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^' 
 
 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 MAN AND SOLDIER 
 
I ^ 
 
 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 MAN AND SOLDIER 
 
 BY 
 
 THOMAS NELSON PAGE 
 
 '/ 
 
 Q leiv' iyyeiKov AaKedai/wvlois 6ti rySe 
 Kel/xeda toTs Kelvuv prjuaai ireiObj/xvoi. 
 
 WITH PORTRAIT AND MAPS 
 
 NEW YORK 
 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
 
 1911 
 
r4L 
 .1 
 
 'T 
 
 COPTRiaHT, 1911, BY 
 
 CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS 
 Published December, 1911 
 
 ^1 
 
 ©CI.a:;^()<>S92 
 
TO THE MEMORY OF 
 
 'as gallant and brave an army as ever existed": 
 
 the army of northern virginia: 
 
 on whose imperishable deeds 
 
 and incomparable constancy 
 
 the fame of their old commander 
 
 was founded 
 
PREFACE ix 
 
 for their courtesy extended me during that expedition 
 and for the great aid which I derived from their care- 
 ful and thoughtful discussions of Lee's campaigns in 
 Virginia. The historical spirit in which these soldiers 
 have approached their subject is one I have endeavored 
 to emulate, even though I may have done so vainly, 
 and is the best assurance that in time a complete his- 
 tory of the great war will be written. 
 
 Thos. Nelson Page. 
 Washington, 
 October, 1911. 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER PAGE 
 
 I. Early Life 3 
 
 II. First Service 15 
 
 III. The Choice of Hercules 36 
 
 IV. Resources 67 
 
 V. Lee in West Virginia 80 
 
 VI. The Situation When Lee Took Com- 
 mand 122 
 
 VII. Battles Around Richmond .... 145 
 
 VIII. Lee Relieves Richmond 192 
 
 IX. Lee's Audacity — Antietam and Chan- 
 
 cellorsville 215 
 
 X. Fredericksburg 249 
 
 XI. Chancellorsville 264 
 
 XII. Lee's Audacity — Salem Church . . 292 
 
 XIII. Gettysburg 304 
 
 XIV. Autumn of 1863 364 
 
 XV. The Wilderness Campaign .... 388 
 
 XVI. Spottsylvania Court House .... 410 
 
 XVII. South Anna and Second Cold Harbor 424 
 
 XVIII. Lee's Strategy and the First Attack 
 
 ON Petersburg 444 
 
 xi 
 
Xll 
 
 CONTENTS 
 
 CHAPTER 
 
 XIX. 
 
 XX. 
 
 XXI. 
 
 XXII. 
 
 XXIII. 
 
 The Siege of Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond 
 
 Lee and Grant 
 
 The Last Ditch 
 
 The Retreat to Appomattox . . . 
 
 General Lee and the Confederate 
 Government 
 
 XXIV. Lee's Clemency . . . 
 
 XXV. Lee in Defeat .... 
 
 XXVI. After the War . . . 
 
 XXVII. JjEE as College President 
 
 XXVIII. Sources of Character . 
 
 Appendix A 
 
 Lee's order for the battle of Gaines's Mill. 
 
 Appendix B 
 
 Extracts from Letter to Author from General Marcus J. 
 
 Wright. 
 Extract ironi Letter to Author from Colonel Thomas L. 
 
 Livermore. 
 
 Appendix C 
 
 Lee's Report of the Gettysburg Campaign. 
 
 Appendix D ■..-.• 
 
 Extract from Letter to Author from Andrew R. Ellerson, 
 Esq., of Ellersoh's, Hanover County, Va. 
 
 Appendix E 
 
 Report of the Surrender at Appomattox. 
 
 Index 
 
 467 
 488 
 516 
 545 
 
 580 
 617 
 636 
 642 
 660 
 684 
 695 
 
 698 
 
 703 
 
 714 
 
 716 
 721 
 
LIST OF MAPS 
 
 General Map of Battle-Fields Around Rich- ^ 
 
 MOND At end of book 
 
 FACING 
 PAGE 
 
 General Map of the Country Around Manassas 
 Junction 210 
 
 The Field of the Antietam 228 
 
 Fredericksburg — Position of Union and Con- 
 federate Forces on December 13, 1862 . . . 262 
 
 Union and Confederate Works Around Chan- ^ 
 
 cellorsville 276 
 
 Gettysburg and Vicinity 324 
 
 The Wilderness 398 
 
 Union and Confederate Works Around Spott- 
 SYLVANiA Court House 412 
 
 Union and Confederate Works Around Peters- .^ 
 
 burg 468 
 
INTRODUCTORY 
 
 This study of a great American is not written with the 
 expectation or even with the hope that the writer can 
 add anything to the fame of Lee; but rather in obe- 
 dience to a feehng that as the son of a Confederate 
 soldier, as a Southerner, as an American, he, as a writer, 
 owes something to himself and to his countrymen which 
 he should endeavor to pay, though it may be but a mite 
 cast into the Treasury of Abundance. 
 
 The subject is not one to be dealt with in the lan- 
 guage of eulogy. To attempt to decorate it with pane- 
 gyric would but belittle it. What the writer proposes 
 to say will be based upon public records; on the studies 
 of those whose authority is unquestioned; or on the tes- 
 timony of those personal witnesses who by character 
 and opportunity for observation would be held to fur- 
 nish evidence by which the gravest concerns of life 
 would be decided. 
 
 At the outset I venture to quote the words of the 
 Master of Historians, not to express my achievement, 
 but my endeavor: 
 
 "With reference to the narrative of events, far 
 from permitting myself to derive it from the first 
 source that came to hand, I did not even trust my 
 own impressions; but it rests partly on what I saw 
 myself, partly on what others saw for me, the accu- 
 
XVI 
 
 INTRODUCTORY 
 
 racy of the report being always tried by the most severe 
 and detailed tests possible. 
 
 " My conclusions have cost me some labor from the 
 want of coincidence between accounts of the same 
 occurrences by different eye-witnesses, arising some- 
 times from imperfect memory, sometimes from undue 
 partiality for one side or the other." ^ 
 
 Tme enough it is, Lee was assailed — and assailed 
 with a rancor and persistence which have undoubtedly 
 left their deep impression on the minds of a large sec- 
 tion of his countrj^men; but, as the years pass by, the 
 passions and prejudices which attempted to destroy 
 him have been gradually giving place to a juster con- 
 ception of the lineaments of Truth. 
 
 Among his warmest admirers to-day are some who 
 fought against him. No more appreciative study of 
 him has been written than that by Mr. Charles Francis 
 Adams, whose breadth, clearness of vision, and classic 
 charm as a writer were only equalled by his gallantry 
 in the Army of the Potomac, where he won his first 
 laurels. 
 
 Unhappily, the world judges mainly by the measure 
 of success, and though Time hath his revenges, and 
 finally rights many wrongs, the man who fails of an im- 
 mediate end appears to the body of his contemporaries, 
 and often to the generations following, to be a failure. 
 Yet from such seed as this have sprung the richest 
 fruits of civilization. In the Divine Economy appears 
 a wonderful myster>'. Through all the history' of sub- 
 lime endeavor would seem to run the strange truth 
 
 • Thucydidcs' " History of The Peloponnesian War," chap. I. 
 
INTRODUCTORY xvii 
 
 enunciated by the Divine Master: that he who loses 
 his life for the sake of the Truth shall find it. 
 
 But although, as was said by the eloquent Hol- 
 combe of Lee just after his death, ''No calumny can 
 ever darken his fame, for History has lighted up his 
 image with her everlasting lamp," yet after forty years 
 there still appears in certain quarters a tendency to 
 rank General Lee, as a soldier, among those captains 
 who failed. Some historians, looking with narrow vi- 
 sion at but one side, and many readers, ignorant of all 
 the facts, honestly take this view. A general he was, 
 they say, able enough for defence; but he was uni- 
 formly defeated when he took the offensive. He failed 
 at Antietam; he was defeated at Gettysburg; he 
 could not drive Grant out of Virginia; therefore he 
 must be classed among captains of the second rank 
 only. 
 
 Iteration and reiteration, to the ordinary observer, 
 however honest he may be, gather accumulated force 
 and oftentimes usurp the place of truth. The public 
 has not time, nor does it care, to go deeper than the or- 
 dinary presentation of a case. It is possible, therefore, 
 that unless the truth be set forth so plainly that it can- 
 not be mistaken, this estimate of Lee as a captain may 
 in time become established as the general, if not the 
 universal, opinion of the public. 
 
 If, however, Lee's reputation becomes established 
 as among the second class of captains, rather than as 
 among the first, the responsibility for it will rest, not 
 upon Northern writers, but upon the Southerners them- 
 selves. For the facts are plain. 
 
xviii INTRODUCTORY 
 
 We of the South have been wont to leave the writing 
 of history mainly to others, and it is far from a complete 
 excuse that whilst others were writing history we were 
 making it. It is as much the duty of a people to dis- 
 prove any charge blackening their fame as it is of an 
 individual. Indeed, the injury is infinitely more far- 
 reaching in the former case than in the latter. 
 
 Lee's character I deem absolutely the fruit of the 
 Virginian civilization which existed in times past. No 
 drop of blood alien to Virginia coursed in his veins; his 
 rearing was wholly within her borders and according 
 to the principles of her life. 
 
 Whatever of praise or censure, therefore, shall be 
 his must fall fairly on his mother, Virginia, and the 
 civilization which existed within her borders. The his- 
 tory of Lee is the history of the South during the great- 
 est crisis of her existence. For with his history is bound 
 up the history of the Army of Northern Virginia, on 
 whose imperishable deeds and incomparable constancy 
 rests his fame. 
 
 The reputation of the South has suffered because 
 we have allowed rhetoric to usurp the place of history. 
 We have furnished many orators, but few historians. 
 But all history at last must be the work, not of the 
 orator, but of the historian. Truth, simply stated, like 
 chastity in a woman's face, is its own best advocate; 
 its simplest presentation is its strongest proof. 
 
ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 MAN AND SOLDIER 
 
{ 
 
ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 MAN AND SOLDIER 
 
 "A Prince once said of a Monarch slain, 
 'Taller he seems in Death.'" 
 
 — Hope. 
 
 CHAPTER I 
 
 EARLY LIFE 
 
 On a plateau about a mile from the south bank of the 
 Potomac River, in the old Colonial county of West- 
 moreland, in what used to be known as the ''Northern 
 Neck," that portion of Virginia which Charles II in 
 his heedlessness once undertook to grant to his friends 
 and favorites, Culpeper and Arlington, stands a massive 
 brick mansion, one of the most impressive piles of 
 brick on this continent. Built in the form of a broad 
 H, it looks, even in its dilapidation, as though it might 
 have been erected by Elizabeth and bombarded by 
 Cromwell. It had to be built strong ; for in those 
 days the Indians were just across the blue mountains to 
 the westward, and roving bands were likely to appear 
 at any time, following the broad river in search of 
 scalps or booty, and ready to fall on any defenceless 
 family in their way. The broad chimneys clustered 
 
4 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 above the roof of each wing are said to have been con- 
 nected in old times by a paviHon which was used for 
 dances and such Uke entertainments. No picture of 
 the mansion gives any adequate idea of its chateau- 
 Hke massiveness. It was built by Thomas Lee, 
 grandson of Richard Lee, the immigrant, who came 
 to Virginia about 1641-42, and founded a family 
 which has numbered among its members as many men 
 of distinction as any family in America. It was 
 through him that Charles II, when an exile in Brussels, 
 is said to have been offered an asylum and a kingdom 
 in Virginia. When the first mansion erected was de- 
 stroyed by fire. Queen Anne, in recognition of the ser- 
 vices of her faithful counsellor in Virginia, sent over a 
 liberal contribution toward its rebuilding. Founded 
 about 1725-30, it bears the old English name, Stratford, 
 after the English estate of Richard Lee, and for many 
 generations, down to the last generation, it was the 
 home of the Lees of Virginia. 
 
 This mansion has a unique distinction among his- 
 torical houses in this country ; for in one of its chambers 
 were born two signers of the Declaration of Independ- 
 ence: Richard Henry Lee, who, in obedience to the 
 mandate of the Virginia Convention, moved the reso- 
 lution in Congress to declare the Colonies free and 
 independent States, and Francis Lightfoot Lee, his 
 brother. But it has a yet greater distinction. In one 
 of its chambers was born, on the 19th of January, 1807, 
 Robert E. Lee, whom many students of military his- 
 tory believe to have been not only the greatest soldier 
 of his time, and, taking all things together, the great- 
 
EARLY LIFE 5 
 
 est captain of the English-speaking race, but the 
 loftiest character of his generation; one rarely equalled, 
 and possibly never excelled, in all the annals of the 
 human race. 
 
 His reputation as a soldier has been dealt with by 
 others much better fitted to speak of it than I; and 
 in what I shall have to say as to this I shall often 
 follow them, drawing from their studies what seem to 
 me the necessary conclusions presented. The cam- 
 paigns in which that reputation was achieved are now 
 the studies of all military students throughout the 
 world, quite as much as are the campaigns of Hannibal 
 and Cffisar, of Cromwell and Marlborough, of Napoleon 
 and Wellington. 
 
 "According to my notion of military history," says 
 Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley, "there is as much 
 instruction both in strategy and in tactics to be gleaned 
 from General Lee's operations of 1862 as there is to be 
 found in Napoleon's campaigns of 1796." In recog- 
 nition of this fact the United States War College an- 
 nually sends an expedition of picked officers to study 
 the movements of these campaigns on the fields on 
 which he gained his renown. 
 
 Robert Edward Lee was the fourth son of General 
 Henry Lee, known in history as "Light Horse Harry" 
 Lee (who in his youth had been the gallant young 
 commander of the "Partisan Legion"), and the third 
 son of Anne Carter, of Shirley, his second wife, a pious 
 and gracious representative of the old Virginia family 
 whose home still stands in simple dignity upon the 
 banks of the James, and has been far-famed for gen- 
 
6 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 erations as one of the best-known seats of the old 
 Virginia hospitahty. His three older brothers were 
 Henry (who was the only child of ''Light Horse Harry" 
 Lee's first marriage), Charles Carter, and Sidney 
 Smith, all of whom were unusually clever men. His 
 two sisters were Mildred and Anne. In his veins 
 flowed the best blood of the gentry of the Old Dominion, 
 and, for that matter, of England, and surrounding him 
 from his earliest childhood were the best traditions 
 of the old Virginia life. Amid these, and these alone, 
 he grew to manhood. On both sides of his house his 
 ancestors for generations had been councillors and 
 governors of Virginia, and had contributed their full 
 share toward Virginia's greatness. 
 
 Richard Lee, '' the immigrant," was a scion of an 
 old family, ancient enough to have fought at Hastings 
 and to have followed Richard of the Lion Heart to 
 the Holy Land.^ On this side of the water they had 
 ever stood among the highest. The history of no two 
 families was more indissolubly bound up with the 
 history of Virginia than that of the Lees and the Car- 
 ters. Thus, Lee was essentially the type of the cava- 
 lier of the Old Dominion, to whom she owed so much 
 of her glory. Like Sir Walter Raleigh, he could number 
 a hundred gentlemen among his kindred, and, even at 
 his greatest, he was in character the type of his order. 
 
 In the youth of young Henry Lee, Princeton was the 
 most popular of the colleges with the Virginians, and 
 Henry Lee was a student at Princeton when the Revo- 
 lutionary War broke out. Nearly all the young men 
 
 * "Lee of Virginia," by Edmund I. Lee. 
 
EARLY LIFE 7 
 
 of his age were deeply interested in the matters which 
 brought on the war, and probably because of the lead- 
 ing part Virginia took in the movement for independ- 
 ence, and possibly because of the prominent part that 
 his kinsmen took in Virginia, no sooner had war begun, 
 with the battle of Lexington, than young Henry Lee 
 left his studies and joined the army. He was com- 
 missioned a captain at the age of nineteen, and by his 
 soldierly qualities soon became a marked man. He 
 rendered such signal service in the early campaigns of 
 the war, and showed such courage, ability and dash, 
 that he early became a favorite with Washington, and, 
 as was stated by his famous son long afterward, "in 
 the difficult and critical operations in Pennsylvania, 
 New Jersey, and New York, from 1777 to 1780, inclu- 
 sive, he was always placed near the enemy, intrusted 
 with the command of outposts, the superintendence of 
 scouts, and that kind of service which requires unusual 
 qualities of resourcefulness and self-reliance." ^ 
 
 His activity and daring in scouting near the enemy 
 drew their attention, and they set to work to capture 
 him. Knowing that he was quartered about six miles 
 below Valley Forge, a surprise was attempted by them. 
 A body of two hundred horse set out one night, and 
 having taken a roundabout route, they eluded his out- 
 posts and reached about daybreak the house where he 
 was quartered. In the house were only eight men: 
 Captain Lee, Lieutenant Lindsay, Major Gemieson, a 
 corporal, and four men. Though surprised, the soldiers 
 in the house, instead of surrendering as they were ex- 
 
 ' "Memoirs of the War of 7G," by H. Lee, p. 16. 
 
8 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 pected to do, under Lee's direction barricaded the doors 
 and fought the assailants off, forcing them finally to 
 retire with a loss of five men killed and a number more 
 wounded. Then, as they were attempting to carry off 
 the horses of the party, Lee hurried the departure of the 
 enemy by shouting to his men to fire away, as the infan- 
 try were coming, and tliey would bag them all. As soon 
 as they retired he sallied forth, got his men to horse, 
 and pursued the English force to their main body. 
 
 For this exploit, together with his services in the 
 campaign before it, which Washington highly com- 
 mended. Congress promoted Captain Lee to the rank 
 of major, and gave him an independent command, 
 known as a "partisan corps," composed first of two, 
 and later of three troops of horse. 
 
 That summer he took part in the capture of Stony 
 Point, which gave Mad Anthony Wayne his fame, and 
 a little later he planned and executed the surprise and 
 capture of Paulus Hook under the nose of the British 
 warships and the garrisons of the New York forts. 
 For this exploit Congress again signally honored him — 
 thanking him publicly, and striking a medal in his 
 honor, a tribute paid to no other officer below the 
 rank of general during the war.* 
 
 Wlien the chief seat of war was transferred to the South, 
 toward the end of 1780, Major Lee moved to join the 
 Southern army, opposing Cornwallis in South Carolina, 
 and Congress in recognition of his distinguished ser- 
 vices made him, on Washington's recommendation, a 
 lieutenant-colonel. He took part in all the battles of 
 
 • Leo's "Memoirs of the War of 70," p. 23. 
 
EARLY LIFE 9 
 
 the Southern campaign, and rendered such service 
 that, when broken in health and partly because dis- 
 appointed of a reward which he thought due him he 
 retired about February, 1782, General Greene wrote of 
 him to the president of Congress in the following warm 
 terms: "Lieutenant-Colonel Lee retired for a time for 
 the recovery of his health. I am more indebted to 
 this officer than to any other for the advantages gained 
 over the enemy in the operations of the last campaign, 
 and should be wanting in gratitude not to acknowl- 
 edge the importance of his services, a detail of which 
 is his best panegyric." ^ 
 
 Later on Colonel Lee became a member of Congress, 
 and was so noted for his eloquence that when in 1799 
 Washington died, he was selected by Congress to deliver 
 the official eulogy on his old commander and life-long 
 friend. Subsequently he became the governor of Vir- 
 ginia, and served as such for three terms, and when the 
 rebellion broke out in Pennsylvania, he was chosen 
 to command the troops mobilized for its suppression. 
 
 Thus, the blood that coursed through the veins of 
 Robert E. Lee was that of a soldier. 
 
 It has been well said that knowledge of a man's 
 ideals is the key to his character. Tell us his ideals 
 and we c^n tell you what manner of man he is. Lee's 
 ideal character was close at hand from his earliest boy- 
 hood. His earliest days were spent in a region filled 
 with traditions of him who, having consecrated his 
 life to duty, had with the fame of a great soldier at- 
 tained such a standard of virtue that if we would 
 
 ' Lee's "Memoirs of the War of 76," p. 41. 
 
10 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 liken him to other governoi-s we must go back to 
 Marcus AureHus, to St. Louis and to WiUiam the 
 Silent. 
 
 Not far from Stratford, within an easy ride, in the 
 same old colonial county of Westmoreland, on the 
 bank of the noble river whose broad waters reflect 
 the arching sky, spanning Virginia and Maryland, 
 was Wakefield, the plantation which had the distinc- 
 tion of having given birth to the Father of his 
 Country. Thus, on this neighborhood, the splendor 
 of the evening of his noble life, just closed, had shed 
 a peculiar glory. And not a great way off, in a neigh- 
 boring county on the banks of the same river, was the 
 home of his manhood, where in majestic simplicity his 
 ashes repose, making Mount Vernon a shrine for lovers 
 )f liberty of every age and every clime. 
 
 On the wall at Shirley, Lee's mother's home, among 
 the portraits of the Carters hangs a full-length portrait 
 of Washington, in a general's uniform, given by him 
 to General Nelson, who gave it to his daughter, Mrs. 
 Carter. Thus, in both his ancestral homes the boy 
 from his cradle found an atmosphere redolent at once 
 of the greatness of Virginia's past and of the memory 
 of the preserver of his countr}^ 
 
 It was Lee's own father, the gallant and gifted 
 "Light Horse Harry" Lee, who, as eloquent in debate 
 as he had been eager in battle, having, as stated, been 
 selected by Congress to deliver the memorial address 
 on Washington, had coined the golden phrase which, 
 reaching the heart of America, has become his epitaph 
 and declared him by the unanimous voice of a grate- 
 
EARLY LIFE 11 
 
 ful people, "First in war, first in peace, and first in 
 the hearts of his countrymen." 
 
 How passionately the memory of ''Light Horse 
 Harry" Lee was revered by his sons we know, not 
 only from the life of Robert E. Lee, himself, but from 
 that most caustic of American philippics, the ''Obser- 
 vations on the Writings of Thomas Jefferson, with 
 Particular Reference to the Attacks they contain on 
 the Memory of the late General Henry Lee, in a series 
 of Letters by Henry Lee of Virginia." 
 
 Mr. Jefferson, with all his prestige and genius, had 
 found a match when he aroused "Black Harry" Lee 
 by a charge of ingratitude on the part of his father to 
 the adored Washington. In no family throughout Vir- 
 ginia was Washington's name more revered than among 
 the Lees, who were bound to him by every tie of grati- 
 tude, of sentiment, and of devotion. 
 
 Thus, the impress of the character of Washington 
 was natural on the plastic and serious mind of the 
 thoughtful son of "Light Horse Harry." 
 
 One familiar with the life of Lee cannot help noting 
 the strong resemblance of his character in its strength, 
 its poise, its rounded completeness to that of Wash- 
 ington, or fail to mark what influence the life of Wash- 
 ington had on the life of Lee. The stamp appears upon 
 it from his boyhood, and grows more plain as his years 
 progress. 
 
 Just when the youth definitely set before himself the 
 character of Washington we may not know; but it 
 must have been at an early date. The famous story 
 of the sturdy little lad and the cherry-tree must have 
 
12 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 been well known to young Lee from his earliest boy- 
 hood, for it was floating about that region when Parson 
 Weems came across it as a neighborhood tradition, and 
 made it a part of our literature/ It has become the 
 fashion to deride such anecdotes, but this much, at 
 least, may be said of this story, that however it may 
 rest solely on the authority of the simple, itinerant 
 preacher, it is absolutely characteristic of Washington, 
 and it is equally characteristic of him who since his 
 time most nearly resembled him. 
 
 However this was, the lad grew up amid the tradi- 
 tions of that greatest of great men, whose life he so 
 manifestly takes as his model, and with whose fame 
 his own fame was to be so closely allied in the minds 
 and hearts of the people of the South. 
 
 Like Washington, Robert E. Lee became an orphan 
 at an early age, his father having been mortally injured 
 in an election riot in Baltimore, and dying when the 
 lad was only eleven years old, and, like Washington, Lee 
 was brought up by a devoted mother, the gentle and 
 pious Anne Carter, of Shirley, a representative, as al- 
 ready stated, of one of the old families of "Tidewater" 
 Virginia, and a descendant of Robert Carter, known as 
 "King Carter," equally because of his great possessions, 
 his dominant character, and his high position in the 
 colony. Through his mother, as through his father, 
 Lee was related to most of the families of distinction in 
 
 • A Japanese oflScer, a military attach<S at Washington, related to 
 the writer that when he was a boy in a hill-town of Japan, where his 
 father was an officer of one of the old Samurai, his mother told him the 
 story of George Washington and the cherry-tree and tried to impress 
 on him the lessons of truth. 
 
EARLY LIFE 13 
 
 the Old Dominion, and, by at least one strain of blood, 
 to Washington himself. 
 
 Early in Lee 's life his father and mother moved from 
 Stratford to Alexandria, one of the two or three Vir- 
 ginia towns that were homes of the gentry, and his boy- 
 hood was pmssed in the old town that was redolent of 
 the memory of Washington. He worshipped in old 
 Christ Church, the same church in which Washington 
 had been a pew-holder, and he was a frequent visitor 
 both at the,' noble mansion on the banks of the Potomac 
 where the !^ather of his Country had made his home 
 and at tha.lt one where lived the Custises, the descend- 
 ants ancli representatives of his adopted son, which was 
 to berjbme Lee's own home in the future. 
 
 S-vprung from such stock and nurtured on such tra- 
 ditions, the lad soon gave evidence of the character 
 that was to place him next to his model. Little is re- 
 corded of his childhood beyond the fact of his devotion 
 to his mother and his sisters, and his attention to his 
 duties. Both of his older brothers were very clever, 
 and it is possible that the sturdy Robert was over- 
 shadowed by them. "Robert, who was always good/' 
 wrote his father of him from the West Indies, where he 
 had gone hoping to restore his health after his injury, 
 "will be confirmed in his happy turn of mind by his 
 ever- watchful and affectionate mother." This proph- 
 ecy was amply fulfilled. It is recorded that "his 
 mother taught him in his childhood to practise self- 
 denial and self-control, as well as the strictest economy 
 in all financial concerns." To his mother he was ever 
 a dutiful and devoted son, and we have a glimpse of 
 
14 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 him, none the less interesting and significant because 
 it is casual, leaving his playfellows at their sport to go 
 and take his invalid mother driving in the old family 
 carriage, where he was careful to fasten the curtains 
 and close up the cracks with newspapers to keep the 
 draughts from her, and using all his poweijs to enter- 
 tain and divert her. The ties between theitn were ever 
 peculiarly close, and more than one of his wousins have 
 recorded that what impressed them most in jtheir youth 
 was "Robert's devotion to his mother." rYou have 
 been both son and daughter to me," wrote liis mother, 
 in her loneliness, after he had left home for \\^est Point. 
 ''The other boys used to drink from the glasse(,s of the 
 gentleman," said one of the family; "but Robert ^never 
 would join them. He was different." 
 
 A light is thrown on his character at this time in c,% 
 pleasant reference to his boyhood made by himself long 
 afterward, in writing of his youngest son, then a lad, 
 who was going to the Virginia Springs as escort to his 
 mother and sister. "A young gentleman," he says, 
 "who has read Virgil must surely be competent to take 
 care of two ladies; for before I had advanced that far 
 I was my mother's outdoor agent and confidential 
 messenger." * He might readily have said more; for 
 it is related that he was known from his boyhood for 
 his devoted attention to his mother, and that "in her 
 last illness he mixed every dose of medicine which she 
 took," and nursed her both night and day. 
 
 » Letter of June 25, 1857. 
 
CHAPTER II 
 FIRST SERVICE 
 
 Young Lee selected at an early age the military pro- 
 fession, which had given his father and his great proto- 
 type their fame. During his early boyhood occurred 
 the capture of Washington city and the destruction of 
 the Capitol and the White House by the British troops, 
 and it has been suggested that this may have turned 
 his mind toward the army. But this was not needed. 
 It was the profession to which all young men of spirit 
 turned. It was in the blood. And young Lee was 
 the son of him of whom General Charles Lee, himself 
 an accomplished soldier, had said, that "he seemed to 
 have come a soldier from his mother's womb," a bit 
 of characterization which this soldier's distinguished 
 son was to quote with filial satisfaction when, after he 
 himself had become possibly the most famous soldier 
 of his time, he wrote his father's biography. He was, 
 wrote one of his cousins, "most anxious to go to West 
 Point, both to relieve his mother and to have a mili- 
 tary education." He had gone to school at the Alex- 
 andria Academy to a Mr. Leary, and with a view to 
 preparing himself for West Point he now went for a 
 time to the school of a well-known teacher, Mr. Hal- 
 lowell. Here, according to his old master, he was 
 
 15 
 
16 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 noted for his attention to his duties and his perfect 
 recitations. "His specialty," adds the old teacher, 
 'Svas finishing up," and he records that even the 
 diagrams in conic sections which he drew on a slate 
 were as carefully drawn and finished as if he had ex- 
 pected them to be engraved. At the proper time, 
 1825, when he was eighteen years of age, he was en- 
 tered as a cadet among Virginia's representatives at 
 the military academy of the country, having, it is said, 
 received his appointment through Andrew Jackson, 
 then a senator from Tennessee, to whom he applied in 
 person. And there is a tradition that the hero of New 
 Orleans was much impressed at the interview between 
 them, with the frank and sturdy youth who applied for 
 the appointment. At the academy, as in the case of 
 young Bonaparte, those soldierly qualities which were 
 to bring him later so great a measure of fame were ap- 
 parent from the first ; and he bore off the highest honor 
 that a cadet can secure — the coveted cadet-adjutancy 
 of the corps. Here, too, he gave evidence of the char- 
 acter that was to prove his most distinguished attribute, 
 and he graduated second in his class of forty-six, but 
 with the extraordinary distinction of not having re- 
 ceived a demerit. Thus early his solid character mani- 
 fested itself. ''Even at West Point," says Holcombe, 
 ''the solid and lofty qualities of the young cadet were 
 remarked on as bearing a resemblance to those of 
 Washington." 
 
 The impress of his character was already becoming 
 stamped upon his countenance. One who knew him 
 about this time records that as she observed his face 
 
FIRST SERVICE 17 
 
 in repose while he read to the assembled family circle, 
 or sat in church, the reflection crossed her mind that he 
 looked more like a great man than any one she had 
 ever seen. 
 
 Among his classmates and fellow students at West 
 Point were many of those men whom he was afterward 
 to serve with or against in the great Civil War, and 
 doubtless a part of his extraordinary success in that 
 Homeric contest was due to the accurate gauge which 
 he formed, in his youth or a little later in Mexico, of 
 their abilities and character. Indeed, as may be 
 shown, this was made almost plainly manifest in his 
 dealings in at least three great campaigns of the war: 
 that in which he confronted the over-prudent McClellan 
 and defeated him, and those in which he balked and 
 routed the vainglorious Pope and Hooker. 
 
 Here is a picture of him at this time from the pen 
 of one who knew and loved him all his life, and had 
 cause to know and love him as a true friend and faith- 
 ful comrade — his old classmate and comrade-in-arms, 
 Joseph E. Johnston. They had, as he states, entered 
 the military academy together as classmates, and 
 formed there a friendship never impaired, a friendship 
 that was hereditary, as Johnston's father had served 
 under Lee's father in the celebrated Lee Legion during 
 the Revolutionary War. 
 
 "We had," says General Johnston, "the same inti- 
 mate associates, who thought as I did, that no other 
 youth or man so united the qualities that win warm 
 friendship and command high respect. For he was 
 full of sympathy and kindness, genial and fond of gay 
 
18 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 conversation, and even of fun, while his correctness of 
 demeanor and attention to all duties, personal and 
 official, and a dignity as much a part of himself as the 
 elegance of his person, gave him a superiority that every 
 one acknowledged in his heart. He was the only one 
 of all the men I have known that could laugh at the 
 faults and follies of his friends in such a manner as to 
 make them ashamed without touching their affection 
 for him, and to confirm their respect and sense of his 
 superiority." He mentions, as an instance of the depth 
 of his s^Tnpathy, an occurrence which took place the 
 morning after a battle in Mexico, in which he had lost 
 a cherished young relative. Lee, meeting him and 
 seeing the grief in his face, burst into tears and soothed 
 him with a sympathy as tender, declared the veteran 
 long years after, ''as his lovely wife would have done." 
 
 Small wonder that the soldiers who followed Lee 
 faced death with a devotion that was wellnigh with- 
 out a parallel. 
 
 Still influenced in part, perhaps, by his worship for 
 his great hero, the young officer chose as the partner 
 of his life his old playmate, Miss Mary Parke Custis, 
 the granddaughter of Washington's stepson, the sur- 
 viving representative of Washington. It was an early 
 love affair, and, as such usually resulted in Virginia, 
 proved one of the happiest of marriages. The mar- 
 riage ceremony took place in the old drawing-room at 
 Arlington, on the 30th of June, 1831, and was per- 
 formed by the Rev. Dr. William Meade, afterward 
 bishop of Virginia. Mrs. Lee was the daughter and 
 heiress of George W. Parke Custis, while Lieutenant 
 
FIRST SERVICE 19 
 
 Lee was poor; but such was her pride in her husband, 
 and her sense of what was his due, that on her mar- 
 riage to him she determined to live on her husband's 
 income as a Heutenant, and for some time she thus 
 hved/ It was a fitting training for the hardships she 
 was called on to face, when her husband, as com- 
 mander-in-chief of the Confederate armies, deemed 
 himself happy to be able to send her one nearly dried-up 
 lemon. Their domestic life was one of ideal devotion 
 and happiness. Should we seek through all the an- 
 nals of time for an illustration of the best that exists 
 in family life, we need not go further to find the 
 perfection and refinement of elegance and of purity 
 than that stately mansion, the home of Lee, which 
 from the wooded heights of Arlington looks down upon 
 the city of Washington, and has by a strange fate 
 become the last resting-place of many of those whose 
 chief renown has been that they fought bravely against 
 Lee. Seven children were born to him, all of whom 
 grew up, and two of whom, like their father, adopted 
 the profession of arms, and rose to the distinguished 
 rank of major-general in the Confederate army. 
 
 With the distinction of such a high graduation as 
 his, young Lee was, of course, assigned to the En- 
 gineers, that corps of intellectual aristocracy from 
 which came, with the notable exceptions of Grant and 
 Jackson, nearly all the officers who attained high rank 
 during the war. His first service was in Virginia, 
 where he was engaged on sea-coast defences, an ex- 
 
 * This fact was stated to the writer by the wife of General William 
 N. Pendleton, Mrs. Lee's close neighbor and friend. 
 
20 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 perience which was to bear rich fruit later on when he 
 was called to construct the coast defences of the Caro- 
 linas, and rendered them impregnable against attack 
 by sea. He was stationed at Fortress Monroe when 
 occurred in a neighboring county the bloody negro 
 uprising known as the "Nat Turner Rebellion/' which 
 thrilled Virginia as thirty years later thrilled her the 
 yet more perilous ''John Brown Raid/' which Lee was 
 sent to quell, and quelled. Lee's letters to his wife 
 touching this episode, while self-contained as was his 
 wont, show the deep gravity with which he regarded 
 this ferocious outbreak. Doubtless it also bore its part 
 in bringing his mind to its definite conclusions against 
 slavery, and his conviction that the presence of the 
 colored race was an incalculable misfortune to a State. 
 In 1834 he was assigned to service in Washington, as 
 assistant to the chief engineer of the army. He was 
 promoted to the rank of first lieutenant in 1836, and 
 in 1838 was promoted to the rank of captain. During 
 this service he resided at Arlington, and took his midday 
 meal at a boarding-house kept by a Mrs. Ulrich, on the 
 site of Riggs's Hotel, which was so popular with the 
 army officers that it was known as ''The Mess." Here 
 he met many of the leading public men of the day, on 
 all of whom he made a deep impression. "No one was 
 ever jealous of him," records one of his old comrades, 
 Colonel McComb; "all delighted to do him honor." 
 
 His early manhood was devoted with unremitting 
 care to his profession, wherein he made, while still a 
 young man, a reputation for ability of so high an order, 
 and for such devotion to duty, that when the Missis- 
 
FIRST SERVICE 21 
 
 sippi, owing to a gradual change in its banks, threat- 
 ened the city of St. Louis, General Scott, having been 
 appealed to to lend his aid to prevent so dire a calam- 
 ity, said he knew of but one man who was equal to 
 the task, Brevet Captain Lee. "He is young," he 
 wrote, ''but if the work can be done, he can do it." 
 The city government, it is said, impatient at the 
 young engineer's methodical way, withdrew the ap- 
 propriation for the work; but he went on quietly, 
 with the comment : "They can do as they like with their 
 own, but I was sent here to do certain work, and I shall 
 do it." And he did it. Feeling in the city ran high, 
 riots broke out, and it is said that cannon were placed 
 in position to fire on his working force; but he kept 
 calmly on to the end. The work he wrought there 
 stands to-day — the bulwark of the great city which has 
 so recently invited America and the nations of the 
 world within her gates. His service in 1837 in sur- 
 veying the upper Mississippi and opening it so as to 
 render it navigable is not generally known ; yet it pro- 
 vided a clear water-way for the great region of the 
 North-west, and opened it for the immigration which 
 has since made it one of the most important sections 
 of the country. And Lee's recommendations led to 
 the great conception of the present system of improve- 
 ment of internal water-ways, and his method was the 
 forerunner of the Eads system of jetties, by which the 
 Mississippi River has been preserved as the midland 
 water-way of the nation. 
 
 Referring to this period, one of his old comrades, 
 who later served against him. General Meigs, says of 
 
22 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 him: "He was a man tlicn in the vigor of youthful 
 strength, with a noble and commanding presence, and 
 an admirable, graceful, and athletic figure. He was 
 one with whom nobody ever wished or ventured to 
 take a liberty, though kind and generous to his sub- 
 ordinates, admired of all women, and respected of all 
 men. He was the model of a soldier, and the beau 
 ideal of a Christian man." Such is the picture of 
 Robert E. Lee at the age of thirty, dra^vn by one who 
 was arrayed against him in the fierce 'sixties, but who 
 honored him throughout all. 
 
 In 1842 Lee was assigned to duty at Fort Hamilton, 
 where for several years he was engaged in improving 
 the defences of New York harbor. Two years later 
 he was appointed on the Board of Visitors of the 
 United States Military Academy, and his efficient ser- 
 vices thereon prepared him for the position of super- 
 intendent of the Academy later on. 
 
 The Mexican War was the training ground of most 
 of those who fought with distinction in the later and 
 more terrible strife of the Civil War, and many of the 
 greatest campaigns and fiercest battles of that war were 
 planned and fought with a science learned upon the pam- 
 pas and amid the mountains of Mexico. Lee, Jackson, 
 Davis, Johnston, Beauregard, McClellan, Grant, Thomas, 
 Sumner, all won their spurs in Mexico. During the 
 Mexican War, Lee, starting in as an engineer officer 
 on the staff of General Wool, achieved more renown 
 than any other soldier of his rank, and possibly more 
 than any other officer in the army of invasion except 
 the commander-in-chief. He became General Scott's 
 
FIRST SERVICE 23 
 
 chief of staff, and between the two was cemented a 
 friendship which even the Civil War could not destroy. 
 Without going fully into the details of his distin- 
 guished services there, which kept him ever at the cru- 
 cial point, it may be said that they led General Scott 
 to declare, long afterward, that he was the "very 
 best soldier he ever saw in the field." His scouts 
 and reconnoissances at Cerro Gordo, Contreras, Churu- 
 busco, and Chapultepec brought him the brevets of 
 major at Cerro Gordo, April 18, 1847, of lieutenant- 
 colonel at Contreras and Churubusco, and of colonel 
 at Chapultepec, September 13. His first marked dis- 
 tinction was won by a reconnoissance made at night 
 with a single guide, a Mexican, whom he compelled to 
 serve at the muzzle of the pistol, wherein he ascertained 
 the falsity of a report that Santa Anna's army had 
 crossed the mountains and lay in their front. Their 
 tents, it was said, whitened the mountain side. He 
 galloped forward alone into the hills, and discovered 
 that the white tents were flocks of sheep. This distinc- 
 tion greatly increased that which he had already won by 
 work at Vera Cruz, by which that strategic point, pro- 
 tected, as it was believed, by impregnable defences, 
 was captured. Here on the landing of General Scott's 
 army on the 9th of March, Lee was placed in charge of 
 the establishment of batteries and other details of the 
 siege, and was "favorably mentioned" by the com- 
 manding general for his valuable services. Lee him- 
 self related his anxiety for his brother, who com- 
 manded a detachment of seamen in the trenches, and 
 his relief at seeing his white teeth shining through the 
 
24 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 smoke. But this, as notable as it was, was as far ex- 
 celled by his services at Cerro Gordo as that was in 
 turn by his work at Contreras. At Cerro Gordo, 
 where Santa Anna with 13,000 troops and 42 guns, 
 posted in a pass, barred the way in an apparently im- 
 pregnable position, Lee discovered a mountain pass, 
 and having in person led Twigg's division to the point 
 for assault in front, and having worked all night post- 
 ing batteries, at dawn next morning led Riley's brigade 
 up the mountains in the turning movement, which 
 forced Santa Anna from his stronghold. At Con- 
 treras again he showed the divinely given endowments 
 on which his future fame was to rest. 
 
 At Contreras the army of invasion found itself in 
 danger of being balked almost at the gates of the capital, 
 and Lee's ability shone forth even more brilliantly than 
 at Cerro Gordo. The defences of the city of Mexico on 
 the eastward appeared impregnable, while an attack 
 from the south, where the approach was by nature of 
 the ground less difficult, was rendered apparently al- 
 most as impossible by powerful batteries constructed 
 at San Antonio Hill, commanding the only avenue 
 of approach — the road which wound between Lake 
 Chalco, with its deep morass on one side and impass- 
 able lava beds on the other. Lee, by careful rccon- 
 noissance, discovered a mule-trail over the Pedregal, 
 as this wild and broken tract of petrified lava was 
 termed, and this trail having been opened sufficiently 
 to admit of the passage of troops, though with diffi- 
 culty and danger, he conducted over it the com- 
 mands of Generals Pillow and Worth, and the village 
 
FIRST SERVICE 25 
 
 of Contreras was seized and held till night against all 
 assaults of the enemy. The position of the Ameri- 
 can troops, however, was one of extreme peril, as it 
 was known that heavy reinforcements were being 
 rushed forward by the Mexicans, and at a council of 
 war it was decided to advance before dawn rather 
 than await attack from the Mexican forces. It be- 
 came necessary to inform General Scott of the situa- 
 tion, and Captain Lee volunteered for the perilous 
 service. He accordingly set out in the darkness and 
 alone, and in the midst of a furious tropical storm 
 he made his way back across the lava beds infested 
 by bands of Mexicans, advised the commander-in- 
 chief of the proposed movement, and having secured 
 his co-operation, returned across the Pedregal in time 
 to assist in the assault, which forced the Mexicans to 
 abandon their position and opened the way to Churu- 
 busco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec, and finally 
 led to the occupation of the capital and the close of 
 the war. General Scott, in his report, stated that 
 seven officers had been sent by him on this reconnois- 
 sance, but all returned, and that Lee was the only 
 man who got through. 
 
 This act of Lee's was, declared Scott, "the greatest 
 feat of physical and moral courage performed by any 
 individual, to my knowledge, pending the campaign." 
 
 The story is well known of his devotion to duty 
 while in Mexico. On one occasion, after the capture 
 of the city, the officers gave a banquet, and when Lee 
 did not appear, Magruder sought him, and found him 
 hard at work on a map which he conceived it his duty 
 
26 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 to prepare without delay. If he was, as Scott declared 
 him, "as daring as laborious," also he was ''as laborious 
 as daring." 
 
 The "gallantry and good conduct," the "invalua- 
 ble services," "the intrepid coolness and gallantry of 
 Captain Lee of the Engineers," of "Captain Lee, so 
 constantly distinguished," are in all the despatches of all 
 the battles of the war, and Lee came out of this war 
 with such a reputation for ability that his old com- 
 mander, Scott, declared to General Preston, that he 
 was "the greatest living soldier in America." Indeed, 
 Scott, with prescient vision, declared his opinion that 
 he was "the greatest soldier now living in the world." 
 "If I were on my death-bed to-morrow," he said to 
 General Preston, long before the breaking out of the 
 war, "and the President of the United States should 
 tell me that a great battle was to be fought for the 
 liberty or slavery of the country, and asked my judg- 
 ment as to the ability of a commander, I would say 
 with my dying breath, 'Let it be Robert E. Lee.' " 
 
 To Reverdy Johnson, Scott said that his success in 
 Mexico "was largely due to the skill, valor, and un- 
 daunted energy of Robert E. Lee." Lee himself, how- 
 ever, declared that it was General Scott's stout heart 
 and military skill which overcame all obstacles, and, 
 while others croaked, pushed the campaign through 
 to final success. The delay in negotiating the treaty 
 of peace after the fall of the city of Mexico seems to 
 have irked him, and he writes privately: "I might 
 make a rough diplomatist, but a tolerable quick one." 
 Soon after the capture of the Mexican capital, he, with 
 
FIRST SERVICE 27 
 
 characteristic modesty, wrote the following letter in 
 reply to a letter from his wife's father, Mr. Custis, 
 who had shown concern lest he should not be prop- 
 erly advanced on the close of hostilities. 
 
 City of Mexico, April 8, 1848. 
 ... I hope my friends will give themselves no an- 
 noyance on my account, or any concern about the dis- 
 tribution of favors. I know how those things are 
 awarded at Washington, and how the President will 
 be besieged by clamorous claimants. I do not wish 
 to be among them. Such as he can conscientiously 
 bestow, I shall gratefully receive, and have no doubt 
 that those will exceed my deserts. . . . 
 
 Certain it is that Lee came out of the Mexican War 
 with more distinction than any other subordinate 
 officer. And it was the opinion of his comrades that 
 "all the compliments won by him were deserved." 
 That ''he was active, untiring, skilful, courageous, and 
 of good judgment" is the verdict they gave. One 
 other characteristic of his is mentioned by an old com- 
 rade. "He was conspicuous ... for never having 
 uttered a wofd among his most intimate associates 
 that might not have been spoken in the presence of 
 the most refined woman." 
 
 The scope of this volume does not admit of a de- 
 tailed account of the years that intervened between 
 the close of the Mexican War and the outbreak of the 
 great Civil War, although it was in these years of devo- 
 tion to duty, often in the form of dull routine, that 
 Lee's powers reached their maturity. 
 
28 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 During the period following the Mexican War Lee 
 was engaged for a time in constructing the defences of 
 Baltimore. Then he was, in 1852, assigned to duty as 
 superintendent of the United States Military Academy 
 at West Point, where he was to come to know and 
 gauge many of the young officers who, a decade later, 
 fought under or against him. Three years later he was 
 assigned to active duty on the south-western frontier 
 as lieutenant-colonel of one of the two regiments of 
 cavalry which Mr. Jefferson Davis, then Secretary of 
 War, had organized on the recommendation of General 
 Scott, and made a separate branch of the service.^ To 
 the Second Cavalry was assigned the duty of guarding 
 the south-western frontier and preventing or punish- 
 ing the depredations of the Indians, and Lee applied 
 himself to this work with characteristic zeal and pa- 
 tience. He speaks of the Indians' expeditions as "a 
 cloak to cover all their thefts and murders," and 
 thinks "the poor creatures" are "not worth the trouble 
 they give to man and horse." He soon rose to the rank 
 of colonel of cavalry, a position which a great critic 
 of war has asserted to be the best of all training- 
 schools for a great captain, and he h§ld tliis rank 
 when, having been brought to Washington to revise 
 the tactics of the army, he was unexpectedly called 
 on in the summer of 1859 to take charge of the force 
 of marines sent to Harper's Ferry to capture John 
 Brown and his followers in their crazy and murder- 
 
 ' Of these regiments E. V. Sumner was colonel of the first and Joseph 
 E. Johnston was lieutenant-colonel, and Albert Sidney Johnston was 
 colonel of the second, with Lee as his lieutenant-colonel. 
 
FIRST SERVICE 29 
 
 ous invasion of Virginia, with the design of starting a 
 servile war which should lead to the negroes achieving 
 their emancipation. This duty he performed promptly 
 and efficiently. It was a delicate position. Virginia 
 was in a tumult of rage and excitement over the bold 
 attempt to arouse within her borders a servile insur- 
 rection, which meant putting her women and children 
 to the sword. It was an armed invasion, and the 
 respective claims of authority had to be recognized. 
 There was grave danger of a conflict of authority be- 
 tween the State and the Federal powers. He met 
 the situation with promptitude and wisdom. The 
 murderous fanatic, Brown, was captured after a 
 brief resistance, and was duly tried and executed by 
 the civil authorities. It is an interesting fact that 
 Lee's aide on this occasion was a young lieutenant, 
 J. E. B. Stuart, who a few years later was to become 
 his cavalry commander and achieve at a bound a 
 world-wide fame. It is also an interesting fact that 
 at this time he had one of his aides make a map for 
 him of Harper's Ferry and the Maryland Heights 
 opposite. 
 
 Though a strict disciplinarian, he was greatly ad- 
 mired by his men. Long afterward, when he was a 
 defeated general on parole, without means, his every 
 act and word watched by enemies thirsting for his 
 blood, one of the men he had commanded in the 
 Second Cavalry, but who had fought in the Union army 
 throughout the war, called at his house in Richmond 
 with a basket of provisions for his old commander, 
 having heard that he was in want, and when he saw 
 
30 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 him he seized him in his arms and kissed him. Of this 
 regiment, Long speaks with pride: "As a proof of the 
 superiority of its officers," he states, "it may be said 
 that this regiment turned out during the war more 
 distinguished men than any other regiment in the 
 army. Besides Johnston, Lee, Hardee, and Thomas, 
 it furnished Van Dorn, Pahner, Hood, Fitz Lee, 
 Stoneman, Kirby Smith, Field, and others." 
 
 A Hght is thrown on his character in the letters he 
 wrote about and to his children during his long ab- 
 sences from home on duty in Mexico and in the West. 
 And it is one of the pathetic elements in the history of 
 this loving and tender father that, with a nature which 
 would have revelled in the joys of domestic life, he 
 should have been called by duty to spend so large a 
 part of his time away from home that on his return he 
 did not know his own child. 
 
 In October, 1857, on the death of his wife's father, 
 he came to Arlington to settle up his estate, and it is 
 said that on his next visit to Virginia, about the time 
 of the John Brown Raid, he was enjoying the second 
 leave of absence that he had had since joining the ser- 
 vice, over thirty years before. It was a delightful res- 
 pite from the exactions of army life on the frontier. 
 He was ever devoted to children, and amid the most 
 tragic scenes of his eventful life his love for them speaks 
 from his letters. Writing to his wife from St. Louis in 
 1837, when he was engaged in engineering work for the 
 government, he speaks with deep feeling of the sadness 
 he felt at being separated from his family, and of his 
 anxiety about the training of his little 'son. "Our dear 
 
FIRST SERVICE 31 
 
 little boy," he says, ''seems to have among his friends 
 the reputation of being hard to manage — a distinction 
 not at all desirable, as it indicates self-will and ob- 
 stinacy. Perhaps these are qualities which he really 
 possesses, and he may have a better right to them than 
 I am willing to acknowledge; but it is our duty, if pos- 
 sible, to counteract them, and assist him to bring them 
 under his control. I have endeavored, in my inter- 
 course with him, to require nothing but what was, in 
 my opinion, necessary or proper, and to explain to him 
 temperately its propriety, and at a time when he could 
 listen to my arguments, and not at the moment of his 
 being vexed and his little faculties warped by passion. 
 I have also tried to show him that I was firm in my 
 demands and constant in their enforcement, and that 
 he must comply with them, and I let him see that I 
 look to their execution in order to relieve him as much 
 as possible from the temptation to break them." 
 
 Wise words from a father, and the significant thing 
 was that they represented his conduct throughout his 
 life. He was the personification of reasonableness. 
 Small wonder that his youngest son, in his memoir of 
 his father, recorded that among his first impressions 
 was the recognition of a difference between his father 
 and other persons, and a knowledge that he had to be 
 obeyed. It was an impression which was later made 
 on all who came in contact with him. A glimpse of 
 him is given in an incident which he related of a walk 
 in the snow with his eldest son when the latter was a 
 child. The little boy had fallen behind, and his father, 
 looking back over his shoulder, found him trying to 
 
32 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 follow his stride and place his feet precisely in his foot- 
 prints. "When I saw this," he said, "I felt that it 
 behooved me to walk very straight, when this fellow is 
 already following in my tracks." ''To be alone in a 
 crowd is to be very solitary," he writes to his wife, in 
 another letter. "In the woods I feel sympathy with 
 the trees and birds, in whose company I take delight; 
 but experience no interest in a strange crowd." A 
 touch in one of his letters to an old friend and classmate, 
 then Lieutenant, afterward Lieutenant-General, Joseph 
 E. Johnston, gives a glimpse of his love for children 
 and also of that of another old friend: "He complains 
 bitterly of his present waste of life, looks thin and dis- 
 pirited, and is acquainted with the cry of every child 
 in Iowa." 
 
 His son and namesake, in his "Recollections" of his 
 father, makes mention of many little instances of his 
 love of and care for animals, and the same love of and 
 care for animals constantly shine from his letters. 
 
 At one time he picks up a dog lost and swimming 
 wildly in "the Narrows," and cared for it through life; 
 at another he takes a long, roundabout journey by 
 steamer for the sake of his horse ; at another he writes : 
 "Cannot you cure poor 'Spec'?" (his dog). "Cheer 
 him up ! take him to walk with you — tell the children 
 to cheer him up." In fact, his love for animals, like 
 his love for children, was a marked characteristic 
 throughout his life, and long after the war he took 
 the trouble to write a description of his horse "Trav- 
 eller," which none but a true lover of horses could 
 have written. 
 
FIRST SERVICE 33 
 
 On his return from Mexico, after an absence so long 
 that he failed to recognize his own child whom he had 
 left a babe in arms, he was, like Ulysses, first recog- 
 nized by his faithful dog/ 
 
 His thoughts were constantly with his children — 
 even amid the most arduous duties and the most peril- 
 ous scenes his mind reverted to them. His letters 
 from Mexico were full of them. On Christmas Eve he, 
 in his imagination, filled their stockings, as on another 
 occasion, in lieu of his own children, from whom he was 
 far distant, he acted Santa Claus and bought presents 
 for all the children in the post. And it has been noted 
 '^how little of war and how much of Christian feeling 
 and domestic affection" his home letters contain. He 
 ever kept in touch with his children, writing them of 
 the interesting scenes through which he passed. To 
 his eldest son, then a school-boy, later a gallant and 
 efficient soldier of high rank, he wrote, just after the 
 battle of Cerro Gordo,^ how in the battle he had won- 
 dered, while the musket balls and grape were whistling 
 over his head in a perfect shower, where he could have 
 put him, if with him, to be safe. Indeed, all through 
 his life children had a charm for him, known only to the 
 starved heart of a father exiled from his own fireside 
 and little ones. To the day of his death the entrance 
 of a child was a signal for the dignified soldier to un- 
 bend, and among his most cherished companions in 
 his retirement, when he was, perhaps, the most noted 
 captain in the world, were the little sun-bonneted 
 
 ' "Recollections and Letters of General Lee," by R. E. Lee. 
 « Letter of April 25, 1847. 
 
34 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 daughters of the professors of the college of which he 
 was the president. 
 
 His two elder sons had both entered the military 
 profession, which their father held in the highest honor, 
 and the letters he wrote them illustrated not only the 
 charming relation that existed between father and 
 sons, but the lofty ideal on which he ever modelled his 
 own life and desired that they should model theirs. To 
 his oldest son, then a cadet at West Point, he writes 
 from Arlington (April 5, 1852), as he was on the point 
 of leaving for New Mexico to see that his '^fine old 
 regiment," which had been "ordered to that distant 
 region," was "properly cared for": "... Your letters 
 breathe a true spirit of frankness; they have given 
 myself and your mother great pleasure. You must 
 study to be frank with the world. Frankness is the 
 child of honesty and courage. . . . Never do a wrong 
 thing to make a friend or to keep one. . . . Above all, 
 do not appear to others what you are not. ... In re- 
 gard to duty, let me in conclusion of this hasty letter 
 inform you that nearly a hundred years ago there was 
 a day of remarkable darkness and gloom, still known 
 as the dark day — a day when the light of the sun was 
 slowly extinguished, as if by an eclipse. The legisla- 
 ture of Connecticut was in session, and as its members 
 saw the unexpected and unaccountable darkness com- 
 ing on, they shared the general awe and terror. It was 
 supposed by many that the last day — the day of judg- 
 ment — had come. Some one in consternation of the 
 hour moved an adjournment. Then there arose an 
 old Pilgrim legislator, Davenport of Stamford, and said 
 
FIRST SERVICE 35 
 
 that if the last day had come he desired to be found at 
 his place doing his duty, and therefore moved that 
 candles be brought in so that the House could proceed 
 with its duty. There was quietness in that man's 
 mind, the quietness of heavenly wisdom and inflexible 
 willingness to obey present duty. Duty, then, is the 
 sublimest word in our language. Do your duty in all 
 things, like the old Puritan. You cannot do more; 
 you should never wish to do less. Never let me or 
 your mother wear one gray hair for lack of duty on 
 your part." ^ 
 
 Such, in brief, was Colonel Robert E. Lee, when at 
 the age of fifty-four he found the storm of Civil War 
 about to break on the country. 
 
 ' It is said that this letter as a whole was made up by a clever news- 
 paper man out of parts of different letters by Lee. 
 
CHAPTER III 
 
 THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 
 
 When the war came Lee had to face the most mo- 
 mentous question that ever confronted a soldier. The 
 government of the United States and his own State, 
 which was later to form a part of a new national gov- 
 ernment, were about to be arrayed in arms against 
 each other. The former was preparing to invade his 
 native State, to coerce by arms the seceded States. 
 He had to decide between allegiance to the general 
 government, of which hitherto Virginia had formed 
 a constituent part, whose commission he had borne, 
 whose honors had been conferred on him, and under 
 whose flag he had won high distinction, and allegiance 
 to his native State, which, on being called on to take 
 part against the South or be herself invaded, now in 
 the exercise of her constitutional right seceded from 
 the Union. 
 
 The John Brown Raid with its aim, the heading of a 
 servile insurrection throughout the South, backed as it 
 was by blind enthusiasts at the North, affected pro- 
 foundly all thinking men at the South. Had it proved 
 successful, the horrors of San Domingo would have 
 been multiplied a thousandfold, and have swept over 
 the South in a deluge of blood. The South was en- 
 
 36 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 37 
 
 raged by this effort to arouse a slave insurrection; but 
 the wild sympathy expressed at the North with its 
 murderous leader gave it a shock from which it never 
 recovered. /Lee had no illusions respecting slavery. 
 He saw its evils with an eye as clear as Wendell Phillips's. 
 He set forth his views in favor of emancipation in as 
 positive terms as Lincoln ever employed. He set free 
 before the war all the slaves he owned in his own right/ 
 and, by a singular coincidence, within a week after 
 the emancipation proclamation he manumitted all the 
 negroes received by him from the Custis estate, hav- 
 ing previous to that time made his arrangements 
 to do so in conformity with the provisions of Mr. 
 Custis's will. 
 
 In addition to his attitude toward slavery, as shown 
 in his letting his own slaves go long before the war, 
 his views on the subject occasionally appear in his 
 letters. "I have always observed," he writes, ^Hhat 
 wherever you find the negro, you see everything going 
 down around him, and wherever you find the white 
 man, you see everything around him improving." 
 And again: "In this enlightened age there are few, I 
 believe, but will acknowledge that slavery as an insti- 
 tution is a moral and a political evil in any country." 
 
 But he held the views that many if not most of 
 the old Virginians held: he esteemed "the relation 
 of master and slave, controlled by humane laws and 
 influenced by Christianity and an enlightened public 
 
 • The authority for this is a letter from General G. W. C. Lee, in the 
 writer's possession, in which he states that General Lee " let his slaves 
 go," and one or more of them went to Liberia. The term as represent- 
 ing the liberation of slaves is as old as the mission of Moses. 
 
38 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 sentiment, as the best that can exist between the white 
 and black races while intermingled, as at present, in 
 this country." 
 
 He stated after the war that ''the best men of the 
 South have long desired to do away with the institu- 
 tion, and were quite willing to see it abolished. But 
 with them in relation to this subject the question has 
 ever been: What will you do with the freed people? 
 That is the serious question to-day. Unless some hu- 
 mane course, based upon wisdom and Christian prin- 
 ciples, is adopted, you do them a great injustice in 
 setting them free." 
 
 Most men of open minds have long passed the point 
 when we should deny to any honorable man the right 
 to make the election which Lee was called on to make 
 on the secession of Virginia, as his conscience dictated. 
 But with most of us sympathy and affection go to the 
 man who chose the weaker side. This choice Lee de- 
 liberately made. Wlio knows what agony that accom- 
 plished soldier and noble gentleman went through 
 during those long weeks, when the sword was sus- 
 pended, and he with unblinded vision foresaw that it 
 must fall ! He was a devoted Union man. His letters 
 all show the depth of his feeling for the Union his fore- 
 fathers had contributed so largely to make. To some 
 men the decision might have been made more difficult 
 by the lure that was suddenly held out to him. But 
 not so with Lee. The only question with him was 
 what was his duty. 
 
 The President of the United States tendered to him 
 the command of the armies of the Union about to take 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 39 
 
 the field. This has long been regarded by those who 
 know as an established fact; but it has become the 
 custom of late among a certain class to deny the fact 
 on the principle, perhaps, that an untruth well stuck- 
 to may possibly supplant the truth. Of the fact that 
 he was offered the command of the armies of the 
 United States there is, however, abundant proof, out- 
 side of General Lee's own statement to Senator Reverdy 
 Johnson, were more proof needed. The Hon. Mont- 
 gomery Blair published the fact as stated by his father, 
 the Hon. Francis P. Blair, that he had been sent by 
 Mr. Lincoln to Colonel Lee with the offer of the com- 
 mand, and long afterward the Hon. Simon Cameron, 
 formerly Secretary of War in Mr. Lincoln's cabinet, in 
 a published interview, frankly admitted the fact. "It 
 is true," he says, "that General Robert E. Lee was ten- 
 dered the command of the Union army. It was the 
 wish of Mr. Lincoln's administration that as many as 
 possible of the Southern officers then in the regular 
 army should remain true to the nation which had edu- 
 cated them. Robert E. Lee and Joseph E. Johnston 
 were then the leading Southern soldiers. ... In the 
 moves and counter moves in the game of war and peace 
 then going on, Francis P. Blair, Sr., was a prominent 
 figure. The tender of the command of the United 
 States forces was made to General Lee through him. 
 Mr. Blair came to me expressing the opinion that Gen- 
 eral Lee could be held to our cause by the offer of the 
 chief command of our forces. I authorized Mr. Blair 
 to make the offer. . . ." ^ 
 
 * New York Herald, cited in Jones's "Lee," p. 130. 
 
40 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 But the matter is set at rest by a letter from General 
 Lee — his letter of February 25, 1868, to Hon. Reverdy 
 Johnson — in which he states that he had a conversation 
 with Mr. Francis Preston Blair, at his invitation, and, 
 as he understood, at the instance of President Lincoln. 
 *' After listening to his remarks," he says, "I declined 
 the offer he made me to take command of the ai-my 
 that was to be brought into the field, stating as can- 
 didly and as courteously as I could that, though op- 
 posed to secession and deprecating war, I could take 
 no part in an invasion of the Southern States. I went 
 directly from the interview with Mr. Blair to the office 
 of General Scott, told him of the proposition that had 
 been made me and my decision." ^ Indeed, it was this 
 offer which possibly hastened his decision. Events 
 were moving with startling and unexampled celerity. 
 On April 12 Fort Sumter was fired on; on April 13 
 President Lincoln called on the unseceded States for 
 troops; on April 17 Virginia, hitherto stanch for the 
 Union, seceded. This action, in Lee's judgment, con- 
 cluded her sons. 
 
 Three days later, on April 20, he resigned his comimis- 
 sion in the United States army, declaring that he never 
 wished to draw his sword again save in defence of liis 
 native State. Even then he "hoped that peace might 
 be preserved and some way found to save the country 
 from the calamities of war." 
 
 So much we have from his own lips, and that is proof 
 enough for those who know his character. 
 
 This action of Lee's at the outbreak of the war, in 
 
 ^See also Jones's "Life and Letters of Robert Edward Lee," p. 128. 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 41 
 
 resigning from the army of the United States, and later 
 in assuming the command, first of the Virginian forces 
 and afterward of the Confederate forces, used, during 
 the period of passion covered by the war and the bitter 
 years which followed, to be made the basis of a criti- 
 cism whose rancor bore an almost precise relation to 
 the degree of security which had been sought by the 
 assailant during the hour of danger. The men who 
 fought the battles of the Union said little upon the 
 subject. They knew, for the most part, the lofty feel- 
 ing which animated the breasts which opposed them, 
 and paid it the tribute of unfeigned respect. The con- 
 duct of Grant and of his officers at Appomattox, with 
 a single exception, was such as to reflect unending credit 
 on them as men of honor and generosity. The charge 
 of treason was mainly left to those who, having risked 
 nothing on the field of honor, were fain later, when all 
 danger was past, to achieve a reputation for patriotism 
 by the unappeasable fury of their cries for revenge. 
 To these, the vultures of the race, may be added an 
 element, sincere and not well informed, who, more than 
 half wishing to avail themselves of Lee's transcendent 
 character, have found his action in this crisis a stum- 
 bling-block in their way. Having been reared solely 
 upon the doctrine of Federalism, and taught all their 
 lives that the officers of the army of the Union had re- 
 ceived their education at West Point at the hands of 
 the National Government, and were guilty of some- 
 thing like treason, or, as it used to be put, treachery, 
 in giving up their commands in the Union army and 
 bearing arms for their States against the United States, 
 
42 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 they find it difficult to accept the plainest facts. These 
 are the bigots of politics. 
 
 As the statement is absolutely unfounded, and as the 
 matter goes to the basis of character, it is well to point 
 these latter to the facts which disprove wholly and 
 forever the premises on which they have based their 
 erroneous conclusion. 
 
 It should be remembered at the outset that the 
 action of every man must be considered in relation 
 to the conditions from which that action springs, and 
 amid which it had its being. The most fallacious 
 method of considering history is that which excludes 
 contemporary conditions and undertakes to judge it 
 by the present, the two eras being often far more dif- 
 ferent than would be indicated by the mere passage 
 of time. 
 
 At the time when Lee and his brother officers re- 
 ceived their education at the Military Academy, they 
 were sent there as State cadets, and the expense of their 
 education was borne at last by the several States, which, 
 there being at that time no high tariff and no internal- 
 revenue taxation to maintain the National Government, 
 miade a yet more direct contribution than since the war 
 to the government for its expenses. In recognition of 
 this fact, and as compensation for the contribution by 
 the States, each representative of a State had the right 
 to send a cadet to each academy. Virginia had been 
 peculiarly instrumental in creating the Union. She 
 had taken a foremost and decisive part in the Revolu- 
 tion for those rights on which the Constitution was 
 based, and subsequently in the adoption of the Con- 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 43 
 
 stitution. She had led ahke in the field and in the 
 council chamber. Without her no Union would have 
 been formed, and without her no Union could have 
 been preserved during the early decades of its existence. 
 To make the Union possible she had ceded her vast 
 north-west territory, to which she had the double claim 
 that it was first embraced in her charter and later was 
 conquered by her sons, led by George Rogers Clark. 
 It may be safely predicated that had any one imagined 
 that entering into the Union would have given the 
 Union government the right to demand service against 
 his State, there would never have been a Union. 
 
 There had long been two different schools of gov- 
 ernmental thought in the country, the one represent- 
 ing the Federalist party and the other representing 
 the Republican or Democratic party. They had their 
 rise in the very inception of the National Govern- 
 ment. Their teachings had divided the country from 
 the first. Originally the chief agitation against the 
 Federal Government had been at the North, and while 
 the parties were not demarked by any sectional lines, 
 for the most part, the body of the Federalist party 
 were at the period of the outbreak of war, owing to 
 certain conditions connected with the institution of 
 slavery, and to various advantages accruing to the 
 Northern States, as manufacturing States, at the 
 North, while the body of the States Rights party were 
 at the South. Not only were the powers of the great- 
 est statesmen and debaters in the country continually 
 exercised upon this question, as, for example, in the 
 debates in which Clay, Webster, Hayne, and Calhoun 
 
44 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 took part on the floor of the Senate, but the teach- 
 ings in the great institutions of learning were divided/ 
 It was a question on which not only men divided, but 
 populations; and the populations of the North and the 
 South had largely exchanged places regarding it. 
 
 But Lee had from his boyhood been reared in the 
 Southern school of States' Rights as interpreted by the 
 conservative statesmen of Virginia. His gallant and 
 distinguished father had been three times governor of 
 Virginia, and while heartily advocating in the Virginia 
 convention the ratification of the Constitution of the 
 United States, favored the Virginia and Kentucky reso- 
 lutions of 1798-99, drawn by Mr. Madison and Mr. 
 Jefferson, which were based upon the States' Rights 
 doctrine. He said in debate : '' Virginia is my country : 
 her will I obey, however lamentable the fate to which 
 it may subject me." 
 
 He wrote to Mr. Madison in January, 1792, a letter 
 in which he said: "No consideration on earth could 
 induce me to act a part, however gratifying to me, 
 which could be construed into disregard of, or faith- 
 lessness to, this commonwealth." 
 
 Such was the teaching under which Robert E. Lee 
 had been reared. One knows little of Virginia who does 
 not know with what passionate esteem the traditions 
 and opinions of a father were cherished by a son. Polit- 
 ical views were as much inherited as religious tenets. 
 
 The doctrine that made it treason for a State to 
 secede is of modern origin. A question might exist 
 
 ' A brief and simple statement of the position of the two sides may 
 be found in Ropes's "Story of the Civil War," I, chap. I. 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 45 
 
 as to the propriety or wisdom of secession; but it was 
 novel to question its right, and when it had seceded 
 few men questioned that it carried with it the alle- 
 giance of its citizens. 
 
 As a matter of fact, at the time that young Lee was 
 attending the Military Academy at West Point, the 
 text-books, such as "Rawle's View of the Constitu- 
 tion," which were used there, taught with great dis- 
 tinctness the absolute' right of a State to secede, and 
 the primary duty of every man to his native State/ 
 ''It depends on the State itself," declares this authority 
 then taught at West Point, 'Ho retain or abolish the 
 principle of representation, because it depends on itself 
 whether it will continue a member of the Union. To 
 deny this right would be inconsistent with the prin- 
 ciple on which all our political systems are founded, 
 which is, that the people have, in all cases, a right to 
 determine how they will be governed. This right must 
 be considered as an ingredient in the composition of 
 the general government, which, though not expressed, 
 was mutually understood, and the doctrine heretofore 
 presented to the reader in regard to the indefeasible 
 nature of personal allegiance is so far qualified in re- 
 
 * This has been ably and conclusively shown by Mr. Charles Francis 
 Adams, of Massachusetts, in his admirable address on "Constitutional 
 Ethics," and in his memorial address on the life and character of 
 Robert E. Lee, delivered at Washington and Lee University on the 
 occasion of the hundredth anniversary of General Lee's birth. His 
 distinguished grandfather, John Quincy Adams, who had been Presi- 
 dent of the United States, had enunciated the doctrine of secession 
 clearly, declaring that it would be better for the States to "part in 
 friendship from each other than to be held together by constraint" 
 and "to form again a more perfect Union by dissolving that which 
 could not bind." (Speech of John Quincy Adams, April 30, 1839.) 
 
46 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 spect to allegiance to the United States." "It was ob- 
 served that it was competent for a State to make a 
 compact with its citizens, that the reciprocal obliga- 
 tion of protection and allegiance might cease on certain 
 events; and it was further observed that allegiance 
 would necessarily cease on the dissolution of the so- 
 ciety to which it was due.!' This position was that 
 held by the leaders of New England during the first 
 half of the century, and was earnestly advanced by 
 them both at the time of the acquisition of Louisiana 
 and of Texas. 
 
 The action of the Hartford convention in threaten- 
 ing secession had blazoned abroad the views of the 
 leaders of New England thought at the time when 
 the Virginians were straining every force to maintain 
 the Union, and John Quincy Adams had presented to 
 Congress (January 23, 1842) a petition from a Massa- 
 chusetts town (Haverhill), asking the dissolution of 
 the Union, on which a motion had been made by a 
 Virginia member (Mr. Gilmer) to censure him, which 
 had been debated for ten days, Mr. Adams ably de- 
 fending himself. 
 
 As has been stated, however, whatever question ex- 
 isted as to the right of a State to secede, there was no 
 question at the time as to her citizens being bound by 
 her action should she secede. The basic principle of 
 the Anglo-Saxon civilization was the defence of the 
 inner circle against whatever assailed it from the out- 
 side, and nowhere was this principle more absolutely 
 established than in Virginia. 
 
 In order for those who do not know the facts to un- 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 47 
 
 derstand fully Lee's decision; it should be explained 
 that Virginia did not make war on the Union, but the 
 Union made war on the South and on Virginia. It has 
 ■ usually been accepted as an established fact that the 
 war began by the firing on Fort Sumter on April 12, 
 1861. Such was not the fact. The bombardment of 
 this key to the Charleston harbor was not even the first 
 instance of "firing on the flag," as it is usually assumed 
 to have been. Three months before this the United 
 States transport. Star of the West, was fired on and 
 driven back as she was proceeding to revictual Sumter. 
 But prior to this the United States Government 
 had been actually engaged in acts of war against the 
 seceded StaTtes. Troops were being levied and equipped 
 and a relief squadron of war had been fitted out and 
 despatched for the avowed purpose of relieving and 
 rendering impregnable the forts commanding Charles- 
 ton harbor. These were acts of war, recognized as 
 such by all authorities on this subject save those who 
 have held a brief for the Union side in this particular 
 struggle. When Virginia refused to join the secession 
 movement and attempted to intervene as a peace- 
 maker, the only reply she received was a peremptory 
 demand to furnish her quota of troops for the war. 
 Her answer to this was her ordinance of secession 
 and her preparation for defence. But even then 
 she took no hostile steps against the North. She 
 only prepared to defend her borders. Whatever his- 
 torians have written and others have thought, war 
 was made on her, and the first shot fired by her within 
 her confines or by her orders was in repelling armed 
 
48 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 invasion. In such a case her whole people, save those 
 in her mountain region, united under her banner with 
 its noble legend: Sic semper tyrannis. In a thought- 
 ful discussion of the action of Virginia at this time, 
 Colonel G. F. R. Henderson, the noted biographer of 
 Stonewall Jackson, says: ''There can be no question but 
 that secession was revolution, and revolutions, as has 
 been well said, are not made for the sake of 'greased 
 cartridges.' . . . Secession, in fact, was a protest 
 against mob rule. ... It is always difficult to analyze 
 the motives of those by whom revolution is provoked ; 
 but if a whole people acquiesce, it is a certain proof of 
 the existence of universal apprehension and deep- 
 rooted discontent. This spirit of self-sacrifice which 
 animated the Confederate South has been characteristic 
 of every revolution which has been the expression of a 
 nation's wrongs, but it has never yet accompanied mere 
 factious insurrection. When, in the process of time, 
 the history of secession comes to be viewed with the 
 same freedom from prejudice as the history of the 
 seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it will be clear 
 that the fourth great revolution of the English-speak- 
 ing race differs in no essential characteristic from those 
 that preceded it. . . . In each a great principle was at 
 stake: in 1642, the liberty of the subject; in 1688, the 
 integrity of the Protestant faith; in 1775, taxation 
 only with consent of the taxed; in 1861, the sover- 
 eignty of the individual States." ^ 
 
 ' Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," new impression, I, pp. 93, 94. I 
 have quoted extensively in this volume from this author, feeling that 
 he, as an impartial student of the Civil War and its causes, is an au- 
 thority to command respect, 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 49 
 
 Whether, then, those who were in the service of the 
 United States at the outbreak of the war were under 
 obHgation to remain in her service after their States 
 seceded, or were under obhgation to resign and espouse 
 the side of their several States, was a matter for each 
 man to decide according to his conscience, and scores 
 of gallant and high-minded gentlemen thus decided. 
 Of the three hundred and odd graduates of West 
 Point who were from the South, a considerable majority 
 followed their States, and these — men whose character 
 would challenge comparison with the loftiest examples 
 of the human race. That there was an obligation on 
 them to remain and bear arms against their family and 
 people because of the source from which their education 
 came is sheer nonsense. Had it ever been imagined 
 that training at West Point bound a man to serve against 
 his family and people in his native State, there would 
 have been no West Point Military Academy. This edu- 
 cation was but a simple return for the money contrib- 
 uted by their States to the general government. And 
 Virginia had paid for all she got a hundred times over. 
 
 Without undertaking to enter upon anything like 
 a complete discussion of this question of the right 
 and the righteousness of secession, it is necessary to 
 make clear the belief of the Southern people on the 
 outbreak of the war, in order to make clear Lee's 
 point of view and the ground of his action; and this 
 may hardly be done better than by citing the words 
 of one of the leading Northern historians of the war — 
 for the fair-minded presentation in his studies of this 
 subject gave the late John C. Ropes the right to speak 
 
60 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 upon it with authority. ''The attitude then," he says, 
 after a brief historical summary of the steps which had 
 led up to secession, ''which the seceding States as- 
 sumed toward the States which remained in the Union 
 was that of foreign nations, as one by one they adopted 
 their ordinances of secession and withdrew their sen- 
 ators and representatives from Congress. And there 
 can be no reasonable doubt that when, in any State, 
 the ordinance of secession had been adopted, the people 
 of that State — or the great majority of them at least — 
 felt that their allegiance was now due solely to their 
 State; and even those persons who had strongly and 
 earnestly opposed the secession movement, whether 
 on grounds of policy or on grounds of right, felt them- 
 selves none the less bound loyally to serve their State, 
 now that it had seceded. 
 
 "All this it is of the greatest importance to know, 
 and continually to bear in mind, if we would under- 
 stand the attitude of the Southern people during the 
 war. They were not, in their own opinion, rebels at 
 all; they were defending their States — that is, the 
 nations to which they conceived themselves to belong — 
 from invasion and conquest. The character which this 
 conviction of the Southern people gave to the contest 
 was most noticeable; it is not too much to say that 
 none of the usual features of a rebellion were to be 
 perceived in the South during the war. There was, 
 for instance, nothing in the temper of the South to 
 suggest that the war was carried on for the redress 
 of grievances — as is always the case among a rebel- 
 lious population. On the contrary, the attitude of the 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 51 
 
 South was from the beginning one of resistance to the 
 uttermost; it was, in fine, the attitude of a nation re- 
 pelHng invasion, dismemberment, conquest. And, we 
 repeat, it is of the first importance that we should 
 recognize the grounds of this wellnigh universal feel- 
 ing among the Southern people if we would under- 
 stand the causes of the unanimity and devotion with 
 which they, for four long years, withstood the armies 
 of the United States." 
 
 Having followed this with a presentation of the 
 Northern point of view at that time, Mr. Ropes goes on 
 to show that "the Northern people were very certain 
 that in 1861, at any rate, the United States constituted 
 but one nation," and that the feeling that they were 
 "charged with the important task of preserving intact 
 the great republic of the world, inspired the people of 
 the North with a determination to maintain the integ- 
 rity of the nation at any cost. The war," he frankly 
 states, "enlisted the patriotic feelings, properly so- 
 called, of both the contending parties. The North 
 was inspired with f, lofty determination to be true to 
 the duty of maintaining in all its integrity the great 
 republic of the Western Continent; the South was 
 equally resolute to defend the independence of her 
 several nationalities. 
 
 "These differences were irreconcilable. The North 
 could not admit the contention of the South. She 
 denied the right of secession; in her view the seceding 
 States werp States in insurrection. The parties were 
 thus from the outset hopelessly at variance regarding 
 the very terms of the controversy." 
 
52 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 While arguing that "the fact that the unadmissible 
 claims to independence were set up by communities 
 which professed devotion to the institution of slavery 
 — a system repugnant to the enlightenment and hu- 
 manity of the age — drew to the Union side the moral 
 approval of the great mass of the Northern people," he 
 disposes briefly of the claim so commonly asserted and 
 believed, that the war was waged by the North for the 
 purpose of abolishing slavery in the South, and de- 
 clares that "that was certainly not the case." The 
 war was prosecuted to put down all resistance to the 
 National Government. 
 
 This able historian, having given briefly his view of 
 the causes which led to this unhappy and disastrous 
 war, concludes in these words, in which all fair-minded 
 men must unite : "The courage and endurance displayed 
 by both sides were wonderful indeed ; and it is clearly 
 desirable that the sources and springs of so much valor 
 and so much fortitude should be distinctly identified." ^ 
 
 When the great conflict came, the time which tried 
 men's souls, no soul in all the limits of this broad coun- 
 try was more tried than that lofty soul which had for 
 its home the breast of Robert E. Lee. Every senti- 
 ment of affection, ambition, and pride bound him to 
 the Union. A glimpse of his love for and pride in his 
 country may be found in a letter written during his 
 stay in Texas, in 1856. Writing of the national holiday 
 — the Fourth of July — to his wife he says: "Mine was 
 spent, after a march of thirty miles, on .one of the 
 branches of the Brazos, under my blanket, elevated on 
 
 » "Story of the Civil War," Ropes, I, pp. 3-9. 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 53 
 
 four sticks driven in the ground, as a sunshade. The 
 sun was fiery hot, the atmosphere Hke a blast from a 
 hot-air furnace, the water salt, still my feelings for my 
 country were as ardent, my faith in her future as true, 
 and my hope for her advancement as unabated as they 
 would have been under better circumstances." ^ In 
 December, 1860, he writes: '' Feeling the aggression of 
 the North, resenting their denial of the equal rights of 
 our citizens to the common territory of the common- 
 wealth, etc., I am not pleased with the course of the 
 'Cotton States,' as they term themselves. In addition 
 to their selfish, dictatorial bearing, the threats they 
 throw out against the 'Border States,' as they call 
 them, if they will not join them, argues little for the 
 benefit or peace of Virginia, should she determine to 
 coalesce with them. Wliile I wish to do what is right, 
 I am unwilling to do what is wrong at the bidding of 
 the South or of the North." And in January following 
 he writes: ''As far as I can judge from the papers, we 
 are between a state of anarchy and civil war. May 
 God avert from us both! ... I see that four States 
 have declared themselves out of the Union. Four 
 more apparently will follow their example. Then if 
 the border States are dragged into the gulf of revolu- 
 tion, one half of the country will be arrayed against 
 the other, and I must try and be patient and wait the 
 end; for I can do nothing to hasten or retard it." 
 
 Such was the feeling of this Virginian for the Union, 
 which was to be put aside at the call of duty. He was 
 a Union man, and viewed secession with abhorrence as 
 
 * Letter of August 4, 1856, cited in Jones's "Lee," p. 80. 
 
54 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 revolution. Only one thing he viewed with more ab- 
 horrence — dishonor. 
 
 Writing from Texas of secession in the beginning of 
 1861, he said: "The South, in my opinion, has been 
 aggrieved by the act of the North. I feel the aggres- 
 sion and am willing to take every proper step for re- 
 dress. It is the principle I contend for, not individual 
 or private interest. As an American citizen I take 
 great pride in my country, her prosperity and institu- 
 tions. But I can anticipate no greater calamity for 
 this country than a dissolution of the Union. It would 
 be an accumulation of all the evils we complain of, and 
 I am willing to sacrifice everything but honor for its 
 preservation. I hope, therefore, that all constitutional 
 means will be exhausted before there is a resort to 
 force. Secession is nothing but revolution. . . . Still 
 a Union that can only be maintained by swords and 
 bayonets, and in which strife and civil war are to take 
 the place of brotherly love and kindness, has no charm 
 for me. I shall mourn for my country, and for the 
 welfare and progress of mankind. If the Union is 
 dissolved and the government disrupted, I shall re- 
 turn to my native State and share the miseries of 
 my people, and, save in defence, will draw my sword 
 no more." ^ 
 
 The agony which he endured when the crucial 
 time came may possibly never be known to us. We 
 have an account given by Mrs. Lee of the manner 
 in which he reached his decision. The Rev. Dr. J. 
 
 ' Letter of January 23, 1861, cited in Jones's "Life and Letters of 
 R. E. Lee," p. 120. 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 55 
 
 William Jones, who knew them both well and was 
 intrusted with many family papers, tells us that 
 "the night his letter of resignation was to be written, 
 he asked to be left alone for a time, and while he paced 
 the chamber above, and was heard frequently to fall 
 upon his knees and engage in prayer for divine guidance, 
 she waited, and watched, and prayed below. At last 
 he came down, came collected, almost cheerfully, and 
 said: 'Well, Mary, the question is settled. Here is 
 my letter of resignation, and a letter I have written to 
 General Scott.' " All night he had wrestled; but in 
 the morning light had come.^ This is the letter: 
 
 Arlington, Va., April 20, 1861. 
 
 General : Since my interview with you on the 18th 
 inst., I have felt that I ought not longer to retain my 
 commission in the army. I therefore tender my resig- 
 nation, which I request you will recommend for accept- 
 ance. It would have been presented at once but for 
 the struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a 
 service to which I have devoted the best years of my 
 life and all the ability I possessed. During the whole 
 of that time — more than a quarter of a century — I 
 have experienced nothing but kindness from my 
 superiors, and a most cordial friendship from my com- 
 rades. To no one, general, have I been as much in- 
 debted as to yourself for uniform kindness and con- 
 sideration, and it has always been my ardent desire 
 to merit your approbation. I shall carry to the 
 grave the most grateful recollections of your kind 
 consideration, and your name and fame will always 
 be dear to me. 
 
 Save in the defence of my native State, I never 
 
 * Jones's "Life and Letters of Robert E. Lee/' p. 132. 
 
56 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 desire again to draw my sword. Be pleased to accept 
 my most earnest wishes for the continuance of your 
 happiness and prosperity, and beheve me most truly 
 yours, 
 
 R. E. Lee. 
 
 His wife's family were strongly Union in their senti- 
 ments, and the writer has heard that powerful family 
 influences were exerted to prevail on him to adhere to 
 the Union side. ''My husband has wept tears of blood," 
 wrote Mrs. Lee to his old commander, Scott, who did 
 him the justice to declare that he knew he acted under 
 a compelling sense of duty. 
 
 His letters to his family and to his friends, though 
 self-restrained, as was the habit of the man, show 
 plainly to those who knew his character how stern was 
 the sense of duty under which Lee acted when in his own 
 person he had to meet the question whether he should 
 take part against his native State. Unlike many other 
 officers who knew no home but the post where they 
 were quartered, Lee's home was in Virginia, and to 
 this beautiful home in his most distant and engrossing 
 service his heart had ever yearned. 
 
 Lee had no personal interests to subserve connected 
 with the preservation of the institution of slavery; his 
 inclinations and his views all tended the other way. 
 "In this enlightened age," he had already written, 
 "there are few, I believe, but will acknowledge that 
 slavery as an institution is a moral and political evil." 
 He had set free the slaves he owned in his own right, 
 and was "in favor of freeing all the slaves in the 
 South, giving to each owner a bond to be the first 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 57 
 
 paid by the Confederacy when its independence should 
 be secured."^ 
 
 The slaves owned by Mrs. Lee he manumitted in 
 1862, or in January, 1863. In fact, it is a curious 
 commentary on the motives connected with the war, 
 that while Lee had set his slaves free, Grant is said to 
 have continued in the ownership of slaves until they were 
 emancipated by the government of the United States.^ 
 
 It was, however, not so much the freeing of these 
 slaves as the compassion and affection that breathe in 
 his letters about them that testify Lee's character. His 
 care that every one should have his papers, even though 
 he might have gone off to the North; his provision for 
 their wages; his solicitude for the weak and feeble 
 among them, all testify to the feeling that the Virginian 
 master had for his servants. 
 
 In February, 1861, the seven Cotton States that 
 had seceded met in convention in Montgomery, Ala., 
 and united themselves in an independent government, 
 which they termed the Confederate States of America. 
 On the 12th of February, negotiations to bring about 
 the withdrawal of the garrisons of the forts in Charles- 
 ton harbor having failed, and the government being en- 
 gaged in revictualling and strengthening Fort Sumter, 
 the fort was bombarded and later surrendered. The 
 
 1 "The Confederate Cause and Conduct of the War," p.'22; "Official 
 Report of the History Committee, Grand Camp, C. V.," by the late 
 Hunter McGuire, M.D., LL.D., Richmond, Va. See also Lee's letter 
 of December 27, 1856, " Life and Letters of Robert E. Lee," Jones, p. 82. 
 
 ^ Ibid., p. 23, note, where Mrs. Grant is given as authority for the 
 statement that "these slaves came to him from my father's family; 
 for I lived in the West when I married the general, who was then a 
 lieutenant in the army." 
 
58 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 following day Mr. Lincoln issued a peremptory call to 
 the unseceded States to furnish quotas of 75,000 troops. 
 
 The crisis that came rent Virginia. It was known 
 that in the event of war, should Virginia secede, her 
 soil would become the battle ground. Lee had no illu- 
 sion as to this, nor had he any illusion as to the fury 
 and duration of the war if it should come. Wliatever 
 delusions others might cherish, he knew the Union 
 thoroughly, and knew the temper and the mettle of 
 the people of both sections. In the dread shadow of 
 war the people of Virginia selected for the great con- 
 vention which was to decide the question of remaining 
 in the Union or taking part with the other Southern 
 States the most conservative men within her borders. 
 Thus, the Virginia convention was a Wliig body with 
 a large majority of stanch Union men, the first Wliig 
 body that ever sat in the State. 
 
 Throughout its entire duration this great body of 
 representative Virginians resisted all the influences that 
 were brought to bear on them, both from the South and 
 from the people of the State, who, under unreasoning 
 provocation, gradually changed their opinion and be- 
 gan to clamor for secession. Only two weeks before 
 the final act by which she severed her connection with 
 the Union, she, by a two-thirds majority, rejected the 
 idea of secession. A relief squadron sailed for Charles- 
 ton while negotiations were going on, and preparations 
 for war were being pushed which could only mean one 
 thing. As a last and supreme effort to prevent war, 
 Union men went to Washington to beg Mr. Lincoln to 
 withdraw the garrisons of Sumter and Pickens, and 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 59 
 
 understood him to say that he had been wilHng to take 
 it under favorable consideration/ The reply when it 
 came was the imperative call for troops to be furnished 
 by the States. It meant war and the invasion of the 
 State. Even after Sumter was fired on, every effort 
 was made by the State to bring about a reconciliation 
 between the estranged and divided sections. But it 
 was too late. Troops were already marching on her. 
 The State of Lee did not make war. War was made 
 on her. And under the shock Virginia, on the 17th 
 day of April, solemnly reversed her former action and 
 seceded from the Union she had done so much to 
 create and so much to make great. 
 
 ''To have acceded to the demand [for her quota of 
 troops to attack South Carolina] would," says Hender- 
 son, ''have been to abjure the most cherished prin- 
 ciples of her political existence. . . . Neutrality was 
 impossible. She was bound to furnish her tale of 
 troops and thus belie her principles, or to secede at 
 once and reject with a clean conscience the President's 
 mandate, . . . The world has long since done justice 
 to the motives of Cromwell and of Washington, and 
 signs are not wanting that before many years have 
 passed it will do justice to the motives of the Southern 
 people." 
 
 Speaking of Virginia's action specifically, he de- 
 clares: "Her best endeavors were exerted to maintain 
 the peace between the hostile sections, and not till her 
 liberties were menaced did she repudiate a compact 
 
 ' Report of Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1st Sess, 39th Cong., 
 pp. 71, 114,115. 
 
60 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 which had become intolerable. It was to preserve 
 the freedom which her forefathers had bequeathed 
 her, and which she desired to hand down unsullied to 
 future generations, that she acquiesced in the revolu- 
 tion." ' 
 
 Her action concluded her citizens. This was Lee's 
 view, as he, after the war, stated under oath before the 
 commission appointed to inquire into the reconstruc- 
 tion of ,the States, and it was the view of every man 
 who sat in her convention. Unionist and Secessionist. 
 Ninety-nine out of every hundred of the intelligent 
 men in what was known as Old Virginia, the great sec- 
 tion east of the Alleghanies which had largely made 
 her history, bowed to her decree, and not with the less 
 unanimity that a considerable element among them 
 were grief-stricken at her decision to separate from the 
 Union which their fathers had done so much to create.^ 
 
 Among these was Robert E. Lee. "1 can contem- 
 plate no greater calamity for the country than a disso- 
 lution of the Union," wrote Lee in January. In April 
 the calamity had come. The Union was dissolved in 
 so far as his State was concerned, and he had only one 
 course left that he could take with honor. Before him 
 stood the example of his life-long model, Washington, 
 who, having fought with Braddock under the English 
 flag, when war came between England and his State, 
 
 * Henderson's "Life of Stonewall Jackson," I, pp. 101, 102. 
 
