BT265 .D25 ,9' ,tf'V DAVIDSON COLLEGE DIVINITY LECTURES, OTTS FOUNDATION, SECOND SERIES, MDCCCXCVII. Christ Our Penal Substitute. ROBERT L. DABNEY, D. D., LL. D. IFtf&ibu RICHMOND, VA.: The Peesbyteeian Committee of Publication. -$?\ $**■ iHIfe ^» COPYRIGHT, 1888, BT JAMES K. HAZEN, Secretary of Publication. * A^on. iy/ Jv Hri^iiisre .RfCFIVED. TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Page. The Rationalistic Objections to Penal Substi- tution, ....... 5 CHAPTER II. Definitions and Statement of the Issue, . . 10 CHAPTER III. Objections Examined, 20 CHAPTER IV. The Utilitarian Theory of Punishments, . . 38 CHAPTER V. Retribution, not Revenge, .... 45 CHAPTER VI. The Witness of Human Consciousness and Experi- ence, . . . . . . . . 58 CHAPTER VII. Our Opponents' Self- Contradictions, . . 62 3 4 Table of Contents. CHAPTER VIII. Page. The Ethical Objection Considered, ... 71 CHAPTER IX. What Scripture Says of Substitution, . . 87 CHAPTER X. The Testimony of Christendom, ... 99 CHAPTER XI. Conclusion, 106 CHRIST OUR PENAL SUBSTITUTE. CHAPTEE I. Cfye nationalistic ©bjections to penal Substitution. THE student of religious discussion finds these objections as varied and pertinacious as though the blessed conception of righteous pardon, grounded in full satisfaction to law, were irritating and insulting to the objectors, instead of being at- tractive, as it should be, to all of us sinners. This cardinal conception is rejected by the multitudes of rationalizing nominal Christians through every party, from Socinians upward. They say that they must reject it as essentially unjust, as thus obnox- ious to necessary moral intuitions, and so impossi- ble to be ascribed to a righteous God. They say they must infer this from the Bible facts, that God strictly prohibits such substitution to civil magis- trates judging in his name (see Deut. xxiv. 16), and that he disclaims the usage for himself, as in the famous text, Ezek. xviii. 20. 6 Christ our Penal Substitute. They claim that, while ancient or pagan peoples, taught by barbarism and debasing forms of reli- gions belief, made constant use of the cruel princi- ple of substitution in their antvpsychoi and host- ages, civilization, Christianity, and correct ethics, have banished these usages from modern Christen- dom. And this, they say, is but the testimony of a more enlightened, a better age, against the cruelty and injustice of substituting the innocent in place of the guilty under punishment. They argue that, since "God is love," we must not represent his penalties as meaning vengeance on transgressors, or simple retribution for supposed outrage upon his authority and personal honor; to inflict misery upon the transgressor for this purpose would not be holy justice, but malicious revenge ; and that this notion has descended from the pagan conceptions of their vindictive gods, who were apprehended rather as fearful demons than as a heavenly Father. Hence their only con- ception of divine justice is the remedial one. Pen- alties are but modified expressions of divine bene- volence, just like the chastisements and bitter medi- cines administered by loving parents to erring or diseased children, solely for their good, and as deterrents from future transgressions for them and their brothers and sisters. Hence the objectors infer, with loud triumph, that there can be no im- puted guilt and vicarious punishment, because the Rationalistic Objections. 7 sick child must swallow his own physic in order to get any cure. The taking of it by a healthy com- rade can do him no good. They charge that the orthodox doctrine of the necessity of a vicarious satisfaction in order to pardon is directly contra- dicted by the duty of Christian forgiveness, so strongly enjoined upon us in Scripture. To for- give those who trespass upon us, without waiting for compensation for the injuries done us, is the loveliest Christian virtue. The Lord's prayer makes such forgiveness the absolute condition of our re- ceiving forgiveness from him. The apostle com- mands Christians to forgive their enemies "even as God for Christ's sake has forgiven them." But surely our Christian virtue should consist in our being like God. His perfections, therefore, do not prompt him to exact penal satisfaction in order to pardon. But the orthodox doctrine misrepresents God in an odious light, as a vindictive being who refuses to relinquish his own pique, no matter how penitent the transgressor against him, until his vengeance is satiated ; yea, so blindly vindictive, that he can be sat'.sfied only by hurting somebody, though that person be the innocent one. The more thoughful objectors also argue analyti- cally, that there can be no penal substitution in God's government, because penalty loses its whole propriety and moral significance when transferred away from the person of the transgressor. They 8 Christ our Penal Substitute. ask, What is it that deserves penalty ? Everybody's