/ -o^-^^<*,o^ \;^^-/ -o,-^-/ ^ ' /^v;;;, \ /' ;g^'-. '*^^^^*' ,:M:, \ / fe. .%*' <.^^"- .S>- EECOITSTIlTJCTIOISr UNION: SUGGESTIONS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE NORTH ON A RECONSTRUCTION OF THE UNION. BY A CITIZEJST OF IOWA. "The unity of Government which coustitutes you one people * * » * Is a main pillar in the edifica of your real Independence. " It is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your National Union to yoar collective and individual happiness ; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual and immovable attachment to it ; accustoming yourselres to think and speak of it as the palladium of your poliiical safety and prosperity ; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety ; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that it can, in any event be abandoned ; and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link the various parts."— Tra*7i(n5ton's Fareicell Address. NEW YORK: J. BH^nD BXJH N (Successor to M. Doolady,) 49 WALKER STREKT. 1863. I h (^3 JOHN J. REED, PRINTER, 43 CEJJTRK-BTMEET, NEW-YO i>7 RECONSTRUCTION OF THE UNION. There are occasions, in the convulsive events of nations, when it becomes an i)nperative obligation on the humblest citizen, as well as it is the duty of the most exalted statesman, to become a voluntary mariner on the Ship of State, and to do the part which becomes a patriot in that capacity, in preserving from destruction the Ark of the National Covenant. It is in this capacity, as a private volunteer, that the writer comes before his fellow-citizens, and lays before them such considerations as may influence them to reflect upon the real condition of our common country, and as may lead tliem to ap])ly some effectual remedy to tlie evils which have affected it to such an extent as to have involved it in a fratricidal war, and which threatens its destruction as a nation and our ruin as a people. The writer has had some opportunities to know the sentiments, opinions, and feelings of the peoj)Ie of the South, botli in relation to the inciting causes which influenced them to revolt against the Federal Government and their fellow-citizens of the North, and in respect to the terms on which they might again be induced or influenced to unite with the people of the North under one government. It is with some hope — a faint one, it is confessed, under exist- ing circumstances — that he might contribute ever so little to bring about a reconstruction of the Union, and be the means, in ever so slight a degree, of perpetuating the blessings of free government to posterity, that the writer presents these sugges- tions to the consideration of his fellow-citizens. They are the re- Bult not only of his own observations of the working of the public mind, and of his reflections on the state of the country and our pystein of government, but what is of more importance to effect the object in view, these suggestions are a reflection of the Union sentiment of the South, and of the opinion and feelings of Southern men who still hope for a reunion of the States under one system of government. From the day on which tlic insurrection in tlie South took the form of Revolution and established a de facto government, which the people of the States that seceded formally from the Union "i-egarded and obeyed as if it were their legitimate govern- ment, it ought to have been perceived by those who were entrusted with the administration of the Federal Government, that to restore the Union as it was, or to reconstruct it upon such a basis as might be permanent, the South should become not merely a party, but a voluntary party, to any new arrange- ment designed to efiect that object. To all intents and purposes, the seceded States became, by their act of secession, and by their confederating together under a compact of their own, a new nation ; and it might and ought to have been foreseen, by the people of the States which remained, as it is called, loyal to tlic old Government, that in any attempt to restore them to tlie Union under the old compact, or in the endeavor to bring about a reconstruction on some new basis, the seceded States should be considered and treated, not as rebels, but as a people liaving as much the right to self-government as those who adhered to the old Government, or the people of any other nation. It is nothing to the pui^pose to allege that they were rebels. This may be admitted without invalidating their ab- stract right to self-government. They acted upon the presump- tion, wliich appeared to them to be well founded, that there was ;i liostility to them in the Northern mind, which manifested itself towards them, not only in the political, but, more griev- ously still, in their social relations. J3y a large portion, a decided majority, as the South thought — and as appears to have been Iho case — of the people of the North, the South felt itself to be roLMi-dcd as an unlit associate, politically and socially, with its Bcctioual neighbor. The doctrine of the "irrepressible conflict" was felt in the South to mean more than the political relations it pretended to change. The South regarded it as more formidable and repnij- nant to its rights, interests, and social condition than it appeared in its aspect to the North. To the South, it not only threatened a change of the political relations which existed till then between the North and South, but it forbode such a change in the social system and domestic economy of eight millions of people as would, in their relations to the North, throw them back centu- ries in the scale of civilization and enlightenment, and place them in disparaging contrast with, if not in real subjection to, their more commercial neighbor. Hence the alarm of the South at the favor with which the popular mind of the North received the proposition that the States of the Union must bo all slave or all free. Had the Union of free and slave States been an untried experiment, there might have been room for doubt as to whether a people like