I* . » • > ^P* »i*£* ^ V fc ^A^* ^ aP ^ v t ^xik> ^ aP ,** V .«^;. % c,0*".i^."* o o " ' /''•^i^ ' ' ,0*°,; "-•• A ^ d* • ; ^x : -.w- : /X l ™' j^** 'iffls s*\'W. : s*x •: X°-7V - °4, ° " ° A ^ „4o* %* A v> A ^ ** * r o V ^°o ^ CU. * . « o • A J . » • A * .-isafei-. %.** .1 ./VliP •/% "-.w.- /\ •«••/% -IK- /\ -W-' /'** • .% ^.-s^V /,c:^.^o /.fi,\ o°*.^.% >*.•&*,'< >>- ■*► , Ok £ ^, - **.«< 'o K ^ 3* ^ *0, ^.0^%^ rP*V '-'-!• *<> xi5 ^ "V-s v °^^: C, vP x,^ ^ ° & V 4 O vV N . » • A <. V " 1 x^> v °^ V^ A ^^ V -*m*; 0.95; i.e., the probability that the confidence interval covers or contains the true value of A is at least 95 pet. 2 Under lined numbers in parentheses re- fer to items in the list of references preceding the appendixes. Failure . — The termination of an item's capability to perform its required func- tion (4, p. 334). Failure rate (A) . — The rate at which failures occur in a certain time inter- val; i.e., failure per unit-time. The time units may be hours, years, shifts, etc. (_5, p. 11). Hazard rate . — The instantaneous failure rate; the probability that a component will fail in a small interval of time (_5, p. 11). Maintainability . — A characteristic of design and installation expressed as the probability that an item will be retained in or restored to a specific condition within a given period of time, provided maintenance is performed in accordance with prescribed procedures and resources (4, p. 335). Mean time between failures. — For a par- ticular interval, the total functioning life of a population of an item divided by the total number of failures within the population during the measurement period (4, p. 336). Reliability . — The characteristic of an item expressed by the probability that it will perform a required function under stated condition for a stated period of time (4, p. 337). RELIABILITY RESEARCH PROGRAM The failure rates of mine electrical power system components for coal mine op- erating and environmental conditions were estimated using one or more of the fol- lowing: 1. A theoretical model based on a thorough understanding of the physics of failure mechanisms was used to predict a failure rate. 2. A statistical estimate of the fail- ure rate was made using accumulated field data on failure or information from main- tenance records. This technique is wide- ly used in other industries. 3. Accelerated life tests were per- formed by conducting magnified load tests in a laboratory environment. In this type of accelerated test, each sample was tested at higher than normal stress lev- el. It is possible to obtain the life distribution of the devices and their failure rates from the data collected by performing these tests. This technique is useful in obtaining a rough estimate of the failure rate in a very short time. Technique (2) (statistical estimation using field data) is by far the best and most accepted approach to obtain a real- istic failure rate for a component (4, p. 37). The field data collection technique and components' sample size are given in appendix A. The selection of components for relia- bility evaluation were protective devices and certain mine power equipment. The protective components of the mine power distribution systems are typically the molded-case circuit breaker, the under- voltage relay (UVR) , the ground check monitor (GCM), and the ground-fault relay (GFR). (See figure 1.) These components are responsible for disconnecting power circuits to mining equipment under abnor- mal system conditions, such as circuit overcurrents , ground faults, system un- dervoltages, or open ground conductors. To ensure the protection of personnel and equipment, abnormal conditions must be detected and cleared promptly. This re- quirement implies that protective compo- nents must be extremely reliable. A high degree of reliability also assures in- creased productivity by maximizing the availability of the equipment. The four possible undesirable modes of operation of protection devices are — (a) failure to trip when desired, (b) undesirable tripping, (c) failure to