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 WHAT FRANCE 
 
 HAS DONE 
 
 IN THE 
 
 WAR 
 
 Prepared by 
 
 THE INFORMATION BUREAU 
 
 OF THE 
 
 FRENCH HIGH COMMISSION 
 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 1919 
 
 / 
 
WHAT FRANCE 
 
 HAS DONE 
 
 IN THE 
 
 WAR 
 
 
 Prepared by 
 THE INFORMATION BUREAU 
 
 OF THE 
 
 FRENCH HIGH COMMISSION 
 WASHINGTON, D. C. 
 
 1919 
 
 » » 
 
 J J J 
 

 IS. ©f jB 
 
 NOV 5 , ' 
 
IT is customary, in speaking of France, to praise the valor 
 of her soldiers. Their heroism was a part of French tradi- 
 tion ; it has surprised no on€. The surprise began when the 
 world saw France not merely fighting with her old-time "fury," 
 but organizing her warfare and making ready for a long 
 struggle. 
 
 The part played by France in the war has been, above all, to 
 cover the preparations of her Allies. By virtue of her geograph- 
 ical situation and of historical conditions, she was the first of the 
 Allies to be prepared, the "chief enemy," as the Kaiser said. To 
 her, throughout the war, fell the task of gaining time while the 
 new armies of the Allies were being assembled, at first in Great 
 Britain, then in America. The role of France was therefore to 
 hold, until the arrival of the divisions sent by Kitchener and the 
 divisions led by Pershing. 
 
 As the war progressed, the feats of valor, of which even our 
 enemies were willing to esteem us capable, were no longer suffi- 
 cient. There developed the need of virtues not commonly re- 
 garded as French: patience, perseverance, work, unity. What 
 was the opinion of France commonly held in 1914.? That the 
 race was wearied; the industries behind the times; the nation 
 hopelessly divided by political dissensions. This was the opinion 
 held by our enemies, perhaps by some of our friends as well. 
 
 Since then the facts have spoken for themselves. 
 
 I. — France In Arms 
 Let the reader picture to himself the march of the mass of 
 the German troops in 1914 through devastated Belgium, then, 
 after the first battles, the advance on French soil. It is not only 
 a vast army, 1,500,000 men, but the most colossal assemblage 
 of the machinery of death that half a century of industrial ef- 
 fort, at a cost of billions of dollars, could create: 4,000 field 
 cannon, 450 heavy batteries, 700 heavy howitzers, not to speak 
 of machine-guns, of armored cars mounted with machine-guns 
 
and with cannon, of Zeppelins and airplanes. With this mighty 
 instrument it is planned to subjugate the world. "Paris to- 
 morrow !" the German officers cry, as they pass through a village 
 on the Meuse. Paris taken means France overpowered before 
 Russia and England can enter the conflict; it means Europe 
 dominated by terror and the world under German hegemony. 
 
 It was then that between the 6th and 12th of September the 
 French army, aided by the six divisions of the British army, 
 made its stand at the Mame and hurled back the German armies 
 of invasion. 
 
 The Marne. — After the battle of Charleroi (August 23rd), 
 General Joffre faced these alternatives: he might continue stub- 
 bornly a battle accepted under unfavorable conditions, without 
 strategic initiative, at a distance from his reserves — or refusing 
 battle, he might remove the mass of the French armies to a new 
 position at which the reserves of all France could be concen- 
 trated, and during this retreat, which would prevent his being 
 enveloped, form a new army at his left by transporting troops 
 from the east to the region of Paris, and attempt in his turn to 
 recover the strategic initiative and to envelop his adversary. 
 
 Joff re's course of action was as follows : he ordered a retreat, 
 a retreat which was disastrous because it yielded to the enemy 
 French territory, mines, and factories, but which was indispen- 
 sable because it gave us time and space and because it deceived 
 the Germans. Von Kluck pursued, engaged battle, and instead 
 of covering his right flank, risked a movement to the northeast 
 of Paris without discovering the danger that menaced him. 
 Joffre profited by this mistake to hurl the army of Maunoury 
 against the German right flank at the same time that he ordered 
 the renewal of the offensive on the morning of the 6th. On the 
 12th, after six days of desperate combat on the entire front, the 
 enemy, exhausted and fearing an irreparable disaster, aban- 
 doned the conflict, retreated from the field, and entrenched on 
 the line of the Aisne. 
 