the American, having such discordant elements among them, and such diversities of inter- ests to foster and protect, could be aggregated and live in har- mony as one nation. But the experiment had been tried, and it was successful beyond anticipation. North and South had been benefitted by the Union ; both sections had prospered in the Union ; each had contributed to the happiness and pros- perity of the other, and both together had, by their united efibrts, become, in one nation, the perfection as it seemed, of human government. Was it not amazing, then, that when the experiment was proved to have been a success, of a people liv- ing so far apart geographically, yet united, and whose interests were so diverse in a pecuniary point of view, yet harmonized so as to ensure prosperity to both-— that one of the parties to this compact, which resulted in this happy state of things, should, all of a sudden, seize, as it were, a firebrand and thrust it into the edifice which gave security, protection, repose, and happiness to both ? In such a light did the South regard the annunciation of the dogma of the " irrepressible conflict ;" and when this dogma was incorporated in the so-called Personal Liberty Bills of North- ern State Legislatures, the forebodings of danger and the appre- hension of evil, with which the South was alarmed at the first 6 annunciation of this dogma, became a confirmed belief in tlie South that it was the design of the Nortli to subject the South to the moral, political, and social ideas and habits of the North, and to assimilate, malgre the laws of nature, the people of the South with those of the Korth in one system, socially, as they were one, to a great extent, politically. The South knew that such a design was not practicable, and that the attempt of the North to bring about such a state of things could end only in confusion, and if the North persisted in the endeavor to effect it, in violence and civil war. Hence the statesmen, philoso- phers, and economists of the South, seeing, as they supposed, but one means by which the evils threatened them by the attempt to overthrow the laws of nature, and to change by force their social system, could be averted, resolved to have recourse to the remedy, and apply it at once, before the danger became nearer, more menacing, and difficult to overcome. As Boon, therefore, as public sentiment in the North mani- fested itself favorably to the doctrine of the " irrepressible con- flict," by the election to the Presidency of one of the advocates of that doctrine, and the representative of all who professed it as their creed, the South felt that to save themselves their only way was to separate from those who had manifestly become their enemies personally, it appeared, as well as of their institu- tions. The excuse of the South for doing this so soon, and without v.'aiting to know what relation the Federal Government under Lincoln's Administration would hold towards them, is, that by remaining in the Union the Government would be so much the stronger and more powerful to carry into effect, in its relations towards the South, the doctrine and policy of the " irrepressible couHict." They took it for granted that an Executive who was chosen to administer the Government from the fact that he, as a I)rivatc citizen, favored, if he did not originate, the docrine of the " irrepressible conflict," would, as a matter of course, carry out, in letter and spirit, the doctrines and policy of the party by whoso votes he was made President. They therefore, instead of waiting till, as they say, it would be too late, made preparations to secure and ])rotect themselves from aggression. buch was the position of the far-seeing men of the South. A large portion, indeed a large majoiity, of the people of that sec- tion could not be Lrought to believe that it was the design or wisli of the people of the North to interfere materially with the people of the South iu their domestic relations, and they were therefore willing to give the new President a fair trial before proceeding to such extremities as to seize the forts, arms, and munitions of war located and deposited in the Southern States. This large portion of the people of tlie South became the more assured that President Lincoln would become the President of the whole people and not of the mere party by whose votes he was elected, from hearing what he had said on taking the oath of office, to support the Constitution of tlie United States. In his Inaugural Address, having, as he delivered it, the condition of the country in his mind, and influenced by the apprehensions of the Southern people of the evils which menaced them he said : " Apprehensions seem to exist among some of the people of the Southern States that by an accession of a Republican Administration, their property and their peace and personal security are to be endangered. There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the most ample evidence to tne contrary has all the while existed and be-en open to their inspection. It is found in nearly all the public speeches of him who now addresses you. I do but quote from one of those speeches when I declare that I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so." He was right in his premises. Apprehensions did exist that the property and peace and personal security of the people of the South were endangered by the accession to power of a so- called Kepublican Executive. And had the President lived up in good faith to the declaration which he then made, and the solemn assurance which he then gave to the people of the South, tiiat " he had no purpose directly or indirectly to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where it exists, and that he had no lawful right to do so," all would have been well; the insurrection would never have become the rebellion that it be- came subsequently ; the Union men of the South would have preserved the peace of the South despite the efforts of the Boceders to excite a revolt. Eut, iiiifortunatelj, tlie