Class U4_ Ia_: 
 
 Book M 
 
 Cof^{ 
 
 COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 
 
LmCOLN AND SE¥ARD 
 
 REMARKS UPON THE MEMORIAL ADDRESS OF CHA8. 
 
 FRANCIS ADAMS, ON THE LATE WM. H. 
 
 SEWARD, 
 
 TXCIDENTS AND COMMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE 
 MEASURES AND POLICY OP THE ADMINISTRA- 
 TION OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN. 
 AND VIEWS AS TO THE RELATIVE POSITIONS OF THE 
 LATE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY 
 OF ST A TE. 
 
 BY 
 
 GIDEON WELLES, 
 
 '.I 
 
 Ex- Secretary of the Navy. 
 
 J. 
 
 fi 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 
 Sheldon & Company. 
 
 1874. 
 
4i'4 
 
 Entered accordiug to Act of Congress in the year 1874, by 
 
 SHELDON & COIVIPANY, 
 in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington. 
 
 NKvv'BURiai Stereotype Co. 
 
F R E F A. O E . 
 
 TX submitting the following pages, it is proper that 
 A- the circumstances which led to, and attended their 
 preparation, should go out with them. The " Memorial 
 Address on the life, character and services of William 
 H. Seward," which Mr. Ad^ms delivered at Albany in 
 April 1873, by invitation of the legislature of the State 
 of New York, attracted general attention, and is a 
 document which, if permitted to pass uncorrected, would 
 be likely to contribute to, and strengthen false history. 
 For a third of a century, Mr. Seward occupied prominent 
 positions in his native state, and no inconsiderable space 
 in the service of his country. It was appropriate that 
 the state which had honored him with its confidence 
 while living, should commemorate his death by an 
 official observance such as the legislature ordered, and 
 Mr. Adams was invited to fulfil. From a variety of 
 considerations, the selection of the orator s4med proper ; 
 for there was much in his association with the deceased 
 to commend it, and it opened a field of historic interest 
 worthy of his pen. The extreme of panegyric, if the 
 eulogist chose to indulge the partiality of friendship in 
 that direction, was allowable and probably expected ; 
 but it was not anticipated that the occasion would be 
 used to elevate the reputation of the deceased statesman 
 at the expense of others, and certainly not by deprecia- 
 
IV PREFACE. 
 
 tins: or underrating^ the abilities of the President under 
 whom lie served. The opportunity might have been 
 improved to say a word in vindication of an administra- 
 tion which he had represented abroad, and of which Mr. 
 Seward was a conspicuous member, for it had in the 
 embittered contests of the period been greatly maligned, 
 misrepresented, and misunderstood. No small disap- 
 pointment was experienced to find the Address pregnant 
 with error, and in some respects an indorsement of 
 aspersions derogatory to President Lincoln and his 
 capacity for the place he had filled, by representing that 
 the merits and success of his administration were due, 
 not to him, but to the superior intellectual power of the 
 Secretary of State. 
 
 My first impression on reading the Address was, that 
 the surviving members of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet should 
 unite in a general statement correcting the misrepresen- 
 tations semi-officially put forth at Albany. Such a 
 statement from them, brief and decisive, without details, 
 would probably have been sufticient to counteract the 
 misrepresentations and erroneous assertions of Mr. 
 Adams, as to the relative merits, executive ability and 
 individual services of the President and Secretary of 
 State during Mr. Lincoln's administration. Some cor- 
 respondence in regard to such a proceeding took place 
 between Me^rs. Chase, Blair, and myself, which was 
 interrupted by the sudden death of the Chief Justice 
 within less than one month after the Address was 
 delivered. This event rendered it advisable that some- 
 thing more should be done than a mere contradictory 
 assertion, or naked statement that Mr. Adams was 
 mistaken in " his estimate of the two men and their 
 relative positions to each other, and to their associates 
 
PREFACE. V 
 
 in the administration, as well as to the whole conduct 
 cf the affairs of the government. 
 
 Of the eight persons who constituted the Executive 
 Council, and administered the government during the 
 dark days of our country's December, four, besides the 
 two eminent characters adverted to in the Memorial Ad- 
 dress, had closed their earthly pilgrimage. Only two mem- 
 bers of the Cabinet who first met around that council- 
 board, and conferred together through most of the years 
 of President Lincoln's Administration, survived to speak 
 from jtersonal knowledge of the acts, qualifications and 
 services of their chief, and those with whom they had 
 been associated in that trying period. 
 
 By special request of Mr. Blair, the duty of stating 
 the facts and vindicating Mr. Lincoln anxThis adminis- 
 tration from the errors or inadvertencies of Mr. Adams 
 devolved on me. To discharge that duty with fidelity 
 was a delicate and embarrassing task, lest in developing 
 the facts in regard to the conduct and measures of the 
 administration, and repelling the remarks derogatory to 
 President Lincoln, it might seem that injustice was done 
 to Secretary' Seward, to whom credit as a superior to 
 the President in native intellectual power, and in the 
 force of moral discipline^ and as directing affairs in the 
 President's name, had been awarded. But while main- 
 taining for Mr. Lincoln greater executive ability, I 
 would withhold no just fame from Mr. Seward, whose 
 versatile and prolific mind, if less persistent and reliable, 
 less capable of establishing and enforcing a policy, less 
 capable of grasping great questions and successfully 
 wielding the highest functions of government, was 
 nevertheless in his position, active, industrious and use- 
 ful. If disclosures of the truth dispel prevailing error, 
 
Vi PREFACE. 
 
 let it not be supposed that wrong is thereby done to a 
 colleague for whom I had great personal regard. 
 
 Undoubtedly both Mr. Adams and Mr. Seward 
 believed in 1860, that Mr. Lincoln possessed neither the 
 abilities nor qualifications to perform the duties of 
 Chief Magistrate, and that he would consequently be 
 governed by some leading member of his Cabinet. It 
 was assumed by them, and indeed by others, that the 
 Secretary of State would be that leading member and 
 President, de facto. Mr. Seward after a brief experience, 
 learned his mistake. Mr. Adams never did— nor^does 
 it appear that Mr. Seward, in their intimate personal 
 and official correspondence undeceived or enlightened 
 the Minister during his absence from the country, 
 covering the entire presidency of Mr. Lincoln. Besides, 
 a class of partisans in all that time busied themselves in 
 affirming and inculcating the false impression that Mr. 
 Seward was the actual Executive. John Wilkes Booth, 
 like Mr. Adams was deceived by it, and hence in his 
 scheme to overturn and destroy the government, he 
 deemed it essential to make Mr. Seward, as well as the 
 President a victim. The murderous attempt of a crazy 
 fanatic, gave strength to the delusion which partisans 
 had promulgated. Sympathy for the survivor of that 
 terrible catastrophe, who, wounded and mangled, escaped 
 the knife of the assassin, seemed to identify him more 
 closely with his chief who had been slain, and, tempo- 
 rarily at least, added to the delusion which finds en- 
 dorsement and is embodied in the Memorial Address. 
 
 In the following pages I have confined my remarks 
 as far as possible, to the acts, views and transactions of 
 the President and Secretary of State and measures of 
 administration during the presidency of Mr. Lincoln. 
 Allusions to other periods, or to the private life or 
 
PEEFACE. Vll 
 
 peculiar characteristics of either, except as preliminary 
 or essential to a correct nnderstanding of their official 
 career, and political principles have been avoided. In 
 stating the views and policy of Mr, Lincoln, it has been 
 no part of ray purpose to discuss the labors or services 
 of Mr. Seward, other than those which relate to the 
 administration of which he was a member, not the chief. 
 Whatever estimate may be put upon his abilities — 
 whatever resemblance there may have been between. 
 him and the renowned men of antiquity, or the distin- 
 guished statesmen of our own country of a past genera- 
 tion, or whatever may have been his experience in 
 other years, and in different fields of public, professional, 
 or social life, are proper matters of eulogy, but foreign to 
 the purpose of these remarks. 
 
 Incidents and measures which occurred, better than 
 statements or assertions, will disabuse the public mind 
 and more truly than mere declarations develop the 
 characteristics of the men and the workings of the 
 administration. I have therefore selected certain cases 
 on different topics, which denote the ideas, executive 
 ability and principles of government of the President 
 and Secretary of State on questions of public policy. 
 They also indicate the actual relation in w^hich they 
 stood to each other, and their associates in the Cabinet. 
 The cases mentioned relate to by-gone measures which 
 have been adjusted or disposed of, and are parts of the 
 recorded, though to some extent, unpublished history 
 of the country and times. 
 
 The remarks on the Address as originally prepared 
 were too voluminous for a Magazine. I therefore con- 
 densed and reduced them to three papers which ap- 
 peared in the Galaxy for October, November and 
 December 1873. The reception of those papers by the 
 
Vm PREFACE. 
 
 public, led the publishers and others to request that the 
 numbers which had appeared, and the whole of the 
 omitted portions with attending details and such 
 additions as I thought proper, might be embodied in a 
 volume, whii3h is herewith submitted. 
 
 G. W. 
 
Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward. 
 
 TT is to be regretted that Mr. Charles Francis 
 Adams, in his "Memorial Address on the Life, 
 Character, and Services of William H. Seward," 
 should have permitted himself to do injustice to Abra- 
 ham Lincoln. Any attempt to canonize Mr. Seward 
 by detracting from the merits of his chief weakens 
 the encomiums bestowed. Mr. Adams has claims to 
 consideration by reason of his talents, acquirements, 
 social position, and public service ; but his estimate 
 of the character, capacity, executive ability, and rela- 
 tive position of the Chief Magistrate and his Secretary 
 of State betrays a want of just discrimination and cor- 
 rect knowledge of each. A greater error could scarce- 
 ly be committed than to represent that Mr. Lincoln 
 "had to deal with a superior intelectual power" when 
 he came in contact with Mr. Seward. The reverse 
 ■was the fact. In mere scholastic acquirements " Mr. 
 Seward, never a learned man," may have had the ad- 
 vantage, though in this respect there was less differ- 
 ence than is generally supposed ; while " in breadth 
 of philosophical experience and in the force of moral 
 discipline" the almost self-tanght and reflective mind 
 
8 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 of Mr. Lincoln, which surmounted difficulties and dis- 
 advantages that his Secretary never knew, conspicuous- 
 ly excelled. In the executive council and in measures 
 of administration the Secretary had influence, not 
 always happily exercised ; but the President's was the 
 master mind. It is empty panegyric to speak of the 
 Secretary of State as chief, or to say his suggestions, 
 save in his own department, were more regarded or 
 had even greater influence than those of others. His 
 restless activity, unceasing labors, showy manifesta- 
 tions, and sometimes incautious exercise of ques- 
 tionable authority which the President deemed it 
 impolitic to disavow, led to the impression, which Mr. 
 Adams seems also to have imbibed, that the subordi- 
 nate was the principal, and have induced him, to use 
 his own words, to " award to one honors that cleaily 
 belong to another." 
 
 Far be it from me to derogate in the least from the 
 merits and services of Mr. Seward, for I was a w^itness 
 to his assiduity, and to some extent a participant and 
 coadjutor with him in the labors and trials that the 
 Administration encountered in troublous times. But 
 it was not necessary in stating his merits, even in 
 eulogy, to undervalue and misstate the worth, services, 
 and capabilities of the remarkable man who was at 
 the helm and guided the Government through a 
 stormy period. Unassuming and unpretentious him- 
 self, Mr. Lincoln was the last person to wear borrowed 
 honors. He was not afflicted with the petty jealousy 
 of narrow minds, nor had he any apprehension that 
 others would deprive him of just fame. He gave to 
 Mr. Seward, as to each of his council, his c^enerous 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 9 
 
 confidence, and patiently listened, if he did not always 
 adopt or assent to the suggestions that were made. 
 To those who knew Abraham Lincoln, or who were at 
 all intimate with his Administration, the representation 
 that he was subordinate to any member of his Cabinet, 
 or that he was deficient in executive or administrative 
 ability, is absurd. Made on a solemn occasion as was 
 this address, and published and sent out to the world in 
 a document which purports to be not only eulogistic but 
 historic, it is essential that the errors thus spread abroad 
 should be corrected. Mr. Adams had not an intimate 
 acquaintance with Mr. Lincoln, and evidently but a 
 slight general knowledge of his character. With ad- 
 mitted great disappointment and disgust, he, in May 
 1861, received the intelligence that this lawyer, legis- 
 lator, and political student of the praries, whom he did 
 not know and with whom he had not associated, had 
 been preferred by the Kepublican representatives at 
 Chicago over a Senator from the Empire State with 
 whom he was intimate and familiar, who had long 
 official experience, which he seems to have considered 
 essential, was acquainted with legislative management, 
 and whose political and party sympathies accorded 
 with his own. His prejudices as well as his partiality 
 were excited, and from the beginning he misconceived 
 the character and undervalued and underrated the ca- 
 pabilities and qualities of one of the most sagacious and 
 remarkable men of the age. 
 
 In his statements of the political career of Mr. 
 Seward, and of the structure and condition of parties 
 from the days of the Monroe administration, one is 
 compelled to believe the eulogist has, as he expresses 
 
10 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 
 
 it, plunged in "the Serbonian bog of obsolete party 
 f>olitics." Yet politics and parties are an essential part 
 of the history of the country, its men and the times, and 
 the author himself has made politics the study of his life. 
 Mr. Seward was also emphatically a party politician. 
 He had a fondness for political studies and employment, 
 and was at all times active and faithful in the service 
 of each of the several political parties to which he be- 
 longed. Whether " the chief characteristic of his mind 
 was its breadth of view " may be questioned by some 
 who look to his general course and form their opinion 
 of his *' characteristics " from it and his acts. If not, 
 as % asserted, a " philosopher studying politics," he 
 was kind and affable, of a genial temperament, calm and 
 subdued under reverses, and to his credit never mani- 
 fested the malevolence and acerbity which too often char- 
 acterize intense political partisans. Among his party as- 
 sociates he always occupied a decidedly prominent place, 
 by reason of his sociability and urbanity as well as of 
 his ability. He was quick of apprehension, prolific in 
 suggestions and expedients, and endowed, if not with 
 eloquence or a commanding presence, with a readiness 
 and facility of expression in speech or writing ^which 
 enabled him in consultations, and when associated with 
 others, to carry personal influence equal to any, and 
 much greater than most of his contemporaries. He 
 had not, however, an executive mind which could of 
 itself magnetize and subordinate others, or the mental 
 strength to take the helm and steadily guide and direct 
 the policy of the government or of a party. Henry 
 Clay once said, ^' Mr. Seward is a man of no convic- 
 tions." This may not have been strictly true, yet he 
 
MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 11 
 
 was not a man of fixed principles, whose convictions 
 wonld not yield to circumstances or be modified by ex- 
 pedients, some of which might be scarcely worthy of 
 consideration. He could be as tenacious as any in ad- 
 hering to a measure or policy so long as his associates, 
 or those friends in whom he trusted, maintained the 
 position ; but alone, he had not the will, self-reliance, 
 and obstinancy to plant himself on the rock of princi- 
 ple, meet the storm, and abide the consequences. 
 
 Mr. Seward was a politician — a partisan politician 
 of the central school — witli talents more versatile than 
 profound ; was more of a conservative than a reformer, 
 with no great original conceptions of right, nor sys- 
 tematic ideas of administration. So far as his party 
 adopted a reforming policy he went with it, and he 
 was with it also in opposing actual reforms by the 
 Democrats. The representation that he was a veteran 
 reformer, or the leader of the anti-slavery movement 
 or of the Republican party, is a mistake. He was 
 neither an Abolitionist nor a Free-soiler, nor did he 
 unite with the Republicans until the AYhig party 
 virtually ceased to exist in most of the states, and was 
 himself one of the last to give up that party, of which 
 he had been from its commencement and in all its 
 phases an active member. It was w^ith reluctance he 
 finally yielded, when the feeble remnant of that organi- 
 zation disbanded. The Republican party, with which 
 he then became associated, was not of mushroom 
 growth. It was years maturing. Mr. Seward, whose 
 friends claim for him its paternity, was a Whig at its 
 inception. He neither rocked its cradle nor identified 
 himself with its youth, but gave it cheering words, as 
 
12 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 he had other ephemeral organizations, in order to 
 weaken the Democrats and help the Whigs. Faithful 
 to party, he adhered to the Whigs nnder all circum- 
 stances. It was his marked public characteristic. 
 Not until the Whig party was prostrate — a skeleton 
 without strength or vitality — did he yield and embark 
 liis political fortunes in the great U23rising. In the 
 destruction of the political scaifolding which he and 
 his friends had constructed, perished the hopes and 
 labors of 3^ears. To relinquish the machinery and 
 organization which by lobby management under a 
 skilful leader had become powerful and controlling in 
 the Empire State of the Union, was a sacrifice not 
 willingly made, and when made it was not in the anti- 
 slavery interest, but with a covert design to perpetu- 
 ate the Albany dynasty under the name of Republican. 
 The Albany lobby was never an abolitionist lobby or 
 an anti-slavery lobby, nor was the organization or its 
 candidate. Any attempt to represent him, or those 
 associated with him, as occupj^ing a more advanced 
 position on the anti-slavery question than those who 
 were of the '* Jefferson school," is rather eulogy than 
 fact. In the presidential contest of 1848, when the 
 domination of previously existing parties was broken, 
 and a stand was made against the expansion of slavery 
 and its extension into the territories from which it had 
 been excluded, Mr. Seward delined to connect himself 
 w^ith the Free-soil or Anti-slavery cause, but clung to 
 the Whig party which opposed the movement, and 
 voted for a candidate who was a slave-owner in prefer- 
 ence to a statesman and citizen of his own State who 
 was not* 
 
MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 13 
 
 According to Mr. Adams, " the origin of the divis- 
 ion of parties which prevailed for more than thirty 
 years," began about the close of the first quarter of 
 the present century, soon after the adoption of the 
 Missouri compromise, consequently in the opening 
 years of Mr. Seward's manhood and political life. 
 " At the outset of Mr. Seward's career," says the ad- 
 dress, " the first thing necessary for him to do was 
 to choose his side. Under his father's roof the in- 
 fluences naturally carried him to sympathize with the 
 old Jeifersonian party on the one hand, while the 
 relics of the slave system remaining in the family as 
 house-servants, the least repulsive form of that rela- 
 tion seemed little likely to inspire in him much aver- 
 sion to it on the other. Nevertheless he early formed 
 his conclusions adversely to the organization in Xew 
 York professing to be the successors of the Jefl:erso- 
 nian school, aaid not less so to the perpetuation of 
 slavery any where. The reason for this is obvious. 
 With his keen perception of the operation of genei-al 
 principles he penetrated at once the fact that the resur- 
 rection in this form of the old party was not only hol- 
 low but selfish. It looked to him somewhat like a close 
 corporation made for the purpose of dealing in popular 
 doctrines, not so much for the public benefit as for 
 that of the individual directors. Moreover it became 
 clear that among those doctrines, that of freedom to 
 the slave w^as rigorously excluded by reason of tlie bond 
 of union entered into with his master at the south. 
 In reality, he was in principle too democratic for the 
 democrats. Hence he waged incessant war against 
 
14 ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWAKD. 
 
 this form of oligarchy down to the hour when it was 
 finally broken up." 
 
 In addition to this fact or fancy sketch, Mr. Adams 
 says that in a Fourth of July oration delivered by Mr. 
 Seward at Auburn when he was twenty-four years old, 
 he made "the delibei^ate claim of a right in the Fed- 
 eral government to emancipate slaves hy legislation^'' 
 and that " in his conclusions he proved a prophet." 
 Jefferson, though sincerely opposed to slavery, was not 
 of the prophets or politicians who made claim to any 
 such right in the Federal government. Had he made 
 such claims, or believed that there was any such author- 
 ity or principle in the government, his love of freedom 
 was so great, and his principles and convictions so 
 abiding he would never have advised its relinquish- 
 ment, or consented that the government and people 
 should be forever bound by a fundamental law incor- 
 porated into the constitution and made unrepealable 
 prohibiting legislation through all time whatever, in 
 the progress of human affairs might be the opinions and 
 wishes of the people. But Mr. Seward who we are 
 told " wao^ed incessant war ao:ainst this form of olio:ar- 
 chy down to the hour w^hen it was finally broken up," 
 was ready when sixty years old to manacle Congress 
 and, so far as the Federal government was concerned, 
 to consign the slaves to perpetual bondage. In his 
 carefully elaborated and celebrated speech delivered on 
 the twelfth of January 1S61, he said: "I am willing 
 to vote for an amendment to the constitution declar- 
 ing that it shall not, by any future amendment, be so 
 altered as to confer on Congress a power to abolish 
 or interfere with slavery in any state." It is for the 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWAED. 15 
 
 author of the Memorial Address who speaks of inces- 
 sant war against the slave-oligarchy down to the hour 
 when it was finally broken up, to reconcile the claim 
 put forth by Mr. Seward when twenty -four years old, 
 that the Federal government had a right to emancipate 
 by legislation, with his willingness after forty years 
 experience and study of the government, to surrender 
 any such claim or right forever. 
 
 The disposition of the financial and tariff" questions 
 which for years divided parties under renowned lead- 
 ers, and the Mexican war with its results during the 
 Polk administration, affected the political status of 
 individuals and also the organization of parties. Clay, 
 Calhoun, and Webster, the intellectual and imperious 
 triumvirate who combined against Jackson fifteen 
 years before, were each infirm from increasing years, 
 and on the descending grade of life and influence. In 
 1849 they retained, individually, but a feeble hold on 
 their followers. Yan Buren and Benton were no 
 longer formidable. With the departure of old ques- 
 tions, the old contestants were passing away. It was 
 just at this period, when old political parties were in 
 a fragmentary and transition state, that Mr. Seward 
 first entered the national councils as a Senator from 
 the ffreat State of New York. ITo time could have 
 been more propitious or circumstances more favorable 
 for a genuine reformer — a statesman of mental grasp 
 and real executive talent, sincere in his convictions and 
 wedded to principle, with the advantage of high 
 position, to have gathered up, concentrated and organ- 
 ized the disturbed political elements which were dis- 
 satisfied with government abuses and central aggres- 
 
16 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 eive power in behalf of an institution which was toler- 
 ated bnt disliked, and its extension and aggressions 
 resisted. This was an opportunity for a statesman, in 
 place if possessed of the indispensable executive ability, 
 to have made himself the leader of a great movement. 
 But Mr. Seward did not prove himself equal to the posi- 
 tion. He was still a Whig and failed to raise the stand- 
 ard and rally the host. In opposing the assumptions 
 of a civil aggression, he was one with others, not their 
 superior nor their chief. Though quick of apprehen- 
 sion and not insensible to the new aspect of affairs and 
 the change that was taking place, he had neither the 
 resolution nor the inclination to abandon his party, 
 " break up the remnants of party ties," and place him- 
 self at the head of a popular demonstration for immor- 
 tal prhiciples. He had been, a life-long party follower 
 — had trod the paths and ruts of party obediently and 
 faithfully, and been so trained and disciplined, so 
 accustomed to look up to others to decide and lead, 
 that no will or independence was left him at fifty to 
 take the initiative in a new departure. He had the 
 sagacity to see that new questions were entering into 
 our politics and old ones were becoming obsolete, but 
 possessed not the courage to abandon the old, nor the 
 organizing and executive talent to become the chief in 
 a new movement. Contrary to good instruction and 
 sound principle, he and the Albany managers at- 
 tempted to put this new Republican wine into old 
 Whig bottles, under the delusive idea that the eff'ete 
 and decaying Whig organization could receive and 
 hold tljis fermenting political element without burst- 
 ing. He made able speeches on the rising questions, 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 17 
 
 as did others ; but the Senate produced no command- 
 ing mind, with " clarion voice" and magnetic power, 
 to rally and lead. Mr. Seward had adventitious 
 advantages above others which his associates felt and 
 conceded. He had been Governor of the largest 
 State in the Union, was its representative in Congress, 
 and stood the peer of any of his associates on the floor 
 of the Senate, but only the peer. Neither in Con- 
 gress nor subsequently in the Cabinet did he display 
 the administrative or executive talent that was antici- 
 pated, or which partisan admirers claim for him at 
 the expense of Mr. Lincoln. 
 
 In closino^ his " Memorial Address'' Mr. Adams 
 alludes to the friends of Mr. Seward, and particularly 
 one who survives, '' whose singularly disinterested 
 labor has been to effect the elevation of others to 
 power, and never his own ; and to whose remarkable 
 address I strongly suspect Mr. Seward owed many 
 obligations of that kind." No person in the least con- 
 versant with the two men could have heard or read the 
 address without a conviction, even if no acknowledg- 
 ment had been made, that the spirit of the friend 
 inspired and imbued the orator with the partialities, 
 prejudices, misconceptions, and errors which pervade 
 the address and are manifest on almost every page. 
 
 Mr. Thurlow Weed, who for forty years was the 
 ruling mind of the party with which he was associated 
 in New York, possessed remarkable qualities as a party 
 manager. The character and services of Mr. Seward 
 can never be delineated or understood without mention 
 of this alter ego, who was not only \ihfidios Achates^ 
 but it may without disparagement be said was also, 
 
18 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 with some radical failings, his Mentor. Mr. Weed, a 
 man of strong, rough native intellect, without much 
 early culture, was a few years the senior of Mr. Seward, 
 whose more polished and facile mind adapted itself to 
 the other — clung to it as the ivy to the oak — and the 
 two became inseparable in politics. AVhen Mr. Seward 
 was about to " choose his side,'' Weed was the editor 
 of a paper in western New York, which fomented the 
 wild, fanatical, and proscriptive antimasonic excite- 
 ment that for a brief period swept with uncontrollable 
 and unreasoning fury that section of country. An 
 organized party was formed on the narrow basis of 
 hate, intolerance, and proscription of every man who 
 belonged to the Masonic fraternity, every one of 
 whom was to be excluded from office, from the jury- 
 box and all places of trust. Under this anti-masonic 
 banner, of which Weed was a champion leader, Mr. 
 Seward enlisted and commenced his public official 
 career, was its candidate in that district, and elected 
 by that party to the Senate of New York. Many will 
 believe that he did not manifest great "breadth of 
 view," nor prove himself a profound '^philosopher 
 studying politics," nor display the "capacity to play a 
 noble part on the more spacious theatre of State 
 affairs," when he entered the Senate of New York an 
 anti-masonic partisan under the guidance of Thurlow 
 Weed. But the friendship commenced under those 
 auspices continued unabated to the death of the junior, 
 and evinces itself in the " Memorial Address" which 
 attempts to place Mr. Seward above the President to 
 whom he was subordinate, and " award to him honors 
 that clearly belong to another." 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 19 
 
 Mr. Weed possessed capacity which rightly direct- 
 ed might have been of service to the country and to 
 'mankind. He was not without good qualities when 
 party and personal favorites or opponents were not 
 concerned ; but he was wanting in political morality, 
 and was unscrupulous in his party intrigues — often 
 and without hesitation resorting to schemes to carry a 
 measure in the Legislature, or to secure an election, 
 Avhich scarcely savored of political or moral honesty. 
 
 When the anti-masonic fervor subsided and the 
 organization died out, Messrs. Seward and Weed be- 
 came identified with the opponents of the Jackson ad- 
 ministration and the supporters of ** the American 
 system" — a centralizing policy.. The address repre- 
 sents that " the political unity of the country under its 
 present form oi government naturally divides itself 
 into two periods of nearly equal length.'' One, which 
 commenced with Washington and closed with Monroe, 
 related chiefly to questions of foreign policy. The 
 other was on the subject of slavery. There is no such 
 natural division. The statement is neither politically 
 nor historically correct, but an arbitrary assumption, 
 warranted by neither history nor facts. The slavery 
 question in no form or shape entered into the election 
 or administration of General Jackson or the great 
 parties of that period. Other absorbing subjects, re- 
 lating to the bank, to finance, to the tariff and internal 
 improvements, combined under wliat in the party no- 
 menclature of the day was styled the ^' American sys- 
 tem,'' were the political and party issues for a quarter 
 of a century succeeding the Monroe administration. 
 It was then, '' at the outset of Mr. Seward's career,'* 
 
20 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 when there was no controversy or difference in State 
 or national parties or politics on the subject of slavery 
 that Weed and '' the philosopher studying politics,'' 
 chose their side, opposed Jackson, supported Clay, ad- 
 vocated a national bank, a protective tarijBE, internal 
 improvements by the federal government, and the 
 whole centralizing *' American system.'' There was 
 no identification of either of the great opposing par- 
 ties of that day with slavery or anti-slavery. From 
 1828, when Jackson was elected, to the election of 
 Taylor in 1848, neither party made the subject of sla- 
 very a test question, or part of its political creed. Op- 
 position to General Jackson and his administration, 
 and to the policy initiated under him, to state rights 
 and constitutional limitations, combined the adverse 
 elements and was the ground-work of the Whig party, 
 to which in all its phases Mr. Seward was a devoted 
 adherent. A coalition was formed by the Whigs with 
 the nullifiers, who were slave-holders, and at a later 
 day secessionists, against the patriotic old chieftain 
 who put forth the executive power for the mainte- 
 nance of the federal union. But the tariff, not sla- 
 very, was the pretext for nullification, and opposition to 
 the administration was the apology for a compromise 
 in which both the protectionists and nullifiers surren- 
 dered each their principles. 
 
 Then, and until some time past the meridian of his 
 life — a period of more than twenty years — Mr. Seward 
 was, for reasons doubtless satisfactory to himself, one 
 of the most zealous and active party men in the coun- 
 try. With him every side-issue, every controverted 
 question, every element of discontent against the gov- 
 
MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 21 
 
 ernment, was courted, fanned, favored, and made subser- 
 vient to party. This embraces the period when, accord- 
 ing to the address, Mr. Seward chose his side adversely 
 to the organization of the Jefferson school, was " too 
 democratic for the Democrats," was ** far more practi- 
 cal than anything ever taught by Jefferson." This pe- 
 culiar democracy and anti-masonry constitute what the 
 address describes as " the various phenomena of Mr. 
 Seward's public life," but which his contemporaries 
 understood to be political partnership of a very active 
 and decided character. In New York and throughout 
 the country Mr. Sewai'd was known and recognized as 
 a busy and efficient party man in the Whig organiza- 
 tion, and one of the leaders to whom the party in that 
 state was under obligation for partisan services. His 
 sphere of influence was limited to his state, for beyond 
 its borders the corrupt Albany lobby led and managed 
 by Weed was detested by the Democrats and dis- 
 trusted by the Whigs themselves. Whatever abilities 
 or qualities of mind he possessed — and they were in 
 some respects remarkable — were given earnestly and 
 cheerfully to that party and its centralizing " Ameri- 
 can system " policy. In their party councils in New 
 York, Thurlow Weed became the supreme manager, 
 and guiding, controlling spirit, always declining office. 
 Mr. Seward was the orator or oracle, and received the 
 official honors. When anti-masonry was on the wane, 
 and after Mr. Seward entered the New York Senate, 
 Weed removed to Albany, where he established a 
 paper and exercised with skill and effect his love of 
 intrigue. He soon organized and became chief of a 
 lobby which had an odious notoriety, and which, while 
 
22 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 it gave him a certain influence in ^ew Yojk, was 
 viewed with abhoiTence by man}^, with distrust by the 
 whole country. His management was, however, 
 adroit ; and the lobby under his direction, though 
 often profligate, unscrupulous, and always debauching 
 and corrupting, contributed at times largely to the suc- 
 cess of his party and the promotion of Mr. Seward. 
 The personal influence of Weed was enhanced and made 
 effective by his apparent self-abnegation and uniform 
 and persistent refusal to accept any office himself,- 
 while all around him were seeking office and legisla- 
 tive favors. His labors were not as disinterested as 
 represented ; for if he declined place he loved po^^^r, 
 and it was his pride and ambition to manage the gov^- 
 ernment of 'New York when the Whigs were success- 
 ful and in the ascendant, to say who might hold office, 
 to control measures, and to prescribe the policy and 
 direct the movements of his party — not always perhaps 
 judiciously or honestly in either respect ; but the ad- 
 ministration in that State, its measures and men, were 
 nevertheless his. The mental force, magnetism, sys- 
 tem, and will of the man were artful, but imperious 
 and indisputable with his party, yet were shrewdly 
 and in general discreetly exercised. Mr. Seward, ever 
 preadvised and consulted, was his exponent in the Le- 
 gislature and in party councils, and the advocate or op- 
 poo ent of the measures and men as prescribed, with 
 his concurrence by Weed. Although the latter never 
 sought office for himself, he always wanted high place 
 for Seward, who was his cherished and almost idolized 
 political offspring, with whom he never disagreed, and 
 who never went counter to him. The two always 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 23 
 
 acted in concert. It was interesting to witness their 
 joint operations. Weed's mind had by far the greatest 
 vigor, Seward's the most pliability. It was so in their 
 anti-masonic days. It was so to the close. Weed's 
 apparently disinterested labors were selfish, yet given 
 with devoted and unsparing fidelity to his friend 
 Seward, who might wear the honors while he was the 
 substantial power behind. Their ideas of government 
 were always personal, when their party was in power 
 they were the state. Mr. Adams '' strongly suspects 
 Mr. Seward owed many obligations " to Mr. Weed. 
 It was never suspicion among those who knew them, 
 but an unquestioned and indisputable fact. Mr. Sew- 
 ard himself acknowledged it with apparent satisfaction. 
 I once heard him declare, others being present, '* Sew- 
 ard is AVeed and Weed is Seward. What I do. Weed 
 approves. What he says, I endorse. We 'are one." 
 " I am sorry to hear the remark," said the late Chief 
 Justice Chase^ ^' for -while I would strain a point to 
 oblige Mr. Seward, I feel under no obligations to do 
 anything for the special benefit of Mr. Weed. The 
 two are not and never can be one to me." 
 Mr. Adams declares, as historical truth : 
 
 "The fact is beyond contradiction that no person 
 ever before nominated, with any reasonable probability 
 of success had so little of public service to show for his 
 reward. . . . The President elect was [m the winter of 
 1861] still at home in Illinois giving no signs of life. . . 
 That which appeared most appalling was the fact that 
 we were to have for our guide through this perilous 
 strife a person selected partly on account of the absence 
 of positive qualities, so far as was known to the public, 
 
24 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 and absolutely without the advantage of any experience 
 in national affairs, beyond the little that can be learned 
 by an occupation of two years in the House of Repre- 
 sentatives It was clear, at least to me, that our 
 
 chance of success would rest upon an executive council 
 composed of the wisest and most experienced men that 
 could be found. So it seemed absolutely indispensable 
 on every account that not only should Mr. Seward have 
 been early secured in a prominent post, but that his 
 advice at least should have been asked in regard to the 
 completion of that organization. But Mr. Lincoln as 
 yet knew little of all this. His mind had not even 
 opened to the nature of the contest. From his secluded 
 home in the heart of Illinois, he was only taking meas- 
 ure of his geographical relations and party services, and 
 beginning his operations where others commonly leave 
 off, at the smaller end. Hence, it was at quite a late 
 period of the session before he had disclosed his inten- 
 tion to put Mr. Seward in the most prominent place. . . . 
 It is the duty of history, in dealing with all human 
 events, to do strict justice in discriminating between 
 persons, and by no means to award to one honors that 
 clearly belong to another. I must then affirm, without 
 hesitation, that in the history of our government, down 
 to this'hour, no experiment so rash has ever been made 
 as that of elevating to the head of affairs a man with so 
 little previous preparation for his task as Mr. Lincoln. 
 .... Mr. Lincoln could not fail soon to perceive the 
 fact that whatever estimate he might put on his own 
 natural judgment, he had to deal with a superior in 
 native intellectual power, in extent of acquirement, in 
 breadth of philosophic experience, and in the force of 
 moral discipline. On the other hand, Mr. Seward could 
 
ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 25 
 
 not have been long blind to the deficiencies of his chief 
 in these respects." 
 
 Those who read and give credit to these represen- 
 tations, and others of similar purport through the 
 address, will receive very erroneous impressions of the 
 two men to whom they relate, as well as of the admin- 
 istration to which they belonged, and in which each 
 bore an important part. It was not Mr. Lincoln 
 W'ho conformed himself and his policy and general 
 views to Mr. Seward, but it was Mr. Seward who 
 adapted himself with ease and address to Mr. Lincoln, 
 and, failing to influence, adopted and carried out the 
 opinions and decisions of his chief. In that respect — . 
 flexibility and facility of change among friends — no 
 person possessed , greater dexterity and tact than the 
 Secretary of State. It made him a pleasant assistant, 
 companion, and coadjutor ; but his character not being 
 positive, nor his convictions absolute, he was not 
 always reliable, being deficient in executive will and 
 ability. Mr. Lincoln, who is represented as ignorant 
 of the condition of the country when elected, and 
 *' whose mind had not yet opened to the nature of the 
 crisis,'' better understood, if we may judge from what 
 they did, the popular sentiment and the public require- 
 ments than senator or representative, ambassador or 
 cabinet minister. In his " secluded home" he w^as not 
 an inattentive and indifferent observer, but watched 
 and studied public measures and pnblic necessities, and 
 more correctly appreciated the actual condition of 
 affairs than the heated politicians engaged in factions 
 strife for ]>arty ascendency m the national and state 
 
26 ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 capitals. "While statesmen and legislators of '^ expe- 
 rience " in Congress were waiting and watching for 
 new appointments, neglectful of the coming storm, 
 anticipating apparently little else than a severe party 
 conflict, " utterly without spirit" to concert measures 
 — exhausting their time and energies in frivolous 
 wragnles, and accomplishing nothing — with confessedly 
 " no leader at hand equal" to the emergency — the 
 President elect, "in the heart of Illinois," compre- 
 hended the situation, and rose above merely personal 
 and party contentions to the dangers, necessities and 
 political condition of the country. Wholly powerless, 
 however, he was compelled to witness without being 
 able to prevent the disintegration in progress, and the 
 accumulating embarrassments that were soon to con- 
 front him, without a single effective demonstration 
 from any of his professed friends in Congress, who 
 prided themselves on their superiority, and on an 
 official " experience" in which they deemed him defi- 
 cient, but which experience they considered indispen- 
 sable for a competent executive. Of what value was 
 the " experience" of senator or representative in that 
 crisis? What executive or legislative ability did they 
 exhibit ? Experience rightly improved is valuable in 
 public official life, but it is not to be denied that it 
 often blunts the mind, and by familiarizing with, ren- 
 ders it indifferent to evil. 
 
 The two great parties of Democrat and Whig were 
 in their day scarcely more apart in their character or 
 more diverse in their purposes than the opposing: ele- 
 ments which met in convention at Chicago in 1860. 
 It was by no means a personal contest as represented. 
 
ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEAVARD. 27 
 
 Mr. Adams seems unconscious of the fact that there 
 were among Kepublicans, and in that convention, con- 
 flicting views and policies ; that a majority was oppo- 
 sed to corrupt legislation and the vicious schemes of 
 managing lobbies, whether at Albany or Washington, 
 as well as hostile to the extension and aggression of 
 slavery. It was the misfortune of Mr. Seward that he 
 was associated with and the candidate of the most of- 
 fensive lobby combination of that date. He was not 
 accused or suspected of receiving pecuniary benefit 
 himself from the practices of that class of jobbing par- 
 ty lobbyists, but he was thought to be indifferent if 
 not assenting to their practices, and w^as their candi- 
 date. They were active in his favor, were conspic- 
 uously instrumental in pressing him forward as the 
 coming man, announcing him as the Republican candi- 
 date, and used extraordinary means to secure deleo-ates 
 to the nominating convention in his interest. These 
 party managers had, like Mr. Seward, adhered to the 
 Whig organization so long as it existed. After its 
 abandonment they became active members of the Ec- 
 publican party, and strove to be foremost in all its pro- 
 ceedings. But there was a large element— the result 
 showed a very decided majority— of the Eepublicans 
 averse to any nomination or movement which would 
 tend to transfer Albany intrigues to Washington, and 
 introduce the debasing practices on the Hudson into 
 our national politics. 
 
