• H r PRACTICAL SYSTEM OF RHETORIC OK THE PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF STYLE, INFERRED FROM EXAMPLES OF WFJTENG' TO WHICH IS ADDED A HISTORICAL DISSERTATION ON ENGLISH STYL* BY SAMUEL P. NEWMAN, PROFESSOR Or RHETORIC IN BOWDOIN OOLLIOB. SIXTIETH EDITION NEW YORK: 1TISON, PHINNEY & CO., 48 & 50 WALKER ST. CHICAGO : S. C. GRIGGS & CO., 39 & 41 LAKE ST. boston: brown, taogard & chase, philadelphia : sower, barnes & co., and j. b. lil'pincott & co. cincinnati: moore, wilstaoh, keys a co. savannah i j. m. cooper & co. st. louis: keith & woods, new Orleans: bloomfield, steel a co. detroit : f. raymond a co. 1862. l« £aj?n*j iccorciap to act of Coagrera is th« je&r ISM. for FLAOG, GOULD AND NEWMAN. w t&« CterK s Og.ce of t&e District Court of M*ssacnas*tt*. prew T&eol. 36IU* .AN 24*908 * INTRODUCTION The advantages proposed to be attained by the study of Rhetoric* 1. Some acquaintance with the philosophy of rhetoric. 2. The cultivation of the taste, and in connexion, the exercise of the imagination. 3. Skill in the use of language. 4. Skill in literary criticism. 5. The formation of a good style. By the philosophy of rhetoric, I here refer to mose princi- ples in the science of the philosophy of mind, ana in the phi- losophy of language, on which are founded those conclusions and directions which are applicable to literary criticism, and to the formation of style. Obviously, then, it wil oe said, an acquaintance with the science of intellectual pnilosophy, and with the philosophy of language, should precede the study of rhetoric. Hence, no doubt, Milton and others assign to this branch of study the last place in a course of education. But it is known to all, that the prevalent opinion and prac- tice are different from those recommended by Milton ; so that our inquiry should be, what is the best practical method of acquainting the young with the philosophy of rhetoric — those whose minds are not accustomed to philosophical investigations, and who are ignorant of those sciences on which the art is founded ? I answer, that, while the attention should be directed to but few principles, and those most essential in a practical view, instruction should be imparted principally by familiar, * Extracted from a *ecture delivered in Boston before the American institute August, 1830 If INTRODUCTION. talking lectures. A text-book, if one is used, should contain but a mere outline, — some general principles plainly statea and well illustrated. Here I would more fully state, what I mean by familiar, talking lectures. Suppose I wish to make the student un- derstand what I mean by taste, and in so doing, I have occasion to speak of the judgment, sensibility, imagination, emotions of beauty and sublimity. Now, should I attempt to effect my purpose by a definition, or an extended technical explanation of these terms, there would be little reason to hope for success. I would rather refer him directly to the operations of his own mind, point out to him instances where he forms a judgment, where his sensibility is excited his imagination called into exercise, and emotions of beauty and sublimity kindled up in his own soul. It is true he may not, after this, be able to give me an exact definition of these faculties and intellectual operations, but he has learned what is meant by the proposed terms ; and when I have oc- casion to use them afterwards, I have no fears of not being understood. That instruction in this part of rhetoric is attended with difficulty, no one will deny. The subjects themselves are intricate ; hard to be understood, and still harder to explain, especially to those whose minds are immature and unaccus- tomed to philosophical reasonings. Here, then, is room foi much ingenuity in the instructor ; and without a skilful ef- fort on his part, the efforts of the pupil will be of little avail. Above all tilings, let not the mockery of set questions and set. answers be practised, in teaching what pertains to the philosophy of rhetoric. After all, it must be allowed, that with the most skilful in- struction, and the best text-book, young students will obtain but imperfect ideas in what pertains to the philosophy of rhetoric. Still, what is thus imperfectly acquired, will be of importance to them as opening some interesting fields of thought, which, with strengthened powers, they may after- wards explore; and further, as aiding them in better under, standing the nature of the rules and directions founded on these important and somewhat intricate principles. I have stated as a second object to be attained by the 8tudy of rhetoric, the cultivation of a literarv taste, and, in connexion, the exercise of the imagination. INTRODUCTION. The cultivation of a literary taste must evidently depend principally on a familiarity with those productions, which are esteemed models of excellence in literature. In this re- spect, there is a close analogy to the cultivation of taste in painting, or in any of the fine arts. We may also learn some- thing on this subject, from the course pursued by painters in the improvement of their taste. They visit the most cele- brated galleries, and seek for models of excellence in their art; and these they make the object of close, long-continued and patient study. They inquire what there is to excite admiration in these paintings, and dwell en their different prominent beauties, and in this way cultivate and improve their tastes. Now it is in the same way that a literary taste is to be cultivated. And that the student may skilfully use his models of excellence in literature, and unite with his ob- servation of them the application of those principles on which they depend, he needs the assistance of an instructor. In stating the details of the course here recommended, ] remark, that, by the aid of a text-book prepared with refer- ence to the proposed method of instruction, the student may have brought to his view examples of those instances, where there is most frequent occasion for the exercise of literary taste. I here refer to what are termed the ornaments of style. In connexion with these examples, the nature of whatever in literary productions comes under the cogni- zance of literary taste, may be explained. The different ornaments of style may be pointed out to his notice, and he may be led fully to see why attempts of this kind are in some instances successful, and in other instances fail. When the examples thus cited, and the comments upon them, have become familiar to the student, let his attention next be directed to finding examples in English writers, which may exhibit similar ornaments of style, and in the ex- amination of which, there is opportunity for the application of the same principles. Here it is that important aid may fce rendered by the instructor, since, in conducting hese inquiries and forming his decisions, the student needs both guidance and confirmation. To make myself fully understood, I will here illustrate my remarks. Suppose that a student finds in his text-book the following ^omparison from the writings of Locke: — ' The minds of the aged are like the tombs to whioft t?rf*y 1* VI INTRODUCTION. are approaching ; where, though the brass and the marble remain, yet the inscriptions are effaced by time, and the im- agery has mouldered away.' This comparison, he is told, is naturally suggested; and in connexion with the example, the meaning of this phrase is fully explained to him. And not only is he made to see what is meant by a comparison's being naturally suggested, but to feel, that in the absence of this trait, the pleasure to be derived from it, as exciting an emotion of taste, would be impaired. Let the student now be directed to bring forward from any author, instances of comparison, which are in the same manner naturally suggested ; and in this way let him become familiar \ r ith the principle stated, and with its appli- cation. In the same manner, by directing the attention in succession to the different traits in the various ornaments of styie, and illustrating, in connexion with examples, the vari- ous principles on which these attempts to excite emotions ot taste are founded, the pupil is led to a full acquaintance with this part of rhetoric. He is enabled at once, when reading the productions of any author, to perceive the beauties of style, and to classify and arrange them — in other words, he acquires a good literary taste. But there is another point connected with this part of my subject, to which I will for a moment direct your attention. I refer to the exercise thus given to the imagination. In our courses of study, we have discipline for the memory, for the reasoning powers in their various forms, and for the in- vention. But no regard is paid to the exercise and im- provement of the imagination. And this, not because this faculty of the mind is useless, or because it admits not 'of being strengthened and improved by exercise. The impres- sion is, that there is no method which can be adopted for the attainment of this end. Now I would ask, if, by the course here recommended, the imagination will not be called into exercise, and strengthened? These attempts to excite emo- tions of taste are addressed to the imagination ; they are un- derstood by the imagination, and it is a just inference, that the plan of study I have now recommended, will furnish a salutary discipline to the imagination. Of the favorable tendency of the method of instruction, 1 can from my own experience as an instructor, speak with some confidence. I have ever found, that my pupils engage INTRODUCTION. VI.' in this part of their rhetorical course with interest. They get new views of the nature of style, are led to notice their susceptibilities of emotions, of which before they have been unmindful. They also become conscious of their own pow- ers of imagination, and learn something of the nature and offices of this faculty ; and with these views and this con- sciousness, they find that a new source of pleasure is open- ed to them. Thus they both derive important aid in be- coming writers themselves, and are prepared to read with increased interest the writings of others. Before concluding my remarks on this head, let me say, that what is here recommended, is perfectly practicable. It is an employment, which any student with common powers of mind may pursue ; and it requires, on the part of the in- structor, only that degree of literary taste, which every one professing to teach rhetoric should possess. The third object proposed to be obtained by the study of rheto c, is skill in the use of language. Here I refer both to the choice of words, so far as purity and propriety are conce ned, and to the construction of sentences. Instruction in this part of rhetoric should be conducted with reference to two points, — to acquaint the student with the nature and principles of verbal criticism, and further to lead him to beware of those faults in construction, to which he is most liable. The former of these appertains to the philosophy of rhet oric, and is included under my first head : but I here offei an additional remark. It was stated, when speaking of giv- ing instruction on the philosophy of rhetoric, that difficulties attend this part of the course. These difficulties exist but in a slight degree, when exhibiting what is connected with the philosophy of language. Here is such abundant oppor- tunity for illustration, and examples are so easily adduced, that every principle may without difficulty be made perfect- ly intelligible. Neither is this part of the study uninterest- ing to students. Curiosity is fully awake to whatever per- tains to the nature of language, and to the rules that govern its use. And here I may be permitted to mention a work, which, in what pertains to this part of rhetoric, I regard as of the highest authority. I refer to Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, — the