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LETTER 
 
 TO 
 
 WILLIAM ROSCOE, ESQ 
 
 CONTAINING 
 
 STRICTURES ON HIS LATE PUBLICATION 
 
 ENTITLED 
 
 " Considerations on the Causes, Objects, and 
 Consequences of the present Wdf\ 
 
 LIVERPOOL PRINTED. 
 
 ME W- YORK REPRLYTED, .-^ 
 
 By D. & G. Bruce, 
 
 FOR E. SARGEANT, 39 WALL-STREET, 
 Opposite the Branch Bank. 
 
 1808. 
 
izoz 
 
A LETTER, 
 
 S(c. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 WAR is an evil of such magnitude, involves so 
 many scenes of individual and national calamity, 
 and is so repulsive to every enli2;htened and liberal 
 Heeling, that those who either inflict it without cause, 
 or continue it beyond the demands of necessity, 
 equally deserve the execrations of mankind. As it 
 is the " last reason," so it ought to be the " last reso?'t," 
 of kings. No means should be left untried to pre- 
 serve the relations of amity, so essential to the vital 
 interests of all countries without exception, and no 
 opportunity favourable to the return of peace (the 
 best of human blessings) ought to pass by without 
 regard. A power, originally injured, if it refuse 
 reasonable and safe terms of conciliation, becomes 
 equally guilty with the first aggressor, and changes 
 its relations. What was at first an act of defensive 
 resistance, then becomes an act of unjustifiable of- 
 fensive encroachment. 
 
 Feeling the impression of these truths upon my 
 own convictions, I should have gone with you to the 
 full length of those pacific sentiments contained in 
 your pamphlet, had they stood in the simple and 
 commanding majesty of truth, wholly disconnected 
 with the rancour of party and the perversions of 
 prejudice. He must, however, have read your per- 
 formance with little attention who does not per- 
 ceive, that whilst you contend for peace with for- 
 eign powers, you do it in the spirit of domestic hos- 
 tility ; and that your opinions are supported by facts 
 exaggerated on the one part, and either falsely col- 
 oured or wholly suppressed on the other. Thescj 
 Sir, I hope to prove in the sequel are not unfounded 
 allegations ; and though 1 respect your virtues, and 
 admire your talents, I shall not be deterred by ei- 
 
Iher from pursuing the tract of fair manly inquiry 
 into the real merits of your political labours, though 
 it may be at the expense of the exposure of the fal- 
 lacy of your arguments, and the deficiency of your 
 candour. 
 
 You have observed in your preface, "that the ho- 
 nour of the nation is the honour of the people, and 
 the disgrace of the nation their disgrace." On this 
 ground, Sir, I meet you. I feel interested in the ho- 
 nour of my country — I should blush at her disgrace: 
 and it is because I think that you have libelled her 
 character ; because you have assimilated yourself to 
 those hireling editors of the French and German pa- 
 pers, whose daily eiTort it is to degrade her in the 
 eyes of Europe ; and because the whole tendency of 
 your pamphlet isto produce distrust and create alarm 
 and by paralising the energies of the people in the 
 present contest for all that renders political existence 
 valuable, the independence of the country, is defeat- 
 ing its own object, the accomplishment of a speedy 
 peace; it is. Sir, I say, for these reasons that I be- 
 come your opponent. Your name, it is true, may 
 give a sanction to your opinions ; that advantage 
 will be wholly in your own favour; but the true me- 
 rits of the question are- not to be thus determined, 
 nor truth confounded and driven from the field by 
 the " whistling of a name." 
 
 It is not my intention to follow you paragraph by 
 paragraph, for the objects you have embraced are 
 not only multifarious but without method. The^ 
 principal argument, and the general tendency of the 
 book only, will be noticed in the following strictures. 
 
 The origin of the war with France you pass slight- 
 ly over; and for that reason I shall not dwell long 
 upon it. In fact, that subject has been discussed in 
 so masterly a manner by the ablest oTour senators 
 and political writers, that the resuscitation of it can- 
 not now be further necessary than as it may serve to 
 elucidate the main principle of your pamphlet. Like 
 other writers on the same side of the question, you 
 
argue against the policy of the war in all its stages, 
 and against its longer continuance, from the defeat 
 of its great objects, and the distressing situation into 
 which we are now reduced. " All the motives which 
 *' have been alleged in its justification, have long 
 " since ceased to operate ; whether it was entered 
 " into for the preservation of the established order 
 " of Europe ; to repress those persons in this coun- 
 " try who, in the early part of the French revolution, 
 *' disinterestedly rejoiced in the prospect of amelio- 
 " ration in France; to restore the house of Bourbon 
 " because the government with which we had to 
 " treat was unable to maintain the accustomed rela- 
 " tions of peace ; or to obtain indemnity for the past 
 " and security for the future," (pages 4 — 6.) " We 
 " are now left without an ally, without an object, and 
 " without a cause," (page 53.) As these arguments 
 are continually urged by persons of your party with 
 an air of triumph, and are calculated by their spe- 
 cious appearance.^to make some impression upon the 
 unthinking, they merit on these accounts some ex- 
 amination. 
 
 Granting that the war has completely failed in its 
 objects, as you would wish your readers to believe, 
 it does not by fair logical deduction follow that it 
 has been impolitic in its origin and progress, or 
 that we shoidd desire its immediate termination. 
 Nothing can be so unfair as to argue from the fai- 
 lure of a project to its impolicy. It is an argument 
 certainly unworthy of a sensible man to say, because 
 you have not succeeded you ought not to have at- 
 tempted. And yet, in the case before us, is not 
 this the amount of all that is here advanced ? on this 
 ground all unsuccessful attempts to resist aggression 
 maybe censured. Should we even fail in the attempt 
 to drive the Gallic legions from our own shores, some 
 future political writer might arise and tell the world 
 that the augmentation of our navy, the arming of the 
 people, and every other military arrangement for our 
 defence, were only the results of a drivelling policy, 
 of weakness and infatuation. 
 
G 
 
 But you. Sir, and your friends have dealt much 
 in political propliesyings ; your constant language 
 is, '^ these events were foretold, they happened as 
 "might have been expected," Now, Sir if the dis- 
 astrous consequences of the war were so discernible, 
 is it not a littlesurprising that they were not obvious 
 to Uie minds of the most illustrious statesmen which 
 ever directed the councils of any nation ? Why were 
 they not convincingly plain to the majority of our 
 nobles in the Flouse of Lords, why did they not stand 
 up in all theirhorrors to the majority of the represen- 
 tatives in the Lower House ? Why, if you suppose 
 corruption and undue influence in the senate, did they 
 not alarm the majority of thinking men in the na- 
 tion ? /But if these prospects into futurity only were 
 opened by supernatural illumination, it is scarcely 
 consistent to impute blame to those who had no more 
 than the ordinary irradiations of unaided reason to 
 guide their inquiries, or to direct their conduct. 
 
 Political predictions, however, like astrological 
 ones, are entitled to all their credit by a lucky hit. 
 Wide and multifarious conjecture must in something 
 be realized; and political prophesy, which predicts 
 any thing and every thing, must in something be ac- 
 complished. But it is fortune-telling still ; and how- 
 ever, by the accidental credit it acquires, it may sup- 
 port the vanity of those who pretend to more than or- 
 dinary foresight, it can never be legitimately made ei- 
 ther the foundation of practical policy, or the ground 
 ofpolitical censure. Your mistake, Sir, liesin Judging 
 of the former measures of British statesmen by their 
 present consequences. But what was deeply hidden 
 in futurity to them at the time such measures were a- 
 doptecl,is now open to us in its causes, conduct, and 
 elfects. AVe have turned over that page in the book 
 of fate which they were not permitted to touch. Is 
 it then candid to decide upon their conduct, as though 
 they possessed the attribute of omniscience ? In strict 
 justice and common honesty, we ought to place our- 
 selves in the same circumstances before we can de- 
 
cide upon the merit of their measures ; and suspend 
 our censures, unless we can prove that those were 
 either extravagant in their principles, or improbable 
 in their execution. 
 
 Whatever objects you, Sir, may attribute to the 
 war, no argument that has ever been oiFered, has 
 proved that it has had any other, than the resistance 
 of French aggressions upon the independence of 
 Europe. England at first entered reluctantly into 
 the war ; she remained neutral amongst conflicting- 
 powers, she disclaimed the idea of intermeddling 
 with the internal arrangements of France ; and that 
 step was not taken till after France had opened the 
 navigation of the Scheldt, in contravention to the 
 most sacred treaties, till she had unfolded her views 
 of universal conquest, and proclaimed war against 
 every state in the universe by her decree of the 19tli 
 of November, 1792 ; in which the " national conven- 
 "tion declare, in the name of- the French nation, 
 " that they will grant fraternity and assistance to all 
 "those people who wish to procure liberty ; and that 
 *'' they charge the executive power to send orders to 
 "their generals to give assistance to such people as 
 " have suffered, or are now suffering, in the cause of 
 " liberty." England hesitated to join the contest 
 until her good faith to her allies, her national justice, 
 and best interests, forced her into it. Lord Gren- 
 ville demanded of France, " to renounce her views 
 " of aggression and aggrandizement, and to confine 
 " herself within her own territories without insulting 
 " other governments, without disturbing their tran- 
 "quillity, without violating their rights." What an- 
 swer did France give to this reasonable demand i? 
 She declared war against England, and thus proved 
 to the world that she had formed other plans, and 
 was actuated by other motives. This part of the 
 controversy I know. Sir, is old, but it is necessary 
 to set our readers right in the main question be- 
 tween us. 
 
 As this was the original ground of the war, so it 
 
8 
 
 has been that of all the coalitions formed against 
 France since that period. From the first to the last, 
 the war against that power has been against her 
 ambition and her encroachments, and, consequently, 
 defensive. The independence of Europe has been 
 the stake ; the value of that independence was ap- 
 preciated by the lucid mind of Mr. Pitt, it was the 
 rule of his conduct towards France j it is apprecia- 
 ted by us, but we know its value now only by its 
 loss. The experience of the present moment proves 
 how vitally it is connected with our interests. Let 
 every Englishman lay his hand upon his breast and 
 say, of what value that independence is to him, now 
 the object of the first revolutionists is realized, and 
 Europe, at the feet of France, arms all its powers, 
 and shuts up all its resources against England. It 
 must therefore follow that as the principle of the war 
 wasjusf, so have the persevering elTorts of England 
 been politic. The object of the various coalitions 
 has been the most glorious. They have reflected 
 the highest honour upon England. She has exhibit- 
 ed herself in the struggle which has convulsed half 
 the globe, as the patroness of the weak, and the 
 coadjutor of the powerful. She has lifted up her 
 arm against universal usurpation, and has undevia- 
 tingly opposed the wild furor of revolutionary anar- 
 chy, and the less popular, but destructive, efforts of 
 a military despotism, That she has partially failed 
 in the conflict, is nothing to the purpose. Success 
 is not honour, neither is defeat infamy; the contest 
 has been noble, and its failure may be attributed to 
 causes which, with all submission to your superior 
 illumination, human wisdom, generally speaking, 
 could neither foresee, nor human power prevent. 
 
 In this (Conclusion we are completely at variance ; 
 you loudly condemn the policy of the war, because 
 "it defeated its own purpose, and brought on the 
 "complete overthrow of that which it pretended to 
 " support," ( page 4.) " In the commencement of the 
 ^'French revolution, (you observe, page 19,) France 
 
*' was not nnlitary. Her first defenders were a raw 
 " undisciplined soldiery. The attack of her enemies 
 "called out her energies, and she has overthrown 
 *' the proudest monarchs of Europe. Had she been 
 ^'suffered to establish wiiliuut interruption tier own 
 ''\form of government, such a result would not have taken 
 ^'^ place. It was, therefore, the attack upon France 
 *' that converted that country info a nation of sol- 
 *' diers, and compelled her to have recourse for her 
 " defence to a government purely military." But be- 
 fore ihci^e can be allowed as valid arguments against 
 the policii of the war, you must prove that France has 
 acfed wholly on the defensive; that she entertained 
 no projects of dangerous ambition, and never designed 
 to arm Europe against its lavvful sovereigns. You 
 must prove these. Sir, as well as hint them. Arguing 
 all along from these principles, you ought first to 
 have supported your premises, and not by assuming 
 that as undoubted truth, which thousands both in 
 England and on the continent would dispute with 
 you, blind your readers, and hide the weakness of 
 your cause. But you have not proved them, you 
 cannot prove them. 
 
 Every thing you have said of the French revolution, 
 carries with it an avowal of approbation. You wish 
 to impress it upon your readers that there was no- 
 tliing more in that event, than an innocent and 
 praise-worthy attempt to ameliorate the condition 
 of France by changing its government, and that all 
 the hcnrors of the revolution and the military de- 
 signs of France were produced by not *' suffering 
 *' htr to establish her own form of government, and 
 *' by the pressure of external force." But this view 
 of the subject is by no means correct. There was 
 no interference in the internal affairs of France, un- 
 til she herself provoked it by tlie madness of her own 
 conduct towards other powers. Whatever effect the 
 new doctrines broached in France might have upon 
 the sovereigns of Europe, they took no active mea- 
 sures against France until she had violated the ri^hta 
 
 B 
 
10 
 
 ot treaties and of nations, refused the reasonable sat- 
 isfaction demanded, and the avowal proposed by the 
 Emperor Francis, "that the French should not con- 
 *' sider themselves, from their revolution, entitled to 
 " violale the rights of other powers.'* France might 
 have established her own form of government w\i\\o\\t 
 interruption, had she not seized the property and 
 dominions of other states ; she might have remained 
 at peace had she restrained her ambitious frenzy j 
 but she proclaimed war because such aggressions 
 v/ere resisted by the surrounding nations. The ru- 
 lers of France precipitated her into a war which 
 they might have avoided. There was something 
 sublime in the idea of contending against all the des- 
 pots of Europe; it suited the wild ravings of demo- 
 cratic madness ; they were uneasy until they had 
 preached acrusadeagainstevery existing government 
 in the civilized world. 
 
