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Historical Events 
 
 In the Vicinity of Philadelphia, Par- 
 ticipated in by the Scotch^rish m 
 the Latter Part of the Year 1777. 
 Also a Brief Account of Brad ocks 
 
 Defeat in the French and Indian 
 War, 1755. 
 
 BY THOMAS SHARP, 
 
 Lt. Col. U.S. Army. 
 
 READ BEFORE THE 
 
 Hamilton Library Association 
 
 Carlisle, Pa. October 16, 1914. 
 
 By J. Webster Henderson^sq^.^^ 
 
 ■—I the 
 ,wn for 
 
^z 
 
 CARLISLE, PA., OCT. 16, 1914. 
 I am indebted to Mr. W. Homer Ames, 
 of Carlisle, for historical research, also 
 to Capt. John Colwell, U. S. N., former 
 Naval Attache, for corroboratory infor- 
 mation from British Colonial Records, 
 m London, and to General Asa Bird 
 Gardiner, U. S. A., for points in the tac- 
 tics and equipment of the period. 
 
 T, S. 
 
LOCAL HiSTQRY. 
 
 Events in the Vicinity of Piiiladeiphia 
 Participated in by the Scotch Irish in 
 the Latter Part of the Year 1777. Also 
 a Brief Account of Braddock's Defeat 
 in French and Indian War, 1755. 
 
 BY THOMAS SHARP, LT. COL. U. S. ARMY, 
 
 Read Before the Hamilton Library Asso- 
 ciation, Carlisle, Pa., October 16, 1914, 
 by J. Webster Henderson, Esq., and 
 Published for the Historical Depart- 
 ment. 
 
 When William Penn peopled his newly 
 acquired possession he gave the land 
 about Philadelphia to his English friends 
 and the Quakers. The Germans would, 
 he thought, make peaceable neighbors 
 so he located them next to the first 
 named in what is now Lancaster and 
 Berks Counties, but the Scotch Irish 
 wereM stubborn, contentious peoplg^o 
 he sent them toward and beyond the 
 Susquehanna. 
 
 The spirit of acquisition inherent in 
 Scotch character developed rapidly and 
 they came in great numbers. In these 
 days it would be called a boom. 
 
 With grief the Indians saw the forest 
 melt away into stumpy fields and do- 
 mestic animals take the place of wild 
 game. It aroused their enmity and war 
 followed. Appeals were made by the 
 frontier people to Colony and Crown for 
 
military protection, but they were met 
 with the reply that as shown by Penn's 
 experience the Indians were peaceable 
 and if there was ^ny trouble the whites 
 were the aggressors. 
 
 The sentiment of the colony was gen- 
 erally against them but there were dis- 
 senters. One of these was Benjamin 
 Franklin, who understood the situation 
 and bent his resourceful mind to pro- 
 viding a remedy. 
 
 This he did by formulating a peculiar 
 military system called "Associators" 
 composed of men ou the frontier. 
 
 All the men joined until a large com- 
 pany was raised. It was then divided 
 into classes or sections, (as many as half 
 a dozen) which were to be called into 
 service in turn, while those left behind 
 gave necessary aid to the families of 
 those on duty. 
 
 This system was in vogue at the time 
 of the outbreak of the Revolution. 
 Though there were many regiments, I 
 will speak more particularly of the 
 brigade of Gen. Potter and will follow its 
 history. 
 
 James Potter had been an Indian 
 fighter all his life and had risen through 
 the different grades from Lieutenant to 
 Colonel 
 
 If you looked over the roster of a regi- 
 ment of Potter's brigade you would al- 
 most think you were reading the names 
 on the roll of membership of an old-time 
 Scotch Presbyterian congregation. 
 
 Potter's own Scotch-Irish personality 
 cropped out in the dialect and phrase- 
 ology of his official papers. For example, 
 he spelled Gen. Sullivan's name Solovan, 
 and in telling of a hotly contested battle 
 with superior numbers he said, "we dis- 
 
puted the matter with them." 
 
 The brigade was in service in the army 
 in 1777. It was at Brandywine but, be- 
 ing on the left of the line, saw nothing 
 of the action. The American army was 
 posted in a line facing the Brandywine. 
 The art of military "security and infor- 
 mation" was unknown in our army at 
 that time and Howe, who was an accom- 
 plished soldier, made a fierce attack on 
 the American front at "Chad's" ford, 
 while by a detour the main body of his 
 army crossed the Brandywine a few miles 
 above and suddenly appeared in fighting 
 line on Washington's right flank. The 
 Americans attempted to change front to 
 the right to meet them but it was too 
 late and the British struck them in the 
 maneuvre. To give the result in ball 
 game parlance, Washington "scored a 
 goose egg." Marquis Marie Jean Paul 
 Roch Yves Gilbert Motier La Fayette 
 had a part of his name shot away and a 
 burning question was "which is the best 
 road to Philadelphia?" 
 