President thought more of the dogmas of his party than he did of the Constitution of the United States. lie Avas influenced more by the suggestions of the partisans ^vho souglit liis favor for sinister and party purposes than he was by the advice and admonitions of jiatriotic men "Nvho, seeing the danger wliich menaced the country, besouglit him to save it by removing from the public mind, as he could do, the apprehensions of coming evil. Not only did he disregard his oath to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United. States, but he acted in direct conflict with his repeatedly declared, opinion that he had "no lawful right " to interfere with slavery in the States in which it existed ; and. he violated his solemnly expressed assurance, if there be solemnity in any assurance or declaration ever made by man, that he had " no intention " to interfere with slaver}'. It seems from recent events that the secession party in the South had the proper appreciation of the President and of the party by whose votes he was elected. They did not trust either the President or his party from the first ; and by degrees, the people of the South who had remained faithful to the old order of things, to the Union and the Constitution, and even to the Administration as the head of the government, became convinced that it was not so much to restore the Union as it was to carry into practical efl'ect against the South the doctrine and policy of the " Irrepressible Conflict," that the war was prosecuted by the Administration. For, thought tiie South, if the object were to restore tlie seceded States and revolted people of the South to the Union, surely it is not by means of devastating, desolating and barbarous war the Administration would try to effect that oltject. If, indeed, it were a mere insurrection which had broken out in the South, and not as it appeared to have become soon after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln in the presidency, a revolu- tion, it might have been suppressed by the power of the Govern- ment. Put as it became a revolution involving a majority of the jicople of the seceded states in the revolt, and by degrees nearly the whole population of these states, it became apparent both to the Soutli and to a large portion of the people of the North that 9 it was not by force of arms, confiscation, rai>ino and ontra;jjcs to non-combatants, but by negotiation tliat a restoration of the South to the Union could be eflectcd, or failing in that object, that a reconstruction of the Union on some new basis could be arranged. After it became apparent, as it did to the Administration soon after the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln, that the South conteui- plated seceding from the Union, the duty of the Administration and of the party which had obtained control of the government was to have removed the apprehensions of the South, and to have given it such assurances, and if necessary to put the South entirely at its ease, to give guarantees, that the Constitutional rights of the Southern people would be both respected and se- cured, and if need be, protected, by the whole power of the Fe- deral Government. ]^o such assurance was given. No such guarantees were offered. On the contrary, the South was ex- pected to i^lace its confidence in the party which embodied in its organization every element in the Northern States hostile to the people of the South. This was too much for the North, for the Administration, for the party which had disturbed the har- mony which existed between the North and South, to expect. The South, right or wrong, it matters not for the purj)ose of the argument, believed that it was the design of the President and of his party to change the relations which had till then ex- isted between the North and South. If the President and his party meant to be understood as having no such design, no such intention, how easy would it have been to manifest this feeling by offering such constitutional guarantees as were contemplated by the Crittenden compromise ? This compromise was treated by the President and his party with contempt, and their refusal to accede to it or to any other system of adjustment which would respect the people of the South as an element of American na- tionality, compelled the South to believe, and believing to act accordingly, that their worst fears of the Administration wei-e to be realized, and that the evils they expected to befall them consequent upon the success of the " Irrepressible Confiict " party, were about to be encountered in their most apprehended aspect. Without following the course of events any further, let us 10 Cf>nic to the present condition of tlic conntiy and to existing relations between the North and South ; or if tlie reader prefers to so consider it, between the Federal Government and the rebels. The rebellion is as formidable, if not more so, as it has been since the firing on Fort Sumter. The Federal Government is no better able than it has been to pat it down by force of arms. Admitting, what it is difficult for any one of ordinary percej^tion to do, that the Administration or the Administration party det^ire or design to restore the seceded states to the Union, what can any one think of the means by which it is sought to effect this object. Force is used to compel compliance with or obedience to the authority which exercises it. Now^ what is it to which the Administration or the Administration party desires the South to comply ? "What is it to which the obedience of the South is required ? Is it to the Constitution of the United States ? It surely cannot be, since every provision of that compact which recognizes the rights of persons and of States in their relationa to tlie Federal Government, has been violated by the Adminis- tration, with the acquiescence and approval, and to a" great ex- tent, under the influence of the Administration party, including now, not only Abolitionists and Eepublicans, but hireling .Dem- ocrats. What then is it