 That the" pressure of hostile force called forth the 
 " energies of the French nation," and brought into 
 action the most splendid military talents in her com- 
 manders, is an observation which allows of no differ- 
 ence of opinion ; but if urged as a reason against the 
 war with France, may be equally applied to wars in 
 general. To the states of Europe no alternative was, 
 however, left but to seize the moment of early resis- 
 tance to France, who had refused the most reasonable 
 terms of pacification ; or calmly to see the rights of 
 the weaker states invaded, and the completion of the 
 arrangementsofan universal plot, which was to spread 
 anarchy, murder, and coniiscation, through the whole 
 of their own dominions. France had tilled every 
 country with her emissaries, the flame had began to 
 kindle, delay in this case was destruction, and not a 
 sovereign in Europe would have deserved to wear his 
 crown, if by a criminal inaction he had waited until 
 his army had been ^seduced, and his people armed 
 against his government. You, Sir, it should seem 
 from various passages in your work, would have regar- 
 ded the extension of the principles of the French rev- 
 
H 
 
 olution as a desirable object^ an dthis in 3'ou is con- 
 sistent enough, because you regard the atrocities of 
 that political convulsion as arising rather from acci- 
 dental circumsta)ices, than from its principle : but 
 for myself, believing firmly from an attentive exami- 
 nation of the suljjCCt, that it was in its principle de- 
 fective, and politically futile ; that every one of its 
 horrors arose out of the nature of the thing, and from 
 circumstances confined solely to the French nation; 
 that it was rather the oftspring of metaphysical pride, 
 atheism, and the worst principles ofthe human heart, 
 than of solid wisdom and public spirit ^ I must con- 
 clude that if the war has had no other effect than the 
 prevention ofthe dire effects of revolutionary horrors, 
 Europe is benefited by the war ; that the sovereigns 
 confederated against France made a wise choice in 
 the side ofthe alternative they adopted ; and I had 
 much rather read in the page of history the conquests 
 of Bonaparte, than have perused the bloody records 
 ofthe acts of sovereign mobs, the devastations ofthe 
 guillotine, and the triumphs of political theory and 
 religious infidelity over the order of nations, and the 
 sanctuaries of religion. 
 
 That this would have been the state of Europe if 
 no war had been entered upon is more than possi- 
 ble, it has the strongest probability. It was the design 
 of the French leaders to revolutionize the world. 
 Brissot, in his letter to his constituents tells them> 
 *' The deterrtiination is made to brave all Europe ;'' and 
 proceeds, " What did enlightened republicans wish be- 
 *^ fore the tenth of August, men who wished for liberty ^ 
 *' notonhjfor their own country, but FOR ALL Europe? 
 " Theij believed that tliey rould establish it by exciting 
 " the goveimed against the governors, in letting the pco- 
 '■'^ pie see thefacility and advantages of such msu7Tec lions.'' 
 These views were not confint d to Brissot and his par- 
 ty, they were the solemn acts ofthe government. On 
 the loth of December, I79'i, the national convention 
 published adecreein whichtheydeclarethat '^France 
 *' will treat as enemies, the people (unpeuple enticr) wlw. 
 
12 
 
 *' refusmg or renouncing liberty and equality, are de- 
 *' s irons of preserving, recalling, or enfei^ing into an ac- 
 " commodation with their prince and privileged casts.'* 
 It should here be noticed, that on the vert/ day the de- 
 cree passed the assembly, the executive council wrote 
 to their agent Chauvilin, in London, instructinrjjhini 
 "todisavow all hostileintentionson the part of France 
 " and to proclaim her detestation of the idea of a war 
 " with England ;" hereby marking the dangerous 
 designs of the French government, and the subtle 
 hypocrisy with which it covered its diplomatic 
 transactions. 
 
 What the consequences of this vigorous spirit of 
 proselytism would have been on the continent, had 
 not active measures been resorted to, may be con- 
 cluded from the rapid and alarming extent of such 
 principles in England previous to the war. Even 
 in England, under the mild and rational govern- 
 ment with which she is favoured, where the persons 
 and property of every individual is respected, and 
 where industry, even in the lowest classes, except un- 
 der very peculiar circumstances of national depres- 
 sion, is ever rewarded with a comfortable subsist- 
 ence; in this countrjs Sir, those who "disinterestedly 
 " rejoiced in the prospect of amelioration in France," 
 (page 4,) addressed congratulations to the national 
 convention, approbatory of the principles and pro- 
 cess of the revolution. One of those addresses ex- 
 pressed the hope " that tlie same doctrines ivould be 
 " received, and the same example generally followed in 
 " other countries,'* whilst that of the London Corres- 
 ponding Society outstripping tlierest, endeavoured to 
 convince the convention that the sentiments enter- 
 tained by them '* existed itlsoin the hearts of all the 
 " freemen of England." " We enjoy** (say these pa- 
 triots,) '■^ by anticipation and zvith common hope, that 
 " epoch, (not far distant) when the interests of Europe, 
 " and of mankind, shall invite the two nations to stretch 
 " out the hand of fraternity .** The objects of these 
 societies were not unknown ; the mobs which imbi- 
 
IS 
 
 bed the sentiments they spread through the nation, 
 were ripe for every deed of mischief and of blood 
 ■which had began to mark the conduct of the sovereign, 
 people on the other side of the channel, and the con- 
 tagion was rapidly spreading when it was arrested by 
 those whom you term the " gloomy advocates of ty- 
 ranny," but who will be regarded by every man not 
 ready to hazard every thing in support of a political 
 theory, the saviours of their con?!/?'}/, and the best 
 friends of the best interests of man. But if the state 
 of things was so alarming in England as to call for 
 all the vigour of the government, on the continent, 
 supposing every state to have remained an inactive 
 spectator of the atfairs of France, revolutions upou 
 revolutions in almost endless succession must have 
 convulsed, and, it is probable, almost have exter- 
 minated society. On the continent ihe emissaries of 
 anarchy had been more than usually busy ; their 
 principles had been secretly operating for a series of 
 years j and the communication between the conti- 
 nental states being by iand only, was free and un- 
 restrained. England might have shut herself out 
 from France even remaining neutral, but the other 
 powers had no such advantages. Tne captivatmg 
 promises of liberty and equality would operate 
 upon them with a force pro()ortioned to the real 
 grievances of the people under the defective conti- 
 nental government ; remaining at peace, they could 
 not even have depended upon the the military ; and 
 universal revolt sanctioned by French armies, which 
 the love of plunder would have operated upon as 
 powerfully as the " pressure of external force," to 
 which you alone ascribe the military exertions of 
 France, would have shaken every establishment, and 
 as completely have placed the continent under French 
 influence, as the victories of an organized dynasty. 
 It ought likewise to be remarked, that the ambi- 
 tious designs of France are neither of a receiU date, 
 nor the result alone of the towering mind of the 
 chief who now seats himself on the throne of her 
 
14 
 
 ancient monarchs. The French are naturally an 
 ambitious people, and fond of military glory. It is 
 as essentially the character of that nation, as the 
 love of independence is the character of England, 
 and commercial gain of Holland. The dispositions 
 of her military emperor harmonizes with this pre- 
 vailing national passion ; and to this, joined to his 
 great successes, he owes that influence which has 
 elevated him, upon the ruins of the old monarchy 
 and the late republic, to supreme government. But 
 his schemes of conquest are not originals; neither 
 has he alone rendered them familiar to the hopes 
 and wishes of the French people. France had the 
 same designs of ambition in the subjugation of the 
 continent, in the early stage of the revolution, as 
 she has during the later periods of the war mani- 
 fested and acted upon. The plan of aggrandize- 
 ment which has been since realized in the humbling 
 of the northern powers, and the partitioning of Ger- 
 many, was laid as early as the year 1793. Publico- 
 la Ciiaussard, commissioner of the executive power, 
 then said, " It is the interest of France to raise her- 
 " self to the rank of a first rate power in Europe; thus 
 " covering with her shield the second-rate powers, and 
 **protecting them against the boundless ambition of 
 *' the northern empires. A war adinternectionem is de- 
 *' dared between the republic and monarchies. Aus- 
 *' tria being once subdued, the Germanic body maij be- 
 " come a colossus of federative i^epubllcsy and change the 
 *' sijstem of the novth.'' For federative republics only 
 substitute the confederation of the Rhine ^ and you see th e 
 career Bonaparte has since followed precisely pointed 
 out, and the object he has, after a long eftbrt, at length 
 accomplished, distinctly marked. Will you, then, 
 tell us, that if France had not been opposed, she 
 would not have accomplished those objects which 
 she has attained in spite of the vast coalitions which 
 have been formed against her ! This conclusion is 
 evidently absurd. Had the powers of the conti- 
 
15 
 
 nent remained at peace, she would have invoh-ed 
 them in anarchy, and seized their dominions. Re- 
 sistance held out the fairest probabilities of success 
 in repressing her intentions ; but though resistance 
 has failed, the continent is saved from civil disorder; 
 though partitioned, it has regular governments, and 
 every change must be apparently for the better. 
 Time, or the chances of the war, may throw the 
 states into the hands of the lawful princes, or the 
 clashing of interests produce new and contrary al- 
 liances, which, by restoring the balance of power, 
 will once more establish the independence of Europe. 
 
 I shall next proceed to examine the opinions jou 
 have given of the peace of Amiens, and the causes 
 which led to the renewal of hostilities with France 
 after that event. 
 
 This peace, notwithstanding the sacrifices which 
 were made on the part of England to obtain it, has 
 a large share of your approbation. The point is 
 now, however, not worth disputing ; but it is evi- 
 dent, from the most cursory review of the articles 
 of that treat}-, that from the narrowness of its prin- 
 ciple it held out but very feeble hopes of perma- 
 nent tranquillity, except to those who were ready to 
 catch at every shadow which bore a pacific resem- 
 blance. The relations of the two powers were not 
 accurately defined; no bar was put upon the ambi- 
 tion of France ; and it was unattended with a treaty 
 of commerce, an object of the first consequence in 
 preserving a good understanding between the two 
 powers. From these circumstances it conveyed at 
 the time to a great number of thinking men in the 
 nation, a low idea both of the sincerity of France, 
 and of the ability of the administration which made 
 the arrangement. A treaty which only makes a 
 kind of temporary provision for the interests of the 
 day, neglects to look into futurity, and to fix, as far 
 as possible, those mutual obligations which may 
 give permanence lo the relations of amity, is obvi- 
 ously far worse than continued war. It is in fact 
 
16 
 
 no more than a truce. It gives a little breathing- 
 time to the belligerents, who afterwards rush into 
 hostility with new causes of irritation, and with more 
 deadly rancour. That the treaty of Amiens was of 
 this kind, subsequent events have fully proved. You 
 have, it is true, detailed a number of causes which 
 led to the renewal of the war, all of which, by your 
 manner of stating them, and the method you have 
 made use of to force them out of their connexion, 
 tend to throw the odium upon Great Britain, and 
 completely exonerate France. But on this part of 
 your performance, I must take the liberty to observe, 
 that 30U have descended to the mean arts of a low 
 polemic ; and, by the evident want of fairness and 
 candour, have exposed yourself to the severest cen- 
 sure. When you represent those persons who view- 
 ed that reconciliation with dissatisfaction, (page 9,) 
 *' as persons of mercenary views and exasperated 
 " feeling," and attribute the renewal of the war to 
 ** the clamours of the French emigrants, and the 
 '•' bands of journalists and hireling writers, who fat- 
 " ten upon the calamities of a nation j" ^^ou may 
 enjoy the petty triumph of blackening your adver- 
 saries, and prejudging the question: but, Sir, the 
 subject is not to be so disposed of; and as you have 
 omitted to introduce those facts into ^our "Consid- 
 erations" which would have enabled your readers to 
 form a better judgment of that proceeding of the 
 British government, justice requires that the defi- 
 ciency should be supplied. 
 
 The manner in which the definitive treaty itself 
 v/as negociated, augured nothing very favourable to 
 the interests of this country. It was protracted, 
 cold, and harassed by questions and discussions on 
 subjects before settled in the preliminaries. After 
 all it was little more than a transcript of the preli- 
 minary arrangements, and, as before noticed, in- 
 stead of taking a wide and general basis, left equal 
 room for the future assumptions of the enemy and 
 the complaints of Briiain. The ambition of Bona- 
 
17 
 
 parte could not be even restrained until the defmi» 
 live treaty was .signed : almost immediately after 
 the signing of the preliminaries, " Louisiana was 
 " added to the power of France. This was not all — 
 " the ink was still wet, the wax was not yet cold, 
 " with which this treaty was concluded, when Pied- 
 " niont, the bulwark of Italy, was annexed to the 
 " French empire. Then seeing the indifference of 
 " the government of Great Britain, the blow was 
 " struck by \a liich the ancient ally of the British 
 " crown, the King of Sardinia, was driven back 
 " irom his seat. Let us look back into the progress 
 " oj eveii!s. The treaty was made in the month of 
 *' March, it was ratified in M-ny ; in June, Pied- 
 *' liiout was by a formal decree annexed to France j 
 " i)i August the consular gov^ernment made a grand 
 " sweep and disposal of the entire constitution of 
 " Germany and of the powers in it. Not a day had 
 "elapsed, (he might cludienge observation on the 
 " vvord,) not a single day had elapsed, without some 
 *' act of insult, indignity, or attack upon Great Bri- 
 " tarn or her ancient allies since that time."* But 
 there vAere causes which operated more immediate- 
 ly upon the interests of this country, and produced 
 suspicion in the government and alarm in the peo- 
 ple. Not only was Switzerland invaded, and her 
 long established liberties entombed in the yawning 
 sepulchre of Gallic rapacity; not only was Flolland 
 kept in a state of the most abject subjection in op- 
 position to the terms of the treaty, her navy at the 
 disposal of Fiance, and hostile preparations forming 
 in her ports, \\hich, whatever might be their osten- 
 sible object, were of a nature to excite the alarm of 
 the very ministry that had concluded the peace; in 
 France, British property had suffered the grossest 
 violence, v^hile justice in the French courts was de- 
 nied to British subjects ; a number of vexatious and 
 illiberal restrictions had been laid upon British com- 
 
 * Lord Grenville's speech in the House of Lords, 
 
 c 
 
18 
 
 inerce ; and designs of the blackest treachery against 
 the internal peace of this country were discovered, hap- 
 pily in suflicient time to prevent their ripening into 
 danger, but which did not for that reason less strik- 
 ingly mark the character of the power with whom we 
 had so lately interchanged the pledges of friendship. 
 
 Colonel Despard and his accomplices were, on the 
 best authority, believed to be in the pay, and under 
 the direction of, France.* The peace had scarcely 
 been concluded, before a number of persons were 
 landed in different parts of Great Britain and Ire- 
 land, under the name of commercial commissioners, 
 but who were proved, on examination, French mili- 
 tary officers. In their possession were found instruc- 
 tions from the French ministers, directing to such in- 
 quiries as could have no relation to commerce, and. 
 could only be useful in a military view. The Ad- 
 dingtoti ministry were at length awakened by these 
 events, and appeared to manifest some symptoms of 
 repentance for having placed too much confidence 
 in a government which, whether in peace or war, 
 cannot be too jealously suspected. The army and 
 navy were increased ; mutual distrust received every 
 day some new addition, and the communications 
 respecting the British press and the island of Malta, 
 ied to those discussions which at length terminated 
 in the complete breach of that hollow truce, flattered 
 much when called the peace of Amiens. 
 