ingenious, elaborate production of the Uuinctilian of English literature. Vlll INTRODUCTION. To lead the student to beware of those faults in construe* tion which are of most common occurrence, — the other object in view in this part of the course, must evidently be effected by adducing examples of these faults. From the nature of the case, the endless forms of correct construction cannot be stated. On the obvious principle, then, that where one has erred, another will be liable to leave the right way, we direct the attention to these wanderings, and con- nect with such instances the cautions they naturally suggest. The object here in view may be accomplished for the most part by the text-book. All that is incumbent on the in structor, is, to lead the pupil fully to see what in every ex- ample adduced the failure is, and how it is to be remedied. This part of a text-book does not require to be dwelt upon in the recitation-room. It is rather a part to be referred to by the student, when, hesitating as to the construction of sentences, he needs guidance and assistance. I mention in the fourth place, as an object to be obtained by the study of rhetoric, skill in literary criticism. Under this head, I include whatever pertains more partic- ularly to style, its nature and diversities, as seen in the writings of different individuals, and in different classes of literary productions. Our inquiry is, What can be done by the instructor most efficiently, to aid the pupil in acquiring skill in literary criticism, as thus explained ? Style has been happily defined by Buffon as ' the man himself.' If I wish to become acquainted with any indi- vidual, I seek an introduction to him ; I endeavor to learn from personal observation the peculiar traits in his charac- ter. I may, indeed, from the description of a third person receive some general and perhaps just impression respecting this individual ; but all this, though it might prepare the way for my better understanding his peculiarities when in his presence, would alone make me but imperfectly acquainted with him. The same holds true, if I wish to become acquainted with the peculiarities of those of different nations. You might describe to me the national traits of the French and of the Spanish ; but a visit to those countries, and familiarity with heir inhabitants, would be of far more avail in learning their I itional traits of character. This illustration suggests the best practical method of INTRODUCTION. U giring instruction in what relates to literary criticism. A te*i-book or an instructor may describe, with accuracy and fulness, the peculiarities of style, as they are seen in the Writings of different individuals, or found in different classes of literary productions. But this is not enough. That the student may clearly discern these characteristic traits, and understand their nature, and the causes on which they de- pend, his attention must be directed to these writings. He must in some good degree become familiar with them, and thus learn wherein they differ, and what there is in each to approve or condemn. It may be thought, that to bring to the view of the stu- dent in this manner the peculiarities of different styles, may require too much time and labor. But with the aid of the text-book, much of the work may be performed by the stu- dent himself. What is most necessary on the part of the instructor is, to direct the attention to specimens of different styles, and in some few instances to point out characteristic traits. The student, with this aid, will soon acquire suffi- cient knowledge and skill to apply the remarks found in the text-book himself. This leads me to remark generally on the importance of reading good authors in connexion with rhetorical studies. This part of education is, I fear, in most of our schools and colleges, too much neglected. From his inability to judge of the merits of writers, the student needs guidance in se- lecting those which may be most useful to him, and this guidance the instructor should feel it is incumbent on him to supply. To read over occasionally with the pupil some choice specimens of style, may also be of essential advan- tage. To learn how to read, is no easy acquisition. Of course, I refer, not to the pronunciation of the words, or the inflections of the voice, but to the quick and true apprehen- sion of the meaning, and a susceptibility to the beauties of style. In this connexion, too, the student may be taught the true nature of literary criticism. It looks not for faults. It cherishes not a censorious, captious spirit. Its eye is di- rected after what is excellent and praiseworthy — after what may inform the mind, give grateful exercise to the imagina- tion and refinement to the taste. And when it discerns ex- tellences of a high order, as if dazzled with what is bright INTRODUCTION and imposing, it sees not minute and unimportant defects. Tt is indeed nearly allied to that charity which is kind, and which, where she discovers what is truly worthy of her regard, throws her mantle of forgiveness over a multitude of sins. I proceed now to notice the last mentioned advantage pro- posed to be obtained by the study of rhetoric. I refer to the formation of style. This part of a rhetorical course of instruction is not par^ ticularly connected with the use of a text-book, further than that it furnishes opportunities for the application of princi- ples and rules, which are there found. The aid furnished by an instructor, is principally in the correction of attempts in composition, with such general guidance and advice, as the intellectual habits and peculiarities of the individual may require. I offer, therefore, on this head, merely a few prac- tical suggestions. 1. It is highly important, that the attention of the student, mi his first attempts, should be directed to the management of his subject. I would require of him to exhibit a plan, or skeleton, stating the precise object he has in view, the divis- ions he proposes to make with reference to this point, and the manner in which he designs to enlarge on each head. In this way, he will not only be aided in forming habits of methodically arranging his thoughts, but will be led to adopt the easiest and most direct method of proceeding, in writing on any subject. 2. I have ever found, that, so far as the construction of sentences is concerned, and here I refer both to the division of a paragraph into sentences and to the phrases and forms of expression, — I remark, that, in relation to this part of the work of composition, I have ever found, that students derive important aid from translating select passages fiom the writings of good authors in other languages. Every one knows, that in this way a command of languages is acquired And I would extend the meaning of the phrase, so as to include, not only that copia verborum, and that power of nice discrimination in the use of words, which are generally un derstood to be implied by it, but also the right arrangement of words, and the correct construction of sentences. Other things being equal, he who, during the first six months in which the attention is directed to composition, shoula devote half of his efforts to the writing of translation INTRODUCTION XI would, I doubt not, be in advance of him, all whose exer- tions had been employed in the work of composition. 3. I would further recommend a familiar mode of cor- recting the first attempts of the student. If practicable, the instructor may with advantage read over with the pupil his productions, and alone with him freely comment upon its defects and excellences. While in this way needed en- couragement is given, the attention of the student is direct- ed to that point where there is most need of improvement Besides, it not unfrequently happens, that the efforts of the student have taken some wrong direction. He has some erroneous impressions as to the nature of style, or as to the manner in which a good style may be formed. It. may be that he is laboring too much on the choice and arrangement of his words, or the construction of his sentences ; or, as- signing undue importance to the ornaments of style, he may be seeking principally after what is figurative, and the ele- gances of expression ; or, again, with false notions of what is original and forcible, he may be striving after what is sententious and striking. Sometimes, too, there exists a fastidiousness of taste, which is detrimental. The student is kept from doing any thing, because he is unable to do better than he can do. In other instances, there is an inju- rious propensity to imitation. The student has fixed upon some writer as his model, and, servilely copying his master, his own native powers are neglected. Now, in all these in- stances, the advice of the instructor may be of essential benefit. One general remark is all that I have to offer further on this head. It should ever be impressed on the student, that, in forming a style, he is to acquire a manner of writing, to some extent, peculiarly his own, and which is to be the in- dex of his modes of thinking — the development of his in- tellectual traits and feelings. It is the office of the instructor to facilitate the accomplishment of this important end, both by wisely directing the efforts of his pupil, and bv removing every obstacle in his way. NOTE TO THE SEVENTH EDITION The following work having been republished in Eng- land, and introduced into the schools of that com try, and having come into extensive use in the United States, the publishers, grateful for the favor with which it has been received, are induced to present it to the public in an improved and more permanent form. It has been stereo- typed, with the hope that its circulation may thus be ex- tended and its usefulness increased. Andover, September, 1838. CHAPTER FIRST OK THOI/GHT AS THE FOUNDATION OF GOOD WRITING* Plan of the work. When we read the production of one who is justly ac- counted a good writer, we are conscious that our attention is engaged, — that we are pleased, and if the subject is one which can interest the feelings, that we are moved. If from being conscious of these effects we are led to search for their causes, we find, that our attention is engaged by the valuable thoughts and just reasonings that are exhibit- ed ; we are pleased by what gives exercise to our imagina- tion, — by happy turns of expression, — by well introduced and well supported illustrations. We are moved, because the writer, whose productions we are reading, is moved, and our feelings of sympathy cause us to be borne along on the same current, by which he is carried forward. But we now ask, what may be hence inferred in relation to the writer ? Do we not discover, that his mind has been stored with knowledge 1 that his reasoning powers have been strength- ened and subjected to salutary discipline? — that his im- agination is active and well regulated, and his heart alive to emotion 1 and is it not from his possessing these resources -'-these intellectual and moral habits, that he is able to 2 14 ON THOUGHT engage our attention, to please and to move us, and conse- quently has acquired the reputation of a good writer ? If this view be just, we may infer, that the foundations oi good writing are laid in the acquisition of knowledge, — in the cultivation of the reasoning powers, — in the exercise and proper regulation of the imagination, and in the sensi- bilities of the heart. But let us now suppose, that two writers, who possess those qualities, which I have called the foundations of good writing, in equal degrees, should write on the same subject There might still be important differences between them. One might use words with correctness and skill, selecting always the best term ; the writings of the other might show improprieties and want of skill. The sentences of the one might be smooth in their flow, perspicuous in their mean- ing, gratefully diversified in their length, and well suited to the thought that is conveyed ; those of the other might be rough, obscure, ambiguous, and tiresome from their uni- formity ; and while we are engaged and pleased in reading the production of the former writer, we soon become wearied and disgusted with that of the latter. Here then we have a new cause in operation, anu tnis obviously is the different degrees of skill in the use of language, possessed by these two writers. From this statement, we may learn the objects of atten- tion to the critic, in examining a literary production. He would judge of the value of the thoughts, of the correctness of the reasoning, especially of the method observed in the discussion of the subject. He would next apply the princi- ples of good taste, and notice what is addressed to the im. agination, and judge of its fitness to excite emotions of beauty, or of grandeur, or other emotions of the same class- He might then direct his attention more immediately to the style, and examine its correctness, perspicuity, smoothness AS THE FOUNDATION OF GOOD WRITING. 