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 DUGALD STEWART'S WORKS, 
 
 
 WITH ADDITIONS. 
 
 
 OUR DUTIES TO GOJD. 
 
 
 Selected, Prepared and Published 
 
 
 BY 
 
 
 ROSS WINANS. 
 
 
 BALTIMORE: 
 JOHN P. DES FOEGES. 
 
 1 1872. 
 
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 GLEANINGS 
 
 FKOM 
 
 Dugald Stewart's Works, with Additions. 
 
 OUR DUTIES TO GOD. 
 
 The study of philosophy in all its various 
 branches, both natural and moral, affords at 
 every step a new illustration of the subject to 
 which these investigations relate, insomuch that 
 the truths of natural religion gain an accession 
 of evidence from every addition that is made to 
 the stock of human knowledge. 
 
 In considering the universe with a view to 
 the illustration of the wisdom and unity of 
 God, it is, in a peculiar degree, satisfactory to 
 trace the relations which different parts of it 
 bear to each other, and to remark the concur- 
 rence of things, apparently unconnected and 
 even remote, in promoting the same benevolent 
 purposes. 
 
The adaptation of the bodies and of the in- 
 stincts of animals to those particular climates 
 and districts of the earth for which they are 
 destined. 
 
 The relations subsisting between particular 
 animals and particular vegetables ; the latter 
 furnishing to the former salutary food in their 
 healthful state and useful remedies in the case 
 of disease. 
 
 The relations which different tribes of ani- 
 mals bear to each other, one tribe being the 
 natural prey of another, and each of them hav- 
 ing their instruments of offence or defence pro- 
 vided accordingly. 
 
 The relations which the periodical instincts 
 of migrating animals bear to the state of the 
 season, and to the vegetable productions of dis- 
 tant parts of the globe. 
 
 This view of the subject is peculiarly striking 
 when we consider the relations which subsist 
 between the nature of man and the circum- 
 stances of his external situation. An examina- 
 tion of his perceptive faculties in particular, 
 and of his intellectual powers as they are adapt- 
 ed to the structure and to the laws of the 
 material world, opens a wide field of curious 
 speculation. 
 
 The accommodation of the objects around 
 
him to his appetites, to his physical wants, and 
 to his capacities of enjoyment, is no less won- 
 derful, and exceeds so far what we observe in 
 the case of other animals as to authorize us to 
 conclude that it was chiefly with a view to his 
 happiness and improvement that the arrange- 
 ments of this lower world were made. 
 
 Interesting as these physical speculations 
 may be, it is still more delightful to trace the 
 uniformity of design which is displayed in the 
 moral world ; to compare the arts of human life 
 with the instincts of the brutes, and the in- 
 stincts of the different tribes of brutes with 
 each other ; and to remark, amidst the aston- 
 ishing variety of means which are employed to 
 accomplish the same ends, a certain analogy 
 characterize them all, or to observe, in the 
 minds of different individuals of our own spe- 
 cies, the workings of the same affections and 
 passions, and to trace the uniformity of their 
 operation in men of different ages and coun- 
 tries. It is this which gives the great charm 
 to what we call nature in epic and dramatic 
 composition, when the poet speaks a language 
 to which every heart is an echo, and which, 
 amidst all the effects of education and fashion 
 in modifying and disguising the principles of 
 our constitution, reminds all the various classes 
 
6 
 
 of readers or of spectators of the existence of 
 those moral ties which unite us to each other 
 and to our common Parent. 
 
 OF THE EVIDENCES OF BENEVOLENT 
 DESIGN IN THE UNIVERSE. 
 
 Oue ideas of the moral attributes of God 
 must be derived from our own moral percep- 
 tions. It is only by attending to these that we 
 can form a conception of what His attributes 
 are, and it is in this way we are furnished with 
 the strongest proofs that they really belong to 
 Him. 
 
 The peculiar sentiment of approbation with 
 which we regard the virtue of beneficence in 
 others, and the peculiar satisfaction with which 
 we reflect on such of our own actions as have 
 contributed to the happiness of mankind — to 
 which we may add the exquisite pleasure ac- 
 companying the exercise of all the kind affec- 
 tions — naturally lead us to consider benevo- 
 lence or goodness as the supreme attribute of 
 the Deity. It is difficult, indeed, to conceive 
 what other motive could have induced a Being, 
 
completely and independently happy, to have 
 called His creatures into existence. 
 