 Having just refreshed the memory of your readers 
 by a rapid sketch of occurences, with which, for cer- 
 tain reasons^ you did not think proper to trouble them, 
 I shall now attend more particularly to your remarks 
 on ttiis important subject. In page II you assert, 
 *' that the disagreement between the two countries 
 "which led to fresh hostilities had no foundation in 
 " any luiavoidable or subslantial cause.'' To prove 
 
 * It was proved in evidence, that Colonel Despard himself a- 
 vowed this connexion, and deferred one of his projects because 
 ' he wailed for news and money from France." 
 
19 
 
 this, you pass over rather lightly the evacuation of 
 Egypt and Malta by the English, and the evacuation 
 of Holland by the French, by just observing thatthese 
 difficulties were in a course of removal, when M. 
 Otto called the attention of ministers to the French 
 emigrants, and the abusive publications against the 
 govtrnment of France which daily issued from the 
 press. This is a point on which you insist with much 
 warmth, and perhaps for this leason, that as you wish 
 to make the grounds of the war appear to the public 
 to be the uiost trifling, you would rest them upon 
 the refusal of government to keep a certain number 
 of newspapers in awe, not by holdmg up the lash of 
 the Attorney-general in the ordinary way of prose- 
 cution for libels, for this would not satisfy the irri- 
 table chief of tije French nation, but by the exer- 
 cise of a previous control over the press by the exe- 
 cutive po>ver. As this is a very disingenuous mode 
 of changing the argument, so it is not a little in- 
 consistent. Whilst at one time you stand forth as 
 the champion of un!)Ounded liberty, you here crouch 
 to a tyrant, and obliquely become the apologist of 
 an interference with the internal arrangements of 
 other governments in a case which most deeply af- 
 fects the best interests of liberty, the freedom of the 
 press. This freedom, more unequivocally than uny 
 thing beside, marks the difference between a free 
 and an enslaved state. It is, when unfettered by ille- 
 tral restraints, the engine of the greatest possible 
 good to a free people; but let it be touched by the 
 wand of power and it is converted into a mere pas- 
 sive instrument of tyranny, it loses its energy be- 
 cause free discussion is proscribed, and it forfeits 
 public confidence because it is suspected. The lan- 
 guage of truth will not then bespoken, except when 
 it is dictated by interest ; and as interest is oftener, in 
 the present state of things, connected with falsehood 
 than with truth, it will oftener deceive than direct, 
 and more frequently injure than benefit. Even truth 
 conveyed through such a medium loses half its force 
 
I will, however, freely admit with you, that the 
 licentiousness of the press ought to be restrained ; that 
 many publications of an indecent kind, and oiTensive 
 to foreign governments, have been issued : but why 
 so tender of Bonaparte ? AVhy have you not com- 
 plained that the best allies of England have been 
 treated by the prints devoted to your party witli the 
 most vulgar abuse and unmanly rancour; and that 
 paragraphs in English newspapers have been so well 
 suited to the palate and views of the enemy, that he 
 has made use of them in place of original composi- 
 tions, finding them more acrimonious against Eng- 
 land and more favourable to the cause of France than 
 even his own retained editors have had the courage 
 or modesty to write. You mention the subject of 
 these oifensive publications, it is true, as an histori- 
 cal fact necessary to the elucidation of your argu- 
 ment, and rather cloak your opinion of the pro- 
 priety of restraining them under the mask of ge- 
 neral observations ; though you~certainly implicate 
 the conduct of the British government as well as the 
 individual writers engaged in the contest. But in this 
 there is an evident attempt to mislead your readers. 
 You have given part of an answer of Lord Ilawkes- 
 hury to the representation of the French minister, 
 but you might have found a dibpatch of his Lordship's 
 which would more forcibly have displayed the merits 
 of the subject to your readers. With respect to the 
 libels alleged to be published against the French go- 
 vernment, he expressed " his assurance that his ma- 
 " jesty could not and never would, in consequence of 
 "any representation or menace from a foreign pow- 
 " er, make any concessions which could, in the small- 
 " est degree, be dangerous to the liberty of the press, 
 *'as secured by the constitution of the country. 
 " That the constitution admitted of no previous re~ 
 " straints upon publications of any description ; but 
 " thatthere existed judicatures, wholly independentof 
 *Mhe executive government, capable of taking cog- 
 " nizance of sach publications, iSrc." Tliis was an 
 
answer equally agreeable to justice and the inde- 
 pendence otafree state. Under some circumstances 
 you, toa, would have avowed it. Had it been an. 
 answer from the French court to a British complaint, 
 you would have written it in letters of gold, you 
 woidd have studded it with diamonds. 
 
 This mode of redress was as open to the first con- 
 sul as to his Britannic majesty himself. " These ju- 
 dicatures," it was observed by Lord H. in his reply, 
 ** might take cognizance not only of libels against 
 " the government and magistracy of this kingdom ; 
 " but, as had been repeatedly experienced, of piiblica- 
 " flons defamatory of those in whose hands the admi- 
 " nistrationuf foreign governments was placed " Here 
 then was a legitimate mode of proceeding poinfed 
 out; but it ill accorded with the summary process 
 required by the man who, having extinguished every 
 spark of liberty in France, and forced the presses of 
 that country and other European states into his own 
 service, was indignant that the British press alone 
 dared to investigate his character, to criticise his go- 
 vernment, and to warn the world of the dangerous 
 maxims of his policy. 
 
 In page 98, you demand, with an air of lofty de- 
 fiance, "at what period since the revohition has the 
 " French government proposed to us to relinquish 
 '* any of our liberties and laws ?" I answer, at this. 
 That government wished the British press to be con- 
 trolled by the executive, contrary to the constitution. 
 Nothing it might deem offensive was to be publish- 
 ed. Had this been admitted, would the system of 
 interference have terminated here } Bonaparte com- 
 plained of the speeches in parliament, as well as li- 
 bellous newspapers ; would you. Sir, have been ready 
 to have conceded tiie freedom of speech in the sena*e 
 as well as the liberty of the press ? 1 believe not. 
 Strong as your bias is towards France, unbounded 
 as your confidence appears to be in her military chief, 
 I believe you would not. A stand must then have 
 been made somewhere, and it was more honourable. 
 
as well as nior6 effectual, to resist the first attempt 
 upon our internal arran elements and established laws. 
 
 With respect to the French emigrants, it is only 
 necessary to quote the reply of the British govern- 
 inent on that suhject. " It was affirmed, that tlie 
 *' greater part of the persons alluded to by the French 
 " government were living in retirement, and that 
 ** there was no reason whatever to suppose that, 
 *' since the conclusion of peace, they had availed 
 *' themselves of their residence in England to pro- 
 " mote designs injurious to the government of 
 *' France." 
 
 On the share which the evacuation of Malta had in 
 producing a recommencement of hostilities, you are 
 rather inconsistent. In the paragraphs in your 
 pamphlet I have been just animadverting upon, you 
 would attribute this even to the libels of the British 
 press; but, in page 100, you say, " We might have 
 *' continued at peace in I8O0, if we would evacuate 
 *' Malta, as we agreed to do by the treaty of Amiens." 
 Passing over this apparent contradiction, I must ob- 
 serve, that the view you have given of this subject, 
 like the former, is far from being fair or accurate. 
 You seem to encourage the notions assiduously 
 spread by a party at that time, that the refusal to 
 evacuate that island was an act of faithlesness on the 
 part of the British minisiry ; and that the peace was 
 broken for the sake of a posse>sion uninteresting to 
 Britain. But the conduct of the Addington admin- 
 istration, I think, was in this respect free from blame. 
 That they were sincere in making the peace, I be- 
 lieve has been allowed by all parties; and it may 
 therefore be fairly concluded that ihey sincerely in- 
 tended to fulfil all its articles. Arrangements zvere 
 entered into lor the purpose of evacuating ^lalta, 
 agreeable to the treaty. Difficulties occurred to pro- 
 long that measure, but still there was no appearance 
 of insincerity. Before these could be removed, 
 France herself had made infractions on the treaty ; 
 and, as before noticed, began to pursue a conduct, 
 
23 
 
 and to manifest a disposition, which augured a 
 speedy rupture between the two countries. Malta 
 was, therefore, retained till the French government 
 should enter into a new arrangement. The treaty 
 was not literall}) fulfilled ; but this is a gross view of 
 a subject, when disposed into the form of a charge, 
 for what may not at hrst sight appear just, vvill be 
 often found so upon explanation. The terms of a 
 treaty are not bindmg only upon one party, they hold 
 both, and when the conduct of one party is in di- 
 rect opposition either to the express terms of an. 
 agreement, or to its evident spirit, so as to nullify 
 its intention, the other is justly exonerated from the 
 obligation. 
 
 With respect to the importance of Malta it may 
 be said, that, considering only the intrinsic value of 
 that island, it would have been most ridiculous to 
 make that, simply considerci, the ground of war. 
 But though on the face of the litigation Malta occu- 
 pied the mostprominent place, the contest was rather 
 between the ambition of France and the safety of 
 our eastern possessions. The possession of Egypt it 
 is notorious, even from the confession of Bonaparte 
 himself, was an object nearest to his heart. The pre- 
 servation of our India possessions was one of the 
 greatest objects for dispossessing the French of that 
 station before the peace of Amiens; and it was na- 
 tural that what we had achieved by a career of 
 honourable victories, should be guaranteed by that 
 treaty. This was done. The 8th article stipnlated, 
 " that the territories," &c. " of the Sublime Porte 
 " were to be maintained in their integrity." But 
 Bonaparte, after the treaty of Amiens, did not aban- 
 don his designs upon Egypt, nor manifest any inten- 
 tion to submit to the restraint of its provisions. The 
 report of Sebastian!, ostensibly a commercial agent, 
 but in reality a military spy, disclosed the fact that 
 such intentions were still entertained, and it was 
 placed beyond a doubt by the conversation of the 
 first consul with Lord Whitworth, while the nego- 
 
124 
 
 ciatious were slill pending. He concluded his ob- 
 servations on the subject of Egypt, with observing, 
 *' ivhaiever migltt he his desire to have it as a colomjy 
 " he did not think it ivorth the risk of a icar, since 
 " sooner or later Egypt would belong to France, either 
 " l)i; the falling to pieces of the Turkish emnire, or by 
 " some arrangement with the Porte." Under such 
 circumstances was Malta to be surrendered ? To 
 Bonaparte, Malta could be of no value but as aiding 
 his designs on Egypt and India; to us it was of no 
 value but as it aiforded security to both. In pro- 
 portion, therefore, as the anxiety of France respect- 
 ing Malta became more urgent, we had additional 
 motives for retahiing it; and when the first consul 
 declared he would rather see us in possession of the 
 Fauxbourgh St. Antoine than that island, it was 
 time for Britain to determine to keep it for ever. 
 
 This indiilerence with respect to Malta and Egypt 
 is not a little singular in you, who have held up a 
 participation in the East India trade to the town of 
 Liverpool as an object of petition to parliament, 
 and have endeavoured to acquire a degree of popu- 
 larity by that proceeding. At the last election an 
 attempt was made to prop up your sinking cause by 
 connecting your name with that hope, and by hint- 
 ing to the electors that you would use every exer- 
 tion to open to them that valuable channel of com- 
 merce. The placards on the walls, inscribed " lios- 
 " coe and the East India trade,'' met the eye in every 
 direction. For the interest you have at any time 
 taken in the welftire of your native place, you are 
 entitled to its thanks ; but it is strange that you 
 should censure the British government for their pre- 
 caution in checking the designs of the enemy in 
 that quarter of the globe to which you directed the 
 attention of your townsmen to find an indemnity 
 for the dilapidated state of their commerce, produc- 
 ed by the abolition of the slave trade. But, per- 
 haps, in this, as well as other instances, you have an 
 unbounded confidence in the honour, the integrity y and 
 
Q3 
 
 the moderate desires of the emperor of the French. 
 You hav'Cj however, been exceeded in tlie sacrifices 
 you would have oft'ered at the shrine oi the ambi- 
 tion of Bonaparte, in order to maintain the peace of 
 Amiens: Earl Stanhope would not only have evacu- 
 ated Malta and Egypt, he would have given to France 
 the islands of Guernsey and Jersey ! ! ! 
 
 From a review of these circumstances it must be 
 left to our readers to deiermine how far your obser- 
 vation is just, " That the disagreement of the two 
 " countries, which soon afterwards led to fresh hos- 
 *' tilities, iiad no foundariou in any unavoidable or 
 " substantial cause," (page 11.) Every impartial 
 man, I am persuaded, will come to a very opposite 
 conclusion. But be this as it may, no man, who is 
 not disposed to follow a party to its last dregs, can 
 allow the intemperate abuse you have lavished upon 
 those who were either dissatisfied with the peace of 
 Amiens, or sanctioned a new declaration of war 
 against the enemy. That such were merely " hireling 
 " writers, placemen, pensioners, or contractors," is 
 either a scurrilous libel, or an intentional falsehood. 
 With respect to the peace of Amiens, the opinions 
 of men were much divided, not only in the nation 
 but in the parliament. It was applauded by Mr. 
 Pitt and many of the members of his administrat ion, 
 and was loudly condemned by those who fornjed 
 conspicuous parts of that, under the banners of 
 which you ranged, and whose measures you sup- 
 ported during the period of yoirr ephemeial sena- 
 torial existence. Great as the joy was which the 
 tidings of peace produced, it was soon followeci by 
 a change of sentiment when the encroachments of 
 France could be no longer hid. You impute this 
 change to the etVoitsot hireling journalists, but you 
 seem to forget that these journiuists were chietly in 
 opposition to the ministry of that drty, and could 
 not therefore be in the pay of tlie treasury. If 
 there were hueling ad\ ocates for war, were there not 
 also hireling clamourers tor peace ? If there were 
 
 I) 
 
those who painted the detbrmities of Bonaparte, 
 were there not also those who, as in the present day, 
 trumpeted his virtues ? You call them alarmistSy 
 and this, it is true, is an alarming word; but what. 
 Sir, is an alarmist ? If he be one who, from the 
 watch-tower of observation, discovers hostile move- 
 ments, and dangerous designs on the part of the 
 enemy, and faithfully rouses his country to a sense 
 of danger, in opposition to the attempt of those 
 whose feminine minds ever sooth into compliance 
 and lull into security, an alarmist is an apj)ellation 
 of which no patriot ought to be ashamed; but if 
 you regard the persons who called upon the energy 
 and spirit of the British nation at that time to resist 
 the assumptions of France as instigating war because 
 they had an interest in it, and as agitating the pub- 
 lic with false and groundless alarms, you implicate, 
 not only French emigrants and hireling writers, but 
 also the most distinguished patriots and statesmen, 
 of almost every political party, that ever adorned a 
 country by their virtues, or honoured a senate by 
 their talents. To prove this it is only necessary to 
 refer the readers to the debates in parliament the 
 23d of May, 1803, upon his majesty's message to 
 the house announcing the rupture between the two 
 countries. What were the majorities in favour of 
 the measures of the British government ? In the 
 House of Lords, contents 142; non-contents 10! 
 In the Commons, for the address 398 ; against it 67 ! 
 Had the emigrants, the journalists, the pensioners, 
 deceived the two houses of parliament also ? You 
 outrage, Sir, the understanding of your readers. 
 
