor of the Kingdom to 
 say, that much as I wish to remove this impression on the 
 public, / do not propose to alter the system of operations which 
 have been determined upon. 
 
 " I request the Government to believe that I am not insen- 
 sible of the nature of their confidence ; but I should forget my 
 duty to my Sovereign, to the Prince Regent of Portugal, and to 
 the cause in general, if I should permit public clamour or panic 
 to induce me to change, in the smallest degree, the system of 
 operations which I have adopted, and which daily experience 
 shows to be the only one likely to produce a good end." 
 (vi. 384.) 
 
 After the battle of Busaco, and when he was in full 
 retreat to the lines, he writes, full of confidence, to Mr. 
 Stuart : — 
 
 "I am quite certain the French will not get Portugal this 
 winter, unless they receive a very large reinforcement indeed. 
 It is probable that they will not succeed even in that case." 
 (vi. 454.) 
 
 A little later, when within the lines, he writes to Mr. 
 Wellesley : — 
 
 "I have no idea what the French will — or, rather, what 
 they can — do. I think it is certain they can do us no mischief, 
 and that they will lose the greatest part of their army if they 
 attack us. They will starve if they stay much longer, and they 
 will experience great difficulty in their retreat." (vi. 502.) 
 
 And afterward to Lord Liverpool he says : — 
 
\\n SENSE 01 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 31 
 
 "I have DO doubt that the enemy is Dot, and does not, con- 
 sider himself able to force our position : indeed I believe I have 
 the means of beating the force now opposed to me. I think 
 that the ' Moniteur/ of 23 November, shows that our position 
 is considered so strong that it ought not to be attacked in front. 
 I am also certain, that if the British should not be obliged to 
 evacuate Portugal, the Trench must withdraw from Andalusia. 
 I do not despair of holding my ground, and have taken 
 measures to prevent the only inconvenience — a deficiency of 
 supplies. The question whether I should attack has been well 
 lered, / think I should succeed, but the loss must be very 
 great. And what is to be gained? failure would be the loss of 
 the whole cause. 
 
 u In the last year I cannot forget that I brought upon my- 
 self and General Cuesta not less than five corps d'armec. In 
 this year I have had three, the most efficient in Spain, upon 
 our hands for eight months. The Spaniards have made no 
 move, because they want pay, clothing, means of subsistence, 
 transport, discipline, and everything. 
 
 " Your Lordship will deem this a melancholy picture of 
 
 jpecta in the Peninsula, but you may rely upon its truth. 
 
 " It is the result of defects in the national character : they 
 have no army; no means of raising one; no authority to disci- 
 pline one if they could raise it; no means to arm, equip, clothe, 
 or feed anything which could be collected under that name. 
 
 " If all this is true, our business is not to fujht the French 
 army, which wc certainly cannot beat out of the Peninsula, but 
 upation to so large a portion of it as wc can manage, 
 and leave the war in Spain to the guerillas." (vii. 51.) 
 
 " Mr. Wellesley informs me that it is probable the Spanish 
 nment will offer me the command of their armies, of 
 which I apprise your Lordship by the earliest opportunity, that 
 the King's Government may take the subject into consideration. 
 I Ii an arrangement had been made a year and half 
 
 and the Spanish GrOVernmenI had seriously set to work to feed 
 and pay their army, the cause would haw been safe. It i> 
 
 impossible to say what will be the effect now. It will answer 
 
 no pi; • i throw upon me the additional trouble, 
 
32 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 and the blame and odium of certain ultimate failure, if measures 
 are not taken to feed and pay the troops. 
 
 " I shall answer, that the acceptance of the command will 
 depend upon His Majesty's commands, which will leave the 
 question open ; and I request to have, by return of post, direc- 
 tions what I shall do." (vii. 216.) 
 
 Ill a letter to the Honourable Henry Wellesley he 
 says : — 
 
 " The answer which I received, disapproved of my acceptance 
 of the office, and I must acknowledge that I never expected that 
 the proposition would be made. I propose, under the instruc- 
 tions which I have received, to carry on such military operations 
 as may lie in my power. I shall communicate confidentially, as 
 I have done, with the Spanish authorities, and shall recommend 
 such measures as may accord with my views ; and I can only 
 say, that whether they attend to my suggestions or not, / shall 
 continue to do the enemy all the mischief which the means at my 
 own disposition will enable me." (vii. 4 84.) 
 
 Again he says, rather later, in spite of this discou- 
 raging prospect : — 
 
 " I am glad to hear such good accounts from the north. 
 [Alluding to affairs in the North of Europe.] God send they 
 may prove true, and that we may overthrow this disgusting- 
 tyranny. Whether true or not at present, something of the 
 kind must occur before long ; and if we can only hold out, we 
 shall yet see the world delivered." (vii. 583.) 
 
 In a private letter to Mr. Villiers, who had at that 
 time given up the mission to Lisbon, he says : — 
 
 " I persevered in the system which I thought best, notwith- 
 standing that it was the opinion of every officer in the country 
 that I ought to embark the army ; while, on the contrary, the 
 Portuguese civil authorities contended that the war ought to be 
 maintained on the frontier, for which we wanted, not only 
 physical force, but the means of providing for the force which 
 they would produce. 
 
 " To this, I believe, nothing but something worse than firm- 
 
\\n SENS] or PIR80NAI RESPONSIBILITY. B8 
 
 Could have carried me tbrotlgh the nine months' discussion 
 
 with those contending opinions. To this, add, that })eoplc in 
 England were changing like the wind, and you will see that I 
 have not much to look to but myself" (frii. 593.) 
 
 In June, 1811, after describing to Lord Liverpool 
 
 the state oi his army, and the last reports that he had of 
 the position of the French, he says : — 
 
 " With this force it becomes a question whether any and 
 what operations shall he undertaken. "With the fine and well- 
 equipped army which we have, and with our cavalry in such 
 good order as it is, I am anxious not to allow this moment of 
 the enemy's comparative weakness to pass by, without making 
 an effort/' (viii. 111.) 
 
 lie then proceeds to discuss various points, and con- 
 tinues : — 
 
 u The next operation which presents itself is the siege of 
 Ciudad Rodrigo. This enterprise promises the best, and I am 
 tempted to try the enterprise. I may be obliged to abandon it, 
 and in a ca-e where the relative force of the two armies will be 
 trly balanced, it is impossible to foresee all the results. I 
 propose to put the army in motion, if circumstances afford a 
 chance of success 
 
 The success of his defensive lines round Lisbon had 
 abundantly proved, lie had never talked of them 
 beforehand, and he never boasted of them after ; but, of 
 course, tiny had now obtained much celebrity. 
 
 A certain Portuguese gentleman laid claim to the 
 
 • of having pointed them out. Lord Wellington's 
 
 confidence in their important value, had given him the 
 
 of security, whkh had proved to be well-founded 
 
 i many month-, and he was not the man to assume 
 
 to himself a credit which he did not feel to belong to 
 
 him. He put forth no claim of merit for himself, but he 
 
 could not assign it to another whom he knew to be un- 
 
 i) 
 
34 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 deserving. The Portuguese gentleman had certain quali- 
 fications, and Lord Wellington allows them thus : — 
 
 " I have not leisure to read Senhor 's works, nor incli- 
 nation to contend with him whether he or my officers have the 
 merit of the plans. 
 
 " I think I have reason to complain of his plans and memoirs 
 as having misled me, and occasioned inconveniences and expenses 
 which would not have been incurred if I had not had them. I 
 am not desirous of making any complaint of him, and I give him 
 credit for being a good draughtsman ; but it would be just as 
 possible to discover the longitude in his plans, as that degree of 
 accuracy on which alone any good system would be founded. 
 
 " If he wants a reward I have no objection, and I shall be 
 silent, or even recommend it. But if he pretends to have any- 
 thing to say to what has been done by our officers, I must 
 expose his ignorance, and the negligence with which he made 
 his survey and report. 
 
 " I can only tell you that I reconnoitred the ground in 
 October, and depended for some facts upon his report. After- 
 wards, Fletcher and our engineers found that these facts were 
 represented erroneously, and I was obliged to travel again to 
 Lisbon in February, 1810, and to alter the whole plan, and to' 
 undo all that had been done, in consequence of the erroneous 
 
 " You know that I was at Lisbon in February, 1810, and 
 that was the reason of the journey." 
 
 Upon the same subject we find a letter about six 
 months later, to the Portuguese Secretary of State, Dom 
 Miguel de Forjaz : — 
 
 " It has never been my practice to refrain from giving ap- 
 plause to those officers who have a claim to it : but I so- 
 lemnly protest against its being understood that Major Das 
 Neves, or Col. Caula, either formed the plan or conceived the 
 idea of the system which was carried into execution for the 
 safety of Lisbon under my direction. I never saw Major Das 
 Neves in my life ; nor Col. Caula, till I saw him at Almeida. 
 
\M) SENSE OY PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. ^0 
 
 Your Excellency gave me a plan, id 1809, of the country in 
 question, and a memoir by Major Has Neves. 1 am obliged 
 Don to declare, that when 1 came to examine the ground I found 
 both 80 inaccurate that I could place no reliance upon them ; 
 and it is a tact that, having trusted to the plan and memoir 
 without reconnoitring the ground, I was obliged to make a 
 second journey, and to destroy the works which had been com- 
 menced.'' i,ix. 84.) 
 
 Whether Major Das Nevea and the Scnhor 
 
 mentioned in the preceding letter Were the same person 
 we have no proof. Lord Wellington had been willing to 
 consent, in silence, that the latter should obtain any 
 reward to which he might prove himself entitled. He 
 might be poor, and he icas a good draughtsman ; and 
 the good nature which was so often tried, was willing to 
 abstain from putting any obstacle in his way ; but be- 
 vond that he could not and would not or>. The claims 
 of the two last gentlemen (whether either of them was 
 identical with the former claimant or not) were put 
 forth with more ostentation, and were met with more 
 sion. 
 
 The question, Who was to take Lord Wellington's 
 place in case of any calamity? has often occurred"; and 
 it l- almost a fearful thing to look back upon. Without 
 disparagement to those officers who, by seniority in the 
 ttusl have Bucceeded to the command Until they 
 could be relieved or superseded, it is no injustice to Bay 
 that they would have be. n involved in an awful respon- 
 sibility ; for which, perhaps, few would have felt tbeni- 
 - prepared. 
 
 Lord Wellington'- confidence m himself, no doubt, 
 was a most valuable quality, and earned him through 
 
 • difficulties ; but his life was beyond his own con- 
 
36 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 trol, and in looking at the immense interests concerned, 
 at this more remote period, when all temporary excite- 
 ment has passed away, it cannot be denied that the risk 
 does appear too great ! 
 
 We read his own feelings upon the subject, though 
 they do not appear to have had full weight with those 
 upon whom the matter rested : - — 
 
 " I am sorry to inform you that there is reason to apprehend 
 that Sir Thomas Graham will be obliged to quit the army on 
 account of his eyes. 
 
 " I mention it in case your Lordship should think proper to 
 make provision for the event of any accident happening to pre- 
 vent me from continuing to hold the command. 
 
 u As far as I am concerned, I certainly should perfer that no 
 officer should be sent out. There are few who understand the 
 situation of second in command of these armies. Unless he 
 should be posted to command a division of cavalry or infantry, 
 and perform that duty, he has really, on ordinary occasions, 
 nothing to do ; at the same time that his opinion relieves me 
 but little from responsibility, and that, after all, I must act 
 according to my own judgment in case of a difference of opinion. 
 There are but few officers who should be sent from England as 
 ' second in command ' who would not come here with opinions 
 formed, probably, on very bad grounds, and with very extrava- 
 gant pretensions. To this add, that when necessary to detach 
 a body of troops in any situation, but few would be satisfied to 
 remain with that detachment, unless it should consist of nearly 
 the whole army. 
 
 " If, therefore, Sir Thomas Graham should be obliged to go, 
 I am not desirous of having anybody sent to fill his situation, as 
 far as I am concerned; and I am convinced we shall go on 
 better if nobody is sent." (ix. 209.) 
 
 The rank of Marshal, which had been conferred upon 
 Sir William Beresford as head of the Portuguese army, 
 had already created much embarrassment with general 
 officers who were his seniors in the British service. 
 
AND SENSE 01 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 37 
 
 The question now under consideration, of the second 
 in command, naturally involved this point. 
 
 Lord Wellington was Marshal-general^ in virtue of 
 which he commanded both the British and Portuguese. 
 Any officer succeeding to the command of the British, in 
 oonsequence of his rank in that service, would not neces- 
 sarily command General Beresford (who held the Portu- 
 guese rank o( marshal, though junior as an English 
 general), unless he were also made marshal-general, and 
 Lord Wellington submitted the point to the Government 
 at home. 
 
 " The Commander-in-chief having decided that officers in 
 the British and Portuguese services should rank with each other 
 according to the dates of their commissions, there is no doubt 
 that Marshal Beresford, holding the rank of marshal, ranks 
 next to me in the Allied army. I hold the rank of Marshal- 
 general. 
 
 " His Majesty's Government have thought proper from time 
 
 to time to appoint a general officer to be second in command to 
 
 British army 'senior in rank in the British service to Sir 
 
 William Beresford), on which officer it has been the intention 
 
 lie command of the Allied army should devolve, in case any 
 
 circumstance should deprive me of the command. 
 
 " In case circumstances should so deprive me of the com- 
 mand which I now hold over the Allied army, as Marshal- 
 general of the Portuguese, either the second in command of the 
 British must be made Marshal-general likewise, or Marshal 
 rfbrd must quit the army at a moment when his absence 
 interpreted to his disadvantage; or he must assume 
 
 immand of the Allied army, and not the officer selected by 
 
 rnment a- the person on whom they wish it 
 ild devoh 
 
 "Im G vernment should think proper to send any officer 
 to replace N i. , Paget, it ia desirable they should advert 
 
 to the circumst affecting his situation." (ix. 585.) 
 
 r Thomas drahaiii had been obliged 1" <|int the 
 
38 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 army, and Sir Edward Paget had been sent out. He 
 was, unfortunately, taken prisoner on the retreat after 
 Burgos, in November 1812, which gave rise to the 
 present discussion. It does not appear to have been 
 then clearly decided upon by the Government at home ; 
 for we find a further letter on the subject to Marshal 
 Beresford : — 
 
 " I am glad that our ideas agree about your military situa- 
 tion. It is certain that Government have always thought it 
 necessary to have an officer here, selected by them, to succeed to 
 the command, in case I should be deprived of it ; and there are 
 some so partial to old practice and precedent, that they do not 
 like a departure from either, in not calling this officer ( the second 
 in command? This officer might have been very useful in the 
 days of Councils of War, &c. ; it may look very well in a news- 
 paper to see that such a general is ' second in command ; ' but 
 there is nobody in a modern army who must not see that there 
 is no duty for the second in command to perform, and that the 
 office is useless. It is at the same time inconvenient, as it 
 gives the holder pretensions which cannot be gratified except at 
 public inconvenience. 
 
 " I do not know, and indeed do not believe, that Government 
 have any distinct idea upon the subject ; but I happen to know 
 
 that they did not consider — as second in command at 
 
 the battle of Salamanca." (ix. 608.) 
 
 He says again, in a letter to Lord Bathurst : — 
 
 " What Marshal Beresford and I ask for is a settlement of 
 the question : not in his favour, if the Government deem it 
 expedient that it should be otherwise ; but that he should not 
 be in the awkward predicament of being obliged to claim the 
 command against the wishes of his own Government, or of 
 quitting the army at a critical moment, in case of the event for 
 which it is intended to provide. 
 
 " I cannot state positively, but I do not think he has any 
 intention to retire, if the question is decided against his rank. 
 I know that / would not retire, and I shall exert all the influence 
 
WD SENSE 01 PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY. 89 
 
 I can possess oyer his judgment to induce him to remain. 
 But the point must be settled. 
 
 " In my opinion, the office of second in command in these 
 days, when Councils of War have been discontinued, and the 
 Chief is held severely responsible for everything, is not only 
 ss but injurious. A person without defined duties, except- 
 ing to give flying opinions, from which he may depart at 
 pleasure, must be a nuisance at moments of decision ; and 
 whether I have a second in command or not, / am determined 
 to act according to the dictates of my own judgment, being 
 certain that 1 shall be responsible for the act, be the person 
 whom he may, according to whose opinion it has been adopted. 
 One person in that situation may give me a little more trouble 
 than another; but substantially I must be indifferent whether it 
 is the Marshal or any of the generals who have been named. I 
 most be out of the way when any one of them should be called 
 upon to act in command, and I can have no preference to one 
 officer over another." (x. -11.) 
 
 In a letter to Marshal Beresford he says : — 
 
 'It is obvious to me that the question is not understood in 
 England. If it is decided against you, it must be by an 
 at with the Portuguese Government, to which you 
 ijiii>t always be a party. 
 
 •• Iii what vet way it may be decided, I recommend to you 
 
 not to be induced to resign. What we have here is the army. 
 
 \ou cannot be in any other than a distinguished situation, 
 
 whatever may be the decision ; and I earnestly recommend to 
 
 qo4 to relinquish it. I beg you not to decide till you 
 
 what the decisioD is, and the mode in which it is brought 
 
 gain : — 
 
 "lend trad from Lord Bathursfe letter regarding 
 
 a which you will see that the busint 
 1 it would be. Ho ■ ' \< r. being iettled, 
 I do i any business of youn to inquire in 
 
 what manner or mi uhat pvinci] -1. 
 
40 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 The Spaniards seemed at length to have been con- 
 vinced of the comparative inefficiency of their own gene- 
 rals, and of the military superiority of Lord Wellington • 
 and, in spite of their national vanity, conferred upon him 
 the command of their armies. 
 
 It had been often talked of, though perhaps never in 
 earnest, and his distrust of every military arrangement in 
 the country had invariably made him reluctant to accept 
 it, even if it had been offered. But having now entered 
 upon the soil of Spain, having taken possession for a 
 time of the capital, and having found in every affair 
 where Spanish troops were, or professed to be, engaged, 
 how utterly worthless they were under existing circum- 
 stances, he gave way, for these reasons : — 
 
 " I am informed that the Spanish Government have con- 
 ferred upon me the command of their armies. 
 
 " The circumstances affecting the decision on this subject 
 have altered; and it is impossible that operations can be suc- 
 cessfully carried on by British and Portuguese armies, and with 
 Spanish troops, without some concert. Indeed, as the Spaniards 
 have lost nearly all their cannon, and all their cavalry, they 
 cannot act separate from the Allies ; and it is expedient on every 
 ground that the general command should be vested in one 
 person. 
 
 " I have not thought proper, therefore, to decline." (ix. 470.) 
 
 He had made his arrangements by the end of March, 
 1813, for the approaching campaign, and with his usual 
 sanguine cheerfulness writes to Mr. Wellesley, expressing 
 his entire confidence, if he had any other people to deal 
 with but the Spaniards, who had done little or nothing 
 about money : — 
 
 " I wish and propose to open the campaign on the 1st of 
 May, and to aid the several Spanish corps; but, from all I hear, 
 I am afraid that none of them will be ready. We shall be so ; 
 
AND SENSE Of PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY . 41 
 
 I hope, completely ; and if there was money I should entertain 
 no doubts of the result of the next campaign : but 1 have cer- 
 tainly the most obstinate and worst-tempered people to deal 
 with that I have yet met m my life. 
 
 '• Depend upon it, the next campaign depends upon our 
 financial resources. I shall be able in a month to take the field 
 with a larger and more efficient British and Portuguese force 
 than I have yet had ; and there are more Spanish troops clothed, 
 armed, and disciplined, than have ever been known ; and we arc 
 making daily prepress towards getting out of the chaos in which 
 I found matters." (x. 240.) 
 
 " I never saw the British army so healthy or so strong. 
 We have gained in strength 25,000 men since we went into 
 cantonments in the beginning of December, and infinitely more 
 in efficiency \ ,y (x. 357.) 
 
 He commenced his movements on the 19th of May, 
 and quitted Portugal for the last time. The battle of 
 Vittoria took place on the 21st of June, and he advanced 
 • Pyrenees immediately. He writes to the Govern- 
 ment as to his future movements : — 
 
 11 It is a common error to believe that there are no limits to 
 military success. After having driven the French to the frontier 
 of France, it is generally supposed that we shall immediately 
 invade France ; and some even expect that we shall be at Paris 
 in a month. 
 
 " I entertain no doubt that 1 could enter France to-morrow, 
 and establish the army on the Adour ; but I could go no 
 further. So far tor the immediate invasion of France ; which, 
 ■ / i I ..-.■■ Been of the negotiations in the north of 
 1 . i determined to consider only in reference to the 
 
 convenience of my own operations." ex. 613.) 
 
 If iraa the hold and resolute general, irhi 
 arrang tfi and forethought had been attended with 
 
 all the success which lie could have anticipated, com- 
 bining caution with confidence. Not seduced by the, 
 brilliancy of hi- advance bo Eur, — not dazzled by the 
 
42 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, 
 
 glory which his brave army had acquired, — not run 
 away with by the intemperate ardour of those who (as 
 we have just read) calculated upon being at Paris in a 
 month, he exercises his judgment and authority to 
 repress (which is perhaps sometimes more difficult than 
 to excite) the ardour of his victorious troops. 
 
 His ultimate decision upon the advance into France 
 was naturally dependant, in a great measure, upon the 
 state of the war on the German frontier. The Allies had 
 been very successful; and some offer appears to have 
 been made to him, or, at all events, some suggestion had 
 been thrown out for him, to change the scene of his glory 
 from the Peninsula to the North. But he was not to be 
 tempted or dazzled, even by the splendid prospect of 
 commanding the masses that were assembled from every 
 power in Europe ; and he answered with his usual wil- 
 lingness to comply with orders, but offering, with the 
 simple, honest, and proud consciousness of his value where 
 he was, his reasons against such an appointment. 
 
 His reply to Lord Bathurst, on the 12 th of July, 
 was : — 
 
 " My future operations will depend a good deal upon what 
 passes in the north of Europe. However, the Government and 
 the Allies may depend upon it that / will do all that I can. 
 
 " In regard to my going to Germany, I am the Prince 
 Regent's servant, and will do whatever he and his Government 
 please. But I would beg them to recollect, that the advantages 
 which I enjoy here consist in the confidence that everybody feels 
 that I am doing what is right ; which advantage I should not 
 enjoy (for a time, at least) in Germany. Many might be found 
 to conduct matters as well as I can, both here and in Germany; 
 but nobody would enjoy the same advantage here, and I should 
 be no better than another in Germany. If a British army should 
 be left in the Peninsula, it is best that I should remain with it." 
 (x. 523.) 
 
\M> SENSE 01 PER60NA1 RESPONSIBILITY. -1 8 
 
 The question about the second in command, or who 
 io succeed in case of anything beMline him. was 
 
 still unsettled. 
 
 •• I most fully concur in Sir John Hope's appointment. I 
 am quite certain that he is the ablest man in the army. 
 
 •• The question about Sir \V. Beresford occurs again. You 
 
 mean that Sir J. Hope shall command the allied army in case 
 
 ccident occur to me. Who is next to me in ihe allied 
 
 British and Portuguese armies till that accident happen ? Have 
 
 settled anything With the Portuguese Government what 
 
 becomes of Sir W. Beresford's rank of marshal ? It is most 
 
 ble that something should be settled ; for although Sir 
 
 William is gone to Lisbon, he will probably return soon, and if 
 
 circumstances should render it expedient that we should not 
 
 forward on this side, as I shall be desirous of going into 
 
 Catalonia, I must leave some person in command here." 
 
 ,xi. 1 I 
 
 " If you wish that Sir J. Hope should have the command in 
 
 the event of my (putting it, you should settle with Portugal that 
 
 that ami . is to take place. If you do not, Marshal 
 
 marshal, must have the command. The Portu- 
 
 * ernment would make Sir J. Hope Marshal-general, in 
 
 a i to me, if they acquiesce. 
 
 [arena! Beresford talks of eventually going to England in 
 
 the winter. If I retain the command, and should not enter 
 
 further into Prance this winter, I ought to go into Catalonia, to 
 
 put matters on a better footing than they are. How I am to 
 
 and pretensions of the gentlemen left behind me, 
 
 I sure 1 do not kndw. w (\i. 208.) 
 
 In the latter part of 1818 it appears to have been a 
 
 lion with the Government at borne, whether it might 
 
 not Ix- more advantage! mploy a British army in 
 
 or in the north of Europe, in preference to the 
 
 . and that some proposition of the sort 
 
 h.ul been made to Lord Wellington. 
 
 [n regard perationsj it i-^ a question tor 
 
44 BUOYANCY OF SPIRIT, ETC. 
 
 the Government, and not for me. With about 30,000 men in 
 the Peninsula, we have now for five years given employment to 
 at least 200,000 French, as it is ridiculous to suppose that 
 either the Portuguese or the Spaniards could have resisted for a 
 moment. If we were withdrawn, it is much more likely that he 
 would make peace with the Peninsula, and turn against the 
 Allies the 200,000 men, of which 100,000 are such troops as 
 their armies have not yet had to deal with. 
 
 " The change of scene of the operations of the British army 
 would put it entirely hors de combat for four months at least, 
 even if the new scene were Holland ; and they would not then 
 be such a machine as this army is. 
 
 " Does any man believe that Napoleon would not feel an 
 army in our position more than he would feel any 30 or 
 40,000 British troops laying siege to a fortress in Holland ? If 
 it be only the resource of men and money of which he will be 
 deprived, and the .reputation he will lose by our being in this 
 position (further advanced in the French territory than any of 
 the allied powers), it will do ten times more to procure peace 
 than ten armies on the side of Flanders. 
 
 " It is the business of the Government, and not mine, to dis- 
 pose of the resources of the nation. I wish, however, to impress, 
 that you cannot maintain military operations in the Peninsula 
 and in Holland : you must give up one or the other, as the 
 British establishment is not equal to two armies in the field. 
 
 " I do not wish to make complaints, but if you look at every 
 branch of the service here you will find it stinted. 
 
 " You are also acquainted with the state of our financial re- 
 sources. We are overwhelmed with debts, and I can scarcely 
 stir out of my house on account of public creditors waiting for 
 payment of what is due to them. 
 
 " I draw your attention to these facts, to show that Great 
 Britain cannot extend her operations without starving the service 
 here, unless additional means should be used to procure what is 
 wanted." (xi. 384.) 
 
FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 
 AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF 
 
 CHARACTER. 
 
 A singulab power of overlooking and forgiving what 
 men, in all conditions of life, might not unreasonably 
 consider as injustice to themselves, seems to have dis- 
 liahed him from a very early period of his profes- 
 sional career. In every case of the sort which is brought 
 to our notice, we find that, strongly as he may have felt 
 it. he invariably brings it to a conclusion by looking at 
 the publiCy rather than the personal result. It would not 
 Q human nature that he should not feel it, but his 
 equanimity, his temper, and his exalted sense of duty, 
 enabled him to view it in the most favourable and 
 placable light. 
 
 The first, and indeed, perhaps, the most striking, 
 because the most important instance of this, is furnished 
 by his letters in India in the year 1801, when he was 
 suddenly, and, as he thought, unfairly, superseded in a 
 military appointment, which he felt justly was of vital 
 importance to hi- future professional prosp< .■- 
 
 in the latter pari of the year 1800 a force was 
 ordered to assemble at Trincomalee, under Colonel 
 Wellesley, with Colonel Champagne* as second in com- 
 mand, to be applied, amongst other objects (if required), 
 with any British force then employed in 
 
 pt. 
 
46 
 
 An attack upon the Isle of France was also projected; 
 and Colonel Wellesley was ordered to proceed there, if 
 the plan should appear to be practicable. The Governor- 
 general, in a private letter of the 1st December, 1800, 
 expresses to Colonel Wellesley his feeling that — 
 
 " Great jealousy will arise among the general officers in con- 
 sequence of my employing you; but I do so because I rely upon 
 your good sense, decision, activity, and spirit, and I cannot find 
 all these qualities united in any other officer in India who could 
 take such a command." (i. 36.) 
 
 Colonel Wellesley was at this time thirty-one years 
 of age, and it would not have been surprising if such an 
 eulogy from such a man had tended to abate the modesty 
 and simplicity of character which we shall show that he 
 possessed, and retained unimpaired. 
 
 The Governor-general's letter continued I — 
 
 " If you succeed in taking the Isles of France and Bourbon, 
 I mean to appoint you to the government of them, with the 
 chief military command annexed. But I consider Mysore to be 
 a greater field for you, where you might be more useful to the 
 public." 
 
 Three weeks after, the Marquis Wellesley writes 
 again : — 
 
 " It is necessary that I should inform you, that if circum- 
 stances ultimately determine me to attempt the expedition to 
 Egypt, it will require so large a force as to occasion the necessity 
 of my employing one or two of his majesty's general officers. 
 You will judge whether your best post would not be Mysore. 
 Either Sir James Craig or General Baird, or both, would pro- 
 bably be employed in the service against Egypt; and I appre- 
 hend that in neither of these cases your situation would be very 
 eligible." (i. 47.) 
 
 
 All these expeditions, after many changes of plan, 
 were ultimately abandoned, and that to Egypt was fixed 
 
WO MM KM. SIMPLICITY OF CIlARArTFR. 1/ 
 
 upon, under the command of General Bainl, with Colonel 
 Welk •>! - - cond in command. 
 
 ( reneral Baird had not arrived, and Colonel \YellcsIey 
 decided, upon his own responsibility, npon taking the 
 force to Bombay, on their way to their ultimate desti- 
 nation, the Red Sea. 
 
 The Qovernor-genera] writes to him : — 
 
 • I am persuaded that a full consideration of the question 
 will induce you to agree with me, that the extent of the force 
 rendered it necessary to appoint a general officer to the chief 
 command, while the sudden call to active service precluded the 
 3S bility of removing you from the second in command with- 
 out injuring your character. You will, however, exercise your 
 judgment upon the propriety of desiring leave to return to 
 Mjyg ire: but my decided opinion is, that you will best satisfy 
 your public duty, and maintain the reputation of your public 
 spirit, by serving cheerfully and zealously in your present 
 situation." (i. 75.) 
 
 Cheerfully and zealously was the way in which he 
 always performed every duty, and he remained with 
 tin- expedition ; but we learn by his private letters how 
 v he felt it. 
 
 In a letter to his brothel- Henry he says: — 
 
 " I shall always consider these expeditions as the most 
 
 unfortunate circumstances for me that could have occurred, and 
 
 I - lament them. I was at the top of the 
 
 untry. The Governors of Fort St. George and 
 
 ! unlimited confidence in me, and I had received 
 
 d mark- of their approbation. 
 
 •• B t thia a lj isipn baa ruined all my prospects, founded 
 
 upon any service I m;i\ have rend. red. 
 
 u Has ther< ly change of eireum-fanees that was 
 
 Inn I was appointed to the command ': If there 
 has not, my supercession must have been occasioned by my 
 own misconduct, oi b; ration irf the sentiments of the 
 
 raj ! I nave not been guilty of robbery or 
 
48 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 
 
 murder, and he has certainly changed his mind : but the world, 
 which is always good-natured to those whose affairs do not 
 exactly prosper, will not, or rather does not, fail to suspect 
 both. 
 
 " I did not look, and did not wish for the appointment, 
 and it would probably have been more proper to give it to some- 
 body else; but when it was given to me, it would have been 
 fair to allow me to hold it till I did something to deserve to 
 lose it. 7 I , 
 
 "I put private considerations out of the question, as they 
 ought to have no weight either in my original appointment or 
 my supercession. I am not quite satisfied with the manner in 
 which I have been treated on the occasion. 
 
 " However I have lost neither my health, spirits, or temper, 
 in consequence thereof. It is useless to write upon a subject 
 of which I wish to retain no remembrance whatever." (i, 82.) 
 
 In another letter, a few days later, to the Hon. 
 H. Wellesley, he says : — 
 
 " My former letters will have shown you how much this 
 will annoy me : but I have never had much value for the public 
 spirit of any man who does not sacrifice his private views and 
 convenience when it is necessary." (i. 84.) 
 
 Judging by the remarkable taciturnity which dis- 
 tinguished him to the end of his life, in all cases strictly 
 personal, his feelings must have been very much excited 
 upon this occasion to have induced him to give vent to 
 them in such terms. 
 
 But whatever they might be, no rancour or bitter- 
 ness existed toward General Baird, who arrived at 
 Bombay and assumed the command, with Colonel Wel- 
 lesley under him. He did not, however, accompany the 
 expedition. He was seized with an intermittent fever, 
 which lasted till after the fleet sailed : and though he 
 had intended to follow it, he was attacked with another 
 disorder, which required him to seek a colder climate, 
 
WD GENERAL SIMPLICITY Of CHARACTER. 49 
 
 ami compelled him to relinquish the idea, lie reported 
 
 this, of course, to General Baird (who had then sailed), 
 and we annex a part of his letter, exemplifying strongly 
 the quality ^ his mind as regards the forgiveness, or 
 one may say the forget fulness, of personal annoyance. 
 After mentioning the state of his health, he adds ; — 
 
 n I should be mad if I were to think of going at this 
 moment. As I am writing upon this subject, I will freely 
 acknowledge that my regret at being prevented from accom- 
 panying you has been greatly increased by the kind, candid, 
 and handsome manner in which you have behaved towards me : 
 and I will confess as freely, not only that I did not expect such 
 treatment, but that my wishes before you arrived; regarding 
 going upon the expedition, were directly the reverse of what 
 they arc at this moment. As 1 know what has been said, and 
 expected, by the world in general, I propose, as well for my 
 own credit as for yours, to make known to my friends and to 
 yours, not only the distinguished manner in which you have 
 behaved to me, but the causes which have prevented my de- 
 monstrating my gratitude by giving you every assistance in the 
 arduous service which you have to conduct." (i. 89.) 
 
 Before he recovered and left Bombay, he wrote to 
 
 Colonel Champagne, who had been nominated as his 
 
 second in command, upon the first assembling of the 
 
 troop- at Trineomalee, and who was probably fully aware 
 
 :ppe>intmenr : — 
 
 M I am entirely ignorant of the circumstances which have 
 
 i from the command; but 1 conclude that 
 
 al found that he could not resist the claim* 
 
 that General Baird had to be employed, I believe you know 
 
 thought that General Baird had not been well 
 
 when I was called to the command. But 1 do not think 
 
 - proper that / >hould be disappointed more than he was, 
 
 ler that he might have no reason to complahl. However, 
 
 •i httle consequence to anybody but myself, 
 
 therefore I >av no more about it. 
 
50 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 
 
 " Lord Wellesley allowed me to return to my old situation, 
 but said he should regret my doing so; and for this reason, and 
 because I saw in the General the most liberal intention to allow 
 me to render him the services I could, I determined to proceed 
 upon the expedition. I was, however, seized with a fever, and 
 cannot join the armament. 
 
 " I see clearly the evil consequences of all this to my repu- 
 tation and future views; but it cannot be helped, and to things 
 of that nature I generally contrive to makeup my mind." (i. 99.) 
 
 This is the last letter which we find upon the sub- 
 ject. It shows that to the last he was deeply impressed 
 with what he considered a severe blow to his pro- 
 fessional character, but it tends to throw out with addi- 
 tional lustre the high principle which induced him to 
 overlook it all, and the high sense of duty which regu- 
 lated every motive and every action. 
 
 The Governor-general had given him the assurance 
 that he should be allowed to resume the command in 
 Mysore ; but his official application to Lord Clive, the 
 Governor of Madras, is so simple, that it really deserves 
 insertion. 
 
 After stating the reasons for his not going with the 
 army to Egypt, he says :— 
 
 " I acknowledge, that though I expected to return under 
 your lordship's orders more worthy of your favour than I have 
 been hitherto, I shall even now return with the greatest satis- 
 faction. I have not forgot the confidence which was placed 
 in me, nor the favour with which all my endeavours to serve 
 the public were received by you ; and if your lordship should 
 think proper to employ me again in the same situation, an 
 adherence to the same line of conduct which has heretofore gained 
 your approbation will, I hope, gain it again." (i. 97.) 
 
 He resumed the command at Seringapatam, where 
 he remained upwards of a year. He was made a Major- 
 general in April 1802. 
 
\\1> Cl'.MTvAl. S1M1M.HT1 '1 OF CHAKArTlK. 51 
 
 harly in ^$03 tjie. statr of the Maliratta powers 
 made it necessary to send a division of the Hritish army 
 into their territories. Lieutenant-general Stuart had the 
 chief command of the troops in the Madras Presidency, 
 and Lord ('live, the (Governor, recommended to him 
 that Major-general Wellesley should he selected for the 
 command o\ the advancing detachment. 
 
 <-vious to that advance, amongst, the numerous 
 communications to General Stuart (his chief), is one 
 which again shoWs so strongly his sense of duty and 
 .subordination, combined at the same time with such 
 an honourable consciousness of his own power and con- 
 fidence of success, that it cannot in justice be omitted : — 
 
 " If j >q ah -aid take the command of the detachment your- 
 self, I hope yon will do me the favour to allow me to accompany 
 you, in any capacity whatever. All that is known of that 
 country, in a military point of view, was learned when I was 
 in ir. and I >liall do everything in my power to make myself 
 u<«nil to you. If you should not think proper to take the 
 command, and should he pleased to entrust it to me, I shall he 
 infinitely gratified, and shall do everything in my power to for- 
 ward your views. ;; (iii. 22.) 
 
 I -• aeral Stuart did not take the command, and 
 nl W Vlloley was invented with very full powers, 
 m. perfaapB, entrusted to an oliieer of his com- 
 paratively junior rank, and thus commenced that bril- 
 liant caree* whieh h&s shed such a glory upon him-elf 
 and bis country. 
 
 But notwithstanding the feelings of honest pride and 
 exultation whieh must ha\e aceompanied the glorious 
 Hiee _n. notwithstanding the almost 
 
 unparalleled confidence whieh was n posed in him by 
 all the superior authorities, and notwithstanding the un- 
 usually extensive power- with whieh he was invested, 
 
52 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 
 
 lie never seems to be dazzled by the splendour of his 
 position, or run away with by the distinction which he 
 was daily acquiring. 
 
 His own glory seems to be left out of his considera- 
 tion. His views were entirely fixed upon the future 
 benefit and advantage of the country for which he was 
 fighting, and the effects which would be produced when- 
 ever he should be removed from his present exalted 
 station. Q n69( J 
 
 This is strongly exemplified in a letter addressed to 
 the Government of Bombay (with which he had not had 
 entire reason to be satisfied) on Dec. 5, 1 803 : — 
 
 " In conducting the extensive duties with which I am 
 charged, it has been ray constant wish to conform to existing 
 rules and establishments, and to introduce no innovations; so 
 that at the conclusion of the war, when my duties would cease, 
 everything might go on in its accustomed channel. I do not 
 comprehend, and cannot say that I admire the system, accord- 
 ing to which the Guickwar government is carried on, but this 
 probably proceeds from ignorance of the subject; and if I 
 were to interfere at all, I might order a measure which would 
 be inconsistent with the existing system. I am, therefore, very 
 desirous not to be called upon to take a more active part than I 
 have hitherto, and that matters should be conducted as usual. 
 