to which the South is expected to com- ply ; to what authority is it expected of it that it should be obedient? Why, simply to the will of its known enemies; to a usurped authority wliich has no more legitimacy for its uncon- stitutional acts than has the de facto government of the rebels for its existence. Here, then, is tlic position, the relation tow^ards the govern- ment and to the Korth, in whicli the South stands now. Sub- jugated it might be by force, but united with the North it never will be, it never can bo, by the sword. The South is a de facto existence in its relations to all the world; a de pire existence in the relations of the Confederate Government to the people of the South. The Confederate Government has been invested with authority by the people of the South, and this authority is obeyed as implicitly and as cheerfully by those people as any government on earth is respected and obeyed by its citizens or eubjeets. This being the case, the South must be treated as a 11 unit in any eifort to restore the Union, or to reconstruct one on the same geographical basis on wliich the old Union existed. No matter in what light the Confederate Government may be regarded by the Federal Government, or by the people of the JSTorthem States, that government holds precisely the same relations to the people of the South that the Federal Govern- ment holds to its citizens who give it their allegiance. In treat- ing with the Sonth, therefore, for a restoration of the Union, or for its reconstruction, the way to do it successfully, and the only way, is to consider and respect the South as an equal in the negotiation for that purpose. Tin's cannot be done by the sword, by war ; for the object of using the sword is to conquer, and to subdue, and compel the compliance of the people attacked to the rule or dominion of those who use that means to effect their object ; and the very fact that such means is resorted to is an evidence that the party who does so feels himself the superior in authority and power to the party whose obedience is sought to be constrained. This the South will not admit in its relations to the Federal Government. One government, no matter how comparatively few the people may be who acknow- ledge its authority, or comparatively limited in extent may be its dominion, is the equal in sovereignty with the government of the most populous nation on the globe. Russia, with ita many millions of population and its vast geogi-aphical extent, is no more than the equal in sovereignty with France, Spain, Portugal, or the minor kingdoms of Europe ; and hence it is that one nation treats with another as a unit and as an equal, just like two natural persons do who undertake to make a bargain. If the Administration, if the people of the Korth, be really in earnest in effecting a restoration of the South to the Union, or in forming a new Union on such terms as will be mutually satis- factory and mutually beneficial to both sections, the w^ay to bring it to a successful consummation, is to make a proposition to the South for a convention in which the Federal and Con- federate governments shall be equally represented, the object being to restore the people of both federations to one govern- ment. This the South will agree to, provided its rights and 12 interests can be secured and protected as tlicy once were under the Fcvieral Government. To this suggestion it will be objected by both fanatics and others interested in the prosecution of the war, that any propo- sition, looking to the restoration of peace and to the adjustment of questions at issue between the North and South, should come from the South, assuming that section of the Union to be l)oth the weaker party, the more in the wrong, and the party which is most affected injuriously by the existing state of things. All this is a mere assum2')tion on the part of the Korth, which the South will not admit. But if it were even all true that the South is the weaker party, that it is the party in the wrong, and that it is more for its benefit than it is for the aSTorth to have an end of the war, and to have the Union restored, does it follow from all this that the North has not interest enough in itself, in the future, in the Union, to make a proposition to the South ? Admitting the North to be the stronger party, as it claims to be, would it not be an act of magnanimity in it to propose terms of compromise to its weaker adversary, especially when that adversary is a part of itself, nationally ? Some will object that it would be dishonorable to the North to propose terms of adjustment to the South. How dishonor- able, and why ? Are we not fellow-citizens of the people of the South, of the same country; and are they not our brothers by all the ties which connect one people to another? And is it dis- honorable for one brother, or for a part of a family at enmity with the other portion, to make propositions of peace which would put an end to their enmity, to the slaughter of war, and restore them to their former love for one another. No propo- sition could be dishonorable which would end the infernal war between the North and South, and which would restore harmony between these people. He is little less than a demon, be him what he may in other respects, who interposes his influence to prevent the cessation of hostilities between the people of the Noi-th and South. It would be an honorable as well as a mag- nanimous act in the North to propose peace to the South, and really it is nu.re the interest of the North than it is of the South U) have peace restored to this countiy. However it may be 13 during the war, which, no matter how long it miglit last, will ho of short duration compared to the long years to follow after- wards, the North will siiffer more in consequence of this war than the South, especially if the South should acquire the sepa- rate and independent existence for wliich it "is so strenuously exerting itself. The South contains in itself elements of wealth with which the North has no comparison, and