15 adaptation to the subject, and the various qualities of a good style. The course here marked out, &s that of the critic in the examination of a literary production, suggests the objects of attention and the method pursued in the following work. In the first part, a writer is regarded as addressing himself to the understanding of his readers, and the importance of being able to think well, as including the number and value of the thoughts and the proper arrangement of them, is con- sidered. The writer is then regarded as addressing him- self more immediately to the imagination, with the design of interesting or pleasing his readers. Here the nature of taste, which directs in what is addressed to the imagination, is explained, — the proper objects of its attention in a lite- rary work pointed out, and some instructions given which may aid in its cultivation. Skill in the use of language is uext made the object of attention, so far as this is necessary for the accurate and perspicuous conveyance of the thoughts. In the remaining part of the work, the qualities of a good style are enumerated, and the different circumstances on which they depend, are mentioned. Through the whole work, the inductive method is observed as far as practi- cable. Examples are given, and rules and principles are inferred from these examples. At the close of the work also exercises are found, the analysis of which may call forth the skill of the learner, and make him familiar with the rule? which are stated. It will at once occur, that in each of the particulars men- tioned, Rhetoric is connected, in a greater or less degree, with other departments of instruction. The Grammarian gives us rules for the attainment of correctness in the use of language ; and Logic informs us of the different modes of conducting an argument. The intellectual philosopher a (so explains to us the phenomena of mind, particularly of those 16 ON THOUGHT emotions with which taste is connected. This connexion has been borne in mind, and hence it is, that on some parts, comparatively little is said, and that of a general natuie Other parts, which are thought to belong more appropriately to Rhetoric, are more fully treated. Extensive Knowledge essential to the good writer. It is a received maxim, that to write well we must think well. To think well, implies extensive knowledge and well disciplined intellectual powers. To think well on any par- ticular subject, implies that we have a full knowledge of that particular subject, and are able to understand its rela^ tions to other subjects, and to reason upon it. In saying that extensive knowledge is essential to the good writer, the word knowledge is meant to include both an acquaintance with the events and the opinions of the day. and with what is taught in the schools. That this Knowledge is necessary to the good writer, may be inferred from the intimate connexion between the different objects of our thoughts. It is impossible for a writer to state and explain his opinions on one subject, without showing a knowledge of many others. And if, in the communication of his opinions, he endeavors to illustrate and recommend them by the ornaments of style, the extent of his knowledge will be shown by his illustrations and allusions. Were it necessary to establish this position, it might be done by analysing a passage of some able writer, and by showing, even from the words that he uses, the knowledge which its composition implies. He, then, who would become a good writer, must possess a rich fund of thoughts. The store-house of the mind must be well filled ; and he must have that command over hia treasures, which will enable him to bring forward, whenever he occasion may require, what has here been accumulated AS THE FOUNDATION OF GOOD WRITING IV 'or future use. To make these acquisitions, is not the work of a month, nor of a year. He who would gain much Knowledge, must possess habits of diligence and attention. He must be always and every where a learner. Especially must he seek after a knowledge of facts, and distinct views of received opinions on important subjects. He will be mindful, that the extent of his knowledge will depend more on his manner of reading, than on the amount read, and on h'3 attention to the facts which fall under his observation, than on the number of these facts. Discipline of mind essential to the good writer. In saying that the discipline of the mind is essentia' o the good writer, particular reference is had to the mason- ing powers. In other words, the good write" ,nust have sound sense. He must be able to examir subjects, and pursue a connected train of thought with power and cor rectness. That this is essential, may be inferred from the rank, which is held by the understanding among the differ- ent faculties of the mind. A man may have invention, memory and imagination, but if he cannot reason accurately and with power, he will not interest and inform his readers, and thus acquire the reputation of a good writer. It is also well known, that many of the faults of style arise from in- distinctness in the thoughts, and an inability to discern their relations to each other. Both these causes of defects in. writing are removed by the discipline of the mind. The improvement of the reasoning powers, is the appro- priate object of the study of the sciences. The ability to reason justly and ably must be acquired by practice. There may be physical strength of mind as of body, but the strength of the giant will not avail him in rearing a stately edifice, unless his strength be combined with skill ; and neither can he giant mind rear its structure without the guidance of 2* 18 ON THOUGHT skill, acquired both by instruction and practice. And how can this skill be better acquired, than by the study of those sciences, which require patient and careful research for hid- den principles, or furnish instances of close and long-con- tinued trains of argumentation? Hence the fondness for metaphysical and moral investigations, and for the exact sciences, which is ever felt by those who excel as sound reasoners. And the student, who in the course of his edu- cation is called to search for truth in the labyrinth of meta- physical and moral reasonings, and to toil in the wearisome study of the long and intricate solutions of mathematical principles, is acquiring that discipline of the mind, whicr fits him to distinguish himself as an able writer. But in addition to the exercise and improvement of the reasoning powers, there ire certain intellectual habits, which form a part of the mental discipline of the able writer, and are worthy of particular consideration. To these I now propose to direct the attention. Habit of patient reflection necessary. He who writes for the instruction of others, seeking in this way to enlighten and influence his readers, offers to them the results of his own investigations and reflections. Unless then he is able to state new facts or to present new views of facts and opinions already known ; he has no claim on the attention of other minds. Hence arises the necessity of habits of investigation and reflection. The good writer is a man of thought ; he is accustomed to observe accu- rately the phenomena, both in the natural world and in the scenes of life, which come under his notice, and to seek an explanation of them ; and whatever statements or opinions he finds in the writings of others, or hears advanced by them, he is wont to examine them, to test the validity of the AS THE FOUNDATION OF GOOD WRITING. 19 arguments brought forward in their support, and the objec- tions which are made, or which rise up in his own mind. The habits of thought here recommended, are not easily formed or generally possessed. The attention of most minds is so much engrossed with the objects and occurrences around them, that there is little inclination or ability to look in upon their own thoughts and trace out their connexions and relations. Even educated men are too ready to be sat- isfied with superficial views of subjects, and to shrink back from that intellectual effort, which a more thorough investigation requires. But there can be no doubt, that habits of research and reflection have done more towards enlightening and improving men, than all the brilliant sal- lies and sudden efforts of genius. It is indeed this ability to think, joined with a favorable constitution of mind, which gives its possessor a claim to the name of genius. It is said, that when the great Newton was asked, how he was enabled to make the greatest discoveries that any mortal had ever communicated to his fellow men, he answered, by thinking. A habit of patient reflection should especially be enjoined upon the young writer. Let him remember, that his dan- ger is from a slight and superficial acquaintance with his- subject, and not enter too hastily on its treatment. He sits- down to reflect, and finds that he has some floating thoughts on what he intends to discuss. This is not enough. He must direct his thoughts to some definite object, and find out all that may be made useful in exhibiting and enforcing his opinions. Neither let him be discouraged, if difficulties offer themselves and first efforts are vain. Often, in the course of such investigations and patient examination of a subject, new views and valuable thoughts will present them selves. We make new discoveries. Our minds become tilled with the subject, and our thoughts flow forth in order wid abundance. 20 ON THOUGHT It is by thus carefully and patiently reflecting on his sub- ject, that the writer prepares himself to read with advantage what has been written by others. Having his own viewa and opinions, which are the result of patient thought and thorough examination, he is enabled to make comparisons between the opinions he has formed and those of other men. Wherein the opinions of others coincide with his own, he feels strengthened and supported. Wherein they differ, he is led to a more careful examination ; and thus the danger of falling into error himself, and of leading others astrav, is liminished. Often also, in reading the productions of oth- ers, some new views will be brought before the mind, or some aid derived for illustrating and enforcing what is de- signed to be communicated. In this way, too, the writer i? less liable to be biased by the authority of a name, and to become the retailer of the opinions of other men. These remarks are designed to answer the inquiry, how far we ought to read what others have written on a subject, before attempting to write ourselves. We should read, not so much with the design of furnishing our minds with ideas, as to test the value of our own thoughts, and receive hints, which may be dwelt upon and thus suggest new views and thoughts. There can be no doubt, that the practice of most young writers is contrary to what is here recommended. Imme- diately upon selecting a subject on which to write, they read what others have written, and thus instead of trusting to thfl resources of their own minds, they look to books for thoughts and opinions. The injurious effect of this habit is seen in that want of originality and vigor of thought, which in later periods of life characterizes the efforts of tb3se servila minds AS THE FOUNDATION OF GOOD WRITING. 