Qass. Book_ i P [€a\lcQt mxts ^t^oal etfttion. W ELEMENTS OF LANGUAGE GENERAL GRAMMAR. GEORGE PAYNE, LL.D. LONDON : JOHN GLADDING, 20, CITY ROAD, AND HAMILTON, ADAMS, AND CO., 33, PATEKNOSTEK-EOAV. 1845. [Price 25. Gd.] PREFACE. The object of the writer of this book has been to supply what he trusts may prove, for the present at least, a desideratum of which the want has been long felt. There are extant, indeed, even in our own language, several learn- ed and able treatises on the principles of lan- guage and general grammar ; but, for the most part, they are contained in large and expensive works, to which comparatively few persons have access : while none of them are precisely adapted to the class of readers for whose benefit this work is designed. In publishing this book, the author has sought to benefit that large and rapidly augmenting class, especially of young people who, to a com- petent acquaintance with the principles of their own language, seek to add the knowledge of those great general principles on which all par- ticular grammars are founded. The reader must, therefore, especially observe that the present work, not being a compendium of English grammar, does not seek to supplant any of those excellent treatises on that subject which have VI PREFACE. deservedly won so much favour with the public. It assumes the mastery of such a book as '^ Murray's Grammar/' especially its syntactical part ; and it aims to carry the reader forwards into regions of philosophical inquiry upon w^hich it was not the province of that excellent writer, or any of his coadjutors, to enter. The author hopes the present work will be found not un- suited to the higher classes in our superior schools — to intelligent and inquiring young people in general — and to the junior students of our various colleges in particular. The work, it is hoped, will possess additional interest to many w^hose opportunities for reading are not extensive, from the account it gives of the opinions held by many eminent writers on some of the more difficult subjects upon which it treats. At a trifling expense, and with a small expenditure of time and labour, the reader may put himself in possession of the sentiments of numerous authors, while the wa'iter will use his best efforts to show, amidst such various and conflicting opinions, which of them are most worthy of general reception. Western College, Dec. 1842. CONTENTS. Definition of language Subdivision of language PAGE 1 ] I. NATURAL LANGUAGE. Strictly so called^ — Examples How its signs are formed . How interpreted .... Less strictly so called^ — Examples Classification of the signs of both Modifications of the features Gestures of the body Modulations of the voice 1 2 2—3 3—5 5 5 6 7 II. CONVENTIONAL LANGUAGE. Character of its signs Why called converdional Why called artificial . Division of its signs 7 7—9 9 9 SPOKEN LANGUAGE. Consists of artificial sounds Wisdom of employing them 10 10—11 WRITTEN LANGUAGE. Its signs ........ 12 Classified 14 Class 1. Signs significant^ pictures, hieroglyphics, &c. 14—16 Class 2. Signs arhitrary^ Peruvian knots, written characters, &c. 16 VUl CONTENTS. Class 3. Signs of things, and signs of sounds The difference between them How the characters are read Chinese characters ..... PAGE 17 17 17—18 18—19 Possible varieties in Characters denoting sounds. Verbal characters Syllabic characters Alphabetical characters 20 20 21—24 THE ORiaiN OF LANGUAGE. First, of spoken language How supposed to have arisen Arguments in support of its divine origin Second, of TVTitten language Probably di\dne .... 25 25 26—31 32 33—35 THE OBJECT OF LANGUAGE. First theory — communication of thought . . 35 Second theoYj — production of thought . . 36 Both considered and harmonized . . 35 — 39 THE CHARACTER OF LANGUAGE. First opinion — is affirmative Second opinion — is imperative Both examined . 39—40 40 — 42 40—43 GRAMMAR. Proper definition of Other definitions examined Considered as an art and a science general and particular 43 43—44 44 44—45 CLASSIFICATION OF WORDS, OR PARTS OF SPEECH. Principles of classification .... 45 — 46 CONTENTS. Home Tooke's, Harris's, Hurwitz's Common division of the parts of speech PAGE 46—48 48—49 NOUN. The word itself — import 49 Whether the noun and adjective distinct . 49 — 51 Kinds of Nouns, Particular nouns General nouns Origin of general terms Nature of general ideas Concrete nouns Abstract nouns 51 52 53—55 55—58 59—60 60—62 Accidents of Nouns. Explained 63 Numbet\ Various definitions examined What it is How many numbers .... What nouns only are capable of change Methods of denoting it . . . 63—65 64 64 65—66 66—68 Gender. Explained 69 The genders which words should have . 69 — 70 Principles on which gender has been given to names of neuter objects 70 — 72 Modes of denoting it . * . . 72 — 73 Case, The strict meaning of What it denotes Ancient account of cases 73 73—75 75—76 CONTENTS. The different cases considered Nominative Genitive Dative and accusative Vocative Ablative PAGE 76—90 76 77—79 80—83 84—85 86—89 THE ARTICLE. Its object illustrated .... The limitation a and the are conceived to effect How explained by Harris The does not itself define Difference in this between a and the . Anomalous use of the English definite of the Greek Statements of Moses Stuart More than two articles 90—92 93 93—94 95—96 96—97 97—99 99—100 99—101 101—103 THE ADJECTIVE. Its name Its significance Its object and effect Apparent anomalies Whether it should vary with noun, &c. Degrees of comparison What they denote How many Are modes as well as degrees the number of the 103—104 . 104 105—109 109—110 110—111 . 112 . 112 113—116 116—118 THE PROXOUX. What the name denotes 119 The personal pronouns are names of relations, therefore nouns .... 119 — 124 Their origin 124 Why they have number .... 124—125 Anomaly 125—126 Whv the/;'.s'^hassex 126—128 CONTENTS. XI PAGE Other pronouns .... Relative pronouns .... Different accounts of . . 128—130 . 130 . 130—136 Explained . 133—136 THE VERB. Its name, import, office, &c. . 136—137 Is a copula All verbs may be resolved into is^ &c. . . 137—138 . 138 Character, &c. of the substantive verb . . 138 Harris's account of examined, &c. . 138—146 The Tenses of Verbs, Their origin Explained General division into past, present, and futi justified . 146—147 . 147 are, . 148—150 Capable of subdivision Principles of division .... The aorist . 151 . 151 . 151 No aorist of the present . 151—155 Divisions of past time .... . 156—157 Aorist . 158 Definite . 158—159 Imperfect ..... Perfect . 159 . 160—163 Pluperfect .... Divisions of future time . 164 165 166 Aorist . 166 Definite . 167 Imperfect .... Perfect . 167 . 168 Modes of forming the future Explanation of 57z«/Z and z^Jz'ZZ Not used indiscriminately . . 169 . 169—170 . 170 Meaning in the different persons . . 170—172 Tenses of the subjunctive . . 173 Present ..... . 173—175 Imperfect .... Perfect and pluperfect . 176—177 . . 177 Xn CONTENTS. Number and Person. PAGE Why supposed to belong to verbs . . 178 — 79 Terminations by which they are expressed . 179 Number, &c. not essential to language . . 180 Moods or Modes of Verbs. What they are thought to denote . . . 181 Definitions by Crombie, Harris, Britannica, &c. 181 — 182 What modes of verbs are . . . 183 — 184 Whether resolvable into the indicative . . 184 Crombie's account of mode and tense consider- ed . 185—187 The number of modes 188—189 The infinite considered .... 189 Proved to be a noun 189 — 191 The Voices and kinds of Verbs. Diiferent forms not necessary ... 193 Transitive and intransitive verbs . . 194 Common doctrine incorrect . . . 194 — 195 True doctrine 195—196 THE PARTICIPLE. From what it derives its name 197 Harris's account of .... . 197 What essential to it 198 Two participles ...... 198 Incorrectly designated 199 — 203 Statements of Harris, Crombie, Britannica, &c. 202 — ^204 Whether the participle occurs in active verbs 204 — 208 THE ADVERB. Derivation and import of the name . . 208 The purpose of the adverb . . . 209 Its necessity and use . . . . . 209 May be fragments of other words . . . 210 CONTENTS. Constitute now a part of speech Opinions of Tooke, Britannica, &c Shown to be incorrect Character oi yes^ and no How resolved by Tooke PAGE 211—212 211 212 212 213—214 CONJUNCTIONS AND PREPOSITIONS. Harris's account of their nature . . . 214 — 215 Shown to be incorrect .... 216 — 218 Proof that they have a meaning . . 218 Are derivative words 218 Tooke's account of their derivation . . 218 — 220 Harris's account examined .... 220 — 223 Derivation of prepositions .... 224 Particles of other languages . . . 225 — 226 Ours denote relations .... 226 — 229 Difference between conjunctions and prepositions230 — 232 Prepositions denoted first relations of place . 232 — 233 Afterwards general relations . . . 233 THE INTERJECTION. Meaning of the term For what purpose employed Tooke's account of them Dewar's statements 234 234 234—235 235—236 ERRATA. Page 32, 4th line, /or Mayee read Magee. — 81,5th and 3rd lines from bottom, /br Isecit r^a^laesit. — 88, 2nd line,/br pelleo read palleo. — 93, 2nd line, /or affect i^ead effect. — 94, 4th line from bottom, for I'eception i^ead per- ception. LANGUAGE GENERAL GRAMMAR. The word Language, derived immediately from the French " langue,' and that from the Latin " lingua^' a tongue, must denote, in its true and proper sense, certain articulate sounds by which thought and feel- ing are expressed or enunciated. By a very natural and easy extension of its meaning, it is, however, made to comprehend any means whatever — any signs, addressed either to the ear or to the eye, by which the wants, or wishes, or conceptions of one in- dividual may be made known to another. Understood in this generalized sense, language admits of subdivision into the two great classes of Natural, and Artificial or Conventional, language. NATURAL LANGUA&E. The first class, viz. natural language, includes, strictly speaking, only those visible and audible signs of internal feeling which are prompted by nature, or which are the results of physical constitution. That signs of this description exist is undoubted. Thus frowning is indicative of displeasure ; weeping of sorrow ; laughter of joy ; trembling of fear. The I NATURAL LANGUAGE STRICTLY whole of these signs^ as well as others of a similar character, are made instinctively^ or, as it would per- haps be more correct to say, they are the natural and visible effects upon the body of the states of mind referred to, and betoken their existence, as languor and bodily emaciation bespeak the presence of disease. The signs, accordingly, accompany the first occurrence of these mental states. They can- not properly be said to he made^ for they are not the results of volition. We weep, and blush, and laugh, and tremble, or turn pale, not because we have seen others weep, &c. ; nor to develop the mental feeling, for that we often wish to conceal ; and the tell-tale sign appears to our annoyance and confusion. The whole of the signs of this description result, then, from the influence of certain mental states upon different parts of the animal frame. It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the existence of the sign, and the interpretation of it. It may be made, without being intei'preted, instinctively. And this we believe to be the fact of the case. To us, it ap- pears as certain, that a person who had never laughed or trembled himself — who had never seen others laugh or tremble — and in whose mind a connexion had not been formed, by the great principle of association, be- tween the mental feeling, and its visible sign — would be as unable to understand the meaning of laughter or trembling itself\ as the meaning of the articulate sound, or of the written characters, by which the joyous and the painful feeling are denoted. Why should instinct be given, and thus wasted, to unfold the meaning of a tear, or a frown, when observation AND I^OOSELY SO CALLED. O and experience would do it with equal certainty, and almost equal speed ? I am aware, in expressing the opinion that no signs are instinctively interpreted, that I have to en- counter the high authorities of Mr. Stewart and Dr. Brown. The latter refers us to two signs, whose meaning is, he conceives, unlocked without the key of observation — a mother's smile, and a mother's frown. It is admitted that these signs are more likely than any other to possess the character ascribed to them; yet I cannot think that even they actually bear it. The mere infant is obviously in- capable of distinguishing between the meaning of the two. Its powers of observation must be roused be- fore it can do this ; and then the first thing observed is, that mamma's smile is followed by a sweet caress, (or by some action which is the direct source of plea- sure to the child,) and mamma's frown by a gentle pat ; and thus a connexion between the sign and its meaning is established at so early a period, that we are apt to think that the former is instinctively un- derstood. But, if God has thus sufficiently provided for the interpretation of the sign, it is unphilosophi- cal to suppose that he has thrown away an instinct to unfold its meaning. In addition to these^ which are natural signs strictly so called, there are others which, by a little extension of the meaning of the term, may be included in this class. They are such as common sense would lead men, ignorant of each other's language, to adopt, when b2 ^ DIVISION oral communication is impossible. Of this character is bending the head forward in token of assent or ap- probation ; and shaking the head as a token of dis- sent and disapprobation. A motion of the hand to- ward the body indicates a desire that a person at a distance shonld approach ; a contrary motion, a wish that he would recede, or remain where he is. " The Indians, of the American continent, incline their head, for a moment, on their hand laterally, to de- note sleep, and repeat the sign according to the num- ber of nights. To indicate combat, the clenched hands are held about as high as the neck, and five or six inches asunder, then waved two or three times laterally, to show the advances and retreats of the combatants ; after which the fingers of both hands are suifered to spring from the thumbs towards each other, as in the art of sprinkling water, to represent the flight of arrows. The practice of kissing the hand to a person in token of respect — originating, probably, in an idea that the gesture signified a wish to convey by the hands a salute to the person to whom it was addressed — seems to have prevailed generally, and at an early period of time." It is al- luded to, as an expression of religious adoration, in the book of Job : " If I beheld the sun when it shine d, or the moon walking in brightness, and my heart hath been secretly enticed, or my mouth hath kissed my hand ; this also were an iniquity to be punished by the judge ; for I should have denied the God that is above." The whole class of natural signs, consisting of those OF NATURAL SI&NS. O which are strictly^ and of others which, as we have stated, are more loosely^ so denominated, has been subdivided into modifications of the features, gestures of the body, and modulations of the voice. Class. I — Modification of the Features, These result from a play of the muscles of the face, corresponding with the fluctuating feelings of the mind. It is a well known, though inexplicable, fact, that all powerful mental feelings and actions do in this way affect the countenance, so that the face be- comes an index of the mind. The particular muscle affected, and the particular manner in which it is affected, constitute a natural sign, in the strictest sense of the term, (for it is the result of our consti- tution,) of the internal feeKng. The scowling eye the indignant frown, mark with precision what is passing within. The placid look, the composed mien, the benignant smile, give universal pleasure, because they are regarded as indicating benevolence and happiness. It is in consequence of this natural action of strong feelings upon the muscles, that the passions which we habitually indulge, and also the intellectual pur- suits that most frequently engross our attention, by strengthening particular sets of muscles, leave traces of their working behind them, which may be per- ceived by an attentive observer. Hence, too, it is, as it has been justly stated, that " a person's coun- tenance becomes more expressive and characteristic 6 FIBST AND SECOND CLASS. as he advances in life ; and that the appearance of a young man or woman, though more beautiful, is not so interesting, nor in general so good a subject for a painter, as that of a person whose character has been longer confirmed by habit." A familiar acquaintance with these significant modifications of the features is essential to the paint- er and the statuary. It is the foundation of the science, if such it may be called, of physiognomy. It may be useful also to the orator, and it will add to the eloquence of the pulpit. Class II. — Gestures of the Body. Melancholy is displayed by the sinking of the head, and the falling down of the arms. Joy, by the elevation of the former. Eagerness, by stretching the head forward. Pride gives to it a stiff and erect posture. Merriment, as we have seen, is indicated by laughter ; fear by trembling. All these, and many other variations of gesture, are the involuntary re- sults of passion. They are the effects of the opera- tions of the mind upon the body, and thus develop what is going on in those hidden chambers of the heart, to which the eyes of others have no access. It is said that in Rome "the exhibition of dramatic action, or the art of pantomime, without the accom- paniment of words, was a common amusement ; and that the audience were never at a loss to follow the action through all its parts.'' By the use of natural language of this kind, also, savages and dumb per- CONVENTIONAL LANaUAGE. i sons are able to hold considerable intercourse with each other. Class III. — Modulations of the Voice. This class of signs consists of certain cries, such as, Oh ! Ah ! Alas ! &c., uttered involuntarily, under the influence of any of the stronger passions of our nature, and which observation quickly renders intel- ligible to the mere infant. It is diflicult to say to what extent, by means of the whole class of natural signs, intercourse might be carried on among those who were destitute of conventional language; probably to a greater extent than we are ready to imagine . yet still such signs must be inadequate to our wants, as intellectual and moral agents. Man has thoughts and feelings which language, even in its present enlarged and perfect state, cannot fully express ! How then could natural signs have been made commensurate with his neces- sities? To supply this essential defect of natural language, we have, secondly, ARTIFICIAL OR CONVENTIONAL LANGUAGE. The signs employed in this kind of language are, for the most part, arbitrary — not being instinctive expressions of thought and feeling, nor prompted by common sense, as adapted in themselves to teach the meaning they convey. Other signs than those which are actually employed might have been fixed up'on. 8 \VHT CALLED CONVENTIONAL. In the case of natural language, no sign but trem- bling could express fear ; but in conventional language tlie articulate sound, man, or tbe characters, m, a, n, might have been made to denote it. Hence we find that, in other languages, both the sound, and the characters, which designate fear, are different. This kind of language is generally and very properly called conventional^ because the signs it employs — having no meaning in themselves, i, e. no adaptation to suggest any thought or feeling — obtain their meaning from convention, or agreement. TThen an Englishman utters the articulate sound, horse, his countrymen are aware that he refers to a certain animal, because the inhabitants of this country have virtually agreed that that sound shall be the sign of a horse. But a Frenchman might not be aware of its import, because a similar agree- ment does not exist, between the two nations, as to the meaning of the sign. I must not, however, be understood to intimate that the language of paradise originated in conven- tion, — that Adam and Eve agreed together that certain signs should signify certain things, and that, as the result of this convention, when either of them, at a subsequent time, made a sign, the other under- stood its meaning. No one who adheres to the literal and grammatical sense of the Bible can believe this to have been the case. The remarks just made were meant rather to unfold the nature of conventional language, than to assert its origin; and yet, it deserves to be remembered, that, with WHY ARTIFICIAL. \) the single exception of our first parents, the know- ledge possessed by all nations, and all men, of the meaning of arbitrary signs must be traced, virtually at least, to convention. God gave to our first parents both the signs, and the knowledge of their meaning, (which indeed was, in their case, the same thing,) by miracle ; but the immediate descen- dants of Adam gained their know^ledge of the meaning of these signs as we do in the present day. And there can be no fountain but convention or agreement, from which the meaning of the multi- plied and varied signs to denote the same thing, which exists among his posterity, could flow. Conventional language is, also, called artijicialy because its signs are not, for the most part, signifi- cant of the meaning they convey. And, as the term conventional might be conceived to favour the notion of those infidels who imagine that man was originally a savage — that language, even in the case of the very first of the race, was of human invention — perhaps artificial or arbitrary might be the better term by which to designate it. Conventional or artificial language comprehends the signs employed for the purposes of communica- tion both when persons are present with, and when separated from, each other. The collection of signs employed, in the former case, are articulate sounds, and, in the latter, arbitrary characters. To this circumstance we owe the division of conventional language into the two branches of "spoken" and 10 SPOKEN LANGUA&E. "written language/' to each of which we must direct some attention. SPOKEN LANGUAGE. The actual signs by which intercourse is car- ried on among persons who are present with each other are, as we have said, articulate sounds. The adoption of this kind of signs, though highly expe- dient, was not absolutely necessary. A set of arbi- trary signs consisting of gestures, or motions of dif- ferent parts and members of the body, might have been fixed upon as the means of communication. The sound angel now denotes a certain being, or class of beings ; a finger^ jpointing upwards^ might have been constituted the sign of the same being: and, in that case, the latter sign would have an- swered the purpose as effectually as the former. Great wisdom, however, has been developed in the choice of articulate sounds rather than gestures as the means of intercourse in the circumstances now supposed, for, in the First j)lace^ we can obtain from this source a greater variety of signs than from the other. That natural and inimitable instrument — the human voice — is so constituted by its divine Author as to be susceptible of articulate modulations in an almost endless variety ! It would be difficult, or rather impossible, to multiply gestures to the same extent. In the Second place, they are made with greater facility ITS SIGNS. 11 and rapidity than the others. Suppose an attempt were made to substitute gestures for articulate sounds, we should have to encounter the primary difficulty of devising gestures sufficiently various and abundant to meet the necessities of the case. Every part and member of the body must be laid under contribution to accomplish this. And, then, there would be the secondary, and more impor- tant, difficulty of using, and making others tise, these gestures, in conversation ! Who would not pity our inveterate talkers, (though talkers they could not then be called,) every limb and every muscle in rapid and incessant action ! How toilsome ! why, the " chat" of a day wou]d be worse than the labours of Hercules ! The motion of that little member, the tongue, over which we have the most perfect physical control at least, effects the object with incomparably greater ease. And then, who would be content to substitute " the human voice di^dne,'' with its infinite and graceful varieties, for the dumb show of gestures, and the grimace of pantomime ? Thirdly, they may he employed in various circum- stances in which signs, consisting of gestures, would he unavailing , Darkness must put a stop to all communication by the latter mode. The interven- tion of a wall or screen, or any thing which hid the persons from each other's view, would produce the same result ; nay their presence in the same apartment would not, though they were in close neighbourhood, avail, if the eye of either should 12 WRITTEN LANGUAGE. wander for a moment from the other party, in the conversation. WRITTEN LANGUAGE. Since mutual intercourse, when persons are to- gether, is carried on by means of articulate sounds, there exists a broad line of distinction between what is hence called spoken and written language, de- signed, as the latter is, to perpetuate that intercourse when the parties are absent from one another. To the nature of this kind of language, especially as de- veloped in alphabetical writing, we now proceed to di- rect attention. Writing or written language consists of certain signs addressed to the eye instead of the ear. They may be, as they have been, impressed upon a variety of substances,* as leaves, the bark of trees, * " The material on which writing was made, differed accordmg to its occasion and object. When the object was some public memorial, as the inscription of remar- kable events, eras, or laws, the material chosen was of a durable order, such as stone, wood, or metal. Thus, the first example of writing, on record, was on stone. This was that of the two tables of the moral law. From a passage in chapter xix. of the book of Job, it appears that men were, in his time, accustomed to write on plates of lead, to cut inscriptions on a rock, and to use an iron style. The laws of Solon were inscribed on wood ; the laws of the Romans, on plates of brass ; and, from the number of the plates, they were called the law of the twelve tables. For similar purposes, it was common among some ancient nations to write on bricks and flat stones ; and we are informed by Herodotus, that the Babylonians inscribed on bricks their astronomical obser- vations ; the bricks being at first in a soft state, and, after the inscription was made, hardened by fire. For WRITTEN LANGUAGE. 13 paper, and parchment ; and then, by the transmis- sion of the substances on which they are impressed, common and temporary uses, the bark and the leaves of trees were employed, particularly those of the palm tree. Hence " liber" became the name of a book, and we speak of the leaves of a book, and of folios. For more lasting uses, the skins of animals were very early employed. From the earliest times we find them dressed and pre- pared for various purposes. In the book of Exodus, it is stated, that the people of Israel used them for the covering of the tabernacle ; amongst others, skins dyed red are mentioned ; and it has been noticed, as a singu- lar fact, that one of the old manuscripts of the law, which Dr. Buchanan received from the black Jews in India, was written on goat skins, dyed red. In the interior of China, also, the roll on which the law is written, used in some of the synagogues, is of goat skin made into flexible leather, dyed red in a similar manner. The Mexicans used skins for their hieroglyphic painting ; and, in the Bodleian Library at Oxford, there are two books of hie- roglyphics of the same kind. Linen cloth was common in very early ages. " I will not," said Abram to the King of Sodom, " take from thee a thread of the woof even to the latchet." Rebecca is said to have covered herself with a vail. Joseph had a coat of many colours ; and Pharaoh arrayed him in vesture of fine linen. Linen manuscripts are accordingly mentioned by various au- thors. Some are found at present ; and Livy makes mention of linen books. These various materials soon came to be so manufactured as to be well fitted to their design. When writing was generally employed in the ordinary business of life, materials of a still more artificial kind were adopted. Among them was the papyrus of Egypt. Paper was afterwards made from various sub- stances. But almost every material for writing intended to be preserved, yielded at length to the use of parch- ment or vellum. For less important purposes various materials were adopted. We find, for example, tablets ; and these made often of thin pieces of wood. Some- times the letters were made in the wood itself; at other times on wax covering the wood. Sometimes tablets 14 FIRST CLASS, OF ITS SIGNS. they may become the medium of communication be- tween those who are separated by distance, or time. The signs capable of being employed in this species of language are various. They may, however, be di- vided into significant and arbitrary ; signs of words, ^. e, of articulate sounds, and signs of things. Class I. Consists of such as are naturally significant, or adapted to unfold their own meaning. Of this class we may reckon, jPz>5^, Pictures, or delineations of external and visi- ble objects. The picture of a horse is a significant sign of a horse ; and, if it be the case that writing was of human invention, pictures there can be little reason to doubt must have been the first rude specimens of that art. It is said that when America was dis- covered this was the only sort of writing practised were covered with a substance, like chalk, which could easily be rubbed off. From these tablets the writers transferred their composition into the more durable form of parchment books. To such tablets various passages of the scripture refer. Thus Isaiah receives this com- mand, " Go, write it before them on a tablet, and note it in a book ; that it may be for the time to come, for ever and ever." So Paul desires Timothy to bring with him " the books, but especially the parchments." Dr. Shaw mentions, that in Barbary the children were taught to write on a thin piece of wood, covered over with whiten- ing. In India children are seen writing lessons on the ground strewed over with fine sand : hence you find in the scripture allusions to writing in the sand or on the earth to mark that which would be " forgotten or blotted out." Macgill's Lectures^ pp. 71 — 74. FIRST CLASS. 15 in the kingdom of Mexico. By historical pictures the Mexicans, it is affirmed, transmitted to memory the most important transactions of their empire. Secondly^ Hieroglyphics belong, also, to this class. It is important to remember here that the characters employed in this mode of writing are not diverse from those of the former class; i, e. they are still pictures of external and visible objects. The difference is not in the character, but in its mean- ing. In picture writing, the pictures, which constitute the characters, mean the objects of which they are delineations. In hieroglyphic al writing they mean something which is invisible, — of which no pictures can be drawn, but to which Ihe visible objects, directly represented, are supposed to bear some resemblance or analogy. In the former mode of writing, the picture of an eye would mean an eye; ^. e. would be intended to denote an eye. In the latter mode it might mean knowledge, of which an eye is supposed to be an emblem ; or Providence, w^hich watches over us with sleepless care. In Egypt this mode of writing was much studied, and brought into a regular art. It was in hieroglyphi- cal characters that all the boasted wisdom of the priests was conveyed, or, as it would be more cor- rect to say, locked up. It should be noticed that the signs in picture and hieroglyphical writing are manifestly not arbi- trary. No sign for a lion, for instance, could, in the former, be employed but the picture of a lion ; nor, in the latter, could any sign for eternity be 16 SECOND CLASS. used, but the picture of a circle, or of some visible object to which eternity bears, or is supposed to bear, some analogy. Class II. Consists of arbitrary signs, ^. e. such as denote objects to which they bear neither resemblance nor analogy. To this class belongs the mode of writing practised among the Peruvians. Intercourse among them was carried on by means of small cords of dif- ferent colours, with knots of various sizes, and differently arranged , — the cords, colours, &c. bear- ing an arbitrary and conventional signification. In the same class must also be arranged the written characters of most modern nations. They are arbitrary signs, obviously destitute of meaning, and understood only by agreement. Our object here is merely to exhibit the nature of language, or it might be proper to describe the process by which pictures and hieroglyphics might at length sink — and, indeed, could scarcely fail of sinking — into arbitrary characters. To abridge labour, successive parts of the original character might be omitted, till by these repeated curtail- ments it became a merely arbitrary sign. The difference in written characters which it is, however, of the greatest importance for the reader to observe, is that which exists among those which, with the view of exhibiting them in contrast, we place in the next class. THIRD CLASS. Class III. 17 Consists of signs of things and signs of words, i.e, of articulate sounds. Of the former description are the pictures, hieroglyphics, and symbols of ancient nations, and the written characters of the Chinese. To the latter belong the alphabetical characters employed by all Europeans, as well as by the most civilized nations of antiquity. The difference between these two kinds of signs is obvious and radical. The articulate sound made by the utter- ance of the written characters m, a, n, is a direct sign of the thing or being man. Such also is the case with the picture of a man; it means a man. But the characters themselves (m, a, n,) form together a sign not of the being man, but of the sound man. The sound and the picture both mean the thing or being ; the characters mean the sound. And it is because alphabetical characters mean nothing but sounds, i. e, are the signs or indications of sounds, and of sounds only, that it is possible for a person ignorant of the Latin language, for instance, to read a book written in that language without understanding it; i. e. without gathering from it any knowledge of the things or subjects on which it treats. And, when it is said he can read the book, the meaning is that he knows and can form the sounds which the characters indicate ; but, being ignorant of the meaning of these sounds, i, e, not knowing of what things or ideas they are the signs, he utters them as a parrot might do, without 18 CHARACTERS HOW READ. any conception of their meaning. We shall suppose that the commencement of Yirgil's deathless song lies before him: he looks at the characters, the letters, and words which meet his eye; he under- stands them (which, if the characters were Greek, he might not do), i, e, he knows the articulate sounds of which they are the constituted signs. He utters them, " Arma virumque cano." He has now read the passage. He has got all the meaning from the characters which they possess ; but the meaning of the articulate sounds he knows not. He has read the book — at any rate the passage — as we are in the habit of saying, though somewhat incorrectly, without understanding it. It is not intended to deny, however, that, after the great principle of suggestion, or, as it is more commonly called, association, has linked the thing, the articulate sound, and the written characters, in indissoluble bonds, the latter may directly recall the thing or idea without the intervening links. Our object has been rather to explain the nature of alphabetical characters, or the precise purpose they answer, than the secondary information we may now derive from them. We have said that the Chinese written characters are signs of things and not of words. All who have written upon the subject are agreed on this point, though opinions have differed on the question whether they were originally merely arbitrary marks, or founded upon some resemblance, or fancied resemblance, between the sign and the thing signi- CHINESE CHARACTERS. 19 fied. Each character, by universal testimony, re- presents a thing or an idea, no !: an articulate sound. It has been thought to be an a Ivantage, consequent upon this circumstance, that a Chinese book may be read or resolved in Greek, Latin, French, or En- glish, &c., as well as in Chinese. It would be more correct to say that a Chinese book cannot be read at all. To read a book is, as we have seen, to give to the characters which meet the eye the articulate sounds of which they are the signs. Chinese characters, not being signs of sounds, but of things, may be understood, but, correctly speak- ing, cannot be read. A written language formed on the principle of the Chinese ought to possess as many distinct characters as words. It is a curious fact, in refer- ence to the Chinese, of which no satisfactory account has been given, that the former greatly exceed in number the latter. According to Sir George Staunton, its words do not exceed 1500, while its characters amount to 80,000, making at an average 50 cha- racters to every word. This circumstance cannot fail to occasion great ambiguity in oral communica- tion ; and it frequently obliges persons^ as we learn, in conversation, to write or di*aw the character, to re- move the ambiguity — the very reverse of our process : we talk to explain writing; they write to explain talking. With such a language, requiring so great an amount of labour (though less than was once imagined) to gain a knowledge of its characters, the Chinese cannot well be otherwise than dwarfs in c2 20 VERBAL AND SYLLABIC CHARACTERS. general attainments. Indeed it would scarcely be going too far to say, that, without alphabetical cha- racters founded, as we shall presently see, on the analysis of compound sounds, no nation can attain to intellectual eminence if it should be fortunate enough to escape barbarism. Of the kind of signs which indicate sounds, not things, alphabetical characters, as it has been stated, constitute the most perfect, if not the only specimen. Now, with a view to obtain a just conception of their nature, the reader is requested to observe, that of written languages, formed on the principle of employing characters to denote sounds, not things, there are three possible varieties. It is not said that we have, in any existing language, perfect specimens of these varieties ; it is enough for our purpose that they might exist. I shall take the liberty of calling them the verbal, the syllabic, and the alphabetical characters. In the first variety, single characters would be employed to denote what we call separate words, or compound sounds, denoting single things or ideas, or classes. Thus there would be a single character to intimate the whole articulate sound mankind. In the second \ariety separate characters would be employed to denote not whole words, as before, but syllables, or parts of those very compound sounds of which words consist. Thus there would be two characters to denote the compound sound mankind ; the one a sign of the sound man, the other a sign of the sound kind. ALPHABETICAL CHARACTERS. 21 In the third variety separate characters would be used, not as formerly to express whole or separate words, or even syllables, but simple elementary sounds. Thus there would be seven characters to denote the whole compound sound mankind. The first variety are verbal characters; the second, syllabic; the third, alphabetical. Now it must be observed, that the alphabetical mode of writing is formed on precisely the same principles with the syllabic, the only difference being that it carries these principles to a point much nearer perfection. Syllabic characters suppose and proceed upon an imperfect analysis of sound. Alphabetical characters imply and require a perfect analysis. Let us take the word to which reference has been made more than once already — the word mankind. It is manifestly a compound sound. A superficial analysis might permit us to suppose that it consists of two elementary sounds, i. e. the sound man and the sound kind. A closer investigation, however, shows us that even these latter sounds, both of which are syllabic sounds, are capable of a still further analysis ; and, extending our investiga- tions beyond them, to all the syllables of the lan- guage, we find them compounded of a few elemen- tary sounds, which, combined as they are capable of being in a vast variety of different ways, form that immense number of articulate sounds of which the spoken language of the country consists. When our analysis is complete, and we have ascertained the full number of elementary sounds, we appropri- 22 ALPHABETICAL CHARACTERS. ate to each of these sounds an arbitrary mark which constitutes its sign ; and the entire collec- tion of these arbitrary marks, or letters, as we call them, we denominate an alphabet ; the word being derived from AX0a and Bera, the first and second letters in the Greek alphabet ; and we further say of a nation, whose language is constructed upon the principle of employing arbitrary characters as signs of its simple elementary sounds, that it adopts the alphabetical mode of writing. Now there are one or two points to which the reader's attention must be especially directed before we leave this part of the subject. The first is the beautiful simplicity of the alpha- betical mode of writing. It may be well to point out here the progressive steps by which the ultimate simplicity is secured. The first, in conception, — i. e, for we do not intend to assume the human origin of the art of writing — is the adoption of characters to represent sounds instead of things. All European languages are on this account simpler than the Chinese. The next step in the process would be the adoption of syllabic instead of verbal characters; for, as there are fewer syllables than words in every language, by proceeding on this principle the number of arbitrary characters, always burdensome to the memory, would be considerably reduced. The next and final step would be the adoption of alphabetical instead of verbal characters ; since the number of elementary sounds in all lan- guages falls immensely short of the number of ALPHABETICAL CHARACTERS. 23 words, and eveu of syllables. Indeed no language contains more than from twenty to six or eight- and- twenty. To obtain tbe knowledge of the power of the letters which are adopted as theii* conventional signs, both singly and in combination, is a work attended with little difficulty ; and that knowledge being attained, a key to the vocal utter- ance of all the words in any language is put into the hands of the student at once. The second remark regards the extreme subtility of analysis which is developed in alphabetical writing. Letters, i, e. arbitrary or conventional signs of sound, (for the sounds themselves are not letters, though this nice distinction between the sound and the letter is not always preserved,) in- dicate either vowel sounds or consonantal sounds. The former are distinct and perfect elementary sounds capable of being uttered by one impulse of the breath ; and, therefore, the letters which designate them are called vowels ; the word being derived from vox, a word, or sound. Consonantal sounds, on the other hand, do not seem to be fall and perfect elementary sounds. They are rather parts of sounds — elements of elements, — ^if we may so speak. They are incapable of being articulated without the aid of a vowel sound prefixed or affixed. Hence the letters which desig- nate them are caUed consonants, i. e. letters sounded with a vowel. How extremely minute and subtile then must be that analysis which, not satisfied with going down to simple sounds, makes an attack even 24 THE ORIOIN OF upon these, and attempts at least to resolve articu- late speech into elements of elements. Such an analysis manifestly requires a profound knowledge of articulate speech, and a perfect acquaintance with the nature and power of those organs which it brings into exercise. Whether the invention of alphabetical characters lies within the compass of unassisted human power will be considered here- after. THE ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE. In the hasty view we have taken of the nature of language, both spoken and written, z. e. of articu- late speech and alphabetical characters, we must have seen enough to fill us with admiration of the beautifiil yet simple processes (beautiful because they are simple) which they develop for the communica- tion of human thought and feeling. The inquiry can have scarcely failed to suggest itself, " Is lan- guage, in either of these great divisions, of human invention .^ or were men taught the method of thus communicating with each other by their Maker ?'' It is impossible, in a treatise of this kind, to avoid considering this question ; though, as it is not adapted to throw much light upon the general prin- ciples of language, we may be as brief as possible. Nothing, however, can be done with effect without instituting a separate inquiry concerning the two general divisions of language. We begin with SPOKEN LANGUAGE. . 