aass Hl5 5- ^^ Book u^ Vif DEFENCE OF USURY; SHEWING THE IMPOLICY OF THE PRESENT LEGAL RESTRAINTS /^f^T ON THE TERMS OF PECUNIARY BARGAINS; IN Letters; to a JTrieriHi* TO WHICH IS ADDED, A LETTER TO ADAM SMITH, Esq. LL.D. ON THE DISCOURAGEMENTS OPPOSED BY THE ABOVE RESTRAINTS TO THE PROGRESS OF INVENTIVE INDUSTRY. THE FOURTH EDITION. AND TO WHICH IS ALSO ADDED, THIRD EDITION, A PROTEST AGAINST LAW-TAXES. By JEREMY BENTHAM, LONDON: PRINTED FOR PAYNE AND FOSS, PALL-MALL. ISIS. v\- J. M^Cieery, Printei ,. Blaskiioree-CcvH t, Loudoa* CONTENTS LETTER I. Introduction . . . Page i LETTER IL Reasons for Restraint. — Prevention of Usury ......... 6 LETTER III. Reasojis for Restraint. — Prevention of Prodigality 16 CONTENTS. LETTER IV. Reasons for Restraint. — Protection of Indigence Page 32 LETTER V. Reasons for Restraint. — Protection of Simplicity . . . ... . 39 LETTER VI. Mischiefs of the anti-usurious Laws, 45 LETTER VII. Efficacy of anti-usurious Laws . . 62 CONTENTS. LETTER VIII. Virtual Usury allowed . . Page 75 LETTER IX. Blacks tone considered . . . . 84 LETTER X. Grounds of the Prejudices against Usury 94 LETTER XI. Compound Interest 1 10 LETTER XII. Maintenance and Champerty , . 117 CONTENTS. LETTER XIII. To Dj\ Smith, on Projects in Arts, SCc Page 129 DEFENCE OF USURY. LETTER I. Introduction, trichofy in While Russia^ January ^ 1787. Among the various species or modifications of liberty, of which on different occasions we have heard so much in England, I do not re- collect ever seeing any thing yet of- fered in behalf of the liberty of mak- ing one*s own terms in money-bargains. From so general and universal a ne- glect, it is an old notion of mine, as you well knov/, that this meek and unassuming species of liberty has been suffering much injustice. B A fancy ^ Lett. I. Introduction. A fancy has taken me, just now, to trouble you with my reasons ; which, if you think them capable of answer- ing any good purpose, you may for- ward to the press : or in the other case, what will give you less trouble, to the fire. In a word, the proposition I have been accustomed to lay down to my- self on this subject is the following one, viz. that no man of ripe years and of sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, with a view to his advatitage, from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as he thinks fit : nor, (what is a necessary consequence) any body hin- dered from supplying him, upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to. This proposition, were it to be re- ^ fceived, would level, you see, at one istroke, all the barriers which law, either Lett. I. Introduction, 8 either statute or common, have in their united wisdom set up, either against the crying sin of Usury, or against the hard- named and little- heard-of practice of Champerty; to which we must also add a portion of the multifarious, and as little-heard- of offence, of Maintenance. On this occasion, were it any indi- vidual antagonist I had to deal with, my part would be a smooth and easy one. *^ You, who fetter contracts ; " you, who lay restraints on the liber- " ty of man, it is for you'* (I should say) " to assign a reason for your do- " ing so." That contracts in general ought to be observed, is a rule, the propriety of which, no man was ever yet found wrong-headed enough to deny : if this case is one of the excep- tions (for some doubtless there are) which the safety and welfare of every B 2! society 4 Lett. I. Introduction. society require should be taken out of that general rule, in this case, as in all those others, it lies upon him, who alledges the necessity of the excep- tion, to produce a reason for it. This, I say, would be a short and very easy method with an individual : but, as the world has no mouth of its own to plead by, no certain attorney by which it can '^ come and defend *' this force and injury,'* I must even find arguments for it at a venture, and ransack my own imagination for such phantoms as I can find to fight with. In favour of the restraints opposed to the species of liberty I contend forj, I can imagine but five arguments. 1. Prevention of usury. 2. Prevention of prodigality. 3. Protection of indigence against extortion. 4. Re- Lett. I. Introduction. 5 4. Repression of the temerity of projectors. 5. Protection of simplicity against imposition. Of all these in their order. 6 Lett. II. Reasons for Restraint, LETTER XL Reasons for Restraint. — Prevention of Usury, I Will begin with the prevention of usury: because in the sound of the word usury lies, I take it, the main strength of the argument : or, to speak strictly, of what is of more import- ance than all argument, of the hold which the opinion I am combating has obtained on the imaginations and passions of mankind. Usury is a bad thing, and as such ought to be prevented : usurers are a bad sort of men, a very bad sort of men, and as such ought to be punished and suppressed. These are among the Prevention of Usury. 7 the string of propositions which every man finds handed down to him from his progenitors : which most men are disposed to accede to without exami- nation, and indeed not unnaturally nor even unreasonably disposed, for it is impossible the bulk of mankind should find leisure, had they the abi- lity, to examine into the grounds of an hundredth part of the rules and maxims, which they find themselves obliged to act upon. Very good apo- logy this for John Trot : but a little more inquisitiveness may be required of legislators. You, my friend, by whom the true force of words is so well understood, have, I am sure, gone before me in perceiving, that to say usury is a thing to be prevented, is neither more nor less than begging the mat- ter in question, I know of but two definitions 8 Lett. II. Reasons for Restraint. definitions that can possibly be given of usury : one is, the taking of a greater interest than the law allows of: this may be styled the political or legal definition. The other is the taking of a greater interest than it is usual for men to give and take : this may be styled the moral one: and this, where the law has not interfered, is plainly enough the only one. It is plain, that in order for usury to be prohibited by law, a positive descrip- tion must have been found for it by law, fixing, or rather superseding, the moral one. To say then that usury is a thing that ought to be prevented, is saying neither more nor less, than that the utmost rate of in- terest which shall be taken ought to be fixed; and that fixation enforced by penalties or such other means, if any, as may answer the purpose of preventing Prevention of Usury. 9 preventing the breach of it. A law punishing usury supposes, therefore, a law fixing the allowed legal rate of interest : and the propriety of the pe- nal law must depend upon the pro- priety of the simply-prohibitive, or, if you please, declaratory one. One thing then is plain ; that, an- tecedently to custom growing from convention, there can be no such thing as usury ; for what rate of in- terest is there that can naturally be more proper than another? what na- tural fixed price can there be for the use of money more than for the use of any other thing ? Were it not then for custom, usury, considered in a moral view, would not then so much as admit of a definition : so far from having existence, it would not so much as be conceivable : nor there- fore could the law, in the definition b3 it 10 Lett. II. Reasons for Restraint, it took upon itself to give of such offence, have so much as a guide to steer by. Custom therefore is the sole basis, vi^hieh, either the moralist in his rules and precepts, or the le- gislator in his injunctions, can have to build upon. But what basis can be more weak or unwarrantable, as a ground for coercive measures, than custom resulting from free choice ? My neighbours, being at liberty, have happened to concur among them- selves in dealing at a certain rate of interest. I, who have money to lend, and Titius, who wants to borrow it of me, would be glad, the one of us to accept, the other to give, an in- terest somewhat higher than theirs: why is the liberty they exercise to be made a pretence for depriving me and Titius of ours? Nor Prevention of Usury. 1 1 Nor has blind custom, thus made the sole and arbitrary guide, any thing of steadiness or uniformity in its decisions : it has varied, from age to age, in the same country, it va- ries, from country to country, in the same age : and the legal rate has va- ried along with it ; and indeed, with regard to times past, it is from the legal rate, more readily than from any other source, that we collect the customary. ^-Among the Romans, till the time of Justinian, we find it as high as 12 per cent. ; in England, so late as the time of Henry VIII., we find it at 10 per cent. I succeeding statutes reduced it to 8, then to 6, and lastly to 5, where it stands at present. Even at present in Ireland it is at 6 per cent. ; and in the West- Indies at 8 per cent. ; and in Hin- dostan, where there is no rate limited by 12 Lett. II. Reasons for Restraint. by law, the lowest customary rate is 10 or IQ. At Constantinople, in cer- tain cases, as I have been well in- formed, thirty per cent, is a com- mon rate. Now, of all these widely different rates, what one is there that is intrinsically more proper than ano- ther ? What is it that evidences this propriety in each instance ? what but the mutual convenience of the par- ties, as manifested by their consent? It is convenience then that has pro- duced whatever there has been of cus- tom in the matter : What can there then be in custom, to make it a bet- ter guide than the convenience which gave it birth ? and what is there in convenience, that should make it a worse guide in one case than in ano- ther ? It would be convenient to me to give 6 per cent, for money : I wish to do so, " No," (says the law) " you Prevention of Usury, 13 *' you shan't." — Why so r " Because *^ it is not convenient to your neigh- " hour to give above 5 for it." Can any thing be more absurd than such a reason r ^^ Much has not been done, I think, by legislators as yet in the way of fix- ing the price of other commodities : and, in what little has been done, the probity of the intention has, I believe, in general, been rather more unquestionable than the rectitude of the principle, or the felicity of the result.'/ Putting money out at interest, is exchanging present money for fu- ture : but why a policy, which, as applied to exchanges in general, would be generally deemed absurd and mischievous, should be deemed necessary in the instance of this par- ticular kind of exchange, mankind are as yet to learn. For him who takes 14 Lett. II. Reasons for Restraint, takes as much as he can get for the use of any other sort of thing, an house for instance, there is no parti- cular appellation, nor any mark of disrepute: nobody is ashamed of do- ing so, nor is it usual so much as to profess to do otherwise. Why a man who takes as much as he can get, be it six, or seven, or eight, or ten per cent, for the use of a sum of money, should be called usurer, should be loaded with an opprobrious name, any more than if he had bought an house with it, and made a proportionable profit by the house, is more than I can see. Another thing I would also wish to learn, is, why the legislator should be more anxious to limit the rate of interest one way, than the other ? why he should set his face against the owners of that species of property more Prevention of Usury, 15 more than of any other? why he should make it his business to prevent their getting more than a certain price for the use of it, rather than to prevent their getting lessf why, in short, he should not take means for making it penal to offer less, for example, than 5 per cent, as well as to accept more ? Let any one that can, find an answer to these questions ; it is more than I can do : I except always the distant and imperceptible advantage, of sink- ing the price of goods of all kinds ; and, in that remote way, multiplying the future enjoyments of individuals. But this was a consideration by far too distant and refined, to have been the original ground for confining the limi- tation to this side. 16 Lett. III. Reasons for Restraint. LETTER III. Reasons for Restraint, — Prevention of Prodigality, Having done with sounds, I conae gladly to propositions ; which, as far as they are true in point of fact, may deserve the name of reasons. And first, as to the efficacy of such restric- tive laws with regard to the Prevention of Prodigality. That prodigality is a bad thing, and that the prevention of it is a pro- per object for the legislator to propose to himself, so long as he confines him- self to, what I look upon as, proper measures, I have no objection to allow, at least for the purpose of the argu- ment 5 Prevention of Prodigality, 17 ment ^ though were this the principal question, I should look upon it as in- cumbent on me to place in a fair light the reasons there may be for doubting, how far, with regard to a person arriv- ed at the age of discretion, third per- sons may be competent judges; which of two pains may be of greater force and value to him, the present pain of restraining his present desires, or the future contingent pain he may be ex- posed to suffer from the want to which the expense of gratifying these desires may hereafter have reduced him. To prevent our doing mischief to one another, it is but too necessary to put bridles into all our mouths : it is ne- cessary to the tranquillity and very be- ing of society : but that the tacking of leading-strings upon the backs of grown persons, in order to prevent their doing thenniselves a mischief, is 18 Lett. III. Reasons for Restraint. not necessary either to the being or tranquillity of society, however con- ducive to its well-being, I think can- not be disputed. Such paternal, or, if you please, maternal care, may be a good work, but it certainly is but a work of supererogation. For my own part, I must confess, that so long as such methods only are employed, as to me appear proper ones, and such there are, I should not feel myself disinclined to see some measures taken for the restraining of prodigality : but this I cannot look upon as being of the number. My reasons I will now endeavour to lay before you. In the first place, I take it, that it is neither natural nor usual for prodi- gals, as such, to betake themselves to this method, I mean, that of giving a rate of interest above the ordinary one, to supply their wants. In Pretention of Prodigality, 19 In the first place, no man, 1 ho^ie you will allow, prodigal or not prodi- gal, ever thinks of borrowing money to spend, so long as he has ready moraeij of his own, or effects which he can turn into ready money without loss. And this deduction strikes off what, I suppose, you will look upon as the greatest proportion of the persons subject, at any given time, to the im- putation of prodigality. In the next place, no man, in such a country as Great Britain at least, has occasion, nor is at all likely, to take up money at an extraordinary rate of interest, who has security to give, equal to that upon which money is commonly to be had at the highest ordinary rate. While so many ad- vertise, as are to be seen every day advertising, money to be lent at five per cent, what should possess a man, who 20 Lett. III. Reasons for Restraint, who has any thing to offer that can be called a security, to give, for ex* ample, six per cent., is more than I can conceive. You may say, perhaps, that a man who wishes to lend his money out up- on security, wishes to have his inter- est punctually, and that without the expense, and hazard, and trouble, and odium of going to law; and that, on this account, it is better to have a sober man to deal with than a prodigal. So far I allow you ; but were you to add, that on this ac- count it would be necessary for a pro- digal to offer more than another man, there I should disagree with you. In the first place it is not so easy a thing, nor, I take it, a common thing, for the lender upon security to be able to judge, or even to form any attempt to judore, whether the conduct of one Prevention of Prodigality. 211 one who offers to borrow his money is or is not of such a cast, as to bring him under this description. The question, prodigal or not prodigal, depends upon two pieces of informa- tion ; neither of which, in general, is very easy to come at : on the one hand, the amount of his means and reasonable expectations; on the other hand, the amount of his expenditure. The goodness or badness of the se- curity is a question of a very differ- ent nature : upon this head, every man has a known and ready means of obtaining that sort of information, which is the most satisfactory the na- ture of things affords, by going to his lawyer. It is accordingly, I take it, on their lawyer's opinion, that lenders in general found their deter- mination in these cases, and not upon any calculations they may have formed, con- 22 Lett. III. Reasons for Restraint concerning the receipt and expen- diture of the borrower. But even supposing a man's disposition to pro- digality to be ever so well known, there are always enough to be found, to whom such a disposition would be rather an inducement than an objec- tion, so long as they were satisfied with the security. Every body knows the advantage to be m3;de in case of mortgage, by foreclosing or forcing a sale : and that this advantage is not uncommonly looked out for, will, I believe, hardly be doubted by any one, who has had any occasion to ob- serve the course of business in the court of Chancery. In short so long as a prodigal has any thing to pledge, or to dispose of, whether in possession, or even in re- version, whether of a certain or even of a contingent nature, I see not, how Prevention of Prodigality, 23 how he can receive the smallest bene- fit, from any laws that are, or can be made to fix the rate of interest. For, suppose the law to be efficacious as far as it goes, and that the prodigal can find none of those monsters called usurers to deal with him, does he lie quiet? no such thing: he goes on, and gets the monfy he wants, by sel- ling his interest instead of borrow- ing. He goes on, I say : for if he has prudence enough to stop him any where, he is not that sort of man, whom it can be worth while for the law to attempt stopping by such means. It is plain enough then, that to a prodigal thus circumstanced, the law cannot be of any service -, on the con- trary, it may, and in many cases must, be of disservice to him, by denying him the option of a resource, which, how disadvantageous soever, could not 24 Lett* III. Reasons for Restraint. not well have proved more so, but would naturally have proved less so, than those which it leaves still open to him. But of this hereafter. I now come to the only remaining class of prodigals, viz. those who have nothing that can be called a security to offer. These, I should think, are not more likely to get money upon an ex- traordinary rate of interest, than an or- dinary one. Persons who either feel, or find reasons for pretending to feel, a friendship for the borrower, can not take of him more than the ordinary rate of interest : persons who have no such motive for lending him, will not lend him at all. If they know him for what he is, that will prevent them of course : and even though they should know nothing of him by any other circumstance, the very circum- stance of his not being able to find a friend Prevention of Prodigality. 