 I shall conclude these observations with the fol- 
 lowing extract from a speech delivered on that oc- 
 casion by Earl Moira, who from his political opin- 
 ions you cannot object to as an impartial evidence. 
 " Our jealousy and alarm were excited by that in- 
 " corrigible spirit of encroachment and ambition 
 " wliich not only the lii'st consul, but in fact all the 
 " persons connected with the government of France, 
 
^' liaci for some time manifested ; and even if Malta 
 " were in our hands in perpetuity, we should not 
 " sit down contented until some further security 
 " should be obtained : of this the nation ought to be- 
 " ware. The fact was, that, from the present state 
 " of this country, there was no option ; either the 
 *' attempt to reduce that power must be made, 
 " or the nation must fall down to the most abject 
 ** and degrading submission. The main object of 
 '•' the war, if it be either popular, or politic, must be 
 " to restrain the arrogance — to reduce the prepon- 
 " deranceof the French government: and until that 
 '' object be attained, the war should not be aban- 
 " doned — until France should not be capable of en- 
 " dangering our existence, whatever might be the 
 *' disposition of her government to injure us." His 
 Lordship concluded by observing that, " if this 
 •' country were to be engaged in war, it ought to 
 " receive a confident assurance that it did not go 
 *' into it, merely for colonial pursuits for petty con- 
 *' tests, but for great national interests '^ 
 
 Upon the whole, when we reflect upon the pacific 
 character of the ministry that concluded the peace 
 of Amiens, and the sincerity that they manifested, 
 immediately after the peace, to fulfil its conditions, 
 it is not to be doubted that if thei) were alarmed there 
 Was cause of alarm ; and as their political existence 
 extended long enough to enter upon a new war ; it 
 may be inferred from their characteristic disposi- 
 tion, that they were forced into it by the most pres- 
 sing causes, the aggressions of the enemy and the 
 danger of the country. In your reflections on this 
 breach of amity, you, however, think that at the mo- 
 ment the Addington administration enfered upon 
 the war, the fairest opportunity was held out to the 
 country, not only of peace, but of aggrandizement ! 
 You found this opinion on the conversation of Bona- 
 parte with the British ambassador. At that interview 
 " he said that if he had not felt the enmity of the 
 *' British government on every occasion since the 
 
" peace of Amiens, there would have been nothing 
 " t'lathe would not have done to prove his desire to 
 *' concili;'.te — jmrlicipation in indemnities as vi^ell as in- 
 *' fluence ou the continent ; treaties of commerce j in 
 *' short, any tiling- that would have given satisfac- 
 '' tion, and testified his friendship." From these 
 fair proni; s of the first consul, to the truth of which 
 you givt as grave an assent as to a mathematical 
 demcAistration. you as gravely infer, (page 23,) " If 
 " peace had l)een the object of the British ministry, 
 " here was lYie groniid work of it ; if security, here 
 " w.io the aiasen for fnuiintj; it ; \^ aggrandizement, this 
 " was tht onuortuuity. In an arrangement upon 
 '' ti^ese grounds this country would have made no 
 " t iCrifices/ &c. Much, Sir, as I am astonished 
 at your ci-edulitif, I am more so at this evident display 
 of a war) I of consistent principle. 
 
 In citing this conversation, you have been guilty 
 of a iiind of literary deception, which is not unfre- 
 quently practised. Whilst you have exhibited the 
 tempting offers of " participationin indemnities,'' and 
 *' treaties of commerce, '' hi Italic characters, to catch 
 the eyes and engage the unu>sual attention of j'our 
 readers, that sentence which is to be considered as 
 the key of the whole of this part of the conversation, 
 stands emborlied in plain Roman, deprived of this 
 supplemental aid to force it into notice. As I have 
 got now into the habit of supplying your omissions, 
 I take the same liberty on this occasion. " Tivo such 
 '^ countries,'' observes the consul, " by a proper under- 
 " standing, might govern the world." This is the sen- 
 tence which explains the whole. The language is 
 too plain to be mistaken. " Join your fleet to my 
 *' army, assist in the accomplishment of my designs 
 " against Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Germany, against 
 " all the rest of the world, and you shall share the 
 " spoils, you shall participate in indemnities." This 
 was indeed. Sir, an opportunity for aggrandizement. 
 If the British ministry had consented to become the 
 tools of Bonaparte's ambition, they might have had 
 
Q9 
 
 indemnities and h^aties of commerce. The ground of 
 the hatred of Bonaparte to England is, because she 
 is the only power that stands between him and 
 universal dominion. Had she been silent on the sub- 
 ject of his encroachments, he would have continued 
 at peace ; but had she co-operated, he would have 
 yielded '^ any thing to testify his frieiidship." And 
 yet you observe that *' in an arrangement on these 
 '* grounds, the country would have made no sacrifices." 
 What ! would the country have made no sacrifices in 
 becoming the accomplice of a public robber, in de- 
 parting from the track of fair manly resistance to the 
 encroachments of universal despotism, and in } ield- 
 ing the energies, given her by Providence for her 
 own defence, into the hands of the scourge of na- 
 tions, ,the "tyrantof the continent?" I profess^Sir, 
 that when I read this part of your book, it was with 
 'difliculty that I could persuade myself that you were 
 in earnest. " But what, you ask, was the answer of 
 " the British ministry? A total silence on those most 
 '' interesting and if?iportant topics." And what an- 
 swer did they deserve, but a contemptuous silence ? 
 Even to have listened for a moment to such an infa- 
 mous proposal would of itself have been sufficient 
 ground of impeachment. 
 
 The disclosure of the views and wishes of the 
 French government in this conversation, were a- 
 mongst the foremost of those causes which excited 
 the spirit of the English nation against France, and 
 which produced a vigorous co-operation with the 
 government of the country after the declaration of 
 war. You seem to attribute this wholly to the na- 
 tional aifront contained in the French Expose^ " that 
 "England alone could not contend with France." 
 Had this been the case, as an Englishman, I should 
 have been proud of the reflection, as it marked a de- 
 licate sense of honour, and proved that commercial 
 pursuits liad not so changed the national character, 
 as to render it insensible to military glory. But this 
 idle vaunt wa3 not the principal cause of exciting 
 
30 
 
 the spirit which led to so determined a resolution on 
 the ^>art oi' the people. The conduct of the French 
 ruler, irom the signing of" the preliminaries of the 
 ptiHie "tii the renewal of hostilities, all served to 
 mark ihe real character of the enemy, and to im- 
 press the nation that its safety alone consisted in 
 prrsuing the strongest and most vigorous measures. 
 But vijen, after the declaration of war, an invasion 
 was threatened, the character of this country was 
 placed \n its mosi imposing light. You, Sir, have 
 treated this subject rather lightly; but, for myself, 
 I esteem it glorious to have lived in an age, when 
 the generous youth of Britain rallied round their 
 ** hearths and their altars," when party itself was 
 absorbed in the common cause of the country, and 
 when it was proved in the most unequivocal man- 
 ner, in what estimation the constitution and inde- 
 pendence of Great Britain was held by its inhabi- 
 tants, by the sacrifices they then made to defend 
 them. That this spirit was ridiculed and depressed 
 hy the coldness, the insults, and theoretical war sys- 
 tems of a late administration, is a subject of deep 
 regret, as it may serve to enervate the future ener- 
 g'es of the people, when called again to associate 
 for the common defence of the liberties of their civil 
 esiablishnient, and the honourable rewards of their 
 industry. But the principle though depressed, still 
 exists, and will, I trust, be found as equal to the 
 rehisal of a peace, which would sacrifice the interests 
 of the country, as to resist the invasion which would 
 endanger its existence. 
 
 Having dismissed the peace of Amiens, you take 
 a rapid survey of the events which almost immedi- 
 ately followed the renewal of the war : the change 
 of ministry, the conduct of the continental war, 
 vrhich terminated so fatally by the battle of Auster- 
 litz, and the death and character of Mr. Pitt. Few 
 as the pages are which you have devoted to these 
 .subjects, they are superfluous additions which have 
 little relation to the scope of your pamphlet. Ap- 
 
31 
 
 parently glad of the opportunity of impugning the 
 ability of Mr. Pitt, in conducting his own mea- 
 sures, as well as his wisdom in adopting them, you 
 have said, ''that if the object of that coalition 
 *' had been laudable, the misconduct and folly of 
 " those who gave rise to the alliance, were such as 
 " must in the eyes of impartial posterity, brand them 
 *' with indelible disgrace,' (page 31.) What the opi- 
 nion of our posterity will be on this subject, is not, 
 I believe known either to you or me ; it is proba- 
 ble that there will be as great a variety of opinions 
 on the political questions of the age in which we 
 have lived at the end of a century as at present. 
 In the case before ns, that there is " folly and mis- 
 " conduct " to be charged someivhere, the result of 
 that unfortunate campaign has rendered too evident 
 to be denied ; but that they are to be attributed chiefly 
 to Mr. Pitt and his friends in adminitration, is an in- 
 ference which, unless your impartiality has been 
 somewhat partial ized, you would not so hastily have 
 reached. "This folly and misconduct," in your 
 opinion, consisted in not binding the King of Prus- 
 sia by the alliance, and in the " blind confidence 
 " that the accession of Russia would ensure the co- 
 " operation of Prussia," This co-operation was cer- 
 tainly highly to be desired, and would in all proba- 
 bility have decided the contest in favour of the allied 
 powers ; the confidence felt in the accession of Prus- 
 sia to the common cause, was certainly supported 
 by the conviction that the interests of that power 
 dictated that line of conduct, and therefore not a 
 blind confidence. But, Sir, it was not absolutely ne- 
 cessary to the success of the coalition that Prussia 
 should become one of the parties, neither does it 
 appear that unlimited confidence was placed in her 
 friendship. Austria and Russia, if their Ibrces, had 
 been united, would have been equal to the contest ; 
 nor is it to be supposed that Mr. Pitt ever intended 
 that they should engage separately. That impolicy 
 neither resulted from the plan of the campaign, nor 
 
32 
 
 necessarily followed the rapid movements of the 
 French. The Austrian force might have retreated 
 until it had met the Russians ; and this movement, 
 though it would have exposed the Austrian territo- 
 ry, was infmitelv to be preferred to the course that 
 was taken. In fact, the principal blame of that af- 
 fair appears to rest with the court of Vienna. Tlie 
 general it appointed was either a traitor or unequal 
 to his appointment, or the court itself guilty of a 
 temerity bordering upon madness. All this, you 
 say, " was foieseen," and therefore might have been 
 avoided ; but. Sir, it is easy to frame predictions when 
 the events are past. ,^ 
 
 But were the conduct of Great Britain as blam- 
 able as you assert, it would prove nothing against 
 the principle of the war or of the coalition. The 
 (7'ifce of Amiens had already shown that, whether in 
 peace or war, the enemy not only pursued a course 
 of spoliation on the continent, but a system of hos- 
 tility against the commerce, the government, and 
 every interest of this country. The most moderate 
 men of every party, the Addingtons who made the 
 peace, even Whigs themselves, joined in the senti- 
 ment — " Unless France be humbled, Britain is un- 
 ♦' safe; either the attempt to reduce that power must 
 " be made, or the nation must fall down to the most 
 ••' abject and degrading submission." This w^as the 
 voice of the parliament and of the nation , and al- 
 though the failure of the attempt added to its diffi- 
 culties, it has left *' to imparlial posterity, to admire 
 •' that noble love of independence which resisted a 
 " successful despotism with so much energy, and 
 '' that firm spirit which remained unbroken under 
 " the pressure of multiplied disappointments and 
 " calamities." 
 