25 THE ORIGIN OF SPOKEN LANGUAGE. Many ancient and modern writers of great cele- brity maintain, that, though all the faculties and organs requisite for the forming of articulate speech were of course given as constituent parts of the human constitution, man was not apprised by any special revelation of the invaluable treasure he possessed in them, nor prompted in the use of them ; that all is to be ascribed to human ingenuity, or that articulate language is of human origin. They cannot, indeed, state when, and by whom, sounds instead of gestures were constituted the signs of thought and feeling ; but, in the absence of all his- torical light on this point, they set themselves to show how our ancestors may, by successive steps, hsbte attained to this most perfect method of effect- ing an intercommunion of thought and feeling. It has been supposed, then, that in the very in- fancy of society men would put forth an effort, under the prompting of necessity, to communicate to each other their wants and wishes; that to effect this they would first employ those natural signs of thought and feeling of which we have spoken — variations of gesture, modulations of the voice, &c. ; that when any particular noise distinguished any object to which they wished to direct attention, they would attempt to secure their purpose by imitating that noise by the voice ; and finally, that the effort to do this might suggest to some mighty genius among 26 NOT OF HUMAN ORIGIN them the possibility of employing the various articulate sounds which the voice is capable of utter- ing as the basis of conventional language, adapted to express all the variety of human thought and feeling. Now, it will be observed, that this hypothesis rests upon, or requires, the following assumptions : — First assumption^ That men had been collected together yand society formed ^previously to the existence of language y — at any rate before the existence of any means of communication except natural signs^ the possession of which scarcely elevates man above the brute. The very point affirmed is, that language is the result of compact, agreement, or convention. Such convention implies association and society — the association and society of numbers. Till man has ceased to be a solitary animal, there can mani- festly be no conventional language. But how can he cease to be such without language ? How could society be formed previous to the existence of lan- guage ? or, if formed, how, without the intervention of speech, could it be held together ? This is one horn of the dilemma on which the advocates of the human origin of language are tossed. But there is another ; since the hypothesis is burdened with the Second as smnption. That the first men were savages; for what but savages could they have been with no means of communication but such as are inferior to those which Hottentots, before missionary enterprize had elevated and refined them, enjoyed ? Indeed that man was originally a savage, many writers, deeply PROVED BY EXPERIENCE. "27 tinctured with infidelity, who advocate the hypothesis under examination, admit. Lord Monboddo, for ex- ample, supposes that at first his features were those of a monkey, and that he possessed the appendage which distinguishes that animal ; but tha.t education gradually improved his features, and at length ex- tirpated his tail ! It is surely not too much to say, that a man must he the very animal of which his Lordship speaks to believe this. "We may credit it, perhaps, when we see education placing horns upon the head of the horse, and removing them from that of the cow. Few men would even venture to hint at a sup- position so ineffably absurd as that of Lord Mon- boddo ; but aU who deny the divine origin of lan- guage do and must believe that the first men were savages. To disprove this assumption is, therefore, to overturn their hypothesis. For this purpose I appeal, I. To the evidence of experience. The following summary of facts is chiefly taken from Dr. Doig's "Letters to Lord Kaimes on the Savage State," a book which we should be happy to see more gene- rally read and studied than it is at present. Firsts The more populous and extensive kingdoms and societies were civilized at a period prior to the records of history. The presumption, therefore, is, that they were civilized from the beginning. Secondy None of the nations that were savages or barbarians at the period of their first appearance in history, have ever been known to move one 28 PROVED BY EXPERIENCE. step forwards towards a civilized state till impelled by some external circumstances. " The original savages of Greece were tamed by the Pelasgi^ a foreign tribe, and were afterwards farther polished by Orpheus, Cecrops, Cadmus, &c., who derived their knowledge from Egypt and the East. The ancient Romans, a ferocious and motley crew, re- ceived the blessings of law and religion from a succession of foreign kings; and the conquests of Rome at a later period contributed to civilize the rest of Europe." "We infer from these facts, that, if the first men had been savages, the whole human family — there being none to civilize them — must have been savages now. Thirdy No people that were once civilized, and who afterwards degenerated into barbarism, have ever recovered their pristine state without foreign aid. The inference still is, that, if originally savage, man would have been savage still. Fourth^ There appears in savages a rooted aver- sion to a civilized state. So strong is this aversion, indeed, that the Gospel only can subdue it. Greece and Rome, it is true, retained civihzation without the Gospel, but who shall say that they 6>Z>tained it without the aid of its powerful though indirect in- fluence ? This fact furnishes a strong presumption that, left to the efforts of their natural genius alone, men, if originally savage, w^ould not have arisen from the degradation of their primitive state. Fifth, Civilization, and improvement of every kind, have always been carried to the highest pitch of BY SCRIPTURE. 29 perfection in large cities and populous societies. In savages the social appetite never reaches beyond their own tribe or horde ; and is, consequently, too weak and confined to dispose them to unite into large communities. Had the whole race, therefore, been at one time in a savage state, no nation could have attained to any degree of civilization. II. I appeal to the evidence of Scripture. Here it wiU be unnecessary to enlarge. None but an in- fidel can believe that our first parents were savages. Their moral, if not intellectual, elevation above their degenerate posterity is written as with a sunbeam in the volume of Divine revelation. Hence, w^hen that great moral revolution takes place in the cha- racter of men which restores them to the Divine image, they are said to be renewed in the spirit of their mind. And, if the first men were not savages, they must have had language. We regard this as an irresistible conclusion from the premises ; it is, however, supported by certain statements of the inspired historian which go directly to prove that of this distinguishing feature of our race they were not destitute. Adam and Eve are said to have conversed, and thus to have held intercourse with God. The former, as we are told, gave names to the animals ; i. e. he uttered articulate sounds, pro- bably under especial Divine guidance, which were to constitute the arbitrary signs by which they should in future be distinguished : in other words, language is of Divine origin. It may be well, before we proceed, to explain the 30 LANGUAGE OF DIVINE last assertion a little more precisely, as the state- ments of several writers on this point are involved in considerable obscurity. Dr. Shuckford, who con- tends " that the origin of language was from God/' seems to understand no more by these words than that God gave to Adam an understanding to form notions of things, and a power to utter sounds which should be to him as names for them. This expla- nation is obviously defective. Had no more assist- ance than Shuckford supposes been rendered to Adam, we might with equal propriety ascribe the origin of painting, or any other art, to God. Again, we have been told that " the power of speech, and the use of speech, were from God.'' By " the power of speech" must be meant, I presume, the organs of articulation. " The use of speech" are words of very doubtful import ; and the two phrases together express less than they ought to have done. It seems to me manifest that the power of understanding, as well as of employing, speech must have been from God : in other words, that a Divine impulse rested upon the minds of our first parents prompting them, when they first sought in- tercourse with each other, to utter certain articulate sounds, and that the same impulse which prompted them to utter these sounds unfolded their meaning. Third assumption. The hypothesis of the human origin of language assumes that it is within the power of savages to invent articulate speech. In- deed, the advocates of this hypothesis are involved in a double dilemma ; for, if language be of human NOT HUMAN ORIGIN. 31 origin, the first men, not possessing it, must have been savages ; but if they had been savages, they could not have invented language. The common argument against the human origin of language ap- plies with double force here. It could not be the invention of children, for they are incapable of in- vention; nor of adults, for they are incapable of speech. It is a well known fact, that sounds to which adult persons were not accustomed in infancy, are imitated by them with extreme difficulty, and indeed are sometimes never completely mastered. To conceive of an adult savage, who has never uttered articulate sounds — whose organs of speech are inflexible to a degree of which we can have but a very feeble conception, and ten thousand times more incapable of forming those nice and delicate modulated sounds which articulate speech employs than his limbs of being moulded into the graceful positions of the dancing master — is to conceive an absurdity. Indeed, one of the most powerful advo- cates of the hypothesis is compelled to admit that the invention of language " is too difficult for the savage state of man, — that, though placed originally in a solitary and savage state, men must have asso- ciated for ages, and have carried on some common work, and even framed some civil polity, and have continued for a considerable length of time in that state, so as ultimately to gain such powers of ab- straction as to be able to form general ideas, before language could possibly be formed !" Now, "whether such theories, in supposing a mute convergence from 32 ORIGIN OF WRITTEN LANGUAGE. savage barbarism to reflecting civilization, and a continued association without an associating tie, prove any thing more than their own extravagance, it is,'' says Dr. Mayee, "for the reader to judge." THE ORIGIN OF WRITTEN LANGUAGE, OR OF ALPHABETICAL WRITING. Assuming it to be of human origin, many persons endeavour to trace its gradual progress through the successive steps of picture writing, hieroglyphics, arbitrary characters, till the invention was brought to perfection in the discovery and adoption of alpha- betical characters. Now, if the question were put, " Is it beyond the power of man, without Divine assistance, to take these successive steps ?" we should reply that no doubt can exist with respect to either except the last. Considering the proneness to imitation which distinguishes man, it may be readily conceded that his own ingenuity would prompt and enable him to draw rough sketches of any visible objects to which he wished to lead the thoughts of others ; that some of these sketches or pictures would, in process of time, be used as hieroglyphics (vide p. 15), thus giving an en- larged extent of meaning to the only signs he pos- sessed ; that, being difficult to form, these pictures, by successive curtailments, prompted by the desire of ease and expedition, might lose, at length, all re- semblance to the objects, and thus unintentionally degenerate into arbitrary signs; and finally, that FACTS IN PROOF. 33 when this change in their original character had taken place, other arbitrary signs, to render the language more complete, might be added to them. All this, we say, may be readily conceded. There ■ is nothing impossible to man in the steps now de- scribed. The difficulty lies in the succeeding ones ; in the first of these which effected the important transition from signs significant of things to signs significant of sounds ; and preeminently in the ulti- mate step which originated alphabetical writing by adopting arbitrary characters not to denote words, i.e. compound sounds {vide p. 21), which would in- volve less difficulty, but elementary sounds ! This is the paramount difficulty involved in the alphabe- tical mode of writing, — this the astonishing invention which it develops, — an invention that eclipses by its splendour all those of modern times ! We cannot but think that these considerations throw great probability upon the opinion that alphabetical writ- ing was the direct gift of God to man. This probability is strengthened by two or three important facts which claim attention. Firsts The five books of Moses are acknowledged to be the most ancient compositions, and to exhibit the earliest specimens of alphabetical writing which have come down to us. Now these specimens present the art in a perfect state, since it seems " impossible to make any real improvement upon the Hebrew alpha- bet." How, then, is this remarkable difference be- tween the art of writing and all other arts to be accounted for P How is it to be explained, that 34 FACTS IN PROOF. while their first specimens were uniformly rude and imperfect, alphabetical writing attained its ne plus ultra at once ? Admit that it came from God, and the fact receives a full explanation. Deny this, and it remains unaccountable. Second, All the alphabetical characters in the world may be traced up to one common origin. " The Europeans derived their knowledge of letters from the Romans, the Romans from the Greeks, the Greeks from the Phoenicians, who, as well as their colonists, the Carthaginians, spoke a dialect of the Hebrew scarcely varying from the original. Indeed all the languages in use among men that have been conveyed in alphabetical characters have been the languages of people connected either immediately or remotely with the Hebrews, who have, as we have seen, handed down the earliest specimens of writing to posterity." May we not, therefore, conclude that their method of writing and their spoken language were derived from the same source ? Third, History does not even profess to trace the origin of alphabetical writing to any particular time, or place, or person, which we have certainly reason to expect it would have done had the art been of human invention. We are not left thus totally in the dark in reference to other arts wdiich originated in the skill of man. Rival claims, indeed, to the honour of invention have been put forward in the case of some, as of printing, &c. But there exists not a single claimant for the honour of inventing alphabetical writing. No one professes even to FACTS IN PROOF. 35 conjecture, as far as I am aware, where and about what period this art sprang into existence ! How can this be accounted for, if it had an inventor ? Is it possible to conceive that no vestiges should re- main of the supposed master-mind to w^hose possessor the invaluable fruits of his mighty genius enjoyed by us have laid us under such imperishable obligations ? I cannot but feel that it is not. Yet vestiges we have none. All we know is, that it was in existence at a very early period of the world ; that its first specimens were perfect ; that it was found among a people not distinguished by inventive powers, but by Divine communications. The probability, there- fore, we cannot but think is, that it constituted one of the innumerable blessings bestowed by God upon his chosen people. THE OBJECT OR DESIGN OF LANGUAGE. The diversified statements on this point which are found to exist, appear to resolve themselves into the two following theories ; firsts that the object of language is the communication of our thoughts and feelings to others ; second^ the production of certain thoughts and feelings in the minds of others. Now it might at first sight appear, that the for- mer of these theories is undoubtedly the correct one. Language consists of the signs of thought and feel- ing. It is the admirable vehicle by which the trea- sures of one mind oyiay be transmitted to another. d2 36 THE OBJECT In the ordinary intercourse of life — in all our literary and philosophical treatises — it is the actual vehicle of transmission. Who then can douht, we are ready to say, that its object is to convey these treasures ; — to announce to others the thoughts and feelings which lie hidden in that chamber to which their eyes can gain no access ? Against this theory of the specific object of lan- guage it has been urged, as an insuperable objec- tion, that it is often used for the purpose of dissem- hling the thoughts and feelings of the speaker. And this must be admitted. No one can doubt that we are frequently imposed upon, the real views of those who address us being at direct variance with their language. In these cases, language does not communicate the thoughts and feelings of the speaker ; it was not used with the intention of doing it ; and, therefore, the communication of our thoughts and feelings cannot, it is contended, be regarded as a sufiiciently comprehensivestatementof the general object of language. That object is, by one of the latest, and certainly one of the most able, writers on gram- mar, affirmed to be " the production of thought by means of oral sounds.'' It may be doubted, however, whether this objec- tion against the first of these theories does not possess more of plausibility than strength ; since it over- looks what appears at least a well-grounded dis- tinction, viz. the difference which exists between the ge.ieral purpose of language, and the end for ivliich^ on particular occasions, it is employed. A OF LANGUAGE. 37 well-known instrument was invented to remove the beard, and not to cut the throat ; nor does its occa- sional employment for this latter purpose gainsay this statement, since it is a perversion of the object for which it was formed. Falsehood is, in like manner, a deviation from the original purpose of language. If of Divine origin, it could not, of course, have been given by God as an instrument of deception ; nor, if of human origin, can we conceive that it was in- vented for that purpose. The object of the liar, in the use of the instrument, is to deceive ; the object of the instrument itself \^ different: it is to express thought ; or to be the vehicle of conveying it from one mind to another. If there be a difference between the communica- tion of our thoughts to others, and the production of thought in them, which is invariably assumed, there seems to be no reason why those who admit the existence of such difference, should deny that, in those cases at least in which language does con- vey our thoughts and feelings, such transmission was the object of the language. We concede to them the existence of a more ultimate object, but this is surely the proximate obj ect . The direct object of putting in motion certain muscles when we wish to move from our seat, may be to perform that movement ; the ultimate one to obtain possession of something we need. The direct object of language may thus, in like manner, be the communication of thought ; its ultimate the production of thought. Language is the means of exhibiting our thoughts. 38 THE OBJECT OF LANGUAGE. and that exhibition is the means of producing similar thoughts in the minds of others. I cannot but doubt^ however, whether the assumed difference between the communication and the pro- duction of thought has any existence. If the thought be communicated is it not produced ? — if not pro- duced, is it communicated? What kind of com- munication is that which does not end in produc- tion ? — or rather does not identify itself with it ? How can wealth be communicated without making a person wealthy .^ Yet, obvious as it seems to be that the communication and the production of thought are identical. Dr. Dewar, one of the most luminous writers on the subject of general grammar, seems to fancy that even when language expresses our own thoughts, there exists a broad line of distinction between them. It is probable — possible at any rate — that he meant no more by communication than the expression or development of thought by oral sounds, their conventional signs. Now there may be, doubtless, an expression or development of thought, without communication of thought, because the signs may not be understood ; but where the signs are understood there must be production, ^. e. the thought of one mind — to use loose, but not philosophical language — is communicated to ano- ther. To support the existence of a difference be- tween the communication and the production of thought, we have been told that the former phrase describes rather the formal nature of language than its object. No mistake, how^ever, could be greater THE CHARACTER OF LANGUA&E. 39 than this ; since language is not the communication of thought at all^ but the medium or instrument of communicating it. The sword is the instrument of shedding human blood, yet who would think of say- ing that the shedding of blood is the formal nature of the sword ? It is probable that, if the advocates of the first theory of the object of language had varied their phraseology a little, and stated the design of language to be to express thought^ without using the term " commwiicate^' and adding the word " oiir^' there would have existed no controversy on the point. Certainly the liar, in giving a false account of a transaction, does not communicate his thoughts of its nature ; but he expresses thoughts^ though in- correct ones. His proximate object is to do this. And thus it is in all cases when the conventional signs of thought are employed. The direct design is to express thought ; the ultimate one may be to govern thought ; — to influence the conceptions of another by the development of thoughts — ^whether our own or not, is of no consequence — w^hich we wish him to adopt. THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF LANGUAGE. Two distinct opinions on this point also have pre- vailed ; some writers contending that language is essen- tially imperative, others that it is essentially affirma- tive. Affirmation, derived from ad fir mare ^ denotes here the establishing of a connection between one idea 40 THE CHARACTER and another. When we employ language, say the maintainers of its affirmative character, we declare or affirm that certain connexions exist in our minds between certain ideas. This view of the general character of language seems naturally connected with the theory, that the ultimate and exclusive object of language is the communication, or, rather, the ex- pression of thought. If that were the case, it would follow that language has fally discharged its office when it has given a faithful transcript of the succes- sions of thought, — when it has asserted the connexion of one idea with another, and thereby conveyed, it may be, new information to those to whom our speech is directed. It cannot, however, be maintained that the mere expression of thought is the ultimate and exclusive object of language. The contrary is indeed obvious. " The only motive," says an able writer, " for making a communication, i. e. for an ex- pression of the emotions, feelings, and actings of the mind by the use of language, must at first have been to obtain the gratification of some object for which the concurrence of others was deemed in some way necessary. We may, therefore, consider ourselves warranted in assuming the imperative verb, denoting in general our desire to accomplish an object, either by direct command if we conceive ourselves possessed with power to compel it, or by request and supplica- tion if we can only attain it by the permission of ano- ther, as constituting the nucleus or radical part of language, from which not only the other branches of the verb, but also the other classes of words, were OF LANGUAGE. 41 gradually to be formed." Having thus assumed that the imperatives of verbs were the root of language, he proceeds to trace, very ingeniously it must be con- fessed, the march of the mind, in its gradual advance from these original elements to all the varieties, and forms, and modifications of words. In this opinion he is joined by Dr. Dewar. " The contrivances of language," says this able writer, " are founded on the known relations existing on different occasions between the speaker and the per- son addressed ; and are so adapted as to enable the former to avail himself of these relations for accom- plishing some definite purpose. An answer to the inquiry, ' what forms of sentences are likely to be earliest and simplest, ' is not obtained by determin- ing what connexions of thoughts are simplest in re- lation to the solitary mind of the individual, but by finding what those purposes are which he is likely soonest to have in view in employing the influence which language gives him over others. " The first objects that strike the attention of man in becoming acquainted with his fellows, are their motions. In other respects one man is not more interesting to another than any piece of dead un- changeable matter. He first observes voluntary motions of the most palpable kind, and then becomes acquainted with more delicate phenomona, such as the motions and changes of the human countenance, from which he infers the existence of thought in other persons, and judges of their nature." " The helplessness of man as an individual, and the support 42 THE CHARACTER OF LANGUAGE. which he is capable of deriving from the services of his fellows, create perpetual occasions on which he wishes for their assistance ; and one of the earliest, as well as the most frequent objects of his wishes, is to influence them to perform those motions for which he finds occasion. These necessities are prior to the mere luxury of a mutual communication of knowledge and opinion. This fact/' he adds, " seems to point out imperative sentences as the earliest forms of language." And again : " In tracing the nature and origin of human language, it appears to us, on the whole, most strictly agree- able to the natural history of our species to consider all language as imperative, that is, as implying the imperative of a verb.'' In support of this opinion, Dr. Dewar proceeds to show, that even nouns are imperative, because, as he says, they imply an imperative, since, when we merely mention an object by making use of a noun, we in fact desire the person to think of it. He far- ther argues that all assertions — even the copula " is" itself — may be reduced to imperatives; inas- much as this copula is equivalent to the imperative of the verb believe-. " God is love ;" i. e. believe that he is so. The whole of these speculations have little in- terest in my view, since they clearly take for grant- ed the human origin of language. The entire speculation proceeds on the assumption that it is an invention which grew out of the necessities of men. The argument is, that, as they were first prompted GRAMMAR. 43 to speak by the desire of obtaining what they need- ed, imperatives were the primitive elements of lan- guage. But, if God gave speech to xidam, he gave him, we may rest assured, more than imperatives. He would not leave him to rear the edifice of lan- guage on so scanty a foundation. All that was necessary for the purposes of full communication would be imparted ; and, therefore, the process that has been described, of nouns, and every other part of speech, growing out of this supposed radicle, is a mere imaginary process. The imperative has no more right to be regarded as the nucleus of language than nouns, or any other part of speech the know- ledge of which, and the use of which, were imparted to Adam at the same time with the imperative. GRAMMAR. The component parts of language are words ; and Grammar has an exclusive relation to words, not taking cognizance of ideas at all, except so far as may be necessary to secure the proper use of words. Grammar is, correctly speaking, the law of language^ or that system of rules and principles by which we are guided in the choice and modifications of words, so as to express our thoughts with accuracy and precision. It is generally defined, indeed, to be " the art of speaking or writing any language cor- rectly ;" and we do not undertake to afiirm that it will not admit of this definition. Analogy would, indeed, seem almost to require it. Logic may be 44 A SCIENCE AND AN ART. said to be the art of reasoning; rhetoric the art of persuading ; — both definitions leading our thoughts rather to the practical facility and power which the rhetorician and logician have acquired in the appli- cation of the rules of their respective arts, than to the rules themselves. In exact harmony with these definitions, grammar may be said to be the art of using words so as to express our thoughts fully and correctly. We still think, however, that the term grammar is more properly employed to denote " the law of language ;" or the system of rules which guide to the correct expression of thought ; and that the practical facility of thus expressing ourselves should rather be considered as the knowledge of grammar, or the result of that knowledge, than grammar itself. Grammar may be considered as an art and as a science. As an art it famishes us with the rules by which speech or writing should be guided. As a science it investigates the principles which lead to the formation of the rules themselves. Grammar may be further regarded as particular, and general. Particular grammar exhibits the rules which guide speech and writing in particular lan- guages — rules, at all events those which are peculiar to each language — founded upon the practice of those persons "who have that degree of conspicuous- ness in society which entitles them to fix the stand- ard in each ;" for the law of language is posterior to the existence and X\ie^ practice of language. General or universal grammar examines and de- velops those great principles which must operate in PARTICULAR AND GENERAL. 45 the formation of all languages, which constitute the common and essential properties of all particular grammars, and give to them that mutual resem- blance which must exist among all things arranged in the same class, thoagh each individual retains its peculiar and distinguishing properties. Thus, when adjectives have been admitted into any language — for adjectives are not essential to language — there is a foundation in nature for the change which they are made, for the most part, to undergo to indicate degrees of comparison. All languages, accordingly, claiming any thing like peifection, must have some mode of indicating the different degrees in which the same property may be possessed by various things. But there is no foundation in nature for varying the termination of the adjective, as in the Latin language, to indicate the number or gender or case of the noun to which it belongs : and, accord- ingly, this variation is not a common property, but forms a distinct feature of certain grammars only. THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE SIGNS OF LANGUAGE, AND THE CHANGES TO WHICH THEY ARE SUBJECT. The signs which constitute language, or the words of which it consists, are exceedingly numerous ; yet they are capable of classification, ^. e. of being arrang- ed in a few general divisions, in consequence of the resemblances and differences which we are able to recognize in their meaning. There is nothing in the nature of the case to exempt them from the 46 MODES OF CLASSIFYING, ETC. process which has been instituted in regard to the objects of science generally — the process of placing them, mentally at least, in groups, forming what we call species, and genera. All the words of language have been, accordingly, arranged in classes ; to which classes we give the name of parts of speech, though, as all classification is, to a great degree, arbitrary, (the books of a library, for instance, may be divided into folios, quartos, octavos, or French, English, or classical, philosophical, &c.) we find, as it might have been expected, much diversity among grammarians in reference to the principles of classi- fication, and even with respect to the number of parts of speech which they allow. Several parts of speech, in general opinion at least, have been by some individuals classed together under a more com- prehensive head, so as to make the divisions compa- ratively few. This generalizing process has been carried to the greatest extent by the late celebrated Home Tooke. He reduces all the parts of speech to two, the Noun, and the Verb. Both, he states, are signs of ideas. The verb is the " quod loquimur," the noun the '^ de qu 0,' ' — what we say, and of what we affirm it. T hus, in the example, " The bird flies," " flies" is the "quod loquimur," "bird" the " de quo." On this account every verb must, as he contends, imply a noun ; since every assertion is made concerning some thing, or being ; the action of flying, for instance, supposes something that flies. According to the classification of Mr. Tooke, all those parts of speech which assist HORNE TOOKE's, HARRIS's. 47 in the expression of onr affirmations, which connect things, — whether they be participles, or adverbs, whether conjunctive or restrictive particles — be- long to the verbal class ; while things, and the qual- ities of things, constitute the class of nouns. The late Mr. Harris, in his Hermes, or treatise upon General Grammar, — a work of great authority formerly, though distinguished more, perhaps, by its learning than by its philosophical spirit, sets out with a binary division of the signs of language very simi- lar in appearance to that of Mr. Tooke. " All words," he tells us, "are significant by themselves, or by rela- tion, ^. e. their connexion with some significant word. Words, which are significant by themselves, denote either substances, or attributes. Words, w^hich are significant by relation, gain their meaning by a con- nexion with one word only, or with more than one In the former case they are definitives ; in the lat- ter connectives ; so that in one or other of the four classes, substantives, attributives, definitives, or connectives, all words whatever may be included. If any of these names," he adds, "seem new and un- usual, we may introduce others more usual by calling the substantives nouns, the attributives verbs, the definitives articles, and the connectives conjunctions." Professor Hurwitz of the London University sug- gests, in his Hebrew Grammar — a work of great merit and ability, from its development of many of the essential principles of language, together with its faithful and luminous statement of the particular 48 HURWITZ. rules of the Hebrew language — tlie following as the most philosophical classification of words. 1st, Such as indicate the objects of thought, or the subjects of discourse, comprehending the names of things or beings with which we become acquainted by perception and consciousness. 2nd, Such as serve to express whatever is af- firmed respecting the objects of contemplation, ^. e. verbs, or words denoting action, passion, being, &c. S?'d, Such as serve to qualify or particularize either the subject or the predicate when they happen to be general terms. This class includes adverbs, adjectives and definitives. 4th, Such as serve to indicate the relations of things or words, in which the expression of general relations has superseded or diverted the attention of the mind from their primary particular meaning. This class comprehends prepositions and conjunc- tions. 5fk, Such as indicate particular affections or emo- tions, as joy, sorrow, &c. He admits at the same time that the third and fourth classes may be re- solved into the noun and the verb, which two alone, he adds, are the most essential parts of speech. These different modes of dividing the parts of speech have been mentioned chiefly on account of the celebrity of their respective advocates; since I cannot but agree in opinion with a late able writer, " that any attempt to establish a different classifi- cation of the parts of speech from that which is commonly received will be found of little utility NOUN. 49 either in speculation or practice." We may, there- fore, proceed to a more particular consideration of the different parts of speech. In most languages, probably in all cultivated languages, grammarians admit the following parts of speech : noun, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb, preposition, and conjunction. The Latin and Eng- lish grammarians classify the interjection as a dis- tinct part of speech ; and, in the Greek and English tongues, the article is added to the list. The Eng- lish grammar allows the following, viz. the noun, article, adjective, pronoun, verb, participle, adverb, preposition, conjunction, and interjection, to the se- parate consideration of which we now proceed. NOUN. The word itself is a contraction of nomen, a name ; and is used, accordingly, to denote that class of signs by which things or ideas are designated. In regard to the names of things and of qualities^ it should be noted, that different modes of classification have been adopted. By some the names of the latter, even in the concrete state, ^. e. when thought of in connexion with the substances in which they are popularly said to inhere, have been placed in the class of nouns. Others arrange them as a distinct class, which they designate the adjective ; while th« names of substances only are classified as nouns. The propriety of the classification we adopt ob- viously depends upon the nature of substances and 50 NOUN. qualities. If tlie quality were a thing, or entity — as many affirm — distinct from the substance in which it is found, the name of the quality would manifestly be not less a noun than the name of the substance itself. If, on the other hand, the doctrine of a material substratum, standing under and giving necessary support to essentially dependent qualities, be a vulgar error, incapable of proof, the mere as- sumption of an excessively inquisitive philosophy; (all of which is distinctly affirmed by one of the best modern writers on general grammar ;) if it be far- ther true, as the same writer asserts, that nothing exists but qualities ; — that what we call substances are only definite assemblages of sensible qualities, which, being found constantly united in nature, are strongly associated together in our minds ; — if all this were fact, and not mere assertion, it would fol- low that nouns, as we now call them, should not stand as a separate class of words, but be placed in the class of adjectives. It is scarcely possible, how- ever, to conceive of an absurdity greater than that which is involved in the preceding statements of Dr. Dewar — even though we should admit that the doc- trine commonly maintained concerning the -sub- stratum does not very correctly express the facts of the case ; for, if a substratum be denied for the qualities of matter, we must, to maintain consis- tency, deny a substratum for the properties and affections of mind : or, in other words, maintain that the soul is nothing more than a continuous train of thought, and feeling; (and in that case the inquiry PARTICULAR NOUNS. 51 could not fail to arise, " What is God ? ") a senti- ment which constitutes the very essence of the in- fidel philosophy. The true state of the case is the very reverse of what is maintained by Dr. Dewar, viz. that " the substances in nature are every thing that has a real existence in nature." What we call the quality is not, as is too commonly imagined, something in the substance, distinct from it, and capable of being withdrawn from it. The quality or the property is the substance formed capable of producing a certain effect upon us, or other beings and things with which it comes into contact. It is, then, in harmony with the true principles of phi- losophy to arrange the noun and adjective in two classes, employing the noun to denote the substra- tum itself — to adopt the old phraseology — i. e. the substance or thing considered apart from the effects it is capable of producing and undergoing ; and the adjective to express the quality, i. e. the substance considered in relation to the effects it un- dergoes and produces. KINDS OF NOUNS. Of nouns there are various kinds ; it is proposed, however, in this treatise, to direct the consideration of the reader to those only wdth the nature of which it is most important for him to obtain a correct acquaintance. Nouns, then, we observe, are parti- cular or general ; concrete or abstract. Particular nouns^ or, as they are more familiarly E 3 52 GENERAL NOUNS. called, proper names, are those which belong, or are applicable, to individuals only ; as London, Thames, Milton, &c. General nouns ^ commonly denominated general terms, and appellatives, are such as are applied to a plurality of objects possessing a common resem- blance. They are, in short, the names of species and genera; i. e. of classes of objects; for a species is, strictly speaking, a class formed of individuals ; and a genus a class of classes, or a class formed of classes. There can be no doubt that the precise difference between species and genus is that which has just been stated, viz. that the former contains individuals ; and the latter classes. In the habi- tual use of the term species and genus this nice distinction in their meaning is not, however, pre- served. A class is considered, and spoken of, as both a species and genus. Yet a different view is, and must be, taken of the class when it is thus made to bear different names. When we speak of it as a genus, we look below it, or think of it as con- taining other classes; when we represent it as a species, we look above it, or regard it as contained in a more comprehensive class: thus ^^iron ore is the genus of loadstone, — but a species of mineral." It deserves to be especially observed that general nouns, or the names of classes, answer the same purpose in regard to the class, that a proper name does in regard to the individual. The word Buce- phalus is the name of an individual animal, and serves to distinguish it from ail others which belong THEIR ORIGIN. 53 to the same class. The word horse is the name of a class of animals, and serves to distinguish that class from all other classes. There is not, then, in one point of view at least, so great a distinction between general and particular nouns as is usually imagined. Both are in on3 sense proper names ; the former being the proper name of the individual ; the latter the proper name of the class. Bucephalus distinguishes Alexander's horse from all other horses ; horse distinguishes that class of animals from all other classes of animals. Of the origin of general nouns or terms different accounts have been given. Some consider them the offspring of design, under the stimulus of neces- sity. When human knowledge had become some- what extended, it was found impossible, it has been supposed, to conduct language by proper names alone. Had such names been given to every tree, and plant, and animal, and object of every kind, with which men became successively acquainted, they could not have found a place in the most te- nacious memory. The contrivance, therefore, of arranging objects in classes was, it is conceived, resorted to : so that, by giving names to the classes, proper names would be rendered unnecessary, while the nouns of the language being few, would be readily acquired and easily remembered. Others, again, suppose that they originated in what they affirm to be the native tendency of the mind to give the same name to objects which nearly resemble each other. Thus a very young child is 54 THEIR ORIGIN. disposed to call every man " papa." Of the opera- tion of this supposed principle Adam Smith has given the following beantifal, though, it must be admitted, fanciful illustration. '' The assignation of particular names to denote particular objects, i. e. the institution of substantive nouns, would probably be one of the first steps towards the formation of language. The particular cave which sheltered an individual from the weather, — the particular tree whose fruit relieved his hunger, — the particular fountain whose waters allayed his thirst, would first be denominated by the words, cave, tree, fountain, or by whatever appellatives'' (names, they would not as yet be appellatives) "he might think proper to mark them. Afterwards when more enlarged ex- perience had led him to observe, and his necessary occasions obliged him to make mention of other caves and other trees, and other fountains, he would naturally bestow upon each of those new objects the same name by which he had been accustomed to express the similar object he was first acquainted with. And thus those words, originally the proper names of individuals, would insensibly become the common names of a multitude." The statements of Dr. Brown do not perhaps radically differ from those of Adam Smith. They are in substance as follows. The great Creator of the mind has given to us the power of perceiving the qualities or properties of each object of sense which presents itself This perception of individual properties is embodied in the proper name of each DIFFICULTY OF THE PERIPATETICS. 