 * The writer's father was a stanch Union man, and stood out against 
 secession till the last; but three days after Virginia seceded he enlisted 
 as a private in an infantry companj^, known as the "Patrick Henry 
 Rifles," Co. C, 3d Va. Regt., later 15th Va. Regt., and fought through 
 to Appomattox. 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 61 
 
 threw in his lot with his people. To him his thoughts 
 recurred not only at this moment of supreme decision, 
 but years afterward, in the seclusion of the little moun- 
 tain town where he spent the evening of his days, as 
 the head of the academic institution which Washing- 
 ton had endowed. ''In the interviews between Gen- 
 eral Scott and Colonel Lee," says Long, ''it is stated 
 that the veteran commander earnestly sought to per- 
 suade the younger officer not to throw up his commis- 
 sion, telling him that it would be the greatest mistake 
 of his life. But to all his pleadings Colonel Lee 
 returned but one answer — that his sense of duty was 
 stronger with him than any prospects of advancement, 
 replying to the appeal not to send in his resignation 
 in the following words: 'I am compelled to; I cannot 
 consult my own feelings in this matter.' " ^ 
 
 Two or three day^ later, on the 20th of April, the 
 same day on which he tendered the resignation of his 
 command of his regiment of cavalry, he wrote to both 
 his brother and sister, informing themi of the grounds 
 of his action. To his brother, with whom he had had 
 an earnest consultation on the subject two days before, 
 he stated that, after the most anxious inquiry as to the 
 correct course for him to pursue, he had decided the 
 matter in his own mind, and had concluded to resign — 
 had, indeed, sent in his resignation — and he had no 
 desire ever again to draw his sword save in defence of 
 his native State. To his sister, whose husband and 
 son espoused the Union cause, he wrote: 
 
 "With all my devotion to the Union, and the feeling 
 
 ' General A. L. Long's "Memoirs of Robert E. Lee." 
 
62 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 of loyalty and duty of an American citizen, I have not 
 been able to make up my mind to raise my hand against 
 my relatives, my children, my home. I have, there- 
 fore, resigned my commission in the army, and save in 
 defence of my native State, with the sincere hope that 
 my poor services may never be needed, I hope I may 
 never be called on to draw my sword. I know you 
 will blame me ; but you must think as kindly of me as 
 you can, and believe that I have endeavored to do 
 what I thought right." 
 
 Could any appeal have come straighter from the 
 heart! That they might see how he felt the step he 
 took, he enclosed to his brother and sister a copy of 
 the letter he had written General Scott. 
 
 All that we know is that, sacrificing place and 
 honors and emoluments, leaving his home to the sack 
 of the enemy already preparing to seize it, he decided in 
 the sight of God, under the all-compelling sense of 
 duty; and this is enough for us to know. "What did 
 the politicians clamoring for war know of the motives 
 that inspired his high soul! His letter to General 
 Scott tendering his resignation is full of noble dignity, 
 and not without a note of noble pathos where he 
 says, in its conclusion, "I shall carry to the grave the 
 most grateful recollection of 3'our kind consideration, 
 and your name and fame will always be dear to me." 
 And to his dying day he always held his old com- 
 mander in undiminished affection and honor. 
 
 Yet, however clear Lee was in his view as to his 
 own duty, he left others to judge for themselves. 
 Holding that the matter was one of conscience, he did 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 63 
 
 not attempt to decide the momentous question for 
 others — not even for his own son. Nearly a month 
 after he had resigned (May 13, 1861), he wrote to his 
 wife: "Tell Custis he must consult his own judgment, 
 reason, and conscience as to the course he may take. 
 I do not wish him to be guided by my wishes or ex- 
 ample. If I have done wrong, let him do better. The 
 present is a momentous question which every man 
 must settle for himself and upon principle." Custis, 
 who had graduated at the head of his class at West 
 Point, had been assigned to the Engineers, and on his 
 resignation from the army, soon after his father wrote 
 this letter, was assigned to duty in preparing the de- 
 fences of Richmond. He later rose to the rank of 
 major-general, C. S. A. 
 
 After the war, when Lee was perhaps the most 
 famous captain of the world, he from time to time 
 recurred to this action. For example, in a letter to 
 General Beauregard, written the day after his entrance 
 on his duties at Washington College, he refers to it: 
 
 "I need not tell you," he says, 'Hhat true patriotism 
 sometimes requires men to act exactly contrary at one 
 period to that which it does at another, and the mo- 
 tive which impels them — the desire to do right — is pre- 
 cisely the same. History is full of illustrations of this. 
 Washington himself is an example. [He was ever his 
 example.] He fought at one time against the French 
 under Braddock, in the service of the king of Great 
 Britain; at another, he fought with the French at 
 Yorktown, under the orders of the Continental Con- 
 gress, against him. He has not been branded by the 
 
64 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 world with reproach for this; but his course has been 
 applauded." 
 
 To the committee of Congress before whom he was 
 called after the war, he stated that he resigned because 
 he believed that the act of Virginia in withdrawing 
 herself from the United States carried him along with 
 it as a citizen of Virginia, and that her laws and acts 
 were binding upon him/ 
 
 On another occasion he stated his motives in his 
 action at this crisis. He says in a letter to an old 
 friend:^ ''I must give you my thanks for doing me the 
 justice to believe that my conduct during the last five 
 years has been governed by my sense of duty. I had 
 no other guide, nor had I any other object than the 
 defence of those principles of American liberty upon 
 which the constitutions of the several States were 
 originally founded, and unless they are strictly ob- 
 served I fear there will be an end to republican govern- 
 ment in tiiis country." 
 
 While the harpies w^ere screaming and clamoring, and 
 blind partisanship was declaiming about leaving him 
 to the "avenging pen of history," his high soul dwelt 
 in the serene air of consciousness of duty performed, 
 [e said to General Wade Hampton, in June, 1869: "I 
 could have taken no other course save in dishonor, and 
 if it were all to be gone over again, I should act in pre- 
 cisely the same way." 
 
 Thus spoke his constant soul. It was his deliberate 
 
 ' Report of Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 1st Sess. 39th 
 Cong., p. 133. 
 
 ^ In a letter of July 9, 18GG, to Captain James May. 
 
THE CHOICE OF HERCULES 65 
 
 judgment on calm reflection, with all the consequences 
 known to him. As before writing it he cast his mind 
 back, how he must have seen everything in the clear 
 light of the inexorable past — all the sacrifices he had 
 made: the chief command of the Union armies, with 
 a great fleet at his back to keep open his lines of com- 
 munication, hold the world for his recruiting ground, 
 and blockade the South until starvation forced capitu- 
 lation. It had lifted Grant from poverty and obscurity 
 to the Presidency, while his own choice, to follow his 
 State and obey her sacred laws, had reduced him from 
 station and affluence to poverty and toil. His beautiful 
 home had been confiscated and turned into a cemetery. 
 Its priceless treasures, endeared by association with 
 Washington, had been seized and scattered. A trial 
 for treason impended. He had been indicted with 
 Mr. Davis by a mixed grand jury of negroes and 
 whites, selected for the purpose, and the furious pack 
 were yet trying to hunt him down. Yet there was 
 no repining — no questioning. "There was quietness 
 in that man's mind." Wlien the sky was darkened 
 he had simply lighted the candles and gone on with 
 his duty. 
 
 "Duty is the sublimest word in our language," he 
 had declared long before, and by it as a pilot-star he 
 ever steered his steadfast course, abiding with calm 
 satisfaction whatever issue God decreed. 
 
 "We are conscious that we have humbly tried to do 
 our duty," he said, about a year after the war; "we 
 may, therefore, with calm satisfaction trust in God 
 and leave results to Him." 
 
66 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 In this devotion to duty and calm reliance on God 
 lay the secret of his Hfe. The same spirit animated 
 his great Heutenant. ''Duty belongs to us, conse- 
 quences belong to God," said Jackson. The same 
 spirit animated the men who followed them. It was 
 the teaching of the Southern home which produced 
 the type of character, the deep foundations of which 
 were devotion to duty and reliance on God. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
 RESOURCES 
 
 And now, dealing with the fruits of character, we 
 come to the proposition, whether Lee was, as some 
 have claimed, a great captain only for defensive op- 
 erations, or was a great captain without reservation 
 or limitation — one of the great captains of history 
 whose genius was equal to every exigency of war to 
 which human genius may rise. 
 
 The question involved is of his greatness both as a 
 soldier and as a man. And to some extent it reaches 
 far beyond the confines of the South and involves the 
 basic traits of race and of civilization. It was nobly 
 said by Mr. Charles Francis Adams, Sr., to whom almost 
 as much as to Lincoln or Grant the final result of the 
 war was due, when, as the representative of the United 
 States in England, he was challenged on an occasion 
 with the argument that the armies of the South had 
 defeated the armies of the North, and was asked what 
 he had to say about it: ''That they also are my coun- 
 tr3anen." Thus, Lee's genius and Lee's fame are the 
 possession of the whole country and the whole race, 
 which his virtue honored. 
 
 And first, in weighing his abilities as a captain, 
 we may ask: What constitutes a great captain? The 
 
 67 
 
68 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 question takes us far into the records of both war 
 and peace. To most men the answer will come by 
 the process of recalling the few — the very few — whom 
 history has by universal consent placed in the first 
 rank. They are Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Frede- 
 rick, and Napoleon, with Cromwell, Turenne, Eugene, 
 Gustavus, Marlborough, Washington, Wellington in 
 a class so close to them in fame as to leave in 
 doubt the rank to which at least one or two of them 
 should be assigned. And on their heels crowd a con- 
 course of captains great and victorious, yet easily 
 distinguishable from the first, if confusingly close on 
 the others. 
 
 Napoleon reckoned as his masters for constant study 
 the first four, and Gustavus, Turenne, and Eugene. 
 
 Among the modern captains stand two conspicuous 
 Americans : first, Washington, whose greatness proved 
 equal to every exaction, and who gave promise that he 
 would have commanded successfully under all condi- 
 tions that might have arisen ; and, secondly, the pereist- 
 ent, indomitable Grant, victor of Vicksburg, Missionary 
 Ridge, and Appomattox, not so brilliant as Marlbor- 
 ough or Frederick, for no flashing stroke of genius 
 like Blenheim or Leuthen adorned his record, but 
 able, resourceful, constant, indomitable, like Scipio 
 or Cromwell. 
 
 What placed those few men of the first rank before 
 all others? Not final success. For though success 
 final and absolute crowned most of them, final and 
 irrevocable defeat was the last reward of others, and 
 these the greatest: Hannibal and Napoleon. Such 
 
RESOURCES 69 
 
 rank, then, was won notwithstanding ultimate defeat, 
 and in reckoning its elements, final success bears no 
 essential part. 
 
 Studying these captains closely, we discern in all 
 certain gifts divided as they were by centuries and 
 by the equally vast gulf of racial differences. First, 
 imagination — the divine imagination to conceive a 
 great cause and the means to support it. It may be 
 to conquer the world, or Rome, or Europe. I conceive 
 that it was this supreme gift that led Alexander to 
 sleep with the casket-set of the Iliad under his pillow 
 beside his dagger, and to declare them the best com- 
 pendium of the soldier's art. 
 
 Next, there must be the comprehensive grasp that 
 seizes and holds firmly great campaigns in their com- 
 pleteness, together with the mastery of every detail in 
 their execution, both great and small. There must be 
 incarnate energy; a tireless mind in a tireless body, 
 informed with zeal; the mental, moral, and physical 
 courage in complete and overpowering combination 
 to compel men to obedience, instant and loyal, un- 
 der all conditions whatsoever; to inspire them with 
 new forces and endow them with the power to carry 
 out orders through every possible chance and change. 
 These, taken all together, give the grand strategy. Its 
 foundation is the combination in a brave soldier of 
 a rare imagination and of a rarer intellect. No 
 amount of fighting power or of capacity for calling 
 it forth in others proves this endowment. In the Na- 
 poleonic wars, '^Ney and Blucher," says Henderson, 
 ''were probably the best fighting generals of France 
 
70 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 and Prussia. But neither could be trusted to conduct 
 a campaign." ^ 
 
 Then there must be the supreme constancy to with- 
 stand every shock of surprise or defeat without a 
 tremor or a doubt, before which mere courage becomes 
 paltry, and constant, imminent danger dwindles to a 
 bare incident, serving only to quicken the spirit and 
 fan its last ember to a consuming flame. 
 
 With these must exist an intuitive and profound 
 knowledge of human nature and of men, singly and 
 in combination ; power to divine the adversary's every 
 design, and to fathom his deepest intention; equal to 
 every exigency, amounting to inspiration ; all culminat- 
 ing in the power to foresee, to prepare for, divine, and 
 seize the critical moment, and, mastering Fate, win 
 where others would lose, or, having lost, save where 
 others would be destroyed. Then there must be the 
 intuitive knowledge of men and the capacity to pick 
 and inspire and use them. There must be a profound 
 and exact knowledge of the art of war as practised by 
 the great masters of all ages. And finally, fusing all 
 in one complete and harmonious whole, crowning this 
 whole with the one final and absolute essential must be 
 the God-given personal endowment of genius, undefined, 
 indefinable; unmeasured, immeasurable; sometimes 
 flaming at the very first, sometimes slumbering through 
 years to burst forth at the moment of supreme crisis; 
 sometimes hardly recognized until its light is caught 
 down the long perspective of the years, but, when 
 caught, recognized as genius. 
 
 * Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," I, p. 93. 
 
RESOURCES 71 
 
 Without this a man may be a great captain, a vic- 
 torious captain; but not the greatest or among the 
 greatest. 
 
 Thus, we come to the measure of Lee's greatness as a 
 captain. 
 
 The measure of a captain's abihties must rest, at 
 last, on his achievement as gauged by his resources. 
 
 Let us see what Lee accompHshed with his means; 
 then we shall be the better able to reckon the measure 
 of his success. Let us turn aside for a moment for 
 the consideration of a few figures. They are a dry 
 and unpalatable diet, but, after all, it was to the 
 science of arithmetic that the South yielded at the 
 end. 
 
 The South began the war with a white population 
 of about 5,500,000. Of these her military population 
 numbered about 1,065,000,^ but one-fifth of these were 
 inhabitants of the mountain regions, who warmly es- 
 poused the side of the Union. 
 
 The North began the war with a white population 
 of about 22,000,000. Of these her fighting men whom 
 she could call into the field numbered about 3,900,000.^ 
 The South enlisted at most about 900,000. The North 
 enrolled of her fighting men about 1,700,000,^ besides 
 which she enlisted of foreigners about 700,000 and of 
 negroes about 186,000. 
 
 ^ Besides these she had a servile population of about 3,500,000, of 
 which a certain proportion were available for raising subsistence for 
 the army. 
 
 ^ Besides, of the negroes, the North drew into her armies about 
 186,000, they being the most able-bodied of this class. 
 
 ^ Cf. "Numbers and Losses in the Civil War in America," pp. 40 and 
 50, Colonel Thomas L. Livermore. (Houghton, MifHin & Co.) 
 
72 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 The North had an organized National Government, 
 with all departments — State, War, Navy, Treasury, 
 and Justice — perfectly organized and equipped, while 
 the South not only had to organize her Confederated 
 Government, but fought on a principle of States' Rights, 
 which left to each State a power capable of neutralizing 
 the general government at the most critical junctures. 
 The North had about $11,000,000,000 of taxable values 
 as against about $5,000,000,000 in the South, of which 
 $2,000,000,000 was represented by the slaves. The 
 South had the advantage of the inner line; but she 
 was not only assailable by sea, she was divided by nu- 
 merous great rivers accessible to the enemy's fleet, and 
 she was cut in half by a great mountain region which 
 stretched like a vast bar across her entire extent, and 
 was occupied by a brave and bitterly hostile population 
 that furnished to the Union armies some 180,000 fight- 
 ing men. Had this population sided with the South, 
 the advantage to her would have been immeasura- 
 ble. Maryland and Kentucky would have joined the 
 Confederacy; West Virginia and East Tennessee and 
 all that they represented would have flung into the 
 Southern scale, instead of into the Northern, all their 
 weight, and possibly the whole preponderance of 
 weight might have been shifted. This mountain re- 
 gion, extended through the South, furnished not only 
 a great recruiting ground for the Union, but a refuge 
 for her armies and a territory as ready for her occu- 
 pation as Pennsylvania or Minnesota. Without this 
 great Union region, McClellan might have ended his 
 days in obscurity without crossing the Kanawha — 
 
RESOURCES 73 
 
 Missionary Ridge and Chattanooga could hardly have 
 become battle-fields, and the March to the Sea would 
 probably never have begun. 
 
 The North had by far the best means of transpor- 
 tation, a large percentage of the efficient railways, and 
 the means of railway equipment. 
 
 In addition to this, the North had nearly all the man- 
 ufactures, and possessed a superiority in equipment that 
 is incalculable. When the war broke out, the South 
 could scarcely manufacture a tin cup or a frying-pan, 
 a railway iron, a wool-card, or a carpenter's tool. In 
 the possession of arms the North was as superior to the 
 South as she was in other manufactured material. This 
 was shown at the first battle of Manassas, when McDow- 
 ell's guns, beyond the range of Beauregard's smooth- 
 bores, hammered to pieces the Confederate left. The 
 South improved its stock of guns that day, adding 
 before night 25 cannon to their store ; but she was gen- 
 erally deficient in equipment to the very end. The re- 
 peating carbines of the Federal cavalry later in the war 
 multiplied their force many fold. General Gorgas, the 
 chief of ordnance of the Confederate States, found within 
 the limits of the Confederacy but ''15,000 rifles and 
 120,000 inferior muskets, with some old flint-muskets 
 at Richmond, and Hall's rifles and carbines at Baton 
 Rouge. There was no powder except small quantities 
 at Baton Rouge and at Mount Vernon, Ala. There 
 was very little artillery and no cavalry arms or equip- 
 ments." General Johnston said of Lee, that ''he cre- 
 ated the ordnance department out of nothing." The 
 day after the victory of First Manassas, there was not 
 
74 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 powder enough left in Virginia to fight another battle. 
 The North possessed nearly the whole old navy, ships 
 and men, the naval forces, and the population from 
 which the seamen were drawn. And finally, and above 
 all, the North had the ear of the world. 
 
 With this superiority she was enabled to blockade 
 the South and lock her within her own confines, while 
 the world was open to her, and she could await, with 
 what patience she could command, the fatal result 
 of ''the policy of attrition." 
 
 No adequate account of the value of the navy to the 
 Union side has ever been given, or, at least, has ever 
 reached the public ear. The navy turned the scale in the 
 war. Had the navy been on the side of the Confederacy 
 instead of on the Union side, it is as certain that the 
 South would have made good her position as is any 
 other fact established by reason. The navy with its 200,- 
 000 men enabled the Union not only to seal up the South 
 against all aid from without, but to penetrate into the 
 heart of the Confederacy, command her interior waters, 
 and form at once the base ofsupplies for the Union armies 
 when advancing, and their protection when defeated.* 
 
 It is not meant to imply that figures give an exact 
 statement of the problem that was worked out during 
 the war; but they cast a light upon it which contributes 
 greatly to its just comprehension. 
 
 In round numbers the South had on her muster-rolls, 
 from first to last, less than 900,000 men. And in this 
 
 * Cf. Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," I, chap. V, p. 113. "Judi- 
 cious, indeed," he says, "was the policy which at the very outset of the 
 war brought the tremendous pressure of the sea-power to bear against 
 the South." 
 
RESOURCES 75 
 
 list the South had all she could muster; for, at the 
 last; she had enlisted in her reserves all men between 
 sixteen and sixty years. In round numbers the North 
 had 2,700,000, and besides, had all Europe as her re- 
 cruiting field/ 
 
 When the war closed, the South had in the field 
 throughout her territory but 175,000 men opposed to 
 the armies of the North, uumbering 980,000 men.^ 
 
 ' Colonel Thomas L. Livermore, of Boston, author of the notable 
 work, "Numbers and Losses," in a letter to the writer says: "I sup- 
 pose that it would be safe to assume that eighty per cent (of the en- 
 listments) would hold in all the Northern States. This would give 
 about 2,234,000 individuals in the army. The Record and Business 
 Bureau, in its memorandum of 1896, computed the average estimates 
 of re-enlistments by different authorities at 543,393." 
 
 The Confederate forces he estimates at "1,239,000, the number 
 shown by the census to have been within the conscript age, less the 
 number of exempts (partly estimated and partly recorded), and an 
 estimate of the natural deaths; or at about 1,000,000 estimated pro- 
 portionally to the killed and 'wounded in the two armies." It will be 
 seen that his first estimate above takes no account of the numbers of 
 Southerners in the mountain regions who sided with the Union. 
 
 General Marcus J. Wright places the total number of the Southern 
 troops at less than 700,000. The total number within the conscript 
 age he places at 1,065,000. 
 
 Henderson, in his "Life of Stonewall Jackson," estimates them at 
 about 900,000. 
 
 I have felt that possibly this trained and impartial soldier of another 
 nation might have arrived at a fairer estimate than any one on this side 
 the Atlantic. 
 
 For calculations of Colonel Livermore and General Wright, see 
 Appendix A. 
 
 ^ Of 346,744 Federal soldiers examined for military service after 
 March 6, 1863, sixty-nine per cent were Americans, the rest were for- 
 eigners. In the 35th Mass. Regt., which, says Henderson, may be 
 taken as a typical Northern regiment, of 495 recruits received during 
 1864, 400 were German immigrants. (Henderson's "Life of Stonewall 
 Jackson," 1st ed., I, p. 466.) 
 
 The South, or rather those orators who stood as the economists of 
 the South, had supposed that her cotton and tobacco were so necessary 
 to the rest of the world that the European nations would take her part, 
 out of plain consideration for their own welfare. It was a great error. 
 The value of the cotton crop exported in 1860 was $202,741,351. In 
 
76 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Toward the close of the war the South was well- 
 nigh stripped naked, and for what was left she had no 
 means of transportation. She had no nitre for her 
 powder, no brass for her percussion caps — the very- 
 kettles and stills from the plantations had been used — 
 and when it was necessary to repair one railroad as a 
 line for transportation, to meet the emergency the best 
 rails were taken up from another road less important. 
 
 The commissariat and the quartermaster's depart- 
 ment were bad enough, and Lee's army starved to a 
 shadow. Study of the matter will, however, convince 
 any one that at the very last it was rather owing to the 
 desperate condition of the lines of transportation than 
 to mere inefficiency of the conamissariat and the quar- 
 termaster's department, to which it has been so often 
 charged, that Lee failed to carry out his final plan of 
 effecting a junction with Johnston.^ 
 
 In fact, from the first a considerable proportion of 
 the equipment of the Southern armies and all of their 
 best equipment had been captured by them on the 
 field of battle. So regular had been their application 
 to this source of supply that, says Henderson in his 
 "Life of Stonewall Jackson," "the dishonesty of the 
 Northern contractors was a constant source of com- 
 plaint among the soldiers of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia." 
 
 1861 it was $42,000,000. In 1862 it was $4,000,000. After that it 
 was next to nothing; yet it was the principal source of revenue of the 
 government with wliich to purchase such supplies and munitions of 
 war in Europe as were brought in by blockade-runners. 
 
 ' I can remember my surprise as a boy at seeing wagons hauling 
 straw from my home to Petcrsl)urg, sixty-odd miles, through roads the 
 like of which, I trust in Grace, do not now exist in the United States. 
 
RESOURCES 77 
 
 An English soldier and critic, Colonel Lawler, writ- 
 ing in Blackwood's Magazine, has declared his doubt 
 whether any general of modern history could have sus- 
 tained for four years — a longer time nowadays than 
 Hannibal's fifteen years in Italy in times past — a war 
 in which, possessed of scanty resources himself, he had 
 against him so enormous an aggregate of men, horses, 
 ships, and supplies. It is an under, rather than an 
 over, estimate to state that during the first two years 
 the odds, all told, were ten to one, during the last two 
 years, twenty to one, against the Confederates/ 
 
 Truly, then, said General Lee to General Early, in 
 the winter of 1865-66: "It will be difficult to get the 
 world to understand the odds against which we fought." 
 It is known by some in the South — the survivors of 
 those armies who tracked the frozen roads of Virginia 
 with bleeding feet, whose breakfast was often nothing 
 but water from a roadside well, and whose dinner 
 nothing but a tightened belt. Some knew it who knew 
 the war-swept South in their boyhood, where the threat 
 was that a crow flying over it should have to carry 
 his rations, and the fact was more terrible than the 
 prophecy. 
 
 But it is well for the race to make the world know it. 
 It is well that the truth should be revealed. 
 
 In the foregoing computation it is true enough to 
 say that we have not reckoned all the resources of the 
 South. She had Lee, and she had Jackson ; she had the 
 men who followed them, and the women who sustained 
 those men. "Lee and Jackson," says Henderson, in his 
 
 ' Jones's "Lee," p. 75. 
 
78 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 ''Life of Stonewall Jackson," ''were worth 200,000 meii 
 to any armies they commanded." Quoting Moltke's 
 saying, that the junction of two armies on the field 
 of battle is the highest achievement of military gen- 
 ius, he says in conament: "Tried by this test alone, 
 Lee stands out as one of the greatest soldiers of all 
 time. Not only against Pope, but against McClellan 
 at Gaines's Mill, against Burnside at Fredericksburg, 
 and against Hooker at Chancellorsville, he succeeded 
 in carrying out the operations of which Moltke speaks." 
 But this is not all. No reckoning of the opposing 
 forces can be made without taking into account the 
 men who followed Lee and Jackson, and the women 
 who stayed at home and sustained them. No people 
 ever gave more promptly to their country's cause than 
 did the old American element of the North, or would 
 have been readier, had occasion arisen, to suffer on 
 their country's behalf. But it is no disparagement of 
 them to state the simple fact that the war did not 
 reach them as a people as it reached the people of the 
 South. Where a class gave at the North, the whole 
 population of the South gave; whereas a fraction suf- 
 fered at the North, the entire population of the South 
 suffered. The rich grew to be as the poor, and, to- 
 gether with the poor, learned to know actual hunger. 
 The delicately nurtured came to be hewers of wood 
 and drawers of water. War in its most brutal and 
 terrible form came to be known all over the land: 
 known in disease without medicines; in life without the 
 common necessaries of life ; in ravaged districts, bom- 
 barded and blackened towns, burnt homesteads, ter- 
 
RESOURCES 79 
 
 rorized and starving women and children. This the 
 South came to know throughout a large extent of her 
 territory. Yet, through it all her people bore them- 
 selves with a constancy that must ever be a monument 
 to them, and that even in the breast of those who were 
 children in that stirring period must ever keep alive 
 the hallowed memory of her undying resolution. 
 
 "All honor and praise to the fair Southern women!" 
 declared a Richmond paper in the closing days of 
 1862. ''May the future historian, when he comes to 
 write of this war, fail not to award them their due 
 share of praise." No history of this war could be 
 written without such due award. It is not too much 
 to say that as brave and constant as were the intrepid 
 soldiery that with steadily wasting ranks followed 
 Lee from Seven Pines to Appomattox, even more 
 brave and constant were the women who stayed at 
 home. Gentle and simple, they gave their husbands, 
 their brothers, and their sons to the cause of the South, 
 sorrowing chiefly that they themselves were too feeble 
 to stand at their side. Hungering in body and heart, 
 they bore with more than a soldier's courage, more 
 than a soldier's hardship, and to the last, undaunted 
 and dauntless, gave them a new courage as with tear- 
 dimmed eyes they sustained them in the darkest hours 
 of their despondency and defeat. 
 
 Such were among the elements which even in the 
 South's darkest hour Lee had at his back. From such 
 elements Lee himself had sprung, and in his character 
 he was their supreme expression. 
 
CHAPTER V 
 
 LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 
 
 And now, bearing clearly in mind what his resources 
 were, we may approach the question intelligently, 
 whether Lee was, as charged by some, great only in 
 defence and when on interior lines and behind breast- 
 works, or was really the greatest soldier of his time, 
 and, perhaps, of the English-speaking race. 
 
 Lee was now fifty-four years old, having reached this 
 age without higher rank than that of colonel, the age 
 at which most of the great captains have won their 
 laurels and laid down their swords. But he was yet in 
 the prime of physical and intellectual manhood. His 
 temperate habits had borne rich fruit, and possibly in 
 neither army had he his superior in bodily or mental 
 force or endurance. He was ''as ruddy as young 
 David from the sheepfolds," says one who saw him then 
 for the first time. Immediately on his resignation 
 from the army of the United States, Lee was ten- 
 dered by the governor of Virginia the command of the 
 forces of the State, which was in the throes of prepara- 
 tion to repel the invasion of her territory, and on the 
 23d of April he received, at the hands of the president 
 of the State convention, the commission of major- 
 general of the Virginia forces. It was an impressive 
 occasion, for the brief ceremony took place in the 
 
 80 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 81 
 
 presence of the convention which had so long stood 
 against secession, but had declared with one voice 
 against tolerating invasion. Virginia was there to do 
 him honor. The president of the convention, the Hon. 
 John Janney, in a brief speech, recalling the example of 
 Washington, announced to him the fact that the con- 
 vention had by a unanimous vote expressed their con- 
 viction that among living Virginians he was '^ first in 
 war"; that they prayed he might so conduct the opera- 
 tions committed to his charge that it should soon be 
 said of him that he was "first in peace," and that 
 when that time came, he should have earned the still 
 prouder distinction of being "first in the hearts of his 
 countrymen." He further recalled to him that Wash- 
 ington in his will had given his swords to his favorite 
 nephews, with an injunction that they should never be 
 drawn from their scabbards except in self-defence or 
 in defence of the rights and liberties of their country. 
 
 He said in closing: "Yesterday your mother Vir- 
 ginia placed her sword in your hand, upon the implied 
 condition that we know you will keep to the letter and 
 in spirit, that you will draw it only in defence, and that 
 you will fall with it in your hand rather than the ob- 
 ject for which it was placed there should fail." 
 
 To this Lee replied in the following simple words: 
 "Mr. President and Gentlemen of the Convention: Pro- 
 foundly impressed with the solemnity of the occasion, 
 for which I must say I was not prepared, I accept the 
 position assigned me by your partiality. I would have 
 much preferred that your choice had fallen upon an 
 abler man. Trusting in Almighty God, an approving 
 
82 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 conscience, and the aid of my fellow citizens, I devote 
 myself to the service of my native State, in whose be- 
 half alone will I ever again draw my sword." 
 
 Thus, passing into the service of his native State in the 
 dire hour of her need, Lee was appointed a major- 
 general of Virginia's forces, to resist the invasion of 
 Virginia's soil, and it was not until the end of August, 
 when war was flagrant throughout the land, and 
 Virginia had been actually invaded, that he became 
 an officer of the Confederate States. Lee set to work 
 promptly to place Virginia in a posture of defence. He 
 established camps for instruction, and soon had some 
 30,000 men under drill, who in a few months increased 
 to 60,000. 
 
 On the evening of the day on which Lee received, at 
 the hands of the president of the Virginia convention, 
 his commission as commander-in-chief of the naval and 
 military forces of the commonwealth, an occasion pre- 
 sented itself for him to show the nobleness of his char- 
 acter, and he met it with the unselfishness which 
 was the mark of the man. Among the spectators of 
 the ceremony that day was the Hon. Alexander H. 
 Stephens, the Vice-President of the Confederate States. 
 He had come to Richmond for "the purpose of induc- 
 ing Virginia to enter the Confederacy," which was "to 
 undo, so far as General Lee was concerned, the work 
 which had been that morning performed." "The mem- 
 bers of the convention," states Mr. Stephens, "had seen 
 at once that Lee was left out of the proposed compact 
 that was to make Virginia one of the Confederate 
 States, and I knew that one word, or even a look of 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 83 
 
 dissatisfaction from him would terminate the nego- 
 tiations with which I was intrusted. North Carolina 
 would act with Virginia, and either the border States 
 would protect our lines or the battle-field be moved 
 at once down to South Carolina and the borders 
 of Georgia." Accordingly, that evening Mr. Stephens 
 sought an interview with General Lee for the purpose 
 of making to him a '^ proposal that he resign, without 
 any compensation or promise therefor, the very honor 
 and rank he had that same morning received." 
 
 Surely Lee must have recalled the difference between 
 this proposal and the one which he had received hardly 
 a week before, when the command of the Union armies 
 had been tendered him; but if he did, he gave no sign 
 of it. " General Lee met me quietly, ' ' says Mr. Stephens, 
 '^understood the situation at once, and saw that he 
 alone stood between the Confederacy and his State. 
 . . . General Lee did not hesitate for one moment, and 
 while he saw that it would make matters worse to 
 throw up his commission, he declared that no personal 
 ambition or emolument should be considered or stand 
 in the way ! 
 
 ''I had admired him in the morning," adds Mr. 
 Stephens, ''but I took his hand that night at parting 
 with feelings of respect, and almost reverence never 
 yet effaced. I met him at times later, and he was 
 always the same Christian gentleman. 
 
 "Virginia became one of us, and the battle-field, as 
 all men know, and General Lee took subordinate posi- 
 tions which for a time placed him nearly out of sight." 
 
 On the 2d of May Lee wrote his wife: "I have just 
 
84 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 received Custis's letter of the 30th, inclosing the 
 acceptance of my resignation. It is stated it will take 
 effect on the 25th of April. I resigned on the 20th, 
 and wished it to take effect on that day. I cannot 
 consent to its running on further, and he must receive 
 no pay, if they tender it, beyond that day, but return 
 the whole if need be." 
 
 From Richmond, May 13, 1861, Lee wrote his wife: 
 ''Do not put faith in rumors of adjustment. I see 
 no prospect for it. It cannot be while passions on 
 both sides are so infuriated. Make your plans for sev- 
 eral years of war. If Virginia is invaded, which appears 
 to be designed, the main routes through the country 
 will, in all probability, be infested and passage inter- 
 rupted. I agree with you in thinking that the in- 
 flammatory articles in the papers do us much harm. I 
 object particularly to those in the Southern papers, 
 as I wish them to take a firm, dignified course, free 
 from bravado and boasting. The times are indeed ca- 
 lamitous. The brightness of God's countenance seems 
 turned from us, and its mercy stopped in its blissful 
 current. It may not always be so dark, and he may 
 in time pardon our sins and take us under his protec- 
 tion. Tell Custis* he must consult his own judgment, 
 reason, and conscience as to the course he may take. 
 I do not wish him to be guided by my wishes or ex- 
 ample. If I have done wrong, let him do better. The 
 present is a momentous question which every man 
 must settle for himself and upon principle. Our good 
 
 ' His SOD then a lieutenant in the Engineer Corps, United States 
 army. 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 85 
 
 Bishop Meade has just come in to see me. He opens 
 the convention to-morrow, and, I understood him to 
 say, would preach his fiftieth anniversary sermon. 
 God bless and guard you." 
 
 Immediately on the outbreak of war, Virginia, as an- 
 ticipated, became the battle ground. In June the Con- 
 federate Government moved its capital to Richmond, 
 and naturally the object of the Union Government be- 
 came the capture of that city. General Scott, indeed, 
 had an idea that the government should avail itself of 
 the strong Union sentiment throughout the North-west 
 and Central West, and, utilizing the Mississippi, should 
 send its army down that vast inland water-way and 
 seize New Orleans, thus cutting the Confederate South 
 in two at the outset. But the government, with its 
 seat at Washington, naturally thought otherwise, and 
 the necessary consequence was the invasion of Virginia. 
 The plan was to overrun this State and seize Rich- 
 mond, where the Confederate Government was now es- 
 tablishing its capital, and where the only important 
 factory of guns in the South (the Tredegar Iron Works) 
 was situated. By this plan Washington could be pro- 
 tected at the same time that the advance to over- 
 run Virginia was made. Accordingly, on the 21st of 
 May the government troops, to the number of some 
 11,000 men, crossed the Potomac, seized Alexandria, 
 and occupied the heights of Arlington, which they im- 
 mediately proceeded to fortify for permanent occupation, 
 with a view to pressing forward in obedience to the cry 
 which was now heard on all sides: ''On to Richmond!" 
 
 Three or four routes for the advance on Richmond 
 
86 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 presented themselves for consideration, following in 
 the main the several railroad lines which crossed Vir- 
 ginia, and offered lines of communication and means 
 of transportation. 
 
 The most direct route was by the Potomac to Acquia 
 Creek, some thirty-odd miles below Washington, and 
 thence along the Richmond and Fredericksburg Rail- 
 way by Fredericksburg and Hanover Junction. This 
 was the route which was attempted two years later by 
 Burnside with such disastrous consequences at Freder- 
 icksburg, and still later with variations by Hooker 
 and Grant. Another route was by the Potomac and 
 the Chesapeake Bay, either to the mouth of the Rap- 
 pahannock, or to Fortress Monroe, at the mouth of 
 the James, and thence up the York or the James to 
 a point comparatively near to Richmond. This last 
 was the route followed by McClellan in the spring of 
 1862. The third was along the line of the Orange and 
 Alexandria Railroad — the present Southern Railway — 
 running south-westerly from Alexandria by Manassas 
 Junction, about thirty miles off (where a branch line 
 ran westwardly through the Blue Ridge into the Shen- 
 andoah Valley), and Culpeper Court House to Gordons- 
 ville. Here it met almost at right angles the Virginia 
 Central Railroad, running from Richmond by Hanover 
 Junction to Gordonsville, and on by Charlottesville to 
 Staunton, in the Valley of Virginia — the upper Shenan- 
 doah Valley. At Charlottesville another railway line 
 ran southwardly to Lynchburg, on the upper James, 
 and on through South-western Virginia to Tennessee. 
 The fourth route, the longest and least feasible, lay 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 87 
 
 along the railway from Harper's Ferry, the point at 
 which the Potomac breaks through the BUie Ridge, to 
 Winchester, and thence through the fertile Valby of 
 Virginia to Staunton, on the Virginia Central Railway. 
 
 Thus, it will be seen that the only all-rail route to 
 Richmond at the time lay along the Orange and Alex- 
 andria Railway, and that the two principal points 
 thereon were Manassas Junction (where the branch 
 road ran through Manassas Gap into the Shenandoah 
 Valley) and Gordonsville, where the road joined the 
 Virginia Central Railway, the direct route from Rich- 
 mond to both the upper Shenandoah Valley and the 
 South-west. This route had the additional advan- 
 tages that it ran through a fertile and open country, 
 with comparatively good roads, and with streams less 
 difficult to cross than lower down, where the Rappa- 
 hannock and the North Anna presented serious ob- 
 stacles if properly defended. 
 
 Up to this time Colonel Thomas J. Jackson had 
 commanded the raw contingent of Southern troops 
 who held Harper's Ferry at the point where the Shen- 
 andoah joins the Potomac and, thus reinforced, the 
 latter breaks through the Blue Ridge Mountains. 
 
 Here had been the arsenal which John Brown had 
 crossed into Virginia to seize in October, 1859, in his 
 mad attempt to arouse the slaves to insurrection. It 
 was still considered a strategic point, and on the 23d 
 of May, General Joseph E. Johnston was sent to take 
 command of it, and of the Army of the Shenandoah, as 
 it was called. He had been a classmate of Lee at West 
 Point, and had served with such distinction in the war 
 
88 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 with Mexico that General Scott is said to have char- 
 acterized him as "a great soldier." Fitz Lee, in his 
 admirable ''Life of General Lee," says of him that he 
 became "distinguished before his beard grew," and 
 that ''his decision to fight under the flag of the South 
 was hailed with delight by the Southern people." 
 
 Against him now was opposed Major-General Robert 
 Patterson, of Pennsylvania, also a veteran, who had 
 been placed by General Scott in command of the De- 
 partment of Washington. Assisted by such able 
 officers as Fitz John Porter, A. E. Burnside, George A. 
 Thomas, and many others who later won high and 
 deserved distinction, he had been busy organizing and 
 equipping an army intended to seize Harper's Ferry, 
 sweep up the valley of the Shenandoah, and, crossing 
 the Blue Ridge, drive Beauregard from Manassas and 
 seize this strategic point. He secured Harper's Ferry 
 without a struggle, having, by an advance with the 
 evident design of crossing the Potomac at Williamsport 
 and flanking Johnston by marching to Martinsburg, 
 forced him to abandon Harper's Ferry as untenable. 
 Johnston posted himself at a point called Bunker 
 Hill, with a view to fighting Patterson on selected 
 ground if the chance offered before McClellan, who was 
 reported to be advancing from Western Virginia, could 
 join him. Patterson was in the act of crossing the 
 Potomac when he received an order from General 
 Scott to forward to Washington at once all the regular 
 troops under his command, together with Colonel A. 
 E. Burnside's picked Rhode Island regiment. Gen- 
 eral Scott for good reason, as appeared to him, had 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 89 
 
 changed the plan by which he had proposed to fight 
 the first pitched battle in the valley of the Shenandoah, 
 and now planned to fight first at Manassas, while 
 Patterson should hold Johnston in the valley. 
 
 The commander assigned to defend this important 
 point by the Southern government was General Beau- 
 regard, a Louisianian of French extraction, as the name 
 implies, and a gallant and able soldier. He had com- 
 manded at Charleston at the outbreak of hostilities, 
 where he had shown ability both as an officer and as an 
 engineer, and he was now the idol of the Southern 
 people, and was soon to increase this measure of ap- 
 probation by his victory on the plain of Manassas. 
 
 A story used to be told, after the war, of some one 
 having spoken to a Creole gentleman of New Orleans 
 of Lee in terms of warm praise, and having received 
 the reply: "Yes, yes — I t'ink I have hear' Beauregard 
 speak well of him." 
 
 It was apparent to Lee and the other trained sol- 
 diers that the first serious attempt of the Union gen- 
 erals would be to seize the strategic point presented by 
 the junction at Manassas of the Orange and Alexandria 
 Railway and of the railway running from Manassas to 
 the Shenandoah Valley, where Johnston was opposing 
 Patterson. Every effort was therefore made to pre- 
 pare for the battle to be fought here. And to this Lee 
 bent all his energies, organizing, equipping, and for- 
 warding troops as fast as possible. Other points also 
 had to be guarded. Norfolk, where Huger commanded, 
 and the Peninsula between the York and the James 
 River, where Magruder commanded, both had to be 
 
90 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 protected; but the chief anxiety at this time centred 
 on Manassas. Lee was the third in rank of the major- 
 generals appointed by Mr. Davis, and his first service 
 was to put Virginia in a posture of defence. That he 
 promptly effected this was shown on the plain of Ma- 
 nassas, on July 2L 
 
 The troops organized for this movement were pos- 
 sibly about equal in number on both sides — some 
 30,000 men. With the invasion of Virginia the govern- 
 ment at Washington had created what was known as 
 the Department of Virginia, and to the command of 
 this department was assigned General Irwin McDowell, 
 a native of Ohio, of Virginian descent, and a gallant 
 officer and gentleman. He laid out his plan of cam- 
 paign to the satisfaction of his superiors in Washing- 
 ton, which was — to march on Manassas and, by turning 
 Beauregard's left flank, manoeuvre him out of his 
 position. He was to have not less than 30,000 men, 
 and the Southern troops in the Shenandoah Valley 
 were to be held there by Patterson's force. This hav- 
 ing been provided for, as was believed, McDowell, on 
 the 16th of July, with entire confidence put his army 
 in motion for Manassas, where his old classmate and 
 friend, Beauregard, awaited him with equal confidence 
 in the issue. And here, on the uplands above the 
 little stream known as Bull Run, the first great battle 
 on Virginia soil was fought out, on the 21st of July, 
 five days later. 
 
 Everything went with McDowell like clockwork, 
 only it was slow clockwork. Setting out from his 
 camp at Alexandria on the 16th, he reached Centreville 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 91 
 
 the following day, and instead of pressing forward, he 
 spent two days in reconnoissances, and did not attack 
 Beauregard until the morning of the 21st. For a time 
 after the battle began the advantage was greatly in his 
 favor, and by three o'clock he was pressing the defen- 
 sive force hard. 
 
 One thing, however, had not been provided for prop- 
 erly. When McDowell laid his plan of campaign be- 
 fore his superiors in Washington, General Scott had 
 promised him that if Johnston, lying about Winchester, 
 in the Shenandoah Valley beyond the Blue Ridge 
 Mountains, some fifty miles away, attempted to rein- 
 force Beauregard, he should find Patterson hanging on 
 his heels. But he did not reckon with the full ability 
 of Johnston or his lieutenants, Jackson and Stuart. It 
 had already been decided in Richmond, where Lee was 
 at work, with the chessboard before him, what moves 
 and countermoves would be made, and no sooner was 
 McDowell on the march than steps were taken to meet 
 the shock of the approaching encounter with the full 
 force of the Confederate armies within call. General 
 Holmes, with his brigade backed by a battery of artil- 
 lery and cavalry, was ordered up from Acquia Creek, 
 thirty miles to the south-east, and General Johnston 
 was also ordered to slip away from Patterson, and, 
 crossing the Blue Ridge, join Beauregard. Holmes 
 arrived duly, and Johnston arrived on the 20th from 
 the Shenandoah Valley, with the brigades of Bee, 
 Bartow, and Jackson, his other brigades, under Kirby 
 Smith and Elzey, arriving next day. Stuart also ap- 
 peared on time after a forced march across the 
 
92 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 mountains. The numbers on both sides were about 
 equal, but the arrival of this fresh force of Johns- 
 ton's in the nick of time turned the scale. The ad- 
 vance of the Federals against the Confederate left 
 was first checked, then turned into a repulse, and 
 then into a decisive defeat, which soon became a 
 disastrous rout. 
 
 Unfortunately for the Southern cause the victory 
 of Manassas was not followed up. The magnitude of 
 the disaster was fully recognized by the North, and 
 President Lincoln issued a call the next day for 
 500,000 troops, and summoned from Western Vir- 
 ginia, where he had displayed qualities of a high 
 order, the most promising young general in the 
 service, George B. McClellan. But at the South it 
 appeared as if it were generally thought that this vic- 
 tory had decided the issue of the war. The simple 
 fact, however, was that the victorious army was with- 
 out the necessary equipment to take the field. 
 
 Although Lee was not present in this great first 
 battle on Virginia soil, his hand was clearly shown in 
 the provision made for the crisis, and although he gave 
 no outward sign by which it could be known, he must 
 have inwardly chafed at the fate which at this critical 
 period consigned him to the bureau service of an ad- 
 jutant's office. 
 
 On June 9, 1861, he wrote to his wife: "You may be 
 aware that the Confederate Government is established 
 here. Yesterday I turned over to it the command of 
 the military and naval forces of the State, in accord- 
 ance with the proclamation of the governor, under an 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 93 
 
 agreement between the State and the Confederate 
 States. I do not know what my position will be. I 
 should like to retire to private life, so that I could be 
 with you and the children; but if I can be of service 
 to the State or her cause, I must continue. Mr. Davis 
 and all his Cabinet are here." And two days after- 
 ward he displays his fortitude and his piety when he 
 tells her: "I am sorry to learn that you are anxious 
 and uneasy about passing events. We cannot change 
 or hinder them, and it is not the part of wisdom to be 
 annoyed by them. In this time of great suffering to 
 the State and country, our private distresses we must 
 bear with resignation, and not aggravate them by re- 
 pining, trusting to a kind and merciful God to overrule 
 them for our good." 
 
 Lee was now an officer without a conmiand, or, pos- 
 sibly, even without rank.^ ' Nominally," says Mr. Alex- 
 ander H. Stephens, ''General Lee lost nothing; but 
 practically, for the time being, he lost everything. The 
 government moved to Richmond, and Mr. Davis di- 
 rected General Lee to retain his command of the Vir- 
 ginia troops, which was really to make him recruiting 
 and drill inspector. ..." 
 
 On June 14 Lee wrote to his wife from Richmond, 
 where he was engaged in the important but somewhat 
 humdrum labor of providing an army for another to 
 command: ''My movements are very uncertain, and I 
 wish to take the field as soon as certain arrangements 
 can be made. I may go at any moment to any point 
 where it may be necessary." 
 
 On the 12th of July he wrote her again: "I am very 
 
94 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 anxious to get into the field, but am detained by matters 
 beyond my control. I have never heard of the assign- 
 ment to which you allude — of commander-in-chief of 
 the Southern army — nor have I any expectation or 
 wish for it. President Davis holds that position. I 
 have been laboring to prepare and get into the field the 
 Virginia troops to strengthen those from other States 
 and the threatened commands of Johnston, Beauregard, 
 Huger, Garnett, etc. Where I shall go I do not know, 
 as that will depend on President Davis." 
 
 Was ever soldier more unselfish! 
 
 Lee was not one of those who had any delusions as 
 to the magnitude of the struggle, or as to Manassas 
 having decided the fortunes of the war. On July 27, 
 six days after the battle, he wrote Mrs. Lee again from 
 Richmond: "That, indeed, was a glorious victory, and 
 has lightened the pressure upon us amazingly. Do not 
 grieve for the brave dead; but sorrow for those they 
 have left behind — friends, relatives, and families. The 
 former are at rest ; the latter must suffer. The battle 
 will be repeated there in greater force. I hope God 
 will again smile on us, and strengthen our hearts and 
 arms. I wished to partake in the former struggle, and 
 am mortified at my absence. But the President thought 
 it more important that I should be here. I could not 
 have done as well as has been done, but I could have 
 helped and taken part in a struggle for my home and 
 neighborhood. So the work is done, I care not by 
 whom it is done. I leave to-morrow for the army in 
 Western Virginia." 
 
 Indeed, it is stated that so far was General Lee 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 95 
 
 from being influenced by any considerations of a self- 
 ish nature, that when Virginia joined the Southern 
 Confederacy and left him without rank, he seriously 
 contemplated enlisting in the company of cavalry 
 commanded by his son/ General Long, his military 
 secretary, gives this account of his first interview with 
 General Lee. Having resigned his commission in the 
 United States army, Long reported to Richmond, in 
 company with three other officers. Colonels Loring and 
 Stevenson, and Lieutenant Deshler, who had likewise 
 resigned, and waited upon General Lee to offer their 
 services to him. He was struck, he states, with 
 the ease and grace of his bearing, and his courteous and 
 mild but decided manner; and the high opinion he 
 then formed of him was fully sustained in the inti- 
 mate relations which afterward existed between them. 
 Though at that time he had attained the age of fifty- 
 four years, his erect and muscular frame, firm step, and 
 the animated expression of his eye made him appear 
 much younger. He exhibited no external signs of his 
 rank, his dress being a plain suit of gray. His office was 
 simply furnished with plain desks and chairs. There 
 were no handsomely dressed aides-de-camp or staff 
 officers filling the anteroom. There was not even a 
 sentinel to mark the military head-quarters. His only 
 attendants were Captain Walter Taylor — afterward 
 Colonel Taylor — adjutant-general of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia, and two or three clerks. 
 
 Indeed, Lee was ever the simplest of men in his 
 personal surroundings. Again and again we have a 
 
 ' Jones's "Life and Letters of Robert E. Lee." 
 
96 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 glimpse of him in the correspondence and memoirs of 
 the time. His camp equipage was of the simplest 
 character — his table service was of "neat tin," the 
 pieces of which slipped into each other. A single head- 
 quarters wagon sufficed for the commander of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia, and many a brigadier rode 
 with a more imposing staff than accompanied him. 
 
 The game, as it appears now to all, and as it appeared 
 then to those who had to shoulder the responsibility 
 of playing it, was, on the one side, the sealing up of the 
 South within its own borders, the suppression of the 
 power of the border States, such as Maryland, Ken- 
 tucky and Missouri, to join the South, and the cutting 
 in two of the section already seceded ; on the other, it 
 was the simple maintenance of the status quo of the 
 seceded section, the power to exercise the right of 
 secession in the border States, and the resistance of 
 invasion. There was no claim on the part of the South 
 to the right of invasion, and no thought of invasion of 
 the North until the exactions of war made it necessary 
 as a counterstroke. Even after the victory of Ma- 
 nassas, while the eager element clamored because the 
 victory was not followed up, the Confederate Govern- 
 ment held back the eager Jackson and sustained the 
 prudent Johnston. Such being the game, it was played 
 on both sides with clear vision and impressive deter- 
 mination. And no one saw more clearly than Lee 
 the magnitude of the impending struggle. 
 
 Of Lee's far-sightedness we have signal proof in his 
 letters. While others discussed the war as a matter 
 of days and occasion for a summer holiday, he, with 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 99 
 
 and Ohio Railroad, had, partly by reason of the origin 
 and character of the population, partly by reason of 
 their direct association with the North and West; but 
 mainly owing to the absence of slaves among them, 
 been unaffected by the causes which created the fric- 
 tion between the North and South. Here in this 
 mountainous and substantially non-slave-holding region 
 bordering on the States of Ohio and Pennsylvania, and 
 mainly trading by way of the Ohio River and the Bal- 
 timore and Ohio Railroad with the North and West, the 
 population was almost as strongly Union in sentiment 
 as that of the States with which they marched, and, 
 finally, when the conflict came, the major portion of 
 the population sided with the North and stood for the 
 Union. 
 
 The importance of securing this great western section 
 of the leading Southern State was manifest to both sides, 
 and from the first, troops were thrown into the State by 
 both sides to control and hold it. General Robert S. 
 Garnett had been early despatched with a command to 
 protect the western border and awe into submission 
 the wavering and the disaffected. He was a Virginian 
 and had served with distinction in the Mexican War, 
 and on his resignation from the army on the outbreak 
 of the war had been assigned to duty as adjutant- 
 general of the Virginian troops, and later had been 
 commissioned a general of the Confederate army. 
 Opposed to Garnett in Western Virginia was a general 
 who was soon to become the hope and mainstay of the 
 government at Washington, and the idol of the Union 
 army, George B. McClellan. He was Garnett's junior 
 
100 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 by several years, and had graduated at West Point in 
 1846 in the same class with Stonewall Jackson and A. 
 E. Burnside. He had been assigned to the Engineers, 
 and after achieving distinction in Mexico had resigned 
 from the army to enter civil life. He was engaged in 
 Ohio as an engineer at the outbreak of the war, and 
 having promptly offered his services to the Governor 
 of Ohio, and been appointed major-general of Ohio 
 volunteers, had shown marked capacity in organizing 
 and forwarding troops. He had now been placed in 
 command of the Department of the Ohio, and recogniz- 
 ing the importance of seizing and holding the mountain 
 region of Virginia, he had on the 26th of May, without 
 waiting for orders, crossed the Ohio River and thrown 
 troops over into that section.^ The fruits of this early 
 occupation were so apparent, and his services were so 
 efficient, that he soon secured the confidence of the gov- 
 ernment at Washington, and later was advanced to the 
 highest command. Pushing forward now into the heart 
 of this Union section of Virginia, and outflanking Gar- 
 nett, who occupied, with a force of some 5,000 men, a 
 position at Laurel Hill, on the turnpike leading to the 
 county seat of Randolph County, he forced Garnett 
 from his position, cut off and captured on July 12 a 
 portion of his force, posted on Rich Mountain, consisting 
 of about 560 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel Pegram, 
 and following up his advantage with rapidity, over- 
 took Garnett at Carrick's Ford, on the main branch of 
 Cheat River. In the fight which ensued Garnett was 
 killed and his command routed. The course of events, 
 
 ' McClellan's Own Story. 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 101 
 
 had made the eastern rather than the western border 
 of this section the seat of operations, with Harper's 
 Ferry, or more properly Winchester, as the key to the 
 situation, and when Harper's Ferry, on the advance of 
 Patterson, soon after the first outbreak of war, fell into 
 the hands of the Federal troops, McClellan had seized 
 the passes that commanded the western region and 
 fortified them strongly. McClellan's rapidity of move- 
 ment in this campaign, aided possibly by his Napo- 
 leonic style of congratulation to his army, beginning, 
 '^Soldiers, I am more than satisfied with you," gained 
 him the sobriquet of "The Little Napoleon." Two cir- 
 cumstances were noted at the time, and later became 
 conspicuous in the light of subsequent events: he 
 overestimated the force opposed to him at more than 
 double its actual strength, and General Scott, in 
 expressing how "charmed the general-in-chief, the 
 Cabinet, and the President were with his activity and 
 valor," declared that they did not mean "to precipi- 
 tate him, as he was fast enough." The irony of fate at 
 times is curious. This despatch of Scott's bore the 
 same date with Lee's letter expressing regret that he 
 could not be in the field. We shall see what a year 
 was to bring forth. 
 
 McClellan, outmatching the commands and the 
 commanders opposed to him, had thus soon showed 
 substantial success for the Union side. Scott had 
 hitherto commanded the armies of the Union, but as a 
 younger man was needed for such onerous service, on 
 the 1st of November, 1861, General George B. McClel- 
 lan was appointed to the chief command. 
 
102 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Possibly, the fact that Scott was a Virginian had 
 something to do with the decision, as it almost cer- 
 tainly had to do with the passing by of Thomas in the 
 earlier stages of the war; the latter's name not even 
 having been mentioned in the President's congratula- 
 tory order on the victory of Mills Springs, which Thomas 
 had won in Kentucky. It is said that Mr. Lincoln, in 
 reply to criticism of the omission, said: '^He is a Vir- 
 ginian; let him wait." ^ 
 
 The day after the battle of Manassas, McClellan was 
 telegraphed from Washington that his presence there 
 was necessary, and on his arrival, he was promptly as- 
 signed to the command of the Department of Washing- 
 ton and North-eastern Virginia, while Rosecrans suc- 
 ceeded to the command in Western Virginia. Rose- 
 crans, having thus succeeded to the command of the 
 troops despatched to hold Western Virginia, was now 
 leading an invading force up the Kanawha, while Reyn- 
 olds was posted on the Cheat River to guard the chief 
 avenue of communication between the East and the 
 West. 
 
 The Confederate forces in this mountainous region 
 were divided into several detachments. Two of them 
 were on the Kanawha under conamand, respectively, of 
 Generals Floyd and Wise, who had raised brigades and 
 were both very popular with the Virginians, John B. 
 Floyd having been Secretary of War in President 
 Buchanan's Cabinet, and Henry A. Wise having been 
 governor of Virginia. And two others were farther 
 
 ' "Life of George B. Thomas," by Thomas B. Van Horn, p. 56. 
 Ropes's "Story of the War," I, p. 209, n. 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 103 
 
 eastward under Generals Loring and H. R. Jackson. 
 Among these commanders the spirit of co-operation 
 left much to be desired. Owing partly to the hostility 
 of the population and partly to the lack of harmony 
 among the commanding officers, the cause of the 
 South steadily waned in this trans-Alleghany region, 
 and in July it had become manifest that a soldier of 
 rank and experience must be sent to Western Vir- 
 ginia, unless it was to be lost permanently to the 
 South. After Johnston had been offered the com- 
 mand in this territory and had declined the billet. 
 General Lee, who was ready to go anywhere, was sent 
 out to Western Virginia to take command of the 
 somewhat disorganized forces in that hostile region. 
 
 Lee left Richmond for Western Virginia on the same 
 day (July 28) that McClellan, called from that region, 
 took command at Washington of the army designed 
 to capture Richmond. It was Lee's first opportunity 
 to serve in the field. His own letters from Western 
 Virginia throw a light not only on the situation there, 
 but on his character. 
 
 On his arrival he wrote to his wife, giving an idea 
 of his surroundings and a hint of the difficulties by 
 which he found himself confronted. He says : " I reached 
 here yesterday to visit this portion of the army. The 
 points from which we can be attacked are numerous, 
 and the enemy's means unlimited, so we must always 
 be on the alert. It is so difficult to get our people, un- 
 accustomed to the necessities of war, to comprehend 
 and promptly execute the measures required for the 
 "occasion. General Johnson, of Georgia, commands on 
 
104 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the Monterey line, General Loring on this line, and 
 General Wise, supported by General Floyd, on the 
 Kanawha line. The soldiers everywhere are sick. 
 The measles are prevalent throughout the whole army. 
 You know that disease leaves unpleasant results and 
 attacks the lungs, etc., especially in camp, where the 
 accommodations for the sick are poor. I travelled 
 from Staunton on horseback. A part of the road I 
 travelled over in the summer of 1840 on my return to 
 St. Louis, after bringing you home. If any one had 
 told me that the next time I travelled that road would 
 have been my present errand, I should have supposed 
 him insane. I enjoyed the mountains as I rode along. 
 The views were magnificent. The valleys so peace- 
 ful, the scenery so beautiful. Wliat a glorious world 
 Almighty God has given us! How thankless and un- 
 grateful we are!"^ 
 
 And from Valley Mountain, August 9, 1861, he writes: 
 "I have been three days coming from Monterey to 
 Huntersville. The mountains are beautiful, fertile to 
 the tops, covered with the richest sward and blue grass 
 and white clover. The enclosed fields wave with a 
 natural growth of timothy. This is a magnificent 
 grazing country, and all it wants is labor to clear the 
 mountain sides of timber. It has rained, I believe, 
 some portion of every day since I left Staunton. Now 
 it is pouring. Colonel Washington, Captain Taylor, 
 and myself are in one tent, which as yet protects us. I 
 have enjoyed the company of our son while I have 
 been here. He is very well and very active, and as yet 
 
 1 Letter, dated August 4, 1861. 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 105 
 
 the war has not reduced him much. He dined with 
 me yesterday and preserves his fine appetite. To-day 
 he is out reconnoitring, and has the full benefit of this 
 fine rain. I fear he is without his overcoat, as I do not 
 recollect seeing it on his saddle. I told you he had 
 been promoted to a major in the cavalry, and he is the 
 commanding cavalry officer on this line at present. 
 He is sanguine, cheerful, and hearty as ever. I sent 
 him some cornmeal this morning, and he sent me some 
 butter — a mutual exchange of good things. The men 
 are suffering from measles and so on, as elsewhere, but 
 are cheerful and light-hearted. The nights are cool 
 and the water delicious. Send word to Miss Lou 
 Washington that her father is sitting on his blanket 
 sewing a strap on his haversack. I think she ought to 
 be here to do it." 
 
 His reputation, gained among the mountains of 
 Mexico, was doubtless one of the motives which ruled 
 when he was assigned to duty among the mountains 
 of Western Virginia; but even his abilities were not 
 equal to conquering the conditions which he found pre- 
 vailing there. Three small forces were occupying this 
 region on behalf of the South, each dignified by the 
 title of an army. But the generals would not take 
 orders from each other, and two of them were bitterly 
 hostile. When Lee arrived he found one army posted 
 on the crest of a mountain and the other at its base, 
 and though the enemy was close at hand, neither gen- 
 eral would yield to the other. Lee considered the 
 position selected by General Wise on the crest as the 
 better of the two, and united the two forces there. 
 
106 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 But the quarrel between the two generals could not be 
 made up, and as General Floyd ranked Wise, the latter 
 had to be relieved and transferred elsewhere. Old 
 soldiers who have discussed the causes of the result of 
 this campaign have never given wholly satisfactory 
 reasons for it, but have felt assured that all that could 
 have been accomplished Lee accomplished. They have 
 felt that in the first place the dissensions of the officers 
 previously in command had tended to demoralize the 
 troops; then, that the sickness among the troops, 
 unaccustomed to the exposure or prostrated by an epi- 
 demic of typhoid fever, measles, and other diseases, im- 
 paired their efficiency, and finally, that the unlooked- 
 for hostility of the population at large in a region where 
 it was difficult at best to maintain lines of communica- 
 tion, now, in a season unprecedentedly wet, which ren- 
 dered the roads impassable, combined with lack of 
 means of transportation to frustrate the plans of even 
 so capable a commander as Lee. Lee himself referred 
 to it later as "a forlorn hope." On September 1, Lee 
 writes Mrs. Lee, giving a hint of his difficulties: ''We 
 have had a great deal of sickness among the soldiers, 
 and those now on the sick list would form an army. 
 The measles is still among them, but I hope is dying 
 out. The constant cold rains, mud, etc., with no shel- 
 ter or tents, have aggravated it. All these drawbacks, 
 with impassable roads, have paralyzed our efforts." 
 
 Lee's report makes mention of the difficulty of main- 
 taining his lines of conamunication, owing to the ex- 
 hausted condition of his horses and the impossibility 
 of obtaining supplies; so it may be assumed that this 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 107 
 
 was in his view the chief reason for the failure of the 
 campaign. 
 
 The first object of Lee's offensive operations was the 
 destruction of Reynolds, posted in a strong position on 
 the summit of Cheat Mountain, commanding the pass 
 and the important roads which led from the west to 
 the Valley of Virginia. The latter's force was estimated 
 in all at about 10,000 men, while Lee had about 6,000. 
 It was necessary to dislodge him, and as his position 
 at the pass was too well fortified to be assaulted in 
 front, Lee determined, after a personal reconnoissance, 
 to dislodge him by crossing the mountain and attacking 
 him in the rear. Dispositions were accordingly made 
 for this purpose. A body of troops were crossed over 
 the mountain by a trail which had been discovered. 
 The movement, however, proved a failure, because the 
 attack on the fortified position on Cheat Mountain, 
 which was to be the signal for the assault intended to 
 be made by the body of troops sent by night across 
 the mountains to attack Reynolds's position in the rear, 
 was not made as ordered by Lee. And the flanking 
 force, having had their ammunition damaged and their 
 provisions destroyed by a furious storm, which raged 
 all night, missing the concerted signal, returned across 
 the mountains without making the expected assault. 
 If any one else was to blame for this failure to carry 
 out Lee's well-conceived plan, the commander, bitterly 
 disappointed as he was, with the magnanimity char- 
 acteristic of him, simply passed it by, as he later did 
 similar failures on the part of his subordinates, assum- 
 ing himself whatever blame attached to the failure. In 
 
108 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 a letter to Mrs. Lee, dated Valley Mountain, September 
 17, 1861, the general expressed his disappointment: 
 "I had hoped to have surprised the enemy's works on 
 the morning of the 12th, both at Cheat Mountain and 
 on Valley River. All the attacking parties with great 
 labor had reached their destination, over mountains 
 considered impassable to bodies of troops, notwith- 
 standing the heavy storm that had set in the day before 
 and raged all night, in which they had to stand till 
 daylight ; their arms were then unserviceable and they 
 in poor condition for a fierce assault. After waiting 
 till ten o'clock for the assault on Cheat Mountain, 
 which did not take place, and which was to be the signal 
 for the rest, they were withdrawn, and after waiting 
 three days in front of the enemy, hoping he would 
 come out of. his trenches, we returned to our position 
 at this place. I cannot tell you my regret and morti- 
 fication at the untoward events that caused the failure 
 of the plan. I had taken every precaution to insure 
 success, and counted on it ; but the Ruler of the universe 
 willed otherwise, and sent the storm to disconcert the 
 well-laid plan. We are no worse off now than before, 
 except the disclosure of our plan, against which they 
 will guard. We met with one heavy loss which grieves 
 me deeply: Colonel Washington accompanied Fitz- 
 hugh [his son] on a reconnoitring expedition. I fear 
 they were carried away by their zeal and approached 
 within the enemy's pickets. The first they knew there 
 was a volley from a concealed party within a few yards 
 of them. Three balls passed through the colonel's 
 body, three struck his horse, and the horse of one of 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 109 
 
 the men was killed. Fitzhugh mounted the colonel's 
 horse and brought him off. I am much grieved. He 
 was always anxious to go on these expeditions. This 
 was the first day I assented. Since I had been thrown 
 in such immediate relations with him, I had learned to 
 appreciate him very highly. Morning and evening 
 have I seen him on his knees praying to his Maker. 
 'The righteous perisheth, and no man layeth it to 
 heart; the merciful men are taken away, none consid- 
 ering that the righteous are taken away from the- evil 
 to come.' Mfty God have mercy on us all." 
 
 And again on the 26th of the same month he writes 
 from his camp on Sewell Mountain: ''I told you of the 
 death of Colonel Washington. I grieve for his loss, 
 though I trust him to the mercy of our heavenly 
 Father. It is raining heavily. The men are all ex- 
 posed on the mountains, with the enemy opposite to us. 
 We are without tents, and for two nights I have lain 
 buttoned up in my overcoat. To-day my tent came 
 up, and I am in it, yet I fear I shall not sleep for think- 
 ing of the poor men. I have no doubt the socks you 
 mentioned will be very acceptable to the men here and 
 elsewhere. If you can send them here I will distribute 
 to the most needy." 
 
 In a private letter to Governor Letcher, dated Sep- 
 tember 17, 1861, he makes no mention of his personal 
 disappointment; that was for his wife alone. He 
 simply states that ''he was sanguine of success in at- 
 tacking the enemy's works on Rich Mountain"; that 
 "the troops intended for the surprise had reached 
 their destination, having traversed twenty miles of 
 
no ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 steep and rugged mountain paths, and the last day 
 through a terrible storm, which had lasted all night, 
 in which they had to stand, drenched to the skin, in a 
 cold rain"; that he ''waited for an attack on Cheat 
 Mountain, which was to be the signal, till 10 a. m., but 
 the signal did not come. The chance for surprise was 
 gone. The provisions of the men had been destroyed 
 the preceding day by the storm. They had nothing 
 to eat that morning, and could not hold out another 
 day, and were obliged to be withdrawn. This, Gov- 
 ernor," he writes, ''is for your own eye. Please do 
 not speak of it ; we must try again. Our greatest loss 
 is the death of my dear friend, Colonel Washington. 
 He and my son were reconnoitring the front of the 
 enemy. They came afterward upon a concealed party, 
 who fired upon them within twenty yards, and the 
 Colonel fell, pierced by three balls. My son's horse re- 
 ceived three shots, but he escaped on the Colonel's horse. 
 His zeal for the cause to which he had devoted himself 
 carried him too far." 
 
 The second opportunity which apparently offered it- 
 self and was allowed by Lee to pass fruitlessly by was 
 when Rosecrans's army, which lay before him at Sewell 
 Mountain, was allowed to slip away unmolested. 
 
 Reynolds having refused to be drawn out of his posi- 
 tion, Lee turned his attention to the western section in 
 the hope of destroying Rosecrans, and leaving General 
 H. R. Jackson to hold Reynolds if possible, Lee ad- 
 dressed himself to the situation in the Kanawha Valley. 
 Riding through the mountains, "attended by a single 
 subaltern/' he visited the commands of Generals Floyd 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 111 
 
 and Wise, whose rivalries threatened the destruction 
 of both commands. His object was to put an end to 
 their strife, bring them together, and get from their 
 united forces the power to crush Rosecrans, who was 
 stronger than either. Nothing could be in greater 
 contrast than the long, heated letters of the two sub- 
 ordinates, and the brief, calm replies of the trained, 
 equable-tempered, well-poised Lee. 
 
 Rosecrans lay on top of Sewell Mountain, in a strongly 
 fortified position, and Lee posted himself on the oppo- 
 site crest, expecting that Rosecrans would attack him. 
 Rosecrans, however, after threatening to attack, sud- 
 denly withdrew his army by night. Lee gave as his 
 reason for his apparent non-action, that he was con- 
 fident of defeating Rosecrans by a flanking movement 
 which he had planned for the following night, and that 
 he "could not afford to sacrifice five or six hundred of 
 his people to silence public clamor." In a letter to his 
 wife, dated October 7, from Sewell Mountain, Lee 
 gives an insight into his views, and incidentally touches 
 on the part that politics was playing in the Southern 
 army. He says: "The enemy was threatening an at- 
 tack, which was continued till Saturday night, when, 
 under cover of darkness and our usual mountain mist, 
 he suddenly withdrew. Your letter, with the socks, 
 was handed to me when I was preparing to follow. I 
 could not at the time attend to either, but I have since; 
 and as I found Perry [his colored servant from Arling- 
 ton] in desperate need, I bestowed a couple of pairs on 
 him as a present from you; the others I have put in 
 my trunk, and suppose they will fall to the lot of Mere- 
 
112 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 dith [a colored servant from the White House], into 
 the state of whose hose I have not yet inquired. 
 Should any sick man require them first he shall have 
 them, but Meredith will have no one near to supply 
 him but me, and will naturally expect that attention. 
 The water is almost as bad here as in the mountams I 
 left. There was a drenching rain yesterday, and as I 
 left my overcoat in camp, I was thoroughly wet from 
 head to foot. It has been raining ever since, and is 
 now coming down with a will ; but I have my clothes 
 out on the bushes, and they will be well washed. The 
 force of the enemy, estimated by prisoners captured, 
 is put down at from 17,000 to 20,000— General Floyd 
 thinks 18,000. I do not think it exceeds 9,000 or 
 10,000, but it exceeds ours. I wish he had attacked, 
 as I believe he would have been repulsed with great 
 loss. The rumbling of his wheels, etc., were heard by 
 our pickets; but as that was customary at night in 
 moving and placing his cannon, the officer of the day, 
 to whom it was reported, paid no particular attention 
 to it, supposing it to be a preparation for an attack in 
 the morning. When day appeared the bird had flown, 
 and the misfortune was that the reduced condition of 
 our horses for want of provender, exposure to cold 
 rains in these mountains, and want of provisions for 
 the men prevented the vigorous pursuit of following 
 up that had been prepared. We can only get up pro- 
 visions from day to day, which paralyzes our opera- 
 tions. I am sorry, as you say, that the movements of 
 the armies cannot keep pace with the expectations of 
 the editors of papers. I know they can regulate mat- 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 113 
 
 ters satisfactory to themselves on paper. I wish they 
 could do so in the field. No one wishes them more 
 success than I do, and would be happy to see them have 
 full swing. General Floyd has three editors on his 
 staff. I hope something will be done to please them." 
 
 When it was all over in Western Virginia, one of his 
 officers, who had been with him there (General Starke), 
 asked Lee why he had not fought Rosecrans, as the 
 forces were about equal, and the Confederates were 
 ready and anxious for a fight, and felt certain of a vic- 
 tory. Lee's reply was that while his men were in good 
 spirits, and would doubtless have done their duty, a 
 battle then would have been without substantial re- 
 sults, owing to their being seventy miles from the rail- 
 road, their base of supplies, with the ordinary roads 
 almost impassable, and that ''ii he had fought and 
 won the battle and Rosecrans had retreated, he would 
 have been compelled to fall back at last to the source 
 of supplies." 
 
 ''But," said General Starke, "your reputation was 
 suffering, the press was denouncing you, your own 
 State was losing confidence in you, and the army 
 needed a victory to add to its enthusiasm." 
 
 To this Lee replied, with a smile: ''I could not afford 
 to sacrifice the lives of five or six hundred of my people 
 to silence public clamor." 
 
 The "public clamor" over Lee's failure was bitter 
 and persistent, but he remained unruffled by it. With 
 characteristic calm he simply stated that it was "only 
 natural that such hasty conclusions should be reached," 
 and gave his opinion that it was "better not to attempt 
 
114 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 a justification or defence, but to go steadily on in the 
 discharge of our duty to the best of our ability, leav- 
 ing all else to the calmer judgment of the future, and 
 to a kind Providence." Long afterward, Mr. Davis 
 wrote how, when ''Lee was unjustly criticised for that 
 campaign," he ''magnanimously declined to make an 
 official report, which would have exonerated himself 
 by throwing the responsibility of the failure upon 
 others." ^ This would have been alien to Lee's nature, 
 /ffll through the war he assumed the responsibility^ 
 'even when, as at Gettysburg, his orders were not car- \ 
 vHed out, and the failure was manifestly due to others. ^ 
 He had no editors on his staff. Indeed, at this period 
 he had only two aides-de-camp, Colonel Washington and 
 Colonel Taylor, of whom the former was, as has been 
 stated, killed in a reconnoissance on Cheat Mountain. 
 Thus fell the last of the name who owned Mount 
 Vernon. 
 
 The first campaign in which Lee engaged was thus, 
 like Washington's first campaign, conducted with 
 adverse fortune. Had Washington's military career 
 closed after the retreat from Long Island, he would 
 have been reckoned simply a brave man and a stark 
 fighter, but one unequal to general command. Had 
 Lee's career ended after the campaign in Western 
 Virginia, when he was derisively characterized in the 
 anti-administration press of Richmond as "Evacuating 
 Lee," he would have been known in history only as a 
 fine organizer, a capital scout, and a brilliant engineer 
 of unusual gallantry whose abilities as a commander 
 
 •Taylor's "Lee," p. 47. 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 115 
 
 were not superior to those of the mediocre officer who 
 opposed him in that experimental campaign, and were 
 possibly equal only to the command of a brigade or, at 
 best, of a division. But the South and fame awaited 
 his opportunity. 
 
 Happily for the South, Mr. Davis knew Lee better 
 than those who were so clamorous against him, and 
 the autumn having closed the campaign in Western 
 Virginia, and the sea cities along the Atlantic coast 
 sorely needing protection from the blockading fleet, Lee 
 was despatched to the South to design and construct 
 a general system of coast-defences along the Atlantic 
 seaboard. It must have irked him, with his clear vis- 
 ion of the outlook, to have been relegated for months 
 to the seacoast of the Carolinas to work among the 
 bayous and swamps — making bricks without straw — 
 while the enemy not only swept the South-west, but 
 got together a great army to move on Richmond. But 
 though he spoke privately of it as "another forlorn 
 hope like that in Western Virginia," no hint to the 
 outside world escaped him. He was doing his duty. 
 And whatever he may have thought of the task, it was 
 one in which he displayed such genius that he rendered 
 the coast cities of Georgia and South Carolina impregna- 
 ble against all assaults by sea. Protected by his chain of 
 forts, they stood as memorials of his genius until Sher- 
 man, with his victorious army, attacked them by land. 
 
 "It must be admitted," says Fitz Lee, in his "Life of 
 Lee," "that General Lee retired from Western Virginia 
 with diminished military reputation." This is far from 
 a complete statement of the feeling as to him at this 
 
116 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 time. He was charged with incompetence, with being 
 ''too tender to shed blood," and with ''impressing with 
 a showy presence" and "an historic name" rather than 
 with soldierly qualities. When he was assigned to 
 duty in the South, a protest was made against his 
 being sent there. Mr. Davis felt it necessary to write 
 to the Governor of South Carolina, defending his as- 
 signment. He declared: "If General Lee is not a gen- 
 eral, I have none to send you." To all of this Lee 
 made no reply. He simply proceeded with his duty, 
 and amid the swamps of South Carolina and Georgia, 
 labored for four months with a zeal which could not 
 have been excelled had he commanded an army. 
 
 The Hon. Alexander H. Stevens gives a picture of 
 Lee at this time. He says : 
 
 "The Confederate Government had adopted the plan 
 of Austria, at the period when Napoleon the First so 
 nearly wiped her off the map of Europe, and endeavored 
 to 'cover everything' with the armies. The army at 
 Centreville was little more than a mob clamoring for 
 leave of absence, and with seldom a day's rations 
 ahead, and General Lee was sent to repair the disasters 
 of Hilton Head and Beaufort, S. C, by the impossible 
 task of engineering sufficient fortifications for a thou- 
 sand miles of mingled sea-coast and inland swamps. I 
 remember seeing him in Savannah, conspicuous by 
 the blue uniform which he was the last of the Con- 
 federates to put off, scarcely noticed among the gray 
 uniforms of the new volunteers, and the least likely of 
 all men to become the first character in the war for 
 States Rights." 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 117 
 
 His letters give a clear picture of the difficulties of 
 protecting these seaport towns against a navy without 
 some sort of navy to oppose it. On February 8, 1862, 
 he writes his wife from Savannah: '^I wrote you the 
 day I left Coosawhatchie. I have been here ever 
 since, endeavoring to push forward the works for the 
 defence of the city. Guns are scarce, as well as ammu- 
 nition. I shall have to bring up batteries from the 
 coast, I fear, to provide for this city. Our enemies 
 are trying to work their way through the creeks and 
 soft marshes along the interior of the coast, which 
 communicate with the sounds and sea, through which 
 the Savannah flows, and thus avoid the entrance to 
 the river, conmianded by Fort Pulaski. Their boats 
 require only seven feet of water to float them, and the 
 tide rises seven feet, so that at high water they can 
 work their way and rest on the mud at low. I hope, 
 however, we shall be able to stop them, and my daily 
 prayer to the Giver of all victory is to enable us to do 
 so. We must make up our minds to meet with re- 
 verses and overcome them. But the contest must be 
 long, and the whole country has to go through much 
 suffering. It is necessary we should be humble and 
 taught to be less boastful, less selfish, and more de- 
 voted to right and justice to all the world." 
 
 And again from the same place he says, on February 
 23: "The news from Tennessee and North Carolina is 
 not at all cheering. Disasters seem to be thickening 
 around us. It calls for renewed energies and redoubled 
 strength on our part. I fear our soldiers have not re- 
 alized the necessity of endurance and labor, and that 
 
118 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 it is better to sacrifice themselves for our cause. God, 
 I hope, will shield us and give us success. I hear the 
 enemy is progressing slowly in his designs. His gun- 
 boats are pushing up all the creeks and marshes to the 
 Savannah, and have obtained a position so near the 
 river as to shell the steamers navigating it. I am en- 
 gaged in constructing a line of defence at Fort Jackson, 
 which, if time permits, and guns can be obtained, I 
 hope will keep them out." 
 
 As McClellan prepared to move on Richmond with 
 the great army which he had been organizing and 
 equipping all winter, so threatening became the situa- 
 tion there, and so deep an impression had Lee's work 
 in preparing the defences of the Southern States made 
 on the people, that they began to look to him once 
 more, and later the Confederate Congress passed an 
 act creating the office of commander-in-chief for him. 
 This act President Davis vetoed as unconstitutional, 
 he, himself, by the constitution, being the commander- 
 in-chief of the naval and military forces of the Con- 
 federate States. He, however, recalled Lee to Rich- 
 mond, and on March 13, 1862, issued the following 
 order: 
 
 ''General Robert E. Lee is assigned to duty at the 
 seat of government, and, under the direction of the 
 President, is charged with the conduct of the military 
 operations in the armies of the Confederacy." 
 
 Mr. Stevens's comment on this is that "again he 
 had a barren though difficult honor thrust upon him." 
 
 Mr. Davis, on the other hand, declared that when 
 General Lee took command of the Army of Northern 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA . 119 
 
 Virginia, he was in command of all the armies of the 
 Confederate States by his order of assignment, and 
 that Lee continued in this general command of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia as long as he would resist 
 Lee's opinion that it was necessary for him to be re- 
 lieved of one of these two duties. But it is manifest 
 that Lee was "under the direction of the President." 
 
 Mr. Stephens states that he did much to improve the 
 army as chief of staff under Mr. Davis, and was nomi- 
 nally head of the army, but soon asked to be relieved 
 from responsibility with no power. During this period, 
 however, his great engineering abilities were exercised 
 to prepare the defences of Richmond against the com- 
 ing storm. And among other benefits that the Con- 
 federate capital now derived from his labors were the 
 works at Drewry's and Chaffin's Bluffs, on the James, to 
 which were due, not long afterward, the repulse of the 
 Federal gunboats, and the preservation of the city 
 when, on Johnston's retiring up the Peninsula in May, 
 Norfolk was abandoned, and the James was thrown 
 open to the Federal fleet. But for this work of Lee's, 
 Richmond might have become untenable before Mc- 
 Clellan crossed the Chickahominy. 
 
 Thus Lee, in the shadow of the vast preparations 
 making at Washington for a great invasion of Virginia, 
 was, in March, 1862, called back to Richmond, to ad- 
 vise the President of the Confederacy. The need was 
 urgent, for a few weeks later McClellan, with Johnston 
 falling back slowly before him, was marching steadily 
 up the Peninsula, with an army the like of which had 
 never been commanded by one man. 
 
120 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 As soon as Lee was brought back from the South, 
 he revolutionized the plan of campaign hitherto fol- 
 lowed. The South was already being shut in and 
 throttled. Her sea-coast cities were being captured, 
 her ports blockaded, and her country cut in two. His 
 clear vision saw the imperative necessity of substitu- 
 ting an aggressive for a defensive policy, and he un- 
 leashed the eager Jackson on the armies in the Valley 
 of Virginia, keeping them fully occupied, and so alarm- 
 ing Washington as to hold McDowell on the north 
 side of the Rappahannock and withhold his 40,000 
 men from swelling McClellan's already powerful army 
 on the Peninsula. Within a month after he was placed 
 in actual command he perfected his plans and fell 
 upon McClellan, and defeated the greatest army that 
 had ever stood on American soil. The next three 
 years proved beyond cavil that in the first campaign, 
 as always, all that could have been done with his 
 forces by any one was done by Lee. Within one year, 
 indeed, he had laid the foundation of a fame as a great 
 captain as enduring as Marlborough's or Wellington's. 
 
 Three years from this time "this colonel of cavalry" 
 surrendered a muster-roll of 26,000 men, of which 
 barely 8,000 muskets showed up, to an army of over 
 130,000 men, commanded by the most determined and 
 able general that the North had found, and, defeated, 
 sheathed his sword with what will undoubtedly be- 
 come the reputation of the first captain and the no- 
 blest public character of his time. 
 
 In this period he had fought three of the greatest 
 campaigns in all the history of war, and had destroyed 
 
LEE IN WEST VIRGINIA 121 
 
 the reputation of more generals than any captain had 
 ever done in the same space of time. His last campaign 
 alone, even ending as it did in defeat, would have suf- 
 ficed to fix him forever as a star of the first magnitude 
 in the constellation of great captains. Though he suc- 
 cumbed at last to the '^ policy of attrition," pursued by 
 his patient and able antagonist, it was not until Grant 
 had lost in the campaign over 124,000 men, better 
 armed and equipped — two men for every one that Lee 
 had had in his army from the beginning of the cam- 
 paign. 
 
CHAPTER VI 
 
 THE SITUATION WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 
 
 When McClellan moved on Richmond, the fortunes 
 of the South appeared to be at a lower ebb than they 
 ever were again until the winter of 1864. The long 
 period since the victory of Manassas had been allowed 
 to pass without any such active operations as would 
 keep at white heat the flame of enthusiasm which pre- 
 ceded that event. The government of the Confederacy 
 held to the doctrine that the war was one solely defen- 
 sive. With even more disastrous reasoning, if pos- 
 sible, it put in practice another theory, that a demo- 
 cratic army should elect its officers. In the spring of 
 1862, a general election was, by direction of the govern- 
 ment, held by the Confederate army, then lying in the 
 face of the enemy, by which all officers from colonel 
 down were voted for by the men of the various com- 
 mands. Such a measure was wholly destructive of 
 discipline, and Lee, in one of his letters, refers to being 
 in the midst of "the fermentation" due to the reorgan- 
 ization of the army. 
 
 The general plan for prosecution of the war on the 
 part of the North was the same that had been laid 
 down at the beginning: that is, to hold the border 
 States, to blockade the Southern ports and attack 
 by sea, and to seize the navigable rivers running far 
 
 122 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 123 
 
 up into her territory, especially the Mississippi, and 
 thereby cut the South in two. By the end of spring, 
 1862, nearly the whole of this far-reaching and saga- 
 cious plan had been measurably accomplished. Mary- 
 land, Missouri, and Kentucky had been held firmly, 
 and in all three States, except Missouri, secession had 
 been forcibly prevented, while Missouri had been sub- 
 stantially conquered. 
 
 The possession of a fleet gave to the Union forces the 
 command of the Chesapeake, of the Potomac, of the 
 York, and (after the sinking of the Merrimac by her 
 commander) of the James, to within less than half a 
 day's march of Richmond. This was quickly followed 
 by an attempt on Richmond by the Federal fleet, 
 which General Johnston declared a greater danger than 
 the Federal army. The fleet, under Commodore John 
 Rodgers, consisting of the Monitor, the Galena, and 
 three other gunboats, ascended the James to within 
 eight miles of Richmond, but were, on May 15, repulsed 
 by the batteries atDrewry's Bluff, where Lee had hastily 
 constructed works which stood till abandoned, on April 
 2, 1865. 
 
 In January, Thomas had won the battle of Mill 
 Springs, in Kentucky, which made the Union forces 
 dominant in that region. In February (6th), Fort 
 Henry, on the Tennessee, had been captured, and four 
 days later (the 10th) Fort Donelson, on the Cumber- 
 land, had surrendered unconditionally to a general 
 hitherto almost unknown, to whom the government 
 had been inclined to turn the cold shoulder, but who 
 was to become better known thereafter. The gallant 
 
124 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Buckner, having refused to escape with the other gen- 
 erals and leave his men, had surrendered with the lat- 
 ter. By these victories the upper Mississippi, the 
 Cumberland, and the Tennessee came into the control 
 of the Federal forces, and all that was needed was to 
 obtain mastery of the lower Mississippi to leave the 
 Confederacy rent in twain. The forts at Hatteras In- 
 let had been reduced in August (28th). Hilton Head 
 and Beaufort, in North Carolina, had been captured, 
 following Admiral DuPont's reduction of the forts on 
 Port Royal Inlet, and Roanoke Island and Newberne, 
 N. C, had been captured in the first half of March, 
 1862. On April 6, Albert Sidney Johnston, deemed up 
 till now the South's most brilliant soldier, had sub- 
 stantially won a battle against the captor of Forts 
 Henry and Donelson, but had been slain in the hour of 
 victory, and that night Buell, having reached the field 
 with fresh troops, the Confederate forces had been in 
 turn defeated. It is probable that but for the fall of 
 Johnston, who bled to death through neglecting his 
 wound in his eagerness to push his victory on the 6th, 
 Grant's fortunate star might have set at Shiloh instead 
 of rising higher and higher in the next three years, to 
 reach its zenith at Appomattox. As it was, the upper 
 Mississippi with its great tributaries was in complete 
 control of the Union, and on April 24, Flag Officer Far- 
 ragut, himself a Tennessean, with a powerful fleet ran 
 up the Mississippi, successfully passing the forts (Jack- 
 son and St. Philip) guarding its mouth, and reached 
 New Orleans, which city was soon occupied by Butler 
 (May 1), its fall being quickly followed by the fall of 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 125 
 
 Pensacola. By this time all the important Florida sea- 
 port tawns were in the possession of the Federal forces, 
 and all these captures, except Roanoke Island and 
 Newberne, had been effected by the navy/ Thus, the 
 Mississippi was open from its mouth to Port Hudson, 
 and even that fort and the yet more threatening forts 
 at Vicksburg could be passed by the Federal gunboats, 
 though not without danger, which it was important to 
 put an end to. The main object of attack, however, 
 now was Richmond. 
 
 The very next day after the rout at Bull Run, Mr. 
 Lincoln, awakening to the gravity of the situation, had 
 called for 500,000 men, and the North had responded 
 with fervor. Between the 4th of August and the 10th 
 of October more than 110 regiments and 30 battalions, 
 comprising at least 112,000 men, were added to the 
 forces in Washington and its neighborhood.^ The 
 ablest organizer in the army had been called to the 
 task of organization, and proved to have a genius for 
 it. All autumn and winter he labored at the work, 
 and when spring came Washington had been strongly 
 fortified, and McClellan found himself at the head of 
 possibly the largest, best equipped, and best drilled 
 army ever commanded by one man in modern times. 
 
 Thus, the spring of 1862 had been spent by the gov- 
 ernment of the United States in preparation for a cam- 
 paign against Richmond which should retrieve the 
 errors and disasters of the preceding year, and by 
 making certain the capture of Richmond, "the heart 
 
 » Ropes's "Story of the Civil War," I, pp. 182-5. 
 2 Ibid., p. 167. 
 
126 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 of the Confederacy/' should end the war by one great 
 and decisive stroke. The new Federal commander 
 proved in the sequel not to be as great a fighter as, at 
 least, one of his successors. But whatever the inomedi- 
 ate result was, McClellan taught the North the way to 
 organize and equip a great army. It was well said that 
 without McClellan there had been no Grant. And 
 McClellan had difficulties to contend with in the panic- 
 struck and urgent authorities in Washington which 
 Grant was wise enough to relieve himself of by previ- 
 ous stipulation. 
 
 Several plans for attacking Richmond still presented 
 themselves, as at the beginning of hostilities, all of 
 which included the idea of cutting off the city from 
 communication with the south-west. One was by way 
 of the Shenandoah Valley, striking the Virginia Central 
 Railroad at Staunton or Waynesboro, and marching on 
 Richmond by way of Charlottesville, whence a railway 
 line ran to South-west Virginia and Tennessee ; one by 
 way of Manassas; one by the Chesapeake Bay and the 
 lower Rappahannock; and finally, one by way of the 
 Chesapeake Bay and the peninsula lying between the 
 York and the James, which presented the opportunity, 
 under certain contingencies, of seizing Petersburg and 
 isolating Richmond from the South. 
 
 The practicability of all of these plans of invasion 
 had to be considered quite as carefully in Richmond as 
 in Washington, and the possibility of each one of them 
 being adopted had to be provided against. As the 
 junction at Manassas had proved to be the key to the 
 situation in the first effort, and its use had enabled the 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 127 
 
 valley forces under Joseph E. Johnston to be brought 
 across the Blue Ridge in the nick of time for the final 
 movement in the battle there, so it still remained the 
 most important point in Central Virginia, and Johns- 
 ton's army was placed there to guard it and at the 
 same time keep Washington in a state of anxiety. 
 The Washington authorities were, for manifest reasons, 
 in favor of trying their fortune again at this point. 
 The armies of Fremont and Banks in the Shenandoah 
 Valley were within a few days' march and might 
 render assistance, and at least it rendered Washington 
 more secure. McClellan, however, favored the route 
 by the Rappahannock. McClellan's first plan was to 
 march to Annapolis, and then transport his army, 
 140,000 men, to Urbana, on the south bank of the 
 Rappahannock, and "occupy Richmond before it could 
 be strongly reinforced." ^ 
 
 This plan he was forbidden to adopt, though he con- 
 sidered it the best of all the plans, and he thereupon 
 selected the route by way of Fortress Monroe and the 
 Peninsula, against the views of the government author- 
 ities, who greatly desired him to adopt the overland 
 route by Manassas, across which Johnston lay with an 
 army then believed to number over 100,000 men, but 
 really containing certainly less than half that number.^ 
 Indeed, it was actually about 35,000 men. 
 