 " Whenever the Governor in Council may think proper to 
 call for my opinion upon any subject, I will give it to him to 
 the best of my judgment ; and I will do so whenever I may think 
 it necessary, in all matters which have a relation to our general 
 situation. But I hope that he will not desire me to enter into 
 the detail of Guzerat affairs, which I cannot be supposed to 
 comprehend, and with which I am convinced it was never 
 intended that I should be charged/' (i. 537.) 
 
 Having brought the war to a successful termination, 
 the army was broken up, and he returned by Seringa- 
 patam, and ultimately resigned all his military powers 
 
AM) G1:mR\L SIMIM.RirY OF CHARACTER. 59 
 
 on the 2<Jth of June. lMU. From thence he went to 
 Calcutta. 
 
 In \<>\ ember, the state of affairs induced the 
 Governor-general to reappoint him to the command in 
 the IV. ran. and he proceeded as far as Seringapatam. 
 lhiv he was again attacked with fever, and the state of 
 the country appearing to be more settled he did not 
 go further. This decision seems to have been a source 
 of anxiety to him j and in a letter to the private secre- 
 tary of the Governor-general, in January 1*05, he gives 
 his reasons i 
 
 " I acknowledge that I have determined not to go, but not 
 
 without doubt and hesitation. 1 know that all classes look up 
 
 to me, and it will be difficult for another officer to take my place. 
 
 I certainly do not propose to spend my life in the Deccan, and 
 
 tme state of atfairs which now renders my presence there 
 
 ble may exist fur the next seven years. I should not think 
 
 s y, in any event, to .stay there one moment longer than 
 
 .ovemor-ircneral should >tay in India, and I conclude that 
 
 he intends to go in February. Having considered whether my 
 
 tee there for one, two, or three months would answer any 
 
 purpose whatever, I am decidedly of opinion that it would not. 
 
 In regard to stay in :r 1 n^< t. the question i* exactly whether the 
 
 ;i- the Kind's Ministers have any claim upon 
 
 me to remain tor a m at length of time in this country. 
 
 " I have served the Company in important situations for 
 
 id have in.er n eeived anything but injury from 
 
 . although I am a singular instance of an 
 
 officer who has served under all the irovernments ; and there is 
 
 .. record, qj m any pnwtte rorropondence, of 
 
 probation of any one of my acts, or a mii^Ic complaint, or 
 
 Diptom of ill-temper, from any one of the political or 
 
 civil ami .ith whom I have m rud. 
 
 ■■ Th< K i _'- Ministers have as little claim upon me as tin; 
 Court of Directors. ] ambitious, and I acknpyv- 
 
 inc m my expectations 
 
54 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 
 
 that military service in India would be considered m the scale in 
 which similar services are in other parts of the world. But I 
 might have expected to be placed on the staff in India ; and yet, 
 if it had not been for the lamented death of General Fraser, 
 General Smith's arrival would have made me supernumerary. 
 This is perfectly well known to the army, and is the subject 
 of a good deal of conversation. 
 
 " If my services were absolutely necessary for the security of 
 the British empire, or to ensure its peace, I should not hesitate 
 a moment about staying, even for years ; but these men or the 
 public have no right to ask me to stay in India, merely because 
 my presence may be attended by convenience. 
 
 " But this is not the only point. I have considered whether, 
 in the affairs of India at present, my arrival in England is not 
 desirable ? Is it not necessary to take some steps to explain the 
 increase of the military establishments, and to explode some 
 erroneous notions upon this subject ? Are there not a variety of 
 subjects upon which verbal explanation is necessary ? 
 
 " I conceive, therefore, that in determining not to go to the 
 Deccan, and to sail by the first opportunity to England, I 
 consult the public interests not less than I do my own 
 wishes." (ii. 518.) 
 
 In a later letter to Major Shawe, the Private Secre- 
 tary to the Governor-general, dated Feb. 3, 1805, he 
 
 g a yg . 
 
 " I now feel an anxiety only about my departure for 
 England, which I cannot describe. I have no confidence in my 
 own judgment in any case in which my own wishes are involved. 
 This is the cause of the great anxiety which I have felt, and 
 still feel, upon these subjects. I know that my presence in 
 England would be useful, and I am certainly very anxious to go 
 there. 
 
 " I mistrust the judgment of every man in a case in which 
 his own wishes are concerned; and I have not come to this 
 determination without consulting Malcolm, who agrees with me 
 upon every part of the subject/'' (ii. 572.) 
 
 He arrived in England in September 1805. 
 
AND GENERAL SIMPLICITY OF CHARACTER. 0-) 
 
 We have in other parts detailed his occupations from 
 that time, till he was sent out the second time to 
 Portugal. 
 
 No man could have been insensible to this mark of 
 Confidence (after all that had happened), in being 
 
 vd as the man upon whom the military fame of his 
 country was to rest ; but nothing shows itself in his 
 language or conduct. On the contrary, there is the 
 same simplicity as ever ; and when lie is informed by 
 our Minister to the Central Junta, that persons in autho- 
 rity at Seville had suggested his appointment to the 
 
 :mand of the Spanish army, he replies thus ; — 
 
 u I am much flattered at the suggestion. I have received 
 no instructions from Government upon that subject; but I 
 believe that it was considered an object of great importance in 
 Enidand that the Commander-in-chief of the British troops 
 should have that situation, but one more likely to be attained by 
 refraining from e.\pres>ing it, and by leaving to the Spanish 
 | nment themselves to discover the expediency of the 
 
 arrangement, than by any suggestion on our parts. 
 
 ■" I < Deluded that you had been made acquainted with the 
 rnment ; but if \ou had no knowledge of them, I 
 do not confei lve that your insinuations upon the subject arc 
 likely to have any effect. That which will prevent the accom- 
 plishment of this object is the jealousy of the Spaniards." 
 B9> 
 
 A" a later period he write- to Lord Castle- 
 
 j - 
 
 I riunk the first part of this letter vull gjve you my opinion 
 'ion you entertained, viz. that the Spaniards 
 miirht be induced to give the command of their armies to a 
 British commander-in-chief. 
 
 *' h such Offer should be made to me, I sliall decline to 
 
 • it till I >liould red i ' - M a>urc; and J 
 
 strongly recommend to vou, unless von mean to incur thr- risk 
 
56 FORGIVENESS OE INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 
 
 of the loss of your array, not to have anything to do with 
 Spanish warfare, on any ground whatever, in the existing state of 
 things. The jealousy of all the Spaniards, even of those most 
 attached to us, is so rooted that even if they were induced in 
 their present difficulties to cede Cadiz to induce me to remain in 
 Spain, I should not think any garrison which this army could 
 spare would be safe in that place. 
 
 -8VO;You ought, along with Cadiz, to insist upon the command 
 of the armies of Spain." (v. 89.) 
 
 His judgment upon the Spanish character was a 
 most correct one, and was abundantly proved on many 
 subsequent occasions. 
 
 But although his natural good sense, and the total 
 absence of all vanity, made him hesitate (indeed we may 
 say, virtually refuse) to entertain any proposition respect- 
 ing the Spanish command, advantageous as it would 
 have been if frankly granted, he felt the difference of his 
 position in Portugal, where he was made Marshal- 
 general, and which he accepted without difficulty. In a 
 letter to the British minister he says : — 
 
 " I have received a letter from the Prince Regent from the 
 Brazils, appointing me the Marshal-general of his army, with 
 all the power and privileges held by the Due de la Foens. I 
 believe that is what I had before, and was certainly as much 
 as was necessary, or as I could manage; and I do not see any 
 reason for altering our arrangements, and the practice under the 
 one appointment, even though the new one may be different." 
 
 The Spanish Government and their military leaders 
 in succession had so constantly rejected all his sug- 
 gestions, that he had been compelled to break off all 
 connexion with their army. Many efforts were made to 
 induce him to renew his co-operation with them ; but he 
 resolutely declined. General Areyzaga had succeeded 
 General Eguia ; but he appeared to be equally incapable, 
 
\\n e Kit BR At MMriirnr of ('iiar.uter. .>/ 
 
 and his whole army was destroyed or dispersed at 
 •n the l ( dth of November. 
 
 Lord Wellington was at Seville when the General 
 commenced his march, and in more than one conversa- 
 tion with the ministers and members of the junta com- 
 municated to them his conviction that they would be 
 dvk ated. Rut the first official information of the move- 
 ment was received at Badajoz, the very day before the 
 lie gflve a written answer to the communi- 
 cations the following day: too late, of course, to avert 
 the calamity, but recording the accuracy of his views. 
 
 It wa< ; at all events, some satisfaction to him to be 
 able to >ay. a little after, — 
 
 " I understand that the people of Seville are informed of my 
 opinion upon the late expedition, and that they have expressed 
 an anxious desire that the Government should attend to what I 
 
 i recommend to them m future." (v. 316.) 
 
 We d<> not adduce this with any reference to the 
 
 military view of the question, but merely to prove that, in 
 
 of their national pride and vanity, they could not 
 
 aekoowfedgibg the justness of his views; and to 
 
 show how very quietly and unostentatiously he felt that 
 
 acknowledgment. 
 
 T. 
 
 A fading appears to have existed, that with the 
 numerous discontented German soldiers serving in the 
 I ii army, more advantage might have been taken to 
 
 indue-' them to d Mr. Villiers had received ms r 
 
 ■ 
 
 r o this effect, and had rommimieated them to 
 . ! J Liverpool had written 
 about it to Lord \\\ llin^ton. 
 
 The lat! ling how little real ground there wa> 
 
 to complaiiL naturally <\\>u- ,->. d at finding thai 
 
58 EOKGJVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELE, 
 
 his friend had written home without 
 him. 
 
 
 " I wish that you had done me the favour to have referred 
 the authority to me, upon which you founded your report on 
 the subjeet of German deserters in your dispatch to England, 
 before you sent it home, as I could have proved to you that it 
 was incorrect, not only in those statements respecting transac- 
 tions whilst I commanded the army, but also respecting the 500 
 Germans stated to have deserted upon a former occasion. 
 
 " Several people in England have given credit to this state- 
 ment, supported as it now is by your authority ; and it is sup- 
 posed that I have neglected the important means pointed out of 
 diminishing the enemy's forces. Now I must tell you a secret 
 upon this subject, and that is, that we have lost more Germans 
 by desertion than the French" (v. 317.) 
 
 Mr. Villiers was apparently hurt, and Lord Wellinff- 
 
 1J .ai nomiqo yM >; 
 ton writes : — 
 
 i 
 
 " I am much concerned that anything in mine should have 
 hurt you. You certainly never communicated to me the infor- 
 mation on which you founded your despatch. If I had known 
 that your opinion, ( that much might be done to distress France 
 by inducing foreigners to desert/ was founded upon reports, I 
 should have requested you not to send home those reports, as 
 they would make an impression injurious to me upon false 
 grounds. You naturally imagined that the facts were known to 
 me, and that from an erroneous opinion I had neglected this 
 mode of annoying the enemy. 
 
 e i You were right in bringing it before the Government, 
 under the impression that I had neglected the subject : but what 
 I regretted was, that I had not an opportunity of showing you 
 that I had not neglected it, and that you were misinformed as to 
 the facts." (v. 325.) 
 
 The Principal Souza, as he was called, and the Patri- 
 arch (theBishop of Oporto), had both been appointed Mem- 
 
WD (,r\T.RAl. SIMPLICITY Of I'll AK AT'IT K . W 
 
 In i- of ftepftjf by the Court at the Brazils. The former 
 was apparently a man of a very meddling disposition, and 
 probably was very jealous of the power and weight of a 
 foreign general. The latter, upon Sir Arthur's first 
 arrival in Portugal, had professed a great regard for him ; 
 but was probably influenced afterwards by the same feel- 
 jjUgs as the Principal; and in the beginning of January, 
 1811, Lord Wellington expresses his opinion of them 
 thus to Mr. Stuart ; — 
 
 rt The conduct of the Patriarch and of the Principal is very 
 improper. 1 am convinced from their conduct, as well as from 
 other circumstances which have come to my knowledge, that 
 persons are endeavouring to form an Anti-English party, 
 which affords another reason for removing the Principal from 
 Lisbon." (vii. 9:2.) 
 
 " My opinion is, that there is a plot on foot against the 
 English, at the head of which are the Bishop and Sonza ; and 
 that they want to he able to show that they protested against 
 our pretensions to command their army." (vii. 101.) 
 
 A few weeks later he says ; — 
 
 " I have lately received several anonymous letters, which 1 
 suspect have been written under the directions of tin; Principal, 
 the Bishop, kc; and I shall be very much obliged to you, if you 
 will send me any papers you have in the handwriting of either 
 of th is, or their Secretaries; \:e. ;; (vii. 314.) 
 
 •■ Baron Kbcn has made some curious diM-overies, and h;e> 
 
 given some paper-- written by tho<c personages, whieh tend 
 
 :i"ir folly equally with their mischievous depositions. 
 
 her plan*, they lave one for libelling and canraturhuj 
 
 mc it: .'. enpl.'iin that I haw had hunting - 
 
 od dinner at Oporto in-trad of pnr- 
 _]. 
 •• I have tins day discovered that some of the anonymous 
 
 n by the Principal'; and I suspect others 
 hop. Bui • i ar. These are men to 
 
 ■ rn a nation in difficult circumstana 
 
60 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 
 
 " One of the anonymous letters is positively written by 
 Principal Souza. Two others, I think, by the Bishop; but -# 
 this I cannot be so certain, as his note to Baron Eben is written 
 upon good paper, with a good pen ; the letters written by the 
 same persons to me are upon bad, brown paper, with a bad pen. 
 The characters in both are very similar, and I have but little 
 doubt are written by the Bishop. It would be very desirable to 
 see more of his writings, if you can get some. If I can prove 
 the fact clearly, I shall send the letters to the Prince Regent at 
 the Brazils, that he may see what clever fellows the Governors of 
 the Kingdom are." (vii. 322.) 
 
 q ad 
 
 A person of the name of Stockier had proposed to 
 publish a book, upon which Lord Wellington writes to 
 Mr. Stuart: — 
 
 " I return Stockier' s paper, which I have not had leisure to 
 read. The Government may publish any nonsense they please; 
 it is entirely a matter of indifference to me : but I think they 
 had better take care how they endeavour to set the people of 
 the country against those who have saved them. They are 
 much mistaken if they think they can do me any harm by such 
 nonsense, or that they can themselves stand for a moment after 
 they have convinced the people that the English, and I in par- 
 ticular, have not done my best for them. I am entirely in- 
 different as to Stockier and his book ! (vii. 354) 
 
 " I am decidedly of opinion, that unless the Portuguese 
 Government alter their system entirely, it will be impossible for 
 the British army to remain in the country. Has any magistrate 
 been yet punished, or even dismissed, for neglecting his duty ? 
 Has any alteration been made in the old system of allowing 
 every booby to do as he pleases, provided that he cries ' Viva* 
 and attends the levees of the Government and the Ministers ? 
 
 " A fresh invasion would find us exactly where we were last 
 year, and I do not think it would be safe to trust the king's 
 army in this country." (vii. 476.) 
 
 " I have so repeatedly received anonymous letters from the 
 Patriarch and the Principal, that at last it is necessary to put an 
 end to a practice which is carried on in the most barefaced 
 
AM) i,!\Ki;.\I. SIMPLICITY OF cllAIiACTKK. () I 
 
 manner. I now enclose one, which I beg yon will look at, 
 merely that yon may be able to recognise the writing again in 
 cast- it should come in question, and that yon will then forward 
 it, as directed, to the Patriarch. I have not read it." (viii S&.) 
 
 '• I have do doubt but that the letter was written by the 
 Patriarch, but as you entertain a doubt, I am much obliged by 
 your stepping it. 
 
 " To Behd [back] an anonymous letter to any one is to 
 accuse him of writing it, the meanest action of which any man can 
 be guilty. It is not very proper, perhaps, to accuse a man in 
 the Patriarch's situation, of being guilty of such an action j but 
 he positively ought not to be accused if there is any the slightest 
 doubt. 1, therefore, acquiesce entirely in your retaining the 
 letter." (viii. 67.) 
 
 Here ended any further notice from him of this 
 miserable and contemptible affair. Whether the parties 
 suspected ever had reason to believe that they were de- 
 tected, we do not know ; but though Lord Wellington 
 still had abundant proofs of want of cordiality and sup- 
 port from the Governors of the Kingdom, we find no 
 
 lition of wretched and paltry personalities. 
 
 W li;iv< -.in how noblv and magnanimously be 
 could put up with all this unmerited calumny, and that 
 the indignation lie might naturally feel at such contempt- 
 ible injustice did not pivwnt the continuation of his 
 public duties with those who were implicated. 
 
 Hut we now haw a more gratifying baril before us. 
 W,- imve already advert* d to the feeling of doubt and 
 discouragement which had pervaded tin public mind in 
 England, to such an extent that the (iovernment were 
 dubiou> a- to the line of policy they ought to pursue in 
 
 id to the war; and that, in fact, if Lord Wellington 
 had himself given way, all must, have been brought to a 
 
C)2 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 
 
 His firmness saved the cause : his skill, his calmness, 
 and the admirable combination of daring, when required, 
 and of caution, when necessary, had produced their effects 
 upon the minds of his fellow-countrymen. The tone of 
 the debates in the House of Commons, upon questions 
 relating to Portugal, had changed. Members who had 
 held decided language against a continuance of the war, 
 had retracted many of their opinions j and the following 
 picture of Lord Wellington's position and character, in a 
 most brilliant speech of Mr. Canning's, on the 26th of 
 April, was greeted with approbation by many who had 
 formerly held very different opinions. He described him as 
 
 " a man whose natural genius and military experience 
 insured the accomplishment of all that was attainable by human 
 sagacity. 
 
 a Follow him from the fatigues of the day to repose in his 
 tent : when, instead of consolation, he found accusation ; instead 
 of encouragement, misrepresentation and obloquy ,• all his 
 dangers magnified, and all the means of the enemy exagge- 
 rated ; every one of his measures traced to temerity or compul- 
 sion, and all the movements of the enemy to wisdom and military 
 skill. When the House took all this into its consideration, it 
 was impossible not to ascribe his steady and unaltered persever- 
 ance to real magnanimity and true valour. Whilst exposed to 
 such misrepresentation, he never deigned to notice any of the 
 unfounded statements which he saw published : he determined 
 not to reply to them in words, but to let the result put the 
 calumnies and calumniators to shame; and steadily prosecuting 
 his purpose, he forbore throughout all his correspondence from 
 introducing one word expressive of discontent. If there was 
 anything which could not be contemplated without admiration, it 
 was a man exposed to such misrepresentation, and yet disdaining 
 to indulge in any expression of his feelings : deliberately charged 
 with the two most opposite feelings of general temerity and pro- 
 crastination, and yet calmly pursuing that wise and salutary 
 course which had brought his country to that happy state when 
 Parliament could look back without regret, or look forward 
 
\M) (,1-Al U\l. SIMPLICITY OB ( IIAUACTIK. (W 
 
 with hope, and when gentlemen were at length enabled to dis- 
 93 :he question with very considerable advantages.'' — Pari. 
 VebaUs, xi.\. 77o. 
 
 One of t lie most signal proofs of the changes we 
 have adverted to. was a letter written within three days 
 of this debate by Mr. Whitbread, M.P. for Hedford, 
 who had been one of the most decided objectors to the 
 line of policy at home and the general conduct of the 
 war abroad. lli> opinion had changed, and he had the 
 manliness and the honourable candonr to write to Lord 
 Wellington. The Dispatcher do not, of course, contain 
 the letter itself, but we gather its tenor and purport by 
 the reply : — 
 
 " I was most highly gratified by your letter of the 29th 
 
 April, which I received last night j and I beg to return my thanks 
 
 for the mode in which you have taken the trouble of informing 
 
 ■ the favourable change in your opinion respecting affairs in 
 
 this country. 
 
 " I acknowledge that I was much concerned to find that 
 r whom I entertained the highest respect, and whose 
 opini" - • re likely to have great weight in England and 
 throughout Europe, had delivered opinions, erroneous as I 
 ipecting affairs in this country; and I prized their 
 judcr: highly that 1 was induced to attribute their con- 
 
 duet to tl. 3 ctf the spirit of party. 
 
 " I - ire you that, highly as I am gratified and flattered by 
 
 life approbation of J and yourself, and others, that 
 
 which givea me most pieasim is to be convinced that such men 
 oonhl nor be unju-t towards an officer in the service of the 
 country- abroad ; and that the opinions which thev had delivered 
 if their judgments upon a fair view of all 
 tlv circu- which had come to their knowledge. To the 
 
 gratification arising from this conviction to one who seen, 
 fined to jtaBi his life in *l)e harness, you have added that wlneli 
 I : from yonr obliging letter, and I a— ore you that I am 
 
 >le of the kindness which induced you to write to me." 
 
04 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF, 
 
 The change of the seat of war, and the final removal 
 of the British army (as a body) from Portugal, in May 
 1 813, had caused a cessation of the personal hostility on 
 the part of some of the Governors of that kingdom, 
 and we have no repetition of the odious and vexatious 
 proceedings of that nature from thence. 
 
 But the same spirit now broke out in Spain. He 
 had been accustomed to every sort of neglect, and injury, 
 and almost insult, from that Government, from a very 
 early period, which he had borne with his usual com- 
 placency ; and though he had often been tempted, and 
 had threatened to give up their cause and withdraw, he 
 had always felt the injury which such a course would 
 inflict upon the general cause throughout Europe, and 
 made the most vigorous efforts to repress his indignation 
 and continue his services. 
 
 For a time, after they had become convinced of the 
 utter incapacity of their own generals, and had conferred 
 the command of their armies upon him, matters went on 
 better. The Spanish troops were improved and brought 
 forward; but, notwithstanding the success which attended 
 him, there was a party at the seat of government who 
 continued bitterly indisposed towards him, and almost 
 every pledge and condition entered into with him was 
 broken. 
 
 After the siege of San Sebastian a most violent and 
 malignant libel was published against the English troops, 
 in a paper called the " Duende." 
 
 In writing to Sir Henry Wellesley, Lord Wellington 
 says : — 
 
 " I never saw such a libel as in the ( Duende/ If it is pub- 
 lished in England I shall prosecute the printer. I do not know 
 how long my temper will last, but I never was so much dis- 
 gusted with anything as with this libel ; and I do not know 
 
AND Q1NBRAL smri.irm OB UIahutiu. lb") 
 
 whether the conduct of the soldiers in plundering San Sebastian, 
 or the libels ol the ' Xet'c Politico/ and * Duende/ made me most 
 angry." (xi 185.) 
 
 u There is no end to the calumnies against me and the array, 
 and I should have no time to do anything else if I were to begin 
 either to refute or even to notice them. Very lately they took 
 the occasion of a libel in an Irish newspaper, reporting a sup- 
 posed conversation between (astanos and me (in which 1 am 
 supposed to have consented to change my religion to become 
 kinrj of Spain, and he to have promised the consent of the 
 grandees), to accuse me of this intention: and then those fools, 
 
 the Duques de and de , and the Visconte de , 
 
 protest formally that they are not of the number who had given 
 their consent to such an arrangement ! ! ! "What can be done 
 with such libels and such people, excepting dksvisi: tiikm, and 
 continuing one's road without noticing them ? 
 
 " I should have taken no notice of the libel about San 
 Sebastian, if it had not come before me officially in the letter 
 from the Minister of War; nor shall I of this second libel in the 
 1 Duende/ although it is obvious that it comes from the Minister 
 of War/" Cxi. I 
 
 If'- had forwarded the otter of resigning his Spanish 
 command on the ."30th of August, stating all their 
 hrfcachea of engagement towards him, but he nrcivrd 
 no definitive answer. 
 
 In writing to his brother in Oetober, ho says: — 
 
 n T - have acted in respect to the resignation as they 
 
 • ry other subject. The delay is of no (msequence to 
 
 on as they are, as leng as they choose to 
 
 delay. In the meantime the Miih-n r at \V;i r has written me a 
 
 impertinent lei I hi/oh I shull tuke no notice." (xi. *16 | 
 
 are now stationed, I wait till I know the conduct 
 
 and decision of the Spanish Government before I take any fnr- 
 
 Stepi ; being determined, if they do not completely undieate 
 08, i shall make known my opinion to the knm'> ( i<>\ < lnnienl, 
 that they ought not to risfc their arm} lure uh.iv an <>[fi< 
 tie goi mnum ti i t hah published sficb W afcropioas libel, and then 
 
 P 
 
66 FORGIVENESS OF INJUSTICE TO HIMSELF. 
 
 called upon the people of Spain to take revenge for facts falsely 
 charged upon our officers, the law giving no redress, and the 
 Government keeping their officer in his office and taking no 
 notice of his conduct." (xi. 232.) 
 
 " If I was to decide, I would not keep the army in Spain one 
 hour. I have perused the statement published by the authority 
 of the Government on the 20th October, which I trust will 
 have the effect of effacing the injurious impressions attempted to 
 be made by the c Xefe Politico ' of Guipuzcoa, and by the infa- 
 mous libellers of Cadiz, and will frustrate the still more infamous 
 attempts of the latter to excite the animosity of the people of 
 this nation against the British army." (xi. 258.) 
 
 A little later he says to Sir Henry Wellesley : — 
 
 " I agree very much with the British Government about 
 these Spanish libels, and think, that being written by the most 
 insignificant of the human race, and having no circulation 
 excepting in Spain, and that which the English newspapers give 
 them, they are quite undeserving of our attention. 
 
 " The only reason I noticed the libel in the ( Duende' was, 
 that it affected Sir Thomas Graham and the officers of the army; 
 and I was convinced that it was written under the direction of 
 that greatest of all blackguards, the Minister at War. If it had 
 not been so, I should have wished it to have passed unnoticed." 
 (xi. 300.) 
 
 He afterwards writes home ! — 
 
 " I have sent to Sir Thomas Graham all the libels, and the 
 copy of the publication by the Spanish Government. 
 
 u The fact is, that the libels were published in the 'Duende' 
 by an officer in the War Department, who is the editor of that 
 paper, and they were part of a scheme to reconcile the Spanish 
 public to my removal from the command. There is one of them 
 in which the people of Spain are called upon to rise and revenge 
 the supposed injury done to San Sebastian, upon which I pro- 
 posed to make a complaint to the British Government, if the 
 Spanish Government, as usual, took no notice of the matter. I 
 made no secret of this intention, which is, I believe, the reason 
 why they published what they did." (xi. 313.) 
 
FIRMNESS rXDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 Intim ati.lt connected with t lie characteristic which we 
 just been considering (so much so, indeed, as to be 
 hardly separated from it, excepting that one had refe- 
 rence to personal, and the other to pnhVic considerations) 
 is the firmness and forbearance with which he bore up 
 against tie incessant (and at times almost ruinous) ob- 
 stacles which beset him throughout the greatest part of 
 his Peninsular career* and the temper and forgiveness 
 with which he was always tempted to treat the authors 
 of them. 
 
 They proceeded partly from his own country, and 
 partly from the Portuguese and Spanish Governments. 
 The two latter were so intermixed — operating often at 
 the same moment — that, though proceeding from dif- 
 t difficult to separate them ; and it 
 
 are, to take notice of them as they 
 But those originating in his own country arose 
 — the Gbvernineftt and the Public. 
 l\ was nor innn the Gbbernment (properly *§o called) 
 that his embarrassments arose: he might have hud his 
 doubts, at times, whether Great Britain had not under- 
 taken more than she would bled to execute, but 
 ^knowledges on several a that the Ministers 
 
 had done thr-ir Utmost 
 
C8 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 In a letter to Lord Castlereagh, of August 25, 1809, 
 lie says : — 
 
 " It may be satisfactory to you to know, that I do not think 
 matters would have been much better if you had sent your large 
 expedition to Spain instead of to the Scheldt." (v. 86.) 
 
 The unfortunate termination of that expedition 
 had created a strong feeling in this country, that the 
 same expenditure of blood and treasure might have been 
 better bestowed in augmenting Sir A. Wellesley's army. 
 He gives his reasons for the opinion expressed above, 
 and absolves the Ministers. And this is not confined to 
 his official communications to them, for we find similar 
 feelings in his private letters to Mr. Villiers. In January 
 
 1810:— 
 
 " I do not mean to say that more troops would not be de- 
 sirable ; but it must be obvious to you that the Government could 
 not give more • and we could neither feed nor pay more without 
 increase of our pecuniary means, which all my communications 
 forbid me to expect. Nor will I endeavour to shift from my own 
 shoulders on to those of Ministers, who are not strong, the re- 
 sponsibility of failure, by calling for means which I know they 
 cannot give." (v. 413.) 
 
 It is true that the Government had difficulties to 
 contend with, which were materially increased, if not 
 created, by the tone of certain members of the House of 
 Commons. 
 
 The British people, taken as a mass, are generally 
 just and generous, and grateful when they have reason 
 to believe that public services are honestly performed. 
 But there is no denying that political violence frequently 
 obscures this feeling ; and hostility to the reigning autho- 
 rities and the party in power, causes a bitterness towards 
 all who are employed under them. 
 
 Sir Arthur's early success upon his first landing 
 
FIRMNESS I M)KK HOME ANNOYANCES. 09 
 
 created, perhaps an exaggerated feeling of triumph and 
 exultation throughout all England ; and the interruption 
 of that success, consequent upon his rapid supercession 
 (arising from an unforeseen and unfortunate coincidence, 
 in no degree reflecting blame either upon him or the 
 Government at home, consummated by the disappoint- 
 ment of the nation at the Convention of Cintra, with 
 which Sir Arthur's name as an executive oiftcer was 
 mixed up, caused a revulsion which was perhaps equally 
 unreasonable. A few worthies in the House of Commons, 
 and the learned and erudite members of the Common 
 Council of London, were the persons who led the cry. 
 The most rancorous hostility was displayed by persons 
 who could have no personal feelings against him, who 
 could not pretend from their professions or pursuits to 
 any military knowledge which should justify them in 
 pronouncing an opinion upon his fitness as a soldier ; 
 but he was employed by a Government to which they 
 : sedfe, and therefore it was not inconsistent with 
 thtir notions of honour and honesty to misrepresent 
 him and his (\lc(\<, of which they really could know 
 nothing. 
 
 But- this was the fact : the embarrassments of the 
 1 rnment at home were greatly increased by the lan- 
 g g • and conduct of these men; and nothing is more 
 striking than the calm, clear, firm, and temperate wav 
 in which Sir Arthur views it. 
 
 In one of hi- Letters to Lord Liverpool he saysj — 
 
 " I assure you, that what has passed in Parliament respecting 
 inn ha- not given me \mk fnomenfs concern, as far as I am per- 
 sonally concerned: it has given my friends an opportunity of 
 
 g the public right, lint I regret that men like Lord 
 
 and others should carry 'lie spirit of party so far a- to attack an 
 officer in his absence, should take the ground of their attack- 
 
70 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 from ' Cobbett' and the i Moniteur/ and should blame him for 
 events over which he could have no control, and for faults which, 
 if committed at all, were not committed by him." (v. 524.) 
 
 In a large army totally inexperienced in warlike opera- 
 tions upon a large scale, with officers of all ranks, who, 
 if they had ever been upon service, could have seen little 
 more than a flying, short-lived expedition (such as that 
 to the Helder, &c), it is not wonderful that there should 
 have been many vain men who would be mortified at the 
 exposure of their deficiencies, and therefore discontented 
 with him under whom they were placed ; and who would 
 write home in terms of disapprobation of their com- 
 mander. And it is not wonderful that there were many 
 persons ready in this country to receive, to report, and 
 to exaggerate every one of these crude representations, 
 if it suited their own general tone of politics, and their 
 own views, either in Parliament or in the columns of the 
 press. Most of them could know nothing of military 
 affairs : they sheltered themselves under the pretence of 
 guarding the finances of the country. They predicted 
 failure because they apparently wished it, and they 
 nearly produced it by the daily impediments which they 
 interposed. It was their hatred of ff the Government" 
 that influenced them ; they felt that if they could thwart 
 the military operations abroad, if they could stop the 
 supplies requisite to carry them on, and if they could 
 thereby create an impression in the public mind that the 
 measures of that Government were impolitic, and that all 
 the blood and treasure w T ere fruitlessly thrown away, they 
 should effect the object they had at heart. 
 
 It was not, therefore, from the Government that he 
 met with coldness or want of support. But we must 
 acknowledge that it was from the Horse Guards, the 
 
nKM\F>-> INDVK HOMK ANNOYANCKS. ?1 
 
 head of his own profession, where ancient customs and 
 former halnts still j)i\ \ ailrcl. and from whence he did not 
 meet with the ready acquiescence that he thought he had 
 t to expect. 
 Pushed forward by his talents, which many of his 
 otfieial political colleagues were fully aware of, it cannot 
 be concealed that his prominent position threw many of 
 vol contemporaries into the shade. This 
 could not be said to apply to his military distinction in 
 India. The nature of the service there is so essentially 
 different, the number of ollicers of " the king's service" 
 employed there i^ comparatively so small, that It is pre- 
 eminence was not likely to interfere with established 
 - or to excite professional jealousy. But that 
 service laid the foundation of his future fame, and pointed 
 out an individual of comparatively junior rank, who in 
 Europe must have undergone a much longer probation 
 re lie was likely to have been equally brought for- 
 ward. The nature and extent of English military service 
 t that time almost entirely conlined to limited, tcni- 
 nd fugitive expeditions, generally undertaken 
 upon tin- spur <f the moment, and, unfortunately, never 
 leading To permanent benefit. A lew thousand men 
 d for a comparatively unimportant object, 
 and generally returned after loss and di>comiiture, in 
 spit, of the personal bra\( ry and individual gallantry 
 of ti. ol. The habits and ideas, therefore, 
 
 tfjthose in authority were of a very limited nature. We 
 do not impugn th I good will, or the good intentions, of 
 who were at the h«ad of the military profession; 
 but in fart, up to that tune, their knowledge and expe- 
 rt nd to upon an r„hif(/r<l scale. 
 
 In'- ti; - ItUoj) entrusted to Sir Arthur Wellesky 
 
 rery much of the clasa above described. A sudden 
 
72 FIRMNESS UNDER HUME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 and unexpected call from certain individuals in Spain, 
 who were smarting under the usurpation of Napoleon, 
 roused the feelings of this country. It was supposed 
 that a few thousand men, with a few thousand spare 
 stands of arms to distribute amongst " the patriots," as 
 they were called, would be of service. The proposed 
 expedition was very limited in extent, and was evidently 
 ordered without any very definite idea of where it was to 
 go, or what it icas to do ! Sir Arthur was known to be 
 an active, intelligent officer, though not of high standing \ 
 and it did not appear derogatory to the rest of the pro- 
 fession, or an infringement of the rule or custom which 
 on former occasions had placed even a prince of the blood 
 in command, to entrust it to him. 
 
 It has been said, indeed (though we know not with 
 what truth), that in a very early stage of the proceedings 
 there were those who demurred to his appointment \ and 
 as the urgency of the Spaniards increased, and the feelings 
 of this country responded, the moderate views which had 
 placed a small force under the command of a not unknown, 
 but junior officer, were extended ; additional troops were 
 ordered for the service, and senior officers were appointed 
 to command them. 
 
 We shall not follow the military progress. We have 
 merely adverted to the nature of the whole proceeding 
 to show that Sir Arthur, in his subsequent position as 
 the Commander-in-chief of the largest force ever em- 
 bodied and sent out by Great Britain, was associated 
 with, and acting under, persons of long-established 
 habits, which did not readily accommodate themselves 
 to his more enlarged views. And hence arose many dif- 
 ficulties, many obstacles, from the Home authorities, which 
 it required more than ordinary equanimity to struggle 
 with. 
 
FIRMNESS l M>! K BOMB AtfNOTANCES 73 
 
 A- the army increased in amount by the reinforce- 
 ments sent out; and the distance from the point of 
 debarkation increased by his advance towards the 
 Spanish frontier, all the difficulties arising from total 
 inexperience of service (and. perhaps, the erroneous 
 nature o'i our military organisation) increased in an 
 accumulated degree. It would not be fair to blame the 
 1 Guards for all these defects, which were now 
 painfully brought to \ iew nearly for the first time ; but 
 
 undeniable that the rules and customs of the Com- 
 mander-in-chief's office at home were ill-calculated to 
 abate the evil. 
 
 Bii Arthur writes a doleful letter to the Secretary of 
 State, in June 1809, ii|X)n his advance towards Spain 
 aft) E the capture of Oporto. He points out most forcibly 
 the total want of power in the hands of a commander to 
 repress or to punish the outrages of which he complains; 
 and he adds : — 
 
 li We all know that the discipline of armies must depend 
 upon the diligence of regimental officers, I may order what I 
 : hut it' they do not execute what I order, I cannot expect 
 that the soldier will he regular. 
 
 " There are two incitements to men of this description to 
 make them do their duty as they ought : fear of punishment, 
 and hope of reward. 
 
 " The first cannot he given individually, for these evils are 
 
 committed by whole corps; and the only way they can he punished 
 
 igracHVg them. I may do this to one or two, hilt I 
 
 Cannot venture to do ir l,y more; and then there is an end to 
 
 Mf of fins punishment, even it those who reeeived it were 
 
 lered in England as disgraced personajrather than martyrs." 
 
 Tin-, perl ta attributable to tin nature of our 
 
 military law. which, as he sayfi in tin- same letter, "is 
 
 tough I-) maintain discipline upon service." 
 
74 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 But the want of the alternative, viz. the power of Reward, 
 was very much, if not altogether, attributable to the rules 
 of our office and our officials. 
 
 " As to the other incitement to officers to do their duty 
 zealously, there is no such thing. We who command have not 
 the power of rewarding, or promising a reward, for a single officer 
 in the army ; and we deceive those who are placed under us, if 
 we hold out to them that they shall derive advantage from the 
 exertion of that power in their favour. 
 
 " You will say in answer to all this, that British armies have 
 been in the field before, and that these complaints have not ex- 
 isted." 
 
 This is exactly what we have already stated, that the 
 rules of our office were founded upon old customs and 
 habits inapplicable to the emergency of the times, and 
 Sir Arthur reasons in the same way. He goes on to 
 say :— 
 
 " I answer : first, that armies are larger, operations more 
 extended, and the exertions required are greater; secondly, 
 that our law, instead of being strong in proportion, has been 
 weakened ; and, finally, that it is only within late years that the 
 Commanders-in-chief abroad have been deprived of all patronage, 
 and, of course, of all power of incitement to the officers under 
 their command. 
 
 " It may be supposed that I wish for the patronage to gratify 
 my own favourites ; but I declare most solemnly, that if I had 
 it to-morrow there is not a soul in the army whom I should 
 wish to promote, excepting for service performed. 
 
 " We are an excellent army on parade, an excellent one to 
 fight j but take my own word for it, that either defeat or success 
 would dissolve us." 
 