 In this manner, without any examination of 
 the fact, we have a strong presumption for the 
 goodness of the Deity, and it is only after estab- 
 lishing this presumption a priori that we can 
 proceed to examine the fact with safety. It is 
 true, indeed, that, independently of this pre- 
 sumption, the disorders we see would not dem- 
 onstrate ill intention in the Author of the uni- 
 verse, as it would still be possible that these 
 might contribute to the happiness and the per- 
 fection of the whole system. 
 
 The Manicheans account for the mixture of 
 good and evil in the universe by the opposite 
 agencies of two co-eternal and independent prin- 
 ciples. Their doctrine has been examined and 
 refuted by many authors by reasoning a pri- 
 ori ; but the most satisfactory of all refutations 
 is its obvious inco.nsistency with that unity of 
 design which is everywhere conspicuous in na- 
 ture. 
 
 The fundamental principle of the Optimists is 
 that all events are ordered for the best, and that 
 the evils which we suffer are parts of a great 
 system conducted by almighty power under the 
 direction of infinite wisdom and goodness. 
 
 Under this general title, however, are com- 
 
8 
 
 prehended two very different descriptions of 
 philosophers, those who admit and those who 
 deny the freedom of human actions. The 
 former only contend that everything is right 
 so far as it is the work of God, and endeavor 
 to show that the creation of beings endowed 
 with free will, and consequently liable to moral 
 delinquency — and the government of the world 
 by general laws, from which occasional evils 
 must result — furnish no solid objection to the 
 perfection of the universe. 
 
 But they hold, at the same time, that al- 
 though the permission of moral evil does not 
 detract from the goodness of God, it is never- 
 theless imputable to man as a fault, and ren- 
 ders him justly obnoxious to punishment. This 
 was the system of Plato, and of the best of the 
 ancient philosophers, who, in most instances, 
 state their doctrine in a manner perfectly con- 
 sistent with man's free will and moral agency. 
 
 All the different subjects of human complaint 
 may be reduced to two classes : moral and 
 physical evils. The former comprehends those 
 which arise from the abuse of free will ; the 
 latter, those which result from the established 
 laws of nature, and which man cannot prevent 
 by his own efforts. 
 
 According to the definition now given of 
 
moral evil, the question with respect to its 
 permission is reduced to this : Why was man 
 made a free agent ? A question to which it 
 seems to be a sufficient reply : That perhaps 
 the object of the Deity in the government of 
 the world is not merely to communicate happi- 
 ness, but to form His creatures to moral excel- 
 lence, or that the enjoyment of high degrees of 
 happiness may perhaps necessarily require the 
 previous acquisition of virtuous habits. 
 
 The sufferings produced by vice are, on this 
 supposition, instances of the goodness of God, 
 no less than the happiness resulting from virtue. 
 
 These observations justify Providence, not 
 only for the permission of moral evil, but for 
 the permission of many things which we com- 
 monly complain of as physical evils. How 
 great is the proportion of these, which we com- 
 monly complain of as physical evils. How 
 great is the proportion of these, which are the 
 obvious consequences of our vices and our pre- 
 judices, and which, so far from being a neces- 
 sary part of the order of nature, seem intended 
 to operate in the progress of human affairs as a 
 gradual remedy against the causes which pro- 
 duce them. 
 
 Some of our other complaints with respect to 
 the lot of humanity will be found, on examina- 
 
10 
 
 tion, to arise from partial views of the constitu- 
 tion of man, and from a want of attention to 
 the circumstances which constitute his happi- 
 ness or promote his improvement. 
 
 Thus it appears not only, that partial evils 
 may be good with respect to the whole system, 
 but that their tendency is beneficial on the 
 whole, even to that small part of it which we 
 see. 
 
 The distinction between right and wrong is 
 apprehended by the mind to be eternal and im- 
 mutable, no less than the distinction between 
 mathematical truth and falsehood. To argue, 
 therefore, from our own moral judgments to 
 the administration of the Deity, cannot be 
 justly censured as a rash extension to the 
 Divine nature of suggestions resulting from the 
 arbitrary constitution of our own minds. 
 