55 object, and expressed by it. The same great Being has bestowed upon us the additional power of recog- nising in surrounding objects the points in which they resemble each other. This notion of resem- blance is embodied in the general term, or, as we have ventured to call it, the proper name of the class. Few things can be more manifest than that this last writer has correctly exhibited the manner in which general ideas now arise, and new general terms are now formed. Yet to a Christian mind the whole of the preceding statements — if they are intended to lead us back to the actual origin of the first general terms — (as Dr. Smith's unquestionably are) must be very unsatisfactory ; proceeding, as they evidently do, on the assumption that language is altogether of human origin ; since if it be, as we think it was, of Divine origin, how can there exist a doubt that gene- ral as well as proper names were communicated by God to the father of the human family. Under the reign of the old Peripatetic philosophy a great difficulty (to which a brief reference will be made for the sake of more fully illustrating the sub- ject) surrounded the whole subject of general ideas, and the consequent formation of general terms — from which juster and simpler views of mental science have happily delivered us. This difficulty arose out of the old and now exploded system of perception by images. According to that theory the objects which the mind contemplates in perception are not any thing external to the mind, but something in contact 56 DIFFICULTY EXPERIENCED BY with it. The whole doctrine was built upon the asser- tion, "Nothing can act where it is not/' then received as an axiomatical truth, since it necessarily followed from this doctrine that external objects, not being present to the mind, cannot act upon it, or that their action must be carried on through some medium. It was, accordingly, conceived that what they called species, ideas, or images of external objects, were thrown off by those objects, — that they were trans- mitted to the brain through the organs of sense ; — and further, that they communicated an impression of themselves to the brain, or the mind, as wax receives the impression of the seal, without the substance of the sea]. These ideas or images of external objects were, it was supposed, the things contemplated by the mind in perception. Now it would be out of place to dwell here upon the absurdity of supposing that matter, or supposed images of material objects, could make any such im- pression upon an immaterial essence like the spirit, as is necessarily supposed in the preceding account of the Peripatetic theory. But the reader is espe- cially requested to observe the impossibility of main- taining the existence of general ideas — and, conse- quently, of accounting for the origin of general terms in connection with this theory. Ideas were, in the creed of the Peripatetics, images^ images of course of existing objects, or they could not have been «V7Z«^^5. But all existing objects are particular obj ects. There are classes of objects in the mind, but not in nature. Nowhere is there to be found a general man, or a THE PERIPATETICS- 57 general tree^ or a general object of any kind ; i. e. an individual destitute- of infividual properties, (for in that case he would.,sic)t be an individual,) and en- dowed only with common ones. Now, as every ob- ject of perception is aii individual object, there can of course, on this theory, be no general ideas, ^. e, images ; since if there were these general ideas, ^. e. images, they would be images of no existing objects; in other words, they would not be images at all. At all events, the advocates of the old theory of percep- tion were thrown upon the following dilemma. Since there is no perception, as they conceived, but by images, they were constrained to admit either that there are universal images, ^. e. as we have seen, images of nothing ; or that there exist no general ideas : and the philosophers of ancient days rang- ed themselves either with the Realists, or the Nominalists — as the contending parties were called — just as it happened to strike them that less absurdity attached itself to the notion of images without ob- jects, or words without ideas. In the present advanced state of mental science no one conceives of an idea as an image or picture of an external object — proceeding from that object to an organ of sense — making its way through the organ to the brain — coming there into contact with the mind — and impressing upon it an image of the external object. Such notions as these, if they could be entertained by any in the present day, w^ould be justly regarded as the relics of a bar- barous age. An idea of any object, according to the 58 GENERAL IDEAS. present use of the term, is the notion or conception which the mind forms of that object. And, since the mind has been constituted to perceive not merely the individual and distinguishing qualities of objects, but to recognize their general and resembling pro- perties, it is surely not more wonderful that terms should be invented to denote the various respects in which surrounding objects are seen to resemble each other, than that names should be given to the objects themselves. General ideas, then, are nothing more than the notions we form of those common properties in which two or more individual beings or things participate.* They are not indebted for their existence to general terms, as has been most falsely and unphilosophically imagined, but are the parents of general terms ; and in this sentiment I am happy to be corroborated by so high an authority as that of Dr. H. Dewar. " With regard to the opinion of those," says this able writer, " who allow the existence of general ideas, yet maintain that they owe that existence to the formation of general terms, it seems to us completely erroneous. A term is invented for the purpose of expressing an idea. The recognizance of a resem- blance among a plurality of individuals is the foun- dation of a general idea ; and this always exists before any general term is invented, and before any * For more extended remarks on this subject, Vide Elements of Mental and Moral Science^ by the Author, pp. 194—208, 2nd edition. CONCRETE NOUNS. 59 term which was formerly a^ proper name receives a generic application." * 06/NcEETE AND ABSTRACT NOUNS. The term concrete is derived from the Latin words '' con" and '' cretus/' — grown together, and is, accordingly, fitly used to designate nouns denoting things in which the substance and the quality are found in a state of union. It is, indeed, more com- monly used by grammarians to express the noun adjective according to their nomenclature ; and then it is regarded as the name of the quality con- sidered as in a state of union with some particular suhstance. Thus " good" would be represented by them as the concrete, and " goodness" as the abstract noun. There is no reason, however, why the desig- nation, concrete noun, should not be applied to those nouns substantive, as they have been called, which represent the substance and the quality in combina- tion. And this, in truth, is the case \Adth almost all nouns. We never, indeed, see substances stripped of their qualities. The substratum of matter is in- visible. We can form, indeed, no conception of the essence of matter ; of its properties alone — i. e. of the different w^ays in which matter affects us — are we cognizant. And, having no ideas of the bare and naked substrata of objects, we have, of course, no names by which to designate them, because the * Vide Edinburgh Encyclopcedia^ article Grammar. 60 ABSTRACT NOUNS. process of naming cani^ot go beyond thought. Our nouns must, therefore, denote, for the most part, neither the essence, nor the Equalities, of matter considered separately, but the latter in "Hnion with, or supported by, their invisible substrata ; ^. e. they must be concrete nouns. Of this kind are man, horse, dog, house, chair, table, &c. &c. The reader must, however, be carefal to observe that, though we cannot conceive of matter apart from its properties, we can and do conceive of the latter apart from the former. This has been regarded by many as a very anomalous fact, yet it is not really such. We have no conceptions of what matter is in itself; all our conceptions relate to the effects it produces upon us, or other beings or things ; i, e, its qualities or properties. How then is it wonder- ful that these effects should become distinct objects of thought, while the matter which affects — and which is the only existing thing — is not thought of, simply because it cannot be thought of, at all ! When these properties are thus separately or exclu- sively thought of, they become, in our conceptions, real and separate entities, capable of standing alone, and of bearing qualities of which they — in the place of real substrata — constitute the support. Thus we say, perfect whiteness, great wisdom, exuberant goodness; where the qualities whiteness, wisdom, and goodness, are exhibited as things, clothed with the other qualities specified. The name of the qua- lity, when thus conceived of as a thing, is of course a noun ; and it is called an abstract noun, because it ABSTRACT NOUNS. 61 is the result of a mental process to which the name of abstraction has been given ; a process which has been supposed to consist in a separation or abstrac- tion of the quality from the substance in which it inheres — though it is not an actual separation. We cannot really take the quality we call white from the egg in w^hich it inheres ; nor the quality denom- inated honest from the good man who possesses it : but we can mentally withdraw or abstract them, it is said, from the egg and the man. Now, without at- tempting to disturb phraseology which length of use has rendered somewhat unyielding, it will be useful to remember, that this mental abstraction is neither more nor less than thinking of these specific quali- ties of the egg and the man, and not thinking either of the latter, or any other qualities possessed by them. To think of qualities apart from substances, or of one quality apart from other qualities, does not appear to involve more difficulty than to think of one man in a crowd, apart from the crowd. If a difficulty should present itself to any one here, founded on the operation of the great principle of association, which might be thought to bind the cluster of qualities which meet in the egg so firmly together, as to prevent one being thought of without immediately introducing the other, it may be admit- ted that in general this is the case ; yet it is not ne- cessarily so. Many circumstances might fix our thoughts, for instance, upon the eyes of our friend, while the nose and mouth — -though united by association with the former feature — might at the moment be disre- 62 HOW FORMED. garded. And it may be further observed^ that, when the notions of whiteness and of honesty have been formed in the manner in which abstract notions, as they are called, are at least generally formed, (viz. by observing a number of objects that agree only in possessing respectively the qualities specified, so as to be struck with their resemblance in these respects,) the notions of whiteness and of honesty may easily arise without any accompanying conception of the objects in which they inhere. Abstract nouns are generally formed from ad- jectives, and are almost invariably longer, in con- sequence of the termination of the original words being made to undergo some alteration, or addition ; thus from grateful, we obtain gratitude ; from white, whiteness ; from red, redness, &c. This is not al- together an accidental circumstance, in which case it would deserve little or no notice in a treatise on general grammar. It obviously results from the facts, that the quality was first observed in connexion with some object, — that the separate consideration of the quality was of a later date, — and that, to de- note it, it was obviously the easier and more natural method to alter, or add something to, the term which expressed the quality in the concrete state, than to adopt a new term altogether. Different languages have fixed upon different terminations to effect this object; thus from the Latin magnus, we have magni- tudo in Latin, and magnitude in English. ACCIDENTS OF NOUNS. 63 . THE ACCIDENTS OF NOUNS. To enable words to represent, as accurately as possible, the objects they denote, they must be sus- ceptible of various changes corresponding with and adapted and designed to express, the various acci- dents of the objects themselves. Thus the subject of our thoughts may be one being or thing, or more than one. It may be a male, or a female, or neither the one nor the other, or both. It may sustain certain relations to other beings or things, and these rela- tions may be not merely diverse but mutable. These are what we call accidents of things or objects, because they may or may not exist while the essen- tial properties of the things or objects remain. Language must, accordingly, have some mode of expressing these accidental properties, or it would be essentially defective. There exist, therefore, in all languages worthy of the name, certain contri- vances to effect this object ; and these contrivances — to adopt the most generalized form of expression — are what we call the accidents of nouns or of words. We shall first consider THE ACCIDENT OF NUMBER Of number as it respects words — for number as it respects things is radically different, and grammar has an exclusive reference to words — many defini- tions have been given, none of which seem perfectly 64 NUMBER. satisfactory. The common grammars tell us " that it is the consideration of an object as one or more;" a definition which fails to describe aright either what number is in the thing or object, or in the word. In neither case is it the consideration of an object ; and, if it were, how can an object be con- sidered as more than one ? Dr. Dewar defines num- bers '^ as a sign for representing the exemplification of a general idea in more than one individual." This sign^ as it would appear, can be nothing else than the plural form which the noun assumes ; but, if so, how can there be a singular number ? The Britannica represents it, more correctly, "as a varia- tion in the form of the noun to denote unity, and plurality ?" Is it not rather the particular form which the noun assumes to accomplish this object, rather than, as the last writer states, a variation in the form ? We have the singular and the plural number. What can number, in both instances, be, but the particular form of the noun intended to inti- mate that the object designated by it is, in the first place, oncy and, in the second, more than one ? Greek and Hebrew nouns have also a dual number to denote two individuals. It is not, however, essen- tial to language, since very few languages possess it ; nor is it easy to assign a sufficient reason for the adoption of a sign to denote this specific case of plurality — two rather than three, or four ; since it may fairly be doubted whether two individuals of a class are more frequently seen associated in nature than any other number. If a conjecture might be NUMBEB. 65 hazarded on this point, it would be that the circum- stance of the creation of men and animals in pairs gave occasion to the dual number. But, though number is a natural accident of nouns, all nouns are not capable of undergoing that change of form in which it is stated by the Britannica to consist. "It can only he essential^' says one writer, " to those which denote genera, and species." ^^It can only apply to general terms,'' adds another. The real meaning of these somewhat obscure phrases is, that proper names can only assume one of the two or three forms in which common terms present themselves, viz. the singular form. Thus the dis- tinctive term of the class of animals to which we belong appears in the form man, or men; but Mil- ton can never become Miltons, "because there is but one Milton while there are many men." To comprehend this fully the reader must recollect the explanation that was given (vide p. 52) of pro- per names, and general terms ; — that the former de- note particular and distinguishing as well as general properties ; while the latter are indicative of general properties only. The distinguishing properties can of course meet only in one individual (or they could not be distinguishing) ; the common properties may meet in many individuals. As the result of this, the name of the individual, comprehending the distin- guishing properties, can stand only in the singular form; the name of the class, i, e. of the common pro- perties, may assume the plural form. " There may be many men," says Dr. Dewar (and hence the term F 66 NUMBER. admits of the plural as well as the singular form), " because the general idea expressed by man may be exemplified in more than one ; but there is but one Socrates, because the idea expressed by that word, being particular, not general, does not accord with any other man. If at any time a proper name be- comes susceptible of plurality — as when we speak of the twelve Caesars, or the seven Jameses — it ceases to be a proper name, i. e. to denote the distinguish- ing qualities of either of them ; it becomes the name of a small class having the name James or Ceesar as the one common property." A few nouns exist which, in respect to number, bear somewhat of an anomalous character. They are such as denote objects " not permanently portioned into individuals," so that they are not conceived of either as one, or more than one. Of this kind are the words gold, silver, iron, brass, &c. The plural form is not given to them, since, though there may be much or little gold, there cannot be many or few golds. Yet, as it is impossible to prefix to them the indefinite article, or to say a gold, it is, perhaps, scarcely right to represent them as being of the singular number. Various methods may of course be adopted to ex- press unity and plurality ; a difference may be made in the mode of spelling the singular and plural form ; the latter form may add something to the former, or number may be indicated by separate words. Of this diversity general grammar takes no cognizance. MODES OF FORMING IT. 67 unless, indeed, to ascertain if possible the manner in which it originated. It is the opinion of Home Tooke that all termina- tions, and of course those which indicate number, were originally separate words, which were soon abbreviated, and conjoined with the principal words, so as to form with them one word. The addition of a term of this sort is the mode of expressing plu- rality in the Bengalese language. " Projaa" signi- fies a peasant, "lok," people; and "projaa lok" signifies peasants. The writer of the article Gram- mar in Hees's Cyclopedia derives the plural sign of the Chaldaic, Arabic, and Persian, as well as of the Greek, Latin, and most of the modern languages of Europe, from a word in the Hebrew language, viz. pan signifying a multitude. He supposes that this word was at first subjoined to the singular word, and that afterwards, for the sake of brevity, the Hebrews designated plurality by retaining only one of the letters, viz. o ; the Chaldeans, Arabians, and others, by retaining the \, Thus the full form of the plural was in Hebrew im ; in Chaldean, in ; in Arabic, oon ; and in the Persian, aan. This theory further supposes the letters 7i and s to have had the same origin. The Chaldean " in" is, therefore, supposed to have become " es" in the formation of many Greek and Latin plurals. From the same source they would wish to derive the ^, which forms the plural terminations in the English and French, while the Italian language is consider- ed as following in all nouns the analogy of the second F 2 68 NUMBER. declension of the Latin by adopting the terminating vowel " i". The same writers might have added, as it has been very justly observed, that this " i" of the Latin and Italian is the vowel letter of the He- brew plural " im/' and that it was natural that a language derived from the Hebrew should adopt this plural sign. Dr. Dewar appears to have little confidence in this whole style of etymology ; and, with regard to the English plural, avows his very decided opinion that it is to be traced to an origin later than that now mentioned. He states that the "s" which now terminates the plural was originally " is," and that the same syllable was used to express the genitive case. Thus towns, the plural of town, was at first townis ; father's, the genitive of father, was fatheris or faderis. He supposes, further, that this syllable originally expressed the general circum- stance of relation betwixt the idea denoted by the noun to which it was attached, and some other ; and that the occasions of discourse were trusted to for the suggestion of the particular relation. A desire of improving the language, amidst the multiplicity of relative ideas which arose from intellectual im- provement, led, he thinks, our ancestors to appro- priate one termination to one subdivision of the general meaning, as well as to produce a still greater particularity by varying the modes of writing the termination. GENDER. GENDER. 69 Besides number, another characteristic feature of the beings and things around us, is that of sex. Language must, accordingly, employ some method of intimating the sex of the object of which the word is a sign; and the divers forms or termina- tions which nouns are made to assume to effect this purpose is what we mean by the genders of words. The number of these forms or terminations should be decided by the actual differences in this point of view which exist in nature. Now everything which exists in nature is " either male or female, or both male and female, or neither one nor the other." Thus, if it should be thought that the existence of hermaphrodites is doubtfd, yet it will follow that language must have some mode of indicating objects which, in reference to gender, are masculine, or feminine, or neuter, or that it must be essentially defective. And in strict propriety, language should give that gender to words which nature has given to the objects which they denote; i, e, put every noun expressing a male animal in the masculine gender ; every name of a female animal in the femi- nine gender ; and every name of an inanimate ob- ject in the neuter gender. In conformity with this correct and important general rule, " all the names of animals should have a gender because the ani- mals themselves have sex." It has, however, been well observed, that " the sex of all is not equally ob- 70 aENDER. vious nor equally worthy of attention ; and that, consequently, the same name is applied in some languages to all the species, and that name is said to be of common gender. On this account diminu- tive insects, though they are doubtless male or female, seem to be considered in the English lan- guage as if they were really creeping things. No man speaking of a worm would say he or she creeps, but it creeps upon the ground." The English language follows, with few excep- tions, the order of nature ; and in this point of view it differs from most. In the earliest languages there was no distinction of gender further than into mas- culine and feminine. This has been ascribed by some to a vividness of imagination, which generally prevails in the infancy of society, leading its pos- sessors to conceive of every thing around them as pervaded by the principle of life. Some modern languages retain this peculiarity of the ancient lan- guages. In the French, Italian, and Spanish, there is no neuter form ; every object has a name which is either masculine or femxinine. Our language, by following the order of nature, in reference to gender, possesses an advantage over them in the poetical and rhetorical style ; for, when nouns naturally neuter are converted into the masculine and femi- nine, the personification is more distinctly and pro- minently marked. What are the analogical principles, if any, under the guidance of which the masculine or feminine gender has been given to the names of inanimate GENDER. 71 objects, it is difficult or impossible to state. It has been thought, indeed, that, when an object was re- garded as possessing masculine properties — such as strength, active energy, communication, &c. — the name of the object was, on that account, invested with the masculine form or gender : and, on the con- trary, that, when feminine qualities — such as beauty, reception, &c. — ^were ascribed to it, its name was made to assume the feminine gender. Many facts, however, seem to render it impossible to accept of this as a general explanation. '' Different genders," it is alleged, " are ascribed to the names of the same things in different languages, and, what is more per- plexing still, to different names of the same object in the same language." It might possibly be said, in reply to the first part of the objection, that, as objects possess different qualities, the attention of different nations may not be arrested by the same quality in the same object ; and that, consequently, the gender of the names employed to designate it would be different. The sun is adorned by beauty as well as strength. The former might strike the imagination of one country — the latter the fancy of another. In the language of the first, the name of the sun would be feminine, in that of the last, mas- culine. But what shall we say to the latter part of the objection ? Perhaps in some languages the fixing upon a specific termination to indicate the gender of objects might be subsequent to the giving of names to the objects themselves; so that the application of the principle, when it came to be applied to the 72 GENDER. existing nouns of the language^ might occasion some of the anomalies which have so greatly perplexed grammarians. That, in the few instances in which the masculine or feminine gender has been given, in our language, to the names of inanimate objects, analogical prin- ciples have governed practice, is not to be doubted. Dr. Dewar says, it " only partakes of the nature of poetical personification ;" but in all personifications the writer or speaker clothes an object with that particular sex to w^hich its qualities are conceived to bear the greatest resemblance. The method of distinguishing gender admits of considerable variety. It may be effected by a change of the word, or a change of the termination merely, and it does not appear that any general rule has guided the practice of our language in this respect. It might have appeared, a^^riori^ probable that, in those species of animals in which the distinction between the male and the female is very strongly marked by nature, language would mark it w^ith equal distinct- ness by selecting separate w^ords to denote the male and the female. This is accordingly done in some cases, both in English and in other languages. Thus we say, husband, w^ife, king, queen, &c; and yet — so anomalous is the practice in this respect — that other names of the very same objects — though indicating different relations — form the feminine by prefixing a syllable to the masculine, or altering the ter- mination ; as, man, woman, emperor, empress, &c. CASE. 73 The specific mode of distinguishing gender does not belong to the department of general grammar. It may be well, before proceeding to another sub- ject, to beg the reader again to observe, that ^^both number and gender appertain to words because they appertain to things; that is to say, because sub- stances are one or many, and have sex or no sex, substantives have number, and are masculine, femi- nine, or neuter. There is, however, this difference betw^een the two attributes. Number, as we have seen, descends no lower than to the last rank of spe- cies : gender stops not here, but descends to every individual, however diversified." CASE. This accident of words properly and strictly denotes "certain changes of termination which they are made to undergo for the purpose of denoting annexa- tion,'' 2. e. the addition of certain individual and dis- tinguishing properties, of a peculiar description, to those common qualities of which only the words them- selves are indicative. In explanation of this state- ment, it must be observed, that most nouns are the names not of individuals, but of classes of objects, called, as we have seen, genera and species. These (Classes are formed, mentally at least, when, on ob- serving a number of individuals, we recognize cer- tain points in which they resemble each other. Thus on contemplating a multitude of beings differing in size, complexion, &c., we observe, it may be, that all 74 CASE. possess reason. The common participation of this quality constitutes a bond of union among them, and the class man is formed in the mind. The term by which we designate the general notion which has thus arisen in the mind is, as we have seen, the pro- per name of the class, and is, accordingly, incapable of doing more than of directing our thoughts to the class. If we wish at any time to fix attention upon a particular individual of that class, we must annex to the word which denotes the general qualities some sign significant of individual properties, or of those properties which make him an individual, and distin- guish him from all others. Thus to particularize the word horse, for instance, ^. e, to use it so as that it shall bring a particular horse to our thoughts, we must annex to that word the sign of some particular quality which that individual alone is known to pos- sess, as whiteness, for instance ; and in the same general way must we proceed in other cases. Among the number of particular in opposition to general properties, are the specific relations sus- tained by different individuals. Thus the phrase, " a man of God was there,'' exhibits the man as sus- taining a relation to God, not borne by all men, and which, consequently, serves to distinguish him from other men. Language must, accordingly, have signs of relations, or of certain classes of relations ; and the connexion or annexation of these signs to general terms, is one mode, among others, of particularizing those terms. This annexation may obviously be effected in various ways ; as, for instance, by the use CASE. 75 of prepositions, or by changes of the termination of the noun. Strictly speaking, those languages only have cases which employ the latter mode of effect- ing this purpose ; and this is the more prevalent mode, because some of the circumstances and rela- tions annexed to the general idea are so general and evanescent, that no separate word to denote them has ever been invented. That w^e are right in thus restricting the mean- ing of the term cases, is evident from the follomng account which has been given of them. The word itself is derived from the Latin cado, cadere, casum, to fall. It connects the notion of falling with what we call the oblique cases, the origin of which notion will appear when we rem'ember the particular mode in which the ancient grammarians conceived of the nominative case, and the peculiar manner in which they represented it. The mere indication of an object by an appropriate sign or name was called by them the nomination, or naming of that object ; hence the name was denominated the nominative case. It intimated, as they thought, no connexion; it merely announced a particular object by a particular name. They represented it by a right line standing perpen- dicularly upon a horizontal line ; hence they called it the " Rectus casus.'' When some relation existed between that word and another, with a view to inti- mate its connexion with that other, they bent or in- flected the line from its original state, and the falling off from the rectus casus they called a casus ; and the whole number of inflections from the perpen- 76 NOMINATIVE. dicular denoted the various cases. This account ex- plains the meaning of the term declension in its ap- plication to nouns ; and shows that by the different declensions of nouns was meant the different ways in which this line declined from the perpendicular. It accounts also for the origin of the phrase " oblique cases." The line representing the nominative case formed a right angle with the horizontal line, the whole of the other lines oblique angles ; hence they were called oblique cases. The relations which exist among objects are ex- ceedingly numerous. Like all other things, they may, however, be formed into classes, and names may be given to the classes adapted to express their distin- guishing characteristics. It is, accordingly, neces- sary to give a short explanation of all the cases, to- gether with the relations which they are supposed to express. The Nominative Case. This case was conceived by the ancient gramma- rians, as we have seen, to be simply the name of the thing or object of thought ; and since it indicated no relation, and did not fall away, as they conceived, from the perpendicular, it ought not to have been compre- hended in their list of cases. They were, however, evidently wrong in regard to the nominative, which always sustains a peculiar relation to some verb ex- pressed or understood ; and, for the most part, has a peculiar termination, lost in the oblique cases, which GENITIVE. 77 must be supposed to be the sign of that relation. " The radical letters of dominus are ^ domin/ and the ^ us/ which does not appear in the oblique cases, is as much a separate sign as the i, o, um, orum, as and is, in the other cases." Dominus is, therefore, some- thing more than the name of the object. It is the name ^^ domin'' with the termination "us" attached to it, to denote that it stands in the specific relation to the verb of being, as we express it, its nominative case. The Genitive Case, The technical name of this case, among the Greeks, is said to have been Hrwo-tc yevLKr) ; or, as was pro- bably meant by the words, the general case. " The Latin grammarians, in translating this name casus genetivus, or the generative case, show that they mistook the nature of the genitive." It is preemi- nently the general case ; intimating the existence of some relation between two objects, but leaving the specific relation to be gathered from the whole of the passage in which the case occurs. It is, indeed, generally supposed that the genitive termi- nation, together with the preposition of — which answers exactly to it — expresses the particular rela- tion of possession ; and it cannot be denied that this is true in very numerous instances. There are many others, however, in which it cannot well be conceived that any such relation is denoted by it. The phrase " injuria regis" may mean either an 78 GENITIVE. injury suffered^ or inflicted by the king. Now, though an injury received may be in the king's pos- session, an injury perpetrated — and which has, ac- cordingly, gone from him — cannot. This example also powerfully tends to confirm the doctrine, that the genitive termination merely denotes general rela- tion, leaving it, as in the instance just referred to, to the sagacity of the reader or hearer, and to his knowledge of the subject, to fix upon the specific relation. Still it must be carefiiUy observed, that, though general, the relation indicated by the genitive ter- mination, as w^ell as the preposition of, is not iden- tical wdth that which is effected between two nouns by the conjunction " and/' This is evident from the fact that we cannot, in the former case, as in the latter, transpose the connected nouns. When " and" occurs between the words man, and virtue, we can use either of the phrases virtue and man, or man and virtue, and the sense will remain the same; but we cannot transpose them when the genitive ter- mination, or the preposition of, intervenes, without effecting an entire alteration of meaning. " Homo virtutis" and "virtus hominis" have a totally differ- ent signification. The sign of the genitive, indeed, merely intimates that man and virtue are related ; but when w^e say "homo virtutis/' the genitive termination intimates that something is annexed to man. When, on the contrary, we say, " virtus homi- nis," we intimate that something is annexed to virtue. In each, the notion expressed by man, and virtue, is GENITIVE. 79 not the general notion merely, but that in combina- tion with a specific and distinguishing relation. Different modes may be adopted to express the genitive case ; it does not, however, fall within the department of general grammar to give a minute ac- count of them. In English the preposition "of" is inserted between the two nouns ; or the letter s with an apostrophe is added to one of them. Thus we say, "the king's crown/' or "the crown of the king." In the Hebrew language what appears, atfirst sight, a singular rule obtains for the formation of the geni- tive. The change of termination denoting the rela- tion is made on what would be in Greek and Latin the governing word ; while the word governed, in both those languages, undergoes no change, though it is to be considered as in the genitive, and to be translated with the sign of that case ; as if, instead of saying " homo virtutis" to denote a man of virtue, we were to say, " hominis virtus." A little reflection will convince any one, it is con- ceived, that the Hebrew language is in this pecu- liarity of its structure more philosophical than those of Greece and Rome, because it connects the change of termination with that word which undergoes the change of meaning. When, instead of saying "vox, " "populus," I join them together and say, "vox populi," it is the former of the terms that has by their connection undergone a change of meaning, and not the latter. Standing alone, or in the unre- stricted state, it comprehends all voices, for it is the 80 DATIVE. name of the class of voices ; but in the state of con- nexion with populi, in which we have placed it, it means a particular voice only — the voice of the people. The Hebrews, accordingly, and very justly we think, point out the word, whose meaning is thus changed by restriction, by altering its termination, and, instead of " vox populi,'' write " vocis po- pulus." It may perhaps be worth observation that when the genitive is, in English, expressed by the prepo- sition "of" — as in the instance "the voice of the people'' — our language conforms as much as it can do to the Hebrew mode. In the other method of expressing the same relation used by us, viz. " the people's voice," we follow the practice of Eome and Greece, giving the change of termination to that word which remains unchanged in meaning. Both in English and in Hebrew the juxtaposition of two words is sometimes the only sign of the geni- tive case. Thus we say, " cart wheel" " garden wall, " "corn field;" — expressions which really mean wheel of cart ; wall of garden ; field of corn ; and in Hebrew the latter is the order in which the words would be arranged, because with them the modified or restricted word, or, as they call it, the word in the statu regiminis, comes invariably before the other. The Dative and Accusative Cases. For reasons which will shortly appear, it is judged better to consider these cases together, rather than DATIVE AND ACCUSATIVE. 81 separately. The following account has been giVen of the derivation and meaning of the terms. The word dative, is from the Latin word " do/' to give. " It is/' says Johnson, " the epithet to signify the person or thing to which any thing is given." It takes for its sign, in our language, the preposition to or for ; and denotes, accordingly, the relation in which the recipient of some communication stands to him who made it. The accusative case is so denominated from the word " accuse," to accuse, — a word applied to judi- cial purposes ; and, as an accusation necessarily supposes a person against whom it is directed, so the exertion of bodily or mental energy implies an object which receives this energy, or is the object of it, or towards which it is directed. The name of this object is said to be in the accusative case. The preceding account, if it be correct, renders it dif&cult to distinguish, occasionally at least, the dative from the accusative, for the former is some- times used to denote the object which receives the action or energy of a verb. An example of this occurs in the following phrase, — ^' Antonius nocuit Ciceroni." Here the action of hurting is not less clearly represented as passing from Anthony, and received by Cicero, than in the phrase, " Antonius Isecit Ciceronem." Where then is the difference ? The following attempt to discriminate has been made by some grammarians. '' The words laecit and nocuit both express an energy or action passing over to its object; but, in the last case, it so passes 82 DATIVE AND over as to unite the agent with the object, and, in the first case, to unite the action with the object. '' Finis venit imperio/' brings the end and the em- pire into apposition or conjunction. " Deus creavit mundum/' places the action of creating and the world in conjunction. When, therefore, we wish to express the conjunction of the agent and the object, we use the dative ; when we intend to denote that of the action and the object, we employ the ac- cusative. The preceding distinction between these cases is perhaps the best that can be suggested, if it be true that the dative and the accusative do really express the transition of an action. It admits of doubt, however, to say the least, whether the common no- tion of the action passing from one thing to another is not founded in mistake. There seems to be no ground w^hatever for the supposition except in the case of physical actions ; nor is it, even with regard to them, strictly accurate. When a man strikes his horse or his dog, the action of striking does not pass over to them (or they would be striking), though they are doubtless affected — and directly affected — by it. But mental actions — such as loving, hating, fearing, esteeming, &c. can in no respect be con- ceived of as passing over to their respective objects. Though excited by those objects, the actions them- selves begin and terminate in the mind of the agent. They do not ev^en pass over in the sense in which a physical action may be said to pass over Should it be replied, that, as in the case of bodily actions, ACCUSATIVE CASES. 83 the objects are directly affected by these emotions, it may be replied that this is not the case. Our esteem and love of others may be productive of acts by which their objects are affected; but this may not be the case, for it is not necessarily implied in the affections themselves. Should it be replied, again, that the mental actions of which we are speak- ing are conceived of as affecting their objects, if not as passing over to them ; and that, on this account, their names are put in the accusative, it may be asked how this solution can account for the fact, that certain verbs denoting no action at all, either bodily or mental, but quiescent qualities — which affect no object different from that to which they belong — govern the accusative .