 At Germantown the Associators were 
 on the right where they encountered 
 but little opposition and advanced so 
 far that they had to be called back after 
 the retreat had been commenced. 
 
 In December when Washington was 
 encamped at Whitemarsh supplies of all 
 kinds ran low. There was an unequal 
 supply of ammunition. There were on 
 the average of the army six rounds per 
 man, though the Associators were pretty 
 well supplied. 
 
 Howe contemplated a repetition of the 
 movement which had been so successful 
 at Brandywine, viz., a secret move until 
 he could form line against one of Wash- 
 ington's flanks and then a vigorous at- 
 
tack. But Washington got timely in- 
 formation of the plan, (probably the 
 Lydia Darrah Legend might fit in here) 
 and advanced Irvine's Division (in which 
 was Potter's brigade and other Associa- 
 tors) to Chestnut Hill where a fierce 
 little engagement took place. Irvine 
 (himself a Scotch-Irishman by descent) 
 was wounded and taken prisoner, but 
 the British were checked and later fell 
 back to Philadelphia. A few days after 
 they made a like attempt on Washing- 
 ton's left but were repulsed by Morgan's 
 riflemen. 
 
 When Washington decided to move 
 from Whitemarsh to Valley Forge his 
 plan was to cross the Schuylkill at Gulf 
 Creek (near Norristown) where a tem- 
 porary bridge was constructed by run- 
 ning wagons in the stream and laying a 
 boardwalk on them. 
 
 Potter's brigade was sent some four 
 miles down the river on the west bank. 
 
 When a part of the army (Sullivan's 
 division) had crossed, a force of the 
 British under Lord Cornwallis who had 
 crossed at the middle ferry (Market St.) 
 moved rapidly up, the object being to 
 strike the Americans when divided by 
 the river. These encountered the dough- 
 ty Potter, whose generalship was here 
 clearly shown. He divided his force and 
 formed two lines, one on the best po- 
 sition at hand, and the other on a good 
 position some distance in rear. The 
 orders were for the line in front to "fight 
 until overpowered, then fall back 
 through the second line, reform on a 
 good position and commence again when 
 the second line, now become the first, 
 fell back through them." In this way 
 we "disputed the matter with them for 
 
four miles." 
 
 To readily understand this, bear in 
 mind tiiat the heavy smooth bore musket 
 carried by the British had an effective 
 range of less than three hundred yards , 
 and the Associators, being backwoods- 
 men, were marksmen. 
 
 Sullivan's division recrossed the 
 Schuylkill and joined the main army. 
 
 Washington issued a general order 
 thanking Potter's Brigade for the ser- 
 vices rendered on this occasion. 
 
 The Army a few days later crossed the 
 river higher up and reached Valley 
 Forge. 
 
 History belittles the achievements of 
 Potter and Irvine. It passes them by, 
 by terming them "minor events in De- 
 cember, 1777." 
 
 Therefore, let me recapitulate some of 
 the conditions attending the battle of 
 Chestnut Hill, showing its importance. 
 
 The officers of the troops which ar- 
 rived from the North flushed with their 
 recent success clamored for the capture 
 of Philadelphia. Washington well knew 
 the futility of such an attempt, opposed 
 it, and finally assembled a council of war 
 to discuss it. 
 
 Four American officers in the council 
 voted for an assault upon the lines of 
 the greatly superior British force, but 
 the General, sustained by eleven others, 
 disregarded their murmurs and rejected 
 "the mad enterprise." 
 
 On the night of December 4th, the 
 British marched out in force to attack 
 the American lines, and Washington 
 knowing that his supply of ammunition 
 was insufficient for a general engagement 
 in the field, detailed Irvine's division 
 (Associators and a small number of 
 
Continentals) as a forlorn hope to meet 
 and retard them. 
 
 We have all heard the story of Wink- 
 elried, who, reaching out his brawny 
 arms to the right and to the left, gather- 
 ed the points of the Austrian spears 
 against his own bosom and pressing 
 forward with the cry "make way for 
 liberty" caused a breach in the enemy's 
 lines tlirough which his countrymen 
 rushed to victory. 
 
 Such heroism was fittingly illustrated 
 by Irvine, who rushed to the point of 
 fiercest attack at Chestnut Hill from 
 which he was carried away by the British, 
 wounded and bleeding, while his object 
 was accomplished, the British having 
 been repulsed and a great disaster to the 
 American army averted. 
 