2.5 friend to trust him at the highest or- dinary rate, will be sufficient reason to a stranger for looking upon him as a man, who, in the judgment of his friends, is not likely to pay. The way that prodigals run into debt, after they have spent their sub- stance, is, 1 take it, by borrowing of their friends and acquaintance, at or- dinary interest, or more commonly at no interest, small sums, such as each man may be content to lose, or be ashamed to ask real security for 5 and as prodigals have generally an exten- sive acquaintance (extensive acquaint- ance being at once the cause and effect of prodigality), the sum total of the money a man may thus find means to squander, may be considerable, tho* each sum borrowed may, relatively to the circumstances of the lender, have been inconsiderable. This I take to C be 26 Lett. III. Reasons for Restraint. be the race which prodigals, who have spent their all, run at present, under the present system of restraining laws: and this, and no other, I take it, would be the race they would run, were those laws out of the way. Another consideration there is, I think, which will compleat your con- viction, if it was not compleat be- fore, of the inefRcacy of these laws, as to the putting any sort of restraint upon prodigality. This is, that there is another set of people from whom prodigals get what they w^ant, and al- ways will get it, so long as credit lasts, in spite of all laws against high in- terest; and, should they find it neces- sary, at an expense more than equal to an excess of interest they might otherwise have to give. I mean the tradesmen who deal in the goods they want. Every body knows it is much easier Pretention of Prodigality, 27 easier to get goods than money. Peo- ple trust goods upon much slenderer security than they do money : it is very natural they should do so : ordinary profit of trade upon the whole capi- tal employed in a man*s trade, even after the expense of warehouse-rent, journeymen's wages, and other such general charges, are taken into the account, and set against it, is at least equal to double interest; say 10 per cent. Ordinary profit upon any par- ticular parcel of goods must there- fore be a great deal more, say at least triple interest, 15 per cent. : in the way of trading, then, a man can af- ford to be at least three times as ad- venturous, as he can in the way of lending, and with equal prudence. So long, then, as a man is looked upon as one who will pay, he can much easier get the goods he wants, C 2 than 28 Lett. III. Reasons for Restraint, than he could the money to buy them with, though he were content to give for it twice, or even thrice the ordinary rate of interest. Supposing any body, for the sake of extraordinary gain, to be willing to run the risk of supplying him, al- though they did not look upon his personal security to be equal to that of another man, and for the sake of the extraordinary profit to run the ex- traordinary risk ; in the trader, in short in every sort of trader whom he was accustomed to deal with in his solvent days, he sees a person who may accept of any rate of profit, without the smallest danger from any laws that are, or can be made against usury. How idle, then, to think of stopping a man from making six, or seven, or eight per cent, interest, when, if he chuses to run a risk pro- portionable. Prevention of Prodigality. ^9 portionable, he may in this way make thirty or forty per cent, or any rate you please. And as to the prodigal, if he cannot get what he wants upon these terms, what chance is there of his getting it upon any terms, sup- posing the laws against usury, to be away ! This then is another way, in which, instead of serving, it injures him, by narrowing his option, and driving him from a market which might have proved less disadvantage- ous, to a more disadvantageous one. As far as prodigality, then, is con- cerned, I must confess, I cannot see the use of stopping the current of ex- penditure in this way at the fosset, when there are so many unprevent- able ways of letting it run out at the bung-hole. Whether any harm is done to so- ciety, upon the whole, by letting so much so Lett. III. Reasons for Restraint* much money drop at once, out of the pockets of tlie prodigal, who would have gone on wasting it, into the till of the frugal tradesman, who will lay it up, is not worth the inquiry for the present purpose : what is plain is, that, so far as the saving the pro- digal from paying at an extraordinary rate for what he gets to spend, is the object of the law, that object is not at all promoted, by fixing the rate of interest upon money borrowed. On the contrary, if the law has any ef- fect, it runs counter to that object : since, were he to borrow, it would only be, in as far as he could borrow at a rate inferior to that at which otherwise he would be obliged to buy, I • Preventing his borrowing at an extra- ^^ rate, may have the effect of increasing his distress, but cannot have the effect of lessening it: allowing his borrowing at Prevention of Prodigality. 31 at such a rate, might have the effect of lessening his distress, but could not have the effect of increasing it. To put a stop to prodigality, if in- deed it be worth while, I know but of one effectual course that can be taken, in addition to the incompleat and insufficient courses at present practicable, and that is to put the convicted prodigal under an interdict^ as was practised fornaerly among the Romans, and is still practised among the French, and other nations who have taken the Roman law for the ground- work of their own. But to discuss the expediency, or sketch out the details of such an institution, be- longs not to the present purpose. 32 Lett. IV. Reasons for Restraint. LETTER IV. Reasons for Restraint, — Protection of Indigence. Besides prodigals, there are three other classes of persons, and but three, for whose security I can conceive these restrictive laws to have been designed. I mean the indigent, the rashly enterprizing, and the sim- ple : those whose pecuniary necessities may dispose them to give an interest above the ordinary rate, rather than not have it, and those who, from rash- ness, may be disposed to venture upon giving such a rate, or from careless- ness combined with ignorance, may be disposed to acquiesce in it. In Protection of Indigence^ S3 In speaking of these three different classes of persons^ I must beg leave to consider one of them at a time: and accordingly, in speaking of the indi- gent, I must consider indigence in the first place as untinctured with simpli- city. On this occasion, I may sup- pose, and ought to suppose, no parti- cular defect in a man's judgment, or his temper, that should mislead him, more than the ordinary run of men. He knows what is his interest as well as they do, and is as well disposed and able to pursue it as they are. I have already intimated, what 1 think is undeniable, that there are no one or two or other limited num- ber of rates of interest, that can be equally suited to the unlimited num- ber of situations, in respect of the de- gree o^ exigency i in which a man is li- able to find himself: insomuch that C3 to 34 Let r. IV. Reasons for Bcstraint. to the situation of a man, who hy the use of money can make, lor example, 11 per cent., six per cent, is as well adapted, as 5 per cent, is to the situ- ation of him who can make but 10; to tliat of iiim who can make 12 per cent, seven, and so on. So, in the case of his wanting it to save himself from a loss, (which is that wliich is most likely to be in view under the name of exigency) if that loss would amount to 11 percent. 6 percent, is as well adapted to his situation, as 5 per cent, would be to the situation of him, who had but a loss amounting to ten per cent, to save himself from by the like means. And in any case, though, in proportion to the amount of the loss, the rate of interest were even so great, as that the clear saving Bhould not amount to more than one per cent, or any fraction per cent, yet so Protection of Indigence, 35 so Jong as it amounted to any thing, he would be just so much the better for borrowing even on such compa- ratively disadvantageous terms. If, instead of gain, we put any other kind of benefit or advantage — if, in- stead of loss, we put any other kind of mischief or inconvenience, of equal value, the result will be the same. A man is in one of these situations, suppose, in which it would be for his advantage to borrow. But his cir- cumstances are such, that it would not be worth any body's while to lend him, at the highest rate which it is proposed the law should allow; in short, he cannot get it at that rate. If he thought he could get it at that rate, most surely he would not give a higher ; he may be trusted for that : for by the supposition he has nothing defective in his understanding. But the 36 Lett. IV. Reasons for Restraint, the fact is, he cannot get it at that lower rate. At a higher rate, how- ever, he could get it : and at that rate, though higher, it would be worth his while to get it: so he judges, who has nothing to hinder him from judging right ; who has every motive and every means for forming a right judgment ; who has every motive and every means for informing himself of the circum- stances, upon which rectitude of judg- ment, in the case in question, de- pends. The legislator, who knows nothing, nor can know any thing, of any one of all these circumstances, who knows nothing at all about the matter, comes and says to him — *^ It ^^ signifies nothing ; you shall not " have the money : for it would be '^ doing you a mischief to let you ^'borrow it upon such terms." — And Protection of Indigence, 37 And this out of prudence and lov- ing-kindness 1 — There may be worse cruelty : but can there be greater folly ? The folly of those who persist, as is supposed, without reason, in not taking advice, has been much expa- tiated upon. Bat the folly of those who persist, without reason, in forcing their advice upon others, has been but little dwelt upon, though it is, perhaps, the more frequent, and the more flagrant of the two. It is not often that one man is a better judge for another, than that other is for himself, even in cases where the ad- viser will take the trouble to make himself master of as many of the ma- terials for judging, as are within the reach of the person to be advised. But the legislator is not, cannot be, in the possession of any one of these materials 3S Lett. IV. Reasons for Restraint. materials. — What private, can be equal to such public folly ? I should now speak of the enter^ prizing class of borrowers : thoge, who, when characterized by a single term, are distinguished by the unfa- vourable appellation of projectors: but in what I shall have to say of them. Dr. Smith, I begin to foresee, will bear so material a part, that when I come to enter upon that sub- ject, I think to take my leave of you, and address myself to him. Protection of Simplicity, 59 LETTER V. Reasons for Restraint. — Protection of Simplicity. I Come, lastly, to the case of the simple. Here, ia the first place, I think I am by this time entitled to observe, that no simplicity, short of absolute idiotism, can cause the in- dividual to make a more groundless judgment than the legislator, who in the circumstances above stated, should pretend to confine him to any given rate of interest, would have made for him. Another consideration, equally con- clusive, is, that were the legislator's judgment ever so much superior to the individual's how weak soever that 40 Lett. V. Reasons for Restraint. that may be, the exertion of it on this occasion can never be any otherwise than useless, so long as there are so many similar occasions, as there ever must be, where the simplicity of the individual is equally likely to make him a sufferer, and on which the legis- lator cannot interpose with effect, nor has ever so much as thought of in- terposing. Buying goods with money, or upon credit, is the business of every day : borrowing money is the business, only, of some particular exigency, which, in comparison, can occur but seldom. Regulating the prices of goods in ge- neral would be an endless task, and no legislator has ever been weak enough to think of attempting it. And sup- posing he were to regulate the prices, what would that signify for the pro- tection of simplicity, unless he were to Protection of Simplicity, 4 1 to regulate also the quantum of what each man shoiild buy ? Such quan- tum irs indeed regulated, or rather means are taken to prevent buying altogether, but in what cases? In those only where the weakness is ad- judged to have arrived at such a pitch, as to render a man utterly unqualified for the management of his affairs: in short, when it has arrived at the length of idiocy. But in what degree soever a man's weakness may expose him to imposi- tion, he stands much more exposed to it, in the way of buying goods, than in the way of borrowing money. To be informed, beforehand, of the ordinary prices of all the sorts of things, a man may have occasion to buy, may be a task of considerable variety and extent. To be informed of the ordinary rate of interest, is to be 42 Lett. V. Reasons for Restraint, be informed of one single fact, too in- teresting not to have attracted atten- tion, and too simple to have escaped the memory. A few per cent, en- hancement upon the price of goods, is a matter that may easily enough pass unheeded j but a single per cent, beyond the ordinary interest of money, is a stride more conspicuous and start- ling, than many per cent, upon the price of any kind of goods. Even in regard to subjects, vehich, by their importance would, if any, justify a regulation of their price, such as for instance land, I question whether there ever was an instance where, with- out some such ground as, on the one side fraud, or suppression of facts ne- cessary to form a judgment of the value, or at least ignorance of such facts, on the other, a bargain was re- scinded, merely because a man had sold Protection of Simplicity. 43 sold too cheap, or bought too dear. Were I to take a fancy to give a hundred years purchase instead of thirty, for a piece of land, rather than not have it, I don't think there is any court in England, or indeed any where else, that would interpose to hinder me, much less to punish the seller with the loss of three times the purchase money, as in the case of usury. Yet when I had got my piece of land, and paid my money, repentance, were the law ever so well disposed to assist me, might be unavailing : for the seller might have spent the money, or gone off with it. But, in the case of borrow- ing money, it is the borrower always, who, according to the indefinite, or short term for which money is lent, is on the safe side : any imprudence he may have committed with regard to the rate of interest, may be corrected at 44 Lett.V. Reasons for Restraijii. at any time : if I find I have given too high an interest to one man, I have no more to do than to borrow of another at a lower rate, and pay off tlie first: if I cannot find any body to lend me at a lower, there cannot be a more certain proof that the first was not in reality too high. But of this hereafter. Misch iefs of and- usurious Laws . 45 LETTER VI. Mischiefs of the anti-usurious Laws, In the preceding Letters, I have ex- amined all the naodes I can think of, in which the restraints, imposed by the laws against usury, can have been fancied to be of service. I hope it appears by this time, that there are no ways in which those laws can do any good. But there are se- veral, in which they can not but do mischief. The first I shall mention, is that of precluding so many people, altogether, from the getting the money they stand in need of, to answer their respective exigencies. Think what a distress it would 46 Lett. VI. Mischiefs of the would profluce, were the liberty of bor- rowing denied to every body : denied to those who have such security to offer, as renders the rate of interest, they have to offer, a sufficient inducement, for a man who has money, to trust them with it. Just that same sort of dis- tress is produced, by denying that liberty to so many people, whose se- curity, though, if they were permitted to add something to that rate, it would be sufficient, is rendered insufficient by their being denied that liberty. Why the misfortune, of not being pos- sessed of that arbitrarily exacted de- gree of security, should be made a ground for subjecting a man to a hardship, which is not imposed on those who are free from tliat misfor- tune, is more tlian 1 can see. To dis- criminate the former class from the latter, 1 can see but this one circum- stance. anti-uiurwus Latrr, 47 ^aoce, v'%z. tiiat ibeir aec&^y i§ greater. This it is by the rerr sap* |K>fciii<>Q : for were it not, tliey could not be, what tln^ are tuyposed to be, willing to give mare to be rdieir^ from it. I& this point of vtefr tbeo^ the sole tendency of the ktw is, to heap disiresf upon distre». A seeofid mkschief U, that of reo* dering the tenos so mtich the wor^^e, to a ntiJtitiide of those, whose eireoflt- sTances exempt them fi-om betog pre- doded altogether fr<»D getting the money they have occasion lor« In tkkts csuse, the mischief, thoogh neees* saviiy less intea^Be than in the other. Is wukch mote pdpMe and coo^icwms. Those who caaoot borrow Miay get what thejr want, so kmg as they hare any thing to sdl. But while, oat of Umn^-kmAmtm, or wbatsoerer other motive^ the law pre^^ndes a man 60m 48 Lett. VI. Mischief s of the borrowings upon terms which it deems tob disadvantageous, it does not pre- clude him from selling, upon any terms, howsoever disadvantageous. — Every body knows that forced sales are attended with a loss : and, to this loss, what would be deemed a most extravagant interest bears in general no proportion. When a man's move- ables are taken in execution, they are, I believe, pretty well sold, if, after all expenses paid, the produce amounts to two-thirds of what it would cost to replace them. In this way the providence and loving-kind- ness of the law costs him 33 per cent, and no more, supposing, what is sel- dom the case, that no more of the ef- fects are taken than what is barely necessary to make up the money due. If, in her negligence and weakness, she were to suffer him to offer 11 per cent. anti-usurious Laivs. 49 cent, per annum for forbearance, it would be three years before he paid what he is charged with, in the first instance, by her wisdom. Such being the kindness done by the law to the owner of moveables, let us see how it fares with him who has an interest in immoveables. Before the late war, 30 years purchase for land might be reckoned, I think it is pretty well agreed, a medium price. During the distress produced by the war, lands, which it was necessary should be sold, were sold at 20, 18, nay, I believe, in some instances, even so low as 15 years purchase. If I do not misrecollect, I remember in- stances of lands put up to public auc- tion, for which nobody bid so high as fifteen. In many instances, villas, which had been bought before the war, or at the beginning of it, and, in D the 50 Lett. VI. Mischief s of the the interval, had been improved rather than impaired, sold for less than half, or even the quarter, of what they had been bought for. I dare not here for my part pretend to be exact : but on this passage, were it worth their no- tice, Mr. Skinner, or Mr. Christie, could furnish very instructive notes. Twenty years purchase instead of thirty, I may be allowed to take, at least for illustration. An estate then of 1001. a year, clear of taxes, was devised to a man, charged, suppose, with 15001. with interest tiH the money should be paid. Five per cent, inte- rest, the utmost which could be ac- cepted from the owner, did not answer the incumbrancer's purpose : he chose to have the money. But 6 per cent, per- haps, would have answered his purpose, if not, most certainly it would have an- swered the purpose of somebody else : for anti-usurious Laws. 5\ for multitudes there all along were, whose purposes were answered by five per cent. The war lasted, I think, seven years : the depreciation of the value of land did not take place im- mediately : but as, on the other hand, neither did it immediately recover its former price upon the peace, if indeed it has even yet recovered it, we may put seven years for the time, during which it would be more advantageous to pay this extraordinary rate of in- terest than sell the land, and during which, accordingly, this extraordinary rate of interest would have had to run. One per cent, for seven years, is not quite of equal worth to seven per cent, the first year; say, however, that it is. The estate, which before the war was worth thirty years purchase, that is 30001. and which the devisor had given to the devisee for that value, D 2 being 52 Lett. VI. Mischief s of the being put up to sale, fetched but 20 years purchase, 20001. At the end of that period it would have fetched its original value, 30001. Compare, then, the situation of the devisee at the 7 years end, under the law, with what it would have been, without the law. In the former case, the land sel- ling for 20 years purchase, i. e. 20001. what he would have, after paying the 1,5001. is 5001. ; which, with the interest of that sum, at 5 per cent, for seven years, viz. 1751. makes, at the end of that seven years, 6751. In the other case, paying 6 per cent, on the 1,5001. that is 901. a year, and receiving all that time the rent of the land, viz. 1001. he would have had at the seven years' end, the amount of the remaining ten pound during that period, that is 701. in ad- dition to his 10001. — 675. substracted from anti'usvrious Laws, 53 from 1,0701. leaves .3951. This 3951. then, is what he loses out of 1,0701. almost 37 per cent, of his capital, by the loving-kindness of the lavr. Make the calculations, and yon will find, that, by preventing him from borrow- ing the money at 6 per cent, interest, it makes him nearly as much a sufferer as if he had borrowed it at ten. What I have said hitherto is con- fined to the case of those who have per- sent value to give, for the money they stand in need of. If they have no such value, then if they succeed in pur- chasing assistance upon any terms, it must be in breach of the law- their lenders exposing themselves to its ven- geance : for I speak not here of the ac- cidental case, of its being so constructed as to be liable to evasion. But, even in this case, the mischievous influence of the law still pursues them ; aggra- vating 54 Lett. VI. Mischief s of the vating the very mischief it pretends to remedy. Though it be ineffica- cious in the way in which the legisla- tor wishes to see it efficacious, it is ef- ficacious in the way opposite to that in which he would wish to see it so. The effect of it is, to raise the rate of in- terest, higher than it would be other- wise, and that in two ways. In the first place, a man must, in common prudence, as Dr. Smith observes, make a point of being indemnified, not only for whatsoever extraordinary risk it is that he runs, independently of the law, but for the very risk occasioned by the law ; he must be insured, as it were, against the law. This cause would operate, were there even as many persons ready to lend upon the illegal rate, as upon the legal. But this is not the casp : a great number of persons are, of course, driven out of this com- petition. anti-usurious Laws, 65 petition, by the danger of the busi- ness, and another great number, by the disrepute which, under cover of these prohibitory laws or otherwise, has fastened itself upon the name of usurer. So many persons, therefore, being driven out of the trade, it happens in this branch, as it must necessarily in every other, that those who remain have the less to wiih-hold them from advancing their terms; and without confederating (for it must be allowed that confederacy in such a case is plainly