^ Such are the words " re- semble" in English, and " similare, or simulare," in Latin. ^' Here, as no transition of any act or motion from one object to another takes place," — for there is, in fact, no action to be transferred, — " the accusative cannot be considered as expressing such a transition." These considerations throw great probability upon the opinion of Dr. Dewar, that the foundation for the use of these cases is not the different modes in which an action passes over to its object, but the different transitions of thought in the mind of the speaker, and the different transitions which he at- tempts to produce in the mind of the hearer. With reference to the phrase "dedit mihi dextram," he gave me the right hand — he says, " there is a more ready and rapid transition to the idea expressed in a 2 84 VOCATIVE CASK. the accusative, than to that expressed in the dative ; and the former idea is more necessary to the com- pletion of a significant phrase than the latter. "Dedit dextram/' though an incomplete sentence, is not quite so deficient as "dedit mihi." When the word '^ dedit" is uttered alone, we inquire more impatiently what was given, than to whom it was given. The accusative termination is employed to indicate the idea which the mind most eagerly seeks ; the dative, to denote the secondary and subordinate idea. The Vocative, The term is derived from voco — to call ; its ety- mology suggests, accordingly, that the vocative is the case employed when we call to any thing. It is of course peculiar to nouns which designate persons, because they only can hear and understand what is said to them. It is a fact worthy of observation, that the nominative and the vocative are for the most part alike in termination ; — a fact which seems to indicate that they were not originally reckoned two cases ; — that the nominative was at first employed where we now use the vocative. The conjecture is strengthened by considering the use to which each of these cases is applied. The vocative is used to awaken the attention of the person addressed ; " but when a man hears his own name (i, e. the nomina- tive case), his attention is instantly roused, and he is naturally led to listen to what is said. Hence when one man wished particularly to solicit the at- VOCATIVE CASE. 85 tention of another, he would naturally pronounce his name ;" and thus the nominative case would practically become a vocative, the use of which is always to solicit attention. An objection against this statement would seem to be supplied by the fact that the vocative is not always the same with the nominative ; — and espe- cially that, where it differs from it, it inclines, like the imperatives of verbs, to greater brevity. Thus the vocative of dominus is domine. A very inge- nious attempt has been made by a writer in the Encyclopsedia Britannic a to account for the abbrevi- ation which most Latin nouns of the second declen- sion, ending in us, suffer in the vocative. It cannot, however, be considered satisfactory, as it fails to show why the " s" has been left out in the vocative, and why the " u" has passed there into an " e,'' and not in the nominative. Other writers contend that the vocative was the earliest (a self-evident absur- dity), and so the shortest, form of the noun ; and that a practical regard to the abbreviating principle might operate in direct addresses, requiring the vocative, so as to convey the idea in the shortest time, and with the least expenditure of breath. But why, it may be asked, should this abbreviating principle operate in shortening the vocative and not the nominative, which is used so much more frequently ? Upon the whole, it seems most probable, that the nominative was originally used both to name and to address, a person, — that, afterwards, to secure S6 ABLATIVE CASE. greater accuracy, a distinction between the two was partially effected, but that no satisfactory reason has yet been assigned why the process was not car- ried to completion in all the declensions ; — and, far- ther, why that distinction was sought to be obtained by the abbreviating process in some nouns of the second declension. The Ablative, The word ablative is derived from " ablatum,'' the gerund of " af '" or " adfero,'' — to take from. By those who originally assigned the name to this case, it must then have been conceived to express the relation w^hich is denoted by our preposition from, or the disjunction of one thing from another ; the object represented by the noun, in this case, being considered as the point of commencement of the motion. This is, however, only one among many uses of this case. It is employed to denote causa- tion, instrumentality, connexion, &c. ; and is, accor- dingly, rendered by several of our prepositions, as, for, in, with, by, &c. Some grammarians, con- sidering it in the last degree improbable that one termination should have been originally intended to express so many different relations, have taxed their ingenuity to discover some general relation, comprehensive of all the others, of which it may be supposed to have been primarily the sign. And, if such generic relation can be discovered — a relation which fairly and obviously includes the species of ABLATIVE CASE. 87 instrumentality, causation, connexion, &c. few would be disposed ^to refase assent to their conclusions. The writer of the article Grammar in Rees's Cyclo- pcedia describes it as pointing to the instrument or medium^ by, or through, which an action is performed ; and, of course, considers its meaning to be most fally expressed in such sentences as " scribo calamo," I write with a pen. But when we say, " the ink flowed from my pen," it is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of the pen either as the instrument or medium of the action. The Britannica supposes the generic relation denoted by the ablative to be that of concomitance/, or that one thing accompanies another ; and, though it may be doubted, perhaps, whether this conjecture will easily and sufficiently account for all the in- stances in which the ablative occurs, it is, we think, more comprehensive in its range than that of the former writer. When it is asserted that two things accompany one another, we sometimes infer that one of them is the cause of the other; and we are apt to imagine that what we have merely inferred from what is said, is actually contained in what is said. A similar delusion we very frequently fall into. Language is a much more imperfect instrument of thought than most persons imagine. It frequently expresses not even the half of what is gathered from it. "We sometimes forget this, and charge another, it may be, with affirming a sentiment which exists not in his words, but only as an inference in our minds. To illustrate by examples, which have been 88 ABLATIVE ABSOLUTE. frequently referred to, when we say " templnm clamore petebant," and " pelleo metn/' it [cannot well be supposed that the two ablatives " clamore" and " metu'' express such different relations as those of concomitancy and causation. Nor is it necessary to suppose this. Concomitancy only is in both instances asserted ; but, in the latter, causation is inferred. All that is said is, " they sought the temple in company with clamour," and '' I am pale in company with fear." In the last case, however, the inference is instantly drawn that the i^dj^ p'oduc- ed the paleness ; and " it is because such inferences are drawn with the utmost readiness, and without any sensible interval of time, that grammarians have been deceived into the belief that the meaning inferred is fully expressed in the ablative case." When the w^ords by which this concomitancy is expressed are cut off grammatically from the adjoin- ing ones, they are said to be in the ablative absolute ; as "illo mortuo," he being dead. '^ Caio and Cassio consulibus. " Caius and Cassius being consuls. The words are put in the ablative^ because they denote concomitancy ; the concomitancy of death with the individual denoted by the pronoun he ; and of the consular office with Caius and Cassius. They are farther said to be in the ablative absolute, because they are disjoined from the other parts of the sentence. It is, however, a just and important remark, "that though such phrases, grammatically considered, have no connexion with the rest of the RELATIONS HOW EXPRESSED. 89 sentence, they are introduced to express that on which something else has depended. To express the various relations indicated by the different cases, the Hebrew language prefixes pre- positions to the principal word, and combines them with it. The French and English most generally employ separate prepositions to accomplish this ob- ject ; w^hile the Greek and Latin, using as they do prepositions to govern the cases, yet express rela- tion by the cases themselves. It could not well fail to become a question whether the preference should be given to the Latin or the English mode of denoting relation. On the one hand, it has been alleged, that by means of cases we may secure grea- ter variety in the collocation of words in a sentence ; and, consequently, greater beauty and harmony; — that there is less necessity to attend to punctuation ; and that we get rid of what has been called the " luggage of language.'' On the other hand, it may be fairly and truly stated, that cases render the acquisition of a language a matter of more labour ; that the " luggage" of terminations is more difficult to carry than the "luggage'' of prepositions ; that while prepositions are more simple than cases, they give more distinctness and perspicuity to language ; since, "when adjectives and verbs are far separated from the nouns to which they belong, we must necessarily be prevented from perceiving quickly the speaker's meaning ; nay the distance to which words are thrown from their connexions, must make 90 THE ARTICLE. it difficulty sometimes impossible, to discern certainly tlieir several relations." THE ARTICLE. Most nouns, as we have seen, are the names of classes of objects — of genera and species; and are of themselves able, accordingly, to distinguish one class from another class, but not one individual of any class from another individual belonging to it. Yet the application of distinct names to classes of objects, especially when the classification descends to the infima or lowest species, gives much greater precision to language than it could otherwise possess. When we speak of a substance formed by the hand of God, our phraseology is capable of very extended application, and, therefore, exceedingly indefinite : that substance may be destitute of life, or endowed with it. If, instead of " substance," we employ the term " animal," denoting a very comprehensive spe- cies in the genus substance, — or '^ man," which indi- cates a comparatively limited one, we lose a por- tion of the former generality of expression : and, in proportion as we descend in our classification by the employment of epithets which mark out different species of men — such as black, white, tall, short, good, bad, &c. &c. — in the same proportion do w^e diminish the ambiguity which must always accom- pany the use of a general term without any other word to limit and fix its meaning. Still no general term, how small soever be the THE ARTICLE. 91 class it denotes^ would be sufficient for the purposes of communication. We have occasion to speak of individuals as well as classes ; and hence language must adopt some expedient for denoting the indi- vidual to whom we refer. This is partially accom- plished, as we have seen, by the cases of nouns, or equivalent prepositions ; which, by attaching the sign of a particular relation to the general term, will serve, at least at times, to distinguish the indi- vidual who sustains the relation from all others. Thus we say, ^Hhe father of Newton," or ^^ Newton's father," and thus distinguish that particular father from all others. The same purpose is also secured by the use of the adjective, the almost invariable office of which is, as we shall hereafter see, to re- duce within a more contracted range the application of a general term, by the addition of a circumstance which belongs to a limited part only of the genus or species which that term expresses. The term ma7i denotes the class ; a man an individual included in that class ; a good man one who belongs to a limited part of that class. An additional circumstance at- tached by means of another adjective, would limit the meaning still more; and an accumulation of words of this kind " is capable of affording a combi- nation of sufficiently limited occurrence for any pur- pose of distinctive description." Still this method of limiting the application of general terms can be resorted to only when the dis- tinctive qualities of individuals are known both to us, and to those with whom we converse. We have^ 92 THE ARTICLE. however, frequent occasion to specify individuals whose characters are entirely unknown to us. "We cannot direct the thoughts of others to them by calling them good or bad, wise or foolish, for we are ignorant which of these properties they possess. Yet the necessities of the case require that, by some means, we should indicate the individuals, and even the individual, to whom our own thoughts recur. To enable us to accomplish this, language employs the article, which, as our common grammars tell us, is " a word added to nouns to point them out, and to show how far their signification extends :'' or, more correctly speaking, articles are words employ- ed for the purpose of enabling us, on particular occasions, to employ general terms to denote par- ticular objects. It is manifest, then, that articles, in combination with the general terms limited by them, are equivalent to, or rather become, proper names. They have, however, been commonly called definitives, because they serve to define, or direct the thoughts to, particular objects so as to distinguish them from the other individuals of the class to which they belong. Of words (at all events of methods) adapted to effect this purpose, whether they have been termed by grammarians articles or not, it is impossible that any language can be entirely destitute. Dr. Dewar degrades the article from its rank as a distinct part of speech, and asserts that it is to all intents an adjective. We cannot coincide with this opinion. That the great object and business ENGLISH ARTICLES. 93 of both is to define, there can be no doubt; but they affect this common purpose in so different a manner that it seems necessary to regard them as distinct classes of words. Adjectives define by adding some particular property to the general qualities denoted by the general term, and thus they circumscribe its application ; but the words a, the, this, that, though definitives, are not, as will be afterwards seen, in- dicative of qualities, and, therefore, they are not adjectives. The English articles are usually said to be two, " a" and " the," — the former becoming " an" before a vowel and a silent h. "A" is commonly said to be the indefinite ; and " the," the definite article. They are in truth, however, both definites, since they both circumscribe the application of general terms ; the term man, for instance, unlimited by an article, is taken in its widest sense; ^. e, it denotes all mankind. Thus we say, " the proper study of mankind is man," "where mankind and man may change places without making any alteration in the sense. But let either of the articles of which we are speaking be prefixed to the word man, and that word is immediately reduced from the name of a whole genus, to denote only a single individual ; and instead of the noble truth which this line as- serts, the poet will be made to say, that the proper study of mankind is not the common nature which is diffused through the w^hole human race, but the manners and caprice of one individual. Thus far, therefore, the two articles agree" {%. e. they are both 94 HOW THE ARTICLE definites) ; " but they differ in this ; that though they both limit the specific name to some individual, the article " a" leaves the individual itself unascer- tained; v\'hereas the article "the" ascertains theindi- ^ddual also. Thou art a man, is a very general and harmless position ; but thou art the man, as Nathan said to David, is an assertion capable of striking terror and remorse into the heart." The preceding statements, which affirm that both of the English articles are definite articles, assume that the limitation or circumscription of the general term is effected bi/ the article (an opinion which will be examined presently) ; and that to accomplish such circumscription is the proper busi- ness of the article. Different statements have been given us of the manner in which the article effects this purpose. The learned Mr. Harris, in his Hermes, explains the matter thus. The article "a" indicates a primary perception ; ^^the," an established acquaintance. " I see an object pass by,'' he adds, ^^ which I never saw till now: what do I say? There goes a beggar ^ith a long beard. The man departs, and returns a week after : what do I say then ? There goes the beggar with the long beard. In consequence of the change of the article, the indi- vidual once vague, is now recognized as something known. The article tacitly insinuates a kind of previous acquaintance by referring a present recep- tion to a like perception already past." There are cases, however, in which " the" cannot indicate a previous acquaintance (since none existed), DEFINES. 95 and in which it cannot of course define on the prin- ciple laid down by Mr. Harris. A very apt case is given us in the Britannica. "I am in a room crowded with company," '' I feel it difficult to breathe/' '' and, looking towards the window, I see in it a person whom I never saw before. I instantly send my compliments to tJie gentleman in the window, and request that, if it be not inconvenient, he will have the goodness to let into the room a little air." Now if "the" does not define by intimating a previous acquain- tance as a means of directing the thoughts of the per- son to whom we speak to a particular individual, the question is, " how does it define ?" I reply, that it may be fairly doubted whether the definition or cir- cumscription ascribed to it is really efi'ected by it at all. The fact of the case seems to be, not that it is able, by its own native power and force, to direct the thoughts of the hearer to a specific individual, but that it is a sign merely that the speaker refers to a specific individual, to whom the mind of the hearer is led by circumstances which cannot fail to secure this result. Let us take Harris's own ex- ample. " There goes the beggar with the long beard." Here no doubt the thoughts of the hearer are guided, in consequence of the use of this article, to a particular beggar; but the question is, what in reality guides them to him .^ Is it the article itself.^ I answer, no ; the article is incapable of doing this. It is a mere sign that the speaker intends a specific beggar, and the hearer mfers, fiom previous circum- stances, that the mendicant who had been seen the 96 HOW THE ARTICLE week before is the one meant. In cases where there exist no peculiar circumstances to lead the mind of a hearer to a particular individual, the employment of the definite article would fail to do it; i, e, in other words, the article itself does not define. I might even say, " the friend is here," to a person who, toge- ther with myself, had had much delightful inter- course with him, yet the words would leave him in doubt to whom I referred ; unless, indeed, our com- mon affection for that friend surpassed our love for any other : and, in that case, this distinguishing circumstance w^ould define the general term friend, and not the accompanying definite article. Substantially the same statements in regard to the destitution of power in the article " the" to define have been given by Dr. Dewar ; and, as the subject is one of considerable importance, I shall lay them before the reader. "It is a mistaken notion to consider it as possessing the power of distinguishing the application of a generic name to an individual from the use of that name in a less definite accepta- tion. It has not this power in a greater degree than adjectives." (Dr. Dewar says, "other" adjec- tives, in conformity with his opinion that the article is an adjective.) " If we speak of ' the man,' w^e no more distinguish any individual than when we say, ^ a man ;' and not so much as when we say, 'a wise man.' " In this respect there seems to be a radical, and, as far as I know, an unobserved difference between the articles "the" and "a" or "an." The latter DEFINES. 97 of itself, or by its own meaning and power defines ; for it is, in fact, an abbreviation of the numeral one, — spelled and pronounced, to this day, in Scot- land, ane. This opinion is farther confirmed by the fact, that, " in the French, the indefinite article "un,'' and the cardinal " un," or one, are precisely the same." In this respect, therefore, our indefinite article is more definite than the definite itself; for, even if the conjecture of Home Tooke should be correct, viz. that the word " the'' is the imperative of a Saxon verb ; and that, accordingly, the meaning of the words " the man'' is " take man," there would be nothing in this phrase itself to lead the thoughts of the hearer to a specific individual. Without defining circumstances, " take man has been here," would leave us in as much uncertainty what par- ticular man was meant, as " the man has been here." This view of the nature of the article the, viz. that it is a mere sign to intimate that the speaker or writer refers to a specific individual, may throw some light upon the apparently anomalous use of the article. It is a general law of the English language not to employ it in connexion with proper names, or terms which are equivalent to them. And the reason assigned is the following ; " being in their own nature definitives," says Harris, "they cannot of course be united with those" (words) " which are already as definite as may be," (which is the case with proper names), "nor yet with those which, being indefinite, cannot be made otherwise. It 98 Harris's account of remains, then, that they must be such as, though indefinite, are yet capable, through the article, of becoming definite." In illustration of this general statement, Harris proceeds to say, " upon these principles we see the reason why it is absurd to say " the I," or " the thou," because nothing can make these pronouns more definite than they are." " Nei- ther can we say '' the both," because it is in its own nature perfectly definite. Thus if it be said, I have read both poets, the expression plainly refers to a definite pair. If, on the contrary, it be said, I have read two poets, the expression may mean any pair whatever. And because two, when standing alone, has reference to some indefinite perception, while the article the has reference to some definite one, we see the reason why it is bad English to say " two the men." Such syntax is, in fact, a blending of incompatibilities,— that is to say, of a defined substantive with an undefined attributive. On the contrary, to say, both the men, is good and allowable, because the substantive cannot possibly be less apt, by being defined, to coalesce with an attributive which is defined as well as itself. So likewise it is correct to say, the two men ; because here the article, being placed in the beginning, extends its power as well through the numeral adjective, as the substan- tive, and equally contributes to define them both.'' Yet, though Harris has correctly stated the gene- ral law, in reference to the use of the English article, there exist important exceptions, of which, perhaps, no satisfactory account can by him be given. When ANOMALIES IN ITS USE. 99 the genitive case is formed by the preposition of, as in such instances as ^Maw of God/' ^^ gospel of Christ/' "voice of the people/' where the words "law/* "gospel/' and "voice/' are, by apposition, rendered as definite as though they were proper names, w^e invariably, if my memory does not fail me, use the article. — thus, " the law of God," &c. &c. i, e. we " unite" the article with words which are " as definite as may be." This is not the case in the Hebrew. The first of the two words, thus con- joined, does not, in that language, take the article ; the latter, if indefinite, does ; as it does also with us. The Hebrews would write " voice of the man." Thus anomalous is the use of the English article, but in the Greek language, the anomaly is still greater. Though, in the cases just referred to, we "unite" the article wdth defined general terms, we never use it in connexion with proper names. The Greeks sometimes employ it in both cases, and sometimes not. Nay, Mr. Stewart, in his " Hints respecting the Greek article," speaks of it as a com- mon principle of the Greek language, that definite nouns should take the article, i. e, according to the ordinary conceptions of the ofiice of the article, that articles should be employed when there is no work for them to do. And, when remarking upon a rule laid down by Matthise — viz. that "when the noun is of itself sufficiently specific, so that no distinction from other like things is required, the article 7nay be omitted," (one might have expected him to say, the article rmist be omitted) — i, e, Mr. S., says H 2 100 ANOMALIES. "one might be almost tempted to say, the very reason why the article is demanded ^ is the reason why it may be omitted.'*' The statements of this writer appear to me exceedingly perplexed and con- tradictory. He admits that the article is nsed for the purpose of effecting specification; and yet, in the words jnst quoted, he represents it as a law of the language that, when this specification is effected by the definite character of the noun, the article which was to perform the work of specification must still be employed; instead, as we should think, of being omitted, simply on the ground that it has then no office to perform. Without dwelling farther on Mr. Stewart's contra- dictions, some of which have been recently and ex- cellently exposed by Dr. Davidson in his late w^ork on Biblical Criticism, I would fix attention upon the fact that great anomalies exist in the use of the article, — anomalies of which it will be found, to say the very least, exceedingly difficult to give any plausible account, while the theory is held that the article is really a definite, or that the specification is made by it. On that theory it would be prepos- terous to use it when the specification was already made ; i. e. in connexion with a noun defined by its adjuncts, or its very nature ; and yet it is thus em- ployed with us in certain cases, and with the Greeks in many. These anomalies appear to me to be partially, if not entirely, accounted for by the doctrine laid down in the previous page ; viz. that the article is not a definite, but a premonitory sign that, MORE ARTICLES THAN TWO. 101 though the speaker or writer employs a general term, he wishes the thoughts of his hearers or readers to revert to a particular individual comprehended under that term. If this be the correct view of the nature and ofi&ce of the article, there is evidently more room left for the employment of it " pro lubitu scriptoris," as Mr. Stewart expresses it. If the noun be itself defined, there is no need to utter the premonitory sign. The noun itself, by its definite character, will do the work of the article. On the other hand, there is nothing Xo forbid the use of it. It is not employed, as Harris's doctrine represents it, to do what had been done already. All that can be said is, that the use of it is then unnecessary ^ unless it be thought to have the effect of awakening attention, and thereby of giving emphasis, — an effect which seems to be intended by the singular reduplication of definites in the Hebrew, as in such phrases as the following, — " the day, the this or that, day." I have said that the English language is generally supposed to possess two articles only, — the two, ^. e, which have just been considered. There can be little doubt, however, that several other words belong also to the class of articles, or definitives; at least that, in certain uses of them, they are such. " If," says an able writer, " the office of an article be to define and ascertain" (or if they are premonitory signs that a definite reference is intended) " the words this, that, as well as any, some, all, &c. which are commonly called pronominal adjectives, or demonstrative pronouns, are more properly articles 102 MORE ARTICLES than any thing else, and as such should be con- sidered in universal grammar. Thus when we say, " this picture we approve, but that we dislike ;" what do we perform by the help of the words this, and that, but bring down the common appellation to denote individuals, the one as the more near, the other as the more remote ? So when we say, " some men are virtuous, but all men are mortal,'' what is the natural effect of this all, and some, but to define that universality and particularity which would remain indefinite were we to take them away ? The same is evident in such instances as, " some sub- stances have sensation, others want it/' " Choose any way of acting, and some men will find fault ;" for here, some, other, and any, serve all of them to define different parts of a given whole ; " some" to denote any indeterminate part ; ^^ any," to denote an indefinite mode of acting, no matter what ; and *^ other," to denote the remaining part, when a part has been assumed already." " That the word "this" or "that" is, at any rate in some of its uses, equivalent to the, is indisputable. It would be perfectly so in the speech of Nathan to David already referred to ; where " thou art that man " would convey exactly the same idea. It follows, therefore, that the Latin language is not destitute of the article, as has been sometimes afi&rmed; for "hie or " ille " exactly answers to our that, and the words of Nathan may be rendered, in Latin, ^tu es ille homo.' The Greeks and the Hebrews, it is admit- ted, possessed the definite article. In the former it THAN TWO. 103 is 0, 7], TO] in the latter n (he) which answers to it, and is a plain abbreviation of the pronoun H)iiy or w»rr. Neither of these learned languages possesses what we call an indefinite article. It is said to be unnecessary, because the noun, without any article, denotes its undefined state ; and, further, because in languages in which the nouns, adjectives, and verbs, have inflections, no mistake can arise from the want of the indefinite article ; because it can always be known by the termination of the noun, and the verb, and by the circumstances predi- cated of the noun, whether a whole species or an individual is intended." This would be correct if, when a noun was taken to denote a whole species, it was always considered plural, and practically treated as such ; but this is not the case. In the phrase "man is mortal," the word man is considered singular, and connected with a singular verb — a verb known to be such. It is hence impossible to ascertain from the verb whether the term is intended to denote the whole species, or one individual mere- ly ; and it must be equally impossible to ascertain this, from the termination of any adjective, or verb, referring to it, in the Latin language. I cannot but think, therefore, that in the possession of an indefi- nite article, our language is superior to those of Greece and Rome. THE ADJECTIVE. The reason which led to the adoption of this 104 ADJECTIVES. term, as the name of the class of words denoted by it, is apparent. When first employed for this pur- pose, the words comprehended in the class must have been regarded as adding something to the idea expressed by the substantives with which they are conjoined. The noun " man " denotes a species of animals, and is a sign of those qualities only in which the whole species participates. The term " good " is a sign of a particular quality possessed by some of the species only ; and, when conjoined with the noun, it is supposed to add this particular property to the general properties of the class. Adjectives, then, are the names of properties in their concrete state, i. e, when conceived of as in- hering in substances. When a quality is thought of apart from any substance, the name by which it is denoted, in that state, is not an adjective, but a substantive. It then becomes, in our conceptions^ a thing, capable of supporting properties of its own. Hence it is called a noun ; and, in consequence of the conceived act by which the separation between the quality and the substance is effected, an ahsti'act noun. Now, as the adjective is the name of the quality in the concrete state, it is manifestly equi- valent to the abstract quality, together with a sign of connexion with some substance. Good is more than goodness. It denotes the entire quality ex- pressed by the latter term ; but it includes, in addi- tion, the relation embodied in the preposition " of. " A good man is a man -p/ goodness. The importance THEIR USE. 105 of this remark will more fully appear when we ad- vance to the consideration of the relative pronoun. Yet, though every adjective is significant of an attribute and a connexion which may be expressed by the preposition " of," the exact kind of connexion can only be gathered, in most cases at least, from our knowledge of the attribute and the substance to which it is affirmed to belong. This has been aptly illustrated by the following instance : " Color salu- bris," — a healthful colour, or colour of health, — sig- nifies a colour that indicates health. " Exercitatio salubris," — healthful exercise, or exercise of health — means not an exercise that indicates health, as in the former instance, but preserves it. " Yictus sa- lubris," — healthful food, or food of health — denotes not food which preserves merely, but improves health. " Medicina salubris," — healthful medicine, or medicine of health — means not medicine which indicates, or preserves, or improves, but restores health. In all these cases the connexion exist- ing between the quality and the diff"erent nouns with which it stands connected, is different; and we are thrown entirely upon our general knowledge of the facts, and the subject, to discover its precise nature. The usual and proper effect of adjectives, as we have formerly stated in somewhat different terms, is to secure the particular application of a general term. It does this by adding a particular quality to the general qualities denoted by the general term ; so that the latter term, though capable of doing more, 106 THE USE will only direct the thoughts of the hearer to the individual or individuals who possess this quality. I have occasion^ for example^ to speak of^ and direct attention to^ a particular man. The word man, is too general for my purpose. It may be applied to every individual of the human race. It can, of itself, only direct the thoughts to the class man in distinction from other classes. In what way, then, do I proceed so as to make that general term — in connexion at least with its adjuncts — call up the idea of a particular person ? I annex to it, or con- join with it, such words as are significant of indivi- dual or personal properties, — properties which serve to distinguish him from all other men. Thus I say, a prudent man, a wise man, a great man, &c. By this addition of signs, significant of particular pro- perties, the general term man is modified, as it is sometimes expressed, so that it can only be applied now to certain men — to those men to whom belong the qualities expressed by the adjectives, prudent, wise, great, &c. If it be still too general for my purpose, I can add to it the signs of other qualities and circumstances, till I render it impossible to apply it to more than one man in the world. Thus the strict and legitimate office of the adjec- tive is, as we have seen, to limit a general term by adding some particular conception to it. A serious mistake has been committed by some writers, in reference to this point, in their efforts to show that two distinct classes of adjectives are formed by the process jnst described. ^^In thus adding to the concep- OF ADJECTIVES. 107 tion we have of an object/' says one of these writers, " there are two distinct processes of mind carried on, by virtue of which we form two distinct classes of adjectives. This division arises solely from the effects produced by their use and application. Some adjectives increase or extend the conception^ denoted by the substantive, by adding to it other conceptions. But other adjectives limit or restrict the significa- tion of the substantives to which they are appended. When I say, the dazzling sun, or an enlivening day, I enlarge the amount of conceptions conveyed by the words sun and day. But when I say, a poor though virtaous and pious man, I limit the substan- tive man by the epithets prefixed to it. The term man is general, but in proportion to the addition of epithets of which particular qualities are described, I contract the signification of the general term, and appropriate it to an individual object." I have quoted this passage because it affords an apt illustration of the error against which the reader is here cautioned, and into which the sound and ap- pearance of words renders us very liable to fall. The adjective, " dazzling, " expresses a positive idea, — " poor,'' a negative or privative one. What more natural, then, than to suppose that the former adds, and the latter takes away, something from the nouns to which they are prefixed ? The main mis- take of this writer — a mistake occasioning the ob- scurity which hangs over the passage quoted — lies in confounding or identifying the two words signifi- cation, and application. Adjectives never contract 108 THE USE the signification of the nouns to which they are attached. It is adverse to their nature to do this. They invariably add to the signification of the noun ; or rather, for that is the more correct way of repre- senting it, the noun, combined with the adjective, has in it a greater amount of signification, than when standing alone. And by thus adding to the signification of the noun, the adjective limits its application ; for, when the noun, by the addition of the adjective, conveys a larger amount of conception, its application must have a diminished range. " When I say," is the language of the writer just referred to, "the dazzling sun, I enlarge the amount of conception conveyed by the word sun.'' Here he is right, at least partially so, as there is more mean- ing in the phrase " dazzling sun,'' than in the word " sun" itself. Here he justly adds, " there is evi- dently added the particular idea of dazzling to the general idea of sun." And, on this account, the application of the term sun is diminished. It cannot be applied to the sun in all states of brilliancy, but in one particular state only. "But when," adds this writer, " I say a poor though virtuous and pious man, I" do what ? Why limit, or decrease the amount of conception conveyed by the term man, we should expect him to say, in harmony with his previous statements. "What he actually says, however, is this, "I limit the substantive man." Now, if he had meant to intimate that, by the introduction of these adjectives, he limited the application of the term man, we might reply that he had done no more OF ADJECTIVES. 109 than he had done in the former case. He evidently means, however, that he has limited the conception conveyed by the word man, since he afterwards talks of contracting the signification of the general term. And in this statement he is manifestly in error. If, by adding the particular idea of dazzling to the general idea of sun, he increases the amount of " conception" conveyed by the term sun, in like manner by adding the particular idea of poverty to the general idea of man, he enlarges the amount of " conception'' conveyed by the general term man. He does not restrict the " conception'' in either case ; he enlarges it in both ; and by enlarging the concep- tion, or the amount of meaning contained in the general term, — or rather, as w^e have said, contained in the clause consisting of the noun and the adjec- tive—he diminishes the range of its application. And it may be remarked, as a general law, that the only w^ay to limit the application of nouns is thus to increase their " conception." The preceding statements exhibit, without dis- pute, the general object and use of the adjective. Cases of exception, or of apparent exception, do, how- ever, sometimes occur. There are instances in which the adjective does not seem to modify or limit the application of the substantive with which it is joined, but in which the abstract noun involved in the adjective is modified or limited — or seems to be so — by the accompanying substantive. Livy, speaking of the abolition of the regal authority at Rome, says that monarchy existed there " ab ur- 110 ADJECTIVES, be condita, ad liberatam ;" i. e. literally, from the city built to the city delivered. This, however, is thought to convey no meaning. The obvious sense of the words is said to be, from the building (the ab- stract noun involved in condita) to the deliverance (the abstract noun involved in liberatam) of the city. Here it is said, the noun city, with which the adjec- tives condita and liberatam are connected, modifies the abstract nouns involved in them. The general no- tions of building, and deliverance, are rendered parti- cular by their common connexion with the word city. It is the building and deliverance of the city of which the historian speaks. Now, if no explanation of such idioms can be given which would show that they do not involve a departure from the general law, " they must be considered," as it has been well observed, ^' as arbitrary inversions of the parts of speech, which do not invalidate the original subserviency of the ad- jective to the substantive noun." It is not, however, certain that no explanation can be given. Why may not the words urbe condita, and urbem liberatam, be rendered the built city, and the delivered city, and the phrases be understood to mean, from the time when the city became a built city, to the time when it became a delivered city. Thus rendered and understood, the adjectives obvi- ously effect the ordinary work of adjectives, — they modify the nouns to which they are attached. The ancient languages of Greece and Kome invest adjectives with the distinctions of gender, number, &c., {. e, they vary the termination of adjectives to WHETHER VARIED. Ill make them correspond with the gender and number, &c. of the nouns to which they belong, (as "bonus homo/' " bona mulier;" "boni homines," " bonee mu- ieres,") the English retain an invariable form. Thus we say "a good man," "a good woman ;" " good men," " good women." In reference to this diversity, the only question which can be touched upon here, is, " are there any general principles of language which decide in favour of one mode rather than the other?" "We think there are such principles. "An attribute," as it has been justly said, " admits of no change in its nature, whether it belong to a man, or a woman," (truth is the same virtue or thing in both sexes,) " to one person or to many ; and therefore the words expressive of attributes ought, on all occasions and in every situation, to be fixed and immutable: for as the qualities good and bad, black and white, are the same whether they be applied" (belong) "to a man or a woman, to many or to few, so the word which expresses any one of these attributes ought iu strict- ness to admit of no alteration with whatever sub- stantive it may be joined." Such we think is the order of nature ; and this order the English lan- guage, on this, as on other occasions, most strictly observes ; for we say equally, a good man or a good woman, good men, or good women, a good house, or good houses. In the ancient languages which ex- pressed relations by varying the termination of the noun, and employed sentences" (as they appear to us, at least) "of inverted structure, it was necessary to vary the adjective that the termination might in- 112 DEGREES OF COMPARISON. dicate the word with which it should be understood in connexion." One variation, however, the adjective must in all languages undergo, since it is founded in nature ; its common grammatical designation is, '' Degrees of Comparison." Adjectives, as we have seen, denote qualities in their concrete state ; but qualities in this state are capable of what Harris calls extension or remission; i, e. as he says, "of more or less." Some substances may possess them in a greater, and others inalesser degree. Thus of three things resembling each other in colour, the wall may be white, — paper whiter, — and snow may be the whitest of all. Language must, accordingly, have some method of indicating the comparative amount in which the same quality is possessed by different substances, — the degree,for instance, in which snow is whiter thanpaper, and one man more wise, or good, or tall than another. The methods adopted in language to denote this are tech- nically called degrees of comparison. A difficulty, however, presents itself here, built upon the impossibility of determining the precise amount of qualities as they are found in substances. In the case of such as can be exactly measured, the degree of excess, when there is excess, may be exactly as- certained. This is not, however, the case with quali- ties in general. Between the first simple white, and the superlative whitest, there are infinite degrees of more white ; and the same may be said of more wise, more good, more tall, &c. How is language DEaREES OF COMPARISON. 113 to mark these numerous or rather numberless de- grees " of extension and remission." A moment's re- flection will convince us that the thing cannot be done ; and a second reflection will teach us that the doing of it is fortunately as unnecessary as it is im- practicable ; that it is sufficient to answer all the purposes of language, to have some mode of express- ing the quality ; of expressing simple comparative excess or deficiency ; and, again, the greatest amount of excess or deficiency, in the quality. Language cannot of course be more precise and perfect than thought ; so that, as we cannot fix upon the number of degrees of white between white and whitest, lan- guage mast necessarily leave that indeterminate in expression, which is so in conception. We have said that degrees of comparison are the modes employed by language to express the different amount in which the same quality is possessed by dif- ferent substances. As to the number of the degrees of comparison, the preceding statements would seem to indicate that there must be three, and three only ; the positive, to denote that the quality is possessed in the common or ordinary degree, — the comparative, in more or less than the ordinary degree, — the superla- tive, in the highest or lowest degree. These three de- grees seem, to exhaust the capabilities both of thought and of language. Grammarians are not, however, agreed as to the number of degrees of comparison. The more prevalent opinion is, perhaps, that two only exist, viz. the comparative and superlative ; and that w^hat is very frequently at least called the positive degree, ^^is the simple state of the adjective. Even 114 DEaREES OF COMPARISON, two, however, seem to be too many for the Encyclo- paedia Britannica. '' The doctrine of grammarians/' says the writer of the article Grammar, in that work, " about three degrees of comparison, positive, com- parative, and superlative must be absurd, both be- cause in their positive there is no comparison at all, and because their superlative is a comparative as much as the comparative itself." The denial that any comparison is involved in the positive is yet more strongly made by a late writer. " Ail adjec- tive," says this writer, " denoting the quality, &c. considered by itself, without reference to the attri- butes of any other, is said to be in the positive state, as, ' John is a diligent boy.' In this example," he adds, ^^ diligent is an adjective in the positive state, because it indicates the accidental property of the boy John, without reference to any other boy w4th whose diligence his might be compared." Were it necessary, which we shall soon see is not the case, it would be perfectly easy to meet and over- turn the assertion that no comparison is involved in the positive. Murray has done it by intimating "that the adjective may be supposed to imply a secret or general reference to other things, as when we say, ' he is a tall man,' we make some reference to the ordinary size of men." I cannot but wonder that this writer should have spoken so hesitatingly upon the subject. Many qualities owe their exist- ence even to comparison, so that the simple adjec- tive could not be had without it. There is no abso- lutely tall man. Tallness is manifestly a relative quality. Our notion of it is altogether the result of DEGREES OF COMPARISON. 