close, and (d) catastrophic failure. The first mode of failure is the most significant from the safety point of view, while the other three modes affect productivity (6^, p. 97-98). The other mine power equipment investi- gated were cables, motors, motor start- ers, and control gear. A cable can fail and result in electrical hazards to per- sonnel, an ignition source for fires, or loss of production due to any one the following causes: (a) Any one of the three phase conduc- tors or the ground conductor or the ground-check conductor can break open; (b) short circuits due to insulation failure can occur; (c) shielding of phase conductors can fail; and (d) jackets can fail. The causes of a motor's failure are nu- merous. However, mechanical and electri- cal failures and starter-control gear failures can result in loss of production and equipment, and in electrical hazards to personnel and mine fires (6, p. 152). 480 V 3 phase J War 480V/I20V ™gg^. Mine power center Mine face equipment Breaker UVR #4H GFR GCM GFR- rOi imor *\ $< Filter £-£ Filter FIGURE 1. - Ground fault protection system. RELIABILITY DATA BASE Table 1 summarizes the results obtained from theoretical analysis, accelerated life tests, and field data evaluation of molded-case circuit breakers. The relia- bility characteristics obtained from the theoretical analysis (fig. 2) show that, for the breaker to have 95-pct reliabil- ity, it must be removed from service be- fore 1 yr of continuous service. Field data (fig. 3) also indicate a removal time of less than a year for greater than 95-pct reliability. Replacement cost would be an expensive item for the mine operators. With good maintenance proce- dures, such as periodic inspection, cor- rect examination, and calibration re- quirements, the circuit breakers could have >95-pct reliability for a longer service life (_5, p. 74). Table 2 summarizes results obtained from theoretical analysis, accelerated life tests, and field data evaluation of both electromechanical (EM) and solid TABLE 1. - Molded-case circuit breaker data Theo- Lab Field retical test data Failure rate ( A) failues per year. . 1 0.1607 2 0.30 3 0.12 95-pct confidence interval of A: l 0. 05975 1 0.3084 ND ND '♦o.oee "+0.204 5 MTBF (1/A)...yr.. 4 6.22 ^3.33 ^8.33 ND No data Wenkata (_5, p. 75); extrapolated (aver- aged). 2 Hill and Collins (_7, p. 17). 3 Hill and Collins (7, p. 16). ^Calculated. 5 Mean time between failures. state (SS) UVR's. Theoretical part fail- ure rates were extrapolated from rates uu K ' ' ' ' i ' I 1 V> N \\ v KEY \ > N. 90 -1 \ v & Upper limit — \ « > o Failure rate - \ °\ X • Lower limit 80 \ - 70 \ V v ~ V \ *>. . \ ^ v s: \ ° \ \ \ \ \ \ A ^ V ti 50 \ \ \ x \ \ \ \ \ N - 40 V 30 " 20 -6 10 i i i i 1 1 i 4 6 TINIE,yr FIGURE 2. - Reliability characteristics of cir- cuit breakers using theoretical analysis <^ 60 x* UJ a > 50 10- KEY a Upper limit o Failure rate • Lower limit 4 6 TIME.yr 10 FIGURE 3. - Reliability characteristics of cir- cuit breakers using field data. TABLE 2. - Undervoltage relay (UVR) data Theoretical Life test Field EM SS EM SS EM SS Failure rate ( A) failures per year. . 95-pct confidence interval of A: 1 0. 15 4 0.0498 '♦0.159 4 6.67 io.ne ND ND 1+ 7.35 ND ND ND ND 2 0.49 2 0.36 2 0.73 2 2.04 3 0.13 t+ 0.0715 '♦0.221 4 7.7 ND ND ND ND EM Electromechanical. SS Solid state. ND No data. ^-Venkata (_5, p. 85); extrapolated (summed). 2 Collins (8, p. 61). 3 Hill and Collins (_7, p. 16). H Calculated. 5 Mean time between failures. tabulated by the United Kingdom's Atomic Energy Agency (UKAEA). A comparative analysis shows that the SS UVR performs (theoretically) better than the EM UVR. One reason might be that the SS UVR has fewer mechanical components. However, as shown in figure 4, both UVR's degrade to the 95-pct reliability levels within 6 to 18 months of operation. 100 100 90 80 70- x w Q 60 ^50- < 40- 30 20 iv — r | i | i | i i i >. N « N KEY \\ \ a EM upper limit — \ ^ N O EM failure rate _ \ c\ »^ • EM lower limit \ \- \ # A SS failure rate \ \\ \ A \ A ^* \ " \ v - \ % *\ ^ — \ \ •. *x — \ ^ ^ \ \A ^ \ Q\ ^ " \ \\ ^J' A "\ v \ V\ \ W \ v - \ X °^ x * \ \ A \ * X \ °^ ^ \ v A \ > ^ \ x cx v \ ■> A^ \ ^ X - \ VV " \ X °0> \ ^ N 1 . 