 The power we have of conceiving this dis- 
 tinction is one of the most remarkable of those 
 which raise us above the brutes, and the sense 
 of obligation which it involves possesses a dis- 
 tinguished pre-eminence over all our other prin- 
 ciples of action. To act in conformity to our 
 sense of rectitude is plainly the highest excel- 
 lence which our nature is capable of attaining, 
 nor can we avoid extending the same rule of 
 estimation to all intelligent beings whatever. 
 
11 
 
 Besides these conclusions with respect to the 
 Divine attributes — which seem to be implied 
 in our very perception of moral distinctions — 
 there are others, perfectly agreeable to them, 
 which continually force themselves on the mind 
 in the exercise of our moral judgments, both 
 with respect to our own conduct and that of 
 other men. The reverence which we feel to 
 be due to the admonitions of conscience ; the 
 sense of merit and demerit which accompanies 
 our good and bad actions ; the warm interest 
 we take in the fortunes of the virtuous ; the 
 indignation we feel at the occasional triumphs 
 of successful villainy : all imply a secret con- 
 viction of the moral administration of the uni- 
 verse. 
 
 An examination of the ordinary course of 
 human affairs adds to the force of these consid- 
 erations, and furnishes a proof from the fact 
 that, notwithstanding the seemingly promis- 
 cuous distribution of happiness and misery in 
 this life, the reward of virtue and the punish- 
 ment of vice are the great objects of all the 
 general laws by which the world is governed. 
 The disorders, in the meantime, — which, in 
 such a world as ours, cannot fail to arise in 
 particular instances when they are compared 
 with our natural sense of good and of ill de- 
 
12 
 
 sert- — afford a presumption that in a future 
 state the moral government which we see be- 
 gun here will be carried into complete execu- 
 tion. 
 
 After the view which has been given of the 
 principles of natural religion, little remains to 
 be added concerning the duties which respect 
 the Deity. To employ our faculties in study- 
 ing those evidences of power, of wisdom, and 
 of goodness which He has displayed in His 
 works, as it is the foundation in other instances 
 of our sense of religious obligation, so it is in 
 itself a duty incumbent on us as reasonable and 
 moral beings, capable of recognising the exist- 
 ence of an almighty cause and of feeling cor- 
 responding sentiments of devotion. By those 
 who entertain just opinions on this most im- 
 portant of all subjects, the following practical 
 consequences, which comprehend some of the 
 chief effects of religion on the temper and con- 
 duct, will be readily admitted as self-evident 
 propositions. 
 
 In the first place : If the Deity be pos- 
 sessed of infinite moral excellence, we must 
 feel towards Him, in an infinite degree, all 
 those affections of love, gratitude, and confi- 
 dence which are excited by the imperfect worth 
 
L3 
 
 we observe among our fellow-creatures ; for it 
 is by conceiving all that is benevolent and 
 amiable in man, raised to the highest perfec- 
 tion, that we can alone form some faint notion 
 of the Divine nature. To cultivate, therefore, 
 an habitual love and reverence of the Supreme 
 Being, may be justly considered as the first 
 great branch of morality ; nor is the virtue of 
 that man complete, or even consistent with 
 itself, in whose mind these sentiments of piety 
 are wanting. 
 
 Secondly : Although religion can with no 
 propriety be considered as the sole foundation 
 of morality, yet when we are convinced that 
 God is infinitely good, and that He is the 
 friend and protector of virtue, this belief affords 
 the most powerful inducements to the practice 
 of every branch of our duty. It leads us to 
 consider conscience as the vicegerent of *God, 
 and to listen to its suggestion as to the com- 
 mands of that Being from whom we have re- 
 ceived our existence, and the great object of 
 whose government is to promote the happiness 
 and the perfection of His whole creation. 
 
 That the practice of veracity and justice, and 
 of all our other duties, is useful to mankind, is 
 acknowledged by moralists of all descriptions ; 
 and there is good reason for believing that if a 
 
14 
 
 person saw all the consequences of his actions, 
 he would perceive that an adherence to their 
 rules is useful and advantageous on the whole, 
 even in those cases in which his limited views 
 incline him to think otherwise. It is possible 
 that in the Deity benevolence, or a regard to 
 utility, may be the sole principle of action, and 
 that the ultimate end for which He enjoined to 
 His creatures the duties of veracity and justice 
 was to secure their own happiness ; but still, 
 with respect to man, they are indispensable 
 laws, for he has an immediate perception of 
 their rectitude. Where they are possessed in 
 an eminent degree, we may perhaps consider 
 them as a ground of moral esteem, because 
 they indicate _ the pains which have been be- 
 stowed on their cultivation, and a course of 
 active virtue in which they have been exer- 
 cised, and strengthened. 
 