115 comparison. If one man only existed, he would be neither tall nor short ; and, were there such dispro- portions in the size of the race as some writers have fabled, the tall man of one country would be a short man in another, and the short man of the latter a tall one in the former. A tall man is one who is of higher stature than the majority of his fellows ; i, e. he is so by comparison with them. There is not Jess of comparison implied in the words, a tall man, than in the other form, a very tall man. The dif- ference in the two expressions is not that in the one, comparison is made, and, in the other, not. It is to be found in the class with which the comparison is made. A tall man is compared with men gene- rally, with the class man ; a taller man is compared with the class " tall men." But, though comparison is thus really involved in the positive, as w^e take the liberty to call it, it is not, we repeat, necessary to prove this. The contro- versy in reference to the number of degrees of com- parison is little better than a logomachy. The ob- jections, boih of Smith and of the Britannica, to which reference has been made, are founded, we think, upon the mere phraseology. They may pos- sibly prove that a better mode of designating what we now express by the words, " degrees of compa- rison," might have been adopted ; but they fail to show that there is not a real foundation in nature for the common threefold division. The objectors have thought more of words than things. In " de- grees of comparison^' — the thought has struck them as the words fell from their lips — there must be both i2 116 DEGREES OF COMPARISON. comparison^ and degrees^ or steps ; but there is no step, no advance in the positive. It is only when we pass on to the comparative that we have a step^ or degree. The positive is not, therefore, a degree ; and, if not a degree, far less is it a degree of com- parison, for it involves no comparison at all. The objection, we think, rests upon phraseology. We are not very anxious to defend that ; but the point we maintain, is, that there is a real foundation in nature for the use of some signs in language, what- ever they may be, and however they may be called, to denote the possession of the ordinary amount of the quality — simple excess or defect — and the highest degree of the one and the other. It has been said of the superlative that its office is to denote the greatest excess or deficiency of the quality, as most wise, least wise, &c. That this is the general law with respect to its office and work, appears to us undoubted, though there are anomalous cases which seem, at first view, to pre- sent some difficulty. Instances, in our language, have been referred to, in which the comparative seems to denote a larger measure of the quality than the superlative itself. " Socrates was the wisest of the Athenians, but Solomon was wiser than he." This might be admitted to be a real anomaly, — if we should be unable to show that it is only such in appearance — ^wdthout surrendering the general doctrine, taught above, concerning the office of the superlative. The instance just brought for- ward is the consequence of the different manner in DKOREES OF COMPARISON. 117 which the comparative and superlative are with us used. Let it, then, be observed that the latter is only employed when we compare an individual with the species to which, at the time at least, we con- ceive it to belong, — or one species with the genus under which it is comprehended. "When the com- parative is used, the objects compared are set in direct opposition to each other, and the one is con- sidered not as a part of the other, or comprehended under it, but as something altogether distinct, and belonging to a different class. Thus we could not say, " Cicero was more eloquent than any Roman," because he was a Roman, ^. e, included in the class Romans ; but we might say, if truth allowed, he was more eloquent than any Briton, because, not being a Briton, he may be set in opposition to them. Cases of this kind — in which the circumstance which directs the employment of the comparative or the superlative is not the degree of the quality possessed by the objects compared — are so numerous as to lead Dr. Dewar to suggest that the two should be called not different " degrees," but "modes," of com- parison. Now, that in the instances mentioned above, as well as in many others, they are really modes of comparison — perhaps rather "modes*' than "degrees" — maybe allowed; but the definition of the comparative and the superlative, as " modes of comparison" merely, would manifestly be too limited, not comprehending many cases in which they occur. The true doctrine may perhaps be, that they are both modes, and degrees ; so that they may be oc- 118 DEGREES OF COMPARISON. casionally employed for one of these purposes to the exclusion of the other. Grammarians have been in the habit of making a distinction between superlatives of eminence, and su- perlatives of comparison. We may, say they, " sim- ply affirm that a certain quality is possessed by an individual in an eminent degree ; or we may com- pare it with a similar quality in others, and affirm its superiority." The former is the comparison of eminence, — the latter of comparison. " Johnson was a very learned man," is an instance of the former ; — " Johnson was the most learned of men," of the latter. This appears to be a distinction without a diiference. The two expressions are surely only two modes of saying the same thing. The remarks formerly made in reference to the positive degree are equally appli- cable here. Comparison, though not intimated, must be involved ; for how can we pronounce a man " very learned" without thinking oi the amount of his know- ledge, in comparison with that of others 1 None of the preceding remarks in reference to comparison are of course applicable to such qualities as are incapable of intension and remission. Of this nature are those which result from, or rather consist in, the figures of bodies, as " circular, quadrangular and triangular." These qualities cannot be posses- sed in different degrees. One circle, or one triangle, may be larger than another, but it cannot be more circular or triangular. Different modes may be adopted, and are adopt- ed, to denote " remission and intension." A letter PRONOUNS. 119 or letters may be added to the positive state of the adjective, as wise, wiser, wisest ; or separate words may he employed, as very excellent, most excellent. The consideration of these diversities lies, however, rather within the department of particular than of general grammar. PRONOUNS. The general opinion formerly held concerning the class of words bearing this designation, is sufficiently indicated by the term itself. They were considered ^^ PRONOMiNA," i, e. words used "for,'' or instead of ''nouns'' Our subsequent remarks will, we think, render it manifest that this designation mistakes al- together the nature and office of the personal pronoun, if not those of others. It will help us to conceive aright of the nature of the personal pronouns, to remember that, in the case of every human being, there exist peculiarities of character, or circumstances, or relations which serve to distinguish him from every one else. These pecu- liarities, especially those which consist in relations, like the material objects by which we are surrounded, have names given to them, as father, mother, child, &c. ; and, accordingly, when we wish to direct the thoughts of those to whom we speak to an individ- ual bearing any one of these relations, we may do it by uttering the name of the distinguishing relation, perhaps even more certainly than by calling him by his proper name. Such distinguishing relations may 120 PERSONAL PRONOUNS be numerous. The same man may be a father, a child, a husband, a brother, a subject, or a sovereign. Some of them may be comparatively Jl?^r??^a/^e/^^, as the above; others maybe incidental and temporary, as patient, creditor, debtor, plaintiff, defendant, wit- ness, culprit, &c. And, it must be especially no- ticed, that the name of any one even of the more fleeting and temporary relations — those which exist one moment and perish the next — (as witness, which is only sustained while the person is delivering his testimony) will as effectually serve the purpose of specification, or of making known the individual re- ferred to, as the name of any of the more permanent relations, if not more so. To say the '' witness'* says so, while he is giving evidence, would more cer- tainly direct the thoughts of the person addressed to him, than to say, the ''father^' or " John Jones'' (his supposed proper name) says so. Now, among the fleeting and temporary relations which distinguish certain men from others, may be classed the places they occupy in conversation. One may be the speaker, another the person spoken to, a third, the person spoken of. Each bears a peculiar and distinguishing relation, both to one another, and to those who hear the conversation, if there be any. The words then, /, tliou^ he, &c. are the names of these relations, as obviously so as the word father is the name of a relation. « T' is the name of the relation sustained, for the moment, by the person addressing another, or others ; it is equivalent with " the speaker:' " Thxm'' is the name of the relation ARE NOUNS. 121 sustained by him to whom he addresses himself; it is equivalent to " the person addressed!' He is the name of the relation sustained by him of whom he says something \ it is equivalent to the person of whom something is said. The preceding statement of the first and second persons agrees substantially with the account given of them by the Britannic a, though we think that account is a little deficient in regard to precision. " The first denotes the speaker " (rather the relation sustained by him) " as characterized by the present act of speaking, in contradistinction to every other character which he may bear. The second denotes the party addressed, as characterized by the present circumstance of being addressed, in contradistinction to every other character, &c.'' Had the writer said that /, and thou, are names of the relations sus- tained by the speaker and the hearer, at the moment, his statement would have been more dis- tinct and precise than it is ; yet in substance it is correct and important. We dissent, however, from him altogether in reference to his account of the third person. " It is," he says, "merely a negation of the other two, as the neuter gender is a negation of the masculine and feminine f it is not," he adds, " the speaker, nor the person addressed, but the subject of conversation!' It is not easy to conjec- ture what is meant by the assertion that "the third is a negation of the first and second," unless it be that the third is not the first, nor the second. And, if this be the meaning, it might be said, with as 122 PERSONAL PRONOUNS much propriety, that the second is a negation of the first, and the first of the second, as that the third is a negation of both. Besides, if it be a correct defi- nition of the third, that it is the subject of conversa- tion, then the first and second persons become the third, — the former when he talks about himself ^ — and the latter when he is talked to concerning him- self. "We are somewhat surprised that this sagacious writer has failed to complete his own doctrine by stating, what is obviously the case, that the third person denotes the relation sustained by the person or thing of which something is said. If he failed to do this under the influence of the recollection, as we suspect, that the third person may denote a thing, as well as a person, we reply, that that is an unessen- tial matter. A thing may sustain the relation of which the third person is the sign, though it cannot bear that which is denoted by the first and second. A thing may be the being talked about, though it cannot be either the being that speaks, or that is addressed. The preceding account of the personal pronouns justifies our denial a short time ago that they are pronomina. They are not used instead of nouns; they are nouns as truly so as proper names them- selves. To illustrate this assertion, let it be observed, that the term "patient," is not the name of any existing being, as the term " tree," or "house;" but the name of a relation by which one person may be distinguished from another. We, accordingly, ar- range it in the same class in which we place all the ARE NOUNS. 123 names of relations ; ^. e. in the class of nouns, not of pronouns. It has no title to be placed in the latter class. It is not used instead of the proper name of the individual ; for his proper name would not convey the whole of the idea suggested by the term '- patient/' it would fail to express the impor- tant and distinguishing fact of his being under medi- cal care and direction. Similar remarks may be made with regard to the personal pronouns, as they are usually called; for it is a very just remark, that " when the names of two persons conversing together are known to each other, they cannot by the use of their names express all that these pronouns express. There is a manifest difference between saying '- George did this," and " I did this." Nor would the power of the pronoun be completely supplied by the name even with the additional aid of indication by the hand. When one says to another, with whom he is conversing, James did so and so, it is surely not equivalent with, you did so and so ; if such were the case, one might pertinently ask, when both persons are known to each other, why do they use the per- sonal pronouns ? In short, it is manifest that the proper names of these individuals would not express that circumstance by which they are temporarily distinguished, and exhibited as temporarily distin- guished, from all others. The personal pronouns, then, as we call them, are not substitutes for nouns, ^. e. are not pronomina. This, at least, can no more be affirmed with truth of them, than of the terms parent, king, subject, debtor, creditor, &c. They 124 WERE PARTICIPLES. are the names of relations ; and^ with reference to them, as well as the terms parent, &c. with which they have jnst been compared, " it is probably mos* accurate not to consider one as substituted for ano- ther, but to consider each as rendered proper, on particular occasions, when a complete and interesting distinction is thus formed/' It is the opinion of many learned men, that the personal pronouns were originally participles, equi- valent in meaning with the phrases, ^^the person speaking," — ^^ the person spoken to," — and ^Hhe person spoken of" With this opinion the following conjectural derivation of the first and third person exactly agrees, — and both with the doctrine here propounded with respect to the nature of these pro- nouns. The late Professor Young, of Glasgow, was of opinion that the lirst personal pronoun, both in Greek and Latin, eycj, was originally eycov, and that this w^as an abbreviation of Xeyojv, the speaking per- son. Home Tooke derives the third personal pro- noun neuter from an old Gothic word, '- Haitan,*' signifying to name ; from which came, in the first place, het, or hit, and afterwards our word, " it, " de- noting the thing last mentioned. Personal pronouns have number, because, as it is commonly said, the nouns for which they stand are susceptible of that variation. Those who regard them as pronomina may deem this reason for in- vesting them with this attribute sufficient ; but we who place them in the class of nouns, must obvi- ously seek for another; and that is clearly supplied HAVE NUMBER, ETC. 125 by the fact, that many persons may speak at once, or that one, on behalf of others, may give utterance to the sentiments entertained in common by them. One person, also, or many, may be addressed, or be the subject of discourse. Pronouns, then, which denote the relations of speaker — person addressed — and of the person or thing spoken of, must admit of the variation of number. The grammatical anomaly prevails in almost all modern languages, of using the plural form of the second person, when addressing an individual. The principle on whicli this practice commenced is not very obvious. Perhaps, when censure had to be conveyed, it was felt, or thought, to be less offensive to employ a form of the pronoun which seemed to afford the person addressed the possibility of con- ceiving of some one else as the culprit. It may have been deemed, on this account, more polite, and so have become the ordinary mode of address. The rule at present seems to be, never to use the singular form of this pronoun except when we wish very strongly to mark unity, or singularity, — when the being designated " thou'' stands in some sense emi- nently alone. Thus we adopt it in solemn addresses to the Deity, to intimate " that he is God alone, and that there is none like him ; and, again, in contemp- tuous and very familiar language, to intimate that the person of whom we speak is the meanest of human beings, or the dearest and most familiar of our friends ; as, thou scoundrel, or, thou best belov- ed.'' It is a rule on no account to be violated, that 126 WHY THEY the plural form of the verb must invariably accom- pany the use of the plural pronoun. " You was" is a barbarism never to be tolerated. But, though all the personal pronouns have num- ber, it is observable that neither in Greek, Latin, nor any modern language, do those of the first and second person carry the distinction of sex. The reason assigned for this by Mr. Hanis is, that the speaker and hearer, being generally present to each other, it would have been superfluous to mark a distinction by art, which from nature, and even dress, was commonly apparent on both sides. By some writejs this reason has been pronounced rather plan- . sible than satisfactory; because, it is said, ^^ the speaker and hearer may meet in the dark, when their persons and their dresses are alike invisible." The writer of the article Grammar in the Britannica, dissatisfied with the statements of Harris, gives the following as the reason. " Sex, and all other pro- perties and attributes whatever, except Ihose men- tioned above, as descriptive of the nature of these pronouns, are foreignfrom the intention of the speaker, who, w^hen he uses the pronoun "I," means the person who now speaks, no matter whether man or woman ; and, when the pronoun " thou," the person, no matter whether man or woman, to whom he now addresses himself, and nothing more. " But," he adds, "the pronoun of the third person, denoting neither the speaker nor the hearer, but the subject of the discourse, and being merely the substitute of a noun which may be either masculine, feminine, or neuter, must of necessity agree with the noun which HAVE NUMBER. 127 it represents, and admit of a triple distinction significant of gender. Now if there were the radical difference between the third per son, and the other two, which this writer lays down, ^. e, if the latter were nouns, and the former a pronoun, there would be more appearance of truth in the doctrine avowed. It might, then, be admitted that the first and second persons do not carry the distinction of gender^^r the reason assigned hy him. But, if all are nouns, being names of relations, as we have endeavoured to show, this cannot be admitted ; since it must have led to the denial of gender to the third person. We agree, therefore, with Harris in thinking that the first and second persons do not carry the distinction of sex, be- cause, on the grounds mentioned by him, it is unne- cessary for them to do so ; the instance referred to by the objector, being an unfrequent exception to a ge- neral rule, for which it was not thought necessary to provide. " The case, however," as he justly ob- serves, " is otherwise with respect to the third per- son, of whose characters and distinctions, including sex among the rest, we often know no more than what we learn from the discourse. And hence it is, that, in most languages, the third person has its genders, and that even the English, which allows its adjectives no genders at all, has in this pronoun the triple distinction of he, she, and it. The utility of this distinction,'' he adds, " may be better found in supposing it away. Suppose, for example, we should read in history these words. He caused him to destroy him ; and that we were to be informed that the he, which is here thrice repeated, stood 128 WHETHER OTHERS ARE each time for something different ; i. e. for a man, for a woman, and for a city, whose *names were Alexandei', Thais, and Persepolis. Taking the pronoun in this manner, divested of its gender, how would it appear which was destroyed, which was the destroyer, and which was the cause which moved to the destruction ? Bat there are no such doubts when we have the genders distinguished ; when, instead of the ambiguous sentence, ' He caused him to destroy him,' we are told, with the proper dis- tinctions, that she caused him to destroy it. Then we know with certainty what before we could not, that the prompter was the woman, that her instru- ment was the hero, and that the subject of their cruelty was the unfortunate city." It is generally thought that I, thou, he, she, and it, comprehend the whole of what are called the per- sonal pronouns. Harris, to whom we have so fre- quently referred, seems to suppose that " that," " other,'' " any," and " some," are pronouns of the third person as well as the former. " A single person for the first and second persons, an ' V for the first, and a ^thou' for the second, are," he says, " suf- ficient to all the purposes of speech, as far as those persons are considered. But it is not so," he adds, '^ with respect to the third person. The various relations of the various objects exhibited by this (I mean relations of near and distant, present and absent, same and different, definite and indefi- nite, &c.) made it necessary that here should be not one, but many pronouns, such as he, she, this, that PERSONAL PRONOUNS. 129 other, any, ^ome." We have placed the last five in the class of articles, — an arrangement which the statements of Harris do not supply sufficient reason to alter. He himself admits that " the words ' this,' and ^that,' do not always appear as pronouns. ^^When they are associated to some noun, as when we say, Hhis habit is virtue,' ^ that man defrauded me,' then, as they supply not the place of a noun, but only serve to ascertain one, they fall rather into the spe- cies of definitives. When they standby themselves, however, and represent some nouns," he adds, '' they are pronouns, as in the following instances ; ' this is virtue ;' ' give me that! " I cannot, however, think that there exists any real difference in the use and office of the terms this and that, in the above instances. There is an obvious ellipsis of some noun in the latter examples. The full expression is, " this action^ &c. &c. is virtue." "Give me that," ^. e, that book or hat, &c. They are as much associated in sense with nouns as in the former cases, only the nouns are here left to be understood. The words my, thy, his, her, our, your, their — placed in the class we are now considering — are very variously denominated ; by many being called pronominal adjectives ; by some, adjective pronouns, by others, possessive pronouns ; and by one writer, ^^ regular possessive pronominal adjectives, denoting both the persons for whom they are substituted, and the right of possession and property." This last writer appears to have formed a just conception of what the words denote, but it is doubtful whether 130 THE RELATIVE they do not intimate more than his language implies. They have certainly somewhat of the nature and characteristics of the adjective. The Britannica says they have the ^^form" of adjectives^ since they are subject to no variation " to indicate either gen- der, number, or case ; and yet they are put in con- cord with nouns, of every gender, and both numbers, as, "my wife," "my son," " my book," ^* her hus- band," " her sons," " her daughters ;" yet he adds, " they have the power of the personal pronouns in the possessive case ; "my book is the book of me," — " our house is the house of us, &c." It appears to me that they have more than the ''Jbnn" of adjec- tives. They perform the work of adjectives, i. e. they restrict the application of general terms. The w^ord my, for instance, in connexion with property, as " my property," has an effect upon the noun similar to that of the adjective "private," or "personal." It is, therefore, properly called an adjective pro- noun. The orders of pronouns already considered have been denominated prepositive pronouns, because they are capable of commencing a sentence. There exists, however, another order bearing characters peculiar to itself — used not for the purpose of intro- ducing, but of connecting, sentences, or parts of sen- tences, with one another. And, since it must of course have a reference to something pieceding, it is called the subjunctive, or relative pronoun, the name intimating that it subjoins that which follows to that which precedes it, — or that it refers to some noun PRONOUN. 131 which occurs in a previous part of the sentence. This pronoun is in Greek, og, in Latin, qui, in Eng- lish, who, which, or that. Very different views are presented by gramma- rians of the nature of the relative pronoun; all> however, agree first, in maintaining that it contains in itself the force or power of a noun^ or of some prepositive pronoun, "It is obvious," says the Brit- annica, " thatthere is not a single noun, or prepositive pronoun, which the relative is not capable of represent- ing ; for we say, 7, who saw him yesterday, cannot be mistaken; yoii^ who did not see him, may have been misinformed ; they^ who neither saw nor heard, can know nothing of the matter ; the things which he exhibited were wonderful. From these examples, it is evident that the relative contains in it the force of any other pronoun." Again, all agree in supposing that, in addition to this, the relative contains in it the force of a connec- tive. What this connective is forms the main point in controversy; whether, in short, it is the connec- tive " and," or " of." Harris maintains the former. " Suppose," he says in illustrating his theory, " I was to say, light is a body. Light moves with great celerity. These words would apparently be two distinct sentences. Suppose, instead of the second light, I were to place the prepositive " it,'' and say, ^ light is a body ; it moves with great celerity,' the sentence would still be distinct and two. But if I add a connective, as, for example, " and," saying, ' light is a body, and it moves with great celerity,' K 2 13*2 THE RELATIVE I then, by connexion, make two into one, as by connecting many stones, I make one wall. Now it is in the united powers of a connective, and of another pronoun, that we may see the force and character of the pronoun here treated of. Thus, therefore, if in the place of " and it," we substitute " that*' or '^ which," saying, ' light is a body which moves with great celerity,' — the sentence still retains its unity and perfection, and becomes if possible more com- pact than before. We may with just reason, there- fore, call this pronoun the subjunctive, because it cannot, like the prepositive, introduce an original sentence, but only serves to subjoin one to some other, which is previous." This genera] doctrine of Harris — that the relative is equivalent to another pronoun^ and the connective particle and^ is ably and successfolly contested by the writer of the article Grammar in the Encyclopsedia Britannica. " Let any one," says this writer, "atten- tively consider the two sentences, ^ light is a body which moves with great celerity,'- — and ' light is a body, and it moves with great celerity,' and he will find that they are not perfectly equivalent." This is manifestly true. The former of these sentences con- tains one proposition only; the latter two. The conjunction " and" entirely fails to condense them into one. The assertions are still, as at first, "light is a body," — " it moves with great celerity." " But by this example," adds the Britannica, "Mr. Harris's doctrine is not exhibited in all its absurdity. Let us try it by another. ' Charles the Twelfth was the PRONOUN. 133 only monarch who conquered kingdoms to bestow them on his friends.' Resolve this sentence upon Mr. Harris's principles, and you have two proposi- tions, of which the first is a notorious falsehood. ^Charles the Twelfth was the only monarch! — and ' he conquered kingdoms to bestow them on his friends.' " This last writer maintains, therefore, that the con- nective of which the relative contains the force, is not ^^and," but "of, " so that the real meaning of the phrase, "light is a body ' wMcK moves with great celerity," is, light is a body of it moves with great celerity — the whole of the words occurring after " of" being in meaning, though not in form, an abstract noun, joined to the word body by the pre- position " of," and modifying or limiting the appli- cation of that word ; as, in the phrase, " man of goodness," the latter term modifies the former. The truth of this statement must, we think, be evident to all who admit that the Britannica has given a correct explanation of the clause in which the relative stands, viz. that it is of the nature of an adjective ; for, if that be the case, it must, like all other adjectives, contain the force of the connective "of." "A good man" is not a man «/^c/ goodness, but a man of goodness. Let us, then, look at the statement by which he seeks to support this great principle. "It may be laid down," he says, "as a general principle, that, by means of the relative pro- noun, a clause of a sentence in which there is a verb is converted into the nature of an adjective, and 134 THE RELATIVE made to denote some attribute of a substance, or some property or circumstance belonging to the antecedent noun. Thus, when we say, ^vir sapit qui pauca lo- quitur/ the relative clause expresses the quality of speaking little as belonging to the man, and as being that quality which constitutes, or from which w^e in- fer, his wisdom/' A general analysis of relative clauses, together with the recollection of the purposes for which they are employed, fully confirm this view of their nature. Take the relative clause in the phrase ^^the man who is wise will think of eternity." Who can doubt that the w^ords " who is wise'' perform the work of an adjective — as really and effectually as the word which bears the name adjective — " the man who is wise" being perfectly equivalent with " the wise man." And so in the instance adduced by the Bri- tannic a: "if there w^ere such a word as pauciloquens, the quality denoted by the relative clause " qui pauca loquitur" might very properly be expressed by it ; and the phrase vir sapit pauciloquens would express the same assertion with vir sapit qui pauca loquitur." He afterwards states, that "the relative phrase is con- ceived of as standing in the place of a noun, governed in the genitive case by vir. The whole sentence might be thus translated, " the man of little speaking" {little speaking^ like goodness^ in the phrase " man of goodness," being an abstract noun) "is wise ; or, did the use" (usage) " of the English language admit of it, "the man of he speaks little is wise." In like manner when it is said, man, vjho is born of a woman ^ is of few days ruH full of trouble," — the relative PRONOUN. 135 clause is equivalent to an abstract noun in the genitive case, and the whole might be expressed in the following manner, " man of he is horn of a wo- man ;" — or, " the born of a woman man, — is of few days and full of trouble." There is the same differ- ence between the first form of expression and the last, as between goodness, and good. " He is born of a woman" denotes, like goodness, the abstract state of the quality, — " the born of a woman," the con- crete ; but the former, with the addition of of is perfectly equivalent with the latter, — as, " of good- ness" is equivalent with " good." Hence a man of " he is horn of a woman' is identical with " a woman born man." Hence the relative, in the clause in which it stands, has in it the force of the connective "of" and not "and." Again, the purpose for which the relative clause is employed, as well as the analysis of that clause, shows that the Britannica has given a correct ex- planation of it ; for it is used — that at least is the general law — to express some distinguishing quality which serves to render more definite the noun to which it refers. Thus we say, " the man who is rich," or "poor," or "wise," or "foolish," or "pious." In each case the relative clause, — who is rich, &c. de- fines more folly the previous noun man. The Bri- tannica imagines, however, that cases of exception exist — cases in which the relative may be resolved into a prepositive pronoun, or noun, and the connec- tive "and." They are the cases in which the rela- tive clause expresses such a property or circumstance 136 THE VERB of the antecedent noun as does not limit its significa- tion ;" i. e. as he thinks, such " attributes as are cha- racteristic of the species to which the antecedent be- longs." "Thus," he adds in explanation, "when it is said, ' Man, who is born of a woman, is of few days, and fall of trouble,' the relative clause — who is born of a woman — expresses an attribute common to all men, and therefore cannot modify." Here he adds, " the relative clause might be omitted ; and it might be said with equal truth, Olanis of few days, and fall of trouble." May it not be said, however, that this is merely a case of the unnecessary use of the rela- tive, and not one of departure from its object or of- fice? The effect of the relative clause in this case seems to be to bring into prominent view aparticalar quahty of man, with which shortness of days, and fre- quent subjection to trouble, seem naturally connected. If it cannot be said that it specificates man, it cer- tainly does seem, at least, to specificate the being who is of few days, and fall of trouble. THE VERB. The term verb, a contraction of verbum, means a word. Now, as all the parts of speech are words, as well as the verb, the adoption of this name to designate this part of speech must have been in- tended to indicate the high rank it sustains among its fellows — its preeminent necessity to secure one of the great purposes of language. Nouns and pro- nouns merely designate material objects and quali- IS A COPULA. 137 ties, or mental states. They are significant of the elements of thought. Affirming no connexion be- tween these elements, they require, for their exist- ence, the exercise of no mental faculties except per- ception and consciousness. The notions of glass, and brittleness, are gained by observation. The words exhibit the notions in a detached or separate state, and it is only by another mental act that we can link them together. When this is done by an operation of judgment, we express the result of that operation in the proposition, " glass is brittle." Now the verb is expressive of this latter operation; not of the act of perception, but of the act of judgment. We compare brittleness with glass, or the notion of the one with that of the other ; we judge that they agree with each other, and we embody that judg- ment in the proposition stated above. The verb, then, performs the work of what is logically called the copula of an affirmative propo- sition ; or rather it is the copula of all such propo- sitions; I. e, it binds the subject and the predicate together — affirming or indicating the connexion which exists between them. Thus, in the instance, " God is good," the verb "is" unites the subject God, and the predicate good, and thus virtually asserts, at least, that goodness is a Divine attribute. Now, that this doctrine in relation to the verb, — viz. that it binds together the subject and pre- dicate of a proposition, or indicates a connexion between them, being thus analogous in its powers to the sign + plus, in Algebra, — is true in all cases. 138 THE VERB IS A COPULA. such as^ "God is good," &€., where the attribute is expressed by a distinct word, is admitted even by- Mr. Harris, whose doctrine, radically different from that which is stated here, will be hereafter examined. But what shall we say of verbs which seem to contain the attribute, such as, walks, hopes, fears, loves, hates, &c..^^ How can it be true that the verb is only a copula here ? The statements of the writer of the article GRAMMARinthe Britannica afford us help in reference to these cases ; for he says in substance very justly, that every verb, whether active, passive, or neuter, may be resolved into the substantive verb, as it is improperly called, and an attributive; for "walks" is of the same import precisely with, is walking, — "hopes" with is hoping, &c. &c. But walking, hoping, fearing, loving, &c. are not verbs ; whence it follows that " the characteristic of the verb — that which constitutes it what it is, and can- not be expressed by other words, must be that which is signified by the word " is ;" " and that," he adds, "appears to us to be neither more nor less than assertion." If this analysis of what we may call compound verbs be correct, ^. e. if each may be resolved into the substantive verb, and an attributive, it follows that the whole essence of the verb is contained in the word " is ;" so that, when its character and office are ascertained, we shall have discovered the nature of this part of speech in general, We must, then, direct our enquiries into the nature of the substantive verb. The two prevalent opinions, in Harris's account of. 139 reference to this point, are that which has been glanced at in the preceding statements, — or that it is a copula ; and the opinion commonly perhaps entertained, and expounded fully by Mr. Harris, that it denotes or afhrms existence, and so may be properly called the verb of existence. The follow- ing summary of this writer's statements must be laid before the reader. " An object," he observes, " must first he before it can be anything else ; it cannot be black or white, or long or short, till it exist." We must, therefore, he thinks, have a word to denote existence ; and that, he says, is the object and use of the substan- tive verb. It is not a copula. It does not join two or more things together; but it denotes or affirms existence. " On this account," he adds, " it takes precedence of all others, as being essential to the very being of every proposition in which it may be found either expressed, or by implication ; as w^hen we say, ^ the sun is bright,' or, ' the sun rises ; ' which means, when resolved, ' the sun is rising ; ' — * is' being the verb, and ^ rising' the attributive." Having thus attempted to prove that it is the very essence of the substantive verb to denote ex- istence, he proceeds, with a view to illustrate its nature still further, to state, " that all existence is either absolute or qualified; absolute, as w^hen we say, ^ B is ; ' qualified, as when we say, ^ B is an animal ; ' ^ B is black,' is ' round,' &c. and that the verb ' is ' can by itself express absolute existence, but never the qualified, without subjoining the par- 140 dewar's account of. ticular form ; because the forms of existence being in number infinite, if the particular form be not ex- pressed we cannot know what is intended." Again he says, as to existence in general, " it is either mutable or immutable — that some mutable ob- jects exist in time, and admit the several distinctions of past, present, and future ; while immutable objects know no such distinctions ^ — that the word ' is, ' when connected with a mutable object, denotes pre- sent time exclusively ; but when, in union with an immutable object, it does not denote time present in opposition to other times, but necessary existence in contradistinction to all temporary existence what- ever." Now, that the word " is " should, by its own proper power, denote things so radically different as immutable and temporary existence, is scarcely to be imagined. Mr. Harris has confounded the in- ference we draw, in each case, with the meaning of the verb itself. When we say, God " is," and the universe " is," the word '' is " does not surely alter its meaning in the two cases ; but, since we know that God is from everlasting to everlasting, — and that the universe at one time began to be, and will at another time perish, we iiifei' that, in the first case, it is comprehensive of all time, and, in the latter, of the present moment exclusively. Dr. Dewar, referring to Mr. Harris's doctrine in respect to the substantive verb, says, in his able ar- ticle on Grammar in the Edinburgh Encyclopaedia, that " Mr. H. has been very unfortunate in his ac- count of this verb/' He pronounces it an opinion BRITANNICA. 141 in all points of view untenable, "that an object must first be before it can be anything else ; because it is not necessary that the thing spoken of should have an actual existence." We can speak of supposed as well as of existing objects. Now, certainly no one can justify the phraseology of Mr. Harris. For B to be black, or white, is not to be any thing else. The meaning, however, seems to be, that existence is, in the order of nature, — at all events it is so in our conceptions, — previous to qualities. But Mr. Harris would doubtless reply to this objection of Dr. Dewar, that an object must be supposed to have existence before it can be supposed to have other qualities; so that the objection falls to the ground. The Britannica, in opposition to Mr. Harris, and in conformity with preceding remarks, says that the verb "is" never varies its signification, denoting, at one time, as the former thinks, existence, — either mutable or immutable, and time, either present or all time ; — for that " it has, as a verb, no connexion with existence of any kind. All such circumstances are superadded," he continues, " to its verbal nature : or, to speak more accurately, we infer such circum- stances from our previous knowledge of the objects concerning which the predication is made. " When we say," he adds, " this orange is ripe," (an example produced by Mr. Harris to show that " is" denotes both existence and present time,) ''. we do indeed mean that it is so now, at the present in opposition to past and future time; but it is not the verb Hs^ but the definite ^ this which fixes the time of matu- 142 Harris's account rity, as well as the place of the orange; for had we said, ' oranges are ripe, we might have been properly asked when, and where, are they ripe ? — although the same verb is used in both sentences." The only cases which even seem to afford support to the doctrine that " is" is in Harris's sense the verb of existence, and is not a mere copula, are those in which it stands alone in connexion with a noun, no attributive being subjoined, — as in the case, "B is.'' Here it might be said the substantive verb cannot unite two things together, as when we say, "B is black or white," there being but one thing mentioned. This may, however, be only a case of ellipsis, — a case in which the predicate is left to be supplied by the reader. The words are equivalent with the expression B + ; i. e. B plus some attribute. And, the attributive not being stated, the reader imme- diately supplies the most general and necessary one, viz. existence ; and the proposition, in the view of his intellect, stands thus, "B is existing." Sufficient has been said, it is imagined, to show that the doctrine of Mr. Harris in regard to the substan- tive verb is not unexceptionable; it may be well, however, to unfold more fully the difficulties in which this writer entangles himself Let it be observed, then, that maintaining, as he does, that the office of the substantive verb is to denote existence, he yet declares that, when it subjoins some particular form of existence to a substance, as in the instance, "Ink is black," it has little more force than that of a mere OPPOSED. 143 assertion ; ^. e. it affirms the connexion between ink and black, or is, according to our doctrine, a copula. He further declares, that, " under the same character, it is latent in very other verb, by express- ing,'' let the reader observe the language, " that assertion which is one of their essentials.'' These statements appear to me, I acknowledge, loose and unsatisfactory. If assertion is essential to all " other verbs'' — if this assertion is effected by the verb "is" which is involved in them, both of which are af- firmed by Mr. Harris, it would seem to follow, by necessary consequence, that it is of the very essence of this verb to assert ; and yet he tells us that its essence is to denote existence — while his subse- quent language implies that to denote existence, and to assert, or to be a copula, are totally dif- ferent things. Mr. Harris's statements involve the absurdity of supposing that all verbs, besides the substantive verb, assert, and yet that the substan- tive verb itself, involved in them, by which the asser- tion is effected, does not assert, but denotes existence. In no way can these statements be reconciled with each other, but by giving to the words " denotes existence" a meaning which they do not appear to have at any rate distinctly borne in the conception of Mr. Harris. If he had said, as he, perhaps, might have done, that the substantive verb inva- riably asserts, and asserts existence ; that its mean- ing is precisely the same in both forms of expression, "B is," and, " B is black," in the former case affirm- ing that B is existing, and in the latter that B is 144 Harris's account existing black, he would have preserved his state- ments from apparent contradiction, and would not have been constrained to give to the word is so dif- ferent a signification in different cases of its occur- rence. If, moreover, he had said this, the differ- ence between his doctrine concerning the verb and that which is stated by the Britannica would have been very considerably reduced. Assertion would be, in the opinion of both, the office or essence of the verb, the only difference being that, while in the opin- ion of the Britannica, the verb directly asserts the connexion between the noun and the attribute, in that of Harris it does it indirectly, by interposing between the predicate denoting the form of existence, and the subject, a direct assertion of existence itself,- so that the latter becomes a mere copula, — as in the instance, " God is good,'' meaning, when resolved in this manner, God is existing, or exists, good. If this could be supposed to be the meaning of Mr. Harris, it would free him from another difficulty in which some of his statements seem to involve him. " Some attributes," he tells us, "joined to substan- tives, make without further help a perfect assertive sentence, because they necessarily involve an attri- butive and an assertion; as in the instance, John writeth, which may be analyzed into, is writing." Now, this is obviously true if the substantive verb asserts, even though it should, in all cases, merely assert existence. But how can it be true if the verb does not assert, — if it merely denotes existence, i. e. unless Mr. Harris regards the two phrases, "to de- OPPOSED. 