1 1 1 ■ 1 2 4 6 8 TIME.yr FIGURE 4. - Reliability characteristics of under- voltage relays using theoretical analysis. x UJ Q CD < UJ or KEY A SS upper limit o SS failure rate • SS lower limit 4 6 TIME,yr "I -A 1 8 =8 10 FIGURE 5. - Reliability characteristics of solid state undervoltage relays using life test data. Life test data (fig. 5) showed a de- gradation of 95-pct reliability of SS UVR within 2 months of continuous service, while the failure rate determined from field data for an EM UVR was less than the failure rate predicted in a theoreti- cal analysis. This suggests that the part failure rates used for the predic- tions were not too pessimistic. As shown in figure 6, the EM UVR falls below the 95-pct reliability level after 3 to 8 months of continuous service. This means that if the UVR's were to be extremely reliable, they would need replacement be- fore completion of a continuous service of 1 yr. The level of reliability of UVR could be raised about 95 pet with suit- able modifications in the design or main- tenance of the relay (8, p. 84). Table 3 shows reliability characteris- tics of GCM's based on field data and maintenance records. Both show the reli- ability fall below the 95-pct level with- in 2 months of continuous service (fig. 7). The lower limit of the confidence in- terval for field is of the same magnitude of failure rate established from the maintenance records. Trailing cables feeding shuttle cars and continuous miners in underground coal mines regularly are subjected to harsh treatment. The failure frequency and the associated splicing rates are very high compared with the failure rate of compo- nents such as circuit breakers and UVR's. Table 4 shows splicing rates on trailing cables feeding shuttle cars and continu- ous miners, as estimated from field data. 100 90- 80- 701- . 60 h x _ z >- 501— 40- 30- 20- 10- ■ , 1 1 , 1 , 1 \\y KEY _\ * \ £ EM upper limit - \ x \ \ ° v » o EM failure rate \ \ \ • EM lower limit \ i \ - V \ ^ A V N \ ° S- \ N • \ « N \ ' \ — \ » • \ v \ \ Q . N V \ •- \ v \ \ v * ^ \ \ - \ ^ ^ \ *•» \ °v *V \ \ N> \ \ \ N \ °N \ V \ X \ X \ "° % x 7\. ** N. O v _ X T ^v ^■^^ f , 1 4 6 TIME,yr 10 KEY & Field upper limit O Field failure rate • Field lower limit a Records failure rate gj n— ■&. FIGURE 6. • Reliability characteristics of electro- mechanical undervoltage relays using field data. 2 3 TIME,yr FIGURE 7. - Reliabil ity characteristics of ground check monitors using field data and maintenance records. TABLE 3. - Ground check monitor (GCM) data Theo- Lab Mainte- reti- test Field nance cal records Failure rate ( A) failures per year. . ND ND 11.6 2 0.75 95-pct confidence interval of A: ND ND 3 0.93 ND ND ND ND ND 3 2.72 3 0.625 ND "MTBF (1/ A) yr. . 3 1.33 ND No data. -Hill and Collins (7, p. 16). z Hill and Collins (_7, p. 17). 'Calculated. u Mean time between failures. Each cable failure resulting in the need insulation failure with a safety hazard for a splice was considered to be a cable involved. A number of field data samples were isolated from the above data, in terms of the time interval in shifts, starting from a new or rebuilt cable until it was replaced. Table 5 shows the replacement rate for shuttle cars and continuous miners. Comparing the mean time between replacement of 96.6 shifts for trailing cable on a shuttle car with the mean time between splice of 3.01 shifts reveals that over 30 splices are commonly made before a cable is replaced in the partic- ular mine under study. A large number of ac and dc motors are used on underground machines. The motors suffer frequent failures (electrical or mechanical) with resultant safety hazards and downtime. The failure rate in table 6 represents all motors used in the mine, irrespective of size, location, and ap- plication. Different application of mo- tors in the mine are expected to generate different failure rates. Failure rates of control circuitry used for continuous miners and shuttle cars are shown in table 7. The control cir- cuitry includes the various contactors, motor starters, switches, and the general wiring on individual machines. Consider- ing the complexity of the control cir- cuitry and available data, it was not possible to estimate individual failure rates of the various components of the control circuit. TABLE 4. - Splicing rates of trailing cables on mine machines TABLE 5. - Replacement rates of trailing cables on mine machines Splice rate ( A) splice per shift. . 