 The mismanagement of the allies, which you ob- 
 liquely attribute to Mr. Pitt, whose ever-to-be-la- 
 mented death succeeded the battle of Austerlitz, 
 gives you an opportunity of uttering a laboured and 
 malignant phillippic against the memory of that dis- 
 
SB 
 
 tinguished statesman. It would be pitiful to follov.* 
 you into the detail of the political vices you at- 
 tribute to his character. His merits can receive no 
 addition from the panegyric of my pen, nor have 
 they suffered any detraction from the oblotpiy of 
 yours. The richest monument of the son of Chat- 
 ham is in the heait of his country, which still cheristies 
 the most grateful remembrance of the wisdom and 
 jjolicy of his administration^ the uprightness of his 
 conduct, and the ardour of his patriotism. V'ery 
 different, however," are your feelings, and perhaps 
 you have furnished the reason in page 3Q. Speak- 
 ing of the French revolution, you observe, *' It was 
 " Mr. Pitt's first misfortune to be insensible to ihft 
 *' grander.r of so glorious a struggle ; his second to 
 " miscalculate its consequences. The first act of 
 *' France was to hold out her emancipated hands to the 
 *' free states of England and America ; but the cold- 
 " ness of the minister soon convinced her that in this 
 " government she was not to expect a friend." Ilmc 
 i?\e, /line laclinimcC. This was the unpardonable sin 
 of Mr. Pitt ; for which he was loaded, by a violent 
 party, with every kind of abuse whilst living, and 
 for this, malice still barks over his ashes. But, Sir, 
 Mr. Pitt was not a theoretical politician, his eye 
 was too strong to be dazzled by the false glare 
 with which the novelty of French principles, and 
 the vivid eloquence vvith which they were adorned, 
 encircled the revolution. " The emancipated hands 
 *' of France" were stretched out to England and 
 America; but neither the sober mind of Washing- 
 ton, thougli president of a republic; nor of Pitt, 
 though prime minister in a nation enjoying a 
 greater portion of true liberty than any other on 
 earth, regarded the invitation to befriend the cause 
 of Gallic republicanism. France *' lield out licr 
 *' emancipated hands,'" but they were ensanguined 
 with murder, and blackened with violence. Whilst 
 she " held out her Viands " to Britain, (I suppose 3'ou 
 mean for help,) she was secretly employing them m 
 
 E 
 
an attempt to pull down our constitution and laws, 
 and in sowing the seeds of discord and rebellion in 
 every state within the reach of her influence. " A 
 *' limited monarchy" did not satisfy those who fo- 
 mented the first breach of the social order in France, 
 rhose who assumed the direction of affairs after the 
 humiliation of Louis, for the most part were the ad- 
 vocates of the most levelling democracy ; and there 
 is good evidence to be produced tliat they themselves 
 provoked external hostilities and domestic massa- 
 cres, that they might with a better grace murder their 
 monarch, and rear the fal)ric of their idolatry upon 
 the ruins of their country. These views were not 
 latent, they discovered themselves in almost every 
 act of the French reformers from the beginning, they 
 xvere obvious to the discerning eye of Mr. Pitt. 
 Would you have w^ished him to make England a 
 party in a civil war ? to aid a Parisian mob against 
 its sovereign ? to have declared war against Germa- 
 ny, Prussia, and the other confederates, because 
 they had declared war against France ? and to have 
 participated with France in her crimes that she might 
 become a sharer in the spoils ? This is another in- 
 stance of your inconsistency. To interfere in the 
 internal arrangements of France in favour of royal- 
 ty, was a crime too great for forgiveness ; but if that 
 interference had been in favour of a factitious liber- 
 ty, it would have been a noble sensibility " to the 
 " graudetir of so glorious a struggle P' I5ut to the 
 grandeur and glory of this struggle Mr. Pitt was in- 
 insensible; and so, I believe, was every man in the 
 country who was not either an ideot too weak to 
 reason, or a philosopher reasoning himself out of 
 the region of common sense; a partisan making use 
 of it as a convenient instrument to blow up the flame 
 of dissention, or a leveller who only waited the 
 watch-word of sedition to give him the property of 
 his neighbour. 
 
 Your reflections on the ill success of Mr. Pitt's 
 policy, which follow, I have anticipated in the for- 
 
35 
 
 xner part of this letter, and shall therefore only no- 
 tice the observation, '* that the principle which car- 
 ** ried the French nation through all her difficulties 
 "was the determination of the people to rally round 
 ** the existing government, whatever that government 
 " jjiight hey In that respect the French are to be 
 applauded, nor shall I object in this instance to your 
 indulging yourselt in your favourite bias; but the 
 observation affords just occasion of admonition to 
 you and others of the same party; and it may be 
 asked whether 3^ou as Englishmen have done that 
 which you praise in 7^;r«c///;z£';z /* The ministry of 
 this country is its government for the tnue being. 
 But, Sir, have yon rallied round it ? Have you, 
 even in cases where your private convictions on po- 
 litical measures would have suffered it, endeavoured 
 to give the existing ministry the respect and confi- 
 dence of the country ? Have you been vi^illing to 
 praise, and reluctant to condemn ? Have you, amidst 
 the dangers of your country, hushed personal in- 
 vectives and party clamours, and absorbed these un- 
 manly partialities in the great considerations con- 
 nected with the welfare of the empire ? Have you 
 never endeavoured to frustrate plans of national po- 
 licy, that the odium of the failure might rest with 
 your opponents, and artfully endeavoured to excite 
 the hopes or the fears of the people to produce 
 a change of sentiment, in order to effect a change 
 of administration ? If I may be allowed to answer 
 these inquiries myself, I will say, that taking your 
 party in the aggregate, almost every effort of theirs, 
 out of place, has tended to discourage the people of 
 this country, and to infuse vigour into their ene- 
 mies. Your pamphlet, Sir, has this tendency at 
 Itome, though it is not likely to find its way abroad ^ 
 and the conduct of your friends in opposition is suf- 
 ficiently applicable. If they speak of Russia, it is 
 in terms calculated to give permanence to tlie es- 
 trangement of that power from England; if of the 
 Danish expedition, every thing that is advanced tends 
 
36 
 
 to strengthen the bonds of northern confederacy ; 
 if of France, it is with a respect that might inijDress 
 its government that in England a powerful party is 
 devoted to its interest; if of the country, the colour- 
 ing is so dark, that every hostile power must be en- 
 couraged to withhold that peace from us which they 
 demand from our own government, in hope of our 
 entire humiliation ; and if of Ireland, every topic 
 is chosen which is calculated to keep alive the flame, 
 the opposition themselves have kindled — to encourage 
 the enemy to invade, and the Irish to receive him. 
 For the sake of consistency, if not of patriotism, if 
 you praise the French for " rallying round their go- 
 " vernment, zvhatever it migfit be,'' when their coun- 
 try was in danger, go. Sir, and imitate the example, 
 lam very far from thinking that an opposition is not 
 highly useful and necessary in this free country, or 
 that the liberty of speech ought to be restrained, 
 Were there even no party ends to serve, no projects 
 of ambition to gratify, tlie diilerence of opinion al- 
 ways found in man would on many subjects of poli- 
 cy unavoidably create an opposition ; but the pre- 
 sent party in the house distinguished by that name, 
 (I except some individuals,) would be entitled to more 
 respect, and would more essentially serve the inte- 
 rests of the countr}'', if their pride were less assum- 
 ing, their desire of place less obvious, and their con- 
 tempt of their opponents restrained within narrower 
 limits of modesty. l{\ burying their party quarrels, 
 they would recollect that tlie state is in dangei^ and 
 that their public duty demands the union of all that 
 is great, wise, and patriotic, in the nation. 
 
 After noticing the change of ministry consequent 
 on the death of Mr. Pitt, you proceed to give an 
 historical narrative of the negociations opened with 
 France by the new ministers, which, according to 
 your statement, took its rise from the refusal of Mr. 
 Fox to become a party in a plot to assassinate the 
 chief of the French government. Admiring, as you 
 do, the principles and politics of that gentleman, to 
 
SI 
 
 have taken an opportunity of paying a trii)ute of 
 respect to his memory as a man, or his talents as a 
 senator, would have been an effort of friendship or 
 of admiration which could have given offence to 
 none, however they might differ from your opinions. 
 But, Sir, had I, who certainly do not carry my ad- 
 miration of Charles Fox as far as yourself, been dis- 
 posed to have panegyrized his character, I could 
 have selected many greater virtues from his heart 
 than that circumstance called into action. It was 
 surely but little to say that his heart recoiled at a 
 murderous proposal; it was little to prove in favour 
 of your friend that he vvas not an assassin. A foreign- 
 er reading 3^our book, if unacquainted with the 
 character of the English nation, might very natu- 
 rally infer that their is a hideous deficiency of th 
 great prmciples of justice and humanity in the coun 
 try, when a political writer is driven to the extremity 
 of praismg a state officer because of his refusal to 
 become an accomplice in a murder ! The serious- 
 ness with which yon treat this subject is indeed 
 throughout ridiculous. It is not enough that this re- 
 fusal should stand for the index of Mr. Fox's virtues 
 as a man, it must also be alleged as a proof of the 
 (soundness of his principles as a politician. " He 
 "had \X\Q courage and virtue io bring forward into 
 *' public life, and to exemplify in the most striking 
 " manner^ one of the most important maxims of mo- 
 " rality, that it is never expedient to do evil in the 
 *' hope of producing an aventual good," (page 44.) 
 To the truth of this axiom I give with you the 
 strongest assent ; but I contess that I am at a loss to 
 discover that the conduct of Mr. Fox in this instance 
 illustrated it in " the most striking ynanner ;'' or that 
 it required any effort of '-'courage'' to brmg this axiom 
 into " public life'' in a country and government like 
 our own. But, Sir, the manner in which you have 
 stated this anecdote only adds another proof, to the 
 many you have already afforded, of the unnatural dis- 
 position you have shown to degrade your country. 
 
38 
 
 ^,n(l to impeach the characters of all who have pur- 
 sued a differeni policy to that which you could ap- 
 prove. Why, if such a disposition does not exist in 
 your bosom, should you wishto represent this maxim 
 of political morality as buried in obscurity till Mr. 
 Fox introduced it into public life? Why hint that 
 the British government had for so long a time de- 
 parted from the most obvious principle of justice, 
 that it required an extraordinary exertion of" rcz//Y/o^e" 
 on the part of a secretary of state, to assert and act 
 upon it ? Why intimate that this " virtue and courage^ 
 existed only in a whig and in a whig ministry ? That 
 neither Mr. Pitt and his friends in office formerly 
 possed them ? And insinuate that the persons now in 
 oihce, had the same proposal been made to them as 
 to Mr. Fox, would have acted the part of murderers 
 and assassins, (see page 77.) It was thought by im- 
 partial men a violent stretch of modesty for the op- 
 position to assume " all the talent of the country; 
 hut you have carried them still farther, you have 
 given them all the virtue. 
 
 The negociation to which this display of negative 
 virtue on the part of Mr. Fox gave rise, is of great 
 importance. It served to mark, in the strongest 
 manner, the character of the enemy, and the insecu- 
 rity of Great Britain, whilst he retains his immense 
 superiority over the continent. You have gone into 
 an historical detail of this transaction, though not 
 exactly with the fidelity, which, according to gen- 
 eral opinion, an historian ought to possess. As far 
 as a proper respect to your friends who conducted 
 that affair would allow, you have endeavoured to 
 give a colouring to those communications, in favour 
 of France and against the decision of your country; 
 but after all your attem])ts, the pages in your pam- 
 phlet which you have employed on this subject, 
 stand as a complete refutation of the main principle 
 you have endeavoured to establish, that the French 
 government has been uniformly disposed to con- 
 clude peace with this country upon safe and honour- 
 
39 
 
 able terms. The Pilt administration had repeatedly 
 dechired that a secure peace could not be made with 
 France. A party in the nation who had made some 
 proselytes tlirough the disasters of the war, and the 
 disappointment of their former liopes were not sat- 
 istied with this declaration. — The Addington party 
 was then brought in, and made a peace, which they 
 found it impossible to preserve. " We are at war," 
 said the pacific Addington himself, " because we 
 ^' cannot he at peace.'' The advocates for the con- 
 tinuance of peace were silent until the destruction 
 of the third coalition raised the desire and excited 
 the cry for peace again. Mr. Fox was then in office, 
 who from the first had opposed the war, and who 
 throughout all its stages had called aloud for- its ter- 
 mination. Mr. Fox made tlie trial, and after his 
 death the negociations were continued by his friends, 
 and the conclusion to which they brought the whole 
 was, that the principle asserted by Mr. Pitt and his 
 friends, and which they had at different times so vio- 
 lently opposed, was strictlij true, — that *' No secure 
 " peace could be made with France." They inform 
 the people " that all their dearest interests are at 
 " stake, that no sacrifices they can be called to make, 
 " can be compared to the certain disgrace and ruin of 
 '^^ yielding to the injurious pretensions of the enemy'* 
 Even you. Sir, make this reflection upon the un- 
 favourable result of these endeavours to restore 
 peace — " that when a negociation, begun by Mr. 
 ' Fox, and the successful result of which was stated 
 ' by him in his last moments to be one of the two 
 ' great objects for which he was most anxiously so- 
 ' licitous: when such a negociation fails, under the 
 ' conduct of his surviving coadjutors and friends, 
 
 * who declare to the country, that the restoration of 
 
 * the general tranquillity was retarded only by the 
 '' injustice and ambition of the enemy, all expectation 
 
 * of peace is abandoned, and nothing appears to re- 
 ' main for the people, but to unite their endeavours 
 
 ' in accomplishing the destruction of an implaca- " 
 •' ble foe." 
 
40 
 
 But, notwithstanding this, we are not allowed to 
 rest the matter here, because that would implicate 
 the character of" France to a greater extent than you 
 wish to impress upon the public mind. In page 56 
 you allow that because peace could not be made 
 with France on terms satisfactory to Russia, our good 
 faith to our ally might be a sutlicient cause of hos- 
 tilitv, " inasmuch as no sacrifices we can ever be 
 " called to make are too great for maintaining the 
 " cliaracter of the nation for honour and integrity 
 " clear and unimpeached ;" but you will not allow us 
 this without a drawback. *' I'his," you observe, (p. 7,) 
 " is rather to be attributed to the unlortunate effects of 
 " our having formed such an alliance, and to the neces- 
 " sit V of adhering to it, than to any misconduct on the 
 ^'' part of France.'' It to usethose arts of which French 
 statesmen are complete masters, to beguile the am- 
 bassadors of other powers, or by political finesse 
 to effect a separate peace between Russia and Eng- 
 land only for the purpose of making more advanta- 
 geous arrangements for France, were the only charges 
 to be alleged against the government of that coun- 
 try, the general laws of diplomatic transactions 
 would, I believe, exculpate it from blame; this lib- 
 erty, being, by a kind of mutual consent, allowed 
 to address and intrigue in all parties; but if there 
 w^ere no real sincerity on the part of the French gov- 
 ernment to make a peace honourable to all the par- 
 ties concerned, according to its own professions; and 
 if France wished for a peace only to tie up the 
 hands of other governments, whilst she herself in- 
 tended to be left at liberty to pursue her own plans 
 of aggrandizement, then France in this affair is to 
 be charged with the grossest misconduct. A peace 
 of this kind Bonaparte has always been wqlling to 
 make ; such a peace he would have made in 1806; 
 but there is no evidence to be produced from any 
 part of his conduct that he has been willing to make 
 a treaty which would prevent him from making ag- 
 gressions on the dominions of othei: states. He has 
 