2J Method. Another intellectual attainment essential to the success of the writer, is the power of methodically arranging his thoughts. It is well known, that the thoughts in their pas- sage through the mind, are connected together by certain principles or laws of association ; and these laws are differ- ent in different minds. In the mind of one man these asso- ciations are accidental. One thought introduces another because it has happened to be joined with it, having before >een brought to view in the same place, or at the same time. Another man thinks in a more philosophical manner, and ooks at the causes and consequences of whatever passes un- der his observation. When his attention is turned to any subject, there is some leading inquiry in view, and the differ- ent trains of thought which pass through his mind, are seen in their bearing on this leading object. As a necessary re- sult, he has clear and connected views of whatever subject he examines, and is prepared to place before the minds of oth- ers, the conclusions to which he has arrived, with the rea- sonings by which they are supported. To attain this power of methodically arranging the thoughts, or as it is sometimes termed, of looking a subject into shape, it is recommended to study with care the works of those, who are accustomed to think with order and pre cision. It may be of advantage, often to make a written analysis of such productions, stating in our own language the proposition, which is the design of the writer to estab- lish, and the different arguments which he has brought foi- ward in its support. This exercise will be found advanta- geous, not only as it aids in forming a valuable intellectual babit, preparatory to the work of composition, but as it ena- bles us to possess ourselves, in the best manner, of the opin io^s and reasonings of well disciplined minds. 22 ON THOUGHT It is also recommended for the attainment of method, te exercise the mind in the work of forming plans. The im- pression is too common, that all which is necessary for be- coming a good writer, is to direct the attention to the man ner of conveying the thoughts by language. But this is an erroneous impression. While it is the design of Logic to aid in the investigation of truth, it is one purpose of Rheto- ric, to give directions for exhibiting to others what is thus discovered. Hence the plan, or the right division of a com- position and the arrangement of its several parts, becomes a prominent object of attention and study. The young wri- ter, especially, should always be required to form and state his plan, before writing ; and, as here recommended, it will be found advantageous to make this a distinct exercise. In this way, habits of consecutive thinking will be formed, and a principle of order established in the mind, which is im- parted to every subject of its contemplation. Amplification. Another qualification of the good writer, which has its foundation in the thoughts and is connected with the intel- lectual habits, is the power of enlarging upon the positions and opinions advanced. When any assertion has been made, whether it be a leading proposition, or a subordinate head or division, the writer is desirous, that what is bus advanced should be understood and received by his readers. He endeavors therefore to exhibit his proposition more full* 10 support it by argument, and to enforce it upon the con sideration and observance of others. His attempts to effeci these objects, constitute what is called amplification. To state the various ways, in which writers enlarge upo» the propositions which they advance, is impracticable. In- genuity is continually in exercise, seeking to arrest the at AS THE FOUNDATION OF GOOD WRITING. 23 tention and awaken the interest of readers. There are however a few general principles, which may be stated, at the same time that some suggestions are made, as to the best ways of attaining and improving this power of amplifi- cation. One leading object of amplification, is the more full exhi- bition of the meaning of what is asserted. This is effected in the following ways ; 1. By formal definitions of the words, or phrases, used in stating the proposition, or head of discourse. This is neces- sary, when the words or phrases are new, or uncommon, or used in a sense differing in any respect from common usage. 2. By stating the proposition in different ways, at the same time shewing what limitations are designed to apply to it, and wherein there is danger of mistake, which it is necessary to guard against. This we often do in conversa- tion, when we fear that an assertion we have made, is not fully and rightly understood. 3. By stating particular cases, or individual instances, and thus shewing what is meant by a general proposition. 4. By illustrations, especially by formal comparisons and historical allusions. What is familiar to our minds, is thus made to aid us in understanding what is less obvious and less easily discerned. A second object of amplification is to support by argument the proposition or assertion advanced. Here, of course, the amplification will vary with the nature of the argument used, The more common forms are, 1, When the proposition to be established is of the na- ture of a general truth, and the writer supports it by an enumeration of the particular instances, on which it is founded, or from which it has been inferred. This is called Induction. Pale) treating on the goodness of Deity, lays down the 24 ON THOUGHT following proposition, that in a vast plurality of instances in which contrivance is perceived, the design of the contrivance is beneficial. To prove this proposition, he looks at the different parts of animals as they are subservient to the uses of the animal, and also at the various orders of animal ex- istence ; and thus from particular instances infers a genera, conclusion. This is an example of inductive reasoning. 2. When a proposition is established by a statement of facts, or an appeal to acknowledged authorities. Thus Ad- dison, when endeavoring to shew that a middle condition in life is to be chosen as favorable to the cultivation of the moral virtues, introduces the prayer of Agur. This is an argument from Testimony. 3. When similar cases are stated, and the inference is made, that what is proved or acknowledged to hold true in the one case, is true also in the corresponding case. This is an argument from Analogy. Illustration. In observing different orders of animal life, we notice important changes as to their modes of existence. Such is the transition of the caterpillar to the butterfly, ani of the bird from its confinement in the shell to its full fledged state. Bishop Butler hence derives an argument from anal- ogy in favor of the existence of man in a future state. Other forms of argument are occasionally resorted to, in proof of propositions and assertions. Those which have been mentioned, are in most frequent use : and we learn from them the nature of amplification, so far as it is of an argumentative kind. A third object of amplification is to persuade. A writer would recommend, or enforce, what he advances. He would induce his readers to think that what he proposes to them, is desirable ; and further, that the course which he recommends for its attainment is practicable and wi-11 be AS THE FOUNDATION OF GOOD WRITING. 25 successful. Here then the amplification becomes in part hortatory, and in part argumentative. So far as the amplification is hortatory, it consists of ap- peals to some leading principles in the constitution of man — to his conscience, or his sense of what is morally right and wrong — to his selfish propensities, or the desire for his own welfare and happiness, and to his feelings of benev- olence. Other passions are also appealed to in particular cases. In making these appeals to the sense of justice, and the selfish and social principles of our nature, there is fre- quert occasion to view one proposition in its connexion with others, to make inferences from what is felt and ac- knowledged to be true in cases of frequent occurrence, to that which is more rarely witnessed. (See Exercise II with remarks.) Appeals are also often made in this kind of amplification to* common sense. By this it is meant, that the writer en- deavors to recommend and enforce his proposition by ac- counting for it, that is, by assigning the causes or reasons on which it rests. It is asserted, for example, that men pro- foundly versed in science are usually negligent in attending to the common transactions of life ; and in supporting this proposition, the writer dwells on the nature of habits of ab- straction, and assigns the existence of these habits as a cause of the negligence referred to. Thus he accounts for what is asserted in his proposition, and every man of com- mon sense perceives the reasonableness of the cause assigned. Appeals of this kind to the common sense of readers, which are sometimes called arguments from cause to effect, are more frequently used to instruct and influence those of can- did minds, than to convince opposers. They gratify also tne strong propensity of man to know the causes of things, and thus o.SDOse the mind to the reception of any proposition which they are brought to support. 3 26 ON THOUGHT The inquiry may here arise, what kinds of composition, and what circumstances, require a brief, and what demana an extended amplification? It may be said generally, in reply, that writings designed to excite emotion, and to influ- ence the will, require a more extended amplification than those which are argumentative, or those addressed directly to the understanding. In the former case, it is desirable, that the mind should be led to dwell on what is presented before it, and to notice whatever is fitted and designed to excite the desired emotion. Hence copiousness of detail, and a full and minute statement of attending circumstances. are required. — On the other hand, an argument should be stated concisely and simply ; in this way it offers itself in a form most striking and convincing to the mind. Some- times, however, it is necessary to modify these general di- rections. An argument may be abstruse and complex, and hence may require to be stated at greater length ; or those, for whom the production is designed, may be men of uncul- tivated minds, and unaccustomed to connected reasonings In these instances, it may be well to depart from the general rule, and to expand and repeat the argument stated The nature and object of amplification may be learnt from what has been stated. The inquiry remains, How is this power of enlarging upon a topic attained ? or rather, upon what intellectual habits and qualifications, does the successful exercise of it depend? And here I mention, 1. Extent and command of knowledge. It was stated at the commencement of this chapter, that extent of knowledge is essential to the good writer. But it is not sufficient, that the mind is well stored with facts. — Our thoughts must be at command. They must come at our bidding, and be made to effect the purposes for which they are needed. This power of producing and applying our knowledge as occasion demands, evidently depends on AS THE FOUNDATION OF GOOD WRITING 27 ihe intellectual habits, especially on the etentiveness and readiness of the memory. 