 Illness during the autumn and early winter of 1861 
 prevented McClellan's acting with the efficiency which 
 he might otherwise have shown; but even more disas- 
 
 ' John C. Ropes's "Story of the Civil War," I, p. 266, citing Mc- 
 Clellan's letter to Stanton (5 W. R., 45). ' Ibid. 
 
128 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 trous than this was his determination not to move 
 until he had an army sufficiently great and properly 
 organized to make his success assured. For this rea- 
 son mainly he resisted alike the importunities of the 
 President and the Secretary of War and the clamor of 
 the public until on toward the spring, by which time 
 he had sacrificed the good-will of the former and the 
 confidence of both. 
 
 Jackson, acting on a suggestion of Lee's, settled the 
 question of the Shenandoah Valley plan by the battle 
 of Winchester and his brilliant retreat between two 
 converging armies down the valley, followed by the 
 twin victories of Cross Keys and Port Republic. The 
 authorities in Washington decided against the lower 
 Rappahannock plan, and gave McClellan his choice 
 between the overland route by way of Manassas and 
 the Fortress Monroe plan, and he states that "of course 
 he selected the latter," adding a jibe at the fears of the 
 administration and a suggestion of their disloyalty to 
 him.^ 
 
 The advantages of the route by the Chesapeake Bay 
 were obvious. The possession of the navy gave the 
 Union Government command of the bay and its navi- 
 gable tributaries, enabling them to transport troops 
 and munitions of war to a point within a convenient 
 distance of Richmond. The chief objections to the 
 selection of this line lay, first, in the danger of denuding 
 the defences of Washington by withdrawing so large a 
 force while the Confederate army under Johnston lay 
 on the Rapidan and the audacious Jackson was oper- 
 
 > "McClellan's Own Story," p. 227. 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 129 
 
 ating in the Shenandoah Valley, and, later on, in the 
 difficulties occasioned by the operations in the Chesa- 
 peake of the new floating war machine, the Virginia, 
 which, with her awkward armor of railway iron, ap- 
 peared a sort of Goliath of the sea. The only other 
 serious difficulties were the presence of the heavy forti- 
 fications at Yorktown and Gloucester Point, guarding 
 the mouth of the York River. Still, McClellan had no 
 doubt of being able, with the aid of the navy, to reduce 
 these forts and open the York to the passage of his 
 transports. 
 
 This decision was reached by him in the first week 
 of March, and on the 9th of March Johnston, under 
 orders from Mr. Davis, withdrew his army from Ma- 
 nassas and fell back to the Rappahannock, and thence 
 toward Richmond, immediately on which McClellan 
 occupied Manassas with the greater part of his army,^ 
 to give them training and with a view to opening the 
 railway from Manassas, where Banks's head-quarters 
 were to be, to Strasburg, in the Shenandoah Valley. 
 
 About the middle of March McClellan began to ship 
 his troops to Fortress Monroe, a movement which pro- 
 ceeded so rapidly that by the end of the month he 
 had three corps on the spot, and was "eagerly expecting 
 others"; and Johnston thereupon, "his movements con- 
 trolled by McClellan," marched to the Peninsula, where 
 Magruder with only some 13,000 men at Yorktown had 
 handled them so ably that McClellan was led to believe 
 his force much larger than it was. 
 
 General Lee wrote to his wife from Richmond, 
 
 » Ropes's "Story of the Civil War," I, p. 225. 
 
130 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 March 22, 1862: ''Our enemies are pressing us every- 
 where, and our army is in the fermentation of reorgani- 
 zation. I pray that the great God may aid us, and 
 am endeavoring by every means in my power to bring 
 out the troops and hasten them to their destination." 
 General Lee was now military adviser to the Presi- 
 dent, and thenceforth, though he was till almost the 
 very end of the war "under the direction of the Presi- 
 dent," and never had a free hand, he had at least a 
 potent hand in the conduct of the military operations 
 of the Confederacy. 
 
 Having found his advance up the Peninsula between 
 the York and the James, for the purpose of enveloping 
 Yorktown, barred by the erection of strong works along 
 the line of the Warwick River, extending entirely across 
 the Peninsula, McClellan, instead of assaulting imme- 
 diately, being under the impression that Magruder was 
 far stronger than he really was, laid siege to Yorktown, 
 and made ready with elaborate preparation to assault 
 on the 5th of May. On the night of the 3d, however, 
 Magruder, acting under the orders of Johnston, who, 
 as stated, on McClellan 's landing in Virginia had with- 
 drawn his army from the Rapidan and now commanded 
 in the Peninsula, skilfully withdrew his troops and re- 
 tired on Williamsburg. So that McClellan, who had 
 spent weeks in preparation for the capture, shipping 
 heavy ordnance from the Northern arsenals and en- 
 gaging the best engineers in the service, found the post 
 abandoned, and got only the abandoned heavy guns 
 which Magruder had been unable to carry off. 
 
 Differing from Johnston, Lee's temperament inclined 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 131 
 
 him to more audacious tactics than the Fabian poHcy 
 which the latter inchned to pursue. He would have 
 had Johnston force the issue on the Rapidan before 
 giving McClellan the opportunity to mass his army 
 on the Peninsula, and now that the latter event had 
 occurred, he was in favor of forwarding troops and de- 
 livering battle before he should advance on Richmond. 
 
 The advance of McClellan on Richmond with an army 
 of 115,000 men immediately under his command, be- 
 sides the reserve of 40,000 under McDowell on the 
 Rappahannock, made the Peninsula the field of the 
 most important operations which had yet been at- 
 tempted, and should they be successfully conducted, 
 they were likely to decide the issue of the war. Op- 
 posed to him, under the immediate command of Gen- 
 eral Johnston, were about 53,000 men, with 18,000 at 
 Norfolk commanded by General Huger, and something 
 over 16,000 in the valley, making a total of 87,000 men.^ 
 
 In this exigency, a conference was held in Richmond 
 between the President, the Secretary of War, and 
 General Lee, to which were also invited Major-Generals 
 Smith 8.nd Longstreet, to discuss the best method of 
 meeting the situation, whose gravity all recognized. 
 
 General Johnston proposed that, without attempting 
 to make a stand on the lower Peninsula along Ma- 
 gruder's line, which would only delay the Federal army 
 in its approach, all the available forces of the Confed- 
 eracy, including those in the Carolinas and Georgia, 
 with those at Norfolk, should be brought together for 
 an attack on McClellan at the moment he began to be- 
 
 » Johnston's "Narrative," pp. 115, 116. 
 
132 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 siege Richmond. He believed that such an attack, 
 coming as a surprise to McClellan ''would be almost 
 certain to win, and the enemy, divided a hundred miles 
 away from the Potomac, their place of refuge, could 
 scarcely escape destruction. Such a victory, he urged, 
 would decide not only the campaign, but the war, while 
 the present plan could produce no decisive results." 
 
 This plan was opposed, the Secretary of War, Gen- 
 eral Randolph, who had been a naval officer, objecting 
 because it involved "at least the temporary abandon- 
 ment of Norfolk, which would involve the probable loss 
 of the materials for many vessels of war contained in 
 the navy yard there." 
 
 "Lee opposed it," states Johnston, "because he 
 thought that the withdrawal from South Carolina and 
 Georgia of any considerable number of troops would 
 expose the important seaports of Charleston and Sa- 
 vannah to the danger of capture. He thought, too, 
 that the Peninsula had excellent fields of battle for a 
 small army contending with a great one, and that we 
 should for that reason make the contest with McClel- 
 lan's army there." 
 
 "Longstreet," adds Johnston, "owing to his deaf- 
 ness, took little part in the conference." 
 
 Longstreet, who states that he and General Smith 
 were invited by General Johnston to accompany him, 
 intimates that he heard quite enough at the conference; 
 that he had a plan of his own, which he intended to 
 suggest, by which he was to join General Jackson in 
 the Shenandoah Valley "with sufficient reinforcements 
 to strike the Federal forces in front of him a sudden, 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 133 
 
 severe blow," cross the Potomac, threaten Washing- 
 ton, and call McClellan to his own capital. This plan, 
 he states, he had proposed to Jackson a few days before. 
 
 On prefacing his views, however, with the statement 
 that he knew General McClellan, 'Hhat he was a mili- 
 tary engineer, and would move his army by careful 
 measurement and preparation, and that he would not 
 be ready to advance before the 1st of May, the Presi- 
 dent interrupted and spoke of McClellan's high at- 
 tainments and capacity in a style indicating that he 
 did not care to hear any one talk who did not have the 
 same appreciation of our great adversary." And he 
 adds that, ''remembering that McClellan had been a 
 special favorite with Mr. Davis when he was Secretary 
 of War in the Pierce administration, and Mr. Davis 
 appearing to take such reflections upon his favorites 
 as somewhat personal, he concluded that his opinion 
 had only been asked through recognition of his pres- 
 ence, not that it was wanted, and said no more." ^ 
 
 Singularly enough, Longstreet makes no mention of 
 General Lee's taking any part in the conference. The 
 interesting fact, however, is established by General 
 Long, that Lee was for fighting McClellan on the Penin- 
 sula, on one of ''the excellent fields of battle for a small 
 army contending with a great one." "The President," 
 continues Johnston in his narrative, "decided in favor 
 of the opinion of General Lee, and ordered General 
 Johnston to take command of the Army of the Penin- 
 sula, adding the departments of Norfolk and the Penin- 
 sula to that of Northern Virginia." 
 
 * Longstreet's "From Manassas to Appomattox," p. 66. 
 
134 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 General Johnston assumed his new command on the 
 17th of April, and proceeded to finish the works begun 
 by Magruder along the line of the Warwick River. 
 
 Lee's views, however, were not adopted, and though 
 Johnston had placed his army between McClellan and 
 Richmond, the advance on the Confederate capital was 
 steady and disheartening. A sharp battle was fought 
 at Williamsburg, the ancient capital of the Old Do- 
 minion, in which, as very often occurred, both sides 
 claimed the advantage; but if Napoleon's dictum be 
 sound, that that side is to be deemed the victor which 
 is able to advance first, the balance was in favor of the 
 Union arms, even though they lost more men and five 
 guns. The true advantage to the Confederates was 
 that they were able, against McClellan's earnest efforts, 
 to bring off the garrisons of the forts at the mouth of 
 the York, extricate their trains, and retire leisurely up 
 the Peninsula to the defensive position behind the 
 Chickahominy, in the neighborhood of Richmond. The 
 evacuation, however, of Yorktown and the withdrawal 
 of Johnston's army necessitated the evacuation of Nor- 
 folk and Portsmouth. 
 
 The iron-clad Virginia — the old Merrimac, by which 
 latter name she was, and doubtless will continue to be, 
 better known — being unable to take the seas, partly 
 because of her slow rate of speed, which prevented her 
 passing the Federal batteries at the mouth of Hampton 
 Roads, and yet more because of her inability to secure 
 coal and other stores, and being unable because of her 
 heavy draught to go up the James, was, on the 11th 
 of May, sunk by her commander, Conmiodorc Tatnall. 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 135 
 
 Thus, the James as well as the York was thenceforth 
 open to the Federal gunboats and transports as far 
 up as Drewry's Bluff, a high point commanding the 
 narrows of the James, only seven or eight miles below 
 Richmond. 
 
 Thus, as the spring closed while the fortunes of the 
 South had waned lamentably in the South-west, the 
 Confederate capital was menaced by an army which 
 had forced its way up the Peninsula and was believed 
 to be capable of taking Richmond whenever its general 
 saw fit to deliver his assault. Feeling sure of it, Mc- 
 Clellan approached leisurely up the north bank of 
 the Chickahominy and entrenched his army in the po- 
 sitions he secured from time to time, until he was 
 within sight of the spires of Richmond, and on quiet 
 nights his pickets could hear the sound of the city's 
 bells pealing the hours. It was believed by many that 
 Richmond was doomed, and there was even discussion 
 of moving the seat of government to a more secure 
 capital in the South. The situation was grave, indeed. 
 McDowell, with 40,000 men, was at Fredericksburg on 
 the Rappahannock, but sixty miles away, and was 
 under stringent orders to effect a junction with Mc- 
 Clellan, who, to get in touch with him and protect his 
 base at West Point on the York, had reached out on 
 the north side of the Chickahominy as far as Hanover 
 Court House and the North Anna. Two armies, one 
 under Banks in the Valley of Virginia and the other 
 under Fremont to the westward, were keeping Stone- 
 wall Jackson so fully engaged that he was making 
 marches which gained for his infantry the appellation 
 
136 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 of "foot cavalry," and to hold his own he was forced 
 to win two battles on two successive days. It is no 
 wonder that the Confederate authorities should have 
 regarded the situation with deep concern — even Mr. 
 Davis, habitually so sanguine, speaking of ''the droop- 
 ing cause of our country"^ — and that the Union 
 authorities should have been correspondingly elated. 
 Richmond, apparently to the latter, lay almost at the 
 mercy of the overwhelming army which McClellan had 
 organized and brought to her gates. The only bright 
 spot on the horizon was the Shenandoah Valley, where 
 Stonewall Jackson, unleashed by Lee, was with his 
 gallant little army showing amazing results, and by 
 his ''terrifying swiftness" and unexpected genius was 
 keeping Washington in a panic, and withholding from 
 McClellan's aid the forces under McDowell, Fremont, 
 Milroy, Banks, and Shields, fully eight times the num- 
 ber of men in his own command. He recognized the 
 necessity of making such a show of force in the Shen- 
 andoah Valley to the westward of Washington as 
 would hold the Union forces there for the defence of 
 Washington. 
 
 It had been the plan of McClellan to have McDowell 
 join him on the Peninsula with his corps, which would 
 have brought his force before Richmond up to some 
 150,000 men, and it had been the intention of the 
 government at Washington to permit this plan to be 
 carried out. They insisted, however, that McDowell, 
 instead of going by water, should advance across coun- 
 
 ' Letter to General Joseph E. Johnston, May 11, 1862. (Ropes, II, 
 p. 114.) 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 137 
 
 try along the line of the Richmond, Fredericksburg, 
 and Potomac Railway, and join McClellan in the low- 
 lands of Hanover, thus keeping his forces in touch with 
 Washington. The 26th of May was set for his ad- 
 vance; but on the afternoon of that very day, owing 
 to Jackson's "rapid and terrifying movements" in 
 the valley of the Shenandoah, this order was, to the 
 "amazement and regret" of both McDowell and McClel- 
 lan, "suspended," and McDowell was ordered to send 
 20,000 men directly to the Valley to aid in the capture 
 of Jackson. The plan appeared feasible enough to 
 civilians and office soldiers, but; as already stated, was 
 frustrated by Jackson's brilliant extraction of his forces 
 by his famous retreat from the Potomac to Strasburg, 
 between the enemy's converging armies, and the sub- 
 sequent victories of Cross Keys and Port Republic on 
 June 8 and 9. 
 
 The retirement of the Confederate forces on Rich- 
 mond had enabled McClellan to proceed up the York to 
 West Point, where the Mattapony and the Pamunkey 
 Rivers join, forming the York. Here he established 
 his base of supplies, and by a singular coincidence he 
 established his head-quarters at "The White House," 
 a plantation belonging to General Lee. From this 
 point he pushed his advance forward toward Richmond, 
 occupying the country l}ing to the northward of Rich- 
 mond, and throwing his left, consisting of the Third 
 and Fourth Corps, under Heintzelman and Keyes, 
 across the Chickahominy, a small, sluggish river that 
 flows south-westerly into the James through a wide, 
 marshy bottom, densely timbered, and often broken 
 
138 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 into a number of channels. Uplands rise on both sides 
 of the stream, and it is crossed only by the bridges on 
 the roads to Richmond. The Fifth Corps remained on 
 the northern side of the Chickahominy, guarding the 
 line of communication with the York. 
 
 Thus, McClellan's forces were divided by a stream 
 which, although apparently insignificant during dry 
 weather, was, when swollen by rains, a factor to be 
 seriously reckoned with. 
 
 In view of this division of his troops, Johnston had 
 determined to attack him before any reinforcements 
 could reach him from Fredericksburg, where McDowell 
 lay with his 40,000 men, prepared to aid McClellan 
 before Richmond, or Fremont in the valley of the 
 Shenandoah, as need required. 
 
 It was a region to which both commanders had 
 looked forward as a probable battle-ground — a gener- 
 ally level country, intersected by an occasional ravine 
 or swamp, often heavily wooded, where some tribu- 
 tary creek had worn its way deep through the alluvial 
 soil, spreading out in the bottoms with impenetrable 
 thickets. But McClellan had not reckoned on the di- 
 vision of his army, which now left three of his corps 
 (the Second, Fifth, and Sixth) on the north of the 
 Chickahominy, while two (the Third and Fourth) were 
 on the south of the stream. To meet this situation he 
 took measures to establish partially a second base at 
 Harrison's Landing, on the James, to which was due 
 later on the preservation of his army. 
 
 Through this region three roads ran from Richmond 
 eastwardly, and substantially parallel to the James, 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 139 
 
 known respectively as the Nine Mile Road, one fork of 
 which ran to New Bridge, on the Chickahominy, the 
 other to Fair Oaks Station, on the Richmond and York 
 River Railroad; the Williamsburg Stage Road; and 
 most southerly of all, the Charles City or River Road. 
 Johnston had, in face of McClellan's steady advance, 
 and, as stated, somewhat against the views of Lee, 
 fallen back on Richmond, and, finding McClellan's 
 army divided by the swollen Chickahominy, had, on 
 May 31, attacked his left under Keyes at Seven Pines, 
 and driven him back to Fair Oaks, possibly missing a 
 complete victory only by reason of Longstreet's slow- 
 ness; then, having been severely wounded, he had been 
 forced to leave the field, and next day a renewal of the 
 attack under General G. W. Smith had resulted in a re- 
 pulse. In this battle Longstreet was to have charge 
 of the general management of the operations along the 
 New Bridge Road, and was to be assisted by Huger 
 from the Charles City Road. By some error, however, 
 in the orders, which were verbal, or in the understand- 
 ing of these orders — first, questions arose between the 
 two commanders; and secondly, the orders were not 
 complied with promptly. Longstreet, instead of at- 
 tacking in the morning by the New Bridge Road, 
 moved to the south-east on the Williamsburg Road, 
 and did not attack until after one o'clock, when, in- 
 stead of concentrating and destroying, as was expected, 
 Keyes's corps, which was stationed somewhat peril- 
 ously far in advance of Heintzelman's force, he only 
 defeated it and drove it in, where it was saved by the 
 opportune arrival of Sedgwick's division of Sumner's 
 
140 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 corps, which had crossed the river at half-past twc, 
 and reaching the field at five o'clock, had attacked in 
 flank. Hill's gallant and persistent attack in the early 
 afternoon carried the field; but it was too late to avail 
 of the golden opportunity that had offered at the be- 
 ginning of the day, and though it was a victory, and 
 the Confederates captured 10 guns, 6,000 rnuskets, and 
 5 colors, besides 347 prisoners,^ it was not the decisive 
 victory it should have been, and the enemy was ready 
 to fight again the next morning. 
 
 On the eve of Seven Pines, Lee sent Colonel Long, 
 of his staff, with a message to Johnston, 'Ho tell him 
 that he would be glad to participate in the battle." 
 He had no desire to interfere with his command, but 
 simply wished to aid him on the field to the best of 
 his ability, and in any manner in which his services 
 would be of most value. Johnston, thanking him, 
 invited him to ride down to the battle-field, and asked 
 that he send him such reinforcements as he could.^ 
 
 General Johnston, in command of the operations, 
 was, about sunset, shot out of his saddle and severely 
 wounded, and the general command devolved upon 
 General Gustavus W. Smith. The battle was renewed 
 the following morning by General Smith, who ordered 
 Longstreet "to renew the engagement and to direct 
 his attack toward the north," where lay Richardson's 
 ''powerful division" of Sumner's corps, that had crossed 
 the river to the rescue the afternoon before; but Long- 
 street seems to have believed that the entire Federal 
 army was opposed to him, and to have been afraid 
 
 ' Ropes, II, pp. 152, 154. ''Long's "Lee," p. 158. 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 141 
 
 of exposing his right flank to the troops of the Fourth 
 Division, who still lay where they had been driven 
 back the evening before. At any rate, he is charged 
 by critics on both sides with having been "singularly 
 lacking in energy and dash/' and with ''having made 
 no serious effort to carry the Union lines." * Huger's 
 brave brigades, under Armistead and Mahone, made a 
 gallant attack, but were repulsed after hard fighting, 
 and at two o'clock a new commander arrived on tlie 
 field. 
 
 It was in this crisis that Lee was placed in command. 
 Lee had ridden down to the battle-field with President 
 Davis while the fight was in progress, and when the 
 wounding of Johnston was reported to the President, 
 he informed Lee that he wished him to take charge. 
 The next day he issued the order, as follows : 
 
 Richmond, Va., June 1, 1862. 
 General R. E. Lee. 
 
 Sir: The unfortunate casualty which has deprived 
 the army in front of Richmond of its immediate com- 
 mander, General Johnston, renders it necessary to in- 
 terfere temporarily with the duties to which you were 
 assigned in connection with the general service, but 
 only so far as to make you available for command in 
 the field of a particular army. You will assume com- 
 mand of the army in Eastern Virginia, and in North 
 Carolina, and give such orders as may be needful and 
 proper. 
 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Jefferson Davis. 
 
 » Ropes, II, p. 149. 
 
142 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Lee thereupon issued his first order to the gallant 
 army with which his fame was thenceforth to be so 
 inseparably bound up. It ran: 
 
 Special Orders No. 22. 
 
 Head-quarters, Richmond, Va., June 1, 1862. 
 
 In pursuance of the orders of the President, General 
 R. E, Lee assumes command of the armies of Eastern 
 Virginia and North Carolina. The unfortunate casualty 
 that has deprived the army in front of Richmond of the 
 valuable services of its able general, is not more deeply 
 deplored by any member of the command than by its 
 present commander. He hopes his absence will be but 
 temporary, and while he will endeavor to the best of 
 his ability to perform his duties, he feels he will be 
 totally inadequate to the task unless he shall receive 
 the cordial support of every officer and man. 
 
 By order of General Lee. 
 
 W. H. Taylor, 
 Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
 The situation at Richmond when, in succession to 
 Johnston, Lee was appointed in command of the Army 
 of Northern Virginia was substantially this : The Con- 
 federate troops, lying between Richmond and McClel- 
 lan's army, numbered about 70,000 men. A steady 
 retreat up the Peninsula had tended to impair their 
 spirit, if not their morale. The single check given to 
 McClellan at Williamsburg had resulted in nothing 
 more practical than to allow time for the retirement on 
 Richmond, and to teach McClellan a wholesome lesson 
 of respect for his enemy. The attack at Seven Pines, 
 
WHEN LEE TOOK COMMAND 143 
 
 on the afternoon of May 31, had been so gallantly 
 pressed that it had resulted in a victory, but not the 
 complete victory that had been expected. Owing to 
 Longstreet's slowness and, possibly, to his half-heart- 
 edness, which led him to wait until the afternoon 
 before making the assault planned for the morning, 
 thereby allowing Sunuier to cross the falling Chicka- 
 hominy and save Keyes, and on the next day led him 
 to attack Sumner with only three brigades instead of 
 with his full force, the victory of the 31st had been fol- 
 lowed by the repulse at Fair Oaks next day, when 
 General G. W. Smith commanded. In the same way, 
 a few weeks later, as Henderson points out, he became 
 responsible for the frontal battle of Malvern Hill. 
 
 It was characteristic of Lee that, although appointed 
 to supersede General Smith on the 1st of June, he left 
 him in actual conmaand in the battle of that day, only 
 endorsing his orders, and aiding him in bringing rein- 
 forcements from the conmaands of Ripley and Holmes.^ 
 
 The fortunes of the Confederacy in the West and 
 along the seaboard, as we have seen, were at this time 
 at a low ebb, and McClellan was now apparently sure 
 of the capture of the Confederate capital. Should it 
 fall, Virginia was likely to be overrun by the forces of 
 the Union, and the principal seat of war would be the 
 South or the West. McClellan's army numbered about 
 110,000 men, now well organized and fairly seasoned; 
 his equipment was as good as the world could furnish, 
 and he believed himself, and was believed to be, a 
 young Napoleon. McDowell's army, was at Fredericks- 
 
 'Fitz Lee's "Lee," p. 147. 
 
144 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 burg, only sixty miles away, clamorous to join him and 
 participate in the glory of the capture of the "rebel capi- 
 tal," and under orders to do so, while already, in the 
 Shenandoah Valley, or ready to march thither, was 
 Fremont with 20,000 men, all operating to unite and 
 fall on Richmond. 
 
 Such, in brief, was the situation when Lee assumed 
 command, on June 1, 1862, and the fate of Richmond 
 was placed in his hands. His prestige at this time was 
 far from being what it soon afterward became, or even 
 what it had been previous to the outbreak of the war. 
 His ability as an engineer was recognized; but the 
 proof of a general is victories, and that proof he had 
 not given. 
 
CHAPTER VII 
 
 BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 
 
 Lee, thus called from the titular position of military 
 adviser to the President to the command of the army 
 defending Richmond, to take the place of Johnston, 
 found himself in command of about 80,000 men— 70,000 
 of whom were close by. 
 
 Longstreet, who was given to being critical of Lee, 
 as of many others, has an interesting account of Lee's 
 action and the impression made by him when he first 
 assumed command of the army which was to be thence- 
 forth associated with his fame. The assignment of 
 General Lee to the command was, he states, ''far from 
 reconcihng the troops to the loss of their beloved chief, 
 General Joseph E. Johnston, on whom all hearts leaned 
 and whom all loved." ''Lee's experience in active 
 field work had been limited to his West Virginia cam- 
 paign, which was not successful." His services as an 
 engineer had been able and as an engineer he had been 
 "especially distinguished." "But officers of the line," 
 he adds, "are not apt to look to the staff in choosing 
 leaders of soldiers, either in tactics or strategy." 
 
 "During the first week of his authority," he contin- 
 ues, "Lee called his general officers to meet him on the 
 Nine Mile Road for a general talk. This novelty was 
 not reassuring, as experience had told that secrecy in 
 
 145 
 
146 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 war was an essential clement of success; that public 
 discussion and secrecy were incompatible." 
 
 They met, and the generals talked. But as they rode 
 homeward, it came to them that Lee had '^ disclosed 
 nothing," ''and," says Longstreet, ''all rode back to 
 their camps little wiser than when they went, except 
 that they found General Lee's object was to learn of 
 the temper of those of his officers whom he did not 
 know, and of the condition and tone among their 
 troops." Surely no bad illustration of the new com- 
 mander's wisdom! 
 
 One more personal touch follows. General Wliiting 
 was afraid of bayous and parallels, and complained of 
 the sickness in his command on account of his position 
 at Fair Oaks, and asked that his command be given a 
 better position. "Wliiting's Division was broken up," 
 says Longstreet. "Three of his brigades were ordered 
 to A. P. Hill's Division. He was permitted to choose 
 two brigades that were to constitute his own command. 
 Besides his own he selected Hood's Brigade. With 
 these two he was ordered by way of Lynchburg to re- 
 port to General Jackson in the valley district." Long- 
 street's thrust at Wliiting throws unconsciously a ray 
 on Lee. Whiting, however, was soon to come to Long- 
 street's relief on the hills above Beaver Dam Creek, and 
 within the month. Hood's Texans were to "put on im- 
 mortality" by being the first to pierce Fitz John Por- 
 ter's blazing lines. 
 
 This was undoubtedly the same conference of which 
 Mr. Davis speaks,* and at which he was present, having, 
 
 * "Rise and Fall of the Confederacy," vol. II, chap. XXIII. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 147 
 
 as he rode by on his way out to the army, seen a num- 
 ber of horses at a house, among which he recognized 
 General Lee's horse, and having joined the conference. 
 "The tone of the conversation," he says, "was quite 
 despondent, and one especially pointed out the inevi- 
 table consequence of the enemy's advance by throwing 
 out 'bayous and constructing successive parallels." 
 This must have been the same general whose division, 
 as Longstreet states, was broken up, and here we have 
 the reason for it. 
 
 Long supplements the account of this first meeting 
 of Lee and his generals given by Longstreet. "The 
 principal officers of the army were," he says, "present 
 and were almost unanimous in the opinion that the line 
 then occupied should be abandoned for one nearer 
 Richmond, which was considered [by them] more de- 
 fensible." 
 
 Lee, as reported by Longstreet, said nothing at the 
 time; but Long states that he made a personal recon- 
 noissance of the whole position and then, against this 
 almost unanimous judgment of his generals, "declared 
 his intention of holding it," and "ordered it to be im- 
 mediately fortified in the most effective manner." ^ 
 How effective it was the 26th and 27th of June were 
 to show. 
 
 This meeting of Lee and his generals had something 
 of the effect which Napoleon's first meeting with his 
 generals in Italy had.. From that moment the army 
 felt a new hand and soon acknowledged its master. 
 His first act was one which should dispel the delusion 
 
 'Long's "Robert E. Lee," pp. 163, 164. 
 
148 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 that he was great only in defensive operations. It 
 was, indeed, the height of audacity and the forerun- 
 ner in a career in which audacity was possibly the 
 chief element. 
 
 Massing his troops suddenly on the north side of the 
 Chickahominy, and calling Stonewall Jackson from the 
 valley to meet him at a given point at a given hour, he 
 fell upon McClellan's entrenchments, crushed his right 
 wing, and rolled him back to the upland plain of Mal- 
 vern Hill. Was it on the defensive or the offensive that 
 he acted when he conceived and carried through to su- 
 preme success those masterly tactics ? Was he acting 
 on the defensive or offensive when again, dashing upon 
 him on the entrenched uplands of Malvern Hill, he swept 
 him back to his gunboats and shattered at once his 
 plans and his prestige? It was a battle fought as Grant 
 fought at second Cold Harbor, mainly by frontal at- 
 tack; and, like the plan of second Cold Harbor, has 
 been criticised as costing needless waste of life. But, 
 unlike Grant's futile and costly assaults, Malvern Hill, 
 however bloody it was, proved successful. That night 
 McClellan, his great army shattered and his prestige 
 destroyed, retreated to the shelter of his gunboats. 
 Lee's audacious tactics saved Richmond. It was not 
 until nearly three years had passed, and until hundreds 
 of thousands of lives had been spent, and the seed-corn 
 of the Confederate South had been ground in the ever- 
 grinding mills of war, that a Union picket ever again 
 got a glimpse of the spires of Richmond, or any Union 
 soldier, other than a prisoner of war, heard her church 
 bells pealing in the quiet night. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 149 
 
 It had long been plain to Lee's clear vision that 
 the best defence of Virginia's capital was an offensive 
 movement which should menace the Federal capital 
 and compel the Washington government to hold for its 
 defence the troops which otherwise would join McClel- 
 lan, and as early as April 29 he had suggested to Stone- 
 wall Jackson, then operating in the Valley of Virginia, 
 a threatening countermove to prevent, if possible, Mc- 
 Dowell from crossing the Rappahannock and joining 
 McClellan. This Jackson had promptly proceeded to 
 do and had executed his famous double. Crossing the 
 Blue Ridge, as if leaving the Valley of Virginia, then 
 doubling back, he had marched on Milroy, and, defeat- 
 ing him at McDowell, had pursued him to Franklin, 
 and had raised such a commotion in Washington that 
 Banks, Fremont, and McDowell were all set on him by 
 the panic-stricken authorities. Two weeks before the 
 battle of Seven Pines Lee had again prompted Jackson 
 to move on Banks and, if successful, drive him back 
 toward the Potomac and create the impression that 
 he intended to threaten that line, a movement in which 
 Jackson was completely successful. Thus Lee had, 
 with the aid of his able lieutenant, stopped the armies 
 of Fremont and McDowell from any attempt to rein- 
 force McClellan, and was ready when the moment came 
 to carry out his far-reaching plan to defeat and pos- 
 sibly destroy by one swift blow McClellan 's great army, 
 now lying at the gates of Richmond and holding both 
 sides of the Chickahominy. 
 
 It is no part of the plan of this book to discuss in 
 detail Lee's consummate tactics; but a clear outline 
 
150 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 of his far-seeing plan is necessary. ]\IcClellan's army, 
 flushed with hope after the constant advance up the 
 Peninsula, lay in a long shallow arc to the east and 
 north of Richmond, extending from the vicinity of the 
 James to the hills above Beaver Dam Creek — five fine 
 army corps in all. Fitz John Porter's corps, his right 
 wing, lay entrenched on these uplands on the north of 
 the Chickahominy. Franklin's corps lay next to the 
 Chickahominy on the south, Heintzelman on his left, 
 resting on the broad morass of Wliite Oak Swamp, with 
 Keyes's corps behind them in reserve; and all were 
 strongly entrenched. 
 
 Johnston had attacked on the south side of the 
 Chickahominy and failed to dislodge McClellan. Wliat 
 would Lee do? His first act, as stated, was to overrule 
 his generals' almost unanimous opinion to withdraw to 
 the inner defence of Richmond. He retired his army 
 only to the original position held before the assault at 
 Seven Pines, and fortified on the south bank of the 
 Chickahominy, to secure that side of the river against 
 any advance from that direction while he prepared for 
 his coup on the north bank against McClellan's right 
 wing, commanded by the gallant Fitz John Porter. 
 The line, as thus selected, ran from Chaffin's Bluff on 
 the north bank of the James across to a point on the 
 Chickahominy above New Bridge (crossing the River 
 Road about four miles, and the other roads about five 
 miles, from Richmond), thence up the south bank of the 
 Chickahominy to Meadow Bridge at the crossing of the 
 Virginia Central Railroad. Along this line lay the six 
 divisions in which Lee's army was organized: Long- 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 151 
 
 street on the right, and next, in order, Huger, D. H. 
 Hill, Magruder, Wliiting, and A. P. Hill, the latter 
 guarding the left of the Confederate position above the 
 Chickahominy. Each general was made responsible 
 for his line, and was ordered to construct defences in 
 his front, which, manned by the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, should withstand any assault. 
 
 At first there appears to have been much complain- 
 ing of the labor which this entailed on the men, and 
 one of the general officers — a man more noted for his 
 courage than for his reticence — is said to have ha- 
 rangued his men on the disgrace of having to shelter 
 themselves behind sand-bags and earthworks instead 
 of being shown the enemy and led against him. In a 
 short time, however, Lee's constant presence along the 
 lines, his serene confidence and soldierly bearing are 
 said to have restored the good temper and morale of 
 the troops, and before long they began to look for his 
 daily visits as he rode by inspecting the work. Even 
 General Tombs, who had held in some contempt picks 
 and spades, prepared fortifications of logs along his 
 front. 
 
 Lee's military secretary notes, on the 3d of June, 
 that the work ''was in rapid progress all along the line. 
 The men appeared in better spirits than the day before, 
 and seemed to be interested in their work." And so 
 on for many days. On June 6 he notes that 'Hhe 
 troops are in good spirits, and their confidence in Gen- 
 eral Lee is rapidly increasing." 
 
 On June 16, General Lee, accompanied by Colonel 
 Long, made a reconnoissance of the Federal position 
 on the north side of the Chickahominy. "There was 
 
152 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 then on that side of the Hne a Federal force of about 
 25,000 men, commanded by General Fitz John Porter. 
 The main body of this force occupied a position near 
 Mr. Gaines's house, and one division, five or six thou- 
 sand strong, was posted at Mechanicsville. During this 
 reconnoissance," continues Long, ''General Lee turned 
 to the writer and remarked: 'Now, Colonel Long, how 
 can we get at those people?'" 
 \y "Fitz John Porter's position " appeared to him "suf- 
 ficiently exposed to invite attack, and, the force at 
 Fredericksburg having been withdrawn, General Lee 
 determined to assume the aggressive. This determina- 
 tion, however, was communicated only to his military 
 family until he had fully matured his plan of operation, 
 which he then submitted to Mr. Davis in a personal 
 interview." 
 
 Thus, though he had as his first move withdrawn his 
 army even nearer Richmond than before, he had no idea 
 of remaining there idle while McClellan prepared to 
 dislodge him. On the 8th of June he outlined to the 
 Secretary of War his plan that Jackson should be "pre- 
 pared to act with the army near Richmond if called 
 on," and on the 11th, having decided to send Stuart to 
 feel around McClellan's right wing, he wrote Jackson of 
 his plans for McClellan's destruction, as follows: 
 
 Head-quarters, near Richmond, June 11, 1862. 
 
 Brigadier-General Thomas J. Jackson, Commanding 
 the Valley District. 
 General: Your recent successes have been the cause 
 of the liveliest joy to this army, as well as to the coun- 
 try. The admiration caused by your skill and bold- 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 153 
 
 ness has been constantly mingled with solicitude for 
 your situation. The practicability of re-inforcing you 
 has been the subject of earnest consideration. It has 
 been determined to do so at the expense of weakening 
 this army. Brigadier-General Lawton, with six regi- 
 ments from Georgia, is on the way to you, and Brigadier- 
 General Whiting, with eight veteran regiments, leaves 
 here to-day. The object is to enable you to crush the 
 forces opposed to you, then leave your unavailable 
 troops to watch the country and guard the passes cov- 
 ered by your cavalry and artillery, and with your main 
 body, including EwelPs Division and Lawton's and 
 Whiting's command, move rapidly to Ashland by rail 
 or otherwise, as you may find most advantageous, and 
 sweep down between the Chickahominy and Pamunkey, 
 cutting up the enemy's comrriunications, while this 
 army attacks General McClellan in front. He will thus, 
 I think, be forced to come out of his entrenchments, 
 where he is strongly posted on the Chickahominy and 
 apparently prepared to move by gradual approaches 
 on Richmond. Keep me advised of your movements, 
 and, if practicable, precede your troops, that we may 
 confer and arrange for simultaneous attack. I am, 
 with great respect, your obedient servant. 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 It was deemed important to ascertain how McClel- 
 lan's line of communication with his base of supplies 
 on the York River was protected. To secure accurate 
 information Lee despatched General Stuart with a small 
 force (about 1,200 cavalry and a battery of horse 
 artillery)^ to investigate around his right flank and 
 make a reconnoissance in the direction of McClellan's 
 
 » Walter H. Taylor's "General Lee," p. 58. 
 
154 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 line of communication, with his base at West Point. 
 Stuart's brilliant performance of this task set a new 
 mark for cavalry leaders the world over. Setting forth 
 from Richmond on the 11th of June, he rode north, 
 as if bound for the mountains, then, turning eastward, 
 passed down through Hanover upon McClellan's right, 
 driving before him a small body of cavalry which 
 he found there and defeating an occupying force 
 found at Old Church, some ten miles below Hanover 
 Court House on the Virginia Central Railroad. In 
 a small skirmish between the two places he lost the 
 only man lost in the raid, the gallant Captain Latane, 
 who was killed leading a charge against a troop of the 
 enemy which attempted to bar the way. Passing on 
 from Old Church he struck McClellan's line of com- 
 munication, the York River Railroad, at Tunstall's 
 Station, where he destroyed the railroad and took note 
 of the indifferent measures adopted to guard the line. 
 Then knowing that an overwhelming force had been 
 sent out in his rear to cut off his retreat, he conceived 
 the daring plan of pushing onward and making a dash 
 around McClellan's entire army. 
 
 Accordingly, turning southward, he headed straight 
 for the Chickahominy, in McClellan's rear. Finding 
 that the bridge on which he had expected to cross had 
 been washed away, he tore down an old building near 
 by and utilizing the remaining timbers of the old 
 bridge, constructed a bridge, swam his horses, crossed 
 in the rear of McClellan, and after a hazardous and 
 record-breaking march, riding night and day, reached 
 the James, swept up its north bank beyond McClellan's 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 155 
 
 left, and reached Richmond with the information de- 
 sired, having made a complete circuit of McClellan's 
 army. 
 
 This achievement had several inamediate conse- 
 quences: It aroused a wide-spread distrust of McClel- 
 lan; it possibly decided Lee to change his first plan to 
 the one he finally adopted, of overwhelming McClellan's 
 right and cutting him off from his base of supplies on 
 the north; and it probably decided McClellan to estab- 
 lish a new base on the James. In any event, a few 
 days later McClellan began to send transports, with 
 all needed anamunition and supplies, to Harrison's 
 Landing, on the James, to provide for a contingency 
 which he had for some time been considering — the 
 possibility of needing some other base than West Point. 
 
 McClellan, however^ while contemplating establish- 
 ing a base of supplies on the James, which he controlled, 
 in preparation for some quick move, appears to have 
 continued satisfied with his former disposition of his 
 forces, by which he occupied both sides of the Chicka- 
 hominy within eight miles of Richmond, except that 
 he transferred the Second and Sixth Corps to the south 
 side of that stream, leaving only the Fifth Corps on the 
 north side. Here he fortified the approaches to his 
 position on the uplands behind Beaver Dam Creek. 
 He yet more heavily fortified the position on the south 
 side of the Chickahominy, extending his powerful 
 field works from a point known as Golding's Farm to 
 White Oak Swamp, a boggy and thickly timbered 
 bottom extending for several miles at an angle to the 
 Chickahominy. He appears to have been obsessed 
 
156 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 with the conviction that the enemy in front of him 
 largely outnumbered him, and he constantly and ur- 
 gently applied for reinforcements. 
 
 On the southern side, as we have seen, Jackson was 
 instructed to strike a blow in the Shenandoah Valley 
 which should startle Washington, and, while they were 
 still dazed, to hasten and join Lee on the Chicka- 
 hominy, and with his veterans act as Lee's left wing 
 in a blow on McClellan's right which should drive him 
 from before Richmond. To make sure of this, as well 
 as to lull McClellan to a sense of security, several bri- 
 gades were sent to Jackson; but time appeared so im- 
 portant to Lee that Jackson was summoned to leave 
 his cavalry and a small force to watch the enemy and 
 join him without waiting for a stroke in the valley. 
 The day after Stuart returned from his raid, Jackson 
 was told that the sooner he could come the better. 
 Putting his troops in motion, the general rode ahead to 
 Richmond to learn the details of Lee's plans, and then 
 rode back to hurry forward his troops, already push- 
 ing on by forced marches toward the field where, by 
 Lee's brilliant plan, the assault was to be delivered at 
 dawn on the 26th by his combined forces.^ This he 
 felt sure would force McClellan out of his entrench- 
 ments, where he was strongly posted and apparently 
 prepared to move by gradual approaches on Richmond. 
 
 It has been stated that his despatching of troops 
 to the valley was done ostentatiously to deceive the 
 enemy; but Lee's letter of the same date to the Secre- 
 tary of War disposes of this idea. In it he states that 
 
 » Walter H. Taylor's "General Lee," p. 60. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 157 
 
 it is very desirable and important that the acquisition 
 of troops to the command of General T. J. Jackson 
 should be kept secret, and with this in view he requests 
 the secretary to use his influence with the Richmond 
 newspapers to prevent any mention of the same in the 
 public prints. 
 
 Moreover, when he decided that he would not wait 
 longer for Jackson, and three days later ordered him to 
 join him at once, he again impressed on him that, 'Ho 
 be efficacious, the movement must be secret." The 
 effect, however, had been already gained, for on the 
 18th McClellan telegraphed the government at Wash- 
 ington that some 10,000 men had been sent to Jackson 
 the same day that Jackson, doubling on his track with 
 three divisions, "containing ten brigades, with eight 
 batteries," perhaps 25,000 men in all, headed for the 
 Chickahominy. 
 
 Jackson had already in the intervening time fought, 
 on June 8 and 9, respectively, the victorious battles of 
 Cross Keys and Port Republic, defeating Fremont and 
 Shields, and struck new awe in the breast of the govern- 
 ment at Washington. And so rapid and secret were 
 his movements that while Mr. Lincoln and McClellan 
 were exchanging telegrams relative to Jackson's re- 
 inforcements from Lee, he was already half way to 
 Richmond. And when, on the 25th of June, Secretary 
 Stanton, in reply to a despatch from McClellan, asking 
 for the latest information about Jackson, telegraphed 
 that he had heard that Jackson was at Gordonsville 
 with 10,000 rebels, but that neither McDowell nor 
 Banks nor Fremont had any knowledge of his move- 
 
158 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 merits, Jackson was bivouacked at Ashland, but a few 
 hours from the field of Gaines's Mill. 
 
 Lee's first plan appears to have been to bring Jack- 
 son down- from the valley and fling him upon McClel- 
 lan's right, and at the same time with such turning 
 movement attack McClellan in front, somewhat as 
 had been done at Seven Pines. But this plan was sub- 
 sequently abandoned for one by which Jackson was, 
 as we have seen, still to attack McClellan's right, as 
 previously proposed, and Lee was to cross to the north 
 of the Chickahominy and unite with him in first de- 
 stroying McClellan's right wing and then in falling 
 upon his main body in the retreat down the Peninsula, 
 which he felt sure he would compel.^ Longstreet as- 
 serts that he suggested this movement to Lee; but 
 the fact is questioned by most authorities and denied 
 by some, and the claim, in face of Lee's silence and of 
 other incontrovertible facts, appears untenable. The 
 chief danger, and a grave one, in this plan was that 
 McClellan, if he learned of the intended removal from 
 his front of Lee's main body, might suddenly assume 
 the offensive and, carrying the depleted works in his 
 front by a sudden assault, seize Richmond. 
 
 The matter resolved itself, finally, into a decision 
 based on the character of the two generals. Lee's 
 plan was the height of audacity; but he decided upon it 
 and carried it through with unwavering resolution to a 
 brilliant conclusion. McClellan did, indeed, on learn- 
 ing through his secret-service agents and an occasional 
 deserter that Jackson was on his way to join in an at- 
 
 • Ropes, II, p. 1G5. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 159 
 
 tack on him, take steps to assume the offensive. He 
 directed General Porter to make provision to guard his 
 right flank (June 23), and spoke of 'Hhe decisive move- 
 ment" to be made to "determine the fate of Rich- 
 mond." ^ He sent General Casey to the Wliite House 
 to protect his base of supplies and his line of communi- 
 cation therewith. He ordered Heintzelman to ad- 
 vance his pickets on the Williamsburg Road, in the 
 direction of Richmond, and so satisfied was he with 
 his progress that he telegraphed to Washington to an- 
 nounce the success of the movement. 
 
 At this time, however, Jackson, almost at the end of 
 his long march, was drawing near Ashland, and Lee was 
 writing his battle order, which was to roll up McClellan's 
 right wing beyond the Chickahominy and send it across 
 the stream by night, shattered and disheartened. In 
 this movement of McClellan's a severe fight took place 
 between Hooker, on the one side, supported by Kearney 
 on the left and Richardson, of Sumner's corps, on the 
 right, and Armistead and Wright, of Huger's Division, on 
 the Southern side, reinforced later by Mahone and Ran- 
 som. The fight lasted until night, and the losses on 
 either side were between four and five hundred men. 
 That night the Federals fell back to their old positions. 
 With this affair, says Allan, "McClellan's opportunity 
 of delivering battle on his own terms passed away." ^ 
 
 Lee, who up to this time had held his forces in hand 
 on the south side of the Chickahominy, now, as the 
 Federals retired, moved Longstreet and D. H. Hill over 
 
 » Allan, p. 136. Ropes, II, p. 169. 
 
 * Allan's "Army of Northern Virginia," pp. 74, 75. 
 
160 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 toward the Chickahominy to be ready to cross near 
 Mechanicsville and join in the attack on Porter next 
 day. His plan was to leave 30,000 men to hold Mc- 
 Clellan's main body of 70,000 men and with 50,000 fall 
 on his right wing, numbering only some 35,000 men. 
 
 Lee's specific battle order was issued on the 24th, 
 and is given in full (in Appendix A) for the benefit of 
 those who wish to study his first battle order. 
 
 Had these orders been carried out exactly, there is 
 no doubt that Porter would have been flanked and 
 forced out of his position without the frightful cost of 
 A. P. Hill's deadly assaults on the heights above 
 Beaver Dam and Po white Creeks. With Jackson up, 
 Lee's army numbered about 80,000 men.^ His plan 
 briefly was for Jackson, with his veterans, to advance 
 before daylight on June 26, with Stuart on his left, 
 and turn the long right wing of McClellan's army, under 
 Porter, posted at Mechanicsville in a strong position, 
 commanding the turnpike and bridge across the Chick- 
 ahominy, with Beaver Dam Creek and its upland be- 
 hind it; for Branch's Brigade, facing Porter, to keep 
 in touch with Jackson, and on his advance to cross the 
 Chickahominy and rejoin his commander. A, P. Hill; 
 for A. P. Hill, as soon as he knew Jackson was engaged, 
 to cross the Chickahominy at the Meadow Bridge and un- 
 cover the crossing of the Chickahominy at the Mechan- 
 icsville Bridge; for Longstreet to cross to the support 
 of A. P. Hill and for D. H. Hill to cross to the support 
 of Jackson; and the front divisions moving together, 
 with Jackson in advance, would sweep down the Chick- 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 69. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 161 
 
 ahominy, drive Porter from his position above New 
 Bridge, and pressing forward together toward the York 
 River Railroad, close upon McClellan's rear and force 
 him down the Chickahominy. Meanwhile Magruder 
 and Huger were to hold the defences on the south side 
 of the Chickahominy and keep McClellan's main army 
 well occupied. 
 
 Lee's plan was the consummation of audacity, for it 
 would leave only 30,000 men to confront and hold Mc- 
 Clellan's left wing and centre on the south of the Chick- 
 ahominy, while he assaulted his right wing on the north 
 bank with his main army. Happily for Lee, McClellan 
 was obsessed with the idea that the force opposite to 
 him numbered at least 200,000 men. This idea had 
 held him back hitherto. This idea held him back now. 
 He neither reinforced Porter on the north bank of the 
 river until the 27th, nor attacked Lee's front though it 
 had been denuded to barely 30,000 men. The time 
 fixed for the assault was based on Jackson's convic- 
 tion that he could be up and ready to attack at day- 
 light on the 26th of June. But for once in his life 
 Jackson was not "up." He was to have been at the 
 Slash Church, near Ashland, on the 25th, and was to 
 bivouac near the Central Railway (now the Chesapeake 
 and Ohio), ready to march at three o'clock on the 
 morning of the 26th on the road to Pole Green Church 
 to deliver the assault which was to be the signal to 
 A. P. Hill to cross the Chickahominy. But it was not 
 until four o'clock that afternoon that he was able to 
 reach the neighborhood of the field of battle, where the 
 fight had been raging for several hours, and even then 
 
162 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 he did not attack, but halted and lay with the roar of the 
 guns to his right distinctly audible. 
 
 A. P. Hill having waited all day for news of Jackson, 
 finally, fearful that the whole plan might miscarry, 
 moved at three o'clock, crossed the Chickahominy at 
 Meadow Bridge, and carried the stoutly defended posi- 
 tion of Mechanicsville, several miles below. Here he 
 found himself in front of Porter, posted " in a formida- 
 ble position " above Beaver Dam Creek, with his entire 
 line covered by strong entrenchments, the approach to 
 which was over an open plain exposed to a withering 
 fire of cannon and musketry. Here lay McCall's power- 
 ful division of 9,500 men and beyond them in support- 
 ing distance were two brigades of Morell's division 
 where they could guard the Federal right or support the 
 centre. Without waiting for further news of Jackson, 
 Hill, who was an ardent fighter, pushing forward, as- 
 saulted furiously, but in vain, the strongly defended 
 position beyond Beaver Dam Creek. The utmost hero- 
 ism was shown on both sides, as the frightful death-roll 
 showed. Wlien night fell the Confederate losses in 
 killed and wounded are said to have been nearly 1,500 
 men,^ while the Union losses were only 361, and, accord- 
 ing to Ropes's view, Hill, who had ^'attacked fiercely 
 and recklessly, was repulsed with great slaughter with- 
 out having made the smallest impression on the Federal 
 lines." ^ 
 
 Jackson, who had moved from Ashland at three 
 o'clock in the morning, reached Hundley's Corners, 
 
 ' Livermore's "Numbers and Losses," p. 82. 
 * Ropes, II, p. 172. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 163 
 
 some three miles from the battle-field, about four in 
 the afternoon, and, though the battle was thundering 
 not far away, he went into bivouac, an act which has 
 given rise to endless wonder and discussion. 
 
 It has always been a question among military stu- 
 dents as to on whom rested the responsibility for the 
 costly attack of the 26th of June on the formidable 
 position above Beaver Dam Creek. Ropes places it on 
 A. P. Hill, to whom he refers as "a daring and energetic 
 but inconsiderate officer." Henderson declares that 
 "the order of June 24, instructing Jackson to start 
 from Slash Church at 3 a. m. on the 26th, and thus lead- 
 ing the other generals to believe that he would certainly 
 be there, should never have been issued," and thus lays 
 the responsibility on Lee. Allan states that Lee's orig- 
 inal plan, by which Jackson was to turn McClellan's 
 right wing, failed through Jackson's not being up. 
 "The Confederate leader felt that his plan of operation 
 must now be apparent to General McClellan," and that 
 "with two-thirds of his army north of the Chickahominy, 
 and but one-third holding the lines in front of the city 
 against McClellan's main body, no time must be al- 
 lowed his adversary to make new dispositions or to set 
 forward a counter movement against Richmond. He, 
 therefore, ordered A. P. Hill to make a direct attack on 
 the Federal positions." * This inferentially seems to 
 place the responsibility on Jackson. And to the same 
 effect are the declarations of General Long and Colonel 
 Taylor, both of whom were on Lee's staff and both of 
 whom give the fear of McClellan's making a counter 
 
 * Allan's "Army of Northern Virginia," p. 80. 
 
164 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 attack on Richmond as the reason for not delaying the 
 attack till Jackson had come up on the flank. That 
 night and next morning, however, McClellan, under 
 protection of his artillery, retired his right wing to his 
 second line above Powhite Creek, in a crescent front- 
 ing Gaines's Mill and Cold Harbor and covering his 
 bridges. Lee, eager to secure the fruits of his strategy 
 and crush McClellan's right wing, and apprehensive 
 lest McClellan might, on finding his main army beyond 
 the Chickahominy, overwhelm Magruder and Huger 
 and march on Richmond, assumed personal direction 
 of the field next day. As soon as it was discovered 
 that Porter was withdrawing his troops from his posi- 
 tion above Beaver Dam Creek, Lee ordered A. P. Hill 
 to push forward in pursuit, and D. H. Hill to join Jack- 
 son to the left in an attack around Porter's right flank. 
 Magruder and Huger, on the south side of the Chick- 
 ahominy, were ordered to demonstrate against the 
 forces in their front "to prevent, as far as possible, all 
 movement on that side," and fully complied with their 
 instructions. It was about noon when A. P. Hill came 
 up with the rear guard of Porter's troops in front of the 
 new Federal position above Powhite Creek.^ This 
 position, like his first, a high plateau above a stream 
 which winds through a deep "bottom," was natu- 
 rally a strong one, and was rendered almost unassail- 
 able by the conformation of the ground, protected 
 by almost impassable swamps and by the abatis of 
 felled trees beyond an open plain a quarter of a mile 
 
 ' The account of these movements is taken partly from Henderson 
 and partly from Allan's "Army of Northern Virginia." 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 165 
 
 wide, swept by a triple line of fire and commanded by 
 heavy batteries on both sides of the Chickahominy. 
 It was a desperate undertaking to drive such a force 
 from such a position, but the need was great — Rich- 
 mond hung in the balance. Lee promptly attacked 
 again, Hill still leading the assault, and after terrific 
 fighting, carried the breastworks, and forced Porter 
 back to the river, across which he withdrew his shat- 
 tered corps that night. 
 
 This battle is said by Allan to have been, perhaps, the 
 most obstinately contested battle of the war, and as 
 Lee's first great battle its details may be given. On 
 finding that Porter had made a stand above Gaines's 
 Mill, Hill's front brigade (Gregg's) was at once de- 
 ployed and sent forward. The Federal skirmishers 
 were driven in, and Gregg, descending into the deep 
 valley, crossed the stream and formed in line on the 
 east side preparatory to attacking the Federal lines on' 
 the face and crest of the ridge. ^ His other brigades, 
 in order — Branch, J. R. Anderson, Field, and Archer — 
 were rapidly moved up and formed in line with Gregg, 
 with Pender in reserve. Here Hill waited, by Lee's 
 orders, till he learned that Longstreet was coming up, 
 lower down the creek, on his right, and then, the 
 approach of Jackson and D. H. Hill being momentarily 
 expected, Lee, who had assumed personal command 
 of the field, gave the order; and about half-past two 
 A. P. Hill let loose his lines, and they dashed forward 
 against the Federal left and centre. 
 
 'Allan's "Army of Northern Virginia," p. 36. Official Records, 
 series I, vol. XI, part II, p. 836. 
 
166 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 The assault was one of the most intrepid made during 
 the war, and it was met with equal intrepidity. Says 
 A. P. Hill: ''The incessant roar of musketry and the 
 deep thunder of the artillery told that the whole force 
 of the enemy was in my front. Branch becoming hard 
 pressed, Pender was sent to his relief. Field and 
 Archer were also doing their part as directed. . . . 
 These two brigades, under their heroic leaders, moving 
 across the open field, met the enemy behind an abatis 
 and strong entrenchments at the base of a long, wooded 
 hill, the enemy being in three lines on the side of this 
 declivity, its crest falling off into a plateau, and this 
 plateau studded with guns. . . . Desperate but un- 
 availing attempts were made to force the enemy 's posi- 
 tion. The 14th South Carolina, Colonel McGowen, on 
 the extreme left, made several daring charges. The 
 16th North Carolina, Colonel McElroy, and 22d, Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Gray, at one time carried the crest of 
 the hill, and were in the enemy's camp, but were driven 
 back by overwhelming numbers. The 35th Georgia, 
 Colonel Thomas, also drove through the enemy's lines 
 like a wedge, but it was of no avail. Gregg and Branch 
 fought with varying success, Gregg having before him 
 the vaunted Zouaves and Sykes's regulars. Pender's 
 Brigade was suffering heavily, but stubbornly held its 
 own. Field and Archer met a withering storm of bul- 
 lets, but pressed on to within a short distance of the 
 enemy's works, but the storm was too fierce for such a 
 handful of men. They recoiled and were again pressed 
 to the charge, but with no better success. These brave 
 men had done all that any brave soldiers could do. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 167 
 
 Directing the men to lie down, the fight was continued 
 and help awaited. From having been the attacking, 
 I now became the attacked, but stubbornly, gallantly 
 was the ground held. My division was thus engaged 
 full two hours before assistance was received." ^ 
 
 Meanwhile Jackson, moving toward Cold Harbor, on 
 finding the roads in his front obstructed and defended 
 by sharp-shooters, had ''gone back into the Bethesda 
 Church Road. This threw him in the rear of D. H. 
 Hill, and it was past midday when these commanders 
 reached the vicinity of Cold Harbor." Here Jackson 
 halted for something over an hour, while the sound 
 of the battle rolled up from the direction of the 
 Chickahominy. He says in his report that ''soon after. 
 General A. P. Hill became engaged, and being un- 
 acquainted with the ground and apprehensive, from 
 what appeared to me to be the respective positions of 
 the Confederate and Federal forces engaged, that if I 
 then pressed forward, our troops would be mistaken 
 for the enemy and fired into, and hoping that Gen- 
 erals A. P. Hill and Longstreet would soon drive the 
 Federals toward me, I directed General D. H. Hill to 
 move his division to the left of the road, so as to leave 
 between him and the woods on the right of the road 
 an open space, across which I hoped the enemy would 
 be driven." ^ 
 
 This halt of Jackson's came near losing the day, 
 and had McClellan sent Porter the reinforcements he 
 
 *A. p. Hill's report. Allan's "Army of Northern Virginia," p. 87; 
 War Records, series I, vol. XI, part II, p. 836. 
 ^ Ibid., series I, vol. XI, part II, p. 553. 
 
168 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 urgently asked for, the error might not have been re- 
 trieved. ''As on the previous da}^," says Henderson, 
 "the Confederate attack had failed in combination. 
 A. P. Hill had fought for two hours without assistance. 
 Longstreet had then come in with Whiting. Jackson 
 and D. H. Hill were still away. ... A battery of 
 D. H. Hill's Division was brought into action, but was 
 soon silenced, and beyond this insignificant demonstra- 
 tion the Army of the Valley made no endeavor to join 
 the battle. The brigades were halted by the roadside. 
 Away to the right, above the intervening forest, rolled 
 the roar of battle, the crash of shells and the din of mus- 
 ketry, but no orders were given for the advance.'' ^ 
 
 At length Jackson awoke to the imperative demand 
 of the situation. According to Long, Lee sent several 
 staff officers to him to bring him to the support of Hill 
 and Longstreet. Others give him the credit of order- 
 ing his command forward when, judging from the 
 sound and direction of the firing that the original plan 
 had failed, he advanced to the attack. D. H. Hill, east 
 of the Old Cold Harbor Road, was sent forward against 
 the enemy's left flank. Ewell was on his right, with 
 Lawton, Wliiting, Winder, in order, still further to the 
 right. The position which they attacked, like that in 
 front of A. P. Hill and Longstreet, might well have 
 appeared impregnable. Whiting, with Law's and 
 Hood's Brigades, moving to the right, were met by 
 General Lee and directed to support General A. P. 
 Hill, and when Jackson's lines advanced they found 
 themselves confronted by the same conditions which 
 
 'Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," II, p. 29. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 169 
 
 had broken and dashed to pieces the charging lines of 
 A. P. Hill and Longstreet. Again and again they had 
 moved forward, only to be smashed to pieces and form 
 and dash forward again. It was then, adds Hender- 
 son, that Jackson recognized that the ''sustained fire 
 was a sure token that the enemy still held his own; 
 and for the first time and the last his staff beheld 
 their leader riding restlessly to and fro, and heard his 
 orders given in a tone which betrayed the storm 
 within." ^ 
 
 Finally he sent to his lieutenants an order. "Tell 
 them," he said, "this affair must hang in suspense no 
 longer. Let them sweep the field with the bayonet." 
 
 So obstinately did Porter cling to his position, and 
 so complete was the repulse of Hill, that Lee thought 
 that they must outnumber him, and felt that the 
 enemy was gradually gaining ground. He, therefore, 
 "sent orders to Longstreet, who was near at hand, to 
 make a diversion against the Federal left near the 
 river." ^ According to Longstreet, he sent an urgent 
 message to that general, who was in reserve on the 
 extreme right, that "all other efforts had failed, and 
 that unless he could do something the day was lost." 
 
 This diversion was made by three brigades under 
 Wilcox, and Pickett's Brigade, which developed the 
 strong position and force of the enemy in his front. 
 "Whereupon," Longstreet says, "from the urgent nature 
 of the message from the commanding general and my 
 
 ^Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 34. 
 
 ''War Records, series I, vol. II, part II, p. 737. Allan's "Army of 
 Northern Virginia," p. 88. 
 
170 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 own peculiar position, I determined to change the feint 
 into an attack, and orders for a general attack were 
 issued." ^ He adds that "at this moment General 
 Whiting arrived with his division and put it into 
 position at once and joined in the assault." 
 
 At this time, however, Porter's reserves had already 
 been exhausted. He had despatched to McClellan in 
 the morning that he hoped to do without aid; but 
 that his retreat was a delicate movement, and he re- 
 quested that Franklin, or some other command, be held 
 ready to reinforce him. Slocum's division reached the 
 field at four o'clock and enabled Porter to hold out 
 for some two hours more. An urgent appeal was 
 sent to McClellan by Porter for further reinforcements; 
 but, to quote Allan, ''so efficiently had Lee's orders to 
 Magruder and Huger, to hold the enemy in their front 
 by demonstrations and a display of force on the Rich- 
 mond side, been carried out, that none of the Federal 
 commanders thought it safe to spare any more troops 
 to aid Porter." McClellan, undoubtedly, toward the 
 end of the day, made efforts to relieve Porter. At 
 half-past five, having heard from Franklin that he did 
 not think it prudent to take any more troops from his 
 front at that time, he sent him word that Porter was 
 hard pressed, and that it was "not a question of pru- 
 dence but of possibilities"; that he had ordered eight 
 regiments of Sumner's to support Porter, and, if possi- 
 ble, Franklin was also to send a brigade.^ 
 
 About dusk the brigades of French and Meagher were 
 
 * Ibid. Ropes, II. 
 
 "War Records, series I, vol. XI, part I, p. 59. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 171 
 
 sent across, and arrived just in time to save the defeat 
 of Porter from becoming a rout. 
 
 Henderson, who is certainly high authority, and who 
 has at times something of a brief for Jackson, has under- 
 taken to relieve Jackson for his extraordinary and in- 
 explicable failure to bear the part expected of him in 
 the battle, and says that "Lee had anticipated that 
 Jackson's approach would cause the enemy to prolong 
 their front in order to cover their line of retreat to the 
 Wliite House, and so weaken that part of the position 
 which was to be attacked by Longstreet"; and that 
 "Jackson had been ordered to draw up his troops so 
 as to meet such a contingency." He admits that no 
 record of such an order is to be found, and that Jackson 
 never mentioned, either at the time or afterward, 
 what its purport was, and when he states that his sur- 
 viving staff officers are unanimous in declaring that 
 he must have received direct instructions from Gen- 
 eral Lee, he shows that they are only reasoning on 
 probabilities and not stating a fact known to them. 
 
 In his later account of thg battle, contained in his 
 history of the war, Longstreet states that "just as the 
 brigades advanced. General Whiting pressed through 
 the woods with his own and Hood's Brigades and re- 
 ported that he had lost sight of his commander. Gen- 
 eral Jackson, in the forest, and asked him to put him 
 into the battle, which was done." From Longstreet's 
 account it might appear that he, himself, had ordered 
 the general advance which carried the day; but a 
 greater general than Longstreet ordered this advance — 
 the same who had met Wliiting and sent him to his 
 
172 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 aid/ In this advance Hood's Texans led the way, 
 followed by Whiting's other brigade, who had orders 
 to charge without firing a shot. ''The Federal lines 
 were broken near their centre. The Confederates bore 
 in, turning the right of the troops which constituted 
 Porter's left, and also making it imperative for those 
 on the right of his line to abandon their position." 
 Before nightfall the field was swept, and as the sun 
 sank, the standards of the Army of Northern Virginia 
 were planted on the breastworks from one end to the 
 other where Porter's intrepid soldiery had clung till the 
 rammers could not be driven into their guns. 
 
 ''As the Federals retreated," continues Henderson, 
 "knots of brave men, hastily collected by officers of all 
 ranks, still qffered a fierce resistance, and, supported 
 by the batteries, inflicted terrible losses on the crowded 
 masses which swarmed up from the ravine; but the 
 majority of the infantry, without ammunition and with 
 few officers, streamed in disorder to the rear. For a 
 time the Federal gunners stood manfully to their work. 
 Porter's reserve artillery,. drawn up midway across the 
 upland, offered a rallying point to the retreating in- 
 fantry. Three small squadrons of the Fifth United 
 States Cavalry made a gallant but useless charge, in 
 which, out of seven oflicers, six fell; and on the ex- 
 treme right the division of regulars, supported by a 
 brigade of volunteers, fell back fighting to a second 
 line. As at Bull Run, the disciplined soldiers alone 
 showed a solid front amid the throng of fugitives. . . . 
 But their stubborn valor availed nothing against the 
 
 » Long's "Robert E. Lee," p. 173. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 173 
 
 superior numbers which Lee's fine strategy had con- 
 centrated on the field of battle." 
 
 The Confederates pushed forward across the hard- 
 won field, gathering up prisoners and capturing twenty- 
 two gunS; besides many stands of colors, and it is 
 believed by close students of the situation that had 
 they kept on they might have captured many more, and 
 possibly have destroyed McClellan's entire right wing. 
 From this additional disaster McClellan was saved by 
 the obscurity of the night and the opportune arrival 
 of Meagher and French with 5,000 fresh troops. ^'Be- 
 tween the bridges and the battle-field, on the slopes fall- 
 ing to the Chickahominy, the dark forest covered the 
 retreat of the routed army. Night had already fallen. 
 The confusion in the ranks of the Confederates was 
 extreme, and it was impossible to distinguish friend 
 from foe. All direction had been lost. None knew the 
 bearings of the bridges, or whether the Federals were 
 retreating east or south. Regiments had already been 
 exposed to the fire of their comrades." At this crucial 
 moment, cheers rolling up from the valley through the 
 dusk told that reinforcements had arrived, and the 
 spent Confederates were halted on the field. ''Pushing 
 through the mass of fugitives with the bayonet, these 
 fine troops . . . formed line on the southern crest of 
 the plateau. Joining the regulars, who still presented 
 a stubborn front, they opened a heavy fire, and under 
 cover of their steadfast lines, Porter's troops withdrew 
 across the river." 
 
 Thus Lee defeated McClellan in the furious battle of 
 Gaines's Mill and Cold Harbor, seizing his position after 
 
174 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 desperate fighting, capturing his hne of communica- 
 tion to West Point; and, driving him across the Cliick- 
 ahominy, forced him to abandon his threatening posi- 
 tion on its south side and fall back across Wliite Oak 
 Swamp to Malvern Hill, some miles to the rear. It was 
 a brilliant stroke for Lee to have crushed McClellan's 
 right wing, while he held the rest of his army with 
 only 25,000 men. And had Jackson attacked on the 
 morning of the 26th, as planned, or possibly even on 
 the morning of the 27th, the victory might have been 
 yet more decisive.^ But it was necessary to do more to 
 drive McClellan back from before Richmond. 
 
 Jackson's error in underestimating the time required 
 to join Lee in his first assault on McClellan was a costly 
 one, and Lee's casualty list was appalling.^ A con- 
 siderable part of this might have been spared had Jack- 
 son been able to turn McClellan's wing on the morning 
 of the 26th before Hill crossed the creek in front to at- 
 tempt the desperate assault on his centre. 
 
 On the 28th Lee held his army in hand, watchful to 
 see which way McClellan, after his staggering blow, 
 would move, whether by the way he had come, down 
 the Peninsula, or toward the James. Ewell and Stuart 
 were sent forward down the river to strike McClellan's 
 
 > Taylor's "General Lee," pp. 68-78. 
 
 * Colonel Thomas L. Livermore figures the Union losses at Gaines's 
 Mill at 894 killed, 3,107 wounded, and 2,836 missing— total, 6,834; the 
 Confederate losses, killed and wounded, at 8,751. The losses in all 
 the Seven Days' Battles, from the 25th of June to July 1, he states 
 as follows: Union — Killed, 1,734; wounded, 8,062; missing, 6,053; 
 total, 15,849. Confederate— Killed, 3,478; wounded, 16,261; missing, 
 875; total, 20,614. (" Numbers and Losses," p. 86.) Allan reckons the 
 Confederate losses at 19,700; the Union losses at 15,765. ("Army of 
 Northern Virginia," p. 141.) 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 175 
 
 line of communication and probable line of retreat 
 along the York River Railroad. The railroad was 
 reached at Dispatch Station — which was destroyed to- 
 gether with the stores collected there — and, the railroad 
 bridge across the Chickahominy having been burnt by 
 the guard on its retreat, Ewell halted there while 
 Stuart rode on to West Point, where the enemy's vast 
 stores that McClellan had left were being destroyed. 
 Driving off Stoneman, he captured what was left. 
 Meantime McClellan, having on the night of the 27th 
 held a council of war with his generals, had destroyed 
 his upper bridges across the Chickahominy and the 
 immense quantity of stores brought with his army, and 
 now, in full retreat on James River, was endeavoring 
 to get his army across White Oak Swamp at his rear. 
 This difficult and hazardous movement was ably and 
 successfully conducted, owing largely to the "vast and 
 impenetrable forest and jungle, under cover of which it 
 was being executed," and to the failure of the com- 
 manders in his front to ascertain his movements. 
 
 Inasmuch as Lee has been criticised for not discover- 
 ing earlier McClellan's intentions, his own views of the 
 matter are interesting. Speaking of the 28th, he says : 
 ''During the forenoon, columns of dust south of the 
 Chickahominy showed that the Federal army was in 
 motion. The abandonment of the railroad and the de- 
 struction of the bridge proved that no further attempt 
 would be made to hold that line. But from the posi- 
 tion it occupied, the roads, which led toward James 
 River, would also enable it to reach the lower bridges 
 over the Chickahominy and retreat down the Penin- 
 sula. In the latter event it was necessary that our 
 
176 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 troops should continue on the north bank of the river, 
 and until the intention of General McClellan was dis- 
 covered it was deemed injudicious to change their dis- 
 position. Ewell was, therefore, ordered to proceed to 
 Bottom's Bridge, to guard that point, and the cavalry 
 to watch the bridges below. No certain indications of 
 a retreat to the James River were discovered by our 
 forces on the south side of the Chickahominy, and late 
 in the afternoon the enemy's works were reported to be 
 fully manned. The strength of these fortifications pre- 
 vented Generals Huger and Magruder from discovering 
 what was passing in their front. Below the enemy's 
 works the country was densely wooded and intersected 
 by impassable swamps, at once concealing his move- 
 ments and precluding reconnoissances except by the 
 regular roads, all of which were strongly guarded. The 
 bridges over the Chickahominy, in rear of the enemy, 
 were destroyed, and their reconstruction impracticable 
 in the presence of his whole army and powerful bat- 
 teries. We were, therefore, compelled to wait until his 
 purpose should be developed. Generals Huger and 
 Magruder were again directed to use the utmost vigi- 
 lance and pursue the enemy vigorously should they dis- 
 cover that he was retreating. During the afternoon 
 and night of the 28th the signs of a general movement 
 were apparent, and no indications of his approach to 
 the lower bridges of the Chickahominy having been dis- 
 covered by the pickets in observation at those points, 
 it became manifest that General McClellan was retreat- 
 ing to the James River." ^ 
 As soon as it became apparent what he would do, Lee 
 
 'Liee's report, W. R., series I, vol. XI, part I, p. 493. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 177 
 
 ordered his troops to the south side of the Chickahominy 
 and proceeded to attack again at Savage Station on the 
 29th. It was the afternoon, however, before Lee was 
 sufficiently informed as to McClellan's disposition of his 
 forces to attack him again, and when Magruder as- 
 saulted his lines near Savage Station, McClellan had 
 been in full retreat long enough to get most of his army 
 across Wliite Oak Swamp, and it was only his strong 
 rear guard that Magruder struck, the main army be- 
 ing on the other side of the impenetrable jungle and 
 morass. 
 
 Longstreet crossed at New Bridge in the morning 
 with his own and A. P. Hill's commands and advanced 
 to the Darbytown Road. Holmes was brought over 
 from Drewry's Bluff to the north side of the James. 
 Magruder was sent forward toward Savage Station, and 
 Jackson was directed to cross at Grapevine Bridge and 
 support the movement. Jackson, however, was de- 
 layed all day in rebuilding the bridge. Magruder was 
 slow, and on coming up with Sumner at Savage Sta- 
 tion, failed to use all his troops, and though McLaws, in 
 the lead, made a gallant fight against superior numbers 
 till dark, it was not supported, and McClellan was en- 
 abled that night to get across White Oak Swamp and 
 destroy the bridges behind him. 
 
 "Lee's design was to close in as rapidly as possible 
 on the rear and flank of the retreating enemy, and by 
 throwing his whole force on McClellan's army, already 
 staggering as it was by Porter's defeat, and still more 
 demoralized by a hurried retreat and an immense de- 
 struction of stores, to deal it a decisive blow. For 
 
178 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 this purpose all his lieutenants were ordered to press 
 the enemy on the morrow." 
 
 Magruder was ordered to pass southward around by 
 the Darbytown Road, and then was sent forward to 
 unite with Holmes and attack the enemy before he 
 could secure his position at Malvern Hill. He arrived, 
 however, too late to aid Holmes, who had attacked, but 
 found himself under the fire of all their guns, both on 
 land and water, and was forced to retire. Jackson, 
 having crossed the Chickahominy during the night and 
 pushed on to Wliite Oak Swamp, found himself stopped 
 by the destruction of the bridge and unable to rebuild 
 it in face of the furious fire which was kept up by the 
 enemy (Franklin's corps) on the other side. 
 
 In the expectation that Jackson would force his cross- 
 ing at White Oak Swamp and be on McClellan's rear 
 in time to co-operate with Longstreet, the latter ad- 
 vanced down the Long Bridge Road and encountered 
 the main force of McClellan's army posted at Frazier's 
 Farm, or Glendale, at the Charles City Cross Roads. 
 Here Longstreet 's Division was deployed across the 
 Long Bridge Road, with a division of A. P. Hill in re- 
 serve, except Branch's Brigade, which was posted to 
 the right and rear to guard against Hooker's division, 
 posted behind the Quaker Road to the right. Huger's 
 column was expected to advance on the Charles City 
 Road and attack on the right. Longstreet, supposing 
 that the firing on his right came from Huger's attack, 
 began the battle. His order was, he states, '^for Colo- 
 nel Jenkins to silence a battery which was annoying 
 them, and this was taken as an order to advance." It 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 179 
 
 developed instantly that the enemy was present in 
 great force, and from this time until night the divisions 
 of Longstreet and A. P. Hill maintained ''one of the 
 bloodiest struggles that took place during the Civil 
 War." On both sides along the Darby town Road 
 charges and countercharges were made with the great- 
 est gallantry; but when night fell, McCall's fine divis- 
 ion, who had borne the brunt of the fight, had been 
 crushed, its gallant commander captured, and fourteen 
 guns as well. The Federal lines, though bravely de- 
 fended by numbers largely superior to the attacking 
 force, had been carried with the exception of a single 
 position. But though a staggering blow had been dealt 
 to the Federal army, ''night found it still holding the 
 Quaker Road and its line of retreat consequently un- 
 obstructed." Critics appear to be agreed that this bat- 
 tle of Glendale, or Frazier's Farm, was "the crisis of 
 the Seven Days' Battles," and that had Lee been able to 
 concentrate his whole strength against the Federals, it 
 is probable that McClellan would never have reached 
 the James, ^ "This day," adds Allan, "marked the 
 crisis in the Seven Days' Battles, for it was on this 
 30th of June that Lee more nearly grasped the full 
 fruits of . his strategy, and McClellan more nearly es- 
 caped complete overthrow, than on any other." 
 
 Once more Lee's admirable plans had failed because 
 of the failure of his lieutenants to co-operate at the 
 crucial moment. "The Confederate commander had 
 arranged with admirable strategy to throw his whole 
 army upon the flank and rear of his retreating foe. 
 
 'Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," II, p. 48. 
 
180 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 While Holmes, on his right, was to try to seize Malvern 
 Hill, and Jackson, on his left, was to press the rear of the 
 retreating army, three columns under Huger, Long- 
 street, and Magruder were to strike at his centre. . . . 
 They were all in position by midday, and by the middle 
 of the afternoon 50,000 men or more should have been 
 attacking the Union lines. But, as we have seen, only 
 the column under Longstreet and A. P. Hill did any- 
 thing — the others accomplished nothing. They did 
 not even prevent reinforcements from getting to the 
 Federal centre. It is impossible to deny that General 
 Lee was very poorly served on this occasion by his 
 subordinates." ^ 
 
 This failure on the part of Lee's lieutenants to co- 
 operate was to cost the South and the Army of Northern 
 Virginia dear. That night McClellan continued his 
 retreat and by daylight the commands of Franklin, 
 Slocum, Heintzelman, and Sumner had joined Porter 
 on the uplands of Malvern Hill, where McClellan had 
 determined to make his last stand. Here in what is 
 esteemed one of the strongest positions that an army 
 could assume — a high plateau, rising to the height of 
 over 100 feet above the surrounding country, a mile and 
 a half in length, by a half mile in breadth — admirably 
 protected, both in front and on the sides, by deep bot- 
 toms and swamps, with wide stretches of open ground 
 beyond them, and approached only by two roads — the 
 River Road and the Quaker Road — McClellan posted 
 his army in a great crescent. It was, indeed, formidable 
 
 ■ Allan's "Army of Northern Virginia," pp. 120, 121. Cf. also " His- 
 tory of the Civil War in America," Comte de Paris, vol. II, p. 132. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 181 
 
 and could hardly have been stronger, with his remain- 
 ing artillery, which — including his heavy siege guns, 
 and aided by the raking fire from the gunboats in the 
 river — was still powerful, covering with converging fire 
 every point of the line. Here, however, notwithstand- 
 ing the strength of the position, Lee determined to 
 attack once more. 
 
 All of the forenoon and a part of the afternoon were 
 spent in reconnoissances, and it was not until four o'clock 
 that the attack began. Jackson, who had now come 
 up, was on 'the left, with Whiting to the left of the 
 Quaker Road, and D. H. Hill to the right with one of 
 Ewell's Brigades, while Jackson's own division, with the 
 rest of Ewell's troops, was in reserve. A half mile 
 beyond Jackson's right was Huger and behind him, 
 to the left, was Magruder. Longstreet and A. P. Hill 
 were in reserve behind Magruder on the Long Bridge 
 Road and Holmes was on the River Road to the 
 right. 
 
 It was now five o'clock, and ^'if anything was to be 
 done, no more time should be lost." General Lee was 
 urgent that the assault be made. The original order 
 for battle had been given about noon, and there had 
 been fighting to the extreme left. Armistead and 
 Wright had attempted to advance and had been 
 repulsed with heavy loss, and, with their batteries 
 hammered to pieces, had been forced to withdraw 
 them, and now ''held their infantry in hand until the 
 arrival of other troops." Here Whiting was carrying 
 on a spirited but unequal artillery contest. Mean- 
 time efforts had been made to bring the artillery to 
 
182 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the front; but owing to the swamps and thickets 
 through which they had to force their way, they were 
 overpowered by the concentrated fire of the Federal 
 guns before they got into action. The obstacles, says 
 Lee in his report, '^presented by the woods and swamps 
 made it impracticable to bring up a sufficient amount 
 of artillery to oppose successfully the extraordinary 
 force of that arm employed by the enemy, while the 
 field itself offered so few positions favorable for its use 
 and none for its proper concentration." 
 
 Lee, according to Longstreet, proposed 'to him now 
 to move to the left with his own and A. P. HilFs Di- 
 visions and turn the Federal right, and this, he states, 
 he issued his orders to do; but through some mistake 
 the order to attack, which had already been issued, 
 was not rescinded, and between five and six o'clock, 
 Magruder, with only two brigades of his three divis- 
 ions, Armistead's and Wright's, in position, engaged 
 the enemy's left, and D. H. Hill, taking this for the 
 signal, sent forward five brigades full against the ene- 
 my's front, only to have them decimated and forced 
 back under the terrible concentrated fire of McClel- 
 lan's massed guns. 
 
 From time to time after this, first in one part of the 
 field and then in another, supports were sent in; in- 
 trepid advances and furious charges were made; but 
 there was no concert. ''The two divisions under Ma- 
 gruder were beaten in detail ; two or three brigades at 
 one time were sent forward, and when broken and beaten 
 back, others took their places, only to meet a similar 
 fate. The battle was a succession of "desperate but 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 183 
 
 disjointed and badly managed charges"; and when 
 night fell, though neither Longstreet nor A. P. Hill 
 had been engaged, and three of Jackson's Divisions 
 • — his own, Whiting's, and Swell's — had suffered little, 
 and though Huger, on a point of etiquette, withheld 
 supports, while Holmes had scarcely fought at all, five 
 thousand Confederates had fallen bravely on the 
 slopes of Malvern Hill, and McClellan's lines were still 
 unbroken. 
 
 For making the frontal attack which now began and 
 which proved so deadly to the assailants, instead of 
 attempting to turn McClellan's flank, Lee has been 
 often and severely criticised. The frontal attack, how- 
 ever, was due to the report made to Lee by Longstreet 
 after Lee, who had been too indisposed himself to 
 reconnoitre in person, had instructed Longstreet to 
 reconnoitre the enemy's left and report whether an 
 attack on that side was feasible. Jackson, it is said, 
 was opposed to a frontal attack, preferring to turn the 
 enemy's right. Longstreet, however, according to his 
 own account, was of a different opinion and reported 
 to General Lee that the "spacious open along Jackson's 
 front appeared to offer a field for the play of a hun- 
 dred or more guns," and he judged that it might 
 justify assault, and the tremendous game at issue called 
 for adventure. ''I thought it probable," he adds, 
 'Hhat Porter's batteries under the cross-fire of the 
 Confederate guns, posted on his left and front, could 
 be thrown into disorder and thus make way for the 
 combined assaults of the infantry. 
 
 ''I so reported, and General Lee ordered dispositions 
 
184 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 accordingly, sending the pioneer corps to cut a road for 
 the right batteries." ^ 
 
 It was a costly sacrifice; but that night McClellan, 
 feeling that his men were completely worn out, and 
 knowing how large a portion of Lee's army had not 
 been engaged the day before, and assured that he might 
 look for further trouble if he remained in that position, 
 withdrew his army under cover of his gunboats. "My 
 men are completely exhausted," he wrote that day 
 before the battle, "and I dread the result if we are 
 attacked to-day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall 
 retire to-night to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboats 
 can render more aid in covering our position. Permit 
 me to urge that not an hour should be lost in sending 
 me fresh troops. More gunboats are much needed."^ 
 
 The failure of some of his lieutenants to grasp the 
 situation prevented the complete success of Lee's plans, 
 and McClellan not only got safely across White Oak 
 Swamp, and reached a position at Malvern Hill of such 
 strength that the attack on him here has been con- 
 sidered by able critics almost the greatest error Lee 
 ever committed; but saved his army. Whatever the 
 errors of his lieutenants, Lee had saved Richmond. 
 From this time he bore the fortunes of the Confederacy 
 on his shoulders. 
 
 Thus Lee had, with less than 80,000 men, by his 
 audacious tactics and masterly handling of his troops, 
 defeated McClellan with more than 105,000 men and 
 
 * "From Manassas to Appomattox," p. 143. 
 
 2 Report on Conduct of War, vol. I, p. 340. Allan's "Army of North- 
 ern Virginia," p. 138. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 185 
 
 superior equipment, and driven him from position after 
 position, relieving Richmond from what had appeared 
 imminent danger of immediate capture. 
 
 MiHtary critics have often wondered why Jackson, 
 who both before and after the seven days' fighting 
 around Richmond proved himself the most eager, 
 prompt, and aggressive heutenant that any commander 
 had during the war, should apparently have been so 
 slow in the execution of the part intrusted to him in 
 this critical movement. Old soldiers who followed 
 and adored him still discuss the mysterious failure, 
 and admit that "Old Jack" was ''not himself" at this 
 crisis. Not only did he fail to attack that first after- 
 noon on his arrival within sound of the furious battle 
 raging but a few miles away, but next day also he halted 
 at Cold Harbor for over an hour while Hill and Long- 
 street were left to put in their last battalions, and again 
 at White Oak Swamp, two days later, he failed, as he 
 hardly ever did either earlier or later, to make good 
 his attempt to reach the enemy's line. 
 
 An explanation of the first failure has been given 
 that he mistook the road leading toward the field 
 of Cold Harbor and missed his way. 
 
 The writer, as a resident of that region, familiar with 
 the country and with the discussion of the facts, vent- 
 ures to suggest a simple explanation. 
 
 The distance from the valley to the Chickahominy 
 being about one hundred and thirty miles, the bringing 
 forward of his troops, even with the indifferent assist- 
 ance of his trains, occupied several days, and the 
 general himself, with a staff officer, at a point some 
 
186 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 sixty-odd miles west of Richmond, left the train and 
 rode to Richmond to consult with Lee as to details. 
 His selection of this mode of travel has been attributed 
 to his fear of being recognized if he should continue by 
 train, but was no doubt partly to familiarize himself 
 somewhat with the roads, which through Hanover wind 
 among the forks of the Pamunkey through a thickly 
 wooded, flat country, and are very confusing. It is of 
 record that he then thought he could be up and ready 
 to co-operate with Hill on the 25th, but General Long- 
 street claims that he urged that this was impossible, and 
 that if not the 27th, at the earliest the 26th should be 
 set for the attack, which was agreed to. At Beaver 
 Dam Station, on the railway, forty miles from Rich- 
 mond, the last troops were taken from the train, and, 
 together with those who had been marching the day 
 before, took the road for Richmond by way of Honey- 
 man's Bridge over the Little River, a branch of the 
 North Anna, and then, owing to high water in the 
 South Anna, instead of taking the shorter route by 
 Groundsquirrel Bridge, some of them marched by way 
 of the Fork Church to Ashland. From Little River to 
 the field of Cold Harbor the roads are deep with sand, 
 water is scant, and in the blazing days of late June the 
 progress of the troops was much slower than had been 
 reckoned on, and the move took nearly a day longer 
 than had been expected. Meanwhile, Jackson, who 
 had left his train and ridden sixty-odd miles to Rich- 
 mond to confer with Lee, rode straight back to bring 
 his men forward, met them at a point more than fifty 
 miles from Richmond, and returned with them. Thus, 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 187 
 
 when he reached the slashes of Hanover, he had been 
 in the saddle almost continuously for several days and 
 nights and was completely broken down/ 
 
 Members of a troop of cavalry, known as the Han- 
 over Troop (Co. C. 4th Virginia Cavalry), who came 
 from that region, were detailed to act as guides for the 
 troops, but many of the roads are mere tracks, and the 
 man detailed to guide Jackson,^ on reaching the neigh- 
 borhood of the battle-field, found so many new roads 
 cut through the forest by McClellan's troops, and so 
 many houses and other familiar landmarks gone, that 
 he became confused and led the column some distance 
 on the wrong road before discovering his error. It then 
 became necessary to retrace their way; but, marching 
 the other troops back and turning around the artillery 
 in the narrow road, bordered by forest and thickets, 
 much time was lost. Ewell, who was present, threat- 
 ened to hang the guide; but Jackson intervened and 
 bade him guide them back.^ This, however, does not 
 account for Jackson's failure to attack earlier on the 
 day of Gaines's Mill, or his failure to cross and aid 
 
 " I remember as a boy seeing Jackson's columns passing down the 
 road near my home in Hanover, some fifteen miles above Ashland, and 
 every hour or so the men were made to lie down full-length on the 
 ground to rest. The troops, or a portion of them, instead of keeping 
 straight ahead across Newfound River and the South Anna by Ground- 
 squirrel Bridge, turned off after crossing Little River at Honeyman's 
 Bridge and marched to Ashland by the Fork Church. 
 
 ^ Lincoln Sydnor. 
 
 ^ The fact of Jackson's complete prostration is mentioned in a letter 
 written at the time by his aide-de-camp, the gallant Major, afterward 
 Lieutenant-Colonel, Alexander S. Pendleton, killed later at Fisher's 
 Hill. The other circumstances I had stated to me in a letter from A. R. 
 Ellerson, Esquire, a member of the Hanover troop, whose home was near 
 Mechanicsville, and who was with Sydnor at Jackson's head-quarters 
 and was sent with despatches from General Lee. See Appendix. 
 
188 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Magruder on the afternoon of the day of Savage Sta- 
 tion, and Longstreet and Hill on the day of Frazier's 
 Farm. Colonel Henderson exculpates him from adverse 
 criticism, and thinks that he had good ground for his 
 action on each occasion, which is certainly high author- 
 ity. But the fact remains unexplained, and as Allan, 
 who admired him vastly, admits, "it is best to set it 
 down as one of the few great mistakes of his marvel- 
 lous career." ^ Never before or after did Jackson fail 
 to march to the sound of the guns or fail to keep a 
 rendezvous on the field of battle. 
 
 One familiar only with the open fields to the west 
 and north of Richmond would scarcely guess the ex- 
 tent of the almost impenetrable thickets along the 
 Chickahominy. They were wellnigh as much a terra 
 incognita to the Southern leaders as to the Northern. 
 Jackson, as already stated, even with a guide familiar 
 with the region, got entangled among them on his forced 
 march down to join Lee, on the Wednesday of the 
 second day's battle around Richmond, and thus failed 
 to make the junction at the critical moment. Wliile, 
 however, these inextricable tangles of the swamps along 
 the Chickahominy caused Lee much inconvenience, 
 and frustrated portions of his plans for the destruction 
 of the enemy, they stood him in good stead in his au- 
 dacious attack on McClellan's far-stretched lines. They 
 at once veiled his movements and offered a barrier 
 broken only where the country roads of Hanover and 
 Henrico pierced them at a few points easy to be de- 
 fended. The swamps of the Chickahominy remained 
 
 'Allan's "Army of Northern Virginia," p. 121. 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 189 
 
 as dense and impenetrable as when John Smith, two 
 centuries and a half before, had stuck fast in them a 
 little lower down and fallen a prey to his enemies. 
 For long distances they were so impenetrable that, as 
 was said by the guide whom General Lee had sent for 
 to pilot a part of his attacking forces, ''not even an 
 old hare could get through." 
 
 However it was, Lee relieved Richmond, and the 
 war, from being based on the issue of a single cam- 
 paign, was now a matter of years and treasure, and the 
 years and the treasure that it required were mainly 
 due to Lee's transcendent genius. It is probable that 
 but for Lee the war would not have lasted two years. 
 
 It is one of the notable facts connected with the con- 
 duct of the war that the staff should have been so dis- 
 proportioned to the demands on it. Nearly all critics 
 have remarked on it. Lee had but few trained soldiers 
 on his staff ; gallant gentlemen he had, men ready to lay 
 down their lives for him or their cause; but not many 
 of them men trained to war. Possibly, to this was due 
 the fact that so often his best-laid plans failed of being 
 exactly carried out. He never had a staff officer who 
 could render him the service which he rendered Scott 
 at Cerro Gordo and Contreras. He often rode with a 
 single officer, and at times absolutely alone. And when 
 toward the latter part of the war he wished to have 
 his son as his chief of staff, the wish was denied him. 
 Such was the strange constituency of the Confederate 
 Government. 
 