41 
 
 manifested no inclination to cease from his am^' 
 bitious projects, to confine himself within the 
 bounds of his present conquests, and to turn his at- 
 tention to the internal improvement of his domin- 
 ions. When a change of ministry placed the reins 
 of government in the hands of the passive Adding- 
 ton party, he concluded an indefinite peace, and 
 agreeable to his intentions continued his aggressions 
 with as much ardour as ever. When that conduct 
 was resisted, the peace was broken. The change of 
 ministry which followed the death of Mr, Pitt, af- 
 forded another opportunity to negociate on similar 
 terms. The new administration was composed and 
 supported by a number of characters who had uni- 
 formly been pacifically disposed to France, who had 
 praised the virtues, and exculpated the crimes of 
 that government. On this ministry France presum- 
 ed as more suited to her purposes than any other 
 that had had the direction of the British councils 
 since the revolution. The aft'air of the assassin af- 
 forded an apportunity to try its temper, and the ex- 
 periment was made. The negociation was entered 
 upon on the basis of the iiti possidetis, or state of 
 actual possession; but the English diplomacy w^as 
 not equal to the French. This basis was evidently 
 allowed by the French minister, but it was only vcr- 
 halli) allowed, and that in terms somewhat equivocal. 
 This was the snare into which the British ministers 
 were first led. The basis ought to have been ex- 
 pressed in zvriting ; but, perhaps, an overweening 
 confidence in the good faith of France might be the 
 inducement to accept the mere verbal professions of 
 the French minister ! This basis, you, however, as- 
 sert was not the original one on which the negocia- 
 tion commenced, (see pages 48 and 49.) " It ap- 
 *• pears that, up to the 4th of June, the principle of 
 " the state of actual possession had neither been assent- 
 " ed to, nor even proposed by either of the parties." 
 In this you are certainly in an error, and you have 
 only resorted to the tergiveri^ation o4" the French 
 
 F 
 
m 
 
 miirister; who, availing himself of his having only 
 given a wr6r?/ assent to this principle, proceeded to 
 deny his former professions, and to change the basis. 
 That Mr. Fox himself entered upon the negociation 
 on this ground is evident from his dispatch to Earl 
 Yarmouth, dated Jane 26th, which has this passage: 
 ** I am very happy to learn that M. Talleyrand ac- 
 " knowledges your accounts of former conversa- 
 ** tions to be accurately correct; but when he does 
 " acknowledge this, I have no conception on what 
 " ground he can recede from what he said so distinct- 
 ** ly to your Lordship before, upon the subject of 
 " Sicily. ' You are in possession of it ; we ask no- 
 " thing from you,' are words that made the more 
 '* impression on me, because those contained in the 
 '* latter clause of the sentence had been used by his 
 *' Excellency in one of his letters to me. It was on 
 " the faith of the iiti possidetis being to be strictly 
 " observed as the basis, and particularly Sicily, on 
 " which satisfaction had been given to your Lord- 
 " ship, that his Majesty was induced to authorize 
 ** your Lordship to hold further conferences with 
 " M. Talleyrand. An}^ tergiversation or cavil there- 
 "~fore on that article, would be a breach of the 
 " principle of the proposed basis in its most essential 
 " part.''' On this principle, therefore, the negocia- 
 tion commenced ; but if the French minister seemed 
 to allow it, it was evidently with the design of amus- 
 ing the British ministry until the sinuous and dan- 
 gerous policy of his court might take effect, llussia 
 and England, the one a great military power, and 
 the other the greatest naval power in the world, 
 whilst united, were yet dangerous enemies to France. 
 The cause of the continent was not hopeless, al- 
 though three coalitions had been defeated ; for, as 
 the subsequent campaign proved, Russia alone was 
 not a contemptible enemy. If the negociation had 
 any other object than to keep England at a distance 
 from Prussia until the designs of France upon that 
 power were wpe for execution, and Prussia being 
 
AS 
 
 defeated, that Russia might be left alone to contend 
 with the immense military force of Bonaparte ; that 
 object was to divide England and Russia, and by 
 embroiling these two powers, to establish the influ- 
 ence of France over the continent by negociation, 
 rather than risk the chances of open war. Or rather, 
 perhaps, it is not too much to say, that these two 
 objects were attempted at the same time. Agreea- 
 ble to this intrigue, while our ambassador was amus- 
 ed b}^ the implied iiti possidetis, M. D'Oubriel, tlie 
 Russian minister, was induced to sign a separate 
 treaty. The terms then proposed to England were 
 advanced, and the original basis denied and ridicul- 
 ed by the French government. When the attempt 
 to separate Russia from England had failed, and the 
 treaty was returned unratified by the Emperor Alex- 
 ander, the diplomatic force of France was employed 
 in the opposite direction, and, to induce England to 
 separate herself from Russia, terms more nearly ap- 
 proaching the former basis were offered. But when 
 the British ministry (now fully awake to the designs 
 of France) had resolved not to treat but in conjunc- 
 tion with Russia, the negociation? was broken off; 
 and France, disappointed in her designs, resolved ra- 
 ther to risk a war for which she had all along been 
 making the most active preparations, than to submit 
 to a peace, the conditions of which, though honour- 
 able to her and her allies, would have marked lier 
 boundary, and provided for the permanent repose of 
 Europe. 
 
 When, therefore, you stretch the expression in his 
 Majesty's recent declaration against the Emperor of 
 Russia, " that the last negociation was broken off 
 *' upon points immediately affecting, not his majesty's 
 " oun intej^estSy but those of his Imperial ally," to 
 signify that the contest was wholly continued, " for 
 " interests not his own,'' you certainly misrepresent 
 the subject, and in imitation of the petty party jour- 
 nalists of the day, give it a meaning which it could 
 fiever be designed to convey. Although the demands 
 
44 
 
 of Russia were the immediate subjects of discussloQ 
 when the negociations terminated, the interests of 
 Bj^itain wer6 not secured. The original basis was 
 not again reverted to, and if France had agreed to 
 the terms proposed by Russia as far as they related 
 to herself, the interests of this country and its allies 
 would still have remained unadjusted. His Majes- 
 ty's declaration of 1806, on the failure of this ne- 
 gociation, contains a full confirmation of this re- 
 mark. "Inconsequence of this important event," 
 (the refusal of the Emperor of Russia to sign the se- 
 parate treaty) " the strongest assurances were given 
 *' to his majesty's minister, that France was now pre- 
 *' pared to make sacrifices to a great extent in order, 
 *' by securing peace with Great Britain, to re-establish 
 " the tranquillity of the world. Terms were offered 
 " to his majesty more nearly approaching than be- 
 *' fore to the original basis of negociation, but these 
 *' were still far short of what his viajesty had wiiformly 
 " insisted on, and was now more than ever entitled to 
 *' expect ; and the decisive rejection of the just de- 
 " mands of Russia, as well as of the conditions propos- 
 " ed by his majesty in behalf of his other allies, left to 
 " his majesty no other course than that of ordering 
 *' his minister to terminate the discussions and to re- 
 *' turn toEngland." Another paragraph from the same 
 instrument may also serve to illustrate the real cha- 
 racter of the government with which we were treat- 
 ing for peace ; and as it is the production of a fa- 
 vourite ministry, you will perhaps feel rather auk- 
 ward at objecting to its statements. After mention- 
 ing the conclusion of a separate treaty with the Rus- 
 sian minister, thedeclaration proceeds, " The French 
 " court, on the contrary, elated by this advantage, 
 *' of which it boasted as equal in importance to the 
 " most decisive victory, departed in every conference 
 " more and more widely from its oxvn offers andengage- 
 " menis. Not only did it take upon itself to change 
 " at its own pleasure the basis of the negociation with 
 ** Great Britain, but it violated, in points still more 
 
45 
 
 " important, every principle of good faith with Rus- 
 " sia. The chief inducement offered to *hat power 
 " as the price of all the sacrifices extorted from her 
 "minister, had been the presej'vation of Germamj ; 
 " yet, before the decision of Russia on this treaty could 
 *^ be known, France had already annihilated the ivhole 
 '^ frame and constitution of the German empire; had 
 " reduced under her own yoke a large portion of the 
 ** states and provinces of Germany ; and, not content 
 *' zvith this open contempt of obligations so recently con- 
 *' t.racted, had at the same time instigated the Porte to 
 ** measures directly subversive of the subsisting engage- 
 " ments with Russia.^' 
 
 The zohig administration could not then make peace. 
 Their sincerity will not be questioned, but they found 
 that no terms could be agreed upon which could 
 render that peace secure. Had it been only for Rus- 
 sian interests that the negociation was broken off, 
 that ground would have been sufficient, inasmuch as 
 it was absolutely necessary that Britain should have 
 allies on the continent to check or in some degree 
 balance the immense influence of France, and that 
 our good faith to Russia should be preserved imma- 
 culate. But our own interests were not, according 
 to that ministry, secured ; there was no frankness, 
 no cordiality on the part of France, and her con- 
 duct in pursuing a system of aggression in defiance 
 of the surreptitious treaty she had concluded vvith 
 Russia, made it evident that if England had agreed 
 to a peace with France, on the terms proposed by 
 the latter, that peace, like the peace of Amiens, 
 would, from the prevalent ambition of the enemy, 
 been only an uneasy and vexatious truce, a mere 
 prelude to another war. I am free to grant with 
 you (page 55) '' that the British ministers did not 
 "compromise the dignity, nor commit the charac- 
 " ter of the country ;" but they certainly committed 
 their own characters as negociators. Never were 
 any persons more completely entangled in the snares 
 of French intrigue, or so conveniently kept a.t bay 
 
46 
 
 until the designs of France, upon what remained of 
 independence on the continent, were fully matured. 
 But there is a more serious charge ; not only their 
 want of diplomatic skill, has been the subject of 
 public censure, but their inaction, their criminal 
 want of judgment, and the total absence of all ener- 
 gy in the prosecution of that war they found them- 
 selves compelled to continue. During the time the 
 negociation was pending, and especially from the 
 moment that the French government began to de- 
 part from the accepted basis first offered, the utmost 
 activity ought to have prevailed at home. France 
 never ceased from military preparations, — why then 
 did we half sheath the sword ? All ought to have 
 been in motion throughout the military and naval 
 departments. Transports ought to have been taken 
 up, and every disposable regiment in the kingdom 
 inarched down to the coast to have embarked at a 
 moment's notice. Either in that case the negocia- 
 tion would have been intluenced, or a firm and nu- 
 merous body of British troops would have been ready 
 to co-operate with our allies. But nothing was done, 
 but what was narrow in its principle, and injudi- 
 cious in its direction. 
 
 This is a part of your subject which you have dis- 
 patched with the utmost brevity. '* Of the part which 
 *^ Great Britain acted in this dreadful struggle, it is 
 *' not necessary to say much. The inefficacy of that 
 *' union between her and Russia, which had been so 
 " triumphantly dwelt upon, as likely to restrain or 
 " overturn the power of France, soon became mani- 
 " fest. — Debarred by her natural situation, it was 
 '' not in the power of Great Britain to assist her ally 
 ** by the aid of a single man, or even to effect a 
 " diversion of any importance in his favour ; and she 
 " thus stood a silent spectator of the additional ruin 
 *' to the governments of Europe consequent upon 
 *' the fatal rejection of the terms offered but a few 
 *■ months before by the ruler of the French." (page 
 66.) England did stand a ** silent spectator''' of this 
 
47 
 
 eventful contest, but it is to the eternal shame of 
 those who then had the command of her energies. 
 When you say that it was out of the power of Eng- 
 land to assist Russia byj^the aid of a single man, the 
 assertion is bold and unsubstantiated. It is false. 
 Russia might have been assisted, Russia had the pro- 
 mise of the British ministry to assist her, but the 
 promise was not kept. The dull negative policy of 
 that administration was a subject of reprobation at 
 the time they were in office, but the papers of late 
 laid before the parliament at their own request, have 
 rendered their condemnation complete. In October, 
 after the unfortunate opening of the Prussian cam- 
 paign. Lord Howick, in his dispatches to the British 
 minister at St. Petersburg, instructs him to urge the 
 immediate advance of the Russian armies, and '' the 
 " application of all the forces of that empire in aid of 
 " the continental warJ" In November his lordship ob- 
 serves, in another dispatch, that " the increase of the 
 " danger will animate his Britannic majesty to increased 
 *' exertions for the sake of the common caused In 
 December, the Marquis of Douglas is instructed to 
 inform the Russian court, that " the same sentiment 
 " was entertained at London as at St. Petersburgh 
 " of the necessity of combined exertion to resist the 
 " increasing danger.^' To meet these views of the 
 British government the emperor required a loan of 
 £ 6,000,000 sterling, to be repaid with interest ; 
 General Budberg alleging " the extraordinary ex- 
 *' penses which the vigorous measures in which his 
 *' imperial majesty was engaged, imposed upon him, 
 " and which could not with sufficient promptitude be 
 " drawn out of the resources of Russia." This loan 
 was refused and no other means devised to meet the 
 expense of the Russian armies. The negociation 
 for this supply was conducted by Lord Howick in 
 the true spirit of a stock broker, and afforded an 
 early proof of that niggardly spirit of economy shown 
 by the late administration, which first crippled the 
 Russian armies, and afterwards their own expedi- 
 
48 
 
 tioiis. It was a blunder only worthy of the men 
 who then managed our foreign relations, to urge the 
 rapid march of all the military power of the Russian 
 empire to fight our battles, and then to leave them to 
 absolute starvation ! In Februarj^the Russian court 
 began to complain " that the promises of England 
 " were not put into execution, and that the whoie of 
 " the enemy's forces were directed against Rrissia, 
 " at a time when Great Britain did not show any dis- 
 " position to diminish the danger by a diversion 
 " against France and Holland." These complaints 
 became louder and more pressing, and were answer- 
 ed by excuses respecting the season of the year, 
 promises of co-operation the hrst opportunity, 
 and a demand for the renewal of the commercial 
 treaty ! Lord Hutchinson, in March, in a dispatch to 
 Hovvick, strongly recommends a diversion in the rear 
 of the French, which he asserts would create serious 
 embarrassments, and oblige them to detach such a 
 number of troops as would soon leave them inferior 
 to the allies. The Marquis of Douglas also presses 
 the same subject, and observes in his dispatch dated 
 April 27, I8O7. '* it is impossible tliat I should be deaf 
 *' to the murmurs that surround me, to the expectation 
 *' of thousands. I cannot without jealousy look to the 
 possible consequences.^^ Was aid ever sent ? '* Up to 
 " this day, (June .'30,) General Budberg observes, 
 " that the diversion on the continent which England 
 "has so long proposed has not taken place." Ail 
 Europe knows the result of what the British minis- 
 try at length attempted to do. Insanity itself could 
 scarcely have devised measures more irrelevant to 
 the great purposes of the war than were adopted. 
 There was every possible motive to exertion, and 
 it was invited by the fairest prospect of success 
 the allied cause had ever exhibited. The cause 
 which was contested on the banks of the Vistu- 
 la was as certainly the cause of England as the 
 cause of Russia. England had in fact more to fear 
 from the colossal power of France and the prostra- 
 