2. Closely connected with the command of the thoughts, is the power of illustration. Successfully to perform this part of amplification, the writer needs to be familiar with objects and scenes in the natural world, with passing events, and with the whole circle of science and literature. He needs also an active imagination. Liveliness of fancy is no less conducive to the clear and striking exhibition of the thoughts, than to ornaments of style. Hence the cultiva- tion of this class of the powers is equally important to the practical and to the elegant writer ; to him who aims to en- lighten the mind and improve the heart, and to him who would gratify the taste and please the fancy of his readers. 3. Another requisite for success in amplification, is defi- niteness of thought in our reasonings. There are men of strong minds, who reason ably, and, if we look at the con elusions to which they arrive, correctly, but who, are unable to follow out in their own minds, or to state to others, the train of argument they have pursued. To do this, requires a mental discipline, to which their intellectual powers have not been subjected. On the contrary, those who are accus- tomed to look in upon the operations of their own minds, and to think with precision and accuracy, are able to state their reasonings definitely and fully to others ; and this, as .'t has been said, is the kind of amplification, which in argu- mentative writings is required. 4. Another requisite for success in amplification, is copi- ousness of expression. This phrase includes both a com- mand of words and of construction, and he who excels in this particular, has one important qualification for enlarging apon the topics on which he writes, especially when joined with the other qualifications that have been mentioned. Copiousness of expression is acquired by a familiarity with 28 ON THOUGHT good authors ; and the differences, which in this respect are found among writers, are principally to be traced t cient connexion, that the different parts tend to the same end. The narrative and descriptive are often found unitea. (Ex. v.) CHAPTER SECOND ON TASTE. Were men simply intellectual beings, and vveie it die »\ iy design of the writer to convey instruction to his readers, what has been said in the preceding chapter, would be all that is required, preparatory to the consideration of the qual» ities of a good style. But men have imagination, and are susceptible of emotions ; and it is often the purpose of the writer, to cause the imagination to be exercised, and emo- tions of various kinds to be excited. To give pleasure in this way, may be the immediate object of the writer, or he may seek to please his readers, merely to arrest their attention, increase the distinctness of their views, and favor- ably incline them to the reception of the opinions he com- municates. From this statement, the definite object of this and the following chapter may be learnt. It is to aid in judging of whatever is thus addressed to the imagination in connexion with certain emotions of which men are susceptible. To direct in all that thus pertains to the imagination and these emotions, is regarded as the office of Taste. Hence the nature of taste in general will first be considered. This will be followed by some account of what is implied by a literary taste, including an enumeration of those different properties in literary productions which are objects of its attention, 4* 42 ON TASTE. with such remarks and directions as may aid in its acquisi- tion and improvement. Definition of Taste. Tue decisions of taste are judgments passed on whatevel is designed to excite emotions of beauty, of grandeur or of sublimity. The power of thus judging is founded on the experience of emotions of the same class, and is called taste ■ and hence he who exercises this power successfully, is called a man of taste. By judgment, as the word is here used, I mean the determining of the fitness of particular causes for producing certain effects. The chemist would produce a mixture having certain properties, — a certain degree of hard- ness, a required color or taste. With this view he unites several simples ; and in selecting the simples that are to be united for producing the required mixture, and in determin- ing the quantity of each to be used, there is judgment. In the same manner, where taste is exercised, there is a certain effect to be produced, and in determining the fitness oi means for producing this effect there is judgment. For a full account of the emotions here mentioned, the stu- dent must be referred to works on the philosophy of the mind. But it is necessary, that a short statement of what is meant by them should here be given. If we reflect on the different emotions, of which we are conscious in the notice of actions and objects around us, we find that some of them are of a moral nature, and we speafe of the actions which excite them as virtuous or vicious. — - Other emotions are included under what are called the pas- sions, and we speak of the objects which excite them as ob- jects of desire or aversion — of fear or remorse, or of some other passion. We think also of such objects as affecting our happiness. But distinct, both from emotions of a moral nature, and from those included under the passions, there is ON TASTE. 43 & third class of emotions, which is particularly referred to in the preceding definition of taste, and these will now be exhibited. When the sun goes down in the west, the surrounding clouds reflect to our view a rich variety of colors. We gaze on the splendid scene, and there is a pleasant emotion ex- cited in our minds. In reading the story of the two friends, Damon and Pythias, who were objects of the cruelty of Dionysius, we are struck with the closeness of their friendship ; and while we think on the fidelity of the returning friend, and on their mutual contest for death, a pleasing emotion arises in the mind. When examining Dr. Paley's reasoning in proof of the existence of the Deity, and observing how every part is brought to bear on the particular object in view, while one example after another gives additional strength to the argu- ment, we admire the skill of the reasoner and the perfection of his work, and in view of this skill and this finished work a grateful emotion arises in the mind. It will be observed in these examples, that the emotion excited is not strong, — that it is of a grateful kind, and that it may continue for some time. This is called an emo- tion of beauty. The traveller, when he stands on the banks of the Missis- sippi, and looks upon that noble river, flowing on with the power of collected waters, and bearing on its bosom the wealth of the surrounding region, is conscious of emotions, which, as they rise and swell within his breast, correspond to the scene on which he looks. Burke has given the following biographical notice of Howard the celebrated philanthropist. " He has visited all Europe, — not to survey the sumptu* ousness of palaces, or the stateliness of temples ; not to 44 . ON TASTE make accurate measurements of the remains oi ancient grandeur ; not to form a scale of the curiosities of modern art, not to collect medals, or collate manuscripts; — but to dive into the depths of dungeons ; to plunge into the infec- tion of hospitals, to survey the mansions of sorrow and pain ; to take the gauge and dimensions of misery, depres- sion and contempt ; to remember the forgotten, to attend to the neglected, to visit the forsaken, and to compare and collate the distresses of all men in all countries. His plan is original ; and it is as full of genius, as it is of humanity. It was a voyage of discovery, a circumnavigation of charity." No one can read this passage, and not feel a high degree of admiration in view of the devotedness and elevation of Durpose it describes. When the orator stands up before collected thousands, and for an hour sways them at his will by the powers of his eloquence, who, in that vast throng, can regard the speaker before him and feel no admiration of his genius ? The emotions excited in these and similar instances, have been called emotions of grandeur. They differ from those of beauty in that they are more elevating and ennobling. Byron, in his description of a thunder storm in the Alps has the following passage : " Far along, From peak to peak, the rattling crags among, Leaps the live thunder ! — not from one lone cloud, But every mountain now hath found a tongue ; And Jura answers through her misty shroud, Back to the joyous Alps who call to her aloud." Who in the midst of Alpine scenery could thus listen co the voice of the leaping thunder, and not start with strcng emotion '? We are told, that when Washington appeared before Congress, to resign his military power at the close of the war, " he was received as the founder and guardian of the ON TASTE. 45 republic. They silently retraced the scenes of danger and distress, through which they had passed together. They recalled to mind the blessings of freedom and peace pur chased by his arm. Every heart was big with emotion Tears of admiration and gratitude burst from every eye." In the presence of this august assembly, the Commander in chief of the armies of the United States, after piously recounting the blessings, which divine providence had con- ferred on his country, and commending that country to the continued care of its Almighty Protector, advanced, and resigned the great powers, which had been committed to his trust. How much must this closing act have added to the deep interest of the scene ! We are told, that when Newton drew near to the close of those calculations, which confirmed his discovery of the laws, by which the planets are bound in their courses, he was so overwhelmed with emotion, that he could not pro- ceed, and was obliged to ask the assistance of a friend. No one can think of the mighty intellectual work that was then accomplished, and not feel as he did, an overpowering emotion. To the emotions excited in these last mentioned examples is applied the epithet sublime. They are less permanent than those of grandeur, but more thrilling and exalting. In these examples, the emotions which are excited, arise neither from a moral approbation of the objects or actions as virtuous, nor from a personal interest in them as affecting our happiness. How, then, are they excited 1 The answers to this inquiry have been numerous. Some have said, that there is a distinct sense, which enables the mind to discern in objects something which is fitted to ex- cite emotions of taste, and which is suited to this purpose in the same manner as the sense of hearing is suited to gounds. Others have attempted to resolve the whole into 46 ON TASTE the principle of the association of ideas, and have said, that in every instance where an emotion of the kind mentioned is excited, some associated thoughts connected with our happiness, are brought before the mind. Thus, in the sec- ond of the examples given, they would say, that the grate- ful emotion arises from the thought of our own past friend- ships, or of how much we should enjoy in the possession of a faithful friend. Others account for these emotions by referring them to what are called primary laws of our nature. So far as these emotions are excited in view of natural ob- jects and scenes, they say, that our Creator has so formed us and adapted us to the world in which we live, that the view of certain objects and scenes is fitted to excite in the mind certain corresponding emotions. — At the same time they allow, that much influence is to be ascribed to the principle of association. In reference tc works of art, another original principle is also recognized, which is called the love of fitness or adaptation. The last theory is that of Brown, and is the one now generally received. For a full explanation of it, the student is referred to his work on In- tellectual Philosophy. It is enough for my present purpose to have pointed out the class of emotions which comes under the cognizance of taste, and to have referred to some of the attempts to explain them. It will be observed, that the examples which are given, are drawn from three different classes of objects, natural, moral, and intellectual. But since, in the classification of emotions, as those of beauty, grandeur and sublimity, we obviously refer to the emotions as they exist in the mind, and not to the objects by which they are excited, this diver- sity in the exciting objects is not regarded. Neither is it of importance, that these different classes of emotions should here be separately considered. It is difficui in many cases to mark the transition from one to another, and ON TASTE. 