 Whatever criticism may have been offered, the South 
 was jubilant, and amid its tears acclaimed Lee and his 
 
190 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 gallant army as its saviors. And Lee himself appears 
 to have been well content with the issue. The results 
 of the battles around Richmond were summed up by 
 him as follows: - 
 
 In his General Order (No. 75, dated July 7, 1862), 
 tendering his ''warmest thanks and congratulations to 
 the army by whose valor such splendid results were 
 achieved," he says: "On Monday, June 26, the power- 
 ful and thoroughly equipped army of the enemy was 
 entrenched in works vast in extent and most formida- 
 ble in character, within sight of our capital. 
 
 ''To-day the remains of that confident and threat- 
 ening host lie upon the banks of the James River, 
 thirty miles from Richmond, seeking to recover, under 
 the protection of his gunboats, from the effects of a 
 series of disastrous defeats. 
 
 "The immediate fruits of your success are the relief 
 of Richmond from a state of siege, the routing of the 
 great army that so long menaced its safety, many 
 thousand prisoners, including officers of high rank, the 
 capture or destruction of stores to the value of millions, 
 and the acquisition of thousands of arms and fifty-one 
 pieces of superior artillery." 
 
 He concludes, after a tribute to the "gallant dead 
 who died nobly in defence of their country's freedom": 
 "Soldiers, your country will thank you for the heroic 
 conduct you have displayed — conduct worthy of men 
 engaged in a cause so just and sacred, and deserving a 
 nation's gratitude and praise." 
 
 In the pride and joy of the victory, and in the relief 
 that the great army which had been thundering at the 
 
BATTLES AROUND RICHMOND 191 
 
 gates had been defeated and driven back, the people 
 of the South took Httle account of the errors that had 
 been committed by Lee's Ueu tenants, who were all gal- 
 lant soldiers and able commanders. Yet it was due to 
 these errors that McClellan's army had been only routed, 
 and not destroyed. And no one knew it so well as Lee. 
 Had Jackson turned Porter's wing as planned, Hill's 
 vast losses would not have occurred, and Porter could 
 never have rejoined McClellan. Had Magruder and 
 Huger not failed to discover that McClellan was retreat- 
 ing, he might never have crossed White Oak Swamp. 
 Had Jackson made good his crossing at White Oak 
 Swamp, McClellan would possibly not have had time to 
 make his last stand at Malvern Hill, and might have 
 lost his entire army. And finally, when Stuart, in ad- 
 vance of the rest of Lee's army, reached Evelington 
 Heights and found McClellan's army lying beneath him 
 on the low grounds, had he but waited until Longstreet 
 came up, instead of firing on them with a bare section 
 of light artillery, the end might have come that day. 
 As it was, in his eagerness he did not wait, and Long- 
 street, whom he supposed close by, had taken another 
 road. 
 
CHAPTER VIII 
 
 LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 
 
 Lee had thus in a month sprung almost to the full 
 measure of fame. ''After the Seven Days' Battles," 
 says Henderson, "the war assumed a new aspect. . . . 
 The strategy which had relieved Richmond recalled 
 the master-strokes of Napoleon." ^ 
 
 The government at Washington, which had on the 
 11th of July appointed Major-General William W. Hal- 
 leck to the chief command of all the armies of the 
 United States, had now determined to unite the forces 
 of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, though it was 
 against the views of its principal advisers, including 
 McClellan himself. Halleck's appointment followed 
 immediately on a personal visit of Mr. Lincoln to Mc- 
 Clellan's army on July 8, in which he ascertained that 
 the army had 86,500 men present for duty, and 73,500 
 absent, and that the sentiment there was that 100,000 
 additional reinforcements were deemed necessary to 
 march on Richmond with any hope of success. The 
 general selected for the command was Major-General 
 John Pope, an officer who was a distinguished graduate 
 of West Point and who had achieved some success in 
 the West. He had a self-confidence in which McClellan 
 was somewhat wanting. He began by issuing a rodo- 
 
 » "Life of Stonewall Jackson," II, 109. 
 192 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 193 
 
 montade which amused even his own army/ and he 
 so inflamed the South by an order of banishment of all 
 persons who would not take the oath of allegiance, and 
 by threats of seizure of non-combatants as hostages,^ 
 and of confiscation of their property, that a note was 
 prepared by the Confederate Government excepting 
 Pope and his officers from the cartel just signed with 
 McClellan for the exchange of prisoners of war. Lee 
 himself appears to have regarded Pope with amused 
 contempt. He wrote Jackson, " I want Pope sup- 
 pressed," and in a letter to his wife (July 28, 1862) he 
 writes her to tell his youngest son, then a private in 
 the Rockbridge Artillery under Jackson, "to catch 
 Pope for me, and also bring in his cousin, Louis Mar- 
 shall, who, I am told, is on his staff." And he adds: ''I 
 could forgive the latter fighting against us, but not his 
 joining Pope." 
 
 The question, now, was whether to reinforce Mc- 
 Clellan or Pope, and Burnside, who had been brought 
 up from the South, was held at Newport News, at 
 the mouth of the James, awaiting the decision of the 
 civilian commanders in Washington. In this decision 
 Lee bore a conspicuous part. 
 
 Having assumed the offensive and won signal suc- 
 cess, Lee was not a general to lose the fruit of his vic- 
 tory and be forced back into a defensive position, the 
 perils of which he well knew. McClellan was routed 
 and driven back to the shelter of his gunboats ; but he 
 was still within little more than a day's march of Rich- 
 
 ' Off. Rec, V, p. 552. 
 
 * General Orders 7 and 11. 
 
194 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 mond, with an army which, though demoraHzed, yet 
 outnumbered Lee's, and was, in its position, still for- 
 midable/ And he could at any time cross to the south 
 bank of the James and attack Richmond from that 
 side and threaten the cutting off of communication 
 with the South by the chief line of communication, the 
 Richmond and Danville Railway, a move he urgently 
 recommended, but as to which he was overruled by 
 Halleck and the other authorities in Washington.^ 
 McDowell, too, a gallant soldier and gentleman, was 
 still at Fredericksburg with a good part of the First 
 Corps, and hungry for a chance to atone for his dis- 
 aster at Bull Run, and Pope, with another army 
 greater than Lee could send against him, was advancing 
 across the Piedmont, dating his letters from ''Head- 
 quarters in the saddle," and boasting that he never 
 saw anything but the backs of his enemies, and that 
 *'if he had McClellan's army he would march to New 
 Orleans."' 
 
 Major-General Pope, in command of the united 
 armies of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell, had in all 
 some 70,000 men. He now lay on the rolling uplands 
 between the upper Rappahannock and the Rapidan, 
 headed for Gordonsville. Pope had, as already stated, 
 incurred the hatred of the South by his orders to seize 
 and shoot non-combatants in reprisal for the acts of 
 
 ' McClellan's army, by his return of July 10, showed present and 
 equipped for duty, 98,631 men. On July 10, General Lee's report 
 showed that, exclusive of the troops in North Carolina, he had 64,419 
 men. 
 
 2 Ropes, II, p. 238. 
 
 * Pope gave his force as 43,000. Taylor's "General Lee," p. 86. 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 195 
 
 what he termed "roving bands," and only complete 
 success would have excused the gasconade which he 
 addressed to his army, lauding himself and reflecting 
 on those gallant but unfortunate officers whom he had 
 supplanted. The Confederate Government declared 
 him outside of the pale. 
 
 If he should seize the Virginia Central Railroad he 
 would destroy an important avenue with the South- 
 west, and the one avenue of communication with the 
 valley of Virginia. He was already on the Rapidan 
 within a day's march of the important junction at Gor- 
 donsville, and a little later his cavalry burnt Beaver 
 Dam Station, forty miles from Richmond. If he should 
 unite with McClellan the South would be lost. The 
 situation was not a whit less critical than it had 
 been on the 1st of June, when McClellan was advan- 
 cing by approaches to shell Richmond. Moreover, 
 President Lincoln had already called for 300,000 more 
 men. 
 
 But Lee was, of all men, the man to meet the situa- 
 tion. It might well be said of him as Conde and 
 Turenne said of Merci, that he never lost a favorable 
 moment, or failed to anticipate their most secret de- 
 signs, as if he had assisted in their councils. He knew 
 that the needle is not more sensitive to the proximity 
 of steel than was the government at Washington to 
 the moving of Stonewall Jackson in their direction. 
 Jackson was in favor of invading Northern territory, 
 and had avouched his readiness to follow any one who 
 would fight. Lee knew his mettle and used it. When 
 some one said to Jackson: "This new general needs 
 
196 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 your attention," his reply was: "And, please God, he 
 shall have it." This was Lee's feeling also. 
 
 Let those who rank General Lee among the defen- 
 sive captains say whether he acted on the defensive or 
 offensive when, leaving only some 20,000 men to guard 
 Richmond, with McClellan still at Harrison's Landing, 
 hurrying troops now to the south side of the James, 
 now to Malvern Hill, he with rare audacity turned on 
 Pope, advancing with threatenings and slaughter across 
 the Piedmont, and sent Jackson to strike him beyond 
 the Rapidan. And when, after the first stroke at Cedar 
 Mountain, he sent him sweeping around in a great half 
 circle through Thoroughfare Gap, struck him, at Grove- 
 ton, a staggering blow, and facing him on the rolling 
 plain of Manassas, routed and drove him back to the 
 shelter of the forts around Alexandria, and then with 
 his army, ill-clad and ill-shod, so threatened the na- 
 tional capital that McClellan was hastily recalled from 
 the James to its defence. 
 
 After a rest of about ten days, spent in watching 
 McClellan, who from time to time was moving troops up 
 to Malvern Hill, or across the James, as if to renew his 
 attack on. Richmond, Lee addressed his attention to Pope. 
 Pope, assured in his mind that he was on the march 
 on Richmond, and boasting that with McClellan 's force 
 he ''could march to New Orleans," pushed his army 
 forward beyond Manassas, where he massed his supplies, 
 and on across the Rappahannock with the intention of 
 seizing the important point, Gordonsville, where the 
 Orange and Alexandria Railroad from Washington 
 united with the Virginia Central Railroad, the line con- 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 197 
 
 necting Richmond with the valley of Virginia, and with 
 the line running from Charlottesville to the South-west. 
 
 Lee's soldier's eye promptly saw the perilous situa- 
 tion in which Pope had placed himself, and his soldier's 
 instinct promptly divined the means of striking him. 
 Lee had now under him for Richmond's defence 64,419 
 men, exclusive of the force in North Carolina, while 
 McClellan, at Harrison's Landing, had 98,631 men 
 (July 10). He conceived the audacious design of mass- 
 ing his forces suddenly in Pope's front and, while he 
 held him with a part, sending the remainder* around 
 his right wing to turn his flank and sever his line of 
 communication. He felt sure that that would relieve 
 Richmond, but he hoped also to destroy Pope. Thus, 
 while with a portion of his depleted army he covered 
 Richmond, he prepared a stroke which should shake 
 Washington and relieve Richmond. On the 13th he 
 despatched Jackson with his division and Ewell's — 
 in all, some 11,0U0 men — to Gordonsville to confront 
 Pope, who reported to Washington a week later that 
 Ewell was at Gordonsville with 6,000 men, and Jack- 
 son at Louisa Court House, a short distance away, 
 with 25,000 men. Pope heard of him first at Louisa, 
 less than forty miles away. This sent Halleck off to 
 consult McClellan in a hurry. McClellan thought he 
 might have gone to the West to fight Buel. McClellan 
 was strenuously urged by Halleck, who visited him 
 for the purpose, to attack Richmond at once, and he 
 assented provided he should be given 20,000 additional 
 troops, which were promised him. 
 
 The effect of Lee's bold movement was what he 
 
198 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 anticipated. A week later Washington knew that 
 Jackson had left Richmond, but had no idea whither 
 he was bound; for Jackson divulged his plans not 
 even to his chief of staff. Jackson, on his arrival at 
 Gordonsville, finding himself confronted by an army 
 many times his own in numbers, applied to Lee for 
 reinforcements. He had but about 11,000 men. At 
 first Lee felt unable to meet his demand, but when 
 Pope's cavalry raiders struck the Virginia Central 
 Railroad at Beaver Dam and cut his line of com- 
 munication within forty miles of Richmond, he de- 
 spatched Stuart and A. P. Hill to Jackson's aid. 
 This brought his force up to 18,700, with which Lee 
 expressed the hope that Pope might be ''suppressed." 
 Lee, who knew Jackson's extreme reticence, and evi- 
 dently thought it not^always advantageous, wrote him 
 to suggest his conferring with Hill, whom he recom- 
 mended to him as "a good officer, with whom he could 
 consult," adding, ''and by advising with your division 
 commanders as to your movements, much trouble will 
 be saved you in arranging details, and they can act 
 more intelligently. I wish to save you trouble from 
 my increasing your command. Cache your troops as 
 much as possible," he adds, " till you can strike your 
 blow, and be prepared to return to me when done, if 
 necessary. I will endeavor to keep General McClellan 
 quiet till it is over, if rapidly executed." ^ Culpeper 
 was the key to the situation, as several roads met 
 there. So Jackson was to go to Culpeper. On the 
 9th of August Jackson, moving on Culpeper, attacked 
 
 • Lee to Jackson, July 27, 1862. 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 199 
 
 and defeated his old opponent, Banks, at Cedar Run, 
 some twenty miles north of Gordonsville, and then 
 withdrew toward Gordonsville to avoid attack by 
 Pope's entire army until Lee should be ready to re- 
 inforce him. Pope wrote that he would have Gordons- 
 ville and Charlottesville in ten days. Washington, 
 however, was in a panic. Burnside had been ordered 
 up from the South to reinforce McClellan, who was 
 clamoring for an additional 100,000 men; but he was 
 still held at Newport News so that he ''might move 
 on short notice, one way or the other, where ordered." 
 And on the 14th of August McClellan received orders 
 from Washington to withdraw his army from the Penin- 
 sula for the protection of the national capital. Lee 
 had already freed his mind of anxiety as to McClellan. 
 As has been well said, he read him like an open book. 
 He knew that for the present McClellan would give no 
 more trouble on the Peninsula, and his quarry now was 
 Pope. He wished to strike him swiftly before McClellan 
 could join him. On the 13th day of August, Lee, having 
 matured his plans and feeling secure as to Richmond, 
 even though McClellan moved a division up to occupy 
 Malvern Hill, as if to move again on Richmond, ordered 
 Longstreet with Hood to Gordonsville, sending thither 
 also R. H. Anderson, and going himself to take per- 
 sonal charge. He had thus massed quickly some 54,000 
 men ready for his stroke, leaving only two brigades for 
 the defence of Richmond. But President Davis wrote 
 him: "Confidence in you overcomes the view which 
 would otherwise be taken. ^ Jackson was eager to attack 
 
 'Ropes's "Story of the Civil War," II, p. 254. Colonel William 
 Allan, p. 199, n. 18, W. R., pp. 928, 945. 
 
200 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 at once, but Lee decided to wait till the men had suf- 
 ficient supplies. On the 19th he issued his order for 
 attack on the 20th. In the interval, however, a serious 
 contretemps [occurred which upset his well-conceived 
 plan. Pope captured Stuart's adjutant-general ^ with a 
 letter on his person from General Lee to General Stuart, 
 setting forth fully his plans, and making manifest to 
 Pope his position and force, and his determination 
 to overwhelm the army under Pope before it could 
 be reinforced by the Army of the Potomac. This ac- 
 cident Stuart offset partially a few days later, when, 
 in a night attack at Catlett's Station, he captured 
 Pope's head-quarters and effects, including his despatch- 
 book, containing important information throwing light 
 on the strength, movements, and designs of the enemy, 
 and disclosing General 'Pope's own views against his 
 ability to defend the line of the Rappahannock.^ But 
 Pope's despatches only made it appear imperative for 
 Lee to attack him before the forces from McClellan 
 and the Shenandoah should join him and make his 
 army overwhelmingly strong. Lee's, on the other 
 hand, enabled Pope to save his army and retire to a 
 position behind the Rappahannock, where he could 
 await these reinforcements. 
 
 This ''fortunate accident" of the capture of Lee's 
 letter containing his plans saved Pope for the time 
 being. It was a revelation to him, and suddenly aware 
 of the peril of his position, he hastily withdrew behind 
 the Rappahannock, thereby preventing the cutting off 
 of his army from his base of supplies as Lee had planned. 
 
 * Major Fitzhugn. Pope's repor . 
 
 '^ General Stuart's report, cited in Taylor's "General Lee." 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 201 
 
 "This retreat," says Ropes in his history of the cam- 
 paign, ''was made not a day too soon. Pope's army 
 had been, in truth, in an extremely dangerous position. 
 ... All this is very plain, but apparently it was not 
 seen by General Pope until the capture of one of the 
 officers of Stuart's staff put him in possession of Lee's 
 orders to his army.^ Lee was greatly disappointed 
 at Pope's escape," continues this able critic,^ and he 
 proceeds to show how, had Pope not retreated precipi- 
 tately, he ''would have been attacked in flank and rear, 
 and his conmaunications severed into the bargain. 
 Doubtless," he adds, "he would have made a strenu- 
 ous fight, but defeat under such circumstances might 
 well have been ruin. From this disaster fortune saved 
 Pope through the capture of Stuart's staff officer." ' 
 
 The credit for this brilliant conception of destroy- 
 ing Pope, Henderson rather gives to Jackson; but no 
 matter who originated the idea, the true credit, as 
 he shows in another connection, belongs to him on 
 whom rested the responsibility of the final decision 
 on which hangs the fate of the cause. This decision 
 Lee made, and when he arrived in the Piedmont he 
 held to his decision, though Pope had withdrawn his 
 army to a far more defensible line than when he 
 thought of pursuing Jackson to Gordonsville. Hav- 
 ing satisfied himself as to Pope's dispositions, Lee, un- 
 swerving in his audacious design, determined to attack 
 him beyond the Rappahannock, where he lay on the 
 
 » Ropes's "Story of the Civil War," pp. 256, 257. 
 "Lee to Jackson, July 23, 1862, W. R., p. 916. 
 ' Ropes, II, pp. 257, 258. 
 
202 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 left bank, on both sides of the Orange and Alexandria 
 Railway, awaiting his reinforcements. Thus, while 
 Longstreet was directed to hold his front, Jackson 
 was sent up the stream to cross beyond Pope at some 
 point and turn his right. This plan left Pope between 
 Lee and Richmond, but Lee had no fears on this score; 
 for it left him between Pope and Washington, and if he 
 were successful, Pope would not be tiying to capture 
 Richmond, but to save his army. Stuart, under cover 
 of the artillery, forced a passage at Beverly Ford, some 
 miles above the railroad, but was forced to withdraw, 
 and Jackson marched on higher up the river in pursu- 
 ance of Lee's order, to "seek a more favorable place to 
 cross," and on the afternoon of the 22d reached the 
 Sulphur Springs. A great rain, however, fell that night 
 and raised the river suddenly after he had sent Early 
 with a brigade or two across, leaving them isolated and 
 preventing their relief for several days. This rain, in 
 Ropes's opinion, saved Pope, who was now strictly on 
 the defensive, and was being encouraged by Halleck 
 to ''fight like the devil." ^ Meantime Longstreet, on 
 the 23d, drove off the force guarding the railroad 
 bridge at Rappahannock Station and the bridge was 
 burned. 
 
 It was after five days spent in trying to reach Pope's 
 right beyond the swollen Rappahannock, that Lee put 
 in operation his famous flank movement by which, 
 holding Pope's front with half his force, he despatched I 
 Jackson, together with a part of Stuart's Cavalry, to 
 circle quite around Pope's right and, crossing the Bull 
 
 > Ibid., II, pp. 259, 260. 16, W. R., pp. 56, 57. 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 203 
 
 Run Mountains at Thoroughfare Gap, strike his line of 
 communication in his rear. Considering that Pope had 
 under him, on the Rappahannock, an army which, 
 making allowance for all losses, '^ numbered upward 
 of 70,000 when Lee undertook this novel and perilous 
 operation," one may well agree with Ropes that "the 
 disparity between this force and that of Jackson is so 
 enormous that it is impossible not to be amazed at the 
 audacity of the Confederate general." ^ 
 
 Lee, however, was now assured of the withdrawal 
 of McClellan's army as a consequence of his auda- 
 cious strategy in threatening Washington, and having 
 massed his forces with a view to attacking Pope, he 
 proceeded to carry out his plans, however "novel and 
 perilous," undisturbed by any forebodings. Almost 
 due north of where Pope lay protected by the Rappa- 
 hannock, beginning a few miles north of Sulphur 
 Springs, just above Pope's right, and running due 
 north and south, lies a range of low mountains, forming 
 an outlying wing of the Blue Ridge. In this range of 
 mountains are several gaps through which wind rough 
 country roads. But most of these gaps lay too near 
 Pope's army to be attempted with any hope of success. 
 One of them, however, lay so far to the northward that 
 it had not been considered necessary to secure it. 
 Lee's plan now was to send Jackson and Stuart around 
 to the westward of this range as far as Thoroughfare 
 Gap, and have them cross the range at this point and 
 attack Pope in the rear, cutting and, if possible, de- 
 stroying his line of communications. And meanwhile 
 
 » Ihid., II, pp. 261, 262. Allen, pp. 212, 213. 
 
204 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Longstreet was to keep him occupied and then, steal- 
 ing away, was to follow Jackson by the same route 
 and join him for the purpose of attack or defence, as 
 circumstances should develop. The plan worked out 
 in a way which has become one of the romantic stories 
 of the history of war. Sending Jackson up the now 
 swollen stream to find a crossing-place well beyond 
 Pope's right, and Longstreet after him to demonstrate 
 in Pope's front and follow Jackson at the proper time, 
 Lee awaited confidently the result of his audacious plan. 
 Jackson withdrew to Jefferson, a few miles south-west 
 of Sulphur Springs, on the evening of the 24th, and 
 Longstreet took his place after dark. Next day, while 
 Longstreet demonstrated as if preparing to cross at 
 Waterloo and Sulphur Springs, Jackson, starting from 
 Jefferson, crossed the river at a point four miles above 
 Waterloo. Keeping to the west of the mountains, he 
 marched twenty-five miles a day, bivouacked at Salem, 
 and pushing forward with '4iis accustomed vigor and 
 celerity," crossed the Bull Run Mountains at Thorough- 
 fare Gap, and, finding the way clear, headed straight 
 for the line of Pope's communication at the rear of his 
 army. At Gainesville, on the day after he started, he 
 was joined by Stuart with two brigades of cavalry. 
 Here, after a record-making march, about nightfall, on 
 the 26th, while Pope thought he was headed for the 
 valley of the Shenandoah/ Jackson, having circled com- 
 pletely around Warren ton, where Pope had his head- 
 quarters, struck the railway at Bristoe Station between 
 Pope and the city he was supposed to be covering. Here 
 
 ' 18, W. R., pp. 653, 665. 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 205 
 
 he destroyed the bridge across Broad Run, which ren- 
 dered him safe for the time being from an attack from 
 the direction of Warrenton, and then turned his atten- 
 tion to the capture of Pope's great depot of suppHes. 
 He despatched Stuart that night with his cavalry and 
 two of Trimble's Regiments, who though they had 
 marched twenty-five miles that day had volunteered 
 for the occasion, to capture Manassas Junction, six 
 miles away, with its vast stores for Pope's army, which 
 was successfully accomplished by midnight, the cap- 
 tures including two batteries of artillery and some 
 300 prisoners. Next morning, leaving Ewell to guard 
 Bristoe Station, Jackson proceeded to Manassas, where 
 he was joined later by Ewell, who had been forced 
 back from Bristoe Station after a sharp fight, and who 
 brought the information that Pope had turned on him 
 with his full force. That morning Pope had issued 
 orders to abandon the line of the Rappahannock.^ 
 
 Ewell's retreat had far-reaching consequences. Pope 
 at first thought that the attack on Manassas was a 
 mere cavalry raid, and when he learned differently 
 and sent a sufficient force to Bristoe Station to drive 
 Ewell off, he conceived the idea that he had defeated 
 Jackson's whole army. He was afterward to learn that 
 this was an even more fatal mistake than the first. 
 That same night Pope, who appears to have thought 
 that his enemy was delivered into his hands, issued 
 orders for his entire army to concentrate at or near 
 Manassas Junction, and a manifesto that he would 
 "bag the whole crowd." Jackson had other views. 
 
 ' 16, W. R., pp. 34, 70. Ropes, II, p. 266. 
 
206 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Lee's plan had not stopped at the destruction of Pope's 
 supplies. He proposed also the destruction of his 
 army. If Pope should be allowed to retire on Wash- 
 ington and await the arrival of McClellan's army, the 
 chief object of his daring move would have been frus- 
 trated. This Jackson understood. Having now re- 
 freshed his men, he proposed to carry out the main 
 purpose of his perilous move. While Pope was con- 
 centrating to bag him at Manassas, Jackson, under 
 cover of darkness, left that point, and marching up 
 Bull Run beyond where Sigel lay to participate in the 
 work of bagging him, moved on the night of the 27th 
 to the westward of the turnpike and took a position 
 in the woods near Groveton, where he could await 
 Longstreet's arrival by way of Thoroughfare Gap, or 
 himself retire through either this gap or Aldie Gap, to 
 the northward, should necessity arise. His army com- 
 prised only about 18,000 men, but it was a fighting 
 force unexcelled in history. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 28th, Jackson, lying in the 
 hills near Groveton, almost surrounded by Pope's 
 army, learned that a large force was moving down the 
 turnpike toward Centre ville, where Pope had finally 
 determined to concentrate. This was King's division 
 of McDowell's command, which was on its way to help 
 bag him at Manassas. He immediately sprang upon 
 them, and the result was one of the most obstinately 
 contested of the minor fields of the war.^ The losses I 
 on both sides were heavy; for on both sides the men 
 fought from start to finish with extraordinary gallantry. 
 
 ' Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," II, p. 149. 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 207 
 
 The Confederate losses were the heaviest, however, 
 and among the 1,200 or more casualties was the gallant 
 old Ewell, who was desperately wounded. Pope, ob- 
 sessed with the idea that Jackson was trying to escape, 
 issued an order stating that McDowell had intercepted 
 his retreat, and with Sigel on his front he could not 
 escape. That night, however, the Federals withdrew 
 and retired toward Manassas, and next day it was known 
 that Pope ''had taken a position to cover Washington 
 against Jackson's advance." Strategically, however, 
 the engagement was decisive. Jackson had brought 
 on the fight with the view of drawing the whole Fed- 
 eral army on himself, and he was entirely successful.^ 
 Thus, this part of Lee's plan had been completely carried 
 out. Jackson, knowing that there was stern work ahead 
 of him, now posted himself in a defensive position par- 
 tially protected by the line of an unfinished railway ex- 
 tending north-eastwardly from the Warrenton Turnpike, 
 and awaited Longstreet (with whom was Lee himself), 
 who, having been relieved by R. H. Anderson, had 
 crossed the river at Hinson's Mill, the*same point where 
 Jackson had crossed several days before, and was push- 
 ing forward for Thoroughfare Gap, which he reached 
 on the afternoon of the 28th. Ricketts had been 
 posted here till he was ordered away to help bag Jack- 
 son, but a force still occupied the Gap. Finding the 
 Gap in possession of the enemy, Longstreet was forced 
 to carry it by assault, and did not reach Jackson till 
 the following afternoon. But though he had been 
 
 » Allan, p. 231. Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," II, pp. 179, 235. 
 Ropes, II, p. 272. 
 
208 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 delayed, he was in time for the final struggle, and Lee's 
 masterly strategy was justified. It was well that he had 
 carried the pass, for Pope had brought up all his army 
 to crush Jackson. It is agreed that the removal of 
 Rickett's conamand from the Gap to help bag Jackson 
 was a cardinal error. Lee had had tidings from Jack- 
 son as late as the 26th, saying that he was able to main- 
 tain himself till support should arrive. But he knew 
 the peril of his position, and he was eager to relieve him. 
 As he now with Longstreet's command emerged from 
 the Gap next morning (29th) the sound of the guns 
 toward Manassas, twelve miles away, told that the 
 battle was on and that Jackson was fighting for his life. 
 It, however, told precisely where Jackson was, and this 
 guided them to the field where Pope's army, now being 
 massed for his destruction, was being led against his 
 well-chosen position. Jackson fought along the line of 
 an unfinished railway embankment, with his artillery 
 on a ridge behind him, his left secured by Bull Run and 
 by Stuart's Cavalry, his right by the cavalry and the 
 commanding artillery posted behind him. Hill was on 
 his left in three lines, E well's Division on his centre 
 and right. The battle began by an attack on his centre 
 and left about seven o'clock, and from this time till 
 sunset it raged along the whole field. 
 
 Pushing forward by Gainesville, Longstreet moved to 
 Jackson's right, where Porter, guarding the enemy's 
 left, lay beyond him to his right. The battle had been 
 raging for hours when Lee reached the field. Sigel, 
 eager to settle old Valley scores, was striving to hold 
 Jackson in check until Pope could concentrate his full 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 209 
 
 force to destroy him. His attack on Jackson's left, 
 fierce as it was, had failed, though once for a short space 
 Hill's first line had been broken, and it required all his 
 reserves to re-establish it. Hooker had now come up 
 on Pope's right with Kearney and Reno — some 18,000 
 men, fresh and full of fight — and McDowell and Porter 
 were ordered to come in on his left and roll up Jack- 
 son's centre and right and thus sweep the field. This 
 Pope, who had now taken personal command' had no 
 doubt of being able to do. He reckoned, however, 
 without his host. Lee had now come up with Long- 
 street, and Jackson knew that his long-cherished de- 
 sign had reached fulfilment. Other corps were soon 
 put in, and for hours the battle raged '^with incessant 
 fury and varying success, but Jackson stubbornly held 
 his ground, though the fighting was often hand to 
 hand and the bayonet was in constant requisition." ^ 
 In all this fighting Longstreet took little part, though 
 Lee himself three times expressed to him his wish that 
 he should attack and thus relieve the hard-pressed Jack- 
 son. As General Lee did not positively order him in, 
 he determined to wait and attack next day, should a 
 weak place be found in the enemy's lines, and he left 
 Jackson and Hill to hold their position alone, except 
 for the aid afforded them by a reconnoissance in force 
 by three gallant brigades — Hood's and Evans's, with 
 Wilcox in support. The command of Fitz John Por- 
 ter, numbering some 10,000 men, lay near Gainesville, 
 deployed to engage any force in their front, and Long- 
 street thought the enemy was marching on him from 
 
 ' Taylor's "General Lee," p. 106. 
 
210 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the rear and failed to press in to Jackson's aid. When 
 evening fell Porter's menace had held Longstreet back 
 from the counterstroke which Lee had desired to give, 
 and le could not have done more had he attempted to 
 carry out Pope's urgent last order. Thus Porter, not- 
 withstanding the stern charges made against him later 
 and their fatal result, fully performed his task.* Lee 
 knew next morning that he need not deliver the attack 
 he had contemplated — that Pope would save him the 
 trouble. Fortunately for Lee, he knew also that Pope 
 thought Jackson was in a perilous position and was 
 anxious only to escape, and he disposed his troops 
 to take advantage of this erroneous view, which he 
 did completely. Pope, who, notwithstanding five 
 successive repulses and the loss of some 8,000 men, 
 claimed to have won the battle of the evening before, 
 was still laboring under 'Hhe strange hallucination" 
 that Jackson was in full retreat, and he massed his 
 army to destroy or ^'bag" him, giving McDowell the 
 ''general charge of the pursuit." Such a pursuit was 
 never known l^efore or since. He did not believe that 
 Longstreet had arrived, though Porter had warned 
 him of the fact, and while he was informed that 
 troops had passed through Thoroughfare Gap the day 
 before, he was confident that they were Jackson's troops 
 in retreat. He had now some 65,000 men directly 
 under his hand, and he not unnaturally felt able to 
 crush any force opposed to him. Accordingly, having 
 placed his army in a position to sweep the whole field 
 at once, he, about noon, gave the order to advance. 
 
 ' Ropes, II, p. 281. 
 
THORO 
 
 SladisonC 
 
 Kadiso 
 
General Map op the Country Around Ma ^^assas Junction 
 
t* 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 211 
 
 Porter had been moved over to the right, and Reynolds 
 was on the left facing Longstreet. Pope was certain 
 of victory and moved deliberately. Thus, it was after- 
 noon before Pope's gallant lines advanced to the attack 
 along the Warrenton Pike, with Porter leading against 
 Jackson's front in such force that Jackson called on 
 Lee for reinforcements. Lee immediately ordered Gen- 
 eral Longstreet in, and his whole line became engaged 
 from Jackson's left, stretching to Bull Run, on the 
 north of the turnpike, to Stuart's Hill, on the south, 
 where Longstreet 's right extended, with Stuart on his 
 right. The guns massed behind swept the open space 
 before Lee's lines and made them a field of death. 
 Supposing still that the force in ront was but a part 
 of Jackson's army left to guard his retreat, Pope was 
 taken by surprise when from the railway an army arose 
 and poured a deadly fire on his advancing ranks. But 
 never did brave men meet braver. Driven back by 
 the deadly blast, the assailants rallied again and again 
 till five assaults had been made. The fighting was 
 from this time furious. Line after line came on under 
 the leaden sleet with a courage which aroused the ad- 
 miration of their antagonists and called for the utmost 
 exertion to repel them. But mortal flesh could not 
 stand against the rain of shot and shell poured down 
 on the brigades "piling up against Jackson's right, 
 centre, and left," ^ and they melted away in the fiery 
 furnace. "Their repeated efforts to rally were," as 
 Lee reported, "unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being 
 thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming num- 
 
 ' Lee's report, Taylor's "General Lee," pp. 112, 113. 
 
212 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 bers, began to press steadily forward, driving the enemy 
 before tliem." As they retreated in confusion Lee 
 ordered a general advance; but "Longstreet, antici- 
 pating the order for a general advance, now threw his 
 whole command against the Federal centre and left, 
 and the whole line swept steadily on, driving the enemy 
 with great carnage from each successive position." It 
 is a modest and uncolored report of the general move- 
 ments made by the victorious comimander. The vic- 
 tory viewed in the light of all the facts was one of the 
 most complete in all the war. '^As Porter rolled back 
 from Jackson's front," says Henderson, 'Hhe hand of 
 a great captain snatched control of the battle from 
 Pope." Lee had seen his opportunity and thrown his 
 whole army on the retreating foe in one supreme and 
 masterly counterstroke. The result was a victory, com- 
 plete and overwhelming. 
 
 Yet, even thus, Pope ''with an audacity which dis- 
 aster was powerless to tame," reported to Halleck that 
 *'the enemy was badly whipped," and that he had 
 "moved back because he was largely outnumbered," 
 and his army was without food. In fact, Pope's army 
 was in rout; when Franklin arrived on the 30th, he 
 found it necessary to throw a division across the road 
 between Centreville and Bull Run to stop the "indis- 
 criminate mass of men, horse, and guns, and wagons, 
 all going pell-mell to the rear. Officers of all grades," 
 he states, ''from brigadier-generals down, were in the 
 throng." When McClellan took charge on the 2d he 
 placed the stragglers at 20,000, and Halleck's mes- 
 senger placed them at 30,000. 
 
LEE RELIEVES RICHMOND 213 
 
 Thus by Lee's "novel and perilous movement," car- 
 ried out to complete success, was won the great battle 
 of Second Manassas, which completed the campaign by 
 which he relieved Richmond. 
 
 With 50,000 men he had routed and driven Pope 
 from his menacing position with (as Ropes states) 
 70,000 men, as gallant as any soldiers in the world, 
 captured more than 9,000 prisoners, 30 pieces of artil- 
 lery, upward of 20,000 stand of small arms, numerous 
 colors, and a large amount of stores/ 
 
 During the night Pope withdrew to the north side 
 of Bull Run and occupied a strong position on the 
 heights about Centreville. But by this time the hunter 
 had become the hunted. Lee, driving for the fruits of 
 his dearly won victory, ordered Jackson to push for- 
 ward around Pope's right, while Longstreet engaged 
 him in front, and Pope, now thoroughly demoralized, 
 retired first on Fairfax Court House, and after a sharp 
 engagement with Jackson at Chantilly, to the secure 
 shelter of the formidable forts at Alexandria. Lee 
 says in his report that "it was found that the enemy 
 had conducted his retreat so rapidly that the attempt 
 to interfere with him was abandoned. The proximity of 
 the fortifications around Alexandria and Washington 
 rendered further pursuit useless." In this last fight 
 the brave Kearny was killed. Having ridden into the 
 Confederate lines by accident, he- was shot as he at- 
 tempted to escape. 
 
 ' Lee's report, cited in Taylor's "General Lee," p. 117. The Federal 
 losses were 1,738 killed and 10,135 wounded. Confederate losses, 
 1,090 killed and 6,154 wounded. Pope had certainly over 70,000 men. 
 See Ropes, cited ante. Henderson places his forces at 80,000. 
 
214 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 "Lee, with his extraordinary insight into character," 
 says Henderson/ "had played on Pope as he had played 
 on McClellan, and his strategy was justified by success. 
 In the space of three weeks he had carried the war 
 from the James to the Potomac; with an army that at 
 no time exceeded 55,000 men, he had driven 80,000 
 men into the fortifications of Washington." It was 
 a proof of Pope's utter demoralization that he tele- 
 graphed that unless something were ''done to restore 
 the tone of his army, it would melt away," and that he 
 attacked as the cause of his disaster the gallant Fitz 
 John Porter with a vehemence which might better 
 have been employed on the field of Manassas, and 
 placed on this fine soldier and honorable gentleman a 
 stigma which it took a generation to extirpate. 
 
 In any event, it was the end of the gascon, Pope. He 
 was transferred to the North-west to hold the Indians 
 in awe, and before a great while resigned. Such was 
 the fruit of Lee's bold generalship, and he was now to 
 give a yet further proof of his audacity and skill. 
 
 ' " Life of stonewall Jackson," II, p. 187. 
 
CHAPTER IX 
 
 LEE'S AUDACITY— ANTIETAM AND 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE 
 
 Lee's move against Pope was not merely the boldest, 
 and possibly the most masterly, piece of strategy in the 
 whole war; it was, as has been well said, ''one of the 
 most brilliant and daring movements in the history of 
 wars." He was already beginning to be confronted by 
 the enemy before which his victorious legions were 
 finally to succumb. The region which had hitherto 
 been the seat of war had been swept so clean and the 
 means of transportation had become so unreliable that 
 it was necessary for the subsistence of his army, if for 
 no other reason, to shift the field of operations. But 
 though the South had lost a year in its refusal to do 
 more than defend its own borders, the exigencies of 
 war made it apparent that this theory must be aban- 
 doned if success were to be sought. Another motive 
 also now operated with Lee. Three armies had been 
 defeated, and the only reply that the Union Gov- 
 ernment had made had been to call for more troops 
 from her inexhaustible resources. It was possible that 
 a victorious invasion of the North might force the 
 North to make peace. Such a move might bring about 
 the recognition of the Southern Confederacy by Great 
 Britain and France, and this would open her ports and 
 give her access to the world. Or it might compel the 
 
 215 
 
216 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 North to make peace. But the immediate cause oper- 
 ating with Lee was the necessity to reheve Virginia and 
 subsist his men. Accordingly he did not pause to 
 enjoy his victory. His army was wellnigh shoeless, 
 and the South was unable to help him. Need became 
 the handmaid of strategy. He was nearer to Wash- 
 ington than to Richmond. Maryland lay the other 
 side of Pope's army. He would place that army and the 
 other armies also between him and Riclimond. He de- 
 termined to march around Pope's army and invade 
 Maryland to subsist his army and relieve Virginia, and 
 to give Maryland the power to join the Southern Con- 
 federacy, which it was believed she longed to do. 
 
 Lee, therefore, who, as we have seen, had, in the be- 
 ginning of the war, held that the South should act 
 strictly on the defensive, now, after the war had pro- 
 ceeded for more than a year, reached a different con- 
 clusion. For what appeared good reasons, he made up 
 his mind that he should advance into IMaryland. Prob- 
 ably he felt that Maryland was properly a part of the 
 South, and he so indicates in his correspondence. Before 
 taking this step, however, he wrote the following letter 
 to President Davis, giving him his reasons for the move: 
 
 Head-quarters, Alexandria and Leesburg Road, 
 
 NEAR Dranesville, September 3, 1862. 
 His Excellency, President Davis. 
 
 Mr. President: The present seems to be the most pro- 
 pitious time since the commencement of the war for the 
 Confederate army to enter Maryland. The two grand 
 armies of the United States that have been operating 
 in Virginia, though now united, are much weakened 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 217 
 
 and demoralized. Their new levies, of which I under- 
 stand 60,000 men have aheady been posted in Washing- 
 ton, are not yet organized, and will take some time to 
 prepare for the field. If it is ever desired to give ma- 
 terial aid to Maryland and afford her an opportunity 
 of throwing off the oppression to which she is now sub- 
 ject, this would seem the most favorable. 
 
 After the enemy had disappeared from the vicinity 
 of Fairfax Court House and taken the road to Alex- 
 andria and Washington, I did not think it would be 
 advantageous to follow him farther. I had no inten- 
 tion of attacking him in his fortifications, and am not 
 prepared to invest them. If I possessed the necessary 
 munitions, I should be unable to supply provisions for 
 the troops. I therefore determined, while threatening 
 the approaches to Washington, to draw the troops into 
 Loudoun, where forage and some provisions can be 
 obtained, menace their possession of the Shenandoah 
 Valley, and, if found practicable, to cross into Mary- 
 land. The purpose, if discovered, will have the effect 
 of carrying the enemy north of the Potomac, and if pre- 
 vented will not result in much evil. 
 
 The army is not properly equipped for an invasion 
 of an enemy's territory. It lacks much of the material 
 of war, is feeble in transportation, the animals being 
 much reduced, and the men are poorly provided with 
 clothes, and in thousands of instances are destitute of 
 shoes. Still, we cannot afford to be idle, and, though 
 weaker than our opponents in men and military equip- 
 ments, must endeavor to harass if we cannot destroy 
 them. I am aware that the movement is attended 
 with much risk, yet I do not consider success impossible, 
 and shall endeavor to guard it from loss. As long as the 
 army of the enemy are employed on this frontier I have 
 no fears for the safety of Richmond, yet I earnestly 
 recommend that advantage be taken of this period of 
 
218 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 comparative safety to place its defence, both by land 
 and water, in the most perfect condition. A respect- 
 able force can be collected to defend its approaches by 
 land, and the steamer Richmond, I hope, is now ready 
 to clear the river of hostile vessels. 
 
 Should General Bragg find it impracticable to operate 
 to advantage on his present frontier, his army, after 
 leaving sufficient garrisons, could be advantageously 
 employed in opposing the overwhelming numbers which 
 it seems to be the intention of the enemy now to con- 
 centrate in Virginia. 
 
 I have already been told by prisoners that some of 
 Buell's cavalry have been joined to General Pope's 
 army, and have reason to believe that the whole of 
 McClellan's, the larger portion of Burnside's and Cox's, 
 and a portion of Hunter's are united to it. 
 
 What occasions me most concern is the fear of getting 
 out of ammunition. I beg you will instruct the Ord- 
 nance Department to spare no pains in manufacturing 
 a sufficient amount of the best kind, and to be par- 
 ticular, in preparing that for the artillery, to provide 
 three times as much of the long-range ammunition as 
 of that for smooth-bore or short-range guns. The 
 points to which I desire the ammunition to be forwarded 
 will be made known to the department in time. If the 
 Quartermaster's Department can furnish any shoes, it 
 would be the greatest relief. We have entered upon 
 September, and the nights are becoming cool. 
 
 I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obe- 
 dient servant, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 Another motive also operated with Lee in causing 
 him to advance into Maryland. He desired peace, and 
 he felt now as he felt when he again crossed the Potomac 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 219 
 
 in the following year that such a move might lead to 
 peace with honor. On the 8th of September he wrote 
 President Davis the following letter: 
 
 Head-quakters, near Fredericktown, Md., 
 
 September 8, 1862. 
 His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, 
 
 President of the Confederate States, Richmond, Va. 
 
 Mr. President: The present position of affairs, in my 
 opinion, places it in the power of the government of 
 the Confederate States to propose with propriety to 
 that of the United States the recognition of our inde- 
 pendence. For more than a year both sections of the 
 country have been devastated by hostilities which have 
 brought sorrow and suffering upon thousands of homes 
 without advancing the objects which our enemies pro- 
 posed to themselves in beginning the contest. Such a 
 proposition, coming from us at this time, could in no 
 way be regarded as suing for peace, but, being made 
 when it is in our power to inflict injury upon our ad- 
 versary, would show conclusively to the world that our 
 sole object is the establishment of our independence 
 and the attainment of an honorable peace. The rejec- 
 tion of this offer would prove to the country that the 
 responsibility of the continuance of the war does not 
 rest upon us, but that the party in power in the United 
 States elect to prosecute it for purposes of their own. 
 The proposal of peace would enable the people of the 
 United States to determine at their coming elections 
 whether they will support those who favor a prolonga- 
 tion of the war or those who wish to bring it to a termi- 
 nation which can but be productive of good to both 
 parties without affecting the honor of either. 
 
 I have the honor to be, with high respect, your obe- 
 dient servant, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
220 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 On the 2d of September, amid the gloom cast by 
 Pope's disastrous defeat, McClellan was requested by 
 Mr. Lincoln to take command of the defence of Wash- 
 ington, and at once took command of Pope's shattered 
 army. On the same day Lee issued his order to cross 
 the Potomac, and, screened by Stuart's Cavalry, Jack- 
 son, whose corps was to form the advance, headed for 
 the fords above Leesburg. It had been hoped, as Lee's 
 letters show, that Maryland would rise and declare for 
 the South. Maryland did not respond. Her popula- 
 tion who espoused the cause of the South lay mainly to 
 the eastward. Her western population were affected by 
 the proximity to the mountain population of Virginia. 
 However, her Legislature had been arrested, and the 
 machinery of her government had been thrown out of 
 gear. Henderson suggests a further reason for this 
 indifference on the part of her people in the uninviting 
 appearance of Lee's ragged soldiery. Moreover, they 
 were accustomed to the Federal occupation, and it 
 was a hazardous experiment to side actively with the 
 South unless she should first show herself able to pro- 
 tect them. Lee issued a proclamation on the 8th, call- 
 ing on the people to rise and enjoy once more the in- 
 alienable rights of freemen; but assuring them that 
 no constraint would be put on them by his army and 
 no intimidation would be allowed. He declared it was 
 for them to decide their destiny freely and without 
 restraint, and that his army would respect their choice, 
 whatever it might be.^ Thus reassured, Maryland re- 
 mained quiescent. Those who espoused the South's 
 
 ' F. Lee's " Lee," p. 198. 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 221 
 
 cause had long since crossed the border and shed their 
 blood on many a hard-fought field. The remainder 
 continued neutral. This, however, was not the cause 
 of Lee's failure. That he did not reap the full fruits of 
 this wonderful generalship was due to one of those 
 strange events which, so insignificant in itself, yet under 
 Him who 
 
 " Views with equal eye, as God of All, 
 A hero perish, or a sparrow fall," 
 
 is fateful to decide the issues of nations. McClellan 
 moved to Frederick, on the east side of South Moun- 
 tain, two days after Lee crossed to the westward. As 
 the capture of Lee's letter and plans had given Pope 
 warning and led him to retire his army behind the Rap- 
 pahannock in time to save it, so now an even stranger 
 fate befell Lee. A copy of his despatch giving his en- 
 tire plan was picked up at Frederick, wrapped about 
 a handful of cigars, on the site of a camp formerly occu- 
 pied by D. H. Hill, and promptly reached McClellan, 
 thus betraying to him a plan which but for this strange 
 accident might have resulted in the complete over- 
 throw of his army, and even in the capture of the na- 
 tional capital, and enabling him with his vast resources 
 to frustrate it. A man's carelessness usually reacts 
 mainly upon himself, but few incidents in the history 
 of the world have ever been fraught with such fateful 
 consequences as that act of the unknown staff officer or 
 courier who chose Lee's plan of battle as a wrapping 
 for his tobacco. 
 
222 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 "If we always had exact information of our enemy's 
 dispositions," said Frederick, "we should beat him 
 every time." This exact information this strange 
 mishap gave to Lee's adversary on the eve of Antie- 
 tam. Even so, Lee, who fought the battle with only 
 35,000 men, came off with more glory than his an- 
 tagonist, who had 87,000,* as gallant men, moreover, 
 as ever braved death, and the latter was a little later 
 removed by his government as a failure, while Lee 
 stood higher than ever in the affection and esteem of 
 the South. Lee's plan was to march into Maryland to 
 the west of Washington, and inclining to the north- 
 eastward, threaten at once Baltimore and Washington, 
 and incidentally Pennsylvania. His first objective was 
 Hagerstown, Md., an important junction point due 
 north of Harper's Ferry. It was expected that this 
 line of march would naturally clear the Shenandoah 
 Valley of the troops which had been harrying it. It 
 had been supposed that as soon as this move was made 
 the troops garrisoning Harper's Ferry, numbering some 
 10,000 men, would be withdrawn, as Johnston had done 
 when Patterson moved south in 1861. When the com- 
 mander at Harper's Ferry still held on, it became neces- 
 sary to dislodge or capture him. Lee decided on the | 
 latter course and despatched Jackson to capture him, 
 while he pushed on into Maryland. 
 
 His disposition of his forces, which McClellan got 
 information of on the 13th of September, was as follows: 
 
 * General Lee told Fitz Lee that he fought the battle of Sharpsburg 
 with 35,000 troops. And McClellan reported that he himself had 
 87,164 troops. (Fitzhugh Lee's "Life of Lee," p. 209.) CJ. also 
 Ropes's "Story of the Civil War," II, pjj. 376, 377. 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 223 
 
 Jackson, whose troops formed the advance, was to turn 
 off from the Hagerstown Road after passing Middle- 
 town, take the Sharpsburg Road, cross the Potomac at 
 the most convenient place, and by Friday night (Sep- 
 tember 12) seize the Baltimore and Ohio Railway, 
 round up and capture the troops at Martinsburg to the 
 west of Harper's Ferry — some 3,000 men — and then 
 proceed to capture Harper's Ferry itself. Longstreet 
 was to proceed to Boonsboro, on the Hagerstown Road ; 
 McLaws was to follow him to Middletown and then, fol- 
 lowing Jackson, with his own and Anderson's Divisions 
 was to seize the Maryland Heights, commanding Har- 
 per's Ferry, by Friday night, and proceed to aid in the 
 capture of Harper's Ferry. General Walker, with his 
 division, was to seize Loudoun Heights on the south 
 side of the Shenandoah River, and as far as practicable 
 co-operate with Jackson and McLaws in intercepting 
 the retreat of the enemy. General D. H. Hill's Division 
 was to form the rear guard of the main army. Stuart 
 was to send detachments of cavalry with these troops, 
 and with the main body of his cavalry was to cover the 
 route of the main army and bring up stragglers. After 
 the capture of Harper's Ferry the troops engaged there 
 were to join the main army. 
 
 It will be seen that Lee had no doubt whatever of the 
 success of his undertaking. Both he and Jackson knew 
 Harper's Ferry and the surrounding country, and his 
 plan, so simple and yet so complete, was laid out with a 
 precision as absolute as if formed on the ground instead 
 of on the march in a new country. It was this order 
 showing the dispersion of his army over twenty-odd 
 
224 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 miles of country, with a river flowing between its widely 
 scattered parts, that by a strange fate fell in McClellan's 
 hands. 
 
 Lee's order was discovered and delivered to McClel- 
 lan on the 13th, and McClellan at once set himself to 
 the task of meeting the situation by relieving Harper's 
 Ferry on the one hand and crushing Lee's army in 
 detail among the passes of the Maryland Spurs. Lee, 
 however, had, through the good offices of a friendly 
 citizen who had been present at or had learned of the 
 delivery of his despatch to McClellan, soon become 
 aware of the misfortune that had befallen him, and 
 while McClellan was preparing to destroy him, he 
 was taking prompt measures to repair the damage as 
 fully as possible. He promptly informed his lieuten- 
 ants and instantly recalled Longstreet from Hagers- 
 town, ordered Hill back to Turner's Gap and Stuart 
 to Crampton Gap, five miles south, to defend them 
 against McClellan's expected advance, a disposition 
 which delayed the enemy until the evening of the 14th, 
 when, after fierce fighting, they carried both positions, 
 forcing McLaws back from Crampton Gap to Pleasant 
 Valley, across which, however, he established "a. formi- 
 dable line of defence." Lee was thus forced to choose 
 between two alternatives — either to retreat across the 
 Potomac or to fight where he had not contemplated 
 fighting. He seems to have wavered momentarily 
 which course to adopt, and well he might waver. It 
 was a perilous situation. He had with him, by the 
 highest computation, when the gaps were stormed on 
 the afternoon of the 14th, only about 19,000 men in 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 225 
 
 all/ "while the main army of McClellan was close upon 
 him." He issued an order that night (8 p. m.) to 
 McLaws to cross the Potomac below Shepherdstown, 
 leaving the ford at Shepherdstown for the main 
 army to take. "But in less than two hours Lee 
 had changed his mind — why we are not informed" 
 —says Ropes, "and had determined to await battle 
 north of the Potomac." By midnight he had planned 
 his battle; he had ordered the cavalry to pilot McLaws 
 over the mountains and across country to Sharps- 
 burg, where he had determined to make his stand 
 on the east of Antietam Creek. He had also taken 
 measures to bring up his other troops as rapidly as 
 possible. "This decision," says Ropes, "to stand and 
 fight at Sharpsburg, which General Lee took on the 
 evening of the 14th of September — just after his 
 troops had been driven from the South Mountain 
 passes — is beyond controversy one of the boldest and 
 most hazardous decisions in his whole military career. 
 It is, in truth, so bold and hazardous that one is be- 
 wildered that he could even have thought seriously of 
 making it." ^ 
 
 Lee's decision was, indeed, so bold and hazardous 
 that the thoughtful Ropes suggests that he must have 
 been influenced by fear of loss of his military prestige. 
 "General Lee, however," he admits, "thought there 
 was a fair chance for him to win a victory over McClel- 
 lan," ^ and he adds that "naturally he did not consider 
 them [McClellan's troops] as good as his own, and it is 
 
 ' Ropes's "Story of the Civil War," II, p. 347. 
 
 * Ibid., pp. 351, 352. * Ibid., II, p. 349. 
 
226 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 without doubt that theji did not constitute so good an 
 army as that which he commanded." 
 
 We have seen what his motives were on crossing over 
 into Maryland. His design now was to cover McLaws's 
 rear at Harper's Ferry, prevent the rehef of that place, 
 draw his army together in a strong, defensive position, 
 and await McClellan's attack. We ivnow, however, 
 that while Longstreet (as usual) suggested the obstacles 
 and dangers of the situation, Jackson approved the 
 action of Lee both before and after the battle.* 
 
 The eastern range of the Blue Ridge in Maryland 
 follows the general trend of the Appalachians from 
 south-west to north-east, and north of the Potomac 
 are known as the South Mountains. To the westward 
 lies a rolling country with pleasant valleys through 
 which wind small streams which flow southward into 
 the Potomac, Up these valleys and up the ridges 
 which divide them wind the roads northward, which 
 Lee was following when he learned of the mishap that 
 had befallen him in the discovery of his plans. It was 
 a perilous situation, for McClellan with 80,000 troops 
 lay on the other side of the South Mountain at Fred- 
 erick, within a day's march of his small force, and 
 the passes were defended by only D. H. Hill's Divis- 
 ion and the cavalry; while Longstreet was at Hagers- 
 town, twelve miles beyond Boonsboro, and Jackson 
 with Walker and McLaws was still engaged in the work 
 of capturing Harper's Ferry, on the other side of the 
 Potomac. The stoutest heart might well have quailed. 
 But Lee stood firm. He knew both Jackson and 
 
 ' Lee's letter to Mrs. Jackson, January 15, 1866. 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 227 
 
 McClellan, and he acted with undaunted resolution. 
 Instead of retreating across the Potomac as Longstreet 
 suggested, he ordered the passes of the South Mountain 
 to be defended, recalled Longstreet to his aid, and re- 
 tiring to a position on the Antietam, prepared for bat- 
 tle with the Potomac at his back, while he awaited 
 Jackson. Fortunately for Lee, his surmise based on 
 McClellan's known caution proved correct. McClellan 
 did not attack the troops posted in the passes until 
 afternoon on the 14th, the day that Jackson invested 
 Harper's Ferry, and then he threw the bulk of his 
 force, 70,000 men, against the northernmost gap, and 
 the one nearest Longstreet, so that by the time his 
 attack became general — four o'clock — Longstreet had 
 reached the field, and at nightfall Turner's Gap was 
 still in Lee's possession. The Southern Gap, known 
 as Crampton's Gap, defended by the gallant Mun- 
 ford with only his cavalry, dismounted, and a regi- 
 ment of infantry, had been carried at five o'clock by 
 Franklin, and that night Franklin, established at the 
 top of the mountain, might with reasonable assistance 
 have commanded the direct line of communication be- 
 tween Lee and Jackson. That night, however, Long- 
 street and Hill abandoned Turner's Gap, their position 
 being no longer tenable, and fell back to Sharps- 
 burg above the Antietam, and Franklin was held at 
 bay by McLaws's bold front and called for reinforce- 
 ments though the latter had only six brigades in line, 
 not over 6,000 men, to Franklin's 20,000.' The losses 
 of the Confederates on this day were in all about 
 
 » Allan, p. 364. 
 
228 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 3,400 men, while of the Federals they were probably 
 a thousand less. Jackson, Walker, and McLaws had 
 been ordered that afternoon by Lee to join him. Jack- 
 son's reply was sent next day in the form of an an- 
 nouncement that; ''through God's blessing, Harper's 
 Ferry and its garrison were to be surrendered, " and 
 that, leaving Hill, whose troops had borne the heaviest 
 part in the engagement, in command, the other troops 
 would march that evening, as soon as they could get 
 their rations. 
 
 It should be said that Jackson completely performed 
 the part assigned to him, as did all who had gone with 
 him. Circling Harper's Ferry, he rounded up the troops 
 at Martinsburg, drove them into Harper's Ferry, 
 which he had already invested on the north and east, 
 and then, following them, proceeded to reduce the 
 place with such success that on the morning of the 
 15th, after a fierce bombardment, he had the satisfac- 
 tion of seizing the town — the white flag being hoisted at 
 the moment his infantry was forming for the assault. 
 By this capture he took 12,500 men, 13,000 small arms, 
 73 pieces of artillery, and some hundreds of wagons. 
 Having accomplished this feat in accordance with 
 Lee's plans, and waiting only to fill his men's haver- 
 sacks, he set out to join Lee, lying in front of McClel- 
 lan's army, which, as stated, had stormed and carried 
 the gaps of the South Mountains in front of him the 
 evening before. They marched all night, forded the 
 Potomac and, while McClellan paltered and reconnoitred 
 and waited to get his whole great army through the 
 passes of the South Mountain, they limped on to the field 
 
The Field of the Antietam 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 229 
 
 on the morning of the 16th Hke a weary pack after a 
 kilhng chase and added 11,000 worn but victorious 
 troops to the 15,000 or 16,000 men whom McClellan's 
 imagination had magnified into a great army. Thir- 
 teen thousand men of Lee's army were still at Harper's 
 Ferry, and every hour of delay was precious for him. 
 
 The passes of the South Mountain having been car- 
 ried while Jackson was closing in on Harper's Ferry, 
 twenty miles away. General Lee on the night of the 14th 
 withdrew his army across Antietam Creek and assumed 
 a position which he thought stronger, along a range of 
 hills on the east side of the Hagerstown Turnpike, with 
 his right resting on Antietam Creek and his left refused 
 across the turnpike some three miles to the northward, 
 this turnpike being a line of communication between 
 the two wings by which he could support either when 
 hard pressed. His position was a strong one for defence. 
 The ridge on which he lay faced the Antietam lying in 
 its deep ravine, and commanded the slopes in front, 
 and all but one of the crossings of the creeks. He had 
 no time for entrenchments, but his men were protected 
 partly by stone walls or fences and partly by outcropping 
 ledges of limestone and belts of forest. The right rested 
 on a spur which lifted above the Antietam, the left on 
 Nicodemus Run, near the Potomac, with a protecting 
 wood just behind. The issue proved that the line had 
 been chosen with a soldier's eye. Thus ensconced, he 
 waited for Jackson, who on the morning of the same day 
 (the 15th) had, as already stated, captured Harper's 
 Ferry, with its garrison, munitions, and stores, and, 
 leaving A. P. Hill in charge, set out in haste at night- 
 
230 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 fall to reinforce Lee, who was confronting McClellan. 
 Happily for Lee, McClellan was still seeing shadows. 
 He waited to make everything sure.' 
 
 McClellan's army, with whom Lee's cavalry had been 
 so effectively skirmishing as to retard the advance all 
 the forenoon, appeared in his front in the early after- 
 noon of the 15th, and Ropes declares that it was an 
 ''unique opportunity" that was offered the Union 
 general. McClellan, however, as he had written Hal- 
 leck on the night of the 13th, still believed that Lee 
 had at least 100,000 men under his command, and he 
 knew how ably that army, whatever its numbers, was 
 commanded. Lee's very boldness was his salvation. 
 Had he shown a less dauntless front McClellan would 
 have destroyed him. As it was, McClellan could not 
 imagine that with less than a sixth of the force which 
 had swept him from the mountain passes, Lee would 
 stand for battle with a river at his back. Moreover, 
 he believed that his own army was still not fully recov- 
 ered from the demoralization it had suffered from 
 under Pope. The Army of the Potomac, he declared 
 later, ''was thoroughly exhausted by the desperate 
 fighting and severe marching in the unhealthy regions 
 of the Chickahominy, and afterward during the second 
 Bull Run campaign." He held that "nothing but 
 sheer necessity justified the advance of the Army of 
 the Potomac to South Mountain and Antietam in its 
 then condition." ^ His idea was, as he has written, to 
 force Lee back across the Potomac, but not to risk losing 
 
 » Ropes, II, pp. 354, 355. 
 
 2 "Battles and Leaders," II, p. 564. 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 231 
 
 a battle which, lost, might lose Washington. He was, 
 therefore, more than ordinarily inclined to be cautious. 
 Accordingly, although his army was now spread out on 
 the slopes above the left bank of the Antietam in full 
 view of Lee, and his artillery engaged in a brief duel 
 with Lee's guns posted above the right bank, it was 
 not until next day (the 16th) that he made any demon- 
 strations against Lee. Meantime Jackson was pushing 
 forward all that night, and on the morning of the 16th 
 he arrived with all of his army who could march, the 
 remainder of them, barefooted and lame, being left 
 behind. But these, alike with those who could march, 
 were flushed with victory. 
 
 McClellan now proposed, if possible, to destroy Lee, 
 Lee proposed to receive McClellan's assault, and, if 
 opportunity presented itself, to deal him at the right 
 moment a counterstroke which should destroy him. 
 McClellan had by his report 87,000 men and 275 guns 
 on the field; Lee had less than 36,000 after his last 
 regiment arrived. 
 
 Lee's troops were posted, with Longstreet command- 
 ing his right and centre and Jackson his left, with 
 Hood in support, his cavalry guarding the wings, 
 while McClellan, in disposing his forces, had placed 
 Hooker on his extreme right with the First Corps, 
 Sunrner next on his right with two corps, the Second 
 and Twelfth, then Porter with the Fifth Corps occu- 
 pying his centre, and Burnside on the left with the 
 Ninth Corps, all good troops and bravely led. That 
 afternoon, in pursuance of McClellan's plan, Hooker was 
 ordered to cross the Antietam and assault Lee's left, 
 
232 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 and crossing the stream his corps assaulted the portion 
 of the hne held by Hood, but was "gallantly repulsed." 
 The only effect of this assault is declared by Ropes to 
 have been the disclosure of McClellan's plans.* It at least 
 informed Lee where to look for the attack next day. 
 That night Mansfield, with the Twelfth Corps, followed 
 Hooker across the Antietam and waited for dawn. 
 
 The real battle of Sharpsburg was fought on the 
 17th, and was the bloodiest battle of the war, a battle 
 in which intrepid courage marked both sides, shining 
 alike in the furious charges of the men who assaulted 
 Lee's lines and the undaunted constancy of the men 
 who defended them. It began early in the morning, 
 as expected, with an attack by Hooker's corps, under 
 such gallant conamanders as Meade, Doubleday, and 
 Ricketts;the first shock falling on Ewell's Division in 
 Jackson's wing, and within the deadly hour of the first 
 onslaught. General J. R. Jones, commanding Jackson's 
 old division, was borne from the field, to be followed 
 immediately by Starke, v/ho succeeded him in com- 
 mand, mortally wounded ; Colonel Douglass, command- 
 ing Lawton's Brigade, was killed; General Lawton, 
 commanding a division, and Colonel Walker, com- 
 manding a brigade, were severely wounded. More 
 than half of the brigades of Lawton and Hays were 
 either killed or wounded, and more than a third of 
 Trimble's, and all of the regimental commanders in 
 those brigades, except two, were killed or wounded.^ 
 ''The corn in a field of thirty acres was cut as close 
 
 ' Ropes, II, pp. 358, 359. 
 
 ^ Ibid., II, p. 359, citing Jackson's report, 27, W. R., p. 956. 
 
 i 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 233 
 
 as if cut by the sickle, and the dead lay piled in 
 regular ranks along the whole Confederate front." In 
 this extremity. Hood's Brigades and three of D. H. 
 Hill's Brigades were rushed to the front in support of 
 the exhausted divisions of Jones and Lawton, and 
 after an hour of furious fighting, Hooker's force, led 
 by himself with Doubleday, Ricketts, and Meade, 
 gallant commanders of gallant divisions, were beaten 
 off, with Hooker himself wounded and over 2,500 
 men dead or wounded. It was a terrific opening of a 
 terrific day. As they retired, Mansfield's corps, 8,500 
 muskets, came in on their left, and in the furious on- 
 slaught on the already shattered brigades of D. H. 
 Hill and Hood, bore them back across the turnpike, 
 ''with loss of some 1,700 men out of the 7,000 brought 
 into action," and an even heavier loss on the Con- 
 federate side. But beyond the turnpike the remnants 
 of Jones's Division under Grigsby, reinforced by Early, 
 who had succeeded the wounded Lawton in command of 
 Swell's Division, "clung obstinately" to their ground,^ 
 and Stuart's Artillery shattered the charging lines. Lee 
 knew the work before him and recognized the need of 
 holding back at all hazards these assaulting columns. 
 From his post on an eminence near his centre his eagle 
 eye had seen the crux of the fight, and while McClellan's 
 columns were spread beyond the Antietam opposite his 
 right and centre, he despatched McLaws and Walker 
 from his right to aid their old comrades. So far Lee's 
 left had suffered terribly, and only the supreme cour- 
 age of the men — rank and file — had saved Lee's army. 
 
 ' Ropes, II, pp. 361, 362. 
 
234 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Along the left so thin was the line that Stuart, always 
 resourceful, had employed the expedient of posting 
 standards at intervals behind the ridge, so that they 
 could be seen above the crest, and gathering up the 
 stragglers, he formed them into a body of sharp-shooters, 
 and, taking personal command himself, led them for- 
 ward, transforming them frDm a lot of shirkers into a 
 band of heroes/ It was at this point that Lee was 
 approached by a captain of artillery, who, having had 
 three of his four guns disabled, asked for instructions, 
 and having told him to take his other gun in, found 
 that his own son was one of the gunners. 
 
 A brief lull now took place, which was broken by 
 the advance of Sumner, with two divisions, 18,000 
 men, pushing hotly across the turnpike in three lines 
 against the Confederate left, his veteran troops cheer- 
 ing and being cheered, confident of sweeping ever}'- 
 thing before them. It was a perilous moment, for 
 Hill and Hood and Early had been terribly shattered, 
 however "obstinately they clung to their ground," and 
 Sedgwick's and Richardson's troops were fresh and 
 game. Beyond the turnpike, however, they came on 
 the remnants of Jackson's Divisions, lying behind a 
 rocky ledge, who gave them a staggering reception. 
 And at this moment the divisions of McLaws and 
 Walker, who had been sent by Lee from his right, 
 came up, and, under Jackson's orders, who rode him- 
 self to meet McLaws and direct him to attack and 
 turn the enemy's flank, they deployed across Sumner's 
 and Sedgwick's flank and poured forth on them a 
 
 '"Story of a Cannoneer I'^nder Stonewall Jackson," p. 151. 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 235 
 
 ^ fire so ''terrible and sustained" that, after a futile 
 . effort to change front, the Federals broke and fell 
 back in confusion under the shelter of their artil- 
 lery, with a loss of over 2,200, officers and men, all 
 , within a few minutes/ It was the crucial point of 
 „ the battle. Had Sumner been able to sweep over 
 Jackson's exhausted divisions, Lee's army would have 
 . been destroyed. They had already given back under 
 ; the terrific onslaught of superior numbers and arms, 
 r and a gap had been made in Jackson's line when the 
 , reinforcements arrived. "God has been very kind to 
 us this day," said Stonewall Jackson, as he rode with 
 McLaws on the heels of his victorious soldiery, who 
 tfj were sweeping Sedgwick from the ridge they had gained 
 yat such cost. 
 
 [j This act of Lee in reinforcing his left wing from 
 
 Ijhis right at this critical juncture. Ropes praises as 
 
 :i exhibiting remarkable ''skill and resolution." An ef- 
 
 ,jfort made to press Sedgwick's defeated troops, who 
 
 reformed behind their artillery, was repulsed by the 
 
 ,1 artillery and Smith's brigade, which had just come 
 
 i up and saved Sedgwick; but not until thirty-nine and 
 
 ||one-half per cent of McLaws's Division had fallen. A 
 
 .jlittle later the remnants of Jones's and Lawton's 
 
 I troops drove the enemy from the ground they had 
 
 secured in the second assault. But by this time all the 
 
 ^Confederate troops in that part of the field had sus- 
 
 lltained terrific losses. Says Henderson, from whom 
 
 ! and Ropes much of this account is taken: "30,500 in- 
 
 r; 'Henderson, II, p. 252, citing Palfrey, "The Antietam and Frede- 
 jricksburg," p. 87. 
 
236 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 fantry at the lowest calculation, and probably 100 guns, 
 besides those across the Antietam — eight divisions of 
 infantry, more than half of McClellan's army — lay 
 paralyzed before them for the rest of the day." * Nearly 
 13,000 men, including no less than fifteen generals and 
 brigadiers, had fallen within six hours. "They had, 
 indeed," says Ropes, "with the utmost bravery, with 
 inflexible resolution, and at a terrible sacrifice of life, 
 repelled the third attack on the left flank of the Con- 
 federate army." ^ Meantime, Sumner's other division, 
 under French, which was put in to reinforce Sedgwick, 
 had by bearing southward been engaged in a bloody and 
 desperate conflict, on Lee's left centre, with the divis- 
 ions of D. H. Hill and R. H. Anderson, the latter 
 of whom, on his way to reinforce the left wing, find- 
 ing Hill's already decimated brigades hard pressed, 
 had turned aside to their succor. They were now in 
 a desperate struggle with these 10,000 fresh troops, 
 under French and Richardson, who tried again and 
 again to secure the strong central point marked by 
 the Dunkard Church. The combat which followed 
 "was," says Ropes, "beyond a question one of the 
 most sanguinary and desperate in the whole war. 
 The Confederate artillery was hammered almost out] 
 of existence; the wood next the Dunkard Churchj 
 was carried, and still Longstreet's infantry held theiij 
 ground, recapturing the wood. For three hours, hovc^ 
 ten till one, the conflict raged over the famous sunkei 
 road before the Federals secured possession of it, anc 
 
 » " Life of stonewall Jackson," pp. 254, 255. 
 
 ^ Ropes, II, p. 367. =• Ibid., II, p. 368. 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 237 
 
 "Bloody Lane" is the name to-day by which is known 
 this roadway whose possession that day cost over 6,000 
 men. ''At this moment/' says the same high authority 
 whose account we have been following, ''fortune favored 
 McClellan. The two divisions of Franklin's corps, under 
 W. F. Smith and Slocum, had arrived on this part of 
 the field." They numbered from 10,000 to 12,000 men, 
 fresh and in good condition. 
 
 Franklin wished to put them in, but Sumner, who 
 had tested the temper of the men who held Lee's line, 
 was unwilling to risk another attack, and "McClellan, 
 undoubtedly much influenced by Sumner, would not 
 permit any attack." "Even Sumner, bravest of men," 
 says Henderson, "had been staggered by the fierce 
 assault which had driven Sedgwick's troops like sheep 
 across the corn-field, nor was McClellan disposed to push 
 matters to extremity." ^ 
 
 The battle was now raging along the front of Lee's 
 
 right, protected by the Antietam. About 1 p. m. the 
 
 bridge was carried by Burnside's troops, and the stream 
 
 was crossed both above and below, but not until four 
 
 assaults had been repelled by Tombs's Brigade, of D. R. 
 
 Jones's Division, assisted by the well-posted artillery. 
 
 About three o'clock Cox made his assault on the heights 
 
 where lay Lee's right, and achieved "a brilliant success," 
 
 seizing the spur, breaking the infantry line, and captur- 
 
 I ing Mcintosh's battery; and, says Ropes, "a complete 
 
 I victory seemed within sight. But this was not to be." 
 
 I Just at the crucial moment the Confederate "light 
 
 I division" — five brigades under A. P. Hill — pushing 
 
 i ' "Life of Stonewall Jackson," II, pp. 255, 256. 
 
238 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 from Harper's Ferry for the sound of the guns, having 
 marched seventeen miles and forded the Potomac, 
 ''chmbed the heights south of the town," and "with- 
 out an instant's hesitation they rushed to the rescue 
 of their comrades," and the end was not long in com- 
 ing. The lines were recaptured along with Mcintosh's 
 battery, and the Federal troops, with victory appar- 
 ently almost in their grasp, were driven back with 
 terrific slaughter. When night fell, 28,000 men lay on 
 the field, the proof of the constancy of the Ameri- 
 can soldier. When night fell, Lee's army, decimated 
 but intact, still held its position above the Antietam. 
 "The failure to put Franklin in" was, in the opinion 
 of Ropes, a capital error. He insists that McClellan 
 should have won the battle; for unlike those who 
 argue only from subsequent events, this thoughtful 
 student of war admits that while "Lee's invasion had 
 terminated in failure," he and his army had unques- 
 tionably won glory, even though he claims that the 
 prestige of victory rested later with McClellan.^ Thus 
 ended what is said to have been the bloodiest day 
 of the war, and one of the bloodiest battles ever fought. 
 Each side lost about one-quarter of the troops engaged, 
 and Lee had with less than half the force of his enemy, 
 though compelled to fight in a place where he had 
 not intended to fight, beaten his brave enemy off 
 with such slaughter that though he offered him battle 
 next day he was not again attacked, and the following 
 morning he retired across the Potomac unmolested. 
 Of "his intrepidity" in standing to fight an army, 
 
 ^ Ropes's "Story of the Civil War," II, p. 379. 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 239 
 
 which Ropes places at 70,000, with less than 40,000 
 men, not all of whom in fact were with him at the 
 commencement of the action, Ropes has nothing but 
 praise. ''Nor could any troops," he adds, ''have more 
 fully justified the reliance their leader placed in them 
 than the troops of the Army of Northern Virginia." ^ 
 "Lee, in fact, intended to try his men again." Both 
 Longstreet and Jackson urged recrossing the Potomac 
 that night, but he refused. 
 
 ''As the men," says Henderson, "sank down to rest 
 on the line of battle, so exhausted that they could not 
 be awakened to eat their rations; as the blood cooled 
 and the tension on the nerves relaxed, and even the 
 officers, faint with hunger and sickened with the awful 
 slaughter, looked forward with apprehension to the 
 morrow, from one indomitable heart the hope of vic- 
 tory had not yet vanished. In the deep silence of the 
 night, more oppressive than the stunning roar of battle, 
 Lee, still mounted, stood on the high-road to the Poto- 
 mac, and as general after general rode in Yveavily from 
 the front, he asked quietly of each, ' How is it on your 
 part of the line?' Each told the same tale: their men 
 were worn out; the enemy's numbers were over- 
 whelming; there was nothing left but to retreat across 
 the Potomac before daylight. Even Jackson had no 
 other counsel to offer. His report was not the less im- 
 pressive for his quiet and respectful tone. He had had 
 to contend, he said, against the heaviest odds he had 
 ever. met. Many of his divisional and brigade com- 
 manders were dead or wounded, and his loss had been 
 severe. Hood, who came next, was quite unmanned. 
 
 ' Ibid., II, p. 377. 
 
240 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 He exclaimed that he had no men left. 'Great God!' 
 cried Lee, with an excitement he had not yet displayed, 
 ' where is the splendid division you had this morning? ' 
 'They are lying on the field, where you sent them,' was 
 the reply, 'for few have straggled. My division has 
 been almost wiped out.' 
 
 "After all had given their opinion, there was an appall- 
 ing silence, which seemed to last for several minutes, 
 and then General Lee, rising erect in his stirrups, said : 
 'Gentlemen, we will not cross the Potomac to-night. 
 You will go to your respective commands, strengthen 
 your lines; send two officers from each brigade toward 
 the ford to collect your stragglers and get them up. 
 Many have come in. I have had the proper steps taken 
 to collect all the men who are in the rear. If McClellan 
 wants to fight in the morning, I will give him battle 
 again. Go!' Without a word of remonstrance the 
 group broke up, leaving their great commander alone 
 with his responsibility, and, says an eye-witness, 'if 
 I read their faces aright, there was not one but con- 
 sidered that General Lee was taking a fearful risk.'" ^ 
 All the next day he watched for this chance as the 
 eagle watches from his crag for the prey; but it did not 
 come and he recrossed into Virginia. He even looked 
 forward to assuming the offensive. McClellan's left 
 wing, protected by the Antietam and strongly posted 
 beyond, was impregnable with any force he could bring 
 to bear, but his right was not so well protected, and Lee 
 now planned to attack and turn McClellan's right, 
 and Jackson was to make the attempt to crush this 
 
 * Henderson, II, p. 2G2, 263, quoting General Stephen D. Lee, wlio was 
 present at the conference. 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 241 
 
 wing, for which purpose he was to be given fifty guns, 
 drawn from his own and other commands. As Stuart, 
 however, had reported against the attempt the evening 
 before, so now Jackson, having personally inspected 
 the position in company with Colonel Stephen D. Lee, 
 reported that it was impossible with any force he 
 could bring to the attack/ 
 
 Of the battle of Sharpsburg, or Antietam, the view 
 usually expressed is one largely influenced by events 
 which succeeded it after a long interval. The view at 
 the time, based on the actual battle and its immediate 
 consequences, was widely different. The North was 
 full of dejection rather than of elation, and General 
 G. H. Gordon, who now commanded a division, wrote : 
 "It would be useless to deny that at this period there 
 was a despondent feeling in the army." General Mc- 
 Clellan wrote that the States of the North are flooded 
 with deserters and absentees.^ Horace Greeley's paper, 
 representing the great constituency which at that time 
 opposed Lincoln's methods, voiced their opinion. ''He 
 leaves us," he declared, speaking of Lee, ''the debris 
 of his late camp, two disabled pieces of artillery, a 
 few hundred of his stragglers, perhaps 2,000 of his 
 wounded, and as many more of his unburied dead. 
 Not a sound field-piece, caisson, ambulance, or wagon ; 
 not a tent, box of stores, or a pound of ammunition. 
 He takes with him the supplies gathered in Mary- 
 land and the rich spoils of Harper's Ferry." ^ 
 
 ' Ibid., II, p. 266, citing General S. D. Lee's account. 
 
 'Off. Rep., vol. XIX, part I, p. 70. 
 
 ^New York Tribune. Quoted from Jones's "Lee," p. 195. 
 
242 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Wliat those rich spoils were Lee himself mentions 
 in the general order issued to his army, two weeks after 
 it had, on the field of Sharpsburg, as he declares, with 
 less than one-third of the enemy's numbers, resisted 
 from daylight until dark the whole army of the enemy, 
 and repulsed every attack along his entire front of 
 more than four miles in extent. 
 
 In this order the commanding general recounts to 
 his army its achievements, in reviewing which he de- 
 clares he ''cannot withhold the expression of his ad- 
 miration of the indomitable courage it has displayed 
 in battle, and its cheerful endurance of privation and 
 hardship on the march." ^ 
 
 If an exultant note of pardonable pride in his army 
 creeps into it, who can wonder! ''Since your great 
 victories around Richmond," he declares, "you have 
 defeated the enemy at Cedar IMountain, expelled him 
 from the Rappahannock, and, after a conflict of three 
 days, utterly repulsed him on the plain of Manassas, 
 and forced him to take shelter within the fortifications 
 around his capital. Without halting for repose, you 
 crossed the Potomac, stormed the heights of Harper's 
 Ferry, made prisoners of more than 11,600 men and 
 .captured upward of 70 pieces of artillery, all ©f their 
 small arms, and other rhunitions of war. Wliile one 
 corps of the army was thus engaged, another insured 
 its success by arresting at Boonsboro the combined 
 armies of the enemy, advancing under their favorite 
 general to the relief of their beleaguered comrades. 
 
 "On the field of Sharpsburg, with less than one- 
 
 ' General Orders, No. 116. 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 243 
 
 third of his numbers, you resisted from dayhght till 
 dark the whole army of the enemy, and repulsed every 
 attack along his entire front of more than four miles 
 in extent. 
 
 ''The whole of the following day you stood prepared 
 to resume the conflict on the same ground, and retired 
 next morning without molestation across the Potomac. 
 
 ''Two attempts subsequently made by the enemy 
 to follow you across the river have resulted in his eom- 
 plete discomfiture and his being driven back with 
 loss." 
 
 Such was the view that the commanding general, 
 Lee himself, took of his campaign two weeks after the 
 battle of Antietam, and it is no wonder that he should 
 have added: "Achievements such as these demanded 
 much valor and patriotism. History records few ex- 
 amples of greater fortitude and endurance than this 
 army has exhibited; " or that he should, as he reports, 
 have "been commissioned by the President to thank 
 the army in the name of the Confederate States for 
 the undying fame they had won for their arms." 
 
 In truth, whatever long subsequent events may have 
 developed as to the consequences of the attack at 
 Sharpsburg and Lee's retirement across the Potomac 
 afterward, to the student of war, now as then, it must 
 appear that the honors of that bloodiest battle of the 
 war were with Lee, and remain with him to-day. That 
 McClellan, with the complete disposition of Lee's forces 
 in his hand, with an army of 87,000 men as brave as 
 ever died for glory, and as gallantly officered, should 
 not have destroyed Lee with but 35,000 in the total on 
 
244 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the field, and that Lee, with but that number up, 
 while the rest, shoeless and lame, were limping far be- 
 hind, yet trying to get up, should, with his back to the 
 river, have not only survived that furious day, repuls- 
 ing every attack along that deadly four-mile front, 
 but should have stood his ground to offer battle again 
 next day, and then have retired across the river un- 
 molested, is proof beyond all doubt/ 
 
 "Why do you not move that line of battle to make 
 it conform to your own?" asked Hunter McGuire of 
 Grigsby, gazing at a long line of men lying quietly in 
 ranks in a field at some little distance. 
 
 "Those men are all dead," was the reply; "they are 
 Georgia soliders." ^ 
 
 A Federal patrol that night, crossing a field where 
 the fight had raged fiercest, came on a battle-line asleep, 
 rank on rank, skirmishers in front and battle-line be- 
 hind, all asleep on their arms. They were all dead. 
 
 It has been thought well to discuss somewhat at 
 lengtli this great battle fought by Lee on Northern soil, 
 because it seems to illustrate peculiarly those qualities 
 which, in combination, made him the great captain 
 he was, and absolutely refutes the foolish charge that 
 he was only a defensive general and remarkable only 
 when behind breastworks. At Antietam there were 
 no breastworks save the limestone ledges, the fences, 
 and the sunken roads cut by the rains and worn by 
 the wagons. It exhibits absolutely his grasp of the 
 
 * The Union losses were 12,400; Confederate, 8,000. 
 
 * Address on Stonewall Jackson, by Dr. Hunter McGuire, " The Con- 
 federate Cause," p. 204. 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 245 
 
 most difficult and unexpected situation, his unequalled 
 audacity, his intrepidity, his resourcefulness, his in- 
 comparable resolution, and his skill in handling men 
 alike in detached sections and in mass on the field of 
 battle. Possibly, no other general on either side would 
 have had the boldness to risk the stand Lee made in 
 the angle of the Antietam, with the Potomac at his 
 back; certainly no other general save Grant would have 
 stood his ground after the battle, and have saved the 
 morale of his army, and as to Grant, it is merely con- 
 jecture; for he fought no battle south of the Rapidan 
 in which he did not largely outnumber his antagonist 
 and vastly excel him in equipment. 
 
 It is true, as Ropes states, that McClellan fol- 
 lowed Lee across the Potomac, but his two immedi- 
 ate attempts were promptly repelled. When McClellan 
 found that Lee had recrossed the Potomac, he con- 
 ceived a different idea of the situation from that he 
 had had with Lee lying in his front with refilled car- 
 tridge boxes and ammunition chests. He decided to 
 advance, and proceeded on the afternoon of the 19th 
 to cross the river in pursuit. This movement he in- 
 trusted to Porter. Lee was now withdrawing to a 
 region where he could rest and subsist his troops, and 
 the ford at which the army had crossed was guarded 
 by only a small rear guard of some 600 infantry, sup- 
 ported by the reserve artillery under General W. N. 
 Pendleton. Crossing over under cover of a heavy 
 artillery fire, Porter attacked the rear guard, which, 
 owing to the necessity to guard threatened points above 
 and below the ford, had been reduced to about 200 
 
246 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 men, and captured four guns. McClellan then ordered 
 Porter to move across in force, confident that lie would 
 catch Lee in retreat and disable him. Porter acted 
 with decision. Lee appears to have gauged well the 
 strength of the pursuit. Wlien he received notice of 
 the affair of the 19th from General Pendleton, he or- 
 dered Jackson to ''drive back those people," and Jack- 
 son, who had already been apprised of the situation, 
 acted promptly. With Hill leading, and Early in sup- 
 port, he turned on the force that was advancing under 
 Sykes and Morell, and with an impetuous charge drove 
 it back across the river, dyeing the stream with the 
 blood of many a brave man, and entailing upon Por- 
 ter's gallant corps a loss which satisfied the commander 
 that though the Army of Virginia had retired from the 
 banks of the Antietam, the idea that it was in retreat 
 had not found a lodgement on the south bank of the 
 Potomac. This was the end of McClellan's serious 
 attempt to follow up the '^ victory" of Antietam. It 
 was not until more than a month later, when Lee lay 
 about Winchester, that McClellan made good a foot- 
 ing in Virginia. During this time, McClellan not hav- 
 ing crossed the Potomac, Lee sent Stuart across the 
 river on one of his famous around-the-enemy rides. 
 Crossing the Potomac at daylight on the 10th of Oc- 
 tober, Stuart with 1,800 men rode due north to Mer- 
 cersburg, thence on to Chambersburg, forty-six miles 
 from his starting-point, in Virginia, which he reached 
 at seven o'clock that evening. Here he destroyed 
 the depot of supplies, including a large quantity of 
 small arms and ammunition, and making a requi- 
 
ANTIETAM AND CHANCELLORSVILLE 247 
 
 sition for some 500 horses, he set out around the 
 rear of McClellan's army. Crossing the mountains, he 
 passed through Summitsburg, crossed the Monocacy 
 near Frederick, and reached Hyattstown at dayUght 
 on the 12th. Learning that 4,000 or 5,000 troops 
 were guarding the roads, he took a by-road, and pass- 
 ing within a mile or two of the enemy near Pottersville, 
 he seized the ford known as White's Ford, and, after a 
 sharp skirmish, crossed back into Virginia, having rid- 
 den one hundred and twenty-six miles from daylight 
 on the 10th to noon on the 12th, and passed close by 
 McClellan's army lying in wait to catch him, and all 
 without the loss of a single man killed. 
 
 This brilliant action of Stuart's had a far-reaching 
 effect. It was the second time the daring cavalry 
 leader had ridden around McClellan, and the people of 
 the North were so excited by it that McClellan was 
 forced to move southward. In the end, indeed, it 
 brought about his removal. 
 
 "Though badly found in weapons, ammunition, mil- 
 itary equipment, etc.," says Field-Marshal Viscount 
 Wolseley, in speaking of Lee at this time, "his army 
 had, nevertheless, achieved great things. His men 
 were so badly shod (indeed, a considerable portion had 
 no boots or shoes) that, at the battle of Antietam, Gen- 
 eral Lee assured me he never had more than 35,000 
 men with him; the remainder of his army, shoeless and 
 footsore, were straggling along the roads in the rear, 
 trying to reach him in time for the battle." Henderson 
 declares that the discovery of Lee's despatch was the 
 cause of the failure of his invasion of Maryland. But 
 
248 ROBERT E. LEE* 
 
 for this he might have selected his own battle-field, 
 there need have been no forced marches, and the 
 25,000 stragglers who had been left beyond the Potomac 
 would have been in the fighting line. 
 
 Had Lee been in McClellan's place, who can doubt 
 what the issue would have been? In fact, Mr. Lincoln 
 plainly put this question to McClellan in another con- 
 nection, and a little later relieved him of conmiand 
 and put the brave but hesitating Burnside in his place, 
 only to add, a few weeks later on the fatal field of 
 Fredericksburg, new laurels to Lee's chaplet. 
 
CHAPTER X 
 
 FREDERICKSBURG 
 
 Toward the end of October, McClellan began to cross 
 the Potomac with a view to moving through the Pied- 
 mont and thus forcing Lee from the Shenandoah Val- 
 ley. He had learned a lesson in strategy from his 
 able opponent. He brought into the Piedmont about 
 125,000 men and 320 guns, while Lee had in all about 
 72,000 men and 275 guns, of which 127 were smooth- 
 bore, short-range pieces. Lee still pursued his old 
 plan of threatening the enemy's communications. He 
 left Jackson with the Second Corps about Winchester, 
 while Longstreet with the First Corps was to bar Mc- 
 Clellan's way to the southward and fall on his com- 
 munications should he turn to the Valley. He had no 
 fear of McClellan's marching on Richmond before him, 
 and he chose the plan which with his smaller force was 
 the only one that promised assured success. He had 
 at first decided to bring Jackson south of the Blue 
 Ridge to unite with Longstreet by means of Fisher's 
 Gap, and from the region about Gordonsville threaten 
 McClellan's communications; but he inlmediately af- 
 terward changed his plan (at Jackson's suggestion, 
 Henderson thinks) and left Jackson in "the Valley" to 
 operate in the way he knew so well, while he himself 
 remained in McClellan's front, awaiting his oppor- 
 tunity. His letter of November 9 to Jackson, setting 
 
 249 
 
250 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 forth his plan, casts a light on his character, and on 
 his relation to his great lieutenant. It runs as follows:* 
 
 Head-quarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 November 9, 1862—1 p. m. 
 Lieutenant-General Thomas J. Jackson, 
 Commanding Left Wing, etc. 
 
 General: Your letter of the 7th is at hand. The 
 enemy seems to be massing his troops along the Ma- 
 nassas Railroad in the vicinity of Piedmont, which gives 
 him great facilities for bringing up supplies from Alex- 
 andria. It has occurred to me that his object may be 
 to seize upon Strasburg with his main force, to inter- 
 cept your ascent of the valley. This would oblige you 
 to cross into the Lost River Valley, or west of it, un- 
 less you could force a passage through the Blue Ridge; 
 hence my anxiety for your safety. If you can prevent 
 such a movement of the enemy, and operate strongly 
 upon his flank and rear through the gaps of the Blue 
 Ridge, you would certainly, in my opinion, effect the 
 object you propose. A demonstration of crossing into 
 Maryland would serve the same purpose, and might 
 call him back to the Potomac. As my object is to re- 
 tard and baffle his designs, if it can be accomplished by 
 manoeuvring your corps as you propose, it will serve 
 my purpose as well as if effected in any other way. 
 With this understanding, you can use youv discretion, 
 which I know I can rely upon, in remaining or advan- 
 cing up the valley. But I desire you will take precau- 
 tions to prevent the enemy's occupying the roads west 
 of the Massanutten Mountains, and your demonstra- 
 tion upon his flank might probably be as well made 
 from a position nearer to Strasburg as from that you 
 now occupy. If the enemy should move into the val- 
 
 ' War Records, series I, vol. XIX, part II, p. 705. 
 
FREDERICKSBURG 251 
 
 ley through Thornton's Gap, you must seize the pass 
 through the Massanutten Mountains as soon as you 
 can, while Longstreet will advance through Milman's, 
 which you term Fisher's Gap (on the direct road from 
 Madison Court House to New Market). But I think 
 his movement upon Front Royal the more probable 
 of the two. 
 
 Keep me advised of your movements and intentions; 
 and you must keep always in view the probability of 
 an attack upon Richmond, from either north or south, 
 when a concentration of forces will become necessary. 
 The enemy has made no advance south of the Rappa- 
 hannock line since I last wi'ote you. . . . 
 
 The non-occupation of Martinsburg by the enemy, 
 and his not marching into the valley from his former 
 base on the Potomac, shows, I think, that his whole 
 force has been drawn from Maryland into Virginia east 
 of the Blue Ridge. His retirement from Snicker's and 
 Ashby's Gaps, and concentration of his force on the 
 railroad in the vicinity of Manassas Gap, must either 
 be for the purpose of supplying it or for making a de- 
 scent upon Front Royal and Strasburg. I hope, there- 
 fore, you will be on your guard. 
 