impossible) each one will find it easier to push his advantage up to any given degree of exorbitancy, than he would, if there were a greater num- ber of persons of the same stamp to resort to. As to the case where the law is so worded as to be liable to be evaded, in this case it is partly inefficacious and 56 Lett. VI. Mischiefs of the and nugatory, and partly mischievous. It is nugatory as to all such, whose confidence of its being so is perfect : it is mischievous, as before, in regard to all such who fail of possessing that perfect confidence. If the borrower can find nobody at all who has confi- dence enough to take advantage of the flaw^, he stands precluded from all assistance, as before : and, though he should, yet the lender's terms must necessarily run the higher, in propor- tion to what his confidence wants of being perfect. It is not likely that it should be perfect : it is still less likely that he should acknowledge it so to be : it is not likely, at least as matters stand in England, that the worst-penned law made for this purpose should be altogether destitute of effect : and while it has any, that effect, we see, must be in one way or other mischievous. I have anti-usurious Laws, 57 I have already hinted at the disre- pute, the ignominy, the reproach, which prejudice, the cause and the effect of these restrictive laws, has heaped upon that perfectly innocent and even meritorious class of men, who, not more for their own advan- tage than to the relief of the distresses of their neighbour, may have ven- tured to break through these restraints. It is certainly not a matter of indif- ference, that a class of persons, who, in every point of view in which their conduct can be placed, whether in re- lation to their own interest, or in re- lation to that of the persons whom they have to deal with, as well on the score of prudence, as on that of be- neficence, (and of what use is even benevolence, but in as far as it is productive of beneficence ?) deserve praise rather than censure, should be D 3 classed 58 Lett. VI. Mischiefs of the classed with the abandoned and pro- fligate, and loaded with a degree of infamy, which is due to those only whose conduct is in its tendency the most opposite to their own. " This suffering," it may be said, " having already been taken account " of, is not to be brought to account a ** second time : they are aware, as you ^^ yourself observe, of this inconve- *^ nience, and have taken care to get ^^ such amends for it, as they themselves ** look upon as sufficient." True : but is it sure that the compensation, such as it is, will always, in the event, have proved a sufficient one? Is there no room here for miscalculation ? May there not be unexpected, un- looked-for incidents, sufficient to turn into bitterness the utmost sg.tisfaction which the difference of pecuniary emolument could afford? For who can anti-usurious Laws, ^ 59 can see to the end of that inexhausti- ble train of consequences that are liable to ensue from the loss of repu- tation? Who can fathom the abyss of infamy? At any rate, this article of mischief, if not an addition in its quantity to the others above-noticed, is at least distinct from them in its nature, and as such ought not to be overlooked. Nor is the event of the execution of the law by any means an unex- ampled one : several such, at different times, have fallen within my notice. Then comes absolute perdition : loss of character, and forfeiture, not of three times the extra-interest, which formed the profit of the offence, but of three times the principal, which gave occasion to it *. The * See Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 4to, 1789. Ch. 14. On the pro- portion between punishments and offences. 60 Lett. VI. Mischief s of the The last article I have to mention in the account of mischief, is, the cor- ruptive influence, exercised by these laws, on the morals of the people; by the pains they take, and cannot but take, to give birth to treachery and ingratitude. To purchase a pos- sibility of being enforced, the law nei- ther has found, nor, what is very ma- terial, must it ever hope to find, in this case, any other expedient, than that of hiring a man to break his en- gagement, and to crush the hand that has been reached out to help him. In the case of informers in general, there has been no troth plighted, nor benefit received. In the case of real crimi- nals invited by rewards to inform against accomplices, it is by such breach of faith that society is held together, as in other cases by the observance of it. In the case of real crimes. anti-usurious Laws. 6l crimes, in proportion as their mis- chievousness is apparent, what cannot but be manifest even to the criminal, is, that it is by the adherence to his engagement that he would do an in- jury to society, and that by the breach of such engagement, instead of doing mischief he is doing good : in the case of usury this is what no man can know, and what one can scarcely think it possible for any man, who, in the character of the borrower, has been concerned in such a transaction, to imagine. He knew that, even in his own judgment, the engagement was a beneficial one to himself, or he would not have entered into it: and nobody else but the lender is affected by it. 62 Lett. VII. Efficacy of LETTER VII. Efficacy of anti-usurious Laws. Before I quit altogether the con- sideration of the case in which a law, made for the purpose of limiting the rate of interest, may be inefficacious with regard to that end, I cannot for- bear taking some further notice of a passage already alluded to of Dr. Smith's: because, to my apprehen- sion, that passage seems to throw upon the subject a degree of obscurity, which I could wish to see cleared up, in a future edition of that valuable work. " No law," says he*, " can reduce " the common rate of interest below '' the * B. ii. c. 10. vol. ii. p. 45. edit. 8vo. 1784. anti-usurious Laws, &3 ^* the lowest ordinary market rate, at " the time when that law was made. " Notwithstanding the edict of 1766, " by which the French king attempted " to reduce the rate of interest from " five to four per cent., money conti- " nued to be lent in France at five per ^^ cent, the law being evaded in several " different ways." As to the general position, if so it be, so much, according to me, the better: but I must confess I do not see why this should be the case. It is for the purpose of proving the truth of this general position, that the fact of the inefficacy of this attempt seems to be adduced : for no other proof is adduced but this. But, taking the fact for granted, I do not see how it can be sufficient to support the in- ference. The law, we are told at the same time, was evaded •, but we are not 64 Lett. VII. Efficacy of not told how it came to be open to evasion. It might be owing to a particular defect in the penning of that particular law : or, what comes to the same thing, in the provisions made for carrying it into execution. In either case, it affords no support to the general position : nor can that position be a just one, unless it were so in the case where every provision had been made, that could be made, for giving efficacy to the law. For the position to be true, the case must be, that the law would still be broken, even after every means of what can properly be called evasion had been removed. True or untrue, the position is certainly not self-evident enough to be received without proof: yet nothing is adduced in proof of it, but the fact above-noticed, which we see amounts to no such thing. What is more, I should anti-usurious Laws, 65 should not expect to find it capable of proof. I do not see, what it is, that should render the law incapable of " reducing the common rate of interest *^ below the lowest ordinary market " rate,** but such a state of things, such a combination of circumstances, as should afford obstacles equally pow- erful, or nearly so, to the efficacy of the law against all higher rates. For destroying the law's efficacy altogether, I know of nothing that could serve, but a resolution on the part of all per- sons any way privy not to inform : but by such a resolution any higher rate is just as effectually protected as any lower one. Suppose the resolution, strictly speaking, universal, and the law must in all instances be equally in- efficacious ; all rates of interest equally free; and the state of men's dealings in this way just what it would be, were 66 Lett. VII. Efficacy of were there no law at all upon the sub- ject. But in this case, the position, in as far as it limits the inefficacy of the law to those rates which are below the *' lowest ordinary market rate," is not true. For my part, I cannot conceive how any such universal resolution could have been maintained, or could ever be maintained, without an open con- cert, and as open a rebellion against government ; nothing of which sort appears to have taken place : and, as to any particular confederacies, they are as capable of protecting any higher rates against the prohibition, as any lower ones. Thus much indeed must be admit- ted, that the low rate in question, viz. that which was the lowest ordinary market rate immediately before the making of the law, is likely to come in for the protection of the public against anti-usurious Laws, 67 against the law, more frequently than any other rate. That must be the case on two accounts : first, because by being of the number of the ordi- nary rates, it was, by the supposition, more frequent than any extraordinary ones : secondly, because the disrepute annexed to the idea of usury, a force which might have more or less effi- cacy in excluding, from the protec- tion above spoken of, such extraor- dinary rates, cannot well be supposed to apply itself, or at least not in equal degree, to this low and ordinary rate. A lender has certainly less to stop him from taking a rate, which may be taken without disrepute, than from taking one, which a man could not take without subjecting himself to that inconvenience: nor is it likely, that men's imaginations and sentiments should testify so sudden an obsequious- ness 68 Lett. VII. Efficacy of ness to the law, as to stamp disrepute to-day, upon a rate of interest to which no such accompaniment had stood an- nexed the day before. Were I to be asked how I imagined the case stood in the particular in- stance referred to by Dr. Smith : judg- ing from hrs account of it, assisted by general probabilities, I should answer thus; — The law, 1 should suppose, was not so penned as to be altogether proof against evasion. In many in- stances, of which it is impossible any account should have been taken, it was indeed conformed to : in some of those instances, people who would have lent otherwise, abstained from lending alto- gether; in others of those instances, people lent their money at the reduced legal rate. In other instances again, the law was broken : the lenders trust- ing, partly to expedients recurred to for anfi'Usurious Laws, 69 for evading it, partly to the good faith and honour of those whom they had to deal with; in this class of instances it was natural, for the two reasons above suggested, that those where the old legal rate was adhered to, should have been the most numerous. From the circumstance, not only of their num- ber, but of their more direct repug- nancy to the particular recent law in question, they would naturally be the most taken notice of. And this, I should suppose, was the foundation in point of fact for the Doctor*s general position above-mentioned, that *^ no " law can reduce the common rate of " interest below the lowest ordinary " market rate, at the time when that ** law was made." In England, as far as I can trust my judgment and imperfect general recollection of the purport of the laws 70 Lett. VII. Efficacy of laws relative to this matter, I should not suppose that the above position would prove true. That there is no such thing as any palpable and uni- versally-notorious, as well as univer- sally-practicable receipt for that pur- pose, is manifest from the examples, which, as I have already mentioned, every now and then occur, of convic- tions upon these statutes. Two such receipts, indeed, 1 shall have occasion to touch upon presently; but they are either not obvious enough in their nature, or too troublesome or not ex- tensive enough in their application, to have despoiled the law altogether of its terrors or of its preventive effi- cacy. In the country in which I am writ- ing, the whole system of laws on this subject is perfectly, and very happily, inefficacious. The rate fixed by law is anti-usurious Laws. 71 is 5 per cent. : many people lend mo- ney; and nobody at that rate: the lowest ordinary rate, upon the very best real security, is 8 per cent. ; 9, and even 10, upon such security, are common. Six or seven may have place, now and then, between rela- tions or other particular friends ; be- cause, now and then, a man may choose to make a present of one or two per cent, to a person whom he means to favour. The contract is re- newed from year to year : for a thou- sand roubles, the borrower, in his written contract, obliges himself to pay at the end of the year one thou- sand and fifty. Before witnesses, he receives his thousand roubles; and, without witnesses, he immediately pays back his 30 roubles, or his 40 roubles, or whatever the sum may be, that is necessary to bring the real rate 72 Lett. VII. Efficacy, 8(c. rate of interest to the rate verbally agreed on. This contrivance, I take it, would not do in England : but why it would not, is a question which it would be in vain for me to pretend, at this dis- tance from all authorities, to discuss. Lett. VI 1 1, Virtual Usury allowed. 73 LETTER VIIL Virtual Usury allowed. Having proved, as I hope by this time, the utter impropriety of the law's limiting the rate of interest, in every case that can be conceived, it may be rather matter of curiosity, than any thing else, to inquire, how far the law, on this head, is consistent with itself, and with any principles upon Vi^hich it can have built. 1. Drawing and re-drawifig is a practice, which it will be sufficient here to hint at. It is perfectly well known to all merchants, and may be so to all who are not merchants, by consulting Dr. Smith. In this way, E he 74 Lett. VIII. Virtual he has shewn how money may be, and has been, taken up, at so high a rate, as 13 or 14 per cent.; a rate nearly three times as high as the utmost which the law professes to allow. The extra in- terest is, in this case, masked under the names of commission , and price of ex^ chanp'e. The commission is but small upon each loan; not more, I think, than one half per cent. : custom having stretched so far but no further, it might be thought dangerous, perhaps, to venture upon any higher allowance under that name. The charge, being repeated a number of times in the course of the year, makes up in fre- quency what it wants in weight. The transaction is by this shift rendered more troublesome, indeed, but not less practicable, to such parties as are agreed about it. But if usury is good for merchants, 1 don't very well see what Usury allowed, 7S what should make it bad for every body else. 2. At this distance from all the fountains of legal knowledge, I will not pretend to say, whether the prac- tice of selling accepted bills at an under value, would hold good against all at- tacks. It strikes my recollection as a pretty common one, and I think it could not be brought under any of the penal statutes against usury. The adequateness of the consideration might, for ought I know, be attacked with success, in a court of equity; or, perhaps, if there were sufficient evidence (which the agreement of the parties might easily prevent) by an action at common law, for money had and received. If the practice be really proof against all attacks, it seems to afford an effectual, and pretty com- modious method of evading the re- E 2 strictive 76 Lett. VIII. Virtual strictive laws. The only restraint is, that it requires the assistance of a third person, a friend of the borrower's; as for instance : jB, the real borrower, wants 1001. and finds U, a usurer, who is willing to lend it to him, at 10 per cent. B has F, a friend, who has not the money himself to lend him, but is willing to stand security for him to that amount. J?, therefore, draws upon F, and F accepts a bill of lOOl. at 5 per cent, interest, pay- able at the end of a twelvemonth from the date. F draws a like bill upon B: each sells his bill to U for fifty pound: and it is endorsed to U accordingly. The 501. that F re- ceives he delivers over without any consideration to B, This transaction, if it be a valid one, and if a man can find such a friend, is evidently much less troublesome than the practice of drawing Usury allowed. 77 drawing and re-drawing. And this, if it be practicable at all, may be practised by persons of any descrip- tion concerned or not in trade. Should the effect of this page be to suggest an expedient, and that a safe and commodious one, for evading the laws against usury, to some, to whom such an expedient might not otherwise have occurred, it will not lie very heavy upon my conscience. The prayers of usurers, whatever efficacy they may have in lightening the burthen, I hope I may lay some claim to. And I think you will not now wonder at my saying, that in the efficacy of such prayers I have not a whit less confidence than in that of the prayers of any other class of men. One apology I shall have to plead at any rate, that in pointing out these flaws, to the individual who may be disposed 7S Lett.VIIL rirlual disposed to creep out at them, I point them out at the same time to the legis- lator, in whose power it is to stop them up, if in his opinion they re- quire it. If, notwithstanding such opinion, he should omit to do so, the blame will lie, not on my industry, but on his negligence. These, it may be said, should they even be secure and effectual evasions, are still but evasions, and, if charge- able upon the law at all, are charge- able not as inconsistencies but as over- sights. Be it so. Setting these aside, then, as expedients practised or practi- cable, only behind its back, I will beg leave to remind you of two others, practised from the day of its birth, under its protection and before its face. The first I shall mention is paivn- broking. In this case there is the less pretence Usurx/ allowed, 79 pretence for more than ordinary in- terest, inasmuch as the security is, in this case, not only equal to, but bet- ter than, what it can be in any other : to wit, the present possession of a moveable thing, of easy sale, on which the creditor has the power, and cer- tainly does not want the inclination, to set such price as is most for his advantage. If there be a case in which the allowing of such extraor- dinary interest is attended with more danger than another, it must be this : "which is so particularly adapted to the situation of the lowest poor, that is, of those who, on the score of in- digence or simplicity, or both, are most open to imposition. This trade however the law, by regulating, avow- edly protects. What the rate of in- terest is, which it allows to be taken in this way, I cannot take upon me to 80 Lett. VIII. Virtual to remember; but I am much de- ceived, if it amounts to less than 12 per cent, in the year, and I beheve it amounts to a good deal more. Whe- ther it were 12 per cent, or 1200, I believe would make in practice but little difference. What commission is in the business of drawing and re-draw- ing, warehouse -room is, in that of pawnbroking. Whatever limits then are set to the profits of this trade, are set, I take it, not by the vigilancy of the law, but, as in the case of other trades, by the competition amongst the traders. Of the other regulations con- tained in the acts relative to this subject, I recollect no reason to doubt the use. The other instance is that of bot^ tomry and respondentia : for the two transactions, being so nearly related^ may be spoken of together. Bottomry is the usury of pawnbroking: respon^ dentia Usury allowed » 81 dentia is usury at large, but com- bined in a manner with insurance, and employed in the assistance of a trade carried on by sea. If any spe- cies of usury is to be condemned, I see not on what grounds this particular species can be screened from the con- demnation. '^ Oh but" (says sir Wil- liam Blackstone, or any body else who takes upon himself the task of finding a reason for the law) ^\ this is " a maritime country, and the trade, " which it carries on by sea, is the great " bulwark of its defence." It is not necessary I should here enquire, whe- ther that branch, which, as Dr. Smith has shewn, is, in every view but the mere one of defence, less beneficial to a nation, than two others out of the four branches which comprehend all trade, has any claim to be preferred to them in this or any other way. I E 3 admit. 82 Lett. VIII. Firtual admit, that the liberty which this branch of trade enjoys, is no more than what it is perfectly right it should enjoy. What I want to know is, what there is in the class of men, embarked in this trade, that should render beneficial to them, a liberty, which would be ruinous to every body else. Is it that sea adventures have less hazard on them than land adventures ? or that the sea teaches those, who have to deal with it, a de- gree of forecast and reflection which has been denied to landmen ? It were easy enough to give farther and farther extension to this charge of inconsistency, by bringing under it the liberty given to insurance in all its branches, to the purchase and sale of annuities, and of post-obits, in a word to all cases where a man is per- mitted to take upon himself an unli- mited Usury allowed. S5 mited degree of risk, receiving for so doing an unlimited connpensation. Indeed I know not where the want of instances would stop me : for in what part of the magazine of events, about which human transactions are conversant, is certainty to be found ? But to this head of argument, this argument ad hominem, as it may be called, the use of which is but subsi- diary, and which has more of confuta- tion in it than of persuasion or instruc- tion, I willingly put an end. ,84 Lett. IX. Blackstone considered, LETTER IX. Blackstone considered. 