145 note existence/' and " to affirm existence" as being identical, which his language will, as we have seen, scarcely admit ns to suppose. I fear, however, it would not deliver him from another difficulty which attaches itself to his definition of a verb. Referring to such attributives as have been mentioned above, he says that " all those attributives which have this double power of denoting both an attribute and an assertion, make the species of words which gram- marians call verbs." Does not this definition de- grade the substantive verb from its verbal rank alto- gether ? Does the substantive verb, on Mr. Harris's principles, denote an attribute, and an assertion ? It ts hard to see how it can even contain an asse?'- tion. On the principles laid down in the preceding- pages, this is, indeed, the case ; for assertion is the especial work of all verbs ; it constitutes their es- sence. Thus, in the example, ^' Milton was a great poet," the verb " was" joins the subject and the predi- cate together, or affirms a connexion between them. But, unless we have conjectured aright concerning the possible meaning of Mr. Harris, in the statement of his doctrine, that " it is the business of the sub- stantive verb to denote existence," and that, conse- quently, the phrase "Bis," must be resolved into B is existing — in which case there would be little or no difference between him and his opponents — -the verb " is" involves no assertion whatever ; and, in that case, all other verbs must likewise be destitute of it. It is still more clear that the substantive verb does not denote an attribute. In the phrase, " Cicero L 146 TENSE. was eloquent," it is the latter term, not the verb was, that expresses the attribute ; and if it be said that existence is an attribute, so that in the phrase, " B is," there may be both an assertion, and an attribute, I answer that, when that phrase is resolved into, B is existing, as it must be to make "is" express asser- tion, the attribute is denoted by existing, and not by the verb " is/' And, if it be doubtful whether that word contains either assertion or an attri- bute separately, it is abundantly more clear that it cannot contain both conjointly, so that the simple verb " ^5," is not a verb at all ; and that designation can only be given to compound verbs, such as "walks," " fears," &c. which may evidently be re- solved into, " is walking," " fearing," &c. On the whole, then, there is little ground to doubt that the verb, stripped of all its occasional adjuncts, is exactly equivalent tc the sign + plus in Algebra, — that all that is essential to the verb is assertion (we say ^55e;^^^«/, because individual verbs may contain more than is essential to them as verbs), — " that every word which predicates is a verb, and that nothing is so which does not predicate." The Tenses of Verbs, Though it is thus essential to the verb to predi- cate, it will be remembered that the sign of predica- tion is more frequently implied than expressed; we more generally say, "Man lives, or thinks," than man "is living," or "thinking." Still the verb always ORIGIN OF. 147 connects an attribute with some subject ; and the reader will observe that the modification of the verb which we call tense, results from a peculiarity of character by which some of these attributes are distinguished. "Were they all essential and, of course, permanent ones, there would be no need of tense. Subjects and attributes being invariably united, we should then merely require a sign to ex- press the connexion between them, and that sign would not need to undergo any variation. Now^ this is the case with some attributes, but not with all. Man, as it has been well said, " is always mortal, but he is not always ill, or in health, or black, or white, or in motion, or at rest, &c." Language must, consequently, have some method of denoting the time in which the attribute is found in connex- ion with the subject, — or in which the assertion in- volved in the verb is true. This, then, is the origin and the use of tenses. They are not intended to effect, nor do they effect, any change in the attri- bute which the verb connects with its subject, but to intimate the time when the connexion exists. Thus, scribit, scripsit, scripserat, and scribet, denote the same attribute — to write, while the difference between them is, that they denote writing at differ- ent times, — or rather the different times in which the attribute writing is predicable of a certain indi- vidual. By the tenses of verbs we are, then, to understand the particular modifications they are made to undergo l2 148 DISTINCTION to render them significant of the times in which the assertion involved in the verb is true. The most obvious division of time is that which separates it into the three classes of past, present, and inture time ; nor can any language be regarded as complete whose verbs have not tenses to mark these distinctions. It is asserted, indeed, by Mr. Harris, and said by the Britannica, to have been demonstrated by him, that there is no such thing as present time, — that, strictly speaking, all. time is either past or future, the present resembling a ma- thematical point, which, in fact, is nothing. Of time in general, the notion of which is gained by observing things in succession, it has been said, "that it has somethings analogous to space." The two things, says Harris, " are both of them by nature continuous, and as such they both of them imply extension. Thus between London and Salisbury, there is the extension of space, and between yester- day and to-morrow, the extension ot time. But in this they differ, that all the parts of space exist at once, and together ; while those of time only exist in transition or succession. Hence, then, we may gain some idea of time, by considering it under the notion of a transient continuity !' It might, perhaps, be well to pause here, and ask what the last two words mean. Our limits, however, forbid this, and we must pass on to the conclusion he draws from the affirmed necessarily transient nature of time, viz. that there cannot (strictly speaking) be any such thing as present time. " For if all time," he OF TENSE. 149 argues, " be transient as well as continuous, it can- not, like a line," (i. e, as I understand the words, as a line cannot^) " be present all together" (which no one ever thought of supposing concerning a line coming, we shall suppose, from the right, and slid- ing before us to the left; but the question is, must not dispart of the line be present, that is, present to us ?) " but part will necessarily be gone, and part be coming." And, may we not add, part will neces- sarily have reached us, and so be present. " If, therefore," he continues, " any portion of its conti- nuity were to be present at once, it would so far quit its transient nature, and be time no longer, but if no portion of its continuity can be thus present, how can time possibly be present, to which such con- tinuity is essential ? " Might we not ask whether, if any part of the passing rope be present to us, that circumstance would not, on these principles, break the continuity of the rope ? Denying the existence of present time, he yet proceeds to define it ! — as the bound of completion to the past, and the bound of commencement to the future ; " from whence," he adds, "we may conceive its nature or end, which is to be the medium of con- tinuity between the past and the fature, so as to render time, through all its parts, one entire and perfect whole." Now I am unable to free myself from the impres- sion that in all this there is more of paradox than of common sense. It is supported by the appearance of mathematical demonstration, yet I cannot but 150 PRESENT TENSE. suspect some radical fallacy in the whole reasoning. This is not the place for any disquisition on the nature, or notion, of time — one of the most abstract of our notions ; but, assuming the popular concep- tion of it to be the right one, it would not be difl&- cult to show, perhaps, that, if there be no present time, there can be no past and future ; for time past consists of that which was once present, — and time to come of that which will hereafter be present, if not to us, at least to our successors. No doubt time is essentially transient. It is constantly com- ing up to us from the future, and passing onwards to the past ; but, for that very reason, it is con- stantly passing hy us ; and I see no reason why that part of the line which has come up to us, and is passing hy us, should not be denominated present time, though it be allowed that the line is always in motion. The common sense of men as it regards present time, is strongly marked by the grammars of various nations, which almost invariably give a present tense to their verbs. The Hebrew is the only one of any importance which seems to furnish an excep- tion to this remark. According to the ordinary import of the term, it has only two tenses, the past and the future. " It employs a participle, however, to express the idea of present time. In many in- stances, too, the future is made to answer the pur- poses of the present." The general division of time into past, present, and future, is, then, we think correct,— since the AORIST. 151 assertion involved in the verb, if true at all, must be so in one or other of these periods. It was once true — it is true now — or it will be so hereafter. Some of these general divisions are, however, capable of subdivision. Although this should not be found to be the case with present time, it is certain that the past and the future may be separated into well de- fined portions or periods, capable of being so indi- cated as to give to language all necessary precision. Our efforts, then, must here be employed to exhibit those natural divisions of past and future time which form the ground for the distinct tenses of both. Before we proceed to do this, however, it may be expedient to examine that form of the verb which is supposed to indicate no time whatever, — and to in- quire whether the present is equally capable of sub- division with the past, and the future ; our remarks on these two points must be blended together. Let it be observed, then, that the assertion in- volved in the verb may not refer to any time ; or, if there be a reference to time past, or future, it may be to time indefinitely past or future. This circum- stance has given rise to the tenses called aorists, the name of which, descriptive of their meaning, is derived from the Greek '^ a," privative, and opog^ a bound or limit. The aorist is the unbounded or in- definite tense. In the Greek, where the tenses called aorists are used, they are confined to past time, and are intended to distinguish time which is indefinitely past from that which is definitely so. It is however manifest, that language will admit of 152 PRESENT TENSE. an aorist or aorists of the future as well as the past, whether any grammars contain such tenses or not. Mr. Harris, indeed, thinks there may be an aorist of the present, as well as of the past and future. "It seems," he says, "agreeable to reason, that, whenever time is signified without any farther cir- cumscription than that of simple present, past, or future, the tense is an aorist." "When I say, I read, or am reading," says another advocate of this doc- trine, " I express present time definitely ; but w^hen I add, a merry heart maketh a glad countenance, I state what is not limited to any definite time, but what may be afiirmed at all times. Hence the latter is time present indefinite, aoptcrrwg." Doubtless, we regard the latter assertion as a general one, yet, as it is not easy to conceive that of two verbs, in the same form and tense, one should " express' definite, and the other ^definite time, it must be supposed that w^e reach this conclusion by inference. The writer of the article Grammar in the Brit- annica contends against the admission of an aorist of the present, on the ground that from its very na- ture it is perfectly indefinite, and, therefore, cannot give notice of any determinate portion of time. " A thing," he says, " may have been present fifty years ago, may be present now, or at any future period/' It would seem, at first sight, to follow from this statement, that he is bound to admit an aorist of the present, — yea to maintain that all present time is aoristic, rather than refiise to admit an aorist of the present. It must be remembered, however, that he only denies the existence of an aoristic present in PRESENT TENSE. 153 contradistinction to other presents which are to be considered definite. Dr. Dewar, adopting the suggestion of Home Tooke, states that " that part of the verb which is called the present indicative is a simple or general indicative, and that no time is implied in it. When we say, ' the sun rises in summer much earlier than in winter/ we assert a fact applicable to past, present, and future." " Of the same nature," he adds, " are mathematical theorems, and general propositions." On this account he conceives that the present indi- cative "might receive the appellation of a universal aorist.'' The reader must observe that by the phrase, a universal aorist. Dr. Dewar intends that this form of the verb, is, in reference to time, perfectly indefi- nite, that no time is indicated by it, or, what amounts to the same thing, that all time is included in it. With this opinion I am far more disposed to con- cur than with that of those who make an aorist of the present tense, in opposition to a supposed definite present. It is most manifest to me that the present of the indicative is essentially aoristic. The ex- pressions " the boy reads," — "the bird flies," — " the lion roars," connect indeed the action with the agent, but, of themselves, they supply no means of ascer- taining the time of the connexion. They do not intimate that it exists now, or at the present mo- ment. Such expressions constitute indeed the form of the verb which is frequently used to denote pre- sent transactions; but "the idea of present time is, even then, attached to the expressions, in conse- quence of an inference drawn from the subject.'' 154 PEESENT TENSE. This is manifest from the fact, that, in the particular cases just mentioned, we conceive general time to be denoted, — a proof that our conception of time is^ in all cases of the use of this form of the verb, gained by inference. In confirmation of this opin- ion, Dr. Dewar says, that '' this tense is used in describing events which have been completed at a time past, — as, yesterday, when walking alone, whom do I see but my old kinsman. " I am glad, sa;i/s he, to find you looking so well. Grammarians," he adds, '' never doubting that such indications are essen- tially of the present tense, have supposed that in such sentences the past is, for the sake of vivid representation, described by a figure of speech, as present. The statements," he again adds, " now made show that such explanations are unneces- sary; and, if they are just, the consideration that this indication is not restricted to any tense, will account for the facility with which we reconcile our minds to a figure of speech which would otherwise appear a distortion. " We sometimes, also," he further observes, " use this general indicative in describing future events> and then futurity is pointed out by some other word in the sentence, or by the evident import of the whole. Next Tuesday ts the first of April, is a sen- tence equally proper with next Tuesday will he the first of April. And we say, without any dread of being accused of vicious diction, ^to-morrow he he- gins his journey.' '* But, though time is not defined by that form of PRESENT TENSE. 155 the indicative which we are now considering, "we are not altogether destitute/' Dr. Dewar observes, " of resources for marking with precision the present tense," or present time. " Every language possesses separate words for the purpose, such as now in Eng- lish, and the corresponding words in other languages. It happens that, in our language, without the use of such additions, we indicate present time by employ- ing the substantive verb with the participle, instead of the usual indicative. " He writes," is the indica- tive without tense. " He is writing/' is the present indicative. When we say, "he writes a good hand," or, "he writes to his relations every month," we restrict our meaning to no particular time. But when we say, " he is writing," we describe a present transaction." He adds, however, with great jus- tice, " that this distinction is entirely conventional. The original meaning of this combination of words implies nothing to distinguish it from the simple indicative, as the verb ^ is,' and the termination ^ ing/ are, with respect to tense, equally general." The truth of these statements with respect to both forms of the indicative, "he writes," and, "he is writing," seems to me to be involved in the definition of the verb laid down at the commencement of our account of this part of speech, viz. that assertion is its essence, or that it is equivalent to the sign + in Algebra. The verb, in each case, " he writes/' and "he is writing," merely affirms a connexion between "he" and "writing." It would seem to imply, perhaps, an inseparable connexion ; but, as 156 PAST TIME. we know that some attributes are only at times con- nected with their subjects, we infer ^ when the verb "is" unites a separable attribute with its subject, that they are united at the present instant ; and hence this form of the verb, though it expresses no time, comes to be regarded by us as indicating pre- sent time, and is, indeed, used by us "conventionally" for that very purpose. Mr. Harris admits into his enumeration of the tenses three as belonging to the present; viz. an inceptive present, — a middle present, — and a com- pletive present. The firsts to denote an action as about to begin, as, " I am going to write ;*' the second ^ to denote an action as in a state of progress, as, "I am writing ;" the thirds to denote it as brought to a conclusion, as, " I have written." The distinction appears to me to be in harmony with the general character of the book, in which there is, occasionally at least, more of learning, and of the appearance of philosophical distinctions, than of plain common sense. It is wonderful that he did not perceive, as is justly remarked by the Britannica, that the middle present is in fact the only one. Nothing can be more obvious than that his inceptive present is a future tense ; and his completive present, " I have written," a past tense. The Divisions of Past Time. In reference to this department of time there are two or three obvious principles of division, the light PRINCIPLES OF DIVISION. 157 of which will afford us a sufficient guide. Confin- ing our observations — ^which for the sake of more easy illustration it will be expedient to do — to active verbs, it is manifest that the action, declared by the verb, must have taken place at some definite or indefinite period of past time. Verbs must, accor- dingly, be susceptible of variations designed to indi- cate the fact in reference to this particular point ; i, e. there must be an aoristic past, and a definite past, tense. In addition to this they must, also, admit of another variation; for, according to the general doctrine at least, an action may be consi- dered, in respect of time, as past ; but in respect of progress, as unfinished. "I was walking," is said to denote past time, but incomplete action. " I have walked," past time, and finished action. The dis- tinction to which 1 now refer is not in the above words very accurately stated ; for how can an action, declared to be incomplete, or unfinished, be affirmed to be past? How can the time be sepa- rated from the action? If the latter be unfinished, how can the time of performance be gone by.^ — or, in other words, how can the form of the verb which denotes this be a past tense ? Still the state of' the action supplies us, equally with the definiteness or indefiniteness of the time, with a principle of division; for we may have occasion to represent an action as in a state of progress at some past time, — or as being now^ completed ; so that we require an imper- fect and 2, perfect tense. Again, we may have occa- sion to represent an action, or event, as having 158 AORIST AND DEFINITE. taken place before the occurrence of some other action, or event, which is, also, a past event. We require, accordingly, d. pluperfect tense. These prin- ciples of division supply us with five distinct tenses of the past ; and they are, we think, as many as it will be found expedient for any language to mark. The distinctions themselves may be expressed, either by altering the termination of the verb, or by prefixing auxiliaries to it. We proceed to a more particular consideration of them, together with the manner in which they are effiected. I. Then, we may have occasion to state simply that an action took place in some period of past time. This gives rise to an aorist of the past. The Greek language admits this tense ; the Latin does not. In the latter, the preter-perfect is made to serve the purpose of the aorist in Greek ; ^, e. to denote a finished action at some indefinite past time, as well as at some time which is both past and definite. The English language, also, possesses this tense. The following are examples ; " I wrote a letter to him." ^^ The Lord gave." "I fought a good fight." These expressions are manifestly aoristic, denoting past time, indeed, but leaving it quite un- certain whether the actions took place a day, a week, a year, or even a century ago. n. We may have occasion to state, that an action took place at some definite period of past time. This gives rise to a tense which stands in direct opposi- tion to the aorist of the past, and may be called the definite of the past. As far as past time can be de- IMPERFECT. 159 fiuitely marked by changes upon the termination of the verb, or by the prefixing of auxiliaries to it, it is thus marked by the preter-perfect of Greek and English verbs. ^^ I have written my letter/' implies that the action of writing had but recently termi- nated, and thus fixes the time of its performance. In the following expressions the distinction existing between the definite and the aoristic past is very strongly marked. " The Lord gave.'' Here the time of the donation is undetermined : but in the fol- lowing clause ; — " The Lord hath taken away/' the time of the bereavement is sufliciently indicated ; it is represented as having been suffered at, or near to, the time when the announcement was made. IIL We may have occasion to represent an action as having been in the course of accomplishment at a former period, — " He was writing when I passed by his room." Nothing is here said of the present state of the action. It may now^ be proceeding, — or it may have been finished. What is the case in this re- spect the words themselves do not enable us to judge ; and, since room is left, by this form of expression, for supposing that the action may even yet be in a state of progress, it is denominated by the Latins the preter-imperfect tense ; and by the Greeks yet more happily, " the incomplete past of the past." The tense now under consideration is, as we are correctly told by Mr. Harris, " sometimes employed to denote what is usual and customary. Thus," he adds, " ^snrgebat' and ' scribebat' signify not only he was rising, he was writing, but he used to rise. 160 PERFECT. he used to write." He is not, however, happy in his statement of the reason for this mode of using the imperfect. The ground on which it rests is, we apprehend, that, when an action has become habit- ual to a person, there is some reason to suppose that it may be going on at the moment when it is referred to ; hence the " incomplete past of the past," as we have seen the Greeks denominated it, is obviously the most proper tense to be employed. IV. We may have occasion to represent an action as being now fully completed, in contradistinction from one which may be in a state of progress. This is, in our language, effected by the aid of the verb " have," in connexion with the past tense of the principal verb. "I was walking," denotes that the action of walking had commenced, and was con- tinuing, at some former period. " I have walked," denotes that I am in possession of the complete act of walking, I have it. The following statement of the Britannica is not less just than ingenious. " The verb have, which is included in the preter- perfect, is plainly a verb of the present tense denot- ing possession. " In instances," he adds, " where ^ have' is used in connexion with a noun, this is obvious and universally acknowledged. I have a gold watch, is, I possess a gold watch. Now, as he proceeds to observe, " the verb have must retain its signification when used as an auxiliary verb, so that the phrase, " I have written a letter," means, I possess, at present, the finished action of writing PERFECT AND IMPERFECT. 161 a letter;" L e. the action has been just brought to a final close. There is thus a broad line of distinction between the imperfect and the perfect tenses. Hence, it is manifest, that the only true English imperfect is the substantive verb, in connexion with the active par- ticiple, as, " I was walking." Dr. Dewar, to my sur- prise, considers " I walked," " I wrote," &c. as be- longing to the imperfect tense. " They denote," he says, "that the action was begun, and was continued^' he adds, " at some past time." This assertion is manifestly contrary to fact. " I wrote my letter,*' denotes the action as fully and completely past, as, ^^ I have written my letter." Whatever differences may exist between the two phrases, in this respect there is none at all. The Britannica, accordingly, considers, " I wrote Dr did write," as the aorist of the past, " did," he says, " expresses the finished performance of some action." It does not represent it as doing, but done. " I wrote, or did w^rite, means that, at some past time, I performed the action of writing J and finished it." Now, if the aorist of the past, and the perfect, both denote finished action, where is the difference between them ? There is, in fact, extremely little. The former is, indeed, a perfect tense, if we may thus call it, as contrasted with the imperfect, but it does not lose its indefinite character as to time. The aorist states an action as finished in some in- definite period of past time. The perfect represents it as ended at a definite period, by exhibiting its 162 PERFECT AND IMPERFECT. completion as a thing now possessed. ^^ I wrote a letter;" it may be a month or a year ago. '^ I have written a letter/' i, e, I j)ossess the finished action of writing, and, therefore, it was but lately per- formed. On this account, as it has been correctly stated, " the perfect is always joined with a portion of time which includes the present now, or instant; for otherwise it could not signify, as it always does, the present possession of the finishing of an action ; but the aorist, which signifies no such possession, is as constantly joined with a portion of past time which excludes the present now, or instant. Thus we say, ' I have written a letter this day, or this week ; but ^I wrote a letter yesterday, last w^eek, &c.' " It is proper to observe here, however, that, when a portion of time, including the present instant, con- sist of obviously distinct parts, we may use the aorist; thus we might say, without the least impro- priety, I wrote, as well as I have written, a letter to-day ; since, on account of the division of the day into morning, noon, &c. the expression still retains its aoristic character. It leaves it undetermined whether the action of writing was performed in the early, or the latter part of the day. But it is at variance with the practice of every correct speaker to say, I have written a letter yesterday. Yesterday cannot include the present instant. It has com- pletely passed away, and the action of writing went along with it. To employ the phrase, " we have written a letter yesterday," would be in effect to HOW USED. 163 declare that we now possess an action which van- ished with the day that gave it birth. It is, indeed, true that the former part of the present day is as completely past and gone as yesterday, or the last century ; but, in consequence of the artificial dis- tinctioDs of time, we are apt to conceive of the w^hole period denoted by the respective terms day, week, month, year or century, as not moving, but remain- ing fixed, till the whole of each has terminated. Hence, we both may, and do, say, " I have written to him this year," though weeks, and even months, may have elapsed since the letter was dispatched. The foregoing explanation of this tense will ac- count for the very peculiar manner in which it was occasionally used by the Latins, viz. " so as to imply the very reverse of the verb in its natural signification.'* The following instances are given by Mr. Harris. "Yixit signified is dead; fuit signified now is noty is no more. It was in this sense that Cicero addressed the people of Rome, when he had put to death the leaders in the Catili- narian conspiracy. He appeared in the Forum, and cried out with a loud voice, ' Vixerunt ' (they have lived)." So Virgil, -' Fuimus Trees, fuit Illium, et ingens Gloria Dardanidam' " The reason of this," adds Mr. Harris, "is de- rived from the completive power of the tense here mentioned. We see that the periods of nature, and M 2 164 PLUPERFECT. of human affairs, are maintained by the reciprocal succession of contraries. It is thus with calm and tempest; with day and night; with prosperity and adversity ; with glory and ignominy ; with life and death. Hence, then, in the instances above, the completion of one contrary is put for the commence- ment of the other, and to say, hath livedo or hath beerij has the same meaning with is dead, or is no moj'e," There is, perhaps, a little too much of fancy in the above representation of a succession of con- traries in human affairs. The simple fact seems to be, that, in the instances referred to, what Mr. Har- ris calls the " commencement of the second period," is inferred from the asserted close of the first, — the commencement of death from the asserted close of life. " Fuit" — he hath lived, i. e. he is now in pos- session of the finished action of living. The state of living exists, therefore, no longer; in other w^ords, he is dead. Y. We may have occasion to represent an action as having been fully accomplished before the occurrence of another past action. This gives rise to the plu- perfect tense, as, I had written my letter before you came into the room. The entrance of the person into the room is here represented, by the aorist, came, as a past event, — an event completely past ; but the writing of the letter was previous to that event. At the time when it took place, the person denoted by the pronoun he, had, or possessed, the finished action of writing the letter. The action had \)^^\\. fully performed though but recently per- PLUPERFECT. ^ 165 formed. This tense is, then^ most aptly denominated the pluperfect; or, as the Latins more fully express it, the plusquam perfectum, or mo7'e than perfect. It is not an aorist, because it represents the action as having taken place at a definite period of past time. The entrance of the person into the room is, in the circumstances of the case, a definite period. The writing of the letter took place at a definite period before that ; for the word " had'' represents it as just accomplished; so that the time is altoge- ther definite. It is distinguished from the imperfect by its name, and is very properly so distinguished since it represents the action as fully accomplished, or completely past. It is distinguished from the perfect in the same way in which the comparative degree differs from the positive, — by an excess of the same general qnality. The perfect intimates the completion of an action, or, in other words, refers to time completely past. The plusquam perfectum specifies a period of time which had completely passed away before another period which has itself now wholly departed. The whole of the previous statement tends to evince the mistake of those who call the past form of English verbs the imperfect tense, instead of the aorist ; for, unless the word " came," in the instance, " I had written my letter before you came into the room," denote time perfectly past, or, an action fully accomplished, i. e. unless it be a perfect tense, it is obviously impossible that the clause, " I had written my letter," can denote time more than per- 166 AORIST OF THE FUTURE. fectly past, or be rightly denominated tlie plusquam perfectiim tense. The phiperfect, as we now, and, we think, very properly, call it, can only be the PERFECT tense^ unless " came'' be a perfect tense, i, e. the English aorist, and not the imperfect. The Divisions of Future Time, The same principles of division which have guided ns in reference to past time, will direct ns in the division of the future. They are, it will be remem- bered, the time and the state of the action. The time may be stated definitely, or indefinitely. The action may be exhibited as in a state of pro- gress, or completed. The employment of these principles of division may give rise to four distinct tenses of the future, — the aorist, the definite, the imperfect, and the perfect tenses of that great general division of time. Whe- ther there exist in any particular language distinct and definite forms of expression to denote these four tenses, is a point of subordinate importance. Gene- ral grammar inquires what language may be, as well as how particular languages came to be what they are. I. The aorist of the future. Of this tense, "scri- bam," or, " I shall write," is an example, denoting time to come indefinitely. It does not specify the precise period when the action of writing is to be performed, whether to-morrow, or next day, or next year. It might possibly be the imperfect of the DEFINITE AND IMPERFECT. 167 future as well as the aorist ; i, e. it might assert, as some suppose, that the action will be m progress in some indefinite period of future time. That fact, if it should be found to be a fact, would not deprive it of its aoristic character ; and this is all to which the attention of the reader is for the present di- rected. II. The definite future. Of this tense, " scripturus sum, I am about to write," is an example. The words fix the period when the action of writing is to take place. They form, therefore, the definite, in opposition to the aoristic, future. '^ Scripsero, I shall have written," is another example of this tense ; for the words denote that at some other time, which is always specified when this form of expression is used, the action of writing will have been complet- ed — and completed not at a period indefinitely pre- vious to that time, but immediately previous to it ; for "shall," denotes future time ; " written," finished action ; and " have," present possession : so that the meaning is, at the time specified, I shall be in possession of the finished action of writing the letter. III. The imperfect of the future. Of this tense, " I shall be writing," is an example, since it asserts that the action of writing will be in a state of pro- gress at some future time ; and, if that time be indefinite, it will be an aorist as well as the im- perfect. Scribam, I shall write, is also regarded as the im- perfect future by many, perhaps by most, writers. 168 FUTURE PERFECT. " It denotes," says the Britannica; "future time and mcomplete action ; for it does not say whether I am to write for a long or a short time, or whether I shall finish what I promised to begin." This is, I cannot but think, a mistake. " Scribam," I shall write, appears to be the simple aorist of the future, denoting indefinite time, but, as iu the case of the aorist of the past, finished action. Were the case otherwise, there would be no difference in meaning between " I shall write," and, " I shall be writing," the supposition of which involves absurdity. That the phrase, " I shall be writing," denotes in- complete action, there can be no doubt. This is the only true imperfect of the future. The other phrase, " I shall write," is the perfect as well as the aorist of the future. IV. The perfect of the future. " Scripsero, I shall have written," was referred to formerly as an example of the definite future. It is, also, the perfect in opposition to the imperfect. The word " written,*' denotes finished action, and " have" defi- nite time. It may perhaps be an imperfection in our language that the same phrase should be used to signify two separate divisions of the future ; yet the practice occasions no ambiguity, nor is it the only case of the kind. " Scribam," according to the view we take of it, is both an aorist, and a perfect. On the contrary, " scripturus sum," I am about to write, is a definite future, as well as a perfect. The words, as we have seen, fix the period when the action is to take place. They do not, therefore, form an aorist ; and they would seem to denote. FUTURE HOW FORMED. 169 though this is not the general opinion, complete action, — not less so, indeed, than, "I shall write," — and so to constitute a perfect tense. Were it true that the phrase, "I am about to w^rite," denotes un- finished action, — or forms an imperfect tense — there would be no difference between it and the phrase, " I am about to be writing ;" a supposition which involves absurdity. " I am about to be writing," is an example of the definite combined with the true imperfect fiiture. The future tense may be formed, it is obvious, in various w^ays. Dr. Dewar states, that the words employed to denote it " are derived from verbs sig- nifying resolution, obligation, or other preparatory circumstances ; and, with respect to etymology, are ■equivalent to such English expressions as, ^I intend to go,* ' I must go,' ' I am likely to go,' * I prepare to go.' " This is manifestly the case with the words "shall" and "will," employed in our language to denote future time. Shall is of Saxon origin, and means owe, or ought. Thus, in Chaucer, " The faith I shall to God," obviously intends, the faith I owe to God. " I shall it," means I owe it, — it is my duty to do it ; and, as it is assumed that duty is generally discharged, the word " shall," in connexion with a verb of action, may be employed to denote the certain occurrence of that action. " Will" is the old English verb " wol," or " woll," and has precisely the same signification. " I will it" means I desire or determine it; so that both words, will and shall, are admirably adapted to de- note future actions whose existence depends upon 170 AUXILIARIES. determination, obligation, &c. The two terms are not, however, used indiscriminately to denote future events. A proper regard is paid to their original meanings when employed for this purpose. Hence " will," generally at least, expresses determination; " shall" obligation. "I will write," i.e. lam de- termined to write. " Thou wilt write," i. e. art determined to write. " He will write," ^. e. he is determined to write. It is said, indeed, that will, in the first person, expresses determination ; but, in the second and third, simple futurity only. This, however, if it be so, is not the original but a second- ary sense of the w^ord, — a sense which it naturally and almost necessarily acquires. When the future occurrence of an event depends upon the resolution of others, to declare that they vnll it, is almost equiva- lent with affirming that it will take place. Hence will, in the second and third persons, have come, by inference, to denote simple futurity, though they primarily express resolution, and express it on the part of these persons. Dr. Henry Dewar, indeed, denies this. He affirms that the auxiliary " will" does not express the resolution of the person spoken of, or to, but that of the speaker ; and he produces an instance which, it must be confessed, appears, at first view, to establish the truth of the first part of his assertion, though it leaves the second part, as the reader will observe, without any confirmation. " We say," is his language, " if you become ob- noxious to the criminal law, you will be punished. The word will," he adds, " does not imply intention BY WHICH FORMED. 171 or even consent, (^. e. as he means, on the part of the person transgressing,) yet it is appropriate, be- cause " shall" would imply constraint or authority on the part of the speaker." Now, suppose it were admitted that, in this instance, the word " will" does not express the resolution of the person spoken to, we might ask the Doctor how it can possibly ex- press the resolution of the speaker, as he affirms it does. It is here used, no doubt, as many other words are, in its secondary sense — the sense of simple futurity. \X is frequently used in this secondary sense, not bearing the sense of resolution at all; but when this its primary meaning is con- veyed by it, it is important to remark that it denotes not as Dr. Dewar says the resolution of the speaker, but of the person spoken of or to. Thus in asking questions, " Will you grant what I request ?" This is surely an inquiry respecting the resolution of the person addressed. Again, in affirmations, as, " You will do as I request;" i. e. you will resolve, on re- flection, to act as I wish. A similar change has taken place in reference to the auxiliary " shall." " 1 shall write " really means, as we have seen, primarily at least, I owe to write; it is my duty to write. No determination on the part of the speaker, as all admit, is expressed by shall in the first person. How^ comes it, then, to express such determination — as it is generally sup- posed it does — in the second and third persons ? " you shall do it,'* " he shall do it ;" i. e. as the words are explained, I am determined that you and he 172 AUXILIARIES AND shall do it. The present writer would suggest that such expressions may be elliptical, and capable of being thus resolved, " I will so arrange matters as to render it your duty to do it. I will make you " shall/' or owe, it. I will place you under the powerful authority of obligation to do it. Originally its exclusive meaning may have been, I will oblige you to do it by rendering it your duty ; but, in pro- cess of time, this particular mode of obligation was less regarded, and it came to include even physical force as one of various modes of giving certainty to actions. A remark by Dr. Dewar on the auxiliary will, deserves attention. " When we mention any thing future with respect to ourselves, although it should be the effect of our intention, this does not render it proper," he says, " to use the auxiliary will;" and, in confirmation of this opinion, he adds, ^^ in expressing the common acts of our lives which are to fill up our future time, we say simply, I ' shall go,' I ^ shall tell you the whole matter.' The reason of this seems to be, that, though the acts re- ferred to may, and indeed must, be the result of our resolution, or volition, we do not intend to exhibit them in that light. Our design is merely to inti- mate their certain futurity. Hence we avoid the use of the word " will," since it might convey more than we intend. " Shall,'' in its secondary sense, expresses all we mean ; though, in its primary sense, it denotes that we are under obligation to perform the promised actions. In addition to the tenses of the indicative, those SUBJUNCTIVE PRESENT. 173 of the subjunctive require some notice. Anticipa- ting as little as possible remarks which will require to be made on the subject of the modes of verbs, it is yet necessary to remind the reader that, consis- tently with preceding statements concerning the es- sence of the verb, the subjunctive must assert as well as the indicative. The difference between the two modes is thus correctly stated by the Britannica. " The indicative asserts something directly concern- ing the action; the subjunctive something concerning the power or liberty of the agent to perform it." Keeping these remarks in mind, it will be seen that, though the tenses of the subjunctive bear the same name with those of the indicative, their import must be materially different. 1 . The Present of the Subjunctive, This tense answers, in the Greek and Latin, "to the English auxiliaries may and can." It will, there- fore, be necessary to explain the meaning of these terms. " May" is a verb of the present tense de- noting liberty, permission, or freedom from external impediment. "Can" is, also, a verb in the same tense, expressive of power, skill, or freedom from in- ternal impediment. It is said to be the same with the old English verb to "con, " signifying to know. The following instance, quoted from the Britannica, admirably illustrates the difference between these two verbs. "Suppose," says the waiter of the ar- ticle Grammar in that work, " we say to one of our 174 PRESENT. transcribers, ^you may write a treatise on grammar/ to which he returns for answer, ' I cannot ;' our as- sertion evidently supposes him at liberty to write the treatise; his answer implies that he is unable or im- skilled to do it." Now, as the words " may" and '^ can" retain, when conjoined with another verb, the meaning which they bear when standing alone, the present of the sub- junctive, must affirm the existence of present liberty or power. " 1 may and can write," means, I have permission and power to write ; i. e, I possess both 710W, — or at the moment of uttering the declaration. The writing is represented d.'