 When the convention met at Chicago, the Albany 
 programme and management were obvious. Xew 
 York and Michigan, under the Whig machinery which 
 with all its appliances was still in force in those states 
 
28 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 though under the name of Republicanism, pushed sol- 
 idly for their candidate. Massachusetts was supposed 
 to have been as thoroughly attended to, but a small 
 minority dissented and went with the majority of the 
 states and delegates from New England in opposition 
 to Mr. Seward. These three states constituted his 
 substantial strength, but under Albany manipulation 
 and management some of the small frontier and bor- 
 der states, and the territories which were introduced 
 and permitted to vote in convention, though they could 
 not in election, added to his force, and gave him, as 
 the address states, a plurality on the first ballot. A 
 second ballot increased his vote bat eleven, when it 
 was evident the Albany programme could not suc- 
 ceed, and the whole personal intrigue was demolished. 
 The lobby measures and tactics, and all the dramatic 
 parade and performance in the streets and hotels of 
 Chicago, failed. Disappointed and overwhelmed, 
 Weed refused to return to New York, but left for the 
 Northwest, and some days later made his appearance 
 far south at Springfield, where he had an interview 
 with Mr. Lincoln in '' his secluded abode." It was 
 ^\th.fidus Achates still a personal matter, and if Mr. 
 Seward could not be President he wished him in a po- 
 sition where he could be potential in the coming admin- 
 istration, believing with Mr. Adams that Mr. Lincoln 
 had '' little previous preparation for his task," and 
 that Mr. Seward was his superior in *' native intellec- 
 tual power." A very serious mistake on the part of 
 both. Members of Congress had also expected, and 
 took it for granted, that a man in ofiicial position and 
 of political experience, with hereditary party claims, 
 
MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 29 
 
 and a personal following as well as pecuniary backers, 
 such as could be found only in the commercial metro- 
 polis, would be selected. Others, however, wjshed a 
 liberal candidate, wedded to no past organization, and 
 untainted by and wholly disconnected with legislative 
 or congressional corruption and intrigue. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln became the choice of the convention, 
 not only from a belief that he had ability for the place, 
 but because he was a Republican from the start, a pri- 
 vate citizen, honest sagacious, and firm, with no vicious 
 connections or debasing political associations or ante- 
 cedents. It was not " the ghosts of the higher law and 
 of the irrepressible conflict " which made Mr. Lincoln 
 a candidate, for he and Mr. Seward stood alike in that 
 respect ; nor was it " the element of bargain and man- 
 agement manipulated by adepts at intrigue " which 
 secured his nomination, for the " adepts at intrigue" 
 were active for another. 
 
 The convention and the people preferred Abraham 
 Lincoln, in what Mr. Adams calls '* his secluded abode 
 in the heart of Illinois " to Senator Seward, with all 
 his experience and metropolitan surroundings, because 
 he was more truly the representative of the Kepubli- 
 can movement. Nor did the country regret, or ever 
 have cause to regret, that preference, whatever may 
 have been tlie disgust of disappointed officials and 
 expectants in Washington or elsewhere. Time, and 
 trials far greater than have ever been the lot of any 
 other chief magistrate, tested and proved the wisdom 
 of their choice. Mr. Lincoln, honest, intelligent, delib- 
 erate, patriotic, and determined, if not courtly bred, 
 had the executive ability to guide the ship of state 
 
OU MR. LINCOLN ANT> ME. SEWARD. 
 
 through a pitiless storm. Mr. Seward, with his rest- 
 less flexible mind, prolific in expedients, but with no 
 well-defined policy, fixed political principles, or strong 
 tenacity of purpose, could not have wielded the execu- 
 tive power successfully, or navigated the ship of state 
 in safety at that period, could he have been nominated 
 and elected, of which last there are very grave doubts. 
 There have been previous occasions, as in 1828 and 
 again in 1810, when all the calculations of politicians, 
 statesmen of experience, and men in place, have been 
 wrecked by an upheaval of popular sentiment, and 
 candidates taken from the ranks — " secluded abodes " — 
 were carried forward on the mighty wave of public, if 
 sometimes mistaken, opinion to a triumphant election. 
 Mr. Adams fails to mention, and probably never 
 realized, the primary differences in the Kepublican 
 party which caused results so unexpected to him and 
 the politicians in Congress. It was confidently expected 
 that the six Eastern states which had been the strong- 
 hold of the whig party and where the central organiza- 
 tion was powerful, would concentrate on Mr. Seward, 
 but though many of the party leaders were committed 
 to his support he was never a favorite with the people. 
 No manipulation or appliances could secure him their 
 support. On the first ballot at Chicago, Connecticut, 
 Rhode Island and Vermont were unanimous against 
 him — I^ew Hampshire gave him only one of her twelve 
 votes. Maine and Massachusetts were divided. The 
 deleo:ates were committed to no one of the several can- 
 didates but were decided against Mr. Seward. Before 
 the convention met, it Avas supposed that an arrange- 
 ment could be made with Cameron, by which Pennsyl- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 31 
 
 ^-aiiia could be ])roiiglit in to sustain Mr. Seward, but 
 although that politician's influence was great it was 
 totally insufficient to attach Pennsylvania to the Al- 
 bany movement. 
 
 So unaware was Mr. Seward of the true condition 
 of things when the convention assembled at Chicago 
 — so convinced that the Albany })rogrannne would 
 succeed — that he left his seat in the Senate and re- 
 paired to Auburn in the confident expectation of there 
 receiving a conmiittee which would inform him of his 
 nomination. The adverse blow was severe; but more 
 readily than many of his friends, did he submit to the 
 great disappointment, and with his usual tact accepted 
 and acquiesced in results which he could not control. 
 
 The " Memorial Address" represents it to have 
 been an error that Mr. Seward was not '' early secured 
 in a prominent post" by the President elect, and says 
 that " his advice at least should have been asked in 
 regard to the completion of the organization." The 
 reverse of this was a matter of duty, for the views and 
 wishes of Mr. Seward and his special friends were not 
 the policy and intention of Mr. Lincoln and the Ee- 
 publicans. Mr. Lincoln knew that the services of Mr. 
 Seward were at his disposal in case the Republicans 
 were successful, even before he was elected, and it 
 was impressed upon him most earnestly as a necessity 
 immediately thereafter. Twice at least did Thurlow 
 Weed, the faithful managing friend of Mr. Seward, 
 tXiQfidus Achates " to whom he owed many obliga- 
 tions of that kind," visit Springfield in Mr. Seward's 
 behalf. The views of Mr. Lincoln in regard to the 
 composition of his executive council, and the material 
 
6^1 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 of which it should be constructed, were so widely- 
 different from those of Mr. Seward and his Albany 
 associates, that no inclination was felt to ask his or 
 their advice on the subject. He had the selection of 
 Mr. Seward in his mind as early as that of any of his 
 associates, but he had no more thought of consulting 
 liim as regarded the other members of his Cabinet 
 than of advising with them or either of them as to his 
 Secretary of State. The members were to be his 
 advisers, not Mr. Seward's ; to aid and assist him in 
 the administration of the government, instead of any 
 one of his subordinates, all of whom were expected to 
 cooperate for the general welfare. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln was modest, kind, and unobstrusive, 
 but he had nevertheless sturdy intellectual indepen- 
 dence, wonderful self-reliance, and, in his unpretending 
 way, great individuality. Though ever willing to lis- 
 ten to others and to avail himself of suggestions from 
 any quarter which he deemed valuable, he never for a 
 moment was unmindful of his position or of proper 
 self-respect, or felt that he was " dependent" on any 
 one for the faithful and competent discharge of any 
 duty upon which he entered. He could have dispensed 
 with any one of his cabinet and the administration 
 not been impaired, but it would have been difficult if 
 not impossible to have selected any one who could 
 have filled the office of chief magistrate as successfully 
 as Mr. Lincoln in that troublesome period. In admin- 
 istering the government, there were details in each 
 department with which he did not interfere or attempt 
 to make himself familiar — a routine which the Secre- 
 taries respectively discharged. Of these the President 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 3o 
 
 had a general knowledge, and the executive control 
 of each and all. In this respect the Secretary of 
 State bore the same relation to the President as his 
 colleagues in the other departments. Mr. Lincoln 
 well understood the nature of the differences which 
 existed in the Republican party — the causes which had 
 influenced the members of the Chicago Convention, 
 and the policy which it was expected would character- 
 ize his administration. His sj^mpathies, feelings, and 
 views were in harmony and full accord with those who 
 had secured his nomination ; and, faithful in his con- 
 victions and to his trust, he would not permit those 
 wlio selected him to be disappointed, nor allow him- 
 self to be diverted from that policy nor to organize a 
 Cabinet opposed to it. 
 
 But the same influences which operated and were 
 defeated at Chicago in nominating a candidate, early 
 obtruded themselves on the President elect in attempts 
 to control his selection of his executive council. Mr. 
 Seward and his special friends, who still clung to the 
 old Whig party, and hoped by some device to renew 
 and prolong it, were apprehensive that there would 
 be too strong an infusion of the Democratic element 
 in the Cabinet. They did not propose to wholly ex- 
 clude men of Democratic antecedents, but it was urged 
 that the Whig element should, for the sake of har- 
 mony, and efficient, concerted, united action, have a 
 decided preponderance. Mr. Lincoln quietly listened 
 to these representations, but he well understood the 
 object, and avoided the path to which they invited 
 him. Instead of yielding to them,, he was confirmed 
 in his convictions that the Eepublican policy which 
 
34 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 
 
 led to his nomination and election was riglit, and 
 should be maintained independent of old parties and 
 old organizations. Discarding the importunities of 
 the Albany mission which visited him in Springfield, 
 he brought into his Cabinet an equal number from 
 each of the old opposing parties, which would enable 
 him to get the opinions of men of diifering political 
 views. It was with two exceptions the same as that 
 with which four months later he commenced his ad- 
 ministration. His first cast of the persons to compose 
 the administration was as follows : 
 
 Lincoln Judd 
 
 Seward Chase 
 
 Bates Blair 
 
 Dayton Welles 
 
 The four names in the first column, including that 
 of Mr. Lincoln himself, were of men who in their 
 political antecedents had been Whigs, while the four 
 in the opposite parallel column were Democrats in 
 their principles and convictions though Mr. Chase had 
 never identified himself with the democratic organiza- 
 tion. He was distinctly anti-slavery, but concurred 
 with the democrats in supporting the rights of the 
 states and was an advocate of a strict construction of 
 the constitution. 
 
 Norman B. Judd of Chicago, was an active and 
 influential politician of Blinois, and for many years a 
 leadino^ member of the lesfislature of that state. He 
 was also a member of the Eepublican National 
 Committee, and probably did more than any other one 
 individual to bring forward and secure the nomination 
 of Mr. Lincoln, for whom he had a high regard and 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 35 
 
 friendship, whicli was fully reciprocated. The Presi- 
 dent informed me that he had personally a stronger 
 desire that Judd should be associated with him in the 
 administration than any one else but he was from 
 Illinois, and there were political and other circum- 
 stances which intervened. Instead of a Cabinet 
 appointment therefore, Judd received the Prussian 
 Mission, which he filled during Mr. Lincoln's adminis- 
 tration, but he was recalled soon after Mr. Lincoln's 
 death, on representations made by Mr. Seward. 
 
 William L. Dayton of Kew Jersey, who was 
 designated for a position in the original cast of the 
 Cabinet was appointed Minister to France. He had 
 been the successful competitor with Mr. Lincoln for 
 the nomination of Yice President in 1858, and was 
 held in especial esteem by him. There was, however, 
 as usual a strong local claim for Pennsylvania, without 
 any distinguished statesman in whom the President 
 had snch faith and confidence as he had in Mr. Dayton, 
 but the pressure from w^ithout as well as from within 
 the State, with certain complications of his friends led 
 to the substitution of Mr. Cameron. It was the first 
 intention of the President, as I have understood, after 
 this substitution, to have conferred on Mr. Dayton the 
 mission to St. James, but Mr. Seward who was to have 
 charge of Foreign Affairs preferred and urged that Mr. 
 Adams should have the English appointment, and Mr. 
 Dayton, therefore, received the mission to France. 
 
 These changes in the original programme or cast 
 of the Cabinet did not afiect the purpose of the Presi- 
 dent to have in his council an equal number of men of 
 opposite parties in the past. Caleb Smith a Whig, 
 
36 MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 and Simon Cameron a democrat took the places of Judd 
 a democrat and Dayton a whig. 
 
 But although this was his first programme he was 
 wisely reticent, and kept his own counsel. When, 
 however, his intentions finally became known, and the 
 names of the gentlem.en whom he proposed to call to 
 his side were ascertained, there was an emphatic dissent 
 on the part of the special managing friends of Mr. 
 Seward. Two of the gentlemen were especially ex- 
 cepted to, as extreme Democrats, antagonistic to Mr. 
 Seward, who had been instrumental against him, 
 especially at Chicago, and to whom he could scarcely 
 be reconciled in administrative duties. But objec- 
 tionable as these men were, the opposition to Mr. 
 Chase was still more decisive ; and it was intimated 
 that if these gentlemen, particularly the last referred 
 to, were to receive Cabinet appointments, Mr. Seward 
 might decline the association. This intimation had 
 no effect on Mr. Lincoln, nor did it in the least change 
 his determination. While willing to accept and desir- 
 ous to have the services of Mr. Seward and the sup- 
 port of his friends, he did not feel that '* it was abso- 
 lutely indispensable on every account " to secure him 
 above others, or to the exclusion of others, or to be 
 governed by him and his likes or dislikes in the choice 
 of confidants or the make-up of his political family. 
 In point of fact, there was strong opposition among 
 his friends to Mr. Seward's appointment. He had no 
 apprehensions whatever that he should not be able to 
 have Mr. Seward in his council ; and if the gentlemen 
 whom he selected had not in their party antecedents, 
 or in certain fundamental political opinions agreed, but 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 37 
 
 were now Repiiblicrms in accord with him on present 
 questions, that wa,s sufficient for his purpose. Old 
 things in parties were with him done away. There 
 was a new departure in political organizations. His 
 administration and his Cabinet were to be Republican 
 irrespective of past parties. But schemes to secure a 
 Seward Cabinet commenced early, and were persist- 
 ently followed up to the inauguration. Weed, as 
 already remarked, did not return to Albany after the 
 Chicago nomination until he visited, and had an inter- 
 view with Mr. Lincoln in his "secluded abode,'' at 
 Springfield, the capital of Illinois. This was the begin- 
 ning, and nothing was accomplished. Late in the Sum- 
 mer, Weed met certain gentlemen in Saratoga, when 
 something definite respecting the Cabinet in the event 
 of Mr. Lincoln's election was attempted. After the elec- 
 tion Mr. Lincoln was urged to visit Auburn and consult 
 Mr. Seward, who " had a plurality of votes on the first 
 ballot" at Chicago, but he dfeclined the invitation. It was 
 winter, the address says, " at quite a late period of the 
 session, before he had disclosed his intention to place Mr. 
 Seward in the most prominent place in the Cabinet." 
 
 Most of the facts in relation to the formation of 
 the Cabinet I received from the mouth of Mr. Lin- 
 coln, who had apparently no concealments on the sub- 
 ject. On the day of the presidential election, Novem- 
 ber 3d, 1860, he said, the telegraj^h operator at Spring- 
 field invited him to occupy his room and obtain intel- 
 ligence of the result as it was received. About two 
 o'clock on Wednesday morning sufficient information 
 had come in to leave no doubt of his election. He 
 then retired, but hardly to sleep. Although fatigued 
 
38 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 and exhausted, he got but little rest. Oppressed with 
 the overwhelming responsibility that was upon him, 
 which in the excitement of the campaign he had not 
 fully realized, he felt the necessity of relief and assist- 
 ance to sustain him in the not distant future. He did, 
 he said, what probably all his predecessors had done — ■ 
 looked about him at once for the men on whom he could 
 depend, and who would be his support in the trials 
 that were before him. The reliable and marked men 
 of the country were in his mind, but there were many 
 other things to be taken into consideration — different 
 influences, sectional and political, to be reconciled. 
 He did not again sleep until he had constructed the 
 framework of his Cabinet. It was essentially the same 
 as that with which four months later he commenced 
 his administration. This voluntary and unsolicited 
 statement was from the man whose mind, Mr. Adams 
 says, months after his election, " had not even opened 
 to the nature of the crisis." Circumstances and ex- 
 tended details which Mr. Lincoln gave, relating to in- 
 dividuals and movements, Cabinet and other appoint- 
 ments need not be here introduced. This generaliza- 
 tion is evidence that even at that period he had a pol- 
 icy and purpose, which he carried into elfect, wholly 
 distinct from and independent of the plans which Mr. 
 Seward and his friends had marked out. He prefer- 
 red to select his own advisers, and did so instead of 
 permitting Mr. Seward to do it for him. He had in 
 view a Republican, not a Whig administration, and 
 therefore required and formed a Republican Cabinet. 
 There was but one member of it appointed on the spe- 
 cial, urgent recommendation and advice of Mr. Seward 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD, 39 
 
 and his friends, who preferred him to Mr. Chase for ^ 
 the Treasury, but that gentleman was soon witli Mr. 1 
 Seward's approval, transferred to hyperborean regions, V t 
 in a wa}' and for reasons never publicly and distinctly \ v 
 made known. — ^ 
 
 The u]] happy condition of the country during the >? 
 winter of 1861 is not overstated in the " Memorial 
 Address." It was as well understood and as deeply 
 deplored at Springfield and in remote sections as at 
 Washington, where Congress frittered away its time, 
 and pursued a course as unpatriotic as, and scarcely less 
 reprehensible than, the Administration which proclaim- 
 ed its inability to coerce a state. The President elect 
 witnessed the factious and disunion proceedings with 
 unutterable distress, but he was powerless ; and it was 
 among the most painful afflictions of his varied and 
 eventful life, to know and feel that he could do 
 nothing to arrest threatened and impending calamities. 
 Through the weary winter months that intervened be- 
 tween the election in November and tlie inauguration 
 in March, he beheld the executive authority paralyzed 
 or wielded in the interest of those who threatened the 
 integrity of the Union. Mr. Adams says : 
 
 " Treason had crept into the very heart of the Cabinet, 
 and a policy had been secretly at work to paralyze 
 rather than to fortify the resources of the Executive, 
 Everything was drifting at the mercy of the wind and 
 waves. ... A message was sent to Congress by Mr. 
 Buchanan lamenting the fact of what he chose to call a 
 secession of several States, but coupling with it a deni- 
 al of any power to coerce them. This was in its essence 
 an abandonment of all right to control popular resist- 
 
40 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 ance in that form. In the condition things were at that 
 moment, with a Cabinet divided and both branches of 
 the legislatnre utterly without spirit to concert meas- 
 ures, the effect was equivalent to disintegration." 
 
 What executive or legislative energy or ability 
 was manifested by Congress at that crisis ? Mr. Lin- 
 coln w^as a private citizen, " at home in Illinois," while 
 this " secession of several states" was going on, hold- 
 ing no office, exercising no authority, "giving no 
 signs of life," Mr. Adams says; but ^vell aware that 
 every movement and every expression of his were 
 watched and weighed not only by secessionists, but 
 by men in place who did nothing to relieve but much 
 to oppose and embarrass him in the duties upon which 
 he \vas soon to enter. Mr. Seward was at that time 
 in the Senate, in a position where a disinterested and 
 patriotic statesman of experience, sagacity, and fore- 
 sight, possessed of an energetic, capable, and master 
 mind, and of executive power, w^ould be expected to 
 detect and expose error and make a decisive stand 
 against avowed and approaching - treason — treason 
 which had in fact already, says the address, crept 
 "into the very heart of the Cabinet." But there 
 was not a measure of resistance, scarcely a note of 
 alarm or even of apprehension, from the New York 
 Senator, w^ho " received a plurality of votes" for Presi- 
 dent on the first ballot in the Chicago Convention, 
 and who was at the time not only a Senator but the 
 accredited Secretary of State of the incoming Adminis- 
 tration. To him, an actor in an exalted official posi- 
 tion, a Senator of reputed sagacity and known expe- 
 
MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 41 
 
 rience, who was in daily personal and official inter- 
 course with men of all parties, at the seat of govern- 
 ment, the President elect from his ''secluded abode," 
 and the whole country indeed, naturally looked with 
 some degree of expectation, if not of great confidence, 
 for decisive action, or at least correct information as to 
 the state of affairs and probable results. Mr. Seward 
 had a theory, but not such as to either inspire hope or 
 create alarm. It was of a pacific tendency, and calcu- 
 lated to calm apprehensions in that '' perilous emer- 
 gency." He anticipated, and said, there would be 
 harmony and reconciliation within ninety days. If 
 sincere in his prophetic assertions, he did not exhibit 
 intelligence or statesmanship superior to Mr. Lincoln ; 
 if insincere, he was even less reliable and faithful. 
 Mr. Lincoln had the inclination and certainly the 
 wish to believe that his selected counsellor, who was 
 in the Senate, with opportunities at the time superior 
 to himself or any other man to know tlie ficts, was 
 correct in his predictions and conclusions. Unfor- 
 tunately Mr. Seward was mistaken. Mr, Adams 
 says : " Wiseacres have commented on his failure of 
 sagacity in making over-confident predictions. But 
 what was he to do in the face of all the nations of the 
 earth?" He certainly was not to falsify the truth ; 
 he was not to sacrifice his integrity, nor did the " wise- 
 acres" accuse him of any such sacrifice when they 
 " commented on his failure of sagacity." It is to be 
 presumed that he believed what he asserted, even if it 
 makes him a less ^' sagacious statesman" than is repre- 
 sented in the " Memorial Address." His sagacity is 
 not to be fortified at the expense of his veracity. 
 
42 ]MR. LIXCOLX AMD MR. SEWAKD. 
 
 The truth is, Mr. Seward did not, even at that late 
 day, realize to its full extent the nature of the impend- 
 ing conflict, but viewed it as a severe and embittered 
 party controversy, not unlike others the country had 
 experienced, and which, being really causeless, he 
 hoped and believed time and the change of administra- 
 tion would pacify. Many of his associates as well as 
 himself were of the party of expedients, and persuaded 
 him and themselves that if once in power he could so 
 manage as to allay dissension, prevent secession, and 
 effect a restoration of Union feeling. Hence, without 
 any avowed reason, nothing but past " experience," 
 he predicted the speedy peaceful solution of a dispute 
 or controversy that to others looked formidable, and 
 which soon not only threatened but assailed the Union. 
 His predictions were in harmony with the policy, so 
 fiir as he had a policy, of himself and friends. He 
 was for peace, and had faith, hope, and confidence 
 that peace would be preserved by some expedient, 
 device, or luck — he knew not how — and he therefore 
 predicted it. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln was comforted by the assurances and 
 predictions of his future minister then in the Senate, 
 but he had apprehensions which no prophetic declara- 
 tions could entirely put at rest. Results have shown 
 that '' in this perilous interval,'' he, " in his secluded 
 abode in the heart of Illinois,'' with unpretending yet 
 undoubted sagacity, had a more correct knowledge 
 and better appreciation of the conditicm of affairs — 
 foresaw with more accurate perception the threatened 
 difficulties — than the experienced politicians wdio pre- 
 dicted and promised peace. Those who best knew 
 
ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 43 
 
 the two men are aware tliat their minds were widely 
 different inherently and in their organization. The 
 President was greatly superior in intellectual strength 
 and vigor, had the more solid and substantial qualities, 
 more earnestness and sincerity, a greater grasp and 
 comprehension, a more intuitive and far-seeing sagaci- 
 ty, came almost instinctively to right conclusions, had 
 more correct convictions, greater self-reliance, greater 
 firmness of purpose, a stricter adherence to principles 
 which he believed to be correct ; points that were best 
 understood by those who knew him best. 
 
 The Secretary of State had, with higher culture 
 and scholastic attainments, quickness of apprehension, 
 wonderful facility and aptness in adapting himself to 
 circumstances and exigencies which he could not con- 
 trol, and a fertility in expedients, with a dexterity in 
 adopting or dismissing plans and projected schemes, 
 unsurpassed ; qualities which made him an acceptable 
 companion, if not always a safe adviser, but never the 
 superior and controlling executive mind. His train- 
 ing and habit were partisan, and his acts often impul- 
 sive ; but, accustomed through his whole official life to 
 consult a faithful friend, to whose judgment and guid- 
 ance he deferred, he had not in great emergencies the 
 self-reliance, energy, will, and force of character which 
 are essential to a truly great and strong executive. 
 He sometimes acted rashly, not always wisely. But 
 if he had not the will which is necessary for a chief, 
 he had the sustaining qualities which are valuable in 
 serving a capable leader with whom he might be iden- 
 tified. He was subordinate to Abraham Lincoln, and 
 deferred to him as he had deferred to Thurlow Weed 
 
44 MR. LINCOLN AND MK« SEWARD. 
 
 — conformed to the views of the former as he had for 
 thirty years to those of the latter — and assumed credit 
 in the one case as it had always been given him in the 
 other, without being the originating and directing 
 mind in either. After the subsidence of the anti-ma- 
 sonic excitement on which he was first carried into 
 office, he became a Whig, and through all its changes 
 and mutations, until the organization was extinguish- 
 ed, he ^' adhered to the party." 
 
 Mr. Lincoln, on the contrary, was div^ested of 
 partisanship beyond almost any man in active public 
 life ; not that he was insensible to party and its claims, 
 but they were secondary and subordinate to principles 
 — the means rather than the end. He " drifted," as 
 he used to say, into the Whig organization at the be- 
 ginning; his associations were chiefly there, but he 
 had no particular veneration for the party or regard 
 for many of its professed doctrines. Time, experience, 
 reflection, and observation weakened whatever feeling 
 or sympathy he once entertained for mere party. Un- 
 like Mr. Seward, he had no reluctance in giving up the 
 Whig organization ; no lingering aflection for it, nor 
 any hesitation to participate in and urge on the Re- 
 publican movement from its inception. Mr. Seward 
 was an adroit and sldlful party tactician, familiar with 
 the tricks and contrivances in which his fidus Achates 
 indulged to carry an election ; while Mr. Lincoln had 
 no taste, inclination, or respect for such practices, and 
 would not, to secure party success, intentionally, even 
 in the most excited election, deceive or permit others 
 to deceive those who trusted him. The minds of the 
 two men ran in difi'erent channels, and when they 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 45 
 
 came together on important questions, that of the 
 President was the principal, and not, as represented in 
 the address, the tributary. 
 Mr. Adams says : 
 
 *' Mr. Lincoln could not fail soon to perceive the fact 
 that whatever estimate he might put on his own natural 
 judgment, he had to deal with a superior in native 
 intellectual power, in extent of acquirement, in breadth 
 of philosophic experience, and in the force of moral 
 discipline. On the other hand, Mr. Seward could not 
 have been long blind to the deficiencies of the chief in 
 these respects, however highly he might value his 
 integrity of purpose, his shrewd capacity, and his 
 generous and amiable disposition. . . . Thus it happened 
 th.it Mr. Seward voluntarily dismissed forever the 
 noblest dreams of an ambition he had the clearest right 
 to indulge, in exchange for a more solid power to direct 
 affairs for the benefit of the nation, through the name 
 of another, who should yet appear in all later time to 
 reap the honors due chiefly to his labors." 
 
 On no consideration would I detract one iota from 
 the just merits of the late Secretary of State, with 
 whom, though sometimes differing, I for eight years, 
 under two Executives, enjoyed uninterruptedly pleas- 
 ant, social and oflScial intercourse ; nor am I willing to 
 see the memory of the distinguished Chief Magistrate 
 who served his country so faithfully and so well, and 
 finally died in her cause, unjustly obscured, and his 
 abilities and deeds belittled and wronged. As is else- 
 where said in the address, " It is the duty of history, 
 in dealing with all human action to do strict justice in 
 
46 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 discriminating between persons, and by no means to 
 award to one, honors that clearly belong to another." 
 Yet a more flagrant violation of " the duty of history" 
 in that respect, a moro erroneous and unjust discrimi- 
 nation, or a more unrighteous ''award to one honors 
 that clearly belong to another," is scarcely to be found 
 in all history than in the assumption that Mr. Seward 
 directed the affairs of the nation through the name of 
 Mr. Lincoln. Mr. Adams omits to state in what 
 particular Mr. Seward, aside from his own department, 
 " exercised the more solid power to direct affairs for 
 the benefit of the nation'' of which Mr. Lincoln was 
 *'in all later time to receive the honors." It was not 
 in the management of the finances and establishing 
 and maintaining the credit of the Government through 
 a wasting war. I am not aware that he ever made a 
 suggestion, proposed a measure, or in any way 
 attempted to interfere with, or direct the affairs of the 
 Treasury Department. There was a personal intimacy 
 between him and the Secretary of War, but I do not 
 remember that he proposed or directed the conduct of 
 a single campaign, or originated any military or army 
 movement, save some unfortunate and irregular pro- 
 ceedings early in the administration, when he took 
 upon himself, as Secretary of State, to perform secretly 
 and improperly the duties of Secretary of War without 
 the knowledge of that officer. On one or two occa- 
 sions when he attempted, in total disregard of good 
 government and correct administration, to intermeddle 
 with naval matters, the proceedings were, as with the 
 War Department, disapproved as irregular, improper, 
 and reprehensible. In the administration and opera- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 47 
 
 tions of the Navy Department he had no part; not a 
 single naval expedition was undertaken on his recom- 
 mendation^ and the most important ones were in 
 progress without his knowledge and far advanced 
 before he was informed of them. In the affairs and 
 management of the other three departments he partici- 
 pated no more than in those mentioned, or than did 
 other members of the Cabinet. The conduct of 
 foreign affairs was of course, intrusted to him under 
 tlie supervision and control of the President, who 
 directed the governmental policy, and sometimes over- 
 ruled, modified, and improved the dispatches which 
 the Secretary had with great industry prepared. Mr. 
 Seward held a ready and prolific pen, and had a mind 
 fertile in expedients, but his judgment and conclusions 
 were not always so sound and reliable as to pass with- 
 out revision and Executive emendations and approval. 
 Measures and important movements of each of the 
 departments were s^enerally, but not always, submitted 
 to the Cabinet. The President was invariably con- 
 sulted, but the Secretar}^ of State stood in this respect 
 like his colleagues, and his opinion and judgment, like 
 theirs, was taken as were the others for what, in the 
 estimation of Mr. Lincoln, they were worth. The 
 policy of the President and the course of administra- 
 tion were based on substantial principles and convic- 
 tions to which he firmly adhered. Mr. Seward relied 
 less on fixed principle than expedients, and trusted to 
 dexterity and skill rather than the rightfulness of a 
 cause to cai-ry him through emergencies. 
 
48 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 The constnu'tion of Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet was, with 
 perhaps one exception, his own work. He would have 
 been glad to call into his council a statesman from the 
 South of marked ability and influence, but there were 
 difficulties wliich prevented. The gentlemen whom 
 he Anally selected had no previous intimacy, personal 
 or political, nor were there antagonisms to prevent 
 harmony and concerted action. Between Seward and 
 Chase there was imputed rivalry, and until within two 
 days of the inauguration the opposition of the friends 
 of the former to placing Mr. Chase in the Treasury 
 was active and persistent. Each of these gentlemen 
 had high aspirations. Each had been the chief Execu- 
 tive of his State. Each had represented his State in 
 the Senate, and each had a distinct party position, 
 and, to some extent, a personal following, which made 
 the competition interesting. Mr. Seward was a Ee- 
 publican with centralizing tendencies, and had been 
 prominent in the once powerful Whig organization 
 which had fallen into decay. Mr. Chase was a federal 
 Republican, favorable to State rights, not attached to. 
 nor strictly identified with, either of the old party or- 
 ganizations, but had been for years a conspicuous leader 
 in the anti-slavery movement which was rising on the 
 ruins of the Whig party. Their colleagues, aware of 
 these differences and rivalries, were indifferent to 
 them, and arrayed themselves under the banners of 
 neither. It would be invidious to attempt to institute 
 a comparison between these two gentlemen thus sit- 
 uated and associated ; but the " Memorial Address " 
 of Mr. Adams places Mr. Seward in the front rank of 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 49 
 
 the anti-slavery movement — a " veteran reformer " — 
 when, in fact, he had been one of the prominent mem- 
 bers of a very different party, which, like the Demo- 
 cratic organization, carefully abstained from connec- 
 tion with that movement, while Mr. Chase was for 
 years a prominent anti-slavery champion — openly, 
 boldly, and irrespective of all other parties or organi- 
 zations, its active and efficient advocate. In the ap- 
 pointment of these two men, Mr. Lincoln, who adopted 
 the policy of Washington in bringing men of oppo- 
 sing principles into his Cabinet, provided they harmo- 
 nized in measures of administration, reversed the 
 original ari'angement by giving to Seward, a Kepubli- 
 can centralist, the post of Jefferson, a State rights 
 federal Republican, and to Chase, a federal Eepubli- 
 can, the post which AYashington assigned to Hamilton, 
 a centralist. 
 
 Mr. Seward entered upon his duties with the im- 
 pression, undoubtedly, which Mr. Adams seems to 
 have imbibed, that he was to be de facto President, 
 and, as the premier in the British Government, to 
 " direct the affairs of the nation in the name of 
 another.'' The consequences were that confusion and 
 derangement prevailed to some extent at the commence- 
 ment by reason of the mental activity, assumptions, 
 and meddlesome intrusions of the Secretary of State in 
 the duties and affairs of others, which were, if not dis- 
 organizing, certainly not good administration. C.onii- 
 dence and mutual frankness on public affairs and mat- 
 ters pertaining to the Government, particularly on 
 what related to present and threatened disturbances, 
 existed among all the members, with the exception of 
 
50 ME. LIXCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 Mr. Sewnnl, who had, or affected, a certain mysterious 
 knowledge which lie was not prepared to impart. 
 This was accepted as a probable necessity by his 
 associates, for he had been in a position to ascertain 
 facts which it was intimated he could not perhaps well 
 disclose. It early became apparent, however, that the 
 Secretary of State had ideas and notions of his own po- 
 sition and that of his colleagues, as well as of the char- 
 acter and attitude of the President, that others could 
 not admit or recognize. Secretiveness, subtle expedi- 
 ents, and mysterious management, which limited the 
 knowledge of certain important transactions to the 
 State Department, but of wdiich the President was in 
 some degree and from time to time partially informed, 
 were the initiative Albany methods of executive gov- 
 ernment. This reserve it appeared from subsequent 
 disclosures consisted of an understanding between him- 
 self an(i certain leading opponents with wdiom he had 
 held private conference during the winter, the main 
 purpose of wdiich was to prevent any collision or deci- 
 sive movernent during the remnant of Mr. Buchanan's 
 administration. The motives of Mr. Sew^ard in promo- 
 ting delay, were undoubtedly well-intentioned, founded 
 on faith that he, if in power, could in some way, by 
 some expedient reconcile differences. The secession- 
 ists had other objects. They knew it would be more 
 difficult to unite the southern people in a war against 
 the Buchanan administration than against Lincoln, the 
 " black republican '' wdiose election they had opposed 
 and whom they declared and caused those who confided 
 in them to believe to be an enemy to the South. The 
 politicians, in Congress and out of it, who gathered in 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 51 
 
 and about Washington that winter were willing to *^ ^ 
 
 
 k 
 
 postpone action during the few remaining days of the 
 expiring administration, and none more so than the r\ 
 feeble and irresohite, but not unintelligent or unpatri- 
 otic President who felt himself hicapable of firmly ^^ 
 holding the reins and successfully guiding the govern- « ^ 
 ment in that crisis. Ill-advised, bewildered, paralyzed rs >, 
 and betrayed, he readily caught at any plan which y^ 
 would give him quiet, and enable him to tide over the ^^ fV^ 
 short remnant of his official life. The private confer- V x- 
 ence of the leaders during this winter led to temporary ^ ^ 
 arrangements, armistices and humiliating terms with ^' 
 avowed disunionists, acquiescence in the seizure of ^ ;: 
 forts, arsenals and other public property. The govern- 
 ment was to do nothing to preserve the union while 
 the rebels were active and permitted to organize and 
 do everything to resist the national authority after the 
 4th of March, should the secession demands not be com- f ^ 
 plied with, and exaction not be met by concession. ^ ^ 
 
 The failures to take prompt, energetic, and decisive f 
 
 measures ao^ainst the secession movements at the com- -t vi 
 mencement, and thus, like Andrew^ Jackson in 1832, ,^_ ^^ 
 to "resist the beginning of evil," displayed on the part ^^' c/ 
 of Mr. Buchanan great want of executive ability, v -s^ 
 The indecision of the president, and the efforts of ^^ i" 
 others to put off' for a few weeks the evil day, was, X^" T 
 from whatever motive, unfortunate for the reputation > *. V 
 of President Buchanan, but more unfortunate for the P f 
 country. In every point of view the temporizing ^ 
 
 policy of the winter of 1861 may be considered a mis- " V 
 take, a national misfortune. I^ot that a war could ' 
 
 have been prevented. The conflict which had been r 
 
2 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 
 
 thirty years maturing was so deep seated, its pro- 
 portions were so vast, tbe passions bad become so 
 excited tbat no eartbly power could bave saved tlie 
 country from war. Tbe men who combined against 
 tbe government for alleged grievances bad, after long 
 preparation, finally succeeded in obtaining control of 
 tbe civil organization of tbe states in one section of tbe 
 miion and were determined to bave tbe ascendency in 
 tbe general government, or a new confederacy of tbeir 
 own. But if hostilities could not bave been pre- 
 vented, it is scarcely to be doubted they would bave 
 been of less proportions bad the administration of 
 Mr. Buchanan put forth tbe strong hand of power 
 against tbe lirst organization to disorganize, and pro- 
 tected, defended and held tbe fortresses and public 
 property intrusted to its keeping. But tbe friends of 
 tbe incoming and outgoing administrations in Wash- 
 ington concurred in acting on a different policy, 
 tbou(yb from different motives. Tbe secessionists felt 
 truly tbat to them delay was important, tbat it would 
 be an embarrassing and unhappy, if not a disastrous 
 complication for them to make open war on tbe govern- 
 ment while it was administered by a man of tbeir own 
 selection and whose general course they approved. 
 Mr. Seward who was in pretty free communication 
 with, though politically opposed to them, persuaded 
 himself tbat if tbe contestants did not take the field 
 until there was a change of administration, he could 
 then, with bis fertility of resources, expedients and 
 means, tranquillize tbe country. In this be was as sincere 
 as in any political act of his life. Those who charge 
 him with unpatriotic and ulterior designs against the 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND yUi. PEWARD. 53 
 
 government and the union, do liiin injustice ; lie was a 
 centralist in his tendencies, not a disunionist, and in. 
 his efforts to delay action he was on what Mr. Adams 
 calls " the delusive track of expediency," without 
 fixed principles, or any clear and well defined policy. 
 His prophecies of pacification within ninety days, iter- 
 ated and reiterated, were based on no facts. He never 
 made known what he proposed to do to reconcile difier- 
 ences except as declared in his speech of the twelfth 
 of January, by meeting exaction with concession, sub- 
 mittino^ to the doctrine of coercion and evacuatinij the 
 national fortresses in the seceding states. With faith 
 in expedients he expressed his readiness for a national 
 convention to revise the constitution, and also for an 
 amendment to prohibit forever, beyond revocation, any 
 authority in Congress to interfere with the subject of 
 slaver3\ As the war was inevitable and soon came 
 '' with all its horrid cost," it was fortunate for the 
 countrv that so honest, so determined, so sao-acious 
 and capable a man as Lincoln was President to meet 
 it, with his comprehensive ability, human instincts, 
 fixed principles, calm forbearance and regard for Fed- 
 eral and state rights. 
 