1 Hope you are, by this time, at least, pretty much of my opinion, that there is just the same sortof harm^ and no other, in making the best terms one can for one's self in a money loan, as there is in any other sort of bargain. If you are not, Blackstone however is, whose opinion I hope you will allow to be worth something. In speaking of the rate of interest*, he starts a pa- rallel between a bargain for the loan of money, and a bargain about a horse, and pronounces, without hesitation, that the harm of making too good a bargain, * B. ii. cli. 30. Lett. IX. Blacks tone considered. 86 bargain, is just as great in the one case, as in the other. As money-lending, and not horse-dealing, was, what you lawyers call, the principal case, he drops the horse-business, as soon as it has answered the purpose of illus- tration, which it was brought to serve. But as, in my conception, as well the reasoning by which he supports the decision, as that by which any body else could have supported it, is just as applicable to the one sort of bargain as to the other, I will carry on the parallel a little further, and give the same extent to the reasoning, as to the position which it is made use of to support. This extension will not be without its use^ for if the position, when thus extended, should be found just, a practical inference will arise; which is, that the benefits of these re- straints ought ^0 be extended from the 86 Lett. IX. Blackstone considered. the money-trade to the horse-trade. That my own opinion is not favour- able to such restraints in either case, has been sufficiently declared ; but if more respectable opinions than mine are still to prevail, they will not be the less respectable for being consistent. The sort of bargain which the learned commentator has happened to pitch upon for the illustration, is in- deed, in the case illustrating, as in the case illustrated, a loan : but as, to my apprehension, loan or sale makes, in point of reasoning, no sort of differ- ence, and as the utility of the conclu- sion will, in the latter case, be more extensive, I shall adapt the reasoning to the more important business of sell- ing horses, instead of the less import- ant one of lending them. A circumstance, that would render the extension of these restraints to the horse- Lett. IX. Blackstone considered, 87 horse-trade more smooth and easy, is, that in the one track, as well as in the other, the public has already got the length of calling names. Jockey-ship, a term of reproach not less frequently applied to the arts of those who sell horses than to the arts of those who ride them, sounds, I take it, to the ear of many a worthy gentleman, nearly as bad as usury : and it is well known to all those who put their trust in proverbs, and not less to those who put their trust in party, that when we have got a dog to hang, who is trou- blesome and keeps us at bay, whoever can contrive to fasten a bad name to his tail, has gained more than half the battle. I now proceed with my application. The words in italics are my own ; all the rest are Sir William Blackstone*s ; and I restore, at bot- tom. 88 Lett. IX. Blackstone considered. torn, the words I was obliged to dis- card, in order to make room for mine. '' To demand an exorbitant price *' is equally contrary to conscience, '' for the loan of a horse, or for the " loan of a sum of money : but a rea- ^^ sonable equivalent for the tempo- ** rary inconvenience, which the own- '' er may fe^.l by the want of it, and ** for tlie hazard of his losing it en- " tirely, is not more immoral in one " case than in the other. **** ** As to selling horses ^ a capital dis- ^^ tinction must be made, between a " moderate and an exorbitant profit : " to the former of which we give the *^ nsLtne o( horse- deali7ig*, to the latter ** the truly odious appellation of joe- " key-ship f : the former is necessary <« in every civil state, if it were but to *' exclude * interest. f usury. Lett. IX. Blackstone considered, 89 " exclude the latter. For, as the whole *^ of this matter is well summed up *' by Grotius> if the compensation *' allowed by law does not exceed " the proportion of the inconvenience ** which it is to the seller of the horse to *^ part with it * , or the want which the " buyer has of it t, its allowance is ** neither repugnant to the revealed " law, nor to the natural law : but ** if it exceeds these bounds, it is " then an o^]}xess\\e jockey -ship j : and *^ though the municipal laws may give '* it impunity, they never can make it ^^ust. " We see, that the exorbitance or *' moderation of the price given for a '^ horse § depends upon two circum- *' stances : upon the inconvenience of ^' parting * hazard run. f felt by the loan, 1 usury. § interest for the money lent. 90 Lett. IX. Blackstone considered. " parting with the horse one has^y and *^ the hazard of not being able to meet " with such another 'I . The inconveni- *' ence to individual sellers of horses^, ** can never be estimated by laws; the *^ general price for horses § must depend ** therefore upon the usual or general " inconvenience. This results entirely ** from the quantity of horses || in the ^^ kingdom : for the more horses^ there " are running about ^^ in any nation, " the greater superfluity there will be ** beyond what is necessary to carry on " the business of the mail coaches-\'\ and ** the common concerns of life. In " every nation or public community " there is a certain quantity o^ horses J J *' then necessary, which a person well *^ skilled in political arithmetic might ^' perhaps * it for the present. f losing it entirely, t lenders. § rate of general interest. || money. ^ specie. ** circulating, ft exchange. ^% money. Lett. IX. Blackstone considered. 91 *' perhaps calculate as exactly as a pri- *^ vate horse-dealer* can the demand '/ for running horses in his own stables-f : " all above this necessary quantity " may be spared, or lent, or sold, with- " out much inconvenience to the re- *' spective lenders or sellers :- and the '* greater the national superfluity is, " the more numerous will be the sell- " ers J, and the lower ought the na- " tio?2al price of horse -flesh § to be ; " but where there are not enough, or *^ barely enough spare horses || to an- *^ swer the ordinary uses of the pub- *' lie, horseflesh ^ will be proportion- " ably high : for sellers ** will be but " few, as few can submit to the incon- ** venience of selling -ff.** — So far the learned commentator. I hope * banker, f cash in his own shop. % lenders, § the rate of the national interest. li circulating cash. ^ interest. ** lenders. ft lending. 92 Lett. IX. Blackstone considered. I hope by this time you are worked up to a proper pitch of indignation, at the neglect and inconsistency be- trayed by the law, in not suppressing this species of jockey-ship, which it would be so easy to do, only by fixing the price of horses. Nobody is less disposed than I am, to be unchari- table ; but when one thinks of the 1500/. taken for Eclipse, and 2000/. for Rockingham, and so on, who can avoid being shocked, to think how little regard those who took such enormous prices must have had for " the law of revelation and the law *' of nature ?'* Whoever it is that is to move for the municipal law, not long ago talked of, for reducing the rate of interest, whenever that motion is made, then would be the time for one of the Yorkshire members to get up,, and move, by way of addition, for Lett. IX. Blackstone considered, 93 for a clause for fixing and reducing the price of horses. I need not expa- tiate on the usefulness of that valuable species of cattle, which might have been as cheap as asses before now, if our lawgivers had been as mindful of their duty in the suppression of /(JC^^j/- ship, as they have been in the sup- pression of usury. It may be said, against fixing the price of horse-flesh, that different horses may be of different values. I answer — and I think I shall shew you as much, when I come to touch upon the subject of champerty — not more different than the values which the use of the same sum of money may be of to different persons, on different occasions. 94 Lett. X. Grounds of the LETTER X. Grounds of the Prejudices against Usury, It is one thing, to find reasons why- it is fit a law should have been made : it is another to find the reasons why it was made: in other words, it is one thing to justify a law : it is another thing to account for its existence. In the present instance, the former task, if the observations I have been trou- bling you with are just, is an impos- sible one. The other, though not necessary for conviction, may contri- bute something perhaps in the way of satisfaction. To trace an error to its fountain head, says Lord Coke, is to refute Prejudices against Usury. 95 refute it; and many men there are who, till they have received this satisfaction, be the error what it may, cannot pre- vail upon themselves to part with it. *' If our ancestors have been all along ^' under a mistake, how came they to " have fallen into it ?" is a question that naturally presents itself upon all such occasions. The case is, that in matters of law more especially, such is the dominion of authority over our minds, and such the prejudice it creates in favour of whatever institution it has taken under its wing, that, after all manner of reasons that can be thought of, in favour of the institution, have been shewn to be insufficient, we still cannot forbear looking to some unas- signable and latent reason for its effi- cient cause. But if, instead of any such reason, we can find a cause for it in some notion, of the erroneousness of which 96 Lett. X. Grounds of the which we are already satisfied, then at last we are content to give it up with- out further struggle ; and then, and not till then, our satisfaction is com- plete. In the conceptions of the more con- siderable part of those through whom our religion has been handed down to us, virtue, or rather godliness, which was an improved substitute for virtue, consisted in self-denial : not in self-de- nial for the sake of society, but of self- denial for its own sake. One pretty general rule served for most occasions : not to do what you had a mind to do; or^ in other words, not to do what would be for your advantage. By this of course was meant temporal ad- vantage ; to which spiritual advantage was understood to be in constant and diametrical opposition. For, the proof of a resolution, on the part of a being of Prejudices against Usury, 97 of perfect power and benevolence, to make his few favourites happy in a state in which they loere to be, was his determined pleasure, that they should keep themselves as much strangers to happiness as possible, in the state ia which they were. Now to get money is what most men have a mind to do : because he who has money gets, as far as it goes, most other things that he has a mind for. Of course nobody was to get money : indeed why should he, when he was not so much as to keep what he had got already ? To lend money at interest, is to get mo- ney, or at least to try to get it: of course it was a bad thing to lend mo- ney upon such terms. The better the terms, the worse it was to lend upon them : but it was bad to lend upon any terms, by which any thing could F be 98 Lett. X. Grounds of the be got. What made it much the worse was, that it was acting like a Jew : for though all Christians at first were Jews, and continued to do as Jews did, after they had become Christians, yet, in process of time, it came to be discovered, that the distance between the mother and the daughter church could not be too wide. By degrees, as old conceits gave place to new, nature so far prevailed, that the objections to getting money in general, were pretty well over- ruled: but still this Jewish way of getting it^ was too odious to be endured. Chris- tians were too intent upon plaguing Jews, to listen to the suggestion of doing as Jews did, even though mo- ney were to be got by it. Indeed the easier method, and a method pretty much in vogue, was, to let the Jews get Prejudices against Usury. 99 get the money any how they could, and then squeeze it out of them as it was wanted. In process of time, as questions of all sorts came under discussion, and this, not the least interesting, among the rest, the anti-Jewish side of it found no unopportune support in a passage of Aristotle : that celebrated heathen, who, in all matters wherein heathenism did not destroy his competence, had established a despotic empire over the Christian world. As fate would have it, that great philosopher, with all his industry, and all his penetration, not- withstanding the great number of pieces of money that had passed through his hands (more perhaps than ever passed through the hands of philosopher before or since), and notwithstanding the uncommon pains he had bestowed on the subject of ge- F 2 neration. 100 Lett. X. Grounds of the neration, had never been able to dis- cover, in any one piece of money, any organs for generating any other such piece. Emboldened by so strong a body of negative proof, he ventured at last to usher into the v^^orld the result of his observations, in the form of an univer- sal proposition, that all money is in its nature barren. You, my friend, to whose cast of mind sound reason is much more congenial than ancient phi- losophy, you have, I dare to say, gone before me in remarking, that the prac- tical inference from this shrewd obser- vation, if it afforded any, should have been, that it w^ould be to no purpose for a man to try to get five per cent, out of money — not, that if he could contrive to get so much, there vj^ould be any harm in it. But the sages of those days did not viev^^ the matter in that light. A con- Prejudices against Usury, 101 A consideration that did not liappen to present itself to that great philoso- pher, but which had it happened to present itself, might not have been altogether unworthy of his notice, is, that though a daric would not beget another daric, any more than it would a ram, or an ewe, yet for a daric which a man borrowed, he might get a ram and a couple of ewes, and that the ewes, were the ram left with them a certain time, would probably not be barren. That then, at the end of the year, he would find himself master of his three sheep, together with two, if not three, lambs ; and that, if he sold his sheep again to pay back his daric, and gave one of his lambs for the use of it in the mean time, he would be two lambs, or at least one lamb, richer than if he had made no such bargain. These 102 Lett. X. Grounds of the These theological and philosophical conceits, the offspring of the day, were not ill seconded by principles of a more permanent complexion. The business of a money-lender, though only among Christians, and in Christian times, a proscribed profes- sion, has no where, nor at any time, been a popular one. Those who have the resolution to sacrifice the present to future, are natural objects of envy to those who have sacrificed the future to the present. The children who have eat their cake are the natural enemies of the children who have theirs. While the money is hoped for, and for a short tinne after it has been re- ceived, he who lends it is a friend and benefactor : by the time the money is spent, and the evil hour of reckoning is come, the benefactor is found to have changed his nature, and to have put Prejudices against Usury, 103 put on the tyrant and the oppressor. It is an oppression for a man to reclaim his own money : it is none to keep it from him. Among the inconsiderate, that is, among the great mass of mankind, selfish affections conspire with the so- cial in treasuring up all favour for the man of dissipation, and in refusing jus- tice to the man of thrift who has sup- plied him. In some shape or other that favour attends the chosen object of it, through every stage of his career. But, in no stage of his career, can the man of thrift come in for any share of it. It is the general interest of those with whom a man lives, that his ex- pense should be at least as great as his circumstances will bear : because there are few expenses which a man can launch into, but what the benefit of it is shared, in some proportion or other, by those with whom he lives. In 104 Lett. X. Grounds of the Iti that circle originates a standing law, forbidding every man, on pain of infamy, to confine his expenses within what is adjudged to be the measure of his means, saving always the power of exceeding that limit, as much as he thinks proper ; and the means assigned him by that law may be ever so much beyond his real means, but are sure never to fall short of them. So close is the combination thus formed be- tween the idea of merit and the idea of expenditure, that a disposition to spend finds favour in the eyes even of those who know that a man's circum- stances do not entitle him to the means : and an upstart, whose chief recom- mendation is this disposition, shall find himself to have purchased a permanent fund of respect, to the prejudice of the very persons at whose expense he has been gratifying his appetites and his pride. Prejudices against Usury, 105 pride. The lustre, which the display of borrowed wealth has diffused over his character, awes men, during the season of his prosperity, into a sub- mission to his insolence : and when the hand of adversity has overtaken him at last, the recollection of the height, from which he has fallen, throws the veil of compassion over his injustice. The condition of the man of thrift is the reverse. His lasting opulence procures him a share, at least, of the same envy, that attends the prodigal's transient display : but the use he makes of it procures him no part of the fa- vour which attends the prodigal. In the satisfactions he derives from that use, the pleasure of possession, and the idea of enjoyingj at some distant pe- riod, which may never arrive, nobody comes in for any share. In the midst of his opulence he is regarded as a F 3 kind 106 Lett. X. Grounds of the kind of insolvent, who refuses to ho- nour the bills, which their rapacity would draw upon him, and who is by so much the more criminal than other insolvents, as not having the plea of inability for an excuse. Could there be an}^ doubt of the dis- favour which attends the cause of the money-lender, in his competition with the borrower, and of the disposition of the public judgment to sacrifice the interest of the former to that of the latter, the stage would afford a com- pendious, but a pretty conclusive proof of it. It is the business of the drama- tist to study, and to conform to, the humours and passions of those, on the pleasing of whoin he depends for his success: it is the course which reflec- tion must suggest to every man, and which a man would naturally fall into, though he were not to think about it. He Prejudices against Usury, 107 He may, and very frequently does, make magnificent pretences, of giv- ing the law to them : but woe be to him that attempts to give them any other law than what they are disposed already to receive. If he would at- tempt to lead them one inch, it must be with great caution, and not with- out suffering himself to be led by them at least a dozen. Now, I question, whether, among all the instances in which a borrower and a lender of mo- ney have been brought together upon the stage, from the days of Thespis to the present, there ever was one, in which the former was not recom- mended to favour in some shape or other, either to admiration, or to love* or to pity, or to all three; and the other, the man of thrift, consigned to infamy. Hence 108 Lett. X. Grounds of the ' Hence it is that, in reviewing and adjusting the interests of these appa- rently rival parties, the advantage made by the borrow^er is so apt to sh'p out of sight, and that made by the lender to appear in so exaggerated a point of view. Hence it is, that though prejudice is so far softened as to ac- quiesce in the lender's making some advantage, lest the borrower should lose altogether the benefit of his assist- ance, yet still the borrower is to have all the favour, and the lender's advan- tage is for ever to be clipped, and pared down, as low as it will bear^ First it was to be confined to ten per cent, then to eight, then to six, then to five, and now lately there was a re- port of its being to be brought down to four; with constant liberty to sink as much lower as it would. The bur^ then * Prejudices against Usury. 109 then of these restraints, of course, has been intended exclusively for the lender; in reality, as I think you have seen, it presses much more hea- vily upon the borrower : I mean him who either becomes, or in vain wishes to become so. But the presents di- rected by prejudice. Dr. Smith will teil us, are not always delivered ac- cording to their address. Jt was thus that the mill-stone designed for the necks of those vermin, as they have been called, the dealers in corn, was found to fall upon the heads of the consumers. It is thus — but further examples would lead me further from the purpose. 