49 
 
 tion of Germany, because France is her natural ri 
 val, and her most formidable enemy. She was there- 
 fore bound by every tie of interest and ol honour, as 
 well as by express stipulations, to have employed 
 every possible enersfy in aidinpf the only power on. 
 the continent capable of resisting France. So far 
 from your assertion, Sir, being correct, that England 
 " could not aid Russia by a single man," she might 
 have aided her with Jifhj ihonsand, if decision and 
 vigour had not been displaced by indiiference and 
 iaibecility. The great, the indispensable object was 
 to relieve Russia from the undivided pressure of the 
 French force. This mij^ht have been done by a de- 
 scent on Holland or Italy, or by a diversion on the 
 rear of the French army in Poland; where, accord- 
 ing to the opinion of Lord Hutchinson, Stralsund, 
 in every event, would have opened a secure retreat 
 to the British troops. But nothing could rouse the 
 torpidity of that ministry. Whilst they were nego- 
 ciating at Paris, they ought to have been preparing 
 for war; neglecting that till the approach of winter, 
 instead of preparing the promised expedition, so that 
 it might have been dispatched early in the season, 
 they were dreaming of frosts which were never felt, 
 and of storms Vv'hich never blew ; and at last, when 
 they began to do sometkiug^ there was no great ef- 
 fort in aid of the common cause, and the ill success 
 of their partial, divided, and useless expeditions, 
 served only to provoke the contempt of our enemies, 
 to alienate our allies, and to plunge the country in- 
 to its present embarrassment.* 
 
 * " Schemes of internal imfirovcment^^ which ministers have 7nani' 
 fested their cleterminatio7i to fiursue. — What ! when empires and po- 
 tent kingdoms in the twinkling of an eye are daily vanishing from 
 our sight — 'When, at the pointing of the great necromancer's sabre, 
 Victory conducts his legions to battle, and Dominion takes her 
 course in the direction he bids, are Ave to counteract the spell, by 
 making auditors of accounts ? Are we to avert from ourselves the 
 mighty mischief that has overwhelmed so many nations, by 
 *' improving " the law courts beyond the Tweed ? — As many "in- 
 " ternal improvements " as ministers pleascj t>ut as foundatiQ7is of 
 
60 
 
 I shall not follow you into your remarks on the 
 expedition to Copenbacfen, because it has met a com- 
 plete discussion in the British senate, and I believe 
 every man in the kingdom has made up his mind on 
 the subject. For myself, I consider it as I have al- 
 ways done — a zcise and a just measure. Jusfy be- 
 cause Denmark had ceased to be a free agent; and 
 it became our indispensable duty to wrest a wea- 
 pon of offence out of her hands which she had no 
 other option than to employ against us ; and zvi'se, 
 because by that means we have broken a second 
 time the force of a northern confederacy, and left 
 our nav}^ at liberty from watching additional hostile 
 squadrons, to defend our own commerce, and injure 
 that of the enemy. The necessity of the measure is 
 its Justification, and that necessitij has been, by the 
 debates in parliament and various political writings, 
 completely proved to the country. On this obvious 
 principle the merits of the question rests ; here it chal- 
 lenges discussion, and defies the state tricks of a dis- 
 contented opposition, who attempt to reprobate it, 
 because the vigour of its execution puts the imbeci- 
 lity of their administration to the blush. You have 
 said, in order to enhance the horrors of that affair^ 
 that it has thrown Denmark into the arms of France, 
 but she was before in the arms of France, because 
 she was completely under the power of France — 
 that the ports of Holland have been more rigidly 
 closed against our commerce ; but they have not 
 been more effectually closed since that time than be- 
 fore — that Russia has been made our enemy ; but. 
 Sir, the hostility of Russia was anterior to that event: 
 
 their fame as statesmen., in the firesent crisis of England^ s destiny^ 
 such petty objects are very trash and trump.ery. Napolean, I doubt 
 not, has his internal improvements in finance and police, but these 
 are not the things of which you hear. To place France at the head 
 of nations, and himself at the head of all conquerors, are his objects. 
 To place Kngland on the rock of security, to preserve her indepeU" 
 dencc and her honour, ought to be the leading object of her ministers, 
 Major Cartwrighes letter to Mr. Whitbready in Cobbett's Re- 
 gister, December, 1806. 
 
51 
 
 it arose from the criminal neglect of that ally by your 
 favourite ministry, by which she was reduced under 
 the power and influence of France, The papers re- 
 specting Russia, lately laid before parliament, prove 
 that this was the remote cause of the present Russian 
 war, and that the immediate cause was not the attack 
 on Denmark, for after that was known the Russian 
 government manifested an inclination to conciliation 
 with England ; but the " incalculable iiifluence " ob- 
 tained by the French over the Russian councils in 
 consequence of their victories. You have also said 
 that our conduct towards Denmark has excited all 
 Euro{)e against us. But, Sir, from what can you 
 judge of the sentiments of European states, but from 
 the state papers of powers under the immediate con- 
 trol of France, and from newspapers equally con- 
 trolled. These sources are certainly not much to 
 be depended upon. There is no organ of the pub- 
 lic sentiment on the continent. Since the murder of 
 Palm, what writer has dared to impugn the policy of 
 Napolean, or applaud the conduct of his enemies ? 
 The press there is brought to that state of submission 
 to the dictates of France, to which you, in a former 
 part of your pamphlet, appear to have wished the 
 English press to have been reduced. But, Sir, there 
 are proofs against you more unequivocal. The court 
 of Portugal has thrown itself into the arms of Eng- 
 land, this great violator of the law of nations. Swe- 
 den has not joined in the universal cry of '■^ horror 
 " and detestation.'' Prussia has declared war without 
 reproaching us ; and Austria has given offence to 
 the mighty emperor and king because she has refu- 
 sed to join the hue and cry raised by the artifice of 
 France against England. Your complaint of the in- 
 jury done to the national character and to the prin- 
 ciples of public morality, could only have weight in 
 case the injustice of the expedition to Copenhagen 
 had been proved ; but it has not been proved, and 
 we have therefore the satisfaction to conclude that 
 the national character is, up to this moment, unsul- 
 
5t 
 
 lied, and that it has suffered no eclipse from the sel- 
 2ure of" the Danish fleet. 
 
 The conclusion of your publication is as singular 
 as its general structure. In page 96; you recapitu- 
 late 3'our arguments. " If it should appear, as I have 
 *' attempted to show, that the war which began in 
 " 1803, was instigated by a few interested and un- 
 ** principled individuals, and by a spirit of animosi- 
 *' ty and rancour which blew up into a conflagration, 
 ** a contemptible dispute about the island of Malta 
 ** — that in the year 1806, peace might have been 
 " established if we had not preferred the interests 
 *' of Russia to our own, and that this cause of hosti- 
 ** lities is now removed by the treaty of Tilsit, and 
 " the declaration of war by Russia against Great 
 *' Britain — the reasons alleged in support of the war 
 " are weak and futile, and its further prosecution 
 " promises no advantages equal to the difficulties and 
 ** dangers we must inevitably incur from it, and there- 
 " fore we ought to approach the throne of the sove- 
 " reign in dutiful and loyal addresses, &c." But, 
 Sir, as far as this conclusion is founded upon the 
 viev\ of facts and arguments contained in the former 
 part of your pamphlet, it is evidently premature, be- 
 cause, as I have shown, the principles you have 
 assumed in the discussion are fallacious. You 
 have not proved the impolicy of the war though 
 you have condemned it. You have not proved 
 the disposition of the enemy to enter into and 
 to preserve the relations of amity witli England, 
 though you have asserted it. You have not prov- 
 ed the unwillingness of the British administrations 
 who have most vigorously supported the war to 
 make peace upon honourable terms, though you, 
 had denounced them the advocates of perpetual war. 
 Yourconclusion may therefore be deemed as unsound 
 in policy and as unsupported by argument as your 
 former statements. In imitation of 3^ou I may also 
 recapitulate. If, as I have attempted to show, the 
 ardent .spirit of democratical proselytism, operat- 
 
5S 
 
 ing upon the natural ambition of the French 
 people, produced an unbounded ambition, and a 
 thirst of universal dominion; — that apian of aggres- 
 sion and encroachment upon other states was laid by 
 their ablest men in the earliest periods of the revo- 
 lution, and has since been uniformly followed under 
 every mode of government, w hether republican, con- 
 sular, or imperial; — that the French revolution not 
 only overturned the political, but the moral system 
 of that country, and by destroying a sense of reli- 
 gious obligauon, gave rise to the perpetration of 
 every crime, at home and abroad, whiih wantonness, 
 cruelty, or rapine could devise, and to a system of 
 foreign policy, cunning, perfidious, and dangerous 
 to every otiier power ; the execution of which it has 
 committed into the hands of men equally base in 
 their origin and their principles, and the more d^m- 
 gerous because possessed of great talents ; — tliat the 
 peace of Amiens was broken by the aggressions of 
 the enemy, whose object in making the peace was 
 evidently to unite the advantages of commerce by a 
 peace, with foreign spoliations, which vvere com- 
 mitted with as little ceremony as in war, and that 
 the renewal of hostilities was sanctioned, " not by 
 " bands of hireling jour?iatisfs," but by the nation, 
 and the most respectable persons of all parties ; — that 
 the negociation in 1806 failed, according to the con- 
 fession of the very men who, before that time, and 
 almost ever since, have most clamorously cried out 
 for peace, because peace could not be obtained on 
 terms consistent with " national honour and security ;'* 
 that throughout the whole of the contest the enemy 
 has never manifested any serious intention to con- 
 clude a peace but such a one as would leave him fully 
 at liberty to pursue a system of aggression against 
 this country and its allies, in a word, against the 
 world: — it will th'^^n follow that to make peace with 
 an enemy of so dangerous a character, whose hatred 
 to this country has been on every occasion unequi- 
 vocally expressed, who has made it evident that he 
 
54 
 
 respects not the faith of treaties, and who is deter- 
 mined, whether in peace or war, to pursue the sug- 
 gestions of his own lawless ambition, demands at 
 least the utmost caution ; and that the present 
 hostile disposition he appears to possess, and even 
 the terms of peace he has lately obliquely hinted to 
 us, ought " to unite us more closely in the prosecution 
 " of the war, and reconcile us to make such further 
 ** sacrifices as we may yet be called upon to make," 
 (page 97.) 
 
 The great conclusions yon wish to establish are, 
 that an immediate peace is necessary for the country ; 
 that a peace may be obtained which will effectually 
 secure its true interests ; and that it is proper to pe- 
 tition the throne to open a negociation for this pur- 
 pose. But lest the history you have given of the 
 conduct and consequences of the war should fail to 
 produce entire conviction, you have endeavoured in 
 your concluding pages to enforce the subject 
 by several supernumerary considerations and ar- 
 guments; which, like a reserved corps, may be 
 brought up as occasion serves, to support the main 
 body. You endeavour first to engage the sympathy 
 of your readers on your side, by a feeling, and, I 
 will allow, well drawn portrait, of the miseries of 
 war ; next, you apply to onx fears, by stating the pro- 
 bability that in case the contest is continued, France 
 will be able to create a navy, which may completely 
 overwhelm the marine of this country, and effect an 
 entire conquest of these islands; and lastly, that no 
 string may remain untouched, you have a secret to 
 whisper to our hopes — that peace will infallibly bring 
 with it the return of commerce and wealth, and open 
 to us the prospect of the most extensive national ag- 
 grandizement. 
 
 To be unfeeling to the sufferings necessarily at- 
 tendant upon a state of warfare, would discover a 
 heart which alnsost every man would be ashamed to 
 own; but sympathetic feeling is not confmed to the 
 philosopher of AUerton, or to the party who now 
 
55 
 
 most assiduously endeavour to storm the government 
 into negociation. It is felt in as great a degree of 
 purity and power in the breasts of those who most 
 cordially approve of the measures of his majesty's 
 present ministers, and who are willing to combine 
 all their energies to give effect to the war, only to 
 secure a permanent peace, as in any body of men 
 whatever. But, Sir, there is a false sensibility which 
 hastens the evils it deprecates, and prolongs those 
 it wishesto remove. Sensibility like every other feel- 
 ing must be controlled and directed by reason be- 
 fore it can become a safe rule of action, and with- 
 out this it is rather an impulse of the blood, than an 
 amiable quality of the mind. Should the sensibility 
 of a surgeon prevent him from amputating a morti- 
 fying limb, he would release his patient from the 
 pain of the knife, only to resign him to the agonies 
 of death. It is a sound maxim which we may ven- 
 ture to set against a host of fastidious sympathies, 
 
 " Rather to bear the ills we have, 
 
 " Than fly to others that we know not of;" 
 
 and more especially when in our patient endurance 
 of these ills lies the only certain means of their al- 
 leviation. " Far be from me the idea," says M. F. 
 Ancillon in his Tableau des Revolutions du Systeme 
 Politique de L'Europe, &c. " of lessening the nat- 
 " ural horror which war inspires, and in which I par- 
 " ticipate with all the friends of humanity ! I de- 
 " sire only to prove that, in the general chain of 
 " events, good may sometimes arise from that de- 
 " structive scourge. Peace is, and always will be, 
 " the first of earthly blessings ; but a nation ought 
 " never to forget that there is an evil greater than war, 
 " it is the loss of her political independence , and of her 
 *' national existence.'' But these, you tell us, " are 
 *' the result of the fears of the weak, who, in the 
 " apprehension of distant dangers, are insensible to 
 " those which are immediately impending over 
 " them." By persevering in the contest we shall in 
 all probability '' school the navies of France to tri- 
 
56 
 
 *' umph over ourselves." This, it is true, is attack- 
 ing our fears where they are the most alive, for from 
 the moment our marine is conquered we are blotted 
 out from the nations of Europe. Fears, however, 
 of such an event I should certainly be inclined to 
 place amongst the '■''fears of the loeaky Bonaparte 
 has used every means which his own resources and 
 his influence over other powers has furnished, to 
 rival the British navy ; but every effort of this kind 
 has been defeated by the skill and courage of our 
 commanders, and the wise and vigorous measures of 
 our government. His own powerful fleets having 
 been almost annihilated, his next attempt was to 
 seize those of weaker powers, and by combining 
 them with the force of his allies in a general con- 
 federacy, to dispute with us the empire of the ocean. 
 That plan has been broken, and the confederacy de- 
 stroyed in its bud. France may build ships, hut 
 during the war she cannot fill them with seamen. 
 Not onlv her intercourse with her colonies is sus- 
 pended, but even her own coasting trade: she has 
 in consequence no nursery for seamen. These must 
 be trained by long or frequent voyages, which, 
 ■whilst the war continues, cannot be made. Peace 
 alone must replenish the navy of France, and long 
 experience render it efficient. This I confess I do 
 not regard as any impediment to a peace with France. 
 I have that confidence in the superior skill and valour 
 of British seamen, that I should feel no uneasiness 
 respecting the result of a naval engagement under 
 the best circumstances in which France could place 
 her navy, in case of a renewal of war. But if this 
 be no hinderance to peace, so, allowing your opinion 
 that it is probable France may create a formidable 
 marine should we persevere in the contest, I do not 
 think it any argument in favour of submission. 
 This cannot terrify us into a premature and a false 
 peace. Should peace bring out of her ports a navy 
 equal or superior in number to our own, we should, 
 do as we have done before, confide in the justice of 
 
57 
 
 our cause and the blessing of Providencfe to add 
 another to the splendid list of naval victories which 
 adorn our annals. Whether in peace or war, I be- 
 lieve, to use your own words, " if we are but true 
 " to ourselves, we may regard all the eiforts of 
 " France to rival us, as a maritime power, without 
 " dismay." 
 