 He seems to have had additional grounds of com- 
 plaint ; not only for being debarred (as we have seen) 
 from conferring, by his own authority, reward for good 
 service, but actually that, either from inadvertency or 
 from a pertinacious determination to keep the authority 
 
FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYAM / ,) 
 
 entirely in their o\\i\ hands at home, men who had been 
 sent to England in disgrace were sent out to him again. 
 Id June, 1809, he writes home to the Military Seere- 
 taity : — 
 
 n I enclose a letter received from Staff- surgeon , not 
 
 because I am apprehensive that the Commander-in-chief should 
 listen to the reports ^ an inferior officer, to the prejudice of his 
 superior ; for if we are lit to be trusted, our characters are not 
 to be injured by defamatory reports of this description : but 
 there are not wanting in England channels for circulating de- 
 famation of this kind. 
 
 " Mr. Staff-surgeon was sent home some time ago in 
 
 quenoe o( a complaint against him, and because he is a 
 a temper with which no one can agree. But, notwith- 
 standing, he was sent Lack here ; and considering that it was 
 still desirable that he should not serve with the army in Portugal, 
 1 lately ordered that he should return to England with sick and 
 wounded prisoners. This drew a remonstrance, to which I paid 
 no attention, and then he commenced his inquiries into the con- 
 duct of Ins superior officer. 
 
 •• 1 -'.Kill be obliged to the Commander-in-chief if he will 
 ing sent back to Portugal." (iv. 424.) 
 
 The question oi Hank, of officers serving in the Por- 
 tuguese army, had bum a source of much embarrassment 
 from a very early period. 
 
 With a view to the formation of an efficient Portuguese 
 arm}. it as that nation was in the class of persons 
 
 Suitable for vffictrg, it was proposed to introduce British 
 A- an inducement to gentlemen to accept the 
 duty, it ■ sag give cue step OI British rank, to 
 
 remain permanent when the foreign service night ter- 
 minate, and again one step in advance m Portuguese 
 rank during the continuance m that servi 
 
 This led to much inconvenience when the two armies 
 a<'i',„fj together. A junior British ensign received 
 
76 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 his lieutenancy for going into the Portuguese service, in 
 which he was then made a captain, and thus became 
 senior to all British lieutenants. In the commencement, 
 when the numbers were comparatively limited, this was 
 not much felt, but it afterwards became very embarrass- 
 ing. Sir Arthur had many communications with the 
 home authorities, and made various suggestions with a 
 view to remedy the evil. He was very long before he 
 could obtain any decision, which at last was against the 
 view which he had taken. 
 
 In a letter to Lord Castlereagh he says : — 
 
 " My opinion always has been, that the mode of applying 
 the services of British officers has been erroneous : many {all in 
 the inferior ranks) are useless. Besides, the selection of those 
 sent out has been unlucky; and the decision on the question I 
 sent home has been made without reference to circumstances, or 
 to the feelings or opinions of the individuals on whom it was 
 to operate, and just like every other decision I have ever seen 
 from the same quarter, as if men were stocks and stones." (v. 87.) 
 
 Some months after this, to show the practical incon- 
 venience of the working of this mode of transacting 
 business, we have a letter to Marshal Beresford j — 
 
 "I never know to what regiment the Horse Guards will 
 appoint an officer whom I recommend for a commission ; and I 
 am, therefore, unwilling to send Mr. Dunlop to any particular 
 regiment, lest he should not be posted to it." (v. 306.) 
 
 With the peculiar delicacy that marked all Sir 
 Arthur's communications, avoiding, in a marked manner, 
 all personal allusions, we have no present means of know- 
 ing to whom reference is made in the following letter to 
 Lord Liverpool ; but it indicates pretty clearly that he 
 had not implicit confidence in the discretion or discrimi- 
 nation of those upon whom the selection depended \ — 
 
 " I wrote to you the other day about general officers. I 
 
lIUMNlss DNDEB HOMK ANNOYANCES, m 
 
 onlv beg vim not to send me any violent party wen. We 
 must (seep the spirit of party out of the army, or we shall be in 
 a bad way, indeed.*' (v. 393.) 
 
 There i§ no doubt that the enormous expenses of the 
 war, including the immense advances of money, anus, 
 and stores of every kind sent to the Allies, imposed very 
 heavy duties upon the Government. It would be too 
 mueh to Bag that they were inert or sluggish ; they had 
 their difficulties to contend with in Parliament and else- 
 where : but, unquestionably, what might appear to be 
 merely official routine, and the usual course of transact- 
 ing business at /tome, created fearful anxiety, and caused 
 the greatest inconvenience to those who were abroad, 
 and who were entirely dependent upon England for every- 
 Ihi.ng ! 
 
 Writing home to Lord Liverpool on the 15/// January, 
 1 &10, Sir Arthur says ! — 
 
 " We have received no intelligence of any kind from England 
 since the 20th of last month. It would be very desirable if the 
 packet- were dispatched reirularly, even though the Ministers 
 should not write. The newspapers contain intelligence which 
 it is desirable we should have. 
 
 " It would, also, be very desirable if an early answer were 
 sent to our requisitions for supplies, stating only whether they 
 would be complied with m the whole, or to what extent, and in 
 what probable period. It we cannot have them we should know 
 it, in Order to make Other arrangements, and narrow our system 
 in proportion tq the deficiency of our means in time." (v. 434.) 
 
 It realty Seehis an extraordinary thing, that in exe- 
 cuting Ike duties of a great empire like Sreai Britain, it 
 should be in e. -;m to impo-e upon the commander of 
 rgesl attny the duty, in detail, of applying to the 
 tary of State, and a member of the cabinet, upon 
 the subject of how the soldiers were to cook their dinners. 
 
 The subject did not come within the ordinan SCOpe of 
 
78 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 the Secretary of State's arrangements, but it had been 
 properly referred to the proper office, that of the Com- 
 mander-in-chief, and not acted upon : and reference to 
 Lord Liverpool seemed to be Sir Arthur's only chance 
 of getting a decision. 
 
 11 1 enclose a copy of a letter which I wrote many months 
 ago [2$tk September, 1809 — this letter being dated, 14th March, 
 1810] to the Commander-in-chief, and no answer has yet been 
 returned ! 
 
 " The inconveniences of this delay in giving an answer are 
 daily increasing, and will be most severely felt by the troops, if 
 they should be engaged with the enemy before arrangements 
 are made for providing for the carriage of their camp-kettles, 
 discussed in that letter. 
 
 " I beg only to mention, that the soldiers cannot cook their 
 food unless they have camp-kettles ? 
 
 The solemn sarcasm in this last sentence, announcing 
 an important truth to the Secretary of State, is invalu- 
 able, as showing the way in which business was done in 
 those days in the office where such matters ought to be 
 arranged. 
 
 The Government itself was in a very precarious con- 
 dition soon after this time : and no doubt the firmness 
 of his rulers, which would have tended greatly to main- 
 tain and encourage Lord Wellington in his trying posi- 
 tion, was much wanting. He evidently felt it, for we 
 find him writing to Admiral Berkeley in April, — 
 
 " The Government are terribly afraid that I shall get them 
 and myself into a scrape. But what can be expected from men 
 who are beaten in the House of Commons three times a-week ? 
 A great deal might be done now if there existed in England 
 less party and more public sentiment, and if there was any 
 Government." (vi. 21.) 
 
1IKMMSS UNDER HOMI ANNO> WrF.S. / \) 
 
 Thte restricted power in his hands of rewarding those 
 
 whom he rhight think deSerfci'tfg pressed upon hini with 
 
 as the exigencies of service, and the ne- 
 
 y \\)V stimulating Individual exertions, or rewarding 
 
 individual merit, increased. 
 
 In a letter to the Military Secretary of t lie Com- 
 mander-in-chief in August, I s 10. after again urging the 
 claim f<>r promotion for different officers, lie again ad- 
 verts to the condition in which a commander of the 
 forces on service was placed ; with, at the same time, 
 the same noble, disinterested statement of his own views, 
 that we have seen on former occasions: — 
 
 •• I am tempted to communicate my opinion upon the dis- 
 posal of the patronage of the. troops on foreign service. In all 
 services excepting that of Great Britain (and in that in former 
 times), the commander of an army employed against the enemy 
 in the rield had the power of promoting officers, at least to 
 vacancies occasioned by the service. 
 
 •• 1: \vt\n pretty nearly the case, formerly in our own service, 
 and I believe the greater number of the general officers of the 
 ,k> of the present day were made lieutenant-colonels 
 by Sir William Howe, Sir Henry Clinton, Lord Cornwallis, &c. 
 But how i^ it now ? I, who command the largest army that has 
 been employed against the enemy for many years, Jiavc not even 
 twer of making a corporal ! 
 
 " It i< not known to the army and to strangers, and I am 
 almo^ •, acknowledge the small deirree ( J omrht to 
 
 say nullity i of power of reward whieh belongs to my situation. 
 
 "I dc n I entertain these opinions because there are any 
 
 officers attached to me for whom I de>ire promotion. All my 
 
 - imp have been promoted in their turn in their regi- 
 
 ts, or are to he promoted for tarrying borne 1 the account of 
 
 the ehatiire of system to me, 
 would be only to give me the pbwer'bf' rewarding the services of 
 rted themselves zealously. 
 
 " I have been iruhired to eonimunieate these opinions from 
 
SO FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 a strong conviction of their truth, and not, I assure you, from 
 any interest I feel in the result. 7" would not give one pin to 
 have the disposal of every commission in the army" (vi. 304.) 
 
 The irregularity of the arrangements respecting the 
 sailing of the packets, both to and from England, was 
 very great. We have already recorded his sense of the 
 inconvenience of their not coming at fixed periods from 
 England (p. 77), and we find that he suffered equally by 
 the uncertainty of their being sent from Lisbon. 
 
 It arose, probably, from some considerations of eco- 
 nomy at home, which, in the momentous condition of 
 the Peninsula at that time, would seem to be mis- 
 placed. 
 
 " I am concerned to hear that the rule respecting the packets 
 cannot be adhered to. It is most convenient to the army and 
 to my public business, and I acknowledge that I do not see the 
 necessity of breaking through a rule to send off a packet every 
 Sunday, if there should be one in the Tagus. 
 
 " However," (he adds, with his usual willingness to submit 
 to any personal inconvenience, and to make the best of it,) "it 
 is no business of mine, and I shall accommodate myself to any 
 plan that may be adopted." (v. 295.) 
 
 It would have appeared most natural that the British 
 officers employed with the Spanish armies, not as Spanish 
 officers, but for the purpose of transmitting correct intel- 
 ligence, upon which the British movements must be 
 essentially dependent, should have been placed under the 
 control of the Commander-in-chief of the British army, 
 who would, in fact, be the surest and best medium of 
 communication with the Government at home, as he 
 would be in possession of information from all points. 
 But the same spirit which pervaded every arrangement 
 was equally shown in this ; and those officers had been 
 
1IKMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 81 
 
 Qiade independent of him. lie writes to Lord Liver- 
 pool : — 
 
 " Having observed a considerable difference in the reports 
 transmitted of recent events in Castille, I have the honour 
 to enclose a correspondence which I have had with Colonel 
 Carroll. 
 
 " Although I have no longer any control over the officers 
 thus employed to report the operations of the Spanish armies, I 
 trust that my interference in the affair will be approved of; as 
 it most be oi the first importance to His Majesty that the in- 
 formation furnished to his Government, and his servants, and 
 officers in the Peninsula, should be accurately correct." (v. 402.) 
 
 The custom of confining all promotion to the au- 
 thorities at home was still adhered to ; and we are not 
 surprised to read the following almost indignant remon- 
 strance from one who was smarting under the re- 
 striction. 
 
 He had expressed the same feelings before, and 
 pointed out how injurious it was to the service at large, 
 but no attention was paid to his suggestions ; and it is 
 only wonderful that any man under such overpowering 
 circumstances, and who must have been aware, even 
 with all the native modesty of his character, how really 
 important he was, should have been found who did not 
 resent the treatment or quit the service : — 
 
 " I enclose a letter which has been received by the Commis- 
 Baiy-general, upon which I have only to observe, that if it is 
 the desire of the Government to carry on extensive military 
 operations, they must leave; some power of reward for zeal, in- 
 telligence, activity, and ability, in the power of those who arc to 
 stimulate their inferiors; and if the system proposed in the 
 enclosed letter is to be adopted, it would be better that the 
 heads of department- in England should take upon thcmsclws 
 the detailed management of concerns here, and make themselves 
 responsible for them. 
 
 o 
 
82 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 u I cannot avoid drawing your Lordship's attention to the 
 mode of promoting, not only commissaries, but the officers of 
 the army. 
 
 " With the largest concern to manage that has lately [he 
 might have said, eve?*] been entrusted to any officer in the 
 British army, and with the heaviest responsibility that ever was 
 placed upon any, 7" have not the power of promoting a man of 
 any rank or description whatever ; and the trial will certainly 
 have been made in my person (whether with success or not still 
 remains to be ascertained), with how small a proportion of the 
 power of reward, an officer in command of an army can carry on 
 the service. 
 
 ff I assure your Lordship that I have no desire to possess the 
 power of promoting officers of the Commissariat (which it is the 
 design of the enclosed letter to retain in the hands of the Com- 
 missary-in-chief), or that of promoting officers of the army. I 
 am not acquainted even with their names or their persons, ex- 
 cepting in the service ; and excepting to reward their services, 
 or to stimulate their exertions, it must be a matter of indifference 
 to me whether they are promoted or not." (vi. 389.) 
 
 In a letter soon after to the Secretary of the Com- 
 mander-in-chief he says : — 
 
 " I observe from some expressions in your letter of the 28th 
 August, and the general tenor of your observations, that I trod 
 upon tender ground. The sooner I quit it, therefore, the better. 
 When I wrote to you, I had no intention of making any invi- 
 dious statement of the advantages which any set of individuals 
 had derived from the system of promotion which had been 
 adopted. I adverted to what is generally understood in the 
 army ; and as I purpose to drop the subject entirely, about the 
 result of which I do not care a pin, I shall not enter into any 
 proof of my statement." (vi. 417.) 
 
 In another letter to Colonel Torrens he says : — 
 
 " Let us drop the subject of army promotions altogether, for 
 I assure you I feel no interest in it excepting with a view to 
 the public good; in which I may be mistaken. My opinions 
 
FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 83 
 
 went against the system, not against the mode of carrying 
 
 it on. 
 
 M I am mncb obliged to you tor relieving me of Major- 
 general and Colonel . I have no public objection to 
 
 make to the former, but he has been guilty of many little im- 
 proprieties, which render him a discreditable person with the 
 
 army ; and Major-general , who commands the division, 
 
 had urged his removal so strenuously, that I had determined to 
 send him word that he had my leave to quit the army. 
 
 " Sir David Dnndas will be the best judge whether this will 
 be sufficient authority to hold the language which he proposes 
 to hold to him. In these times I should prefer avoiding to 
 employ him, and give no reason ; and I should have acted 
 accordingly.^ (vi. 458.) 
 
 In a letter to Colonel Gordon, Commissary-in-clrief, 
 Lord Wellington says : — 
 
 " It may be very proper to frame rules for a department, and 
 to conduct a department according to the rules: but that is not 
 the mode in which the service can be carried on; and if the 
 attempt is persevered in, the army will be lost on some fine day, 
 on account of the total incapacity of the officers. 
 
 " I may be wrong, but I have objections to all those rules 
 which prevent the promotion of officers of merit. There is no 
 power of rewarding extraordinary services or merit; and under 
 circumstances which require unwearied exertion, we appear to be 
 framing regulations to prevent ourselves from commanding it, 
 by the only stimulus, honourable reward by promotion ! 
 
 " These arc my decided opinions. They go to the principle 
 of our proceedings, and not to any particular case. I wish to 
 know whether, in any service in the world, a man has been ever 
 1 at the head of such a concern as I am now conducting, 
 without having the power of selecting the person to fill such 
 office? An assistant commissary is found the most capable in 
 the whole department, and he cannot be made a deputy com- 
 ry because he has not served five year-, and there are 
 other assistants senior to him ; who, though very good men, and 
 able to do the duty of assistant, are not equal to the duty for 
 
84 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 which Mr. Ogilvie was selected, notwithstanding that there were 
 many deputy commissaries with the army ! ! ! 
 
 " I hope the gentlemen in London will be so kind as to be 
 responsible for all that passes here, and bear all the abuse, mis- 
 representation; &c. &c, which he must make up his mind to 
 who is honoured with the command of the British troops on 
 foreign service," (vi. 566.) 
 
 The obstacles and impediments thrown in his way 
 by the military authorities, the head of his profession, 
 founded upon old rules and customs, and maintained in 
 great measure for the gratification of personal power at 
 home, were galling enough. But here was a depart- 
 ment, (certainly most necessary, and indeed indispen- 
 sable to the military branch, but) which was composed 
 entirely of civilians ; and though the head of it in Eng- 
 land, at the moment we are treating of, was a military 
 man (Colonel Gordon), it was essentially a civil depart- 
 ment. 
 
 When Lord Wellington took the field, it is not too 
 much to say, that there was hardly a commissary who 
 knew or could execute the duties required on service. In 
 a part of the letter from which we have quoted above, 
 Lord Wellington says, — 
 
 " The only duty they learn in England is the superintend- 
 ance of deliveries by a contractor, and comparing the accounts 
 with the vouchers." 
 
 And yet this was the office setting up its narrow- 
 minded rules against the only man who had ever seen 
 service upon an extended scale; and whose knowledge 
 was founded upon actual experience. For, though it is 
 true that Lord Wellington's European fame was compa- 
 ratively recent, he had served his apprenticeship with 
 respect to feeding his army in a country where the 
 number of mouths to be fed exceeded by many thou- 
 
FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 85 
 
 sands those under his present command. His actual 
 soldiers in India might not exceed his Peninsular army 
 in numbers] but the habits of that country and that 
 service, required that the camp-followers must live, and 
 the head which provided for the one had also to provide 
 for the other. 
 
 Prom motives of economy at home, an order had 
 bnn Miit out forbidding the sending home any more 
 prisoners; founded, in all probability, upon the assump- 
 tion, that as thev were taken in the Portuguese cause 
 they wire to be deemed Portuguese prisoners, but 
 leaving out o( consideration that the Portuguese had not 
 means of bestowing them, or securing them. 
 
 " 1 have received your Lordship's letter respecting the French 
 prisoners in this country, and the directions will, of course, be 
 attended to ; hut I am apprehensive that we shall experience 
 much inconvenience in having so many prisoners to take care 
 of, at the same time that we have other important objects to 
 attend to. 
 
 " It is in vain to expect any assistance from the Portuguese 
 Government to provide for the removal of these prisoners, or for 
 the care of them at Lisbon, or in any distant part of the world. 
 That, as well as everything else, must fall upon me; audi must 
 take the best care of them I can." (vii. 105.) 
 
 The difficulties arising out of the relative rank of 
 officers in the British and Portuguese services was still 
 of much embarrassment. Lord Wellington had 
 made urgent applications to have general officers sent 
 out to him, and the following letter shows that though 
 the Horse Guards must have been as well aware of the 
 circumstances, and might have seen, without the neces- 
 sity of his pointing it out. that objections might be urged 
 whom they seem to have selected, they did 
 
86 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 not do so, but left the labour, and threw the odium, if 
 such should arise, upon him : — 
 
 " I have received your letter regarding the generals who are 
 to come. In respect to General Murray, I think him a very 
 able officer ; and there is no man whose assistance I should have 
 been more desirous of retaining than his, except in this country. 
 He is senior to Marshal Beresford, and left us on a question 
 arising out of that seniority. I have hitherto gone on perfectly 
 well, without having to decide one question of rank between the 
 services. 
 
 " I attribute this as well to the temper of the army as to my 
 own management ; but if a general comes here who appeared, 
 when he was here before, disposed not to avoid those questions, 
 but to bring them into discussion unnecessarily, the difficulties 
 of managing this intricate machine will be vastly increased. I 
 would, therefore, prefer to pass sub silentio his desire to be 
 employed. 
 
 General H. Clinton is also a very able officer, who would 
 be very useful ; but why is a man to volunteer his services in 
 a situation where he does not approve of what is going on ? 
 I have men enough of this description here already " (vii. 237.) 
 
 The Board at home appear again to have had some 
 objection to the course which had been pursued with 
 the army, of appointing persons to act with the Commis- 
 sariat. Lord Wellington indignantly writes : — 
 
 " I hope that I have not been induced (in the confidence 
 that the King's Ministers would approve of my measures) to 
 make temporary appointments, required for the service, of gentle- 
 men, to whom anybody in London can by his orders prevent 
 their salaries being paid. If this is the case, I am sincerely 
 desirous that the Government would consider of the appointment 
 of some other officer to conduct their concerns in this country, 
 as I am utterly incapable of managing them if I am to be treated 
 in such a manner." (vii. 262.) 
 
 There still remained the original wish on the part of 
 
FIRMNESS ONDEB HOME ANNOYANCES. 87 
 
 the office at the Horse Guards to retain the power over 
 regiments in their own hands ; and orders were given by 
 the Commander-in-chief that certain regiments should be 
 sent home. 
 
 Lord Wellington writes to the Secretary of State, 
 inc. — 
 
 u I have received orders from the Duke of York to send 
 regiments home, &c. &c. If II . R. Highness directs me to 
 draft two battalions into one, there is no material diminution of 
 force here ; but he has lately directed me to send home regi- 
 ments, which would make a diminution of about 600 rank and 
 tile, which becomes a little important. 
 
 " I do not know whether I am right or wrong, but I con- 
 sider you responsible for the force I have here ; and although I 
 should be sorry to be the cause of any unpleasant explanation 
 on a subject of this kind, I think it right to inform you that I 
 have received these orders, and that I consider that I must obey 
 them : but if it should be possible, it is desirable that you should 
 come to an understanding with II. R. II. regarding the recall of 
 troops from this country." (Yin. 266.) 
 
 •• Your Lordship and His Royal Highness are the best judges 
 of what description of troops it is expedient that this army 
 should be composed. I beg leave, however, to submit, that some 
 of the best and most experienced soldiers, the most healthy and 
 capable of bearing fatigue, arc in the 2d battalions; many of 
 which are much more efficient, and have always more men for 
 duty in proportion to their gross number, and fewer sick, than 
 any of the 1st battalions recently arrived, which had been at 
 Walcheren j and it is certain that this army will not be so 
 strong by the exchange of new for old soldiers. 
 
 " I have thought it proper to submit this matter, assuring 
 you at the same time that it is entirely indifferent to me; and 
 that whatever ordi ' ve upon the subject will be imme- 
 diately obeyed.** (ix. 52 
 
 Lin- Secretary of State was the medium of commu- 
 nication with the hoiin authorities ; and if the nobleman 
 
88 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 filling that office had issued these orders, it might not 
 have been so astonishing. A man might be an excellent 
 minister, and an able member of a cabinet, without 
 being a practical soldier; and the idea of keeping 
 regularity in the office books, or any other reason, might 
 have appeared sufficient to him to order home second 
 battalions, weakened as they no doubt were by service : 
 but the authorities from whom these orders did come 
 were soldiers ; and it would not have appeared necessary 
 to require a suggestion from the commander abroad to 
 convince them that a seasoned man was of more value 
 than a new one. But we suppose that the rules of office 
 hampered the authorities at home, and certainly crippled 
 those abroad. 
 
 Some rules of the same stringent nature, emanating 
 from home, called for remonstrance six months later. 
 Invalids were ordered not to be sent home till their 
 accounts were settled. 
 
 " In truth, my dear Torrens, the difficulties we labour under 
 are but little known in England. How is it possible for any 
 officer to come to a settlement, by a correspondence, with one 
 who has to settle the accounts of probably 500 men going to 
 England at the same moment ? It is quite impossible ! And 
 the consequence is, that the poor men are detained three, four, 
 or five months, to the loss of many, till the correspondence 
 respecting their accounts is finished. 
 
 " If a soldier makes a claim at Lisbon, the officer who has to 
 settle the claims before they go to England must detain as 
 many as one transport will contain, till the claims of one shall 
 be inquired into by post; every letter now requiring three 
 weeks to get an answer. 
 
 " I am convinced that it is impossible to attain H. II . H/s 
 object in this country without detaining men three or four 
 months after the necessity of their going to England is 
 pronounced." (ix. 423.) 
 
FIRMNESS UNDEB HOME ANNOYANCES. S9 
 
 A letter to the Duke of York himself, proves that 
 there was a very rigid adherence to form in that office. 
 It might be very necessary, hut no douht it must 
 at times have thrown much additional labour upon one 
 who was already almost overburthened, like Lord Wel- 
 lington. But his patient, enduring disposition, and 
 his strict sense of obedience to orders, shows itself as 
 usual : 
 
 " In regard to the subjects referred to in Y. R. H/s letter, 
 one of them was suggested to me by Colonel Gordon, who was 
 my Qoarter-master-genera] ; and knowing that he possessed 
 your confidence, and was in the habit of communication with the 
 heads of departments at the Horse Guards, I consented to his 
 writing to England on those subjects. 
 
 " It did not occur to me that they were official communications, 
 
 and I allowed him to make them because he had suggested what 
 
 proposed, and appeared to understand the arrangements; 
 
 and because I believed that he was in the habit of writing to 
 
 your Royal Highness. 
 
 " I am aware that the staff-officers of the army are attached 
 to me to communicate with my inferiors, but not to carry on my 
 communications with my superiors; and, therefore, I should not 
 have allowed Colonel Gordon to write, even upon the subjects 
 referred to, if I had considered what he was writing at all of a 
 nature of an official communication." (ix. 488.) 
 
 In a letter soon after to the Military Secretary, 
 Colonel Torrens, he states the difficulties to which he is 
 subjected by the change of officers, which (though, 
 perhaps, not entirely) were dependent, in great measure, 
 upon the arrangements at home: — 
 
 "I have frequently mentioned the inconvenience from the 
 
 Hilt change of officers ID every important department, or 
 
 filling every situation of rank or responsibility here. No man 
 
 can be aware of the extent of tins inconvenience, and the labour 
 
 which these con-taut changes occasions is of a most distressing 
 
 .ption. No .sooner is an arrangement made, the order 
 
90 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 given, and the whole in train, than a gentleman comes out, who 
 has probably but little knowledge of the practical part of his duty 
 in any country, and none whatever in this most difficult of all. 
 Nobody in the British army ever reads an order or a regulation 
 in any manner but as an amusing novel, and the consequence is, 
 that when complicated arrangements are to be carried into 
 execution, every gentleman proceeds according to his own fancy ; 
 and then, when the arrangement fails (as it must if the 
 order is not strictly obeyed), they come upon me to set matters 
 to rights; and thus my labour is increased tenfold." (ix. 602.) 
 
 He had occasion to write upon the same subject 
 soon after : — 
 
 " It is no encouragement to those who are performing their 
 duty in this country to see, that when they have attracted the 
 notice of the officers under whom they are serving, and have been 
 recommended for promotion, others are preferred who have 
 quitted the arduous service, probably to solicit from the 
 Medical Board the promotion these have deserved. 
 
 " I have frequently made you acquainted with the incon- 
 venience felt by the constant change of the officers employed in 
 every branch. One of the principal causes of these changes is 
 the practice of going to England to apply for promotion, which 
 ought to be acquired by service here : and I do not see the utility 
 of my forwarding recommendations of the heads of departments 
 of those officers whom they deem deserving of promotion, if to 
 those recommendations are to be preferred the claims and 
 applications of those who quit the service to go home to make 
 them/ 3 (ix. 625.) 
 
 " I have proofs that every promotion by the Medical Board is 
 a matter of application and intrigue. I shall send home papers 
 which I have received from , in regard to his promo- 
 tion ; in which you will see, that this gentleman was excited by 
 * * * to prevail upon Sir Thomas Graham, to prevail upon me, 
 to recommend him for a situation which * * * did not think he 
 ought to fill, and to which he refused to appoint him. What is 
 all this but intrigue and attention to private applications, instead 
 of claims grounded upon public services? Then can it be 
 supposed that I can be the victim of these doings without 
 
FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 91 
 
 What interest can I have in these concerns, 
 Of what have I to say to any of these Medical Officers?" 
 
 x. n.) 
 
 The question about sending home men, or drafting 
 
 3, upon orders received from the Horse Guards, was 
 
 one which gave infinite trouble. It is impossible to say 
 
 what were the reasons at the oiiiee at home ; but 
 Lord Wellington did not conceive them to be applicable to 
 the army abroad. There are many letters filled with 
 details which it would be needless to recapitulate here ; 
 but it must be owned that his reasons against the orders 
 arc very substantial, at the same time that he says, — 
 ive rite order* and they shall be obeyed" The follow- 
 ing phrases occur in various places : — 
 
 "I prefer having one officer or soldier who has served one 
 or two campaigns, to having two or three who have not ; and I 
 should be very unwilling to part with the officers of the 2d 
 German Legion). 
 
 " I wish the Secretary of State and the Commander-in- 
 chief would send ma positive orders. What they order, sJiall be 
 d, cotite qui coute : but if they leave matters to my 
 :,\ I -hall never do anything which, in my judgment, 
 may be prejudicial to the service here." (x. 75.) 
 
 " His Uoyal Highness and I, unfortunately, take a very 
 different view : he, one referable to the whole army and the 
 general service ; I, to the particular service under my charge. 
 II. EL II. must be right ; bat I wish that, being so, he would give 
 me a positive order. He may depend upon it, it shall be obeyed; 
 but when be conveys wishes and suggestions, and leaves it to 
 my discretion, he most excuse me if I take my own view of the 
 
 "New soldiers QOt only do no service, but by filling the 
 
 hospital they are a burthen to us. Pot these reasons J am so 
 
 unwilling to part with the men whom I bare formed Into 
 
 1 battalions! and I never wfl] part with them as long 
 
 - mv discretion. 
 
92 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 " The same is the case in regard to the cavalry \ indeed 
 stronger ; and if I were now to choose, I should prefer by far to 
 give the horses of the fine regiments of English hussars to the 
 old regiments here, and keep the officers and soldiers of the 
 latter." (x. 76.) 
 
 " The second battalions, some of which have now been four 
 years in this army, are the best troops we have, and will render 
 good service in the next campaign in the way that I have 
 organised them. It could not be expected that I should send 
 away nearly 2000 of these soldiers at a moment when every 
 man is an object. But let the orders that they shall be sent 
 come } and they shall be obeyed with alacrity ; and you shall hear 
 no complaints. 
 
 " I am one of those who are incredulous respecting the diffi- 
 culty of procuring horses in England. One thousand horses for 
 the cavalry in this last winter would have given the army the 
 service of three, if not four, regiments ; from which, by orders 
 from the Horse Guards, I have been obliged to draught their 
 horses, very much against their will. Surely horses of five and 
 six years old cannot be wanting in England \" (x. 175.) 
 
 " I do not mean to complain of the Duke of York's decision 
 to take from us four regiments of cavalry, but a remount of 
 700 horses at the end of last campaign, and permission to take 
 100 from each of the English hussars (which they would have 
 been better without), would have given us now 1200 additional 
 cavalry, would have enabled me to keep that number in reserve 
 towards the close of the campaign, when a great effort will be 
 made by the enemy ; and all the dissatisfaction would have 
 been avoided which has been the consequence of the drafting 
 the horses from those regiments." (x. 400.) 
 
 All these remonstrances to the powers at home of 
 one branch of the service were before he moved, and 
 with reference to the means and efficiency of the army 
 itself ; but the parts of Spain to which his efforts were 
 soon directed were connected with the coast, and in- 
 volved a connexion with the navy, for the protection of 
 
FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 93 
 
 his communication by sea. lie had written to the naval 
 commanders, stating his wants and wishes ; but, unfor- 
 tunately, the regulations of the service under the home 
 authorities divided their commands ; and however willing 
 or able one of the naval commanders might be, his 
 authority only extended to a certain point, and he could 
 give no orders to the officer in command beyond it. 
 
 Lord Wellington had adverted to this difficulty in 
 letters to the Government before, but apparently without 
 effect, as we find by a letter to Mr. Stuart at Lisbon, in 
 which he says : — 
 
 M It will be very inconvenient, and increase the difficulties of 
 
 my situation very much, if the communication by sea along the 
 
 - of Portugal and Gallicia should not be secure. I had 
 
 written to on the subject, and have received an answer 
 
 which proves that, in our country, it is better to suffer any 
 public inconvenience than to venture to suggest a measure as a 
 remedy which is to be carried into execution by another public 
 department. In future, therefore, I shall complain of incon- 
 veniences when they arc severely felt, and shall not trouble 
 Government with suggestions of remedies or preventatives." 
 
 I ix. m.) 
 
 " I am afraid you will think me very troublesome about our 
 want of ships of war on these coasts. 
 
 u I am certain it will not be denied, that since Great 
 Britain has been a naval power, a British army has never been 
 left in such a situation, and that at a moment when it is most 
 important to na to preserve, and to the enemy to interrupt the 
 communication by the coast. If they only take the ship with 
 our thoes, we must halt for sia week 
 
 u I hope it will not be deemed unreasonable to request to 
 have the navigation of the coa^t secured lor me, without which 
 you must not expect success." (x. o22.) 
 
 " The supplies of all kinds from Lisbon and Coruna arc 
 delayed for want of convoy ; the blockade of San Sebastian is 
 
94 FIRMNESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 not kept at all, and the enemy have introduced supplies of 
 different kinds. 
 
 " In the attack of a maritime place, some assistance has 
 generally been received from the navy; but the soldiers are 
 obliged to work in the transports to unload the vessels, because 
 no seamen can be furnished. 
 
 " I have never been in the habit of troubling Government 
 with requisitions for force, but have carried on the service to the 
 best of my ability with what was placed at my disposal ; and if 
 the navy of Great Britain cannot afford more than one frigate 
 and &few brigs and cutters, I must be satisfied, and do the best 
 I can : but I hope you will let me know positively whether I am 
 or not to have further naval means." (xi. 17.) 
 
 " I complain of an actual want of naval assistance. I know 
 nothing about the cause of the evil ; I state the fact, which 
 nobody will deny, and leave it to Government to apply the 
 remedy or not as they may think proper. I assure you that 
 there is not an hour in the day in which some statement does 
 not come before me of the inconvenience resulting from the 
 want of naval means ; and even while writing this letter, the 
 Commissary-general has been here to complain that his empty 
 provision-ships are detained at Santander for want of convoy." 
 (xi. 118.) 
 
 " It is very desirable that some arrangement should be fixed 
 and made known, under which officers will be able to get from 
 England those equipments which they want. We can get 
 nothing in these countries ; and those who have been here as 
 long as I have, feel very uncomfortable for the want of a variety 
 of articles which they can only get from England. 
 
 " I cannot understand why the rule regarding the packets 
 should have been made more strict lately ; and I know that I, 
 among others, am suffering from it, not having even a second 
 saddle." (xi. 123.) 
 
 " It appears to be the opinion of Admiral Lord Keith that 
 there is a want of regularity and system in the application for 
 convoys. I wish his lordship had stated his reasons (inde- 
 pendent of his suspicions), founded on experience of former 
 services. I believe there is a great difference between the ser- 
 
FIRMNESS UNDEB SOME ANNOYANCES. 05 
 
 vice in this country and those on which he has heretofore been 
 employed with the army. This is no joint service. All that is 
 required i> to give convoy to the supplies for the army coming 
 from England and elsewhere, and to convoy back the empty 
 transports. 
 
 " Thai: which an army wants docs not always require many 
 ships to carry ; for instance, the great coats were ordered round 
 early in August, and are now (Nov, 1) in one ship at Oporto, 
 waiting for convoy. All the stores wanted at particular seasons, 
 such as at this moment tents, are supplied in general by one, or 
 at most, two ships. 
 
 " I beg once more to impress the absolute necessity that we 
 should have the maritime communication constant and secure, if 
 it l- intended that I should maintain a large army on this 
 frontier ; and it is obvious that stinted naval means will not 
 answer." (xi. 239.) 
 
 It may be quite true that the exigencies of the 
 service in all parts of the world rendered the task of the 
 Admiralty in making arrangements to meet them a very 
 difficult one. But the present difficulty, which is so 
 repeatedly and forcibly urged, would have required little 
 (indeed it may fairly be said, no) additional force; a 
 better distribution of what was already there would 
 have done everything. 
 
 Here again, as we have pointed out before in refer- 
 ence to other departments, the old existing rules of office 
 were the obstacle. The north coast of Spain and the 
 Portugal were two separate /tarn/ commands! 
 ip sent from Lisbon or Oporto was under the orders 
 of one commander ; when she reached Corufia she 
 came under another. Whether more could have been 
 done by any bet! o or arrangement between these 
 
 naval commanders it is not now easy to pronounce, but 
 hence arose the evila and delays complained of. 
 
FIRM 
 
 NESS UNDER HOME ANNOYANCES. 
 
 This does appear to be an inconvenience of a nature 
 which might have been remedied by the authorities at 
 home, if they had thought fit; but it remained to the 
 last! 
 
 Many of these obstacles and impediments might, 
 perhaps, have been unavoidable ; but it is clear that 
 Lord Wellington suffered much under the weight of 
 them. They are not adduced here with a view to ani- 
 madvert upon the rules or habits of the service, or to 
 insinuate that there was any reluctance to act for the 
 best ; but we lay them before the reader to prove, what 
 we set out with stating, that he had an extraordinary 
 power of submitting with patience to what he could not 
 avert or amend. 
 
 " Give me orders and they shall he obeyed/" was his 
 maxim and his practice, at whatever cost to his own 
 private convictions. 
 

 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 In the commencement of our remarks upon the subject 
 of annoyances, we divided them under two heads, Home 
 and Foreign. The former have furnished so very 
 extensive a field, and one so much more prolific in proofs 
 of what he had to submit to than we had anticipated, 
 that we have thought it better to collect the remarks 
 upon his foreign impediments under a separate head. 
 
 In the very early stage of his connexion with the 
 Portuguese Government he had no special ground of 
 complaint. "We find one letter, in consequence of the 
 
 sal of General Freire, commanding the Portuguese 
 army, to co-operate with him in his first advance; but 
 that was merely the act of an individual: — 
 
 " I have written to General Freire : as to his plan of opera- 
 tions, I do not see what purpose it is to answer ; and I certainly 
 can never give my sanction to anything so useless, and so 
 crudely digested, so far as even to promise to communicate with 
 Of aid the person who is carrying it into execution. 
 
 " I shall execute the orders which I have received from my 
 1 mment without the assistance of the Portuguese; and 
 General Freire will have to justify himself with his prince and 
 the world for haying declined to Btand forward upon this inte- 
 resting occasion, and tor having refused to send me the assist- 
 ance which it is m hifl power to give." (iv. 72.) 
 
 It will be almost impossible to s< parate the Portuguese 
 from the Spanish grievances. They proceeded, certainly, 
 
 H 
 
98 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 from totally different parties, and influenced possibly by 
 very different motives ; but they often arose at the very 
 same time, and were injurious to the operations in which 
 he was engaged, whether he were on one side of the 
 frontier or the other. 
 
 The Spanish difficulties were generally more of a 
 military nature, arising from the ignorance, the caprice, 
 or vanity and incapacity of their officers, — not unac- 
 companied by the most gross falsehood in almost every 
 statement respecting their own force, or their promises 
 of supplies to the British, and the most infamous failure 
 in fulfilling any one of them. 
 