as a people, the South have that in common among them which will aggregate and combine them in one nationality. The South being out of the Union, what has the North in common to hold the remain- ing States together as a unit ? Nothing. On the contrary, the interests of the East and the West are so diverse and even antagonistic to each other that these sections will not remain, united under one government, should the separate existence of the South become an established fact. For this reason, there- fore, it is the interest of the North, at least as much as it is of the South, to have a cessation of hostilities, and to propose such terms of adjustment as cannot fail to reunite the South and North in one political system. The self-interest of the North, as well as its own existence as a unit, is at stake in the pending struggle. It can both preserve its political unity and promote and secure its prosj^erity by making such propositions to the South for a reconstruction of the Union, as should not tail to effect that object. Peace being restored, and it being agreed by both North and South, as it readily will be, that to be one peox:>le, one nation, it only remains to determine on what terms the North and South can be made one. As they exist now, in hostile array towards each other, the South claims to be the equal in sovereignty, in power, in authority, with the North. The North disputes this assumption, and has lost a quarter of a million of men and more than a thousand millions of dollars to maintain its side of the ar- gument, and to what effect ? Better to admit at once the equality of the sections in the negotiation for a new settleincnt between them, than to dispute any longer, to so little purpose as has been accomplished, about abstractions. Let each section, through its representatives, propose the terms on which a new Union might be constructed. Regarding each other as equal, there would 14 be no cause for the indulgenee of sucli feelings of superiority on one side or of subjection on the other, as might, if indulged in, prevent any negotiations for a settlement from being commenced, and any desirable result from being accomplished. Treating aa equals, neither jiarty would yield, anything to the other in dig- nity, sovereignty, equality. In the negotiation, the Federal Government and the people of the North would be one, party and the Confederate Government and the people of the Confederate States would be another, both equal in every re- spect, and every proposition looking to a satisfactory adjust- ment requiring the mutual consent of both. By this means, and on these terms, the Union could either be restored as it once existed or a new Union could be formed, which would embrace in its geographical domain most, if not all, the territorial extent of the United States as they existed previous to the Rebellion ; and the Union which might be formed now would be more lasting, because formed on a basis of experience as well as of interest, of which the patriots and statesmen who formed the old Union had not the advantage. Questions of doubt which have arisen from time to time to dis- turb the harmony of the old Union might be settled by constitu- tional compact in the formation of the new Union; and the checks and balances, which were left too much to be wielded by the caj^rice of the hour, might be connected more intimately with some department of the new Government, which should have the authority and requisite power to wield them for the enforcement of the authority of the Government, and to protect the people individually, as well as the States, in the enjoyment of their resi)ective rights. In referring to checks and balances, it might be well to consider whether the restraints placed by the Constitution upon the Executive j)Ower should not only bo more explicitly defined, and some means besides that of im- peachment provided, to both check the assumption of power by the Executive, and, if assumed, to punish the act. Under the present Constitution, it is true, that the powers, duties, and au- thority of the several branches of the Government are defined and prescribed sufliciently clear, and it is contemplated by the Constitution itself, that in case of doubt or difierence of opinion 15 between ov among tlic departments of the Government, that tlie Supreme Court shall decide. But it has been experienced that the Executive has no respect for the decisions of tliat tril)iinal when they conflict with the Executive judgment or will ; and that insteiid of conforming to such decisions, the Executive has gone on, and not only disregarded the decisions of the justices of the Supreme Court, in cases involving the rights and liberties of individual citizens, but, in several instances, imprisoned the judges of courts for having attempted to perform their sworn duties. There is, therefore, no protection from the usurpations of power by the Executive under the present ConstituLion, beyond its mere verbal inhibition, which, if disregarded by the Executive, amounts to no more than a dead letter. In any new compact, therefore, which might be formed as the basis of the reunion of the people of the United States there should be some constitutional authority given to the Supreme Court to carry into-eflect its decrees, when a conflict would arise between that branch of the Government and either of the others on the construction of the authority given to them by the Constitution, and to protect individuals in the enjoyment of their rights when infringed upon by arbitrary power. One mode of doing this might be by investing the United States courts with the appointment of the marshals, and these marshals with authority, under the direction of the courts, to carry into efiect judicial decisions. The marshals, as appointed under the existing system, feel under more obligation to disregard the order of the United States courts than they do to comply with such orders, when the decisions of the courts conflict with the will of the Executive. The defect of our