 I am, etc., 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 Meantime, McClellan's methods were rapidly alien- 
 ating anew the confidence of both the government and 
 the people of the United States. McClellan felt that he 
 had saved Washington and the nation; the government 
 felt that he should have destroyed Lee's army. The 
 government complained of McClellan 's want of celerity; 
 McClellan complained of Halleck's fault-finding. He 
 wrote urging the government to say something in com- 
 mendation of his army, which had been ''badly cut 
 
252 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 up and scattered by the overwhelming numbers brought 
 against them in the battle of the 17th." The reply was 
 a complaint of the army's "inactivity." 
 
 Finally, the breach became so wide as to place its 
 closing beyond possibility. When Lee retired across 
 the Potomac, Mr. Lincoln, as a war measure, gave 
 notice of his intention to issue an emancipation proc- 
 lamation. This, though it eventually had an immense 
 influence on the result of the struggle, was at the 
 time contrary to the views of many, both out of the 
 armies of the Union and in them, and was sharply, if 
 indirectly, criticised by McClellan.^ 
 
 In the early days of November, McCIellan advanced 
 on Warrenton, and Lee, in anticipation of this, moved 
 down to the east of the Blue Ridge and occupied Cul- 
 peper and the region south of the Rappahannock, 
 whereupon, after a tart correspondence between McCIel- 
 lan and the authorities in Washington over McClellan's 
 failure to destroy Lee's army, McCIellan was relieved 
 of his command, the order issuing on the 5th of 
 November. At the same time — indeed, by the same 
 order — the gallant Fitz John Porter was ordered 
 before a court-martial to answer charges preferred 
 against him by Pope, that he had lost him the battle 
 of Second Manassas. Thus was lost the service of 
 ''probably the best officer in the Army of the Poto- 
 mac," ^ and thus the North lost the services of the 
 general whom General Lee is said to have considered 
 
 > Rhodes's " Hist, of U. S.," IV, p. 191. Henderson's " Stonewall 
 Jackson," pp, 289. 
 2 Ibid., II, p. 300. 
 
 
FREDERICKSBURG 253 
 
 the best commander opposed to him during the war. 
 That McClellan was not Lee's equal, either as a strat- 
 egist, a tactician, or a fighter, was clearly manifest then 
 as it is now; but he was a great organizer, conducted 
 war on high principles, restored the morale of a shat- 
 tered army, and defeated the object of Lee's first inva- 
 sion of Maryland. And, as has been already quoted, it 
 was well said that "without McClellan there could have 
 been no Grant." 
 
 Two days before Lee's letter to Jackson was de- 
 spatched, and on the very day that Lee decided to 
 concentrate his forces, the plan of the campaign from 
 the North was unexpectedly revolutionized. That day 
 Burnside rode into McClellan's camp with an order su- 
 perseding McClellan and appointing himself in com- 
 mand of the army. Politics had joined hands with 
 impatience, and the most experienced general of the 
 North was set aside for one who had so far com- 
 manded only a corps and doubted his own ability to 
 do more.^ What McClellan might have achieved had 
 he been left untrammelled, as Grant was later, will 
 never be known, any more than it will be known what 
 Joseph E. Johnston might have accomplished had he 
 not been superseded by the gallant but rash Hood 
 before Sherman. But he could hardly have done worse 
 than Burnside did. For the latter completely failed, 
 and his failure led to a sacrifice of life as terrible as it 
 was useless. 
 
 The new commander absolutely changed the plan 
 which McClellan had laid down. Turning southward, 
 
 ' Ropes, II, pp. 441, 442." Rhodes's "Hist, of U. S.,"IV, pp. 190, 191. 
 Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," II, pp. 299, 300. 
 
254 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 he led his army straight for Richmond. It sounded 
 well, but was more difficult of accomplishment. Leav- 
 ing Warrenton on the 15th of November, in two days 
 Burnside's advance guard was on the heights opposite 
 Fredericksburg. Had he pushed forward he might 
 have seized the town and the heights behind it, and this 
 Sumner urged his doing; but he feared to divide his 
 army, and two days later Lee, who had previously ad- 
 vised, though he had not ordered, Jackson's withdrawal 
 toward Richmond, ordered Longstreet to take positioil 
 there, and called Jackson from the valley to Orange 
 Court House on the way to join him. "One hardly 
 knows," says Ropes, ''which is more remarkable. Gen- 
 eral Lee's sagacity in estimating the inertia of his an- 
 tagonist or his temerity in confronting him so long with 
 a force only one-third as strong, and actually for a time 
 refusing the aid which Jackson was bringing to him." * 
 Burnside, having made it thus manifest that he 
 designed to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, 
 Lee now moved down from Culpeper and Orange, on 
 the upper waters of the Rappahannock, and posting 
 himself on the heights on the southern side of the town, 
 fortified and awaited Burnside's further advance. The 
 fortifications for the artillery were made under the 
 supintendence of General Lee's chief of artillery, Gen- 
 eral William N. Pendleton, and were much commended; 
 at least they served. The question that had presented 
 itself on Burnside's advance was whether Lee should 
 take position at Fredericksburg or on the south shore 
 of the North Anna. It appears that Lee and his lieu- 
 tenants preferred the latter line of defence as present- 
 
 • Ropes, II, p. 454. 
 
FREDERICKSBURG 255 
 
 ing a better chance for a counterstroke ; but the Con- 
 federate authorities insisted on the former. And Lee, 
 always dutiful, proceeded to secure this line. To 
 allow the enemy to approach so near Richmond un- 
 opposed, appeared to the government bad policy, and 
 the valley of the Rappahannock and the other regions 
 which would be given up were too valuable to be sac- 
 rificed without a struggle. Leaving Winchester on the 
 22d, Jackson marched down the valley, and crossing 
 the Blue Ridge at Fisher's Gap, reached Orange Court 
 House on the 27th, thirty-six miles from Fredericks- 
 burg, having marched meantime one hundred and 
 twenty miles and rested his army two days. Burn- 
 side was still on the north side of the Rappahannock, 
 getting his new line of communications and base of 
 supplies established; the roads were growing worse 
 and worse and the North more and more impatient. 
 
 Thus Lee in mid-December found himself posted on 
 the heights of Fredericksburg to bar Burnside's way. 
 
 Fredericksburg lies on the plain on the west bank of 
 the Rappahannock, where it is perhaps one hundred 
 and fifty yards wide. The heights on this side begin 
 on the river above the town and, curving around to 
 the southward, continue in a range of hills parallel to 
 the river at a distance of about a mile from the stream. 
 The heights on the northern bank rose immediately 
 above tRe water and were crowned by Burnside's pow- 
 erful batteries. Burnside's forces, as given by him- 
 self, numbered 113,000, while Lee's total strength 
 was 78,288 men of all arms.^ Longstreet was posted 
 on the heights back of the old town in a formidable 
 
 1 Taylor's "General Lee," pp. 145, 146. 
 
256 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 position, and Jackson was (on the 29th of Novem- 
 ber) despatched by Lee to guard the crossing-places 
 further down the river. Early, in command of Ewell's 
 Division, was sent to Skinker's Neck, a point ten or 
 twelve miles below the town. D. H. Hill was placed at 
 Port Royal, five miles yet farther down. A. P. Hill and 
 Taliaferro were posted at or near Guinea Station, on the 
 railway to Richmond — the former within a few miles 
 of Longstreet's right and the latter some five miles 
 farther off, all about an equal distance from Long- 
 street and D. H. Hill. With his troops thus disposed 
 in a way to lead Burnside to attack and at the same 
 time to enable him to concentrate at the moment of 
 attack and defeat him, Lee awaited his enemy's next 
 move, while his cavalry division guarded his flank and 
 patrolled the stream. He had not long to watch, and 
 this time was put to good use in fortifying. An at- 
 tempt to pass the Federal gunboats up the river was 
 defeated at Port Royal by D. H. Hill and Stuart's 
 horse artillery, and Early caused to end what was ap- 
 parently an attempt to cross at Skinker's Neck. But 
 on the 11th Burnside moved directly on Fredericks- 
 burg. 
 
 The actual laying of the pontoons, after a number of 
 attempts in which the troops attempting it were picked 
 off, man by man, by Barksdale's Mississippi regiments 
 posted in the cellars of houses overlooking the water, 
 was gallantly effected by the Federal troops on the 
 afternoon of the 11th, under cover of a heavy artillery 
 fire from 150 guns, and that evening and the follow- 
 ing day Burnside's army crossed over on five bridges, 
 their movements being veiled by a heavy fog which 
 
FREDERICKSBURG 257 
 
 rose from the river and the sodden ground, blanket- 
 ing all beneath it. The following morning as the fog 
 lifted, Burnside's army, with Franklin commanding his 
 left and Sumner his right, filled the plains as they ad- 
 vanced to the attack where Lee lay along the heights 
 above the town, with Longstreet commanding his left 
 and Jackson his right. It was a battle as fierce almost 
 as Sharpsburg, and scarcely less deadly for the hap- 
 less assailants. Also, like Sharpsburg, it was fatuously 
 fought in detachments. The assault began on the less 
 commanding hills to the south of the town where Jack- 
 son lay, his right protected by the artillery and Stuart's 
 Cavalry, faced north on the plain near Hamilton's 
 Crossing. Here young John Pelham reaped fame by 
 holding back the enemy for a time with a single piece, 
 posted on the plain. Burnside had imagined that 
 Jackson was still at Port Royal, fifteen miles below, 
 guarding the crossing,^ and thus had ordered Frank- 
 lin to seize the heights. Franklin promptly directed 
 Reynolds to prepare to attack. He in compliance with 
 his instructions " assigned the duty to Meade's divis- 
 ion, supported by Gibbon's." In three battle-lines 
 came on, as if on parade, Meade's and Gibbon's ear- 
 nest Pennsylvanians. Line after line advanced to the 
 attack, only to be swept back with terrific slaughter. 
 When the infantry were swept back, the artillery was 
 sent in to clear the way, and after a fierce duel the 
 Pennsylvanians advanced again. At one point where 
 a marshy stream bordered by woodland, known as 
 Deep Run, came through, it had been supposed that 
 the marsh was impassable, and thus a gap of about 600 
 
 > Ropes, II, p. 468. 
 
258 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 yards had been left in Jackson's lines, though Early 
 lay across it only a third of a mile to the rear. Here, 
 shielded by the woods from the leaden sleet as they 
 advanced, the gallant assailants broke through the 
 first line of A. P. Hill. Passing between the brigades 
 of Lane and Archer, the first brigade turned to the 
 right and rolled up Lane's right flank, while the next 
 one, sweeping to the left, struck Archer's flank, who, 
 though taken by surprise, held on stoutly. Had they 
 been supported the situation might have been serious, 
 but Thomas came to Lane's aid, and Jackson ordered 
 up Early and Taliaferro from his third line, while Gregg 
 brought up his brigade in time to help stay the disaster, 
 though it cost liim his life to do so. 
 
 The leading regiment in the advance of Gibbon's 
 troops was the 107th Pennsylvania, led by its gallant 
 commander, *Colonel (later General) T. F. McCoy, a 
 veteran of the Mexican War. In the advance it was 
 separated for a time from the rest of the line, and the 
 leading place was taken by other troops, which were 
 staggered and stopped by the terrific fire directed 
 against them. Finding his advance checked. General 
 Gibbon rode up to the 107th Pennsylvania, and point- 
 ing to the front, said: "1 desire this regiment to take 
 that wood at the point of the bayonet." Colonel 
 McCoy gave the orders to unsling knapsacks and fix 
 bayonets, and, after a few simple words to his men, 
 moved forward. Passing over the broken troops in 
 their front, they rushed onward and penetrated the 
 wood, breaking through the line before them and clear- 
 ing the line of the railroad. 
 
 This was but one of many gallant actions that day, 
 
FREDERICKSBURG 259 
 
 so fatal to the Union arms; but it marked the furthest 
 advance of Burnside's troops on Lee's right. 
 
 Frankhn's brave divisions having failed to break 
 Lee's right, an assault was made against Lee's left by 
 Sumner, who had been ordered to hold his men where 
 they were sheltered by the town, until "an impression" 
 could be made on Lee's right. It was an even more 
 impossible and deadly task than Franklin had essayed. 
 A canal too deep to cross save by bridges stretched 
 across the fiat below the hill. A stout stone wall ran 
 along the base of the hill known as Marye's Heights, 
 and up the slope rifle pits had been dug to shelter all 
 the men needed for the defence, while on top were 
 posted the artillery and supporting infantry, all sweep- 
 ing the level plain below with an iron hail. ''Six 
 distinct and separate assaults were made against Long- 
 street's front," line after line rushing recklessly for- 
 ward under the deadly fire ''only to be torn to pieces" 
 and melt away without making any impression on 
 Lee's determined veterans. Franklin was now called 
 on to renew his attack and co-operate on the left. He 
 was unable to respond. His power was spent. His 
 force had been exhausted. When night came the 
 great army of Burnside had been hurled back with 
 losses amounting to 12,500 men, "sacrificed to incom- 
 petency," after having displayed, in a task which "ex- 
 ceeded human endeavor," a heroism which "won the 
 praise and the pity of their opponents." ^ 
 
 » Taylor's "General Lee," p. 148. Allan, pp. 475-509. Ropes, II, 
 pp. 462-7. Alexander, pp. 310-16. The losses in the Federal army 
 .numbered 12,653; in the Confederate army, 5,322, killed and wounded. 
 
260 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 The following day passed without the renewal of the 
 attack which Lee expected, and which Burnside pro- 
 posed, only to have his lieutenants, who knew the 
 futility of it, protest against such useless sacrifice of 
 life; and next morning Burnside, shaken and dis- 
 tressed over his disaster, sent a flag of truce to Jack- 
 son's front, asking for a cessation of hostilities to bury 
 the dead/ As he finished burying his dead he, under 
 cover of a winter storm, retired to the other side in 
 the gloom of defeat and broke his pontoon bridges. 
 It was without doubt one of the most ineffective bat- 
 tles ever fought by the North. A little later Burnside 
 charged a number of his best generals with having 
 failed him and thus caused his defeat. He issued an 
 order dismissing from the service Generals Hooker, 
 Brooks, Newton, and Cochrane, and relieving from duty 
 with the Army of the Potomac, Generals Franklin 
 W. F. Smith, Sturgis, Ferrero, and other officers.^ The 
 final answer to this wholesale dismissal came after his 
 "mud-campaign" affair of five or six weeks later, when 
 he attempted to do what Hooker later attempted to 
 
 ' The writer as a small boy rode over the battle-field of Fredericks- 
 burg with his father, who was a major on the staff of General William 
 N. Pendleton, General Lee's chief of artillery, and he recalls vi\'idly 
 the terrible sight of a battle-field while the dead are being buried : blood 
 everywhere — along the trenches, the shattered fences, and the road- 
 sides — the orchards, peeled by the bullets and canister, looked at a little 
 distance as if covered with snow; the plank fences, splintered by shot 
 and shrapnel, looked as though they had been whitewashed, and the 
 field, torn by shells and covered with dead horses, broken arms, and 
 debris, presented an ineffaceable scene of desolation, while on the 
 common, being filled with the bloody and rigid forms of those who two 
 days before had been the bravest of the brave, was a long, wide, ghastly 
 trench, where the path of glory ended. 
 
 2 Off. Rep., 31, p. 998. Ropes, II, p. 470. 
 
I FREDERICKSBURG 261 
 
 do, with disastrous results, at Chancellorsville. He 
 "stuck in the mud," and, on 'Hhe representations 
 made by his heutenants to the President, was super- 
 seded" by ''Fighting" Joe Hooker. 
 
 Fredericksburg was, with the exceptioji of Cold 
 Harbor, almost the only wholly defensive battle that 
 Lee fought, and in this he could scarcely believe that 
 Burnside had put forth all his strength. His report 
 and letters show that he expected and awaited another 
 and fiercer assault. It is asserted that Jackson coun- 
 selled a night attack on Burnside's army as it lay in 
 the town after the battle, and he undoubtedly contem- 
 plated the possibility of such an attack, for he ordered 
 his chief of medical staff to be ready with his bandages 
 to furnish bands for the arms of the men, by which 
 they would know each other should such an attack be 
 made.^ Lee, however, decided against this plan, if it 
 was ever formally proposed, and in his report he gives 
 his reason. ''The attack on the 13th," he says, "had 
 been so easily repulsed, and by so small a part of our 
 I army, that it was not supposed the enemy would limit 
 his effort, which, in view of the magnitude of his prep- 
 j arations and the extent of his force, seemed to be 
 ;i comparatively insignificant. Believing, therefore, that 
 ' he would attack us, it was not deemed expedient to 
 lose the advantage of our position and expose the 
 I troops to the fire of his inaccessible batteries beyond 
 (the river by advancing against him." It appears to 
 I be the general opinion of military critics that the mis- 
 it 'Address on Stonewall Jackson by Dr. Hunter McGuire, "The Con- 
 j federate Cause." (The Bell Co., Richmond, Va.) 
 
262 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 take of Fredericksburg by the Southern leaders was 
 the substitution of the hne of the Rappahannock (or 
 that of the North Anna, which Lee and Jackson bpth 
 favored. Even after his terrific defeat Burnside could 
 not be pursued; his flanks were so well protected by 
 the river and by the tremendous fortifications along 
 the Stafford Heights, on the north bank of the stream. 
 Had he attempted to cross the North Anna and met 
 with a similar defeat, he would probably never have 
 been able to get his army back across the bottomless 
 levels of the Mattapony. However, the South was well 
 satisfied with the result. Wlien Lee visited Richmond, 
 a little later, the authorities informed him that the war 
 was substantially over — the fight was won. Lee knew 
 better. And the others were to have a rude awaken- 
 ing. Lee knew that his resources were being steadily 
 exhausted, and that those of the enemy were inex- 
 haustible. 
 
 Lee was at this time at the zenith of his fame as a 
 successful general, yet was never more modest. His 
 letter of Christmas Day, 1862, to his wife is full of the 
 spirit of the man in his most intimate moments. He 
 writes: "I will commence this holy day by writing to 
 you. My heart is filled with gratitude to God for the 
 unspeakable mercies with which He has blessed us in 
 this day; for those He has granted us from the begin- 
 ning of life, and particularly for those He has vouch- 
 safed us during the past year. What should become 
 of us without His crowning help and protection? Oh! 
 if our people would only recognize it and cease from 
 vain self-boasting and adulation, how strong would be _ 
 
SCALE OF MILES 
 
 ; Fredericksburg — Position of Union and Confederate Forces 
 ON December 13, 1862 
 
FREDERICKSBURG 263 
 
 my belief in final success and happiness to our country. 
 But what a cruel thing is war to separate and destroy 
 families and friends, and mar the purest joys and hap- 
 piness God has granted us in this world, to fill our 
 hearts with hatred instead of love for our neighbors, 
 and to devastate the fair face of this beautiful world! 
 I pray that on this day, when only peace and good-will 
 are preached to mankind, better thoughts may fill the 
 hearts of our enemies and turn them to peace. Our 
 army was never in such good health and condition 
 since I have been attached to it. I believe they share 
 with me my disappointment that the enemy did not 
 renew the combat on the 13th. I was holding back 
 all that day and husbanding our strength and ammu- 
 nition for the great struggle for which I thought I was 
 preparing. Had I divined that was to have been his 
 only effort, he would have had more of it. My heart 
 bleeds at the death of every one of our gallant men." 
 
 Should the portrait of a victorious general be drawn, 
 I know no better example than this simple outline of a 
 Christian 'soldier drawn out of his heart that Christmas 
 morning in his tent, while the world rang with his vic- 
 tory of two weeks before. It is a portrait of which the 
 South may well be proud. 
 
CHAPTER XI 
 CHANCELLORSVILLE 
 
 But again we have, following on his success in the de- 
 fence of Fredericksburg, the proof of Lee's boldness in 
 offensive operations, which resulted in what is esteemed 
 among foreign military critics as the most brilliant 
 action, not only of the Civil War, but of the century. 
 With a vast expenditure of care and treasure, the 
 armies of the Union were once more recruited and 
 equipped, and the command of the Army of the Po- 
 tomac was, as we have seen, intrusted to General 
 Hooker — ''Fighting Joe Hooker," as he was called — 
 whose reputation was such that he was supposed to 
 make good at once all the deficiencies of McClellan and 
 Burnside. He had shown capacity to command a 
 corps both in the West and the East, and was given to 
 criticising his superiors with much self-confidence. 
 His self-confidence was, indeed, so great that it called 
 from Mr. Lincoln one of those remarkable letters 
 which he was given to writing on occasion. He says: 
 " I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your 
 recently saying that both the army and the govern- 
 ment needed a dictator. Of course, it is not for tliis, 
 but in spite of it, that I have given you the com- 
 mand. Only those generals who gain successes can 
 set up dictators. What I ask of you is military suc- 
 
 264 
 
 I 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 265 
 
 cess, and I will risk the dictatorship. . . ." The situa- 
 tion of the Confederacy was at this time, however the 
 glamour of Lee's victory may have blinded the au- 
 thorities, steadily growing more precarious. The far 
 South-west was substantially cut off. In Kentucky and 
 Tennessee the Union arms had prospered; and along 
 the seaboard of the Carolinas, from New-Berne south 
 the Confederate forces had much to do to hold their 
 own. The North had now some 900,000 men in the 
 field and the South less than two-thirds of that number. 
 
 In the spring the interior of Virginia and Rich- 
 mond itself were threatened from Fortress Monroe and 
 Suffolk, on the south side of the James, and a requisi- 
 tion was made on Lee by the government in Richmond 
 to send Longstreet with sufficient troops to make 
 Richmond secure. Accordingly, although Ransom had 
 already gone with 3,600 men, Longstreet was now sent, 
 with the gallant divisions of Pickett and Hood, to 
 take care of '^the south side," thus cutting down Lee's 
 army by some 20,000 veteran troops. Lee, who was 
 not deceived by the enemy's movements, instructed 
 Longstreet to so ^'dispose his troops that they could 
 return to the Rappahannock at the first alarm." But 
 this proved impossible. Just when the Union authori- 
 ties had learned, says Henderson, not to interfere with 
 their general's plans, the Confederate authorities took 
 it up. Contrary to Lee's expressed request, Longstreet, 
 who wished to go, was sent to Suffolk, a hundred and 
 twenty odd miles from Lee, and when Hooker moved, 
 Longstreet was not able to rejoin Lee in time to aid him. 
 
 The plan on which Hooker now proceeded is acknowl- 
 
266 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 edged to have been well conceived, and it gave prom- 
 ise of victory. Lee had fortified the right bank of the 
 river for something like forty miles from Banks's Ford, 
 above Fredericksburg, to Port Royal, below, and these 
 fortifications were filled with the victors of Fredericks- 
 burg. It would not do to attack him in front; but 
 Hooker, who had taken a firm grasp of the situation, 
 felt that he could attack him in the flank and with 
 his great army crush him. In the full assurance that 
 he had "the finest army in the world" and would 
 soon be " holding the strongest position on the planet," 
 he elaborated his plans with care and prepared to 
 deliver the assault which should force Lee from his 
 defensive position, with the alternative of the capture of 
 his entire army. Possibly, he ranked Lee as a captain 
 good for defensive operations alone. If so, his error 
 cost him dear. While he was congratulating himself 
 on his tactics, and issuing grandiloquent proclamations 
 to his eager yet untried army in the tone of a conqueror, 
 declaring that the enemy must come out from his 
 breastworks and fight him on his own ground, "where 
 certain destruction awaited him," or else "ingloriously 
 fly," Lee performed the same masterly feat which he 
 had already performed before Richmond and in the 
 Piedmont, and with yet more signal success. Detach- 
 ing Stonewall Jackson from his force in front of Sedg- 
 wick, he sent him around Hooker's right at Chancellors- 
 ville, and while the latter was congratulating himself 
 that Lee was in full retreat on Gordonsville, he fell 
 upon him and rolled him up like a scroll. Unhappily, 
 his great lieutenant who performed this feat fell in 
 
w 
 u 
 
 fl 
 I? 
 
 o 
 
 CO 
 O 
 
 'A 
 
 o 
 
i 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 267 
 
 the moment of victory, shot by his own men in the 
 dusk of the evening as he galloped past from a reoon- 
 noissance. Possibly, Hooker's army was saved by this 
 fatal accident from capture or annihilation that night. 
 For when, a week later, Stonewall Jackson, still mur- 
 muring of his battle-lines, passed over the river to rest 
 under the shade of the trees, it was with a fame hardly 
 second to that of his great captain. Such in brief was 
 the campaign which ended at Chancellorsville. In more 
 detail — and it deserves more detail — it was as follows : 
 In fact, Lee had intended to assume the offensive 
 himself as soon as it was possible to move, and had 
 been prevented from doing so before only by the con- 
 dition of his horses, the want of feed for them, and of 
 supplies for his men. The conquering enemy before 
 which his victorious army finally melted away was al- 
 ready encompassing his lines, impregnable to any other 
 foe, and no strategy nor tactics, however masterly, no 
 constancy, however unconquerable, could hold it back. 
 He might fill his wasted ranks even though it took 
 "the seed-corn of the Confederacy" to do it, but he 
 could not subsist his army nor equip them to march. 
 Whatever delusions the government in Richmond had 
 I as to the coming of peace, he had none. He had already 
 1 written that he might "have to yield to a stronger force 
 than General Burnside," and all winter as he lay in his 
 j trenches after Burnside's defeat, contained by that 
 I "stronger force" than the great army opposite him, 
 * he was "haunted by the idea of securing the provisions, 
 ; wagons, and guns of the enemy." ^ Ten days before 
 
 1 ' Letter of Lee to General Trimble, March 8, 1863, War Records, 
 ' XXV, part II, p. 658. 
 
268 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Hooker moved, Lee had written an urgent letter to 
 President Davis stating that he considered it "all im- 
 portant that we should assume the aggressive by the 1st 
 of May," adding that if he could be placed in a condi- 
 tion to make a vigorous advance at that time, he thought 
 the valley could be swept of the enemy and the army 
 opposite be thrown north of the Potomac. He ap- 
 pears, indeed, to have taken ''our old friend, J. H.," as 
 he speaks of him, rather humorously ; for he wrote on 
 the 26th of February: ''General Hooker is obliged to 
 do something. I do not know what it will be. He is 
 playing the Chinese game, trying what frightening will 
 do. He runs out his guns, starts his wagons and troops 
 up and down the river, and creates an excitement gen- 
 erally. Our men look on in content, give a cheer, and 
 all again subsides in statu quo ante bellum." ^ 
 
 Such was the temper of general and men when Hooker 
 finally fulfilled Lee's prophecy and did "something." 
 
 On the 27th of April, Hooker, who had worked hard 
 to get his army in shape, began his movement to de- 
 stroy Lee, as to the success of which neither he nor his 
 army had the least doubt. Nor, except for the genius 
 of his opponents and the constancy of the men they 
 commanded, was there much room for doubt. He had 
 130,000 men and 448 guns; Lee had 62,000 men and 
 170 gims.^ Hooker would divide his army, with one 
 part threaten him, with the other manoeuvre him out of 
 his position, and uniting his own forces on the field of 
 battle, crush him by sheer weight. His line of communi- 
 cation with the Potomac was securely protected by the 
 
 ' Letter to his daughter Agnes, February 26, 1863. 
 
 - Bigelow's " ChanccUorsvillc Campaign," pp. 21, 262. 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 269 
 
 Rappahannock; so he moved at ease. While Sedgwick, 
 with two corps, the First and Sixth, was ordered to 
 cross the Rappahannock below Lee's fortified position 
 at Fredericksburg, threaten his right flank, and assail 
 his lines of communication with Richmond, follow- 
 ing him up if he retreated. Hooker, with the Fifth, 
 Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps and Pleasanton's brigades 
 of horse, marched up the river, crossed it high up beyond 
 Lee's extreme left, and prepared to assail his rear. 
 His army was in as fine spirits as himself, and it re- 
 sponded cheerfully to his eager urging. 
 
 With a view to drawing off Lee's cavalry and cutting 
 his line of communication, Hooker had sent his own 
 cavalry under Stoneman to operate toward Orange 
 Court House and Gordonsville and the Virginia Central 
 Railroad. But Stuart knew the situation too well to be 
 drawn off at such a critical juncture, and having sent 
 a regiment or two under W. H. F. Lee to follow Stone- 
 man in his raid, he applied himself to his proper duty of 
 hanging on the flank of Hooker's advancing columns 
 and furnishing Lee with information as to his move- 
 ments and strength. As Hooker advanced, the alert 
 cavalry general detached a regiment to retard him, and 
 making a detour with one of his brigades, flung himself 
 across the routes leading to Lee's communications. On 
 the morning of the 28th of April, Lee received from 
 J him the news that Hooker was moving in force toward 
 I Kelly's Ford, well to his left, and next evening he re- 
 
 I ceived the further information that a corps had crossed 
 ^ that afternoon at Ely's Ford and Germana Ford. He 
 
 II thereupon brought Jackson up from below to Hamilton's 
 
270 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Crossing, and he promptly sent Anderson with his divis- 
 ion to Chancellorsville, a point of junction of the roads 
 leading from Orange Court House and the fords of the 
 Rapidan and Rappahannock, with orders to fortify 
 the best positions commanding the roads. Meantime, 
 equally interesting information came from the south- 
 ward. Jackson sent him word on the morning of the 
 29th that, under cover of the fog, Sedgwick had laid 
 down his bridges and was crossing in force at Deep 
 Run, where he was protected by his powerful batteries 
 on the Stafford Heights. Lee was in good humor; 
 ''something" was being done, and he would now be 
 able to do something himself. His remark to the staff 
 officer bringing him Jackson's report was a jocular 
 one: ''Well, I heard firing, and I thought it was 
 time some of you lazy young fellows were coming 
 to tell me what it was about. Tell your good general 
 that he knows what to do with the enemy just as 
 well as I do." Next morning came the further informa- 
 tion from Stuart that the troops that had crossed the 
 Rapidan in Lee's rear were the Fifth, Eleventh, and 
 Twelfth Corps, and that their commanders, Meade, 
 Howard, and Slocum, were with them. Also, that 
 Anderson was falling back. Thus, it was known to 
 Lee that the main body of Hooker's army was over 
 the river, marching on him to crush him. Jackson 
 wished to attack Sedgwick, who had entrenched him- 
 self on the river under cover of the tremendous batteries 
 on the Stafford side. But Lee deemed this as impracti- 
 cable as it was at the first battle of Fredericksburg. " It 
 was," he said, "hard to get at the enemy, and harder 
 
 I 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 271 
 
 still to get away if we drove him into the river." Never- 
 theless, such was his confidence in his lieutenant, that 
 he told him that "if he thought it could be done," he 
 would "give orders for it." Jackson, however, on ex- 
 amining the ground, came to the same conclusion with 
 Lee, and Lee, leaving Early with 10,000 men, including 
 his reserve artillery under General Pendleton — some 
 50 guns — to hold Sedgwick in check, with the rest of 
 his army turned on Hooker, a dozen miles away, march- 
 ing on his rear through the forests of Spottsylvania. 
 Jackson was sent to relieve Anderson, who had taken 
 and entrenched a position along a stretch of rising 
 ground facing the roads by which Hooker was advan- 
 cing through the wilderness. 
 
 Fortunately for Lee, Hooker's self-assurance appears 
 to have left him suddenly when he came face to face 
 with the situation he had developed. He had laid out 
 a good plan, and had carried it through to a considerable 
 extent with marked success, and to his own entire sat- 
 isfaction. Sedgwick (with three army corps) had easily 
 crossed the river below Lee's right and was ready, as 
 directed, to co-operate with Hooker. The latter's own 
 large army had marched swiftly and was in the highest 
 spirits, and he was now well in Lee's rear, in a posi- 
 tion which he declared "the strongest on the planet." ^ 
 According to current report he had even asserted that 
 " God Almighty couldn't prevent his destroying the rebel 
 army," a speech which is said to have " created great un- 
 easiness even to the most irreligious." ^ Yet, as he passed 
 
 * C. Schurz's " Autobiography." 
 ^Bigelow's "Chancellorsville," p. 237. 
 
272 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 mile after mile into the tangles of the Spottsylvania 
 wilderness, he suddenly hesitated and paused in his ad- 
 vance. Whether the Federal commander was momen- 
 tarily overcome by the magnitude of Lee's fame, or 
 whether by the terrifying mystery of the shadowy 
 silences stretching before him, from which no word had 
 come since he crossed the Rappahannock and turned 
 southward, or whether there was a personal reason, all 
 of which have been asserted, he halted and began to 
 boast of his achievement. He issued an orderto his army 
 as if he were already a victor. He declared that ''the 
 operations of the Fifth, Eleventh, and Twelfth Corps 
 have been a succession of splendid achievements." Yet 
 they had done nothing but march, and, according to 
 some of his own officers, felt that this was sheer gascon- 
 ade. He announced further that "the operations of the 
 last three days have determined that the enemy must 
 either ingloriously fly or come out from behind his de- 
 fences and give us battle on our own ground, where 
 certain destruction awaits him." This was nearer the 
 truth, and was quite true except the last conclusion, 
 which the event was to prove quite false. It was this 
 pause and this misplaced confidence in the Federal 
 commander which gave Lee his opportunity. 
 
 When Hooker crossed the Rapidan, the region into 
 which he plunged after leaving the open country is 
 one which, since the earliest advent of the white man 
 on the continent, has amply justified the name by 
 which it is known — 'Hhe Wilderness." A densely 
 wooded, rolling plateau stretches nearly twenty miles 
 in extent each way. Too poor to be cultivated success- 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 273 
 
 fully, it has remained substantially as it was when the 
 white man first came, an almost impenetrable jungle 
 of scrubby growth, which used to be known as "the 
 Poisoned Lands." A few small streams, locally termed 
 "runs," steal through it, and in a few places the land 
 was found good enough to pay for clearing and culti- 
 vating; but for the most part it remained forest and 
 thicket, given up to the denizens of the forest, the deer, 
 the 'possum, the wild turkey, and the raccoon. Gov- 
 ernor Spottswood established an iron furnace within or 
 near its borders as far back as the middle of the eigh- 
 teenth century, and at the time of the war some of his 
 descendants still attempted to work the not very re- 
 munerative ore which existed in certain places, to which 
 fact was due in part the success of Lee's contemplated 
 plan. Three or four roads only ran through this Wilder- 
 ness in the direction of Fredericksburg. Two of these, 
 running generally eastward — the first, known as the 
 Turnpike, leading from Kelly's Ford, on the Rappahan- 
 nock, and Germana Ford, on the Rapidan, and the sec- 
 ond, the Orange Plank Road — united at a point where 
 stood a church known as "Wilderness Church," and a 
 tavern called Dowdall's Tavern, about four miles west 
 of the Cross Roads, known as Chancellorsville, a planta- 
 tion on a high plateau, eight or ten miles from Fred- 
 ericksburg. At Chancellorsville the roads met and 
 crossed a third road, leading from Kelly's Ford, on the 
 Rappahannock, by way of Ely's and Germana Fords, 
 on the Rapidan, and dividing again, ran separately 
 for several miles toward Fredericksburg, then, uniting 
 once more, they formed one road to Fredericksburg. 
 
274 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Toward the western part of the Wilderness, a few miles 
 west of Chancellorsville, ran north and south, at nearly- 
 right angles to these highways, a country road known as 
 the Brock Road, leading to Spottsylvania, and where 
 the Brock Road made a curve, across the arc, a mile or 
 so further west lay a narrow country road screened, like 
 the others, by woods. On the eastern side of the Wil- 
 derness, to the north-eastward of Chancellorsville, fol- 
 lowing generally the course of the Rappahannock to 
 Fredericksburg, was the River Road, which was united 
 with the others at Chancellorsville by a road which 
 crossed the Rappahannock at the United States Ford. 
 One other way cut through the Wilderness almost due 
 east and west, several miles south of the Turnpike and 
 Plank Roads — an unfinished railway, laid off from 
 Fredericksburg toward Orange Court House. Thus it 
 will be seen that Chancellorsville, on open and rising 
 ground, w^here three of the four principal roads through 
 this wooded Wilderness met, was a point of the greatest 
 importance. And this all the leaders knew. This point 
 Hooker had now secured. 
 
 When Jackson, about eight o'clock on the morning 
 of the 1st, reached the line where Anderson had en- 
 trenched across the roads, several miles east of Chan- 
 cellorsville, he, by Lee's orders, at once abandoning the 
 breastworks, advanced on Hooker, who, established 
 in his strong position at Chancellorsville, was now be- 
 ginning to advance once more. It is possible that this 
 battle was won the moment Jackson passed beyond 
 Anderson's entrenchments. From this time Hooker 
 lost all initiative and fought almost wholly on the de- 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 275 
 
 fensive. Jackson soon came on the Federal cavalry, 
 moving in advance of the columns which Hooker was 
 now moving forward. Anderson was put in advance, 
 with McLaws following, together with Jackson's own 
 troops, and moving forward by both the Turnpike and 
 Plank Roads, the cavalry was soon driven in. Then, as 
 he advanced farther, McLaws, on the Turnpike, found 
 his way barred by infantry and artillery posted beyond 
 an open field, and it was necessary to deploy his bri- 
 gades to turn their flank before proceeding onward. 
 Jackson, on the left, advancing along the Plank Road, 
 likewise found his way barred by an advancing column, 
 and was obliged to flank with a brigade along the un- 
 finished railway to the enemy's right before he could 
 advance farther. This done, however, the Confederates 
 followed the retiring Federals, until toward sunset Lee, 
 who was personally present, found himself immediately 
 in front of Hooker's army of some 70,000 men, posted 
 on the plateau of Chancellorsville in the position which 
 Hooker had boasted was his "own ground," and "the 
 strongest position on the planet." Hooker's left rested 
 on the Rappahannock River, covering the United States 
 Ford, to which a road led from Chancellorsville; his 
 centre occupied the rise that covered the Cross Roads 
 at Chancellorsville, and, extending westward, took in 
 the eminences of Fairview and Hazel Grove, while his 
 right, refused, stretched westward through the forest 
 and ended no one knew where. Of the strength of this 
 position Lee himself has spoken. 
 
 This was the position which Lee proposed to at- 
 tack before Sedgwick could come up, wherever the 
 
276 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 weakest point should be found. He immediately had 
 the enemy's front carefully reconnoitred and himself re- 
 connoitred personall}^ the position of the left wing, rest- 
 ing on the Rappahannock, behind a stream known as 
 Mineral Spring Run. It was found too strong to 
 attack in front — at least at night — and Lee halted 
 and formed line of battle across the Plank Road, a 
 couple of miles from Chancellorsville, his left extend- 
 ing toward Catherine Furnace, above which Hooker's 
 right centre lay in force. Into the bivouac where Lee 
 and Jackson consulted, in a pine thicket near the Plank 
 Road, came Stuart that evening with important infor- 
 mation which solved the difficulty. General Fitz Lee, 
 reconnoitring around the enemy's right wing miles to 
 the north-westward, had discovered that this wing, 
 where were posted the German divisions of Howard, 
 rested in the air, having no protection but the woods 
 and a couple of regiments refused with an ordinary 
 breastwork. It presented a better chance of turning 
 than Porter had presented at Gaines's Mill. The at- 
 tempt, however, was full of danger, first in that it di- 
 vided Lee's army, already numerically far below that 
 which it confronted ; and secondly, in that it was neces- 
 sary to pass the flanking column entirely across the front 
 of Hooker's centre and right, posted in line of battle, 
 and he might, if active enough, strike it on the march 
 and smash it to pieces. Lee and his lieutenants, how- 
 ever, were prepared to take all necessary chances where 
 the reward was so promising, and after a conference the 
 audacious plan was decided on. The forest would 
 partly conceal the movements, and Stuart would use 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 277 
 
 his cavalry as a screen and cover to the moving troops. 
 McLaws was ordered to protect his position in Hooker's 
 front by as strong entrenchments as possible, and Jack- 
 son was given charge of the flanking force, numbering 
 about 25,000 men. He sent his engineers to ascertain if 
 any other road than the Plank Road led through the 
 forest toward the south-west, and on learning from a 
 gentleman who lived near by that a new way or road 
 had recently been cut to haul cord-wood to a furnace, 
 he informed General Lee that his troops would move 
 at once. The order was soon given, and as the day 
 broke, the Second Corps, with Fitz Lee's Cavalry (the 
 2d Virginia, commanded by Colonel Munford, in the 
 lead) covering the front, took the road to the south- 
 west, leaving Lee with only Anderson's and McLaws's 
 Divisions, some 10,000 men, to hold in check Hooker's 
 powerful army. Audacity has rarely gone further, and 
 never was it better rewarded. Throwing forward skir- 
 mishers, and opening with his artillery from every emi- 
 nence, Lee made a demonstration which kept Hooker 
 well occupied. The movement of Jackson's column 
 was seen, the dust rising high above the trees, and 
 was reported to Hooker early in the morning, but 
 he jumped to the conclusion that the enemy, finding 
 him too strong on ground chosen by himself, had taken 
 the other alternative that he had set for him and was 
 ingloriously flying. Lee, he believed, forced by Sedg- 
 wick from the direct line of retreat on Richmond, was 
 retreating on Gordonsville. Though at times he wa- 
 vered as he consulted his maps and ejaculated that 
 it was not like Lee, nearly all day long he labored 
 
278 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 under this delusion. As at a certain point Jackson, 
 with baggage trains, etc., turned almost due south 
 down a valley, it was not, perhaps, unnatural that this 
 should have appeared to the Federal commander a flight. 
 The moving column was shelled vigorously from the 
 high plateau on Hooker's right, known as Hazel Grove, 
 and Sickles was sent with his corps to cut up the 
 moving force, but he met with such a reception from 
 Anderson, on Lee's left, and made such slow progress, 
 that he called for reinforcements, and Howard, holding 
 Hooker's extreme right, was directed to send him a 
 brigade, and despatched Barlow, with the brigade which 
 formed his reserve, to Sickles's aid, thus weakening 
 the very point against which Lee had sent Jackson to 
 address his attack. As Sickles with Pleasanton's cav- 
 alry began to make progress, Jackson sent back the 
 brigades of Archer and Thomas, and Brown's batallion 
 of artillery, to aid Anderson; but, unswerved from his 
 design, with the rest of his force he pushed on south- 
 westward, till he reached the road he was seeking — a 
 road west of the Brock Road, running north and south 
 well beyond the extreme end of Hooker's right. Here 
 turning northward, Jackson struck for the point where 
 this road crosses the Plank Road, some two miles west 
 of Hooker's extreme right, which it was planned to de- 
 stroy. Reaching the Cross Roads about two o'clock, he 
 received from General Fitzhugh Lee, who had halted 
 here, the information that the enemy were apparently 
 wholly ignorant of his approach, and by proceeding a 
 mile or so farther on to the Turnpike, he might strike 
 Hooker's right in the rear. It has been related that, 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 279 
 
 riding forward with General Fitz Lee, attended by a 
 single courier, he sought the hill-top from which Lee had 
 discovered the facts he disclosed, and found the situation 
 still unchanged. Lee speaks of 'Hhe commander of the 
 cavalry accompanying him/' but does not say it was 
 himself, and it seems certain that Munford with the 
 Second Virginia Cavalry was in the lead all the time. A 
 few hundred yards below them to the eastward was the 
 end of Hooker's line and fortifications, heavily protected 
 in front with abatis, but resting on nothing that could af- 
 ford protection, and "untenanted by a single company.'* 
 The men were scattered about in groups, loafing, gossip- 
 ing, playing cards, drawing rations, and cooking, while 
 their arms were stacked as though they were in a sum- 
 mer encampment. Lee says that Jackson's eyes ''burnt 
 with a brilliant glow" while he scanned the extraor- 
 dinary scene, but he uttered no words though his lips 
 moved. Then suddenly turning to his courier he gave 
 his orders: ''Tell General Rodes to move across the 
 Plank Road and halt when he gets to the old turn- 
 pike; I will join him there." He turned back and 
 scanned the scene again and then rode rapidly down 
 the hill.^ 
 
 By four o'clock, or a little after, the divisions which 
 had turned back to balk Sickles's advance on the turn- 
 ing point were coming up, and Rodes was deploying 
 his men in line of battle across the turnpike, envelop- 
 ing Howard's still unsuspecting right, still engaged in 
 getting supper and amusing themselves. Hooker, him- 
 self, was equally unsuspecting. On being informed 
 
 »r. Lee's "Lee." 
 
280 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 in the morning that Lee was crossing his front, he had 
 notified Howard to look to his right and secure it, and 
 Howard repUed that he had done so ; but after Sickles 
 drove his way through toward where Jackson turned 
 south, he returned to his complacent belief that Lee 
 was fleeing or preparing to do so. And at four o'clock, 
 just at the time that Jackson was preparing to strike 
 home, he sent an order to Sedgwick to capture Freder- 
 icksburg and everything in it as soon as preparations 
 permitted, and "vigorously pursue the enemy. We 
 know," he added, "that the enemy is fleeing, trying to 
 save his trains. Two of Sickles's divisions are among 
 them." It was a fatal error into which he had fallen, 
 and to his undoings Howard also held this view. 
 
 It was near six o'clock when, everything being in 
 readiness, his men in two lines of battle, with columns in 
 support, and all orders given for the advance to roll up 
 the enemy's right and sweep forward, Jackson gave 
 Rodes the word to go forward. At the sound of a bugle, 
 re-echoed from right to left where the divisions were 
 posted in battle line awaiting the signal, the lines swept 
 forward, skirmishers in advance, and driving the startled 
 denizens of the forest scurrying before them, broke 
 through the woods on the equally startled line of How- 
 ard's Germans, Twenty regiments of Howard's corps 
 lay in the trenches, along which Jackson's cheering bat- 
 tle lines were sweeping; but beyond them was a gap 
 of over a mile, left by the withdrawal of Sickles and 
 of Barlow's reserve brigade. Thus, though they at- 
 tempted to make a stand, and, Schurz declares, with- 
 stood the shock for nearly a half hour, they were 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 281 
 
 soon swept away in utter rout and panic. Beyond 
 them another brigade, facing to the right, attempted 
 to stay the fierce surge of Jackson's lines; but every 
 mounted officer was struck from his horse by the rain 
 of bullet and canister, and, after a gallant but hapless 
 effort, they too were swept into the rout. In the open 
 lay other German regiments trying to stem the tide, 
 while on the opposite ridge across the wide clearing, 
 from breastwork and rifle-pit blazed the fierce fire of 
 Howard's. last brigade, checking for a few moments the 
 steady onsweep with rifle fire and canister; but Rodes, 
 dashing forward, cleared the field, and then rushing up 
 the ridge drove on with resistless force into the red 
 flame pouring from the long line of breastworks, and 
 climbing the parapets, swept away the last remnant 
 of Howard's corps. Hooker's right wing. The rout of 
 this corps was now complete and hopeless, and it de- 
 manded good generalship and great courage in line 
 and staff not to have it extended to the next command 
 in the same degree. While this catastrophe was befall- 
 ing his right wing, Hooker is said to have been seated 
 on the portico of the Chancellor mansion, congratulating 
 himself on the success of his well-matured plan. About 
 him were staff officers who, like him, believed that 
 Lee's second corps was in full retreat and could well 
 be left to Sickles and Pleasanton and Barlow till such 
 time as he should have rolled back the rest of Lee's 
 army and taken up the pursuit. Orders had already 
 been given to his left to advance and overwhelm what 
 remained in their front. It was all like a dream that 
 has been realized. From this dream the Federal com- 
 
282 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 mander was rudely awakened. From his right down 
 the aisles of the Wilderness came suddenly the sound 
 of battle — not of skirmishing, nor of a mere reconnois- 
 sance such as cavalry might have made, but of furious 
 battle, and nearer and nearer it rolled, while at the 
 same time increased on his front the fight which had 
 proceeded all day where Lee in person was keeping his 
 centre occupied. So near and astonishing rolled the 
 din of battle on the right that the officers rose and 
 sought their horses, and one of them, going down to 
 the road, gazed westward. The sight he saw in the dis- 
 tance was one to astound him. ''My God! here they 
 come," he cried, and dashed for his horse. The distant 
 road was packed as far as the eye could see with the 
 terrible debris of a routed army — men, horses, wagons 
 • — all mingled in one indiscriminate and terrible panic. 
 Happily for Hooker he had as brave and devoted men 
 about him as ever faced death for a cause, and he had 
 troops enough to fill any breach which Lee's army could 
 make and still leave others behind. Officers and 
 couriers were sent in all directions to order fresh troops 
 to the threatened point. Sickles and Pleasanton and 
 Barlow were summoned back to Hazel Grove to fill the 
 gap they had left in the morning. Berry and Hays 
 were transferred from beyond Chancellorsville, and the 
 reserve artillery was rushed forward to the Fairview 
 Heights, south-east of Hazel Grove, to hold Jackson in 
 check at all hazards and, if possible, save Hooker's 
 army. It was a close graze, but though the defeat 
 was irrevocable, the army was saved from destruction 
 by an event which is one of the strange tragedies of 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 283 
 
 history. Jackson, in the hour of victory, was shot by 
 some of his own men. This is how it happened. 
 
 It was nearly dusk, and still Jackson kept driving on. 
 His objective now was Hooker's centre at Chancellors- 
 ville, a mile and a half ahead, and his line of retreat on 
 the United States Ford Road, a half mile beyond. Rid- 
 ing among his victorious but wellnigh exhausted troops, 
 he continually urged them to keep their order. "Keep 
 your places — keep your places; there is more work to 
 do," he said to the officers. But his own work was 
 almost done. 
 
 Though so far Lee's audacious tactics had attained 
 complete success, they were now to result in a misfort- 
 une, at the cost of which, as he said on hearing it, any 
 victory would be dear. As the dusk fell on Hooker's 
 extreme right wing in irrevocable rout, fleeing behind 
 the protection of the artillery massed on the eminence of 
 Hazel Grove, near his right centre, Jackson, finding the 
 pursuit slacken in the confusion of the dusky woods, and 
 fearing to lose the richest fruit of his brilliant victory, 
 rode forward on a reconnoissance, giving orders right 
 and left, to such officers as he saw, to get their men in 
 order and "push forward." "Push right ahead, Lane; 
 right ahead," he said to one; to another: "Press them; 
 cut them off from the United States Ford, Hill; press 
 them." His lines were being straightened out for the 
 next onward sweep on Chancellorsville itself, and he 
 passed on through them, along the Plank Road toward 
 where the Federal reserves were, with flying axes and 
 bayonets, industriously trying with Berry's troops to 
 get some sort of entrenchments and barricades along the 
 
284 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Fairview Heights before the next onslaught came. As 
 he passed forward he, with a wave of the hand toward 
 the front, directed an officer of an infantry regiment 
 lying in a small clearing to watch in that direction, and 
 fire on whatever came from there. Having ridden so 
 close to the Federal lines that their voices and axes 
 could be clearly heard, he turned back, it is said, to 
 hasten Hill's advance, and a moment later the road on 
 which he was riding was swept by a sudden storm of 
 canister from guns posted on the enemy's line to sweep 
 the highway. Swerving aside to get out of the line of 
 fire directly down the road, Jackson and his attendants 
 turned at a gallop in the darkness into the clearing, 
 almost immediately in front of the infantry line which 
 he had a little before ordered to fire on whatever came 
 from that way. They obeyed his command all too well. 
 As the group of horsemen emerged with a rush from 
 the wood and galloped down on them in the dusk, and 
 the guns rattled in the thickets behind them, from the 
 dark line stretched across the clearing came a blaze of 
 fire, and Hooker's army was saved from instant de- 
 struction. In the midst of the most brilliant achieve- 
 ment of his brilliant career, Stonewall Jackson's career 
 ended and passed into history. At the first unexpected 
 volley a number of men fell dead or badly wounded 
 and others flung themselves from their horses to avoid 
 the next volley. Jackson's right hand was hurt and 
 his left arm and shoulder were badly shattered. His 
 horse, terrified and suddenly released from the mas- 
 ter's guiding hand, wheeled and dashed back into 
 the wood toward the enemy, where the overhanging 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 285 
 
 boughs tore the rider's face and almost swept him out 
 of the saddle. Jackson, however, managed to keep his 
 seat, and after a little stopped him, and turned back 
 toward his own lines, where Captain Wilbourn, of his 
 staff, having caught the reins, the survivors of those 
 with him lifted him down and made him lie on the 
 ground to avoid the rain of bullets that was now sweep- 
 ing over them. Hill had now come up and recognized 
 him, and Morrison and Smith and Leigh, of Hill's staff, 
 aided him to move on toward his own lines, and when 
 a sleet of bullets and canister swept about them, laid 
 him down in the ditch beside the road and protected 
 him by interposing their own bodies between him and 
 the line of fire. For a moment the range shifted, the 
 enemy having changed from canister to shell, and again 
 they moved on painfully. Then Jackson gave his last 
 battle order. General Pender riding by, pushing his 
 brigade to the front under the terrible fire, saw the sad 
 procession, and asked who was hurt. ''A Confederate 
 officer," was the reply, in accordance with Jackson's 
 command. But Pender recognized him, and springing 
 from his horse, spoke his grief. Then he added that the 
 artillery fire was so deadly that he was afraid he should 
 have to fall back. The words aroused Jackson from his 
 half-fainting condition. Pushing aside those who sup- 
 ported him, he raised himself to his full height. ''You 
 must hold your ground, General Pender. You must hold 
 out to the last, sir." It was the epitome at once of his 
 own life and of the Southern cause. It was his last 
 order until, with the light fading from his eyes forever, 
 as he was passing over the river to rest under the shade 
 
286 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 of the trees, he murmured once more for A. P. Hill to 
 
 pass his infantry forward. As he was being borne 
 from the field on a litter carried on men's shoulders, 
 the man at his wounded shoulder was shot down and 
 the litter fell, throwing Jackson heavily on his wounded 
 shoulder, and he sustained an injury to which later 
 many attributed his death. At 2 a. m., by the fitful 
 light afforded in a field hospital, his arm was ampu- 
 tated. As he regained consciousness his first question, 
 it is said, was whether Stuart had received his order to 
 take command. When toward morning Stuart, who had 
 arrived after midnight from Ely's Ford, where he was 
 about to attack Averell's cavalry force and had taken 
 charge, sent Major Pendleton to announce that Hill 
 had been seriously wounded, and the men were in 
 great confusion, and to ask what he wished done, he 
 made a brave attempt to rally his sinking forces, but 
 in vain. ''For a moment," says Dr. McGuire, "we be- 
 lieved he had succeeded; for his nostrils dilated and 
 his eye flashed with his old fire; but it was only for a 
 moment. His face relaxed again, and presently he an- 
 swered, very feebly and sadly: 'I don't know, I can't 
 tell. Say to General Stuart he must do what he thinks 
 best.' And he sank again into sleep." 
 
 To Jackson's fall, at the moment when his victorious 
 troops should have been pressing forward with their 
 irresistible force to capture Chancellorsville and the 
 road to the United States Ford, Henderson and most 
 other well-informed critics attribute the failure to de- 
 stroy utterly Hooker's army that night. Hill, who 
 alone knew anything of his plans, had been seriously 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 287 
 
 wounded also, and Boswell, Jackson's engineer, sent 
 to pilot the advancing line to the White House, had 
 been killed. The respite gained by his fall enabled 
 Hooker to readjust his lines and cover his right with 
 the corps of Couch and Slocum, and to send Sickles, 
 who had come hurrying back to the strong position 
 at Hazel Grove and supported Pleasanton's artil- 
 lery posted there, to make about midnight a strong 
 assault on Stuart's right where, south of the Plank 
 Road, Lane's hard-fought brigade awaited them in the 
 woods, while the artillery tore the tree-tops and cut 
 down great boughs above their heads. The assault was 
 repulsed; but the commanding position of Hazel Grove 
 and Fairview Heights, between Jackson's force and 
 Lee's, which Jackson would inevitably have carried had 
 he been able to make his next assault while the panic 
 lasted, was saved. And Lee had to fight again next 
 day with all his might to reap the fruits of his audacity. 
 Happily for his army, his genius was equal to the 
 emergency. 
 
 No one knew so well as Lee the magnitude of the 
 disaster that had befallen him in the loss of Jackson. 
 He had early gauged his abilities as a soldier. On the 
 2d of October, 1862, after the battle of Sharpsburg, 
 when the Army of Northern Virginia was reorganized 
 in two corps, Lee, in recommending Longstreet and 
 Jackson for their respective commands, wrote of 
 Jackson: "My opinion of General Jackson has been 
 greatly enhanced during this expedition. He is true, 
 honest, and brave; has a single eye to the good of 
 the service, and spares no exertion to accomplish his 
 
288 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 object." His opinion of him had steadily risen. The 
 two men thoroughly understood and honored each other 
 and were worthy of each other's regard. When Lee 
 learned of Jackson's wound, he sent him a warm mes- 
 sage. "Give him my affectionate regards, and tell him 
 to make haste and get well and come back to me as 
 soon as he can. He has lost his left arm, but I have 
 lost my right." And later he wrote: ''Any victory 
 would be dear at such a price. I know not how to re- 
 place him." His formal letter was written on the 
 evening of the morrow of Jackson's fall, when having 
 carried by assault Hooker's first lines, and supplanted 
 him in the position which he had boasted the strongest 
 on the planet, he received a note telling him of Jack- 
 son's wound. Surrounded by his victorious troops in 
 the full tide of their triumph, he penned to his wounded 
 lieutenant his reply: 
 
 General: I have just received your note informing 
 me that you were wounded. I cannot express my re- 
 gret at the occurrence. Could I have directed events, 
 I should have chosen, for the good of the country, to 
 be disabled in your stead. 
 
 I congratulate you upon the victory which is due 
 to your skill and energy. 
 
 Yerf respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 No wonder his staff officer, who received his reply 
 from him, says that ''as he gave expression to the 
 thoughts of his exalted mind, he forgot his genius that 
 won the day in his reverence for the generosity that 
 refused the glory." 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 289 
 
 Had Hooker been the equal of his antagonists, he 
 had a great opportunity on the morning of the' 3d. He 
 held with a superior force a position between them 
 strongly fortified, and the heights of Hazel Grove and 
 Fairview, extending southwardly, cut them in tw^o. 
 But he fatuously threw away his advantage. He 
 withdrew Sickles from Hazel Grove. Lee sent word 
 across the wide gap to renew the assault at the earliest 
 moment possible, and when the first light came and 
 disclosed the comimanding position of Hazel Grove as 
 the key to the situation, Stuart immediately prepared 
 to seize it. Swinging his right around and forward to 
 get closer to Lee, he began a furious assault, and although 
 the strong point of Fairview was long defended with the 
 utmost bravery, in the end the Confederate veterans, by 
 this time informed of their old commander's fall, and 
 charging with the battle-cry, ''Remember Jackson!" 
 swept all before them, securing the strong position of 
 Hazel Grove. Lee on his side directed the assault with 
 confidence. Shaken by the misfortune to his right wing. 
 Hooker was already looking to his safety, and was en- 
 deavoring to withdraw to a second and closer line, well 
 in rear of Chancellorsville, lying above and between 
 Fighting Run and Mineral Spring Run and covering 
 the United States Ford Road, his line of retreat. 
 Heth, on the left, commanding Hill's Division, came 
 forward, Anderson and McLaws on the centre and 
 the right, where Lee himself in person directed his 
 fervid veterans. It was a fierce day, for Hooker's army 
 knew that their salvation depended on holding Lee 
 back. Fairview, where the enemy was strongly posted 
 
290 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 with thirty guns heavily supported, took long to capture. 
 For hours the battle raged through the woods, which 
 were now aflame for miles and added to the horror of 
 the occasion. The utmost courage was shown on both 
 sides. Hill, on the left, was repulsed again and again, 
 but his second and third lines came forward to aid the 
 first line. So resolute was the resistance that at one 
 time all three of his lines were mingled together, and 
 once word was sent to Stuart that the anamunition 
 was exhausted and they would have to fall back; 
 to which Stuart replied, as Jackson would have done 
 in his place, that they still had the bayonet. Thirty 
 guns under the gallant officers, Colonel Thomas H. 
 Carter and Colonel Hilary P. Jones, were massed on 
 the captured heights of Hazel Grove, and enfiladed 
 with deadly effect the lines of the Federals, and Stuart, 
 putting himself at the head of his troops and chanting, 
 ''Old Joe Hooker, won't you come out of the Wilder- 
 ness?" led them in a final charge on the entrench- 
 ments which swept everything before it. Hooker's 
 right having been thus broken, a general advance made 
 with unflinching determination swept him back all 
 along his line, leaving Lee in possession of Chancellors- 
 ville and the whole position which Hooker had held. 
 
 During the morning the Federal commander was 
 struck down by a fragment of a shattered pillar of the 
 porch of the Chancellor mansion, which was shivered 
 by a cannon-ball, where he stood superintending his op- 
 erations. The report spread that he was killed, and to 
 contradict it, as soon as he recovered consciousness he 
 mounted his horse and rode down his lines. He was, 
 
CHANCELLORSVILLE 291 
 
 however, unable to remain in the saddle, and was in a 
 state of semi-consciousness from time to time, the 
 command devolving temporarily on Couch. 
 
 As his lines swept forward on Chancellorsville, driv- 
 ing the fiercely fighting enemy before them, Lee him- 
 self rode forward to encourage his men and to take 
 charge of the position. It was the signal for what sol- 
 diers rarely see even once in a lifetime. His already 
 victorious troops were set wild by his presence, and in 
 the midst of the horrors of the field acclaimed him to 
 the skies, the wounded adding their feeble voices to 
 the cheers of those who still fought the guns. "His 
 first care," says one of his staff, "was for the wounded 
 of both armies, and he was foremost at the burning 
 mansion [of Chancellorsville], where some of them lay." 
 
 It was at this moment that the note reached him 
 from Jackson, announcing that he was badly wounded, 
 and that he sent him the reply that the victory was 
 due to his skill and energy, and that could he have 
 directed events, he would have chosen for the good of 
 the country to be disabled in his stead. It was char- 
 acteristic of Jackson, when his admired commander's 
 noble reply was brought to him where he lay wounded, 
 to say: "General Lee is very kind, but he should give 
 the praise to God." 
 
CHAPTER XII 
 
 LEE'S AUDACITY— SALEM CHURCH 
 
 HooKER^s first positions had been carried, and Lee was 
 ready to assault the second position, where, behind 
 the strong fortifications which he had prepared for the 
 emergency. Hooker, now much shaken, had made his 
 final stand, when information arrived which must have 
 discomfited a less resolute and constant mind. The 
 news reached Lee that Sedgwick, who had hitherto been 
 held on the river by Early, and had recrossed to the 
 northern side, had now not only recrossed again, but had 
 carried Marye's Heights, driven Early back, and inter- 
 vened between him and Lee, and was marching by the 
 Plank Road with his force of 30,000 men on Lee's rear. 
 In fact. Hooker had sent Sedgwick urgent orders to come 
 to his aid. Lee had already 60,000 men in his front in 
 line of battle, and if Hooker was stunned and shaken, 
 he had at his side such redoubtable fighters as Meade, 
 Slocum, Humphreys, Couch, Reynolds, Sickles, and 
 Pleasanton, with a host besides. But the mens ceqiia 
 in arduis which inspired Lee's breast was equal to this 
 difficulty also. Wilcox's Brigade, of Anderson's Divis- 
 ion, lying above Banks's Ford at the point nearest to 
 Sedgwick's route, was ordered to retard his advance, 
 and, to bar his way, McLaws was despatched to Salem 
 Church, the point of junction of the road from Banks's 
 
 292 
 
LEE'S AUDACITY— SALEM CHURCH 293 
 
 Ford with the Plank Road from Chancellorsville to Fred- 
 ericksburg. When Sedgwick broke through Early's line 
 on the heights of Fredericksburg, Early fell back, cover- 
 ing the road to Richmond. Sedgwick then pushed away 
 the small force on his right, and was now driving for the 
 rear of Lee's right. Wilcox, across the Plank Road, 
 fought stubbornly as he fell back to Salem Church, 
 where, deploying his men under cover of the woodland, 
 McLaws awaited Sedgwick's advance across the open 
 fields in his front. The unexpected fire at close range 
 was deadly, and advancing two of his brigades at the 
 nick of time, he drove Sedgwick's first line back on his 
 rear, which had not yet got deployed. " Now ensued," 
 says Alexander, " one of the most brilliant and im- 
 portant of the minor affairs of the war." The fight, 
 though short, was bloody, and Sedgwick, having lost 
 something like 5,000 men, was content to make a stand 
 on the ridge above Banks's Ford, which he fortified 
 strongly. Next morning, in view of the gravity of the 
 situation, with 60,000 men in his front and twenty- 
 odd thousand but a few miles behind him, Lee him- 
 self took personal charge of the operations. Leaving 
 "only what remained of Jackson's old corps" — some 
 20,000 men — to hold Hooker in his breastworks, he 
 took Anderson's three remaining brigades to Salem 
 Church, and as soon as Sedgwick's new position could 
 be reconnoitred, he ordered the assault. It was a 
 brief fight, for it began late, but it was fierce while it 
 lasted. Assailing, however, both in front and flank, 
 Lee's ragged veterans drove the enemy from their posi- 
 tion with a heavy loss, and that night, under cover of 
 
294 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the rain and fog, Sedgwick, who had been left by Hooker 
 to fight alone, withdrew across the Rappahannock by 
 the nearest ford, leaving Lee to turn again on Hooker, 
 penned in his fortifications by Lee's containing force 
 of one-third of his numbers/ Lee promptly led back 
 to Chancellorsville his victorious brigades to fall on 
 Hooker as they had just fallen on his lieutenant. 
 
 Hooker, however, had no stomach for more, and 
 that night (the 5th) while Lee was making ready to 
 assault him next morning, he, under cover of the storm 
 and darkness, retreated across the Rappahannock. He 
 was badly demoralized even if his army was not, 
 and had allowed the plan which he had elaborated 
 with so much satisfaction while safe beyond the Rap- 
 pahannock, to be smashed in pieces by Lee when in 
 the very act of being carried out. He had lain in his 
 breastworks all day, held by a third of his numbers, 
 while one of his lieutenants, in the act of executing his 
 orders, was being hammered to pieces by Lee, hardly 
 a half dozen miles away. No greater exliibition of 
 daring genius on the one side and of failure on the 
 other was shown during the war, and the charge used 
 to be made that Hooker's defeat was due to the fact 
 that he was under the influence of liquor; but this 
 charge seems to have been disposed of, and it has even 
 been suggested that the lack of stimulant was the 
 cause of his inertia. The only other excuse that has 
 been offered for him is, that he was knocked down and 
 stunned during the battle. The true reason is that he 
 
 * Steele's "American Campaigns," p. 351, citing Swintonand E. P. 
 Alexander. 
 
LEE^S AUDACITY— SALEM CHURCH 295 
 
 had been so hopelessly outgeneralled and outfought 
 by his opponent, that he had been thrown in a maze, 
 in which his brain had almost ceased to act. 
 
 As soon as he was safe across the Rappahannock, 
 he issued (on May 6th) a general order to his army 
 congratulating it on its achievements. It contained a 
 remarkable sentence, which will be found quoted in a 
 letter of Lee's, below. His army had, indeed, fought 
 admirably. The fault lay with the commander. He 
 even wrote to Mr. Lincoln a few days later (May 
 13): "Is it asking too much to inquire your opinion 
 of my Order No. 49? Jackson is dead," he added, 
 "and Lee beats McClellan with his untruthful bul- 
 letins." Thus he achieved the distinction of being 
 probably the only man in the world who ever charged 
 Lee with untruthfulness. We may imagine what was 
 the inward thought of that sometimes grim humorist. 
 For the Army of the Potomac had lost since Hooker 
 crossed the Rappahannock 17,287 officers and men, 
 killed and wounded, and 13 guns, and over 6,000 officers 
 and men were reported captured or missing. The 
 Army of Northern Virginia had also suffered heavily — 
 10,277 killed and wounded and about 2,000 captured 
 or missing.^ 
 
 Wliat Mr. Lincoln thought of Hooker's order. No. 
 49, is possibly not known; what Lee thought is known. 
 In a letter to his wife, dated May 20, he writes: "I 
 learn that our poor wounded are doing very well. 
 General Hooker is airing himself north of the Rappa- 
 hannock, and again threatening us with a crossing. It 
 
 * Henderson's "Stonewall Jackson," II, pp. 466, 467. 
 
296 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 was reported last night that he had brought his pon- 
 toons to the river, but I hear nothing of him this morn- 
 ing. I think he will consider it a few days. He has 
 published a gratulatory order to his troops, telling 
 them they have covered themselves with new laurels, 
 have destroyed our stores, communications, thousands 
 of our choice troops, captured prisoners in their forti- 
 fications, filling the country with fear and conster- 
 nation. ^Profoundly loyal and conscious of its own 
 strength, the Army of the Potomac will give or decline 
 battle whenever its interests or honor may demand. 
 It will also be the guardian of its own history and its 
 own honor.' All of which is signed by our old friend, 
 S. Williams, A. A. G. It shows, at least, he is so far un- 
 hurt, and is so far good, but as to the truth of history 
 I will not speak. May the great God have you all in 
 His holy keeping and soon unite us again. " 
 
 On the 10th of May Stonewall Jackson died of pneu- 
 monia, resulting from his wound. He had, for a brief 
 period after his arm was amputated on the field, ap- 
 peared to be doing well, and hopes were entertained of 
 His recovery. By order of General Lee he was removed 
 from the proximity of Chancellorsville to the home of 
 a Dr. Chandler, near Guinea Station, on the Richmond, 
 Fredericksburg and Potomac Railroad, some fifty miles 
 from Richmond, where he was made comfortable in an 
 outhouse which still stands by the railway line, having 
 been preserved by the pious care of the women of Vir- 
 ginia. 
 
 The question has often been debated whether the 
 chief credit for the victory at Chancellorsville should 
 
LEE'S AUDACITY— SALEM CHURCH 297 
 
 be assigned to Lee or to Jackson. Lee, himself, has 
 settled it in a letter which he wrote to Mrs. Jackson, in 
 which he states that the responsibility for the flank at- 
 tack by Jackson — that is, for the tactics which made it 
 possible — necessarily rested on himself. He repeated 
 the statement in a letter to his friend, Professor Bledsoe. 
 And apart from his conclusive statement, this is the 
 judgment of Jackson's biographer. General Henderson. 
 Conmaenting on the question as to whether to Lee or 
 Jackson the credit was due for the daring plan of the 
 campaign against Pope, Henderson says: '^We have 
 record of few enterprises of greater daring than that 
 which was then decided on; and no matter from whose 
 brain it emanated, on Lee fell the burden of the respon- 
 sibility; on his shoulders, and on his alone, rested the 
 honor of the Confederate arms, the fate of Richmond, 
 the independence of the South; and if we may suppose, 
 so consonant was the design proposed with the strategy 
 which Jackson had already practised, that it was to 
 him its inception was due, it is still to Lee that we 
 must assign the higher merit. It is easy to conceive; 
 it is less easy to execute. But to risk cause and coun- 
 try, name and reputation, on a single throw, and to 
 abide the issue with unflinching heart, is the supreme 
 exhibition of the soldier's fortitude." ^ 
 
 It is, indeed, no disparagement from Jackson's fame 
 to declare that, if possible, even more brilliant than 
 the afternoon attack on Hooker's right, which routed 
 that wing and began the demoralization of his army, 
 was the final attack, when Lee, who had left Early 
 
 > Ibid,. II, p. 582. 
 
298 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 with only enough men at Fredericksburg to hold Sedg- 
 wick in check, learning that Sedgwick had forced a 
 crossing and was marching on his rear, turned and, 
 leaving only a fragment of his army to hold the shaken 
 Hooker in his breastworks, fell on Sedgwick and hurled 
 him back across the river, and then, turning again, 
 marched on Hooker's position and so awed him that 
 he was glad to retreat by night, broken and dismayed, 
 across the Rappahannock. 
 
 The victory of Chancellorsville, in which Lee with 
 62,000 men and 170 guns completely routed Hooker 
 on his own ground, with 130,000 men and 448 guns, 
 was, declares Henderson, "the most brilliant feat of 
 arms of the century." 
 
 Thus, Lee had destroyed the reputation of more 
 generals than any captain had destroyed since Napo- 
 leon. 
 
 After Chancellorsville the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia was reorganized in three corps instead of two, 
 as formerly. Longstreet commanded the first, as here- 
 tofore, now commanding the three divisions of Mc- 
 Laws, Pickett, and Hood; and Ewell and A. P. Hill 
 were created lieutenant-generals for the purpose, and 
 were put in command of the Second and Third Corps, 
 respectively, the former comprising the three divisions 
 of Rodes, Early, and Johnson; the latter the three 
 divisions of Anderson, Heth, and Pender. Thus, Ewell 
 became Stonewall Jackson's successor. 
 
 To each corps were attached five battalions of artil- 
 lery, two of which were in reserve, the total number 
 of guns being 270. The total number of troops of all 
 
LEE'S AUDACITY— SALEM CHURCH 299 
 
 arms was 68,352, of which 54,356 were infantry, 4,460 
 were artillery, and 9,536 were cavalry. "This artillery 
 organization was," says Steele in his " American Cam- 
 paigns," "the first of its kind ever employed, and it has 
 since been adopted by the leading nations of Europe." 
 It was a fighting force which in its personnel has 
 rarely been equalled in the history of war, composed 
 largely of that volunteer soldiery, animated by love of 
 country and the spirit of free institutions, which so 
 good a critic as Stonewall Jackson declared the best 
 soldiers on earth. Lee's confidence in them was dis- 
 played when, a little later, he threw them against 
 Meade's imposing position on the heights of Gettys- 
 burg, in the great strategic move which he was even 
 now planning. With the object of guarding the capital 
 of the Confederacy against another attempt such as 
 he had already frustrated four times, at such cost to 
 the South, Lee was ^ow planning carrying the war into 
 Africa. To do this with the greatest possible assurance 
 of success attainable, it was necessary to have as strong 
 an army as possible. Sharpsburg had shown that 
 neither gallantry nor brilliant handling of men was 
 sufficient to render invasion successful when it brought 
 into the field such an army as the North could oppose to 
 it. And as moderate as was the size of Lee's army now, 
 there was always danger that he might be called on to 
 detach a part of his force to protect distant fields. 
 Longstreet had been detached before Chancellorsville 
 to defend the approaches on the south side of the James, 
 in Virginia, and this possibly had enabled Hooker to 
 escape across the Rappahannock. Such, indeed, was 
 
300 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Henderson's opinion. Now, the whole seaboard of the 
 South was in deep anxiety, and the clamors of the po- 
 litical representatives of the threatened regions were 
 unremitting. Lee had the responsibility of defending 
 Richmond and of conducting the war; but he lacked 
 the power to dispose of the troops in the field so as 
 best to carry out the plans which he believed necessary 
 for the proper performance of his task. As has been 
 already said, the form of government of the Confederacy, 
 however suited for peace, was inefficient for the con- 
 duct of a great revolution. So many conflicting inter- 
 ests had to be reconciled, so many selfish ambitions 
 reckoned with, so many divergent views harmonized, 
 that in times of crisis the exigencies often came and 
 passed before the proper authority requisite to pro- 
 vide means to meet it could be secured. The present 
 crisis furnished an illustration of this unhappy con- 
 dition. 
 
 It was plain enough to Lee's clear vision what steps 
 should be taken to meet this situation; but he lacked 
 the means to nlake his views effectual. He was not 
 thwarted and set aside as the commanding generals on 
 the Union side were, but he was impeded and hindered 
 in his plans by the action of the government, who, 
 whatever the emergency, felt called on to consult the 
 views of those they represented. He wrote on June 
 13 to the Secretary of War: ''You can realize the diffi- 
 culty of operating in any offensive movement with 
 this army, if it has to be divided to cover Richmond, 
 It seems to me useless to attempt it with the force 
 against it. You will have seen its effective strength 
 
LEE'S AUDACITY— SALEM CHURCH 301 
 
 by the last returns." Mr. Davis wrote him, a few days 
 later, that the attempt was being made to organize a 
 force for local defence, and that he hoped it would be 
 possible to defend the city without drawing from the 
 force in the field more heavily than may be necessary 
 for the duty of outposts and reconnoissances. But 
 General Lee had a bolder and loftier object hi view 
 than the mere defence of Richmond. He would by 
 his strategy not only relieve Richmond, but possibly 
 secure peace. And he saw clearly that the chances of 
 peace were dependent on his success, as he saw that 
 his chances of success were dwindling with his dwin- 
 dling resources. 
 
 ''At this distance," he wrote Mr. Davis, ''I can see 
 no benefit to be derived from maintaining a larger 
 force on the southern coast during the unhealthy 
 months of summer and autumn, and I think that a 
 part at least of the troops in North Carolina, and of 
 those under General Beauregard, can be employed at 
 this time to great advantage in Virginia. If an army 
 could be organized under the conamand of General 
 Beauregard, and pushed forward to Culpeper Court 
 House, threatening Washington from that direction, it 
 would not only effect a diversion most favorable for 
 this army, but would, I think, relieve us of any appre- 
 hension of an attack upon Richmond during our ab- 
 sence. ... If success should attend the operations of 
 this army — and what I now suggest would greatly in- 
 crease the probability of that result — we might even 
 hope to compel the recall of some of the enemy's troops 
 from the West. . . . The good effects of beginaing to 
 
302 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 assemble an army at Culpeper Court House would, 
 I think, soon become apparent, and the movement 
 might be increased in importance as the result might 
 appear to justify." 
 
 And again, under date of the 25th of June, to Presi- 
 dent Davis, he wrote: '^You will see that apprehension 
 for the safety of Washington and their own territory 
 has aroused the Federal Government and people to 
 great exertions, and it is incumbent upon us to call 
 forth all our energies. In addition to the 100,000 
 troops called for by President Lincoln to defend the 
 frontier of Pennsylvania, you will see that he is con- 
 centrating other organized forces in Maryland. It is 
 stated in the papers that they are all being withdrawn 
 from Suffolk, and according to General Buckner's re- 
 port, Burnside and his corps are recalled from Ken- 
 tucky. ... I think this should liberate the troops in 
 the Carolinas, and enable Generals Buckner and Bragg 
 to accomplish something in Ohio. It is plain that if all 
 the Federal army is concentrated upon this it will re- 
 sult in our accomplishing nothing and being compelled 
 to return to Virginia. If the plan that I suggested 
 the other day, of organizing an army, even in effigy, 
 under General Beauregard at Culpeper Court House, 
 can be carried into effect, much relief will be afforded. 
 If even the brigades in Virginia and North Carolina, 
 which Generals D. H. Hill and Elzey think cannot be 
 spared, were ordered there at once, and General Beau- 
 regard were sent there, if he had to return to South 
 Carolina, it would do more to protect both States from 
 marauding expeditions of the enemy than anything 
 
LEE'S AUDACITY— SALEM CHURCH 303 
 
 else. I have not sufficient troops to maintain my com- 
 munications, and therefore have to abandon them. I 
 think I can throw General Hooker's army across the 
 Potomac, and draw troops from the South, embarrass- 
 ing their plan of campaign in a measure, if I can do 
 nothing more and have to return." ^ 
 
 It was a tragic situation, this general, on whose genius 
 hung the fate of the Codfederacy, begging in vain for 
 an army, "even in effigy," to post on his flank and 
 afford him some relief while he pursued the strategy 
 which alone could save his cause. 
 
 > Colonel W. H. Taylor's "General Lee," p. 216. 
 
CHAPTER XIII 
 
 GETTYSBURG 
 
 Possibly, it may appear to some a fault in Lee as a 
 soldier that lie accounted the abilities of his enemy at 
 less than their true value. Study of the war must lead 
 to the conviction that neither courage nor fortitude was 
 the monopoly of either side. The men who withstood 
 at Gaines's Mill and Malvern Hill the fierce charges 
 of the Southern infantry; the men who marched down 
 the rolling plain of Second Manassas against Stonewall 
 Jackson's lines of flame, and dashed, like the surging 
 sea, wave upon wave, on Lee's iron ranks at Antietam; 
 the men who charged impregnable defences at Marye's 
 Heights; the men who climbed the slippery steeps of 
 Chattanooga and swept the crimson plain of Franklin; 
 the men who maintained their positions under the 
 leaden sleet of the Wilderness and seized the Bloody 
 Angle at Spottsylvania; the men who died at Cold 
 Harbor, rank on rank, needed to ask no odds for valor 
 of any troops on earth, not even of the men who followed 
 Lee. 
 
 In a recent discussion of this subject, the philosoph- 
 ical Charles Francis Adams, himself a veteran of the 
 Army of the Potomac, whose laurels were won in op- 
 posing Lee, quotes with approval Lee's proud declara- 
 
 304 
 
GETTYSBURG 305 
 
 tion that "there never were such men in an army 
 before. They will go anywhere and do anything if 
 properly led." ''And for myself," he adds, "I do not 
 think the estimate thus expressed was exaggerated. 
 Speaking deliberately, having faced some portions of 
 the Army of Northern Virginia at the time, and having 
 reflected much on the occurrences of that momentous 
 period, I do not believe that any more formidable or 
 better organized and animated force was ever set in 
 motion than that which Lee led across the Potomac in 
 the early summer of 1863. It was essentially an army 
 of fighters — men who individually or in the mass 
 could be depended upon for any feat of arms in the 
 power of mere mortals to accomplish. They would 
 blench at no danger. This Lee from experience knew. 
 He had tested them; they had full confidence in him." ^ 
 
 Lee's error, such as it was, lay not in overrating his 
 own weapon, but in undervaluing the larger weapon of 
 his antagonist. Yet, if this underrating of his enemy 
 was a fault, it was a noble one; and how often it led 
 to victory! Lee's success was due largely to his splen- 
 did audacity. 
 
 If, in attacking the redoubtable forces of Meade on 
 the heights of Gettysburg, he overestimated the ability 
 of that army of sixty thousand Southern men who wore 
 the gray, who can wonder? In their rags and tatters, 
 ill-shod and ill-armed, they were the flower of the 
 South. Had he not seen them on every field since 
 Mechanicsville? Seen them, under his masterly tactics 
 and inspiring eye, sweep McClellan's mighty army from 
 
 ' Address at Lexington, Va., cited ante. 
 
306 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the very gates of Richmond? Seen them send Pope, 
 routed and demorahzed, to the shelter of the fortifica- 
 tions around Alexandria? Seen them repel McClellan's 
 furious charges on the field of Antietam, and hold him 
 at bay with a fresh army at his back? Seen them drive 
 Burnside's valorous men back to their entrenchments? 
 Seen them roll Hooker's great army up as a scroll and 
 hurl it back across the Rappahannock? What was 
 disparity of numbers to him? What strength of posi- 
 tion? His greatest victories had been plucked by dar- 
 ing, which hitherto fortune had proved the wisest of 
 calculation, from the jaws of apparent impossibility. 
 Besides, who knew so well as he the necessity of strik- 
 ing such a blow? The South-west was being gradu- 
 ally conquered. Grant's brilliant work before Vicks- 
 burg had almost completed what Fort Donelson and 
 Shiloh had begun. Vicksburg, the last stronghold of 
 the Confederacy on the Mississippi, was in the last 
 throes of a fatal siege, and, on the same day that Lee 
 faced his fate at the heights of Gettysburg, fell before the 
 indomitable Grant, and the Confederate South was cut 
 in two. His delivering battle here under such condi- 
 tions has been often criticised. He is charged with hav- 
 ing violated a canon of war. He replied to his critics 
 once that even so dull a man as himself could see clearly 
 enough his mistakes after they were committed. 
 
 This battle has been fought over so often that it is 
 not necessary to go fully over its details now, and yet 
 in a volume which deals with Lee's military genius 
 some account is necessary of the great battle which 
 appears to have been the turning point of the great 
 
GETTYSBURG 307 
 
 civil strife. Gettysburg was only one factor in the 
 unbroken chain of proof to establish his boldness and 
 his resolution. Southern historians have unanimously 
 placed the chief responsibility for his defeat on Long- 
 street, whose tendency to be dilatory and obstinate 
 has been noted in connection with the fields of Seven 
 Pines, Frazier's Farm, and Second Manassas, and whose 
 slowness and surliness now probably cost Lee this battle, 
 and possibly cost the South, if not its independence, at 
 least the offer of honorable terms. And in this estimate 
 of him many other competent critics concur. ''Lee," 
 says Henderson, in his "Life of Stonewall Jackson," 
 "lost the battle of Gettysburg because he allowed his 
 second in command to argue instead of marching." ^ It 
 is impossible in reading his writings not to be struck by 
 his self-esteem, and sheer jealousy is often written plain 
 on his pages. That he should have envied Jackson 
 and hated Early is perhaps not to be wondered at. 
 But that he should have assailed Lee with what ap- 
 pears not far from rancor can only be attributed to 
 jealousy. Lee, we know, held him in high esteem, 
 speaking of him as his "old war horse," and was too 
 magnanimous ever to give countenance to the furious 
 clamor which later assailed his sturdy if opinionated 
 and bull-headed lieutenant. It was a magnanimity 
 which Longstreet ill requited when long afterward — 
 years after Lee's death — he attempted to reply to his 
 critics. Longstreet seems, indeed, to have been not 
 unlike a bull, ponderous and dull until aroused, but 
 once aroused by the sight of blood, terrible in his fury, 
 
 * " Life of Stonewall Jackson," II, p. 488. 
 
308 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 and a ferocious fighter. But the question here is, did 
 Lee err or not in fighting the battle. 
 
 Longstreet with two divisions had been absent from 
 Lee's army since soon after the battle of Fredericks- 
 burg. He had at his request been sent to south-side 
 Virginia to defend the line of the Blackwater against 
 an advance from Norfolk, on the south side of the 
 James. In anticipation of Hooker's advance around 
 Lee's left, he had been ordered to rejoin Lee, but ''his 
 movements were so delayed that though the battle of 
 Chancellorsville did not occur until many days after 
 he was expected to join, his force was absent when it 
 occurred." ^ This, too, when his instructions had been 
 "repeated with urgent insistence." 
 
 Longstreet declared long afterward that he now had 
 a plan of his own. He not infrequently claims the 
 credit for the plans acted on if they proved successful. 
 His idea was that the proper strategy would be for 
 him to join Joseph E. Johnston, then near Tullahoma, 
 so as to enable him to crush Rosecrans; then march 
 through Tennessee and Kentucky and threaten Ohio. 
 This view he urged both on Mr. Seddon, the Confederate 
 Secretary of War, and on Lee himself. Neither acceded 
 to his plan — mainly, he says, because it would force 
 Lee to divide his army.^ Assuredly a sound enough 
 reason. His account of his interview with Lee has 
 been noted by a thoughtful student of the Gettysburg 
 campaign, himself a gallant participant in the battle, 
 as reflecting Longstreet's mental attitude both toward 
 
 ' " Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government." 
 'Southern Historical Society Papers, vol. V, p. 55. 
 
GETTYSBURG 309 
 
 the campaign and toward Lee/ It was, at least, not 
 one of cordial subordination and support. 
 
 In brief, the battle of Gettysburg came of the neces- 
 sity to '^ yield to a stronger power than General Burn- 
 side." Feeling the imperative necessity of relieving 
 Virginia of the burden that was crushing her to the 
 earth, Lee determined, as the summer of 1863 drew near, 
 to manoeuvre Hooker from his impregnable position on 
 the Stafford Heights, and to transfer the theatre of 
 war to Northern soil. 
 
 For this reason Lee, boldly flanking Hooker, who, 
 now secure on the further side of the Rappahannock, 
 was boasting still, marched his army into Maryland and 
 Pennsylvania, not for conquest, but for subsistence, 
 and to employ once more, at need, the strategy which 
 he knew would compel the withdrawal of the forces 
 still threatening Richmond. 
 
 It testifies his foresight that he had already pre- 
 dicted that a pitched battle would probably be fought 
 at York, or at Gettysburg. 
 
 Yet, when the time came, Lee's meeting with ]\Ieade's 
 army at the latter place was to some extent a surprise to 
 him; for his able and gallant cavalry commander, Stuart, 
 on whom he had relied to keep him informed touching 
 the enemy, had been led by the ardor of a successful raid 
 further afield than had been planned, and the presence 
 of Meade's army in force was unsuspected until too late 
 to decline battle.^ Heth's Division had sought the 
 
 ^"Review of the Gettysburg Campaign," by Colonel David Gregg 
 Mcintosh, p. 9. 
 
 ^ That Stuart was in any way responsible for this is denied by Colonel 
 John S. Mosby in his "Stuart in the Gettysburg Campaign." 
 
310 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 place for imperatively needed supplies, and found the 
 Union troops holding it, and a battle was precipitated. 
 Lee's plan of battle failed here, but the student of war 
 knows how it failed and why. It failed because his 
 lieutenants failed, and his orders were not carried out 
 — possibly because he called on his intrepid army for 
 more than human strength was able to achieve. ''Had 
 I had Jackson at Gettysburg," he once said, "I should, 
 so far as man can judge, have won that battle." 
 
 It was the first week of June when Lee, leaving A. P. 
 Hill to occupy the lines at Fredericksburg and cover 
 Richmond, withdrew the major portion of his force to 
 Culpeper, Ewell leading and Longstreet following. Lee 
 moved secretly, sending Ewell by Spottsylvania Court 
 House to escape observation; but observation balloons 
 and spies discovered something of his movements to 
 Hooker, who notified his government and without 
 avail asked leave to "pitch into his rear." He crossed 
 Sedgwick over the Rappahannock, on June 5, to dem- 
 onstrate against Hill's right on the River Road to 
 Richmond; but as Lee, after making a personal recon- 
 noissance of the position, recognized the move as 
 a feint and paid little attention to it, he withdrew 
 Sedgwick again. Hooker now knew that Lee was 
 beginning some movement, but thought it was merely 
 a cavalry raid, with possibly a heavy column of in- 
 fantry in support, and he sent Pleasanton with his 
 cavalry, "stiffened by about 3,000 infantry," to dis- 
 perse and destroy the cavalry forces in the vicinity of 
 Culpeper. At Culpeper Lee waited for a few days and 
 rested and reviewed his cavalry. Lee wrote his wife 
 
GETTYSBURG 311 
 
 of the review. ''It was a splendid sight," he said; ''the 
 men and horses looked well. They had recuperated 
 since last fall. Stuart was in all his glory. Your sons 
 and nephews are well and flourishing. The country 
 here looks very green and pretty, notwithstanding the 
 ravages of war. What a beautiful world God in His 
 loving-kindness to His creatures has given us. What a 
 shame that men endowed with reason and knowledge 
 of right should mar His gifts." The day following this 
 review, a short distance away on the rolling plain 
 above Kelly's Ford, Stuart and Pleasanton, the latter, 
 as stated, "stiffened by about 3,000 infantry," fought 
 possibly the greatest cavalry battle that has ever taken 
 place. Alexander's artillery was moved over in that 
 direction, to be ready at need; but was kept in con- 
 cealment, as Lee did not wish the presence of his 
 army to be known. After several hours of stiff 
 fighting, Pleasanton was driven back across the Rap- 
 pahannock with the loss of 500 prisoners, 3 pieces of 
 artillery, and several colors, having himself captured 
 a good number of prisoners. Hooker, as at Chancel- 
 lorsville, found this a cause of congratulation, and 
 wrote a report quite in the tone of a victor. Pleasan- 
 ton, he reported, "pressed Stuart three miles, capt- 
 uring 200 prisoners and a battle-flag. Our cavalry 
 made many hand-to-hand combats, always driving the 
 enemy before them." 
 
 Lee's plan now was to sweep over the mountains 
 and on through the valley of Virginia, clearing it of 
 Milroy's army, which was proving a pest there, cross 
 over into Maryland, and, passing through that State, 
 
312 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 invade Pennsylvania and threaten at once Harrisburg, 
 Baltimore, and Washington. This, he hoped, would 
 lead to peace, or, failing this, would at least "throw 
 Hooker's army across the Potomac." 
 
 Before leaving Culpeper, Lee, on the 10th of June, 
 wrote President Davis the following letter, which shows 
 how clearly he saw the need of making peace : 
 
 Mr. President: I beg leave to bring to your attention 
 a subject with reference to which I have thought that 
 the course pursued by writers and speakers among us 
 has had a tendency to interfere with our success. I 
 refer to the manner in which the demonstration of a 
 desire for peace at the North has been received in our 
 country. 
 
 I think there can be no doubt that journalists and 
 others at the South, to whom the Northern people 
 naturally look for a reflection of our opinions, have 
 met these indications in such wise as to weaken the 
 hands of the advocates of a pacific policy on the part 
 of the Federal Government, and give much encourage- 
 ment to those who urge a continuance of the war. 
 
 Recent political movements in the United States 
 and the comments of influential newspapers upon them 
 have attracted my attention particularly to this sub- 
 ject, which I deem not unworthy of the consideration 
 of your Excellency, nor inappropriate to be adverted 
 to by me in view of its connection with the situation 
 of military affairs. 
 