 The Portuguese were different, but equally em- 
 barrassing. The neglect was universal, from the highest 
 officer of state to the lowest juiz da fora. Every 
 promise was violated — every suggestion was disre- 
 garded ; the means of carrying up stores and food 
 to his army were in many cases so scandalously neg- 
 lected, as nearly to reduce them to starvation ; the 
 means of removing his wounded were not provided ; 
 and yet, so great was his regard for constituted autho- 
 rity in the territories of an ally, that he never attempted 
 to rectify the abuses by the physical power which he 
 had in his own hands, but invariably confined himself 
 to remonstrance, passing through the minister of his 
 own country. 
 
 The Government, during the absence of the Prince 
 Regent in the Brazils, was in the hands of a Council 
 of Regency ; many of whom, no doubt, were persons 
 more actuated by views of personal interest or im- 
 portance than by any more patriotic motive. 
 
 Sir Arthur very early became conscious of the total 
 incapacity (to say nothing worse) of many of them ; but, 
 however desirable he might have felt it to recommend, 
 
FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 99 
 
 or even to force a change, by putting out or substitu- 
 ting any member, he recommended Mr. Stuart not to 
 shake their authority, which depended upon the sound- 
 ness of their appointment from the Brazils. 
 
 After his successful expedition against Soult at 
 Oporto, he moved to the frontier of Spain, with the in- 
 tention of co-operating with Cuesta. Even at that early 
 period his grounds of complaint began, and from the 
 very first place where he halted after crossing the 
 frontier he writes to Mr. Villiers at Lisbon : — 
 
 " I shall be obliged to you to mention to the Government 
 the great inconvenience which the army has felt ever since its 
 arrival in Portugal, for the want of the assistance of the civil 
 government to procure the supplies it has required, parti- 
 cularly of carriages and mules. For the latter I have written 
 to you, I believe, not less than ten letters : but they have not 
 yet assisted the British army with one ; and the magistrates 
 of the country have rather prevented than aided us in procuring 
 carts/'' (iv. 472.) 
 
 Previous to his advance into Spain he had a fore- 
 taste of the people whom he was going to assist. lie 
 tells Mr. Frere, — 
 
 " I can only say, that the obstinacy of this old gentleman 
 [Cuesta] is throwing out of our hands the finest game that 
 any armies ever had." 
 
 And again he says to Lord Castlereagh : — 
 
 " My c irrespondence with General Cuesta has been a very 
 curious one, and proves him to be as obstinate as any gentle- 
 man at the head of an army need be. He would not alter 
 his position, even to insure the safety of his army, because it 
 it be injurious to himself." 
 
 With the contempt which he must have felt for the 
 military ^and, indeed, private) character of his intended 
 
100 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 coadjutor, he yet gives way upon principle, and thus 
 modestly concludes his letter to his own Government : — 
 
 " I hope I acted right in giving way, more particularly as 
 the operation was to be carried on in Spain ; and the argument 
 used to me was, that the safety of Cuesta' s army depended upon 
 my compliance." 
 
 A little later he writes to Mr. Frere : — 
 
 " It is impossible to express to you the inconvenience and 
 risk we incur from the want of means of conveyance, which 
 I cannot believe the country would not furnish, if there existed 
 any inclination. 
 
 " Though to me, personally, there has been much civility 
 from all classes, it has not been the case with the army in 
 general. The officers complain that the country gives unwill- 
 ingly the supplies we have required; and we have not procured 
 a cart or a mule for the service of the army. This does not look 
 promising, and I shall certainly not persevere if our prospect 
 of good treatment does not improve. 
 
 " We really should not be so ill off in an enemy's country, 
 as we should there take by force what we should require." (iv. 
 488.) 
 
 " I have been obliged to intimate to Cuesta that I could 
 attempt no further operation till I should be made certain of 
 my supplies for transport, and regular provisions from the 
 country. 
 
 " I lament the necessity which obliges me to halt, and will 
 oblige me to withdraw from Spain if it should continue. I can 
 only say I never have seen an army so ill-treated in any country. 
 
 " It is ridiculous to pretend that the country cannot supply 
 our wants. The French army is well fed ; the Spanish army 
 has plenty of everything ; and we alone, upon whom everything 
 depends, are actually starving." (iv. 496.) 
 
 " I find General Cuesta more and more impracticable every 
 day. It is impossible to do business with him. His want of 
 communication with his officers of the plan settled with me for 
 the 22d (July), and his absence from the field, were the cause 
 that we did the French but little mischief on that day." (iv. 498.) 
 
FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 101 
 
 " I have not been able to follow the enemy as I could wish, 
 on account of the great deficiency of the means of transport, 
 owing to my having found it impossible to procure even one 
 mule or a cart in Spain/'' (iv. 499.) 
 
 With the little confidence which he had in the real 
 honest integrity of the Spanish authorities, he felt it 
 necessary to be very punctilious in his dealings with 
 them. 
 
 Don Martin de Garay (the Spanish War Minister) 
 had addressed him upon some subject, and the following 
 is his tetter to Mr. Frere, conveying, in the most civil 
 terms that official correspondence would permit, his 
 plain and unequivocal opinion that Don Martin had 
 told a falsehood! — 
 
 " I shall be very much obliged to him if he will understand 
 that I have no authority — nay, that I have been directed not 
 — to correspond with any of the Spanish Ministers ; and I 
 request that he will, in future, convey to me, through you, the 
 commands which he may have for me. I shall thus avoid the 
 injurious and uncandid misrepresentations of what passes, which 
 D. .Martin has more than once sent to me, apparently with a 
 view of placing on the records of his government, statements of 
 my actions and conduct which are entirely inconsistent with the 
 truth, and to which I have no regular means of replying. 
 
 ft It is an unfounded assertion, that the first account the 
 1 nment received of my intention not to undertake any 
 
 peration was when they heard that I had left Cucsta 
 alone to pursue the enemy. The statement is not true! And 
 Supposing it to be true, and that Cnesta was exposed when 
 alone, it was his fault and not mine. I had given him fair 
 notice. 
 
 "It is not a difficult matter for a gentleman in the situa- 
 tion of I). .Martin de Garay U) sit down in his cabinet and write 
 his ideal of the glory which would result from driving the 
 Prencfa through the I'; and I believe there is no man 
 
 in Spain who has wished BO much, or sacrificed so much, to 
 effect that object as I have. 
 
102 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 "It is a positive fact, that during the last seven days the 
 British army have not received one-third of their provisions ; 
 that at this moment there are nearly 4000 wounded soldiers 
 dying in the hospital for want of common assistance and 
 necessaries ; and that I can get no assistance of any description 
 from the country. 
 
 " I positively will not move, nay more, I will disperse my 
 army, till I am supplied with provisions and means of transport 
 as I ought to be." 
 
 At this time the Marquis Wellesley had relieved Mr. 
 Frere as British Minister to the Central Junta. 
 
 Sir Arthur gives him a general statement of the 
 military affairs, the position and condition of the British 
 army, and the state of the Spanish troops, which was 
 wretched. 
 
 He repeats his complaints of the wants of his army, 
 and says : — 
 
 " If the Government have not already made great exertions 
 to supply us, and if we do not immediately experience the effects 
 by receiving a plentiful supply of provisions and forage, we must 
 move away. There is this day, again, no bread for the soldiers." 
 (v. 13.) ' 
 
 And yet, with all these exasperating circumstances, 
 he tries to make the best of it, and concludes his letter 
 thus : — 
 
 " I must do the late British Minister the justice to declare, 
 that this deficiency is not to be at all attributed to any neglect 
 or omission on his part. It is to be attributed to the poverty 
 and exhausted state of the country; to the inactivity of the 
 magistrates and people ; to their disinclination to take any 
 trouble, excepting that of packing up their property and running 
 away when they hear of the approach of a French patrole ; and 
 to their habits of insubordination, and disobedience of, and to 
 the want of power in, the Government and their officers." 
 
FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 103 
 
 The picture was, alas ! an accurate likeness, calcu- 
 lated to excite nothing but contempt for all classes ! 
 
 The following contemptuous letter to General Cuesta 
 was, apparently, well-deserved : — 
 
 "The assertion in your Excellency's letter, that the British 
 troops sell their bread to the Spanish soldiers, is heneath the dig- 
 nity of your Excellency's situation for yon to notice, or for me to 
 reply. The British troops could not sell that which they had 
 nut ; and the reverse of the statement of your Excellency is the 
 fact at the time the armies were at Talavera, as I have myself 
 witnessed frequently in the streets of that town." (v. 25.) 
 
 Ill another letter to Cuesta he says : — 
 
 " Since I joined your army, the troops have not received 
 upon an average half a ration, and on some days nothing at all. 
 I can procure no means of transport ; and I have not received 
 even an answer to a request I made, to have a remount for the 
 cavalry of only 100 mares, which would be entirely useless to 
 the Spanish cavalry. 
 
 " Under these circumstances, your Excellency cannot be 
 surprised that I should think that the British army has been 
 neglected and ill-treated ; or at the determination which I now 
 communicate to you, that if they are not more regularly supplied 
 I shall march them back to Portugal." (v. 33.) 
 
 I lis resolution was at length taken, and on the 
 
 15th August he writes : — 
 
 " I hope your Excellency [General Eguia, who had suc- 
 
 I General Cuesta,] will occupy the posts on the Tagus this 
 
 night. But if you should not do so, 1 can only say that my 
 
 troops shall be withdrawn to-morrow night, whether relieved 
 
 or not." (v. 50. | 
 
 Q nera] Eguia bad an interview with Sir Arthur, 
 and promised redress lor all the evils; but, as usual, 
 nothing was done. Similar complaints, which had been 
 
 laid before General Cuesta more than a month before, 
 
104 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 had been transmitted by him (as he averred) to the 
 Supreme Central Junta at Seville ; and if any measures 
 had been taken, supplies might have been forwarded, 
 even from a distance : but nothing was received. 
 
 The Government might have given orders; but as 
 Sir Arthur observed — 
 
 " Orders are not sufficient. The Junta may have issued 
 orders to supply the deficiencies, but, from want of arrange- 
 ment, there are no persons to obey, and this army would 
 perish." 
 
 He writes again to General Eguia, who had for- 
 warded to him some of the evasive subterfuges from the 
 Central Junta, and probably containing some of their 
 gasconading projects of active operation : — 
 
 " I have received your Excellency's letter, enclosing one 
 from the Minister of War at Seville. He has been entirely 
 misinformed. 
 
 " He forgets that we have no food ; our cavalry, from want, 
 were scarcely able to move from their ground ; artillery horses 
 unable to draw the guns ; that I have no means of moving, and 
 my soldiers are worn down by want of every description. 
 
 " It is extraordinary that the minister did not advert to 
 these circumstances, which have been frequently laid before him, 
 or that he should have proposed to me any operation of any 
 description, to which he must have known that I was unequal ; 
 but his having omitted to advert to them, sufficiently accounts 
 for their continued existence." (v. 54.) 
 
 A Senor Don Luis de Calvo had been appointed 
 Commissary-general to the Spanish army. Who or what 
 he was we have no means here of ascertaining, and many 
 may be of opinion that it is of little consequence, and 
 that he is unworthy of further notice. But, unfortu- 
 nately, he was now in a situation of great importance, 
 deeply affecting the interests, if not the existence of the 
 British General and his army ; and it illustrates forcibly 
 
FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 105 
 
 the difficulties o( Sir Arthur's position, in being placed 
 at the mercy of such men. 
 
 In reply to his n'rst communication to Sir Arthur, 
 promising abundant supplies in three days, and that in 
 
 the mean time the magazine at Truxillo should be given 
 to him, the latter replies with some bluntness : — 
 
 " I have received the same assurances from every Spanish 
 Commissioner who has been employed with us ; and although 
 your rank is higher and your powers are greater than those of 
 the other Spanish officers who have been with me, I acknow- 
 ledge that I feel no confidence in your assurances ; and I give no 
 credit to the accounts of resources on the road [in what place is 
 n<>t known], or of the magazine at Truxillo." (v. 57.) 
 
 In a letter very shortly after to Marquis Wellesley 
 he notices 
 
 " an injurious and unfounded assertion of this said Don 
 Luis de Calvo, who had said, that ( the want of provisions was 
 a mere pretext for withdrawing from Spain ; and that it was 
 false, for that there was plenty. 9 " (v. 64.) 
 
 And in proof of De Calvo's falsehood Sir Arthur 
 sends a copy of a letter (of which the original was in 
 his possession), from an alcalde in one of the towns 
 to a British Commissary (Mr. Downie), stating that 
 he had received directions from Don L. de Calvo to 
 send to the Spanish head-quarters the very provisions 
 which Downie had procured for the British. 
 
 • And this," adds Sir Arthur, indignantly, u is the honour 
 and good faith, and this Don L. de Calvo is the gentleman in 
 trance* I was to place confidence] I 
 
 u These reports and insinuations against me may do very 
 well for the people of Seville, but the British army will not 
 soon forget the treatment it has received." (v. Gt.) 
 
 General Bguia had also descended so low as to put 
 
106 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 forward the same insinuation, as to the pretended 
 grounds for withdrawing the British. Sir Arthur re- 
 plied to his letter, but in reporting the fact to Marquis 
 AVellesley, he says : — 
 
 " Until the insulting assertion was withdrawn, it was im- 
 possible for me to continue any correspondence with General 
 Eguia after I had replied to his letter, which I hope I did with 
 the temper which became my situation and character. In his 
 reply he has left the charge of making use of a false pretext 
 where it stood ; and I have, therefore, not given him any reply 
 upon that or any other subject on which he has addressed 
 nie." (v. 63.) 
 
 Notwithstanding the boasting and vapouring which 
 seemed to be inherent in the Spanish character (though 
 at a later period the peasantry showed much more per- 
 severance and personal courage), it is undeniable that 
 at this period of the war Sir Arthur formed a most just 
 opinion of their value as soldiers. 
 
 It was clear, from what we have seen, that he had 
 no reason to estimate very highly the talent or the cha- 
 racter of those in authority ; and in justice to the lower 
 orders it may be fair to assume, that want of confidence 
 in their superiors might lead to the character which he 
 ascribed to them. 
 
 In a long and most able dispatch to Marquis Wel- 
 lesley, after the British had retired beyond the Spanish 
 frontier, and giving his reasons for so doing in detail, 
 he proceeds to a most dispassionate consideration of 
 future plans and projects : — 
 
 " 1st. Shall I again join in co-operation with the Spaniards V 
 
 He argues the question in all its bearings, and con- 
 cludes by saying, — 
 
 " It does not appear to be necessary, and not very desirable. 
 
FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 107 
 
 "2d. Is there do chance of resuming the offensive? At 
 present, I sec none ; and hereafter, certainly none. The same 
 causes which changed the late operations from offensive after a 
 
 victory to defensive, would still exist. 
 
 •" But I come now to another topic, of serious consideration, 
 and that is the frequent —I ought to say, constant and shameful 
 misbehaviour of the Spanish troops before the enemy. We in 
 England never hear of their defeats and ilights. In the battle of 
 Talavera whole corps threw away their arms, and ran off in my 
 presence, when they were neither attacked nor threatened, but 
 frightened, I believe, by their own fire. 
 
 " I refer for evidence upon this subject to General Cuesta's 
 own orders, in which, after extolling the gallantry of his army in 
 general, he declares his intention to decimate the runaways; 
 which he did ! 
 
 w I can easily conceive the unuillinguess of officers in com- 
 mand to report their misbehaviour in presence of the enemy, 
 for no honour can be acquired ; and in this way I account for 
 the numerous histories we have of the bravery of the Spanish 
 troop 
 
 u I have found, from experience, the instances of misbe- 
 haviour to be so numerous, and those of good behaviour so few, 
 that I must conclude that they are troops by no means to be 
 depended upon. 
 
 M Upon every ground, therefore, it is my opinion, that I 
 ought to avoid entering into any further co-operation with the 
 Spanish armies. " (v. 78.) 
 
 In pursuance of the same subject he writes to Lord 
 I blereagh : — 
 
 H It Lb lamentable to sec how bad the Spanish infantry is. 
 It is impossible to calculate upon any operation with them. 
 It i- laid that sometimes they behave well, though I acknow- 
 ihat I have never seen them behave otherwise than ill. 
 The practice of running away, and throwing off arms, accoutre- 
 ments, and clothing, is fatal to everything, excepting a re- 
 assembling of the men in a state of nature, who as regularly 
 perform the same manoeuvre the next time an occasion off 
 
108 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 " Nothing can be worse than the officers ; and it is extra- 
 ordinary that when a nation has devoted itself to war, as this 
 nation has, by the measures it has adopted in the last two years, 
 so little progress has been made in any one branch of the mili- 
 tary profession by any individual. 
 
 " I really believe that much of this deficiency of numbers, 
 composition, discipline, and efficiency, is to be attributed to the 
 existing Government. They have attempted to govern the king- 
 dom in a state of revolution, by an adherence to old rules and 
 systems, with the aid of what is called enthusiasm, which is no 
 aid to accomplish anything, and is only an excuse for irregularity 
 in everything, and the want of discipline and subordination of 
 the armies." (v. 84.) 
 
 Sir Arthur was created Viscount Wellington, and 
 assumed his title on the 16th of September. 
 
 He had occasion to communicate with the officers in 
 command of the French army, respecting prisoners, and 
 wounded men. Latterly General Eguia had detained 
 a French officer, who had come to the Spanish lines 
 with an answer. Eguia had been apprised of the con- 
 tents of the letter, and in order to avoid all suspicion, 
 had been requested to open any which might be sealed. 
 But he still detained the officer. Lord Wellington 
 reports this : — 
 
 " The consequence of this unwarrantable act must be a ces- 
 sation of all intercourse between me and the French on the sub- 
 ject of our prisoners, and the consequent aggravation of their 
 captivity. I would write to you officially, only that I think it is 
 too bad to be made the subject of a dispatch, and that if it were 
 to be known in England it would create such an irritation 
 against Eguia and the Spaniards in^general that they would not 
 easily remove." (v. 182.) 
 
 " I acknowledge that the refusal to send back le Capitaine 
 Thevenon (the officer above alluded to) surprised me; as I 
 imagined that / had some claim to the favourable consideration 
 
FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 109 
 
 of the Spanish Government. But when I consider that this 
 officer came into the Spanish lines under my protection, to brine; 
 me b Utter, on a Bubject equally interesting to the Spanish 
 rnment, and as 1 have a right to claim him, I am still more 
 astonished. The pretences for detaining him are as idle as the 
 detention of him is improper, and ungracious to me personally. 
 In respect to the subject of the correspondence, no suspicion 
 could have been entertained, as I desired the Spanish Com- 
 mander- in-chief to open and read all letters. 
 
 " If this principle is to be adopted, it will be more difficult 
 than it is for a British army to give assistance to Spain. The 
 temper manifested may perhaps only be personal to me, though 
 I had hoped I had established some claim for consideration from 
 the Spanish Government." (v. 221.) 
 
 The Spaniards wore again defeated in the beginning 
 of December, in La Mancha and in Old Castille. 
 
 Mr. Frere (brother to the former minister) had been 
 appointed as Minister to the Spanish Government upon 
 Marquis Wellesley's departure, and Lord Wellington 
 write- to him : — 
 
 u I lament that a eausc which promised so well a few weeks 
 iould have been so completely lost by the ignorance, folly, 
 presumption, and mismanagement of those to whom it was in- 
 trusted. 
 
 u If they had preserved their two armies (or even one of 
 them), the cause was safe. But no! nothing will answer ex- 
 cepting to fight irreat battles in plains, in which their defeat is 
 certain. They will not credit the accounts I have repeatedly 
 given them of the superior number of the French : they will 
 seel them out, and find them in all parts superior to them- 
 .•• v. :VJ1. 
 
 IIi^ Spanish embarrassments were now in some 
 s e diminished, as be had left the country and given 
 up everything like military co-operation. 
 
 His Portuguese difficulties, however, increased. Ajs 
 
110 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 yet they had been mainly confined to the inefficiency or 
 want of energy of inferiors, now they began to show 
 themselves in the constitution of the Government itself. 
 
 Some arrangements had been made by the Prince 
 Regent in the Brazils connected with the formation of 
 the Regency at home, which Lord Wellington did not 
 approve of. He writes to Mr. Villiers ■ — 
 
 " I can account for the arrangement of the Regency as far 
 as I am concerned, only by the desire in the Government of 
 Brazil to weaken the British influence over the army in this 
 country, by a division of the authority placed over it. However, 
 the persons who formed this arrangement appear to me to be 
 entirely ignorant of the national character of Englishmen, and 
 particularly of those who were the objects of the arrangements, 
 in thinking that by such means they could obtain their views." 
 (v. 199.) 
 
 The Government thus formed, working through the 
 medium of the British Minister, urged measures respect- 
 ing pay, provisions, &c. for the Portuguese army. Lord 
 Wellington offered various suggestions to meet the diffi- 
 culties, but they were not acceded to; and at length 
 worn out, he writes to Mr. Villiers: — 
 
 " I have done with the Portuguese Government ! I have 
 performed my duty by suggesting measures for the relief of the 
 great distress under which they labour. My letters will relieve 
 me from any blame for the misfortunes which must be the con- 
 sequence of this mode of proceeding ; and from this time for- 
 ward I shall not write a line excepting in answer to questions 
 put to me, or to propositions which may be forwarded for my 
 consideration " (v. 243.) 
 
 Upon the same subject, writing to Admiral Berkeley, 
 he says : — 
 
 " I do not know what to make of the Portuguese Govern- 
 ment. I cannot bring my mind to doubt their good inten- 
 tions ; but you will scarcely believe, that although their army is 
 
FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. Ill 
 
 starving, and they have no money to buy provisions, they have 
 hesitated, and indeed refused, to adopt two propositions made 
 by me, which would have relieved all their difficulties, and 
 would have given them magazines. I have done with them." 
 v. 445.) 
 
 We now hcc:in to feel the influence that exerted itself 
 against him. For some reason flic Senhor de Souza, in 
 the Brazils, whose brother was the Portuguese Minister 
 in England, seems to have had a hostile feeling towards 
 him. The Patriarch (the Bishop of Oporto), and Dom 
 Miguel de Forjaz, though they disliked each other, pro- 
 bably from a jealousy of their respective weight in the 
 country, seemed to have believed that Lord Wellington 
 and the British Ministers at Lisbon had combined with 
 the De Souzas against them. 
 
 Lord Wellington writes to Mr. Stuart : — 
 
 u The Patriarch and De Forjaz have their faults, but I am 
 convinced that we cannot change either, excepting for the worse; 
 and I shall be obliged if you will assure them, not only that I 
 will not be any party to the promotion of any change in the 
 rnnient, but that I shall do everything in my power to sup- 
 port their authority and the continuance of the Government in 
 their hands, (vi. 21.) 
 
 " The principal strength of the Regency consists in the 
 
 .lity and legality of their appointment by the Prince 
 
 _ :.t j and I know of no person whose assistance as a col- 
 
 inld compensate for the loss of this advantage, by their 
 
 making any addition or alteration by their own assumed and 
 
 illegal authority." (vi. 60.) 
 
 u The Local Government do not feel themselves sufficiently 
 strong in the support of the Government in the Brazils. 
 
 "The K jr/i Minister will have acquainted you of the 
 existing party in Portugal, not favourable to the French, nor 
 hostile to the British influence over the Portuguese coun- 
 cils, but jealous of the authority of the local Government, 
 
112 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 and undermining its influence, and paralyzing its power, 
 by private intrigues through friends and relations in the 
 Brazils . 
 
 " This party can only be resisted by cordial support to the 
 local Government in Portugal, and till that is done our efforts 
 must fail." (vi. 318.) 
 
 Senhor de Souza was, however, appointed a Member 
 of the Council of Regency. The anti-British feeling was 
 apparent, and the measures proposed by them were such 
 that Lord Wellington wrote : — 
 
 " In order to put an end to these miserable intrigues, I beg 
 that you will inform the Government that I will not stay in this 
 country, and that I shall advise the King's Government to with- 
 draw the assistance which His Majesty affords them if they inter- 
 fere in any manner with the appointments of Marshal Beresford's 
 staff, for which he is responsible, or with the operations of the 
 army, or with any of the points which under the original ar- 
 rangement were referred exclusively to him. 
 
 " It appears that the Government have lately discovered that 
 we are all wrong; they are impatient for the defeat of the 
 enemy, and, like the Central Junta in Spain, call out for a battle. 
 If I had had the power I would have prevented the Spaniards, 
 and the cause would now have been safe ; but now, having the 
 power, I will not lose the only chance which remains of saving 
 the cause, by paying the smallest attention to the senseless sug- 
 gestions of the Portuguese Government. 
 
 " I am much hurt at this change of conduct of the Regency, 
 which I must attribute to the persons recently introduced into 
 the Government." (vi. 387.) 
 
 " I can only declare this, that if I find the Government hesi- 
 tating, and alarmed by the mob of Lisbon, I shall forthwith 
 embark the army, and the Portuguese nation will have the satis- 
 faction of losing itself by the pusillanimity of the Government. 
 
 " I attribute much to the conduct of the Government, and 
 particularly of the new members of it. If these foolish fellows 
 
FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 1 1 3 
 
 cannot be kept in order we must gel rid Off them ; and one mode 
 is, that I shall insist upon Souza's being sent away." (vi. 398.) 
 
 u At all times, and under all circumstances, I have possessed 
 the confidence of the Government, and their object has been to 
 forward mv views for the public service. And till the late 
 change, I never received any observation except of confidence in 
 the measures which I recommended. But the Principal Souza 
 is of that impatient, meddling, and mischievous disposition, that 
 we cannot go on as we have hitherto as long as he continues a 
 member of the Government. 
 
 His Majesty's Government will be the best judges of what 
 measures ought to be adopted. I have already desired Mr. 
 Stuart to give notice to the Regency, that if they continued to 
 interfere with the military operations I should recommend to 
 His Majesty to withdraw the army." (v. 410.) 
 
 The same system of interference went on, and he 
 writes to Mr. Stuart, — 
 
 " I beg you will inform the Regency, and above all Principal 
 Souza, that His Majesty has entrusted me with the command of 
 the army ; I will not suffer them or anybody else to interfere : 
 that I know best where to station my troops, and I shall not 
 alter ni} system upon any suggestion of theirs. 
 
 " I am responsible for what I do, and they are not. As for 
 Principal Souza, I beg you to tell him from me, that I have had 
 ' isfaction in transacting the business of this country since he 
 has been a member of the Government; and that no power on 
 earth shall induce me to remain in the Peninsula for one moment 
 after I shall have obtained His Majesty's leave to resign, if Prin- 
 cipal Sou/a Lb to remain cither a member of the Government or 
 to remain at Lisbon. Either he must quit the country or I 
 shall; and I will take care that the world shall be made 
 acquainted with my reasons." (vi. 400.) 
 
 The conduct which was pursued by the leading 
 
 members of the local Government from this time, 
 
 ber 1810, till he finally marched out of the 
 
 country, though most injurious to the army, partook 
 
 i 
 
114 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 so much of personal hostility to himself, that the notice 
 which justice to him requires us to take of it is more 
 appropriately classed, and has been stated, in that por- 
 tion of our remarks which refer to his personal Forgive- 
 ness of Injustice. 
 
 In writing home to Lieut. -colonel Gordon, the Com- 
 missary-in-chief, he points out the wretched and hopeless 
 condition of that department in Portugal: — 
 
 " These unfortunate Governments in the Peninsula had been 
 reduced to such a state of decrepitude, that I believe there was 
 no authority existing within Spain or Portugal before the French 
 invaded the countries. The invasion did not improve this state 
 of things, and no crime that I know of has been punished in 
 either, excepting that of being a French partizan. They have 
 imagined that the best foundation for power was a low, vulgar 
 popularity, shown by the shouts of the mob and the bows and 
 scrapes of people in office, who ought to have other modes of 
 spending their time ; and to obtain this bubble, the Government 
 has neglected to perform all essential duties." (viii. 5.) 
 
 A complaint had been forwarded to him of an officer 
 (not named) for violence in enforcing a billet at Lisbon. 
 He writes : — 
 
 " Having read the inflammatory report of the Judge of Police, 
 and of the Juiz dos Barrios, and of the Secretary of State, on 
 the complaint, I am not astonished that complaints on this sub- 
 ject should be frequent at Lisbon, where, if they did not receive 
 encouragement from these high authorities, there ought and would 
 be none. 
 
 " I have long seen the inutility of complaining to the Govern- 
 ment on the conduct of any of the public servants, or on any 
 subject whatever. I shall therefore not make any complaint of 
 the Judge of Police, who, instead of endeavouring to conciliate, 
 or, as was his duty, enforcing the necessary law of billets, has 
 done everything in his power to aggravate. 
 
 " The case is so flagrant, and the conduct of the magistrate 
 has been so improper, that if I could entertain any hopes that 
 
i'OKHtA WMn ANCI'v I 1 5 
 
 the truth would reach the Prince Regent of Portugal, 1 Would 
 address his R. Highness on the Subject. 
 
 "I only hope that the time is not tar distant when the British 
 
 army, tired of such conduct, will impart to the British nation 
 
 the disgust which it must occasion, as well as the desire to leave 
 
 to its fate a country in which, by the Government and the higher 
 
 ^. they have been so unworthily treated." (viii. 134.) 
 
 " It is my opinion, that a change in the Government in 
 
 Portugal is become absolutely necessary. The Prince Regent's 
 
 servants have, in fact, no mtiuenee over the proceedings of the 
 
 local Government, who have done everything to defeat their 
 
 ires. 
 
 "It is a matter of astonishment that such a spirit should 
 exi<t among people who absolutely depend for their existence 
 upon the continuance of II. R. Ilighness's protection of their 
 country ; but so it is ! The truth is, that they have been 
 ashamed of the influence and power which they had been in- 
 duced to give to British officers in their army. The contrast of 
 the conduct of the Spaniards is perpetually occurring to them : 
 
 Spaniards reproach them that they have no country, and that 
 there are no Portuguese; and the object of the local Govern- 
 ment appears to be, to diminish the reputation and the influence 
 itish officers as much as they can : and with this view they 
 oppose every measure proposed by us." (viii. 270.) 
 
 We have already notieed as a peculiar characteristic, 
 otoer and his vnlll/i guess \o forget nudi forgive ; and 
 a part of his correspondence at this period strongly 
 uplifies it. 
 
 After all the indignities to which he had been exposed 
 
 eiallv. and after nil the injuries inflicted on his army, 
 
 by neglect and wilfulness, it i- not every ni;m who would 
 
 u willing to hold out the hand of reconciliation 
 
 in the tone which he addresses to Mr, Stuart: — 
 
 u Ir ia obvious to me, from everything that bat pawed, thai 
 Prince will not dismast Principal Boosa; but the orders 
 
 which have been lately here, and the promise whirh the 
 
116 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 Prince makes to receive favourably the services of Dom M. de 
 Forjaz, render the dismission of the Principal an object of less 
 importance. 
 
 "I have therefore taken advantage of the receipt of the 
 Prince's letter to put an end to the uncomfortable state in which 
 I have so long stood in respect of the Government. 
 
 " We shall now start afresh, and must endeavour to carry the 
 business on as well as we can V (viii. 346.) 
 
 The above letter was written in October 1811. His 
 old enemy, Principal Souza, was still continued in power, 
 and probably (notwithstanding Lord Wellington's mag- 
 nanimity) was as troublesome as ever \ but we have no 
 further mention of him till the following February. 
 
 Some efforts had been made by the British Govern- 
 ment at home to induce the Prince Regent at the 
 Brazils to remove him. Lord Wellington says to 
 Mr. Stuart -.— 
 
 "I am positively certain that I desired Sydenham to tell 
 Lord Wellesley that it was, in my opinion, best to take no further 
 steps to endeavour to remove the Principal ; as it appeared from 
 the Prince's letter to me that his removal was so very repugnant 
 to his feelings, that the matters which had been in dispute were 
 at an end, and that I should endeavour to work on as well as 
 I could. 
 
 " I do not know what to say to the order for the removal of 
 the Principal. If it were to come direct to Portugal, I should 
 say it ought to be obeyed ; for the same reason that I said the 
 order for his appointment should be obeyed. But it appears that 
 it is sent to England, and entrusted to Lord Wellesley's discre- 
 tion, who, I think likely, will entrust it to ours. 
 
 " We should certainly do better without the Principal. The 
 truth is, the man is mad, and he cannot act with common sense 
 upon any occasion . But if he were removed, though we should 
 go on better, as we should get rid of the perpetual talkings about 
 affairs and doing nothing, things would still not go on as we 
 would wish. 
 
FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. ] 17 
 
 u However, upon the whole, I am rather inclined to remove 
 him ; but I shall not decide till I have considered the matter." 
 (viii. 561.) 
 
 The consent to Ins removal had, however, been given 
 from the Brazils, and had apparently been referred to the 
 British Government. They had Written to our Minister 
 at Lisbon, who in his turn had communicated with Lord 
 Wellington, who writes in reply : — 
 
 w It is not necessary to enter upon the natural defects of his 
 mind and character. My objections to him, and my recom- 
 mendation that he should be removed, were founded upon his 
 opposition to the measures which I proposed. 
 
 "The Prince Regent refused, however; and although the 
 determination was not communicated to me in very gracious 
 terms, I determined not to press it. I afterwards, in October 
 1811, received a letter from the Prince, which appeared to offer 
 a favourable opportunity of being reconciled to the local Govern- 
 ment ; and I offered and requested that everything might be buried 
 in oblivion. 
 
 '■ In the meantime, His Majesty's Government having inter- 
 fend with their influence, His Royal Highness has consented that 
 he should be removed; and the question is, whether wc should avail 
 ourselves of it. 
 
 " It is obvious that the consent of the Prince has been ex- 
 torted from him ; and though Principal Souza should be removed, 
 old retain the influence which he possesses. Nothing would 
 
 _ lined ; and he would be considered as a martyr to English 
 influence, and his popularity would increase. 
 
 •' I cannot but admit that it would be desirable that he 
 
 should be removed ; but upon the same principle that on the 
 
 ►n I would not urge the Prince to remove him, I do 
 
 commend that advantage should be now taken' of fl. R. II. 's 
 letter." fix. 91.) 
 
 A project had been offered for his consideration* as 
 to th<- possibility of organizing the Spanish army upon 
 the same principle as the Portuguese. He replies: — 
 
118 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 " I am quite convinced, that the majority of the Spanish 
 officers would prefer submitting to the French to allowing us 
 to have anything to say to their troops. In truth, they are by 
 no means convinced, or, at all events, will not allow, that our 
 officers know any more of their profession than they do them- 
 selves ; and we may depend upon it that we should always have 
 them acting against us, and that all their class would follow 
 their example. 
 
 " I think it probable (but I am not certain) that we should 
 get some of the lower orders to serve in regiments officered by 
 British officers ; but I am convinced that if the authorities set 
 their faces against the measure, we should get but few." 
 (viii. 237.) 
 
 Referring again to the proposition respecting the 
 amendment of the Spanish army, he says to Mr. 
 Wellesley \ — 
 
 " In regard to the employment of British officers, I entertain 
 the same opinion that I always have. They will be worse than 
 useless if they have not the support of the Commander-in-chief, 
 who must have the cordial support of the Government, or he 
 will have no authority. 
 
 " I retain likewise the same opinion regarding my having 
 the command of the Spanish armies. I consider troops that are 
 neither paid, fed, nor disciplined, to be dangerous only to their 
 friends, when assembled in large bodies. 
 
 " I never will voluntarily command troops who cannot and 
 will not obey ; and therefore I am not desirous of having any- 
 thing to say to the command of the Spanish troops. 
 
 " Upon this subject of the employment of British officers, and 
 of the command being given to me, I may be wrong; but I 
 entertain an opinion which I have not heard from others. It 
 is my opinion that the officers of the Spanish armies are the 
 principal exciters of the general sentiment which prevails against 
 the French. They all consider themselves deprived of their pro- 
 fession by the government of Buonaparte ; and therefore, if we 
 mean to encourage the resistance of the people, we ought not to 
 disgust the Spanish officers, and so far deprive them of their pro- 
 
FOREIGN ANMnANVls. 119 
 
 ! as to give to British officers the effectual control over the 
 army. 
 
 Although there are many difficulties in introducing our 
 officers into the Spanish service, and in giving; the Commander- 
 in-chief the command of the whole, many of the advantages 
 might be obtained. I think that I have already acquired such an 
 influence over the Spanish officers that they would do anything 
 I should desire, excepting, perhaps, to discipline their troops 
 and esrablish subordination amongst them. 
 
 •• Ir has always been my opinion, that much might be done 
 by the British (Government to increase the authority and influ- 
 ence of the Commander-in-chief in this country. But all pro- 
 portions for increase and extension of authority are received in 
 England with jealousy; and I have, therefore, never made any 
 direct proposition. I might have hoped, that the desire which I 
 have always expressed to be allowed to confine toy attention to 
 my own army might have satisfied the King's Government that 
 I want no extension of authority, and that I deprecate it, as 
 throwing upon me additional responsibility and trouble. 
 
 " But I have no hesitation in saying, that the only remedy 
 for the existing evils is to increase to the utmost the power aud 
 authority of the Commander-in-chief, and to leave to his discretion 
 the distribution of all the aids to the Peninsula." (ix. 112.) 
 
 Rather later, with reference to an appointment which 
 the Spanish Government had made, he expresses himself 
 
 rather warmly ■ — 
 
 " 1 am certain that the existing Spanish Government have 
 
 no intention of doing anything offensive to mr, but I should be 
 
 inclined to i doubts in consequence of this appointment. 
 
 Se&hor i< the person who was employed by the 
 
 al Junta to attend this army. He is not only the most 
 
 reatanes, but i- an impediment 
 
 ty and he peak a word of truth. 
 
 " After knowing the truth of all my complaints of those days', 
 
 and, as fa d me, reporting them to his employers, he 
 
 suddenly turned round, when the Junta lenl a >um of money, 
 
 ' that we wanted nothinir, and were amply mpplied. J 
 
120 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 He had the impudence to tell me so at Tmxillo ; and after I had 
 forced him to acknowledge that he told a falsehood, I turned him 
 out of the room, and desired that I might never see his face 
 again. I shall hold no communication with him ; and it will 
 remain for the Government to consider whether such a man 
 should be appointed in connection with this army." (ix. 360.) 
 
 ' e I do not expect much from the Spaniards, notwithstanding 
 all that we have done for them. They cry ' Viva, and are very 
 fond of us, and hate the French ; but they are, in general, the 
 most incapable of useful exertion of any nation that I have 
 known : the most vain, the most ignorant, particularly of mili- 
 tary affairs. The utmost we can hope for is, to teach them how 
 to avoid being beat." (ix. 366.) 
 
 " It is extraordinary that the revolution in Spain should not 
 have produced one man with any knowledge of the real situation 
 of the country. It really appears as if they were all drunk, and 
 thinking and talking of any other subject than Spain." (ix. 524.) 
 