present system is, that if the Executive refuse to carry into eti'ect the decisions of courts, these decisions are of no effect. A perfect system of government would not leave it to the will or caprice of the Ex- ecutive to enforce the laws, or to carry into eft'ect such a con- struction of the laws as the courts might determine. K United States marshals held their oflice during the pleasure of the judges of their respective districts, instead of holding them at the will of the President, these ofiicers would bo more likely to perform their duties in a manner more conformable to the Con- 16 stitntion, and less repugnant to their fellow-citizens, than thej do under the existing system, or than they will ever do under circumstances involving an issue between the Executive and Judiciary. Tlie experience of the day shows that power in tlie control of elective rulers is as dangerous to liberty as it is in the hands of hereditary monarchs ; and that mere verbal inhibitions or re- straints upon the assumption and exercise of power is of no more practical eifect than if the Constitution never existed. Hence, if the people of the United States would preserve that form of government which gives security to liberty and protection in its enjoyment, they must devise some means by which the restraints upon power shall be enforced, and if an attempt be mijde to break through these restraints, to punish summarily and severely whoever commits such a crime against the country and the people. Tbei'e is no security in a centralized, consolidated govern- ment for individual liberty. Hence the necessity and the utility of having power divided between the Government of the Union and the Governments of the respective States, and among seve- ral departments and different persons. Provision should be made in the amended Constitution that in all other relations, except such as arc absolutely indispensable to the well-being of the Union Government, the people should be identified with their respective States, and be secured and protected by the States in all their rights of life, liberty, and property. This, it is true, is the theory of those Governments now, but the practice of the Federal Administration does not conform to this theory. On the contrary, it violates not only the relations of the people towards the States, but its own relations, as established by law, towards the Federal Government. Mere constitutional compacts will not hold the people to- gether, no more than does constitutional restraints prevent the aBBumption and exercise of arbitrary power. There must be something more tlian the Constitution to hold the people to- gether as one nation, and there must be something else besides the restraints of the present Constitution to prevent Eepublican rulers from becoming despots and tyrants. It is not enough for 17 unite ourselves together for our mutual good." This may form a Union, but it will not preserve it. There must Le a power to preserve and pci-petuate this Union, and this power must bo created by the people, and invested by them with sovereign authority, but subject to consequences for abuse of power which would in all probablity deter any human beiug who might be intrusted with its exercise from transcending the pre- scribed limitations of its authority. A great defect of the Execu- tive Department of the existing Federal Government is that there is too much power vested in one individual, and that there is no punishment prescribed by law for the malfeasance in office of Executive officers, nor for abuse of power, nor for the assumption of power not granted to the Federal Government. Under the present Constitution, the President or any of his subordinates may, with entire impunity, commit the most fla- gitious acts of despotism. There is no law to punish them, although there is a Constitution to restrain them. This is an anomalous case. It is a general principle that no wrong can be committed that there is not a remedy to redress it ; but the Pre- sident of the United States may do wrong continually with im- punity,, and does so without any apprehensions of being sub- jected to unpleasant consequences. The Constitution provides for his impeachment, but this is like providing for the trial of a person after his death. It is of no practical utility. The Constitution says to the President, in substance, " You shall not assume nor exercise arbitrary power nor any power but that which is herein granted, and hereby authorized." But the President and other executive officers, civil and military, do, nevertheless, assume and exercise those powers ; powers which if exercised by foreign monarchs would be called by us Ameri- cans, despotic, and if exercised by their subordinates would be denounced by us as tyrannic, and there is no practical remedy but that of resistance to prevent or oppose this abuse of power. Thus are the free people of the United States left as much at the mercy of those who choose to become tyi'ants and despots as are the merest serfs living under the most arbitrary and absolute despotisms of the Old "World. To some extent this is a defect; 2 18 of the Constitution, but to a greater extent it is owing to tlie acquiescence of the people in the exercise of arbitrary power by their public servants. Tiie power reserved by the Constitution to the States and peo- ple, should be so vested as that it could be exercised when needed to check the assumption of unauthorized power by the Federal Government. It is a defect of our present system of Govern- ment, that this reserved power cannot be wielded otherwise than by means of the ballot box, and even this means is now controlled and may be still more subjected to the will of the despots at Washington, who have arrogated to themselves extraordinary power. The State Governments ought to be strengthened with more power than they possess, and they ought to be invested with authority over Federal officials who might be influenced to depart, by their acts, from the line of duty prescribed by the Constitution and