Flanders. — But Germany was not conquered. She was to 
 renew her attacks and repeat her blows. While the French com- 
 mander-in-chief was seeking to envelop the German right wing, 
 the enemy was extending that wing and was soon to reinforce 
 it with an entire army organized in Germany. In this "race to 
 the sea," in which the French commander had the initiative, but 
 the enemy soon had the advantage in numbers, Foch, charged 
 with "co-ordinating the operations of the Allies," revealed him- 
 self as a veritable leader of composite forces. Here he was op- 
 posed to the Kaiser himself, commanding in person. William 
 II had not succeeded in making a triumphal entry either into 
 Paris or into Nancy; he now dreamed of entering Ypres and 
 there proclaiming the annexation of Belgium and of seizing the 
 maritime bases of Flanders. It was his express desire, he said, 
 that his troops should be in Ypres on November 1st. 
 
 The battle was begun on October 23rd and continued until 
 November 11th. The German offensive was launched with con- 
 siderable forces from southeast of Ypres to the sea. The British 
 divisions of General Sir Douglas Haig, with French territorial 
 divisions and cavalry, opposed a splendid resistance. Foch rein- 
 forced them successively with five French army corps. Finally 
 the offensive of the Yser was broken. In two months the French 
 army had twice arrested the progress of the German army. 
 
 1915. — Then began the long period of waiting in the 
 trenches that were dug from Nieuport to Altkirch. The French 
 army mounted guard, while Kitchener in silence prepared his 
 armies. Then, since in this year, Germany was directing her 
 principal effort against Russia, the French army, acting in con- 
 cert with the English army, took the offensive on May 9th in 
 Artois, on September 25th in Artois and in Champagne, to force 
 the common enemy to diminish his pressure toward the east and 
 to recall his divisions to the western front. It was a year of 
 waiting, of organization, of preparation. 
 
 1916, Verdun. — Disquieted by the formation of Kitchener's 
 
army, Germany decided to direct her effort once more against the 
 west. Her project at the beginning of 1916 was to annihilate or to 
 exhaust the French army in single combat before the new Eng- 
 lish armies were ready to bring aid. The German offensive be- 
 gan before Verdun on February 25, 1916, and lasted till July. 
 Never before had Germany concentrated at one point so much 
 material and so many men — a colossal but vain effort, frustrated 
 by the energy of Generals Petain, Nivelle, and Mangin, and by 
 the resolution of the sixty-two divisions which in turn came to 
 defend the fortress between February and July. 
 
 Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, could say later, 
 in the citadel of Verdun: "The memory of the victorious resist- 
 ance of Verdun will be immortal, for Verdun has saved not only 
 France but the whole of the great cause which is common to our- 
 selves and humanity. . . . 
 
 "I am deeply moved when I tread this sacred soil, and I do 
 not speak for myself alone. I bring you a tribute of the admi- 
 ration of my country, of the great Empire which I represent 
 here. They bow with me before your sacrifice and before your 
 glory. Once again, for the defense of the great cause with 
 which its very future is bound up, mankind turns to France." 
 
 The immediate result of this sacrifice was to make possible 
 the battle of the Somme. 
 
 The Somme. — The new British armies, in concert with the 
 French army, attacked in July, 1916. It is now known that 
 this offensive brought Germany to the verge of ruin and that 
 the German General Staff later admitted its material and moral 
 inferiority in the course of the battle. Moreover, it was imme- 
 diately after our victorious offensive on the Somme that the so- 
 called Hindenburg line was constructed and that the Germans 
 decided to retreat to that line rather than accept another battle 
 as costly as the one just concluded at the beginning of the win- 
 ter of 1916-17. 
 
 1917. — At the beginning of the year 1917 the Anglo-French 
 
armies were in the fulness of their power. Unfortunately, 
 owing to the lack of unity of command, several battles were 
 fought instead of one single battle. Each was glorious, but 
 none brought a decisive result. The battle of the Aisne, the 
 English offensive at Vimy and at La Bassee, the local offensive 
 at Verdun, the battle of attrition at Ypres, in which the French 
 army collaborated, the offensive at La Malmaison on October 
 23rd, the stabilization of the Italian front after the disaster of 
 Caporetto — ^all these efforts were lacking in harmony, for want 
 of unified command. It must be added that they encountered 
 stronger and stronger German resistance, the internal situation 
 in Russia enabling Germany to transfer a constant succession of 
 new divisions to the western front. 
 