 In truth, all those offices, whether apparently 
 trifling or important, by which the happiness 
 of other men is affected — civility, gentleness, 
 kindness, humanity, patriotism, universal be- 
 nevolence — are only diversified expressions of 
 the same disposition, according to the circum- 
 stances'in which it operates and the relations 
 which the agent bears to others. 
 
15 
 
 OF VERACITY. 
 
 The important rank which veracity holds 
 among our social duties, appears from the ob- 
 vious consequences that would result if no foun- 
 dation were laid for it in the constitution of our 
 nature. The purposes of speech would be frus- 
 trated, and every man's opportunities of know- 
 ledge would be limited to his own personal 
 experience. 
 
 Considerations of utility, however, do not 
 seem to be the only ground of the approbation 
 we bestow on this disposition. Abstracting 
 from all regard to consequences, there is some- 
 thing pleasing and amiable in sincerity, open- 
 ness, and truth ; something disagreeable and 
 disgusting in duplicity, equivocation, and false- 
 hood. 
 
 That there is in the human mind a natural 
 or instinctive principle of veracity has been 
 remarked by many authors, the same part of 
 our constitution which prompts to social inter- 
 course prompting also to sincerity in our mu- 
 tual communications. Truth is always the 
 spontaneous and native expression of our sen- 
 timents, whereas falsehood implies a certain 
 violence done to our nature in consequence of 
 
16 
 
 the influence of some motive which we are 
 anxious to conceal. 
 
 [Accordingly it is, remarked both by Reid 
 and Smith, that the greatest liars, where they 
 lie once, they speak truth a hundred times.] 
 
 Corresponding to this instinctive principle of 
 veracity, there is a principle — coeval with the 
 use of language — determining us to repose 
 faith in testimony. Without such a disposition 
 the education of children would be impracti- 
 cable ; and, accordingly, so far from being the 
 result of experience, it seems to be, in the first 
 instance, unlimited, nature intrusting its grad- 
 ual correction to the progress of reason and ob- 
 servation. It bears a striking analogy, both in 
 its origin and in its final cause, to our instinct- 
 ive expectation of the continuance of those laws 
 which regulate the course of physical events. 
 
 [As this principle presupposes the general 
 practice of veracity, it may be regarded as an 
 additional intimation of that conduct which is 
 conformable to the end and destination of our 
 being.] 
 
 It would appear that every breach of veracity 
 indicates some latent vice, or some criminal in- 
 tention, which an individual is ashamed to 
 avow. And hence the peculiar beauty of open- 
 ness or sincerity, uniting, in some degree, in 
 
17 
 
 itself, the graces of all the other moral qualities 
 of which it attests the existence. 
 
 The practice of veracity is secured, to a con- 
 siderable extent, in modern Europe, by the 
 received maxims of honor which brand with 
 infamy every palpable deviation from the truth 
 in matters of fact or in the fulfilment of prom- 
 ises. Veracity, however, considered as a moral 
 duty, is not confined to sincerity in the use of 
 speech, but prohibits every circumstance in our 
 external conduct which is calculated to mislead 
 others by conveying to them false information. 
 It prohibits, in like manner, the wilful employ- 
 ment of sophistry in an argument, no less than 
 a wilful misrepresentation of fact. The fash- 
 ion of the times may establish distinctions in 
 these different cases, but none of them are 
 sanctioned by the principles of morality. 
 
 The same disposition of mind which leads to 
 the practice of veracity in our commerce with 
 the world, cherishes the love of truth in our 
 philosophical inquiries. This active principle, 
 which is indeed but another name for the prin- 
 ciple of curiosity, seems also to be an ultimate 
 fact in the human frame. 
 
 Although, however, in its first origin not 
 resolvable into views of utility, the gradual dis- 
 covery of its extensive effects on human im- 
 
provement cannot fail to confirm and to aug- 
 ment its native influence on the mind. The 
 connexion between error and misery, between 
 truth and happiness, becomes more apparent as 
 our researches proceed, producing at last a com- 
 plete conviction that even in those cases where 
 we are unable to trace it the connexion sub- 
 sists, and encouraging the free and unbiassed 
 exercise of our rational powers as an expression 
 at once of benevolence to man and of confi- 
 dence in the righteous administration of the 
 universe. 
 