laws. So should the construction of the Federal Government itself be remodelled so as to divide the powers of the Executive between tAvo persons at least, and give each section of the Union a repre- sentation in the Executive Department of the government, as well as in the two other departments. It might be so provided, constitutionally, that both the President and Yice President should not be elected from the same section of the Union, the sec- tions being understood to mean the non-slaveholding States on one side, and the slaveholding States on the other. That while the appointing power should remain, as it is now, in the President, the Vice President should be invested with a veto, as well on acts of legislation as on executive acts of the President to such an extent, and in such cases as would give security and j^rotec- tion to the interests of the section of the Union which the Yice President might specially represent. The Union, it cannot be denied, is as much a Union or nation of sections, as it is of States ; and if there be a propriety, as there is, in having States represented in one branch of the Federal Government, and the people hy districts in two branches of it, there is no less propriety and utility in having the distinctive sections represented in the Executive Department. To a great extent this is done already, by the practice of the executive in 19 selecting cabinet officers, and in consulting with them on the administration of the Federal Government. But the President is not bound to either consult these officers, or to be advised by tliem, much less to be controlled, restrained, or influenced by their will or judgment in any way. The executive powers are all invested in the President ; and though practically he cannot of himself perform all the executive duties, and though the most important of these duties are performed by subordinates who are not responsible for their acts to either the government, the people, the States, or the sections of the Union, these func- tionaries are not known to the Constitution, and the President alone is presumed to be the executive head of the government, the others being mere clerks or secretaries of the President, without any executive will or judgment but such as the Presi- dent chooses to permit them to exercise. To all intents and purposes the executive duties are performed by several persons. It only needs that the executive powers be divided to conform powers and duties to each other, and vest the former by law in the same individual who is required to perform the latter. The reorganization of the executive branch of the Govern- ment might restore the Union and preserve it for ages. It can never be restored as it was under the Federal Constitution as it exists. The Constitution must be changed or the Union will cease to exist, not only as between the North and the South, but as among the States of the North after the South shall be either subdued or have acquired a separate existence. The interests of the different sections of the Union, the sections of the Pacific coast and the great West, as well as of the North and South, have become too diverse, and even conflicting with each other, to be entrusted to the care of one executive head. These sections as much need a representation in the Executive De- partment of the government, with Constitutional authority and power to protect their respective interests, as such a representa- tion is necessary to their well being both in Congress and in the Supreme Court. To effect this object, besides providing that the President and Yice President should not be elected from the same section of the Union, as distinguished by slaveholding and non-slaveholding States, the new Constitution might provide 20 that the Union be divided into sections or divisions, correspond- ing in number, either with identity of local interests among con- tiguous States, or with the number of necessary heads of executive departments. Each of these sections embracing as many contigu- ous States as may have local interests in common, and distinctive from the other States, should be invested witli the right to elect one of the heads of Executive Departments ; and it might be so provided that after the first election, each section or division of States should take its turn in electing the head of a specified Executive Department. By this means, every distinct section of the Union would be represented constitutionally in the Execu- tive branch of the government, and every section would in its turn elect the head of each department. It will be objected to this proposition, that such a division of executive power would weaken that branch of the government ; but a careful consideration of the construction of the most powerful governments will show that there is no force in the objection. Practically, as we have noticed already, the execu- tive powers of our own government are divided among several persons, and the executive duties performed by heads of depart- ments. It is so also in Great Britain, where, although the Queen is the nominal executive, the executive powers are really divided among several ministers of state, who are required to act in harmony in the performance of executive acts of govern- ment. It is not the Queen even who makes appointments to oiOSce, but the chief ministers of the crown. The objection, therefore, without going any further for proofs, that the Execu- tive branch of tlie government would be rendered inefficient, or weakened by dividing the executive power among several per- sons, has no great force. The proposed change of the Consti- tution would be little more than conforming the theory of the fundamental law to the practice of most governments including our own, and adopting as a principle in the fundamental law a system Mhich has been found to be both useful and necessary in practice, and which, if recognized as a principle, might be the means of preserving unity of government among the American States. Our Government system was designed to be one of