110 Lett. XL Compound Intertst, LETTER XI. Compound Interest, A Word or two I must trouble you with, concerning compound interest ; for compound interest is discounten- anced by the law : I suppose, as a sort of usury. That, without an ex- press stipulation, the law never gives it, I well remember : whether, in case of an express stipulation, the law al- lows it to be taken, I am not absolute- ly certain. I should suppose it might : remembering covenants in mortgages that interest should become principal. At any rate, 1 think the law can- not well punish it under the name of usury. If Lett. XI. Compound Interest. Ill If the discountenance shewn to this arrangement be grounded on the hor- ror of the sin of usury, the impro- priety of such discountenance follows of course, from the arguments which shew the un-^' sinfulness of that sin,''' Other argument against it, I believe, was never attempted, unless it were the giving to such an arrangement the epithet of a hard one : in doing which, something more like a reason is given, than one gets in ordinary from the common law. If that consistency were to be found in the common law, which has never yet been found in man's conduct, and which perhaps is hardly in man's na- ture, compound interest never could have been denied. , The views which suggested this denial, were, I dare to say, very good ; the 112 Lett. XI. Compound Interest. the effects of it are, I am certain, very pernicious. If the borrower pays the interest at the day, if he performs his engage- ment, that very engagement to which the law pretends to obhge him to con- form, the lender, who receives that in- terest, makes compound interest of course, by lending it out again, unless he chooses rather to expend it : he ex- pects to receive it at the day, or what meant the engagement ? if he fails of receiving it, he is by so much a loser. The borrower, by paying it at the day, is no loser : if he does not pay it at the day, he is by so much a gainer : a pain of disappointment takes place in the case of the one, while no such pain takes place in the case of the other. The cause of him whose con- tention is to catch a gain, is thus pre- ferred Lett. XL Compound Interest. 1 13 ferred to that of him whose conten- tion is to avoid a loss : contrary to the reasonable and useful maxim of that branch of the common law which has acquired the name of equity. The gain, which the law in its tenderness thus bestows on the defaulter, is an encouragement, a reward, which it holds out for breach of faith, for iniquity, for indolence, for negli- gence. The loss, which it thu^ throws up- on the forbearing lender, is a punish- ment which it inflicts on him for his forbearance : the power which it gives him of avoiding that loss, by prose- cuting the borrower upon the instant of failure, is thus converted into a re- ward which it holds out to him for his hard-heartedness and rigour. Man is not quite so good as it were to be wished he were ; but he would be bad indeed. 114 Lett. XI. Compound Liter est, indeed, were he bad on all the occa- sions where the law, as far as depends on her, has made it his interest so to be. It may be impossible, say you, it often is impossible, for the borrower to pay the interest at the day : and you say truly. What is the inference ? That the creditor should not have it in his power to ruin the debtor for not paying at the day, and that he should receive a compensation for the loss oc- casioned by such failure, — He has it in his power to ruin him, and he has it not in his power to obtain such compensation. The judge, were it possible for an arrested debtor to find his way into a judge's chamber instead of a spunging-house, might award a proper respite, suited to the circum- stances of the parties. It is not possi- ble : but a respite is purchased, proper or Lett. XI. Compound Interest. 115 or not proper, perhaps at ten times, perhaps at a hundred times the ex- pense of compound interest, by put- ting in bail, and fighting the creditor through all the windings of mischiev- ous and unnecessary delay. Of the satisfaction due either for the original failure, or for the subsequent vexation by which it has been aggravated, no part is ever received by the injured creditor : but the instruments of the law receive, perhaps at his expense, perhaps at the debtor's, perhaps ten times, perhaps a hundred times the amount of that satisfaction. Such is the result of this tenderness of the Jaw. It is in consequence of such tender* ness that on so many occasions a man, though ever so able, would find him- self a loser by paying his just debts: those very debts of which the law has recognized 116 Lett. XI. Compound Interest, recognized the justice. The man who obeys the dictates of common honesty^ the man who does what the law pre- tends to bid him, is wanting to him- self. Hence your regular and securely profitable writs of error in the House of Lords : hence your random and vin- dictive costs of one hundred pounds, and two hundred pounds, now and then given in that house. It is natu- ral, and it is something, to fmd, in a company of lords, a zeal for justice ; it is not natural, to find, in such a company, a disposition to bend down to the toil of calculation. Lett. XII. Maintenance, 8{c. 117 LETTER XII. Maintenance and Champerty, Having in the preceding letters had occasion to lay down, and, as I flatter myself, to make good, the general principle, that no man of ripe years, and of sound mind, ought, out of loving kindness to him, to he hindered from making such bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as, acting with his eyes open, he deems conducive to his interest, I will take your leave for pushing it a little farther, and extending the appli- cation of it to another class of regula- tions still less defensible. I mean the antique 118 Lett. XII. Maintenance antique laws against what are called Maintenance and Champerty. To the head oi Maintenance, I think you refer, besides other offences which are not to tlie present purpose, that of purchasing, upon any terms, any claim, which it requires a suit at law, or in equity, to enforce. Champerty, which is but a particu- lar modification of this sin of Mainte- nance, is, I think, the furnishing a man who has such a claim, with regard to a real estate, such money as he may have occasion for, to carry on such claim, upon the terms of receiving a part of the estate in case of success. What the penalties are for these offences I do not recollect, nor do I think it worth while hunting for them, though I have Blackstone at my elbow. They are at any rate, sufficiently se- vere and Champerty. 119 vere to answer the purpose, the rather as the bargain is made void. To illustrate the mischievousness of the laws by which they have been created, give me leave to tell you a story, which is but too true an one, and which happened to fall within my own observation. A gentleman of my acquaintance had succeeded, during his minority, to an estate of about 3,000/. a year : I won't say where. His guardian, con- cealing from him the value of the estate, which circumstances rendered it easy for him to do, got a convey- ance of it from him, during his non- age, for a trifle. Immediately upon the ward's coming of age, the guardian, keeping him still in darkness, found means to get the conveyance confirm- ed. Some years afterwards, the ward discovered the value of the inheritance he 120 Lett. XII. Maintenance he had been throwing away. Private representations proving, as it may be imagined, inefFectual, he applied to a court of equity. The suit was in some forwardness : the opinion of the ablest counsel highly encouraging : but mo- ney there remained none. We all know but too well, that, in spite of the un- impeachable integrity of the bench, that branch of justice, which is parti- cularly dignified with the name of equity, is only for those who can af- ford to throw away one fortune for the chance of recovering another. Two persons, however, were found, who, between them, were content to defray the expense of the ticket for this lot- tery, on condition of receiving half the prize. The prospect now became en- couraging : when unfortunately one of the adventurers, in exploring the recesses of the bottomless pit, happen- ed and Champerty. 121 ed to dig up one of the old statutes against Champerty. This blew up the whole project : however the defend- ant, understanding that, some how or other, his antagonist had found sup- port, had thought fit in the mean time to propose terms, which the plaintiff, after his support had thus dropped from under him, was very glad to close with. He received, I think it was, 30001. : and for that he gave up the estate, which was worth about as much year- ly, together with the arrears, which were worth about as much as the estate. Whether, in the barbarous age which gave birth to these barbarous precautions, whether, even under the zenith of feudal anarchy, such fetter- ing regulations could have had reason on their side, is a question of curiosity rather than use. My notion is, that G there 122 Lett. XII. Maint€7iancc there never was a time, that there ne- ver could have been, or can be a time, vi^hen the pushing of suitors away from court with one hand, while they are beckoned into it with another, would not be a policy equally faithless, in- consistent, and absurd. But, what every body must acknowledge, is, that, to the times which called forth these laws, and in which alone they could have started up, the present are as opposite as light to darkness. A mischief, in those times, it seems, but too common, though a mischief not to be cured by such laws, was, that a man would buy a weak claim, in hopes that power might convert it into a strong one, and that the sword of a baron, stalking into court with a rabble of retainers at his heels, might strike terror into the eyes of a judge upon the bench. At present, what cares and Champerty, 123 cares an English judge for the swords of an hundred barons ? — Neither fear- ing nor hoping, hating nor loving, the judge of our days is ready with equal phlegm to administer, upon all occasions, that system, whatever it be, of justice, or injustice, which the law has put into his hands. A disposition 50 consonant to duty could not have then been hoped for : one more con- sonant is hardly to be wished. Wealth has indeed the monopoly of justice against poverty : and such monopoly it is the direct tendency and necessary effect of regulations like these to strengthen and confirm. But with this monopoly no judge that lives now is at all chargeable. The law created this monopoly : the law, when- ever it pleases, may dissolve it. I will not however so far wander from my subject as to enquire what G 2 measure 124 Lett. XII. Maintenance measure might have been necessary to afford a full rehef to the case of that unfortunate gentleman, any more than to the cases of so many other gentle- men who might be found, as unfortu- nate as he. I will not insist upon so strange and so inconceivable an ar- rangement, as that of the judge's see- ing both parties face to face in the first instance, observing what the facts are in dispute, and declaring, that as the fact^ should turn out this way or that way, such or such would be his decree. At present, I confine myself to the removal of such part of the mischief, as may arise from the general conceit of keeping men out of difficulties, by cutting them off from such means of relief as each man's situation may af- ford. A spunge in this, as in so ma- ny other cases, is the only needful, and only availing remedy : one stroke of it and Champerty. 125 it for the musty laws against mainte- nance and champerty : another for the more recent ones against usury. Con- sider, for example, what would have respectively been the effect of two such strokes, in the case of the unfortunate gentleman I have been speaking of. By the first, if what is called equity has any claim to confidence, he would have got, even after paying of his champerty -usurers, 15001. a year in land, and about as much in money : instead of getting, and that only by an accident, 30001. once told. By the other, there is no saying to what a de- gree he might have been benefited. May I be allowed to stretch so far in favour of the law as to suppose, that so small a sum as 5001. would have carried him through his suit, in the course of about three years ? I am sen- sible, that may be thought but a short sum. 126 Lett. XII. Maintenance sum, and this but a short term, for a suit in equity 3 but, for the purpose of illustration, it may serve as well as a longer. Suppose he had sought this necessary sum in the way of borrow- ing ; and had been so fortunate, or, as the laws against the sin of usury would stile it, so unfortunate, as to get it at 200 per cent. He would then have purchased his 60001. a year at the price of half as much once paid, viz. 30001. i instead of selling it at that price. Whe- ther, if no such laws against usury had been in being, he could have got the money, even at that rate, I will not pre- tend to say : perhaps he might not have got it under ten times that rate, perhaps he might have got it at the tenth part of that rate. Thus far, I think, we may say, that he might, and probably would, have been the better for the repeal of those laws : but thus far and Champerty. 127 far we must say, that it is impossible he should have been the worse. The terms, upon which he met with adven- turers wilHng to relieve him, though they come not within that scanty field, which the law, in the narrowness of its views, calls usury, do, in the present case, at twenty years purchase of the 30001. a year he was content to have sacrificed for such assistance, amount, in effect, to 4000 per cent. Whether it was likely that any man, who was disposed to venture his money, at all, upon such a chance, would have thought of insisting upon such a rate of interest, I will leave you to ima- gine : but thus much may be said with confidence, because the fact demon- strates it, that, at a rate not exceeding this, the sum would actually have been supplied. Whatever becomes then of the laws against maintenance and champerty^ 128 Lett. XIL Maintenance, 8(c. champerty, the example in question, when applied to the laws against usu- ry, ought, I think, to be sufficient to convince us, that so long as the ex- pense of seeking relief at law stands on its present footing, the purpose of seeking that relief will, of itself, inde- pendently of every other, afford a suf- ficient ground for allowing any man, or every man, to borrow money on any terms on which he can obtain it. Crichqf, ' in White Russia, March, 1787. LET- Lett. XIII. To Dr, Smith. 129 LETTER XIII. To Dr, Smith, on Projects in Arts^ 8(c. SIR, I FORGET what son of controversy it was, among the Greeks, who having put himself to school to a professor of eminence, to learn what, in those days, went by the name of wisdom, chose an attack upon his master for the first public specimen of his profi- ciency. This specimen, whatever en- tertainment it might have afforded to the audience, afforded, it may be sup- posed, no great satisfaction to the mas- ter : for the thesis was, that the pupil G 3 owed 130 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smithy owed him nothing for his pains. For my part, being about to shew myself in one respect as ungrateful as the Greek, it may be a matter of prudence for me to look out for something like candour by way of covering to my in- gratitude: instead therefore of pre- tending to owe you nothing, I shall begin with acknowledging, that, as far as your track coincides with mine, I should come much nearer the truth, were I to say I owed you every thing. Should it be my fortune to gain any advantage over you, it must be with weapons which you have taught me to wield, and with which you yourself have furnished me : for, as all the great standards of truth, which can be ap- pealed to in this line, owe, as far as I can understand, their establishment to you, I can see scarce any other way of convicting you of any error or over- sight, on Projects in Arts, 8(c,- 131 sight, than by judging you out of your own mouth. In the series of letters to which this will form a sequel, I had travelled nearly thus far in my researches into the policy of the laws fixing the rate of interest, combating such arguments as fancy rather than observation had sug- gested to my view, when, on a sud- den, recollection presented me with your formidable image, bestriding the ground over which I was travelling pretty much at my ease, and opposing the shield of your authority to any ar- guments I could produce. It was a reflection mentioned by Ci- cero as affording him some comfort, that the employment his talents till that time had met with, had been chiefly on the defending side. How little soever blest, on any occasion, with any portion of his eloquence, I may, on 132 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smith, on the present occasion, however, in- dulge myself with a portion of what constituted his comfort : for, if I pre- sume to contend with you, it is only in defence of what I look upon as, not only an innocent, but a most merito- rious race of men, who are so unfortu- nate as to have fallen under the rod of your displeasure. I mean projectors : under which invidious name I under- stand you to comprehend, in particu- lar, all such persons as, in the pursuit of wealth, strike out into any new channel, and more especially into any channel of invention. ^ It is with the professed view of checking, or rather of crushing, these adventurous spirits, whom you rank with '' prodigals," that you approve of the laws which limit the rate of in- terest, grounding yourself on the ten- dency, they appear to you to have, to keep on Projects in ArtSy 8(c. 133 keep the capital of the country out of two such different sets of hands. The passage, I am speaking of, is in the fourth chapter of your second book, volume the second of the 8vo. edition of 1784. " The legal rate," (you say) '^ it is to be observed, though " it ought to be somewhat above, " ought not to be much above, the " lowest market rate. If the legal rate '^ of interest in Great Britain, for ex- " ample, was fixed so high as eight or *^ ten per cent, the greater part of the '"^ money which was to be lent, would " be lent to prodigals and projectors, ^* who alone would be willing to give ^^ this high interest. Sober people, " who will give for the use of money " no more than a part of what they " are likely to make by the use of it, " would not venture into the compe- " tition. A great part of the capital '' of 134 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smithy " of the country would thus be kept " out of the hands which were most '^ likely to make a profitable and ad- " vantageous use of it, and thrown *' into those which were most likely to " waste and destroy it. Where the " legal interest, on the contrary, is *' fixed but a very little above the " lowest market rate, sober people are " universally preferred as borrowers, *' to prodigals and projectors. The " person who lends money, gets nearly '^ as much interest from the former, " as he dares to take from the latter, " and his money is much safer in the " hands of the one set of people than " in those of the other. A great part *' of the capital of the country is thus " thrown into the hands in which it " is most likely to be employed with *^ advantasre." It happens fortunately for the side you on Projects in Arts, S^c, 135 you appear to have taken, and as un- fortunately for mine, that the appella- tive, which the custom of the language has authorized you, and v^^hich the po- verty and perversity of the language has in a manner forced you, to make use of, is one, which, along with the idea of the sort of persons in question, conveys the idea of reprobation, as in- discriminately and deservedly applied to them. With what justice or con- sistency, or by the influence of what causes, this stamp of indiscriminate re- probation has been thus affixed, it is not immediately necessary to inquire. But, that it does stand thus affixed, you and every body else, I imagine, will be ready enough to allow. This being the case, the question stands al- ready decided, in the first instance at least, if not irrevocably, in the judg- ments of all those, who, unable or un- willing 13fi lAVrv.XUl. 