 Prudence, temperance, and fortitude are no 
 less requisite for enabling us to discharge our 
 social duties than for securing our own private 
 happiness. 
 
 A steady regard, in the conduct of life, to 
 the happiness and perfection of our own nature, 
 and a diligent study of the means by which 
 these ends may be attained, is another duty 
 belonging to this branch of virtue. It is a 
 duty so important and comprehensive, that it 
 leads to the practice of all the rest ; and is 
 therefore entitled to a very full and particular 
 examination in a system of Moral Philosophy. 
 Such an examination leads our thoughts " to the 
 end and aim of our being.' ' 
 
 That the principle of self-love — or, in other 
 
19 
 
 words, the desire of happiness — is neither an 
 object of approbation nor of blame, is suffici- 
 ently obvious. It is inseparable from the nature 
 of man, as a rational and a sensitive being. 
 
 It is, however, no less obvious, on the other 
 hand, that this desire, considered as a principle 
 of action, has by no means a uniform influence 
 on the conduct. 
 
 Our animal appetites, our affections, and the 
 other inferior principles of our nature, interfere 
 as often with self-love as with benevolence, 
 and mislead us from our own happiness as much 
 as from the duties we owe to others. 
 
 The most superficial observation of life is 
 sufficient to convince us that happiness is not 
 to be attained by giving every appetite and 
 desire the gratification they demand, and that 
 it is necessary for us to form to ourselves some 
 plan or system of conduct in subordination to 
 which all other objects are to be pursued. 
 
 The Stoics placed the supreme good in rec- 
 titude of conduct without any regard to the 
 event. 
 
 They did not, however, recommend an indif- 
 ference to external objects, or a life of inactivity 
 and apathy ; but on the contrary, they taught 
 that nature pointed out to us certain objects of 
 choice and rejection, and amongst these, some 
 3 w 
 
20 
 
 as more to be chosen and avoided than others ; 
 and that virtue consisted in choosing and reject- 
 ing objects according to their intrinsic value. 
 They only contended that these objects should 
 be pursued, not as the means of our happiness, 
 but because we believe it to be agreeable to 
 nature that we should pursue them, and that 
 therefore when we have done our utmost, we 
 should regard the event as indifferent. 
 
 The scale of desirable objects exhibited in 
 this system was peculiarly calculated to en- 
 courage the social virtues. It taught that the 
 prosperity of two was preferable to that of one, 
 that of a city to that of a family, and that of 
 our country to all partial considerations. On 
 this principle, added to a sublime sentiment of 
 piety, it founded its chief argument for an entire 
 resignation to the dispensations of Providence. 
 As all events are ordered by perfect wisdom 
 and goodness, the Stoics concluded that what- 
 ever happens is calculated to produce the great- 
 est possible good to the universe in general. 
 
 As it is agreeable, therefore, to nature that 
 we should prefer the happiness of many to that 
 of a few, and of all to that of many, they con- 
 cluded that every event which happens is pre- 
 cisely that which we ourselves would have de- 
 sired if we had been acquainted with the whole 
 scheme of the Divine administration. 
 
21 
 
 While the Stoics held this elevated language, 
 they acknowledged the weaknesses of humanity, 
 but insisted that it is the business of the philo- 
 sopher to delineate what is perfect, without 
 lowering the dignity of virtue by limitations 
 arising from the frailties of mankind. 
 
 In the greater part of these opinions, the 
 Peripatetics agreed with the Stoics. They ad- 
 mitted that virtue ought to be the law of our 
 conduct, and that no other good was to be com- 
 pared to it ; but they did not represent it as the 
 sole good, nor affect a total indifference to 
 things external. 
 
 Prom the slight view now given of the sys- 
 tems of philosophers with respect to the sover- 
 eign good, it may be assumed as an acknow- 
 ledged and indisputable fact that happiness 
 arises chiefly from the mind. The Stoics per- 
 haps expressed this too strongly when they 
 said that to a wise man external circumstances 
 are indifferent. Yet it must be confessed that 
 happiness depends much less on these than is 
 commonly imagined ; and that as there is no 
 situation so prosperous as to exclude the tor- 
 ments of malice, cowardice and remorse, so 
 there is none so adverse as to withhold the en- 
 joyment of a benevolent, resolute, and upright 
 heart. 
 
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