 1918.— Thus in 1918 the German General Staff had at its 
 disposal 195 divisions on the western front and was soon to have 
 as many as 205. It sought a quick decision : to separate the Brit- 
 ish and French armies, to threaten Paris, and to destroy the 
 British army. 
 
 On March 21 a mass of 64 divisions attacked the British 
 ai-my, which had but 19 divisions in line and 13 in reserve. The 
 fifth British army was compelled to give ground, involving the 
 third in its retreat. Noyon was lost, Paris uncovered. On the 
 evening of the 26th the separation of the British and the French 
 was all but accomplished. 
 
 Confronted by this grave situation, the allied Governments, 
 recognizing the inefficiency of understandings between independ- 
 ent commanders-in-chief, decided to entrust to General Foch the 
 supreme command of the Allied forces in France. In less than 
 a week General Foch re-established and thenceforward main- 
 tained the liaison between the British and French armies, and 
 arrested the enemy's offensive in Picardy before it had reached 
 its first strategic objective, Amiens. 
 
 On March 27th General Pershing chivalrously placed his 
 troops at the disposal of General Foch. One division was sent 
 
into battle ; the others took up positions in defensive sectors, re- 
 placing French divisions. 
 
 Held in Picardy, the enemy immediately attempted to break 
 the British front further north, at first in the Portuguese sector, 
 then to the south of Ypres, this time aiming directly at the mari- 
 time bases. He was successfully resisted and finally checked by 
 British reinforcements and by a French army transported to 
 Flanders. By April, the front wa,s again stabilized. 
 
 But owing to the depletion of the British effectives and to 
 the lengthening of the French front by sixty miles, the numer- 
 ical superiority remained with the 205 German divisions, a 
 superiority which the American reinforcements had not yet over- 
 come, for despite the effective working of the transport service, 
 only the four divisions of the first American army corps were 
 immediately available. Accordingly, on May 27th, by a violent 
 surprise attack, the enemy reached Chateau-Thierry. The ar- 
 rival of American reserves enabled Foch on June 2nd to arrest 
 this attack between the Aisne and the Marne, and on June 9th to 
 prevent an attempt to pierce the line north of Compi^gne. 
 
 By June 15th the new front was stabilized. But the Ger- 
 mans were in possession of a good base for further attacks, only 
 fifty miles from Paris. The Allied losses were serious. To com- 
 pensate for these, Pershing arranged with Foch to place a cer- 
 tain number of American divisions provisionally at the disposal 
 of the French army, and began the organization of a first Amer- 
 ican army, speeding up the training of the troops. The Allied 
 command grouped its reserves behind the Marne and Champagne 
 front, where the indications were that a new attack was being 
 planned for an early date, and prepared a counter-offensive on 
 a front of twenty-five miles from the Aisne to Belleau Wood. 
 
 On July 15th the expected attack was launched. It encoun- 
 tered stubborn resistance on the part of General Gouraud's army, 
 and was consequently unable to profit by its slight advance south 
 of the Marne. On the 18th, Generals Mangin and Degoutte, 
 
aided by the gallant American divisions, resumed the offensive. 
 That date, July 18th, was the starting-point of the general 
 Allied offensive, which did not cease until it had gained the 
 victory. 
 
 In the Near East. — In addition to the prolonged effort of 
 France on the western front, it is necessary to recall the French 
 effort in the Near East. Besides her co-operation at the Darda- 
 nelles and in Palestine, besides the war material — rifles, cannon, 
 ammunition — sent in great quantity to Russia and to Rou- 
 mania, France sent an army of 200,000 men to Salonica and 
 maintained them there. No measure could have been more bur- 
 densome, but none was more far-sighted or more efficacious. 
 Despite the risks of navigation in the Mediterranean, reinforce- 
 ments were constantly sent to make good the losses caused by 
 warfare and by disease. Further, France collected the Serbian 
 army at Corfu after its retreat from Serbia, saved it from 
 typhus, reorganized it, equipped it, and transported it, 120,000 
 strong, to Salonica in 1916. The defection of Bulgaria was the 
 direct result of the Salonica expedition, and we know the conse- 
 quences of that defection in Turkey, in Hungary, in Austria, 
 and in Germany. 
 