 For several weeks after the inauguration, no stated 
 Cabinet meetings were held, though the members 
 were IVequently assembled in council — sometimes only 
 a part ; but whenever convened, it was by special no- 
 tice from the Secretary of State. This irregular prac- 
 tice, initiated and pressed by the Secretary of State, 
 who was supposed to be familiar with usage and to 
 have great executive expei-ience, was after some weeks 
 corrected, and stated meetings on Tuesdays and Fri- 
 
54 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 days were ordered, against the remonstrance of Secre- 
 tary Seward, who thought stated meetings caused un- 
 necessary interruptions of business, and that often 
 only a part of the members, such as were specially in- 
 terested in the subjects under consideration, need be 
 called to meet him and the President. It is mention- 
 ed in the " Memorial Address," that " Mr. Seward 
 himself came into the State Department with no ac- 
 quaintance with the forms of business other than that 
 obtained incidentally through his services in the Sen- 
 ate.'' This was soon obvious to the whole council, 
 Avho were much annoyed for a time by this want of 
 proper system and that correct administration which 
 is essential to intelligent unity in the Government. 
 Under evident misapprehension of his own powers 
 and duties, and in disregard of what belonged to oth- 
 ers, the Secretary of State undertook too much, found 
 himself embarrassed by promises and assurances in- 
 considerately given ; and with no clear and weH-delined 
 policy, but with assumption of pretty unlimited au- 
 thority and faith in expedients, on which, rather than 
 substantial principles, he relied, there were for a brief 
 period some singular proceedings. President Lincoln 
 bore with these things patiently, though greatly em- 
 barrassed, for the omens abroad were portentous. In- 
 cidents and occurrences which actually took place will 
 best illustrate the condition of affairs, the men, and 
 their relative positions in administering the govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Within a month after the advent of Mr. Lincoln 
 and the organization of his Cabinet, the Secretary of 
 State exhibited his loose ideas of government, his want 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 55 
 
 of system and defect of correct executive and admin- 
 istrative talent by preparing and sending out an irreg- 
 ular military expedition for tlie'relief of Fort Pickens, 
 without consulting the Secretary of War and without 
 his knowledge or that of any of his associates. There 
 is not in the archives and history of the Government 
 a record of such mischievous maladministration, when 
 all the circumstances are considered, as this secret 
 scheme of the Secretary of State to send, without con- 
 sulting the War Department or the General-in-Chief, 
 a military expedition to Pickens, which had already 
 been relieved. Military and naval appropriations 
 were not at his disposal, but he assumed their expen- 
 diture. Officers and men of both the War and Navy 
 Departments were surreptitiously, and without the 
 knowledge of either the Secretary of War or Secretary 
 of the Navy, witlidrawn from legitimate duty ; the 
 funds and means provided for their respective depart- 
 ments by Congress, and legally under their control, 
 for whicli they, and not the Secretary of State, were 
 responsible, and which were destined by them and the 
 government for different objects, were secretly ab- 
 stracted and diverted to purposes of which neither of 
 them, nor any member of the Cabinet, was informed. 
 In consequence of this strange misgovernment there 
 was confusion, disorganization, and demoralization ; 
 the records of the War and Navy Departments were 
 made unreliable and apparently false ; officers were 
 away from their assigned duty ; funds were misap- 
 plied ; important movements were paralyzed and de- 
 feated ; the course of the xVdtninistration was inter- 
 rupted and incomprehensible, and it is not surprising 
 
56 MR. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWAED. 
 
 that it was accused of weakness and mismanagement. 
 No satisfactory solution was ever made or attempted 
 for these erratic and intrusive proceedings, other than 
 rumors or charges that the Secretary of State had 
 given assurances in regard to Fort Sumter that were 
 unauthorized, and which could in no other way be 
 carried out. 
 
 The condition of Fort Sumter and the necessity of 
 measures for its relief were the first matters pressed 
 upon the President, even before his Cabinet was organ- 
 ized. In his Inaugural Address he had said, '' The 
 power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and 
 possess the property and places belonging to the Gov- 
 ernment.'' This was his policy ; but the. Secretary of 
 State, who had different views, opposed sending rein- 
 forcements to Sumter, and in his opposition he was 
 sustained by General Scott, to whom the subject was 
 first properly referred as a military question. General 
 Scott gave his ''hearty cooperation," to Mr. Seward, 
 and reported against sending supplies. All the Cab- 
 inet, except Mr. lilair, acquiesced in the military rec- 
 ommendation ; but the President, after repeated dis- 
 cussions, rejected the advice of Mr. Seward and ad- 
 hered to his own original policy. The decision was a 
 great disappointment to the Secretary of State. It 
 was subsequently alleged, and has never been denied, 
 that he had promised the rebels that Sumter should be 
 evacuated. Thurlow Weed admitted in the Albany 
 Evening Journal that such a promise had been made, 
 but though Mr. Weed appears to have been informed 
 of the fact, the Cabinet was not. The President was 
 not a party to any such assurance, knew not of it, and 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND AtR. SEWARD. 57 
 
 never gave it his sanction. Here, at the very com- 
 mencement of the Administration, the two minds were 
 in direct antagonism on a snbject of momentous na- 
 tional interest. The president, who is represented as 
 " having been selected partly on account of tlie absence 
 of positive qualities," with a '' mind not opened to the 
 nature of the crisis," as subordinate and deficient in 
 '* native intellectual power," had a policy of his own 
 in which he persisted, though opposed by the Secre- 
 tary of State, aided by the General-in-Chief and the 
 acquiescence of all but one of the Cabinet. His 
 countrymen were with him and his views, not with 
 the Secretary of State. 
 
 One evening in the latter part of the month of 
 March there was a small gathering at the Executive 
 Mansion while the Sumter question was still pending. 
 The members of the Cabinet were soon individually 
 and quietly invited to the council-chamber, where, as 
 soon as assembled, the President informed them he 
 had just been advised by General Scott that it was ex- 
 pedient to evacuate Fort Pickens as well as Fort Sum- 
 ter, which last was assumed at military headquarters 
 to be a determined fact in conformity with the views 
 of Secretary Seward and the General-in-Chief. This 
 astounding announcement was the more surprising 
 from the fact that the Navy Department had, about a 
 fortnight previously, on the 12th of March, on the spe- 
 cial application of General Scott, sent the steamer 
 Mohawk to the squadron off Pensacola with orders to 
 land Captain Vogdes and his command, and thus rein- 
 force Pickens. 'No word had been received from the 
 fort, or from any quarter, that rendered ne.essary or 
 
5S MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 even expedient this unaccountable change of military 
 operations. A brief silence followed the announce- 
 ment of the amazino; recommendation of General 
 Scott, when Mr. Blair, who had been much annoyed 
 by the vacillating course of the General-in-Chief in re- 
 gard to Sumter, remarked, looking earnestly at Mr. 
 Seward, that it was evident the old general was play- 
 ing politician in regard to both Sumter and Pickens ; 
 for it was not possible, if there was a defence, for the 
 rebels to take Pickens ; and the Administration would 
 not be justified if it listened to his advice and evacua- 
 ted either. Yery soon thereafter, I think at the next 
 Cabinet meeting, the President announced his decision 
 that supplies should be sent to Sumter, and issued con- 
 fidential orders to that eflfect. All were gratified with 
 this decision except Mr. Seward, who still remonstra- 
 ted, but preparations were immediately commenced to 
 fi.t out an expedition to forward supplies. To the 
 surprise of the Administration, information of the con- 
 fidential order to reinforce Sumter was promptly sent 
 to Charleston. It was subsequently ascertained that 
 this telegram was sent by Mr. Harvey, a newspaper 
 correspondent, who was intimate at the State Depart- 
 ment. Mr. Harvey himself was soon after appointed 
 Minister to Portugal, on the recommendation and by 
 request of Mr. Seward. 
 
 It was on the twenty-eighth of March that the 
 President informed the Cabinet of his determination 
 to relieve the garrison in Fort Sumter. On the follow- 
 ing day, the twenty-ninth of March, Mr. Seward in- 
 stituted his secret military expedition, without consult- 
 ing the Secretary of War or General Scott. Until 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 59 
 
 this time there had been "hearty cooperation" be- 
 tween them, but on the twenty-ninth Mr. Seward 
 took Montgomery C. Meigs, then a captain of en- 
 gineers, to the President, saying, " he thought the Presi- 
 dent ought to see some of the younger officers, and not 
 consult only with men who, if the war broke out. 
 could not mount a horse," as General Scott could not. 
 The General had from some cause or influence during 
 the winter abandoned his original Jacksonian recom- 
 mendation to President Buchanan that the forts in the 
 South should be occupied and strengthened. He now 
 advised President Lincoln to a different policy, and 
 that Sumter and Pickens should be evacuated. Two 
 days before the inauguration he had so far yielded to 
 the secession movement as to propose in a private let- 
 ter to Mr. Seward as a last alternative, to permit 
 " the wayward sisters to go in peace." 
 
 This letter of the second of March was addressed to 
 Mr. Seward who does not appear to have dissented 
 from it. On the contrary, knowing the position of 
 General Scott, consulting and advising with him 
 through tlie winter, aware of, if he was not instru- 
 mental in, inducino^ the General to chano^e his orio-inal 
 recommendation to President Buchanan that the forts 
 at the South ought to be garrisoned and strengthened, 
 Mr. Seward, when tlie question of reinforcing Fort 
 Sumter was under consideration advised that the whole 
 subject should be referred to General Scott and that 
 his report should be conclusive. At the time he so 
 advised, Mr. Seward was aware of the altered views or 
 position of General Scott, but no other member of the 
 Cabinet was informed of the fact. On the eleventh 
 
60 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 of March, General Scott made special personal and 
 urgent application for a naval vessel to convey an 
 officer who would be a bearer of dispatches with instruc- 
 tions to Captain Yogdes on the steamer Brooklyn oft" the 
 harbor of Pensacola to disembark his men and reinforce 
 Fort Pickens. After orders had gone forward to Kew 
 York to receive and convey this officer, I, on the even- 
 ing of the succeeding day, the twelfth, received a note 
 from the general stating he would not send an officer 
 but a written order which would be sufficient. The 
 earnest zeal of the preceding day had, from some cause 
 for which I could not account, abated ; the change in 
 that emergency for which he gave no reason struck 
 me with surprise, nevertheless I sent directions for 
 Commander Strong of the Mohawk to carry and 
 deliver the dispatch, if Commander Craven of the 
 Crusader had sailed. 
 
 'Not until the President, a fortnight later made 
 known to the Cabinet the recommendation of General 
 Scott to evacuate Pickens as well as Sumter, and I 
 heard the remark from Mr. Blair that he was playing 
 politician instead of general could I account for the 
 change from the programme of the twelfth. 
 
 The unanimous rejection of his proposition to 
 evacute Pickens, and the decision to reinforce Sumter, 
 weakened the influence of General Scott and chancred 
 Mr. Seward's tactics. Captain Meigs was substituted 
 as military adviser of the Secretary of State and man- 
 ager of details in his secret military operations. This 
 method of taking subordinates into the confidence of 
 the Secretary of State, ignoring the whole Cabinet, and 
 of adminigtering the different departments of the gov- 
 
]\rK. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWARD. 61 
 
 ernment, was nc3ver before practised, and will at no 
 time bear very close inspection. General Scott, who 
 had primarily confided implicitly in Mr. Seward was 
 more surprised than any other, at the course things had 
 taken. 
 
 The President, in the legitimate discharge of his 
 functions as the chief executive officer of the govern- 
 ment, directed that supplies should be sent to Sumter, 
 and his coniidential executive orders to that eftect 
 became an absorbing administration measure. Military 
 preparations were made, and a squadron was promptly 
 litted out by the Xavy Department within one week 
 from the date of the executive order to cooperate with 
 the military, and instructions, sanctioned and approved 
 by the President, were given to Captain Mercer, of 
 the steam frigate Powhatan, to command the squadron 
 and proceed off Charleston harbor. The other vessels 
 were directed to report to him on the 11th of April 
 ten miles due east from Charleston liglithouse. But 
 the whole plan and arrangement were defeated. !Not 
 only were the rebels advised of the confidential move- 
 ments of the Administration by Harvey, and Governor 
 Pickens by particular request of Mr. Seward informed 
 of the intentions of the President to send supplies but 
 not troops, if the supplies were peaceably received ; but 
 at the moment of sailing the expedition was deprived 
 of its commander and flagship. Captain Mercer was 
 displaced from the command without the knowledge 
 of the Secretary of the Kavy and the entire squadron, 
 when it arrived at the place of rendezvous, was desti- 
 tute of a naval commander, flagship, and instructions. 
 The Powhatan, with boats, supplies, and men destined 
 
62 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 for Samter, had been withdrawn from the service to 
 which she was especially ordered, and sent, without 
 naval orders or record, under a different and junior 
 commander, on a secret and nseless mission to Pensa- 
 cola, by the Secretary of State. Kone of these orders 
 emanated from, passed through, or were known to the 
 Kavy or War Departments. The whole proceeding, in 
 all its parts, was irregular, disorganizing, bad adminis- 
 tration, and delicient in executive ability. The Presi- 
 dent, who, without giving the subject much considera- 
 tion, had assented to the scheme of the Secretary of 
 State to reinforce Pickens, was not aware that the flag- 
 ship of the squadron to Charleston had been detached, 
 and its commander superseded, until the evening of the 
 6th of April, on which day the Powhatan sailed under 
 a different oflicer for a distant destination, carrying 
 off supplies, munitions, and boats which the Navy De- 
 partment had ordered for Sumter. I was not made 
 acquainted with this secret proceeding until the Pow- 
 hatan sailed, when I immediately informed the Pres- 
 ident. So soon as aware of the fact, he directed Mr. 
 Seward, although it was then midnight, to telegraph 
 forthwith and countermand the orders which detached 
 that vessel ; to reinstate Mercer, and in no way to inter- 
 fere 'with the arran Clements of the Secretarv of the 
 ]^avy. Mr. Seward remonstrated, claimed that the 
 Powhatan was essential to reinforce Pickens, but the 
 President was decided. A brief and curious telegram 
 was sent by Mr. Seward in his own name to New 
 York, and a fast boat despatched from the Navy Yard 
 which overtook the Powhatan at Staten Island, but 
 nothing was accomplished. The Sumter expedition 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND Sill. SEWARD. 63 
 
 sailed without a naval commander, the squadron had 
 no head, and the Powhatan, one of the three naval 
 vessels on the Atlantic coast on which the government 
 relied in that " perilous emergency," with her large 
 crew and armament, was sent to the Gulf, where she 
 was not wanted, and where ahnost the whole home 
 squadron was concentrated, while the whole maritime 
 frontier north of Cape Florida was left destitute. It 
 was on the night of the 6th of April that the Powhatan 
 sailed for Pickens. On the next day Mr. Seward sent 
 to Judge Campbell, a leading secessionist on the Su- 
 preme bench : " Faith as to Sumter fully kept. Wait 
 and see.'' 
 
 In these proceedings the administration and execu- 
 tive management of the President and Secretary of 
 State, respectively, may be seen. The merits, sincerity, 
 acts, and policy of each are disclosed, and from them a 
 more correct estimate may be formed of their ability, 
 resp:ctive fitness, and peculiar qualities to discharge 
 the duties of chief magistrate, than from the partial and 
 prejudiced assertions of interested partisans. 
 
 I have made mention of only certain general meas- 
 ures of administration in regard to the relief of Sumter, 
 but it may be said in passing that there is an unwritten 
 history of the transaction — of vacillating changes on 
 the part of General Scott ; of the singular notice of 
 ]\[ajor Anderson to Mr. Buchanan on the morning of 
 the 4th of March, an hour or two before the inaugura- 
 tion of Mr. Lincoln and of the stirring tidings to Mr. 
 Lincoln on his taking the inaugural oath, of the prep- 
 arations and non-preparations for defence, and other 
 
G4 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 planning— which is jet to be analyzed and developed, 
 but would be inappropriate in this place. 
 
 The following letter from ex-Postmaster-General 
 Blair, one of the surviving members of the first Cabi- 
 net of Mr. Lincoln, corroborative of the foregoing 
 statement, and illustrative of the character and course 
 of the late Secretary of State in other respects will be 
 read with interest : 
 
 "Washington, May IV, 1873. 
 
 "My Dear Mr. Welles; I duly received yours 
 of the 14th. You will have seen ere this that I have 
 anticipated your advice and made a statement in reply 
 to Mr. Adams on the relations of Messrs. Lincoln and 
 Seward. I know that a fuller statement would be read 
 with interest, but I prefer to leave that to you. I am 
 tempted, however, to contribute a short chapter to your 
 exposition, and to illustrate Mr. Seward's character by 
 o-ivinsc ^^^ account of his intrigue to surrender the forts 
 and allow secession to take its course, and his sudden 
 change of policy when he found that Mr. Lincoln would 
 resist secession. 
 
 General Scott was his great card at the outset. 
 Lincoln, having been a Whig and a supporter of Scott 
 for the Presidency, had persuaded himself in the canvass 
 that the old general was a great military man ; and the 
 general being really patriotic, and having learned from 
 General Jackson how to deal with secession, would have 
 given good advice, if, unfortunately, he had not fallen 
 into Mr. Adams' error in regarding Mr. Seward as the 
 head of the government, and for this reason surrendered 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. b'O 
 
 his own better judgment to that of Mr. Seward. This 
 is shown by the fact that he had advised Mr. Buchanan 
 to reinforce the forts. But in deference to Mr. Seward 
 he changed all this, gave up his own opinions, and said, 
 " Let the wayward sisters go in peace ; " and. actually 
 advised the surrender of Fort Pickens at Pensacola as 
 well as Fort Sumter at Charleston ! 
 
 I never shall forget the President's excitement when, 
 after a Cabinet dinner at the White House, he called 
 the Cabinet into a separate room, and informed us that 
 General Scott had told iiim it loould be necessary to 
 evacuate Fort Pickens as icell as Fort Sumter. It was 
 while the question of the surrender of Fort Sumter was 
 undecided ; but at a time when it was believed the fort 
 would be surrendered, and after the way had been pre- 
 pared for it by statements in the Press that the fort was 
 untenable. A very oppressive silence succeeded, the 
 President's statement of what General Scott had said. 
 At length it was said this advice of the general's was 
 enough of itself to show that he was playing politician 
 and not general as respects Fort Sumter, as well as with 
 respect to Fort Pickens, for there was no reason to 
 believe that Fort Pickens could be taken from us." 
 
 " Mr. Seward had overshot the mai-k this time. The 
 Cabinet generally had been convinced that Fort Sumter 
 was untenable, and acquiesced in its surrender, submit- 
 ting to the inevitable. But there was no apprehension 
 felt about Fort Pickens. The fort was well supplied, 
 and was actually impregnable wdiile we commanded the 
 sea, and we then had a large naval force there^. flence, 
 when the general said we mitst give up this fort too, 
 the President's confidence in him was staggered, and 
 from that moment I have always thought his power with 
 the President waned. 
 
GQ MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 
 
 "When Mr. Seward saw that his policy of meeting 
 "exaction with concession" and "violence with peace," 
 announced in his speech of January 12, 1861. had failed, 
 and that the President would not agree to surrender 
 the forts, as Mr. Seward had induced General Scott to 
 recommend him to do, he immediately telegraphed Gov- 
 ernor Pickens, by the hands of Mr. Harvey, his Portu- 
 guese minister, that an attempt was to be made to rein- 
 force Sumter. General Anderson had made no prepa- 
 rations to defend it, but left his barracks standing, to be 
 fired at the first shot, instead of pulling them down and 
 taking to his casemates, as he certainly would have 
 done if he had not been authoritatively told that the fort 
 vKis to he evacuated as soon as the small supply of provis- 
 ions on hand had been consumed. But for this negli- 
 gence for v:hich he vms never eluded^ the fort was im- 
 pregnable, as events proved, for we could never take it 
 from the Confederates. To make sure of defeating the 
 relief, however, the Powhatan, on whose seamen arid 
 guns the success of this expedition wholly depended, 
 was secretly detached, by an order surreptitiously ob- 
 tained from the President, on the pretext of relieving 
 Fort Pickens, which was in no danger, for the defence 
 of which ample provision had already been made, and 
 to whose relief the Powhatan was wholly unnecessary 
 and in no way contributed. 
 
 " Mr. Seward had two objects in detaching this ves- 
 sel : 1st, It defeated the relief of Fort Sumter, which 
 he was pledged to surrender, and the failure to relieve 
 it would vindicate his judgment in advising against the 
 attempt. 2d, Fort Pickens could be claimed as having 
 been saved by an expedition conceived and carried into 
 execution under his orders, and so, though he would by 
 this movement abandon his method of meeting " exac- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 67 
 
 and " violence with peace," he 
 would signalize his abandonment of his peace policy by- 
 such a success in administering the force policy, as to 
 put himself per saltwn at the head of his opponents, 
 discomfited by the failure of their attempt at resistance. 
 And accordingly, though the Powhatan did but sail to 
 Pensacola and back again, it was heralded as a great 
 achievement. 
 
 " The result of this scheming was sad indeed. Our 
 flao; on Fort Sumter held Beauregjard at Charleston. 
 When it fell he marched into Virginia and precipi- 
 tated secession there. If we could have held Fort Sum- 
 ter there never would have been a drop of blood shed. 
 It was the coercion of Virginia into the Confederacy by 
 Beauregard's army that made the war. General Jack- 
 son held nullification in check, and compelled the repeal 
 of the South Carolina ordinance, simply by sending 
 Scott, with one thousand men, to hold Fort Moukrie. 
 Sumter was infinitely stronger, and the North was rela- 
 tively as much stronger than the South in 1860 as Sum- 
 ter was stronger than Moultrie in 1833. Fortunately, 
 the country was not cursed in Jackson's day with a 
 meddling Secretary of State, to invite secession by 
 agreeing to yield to its exactions and disarm the force 
 ordered for its suppression, which was all-sufficient for 
 the purpose at the start — using, without stint, his pa- 
 tronage and power to palm oflf through the Press the blun- 
 dering intrigues which brought on a disastrous war, as 
 statesmanship, and holding on to place by abandoning 
 any policy which stood in the way of it, or by adopting 
 any whicli miglit be required to retain it. I may misjudge 
 Mr. Seward, but if" I do it is not because I have ever had 
 the least unkind feeling toward him personally. He 
 never gave me the slightest reason for personal ill-will to 
 
68 MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 hira. My opposition to him has always been political, 
 and because I regarded him as a most unsafe pul)lic 
 man. He was a kindly man in his social relations, and 
 when I met him in his home and family I enjoyed his 
 society and was interested in him and them, and had a 
 warm and sympathetic feeling for all that pertained to 
 his domestic life. In that sphere I think he was a good 
 and pure man. There was a freshness and heartiness in 
 his manner, and his conversation so abounded in humor, 
 and there was such an endless flow in his spirits, that I 
 always found his society attractive. It was only against 
 the political man that my nature revolted. He was to 
 me the personification of old Polonius' politician, who 
 " by indirection found direction out." Nor is this ver- 
 sion of his character the result merely of my own obser- 
 vation of his conduct, or derived from the reports of 
 others who have been associated with him. I have seen 
 much of him, and much of those who have associated 
 long with him. But the familiar facts of his life, deriv- 
 ed from these sources, accord exactly with the political 
 philosophy I have heard him propound over and over 
 aojain. No one has ever associated Ions: with him who 
 has not heard him recount by the hour his successful 
 political strategy. I could fill a volume with his narra- 
 tives of the tricks he has played, if I could recall the 
 half part of what I have heard from him. He really 
 thought that politics was but a game. I shall never 
 forget how shocked I was at his telling me that he was 
 the man who put Archy Dixon, the Whig Senator from 
 Kentucky in 1854, up to moving the repeal of the Mis- 
 souri Compromise, as an amendment to Douglas's first 
 Kansas bill, and had himself forced the repeal by that 
 movement, and had thus brought to life the Republican 
 party. Dixon was to out-herod Herod at the South, 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 69 
 
 and he would oiit-herod Herod at the ISTortli. He did 
 not contemplate what followed. He did not believe in 
 the reality of the passions he excited, because he felt 
 none himself. He thought it all a harmless game for 
 power. 
 
 "Yours truly, 
 
 " Montgomery Blair." 
 
 The crowded incidents of the early days of Mr. 
 Lincoln's Presidency, while the members of the Cabi- 
 net were new to each other, and their relative stand- 
 ing and authority apparently unsettled, the character 
 of the Administration not yet defined, and the gov- 
 ernment and country much demoralized, are deeply 
 interesting, and some of them of a singular description. 
 In his confiding nature the President doubtless trusted 
 much to the Secretary of State. 
 
 On the evening of the 1st of April, Mr. Nicolay, 
 the private secretary of the President, brought me a 
 package containing papers, instructions, and executive 
 orders of a most extraordinary character. One of 
 them directed me to detach Commodore Stringham, a 
 patriotic officer whom I had called to special duty in 
 the Navy Department, where he was employed in 
 coniidential trusts, and send him to Pensacola. Com- 
 modore Pendergrast, who had just arrived at Hamp- 
 ton Roads from the West Indies with the Cumberland, 
 was ordered to repair forthwith to Vera Cruz on 
 account of alleged complications. Why these two 
 officers in whom I confided were selected to be sent 
 away was a mystery. On tlie Cumberland and the 
 Powhatan the Navy Department was relying to co- 
 
70 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 operate with the military, for the protection of the 
 IS'avy Yard at Xorfolk in case of difScultj. All these 
 orders relating to the navy were issued by the Secre- 
 tary of State without consultation with the Secretary 
 of the Navy or any Cabinet consultation whatever. 
 But the most extraordinary and irregular if not illegal 
 order in that remarkable package directed a reorgani- 
 zation of the Navy Department, and the establish- 
 ment of a new bureau, in which I was commanded to 
 place in the most confidential relations, where he 
 should have knowledge of all the iniportant transac- 
 tions of the navy and Navy Department, and the 
 government, Samuel Barron, a finished courtier and 
 shrewd secessionist. On looking over these documents 
 it was evident to me that the President had been the 
 victim of misplaced confidence and was sadly imposed 
 upon, or that he was as unfit for the office of Chief 
 Executive as is re])rescnted in the " Memorial Address.-' 
 I lost not a moment in waiting upon him, and reading 
 to him these extraordinary papers. He promptly and 
 emphatically disavowed them ; said he had hurriedly 
 and without examination signed a large number of 
 papers which had been brought to him by Secretary 
 Seward for a very different purpose, and which he 
 had supposed were merely formal ; that he was not 
 aware of their contents; had trusted entirely to Mr. 
 Seward ; and whom could he trust if not the Secretary 
 of State ? He requested me to return him the orders 
 or treat them as nullities. The result was, no new 
 bureau was organized without law ; Barron was not 
 taken into the confidence of the Navy Department, 
 but soon deserted and was the first naval officer cap- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SKWARD. 71 
 
 hired in the rebel service ; Stringham never went to 
 Pensacola nor Pendergrast again to Yera Cruz, nor 
 was there any complication tliat required it. 
 
 It is stated that President Lincoln was " quite de- 
 ficient in his acquaintance with the character and 
 qualities of public men, or their aptitude for the posi- 
 tions to which he assigned them. Indeed, he never 
 selected them solely by that standard.'' The authori- 
 ty for tliis statement is not given. It relates, apparent- 
 ly, chiefly to appointments abroad, and these appoint- 
 ments for which the President is held responsible, 
 were most of them made on the recommendation of 
 Mr. Seward, to whose department they properly ap- 
 pertained, and who was vigilant and tenacious in dis- 
 pensing the patronage of the State Department, often 
 without consulting others. 
 
 On this point of selecting officials, or being con- 
 sulted in regard to appointments which came within 
 the purview of his department, no man was more sen- 
 sitive than Mr. Seward, though himself not always re- 
 gardful of what in this respect was due to others. 
 
 In March 1861, while the Senate was in extra 
 session, differences existed between the Secretary of 
 State and the Senators from Kew York relative to the 
 local appointments in that state. These differences 
 resulted in a conference at the State De])artment, to 
 which the President was specially invited, and con 
 sented with some reluctance to be present. It was an 
 evening consultation, and he thought proper to invite 
 me to accompany him. The Pj-esideut, Secretary 
 
< 'J MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 Seward, aiid Senators King and Harris were the only 
 persons besides myself in attendance. Before taking 
 up the list of names the President said he would re- 
 lieve thein of any difference in regard to the most im- 
 portant office, that of Collector, bj appointing on his 
 own responsibility and from personal knowledge, Hi- 
 ram Barney, who had his confidence and was a man 
 of integrity. There was but a single civil appoint- 
 ment, that of Navy Agent, connected with the Navy 
 Department to be made. No disagreement existed 
 concerning that, which was soon disposed of, when 
 Mr. Seward remarked it would be unnecessary to de- 
 tain me longer, but the President and the Senators 
 desired me to remain. It is not necessary to go into 
 the particulars of that conference, which seemed to 
 cover most of the important appointments in the city 
 and State of New York. After listening to the dis- 
 position of some coUectorships and other offices in 
 which there was an approximation to agreement, an 
 intimation was thrown out by Mr. Seward that he 
 wished the list which he had made out, and which was 
 somewhat extended, might be completed and the nom- 
 inations sent forthwith to the Senate. This embarrassed 
 the two Senators who were unprepared for so hasty a 
 movement. 1 inquired if the Secretary of the Treas- 
 ury and Attorney General had been consulted, and 
 concurred in the selection. Mr. Seward said they had 
 not ; that it was unnecessary ; that these were New 
 York appointments, and he and the Senators knew 
 better than any others what was best for the party and 
 the administration in that state. I remarked that 
 Cabinet officers were responsible for the proper admia- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 73 
 
 istration of their respective departments ; that subor- 
 dinates should have their confidence, and if changes 
 were to be made of the incumbents, the new selections 
 should be by them or with their concurrence; that to 
 till the offices nnder them with untried men whom 
 they did not know, and without their knowledge, ap- 
 peared to me improper and would be likely to cause 
 difficulties. Mr. Seward dissented, and claimed that 
 he knew what was best for the Administration in Isew 
 York ; that there were personal and party matters to 
 be considered, which neither Mr. Chase nor Mr. Bates 
 could understand so well as himself. I disclaimed any 
 intention to meddle with ]N"ew York parties or New 
 York controversies ; but besides courtesies which it 
 would be well always to observe, I insisted as a sound 
 principle and correct rule of action that the heads of 
 departments should, if they did not select, at least be 
 consulted in regard to the appointments of their sub- 
 ordinates. The President said I was right ; that to 
 fill the New York appointments as Mr. Seward wished, 
 without consulting the Secretary of the Treasury, and 
 others directly interested, would, he was convinced, 
 not be satisfactory. He was willing to hear any re- 
 marks or suggestions relative to candidates, to take 
 their recommendations ; but it must be distinctly un- 
 derstood that there would be nothing conclusive until 
 he advdsed with the heads of the departments interest- 
 ed. With this, the meeting soon and somewhat ab- 
 ruptly terminated. 
 
 Mr. Thurlow Weed has related and published more 
 than once what he deems a creditable proceeding, 
 which exemplifies the Albany practice of making 
 4 
 
74 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 appointments, and the method of discharging the 
 executive functions with which he was familiar. He 
 was going, he sajs, on a brief errand to Washington 
 early in the administration, when he was requested by 
 some of his |>arty intimates to get a snng place for a 
 naturalized Englishman who had for years been a 
 willing runner, or whipper-in, for the Whigs of Kew 
 York city, a sort of " Tim Li nken water" Weed says, 
 but who now wished to go home and spend his last 
 days in a comfortable place in England. The request 
 was cheerfully assented to, and Mr. Weed on the 
 morning of his arrival, while at breakfast Avith the 
 Secretary of State, communicated the wishes of their 
 party friends, and was assured the solicited appoint- 
 ment should be made. Immediately, without inquiry 
 or investigation, and while they were at breakfast, the 
 Secretary, with his accustomed promptness, ordered 
 the removal of the consul at Falmouth and the ap- 
 pointment of the party instrument " Tim Linkenwater" 
 in his place. When Weed called at the State Depart- 
 ment for the commission, Mr. Hunter, the old chief 
 clerk, on delivering the document expressed his regret 
 at the change. The consul whom you remove, said 
 Mr. Hunter, is one of the most correct and efficient 
 officers in the consular service, as was his father before 
 him. That father was the open, steadfast, and true 
 friend of our country in the war of independence. 
 General Washington when President, in grateful 
 remembrance of the sympathy and friendship of this 
 English gentleman, appointed him consul at Falmouth; 
 and on his death. General Jackson appointed the son, 
 whom you now remove without fault or complaint 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 75 
 
 after years of faithful service. It makes me sad, said 
 tlie old clerk. Weed acknowledged he was ashamed. 
 His sensibilities were touched for the man ; there had 
 been no thought for the faithful incumbent or the 
 w^elfare of the government. He declined to take the 
 commission, and the removed consul was by Mr. Weed, 
 not by Mr. Seward, reinstated without ever knowing 
 he had been displaced. No Secretary of State had 
 ever before permitted a partisan editor to enter the 
 State Department and take such freedom with impor- 
 tant appointments. Mr. AVeed assumes and is entitled 
 to the credit of notfinallv consummatino^ awrono^ after 
 he learned the facts, though he did not inquire into 
 the case, nor did the State Department before ordering 
 the removal. 
 
 periment so rash has ever been made as that of elevat- 
 ing to the head of affairs a man with so little previous 
 preparation for his task as Mr. Lincoln. If this be 
 true of him in regard to the course of domestic admin- 
 istration, with which he might be supposed partially 
 familiar, it is eminently so in respect to the foreign 
 relations of which he knew absolutely nothing." 
 
 No greater mistake or misrepresentation could be 
 made. Men vastly inferior to Mr. Lincoln, less quali- 
 fied and less able, have been elected President ; and 
 his general knowledge of our " foreign relations," if 
 not as minute in routine and current details as that of 
 members of the Committee on Foreign Kelations, was 
 more enlarged and comprehensive than that of many in 
 
76 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 those positions. Some of our countrymen, who live 
 and die in retirement without ever holding office, give 
 attention to those subjects, and are more capable of 
 discharging the duties, and would represent the gov- 
 ernment abroad with more ability than the persons 
 selected. Without specifying particulars on these mat- 
 ters, I may mention that this man, who is represented 
 as so totally ignorant and unfit, and §o destitute of ex- 
 perience, and who it is said '' absolutely knew noth- 
 ing " — concerning them, showed intelligence, sound 
 judgment, and correct views at the very commence- 
 ment of the administration, on a most interesting occa- 
 sion, above the Secretary of State, who was, by the 
 standard of Mr. Adams, greatly his superior. In an 
 important dispatch of the Secretary of State to Mr. 
 Adams, who was then our Minister at London, Mr. 
 Lincoln took the document, which he considered in 
 some respects exceptional, criticised, modified, and with 
 his own hand expurgated, corrected, and improved it, 
 and changed its character. This paper related to the 
 recognition of belligerent rights, was addressed to Mr. 
 Adams, and is probably now on the files of the State 
 Department in its original form, with the corrections 
 and improvements of the President. Mr. Adams was 
 doubtless unaware that the President, who, he says, 
 ^' absolutely knew nothing " of our foreign relations, 
 was substantially the author of the instructions to him- 
 self, and laid down the chart by which he was to be 
 guided in a most important matter of national concern- 
 ment. The President overruled and. set aside some 
 of the elaborate and important, but in his view, objec- 
 tionable portions of the dispatch of Mr. Seward. 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 77 
 
 These facts are known beyond the Cabinet cii-cle, and 
 are consequently no secret. There were other marked 
 cases of intelligent supervision of our -foreign aftairs 
 and their management by the President in the final 
 summing up on important questions, which overthrow 
 the statements of Mr. Adams, who has an utterly false 
 conception of the relative position, ability, and charac- 
 ter of the two men of whom he speaks. To the Secre- 
 tary of State, whose special duty it was to investigate 
 and report upon international subjects, and prepare 
 instructions to the respresentatives of the government 
 abroad, the President gave the same, perhaps closer 
 attention than to the Secretary of the Navy, who 
 issued instructions and orders to the commanders of 
 squadrons and officers on special duty. In no respect 
 was the Secretarj^ of State on a different footing in 
 administering the government from other heads of 
 departments nor did he infuse more vigor or character 
 in the administration. He was more constant and 
 unwearied than others in his attention to and atten- 
 dance upon the President, made it a point to always 
 accompany him in his visits to the army or wherever 
 he appeared in public, and was personally very devoted 
 to him, but never exercised higher executive authority 
 or had " the more solid power to direct affairs for the 
 benefit of the nation " than his associates. There were 
 in the foreign policy of the government during Mr. 
 Lincoln's administration fewer and less perplexing 
 questions, less serious complications than under several 
 of our previous Presidents. But the domestic admin- 
 istration from the commencement to its close was one 
 of unprecedented labor and responsibility requiring 
 
Y8 MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 energy, vigilance, executive and administrative ability, 
 such as had never before devolved on the Chief Magis- 
 trate or the government. The action and responsibil- 
 ity of others were far greater than those devolved on 
 the Secretary of State. 
 
 It is admitted by Mr. Adams that, while wanting 
 in the qualities of President, and while ^' no experi- 
 ment so rash has ever been made as that of elevatina: 
 to the head of affairs a man with so little previous 
 preparation for his task as Mr. Lincoln," " he after- 
 wards proved himself before the world, a pure, brave, 
 honest man, faithful to his arduous work." Nothing 
 more. It is still left to be inferred that though he 
 meant well, he was incompetent and without ability to 
 discharge the duties of his position, except under the 
 direction of one of his subordinates who had really 
 less to do than others in the domestic administration 
 of the government. It does not occur to Mr. Adams 
 that he under estimated the ability of the President of 
 whom he personally knew little, and that the people 
 formed a more correct estimate of their Chief Majes- 
 trate's capacity than himself. He gives no credit to 
 President Lincoln for far-seeing sagacity, in which he 
 excelled most men of his time ; for knowledge of the 
 structure of the government and information on 
 public affairs, which he had studied with diligence 
 and passionate fondness; for arduous and successful 
 labors, though holding no office, endowed with no 
 wealth, and aided by no metropolitan funds, in his 
 great struggle for constitutional freedom ; for execu- 
 
MR. LINCOLX AND MR. SEWARD. T9 
 
 tiv^e and administrative ability, for sonnd judgment, 
 intellectual capacity, mental power, and practical 
 knowledge, which enabled hira to stand at the helm 
 and guide the government through storms and dan- 
 gers sucli as no country ever experienced. In all 
 these qualities the impression is conveyed that this 
 remarkable man was deficient, but that they were 
 possessed by the Secretary of State, who was " not 
 blind to the deficiencies of his chief." Indeed, the 
 whole language, tone, tenor, sentiment, and intent of 
 the address are to elevate Mr. Seward and depreciate 
 Mr. Lincoln ; to award to the Secretary honors that 
 clearly belong to the President; to make it appear 
 that the subordinate controlled and directed the prin- 
 cipal ; that the Secretary of State was de facto Presi- 
 dent, and the President himself a mere locum tenens^ 
 incompetent for the place from the want of '' experi- 
 ence" and ''previous preparation." Mr. Seward had 
 influence in the administration, but not control. His 
 mental activity, the "marvellous fertility of his pen," 
 his proneness to exercise authority and to make him- 
 self conspicuous on every important subject and occa- 
 sion, imposed on admiring and willing friends, who, 
 like Mr. Adams, persuaded themselves that one so 
 active and prominent must be the moving and direct- 
 ing spirit of the administration. It would be diffi- 
 cult, however, for his most partial friends to specify 
 any financial, military, naval, territorial or general 
 measure of administration, which had its origin with 
 or was directed by the Secretary of State, while the 
 President suggested some and directed all. Mr. 
 Seward could adapt himself to, or adopt and appropri- 
 
80 MR. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWAKD. 
 
 ate the views of others, with wonderful facility and 
 address could second their propositions, and support 
 them with a zeal and earnestness which made them 
 seem his own. 
 
 Me. Adams says he knows that in order to cut up 
 by the roots the possibility of misunderstanding or 
 rivalry between the President and Secretary of State, 
 " Mr. Seward deliberately came to the conclusion to 
 stifle every sensation left him of aspiration in the future, 
 by establishing a distinct understanding with the Presi- 
 dent on that subject." " Thus it happened that Mr, 
 Seward voluntarily dismissed forever the noblest 
 dreams of an ambition he had the clearest right to in- 
 dulge, in exchange for a more solid power to direct 
 affairs for the benefit of the nation through the name 
 of another, who should yet appear in all later time to 
 reap the honors due chiefly to his labors." 
 
 That Mr. Seward signified to the President he 
 should not be a competitor with him for the ofiice of 
 Chief Magistrate in 1864 is not improbable, and but 
 for the disparagement so ungenerously as well as unjust- 
 ly thrown upon the President, who according to the 
 " Memorial Address'' was " in all later times to reap 
 the honors due chiefly to Mr. Seward's labors," the lat- 
 ter should have the unrestricted credit of patriotic 
 self-abnegation. But the truth must not be suppressed 
 or perverted, and there are, aside from the act of dec- 
 lination but connected with it, certain facts and cir- 
 cumstances which are essential to a right understand- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 81 
 
 ing of the case, and which, if the subject be alhided 
 to, truth requires should not be omitted. 
 