 Conceding to our enemies the superiority claimed 
 by them in numbers, resources, and all the means and 
 appliances for carrying on the war, we have no right 
 to look for exemption from the military consequences 
 of a vigorous use of these advantages, except by such 
 deliverance as the mercy of Heaven may accord to the 
 
GETTYSBURG 313 
 
 courage of our soldiers, the justice of our cause, and 
 the constancy and prayers of our people. While mak- 
 ing the most we can of the means of resistance we 
 possess, and gratefully accepting the measure of success 
 with which God has blessed our efforts as an earnest 
 of His approval and favor, it is nevertheless the part 
 of wisdom to carefully measure and husband our 
 strength, and not to expect from it more than in the 
 ordinary course of affairs it is capable of accomplish- 
 ing. We should not, therefore, conceal from ourselves 
 that our resources in men are constantly diminishing, 
 and the disproportion in this respect between us and 
 our enemies, if they continue united in their efforts 
 to subjugate, is steadily augmenting. The decrease 
 of the aggregate of this army as disclosed by the re- 
 turns affords an illustration of this fact. Its effect- 
 ive strength varies from time to time, but the falling 
 off in its aggregate shows that its ranks are grow- 
 ing weaker and that its losses are not supplied by 
 recruits. 
 
 Under these circumstances we should neglect no 
 honorable means of dividing and weakening our ene- 
 mies, that they may feel some of the difficulties ex- 
 perienced by ourselves. It seems to me that the most 
 effectual mode of accomplishing this object now within 
 our reach is to give all the encouragement we can, con- 
 sistently with truth, to the rising peace party of the 
 North. 
 
 Nor do I think we should, in this connection, make 
 nice distinction between those who declare for peace 
 unconditionally and those who advocate it as a means 
 of restoring the Union, however much we may prefer 
 the former. 
 
 We should bear in mind that the friends of peace at 
 the North must make concessions to the earnest desire 
 that exists in the minds of their countrymen for a res- 
 
314 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 toration of the Union, and that to hold out such a re- 
 sult as an inducement is essential to the success of their 
 party. 
 
 Should the belief that peace will bring back the Union 
 become general the war would no longer be supported; 
 and that, after all, is what we are interested in bringing 
 about. When peace is proposed to us it will be time 
 enough to discuss its terms, and it is not the part of 
 prudence to spurn the proposition in advance merely 
 because those who wish to make it believe, or affect 
 to believe, that it will result in bringing us back to 
 the Union. We entertain no such apprehensions, nor 
 doubt that the desire of our people for a distinct and 
 independent national existence will prove as steadfast 
 under the influence of peaceful measures as it has shown 
 itself in the midst of war. 
 
 If the views I have indicated meet the approval of 
 your Excellency, you will best know how to give effect 
 to them. Should you deem them inexpedient or im- 
 practicable, I think you will nevertheless agree with 
 me that we should at least carefully abstain from meas- 
 ures or expressions that tend to discourage any party 
 whose purpose is peace. 
 
 With this statement of my own opinion on the sub- 
 ject, the length of which you will excuse, I leave to 
 your better judgment to determine the proper course 
 to be pursued. 
 
 I am, with great respect. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 The day after the fight at Kelly's Ford, Lee sent 
 Ewell forward by Mount Royal to the Shenandoah 
 Valley, which he immediately cleared of the enemy. 
 Longstreet was directed to operate so as to embarrass 
 
GETTYSBURG 315 
 
 Hooker as to Lee's movements, and keep him east of 
 the Blue Ridge, at least until Hill could arrive and get 
 in touch with Ewell, and Stuart was set to screen Lee's 
 movements to the west of the Blue Ridge from Hooker, 
 posted to the east of the Blue Ridge, covering the 
 southerly approaches to Washington. 
 
 As Lee anticipated, his strategy drew Hooker back 
 toward the Potomac, and Longstreet was moved for- 
 ward on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, while 
 A. P. Hill followed Ewell over the mountains into the 
 valley of Virginia, the whole being screened by Stuart's 
 cavalry. 
 
 As late as the 12th Hooker wrote Governor Dix that 
 "all of Lee's army, so far as I know, is extended along 
 the immediate bank of the Rappahannock from Hamil- 
 ton's Crossing to Culpeper. A. P. Hill's Corps is on his 
 right, below Fredericksburg; E well's Corps joins his 
 left, reaching to the Rapidan, and beyond that river is 
 Longstreet's Corps." Two days from this time Ewell, 
 who had crossed the Blue Ridge on the 12th, captured 
 Winchester, with some 4,000 prisoners and 29 guns, 
 together with the vast stores collected there, and barely 
 missed capturing Milroy himself, who escaped with a 
 small portion of the garrison. 
 
 On the night of the 13th, Hooker, knowing that Lee 
 was engaged in some new enterprise, but not know- 
 ing yet what it was, withdrew from before Fredericks- 
 burg and headed for the line of the Orange and Alex- 
 andria Railroad, to cover Washington. Next day Hill, 
 no longer needed on the south bank of the Rappahan- 
 nock, marched for Culpeper en route for the Valley, 
 
316 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 to overtake Lee's other corps. Lee had thus once 
 more manceuvred a great army from an attack on 
 Richmond to the defence of Washington. Hooker was 
 still in a maze, and sent his cavahy westward to force 
 Lee 'Ho show his hand, if he had any in this part of 
 the country." To prevent this "a, stiff fight" occurred 
 on the 17th, at Aldie, between Fitz Lee and Gregg, and 
 two days later Pleasanton, ''stiffened by an infantry 
 division," flanked Stuart at Middleburg and forced him 
 beyond Upperville. Longstreet sent a division to rein- 
 force Stuart, and on the 23d Lee wrote Mr. Davis that 
 "the attempts to penetrate the mountains have been 
 successfully resisted by General Stuart with the cav- 
 alry," and that the enemy had retired to Aldie. 
 
 By the middle of the month (June) Lee's advanced 
 corps had crossed the Potomac, and Longstreet was 
 ordered soon afterward to do the same, while Stuart 
 was left to impede Hooker should he attempt to follow 
 across the Potomac, it being left to Stuart's discretion 
 whether to cross east or west of the Blue Ridge; but 
 on crossing he was to cover the right of the army. On 
 the 22d of June, Lee wrote from Berryville, where 
 A. P. Hill had just arrived, directing Ewell to move 
 forward from Shepherdstown toward the Susquehanna, 
 taking the route by Emmetsburg, Chambersburg, and 
 McConnellsburg, keeping his trains on the centre route, 
 and notifying him that Stuart had been directed, if 
 possible, to place himself with three brigades of cav- 
 alry on his right, and Imboden had been ordered to 
 his left. Ewell was told "if Harrisburg comes within 
 your means capture it." On the same day Lee wrote 
 
GETTYSBURG 317 
 
 Stuart, expressing concern lest the enemy should '^ steal 
 a march on us and get across the Potomac before we 
 are aware/' and authorizing him, if he found the enemy 
 moving northward, to leave two brigades to guard the 
 Blue Ridge and take care of his rear, to move with his 
 other three brigades into Maryland, place himself in 
 communication with Ewell, and guard his right flank, 
 keeping him informed of the enemy's movements and 
 collecting supplies. This letter was forwarded through 
 Longstreet, who wrote Stuart, advising his leaving by 
 Hopewell Gap and passing in the rear of the enemy, so 
 as not to disclose Lee's plans. Stuart mentioned that 
 Lee had authorized him to use his discretion. 
 
 On the 23d Lee wrote Stuart again, confirming the 
 above, but suggesting that should Hooker appear to 
 be moving northward, Stuart had better withdraw to 
 the west of the Blue Ridge and cross the Potomac at 
 Shepherdstown. He however stated that Stuart would 
 be able to judge; he could pass around Hooker's wing 
 and cross the river east of the mountains. "But in 
 either case," he adds, '^ after crossing the river you 
 must move on and feel the right of Ewell's troops. . . . 
 I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after to- 
 morrow, the better." Stuart sent Colonel Mosby on 
 a scout to learn if Hooker were crossing the Potomac, 
 and received on the 24th a report that no signs of 
 movement were found. This report was to be sent 
 to General Lee. He moved that night to pass around 
 Hooker's rear and cross the river at Seneca Ford. 
 He had intended to pass through Haymarket and on 
 through Hooker's army; but finding Hancock, across 
 
318 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 his path in the Bull Run Mountains, he bore farther 
 eastward and passed through Fairfax Station. The 
 detour delayed his crossing of the river till the night 
 of the 27th, when he learned that Hooker had crossed 
 at Edward's Ferry on the 25th and 26th, and was now 
 at Poolesville, Md., en route for Frederick. 
 
 Meantime, Lee had passed the rest of his army to the 
 north side of the Potomac, and Hooker's entire army 
 was between Lee and his cavalry. Hill had crossed at 
 Shepherdstown, and Longstreet at Williamsport, on the 
 24th, the day that Stuart received the report to transmit 
 to Lee that no signs of Hooker's movement had been 
 found. The two corps had united at Hagerstown, and 
 on the 27th were near Chambersburg, secure in the 
 conviction that Hooker was probably still on the south 
 side of the Potomac or Stuart would have notified 
 them.^ Here Lee issued his famous order to his army, 
 admonishing them to respect non-combatants and 
 private property, and remember that the inhabitants 
 were their fellow citizens. Ewell, marching by Hagers- 
 town and Chambersburg, had reached Carlisle on the 
 27th with two of his divisions, the third, under Early, 
 having been sent to York. Early was sent eastward 
 across the South Mountains and through Gettysburg, 
 York, and Wrightsville, to cross the Susquehanna by 
 the Columbia bridge and move up the north bank of 
 the river on Harrisburg. Crossing the South Moun- 
 tains by the Chambersburg pike. Early passed through 
 Gettysburg on the 26th and moved on through York 
 to Wrightsville, respectively twenty-eight and forty 
 
 ' Lee's report, dated 20th January, 1864. 
 
GETTYSBURG 319 
 
 miles from Gettysburg, and was preparing to cross the 
 river when he received orders to rejoin Lee. Ewell, at 
 CarHsle, was about to set out for Harrisburg, whose 
 defences were already being studied by his engineers. 
 It was not until the next night (28th) that Lee learned 
 through a scout that momentous events had taken 
 place in the past few days along the Potomac; that 
 Hooker had crossed the river; had then been relieved 
 and superseded by Meade, and that Meade was now con- 
 centrating in his rear between him and Washington. 
 Hooker, on crossing the Potomac, had telegraphed Hal- 
 leck that he wanted the garrison from Harper's Ferry 
 and Maryland Heights — some 10,000 men — and on Hal- 
 leck's refusing, on the ground that Harper's Ferry was 
 the key to the situation, he had replied that the key was 
 of no use when the lock was broken, and asked that 
 his resignation be accepted. This was promptly done — 
 the authorities, possibly, not being sorry to get rid of 
 another ill-starred commander — and to the surprise of 
 many, who had expected Couch or Reynolds to succeed 
 him, Meade was not only placed in command, but was 
 given the troops which were refused Hooker. Meade, 
 bearing to the eastward and keeping Washington and 
 Baltimore covered, continued to march northward tow- 
 ard where Lee was throwing Pennsylvania into a panic. 
 Extended as he was over nearly fifty miles in a hostile 
 country, it behooved Lee to get his army together before 
 he attacked or was attacked by an enemy which so 
 largely outnumbered him, and he proceeded to do so. 
 
 Stuart meantime, acting in the discretion accorded 
 him by Lee, had passed in the rear of Hooker and 
 
320 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 crossed the Potomac at Seneca, barely a dozen miles 
 from Washington, and had moved on northward be- 
 tween Hooker and Washington, capturing a great 
 wagon-train at Rockville, cutting up the railway and 
 telegraph, and drawing after him all the Federal cav- 
 alry available. His march was made with his usual 
 swiftness, but as the Federal army was between him 
 and the Confederate columns, he did not know where 
 the main army was until the night of the 1st of July, 
 when, having ridden around Gettysburg, he reached 
 Carlisle on his way to the Susquehanna. That day 
 Lee's army had fought the first day's battle of Gettys- 
 burg. Leaving Carlisle at once, Stuart rode for Gettys- 
 burg, where he arrived next afternoon. 
 
 While Stuart was riding around the Federal army, 
 Lee was meeting the new situation presented to him 
 by the unexpected proximity of Meade's army on 
 his flank. On learning that Meade was so near, Lee 
 promptly decided to concentrate his forces on the east 
 of the mountains. Orders were issued immediately 
 for his troops to turn and concentrate about Cash- 
 town or Gettysburg. Ewell received the order at 
 Carlisle as he was about to set out for Harrisburg, his 
 instructions recalling him first to Chambersburg and 
 then 'Ho proceed to Cashtown or Gettysburg, as cir- 
 cumstances might dictate," and Hill was ordered to 
 Cashtown, to the north-westward of Gettysburg, to 
 which place a turnpike ran, with Longstreet following 
 next day. Ewell immediately turned back; on the 
 night of the 29th his trains were passing through 
 Chambersburg, his three divisions moving on Gettys- 
 
GETTYSBURG 321 
 
 burg from the north. On the same day that Ewell ar- 
 rived at Carhsle, the 27th, Longstreet and A. P. Hill 
 reached the vicinity of Chambersburg. Up to this time 
 no information had come from any source of the ap- 
 proach of the Federal army, and it was not until the 
 night of the 28th that Lee was apprised by one of his 
 scouts that the army had not only crossed the Potomac 
 several days before but was now near South Mountain. 
 A. P. Hill was, on the 29th, encamped on the road 
 from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, and that day he 
 moved Heth's Division from Fayetteville, where Ander- 
 son was left, to Cashtown, on the eastern side of the 
 South Mountain, eight miles from Gettysburg, while 
 Pender's Division followed to the western foot of the 
 mountain. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th, Pettigrew's Brigade, of 
 Heth's Division, was ordered to the little town of 
 Gettysburg, a few miles southward, to get shoes and 
 other supplies, of which it stood sorely in need, and 
 found it occupied by the enemy, who were not known 
 to be nearer than fifteen miles away. Pettigrew with- 
 drew and bivouacked. The rest of Lee's army, on the 
 night of the 30th, was placed as follows: Johnson's 
 Division, of Ewell's Corps (four brigades — Jones's, 
 Williams's, Walker's, and Stuart's), was near Fayette- 
 ville, on the Chambersburg Pike, seventeen miles 
 north-west of Gettysburg; Early's Division, with four 
 brigades (Gordon's, Hays's, Hoke's, and Smith's), 
 was at East Berlin, on the York Pike, fifteen miles 
 north-east of Gettysburg; Rodes's Division, five bri- 
 gades (Daniels's, Ramseur's, Iverson's, O'Neal's, and 
 
322 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Doles's), was at Heidlersburg, ten miles north of 
 Gettysburg. Of Hill's Corps, Heth's Division, three 
 brigades (Archer's, Davis's, and Brockenborough's), 
 was at Cashtown, eight miles north-west of Gettys- 
 burg; Pender's Division, four brigades (Thomas's, 
 Lane's, Scales's, and McGowan's), was on the west 
 side of the mountain, a few miles farther away, while 
 Anderson's Division, beyond them, was at Fayetteville, 
 seventeen miles from Gettysburg. 
 
 Longstreet, leaving Pickett's Division at Chambers- 
 burg to guard the rear, moved his other divisions 
 (Hood's and McLaws's) on the 30th to Greenwood, 
 fourteen miles north-west of Gettysburg, where Lee 
 had his head-quarters, and ''bivouacked about 2 p. m." 
 Lee, at Greenwood, wrote on the 30th, ordering Im- 
 boden to take Pickett's place, so that the latter could 
 move next day to Cashtown, where he proposed to 
 establish his head-quarters. He had no new informa- 
 tion as to the movements of the Federal army, and 
 was sending out scouts to find Stuart. Stuart on the 
 same day was riding northward from Westminster, 
 Md., toward Hanover, Pa., on the way to Harrisburg. 
 
 On the day following (July 1), while Hill and Ewell 
 were fighting the first day's battle about the town of 
 Gettysburg, Longstreet's two divisions were moved for- 
 ward, and they bivouacked that night on Willoughby 
 Run, only three or four miles from the battle-field. 
 
 On the same day that Lee was moving southward 
 toward Gettysburg, the 30th, Meade was moving 
 northward along lines which would bring him nearer 
 to Lee's route, and would at the same time cover 
 
GETTYSBURG 323 
 
 Washington and Baltimore. That day he established 
 his head-quarters at Taney town, Md., thirteen miles 
 south of Gettysburg, having moved from Frederick, 
 and set his engineers to work to reconnoitre-and prepare 
 defences for a pitched battle along the line of Pipe 
 Creek, a few miles to the south of Taneytown. Reyn- 
 olds, who commanded his left, consisting of the First, 
 Third, and Eleventh Corps, with Buford's cavalry, was 
 sent forward toward Gettysburg to find and draw Lee 
 on to a battle on the ground which Meade had chosen 
 along Pipe Creek. The Fifth Corps was moved toward 
 Hanover, fourteen miles south-east of Gettysburg; 
 the Twelfth Corps was pushed forward that night on 
 the Baltimore Pike to within ten miles of Gettysburg; 
 the Second Corps was at Queentown, and the Sixth 
 Corps was at Manchester, thirty-four or thirty-five 
 miles to the south-east, half way to Baltimore. On 
 the evening of the 30th, Reynolds had pushed forward 
 to Gettysburg, through which two of Buford's bri- 
 gades of cavalry (Devin's and Gamble's) had passed to 
 picket the roads from the north, while that night the 
 First Corps bivouacked five miles south of the town, 
 and the Third and Eleventh Corps bivouacked at Em- 
 metsburg, ten miles south of the town. 
 
 It seems clear that while each side knew that the 
 other was not far distant, and that a great battle was 
 imminent, neither anticipated that the battle would 
 be fought at Gettysburg. 
 
 The battle-field of Gettysburg lies in a piedmont 
 region, in a fertile, rolling country of farms and ham- 
 lets, for the most part open, but interspersed with 
 
324 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 woodland, divided by ridges running mainly north and 
 south, with streams running between them, and in 
 places broken by shaip though not high spurs, covered 
 with boulders and clad with forest. The little town 
 which gives its name to the battle lies on the slope at 
 the northern end of one of these ridges, which rises 
 somewhat abruptly at its back, and is crowned there 
 by the cemetery from which it takes its name. This 
 ridge throws out a curving spur to the eastward, known 
 as Gulp's Hill, around which runs Rock Creek, but the 
 main backbone of the ridge extends south by south-west 
 for some two miles, and after sinking in the middle, rises 
 again, and ends in two sharp, wooded spurs which are 
 known respectively as Little- and Big Roundtop. The 
 ground between the end of the eastern curve — Gulp's 
 Hill — and the southern portion of the ridge is much 
 broken, but is traversed by roads which afford ready 
 access from one to the other. On either side east and 
 west of this ridge, at the distance of a mile or so, and 
 divided from it by open valleys filled with farms and 
 orchards, lie other ridges; that on the west was known 
 as Seminary Ridge, from the Lutheran Seminary, which 
 rose near its northern end. 
 
 On the morning of the 1st of July, the nearer troops 
 to Gettysburg on both sides were set in motion for that 
 place, while those farther away continued their gen- 
 eral line of march, leading to the concentration about 
 Gettysburg, which had been ordered. Hill, moving 
 on Gettysburg from the westward, sent word of his 
 movement to Ewell, who was some miles farther away, 
 and who likewise set his troops in motion. . Lee's orders 
 
SCALE OF MILES 
 
 pp'W)?SKIN<aTOM 
 
 Gettysburg and Vicinity 
 
GETTYSBURG 325 
 
 to his lieutenants were to confine any action which the 
 meeting with the enemy might necessitate to a recon- 
 noissance, and not bring on a general engagement. This 
 was because of the dispersed condition of his own army 
 and his ignorance of the disposition of the enemy. 
 General Lee arrived at Cashtown on the morning of 
 July 1, whence Heth had been sent that morning by 
 Hill with orders to ascertain the force of the enemy; 
 but if he found infantry in force to report the fact 
 and not force an engagement. Meade's orders to his 
 lieutenants were to fall back, if pressed, to the position 
 which he had selected north of Emmeteburg, where 
 he would probably be in a position to fight a defensive 
 battle. As late as 12.30 on the 1st, his chief of staff 
 wrote Buford, whose cavalry was then engaged beyond 
 Gettysburg, to withdraw to Frizzelburg. At this time 
 Hill had two divisions up, and the third not far in the 
 rear, and Ewell was on his way. 
 
 Heth's Division, moving south-eastwardly along the 
 Chambersburg Pike from Cashtown, eight miles away, 
 toward nine o'clock came on Buford's pickets about a 
 mile and a half from Gettysburg, and on these being 
 driven in, encountered his dismounted cavalry, well 
 posted on both sides of the road, on a commanding 
 ridge to the west of the town. With Archer's Brigade 
 on his right, and Davis's on his left, supported by 
 Pegram's and Mcintosh's Battalions, Heth pushed 
 forward, crossed Willoughby Run, and passed up the 
 slope, where to their surprise they were met by two 
 brigades of the First Corps (Cutler's brigade and Mere- 
 dith's '^Iron Brigade") and were driven back with 
 
326 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 heavy loss. Rejuolds, moving to Gettysburg with 
 Wadsworth's division, on hearing the firing, had ridden 
 ahead, and, on finding that Hill was advancing, had 
 sent word to Meade and hurried forward the First Corps 
 to Buford's support. Conducting Wadsworth's division 
 from the Emmetsburg Pike north-westward under cover 
 of the woodland, he formed them on the ridge up which 
 Heth was advancing. In a short time the remainder 
 of the Federal First Corps, under Doubleday, had ar- 
 rived on the ground, and when Archer, who had come 
 under heavy fire from the crest above and obliqued 
 to the right, penetrated the woodland in his advance, 
 he found himself flanked and cut off by the Federal 
 troops, and in retreating across the run was captured 
 with a considerable portion of his brigade. Near the 
 same wood Reynolds was killed about this time as he 
 was placing his troops, and the command of the Federal 
 force on the field devolved on Doubleday, until a little 
 later, when Howard appeared a little in advance of the 
 Eleventh Corps and took command. The fighting dur- 
 ing these hours was hardly excelled during the war. 
 Brigades were decimated; regiments on both sides 
 were captured and recaptured. 
 
 The fight, though not so celebrated, was as fierce 
 and deadly as on any of the succeeding days. On the 
 Federal side, the Eleventh Corps came up to the assist- 
 ance of the First, and Howard, who as ranking officer 
 assumed command of the field, sent urgent messages 
 to Slocum and to Sickles to hasten to his support. 
 Each side fought with the most desperate valor. There 
 were times when the opposing ranks delivered their 
 
GETTYSBURG 327 
 
 deadly volleys almost in each other's faces. Heth was 
 nearly spent, when soon after two o'clock Rodes's 
 Division, which on hearing the firing had been turned 
 to the eastward and marched to the sound of the guns, 
 came on the field deployed for action, and Hill, who 
 appeared to be waiting for Ewell, now on his appear- 
 ance sent Pender in. The fighting was renewed with 
 redoubled fury; but in the nick of time Early came up 
 on Rodes's left and gave a new impulse to the Confed- 
 erate attack. Gordon, pushing forward against Bar- 
 low on the Federal right centre, and favored by a wide 
 gap between Barlow and Schurz, carried the hill to the 
 north-east of the town and drove Barlow's men back 
 on the town. Barlow himself was left for dead on the 
 field, but happily recovered to add later to his repu- 
 tation as a gallant and able officer. His men were 
 driven with great loss from the crest which they had 
 held so stoutly, and were pushed down into and through 
 the town. 
 
 The sweep of Pender's fresh troops added new fire to 
 the Confederates, and rushing forward all along the 
 front, they finally forced the Federal lines from their 
 position, covering the town from north-east to south- 
 west. The Eleventh Corps, driven down into the town, 
 encountered there the rest of Early's Division, who 
 had entered the town by the York Pike to the east- 
 ward, and, becoming a confused mass, were captured 
 to the number of several thousand. The remainder of 
 them retreated through and beyond the town to the 
 heights above it, known as Cemetery Ridge, and were 
 followed by Early's Division until the latter were re- 
 
328 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 called by EwelFs command. The First Corps, which 
 held on longer, was eventually forced back likewise, 
 and was driven across the valley to the west of the 
 town, still fighting as it retreated. 
 
 Lee had arrived on the scene about two o'clock, hav- 
 ing heard the sound of battle while he was riding 
 toward Cashtown. A message from Hill informed him 
 of the situation, and Lee, having ordered Anderson 
 forward from Cashtown, rode on with his staff — rid- 
 ing too hard for the corps commander with him. He 
 arrived in time to see the enemy driven through the 
 town. He appears to have been content with the way 
 things had progressed, and about half-past two or 
 three o'clock he sent Colonel Taylor, of his staff, to say 
 to General Ewell that from where he was he could see 
 ''those people" retreating up the heights ''without or- 
 ganization and in great confusion," that it was only 
 necessary to press them to secure possession of the 
 heights, and that, "if possible, he wished him to do 
 this." Ewell, however, seems to have been personally 
 spent, and to have thought that his men were equally 
 so, and Lee's order had contained the proviso, "if pos- 
 sible." They had, indeed, been marching and fighting 
 together for twelve hours; but had he called on them 
 for a final effort, it seems beyond question that they 
 would have swept on and carried the heights. 
 
 Hancock, \yho on the announcement of Reynolds's 
 death had been sent forward by Meade to take over 
 the command of the forces on the field, thought that 
 the hill might have been captured by Ewell at that 
 time had he pursued Howard's corps, but not after 
 
GETTYSBURG 329 
 
 he himself arrived and made his dispositions for de- 
 fence. He says: "When I arrived upon the field, about 
 3 p. M., or between that and 3.30 p. m., I found the 
 fighting about over; the rear of our troops were hur- 
 rying through the town, pursued by the Confederates. 
 There had been an attempt to reform some of the 
 Eleventh Corps as they passed over Cemetery Hill, 
 but it had not been very successful. I presume there 
 may have been 1,000 or 1,200 organized troops of that 
 corps in position on the hill." In addition to these, 
 Steinwehr's brigade alone occupied the heights. 
 
 Had Ewell not stopped the pursuit it is beyond 
 question that Meade's army would have concentrated, 
 as he had already ordered, along the Pipe Creek line. 
 
 General Ewell ''deemed it unwise to make the pur- 
 suit," for fear, probably, as Taylor conjectures, of bring- 
 ing on a general engagement. However this was, the 
 pursuit was not pressed, though Gordon, who was in the 
 full tide of victory, required three or four orders ''of the 
 most peremptory character" before he stayed his eager 
 troops. Ewell not only halted his men and thus lost 
 the golden opportunity presented of seizing the Ridge, 
 whose possession two days later decided the issue of the 
 battle and possibly that of the war, but he sent John- 
 son's Division around Gulp's Hill, where it was isolated. 
 
 It was a stubborn and bloody conflict, with from 
 22,000 to 24,000 men on either side, and while it re- 
 sulted in a clear victory for the Confederate troops, 
 who not only swept the field but captured some 5,000 
 prisoners, including two generals, the loss on both sides 
 was heavy. On the Confederate side the losses were 
 
330 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 about 2,500, killed, wounded, and missing, and among 
 them Heth and Scales had been wounded, and Archer 
 had been captured. On the Union side the losses in 
 killed and wounded were not less, and they had lost 
 over 5,000 men captured, while Reynolds, the able 
 commander of the First Corps, had been killed. 
 
 That night the Federals fortified the heights, and 
 as during the ensuing hours new troops came pouring 
 in by forced marches, the lines were rapidly strength- 
 ened with entrenchments. At the time, however, when 
 Ewell halted, the commanding position of Gulp's Hill 
 was unoccupied. Hancock states that he ordered Wads- 
 worth's division and a battery to take position there 
 in the afternoon. But two of E well's staff officers re- 
 ported to him that they were on the hill at dark. That 
 night Lee held a conference in Gettysburg, at wliicji 
 were present Longstreet, Ewell, Hill, Rodes, Early, and 
 Long, who has reported what occurred. "Longstreet 
 gave it as his opinion that the best plan would be to 
 turn Meade's left flank and force him back to the 
 neighborhood of Pipecla}^ Greek. To this General Lee 
 objected, and pronounced it impracticable under the 
 circumstances." And later when Long, who had been 
 directed to reconnoitre the Federal position on Ceme- 
 tery Ridge, reported against a renewal of the attack 
 that evening, he decided to make no further advance 
 that evening, but to wait till morning to follow up his 
 advantage. "He turned to Longstreet and Hill, who 
 were present, and said : ' Gentlemen, we will attack the 
 enemy in the morning as early as practicable.' In the 
 conversation that succeeded, he directed them to make 
 
GETTYSBURG 331 
 
 the necessary preparations and be ready for prompt 
 action the next day." Such is Long's account of this 
 conference/ 
 
 On leaving the conference of the generals, General 
 Lee informed General Pendleton, his chief of artillery, 
 that he had ordered Longstreet to attack the enemy 
 early next morning. This Longstreet has denied.^ 
 But it is certain that Lee expected him to do this, and 
 there is, in addition to Lee's declaration at the meet- 
 ing, the testimony of many officers^ and the evidence 
 of his own movements and demeanor the following 
 morning. He was on the ground the following morn- 
 ing at daybreak, and all who saw him testify to his 
 eager expectation of Longstreet's appearance and his 
 impatience at his delay.^ '^ Longstreet is so slow!" 
 he exclaimed. At this hour only the Second Federal 
 Corps, a division of the Twelfth and a division of the 
 Third occupied the heights. Little Roundtop was not 
 occupied, no guns were on the key to the field. 
 
 Meade, at Taney town, Md., thirteen miles away, with 
 the Second Corps, received Hancock's report of the sit- 
 uation that first afternoon and, issuing orders with a 
 
 * Long's "Memoir of Lee," p. 277. 
 
 2 Philadelphia Times, Nov. 3, 1877. 
 
 ^See reports of Generals Anderson and Wilcox; also General Early's 
 statement: Southern Historical Society Papers, December, 1877, pp. 
 269, 285, 286. Lee's "Memoir of William N. Pendleton," p. 292. 
 
 *"Next morning," writes one of his officers, speaking of the second 
 day, in which his battalion rendered signal service, " about 9 a. m., while 
 reconnoitring that region south-west of Big Roundtop, I ran across 
 General Lee, with two or three couriers, riding through the wood. He 
 called me to him and asked : ' Have you seen General Longstreet or any 
 of his troops anywhere in this neighborhood? ' I answered that I had 
 not. Then, getting a glimpse of a small body of men on foot moving 
 along the edge of the woods, he despatched one of his couriers to learn 
 
332 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 promptness which bore rich fruit, marched for the 
 heights commanding the battle-field, where he arrived 
 at one in the morning. There was discussion as to the 
 availability of the position, and Meade at one time 
 thought of withdrawing from it; but Hancock rode 
 in person to urge the stand on this field. The Fifth 
 Corps, that evening, was at Union Mills, twenty-three 
 miles away, and the Sixth Corps was at Manchester, 
 thirty-four to thirty-six miles away. Lee's army la}' 
 close to the battle-field, and might attack before hia 
 troops got up, or might interpose between him and 
 Washington.^ 
 
 Longstreet says he himself opposed further fighting 
 there. Lee, however, was ready for the fight, and, rely- 
 ing on his officers and men, believed he could destroy 
 Meade in detail. In the light of his failure some his- 
 torians now criticise sharply his decision. Let us see. 
 At daybreak Lee himself was ready and waiting for 
 the battle to begin; but Longstreet, who the evening 
 before had been averse to attacking, says he sought 
 him out again at daybreak and renewed his views 
 against making the attack on this side, an expostulation 
 
 who they were. He then asked me how far I had been toward the 
 mountain, pointing toward Roundtop, and my object in being out 
 there, etc., and then as soon as the courier returned, he asked: 'Are 
 they Longstreet's men? ' The answer was: 'They are not; but a small 
 detachment returning to their command in the direction of Gettysburg.' 
 Then, showing disappointment and impatience by his manner and tone, 
 he said : ' I wonder where General Longstreet can be? . . . ' This inci- 
 dent tends to confirm the belief, wellnigh universal among Confederates, 
 that Longstreet was responsible for the loss of the battle." (Communi- 
 cated to the writer by Colonel William T. Poague, from a manuscrijit 
 prepared by him "for the information of his sons.") 
 * Meade to Halleck. Despatch, 2 p. m., July 2, 1863. 
 
GETTYSBURG 333 
 
 which caused Lee to send a staff officer to Ewell to 
 ascertain whether, after examining the position by day- 
 light, he could not attack. The position in front of 
 Ewell was, however, now too strongly fortified to 
 make an assault possible, and Meade, in contemplation 
 of assuming the offensive, was massing his forces there. 
 Lee even rode himself to confer with Ewell, but, find- 
 ing what the situation was, adhered to his original 
 decision and ordered Longstreet at eleven o'clock to 
 attack as already directed.^ 
 
 Even then, however, Longstreet held back, whether 
 from obstinacy and refractoriness, or because "his 
 heart was not in it" longer, or because he felt the situa- 
 tion hopeless — the two former of which reasons have 
 been charged against him, and the last of which has been 
 claimed by him — has ever been a question hotly de- 
 bated. However it was, though his troops, except one 
 hi 'gade — Law's- -were encamped close to the battle- 
 field, he failed to move until half the day had been lost, 
 because, as he said, he hated to go into battle with 
 one boot off; and when he moved, Roundtop was 
 fully protected. Meade had changed his plan of at- 
 tacking with his right, and had strengthened his left; 
 Sedgwick's corps, the Sixth, had come up after an 
 epoch-making march of thirty-four miles since nine 
 o'clock the night before, and was in position, while 
 Longstreet sulked and dawdled with his eager troops 
 awaiting orders on the edge of the battle-field. 
 
 Even as it was, in the furious battle which took 
 
 ' Henderson's Review of Longstreet 's " From Manassas to Appo- 
 mattox." (Journal of Royal United Service Inst., October, 1897.) 
 
334 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 place that afternoon when Longstreet at last began to 
 fight, Lee seized the elevation in front of his right, 
 held it for some time, and passed beyond it, turned 
 Sickles's left, and made a lodgement on Little Round- 
 top, which Meade declared ''the key-point of his whole 
 position," and held it with his brave Alabamians until 
 driven back by the Fifth Corps, massed for the purpose, 
 and this, if held, would, Meade states, "have prevented 
 him from holding any of the ground he subsequently 
 held to the last." 
 
 Lee's plan is stated in his report. Longstreet was 
 directed to make an attack upon the enemy's left. 
 Ewell was to attack the high ground to his right, 
 while Hill was to threaten the Federal centre to pre- 
 vent the sending reinforcements to either wing.* 
 
 All night of the 1st Hancock's corps was marching for 
 Gettysburg, where it arrived next morning about seven 
 o'clock, and was posted along Cemetery Ridge. Two 
 brigades of Birney's arrived that evening, and two 
 brigades of Humphreys's next morning. The Fifth 
 Corps marched twenty-three miles, and reached the 
 ground about eight o'clock a. m., when it was posted 
 on the Federal right above Rock Creek. The Sixth 
 Corps marched thirty-four miles, from Manchester, ar- 
 riving only on the afternoon of the 2d. 
 
 On the 2d, Longstreet 's Corps, except Law's Brigade, 
 reached the immediate vicinity of the battle-field 
 early in the morning. Kershaw bivouacked two miles 
 from Gettysburg the night before, and was ordered to 
 move at four o'clock in the morning. McLaws had 
 
 ' Lee's report. See Appendix C. 
 
GETTYSBURG 335 
 
 reached the field at nine o'clock, and Lee, in Long- 
 street's presence, personally pointed out to him on the 
 map the road where he was to place his division. He 
 reports that Lee rejected a suggestion of Longstreet's, 
 and that the latter appeared irritated. From this 
 time until after three o'clock, Lee was eagerly awaiting 
 the movement by Longstreet which he had ordered, 
 and which was to begin the battle. It was not, how- 
 ever, until four o'clock that Hood moved forward to 
 the attack against Sickles's left, which was bent back 
 toward Roundtop. McLaws, opposite Sickles's centre, 
 posted on high ground formed by an outbranching ele- 
 vation nearly a mile in advance of the Federal left, was 
 still held back "awaiting Longstreet's orders." In a 
 brief time the fighting was as furious as any that oc- 
 curred on that deadly field. Hood, pushing in beyond 
 Sickles's left, sent his right to seize first Big and then 
 Little Roundtop, which up to this hour had not been 
 occupied by the Federals. But at this juncture — 
 only a few minutes before Hood's men (Law's Ala- 
 bamians) reached the top of that rocky spur — the 
 Federals appeared in force on the summit, and again 
 the chance of victory was snatched from Lee. Gen- 
 eral Warren, who had been sent by Sickles a little 
 while before to reconnoitre that part of the field, had 
 ridden up Roundtop and caught sight of Hood's men 
 moving forward on that position. Realizing the im- 
 portance of the position, he had dashed back, and find- 
 ing Vincent's brigade being pushed forward to Sickles's 
 aid, he had turned and directed them up Little Round- 
 top, which they reached just in time to hold against 
 
336 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Law's Alabamians, who were clambering up the side. 
 In the first shock the gallant Vincent was mortally 
 wounded. Driven down the steep spur, Law's Brigade 
 reformed at its foot, and, reinforced by Robertson's 
 Texans and Bennings's Georgians, who had seized the 
 Devil's Den and driven in Sickles's left, again charged 
 up, driving Vincent's men back to the Top; but at 
 this moment Federal reinforcements sent by Warren 
 arrived, and Hood's men were once more driven down 
 the steep, and Weed's brigade was sent with artillery 
 to help hold what was now recognized as the key to the 
 situation. '^ During all this time," says Alexander, 
 ''McLaws's Division was standing idle," though Barks- 
 dale was begging to be allowed to charge, and McLaws 
 was awaiting Longstreet's order. Even when it was 
 advanced it was in detachments, which sacrificed bri- 
 gade after brigade. Kershaw, Semmes, Wofford, and 
 Barksdale, Wilcox, Lang, and Wright fought brilliantly, 
 but in turn rather than in concert, attacking Sickles 
 along his left and centre. At length. Hood, on the ex- 
 treme right, McLaws next to him, and Anderson, on 
 the left, after furious fighting drove Sickles from the 
 peach-orchard, across the wheat-field, and drove them 
 finally, with terrific losses to both sides, to the high 
 ground along Cemetery Ridge, christening the ground 
 which Pickett was to make glorious next day.^ The 
 Fifth Corps, however, was now in position, and the 
 Sixth Corps was arriving, and being put in to the north 
 of Roundtop, was sent forward to support the hard- 
 pressed Third Corps, which was being cfriven across 
 
 ' Alexander's "Memoirs," pp. 394-403. 
 
GETTYSBURG 337 
 
 the wheat-field. Further to the Confederate left, while 
 Anderson was supporting McLaws with Wilcox alone, 
 while Mahone and Posey were held back. Hill attacked 
 the Federal centre with but two brigades — Wright's 
 Georgia Brigade and Perry's Florida Brigade under 
 Lang. In a splendid charge across the open valley 
 and up the bare slope under a withering fire of bullet, 
 shot, and shell they advanced for over three-quarters 
 of a mile, drove the enemy from their first line and car- 
 ried the Ridge, capturing a number of the guns with 
 which it was crowned. But here they found the enemy 
 in a second line beyond their guns, and with their flanks 
 exposed to a destructive fire of canister from either side, 
 they were forced back with terrible losses, thus losing 
 for want of support what Pickett vainly tried to capture 
 next day. Wright declared that he could have held 
 the Ridge had he been supported. None of these new 
 troops on the Federal side were on the ground before 
 five o'clock, and it cost 10,000 men to gain but a small 
 part of what might have been seized with comparatively 
 little cost had Lee's orders been carried out in the fore- 
 noon, when only the Second Corps and one division of 
 the Third Corps were on the Ridge south of Cemetery 
 Hill. 
 
 Ewell had waited all morning for the signal of Long- 
 street's and Hill's guns to begin his assault on the 
 Federal right, on Cemetery Hill, and on the eastern 
 spur of Gulp's Hill, both of which were well fortified 
 and defended with abundant artillery to protect them. 
 Owing probably to the deadly fire from the batteries 
 crowning the hills, E well's attack was delayed until 
 
338 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 nearly sunset. Early was to attack Cemetery Hill 
 with Hoke's and Hays's Brigades, and Edward John- 
 son, to his left, was to assault Gulp's Hill. Under a 
 withering fire Hays's Brigade carried Cemetery Ridge, 
 but was forced back again by Hancock's reinforcement 
 of the Eleventh Corps and the failure of his own sup- 
 porting columns to come up on his right till he was 
 driven back. It was not until after Early had been 
 driven back with terrific losses that Johnson's Division, 
 to the left, moved on the enemy's right on Culp's Hill. 
 Johnson, after heavy fighting, carried the enemy's 
 breastworks, which he held until next morning, when 
 he was driven from them by the Twelfth Corps, rein- 
 forced by portions of the Fifth and Sixth Corps. The 
 whole battle was without concert. 
 
 Yet Lee, at the close of the day, had made decided 
 gains. He had driven Sickles from his chosen position 
 to the ridge behind it; had effected a lodgement in the 
 Devil's Den near the foot of the Roundtops, and on the 
 enemy's right held their fortifications on Culp's Hill 
 He had suffered terribly himself, but had inflicted on 
 them losses of 10,000 men, and he had received the re- 
 inforcement of Pickett's Division and of Stuart's Cav- 
 alry. Lee's own view was that ''the result of the day's 
 operation induced the belief that, with proper concert 
 of action and with the increased support that the 
 position gained on the right would enable the artillery 
 to render the assaulting column," he had good grounds 
 to count on success.^ Accordingly, that night at a 
 
 ■Lee's report. Cf. Fitzhugh Lee's "Life of Lee"; General Hum- 
 phreys' "Gettysburg Campaign." 
 
GETTYSBURG 339 
 
 council of war he determined to continue the attack, 
 and gave orders for the assault next morning. 
 
 Stuart having, as stated, crossed the Potomac to 
 the eastward of Hooker, did not learn of the changed 
 status of affairs, and of Lee's concentration of his army 
 about Gettysburg, until he reached Carlisle, well to the 
 north of Gettysburg, which he had passed around on his 
 way toward the Susquehanna. He then turned and 
 made for Gettysburg, where he arrived on the after- 
 noon of the second day. It was said by men who were 
 present when Stuart met Lee, that the latter exclaimed 
 with more feeling than he usually allowed himself to 
 manifest: '^ General Stuart, where have you been?" 
 and when Stuart explained, and mentioned his capture 
 of over two hundred wagons, that Lee exclaimed: "Two 
 hundred wagons ! General Stuart, what are two hun- 
 dred wagons to this army!" Then, inmaediately re- 
 covering himself, the commanding-general proceeded 
 to give his lieutenant orders as to the disposition of his 
 force. This disposition sent him around the left to 
 strike the enemy's rear, where he was engaged heavily 
 with Gregg and Custer, without material results. On 
 the 3d, to quote Lee's report, 'Hhe general plan was un- 
 changed. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three bri- 
 gades, which arrived near the battle-field during the 
 afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next 
 morning, and General Ewell was directed to assault 
 the enemy's right at the same time." ^ 
 
 But on the 3d, as before, the movement against the 
 centre was delayed for hours, and when finally it was 
 
 ' Lee's report. 
 
340 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 carried out, there was again a failure of the support 
 which alone could bring success. Johnson, isolated on 
 the extreme left, was attacked at daylight and driven 
 from the position he had captured the evening before, 
 and after he had charged again and been repulsed with 
 great loss, this ended the fighting for the day on that 
 part of the field. 
 
 To the right the morning wore away and noon came 
 and passed without the expected assault. Every hour 
 was spent by Meade in strengthening his lines and pre- 
 paring for the coming storm. 
 
 It was nearly two o'clock when the guns of the 
 Confederate artillery, about 125 in number, along the 
 Seminary Ridge, which were to begin the fight and 
 prepare the way for the infantry to charge the Fed- 
 eral lines, entrenched on the Cemetery Ridge, nearly a 
 mile away, opened fire on them. They were promptly 
 replied to by the guns, about 100 in all, but of supe- 
 rior calibre and force, ranged along the Federal lines. 
 
 It is said that no such cannonading as this had ever 
 been known on the continent. The Federal batteries 
 presently slackened, as proved later, merely to sub- 
 stitute fresh battalions, and Alexander, in charge of 
 Lee's advance artillery, sent an urgent message to 
 Longstreet that his ammunition was nearly exhausted, 
 and on Longstreet's saying that he had better replenish 
 it, replied that there was none with which to replenish. 
 Then finally Longstreet ordered his leading division 
 forward, and in all the annals of war there is no more 
 heroic record than that of that stead}^ march across 
 the open plain, with the Federal army posted on the 
 
GETTYSBURG 341 
 
 ridge above it raining death upon them from 100 guns 
 and 50,000 muskets. 
 
 Lee says nothing of the hour set for the attack ; but 
 according to overwhelming authority it was to be made 
 in the early morning by a column composed of McLaws's 
 and Hood's Divisions, reinforced by Pickett's Brigades/ 
 Ewell says "at daylight Friday morning, and that John- 
 son was engaged when he was informed that Longstreet 
 would not be ready till ten."^ But when Longstreet, 
 hours later, unwillingly gave his order to Pickett to ad- 
 vance in the charge which has made Pickett's Division 
 glorious, curiously enough McLaws and Hood were not 
 sent forward in support, and these two fine divisions 
 were left where they were awaiting orders, and the 
 first knowledge they had was that the assault had been 
 made and had failed.^ 
 
 Heth's Division under Pettigrew — who commanded 
 since Heth's disablement by a serious wound the day 
 before — was formed in two lines on Pickett's left, with 
 a space of several hundred yards between the two, and 
 two brigades of Pender's Division, under Trimble, were 
 formed in the rear and in supporting distance of Petti- 
 grew. Wilcox's Brigade, from Anderson's Division, was 
 ordered to move on Pickett's right flank as a protec- 
 tion to that flank. In all, about 14,000 or 15,000 men 
 against 70,000, posted in one of the strongest positions 
 found during the war. It was a tragic situation. 
 
 With ranks dressed on their colors and bands play- 
 ing as if on parade, the gray line marched down the 
 
 ' Lee's report. ^ Ewell's report. 
 
 ^ Longstreet's account of the battle. 
 
342 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 slope, across the level, and then up the long slope be- 
 fore them, and all the while the gaps were being torn 
 wider and wider in their ranks by the sleet of iron from 
 a hundred guns, trained on them from front and flanks. 
 
 It transpired later that a part of the Confederate 
 artillery had not done great damage, having failed 
 to get the range. One battery of Nelson's Battalion, 
 however (Milledge's), posted on a ridge to the north- 
 east of Cemetery Hill, struck the range and did much 
 execution with its rifled guns, enfilading the Eleventh 
 Corps, till Nelson was ordered to withdraw.^ No bet- 
 ter description of what followed can be written than 
 that contained in Colonel David Gregg Mcintosh's 
 "Review of the Gettysburg Campaign." The author 
 was himself not only a "beholder," but one of the most 
 gallant participants in that fatal battle. 
 
 "When Pickett and the other divisions emerged from 
 cover and advanced to the open, they presented a 
 thrilling spectacle, and one which no beholder can ever 
 forget. The ranks were beautifully dressed, and the 
 battle-flags told off the different commands. . . . 
 
 "As the lines advanced, and the batteries of the 
 enemy again opened, and the gaps in the ranks began 
 to grow wider and then to shrivel and shrink up be- 
 neath the deadly, withering fire of the infantry, and the 
 stream of the wounded began to pour back in increas- 
 ing volume, the hearts of those who were spectators 
 were filled at first with a deep hush of expectancy, and 
 then with a feeling of agonized despair, when the goal 
 seemed to be reached and, hanging suspended a mo- 
 
 ' Alexander's "Memoirs," pp. 418, 427. 
 
GETTYSBURG 343 
 
 merit, the tide rolled backward broken into fragments, 
 and the brave fellows who a half hour before marched 
 so valiantly up to the cannon's mouth, now lay pros- 
 trate on the green slopes, or else came limping back, 
 battered and bleeding. There is no need for repetition 
 of the details. The monuments on the ground attest 
 the desperate valor with which each side fought." 
 
 As the broken ranks came back across the shot- 
 ploughed plain, Lee advanced to meet them. "This is 
 too bad! too bad!" he exclaimed. "It is all my fault." 
 And then to the men as they passed him he said: " Go 
 down to the stream and refresh yourselves." The next 
 moment he was ordering up troops to meet any coun- 
 terstroke which Meade might attempt. But Meade, 
 like himself, was spent. Valor may be infinite, but en- 
 durance has its limitations. 
 
 The battle of Gettysburg has continued to be fought 
 over from that day to the present, and will doubtless 
 continue to be fought over for many years to come. 
 To one, however, who has endeavored to study care- 
 fully and dispassionately both sides of the controversy 
 which has grown out of this battle, it appears that Lee 
 had good reason to believe that he would win it; that 
 he ought to have won it on the first day, and on the 
 second, even against Meade's masterly generalship; but 
 that on the third day his chances were incalculably 
 diminished. Whatever may be thought as to this, the 
 opinion of the future is likely to be that on the part 
 of Lee's corps commanders it was the worst-fought 
 battle of the war. With a plan that gave every promise 
 of success, and that ought to have succeeded — with 
 
344 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 valor never surpassed on any field^ valor on both sides 
 so heroic and so splendid as to be almost incredible — 
 the corps commanders, not once, but again and again, 
 by their failure to carry out the plan of their chief in 
 the spirit in which it was conceived, threw away every 
 chance of victory and left the honors of all but valor 
 to the Union general. 
 
 It used to be conamon soon after the war for old Con- 
 federate officers to declare that Longstreet should have 
 been shot immediately after the battle, and that Napo- 
 leon would certainly have done so. But Lee was cast in 
 a different mould. Of all his army he possibly knew 
 most fully how absolutely Longstreet had frustrated 
 his plans, and certainly of all he treated him with most 
 leniency. No hint of his subordinate's failure or de- 
 lay appears in his report, and to the day of his death 
 he wrote his old lieutenant letters full of warm re- 
 gard. But while he was assuming the burden of the 
 responsibility and wrote Longstreet the affectionate 
 letters of an old brother-in-arms who knew his worth, 
 and overlooked his errors, Longstreet, with what was 
 not far from sheer ingratitude, was placing on Lee the 
 blame for his own shortcomings, and was arrogantly 
 claiming that had he been allowed to dictate the plan 
 of the campaign, the result would have been success. 
 
 Longstreet's fatal delay has been attributed to the 
 time it required to find and follow a route to Sickles's 
 left flank without being observed. General E. P. Alex- 
 ander, his chief of artillery, admits his unaccountable 
 slowness. But a better reason may be found in his 
 own account of his action. After General Lee was in 
 
GETTYSBURG 345 
 
 his honored grave, Longstreet published his own de- 
 fence, in which, evidently angered by Lee's reported 
 speech that Longstreet was "so slow/', he undertook to 
 prove that Lee had made eleven grave errors in the pre- 
 cipitation and conduct of the battle of Gettysburg. He 
 says that he opposed fighting the battle of Gettysburg, 
 and that when he, on the evening of the 1st, gave his 
 opinion to General Lee that they could not have called 
 the enemy to a position better suited to their plans, 
 and that all they had to do was to file around his left 
 and secure good ground between him and his capital, 
 he was astonished at Lee's impatience and his vehement 
 declaration: "If he is there to-morrow I will attack 
 him," and thereupon he observes: "His desperate 
 mood was painfully evident and gave rise to serious 
 apprehensions." All of which was written long after- 
 ward and as a defence against the quite general and 
 serious criticism of his own conduct as the cause of 
 Lee's failure. 
 
 But why, it has been asked, should Lee have been 
 in a desperate mood? He had an army on which he 
 knew he could count to do anything if they were 
 properly led. He had gone into the North to fight; 
 he had just seen a part of his force roll two fine army 
 corps, fighting furiously, back through the town and 
 over the heights, in confusion, leaving in his hands 
 5,000 captives, and he knew that the bulk of the 
 Federal army was from four to nine times as far from 
 the field as his own corps. His reason for fighting 
 next morning was, therefore, not his desperation, but 
 his apparently well-grounded hope that he should win 
 
346 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 a battle before Meade could concentrate^ and then be 
 in a position to force terms. His position has com- 
 mended itself to clear-headed soldiers since/ and the 
 criticism of it is retroactive and based on events which 
 should not, and in all human probability would not, 
 have occurred but for Longstreet's slowness if not 
 his bull-headedness. 
 
 Lee, as he waited on the morning of the 2d for Long- 
 street to move forward, gave Hood, who had been on 
 the ground since daybreak, his chief reason for fighting. 
 ''The enemy is here," he said, ^'and if we don't whip 
 him he will whip us." It was a sound reason and has 
 been approved by good critics, and had Longstreet not 
 dallied or sulked for more than half the day it might 
 have been justified before dark fell on the night of the 
 2d of July. With Meade's army concentrated in his 
 front, Lee could not l^etire through the passes of the 
 South Mountain, and he could not manoeuvre without 
 abandoning his lines of communication; for without 
 his cavalry he could get no supplies. As we see Long- 
 street fooling away the hours while spade and shovel 
 rang along the green crest piling up the earthworks, 
 and while Sedgwick's Sixth Corps, hot-footed, pushed 
 along the dusty roads telling off the long miles hour 
 after hour, we may well understand how different would 
 have been the result had but Stonewall Jackson com- 
 manded that day the bronzed and eager divisions lying 
 all morning with stacked arms awaiting orders. Doubt- 
 
 ' Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. R. Henderson's Review of Longstreet's 
 "From Manassas to Appomattox." {Journal of Royal United Service 
 Inst., October, 1897.) 
 
GETTYSBURG 347 
 
 less it was this that was in Lee's mind when, long 
 afterward, he said: ''If I had had Jackson at Gettys- 
 burg, as far as human reason can see, I should have 
 won a great victory." 
 
 On July 3, when I^ee assaulted he was repulsed in 
 what is known to soldiers as the third day's battle; but 
 his defeat was accomplished in the first half of the 
 preceding day, when Longstreet failed to carry out his 
 orders and the golden opportunity was lost. 
 
 To show that on this third day it was Longstreet 's 
 slowness which destroyed finally all possibility of suc- 
 cess, cannot be better done than by quoting from the 
 illuminating review of his book by Lieutenant-Colonel, 
 afterward Brigadier-General, G. F. R. Henderson, al- 
 ready so closely followed. 
 
 "His conduct on the third day," declares this critic, 
 "opens up a still graver issue. The First Army Corps 
 when at length, on the afternoon of July 2, it was per- 
 mitted to attack had achieved a distinct success. The 
 enemy was driven back to his main position with 
 enormous loss. On the morning of July 3, Lee deter- 
 mined to assault that position, in front and flank, 
 simultaneously, and, according to his chief of the staff, 
 Longstreet 's Corps was to make the main attack on 
 the centre, while the Second Corps attacked the right. 
 But again there was delay, and this time it was fatal. 
 . . . We may note that according to Longstreet 's own 
 testimony the order [to attack] was given soon after 
 sunrise, and yet, although the Second Corps attacking 
 the Federal right became engaged at daylight, it was 
 not until 1 p. m., eight hours later, that the artillery of 
 
348 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the First Corps opened fire, and not till 2 p. m. that the 
 infantry advanced. Their assault was absolutely iso- 
 lated. The Second Corps had already been beaten 
 back. The Third Corps, although a division who were 
 ready to move to any point to which Longstreet might 
 indicate, was not called upon for assistance. Two divis- 
 ions of his own corps, posted on the right flank, did 
 absolutely nothing, and after a supremely gallant ef- 
 fort the 15,000 men who were hurled against the front 
 of the Federal army, and some of whom actually 
 penetrated the position, were repulsed with fearful 
 slaughter." 
 
 After discussing in detail Longstreet's tactics and 
 action, this thoughtful critic adds: ''But the crucial 
 question is this : Why did he delay his attack for eight 
 hours, during which time the Second Corps with which 
 he was to co-operate was heavily engaged? If he 
 moved only under compulsion, if he deliberately for- 
 bore to use his best efforts to carry out Lee's design, 
 and to compel him to adopt his own, the case is very 
 different. That he did so seems perfectly clear." "If 
 Lee was to blame at all in the Gettysburg campaign," 
 adds Henderson, ''it was in taking as his second in 
 command a general who was so completely indifferent 
 to the claim of discipline." 
 
 Had Lee's orders been obeyed, he would probably 
 have won the battle of Gettysburg. He must have 
 won it on the 2d of July, when he had "a fine oppor- 
 tunity of dealing with the enemy in detail"; he might 
 have won it even on the 3d, though his chances of doing 
 so were greatly diminished. But fate, that decides the 
 
GETTYSBURG 349 
 
 issues of nations, decreed otherwise. The crown of 
 Cemetery Ridge, seized and held for twenty minutes 
 by that devoted band of gray-clad heroes, marks the 
 highest tide, not of Confederate valor, but of Confed- 
 erate hope. Even so, it appeared at first but a drawn 
 battle. The Army of Northern Virginia had struck 
 Meade so terrible a blow that, as Halleck testified be- 
 fore the commission on the conduct of the war, a coun- 
 cil of war was held on the night of the 4th to decide 
 whether they should retreat. At this council Meade 
 asked his corps commanders three momentous ques- 
 tions: First, "Shall the army remain here?" Second, 
 "If we remain here, shall we assume the offensive?" 
 And then, third, "By what route shall we follow Lee?" 
 The majority of voices were for remaining there; but 
 unanimously they were against assuming the offensive. 
 All that day the two armies lay on the opposite hills 
 like spent lions nursing their wounds, neither of them 
 able to attack the other. Next day Lee, with ammu- 
 nition-chests nearly exhausted, fell slowly back to the 
 Potomac, cautiously followed by his antagonist, and 
 after waiting quietly for its swollen waters to subside, 
 recrossed into Virginia. It was a defeat, for Lee had 
 failed of his purpose. But it was a defeat which barely 
 touches his fame as a captain. No other captain or 
 army in history might have done more. No other ever 
 conducted a more masterly retreat when the fight 
 ended in failure. 
 
 It was possibly apparent to most trained soldiers 
 when the remnants of the gray line that had climbed 
 the long slopes of Gettysburg under the deadly sleet 
 
350 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 that poured down on them, came back, that the battle 
 was lost, and the Southern cause had received a stagger- 
 ing shock. None could have known it so well as Lee, 
 and later he wrote his wife that she must not place too 
 much reliance on the newspaper accounts of the South- 
 ern success. But he gave no sign of defeat. When 
 young Colonel Pendleton, who had been Jackson's adju- 
 tant-general, and was still adjutant-general of the Second 
 Corps, took him, on the 4th, the casualty list of his corps, 
 and thinking to be encouraging, remarked that he hoped 
 that the other two corps were in as good condition for 
 work as the Second was that morning, Lee looked at 
 him steadily and said coldly: ''Wliat reason have you, 
 young gentleman, to suppose that they are not?" 
 
 During the 4th he had begun to send back his trains, 
 his wounded and his prisoners, under a cavalry escort, 
 taking the direct road for Williamsport by Fairfield, 
 and on the night of the 4th he began to withdraw his 
 army. Owing, however, to the storm and the condition 
 of the roads, it was not till the afternoon of the 5th 
 that Ewell's command, composing his rear guard, left 
 his position in front of Meade. Next day Meade, urged 
 on from Washington, began his pursuit, if that could be 
 termed a pursuit, which took a roundabout course by 
 Frederick and Middletown, and did not bring him to 
 the Potomac until Lee had been waiting there for six 
 days. Within sixty hours, Lee was at Hagerstown, 
 posted to receive any assault which Meade might de- 
 liver. Then, as the assault was not made, he moved 
 on. On the 13th he was at Williamsport, where, find- 
 ing the river in flood, he took a position, which he forti- 
 
GETTYSBURG 351 
 
 fied in such a manner as to cover his position all the 
 way to Falling Waters, and again prepared for battle, 
 and awaited Meade's attack. Then, to quote his own 
 words, as the river was likely to rise higher, and Meade 
 ''exhibited an intention of fortifying so as to hold a 
 small force in our front, while they operated elsewhere," 
 Lee concluded to recross to the Virginia side. This he 
 accomplished on the afternoon and night of Monday, 
 the 13th, and the morning of Tuesday, the 14th.^ 
 
 As Lee lay near Williamsport, waiting for the Po- 
 tomac River to subside, he gave an exhibition of his 
 constancy. He heard here of the capture by Kil- 
 patrick, in a raid, of his son. General W. H. F. Lee, 
 who had been seriously wounded, and was ill at the 
 home of his wife's uncle, Mr. William F. Wickham, in 
 Hanover County. ''I have heard with great grief," 
 he writes his wife, "that Fitzhugh has been captuted 
 by the enemy. Had not expected that he would have 
 been taken from his bed and carried off, but we must 
 bear this additional affliction with fortitude and res- 
 ignation and not repine at the will of God. It will 
 eventuate in some good that we know not of now. 
 We must all bear our labors and hardships manfully. 
 Our noble men are cheerful and confident. I con- 
 stantly remember you in my thoughts and prayers." 
 
 To Mr. Davis he writes, on the 8th, of his army: 
 ''Though reduced in numbers by the hardships and 
 battles through which it has passed since leaving the 
 Rappahannock, its condition is good, and its confidence 
 
 ' " Memoirs of William Nelson Pendleton, D.D., " pp. 295, 296. E. P. 
 Alexander's "Memoirs," p. 441. 
 
352 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 is unimpaired. I hope your Excellency will under- 
 stand that I am not in the least discouraged, or that my 
 faith in the protection of an all-merciful Providence, or 
 in the fortitude of this army, is at all shaken." 
 
 When was that constant soul ever shaken! God 
 had established it beyond the power of adversity to 
 touch, much less to shake, it. On July 12, lying be- 
 tween Meade's great army and the swollen river, he 
 writes his wife: ''You will learn before this reaches 
 you, that our success at Gettysburg was not so great 
 as reported. In fact, that we failed to drive the enemy 
 from his position, and that our army withdrew to the 
 Potomac. Had the river not unexpectedly risen, all 
 would have been well with us; but God in His all-wise 
 providence willed otherwise, and our communications 
 have been interrupted and almost cut off. The waters 
 have subsided to about four feet, and if they continue, 
 by to-morrow I hope our communications will be open. 
 I trust that a merciful God, our only hope and refuge, 
 will not desert us in this hour of need, and will deliver 
 us by His almighty hand, that the whole world may 
 recognize His power, and all hearts be lifted up in 
 adoration and praise of His unbounded loving-kindness. 
 We must, however, submit to His almighty will, what- 
 ever that may be. May God guide and protect us all 
 is my constant prayer." 
 
 Surely no defeated general, with his army lying 
 where, humanly speaking, every chance was against 
 them, ever exhibited a humbler heart to God or pre- 
 sented a more constant front to his enemy. Meade, 
 though heavily reinforced, could not see his way clear 
 
GETTYSBURG 353 
 
 to assault a foe so bold and perilous even in retreat, 
 and called a council of war, at which the decision 
 reached was not to attack. And, indeed, Lee's position 
 was almost impregnable/ The insistence of the gov- 
 ernment in Washington, however, was so great, and 
 Halleck's despatch to Meade was so close akin to a 
 censure, that he instantly requested to be relieved, 
 which drew from Halleck something like an apology. 
 The next day, spurred on by the reflection of his supe- 
 riors in Washington, he made his dispositions to attack; 
 but the day before Lee had begun to cross the river, 
 and by one o'clock on the 14th his rear guard, com- 
 posed of Hill's command, was over, leaving to the 
 enemy, as the spoils of the rear-guard battle fought by 
 Hill's Division, 2 guns, a number of wagons abandoned 
 for want of horses, and some 500 men, including strag- 
 glers from various commands, '^overcome by previous 
 labors and hardships, and fatigues of a most trying 
 night." Such was Lee's account. 
 
 Before leaving the subject of Gettysburg, it may 
 prove illuminating, even at the cost of some repetition, 
 to know what Lee himself said on the subject of this 
 campaign. His formal statement is contained in his re- 
 port to his government, nearly a month later. ^ He gives 
 in outline not only his movements, but his reasons, and 
 in them we have the picture of the man. No word of 
 censure appears. It is a simple and lucid statement of 
 the essential facts, and testifies to a serene and con- 
 stant mind. The responsibility he assumed fully and 
 
 'Humphreys' "Gettysburg Campaign." 
 ^ See Appendix C. 
 
354 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 unequivocally. His reference to Longstrect conveys a 
 commendation, in that he linked his name with the 
 capture of " the desired ground " on the second day/ 
 
 On his return to Virginia, Lee wrote to his wife let- 
 ters which gave his views on the situation : 
 
 Bunker Hill, Va., July 15th. 
 The army has returned to Virginia. Its return is 
 rather sooner than I had originally contemplated, but 
 having accomplished much of what I proposed on leav- 
 ing the Rappahannock — namely, relieving the valley 
 of the presence of the enemy and drawing his army 
 north of the Potomac — I determined to recross the 
 latter river. The enemy, after concentrating his forces 
 in our front, began to fortify himself in his position, 
 and bring up his troops, militia, etc., and those around 
 Washington and Alexandria. This gave him enormous 
 odds. It also circumscribed our limits for procuring 
 subsistence for men and animals, which, with the un- 
 certain state of the river, rendered it hazardous for us 
 to continue on the north side. It has been raining a 
 great deal since we first crossed the Potomac, making 
 the roads horrid and embarrassing our operations. 
 The night we recrossed it rained terribly; yet we got 
 all over safe, save such vehicles as broke down on the 
 road from the mud, rocks, etc. We are all well. I 
 hope we will yet be able to damage our adversaries 
 when they meet us, and that all will go right with us. 
 That it should be so we must implore the forgiveness 
 of God for our sins and the continuance of His bless- 
 ings. There is nothing but His almighty power that 
 can sustain us. God bless you all. 
 
 ' See Appendix C. 
 
GETTYSBURG 355 
 
 Camp Culpeper, Va., July 26, 1863. 
 After crossing the Potomac, finding that the Shen- 
 andoah was six feet above fording stage, and having 
 waited a week for it to fall so that I might cross into 
 Loudoun, fearing that the enemy might take advantage 
 of our position and move upon Richmond, I deter- 
 mined to ascend the valley and cross into Culpeper. 
 Two corps are here with me. The third passed Thorn- 
 ton's Gap, and, I hope, will be in striking distance 
 to-morrow. The army has labored hard, endured much, 
 and behaved nobly. It has accomplished all that could 
 be reasonably expected. It ought not to have been ex- 
 pected to perform impossibilities or to have fulfilled the 
 anticipations of the thoughtless and unreasonable. 
 
 The numbers of the respective armies on the field 
 were: Meade's troops, 105,000; Lee's troops, 62,000. 
 The losses during the three days were: Meade's losses, 
 23,000 — killed, wounded, and missing; Lee's losses, 
 20,500 — killed, wounded, and missing. In the Army of 
 the Potomac 4 general officers were killed and 13 were 
 wounded. In the Army of Northern Virginia 5 general 
 officers were killed and 9 were wounded. It is a roll 
 of honor. 
 
 Three or four cardinal mistakes united to cause Lee's 
 defeat at Gettysburg. The first was Stuart's failure 
 to keep him apprised of Hooker's movements, by which 
 he ran into the Federal army in a situation where he 
 had either to fight and whip it or be whipped by it. 
 The second was Ewell's failure to pursue the advantage 
 he had gained on the afternoon of the 1st and seize 
 Cemetery Ridge, instead of halting his troops below it 
 and giving Meade time to occupy and fortify it. The 
 
356 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 third was Longstreet's failure to attack^ on the morn- 
 ing of the 2d, before Meade's whole army was up. And 
 the fourth was Longstreet's failure to carry out his 
 orders and attack in concert on the morning of the 3d, 
 instead of throwing away the entire forenoon and then 
 sending Pickett and Heth alone up the long open slopes 
 of Gettysburg, with the whole Federal army to play on 
 them as they advanced. 
 
 Had Stuart operated between Lee and Hooker's 
 army, as he was expected to do, Lee might have chosen 
 his own battle-ground and have awaited attack as he 
 did at Sharpsburg, The absence of Stuart on his raid 
 Steele thinks possibly cost Lee a victory. But even 
 after Gettysburg had become the battle-ground, Lee's 
 plan was sound enough had his corps commanders not 
 hesitated and delayed the execution of their respective 
 parts. Valor could do no more than was done. On 
 both sides it reached its high tide of self-devotion and 
 immolation. But the intelligence which should have 
 directed this valor on the Southern side suddenly fell 
 into abeyance, and the opportunities which Fortune 
 offered were allowed to pass unheeded with the passing 
 hours. Indeed, the judgment of the future is likely to 
 be, that while on the Northern side the corps command- 
 ers made amends for lack of plan and saved the day by 
 their admirable co-operation, on the Southern side the 
 plan of the commanding general was defeated by the 
 failure of the corps commanders to act promptly and in 
 concert. Lee's declaration that had he had Jackson at 
 Gettysburg, he would, so far as man could see, have 
 won the battle, is to this effect. The prompt' and high- 
 
GETTYSBURG 357 
 
 minded Meade was a little later superseded by his 
 government in favor of the victorious Grant, and loy- 
 ally served under him as commander of the Army of 
 the Potomac to the end. His government thought he 
 should have destroyed Lee's army. The truth is that 
 Lee's army was indestructible by any force that Meade 
 could have brought against it. But, at the South, 
 neither Lee nor his heroic army ever stood higher 
 with the authorities or the Southern people. His 
 very defeat seems even now but the pedestal for a 
 more exalted heroism. With a magnanimity too sub- 
 lime for conamon men wholly to appreciate, he took 
 all the blame for the failure on himself. History has 
 traversed his unselfish statement, and has placed the 
 blame where it justly belongs: on those who failed to 
 carry out the plan his daring genius had conceived. 
 
 Moved possibly by the criticism of the opposition 
 press, for there was ever a hostile and intractable press 
 attacking the government of the Confederacy and re- 
 viling all its works, Lee a little later wrote to Mr. Davis 
 and proposed that he should be relieved by some 
 younger and possibly more efficient man. His bodily 
 strength was failing, he said, and he was dependent 
 on the eyes of others. Mr. Davis promptly reassured 
 him in a letter which goes far to explain the personal 
 loyalty to him, not only of Lee, but of the South. 
 
 These letters give a picture of the two men in their 
 relation to each other, and to the cause they repre- 
 sented, and should be read in full by all who would 
 understand the character of the two leaders of the 
 Confederacy. 
 
358 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Lee's letter was as follows: 
 
 Camp Orange, August 8, 1863. 
 Mr. President: 
 
 Your letters of the 28th of July and 2d of August 
 have been received, and I have waited for a leisure 
 hour to reply, but I fear that will never come. I am 
 extremely obliged to you for the attention given to the 
 wants of this army and the efforts made to supply 
 them. Our absentees are returning, and I hope the 
 earnest and beautiful appeal made to the country in 
 your proclamation may stir up the whole people, and 
 that they may see their duty and perform it. Nothing 
 is wanted but that their fortitude should equal their 
 bravery to insure the success of our cause. We must 
 expect reverses, even defeats. They are sent to teach 
 us wisdom and prudence, to call forth greater energies, 
 and to prevent our falling into greater disasters. Our 
 people have only to be true and united, to bear man- 
 fully the misfortunes incident to war, and all will come 
 right in the end. I know how prone we are to censure, 
 and how ready to blame others for the non-fulfilment 
 of our expectations. This is unbecoming in a generous 
 people, and I grieve at its expression. The general 
 remedy for the want of success in a military commander 
 is his removal. This is natural, and in many instances 
 proper; for no matter what may be the ability of the 
 officer, if he loses the confidence of his troops, disaster 
 must sooner or later ensue. 
 
 I have been prompted by these reflections more than 
 once since my return from Pennsylvania to propose to 
 your Excellency the propriety of selecting another 
 commander for this army. I have seen and heard of ex- 
 pressions of discontent in the public journals as the 
 result of the expedition. I do not know how far this 
 feeling extends to the army. My brother officers have 
 
GETTYSBURG 359 
 
 been too kind to report it, and so far the troops have 
 been too generous to exhibit it. It is fair, however, 
 to suppose that it does exist, and success is so necessary 
 to us that nothing should be left undone to secure it. 
 I, therefore, in all sincerity, request your Excellency 
 to take measures to supply my place. I do this with 
 the more earnestness because no one is more aware 
 than myself of my inability to discharge the duties of 
 my position. I cannot even accomplish what I myself 
 desire. How can I fulfil the expectations of others? 
 In addition, I sensibly feel the growing failure of my 
 bodily strength. I have not yet recovered from the 
 attack I experienced the past spring. I am becoming 
 more and more incapable of exertion, and am thus pre- 
 vented from making the personal examination and giv- 
 ing the supervision to the operations in the field which 
 I feel to be necessary. I am so dull that, in undertak- 
 ing to use the eyes of others, I am frequently misled. 
 
 Everything, therefore, points to the advantage to be 
 derived from a new commander, and I the more anx- 
 iously urge the matter upon your Excellency from my 
 belief that a younger and abler man than myself can 
 be readily obtained. I know that he will have as 
 gallant and brave an army as ever existed to second his 
 efforts, and it would be the happiest day of my life to 
 see at its head a worthy leader — one that would accom- 
 plish more than I can perform, and all that I have 
 wished. I hope your Excellency will attribute my 
 request to the true reason — the desire to serve my 
 country and to do all in my power to insure the success 
 of her righteous cause. 
 
 I have no complaints to make of any one but my- 
 self. I have received nothing but kindness from those 
 above me, and the most considerate attention from 
 my comrades and companions in arms. To your Ex- 
 cellency I am specially indebted for uniform kindness 
 
360 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 and consideration. You have done everything in your 
 power to aid me in the work committed to my charge, 
 without omitting anything to promote the general 
 welfare. I pray that your efforts may at length be 
 crowned with success, and that you may long live to 
 enjoy the thanks of a grateful people. 
 With sentiments of great esteem, I am. 
 
 Very respectfully and truly yours, 
 R. E, Lee, General. 
 His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, President Confederate 
 States. 
 
 To this letter President Davis sent the following 
 reply: 
 
 Richmond, Va., August 11, 1863. 
 General R. E. Lee, 
 
 Commanding Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
 Yours of the 8th inst. has just been received. I am 
 glad that you concur so entirely with me as to the 
 wants of our country in this trying hour, and am happy 
 to add that after the first depression consequent upon 
 our disasters in the West, indications have appeared 
 that our people will exhibit that fortitude which we 
 agree in believing is alone needed to secure ultimate 
 success. 
 
 It well became Sidney Johnston when overwhelmed 
 by a senseless clamor to admit the rule that success is 
 the test of merit; and yet there has been nothing which 
 I have found to require a greater effort of patience than 
 to bear the criticisms of the ignorant who pronounce 
 everything a failure which does not equal their expec- 
 tations or desires, and can see no good result which is 
 not in the line of their own imaginings. 
 
 I admit the propriety of your conclusions that an 
 
GETTYSBURG 361 
 
 officer who loses the confidence of his troops should 
 have his position changed, whatever may be his ability ; 
 but when I read the sentence I was not at all prepared 
 for the application you were about to make. Expres- 
 sions of discontent in the public journals furnish but 
 little evidence of the sentiment of the army. I wish 
 it were otherwise, even though all the abuse of myself 
 should be accepted as the results of honest observation. 
 Were you capable of stooping to it, you could easily 
 surround yourself with those who would fill the press 
 with your laudations, and seek to exalt you for what 
 you had not done, rather than detract from the achieve- 
 ments which will make you and your army the subject 
 of history and the object of the world's admiration for 
 generations to come. 
 
 I am truly sorry to know that you still feel the effects 
 of the illness you suffered last spring, and can readily 
 understand the embarrassments you experience in 
 using the eyes of others, having been so much accus- 
 tomed to make your own reconnoissances. Practice 
 will, however, do much to relieve that embarrassment, 
 and the minute knowledge of the country which you 
 have acquired will render you less dependent for topo- 
 graphical information. 
 
 But suppose, my dear friend, that I were to admit, 
 with all their implications, the points which you pre- 
 sent, where am I to find the new commander who is to 
 possess the greater ability which you believe to be re- 
 quired? I do not doubt the readiness with which you 
 would give way to one who could accomplish all that 
 you have wished, and you will do me the justice to 
 believe that if Providence should kindly offer such a 
 person for our use I would not hesitate to avail myself 
 of his services. 
 
 My sight is not sufficiently penetrating to discover 
 such hidden merit, if it exists, and I have but used to 
 
362 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 you the language of sober earnestness when I have im- 
 pressed upon you the propriety of avoiding all unneces- 
 sary exposure to danger, because I felt our country 
 could not bear to lose you. To ask me to substitute 
 for you some one, in my judgment, more fit to com- 
 mand or who would possess more of the confidence of 
 the army, or of the reflecting men of the country, is to 
 demand an impossibility. It only remains for me to 
 hope that you will take all possible care of yourself, 
 that your health and strength will be entirely restored, 
 and that the Lord will preserve you for the important 
 duties devolved upon you in the struggle of our suffer- 
 ing country for the independence which we have en- 
 gaged in war to maintain. 
 As ever. 
 
 Very respectfully and truly, 
 
 Jefferson Davis. 
 
 With these letters to portray the character of Lee, 
 history will endorse with its infallible pen what the 
 President of the Confederacy wrote: There was no 
 better man to take his place. 
 
 Though Lee failed of final success, to the student of 
 history who weighs opportunities and compares re- 
 sources, this in nowise mars his fame. With ammuni- 
 tion almost exhausted, he lay in the face of the enemy 
 twenty-four hours, and then, with Meade's great army 
 pressing him, urged on by the now eager government 
 and people of the Union, he marched slowly to the 
 Potomac, which was in flood, and after lying ten days 
 in the face of his antagonist, with the swollen Potomac 
 at his back, brought off his army intact and undis- 
 
GETTYSBURG 363 
 
 spirited, together with 4,000 prisoners, and having 
 recrossed the Potomac on the 13th and 14th, and 
 moved back to his old ground about Culpeper, he pro- 
 ceeded to prepare for the next campaign. 
 
 The chief disaster of Gettysburg lay not so much in 
 the first repulse of the intrepid lines, which, in the face 
 of a constantly increasing storm of shot and shell, 
 swept across that deadly plain and on up the flaming 
 slopes of Cemetery Ridge and Little Roundtop, as in 
 the consequences which were soon disclosed. 
 
CHAPTER XIV 
 
 AUTUMN OF 1863 
 
 On finding that Lee had succeeded in crossing the 
 Potomac, Gregg's cavahy undertook to cross the river: 
 but two of Stuart's Brigades fell on him and drove him 
 back to his own side with heavy loss. Lee having, a 
 little later, moved up the valley of the Shenandoah, 
 with a view of crossing the Blue Ridge into Loudoun, 
 not only found the Shenandoah too high for fording, 
 but that Meade, who had crossed the Potomac lower 
 down, had seized and fortified the passes of the Blue 
 Ridge. He accordingly marched on and crossed over 
 by way of Chester Gap into Culpeper, where he posted 
 himself on the Rapidan to prevent Meade's marching 
 on Richmond, which was now uncovered. 
 
 Meade was now by reason of his magnitude and the 
 spirit of his troops formidable enough to require care- 
 ful watching. It has been frequently remarked that 
 Lee after Gettysburg made no further attempt to in- 
 vade the country of the enemy. The fact is correct, 
 but the reason given for it is mainly erroneous. The 
 true reason was that his army had no shoes nor clothes/ 
 It was said by Napoleon that an army marches on its 
 belly; and it has been said with equal truth that while 
 it can fight without shoes, it cannot march without 
 them. Shoes were now more difficult to get in the 
 
 364 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 365 
 
 Confederacy than guns. The need of clothes and shoes 
 precipitated the battle of Gettysburg. The same want 
 now effected what Meade with his great and gallant 
 aiTmy could not have done — it held Lee within a cir- 
 cumscribed field of operations. He could no longer 
 lead his eager veterans to distant fields and exercise 
 his masterly strategy. The South-west was almost as 
 completely cut off by the capture of Vicksburg and 
 the opening of the Mississippi as was Canada, and what 
 the opened Mississippi failed to accomplish in this re- 
 spect, the steadily dwindling lines to the south com- 
 pleted. The South was, indeed, entering on its final 
 period of exhaustion. 
 
 Lee, having marched around Meade to Culpeper, 
 now established his army in the well-known region 
 among the head-waters of the Rappahannock and 
 Rapidan, where his position was convenient for cover- 
 ing the railroad at the same time that he could observe 
 Meade and be ready to take advantage of any misstep 
 he might make. Here he spent the remainder of the 
 summer endeavoring to get his army refitted with 
 shoes and clothing necessary to resume the offensive. 
 Another reason for his remaining inactive during this 
 period was that owing to the exigency in the South- 
 west, where affairs were not going well, Longstreet was 
 detached and sent out to Tennessee with two of his 
 divisions, those of McLaws and Hood, to reinforce 
 Bragg and defeat Rosecrans at Chickamauga, while 
 Pickett's Division was detached for service below 
 Petersburg, where Richmond was threatened from 
 Norfolk and Suffolk. Longstreet was urgent to go, 
 
3G6 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 and when Lee, from Richmond, where he had been 
 summoned by Mr. Davis for consultation, wrote him in 
 August, urging him to "use every exertion to prepare 
 the army for offensive operations," so as to bring 
 General Meade out in the open field and crush his 
 army, Longstreet wrote combating Lee's suggestions, 
 and gave his opinion that the ''best opportunity for 
 great results is in Tennessee." 
 
 As the summer passed and Meade learned of the 
 diminution of Lee's forces by the detachment of 
 Longstreet, who had been sent to Tennessee, he began 
 to conceive hopes of being able to force him back on 
 Richmond. On September 4, Lee wrote his wife from 
 camp, near Orange Court House: "You see I am still 
 here. When I last wrote, the indications were that 
 the enemy would move against us any day; but this 
 past week he has been very quiet, and seems at present 
 to continue so. I was out looking at him yesterday 
 from Clark's Mountain. He has spread himself over 
 a large surface and looks immense; but I hope will not 
 prove as formidable as he looks." Lee was now on the 
 alert to bar Meade's way, whichever direction he might 
 take, and after waiting three weeks for Meade to take 
 the steps he had apparently been contemplating, Lee 
 followed his natural instinct and assumed the offensive. 
 On October 9, leaving a force of cavalry and infan- 
 try to guard his old position, he began a flank move- 
 ment around Meade's right, which was substantially a 
 repetition of the manoeuvre that had hurried Pope 
 across the Rappahannock over a year before. Like 
 Pope, Meade hastily withdrew to the north of the Rap 
 
 ! 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 367 
 
 pahannock. Then learning nothing definite of Lee's 
 movements he retraced his steps and again crossed 
 the Rappahannock and reoccupied Culpeper, leaving a 
 corps at the crossings of the Rappahannock. Here he 
 was informed that Lee, ignoring his manoeuvres, had 
 on the 12th forced a crossing of the Rappahannock 
 at Wliite Sulphur Springs, and having driven Gregg 
 off, was marching northward. Meade was a master at 
 moving his troops, and now, making a forced march 
 that night, he was in Lee's rear next morning. Lee 
 being out of rations, was forced to wait at Warrenton 
 all of the 13th, and tliis dela}^ enabled Meade to pass 
 by him. On the morning of the 14th Lee sent Ewell 
 and A. P. Hill to Bristoe Station, hoping to make an 
 effective attack on Meade's rear, but "some one blun- 
 dered." Warren, being attacked by two of Hill's Di- 
 visions, occupied a railway cut, and in the fight which 
 ensued cut off and captured 5 guns, 2 stands of colors, 
 and some 450 prisoners, and then marched on after 
 Meade, who now concentrated at Centreville and 
 awaited Lee's attack. Men groaned at a defeat which 
 should have been a victory but for an inexplicable 
 blunder.^ As, even had Meade's strongly fortified 
 position been carried or turned, he could have fallen 
 back on Alexandria, as Pope had done, Lee refrained 
 from further attack and returned to his position on 
 the Rappahannock. Meade promptly followed; but 
 his cavalry under Kilpatrick was routed at Buckland, 
 in a way to show that Stuart was not to be caught nap- 
 ping, and to furnish the Army of Northern Virginia 
 
 » S. P. Lee's " Life of William N. Pendleton." 
 
368 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 with many a joke on the "Buckland Races." The 
 affair at Bristoe Station marred what would otherwise 
 have been a completely successful manoeuvre. 
 
 Such a fiasco was an experience to which the Sec- 
 ond Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia was little 
 accustomed, and the loss of Jackson was felt anew by 
 his old command. Lee now returned toward Culpeper, 
 forced to abandon the offensive by the want of shoes 
 in his army. Lee wrote his wife on the 19th of Octo- 
 ber: "I have returned to the Rappahannock. I did 
 not pursue with the main army beyond Bristoe or 
 Broad Run. Our advance went as far as Bull Run, 
 where the enemy was entrenched, extending his right 
 as far as Chantilly, in the yard of which he was 
 building a redoubt. I could have thrown him far- 
 ther back, but I saw no chance of bringing him to 
 battle, and it would have only served to fatigue our 
 troops by advancing farther. If they had been prop- 
 erly provided with clothes, I would certainly have en- 
 deavored to have thrown them north of the Potomac ; 
 but thousands were barefooted, thousands with frag- 
 ments of shoes, and all without overcoats, blankets, 
 or warm clothing. I could not bear to expose them 
 to certain suffering on an uncertain issue." 
 
 On October 28 he wrote her a letter which threw a 
 fine light on the situation of his army as regarded shoes 
 and necessary clothing, and on his own simplicity of 
 life. "I moved yesterday," he says, "into a nice pine 
 thicket, and Perry is to-day engaged in constructing 
 a chimney in front of my tent which will make it warm 
 and comfortable. I have no idea when F. [his son, 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 369 
 
 Brigadier-General W. H. F. Lee] will be exchanged. 
 The Federal authorities still resist all exchanges, be- 
 cause they think it is to our interest to make them. 
 Any desire expressed on our part for the exchange of 
 any individual magnifies the difficulty, as they at once 
 think some great benefit is to result to us from it. His 
 detention is very grievous to me, and, besides, I want 
 his services. I am glad you have some socks for the 
 army. Send them to me. They will come safely. 
 Tell the girls to send all they can. I wish they could 
 make some shoes, too. We have thousands of bare- 
 footed men. There is no news. General Meade, I be- 
 lieve, is repairing the railroad, and I presume will come 
 on again. If I could only get some shoes and clothes 
 for the men, I would save him the trouble." 
 
 The loss of Vicksburg had done more than the defeat 
 at Gettysburg to overthrow the South. Thenceforth 
 the South was cut in two. 
 
 On the 7th of November, Meade, finding Lee not dis- 
 posed to attack him or repeat the manoeuvre which had 
 put Washington in a fright, and conscious of his own 
 superiority in men and equipment, moved forward to 
 the Rappahannock. His left, under French, crossed 
 at Kelly's Ford; his right, under Sedgwick, came, about 
 nightfall, on the Bridge Head, on the near side of the 
 river, at Rappahannock Station, guarding the bridge, 
 occupied by two of Early's Brigades. Making a dash 
 for it, Russell's division rushed the pontoon bridge, 
 surprised and captured the position, with 5 guns, 1,675 
 men, and 8 stands of colors, with little loss and before 
 the Confederates on the south side of the river knew 
 
370 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 that the point was being attacked. These "blunders on 
 the part of some one" set the Second Corps to deplor- 
 ing afresh the loss of their old commander. ''It makes 
 me sick," wrote the young adjutant-general of the 
 corps, who had been on Jackson's staff. It looked now 
 as though Meade were i^reparing for a general attack, 
 and with a view to drav/ing him on where he might 
 renew his attack in a position where disparit}^ of 
 numbers would not count for so much, Lee, on the 
 night of the 8th of November, withdrew to the western 
 bank of the Rapidan, and there awaited him in the 
 position he had occupied in October. 
 
 Finally, on the 26th of November, ]\Ieade, spurred 
 on to attack Lee by the urgency of his government and 
 the clamor of the press, moved southward and crossed 
 the Rapidan at the lower fords below Lee's position, 
 with the intention of manoeuvring him out of his posi- 
 tion and attacking him. Lee promptl}^ "accepted the 
 gage," and withdrawing his troops from his lines that 
 night; by daylight next morning was on Meade's flank, 
 prepared for any move he might make. With his 
 cavalry in front to feel the enemy and ascertain his 
 purpose, he moved his Second Corps under Early 
 (Ewell being sick) to Locust Grove by the old Turn- 
 pike and the Raccoon Ford Road, and his Third Corps 
 by the Plank Road. Skirmishing ensued for a time, 
 and about four o'clock it developed into a sharp en- 
 gagement in which the enemy were driven back from 
 the position they had assumed. That night, learning 
 that Meade was moving in the direction of Orange 
 Court House, Lee, believing that he would now with- 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 371 
 
 out doubt attack him, withdrew his army to the west 
 side of ]\Iine Run and took a strong position on the 
 heights above Mine Run, where he awaited Meade's 
 attack for several days. But although Meade brought 
 up his army, and apparently made every preparation 
 for a general battle, on the morning of the 2d of Decem- 
 ber he had drawn back beyond the Rappahannock. 
 Warren, to whom the conduct of the assault had been 
 confided, had found Lee's position too strong to give 
 promise of its being successfully assaulted, and the 
 expected battle never came off. Two days later Lee 
 wrote his wife as follows: ''You will probably have seen 
 that General Meade has retired to his old position on 
 the Rappahannock without giving us battle. I had 
 expected, from his movements and all that I had heard, 
 that it was his intention to do so, and after the first 
 day, when I thought it necessary to skirmish pretty 
 sharply with him on both flanks to ascertain his views, 
 I waited patiently his attack. On Tuesday, however, 
 I thought he had changed his mind, and that night 
 made preparations to move around his left next morn- 
 ing and attack him. But when day dawned he was 
 nowhere to be seen. He had commenced to withdraw 
 at dark Tuesday evening. We pursued to the Rapidan, 
 but he was over. Owing to the nature of the ground, 
 it was to our advantage to receive rather than to make 
 the attack, and as he about doubled us in numbers, 
 I wished to have tha.t advantage. I am greatly dis- 
 appointed at his getting off with so little damage, but 
 we do not know what is best for us. I believe a kind 
 God has ordered all things for our good." 
 
372 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 After this the weather became so severe that further 
 operations were impossible, and the armies went into 
 winter quarters, Lee along the Virginia Central Rail- 
 way and in the vicinity of Orange, Meade in the region 
 about Culpeper. The inaction was, however, much in 
 favor of the North; for the South was rapidly being de- 
 pleted. Lee's army was in a state of such destitution 
 that it is a wonder the men could be kept together. 
 Only their spirit enabled them to stand the hardships 
 of the winter. Barefooted and hungry, they stood it 
 out through the long months of a Virginia winter, and 
 when it is considered that until they joined the army 
 many of these men had never seen snow, and that none 
 of them had ever experienced want of adequate cloth- 
 ing, their resolution is a tribute to their patriotism 
 which can never be excelled. That Lee himself en- 
 dured hardships and suffered with them in their self- 
 denial was sufficient for them. An incident of this 
 period is related by Colonel Charles ]\Iarshall, General 
 Lee's aide-de-camp. He says: ''While the army was 
 on the Rapidan, in the winter of 1863-64, it became 
 necessary, as was often the case, to put the men on 
 very short rations. Their duty was hard, not only on 
 the outposts during the winter, but in the construc- 
 tion of roads, to facilitate comnRinication between the 
 different parts of the army. One day General Lee 
 received a letter from a private soldier whose name 
 I do not now remember, informing him of the work 
 that he had to do, and stating that his rations 
 were not sufficient to enable him to undergo the fa- 
 tigue. He said, however, that if it was absolutely 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 373 
 
 necessary to put him upon such short allowance, he 
 would make the best of it, but that he and his com- 
 rades wanted to know if General Lee was aware that 
 his men were getting so little to eat, because if he was 
 aware of it he was sure there must be some necessity 
 for it. General Lee did not reply directly to the let- 
 ter, but issued a general order in which he informed 
 the soldiers of his efforts in their behalf, and that their 
 privation was beyond his means of present relief, but 
 assured them that he was making every effort to pro- 
 cure sufficient supplies. After that there was not a 
 murmur in the army, and the hungry men went cheer- 
 fully to their hard work." 
 
 Lee's private letters to his family speak in their 
 simplicity with an eloquence which no rhetoric could 
 equal. From his camp he writes to his wife on Jan- 
 uary 24, 1864: ^'I have had to disperse the cavalry as 
 much as possible to obtain forage for their horses, and 
 it is that which causes trouble. Provisions for the 
 men, too, are very scarce, and with very light diet and 
 light clothing, I fear they suffer, but still they are 
 cheerful and uncomplaining. I received a report from 
 one division the other day, in which it was stated that 
 over 400 men were barefooted and over 1,000 were 
 without blankets." 
 
 His letters to his family continually refer to the 
 socks they knitted for his men, and at times he brought 
 and delivered these socks himself. As he lay during 
 this winter confronting Meade's well-equipped army, 
 while his own men, ragged and barerooted and hungry, 
 shivered and danced by turns, his mien was as calm and 
 
374 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 asoured as though the conditions had been reversed. 
 But he must have faced often the stern and tragic 
 fact that his resources, as small as they were tlien, 
 were steadily dwindling. Whatever the inward grip 
 on his heart of this secret knowledge, which like a vult- 
 ure was tearing his vitals, to the outer world he was all 
 tranquillity. Tranquillus in ardu'is was the mark of 
 his character. 
 