47 to decide whether the emotion excited be an emotion of beauty, of grandeur, or of sublimity. These three classes of emotions are alike objects of the attention of taste ; and the principles and rules established in reference to one class, admit of application to the others. Hence the attention is principally directed to emotions of beauty, and emotions of each class are sometimes called emotions of taste. I return now to the definition of taste. Every instance of judgment implies knowledge of those subjects, on which it is exercised. The chemist cannot form his mixture, thae shall possess certain required properties, without a knowl- edge of the properties of the several simples which are in- gredients. In those instances of judgment also which are included under taste, there is in the same manner knowl- edge implied ; but as this is the knowledge of emotions, and can be acquired only by experience, taste is said to be founded on the experience of past emotions. Though taste, in the definition which has now been ex- plained, is called judgment, it is not meant, that in the ex- ercise of taste, the mind is ordinarily conscious of delib- eration or of the balancing of reasons, as in some other in- stances of judgment. It is true, that this deliberation may be rapidly passed through in all instances, and in some, as in the case of the artist employed in designing and execut- ing his work, there may be a consciousness of the process But most frequently, judgment on objects of taste seems to be passed instantaneously. As the result of past experi- ence of emotions, certain principles seem fixed in the mind, and when taste is called into exercise, it is the immediate application of these principles to particular instances. The analogy is close between the exercise of taste in the works of the fine arts, and of taste, as the word is literally applied to the sense of taste. Take for example the case of wine? The wine merchant is able at once to decide as to the qual- 48 ON TASTE. lty of the wine presented to him, and to detect any foreign ingredient. He has acquired his ability to do this by past experience, and he brings the results of this past experi- ence, which seem to exist in his mind as certain fixed principles, to the particular instance in which bis judgment is required. Sensibility as connected with taste. From the definition that has been given of taste, we may learn in what way sensibility is connected with its attain- ment. By sensibility, is meant a high degree of suscepti- bility of the emotions of beauty. And since taste is founded on the experience of these emotions, sensibility, as thus de- fined, must aid in the formation of a good taste. It must be supposed, that so far as the emotions of beauty result from original tendencies of the mind to be pleased in view of certain objects, they are in some degree common to all men in their earliest years. But it is a well known fact re- specting all our emotions, that if neglected, they lose their strength, and if entirely disregarded, they will soon cease to be felt. On the contrary they are strengthened by being regarded and cherished. Hence it is, that while some men are susceptible of emotions of beauty in view of objects and scenes around them, others, the circumstances of whose life have been different, look upon the same objects and scenes without any emotion of this nature, i So far, too, as these emotions result from associated thoughts and feelings, there is an equal cause of diversity among different indi- viduals. One, from the scenes and events that have fallen under his observation, may have many associations connect ed with a particular object, which another may have nevei formed. These remarks admit of illustration. Addison, when he ON TASTE. 49 went forth in the evening, and gazed upon the starry heav ens and the moon walking in her majesty, felt emotions ot sublimity. In accounting for the rise of these emotions, we might say, that he was a man of sensibility — from the ori- ginal constitution of his mind he was susceptible of emo- tions of taste to a high degree. His intellectual habits also, and the circumstances of his life, were such as to cherish and strengthen these original tendencies of his mind. As- tronomy had taught him something of the size and number and uses of these heavenly bodies ; and in this way, or in other ways, many associations were connected with them. On the same evening, perhaps, and in the same neighbor- hood, the laborer returning from his daily toil, looked upon the. same starry and moon-lit firmament, but felt no emotion of beauty or sublimity. Still this individual might have been originally constituted with as much sensibility as Ad- dison ; but such has been his lot in life, that this sensibility has been lost, and he thinks of the moon and stars only as lighting him homewards from his toil. Standard of taste. The inquiry here arises, whether a sensibility to emotions of beauty may not exist, and still the individual possessing it be destitute of good taste? And if this inquiry be answered in the affirmative, as it must be in accordance with facts, it may be still further asked, how this want of taste is con- sistent with the statement, that taste is founded on the ex- perience of emotions of beauty and sublimity ? The resolu- tion of this apparent difficulty brings to view what is termed the standard of taste. It is the case, as we have seen, that from the peculiar circumstances of individuals, their original tendencies to emotions of beauty may be per- verted and blunted, or strengthened and increased. The 5 50 ON TASTE. associations also connected with the same objects and scenes may be very different in different minds. From bcth of these causes, and from others not mentioned, the emotions, excited in the minds of different individuals in the view of the same objects, will differ, and consequently, their expe- rience as to past emotions will vary. In this way we ac- count for diversities of taste among individuals, and here is the ground of the maxim so often quoted, de gustibus non disputandum. But amidst all these diversities, there are some objects and scenes, which do uniformly excite emo- tions of beauty in the great majority of those, who have any degree of sensibility. And where there are cases of excep- tion, some sufficient reason may generally be assigned. In the assertion then that taste is founded on the experience of past emotions, reference is made to this common expe- rience, and not to the experience of individuals, or of any particular country or age. Hence then we infer, that the standard of taste is the agreeing voice of siich as are suscep- tible of emotions of beauty, both of those who lived in past ages, and of those now existing. To illustrate these remarks, I may refer the student to the statue of Washington, which has been recently placed in the metropolis of New England, and which represents him in the drapery of a Roman hero. Should it be asked, why he is thus represented, rather than in the dress, which as a military commander, or a civil leader, he was accus- tomed to wear 1 or in such attire as was used by military and civil leaders in Europe two hundred, or five hundred, years ago 1 it might be answered, that though such draper} might have been approved at the period when it was worn, and thus have been in agreement with the taste of the age at the present time it would appear unbecoming to the hu man form. But such is not the case with the Roman toga, This is a drapery, which at all times, and to all men, ap* ON TASTE. 51 pears graceful and excites emotions of beauty. This fact, then, both proves, that there is a standard of taste, and illus- trates what is meant by it. Hence we learn one object and use of models of excel- lence in the fine arts. It is principally by means of these, that we obtain a knowledge of the standard of taste, or rather they are the standard, since in them the decisions of men in different periods and portions of the world are found embodied. To illustrate this by an example, I will refer to West's painting of Christ in the exercise of the charities. We know that th's painting was universally admired in England. It has been regarded with like admiration in this country. All those who are susceptible of emotions of taste, have felt these emotions when looking upon this pro- duction of art. Here, then, is found the united voice of men of the present age ; and the artist knows, that so far as his production exhibits what excites emotions of beauty in this painting, it is in agreement with the general opinion of men now living, or the standard of the taste of the age. Had this picture existed through successive ages, and been uniformly admired, this would give it higher authority, and the artist, in conforming his work to it, would know, that what he produces, is in agreement with the opinions of men of different ages of the world. He might then hope, that his work, being conformed to this general standard of taste, would please all men every where, and of every age, who are susceptible of emotions of beauty, and whose minds are not under the influence of some particular bias. In models of excellence, then, in the fine arts, is expressed the expe- rience of mankind respecting emotions of beauty; and in studying these models, the man of sensibility learns to cor- rect any peculiar influence which circumstances may have nad on his own emotions, and thus acquires a taste which w n conformity with the general standard of taste 52 ON TASTE. Taste as affected by the intellectual habits. Taste, as it exists in different individuals, is affected by the intellectual character and habits. We might expect this ts he the case from the fact, that it implies discrimination, and that the same intellectual habits will be brought into exer- cise in judging of what is fitted to excite emotions of taste, as in those instances where judgments are formed on other subjects. It is in this way, that we may in part account for the diversities of taste in different individuals. He whose mind is enriched with various knowledge, and whose intel- lectual powers have been strengthened and improved, and who is wont to take large and comprehensive views of sub- jects, will manifest the greatness of his mind and the liber- ality of his views, in his judgment of what is fitted to excite an emotion of taste. He whose attention has been restricted to philosophical speculations, and who has been accustomed to reason with the precision of mathematical accuracy, will in like manner bring his habits of reasoning to subjects of taste, and will be less bold and more severe in his judgment of what is fitted to excite emotions of this kind. Locke and Burke are striking examples of the justness of these remarks. Locke was an accurate thinker, and a close reasoner. His judgment, where he forms an opinion, is based on careful and minute examination. Hence his taste was severe. He used but little ornament, and that simple and illustrative. Fearful also that it might betray him, he condemned the use of it in the writings of others. Burke, on the contrary, was a man of much refinement. He pos- sessed extensive classical attainments — had large and lib- eral views of