 In December 1862, the dissatisfaction which ex- 
 isted in Congress and the country against the imputed 
 meddlesome interference and alleged mismanagement 
 of the Secretary of State, and his supposed influence 
 over the Executive, was such that a very general desire 
 was expressed that he should leave the Cabinet and 
 retire from the Administration. To some extent he 
 had unwittingly and unintentionally contributed to the 
 prevailing discontent by persistent and ostentatious 
 exhibition of himself in public with the President 
 when he visited the army, and indeed on every possible 
 occasion, outside of the State Department. His 
 claqueurs and supporters busied themselves in repre- 
 senting that Mr. Seward was de facto President, and the 
 " Memorial Address" falls into the same error by de- 
 claring he was directing affairs. Mr. Seward gave en- 
 couragement to these representations. They gratified 
 his vanity and that of his supporters, but did not 
 strengthen and fortify him in Congress or with the 
 public, as he and his friends anticipated would be the 
 case, but really weakened him, and for a time were 
 harmful to the President, towards whom the country 
 was otherwise well inclined. Military reverses always 
 weaken an administration. The people, however, are 
 tolerant of the mistakes of their Chief ]\[agistrate, and 
 forbearing towards his honest errors, but are exacting 
 and often intolerant .towards subordinate or reputed 
 favorites. Under national reverses they were lenient 
 towards the President, and whatever was wrong they 
 charged, sometimes improperly, on the secretaries, 
 
82 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 particularly the one who assumed the "more solid 
 power to direct affairs," and whom they held account- 
 able, not entirely without reason, for certain executive 
 indiscretions and for national misfortunes. 
 
 "When Congress convened in December, the senti- 
 ment or prejudice against Mr. Seward was deep and 
 severe, but he seemed not cognizant of it, nor was the 
 President himself aware of its full extent. He could 
 not have been wholly ignorant of the fact that there 
 was a growing dislike of Mr. Seward and that he was 
 opposed by many friends of the administration as well 
 as opponents ; but he knew that others of the Cabinet 
 were improperly censured and abused, and that he as 
 well as they were in some cases unjustly assailed. No 
 one, however, had warned either of the extreme dis- 
 favor with which almost the whole community in those 
 days viewed Mr. Seward — their want of confidence in 
 his sincerity and. judgment, and their belief that his 
 intimacy and influence with the President were per- 
 nicious. This erroneous, or, more properly speaking, 
 exaggerated impression of the influence and power of 
 the Secretary of State which the partisans of Mr. Sew- 
 ard had inculcated, in the mistaken belief that it would 
 increase his strength to the same extent that it injur- 
 ed the President — a mistake into which Mr. Adams 
 appears to have fallen — carried with it the idea that 
 the President permitted himself to be persuaded and 
 misled by his subordinate to do acts against his own 
 better judgment. The assiduous attentions of the 
 Secretary of State could scarcely fail to have some 
 effect on the President, especially in minor matters, to 
 which he could not always, in the overwhelming mul- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 83 
 
 tiplicity of affairs, give that minute attention which he 
 wished. Intimacy, companionship would unavoidably 
 carry with it more or less influence, and in that view 
 the Secretary had influence which he was forward to 
 exhibit and not reluctant to exercise, sometimes un- 
 fortunately for the President and the country. It 
 was notorious that the partisan friends of Mr. Seward 
 were anxious to have it believed he was the power be- 
 hind the President who controlled the action of the 
 government, and some of his own oracular sayings 
 and doings tended to that belief. 
 
 A brief interchange of views among the members 
 after Congress assembled led to the disclosure of great 
 unanimity of opinion adverse to the Secretary of State, 
 which resulted in a meeting of the "Republican Sena- 
 tors on the 17th of December, at which, resolutions in 
 opposition to him and requesting that he should be dis- 
 missed, were adopted with but one dissenting voice. 
 A committee of nine Senators, embracing some of the 
 ablest and most eminent men of that body, at the head 
 of which was the venerable Judge Col lamer of Ver- 
 mont, chairman of the Judiciary Committee, Avas ap- 
 pointed, and instructed to wait upon the President and 
 communicate to him the general conviction that the 
 continuance of Mr. Seward in ofiice would be injurious 
 to the administration and the country, and to make 
 known to him a request on the part of the Senators 
 assembled that the services of Mr. Seward should be 
 dispensed with. 
 
 These extraordinary proceedings were immediately 
 communicated to Secretary Seward, before the com- 
 mittee had waited upon the President, by Senator 
 
84 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 King of lS"ew York, the only gentleman who had 
 opposed them. Mr. Seward promptly and properly 
 tendered his resignation. It is not essential to enter 
 into the details of that movement further than to say 
 that Mr. Lincoln defeated it, and in doing so, demon- 
 strated to Senators and Cabinet executive ability, tact, 
 and power such as Mr. Adams never knew he possessed, 
 and consequently fails to appreciate. Although sur- 
 prised and grieved by what was done and what he 
 learned, thie President did not submit to Senatorial 
 dictation, nor permit the Executive Department of the 
 government to be overborne or invaded. Mr. Seward 
 was not dismissed, nor was his resignation accepted, 
 nor did he wish it to be accepted. The attempt to 
 drive him from the State Department really strength- 
 ened him in the position, but there is no doubt the 
 movement had in some respects a beneficial effect in 
 restrainino^ his officionsness and in arousina^ Mr. Lin- 
 coin's attention to it. The scheming party manage- 
 ment, which had been defeated first at Chicago and 
 subsequently in the formation of the Cabinet, but 
 which had adroitly undertaken to control and regulate 
 the Administration, was by these Senatorial proceed- 
 ing's rebuked and ao^ain defeated. Some of the active 
 Congressional friends who had favored the nomination 
 of Mr. Seward at Chicago had become dissatisfied with 
 him and his demonstrations, and were most forward 
 in asking that he should not be permitted to longer 
 discharge the duties of Secretary of State. 
 
 It was at this juncture, when he became conscious 
 that he had no longer a party to sustain him — when 
 he saw all the Senate, and it may be added, about the 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 85 
 
 whole of the representative body opposed to him — 
 when there was not a single state, nor any party in 
 any state, in his favor — that '' Mr. Seward deliberately 
 came to the conclusion to stifle every sensation left in 
 him of aspiration in the future," and ''dismiss forever 
 the noblest dreams of auibition,'' not that he might be 
 or was thereby able to '' direct afi'airs," nur yet with 
 the conviction that Abraham Lincoln "should reap the 
 honors due chiefly to his labors," but because any idea 
 of political preferment was to him utterly hopeless. 
 It is an incontrovertible truth that he had the confi- 
 dence and support of no party, and was consequently 
 wanting in that power which derives its strength from 
 public opinion. 
 
 Perhaps no one occurrence better illustrates the 
 executive and administrative course of Mr. Seward, 
 than certain proceedings in relation to mails taken on 
 captured vessels. Very little publicity was given to 
 the subject at the time, though it was the cause of 
 frequent and earnest discussion, and of a somewhat 
 extensive and elaborate correspondence. 
 
 I received on the last day of October, 1862, a brief 
 note from Mr. Seward, saying: "It is thought expe- 
 dient that instructions be given to the blockading and 
 naval ofiicers, that in case of capture of merchant ves- 
 sels suspected or proved to be vessels of the insurgents 
 or contraband," the mails should ''not be searched 
 or opened, but be put as speedily as may be conve- 
 nient on the way to their designated destinations." 
 By whom it was " thought expedient" that such ille- 
 
86 MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 gal '' instructions" should be given, and an essential 
 national right renounced in the midst of war when 
 most needed, did not appear. The note, though char- 
 acteristic, was of such a tenor that I gave it no atten- 
 tion whatever, except to say to Mr. Seward within a 
 day or two, probably at our next meeting, that I had 
 received it, that I disliked its tone, and knew not its 
 object, or whether it was private or official, but it 
 could not be expected I would carry it into effect. 
 He made a passing reply that he had great difficulty 
 in keeping the peace and satisfying foreign demands, 
 particularly the English, who were very exacting. 
 There the matter rested, and I supposed was ended ; 
 but six months later he came to my house, Saturday 
 evening, the 11th of April, with a letter from Lord 
 Lyons enclosing an extract from Mr. Archibald, the 
 Euglish Consul in ^ew York, who had written his 
 lordship that the mail-bag of the Peterhoff, a captured 
 vessel, was in the prize-commissioner's office, " that 
 the court had directed the mail parcels should be 
 opened in order to see what letters were enclosed 
 relating to the cargo on board the ship, and requested 
 that I would open the package and select such letters 
 as appeared to me to relate to the cargo on board or 
 to the consignee mentioned in the manifest, and to 
 take charge of the residue, with a view of forwarding 
 them to their destination." With this request the 
 consul refused to comply, and immediately informed 
 Lord Lyons, who wrote Mr. Seward that "all these 
 proceedings seem to me to be so contrary to the spirit 
 of your letter to the Secretary of the ISTavy of the 31st 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 87 
 
 of October, that I cannot help hoping you will send 
 orders by telegraph to stop them." 
 
 I asked Mr. Seward if he had telegraphed or writ- 
 ten as requested. He said he had not ; it was not 
 strictly within the province of the State Department ; 
 the coui't would not be likely to be governed by any- 
 thing from him on a subject of naval concern; he 
 therefore wished me to send word to the court to give 
 up the mail. I assured him I was not prepared to send 
 any such order ; that I could not do it without a vio- 
 lation of law, and that the judge knew his duty too 
 well to regard such an order from him or me ; that the 
 mails were legally in the custody of the court, and 
 ought not to be given up without examination, for, in 
 all probability, the best, and perhaps the only evidence 
 that the Peterhoff was a good prize, was to be found in 
 the mail bag. It would be wrong toward the govern- 
 ment and unjust to the captors to part with this evi- 
 dence. 
 
 He was greatly disturbed ; said he was committed 
 by his letter to me of the thirty-first of October, 
 which had directed and virtually pledged the gov- 
 ernment that the mails should be given up mthout 
 search. I replied that he was not authorized to give 
 any such direction or pledge ; that it was contrary 
 not only to usage but to international and statute law ; 
 that I had paid no attention to his note, which was 
 irregular and improper, as well as illegal, subversive 
 of usage, and an unauthorized abandonment of a na- 
 tional right, which would be most injurious to the 
 navy and the country ; that as regarded any personal 
 humiliation in recalling or disavowing it, no one but 
 
88 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWAKD. 
 
 myself was aware he bad ever written such a note, and 
 it had entirely passed from my mind. He answered 
 that he had given a copy of it, and it had been read 
 and received as authority in Parliament. Our gov- 
 ernment would be holden to the promise he had made. 
 But, said I, you could make no promise to override 
 the law, or against law ; the letter was not an execu- 
 tive order, an act of Congress, or a treaty stipulation. 
 I regretted that it had been written, still more that it 
 was published, for it was supercilious and improper on 
 his part to undertake to instruct the Secretary of the 
 Navy as he would a subordinate ; that it was unfortu- 
 nate such a note, unofficial and of no authority wdiat- 
 ever, should have been made public. It was discour- 
 teous for him to address such a letter to me ; disre- 
 spectful and wrong to have communicated such an un- 
 authorized missi ve to the English Minister; that they 
 were not aware he was not empowered to instruct me 
 or any of his colleagues ; that this subject had never 
 been a matter of Cabinet consultation, and was in no 
 sense an administration measure. He left me at a late 
 hour, and after a pretty earnest conversation, to see 
 Lord Lyons. The Minister was unyielding, and the 
 question was carried to the President, who frankly 
 stated that the subject was new to him ; that' he w^as 
 not familiar with maritime law or the law of prize. I 
 turned his attention to our statutes, which were clear 
 and explicit. The law of 1789, our earliest statute, 
 says : " illl papers, charter-parties, bills of ladin j:, 
 passports, and other writings whatsoever found on 
 board any ship or ships which shall be taken, shall be 
 carefully preserved, and the originals sent to the courts 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 89 
 
 of justice for maritime affairs," confirmed by the law 
 of 1800, and subsequent enactments. 
 
 Eminent counsel were consulted, and authorities 
 hunted up, but the whole array was against the unau- 
 thorized, illegal, and ill-considered note of the thirty- 
 first of October. For days and weeks the subject was 
 under consideration, and the more clear and unques- 
 tionable the case appeared, and the greater the embar- 
 rassment of Mr. Seward, the deeper were the Presi- 
 dent's sympathies for him and the stronger his wish to 
 extricate the Secretary from a dilemma into which he 
 had been apparently unwittingly seduced. The trans- 
 action was studiously withheld from Cabinet consulta- 
 tions. Mr. Seward had, it seemed, in a weak and un- 
 guarded moment, attempted to show to Mr. Stuart, of 
 the British legation, his authority and power as Secre- 
 tary of State ; that he was virtually the premier and the 
 controlling mind of the Government ; that he could 
 issue orders to his associates in the Cabinet as he would 
 to subordinates, and regulate international questions 
 by a mere dash of his pen, without regard to the 
 President and Cabinet, the Senate or Congress. But 
 when the question came to a practical issue, and he 
 was required to show his authority to make regulations 
 for the navy, to set aside the laws of the country, to 
 disregard international law and usage, his ill-timed 
 letter and assumption of power came home with terri- 
 ble effect. Law and usage and the practice of nations 
 could not be overturned by a flippant note from the 
 head of a department. Only an Act of Congress or a 
 treaty duly ratified could do what the Secretary of 
 State, with all the experience and superior intelligence 
 
90 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWAED. 
 
 awarded him by Mr. Adams, attempted to do, in order 
 to gratify a subordinate in the British legation, who 
 had an object in view, and gained his point by sedu- 
 cing the Secretary, whose vanity was susceptible. 
 When I asked if this renunciation of a right, which 
 would impair the efficiency of the navy and operate 
 injuriously to our national interest, was reciprocal, 
 whether the British Government had consented, in 
 case of war, to also abandon the right, M. Seward ad- 
 mitted they had come under no obligation to that ef- 
 fect, but he had no doubt they would. His principal 
 justification, however, was the unfriendly feeling of 
 Great Britain, which he declared was very hostile, and 
 that it was his constant labor and duty to pacify and 
 appease that government. This necessity, he said, 
 had driven him to extraordinary concessions, and in 
 promising the surrender of the mails without examina- 
 tion he had acted in the interest of peace. In other 
 words, he had disregarded law, renounced an essential 
 right at a critical period of the war without reciprocity, 
 without an equivalent, without Cabinet consultation, 
 and submitted and yielded to the illegal exactions of 
 the English legation. 
 
 Senator Sumner, chairman of the Committee on 
 Foreign Relations, in whose superior intelligence and 
 information on questions of international law Presi- 
 dent Lincoln had great confidence, and whom he often 
 consulted on conflicting and troublesome subjects with 
 foreign powers, became greatly interested in this ques- 
 tion. He assured the President that the Secretary of 
 the Navy was right, and the State Department wrong. 
 But Mr. Seward insisted that the British Government 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWAEO. 91 
 
 was sensitive, and if we opened and examined the 
 mails they would avail themselves of the occasion to 
 make war. This the President dreaded. I claimed 
 that the best way to avert war was a fearless mainte- 
 nance of our rights ; that to abandon or renounce our 
 rights from fear or threat would be humiliation and 
 weakness. The point was one on which the Presi- 
 dent assumed the Secretary of State must be correctly 
 informed, and, horrilied with the idea of irritating 
 Great Britain', which Mr. Seward insisted would be in- 
 evitable, and all his sympathies being with the Secre- 
 tary, he thought it expedient to accede to Lord Lyons' 
 demand, and surrender the Peterhoff mails. 
 
 Mr. Seward did not call and inform me after the 
 interview on the evening of Saturday, the 11th of 
 April, of «xie result of his visit to Lord Lyons, but I 
 received on Monday the 13th, a note from him enclos- 
 ing a letter from the Minister, written on the 9th, with 
 extracts from a correspondence between Kear- Admiral 
 Bailey and the British Yice-Consul at Key West in 
 which Lord Lyons said : " It would seem from these 
 that the mail found on board the captured steamer Pe- 
 terhoff has been dealt with both at Key West, and at 
 New York in a manner which is not in accordance 
 loith the views of the government of the United States 
 as stated in yonr letter to the Secretary of the Navy 
 of the 31st of October last." Mr. Seward's letter, en- 
 closing this correspondence was written on Saturday 
 the 11th, before his evening interview with me at my 
 house and previous to his reception of the second letter 
 from Lord Lyons, which he brought tome, with notice 
 from Mr. Archibald stating the mail was in the hands of 
 
92 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 the prize-commissioners. This letter of the 11th reach- 
 ed me on Monday morning, and having in view our con- 
 versation on Saturday evening, I embraced the oppor- 
 tunity of sending him at once the following reply : 
 
 "Navy Department. 
 
 April 13, 1863. 
 "Sir:— 
 
 "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
 your coramunication of the 11th inst. enclosing a note 
 of Lord Lyons' and correspondence relative to the mail 
 of the Peterhoff. 
 
 "His lordship complains that the Peterhoff's mails 
 were dealt wnth 'both at Key West and at New York in 
 a manner which is not in accordance with the views of 
 the government of the United States, as stated in your 
 letter to the Secretary of the Navy, of the 31st Octo- 
 ber last.' 
 
 " Acting Rear- Admiral Bailey, an extract from whose 
 letter is enclosed in the correspondence transmitted 
 on the 14th ult., gave Her Majesty's Consul at Key West 
 an authenticated copy of the law of the United States, 
 and of the instructions based thereon, on the subject of 
 papers which strictly belong to captured vessels and 
 the mails. By special direction of the President, unu- 
 sual courtesy and concession were made to neutrals in 
 the instructions of the 18th August last to Naval offi- 
 cers, who themselves were restricted and prohibited 
 from examining or breaking the seals of the mail-bags, 
 parcels, etc., which they might find on board of captur- 
 ed vessels, under any pretext, but were authorized at 
 their discretion to deliver them to the consul, command- 
 ing naval officer, or the legation of the foreign govern- 
 ment to be opened, upon the understanding that what- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SP^WARD. 93 
 
 ever is contraband, or important as evidence concerning 
 the character of a captured vessel, will be remitted to 
 the prize-coui't. 
 
 "On the 31st of October last, I had the honor to 
 receive from you a note suggesting the expediency of 
 instructing naval officers that, in case of capture of 
 merchant vessels suspected or found to be, vessels 
 of insurgents or contraband, the public mails of every 
 friendly or neutral power, duly certified or authenticated 
 as such, shall not be searched or opened, but be put as 
 speedily as may be convenient on the way to their 
 designated destination. As I did not concur in the 
 propriety or 'expediency' of issuing instructions so 
 manifestly in conflict with all usage and practice, and 
 the law itself, and so detrimental to the legal rights of 
 ca^jtors, who would thereby be frequently deprived of 
 the best, if not the only evidence that would insure 
 condemnation of the captured vessel, no action w^as 
 taken on the suggestions of the letter of the 31st 
 October, as Lord Lyons seems erroneously to have 
 supposed. 
 
 "In the only brief conversation that I ever remember 
 to have had with you, I expressed my opinion that we 
 had in the instructions of the 18th of August, gone to 
 the utmost justifiable limit on this subject. The idea 
 that our naval officers should be compelled to forward 
 the mails found on board the vessels of the insurgents — 
 that foreign officials would have the sanction of this 
 government in confiding their mails to blockade-runners 
 and vessels contraband, and that without judicial or 
 other investigation, the officers of our service should 
 -hasten such mails, without examination to their desti- 
 nation, was so repugnant to my own convictions, that 
 I came to the conclusion it was only a passing sug- 
 
94 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 gestion, and the subject was therefore dropped. Until 
 the receipt of your note of Saturday, I Avas not aware 
 that Lord Lyons was cognizant such a note had been 
 written. Acting Rear-Admiral Bailey has acted strictly 
 in accordance with the law and his instructions in the 
 matter of the PeterholTs mail. The dispatch of Lord 
 Lyons is herewith returned. 
 
 " I am respectfully, 
 
 " Your obed't servant, 
 
 " Gideon Welles, 
 " Sec'Vy of Navy:' 
 " Hon. Wm. H. Seward, 
 
 " SecH'y of State:' 
 This letter exhibiting our different views and opin- 
 ions, would I supposed, cause the subject to be brouglit 
 before the President and Cabinet ; but instead of this, 
 Mr. Seward wrote me on the loth, that he had sub- 
 mitted the subject to the President who approved his 
 course, that the Peterholf's mail was to be given up, 
 and that it was an inauspicious time to ' raise new 
 questions or pretensions under the belligerent right of 
 search.' This hasty committal of the President was a 
 sort of snap judgment so unlike him, and so inconsis- 
 tent with his character and general course, that it was 
 evident to my mind that confiding in the Secretary of 
 State, he had given his sanction to the proceeding with- 
 out a full knowledge of the facts, or of the irregular 
 and illegal act which renounced our unquestioned 
 right, and, if made a precedent, would work serious 
 injury to the country. I was not willing therefore, 
 that the question should be thus summarily disposed 
 of nor to remain quiet under the admonition respect- 
 ing *new questions or pretensions.' The warning 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 95 
 
 that Great Britain would take offence — an argument 
 often used to affect the President on doubtful or dis- 
 puted points bv the State Department, I knew how to 
 appreciate, and therefore wrote the following: 
 
 " Navy Department. 
 
 April 18, 1863. 
 " Sir :— 
 
 " I have had the honor to receive your note of the 
 15th inst. in reference to the mails of the Peterhoff 
 which are in possession of the prize-court in New York. 
 I am not aware that this Department has raised any 
 * new questions or pretensions under the belligerent 
 right of search,' in the case of the mails of the Peter- 
 hoff. Had there been ground for such an imputation, 
 it could hardly, on an occasion to which so much impor- 
 tance has been given, have escaped the observation of 
 Lord Lyons. He however, advances no such charge, 
 directly or by implication, and founds the demand made 
 by him exclusively on the concession which he, apparently 
 through some knowledge of the details of your letter to 
 me of the 31st October, had been erroneously led to 
 believe was made by this government, in instructions 
 given to the commanders of its vessels of war. 
 
 " The true question in the present case is, whether the 
 administration of tlie law shall be sufiered to take its 
 ordinary course, or whether the court established to ad- 
 minister the law, and which has certainly been in exis- 
 tence long enough to know its powers and duties, shall 
 be arrested in the discharge of its functions by an order 
 of the Executive, issued on the demand of a foreign gov- 
 ernment, which exhibits no evidence, and in fact makes 
 no charge that law or usage has been violated on our 
 part. 
 
96 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 " If the Peterhoff was captured and sent to the prize- 
 court without any reasonable grounds for such a pro- 
 ceeding, then undoubtedly the opening of the mails, if it 
 takes place, may have been an illegal act — but in my 
 judgment, not otherwise. If it is to be assumed that 
 the capture was wrongful, not only the mails, but the 
 vessel and cargo should at once be surrendered. 
 
 "It may be an ' unfavorable time to raise new ques- 
 tions or pretensions,' but it is certainly no time to re- 
 nounce any right or to unsettle any long and well-estab- 
 lished principles and usage. Such a surrender would be 
 a confession of weakness which, even if it existed, it 
 would be inexpedient and injurious to make known to 
 our enemies. If the case be one of doubt, it will be time 
 enough to yield when the doubt is dispelled, and we are 
 found to have been in the wrong. We may then yield 
 and make amends. 
 
 '^ I do not consider it necessary to discuss the question 
 of genuine or spurious and simulated mails ; but will 
 merely suggest that if what pretends to be a mail is to 
 be considered, in all cases, prima facie sacred, and ex- 
 empt from examination, it will hereafter be found ex- 
 ceedingly difficult, in practice, to distinguish the spuri- 
 ous from the genuine ; nor indeed would there be any 
 necessity for the fabrication of a spurious mail. 
 
 " In the meantime I cannot but hold that the prize- 
 court is lawfully in possession of the mail-bag in ques- 
 tion, and that the court itself is the proper authority to 
 adjudge and determine what disposition shall be made 
 of it. I propose to avoid all new questions by leaving 
 the whole matter to this ancient method of adjustment, 
 established by the consent of nations, and it was in 
 order to avoid innovations, as well as to maintain our 
 national rights and the legal rights of the captors, that 
 
MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 97 
 
 the suggestions contained in your note of the 31st of 
 October were not adopted by this Department. 
 " I am, respectfully, 
 
 " Your obed't serv't, 
 
 " Gideon Welles, 
 :' Sec'fy of Navy:' 
 
 " Hon. Wm. H. Seward, 
 
 " SecH'y of State:' 
 
 Before sending this letter I read it to the President 
 who was evidently surprised and somewhat disturbed 
 by it. He said that the subject was one with which 
 he was not familiar — that he had no time to investi- 
 gate it and must depend on those of us who under- 
 stood it, that his great object was to keep the peace 
 which was much endangered, he thought it unneces- 
 sary to bring the matter before a full Cabinet — Seward 
 he said was sensitive, he wished me to send Seward the 
 letter, and if he did not bring it to his notice, which I 
 doubted from what had already occurred, said he 
 would call it up for further action. 
 
 At the Cabinet meeting on the 21st he requested 
 Mr. Seward and myself to remain after the adjourn- 
 ment, and when we were alone, made known that his 
 object was to get at the right of the question in rela- 
 tion to the seizure of foreign mails. A long and ani- 
 mated discussion took place in which Mr. Seward 
 dwelt at length on the great changes which had taken 
 place in regard to mails during the last fifty years, 
 and that nations must move forward with the improve- 
 ments of the age ; spoke of the Trent affair and tlie 
 concessions that were then made, of the necessity of 
 keeping at this time on good terms with England and 
 5 
 
98 ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 said, that the measures he had taken had been with 
 the President's approval. 
 
 I thought it unnecessary to discuss the changes that 
 had taken place in regard to the mails which constitu- 
 ted the principal part of his remarks, for whatever 
 they were, law and usage and the practice of nations 
 could not be set aside, except by legislation or treaty, 
 denied that the Trent was a parallel case, and main- 
 tained that the legitimacy of the capture and the dis- 
 position of the mails belonged by law to the courts 
 and not to the executive. 
 
 The President said ho had no distinct recollection 
 that the subject of captured mails had been brought 
 to his notice, but Mr. Seward was doubtless right for 
 it was his work. The Trent case he did not consider 
 analagous, but he thought the executive had perhaps 
 some rio^hts in the matter thouo-h he was not certain 
 what they were, nor what had been the practice. The 
 discussion closed by his saying he wished to be thor- 
 oughly informed on the subject, and in order to be in- 
 formed and to hold us each responsible for our posi- 
 tions he would address to us certain interrogatories 
 which we could respectively answer. Mr. Seward re- 
 marked that there was no time, that Lord Lyons was 
 pressing him, claiming that we had conceded the point. 
 I replied that Great Britian had no claim whatever 
 except under his note of the 31st of October which I 
 regarded as unofficial and of no authority until our 
 statutes were repealed. 
 
 On the next day I received from tlie President the 
 interrogatories addressed mutually to the Secretary of 
 State and myself which 1 insert with my answer. 
 
ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 99 
 
 "Executive Mansion, April 21, 1863. 
 " Hon. Secretaries of State and Navy. 
 
 " Gentlemen, 
 
 "It is 
 now a practical question for this government whether 
 a government mail of a neutral power, found on 
 board a vessel captured by a belligerent power, on 
 charge of breach of blockade, shall be forwarded to its 
 designated destination, without opening ; or shall be 
 placed in custody of the prize-court to be in the dis- 
 cretion of the court, opened and searched for evidence 
 to be used on the trial of the prize case. I will thank 
 each of you to furnish me : 
 
 " First, a list of all cases wherein such question has 
 been passed upon, either by a diplomatic or a judicial 
 decision, 
 
 " Secondly, all cases wherein mails under such cir- 
 cumstances have been without special discussion either 
 forwarded unopened, or detained and opened in search 
 of evidence. I wish these lists to embrace as well the 
 reported cases in the books generally, as the cases per- 
 taining to the j^resent war in the United States, 
 
 " Thirdly, a statement and brief argument of what 
 would be the dangers and evils of forwarding such mails 
 unopened, 
 
 " Fourthly, a statement and brief argument of what 
 would be the dangers and evils of detaining and oj^en- 
 ing such mails, and using the contents, if pertinent, as 
 evidence, 
 
 " And lastly, any general remarks that may occur to 
 you or either of you. 
 
 " Your Obed't Serv't, 
 
 " A. Lincoln." 
 
100 me. lincoln and mb. seward. 
 
 *'Navy Department, 
 
 April 25, 1863. 
 "Sir :— 
 
 " I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
 your communication of the 21st inst. in which you di- 
 rect me to furnish certain information, which is called for 
 by you in consequence of the application made by the 
 British Minister, Lord Lyons, for the delivery without 
 examination by the prize-court, of the government mail 
 found on board the Peterhoff ; a British vessel recently 
 captured and brought into the port of New York. 
 
 " This application had previously been made known to 
 this Department, and was urged upon it not as a request, 
 but, as I understood, a demand founded on a communi- 
 cation by which a right is assumed to have been yielded 
 by this government. 
 
 " It is, I believe, nowhere claimed by Lord Lyons or 
 the parties in interest, that by any law or usage of this 
 or any other country, or by any principle or practice 
 among nations that this examination should not be made, 
 but it is urged, or demanded that the mail shall be giv- 
 en up and the evidence essential to condemnation sur- 
 rendered, by reason of a letter from the Secretary of 
 State, under date of October 31st, 1862, addressed to the 
 Secretary of the Navy, suggesting instructions to our 
 naval officers. The proposed instructions would in my 
 judgment have been such a renimciation of the rights 
 of the nations and of the captors that the suggestions 
 were never carried into effect. 
 
 "The pretension that mail-bags found on board ves- 
 sels captured at sea, should be exempt from examination 
 by a prize-court appears to the Department not only 
 novel and startling, but, if admitted, pregnant with the 
 most serious consequences. A recognition of it would 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 101 
 
 seem to be nothing less than a surrender of all the 
 rights of the captor government in such courts. 
 
 " The Department, after inquiry, can find no pre- 
 cedent for such a pretension — no case in which it has 
 been either asserted diplomatically or affirmed judicially. 
 The right of examining all papers, of whatsoever 
 nature, found on board a captured vessel appears to have 
 been always exercised. 
 
 "Our own earliest statute on the subject, the Act of 
 March 2, 1789, for the Government of the Navy directs 
 that ; 
 
 " * All papers^ charter-parties bills of lading, pass- 
 ports, and other writings lohatsoever^ found on board any 
 ship or ships whicH shall be taken, shall be carefully pre- 
 served, and the originals sent to the courts of justice for 
 maritime affairs.' 
 
 So too the Act of April 23, 1800 : 
 
 " ' The commanding officers of every ship or vessel in 
 the navy, who shall capture or seize upon any vessel as 
 a prize, shall carefully preserve all the papers and writ- 
 ings found on board, and transmit the whole of the orig- 
 inals unmutilated to the judge of the district to which 
 such prize is ordered to proceed.' 
 
 "Our law on this subject is borrowed from the British 
 law and practice. The instructions of the King to 
 commanders of letters-of-marque, issued September 29, 
 1798, direct them to bring and deliver to the admiralty 
 judge: 
 
 " * All such papers, passes, sea-briefs, charter-parties, 
 bills of lading, cockets, letters and other documents and 
 writings as shall be delivered up ' or found on hoard 
 any ship.' (2 Rob. Appendix No. VIII.) 
 
 " It has never been pretended that these instructions, 
 which except no letters or papers whatsoever, whether 
 
102 ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWAKD. 
 
 contained in mail-bags or not, are in violation of inter- 
 national law. And yet for what purpose are all the 
 letters and writings found on board, without exception, 
 to be delivered to the admiralty judge if not to be used 
 as evidence in the case ? 
 
 " The * standing interrogatories' administered to all 
 witnesses in every prize, British, or American, direct 
 them to state under oath, — 16th Interrogate — 'What 
 papers, bills of lading, letters or other loritings were on 
 board the ship at the time she took her departure from 
 the last clearing port, before her being taken as a prize ? 
 Were any of them burnt, torn, thrown overboard, de- 
 stroyed or cancelled, or attempted to be concealed, and 
 when, and by whom, and who was then present? ' 
 
 " What necessity could exist for destroying or attempt- 
 ing to conceal ' letters or other writings' if, by simply 
 enclosing them in a mail-bag, they were exempted from 
 examination ? The very reason for destroying or 
 attempting to conceal them is, that the mail-bag is not 
 exempt from examination by the court. And the very 
 reason for making it all important to seek and find the 
 information concealed in letters is, that without such 
 information, there would hardly in any case be sufficient 
 proof to condemn a vessel. So far as it respects the 
 ordinary ship's papers — clearance, manifests, etc,, every 
 vessel would appear innocent. 
 
 " No rule can be better known,' says Sir Wm. Scott, 
 * than that neutral masters are not at liberty to destroy 
 papers ; or if they do, that they will not be permitted 
 to explain away such a suppression by saying they were 
 only private letters.' (The Two Brothers, 1 Rob. 134.) 
 
 " This rule, so well known, must have originated from 
 the practice of destroying papers, and such practice 
 necessarily implies the practice of searching for, seizing 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWAED. 103 
 
 and sending, in for judicial examination all papers, 
 including ' private letters.' 
 
 " Tlie British practice of seizing such private letters 
 and using them in evidence in the prize-court will 
 .appear from the case of the Roraea (6 Rob). The report 
 of the case shows that the commander of a British gun- 
 brig, in the exercise of the right of search, had stopped 
 an American vessel,' ' had examined her papers and 
 finding a letter which purported to disclose the real 
 state of a transaction which had been fraudulently 
 concealed, had sent the paper in question to the King's 
 proctor, officially, but without detaining the ship in 
 which it was found.' The letter was a private letter 
 having no relation to the vessel in which it was found, 
 or the cargo of that vessel, but, relating to another vessel. 
 
 "In the case of the Atlanta (6 Rob.), Sir Wm. Scott 
 refers to the case of the Lisette * which had carried a 
 Dutch packet in the Danish mail-hag.'' How could this 
 have been known but by examining the Danish mail-bag ? 
 
 " In the case of the Caroline (6 Rob.) dispatches from 
 the Minister and Consul of France in the United States 
 to the government of France were found on board an 
 American vessel. As it had never been decided and was 
 not in this case decided, that carrying such dispatches 
 was ground for condemnation, it is presumed that these 
 dispatches were not concealed on board the Caroline but 
 found in the ship's letter-bag. 
 
 " The practice of our courts, so far as is known, has 
 been in conformity with that of the British. Our 
 statute peremptorily directs that all * papers and 
 writings found on board ' a captured vessel shall be sent 
 to the district judge. The Department is not aware of 
 any exception taken to this law until very recently; 
 though in the numerous captures which have been made 
 
104 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 during the present war, mail-bags containing important 
 correspondence must have been frequently transmitted 
 to the prize-court. If there had been any violation of 
 international law or usage in this course it is not to be 
 doubted that we should have been very promptly 
 reminded of it, and in earnest terms. Yet it is not 
 until near the close of the second year of the war, that 
 anything in the nature of a remonstrance appears, and 
 then the remonstrance is, not against a departure from 
 international law or usage, but against the tenure of a 
 surrender of an independent and established right made 
 and communicated to the British Minister without 
 alleged authority from the President, and as is believed 
 by this Department, in direct contravention of the 
 ancient policy of this and other governments, and of the 
 rights and duties of captors as defined by statute. 
 
 " That there may be in the discretion of the prize- 
 court some exception to an indiscriminate examination 
 of all letters and writings found on board of a captured 
 ship, may be admitted in cases when such exception 
 does not interfere with the proper evidence ; and no 
 doubt such exceptions have been made in practice in 
 favor of official dispatches. They have been regulated, 
 however, not by strict international law, but rather as a 
 matter of comity between nations. 
 
 " If a mail-bag on board a captured vessel is to be 
 held sacred and free from judicial examination, what 
 security will there be that it does not conceal and 
 protect the proof which the captor requires to condemn 
 his prize, and which would be sufficient to condemn it ? 
 No government could give such assurance without a 
 previous examination of all the private letters admitted 
 into the bag. Few private individuals would be content 
 to have their letters examined by government officials, 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 105 
 
 before being admitted into the mail, although they 
 might be willing to run the risk of their being examined 
 by belligerents during the war. 
 
 *' And if individuals are willing to run this risk, why 
 should their government insist on protecting them 
 against it ? Why indeed, should the most exacting 
 government insist on anything more than that its own 
 dispatches, certified as such, or claimed as such by re- 
 sponsible officers, should, when known to be such, be free 
 from scrutiny. There would be little difficulty in 
 framing an arrangement to this effect, 
 
 " No such arrangement is now in existence, except, as 
 before stated, informally, perhaps by custom, and in con- 
 formity with the comity due to friendly or neutral govern 
 ments in reference to their admitted official dispatches. 
 
 " The instructions which were issued by this Depart- 
 ment on the 18th August last, to commanders of vessels 
 of the Navy, authorizing them to use their discretion in 
 delivering up government mails or dispatches found on 
 board captured vessels, to be opened and examined in 
 their presence, merely empowered them to exorcise a 
 comity towards neutral or friendly governments, the 
 exercise of which might be safely entrusted to those 
 who were on the spot, had the means of judging, and 
 being interested in the capture,, were not likely to show 
 undue indulgence. The only doubt entertained by me 
 as to those instructions was, whether they were in strict 
 conformity with our statute and with the rights of the 
 captors. But in deference to the State Department 
 communicating with foreign powers, it seemed possible 
 to presume that the Executive government here might 
 have so much discretionary power in such cases. 
 
 *' These instructions, however, I considered a stretch 
 of power on the part of this Department, and even of 
 5* 
 
106 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWAED. 
 
 the Executive, and when it was proposed shortly after 
 wards that they should be put in the form of a positive 
 injunction to forward immediately to their destination 
 all government mails found on captured vessels, a very 
 little reflection sufficed to convince me that no such 
 order ought to be issued. 
 
 " But unfortunately, it has been taken for granted that 
 a mere suggestion made without alleged authority by 
 the President, and by this Department at once objected to, 
 was carried into immediate execution ; and what is more 
 unfortunate, at least one foreign government has been led 
 apparently to adopt the very same erroneous conclusion. 
 
 " Such presumption is wholly unathorized and is incom- 
 patible with the nature and organization of our govern- 
 ment. Under our constitution and laws the Chief Ma- 
 gistrate gives, or is supposed to give, directly to the head 
 of each of the principal departments his orders in rela- 
 tion to the business of the departments respectively, and 
 this most especially in all matters oiiiatioyial importance. 
 
 " And in all matters — especially im23ortant matters — 
 affecting the international relations of the government, 
 or its rights as a belligerent, even the Chief Magistrate 
 might hesitate to adjust questions by an executive order, 
 but would prefer to make them the subject of reciprocal 
 treaty stipulations, duly considered and clearly expressed 
 to be submitted to the scrutiny of the body whose con- 
 currence is necessary. 
 
 " There is nothing to justify the presumption that this 
 government would at a time like the present, surrender 
 any of its belligerent rights by an executive order, in pur- 
 suance of a mere suggestion, not even reciprocal in its na- 
 ture, and especially when such concession would effect- 
 ually deprive it of all the advantages of the right of search. 
 
 "It is remarkable that in our traditional anxiety to 
 
ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 107 
 
 protect in treaty stipulations at every point all the rights 
 of neutrals, we have never attempted to reserve mails, 
 or mail-bags, or mail-matter from the scrutiny of a prize- 
 court. On the contrary we have always recognized 
 that by the law of prize, mail-matter may be contra- 
 band — for enemy's dispatches are mail matter and no 
 prize-court in the United States, or in any other country, 
 has ever doubted that they were contraband. In our 
 treaty with New Granada we stipulate for the inviola- 
 bility of correspondence on its land transit across the 
 istlniius from ocean to ocean, but we abstain from at- 
 tempting to make it inviolable on the sea. In our treaty 
 with the Argentine Republic we stipulate, reciprocally the 
 free access of mail-packets to the ports of the contracting 
 parties, but there is no record in the treaty, excepting 
 them or their mail-bags out of the belligerent right and 
 law of search and judicial examination. On the contrary, 
 Hautefeuille — perhaps the most eminent living publicist 
 of France, and known as preeminently the champion of 
 the lights of neutrals — in his very last publication, 
 elicited by the affair of the Trent, does not hesitate ex- 
 pressly to affirm, that no mail steam-packet can, in its 
 quality of a regular and recognized government mail- 
 carrier, claim immunity from search, and much less of 
 course from judicial examination. In the war with 
 Mexico we, as a mere favor, permitted the ingress of 
 British mail-steamers into Mexican blockaded ports. The 
 mail-steamer Teviot abused the indulgence by carrying 
 in the Mexican General Parades. We thereupon asserted 
 diplomatically, our right both to condemn the Teviot 
 and to withdraw the privilege from all the mail-packets. 
 The British government made no denial of our position 
 and settled the matter satisfactorily. [Mr. Bancroft to 
 Lord Palmerston, Oct. 8, 1847.] 
 