 Irvine, as before said, met the enemy 
 at Chestnut Hill, where, leading them, 
 he heroically threw his division of raw 
 Associators against an overwhelmingly 
 greater force of highly trained British 
 regulars, and checked their advance 
 though his command suffered severely 
 and he himself was wounded and taken 
 prisoner. 
 
 But here let me note the factor his 
 action became in general results. His- 
 tory tells us that Vv^ashington spent the 
 day and night (of December 5th when 
 the British were at Chestnut Hill) in 
 strengthening his position at White 
 Marsh. It does not describe his method 
 of fortification, but as his men were 
 largely backwoodsmen, expert with the 
 axe and trees were plenty, I would con- 
 jecture that it was the construction of 
 "abattis" so arranged as to hamper the 
 movements of the British lines while an 
 "enfilade fire" would be directed on 
 
theoi. 
 
 Howe returned to Philadelphia and 
 after a tentative skirmish on Washing- 
 ton's left refrained from the aggressive. 
 My belief is that he had in mind Brad- 
 dock's defeat, where with like conditions 
 sixty French soldiers, allied with one 
 hundred and eighty couriers de bois and 
 voyageurs and a few Indians, routed the 
 finest army which up to that time had 
 been mustered on the American conti- 
 nent. 
 
 Having referred to Braddock's defeat, 
 let us give a brief account of it. It is 
 Pennsylvania history. 
 
 The French Government, alarmed by 
 the magnitude of Braddock's expedi- 
 tion, appealed to the scattered French 
 settlements in America to rally to the 
 aid of Fort Duquesne. 
 
 One of these was Michilimackinac, 
 governed by Sieur De Langlede. 
 
 Le Langlede (more commonly called 
 Langlede) was the son of a French 
 nobleman and his Indian wife. He was 
 born at Mackinac. As a boy he was 
 educated under tutors in America and 
 then sent to France to complete his 
 education, after which he was commis- 
 sioned in the French army. Having 
 shown remarkable administrative ability 
 he was sent to his native place as gover- 
 nor, (a small office having a large title.) 
 On receiving the notice to aid Fort 
 Duquesne he took the force at Mackinac 
 consisting of one company (sixty 
 regulars) under Captain Beaujeau; 
 gathered a force of voyageurs and 
 couriers de bois, one hundred and eighty 
 in number, seasoned men familiar with 
 fire arms, and started in canoes down 
 Lake Huron through the Detroit River 
 
and Lake Erie to Presque Isle, (now 
 Erie, Pa.) Thence they portaged their 
 canoes over to the head waters of French 
 Creek and floated down that and the 
 Allegheny to Fort Duquesne. 
 
 On their arrival there they found Col. 
 Contrecoeur, the Commandant, dis- 
 mantling the fort and shipping the 
 armament down the river in batteaux. 
 On Lanjjiede's inquiry why he did that, 
 his reply was "When Braddock gets his 
 artillery on that hill he will quickly 
 knock our palisades into splinters." 
 The reply of Langlede was "You need 
 not let him get there at all; meet him in 
 the woods." Contrecoeur, who was 
 trained to large field movements, said 
 his force was too small. Then Langlede 
 bristled up and said "If you will do 
 nothing, I will meet him with my own 
 little command." 
 
 By that time the British were close at 
 hand. Langlede made a quick recon- 
 noisance, selected a spot with trees for his 
 command, started out with it accom- 
 panied by a few volunteers from Fort 
 Duquesne, followed by the loose vaga- 
 bond Indians found near every fort 
 incited by the hope of plunder. 
 
 Contrecoeur remained in the Fort 
 shipping the stores down the river and 
 would not believe that Braddock had 
 been defeated until the Indians com- 
 menced to come in with plunder of a 
 kind which would be abandoned only by 
 a completely routed army. Then he 
 fired a salute and prepared a report 
 claiming that he had defeated Braddock 
 by an overwhelming force of French and 
 Indians. 
 
 Captain Beaujeau, who commanded 
 the only company of regulars in the 
 
action, being killed, could make no 
 report, so Contrecoeur had the oppor- 
 tunity to fix it up to suit himself and 
 from Contrecoeur's false report arises 
 the confusion which has misled histor- 
 ians. He failed to mention Lang|ede 
 andthe_Machilimackinac contijjgent, 
 who really did aJOhe^Sglitlng^ while the 
 Duquesne garrison were making prepara- 
 tions to escape down the river. 
 
 To me it was straightened out by a 
 scholarly French priest given to histori- 
 cal research (who had access to military, 
 Jesuit and other records) with whom I 
 became acquainted while stationed at 
 Fort Mackinac. Contrecoeur may have 
 shared the fate of Admiral Byng had 
 the truth been known. 
 
 None of the regular Fort Duquesne 
 garrison except a few young officers who 
 managed to join Langlede as volunteers 
 were in the action. 
 