 He had accepted the command of the Spanish army 
 in October, 1812, and had given his utmost attention 
 with a view to put it into a state of efficiency ; but in all 
 his letters he expressed his doubts as to what it might be 
 in his power to effect, in consequence of the national 
 character and the general incapacity of the Government. 
 
 Towards the end of December he writes to the Mi- 
 nister of War : — 
 
 " The Cortes have done me the honour to confer upon me 
 the command of their armies, and have thus manifested to the 
 world the confidence they repose in me. 
 
 " It is impossible to perform the duties as they ought, unless 
 I possess sufficient powers ; and I request that you will inform 
 the Government, that if they do not feel themselves authorised, 
 or have not confidence in me, to . trust me with those powers, I 
 beg leave to decline the command. 
 
 " I stated distinctly what the powers are which I require. 
 [He then recapitulates them, and adds :] I beg to have a decided 
 answer on all these points. Whatever may be the decision of 
 
reman annoyances. 121 
 
 the Government, my desire to serve the cause of Spain will 
 remain the same." (x. 1.) 
 
 In March following he writes home : — 
 
 " I have been doing everything in my power to get on the 
 Spanish army, and I must do the officers the justice to say that 
 they do everything in their power. I have much reason, how- 
 ever, to complain of the Government." (x. 16-1.) 
 
 u I wish you would sec whoever is really at the head of 
 affairs, and represent to him how desirous I am to carry on the 
 service in the most honourable, advantageous, and agreeable 
 manner ; but that the engagements with me must be strictly 
 carried into execution, if it is wished that I should retain the 
 command. It is only necessary to express a hint, or desire, that 
 1 should resign, or fail to perform their engagements entered 
 into with me, and I shall resign with much more pleasure than I 
 ever accepted." (x. 216.) 
 
 The campaign commenced in May. The Spanish 
 (lowrnment was entirely under the domination of the 
 papers at Cadiz, and the greatest difficulty was 
 found in respect to pay for their troops. Lord Welling- 
 ton wrote to some of their generals as to their difficulty 
 of moving. To one he says : — 
 
 " Whether you march now, or at a future period, I consider 
 it to be more important to have a small body well paid and ap- 
 pointed, than a larger one which there did not exist means of 
 paying and feeding. The former may render some service, the 
 latter cannot/' (x. 339.) 
 
 1 1< says afterwards to the Spanish Minister of War:— 
 
 • [• is impossible to maintain a Spanish army in the field, 
 by the resources of Spam itself. The campaign is 
 about to open, and I foretell what will happen. For a short 
 time the troops will be maintained, whilst the harvest is on the 
 ground. This will last but a short time, and the Spanish troops 
 must I id, or §eni to the rear, Resources for the army I 
 
 the com • ;Ford, which require only due care to be 
 
 realised." (x. 380. 
 
122 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 He complains, after the army had advanced, of the 
 neglect and misconduct of the Intendants and civil au- 
 thorities of the province of Andalusia ; whereby the 
 Spaniards, who were joined to the allied British and 
 Portuguese, were unfurnished with mules and means of 
 transport, and 
 
 11 though clothed, armed, and disciplined, were obliged to be 
 kept in the rear, so that the campaign would be fought without 
 a single Spanish corps, although it was supposed that 160,000 
 men were in arms." (x. 415.) 
 
 He received a most unfavourable reply to his remon- 
 strance, and very soon after they removed generals from 
 their commands, and appointed others, in breach of the 
 agreements with him. 
 
 He writes to Mr. Wellesley, begging him to call to- 
 gether any of 
 
 " the persons who had been concerned in nominating him 
 to the command, and to tell them that if he did not receive some 
 satisfaction for the insults offered by those arrangements, it would 
 be impossible for him to hold the command." (x. 491.) 
 
 In another letter to Mr. Wellesley he says: — 
 
 " Although I think the conduct towards General Castanos 
 and Giron is harsh and unjust, I do not complain of it as a 
 breach of engagement with me. Neither do I complain of their 
 refusal to promote the officers whom I recommend. It was 
 ungracious. But what I complain of is, that having made en- 
 gagements with me, without which I neither can nor will hold 
 the command, they have broken them, not in one, but in an 
 hundred instances ; and that they do it wantonly, because they 
 know my disinclination to relinquish the command, on account 
 of the bad effect it would have in Spain and throughout Europe. 
 Their conduct, therefore, is injurious and an indignity, and I 
 must have satisfaction W (x. 564.) 
 
FORI. U.N ANNo\ANCES. 103 
 
 ast he says to the Minister at AVar : — 
 " I shall be much concerned, for many reasons, if I should 
 be obliged to relinquish the command ; but if I should, I can 
 assure your Excellency that I will do it at the period and in the 
 mode which may be most convenient and agreeable to the Re- 
 gency/' (x. Oil*.) 
 
 He tells the Government at home: — 
 
 " The Spanish Government have behaved very ill in this, as 
 they have m every other transaction ; but in the existing state of 
 affairs, I do not think it wise to push them to extremities. The 
 - and the people of Cadiz are making an intrigue of it; and 
 1 have, therefore, thought it best to act on my own grounds, ac- 
 cording to my own judgment of what is most for the public 
 <t, and keeping myself clear of the intrigues and cabals of 
 others." 
 
 He had now quitted Portugal, not to return! A 
 I deal of correspondence had been maintained during 
 the whole of his stay at Frcnada, from the month of 
 .January, and after his advance into Spain, relating, as 
 usual, to finance, or to neglect on the part of the autho- 
 3. The last letter which we shall notice, dated 
 •July 20, 1^13, to Sir Charles Stuart, is upon the mis- 
 conduct of a Juiz da Fora, and concludes with the fol- 
 lowing sentence : — 
 
 " I must say that the British army have met with nothing 
 but ingratitude from the Government and authorities of Portu- 
 gal for their service ; and that everything that could be done, 
 done by the eivil authorities lately, to oppress the 
 dien on every Occasion in which it has, by anv 
 aceidrnt, been m their power. / hope, however, thai \n> have 
 seen the last of Portugal/" (\. .V>7. 
 
 AW find one more letter respecting Portugal, which 
 Dg to insert, bs expressing bis feelings, 
 
124 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 though no necessity, fortunately, arose for acting upon 
 it:— 
 
 " In regard to the appointment of General to command 
 
 the army when Marshal Beresford goes to England, I shall be 
 obliged to you to remind the Government, that they are ordered 
 by the Prince Regent to consult my opinion on matters of finance 
 and military affairs; and I recommend to them not to adopt 
 such a measure as to appoint a commanding officer to the army 
 without consulting with me. 
 
 " I was prejudiced in favour of General , and I believe 
 
 I was the cause of his being employed with the army in this 
 campaign. My opinion is very much altered. He possesses 
 no one military quality, and he has been repeatedly guilty of 
 that worst of all tricks, which invariably defeats its own ends, 
 viz. courting popularity with the common soldiers, by flattering 
 their vices, and by impunity for their misconduct. Such a man 
 will not do in this army." (ix. 263.) 
 
 Here we take leave of his Portuguese annoyances. 
 Those from the Spaniards continued in full force. Some 
 of the instances were, perhaps, prior in date to the letter 
 which we have just quoted, and which we have done for 
 the purpose of keeping the affairs distinct and clear of 
 each other. 
 
 The Spanish Government had been altered. Lord 
 W. had been appointed by the former Government with 
 certain powers, and under certain stipulations on their 
 parts, which, with the bad faith that distinguished them 
 throughout, the new Government broke through in many 
 instances ; and the Minister at War, in his correspond- 
 ence with the British Ambassador, endeavoured to show 
 that the " existing Regents could only agree to what was 
 directed by the Cortes, and could not confirm any agree- 
 ment made by their predecessors." 
 
 Lord Wellington proved, by original letters, that the 
 existing Government had, after full consideration, con- 
 
FOREIGN ANXOYANi 1^ 125 
 
 Gamed all the agreements of their predecessors ; and in 
 regard to any alteration of what was agreed with him, 
 he did not see how it could be done, " so as to enable 
 him to hold the command with advantage to the public 
 or honour to himself." He adds : — 
 
 "Matters cannot 2:0 on much longer as they are: either I 
 
 must posses^ the confidence and support of the Government and 
 the Minister at "War. whatever may be the nature of the agree- 
 ment with mo, or I must resign the command, notwithstanding 
 the consequences, of which I am as well aware as any man." 
 22.) 
 
 But even then he subdues his feelings and adds: — 
 
 u Tell the gentlemen, that if I am obliged to take this step 
 I will do it in the manner most agreeable to them ( ! ! ), and 
 least injurious to the public service." 
 
 Notwithstanding his private conviction of the worth- 
 •f tic" man, Ik still continues his official corre- 
 spondence with the minister : — 
 
 * I concur with your Excellency in thinking that the union 
 of the command of the armies of the allied nations in one hand, 
 is the only mode by which great successes can be acquired: but 
 I do not despair of being still able to acquire such as will be 
 satisfactory. 
 
 " I propose to continue to exercise the command as usual, 
 and I shall omit to announce to the army my resignation, till I 
 receive those further orders which your Excellency announces to 
 me." ixi. 164) 
 
 In hia letter to the Secretary of State at the end of 
 
 \ •< nib. r he says : — - 
 
 " Blatters are becoming so bad between us and the Spaniards, 
 that I think it necessary to draw your attention seriously. 
 
 "You will have seen the libels about San Sebastian, which 
 
 I know were written and published by an officer of the War 
 
 Department, and, I believ, under the direction of the Minister 
 
 * War, Don Juan O'Donoju. I believe these libels all to pro- 
 
126 FOREIGN ANNOYANCES. 
 
 ceed from the same source — the Government, their immediate 
 servants, and officers ; and although I have no reason to believe 
 that they have as yet made any impression on the nation at 
 large, they certainly have upon the principal officers of the 
 army. They must see that, if they are not written by the 
 Government, they are, at least, not discouraged : they know- 
 that we are odious to the Government, and they treat us ac- 
 cordingly. 
 
 " The Spanish troops plunder everything. Till lately there 
 was some semblance of inquiry, and a desire to punish : lately 
 these acts have been left entirely unnoticed, till I have inter- 
 fered with my authority as Commander-in-chief of the Spanish 
 army. 
 
 u I will now request you to consider what will be the con- 
 sequence if any reverse were to happen, or that you were to 
 think fit to withdraw your army." (xi. 325.) 
 
 He then proceeds to suggest the course to pursue, 
 and adds : — 
 
 " I recommend you to withdraw the troops if these demands 
 are not complied with. You may rely upon this, that if you 
 take a firm, decided line, and show your determination to go 
 through with it, you will have the Spanish nation with you, you 
 will bring the Government to their senses, and you will put an 
 end at once to all the petty cabals existing at this moment, 
 and you will not be under the necessity of bringing matters to 
 extremities. If you take any other than a decided line (which 
 in its consequences will involve them in ruin), you may depend 
 upon it you will gain nothing, and will only make matters 
 worse. 
 
 "I recommend this, whatever may be the decision respecting 
 my command of the [Spanish] army. They are, probably, the 
 more necessary if I should keep the command. The truth is, 
 that a crisis is approaching in our connexion with Spain ; and 
 if you do not bring the nation to their senses before they go too 
 far, you will inevitably lose all the advantages which you might 
 expect from the services rendered to them." 
 
 Here was the exemplification of a great man with a 
 
lORF.ir.X ANXoVANd'N. 127 
 
 great mmd. This counsel tafi not the result of the 
 working of a petulant temper, justly irritated by studied 
 insult. We have seen a few pages back how nobly he 
 
 garded all that was merely personal, and how con- 
 scious he was of the public injury which would arise 
 from yielding to any personal exasperation. But here 
 he shows how injurious too much subserviency would 
 
 and with the warmth of a bold, but not a passionate 
 mind, he lveommends bringing matters to a crisis as the 
 only remedy. 
 
 lb' afterwards had reason to believe that there was 
 an inclination in the Cortes to get rid of the existing 
 
 rmnent, principally on account of their treatment of 
 the British ; and says : — 
 
 •• Although I am quite certain that nothing can ever be 
 done with the Spaniards, excepting by coining to extremities 
 with them, I am very averse that there should be the appear- 
 ance of difference of opinion just at this moment here, if it can 
 be avoidr.l. 
 
 " I believe the effect in the Cortes has heen produced very 
 much bv the language I held about the San Sebastian libels." 
 xi. 338.) 
 
SECRECY AND CAUTION. 
 
 Secrecy, or the power of keeping to himself his opinions 
 and intentions, was undoubtedly a prominent feature of 
 the Duke's character. It seems to have been adopted 
 upon principle, from the very earliest period of his public 
 career. 
 
 A letter of his own in these Dispatches, written in 
 1804, exemplifies, in the shortest and most explicit 
 manner, the nature of his feelings on the subject. 
 
 In virtue of the authority vested in him during the 
 campaigns in the Deccan in 1804, previous to the break- 
 ing up that army, he had appointed Lieutenant-colonel 
 Wallace to the command of the subsidiary force, which 
 was to be stationed with the Peshwah at Poonah. 
 Colonel Wallace was an officer who had justly obtained 
 a military reputation by the zealous manner in which he 
 had executed the duties confided to him; but he had 
 not hitherto had any independent charge entrusted to 
 him, involving other considerations as well as the strict 
 duty of the soldier. 
 
 General Wellesley, after he had left Lieutenant-colonel 
 Wallace at his destined post, writes to him; and we 
 believe it will be difficult to find more sensible principles 
 explained in more simple terms : — 
 
 " I believe that in my public dispatch I have alluded to 
 every point to which I wish to draw your attention, excepting 
 
RBCI AND CAUTION. 129 
 
 one, which I will mention to yon, that is, the secrecy of your 
 proceedings. Ninety-nine cases out of a hundred might be 
 
 posted up at the market-eross, without injury to the public 
 interests ; but when the public business is the subject of general 
 conversation, ami is not kept secret, as a mutter of course, upon 
 every occasion, it is very difficult to keep it secret upon that 
 occasion where it is necessary. There is an awkwardness about 
 
 ret, which enables observant men invariably to find it 
 out. 
 
 " Secrecy is always best. Those who have been long trusted 
 with the conduct of public affairs, are in the habit of never 
 making public any business of any description which it is not 
 
 siry for the public to know. Secrecy becomes natural to 
 them, and as much a habit to them as it is to others to talk ; 
 and they have it in their power to keep things secret or not, as 
 they may think proper. I mention this, because, in fact, I 
 have been the means of throwing the public affairs into your 
 hands, and I am anxious that you should conduct them as you 
 ought. This is a matter which would never occur to you, but it 
 
 < atially necessary. 
 •• Remember, what I recommend is fai removed from mys- 
 in fact, I recommend silence upon ad occasions, to avoid 
 of mystery upon any" (xi. 562.) 
 
 It lias been professed in our introductory observa- 
 tions, that all the statements, and the deductions from 
 them, would be founded solely upon the contents of the 
 Dispatches, subjected as they had been before publi- 
 cation to atrict examination from the Duke himself. 
 
 The following am edote. it is true, is not contained in 
 any one of the Duke's letters; but it is published in 
 vol. i. ; and must have been seen by him, and, there- 
 ! 8 DIUcfa to be relied upon as if it had been 
 
 I by himsel£ The event recorded took place at an 
 earlier date than that of the letter which we have quoted 
 above; but precedence has been given to the latter, 
 ii states in the Duke's own words his own 
 
 K 
 
130 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 
 
 feelings and principles, upon which he invariably acted, 
 and which are illustrated in the anecdote itself. 
 
 It is not intended to insinuate that any British 
 officer would have been open to the bribery which an 
 Oriental might feel himself warranted in offering, and 
 which the latter would, probably, regard as too much a 
 matter of custom to consider in any way disgraceful. 
 We do not, therefore, put it forward as a proof of 
 General Wellesley's disinterestedness respecting money ; 
 but it is told in an amusing way, strongly exemplifying 
 his curt and abrupt style, and at least illustrates his 
 general adherence to the practice of secrecy : — 
 
 " At a conference in camp on December 24, 1803, Mohiput 
 Ram, the Vakeel, or Resident, from the Nizam, was very anxious 
 to ascertain from General Wellesley what districts were likely to 
 be assigned to his master. The General declined giving any 
 information, when Mohiput offered him seven lacs of rupees for 
 it (about 70,000/.). General Wellesley said, ' Can you keep a 
 secret V Mohiput, hoping that he had touched the right 
 chord, eagerly answered, { Yes/ ' And so can 1/ said the 
 General. 
 
 " Mohiput was supposed to have obtained the information 
 afterwards, as the messenger who carried the dispatches was 
 waylaid and murdered." (i. 522.) 
 
 Sir Arthur Wellesley (as he had then been made) 
 left India in March 1805, and reached England in Sep- 
 tember. 
 
 He was in no public situation from that time, in 
 which the particular characteristic we are now consi-. 
 dering was called for, until he was sent for the second 
 time to Portugal in 1809. 
 
 The French, under Soult, were in possession of 
 Oporto, and the whole of the kingdom north of the 
 
 
SBOBEOI AND CAUTION. 131 
 
 Pouro ; and Sir Arthur made immediate preparations to 
 attack him. 
 
 It appeared that much discontent prevailed in Soult's 
 army, and arrangements were made for one of the dis- 
 affected French officers to have an interview with Sir 
 Arthur. He might naturally feel a little suspicious of 
 such persons, and his natural caution (allied as it was to 
 neral principle of secrecy) shows itself upon the occa- 
 sion, as we see by the following letter to Colonel Tramt, 
 who commanded the Portuguese troops in that district, 
 and by whom the interview was to be managed : — 
 
 • W, shall have troops on the march to-morrow towards 
 Vizcu ; and as it is desirable that your friends (alluding to the 
 French officers) should not see more of our troops than is abso- 
 hitely necessary, and should know nothing of our operations, I 
 request you to bring or send them word to Murtede, three 
 _ i -s from hence, and let me know at what hour they will be 
 ." (,iv. 275.) 
 
 It is not our object to follow the military details, and 
 we find nothing to illustrate the characteristic we are 
 considering, till July, when he writes the following 
 letter, in answer to one in which Mr. Frere, then the 
 British Minister in Spain, had probably recommended 
 the gentleman alluded to to his favourable notice: — 
 
 u I have no reason to complain of Senhor . He 
 
 only appear- to me to be too anxious to obtain a knowledge of 
 our plans; but I do not know whether I ought to attribute llns 
 appearance of anxiety in him to my prejudices against him, or 
 lire to make In- own employment of more importance, 
 or to In- curiosity, or to hia wish to make himself useful. A 
 man in his situation, if he i- not honest, has it in his power to 
 do ns much mischief. II«' has certainly the mind and manner 
 of an intrigant, and comes from a part of Spain of which the 
 people are moat likely not to be inimical to the French. 
 
132 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 
 
 " Besides his anxiety to obtain a knowledge of our plans 
 from me, I have heard him making inquiries respecting the 
 strength of corps from others, with which he had certainly no 
 concern." (iv. 478.) 
 
 We do not suppose that he learned much from Sir 
 Arthur ! 
 
 When lie was compelled, by the want of all supplies 
 for his army, to fall back into Portugal, after Talavera, 
 the question of the defence of that country became 
 pressing. 
 
 Sir Arthur considers the subject in all its bearings, 
 in a very full exposition of his views to Lord Castlereagh 
 (August 25, 1809), and here we find the first intimation 
 respecting the celebrated Lines of Torres Vedras, though 
 in vague and indefinite terms : — 
 
 " The difficulty lies in the embarkation of the British army. 
 It is difficult, if not impossible, to bring the contest for the 
 capital to extremities, and afterwards to embark. You will see 
 by the map, that Lisbon is so high up the Tagus that no army 
 that we could collect would be able at the same time to secure 
 the navigation of the river, by the occupation of both banks, and 
 the possession of the capital. One of the objects must, I fear, 
 be given up. However, I have not entirely made up my mind. 
 I have a great deal of information, but I should wish to have 
 more before I decide." (v. 89.) 
 
 He went to Lisbon early in October, for the purpose 
 of a personal reconnaissance ; but his only announce- 
 ment of that move in his private letter to Lord Castle- 
 reagh is, — 
 
 " I am going to Lisbon on Sunday, all being quiet; and I 
 hope in a short time to be able to make a report on the defence 
 of Portugal, which I hope will be satisfactory to Government." 
 (v. 210.) 
 
 The first instructions for the engineers were drawn 
 
SECRECY AND CAUTION. 133 
 
 up during this visit, though they were subsequently 
 modified and improved. 
 
 He did not anticipate an early attack, but he looked 
 to every possible contingency, and his instructions en- 
 tered into the most minute details. But they were con- 
 fined solely to those who were to carry them into execu- 
 tion. It is impossible to say how far he may have 
 divulged his scheme to those about him, in the course of 
 conversation : but the principle of secrecy, which he had 
 so ably inculcated early in his career to his friend, 
 Colonel Wallace, in India (p. 128), probably influenced 
 him still ; and we find no indication of it, in any letter 
 or dispatch even to the Government, till much later. 
 
 Upon an occasion in January, IS 10, when he had 
 son to feel that his own personal inspection of the 
 works was necessary, he merely says in his letters to 
 Generals Sir L. Cole and R. Crawford (who were com- 
 manding on the frontier), that he was going " for a few 
 upon a reconnaissance towards Torres Yedras ;" 
 and, in fact, though no doubt the execution of such 
 works must have been, and was, known to thousands, 
 they were completed with so little eclat or display, that 
 the public in England, the greater number of our own 
 army, and certainly the whole of the French army, were 
 taken by surprise when we occupied them, after the 
 battle of Rusaco. 
 
 Hi- caution and forethought, and the avoiding of 
 every public or outward demonstration which might ex- 
 cite suspicion or alarm, or convey any intimation of what 
 Us views might be, Beemed to extend to every point. If 
 should be brought to extremities, the final em- 
 barkation of the army, notwithstanding every previous 
 precaution, must have been a hurried and hazardous 
 
134 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 
 
 operation, and if not well considered beforehand, must 
 have been attended with immense loss of baggage, &c, 
 even if the troops themselves were saved ; and the fol- 
 lowing letter to Sir George Berkeley, who commanded 
 the fleet in the Tagus, is in reference to that object : — 
 
 " With a view to the possible necessity of evacuating Por- 
 tugal, I have considered it desirable that the baggage of the 
 army (left in store at Lisbon) should be embarked in the trans- 
 ports; and it has occurred to me, that the moment at which 
 this measure can be adopted without being misunderstood by the 
 public, and without creating alarm, is that at which reinforce- 
 ments arrive from England." (v. 429.) 
 
 A formal public embarkation of stores and baggage, 
 when the enemy were still beyond the frontier, would 
 naturally have conveyed an impression that he antici- 
 pated danger, though remote ; but the passage of boats, 
 whether to or from the ships, at such a time as he points 
 out, would be no novelty — it would hardly be noticed ; 
 and the idea that the embarkation going on was a long- 
 sighted measure of precaution, would not strike the 
 mind of the Lisbon people, and be by them disseminated 
 far and wide. 
 
 " I have accordingly ordered that the baggage of the several 
 regiments may be embarked as soon as the reinforcements 
 shall arrive, in the ships in which the regiments would be 
 placed; and that the baggage of the regiments expected from 
 England should be left in one of the ships which have brought 
 each of them." 
 
 But with all this careful forethought as to the effect 
 which premature demonstration might produce upon the 
 public mind, we find on other occasions the exercise of 
 sound, good sense, which made him feel the inexpediency 
 of attempting concealment. Intentions might be con- 
 cealed; events could not. 
 
URCT AND CAUTION. 135 
 
 After his advance to the frontier in June, 1S10, he 
 writes from Celerico to Mr. Stuart : — 
 
 11 I do not think that any measure can be adopted to prevent 
 false reports, or to remedy the evils which result from them. 
 Fal>e reports respecting the operations of armies are always 
 circulated, particularly where British officers are concerned. 
 These reports are circulated even in this town, where there is no 
 reserve, and where every person who chooses sees the reports of 
 intelligence received. Then we are the most indefatigable writers 
 of letters and news that exist in the world, and the fashion of 
 the times gives encouragement to lies. I know no mode of 
 getting the better of the inconvenience, which is the consequence 
 of the circulation of these false reports, excepting to have no 
 > on the real and well-founded intelligence. I would not 
 recommend publication, as it might lead to inconveniences of 
 another description ; nor would I, as Col. Peacocke very inno- 
 cently but indiscreetly did last year, check, by any public order, 
 the circulation of every description of report." (vi. 193.) 
 
 In corroboration of the danger and inconvenience 
 resulting from the gossiping propensity which he felt 
 inherent in British correspondents upon foreign 
 service, he writes to Lord Liverpool: — 
 
 w I enclose a paper which purports to be a translation of a 
 letter from one French marshal to another, which had been 
 intercepted, conveying information of the strength of the Allies, 
 extracted from the English newspapers. It may be satisfactory 
 to have the reasons which this paper affords for believing that 
 . have no better means of acquiring intelligence. Very 
 recently all the newspapers contained accounts, not only of the 
 numbers, but of the positions occupied by this army." (vi. 232.) 
 
 An affair of outposts had taken place in Gen. R. 
 Crawford's division, quite in the advanced position 
 beyond the Coa, in which it was supposed that the 10th 
 Light Dragoons had got into some scrape. It was sug- 
 
 d to Lord Wellington to have an inquiry into their 
 
136 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 
 
 conduct ; which he refused, saying that he was perfectly 
 satisfied, and that the very fact of instituting the inquiry 
 would imply some misconduct ; and he ends his letter 
 to Gen. Crawfurd with his customary attack upon 
 
 gossip : — 
 
 " All this would not much signify if our staff, and other 
 officers, would mind their business, instead of writing news and 
 keeping coffee-houses." [He no doubt had somebody in view.] 
 " But as soon as an accident happens, every man who can write, 
 and who has a friend who can read, sits down to write his 
 account of what he does not know, and his comments on what 
 he does not understand ; and those are circulated by the idle 
 and malicious, of whom there are plenty in all armies ; and it 
 would be cruel to allow the reputation of this regiment to be 
 whispered away by ignorance, idleness, and slander." (vi. 276.) 
 
 In a letter to Sir Thomas Graham, then commanding 
 at Cadiz, he again adverts to the mischief and danger 
 arising from the private correspondence of officers : — 
 
 "1 was astonished to see in the English newspapers an 
 accurate account of the batteries and works erecting at Cadiz, 
 with the number of guns and what calibre, each was to contain, 
 and their distance from each other, and from the enemy. This 
 must have been extracted from the letter of an officer. If 
 officers wish to give their friends this description of information, 
 they should request them not to publish their letters in the 
 newspapers." (vi. 325.) 
 
 In a letter to Marshal Beresford, of September 8th, 
 1810, dated Gouveia, he says : — 
 
 " Upon considering the subject which you mentioned last 
 night, I do not think it so important as it appeared upon first 
 hearing. 
 
 " I beg you, however, not to mention the subject to anybody. 
 The croaking which already prevails in the army, and parti- 
 cularly about head-quarters, is disgraceful to us as a nation, and 
 does infinite mischief ; and it would become worse if this story 
 were known." (vi. 392.) 
 
SEC \IY( Y WD ( Al'TlOX. 137 
 
 We have do menus of knowing what is alluded to. 
 It may have been trifling, whether it related to public 
 affairs, or to any private person or transaction ; but it is 
 
 ntinued illustration of his horror of gossip. 
 
 In a letter to Lord Liverpool, again adverting to the 
 intelligence contained in the English newspapers, he 
 say- : — 
 
 " I did not mean to say that the information in the news- 
 papers was received from your Lordship's office, or from that of 
 the Commander-in-chief, for I know that neither have the in- 
 formation from me ; but I wished to point, out the disadvantages 
 under which we carried on our operations. Gen. Foy brought 
 from Paris, not only the paper containing the information, but 
 copies of all my dispatches, and Massena knew all that I intended 
 to do, and knew accurately every inch of my position, by how- 
 many guns defended, for what purpose, &c. It may be right to 
 give the British public this information, but they ought to know 
 the price they pay for it, and the advantage which it gives the 
 enemy. 
 
 '• Neither I, nor any other officer in command of a British 
 army, can prevent the correspondence of the officers. I have 
 done everything in my power by way of remonstrance, and have 
 been very handsomely abused for it. This intelligence must 
 certainly have gone from some officer of this army, by whom it 
 •nfidentially communicated to his friends in England ; and 
 I have heard that it was circulated from one of the offices with 
 a plan I" (vh. 357.) 
 
 With a reference to the unlimited publication of his 
 dispatcher in England, to which some of these remarks 
 may have pointed, and to which he has already said 
 there might be consequent disadvantages, we find a 
 letter : — 
 
 " I generally confine myself to a relation offactt, and Beldom 
 
 trivc any Opinion upon them, and always send the same to the 
 Portuguese Government ; marking in the Portuguese dispatch 
 
138 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 
 
 those facts which, in my opinion, ought not to be published, and 
 which it would be inconvenient for the enemy to know. 
 
 " I will, with your Lordship's permission, adopt the same 
 practice with my dispatches to you, and mark with a pencil in 
 the margin those parts which, in my opinion, ought not to be 
 published." 
 
 So suspicious was he of the schemes of the enemy to 
 procure information, that he regarded many things in 
 that light which might not have struck other persons. 
 He writes to General Campbell : — 
 
 "I received the enclosed from the French Governor of 
 Almeida. I beg you will tell him that we generally send off 
 immediately any prisoners ; but I beg him to let me know his 
 wish for any particular men, or belonging to any particular 
 corps, recently made prisoners. 
 
 " The truth is, that this gentleman wants to get a little news. 
 He has found out that our men know little, or are but little 
 communicative, and he wants to get some Frenchmen in exchange 
 for them, from whom he thinks he will find out what is going 
 on. It is as well to let him believe that we are good-natured 
 gulls, who will easily swallow." (vii. 297.) 
 
 The numbers of French prisoners at Lisbon became 
 very embarrassing, and a proposition was made by Ad- 
 miral Berkeley that disabled men should be sent back. 
 Lord Wellington gives the following reasons for not 
 concurring : — 
 
 " I am sorry to say that no confidence can be placed in the 
 parole of \ any French officer. I know many, who have been 
 allowed to quit England on parole not to serve till exchanged, 
 who are now serving in Spain. 
 
 "1 have invariably experienced the greatest inconvenience 
 from allowing any person to return to the enemy's army. It is 
 not believed in England that the generals commanding the 
 French armies have no communication, and are entirely ignorant 
 of all that is passing around them, excepting what they derive 
 
- illVY AND CAUTION. 139 
 
 from deserters, and from prisoners occasionally sent back in 
 exchange for some of our officers or soldiers. 
 
 " 1 attribute the success which we have had, in a great 
 degree, to the want of information by the French generals. 
 
 "' At this moment, though this whole army is within a few 
 miles of them, they do not know where they are ; but if disabled 
 prisoners are to be sent to them, they will get all the informa- 
 tion they require. The disabled, as well as other prisoners, 
 ought to be sent to England/''' (viii. 6.2.) 
 
 Animadverting upon the gross mismanagement of 
 
 their cause by the Spaniards in one of his letters to Mr. 
 Wellesley, he says : — 
 
 " Let any one Spanish transaction be examined, and the 
 
 folly of the principal people will be mauifest. I apprized 
 
 of my intention and plan for attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, 
 
 and him alone, the success of which depends principally upon 
 the length of time during which I can keep it concealed from 
 the enemy. Some Spanish women were apprized of the plan by 
 him, and it must reach the enemy ! Yet he is one of the best 
 of them." [viii. 159.) 
 
 In a letter to some person, who was probably 
 employed in collecting intelligence by means of com- 
 mnnieation with the French army, he says : — 
 
 " I beg you to take care how you communicate with the 
 
 Portuguese in the French army. Do not let any one of them 
 
 know where you are on any account, and be particularly cautious 
 
 that a second individual of them does not discover that you are 
 
 nee with one of them ; be assured that those who 
 
 ; their country arc not to be trusted." (viii. 103.) 
 
 The following letter i- a striking proof of his caution 
 and forethought as to the effect which even trifling cir- 
 cumstances might produce upon the enemy. We have 
 that he had a conviction of the very little rial 
 knowledge which the French generally possessed respect- 
 
 _ him : hut he w;h COnSCtOUS that, with all his care, 
 
140 SECRECY AND CAUTION. 
 
 some intelligence might reach them. The concealment 
 of his actual or intended movements, by remaining to the 
 last at the quarters where he was known to have been, 
 might have struck even a common mind ; but we believe 
 it is not every man who would have suggested the latter 
 part of the letter : — 
 
 " As I am about to undertake an important operation in 
 Estremadura, which will require some time to complete it, I am 
 anxious to take advantage, as much as possible, of the difficulties 
 which the enemy experience in obtaining intelligence to gain 
 time. With this view I have remained so long in this part of 
 the country after the body of the army had marched ; and I 
 have detained the 5th Division here, and am desirous that you 
 should remain in this part of the country for some time longer. 
 I beg you to circulate in the country that I am going to hunt on 
 the banks of the Huelva and Yeltes ; and you might even have 
 a house arranged for the hounds at Aldea de Yeltes \" (ix. 3.) 
 
DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT MONEY 
 AND RANK. 
 
 We know little of the Duke's private circumstances in 
 early life. It is not possible that he could have had 
 much fortune ; and though we have no reason to believe 
 that the habits of his youth were expensive, yet we may 
 fairly presume that one brought up at Eton, introduced 
 at an early age into the army, and made one of the 
 aides-de-camp to the Lord-lieutenant of Ireland, would 
 not have been without those temptations which beset 
 other young men of his standing and position ; and, 
 consequently, that if circumstances connected with the 
 honourable exercise of his profession should afterwards 
 throw favourable chances in his way, he would naturally, 
 and, indeed, properly, take advantage of them. 
 
 A high and advanced position in India was always 
 considered a lucrative one. Colonel Wellesley, though 
 not holding a t that time high military rank, was placed 
 in a prominent position, from which he could hardly 
 derii ) great advantage, in consequence of his junior 
 Standing. We have, indeed, his own statement, in a 
 r to the Governor-general, of the expenses attendant 
 upon the extra staff which he had been obliged to main- 
 tain, and the extended BCale of an establishment cou- 
 nt with hifl position, and the cost to which he had 
 
142 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 
 
 been subjected when he was Commander-in-chief in the 
 Deccan : — 
 
 " I take the liberty of drawing your Excellency's attention 
 to the inadequacy of the allowances which I received as a Major- 
 general of the Staff of the Army ; or to the increased expenses 
 which I was obliged to incur by the necessity of augmenting all 
 my establishments, and of forming them upon a scale more 
 consistent with the character with which I was invested by your 
 Excellency, than with the situation of a Major-general com- 
 manding a division of the army.'" (iii. 310.) 
 
 And yet, though he must have felt this pressure upon 
 his finances during the whole of that service, we find 
 that, only the preceding year (Sept. 28, 1803), when 
 referred to respecting a claim of prize-money for the 
 capture of Baroach, of which he, as the commander of 
 the army engage^, would have had a share, he had the 
 delicacy to decline giving an opinion. In reply to the 
 Secretary of Government at Bombay, he says : — 
 
 " As the commanding officer of the troops employed at the 
 siege of Baroach acted upon that occasion under my immediate 
 orders, I consider that / have a claim to a proportion of any 
 benefit that may accrue to those troops from the capture of that 
 place. As a party in the case, therefore, my opinion can have 
 little weight, and / beg to decline giving it." 
 
 The allowances which the Governor-general thought 
 fit to make him, of course form no part of General 
 Wellesley's own dispatches. We may reasonably suppose 
 that his representations were duly attended to ; but we 
 have no reason to believe that he was at any time placed 
 in a position which could have given him pecuniary 
 advantages. 
 
 His advance in rank was, of course, attended with 
 advance of pay ; but we apprehend that European service 
 is not of a nature to fill the pocket. When he entered 
 
MONEY ANP RANK. 143 
 
 upon the exalted situation of Commander-in-chief of the 
 largest British army upon record, we may very readily 
 and truly believe that his personal expenses would have 
 been fully, if not more than, equal to his appointments. 
 A man who has his own private resources to fall back 
 upon may find his professional income sufficient; and 
 probably General Wellesley contrived to make it so. 
 But it would have been no proof of a mercenary spirit if 
 he had taken such advantages as his professional position 
 might honourably lay open to him. 
 
 A considerable time elapsed before we again have an 
 opportunity of observing his feelings upon such subjects; 
 but the very first occasion offers to us again the same 
 proof of his personal disinterestedness. 
 
 Upon his second appointment to qommand in Por- 
 tugal his rapid movement upon Oporto, which was at 
 that time in possession of the French, enabled him to 
 take possession of it. 
 
 A question soon arose as to the rights of the captors, 
 
 and how far the property thus taken from the enemy 
 
 (for it must be acknowledged that they were, and had 
 
 for some time, in full and undisputed possession) 
 
 to be considered as prize. The navy, who, as being 
 employed at the mouth of the river, considered thein- 
 parties contributing to the success of the opera- 
 tiom pur in their claim ; and of course, if it were 
 granted, and the property condemned, Sir Arthur, as 
 OOmmander-in-chief, would be largely entitled to share. 
 
 The question W9B submitted to him, and the fol- 
 lowing is hi- answer to the British minister at Lisbon. 
 
 The mosf valuable part of the property was wine, 
 belonging to the English merchants -and some cotton, 
 which the French had bought and collected here in 
 
144 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 
 
 charge of the French consul). The Admiral, on the 
 notion that all the property at Oporto was to be dealt 
 with by the rules of prize, thought us entitled to salvage 
 upon the British portion. Sir Arthur says : — 
 
 " My opinion is, that if we are entitled to it at all, we are 
 entitled to the whole of the property ; but the doubt I have is, 
 whether we have a right to any part. 
 
 " Oporto being a Portuguese port, and the British army 
 acting in this country as allies, everything taken in Portugal 
 belongs to the Government of Portugal. 
 
 " However glad I shall be that the success of the army 
 should turn out to their benefit, and however convenient it might 
 be to me to share in this benefit myself, I am very unwilling to 
 forward such a claim, if it is to put our friends out of temper." 
 (iv. 331.) 
 
 Some months afterwards he again writes : — 
 
 " I considered well the whole question of the claim of the 
 army to the property at Oporto, and the result was a conviction 
 on my mind that we have no claim whatever. This is my 
 opinion, but I may be wrong; and I should be sorry if the 
 army were to lose any advantage to which they are entitled by 
 any error of judgment of mine." (v. 136.) 
 
 Whether his judgment were right or wrong, we 
 cannot conceal from ourselves that he had a very consi- 
 derable pecuniary interest involved in the ultimate 
 decision ; and though from his multitudinous duties, and 
 no special legal learning upon such points, he might not 
 have been induced to moot the point, yet if the navy or 
 others were inclined to establish the claim, it cannot be 
 denied that he showed much personal disinterestedness 
 in the view which he took. 
 
 In the summer of 1809, the Spanish Government 
 appointed him to the rank of Captain -general of the 
 Spanish army. He replies : — 
 
MONEY AM) RANK. I 15 
 
 " I have to express my acknowledgments to the Government 
 for the honour they have done me; and I have to return them 
 thanks tor the horses which they have been pleased to present to 
 me in the name of His Majesty Ferdinand VII. 
 