 The prosperity of our commerce, of which, in the 
 event of a peace, you have given so glowing a pic- 
 ture, must depend wholly upon the terms of that 
 peace. lam not an advocate for perpetual war; 
 but I am an advocate for the continuance and vigor- 
 ous prosecution of the war until such a peace can 
 be obtained as will place the country in a secure and 
 prosperous situation. The next peace we make will, 
 it is probable, either sign our death warrant or se- 
 cure our privileges for ever. It is not the partial in- 
 terest of our merchants and manufacturers that is 
 now at stake, it is the interest of the empire, and of 
 posterity. That we can noia make such a peace, as 
 will secure our great interests, and preserve our in- 
 dependence and national strength unsullied and un- 
 impaired .to our children, is at least doubtful ; and 
 in the opinion of as wise, as disinterested, and as 
 patriotic characters as the natio^i can boast, impos- 
 sible. It is strange that you insist so forcibly on the 
 necessity of making an immediate peace without 
 mentioning the terms on which it is probable it may 
 be obtained. But yon wish to inspire a confidence 
 in the moderation of the Frencli government, which 
 is most sincerely to be deprecated. It is the most 
 fatal error into which we can fall, and no one can 
 more essentially injure his country than by pro- 
 moting it. With such an enemy every suspicion 
 ought to be awake. Neither the character of Bo- 
 naparte nor that of the nation he governs, in its pre- 
 sent state, is entitled to confidence. Justice and 
 honour are out of the question; interest and ambi- 
 tion alone are the principles of their conduct. We 
 can never expect a peace on terms to which Eng- 
 
 H 
 
6^ 
 
 land oiigTit to submit, until it is the interest o( France 
 to make it, and in all probability the conditions of 
 that peace will be no longer observed by the pre- 
 sent government of France, than while they accord 
 with the state of its interests or the views of its am- 
 bition. Peace with such a government, it is evident, 
 can hold out no cheering prospect to Great Britain, 
 either in its arrangements or its permanence, until 
 France imperiously feels it to be her interest to make 
 peace, and her interest to observe it. 
 
 Such a state of things I, however, think is rapidly 
 approaciiing, and, as it approximates, brings with 
 it a fairer and more enlivening prospect of terminat- 
 ing the war in a manner which may prevent its spee- 
 dy renewal. So long since as the affair of Ulm, Bo- 
 naparte observed to General Mack, that he wanted 
 *' ships, colonies, and commerce." These wants 
 cannot be now less pressing. They are redoubled. 
 The navy of France has been brought, since that 
 time, to a still lower degree of degradation ; the co- 
 lonies of France, and her dependant states, are be- 
 come more limited ; the practicability of intercourse 
 with those that remain, is rendered a mat^ter of the 
 most difficult enterprise ; and the commerce of 
 France, before too contracted to produce very fa- 
 vourable efforts upon her internal wealth, or inter- 
 nal maritime importance, has been reduced to the 
 brink of annihilation, by the unprecedented and un- 
 just regulations of her own decrees. If the attain- 
 ment of these objects be motives to conciliation with 
 this country, they operate upon France with a force 
 increased by the lapse of every year, and everyday. 
 France has enlarged her territory to an extent un- 
 known in the annals of her history : but she has nei- 
 ther secured to herself nor to her newly organized 
 states, the means of rendering that empire great and 
 prosperous. Society must, at least, assume the ap- 
 pearance of tranquillity, before industry can be ex- 
 cited to those exertions which will produce more 
 than the mere supply of necessary wants; and it is 
 
59 
 
 peace alone which, by encouraging general com- 
 njerce, can recruit the energies of countries ex- 
 hausted by revolutions, by exactions, and by war. 
 Portugal and Spain are now wholly separated from 
 tho>e cobjnies from which they derived their whole 
 support, and on which they had been accustomed 
 for ar.es to depend ; Holland is reduced to the verge 
 of absolute ruin ; France has lost the oidy medium 
 through which her foreign commerce could circulate, 
 the intercourse of neutrals; and Russia, blinded for 
 a time by councils, the labyrinths of vvhich she ap- 
 pears scarcely to have the capacity to explore, has 
 engaged in a contest in which she has every thing 
 to lose, and little, essential to her real interests, to 
 gain. Bonaparte boasts of an army of 800,000 sol- 
 diers, but not the whole of this force is able to anni- 
 hilate a single British frigate, not the whole of this 
 force can give effect to his decrees beyond the li- 
 mits of his own harbours ; and he must either be 
 content to stretch his sceptre over wildness and de- 
 solation, or give prosperity to the continent by a 
 peace which shall open the navigation of the seas, 
 and unite the interests of Europe by reciprocating 
 the productions of its soil, and mechanical skill, 
 through the medium of a maritime intercourse. 
 
 But this state of things ought rather to encourage 
 our perseverance and patience than weaken our ef- 
 forts. It cannot be inferred from this, that the time 
 is arrived when a peace with France may be made 
 with advantage. Every day's intelligence from the 
 continent proves how greatly evei'y state at enmity 
 with this country is suffering from the interruption 
 of its commerce ; but " the tyrant of the continent," 
 supported by his immense military force, has the 
 means for a time of stiffling their murmurs, and 
 crushing their resistance. He will, in the contest 
 into which he brings their sufferance with the pow- 
 er of Britain, push them to the utmost limits of en- 
 durance ; and will first try the extent of otrr pa- 
 tience and firmness, before he will relieve tJiei?' pres- 
 
60 
 
 siires by entering into liberal arrangements for a ge- 
 neral peace. We, too, must feel for our share of 
 privations, though, ftom the riches It-ft in the coun- 
 try by a flourishing commerce which has but of late 
 met any diminution, and the foreign trade we can 
 still command, we shall feel them in a much smaller 
 degree than the continental states; but it can only 
 be by a patriotic display of fortitude and persever- 
 ance on our part that the contest will be brought to 
 a speedier termination. Our navy is the only means 
 left us of offensive attack; it is the right arm of our 
 country, and must be wielded with vigour. It is in 
 reality, what the lever of Archimedes was in imagi- 
 nation, the power that moves the zvoj^ld ; but if its 
 energies require to be applied with skill, it must al- 
 so 'derive its full elfect from the operation of united 
 strength. To relax in our endeavours would not re- 
 lieve us from the operation of the blockading decrees 
 of Bonaparte, which existed before this country re- 
 sorted to measures of retaliation ; and if ever we 
 make a good peace it must be when the country 
 stands in the most menacing attitude : when it pre- 
 sents an undaunted front both to external threats, 
 and to domestic suffering. To yield is ruin, and to 
 betray impatience is to throw ourselves at the feet of 
 the enemy. 
 
 It is on this account. Sir, that I can by no 
 means agree with you in recommending petitions to 
 the throne for peace. That they have in some places 
 been promoted out of mere party motives is too 
 much to be suspected; but if we concede the good- 
 ness of their intention, it requires few arguments to 
 show their impolicy, and that they are of little weight 
 in a question of national policy. Nothing can be 
 more easy than to gain signatures to such instruments 
 from any number of manufacturers and mechanics 
 who are suffering in consequence of the war; but 
 such acts being only expressions of personal priva- 
 tions, and not the results of enlightened and exten- 
 sive views of the relations of the country, are of no 
 
61 
 
 authority in a question of peace or war. I am far, 
 very far, from thinking that the distress of our 
 manufacturers ought to be passed over without notice ; 
 on the contrary, tliey ought to fix the attention not 
 only of the government, but of the opulent part of 
 the community vvithout exception. The state of the 
 lower classes, where the pressure of the war falls hea- 
 viest, ought tobe,asfar as possible,relieved. Because 
 they are incapable of feeling the force of those mo- 
 tives which should lead a people in times of national 
 exigency to submit to sacrifices, and because they 
 are unable to submit to them, they ought to be re- 
 lieved : and I think patriotism may devise the means 
 to afford that relief. The present contest ought to be 
 supported until we can secure a peace, safe and ho- 
 nourable to thecountry; but it ought to be supported 
 by retrenching unnecessary expenditure in the state, 
 and by the sacrifices of the rich, not of the poor. 
 Had these been petitions to government for relief, 
 they would have deserved the attention of parliament, 
 and the support of the country ; but as they assume 
 to prescribe to ministers the time of entering into 
 negociations with the enemy, they bear very sus- 
 picious marks of the design of a party, operating 
 upon the feelings of the populace to effect that change 
 of policy by constraint, for which other measures 
 have been found ineffectual. In this respect they not 
 only serve the purposes of a party, but of the com- 
 mon enemy. It is known in France, that there is a 
 parry in JEngland which clamours for immediate 
 peace; that would feel little hesitation, so great is 
 their confidence in the magnanimous Emperor of the 
 French, to send a carte blanche^ and desire him to 
 write his own conditions. Bonaparte wishes to ani- 
 mate this party, to create dissention, to produce dis- 
 trust, and thus, by clogging the wheels of govern- 
 ment, to paralize those efforts by which Britain strug- 
 gles to support her independence, and to maintain 
 her honour. Did ministers wantonly withhold the 
 return of peace from the nation, the petitions might 
 
62 
 
 on that ground be defended, but of this there is no. 
 proof, except the singular one you have mentioned 
 in one part of }'our publication, that they were the 
 coadjutors of Mr. Pitt ! They have, however, openly 
 professed their sincere desire to make peace as soon 
 as it can be done with safety, and in this respect I 
 see no reason why they sliould not be entitled to credit. 
 Peace on terms consistent with the national wellare 
 would be so universally popular, that ministers of 
 any political opinions would be anxious to accom- 
 plish it as a measure which, more than any other, 
 would tend to secure the confidence and love of the 
 people, and to fix themselves securely in their ele- 
 vated situations; and, in fart, there is sometmng so 
 tempting in it, that it ought rather to be feared that 
 it may be restored to us too early, than withheld from 
 us by design. 
 
 But you have told us repeatedly that, since the se- 
 paration of Russia from our interests, " all the mo- 
 ** tives which were urged for the prosecution of the 
 " war, have ceased to operate, and that we are now 
 *' left without an ally, without an object, and with- 
 ** a cause." If so, it is certainly high time to turn 
 our thoughts to the termination of a worse than use- 
 less struggle, and to employ ourselves in something 
 more rational than a contest which has neither mo- 
 tive nor object. The late ministry by their neglect 
 of Russia, it is true, have left us without an ally of 
 importance, but the consequences of their miscon- 
 duct have not been so fortunate in leaving us quite 
 destitute of a cause. The defeat of the Russian 
 arms, and the disgust produced in the mind of the 
 Russian emperor, by the conduct of the British min- 
 isters in withholding their co-operation in the ardu- 
 ous contest in which he had been engaged, threw 
 our most valuable ally into the arms of France. 
 From that moment the principle of the war changed. 
 France and Russia both joined in the same cause, 
 and the object of that coalition was to attack, and 
 force us to renounce, our maritime rights. To de- 
 
63 
 
 fend these has hitherto been the immediate object of 
 the war since that time ; for what is the object of 
 the enemy to destroy, is certainly our object to de- 
 fend, and to preserve. The negociations Bonaparte 
 held out to ^s since that time has been therefore 
 for a " viarifime peacCy' that is, a peace in which we 
 shall renounce all interference and connexion with 
 the continent of Europe, and render our naval 
 rights and ancient maritime jurisprudence, the firm- 
 est bulwark of our safety and prosperity, the subject 
 of discussion and infringement. This, then, is the 
 kind of peace Bonaparte offers us, and these are the 
 principles on which we must commence anegocia- 
 tion if we commence it now. It remains then for 
 you who wish an immediate peace, and who blame 
 ministers for not concluding one, to say whether we 
 shall take it on these conditions? No, Sir, we will 
 not accept this basis ; we will not suffer our naval 
 superiority, the most precious gift of Providence, 
 the most valuable legacy of our ancestors, and which 
 has been confirmed to us by the valour of our co- 
 temporaries who have fought and died in our de- 
 fence, to be made the subject of negociation for a 
 moment. Thank God, if we be true to ourselves, 
 we can support the contest. Whilst our navy stands 
 unshaken, amidst the wreck of nations, our trade will 
 not only be protected, but enlarged. Difficulties 
 only call forth the resources of a great people, and 
 the resources of England are not exhausted. She 
 still possesses an extensive commerce j and her cap- 
 ital, her industry, and her enterprise, must finally 
 break down the barriers which are opposed to her 
 prosperity. Bonaparte knows this, and he fears it ; 
 and if he cannot succeed in enervating us by dis- 
 union, he is evidently prepared to acknowledge 
 those rights, against which he so loudly declaims, 
 and which we for that reason ought as strenuously 
 to defend. This, Sir, is the glorious object of the 
 present struggle, it is the object we are called upon 
 by every consideration of justice, honour, and inter- 
 
64 
 
 est, to defend. It is dear to us as the soil on which 
 we tread, as the constitution under which we live ; 
 it is the only guarantee of our independence, and the 
 only sure pledge of our future commercial prosperity. 
 //' the sea cannot be our empire^ let it be our grave. 
 « This is the xRuii positjon, this js the hjgh 
 
 " DESTINY OF OUR COUNTRY; AND NOTHliSG BUT 
 " A POLinCAL SUICIDE, A TOTAL INCAPACITY TO 
 *' MEET THE BOUNTIES OF PROVIDENCE, AND TO 
 " IMPROVE ITS BLESSINGS, CAN INDUCE US \:o HE- 
 " SITATE, FOR A MOMENT, AS TO THE COURSE WE 
 " OUGHT TO PURSUE." 
 
 I am yours, &c. 
 
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