108 ME. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWARD. 
 
 "On these grounds of judicial authority, of ancient 
 practice, of statute law, and of public policy embodied 
 in treaty stipulations, it is considered to be clear and 
 unquestionable, that, in every case of capture of a ship 
 upon probable cause, every manuscript, or printed paper 
 found on board of her is liable in law to the inspection 
 of a prize-court. Indeed a part of the complaint of the 
 British government in the case of the Trent was, that the 
 vessel was not brought in for adjudication in order to 
 enable the court to determine whether or not she be a 
 good prize. It cannot be otherwise — for being so 
 captured, the ship is presumed to be in delicto — to be pro 
 hac vice, adhering to the enemy — by some form of vio- 
 lation of the belligerent right of the captor government; 
 and this predicament of the ship necessarily opens to the 
 tribunal all the proofs of guilt which the ship contains. 
 
 "But all this, though conclusive, is not the most im- 
 portant point involved in this inquiry. That point is 
 not the immunity of a government mail-bag from inspec- 
 tion by a prize-court, but it is the far higher and graver 
 point of the immunity of the jurisdiction of tlie prize- 
 court itself from executive interference. This trans- 
 cendent question has been fully settled by the unanimous 
 and unquestioned assent of all the departments of this 
 government. By the constitution and by the law, our 
 prize-courts, unlike those of England and other Euro- 
 pean powers are not a portion, or an appendage, or a 
 dependent of the political administration, but are a part 
 of the permanent organization of the judicial power, and 
 invested with its independence in the determination and 
 application of the law to all the cases of which they take 
 cognizance. 
 
 " In a whole series of treaties, beginning with the Con- 
 vention with France in 1800, and continuing down to 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 109 
 
 our latest treaties with Spanish America, we solemnly 
 stipulate that the prize-courts of the contracting parties 
 shall have exclusive cognizance and adjudication of all 
 questions of prize, and in case of condemnation, shall 
 render, and on demand certify, to claimants the grounds 
 of such condemnation. 
 
 " In our proclamation oj^ening New Orleans and other 
 ports to vessels from foreign ports, licensed by our con- 
 suls under authority of the President, we insert as a con- 
 dition of the license that the vessel shall carry no infor- 
 mation useful to the enemy, and the condition of her 
 clearance by our own collector for her return voyage is, 
 that he shall be satisfied and certify that in entering the 
 port, she has complied with the requirements of her 
 license. Must not the collector then have authority to 
 inspect the mail she brings ? And if our collector in 
 execution of our municipal law has such authority, can 
 we doubt that the prize-court has it under the broader 
 belligerent right of search and the law of war ? In our 
 recent treaty with Great Britain respecting the slave 
 trade, negotiated by the present Secretary of State, the 
 reciprocal right of search, established by that treaty con- 
 tains no exemption of mails, or mail-matter fi-om such 
 search. Suppose the PeterhofF had been brought in on 
 suspicion under that treaty, is there a doubt that every 
 paper on board of her could, in the discretion of the 
 court, be looked into in order to settle the question of 
 her guilt? We must remember that this question of the 
 mail on board of a captured ship is a question of evi- 
 dence against her. If the District Attorney may law- 
 fully threaten the court, that he will abandon the case 
 if the court looks into such evidence by reason of its be- 
 ing under an official seal, or lock, why may he not also 
 in his discretion make the same threat to the court on 
 
110 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 the question of its inspecting any other official paper — 
 the register, or clearance for example — which the ship 
 contains? But by the whole law all this is settled other- 
 wise. It is for the court under the law, and not for the 
 Executive, to determine what papers found on board the 
 prize-ship shall be inspected as evidence. 
 
 " No muniment by a foreign gOA^ernment can shield 
 any writing whatever found on board a captured ship 
 from such inspection, when deemed necessary by the 
 court in the due administration of justice. 
 
 " In repeated cases, and without doubt or denial, the 
 Supreme Court of the United States, with the full sanc- 
 tion of the Executive, has sat in judgment on the ques- 
 tion, not of inspecting for evidence the government niail- 
 bag, but as condemning as good prize a regularly docu- 
 mented vessel, or commissioned armed vessel, composing 
 part of the navy of a foreign friendly power. Three of 
 these cases — that of the Cassius in the 2d of Dallas, and 
 that of the Exchange in the Yth of Cranch and that 
 of La Jeune Eugenie, are reviewed by Mr. Attorney- 
 General Wirt in an official opinion given by him in the 
 year 1821. In these ca,ses not only the foreign Minister 
 claimed, hut the President was fully satisfied, that the 
 court could not condemn without infraction of the sov- 
 ereign right of a friendly power by reason of the public 
 character and commission of the ship. What happened ? 
 Did the President direct the court to release the ship, 
 or not proceed to adjudication ? Did the District At- 
 torney threaten to abandon the case if the court should 
 proceed? Quite the contrary. The President, through 
 the Attorney- General, came into court, and made sug- 
 gestion for the consideration of the court, as a part of 
 the fact in the case, that the Executive was satisfied the 
 ship was a public ship — such suggestion, no way manda- 
 
MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWAKD. Ill 
 
 tory in its character, but leaving open to the unswayed 
 determination of the court all the evidence and the 
 whole question of prize or no prize, was the uttermost 
 limit to which the Executive deemed it right to proceed. 
 The very careful language of Attorney-General Wirt on 
 this point merits your special attention. It may be found 
 in vol. I of ' Opinions of Attorneys-General,' page 505. 
 
 " In the late case of the Amisted, 15 Pet. Rep., page 
 587, the claim of Spain made in virtue of its sovereign 
 right, even when supported by the admission of our Ex- 
 ecutive, was to the great satisfaction of the country 
 overruled by the prize-court, and the Executive did not 
 contest the validity of its decree. [See for citation, 
 with approval of these cases, Wheaton's Elements, sec- 
 ond edition by Lawrence, page 969, et seq.] 
 
 "These cases are as strong as any which can possibly 
 be imagined, to show the absolute independence of our 
 prize-courts in the adjudication of the most transcendent 
 claims of foreign sovereignties, when presented in cases 
 of prize ; and the acknowledged immunity of these tri- 
 bunals from any species of dictation or interference by 
 the executive government. 
 
 *' In the presence of such precedents, is it not clear 
 that the prize-court has full right to examine the mail- 
 bag found on board of a captured vessel, which doubt- 
 less contains conclusive evidence of her liability to con- 
 demnation ? 
 
 " I observe that the terms of your letter refer only to 
 vessels captured for alleged violation of the blockade. 
 I suppose this restriction to be accidental, and that you 
 intend the inquiry to extend to mails found on board of 
 vessels captured for any cause as prize of war. The case 
 of the Peterhoff, as I understand it, is not one of viola- 
 ted blockade, but a case of contraband. 
 
112 MR. LINCOLN AN.T> MR. SEWARD. 
 
 " I observe also that your letter makes no reference to 
 the question as to which department of the government 
 is the proper organ to convey any suggestion from the 
 President to the prize-court ; nor does it refer to the 
 question which of the heads of department is the statu- 
 tory organ of the President to convey instructions to 
 the District Attorneys of the United States. It is in my 
 opinion important to the interest of the public service 
 and to the good order of executive business, that there 
 should be no conflict or misapprehension as to the char- 
 acter of the instructions to such officers, and T therefore 
 beg leave to refer you to the recent Act of Congress of 
 August 2, 1861, which in the pressure of your cares may 
 have escaped your attention. It places the District At- 
 torneys, in the conduct of all their official business, under 
 the exclusive superintendence and direction of the At- 
 torney-General, as the organ of the President. 
 
 " The court had it appears no hesitation as to its rights 
 and duty to examine the mails of the Peterhoff, nor had 
 the District Attorney. The court was proceeding to 
 exercise its duty in conformity to law and usage when it 
 was estopped by an order to the District Attorney — not 
 emanating from, or conveyed through that department 
 of the government to which he is by law attached — di- 
 recting him to demand the surrender of the mail and 
 with it of course the evidence therein contained. 
 
 " Now if the mails or captured vessels are to be for- 
 warded to their designated destination, without inspec- 
 tion, and the evidence which they contain thereby denied 
 to the captors, should not the chief law officer of the 
 government be aware of the authority for so extraordi- 
 nary a proceeding, whereby important national rights 
 have been renounced and the rights of captors surren- 
 dered ? It appears to me that if the suggestions of the 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 113 
 
 31st of October, which effect so great, and in my judg- 
 ment so calamitous a revolution in the law of search, 
 capture and adjudication, are to govern our national 
 forces, that not only the officers of the navy, but the 
 District Attorneys, the judges, and all authorities of our 
 own and other countries should be promptly informed of 
 this great change of policy, by an immediate and formal 
 publication to that effect. 
 
 ' In conclusion, I have no doubt that, even under 
 the British rule as laid down in Earl Russell's recent 
 communication to Mr. Spence, the Peterhoff, was right- 
 fully captured and is liable to condemnation for carry- 
 ing contraband, ostensibly to Mataraoras, but with con- 
 tingent destination to Brownsville. I still hope that 
 sufficient evidence yet remains in the reach of the court 
 to condemn this vessel and cargo, but I greatly fear 
 that such evidence, even in this case may have been ir- 
 reparably lost by the unfortunate surrender of the mail. 
 However this may be in the present instance, I cannot 
 doubt that if this case becomes a precedent, in future all 
 documentary evidence to condemn any such ship will be 
 concealed in her mail-bag, and no papers but innocent 
 ones will be found outside of it. If so, condemnation 
 of the guiltiest ship will become almost an impossibility 
 while her capture may saddle her captors — who will 
 only have done their duty — Avith heavy costs and dama- 
 ges, and probably the government with heavy claims 
 for indemnification to the guilty party, whom its ill-or- 
 dered surrender of a clear right shall have enabled to 
 conceal his guilt from the judicial eye. 
 
 " I most respectfully and earnestly invoke your se- 
 rious and careful consideration of the evil consequences 
 that must follow from this calamitous state of things. 
 Already 3[r. Spence, the Confederate Agent, has an- 
 
114: ME. LIXCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 nounced that the Peterhoff which had previously once 
 run the blockade is but one of a line of four steam- 
 ers, owned by him and destined to carry goods un- 
 questionably contraband to Matamoras. The Peterhoff 
 precedent, as it now stands, arms him with power to set 
 at defiance all our efforts to stop such trade though its 
 ultimate destination be undoubtedly to Brownsville ; 
 for under this precedent, he will assuredly hereafcer put 
 the proof of the guilt of his vessels into the mail-bag and 
 so beyond our reach. Thus, by our own act, done as I 
 think in derogation of the unquestionable right of our 
 prize-court, we shall furnish to our enemies an abun- 
 dant supply of the munitions of war through the port of 
 Matamoras. In this view I perceive with satisfaction 
 that the prize-court has placed its surrender cf the 
 mail-bag exclusively, and only upon the request of the 
 government, made known through the District Attor- 
 ney. After careful consideration, I think that the court 
 erred in yielding to this request, so expressed. I trust, 
 however, that it is not yet too late for the government to 
 retrieve its mistake, at least in part, by taking action and 
 making such declarations as Avill prevent the case of the 
 Peterhoff from becoming a precedent for the future sur- 
 render by the court of lawful and necessary evidence. 
 
 " If we go on as we have begun in the Peterhoff 
 case, we shall find ourselves inconsiderately relinquish- 
 ing an undoubted national right, not by consent of the 
 people or with the approval of the government — not by 
 treaty with reciprocal advantages, but by voluntary re- 
 nunciation of an indispensable right in all naval cap- 
 tures in cases of contraband or breach of blockade. 
 
 " Besides national abnegation, a cruel wrong is done 
 the gallant men of our navy, who will be liable to 
 censure if they do not capture, and who- are to be 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 115 
 
 deprived by their own government of the evidence that 
 would sustain them. 
 
 *' I am Sir, with great respect, 
 " Your ob'd't serv't, 
 ■ " Gideon Welles, 
 
 " S>ec'Vy of JSTavy:' 
 ** The President." 
 
 Mr. Seward's answer to the the interrogatories I 
 never saw, though I think the President promised me 
 the perusal, or a copy, but the subject passed away, 
 and I do not remember that it was ever again alluded to. 
 Sometime after — about the close of the war, I met in 
 the published deplomatic correspondence the following : 
 
 *' Department of State, 
 Washington, April 21, 18G3." 
 " Sir :— 
 
 " The Peterhoff will be left to the care of the courts. 
 Her mail will be forwarded to its destination unopened. 
 I shall, however, improve the occasion to submit some 
 views upon the general question of the immunities to 
 public mails found on board of vessels visited under the 
 belligerent right of search. The subject is one attended 
 by many embarrassments, while it is of great impor- 
 tance. The President believes that it is not less desira- 
 ble to Great Britain than it is to the United States and 
 other maritime powers, to arrive at some regulation that 
 will at once save the mails of neutrals from unnecessary 
 interruption and exposure, and at the same time prevent 
 them from being made use of as auxiliaries to unlawful 
 designs of irresponsible persons seeking to embroil 
 friendly states in the calamities of war. 
 
 " I am Sir, your ob'd't serv't, 
 
 "William H. Seward." 
 "Charles Francis Adams, Esq." 
 
116 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 I need not comment on this letter, written months 
 after the Seca-etarj of State in his letter of the 31st of 
 October had assumed without consultation or advise- 
 ment to overturn and dispose of a long-settled question 
 which involved the efficcietit and proper administration 
 of another department of the government and the gov- 
 ernment itself — an assumption in derogation of usage 
 and a violation of law, on the ground that he deemed 
 it expedient. In the workings and disposition of this 
 subject the orator who delivered the '' Memorial Ad- 
 dress'' has an exposition of that "solid power to direct 
 affairs for the benefit of the nation through the name 
 of another" which he asserts was exercised by Mr. 
 Seward, a " superior in native intellectual power" to 
 Mr. Lincoln. The latter anxious to extricate the 
 Secretary of State and the country from its dilemma 
 on becoming acquainted with the facts, the law and 
 usage, thought it desirable that Great Britain and the 
 other maritime powers should *' arrive at some regula- 
 tion" in regard to captured mails. He was not aware 
 and Mr. Seward persisted in denying, that the question 
 belonged to the courts, yet in the characteristic letter 
 to Mr. Adams he admits " the subject is one attended 
 by many embarrassments while it is of great impor- 
 tance." This important subject and its ''many em- 
 barrassments" all of which by usage and international 
 and statute law belonged to the courts, he, without 
 consultation with the Cabinet, without the assent of 
 the Senate, without the action of Congress, undertook 
 to dispose of in a flippant letter to a subordinate of 
 the English legation, by giving up without condi^tion 
 or equivalent our undisputed right. AYorse than the 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 117 
 
 original mistake, for it was doubtless a mistake of his 
 authority, he refused to retract, and when he became 
 informed, persisted in error to the detriment of the 
 naval service and the injury of the country. What 
 farther views, if any, he ever presented I am not 
 informed. ^N'or, after our frequent passages on the 
 subject, did he submit to me the letter addressed by 
 order of the President, to Mr. Adams. The English 
 government less willing to renounce a right than our 
 Secretary of State, received with complacency our 
 obsequious surrender in the case of the Peterhoff, but 
 entered into no arrangement for renunciation on their 
 part nor am I aware that the abandonment of our 
 right was farther insisted upon after the subject was 
 canvassed. 
 
 English enterprise, if not English diplomacy from 
 the commencement to the close of our domestic diffi- 
 culties was vigilant and unceasing in schemes to evade 
 the blockade and establish intercourse with the rebels, 
 of which the non-examination of the mails seemed a 
 part. The western borders of Texas, where there was 
 no military force to guard the frontiers, opened the 
 way for illicit traffic which was hastily improved. 
 The attention of the Secretary of State was repeatedly 
 called to this subject with suggestion that we could 
 not have a thorough blockade in the southwest under 
 the existing state of things ; but that an arrangement 
 might be made with Mexico in relation to the naviga- 
 tion of the Rio Grande which was the boundary be- 
 tween the two countries, and that being a mutual 
 highway, we could not close, nor could we but by con- 
 sent of Mexico, interdict or regulate trade upon that 
 
118 ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 river. An immense commerce sprang np with the 
 neutral port of Matamoras which became for a period 
 a great commercial mart, but it was notoriously iUicit 
 trade with the rebels through Brownsville. This 
 fraudulent and evasive traffic was stimulated and en- 
 couraged by the assurance which the Secretary of 
 State had given to England, of immunity to the mails. 
 Information of this renunciation of our right of search 
 was promptly communicated to the British public, by 
 an announcement of the fact on the floor of Parlia- 
 ment. A line of British mail-packets to Matamoras, 
 of which the Peterhoff, an old blockade-runner was 
 one, was speedily established in the confident belief 
 that a vessel with a mail and clearance to a neutral 
 port, though carrying letters and freight fraudulently 
 for Brownsville and the insurgent region, would escape 
 capture, for the mails which could not be examined 
 would cover the evidence of guilt. My suggestions 
 that a treaty or arrangement might be made with the 
 Mexican republic, by which we might blockade the 
 Pio Grande were unheeded, lest we should' give of- 
 fence to Louis ^^apoleon who was sustaining the em- 
 pire of Maximilian. The case of the Peterhoff and her 
 mails demonstrated that a great diplomatic error had 
 been committed. The Secretary of State had of his 
 own motion, against law and without Cabinet consulta- 
 tion abandoned a national and indispensable belliger- 
 ent right without an equivalent, without mutual ar- 
 rangement or reciprocity. England would enter into 
 no arrangement that required the surrender of the 
 right which the Secretary of State had inconsiderately 
 and without authoritv renounced. The act was our 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWARD. 119 
 
 own. It was declared in Parliament that " Earl Rus- 
 sell considered that this was not an arrangement be- 
 tween her Majesty's government and the government 
 of the United States, but simply an arrangement made 
 by the government of the United States for the direc- 
 tion of their own cruisers.'' 
 
 Mr. E. Delafield Smith, District Attorney for the 
 United States, who under direction of Mr. Seward 
 withdrew the mail from the court and delivered it to 
 the British consul also said in his argument before the 
 United States court : 
 
 " The withdrawal from the registry of the court of 
 the public mail of Great Britain and its delivery 
 through us to the Consul of that country to be by him 
 forwarded to its professed destination, will be cited by 
 the respective counsel for the captors and the claim- 
 ants. Each will insist that the mail might have pro- 
 duced witnesses in favor of his clients. As it was thus 
 disposed of at my instance (under Mr. Seward), I shall 
 aro^ue nothino; from its absence, and shall seek to infer 
 nothing from the silence of the claimants when I ap- 
 plied for its release. They unquestionably in that 
 silence acted in accordance with the wishes of their 
 government, as I, in my application, cornplied with the 
 policy of my oivn.''' 
 
 A few days after the renunciation of our national 
 right to placate England, Senator Sumner met Lord 
 Lyons at the house of Tassara, the Spanish Minister, 
 and expressed to him his regret that, taking advantage 
 of the peculiar condition of our affairs, he should have 
 made a demand on our o-overnment which could not 
 be yielded without national dishonor ; and remarked 
 
120 MR. LTXCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 that the subject of examining all letters and papers on 
 prizes was well settled bj the law of nations, and that 
 questions relating to mails on captured vessels were 
 judicial rather than diplomatic. Lord Lyons dis- 
 avowed ever having made a demand ; said he was 
 careful and guarded in all his transactions with Mr. 
 Seward, and made it a point to reduce every question 
 with him to writing. He authorized Mr. Sumner to 
 examine his whole correspondence with the State 
 Department ; said he had of course been gratified with 
 the voluntary renunciation by Mr. Seward of the right 
 to search the mails ; and when, contrary to the promise 
 tendered by the Secretary of State, the mails were 
 carried into court, he had called Mr. Seward's atten- 
 tion to his own letter of the 31st of October to the 
 Secretary of the Xavy, abandoning the right ; but he 
 had exacted nothing, made no demand, and merely 
 asked him to do as he had promised. 
 
 "When Mr. Sumner on the following day reported 
 this interview with the British Minister, the President 
 was filled with astonishment, and said, in his emphatic 
 manner, " I shall have to cut this knot." 
 
 Of what advantage to the Executive or the country 
 was the greater experience of the Secretary of State 
 in this instance? He had been twelve years in the 
 Senate, and by a dash of the pen, in a note of six lines, 
 he, against usage — against both national'and inter- 
 national law — without the action of Congress — without 
 consulting President or Cabinet — without the consent 
 of the people or the approval of the government — 
 without a treaty with reciprocal advantages — without 
 authority of any kind, assumed the power to relinquish 
 
MR. LINGO LH" AND MR. SEWARD. 121 
 
 and renounce an indispensable national right in naval 
 captures. If the President, from friendship or 
 sympathy, was influenced to shield or sustain the 
 Secretary of State in his distressing embarrassment, 
 it was under circumstances which will be rightly 
 appreciated. It is one of many cases which exhibit 
 the workings of the Administration — the " positive 
 qualities" and real merits and course of action of the 
 President and Secretary of State — the confiding nature 
 of the former and the influence exercised by the latter ; 
 and from facts like these, a judgment may be formed 
 how far the country and posterity are likely to " award 
 honors to Mr. Lincoln that clearly belong to Mr. 
 Seward." Let neither be robbed of the honors he 
 earned, or of the just merits to which he is entitled. 
 
 The Peterhofl[' was an advance steamer of a pro- 
 posed line of packets which were to convey mails and 
 supplies, ostensibly to Matamoras, but with contin- 
 gent destination for Texas. The whole scheme was 
 deliberately planned to evade the blockade, and open 
 for the rebels free communication abroad throu2:h 
 British mails, via the Kio Grande ; and the Secretary 
 of State flattered and seduced, I need not say intimi- 
 dated by the British legation, had without authority 
 by law or by treaty, abandoned a principle and given 
 the parties immunity by his ill-advised letter renoun- 
 cing the national right to search the mails. After the 
 mails of tlie Peterhofl' were given up, that vessel 
 or her appraised value was restored to her owners 
 for the want of sufiicient evidence to condemn 
 her, a heavy loss to the captors and to the govern- 
 ment ; but the parties in the Matamoras line became 
 6 
 
122 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 involved in a legal controversy in'tlie English courts 
 after the war was over, when it was made evident that 
 the vessel was actually good prize, and it is understood 
 the evidence which would have insured her condemna- 
 tion was in the mails that were surrendered. 
 
 Differences existed in the Cabinet and the conn- 
 try in 1861 on some of the measures and the course of 
 policy which the government should pursue toward the 
 secessionists. The questions presented were in some 
 respects novel and without precedent, as was the insur- 
 rection itself. Hostilities were precipitated within 
 forty days of the inauguration, before the administra- 
 t'on was fully established in place, or had time to de- 
 velop its policy. The assault on the flag at Charles- 
 ton compelled immediate action. The proclamation 
 promptly issued for seventy-five thousand volunteers, 
 also declared a Wockale of the Southern ports. There 
 was entire unanimity in the Cabinet on all points in 
 the proclamation except that of a blockade, which was 
 questioned as a doubtful and irregular proceeding ; for 
 the conflict, whether an insurrection or rebellion, was 
 purely domestic — a civil war, and not a foreign war ; 
 and it was thought the internal dissensions in our own 
 territory should be confined within our own borders. 
 A majority of the Cabinet, therefore, preferred an 
 embargo or suspension of intercourse with that part 
 of the country, to a blockade, and maintained it to be 
 the true policy of the government to close the ports 
 and interdict commerce with the insurgents until the 
 rebellion was suppressed. It was claimed that a block- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 123 
 
 ade was not a domestic but an international question 
 — legitimate and proper as between two distinct na- 
 tions, but that we could not properly blockade our own 
 ports, though we might shut them up, prohibit traffic 
 from abroad by law, and make its violation a criminal 
 offence ; that the very fact of a blockade of the w^hole 
 rebel territory would raise the insurgents to the level 
 of belligerents — a concession to the Confederate organ- 
 ization virtually admitting it to be a quasi government 
 — giving that organization a position among nations 
 that we would not and could not recognize or sanction, 
 and which would inevitably lead to embarrassments. 
 But the subject was in some of its aspects novel, and 
 the Secretary of State, though sometimes rash, had not 
 the bold and vigorous mind to assert and maintain a 
 right principle, if fraught with doubt and difficulty, 
 provided there was an easier path. The blockade, he 
 thought, opened up a way. The questions of blockade 
 were well settled and clearly defined, the authority 
 and precedents explicit ; and he therefore preferred to 
 adopt that course, shelter himself under those prece- 
 dents, and apply international law to a strictly national 
 and domestic controversy, rather than assert a measure 
 and vindicate an important principle affecting nation- 
 al rights. Less was said, in the confusion and proceed- 
 ings which came like an avalanche at that critical mo- 
 ment upon the Administration, than at a later period. 
 Two members of the Cabinet, Messrs. Cameron and 
 Caleb Smith said they had bestowed very slight exam- 
 ination upon the subject, and as it related to foreign 
 intercourse they deferred to the Secretary of State, 
 who had given it special attention, and also cited au- 
 
12^^ MR. LIXCOLX AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 thorities justifying an exclusion of commerce from 
 national ports in the equitable form of blockade. Pres- 
 ident Lincoln inclined to that view, and when Mr. 
 Seward asserted that one great object of the blockade 
 instead of a closure of the ports was to avoid complica- 
 tions which would be likely to involve us in a foreign 
 war, the question was decided. The President said 
 we could not afford to have two wars on our hands at 
 once, and a blockade of our own ports and collection 
 districts was ordered. The authority and the right 
 of the national government to close ports within its 
 jurisdiction was controverted by no one, though a 
 blockade was. Mr. Seward himself, in his dispatch 
 of the 8th of June 1861, to Mr. Adams, said : "We 
 claim to have a right to close the ports which have 
 been seized by insurrectionists for the purpose of sup- 
 pressing the attempted revolution, and no one could 
 justly complain if we had done so decisively and per- 
 emptorily." But the English Government, as soon as 
 information crossed the Atlantic of differences in the 
 American Cabinet, made haste to force us to adhere 
 to the blockade, which would be an acknowledgment 
 of belligerent rights to the rebels, by indirectly ad- 
 monishing us of its views and intentions in a debate 
 promptly got np in Parliament for the purpose on the 
 2Tth of June, immediately on the receipt of Mr. Sew- 
 ard's dispatch. Lord John Eussell in that debate an- 
 nounced the interpolation of a new doctrine by the 
 British Government into international law, by declar- 
 ing to the feeble government of Xew Granada, '^ It 
 is not competent for its government to close its ports 
 that are de/acto in possession of the insurgents." 
 
MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWAKD. 125 
 
 The debate, ostensibly on the affairs of ISTew 
 Granada, was evidently and unmistakably intended as 
 an admonition and menace to the United States, then 
 engaged in suppressing insurrection. In a dispatch 
 of the 28th of June from our Minister in London, just 
 twenty days after Mr. Seward's dispatch of the 8th 
 of June claiming our right to close the ports, Mr. 
 Adams wrote the Secretary of State that in an inter- 
 view with Lord John Eussell, " His lordship then 
 said something about difficulties in New Granada, and 
 the intelligence that the insurgents had undertaken to 
 close several of their ports. Bat the law officers here 
 told him that this could not be done as ao^ainst foreiorn 
 nations, excepting by the regular form of blockade. 
 He did not know wliat we thought about it, but he 
 had observed that some such plan was likely to be 
 adopted at the coming session of Congress in regard 
 to the ports of those wdiom^ we considered as insur- 
 gents." His lordship also on the 2Tth of June an- 
 nounced in Parliament that " the opinion of Her 
 Majesty's Government after taking legal advice is, 
 that it is perfectly competent for the government of a 
 country in a state of tranquillity to say which ports 
 shall be open to trade and which shall be closed ; but 
 in the event of insurrection or civil war in that coun- 
 try, it is not competent for its government to close its 
 ports that are de facto in the hands of the insurgents, 
 as that would be an invasion of international law with 
 regard to blockade." 
 
 Congress when it convened in special session in 
 July, a few days after this English menace, totally 
 unmindful of " the opinion of Her Majesty's Govern- 
 
126 MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 ment after taking legal advice," but imder the counsel 
 and deliberate conclusion of our wisest and ablest 
 legislators and statesmen, and in total disregard of 
 the policy of our own Secretary of State as well as of 
 Her Majesty's Government, declined to commit itself 
 to the blockade, and in explicit and emphatic language 
 authorized by the Act of the 13th of July, a closure of 
 the ports. Mr. Seward was constrained, under these 
 circumstances and under the direction of President 
 Lincoln, on the 21st of July, to tell Mr. Adams that 
 " Since your conversation with Lord John Eussell, the 
 Congress of the United States has by law asserted the 
 right of this government to close the ports of this 
 country which have been seized by the insurgents. 
 The connecting by Lord John Russell of that measure 
 when it was in prospect with what had taken place in 
 regard to a law of New Granada, gives to the remarks 
 which he made to you a significance that requires no 
 especial illustration. The President fully agrees v/ith 
 Congress in the principle of the law which authorizes 
 liim to close the ports which have been seized by the 
 insurgents, and he will put into execution and main- 
 tain it with all the means at his command, at the 
 hazard of whatever consequences, whenever it shall 
 appear that the safety of the nation requires it." 
 
 It is not expedient, perhaps, to follow up in its 
 details a subject not particularly creditable to our 
 diplomacy and to the maintenance of our national 
 rights, further than to allude briefly to the historic 
 facts. The brave words of the Secretary of State, 
 uttered on the 21st of July, were not enforced. Mr. 
 Adams, in a dispatch of the 16th of August, says he 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 127 
 
 took occasion to intimate to Lord John Ilussell that 
 *' he must not infer from my not having entered into 
 discussion of the merits of the question, that I gave 
 any assent to the position taken by him about the 
 right of a government to close its own ports, when 
 held b}^ forcible possession of persons resisting its 
 authority. On the contrary, I desired to reserve for 
 my government the treatment of it as an open ques- 
 tion whenever it should take any practical shape. In 
 the mean time I had every reason to believe that it 
 was the design of the President to persevere in the 
 blockade," etc. His lordship declared in Parliament, 
 however, that he considered the law of Congress ''as 
 merely giving a discretionary power. But if carried 
 into practice, he construed it. as putting an end to the 
 blockade." Under these threats our government 
 tamely submitted. The law of Congress was not 
 carried into effect, our diplomacy was meek and yield- 
 ing, and under British menace the blockade of our 
 own ports, by our own ships, w^as continued. 
 
 On the 2d of September the Secretary of State, 
 with some trepidation, informed the Minister that " no 
 change of policy in regard to the blockade has been 
 adopted'' — a timid intimation of acquiescence in an 
 insult and injury, to appease British arrogance ; her 
 ministry believing and asserting tliat an effective 
 blockade of our extensive coast was impossible, but 
 that in no other way than by blockade could com- 
 merce be interdicted. Our government did not order 
 the ports to be closed but under the hint given by the 
 English dictum to jSTew Granada, it abstained from ex- 
 ercising the national authority within that part of the 
 
128 MR. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWAED. 
 
 territory of the United States that was in insurrec- 
 tion, and was passive and submissive. In all this time, 
 while treating the Confederates as belligerents, and 
 their organization as a quasi government, the Secre- 
 tary of State, with strange inconsistency, denounced 
 their cruisers as pirates. 
 
 Kot until the 11th of April, 1865, after Eichmond 
 had fallen, and only three days before the assassination 
 of President Lincoln, was a proclamation issued, in 
 pursuance of the Act of Congress of the 13th of July, 
 1861, to close the ports of the Southern States. Until 
 the war had virtually ceased, the law of Congress was 
 not enforced. The British mandate to New Granada 
 was submissively acquiesced in and obsequiously ob- 
 served by the United States. Our ports were not 
 closed, but blockaded, which eventuated, as was in- 
 tended, in estabhshing throughout the war the English 
 ports of I^assau, Bermuda, and Halifax as entrepots 
 for ilhcit traffic with the rebels and resorts for rebel 
 cruisers, to harass and destroy our commerce. It 
 opened the English ports throughout the world to the 
 Alabama, and rovers of her class, which swept our 
 merchant ships from the ocean for the benefit of 
 England. 
 
 On the subject of a blockade of our own ports by 
 our own vessels, Mr. Seward had undoubtedly, for 
 good or for evil, influence with the President, which 
 outweighed a majorit}^ of the Cabinet and Congress. 
 The subject was new to him wdien his decision was 
 given, and the blockade being made effective by the 
 navy, he did not care to re-open a disturbing question, 
 though his views became modiiied, and ultimately the 
 
MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 129 
 
 ports were closed, notwithstanding the Enghsh dictum 
 to New Granada. 
 
 The management of our foreign affairs, and the 
 maintenance of our rights against the pretensions and 
 menaces of the arrogant ministry of England, thus 
 commenced, was continued, until intelligent English- 
 men themselves were surprised if not disgusted with 
 our subsersdencj. After the shameful renunciation 
 of our right to send into the courts, mails from captur- 
 ed vessels — a right recognized and established by the 
 usage of nations, and made a duty by our own stat- 
 utes — an eminent English publicist, Sir Yernon Har- 
 court amazed at our submissive and pusillanimous di- 
 plomacy, warned his government against proceeding 
 too far in its demands, " for," said he ; " what we have 
 most to fear is not that Americans will yield too little 
 hut that ice shall accept too inuchr A humiliating 
 commentary on our diplomacy, by an English writer 
 of no mean ability. 
 
 The efforts of the secessionists to bring about a 
 dissolution of the Union on the pretext that slavery in 
 the states was in danger, in consequence of the suc- 
 cess of the Republicans in 1860, and that new guarantees 
 were required to protect the institution, had the effect 
 of increasing the anti-slavery feeling in the free states. 
 Until the attempts to secede from the Union and throw 
 the country into dissevered sections, the fundamental 
 law was strictly observed and adhered to throughout the 
 whole North, and the right of each state to regulate its 
 own affairs, its industrial pursuits, its domestic institu- 
 6* 
 
130 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 tions, the condition of its people in tlie matter of 
 servitude, of debtor and creditor, including imprison- 
 ment for debt, and punishment for criminal offences 
 was respected. The serious agitation of the slavery 
 question had its origin in fact with the nullifiers. After 
 their defeat, as a party on the tariff issue and the futile 
 claim of intolerable burdens by reason of high duties 
 on imposts, which they had striven to make a political 
 party test, the South Carolina politicians changed their 
 tactics and professed to be greatly alarmed by the 
 petitions of the Quakers and a few fanatics as extreme 
 as the nullifiers themselves, and vastly inferior in num- 
 bers and talents, who — regardless of constitutional ob- 
 ligations and limitations, asked for the abolition of 
 slavery by the general government. 
 
 So pronounced and universal was the sentiment of 
 the IN'orth against this feeble sect, that politicians and 
 public men denounced their doctrines and were careful 
 to be in no way committed to, or connected with them. 
 Abolition was as unpopular with both the great parties 
 of the North as the South, but it pleased the Nullifiers 
 to make indiscriminate war upon the free states and to 
 classify the whole North as abolitionists inimical to the 
 South and southern institutions. Disclaimers and disa- 
 vowals were of no avail with the men who had a party 
 purpose to accomplish by these deliberate misrepresen- 
 tations. On the abstract question of slavery there was 
 but one sentiment throughout the free states ; but this 
 sentiment, for it was a sentiment — could not overcome 
 the deep and sacred regard for constitutional obligations. 
 On no political subject was there more unity, than that 
 the rights of the states should be respected and observed 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 131 
 
 on the question of slavery. But the Kullifiers started 
 to be aggressive, and with a determination to be the 
 ascendant party in the government or to subvert it. 
 The means resorted to for uniting the South irrespec- 
 tive of parties on this local question were, by creating 
 alarm in the slave states — stating the free states were 
 aggressive — warning the slave ownei'S that their prop- 
 erty was in jeopardy — demanding new guarantees for 
 its security — promoting sectional animosity and some 
 of them requiring a dual executive. 
 
 Mr. Seward who, according to Mr. Adams, had in 
 182tt made ^' a deliberate claim of a right in the federal 
 government to emancipate slaves by legislation," 
 abandoned in the winter of 1861, this original position 
 aiid proposed an amendment to the constitution guar- 
 anteeing the perpetuation of slavery so far as the gen- 
 eral government was concerned by prohibiting Congress 
 through all time and under all circumstances from ex- 
 ercising " any power to abolish or interfere in any state 
 with the domestic institutions thereof, including that 
 of persons lield to service or labor by the laws of said 
 state." Politicians of the Jefferson school, less prac- 
 tical, in the judgment of Mr. Adams, than Mr. Seward 
 (for Jefferson never admitted "a right in the federal 
 government to emancipate slaves,''), were averse to this 
 extraordinary proposition which was presented as a 
 peace-offering and a compromise by one who, accord- 
 ins^ to the "Memorial Address" ouo^lit to have been 
 made President instead of Mr. Lincoln. 
 
 When at length, after more than twenty years of 
 declamation, agitation, persistent aggression and delib- 
 erate misrepresentation, the country became involved 
 
132 MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 in civil war on the subject of slaveiy, it is not surpris- 
 ing that many who had until this time adhered to and 
 maintained the constitutional safeguards, deprecated 
 the cause of dissension and disunion and wished it 
 removed. The rebellion rapidly increased the anti- 
 slavery sentiment everywhere, and politicians shaped 
 their course accordingly. On the wave of this anti- 
 slavery excitement the Secretary of State and the 
 British Minister in the spring of 1862 negotiated a 
 treaty for the suppression of the African slave-trade, 
 a revival of which had been threatened by the seces- 
 sionists in the cotton-growing states. If other and 
 ulterior purposes were designed, it was an adroit 
 movement on the part of the English diplomat who 
 availed himself of the popular feeling which in free 
 governments influences public men. The Secretary 
 of State very naturally fell in with a movement which 
 was in harmony with public sentiment and the current 
 of affairs. The treaty was quietly negotiated. I 
 knew nothing of it until after its ratification, for it 
 was not submitted for Cabinet consultation in any 
 stage of its progress. AVhen promulgated in the 
 second year of the war, it did not create the sensation 
 which might have been expected. Other and more 
 exciting matters absorbed the public mind. There 
 beo:an to be a conviction that not only tlie slave-traffic 
 but slavery itself was doomed. I do not remember 
 to have seen or read the treaty until after it had been 
 ratified and duly exchanged by both governments. A 
 certified copy was sent me by the Secretary of State 
 about the first of September, and also a copy of a 
 singular arrangement, con tract, or treaty negotiated or 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 133 
 
 entered into by the Secretary of the Interior under 
 advisement of the Secretary of State and the Charge 
 d 'affaire's of Denmark relative to the colonization in 
 the West Indies of negroes captured under the treaty. 
 On the 17th of September I received the following 
 letter from the Secretary of State with a list of some 
 twenty or thirty naval vessels in Her Majesty's service, 
 and a copy of the instructions of the British govern- 
 ment to the respective commanders. 
 
 "Department of State, 
 
 17 Sept. 1862." 
 "Sir:— 
 
 " I have the honor to invite your attention to the 
 enclosed copy of a communication of the 13th inst. from 
 the British Charge d'affaires here, embracing the 
 instructions which it is intended to furnish to the com- 
 manders of Her Brittannic Majesty's cruisers who may 
 be employed in carrying out the provisions of the recent 
 slave-trade treaty between the United States and Great 
 Britain as well as lists of Her Majesty's several ships 
 employed on the African, North American and AYest 
 India stations, whose commanders will be authorized to 
 act under the treaty and asking for a similar list of 
 United States cruisers. 
 