 " In respect to the pay attached to the rank of Captain- 
 general, I hope the Government will excuse me if I decline to 
 become a burthen upon the finances of Spain during this contest 
 for her independence/' (v. 3.) 
 
 In the commencement of the following year a propo- 
 sition was made to him of giving him a regiment of two 
 battalions, which, of course, in a pecuniary point of view, 
 would have been more advantageous. This is the way 
 in which he took the offer, in his letter to Colonel 
 Torre ns : — 
 
 " I should esteem it a favour if you will tell Sir David 
 Dundas that I am very much obliged to him, but that I have no 
 wish to be removed from the 33d Regiment, of which I was 
 major, licut. -colonel, and then colonel. 
 
 u I must say that my friend the late Secretary-at-War made 
 it the lea>t profitable of all the regiments of the army, and I 
 believe a losing concern, having reduced the establishment at 
 once from 1200 to 800, when it consisted of about 750 men; 
 and I had to pay the freight of the clothing to the East Indies, 
 and its carriage to Hyderabad, about 500 miles from Madras. 
 
 "With all this. I have the reputation of having a good thing 
 in a regiment in the East Indies." (v. 155.) 
 
 At a much later period he again says to Colonel 
 
 Tonvns ; — 
 
 " I am obliged to the Duke of York, as much as if his recom- 
 mendation of me had been successful. 
 
 " Eii B ; d Highness the Prince Regent most have misun- 
 od Lord Wellesley when lie supposed that he intended to 
 convey to him that a military government was no object to me, 
 and that I had other views. Lord Wellesley must have said, 
 that I had never spoken or written to him, or to anybody else, 
 respecting such an object ; but he could not have -aid that I had 
 
 I. 
 
146 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 
 
 other views. Indeed I do not know what views I could have, 
 excepting to serve the country to the best of my ability. 
 
 " I have never stated to anybody a wish to have a military 
 government, because I make it a rule never to apply to anybody } 
 in any manner, for anything for myself; and I have always been 
 convinced that, if it was expedient and proper that I should 
 receive such a favour, the Duke of York would recommend me, 
 without any application from myself or my friends. 
 
 " I should have been very happy to receive, at the recom- 
 mendation of H. R. H. the Commander-in-chief, the mark of 
 favour of the Prince Regent which was proposed for me. 
 
 " I have not much time to attend to my own affairs, and I 
 do not exactly know how I stand with the world at present. The 
 pay of Commander of the Forces, which is all that I receive in 
 this country, does not defray my expenses here, while my family 
 must be maintained in England ; and I think it probable that I 
 shall not be richer for having served in the Peninsula. A military 
 government, therefore, would be desirable, as an addition to my 
 income." (ix. 2.) 
 
 Some months afterwards, from Madrid, he writes : — 
 
 " I have been going on for more than three years upon the 
 usual allowance of a Commander-in-chief, that is, ten pounds a- 
 day, liable to various deductions, reducing it to about eight 
 guineas ; but it will be necessary that Government should now 
 either give me an additional pay under the head of table-money, 
 or any other they please, or that they should allow me to charge 
 some of the expenses, such as charities, &c, which I am obliged 
 to incur in the existing state of this country, or I shall be 
 ruined. 
 
 " It is not proper, probably, to advert to other services, but 
 I believe there is no service in which the Commander-in-chief, 
 with such a charge as I have, is so badly paid as in the British 
 service. Indeed, as far as I can learn, there is no instance of 
 an officer holding a permanent command in the British service 
 whose receipts have been confined to 10/. a-day with deductions. 
 They all receive either the allowance of a government with thai 
 of a commander-in-chief, or an allowance of some other descrip- 
 tion; but I doubt that the trouble, or responsibility, or the 
 
MONEY AND RANK. 147 
 
 expenses of any, at all equal mine. However, I should not have 
 mentioned the subject, knowing that the public expect to be 
 served at the lowest possible rate, if I did not find that I was in 
 a situation in which I must incur expenses which I cannot defray 
 without injury to myself." (ix. 373.) 
 
 The Government at home appear to have made 
 arrangements upon the subject before they could have 
 received the above letter, which was dated August 24 ; 
 for on the 7th of September he writes : — 
 
 " I am very much obliged to your Lordship for having 
 adverted to my expenses in this country, and for having provided 
 for them so handsomely. You will have received a letter from 
 me on the subject since you dispatched yours : I should never 
 written it if I had not incurred an enormous expense at 
 Madrid which I could not bear. 
 
 " You communicate to me that it is the intention to propose 
 to Parliament to grant me the sum of 100,000/. to enable me to 
 support suitably the honours which H. R. Highness has recently 
 been pleased to confer upon me. 
 
 M I request your Lordship to take an early opportunity of 
 
 expressing my gratitude for all his favours: they are far beyond 
 
 my hopes, and I can show my gratitude only by continuing to 
 
 II. R. H. with the same zeal and devotion which have 
 
 already acquired them for me." (ix. 398.) 
 
 The Prince Regent at the same time granted certain 
 heraldic distinctions, " as a lasting memorial of the 
 glorious and transcendent achievements of the said 
 Arthur Marquis of Wellington on various occasions." 
 
 u I shall receive with gratitude any honour which II. K. II. 
 may think proper to confer npon me ; but the addition proposed 
 to my srma ia the last which would have occurred to me. It 
 carries with it an appearance of ostentation , of which I hope I -,\]\) 
 
 ! -llty; and it will scarcely be credited that I did not apply 
 for it." "ix. 406.) 
 
 We sec the mod* -Ty and simplicity of mind with 
 
148 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 
 
 which he received favours. He, no doubt, had an 
 internal consciousness that he deserved them ; and how- 
 ever insignificant such things are to the real advantage 
 of man, they have acted as a stimulus to the human 
 mind in all ages. But his mode of receiving them made 
 every one of his countrymen additionally proud of the 
 gift and of the recipient. 
 
 We do not know who is referred to in the conclusion 
 of the same letter ; but his conduct does not show to 
 advantage when contrasted with that of his illustrious 
 leader : — 
 
 " I am quite surprised at the conduct of the . I 
 
 always thought the Order of the Bath that mark of the King's 
 favour which it was most desirable for an officer to receive ; and 
 I mentioned it to you, as I thought it likely it would be agree- 
 able to him. It might be very proper to create him a peer, but 
 I would not propose such an arrangement. Even if it had been 
 proper that I should do so for any officer, I should have consi- 
 dered it my duty to make you acquainted with what I know are 
 * * *'s feelings on this subject. He was much disappointed 
 and hurt that this mark of the King's favour was not conferred 
 upon him when the restrictions (imposed by the Kegency Bill) 
 ceased ; and I really believe that his regard for me alone pre- 
 vented him from resigning his situation. If had 
 
 been made a peer, I really believe that he would, notwithstanding 
 that he is junior to . 
 
 " But your Lordship is aware that we none of us act discreetly 
 in cases where our own passions are concerned." 
 
 We think he might have made one exception ! 
 
 " When the Prince Regent promoted me in the peerage and 
 made an addition to my pension, I determined, for the sake of 
 my sons, to lay out all the money I had in the purchase of land 
 in Great Britain. I likewise intend to lay out in the same 
 manner the sum of money which H. R. H. has declared his 
 intention to recommend to Parliament to grant me. 
 
money and rank. 141) 
 
 " It occurs to me, that as I propose to lay out all the money 
 which the public grant me in the purchase of land, it would save 
 mc some trouble, and might probably be more advantageous to 
 the public, if the value were granted in land. However, 1 
 suggest this, to be attended to only in case there should be no 
 objections." (ix, 427.) 
 
 He was made a Knight of the Garter in March 1813, 
 and in the usual course would have to relinquish the 
 Onler of the Bath, of which he was a member. He 
 writes to Lord Liverpool : — 
 
 " Some of my brother officers have expressed an anxious 
 that I should continue a Knight of the Bath, into which 
 I have admitted most of them ; and all of them owe this honour 
 to actions performed under my command. Under these circum- 
 stances, and adverting to the reasons which induced you to wish 
 that I should resign the Order, I would wish you to consider 
 whether it would not be better that I should keep it. I feel 
 great reluctance in suggesting this, and should not have done 
 so if it had not been suggested to me by some of the knights. 
 God knows I have plenty of Orders, and I consider myself to 
 have been most handsomely treated by the Prince Regent and 
 bis Government, and shall not consider myself the less so if you 
 should not think proper that I should retain the Order of the 
 Bath." (x. 376.) 
 
 fter the battle of Vittoria he was made a Ficld- 
 ial in the British service, accompanied by an auto- 
 graph letter from the Prince Regent, containing these 
 word- : — •You have sent me, among the trophies of your 
 unrivalled fame, the staff of a French marshal ; and I 
 send you in return thai of England.' 5 
 
 Lord Wellington returned a respectful answer, con- 
 cluding : — 
 
 "I can evini gratitude for Y. R. Highness repeated 
 
 favours only by devoting my life to your service." (x. 532.) 
 
150 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 
 
 Some officer applied to him to procure some mark 
 of royal favour or distinction, adverting, as we may 
 judge from the answer, to the favours which had been 
 conferred upon himself. His answer is very charac- 
 teristic : — 
 
 " What I would recommend you is, to express neither wishes 
 nor disappointment upon the subject, even to an intimate friend, 
 much less to the Government. Continue, as you have done, 
 to deserve the honourable distinction to which you aspire, and 
 you may be certain, that if the Government is wise you will 
 obtain it. 
 
 " The comparison between myself, who have been the most 
 favoured of His Majesty's subjects, and you, will not be deemed 
 quite correct ; and I advert to my own situation, only to tell you 
 that I recommend to you the conduct which I have always 
 followed. 
 
 " Notwithstanding the numerous favours that I have received 
 from the Crown, I have never solicited one ; and I have never 
 hinted, nor would any one of my friends or relatives venture to 
 hint for me, a desire to receive even one. And much as I have 
 been favoured, the consciousness that it has been spontaneously 
 by the King and Regent gives me more pleasure than anything 
 else. 
 
 " I recommend to you the same conduct and patience, 
 and above all, resignation, if after all you should not succeed." 
 (xi. 98.) 
 
 At the battle of Vittoria all the baggage of King 
 Joseph fell into his hands. It was all legitimate prize, 
 and he was under no necessity of giving up any part of 
 it. That, however, was not his mode of acting * and 
 some months after he wrote to his brother : — 
 
 " I sent them all to England, and have found that there are 
 among them much finer pictures than I conceived there were. 
 And as, if the King's palaces have been robbed of pictures, it is 
 not improbable that some of his may be among them, and I am 
 desirous of restoring them to His Majesty, I shall be much obliged 
 
MONEY AND RANK. 151 
 
 if you will mention the subject to Don J. Luyando, and tell him 
 that I request that a person may be tixed upon to go to London 
 them, and to fix upon those belonging to His Majesty." 
 (\i. 586.) 
 
 After the battle of Toulouse, and the termination of 
 hostilities, he was appointed to the post of British Am- 
 bassador at Paris. No man could be more qualified for 
 the office, though he had never hitherto held a diplomatic 
 situation. 1 1 is acceptance was, however, expressed pre- 
 cis^ lv in the same terms, and guided by the same prin- 
 ciple, as upon any other public appointment in his own 
 profession : — 
 
 "lam much flattered by your thinking of me for a situation 
 for which I should never have thought myself qualified. I hope, 
 however, that the Prince Regent and his Government are con- 
 vinced that I am ready to serve him in any situation in which it 
 may be thought that I can be of any service. Although I have 
 been so long absent from England, I should have remained as 
 much longer if it had been necessary j and I feel no objection 
 to another absence on the public service, if it be necessary or 
 desirable/ 1 (xi. 668.) 
 
 Po these instances of his total want of all affectation, 
 all wish or attempt to push himself forward, or to apply 
 for favour or benefit, we must add his candour. 
 
 During the long and arduous career through which 
 we have been following him, it is true that there were 
 not many failures. There were many instances, no 
 doubt, in which the results that lie might have anticipated 
 do1 realised ; there were others, perhaps, in which 
 vii Bounder judgment would have induced him to 
 decline taking a part, if it had not be enforconsiderations 
 of public policy; and therefore, if failure did take place, 
 he bad not himself to blame. 
 
 Hut tli. re i- i in very striking instance of his honest 
 
152 DISINTERESTEDNESS ABOUT 
 
 candour, in a letter to Lord Liverpool in November 
 
 1812:— 
 
 " It is not easy to form a judgment in Spain of the strength 
 of the enemy's armies. I have seldom found myself mistaken in 
 my estimate of their numbers, when I relied upon the returns. 
 The only occasion on which I have been seriously mistaken was 
 at Burgos, when I relied upon the reports of the country. 
 
 " From what I see in the newspapers, I am afraid that the 
 public will be disappointed at the result of the last campaign, 
 notwithstanding that it is, in fact, the most successful in all its 
 circumstances, and has produced more important results than 
 any in which a British army has been engaged for the last 
 century. We should have retained still greater advantages if I 
 could have taken Burgos, as I ought, early in October. 
 
 " The fault of which I was guilty was, not that I undertook 
 the expedition with inadequate means, but that I took there the 
 most inexperienced, instead of the best troops. I left at Madrid 
 the 3d, 4th, and Light Divisions, who had been with myself 
 always before ; and I brought with me, that were good, the 1st 
 Division, and they were inexperienced. In fact, the troops ought 
 to have carried the exterior line by escalade on the first trial. 
 
 " I see that a disposition already exists to blame the Govern- 
 ment for the failure of the siege. The Government had nothing 
 to say to the siege : it was entirely my own act ! }) (ix. 563.) 
 
 A court-martial was to be held upon Sir John 
 Murray, for his conduct when he relinquished the siege 
 of Tarragona in July 1813; and the only reason for 
 adverting to it here (as it was subsequently given up) is 
 to adduce a further proof of the Duke's candour. 
 
 He was compelled to prefer the charges, in his official 
 capacity as Commander-in-chief (although Sir John 
 Murray was acting in command of an entirely detached 
 corps), and partly because an angry feeling existed on 
 the part of the Admiral who was acting in co-operation 
 with Sir John. 
 
MONEY AND KANK. 153 
 
 The change of circumstances arising from the removal 
 of the British allied army into France, and the subsequent 
 peace, had rendered it impossible to hold the court till 
 after a very considerable lapse of time, and different 
 places had been fixed for the purpose. 
 
 Mr. Larpent, the Judge- Advocate-General, was of 
 course to have been employed; and at the close of his 
 ''Private Journal' 1 a letter is inserted from the Duke of 
 Wellington, who was then Ambassador at Paris, in 
 January 1815, from which we quote an extract in proof 
 of our opinion : — 
 
 "Sir John Murray contends, that one paragraph of my in- 
 structions directed him not to risk an action. I think he has 
 mistaken my meaning." And he gives his reasons for thinking 
 so. 
 
 "The Court has, of course, a right to judge of my meaning 
 by the words in which it is conveyed (in whatever manner I may 
 nmr explain it), as the obvious meaning of those words was to be 
 
 guide of Sir John's conduct. I must add, also, that what- 
 ever care I may have taken, it is not improbable that, in drawing 
 an instruction for the operations of so many corps, all with sepa- 
 rate commanders-in-chief, I may not, in every instance, have 
 made use of the language which should convey the meaning I 
 had in my mind." 
 
 Here, again, is the kindly feeling towards the officer 
 who would Buffer, combined with the candid acknowledg- 
 ment that he might himself have given ground for the 
 conduct impugned by some deficiency in his own 
 instructions. 
 
SUBORDINATION. 
 
 Placed very early in life in a position of great power, 
 and compelled to exercise authority, it is not extraor- 
 dinary that he should have attached much importance to 
 the necessity of subordination amongst those who were 
 serving under him. We do not here allude so much to 
 the mere military technical discipline of the soldier, as to 
 the moral, honourable, gentlemanly feeling of the officer. 
 
 Those who have had to struggle on till later in life, 
 without attaining to stations of responsibility, are gene- 
 rally found to be more inclined to evade than to support 
 principles of implicit obedience. But a man who is 
 placed in command soon feels the necessity of enforcing 
 due submission. It is true that there are different 
 ways in which this is effected. Strict discipline, rigid 
 severity, and the arm of power, no doubt will do it ; but 
 we believe, and the instances before us in these Dis- 
 patches prove, that mild, dispassionate, and manly 
 reasoning, appealing to the sense, the honour, and good 
 principles of the person addressed, will frequently do it 
 better. 
 
 We have only one instance to adduce during Colonel 
 Wellesley's command in India, but it is strictly in point. 
 
 Colonel Murray, who had a command in the Presi- 
 dency of Bombay, had had a difference of opinion with 
 
SUBORDINATION. 155 
 
 the higher authorities; and General Wellesley had re- 
 ceived some reference upon a part of the question. He 
 
 writes to Colonel Murray : — 
 
 '* I have read with the utmost concern the letter to General 
 Xicholls. It was hastily drawn and dispatched, to say no more : 
 and I strongly recommend you to desire to withdraw it. It 
 contains some strong censures upon Mr. Duncan (the Governor 
 of Bombay) personally, and upon his government. An officer in 
 the service of a Government, let his rank be what it may, has no 
 right to, and cannot with propriety, address such sentiments to 
 that Government, even supposing that they were merited by a 
 long course oi injurious treatment by such Government. 
 
 " Remember I tell you, that no person can approve of your 
 having written that letter, and I again most anxiously recom- 
 mend you to withdraw it." (i. 541.) 
 
 Soon after he writes again, and after some reference 
 to the grounds of the misunderstanding he adds : — 
 
 " For my part I shall shortly resign my charge in this part 
 of India, and, excepting as far as good wishes go, 1 shall be indif- 
 ferent to what passes. But I shall be sorry to hear that you 
 misapply your talent by entering into these disputes, and that 
 you have thereby tired the Government, and put it under a ncces- 
 rity not t<» employ you." (ii. 66.) 
 
 This appeal seems to have produced its effect, for 
 \<tv shortly after he writes to the Secretary of the 
 •_ neral : — 
 
 " I have received a letter from Colonel Murray, in which he 
 acknowledges hit error in writing to the Governor of Bombay; 
 ding to my advice he has made an apology, and has desired 
 leave to withdraw his letter." (ii. 89.) 
 
 Hi- nturn to Europe reduced him for a time to a 
 subordinate -ration ; and we believe that no page of his- 
 tory will produce a more modest, touching, and honour- 
 
156 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 able example of what an officer and a gentleman should 
 feel than Sir Arthur's on that occasion. 
 
 An expedition was fitted out to proceed to Hanover 
 in 1805, and he was appointed to command a brigade in 
 it. It was afterwards abandoned, and the brigade was 
 stationed at Hastings. 
 
 The compiler of his Dispatches tells us, that an inti- 
 mate friend having inquired in familiar terms of Sir 
 Arthur how he, having commanded armies of 40,000 
 men in the field, having received the thanks of Parlia- 
 ment, and having been made a Knight of the Bath, could 
 submit to be reduced to the command of a brigade of 
 infantry? he answered: "For this plain reason, — I con- 
 ceive it to be my duty to serve with unhesitating zeal and 
 cheerfulness when and wherever the King or his Govern- 
 ment may think proper to employ me!' (ii. 616.) 
 
 His conduct afterwards, when the arrival of his seniors 
 deprived him of his first command in Portugal, is exactly 
 founded upon the same principles. He became by his 
 supercession a junior and subordinate officer. He might 
 not, and he did not, agree with, or approve the course 
 adopted by his superiors, but he obeyed! He felt that 
 from that time his services would be comparatively use- 
 less, and he requested to be allowed to retire ; but as 
 long as he remained, no young junior ensign was ever 
 more obedient to his commander. 
 
 His own conduct thus furnished a test of the sin- 
 cerity of his principles ; and a man who had so done was 
 fully justified afterwards in exacting similar obedience 
 from those who were placed under him. 
 
 When he was on the passage, on the first expedition 
 to the coast of Portugal, he wrote home to the Secretary 
 of State : — 
 
SUBORDINATION. 1 T)7 
 
 " Burgherst and Pole have apprised mc of the arrangements 
 for the future command of their army. 
 
 u All that I ean say is, that whether I am to command the 
 army or not, or am to quit it, I shall do my best to ensure its 
 success ; and you may depend upon it, that I shall not hurry 
 the operations, or commence them one moment sooner than they 
 ought to be commenced, in order that / may acquire the credit 
 of success. 
 
 " The Government will determine for me in what way they 
 will employ me hereafter, whether here or elsewhere." (iv. 43.) 
 
 A month after he writes : — 
 
 " I assure you matters arc not prospering here ; and I feel 
 an earnest wish to quit the army. I have been too successful 
 with it ever to serve with it in a subordinate situation with satis- 
 faction to the person who shall command it, and of course not 
 to myself. However, I shall do whatever the Government may 
 wi$k. n (iv. 118.) 
 
 A m ek later he writes again: — 
 
 " It is impossible for me to continue any longer with this 
 army ; and I wish that you would allow me to return home and 
 resume my office [Chief Secretary for Ireland], if I shall still be 
 in office, and it is convenient to the Government that I should 
 retain it ; or if not, that I should remain on the staff in Eng- 
 land ; or, if that should not be practicable, that I should remain 
 without employment. You will hear from others of the causes 
 which I must have for being dissatisfied, not only with the mili- 
 tary and other public measures of the Commander-in-chief, but 
 with his treatment of myself. I am convinced it is better for 
 him, for the army, and for me, that I should go away, and the 
 sooner I go the better." 
 
 II. accordingly returned to England, and the inquiry 
 into the Convention of Cintra took place. 
 
 JI. was asked why, if lie dissented from the pro- 
 priety of the convention, he had affixed his signature to 
 i r ? Hi- answer was quite characteristic, and in accord- 
 ance with the principles lie had always professed i — 
 
158 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 " I thought it my duty to comply with the desire of the 
 Commander-in-chief, from the wish that I always have felt , and 
 according to which I always have acted, to carry into effect the 
 orders and objects of those placed in command over me, however 
 I might differ in opinion with them." (iv. 153.) 
 
 For some months after he was re-appointed to the 
 command in Portugal, in April, we find no letters or 
 observations upon the point now under our considera- 
 tion. The first is in a letter to General Sherbrooke, in 
 July:— 
 
 " I am not astonished that you and the general officers 
 should feel indignant at the neglect and incapacity of some of 
 the officers of the Commissariat, by which we have suffered so 
 much : but what I wish to impress upon you is, that they are 
 appointed by the King's authority, though not holding his com- 
 mission ; and that it would be more proper if all their faults were 
 reported to me, by whom they can be dismissed, than that they 
 should be abused by the general officers, however well deserved 
 we may deem it to be. I do not enter into the grounds you had 
 for being displeased with Mr. , which I dare say were suffi- 
 cient ; but I only desire that in all these cases punishment may 
 be left to me, who alone can have the power of inflicting it." 
 (iv. 483.) 
 
 It was not only in cases of this nature, where, in fact, 
 there was a sort of mixed authority between the civil and 
 the military departments (for the Commissaries were not 
 commissioned officers, but were appointed by the Trea- 
 sury), that he felt the necessity of sole responsibility; 
 but, a fortiori, he exacted it in purely military cases. 
 
 A letter to Mr. Villiers gives us reason to infer that, 
 for reasons which no doubt appeared sufficient to that 
 gentleman, he had suggested to General Blunt, who was 
 in command at Lisbon, some changes in the distribution 
 of the troops there, of which Sir Arthur did not approve : 
 
SUBORDINATION. 159 
 
 i( I intend to assemble the army on the Tagus, and to act on 
 the north or south bank as I may think proper. I hope, how- 
 ever, that the troops will be left in their stations till I send them 
 ordert to move. 
 
 " The foundation of all military plana is compounded of the 
 situations of one's own troops, those of the allies, and those of 
 the enemy : but if I cannot be certain even of my own, it is im- 
 ile for me to form, much less to execute, any military plan. 
 I do not in general leave the troops idle, and you may depend 
 upon it they will have enough to do before the campaign is over. 
 The troops must not be moved without my direction." (iv. 337.) 
 
 After the retreat following the battle of Talavera, 
 some occurrence took plaee without his orders, which, 
 upon the principle as explained above, deranged his 
 plans. No names of the person or the place are given, 
 but the following memorandum shows how strongly he 
 felt it :— 
 
 " From the orders sent yesterday to he will see 
 
 how important it is that an officer should sti-ictly obey the orders 
 which he receives; and, having obeyed them, should patiently 
 wait for further orders. 
 
 i: He could not suppose that he was forgotten, or that any 
 of those points respecting which he has taken upon himself to 
 give orders, such as the march of the 11th Regiment and the 
 artillery from Lisbon, &c. had not been attended to. 
 
 " The orders given yesterday contain a detailed plan for the 
 defence of Portugal, founded upon a supposition that different 
 
 S were in certain situations. 
 
 "In consequence of 'a orders and arrangements 
 
 all thi> now becomes B matter of doubt ; and he will understand 
 that his 11 i and orders have involved him in very serious 
 
 responsibility." | v. 86.) 
 
 Writing shortly afterwards to Marshal Beresford, he 
 adverts to the Bame circumstance, as connected with 
 some proposed movement of the latter, and says: — 
 
 " General ; s disobedience of orders, although well iuten- 
 
160 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 tioned, was positive, and committed with his eyes open ; and as 
 his corps was useless at Zarza Mayor, and in your retreat might 
 have embarrassed you, I was not sorry, by ordering him back to 
 the position he had quitted, to show him and the army that / 
 must command and they must obey." (v. 55.) 
 
 It is possible that some of these events may not be 
 inserted here in strict chronological order ; but the object 
 has not been to record the events of the campaign, so 
 much as to illustrate the feelings and objects of the com- 
 mander. 
 
 We have already seen that he had had reason to 
 complain of the selection of officers sent from home into 
 the Portuguese service, and the following letter shows 
 that his objections were not confined to the junior 
 ranks : — 
 
 " I enclose a letter to your Lordship relative to Brigadier- 
 general and Colonel who have absented themselves 
 
 from the Portuguese service without leave ; and who, it appears, 
 cannot be punished, as they are not in His Majesty's service. 
 
 " I beg to recommend, that in future persons of this descrip- 
 tion may not be sent to serve in Portugal, because no means 
 exist of punishing the military disorders and irregularities of 
 which they may be guilty, of the kind committed by Brigadier- 
 general and Colonel . 
 
 " In respect to these gentlemen, I should also beg leave to 
 suggest that they may not in future be employed in England, 
 as inspecting field-officers, &c." (v. 236.) 
 
 By the following letter we see that it was not merely 
 the military efficiency in the field, or the obedience to 
 his orders upon professional subjects, with which his 
 time and talents were occupied, but that he had actually 
 to pay attention to, and endeavour to control, the private 
 conduct of men hundreds of miles from him. 
 
SUBORDINATION. 1C1 
 
 With the weight pressing upon his mind, and 
 occupying as one should have thought") every faculty, 
 it might have been hoped, that those who were left in 
 charge at distant points might have relieved him from 
 these minor cares. But the following letter shows that 
 tli is was not the case. 
 
 To Colonel Peacocke, commanding at Lisbon, he 
 Bays : — 
 
 w I am concerned to he obliged to inform yon, that it has 
 been mentioned to me that some British officers in Lisbon have 
 conducted themselves in a vapv improper manner at the theatres, 
 I cannot conceive for what reason officers should conduct them- 
 selves at Lisbon in a manner which would not be permitted in 
 their own country. 
 
 " Officers commanding regiments, and superior officers, must 
 take measures to prevent a repetition of such conduct; or 1 must 
 take measures to prevent the character of the army, and of the 
 British nation, from suffering by the misconduct of a few. 
 
 " I beg you to take such measures as may be necessary to 
 prevent a repetition of this conduct." 
 
 The Commissariat still continued to be the source of 
 his principal embarrassment. They had great difficulties 
 to contend with, no doubt, and Sir Arthur was well aware 
 of it. Hut there was a great want of experience in the 
 rtment; and, probably, from the tone of the follow- 
 ing letter to the Commissary-general, Mr. Murray, some 
 want _ :nl exertion : — 
 
 • I have the. mortification to learn that the horses of the 
 cavalry have beeo worse Bupplied in their present quarters than 
 teen. 
 
 u 5 informed on the , by the Quarter-ma-tcr- 
 
 general, of the proposed distribution of the cavalry, with a view- 
 to the supply of foi 
 
 "I 5 \ know what orders you gave, and what arrttnijo- 
 you made, and on what dates, and to whom, to ensure 
 
 M 
 
162 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 these objects ? I also desire to know ivho gave Mr. leave 
 
 to go to Lisbon ? He ought to have made arrangements before 
 he left his station, even if he had leave. 
 
 " I am determined that the Government shall know how the 
 public are served, and all the most important objects are 
 disappointed, by the inefficiency or neglect of the officers of the 
 Commissariat/'' (v. 421.) 
 
 In another letter shortly after to General Payne he 
 says : — 
 
 " This failure of all our measures for the re-establishment of 
 
 the heavy cavalry is entirely attributable to Mr. , of whom I 
 
 shall make a formal complaint to the Treasury, and shall suspend 
 him from his office till their pleasure is known. 
 
 "If the cavalry had been in order, and had recovered, as I 
 had reason to expect they would, I might now strike a blow of 
 essential importance. However, it cannot now be helped. Mr. 
 
 shall be punished, and I hope the next commissary will do 
 
 his duty better." (v. 445.) 
 
 British officers were employed with different divisions 
 of the Spanish armies to communicate confidentially with 
 the British ; and so little reliance was to be placed upon 
 all the Spanish reports of their own proceedings, that 
 the accuracy of these officers was of vital importance. 
 Lieutenant-colonel Carroll was one of them, and had 
 written to Lord Wellington after some affair, of which a 
 very different account reached him from other quarters. 
 The Spaniards were reported to have dispersed in a 
 dastardly way, which Colonel Carroll had not reported. 
 
 " If this fact be true, it is desirable that you should have 
 reported it ; and, indeed, as the reports of officers employed as 
 you are, are the foundation of the measures of the Government, 
 and upon which I must found the operations of the army under 
 my command, it is most desirable that they should be correct 
 and full in every particular." (v. 362. ) 
 
-I BO i\\) i NATION. 103 
 
 A correspondence had taken place with General R. 
 Crawford, in which that officer had apparently felt hurt 
 at some of Lord Wellington's observations, avIio now 
 
 writes : — 
 
 u I am concerned that you should believe I had any feeling 
 of disapprobation in consequence of oar discussions upon commis- 
 sariat concerns. You and I must necessarily take a different 
 view o( these questions : / must view them in their relations with 
 the different parts of the army, and with the departments at 
 home ; your view is naturally confined to their relation with 
 your own immediate command. 
 
 In discussing them, I considered that it was to be carried on 
 a< if neither had any concern in things as they stood, and made 
 my remarks with perfect freedom, without taking much trouble 
 to choose the terms : but there was no feeling of disapprobation 
 daring the time or since. 
 
 " I conceive that a part of my business, and not the most 
 
 is to prevent discussion and disputes between the officers 
 
 under my command ; and I therefore did not send you the 
 
 . from General Cox to General Beresford, to which you 
 
 The observations which I made on the letter would show 
 
 what I felt. 
 
 •■ Bu1 it l- really better to drop the whole of the subject. I 
 am convinced that in all you have done you have been actuated 
 solely by a desire to forward the .>ervice, and to force those, who 
 are more interested than we arc, to do their duty by their 
 country and by us. 
 
 The different officers who were in command of 
 
 brigades, &e., were on many occasions extremely solici- 
 
 to in* their strength, more especially in 
 
 sh. The following is our of his replied to such 
 
 application : — 
 
 •• I havi i d mbi - I the seal oftihe troops under four com- 
 mand, or of their desire to be actively employed. 
 
 •• I . ; \w r to your desire to have more English, I must 
 inform you that J class and dispose of the troops of different 
 
1 64 SUBORDINATION . 
 
 descriptions according to my views of the service which will be 
 required of them, and not as a matter of favour to any officer." 
 (vi. 380.) 
 
 The Portuguese Government were still very trouble- 
 some in urging their views of military operations : — 
 
 " They will end in forcing me to quit them : and then they 
 will see how they will get on. They will then find that I alone 
 keep things in their present state. Indeed the temper of some 
 of the officers of the British army give me more concern than 
 the folly of the Portuguese. I have always been accustomed to 
 have the confidence and support of the officers which I have 
 commanded : but for the first time, whether owing to the 
 opposition in England, or that the magnitude of the concern is 
 too much for their minds and their nerves, or whether I am 
 mistaken and they are right, I cannot tell; but there is a 
 system of croaking in the army which is highly injurious to the 
 public service, and which I must devise some means of putting 
 an end to, or it will put an end to us. Officers have a right to 
 form their own opinions ; but officers of high rank ought to 
 keep their opinions to themselves. If they do not approve of 
 the system of their commander, they ought to withdraw from 
 the army. And this is the point to which / must bring some, if 
 their own good sense does not prevent them from going on as 
 they have done lately." (vi. 403.) 
 
 Some correspondence appears to have taken place 
 between Lord Wellington and Dr. Prank, the head of 
 the Medical Department. Lord Wellington writes to the 
 latter, with the temper and moderation which distin- 
 guished him, in order to prevent erroneous impressions 
 from taking effect amongst the valuable members of that 
 branch of the service. But the necessity for his writing 
 illustrates strongly the truth of his observations in the 
 letter which we have quoted a few pages back, as to the 
 difficulty which he had in executing " the part of his 
 duty, and not the most easy, of preventing discussions 
 and disputes amongst his officers." 
 
SUBORDINATION. 165 
 
 "I have ordered a Board to inquire into the complaint of 
 
 Lieutenant , which I have no doubt will end in a manner 
 
 ictory to you. But I feel concerned at the tone of the 
 letters which 1 have received from you lately, written under the 
 notion that these complaints were rctlectious upon you, encour- 
 
 I by me, 
 
 " Lieutenant 's complaint, in particular, is a reflection 
 
 upon me much more than upon you ! 
 
 " We all do our best to carry on the service in a manner the 
 
 - satisfactory ; and I have been much misunderstood by you 
 and the gentlemen of the Medical Department, if it is supposed 
 that I have expressed dissatisfaction. 
 
 " But the best arrangements may fail, and it may be necessary 
 to inquire into the causes of these accidents. 
 
 These inquiries, it is true, always suppose that there has 
 been Borne failure: but it does not follow of course, that there 
 has been fault } much less on the part of the head of the Depart- 
 ment." 
 
 Applications from persons in high stations, some- 
 time-, pi limps, private friends, on behalf of officers who 
 had incurred Lord Wellington's displeasure, wen 1 no 
 doubt, at times, a source of much embarrassment and 
 annoyance to him. Every man who got into a scrape 
 
 apt to think that a word from a person of rank or 
 importance would influence Lord AYellington, and effect 
 his reinstatement The application was, no doubt, fre- 
 quently made to him from mere easiness of temper, or to 
 
 rid of importunity, without a full knowledge of the 
 
 on the part of the writer; but the following is an 
 
 how little effect they had with one who did not 
 
 form an opinion in a hurry at the beginning of a case, 
 
 and did not change it from fear or favour at the end : — 
 
 ■ To the Right Honourable 
 
 "Oct 19, 1810. 
 " My dear Sir, — I received yonr letter regarding Mr. , 
 
 late Lieut, of the Regiment, and 1 am much concerned that 
 
166 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 the conduct of that officer was such as to prevent me from at- 
 tending to your request. When in arrest for one crime, he 
 insulted, in the grossest and most wanton manner, another 
 officer ; for which he refused to make any apology, though de- 
 sired to do so by me ; and he broke his arrest. 
 
 " If I were to interfere in favour of those who commit 
 offences of this description, I should give such a blow to the 
 discipline and subordination of the army, that there would very 
 soon be no army remaining. 
 
 " I am convinced that you will perceive the impossibility 
 of my interfering in any manner. 
 
 " I enclose the orders of the army, and the decision of the 
 court-martial." (vi. 496.) 
 
 Applications for leave to go home, as we have already 
 seen (p. 90), were amongst the most irksome trials that 
 he had. He had himself been upon service from the 
 very commencement, without an hour's relaxation. It 
 is true that, if he had been compelled by health or any 
 other consideration, to vacate his post for even the short- 
 est time, everything must have been paralyzed • but 
 though this did not apply with equal force, in the case 
 of every officer serving under him, it did weigh heavily 
 when they held responsible situations. The following 
 letter to General R. Crawfurd explains his feelings : — 
 
 " Officers (general officers in particular) are the best judges 
 of their own private concerns ; and though my own opinion is, that 
 there is no private concern that cannot be settled by instruction 
 and power of attorney (and that, after all, is not so settled), I 
 cannot refuse leave to those who say that their business requires 
 personal superintendence. 
 
 " It is certainly the greatest inconvenienee to the service 
 that officers should absent themselves as they do, each requiring 
 that, when it is convenient to return, he shall find himself in the 
 same situation as when he left. In the mean time, who is to do 
 the duty ? How am I to be responsible for the army ? Is 
 Colonel a proper substitute for General Crawfurd, in the 
 
M HOK Dl NATION. 1G7 
 
 command of our advanced posts ? or General for Sir Sta- 
 
 pleton Cotton, in command of the cavalry? 
 
 •■ 1 may be obliged to consent to the absence of an officer, 
 but 1 cannot approve of it. I repeat that you know the situ- 
 ation of affairs as well as 1 do, and you have my leave to go, if 
 you think proper/' (Yii. 191.) 
 
 An officer, who had been suspended from rank and 
 pay by sentence of court-martial, applied for leave of 
 
 ice •• — 
 
 " When I observe in Lieut. 's letters a disposition to 
 
 repeat the offence, which it had been the object of the sentence 
 to punish, I cannot thiuk him an officer entitled to any indul- 
 gence. 
 
 •• A very trilling degree of education and practice will enable 
 
 an officer to string together a few words in a letter, in a manner 
 
 and conveying a meaning which a superior cannot bear. But 
 
 rous qualification, unless the possessor has sense 
 
 _ ride his pen, and discretion to restrain him from intem- 
 perate language. 
 
 • A- tti sentence of the court has not had the effect upon 
 
 Lieut. , I hope that the refusal to grant an indulgence 
 
 (which, probably, would not have been refused, if applied for in 
 
 ; civility in which indulgences are usually asked), 
 
 will correct a disposition which can never tend to his advan- 
 
 " lie most remain at the head -quarters of his regiment 
 till the term of his suspension is concluded. " (vii. 222.) 
 
 II writes to Lord Liverpool respecting officers on 
 
 : 
 
 M I assure you that the departure of the general officers 
 
 I much against my inclination B8 their arrival in England 
 
 DJnrious t-> the public interests. I did everything to prevail 
 
 upon them not to L r '». but in vain ; and I acknowledge that it 
 
 satismetioD to find that they have been roughly 
 
 handled in the newspapers. The consequence of the absence of 
 of them was that, in the late operations, 1 have been obliged 
 
168 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 to be general of cavalry and of the advanced guard, and the 
 leader of two or three columns, sometimes on the same day. 
 