 The French Navy During the War. — ^At the beginning of 
 August, 1914, nearly all the French naval units were concen- 
 trated in the Mediterranean Sea, while the British fleet was to 
 guard the North Sea, the Channel, and the Atlantic Ocean. 
 After assuring the transportation of many African troops, 
 which proved to be an efficient reinforcement in the first battles 
 of the war, the French Fleet, 20 dreadnoughts and 10 cruisers 
 strong, bombarded the Dalmatian coast (August 16, 1914), 
 shelled the Cattaro moorings (October 18, 1914), and blockaded 
 the Straits of Otranto. Then, in 1915, the concentration at 
 Corfu and the transportation to Salonica in 1916 of the 
 Serbian Army, after its retreat from Serbia, was due to tlie 
 French Navy. 
 
After contributing to the expedition in the Dardanelles, 
 and the shipment of Anglo-French troops from Gallipoli to Sa- 
 lonica, the French Navy turned to the less glorious, but no less 
 useful task of protecting against hostile submarines the trans- 
 portation of troops and supplies. 
 
 Meanwhile, it kept the Syrian harbors closed to the Germans, 
 and later on convoyed the French contingents to Palestine. 
 
 The naval demonstrations on the Greek coasts (bombardment 
 of Cavalla, August, 1916; blockade of the Greek coasts and 
 moorings at Salamis, September, 1916) finally enabled Mr. 
 Jonnart, High Commissioner of the Entente, to bring about the 
 abdication of Constantine, and to re-establish in Greece — with 
 Venizelos — ^a government free from any German influence. 
 
 The French Navy was able, besides, to send to the front the 
 naval fusiliers, who fought for two days and nights to cover the 
 retreat of the Belgian army from Antwerp to the Yser, and 
 then held up the Germans at Dixmude for twenty-six days. Two 
 thousand naval gunners and thirty thousand sailors were dis- 
 tributed among different units, and their gallantry made all 
 those detachments (and more particularly the fusiliers) as re- 
 nowned in France as the Marines are in the United States. 
 
 Finally, France took an important part in the methodical 
 struggle against the German submarines; the merchant marine 
 w^as carefully convoyed by warships and airplanes; trawlers 
 armed with cannon were engaged in the daily pursuit of U-boats. 
 This silent, endless task may be compared to the long guard the 
 Allied armies had to mount during the years of trench warfare 
 — a life of continuous risk without battles or glory ; but the ac- 
 complishment of that thankless duty contributed to secure the 
 supremacy of the seas, which finally brought about victory. 
 
 II. — The Organization of the Feench Effort 
 
 Mobilization. — It will be understood that to support so great 
 an effort upon the several fronts, France found it necessary to 
 
mobilize all her available classes. Since August, 1914, 7,500,000 
 Frenchmen have been called to the colors, one-fifth of the total 
 population of the country. The like proportion would give the 
 United States an army of 21,000,000 men. The losses have 
 been heavy. Up to November 1, 1918, France had 1,327,800 
 killed in action, dead of wounds, or missing; nearly 700,000 
 crippled and pensioned, out of 3,000,000 wounded. In spite 
 of these losses there were 3,000,000 French soldiers on the 
 various fronts and 113 divisions in France on November 11, 
 1918. It is not diminishing the part played by the British 
 or the Americans or the Italians — ^the services rendered by each 
 of these have been in many ways valuable, indispensable — to 
 conclude that the French army has constantly been the pivot 
 of all the strategic combinations on the western front. 
 
 The Indtcstrial Effort. — So formidable a military and naval 
 effort requires for its support a corresponding industrial effort 
 behind the firing line. The mobilization had taken from the 
 factories the greater part of their youngest and most active 
 workmen ; the invasion had deprived the country not only of the 
 mining district of Briey but of the rich industrial and mining 
 region of the North. Yet France, though mutilated, was capable 
 of organizing the labor of her industries in the measure revealed 
 by the following figures: 
 
 Munitions and Artillery Material. — For every 100 rifles she 
 made at the beginning of 1914, France made in 1918 29,000; 
 for every 100 machine-guns, 7,000. She has been able to furnish 
 to her Allies 1,350,000 rifles; 15,000 automatic rifles; 10,000 
 machine-guns; 200,000,000 cartridges, at the same time main- 
 taining and increasing her own armament notwithstanding 
 losses. To-day, in place of two St. Etienne machine-guns, each 
 battalion has twelve Hotchkiss machine-guns. 
 