 In the necessary disposal of the cavalry to obtain 
 forage, to which General Lee refers as above stated, the 
 cavalry was stationed at Charlottesville, and General 
 Lee's youngest son, who had been transferred the 
 summer before to the cavalry, having sent him an in- 
 vitation, received from him a repl}-, which shows how 
 heavily the burden was weighing on his shoulders. 
 
 Camp Orange Court House, 
 January 17, 1864. 
 
 I enclose a letter for you which has been sent to my 
 care. I hope you are well and all around you. Tell 
 Fitz I grieve over the hardships and sufferings of his 
 men in their late expedition. I would have preferred 
 his waiting for more favorable weather. He accom- 
 plished much under the circumstances, but would 
 have done more in l^etter weather. I am afraid he 
 was anxious to get back to the ball. This is a bad 
 time for such things. We have too grave subjects on 
 hand to engage in such trivial amusements. I would 
 rather his officers should entertain themselves in fat- 
 tening their horses, healing their men, and recruiting 
 their regiments. There arc too many Lees on the 
 committee. I like them all to be present at battles, 
 but can excuse them at Ijalls. But the saying is: 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 375 
 
 ''Children will be children!" I think he had better 
 move his camp farther from Charlottesville, and per- 
 haps he will get more work and less play. He and I 
 are too old for such assemblies. I want him to write 
 me how his men are, his horses, and what I can do to 
 fill up his ranks. 
 
 At the end of the first week in February, in pursuance 
 of a not very well-developed plan to hold Lee by a dem- 
 onstration along the Rapidan while an advance was 
 made on Richmond by way of the Peninsula, Sedgwick 
 was moved forward as if to bring on a battle; but after 
 a sharp skirmish, in which he lost over a thousand men, 
 he retired to his original position, while below Rich- 
 mond the movements j^roved equally futile. General 
 Lee, writing of the affair, says (in a letter to Mrs. Lee, 
 dated February 16, 1864) : ''This day last week we were 
 prepared for battle, but I believe the advance of the 
 enemy was only to see where we were and whether they 
 could injure us. They place their entire loss in killed, 
 wounded, and missing at 1,200, but I think that is 
 exaggerated. Our old friend, Sedgwick, was in com- 
 mand." 
 
 At the end of February General Lee narrowly es- 
 caped capture at the hands of a cavalry force, under 
 the command of Colonel Dahlgren, who, in a bold raid 
 on Richmond, struck the Virginia Central Railroad a 
 short time after General Lee passed by in a train. 
 Other attempts having failed, a new method was at- 
 tempted for the capture of R^ichmond. Knowing that 
 the city was almost totall}' unprotected on the south 
 side and contained only local guards, it was conceived 
 
376 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 that it might be seized by a bold dash made by a picked 
 body of cavalry, who should ride around Lee's flank, 
 and, striking across country, should cross the James 
 some thirty miles above Richmond, where it was ford- 
 able, and then, turning down its right bank, enter 
 Richmond. The plan was boldly conceived and begun; 
 but it came to a hapless end. Three columns, number- 
 ing 4,000 sabres, set out, respectively under Kilpatrick, 
 Custer, and Dahlgren. Kilpatrick from the north side 
 penetrated the outer defences of Richmond, but was 
 driven out, and only the last named force ever reached 
 the James. Here, finding it in flood and beyond ford- 
 ing, the "contraband guide" was hanged "according 
 to contract" and an attempt was made to duplicate 
 Stuart's feat and make their way out down the north 
 bank of the river. The force was, however, met and 
 dispersed and Colonel Dahlgren was killed in a charge. 
 On his person were found plans which related to the 
 capture of Richmond, and sent up to Richmond, as 
 among them were entries in a memorandum book 
 which created a great furor, and were made the sub- 
 ject of a special cartel by the Confederate Govern- 
 ment, which Lee forwarded to General Meade. But 
 General Meade promptly disclaimed any knowledge 
 of the incendiary portions of them, and Colonel Dahl- 
 gren 's father, in a memoir of his son, has declared 
 them a forgery.^ General Long states that "it is but 
 justice to the memory of Dahlgren to say that no act 
 
 'See J. D. McCabe's "Life of Lee," p. 651; Memoir of Colonel 
 Ulric Dahlgren; Fitz Lee's "Lee," p. 324; Southern Historical Society 
 Papers, April, 1877. 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 377 
 
 of cruelty was perpetrated by him during this hapless 
 expedition." The incident, which called forth recrim- 
 inating charges of great bitterness at the time, brought 
 from Lee a temperate and wise letter, in which he dis- 
 cusses on the broadest grounds the futility of retalia- 
 tion, which had been suggested to him, and calls atten- 
 tion to an alleged outrage by some of his own men, who 
 had held up a train and robbed the passengers. 
 
 The North was enabled to recruit her armies by 
 drafting all the men she needed, and her command of 
 the sea gave her Europe as a recruiting ground. On 
 October 17, 1863, the President of the United States 
 ordered a draft for 300,000 men. On February 1, 1864, 
 he called for 500,000, allowing a deduction for quotas 
 filled under the preceding draft; and on March 14, 
 1864, he issued an additional call for 200,000 more, 
 "to provide an additional reserve for all contingencies." ^ 
 
 The South was almost spent. Her spirit was un- 
 quenched, and was, indeed, unquenchable; but her 
 resources, both of treasure and men, were wellnigh 
 exhausted. Her levies for reserves of all men between 
 fifteen and sixty drew from President Davis the lament 
 that she was grinding the seed-corn of the Confederacy. 
 Yet more significantly it satisfied the new general who, 
 with his laurels fresh from the dearly won heights of 
 Missionary Ridge, succeeded (on March 12) the high- 
 
 ' Under the first call 369,380 men were drawn, of whom 52,288 paid 
 commutation; under the second 259,575 men were drawn, of whom 
 32,678 paid commutation. Again, on July 18, 1864, a call was made 
 for 500,000 more men, of whom 385,163 were furnished; and on Decem- 
 ber 19, 1864, 300,000 more were called for and 211,755 were furnished. 
 (Rhodes's "History," vol. IV, p. 429, citing "Statistical Rec. Phis- 
 terer," pp. 6, 8, 9.) 
 
378 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 minded Meade in the command of the Union army on 
 the Potomac, that a policy of attrition was one, and 
 possibly the only one, which must win in the end. 
 Clear-headed, aggressive, and able, he began his cam- 
 paign with this policy, from which he never varied, 
 though the attrition wore away two men in his own 
 ranks for every one in Lee's army. 
 
 In the spring of 1864 the President of the United 
 States, recognizing that the people, like himself, had 
 grown weary of having generals beaten and armies 
 routed by Lee with an army manifestly inferior in num- 
 bers and equipment, took a new step. It was clear now 
 to his mind that the South could not be conquered so 
 long as Lee, at the head of an army of veteran troops, 
 had the power to manoeuvre them at will. It was 
 equally clear to him that, whatever the public might 
 think, the South was at last becoming exhausted, 
 while the North was steadily growing stronger. He 
 had some time before come to the conclusion that not 
 Richmond but Lee's army was the proper objective 
 of the Union armies, and he had so written his com- 
 manding general. Hooker. He now took a step further. 
 In this state of the case, he set aside Meade, who had 
 failed to destroy Lee after months of endeavor, anil 
 called to his aid a general hitherto a stranger to the 
 East, but one who, in the West, had given evidence of 
 abilities which promised to prove the kind which wero 
 needed in the situation in Virginia. He was a fighter, 
 and so sturdy was he that he was as ready to fight 
 after a defeat as before. 
 
 In the West were several generals who had given 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 379 
 
 that proof of unusual abilities — success — which had 
 been lacking in the East, where the conunanders were 
 opposed by Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia. 
 Grant; Thomas, Sherman, and McPherson had all shown 
 military gifts of a high order. Among these the first 
 in order having such gifts was, possibly. Grant, though 
 it took a long time for his government to recognize 
 them, and it required the close study of a special agent 
 in the person of the Assistant Secretary of War before 
 the lot fell upon him. Like Mr. Lincoln, he was of 
 Southern blood and affiliations by way of Kentucky. 
 He was, however, a native of Ohio. He had gradu- 
 ated at West Point in 1843, and had served with dis- 
 tinction in Mexico, as had most of the soldiers on both 
 sides who attained high rank during the Civil War. 
 He first attracted attention at Molino del Rey, where 
 he got a piece of artillery up in a church tower and 
 contributed to the success of the day. Having fallen 
 into habits of intemperance, he had left the army and 
 for eight years had lived in poverty and obscurity, 
 first on a farm in Missouri and afterward as a clerk in 
 his father's store in Galena, 111. On the outbreak of 
 the war he had written offering his services to the 
 government, but his letter appears to have been ig- 
 nored; and he had thereupon shown such zeal and effi- 
 ciency in the organization of the volunteers in Illinois 
 that he was appointed by the governor of that State 
 colonel of the 21st Regiment of Illinois volunteers. 
 His ability presently brought him command of the 
 Department of Cairo, and when he captured Fort Henry, 
 on February 6, 1862, and, following a sharp defeat, in 
 
380 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 his temporary absence, of his forces besieging Fort 
 Donelson, availed himself promptly of a fatal error of 
 the Confederate commander and captured this fort also, 
 with its garrison of nearly 12,000 men, he began to be 
 esteemed a man to reckon with. In command of the 
 Army of the Tennessee, he had narrowly missed having 
 his army destroyed at Pittsburg Landing in the first 
 day's fight of the battle of Shiloh, and had probably 
 been saved by the death of Albert Sidney Johnston in 
 the hour of victory, and certainly by the opportune 
 arrival of Buell's army next day. But he had shown 
 the resolution and serenity of a constant mind and had 
 continued fighting next day as stoutly as if he had won 
 the day before. He had indeed the gift never to know 
 when he was beaten. At Vicksburg he had increased 
 greatly his reputation by his able transfer of his army 
 from one side of the Mississippi to the other, followed 
 by his brilliant manoeuvres and the successful siege 
 and capture of this important post which had hitherto 
 guarded the Mississippi. And finally, while suffering 
 from a severe injury, he had ridden to Chattanooga, 
 where matters, following on Rosecrans's defeat at 
 Chickamauga, were in a bad way, and, arriving "tired, 
 dirty, and well," had immediately so straightened out 
 the tangles and infused spirit and courage that within 
 a month he won the battle of Missionary Ridge, or 
 Chattanooga (November 23-25), and secured posses- 
 sion of Chattanooga and Knoxville and command of 
 Eastern Tennessee and the adjacent regions. Sucli, 
 in brief, was the previous record of the man to whom 
 Mr. Lincoln now turned for aid. 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 381 
 
 On the 10th of March/ 1864, Mr. Lincoln appointed 
 General Ulysses S, Grant lieutenant-general in com- 
 mand of all the armies of the Union, and General Grant, 
 on the 23d of March, took personal command of the 
 armies in the East with the stipulation, it is said, that 
 he was to be given such troops as he needed and was 
 not to be interfered with by the government in Wash- 
 ington. It was without doubt a wise precaution that 
 he took, for otherwise he might never have survived 
 the Wilderness and Cold Harbor. 
 
 Grant was now nearly forty-two years old, while Lee 
 was fifty-seven. We have pictures of them both as 
 they impressed men capable of drawing their portraits. 
 
 This is a picture of Grant given by Richard H. Dana, 
 who fell in with him at Willard's Hotel as he was about 
 to leave for the army on the Rapidan: ''A short, 
 round-shouldered man, in a very tarnished major-gen- 
 eral's uniform. . . . There was nothing marked in his 
 appearance. He had no gait, no station, no manner, 
 rough, light-brown whiskers, a blue eye, and rather a 
 scrubby look withal. A crowd formed round him; 
 men looked, stared at him, as if they were taking his 
 likeness, and two generals were introduced. Still, I 
 could not get his name. It was not Hooker. Who 
 could it be? He had a cigar in his mouth, and rather 
 the look of a man who did, or once did, take a little too 
 much to drink. I inquired of the bookkeeper. 'That 
 is General Grant.' I joined the starers. I saw that 
 the ordinary, scrubby-looking man, with a slightly 
 
 ' The commission was dated March 9, and was delivered to him by 
 Mr. Lincoln in the presence of his cabinet the following day. 
 
382 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 seedy look, as if he was out of office and on half pay, 
 and nothing to do but hang round the entry of Wil- 
 lard's, cigar in mouth, had a clear blue eye, and a look 
 of resolution, as if he could not be trifled with, and an 
 entire indifference to the crowd about him. Straight 
 nose, too. Still, to see him talking and smoking in the 
 lower entry of Willard's, in that crowd, in such times — 
 the generalissimo of our armies, on whom the destiny 
 of the empire seemed to hang! ... He gets over the 
 ground queerh'. He does not march, nor quite walk; 
 but pitches along as if the next step would bring him 
 on his nose. But his face looks firm and hard, and his 
 eye is clear and resolute, and he is certainly natural, 
 and clear of all appearance of self-consciousness. How 
 war, how all great crises, bring us to the one-man 
 power!" ^ 
 
 It should be said, and the fact has been much over- 
 looked, that while to Grant's dogged resolution to wear 
 out his opponent, no matter what the cost to his own 
 side, was due in the end the exhaustion of the South ; 3''et 
 the tactical detail with which the military operations 
 were conducted was to a considerable extent attribu- 
 table to Meade. The commander at Gettysburg has 
 never gotten the credit generally that he deserves. 
 Because he could not destroy Lee at or after Gettys- 
 burg, and failed to attain a decided success in the 
 autumn campaign following, he lost the prestige that . 
 he should have had for an accomplishment greater than 
 any other general had attained. And in the campaign 
 
 > Adams's "Dana," vol. II, p. 272. Rhodcs's "History of the Uniteil 
 States," vul. IV, pp. 438, 439. 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 383 
 
 of 1864-65 he conducted the mihtary operations of the 
 Army of the Potomac, though he did not dictate the 
 poHcy. Grant himself declared later in his official re- 
 port of July 22, 1865, that, while he commanded all the 
 armies, he had tried, as far as possible, to leave General 
 Meade in independent command of the Army of the 
 Potomac. "My instructions for that army," he said, 
 "were all through him and were general in their nature, 
 leaving all the details and execution to him." ^ He 
 directed the general operations, but Meade directed 
 mainly the movements of the several corps and under 
 him fought the battles. Yet undoubtedly Grant was 
 the master spirit and the abler soldier. 
 
 Mr. Lincoln had some time before reached the con- 
 clusion, as most other thinking men had, that so long 
 as Lee's army remained in the field, commanded by 
 Lee, the South could not be subjugated. And in this 
 view General Grant wholly concurred. The destruc- 
 tion of Lee's army, therefore, became the avowed ob- 
 ject of both Lincoln and Grant. The method was sim- 
 ple in conception — to give man for man — or, if that 
 would not accomplish the object, to give two men for 
 one till the dread tale was exhausted. In execution 
 it required not only man for man, not only two men 
 for one, but two men for every one that Lee had in his 
 army. 
 
 The infantry of the Army of the Potomac was, prior 
 to the advance on Richmond in the spring of 1864, 
 organi:^ed on Meade's suggestion and formed in three 
 grand corps, the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Corps, com- 
 
 1 Humphreys' "Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865," p. 6. 
 
384 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 manded respectively by the three veteran generals, 
 Hancock, Warren, and Sedgwick, each corps numbering 
 about 25,000 men. To these were soon added the 
 Ninth Corps under Burnside. The cavalry was com- 
 manded by General Sheridan, a young officer whom 
 Grant had brought from the West with him, having 
 observed in him unusual abilities and the fighting 
 quality which he himself possessed. 
 
 In general terms the plan adopted for the new cam- 
 paign was to have Butler, who commanded at Fortress 
 Monroe, move on Richmond by way of the James, the 
 York, and the Peninsula, and for Grant to march the 
 Army of the Potomac by a route parallel with the 
 Richmond and Fredericksburg Railway, which railway, 
 with the Rappalmnnock and the Potomac, formed his 
 line of communication with his base and with Washing- 
 ton. This base he established at Belle Plain. There 
 were men and supplies of all kinds in abundance. The 
 difficulty in the way was the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia with its general. This army lay along the Rapidan 
 in the Piedmont, about Orange and Gordonsville, at 
 the junction of the Orange and Alexandria Railway, 
 and the Virginia Central Railway, which led south- 
 east to Richmond and west to the valley of Virginia 
 and to the south-west. One plan which was con- 
 sidered at Washington was to move by Lee's left 
 flank against this important line of communication 
 and thence on Richmond; but for good reasons this 
 plan was discarded and the movement b}' Lee's right 
 flank was adopted. This latter plan, though it led 
 through more difficult country than the other, would 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 385 
 
 place Grant's lines of communication on the opposite 
 side of his army from Lee and would effectually se- 
 cure them from attack. It would also enable him 
 to cover Washington and receive reinforcements as 
 needed. 
 
 Grant's plan was a comprehensive one. In brief, it 
 was to ''attack all along the line," and thus, first, keep 
 all the Confederate forces fully engaged, so that one 
 army should not be able to reinforce any other; sec- 
 ondly, destroy all the lines of communication between 
 Richmond and the South and South-west; thirdly, 
 destroy all the sources of supply of the Southern armies; 
 fourthly, destroy those armies themselves and finally 
 capture Richmond. In accordance with this plan, Sher- 
 man, with his army of 100,000 men, was to march from 
 Chattanooga eastward through Georgia and the Caro- 
 linas; Sigel, with his army of 20,000 men, was to 
 march from Western Virginia on the two lines that con- 
 nected Richmond with the valley of Virginia at Staun- 
 ton and with the South-west at Lynchburg; Butler 
 was to march on Richmond with his army of 40,000 
 men from Fortress Monroe by way of the Peninsula 
 and the James and co-operate with Grant; and finally. 
 Grant himself was to march on Richmond with his great 
 army of 140,000 men by way of the region lying between 
 the Virginia Central Railroad and the Richmond and 
 Fredericksburg Railroad. 
 
 On the day agreed on, the 4th of May, the campaign 
 began. Grant crossed the Rapidan on his march to 
 Richmond, Butler moved on Richmond from Fortress 
 Monroe by way of the James, Sherman set out on his 
 
386 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 march across the South, and Sigel proceeded with his 
 movements; a cohimn of 6,000 men, under Averell, 
 marching on South-west Virginia, while Sigel him- 
 self, with his main army, moved on the upper Shenan- 
 doah Valley to menace the Virginia Central Railway and 
 the Railway from Charlottesville to Lynchburg and the 
 South-west. All of these operations held direct rela- 
 tion with the Richmond campaign,* and eventually 
 all contributed their full share to its successful termina- 
 tion. For in the end Richmond fell because its lines 
 of communication with the region which supplied Lee's 
 army were destroyed. 
 
 Grant, resolved on his policy of '^persistent hammer- 
 ing" (a phrase coined by him after the events which 
 proved its effectiveness), and, assured of vast levies and 
 of a free hand, to carry out his plan on his own line no 
 matter what the cost, crossed the Rapidan on the night 
 of the 3d of May, 1864. Marching by Ely and Ger- 
 mana Fords, as Lee had predicted he would, he com- 
 mitted himself boldly to the tangled forest of the Wil- 
 derness, where one year before Hooker had met such 
 signal defeat. His army numbered over 140,000 men 
 of all arms — more than double the number that Lee 
 now commanded — and he had 318 field guns. His 
 equipment was possibly the best that any army could 
 boast that ever took the field. His baggage train 
 would, as he states, have stretched in line to Richmond, 
 sixty-odd miles away. Lee had, with which to oppose 
 him, 62,000 men of all arms and 224 guns. But the 
 men were the Army of Northern Virginia, and a better 
 
 ' "The Shenandoah Valley in 1864," George E. Pond, p. 5. 
 
AUTUMN OF 1863 387 
 
 weapon was never fitted to the hand of a more skilful 
 master. Whatever measure of fame he had attained 
 hitherto, it was to be more than doubled in the ensuing 
 campaign. 
 
 Lee has been criticised of late for not having posted 
 Longstreet nearer to the prospective battle-field of the 
 Wilderness than Gordonsville. It was not a matter of 
 choice with him, but of necessity. The dispersion of 
 his troops was due to the ever-growing difficulty of 
 subsistence. He probably knew as well as his critics 
 the disadvantages of such wide dispersion, and had his 
 orders for their concentration been promptly carried 
 out, he would have struck Grant on the first day with 
 his full force instead of with only half of it. 
 
CHAPTER XV 
 
 THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 
 
 If Grant had harbored any delusion that Lee was a 
 general strong only in defensive operations, he had rea- 
 son quickly to be undeceived. Lee, who, for reasons 
 of his own, had permitted him to cross the river un- 
 opposed, prepared to strike him amid the tangles of 
 the Wilderness, where his superiority in men and arms 
 might prove less preponderant, and two days later, 
 having called in his widely separated divisions — sepa- 
 rated for the want of subsistence — though he was out- 
 numbered two to one^ — threw himself upon him, in- 
 flicting upon him losses before which any other general 
 who had yet commanded the Army of the Potomac 
 would have recrossed the river, and even Grant re- 
 coiled. For two days (the 5th and 6th) the battle 
 raged, and Lee forced Grant, with losses of 17,666 men,^ 
 from his direct line of march and led him to call on his 
 government for reinforcements. ''Send to Belle Plain," ' 
 he wrote on the 10th, "all the infantry you can rake 
 and scrape." And he needed them all. On the even- 
 ing of the second day an attack similar to Jackson's at 
 Chancellorsville was made on Grant's flank, and his 
 
 ' Rhodes's "History of the United States," IV, p. 480. Humphreys' 
 "Virginia Campaign of 1864 and 1865," p. 17. 
 
 ^ The Century Co.'s " Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," IV, p. 182. 
 
 388 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 389 
 
 left taken in reverse was driven back when an accident 
 similar to that which changed the issue of that day 
 changed this day's issue. As Longstreet, who com- 
 manded the advancing troops, rode down the Plank 
 Road accompanied by Generals Kershaw and Jenkins, 
 a volley was poured into them by his own men. Jen- 
 kins was killed and Longstreet dangerously wounded. 
 It stopped the movement which otherwise might have 
 forced Grant back across the Rapidan. Lee's forces 
 were largely outnumbered, but to make good the dif- 
 ference Lee offered at more than one critical moment to 
 lead them in person. Officers and men alike refused 
 to advance while he remained at a point of danger, and 
 he was forced to the rear. But not only in the battle 
 of the 6th, but also in the battle of the 10th and in the 
 furious fight at the "bloody angle," where, when his 
 army was imperilled, he again rode forward to inspire 
 his straining troops and was again driven by them 
 to the rear, the fact that he had felt it necessary to 
 place himself at their head called forth new efforts 
 from the jaded soldiers and stirred them to redoubled 
 valor. 
 
 ''These men. General," said Gordon, as he rode with 
 him down the lines at Spottsylvania, where they rested 
 for a moment prior to the final charge, ''are the brave 
 Virginians." Lee uttered no word. He simply re- 
 moved his hat and passed bare-headed along the line. 
 I had it from one who witnessed the act. "It was," 
 said he, "the most eloquent address ever delivered." 
 And a few minutes later as the men advanced to the 
 charge, he heard a youth, as he ran forward crying and 
 
390 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 reloading his musket, shout through his tears that ''any 
 man who would not fight after what General Lee said 
 was a coward." 
 
 In no battle of the war did Lee's genius shine forth 
 more brightly than in the great battle of Spottsylvania 
 Court House, where, after the bloody battle of the Wil- 
 derness, he divined Grant's plans, and again cutting 
 him off from the object of his desire, threw himself 
 upon him in a contest whose fury may be gauged by the 
 fact that the musketry fire continued in one unbroken 
 roar for seventeen hours, and trees were shorn down 
 by the musket balls. 
 
 By the evening of the 7th, while his staff were yet 
 in darkness as to Grant's next move, Lee, with his un- 
 erring sense of the soldier, had divined it, and he sent 
 General Anderson with his division to relieve Stuart 
 at Spottsylvania.^ His adjutant-general, who was sent 
 to apprise Stuart of the approach of the infantry, found 
 him already engaged. The supports arrived just in 
 time ; for the cavalry had been driven back, and Grant 
 believed that he already occupied the Court House, as 
 he reported in his despatch of the 8th. But Lee's 
 promptness ''deranged this part of the programme," 
 driving him back and holding him off during a week's 
 fierce fighting, when Grant, having lost 40,000 men, 
 finding his enemy too obstinate and ready to die in the 
 last ditch, drew off by the flank toward the southward, 
 whereupon Lee again headed him and, facing him at 
 Hanover Junction, forced him down the north bank of 
 the Pamunkey to Hanovertown. 
 
 ' Taylor's "General Lee," p. 238. 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 391 
 
 ''Before the lines of Spottsylvania/' says Swinton, 
 ''the Army of the Potomac had for twelve days and 
 nights engaged in a fierce wrestle in which it had done 
 all that valor may do to carry a position by nature and 
 art impregnable. In this contest; unparalleled in its 
 continuous fury and swelling to the proportions of a 
 campaign, language is inadequate to convey an impres- 
 sion of the labors, fatigues, and sufferings of those who 
 fought by day, only to march by night from point to 
 point of the long line and renew the fight on the morrow. 
 Above 40,000 men had already fallen in the bloody 
 encounters of the Wilderness and Spottsylvania, and 
 the exhausted army began to lose its spirits." 
 
 Such was the defence which Lee presented to his 
 able antagonist and his great army after the exhaus- 
 tion of the hungry winter of '64. Had he not been ill 
 and half delirious in his ambulance when Grant at- 
 tempted to cross the North Anna and failed to get his 
 centre over after his two wings were across, Grant's 
 star might have set on the banks of the North Anna 
 instead of rising to its zenith at Appomattox. But 
 Lee was suddenly stricken down, and while he was mur- 
 muring in his semi-delirium, "We must strike them — 
 we must never let them pass us again," Grant, after 
 the most anxious night of the war, drew back his wings 
 and slowly moved down the Pamunkey to find Lee still 
 across his path at the historic levels of Cold Harbor, 
 where valor and constancy rose to their highest point. 
 
 "I stood recently in the wood where Gregg's Tex- 
 ans put on immortality," wrote a Southern historian, 
 "where Kershaw led three of his brigades in person to 
 
392 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 compensate them for the absence of the fourth." ^ It 
 was this need to compensate their troops for want of 
 reserves or equipment which so often led the generals 
 of the Confederacy to the firing line. But it was a 
 costly expedient. Four times, in what appeared the 
 very hour of complete victory, the prize was stricken 
 from the hand by the commander being shot from his 
 saddle. First, when General Albert Sidney Johnston 
 was slain at Shiloh, in the moment of victory. Next, 
 when, at Seven Pines, Joseph E. Johnston was struck 
 from his horse, and what might have proved a crush- 
 ing defeat for McClellan was turned into an indecisive 
 battle. Again, when Jackson was driving all before 
 him at Chancellorsville, and fell, like Wolfe, victorious. 
 And finally, when, in the Wilderness, Longstreet was 
 wounded and incapacitated at the critical moment when 
 victory hovered over his arms. 
 
 It is related that on one occasion during a battle 
 Lee, being asked by his staff to leave one spot after 
 another where he had posted himself, finally exclaimed, 
 ''I wish I knew where my place is on the battle-field. 
 Wherever I go some one tells me it is not the place for 
 me." 
 
 In fact, so far from Lee being chiefly good in defence, 
 the quality of his military spirit appears to one who 
 studies his career to have been distinctly aggressive, 
 possibly even too aggressive. This is Longstreet's 
 charge against him. No captain ever knew better the 
 value of a quarter of an hour or the importance of strik- 
 
 ' Leigh Robinson's Address on the Wilderness Campaign, Memorial 
 Volume, Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 393 
 
 ing first when the enemy was preparing to deliver his 
 blow. In truth, he was, as Henderson declares, an 
 ardent fighter, and possessed in an extraordinary de- 
 gree the qualities of both physical and moral courage. 
 Lee's personal daring was the talk of his army. ''I 
 hear on all sides of your exposing yourself," wrote 
 one of his sons during the Wilderness campaign, urging 
 him to be more careful for the sake of the cause. And 
 again and again, at some moment of supreme crisis, as 
 at the Wilderness when Longstreet's van appeared at 
 the critical moment, and as at the "Bloody Angle" at 
 Spottsylvania, which Grant had seized and where he 
 was massing his picked troops to the number of 50,000, 
 he rode forward to put himself at the head of his ex- 
 hausted soldiery to lead them in a charge on which hung 
 the fate of his army. Yet, as Henderson says, in dis- 
 cussing Lee's audacity in attacking with an inferior 
 force McClellan's well-equipped army, secure in their 
 entrenchments, "he was no hare-brained leader, but a 
 profound thinker, following the highest principles of 
 the military art." That this will be the final verdict 
 of history there can be little doubt. 
 
 After crossing the Rapidan the advance of Grant 
 by the flank was under almost continuous attack by 
 Lee. "Measured by casualties," says Rhodes, in his 
 history of this campaign, "the advantage was with the 
 Confederates." This far from expresses the real fact 
 that Grant received a mauling which, as Lee's adju- 
 tant-general. Colonel Walter H. Taylor, said the next 
 day in his note-book, would have sent any other gen- 
 eral who had hitherto commanded the Union army back 
 
394 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 in haste across the river. It was Grant's fortitude 
 which saved him, and led him to tell General James H. 
 Wilson that he would fight again. As Lee had as- 
 saulted at the Wilderness, so again at Spottsylvania he 
 barred the way of his indomitable antagonist, and again 
 and again forced the fighting, until, after holding him 
 at the North Anna, where he offered battle, he had 
 wedged Grant from his direct march on Richmond and 
 forced him down the left bank of the Pamunkey to 
 end at last his direct march on Richmond on the doubly 
 bloody field of Cold Harbor, the only battle which 
 Grant declared afterward he would not have fought 
 over again under the same circumstances. 
 
 Foiled in that campaign of his immediate object, 
 and having lost more men than Lee had at any time 
 in his entire army, Grant adopted a new line of attack, 
 and secretly crossing to the south side of the James, 
 which he might at any time have reached by water 
 without the loss of a man, attempted to seize Peters- 
 burg, as McClellan had planned to do, by a coup, but, 
 failing in his object, began to lay siege to that place 
 with a view to cutting off Richmond from the South, 
 a feat which he only accomplished after eight months' 
 fighting, in which he lost over 60,000 more men. 
 
 Such in general terms was the last and, possibly, the 
 greatest campaign of Lee. But as so much of Lee's 
 fame as a soldier must rest on this final campaign in 
 which he showed new powers and resisted the mights- 
 forces thrown against him until the South collapsed 
 from exhaustion, it is proper to give for those who 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 395 
 
 may be interested in his military career a more detailed 
 account of his masterly defence of Richmond and show 
 clearly the reason of its ultimate failure. 
 
 Wlien Grant, on the evening of the 4th of May, 1864, 
 found the last of his four army corps on the south 
 side of the Rapidan without a shot having been fired 
 save by the pickets along the stream, he undoubtedly 
 felt that he had taken a long step toward Richmond. 
 Unlike McClellan, he did not overestimate his oppo- 
 nent's strength, nor did he, like Hooker, falter in the 
 presence of his masterly ability. He had supreme 
 self-confidence based on rare courage and rare ability 
 to command and to fight, and he knew that he out- 
 numbered Lee more than two to one, and that in his 
 army were the flower of the North, men as valorous 
 as ever drew breath. He knew that Lee's forces were 
 dispersed over a considerable extent of country in the 
 open region about Orange and Gordonsville from twenty 
 to thirty miles to the westward, and that they were ill- 
 clad, ill-shod, and ill-fed. It was, accordingly, without 
 a tremor that, having crossed the river unopposed, he 
 boldly conrnnitted himself to the narrow roads that led 
 southward through the western part of the Wilder- 
 ness, in the assurance that Lee would throw his army 
 across his path somewhere beyond the Wilderness, and 
 that in the battle which would thus be joined he would 
 ; defeat him. Lee, however, had other plans than those 
 j Grant assumed he would follow. He had divined 
 I Grant's plans as well as if he had sat with him at his 
 I council board, and he had formed his own. He had 
 I predicted to his generals that Grant would soon move 
 
396 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 and would cross the Rapidan at the very fords he se- 
 lected. Accordingly, he had given his orders, and on the 
 day that Grant crossed the river and headed for Rich- 
 mond, Lee struck his head-quarters tent, and send- 
 ing orders to Anderson at Rapidan to follow without 
 delay with his division, and to Longstreet at Gordons- 
 ville to follow with his two divisions there, he himself 
 took E well's Corps — two brigades — and two of Hill's Di- 
 visions, with artillery and cavalry, and struck straight 
 for Grant's army. Marching in two columns, Ewell to 
 the left on the Turnpike and Hill on the old Plank 
 Road, he pushed forward, and that night, while Grant 
 supposed Lee was still about Orange or moving south- 
 ward, Ewell 's advance guard bivouacked within four 
 miles of Warren's corps, which bivouacked at the old 
 Wilderness tavern at the intersection of the Germana 
 Plank Road and the Orange Turnpike. Still unsus- 
 pecting Lee's approach, Grant, on the 5th, moved on 
 through the Wilderness toward Richmond, his army in 
 two columns — on the right Warren's and Sedgwick's 
 corps, heading for Parker's store, on the Plank Road 
 toward the western edge of the Wilderness, while Han- 
 cock's corps (the Second) took the route to Shady 
 Grove Church, to the south-eastward. It was not 
 long, however, before Lee made known his intention to 
 attack without waiting for Grant to emerge from the 
 Wilderness. Ewell, advancing on the Turnpike at right 
 angles to the Federal line of march, quickly came in 
 contact with Griffin's division, which Warren had 
 posted on the Pike to cover his flank during his march, 
 and was soon heavily engaged. Warren, finding Ewell 's 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 397 
 
 Corps on his right, formed Hne of battle, and Sedgwick 
 forming on his right, they advanced and attacked 
 Ewell in heavy force. Meanwhile Getty's division was 
 sent by Sedgwick to hold Hill, who was advancing on 
 the Plank Road toward Parker's store, until Hancock 
 could arrive with the Second Corps. Warren's sharp 
 attack on Ewell was at first successful, for the Confed- 
 erates had not on the field more than half the number 
 of the Federals who attacked them.^ But rallying, the 
 Confederates swept forward, and not only regained the 
 ground they had lost, but captured four guns and a 
 large number of prisoners. But as the fight slackened 
 on the left, where Ewell was pushing Warren back 
 along the Turnpike, it began to increase in fury along 
 Lee's right, where, on the Plank Road, Heth's and 
 Wilcox's Divisions of Lee's Second Corps were hold- 
 ing back the masses of Grant's Second Corps. This 
 they did all the afternoon, stubbornly maintaining 
 their ground against the repeated assaults of Hancock's 
 well-led divisions. Happily for Lee's army, the ground 
 he had selected on which to bring Grant to bay was 
 well adapted for his purpose. As in the battle of 
 Chancellorsville, he had chosen the Wilderness for his 
 battle-ground, because its tangles of far-stretching 
 forest, intersected by only a few roads and broken by 
 but a few openings, prevented the preponderant num- 
 bers of the enemy in men and guns from being availed 
 of by his antagonist. 
 Lee, however, when he marched straight for Grant's 
 
 * Humphreys' "Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 17. Rhodes's 
 "History of the United States," IV, p. 440. Nicolay and Hay, YUI, 
 )p. 352. 
 
398 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 army with his Second Corps and part of his Third 
 Corps, had expected that Longstreet, who was at 
 Gordonsville, httle more than ten miles further away 
 from his ol^ject of attack than he himself was, would 
 follow inmiediately and join him not later than the 
 afternoon of the 5th. To insure this he had sent him 
 as guide an officer who knew the roads, to pilot him. 
 But Longstreet was incurably slow. A large, heavy, 
 ponderous man, his movements were correspondingly 
 slow, and possibly his mental operations partook of 
 the same deliberateness. Wliether it was at Seven 
 Pines or at Malvern Hill, at Second ]\Ianassas, or 
 Gettysburg, or the Wilderness, he was late; and in 
 this instance, as in those which had preceded it, he 
 came near causing the most serious consequences to 
 Lee's army. Had Longstreet been up when Ewell 
 made his gallant attack, or even when Wilcox and 
 Heth, in the afternoon, were holding on with despera- 
 tion to the lines against which Hancock was dashing 
 his straining brigades, an advance might have been 
 made which might possibly have driven Grant back 
 toward the Rapidan and have saved the carnage of 
 the succeeding weeks. Longstreet had, however, sent 
 off the guide furnished him and had subsequently 
 missed the road. So, when darkness fell on Wilcox's 
 and Heth's exhausted divisions in the Wilderness 
 woods, the First Corps of the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia was going into bivouac at Verdiersville, some 
 ten miles away. Fortunately, Longstreet was fully 
 awake now to the urgency of the situation, of which 
 Lee had apprised him, and, breaking camp soon after 
 
The Wilderness 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 399 
 
 midnight, he pushed forward for the Wilderness, within 
 whose western tangles the armies of Grant and Lee lay 
 confronting each other. Had he been two hours later it 
 might have been too late to save the situation. As it 
 was, he was barely in time to save the rest of Lee's 
 army from, possibly, irretrievable disaster. Lee's plan 
 was that which he so often adopted with success: to 
 assail one wing of the enemy — this time Grant's right 
 — and while doing so to mass his forces on the enemy's 
 other wing and overwhelm it. Wlien night fell on the 
 5th, each commander knew that the next day's sun 
 would rise on a great battle, and each prepared to 
 take the offensive. Grant, whose plan was to use his 
 preponderant numbers and attack along his whole 
 line, prepared to move to the attack at five. Lee 
 was so sure that Longstreet and Anderson would both 
 be in place that the exhausted divisions of Wilcox and 
 Heth had been told they would be withdrawn and their 
 places taken by the fresh troops. Lee was obliged by 
 Longstreet's absence to wait before advancing his 
 right, and on the left, where Gordon was eagerly 
 urging Ewell to give him permission to turn Grant's 
 right which he had discovered to be exposed, Ewell 
 had felt compelled to refuse his assent and content 
 himself with withstanding most of the day Sedgwick's 
 fierce assaults. On the right Wilcox and Heth had not 
 even replenished their ammunition chests and cartridge 
 boxes, and when Hancock with his corps, Getty's 
 division of Sedgwick's corps, and Wadsworth's divis- 
 ion of the Fifth Corps attacked them in the early 
 morning, the two Confederate divisions, unable to 
 
400 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 make an effectual resistance, were swept back in con- 
 fusion. It looked as though Lee's right wing would 
 be crushed. At this critical moment Longstreet ar- 
 rived on the field. Wliatever his dulness in prepara- 
 tion, or his sloth on the march, on the field of battle 
 all his senses were quickened. As a fighter he had 
 no superior in either army. Making his dispositions 
 swiftly, he promptly threw his men across the space 
 where the lines had given way and where men were 
 now streaming to the rear, and, with Kershaw on the 
 right of the Plank Road and Field on the left, pressed 
 forward to meet the advancing Federals. The change 
 was instant and complete, and as the fresh troops 
 struck the long line of Hancock's men, who had sup- 
 posed that they had overcome all opposition, they gave 
 way under the shock and were pressed back to their 
 original lines of entrenchment. The presence of Lee 
 himself added to the ardor of the charge that swept 
 back the advancing Federal divisions and changed a 
 reverse into a victory. 
 
 The Confederate commander must have felt during 
 the early hours of the contest much more anxiety than 
 he displayed, for the delay of Longstreet completely 
 paralyzed his plans; and now as the troops advanced 
 to the attack which was to re-establish his lines, Lee 
 rode forward and put himself at their head. The ef- 
 fect was instantaneous. The cry arose, '^General Lee, 
 to the rear!" and as the men passed to the front he 
 was called to, ''Go back, General Lee; this is no place 
 for you. Go back, we'll settle this." ^ And they did 
 
 > Taylor's "Lee," p. 234. 
 
 ^ 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 401 
 
 settle it. The lines of gray swept forward and Lee's 
 broken line was re-established. 
 
 An account of this episode was given afterward by 
 an eye-witness, General Lee's chief of artillery. After 
 speaking of posting some guns in a clearing, he con- 
 tinues : 
 
 "All night Heth, Hill, and Wilcox remained at their 
 posts in the thicket, with their men really under arms 
 and not only ready for a night encounter, but occa- 
 sionally exchanging shots with the enemy. By those 
 guns I bivouacked that night and General Lee very 
 near. Early next morning (the 6th) the fight was re- 
 newed by Hill with his brave division commanders and 
 their sternly enduring soldiers. Before long, however, 
 they sent word to General Lee — by whose srde I was 
 on horseback — that they were much worn and even 
 harder pressed than on the previous day, and must 
 inevitably fall back if not reinforced. General Lee 
 sent exhorting them to hold on and promising support; 
 he also sent to hasten Longstreet to the rescue. . . . 
 Not long after, our exhausted fellows came back in num- 
 bers and the occasion arrived for the grape from those 
 guns to stem and shatter the hastening bluecoats. It 
 was at this critical moment that General Lee, deeply 
 anxious for the appearance of Longstreet's column, 
 greeted a score or two of gray boys who rushed double- 
 quick into the little opening occupied by our guns and 
 ourselves. The general called out, 'Who are you, my 
 boys?' They immediately cried out, 'Texas boys.' 
 The general instantly lifted his hat and waved it round, 
 exclaiming, 'Hurrah for Texas! Hurrah for Texas!' 
 
402 R013ERT E. LEE 
 
 By this nearly a regiment had gathered, and at word 
 from the general to form, they at once did so. The 
 general placed himself at their left with the shout, 
 'Charge!' Many voices cried, 'General Lee, to the 
 rear!' But he kept his place at the left, square up 
 with the line, repeating with his thrilling tone, 'Charge, 
 boys ! ' Then a tall gray-bearded man very near him 
 stepped from the ranks and grasped the bridle of Gen- 
 eral Lee's horse near the bit and said to him respect- 
 fully, yet resolutely, 'General Lee, if you do not go 
 back, we will not go forward.' The general yielded. 
 But the gallant Texans sprang forward with a shout 
 and the enemy's advance was driven back." ^ 
 
 Lee was not now able to carry out his plan as origi- 
 nally coilceived. A reconnoissance to the right disclosed 
 the fact that Hancock's left might be assailed with 
 promise of good success, and of being turned by a move- 
 ment around his extreme left south of the Plank Road. 
 With R. H. Anderson's Division, now arrived on the 
 field, added to his command, Longstreet attacked Han- 
 cock in front with three of his brigades (Gregg's, Ben- 
 nings's, and Laws's) and sent a strong force of four 
 brigades under Mahone (G. T. Anderson's, of Field's 
 Division; Mahone's, of R. H. Anderson's Division; Wof- 
 ford's, of Kershaw's Division, and Davis's Brigade) 
 to assail and turn his flank. "The movement was a 
 success, as complete as it was brilliant." The enemy 
 was swept from their front on the Plank Road, where his 
 advantage of position had been already felt by Lee's 
 lines. The Plank Road was gained and the enemy's 
 » S. P. Lee's "Life of William N. Pendleton, D.D.," p. 326. 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 403 
 
 lines were bent back in much disorder. In the advance 
 General Wadsworth, whose division, with that of Ste- 
 venson, had been fighting Field's Brigades on the north 
 of the Plank Road, was mortally wounded and fell into 
 the hands of the Confederates. The advance of the 
 Confederates was impeded by the fire which had caught 
 in the woods and was now raging furiously; but Han- 
 cock had been driven back nearly a mile to a second 
 line of strong breastworks which had been erected along 
 the Brock Road at right angles to the Plank Road. 
 
 Everj^hing had gone in favor of the Confederates to 
 this point, and now Lee prepared to dislodge Hancock 
 by again turning his left. Longstreet, pressing his ad- 
 vantage, made his dispositions to turn his flank again 
 while he threw against him his victorious brigades. His 
 advanced brigades were already in action when again 
 the same accident occurred that had befallen on the 
 fatal 2d of May a year before in almost the same place 
 and manner. Longstreet, riding along the Plank Road 
 with his staff and a number of other officers to direct 
 the advance of his ardent troops, received a volley that 
 swept across the highway from a body of his own 
 men lying in the woods less than a hundred yards 
 away. The gallant Jenkins was killed outright and 
 Longstreet was so badly wounded that he was borne 
 from the field and was incapacitated for many months. 
 To those who have studied the history of war it is not 
 necessary to explain the fatal effects of the loss of a 
 conmiander. In all history the story of battles is full 
 of the tragic consequences of such a loss, from the time 
 of Antony, in the moment of victory flinging a world 
 
404 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 away by turning his back on the field and following 
 Cleopatra in her flight. The consequences that follow 
 the relaxation of the commander's grasp are scarcely 
 less dire in modem warfare. Three times already, as 
 heretofore noted, the Southern aniiies had suffered 
 from this far-reaching fatality — at Shiloh, at Seven 
 Pines, at Chancellorsville, and now in the Wilderness — 
 when the victorious soldiery of the South were sweep- 
 ing forward in the full tide of victory with an ardor 
 which would have been irresistible, the mind that 
 directed them as one organic whole was suddenly re- 
 moved ; the carefully planned movement lost its direct- 
 ing force and the power that, continuously applied, 
 would have been irresistible spent itself futilely in gen- 
 eral but undirected application. 
 
 ''This catastrophe of Longst reefs wound and disa- 
 blement brought to a stop a movement which bade 
 fair to rival Jackson's famous flanking movement at 
 Chancellorsville a year before. R. H. Anderson was 
 assigned to the command of the First Corps, as Stuart 
 had succeeded Jackson on the earlier fleld, and Mahone 
 took Anderson's Division of Hill's Corps; but the time 
 consumed was precious, and the impulse which might 
 have swept Hancock from his stoutly held breastworks 
 was lost. Portions of the line were carried, but time 
 had been given to mass sufficient troops to retake and 
 hold them. On Lee's left, Gordon having at last se- 
 cured consent from Ewell to attempt a turning move- 
 ment after Ewell had personally reconnoitred the 
 ground and verified the report of the scouts that Grant's 
 right was sufficiently exposed to promise good results, 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 405 
 
 moved forward with three brigades about sunset, and, 
 in a gallant attack, carried Sedgwick's lines, and, roll- 
 ing back his right flank, drove him from his entrenched 
 position for a mile, capturing some 600 prisoners, includ- 
 ing two brigadier-generals, Seymour and Shaler/ It 
 was, however, too late to accomplish more; and as 
 darkness fell the combat died away in the thick tangles 
 of the forest, each army glad to gain the merciful respite 
 of the night's rest. 
 
 The darkness had settled down with Grant's lines 
 driven back on both wings far beyond the points they 
 had held in the morning, and with the Confederates 
 attacking on both wings with marked success, while 
 his army was decidedly shaken. Officers unsurpassed 
 for gallantry found themselves in a maze of doubt as 
 to what the morrow would bring forth. ''If we do not 
 die to-day we shall to-morrow," wrote a little later 
 one who spoke for many others. But if the stoutest 
 hearted among them found cause for gloom, one heart 
 had not quailed. As one of his generals rode up to 
 Grant the following morning out of the confusion and 
 gloom of the wretched night, he calmly called to him: 
 "It is all right, Wilson; we will fight again." 
 
 That Grant had been terribly hammered, nearly all 
 soldiers are agreed; that he had not in the least wa- 
 vered in his resolution, is equally apparent. 17,666 
 men were his losses in these two days,^ or, by Hum- 
 phreys' reckoning, 15,380 men. 
 
 He had gotten a mauling that had cost him two men 
 
 ' W. H. Taylor's "Lee," p. 237. 
 2 F. Lee's "Life of Lee," p. 322. 
 
406 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 for one that his opponent had lost, and that would have 
 put any one of his predecessors on the retreat ; but he 
 had not had a tremor. He had calculated that he could 
 afford to lose two men if his hammering cost his an- 
 tagonist one, and he would fight again. 
 
 What might have happened if Longstreet had been 
 up when Lee struck Grant while his army was toiling 
 through the narrow roads of the Wilderness, expecting 
 to reach open country before forming line of battle, 
 must be relegated to the gloomy sphere of the "might 
 have been." Lee, opening the battle of the Wilderness 
 when "his opponent had three men for every one that 
 he could put in his battle line, won the honors of one of 
 the fiercest battles of the war and added new laurels 
 to the chaplet of his imperishable renown. 
 
 Next day the two armies lay in each other's front, 
 each strengthening his position as best he might and 
 expecting the other to assault. As the Union com- 
 mander was the aggressor, and had more than double 
 Lee's force, the latter might well await his attack. 
 Toward afternoon, however, it became known that 
 Grant was moving his baggage-train covered by his 
 heavy lines. It was believed by some in both armies 
 that he was on the retreat for the Rappahannock. Lee's 
 adjutant-general and military secretary recorded in his 
 notebook a query as to this new general, adding that 
 any one of his predecessors would have recrossed the 
 river after such a defeat. Stuart, who was always 
 alert, reported to Lee in the afternoon that Grant was 
 moving his wagons toward Chancellorsville.^ Lee alone 
 
 ' Ibid., p. 333. 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 407 
 
 divined that in moving, Grant would head, not for the 
 nortli bank of the Rappahannock, but for the north 
 bank of the James. All day he spent on his lines study- 
 ing his enemy's designs, and, while his staff officers 
 felt assured that Grant was fixed in their front, he pene- 
 trated his purpose with an infallible instinct. In wise 
 anticipation of Grant's design, Stuart had already been 
 sent to Spottsylvania Court House to guard the im- 
 portant roads which met there; and at nightfall Lee 
 detached four brigades of Longstreet's Corps, now com- 
 manded in Longstreet's absence by R. H. Anderson, 
 and sent them to this point, despatching with him his 
 adjutant-general to apprise Stuart of the approach of 
 the infantry. He was not a moment too soon. Grant 
 had already formed his plan of withdrawing from Lee's 
 front by night and, marching by the left flank, of seiz- 
 ing the strategic point of Spottsylvania Court House; 
 and that night at 9 o'clock he began his march. So 
 assured, indeed, was he of the successful execution of 
 his movement that next day he sent his government a 
 despatch speaking of it as though it were an already 
 accomplished fact. He ''stated the positions to be 
 occupied by his several corps at the end of the first day's 
 march, in which Warren's corps was placed at Spott- 
 sylvania Court House." But as Colonel Taylor, Lee's 
 adjutant-general, says in his "General Lee," "Lee dis- 
 arranged this part of the programme." 
 
 Warren, marching for the Cross Roads at Spottsyl- 
 vania Court House, found himself seriously delayed in 
 the darkness by the staff and head-quarters equipment 
 of Meade, as well as of the commanding general, which 
 
408 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 occupied the road ahead of him; and when he arrived 
 within two or three miles of his destination he found 
 Sheridan's cavalry in his front, held back by Fitz Lee's 
 Cavalry, posted across the Brock Road and another 
 road which joined it two miles from Spottsylvania. 
 The gossip of the army was, that in an interview be- 
 tween Warren and Sheridan at this point were laid the 
 seeds which were to bear such bitter fruit for Warren 
 at the battle of Five Forks, nearly a year later. It is 
 reported that Warren ordered Sheridan to get his men 
 out of his way, and stated that if he could not drive the 
 enemy from their front he (Warren) had men who could 
 do it, a speech which offended Sheridan deeply. How- 
 ever this may have been, acting in accordance with this 
 idea, Warren moved his men forward in line of battle 
 and drove the Confederate cavalry from the position 
 which they had hitherto held, driving them across an 
 open field into the woods beyond it. Warren's line 
 advanced across the field in pursuit, and when within 
 a few score yards of the edge of the woods, found them- 
 selves unexpectedly facing Anderson's lines lying be- 
 hind a fence on the edge of the woods, who suddenly 
 poured into their faces a sheet of flame. Breaking 
 under the shock, they were driven back across the field 
 and along the Brock Road, and the lines were eventu- 
 ally established near this place in a wide crescent, with 
 Lee's left and right resting on the Po and the coveted 
 Cross Roads of Spottsylvania Court House well covered 
 in the centre. 
 
 Humphreys pays General Fitz Lee the tribute of 
 saying that he saved Spottsylvania that morning for 
 
THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN 409 
 
 General Lee. This is quite true. But General Lee 
 saved it for the Southern Confederacy by the masterly 
 ability with which he divined and met Grant's move- 
 ment. 
 
CHAPTER XVI 
 SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE 
 
 The lines of the two armies at Spottsylvania Court 
 House were, says Humphreys, formed to hold the posi- 
 tions which each one occupied at the close of the fight- 
 ing on the first day, the 8th. This accounts for the 
 Salient. 
 
 About midway of Lee's line of fortifications, which 
 on his left ran nearly eastward from the Po, lay a 
 tract of rising ground about a half mile in width and 
 from three-quarters of a mile to a mile in depth. Just 
 back of it was a low bottom through which crept a 
 small branch in front of a farm-house at the top of a 
 gentle slope.^ This rising ground appeared to com- 
 mand the ground in front of it, and in order to avoid 
 the low ground and hold the elevation, the entrench- 
 ments suddenly swerved north-eastward for about 
 three-quarters of a mile, following the conformation 
 of the ground, then turned back at an angle and ran 
 south-eastward for a distance of between three and 
 four miles to the Po River. This space thus enclosed 
 within the out jutting entrenchments came to be known 
 later, when thousands of brave men had died for its 
 possession, as the ^'Bloody Salient," or the "Bloody 
 Angle." More properly, however, a crook in the western 
 
 * The McCool house. 
 410 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE 411 
 
 line near the apex of the Sahent was the point known as 
 the Bloody Angle. At a distance of two hundred yards 
 or so on either side of the Salient was woodland which 
 formed a protection for any force formed to attack it. 
 Jutting out as it did for such a distance beyond the 
 general direction of Lee's line, it was the weak point 
 in the Confederate defences, and this Lee's eye detected 
 the instant he arrived on the ground and rode along 
 his lines as was his wont, and a second line of defences 
 was run across this Salient. The lines of the Sali- 
 ent were, however, held on to. In Lee's dispositions 
 Longstreet's Corps was on Lee's left, faced by the 
 Fifth Corps (Warren's). Next to him came Ewell, his 
 lines running north-eastward almost at right angles 
 to Longstreet and embracing the Salient. At the apex 
 they turned southward to join Hill, who defended Lee's 
 right. Rodes's Division, of Ewell's Corps, occupied the 
 west side of the Salient, with Johnson's Division next 
 him holding the apex and the east side. Across the 
 Salient about half way to the apex was a second line 
 of entrenchment, where Gordon was placed in reserve. 
 
 Lee had outmarched and outgeneralled Grant so far, 
 and had barred his way to the coveted point whence 
 the roads led to Lee's own communications with Rich- 
 mond. But Grant's preponderant force made the turn- 
 ing of his line always a danger to be met. 
 
 The next day, the 9th, was spent mainly in adjusting 
 the lines and constructing fortifications, and except 
 for the skirmishing between the lines, which was con- 
 stant, and one movement to turn Lee's left, no fight- 
 ing was done. The enemy, however, sustained a severe 
 
412 ROBERT E. LEE '^^^ 
 
 loss in the death of the gallant General Sedgwick, who 
 in the skirmishing was shot on his lines at a fork on the 
 Brock Road just after he had rallied a soldier for dodg- 
 ing the bullets of the sharp-shooters and told him that 
 they could not hit an elephant at that distance. The 
 forces on both sides were working like beavers making 
 entrenchments for the fight which all knew the morrow 
 would bring. 
 
 Only one serious movement was undertaken this day. 
 An effort was made on the afternoon of the 9th to turn 
 Lee's left, and for this purpose Hancock was sent around 
 across the Po with several divisions; but was unable to 
 make much progress and waited for daylight to carry 
 out his movement. Lee, being notified, sent Early 
 back to meet this threatening force, which was being 
 retarded by Hampton's Cavalry, and Early, attacking 
 sharply along a little stream known as Glade Run, just 
 after two of the Federal divisions were withdrawn to 
 aid Warren in a direct assault on Lee's left centre, 
 moved forward. A stubborn resistance was offered by 
 Barlow's division, which held the ridge above the Po, 
 and Heth's Division, which bore the brunt of the work, 
 was twice repulsed in the afternoon, but he drove the 
 enemy across the river, and Lee, strengthening his 
 left and entrenching behind the Po, ended the turning 
 movement which threatened his communications with 
 the railroad and Richmond. The next day, the 10th, 
 the battle of Spottsylvania began in earnest. Warren 
 and Hancock and Wright advanced in the afternoon 
 about four o'clock in a gallant but futile assault against 
 Lee's left; the whole line of assailants sweeping up to 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE 413 
 
 the heavy abatis in front of the trenches, and some 
 of the assailants actually reaching the parapet where 
 Longstreet's Corps awaited them, only to be shot down 
 in the furious struggle. Three hours later another as- 
 sault was made along this part of the line by Hancock's 
 corps; but again the assailants were swept back with 
 frightful loss. 
 
 In another part of the line farther toward the centre 
 the assault was for a time more successful. At the left 
 of the Salient, above the intersection of the Brock Road 
 and the Louisa Court House Road, where Doles's Bri- 
 gade, of Rodes's Division, lay in what came after- 
 ward to be known as the "Bloody Angle," Upton's 
 division, of the Sixth Corps, having formed in four lines 
 behind a wood, made an assault under cover of a ter- 
 rific fire from the Federal artillery, and sweeping over 
 the breastworks, carried the line for several hundred 
 yards, capturing a number of prisoners estimated at 
 from 350 to 1,200, together with the guns of the bat- 
 tery defending that angle. Had the assailants been 
 promptly supported as was ordered, the fight at this 
 point might have been as renowned as was that which 
 occurred two days later, when Hancock again carried 
 the line of the Salient and for a time put Lee's army 
 in such peril that Lee felt it necessary to place him- 
 self at the head of the troops sent in to recapture 
 the line which had been broken. Upton, however, 
 was not supported, and after a short time Gordon 
 arrived from the second line, which he held as a 
 reserve and, together with Battle's Brigade, Daniel's 
 Brigade, and the remnant of Doles's Brigade, attacked 
 
414 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the intruders, while Walker's Brigade attacked them 
 in flank and recaptured the lost lines together with the 
 guns and many prisoners. The total Federal loss on 
 this day is set down by Federal authorities at something 
 over 4,000 men, while the Confederate loss was about 
 half that number. 
 
 The following day, the 11th, Grant, though still 
 resolute in his belief that he could destroy Lee's army 
 if he were but given men enough, must have begun to 
 entertain some doubt, at least, as to the ease with 
 which this destruction could be accomplished. On 
 the 10th he sent a despatch to Washington, saying: 
 "The enemy hold our front in very strong force and 
 evince a strong determination to interpose between us 
 and Richmond to the last. I shall take no backward 
 steps. . . . We can maintain ourselves, at least, and 
 in the end beat Lee's army, I believe. Send to Belle 
 Plain all the infantry you can rake and scrape. ..." 
 This was far from the state of mind which declared 
 that Lee's army was his objective. The next day he 
 must have been in yet further doubt as to the man- 
 ner of defeating his antagonist; for although his eulo- 
 gists have declared that he never countermanded an 
 order when once given, a statement in itself far from 
 exact, on this day Burnside was first ordered to with- 
 draw the Ninth Corps from the south side of the Ny; 
 then was ordered to resume his position.^ Later in 
 the day such evidence was given of an attempt to turn 
 the Confederate left that Early was ordered by Lee to 
 take possession of Shady Grove by light next morning 
 
 ■ Humphreys' "Campaign in Virginia in '64 and '65." 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE 415 
 
 and hold it, a move necessary to protect the road to 
 Louisa Court House, by which Lee secured his sup- 
 plies. But during the night it was discovered that 
 the real movement of the enemy was toward Lee's 
 right, and Mahone's Division, with two brigades of 
 Wilcox's Division, which had been sent with Early, 
 were moved by Lee back to the right to meet this 
 new movement. 
 
 Grant had, indeed, determined to repeat on a larger 
 scale the attack on the outlying Salient which had 
 so nearly succeeded and so signally failed on the even- 
 ing of the 10th, and for this purpose he was massing 
 his troops on both sides of the Salient under cover of 
 the woods which stretched about it, with a view to mak- 
 ing the assault next morning at daylight. In this he 
 was favored by the fact that that evening Lee had re- 
 ceived information that, added to the withdrawal of 
 Burnside's Corps to the north of the Ny River, tended 
 to show that Grant was preparing to repeat his ma- 
 noeuvre of moving by the left flank toward Richmond, 
 and in consequence orders were given to withdraw the 
 artillery from the Salient occupied by Johnson's Divis- 
 ion, to have it available for a counter move to the right. ^ 
 
 In truth, Lee, entrenched across Grant's selected 
 path to Richmond, was very difficult to dislodge, 
 though he had little more than half as many men as 
 Grant had in his front. Every effort which Grant had 
 made to break his lines had failed disastrously, and 
 whichever way he turned he found himself balked. As 
 he had wired on the 10th for all the reinforcements 
 
 •Taylor's "Lee," p. 224. 
 
416 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 that could be raked and scraped, even for 10,000 men 
 from the defences of Washington, so on the 11th he 
 wired again saying: ''The arrival of reinforcements here 
 will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope that 
 they will be sent as fast as possible and in as great num- 
 bers." It was in this despatch that he declares, "I 
 propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all sum- 
 mer," a declaration which he found impossible to fulfil; 
 for by the time the summer was half out he was in the 
 trenches south of the James, having lost in fighting it 
 out on this line as many men as Lee had in his army on 
 any day since the campaign opened. Indeed, in this 
 despatch Grant gives an idea of the terrible cost of the 
 slight advance which he had made. "We have now," 
 he says, ''ended the sixth day of very heavy fighting. 
 The result to this time is much in our favor, but our 
 losses have been heavy, as well as those of the enemy. 
 We have lost to this time eleven general officers, killed, 
 wounded, and missing, and probably 20,000 men." 
 Had he waited until after the next day's battle at the 
 "Bloody Angle" he might have added another 7,000 
 to the terrible tale, and had he waited but another 
 six days, when he abandoned his efforts to destroy Lee 
 at Spottsylvania, he must have given the dread score 
 of killed, wounded, and missing at nearly twice 20,000 
 men. Lee's loss in the fight over the "Bloody Angle" 
 he might have placed at possibly 10,000 men, includ- 
 ing the prisoners taken. The numbers are so stag- 
 gering that the mind fails to grasp the terrible truth 
 that these were men and merely deals with them as 
 ciphers, as Grant did in his despatch. 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE 417 
 
 All the night of the 11th Grant was massing his troops, 
 behind the screen of the darkness, about the top of the 
 Salient, with a view to rushing it at dawn. Hancock 
 led three of his divisions to the point, and staff officers 
 were sent to Burnside to spur him to prompt action. 
 Wright, who had succeeded Sedgwick in command 
 of the Sixth Corps, was to give aid as needed. The 
 movement in front of Lee's lines was not unnoticed, 
 and Johnson sent word to return his artillery; which 
 drew from General Lee the remark that his generals 
 were sending different accounts. Early reporting that 
 the enemy were moving around his left and Johnson 
 that they were massing in his front. The guns were 
 ordered back, but different artillery was sent, and the 
 ground being unknown, it only reached the lines in 
 time to be taken. The lines, indeed, were broken at 
 the moment that the guns (Page's and Cutshaw's bat- 
 talions) were being wheeled in at a gallop. All but two 
 of the twenty-two guns returned were captured, and 
 only the two front guns got in a shot.^ As the night 
 fog lifted, out of the mist came something like 40,000 
 men sweeping forward, line after line, like the waves 
 of the sea, enveloping the top of the Salient on all sides. 
 Had Johnson's artillery been in place the result might 
 have been different ; but though the infantry poured a 
 steady fire in their assailants' faces, the impulse was too 
 great to be resisted. They swarmed over the breast- 
 works in masses; the various commands mingled to- 
 gether, and inside the furious contest raged on with the 
 
 ' These were Captain William Page Carter's guns. Letters of John 
 W. Daniel, Robert M. Hunter, and A. W. Garber, Richmond Times- 
 Dispatch, November 26, 1905. 
 
418 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 men who held them to the last, many of whom were slain 
 with the bayonet in the fierce hand-to-hand fight which 
 ensued before they were overwhelmed and subdued. 
 When the smoke cleared away the Federals were in 
 possession of over a thousand yards of Lee's centre 
 and had captured some 4,000 men, including Major- 
 General Edward Johnson and Brigadier-General George 
 H. Steuart, and twenty guns. It looked as though 
 Lee's army were cut in two by a force fully equal to the 
 destruction of both fragments. But this army was 
 composed of the best fighting men of the South and 
 was captained by one who, like Napoleon, left nothing 
 to chance. Across the base of the Angle thus seized, 
 another line of entrenchments had been thrown to 
 meet precisely such an emergency, and here Gordon 
 was posted in reserve. During the night he, on hearing 
 that the enemy were massing to assault the line, had 
 sent Pegram's Brigade to Johnson, and as soon as the 
 firing began he sent R. H. Johnston forward only to be 
 met by the onrush of Hancock's troops as they swept 
 on down the interior of the Salient. Withdrawing Pe- 
 gram's and Evans's Brigades to the cover of his reserve 
 entrenchments, he reformed them and led them for- 
 ward to recover the lost ground. It was at this critical 
 moment, when the fate of his army appeared to hang 
 in the balance, that Lee in person appeared on the scene 
 and rode forward to place himself at the head of his 
 men. Riding to the head of the column forming for 
 the charge he took off his hat and pointed to the cap- 
 tured line. The cry was instantaneous from general 
 and men: "Go to the rear. General Lee!" Lee, still 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE 419 
 
 determined, held his place; when Gordon appealed to 
 his men. ''Is it necessary," he demanded, ''for General 
 Lee to lead this charge?" "No! no!" they shouted; 
 "we will drive them back if General Lee will go to the 
 rear." And rushing forward they made good their 
 word. Their first attack fell on Hancock's left, on the 
 east side of the Salient, which they cleared after a bitter 
 struggle, recapturing (for a time) some of the lost guns. 
 At the same time Rodes was sending forward Daniel's 
 and Ramseur's Brigades to clear the west side of the 
 Salient. This also was done, though with immense 
 losses, and for much of the time the enemy held the 
 reverse side of the fortifications, the Confederates 
 the inner side, the fight now being hand to hand; at 
 other times the men firing at each other point-blank 
 through the crevices of the logs which formed the for- 
 tifications. General Daniel was killed; General Ram- 
 seur was badly wounded. Two of Mahone's Brigades, 
 Perrin's and Harris's, now came in on Ramseur's right, 
 and one of Wilcox's Brigades (McGowan's) came up 
 also. Perrin and McGowan both were shot soon after 
 getting on the ground, the former being killed, the 
 latter seriously wounded. From this time the fighting 
 continued with unabated fury, and, indeed, ferocity, all 
 through the day and on into the night until it ceased 
 from the sheer exhaustion of the combatants. Mean- 
 time, while Hancock's and Burnside's corps were con- 
 tending over the bloody Salient, under Grant's orders 
 one of Burnside's divisions (Potter's) had attacked 
 and captured a portion of Hill's line on Lee's right, held 
 by Lane's Brigade, and, with the line, two guns. Lane, 
 
420 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 however, rallied his men and, reinforced by two of 
 Wilcox's Brigades, and Doles's Brigade, promptly re- 
 captured the fortifications and the guns, and pressing 
 back the enemy, made good his line. Then with a view 
 to relieving Ewell to the westward, they pushed on, driv- 
 ing Potter's troops before them, capturing a battery of 
 six guns and many prisoners, until Lane found himself 
 in front of a large force of the enemy advancing in two 
 lines, when he retired to his lines without being able 
 to bring off the gims. These advancing lines were 
 Willcox's division, of Burnside's corps. Grant's plan 
 was to press an advance along his whole line, and while 
 the fight raged about the bloody Salient, where Sedg- 
 wick's old corps, Hancock's corps, and much of Burn- 
 side's corps were struggling to break through Lee's 
 centre, Warren was ordered to attack Anderson's line, 
 where Longstreet's men lay guarding Lee's left. Two 
 assaults were made, after "Warren had opened all his 
 guns," in a heavy fire on the lines, the men of the Fifth 
 Corps advancing gallantly under a hail of lead and 
 iron; but they were repulsed with heavy loss, and in 
 a short time "a, furious fusillade" broke out between 
 two Federal brigades who, by mistake, attacked each 
 other in the woods. Next, Warren was ordered to 
 the west face of the Salient; but at the last moment 
 it was given up. Lee's line, broken in the centre by 
 the sheer weight of numbers in the dim dawn, had 
 been reformed and held intact throughout the long day 
 against an assault whose fury and duration were un- 
 known in the annals of war. The fighting is said to 
 have been more continuously fierce and deadly than in 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE 421 
 
 any battle of the war. For seventeen hours on a stretch 
 a sleet of musketry swept the ground in front of the 
 contending lines, gnawing down forest trees and eating 
 away the fortifications in a leaden storm. The dead in 
 the trenches had to be lifted out time and again to make 
 room for the living who took their places only to follow 
 them and be lifted out in turn by those who followed 
 them. It is not a question of who was bravest where 
 all were brave. Nearly 6,000 brave men fell that day 
 on each side. It was the supreme proof of American 
 constancy. On the Southern side two brigadier-gen- 
 erals were killed, four were severely wounded, and one 
 major-general and one brigadier-general were captured. 
 
 When morning dawned on the 13th Lee had estab- 
 lished his line across the base of the Salient and still 
 presented to Grant an unbroken front resting as be- 
 fore on the Po and guarding the roads to his line of 
 communication. But he had lost nearly 10,000 men. 
 
 Lee having thwarted Grant's earnest and costly at- 
 tempt to break through his lines, it was determined by 
 the latter to try an assault on Lee's right, and at the 
 same time assault his centre again with the Second and 
 Ninth Corps, Hancock's and Burnside's. Accordingly, 
 Warren and Wright were on the night of the 13th moved 
 across opposite to where Hill held Lee's right, to open 
 the attack next morning at daybreak. Lee, however, 
 had brought Mahone from his left to support Hill. 
 . Again that power of divining what his opponent would 
 attempt came to his aid, and when the enemy appeared 
 in increased force on his right he was prepared to meet 
 them. When Upton's brigade occupied a high and 
 
422 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 commanding point on the south side of the Ny, Lee had 
 Mahone's Division (Wright's Brigade) in place ready to 
 support his cavalry and dislodge him. Grant now tried 
 approaches, and for three days gave himself up to ad- 
 vancing his entrenchments and establishing batteries for 
 another assault, and on the night of the 17th Hancock's 
 and Wright's corps were ordered back to their old 
 lines under cover of darkness in the hope that Lee's left 
 and left centre, denuded to strengthen his right, might 
 be carried by a coup. But there, too, Lee was ready 
 for them, and though the attack was made at daylight 
 as planned and was pressed for hours by three corps of 
 the Army of the Potomac, aided by their pov/erful 
 artillery, they were met with a fire "which completely 
 swept the ground in front," and the only result of the 
 assault was to swell the already appalling roster of the 
 dead and wounded by over 2,000 men. 
 
 Grant, balked in his effort to break Lee's line of 
 defences, at last gave it up and planned once more to 
 do that which he had once declared he never did — 
 manoeuvre. Orders were issued to move by the left 
 flank on the night of the 19th to the south-west; but 
 Lee, again suspecting him, sent Ewell forward around 
 Grant's right to demonstrate and learn his intentions, 
 which was effectually accomplished, Kershaw holding 
 E well's lines while the latter was feeling the enemy, 
 and Ewell making such a threatening attack that Han- 
 cock and Warren, who were already headed south, were 
 forced to send troops back on the double-quick, and 
 Grant's plan was broken up for at least that day. 
 
 Thus ended the famous battles of the Wilderness and 
 
SPOTTSYLVANIA COURT HOUSE 423 
 
 Spottsylvania Court House, with Lee's army of half 
 the size of his opponent's assuming the offensive after 
 two weeks of such fighting as the American continent 
 had never hitherto witnessed. The latter 's losses had 
 been over 32,000 killed and wounded. Lee's losses are 
 not known, but were heavy enough. "The Confeder- 
 ate losses," says Alexander, '^can never be accurately 
 known for any of the battles from now until the close 
 of the war, as few reports could be made in such active 
 campaigns. Livermore's estimates give 17,250 for the 
 same battles, the missing not included." ^ 
 /Three facts stand forth pre-eminently during this 
 deadly campaign: Lee's genius. Grant's resolution, and 
 the infinite courage of the officers and men on both 
 sides. 
 
 /^ 'Alexander's "Memoirs," p. 629. 
 
CHAPTER XVII 
 SOUTH ANNA AND SECOND COLD HARBOR 
 
 While the death struggle was going on day after day 
 in the Spottsylvania forests between Lee and Grant, a 
 struggle was going on elsewhere in Virginia both to the 
 north and south of the main battle-ground, yet which 
 was intimately connected therewith. Sigel, whose part 
 in Grant's general scheme to compass Lee's destruc- 
 tion was to sweep through the valley of Virginia and 
 destroy not only the source of Lee's supplies, but the 
 Virginia Central Railway, his line of communication 
 therewith, was approaching Staunton with a force of 
 5,500 men when he was met and defeated at New- 
 market, on the 15th of May, by Breckinridge with a 
 force of 5,000 men. It was in this battle that the 
 Cadet Corps of the Virginia Military Institute achieved 
 fame by marching forward under fire as if on parade, 
 dressing on their colors while shot and shell tore through 
 their ranks, recalling, in their coolness and undaunted 
 gallantry, the Gants Glasses at the siege of Rethel. . 
 
 Meantime Lee had to bear the burden of the defence 
 of Richmond from attack in another direction. To 
 the southward, on the day following Grant's move 
 toward the James, another part of Grant's plan was 
 attempted, with, if possible, more signal failure. At 
 City Point, where the Appomattox empties into the 
 
 424 
 
SOUTH ANNA 425 
 
 James, lay General B. F. Butler with the Army of 
 the James, two army corps, the Tenth and the Eigh- 
 teenth, and a division of cavalry, in all some 38,600 
 officers and men, and 88 guns/ General Butler had 
 been "instructed by General Grant that Richmond 
 was his objective point," that he was to "move at 
 the same time with the Army of the Potomac, take 
 City Point and that vicinity, . . . operate on the 
 south side of the James, . . . and that his army and 
 the Army of the Potomac were to co-operate. . . . 
 Should Lee fall back upon Richmond, the Army of the 
 Potomac would unite with the Army of the James. 
 ... If he should be able to invest Richmond on the 
 south side, so as to rest his left upon the James above 
 the city, the junction of the armies would preferably 
 take place there." ^ Should he learn that the Army 
 of the Potomac was advancing on Richmond, he was 
 to "attack vigorously"; and if he should not be able 
 to carry the city, he would, at least, be able "to detain 
 a considerable force of the enemy there." It was all 
 very well conceived and, up to the actual execution, 
 well carried out. 
 
 Butler, under these orders to co-operate with Grant, 
 had moved on Richmond by way of the James on the 
 same day (May 4) that Grant moved by way of the 
 Wilderness. On the 5th, the same day that Lee struck 
 Grant in the Wilderness, he reached Bermuda Hundred, 
 twenty miles below Richmond, under cover of an im- 
 posing fleet of war vessels ; and next day he advanced 
 
 * Humphreys' "Campaign in Virginia in '64 and '65," p. 137. 
 » Ibid., p. 138. 
 
426 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 to within two miles and a half of the Richmond and 
 Petersburg Railwa}-, only six miles from Petersburg 
 and sixteen from Richmond. An attempt to reach 
 this railway line was defeated by a South Carolina 
 brigade which was opportunely halted there on its 
 way to Richmond by General Pickett, who was in 
 charge of the defence of Petersburg, until relieved 
 by Beauregard, when he was summoned from South 
 Carolina for the defence of Richmond. At this time 
 Petersburg was substantially ungarrisoned. Pickett 
 had there but one regiment, and to the south-east, 
 along the Blackwater, a part of Clingman's Brigade of 
 North Carolinians, stationed there to contest any ad- 
 vance from Suffolk; so completely had the south side 
 been stripped to enable Lee to hold Grant back. 
 
 The next few days were spent by Butler in attempt- 
 ing to establish his lines near Richmond and to cut 
 the railways both north and south of Petersburg. The 
 destruction of the bridges south of Petersburg by the 
 Federal cavalry delayed the troops being brought up 
 from the South by Beauregard; but those whom he 
 secured proved sufficient. By the time that Butler 
 made his serious attack on Petersburg, Beauregard had 
 got together some 20,000 men. At this time, however, 
 when Butler first appeared, Beauregard had in Peters- 
 burg only Wise's Brigade, some 2,500 men, to which were 
 later added Martin's Brigade and Bearing's Cavalry. 
 On the 12th of May, the same day that saw the ter- 
 rific battle over the "Bloody Angle" at Spottsylvania, 
 Butler set out to turn Beauregard's right and to de- 
 stroy him utterly. Advancing up the James he sent his 
 
SOUTH ANNA 427 
 
 cavalry to destroy the two railways from Richmond to 
 the South, and he himself prepared to dislodge Beau- 
 regard, entrenched along a line between Drewry's Bluff 
 and Petersburg, while he called on Admiral Lee, in com- 
 mand of the fleet, to ascend the river and keep pace 
 with his advance. An attack on the entrenchments 
 was repulsed, after which Beauregard withdrew to his 
 inner entrenchments. Butler now thought that every- 
 thing was going favorably and planned to attack next 
 day with his whole army, but for some reason deferred 
 the attack till the 16th. But a better soldier than 
 Butler was commanding the force opposite to him, 
 inferior in numbers as it was. The defences of Rich- 
 mond and Petersburg had been laid out by masters 
 of the science of fortification, at whose head was one 
 equally the master of the science of fortifications and 
 of their defence. So long as a thousand men to the 
 mile to defend them could be found they were im- 
 pregnable. Thus, when Butler attacked the defences 
 of Petersburg, Beauregard was not only ready to de- 
 fend them, but to assume the offensive. '^ General 
 Butler," says the same high Union authority on whose 
 studies so much of the history of this campaign has 
 been based, " could not assault Drewry's Bluff entrench- 
 ments; he could not move to turn them, and he could 
 not fall back to his Bermuda Hundred lines or to a new 
 position on the river without abandoning his campaign 
 against Richmond with the Army of the James. In 
 other words, he was completely paralyzed so far as con- 
 cerned offensive operations." ^ 
 
 * IMd., p. 149. 
 
428 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Thus, when, on the morning of the 16th, Butler 
 was preparing to destroy Beauregard, Beauregard fore- 
 stalled him, and, having formed his men during the 
 ''sma' hours" of the night, at daybreak made an attack 
 with Ransom's Division and two of Hoke's Brigades on 
 Butler's right that shattered not only his dream of con- 
 quest, but, after a fierce contest of an hour's duration, 
 carried the right of Butler's breastworks held by Heck- 
 man's brigade, of General Baldy Smith's corps, cap- 
 turing the brigadier, many prisoners, and five stands of 
 colors. The fight along the centre and right was more 
 obstinately contested; but eventually Gillmore, who 
 commanded there, was forced out of his entrenchments, 
 having, he says, been ordered to retire and reinforce 
 General Baldy Smith, who was being driven back and 
 hard pressed. A dense fog which had fallen toward 
 morning and enveloped everything doubtless contrib- 
 uted to the surprise of Smith's lines; but it also con- 
 fused the advancing Confederates, who had to be halted 
 and realigned. And the failure of Wliiting to come 
 up on the right from Petersburg with his two brigades, 
 as he had been ordered to do, marred Beauregard's 
 plan and prevented as complete a rout of Butler's 
 army as he had anticipated. Yet, it was sufficiently 
 complete. It saved Petersburg, and for the rest of 
 the month, Butler, who retreated that night to his 
 Bermuda Hundred entrenchments, was "hemmed in" 
 where he could not menace Richmond further; or, 
 to use Grant's expressive phrase, was bottled up as 
 tightly as if he had been corked up in a bottle. He 
 had lost in the battle 3,500 men, 5 guns, and 5 
 
SOUTH ANNA 429 
 
 stands of colors, while Beauregard had lost some 2,200 
 men. Butler lost, beside, pretty much whatever repu- 
 tation as a general he had previously retained. Grant, 
 on learning of his failure to accomplish anything, 
 ordered him to forward to him, by way of the James 
 and the York, under General Baldy Smith, all troops 
 except enough to hold his position; and on the 29th, 
 Smith left by water for West Point, on the York, with 
 16,000 men to join the Army of the Potomac, which 
 he did in time to be one of the sufferers at Cold Har- 
 bor. Butler retained some 14,000 men, but so little 
 was he considered that Beauregard sent Lee, under 
 the latter 's orders, more than half of his command. 
 
 Having failed in his plan to destroy Lee's army, 
 Grant now moved by the left flank nearer to Richmond, 
 with the design, says Humphreys, of drawing him into 
 a battle in the open country before he could occupy and 
 fortify a new position; or, if this trap should fail, of 
 marching on and making a successful turning movement 
 and throwing his army between Lee and Richmond. 
 With this in view, Hancock's corps was moved on the 
 night of the 20th to Guinea Station, on the Richmond 
 and Fredericksburg Railway, and thence to Bowling 
 Green and Milford Station, in the direction of Richmond; 
 Warren's corps was moved on the 21st in the same 
 direction; Burnside's corps was to follow, taking the 
 telegraph road, the most direct of the highways; and 
 V/right's corps was to follow last; the whole army 
 being headed for Hanover Junction, beyond the North 
 Anna River, only twenty-five miles from Richmond. 
 The plan was an excellent one and its execution began 
 
430 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 duly on time. That it did not come to a successful 
 conclusion was due solely to Lee's generalship. Watch- 
 ful as ever, the enemy had no sooner begun to move 
 than Lee moved also, and though Grant had the start 
 and lay nearer the North Anna, Lee outstripped him 
 for the goal. Wlien the head of Grant's columns ar- 
 rived in sight of the North Anna, there on the other 
 side lay Lee's army across his path. 
 
 On the first intimation that Grant was withdrawing 
 from his front, Lee had moved Ewell to his right ; and 
 when Burnside, marching for the North Anna, reached 
 the Po, there on the south bank across the telegraph 
 road lay Jackson's old corps to contest his way. It 
 was not an inviting prospect, and the Ninth Corps was 
 turned aside and followed Hancock's line by the more 
 roundabout way by Guinea and Milford. 
 
 Lee's transfer of his army on this occasion from 
 Grant's rear to his front was one of the most skilful ma- 
 noeuvres of the war. He was not one to be caught in 
 the trap which had been so carefully set. He let no 
 man select a -battle-ground on which to whip him. If 
 adverse fate brought him there, he made the best of 
 it; but no man was able to lure him to his destruc- 
 tion. He had no idea of becoming enmeshed in an en- 
 gagement with Grant on disadvantageous terms, and 
 in this race for the North Anna, while the Army of 
 the Potomac rested, the Army of Northern Virginia 
 marched. Hancock was across the Mattapony at Mil- 
 ford, nearly half way to the North Anna, on the morn- 
 ing of the 21st, when the skirmishers of Grant's other 
 corps pressed up to Lee's entrenchments at Spottsyl- 
 
SOUTH ANNA 431 
 
 vania to find him still there. Wlien Hancock arrived 
 at the North Anna, Lee was entrenched across his road. 
 He had marched from Spottsylvania with only two 
 hours' rest. All the afternoon and night of the 21st 
 his army was marching parallel with Grant's army, 
 resolute to gain the strong position of the South Anna. 
 Warren's outposts heard the rumble of guns and trains 
 all night long on the Telegraph Road ; and when Warren, 
 on the 22d, reached the Telegraph Road, the rear of 
 Longst reefs Corps was only four miles ahead of him. 
 Lee's cavalry kept in touch with the advancing Fed- 
 erals on every road throughout the entire march. 
 
 Lee, who was with the front of E well's Corps, having, 
 on the morning of the 22d, reached Hanover Junction, 
 where the two railways from Richmond to Fredericks- 
 burg and to Gordonsville and the south-west crossed 
 each other, telegraphed his arrival to the govern- 
 ment in Richmond, which was in some anxiety over 
 the situation. Breckinridge, having defeated Sigel at 
 Newmarket on the 15th, had been ordered to Hanover 
 Junction, where he arrived on the 20th and was await- 
 ing Lee with some 2,500 men; and Pickett's Division 
 and Hoke's Brigade, Colonel Lewis commanding, had 
 been ordered from before Petersburg to join him. As 
 Anderson and Hill came up, the former that evening, 
 the latter next morning, Lee made his dispositions. 
 Ewell was placed on his right, resting on the south 
 bank of the North Anna, commanding a crossing some 
 three miles below the railway; Hill, with Pickett's 
 Division, some 5,000 men which had been sent by Beau- 
 regard, commanding south of Richmond, to meet Lee 
 
432 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 at Hanover Junction, was on Lee's left, extending from 
 the North Anna south-westward across the Virginia 
 Central Railway to Little River, near Newmarket, three 
 or four miles away, the two lines forming a wide angle, 
 with the blunt apex resting on the North Anna for 
 nearly a mile, coimnanding the Telegraph Road and 
 the Oxford Crossings, the former a half a mile or more 
 above the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railway 
 bridge, the latter two miles or so above it where the 
 North Anna runs between high bluffs. The next after- 
 noon Warren's corps crossed the North Anna at a ford 
 at Jericho Mills, opposite Noel's Station, on the Virginia 
 Central Railway, about five miles above the Telegraph 
 Road Bridge, and was promptly attacked by Hill as 
 he was deploying in line of battle and his line driven 
 back on his artillery. Next morning the Sixth Corps 
 followed the Fifth, which entrenched on the ground 
 occupied above the river. That afternoon Hancock's 
 corps reached the river by the Telegraph Road and 
 after a spirited fight drove off the bridge guard posted 
 on the north side of this stream. Burnside's corps 
 also reached the river by the Telegraph Road, but failed 
 to effect a crossing at the Oxford, as Grant had planned. 
 That night Lee withdrew his advanced line and, hold- 
 ing the line along the river on the bluff above Oxford, 
 occupied the fortifications extending from above the 
 Oxford along the bluff and then south-eastwardly 
 across the railway, where he had prepared to deliver 
 his attack on Grant's wings, while he held back his 
 centre beyond the river at the Oxford. Burnside was 
 ordered on the 24th to carry the crossing of the river 
 
SOUTH ANNA 433 
 
 in his front, the Oxford; but although two divisions 
 were thrown across the river higher up with a view to 
 menacing the Oxford, it was found that Lee's disposi- 
 tion had been too well made to be successfully chal- 
 lenged. And that night Grant, having failed to make 
 good his crossing, turned his back on Lee's entrench- 
 ments and withdrawing his wings, already across on 
 the right and left, marched down the river to a point 
 twenty-odd miles below that at which Lee had offered 
 battle. It is said that Grant declared that this night, 
 when with his wings beyond the North Anna he found 
 himself unable to connect them, was the most uneasy 
 night of the war. In his report he simply says that, 
 finding Lee in a position stronger than either of the 
 two previous ones he had occupied, he abandoned 
 his intention to attack him there and crossed the 
 Pamunkey at Hanovertown below the junction of the 
 confluents of the Pamunkey, and some thirty miles 
 below Hanover Junction, with the design, as he stated 
 to Washington, of turning Lee's position by his right. 
 Lee wrote his wife from Hanover Junction on the 
 23d: "General Grant, having apparently grown tired 
 of forcing his passage through, began, on the night of 
 the 20th, to move around our right toward Bowling 
 Green, placing the Mattapony River between us. Fear- 
 ing he might unite with Sheridan and make a sudden 
 and rapid move upon Richmond, I determined to march 
 to this point so as to be in striking distance of Rich- 
 mond and be able to intercept him. The army is now 
 south of the North Anna. We have the advantage of 
 being nearer our supplies and less liable to have our 
 
434 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 communication trains, etc., cut by his cavalry. Still 
 I begrudge every step he takes toward Richmond." 
 
 Lee's position was, indeed, a strong one, and it was 
 a soldierly instinct of a high order that had led him to 
 occupy it. Burnside was the object of considerable 
 animadversion for not forcing a passage at the Oxford, 
 as Hancock had done at the Telegraph Road. In fact, 
 Lee's position above the Oxford was impregnable and 
 no force could have carried it. The fortifications along 
 the bluff and across the plateau are there to-day to 
 show how Lee placed his army like a wedge between 
 the lines which Grant chose for his two wings. With 
 these wings on one side of the river and the centre on 
 the other side it was a serious position which the Army 
 of the Potomac occupied from the 23d to the 26th, and 
 but for one of those strange fatalities which appeared 
 to visit the Southern arms. Grant's divided wings might 
 have found it fatal. It happened that Lee was sud- 
 denly struck down by an attack of what would now 
 be probably termed ptomaine poisoning. And at the 
 moment when he was about to reap the benefit of his 
 masterly disposition he was prostrated in his tent and 
 the opportunity passed. His adjutant-general tells 
 how, as he lay in his tent, he kept murmuring in his 
 feverish half-delirium, "We must strike them! we must 
 strike them! They must never be allowed to pass us 
 again." But the occasion was lost, and when Lee was 
 able to leave his bed. Grant was crossing the Pamun- 
 key, twenty-odd miles below the point where he had 
 declined Lee's offer of battle. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 28th of May the greater part 
 
SOUTH ANNA 435 
 
 of Grant's army crossed the Pamunkey — at the ferries 
 about Hanovertown, some thirty miles below Hanover 
 Junction and seventeen miles from Richmond — and 
 took position across the roads leading to the Confederate 
 capital. But once more Lee placed himself across his 
 path. On the evening of that day Lee's army, having 
 marched twenty-four miles since morning, took posi- 
 tion between Grant's army and Richmond, covering 
 those roads from the Chickahominy almost to Hanover 
 Court House. It was the fourth time in the great 
 manoeuvres that Lee had headed Grant and forced 
 him to fight for the line he had selected; and as before, 
 so now, Lee had chosen his line of defence. It was 
 already historic ground, for two years before, almost 
 to a day, Lee had won his first victory over McClellan 
 along the uplands above Beaver Dam Creek and Cold 
 Harbor; and to reach Richmond Grant must pass 
 across this historic field. Lee's cavalry, under Fitz 
 Lee, Hampton, and Butler, had been sent to keep touch 
 with the enemy should he advance directly toward 
 Richmond; and on the 28th, as Sheridan moved for- 
 ward along the Richmond Road in advance of Grant's 
 corps to find what difficulties were in the wa}^, he came 
 on the Confederate cavalry dismounted and holding 
 the road near Haw's shop, eight miles or so north-east 
 of Richmond. A sharp engagement ensued which 
 lasted until near nightfall, when the Confederate cav- 
 alry, being heavily outnumbered, fell back. But so 
 fierce had been the fight that Sheridan reported them 
 as having been supported by a brigade of 4,000 South 
 Carolinians armed with long-range rifles. 
 
436 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 On the 26th, as he retired from before Lee on the 
 South Anna, Grant, in explaining to Washington this 
 retrograde movement, added that "Lee's army is really 
 whipped." He was now to learn how wide this view 
 was of the fact. He had manoeuvred Lee out of his 
 defensive position on the South Anna only to find him 
 across his path on the Chickahominy. Lee had posted 
 on his right, resting on Beaver Dam Creek, Longstreet's 
 Corps, which owing to Longstreet's wound was still 
 commanded by Anderson; Swell's Corps (Early com- 
 manding, as Ewell was ill) came next ; and on his left, 
 with their front protected partly by the head branches 
 of Totopotomoy Creek and the impenetrable thickets 
 through which they run, were posted Hill's Corps and 
 Breckinridge's command, extending westward across 
 the Virginia Central Railway, a mile or so north of 
 Atlee Station. Opposite Lee, at first, on Grant's right, 
 were the Sixth Corps; the Second Corps (Hancock's) 
 next; the Fifth Corps (Warren's), with Wilson's cav- 
 alry on Grant's right wing and the rest of Sheridan's 
 cavalry guarding his left wing, while Burnside's corps 
 (the Ninth) was held in reserve. Grant had received 
 already in reinforcements some 30,000 men, and was 
 expecting some 16,000 more under General William F. 
 ("Baldy") Smith. These men, whom he had ordered 
 from Butler's army at Bermuda Hundred on the 28th, 
 when he had reason to fear that Lee had again flung 
 himself across his path, were on their way to him by 
 the York River route. His army numbered now — be- 
 fore Smith's arrival, which took place on the 30th — not 
 less than 110,000 men. Lee had received, since crossing 
 
SOUTH ANNA 437 
 
 the North Anna, reinforcements composed of Breckin- 
 ridge's command from South-west Virginia, 2,500 men; 
 Pickett's Division of Longstreet's Corps, 5,000 men; 
 and lastly, Hoke's Division, 5,000 men, which joined 
 him on the night of the 28th at Cold Harbor. His 
 army now numbered about 60,000 men. 
 