 " I have requested Col. Torrens not to allow any general 
 officer to come out in future, who is not willing to declare that 
 he has no private business to recall him to England, and that he 
 will remain with the army as long as it shall stay in the Pen- 
 insula." 
 
 The following observations may be said to refer 
 rather more to discipline than to subordination ; but as 
 the conduct and character of officers are involved, it is 
 not improperly connected with this branch of our sub- 
 ject. They are contained in letters to Marshal Beres- 
 ford, with respect to the cavalry : — 
 
 " I recommend you to keep your troops very much en masse. 
 I have always considered the cavalry to be the most delicate arm 
 that we possess. We have few officers who have practical know- 
 ledge of the mode of using it, or who have ever seen more than 
 two regiments together ; and all our troops, cavalry as well as 
 infantry, are a little inclined to go out of order in battle. To 
 these circumstances add, that the defeat of, or any great loss 
 sustained by our cavalry, would be a misfortune amounting 
 almost to a defeat of the whole, and you will see the necessity of 
 keeping the cavalry as much as possible en masse and in reserve, 
 to be thrown in when an opportunity may offer." 
 
 This was written on the 20th of March. A gallant 
 affair of cavalry, but not attended by any result, took 
 place within a very few clays, (on the 25 th,) in which the 
 very circumstances foreseen by Lord Wellington occurred 
 from want of attention to the principles above laid down. 
 
 1 ' I wish you would call together the officers of the dragoons, 
 and point out to them the mischiefs which must result from the 
 disorder of troops in action. The undisciplined ardour of the 
 13th Dragoons and the 1st Portuguese cavalry is not of the de- 
 scription of determined bravery and steadiness of soldiers, confi- 
 dent in their discipline and their officers. Their conduct was 
 
SUBORDINATION. 169 
 
 that of a rabble, — galloping, as last as their horses would carry 
 them, over a plain, after an enemy to whom they could do no 
 mischief when they were broken, ami sacrificing all the objects 
 of your operation by their want of discipline. 
 
 " It' the enemy could have thrown out of Badajoz only 100 
 men, regularly formed, they would have driven back these two 
 regiments ; and would, probably, have taken many whose horses 
 were knocked up. If the 13th are again guilty of this conduct, 
 I shall take their horses from them, and send the officers and 
 men to do duty at Lisbon." (vii. 400.) 
 
 Another letter, a few weeks later, touehes on the 
 same subject, not referring to cavalry only: — 
 
 " The frequent instances which have occurred lately of severe 
 ind, in some instances, of important failure, by officers lead- 
 in l: the troops beyond the point to which they are ordered, and 
 beyond all bounds, (mentioning the instances,) have induced me 
 t<> determine to bring before a court-martial any officer who 
 shall in future be guilty of this conduct. 
 
 " I entertain no doubt of the readiness of the officers and 
 soldiers to advance upon the enemy ; but it is my duty to regulate 
 spirit, and not to allow them to follow up trifling advan- 
 in which they incur the risk of being prisoners to the 
 enemy whom they had before beaten. The desire to be forward 
 gaging the enemy is not uncommon in the British army; 
 but the quality I wish to see the officers possess is, a cool judg- 
 ment in action, which will enable them to decide with prompt i- 
 far they can and ought to go; and to act with such 
 in that the soldiers will look up to them with confidence, 
 and obey them with alacrity. 
 
 " 1 trust thai this letter will have the effect of inducing the 
 riously upon the duties they have to perform 
 before the enemy, and avoid the error which is the subject of it." 
 | vn. 5 16. 
 
 The provocations to himself and hi- army to take the 
 
 law into their own hands were abundant, and nothing 
 
 but tin- most decided conduct of the commander could 
 
 prevented fearful reprisals. The people of the 
 
170 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 country were ready enough to cry out, but very little 
 disposed to assist in detecting or punishing the offenders ; 
 and the difficulty of maintaining due discipline was in- 
 creased to the greatest degree, in spite of all his efforts. 
 
 " I have received reports as to the misconduct of certain 
 officers at Espinhal, on the 11th of May. I have ordered Capt. 
 
 into arrest, in hopes that the Government [Portuguese, as 
 
 he would be tried by civil law,] will adopt measures to enforce 
 the attendance of evidence. 
 
 " I observe that, as usual, there is great readiness to com- 
 plain, but no desire to prosecute ; and though Capt. will 
 
 be brought to trial for having taken upon himself to do himself 
 justice, I am not astonished when a British officer is guilty of 
 this conduct. 
 
 " They scarcely ever enter a village in which they or their 
 people are not robbed, and they can get no redress on the spot ; 
 and I repeat that, since I have been in Portugal I have not 
 known any man punished except for being a French partisan. 
 
 "But whatever may be the conduct of the Portuguese, I 
 shall not allow the British army to commit irregularities with 
 
 impunity ; and Captain shall certainly be tried, if within a 
 
 month evidence is produced against him." (viii. 98.) 
 
 We do not know who the following delinquent 
 
 was 
 
 ' ' In regard to , surely no man can complain that 
 
 the want of c daily state reports' for so many days was not a 
 ground of complaint. I ordered the person responsible to the 
 Adjutant-general to be put in arrest ; and upon being informed 
 
 that 's superiors were in fault (for fault there was), 
 
 I said, Let them be put in arrest. I do not think there is any- 
 thing unreasonable or harsh in this : and with every good dis- 
 position towards , he must not expect that I shall 
 
 recall anything I have ever authorised to be written respecting 
 anybody on any omission of duty ." (viii. 127.) 
 
 Some months before this time (Sept. 1811) he had 
 written home respecting certain officers, who had then 
 
SUBORDINATION. 171 
 
 been proposed to be Bent out (vide p. 86). lie now 
 
 — 
 " When I wrote in February in regard to Clinton, things 
 were in a very different state, and opinions very different. 
 
 "I object to the mode which our officers have of adopting 
 
 an opinion before they entirely understand the subject; and 
 
 then acting as if it were necessary that he should produce an 
 
 alteration of measures in an army as he would in the House of 
 
 Commons. Every man has a right to form his own opinion, and 
 
 tain it : but I expect, what I do not always find, that whin 
 
 mes to the army he shall act according to my opinion, I 
 
 being alone responsible. However, matters are so altered, that 
 
 uot only I have no objection, but I shall be glad to have the 
 
 nee of General Henry Clinton. 
 
 • Former subjects of difference arc gone by, and are not worth 
 
 considering; neither would ever think of them under existing 
 
 circumstances. " (viii. 261.) 
 
 A complaint had been made against General Camp- 
 bell by of the Regiment, who felt that 
 
 he had spoken in violent and abusive terms to him, and 
 who demanded a court-martial. In that division of our 
 Bubjcct which treats of. courts-martial we shall find Lord 
 Wellington's reasons for not granting one at that time. 
 JUit though the language in that officer's letters had 
 highly improper, Lord Wellington's sense of justice 
 made him feel that the General was not free from blame, 
 and he wrote to the General himself. It is impossible to 
 conceive a more manly, dignified suggestion to a superior 
 r, of the mode in which duty (occasionally mosl 
 harassing and painful should be carried on, than the 
 following : — 
 
 " Harsh and ungentlemanlike language by a superior, does 
 afford ground of complaint to an interior officer. But the com- 
 plaint Ought to be made at the moment. 
 
 "It would, undoubtedly, be better if language of tins de 
 Bcription were never used; and it' officers placed aa you were 
 
172 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 could correct errors and neglects, in language which should not 
 hurt the feelings of the person addressed, and without vehe- 
 mence. 
 
 " But, unfortunately, there are some of us who cannot avoid 
 to feel warmly for the success of the operation of which we have 
 the charge, and to express ourselves with vehemence, and in 
 language not perfectly correct ; and though I consider every 
 officer responsible for language of this description, the complaint 
 ought to be made immediately, in order that the circumstances 
 may come fairly before those whose duty it may be to inquire 
 into the subject. 
 
 " Conceiving, therefore, that Lieutenant-colonel } s feel- 
 ings could not have been hurt by the language now complained 
 of, or that he could not have allowed four months to elapse, 
 and that it is now only made to aggravate complaints upon 
 other subjects, which afford him no ground for complaint, I do 
 not think it proper to make his complaint upon this head the 
 subject of further inquiry." (viii. 292.) 
 
 An officer of the rank of Major-general had been 
 furnished with detailed instructions, which he had disre- 
 garded. Lord Wellington gives his proofs of the dis- 
 obedience of his orders, and of the inconvenience result- 
 ing from it ; and concludes with what may be regarded 
 as a most quiet, yet impressive reprimand : — ■ 
 
 " Till I received your letter I did not conceive it possible 
 that you would so far have disregarded your instructions, other- 
 wise I should certainly have prevented it. 
 
 " I am willing to believe that the omission to obey my in- 
 structions was not intentional, and that it is to be attributed to 
 that description of inattention which is too much the practice of 
 the service. If the instructions of the 5th March had been 
 read with attention, and pains had been taken to understand 
 them, and a plan had been taken for the mode of executing 
 them, in case of the occurrence of the case for which they were 
 provided, it is impossible that the mistakes of which I complain 
 could have occurred." (ix. 72.) 
 
SUBORDINATION. 173 
 
 All affair took place in June L812, which thoroughly 
 proved the soundness o( the principles which, as we 
 have already seen p. 168 . he had laid down for the nia- 
 aient and use of cavalry at the time of the affair at 
 Campo Mayor, and the disregard of which had led to 
 the present disaster : — 
 
 "I have never been more annoyed than by 's 
 
 affair, and I entirely concur with yon in the necessity of in- 
 quiring into it. It is occasioned entirely by the trick our 
 officers o£ cavalry have acquired of galloping at everything, and 
 then galloping back as fast as they gallop on. They never con- 
 sider their situation, never think of manoeuvring before an 
 enemy, so little that one would think they cannot manoeuvre 
 except on Wimbledon Common ; and when they use the arm as 
 — lit to be used, they never keep nor provide a reserve. 
 
 "The two regiments were the best in the cavalry in this 
 country, and it annoys me particularly that the misfortune has 
 happened to them. I do not wonder at the French boasting of 
 it; it is the Lrivatest blow they have struck. ;; (ix. 210.) 
 
 We have nothing to guide us as to the regiment 
 alluded to in the following observations : — 
 
 •• Ti,< re exists a committee in the th Regiment, which, I 
 
 suppose, i- the committee tor n ; but you will see that 
 
 it extends its attention to other matters, with which it ought 
 to have no concern, and which is improper and injurious to 
 line. 
 " Nothing upholds discipline and good, order to a greater 
 than the sentiments and spirit of the officers. No man 
 • to eonduet himself in a manner an- 
 ting an officer and a gentleman, if lie knows that his con- 
 duct will be noticed with disapprobation by hi- brother officers. 
 _• the officers i- very different from what 
 
 appear- a- the proceedings of the committee in the th. 
 
 •' En *.• fi n ii officer judges and acts for him- 
 
 self, and discourages misconduct or oegleci of duty by his de- 
 meanour towards those guilty of either. He does nol bend his 
 opinion even to a whole mess, which, I am sorry to say, some- 
 
174 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 times acts in the spirit of combination ; much less does he 
 shape his conduct according to the opinion of a committee of 
 that mess. 
 
 "The existence of such a committee, taking upon them- 
 selves to advert to circumstances such as the th have con- 
 sidered, must be prejudicial to subordination ; and that even 
 the officers themselves cannot with propriety act as this com- 
 mittee has. 
 
 1 1 beg you to call before you the officers, and point out to 
 them the danger and impropriety of such conduct; and inform 
 the commanding officer that / shall consider him responsible " 
 (x. 179.) 
 
 Much discontent had been excited in the cavalry 
 regiments by the orders to draft their horses, and some 
 of the officers seem to have remonstrated in a tone which 
 displeased Lord Wellington. 
 
 We have seen in a former chapter how much op- 
 posed he was to the measure, and how strenuously he 
 endeavoured to avoid carrying it into execution. But 
 his efforts were unavailing. It was ordered/ he must 
 obey ! and those under him must obey ! 
 
 He writes as follows to General Alten : — 
 
 " I have received the orders of the Commander-in-chief to 
 
 draft the horses from the ; and whatever may be the 
 
 feelings or opinion of the regiment, I shall certainly obey the 
 orders if it should be necessary. 
 
 " I did not require the opinion of • to be aware of 
 
 the merits of the 2d Hussars (German Legion), which I, pro- 
 bably, should have taken a proper opportunity of expressing, if 
 it had not appeared by your letter that the probability of draft- 
 ing the horses had occasioned dissatisfaction, inconsistent with 
 military subordination; and which had induced you to f advise ' 
 the regiment to bear their fate 'quietly, and as good, disciplined, 
 brave soldiers ought, and to behave on their march everywhere 
 as such :' and to tell me that ' you trust they will do so/ 
 
 " I had believed that the would certainly behave 
 
>rdin \ nox. 175 
 
 so on all occasions : and if there were any doubt, that something 
 more than advice would have been given to ensure it. 
 
 •• I have now to inform you that, if I rind it necessary to 
 
 draft the horses I shall order to march with the 
 
 cut as their colonel, and to remain with them till they 
 are embarked, in order that I may be certain that they ' behave 
 ; - _ ul. disciplined soldiers ought ;' and that, contrary to my 
 usual practice, I shall refrain from paying in general orders the 
 compliment their services may deserve till they shall have quitted 
 the country." (x. £57. 
 
 The officer who bad remonstrated did not gain much 
 
 bv high-sounding words. 
 
 > 
 
 The recommendation of individuals to serve in dif- 
 ferent capacities, through the medium of private friends, 
 - a source of embarrassment, and bis power of writing 
 civil letters must sometimes have been severely tried, 
 brother. Sir Henry AVellesley, bad recommended a 
 p ntleman, who. we may suppose, bad been hitherto 
 employed, or who bad employed himself, in collecting 
 inn : . — 
 
 •• Although I do not very much approve of General , I 
 
 shall haw- do objection to employ him, provided he will join, 
 take the command of, and stay with the troops to which he is 
 appointed, and co/ifine his attention sold// to them. 
 
 " 1 1 ;r«'in , of the 22d April, is a counterpart of 
 
 all those I have ever seen from him. I possess many, which 
 would equally good information; and the letters are not 
 
 confined t 'ho mma t. kirn to acquire information, 
 
 but they fly about the army and England, addressed to persons 
 of all descriptions. I possess accurate information on every 
 point on which he has written, and can supply you with it if 
 you like. 
 
 •'■ 1 1 he will discontinue his attention to wmena b, and con- 
 fine thnn rtioular duty, I will employ him bs ;i general, 
 Otherwise not : but I will not allow him to remain as an idler 
 and amateur with any army, in order to give him an OppOC&L- 
 
176 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 nity of circulating the description of intelligence which he picks 
 up." (x. 366.) 
 
 Whether he ever was employed we know not ; but 
 it is evident that Lord Wellington's horror of gossip was 
 as strong as ever. 
 
 The occasional absence upon leave, and subsequent 
 return of officers, occasioned many temporary appoint- 
 ments, the holders of which were afterwards reduced to 
 their former positions. The nature of these temporary 
 promotions, on most of the occasions, must have been 
 obvious; and under the presumption (which from his 
 general character we must entertain) that Lord Wel- 
 lington was not guilty of injustice to the officer so 
 circumstanced, we should believe that none but a very 
 sensitive (not to say huffy) man could have taken offence. 
 Unfortunately we find many such, and the following 
 letter shows that he was not free from them : — 
 
 " I cannot understand the nature of the feelings of an officer 
 which are to be mortified by his performance of his duty in the 
 situation in which His Majesty and the rules of the service 
 have placed him. I can only say, that in the course of my 
 military life I have gone from the command of a brigade to that 
 of my regiment, and from the command of an army to that 
 of a brigade or division, as I was ordered, without feeling mor- 
 tification. 
 
 " As, however, you feel mortified upon reassuming the com- 
 mand of your regiment from the command of a brigade (of which 
 your regiment forms a part), you will see the propriety of my 
 determination not to remove officers from their regiments to the 
 temporary command of brigades of which their regiments do not 
 form a part ; as it is probable that your feelings would have 
 been mortified in a greater degree if you had now been obliged 
 to return to your regiment from a brigade of the line." (x. 369.) 
 
 After the battle of Vittoria he writes home : — 
 
-l B0RD1TS \riov 1 77 
 
 •• Any reinforcements may come to Santander, though I am 
 very apprehensive o( marching our vagabond soldiers through 
 the province of Biscay, in the state of discipline they and their 
 Officers generally come out to us. The people will shoot them 
 as they would the French, if they should misbehave. 
 
 •• We started with the army in the highest order, and up 
 to the day o\ the battle nothing eould be better; but that event 
 annihilated all order and discipline. The soldiers have got 
 about a million sterling in money. The night of the battle 
 — d in looking for plunder: the consequcnee was, they 
 were totally knocked up, and incapable of pursuing the enemy. 
 The rain came on and increased their fatigue, and we have 
 now, out of the ranks, double the amount of loss in the battle : 
 we have lost more men in the pursuit than the enemy. 
 
 " This is the consequence of the discipline of the British 
 army. We may gain great victories, but we shall do no good 
 till we alter our system, so far as to force all ranks to do their 
 
 duty. The — th ■ are a disgrace to the name of 
 
 soldier, in action as well as elsewhere; and I propose to draft 
 their rom them, and send the men to England, if 1 
 
 cannot get the better of them in any other manner." (x. 173.) 
 
 •It i< an unrivalled army for fighting, if the soldiers can 
 only be kept in their ranks during the battle: but it wants 
 of the qualities indispensable to enable a general to bring 
 them into the tield in the order fit to meet an enemy, or to take 
 advantage from a victory : the cause of their defects is want of 
 habits of obedience and attention to orders by flic inferior officers, 
 nod indeed by all. Tiny never attend to an order, with an inten- 
 tion • it, and therefore never understand it or obey it 
 when obedience becomes troublesome or difficult. 
 
 • I cannot recommend for promotion, because I 
 
 had him in BJ •■ the battle for disobeying an order 
 
 given to him by me verbally. I put him in arrest, and had 
 
 □ined to make an example of him; but I have since 
 
 sed him. But I cannot recommend him for promotion. 
 ■ Oursoldiera are terrible fellows for everything but fighting 
 with their regiments. What do you think of seventy or eighty 
 
 in having wandered during the late operations, and having 
 
 N 
 
178 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 surrendered themselves to some of the French peasantry, whom 
 they would at other times have eaten up \" (x. 624.) 
 
 He always acknowledges their readiness to fight: 
 and we have seen in some of the preceding pages that 
 the object he had most at heart was to make his officers 
 exercise proper judgment in restraining their men, when 
 common sense and ordinary prudence ought to show 
 them that there was no necessity to incur loss of life. 
 Here is another case in point : — 
 
 " I shall be obliged to you to tell — that I am con- 
 cerned again to be obliged to disapprove of his conduct. He 
 has just lost 150 men for nothing, and in disobedience of your 
 orders. If the enemy were ten times worse, and more dis- 
 heartened than they are, the conduct of in getting 
 
 his brigade into unnecessary scrapes would make them soldiers 
 again. 
 
 " It is unworthy of one of his reputation to get his brigade 
 into scrapes for the sake of the gloriole of driving in a few 
 piquets, knowing as he must do that it is not intended he should 
 engage in a serious affair. 
 
 " I hope he will reflect upon what has passed, and observe 
 that the best he can do is to obey orders, and execute strictly 
 the designs of his commander." (xi. 181.) 
 
 Promotion of officers, within their own regiments, is 
 of course the regular process, and naturally looked to by 
 the members of it. 
 
 One of the cavalry regiments had grossly miscon- 
 ducted itself, in Lord Wellington's opinion, during and 
 immediately after the battle of Vittoria, and he had 
 stopped promotion in it. Three troops had been since 
 given to officers from other regiments, and a fourth 
 was now vacant, for which, apparently, interest was 
 being made at home ; as Lord Wellington writes to 
 
SI ^ORDINATION. 179 
 
 Colonel Torrens, to tell him that the regiment was 
 still in very had condition, adding, — 
 
 u I will not recommend any officer belonging to it for any 
 promotion whatever. From what I have seen of them, my 
 opinion is that they cannot be called a regiment at all : there 
 is no established system of discipline or subordination among 
 them, and the gentleman at their head is quite incapable of 
 commanding them. 
 
 " The question is, whether to refrain from promoting the 
 officers of a bad regiment is the way to improve it ? If it is, 
 they ought not to be promoted, and I will not recommend them 
 till the regiment is improved, whatever may be the extent to 
 which private interests may be effected. If it is not, the sooner the 
 officers of the are promoted the better ! " (xi. 189.) 
 
 The following remarks probably refer to the same 
 regiment : and though in a work of this nature the pro- 
 motion of any given officers is of very minor importance, 
 it is adduced here as a proof of his readiness to take a 
 lenient and favourable view if he could : — 
 
 " Captain of the was killed in an awkward affair 
 
 which a squadron of that regiment got into : and there are now 
 two troops vacant. Although they are still in my opinion the 
 . the norst commanded, and the worst officered regiment 
 that I have ever met with, and we are obliged to get the 
 L r cneral officer of the brigade to look after them as the com- 
 mand i g ficer of the regiment, yet, as Sir Stapleton thinks 
 •me degree improved, I have recommended the 
 at for one of the vacant troops, and Lieutenant 
 for the other." (xi. 415. 
 
 1I<' had at length got the Spanish troops into some 
 sort of discipline. When they got to the borders of 
 
 France 1 : — 
 
 u The Spaniards plunder* _ id deal, and did a good 
 
 F mischief in the 6rst I : but even this misfortune 
 
 ha> been of Bervk N rate were executed and many 
 
180 SUBORDINATION. 
 
 punished; and I sent all the Spanish troops back into Spain 
 to be cantoned, which has convinced the French of our desire 
 not to injure individuals. The inhabitants have in general 
 returned — many at the risk of their lives, having been fired at 
 by the French sentries, and are living very quietly and comfort- 
 ably with our soldiers cantoned in their houses." (xi. 304.) 
 
 They still gave him much trouble wherever they did 
 remain. It was, perhaps, not unnatural ; probably they 
 were not very carefully treated as to food, &c. by their 
 own authorities ; and it must be borne in mind that the 
 spirit of retaliation had an effect upon a Spaniard which 
 did not influence an Englishman. Lord Wellington 
 writes to General Morillo, and was apparently a good 
 deal excited ; it is in warmer terms than usual : — 
 
 " Before I gave the orders of which you and your officers 
 have made such complaints, I warned you repeatedly of the mis- 
 conduct of your troops, which I told you I would not permit. I 
 give you notice, that whatever may be the consequences, I will 
 repeat those orders if your troops are not made to conduct them- 
 selves as well-disciplined soldiers ought. 
 
 " I did not lose thousands of men to bring the army into 
 France, in order that the soldiers might plunder and ill-treat 
 the French peasantry ; and I beg that you and your officers will 
 understand, that I prefer to have a small army that will obey 
 to a large one that is disobedient and undisciplined : and if the 
 measures which I am obliged to adopt to enforce obedience and 
 good order, occasion the loss of men and the reduction of my 
 force, it is totally indifferent to me; and the fault rests with 
 those who suffer their soldiers to commit disorders. 
 
 " I cannot be satisfied with profession of obedience. My 
 orders must be really obeyed, and strictly carried into execution; 
 and if I cannot obtain obedience in one way, I will in another } or 
 I will not command the troops which disobey." (xi. 390.) 
 
CONDUCT AND FEELINGS RESPECTING 
 COURTS-MARTIAL. 
 
 There is no part of an officer's duty which is more dis- 
 tressing than that of passing judgment upon the sentences 
 of courts-martial. Even at home, with all the assistance 
 of skilful and experienced professional men, and with 
 abundant leisure to consider and re-consider a case, it is 
 embarrassing enough ; and we can easily conceive how 
 that must be increased by all the circumstances attending 
 foreign service. 
 
 The Duke has been reckoned hard and stern. We 
 cannot read these Dispatches without feeling that he un- 
 fortunately had cause enough to become so ; but the 
 
 sal of the many cases in which he may show it, 
 prove that there never was a mind more thoroughly 
 imbued with a sense of justice I 
 
 But though there may be many proofs of inflexible 
 
 aion, there are many touching instances of his wish 
 lor lenity. We have no mean- of forming a judgment in 
 man}- of th why he was influenced one way or 
 
 the other; the only wonder is, that amidst the numerous 
 and overwhelming duties which pressed upon him, he 
 Should have hid the time and the power of cool reflec- 
 tion upon each case, to enable him to write and to record 
 
 bo much as he- did. We trace clearly a wish to look at 
 
182 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 the favourable side ; and we find, certainly, in many of 
 the cases, that he trusted to what a more petulant or 
 intemperate man would have disregarded, viz. the sense, 
 and honour, and good feeling of the delinquent. 
 
 It has been urged against him, that having once 
 formed and pronounced an opinion he was immovable, 
 and that no circumstances which might subsequently 
 transpire could effect a change. This, if true to the 
 letter, would savour of injustice ; but we must bear in 
 mind the circumstances in which he was placed. He 
 was not a rash or passionate man : his maxim was 
 "Audi alteram partem" or, at least, his practice in all the 
 other events of life was " hear both sides of the ques- 
 tion." In order, therefore, to be enabled to form his 
 opinion, he was, we believe, very strict in requiring that 
 every part of the case should be brought forward at once. 
 He could have no personal knowledge of it, and his only 
 means of forming a judgment was by duly balancing 
 what was laid before him. When that decision was 
 formed and pronounced, it is not to be wondered at that 
 his other avocations should compel him to dismiss it 
 from his mind, and that subsequent attempts to alter his 
 judgment were steadfastly resisted. It might be harshly 
 done in some cases, and the friends of the suffering par- 
 ties would say unjustly. But however we may feel for 
 them, we must have some consideration for the arduous, 
 overpowering nature of his own position. 
 
 We have evidence from the best authority as to his 
 feelings and conduct on these subjects, in the "Private 
 Journal" of Mr. Larpent, who was appointed Judge-Advo- 
 cate-General in 1812, and who joined the head-quarters 
 in November, at the commencement of the retreat after 
 the failure at Burgos. 
 
 There does not appear to have been any permanent 
 
RESPECTING rOl'RTS-MARTIAL. 183 
 
 officer previously filling that post ; and he tells us that 
 Lord Wellington said to him: — 
 
 u If your friends knew what was going on here, they would 
 think you had no sinecure. Ami how do you suppose I was 
 plagued when I hud to do it nearly ull myself?" 
 
 In spite of Lord Wellington's assiduity there were 
 many eases still undecided, which were passed over to 
 Mr. Larpent; ''some/' as he says, "of near two years' 
 standing." 
 
 His description of Lord Wellington may be received 
 without reserve, lie was personally a stranger to him, 
 and acknowledges with much naivete that at first he 
 approached him " like a boy going to school." This did 
 not last : Lord Wellington's quickness and habits of 
 business soon got over any such feelings. On the second 
 opportunity of meeting, when Mr. Larpent had taken 
 his papers upon the mere chance of seeing him, Lord 
 Wellington said, — " ' Come up ;' and in ten minutes he 
 1 over tour sets of charges against officers, and they 
 led, with a few judicious alterations in which 
 1 entirely agreed/' 
 
 " I like him much in business affairs. He is very 
 ready, decisive, and civil. He thinks and acts quite for 
 himself: with me, if he thinks I am right; but not other- 
 J have not, however, found what I was told I 
 should, that he immediately determines against anything 
 that I to him. On the contrary, 1 think he 
 
 is i- ifi nabli enough; only, often a little too hasty in 
 ordering trials where an acquittal natst be the eonse- 
 quence, when they could not be made out in evidence, 
 which is tl _ difficulty." 
 
 The coolness and the experience of the practised lawyer 
 Was here of value ; and we cannot but agree with him in 
 
184 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 thinking u it does harm, as I would have the law punish 
 almost always when it is put in force." 
 
 The first proofs which we find of his sentiments 
 respecting courts-martial, and the conduct of officers 
 who were implicated, are very early in his Indian career. 
 
 Writing to Colonel Murray respecting some trans- 
 actions which had led to them in his division, he says : — 
 
 ", These courts-martial are distressing at present. We must 
 endeavour to stop these trifling disputes. 
 
 " It occurs to me that there is much party in the army in 
 your quarter. This must be put an end to : and there is only 
 one mode. The commanding-officer must be of no side except- 
 ing that of the public, to employ indiscriminately those who can 
 best serve the public, be they who they may. 
 
 " The subjects are generally referable to private quarrels 
 in which the public have no concern. The character of officers 
 is undoubtedly a public concern ; but in many instances it would 
 be much more proper and creditable to both parties to settle it 
 by mutual concession, than to take up the time of the army by 
 courts-martial, for the gratification of any private pique." (i. 378.) 
 
 The active service which followed, probably did not 
 furnish officers with leisure to quarrel, and we find no 
 more such observations. But towards the conclusion of 
 his service in that country a case seems to have arisen 
 which exemplified more than one of General Wellesley's 
 characteristics : his sense of duty to the public in order- 
 ing the court ; his sense of the inadequacy of the sen- 
 tence pronounced, which his duty to the public compelled 
 him to order to be revised ; a sense of justice to the 
 offender himself, by allowing a mere form to invalidate 
 that sentence ; but, finally, the determination that such a 
 man should not be again at large to the injury of the 
 service, by ordering him to be suspended till the pleasure 
 of the Court of Directors could be obtained. 
 
RESPECTING I Ol'KTS-M AKTIAT.. | s ") 
 
 fl Capt. was put in arrest by my orders, and a court- 
 martial was assembled. In the course of the proceedings it 
 appears that the members and the Judge-Advocate were not 
 
 sworn, which is fatal to the legality of the sentence. The Court 
 acquitted him of some charges j and for those charges of which 
 found him guilty they sentenced a very inadequate punish- 
 ment, by no means likely to operate as an example. 
 
 •• The late Commander-in-chief referred the trial to me, and 
 I ordered that it might be revised. 
 
 " From various causes it has not been possible to assemble 
 ►art till to-day, and the number of members at present 
 alive is aot sufficient. The sentence passed is obviously illegal, 
 supposing it to be adequate to the crimes proved. There never 
 more flagrant instance of breach of trust ; and if he should 
 by any accident be suffered to escape with impunity, the worst 
 impression will be made on the minds of the natives in general. 
 
 u I uder these circumstances, I beg leave to recommend that 
 he may be suspended from the service till the pleasure of the 
 Court of Din etois is known. " (ii. 582.) 
 
 When he commenced his glorious but trying career in 
 
 European warfare, he had a different class to deal with. 
 
 non soldiers of the British army were composed, 
 
 lor the most part, of the lowest classes,. — indeed it might 
 
 id, the dregs of society; men who, under the most 
 favourable circumstances, would be difficult to control, 
 but who, when half starved, were often driven nearly to 
 
 ration, in spite of all discipline. The Duke's letters 
 upon the subject of our military law. showing its total 
 inadequacy to meet the evils of such a state of crime and 
 abomination a- be i forced to describe, are pain- 
 
 fid pictures of what he had to undergo. 
 
 " 'I >>( discipline of the army 1- a subjeel of serious 
 
 ! Impossible to describe the irregularities 
 
 They are never out of the Bight of 
 
 their are not committed. I am convinced 
 
186 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 that the law is not strong enough to maintain discipline upon 
 service. It is most difficult to convict any prisoner, for the sol- 
 diers have little regard to the oath; and the officers, who are 
 sworn to try " according to the evidence/' have too much regard 
 to the strict letter of it. A court-martial is no longer a court of 
 honour, where a soldier was certain of receiving punishment if he 
 deserved it ; but is a court of law, whose decision is to be formed 
 upon the evidence of those upon whose actions it is constituted 
 as a restraint. 
 
 " The law in this respect ought to be amended, and when 
 the army is on service in a foreign country, any one, two, or 
 three officers ought to have the power of trying criminals, and 
 punishing them instanter" (iv. 404.) 
 
 This may sound harsh and arbitrary to the morbid 
 civilian. No doubt he was very often obliged to sanc- 
 tion the execution of a sentence which he felt was well 
 deserved; but we find many instances in which (with an 
 acumen that no professional lawyer could have exceeded) 
 he detects a fallacy, and points out the true bearing of 
 the case, which required further consideration or revision. 
 We do not aver that his observations always went to a 
 mitigation of the sentence ; but there was a nicety, a 
 delicacy, and a selection of the right point, in many of 
 his comments, which are very striking from their 
 justness. 
 
 A Paymaster had absented himself from his regi- 
 ment after the battle of Talavera. His defence was, that 
 he had public money in his charge ; but that he remained 
 with the sick and wounded on their retreat. He was 
 found guilty of absenting himself ^ and sentenced to be 
 "privately" reprimanded. 
 
 Lord Wellington was dissatisfied with the sentence, 
 and sent it back to the Court. He says to the 
 President : — 
 
 a The point is, did Mr. really remain with the hospital? 
 
RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. I v ? 
 
 did he ever make inquiries respecting the position of his regi- 
 ment ? It will appear to the Court that the hospital was within 
 two miles of his regiment, 
 
 • This may induce the Court to alter their sentence; but, 
 if it should not, I be£ to suggest to them to omit the word 
 'privately.' I have to observe that privacy is inconsistent with 
 every just notion of punishment." (v, 164 i) 
 
 Another case of a similar nature is recorded; and he 
 writes to the President of the Court : — 
 
 •• Lieutenant of the — th Regiment was tried for 
 
 1 most unofficer-like and ungcntleman-like conduct/ of which 
 he was honourably acquitted. I request you to revise this sen- 
 tence. The affray m which he was concerned arose in a dis- 
 graceful place; and though, by the activity he showed to quell 
 it, he might merit the acquittal, I should not do my duty if I did 
 not draw attention to the term 'honourably' 
 
 " Honourable acquittal by court-martial should be considered 
 - and soldiers as a subject of exultation; but no man 
 caii exult in the termination of a transaction, a part of which has 
 been disgraceful to him. 
 
 '• Th< ' >>/rabte acquittal of Lieutenant in this sen- 
 tence, which records that he was concerned in an affray origi- 
 nating in a disgraceful place, will connect with such an act the 
 honourable distinction which a court-martial has it in its power 
 to bestow. 
 
 r< I therefore anxiously recommend the Court to omit the 
 word 'honourably' in their sentence. " (v. 217.) 
 
 W« m in fact, almost connected 
 
 with the sul advert to his conduct towards 
 
 officers whom he did not think lit to visit more severely, 
 or t<> try by court-martial, bat whose proceedings merited 
 animadversion; and fo cause it proves what we have 
 already noticed, hi> natural bearing towards leniency. 
 
 It is true that tin- not all confined or in 
 
 some d connected with mffitqey offences, but 
 
188 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 we adduce them as they arise in the course of the Dis- 
 patches, merely to prove that he could take a lenient view 
 of a subject, and that he was not in every case the Iron 
 Duke. 
 
 In the very first movement that he made upon Oporto, 
 in 1809, the Portuguese army was in a very raw and in- 
 efficient state. British officers were attached to parts of 
 it ; and the following letter is addressed to Brigadier 
 Campbell \ — 
 
 " The Adjutant-general has communicated your letter, re- 
 porting the conduct of Captain the Marquis of in absenting 
 
 himself from his battalion without leave, when the troops 
 were in pursuit of the enemy ; and that you had put him in 
 arrest. 
 
 " I am not disposed to carry matters to extremities with the 
 Marquis ; and I beg that you will call him and the officers of the 
 regiment before you, and point out the extreme impropriety of 
 his conduct, and that it is incumbent upon the nobility and 
 persons of fortune and station to set the example. 
 
 " You will tell the Marquis, that / hope the lenity with which 
 his fault has been treated upon this occasion will induce him to 
 be more attentive to his duty ; and you will then release him 
 from his arrest." (iv. 334.) 
 
 Here is exactly a case in which temper, moderation, 
 and a view to ulterior effect, were shown. We may be 
 quite sure that the same lenity would not have been shown 
 to any British officer who had so misconducted himself. 
 Sir Arthur would have felt that the latter ought to know 
 his duty, and would have no excuse ; but the present 
 offender was probably a young man — certainly a young 
 soldier ; and what wouJd have been misplaced lenity in 
 the one case, would act as encouraging forbearance in 
 the other. 
 
 In another case, a Mr. Downie (afterwards Sir John 
 Downie, and who became a lieutenant-general in the 
 
EtESPIl -TIM. 001 BLTB-MARTIAL. 1S9 
 
 service of Spain); who was at that time a commissary in 
 the British service, was induced by a spirit of gallantry 
 to exceed his duty. Sir Arthur writes thus to General 
 Mackenzie, to whom Mr. Downie was attached: — 
 
 "I beg that you will let Mr. Downie know that lie is a 
 commissary, and his business is to collect supplies j and that I 
 am much surprised and highly displeased with him for quitting 
 ition to move forward to Alcantara, where a lew shots were 
 tired, to see what terrice he could render there; as if he could 
 render any >o important as that upon which he was employed by 
 me. I thought he had seen too much service to be so incon- 
 siderate/' (iv. 385.) 
 
 Mr. Downie was apparently hurt at this reprimand, 
 ami Sir Arthur writes again to General Mackenzie : — 
 
 " My objection to his conduct was founded, upon his own 
 report, upon the military principle that the only proper place 
 fur any military officer was that to which he was ordered. 
 Mr, 1 am not irreconcileable upon this or any other 
 subject : I am quite convinced that Mr. Downie did what he 
 thought best for the service; and that a gentleman who feels 
 ly, will take care not to incur the risk of 
 receiving another." (iv. 133.) 
 
 He was not only subjected to the labour of looking 
 through, ami passing final judgment upon, courts- 
 martial which had already been held, but, as we see 
 by the- following letter, had to take cognizance of many 
 Buch cases before they were brought to trial. He 
 writ.- to Major Davy, commanding the 5th battalion, 
 Regiment •. — 
 
 • I have received your letter relative to the charge exhibited 
 by Lieutenant S against Captain A . 
 
 tt Captain A has entirely cleared himself; and I shall 
 
 certainly oot gratify the malicious spirit of Lieutenant S by 
 
 submitting the conduct of Captain A to further inquiry. 
 
 •• I desire also that you will inform Lieutenant S that 
 
190 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 I will not order a court-martial for the trial of Lieutenant de 
 E , the subject of that charge having been already inci- 
 dentally before the general court-martial. 
 
 " I desire you will put Lieutenant S in arrest, for un- 
 
 military conduct in disturbing the harmony which ought to 
 subsist amongst the officers of the regiment. 
 
 " You will keep him in arrest with the regiment, as I 
 know enough of the character and past conduct of that officer to 
 be suspicious that his late conduct is to be attributed to a desire 
 to leave his regiment during the time it may be actively 
 employed." (v. 355.) 
 
 In a letter to Lord Liverpool, 11th April, 1810, he 
 
 says : — 
 
 " The army is becoming healthy : it would, indeed, be an 
 excellent army if the soldiers did not plunder. 
 