^ future^ but the permis- sion and power to perform it as pi'esent. There are cases, however, in which the liberty seems to be fu- ture, as well as the action ; as, " You may go to- morrow." It has been replied by some that the liberty, though it must not be used till to-morrow, is now given; as wealth may be possessed though, for a season, we should be interdicted from using it. If it should be doubted whether liberty, not to be used nowy can be properly said to be Jore5e?^^ liberty, the reply of the Britannica may be thought sufficient. " The liberty or ability, signified by this tense, is always represented as present ; but the time of this presence is indefinite. If no pa^rticular time be spe- cified, we generally refer it to the time of speaking ; but another point may be given from which we are to compute. ^When he shall have finished you may then proceed as you propose.' Here the liberty of proceeding is stated as present, not at the time of SUBJUNCTIVE. 175 speaking, but at the time of his finishing, which is future to the time of his speaking." Most writers maintain that a very near affinity exists between the present of the subjunctive, and the future of the indicative, — so near as to render it often " of little consequence which mode of ex- pression we employ." Dr. Dewar says, that the phrase, ^* I may go," is " radically future in its ap- plication." To a certain extent this is true ; yet we must bear carefully in mind the distinction which exists between the action itself, and the liberty of the agent to perform it. The example produced by Dr. Dewar, represents the going as future ; and to that extent, the tense, we are now considering, has an affinity with the indicative future ; but it denotes the present possession of the liberty to go, and, in that respect, is not a future. If the entire phrase, " I may go," were future in its application, as Dr. Dewar asserts, it would be impossible to regard it as \\\& present of the subjunctive. The preceding statements explain one or two facts alluded to by more than one w^riter. The tense of which we are speaking represents the action as contingent^ — a fact not satisfactorily accounted for by the Britannica. We have seen that the clause "I may go," exhibits the action ^i going as future. It is, therefore, contingent on two accounts. In the first place, the liberty to go, which is affirmed to exist at present, may cease before the period of going arrives : or, secondly, if it remain, it may not be used. " It is not necessary that a man should 176 IMPERFECT. perform an action because he has the capacity to perform it." Again, this tense is used to signify command or request^ as, " you may give my compliments to him ;" i. e. for that is all that is said, " you are at liberty to do so.'' The person addressed infers, however, that we wish him to do it; hence the phrase is a virtual command. 2. The Imperfect of the Subjunctive, The Britannica states very justly, that this tense asserts the liberty to perform an action as having existed in some indefinite period of past time, while it leaves room for supposing that its performance may be even yet in progress ; as, " I said that I would do whatever he might command." It maybe well to observe here that, when the subjunctive is connected with an indicative verb in the past tense, — as in the instances, " I said that I would go," "I knew that I should fall," the statement of the Britannica ap- pears evidently to hold good. But is it equally evi- dent, or even true, that past time is expressed by the subjunctive in such phrases as the following, "I would go if you would reward me." The meaning of the auxiliaries will afford assistance in this point. "Might" is thepreterite of the verb "may ;" " could" the preterite of the verb " can ;" "would" the preter- ite of the verb " will." I might or could go ; i. e. I had permission or power to go. The act of going is by this phrase represented as future in relation to the IMPERFECT. 177 permission or power ; the permission, &c., is past in relation to the act. The jjermtssto?i, &c. is said to have existed in time past ; the going, should it take place at all, will exist in time to come. This expla- nation accounts for the different degrees of certainty w^hich " may" and "might"' impress on the future events which they are employed to introduce. Both of them denote, as it has been justly said, "uncer- tain or conditional futurity." But " may" inti- mates, as every one feels, " a state of greater prepa- ration, and a stronger probability of the contingency taking place." This it does by the force of its own meaning. " I may go," intends I have now per- mission to go. "I might go," means I had formerly permission to go. But, as the words do not state that the permission yet remains, yea seem rather to intimate that it has been withdrawn, the act of going is doubly uncertain. The example, referred to formerly, "I would go if you would reward me," is of more difficult reso- lution. Still, as " would'' is the past tense of will, it must denote past time. But, as all time is relative and as an event may be past in relation to one period, and future in relation to another, the deter- mination expressed by "'would," though subsequent to the present moment, may be previous to the period of the delicately solicited reward. The words carry us forward to the latter period; and the speaker, looking back from that period, says not that deter- mination will then exist, but that it had existed, or, 178 PERFECT AND PLUPERFECT. would have existed, if the promise of a reward had been given. 3. The Perfect of the Subjunctive, Of this tense, the Britannica seems to have given a just account. The present of this mode " states the agent as at liberty to be performing an unfinished action ; the perfect states him as at liberty to per- form the action considered as finished. ' I may be writing a letter when you come/ ^. e, I am at liberty to be writing a letter when you come. ' I may have written a letter when you come/ i, e. I am at liberty to be in possession of the finished action of writing a letter when you come." 4. The Pluperfect of the Subjunctive, This tense represents an agent as having been at liberty to possess a finished action before another action which is past and finished; as, "I might have written a letter before you came/' i, e. ''\ was, then, at liberty to possess the finished action of writing a letter." Nmnber and Person. Besides tense, number and person are supposed to belong to verbs. "Energies,'' it has been said, " are the attributes of persons ; hence verbs, which denote them, must be susceptible of personality, NUMBER AND PERSON. 179 number, and even of gender." In point of fact, in all the learned languages, the distinctions of number and person exist ; and, if these are admitted, there does not appear to be any sufficient reason for the exclusion of gender. It is the fact, indeed, that in other languages than the Hebrew the distinction of gender is preserved in some of the tenses. With respect to the terminations by which the more ancient languages distinguish the first, second, and third persons, it has been justly stated that they are pronouns, or fragments of pronouns, and are equally complete as if they had been separate words. This is obviously the case with the Hebrew, and not much less so with the Latin. " The termina- tion in amo, for instance, was probably derived from ego ; the s, in amas, from av ; the t, in amat, from avTOQ ; the amas from -qixeiQ. Of atis and ant, no account can be given. But difficulties in ety- mology do not in the least degree invalidate the general position that such terminations are real pronouns. Atis and ant have exactly the same meaning with vjielq and avroiJ' The inflexions in English verbs seem to possess a somewhat different character. They do not supply the place of the nominatives, but are used along with them. We say, "/love ;" " thou lovest ;" "• he loves." Our English terminations are not, conse- quently, complete pronouns as in Latin ; but " ac- companying signs, intimating that a particular sort of word is the nominative to the verb ; and, being less essential than in the Latin, they are fewer, and n2 180 NUMBER AND PERSON. less varied. The first person singular, and all the three persons plural, consist of the simple verb with the pronoun prefixed. " I love," " we love/' " ye love/' ^^ they love." On this account, in connexion with other reasons, our language admits of less in- version in the order of the words. Yet, though the distinctions of number, person, and gender are marked in the verbs of various countries, they are by no means essential to lan- guage. Thpy are, indeed, we think, unphilosophi- cal, — an opinion which appears to result necessarily from the view which has been given, in preceding pages, of the nature of the verb. If the verb affirms, or unites the subject and predicate of a proposition, and does uothing more, it surely ought not to be made to undergo any change ; for, as it has been truly said, " affirmation is the same whether it be made by you or by me, or a third person ; or whe- ther it be made by one man, or by a thousand." In languages, where considerable variety in the collo- cation of words is practised, it is, however, expe- dient, if not necessary, that the terminations of the verb should vary with the number and person of its nominative, so as to enable us to connect with cer- tainty the substantive, or pronoun, with its verbal attributive. '^ The same," adds the writer last quoted, " may be said of sex with respect to adjec- tives. They have terminations which vary as they represent beings male or female, though it is past dispute that substantives alone are susceptible of sex" (or rather, as he should have said, the beings MOODS OR MODES. 181 whom the substantives represent) : "we, therefore/* he adds, "pass over these matters, and all of like kind, as being rather among the elegances of par- ticular languages, and, therefore, to be learned from the particular grammar of each tongue, than among the essentials of language ; which essentials alone are the subject of inquiry in a treatise on universal grammar/' Moods or Modes of Verbs, Of modes, in relation to verbs, it is by no means easy to give a definition. It is, perhaps, generally thought that those forms of expression to which we appropriate the name of modes, are intended to re- present different modifications of the action, &c. of the verb. "Actions and states of being," says Dr. Crombie, "may be predicated as either certain or contingent, free or necessary, possible or impossible, obligatory or optional ; in short, as they may take place in a variety of ways, they may be spoken of as diversified in their modes of production!' This is true, but a mode of production is not a mode of action or existence ; so that his subsequent defini- tion of mode, viz. as " that which expresses the mode or manner of existence^' does not accord with his statement of that which gives rise to it. The general definition of modes, referred to above, is sufii- ciently refated by the Britannica. "Amo, amem, ama," says this writer, " do not signify modes of loving, for modes of loving are, loving little, loving much, lov- 1S2 ACCOUNT OF BY ing long, &c/' Murray tells us, "that mode is a particular form of the verb showing the manner in which the being, action, or passion, is represented." But the phrases, " I may love," and " let me love," indicate no difference in the manner of loving. Any difference which exists is not to be found in the action itself, but in the state and circumstances of the agent. In the former case he declares his liberty to perform the action ; in the latter he asks for liberty to do it. Harris tells us that " the modes of verbs exhibit some way or other the soul and its affections." It has been justly said, in reply to this statement, that "it does not discriminate between the meaning of mode, and the object of language in general ; all language being intended to exhibit the soul and its affections." A second definition of mode by Murray is more to the purpose. " Mode consists in the change which the verb undergoes to signify various intentions of the mind, and various modifi- cations and circumstances of action." It may be objected, however, that, unless the auxiliary be re- garded as a part of the verb, the verb itself under- goes no change. We say, I love ; I may love ; let ine love. Nor is the object of the assumed change stated in the concluding part of the definition with sufficient precision. A similar objection lies also against the definition of the Britannica. " Gram- matical modes of verbs are concise modes of express- ing some of those combinations of thoughts w^hich occur most frequently, and of which assertion is an essential part." The commendable effort, made by MURRAY, HARRIS, &C. 183 the powerfQl writer of the article " Grammar/' in that work, to generalize the definition, deprives it of distinctness and perspicuity. It is possible that, in consistency with his own principles, he might have given a more intelligible account of the matter- Affirmation is, as we have seen, the essence of the verb. It follows, then, that, in every mode, there must be affirmation. But affirmation may have different subjects; or the verb may affirm different things. It may assert something concerning the action, or the agent. It may declare that a certain action is performed by a certain agent, — or that he has liberty or power to perform it, — or that he washes to perform it, — or wishes that others should perform it. The modes of verbs are then contrivances in language to indicate these, and similar differences, in the subjects of affirmation, or in the things affirm- ed by the verb. The indicative simply asserts that a connexion exists between a certain action (we confine our illustrations to verbs of action, for the purpose of securing simplicity) and a certain agent ; as, "I write." The subjunctive asserts that an agent has liberty or power to perform a certain action; as, "I may write." The imperative asserts that he desires to perform it, or to have it perform- ed; as, " let me write," "let them write," &c. In all these cases the verb asserts. No doubt can exist of this, in any instance, with the exception of the last. It might, possibly, be thought that, in the imperative, " write thou," there is no assertion. But, on examination, it appears most manifestly to be a 184 riFFERENT MODES compendious or abbreviated form of asserting the desire^ or if you will, the determination, of the speaker, that the action of writing should be per- formed : it is equivalent with " I desire or command you to write." It is on this account that some grammarians deny the propriety of admitting an imperative inode, or rather the existence of the imperative. All impera- tive sentences resolve themselves, we are told, into indicative sentences. To be consistent, they should deny the existence of a subjunctive mode ; for, what- ever meaning they attach to the phrase an indicative sentence, the sentences, " I am at liberty to go," " I have power to go," into w^hichthe subjunctive phrases? I may go, I can go, resolve themselves, are as clearly indicative, as, " I go/' The subjunctive is clearly as much an indicative mode, as is the imperative. And, accordingly. Dr. Crombie distinctly afl&rms — at utter variance, as it appears to me, with his own account of the origin and meaning of moods, or modes, quoted a short time ago — "that in English there is only one mood, namely, the indicative." This assertion is not, however, placed by this writer on the asserted ground that both subjunctive and imperative phrases may be resolved into indicative ones ; but on the opinion, " that those only can be justly regarded as modes which, by a different form of the verb,'' i, e. a variation of inflexion, "express a different mode of existence." In short, different inflexions of the verb are, in the view of this writer, essential to the existence of different modes. The same EXIST. 185 decision is given in regard to tense. Two tenses only are assigned to English verbs, as love, and loved; the other tenses, as we call them, being formed by auxiliaries, are not tenses. The correct- ness of Dr. Crombie's statements depends altogether upon the definition which should be given of the words tense, and mode. If they must be so defined as to contain a reference to the termination of each, it is manifest that Dr. C. is right; — and that we ought not to admit more modes, and tenses, than we have variations of inflexion. But the argument by which he seeks to support his opinion is obvi- ously fallacious. He states that, though the English language possesses means of expressing the relations which are indicated by the terminations of nouns in the Latin language, we do not maintain that our nouns have six distinct cases ; and his inference is, that it is not less absurd to admit that auxiliaries can form modes and tenses, than prepositions can form cases. " By a king," would not be called the ablative case : why, then, he says in effect, should " I may love" be denominated the subjunctive mood ? "We reply, the whole argument strangely overlooks the fact, that the very word " case'' implies termi- nation, while there is no such implication in the words mode and tense. In the strict sense of the term case, the number of cases in any language must be bounded by the number of changes of ter- mination which its nouns undergo. But there is no similar strict sense of the terms mode and tense. There exists nothing in their etymology to forbid a 186 DR. crombie's statements generalized definition of them, — a definition com- prehending any manner of denoting the subject of affirmation (see previous definitions of mode and tense), and the time in which the assertion is said to he true. Such a generalized definition of " mode" would seem to be required, as we have said, by Dr. Crombie's own statement of its origin. As actions "take place in a variety of ways, they may be spoken of as diversified in their modes of production. Hence arises another accideyit of verbs^ called a modey expressing a mode or manner of existence." Now as modes express manner of existence, and as the manner of existence may be different, we have of course need for more " modes" of verbs than one- Similar remarks may be made upon what he says with regard to tense. "As all things exist in time, and whatever is predicable of any subject, must be predicated as either past, present or future" — " hence arises the utility of tenses, to express the time, or relative order of their existence." This fact, so cor- rectly stated, seems to render three tenses at least necessary ; and yet Dr. Crombie declares that we have only two, — " I write," and, " I wrote." What then are, "I have written;" " I had written." Are they not tenses, i, e, forms of expression chosen and adapted to denote sufficiently distinct divisions of past time in which the action of writing was per- formed? And this is the general and correct notion of tense. To represent variations of termination as essential to tense, is to identify the mode of doing a thing with the actual doing of it ; — the mode of draw- EXAAIlNED. 187 ing a tooth, for instance, with the actual drawing of it. The term "tenses" does not, like "cases/' imply termination. Hence it is not correct to reason from the one to the other. The reasons stated by Dr. Cromhie do not then justify us in denying that the English verb has more modes than one. Whether the alleged fact, if it be a fact, that every supposed mode may be resolved into the indicative, ^YOuld justify that denial, is another question altogether. Certainly if the cri- terion, or differentia, of the indicative mode be that it asserts, or if this be taken to be the meaning of indicative, every mode is indicative ; for there is assertion, or implied assertion, in every mode — in the subjunctive as well as in the indicative. Nor is it the distinction between them, as some have thought, that the latter affirms absolutely, and the former conditionally. They both express absolute affirmation ; " I may write," not less so than, " I write." The sole difference is in the thing affirmed. " I write" affirms a connexion between the agent and the action. " 1 may write," a similar con- nexion between the agent and liberty to write. " Write thou," when resolved, affirms a connexion between the agent and a desire on his part to have the action performed. Now, as the corresponding Latin terms, scribo, scribe, scribam, which affirm precisely the same things, and might be resolved in precisely the same manner, are admitted to be dif- ferent modes of the same verb, why should we deny this of the three forms of the English verb. The IBS NUMBER OF MODES. thing done is the same, the only difference lies in the manner of doing it. How many modes should exist in language? whether formed by auxiliaries, or by variations of termination, is clearly a question belonging to the department of general grammar. Mr. Harris pleads for the following, viz. the indicative, the po- tential, the interrogative, the requisitive, the im- perative, and the precative ; while Dr. Gregory laments that the number is not multiplied beyond this ; and it is manifest, from our preceding state- ments, that it might be multiplied almost ad infinitum. " It may be justly doubted, however,'' says the Britannic a, especially, we add, when they are formed by changes of termination, " whether such a multiplication of modes would be any improvement, in language. The verb, ^ith the modes and tenses which it has in all languages, is already a very complex part of speech, which few are able, and still fewer inclined to analyze ; and it would surely be no advantage to make it more complex by the introduction of new modes, especially when the va- rieties of meaning which could be marked by them are, with equal, and perhaps greater, precision, marked in the living speech by the different tones of voice adapted to them by nature ; and in written language by the reader's general knowledge of the subject and of the persons who may be occasionally introduced. If there be any particular delicacy of sentiment or energy which cannot tbus be made known, it is better to express it by a name appro- THE IXFiyiTIVE. 189 priated to itself^ together with the original and simple verb of affirmation, than to clog the com- pound verb with such a multiplicity of variations as would render the acquisition of every language as difficult as is said to be that of the Chinese written character." Nothing, it will be observed, has been as yet said about the infinitive. The reason is, that we do not consider it a verb, but a noun, denoting the abstract action affirmed by the indicative. The whole of the preceding statements render it manifest, either that assertion is not the essence of the verb, or that the infinitive has no claim to that title. In the sen- tences, '^ to write," " to die," there is obviously no assertion. 'We cannot abandon the doctrine pre- viously affirmed concerning the nature of the verb ; and are, consequently, constrained, with the ancient grammarians, to consider it as " nomen verbi," the " noun or name of the verb ;'' i. e. to regard it not as a verb but a noun Many arguments of OA'erpowering force have been adduced in support of this opinion. It is frequently used, like the noun, as the nominative case to a verb, as, " to obey God is the duty of all ;' i. e. the act of obepng God, or obedience to God, is incumbent upon aU. It is, again, capable, like a noun, of being go- verned by an active verb ; " he refuses to obey God;'' i.e. refuses to perform the act of obeying God, or, in other words, obedience to God. Farther, we are told, that, sometimes in the Latin language, an adjective is employed to agree with it, as with a 190 THE INFINITIVE noun. The follo^Ying example is given in the Bri- tannica. " Petronius says, ' meum intelligere nulla pecunia vendo.* Here/' adds the Britannica, " in- telligere is used for intellectum, the accusative of intellectus." I sell my to understand^ i. e, under- standing, at no price. It is true/' proceeds the same writer, " this kind of phraseology is not common even in the Latin language, and it is never found in the English. There is nothing, however, in the nature of the case to prevent it." If we had been accustomed to say, " a good to understand, instead of a good un- derstanding," we should feel it to be equally proper with the latter. The mode in which the infinite, as it is called, is used in the Hebrew is strongly corroborative of the preceding remarks. It frequently occurs where we should employ a noun. Thus, in the fourth verse of the second chapter of Genesis, we meet with the following examples. " These are the generations of the heavens, and the earth, in to be created them, or of them," i. e. "m their creation /' or, as the words are properly rendered, " when they were created. " '' In the day of to make of Jehovah God of the earth and the heavens," i. e. in the day of " the making" of or by Jehovah God "of the heaven, &c ;" properly rendered in our version, "In the day that the Lord God made the earth and the heavens." Unconvinced by these arguments. Dr. Gregory maintains that the infinitive is truly averb, because, as he says, "the thought expressed by it maybe ex- pressed in synonymous and convertible phrases in IS A NOUN. 191 different languages. In support of this statement, he refers to the following among other phrases. " Dico Titium existere.'"' I affirm the existence of Titius; literally, "I say Titius to exist." This phrase is, he says, " synonymous with Dico quod Titius existat ; I say that Titius may exist." TheBritannica, how- ever, in examining these phrases, which it has done with great ingenuity, shows that the infinitive, in the above instance, acquires, in consequence of its connexion with the verb dico in the indicative, something of the form of affirmation ; and that it is used as an abstract noun in the accusative case, denoting, in conjunction with " Titium," one complex conception; — the existence of Titius. "I say, and the object of my speech is, Titium existere, — the ex- istence of Titius." In reference to the subjunctive forms, he adds, " Every one knows that quod, though often called a conjunction, is always a relative pro- noun." "Dico quod Titius existat must, therefore, be construed thus ; Titius existat (id est) quod dico. Titius exists is [that thing] which I say." Dr. H. Dewar, at the close of a long and a very fair statement of the argument on both sides of the question, takes leave of the subject in the follovdng words ; " But both of these circumstances are too slight, to confer on the infinitive the same rank with the assertive verb, and to divest it of the character of a noun ; especially when we consider," he contin- ues in substance, that it is often used without any of those circumstances which, as he had stated, cause it to resemble a verb ; but never, he adds, "indepen- 192 KINDS OF VERBS. dent of some character of syntax which is common to it with the noun." The Voices and kinds of Yerhs. It appears to be a just remark, that since predica- tion or assertion is the essence of the verb, there can- not be different kinds or species of verbs, since the copula, or bond of union between the subject and its attribute — and the verb is that bond — cannot be af- fected by the nature of either, especially by that of the latter. This is too apparent to require any ar- gument when the verb is simply the copula, i. e. the substantive verb. But the greater part of verbs, as we have seen, contain the predicate as well as the copula, — the attribute as well as the affirmation. Thus "lego," 1 am reading; "ambulo," I am walk- ing, " sto," I rnn standing ; "verbero," lam striking ; "verberor," I am stricken. In these cases, though the verb undergoes no change, and though it merely unites these different attributes to the common sub- ject I, yet the attributes themselves are evidently of different kinds ; some consisting in action, some in suffering ; and some in a state of being which is neither active nor passive r This is the only foun- dation for the common division of verbs. Their de- nomination as active, passive, or neuter, depends upon the nature of the attribute which they unite with the subject. If it consist in action, the verb is said to be active ; if of suffering, it is called a passive verb, &c. This does not, indeed, appear to VOICES, ETC. 193 be a very correct nomenclature, since it is properly speaking not upon the verb, but upon the nomina- tive, that the change takes place when the verb alters its voice. Thus, in the examples, " I strike," ^^I am stricken;" — the I, or the being denoted by it, is active in the former, but passive in the latter ; for, " when the nominative is the name of an agent, the verb is active ; — when it is the name of an ob- ject affected, it is said to be passive. The difference of these two uses," or voices as they are usually called, '^ of the verb, is, that they give these cha- racters to the noun. There is no necessity, however,'' adds this author very justly, " to alter our settled phraseology. It is established by common usage, and possesses the advantage of a convenient brief- ness." Most languages, perhaps, have different forms of the verb to denote the active and passive sense. This is not, however, necessary, and, therefore, not universal. We, for instance, can use the word " cut," in any one of the three following ways. " They cut the trees." Here it is considered active and transitive. "These tools cut smoothly ;" it is here intransitive, or neuter. "Fir cuts more easily than oak ;" here it is passive, the meaning being, fir is cut more easily than oak. We say also, "look at that person's face ;" and "he looks well," i. e. he appears, or is seen to be well. Dr. Dewar conjec- tures that those verbs which we call active were, in their earliest application, of no particular voice ; though from the agent generally appearing in the 194 VERBS TRANSITIVE miiid of the speaker more important than any object acted upon, the active application of them is the most frequent. This remark wonld seem to be, in some measure, supported by the instances just men- tioned. To these, others may be added. Thus we say, " he drinks wine," — and " the wine drinks plea- santly.'' " The kind of connexion between the wine and the act of drinking is left to be inferred from the nature of the subject." Among verbs denoting action a distinction exists, or is thought to exist, between some which are said to be transitive, and others which are called intran- sitive. The distinction is thus explained. In the case of the former, the action passes over to some object ; in that of the latter, it begins and termi- nates in the agent himself " I strike," and ^' I walk," are regarded as examples of this distinction. Common, how^ever, as this statement is, it is not strictly true. It has been show^n (vide pp. 82 — 83) that even physical actions can only be said in a loose and popular sense to pass over to their objects, i. e. in the sense of affecting them, — that mental actions, such as love, hate, esteem, fear, &c. do not always, and indeed but seldom, even thus pass over to their objects, — that there are some transitive verbs, such as similare, or resemble, which denote no action at all, so that it cannot even be conceived to pass over to, or affect, the object. Even in the case of physical actions — the most favourable to the common doctrine — the affirmed distinction between transitive verbs does not seem to exist. The action AND INTRANSITIVE. 195 of walking, and the same thing may be said of all actions of this kind, does as truly affect something, i. e. pass over to an object, as the action of striking. " In walking, a man w^alks upon some object, which supports him ; he walks from some place to some other." The ground is as truly affected by the action of walking, as the horse by the action of striking. '' Each of the phrases, * I strike my horse,' and ^I walk upon the ground,' expresses, in a manner equally explicit, a particular act, with an object affected by it." Where, then, is the difference between transitive and intransitive verbs? The only intelligible answer is, we think, given by Dr. Dewar, who states, in substance at least, that tran- sitive verbs are those which express actions when we have immediate occasion to mention the object acted on. Intransitive verbs describe actions when we are satisfied, with stating the connexion between the action and the agent. Thus in the cases men- tioned above, when we |peak of striking, it is gene- rally of importance to point out the object struck ; but when we speak of walking, our attention is chiefly directed to the act as connected with an agent, though each, as we have seen, has an object. " It might naturally be expected," says Dr. Dewar, " from the numerous and varied occasions which we have for the relation of events, that, even in describ- ing the same sort of action, we should sometimes have a motive for mentioning an object, and some- times not." As instances, the Doctor refers to the following phrases, — " A miller grinds corn ;" '^ two o 2 196 VERBS TRANSITIVE, ETC. women were grinding at the mill." In the first case, it is essential to our purpose to mention the object? corn, which is affected by the action. In the latter, it is not. Here we "have only to speak of the act of grinding as characteristic of the situation and employment of the women ;" and, accordingly, the thing ground is not stated. But there must have been something ground — ^. e, the action of grinding must have passed over to, or affected something in the latter case as well as in the former ; in other words, the verb grind, if transitive in one case, cannot be intransitive in the other. It appears to have escaped this very philosophi- cal writer, that there are verbs which, in connexion with the occasions on which we use them, require the mention of the object ; and others again which do not require this. Out of this fact has grown the prejudice, for it is really such, that the former are transitive, and the latter intransitive, verbs. The object not being mentioned v^ the case of the latter — because there is no need to mention it — we cease to think of it, or rather fancy that no object exists. It is confirmatory of this view of the matter, that, when a verb, allowed to be a transitive verb, is em- ployed without mention of the object affected by it, — as in the instance, "Two women were grinding at the mill," — we think of it as a neuter or intransitive verb. Th^ mention of the object, and the notion of transition of action, become so firmly blended toge- ther by the power of suggestion, or association, that the notion does not — if we may not say cannot — PARTICIPLES. 197 arise, when the object affected by the action is not mentioned. The action of walking as truly affects the ground — or that, whatever it may be — on which we walk, as the action of striking a horse affects the horse. But, as we habitually, at least, walk on the ground, and not on water, or air, there is no need to mention the object affected. Hence the prejudice that the act of walking has no object. PARTICIPLES. The participle derives its name from the assumea fact of its participating in the properties of the verb and the adjective. The following account of its na- ture is given us by Mr. Harris. " Every verb," says this writer, " except the substantive verb, is expres- sive of an attribute, of time, and of an assertion. If we take away the assertion, and thus destroy the verb, there will remain the attribute and the time ; and these combined make the essence of that species of words called participles. Thus, take away the assertion from the verb ypa^et, waiteth, and there remains the participle ypacfxjjv, writing ,- which, with- out the assertion, denotes the same attribute, and the same time. After the same manner, by with- drawing the assertion, we discover ypa\pag, written, in eypa\pe, " wrote." Thus, according to this writer, the participle denotes an attribute like the adjective, and time like the verb ; and from this circumstance it derives its name. There are words bearing the form of participles, — as <^doctus" "learned;" "elo- 198 TWO PARTICIPLES. quens" " eloquent," — yet^ as they denote no time, they are not participles, but adjectives. It is essen- tial to a participle to express both an attribute and time. "Add assertion to a participle/' says one, " and you make it a verb : take time from the participle, and you make it an adjective." Now, since the verb simply asserts, and since the participle is formed by the withdrawment of asser- tion, it would seem to follow that no verbal quality can exist in the participle, — or that it cannot com- bine in itself the properties of the verb and the ad- jective. And when the term " verb" is understood in its strict sense, this is no doubt true. The with- drawment of assertion from the verb is the extinc- tion of the verb, as the withdrawment of life is the extinction of the animal. But, if the term " verb'* be taken in its loose sense, or as comprehending all that the compound words " write" and " strike" con- tain — in which sense it appears to be understood by Mr. Harris — then his doctrine concerning the par- ticiple may be admitted to be perspicuous and just. " Write" may be resolved into "is writing'' — aphrase which is understood to contain an attribute, an assertion, and time. Remove the assertion " is,*' and " writing" remains, which word denotes both the attribute and the time. Participles, it may also be further remembered, have the regimen of verbs, go- verning the noun or pronoun which follows them. There are, in most languages, two participles form- ed in different ways, according to the genius of the language in which they are found. They have been HOW CALLED. 199 called ; the present participle active, and the past participle passive. The former is distinguished in English by the termination " ing ;" the latter, some- times by a change in a vowel of the simple verb ; but, more commonly, by the termination " ed ;" as, writing, wrote, loving, loved. It may be doubted whether the names to which reference has just been made, are the best fitted to express the difference which exists between these two participles. We should rather incline to call them the imperfect and the jt?er/^c^ participles: for, though the participle in " ing " may be more commonly active, it is by no means invariably so. We say not only, he is build- ing the house, but, " the house is building." '^ I heard of a plan forming for his rescue.'' '^ A large sum is owing to me." " The prisoner was burning." In the first three instances, the participle is un- doubtedly used in the passive sense; in the last, " our knowledge of the subject only can enable us to determine whether the prisoner was active or passive ; whether he was employing fire to consume, or was himself consuming by fire." Nor is the participle in " ed " exclusively passive. " Landed," " departed," " strayed," and a variety of others, are active in their signification. "As those gramma- rians," says Dr. Crombie, " have erred who consider the participle in ' ing ' as an active participle, when it in fact denotes either action or passion, so those, on the other hand, commit a similar mistake, who regard the participle in ^ ed' as purely passive." " If I say, ^ he had concealed a poniard under his 200 DESIGNATION coat/ the participle here would be considered as active/' (It may, however, admit of doubt, as we shall afterwards see, whether concealed is here a participle.) " If I say, ^he had a poniard concealed under his clothes,' the participle would be regarded as passive. Does not this prove that this participle is ambiguous, belonging properly to neither voice ? " And then, as to time, is it certain that " ing" de- notes present time, and '^ ed " past time ? We say^ " I was writing yesterday;" ^^ I shall be writing to- morrow.'' And again, ^^ I had landed before he came." " I shall have landed ere he arrive." In these in- stances, each participle appears to express both past and future time. Perhaps the very ingenious state- ments of the Britannica may partly help us over the difficulty. " "When we speak simply of an action us j:)7'esenty we must mean that it is present with re- spect to something besides itself, or we speak a jar- gon which is unintelHgible, but we do not ascertain the ti?ne of its presence. From the very nature of time^ an action may be present now, it may have heeii present formerly, or it may he present at some future period ; but \he , precise time of its presence cannot be ascertained even by the present of the indicative of the verb itself; yet who ever supposed that Xhe present of the indicative denotes no time? The participle of the present represents the action of the verb as going on ; but an action cannot be going on without being present in time with some- thing. When, therefore, Cebes says, ' We were walking in the temple of Saturn,' he represents the OF PARTICIPLES. 201 action of the verb walk di^ present W\i\i something; but by nsing the verb expressive of his assertion in ^past tense J he gives ns to understand that the ac- tion was not present with any thing at the period of his speaking J but at some portion of time prior to that period : what \}ii2X portion of time was, must be collected from the subsequent parts of his discourse. The same is to be said of the phrases, I was writing yesterday^ and, / shall he writing to-morrow. They indicate that the action of the verb write was pre- sent with me yesterday^ and will again he present with me to-morrow!' Dr. Dewar, referring to this passage, says, that " the statement will not apply, otherwise we might as well use the expression, ' the public attention was excited yesterday by an aero- naut who ascends, or who is ascending. And we might say, I thought that he ascends in a beautiful style.' These phrases would be condemned as not only chargeable with bad grammar, but with incon- gruity and absurdity. It is therefore necessary to allow that Che participle in ^ ing ' is not restricted to any tense." Now, it is not necessary to plead for the use of such phrases ; but how Dr. Dewar — contending, as he does, that the present is a uni- versal aorist, and that it is correct on that account to say, " Yesterday, when I was walking along, whom DO I meet, &c." — can pronounce the phrase, " I thought he ascends in a beautiful style," a vio- lation of grammar, I am unable to conceive. Where- in does the latter phrase differ from the former ? What else can be said P Surely not, ^' I thought he W2 STATEMENTS OF DKWAR;, ascended.'' The action of ascending was not pre- vious to the thinkings hut contemporaneous with it. The correct expression is, therefore, I think that he ascended^ or was ascending, yesterday, — not, I thought he ascended, &c. The latter phrase would imply, what is not the fact, viz. that the ascending was prior to the thinking. A very slight variation of the phrase, excepted against by Dr. Dewar, will show that it does not involve any grammatical ano- maly, — " I thought how beautifiilly he ascends !" Even the simple ellipsis of " that " will prove it, " I thought, he ascends in a beautiful style." It would indeed be incorrect to say, " Yesterday the public attention was excited by an aeronaut who ascends," or " who is ascending." But that is the result of the effect produced by the introduction of the rela- tive " who^' which brings the individual before us, and renders him in conception present to us. In consequence of its introduction, we think not of the aeronaut of yesterday who went up in his balloon, but of the seronaut of to-day, as standing near to us in imagination ; and, therefore, looking back to yes- terday, we are in this case constrained to say, the aeronaut w^ho ascended^ or was ascending. Still, though the statements of the Britannic a might justify us in regarding our participle in "ing" as a jor^5e/^^ participle — if it were thought desirable to contend for this nomenclature — yet, as we have shown that the present of the indicative is a uni- versal aorist, and as it would seem to follow that the participle in " ing," derived from it, must also be BRITANNICA, CROMBIE, &C. 203 aoristic as to time, — and, as we have further shown, that it is not always active in signification, we pre- fer the designation suggested p. 199, and would call the participle in " ing " the imperfect, and the parti- ciple in " ed " the perfect participle. For, though it may be true that, in the great majority of cases, the former participle denotes action and present time, and the latter, passion and past time ; yet are there so many cases of exception, as to lead us to seek for a better defined and more invariable point of distinction between them : and that, if w^e mis- take not, will be found in the circumstance that the one denotes complete action, and the other continued action. Thus, whether we say, ^^ I am writing," " I was writing," or, " I shall be writing," the action is presented to us as in a state of progress. On the contrary, whether we say, " the letter is written," " I have written/' or, " I shall have written it," the action of writing is represented as brought to a final close. Not essentially dissimilar from the above account are the statements of Dr. Crombie. " If we say, ^ James was building the house,' the participle ex- presses the continuation of the action, and the verb may be considered as active. If we say, ^ the house was building,' the participle denotes the continuation of a state not of action but — " of suffering, or being acted upon, and the verb may be considered as pas- sive." And, having cited examples in which the par- ticiple in " ed" is used actively as weU as passively, but in each case intimating finished action, he adds, 204 WRITTEN IN THE ACTIVE VOICE "the participle in " ed/' therefore, I consider to be perfectly analogous to the participle in " ing/' and used like it in either an active or a passive sense ; belonging, therefore, neither to the one voice nor to the other exclusively, but denoting the completion of an action or state of being, while the participle in "ing" denotes its continuation." Yet, though the past or perfect is sometimes ac- tive, it may be allowed that this is not its general character ; it is usually passive. Hence it has come to be a subject of inquiry, why it is employed in the compound tenses of the active verb, as, " I have writ- ten^' "I had written^' &c. Many writers, assuming the fact that the words employed in such examples are beyond all doubt participles, have suggested the following explanation, which it must be confessed is not a little ingenious. "If," says one of their num- ber, " we vary the order of the auxiliaries, this will be accounted for. Thus, if instead of saying, ' I have written a letter,' we say, ^I have a letter written' — an order not unfrequently adopted for the sake of harmony and variety — it appears at once that the participle written belongs not to the verb, but to the accusative or object letter (I have a written letter) "or object acted upon; thus proving that, though connected with the active voice, and forming what may be called the compound tenses of the active voice, when analyzed and resolved, they are still no- thing more than the passive participles." Had the conclusion been, " they are nothing more than adjec- tives," it would have been more fully justified by the IS NOT A PARTICIPLE. 