subjects, and, susceptible to a high degree of emotions of taste, he was ever prone to indulge in the excite- ment of these emotions. But then he approved only of ON TASTE 53 what is truly beautiful and sublime, and his judgment of what is fitted to excite these emotions, evidently felt the influence of his enlarged and liberal views on other subjects, or, in other words, of his intellectual habits. Objects on which taste is exercised. Taste, as thus explained, employs itself in judging both of the objects and scenes in Nature, and of works in the Fine Arts, and in both cases it determines as to the fitness of what is presented before it to produce emotions of beauty. Suppose several individuals, who are susceptible of emotions of beauty, to be travelling through some region of our country, which presents a rich variety of natural sce- nery. One of them, in advance of the others, upon rising an eminence, is struck with the view opening before hinv and is led to exclaim as to the beauty of the prospect. The others, upon coming up, are impressed in the same manner. They declare the scene before them beautiful, and they unite in pronouncing him wr o first pointed it out, a man of taste. All that is meant by this expression is, that the indi- vidual to whom it is applied, is able, from his experience of past emotions, to form a judgment respecting the fitness of objects in natural scenery to produce emotions of beauty, which is in agreement with the general judgment of man- kind. Suppose further, that the same individuals, in the course of their journey, stop to examine a gallery of paintings. One of them, in looking round on the different pictures, se- lects a painting which he pronounces beautiful. The atten- tion of the others being called to it, they express the same opinion, and again they unite in calling the individual who has pointed out the painting, a man of taste. Here, as \n the former case, all that is imp! if d is, that the individual 5* 51 ON TASTE. called a man of taste, is able to judge of the fitness of cer tain works of art to produce emotions of beauty. But let us now suppose, that instead of speaking of the individual who pointed out the painting to their notice, they are lad to speak of the work itself, and to call it a work of taste. This might be said of a work of art, though not of a scene in nature; for in this expression reference is evi* dently had to the artist by whom the work was executed, and we never think of the Creator as guided by taste in the work of creation. In this then, as in the preceding case, all that is implied is, that the artist has shewn by the design and execution of his work, that he is able to judge correctly as to the fitness of objects and scenes to produce emotions of beauty. But to shew more fully the nature of taste, and to point out its connexion with the imagination, I shall here describe the manner, in which it guides the artist in designing and executing his work ; and in doing this, I shall confine the attention to works in the art of Painting, since the mind conceives most eas ; ly and distinctly objects of sense. Connexion of taste with the imagination. Let us first suppose, that the scene or object represented by the painter, is an exact imitation of some scene or object in nature. In this case, we might be pleased with the work, and say that it discovers good taste. We might be pleased, because the original scene is one fitted to excite emotions of beauty, and we might ascribe good taste to the painter, from his having selected a scene of this kind to be repre- sented. Besides, v*e might be gratified with the skill that is shewn in the execution of the work. Emotions of beautj might be excited in view of the closeness of the imitation, *\ie justness of the coloring, and the truth of the perspective ON TASTE. 55 and we might say, that taste has guided the artist in his ex- hibit ion of what are usually called secondary beauties of painting. But the most admired works in the arts of painting are not exact imitations. They are the creations of the painter, and have no archetype in nature. And it is in designing these original works, that the presence of taste is most needed, and her influence felt. To show in what way taste guides the artist in designing his work, I shall here introduce an account given by Cicero of the course pursued by Zeuxis, when employed by the Crotonians to paint the picture of a beautiful female. The city of Crotona was celebrated for the beauty of its females. Zeuxis requested, that those esteemed most beautiful might be assembled at the same place. From these he selected five, who in his estimation excelled all others in beauty, and by combining in his picture the most striking traits of beauty in each of these five, he executed the task assigned to him. Now in the whole of this process, taste was evidently the guide of the artist. The selection of the five most beautiful virgins, the choice of the most beautiful traits in each, are both instances of judgment, founded on the experience of past emotions. But this is only the preparation for his work. What has been thus selected must now be combined together, and so combined, as to produce one harmonious effect. Instead of an assemblage of beautiful limbs and features, an air and proportion must be given to the form, and a cast to the countenance. Here is exercise for the designing powers of the artist, and over this part of the work also taste must preside. Different modes of combina- ion present themselves before his " mind's eye," and of these different combinations, one is to be selected as most oeautiful. The making of this selection is evidently an in- 56 ON TASTE. stance of judgment, founded on the experience of past emo tions of beauty. Zeuxis was familiar with forms of beauty j and had fixed in his mind those principles of judging which enabled him to decide with readiness and correct ness. Hence, no doubt, his celebrity as a painter of the female form. From this example, we learn, why the most admired pro- ductions of the painter are not exact representations of ob- jects and scenes in nature. In natural objects and scenes, that which is suited to excite emotions of beauty, is mingled with objects of indifference and disgust. The artist, under the guidance of taste, collects together these scattered frag- ments of beauty, and combining them in one view with har- monious effect, presents to us objects and scenes more beautiful than those which can be found in nature. But it is by no means the case, that the artist is confined to objects and scenes of nature for the materials of these new combinations. It is here that the office of imagination and its connexion with taste, may be seen. By this faculty of the mind, the objects of past sensations are modified and combined anew, and images of objects and scenes, that exist only in this airy creation, rise up before our view. But while gazing on these visionary things, the same grateful emotions of beauty are excited, as when the objects before us have more of reality. Hence, when the artist would represent to us a scene, which shall strongly excite our emotions of beauty, he calls in imagination to his aid. She brings to his view a bright assemblage of forms of beauty. She presents them in different lights ; combines and modifies them variously. And while these shifting scenes are flitting before him, he selects, under the guidance of taste, the most beautiful forms and happiest combinations, and fixes them on the canvass for our view. From these united efforts of imagination and taste, the ON TASTE. 57 artist presents to us models of excellence, superior to what can be found in the works of nature, or in the productions of artists that have preceded him. By the efforts of genius, he is enabled to make such combinations as others have never made; and taste, by exercising itself in the study of these visions of the mind, reaches a degree of perfection, to which it could never have attained in the study of existing models, or of the scenes of nature. But if imagination thus assists in the cultivation and improvement of taste, taste in return repays the assistance of imagination, by acting as director in the new creations which she forms. Imagina- tion might be furnished with a thousand different forms of beauty, as the materials of her work, and unite them in ten thousand different combinations; but without taste to pre- side and direct, she could never reach that harmoniousness of effect, that unity of expression, to which nature often attains. Value of models of excellence in the arts. From this analysis of the manner in which works in the fine arts are produced, the assistance, which the artist must derive from the study of models of excellence in the arts, may be learnt. Here he sees presented before him, the representations of those beautiful forms of nature, the knowl- edge of which, without this assistance, he could have ob- tained only by frequent and tedious processes of observation and analysis. The beau ideal is delineated to his view, and he forms his taste from the contemplation of perfect forms of beauty, instead of those imperfect forms where beauty is mingled with deformity. He sees also the most happy combinations of these forms. He has before him the results which others have made, and is th is placed in advance of 58 ON TASTE. those who are not favored with similar means of improve ment. The man, who is thus permitted to form his taste from models of excellence around him, may be said to exist in a new creation. He lives where the sun sheds a brightei day, where the clouds are skirted by more brilliant colors, and where nature's carpet shews a richer green. Angelic forms are about him. He ever stands on some chosen spot, and each new scene that presents itself, gives but a varied hue to the emotion of beauty that he feels. Explanation of the word Picturesque. We may learn also in this connexion, and by the aid oi the principles which have been stated, what is meant, when it is said of some countries, that they present scenes more picturesque than those found in others. This epithet, when applied to natural scenery, relates primarily and principally to the harmoniousness of effect produced on the mind, and implies such a prominence and combination of objects as give an expression or character to the scene. Nature seems in such instances to perform that work of combination, which, when represented to us on canvass by the skilful painter, we say he has designed by the aid of imagination and taste. The view may or may not present surpassing forms of beauty. We look not at objects individually, but regard them as grouped together and exerting a combined influence. Neither is it implied that the prospect is exten- sive, and that it embraces numerous and varied objects, On the contrary, picturesque scenes are most frequently those of limitei extent, and which contain but few prorai nent parts. ON TASTE. 