'Jo Dr. Smith, willing to be al the puiriH of analy- sing tlieii' iileuH, Nufler their minds to be led eaptivt? by the tyranny of sounds ; that is, I doubt, of by far the greater proportion of those whom we are hkeiy to have to judge us. In tlie coneep- tionsofall such [lersons, to ask whether it be fit to r(^strail» [>rojeels and [iro- jectors, will b(* as mueh as to ask, whetlier it be fit to restrain rashness, and Tolly, and absurdity, and knavery, and waste. or prodigals I shall say no more at present. I have already stated my rea- sons for thinking that it is not among them that we arc to look for the na- tural customers for money at high rates of interest. As far as those rea- sons are conclusive, it v^ill follow, that, of the two sorts of men you mention as proper objects o( the burthen of tliese restraints, prodigals and jiroject- ors* the iMUST. A» to Vaemf what your de* tnHian m of ^iffteton, ^uad whaA de* fCff pCfoof ^ penan§ you mamt to m* dmde mder the ceamre conweyed hy tiuA tuunep migfai be vmUtM for the porpoie of jodgifij^ of the ^oj^rkiy €ii thai eemure, bat mMke$ no iAtet'- eoee m judgtog of tlie propricijr of the lair^ wbicfo tlial ccmT e u employ^ ed to justify^ Whether yom yamnH, were the tefenii dnuti ofpenomuuiie to Y9m before yom m rewtew, would he diepot e d to fkk out thk or th^ dam, or thie and that todswidtud, iu order to exempt them bom Midi eea^ erne, k what (or that furpote we bare no need to inquire. The law^ it is it hSU with eqnal weighty and with all ita weighty npon all thoie pertone. Without dMnetion, to whom the term f/rc^'ectors. In the mott unpartkd and 158 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smith, extensive signification of which it is capable, can be applied. It falls at any rate (to repeat some of the words of my former definition), upon all such persons, as, in the pursuit of wealth, or even of any other ob- ject, endeavour, by the assistance of wealth, to strike into any channel of invention. It falls upon all such per- sons, as, in the cultivation of any of those arts which have been by way of eminence termed useful, direct their en- deavours to any of those departments in which their utility shines most con- spicuous and indubitable ; upon all such persons as, in the line of any of their pursuits, aim at any thing that can be called improvement ; whether it consist in the production of any new article adapted to man*s use, or in the meliorating the quality, or diminishing the expense, of any of those which are already known to us. It falls, in short, 011 Projects in Arts, 8(c. 139 short, upon every application of the human powers, in which ingenuity stands in need of wealth for its as- sistant. High and extraordinary rates of in- terest, how little soever adapted to the situation of the prodigal, are certainly, as you very justly observe, particularly adapted to the situation of the pro» jector : not however to that of the im- prudent projector only, nor even to his case more than another's, but to that of the prudent and well-grounded projector, if the existence of such a being were to be supposed. Whatever be the prudence or other qualities of the project, in whatever circumstance the novelty of it may lie, it has this circumstance against it, viz. that it is new. But the rates of interest, the highest rates allowed, are, as you ex- pressly say they are, and as you would have them to be, adjusted to the situ- ation 140 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smith, ation which the sort of trader is in, whose trade runs in the old channels, and to the best security which such channels can afford. But in the na- ture of things, no new trade, no trade carried on in any new channel, can af- ford a security equal to that which may be afforded by a trade carried on in any of the old ones : in whatever light the matter might appear to per- fect intelligence, in the eye of every prudent person, exerting the best pow- ers of judging which the fallible con- dition of the human faculties affords, the novelty of any commercial adven- ture will oppose a chance of ill success, superadded to every one which could attend the same, or any other, adven- ture, already tried, and proved to be profitable by experience. The limitation of the profit that is to be made, by lending money to per- sons embarked in trade, will render the monied on Projects in Arts^ Kc, 141 monied man more anxious, you may say, about the goodness of his secu- rity, and accordingly more anxious to satisfy himself respecting the prudence of a project in the carrying on of which the money is to be employed, than he would be otherwise : and in this way it may be thought that these laws ha'oe a tendency to pick out the good projects from the bad, and fa- vour the former at the expense of the latter. The first of these positions I admit : but I can never admit the consequence to follow. A prudent man, (I mean nothing more than a man of ordinary prudence) a prudent man acting under the sole governance of prudential motives, I still say will not, in these circumstances, pick out the good projects from the bad, for he will not meddle with projects at all. He will pick out old established trades from 142 Lett. XIII. To Dr, Smith, from all sorts of projects, good and bad ; for with a new [)roject, be it ever so promising, he never will have any thing to do. By every man that has money, five per cent, or whatever be the highest legal rate, is at all times, and always will be, to be had upon the very best security, that the best and most prosperous old-established trade can afford. Traders in general, I be- lieve, it is commonly understood, are well enough inclined to enlarge their capital, as far as all the money they can borrow at the highest legal rate, while that rate is so low as 5 per cent, will enlarge it. How it is pos- sible therefore for a project, be it ever so promising, to afford, to a lender at any such rate of interest, terms equal- ly advantageous, upon the whole, with those he might be sure of obtaining from an old-established business, is more on Projects in ArLSy ^c. 1 43 more tiian I can conceive. JLoariH of money may cortairjly cfiance, now and then, to fjtjfl tlicir way into the poc- kets of projectors as well as of other men : btit wlien this lja[*pens it must be througfi incautiousrjess, or friend- sliip, or tlje expectation of some colla- teral l>en(Tit, and not througli any idea of the advantageoubness of the transaction, in tlie light of a pecuniary hargait). I should not expect to see it alledgfd, that there is any thing that should render the number of well-grounded projects, in comparison of the ill- grounded, less in time future, than it has been in time past. 1 am sure at least that I know of no reasons why it should be so, though I know of some reasons, which 1 shall beg leave to sub- mit to you f)y and by, which appear to me 144 Lett. XIII. To Dr, Smith, me pretty good ones, why the advan- tage should be on the side of futurity. But unless the stock of well grounded projects is already spent, and the whole stock of ill-grounded projects that ever were possible, are to be looked for exclusively in the time to come, the censure you have passed on projec- tors, measuring still the extent of it by that of the operation of the laws in the defence of which it is employed, looks as far backward as forward : it con- demns as rash and ill-grounded, all those projects, by which our species have been successively advanced from that state in which acorns were their food, and raw hides their cloathing, to the state in which it stands at pre- sent ; for think. Sir, let me beg of you, whether whatever is now the routine of trade was not, at its commence- ment. on Projects in Arts, SCc, 145 ment, project? whether whatever is now establishment, was not, at one time, innovation ? How is it that the tribe of well- grounded projects, and of prudent pro- jectors (if by this time I may have your leave for applying this epithet to some at least among the projectors of time past), have managed to struggle through the obstacles which the laws in question have been holding in their way, it is neither easy to know, nor necessary to inquire. Manifest enough, I think, it must be by this time, that difficulties, and those not inconsider- able ones, those laws must have been holding up, in the way of projects of all sorts, of improvement (if I may say so) in every line, so long as they have had existence : reasonable therefore it must be to conclude, that, had it not been for these discouragements, pro- H ^'ects UG Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smit/i, jccts of all Horts, wc^ll-groiindcd and succeHHful onii.s, as well as oUuts, would hiivr. Ix'ori more numerous than tlicy liave been: and tlial a<:eonlingly, on llu; other liiind, us soon, i( (;ver, ajs th(;se diseonragenKuiLs KJiall Ix! removed, projects of all sorts, and arnon/^ the rest, well grounded and sueeeHsful ones, will he more; numerous th:in th(;y would otherwise have heen : in short, that, as, without these discou- ragements, th<; progn.'ss of mankind in the career of prosperity, wouhi have been greater than it has Ix^en und(;r them in tinui [)ast ; so, were tlxy to be removed, it would be at least jiro- portionably greater in time future. Tliat I had done you no injustice, in assigning to your idea of [jrojeetors so great a latitude, and that th(.' unfa- vourable opinion you have professed to entertain of them is not confined to tlie on Projects in Art.;, 5Cc. 147 the above paft»ago, might he made, I think, pretty apparent, if it be mate- rial, by another passage in the tenth chapter of your first book,* ** The ** ejitablinhment of any new manufac- *' ture, of any new branch of com- *' meree, or of any new practice in ** agriculture;" all these you compre- henci by name under the li«t of *' pro- '' jects:'* of every one of them you ob- serve, that *' it h a (Speculation from *' which the proj(:rJ.or promises him«elf " extraordinary profits. 7"her^.e pro- *' fits (you a^ld) are .sometimes very ** greaty and sometimes, more, frequently *' perhaps, they are <7M^^^r otkerwue: but " in general they bear no regular pro- *' portion Uj those of otlier old tradeu ** in the neighbourhood. If the pro- " ject succeeds, they are commonly ^ £ait. 17&4. 8vo. p, 177. H2I 148 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smith, " at first vesy high. When tho trade '* or practice becomes thoroutijlily es- " tahhshed and well known, the com- *^* petition reduces iheni to thc^ level of " otiier trades." lint on this head J forbear to insist: nor shouhJ I have taken this liberty of giving yon back your own words, but in the [lope of seeing some aheration made in them in your next edition, should 1 be fortunate enoui;h to find my sentiments confirm- ed by your*s. In other respects, what is essential to the pubhc, is, what the error is in the sentiments entertained, not who it is that entertains them. I know not whether the observations which I have been troubling you with, will be thou^dit to need, or whether they will be thought to receive, any additional support from those comfortable positions, of which you have made such good and such fre- quent on Project in ArtSy 8(c, 149 quent use, concerning ih'^; constant temi^-ncy of mankind to ^f:t forward in the career of prosperity, the preva- lence of prudence over imprudence, in the sum of private conduct at least, and the superior fitness of individual* for managing their own pecuniary con- cerns, of which they know the parti- culars and the circumstances, in com- parison of the legislator, who can have no such knowledge. I will make the experiment: for, so long as I have the mortification to see you on the oppo- site side, 1 can never think the ground I have taken strong enough, while any thing remains that appears capable of rendering it still stronger. " With regard to misconduct, the *' numl>er of prudent and successful " undertakings ** [yon obs^:rve * '^ is * B. IL dL ill €dit. %ro. 17^, tU* u, p, 30, ** every 150 Lett. XIII. To Dr, Smith, ** every where much greater than that " of injudicious and unsuccessful ones. ** After all our complaints of the fre- *^ quency of bankruptcies, the unhap- *' py men who fall into this misfor- ** tune make but a very small part of *' the whole number engaged in trade, ** and all other sorts of business; not " much more perhaps than one in a " thousand/' 'Tis in support of this position that you appeal to history for the constant and uninterrupted progress of man- kind, in our island at least, in the ca- reer of prosperity: calling upon any one who should entertain a doubt of the fact, to divide the history into any number of periods, from the time of Caesar's visit down to the present: pro- posing for instance the respective aeras of the Restoration, the Accession of Elizabeth^ that of Henry VII. the Norman on Projects in Arts^ 8(c. 151 Norman Conquest, and the Heptar- chy; and putting it to the sceptic to find out, if he can, among all these periods, any one at which the condi- tion of the country was not more pros- perous than at the period immediately preceding it: spite of so many wars, and fires, and plagues, and all other public calamities, with which it has been at different times afflicted, whe- ther by the hand of God, or by the misconduct of the sovereign. No very easy task, I believe: the fact is too manifest for the most jaundiced eye to escape seeing it: — But what and whom are we to thank for it, but projects, and projectors? " No," I think I hear you saying, " I will not thank projectors for it, I " will rather thank the laws, which " by fixing the rates of interest, have " been exercising their vigilance in " repressing 152 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smith. " repressing the temerity of projectors, " and preventing their imprudence *^ from making those defalcations from " the sum of national prosperity, which *Mt would not have failed to make, " had it been left free. If, during all *^ these periods, that adventurous race " of men had been left at liberty by " the laws to give full scope to their " rash enterprizes, the increase of " national prosperity during these " periods might have afforded some *Vground for regarding them in a *^ more favourable point of view. But " the fact is, that their activity has " had these laws to check it ^ without " which checks you must give me " leave to suppose, that the current " of prosperity, if not totally stopt, or " turned the other way, would at any <^ rate have been more or less retard- «^ ed. Here then'* (you conclude) " lies on Projects in Arts, 8(c. 153 ** lies the difference between us. What " jou look upon as the cause of the *' increase about which we are both " agreed, I look upon as an obstacle *^ to it : and what you look upon as the " obstacle, I look upon as the cause." Instead of starting this as a sort of plea that might be urged by you, I ought, perhaps, rather to have men- tioned it as what might be urged by some people in your place: for as 1 do not imagine your penetration would suffer you to rest satisfied with it, still less can I suppose that, if you v^^ere not, your candour would allow you to make use of it as if you were. To prevent your resting satisfied with it, the following considerations w^ould, I think, be sufiicient. In the first place, of the seven pe- riods which you have pitched upon, as so many stages for the eye to rest H 3 at IM Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smith, at in viewing the progress of prospe- rity, it is only during the three last, that the country has had the benefit, if such we are to call it, of these laws : for it is to the reign of Henry VIII. that we owe the first of them. Here a multitude of questions might be started: Whether the curbing of projectors formed any part of the de- sign of that first statute, or whether the views of it were not wholly con- fined to the reducing the gains of that obnoxious and envied class of men, the money-lenders ? Whether projec- tors have been most abundant before that statute, or since that statute ? And whether the nation has suffered, as you might say — benefited, as I should say, most by them, upon the whole, dur- ing the former period or the latter ? All these discussions, and many more that might be started, I decline engag- ing on Projects in ArtSy 8(c. 155 mg in, as more likely to retard, than to forward, our coming to any agree- ment concerning the main question. In the next place, I must here take the liberty of referring you to the proof, which I think I have already given, of the proposition, that the re- straints in question could never have had the effect, in any degree, of lessen- ing the proportion of bad projects to good ones, but only of diminishing, as far as their influence may have ex- tended, the total number of projects, good and bad together. Whatever therefore was the general tendency of the projecting spirit previously to the first of these laws, such it must have remained ever since, for any effect which they could have had in purify- ing and correcting it. But what may appear more satisfac- tory perhaps than both the above con- siderations. 156 Licrr. XIII. To Dr. Smith, siderations, and may ailbrd us the best lu'lp towards extricating ourselves from the pcM'plexity, which the pha I have been combating (and which 1 thought il necessary to bring to view, as the best tljat could be urged) seems much hitler (calculated to plunge us into, tlian bring us out of, is, the con- sideration of the small elVect which the gre^atest waste that can be conceived to have been made within any compass of time, by injudicious projects, can have iiad on the sum ol' prosperity, even in the estimation of those whose o[)inion is most unfavourable to projectors, in comparison of the effect which within the same compass of time must have been produced by prodigdlihj. Of the two causes, and only two causes, which you mention as contri- buting to retard the accumulation of national wealth, as far as the conduct of on Projects in Arts, Kr. 15? of individuals is concerned, project- ing, as 1 observed fielore, is the one, and prodigality is the other: but tlic detriment, which society can receive even irom the concurrent efhcacy of both these causes, yon represent on se- veral occasions, as inconsiderable; and, if I do not niisa|)prehend yon, too inconsiderable, either to need, or to warrant, the Interposition of govern- ment to oppose it. Be tliis as it may with regard to projecting and pro- digality taken together, witli regard to prodigality at least, 1 am certain I do not misapprehend you. On this subject yon ride trium[)hant, an those who can see ? It must be by some distinction too fine for my conception, if you clear yourself from the having taken, on another occasion, but on the very point in question, the side, on which it would be my ambition to see you fix. " What is the species of domestic '* industry which his capital can em- " ploy, and of which the produce is '* likely to be of the greatest value, *^ every individual " (you say*), " it " is evident, can, in his local situation, "judge much better than any states- *^ man or lawgiver can do for him. " The statesman, who should attempt " to direct private people in what " manner they ought to employ their * B. IV. ch. ii. vol. ii. p. 183, edit. 8vo. " capitals. 166 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smithy r " capitals, would not only load him- " self with a most unnecessary atten- *' tion, but assume an authority which *^ could safely be trusted, not only to ** no single person, but to no council " or senate whatsoever, and which *^ would no where be so dangerous as *' in the hands of a man who had folly " and presumption enough to fancy ** himself fit to exercise it. " To give the monopoly of the " home market to the produce of do- " mestic industry, in any particular *' art or manufacture, is in some mea* " sure to direct private people in what " manner they ought to employ their " capitals, and must in almost all cases , " be either a useless or a hurtful regu- " lation.** — Thus far you : and I add, I to limit the legal interest to a rate at which the carriers on of the oldest and best-established and least hazardous trades on Projects in Arts, 8(c, 167 trades are always glad to borrow, is to give the monopoly of the money-mar- ket to those traders, as against the pro- jectors of new-imagined trades, not j one of which but, were it only from 1 the circumstance of its novelty, must, as I have already observed, appear more hazardous than the old. These, in comparison, are but in- conclusive topics. I touched upon them merely as affording, what ap- peared to me the only shadow of a plea, that could be brought, in defence of the policy I am contending against. I come back therefore to my first ground, and beg you once more to consider, whether, of all that host of manufactures, which we both exult in ; as the causes and ingredients of na- I tional prosperity, there be a single one, that could have existed at first but in the shape of a project. But, if a re- gulation. 