205 premises. This is not the point, however, which we wish the reader at present to mark. That point is the following. The whole statement takes it for granted, then, let it he ohserved, that the word writ- ten^ as well as corresponding ones in similar cases, is what is commonly called the passive, and what we have denominated the perfect, participle. But may not this he douhted ? There are, indeed, facts which seem to sanction the opinion. When what is usu- ally called the passive participle in English differs from the aorist, — as in the case wrote, written, it is the latter word that is unifoi'mly used in connexion with the auxiliary. Thus we say, not "I have wrote," hut ^^ I have written." The words " wrote" and " written" are, however, regarded by Dr. De war, Mr, Tooke, and others, as only different forms of the aorist, or past tense of the verb. The latter gentleman complains of it as a redundancy, because, as he says, " one word for past time is sufficient for every purpose." The opinion seems to derive farther support ''from the sti'iicture of some phrases in the Italian language^ which show that the passive participle is really the word employed^ as its inflexions are varied, and made to agree with the noun in gender and number." Some phrases, also, of a similar nature, occur in the French language. A very competent authority has, however, stated, "that such construc- tions even in the Italian are not general, — that in •the French they are altogether peculiar, and give no room for supposing that this is the original construc- tion of the form of the preterite, afterwards trans- 206 WHITTEN, ETC. IN THE ACTIVE VOICE ferred to an active meaning ; for it only takes place when the substantive noun has been previously in- troduced, and then is referred to by means of the relative que." The general practice, then, of those languages which form their past tenses of the active voice by auxiliaries, is against the opinion that the word joined vvith the auxiliary is the passive participle ; and, if we examine our own language, the statements of Dr. Dewar appear to us unanswerable. This writer refers to the case of what are called neuter or intransitive verbs. Such verbs being destitute of a passive voice, cannot have a passive participle. ^^ When we say, ' he has gone,' ' I have come,' the words ' gone,* and ' come,' cannot be passive parti- ciples, agreeing with nouns," as the theory supposes, because Dr. Dewar adds, "no nouns are introduced after them. There is no sufficient reason why the introduction of a noun should alter the nature of the word. In the phrase, ' I have struck,' the word struck signifies action" — being obviously the past tense of the verb — " and, as a part of the active verb, it may govern the accusative case with as much propriety as any other part of it. When w^e say, ' I have struck, and, I have struck my enemy,' the word struck is equally active in its meaning." It is the preterite tense, and not the passive participle. Were it the latter, the whole power of government must be in the verb have ; and the thing "had," i, e. possessed, would be not struck, or the action, but the enemy. Now it may IS NOT A PARTICIPLE. 207 be left to the common sense of any man to say whether the two phrases, " I had/' i, e. possessed , " struck/' or the finished action of striking, — and, '^ I had," or possessed, " an enemy," do not convey radically different ideas. In addition to all this it should be observed, that if the part of the compound tense to which we are now referring does not belong to the verb, but to the accusative or object, with which it is said also to agree, it is not in reality a participle at all, but an ad- jective. If the phrase, " I have written a letter, " im- ports, "I have a letter written/' the word "written" can mean no more than if it stood before the noun, as in the phrase, " I have a written letter.'' In that position all would admit it to be an adjective, — no time whatever being implied in it. I have no doubt, therefore, that the word "written/' in the phrase, "I have written," even when a noun is subjoined to it, should be regarded as part at least of the past tense of the verb. The present writer would intimate, that perhaps the mistaken conception that what he has ventured to call the perfect participle is essentially passive, may have originated a controversy which more cor- rect views on this point would have prevented. For since the participle in "ed'' may be active in sense, such words as written, beaten, &c. might be allowed to be participles with an active signification ; and, in that case, there would exist in the past tense nothing of the anomaly complained of. It is a remark of Dr. Dewar worthy to be remem- 208 THE ADVERB. bered, that, " in the use of the participle, we have a method of subjoining a descriptive sentence to the noun, which, with respect to briefness, and extent of regimen, is intermediate betwixt the use of the ad- jective, or of the genitive case, and that of the rela- tive. It resembles the adjective in the manner in which it is introduced, but always follows the par- ticular verb to which it belongs in the regimen which it possesses as introductory to other words. Hence it is capable of annexing a train of ideas to the noun. We say" — " the square of the side of a right angled triangle, subtending the right angle, is equal to the sum of the squares of the other two." He again observes, that the participle is resolvable into an indicative sentence introduced by the relative. " A man walking is," he says, " resolvable into a man who walks." Yet more evidently is this the case with the words, "God being rich in mercy,' which phrase is obviously the same with "God who is rich in mercy." The Adverb. The grammatical term adverb is derived from the Latin word " ad," to, and " verbum," a word. Look- ing, therefore, at words of this class etymologically, they are words added to verbs which, on account of their high rank and great importance in language, have appropriated the name "verbum" to them- selves. The name, however, merely intimates that all of them are capable of being annexed to verbs, — PURPOSE OF THE ADVERB. 209 not that they never stand in connexion with other words. In point of fact, they are found united to adjectives, as well as verbs, and it is by no means unusual to join one adverb to another. They are, accordingly, attributes of attributes ; or, as they have been very properly called, attributives of the second order. ^^As the attributives hitherto mentioned," says Mr. Harris, " viz. adjective and verb, denote the attributes of substances, so there is an inferior class of them which denote the attributes only of attributes. If I say, * Cicero w-as eloquent,' I ascribe to him the attribute of eloquence simply and absolutely ; if I say, ' he was exceedingly eloquent,' 1 affirm an eminent degree of eloquence, the adverb exceedingly denoting that degree. If I say, ^ he died lighting bravely for his country,' the word bravely here^ added to the verb, denotes the manner of the action." It appears, then, that the general purpose of the adverb, in common with that of some other parts of speech, is to give increased precision to language. All nouns, excepting proper names, are general terms, of extensive application. Their range of application is in a degree restricted by uniting attri- butives, especially adjectives, to them, and thus, to a certain extent, precision is gained, (vide Adjective). But all words denoting attributives are themselves, al^7 general terms ; and, consequently, devoid of full precision. They need themselves to be defined. Thus, after we have applied eloquent to an advocate, and say, accordingly, " the eloquent advocate," we feel that, though advocate is defined, eloquent is not 210 IS A PART OF SPEECH. SO. There are degrees of eloquence. The question arises, " to vrhat degree did his eloquence amount ? Haw eloquent was he ? We introduce an adverb to give greater precision to the general term eloquent, and say, " he was greatly eloquent." But greatly itself is a general term as well as eloquent. We apply to it, therefore, another adverb, and say, a very greatly eloquent man; and thus secure for our statement greater precision : and, if it be objected, that general terms can never impart full precision, ^ve would reply, that the fact af&rmed, if it be a fact, is only one proof among many of the necessary im- perfection of language. Whether the words now employed for this pur- pose, either in our language, or in other languages, are words, or fragments of words, belonging toother parts of speech, is an interesting etymological ques- tion, and adapted to throw much light on the mean- ing of terms which have been sometimes thought entirely devoid of meaning ; but the answer, what- ever it may be, does not settle the question, " ought they now to be regarded as forming a distinct part of speech ?" Mr. Home Tooke denies that oitr adverbs— extending the denial to the Englis-h parti- cles in general— express " any character by which a part of speech can be distinguished." He con- siders the adoption of it as an artificial means by which, "under the colour of scientific order, gram- marians have brought together a multitude of words, originating in abbreviations and corruptions, and possessing in no other respect any common pro- perty.". The Britannica unites with Mr. Tooke in tooke's opinion exposed. 211 degrading the adverb from its present position as a part of speech. There is, however, a fallacy in the reasoning of Mr. Tooke which it is alike surpris- ing that he should have committed, and that the Britannica should not have detected. Mr. Tooke's reasoning, reduced to a syllogism, is as follows ; '^ all words which were verbs or nouns, &c. ori- ginally, are so now; adverbs, and particles in general, w^ere originally nouns or verbs, &c. ; they are consequently nouns, &c. &c. now. The validity of the conclusion depends, as every logician knows, upon the truth of both premises. Mr. Tooke has, we admit, sufl&ciently established his minor, but in support of the major he has not said a single word. This is not, perhaps, surprising. When Mr. Tooke's labours commenced, the minor was the more doubtful premiss. No one had called in question the major; no one had ever dreamed of the truth of the minor. To establish that was all — as it was likely to appear to him — that he had to do. In the process of inves- tigation its truth burst upon his mind with over- powering conviction ; and, his attention being divert- ed from the major, as it could not well fail to be, he fancied that his work was done. We agree, how- ever, with Mr. Dugald Stewart in the following decision. "To prove that conjunctions,'' — or ad- verbs, — " are a derivative part of speech, and that, at first, their place was supplied by words which are chnfessedly pronouns, or articles, or verbs, does not prove that they ought not to be considered as a separate part of speech at present, any more than p2 212 tooke's opinion opposed. Mr. Smith's theory with respect to the gradual transformation of proper names into appellatives proves that proper names and appellatives are now radically and essentially the same ; or that the em- ployment of substantives to supply the place of adjec- tives (which Mr. Tooke tells us is one of the signs of an imperfect language), proves that no grammatical distinction exists between these two parts of speech in such tongues as the Greek, the Latin, and the Eng- lish. Mr. Tooke, indeed, has not hesitated to draw this last inference also ; but, in my opinion, with nearly as great precipitation as if he had concluded, because savages supply the w^ant of forks by their fingers, that, therefore, a finger and a fork are the same thing.'' It may be true that " bravely" was originally, " brave like ;" but, though two words for- merly, it is now one^ performing a distinct and well defined office in language, i. e, modifying the attri- butive with which it stands connected; as, "he fought bravely.'' And thus it is with all adverbs, as we call them. They possess the common quality of expressing some modification " of an action or qua- lity, as the manner, order, time, place, &c. Thus, " he wrote well ;"" he stood foremost;" "he came first ;" " he went thither," &c. And, on these grounds, they are justly entitled to take rank as forming a distinct part of speech. Kn exception must, however, be made in reference to two words generally classed among the adverb's; viz. the words " 5'es," and "no." They do not modify attributives. "Is he learned. P" No. "Is THE DERIVATIVE WORDS. 213 he brave ?" Yes. " Here/' as it has been justly said, " the two words signify not any modification of the attributes brave and learned, but a total nega- tion of the attribute, in one case ; and, in the other, a declaration that the attribute belongs to the person spoken of. On this account they should not be classed among the adverbs. They are imperatives of verbs of northern extraction." We fully accord with Mr. Home Tooke in think- ing that adverbs are derivative words. There are many which scarcely need resolution. The greater part, if not all, of the words of this class commencing in " a " proclaim their composition, " a '' being evi- dently a corruption of on — as afoot, ^. e, on foot, adays, ashore, astray, aslope, aright, abed, aback, abreast, afloat, abound, around, aloud, &c. Those, again, which terminate in " ly," Mr Tooke resolves by considering the ly as a corruption of like — as, greatly, ^. e. great like, honestly, honest like. Some of the more difficult adverbs are resolved in the following manner. " Ago '' into the past participle agone, or gone ; " asunder " he derives from asnn- dered, separated, the past participle of the Anglo- Saxon verb asundrian ; " to wit" from wittan, to know. " Needs " he resolves into " need is," used parenthetically, as, I must needs do such a thing, ^. e. there is need of doing it. " Anon," which our ^d authors use for immediately, instantly, means, he says, in one, i. e. in one instant, moment, minute. " Alone " and " only" are resolved into all one, and one like. " Alive " is on life, or in life. " Whilst" 214 CONJUNCTIONS AND PREPOSITIONS. is the Saxon hwile-es, time that. "Aloft" is on loft, as it was formerly written. Adverbs of place, also, are evidently abbreviations. " Where " is, in what place. " Whither," to what place. " Hence," from this place. " Thence,'' from that place. " Up- wards," in a direction ascending. " Now," at the present time. " When,'' at what time. " Then," at that time. " Often," many times. " Seldom," not many times. The adverbs of affirmation and negative, as they are usually called, are thus re- solved. " Aye," or " yea," is the imperative of a verb of northern extraction, and means have, pos- sess, enjoy ; and " yes *' is a contraction of ay-es, have, possess, or enjoy that. Thus, when it is asked whether a man be learned, if the answer be by the word yes, it is equivalent to have, enjoy that belief, or that proposition. " No," he derives from the Dutch. " In the Danish we have nodig ; in the Swedish, nodig ; and in the Dutch, noode, node, and no, for averse, unwilling. So that, when it is asked whether a man be brave, and the answer be. No, it is a declaration that he who utters the word is averse from, or unwilling to admit, that propo- sition." CONJUNCTIONS AND PREPOSITIONS. i Both these classes of words are comprehended-^ by Mr. Harris under the more general class of i. connectives whose simple office it is to coalesce what could not have been brought into a state of union HAVE A MEANING. 215 without their aid. " Some things/' says this writer, " coalesce and unite of themselves ; others refuse to do so without help, and as it were compulsion. Thus the mortar and stone in a building ; while the wainscot and the wall require for their joining, nails and pins. Thus, again, substances and their qua- lities.'' From these facts he draws the conclusion, " that parts of speech unite of themselves, or the contrary, as their archetypes unite, or require some- thing to effect an union. Thus substantives unite with verbs, and adjectives, without any interposing link; but tw^o substantives cannot be joined to- gether without the aid of conjunctions or prepo- sitions. The objection to Mr. Harris's doctrine is not grounded on his assertion that conjunctions and prepositions are connectives, for that they mani- festly are ; but that they are merely such, having no meaning of their own. He expressly affirms of both, that they are devoidof meaning in themselves, though, with singular inconsistency, he states after- wards, concerning prepositions, that they w^ere ori- ginally formed to denote the relations of place, — that they came afterwards to denote intellectual as well as local relations, — and that, when used as prefixes to other words, as inj^retell, to ^2;eract, to ' underN^yi^y to outgo^ they commonly transfuse some- thing of their own meaning into the word with which ■'they are compounded." It may be very well asked how a word, destitute of meaning, can transfuse a 216 ARE SIGNS meanings and, d fortiori^ its own meaning, into another ! This doctrine of Harris is opposed to all the pro- babilities of the case* How can a word^ — and espe- cially so large a class of words as that which is comprehended by Mr. Harris under the general term connectives, — be supposed to have come into existence without necessity ? ^^ e, without having any thought to express ? Language is the vehicle for the communication of thought. It supposes the previous existence of thought. Without thought, there would of course be no language. And, since language is a collection of words, each w^ord supposes the pre- vious existence of the thought which it expresses. To suppose the existence of a word which, at first, had no thought to express, and was not of course intended to express any, is to suppose the existence of a monster, — an effect without a cause, a child without a parent. Yet of this kind are all the par- ticles, as they are sometimes called, of every lan- guage ! says Mr. Harris. They have no meaning in themselves ! Then how came they into existence ? and of what use are they ? To resort to a material analogy, by comparing conjunctions, prepositions, &c. to nails or pegs, or cement, is to shed darkness instead of light over the subject. How can words be connectives which have no meaning ? If the word " with" in the phrase, " the sun t^zVA beams," really^ means nothing, how can it unite sun and beams ?^ The phrase would express no more than the two OF RELATIONS. 217 substantives without it. If it unite them at all, it must be by its meaning ; if it has no meaning, it does not unite them. Should it be alleged that it is a sign of connexion, it may be replied, that it has then meaning, and that the connexion between the two is that meaning. The fact seems to be, that Mr. Harris, even while he asserted that conjunc- tions, &c. are unmeaning words, could not resist the impression that they mean relations. Hence the self-contradictory statements to which reference was made a short time ago. Again, this doctrine of Mr. Harris is disproved by the circumstance, that all languages have at least more than one conjunction and preposition. It is impossible for an adherent of the doctrine to answer the question of the Britannica. "If prepositions'' — and the enquiry applies equally to conjunctions — ^^are words devoid of meaning, why should there be in any language more than one preposition, since a single unmeaningmark of connexion" (we have argued that a mark of connexion must have a meaning, — that it means connexion) " would certainly answer the purpose as well as a thousand ?'' The question would be equally unanswerable, w^ere the adherent to concede that the words in question indicate connexion ; for, unless they denote diversities of connexion, w^hy^ we ask, with the Britannica, are they more than one ? , The fact of their being many, proves that they de- ^note diversities of connexion ; — in other words, that they are the signs of relations, or rather of classes 218 FROM WHAT of relations, like the terminations of Latin and Greek nouns. Finally, the very learned and able researches of Mr. Home Tooke have directly disproved this doctrine of Mr. Harris, by showing that, at least, for we need not say more — a great part of our English conjunc- tions and prepositions, together with some which ex- ist in other languages, are really fragments of that very class of words which are admitted by Harris to have a meaning in themselves, so that they must express the generalized idea which is denoted by the primitive words. The mere statement of the sources to which Mr. Tooke traces some of our English particles, as well as a few others, will be sufficient to convince the reader of the general truth of that writer's doctrine. "And*' is a Saxon word, being an abbreviation of " anad," the imperative of ananad, to add to, or heap up. So that when we say, " two and two make four," we really affirm that two, added to two, make four. " Because," is compounded of the Saxon word "be," by, and "cause." By some of our most ancient wri- ters it was written, "by cause;" befell "because," ^. e. by cause of his weakness. " Or," is a contrac- tion of the Saxon " oder," signifying other, i.e. some- thing different and often contrary ; so that " or" must always denote diversity, and often direct opposition. "If," is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb "f i- ' fan," to give, where, as well as in the English formerly^ * it was written " gif " If has, therefore, invariably DERIVED. 219 the signification of the English imperative give ; as in the following instance ; " If you believe, you shall be saved." Salvation is here declared to depend on faith. Give tJiat^ or that you believe^ and you shall be saved. "An/' is the imperative of the Anglo-Saxon verb " anan/' which likewise means to give, or grant ; as, " an you had an eye behind you, you might see more detraction at your heels than fortunes before you," i, e. grant that you had an eye behind you. " Since,'* is derived from "seand," seeing, and es, that, or it ; or of " sin," seen, and " es" " Seand" and " 5m" are the present and past participles of the Anglo-Saxon verb to see. Since, then, is ^^ seeing that," or " that seen ;' as in the instance, " seeing the atonement of Christ is perfect, all who believe shall be saved;'' t. e. the atonement of Christ is perfect, — " that seen," all who believe, &c. The words "wherefore," and "therefore," are compounds of the Saxon words, ^'hwoer" and ''thcer," vi\\hfor, OY "voor,'' and signify "for which," "for those," or "that." With regard to " but" Mr. Tooke supposes that, when used at the beginning of a sentence, it is derived from the Saxon verb "Z>6>to^," to "boot," to "superadd," to "supply," &c.; that, when it occurs in the middle of a sentence, it is a contraction of " be-utan," the imperative of " beonu- tan," to be out. In the following sentences it bears botl| these meanings. ''But" he relapsed, and, ^ but," for the great skill of the physician, he must have perished; ^. e. "superadd," to something pre- viously said, ^*he relapsed, so that but, ^. e. without. 220 HARRIS AND TOOKE's the great skill of the physician he must have died." To this, it may be added, that even now the word " but" is used in Scotland for without, as, "he came from home but his breakfast." The words "but," and " ben," used to describe a cottage having two rooms, evidently mean " the be out," ^. e, the o^^;tery and " the be in,'' or inner room. " Unless,'* and "although," are verbs in the imperative mode; the former signifying "take away," or " dismiss ;" the latter, "allow," "permit," "grant," "yield," "as- sent." The preceding account of the origin and true meaning of our English conjunctions, exhibits the causes of the diversities which, as every one per- ceives, exist among them,— diversities somewhat pompously stated by Mr. Harris, and grammarians of that school, but left by them in obscurity. Some conjunctions are said to be copulative, others dis- junctive. ''And," is of the former, "or," of the latter class. Now the influence of the former to imite, and of the latter to disjoin, results from the simple meaning of the words ; as " John and," z. e. superadd, " James were there," " John or," i. e. other, or otherwise, " James was there." Again, we are told that diversities exist in each of these classes of conjunctions. "Conjunctions connecting sentences," says Mr, Harris, " sometimes connect their meaning, and sometimes not; as, Rome was enslaved because Caesar was ambitious. Man- ners must be reformed, or liberty will be lost." In these instances it is evident that "because," mean- ACCOUNT EXAMINED. m ing by cause, must connecty and that " or," or oder^' " other/' must separate^ the meaning of the clauses between which they stand. Further, some of the copulative conjunctions are designated by Mr. Kar- ris, causal^ and others copulative^ conjunctions. The causals subjoin causes to effects ; as, " the sun is in an eclipse, because the moon intervenes." " The collectives subjoin effects to causes; as, ^^ the moon intervenes, therefore the sun is in an eclipse." There is more of apparent than real information in this statement. It is no doubt true that " because" adds the cause to the effect, — and " therefore" the effect to the cause ; but the reason of this diversity can only be found in the meaning of the words "because," and " therefore," as stated by Mr, Tooke. " The sun is in an eclipse, because," i, e. hy cause " the moon intervenes." " The moon intervenes there- fore," OT for that, "the sun is eclipsed." The disjunctive conjunctions are divided by Mr. Harris into simple and adversative, — words which convey no distinct idea, while the explanatory state- ments are not much more intelligible. Of the Jvr?ner he gives, as an example, " either it is day, or it is night;" of the laffer, "it is not day, but it is night.'* " The difference between them," he adds," is that the simple express nothing more than a relation of diver- sity ; the adversative express a relation, not merely df diversity, but of opposition. The light which the statements of Mr. Harris fail to give is afforded by the meaning and derivation of the words. " Either" being a distributive pronoun, and " o?' " meaning 222 HARRIS AND TOOKE S " Other," as we have seen, the relation expressed by them must manifestly be a relation of diversity merely. " But" means « superadd." " It is not day, but," i. e. superadd, « it is night." Now, it is not strictly correct to caU "but" an adversative here, if by an adversative conjunction be meant one which expresses opposition; far less is it correct to call it an absolute adversative, whatever these words may mean. Nor is the designation at anytime a proper one. Whatever opposition may exist be- tween two clauses, in any specific case, when « but" intervenes, it is not made by the conjunction, but by the clauses themselves ; as, « Brutus was a patriot, but Cssar was not." « The opposition here is not intimated by ' hut; superadd, but by the words was, and was not " Again, the adversative conjunctions are divided into adequate and inadequate, both being at the same time regarded as preventives. « The /ome; are expressed by such words as unless. Troy wi be taken unless the palladium be preserved ; that is, this alone is sufficient to prevent it. The inadequaie^ are expressed by such adversatives as « although. Troy will be taken although Hector defend it ; i. e. Hector's defence will prove ineffectual." Every one must feel how worthless such statements are ! They seem to indicate thought and power of discrimina- tion, but they explain nothing. The knowledge of the derivation and real meaning of the words " un- less" and "although" will alone afford us light. Mr 'Tooke's explanation of both unfolds everything. ACCOUNT EXAMINED. ns " Unless " means take avmy^ remove ; so that the real meaning of " Troy will be taken unless the pal- ladium be preserved," is, the city must fall if the preservation of the palladium be taken away. " Troy will be taken/' remove the palladium be pre- served, or the preservation of the palladium. '' Al- though " means allow^ so that " Troy will be taken although Hector defend it," is the same as, " Troy will be taken allow Hector to defend it." The idea therefore expressed by " unless " is that of the re- moval of one thing to make way for another ; the idea expressed by " although " is that of allowing one thing to coexist with another with which it is apparently incompatible. The foregoing statements of these two eminent wri- ters, put in contrast with each other, will I doubt not prepare the reader to acquiesce in the following judg- ment of the Britannica. " The nature of conjunc- tions can be thoroughly understood only by tracing j.?ach to its original in some parent or cognate tongue ; 'ind when that shall be done" (shall have been done) " in other languages, with as much success as it has lately been done by Mr. Home Tooke in English, then, and not till then, may w^e hope to see a ra- tional, comprehensive, and consistent theory of this part of speech. Then, too, shall we get rid of all that farrago of useless distinctions into conjunctive, adjunctive, disjunctive, subjunctive, copulative, con- tinuative, subcontinuative, positive, suppositive, cau- sal, (collective, preventive, adequate and inadequate, adversative, conditional, illative, &c. &c., which ex- 224 DERIVATION OF PREPOSITIONS. plain nothing, and serve only to veil ignorance, and perplex sagacity/' The following are some of Mr. Tooke's derivations of the prepositions. "With," is the imperative of the old Anglo-Saxon verh withan, "to join." All the other parts of the verb are lost but the imperative, which has degene- rated into a particle. " Christ sat at meat " with" his disciples ;" i, e, Christ join his disciples, sat at meat. It is sometimes, however, the imperative of wrythariy " to be ;" hence by and with are often synonymous, the i former by being derived from beon, "to be " " Without," is the imperative of wrythaii-utan, with a slight change of orthography. " A house without a roof," is a house, "be out of a roof," — a house beyond, or out of, the covering of a roof " Through," is a slight alteration of the Teutonic substantive thurahy " a door," or " passage." " The splendid sun with,'' i.e, "join," "his beams, warmeth through^'' i. e. " passage," "the air, the fertile^ earth." "From," is from the Gothic /rum, "beginning;" as, " the figs came from," i. e. beginning, " Turkey," or Turkey was the commencing point of their jour- ney. " For," comes from a Gothic word signifying a cause; "of," from a/ora, progeny; "betwixt," from the imperative " be' and twos, the Gothic word for "two ;" "beneath," is from an old Saxon wprd signifying " bottom ;" " beyond," from geond, which has the same meaning with " gone," or " past ;" "along," means "on long," i. e. on length; "round," CONJUNCTIONS DERIVATIVES. 225 and " around," come from a word signifying a '^ circle ;" " down/' is diifen^ to " dive," or " dip." Thus the labours of Mr. Tooke have entirely sub- verted the opinion of Harris, that our conjunctions and prepositions are devoid of meaning. They are abbreviations of nouns, verbs, &c. ; yet it would be rash to conclude, a priori^ that it is so in all other tongues. Before this opinion can be legitimately held, it will be necessary for some one to institute an examination of the conjunctions and prepositions of other languages, similar to that which Mr. Tooke has so successfnlly prosecuted in reference to those of our own. Mr. T. expresses a confident opinion that all conjunctions are derivatives. He virtually denies " that any language contains a real^ original^ native^ pure adverb, or conjunction ;" and confidently asserts that ^'what he has done with ^if,' and ^an,' may be done universally with all the conjunctions of all the languages of the world." He asserts it " universally," he adds, " from arguments a priori^ — confirmed, however," he continues, " by a successful search in many other languages besides the English, &c," We suspect, however, either that Mr. Tooke has somewhat mistaken the source of his own con- fidence, or that his logic is defective on this point. We should like to ask Mr. Tooke, "what originated, in his own mind, the conviction, or rather the first suspicion, that adverbs, conjunctions, &c. are deri- vatives ?" They obviously answer, we think at least, definite and important purposes in language. What legitimate a priori confidence, then, can any Q 226 WHETHER ALL PARTICLES man have that they are not primitive words, formed expressly to answer this purpose, though later, it may be, in their origin, than some other words, more essential than they, to the purposes of com- munication? Did he not ^ist Jind the words, which he now proclaims as the originals, — as gifan^ " to give," anan^ " to grant," anad^ " to add," — and, then, infer that if an^ and and^ are derivatives from, or fragments of, these words, because the un- doubted meaning of the former may be recognized in the latter words ? If he did not, his a priori reasonings, as he calls them, were little better than conclusions without premises. If he did, his rea- soning was a '^ j)osterio7'i,'' not a ^'priori!' In like manner, when he began to extend the conclusion he had reached concerning English adverbs, conjunc- tions, &c., to the particles of other languages, it could not have been by the " a priori'' argument, properly so called. He must have reasoned from discovered facts, in the English language, to un- known though suspected facts (if facts they should be found to be) in other languages ; and, it may be well to observe further, that the reasoning must have been disfigured by the same fallacy which has led to the conclusion (vide p. 211) that our adverbs, conjunctions, &c., are not parts of speech at aU. Reduced to a syllogism, the argument is, " the par- ticles of all languages have the same origin, or are of the same nature." The English particles, i. e, adverbs, &c. are fragments of nouns or verbs. Therefore, the particles of the French, Latin, Greek, ARE DERIVATIVES. 227 Hebrew, &c. are nouns, or verbs. What a priori argument can support the first premiss here ? Suppose we admit it to be probable — the utmost that can be said of it — the conclusion would be ille- gitimate. One premiss being probable merely, not certain, the conclusion can only be probable, not certain as here. It may be admitted that, as our adverbs, conjunctions, &c. are nouns, or verbs, or fragments of oie or the other, it ^V likely, or possible, that such is tl^ e case with those of the French, Latin, &c. ; but no (.autious reasoner will venture to assert this till he shall have instituted an examination as extensive as that which the Britannica declares to be necessary. In another respect, also, Mr, Tooke seems to la- bour under a mistake. We have seen that conjunc- tions, and prepositions, designate relations, or classes of relations. Now, as the mind forms conceptions of relations, as well as of things which actually exist, the words which designate these relations cannot be in- significant. Nay it might be contended that they do not differ radically from nouns ; and that, on this account, they may be said to be nouns. Should it be replied, that relations, not being things but mere abstractions of the mind, there is an obvious differ- ence between the names of relations, and of things, it might still be alleged that — -as the objects of hu- man knowledge are chiefly the relations of things, — and, especially as other terms denoting relations are always regarded as nouns — as, " father," " witness," subject, &c. — that these terms, i. ^.conjunctions, pre- ^28 MR. tooke's statements. positions, &c., not differing essentially from "father/' " witness/' &c., should be placed in the same class with them. Mr. Tooke, however, is not satisfied to rest their claim to be classed with nouns on the ground of their being names of relations. He insists that, having been the names of substantial material objects, they bear the full meaning of the concrete nouns themselves. The preposition "through/' for instance, being derived from thurahy a " door," car- ries along with it 7iow the entire meaning of that concrete word. He went "through," i. e, the door of it. To this opinion we trace the determination of Mr. Tooke not to give rank to our adverbs, conjunc- tions, &c. as distinct parts of speech ; for, certainly, if "through" means all that door means, there couldbe no propriety in calling the latter a noun, and the for- mer a preposition. But this is not the case. Seldom, perhaps, do derivatives carry along with them the full meaning of their primitives. They frequently embody the general idea contained in the original word, drop- ping all the specialities. This seems to be the case with conjunctions and prepositions. The remark of Dr. Dewar is especially worthy of notice on this point. "If the whole meaning of the concrete noun," door, "were contained in the preposition" through, "it could only be in the form of allusion ; and a language is not pure, and perfect, till the allusion itself disappears, and till the word is employed to express an appropri- ate and well defined degree of generality, independ- ently of the concomitant ideas contained in the sub- ject from the name of which it has been borrowed. PREPOSITIONS ARE BRIEF, ETC. 229 '' Through" expresses only one property of a door, and a property which resembles many other objects which have different names. This preposition is equivalent to a noun, but it is to a more general one than that which suggested the term. The noun to which it is nearly equivalent is passage, or me- dium." And while prepositions denote all the variety of relations, they are distinguished, as Dr. Dewar ob- serves, " by a peculiar brevity, and the absence of all inflection, Without the formality of significant ter- minations, prepositions express all their force. Thus they correspond to the rapidity of human thought, and to the subordinate rank of the ideas which they convey. The frequent recurrence and consequent familiarity of the ideas, together with their subordi- nate character, render language copious and minute without incumbrance. They are the eirea Trrepoevra, the winged words of discourse. Whether we con- sider them as always derived from other parts of speech of greater length, which a large proportion of them undoubtedly are, or suppose it possible that they have occasionally consisted of syllables thrown in at random, and afterwards adhered to as significant, in the same manner as almost all original words must have been produced, we see, in their general form and application, their excellent adaptation to the completion of language." On these accounts we plead for the retention of conjunctions and prepositions as parts of speech dis- tinct from nouns and verbs. They may be in all 230 CONJUNCTIONS AND PREPOSITIONS languages, as they unquestionably are in ours, frag- ments of verbs or nouns ; but they answer now dis- tinct and important purposes in language, which could at best be only awkwardly attained by the original words — sometimes perhaps scarcely at all — — and never with so much ease, expedition, and beauty. They are, accordingly, w^orthy to take rank as parts of speech. A question occurs here to which some attention must be given. Although it might be admitted that the kind of words now under consideration should not be arranged with nouns and verbs, it might be still thought that they ought not to form two separate classes of words. Both denote rela- tions ; why then should not both be, on this account, regarded as forming one, and but one, part of speech ? The answer depends upon the reply to another question, viz. " Is there a definite and broad line of distinction between them ? " We think there is, and that this fact justifies their classification as separate parts of speech, i, e, as conjunctions and prepo- sitions. Mr. Harris, treating of this difference, says that the latter connect words, and the former sentences. We are inclined to think this assertion substantially true, though it conflicts w4th the opinion of more celebrated writers than one. Mr. Tooke laughs at it, as he is accustomed to do at any thing which is contrary to his own opinion. The Britannica pro- nounces the statement of Mr. Harris an unfounded one ; and, doubtless, there are instances in which TWO PARTS OF SPEECH. ^31 conjunctions connect not sentences, but words only, as, ^^ two and two are four." It may be replied, however, that this is an exception to a general rule. Farther, that, in cases where words are united by conjunctions, the conjunctions are designed not so much to exhibit the relations which the words thus united sustain to each other, as the relations w^hich both, in their state of junction, bear to other mem- bers or words of the sentence ; as in the cases men- tioned by Mr. Tooke. " Two and two make four." " John and James are a handsome couple." The first example shows the relation between two and two and four ; the second the relation between John and James and handsome. In short, when con- junctions do unite words, they do it to secure a more ultimate object, as, " If you repent and believe, you shall be saved." An excellent writer states " that conjunctions sustain the same relation to sentences that prepositions sustain to words. In both cases they exhibit the relations existing among objects ; the one the particular relation existing among the separate and individual objects, denoted by the signs of language ; and the other the general relation of the parts of sentences to one another." Thus God exercises forbearance towards man, though his sins are great.'' The preposition "towards" exhibits the relation between forbearance and man ; the conjunction " though" the relation which exists be- tween the first member of the sentence and the second. Now, there is obviously a broad line of distinc- 232 DISTINCTION BETWEEN THEM. tion between those words which, by joining sentences or parts of sentences together, are designed to mark the connexions and dependences of human thought, and those w^hich merely mark the relations in which different words, ^. e, nouns, stand to each other. And, possibly, it is to the circumstance that prepo- sitions bind words together and not sentences^ that the power of government is given to them, and not to conjunctions ; for this constitutes another broad line of distinction between these two classes of signs. We say, ^' no one is better for him, but no one is better than he'' In harmony with these statements Dr. Dewar says, " It is from its properties in syntax that the preposition must take its rank among the parts of speech." " Conjunctions," he states, ^* con- nect words or sentences" (it might have been no- ticed formerly that, in the cases in which it is al- lowed that conjunctions join words together, the conjunction does not govern the latter word) ^^ on equal terms, without regimen or subj unction. They continue the syntax of the introducing word to that which they introduce." It is the opinion of Mr. Harris that most preposi- tions were primarily employed to express relations of place, the relative position of bodies being a rela- tion which would soon strike attention ; but that, by degrees, " they came to be employed to denote relations in general, — intellectual as well as local. Thus because he who is above in jo/«(?'^^ ovT^vo«^^•^rl wifT» social discourse. In the use ci this part cf spee man is seen to rise from thr- bra 't ?; .-f ^ji i^\\\- ; impelled by passion to that displays intelligence and ac fellow creatures." ^'Sometimes words beloiigvag speech, and expressing defiiuu ideo^. i* ,. < jv ■; abruptly to express emotion, and numbered among interjections ; . as, ' amazing,' ^wonderful,' ^ pro- digious,' ^shocking,' 'horrible,' 'mercy,' 'T)itiful,' ' wee's me.' Whether we call such exclamations as these interjections, or abbreviations by ellipsis, is of little importance. Their meaning is never ambi- guous." THE END. SCOTT, PRINTER, JOHN-STREET, BLACKFRIARS-ROAD. Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide Treatment Date: June 2006 PreservationTechnclogies A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 1 1 1 ThOiTison Park Drive Cranberry Township. PA 16066 (724)779-2111