59 Revolutions in Taste. On the principles which have been stated in this chapter, the revolutions of taste may be easily explained. As pecu- liar circumstances have their influence on the tastes of dif- ferent individuals, so the manners and customs and peculiar circumstances of different ages, exert their influence on the aste of these ages. The power of these adventitious cir- cumstances is so great, that what in one age is esteemed and pronounced beautiful, in a succeeding age of more refine- ment, is regarded with disgust. Still it is true, that in this case, as in the diversities of the taste of individuals, there are some works of art, which rise superior to the influence of these accidental causes, and wherever they are known, «xcke emotions of beauty. Different qualities of taste explained 1 shall close this account of taste in general with a short explanation of the qualities, which are most frequently ascribed to it. These are three ; Refinement, Delicacy, and Correctness. We speak of Refinement of taste in reference to different ages and different periods in the life of an individual. It implies a progress, so that what is pleasing in one age, or one period of life, is not so in another. The sculptured mon« ument, which in the early ages of a country is regarded with admiration and called beautiful, at a later period is unheeded, or considered rude and unsightly. — The pictures, which in our childish years we gazed upon with pleasure, at a more mature time of life, are passed by with neglect. Thia difference in the feelings with which the same object is regarded at different oeriods, is found connected with differ 60 ON TASTE. ent acbances that have been made in knowledge, and in the cultivation and refinement of the intellectual powers. The emotion of pleasure, felt by the ignorant and half-civilized man when gazing on some rude monument or unsightly picture, is of the same nature as that felt by the man of knowledge and refinement, while viewing a finished work of sculpture or of painting. But the latter has become habit- uated to the exhibition of skill in the works of art. He has become familiar with monuments and paintings, that are better in their design and execution, than those that have been seen by the former ; and hence it is, that the production of the artist, which at an earlier period of life would have excited emotions of beauty, is now disregarded. Refine ment in taste, then, denotes a progress in the knowledge of what is excellent in works of art, and results from the study of models of excellence. Delicacy of taste implies a quick and nice perception of whatever is fitted to excite emotions of beauty. He who possesses it, will detect beauties both of design and execu- tion, which pass unnoticed by common men ; and when others pronounce a scene beautiful from the general effect •on their minds, he will discover and point out all that tends to the production of this effect. This quality of taste results from a habit of careful and minute observation, joined with a quick susceptibility of emotions of beauty. It is also most frequently found in connection with moral purity of feeling, and in its common acceptation, is sometimes used as opposed to what is indelicate. Correctness of taste evidently refers to an agreement with some standard. What this standard is, has been already shewn. It is the agreeing voice of those, who, from their experience of past emotions, are able to form a judgment on what is fitted to excite emotions of beauty. He, then, who has correctness of taste, feels and judges, in reference to ON TASTE. 61 objects which come under the cognizance of taste, in agree ment with he only true standard of taste. Different uses of the word Taste. It will at once be seen, that in the preceding account of taste, the word is used in a sense, different from that often applied to it in its common acceptation. We speak of a tayCe for some particular occupation, for some amusement or study, when all that is meant to be expressed, is, that there is a fondness, or inclination of the mind, for the pursuit, and the word fondness or inclination would better convey our meaning. It must be obvious to all, that the rhetorical use of the word is quite different. The definition here given of taste is also different from that found in Blair's Lectures on Rhetoric, which, as a text book, is in most frequent use. He defines taste to be the power of receiving pleasure or pain from the beauties or de- formities of nature and art. The definition which has been given of it in this chapter, makes it of a more discriminating principle. It implies, that the man of taste is able to discern what in nature and art is fitted to excite this feeling of pleas- ure and pain, while the power of receiving this pleasure is called sensibility. That there is ground for this distinction, is evident from the fact already stated, that some men are highly susceptible of emotions of beauty, who, at the same time, are utterly destitute of good taste. Technical Taste. Neither is it the case, that in all instances where the word taste is used, reference is had to the standard, which has been stated in this chapter to be the true standard of taste. A man is sometimes called a man of taste, when his 6 62 ON TASTE judgment extends no further than to a decision, whether in any particular production, or performance, the rules of ha art ha\3 been observed. This may be illustrated in the case of an epic poem. Aristotle has fully and with precision laid down the rules, according to which this species of writ- ing should be composed, deriving them from Homer, the great master of the art. It is evident, that one, who jas made himself familiar with these rules, may sit in judgment on the ^Eneid of Virgil, and the Paradise Lost of Milton. With his line and his compass, he may take the dimensions of an Epic Poem, as readily and easily as of a building. In fact, he does nothing more than apply to the work he exam- ines, the measures which have been taken from some other work that has been admired, and in this way decide as to the merits of the poem. This is the lowest kind of criti- cism, and he who exercises it, may be called a man of technical taste. Taste of Comparison. It is also sometimes the case, that the productions of some admired author, or artist, are the standard, to which all attempts of the same nature must be brought. The admirer of Byron, whose mind is filled with his delightful horrors, and who is wont to admire his master-strokes of passion, in examining the productions of other poets, will pronounce on their excellence, from their comparative effect on his own mind, and will approve or condemn, as they agree with those of this great master of the art. This may be distinguished as the taste of comparison. It is often found among those, who devote their time to visiting galleries of paintings, and other collections of works in the fine arts. This kind of taste is a source of enjoyment to its possessor, and is often found united with merit as an author or artist. Some men ON TASTE. 63 succeed better, when they take the taste of another for their guide, than when they rely on their own. — " Velles eum suo ingenio dixisse, alieno judicio." * Philosophical taste. But the man of taste, in the true use of the word, does not, like the mere critic of technical skill, only apply the rules ol his art. Neither, in forming his decisions, does he bring every object of which he judges, to some favorite standard of excellence. Truth and nature are the models which he has studied, and he has found them alike in the objects of creation around him, in the scenes of real life, and in the creations of genius. Like Numa of old, he has his Egeria in the woods, and after holding high converse with this mys- terious revealer of the secrets of nature, he comes forth to the world, and discloses, as if by inspiration, the principles of the empire of taste, and the laws of her dominion. To him belongs the prophetic eye of taste. He can not only decide with correctness on the scene spread before him, but sur- veying the visions of his own mind — the scenes that exist only in the world of imagination, "he can anticipate with un- erring certainty their beauty and effect. There is also an un- changing uniformity in the decisions of philosophical taste, Even the eternal principles of morality are not more fixed and determinate. What met the approbation of the man of philosophical taste two thousand years ago, meets the appro- bation of the man of philosophical taste now, and will con- tinue to be thus admired till the end of time. On ihis prin- ciple duinctilian has said, " Ule se profecisse sciat, cui Cice~ ro valde placebit."i On this principle Homer, and Virgil, * You commend the genius of the writer, but prefer, that it should be guided by another's taste, rather than by his own t Whoever can discern the excellences of Cicero, may hence learn that he has himself made proficiency as an orator. 64 ON TASTE. and Demosthenes, and Cicero, have been admired, wherevei they have been known. Here also is the only foundation of hope to the aspirant after literary immortality. The Fine Arts are so closely connected with the subject of taste, that I subjoin to this chapter a short account of what is meant by them. The Fine, Elegant, or Polite Arts, for these epithets ire synonymous, are so called in distinction from the Useful Arts. The former are designed to please ; the latter aim at the supply of human wants. It is true, that works in the useful arts may be so constructed as to please, at the same time that they subserve our necessities. And on the other hand, works that please and are designed to please, may be useful. Hence it may be difficult in regard to some productions in the arts, to say to which they belong, the Useful, or the Elegant ; still there is ground for the distinction that has been made, and according to the design — to please, or to be useful, we say that some arts are elegant and others useful. Of the Fine Arts, somp are imitative, and others symbol- ical. Some exhibit r\n exact representation of the object or scene they would present before the mind ; such are Painting and Sculpture. These are called imitative fine arts. Others make use of signs which have been agreed upon among men fox the representation of objects ; such' as Music and Poetry. These, in distinction from the former, may be sailed symbolical fine arts. It has been stated, that the design of works in the fine Lrts, is to please. This may be effected in two different ways. Tiie object or scene brought before the mind, may be such as is suited to excite grateful emotions, or the mind may be pleased with the skill that is shown in the execution of the work. In the former case, when the Dbject or scene ON TASTE. 65 represented has no original in nature, but is a creation of .he artist's mind, while we regard the object of the work, and notice how the different parts of it tend to the promo- tion of this object, we are said to observe the primary beau- ties, or the beauties of design. But whether the scene or object represented be an exact copy of some original in na- ture, or a creation of the artist's, if the attention is directed only to the skill shewn in the execution of the work, we are said to observe secondary beauties, or the beauties of exe- cution. The art of writing or composition, whether elegant or useful, is one of the symbolical arts. There is no exact imitation of what is designed to be brought before the mind, but objects and scenes are represented by words as symbols. This must evidently increase the difficulty of the artist, cr writer ; for though he may have in his own mind distinct views of what is fitted to excite emotions of taste, and may connect these views with the signs which he uses, yet, if the reader do not attach the same views to the signs used, they will fail to excite in his mind the emotion* designed to be produced. Much then will depend upon the skill with which these signs are used, and hence it is, that in literary produc- tions, so much attention is paid, with the design of pleasing, to the execution of the work. We may here also see a reason, why the beauties of de- sign in literary productions, are said to be addressed to the imagination of the readers. As we have seen in the last chapter, it is by the aid of the imagination that the artist is able to design those objects and scenes, which are the crea- tions of his own mind. When these creations have been formed, they are represented by the signs that are used. Now it is obviously the imagination of the reader, which must interpret these signs. They are intended to set his imagina- tion in exercise, and to cause it to present before the mind in object or scene, similar to that which the writer had in 6* 66 ON TASTE view when i sing these signs ; and if the reader have n