168 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smithy gulation, the tendency and effect of which is merely to check projects, in as far as they are projects, without any sort of tendency, as I have shewn, to weed out the bad ones, is defensible in its present state of imperfect effica- cy, it should not only have been de- fensible, but much more worthy of our approbation, could the efficacy of it have been so far strengthened and compleated as to have opposed, from the beginning, an unsurmountable bar to all sorts of projects whatsoever : that is to say, if, stretching forth its hand over the first rudiments of soci- ety, it had confined us, from the be- ginning, to mud for our habitations, to skins for our cloathing, and to acorns for our food. I hope you may by this time be disposed to allow me, that we have not been ill served by the projects of time on Projects in ArtSy Kc, 169 time past. I have already intimated, that I could not see any reason why we should apprehend our being worse served by the projects of time future. I will now venture to add, that I think I do see reason, why we should expect to be still better and better served by these projects, than by those. I mean better upon the whole, in vir- tue of the reduction which experience, if experience be worth any thing, should make in the proportion of the number of the ill-grounded and unsuc- cessful, to that of the well-grounded and successful ones. The career of art, the great road which receives the footsteps of pro- jectors, may be considered as a vast, and perhaps unbounded, plain, be- strewed with gulphs, such as Curtius was swallowed up in. Each requires I an 170 Lett.XIII. To Dr, Smith, an human victim to fall into it ere it can close; but when it once closes, it closes to open no more, and so much of the path is safe to those who fol- low. If the want of perfect informa- tion of former miscarriages renders the reality of human life less happy than this picture, still the similitude must be acknowledged : and we see at once the only plain and effectual method for bringing that similitude still nearer and nearer to perfection ; I mean, the framing the history of the projects of time past, and (what may be executed in much greater perfection, were but a finger held up by the hand of govern- ment) the making provision for re- cording, and collecting, and publishing as they are brought forth, the race of those with which the womb of futu- rity is still pregnant. But to pursue this o?i Projects in Arts, SCc, 1 7 ^ this idea, the execution of which is not within my competence, would lead me too far from the purpose. Comfortable it is to reflect, that this state of continually-improving secu- rity, is the natural state not only of the road to opulence, but of every other track of human life. In the war which industry and ingenuity main- tain with fortune, past ages of igno- rance and barbarism form the forlorn hope, which has been detached in ad- vance, and made a sacrifice of for the sake of future. The golden age, it is but too true, is not the lot of the ge- neration in which we live : but, if it is to be found in any part of the track marked out for human existence, it will be found, I trust, not in any part which is past, but in some part which is to come. But to return to the laws against I 2 usury. usury, ami their rcNtrainiuf^ inllueiicr on [>n>jt ('U)rN. I Imvo nuul<* il» 1 hope, pnlly appiiKu!, that these resiniintH huve no power or lenthMiey lo pick out bml projects iVom the good. Is it worth whiU^ to mhl, whiih I think 1 way tU> witli sonu* Irulh, Uuit the* It n~ deuey of Iheni is nvlher lo piek the good out (roui the hiul ? Thus nuieli at kuist may be said, and it eoiiu s to the same thini;j, lliat llure is t)iu* case in whieh, he the projt et what it mtxy, they nuiy have \\\c elleet of chocking it, aiul another- in whieh th(\v Cftu luive no sneh t tVeet ; and tluit the first has tor its uccompaniment, and that a necessary i>ne, a eiren instance Avhicli has a strong tendency io 4i< pa- late anil ihscavd eve i y projetrt iA the injudicious stamp, hnt which is want- ing in the otht I- case. I mean, in a word, the benefit of discussion. It on Projects in Arh^^^c. 173 It is evident enough, ihiit upon all such projects, whatever be their na- ture, as find fundn Kntticient to carry them on, in the hands of him whose invention gave th(Mn birth, tliesc laws are perfectly, and if by this time you will allow me to say so, very hfeppily, without power. But for these there 1ms not necessarily been any other judge, prior to experience, than the inventor's own })artial aHcction. It is not only not necessary that they should have had, but it is natural enough that they should not have had, any such judge : since in most cases the advantage to be expected from the project depends upon the exclusive property in it, and consequently upon tlje conceahnent of the princi- ple. Thitik, on the oth(T hand, how different is the lot of tliat enterprise which depends upon the good opinion of I7i I.KTT. XIII. To lh\ Smith, of another man ; that other, a man })os- sesBed of the wealth which the projec- tor wants, and before whom necessity forces liim to a|)[)ear in the character of a supphant at U;ast : hap[)y if, in the imagination of his Jndt»;e, he adds not to that (higrading character, that of a visionary enthnsiast or an impostor ! At any rate, llieie are, in this ease, two wits, set to sift into the nurils of the project, for one, which was employed upon that same task in the other case : and of these two there is one, whose prejndices are certainly not most likely to he on the favonrable side. True it is, that in the jumble of occurrences, an over-sanguine projector may stum- ble upon a patron as over-sanguine as himself; and the wishes may bribe the judgment of the one, as they did of the other. The opposite case, how- ever, you will allow, I think, to be by much on Projects in Arlr.^ Kc. 17^ much the more nalurjil. Whatever a man's wishes may l>e for the .success of an enterprize not yet liis own, tiis fears are likely to be still stronger. That same pretty generally implanted prin- ciple of vanity and self-conceit, which disposes most of us to over- value each of us his own conceptions, disposes us, in a proportionable degree, to under- value those of other men. Is it worth adding, though it be undeniabjy true, that could it even be proved, by ever so uncontrovertible evidence, that, from the beginning of time to tlje present ^V^y^ there never was a project that did not terminate in the ruin of its author j not even from such a fact as this, could the legislator derive any sufficient warrant, so much as for wishing to see the spirit of pro- jects in any degree repressed ? — The discouraging motto, Sic vos non vohu, may 175 Lett. XIII. To Dr, Smith, may be matter of serious consideration to the individual, but what is it to the legislator ? What general, let him at- tack with ever so superior an army, but knows that hundreds, or perhaps thousands, must perish at the first on- set ? Shall he, for that consideration alone, lie inactive in his lines? "Every " man for himself — but God,** adds the proverb (and it might have added the general, and the legislator, and all other public servants), " for us all.** Those sacrifices of individual to gene- ral welfare, which, on so many occa- sions, are made by third persons against men*s wills, shall the parties them- selves be restrained from making, when they do it of their own choice ? To tie men, neck and heels, and throw them into the gulphs I have been speaking of, is altogether out of the question : but if at every gulph a Curtius stands mounted on Projects in Arts, 8(c, 177 mounted and caparisoned, ready to take the leap, is it for the legislator, in a fit of old womanish tenderness, to pull him away ? Laying even public interest out of the question, and considering nothing but the feelings of the indivi- duals immediately concerned, a legis- lator would >carcely do so, who knew the value of hope, " the most precious " gift of heaven.'* Consider, Sir, that it is not with the invention-lottery (that great branch of the project lottery, for the sake of which I am defending the whole, and must continue so to do until you or somebody else can shew me how to defend it on better terms), it is not I say with the invention-lottery, as with the mine-lottery, the privateering- lottery, and so many other lotteries, which you speak of, and in no instance, I think, very much to their advantage. I 3 In 178 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smith, In these lines, success does not, as in this, arise out of the embers of ill suc- cess, and thence propagate itself, by a happy contagion, perhaps to all eter- nity. Let Titius have found a mine, it is not the more easy, but by so much the less easy, for Sempronius to find one too : Let Titius have made a cap- ture, it is not the more easy, but by so much the less easy, for Sempronius to do the like. But let Titius have found out a new dye, more brilliant or more durable than those in use, let him have invented a new and more convenient machine, or a new and more profitable mode of husbandry ^ a thousand dyers, ten thousand mechanics, a hundred thousand husbandmen, may repeat and multiply his success: and then, what is it to the public, though the for- tune of Titius, or of his usurer, should on Projects in ArtSy 8Cc, 179 should have sunk under the experi- ment ? Birmingham and Sheffield are pitch- ed upon by you as examples, the one of a projecting town, the other of an unprojecting one. * Can you forgive my saying, I rather wonder that this comparison of your own choosing, did not suggest some suspicions of the jus- tice of the conceptions you had taken up, to the disadvantage of projectors. Sheffield is an old oak : Birmingham, but a mushroom. What if we should find the mushroom still vaster and more vigorous than the oak ? Not but the one as well as the other, at what time soever planted, must equally have been planted by projectors : for though Tubal Cain himself were to be * B. I. ch. X. vol. i. p. 176. edit. 870. 1784, 180 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smithy be brought post from Armenia to plant Sheffield, Tubal Cain himself was as arrant a projector in his day, as ever Sir Thomas Lombe was, or Bishop Blaise: but Birmingham, it seems, claims in common parlance the title of a projecting town, to the exclusion of the other, because, being but of yesterday, the spirit of project smells fresher and stronger there than elsewhere. When the odious sound of the word projector no longer tingles in your ears, the race of men thus stig- matized do not always find you their enemy. Projects, even under the name of " dangerous and expensive experi- " ments," are represented as not unfit to be encouraged, even though mono- poly be the means : and the monopoly is defended in that instance, by its si- milarity on Projects in Arts, S(c, 181 milarity to other instances in which the like means are employed to the like purpose. " When a company of merchants *' undertake at their own risk and ex- " pense to establish a new trade with *' some remote and barbarons nation, *' it may not be unreasonable" (you observe) " to incorporate them into ** a joint-stock company, and to grant ** them, in case of their success, a " monopoly of the trade for a certain *' number of years. It is the easiest " and most natural way, in which the *' state can recompense them, for ha- ** zarding a dangerous and expensive *' experiment, of which the public is " afterwards to reap the benefit. A " temporary monopoly of this kind " may be vindicated, upon the same '' principles, upon which a like mon- " opoly of a new machine is granted to ^'its 18^ Lett.XIII. To Dr. Smith, " its inventor, and that of a new book *^ to its author." Private respect must not stop me from embracing this occasion of giv- ing a vi'arning, vi^hich is so much need- ed by mankind. If so original and independent a spirit has not been al- ways able to save itself from being drawn aside by the fascination of sounds, into the paths of vulgar pre- judice, how strict a watch ought not men of common mould to set over their judgments, to save themselves from being led astray by similar de- lusions ? I have sometimes been tempted to think, that were it in the.power of laws to "^mX xwrds under proscription, as it is to put men, the cause of inventive in- dustry might perhaps derive scarcely less assistance from a bill of attainder against the words project and projectors, than on Projects in Arts, 8(c, 183 than it has derived from the act au- thorizing the grant of patents. I should add, however, for a time : for even then the envy, and vanity, and wounded pride, of the uningenious herd, would sooner or later infuse their venom into some other word, and set it up as a new tyrant, to hover, like its predecessor, over the birth of infant genius, and crush it in its cra- dle. Will not you accuse me of pushing malice beyond all bounds, if I bring down against you so numerous and re- spectable a body of men, as the mem- bers of the Society for the Encourage^ ment of Arts F 1 do not, must not, care : for you command too much re- spect to have any claim to mercy. At least you will not accuse me of spirit- ing up against you barbarian enemies, and 184 Lett. XIII. To Dr, Smith, and devoting you to the vengeance of Cherokees and Chicasaws. Of that popular institution, the very professed and capital object is the encouragement of projects, and the jpropagating of that obnoxious breed, jthe crushing of which you commend las a fit exercise for the arm of power. fBut if it be right to crush the acting malefactors, it would be downright inconsistency not to crush, at the same time, or rather not to begin with crushing, these their hirers and abet- tors. Thank then their inadvertence, or their generosity, or their prudence, if their beadle has not yet received orders to burn in ceremony, as a libel on the society, a book that does ho- nour to the age. After having had the boldness to accuse so great a master of having fallen on Projects hi Arts, 8Cc, 185 fallen unawares into an error^ ^^^y I take the still farther liberty, of setting conjecture to work to account for it ? Scarce any man, perhaps no man, can push the work of creation, in any line, to such a pitch of compleatness, as to have gone through the task of examin- ing with his own eyes into the grounds of every position, without exception^ which he has had occasion to employ. You heard the public voice, strength- ened by that of law, proclaiming all round you, that usury was a sad thing, and usurers a wicked and pernicious set of men : you heard from one at least of those quarters, that projectors were either a foolish and contemptible race, or a knavish and destructive one: Hurried away by the throng, and tak- ing, very naturally, for granted, that what every body said must have some ground for it, you have joined the cry, and 186 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smith, and added your suffrage to the rest. Possibly too, among the crowd of pro- jectors which the lottery of occurrences happened to present to your observa- tion, the prejudicial sort may have borne such a proportion to the bene- ficial, or shewn themselves in so much stronger colours, as to have given the popular notion a firmer hold in your judgment, than it would have had, had the contrary proportion happened to present itself to your notice. To al- low no more weight to examples that fall close under our eyes, than to those which have fallen at ever so great a distance — to suffer the judgment on no occasion to indulge itself in the licence of a too hasty and extensive generali- zation — not to give any proposition footing there, till after all such defal- cations have been made, as are neces- sary to reduce it within the limits of rigid on Projects in Arts^ 8(c. 187 rigid truth — these are laws, the com- pleat observance whereof forms the ul- timate, and hitherto, perhaps for ever, ideal term of human wisdom. You have defended against unmerited obloquy two classes of men, the one innocent at least, the other highly use- ful 5 the spreaders of English arts in foreign climes, * and those whose in- dustry exerts itself m distributing that necessary commodity which is called by the way of eminence the staff of life. May 1 flatter myself with having succeeded at last in my endeavours, to recommend lo the same powerful protection, two other highly useful and equally persecuted sets of men, usurers and projectors. — Yes — I will, for the moment at least, indulge so flattering * B. IV. ch. viii. vol. ii. !>. 514. et alibi, ediU Svo. 1784. 188 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smith, flattering an idea; and, in pursuance of it, leaving usurers, for whom I have said enough already, I will consider myself as joined now with you in the same commission, and thinking with you of the best means of relieving the projector from the load of discourage- ment laid on him by these laws, in so far as the pressure of them falls parti- cularly upon him. In my own view of the matter, indeed, no tempera- ment, no middle course, is either ne- cessary or proper : the only perfectly effectual, is the only perfectly proper remedy, — a spunge. But, as nothing is more common with mankind, than to give opposite receptions, to con- clusions flowing with equal necessity from the same principle, let us ac- commodate our views to that con- tingency, According to this idea, the object, as on Projects in Arts, S>'c, 189 as far as confined to the present case> should be, to provide, in favour of projectors onlj, a dispensation from the rigour of the anti-usurious laws : such, for instance, as is enjoyed by persons engaged in the carrying trade, in virtue of the indulgence given to loans made on the footing of respon- dentia or bottomry. As to abuse, I see not why the danger of it should be greater in this case than in those. Whe- ther a sum of money be embarked, or not embarked in such or such a new manufacture on land, should not, in its own nature, be a fact much more dif- ficclt to ascertain, than whether it be embarked, or not embarked, in such or such a trading adventure by sea ^ and, in the one case as in the other, the payment of the interest, as well as the repayment of the principal, might be made to depend upon the success of 1 90 Lett. XUL To Dr. SmM, of the adventure. To confine the indulgence to new undertakings, tlic having obtained a patent for some in- vention, and the continuance of the term of the patent, migfit be made conditions of the allowance given to the bargain : to this might be added aflidavits, expressive of the intended application, and bonds, with sureties, conditionerl for tlie performance of the intention so declared ; to be regis- tered in one of the patent-offices, or elsewhere. After this, affidavits once a year, or oftener, during the subsistence of the contract, declaring what has been done in execution of it. If the leading-string is not yet thought tight enough, boards of con- troul might be instituted to draw it tighter. Then opens a scene of vexa- tion and intrigue: waste of time con- sumed in courting the favour of the members on Projects in ArU, Kc, JQl members of the board : wat^ of time in opening their under%tauding», clenched perhaps by ignorance, at any rate by disdain and self-sufficiency, and vanity, and pride: the favoor (for pride will make it a favour) granted to skill in the arts of self recommen- dation and cabal, devoid of in\entive merit, and refused to naked merit un- adorned by practice in those art^: waste of time on the part of the per- sons themselves engaged in this imper- tinent inquiry: waste of somebody's money in paying them for this waste of time. AH these may be necessary evils, where the money to be bestowed is public money : how idle where it is the party's own ! — I will not plague yoo, nor myself, with inquiring of whom shall be composed this board of nurses to grown gentlemen : were it only to cut the matter shorty one might name at 192 Lett. XIII. To Dr. Smith, at once the committees of the Society of Arts* There you have a body of men ready trained in the conduct of inquiries, which resemble that in ques- tion, in every circumstance, but that which renders it ridiculous : the mem- bers or representatives of this demo- cratic body would be as likely, I take it, to discharge such a trust with fide- lity and skill, as any aristocracy that could be substituted in their room. Crichoff, in White Russia^ March, 1787. [ 193 ] LETTERS IN DEFENCE OF USURY, &c. CONTENTS. Lett. I. Introduction, The liberty of bargaining in money-matters, a species of liberty which has never yet found an advocate, p. 1 Fixing the rate of interest, being a coercive measure, and an exception to the general rule in favour of the enforcement of contracts, it lies upon the advocates of the measure to produce reasons for it, p. 3 List of the reasons which may be supposed to have operated in favour of it, p. 4 Lett. II. Reasons for Restraint, — 1. Prevention of Usury, Arguments in favour of the restraint. 1. Pre- K vention 1 94 Letters in Defence of Usury. vention of Uwury. This begs the ques- tion, p. 7 No one rate of interest is naturally more proper than another, p. 9 No idea of propriety could liave been formed on this bead, but for custom, ibid. But the rate indicated by custom, varies from age to age, and from place to place, . p. 11 Custom, being generated by convenience, evi* denced l>y consent, should submit to it throughout, p. 12 No more reason for fixing the price of the use of money than the price of goods, . . p. 13 —nor for fixing the rate on one side more than on the other — excepting a weak and distant one, * p. 15 Lett. III. Reasons for Restraint. — 2. Prevention of Prodigality. Interposing at all, to prevent prodigality, is not necessary to the existence of society, . p. 17 —though it may be of use, choosing proper methods, p. 18 This not of the number: 1. Because borrowing at extraordinary rates C0NTEKT3. 195 fit nalt a natural cour<« for prodi|^ U Uke, p. 18 It if out of the qucftioo with re|;ard to^ «. Tbofe who haire OMfiejr of Uidr oirn, . p. If 6. Tboce who hare real or f^ood tecnnty ta oflfer, i/^id* c. Of anj thiflg to idl, th' and blamable. Would you really check litigation, and check it on both sides? — the simple course would be a sure one. When men are in earnest about preventing misconduct in any line, they annex punishment to miscon- duct in that line, and to that only: a species of misconduct which cannot be practised but as it were under the eye of the court, is of all others the easiest to cope with in the way of law. Deal with misconduct that displays itself under the eye of the court as you deal by delinquency at large, and you may be sure of succeeding to a still superior degree. Discriminate misconduct then from innocence : lay the burthen on misconduct and mis- conduct only, leaving innocence unop- pressed. Keep back punishment, till guilt is ascertained. Keep back costs, as much as possible, till the last stage of 46 No Check to Litigiousfiess, of procedure ; keep off from both par- ties every thing of expense that is not absolutely unavoidable, where litiga- tion is on both sides without blame : at that last stage if there be found blame, throw whatever expense of which you allow the necessity to subsist beyond what is absolutely unavoidable, throw it on that side, and on that side only, where there has been blame. If on both, then if circumstances require, punish it on both sides, by fine for in- stance to the profit of the public. Litigation, though eventually it prove groundless, litigation, like any other course of conduct of which mischief is the result, is not therefore blamable: and where it is blamable, there is a wide difference whether it is accompanied with temerity only, or with consciousness of its own injustice. The countenance shewn to the parties by hut an Encouragement. 