 " Several have lately been convicted and executed; which I 
 hope will have effect, as well upon officers as men. It will induce 
 the former to take more pains to keep their men in order, and 
 support the authority of the non-commissioned officers ; and I 
 hope will convince the latter that I possess the power, and am 
 determined to exert it, to punish those who are guilty. I am 
 still apprehensive of the consequence of trying them in any nice 
 operation before the enemy, for they really forget everything 
 when plunder or wine is in their reach." (vi. 30.) 
 
 The difficulty in compelling the magistrates and peo- 
 ple of Portugal to obey the orders (or professed orders) 
 of their Government, for the supply of articles required 
 by the troops, had occasioned a wish, at Lisbon, to esta- 
 blish military law. 
 
 Lord Wellington, as we have already seen, was pain- 
 fully aware of the bad effects resulting from the neglect 
 of the law as it stood, on the part of the inhabitants ; 
 more especially as weakening or destroying the efficiency 
 of military law in his own army; and many readers 
 might imagine that his turn of mind was one which 
 
PINO I 01 IMS-MARTIAL. 191 
 
 would have made him hafl such a proposition with avid- 
 ity. 0\\ the contrary, we find the coolest, the most just, 
 and nmst convincing arguments against it: — 
 
 " What is military law ? As applied to any persons except- 
 ing the annv dor whose government there are particular provi- 
 law), it is neither more nor less than the will of the 
 eral. He punishes, with or without trial, by his own orders. 
 For what object is it to be established in Portugal, except 
 with a view to restrain the people? We have no such object. 
 What we want is : 1st, to make the magistrates do their duty. 
 We may try them by court-martial for neglect, but what punish- 
 ment could it inflict except dismissal from office ? and that the 
 lent Government can do. 2ndly, we want to make the people 
 perform their duties, and supply the articles required by the law. 
 The law which imposes those duties and requires those articles 
 furnishes the means of its own execution, and imposes penalties for 
 non-performance, and it is the duty of the inferior magistrate to 
 impose that penalty. 
 
 " If military law is to supersede every other authority, the 
 
 ps must be the executive officers of the law j and, probably, 
 
 when the enemy may be in the country governed by this law, 
 
 inst Ik- employed in the civil government, instead of 
 
 opposing the enei 
 
 • I>. : ad upon it, military law will only increase our diffi- 
 cult: 13.) 
 
 In pursuing the perusal of the Dispatches, which ex- 
 tend over >o long a time and embrace so many Bubjects, 
 it is difficult to separate all the subjects referred to under 
 precise and definite heads. The present section relates 
 more especially to the Duke's conduct and feelings upon 
 the subject of conrts^martia] ; hut that has an almost in- 
 ble connexion with his conduct towards officers, of 
 pr to whom he might have been obliged to address himself 
 upon - 3 not deserving more severe treatment. V- e 
 
 have already adduced one or and others may 
 
 present themselves hereafter, though mixed with more 
 
192 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 important ones ; but in them all there is a quiet, gentle- 
 manly, yet feeling severity, that makes them striking 
 and remarkable. 
 
 Colonel Peacocke was left as Commandant at Lisbon ; 
 he had had some disagreement with Lieut. -colonel Walsh, 
 who was also left there in command of detachments and 
 convalescents. 
 
 Lord Wellington feels that Colonel Peacocke has put 
 himself in the wrong, and this is the tone of his repri- 
 mand, if it may be so called : — 
 
 " I consider that Lieut. -col. Walsh in his line has ren- 
 dered very essential service to the army ; and I am so little 
 disposed to allow him to be removed from either of the offi- 
 ces of which he has, till you took the command, done the duty 
 in a satisfactory manner ; that if these complaints should con- 
 tinue I shall be under the necessity of making an entirely 
 new arrangement at Lisbon, however disagreeable it may be to 
 me." (v. 163.) 
 
 The following is an admirable specimen of a courteous 
 yet stern refusal to an unreasonable application : — 
 
 " It always gives me great concern to be under the necessity 
 of refusing compliance with a request, and I might have hoped 
 to be spared this by one who must know that I would gratify 
 him if it were in my power ; and who must be aware that it is 
 absolutely without precedent that any officer should ask, much 
 less obtain, leave of absence, on any account, excepting that of 
 sickness or of business, the neglect of which may be prejudicial. 
 
 " I repeat that I cannot give leave to any officer whose health 
 does not require his return to England, or who has not busi- 
 ness which cannot be done by another, or delayed. You cannot 
 bring forward either of these pleas. Your health is good ; and as 
 for your business, I know of none that can require your imme- 
 diate return, which would not have required that you should 
 have remained, when you left England six months ago. 
 
 " I trust that I shall be spared the pain of again refusing 
 you." (v. 302.) 
 
 
RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 193 
 
 The following is a private letter to Mr. Vifliers, 
 which, though not immediately referring to any military 
 
 event or person, is worth notice from its friendly and 
 playful mode of giving a reproof: — 
 
 " I am concerned to be obliged to make any complaint of 
 any protv(/c of yours, but I must say that I think I have some 
 cause to complain of Mr. . 
 
 " He was appointed by me to the Commissariat in June, and 
 on the 16th of July he writes a letter to the Lords of the Trea- 
 sury, in which he gives them to understand neither more nor 
 i 98 than that the Commissary -general and all his officers, as 
 well as myself; are either knaves or fools ; and that he can save 
 thousands to the public by some new mode he has discovered of 
 supplying the troops with bread! 
 
 '• Now I must say, if Mr. has made any discovery it 
 
 im his di/f ij to apprize me of it; and, at least, to try whether 
 our failure to save the public these thousands upon thousands 
 was to be attributed to knavery or folly, before he wrote to the 
 Treasury upon the subject. " (v. 376.) 
 
 In a subsequent letter he says •. — 
 
 M As tor Mr. , I only beg that he will not write letters 
 
 to the Treasury on subjects which he does not understand. - " (v. 
 380.) 
 
 1 [e appears in all his correspondence to have had a very 
 high opinion of General R. Crawfurd, who commanded 
 the Light Division, and had been the most in advance 
 towards the enemy during the whole winter of 1809-10. 
 In Borne letters a probable necessity for withdrawing 
 some of those regiments was communicated, and by the 
 tone of Lord Wellington's letter we may inter that it 
 was unsatisfactory to the General: for Lord Wellington 
 concludes one letter 1»\ saying: — 
 
 " You may depend upon it, however, that whatever may be the 
 arrangement which I shall make, I \\\>\\ your brigade to he m 
 the advanced guard/'' vi. 8 ! 
 
194 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 We do not, of course, hear what reply the General 
 made ; but in all probability it was with some warmth, 
 and apparently accompanied with a proposition of re- 
 signing, as we may infer from the following : — 
 
 " In answer to your letter of the 17th, I will only tell 
 you that it has excited any feeling in my mind excepting anger. 
 I have already told you that I shall regret exceedingly the ex- 
 istence of a necessity to place in other hands the command of 
 our advanced guard ; and I shall regret it particularly if it should 
 deprive me of your assistance altogether. 
 
 " I shall be able, in a day or two, to make arrangements 
 that may enable me to leave you in the command of your divi- 
 sion, which I am very anxious to do." (vi. 48.) 
 
 We must acknowledge that a man in his position of 
 a more hasty and intemperate nature, or one of a more 
 sullen, and what in common parlance might be called a 
 huffy temper, would not have been so placably disposed ; 
 and we find many communications afterwards which 
 never testify the slightest symptoms of any angry feeling. 
 
 A most friendly letter follows very soon • — 
 
 " Nothing can be more advantageous to me, or can give me 
 more satisfaction, than to receive the assistance of your opinion 
 upon any subject ; but you may depend upon it, there are few of 
 the general arrangements which have not been maturely con- 
 sidered by me. I request, therefore, that whenever you see 
 reason to wish to make any alteration you will let me know it ; 
 but do not make the alteration without reference to me.' 3 (vi. 87.) 
 
 Cases of this nature, occurring between himself and 
 the senior or more responsible officers of his army, were, 
 of course, the cause of much anxiety to him ; and we 
 have abundant proofs of his desire to avoid public ani- 
 madversion, or to make the matter worse by public 
 exposure. He had a natural repugnance to all courts of 
 inquiry, or courts-martial, excepting in cases of absolute 
 
RESPB1 TING i OURTS-MARTIAL. I 96 
 
 necessity ; and, whan possible, he always endeavoured to 
 avoid them. But it was not the rank of the officer that 
 deterred him ; a junior ensign was as sure of a just view 
 of his case as a general oifiecr. In a letter to General 
 Sherbrooke we find : — 
 
 11 Upon considering the charge against Ensign of the 
 
 and the second charge, founded solely upon his 
 
 writing certain letters, I think them so frivolous that I shall he 
 obliged to yon to call before you General , and the com- 
 manding officer of the regiment, and Ensign , and inform 
 
 them that I consider the first charge as frivolous, and the second 
 
 as groundless; and, therefore, that I have ordered Ensign 
 
 to be released from his arrest. At the same time I beg you to 
 
 point out to Ensign that I will not allow him to disobey 
 
 any order of his commanding officer, however trifling; and that 
 the next time he errs he shall certainly be brought to trial." (v. 
 154.) 
 
 a It is always my wish to attend to the recommendation of 
 _ •.« ral court-martial; but I am desirous that the Court of 
 which you arc President should reconsider their recommend- 
 ation in favor of Lieut. of the Dragoons. It appears 
 
 to be founded solely on the length of his confinement, which, I 
 must observe, has been in arrest at large. This has been owing 
 
 to Lieut. himself, as he did not know the officer or the 
 
 regiment to whom he asserted that he reported himself, and 
 from whom he declared that he received orders to go to Lisbon ; 
 and I would heir the Court to consider that, if length of confine- 
 ment i- considered and admitted as a ground of recommend- 
 ation in this instance, it ought hi every one in which the pub- 
 lic convenience may render the delay of the trial of an officer 
 jsary." ri. 41! 
 
 A Regimental Surgeon had been fried by a court- 
 martial for having confined a man in the guard-house 
 upon a charge of having stolen a marc, and afterwards 
 having agreed to liberate the man if he would pay 
 
 sixty dollars ; of which lie \va< honOUTobh acquitted. 
 
196 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 Lord Wellington sends the sentence back for revision, 
 and adds : — 
 
 " Whatever may be the opinion as to the prisoner's guilt 
 or innocence, I would suggest that it is not an honorable 
 transaction to take money from a supposed thief, in order to 
 compromise a prosecution for robbery; and there is nothing 
 
 which entitles Surgeon to the distinction of an honourable 
 
 acquittal. 
 
 " Surgeon confined the man for justice, or for money. 
 
 If for justice, he abandoned it, and made a compromise for 
 60 dollars, which is not an honourable transaction. If for 
 money, the charge is proved, and the Court should sentence 
 accordingly. 
 
 " It gives me concern to differ with the Court ; and I shall 
 
 assure them that I have no knowledge of Surgeon ; that I 
 
 brought him to trial as an act of duty ; and that, as far as he is 
 concerned, I am indifferent as to the result. 
 
 " I have a feeling, however, for the honour of the army, and 
 for the character of the country for justice ; and I hope the 
 Court will see the necessity of supporting the discipline and 
 character of the army by marking their own disapprobation of 
 the transaction." (vii. 70.) 
 
 A frivolous charge, arising out of private quarrels 
 and abusive letters between three British officers in the 
 Portuguese army, had been laid before him : — 
 
 " I do not think it proper to employ the time of the officers 
 of the army in investigating the truth or falsehood of all the 
 nonsense these contain. Nor do I think it expedient to expose 
 to the Portuguese army, by such an investigation, the weakness 
 and the futility of the disputes of those who, to be of any use 
 to them, or to do credit to the British army, must command 
 respect. 
 
 " I am of opinion that you should recommmend to the Prince 
 Regent to dismiss the gentleman who does not attend to the 
 admonition to reconcile the differences; and you may depend 
 upon it, that I will take care not to admit such a firebrand into 
 the medical department of this army. 
 
RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 197 
 
 Uthough I do not deem it expedient to assemble a general 
 court-martial for the investigation of these charges, I cannot 
 
 hem by without animadverting upon the spirit with which 
 they have been formed, and how necessary it is that it should 
 be crushed, it' we do not wish to expose to the curiosity of the 
 public in this country a scene of vindictive but childish slander, 
 such as, perhaps, has never before come out before a general 
 court-martial/'' (vii. 167.) 
 
 These cases are. perhaps, trifling in themselves ; but 
 they show how the time was occupied, and the mind was 
 worn, of a man who had much more important duties 
 to attend to. And when we see the sound practical 
 common-sense and the honourable feeling with which he 
 animadverts upon them, we cannot but testify our feeling 
 of admiration and approbation. 
 
 A complaint having been forwarded from the Com- 
 mander-in-chief's office at home, of delay in respect to 
 a court-martial, he says : — 
 
 " In an army so large and so dispersed as it is in general, 
 it i- not at all times possible to collect the members of a court, 
 and the witnesses who it is necessary should attend ; and when 
 a court is assembled its proceedings must be suspended when 
 the army, or that part of it, are in operation against the enemy. 
 I am much concerned if any officer suffers from delay in bring- 
 ing him to trial, or in bringing it to a conclusion. It can 
 > object to me to delay a trial ; on the contrary : but I 
 must take rare that it when it does take place it is one in earnest, 
 and that the law is attended to. 
 
 " If the mode of trial by court-martial is inconvenient in 
 active service, the fault i^ the law, and, I hope, not in the mode 
 in which it is carried into execution." (viii. 163.) 
 
 We have already adduced several instances of his 
 
 reluctance to push matters to extremity, and to avert the 
 
 mty of trial, by urging the offender to adopt some 
 
i 
 
 198 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 course which would enable him to avoid it. Here is 
 another case : — 
 
 " I am very desirous to prevent these charges coming before 
 a court-martial. 
 
 " You imagine that you have reason to complain of an order 
 issued by your commanding officer, and you have remonstrated. 
 I put out of the question the justice or injustice of that order 
 for the present, as bearing in no manner on the case. If 
 you address your superior officer, you must avoid the use of 
 offensive terms. You sent a letter containing the terms ' totally 
 destitute of foundation;' 'the reverse of what has been stated ; y 
 'gross injustice to yourself 3 I believe it will be admitted that 
 such expressions would not be tolerated in private life, much less 
 can the use of them be allowed from an officer to his superior, 
 upon an order issued by that superior. These expressions are 
 entirely unnecessary : your object was to show General Camp- 
 bell that he was mistaken respecting the — th Regiment ; your 
 comments were not necessary, and when conveyed in offensive 
 terms, would appear as if added only for the purpose of 
 offending. 
 
 " The discussion cannot lead to any good, and if the Court 
 view it in the light that I do, you will be in a situation in which 
 I should be concerned to see an officer of your rank. I request 
 you, therefore, to reconsider the subject ; and nothing will give 
 me more pleasure than to have succeeded in prevailing upon 
 you to recall expressions which nqfcbing should have provoked 
 you to use." (viii. 199.) 
 
 The majority of -these cases were not likely to be 
 attended with more severe punishment to the delin- 
 quent than being obliged to quit the service, or degrada- 
 tion of some sort. But we now meet with one in which 
 the offence must have been more heavily visited ; and 
 it is impossible not to be alive to the feeling manner 
 in which Lord Wellington looks at it, with reference to 
 the officer implicated, combined with the manly, honest 
 
RESrECTINC COURTS-MARTIAL. 199 
 
 wav in which he looks upon its ill effects upon the army 
 
 at large. 
 
 An officer of the Brunswick troops had been accused 
 of cowardice in the presence of the enemy. He had after- 
 wards applied for leave of absence or to resign, which 
 
 was refused : — 
 
 " I have delayed to reply to your Ilighncss's letter till I 
 had received information regarding Lieutenant 
 
 " I recollect to have refused him leave of absence after the 
 siege of Badajoz, or to accept his resignation, because I was not 
 aware of the circumstances : if I had been made acquainted with 
 what had occurred, I should have thought it desirable that he 
 should quit the service. 
 
 " The instances of want of spirit amongst the officers are 
 \ ery rare, and the example of punishment for this crime is not 
 required ; and this being the case, I should wish to avoid giving 
 the soldiers a notion that an officer can behave otherwise than recti 
 in the presence of the enemy : and if there should be an unfor- 
 tunate person who fails in this respect, I would prefer to 
 allow him to retire to a private station rather than expose his 
 weakness. 
 
 " I beg your Highness to accept his resignation, and to 
 allow him to return to Germany, as being in every respect unfit 
 to serve His Majesty in your Dighness's regiment; at the same 
 time, that it is not expedient to expose his weakness by bringing 
 him to trial before a general court-martial." (viii. 233.) 
 
 These are proofs that his leading object in all such 
 - - had reference to the (fleet upon the army at larg 
 upon all the classes and ranks of it. The soldiers could 
 not he kept in a state of discipline if their officers set 
 them the example of insubordination. If a case was 
 made public by being brought before a court, every 
 soldier in the army would be apprised that officers bad 
 been charged with offences of the aame sort wthemsek 
 Though it was not potable to avoid it on all occasions, 
 
200 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 his object was to maintain discipline, but without ex- 
 posure. 
 
 The court-martial held upon a soldier for desertion 
 and for serving with the enemy had found him guilty, but 
 recommended him to mercy. Lord Wellington writes to 
 the President : — 
 
 " There is not a shadow of a doubt that this soldier deserted ; 
 and having deserted, served in the enemy's ranks. Indeed, if he 
 had not so served, he could not have been taken in the battle at 
 Salamanca. After being taken, he did everything in his power 
 to conceal himself, and denied all knowledge of his comrade of 
 the 66th, who happened to be in the hospital and recognised 
 him. These facts, all proving his guilt, are perfectly known, 
 at least, to the regiment to which he belongs ; and yet the 
 Court having found him guilty, and passed sentence of death, 
 have recommended that / should pardon him. 
 
 " I wish the Court to reconsider their recommendation, and 
 particularly to consider the task they throw upon me, whose 
 duty it is to uphold the discipline and efficiency of the army. 
 If they persist, I shall certainly attend to it ; but I must say, 
 that this case is the most clearly proved of any that has come 
 before me, of premeditated desertion to the enemy, and of sub- 
 sequent service in his ranks ; and that it does become general 
 courts-martial to take serious notice of a crime of this nature 
 so proved, in an army in which, amongst other crimes, desertion 
 is so prevalent/' (x. 98.) 
 
 In another case of an officer who had been found 
 guilty, but recommended to mercy, he writes : — 
 
 " I would beg the Court to observe, that it is never thought 
 necessary to trouble a court with any but cases carrying an 
 appearance of an extra ordinary degree of guilt ; and it is a 
 waste of public time, and in itself very extraordinary, that a 
 court having the guilt proved, and having convicted the prisoner 
 by their sentence, and decreed a punishment, should then do 
 worse than defeat all the objects of the trial by holding up an 
 
RESlTi TIM; COURTS-MARTIAL. 201 
 
 example o( impunity, procured through the means of the very 
 tribunal appointed to maintain the good order of the army. 
 
 u I am quite convinced, that if I were to exercise my own 
 judgment on their recommendations, or if courts-martial were to 
 consider them (as they are") mistaken lenity, and were to be more 
 sparing o{ them, the army would be in a better state. " 
 
 " The Court have found Lieut. guilty c of behaving in 
 
 a scandalous, infamous manner, unbecoming an officer and a gen- 
 tleman/ In the whole catalogue of military crimes, it is hardly 
 ile to tind one more enormous or injurious to the service. 
 
 n Supposing I I.R.I I. the Prince Regent should attend to 
 their recommendation, do the Court believe that the officers of 
 his regiment would associate with a man to whom such infamy 
 attached ? Is there any regiment in the service of which the 
 officers would not think it a disgrace to associate with him ? Is 
 there an officer of the Court who would not consider himself 
 iced, if he were seen in company with him ? 
 
 " His R.H. will be called upon to pardon an officer for a 
 crime so infamous that neither the officers of the corps to which 
 he belongs, nor of any other in the army, will associate with 
 him. 
 
 " I entreat the Court to feel that confidence in the justice 
 and propriety of their sentence which it deserves, and to allow 
 it to L r o without recommendation. If they still desire it, I shall 
 send it to England, but without remark on my part; as I never 
 will be instrumental in retaining in His Majesty's service as an 
 officer, a person found guilty of scandalous and infamous con- 
 duet, and of forcing him into the society of officers, by whom to 
 
 ciate with him will be deemed disgrace." (x. 315.) 
 
 An allegation had been made against a particnlar 
 _ oent lor misconduct during the battle of Vittoria. If 
 it were well-founded, Lord Wellington felt that the officer 
 who commanded it must be brought to trial. If the 
 cut. as n body x had been disgracefully repulsed, it 
 would, of course, reflect upon the commanding officer, 
 who must take his Fate. If it was only a pari of the 
 regiment which had given wav. a- such tilings must be 
 
202 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS 
 
 expected, it would not require further inquiry. Lord 
 Wellington had himself seen the regiment shortly before 
 the event spoken of, and with his characteristic leniency 
 is the person to suggest the latter view of the case, and 
 concludes his letter thus : — 
 
 " Under these circumstances, and adverting to the desire in 
 which we must all participate, that there should be no discussion 
 on the conduct of any part of the army which gained such a 
 victory, I would request you to consider whether your censure 
 would not apply exclusively to the light infantry or other skir- 
 mishers in front of the regiment. If it would not, we must bring 
 the major to a court-martial. " (x. 530.) 
 
 A corps had been formed to assist the Provost-mar- 
 shal of the army in the repression of disorders, selected 
 from all the cavalry regiments, and called the Staff Corps. 
 The duties were, perhaps, severe (though there was some 
 pecuniary advantage), and, as acting against men of the 
 same class of life as themselves, perhaps somewhat 
 odious ; but, as Lord Wellington observed, — 
 
 " If the odium is accompanied with danger ; if a serjeant can 
 be resisted with impunity when endeavouring to prevent a pri- 
 vate from plundering \ if such sergeant (as appears by this 
 court-martial) is put in fear of his life, and is actually obliged to 
 remonstrate with the private soldier to induce him not to shoot 
 him ; what can he expected ? 
 
 " There is no crime so fatal to the very existence of an army, 
 and no crime which officers, sworn as members of a court, should 
 feel so anxious to punish, as that of which this soldier has been 
 guilty. 
 
 " It is very unpleasant to me to resist the inclination of the 
 Court to save the life of this man ; but if the impunity with 
 which this offence will have been committed should occasion 
 resistance to authority in other instances, the supposed mercy 
 will turn out extreme cruelty, and occasion the loss of some 
 valuable men, I recommend the Court to withdraw their 
 
RESPECTING COURTS-MARTIAL. 203 
 
 recommendation, and to allow the law to take its course/' 
 
 (xi. 3:28.) 
 
 The following case, with the particulars of which we 
 arc not acquainted, was, probably, of a heinous nature. 
 The culprits were all foreigners, and not with his own 
 army. It is the first instance which we have met with, 
 during the long and severe trials to which his temper 
 and patience had been exposed, where we find him 
 offering no extenuating considerations, and taking so 
 sweeping and severe a view of it : — 
 
 " I have received the eight proceedings against certain sol- 
 diera of Dillon's regiment, and confirmed them all. 
 
 u I desire that and may be pardoned ; that 
 
 and and lance-corporal may be shot; and that the 
 
 remainder should draw lots for one more to be shot : according 
 to the sentence of the Court. The other eleven are to have the 
 choice of corporal punishment or to be executed, according to 
 sentence : those who are punished to receive not more than 300 
 la>hes. 
 
 " The punishment to take place in the most solemn manner, 
 in presence of the troops, to be paraded for the purpose; and 
 care to be taken to impress upon them that their entrance into 
 tlit service is voluntary, and that any attempt to desert will be 
 followed by certain punishment." (xi. 340.) 
 
 A Deputy-purveyor had been tried for neglect of 
 duty, in not attending to certain sick and wounded men. 
 The Court found him guilty, but passed a lenient sen- 
 tence, stating that " no material injury had occurred to 
 the service." Lord Wellington desired them to revise 
 their sentence, and comments upon the case : — 
 
 " I recommend the Court to omit that remark; as it con- 
 veys a notion that their sentence has been lenient, because the 
 gentleman's conduct Wl tble, U he had ordered an infe- 
 
 rior officer to attend the wounded. This it a principle very erro- 
 
204 CONDUCT AND FEELINGS, ETC. 
 
 neous, and very detrimental to the service. Every officer is 
 personally responsible for the execution of the orders which he 
 receives from his superiors, and I am responsible for the whole. 
 It is no excuse for me, or any other officer, to state that he 
 ordered an inferior to carry it into execution. Instances may 
 occur when an officer receiving an order may be under the 
 necessity, or it may be his duty, to entrust it to another ; but in 
 this case there was no such necessity. 
 
 " If the Court agree with me, they will consider whether the 
 punishment they have inflicted is adequate to the offence. A 
 
 person in Mr. 's situation has but few duties to perform : 
 
 but those, however trifling, are important to the service, and the 
 well-being of the soldier. 
 
 " It is the duty of a court-martial to prevent such neglect, 
 and the chance of suffering to the soldiers, by the punishment 
 they inflict ; and this Court will judge whether they have per- 
 formed that duty by their sentence/'' (xi. 404.) 
 
HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 
 
 Here ended his vexations and annoyance from the weak 
 and paltry Portuguese; and from the wretched and con- 
 temptible Spanish Government. 
 
 He entered the French territory in December, and it 
 is curious and interesting to observe the difference of his 
 bearing and conduct. 
 
 From a very early period after his second arrival at 
 the head of the army at Lisbon, he had been subjected 
 to all the paltry intrigues which we have already re- 
 corded ; and, upon principle, had submitted to them with 
 a forbearance that probably would have been shown by 
 no other general so circumstanced, lie felt that he was in 
 the kingdom of Portugal as an ally, and as such, that he 
 was subject to the laws and government of that country. 
 He had writhed under the vexatious indignities to which 
 the acting Government had subjected him ; and though 
 
 LUSt have felt on many occasions that he could have 
 enforced his own view-, it would have been in violation 
 of the high principles which always influenced him. 
 
 He -:\'A, Bfl we have already seen (p. LOO), that his 
 
 situation would have been preferable in an enemy % coun- 
 
 we could take what we required; but, even 
 
 under the highest provocation, he would not permit his 
 
 is to proceed to extremities in the country of an 
 
 ally. 
 
206 HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 
 
 Some measures of that nature had occurred near 
 the frontier of Portugal, in May 1810, and we find his 
 firm and strong determination to permit nothing of the 
 sort. Writing to Colonel Cox, governor of Almeida, 
 and afterwards, upon the same subject, to General Craw- 
 furd, he says : — 
 
 " Neither I, nor any other officer in the British service, has 
 the power of confining and punishing a magistrate, whatever 
 may be the nature of his crime ; and / certainly shall not permit 
 such a practice. I beg to know the officer, or the civil magis- 
 trate of Castello Bom, who received corporal punishment." 
 (vi. 119.) 
 
 " I wish to mention to you, that neither I nor any other 
 officer of the British army have the power of confining or punish- 
 ing magistrates or others in Portugal. All that can be done is 
 to report them to me : and I shall order them to head-quarters, 
 and thence to Lisbon to be punished by the Government." (vi. 
 120.) 
 
 There can be little doubt that he would have been 
 heartily supported by his own army, who were half 
 starved on many occasions by the infamous neglect of 
 those whose country they were defending ; and there can 
 be as little doubt that he would have been equally sup- 
 ported by the Portuguese army, who were well aware 
 that their only chance of ultimate success depended upon 
 him. But, strong as these considerations were, and 
 almost irresistible as the temptation must frequently 
 have been to take the law into his own hands, he did 
 resist, and went through to the last. 
 
 The impediments from the Portuguese were rather 
 passive, and indolent neglect of what was required ; but 
 the vexations which he experienced from the Spanish Go- 
 vernment were even worse : for, in addition to the same 
 neglect as to provisions and means of transport, the in- 
 
HIS ENTRY INTO FUAM1 . 00? 
 
 tolerable vanity of the national character (at least of that 
 class who had the power in their hands) made it almost 
 impossible to deal with them. Their army was said to 
 be numerically strong, but it was useless, because it 
 was immovable, either from want of equipment or of dis- 
 cipline ; and when at times it was in some measure more 
 complete in arms and clothing by the assistance of Eng- 
 land, the empty vapouring of the higher authorities, and 
 the boasting bravado of those who called themselves sol- 
 diers. invariably led to attempts against the enemy which 
 inevitably failed. They were always clamorous with 
 Lord Wellington to induce him to advance and to co- 
 operate, though it was obvious to any military man that 
 they wire unequal to the task ; and when, on one or two 
 occasions, he was induced to yield to their importunity, 
 they invariably neglected every precaution which he had 
 •1, and deserted him at the important moment. 
 In fact, from the moment he set foot in their country he 
 ■ever received cordial support, either from the civil or the 
 military authorities. 
 
 His entry upon the soil of France placed him, how- 
 ever, upon a new footing. He was then in an enemy s 
 country, and was justified in using the powers of a con- 
 queror. But his efforts, even in that capacity, were most 
 earnestly directed to prevent his army from committing 
 depredations, and to obtain the supplies for them through 
 the regular established authorities, instead of by force 
 and violence. Every letter to officers commanding divi- 
 sion- or brigades of his army, whether British or foreign, 
 directed to this point: and he published numerous 
 proclamations, calling upon all public functionaries to 
 continue at their posts, and upon the inhabitants gene- 
 rally not to quit their habitations. !!<• had acted upon 
 the same principles in Spain and Portugal, and m each 
 
208 HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 
 
 country had found how useless his efforts were, and how 
 feebly (if at all) he was seconded by the authorities. 
 But there, as we have said, he was an ally. His high 
 sense of duty would not permit him to fly in the face of 
 the Constitutional Government ; and although he saw his 
 soldiers in many cases almost dying of famine, he would 
 not attempt to take power into his own hand, or permit 
 his officers to do so. 
 
 Here, however, in France, the case was different. 
 He had the power, and with the firmness which was 
 inherent in him he exercised it. 
 
 He wished and endeavoured to confide everything 
 (not inconsistent with military security) to the mayors 
 and municipal officers of every district ; and all his letters 
 and addresses to them are couched in a tone calculated 
 to uphold their authority. 
 
 But when they attempted to set him at defiance, and 
 to give themselves airs, his conduct was very different 
 from what it had been in Spain. He must have been 
 equally conscious in each case of the injury resulting to 
 the service from the presumption, the arrogance, or the 
 insolence of the individual ; and it is impossible to 
 believe that he could have been insensible to the per- 
 sonal disrespect to himself. But in the one case he was 
 acting as the ally of the nation to which the offender 
 belonged, and therefore appealed for redress to the Go- 
 vernment of that nation ; in the other case he was, for the 
 time, virtually the chief of the country which he had con- 
 quered, and might make his own rules. 
 
 Disturbances caused by the plunder and irregular 
 conduct of some of the Spanish troops under Mina, in 
 Sir W. Beresford's division, had created a strong feeling 
 of hostility amongst the peasantry, more particularly in 
 the villages of Bidarry and Baygorry. The feeling and 
 
UTS ENTRY INTO PB INC] 209 
 
 conduct of these peasants might have been quite natural, 
 and in fact justifiable; but it was essential to the safety 
 
 of the army to put a step to it. 
 
 The Duke's language upon the occasion is the first 
 instance which we meet with of a threat. On the 28th 
 January he writes to Sir William Beresford, who had 
 
 secured some of the offenders : — 
 
 " I enclose a letter which shall go to you in print; and I 
 will he obliged to yon to reach an d have it explained, to the 
 gentry you have with you, and send off one of them with an 
 officer of the Staff Corps to give it to the people of Bidarry and 
 Baygony. You may also give the person you send to under- 
 stanch that if I have further reason to complain of these or any 
 other villages, I will act towards them as the French did towards 
 the towns and villages in Spain and Portugal ; that is, I will 
 totally destroy them, and hang up all the people belonging to 
 them that I shall finch 
 
 " Let the rest of the people of Bidarry be detained till we 
 
 what effect my letter produces." (xi. 483.) 
 
 He here felt the necessity of showing the authority 
 which he possessed to subdue turbulence ; but it is 
 char that the natural goodness of his disposition was 
 predominant. Is it possible to suppose that an austere, 
 violent, ill-tempered man, embittered perhaps by well- 
 grounded causes of offence, writing to his officers, and 
 threatening to burn houses and hang their inhabit- 
 ant-, would have commenced his letter by alluding to 
 " those gentry whom you have with you?" The kindly 
 feeling of the man appears ID every line, not withstanding 
 In- authoritative denunciations, though we cannot under- 
 take to say what he might have been compelled to do, 
 
 if fore 
 
 He issued a proclamation respecting mayors and 
 other civil officers throughout all the country which he 
 had conquered. It was not unnatural thai these injuno- 
 
 p 
 
210 HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 
 
 tions should have been received with angry feelings, and 
 rather negligently complied with ; and we find that he 
 was obliged to write to Sir W. Beresford, in whose can- 
 tonments there had been some difficulty or disturbance. 
 
 " I send you all the proclamations respecting mayors, civic 
 guards, &c, and will send you more when I get them. 
 
 " If your adjoints (assistants to the mayors) will not con- 
 tinue in office, call together the respectable inhabitants, and tell 
 them that a civil government is much more interesting to them 
 than to me : that I will make them comply with my orders, 
 whether they have a magistrate or not ; and that they had much 
 better have the protection of a magistrate than be without one, 
 and that I require them to name one." (xi. 541.) 
 
 Here is certainly the exercise of authority and the 
 dictation of power, but it is not arhitrary. It is tem- 
 perate, it is cool : it is issued more for the benefit of the 
 conquered than the conqueror ; and even in cases where 
 he might have been justified in taking the law entirely 
 into his own hands, by the military at his command, and 
 exercising summary justice upon those who had given 
 him cause of offence, he prefers doing it through the 
 proper course. 
 
 Some disturbances (the Dispatches do not say what, 
 or whether connected with our troops) had occurred at a 
 place called Hagetnau. Lord Wellington writes to the 
 mayor : — 
 
 " Vous aurez la bonte de faire arreter Dupay, ancien maire ; 
 Saubigne, ex-adjoint ; et le norame Mathieu, ex-employe des 
 droits reunis ; et tout autre qui ont eu part dans P affaire des 
 partisans a Hagetnau. Pour moi, je suis en cela l'exemple des 
 generaux Francais, et je fais pendre tous ceux qui font le 
 metier de partisans, et je ferai bruler leurs maisons. Je serais 
 fache d'etre oblige de faire avancer les troupes pour maintenir 
 la police." (xi. 601.) 
 
 It may seem rather ironical to request one mayor to 
 
BIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 211 
 
 have the goodness to arrest his predecessor; but it shows 
 the tone and temper which characterised all his pro- 
 ceedings 
 
 It was not to be expected, however, that the national 
 vanity, combined with the natural exasperation at the 
 fact of their being now under the rod and domination of 
 a foreign (and perhaps, of all others, a British) army, 
 should be entirely subdued. And it was to be expected 
 that many a vain jack-in-ofh'ce would hardly conform 
 without some swaau'er, though we have no reason to 
 believe that this conduct was extensive or prolonged. 
 The following proves, that when it did show itself it did 
 not pass unnoticed. 
 
 The Earl of Dalhousie had been left in charge of the 
 troops near Bordeaux, which town had declared in favour 
 of the Bourbons ; and our fleet were making arrange- 
 ments for coming into the Garonne. Sir William 
 Beresford had occasion to communicate with the fleet ; 
 but the person who was sent with his letter was stopped 
 by the mayor of a place called La Teste. Lord Welling- 
 ton writes to Lord Dalhousie : — 
 
 M When your lord-skip shall send in that direction you will 
 take that mayor prisoner, and send him to my head-quarters. If 
 mayors of villages are each to have a military force Bent to them 
 t<» receive their Parma] surrender, they must be considered as 
 military men, and must be made prisoners of war. I shall con- 
 sider them accordingly and will send Monsieur le Maire de la 
 a prisoner of war to England when he falls into my 
 hands." 
 
 Here is the Bame firmness and determination, but 
 accompanied by the same calmness and temper. The 
 petulant vanity of tin- Frenchman had obstructed public 
 business. Jt was \.<c^^ [ yx to check such presumption, 
 but it was not of the urgenl character to require moving 
 
212 HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 
 
 a regiment. Lord Dalhousie is merely instructed, or 
 rather requested, " when he shall send in that direction' 
 (as if he was going out hunting or coursing), to catch 
 this mayor ! We have no further record of the fate of 
 the mayor ; but the whole proceeding is strongly illus- 
 trative of the calm, easy, playful (though not-to-be- 
 trifled- with) temper of Lord Wellington. 
 
 We have no further instance of it during the short 
 remainder of that campaign ; but a knowledge of what 
 was likely to be the consequence would probably check 
 any exuberant display of importance. 
 
 A very similar case arose the following year in 
 another part of France, when the British army moved up 
 to Paris after the battle of Waterloo. 
 
 The sous-prefet of Pontoise had thought proper to 
 refuse compliance with a requisition made upon him, — a 
 course which the Duke adopted in all cases of provisions 
 or forage ; not with a view of paying for what was 
 received, but to avoid abuse and plunder on the part of 
 the troops. 
 
 The Duke's letter appears to have been almost an 
 excess of ironical politeness : — 
 
 " Monsieur, j'ai ordonne qu'on vous fasse prisonnier parce- 
 que ayant envoye une requisition a Pontoise pour des vivres, 
 vous avez repondue que vous ne les donneriez pas sans qu'on 
 envoie une force militaire assez forte pour les prendre. 
 Vous vous etes done mis dans le cas des militaires, etje vous fais 
 prisonnier de guerre, et je vous envoie en Angleterre. 
 
 " Si je vous traitais comme Pusurpateur et ses adherens ont 
 traite les habitans des pays ou ils on fait la guerre, je vous 
 ferais fusilier : mais, comme vous vous etes constitue guerrier, 
 je vous fais prisonnier de guerre." (xii. 556.) 
 
 The choice of the word guerrier to this self-sufficient 
 gentleman is inimitable, and we can really picture to 
 
HIS ENTRY INTO FRANCE. 218 
 
 ourselves the Duke's chuckle at sending this letter, and 
 afterwards sending off Monsieur le Sous-prefet to Eng- 
 land, — if he ever went ! 
 
 We are not writing the Duke's memoirs, or a history 
 of his military deeds, and we have not thought it neccs- 
 sai'v to sav anything respecting his transactions between 
 the termination of hostilities at Toulouse and the final 
 march to Paris after Waterloo. 
 
 We have followed him, as far as our professed object 
 is concerned, through the whole of his glorious and 
 eventful life. We believe that we have adduced abun- 
 dant evidence, from the most unquestionable sources, to 
 prove what we set out with saying, — that there never 
 existed a more noble, great, and glorious spirit; and with 
 that impression we leave his example for the admiration 
 and imitation of his fellow-countrymen. 
 
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LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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