checks 21 and balances, so constructed that while every function of Go- vernment conld he performed by either the Federal or State Governments, no function of Government should be exercised to the prejudice of even one individual, much less of whole communities and of States. But it was impossible for mere human foresight to perceive that such a combination of circum- stances would occur as to be beyond the control of the Constitu- tion by which the Federal Government was established. Ko mere human conception, inspired as it may be by patriotism and en- lightened by statesmanship, could have thought that within a cen- tury after the American people had acquired independence as a nation, and liberty as individuals, they would succumb to a domestic despotism and tyranny a thousand times more grievous in its effects than that which they had thrown off by the vio- lence and sacrifices of war. ]N"or could it enter into the minds of our patriotic ancestors that the example of heroic virtue set by the first President of the Republic would so soon be brought into contrast with the repulsive vices of one of his not very remote successors. It is true that history had presented similar contrasts, but it was under diflerent circumstances. As there was no parallel to that of the colonists in acquiring independ- ence as a people, and establishing for themselves and their pos- terity the most perfect system of government the world had ever experienced, it never entered into their conceptions that their posterity would become so degenerate and debased as to suffer this perfection of government to be subverted by those who might in time to come be chosen to be its administrators. No provision was made by them for such a contingency, and, in this respect the system of government is defective, but it is owing more to the depravity of both the people and their rulers, than it is to any very radical defect of the system itself, that our government has proved a failure. But as experience has impressively and dearly taught the American people, that men void of moral principle, may be elevated from among them to the highest places of trust, honor and power, and that these bad men may in the exercise of power subvert the very institutions of government they were elected to preserve, protect and de- fend ; and as they know also by the same exj erience that self- 22 interest will influence many persons to favor the most flagitious acts of despotism and tyranny, it becomes tlieir bounden duty, wbile tliere remains any vitality in tlie Ilej)ublic, and patriotism among the people, to make an earnest efix»rt to preserve even a portion of constitutional law as a principle of government, to se- cure even a remnant of personal rights, to establish as inviolable principles, that violators of law in high places as well as am.ong the commonality, shall be held amenable for their crimes, and that it is a crime second only to treason and be made punishable as such, for any oflicer of the government to violate the Constitu- tion, or the rights of persons recognized to be sacred in the peo- ple by that compact. By such modifications in the fundamental law as are herein proposed and by others which experience will suggest to be use- ful, a re-union of the States can be eifected, the blessings of a republican form of government and a constitutional system of government will be secured to the American people, and the personal rights and individual liberty which it was the endeavor of our patriot ancestors to purchase for posterity by their lives and nurture by their heroic toils and sacrifices, will be protected in tlieir fullest enjoyment, and once more we shall have a union of States without conflicting sections, a government of authority without despotic power, a country which every American can jn-oudly call his own. It is a principle as sound as Truth, and as ajjplicable to one section of the Union as it is to another, that the Union cannot be sundered and national life exist in each of its severed parts. It must be preserved in one to secure to the people of the North at least, the rights of liberty. If left to perish, American na- tionality will become extinct forever except as it might exist in the slaveholding States ; and the security of individual riglits and protection in their enjoyment will depend upon the limited power of States, which will become weak the moment they become sundered from one another. The States will become antagonists for supremacy tlie moment their unity is broken. States Eights in the Federal Union is the equilibrium between the rights of the people and the powers of the General Government ; but with- out the Union, States cannot preserve their Sovereignty nor se- 23 cure the people in the enjoyment of their rights of person and property. The Union is strong in proportion to the perfection of Sovereignty in the States joined together in Union, so will the States become weak, and in all probability their Sovereignty be- come extinct, should the Union be dissolved. Let it therefore be the endeavor of the American people to preserve the Sove- reignty of the respective States, and the Union of these States under one government, whose power will be co-omnipotent with its duty, and whose duty it will be to give security and pro- tection to both States and people in the exercise of their rights and functions, and not to become an instrument of desjDotism and tyranny in the hands of ambitious or partisan rulers. With such a government the American people will be able to enjoy the gifts of Providence bestowed upon them in a vast extent of country, in the richness and variety of the productions of its soil, in its incalculable wealth of minerals, and in the salubrity of its climate, "Without such a government America will be- come what Asia is, wealthy in everything but in freemen to enjoy, as man should, the blessings of Providence. H132 74 562 ■p. ^■^' |: \f :«^ %j^ =»: Xf f»^ .\-4. • <'"^' .,. "'f '•■■' *<" ... % ••■ ^. lOv, .. .-:-,,.,• -40. • -."1 -rj ■,.■,• „_ •