 Let us now turn from the French to 
 the British side. Gen. Braddock, who 
 commanded, was an officer of about forty 
 years' experience. He was brave as a 
 lion, and, despite his years, as active as 
 a colt, believed in the validity of the 
 British military system, (the three rank 
 battle formation) despised the Ameri- 
 cans and the Indians and believed that 
 if the latter were met by a "solid body" 
 (as he termed it) they could be undone — 
 would melt away. 
 
 The head of his column reached a 
 somewhat open spot faced on the op- 
 posite side by a curtain of foliage and 
 trees. Suddenly a man dressed as an 
 Indian but wearing the decorations of an 
 officer, sprang from the woods near the 
 head of the column, waved a signal and 
 quickly disappeared. At once fire on 
 
10 
 
 the British troops commenced. Gage 
 returned volleys but only hit the trees. 
 Braddock hurried to the front of the 
 column to form the "solid body" in line 
 but the result of the maneuvre was to 
 mass his troops against the very muzzles 
 of a concealed and protected enemy. 
 They made a better target than the pro- 
 verbial "barn door." Every shot took 
 effect; Braddock labored heroically, four 
 horses were shot under him before he 
 fell mortally wounded. 
 
 The result has often been told. It 
 was first defeat, next retreat, then panic. 
 
 The term "deploy as skirmishers" 
 was not as yet in the military vocabulary 
 but Washington knew what was wanted 
 and extended a line of riflemen at inter- 
 vals in rear of the fleeing army. This, 
 in connection with the fact that the 
 French force was a very small one, saved 
 Braddock's army. 
 
 As the correctness of my account de- 
 pends largely on the numbers engaged I 
 will prove it by one solitary witness, 
 namely, Capt. Robert Orme, Aide De- 
 Camp on Gen. Braddock's staff, who was 
 a personal friend of Washington and a 
 writer of repute on military subjects. 
 
 Capt. Orme says the number of the 
 enemy did not exceed. three hundrg^. 
 Now, thisTcaTcuIallon of the enemy by 
 Capt. Orme was made while he and his 
 command were under a withering fire 
 which they had little opportunity to re- 
 turn. There are among you men who 
 have been thus situated and you know 
 the tendency is to overestimate the 
 numerical force of the enemy. How is 
 that? 
 
 The preparations by Contrecoeur to 
 evacuate Ft. Duquesne on the approach 
 
11 
 
 of Braddock in 1755, was again made 
 available in 1758, when Forbes after a 
 snail-like movement, approached within 
 fifty miles of the place allowed Wash- 
 ington, who, with bis Virginians, led the 
 van to make such a vigorous attack that 
 the entire French garrison (500 in num- 
 ber) embarked on a fleet of batteaux 
 and floated down the Ohio, leaving the 
 site on which Fort Pitt was established 
 provided with munition of war. 
 
 This convinces me that the method 
 had been devised long before (ab initio.) 
 to secure the safety of the garrison, 
 which was insecure by reason of remote- 
 ness from other French settlements and 
 rather closely contiguous to ever ad- 
 vancing English colonies. 
 
 My belief is that the purpose of the 
 French in establishing Fort Duquesne 
 (built in 1754) was not to secure supre- 
 macy in the Allegheny region, but to 
 prevent the emigration of English speak- 
 ing population to the Mississippi valley 
 (mainly French territory.) 
 
 France had secured sites on all the 
 streams flowing into "The Father of 
 Waters" and there was in France a 
 sanguine vision of glories to be attained 
 by combining French thrift with Ameri- 
 can soil and climate. This, I think, 
 accounts for their ever preparedness to 
 move the Duquesne force to some point 
 further down the river. 
 
 Let us now drop the French and In- 
 dian War and return to the war for In- 
 dependence. 
 
 Braddock's defeat was the first large 
 engagement in which Washington parti- 
 cipated and he was -quick to see that the 
 heavy three rank line of battle, formid- 
 able as it was in the open field, came to 
 
12 
 naught when directed against a force 
 properly posted in a well selected woods. 
 It was a lesson which^e (Washington) 
 kept iu mind and a resource which he 
 held in reserve from the time he took 
 command at Cambridge until the smoke 
 of the last gun fired at Yorktown faded 
 away in the mist of the York River. 
 
 While Howe, with more than twenty 
 thousand well appointed, well equipped 
 and well disciplined men, spent the win- 
 ter in Philadelphia, Washington's half 
 clothed, half starved, greatly diminished 
 army shivered at Valley Forge. Irregu- 
 lar American detachments patroled the 
 neutral ground between the two places 
 and Benjamin Franklin, "facile prin- 
 ceps" of diplomats, commenced to se- 
 cure the recognition of our government 
 by the nations of the world. 
 
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