 In this war of armament, the production of artillery has 
 reached unheard-of proportions. In August, 1914, the daily 
 production of 75-millimeter shells in the French factories was 
 
13,000 ; in 1918 it was 180,000. Their daily production of shells 
 of large caliber wais 100,000, and in particular 45,000 of 155 
 millimeters as against 200 in August, 1914. It has been neces- 
 sary not only to replace the 75's lost and destroyed, but to in- 
 crease the supply of this arm, and to furnish it to the Allies 
 (especially to the American army, whose entire field artillery is 
 at present of French manufacture). It has also been necessary 
 to create for France a heavy artillery (France has 6,000 heavy 
 guns, as against 300 at the beginning of the war), and to fur- 
 nish heavy artillery, especially 155-millimeter cannon, to the 
 Allies (Russia, Roumania, the United States). In 1918 the 
 French factories turned out each day 60 cannon of all calibers. 
 The French army alone is provided with 17,000 cannon and 
 6,000 trench mortars and light field mortars (mortiers d'accom- 
 pagnement). 
 
 TanJcs {Artillery of Assault). — Here it has not been enough 
 to improve and develop; it has been necessary to create. After 
 the English had tested the first types of heavy tanks, and France 
 had in 1917 followed their example, she turned her efforts in 
 another direction. The light tank, highly mobile, easily con- 
 cealed, armed either with a 37-millimeter gun or with a machine- 
 gun, and carrying a crew of only two men, the "baby Renault," 
 is a French conception. It has proved its worth on the battle- 
 fields of 1918 and has been one of the niost valuable arms in the 
 decisive combats. To give an idea of the industrial effort in- 
 volved, it is sufficient to say that in the spring of 1918 the pro- 
 duction of light tanks had reached an average of 150 to 160 a 
 month. 
 
 Aviation. — The aviation service also had to be created. Com- 
 pare with the 100 or more airplanes of touring type which the 
 French army had in August, 1914, the 4,000 war airplanes, 
 equipped with all modem apparatus and powerfully armed, 
 which France now has in service. The present planes have a 
 speed of 150 miles an hour and can climb to 20,000 feet in 18 
 
minutes. The giant bombing planes, furnished with 2, 3, or 4 
 motors of 450 horsepower each, carry a load of two tons, and 
 can fly for six hours at 110 miles an hour; these are the planes 
 which have bombed German cities in reprisal for the German 
 raids on Paris and other French cities. France manufactured 
 p 7,000 motors a month, many of which were furnished to her 
 
 Allies. The manufacture of planes has been developed to a 
 still higher output. 
 
 A Few Figures. — ^A few statistics will enable the reader to 
 form an estimate of the industrial effort of France. In 1914, 
 France's daily production of steel, with all her blast furnaces 
 operating, was only 13,500 tons, while th-at of Germany was 
 42,500. Moreover, the retreat of August, 1914, left in the 
 enemy's possession mines and factories, three-fourths of the 
 French resources in iron and coal, four-fifths of the French re- 
 sources in cast iron, steel, and coke. Schroeder, the President 
 of the Grerman Metallurgical Association, announced in Janu- 
 ary, 1915: "Out of 127 blast furnaces in France, hardly 30 are 
 producing cast iron; 95 are in the war zone." France set her 
 hand to the task: new mines were developed; water-power was 
 brought into service; new factories were estabhshed. The num- 
 ber of workers in her steel and iron plants, compared with the 
 number of workers before the war, and which in August, 1914, 
 had fallen to 33 per cent, had by July, 1917, risen to 173 per 
 cent. Women operatives had largely replaced the men, who 
 were standing guard in the trenches. 
 
 The Agricultural Effort. — The agricultural effort of France 
 was equal to her industrial one. The task was difficult : the peas- 
 ants formed the great mass of the army ; out of 8,000,000 em- 
 ployed in farming in 1914, 2,555,000 were mobilized. Besides 
 the needs of the army, the occupation of part of the territory 
 by the enemy brought about a great decrease in stock (10,000, 
 000 sheep instead of 16,000,000; 12,000,000 oxen instead of 
 14,000,000; 2,000,000 horses instead of 3,000,000; 4,000,000 
 
swine instead of 7,000,000). Fertilizers were lacking; tiie out- 
 put of sulphate of ammonia had fallen from 100,000 tons to 
 28,000 ; all the nitrate of soda available was used for the manu- 
 facture of powder. Therefore, 60,000 farms were abandoned 
 in France, and the war wheat crop was less than the average 
 pre-war crop. 
 
 A great effort was made: men were replaced by machines; 
 4,000 agricultural tractors are now used in France. Here, 
 again, the French women did their bit, while their husbands, 
 their fathers, their sons were in the trenches. 
 