47 by the law ought to be governed, and governed uniformly and proportion- ally, by these important differences. — So much in point of utility: — how stands establishment? — Taxes heaped on in all stages from the first to the last w^ithout distinction : — - all costs given or no costs, no medium : — costs scarce ever complete, and nothing be- yond costs. — No mitigation, or en- hancement, in consideration of pecu- niary circumstances. No shades of punishment in this way correspondent to shades of blame : — in most cases no difference so much as between consci- ousness of injustice and simple teme- rity, nor so much as betwixt either and innocence. The power of adjudging as between costs and no costs, seldom discretionary: — that of apportioning, never: — nor that of fining beyond the amount of costs: — consequently nor that 48 No Check to Litigiousness, that of punishing both parties where both have been to blame. Were a power to be given by statute to im- pose on a litigious suitor convicted of litigation, a fine to an amount not ex- ceeding what the losing party pays now, whether he be blamable or blameless, it would be cried out against perhaps as a great power, too great to be given to judges without juries.* Justice * The distinction between temerity and con- sciousness of blame, a distinction pervading hu- man nature, and applicable to every species of misbehaviour, is scarce so much as known to the English law. There are scarce words for it in the language. Temerity is taken from the Ro- man law. Malice, the term by which English Lawyers seem in some instances to have had in view the expressing consciousness of blame, pre- sents a wrong idea, since in common language it implies hatred, an affection which in many in- stances of conscious guilt, may be altogether wanting :-^ but an Encouragement. 49 Justice shall he denied to no man, jus- tice shall be sold to no man, says the first of wanting: — instance offences of mere rapacity, such as theft, robbery, and homicide for lucre. The legislator ?^— he talk of vexation ? — He does every thing to create the evil, he does nothing to remove it. I happened once to fall into conversation with a man, who, from an Attorney had been made Judge of one of the provinces in America, Justice, I understood from him, was on a very bad footing there : it might be had almost for nothing: the people were very litigious: he found them very troublesome. A summons cost — I forget whether it was three and six- pence, or half a crown. Whom the half crown went to I do not know : one may be pretty certain not to the Judge. — Seeing no prospect of our agreeing, I did not pu?h the conversation far. The half crown seemed to him too little : to me it seemed all too much. The pleasant thing would have been to have enjoyed the salary in peace and quietness, without being plagued with a parcel of low people. Justice would then have been upon the best footing pos- sible. 50 No Check to Litigioiisness, of statutes. Magna Charta, How is it under these later ones ? — Denied, as we have seen, to nine-tenths of the peo- ple, sold to the other tenth at an un- conscionable price. '^It was a conceit among the old lawyers, reported if not adopted by Lord Coke, that a statute made contrary to Magna Charfa, though made in all the forms, would be a void law. God forbid, that by all the lawyers in the world, or for the purpose of any argument, I should ever suffer myself to be betrayed into any such extravagance : in a subject it would be sedition, in a judge it would be usurpation, in any body it would be nonsense, ^f But after all it must be acknowledg- ed, to be in some degree unfortu- sible. He had accordingly a project for check- ing litigation by raising the fees. I don't know whether it succeeded. nate. but ail Encouragement 5 1 iiate, as well as altogether singu- lar, that, of an instrument deemed the foundation of all liberty, and magni- fied as such even still, to a degree of fanaticism, a passage by far the most important, and almost the only one that has any application now a days, should be thus habitually trodden un- der foot, without remorse or reclama- tion.* * Let us not for the purpose of any argument,' give rise or countenance to injurious imputa- tions. Though justice is partly denied, and partly sold, the difference is certainly immense, betwixt selling it for the personal benefit of the king or of a judge, and selling it for the benefit of the public : — betwixt selling it by auction, and selling it at a fixed price : — betwixt denying it for the sake of forcing the sale of it, or denying it to a few obnoxious individuals, and denying it indiscriminately to the great majority of the people. In point of moral guilt, there is cer- tainly no comparison : but in point of political effect, it may not be altogether easy in every part 5? Whi/ resorted to, A tax so impolitic and so grievous, a tax thus demonstrated to be the worst of taxes, how comes it ever to have been made choice of, and when made choice of, acquiesced in ? — These are not questions of mere curiosity : for acquiescence under a tax, and that so general, forms at first glance no inconsiderable presumption in its favour. A presumption it does form : but when demonstration has shewn itself, presumptions are at aa end. How comes the tax to have been made choice of? — One cause we have seen already in another shape ; the unscrutinized notion of its supposed tendency to check litigation : litiga- tion, which where it stands for mis- chief, is the very mischief which the species part of the parallel, to say which mode of abuse is most extensively pernicious. and acquiesced under. 5S species of tax in question contributes with all its power to promote. Another cause may possibly be, the tendency which this sort of tax has to be confounded in the eye of an incu- rious observer, with other sorts, which are either the best of all, or next to the best. The best of all are taxes on consumption, because not only do they fall no where without finding some ability to pay them ; but where necessaries are out of the question^ they fall on nobody who has not the option of not paying them if he does not choose it. Taxes on property, and those on transfer of property, such as those on contracts relative to property, are the next best: because though they are not optional like the former, they may be so selected as never to call for money but where there is ability, nay even ample abi- lity,. 54 Why resorted to, lity, to pay them. Now of these two most supportable classes of taxes, the second are all of them levied by means of stamps : taxes on consumption too, in many instances, such as those on cards, dice, gloves, and perfumery, show to the eye as stamp-duties. But all these are very good taxes. Stamp-duties therefore are good taxes : and taxes on justice are all stamp-du- ties. — Thinking men look to conse- quences ; they look to the feelings of the individuals affected : acting men look to the stamp: taxes on justice, taxes on property, taxes on consump- tion, are accordingly one and the same object to the optics of finance. Stamp- duties too have another most conve- nient property, they execute them- selves, and law-taxes beyond all others : in short they exclude all smuggling.* ♦ Law paper might be forged : but the diffi- culty would be to issue it. They 'a?id acquiesced under. 55 They heap distress indeed upon dis- tress : but the distress is not worth minding, as there is no escaping it. But the great cause of all is the prospect of acquiescence : a prospect first presented by hope, since reahzed over and over again by experience. It is too much to expect of a man of finance, that he should anticipate the feelings of unknown individuals : it is a great deal if he will listen to their cries. Taxes on consumption fall on bodies of men : the most inconsider- able one when touched will make the whole country ring again. The oppressed and ruined objects of the taxes on justice, weep in holes and corners, as rats die : no one voice finds any other to join with it. A tax on shops, a tax on tobacco, falls upon a man, if at all, immediately, and presses on him constantly : every man knows whether he keeps or means 56 W% resorted to, means to keep a shop, whether he means to sell or to use tobacco. A tax on justice falls upon a man only occasionally : it is like a thunder- stroke, which a man never looks for till he is destroyed by it. He does not know when it will fall on him, or "whether it ever will : nor even whe- ther, when it does fall, it will press up- on him most, or upon his adversary. He knows not what it will amount to : he has no data from which to calcu- late it : it comes lumped to him in the general mass of law charges : a heap of items among which no vulgar eye can ever hope to discriminate : an ob- ject on which investigation would be thrown away, as comprehension is im- possible. Calamities that are not to be averted by thought, are little thought of, and it is best not to think of them. When is the time for com- plaint? Before the thunder-bolt is fallen and acquiesced under, d7 fallen it would be too soon : when fallen, it is too late. Shopkeepers, to- bacconists, glovers, are compact bo- dies : they can arm counsel : they come in force to the House of Com- mons. Suitors for justice have no common cause, and scarce a common name : they are every body and no- body : their business being every body's is nobody's. Who are suit- ors ? where are they ? what does a Chancellor of the Exchequer care for them ? what can they do to help him ? what can they do to hurt him ? So far from having a common interest, they have a repugnant interest : to crush the injured, is to befriend the injurer. May not ignorance with regard to the quantum and the source of the grievance, have contributed some- thing to patience ? — Unable to pierce the veil of darkness, that guards from vulgar 58 Wh^ resorted to, vulgar eyes the avenues of justice, men know not how much of the diffi- culty of the approach is to be ascribed to art, and how much to nature. As the consumers of tobacco confound the tax on that commodity with the price, so those who borrow or would have wished to borrow the hand of justice, confound the artificial with the natural expense of hiring it. But if the vi^hole of the grievance be na- tural, it may be all inevitable and in- curable, and at any rate it may be no more the fault of lawyers or law ma- kers, than gout and stone are of phy- sicians. — Happy ignorance ! — if blind- ness to the cause of a malady could blunt the pain of it ! There want not apologists-general and talkers in the air, to prove to us that this as well as every thing else, is as it should be. The expense, the delay, and all the other grievances, which and acquiesced under. 59 which activity has heaped up, or negli- gence sutTered to accumulate, are the prices which, according to Montes* quieu, we must be content to pay for liberty and justice. A penny is the price men pay for a penny loaf: there- fore why not two-pence ? and, if three- pence, there would be no harm done, since the loaf would be worth so much the more. May not a sort of instinctive fellow- feeling among the wealthy have con- tributed something, if not to the im- position, at least to the acquiescence? It is the wealthy alone, that either by fortune, situation, education, intelli- gence, or influence, are qualified to take the lead in legislation : and the characteristic property of this tax, is to be favourable to the wealthy, and that in proportion to their wealth. Other taxes afford a man no indemni- fication for the wealth they take from N him : 60 Why resorted tOy him : this gives him power in exchange. The power of keeping down those who are to be kept down, the power of doing wrong, and the more gene- rous pride of abstaining from the wrong which it is in our power to do; advan- tages such as these, are too pcecious not to be grasped at with avidity by human weakness : and, as in a country of po- litical liberty, and under a system of justice in other respects impartial, they can only be obtained by a blind and indirect route such as this, the incon- venience of travelling in it, finds on the part of those who are well equip- ped for it, the more patient an acqui- escence. Will it be said that abolishing the taxes on justice would not answer the purpose, for that supposing them all abolished, justice would still remain inaccessible to the body of the people ? *— -This would be to' justify one abuse by and acquiesced under, 61 by another. The other obstacles by which the avenues to justice have been blocked up, constitute a separate head of abuse, from which I gladly turn aside, as being foreign to the present purpose. Take off law taxes all toge- ther, the number of those to whom jus- tice will still remain inaccessible, would still, it must be confessed, be but too great. It would however not be so great, as it is at present under the pressure of those taxes. Though you could not tell exactly to how ma- ny you would open the doors of jus- tice, you might be sure you opened them to some. Though you would still leave the burthen but too heavy, you would at any rate make it proper- tionably more supportable. If by taking off these taxes, you re- duced the expense of a common action from Q51. to 201., you might open the door, suppose, to one in five of N 2 those 62 Why resorted to, those against whom it is shut at pre- sent. Even this would be something : at any rate whatever were the remaining quantum of abuse, which you still suf- fered to subsist, you would have the consolation at least of not being active- ly instrumental in producing it. To reform in toto a system of procedure is a work of time and difficulty, and would require a rare union of legal knowledge with genius;— repealing a tax may require discernment, candour, philanthropy, and fortitude; but is a work of no difficulty, requires no extra- ordinary measure of science, nor even so much time as the imposing of one. But by whatever plea the continu- ance of the subsisting taxes of this kind may be apologized for, nothing can be said in favour of any new addi- tion to the burthen. The subsisting ones, it may be said, have been acqui- esced in, and men are used to them : in and acquiesced under! 63 in this respect at least they have the ad- vantage of any new ones which could be substituted in the room of them. But even this immoral plea, which puts bad and good upon a level, effacing all distinction but that between established and not established, even this faint plea is mute against any augmentation of this worst of evils. To conclude — Either I am much mistaken, or it has been proved-^ that a law tax is the worst of all taxes, actual or possible : — that for the most part it is a denial of justice, that at the best, it is a tax upon distress : — that it lays the burthen, not where there is most, but where there is least, benefit: — that it co-operates with every injury, and with every crime : — that the persons on whom it bears hardest, are those on whom a bur- then of any kind lies heaviest, and that they compose the great majority of 64 Recapitulation. of the people : — that so far from being a check, it is an encouragement to li- tigation : and that it operates in direct breach of Magna Charta, that venera- ble monument, commonly regarded as the foundation of English liberty. The statesman who cares not what mischief he does, so he does it without disturbance, may lay on law taxes with- out end : he who makes a conscience to abstain from mischief will abstain from adding to them : he whose ambi- tion it is to extirpate mischief, will re- peal them. General error makes law, says a maxim in use among lawyers. It makes at any rate an apology for law ; but when the error is pointed out, the apology is gone. NOTES TO THE SECOND EDITION. Mem. — Anno, 1796. At a dinner at Mr. M. P.'s, in Street, Mr. R. in the presence of Mr. William Pitt, (then Minister) took me aside, and told me that they had read my Pam- phlet on Law Taxes; that the reasons against them were unanswerable, and it was determined there should be no more of them. Anno, 1804, July 10, 12, 14, 18.— This being in the number of Mr. Addington's Taxes, Mr. Pitt, upon returning to office, took up all those Taxes in the lump. On the above days, this Tax was opposed in the House of Commons : and Mr. Wyndham, according to the report in the TimeSj on one of those days, spoke of this Pamphlet as containing complete information on the subject ; observing at the same time, that it was out of print. On behalf of administration, nothing like an answer to any of the objections was attempted : only the Attorney- General (Percival) said, that the 66 the addition proposed to those Taxes, was no more than equal to the depreciation of money. Mr. Addington, before this, had recourse to the Tax on Medicine here spoken of, (p. 22.) So that, in the course of his short administration, if the representation here given be correct, he had had the misfortune to find out and impose the two worst species of taxation possible. Compare this with Denmark, and its courts of Natural Proce- dure, called Reconciliation Courts. 26th February, 1816. — Unalleviated by any ade- quate hope of use, too painful would be the task, of hunting out, and holding up to view, the subse- quent additions, which this worst of oppressions has, in this interval of twenty years, been re- ceiving. Money, it is said, must be had, and no other taxes can be found. The justification being con- clusive, the tax receives its increase : next year, from the same hand, flow others in abundance. Grievous enough is the Income Tax, called, lest it should be thought to be what it is, the Property Tax. — Grievous that tax is, whatever be its name ; yet, sum for sum, compared with this tax, it is a blessing. Instead of 10 per cent, sup- pose it 80 per cent. Less bad would it be to add yet another 10 per cent, than a tax to an equal amount upon justice. Grievous 67 Grievous have been the additions, so lately and repeatedly made, to the taxes on Conveyances and Agreements. Extensive the prohibitory part of the effect, though the pressure, — confined as usual to the poor, i. e. the great majority of the community, who have none to speak for them, — is scarcely complained of by the rich. Yet, were all law-taxes taken off, and the amount thrown upon Conveyances and Agreements, this — even this — would in reahty be an indulgence. Whether the oppression be more or less griev* ous, is never worth a thought. Will it be sub- mitted to ?^ — This is the only question. Charity is kicked out of doors. Hope is fled. Faith and Piety remain, and atone for every thing. For a list of about twenty-eight other sources of factitious delay, vexation, and expense, and thence of denial of justice, produced by the judges of former times, for the augmentation of lawyers' profit, their own included, — together with a list and summary account of the devices by which these burthens have been imposed, and by which Technical stands distinguished from Natural PrO' cedure, — see by the same author, Scotch Reformy &c. printed for Ridgway, Piccadilly. 68 ADDITION BY A LEARNED FRIEND. In the court of Chancery, two case^ have re- cently occurred, which may serve as an illustra- tion of the extent in which the taxes upon law proceedings may operate as a denial of justice. In one case — Roe v. Gudgeon — the Defendant, in his answer to the Plaintiff's bill, submitted that he ought not to be compelled to set out certain accounts which had been required by the bill, as the expense of taking what is called an office copy of them, — a necessary preliminary to any further proceeding on the part of the Plaintiff in the cause, — would amount to the sum of 29,000/. : an expense almost wholly arising from the Stamps on the Paper, on which the office copy of the answer is compulsorily made. In this case the court de- termined, that it was not necessary these ac- counts should be set out : but in coming to this conclusion, how far the court was determined by the nature of the particular case, or by the magni- tude 69 tude of the expense that would thus be occasion- ed; — or whether if, without any such objection, the Defendant had actually set out these accounts, the Plaintiff could have been relieved from pur- suing the regular mode of procuring a copy of them, and thus incurring the above expense ; — or whether, if the expense had been instead of 29,000/. only 28 or 27 thousand pounds, such an objection would have been hstened to ; — it is extremely difficult to say. The other case alluded to is one in which from peculiar circumstances, it is not thought proper to mention the names of the parties. It is optional with a man to be a Plaintiff in a cause, it is not altogether so optional with him to be a defendant. The preceding case shews that it is not always safe for a man to become a Plaintiff, without 28,000^ at least in his pocket, to begin with, over and above what is necessary for his maintenance. — The following case shews that a man may not be always able to resist a demand, however unjust it may be, with- out being able to support an outlay of at least 800/. In the case in question, the writer of this has been assured, — and from authority, which he has peculiar reason for relying upon, — that the ex- pense of merely putting in an answer by one of the Defendants to a bill in Equity, amounted to the above 70 above sum of 800/. : what part of this expense was occasioned by the tax on law proceedings cannot be accurately ascertained, but it assuredly constituted a very considerable proportion of that sum. FINIS. J. M'Creery^ Printer, Black-Horsfc-Court, London. I JUL 1"