95-pct confidence in- terval of A: Lower Upper 4 MTBS (1/ A).... shifts.. Shuttle car !0.332 L 0.292 3 3.01 Contin- uous miner 2 0.072 3 0.0504 3 0.1022 3 13.9 1 Venkata (_5, p. 102). 2 Venkata (_5, p. 106). Calculated. ^Mean time between splices Replacement rate ( A) replacements per shift. . 95-pct confidence in- terval of A: Lower Upper *MTBR (1/A) shifts.. Shuttle Contin- car uous miner 0.01035 0.00714 0.005 0.0023 0.0176 0.0146 96.6 140.1 Mean time between replacement. Source: Venkata (5, p. 107). TABLE 6. - Motor data 1 Failure rate ( A) failures per shift. . 2 95-pct confidence in- terval of A: Lower Upper 3 MTBF (1/A) shifts.. ac motor 0.056 0.00381 0.02436 2 17.86 dc motor 0.0379 0.0234 0.06064 2 26.39 1 Venkata (_5, p. HO). 2 Calculated. 3 Mean time between failures. TABLE 7. - Control circuitry data Shuttle Contin- car uous miner Failure rate ( A) failures per shift. . 1 0.022 2 0.32 3 95-pct confidence in- terval of A: 0.01815 0.0561 0.0176 0.0545 l+ MTBF (1/A) shifts.. 3 45.5 3 31.3 Venkata (_5, p. 110). 2 Venkata (_5, p. 111). Calculated. 4 Mean time between failures. No failure data are available for such equipment as transformers, cable cou- plers, contactors, and other items us- ually found in the mine power system. However, some failure rate data are available from IEEE (_9, pp. 17-41) and UKAEA ( 10 , p. 72) , and suitable weighting or multiplication factors could be appl- ied to certain mine operating and envi- ronmental conditions (_5, pp. 111-114). Table 8 lists the failure rates, convert- ed to a common unit — failures per unit- year — for many electrical components and gives comparative data from IEEE and UKAEA, where such data exist. Although several components can be compared using these data, no strong conclusion can be made concerning any general multiplica- tion factors that would be applicable to the mine environment, largely because of the unavailability of comparable data for many of the components. The conversion processes for presenting research data in failures per unit-year are shown in ap- pendix B. APPLICATION OF RELIABILITY DATA Preventive maintenance traditionally means performing various tasks, on a pe- riodic basis, to extend the life of a component. An example is the periodic lubrication of motor bearings. However, a more general definition is the process of prolonging the useful life for a com- ponent, and when failure is imminent, re- placing the component with minimum down time and personal hazard. Problems and concerns of implementing a preventive maintenance program could be discussed at great length. Preventive maintenance is the key to improved pro- ductivity and safety in mines (2_, p. 488). While the mining systems pose unique problems, these difficulties are no more severe than those of other industries. Research (_5, pp. 10-42) determines optimal maintenance schedules for certain mine power equipment. The information used to obtain the results is based upon failure rate from field data and es- timation from other sources, discussions with mine operators, and engineering judgment. The preventive maintenance intervals for various mining electrical equipment are shown in table 9. These intervals seek to maintain a 95-pct level of reliability. TABLE 8. - Failure rate data source comparison Failure rate, failures per unit-year Research UKAEA IEEE Molded-case circuit breaker. . Undervoltage relay (UVR) Ground check monitor (GCM)... Ground fault relay Cable splicing: Shuttle car Continuous miner Cable replacement: Shuttle