 The output of superphosphates from Tunis and Algiers in- 
 creased from 600,000 tons to 800,000. The abandoned farms 
 were sold to new farmers, with the result that France, before 
 long, will have reached in the production of cereals her pre-war 
 figure of 90,000,000 quintals. Despite her many wounds, the 
 soil of France retains its fertility. 
 
 The Fmancial Effort of Frcmce. — The industrial and agri- 
 cultural effort could not have been sustained without a corre- 
 sponding financial effort. Notwithstanding the loss of the 
 regions of the North, which paid 25 per cent of the total amount 
 of French taxes, the citizens of France were in 1918 paying to 
 the State $50 for each man, woman, and child — a total amount 
 of $1,651,376,000, i.e., more than twice what they paid before 
 the war ($765,779,816 annually). The total war taxes have 
 given to the State since August, 1914, $4,464,220,182. 
 
 Along with this taxation, the three war loans of 1915, 1916, 
 1917 realized $5,882,935,780, and the fourth loan of Novem- 
 ber, 1918, amounted to $3,944,954,128, an average of $128 
 per inhabitant. 
 
 The sum of $4,978,333,027 was obtained through short-term 
 Treasury notes. 
 
 Allied and foreign countries loaned to France $4,711,736,880 
 
 (the United States $2,181,121,835; England, $2,303,289,358). 
 
 The Banks of France and Algeria advanced $3,562,385,321. 
 
$23,599,611,190 was thus raised, enabling France to meet all 
 her war expenses, which have amounted to $23,486,238,552. 
 
 French Women During the War, — These statements would 
 be neither complete nor fair without a few remarks about the 
 part played by the women of France during this war. In the 
 absence of all the best of her manhood, the activity of women 
 was one of the most wonderful achievements of France. The 
 French women, prepared to play their social part in the strug- 
 gle by the powerfxil feminine organizations which existed before 
 the war, were ready everywhere to do their duty. 
 
 In education, thousands of young women took the place of 
 schoolmasters or of high-school teachers (12,600 of them en- 
 deavored to fill the places left vacant by 30,000 men) ; in the 
 railroad administration they count more than 15,000; in the 
 banks, in transportation (Metropolitan and Nord-Sud subways, 
 street-cars), their work is especially successful; moreover, they 
 work in all the Government offices, including the War Office and 
 the barracks (150,000 in the army services and in administra- 
 tive work). 
 
 Women have been members of town councils. Some of them, 
 as Mme. Macherez, "the Mayor of Soissons," have struck the 
 Germans with amazement by their intelligence and their firm- 
 ness ; others, most of them teachers in the schools, became secre- 
 taries or chief clerks to the mayors, and ruled vast townships 
 with the same genius as their own home. The French Red Cross 
 is entirely organized and managed by women. In 1914, there 
 were 250,000 members, with a capital of $6,000,000 for 600 
 hospitals. 
 
 Thanks to the efforts of the Secretary for Armament and 
 the Assistant for Ammunition, women were employed in all the 
 war industries; to protect them against all risks, to secure them 
 good wages and good health, a Committee on Women's Work 
 was created, whose efforts have brought into the war industries 
 more than half a million of women. 
 
For every two women working before the war, there were 
 in January, 1918, 781 in iron works, 148 in chemical works, 830 
 in transportation, 161 in wood works. 111 in leather, 104 in 
 rubber, paper, pasteboard factories, 102 in various other trades. 
 Altogether, in agriculture, trade, administration, war industries, 
 more than one million and a half women were engaged in war 
 work. Their effort deserves the admiration of the world, for 
 their share is great in our common victory. 
 
 Conclusion 
 
 The spectacle afforded by France at war and by France at 
 work suffices to prove the vitality of the race. Who was it that 
 spoke of "the decadence of France".'^ There is both good and 
 evil in everything, and this war itself, with all its atrocities, its 
 massacres, and its devastations, will have conferred a benefit in 
 revealing the moral value of individuals and of peoples. To- 
 day France recalls with emotion all the great spirits who in other 
 lands have refused to doubt her worth, the writers and artists 
 who in her darkest hours have proclaimed their faith in her. 
 She thanks the American poet Whitman for having had the con- 
 fidence to predict in 1871 what the victory of to-day is about 
 to bring to pass : 
 
 "Again thy star, O France, fair, lustrous star. 
 In heavenly peace, clearer, more bright than ever 
 Shall beam immortal." 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
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