 " I am sir, your ob'd't serv't, 
 
 "Wm. H. Seward." 
 "Hon. Gideon Welles, 
 
 " SecH'y of the JSTavyy 
 
 This communication and the accompanying pa- 
 pers led to a critical examination of the treaty, which 
 contained some extraordinary provisions that, if carried 
 
134: MK. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWAED. 
 
 into effect, were likely to impair the efficiency of onr 
 own navy during the war. "Whilst examining and 
 considering the treaty, then wholly new to me, and 
 concerning which I had not been consulted, although 
 the navy was to be employed in carrying out its pro- 
 visions ; and in its operation our cruisers would be se- 
 riously affected by the instrument, I received a second 
 or duplicate of the foregoing letter, hastening early 
 compliance, and asking for a list of United States ves- 
 sels with my instructions to officers commanding such 
 as were authorized by the treaty to capture slaves. I 
 replied on the 29th, informing Mr. Seward the treaty 
 was wholly incompatible with the existing condition 
 of affairs — that it would be impossible during, the war 
 to detail any vessel with specific instructions to act 
 under the treaty, for it would, for belligerent purposes, 
 destroy the efficiency of any vessel so instructed — that 
 it would be virtually locking up a portion of the navy 
 tj'ing the hands of the government at a time when 
 every vessel was wanted for blockade and independent 
 cruising, and it appeared to me the full force and scope 
 of the treaty could not have been well considered when 
 negotiated. My letter was probably more pungent 
 than was necessary or expedient. It aroused Mr. Sew- 
 ard's attention to certain conditions and stipulations, 
 the operation of which had not attracted his attention 
 while framino: and assentiusr to the instrument. He 
 evidently felt that he had been precipitate, and that 
 there were unfortunate or unguarded stipulations in 
 liis arrangement with which we could not comply. 
 He therefore wrote me an unofficial note on the 30th 
 of September, enclosing the form of letter which he 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 135 
 
 wished me to substitute for mine of the preceding 
 daj. His reason for this, as stated by himself was that 
 he might wish to give Lord Lyons a copy of my objec- 
 tions which he saw were insuperable. But this pro- 
 posed substitute prepared by him was gentle and too 
 pointless in its expressions, and on the whole, of such 
 a tenor that I was not inclined to adopt and make it 
 mv own, thouo^h desirous to oblis^e him in the emer- 
 gency. I however modified my communication of 
 the 29th and sent to him the following : 
 
 " Navy Department, 
 
 "Oct 9, 1862. 
 "Sir:— 
 
 " I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your 
 communications of the 17th and 26th ulto., enclosing a 
 copy of a letter from the British Charge d'affaires, com- 
 municating the instructions which it is intended to fur- 
 nish the commanders of Her Brittanic Majesty's crui- 
 sers who may be employed in carrying out the provisions 
 of the recent slave-trade treaty between the United 
 States and Great Britain, as well as lists of Her Majes- 
 ty's several sliips employed in the African, North Amer- 
 ican andAVest India stations, whose commanders will be 
 authorized to act under the treaty, and asking for a sim- 
 ilar list of United States cruisers. 
 
 *' I have the honor to inform you that all our crui- 
 sers are at present exercising the belligerent right of 
 search, and it would be highly detrimental to the ser- 
 vice and unjust to the country to detach any of them at 
 the present moment from the duties on which they are 
 engaged and restrict their operations by instructions un- 
 der the treaty for the present, or during the existence 
 
136 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SKVVARD. 
 
 of hostilities, under the unquestioned belligerent right 
 of search, each and all of our national vessels will exer- 
 cise the rights which appertain to them as belligerents 
 — will visit and search suspected vessels not only within 
 the latitude prescribed by the treaty, but elsewhere ; 
 and in the exercise of this belligerent right, they will 
 not hesitate to seize slavers or other piratical craft that 
 are abusing our flag. 
 
 " To give our cruisers, now performing such general 
 duties, instructions under the treaty, would be to limit 
 their operations to a specific object, while the exigencies 
 of the country require them to perform other necessary, 
 legal and legitimate duties. So far as it is practicable 
 on our part to use the belligerent right of search inci- 
 dentally, in aid of the purposes of the treaty, we shall 
 60 use it. 
 
 " The important privilege of visit and search, and in 
 some cases of detention and capture, is conceded by each 
 of the two governments in this treat}^ and offence can- 
 not be taken at our waiving for a season the exercise of 
 the privilege conceded. This waiver will not prevent 
 British cruisers from searching and seizing suspected 
 vessels claiming to be American, while those claiming 
 to be English will also be searched by them. Besides 
 this, our cruisers searching all vessels under the belli- 
 gerent right, will of course capture all slavers which use 
 or abuse the American Flag or adopt that of the rebels. 
 
 "I do not propose during the existence of hostilities 
 to impair the efliciency or usefulness of our cruisers as 
 war vessels by giving their commanders instructions un- 
 der the treaty, for the reason that any naval officer act- 
 inor under such instructions would be restrained from the 
 general belligerent right of search — the instrument it- 
 self compels him to declare, on boarding a vessel, that 
 
MTl. LINCOLX AND MR. SEWARD. IP.7 
 
 * the only object of the searchy is to ascertain whether 
 the vessel is employed in the African slave-trade, or is 
 fitted up for that trade ' — whereas, instead of confin- 
 ing our officers to that only object in this time of war, 
 we have not a cruiser afloat whose commander is not 
 under imperative orders to search all merchant vessels 
 for contraband of war. We can not consent to abandon 
 the belli i^erent rioht of search and seizure in the West 
 Indies, where neutral obligations are disregarded and neu- 
 tral flags are prostituted to aid the insurgents — conse- 
 quently, I must for the present omit to issue any instruc- 
 tions under the treaty which permits no commander 
 having instructions under the treaty to search a vessel in 
 certain localities for any other pitrpose than that of 
 detecting slaves. 
 
 " Whenever the condition of afiairs will permit us to set 
 apart cruisers for the special service required, it will give 
 me pleasure to furnish a list of them as requested and to 
 perform the duties which devolve upon the department 
 for a strict execution of the treaty. 
 
 " I am, respectfully, 
 " Your Obed't Serv't, 
 "GiDEox Welles, 
 « Sec'fy of the JSTavy.'' 
 
 "Hon. W. H. Seward, 
 " Secretary of State.'' 
 
 I on the same day addressed the subjoined com- 
 munication, adverting to the unfortunate complications 
 and difficulties in which we were likely to become in- 
 volved by this confused mixture of executive, legisla- 
 tive and diplomatic proceedings, under the treaty, un- 
 der the law of Congress which he had procured to be 
 
138 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 
 
 enacted, and under tlie Danish treaty which had never 
 been ratified. 
 
 " Nayy Depaet^ient, 
 
 Oct. 9. 1862. 
 " Sir :— 
 
 " Since the receipt of your unofficial note of the 30th 
 ultimo, with the proposed form of a draft as a substitute 
 for my letter of the 29th ultimo, I have given the subject 
 much thought and examination. That a copy of my let- 
 ter would have to be communicated to the British Gov- 
 ernment had not occurred to me. That fact, and some 
 defects of full explanation in my letter of the 29th ultimo 
 to you, render it proper that I should revise and modify 
 my communication. 
 
 " I have therefore prepared the enclosed with some 
 care, as better adapted, I think, to the case than the 
 form you were so kind as to send me. This whole sub- 
 ject has become strangely complicated ; there is, in the 
 first place, the conceded privilege of reciprocal search by 
 the treaty, and there is the unquestioned belligerent 
 right of search which cannot be surrendered. Yet the 
 two are in conflict. Then we come in contact with that 
 strange anomaly, a treaty with Demmark, which has 
 never been ratified by the Senate — concluded and signed 
 by the Danish Charge d'affaires on behalf of the gov- 
 ernment of Demmark, and by the Secretary of the Interior 
 on behalf of the government of the United States — not 
 negotiated in conformity with the requirements of the 
 Constitution, nor through the department that is charged 
 with the special duty of making treaties, but by an 
 entirely different department and under an Act of Con- 
 gress which assumes to authorize the treaty or agreement 
 regardless of the Constitution. 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 139 
 
 " The treaty with Great Britain provides that instruc- 
 tions shall be given to our cruisers. The form of letter 
 which you send me promises that orders will be given 
 for captured slavers to be sent into port for adjudication 
 according to the terras of the treaty, and this without 
 instructions. 
 
 " The mixed commission under the treaty carlnot 
 adjudicate the questions, if instructions are not given, 
 and are precluded from action. 
 
 " In addition to this, by the Danish treaty or agree- 
 ment, it is stipulated to the effect that all negroes, raulat- 
 toes, or persons of color on board of vessels seized in the 
 prosecution of the slave-trade shall be sent to West End^ 
 in the Island of St. Croix, and our commanders, exercis- 
 ing the belligerent right of search, are to be instructed 
 accordingly. 
 
 " It is true that this strange, unconfirmed and singular 
 instrument makes no provision for adjudication and con- 
 demnation of any captured slaver. Ordering the negroes 
 to be sent to St. Croix, therefore, may not be inconsist- 
 ent with a condemnation under the treaty, but how can 
 the slaves and slaver be brought before the mixed com^ 
 mission established by the treaty, when they are not 
 captured by officers instructed under that instrument — 
 such instructions being made a condition-precedent under 
 that instrument, of all proceedings by the mixed com- 
 mission ? 
 
 " I find myself, I confess, embarrassed in several 
 respects by the stipulations and complications involved 
 in this subject of captured slavers, and see no other 
 course to pursue, than to wholly abstain from any action 
 whatever under the treaty, so long as the war con- 
 tinues. 
 
 " The privilege of reciprocal search for slavers being 
 
14:0 MR. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWARD. 
 
 conceded by the treaty, I do not see that the English 
 government can complain if we do not avail ourselves 
 of it, but permit them to enjoy it. 
 
 "Incidentally our own cruisers will, with greater 
 energy and effect, aid in enforcing the object of the 
 treaty under the more comprehensive belligerent right 
 of search. 
 
 "It appears to me that this whole subject of slaves 
 and slavers has become so involved and complicated by 
 treaties and agreements and statutory enactments — the 
 reciprocal right of search, and belligerent right of 
 search — the process of adjudication under the mixed 
 commission, under the stipulations to adjudicate by the 
 British treaty, and the arrangements to send the negroes 
 to St. Croix under the Danish agreements, that some 
 measures should be adopted to disembarrass the ques- 
 tion, 
 
 "I am, respectfully, 
 " Your Obed't Serv't, 
 " Gideon Welles, 
 " SecH'i/, of the Navy:' 
 "Hon. Wm. H. Seward, 
 " SecH'y. of Stated 
 
 Whether a copy of my letter was ever sent to 
 Lord Lyons is problematical, but he was made aware 
 that the Secretary of the I^avy was disinclined and 
 believed it impracticable to carry out the stipulations 
 of the treaty during the existence of hostilities. It 
 was unquestionably an unpleasant topic to one of the 
 temperament and mind of the Secretary of State to 
 dwell upon, nor was it pleasant for him to admit that 
 in a treaty on which he prided himself, he had com- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 141 
 
 mitted an error or been overreached. I supposed at 
 the time that the exceptional provision was an inad- 
 vertence on the part of both the negotiators, and have 
 no doubt it was as regards the Secretary of State, but 
 subsequent developments in regard to the treatment 
 of mails captured and the simultaneous establishment 
 of a line of British mail-packets to the Kio Grande, 
 which was within the prescribed latitudes, where naval 
 vessels under treaty instructions could only search for 
 slaves, rendered it doubtful whether the English 
 legation had not shrewdly availed itself of the zeal of 
 the Secretary of State against slave traffic to adopt a 
 measure which would promote English commercial 
 enterprise by securing immunity to their vessels and 
 thus opening a way for intercourse with the blockaded 
 rebels. 
 
 Mr. Seward did not submit to me his letter to the 
 English legation stating the obstacles which inter- 
 vened to prevent the consummation of the treaty or 
 action under it in the existing state of things, nor do 
 I think the President was fully apprised of it. I only 
 know that the treaty was necessarily suspended. The 
 tenor of his communication to Lord Lyons, I learned 
 some eighteen months later from the following latter, 
 written several weeks after my communication of the 
 9th of October, stating the objections to issue instruc- 
 tions which would circumscribe and impair the rights 
 and efficiency of our cruisers. 
 
 "Washington, November 27, 1862. 
 "Sir:— 
 
 " Mr. Stuart did not fail to communicate to her Ma- 
 jesty's government the note which you did him the 
 
1-12 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 honor to address to him on the 14th of last month, and 
 in which you stated certain reasons which induced the 
 government of the United States to decline, for the 
 moment to issue to commanders of United States vessels 
 the instructions contemplated by the treaty of the 7th 
 of April last for their guidance in carrying out the 
 stipulations of that treaty for the suppression of the 
 slave trade. The principal reason for omitting to issue 
 the instructions appears to be an apprehension that 
 they would restrict the more extended right of search, 
 which the commanders of United States vessels now 
 exercise as belligerents. 
 
 "And it seems to be believed that the object of the 
 treaty may be in great measure attained by the exercise 
 of this belligerent right of search in lieu of the special 
 right of search provided for by the treaty. I am how- 
 ever instructed by Her j\[ajesty's principal Secretary of 
 State for Foreign Affairs to take an opportunity of 
 representing to you, that although United States cruisers 
 may search by virtue of their belligerent rights, yet 
 they cannot by virtue of these rights, detain or send in 
 for adjudication any neutral vessel not breaking block- 
 ade ; in short, that they cannot give effect to the stipu- 
 lations of the treaty unless they have such warrants and 
 instructions as are prescribed by it. 
 
 " I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, 
 sir, your most obedient humble servant, 
 
 " Lyons." 
 " Hon. William H. Seward, 
 " Secretary of State." 
 
 In this letter Her Majesty's principal Secretary of 
 State did not controvert or modify the point presented, 
 but denied that any neutral vessel, not breaking tlie 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 14:3 
 
 blockade, could be detained or sent in for adjudication 
 by the naval commander under the belligerent right — 
 in other words, no slaver captured by our war-vessels 
 without specific instructions, could be adjudicated by 
 the courts established by the treaty, and if they had 
 specific instructions, they could not capture blockade- 
 runners or anything else. This ultimatum failed to 
 influence our government, and from the necessity of 
 the case, action under the treaty remained suspended. 
 Mr. Seward was, properly perhaps, opposed to any 
 direct ofiicial communication between the representa- 
 tives of foreign governments and the head of any 
 department except through the Secretary of State. 
 In this condition of affairs and while matters were in 
 abeyance, Lord Lyons, a cool, adroit and sagacious 
 diplomatist, but able and far-seeing, and I think, 
 friendly to our government when it did not clash with 
 British interests, felt it important that he should 
 rio:htlv understand the case and the difficulties to be 
 overcome. As he could not, under the rule or practice, 
 communicate with the Secretary of the Navy directly, 
 he, on the 14th of December invited the Assistant 
 Secretary of the ]^avy, Mr. Fox, to dine with him. 
 Mr. Fox informed me of the invitation and that he 
 had an intimation that Lord Lyons was anxious to 
 know the difficulties in the way of carrying the treaty 
 into effect. I authorized him to say frankly to Lord 
 Lyons or any one else, that in declining to give special 
 instmctions which would tie up the hands of our naval 
 commanders, my only object was not to impair their 
 efficiency or circumscribe their undoubted belligerent 
 right by specific instructions, that were inconsistent 
 
144 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 with the broader general belb'gerent right. Mr. Fox 
 so informed the Minister, and in due time the treaty 
 requirements were so far relaxed as to authorize a 
 special warrant to our naval officers, to the effect that 
 the rights and privileges under the treaty would not 
 in any way derogate from or conflict with belligerent 
 rights — that the power conferred by the treaty was 
 added to belligerent riglits, not substituted for them, 
 and that the mixed courts of justice established by the 
 treaty would exercise their functions in cases of 
 captures under the belligerent right as well as the 
 special right, which might be sent to them for adjudi- 
 cation. But, in point of fact, I believe not a single 
 capture was made, the African slave-trade had ceased, 
 and the cumbrous and expensive machinery of mixed 
 courts at the Cape of Good Hope, Sierra Leone and 
 'New York were never put in operation. The offi- 
 cers of these tribunals never had anything to do 
 but draw their salaries. After the war was over, the 
 treaty, the Danish arrangement and all the accom- 
 paniments went out of existence. No great eclat 
 attached to the negotiators of this slave-trade treaty in 
 the United States, nor did Great Britain derive any 
 commercial benefit from the attempt to limit the right 
 of search below the latitude of 32° ; but failing in this, 
 of which the English legation was notified on the 14th 
 of October, they succeeded on the 31st of that month 
 in securing from the Secretary of State, without law, 
 assurance of immunity to the mails. Lines of packets 
 to Matamoras were immediately established, which 
 opened intercourse to the rebel states through Texas 
 and the blockade was thereby evaded. 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 145 
 
 That Mr. Seward himself came into the State De- 
 partment with no acquaintance with the forms of bu- 
 siness other than that obtained incidentally through 
 his services in the Senate, is undoubtedly correct and 
 is well exemplified in the whole arrangement attend- 
 ing this slave-trade treaty and its incidents, a treaty 
 wherein the negotiator, represented as " a superior in 
 native intellectual power" to the President and who 
 exercised the more solid power to direct aifairs '^ through 
 the President's name," a treaty negotiated in the midst 
 of war but which by its provisions would cripple the 
 war power of the government, a treaty negotiated by 
 the Secretary of State without consulting his colleagues 
 in the administration, a treaty fortified or attempted 
 to be fortified by an anomalous quasi-treaty entered 
 into by another and a domestic department with the 
 representative of a foreign government, which quasi- 
 treaty or arrangement was never ratified by the Sen- 
 ate, as the constitution requires, but which anomaly 
 and the law under which it was justified were the off- 
 spring of the negotiator of the slave-trade treaty and 
 a part of that arrangement. This strange complica- 
 tion, the treaty, the quasi-treaty and the law, with 
 the legal tribunals and the extensive and attending 
 paraphernalia resulted in nothing but a large expen- 
 diture from the national treasury. 
 
 The subject of enlisting private enterprise in aid 
 of the government upon the ocean as well as the land, 
 early engaged attention. Yague and wonderfully ex- 
 aggerated rumors that our commerce and shipping in- 
 7 
 
146 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 
 
 terests were endangered from swarms of privateers that 
 were, or soon would be abroad, alarmed the mercantile 
 communities, and stirred up the fishermen and mari- 
 ners on our coast who were anxious that there should 
 be counteracting movements against these threatened 
 depredators. Schemes for a volunteer navy, proposi- 
 tions for a militia of the seas, tenders of jacht-squad- 
 rons and plans for naval brigades were pressed upon 
 the government bj men of position and character as 
 well as bj adventurous spirits. It was remembered 
 that in the war of 1812 important service was render- 
 ed by the privateers. Without considering the diifer- 
 cnce between a foreis^n war with the wealthiest com- 
 mercial nation and a civil conflict with insurgents who 
 had neither commerce to be injured, nor booty to re- 
 ward private enterprise, it was urged that the govern- 
 ment might be benefitted now, as then by reprisals. 
 
 The Secretary of State falling in with the current 
 popular feeling favored these crude schemes ; while the 
 Secretary of the Xavy who had more especially in 
 charge, the police of the seas, questioned whether let- 
 ters-of-marque could be made effective in this conflict 
 with the rebels, and was apprehensive thej^ might 
 jeopard peaceful relations with other powers. At the 
 commencement of difficulties the rebel government au- 
 thorized the licensing of privateers which produced a 
 great sensation and aggravated the existing hostile 
 feeling. In the universal desire to strike the most 
 effective blows against the rebels, the demand for 
 using every available means became almost irresisti- 
 ble. Indications of a willingness by foreign govern- 
 ments, particularly by Great Britain, to give encour- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 147 
 
 agement to the rebels by their treatment of questions 
 of international maritime law had probably an influ- 
 ence on the Secretary of State and more deeply enlist- 
 ed his sympathies with those who were zealous foi 
 carrying on upon the high seas, private as well as pub- 
 lic war against the insurgents. No encouragement was 
 given by the administration, for privateers, but the 
 pressure from without, naturally led to occasional dis- 
 cussions in the Cabinet, which developed the different 
 views entertained by the heads of the two departments 
 most interested. But no decisive steps were taken, 
 and this was in itself the naval policy. At the extra 
 session of Congress in July, the subject was entertain- 
 ed by the members and among the acts passed confer- 
 ring authority on the Executive, was one empowering 
 the President to " authorize the commanders of armed 
 vessels sailing under the authority of any letters-of- 
 marque and reprisal granted by Congress — to subdue, 
 seize, take, and if on the high seas to send into port.'' 
 But Congress omitted to authorize the issuing of 
 letters-of-marque and prescribe conditions for the gov- 
 ernment of privateers ; the enactment however served 
 to relieve the administration in a measure from many 
 of the schemes that had been urged. Shortly after 
 Congress adjourned several highly respectable mer- 
 chants of Boston engaged in the China trade, apprehen- 
 sive that " rebel cruisers might get into those seas'* 
 addressed a communication to the Secretary of the 
 Navy suggesting the " expediency of letters-of-marque 
 or other commission," under the provision of the re- 
 cent enactment. Application was also made to the 
 Secretary of State by some of the same parties for let- 
 
148 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 ters-of-marque to the steamer Pembroke which was 
 about sailing from Boston to China. Mr. Seward in 
 view of the differences between the State and Navy 
 Departments instead of answering this letter direct, 
 referred it with an inquiry to me. My reply to him 
 which the President approved, and which I here in- 
 sert, corresponded with my answer to the merchants, 
 and Mr. Seward disposed of the application to him- 
 self, by sending out and publishing my letter to him. 
 This relieved him of responsibility. 
 
 "Navy Department, Oct. 1. 1861. 
 " Sir :— 
 
 " In relation to the communication of R. B. Forbes, 
 Esq., a copy of which was sent by you to this Depart- 
 ment on the 16th ultimo, inquiring whether letters-of- 
 marque cannot be furnished for the propeller Pembroke, 
 which is about to be despatched to China, I have the 
 honor to state that it appears to me there are objections 
 to, and no authority for, granting letters-of-marque in 
 the present contest. I am not aware that Congress, 
 which has exclusive power of granting letters-of-marque 
 and reprisal, has authorized such letters to be issued 
 against the insurgents ; and were there such authoriza- 
 tion, I am not prepared to advise its exercise, because 
 it would, in my view, be a recognition of the assumption 
 of the insurgents, that they are a distinct and indepen- 
 dent nationality. 
 
 "Under the Act of August 5, 1861, 'Supplementary 
 to an Act entitled An Act to protect the commerce of 
 the United States and to punish the crime of piracy,' 
 the President is authorized to instruct the commanders 
 of * armed vessels sailing under the authority of any 
 letters-of-marque and reprisal granted by the Congress 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 149 
 
 of the United States, or the commanders of any other 
 suitable vessels, to subdue, seize, take, and, if on the 
 high seas to send into any port of the United States any 
 vessel or boat built, purchased, fitted out, or held,' etc. 
 This allusion to letters-of-raarque does not authorize 
 such letters to be issued, nor do I find any other act 
 containing such authorization. But the same act, in the 
 second section, as above quoted, gives the President 
 power to authorize the 'commanders of any suitable 
 vessels to subdue, seize,' etc. Under this clause, letters 
 permissive, under proper restrictions and guards against 
 abuse, might be granted to the propeller Pembroke, so 
 as to meet the views expressed by Mr. Forbes. This 
 would seem to be lawful, and perhaps not liable to the 
 objection of granting letters-of-marque against our own 
 citizens, and that too, without law or authority from the 
 only constituted power that can grant it. 
 
 " I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a 
 letter from Messrs. J. M. Forbes & Co. and others, ad- 
 dressed to this Department, on the same subject. 
 " I am very respectfully, 
 
 " Your obedient servant, 
 
 "Gideon Welles." 
 « Wm. H. Seward. 
 
 " Secretary/ of State.'*'* 
 
 The letter had the effect apparently of satisfying 
 for a time, at least, those who had taken the deepest 
 interest in the subject. But the ravages of the Sumter, 
 which vessel was hailed with friendly welcome and 
 supplied in British ports, with the subsequent depreda- 
 tions of the Alabama and Florida — English built, and 
 manned chiefly by Englishmen, aroused the indigna- 
 tion of the whole country. This indignation was 
 
150 MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWAED. 
 
 increased and aggravated by the conduct of the British 
 government in excluding all United States cruisers 
 from the English ports in China, though the seas of 
 that empire were infested by pirates, and the whole 
 commercial world was interested in their suppression. 
 While our national ships in English ports received 
 only grudging hospitality it was notorious that the 
 semi-piratical vessels with no recognized nationality, 
 though substantially English vessels sailing under the 
 rebel flag were capturing, plundering and wantonly 
 destroying our commerce, and that the injury to us 
 was to the benefit of England. Under these wrongs 
 and outrages our whole commercial marine became 
 greatly excited, and could the country have been 
 united, a war with England, more calamitous than any 
 she had ever known, would have made havoc with her 
 commerce. But our condition was such that forbear- 
 ance became a duty, and the government while 
 engaged in prosecuting a war with the rebels was 
 also subjected to a severe trial, in restraining the 
 popular demand for reprisals which would likely have 
 begotten a war with Great Britain ; — for though the 
 crown was not unfriendly to the Union it was known 
 that English capital was largely engaged in illicit 
 traffic with the insurgents and in running and evading 
 the blockade. At the same time the unnatural and 
 unfriendly conduct of her ministry, who put forth no 
 arm to prevent, but craftily connived at schemes 
 against the Union was felt, and will be remembered 
 against the Administration of Palmerston and Kussell. 
 It is some gratification to remember now when those 
 dark days are over, that in addition to the award of 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 151 
 
 fifteen millions for the criminal wrong we snlfered 
 from Eno^land, onr navv, without assistance from 
 privateers, captured m.ore than thirty millions of 
 property engaged in illicit traffic and running the 
 blockade, no inconsiderable portion of which was 
 English capital. While the public mind was inflamed 
 by the wrongs inflicted, complaints were made of the 
 want of efficiency on the part of tlie navy and jS^avy 
 Department. Privateers, letters-of-marque were called 
 for, regardless of the necessities of the case and 
 of the consequences of committing to greedy and 
 reckless adventurers the highest and most delicate 
 responsibilities of government, an abuse of which 
 w^ould endanger our peace with other nations. To 
 meet and dispose of these demands required decision 
 and effort. The Secretary of State instead of repress- 
 ing, quietly favored the privateer policy which had its 
 advocates in certain persons and circles in New York. 
 Fortunately the President, cautious but firm, main- 
 tained a prudent and wise reserve, and committed him- 
 self to no project that was likely to endanger the 
 national welfare. There were also judicious and 
 discreet minds in Congress that deprecated the policy 
 of sending out letters-of-marque in this war with 
 rebels ; but the subject was much agitated, and in July 
 1862, Mr. Seward wrote to Mr. Adams, that he might 
 inform Earl liussell " Since the Oreto and other gun- 
 boats are being received by the insurgents from Europe 
 to renew demonstrations on our national commerce, 
 Congress is about to authorize the issue of letters-of- 
 marque and reprisal, and that if we find it necessary 
 to suppress this piracy we shall bring privateers into 
 
152 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 service for that purpose and of course for that purpose 
 only." 
 
 This was a qualified and harmless admonition 
 w^hich was duly appreciated by Earl Enssell, particu- 
 larly when he learned a few days after, that Congress 
 had adjourned without taking action on the subject. 
 In the meantime the depredations of the Alabama and 
 Florida increased the irritation against not only the 
 rebels but mercenary England. 
 
 On the 29th of September, Mr. Seward warned me 
 that there were extensive combinations to break the 
 blockade and to confirm his admonition, brought me a 
 dispatch and documents from Mr. Dudley, our efficient 
 consul at Liverpool. The dispatches were % notification 
 that eight or ten steamers were nearly ready to run the 
 blockade ; but there was no evidence to confirm the 
 apprehensions of the Secretary of State. 'No mention 
 was made of any armed vessels, but there were reports 
 of wonderful activity among the merchant adventurers 
 of Great Britain, stimulated by the tidings of our dis- 
 asters under Gen. Pope at Bull Run, which they had 
 just previously received, and which they considered 
 conclusive that the Union cause could not be sustain- 
 ed. Mr. Seward had mistaken unarmed English 
 blockade runners for armed blockade breakers. Al- 
 though relieved by my remarks he persisted still that 
 the policy of letters-of-marque was advisable and pro- 
 posed that the powerful merchant-steamer Baltic 
 should be commissioned, and Comstock, a very compe- 
 tent merchant-captain, somewhat connected with, and 
 used by the Kew York Ring should be placed in com- 
 mand. Such a proceeding on the part of the govern- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 153 
 
 ment would have been a reflection on naval officers and 
 could not be entertained, there was yet no authority 
 to grant letters-of-marque, and if the Baltic were char- 
 tered or purchased by the Navy, she must I assured 
 him, be commanded by a naval officer. 
 
 So long as the subject remained under executive 
 control the prudence and firmness of the President in- 
 sured the national welfare and safety. But the public 
 mind had become angry and highly inflamed, in which 
 Congress participated, and on the 3rd of March 1863, 
 the last day of the session, an Act was passed declaring, 
 ** that in all domestic and foreign wars the President 
 ** of the United States is authorized to issue to private 
 " armed vessels of the United States, commissions or 
 " letters-of-marque and general reprisal in such form 
 " as he shall think proper, and under the seal of the 
 " United States, and make all needful rules and regu- 
 " lations for the government thereof, and for the adju- 
 " dication and disposal of the prizes and salvages made 
 " by each vessel — -jy^'ovided that the authority confer- 
 " red by this Act shall cease and terminate at the end 
 **of three years from the passage of this Act." 
 
 This action of Congress, though general in its char- 
 acter would, it w^as anticipated, have a favorable eflect 
 abroad. England would be admonished that there 
 was a limit to American forbearance. Viewing it in 
 this light, and as a warning to Great Britain where the 
 spirit of unscrupulous greed, if not of positive enmity 
 to the Union, had embarked an immense capital in 
 schemes of illicit traffic in violation of our laws and of 
 the blockade, the brief and modified enactment was 
 acquiesced in. It was moreover felt, notwithstanding 
 7* 
 
154: MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 the favor which the project received from the Secretary 
 of State, that the country would be secure against any 
 rash or precipitate measure by the President to whom 
 the whole subject was committed. But, unfortunately, 
 the effect of the enactment, and the feeling which 
 forced its passage, proved a stimulant which brought 
 strength, and added unexpected recruits to the move- 
 ment. Among others, the Secretary of the Treasury, 
 on whom the more cautious and prudent had' relied, 
 became a convert to, or avowed advocate for, privateers 
 and reprisals. The Secretary of State was much 
 elated by the enactment, and by the acquisition of the 
 Secretary of the Treasury to his policy. He also rep- 
 resented that merchants of J^ew York were ready and 
 anxious to fit out privateers to take the Alabama and 
 Florida, and proposed at once to take measures for 
 carrying the law into effect. But the President still 
 hesitated, though the law, considered as an expression 
 of the sentiment of the legislative branch of the gov- 
 ernment, together with the countenance which it re- 
 ceived from the Secretary of the Treasury, who was 
 understood to be the special representative and ex- 
 ponent of the commercial interest, had each an influence 
 which it was difficult successfully to resist. I had from 
 the first maintained that commerce being sensitive, in- 
 telligent merchants and capitalists would not engage in 
 such enterprises — that privateers were usually excited 
 by the expectation of large returns from captured mer- 
 chantmen — that the Alabama and Florida, plundering 
 rovers w^hich they would, under present circumstances 
 be commissioned to overtake, would, if captured, be 
 found destitute of cargo or merchandize, and that ves- 
 
MR, LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 165 
 
 sels of sufficient magnitude and power to cope success- 
 ful! j- with the Alabama would require a large invest- 
 ment for so uncertain a venture. Without namins^ 
 persons, Mr, vSeward insisted there were responsible 
 parties ready to engage in the work so soon as they 
 could be licensed, he therefore proceeded at once to 
 prepare forms and make " needful rules and regulations" 
 for the government of privateers in conformity with 
 the recent Act. These regulations covering a number 
 of pages, he, on the 10th of March, one week after the 
 enactment submitted to me for review, criticism and 
 suggestions. As I was wholly opposed to the proceed- 
 ing, I declined the labor, admitted they conformed to 
 the leo:al enactments of 1812; but in a free Cabinet 
 discussion I made some general remarks, excepting to 
 the regulations as transcending executive authority. 
 The subject lingered for two or three weeks during a 
 portion of which time I was absent from Washington 
 and the President declined to come to a decision while 
 I was away. Soon after my return, Mr. Seward 
 brought forward the subject and said that parties inter- 
 ested were becoming impatient. He proposed that I 
 should communicate my objections to his rules in writ- 
 ing, and the President concurred in the suggestion. I 
 therefore in a day or two, addressed to him the follow- 
 ing letter : 
 
 " Navy Department, 
 
 March 31st, 1863. 
 " Sir :— 
 
 " When discussing the regulations concerning ' let- 
 ters-of-marque,' etc., a few days since, I made certain 
 
156 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 suggestions, and you invited me to communicate any 
 views I might entertain in writing. 
 
 "I have felt some delicacy, I may say disinclination, 
 to take any active part in this matter, because I have 
 from the beginning of our difficulties discouraged the 
 policy of privateering in such a war as this we are now 
 waging. The rebels have no commercia^l marine to 
 entice and stimulate private enterprise and capital in 
 such undertakings, provided the policy were desirable. 
 We, however, have a commerce that invites the cupid- 
 ity, zeal and spirit of adventure, which, once commenced, 
 it will be difficult to regulate or suppress. A few priva- 
 teers let loose among our shipping, like wolves among 
 sheep would make sad havoc, as the Alabama and 
 the Florida bear witness. It is proposed to encourage 
 private enterprise to embark in an undertaking to cap- 
 ture the two wolves or privateers that are abroad 
 devastating the seas; and it is said, in addition to 
 the wolves, they may be authorized to catch blockade 
 runners. The inducement, I apprehend will not meet 
 a favorable response. There may be vessels fitted 
 out to capture unarmed prizes, but not of sufficient 
 force to meet and overcome the Alabama ; if not, the 
 great end and purpose of the scheme will fail of accom- 
 plishment. 
 
 " To clothe private armed vessels with governmental 
 power and authority, including the belligerent right of 
 search, will be likely to beget trouble, and the tendency 
 must unavoidably be to abuse. Clothed with these 
 powers, reckless men will be likely to involve the gov- 
 ernment in difficulty, and it was in apprehension of that 
 fact, and to avoid it, I encountered much obloquy and 
 reproach at the beginning of the rebellion, and labored 
 to institute a less objectionable policy. 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 157 
 
 "Propositions for privateers, for yacht-squadrons, 
 for naval brigades, volunteer navy, etc., etc., were, 
 with the best intentions in most instances, pressed upon 
 the department regardless of the consequences that might 
 follow from these rude schemes of private warfare. It 
 was to relieve us of the necessity of going into these 
 schemes of j^rivate adventure, that the ' Act to provide 
 for the temporary increase of the Navy,' approved 
 July 24, 1861, was so framed as to give authority to 
 take vessels into the naval service and to appoint 
 officers for them, temporarily, to any extent which 
 the President may deem expedient. Under other laAVS, 
 seamen may be enlisted and their wages fixed by exec- 
 utive authority ; and the officers and men so taken 
 temporarily into the naval service are subject to the 
 laws for the government of the navy. An ' Act for 
 the better government of the navy, approved July 17, 
 1862, grants prize-money to any armed vessel in the 
 service of the United States,' in the same manner as to 
 vessels of the navy. 
 
 " These laws, therefore, seem and were intended to 
 provide all the advantages of letters-of-marque, and yet 
 prevent in a great measure, the abuses liable to spring 
 from them. Private armed vessels, adopted temporarily 
 into the naval service, would be more certainly and 
 immediately under the control of the government, than 
 if acting only under a general responsibility to law. 
 
 " It will be necessary to establish strict rules for the 
 government of private armed vessels, as to some extent 
 they will be likely to be officered and manned by per- 
 sons of rude notions and free habits. Congress after 
 authorizing letters-of-marque in the war of 1812, adopt- 
 ed the necessary legislation for the vessels bearing 
 them, by the Act of June 26th of that year. This Act 
 
158 ME. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWAED. 
 
 has not been revived. The recent Act concerning let- 
 ters of-raarque etc., etc., authorized the President to 
 " make all needful rules and regulations for the govern- 
 ment and conduct of private armed vessels, furnished 
 with letters-of-marque.' In pursuance of this authori- 
 zation, the 'Regulations' have been prepared, embrac- 
 ing the provisions of the statute enacted during the 
 War of 1812. These regulations establish, as the stat- 
 ute did a penal code. They impose fines and assume 
 to authorize punishments, including even capital punish- 
 ment. 
 
 " As suggested in our interview, I question the va- 
 lidity of such proceedings. Can Congress delegate this 
 power of penal legislation to the President? and if to 
 the President, why may it not to any branch of the ex- 
 ecutive ? 
 
 *' If it can be granted for this special purpose — the 
 government of private armed vessels — why not for any 
 other purpose ? And if it can delegate the power of 
 penal legislation, why could it not delegate any other 
 power or powers, to the President, to Commissioners, or 
 even to a Committee of its own body, to sit during the 
 recess? Why could it not delegate authority to the 
 Secretary of the Treasury to legislate respecting im- 
 ports, foreign trade, or to the Postmaster-general full 
 power of legislation respecting postofiices and post 
 routes? The power of imposing penalties and inflict- 
 ing punishments is the essence of legislative power, for it 
 is the penalty of transgression that gives force to law. 
 These regulations also establish rewards as well as pen- 
 alties. They provide that a large bounty shall be paid 
 to private armed vessels in certain cases. But no fund 
 is appropriated for the purpose by the Act, nor has any 
 provision elsewhere been made for it. Can Congress 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 159 
 
 delegate to the President the power to appropriate the 
 public moneys, or to take them without specific ap- 
 propriation, or pledge the public faith at his discretion 
 for an indefiniie amount ? 
 
 " As I have already said I have doubts in these par- 
 ticulars. They are expressed with some reluctance, be- 
 cause in the uneasy condition of the public mind, grow- 
 ing out of the lawless depredations of the semi-piratical 
 cruisers that are abroad, I am unwilling to interpose 
 anything which may be construed into an obstacle to 
 repress public indignation, which is so justly excited. I 
 did not regret that Congress enacted a law authorizing 
 letters-of-marque ; because I verily believe that, with 
 it, England can be made to prevent her mercenary citi- 
 zens from making war on our commerce under a flag 
 that has no recognized nationality. If the police of the 
 sea is to be surrendered, and rovers built by English 
 capital and manned by Englishmen are to be let loose 
 to plunder our commerce, let England understand that 
 her ships will suffer, and her commerce also be annoyed 
 and injured by private armed ships. With her distant 
 and dependent colonies, no nation has greater cause to 
 oppose maritime robbery and plunder, such as is being 
 inflicted on us by Englishmen and English capital, than 
 Great Britain. 
 
 "The West Indies are, notoriously, harbors of refuge 
 for the cruisers that are plundering our merchants, as 
 well as for the infamous and demoralizing business of 
 running our blockade, to encourage the insurgents who 
 are waging war on our government. Of these ports, 
 those of England are the worst, and a vast amount of 
 English capital is engaged in illicit trafiic, and her 
 people and authorities exhibit sympathy for and afford 
 
160 MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 aid to the insurgents and their abettors, and correspond- 
 ing opposition to this government. 
 
 " The English ship-yards are filled with vessels built 
 and building for the rebel service, and if measures are 
 not taken to prevent, these will soon swarm the seas to 
 capture, condemn and destroy American property, with- 
 out a port into which they can send their captures for 
 adjudication. Enjoying greater advantages than the 
 corsairs and sea-rovers that once infested the ocean, 
 because protected, harbored and sheltered by govern- 
 ments in alliance with and professedly friendly to us, 
 while ordinary pirates are outlaws, this species of lawless 
 outrage cannot be permitted to go on. 
 
 " England should be warned that we cannot permit 
 this indirect war to continue with impunity — that it 
 will provoke and justify retaliation, and that if her 
 people and government make war upon our commerce, 
 by sending abroad rovers with no nationality, to prey 
 upon the property of our citizens, it will be impossible 
 to restrain our people from retaliatory measures. 
 " I am respectfully, 
 
 " Your ob'd't serv't, 
 
 "Gideon Welles, 
 
 " 8ec'Cy of Navy.'' 
 "Hon. Wm. H. Seward, 
 
 " SecH'y of State:' 
 
 Whilst this letter was on my table, Senator Sum- 
 ner, who had opposed the law when on its passage, 
 called on me, and was very much disturbed by what 
 be had learned from Mr. Seward would be the prob- 
 able policy of the administration. From the com- 
 mencement he had objected to licensing privateers, and 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. IGl 
 
 was, when he called, a good deal incensed at some re- 
 marks of the Secretary of State whom he had just 
 left. It was felt by Mr. Seward to be something of a 
 triumph over Mr. Sumner, who often came in conflict 
 with his views, and in allusion to whom, when con- 
 fronted, as he sometimes was by the President with 
 the Senator's opinions, he remarked, *' there were too 
 many Secretaries of State in Washington." I handed 
 to Mr. Sumner during the interview, my letter which 
 was yet unsent, to read, and remarked as I did so, that 
 I was very much disappointed at the recent course of 
 Mr. Chase, and discouraged by communications just 
 received from Earl Eussell. He expressed great grat- 
 ification with my letter, but hoped before I sent it to 
 the State Department that I, would read it to Mr. Lin- 
 coln ; this was not my practice. I could not doubt that 
 Mr. Seward himself on its receipt would submit it to 
 the President. 
 