car Continuous miner ac motors dc motors Machine control circuitry: Shuttle car Continuous miner ND No data. 0.0086 .0093 .1143 None 35.174 12.708 1.096 1.513 1.059 .5918 5.825 5.648 0.0175 .0438 ND ND ND ND ND ND .0876 .0876 ND ND 0.0052 ND ND ND ND ND ND ND .0109 .0556 ND ND 10 Research ( 11 , pp. 106-156) developed reliability models for the electric power systems of surface and underground mines capable of predicting the probability of electrical shock hazards existing on dis- tribution systems in the mines. Relia- bility data are used to predict hazard rates through fault-tree analysis. Predictions of mine electrical accident probabilities using reliability modeling techniques have produced several impor- tant results. Table 10 summarizes the results for the various mining operations analyzed. The most sensitive components are defined as the components which, if reliability is increased, will provide better protection against electrical shock hazards. TABLE 9. - Maintenance intervals 1 for mining electrical equipment, months Cables: Shuttle car , 2.5 Continuous miner ^ c Roof bolter 5^0 Couplers: Low-voltage 36.0 Molded-case circuit breaker 7.0 Motors: ac motors 12.5 dc motors 21.5 iThe following equipment is subject to emergency repairs only: Ground check monitors Ground fault relays High-voltage couplers Power center transformers CONCLUSIONS The mine electrical reliability re- search program evaluated molded-case cir- cuit breakers, undervoltage relays, ground-check monitors, cables, motors, and control circuitry. Failure rates were estimated from theoretical, labora- tory, and field studies. Results showed that to maintain 95-pct reliability, many components would have to be removed from continuous service within 2 months to 1.5 yr. Failure rate data were used to cal- culate optimal maintenance scheduling on various mining equipment. For example, the optimal maintenance interval is 7 months for circuit breakers and 12.5 months for ac motors; whereas ground- TABLE 10. - Probability of hazardous voltages of mining operations Operation Probability of hazardous voltage, hazards per year Most sensitive component Underground coal mine: 0.0047 .1871 .01403 .005946 .00003 .00153 .00409 .00003 .02897 Ground diode. Underground M/NM mine: 480-V system Safety ground system. Open or short grounding resistor. Cable insulation and leakage detector. Open ground wire. Ground check monitor and grounding resistor. Ground wire. 300-V system 120-V system Dredging: 2, 300-V system 120-V system Open ground wire. Grounding resistor and overhead ground wire. Open pit M/NM mine: Distribution system.... M/NM Metal-nomental. Source: Hill and Collins (11, pp. 123-147). 11 fault relays require emergency repair only. Prediction of mine electrical ac- cident probabilities using reliability modeling techniques has produced several important results to improve mine dis- tribution systems for various mining op- erations. The most sensitive components to probability of hazardous voltage for underground coal mine operations are the ground diodes for shuttle cars and the safety ground systems for continuous miners. The need for complete, accurate, and appropriate failure rates for mine compo- nents is of the utmost importance. Sev- eral of the failure rates used for appli- cation purposes are extrapolations of failure rates for similar devices from other sources. The failure rates for the same devices in a less hostile environ- ment than a mine are also suspect. These facts point out the importance of com- plete data from field tests and mainte- nance records. Complete data on failure rates of mine electrical equipment should include components installed in an oper- ating coal mine power system. These com- ponents include ground-check monitors, ground-fault relays, molded-case circuit breakers, electromechanical and solid state undervoltage relays, ac and dc motors, control circuitry, cables, cable couplers, and transformers. A suggested field data collection tech- nique could include the following: 1. Select several underground coal mine sites to represent the worst mine environment. Experience from previous in-mine tests shows that working sections are phased out periodically; therefore, several mines would be needed to provide, on a continuous basis, an adequate compo- nent sample size for failure rate data analysis. 