common sense answers, It is the sin. But sin is not a substantial thing when abstracted from the sinner. In strictness of speech, sin is the sin- ner acting. The sinfulness and bad desert are nothing more than the attributes of the sinning person. Hence they infer that the penalty must be as inalienable as the personal ill-desert. Therefore, imputation can be but a legal fiction, and that an immoral one. Passing from abstrac- tions to concrete cases, they cry passionately, "How could any right mind view the punishment of an innocent person in place of the guilty except with righteous and burning indignation?" If you, Mr. Calvinist, were the victim of such a legal fiction, we surmise that all the dogmatism of the orthodox would fail to satisfy you under your unjust suffer- ings ! Therefore, the ground upon which God per- mitted a holy Christ to suffer and die must be otherwise explained. The places in the Scripture which see^ o teach his penal substitution must be so expounded as to expunge that doctrine out of them. So far as I know myself, I have above given the points and the arguments of the objectors with com- plete fairness and sufficient fulness. I have set them in the strongest light which their assertors could throw around them . I do not believe that the impartial reader can find any treatise advocating Eationalistic Objections. 9 Socinianism, or the new theology, which makes as plausible a showing as I have now made for them. Does the array appear formidable? Yet if the reader will follow me faithfully, he will convince himself that these seeming bulwarks are built not of stone,' but of fog. They owe their seeming strength to half truths, false analogies, and defective analyses of elements. Now, reader, audi alteram partem, " A man seemeth right in his own cause until his neighbor cometh and searcheth him." CHAPTEK II. Definitions anb Statement of tfye 3ssne. THE standard which distinguishes between righteousness and sin is the preceptive will of a holy God. This legislative prerogative be- longs to him by right of his moral perfections, omniscience and righteous ownership of us as our Maker, Preserver, and Eedeemer. Our right- eousness is our intelligent and hearty compliance with that will. Our sin is our conscious and spon- taneous discrepancy therefrom. (1 John iii. 4: fj b-tia^zca lozlv -q avofila, original.) The badness or evilness expressed in any sin (and usually increased by it) is the attribute or subjective quality of the sinning agent. "Potential guilt" is the ill-desert, or merit of punishment, attaching to the transgres- sor by reason of his sin. This concept is not identical with that judgment and sentiment of dis- approbation which sin awakens in the conscience, though it springs immediately out of it. Where we judge that an agent has sinned, we also judge that he has made himself worthy of penalty ; that his sin deserves suffering, and this is a necessary and universal part of the moral intuition whose rise he occasions in us. Such is potential guilt. 10 Definitions and Statement of the Issue. 11 Actual guilt (reatus) is obligatio ad poenam ex peecato, the debt of penalty to law arising out of transgression. It is the penal enactment of the lawgiver which ascertains and fixes this guilt. Hence, under a lawgiver who was less than omni- scient and all perfect, there might be sin, evil attribute and potential guilt, while yet the actual guilt was absent, because the penal statute defin- ing it did not exist. It thus appears that while evilness or sinfulness is an attribute, actual guilt {reatus) is not an attribute but a relation. It is a personal relation between a sinning agent and the sovereign will which legislates the penal statute. Now, when the Scriptures and theology speak of penal imputation or substitution, it is this relation only which is transferred or counted over from the sinning person to his substitute. "We do not dream of a similar transfer of personal acts, or of the per- sonal attributes expressed in such acts. Now let none exclaim that these are the mere subtleties of abstraction. They are the most prac- tical distinctions. They are recognized, and must be recognized, in the civil and criminal laws of men as much as in the government of God. Read- ers must observe that in sacred Scripture the word "sin" is often used by metonymy where the con- cept intended is that of actual guilt. Thus a pro- phet exclaims (Jer. 1. 20): "In those days, and in that time, saith the Lord, the iniquity of Israel 12 Christ our Penal Substitute. shall be sought for, and there shall be none." The exact meaning of the word "iniquity" here must be actual guilt, else we should make the prophet contradict himself utterly by first charging on Israel very great sins, and then declaring that no sins of theirs existed, which is, moreover, a state- ment impossible to be true of any of Adam's race. In a multitude of places, God's mercy is said to "remit sins" (a