 The evening after this interview, the President 
 came across the Square to my house, which was direct- 
 ly opposite the executive mansion, and said his princi- 
 pal object in calling was to see a letter I had prepared, 
 which Mr. Sumner had read and complimented, and 
 wished him to peruse. I informed him that the letter 
 had gone to Mr. Seward, but I would bring him the 
 press copy in the morning. He thought this unne- 
 cessary for Mr. Seward would undoubtedly present it. 
 He then discussed this subject with others at consider- 
 able length. The President met my disbelief that 
 merchants of character and intelligence would be in- 
 duced to engage in the business of privateering, and 
 my opinion that Mr. Seward was deceiving himself in 
 
162 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 
 
 that respect, by asking whether the best method of 
 testing the fact would not be by giving the merchants 
 an opportunity to manifest their views by their acts. 
 Let us see, said he, who the men are that are ready and 
 anxious to aid the government in this way ; perhaps 
 you are mistaken and Seward right. Chase who 
 knows, or ought to know the commercial sentiment 
 has come into Seward's views. It may be well to 
 make the experiment. The State and the Treasury 
 may know more correctly the feehngs of the merchants 
 than the !N'avy. I replied, the test would be hazard- 
 ous. Should the merchants, as Mr. Seward believed, 
 embark in the measure, adventurers would be likely to 
 also engage in reprisals, and might involve us in war 
 which with the load upon our hands would be disas- 
 trous. We ought therefore to act deHberately, and 
 with a full and right appreciation of all the probable 
 consequences. He said that was true and he had con- 
 fidence in my judgment and my opinions, but I might 
 be mistaken — the State and the Treasury took a differ- 
 ent view, and if I was right in my belief that the mer- 
 chants would not engage in privateering, no harm 
 could come from the trial. If Seward was mistaken, 
 and the substantial men of the country held off, the 
 credit would be mine, and all would then be satisfied. 
 At the Cabinet meeting on Friday the 3d of April 
 Mr. Seward had some side talk with me in relation to 
 the assignment of a naval officer of character to the 
 service of the State Department, on whom he could 
 devolve the labor and details of examining applications 
 and preparing papers. He had previously requested 
 that Admiral Foote should be detailed for that service, 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 163 
 
 but that officer after looking into the subject requested 
 to be excused. As all matters relating to privateers 
 and letters-of-marque had in former wars been com- 
 mitted to the State Department and were to be on this 
 occasion, I objected that the navy ought not to be 
 blended with the movement. He very frankly said his 
 purpose in asking for a naval officer of rank, was to 
 be relieved himself of labor and details — in other 
 words, I perceived the Navy Department was to share 
 in the responsibility of any failure or imbroglio that 
 might result from a policy which it disapproved. 
 He named Rear-Admiral C. H. Davis as acceptable, 
 who was assigned accordingly. 
 
 The President requested to see me on the following 
 morning, Saturday, and as I entered the room he re- 
 marked that I would probably be surprised to hear that 
 Seward already had application for letters-of-marque. 
 I acknowledged I was disappointed if there were re- 
 spectable and responsible parties to engage in the busi- 
 ness. The President said he knew nothing of the 
 gentleman whom Seward had brought him, farther 
 than that he had a vessel, and was anxious to enter 
 upon the service. Taking up and looking at a paper, 
 he said the gentleman's name was Seybert, that he had 
 a vessel of one hundred tons, into which he proposed 
 to put a screw — that this gentleman was then in the 
 audience room, and he would call him in, that I might 
 examine him. This I informed him was unnecessary, 
 for I was familiar with the case which had already been 
 before me. There were, I assured the President no 
 New York merchants or capital in this enterprise. 
 Seybert was, I had learned, a Prussian adventurer, 
 
164 MR. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWARD. 
 
 who called himself a citizen of South Carolina, and 
 I preferred that the Secretary of State should dispose 
 of this and all other similar applications. With a 
 twinkle in his eye the President said he certainly 
 would not trouble me farther in this instance, but 
 wait for the merchants. 
 
 Senator Sumner informed me at the same time 
 that the President had experienced great difficulty in 
 getting a sight of my letter of the 31st of March. Mr. 
 Seward did not bring it to his notice as was expected, 
 and when he asked for it, one excuse after another was 
 given, but the President persisted until it was sent 
 him, when he notified the Senator, and together they 
 read it, and discussed the whole subject of privateer- 
 ing and reprisals. 
 
 This, with Seybert's application, the only one that 
 ever after came to my knowledge, terminated the pri- 
 vateer policy, closed the subject of letters-of-marque 
 and reprisals during the rebellion. I never again saw 
 the Kegulations or heard them alluded to. That Mr. 
 Seward was earnest and sincere in his belief that pri- 
 vateers might render efficient service, I never question- 
 ed, but it was fortunate for the administration and the 
 country, that he did not direct affairs for the nation in 
 regard to the policy of letters-of-marque during our civil 
 war. Mr. Lincoln proved himself on that subject and 
 others through that whole exciting period, the " supe- 
 rior in native intellectual power/' and in administrative 
 ability. 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 165 
 
 Official intercourse between the Secretary of State, 
 and the Secretary of the 'Navy was probably more fre- 
 quent than between any other two departments. 
 
 The service of naval officers on foreign stations 
 where courtesy and the obligations of treaties were to be 
 observed and maintained, and questions growing out 
 of the exercise of belligerent rights, including those of 
 blockade, contraband and the right of search, brought 
 the heads of these two departments in contact, and 
 rendered consultations necessary. These consultations, 
 often in personal interviews, but sometimes by corre- 
 spondence, brought out the points in which they 
 agreed and disagreed, developed the views of each 
 and to some extent the policy and principles and the 
 working of the administration. But however antago- 
 nistic their opinions, there was between the two 
 Secretaries always harmony and mutual good-will and 
 friendly personal relations during the years they were 
 associated together. When they did not agree on any 
 public measure, the subject was submitted to the 
 President who usually decided for himself; but some- 
 times the diiferences were made the subject of Cabi- 
 net consultation. As a general thing the Secretary of 
 State was averse to bringing department differences 
 before the Cabinet. Yisiting the President daily, there 
 were occasions when Mr. Seward obtained a decision 
 without the President's being aware of any difference, 
 or that the point was contested. A decision once 
 made and promulgated it was often difficult to have it 
 reversed. In mentioning these and other incidents 
 rendered necessary in remarking on the " Memorial Ad- 
 
166 ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWAED. 
 
 dress," my object has been to exhibit the executive 
 ability and peculiar management of Mr. Seward, 
 which Mr. Adams assumes, and many have believed, 
 controlled and directed the administration of Mr. Lin- 
 coln. Such was not the fact. The ideas of the two 
 as to the extent and exercise of executive authority- 
 were different, the grants and limitations of power by 
 the constitution were less respected by the Secretary 
 of State than by the President, hence Mr. Seward 
 often and especially when Congress was not in session, 
 freely and sometimes inconsiderately if not rashly, 
 gave unfortunate opinions — conceded away important 
 rights, and himself, exercised questionable executive 
 authority, on the assumption, apparently, that the ex- 
 ecutive was the government, and his power in the ad- 
 ministration almost absolute. ^Nevertheless Mr. Sew- 
 ard was timid in facing Congress, felt his responsibility 
 to the legislative department more than to the Consti- 
 tution and disliked controversy, especially with associ- 
 ates who were compelled to sometimes question the 
 correctness of his views. His readiness to manifest 
 his authority and magnify his position led him to 
 make off-hand promises and to decide questions with- 
 out first investigating and ascertaining their true 
 merits, or his authority to act and his power to fulfil 
 his engagements. This precipitancy not unfrequent- 
 ly begat embarassment and betrayed not only a want 
 of wise diplomatic reserve, but of calm and intelligent 
 executive ability. But if he was at times rash and ar- 
 bitrary it was from personal weakness, a desire to 
 show his power rather than from malevolence or want 
 of patrioitsm. Towards the demands of foreign gov- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 167 
 
 erninents, particularly the great powers who were of- 
 ten wrong and unreasonable, he was submissive, too 
 ready to yield and make concessions that could not be 
 justified, and which were in fact sometimes a surren- 
 der of undoubted national rights. 
 
 In October 1862, Mr. Seward sent me the copy of 
 a singular letter from the Spanish Minister claiming 
 that the dominion of Spain extended six miles instead 
 of three from the coast of Cuba. In his reception 
 and treatment of this absurd demand, and in trans- 
 mitting the letter making the claim, Mr. Seward un- 
 wittingly erred and made some unfortunate admissions, 
 said " the questions raised were important and by no 
 means easy of solution" — yet there was no principle 
 or rule better settled by the consent and practice of 
 maritime nations, than that the marine league or three 
 miles off the open sea was the extent of sovereign 
 dominion. This novel assumption if permitted or enter- 
 tained would have been a wonderful protection to the 
 rebels and blockade-runners that were swarming the 
 waters of Cuba and its vicinity. Instead of squarely 
 meeting and promptly dismissing this strange claim 
 made at a strange period, when we were engaged in a 
 .deadly struggle with the insurgents and their covert 
 allies, or bringing the subject before the Cabinet, Mr. 
 Seward had allowed himself to discuss it. Instead of 
 appealing to the law of nations which no Secretary 
 of State could change, he had, sitting in the State 
 Department, incautiously and improperly put our 
 rights in jeopardy by admitting that the Spanish 
 government, when it asserted that an improvement in 
 ordnance enlarged the marine jurisdiction of every 
 
168 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 sovereign, had " set forth a true principle of interna- 
 tional law." But the law should have governed him. 
 IS" either he nor the Spainish Minister, nor both com- 
 bined could revoke it. Other nations were interested. 
 He might as he had undertaken in the matter of the 
 captured mails, renounce the right of the United States, 
 but that would not unsettle or change the law of nations. 
 The following is the correspondence referred to : 
 
 " Department of State. 
 
 "Washington, Oct. 10, 1862. 
 "Sir: — 
 
 " I have the honor to communicate for your informa- 
 tion, a copy of a note which has been received at this 
 Department from His Excellency Senor Don Gabriel 
 Garcia y Tassara, Minister-Plenipotentiary of Her Catho 
 lie Majesty, on the subject of the marine dominion 
 appurtenant to the island of Cuba. You will learn from 
 this paper that Spain claims that this dominion covers 
 six miles upon the open sea, instead of three miles as it 
 has been understood by this government. The questions 
 raised by this note are important, and by no means easy 
 of solution. The Spanish Government sets forth a true 
 principle of international law when it states that the 
 marine jurisdiction of every sovereign extends the length 
 of a cannon shot from the shore. It has however, been 
 generally agreed, by the acquiescence rather than by the 
 formal consent of nations, that this extent is a marine 
 league, or three miles. Spain now claims that the limit 
 may be extended beyond the three miles, so however, as 
 to be kept within the length of a gun-shot, as it is ex- 
 tended by modern improvements in the machinery of 
 ordnance, and that each nation may fix the limit of its 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 169 
 
 own marine dominion, with that reservation, for itself, 
 without making general or specific arrangements for the 
 purpose with other states. Spain, moreover, claims that 
 she has thus fixed the limit for herself at six miles. The 
 subject will receive due examination by this Department. 
 As a preliminary to that examination, I have the honor 
 to ask you how the allowance of this claim would prac- 
 tically effect the efficiency of the navy in the exercise of 
 such belligerent rights as the United States have occasion 
 to maintain and exercise in the vicinity of Cuba. 
 " I am, Sir, Your Ob't Serv't, 
 
 " Wm H. Seward." 
 *' Hon. Gideon Welles, 
 " 8eGH\j of the NavyP 
 
 "Navy Department, 
 "Sir:— Oct. 15, 1862. 
 
 "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
 your communication of the 10th inst. covering the dis- 
 patch of His Excellency Don G. G. Tassara, Minister- 
 Plenipotentiary of Her Catholic Majesty, on the subject 
 of the marine dominion appurtenant to the island of 
 Cuba — claiming that it covers six miles upon the open 
 sea, instead of three miles as hitherto understood by this 
 government — admitting the recognized principle that 
 marine jurisdiction extends to cannon ball range, and 
 citing modern improvements in artillery as authority in 
 support of his claim. 
 
 " You do me the honor to ask me, as preliminary to 
 the examination which you propose to make, how the 
 allowance of this claim would practically affect the 
 efficiency of the Navy in the exercise of such belligerent 
 rights as the United States have occasion to maintain 
 and exercise in the vicinity of Cuba." 
 8 
 
170 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWAIID. 
 
 "The concession of this claim would be inconsistent 
 with the exercise of our belligerent rights at this junc- 
 ture, in consequence of the constant and flagrant abuse 
 of neutral flags by a class of contrabandists who make 
 it their business to set our laws at defiance, violate our 
 blockade and aid and assist the insurgents in the war 
 which they are w^aging upon our government. The 
 vessels engaged in this system of indirect aggression 
 upon a country at peace with Spain, when pursued by 
 our cruisers, fly to the shelter of neutral territory to 
 escape, and the more extended the maritime jurisdiction 
 of Cuba and the possessions of other governments in 
 the West Indies, the greater impunity to these violators 
 of our laws. 
 
 " We have no wish to intrude upon the unquestioned 
 rights of Spain, whose government has manifested a 
 friendly spirit and just regard towards us in other par- 
 ticulars, but the assertion of this extended jurisdiction 
 at this particuhir period, I should deem unfortunate. 
 The effect would be to aid and encourage mischievous 
 wrong-doers and to inflict injury upon a friendly nation 
 in the day of her misfortune. 
 
 " At a more propitious moment, the question of 
 maritime jurisdiction and the influence of modern 
 improvement in ordnance upon it, might be discussed 
 and settled with advantage; but the present time is 
 inopportune for such a novel interpretation of the law 
 of nations. The publicists and the world generally 
 have hitherto regarded the marine league adjacent to 
 the coast as the limit of territorial jurisdiction, and our 
 Naval officers in this particular have concurred in this 
 view. 
 
 "Permit me to add that the object of law is to put 
 an end to license and discretion and to establish a fixed 
 
MK. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 171 
 
 rule which all may ascertain, and be giiided by. It is 
 a provision of international law that the jurisdiction of 
 a state extends to a marine league or cannon range, 
 beyond its shores. The marine league is something 
 fixed and definite ; the cannon range is not. To insist 
 on excluding the former and retaining the latter only, 
 would be to revive the license and uncertainty which it 
 was the purpose of the law to prevent. The question 
 and dispute would be constantly recurring. What is 
 the range of a cannon ? 
 
 "There is no doubt that the marine league was 
 adopted because it was near, but somewhat more than 
 the extreme range of the heaviest ordnance in ordinary 
 use, when the rule was adopted ; and it is so now, not- 
 withstanding the improvements in ordnance. Cannon 
 range is merely referred to in the rule as showing the 
 reason of the rule ; if it had been intended to be the 
 rule in itself, it would have been absurd to refer at the 
 same time to the marine league. The marine league is 
 now universally regarded as the fixed rule. 
 
 " If ordnance should come into general use, throwing 
 their projectiles to a greater distance than a league, 
 nations might feel called upon to consult with each 
 other as to a revision of the rule. But in the meantime 
 for any one nation to repudiate it, is simj^ly to set 
 itself above the obligation of international law, without 
 even the pretence of necessity. What real danger or 
 inconvenience is apprehended from a continuance of the 
 rule? 
 
 " I am respectfully, 
 
 " Your Ob't. Servt., 
 
 " Gideon Welles, 
 '' jSecr^j of JVavi/,'' 
 
 « Hon. Wm. H. Seward, 
 SecH'ij of State.'' 
 
172 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 Unfortunately the Secretary had said too iniieh to 
 the Spanish diplomat to retract, and put himself in a 
 right position , without a virtual acknowledgment of 
 error in the early discussion ; and the Minister was not 
 inclined to relinquish the ground he had gained, but 
 continued to press his advantage. The result was, that 
 instead of referring to and abiding by the law and by 
 established usage and practice, the Secretary and the 
 Minister agreed to submit the question to the king of 
 the Belgians for a decision, and the project for a Con- 
 vention for that purpose was drawn up by which the 
 two governments stipulated in the second article, to 
 *' abide by the decision of His said Majesty." 
 
 When, more than a year after this arrangement be- 
 tween the two functionaries, had been entered into, 
 though not confirmed by the Senate, I learned what 
 was proposed to be done, I objected that the consent 
 to submit our unquestioned and undoubted right to 
 arbitration was wrong. There was little doubt the 
 decision would, as Mr. Seward felt confident, be favor- 
 able to us in conformity to the law and the practice 
 of nations, but it was highly improper and not good 
 and faithful administration to put our undoubted rights 
 in jeopardy. Had Spain laid claim to the possession 
 of Long Island or Nantucket, the idea of submitting 
 the claim to the decision of the king of the Belgians 
 or any other king would never have been for a mo- 
 ment entertained. 'Nor should the principle and our 
 legal right in regard to the great highway of nations 
 which Spain had undertaken to invade and appropri- 
 ate to her exclusive jurisdiction, be matter of arbitra- 
 
ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWAKD. 173 
 
 ment, nor would other governments, whatever might 
 be the decision regard it as obligatory on them. 
 
 Mr. Adams saj's, "in respect to the foreign rela- 
 tions, Mr. Lincoln knew absolutely nothing," but that 
 " it may be questioned whether any head of an execu- 
 tive department ever approached Mr. Seward in the 
 extent and minuteness of the instructions he was con- 
 stantly issuing during the critical period of the war." 
 These frequent and minute instructions and conces- 
 sions, incautiously giv^en and admitted, were often er- 
 roneous and embarrassing. Had the preposterous 
 pretensions of the Spanish Minister which Mr. Sew- 
 ard listened to and consented to negotiate been suc- 
 cessful, scarcely a greater or more injurious error 
 could be found in our history. It would have 
 afforded great additional security to the rebels and 
 blockade-runners. 
 
 Simultaneously with this Spanish claim of an ex- 
 tension of maritime jurisdiction the Secretary of State 
 sent me a copy of an unofficial note from Mr. Stuart 
 of the English legation, and at the time, Charge 
 d'affaires, expressing apprehensions that the " Bermu- 
 da,'' a captured blockade-runner would be purchased by 
 the JSTavy Department and taken into service prior to 
 condemnation. We were at that time availino: ourselves 
 of every suitable steamer in the country that could be 
 armed and made efficient in enforcing our extensive 
 blockade, which Earl Russell had pronounced at the 
 beginning of our troubles an impossibility ; but in due 
 time he admitted it was effective. When the block- 
 
174 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD 
 
 ade was first proclaimed we could neither build, nor 
 buy from our mercliant service a sufficient number of 
 vessels to enforce it and therefore had a standing order 
 to obtain from the courts, such prizes as were in the 
 possession of the prize-commissioners and liable to 
 condemnation. In this way we procured many excel- 
 lent steamers, which having been built for speed were 
 a valuable acquisition to our naval force. This pro- 
 ceeding became a great annoyance to our open ene- 
 mies, and no less so to their secret allies who were 
 largely engaged in illicit traffic, and found their risks 
 increased by some of their own most valuable and ex- 
 pensive vessels which were turned against them. To 
 prevent this as far as possible, and if they could not 
 wholly prevent, to postpone as long as possible the 
 condemnation of the steamers captured, delays in court 
 were interposed and the legality of the captures con- 
 tested, although there was not a doubt that they would 
 ultimately be condemned as good prize. In the mean- 
 time the prizes were, besides the detention, deteriora- 
 ting and often in a perishing condition. The courts 
 and prize-commissioners acting in good faith to both 
 captors and claimants, always had vessel and cargo 
 promptly appraised and disposed of at their true value, 
 and the money paid into court to abide the final de- 
 cree. That there might be no delay in the transfer, a 
 board consisting of a naval constructor, engineer 
 and ordnance officer was empowered by the Secretary 
 of the Navy to make a thorough examination of every 
 prize deemed suitable for naval service, and on a fa- 
 vorable report he deposited the amount of the apprais- 
 ed value with the registrar of the court, and had her 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 175 
 
 iiinnediately taken to the N^avj-yard, fitted and armed 
 for naval duty. 
 
 This was the state of facts and the course of pro- 
 ceeding when Mr. Stuart, Her Majesty's Charge 
 d'afl:aires on the 20th of October, 1862 sent his note, 
 shrewdly made unofficial^ to Mr. Seward, Secretary of 
 State. The latter without knowledge of the facts, and 
 without investigation or inquiry — without consulting 
 the President or Cabinet or any one of them, commit- 
 ted himself at once against the Navy Department and 
 the government, and in an official communication 
 *' hoped the unofiicial apprehensions of Mr. Stuart are 
 unfounded, as such a measure would afford ground for 
 serious complaint on the part of the British govern- 
 ment, which under existing circumstances it is desira- 
 ble to avoid." 
 
 It was a timid and hasty abandonment of a right, 
 an admission of wrong on our part, and an acknowl- 
 edgement of the propriety of foreign interference, 
 wholly unjustifiable, aside from the obvious intent of 
 keeping out of our service as long as possible an 
 important prize, captured in its attempts to supply the 
 insurgents with munitions of war. 
 
 Subjoined is the correspondence : 
 
 " Department of State, 
 
 Washington, Oct. 10, 1862." 
 "Sir:— 
 
 " I have the honor to enclose a copy of an unofficial 
 note of this date, addressed to me by Mr. Stuart, Her 
 Britannic Majesty's Charge d'aifaires, expressing 
 apprehensions that the steamer " Bermuda" may be 
 taken fur the use of the Xavy Department prior to her 
 
176 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 condemnation at Philadelphia. It is to be hoped that 
 these apprehensions are unfounded as such a measure 
 would afford ground for serious complaint on the part 
 of the British Government, which under existing cir- 
 cumstances, it is desirable to avoid. 
 
 " I have the honor to be, &c, 
 
 " Wm. H. Seward." 
 ''The Hon. Gideon Welles, 
 
 '' Sec'ey of the JSTavyy 
 
 "Navy Deparwient, 
 
 Oct. 15, 1862." 
 « Sir :— 
 
 "I had the honor on the evening of Saturday last, the 
 11th inst. to receive your communication of the 10th 
 inst. enclosing the copy of an unofficial note from 
 Mr. Stuart, Her Britannic Majesty's Charge d'affaires, 
 expressing an apprehension that it is the intention of 
 the naval authorities to appropriate the steamer 
 Bermuda, although no judgment has as yet been pro- 
 nounced upon her by the court. 
 
 " This is certainly a very extraordinary communica- 
 tion from Her Majesty's Charge d'affaires. The custody 
 of captured property, or the disposition to be made of 
 it before adjudication, is not regulated by international 
 law, but that law requires that an adjudication should 
 be had as speedily as possible. 
 
 "In some cases the captors themselves have a right 
 to dispose of captured property before adjudication. 
 (2. Pvob. 31.) 
 
 " The court, after the captured property comes into 
 its possession, may deliver it on bond to the captors or 
 claimants, or if ship or other cargo is in a perishing 
 condition or liable to deterioration pending the process, 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND ME, SEWAKD. 177 
 
 may order a sale of it by interlocutory decree. This is 
 the English law and the practice followed by our courts. 
 There is no doubt as to this discretionary power of a 
 prize-court or as to the practice. The property is al- 
 ways supposed to be in the custody of the court, but the 
 practice has been from time immemorial to consider the 
 proceeds as representing the thing itself. Certainly the 
 safest custodian of the property is the government, 
 which is ultimately responsible. The marshal, who or- 
 dinarily has the custody, is but an officer of the govern- 
 ment. In the event of a decree of restitution, if the 
 custodian has been found to be unfaithful and the cap- 
 tors unable to indemnify the foreign claimants, the gov- 
 ernment must make the restitution and indemnify the 
 claimants. There could be no additional risk to the 
 claimants, but rather the contrary, if the government 
 should take immediate possession of the captured prop- 
 erty without waiting an order of the prize-court. All 
 that international law requires is, that the evidence and 
 all the necessary witnesses be placed in the presence of 
 the court. 
 
 "International law is rigid against individual captors ; 
 they should not pillage in the slightest degree, upon 
 pain of forfeiting their rights. But it does not pretend 
 to lay down rules for the custody of captured property. 
 It is enough that the government of the captors is ulti- 
 mately responsible for any injury done by the captors. 
 
 "The Bermuda was captured on the 27th of April, 
 1862, about fifteen miles N. E. by E. from the " Hole in 
 the Wall," and brought into Philadelphia. She has 
 been appraised by order of the court, on application of 
 the prize-commissioners, and the Navy Department pro- 
 poses to purchase her under the decree of the court. If 
 so, the amount of valuation will be deposited in con- 
 8* 
 
178 ME. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWARD. 
 
 formity with law and the order of the court with the 
 registrar. The whole proceeding is strictly legal and 
 strictly regular and for the benefit of all having a legal 
 interest in the captured steamer. 
 
 "There is no novelty in these proceedings. Other 
 captured vessels have in like manner been disposed of, 
 and not infrequently purchased by the Navy Depart- 
 ment on appraisement, not only in Philadelphia under 
 the order of Judge Cadwalader, but in New York under 
 Judge Betts, and in Key West under Judge Marvin. 
 But these are matters in which I recognize no right 
 for foreign interference. The capture was lawful and 
 prima facie correct. 
 
 "It was made under the authority of the United 
 States in the exercise of an undoubted belligerent right. 
 But the capture is subject to adjudication, and if the 
 court shall fail to condemn, the United States must and 
 will respond in damages. But until the final judgment 
 of the court, I know of no right for foreign interfer- 
 ence. 
 
 " I cannot forbear the expression of my surprise at the 
 interposition of Her Majesty's representative in behalf of 
 a vessel captured with such an amount of contraband of 
 war on board intended to afford assistance to rebels who 
 are waging war upon this government. Her cargo of 
 guns, shot, shell, powder, etc., is a perfect magazine of mu- 
 nitions designed, as you and I well knew before she left 
 the shores of England, for those of our countrymen 
 who are in insurrection. Taken as she was on the high 
 seas with contraband of war on board in large quanti- 
 ties, does Her Majesty's representative appear, even un- 
 officially^ in behalf of this vessel, whose mission was to do 
 wrong — to violate our laws, injure our country and fur- 
 nish insurgent rebels with the means to destroy our coun- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWARD. 179 
 
 trymen, with whom he and his government are profess- 
 edly on terms of amity and friendship ? 
 
 " Assuredly Her Majesty's Charge d'affaires could not 
 have been aware of the character of the steamer Bermu- 
 da and her cargo, or he would never have permitted 
 himself to have been interested for her. Captured as 
 she was on the high seas, iilled with material to inflict 
 wrong upon a nation with which Great Britain is at 
 peace, I confess ray astonishment at the interposition of 
 Her Majesty's Charge d'affaires in the action of our 
 courts. The case of the Bermuda is so transparently 
 wrong as to admit of no doubt as to the final result in 
 regard to her, but were it otherwise, the government of 
 the United States is not only abundantly able to respond, 
 but is always anxious to do right in matters of this 
 description. We may be wronged and experience bad 
 faith from others, but these will never induce our courts 
 or our government to be unjust. 
 
 *' The opportunity is not an improper one for me to 
 invite your attention to the conduct of the British Co- 
 lonial authorities in permitting Her Majesty's Proclama- 
 tion to be constantly disregarded, and good faith and 
 the laws of neutrality to be persistently violated. Ves- 
 sels, as is known to us and to the whole world, are con- 
 stantly leaving certain ports in the British West Indies, 
 avowedly to run our blockade and furnish assistance to 
 the insurgents in their criminal assault upon our gov- 
 ernment. N'assau is notoriously an entrepot for sys- 
 tematic arrangements to violate our blockade, where 
 cargoes are interchanged, contraband of war transhipped, 
 and vessels are received and fitted out, despite the re- 
 monstrance of our Consul, who has repeatedly brought 
 these flagitious proceedings to the notice of the public 
 authorities. So flaorrant indeed was the case of the 
 
180 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 Oreto that she was once or twice detained, and after 
 the formality of a trial, most extraordinary in its char- 
 acter and results, was permitted to depart by the British 
 Courts, and, as is well known, directly after, ran the 
 blockade at Mobile. 
 
 " But the Colonial authorities are not alone in fault. 
 More recently we have intelligence that the steamer '290' 
 alias the * Alabama,' which our Consul and our Minister 
 at London warned the British authorities was being pre- 
 pared to depredate upon our commerce and make war 
 upon our flag, but which in spite of these remonstrances 
 they permitted to escape, has got abroad and is seizing, 
 sinking and burning the property of innocent merchants. 
 
 "Who is to be responsible for the devastation made 
 by this rebel rover which has never yet visited the ports 
 of any other country but those of Great Britain, when 
 the government of that country was repeatedly admon- 
 ished of her true character and purpose before she left 
 its shores ? 
 
 " I know of no case in history that has a parallel in 
 the enormity of the outrage committed, as between 
 friendly nations, to that of this semi-piratical vessel 
 from England which is now plundering and destroying 
 our commerce. From the commencement of the insur- 
 rection, the insurgents who are making war upon our 
 government and endeavoring to subvert it, without a 
 naval vessel of their own afloat or a port free of access, 
 have gone to England — a power that is professedly on 
 terms of amity with the United States — and there have 
 experienced no difiiculty in contracting for and procur- 
 ing to be built and sent forth, a cruiser, armed and 
 ladened with munitions of war, to make waste and de- 
 struction with the property of our citizens who are 
 wholly uninformed, and consequently wholly unpre- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 181 
 
 pared for such aggressive proceedings under any 
 guise from Great Britain. This vessel which is commit- 
 ting these outrages upon peaceful commerce, it will be 
 borne in mind, has never visited the waters of any nation 
 but those of Great Britain, is committing havoc upon 
 the commerce of a jDCople who enjoyed, as they sup- 
 posed, peaceful relations with that country. 
 
 " On every principle of equity and right, morally 
 and politically, the British nation should be held respon- 
 sible for the losses which our citizens sustain by the 
 depredations which this semi-piratical cruiser, which 
 was built on British soil, and went forth from a Britisli 
 port against the remonstrance and protests of our Minis- 
 ter and Consul, to prey upon American commerce. 
 
 " I do not permit myself to doubt that you have 
 been attentive to these facts and have duly presented 
 them in the proper quarter, asserting our rights and our 
 sense of the injury that our country and countrymen 
 have received. But I have deemed it not inopportune, 
 nor improper in me, to invite your especial attention to 
 the subject, because there is no concealment of the fact 
 that there are at this time vessels being built and others 
 purchased and fitted out with arms and munitions and 
 contraband of war in various places in Great Britain, 
 notoriously to promote aggressive war against the 
 United States. 
 
 " I am respectfully, 
 
 ''Your obed't serv't, 
 
 " Gideon Welles, 
 
 "Hon. Wm. H. Seward, 
 
 " SeoH'y of State:' 
 
 Thi^ correspondence, it will be noticed, was not 
 
182 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 with Lord Lyons, the Minister, who was then absent, 
 but with Mr. Stuart a subordinate then temporarily 
 in charge of the legation, and who improved his 
 opportunity, w^hich Lord Lyons would scarcely have 
 asked to obtain concessions from our Secretary of 
 State in the case of captured mails as well as cap- 
 tured vessels. In the case of captured mails, it 
 will be remembered Lord Lyons disavowed to Mr. 
 Sumner that he had ever made a demand, but that it 
 was a voluntary renunciation of our right by our 
 Secretary of State who was supposed to be the 
 authorized organ of the government. In a letter of 
 the 31st of December following. Lord Lyons, who had 
 resumed his duties, admitted that by *' a British statute 
 authorizing the sale of a ship before the decision of 
 an appellate court has been pronounced, is well- 
 founded," — that '* the exercise of such an abstract 
 power of sale is not denied by Her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment to the United States authorities," but, he thought 
 " the claimant ought to be preferred as a purchaser," etc. 
 This better of the British Minister disposed of the 
 unofficial apprehensions of his subordinate — apprehen- 
 sions in which the Secretar}^ of State participated, and 
 " hoped were unfounded," but which the Secretary of 
 the I^avy, thus admonished or rebuked, disregarded. 
 The transfer in this and other cases, was carried into 
 effect, notwithstanding hopes and fears and timid 
 concessions of the experienced government official, 
 who according to Mr. Adams, had the '' solid power to 
 direct affairs" — and possessed " breadth of philosophic 
 experience" and "native intellectual power" greatly 
 superior to Mr. Lincoln. 
 
ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 183 
 
 The President had a happy way of illustrating 
 questions and sometimes disposing of a subject by an 
 anecdote, which, better than an elaborate argument, 
 expressed his opinion. In the latter part of the win- 
 ter of 186 J:, Mr. Seward came one day to the cabinet 
 council with a full portfolio, and brow clouded and 
 disturbed. The President ever watchful, immediately 
 detected difficulty, and exhibited his concern as the 
 Secretary of State slowly adjusted his papers. Mr. 
 Seward commenced by alluding to the fact that Spain 
 was sick of the European alliance, and was beginning 
 to manifest towards our country a more friendly spirit ; 
 that her government had never been fully identified 
 with Palmerston and Louis Kapoleon in their intrigue 
 for European intervention, but she had at the begin- 
 ning of American troubles committed herself to some 
 extent and been induced to undertake to recover her 
 possessions in San Domingo. She had however been 
 unfortunate and met unexpected resistance. The 
 negroes were making a great struggle to maintain 
 their independence, and had the sympathies of the 
 abolitionists of our country with them. It was im- 
 portant in every point of view to detach Spain from 
 the alliance and preserve her friendship, at the same 
 time not give offence to our own countrymen whose 
 sympathies in the present condition of affairs were en- 
 listed in behalf of the negroes. In this Spanish- 
 Dominican complication we were pressed from both 
 quarters, and it was a delicate and grave question what 
 position we should take and what course pursue. On 
 one side was Spain, whom we wish to conciliate, on 
 
184 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 the other side, the negroes who had become great fa- 
 vorites and wanted our good-will in resisting Spanish 
 oppression. 
 
 The President's countenance indicated that his 
 mind was relieved before Seward had concluded. He 
 remarked that the dilemma of the Secretary of State 
 reminded him of an interview between two negroes in 
 Tennessee. One was a preacher, who with the crude 
 and strano^e notions of the is^norant of his race was en- 
 deavoring to admonish and enlighten his brother Afri- 
 can of the importance of religion and tlie dangers of 
 the future. '• Dere are," said Josh, the preacher, " two 
 roads before you, Jo. Be careful which you take. 
 One ob dem roads leads straight to hell — de odder 
 goes right to damnation." Jo opened his eyes with 
 affright and under the inspired eloquence, and awful 
 danger before him exclaimed, " Josh, take which road 
 you please — I shall go thro' de woods." 
 
 "I am not willing,'' said the President, "to assume 
 any new troubles or responsibility at this time, and shall 
 therefore avoid going to one place with Spain or with 
 the negro to the other, but shall take to the woods. 
 We will maintain an honest and strict neutrality." 
 
 The relation of the circumstances attending the 
 capture and release of the rebel emissaries, Mason and 
 Slidell, is pregnant with error. The excitement which 
 accompanied the intelligence of the capture of these 
 mischievous men was great, and had at one time a 
 threatening aspect. The final disposition of the ques- 
 tion, with the restoration of the prisoners to British 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 185 
 
 autliority, might well be mentioned as displaying the 
 marked and in some respects perhaps hap])y trait of 
 Mr. Seward in adapting himself to circumstances which 
 he could not control. But Mr. Adams fails to bring 
 out that shrewd diplomatic quality of Mr. Seward's 
 mind, and strives to inculcate an impression that the 
 Secretary of State stood alone ; was wise, sagacious, 
 reserved, and profound, when others were blind, pre- 
 cipitate, and weak ; took upon himself '' the whole 
 weight of popular indignation,'' and, " like the Eoman 
 Curtius, who leaped into the abyss which could have 
 been closed in no other way,'' he offered himself a sac- 
 rifice to secure the safety of the state. Mr. Seward 
 should receive credit for the dexterous and skilful dis- 
 patch which he prepared on his own change of position. 
 It exhibits his readiness and peculiar tact and talent 
 to extricate himself from and to pass over difficulties. 
 But in point of fact no man was more elated or jubilant 
 over the capture of the emissaries than Mr. Seward, 
 who for a time made no attempt to conceal his gratifi- 
 cation and approval of the act of Wilkes. But while 
 he and most of the Cabinet and country were hilarious, 
 the President had doubts, misgivings, and regrets, 
 which were increased after an interview with Senator 
 Sumner, with whom he often — sometimes to the dis- 
 gust and annoyance of Mr. Seward — advised on con- 
 troverted or disputed international questions, and espe- 
 cially when there were differences between himself and 
 the Secretary of State. 
 
 On the question of giving up the emissaries, Mr. 
 Adams says : " When the time came for the assembly 
 of tlie Cabinet, not a sign had been given by the Prcs- 
 
186 ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 ident, or any of the members, favorable to concession. 
 Mr. Seward, who had been charged with the official 
 duty of furnishing the expected answer, assumed tlie 
 responsibility of preparing his able argument, upon 
 which a decision was made to surrender the men. 
 Upon him would have rested the whole weight of 
 popular indignation had it proved formidable. If I 
 have been rightly informed, when read, it met with 
 few comments and less approbation. On the other 
 hand, there was no resistance. Silence gave consent. 
 It was the act of Mr. Seward, and his name was to be 
 associated with it, whether for good or for evil." 
 
 The truth is, not only had the President expressed 
 his doubts of the legality of the capture, and had them 
 increased, while Mr. Seward was rejoicing over and 
 approving of the proceeding, but Mr. Blair from the 
 first had denounced the act as unathorized, irregular, 
 and illegal. 'Not being a special admirer of Wilkes, 
 Mr. Bhiir recommended that Wilkes should be ordered 
 to take the Iroquois and go with Mason and Slidell to 
 England, and deliver them to the British government; 
 for Palmerston and Russell would, he said, seize the 
 occasion to make war. The prompt and voluntary 
 disavowal of the act of Wilkes, and delivering over the 
 prisoners, would have evinced our confidence in our 
 own power, and been a manifestation of our indifierence 
 and contempt for the emissaries, and a rebuke to the 
 alleged intrigues between the rebels and the English 
 Cabinet. Mr. Seward took a totally different view ; 
 scouted the idea of letting the prisoners go ; said the 
 British did not want them, and we could not think of 
 delivering them up. While Mr. Blair did not go about 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 187 
 
 at the time proclaiming bis opinions on a subject which 
 was under consideration, his dissent from the original 
 views of the Secretary of State, and his condemnation 
 of the act of Wilkes, are notorious among those who 
 were intimate with the transactions of the government. 
 The time for further withholding the facts, and permit- 
 ting men like Mr. Adams to be misled, has gone by. 
 The truth in relation to these and other matters, so 
 long perverted and suppressed, should be known, and 
 history set right. 
 
 Nearly every member of the administration, like 
 Mr. Seward, rejoiced in the capture of these mischiev- 
 ous men. Ko one coincided with Mr. Blair in his 
 suggestion to compel Wilkes to return them to the 
 custod}^ of Great Britain, however wise it may have 
 been in view of subsequent events. But the irregular 
 action of AYilkes in this case was in various ways the 
 cause of serious embarrassment. If the proceedings 
 could not be fully justified, neither could they, in the 
 then condition of affairs, and the excited state of 
 public feeling, be censured and condemned. But the 
 Secretary of the Navy, before hearing from Great 
 Britain, before even the administration had passed 
 upon the subject, was compelled to recognize and 
 approve or disapprove the act, and communicate the 
 transaction in his Annual Navy Eeport, just then to be 
 submitted to the President and Congress. In that 
 Report, and in a congratulatory letter of the 30th of 
 November, allusion is made to the irregularity of 
 Wilkes, which, it is suggested, might be excused in 
 view of the patriotic motives ; " but it must by no 
 means be permitted to constitute a precedent hereafter 
 
188 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 for the treatment of any similar infraction of neutral 
 obligations bj foreign vessels engaged in commerce or 
 the carrying trade." This Report, though bearing 
 date of the 2d of December, the day on which Con- 
 gress convened, was, as is usual with Annual Reports, 
 delivered complete to the President at the last regular 
 Cabinet meeting preceding the session, which was on 
 Friday, the 29th of November, 1861, to be trans- 
 mitted with the Message. Of course the Naval Report 
 was seen on that day by Mr. Seward, who until then 
 had taken no exception to the capture ; but on the 
 succeeding day, the 30th of November, the date of 
 the congratulatory letter to Wilkes, he wrote to Mr. 
 Adams what the latter gentleman calls the " prelimi- 
 nary dispatch that saved the dignity of the country.'' 
 These matters, it will be borne in mind, were 
 weeks before hearing from England, and before Mr. 
 Seward's elaborate answer of the 26th of December to 
 the demand of the Britisli government for the sur- 
 render of the emissaries. When Mr. Adams declares 
 that " not a sign had been given by the President or 
 any member of the Cabinet favorable to concession," 
 at the time that answer was prepared, he commits an 
 eo^re odious mistake. The President was from the first 
 willing to make concession. Mr. Blair advocated it. 
 Mr. Seward was at the beginning opposed to any idea 
 of concession which involved giving up the emissaries, 
 but yielded at once, and with dexterity, to the peremp- 
 tory demand of Great Britain. Let him have all the 
 applause which belongs to him for the facility and 
 diplomatic skill which he displayed in that change, 
 but in doing so, it is unjust to the President and 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 189 
 
 others to misrepresent them, or to mistake or pervert 
 the facts in regard to them or Mr. Seward. 
 