2. All electrical components identi- fied for evaluation would be tagged with unique identification stickers. 3. Maintenance records would be main- tained for each tagged component. 4. Postcards would be provided to the mine personnel for notification of in- stallation and failure dates for each component. 5. As tagged components fail they would be removed from service by the mine personnel and returned for laboratory analysis to determine failure modes and possible failure mechanism. For larger components, e.g., cables, motors, and transformers, mine personnel would pro- vide their best judgment on the cause of component failure. Failure data collection and failure rate estimation has only begun to help achieve mine power system reliability. After complete data on failure rates are assembled, the overall system reliabil- ity, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) models could h~ developed and quantitative results can be obtain- ed. Suitable component replacement, preventive maintenance, and optimum maintenance-crew deployments can be achieved to maximize both safety and pro- ductivity of the mine. Long-range findings of the RAMS studies of existing systems and equipment can be used in the design of future systems and equipment, particularly because large- scale automated or semi automated systems of mining are evolving for use in the near future. Therefore, a high degree of RAMS is an essential attribute of these systems to justify the cost and complex- ity of such automation. The system must always be designed to be fail-safe, yet cost-effective. These aspects cannot be overemphasized, as already proven by re- cent advances in space and other sophis- ticated technologies. Coal mining, though it looks like a mundane applicat- ion, is an equally challenging task. REFERENCES 1. Syska and Hennessy, Inc. Engineer- ing Management Series. V. 6. Applied Preventive Maintenance. Eng. Manage. Div. , New York, 1981, 49 pp. 2. Morely, L. A. Mine Power Systems. Volume II (contract J0155009, PA St. Univ.). BuMines OFR 178(2)-82, 1980, 532 pp.; NTIS PB 83-120386. 12 3. Heising, C. R. Quantitative Rela- tionships Between Scheduled Electrical Preventive Maintenance and Failure Rate of Electrical Equipment. IEEE Trans. Ind. Appl. , May/June 1982, 220 pp. 4. Reliability Analysis Center (RADC Griff is Air Force Base, New York). Reli- ability Design Handbook. Cat. No. RDH- 376, Mar. 1976, 342 pp. 5. Venkata, S. S., M. Chinnarao, E. W. Collins, and E. U. Ibok. Transients Pro- tection, Reliability Investigation, and Safety Testing of Mine Electrical Power Systems. Volume II. Reliability of Mine Electrical Power Systems (grant G0144137, WV Univ.). BuMines OFR 52-78, 1979, 197 pp.; NTIS PB 81-166779. 6. Stanek, E. K. Digital Computation of Transients and Safety Testing of Mine Electrical Power Systems (grant G0144137, WV Univ.). BuMines OFR 52-78, 1977, 200 pp. NTIS PB 283400/AS. 7. Hill, H. W. , and E. W. Collins. Mine Power System Safety and Reliability Improvement. Volume II (contract J0199119, WV Univ.). BuMines OFR 183-84. 1983. 19 pp.; NTIS PB 85-109288. 8. Collins, E. W. Reliability Analy- sis, Maintenance Scheduling of Solid State Undervoltage Relay. M.S. Thesis, WV Univ., Morgantown, WV, 1980, 123 pp. 9. Institute of Electrical and Elec- tronics Engineers. IEEE Recommended Practice for Design of Reliable Indus- trial and Commercial Power Systems. IEEE Standard 493-1980. Wiley, 1980, 224 pp. 10. Green, A. E. , and A. J. Brourne. Reliability Technology. Wiley, 1972, 233 pp. 11. Hill, H. W. , and Mine Power System Safety Improvement. Volume E. W. Collins. and Reliability I (contract J0199119, WV Univ.). BuMines OFR 46-85, 1981, 186 pp. 12. Stanek, E. K. Enhancement of Mine Power System Safety and Reliability (grant G0188097, WV Univ.). BuMines OFR 116-80, 1979 207 pp.; NTIS PB 81-125361. 