 These incidents selected from among many indicate 
 something of the managing expediency, fertihty of 
 resources, and administrative manner of Mr. Seward, 
 and illustrate the " superior intellectual power" and 
 " force of moral discipline ' which the ^' Memorial Ad- 
 dress" undertakes to say, enabled him to "direct affairs 
 for the benefit of the nation, through the name of 
 another." Acting at times from impulse, often with- 
 out sufficient forethought of consequences — fond of 
 displaying power — frequently exercising questionable 
 authority — prompted in some degree by jobbing and 
 lobby surroundings which, fostered at Albany and 
 defeated at Chicago, followed him to Washington, 
 where not a few of those followers contrived to grow 
 rich as the countr^^ grew poor, Mr. Seward attempted 
 and did, man}^ things which could scarcely be justified, 
 hut for which the administration was held responsi- 
 ble. It would be unjust to throw his eccentricities 
 and errors upon others, and to award to him the 
 honors and credit of successful measures of administra- 
 tion which he did not originate. 
 
 The President, never unreasonably obstinate or 
 wilful, was ever lenient and forbearing, even when 
 his intentions were defeated, and sometimes yielded to 
 proceedings that his judgment did not fully approve. 
 In the generosity of his nature he was tolerant of acts 
 where a more arbitrary and imperious mind would 
 have been implacable and unforgiving. There were 
 
190 ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 occasions, however, when, relying on his own convic- 
 tions, and the exigency being great, he exercised the 
 executive will — the one-man power — with intelligent 
 determination and effect. His promptness and energy 
 in an emergency were displayed on one memorable 
 occasion, when danger was imminent and immediate 
 decision necessary. It may be mentioned as illustra- 
 tive of his executive ability, promptness, and self-reli- 
 ance ; for it was in the absence of Mr. Seward, and 
 when those on whom he had a right to rely failed him 
 and were despondent. Gloom and national disaster 
 were upon the countr^^, but the President met the 
 crisis with firmness, rose with the exigency, and in- 
 dependent of his Cabinet and against the general sen- 
 timent of the people, and by a sacrifice of personal 
 feeling, adopted a course which results justified, and 
 proved his ability as a chief. 
 
 In the early period of the war the proceedings and 
 operations of the military commanders were unsatis- 
 factory, and nowhere equalled the general expectation. 
 Too much was doubtless expected and too little accom- 
 plished. None were more disappointed or depressed 
 by the slow progress made than the President himself. 
 For a period he had hopes from McClellan, whose tal- 
 ents at organization were displayed to advantage when, 
 in the summer of 1861, he took command at Washing- 
 ton, established order, and enforced good military ad- 
 ministration. In some respects the President esteemed 
 him to be superior to any of the generals with whom 
 he had come in contact ; but the autumn and winter 
 wore away in dilatory parades. With tlie change in 
 the War Department in January, 1SG2, came the hos- 
 
MR, LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 191 
 
 tilitj of Secretary Stanton to McClellan, then Gener- 
 al-in-Cliief. The hesitating movements of that officer 
 weakened the confidence of the President in his energy 
 and military power. He still believed, however, that 
 the general had superior military capacity and intelli- 
 gence, bnt that he was inert, infirm of purpose ; not 
 quite ready to do all that he had the ability to accom- 
 plish. He required pushing, and the President there- 
 fore took upon himself to order a forward movement 
 of both the army and navy. But McClellan continued 
 tardy, and the winter and spring delays, followed by 
 the sluggish movements on the York Peninsula and 
 the reverses before Richmond, discouraged and greatly 
 disheartened not only the President but the whole 
 country. At this juncture, when, with large armies 
 under him, he had more than he could perform in the 
 line of his profession, McClellan in July wn-ote from 
 his headquarters a very injudicious, not to say, imperti- 
 nent letter to the President, in relation to the civil 
 administration and the political conduct of affairs. 
 This unwise letter, and the reverses of the army, with 
 the active hostility of Stanton, brought Halleck, a 
 vastly inferior man, to Washington. General Pope 
 had preceded him, and, by an executive order creating 
 the Army of Virginia, had been placed in command of 
 the forces then in front of AYashington, to the infinite 
 dissrust of some of the older £:enerals. This diss^ust 
 was increased by his public gasconading proclamation 
 reflecting on the proceedings of his seniors — on their 
 "lines of retreat and bases of supplies," which must, 
 he said, tlionceforward be discarded. These blatant 
 bulletins, instead of inspiriting the men, caused ridi- 
 
192 MR. LIXCOLX AXD MR. SEWARD. 
 
 cnle in the ranks. The soldiers were attached to their 
 old officers, particularly to McClellan, and to a great 
 extent sympathized with him and other generals in 
 their dislike, almost contempt, of this junior com- 
 mander. Pope had been brought from the West 
 directly after Halleck reported he had accomplished 
 extraordinary achievements — reports grossly untrue, 
 and which Pope himself afterward refuted. On com- 
 ing to Washington, Pope, who was ardent, and I think 
 courageous, though not always discreet, very naturally 
 fell into the views of Secretary Stanton, who im^^roved 
 every opportunity to denounce McClellan and his hes- 
 itating policy. Pope also reciprocated the commenda- 
 tions bestowed on him by Halleck, by uniKog with 
 Stanton and General Scott in advising that McClellan 
 should be superseded, and Halleck placed in charge of 
 military affairs at Washington. This, combined with 
 the movements and the disasters before Richmond, and 
 his own imprudent letter, enabled Stanton to get rid 
 of McClellan at headquarters. One of the first orders 
 of Halleck on reaching Washington, after superseding 
 McClellan, was for the withdrawal of the Army of the 
 Potomac from the vicinity of Richmond. This recalled 
 McClellan and his generals with their commands to 
 the assistance of Pope, for whom they not only enter- 
 tained no special regard, but some of them absolute 
 hate. The orders' to reinforce and assist Pope were 
 consequently not obeyed with alacrity. There is no 
 denying the fact that professional pride was allowed to 
 encroach on patriotic duty in that momentous period. 
 The selection of Pope to command that army may have 
 been injudicious ; he may not have been the man to 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 193 
 
 take in hand and wield the immense force which met 
 Lee and Jackson at the front ; there may hav^e been 
 error on the part of Stanton and Halleck as well as 
 Pope in sligliting some of the older generals ; the 
 enmit}^ of the Secretary of War toward McClellan may 
 not without reason have been felt by him and his 
 favorites as unjust ; yet the welfare of the Republic 
 should not have been put in jeopardy to gratify per- 
 sonal, official, or professional resentments. The gen- 
 eral in command, whether young or old, should at 
 such a crisis have been earnestly and in good faith sus- 
 tained. Had that been the case, the results of the 
 second battle at Manassas or Bull Run might have 
 been different. But Pope was defeated, and the army, 
 sadly demoralized, came retreating to the Potomac. 
 The AVar Department, and especially Stanton and 
 Halleck, became greatly alarmed. On the 30th of 
 August, in the midst of these disasters and before the 
 result had reached us, though most damaging informa- 
 tion in regard to McClellan, who lingered at Alexan- 
 dria, was current, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. 
 Chase, called upon me with a protest, signed by him- 
 self and Stanton, denouncing the conduct of McClellan 
 and demanding his immediate dismissal. Two other 
 members were ready to append their names after mine. 
 I declined to sign the paper, which was in the hand- 
 writing of Stanton, not that I did not disapprove of 
 the course of the general, but because the combination 
 was improper and disrespectful to the President, who 
 had selected his Cabinet to consult and advise with, 
 not to conspire against him ; besides, some of the 
 charges or allusions in the paper I knew nothing of, 
 9 
 
194 MR. LINCOLN AND ME. SEWAF.D. 
 
 and I had doubted the wisdom of recalling the Army 
 of the Potomac from Richmond, therein differing from 
 Chase and Stanton. The object in bringing that army 
 back to AYashington in order to start anew, march 
 overland, and regain the abandoned position, I did not 
 understand unless it was to get rid of McClellan ; and 
 if that was the object, it would have been much better 
 to place another general at the head of the army while 
 it w^as yet on the James. But a majority of the Cab- 
 inet finally nnited in this proceeding. On Monday, 
 the 1st of September, the paper, somewhat modified 
 and signed by four of the Cabinet ofiicers, was brought 
 me. Mr. Seward was at the time absent from Wash- 
 ington — I never doubted purposely absent — and not 
 of the number. My refusal and perhaps my remarks 
 prevented the matter from proceeding further. The 
 indignation against McClellan was at the time intense 
 in AYashington and the country. The President never 
 knew of this paper, but was not unaware of the popular 
 feeling against that ofiicer in which he sympathized, 
 and of the sentiments of the members of the Cabinet, 
 aggravated by the hostility and strong, if not exagger- 
 ated rumors sent out by the Secretary of War. Both 
 Stanton and Halleck were, however, filled with appre- 
 hensions beyond others, as the army of stragglers and 
 broken battalions on the last of August and first of 
 September came rushing toward Washington. 
 
 At the stated Cabinet meeting on Tuesday, the 2d 
 of September, while the whole community was stirred 
 up and in confusion, and afifairs were gloomy beyond 
 anything that had previously occurred, Stanton enter- 
 ed the council-room a few moments in advance of Mr. 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 195 
 
 Lincoln and said, with great excitement, he had just 
 learned from General Halleck that the President had 
 placed McClellan in command of the forces in Wash- 
 ington. The information was surprising, and, in view 
 of the prevailing excitement against that officer, alarm- 
 ing. The President soon came in, and in answer to 
 an inquiry from Mr. Chase, confirmed what Stantou 
 had stated. General regret was expressed, and Stan- 
 ton with some feeling remarked, that no order to that 
 effect had issued from the War Department. The 
 President, calmly but w^ith some emphasis, said the 
 order was his, and he would be responsible for it to 
 the country. AVith a retreating and demoralized army 
 tumbling in upon us, and alarm and panic in the com- 
 munity, it was necessary, the President said, that 
 something should be done, but there seemed to be no 
 one to do it. He therefore had directed McClellan, 
 who knew this whole ground, who was the best organ- 
 izer in the army, whose faculty was to organize and 
 defend, and who would here act upon the defensive, 
 to take this defeated and shattered army and reorgan- 
 ize it. He knew full well the infirmities of McClellan, 
 who was not an affirmative man ; w^as worth little for 
 an onward movement ; but beyond any other officer 
 he had the confidence of the army, and he could more 
 efficiently and speedily reorganize it and put it in con- 
 dition than any other general. If the Secretary of 
 War, or any member of the Cabinet, would name a 
 general that could do this as promptly and well, he 
 would appoint him. For an active fighting general 
 he was sorry to say McClellan was a failure ; he had 
 " the slows" ; was never ready for battle, and probably 
 
196 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 never would be ; but for this exigency, when organi- 
 zation and defence were needed, he considered him 
 the best man for the service, and the country must 
 have the benefits of his talents though he had behaved 
 badly. The President said he had seen and given his 
 opinion to General Halleck, who was still General-in 
 Chief; but Halleck had no plan or views of his own, 
 proposed to do nothing himself, and fully approved 
 his calling upon McClellan. 
 
 In stating what he had done the President was de- 
 liberate, but firm and decisive. His language and 
 manner were kind and affectionate, especially toward 
 two of the members who were greatly disturbed ; but 
 every person present felt that he was truly the chief, 
 and every one knew his decision, though mildly express- 
 ed was as fixed and unalterable as if given out with 
 the imperious command and determined will of An- 
 drew Jackson. A long discussion followed, closing 
 with acquiescence in the decision of the President, 
 but before separating the Secretary of the Treasury 
 expressed his apprehension that the reinstatement of 
 McClellan would prove a national calamity. 
 
 In this instance the President, unaided by others, 
 put forth with firmness and determination the execu- 
 tive will — the one-man power — against the temporary 
 general sense of the community as well as of his 
 Cabinet ; two of whom it has been generally supposed 
 had with him an influence almost as great as the Sec- 
 retary of State. They had been ready to make issue 
 and resign their places unless McClellan was dismiss- 
 ed ; but yet knowing their opposition, and in spite of 
 it and of the general dissatisfaction in the community, 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SP:WARD. 197 
 
 the President had in that perilous moment exalted 
 him to new and important trusts. In an interview 
 with the President on the succeeding Friday, when 
 onlj he and myself were present, he unburthened his 
 mind freely. Militar3^ matters were still in confusion, 
 without plan or purpose at headquarters. The Secre- 
 tary of War, under Pope's defeat and McClellan's re- 
 instatement, was not only disappointed, but dejected 
 and dispirited. The President said most of our troub- 
 les grew out of military jealousies. Whether chang- 
 ing the plan of operations (discarding McClellan and 
 placing Pope in command iu front) was wise or not, 
 was not now the matter in hand. These things, right 
 or wrong, had been done. If the administration had 
 erred, the country should not have been made to suf- 
 fer nor our brave men been cut down and butchered. 
 Pope should have been sustained, but he was not. 
 These personal and professional quarrels came in. 
 AVhatever may have been said to the contrary, it could 
 not be denied that the army was with McClellan. He 
 had so skilfully handled his troops in not getting to 
 Eichmond as to retain their confidence. The soldiers 
 certainly had not transferred their confidence to Pope. 
 He could, however, do no more good in this quarter. 
 It was humiliating, after what had transpired and all 
 we knew, to reward McClellan and those who failed to 
 do their whole duty in the hour of trial, but so it 
 was. Personal considerations must be sacrificed 
 for the public good. He had kept aloof from the 
 dissensions that prevailed, and intended to; "but,'* 
 said he, " I must have McClellan to reorganize the 
 army and bring it out of chaos. There has been a de- 
 
198 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 sign, a purpose in breaking down Pope, without re- 
 gard to the consequences to the country that is atro- 
 cious. It is shocking to see and know this, but there 
 is no remedy at present. McClellan has the army 
 with him." These were the views and this the course 
 of the President when there was general dismay in the 
 country and confusion in the army ; the rebels near the 
 intrenchments of Washington, and some of the Cab- 
 inet alarmed and preparing to leave. The President 
 was not insensible to the deficiencies or ignorant of the 
 faults of McClellan, nor yet blind to, and stubborn as 
 regarded his better qualities. In placing him at the 
 head of the army he went counter to the wishes of his 
 friends, and forgetful of all else he subdued every per- 
 sonal feeling, and in the spirit of unselfish patriotism 
 resolved to do what was for tlie true interest of the 
 country. Had the general followed up the battle of 
 Antietam, which took place a fortnight later, he would 
 have retrieved the misfortunes of the peninsula and 
 given the President additional reason to congratulate 
 himself on the reinstatement ; but the old dilatory in- 
 firmity remained, which strengthened the influence 
 that persistently opposed him, and soon after led to his 
 being retired from the command of the army. 
 
 The President was a much more shrewd and 
 accurate observer of the characteristics of men — better 
 and more correctly formed an estimate of their power 
 and capabilities — than the Secretary of State or most 
 others. Those in the public service he closely scanned, 
 but was deliberate in forming a conclusion adverse to 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 199 
 
 any one he had appointed. In giving or withdrawing 
 coniidence he was discriminating and just in liis final 
 decision ; careful never to wound unnecessarily the 
 sensibilities of any for their infirmities, always ready 
 to praise, but nevertheless firm and resolute in dis- 
 charging the to him, always painful duty of censure, 
 reproof, or dismissal. 
 
 Dupont he classed in the naval service with 
 McClellan in the military. Both were intelligent, 
 accomplished, and valuable officers in their way, but 
 neither was the man for fierce encounter and desperate 
 fighting. The two until tried had his support and all 
 the confidence to which they were entitled, or which 
 either had reason to expect. If the results at Port 
 Royal were not followed up with the energy and vigor 
 anticipated, the fault was, he justly considered, as 
 much with the military as with the navy. But in the 
 autumn of 1862 and winter of 1863 extensive prepa- 
 rations were made for retaking Fort Sumter and the 
 capture of Charleston. Dupont visited Washington 
 in the autumn, and had consulted on the subject, but 
 would listen to no suggestion that any other officer 
 should be detailed for that especial service, which he 
 claimed as a right and as within the limits of his 
 blockade. Extraordinary effi^rts were accordingly 
 made by the Navy Department, which gave him a 
 large portion of the best officers and vessels in the 
 service that he might be successful. But time wore on, 
 with no more efiective demonstration than had been 
 made by the army of the Potomac on the York 
 peninsula. Dupont, like McClellan, was constantly 
 asking for more reinforcements, and the Navy Depart- 
 
200 MR. .LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 ment strained every nerve to aid him, and often 
 answered his requisitions at the expense of other 
 squadrons. 
 
 The President, as well as the whole country, felt 
 greatly interested in this subject ; not that Charleston 
 was of any great strategic importance, but it was the 
 hot-bed of secession, and there the rebellion had its ori- 
 gin. It was winter or early spring, and nothing had 
 been accomplished, when the President one day 
 said to me he had but slight expectation that we 
 should have any great success from Dupont. ^' He, 
 as well as McClellan," said Mr. Lincoln, " hesitates — 
 has * the slows.' McClellan always wanted more regi- 
 ments; Dupont is everlastingly asking for more gun- 
 boats — more iron-clads. He will do nothing with any. 
 He has intelligence and system, and will maintain a 
 good blockade. You did well in selecting him for 
 that command, but he will never take Sumter or get 
 to Charleston. He is no Farragut, though unquestion- 
 ably a good routine officer, who obeys orders and in a 
 general way carries out his instructions." A few 
 weeks served to verify all that the President had said 
 on the subject. Dupont died without planting the 
 flag on Sumter or visiting Charleston. 
 
 The views, theories and policy of Mr. Seward so 
 far as he had a policy in relation to secession, were at 
 the beginning different from the purposes and inten- 
 tions of the President and his colleagues in the Cabinet. 
 Through the winter of 1861 he possessed extraordi- 
 nary opportunities to inform himself of the schemes 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWAKD. 201 
 
 and intrigues of the secessionists, and also the opera- 
 tions and designs of the Buchanan Administration as 
 well as of the Republicans. In the Senate he had free 
 intercourse with all parties, and the fact, well under- 
 stood, that he was to receive the first appointment in 
 Mr. Lincoln's Cabinet gave to his opinions weight and 
 influence. Leading men of opposing factions courted 
 and consulted him, for many, like Mr. Adams, under- 
 estimated the capacity and qualities of Mr. Lincoln, 
 and assumed that the future Secretary of State would 
 be the guiding spirit of the incoming administration. 
 It is now well-known that Mr. Stanton, at that time a\ 
 member of Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet was impressed -■ 
 with this beliei and secretly confided to Mr. Seward 
 the consultations and purposes of that administration. 
 General Scott also, an old courtier as well as soldier, 
 turned to the rising sun and in deference to the new pro- 
 jected policy, abandoned his original and sensible pa- 
 triotic advice to Mr. Buchanan to garrison the southern 
 forts and prepare the government for the threatened out- 
 break. Neither Mr. Lincoln nor any of his Cabinet ex- 
 cept Mr. Seward, was aware of the schemes which had 
 been maturing for a few months preceding the inaugu- 
 ration. Mr. Seward, with whom many of the southern 
 leaders held intercourse, was gratified with the atten- 
 tion shown him, and, having really no settled convic- 
 tions was kindly conciliatory and made concessions and 
 promises which he found it difficult to carry fully into 
 efiect. In his speech of the 12th of January h6 
 expressed his intention " to meet exaction with conces- 
 sion," and his readiness to change the Constitution to 
 get over difficulties. It has also been claimed and 
 
202 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 ^ever denied, while facts go far to confirm the state- 
 ment, that he had an understanding with the secession- 
 ists to the effect that Sumter and other forts in the 
 seceding states should be surrendered. In such a 
 purpose he entertained no intention of permanent 
 disunion, but there are many circumstances which 
 indicate that he contemplated temporary separation, 
 and a reunion by a national convention to revise the 
 constitution, and among other things give new guaran- 
 ties to the slave-holding states. A new faith in 
 expedients such as in the absence of principle had 
 been resor,ted to by the Albany lobby and made suc- 
 cessful in great emergencies. 
 
 On the lOth of April, two days after sending to 
 Judge Campbell " Faith as regards Sumter — wait 
 and see," he wrote to Mr. Adams : *' Only an imperial 
 or despotic government would subjugate thoroughly 
 disaffected and insurrectionary members of the state. 
 This federal republican system of ours is, of all forms 
 of government, the very one which is most unfitted 
 for such a labor. Happily however, this is only an 
 imaginary defect. The system has, within itself ade- 
 quate peaceful, conservative and recuperative forces. 
 Firmness on the part of the government in maintain- 
 ing and-preserving the public institutions and property, 
 and in executing the laws where authority can he exer- 
 cised without waging war^ combined with such meas- 
 ures of justice, moderation,, and forbearance as will 
 disarm reasoning opposition, *vill be sufficient -to secure 
 the public safety until returning reflection, concurring 
 with the fearful experience of social evils, the inevi- 
 table fruits of faction, shall hring the recusant mem- 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARb. -S03 
 
 he^'s cheerfidly hack into the family^ which, after all, 
 must prove their best and happiest, as it undeniably 
 is their most natural home. The Constitution of the 
 United States provides for that returji by authorizing 
 Congress, on application to be made by a certain 
 majority of the States, to assembU a National Conven- 
 tion ^ in which the organic law can, if it he needful^ he 
 revised so as to remove all real obstacles to a reunion 
 so suitable to the habits of the people, and so eminently 
 conducive to the common safety and welfare." 
 
 This was the scheme, or policy if it may be so call- 
 ed, of Mr. Seward and his conferees at the begin- 
 ning, but it was not the policy of Mr. Lincoln. The 
 letter to Mr. Adams was prepared, it will be remem- 
 bered, at the very time when the squadron to relieve 
 Fort Sumter was rendered abortive, by his detaching 
 the Powhatan, the flag-ship from the expedition. Mr. 
 Lincoln was not a party to the arrangements. They 
 were concerted and employed to defeat his efforts to 
 use the power of the government to check and break 
 down the early movements of the rebels. The nation- 
 al forces and authority were ejected from the forts in 
 South Carolina and Geo gia. The "wayward sisters 
 were to go in peace," and be brought back by a National 
 Convention, " in which the organic law can be revised, 
 so as to remove all real obstacles to a reunionP 
 
 Without discussing the soundness of the policy in- 
 dicated in this letter to JVL.-. Adams and the facfs which 
 accord with that policy, it is sufficient to state, and 
 subsequent events demonstrate, that it was not the 
 policy of Mr. Lincoln, and the administration. In its 
 details the course proposed by Mr. Seward conformed to 
 
204 MR. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWARD. 
 
 the policy of Bnclianan and Black, that a state could 
 not be coerced — the union was to be dismembered and 
 reunited by a new, or revised constitution. In these 
 proceedings, Mr. Seward perplexed, confused and em- 
 barrassed, but did not direct affairs of the administra- 
 tion. 
 
 The distinctive measure of Mr. Lincoln's Adminis- 
 tration, beyond all others, that whicii makes it an era 
 in our national history, is the decree of Emancipation. 
 This movement, almost revolutionary, was a step not 
 anticipated by him when elected, and which neither 
 he nor any of his Cabinet was prepared for, or would 
 have assented to when they entered upon their duties. 
 He and they had, regardless of party discipline, resist- 
 ed the schemes for the extension of slavery into free 
 territory under the sanction of federal authorit3^ All 
 of them, though of different parties, were and ever 
 had been opposed to slavery, but not one of them fa- 
 vored any interference with it by tlie Kational Gov- 
 ernment in the states where it was established or per- 
 mitted. The assumption, after the acquisition of ter- 
 ritory from Mexico, that slavery was a national and 
 not a local institution had opened a new controversy 
 in American politics, which contributed to the disin- 
 tegration of old party organizations, each of whicli be- 
 came in a measure sectional. The dissenting elements 
 resisted the centralizing claim that slavery was national, 
 not local ; and ultimately, after a struggle of several 
 years, they threw off old party allegiance and com- 
 bined under a new organization, thenceforward known 
 
MK. LINCOLX AND MR. SEWARD. 205 
 
 as Eepublican. In the first stages of this movement 
 neither Mr. Lincohi nor Mr. Seward participated. 
 Both of them had sympathized with what was known 
 as the Free-soil party in 1848, but declined to become 
 identified with it. They were politicians, and not 
 then prepared to abandon the organization with which 
 they had previously acted. Mr. Lincoln, with the free 
 thought and independence of the men of the West, 
 less trained and bound to party than the disciplined 
 politicians in the old states, holding no official position, 
 a quiet but observing and reflecting citizen ; truthful, 
 honest, faithful to his convictions, and with the men- 
 tal strength and courage to avow and maintain them, 
 early appreciated the important principles involved in 
 this rising question, and boldly cast off the shackles 
 of party in defence of the right, and earnestly, irre- 
 spective of any and all parties, opposed the extension 
 and aggressions of slavery. Mr. Seward was in those 
 days in office, trammelled by party followers and party 
 surroundings. Trained during his whole public career 
 in the severest discipline of party, indebted to it for 
 his high position, always subservient to its decrees and 
 requirements, active and exacting in enforcing its ob- 
 ligations, he had not the independence and moral 
 stamina to free himself from the restraints and despot- 
 ism of party, whatever were his sympathies, until the 
 Whig organization disbanded. The people of the 
 West, who knew Mr. Lincoln and appreciated his ca- 
 pabilities, tried in 1856 to place him on the ticket with 
 Fremont as a candidate for "Vice-President. Although 
 but slightly known in the East, such was the zeal and 
 enthusiasm in his favor of those who knew him, that 
 
206 ME. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 nothing but the expediency of selecting an Eastern 
 man to be associated with Fremont, who was from the 
 West, prevented his nomination instead of Dayton. 
 From the start he was a prominent Republican cham- 
 pion and leader, while Mr. Seward, a partisan politi- 
 cian, held off; was reluctant to leave the party wdth 
 which he had been associated, hoping to make the new 
 movement subservient to, or a part of the Whig party. 
 Mr. Lincoln had no such purpose ; the principles in- 
 volved were w^ith him above mere party. With no 
 fortune, unaided by metropolitan funds or pecuniary 
 assistance from any quarter, he gave his time and 
 mind with unstinted devotion to the cause of freedom 
 and in his memorable campaign with Douglass, alone 
 and unassisted, he, through the empire State of the 
 West, met the Senatorial giant on the questions of the 
 extension of slavery, the rights of the states, the grants 
 to and limitation of the powers of the general gov- 
 ernment, and displayed ability and powder w4nch won 
 the applause of the country, and drew from Douglass 
 himself expressions of profound respect. 
 
 When the Eepublicans, in convention at Chicago, 
 chose their standard-bearer, they wisely and properly 
 selected as their representative, the sincere and able 
 man who had no great money-power in his interest, no 
 disciplined lobby, no host of party followers, but who, 
 like David, coniided in the justice of his cause and 
 with the simple weapons of truth and right, met the 
 Goliath of slavery aggression, before assembled multi- 
 tudes, in many a well-contested debate. The popular 
 voice was not in error, or its confidence misplaced, 
 when it selected and elected Lincoln. 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MK. SEWARD. 207 
 
 After his election, and after the war commenced, 
 events forced upon him the emancipation of the 
 slaves in the rebellious states. It was his own act, 
 a bold step, an executive measure originating with him, 
 and was, as stated in the memorable appeal at the 
 close of the final Proclamation, invoking for it the 
 considerate judgment of mankind, warranted alone by 
 military necessity. He and the Cabinet were aware 
 that the measure involved high and fearful responsi- 
 bility, for it would alarm the timid everywhere, and 
 alienate, at least for a time, the bold in the border 
 states who clung to the Union. The act itself could 
 not have been justified or excused, and w^ould never 
 have been attempted, had the country been at peace ; 
 yet the movement seemed aggravated and more 
 hazardous from the fact that the Union was weakened 
 and imperilled by civil war. Eesults have proved that 
 there was in the measure profound thought, statesman- 
 ship, courage, and far-seeing sagacity — consummate 
 executive and administrative ability, which was, after 
 some reverses, crowned with success. The nation, 
 emerging from gloom and disaster, and the whole 
 civilized world, united in awarding honor and gratitude 
 to the illustrious man who had the mind to conceive 
 and the courage and firmness to decree the emancipa- 
 tion of a race. Ten years after this event, when the 
 patriot and philanthropist who decreed emancipation 
 had been years in his grave, an attempt is made on a 
 solemn occasion to award to one of his subordinates 
 the honor and credit which justly belong to the great 
 chief who decreed it. The Albany ''Memorial 
 Address'' dwells on public measures, particularly 
 
208 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 during the war, but makes no allusion to this great act 
 of Lincoln, nor to his merits in the cause of freedom, 
 for which he labored and in which he died, but de- 
 clares that his Secretary of State, a life-long partisan 
 politician, was always opposed to slavery, and that he 
 " directed affairs for the benefit of the nation, through 
 the name of another." It is unnecessarj^, after what has 
 already been said, to comment on this assumed direc- 
 tion by a subordinate instead of the chief, or on the 
 gross injustice to Mr. Lincoln ; but it should be known 
 that the Secretary of State neither originated nor 
 directed the affairs of the government on the great 
 measure of emancipation. Mr. Seward was undoubt- 
 edly opposed to slavery, and so was every member of 
 the administration, but his opposition never led him 
 to propose any measure of relief to the country, or to 
 take any steps against slavery which would be likely 
 to impair the Whig party or the Whig organization 
 while it existed, ^o specific act of his — no measure 
 or distinct proposition to emancipate the slaves at any 
 time — is mentioned, for there was none. In the 
 administration of the government he took no advance 
 step on the slavery question. Mr. Lincoln was the 
 pioneer and responsible author, while the Secretary 
 of State studiously avoided any expression of opinion 
 in regard to it. The Secretaries of War and Navy 
 were compelled to act in relation to fugitives from 
 slavery who sought protection under the Union flag — 
 an anomalous question — but they could obtain no 
 counsel or advice from the Secretary of- State how to 
 act. He not only avoided giving an opinion, but 
 recommended that the administration should abstain 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 209 
 
 from any decisive stand on that controverted and 
 embarrassing subject. 
 
 The President, who is represented as incompetent 
 for his position, and whose mind in 1861, it is said, 
 *' had not even opened to the crisis," was reluctant to 
 meddle with this disturbing element. Yet earlier 
 than others he rightly appreciated what the govern- 
 ment would have to encounter, and was convinced 
 it must be taken in hand and disposed of. The mag- 
 nitude of the rebellion, and the nature of the contest, 
 compelled him, after the civil war had been carried on 
 for twelve months, to grapple with this formidable 
 subject. His first movement, in March 1862, was 
 cautious and deliberate, characterized by great pru- 
 dence and forethought, and designed not to alarm the 
 friends of the Union by any harsh or offensive pro- 
 ceeding. It was an ameliorated plan for the gradual 
 abolition of slavery by action of the states respectively, 
 with the cooperation and assistance of the general 
 government. This plan of voluntary and compensated 
 emancipation was pressed upon Congress and the 
 border slave states, with great earnestness, by the 
 President. Mr. Blair and Mr. Bates, both residents 
 of the border slave states, were the only members of 
 the Cabinet who cordially seconded these first early 
 measures in the cause of emancipation. Their asso- 
 ciates cheerfully assented to and acquiesced in the 
 proposition, but had neither faith nor zeal in its 
 success ; nor did Mr. Seward or any one of them sug- 
 gest a different or more available plan for national 
 relief. The subject was beset on every side with 
 difficulty, requiring fur its manipulation and disposi- 
 
210 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 tion the highest order of administrative and executive 
 ability, i^o one more than the President was im- 
 pressed with the difficulties to be met, and at the same 
 time with the imperative necessity of decisive action. 
 The details of these proceedings, and the final deter- 
 mined stand taken by him — not by the Secretary of 
 State or any of the Cabinet — to decree by an execu- 
 tive order the emancipation of the slaves in the rebel- 
 lious states, have been elsewhere related. It was 
 after all efforts for voluntary emancipation by the 
 states interested, with pecuniary aid from the national 
 treasury, had failed. To Mr Seward and myself the 
 President communicated his purpose, and asked our 
 views, on the 13th of July 1862. It was the day 
 succeeding his last unsuccessful and hopeless confer- 
 ence with the representatives in Congress from the 
 border slave states, at a gloomy period of our affairs, 
 just after the reverses of our armies under McClellan 
 before Richmond. The time, he said, had arrived 
 when we must determine whether the slave element 
 should be for or against us. Mr. Seward, represented 
 as a superior in " native intellectual power," and as 
 having forty years previously chosen his side, and as 
 at that early period having claimed '^ a right in the 
 government to emancipate slaves," was appalled and 
 not prepared for this decisive step, when Mr. Lincoln 
 made known to us that he contemplated by an exec- 
 utive order, to emancipate the slaves. Startled with 
 so broad and radical a proposition, he informed the 
 President that the consequences of such an act were 
 so momentous that he was not prepared to advise on 
 the subject without further reflection. 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 211 
 
 He had, it will be remembered, only the preced- 
 ing year, in his carefully prepared and studied speech 
 of thel2tliof January 1861, avowed a policy diametri- 
 cally opposed to emancipation by the general govern-, 
 ment. *' I am willing," said he, on that occasion, *'to' 
 vote for an amendment to the Constitution declaring that 
 it shall not by any future amendment be so altered as to 
 confer on Congress a power to abolish or interfere with 
 slavery in any state." In addition to this speech on 
 the floor of the Senate and in corroboration of it, he, as a 
 member of the Senatorial committee of thirteen, pro- 
 posed the following amendment to the Federal Consti- 
 tution : '* No amendment shall be made to the Con- 
 stitution, which will authorize or give to Congress any 
 power to abolish or interfere in any state with the do- 
 mestic institutions thereof, including that of persons 
 held to service or labor by the laws of said state." 
 
 The President aware of the position taken by Mr. 
 Seward and of the embarrassment which he might feel 
 in acceding to a measure that conflicted with that posi- 
 tion, stated he wished from neither of us a committal, 
 but he thought best to make known to us, that emanci- 
 pation appeared to him an inevitable necessity. 
 
 While Mr. Seward hesitated, and had the subject 
 under consideration, the President deliberately pre- 
 pared his preliminary proclamation, which met the ap- 
 proval, or at least the acquiescence, of the whole Cab- 
 inet, though there were phases of opinion not entirely 
 in accord with the proceedings. Mr. Blair, an original 
 emancipationist, and committed to the principle, 
 thought the time to issue the order inopportune, and 
 Mr. Bates desired that the deportation of the colored 
 
212 MR. LmCOLN AMD MR. SEWARD. 
 
 race sliould be coincident with emancipation. Aware 
 that there were shades of difference among his coun- 
 sellors, and hesitation and doubt with some, in view 
 of the vast responsibility and its consequences, the 
 President devised his own scheme, held himself alone 
 accountable for the act, and, unaided and unassisted, 
 prepared each of the proclamations of freedom. Mr. 
 Seward in no way or form originated or was responsi- 
 ble for that important measure, did not in any way 
 " direct affairs " in regard to it, was in no other way 
 cognizant of it beyond his colleagues, except as com- 
 municated to him and myself on the 13th of July, at 
 its inception. Yet in the '' Memorial Address," Mr. 
 Seward is represented as the life-long opponent of sla- 
 very, beyond others the master spirit in the Lincoln 
 Administration. The President and this great event 
 are ignored, and the inference is intended to be con- 
 veyed, that the Secretary of State who " chose his side" 
 in the morning of life adverse to slavery, is entitled to 
 the credit ; for it is represented that the President was 
 a mere secondary personage, and the Secretary of 
 State directed affairs in the name of Mr. Lincoln, who 
 was to " reap the honors due chiefly to Mr. Seward's 
 labors." 
 
 To unfold the leaves of suppressed history, and 
 correct the errors and perversions which interested — 
 and many of them still living — persons have spread 
 abroad and inculcated, is a thankless task, and will 
 subject him who performs it to partisan abuse. It is 
 scarcely to be expected that the present generation 
 will know or be able to appreciate the labors and acts 
 of those who, intrusted with the government in a 
 
MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 213 
 
 trying period, took upon themselves immense and 
 unprecedented responsibilities, or that a rightful dis- 
 crimination will at this early day, if ever, be made as 
 regards those who in the quiet of civil official life par- 
 ticipated in the movements which eventuated in the 
 salvation of tlie Union and the emancipation of a race. 
 The late labored effort of the distinguished gentleman 
 of an historic family and name to depreciate the 
 talents and services of Abraham Lincoln, and to crown 
 another with honors that justly belong to him, is a 
 specimen of lamentable partisan prejudice and error. 
 It is but one, and perhaps the last of many attempts 
 of a similar character, to take from the brow of Lincoln 
 the wreath of merit that is justly his — to deprive him 
 of the reward due for his labor, and give to another 
 credit for his acts. It is not the first time in our 
 history w^hen like injustice has been witnessed toward 
 our Chief Magistrates. Volumes have been written 
 to prove that Hamilton controlled Washington and 
 directed the affairs of the nation in the name of his 
 chief Van Buren, it was claimed, controlled the 
 imperious will of Jackson and dictated his measures. 
 Undoubtedly^ each had influence with his chief, 
 perhaps more than he deserved. The same may be 
 said of Mr. Seward, who had undeniably influence 
 with Mr. Lincoln, but who was no more the directing 
 mind of the Administration of Lincoln, but really much 
 less, than was Hamilton of Washington or Yan Buren 
 of Jackson. Both Hamilton and Seward are charged 
 w^ith having given countenance to this false impression, 
 which, however, redounds to the credit of neither. 
 In these pages written to correct the misconcep- 
 
214 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 
 
 tions of Mr. Adams, and the misrepresentations of the 
 Albany '' Memorial Address," incidents of what oc- 
 curred would, I thought, better than mere contra- 
 dictory assertions, illustrate the acts, the executive 
 management and administrative ability, as well as the 
 capacity and mental energy of the men whose traits 
 are involved in the statements which have been made. 
 
 Of the incidents that took place during the admin- 
 istration of Mr. Lincoln, some of which and the attend- 
 ing circumstances could not have been disclosed at the 
 time of their occurrence, there are in most cases living 
 witnesses. The transactions of an earlier date are of 
 public notoriety and matters of record, commencing 
 with the organized anti-masonic proscription, and 
 embracing the rise and fall of that and subsequent 
 parties, down to, and including the much misrepre- 
 sented proceedings of the Chicago Convention in 
 1860. 
 
 It has been no part of my purpose to magnify or 
 overstate the qualities, or to give undue credit to the 
 labors and abilities of Mr. Lincoln, still less to do 
 injustice to Mr. Seward, who is represented in the 
 "Memorial Address" as overshadowing his chief. 
 Mr. Lincoln was in many respects a remarkable, 
 though I do not mean to say an infallible man. No 
 true delineation or photograph of his intellectual 
 capacity and attributes has ever been given, nor shall 
 I attempt it. His vigorous and rugged, but compre- 
 hensive mind, his keen and shrewd sagacity, his 
 intellectual strength and mental power, his genial, 
 kindly temperament — with charity for all and malice 
 towards none — his sincerity, unquestioned honesty and 
 
^rR. LIXCOLN A>fD MR. SEWARD. 215 
 
 homelj suavity, made him popular as well as great. 
 Had he survived to this day, the Albany " Memorial 
 Address" would have been of a different character, 
 and its pages not marred with paragraphs which 
 reflect on his ability and do injustice to his memory. 
 
 THB END. 
 
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