13 APPENDIX A.— FIELD DATA COLLECTION TECHNIQUE AND COMPONENTS* SAMPLE SIZE A. Data collection technique for the molded-case circuit breakers with UVR's, GFR's, and GCM's: One underground coal mine agreed to cooperate with a Bureau contractor in providing an operation mine site for field testing. The components identified were tagged with unique identification stickers. Postcards were provided to the mine personnel for notification to contractor of installation and failure dates for each component. As tagged compo- nents failed, they were removed from service by the mine personnel. No GFR units failed. Components involved in field testing were phased into operational service on a new section power center from May 1981 to September 1983. B. Collection technique for trailing cables, motors, and control circuitry: One underground coal mine agreed to provide the Bureau contractor with maintenance foremen's reports for a 1-yr period. The data available over the year contained the dates and shifts during which trailing cables, motors, or control cir- cuitry were repaired or replaced. C. Table A-l lists components' sample sizes. TABLE A-l. - Components' sample size Molded-case circuit breaker 14 Undervoltage relay (UVR) 14 Ground check monitor GCM) 14 Ground fault relay (GFR) 14 Cable splicing: Shuttle car 10 Continuous miner 6 Cable replacement: Shuttle car 10 Continuous miner 5 ac motors 56 dc motors 68 Machine control circuitry: Shuttle car 6 Continuous miner 4 14 APPENDIX B.— FIELD DATA CONVERSION TO FAILURES PER UNIT-YEAR To obtain failures determine the numbe year, then divide by For some components, year proceeded duri the total shifts (1 in this case, it is the number of shifts number of shifts pe fraction of a year o to divide this numbe failures to obtain f per unit-year, first rs of failures per the number of units. operation during the ng only a portion of ,059) during a year; necessary to divide in operation by the r year to obtain the f operation, and then r into the number of ailures per year. Molded-case circuit breakers: Failures per year.. 0.12 Units v 14 Failures per unit-year 0.0086 Undervoltage relays (UVR's): Failures per year 0.13 Units t 14 Failures per unit-year 0.0093 Ground fault monitors (GFM's): Failures per year 1.6 Units t 14 Failures per unit-year 0.1143 Cable splicing — Shuttle cars: Failures 93 Fraction of year in operation = (280 shifts v 1,059 shifts per year) v 0.2644 Failures per year 351.74 Units t 10 Failures per unit-year.. 35.174 Cable splicing — Continuous miners: Failures 36 Fraction of year in operation = (500 shifts v 1,059 shifts per year) ^ 0.4721 Failures per year 76.255 Units v 6 Failures per unit-year.. 12.708 Cable replacement — Shuttle cars: Failures 10 Fraction of year in operation = (966 shifts f 1,059 shifts per year) -s- 0.9122 Failures per year 10.963 Units v 10 Failures per unit-year.... 1.096 *U.S. CPO: 1985-505-019/20,110 Cable replacement — Continuous miners: Failures 5 Fraction of year in operation = (700 shifts x 1,059 shifts per year) i 0.6610 Failures per year 7.564 Units v 5 Failures per unit-year.. 1.513 ac motors: Failures 28 Fraction of year in operation = (500 shifts v 1,059 shifts per year) -5- 0.4721 Failures per year 59.309 Units 7 56 Failures per unit-year.. 1.059 dc motors: Failures 19 Fraction of year in operation = (500 shifts t 1,059 shifts per year) v 0.4721 Failures per year 40.246 Units v 68 Failures per unit-year.. 0.5918 Control circuitry — Shuttle cars: Failures 16 Fraction of year in operation = (500 shifts t 1,059 shifts per year) v 0.4721 Failures per year 33.891 Uni t s -i- 6 Failures per unit-year.. 5.648 Control circuitry — Continuous miners: Failures 11 Fraction of year in operation = (500 shifts t 1,059 shifts per year) -r 0.4721 Failures per year 23.300 Units -5- 4 Failures per unit-year.. 5.825 INT.-BU.O F MINES, PGH..P A. 28112 U.S. Department of the Interior Bureau of Mines— Prod, and Distr. 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