 The next few days were spent in skirmishing and 
 feeling the opposite force and in laying off the lines 
 for the pitched battle which each commander knew 
 was imminent. Grant's lines on his right extended a 
 good distance beyond Lee's left, and on the 30th 
 Wright's and Hancock's corps were ordered to try to 
 turn Lee's left; but failed to reach the point necessary, 
 owing, it is stated, to the impassable character of the 
 swamps and thickets in their course. Burnside's and 
 Warren's corps were pushed forward at the same time 
 (Warren on the left), but came on Early entrenched 
 beyond a swampy bottom and were stopped. As the 
 enemy were also extending toward his right, General 
 Lee now sent Early to his right to stop it and moved 
 Anderson to the right to take his place, thus keeping 
 steadily ahead of Grant. Early was moved over to the 
 Mechanicsville Road, and, advancing beyond Grant's 
 left, encountered one of Warren's brigades moving for- 
 ward, and Rodes's Division, sent forward in a charge, 
 drove them back to the cover of their artillery, which 
 stopped the pursuit. Next day Grant threatened to 
 attack all along the line; but Lee's front appeared too 
 perilous, and beyond a cavalry fight at the cross-roads 
 at old Cold Harbor, in which Sheridan pressed Fitz 
 Lee back, the day was mainly occupied in general 
 
438 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 skirmishing and strengthening lines. Lee now moved 
 Anderson further to his right beyond Early, thus ex- 
 tending his lines southward to keep pace with Grant's 
 manifest side-stepping toward the Chickahominy and 
 Richmond. Heavy skirmishing went on every day. 
 
 Grant, so far balked, now began to direct his atten- 
 tion to securing the important point where various 
 roads to Richmond and the lower James intersected, 
 and for this purpose he ordered the Sixth Corps from 
 his right to move by night to Cold Harbor to relieve 
 Sheridan. Lee countered by moving Longstreet far- 
 ther to the right, and Hoke yet farther. Lee was still 
 too ill to mount his horse; but he rode along his lines 
 in a little carriage, so great was the exigency of the 
 situation.^ That afternoon, the 1st of May, the battle 
 of "Second Cold Harbor" really began. The Sixth 
 Corps, supported by the newly arrived troops under 
 General Baldy Smith, made an attack along the road 
 leading westward from old Cold Harbor to Richmond, 
 and broke through where Hoke, on Lee's extreme right, 
 extended beyond Kershaw, of Longstreet's Corps, with 
 an interval between them. Happily, Hunton's Brigade, 
 of Pickett's Division, was near by, and marching 
 promptly to Hoke's aid, the lost ground was quickly 
 recovered, while Kershaw, on Hoke's left, recovered 
 the lost ground on his right and connected with Hoke 
 in a new line. Humphreys places the losses in the 
 Sixth and Sixteenth Corps in this encounter at 3,300 
 killed and wounded. The Confederate losses were also 
 heavy. 
 
 ' "Life of General William N. Pendleton," by S. P. Lee, p. 337. 
 
SOUTH ANNA 439 
 
 That afternoon the force opposite Lee's right was 
 ordered to be increased by Hancock's corps, which 
 marched by night from its position opposite Lee's left; 
 but on arrival near old Cold Harbor the troops were too 
 much broken down to engage, so the assault on Lee's 
 right was deferred till late in the afternoon, and then 
 was again deferred until daylight of the 3d. When 
 daylight came Lee was ready for this, as he had been 
 for Grant's former assaults. Anticipating the enemy's 
 plan to attack his right, Lee, on the 2d, met Grant's 
 move by extending his line south to the Chickahominy. 
 He that morning sent Breckinridge and Hill with two of 
 his divisions to his right, while Fitz Lee was sent across 
 the Chickahominy to picket the roads on that side 
 should Grant attempt to cross to the south side. The 
 armies now lay in line of battle opposite each other for 
 the final struggle on "this hne," ranged as follows: On 
 Lee's right, Wilcox's and Mahone's Divisions of Hill's 
 Corps; then Breckinridge. Next came Longstreet's 
 Corps, Kershaw with three brigades of Field's Division, 
 and, on the left, Early with Heth's Division extended to 
 the Shady Grove Church Road and beyond. On the 
 Federal side, Hancock was now opposite Lee's right; 
 next to him Wright (the Sixth Corps); then Smith 
 with the Eighteenth Corps; then Warren (the Fifth 
 Corps) ; and Burnside (the Ninth Corps) was in support 
 of Warren. On Grant's right flank was his cavalry, 
 while on Lee's left, opposite them, was his cavalry, ex- 
 cept Fitz Lee's Division, which was beyond the Chick- 
 ahominy. The whole line was some six miles long, 
 with Grant overlapping Lee's left with his preponder- 
 
440 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 ant numbers. Both sides, officers and men alike, knew 
 that the next day was to see a decisive battle, for both 
 sides knew well that Grant was still resolved to fight it 
 out on this line, and he was now at the end of the line. 
 Officers passing among the Union troops found them 
 sewing their names and addresses on their coats. Like 
 the Spartans at Thermopylae, they were preparing to 
 die. 
 
 It was barely light on the 3d of June when Grant's 
 left and centre, three full corps, moved from their 
 breastworks and advanced against Lee's right and cen- 
 tre ; Hancock, Baldy Smith, and Wright all moving in 
 concert and rushing forward along a line extending 
 nearly six miles from left to right. Grant had selected 
 the region of Cold Harbor for his attack, because, it is 
 said, he thought that if Lee attempted in his retreat to 
 cross the Chickahominy he would be in a perilous posi- 
 tion.^ 
 
 He was now to discover his mistake, and at what a 
 terrible cost! The attack made by his army was gal- 
 lant and desperate. Beginning with Hancock's left, 
 where Barlow's veteran division led the way with a 
 rush which swept over Lee's first line, and extending 
 to where, far to the northward, Burnside was attacking 
 Early beyond the Shady Grove Church Road, it con- 
 tinued until more men had been mowed down by the 
 leaden sleet from Lee's steadfast lines than fell in the 
 same time during the war. They were simply slaugh- 
 tered along a stretch of nearly six miles. They were 
 again and again sent forward only to be mercilessly 
 
 ' Humphreys' "Campaign in Virginia in '64 and '65," p. 181. 
 
SOUTH ANNA 441 
 
 torn to pieces by the lines of flame which swept them 
 from front and oblique till flesh and blood could stand 
 no more, and the gallant Army of the Potomac quailed 
 and lay still in face of the order to charge again. 
 Finally Grant and Meade both saw that it was a hope- 
 less task to set and gave orders to desist ; but not until, 
 for the first time possibly in the history of that brave 
 army, officers and men had throughout a long line failed 
 to respond to an order to advance. Late in the even- 
 ing, as Lee reported next day, one more attempt, ''final 
 but furious," was made to carry the position where 
 Breckinridge and Hoke were establishing their skir- 
 mish line, but "the enemy was soon repulsed." Thus 
 ended the furious battle of Second Cold Harbor; for 
 though Grant attempted to reach Lee's lines later it 
 was not by assaulting again, but by approaches only, 
 and by the 11th he knew that this move also was hope- 
 less and was planning to cross to the south side of the 
 James and effect what Butler had failed to accomplish 
 — the capture of Petersburg. 
 
 Grant's account of this last battle on his chosen line 
 was hardly sufficient. He dismisses in a sentence the 
 bloodiest and most signal defeat he had ever suffered. 
 ''On the 3d of June we again assaulted the enemy's 
 works in the hope of driving him from his position. In 
 this attempt our loss was heavy, while that of the ene- 
 my, I have reason to believe, was comparatively light." 
 This was hardly an adequate historical statement of a 
 battle in which over 110,000 men were totally defeated 
 by an army of less than 60,000, with a loss to the former 
 of over 8,000 men and to the latter of less than 1,000 
 
442 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 men. The number of casualties in the Army of North- 
 ern Virginia during this period, from the 27th of May 
 to the 12th of June, are nowhere stated. Humphreys 
 conjecturally places the killed and wounded at between 
 three and four thousand, the missing at a thousand 
 more.^ The Federal losses from June 1 to June 3, 
 inclusive, Humphreys gives at 12,970. McParlin, in 
 ''The Medical and Surgical History of the War," places 
 Grant's losses, from the time he crossed the Pamunkey 
 till he left Cold Harbor, at 17,129.' Whichever figure 
 be correct. Grant's losses had been prodigious, and un- 
 less it be conceded that this sacrifice of more than three 
 men for one of his opponent's was the only method by 
 which Grant could achieve his end, the future historian 
 is likely to revert to the judgment of the time when 
 Grant lost 60,000 men in thirty days — that it was not 
 good generalship. The harsh name given it then was 
 '' butchery." 
 
 In fact. Cold Harbor was one of the most signal and 
 disastrous failures in the history of the war. Even 
 Humphreys, usually so open and complete, fails to con- 
 vey the least idea of the absolute and disastrous de- 
 feat to which Grant had led his brave army. Grant 
 declared long afterward that Cold Harbor was the 
 only battle of the war which he would not fight over 
 again under the same circumstances. This was but a 
 tardy and incomplete admission of defeat. He was de- 
 feated and, with the summer but begun, he was forced 
 to abandon ''this line" on which he had boasted three 
 weeks before that he would fight it out if it took all 
 
 nbid., p. 192. ^Ibid., p. 191 and note. 
 
SOUTH ANNA 443 
 
 summer. Lee with but half his force had outgeneralled 
 him; within one month had destroyed over 40,000 men, 
 the flower of his army, and on this day, when Grant had 
 declared him whipped, he added to the dread tale over 
 8,000 more, and so shattered the confidence of his 
 government in Grant that gold went to the highest 
 point it had ever reached during the war. Instead of 
 Lee's retreating across the Chickahominy, as Grant had 
 planned. Grant, a little over a week later, on the 12th, 
 moved secretly by night away from Lee's front, and by 
 a distant and roundabout route took his army to the 
 James, which he obstructed by sinking boats in the 
 channel above him, and then by night on the 14th moved 
 his army across the river. His move was skilfully 
 executed, but, though it was inspired by a constant 
 mind and an indomitable will, it was certainly not the 
 act of a victor. He crossed the James with the hope 
 of capturing Petersburg by a coup, only to be again 
 defeated by Lee, and to be held off until he had lost 
 another 60,000 men and Lee had succumbed, not to his 
 generalship, as determined and resourceful as he was, 
 but to the forces which undermined the power of the 
 Confederate Government to furnish Lee with subsistence 
 for his army. 
 
CHAPTER XVIII 
 
 LEE'S STRATEGY AND THE FIRST ATTACK ON 
 PETERSBURG 
 
 Lee not only defeated Grant at Cold Harbor, but a 
 little later, with Grant still before him, he did what 
 Grant was vainly endeavoring to prevent. He sent 
 Hampton and Fitz Lee off after Sheridan, who was 
 marching on Charlottesville, expecting to meet Hunter 
 there ; sent Breckinridge back to the valley of Virginia 
 to intercept Hunter; and sent Early with his corps 
 to cut off Hunter, who was marching down the valley, 
 his course marked by the embers of burning mansions 
 and the evidences of such ruthless destruction that even 
 Halleck protested. It is said that at least forty of his 
 officers declared that they would resign before execut- 
 ing Hunter's orders. Moreover, before this, Lee him- 
 self assumed the offensive, and, on both the 6th and 
 7th of June, sent Early around to attempt a turning 
 movement against Grant's right, which failed to attain 
 any success mainly because of the impassable nature 
 of the region of swamps and tangled thickets on which 
 Burnside's right rested. ''The Slashes of Hanover " 
 were not designed for the manoeuvring of troops. 
 
 The detachment of Breckinridge and Early to meet 
 Hunter in the valley of Virginia was forced on Lee by 
 the exigency of the situation. 
 
 444 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 445 
 
 On the defeat of Sigel at Newmarket by Breckin- 
 ridge, General David Hunter, a Virginian by birth, with 
 a force of some 20,000 men, after Crook and Averell 
 joined him at Staunton, had been sent up the valley of 
 Virginia to sweep it clean and to capture Staunton, on 
 the Virginia Central Railway; Lynchburg, the junc- 
 tion point of two railways from Richmond to the South- 
 west; and Charlottesville, the junction point of the Vir- 
 ginia Central Railway and the railway to Lynchburg 
 and the South-west. Having accomplished this. Hun- 
 ter was to march on down the Virginia Central Railway, 
 destroying it as he advanced, and join the Army of the 
 Potomac before Richmond. He had performed the 
 first part of his grateful task. He had swept the valley 
 clean enough to realize Grant's subsequent suggestion, 
 quoted by Halleck, that crows flying over it for the 
 rest of the season should be forced to carry their prov- 
 ender.* He had defeated, on June 5, at Piedmont, a 
 dozen miles north of Staunton, a force consisting of 
 Jones's, Vaughan's, and Imboden's Brigades, the gallant 
 Jones being killed in the engagement ; he had captured 
 Staunton, and learning that Breckinridge with the force 
 which he had defeated at Piedmont was posted at 
 Waynesboro guarding the gap in the Blue Ridge on 
 the road to Charlottesville, he had marched on toward 
 Lynchburg through Lexington, where he had burned 
 the Virginia Military Institute (the institution where 
 Stonewall Jackson taught before the war), the profes- 
 sors' houses, and the mansion of Governor Letcher, and 
 he was now supposed to be on his victorious and blaz- 
 
 » War Records, series I, vol, XXXVII, part 2, p. 366, 
 
446 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 ing way to Charlottesville en route to Richmond. Lee 
 determined to stop this fiery progress. Accordingly 
 he first sent Breckinridge back to the valley and then, 
 learning that Sheridan had been sent to meet Hunter 
 and aid in the destruction of the Virginia Central Rail- 
 way toward Charlottesville, he, on the 8th of June, 
 sent after him Hampton's and Fitz Lee's cavalry divis- 
 ions; and on the 12th of June he ordered Early to 
 follow Hunter and, if possible, destroy him and then 
 march on Washington, as Stonewall Jackson had done 
 in 1862. Thus, Lee, with Grant entrenched before 
 him, had reduced his army by the 2,500 men sent with 
 Breckinridge and 8,000 men sent with Early, besides 
 his two cavalry divisions. It was an exhibition of 
 serene confidence rarely equalled during the war. 
 
 It must be remembered that at this time Grant still 
 lay in front of Lee with an army nearly if not quite 
 double Lee's; for it was not until the night of the 12th 
 that Grant began to withdraw his army from the 
 trenches at Cold Harbor. One is scarcely more im- 
 pressed by the exigency that called for such a sacrifice 
 on Lee's part or the unhesitating courage with which 
 he accepted the situation. 
 
 It should be said before leaving the matter that both 
 Early and Hampton were completely successful in the 
 tasks assigned them. Hampton set out after Sheridan, 
 and intercepting him at Trevillian's Station, about ten 
 miles from Gordonsville, fought a sharp battle with 
 him, in which, though at first flanked and driven back 
 with the loss of many men, he was joined by Fitz Lee, 
 and next day drove Sheridan back, defeating him, with 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 447 
 
 a decidedly greater loss than he had himself suffered 
 and rendering his mission completely abortive. 
 
 Early, on his part, having reached Charlottesville, 
 embarked his corps on the cars, and at Lynchburg 
 defeated Hunter's plan, and pursuing him, drove him, 
 with the loss of many men, into West Virginia, after 
 which Early was sent by Lee down the valley to threaten 
 Washington. 
 
 On the night of the 12th of June, as darkness fell. 
 Grant began to withdraw his troops from his lines at 
 Cold Harbor to cross to the south side of the James, 
 having on the 11th moved Warren's corps to the rear, 
 to a new line of entrenchments, to cover his move. His 
 crossing-place was so far down the river that the cross- 
 ing was effected without the interruption which a more 
 direct crossing would have provoked. It was some 
 thirty miles below Lee's lines. The nearest crossing- 
 point on the Chickahominy was fifteen miles below 
 Cold Harbor, the most distant twenty-four miles. 
 Thence he marched across to the James, to cross which 
 he constructed a pontoon bridge at Windmill Point 
 where it was easily protected by his fleet, having sunk 
 vessels in the channel above, opposite Butler's Ber- 
 muda Hundred entrenchments; and by means of this 
 pontoon bridge and of ferry-boats, all his army except 
 Smith's corps were transferred to the south side by 
 midnight of the 16th. This corps was sent back the 
 way it had come — by boat from the White House. His 
 design was to effect what Butler had failed to accom- 
 plish a month before: capture Petersburg by a coup 
 before Beauregard could be reinforced by Lee, which 
 
448 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 he felt sure of being able to do, as it was garrisoned at 
 the moment only by Wise's Brigade of less than 2,500 
 men. If he had not in mind also the possibility of 
 seizing Richmond by a dash up the north side of the 
 James, between that river and the Chickahominy, it 
 was because the last month had taught him that his 
 long-tried method was hopeless, and Lee was too alert 
 and able to be thus passed. Certain historians of the 
 war write as though Grant's Wilderness campaign were 
 a great feat of generalship and a harmonious part of a 
 comprehensive plan wisely preconceived and success- 
 fully executed as planned, resulting in the complete, if 
 costly, destruction of Lee's army. This is far from the 
 fact, and is due to a confusion of ideas, a portion of 
 which had their origin in events which transpired long 
 after Grant was forced to abandon the line on which 
 he had proposed to fight it out if it took all summer. 
 That Grant eventually compassed the destruction of 
 Lee's army with the never adequately recognized aid of 
 the navy no one would deny; but in this destruction 
 the campaign of May, 1864, bore but a subordinate 
 part. The destruction of Lee's army was mainly due 
 to Grant's work after he crossed to the south side of 
 the James, and to extraneous causes in which Grant's 
 generalship bore a commanding part, but with which 
 his Wilderness campaign had less to do than had the 
 campaigns beyond the Alleghanies. Grant had sacri- 
 ficed 60,000 men in a month's fighting and was only 
 where he might have been without the loss of a man. 
 The policy of attrition, if not created afterward, had 
 not, up to this time at least, worked successfully. Lee's 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 449 
 
 army was still unshaken by his hammering, and had 
 in the last battle given him the most terrible hammering 
 he had ever received. So this was clearly not the way 
 to capture Richmond. 
 
 Had he attempted its capture again from the north 
 side, Lee was prepared again to fling himself between 
 him and Richmond on that side, as later he did on the 
 south side. 
 
 Lee knew on the morning of the 13th that Grant was 
 crossing the Chickahominy, and he himself at once 
 crossed to the south side, and, advancing across the 
 White Oak Swamp, over which he had pursued Mc- 
 Clellan, posted himself across the neck between the 
 Chickahominy and the James, extending from White 
 Oak Swamp to Malvern Hill, where he entrenched, cov- 
 ering the roads to Richmond. In front of Hill on Lee's 
 left was Warren, with whom there was sharp fighting, 
 resulting in his being driven from Riddell's Shop by 
 Hill, leaving many dead and prisoners behind him.^ 
 In front of that portion of Lee's left where Anderson 
 was posted was Wilson's Cavalry. 
 
 Grant's plan, however, was to keep Lee occupied 
 on the north side of the James, and, crossing to the 
 south side, seize Petersburg by a dash before Lee could 
 interpose. And for this purpose General "Baldy" 
 Smith, who had arrived at City Point from the White 
 House with the Eighteenth Corps on the night of the 
 14th, was ordered to move at daylight next morning 
 on Petersburg (the outer works guarding which were 
 about six miles distant), his force being increased by a 
 
 ' Lee's despatch to Beauregard, June 17, 
 
450 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 negro division and Butler's cavalry, the whole some 
 17,000 men. At the same time orders were given to 
 Hancock, who crossed the James that same night (14th), 
 to move on Petersburg as soon as his command re- 
 ceived their rations, and, when these were delayed, 
 to march without rations by the nearest route, which 
 he did. The plan was well conceived and gave abun- 
 dant promise of success. But the Federal generals had 
 not reckoned on the ability of their opponent. 
 
 The regular troops at this time (June 15) in the 
 Petersburg trenches, besides some artillery in the re- 
 doubts, were only Wise's Brigade, 2,600 men, and Bear- 
 ing's Cavalry; whatever other force was there was a 
 home guard. The situation appeared to Grant and 
 Meade, as it appears now to every one else, to be such 
 that the two corps should have walked over the defen- 
 sive force with ease. But so brave was the defence 
 made when Smith and Kautz attacked the Confed- 
 erate lines, and so wholesome was the respect inspired 
 in Grant's army by their last thirty days' experience 
 of Lee's army, that the Federal officers in charge of 
 the movement were made to believe that a strong 
 force confronted them, and instead of assaulting at 
 once, sent for reinforcements and wasted the hours in 
 reconnoissances. Wlien at last, about sunset, the at- 
 tack was made, the outer defences were carried and 16 
 guns and 200 prisoners were captured in them. Beau- 
 regard, being almost without troops, had appealed to 
 Lee on the 14th for aid. Lee, however, at this time 
 felt that he must protect Richmond against the peril 
 of Grant's attempting to march on it on the north 
 
 11 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 451 
 
 side of the James, where the main portion of his army 
 still remained. But on the morning of the 15th, Lee 
 sent Hoke's Division back to Beauregard, from whom 
 he had taken it on the eve of Cold Harbor. It arrived 
 that night and took position on the lines where Wise's 
 Brigade was posted. Its presence was worth more than 
 could have been hoped for. The news that Lee's army 
 was moving to Petersburg held Smith tight in his 
 captured redans, he preferring to hold what he had to 
 attempting to gain more and "have the troops meet 
 disaster." But the danger was still imminent. That 
 night Beauregard withdrew a division (Johnson's) from 
 his Bermuda Hundred entrenchments before Butler 
 to strengthen his lines before Petersburg, and noti- 
 fied Lee, who promptly moved Pickett's and Field's 
 Divisions across the river to occupy the lines the other 
 troops had left, which were then held only by Grade's 
 Brigade. These divisions arrived in time to retake the 
 works there from Terry, who had advanced and seized 
 them in the morning. On the 17th, when the Sixth 
 Corps had crossed the river, Grant sent them to hold 
 these lines; but when they arrived Beauregard held 
 them with Pickett and Field and Gracie, and Lee had 
 again balked him. 
 
 Much has been said of the fact that Lee did not know, 
 as late as the afternoon of the 16th, that Grant's army 
 had crossed to the south side of the James, and that 
 even on the 17th he was not sure where Grant's army 
 was. On the 15th, the Sixth Corps was still on the 
 Peninsula in Lee's front, and the few roads leading up 
 through the swamps and forest to the south of the Chick- 
 
m 
 
 452 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 ill 
 
 ahominy were strongly held by cavalry, so that to one 
 who knows the country it causes less surprise that 
 information was lacking. On Lee rested the respon- 
 sibility of protecting Richmond, and though he tele- 
 graphed Beauregard that he could not "strip the north 
 bank," he sent him troops at his need, and whatever 
 his mystification may have been, both Richmond and 
 Petersburg were saved. 
 
 Grant, having failed to seize Petersburg by a coup, 
 was now resolved to capture it by assault. It was be- 
 lieved that the force occupying it was not large, and am- 
 ple means were employed, as was considered, to secure 
 it. Beauregard's occupied lines extended in a curve 
 before Petersburg, at first easterly, then southerly, 
 some five miles. Beyond his right the defences ran 
 westwardly from the Jerusalem Plank Road to the Ap- 
 pomattox, about five miles ; but this stretch was wholly 
 unoccupied save by cavalry pickets. Against this line, 
 manned for but half its length. Grant, on the 16th, flung 
 the weight of three of his army corps (the Second, the 
 Ninth, and the Eighteenth), capturing four redoubts, 
 and the following morning at daylight he assaulted 
 again, this time adding the Fifth Corps to the others. 
 Surprising the troops in the outer trenches, who were 
 asleep in their exhaustion, the assailants swept over 
 the first lines. But although they carried the outer 
 lines, they got little farther. All day long, at one point 
 or another, along Beauregard's second line, from the 
 Appomattox to the Norfolk Railroad, Grant's crack 
 divisions poured out their blood, only to be kept off 
 or driven out if they made a momentary lodgement. 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 453 
 
 When night fell, the ground in front of the Confederate 
 hnes was thick with the dead, and the defenders were 
 piled high in the trenches; but Beauregard's lines were 
 intact, and Lee, satisfied now that Grant could not 
 attack Richmond from the Peninsula side, was hasten- 
 ing to his lieutenant's aid with the rest of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia. That night Beauregard withdrew 
 from the trenches he had defended so well to contract 
 his lines, and throwing up new entrenchments several 
 hundred yards to the rear awaited the renewal of the 
 storm. It broke at daylight. The Second Corps, and 
 the Ninth, were thrown against Beauregard's newly 
 constructed defences, while the second division of the 
 Sixth Corps and a division of the Eighteenth were held 
 in reserve. Meade knew that the line occupied by 
 Beauregard was hastily entrenched. Moreover, he had 
 learned the numbers of Beauregard's force, and the 
 assault was made with confidence. But he had not 
 counted on the constancy of the men in those hasty 
 entrenchments. And when the assault was made Lee 
 had brought up Anderson's Corps and the divisions of 
 Kershaw and Field, and Hill's Corps was on the way 
 pushing hot-footed for the point where Grant's gallant 
 troops were being thrown against Beauregard's stead- 
 fast lines only to be broken like the waves of the sea 
 against the impregnable rocks. It was a repetition of 
 Spottsylvania and Cold Harbor. All day long the as- 
 saults came, like the billows of the advancing tide, only 
 to recede again, until, as evening fell, even the iron 
 Grant grew weary of attempting the impossible and 
 withdrew his shattered divisions to the shelter of his 
 
454 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 fortifications. Meade had informed him that Lee's 
 army had arrived, and Grant knew that his most des- 
 perate assault would be in vain. His assault on Peters- 
 burg in the first three days of his occupancy of the 
 south side of the James had cost him over 10,500 men. 
 And he had failed. That night Lee held the lines 
 which substantially he held till the end, ten months 
 later, when the gallant Army of Northern Virginia, 
 from causes, of which Grant's persistent hammering 
 was but one, had almost perished from the earth. 
 
 Lee knew that Grant, having failed in his direct as- 
 sault, would now endeavor with his superior numbers 
 to extend his lines westward beyond Lee's lines, with 
 the object of not only investing Petersburg on the south, 
 but of reaching the railways which led from Richmond 
 south and formed the lines of communication over 
 which supplies and troops were brought from the 
 Southern States. Also that his first move would be to 
 reach the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, which run- 
 ning due south from Petersburg connected this city and 
 Richmond with the Southern States and such impor- 
 tant seaports as Wilmington and Savannah, the most 
 essential of the ports from which blockade-running 
 could still be successfully carried on. Accordingly, 
 Lee was on the watch, and when, on the 21st, Grant (or 
 Meade) sent the Ninth and Fifth Corps toward the 
 Jerusalem Plank Road and moved the Second and 
 Sixth Corps beyond their lines toward the Petersburg 
 and Weldon Railway, Lee was ready for him, and as 
 the Second Corps (now commanded by Birney, Han- 
 cock having been disabled on the 16th) marched west- 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 455 
 
 ward beyond the Sixth Corps, A. P. Hill, who had been 
 sent down the Richmond and Weldon Railway to foil 
 the attempt, directed Wilcox's Division against the 
 Sixth Corps, while with Mahone's and Bradley John- 
 son's Divisions he fell on Birney's flank and rolled 
 back his corps in the utmost confusion, capturing some 
 1,700 men, 4 guns, and several colors. The attack 
 was completely successful; but Lee was compelled by 
 the comparative smallness of his army to withdraw 
 Hill again that night to his original lines, and Grant 
 was able later to extend his lines to within a mile and 
 a half of the railroad. 
 
 This unsuccessful attempt to seize the railway to the 
 south was followed by an attempt to destroy it and the 
 other roads southward by means of a cavalry raid. 
 On the 22d of June General James H. Wilson, a gallant 
 and enterprising officer, set out on a raid southward, 
 crossed the Petersburg and Weldon Road, and moving 
 toward Burkeville Junction, where the lines to Lynch- 
 burg and Danville crossed, destroyed both railways. 
 Moving south-westwardly, he was brought to a halt at 
 the Staunton River — the upper reach of the Roanoke 
 — where the bridge was stoutly defended by the home 
 guard and where a part of W. H. F. Lee's Division of 
 cavalry attacked him in the rear. Unable to cross the 
 river, he was forced to abandon his raid and head for 
 the main army at Petersburg by a roundabout route. 
 At Stony Creek, some thirty miles from Petersburg, 
 he was attacked by Hampton, and his command was 
 cut in two, and at Reams's Station, on the 29th, when 
 within ten miles of Petersburg, he was caught between 
 
45G ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Fitz Lee's command and Mahone's Division, which had 
 been sent down the raihvay to cut him off. Here, 
 nearly surrounded, he was forced to destroy his wagons 
 and caissons and retreat southward again with his 
 main force across the Nottaway River, while Kautz, 
 making a sweep around in the other direction, gained 
 the shelter of the Federal lines only after losing his 
 guns. Two days later, after being in the saddle almost 
 continuously, Wilson himself was able to reach shelter 
 likewise, his total losses having been 1,500 men and 
 12 guns. 
 
 The commonly accepted idea of the effect of this 
 campaign on Grant's reputation as a general at this 
 time is one that has been taken from subsequent events 
 and is utterly erroneous. The simple fact is that when 
 Grant's costly failure to capture Richmond was suc- 
 ceeded by his costly failure to capture Petersburg, the 
 nation was utterly staggered. So much blood and 
 money for nothing was something that they could not 
 accept calmly. Happily for the Union cause, Mr. Lin- 
 coln and his war secretary had flung everything into 
 the scale for the Union, and realizing that whatever 
 the cost might be they had in Grant a resolute fighter, 
 they were as resolute as their general. But the country 
 was not so undivided in its views, and Grant himself, 
 possibly, came nearer meeting the fate of his unfor- 
 tunate predecessors than is usually understood. A 
 wail of anguish and of rage went up throughout the 
 country. Dissensions arose among the officers of the 
 Army of the Potomac, and crimination and recrimina- 
 tion went on, which did not cease till long after the war. 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 457 
 
 General W. F. Smith and General Butler became in- 
 volved in a quarrel, and although Grant declared that 
 the latter was clearly in the wrong and, at first, asked 
 that he be relieved from active command, after a mys- 
 terious interview with Butler he retracted his request, 
 and a short time later General "Baldy" Smith himself 
 was relieved, while Butler was allowed to retain his 
 active command.^ 
 
 From this time the history of Lee a,nd his gallant 
 army is the history of the siege of Petersburg, with one 
 week at the end occupied in the retreat to Appomat- 
 tox. It is one of the most glorious chapters in a history 
 which has few parallels in the records of war either for 
 valor or fortitude. For Grant was at his best in these 
 months of resolute and unremitting pressure and ham- 
 mering with all the men and equipment that the United 
 States could furnish, and yet Lee's army held them at 
 bay through ten long months and until his ranks had 
 thinned to less than one thousand men to the mile 
 along over thirty-five miles of lines. Lee had now to 
 defend both Richmond and Petersburg, and his lines 
 when completed extended from White Oak Swamp 
 near its junction with the Chickahominy, eight miles 
 north of the James, to Hatcher's Run, where the Clai- 
 borne Road crossed it five or six miles south-west of 
 Petersburg — the whole making thirty-seven miles, in- 
 cluding the lines on either bank of the James at Drewry's 
 and Chaffin's Bluffs. 
 
 Had Lee been allowed to march his army southward 
 and unite or co-operate with Johnson's army, which 
 
 ' Rhodes's "History of the United States," IV, p. 509, note. 
 
458 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 was retiring before Sherman, the entire field of the 
 war might have been changed. Sherman would cer- 
 tainly not have reached the sea, and the final issue of 
 the struggle might have been different. But this plan, 
 though suggested by some others, if not by Lee, could 
 not be accepted by the Confederate authorities. The 
 political consequences of the loss of Richmond and the 
 abandonment of Virginia were too serious to be con- 
 templated, and Lee was compelled by the exigencies of 
 the Confederate Government to maintain the defence 
 of Richmond while the forces of the Confederacy were 
 destroyed in detail. 
 
 Grant, rendered more cautious than he had been 
 hitherto by the great outcry over his terrible losses, 
 began now to attempt the reduction of Petersburg — 
 which is but another way of saying the reduction of 
 Richmond — by approaches.* 
 
 This was precisely what McClellan had proposed to 
 do two years previously; but the conditions were now 
 widely different. At that time the government at 
 Washington was in a panicky condition and distrusted 
 McClellan as much as they feared Lee and Jackson. 
 The defeat of the Union army in the valley of the Shen- 
 andoah was sufficient to set them to clamoring for 
 McClellan to come to their rescue — to do something 
 which would relieve them from their peril. Now, how- 
 ever, Washington was fully defended, and experience 
 had taught them that though the glow of his camp- 
 fires might light the skies above the South Mountains 
 or flame on the hills of the upper Cumberland, Lee him- 
 
 ' Humphreys' "Campaign in Virginia in '64 and '65," p. 247. 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 459 
 
 self could not capture it. They had learned from their 
 general the arithmetical problem that if three men at- 
 tack one, though two fall in destroying him, the third 
 remains, and they were putting the problem to a prac- 
 tical test. The country was mourning over the dread- 
 ful carnage of the Wilderness battles and their yet 
 deadlier successors of Cold Harbor and Petersburg; 
 but the government was firm. Its reply to the cry of 
 anguish throughout the land was to call for another 
 draft from its inexhaustible resources of men and 
 treasure. 
 
 Lee was under no misapprehension as to the magni- 
 tude and desperateness of the struggle before him. He 
 knew as well as Grant the answer to the arithmetical 
 problem which the latter was working out along his 
 lines in his process of exchanging two men for one on 
 the field of battle; he knew as well as Grant the inev- 
 itable result of the continued destruction of the rail- 
 way lines which formed his lines of communication; 
 he knew, as possibly no one else did, that time and 
 time again his gallant army was within two days of 
 starvation. Richmond was hung like a millstone about 
 his neck, and he could not seek the as yet undevastated 
 regions to the southward. Nor could he deal with 
 Grant as he had dealt with McClellan, and, leaving a 
 small force in his front, lead his army to victory against 
 the defensive forces of Washington. Grant was far 
 too resolute and bold for him to attempt with him the 
 daring strategy that had won Second Manassas and 
 recalled McClellan from the gates of Richmond, Lee 
 had gone to the extreme of boldness in sending Early 
 
460 ROBERT E. LEE j 
 
 off to stop the marching and burning of Hunter, while 
 Grant lay within a dozen miles of Richmond, and only 
 his knowledge of the staggering defeat he had inflicted 
 on his bold antagonist at Cold Harbor can account for 
 it. Now, in the face of Grant's next attack, he plans the 
 only strategy left to him. Early had learned at Char- 
 lottesville that Hunter had burnt his way through the 
 valley of Virginia and was now approaching Lynch- 
 burg, on the upper James. Lynchburg was his home, 
 and its danger fired him to extraordinary activity. 
 Putting his men on the train at Charlottesville, Early 
 hastened to Lynchburg and reached there in time, on 
 the 17th of June, to balk Hunter of his coveted prize 
 and drive him out of Virginia into West Virginia. So 
 rapid had been Early's march that he was on Hunter 
 before the latter knew of his arrival, and Hunter's re- 
 treat was little less than a flight. On the 18th, the day 
 Lee moved the main body of his army to the south side 
 of the James to confront Grant in his attempt to possess 
 himself of the southern gateway of Richmond, Lee 
 sent a despatch to Early at Lynchburg, informing him 
 of Grant's movement on Petersburg and directing him 
 to '^strike as quick as you can, and, if circumstances 
 authorize, carry out the original plan." ^ This was to 
 threaten Washington. 
 
 Early, finding Hunter gone on the morning of the 
 19th, pursued him into South-western Virginia, capt- 
 uring, at Salem, a number of guns and caissons, and 
 driving him at "headlong speed" beyond the moun- 
 tains into the Kanawha Valley, putting him in such 
 
 » S. P. Lee's "Life of WiUiam N. Pendleton," p. 360. 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 461 
 
 peril that Grant sent him a despatch to "save his army " 
 as best he could. Having thus cleared the valley of 
 Virginia of this menace, Early turned back to carry 
 out Lee's strategy. Passing through Lexington and 
 Staunton, he swept down the valley straight for Wash- 
 ington, It was Jackson's old corps, or what remained 
 of it, and they knew the valley of the Shenandoah as 
 a fox knows his covert. But not even in Jackson's 
 day, when they had earned the title of ''foot cavalry," 
 had they made much better time. 
 
 Leaving Staunton on the 28th of June, in such light- 
 marching trim that even officers of rank were allowed 
 to take only one extra suit of underclothing, the Second 
 Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia was at Win- 
 chester on the 2d of July. Here Early received instruc- 
 tions from Lee "to remain in the lower valley until 
 fully prepared to cross the Potomac and meanwhile to 
 wreck the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the canal." ^ 
 This task he accomplished by burning the bridges and 
 destroying the railroad to within five miles of Harper's 
 Ferry, to the heights above which Sigel had retreated 
 after being driven out of Martinsburg, with the loss of 
 many valuable stores. 
 I This strongly fortified position — Maryland Heights — 
 j commanded Harper's Ferry, and Lee's plan to relieve 
 1 the pressure at Richmond did not admit of delay. So, 
 after a demonstration against the place by Rodes and 
 j Ramseur, Early, having crossed the river at Shepherds- 
 town, after burning such stores at Harper's Ferry as he 
 j had not been able to send back, moved on beyond the 
 
 > Pond's "Shenandoah Valley in 1864," p. 47. 
 
462 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 South Mountains toward Frederick, his army passing 
 on the way the scene of their former heroic struggle on 
 the field of Sharpsburg. 
 
 On the morning of the 9th he was at Frederick, and 
 that afternoon he attacked and routed General Lew 
 Wallace at Monocacy Junction, where the latter had 
 posted himself with some 6,000 troops to protect the 
 important railway bridge at that point and to cover 
 the roads to Washington and Baltimore. Having 
 driven Wallace, with a loss of some 2,000 men, toward 
 Baltimore, Early turned toward Washington, march- 
 ing with a celerity which recalled and rivalled Stone- 
 wall Jackson. He encamped that night about four 
 miles north of Rockville, having marched his whole 
 army twenty miles that day, and a portion of it thirty 
 miles. ^ By daylight next morning he was again on 
 the march, pushing forward toward Washington, and 
 before noon his advance guard was in sight of the dome 
 of the Capitol. Three hours later he was in line of bat- 
 tle before the defences of Washington. But it was 
 already too late to attack with his jaded force, with 
 any hope of success, the powerful defences of the na- 
 tional capital manned as they were. One of his bri- 
 gades (Bradley T. Johnson's) had been sent off toward 
 Baltimore to try to release the prisoners confined at 
 Point Lookout and to destroy the railway leading 
 from the north, and Early's force before the capital 
 did not exceed over 9,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry, 
 while the forces garrisoning Washington and its im- 
 mediate vicinity consisted of some 20,000 effectives, 
 
 * Early's report; Pond's "Shenandoah Valley in 1864," p. 67. 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 463 
 
 including 4,400 veteran reserves, who were on the 
 afternoon of the 11th reinforced by two divisions of 
 the Sixth Corps, under Major General Wright, sent 
 from Petersburg by Grant, and by a portion of the 
 Nineteenth Corps, which had just arrived from New 
 Orleans. A demonstration was, indeed, made against 
 the lines running west from Fort Stevens, on the 
 Seventh Street Road, to Rock Creek, in which the 
 Federal skirmishers were driven into their works; but 
 Early, having satisfied himself that the garrison of 
 Washington had been too strongly reinforced from 
 Virginia for him to attack with safety, after lying in 
 front of the city, at Crystal Spring, all day of the 13th 
 and skirmishing sharply with Getty's division, withdrew 
 that night to Darnestown, beyond Rockville, and on 
 the morning of the 14th, having been rejoined by his 
 foraging parties, recrossed the Potomac at White's 
 Ferry. 
 
 Many conjectures have been made as to whether 
 Early could have captured Washington. A full dis- 
 cussion of the question is beyond the scope of this 
 volume ; but to the writer it appears now, as it appeared 
 then to those most charged with the responsibility on 
 either side, that had Early attempted to enter Wash- 
 ington he would not only have been defeated, but 
 would probably have lost his army. The conditions 
 that summer were peculiar. In Eastern Virginia no 
 rain fell from the 3d of June to the 23d of July; in Mary- 
 land the conditions were substantially the same. When 
 Early arrived in front of Washington, it was after days 
 of forced marching through heat so exhausting that 
 
464 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 his men fell by the wayside by hundreds, and to have 
 entered the city it would have been necessary not only 
 to capture defences on which the best military science 
 of the world had been lavished, manned by a force 
 possibly half as large again as his own, to which were 
 added, in full time to have met him, the reinforcements 
 of two divisions from the Sixth Corps and of one from 
 the Nineteenth, but to march on to Washington, six 
 miles away, through broken country well defended by 
 these forces. 
 
 Early's own report gives his reasons for not attempt- 
 ing an assault, and he is borne out by the statements of 
 all who were with him. He says: ''The day [the 10th] 
 was very hot and the roads exceedingly dusty, but 
 we marched thirty miles. On the morning of the 11th 
 we continued the march, but the day was so excessively 
 hot, even at a very early hour in the morning, and the 
 dust was so dense, that many of the men fell by the 
 way, and it became necessary to slacken our pace. 
 Nevertheless, when we reached the enemy's fortifi- 
 cations, the men were completely exhausted, and not 
 in a condition to make an attack. ... I determined 
 to make an assault, but before it could be made it 
 became apparent that the enemy had been strongly 
 reinforced. . . . After consultation with my division 
 commanders, I became satisfied that the assault, even 
 if successful, would be attended with such great sacri- 
 fice as would insure the destruction of my whole force 
 before the victory could have been made available, 
 and if unsuccessful would necessarily have resulted in 
 the loss of the whole force." 
 
LEE'S STRATEGY 465 
 
 The capture of Washington was probably never a 
 part of Lee's scheme when he despatched Early from 
 Lynchburg to threaten the capital of the United States. 
 His plan seems to have been to repeat the strategy of 
 1862, and by a menace of the national capital cause 
 the raising of the siege of Richmond. The possibility 
 of an attack on Washington itself probably occurred 
 to Early first after the defeat of Lew Wallace at Monoc- 
 acy Bridge. 
 
 If, however, when he recrossed the Potomac, Early's 
 campaign in the valley of the Shenandoah had neither 
 resulted in the capture of Washington nor in the with- 
 drawal of Grant from before Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond, it had accomplished everj^thing else which Lee 
 had planned, and had completely justified Lee's mas- 
 terly strategy. It had cleared the valley of Virginia of 
 Hunter's army and enabled the farmers of that fruitful 
 land to reap their crops in peace ; and it had shown the 
 world that the idea that Lee's army was almost annihi- 
 lated was so far from being sound that it could hold the 
 combined armies of Meade and Butler at bay, drive 
 Hunter in headlong retreat from the valley of Virginia, 
 and, sweeping across into Maryland, could roll its 
 drums at the very gates of the national capital. It is 
 not too much to say that it so disheartened the North 
 and enheartened the South that it probably prolonged 
 the contest by six months. 
 
 It illustrated Lee's bold strategy that on the heels of 
 a determined movement which Grant made on the north 
 side of the James, Lee, learning that his opponent had 
 detached cavalry and infantry to Washington, promptly 
 
46G ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 detached on his side R. H. Anderson with infantry and 
 cavalry to observe their movements/ It also illus- 
 trated the desperate need of the Confederacy that he 
 should have been compelled to weaken his army before 
 Grant at such a time. This force, after stopping for a 
 short time at Culpeper, joined Early and remained 
 with him till the middle of September, when Lee, under 
 Grant's persistent hammering, found it necessary to 
 recall the infantry to his own aid, leaving only Fitz 
 Lee's Cavalry along the Shenandoah. 
 
 * Lee's despatch to Early, August 8. 
 
 
CHAPTER XIX 
 
 THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG AND RICHMOND 
 
 The remainder of the Petersburg campaign, though 
 forming one of the most glorious chapters in the title 
 to renown of Lee and of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
 was, in the words of the President of the Confederacy, 
 ''too sad to be patiently considered." Locked in his 
 fortifications, with Richmond hung like a millstone 
 about his neck, while the South was cut off piecemeal 
 from possibility of contributing to his support, and his 
 gallant army, like an overused blade, was being worn 
 to a shadow by the attrition of continued battling, Lee, 
 faithful to his trust, and obedient to the laws, put aside 
 whatever personal views he might have held and con- 
 tinued to handle the situation with supreme skill. Be- 
 fore that army succumbed it had added to Grant's 
 casualty list from the time he crossed the James another 
 sixty-odd thousand men, thus doubling the ghastly 
 record of his losses. 
 
 It is curious to note from the records of the time how 
 utterly dependent the two contesting governments were 
 on their commanding generals. Halleck's despatches 
 to Grant from the Union War Office display an almost 
 pitiful dependence on Grant. Again and again he 
 writes assuring him that he ''awaits his instructions." 
 On the 4th of August he notifies him that he can give 
 no instruction to Hunter or Sheridan till Grant decides 
 
 467 
 
468 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 on their commands. ''I await your orders," he adds, 
 ''and shall strictly carry them out, whatever they may 
 be." And, indeed. Grant appears to be the one firm, 
 clear-headed, practical man in all the muddle of con- 
 flicting ambitions and confused orders. ''This man 
 Grant grows on me," Mr. Lincoln had said a year or 
 more before — "he fights." It was the one solution of 
 the problem — to fight and keep on, no matter at what 
 cost, till the other side should be exhausted. Grant 
 recognized it and acted on it. Happily for the Union 
 cause. Grant was the commanding general of all the 
 armies of the Union. Unhappily for the Confederate 
 cause, Lee had not been given similar power. As de- 
 pendent as was the cause of the South on his genius, 
 the military command was still reserved in the hands 
 of the civil authorities. He could not even appoint 
 his chief of staff. 
 
 Lee's strategy in despatching Early against Washing- 
 ton gave him relief for some time, and deferred for 
 months the seizure of Petersburg. 
 
 The detachment of the Sixth Corps from the Army 
 of the Potomac to defend Washington forced Grant 
 to withdraw his left to the Jerusalem Plank Road from 
 the position formerly occupied, menacing the Peters- 
 burg and Weldon Railroad. Instead, therefore, of 
 Grant's cutting the railway by which Lee received sup- 
 plies, Lee was now cutting the Baltimore and Ohio 
 Railroad. Early's cavalry raiders were threatening the 
 Cuml^erland Valley, while his main body lay just beyond 
 the Potomac. Chaos reigned about Washington, and 
 early in August, after suggesting Franklin, Meade, and 
 
Union and CbNFEt- Mi 
 
^{^iARouND Petersburg 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 469 
 
 one or two other commanders for the somewhat dis- 
 organized forces guarding the capital, Grant sent his 
 young and energetic chief of cavalry, General Phihp H. 
 Sheridan, to take over the command in that region. 
 A discussion of the remainder of Early's campaign in 
 detail is not within the proper scope of this volume. 
 Sheridan's army, with the Sixth and Nineteenth 
 Corps and General Crook's force, known as ''The Army 
 of West Virginia," numbered, present for duty on Sep- 
 tember 10, including Averell's cavalry, 48,000 troops. 
 Early had at Winchester 14,000. After holding Sheridan 
 in check for many weeks. Early was defeated by him at 
 Winchester on September 19, and was again attacked 
 and defeated at Fisher's Hill on the 22d, Sheridan .out- 
 numbering him on each occasion nearly three to one. 
 Being reinforced by Kershaw's Division, Cutshaw's 
 Artillery, and Rosser's Cavalry, Early now assumed the 
 offensive, and advanced against Sheridan, who retired 
 to Cedar Creek. Here Early, on October 19, surprised 
 and at first defeated his army, capturing his camp; but 
 instead of pursuing his advantage, he allowed his men 
 to get out of hand, and while they were looting the capt- 
 ured camp, Sheridan rallied his men, and attacking in 
 turn, completely defeated him, and almost destroyed 
 his army. Meantime, Grant made a determined and 
 threatening effort to possess himself of both Richmond 
 and Petersburg by a bold and secret expedient. His 
 lines on the north side of the James extended, as has 
 been stated, across the Peninsula between the James 
 and the Chickahominy, to within some seven or eight 
 miles of Richmond, the lines on either side of the 
 
470 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 James being connected by his pontoon bridges, so sit- ( 
 uated that he could readily transfer his forces from one 
 side to the other as he desired with both secrecy and 
 despatch. His plan now was to transfer secretly the I 
 Second Corps and his cavalry to the north side of the H 
 James and to make a concerted attempt to seize Rich- ' 
 mond on that side at the same time that he attempted 
 to break through Lee's lines before Petersburg. It 
 had been suggested by General Potter, the commander ' 
 of one of his Pennsylvania brigades, composed largely 
 of miners, that his men could run a mine under one of 
 Lee's forts and blow it up. Accordingly, in preparation 
 for the assault at Petersburg, mining operations had been 
 going on for a month between the lines, the objective 
 point being what was known as Elliott's Salient, a point 
 some two hundred yards in front of Burnsidc's corps, to 
 the east of Petersburg. The mine had been discovered 
 on the Southern side, and some efTort had been made at 
 countermining; but this had been abandoned and en- 
 trenchments had been thrown up across "the gorge of 
 the Salient, at which the mine was apparently directed." 
 It had even been intimated in the press that this mine 
 was being run. The mine was ready on the 23d or 
 24th of July, and just before exploding it, an attempt 
 at an assault was made on the north side of the James, 
 as stated, to compel Lee to thin his lines before Peters- 
 burg. Lee was not misled by it, as has been supposed; 
 but it was necessary to meet the movement.^ On the 
 night of the 26tli of July Hancock's corps, supported 
 
 > Letter of General William N. Pendleton, July 29, 1864. (S. P. 
 Lee's "Life of William N. Pendleton," p. 355.) 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 471 
 
 by Sheridan's cavalry, was sent secretly across the pon- 
 toon bridges at Deep Bottom, twelve miles below Rich- 
 mond, and turning up the river, made a determined 
 attack on Lee's left. It was hoped by Grant that while 
 his infantry engaged such forces as Lee might have at 
 Chaffin's Bluff, his cavalry might be able to dash into 
 Richmond. Lee, however, was ready for them. As 
 though he had read Grant's mind, he had despatched 
 Wilcox and Kershaw to the north side '' before the 
 movement began," and on the 27th Heth's Division 
 joined them. Thus, when the assault was made it was 
 promptly repulsed, and on the night of the 29th, this 
 coup having failed, Hancock and Sheridan both re- 
 crossed the river to take part in the capture of Peters- 
 burg, which was set for the following day. Everything 
 was got ready for the assault, and it appeared to the 
 Union commander as though the fall of Petersburg, as 
 a result of his elaborate preparations, were a foregone 
 conclusion. His movement against Lee's extreme left 
 had taken from before Petersburg two of Longstreet's 
 Divisions (Field's and Kershaw's), two of Hill's Divis- 
 ions (tieth's and Wilcox's), and the cavalry divisions of 
 the two Lees, and Lee now had left before Petersburg 
 only Hoke's, Johnson's, and Mahone's Divisions — not 
 a very strong force, certainly; but it served. Against 
 these thin lines were massed, in the hours of darkness 
 on the night of the 29th, Grant's great army. All 
 arrangements were made carefully. The mine was 
 charged; the fuses laid; the heavy guns and mortars 
 were got in position to cover the assault and to sweep 
 the open space beyond the doomed Salient, to prevent 
 
472 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the approach of fresh defenders. The night was spent 
 in massing troops for the assault and in clearing away 
 the abatis to make ready for the passage and charge 
 of the troops; the pioneers were marshalled with their 
 axes and entrenching tools, and everything was pre- 
 pared for the rush forward as soon as the explosion 
 should occur. The time set for this was the first crack 
 of dawn. Burnside, Warren, Ord, and Hancock were 
 all in place — the major portion of their corps massed 
 to rush forward and overwhelm the defenders' thin 
 line. A delay occurred; the first fuse did not burn 
 and it was nearly two hours before another could be 
 lighted. The explosion, however, when it occurred 
 was a complete success; the undermined redan was 
 blown up, carrying a battery and nearly two companies 
 to destruction and shocking the men in the trenches 
 on either side for a considerable distance. A huge 
 crater yawned in Lee's lines where one of his strongest 
 forts had frowned. Promptly the assailing force poured 
 out of their breastworks and rushed forward into the 
 great gap opened in Lee's lines. It proved a death- 
 trap. The huge yawning pit was nearly a hundred 
 yards long and was sixty feet wide and twenty-five 
 feet deep, and into this cul-de-sac poured the leading 
 troops of Burnside, so that in a little time the troops 
 were huddled together in much confusion. Other regi- 
 ments being pushed forward obliqued to the right and 
 left and captured a part of the lines on either side; but 
 the delay had enabled the startled Confederates to 
 regain their bearings, and by the time the Federals 
 undertook to reach the crest beyond the crater the 
 
 i 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 473 
 
 Confederate batteries were sweeping the open space 
 which lay before it, and two of Mahone's Brigades 
 (Weiseger's and Wright's), who had been hastily sum- 
 moned by Lee on learning of the explosion, were filing 
 down the covered ways, ready to contest every foot 
 of ground. Elliott's men, driven from the outer line 
 by the shock of the explosion and the onsweep of Burn- 
 side's troops, had made a stand under cover of a ravine 
 and had held back the advance until succor arrived, 
 and now Lee himself had reached the field with Beau- 
 regard and assumed charge of the operations. As 
 Wright's Brigade was moving into position, Ferrero's 
 division of negro troops, who had been drawn out to 
 make the assault in the first instance, but had been set 
 aside for another division of Bu-rnside's, were forced 
 forward from the first line of captured entrenchments, 
 where they had sheltered themselves from the terrible 
 fire that was now sweeping the open space, and were 
 ordered to carry the crest beyond. Pushed forward, 
 they passed through the troops lying down to shield 
 themselves and advanced up the slope. The presence 
 of negro troops always infuriated the Southerners and 
 redoubled their determination. So now the knowledge 
 that negro troops were being used in the assault spurred 
 every gray-clad soldier to put forth his utmost might. 
 As Ferrero's black regiments advanced, Weiseger's and 
 Elliott's men broke from their cover and dashed upon 
 them in a counter charge so furious that they suddenly 
 turned tail and fled for their lives to their own works 
 or piled pell-mell into the crater as a place of refuge, 
 sweeping away with them in their flight most, if not all, 
 
474 ROBERT E. LEE ^1 
 
 of the troops about the crater. By half-past nine all 
 chance of the capture of Petersburg by this coup had 
 passed and the Federal generals were concerned only to 
 save their men who were huddled in the crater or a sec- 
 tion of the trenches to the south of that death-trap. 
 Warren, who had been ordered by Grant to put his men 
 in, but had reported that it would be a useless waste of 
 life, as the opportunity had passed, was now ordered 
 to make an attack toward Lee's right. But this, too, 
 he found impracticable, a difference of opinion that was 
 to cost him dear later on. Lee was now bending his 
 energies to repair the break in his defences, and Ma- 
 hone, after three assaults, carried the captured lines 
 and drove out or captured all the troops left in the 
 crater or the lines that had been broken. Among 
 the captured in the crater was the gallant Brigadier- 
 General William F. Bartlett, bravest of the brave, who 
 was after the war to endear himself as much to his foes 
 of the war time as he had previously done to his com- 
 rades on his own side. 
 
 The day ended with a loss of some 4,000 men added 
 to Grant's ever-increasing list, while Lee's losses were 
 less than a third of that number, mainl}^ among Elliott's 
 and Mahone's gallant brigades, who had done such yeo- 
 men's service. On the 1st of August Grant asked for 
 an armistice to bury his dead, who lay in piles in and 
 about the crater, and from five till nine on the 2d there 
 was for the first time no firing along the lines about 
 Petersburg, and many officers gathered from each side 
 to see the effect of the strange attempt which had so 
 nearly succeeded and so disastrously failed. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 475 
 
 It is said that the negro troops had been given to 
 singing over their camp-fires during the weeks of prep- 
 aration a sort of chant with a refrain ending, 
 
 *' For we are mighty men of war," 
 
 but after the catastrophe of the crater they were never 
 known to sing it again. 
 
 When Grant learned that Lee had sent away so im- 
 portant a part of his army as that which Anderson had 
 taken to the Shenandoah Valley, he promptly proceeded 
 to take advantage of the weakening of Lee's lines. 
 Thus, while Lee had been compelled to weaken his own 
 forces to strengthen Early in the valley of Virginia, he 
 was obliged to withstand the renewed shocks against 
 his lines which this detachment of troops called forth. 
 But, as before, Lee's sleepless vigilance forestalled him. 
 The first attempt made was against Lee's left, on the 
 north side of the James. It was substantially a repeti- 
 tion of the attempt of July 26. Hancock's corps, and 
 a part of the Tenth Corps, commanded by Birney, 
 supported by Gregg's cavalry, were sent secretly to the 
 north side of the James. On August 14 the infantry 
 body embarked on boats with much ostentation, as if 
 intended for Washington. Disembarking a little lower 
 down the river on the north bank, they were marched 
 up the James and a sudden attack was made on Lee's 
 lines in the expectation of surprising them. The plan 
 was that, while Gregg's cavalry should turn the left 
 flank, the infantry was to assault and capture the lines, 
 including Chaffin's Bluff, one of the chief defences of 
 Richmond. Field and Wilcox, however, were on guard, 
 
476 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the former at Deep Bottom, the latter at Chaffin's 
 Bluff, and though, by reason of the thinning of the Con- 
 federate right to strengthen the left against the attack 
 of Barlow's divisions, Birney was able to gain a tem- 
 porary advantage and seize a part of the line, captur- 
 ing four guns, Lee soon had a sufficient force on the 
 ground to repel the movement. Mahone's Division 
 with Hampton's and W. H. F. Lee's Cavalry Divisions 
 were rushed across the river from Petersburg, and when 
 Hancock, Birney, and Gregg attacked, on the morning 
 of the 16th, along the Darby town and Charles City 
 Roads, though again they had a temporary success and 
 captured between 200 and 300 prisoners and three 
 stands of colors, they were ultimately repulsed with 
 heavy loss and were driven back all along the line. 
 For several days following this the skirmishing con- 
 tinued on the north side; but on the night of the 20th, 
 the attempt on Richmond having been frustrated. 
 Grant withdrew his troops again to the Petersburg 
 lines, having lost in this attempt on Richmond 2,786 
 men.^ 
 
 Meantime, Lee had to guard his extreme right to the 
 south of Petersburg no less than his extreme left to 
 the east of Richmond, thirty miles away, and here too 
 he was able to repel Grant's assault. Grant's superi- 
 ority in numbers gave him the power to attack both 
 sides of Lee's extended lines at will. Accordingly, 
 while the Second and Tenth Corps were operating di- 
 rectly against ^Richmond, he and Meade were planning 
 to turn Lee's right also. Hoping to cut and, possibly, 
 
 * Humphreys' "Campaign in Virginia in '64 and '65," p. 272. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 477 
 
 to secure permanent possession of the two railway lines 
 connecting Petersburg and Richmond with the Caro- 
 linas and the far South, and figuring that, at least, he 
 could compel Lee to recall Anderson from the Shen- 
 andoah Valley and thus weaken Early, who was still 
 holding Washington and Western Maryland and Penn- 
 sylvania in terror, though Sheridan was now on hand 
 to protect them, Grant, on the 18th of August, sent 
 Warren with the Fifth Corps, and Parke with the Ninth 
 Corps, or a good part of it, around Lee's right to seize 
 the Petersburg and Weldon Railway within a few miles 
 of Petersburg. ''In addition to the destruction of the 
 road, he was to consider the movement a reconnoissance 
 in force and take advantage of any weakness the enemy 
 might betray/' The enemy betrayed some ''weak- 
 ness," but in numbers only. Warren's corps, with three 
 divisions of the Ninth Corps, was, indeed, able to strike 
 the Petersburg and Weldon Railway at a point some 
 three miles beyond Grant's left, having only Bearing's 
 Cavalry Brigade opposed to their advance; but a few 
 hours later, Heth, sent by Lee with two divisions, swept 
 down on them, and though they were eventually driven 
 back, Warren reported that night losses numbering 
 936 men. Lee met the situation, as usual, with prompt- 
 ness. Recalling Mahone's and Lee's Divisions from 
 before Richmond, where Hancock still lay at Deep 
 Bottom, he sent them against Warren where his right 
 was stretched thin, while A. P. Hill attacked his centre 
 and left. Breaking through to Warren's right, Mahone's 
 Divisions rolled up Crawford's division on this wing 
 until it came on his strongly posted centre, when they 
 
478 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 were driven back in turn. But Warren's losses that 
 day were 2,900 men, and that night Warren fell back 
 a mile or more and entrenched. Lee was under the 
 necessity of preserving the railway which had thus been 
 attacked, and for this purpose he began to mass his 
 forces as Grant was massing his to resist him. Wilcox 
 was brought over to the south side, and on the 21st two 
 of Field's brigades and Butler's brigade of cavalry were 
 transferred to Lee's left. A. P. Hill was sent to assault 
 Warren's right; but the latter was too firmly estab- 
 lished to be dislodged. That afternoon an attack was 
 made on Warren's left along the railway by Mahone's 
 Division; but equally without success. And Hagood's 
 Brigade, having pushed gallantly forward, was almost 
 surrounded and cut off. Meantime, Grant had ordered 
 Hancock back from before Richmond to support Warren 
 on his left, thus extended, and the space covered in 
 his recent flank movement was heavily fortified from 
 the Jerusalem Plank Road to the railway, a stretch of 
 several miles. Lee was too dependent on this line to 
 tolerate its loss if it could be prevented and he made his 
 dispositions accordingly. On the evening of the 24th 
 he sent A. P. Hill with his corps, a brigade of Long- 
 street's Corps (Anderson's), and Lee's Cavalry around 
 Warren's left to interpose between him and Hancock 
 at Reams's Station, ten miles south of Petersburg. On 
 the afternoon of the following day they assaulted Han- 
 cock, who was posted in a fortified position extending 
 along the railway with both wings refused, and after 
 a spirited engagement carried the position, capturing 
 " 12 stands of colors, 9 guns, 10 caissons, 2,150 prisoners, 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 479 
 
 3,100 stands of small arms," and forcing Hancock to 
 retreat under cover of night to avoid further disaster. 
 Hill's own losses were reported by him to be 720 men, 
 while Hancock's were 2,372. Still Lee was unable be- 
 cause of the superiority of Grant's numbers to dislodge 
 him from his main fortified lines, which were gradually 
 stretching westward, and he found it necessary to re- 
 call Anderson from the valley of the Shenandoah to 
 help him withstand the resistless tide that was grad- 
 ually sweeping away his resources and annihilating 
 his army.^ His enforced recall left Early alone to con- 
 front Sheridan's army of thrice his numbers. 
 
 Anderson's Divisions were brought back toward the 
 latter part of September, and the exigency was great; 
 for Grant was steadily attempting to break through 
 first on one side of the James and then on the other. 
 
 The next serious attempt which had to be met was 
 at the end of September, on the north side of the James, 
 where the lines still remained denuded. Grant sent 
 by night the Eighteenth Corps (now under Ord) and 
 the Tenth Corps (now under Birney) to the north side 
 of the James to repeat the experiment of August, while 
 at the same time Meade made a demonstration against 
 Lee's right. Ord was to attack and capture Chaffin's 
 Bluff and the forts connected therewith, while the 
 Tenth Corps was to advance by the more northerly 
 roads against the left of the Confederate lines. Lee 
 was, however, no more taken by surprise than before. 
 
 ' The Confederate losses in these movements are not given with any 
 accuracy, but are assumed by Alexander and others to be approxi- 
 mately proportioned to the Union losses according to the niunber of 
 troops engaged. 
 
480 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 He promptly withdrew troops from his right to rein- 
 force Ewell, who now commanded on the north side of 
 the James, and though Fort Harrison was captured by 
 Ord, Fort Gilmer, which lay nearer to and protected 
 Chaffin's Bluff, was firmly held and the enemy was re- 
 l^ulsed with heavy loss. Lee and Grant were both on 
 the ground in this engagement, and the fighting, which 
 was under their immediate supervision, was costly to 
 both sides. On the Southern side the losses were some 
 2,000 men, while on -the Union side they were reported 
 at 2,272. At the same time Meade attacked Lee's 
 right where Hill commanded, Beauregard having gone 
 south to meet the exigencies there. With the design 
 of capturing the entrenchments along the Boydton 
 Road and the South-side Railroad, General Parke and 
 General Warren were, on the 30th, thrown against these 
 lines and captured a portion of the outer entrench- 
 ments; but in the end they were repulsed with losses 
 stated at over 2,000 men, and were content to extend 
 their own entrenchments farther to the westward. 
 
 Still the Federal losses, though staggering, were stead- 
 ily made up by the ever-renewed reinforcements. The 
 bounties for enlistment in the North — county. State, 
 and Federal — amounted now to so large a sum — over 
 $1,500 in some States — that a new profession was 
 created: that of the ''bounty-jumper," and while this 
 class of soldier was ever ready to desert if occasion pre- 
 sented itself, he made ''food for powder," and filled in 
 the gaps between the brave and the patriotic. The 
 contingent of mercenaries grew ever larger and larger, 
 and Northern historians state as one of the reasons of 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 481 
 
 Grant's continued failure to break through Lee's lines — 
 the loss of the flower of his army on so many fatal 
 fields. Hancock attributed his defeat at Reams's Sta- 
 tion on the 25th of August mainly to his "heavy losses 
 during the campaign, especially officers/' and says that 
 ''there were several regiments largely made up of re- 
 cruits and substitutes. One, General Hancock men- 
 tions particularly, as being entirely new, and some of 
 its officers unable to speak English." * 
 
 The remainder of the siege of Petersburg was like 
 the beginning, save that Lee's lines steadily grew thin- 
 ner under the wasting of battle and famine and sick- 
 ness, while his opponent's lines as steadily refilled. 
 Confident of being able to replenish his ranks, Grant's 
 tactics were a repetition of those of the autumn — to 
 attack now one wing and now the other of Lee's ex- 
 tended lines, in the assurance that in time they would 
 be worn thin enough to break somewhere. This he 
 was enabled to do with his preponderant numbers, 
 and his line across the James, by leaving enough men 
 on one side of the James to hold one wing and march- 
 ing a large force under cover of night to the other side 
 to attack the other wing. Lee's part was to hold his 
 lines in obedience to orders, and, if possible, break 
 through Grant's line if an opening were presented. 
 
 Thus, on the 6th of October, Hoke and Field were 
 withdrawn from before Petersburg and sent to the 
 Richmond side to recover the entrenchments across 
 the Darbytown Road lost in the engagement of Septem- 
 ber 29. This they accomplished, flanking and driv- 
 
 * Humphreys' "Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 283, 
 
482 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 ing Kautz therefrom across White Oak Swamp, with 
 a loss of over 300 men and 8 of his guns. 
 
 On the 13th of October an assault made on Lee's 
 left before Richmond by the Tenth Corps of Grant's 
 army was repulsed without great loss on either side. 
 And for some ten days there was an intermission of the 
 assaults, though the daily skirmishing went on as before, 
 varied by the nightly bombardment from the mortars 
 and siege g-uns. 
 
 A fortnight later Lee had to meet a yet more deter- 
 mined attempt to cut him off from the south and, if 
 possible, turn his right. Grant undertook to attack 
 both of Lee's wings at the same time, the serious 
 effort being made against Lee's right with three army 
 corps, while Butler attacked Lee's left, in front of 
 Richmond. With this in view, on October 27, Meade, 
 in pursuance of Grant's orders, attempted to move 
 westward across Lee's right and seize the South-side 
 Railroad. He was to leave enough men in front of 
 Lee's centre to hold their lines and with three corps 
 — some forty-odd thousand men — make the flank move- 
 ment. Parke, with the Ninth Corps (Burnside's old 
 comjnand), was to move next Lee's lines, surprise his 
 incomplete entrenchments on his right, and contain 
 him until Hancock and Warren should have marched 
 beyond Lee's right and seized the South-side Rail- 
 road, when Parke was to attack in unison with the 
 other two corps. It was a formidable movement, and 
 under Meade's careful hand it started like clockwork. 
 But Lee was ready, as ever. When Parke and Warren 
 reached the ground where they were to surprise Lee's 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 483 
 
 unfinished entrenchments, they found them not only 
 sufficiently completed, but sufficiently manned to with- 
 stand the assault, and Grant and Meade having both 
 come on the field, Warren was sent westward to support 
 Hancock, who was pushing forward beyond Hatcher's 
 Run toward Lee's extreme right. But so difficult was 
 the ground, so dense the undergrowth, and so cleverly 
 were Lee's defences constructed, that it took four hours 
 for the advancing troops to move a mile and a half, and 
 it was four o'clock in the afternoon before Warren's 
 advance brigades could be abreast of Hancock, who had 
 halted at the Boydton Plank Road to await his aid. 
 Meantime, while Wilcox alone was left to hold the en- 
 trenchments threatened by Parke, the divisions of 
 Heth and Mahone had been sent forward by Lee to 
 meet this threatening advance and, with Hampton's 
 Cavalry, were now, not awaiting an attack, but making 
 one — Hampton on Hancock's left flank, Heth in his 
 front, and Mahone moving silently by a wood-road to 
 flank his right. As Egan's division of Hancock's corps 
 was attempting to carry the bridge across Hatcher's 
 Run, Mahone, who had passed through an interval be- 
 tween Hancock's right and Warren, ''broke out of the 
 woods" on Hancock's right and sweeping away Peirce's 
 brigade, which had been sent to hold this part of Han- 
 cock's line, pushed forward, while Hampton, on the 
 other side, attacked so hotly his left flank, where lay 
 Gregg's cavalry dismounted, that Hancock brought 
 Egan back from the bridge to help withstand Mahone's 
 furious attack. With these reinforcements Hancock 
 was able to flank in turn, and Mahone was driven back 
 
484 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 into the woods with tlie loss of two stands of colors and 
 several hundred prisoners. But on his side he had to 
 show as spoils three stands of colors, four hundred pris- 
 oners, and six pieces of artillery, which he spiked, being 
 unable to get them across the stream, as the enemy held 
 the bridge. Moreover, the Confederates had to their 
 account the complete defeat of Grant's well-laid scheme 
 to seize the South-side Railroad; for that night the 
 Federals retreated under cover of darkness to their 
 original positions, leaving their dead and 250 wounded 
 on the field, their total loss having been over 1,400 
 men. 
 
 On the same day Butler attacked Lee's left before 
 Richmond, where Longstreet, who had recovered from 
 his wound of the Wilderness and returned to his com- 
 mand on October 19, now had charge. With Hoke's 
 and Field's Divisions, the "Local Defences," or Home 
 Guard, and Gary's Cavalry, Longstreet met and re- 
 pulsed the assaults made along his lines by Butler, driv- 
 ing the Federals back and capturing nine colors and 
 several hundred prisoners. In this attempt the Fed- 
 eral loss was over 1,100 men, while the Confederate loss 
 was comparatively light. Thus, the total Federal loss 
 of the day in both the attacks was over 2,500 men — so 
 effective even at this late stage was the depleted Army 
 of Northern Virginia. This repulse appears to have 
 satisfied Grant that, for the present at least, even "per- 
 sistent hammering" did not give the expected results, 
 and though, as transpired later, the attrition was wear- 
 ing away Lee's army with deadly effect, up to this time 
 it appeared mainly to have worn the Army of the Poto- 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 485 
 
 mac. Thus the hammering was for the time being sus- 
 pended. 
 
 The losses of Lee's army are not known with any 
 accuracy, though they were heavy enough to deplete 
 the South; but the losses of Grant's army were enough 
 to show what a powerful weapon Lee had wielded and 
 with what masterly skill. The Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia in December, 1864, numbered some 50,000 effec- 
 tives. On the 7th of November the medical director 
 of the Army of the Potomac reported to General Meade 
 that ''the number of wounded of the Army of the 
 Potomac from M,ay 3 to October 31, 1864, may be 
 considered as amounting to 57,495." ''This," says 
 Humphreys, "was exclusive of the Eighteenth Corps 
 while it served with the Army of the Potomac, and does 
 not include the Ninth Corps at the Wilderness and 
 Spottsylvania." Nor does it include the dead or the 
 missing. Nearly 100,000 men had Lee's army de- 
 stroyed in these six months. 
 
 Unfortunately for Lee, the attrition went on in other 
 ways continuously. Early had, as stated, been deci- 
 sively defeated at Cedar Creek by Sheridan on October 
 19, and his subsequent final defeat at Waynesboro sub- 
 stantially destroyed his force in the valley of Virginia, 
 leaving that region at the mercy of Sheridan, and ena- 
 bling the Sixth Corps to be sent back to swell Grant's 
 ranks before Petersburg. Sheridan swept up the valley 
 to Staunton, thence to Charlottesville, and Gordons- 
 ville, the object of so many futile movements. From 
 there he crossed over to the James at Columbia, de- 
 stroying the canal to Lynchburg, and having thus cut 
 up Lee's two lines of supply, he passed on down through 
 
486 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Goochland and Hanover and rejoined Grant on the 27th 
 of March in time to take a prominent part in the final 
 act of the drama which ended at Appomattox. 
 
 Bui other causes than Grant's persistent hammering 
 were now wearing away Lee's army. Cut off from 
 supplies of almost every kind on nearly every side, 
 grim famine and its grisly sister, disease, were slowly 
 wasting what battle had spared. The condition can 
 hardly be better set forth than in the statement of the 
 careful and patient historian of the Virginia campaign 
 of 1864-65, whose account has been mainly followed 
 in this chapter. He says: ''The winter of 1864-65 
 was one of unusual severity, making the picket duty 
 in front of the entrenchments very severe. It was es- 
 pecially so to the Confederate troops with their thread- 
 bare, insufficient clothing and meagre food, chiefly 
 corn bread made of the coarsest meal. Meat they had 
 but little of, and their Subsistence Department was 
 actually importing it from abroad. Of coffee or tea 
 or sugar they had none, except in the hospitals. 
 
 " It is stated that in a secret session of the Confederate 
 Congress, the condition of the Confederacy as to sub- 
 sistence was declared to be: 
 
 '''That there was not meat enough in the Southern 
 Confederacy for the armies it had in the field. 
 
 " ' That there was not in Virginia either meat or bread 
 for the armies within her limits. 
 
 "'That the supply of bread for those armies to be 
 obtained from other places depended absolutely upon 
 keeping open the railroad connections with the South. 
 
 '"That the meat must be obtained from abroad 
 through a seaport. 
 
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG 487 
 
 '''That the transportation was not adequate, from 
 whatever cause, to meet the necessary demands of the 
 service. 
 
 "'That the supply of fresh meat to General Lee's 
 army was precarious, and, if the army fell back from 
 Richmond and Petersburg, that there was every proba- 
 bility that it would cease altogether.'" 
 
 The bald statement of these facts gives little idea 
 of the condition within the Confederate lines. The 
 region about the armies was absolutely denuded of 
 food and the men in the trenches not only starved 
 themselves, but underwent the additional pangs of 
 knowing that their families were starving at home. 
 
 These facts were as well known in the Union camp as 
 in the Confederate, and Grant's objective now was far 
 more the lines of supply than the lines of breastwork 
 behind which Lee's ragged and shivering veterans, 
 wasting away as they were, still proved too deadly to 
 be inconsiderately attacked. So constant was the firing 
 across the lines that no wagons could approach the 
 front to bring fuel, and the ill-clad Southern soldiers 
 were compelled to resort to the desperate expedient of 
 burning the abatis in their front to keep from freezing. 
 In consequence, when the final assaults came their lines 
 had been weakened in many places, without as well as 
 within the entrenchments. Numbers of them froze to 
 death at their posts, and of those who remained, the 
 entire body was so enfeebled as scarcely to be able to 
 stand the fatigue of the retreat, and many of them 
 dropped by the wayside in exhaustion. 
 
CHAPTER XX 
 LEE AND GRANT 
 
 Necessarily a comparison arises between the two 
 captains who confronted each other in this great cam- 
 paign of 1864. But the exalting of the one does not 
 necessarily mean the depreciation of the other. To 
 argue that Grant was not as great a soldier as Lee 
 does not reflect on him. No more were Jackson or 
 Johnston. Lee excelled them all. 
 
 Grant's fame, when he was made lieutenant-general 
 and came into Virginia, rested on the three great feats 
 of Donelson, Vicksburg, and Missionary Ridge. And 
 to these three a fourth was added a year later, when at 
 Appomattox, Lee, on the 9th of April, 1865, surrendered 
 to him the starving remnant of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, which the exigencies of the Confederacy had 
 held before Petersburg as in a vise till it had slowly 
 shrunken to a shadow. Current history has chosen to 
 assign to Grant the greater praise for this last campaign, 
 partly because he finally crushed Lee, but chiefly be- 
 cause it ended the war. And possibly the lasting fame 
 of the successful captain will be based chiefly on this. 
 As a man, it should be based on this; for no victor in 
 all history ever displayed nobler qualities than those 
 which Grant showed when Lee asked him for terms. 
 It may be well, however, to recall the simple but often 
 
 488 
 
LEE AND GRANT 489 
 
 overlooked principle, that while success is without 
 doubt the gauge of a general's ability, this does not 
 necessarily mean final success. History shines with the 
 names of generals who have failed at last and have yet 
 borne off the palm in the great contest in which Fame 
 is the reward. Hannibal was not the less the superior 
 of Scipio Africanus because the latter finally conquered 
 him and saved Rome. Charles XII was not the less 
 a greater captain than Peter's forgotten general be- 
 cause the latter drove him from Russia to seek an 
 asylum in Turkey. Nor was Napoleon inferior to Wel- 
 lington though he died defeated and a prisoner, while 
 Wellington became prime minister and first citizen of 
 the England he had been so capable and fortunate as 
 to save. 
 
 A captain's rank must be measured by his opportu- 
 nities and the manner in which he uses them. That 
 Grant was a general of rare ability — clear-headed, capa- 
 ble, far-sighted, single-minded, prompt, resourceful, 
 constant, resolute even to obstinacy — no one who stud- 
 ies his campaigns will deny; that he was the equal of 
 Lee in that high combination of these and other rarer 
 qualities which go to make up the greatest soldier, no 
 one who studies with open mind the campaign of 1864 
 may successfully maintain. 
 
 The heroic manner in which Lee with his half-starved 
 veterans sustained the repeated shocks of the '' per- 
 sistent hammering" of Grant's great army through so 
 long a period must ever be a cause of wonder to the 
 true student of history, and the key will only be found 
 by him who, looking beyond mere natural forces, shall 
 
490 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 consider the inspiration that, springing from love of 
 country, and nourished by love of liberty, animates the 
 breast of those who, firm in their conviction of right, 
 fight on their own soil for their homes and their fire- 
 sides. Study of the subject has, at least, convinced 
 one writer, who has desired to give the truth, and noth- 
 ing but the truth, that rarely if ever has there been 
 such an army led by such a leader. Grant's persistent 
 hammering, as attritive as it was, was far less so than 
 the attrition of hunger and want. Lee, who early in 
 the war had sighed for a force of veteran troops to 
 whom to confide the trust, had long been at the head 
 of the most experienced veterans who ever fought on 
 American soil. He believed in his soul that they would 
 go anywhere when properly led. But he was too clear- 
 eyed a soldier not to know that the most veteran legions 
 that ever followed the eagles of Rome or France or the 
 flag of the Confederacy must be shod and fed or they 
 could not fight. From the first there had been diffi- 
 culty in the equipment of the troops, owing to the ab- 
 sence of manufactories of even elementary articles. 
 The arms with which the South entered the war were 
 largely of the oldest and most obsolete kind ; and many 
 troops were armed with old muskets roughly changed 
 from fiintlocks to percussion; saddles were wanting to 
 the cavalry, and swords were made on country forges.' 
 Artillery had to be mounted on farm wagons,^ and 
 uniforms were woven on country looms. The ordnance 
 department was created, said General Johnston, out of 
 
 > "Life of Forrest," by Dr. John A. \Vyeth. 
 2 "Life of William N. Pendleton," by S. P. Lee. 
 
LEE AND GRANT 491 
 
 nothing. This deficiency was in time partially over- 
 come by captures from the enemy; by building up 
 hastily manufacturing establishments at a number of 
 points, and by blockade-running; but the matter of 
 subsistence of the army was one which always caused 
 grave alarm and serious and, at last, fatal trouble. 
 The means of transportation were so limited that any 
 break in even one line of railway was a perilous loss 
 and the absence of manufactories contributed to frus- 
 trate Lee's boldest designs. 
 
 In the history of war it has ever pleased the romantic 
 to find the commander sharing with his soldiers what- 
 ever hardships the campaign might bring. No captain 
 ever measured up to this standard more fully than Gen- 
 eral Lee. The world has little conception of the scarcity 
 among the Confederate soldiery of the commonest nec- 
 essaries of life. They were scarce from the beginning. 
 Often shirts were made from curtains, for blankets were 
 substituted squares of old carpet, shoes were made of 
 rawhide, and uniforms of cotton. Medicine was made 
 contraband of war by the Federal Government, and 
 quinine and chloroform were as rigidly excluded as 
 percussion caps and powder. After the middle of the 
 war, except when they were in the enemy's country 
 and could secure supplies, the army rarely had enough, 
 often had the least that men can subsist on; at times 
 had nothing. "Shoes were scarce, blankets were curi- 
 osities, and overcoats phenomena," writes a careful 
 Northern student of the war.^ This was nothing new. 
 
 "The troops of this portion of the army have for 
 
 ' "The Campaign of Chancellorsville," p. 33 (Bigelow). 
 
492 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 some time been confined to reduced rations," wrote 
 Lee to the Confederate Secretary of War in 1863. 
 ". . . Symptoms of scurvy are appearing among 
 them, and to supply the place of vegetables each regi- 
 ment is directed to send a daily detail to gather 
 sassafras buds, wild onion, garlic, lamb's quarters, 
 and poke sprouts; but for so large an army the supply 
 obtained is very small." ^ 
 
 It is tragic to think of being dependant for the supply 
 of any army on the wild vegetables that could be found 
 in the March woods and fields. No more unconscious 
 or more damning indictment was ever framed against 
 a commissariat. He had already written to Mr. Sed- 
 don ten days before on the same subject, and he now 
 again is urging the necessity of a "more generous diet" 
 for his men, not because of their dissatisfaction, for, 
 said he, "the men are cheerful and I receive but few 
 complaints, still I do not think it is enough to continue 
 them in health and vigor, and I fear they will not be 
 able to endure the hardships of the approaching cam- 
 paign." 
 
 In his letter of March 17, he wrote: ". . . I am in- 
 formed by the chief commissary of the army that he 
 has been unable to issue the sugar ration to the troops 
 for the last ten days. Their ration consequently con- 
 sists of one-fourth pound of bacon, eighteen ounces of 
 flour, ten pounds of rice to each one hundred men about 
 every third day, with some few peas and a small amount 
 of dried fruit occasionally as the}^ can be obtained. 
 This may give existence to the troops while idle, but 
 
 ' Letter of March 27, 1863. 
 
LEE AND GRANT 493 
 
 will certainly cause them to break down when called 
 upon for exertion. . . . The time has come when it is 
 necessary that the men should have full rations. Their 
 health is failing, scurvy and typhus fever are making 
 their appearance, and it is necessary for them to have 
 a more generous diet." 
 
 It was on this fare that the army was kept who fought 
 the battle of Chancellorsville, and, for that matter, 
 it was on less than this that they withstood Grant's 
 tremendous assaults, fought the battles of the Wilder- 
 ness campaign, and held the lines before Richmond and 
 Petersburg. 
 
 But whatever the hardships of his soldiers were, Lee 
 shared them. Many stories were told, by those who 
 had opportunities to know, of the meagreness of his 
 own table. He himself told of the hen which had 
 made her home throughout the campaign in his head- 
 quarters wagon and had inexplicably disappeared. 
 On inquiry it turned out that some stranger had been 
 invited to dinner, and his servant, ashamed to have 
 the visitor see how little they had to eat at the general's 
 table, had killed the hen and served her at dinner. 
 
 Another story used to be told which, though per- 
 haps not having so high authority, was generally ac- 
 cepted as authentic. It is said that the general on 
 one occasion, finding his meal to consist only of cabbage, 
 questioned his servant on the subject, and on being in- 
 formed that there was no bacon, asked what became of 
 a piece of bacon which had been on the table the day 
 before when they had had a guest. "That was bor- 
 rered bacon, sir," said the servant. 
 
494 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 We have seen how at Sharpsburg the want of shoes 
 prevented his meeting McClellan with his full force. 
 Want of supplies held him in Virginia later, when 
 strategy appeared to demand his again invading Mary- 
 land. A few extracts from Lee's letters at the time will 
 show the situation plainly. In October, 1863, after 
 Gettysburg, Lee writes of his troops : "If they had been 
 properly provided with clothes I would certainly have 
 endeavored to have thrown them north of the Potomac; 
 but thousands were barefooted; thousands with frag- 
 ments of shoes, and all without coats, blankets, or warm 
 clothing. I could not bear to expose them to certain 
 suffering on an uncertain issue." ^ 
 
 On October 28 he writes to his wife: ''I am glad 
 you have some socks for the army. Send them to me. 
 Tell the girls to send all they can. I wish they could 
 make some shoes, too. We have thousands of bare- 
 footed men. There is no news. General Meade, I be- 
 lieve, is repairing the railroads and I presume will 
 come on again. If I could only get some shoes and 
 clothes for the men I would save him the trouble." 
 
 Could anything be more tragic than this general 
 bound in his trenches by the nakedness of his army, 
 while his opponent prepared in his sight to over- 
 whelm him! Or could anything be more pathetic 
 than this general of an army acting as receiver of a 
 few dozen pairs of socks knitted for his barefooted 
 army by his invalid wife ! Not merely here, but from 
 now on, he acts as dispenser of the socks knitted by 
 her busy needles. Truly, the South may well point 
 
 ' Letter to Mrs. Lee, October 19, 1863. 
 
LEE AND GRANT 495 
 
 with pride to her gifted son, who in his head-quarters 
 in a "nice pine thicket" showed such antique simplicity 
 of character. 
 
 By the beginning of the year 1864, the subsistence 
 of the army had become almost impossible. ^'Many 
 of the infantry," writes General Lee in an official com- 
 munication, '^are without shoes, and the cavalry worn 
 down by the pursuit of Averell. We are now issuing 
 to the troops a fourth of a pound of salt meat, and have 
 only three days' supply at that rate. Two droves of 
 cattle from the West that were reported to be for this 
 army, I am told have been directed to Richmond. I 
 can learn of no supply of meat on the road to the army, 
 and fear I shall be unable to retain it in the field." ^ 
 
 In another official letter to the commissary-general 
 he writes: ''I regret very much to learn that the supply 
 of beef for the army is so nearly exhausted. ... No 
 beef has been issued to the cavalry corps by the chief 
 commissary, that T am aware of, for eighteen months. 
 During that time it has supplied itself, and has now, 
 I understand, sufficient to last until the middle of 
 February." ^ 
 
 Two weeks later he writes the quartermaster-gen- 
 eral as follows : ''General : The want of shoes and blank- 
 ets in this army continues to cause much suffering and 
 to impair its efficiency. In one regiment, I am informed, 
 there are only fifty men with serviceable shoes, and a 
 brigade that recently went on picket was compelled to 
 leave several hundred men in camp that were unable 
 
 ' Letter to President Davis, January 2, 1864. 
 
 ^ Letter to Colonel L. B. Northrop, commissary-general, January 5, 
 1864. 
 
496 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 to bear the exposure of duty, being destitute of shoes 
 and blankets." ^ 
 
 He thereupon urges that instead of trusting to the 
 precarious suppHes procured by running the blockade, 
 the South should spare no effort to develop her own 
 resources. 
 
 But the time had passed when the South could de- 
 velop her resources, and it was soon to come when even 
 the precarious supply by blockade-running was to cease 
 altogether. 
 
 On the 24th of January he wrote his wife: "... I 
 have had to disperse the cavalry as much as possible 
 to obtain forage for their horses, and it is that which 
 causes trouble. Provisions for the men, too, are very 
 scarce, and with very light diet and light clothing I 
 fear they suffer. But still they are cheerful and un- 
 complaining. I received a report from one division the 
 other day in which it stated that over four hundred 
 men were barefooted and over one thousand without 
 blankets. ..." 
 
 Such was the condition of the army in the depth of 
 the winter of 1863-64, and it steadily grew worse. 
 By the opening of spring Lee stood face to face with 
 the gravest problem that can confront a general — the 
 impossibility of subsisting his army — and, moreover, his 
 own strength was waning, although he was yet to put 
 forth the supreme effort which was to make his defence 
 of Virginia against Grant possibly the greatest defen- 
 sive campaign in history. In a letter to his eldest son, 
 expressing his hearty acquiescence in an order substi- 
 
 ' Letter to Brigadier-General R. A. Lawton, quartermaster-general, 
 January 18, 1864. 
 
LEE AND GRANT 497 
 
 tuting a chief engineer in place of his son, for whom he 
 had applied, with the design of making him chief of 
 staff, he says: '^I thought that position presented less 
 objections to your serving with me than any other. . . . 
 I want all the aid I can get now. I feel a marked change 
 in my strength since my attack last spring at Fred- 
 ericksburg, and am less competent for my duty than 
 ever." ^ 
 
 All through the spring, with undimmed vision, he 
 had foreseen the tragic fate awaiting him, and his letters 
 show plainly how clear this vision was, yet never once 
 does he show aught but the same heroic constancy 
 which had distinguished him in the past. "In none of 
 them," says Long, "does he show a symptom of despair 
 or breathe a thought of giving up the contest. To the 
 last, he remained full of resources, energetic and defiant, 
 and ready to bear on his own shoulders the whole bur- 
 den of the conduct of the war." ^ 
 
 In March, when lying opposite Grant's great army 
 on the Rapidan, he wrote the President of the indica- 
 tion that Grant was concentrating a great force to 
 operate in Virginia. And on April 6 he writes of the 
 great efforts that, according to all the information he 
 received, were to be made in Virginia. A week later 
 he writes him again: 
 
 Head-quarters, April 12, 1864. 
 
 Mr. President: My anxiety on the subject of pro- 
 visions for the army is so great that I cannot refrain 
 from expressing it to your Excellency. I cannot see 
 
 > Letter of April 6, 1864. ' Long's " Lee." 
 
498 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 how we can operate with our present supplies. Any 
 derangement in their arrival, or disaster to the rail- 
 road, would render it impossible for me to keep the 
 army together, and might force a retreat into North 
 Carolina. There is nothing to be had in this section 
 for men or animals. We have rations for the troops 
 to-day and to-morrow. . . . Every exertion should be 
 made to supply the depots at Richmond and at other 
 points. . . . 
 
 I am, with great respect, your obedient servant, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 Three weeks later in a letter stating the movements 
 of Grant's troops along the Rappahannock, and the 
 signs of "large preparations on the part of the enemy 
 and a state of readiness for action," he adds: ''If I 
 could get back Pickett, Hoke, and B. R. Johnson, I 
 would feel strong enough to operate. ... I cannot 
 get the troops together for want of forage and am look- 
 ing for grass." It was a tragic situation. Three days 
 later, on the night of May 3, 1864, Grant crossed the 
 Rapidan with an army of over 140,000 men, many of 
 them veteran troops, as brave men as ever carried a 
 musket — armed and equipped in a manner unsurpassed, 
 if equalled, in the annals of war, officered by the flower 
 of the North. He had also 318 guns and a wagon-train 
 that, stretched in a line, would have reached to Rich- 
 mond.^ He controlled, with the aid of the exceedingly 
 efficient navy, the York and the Janies to Dutch Gap, 
 
 * " The army immediately opposed to Lee numbered, when it crossed 
 the Rapidan, on May 4, 1864, 149,166 men. While Lee had within 
 call 62,000, but with only half that number he moved on and attacked 
 Grant's army in the Wilderness." (Jones's "Life and Letters of R. E. 
 Lee," p. 310.) 
 
LEE AND GRANT 499 
 
 where Butler lay with an army which could spare him 
 16,000 men, to help in the deadly assaults at Cold 
 Harbor, and a few days later could carry the formidable 
 outer defences of Petersburg. 
 
 To meet this force, Lee had 62,000 men and 224 
 guns. His army was less efficiently armed and with an 
 equipment which would have been hopelessly insuffi- 
 cient for any other army than the one he commanded : 
 the war-worn veterans of the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia, inured to hunger and hardship and battle. 
 
 On the 12th day of June, when Grant crossed the 
 James to the south side, of the 140,000 men who had 
 crossed the Rapidan one month and nine days before 
 he had lost nearly 60,000, almost as many men as 
 Lee had had during the campaign. On the 9th of 
 April following, when Lee surrendered. Grant's losses 
 had mounted up to 124,390, two men for every one 
 that Lee had in his army at any time.^ By this record 
 posterity must judge the two captains. It will also pay 
 its tribute to the valor which could stand up against 
 such losses. 
 
 The adverse criticism of Grant is based on the charge 
 that he sacrificed over 50,000 men to reach the James, 
 when he might have reached the south side of James 
 River and laid siege to Petersburg and Richmond with- 
 out the loss of a man.^ As to whether, had he done 
 this, he could have succeeded in the destruction of 
 
 ^E. P. Alexander's "Memoirs," p. 619. 
 
 ^ Grant's losses, from May 4, when he crossed the Rapidan, to June 
 12, when, staggering back from Cold Harbor, he abandoned his first plan 
 of attack and crossed to the south side of the James, was, according to 
 the Union authorities, 54,929. (Rhodes's "History," vol. IV, p. 447; 
 
500 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Lee's army, the impregnable defence of the Confederate 
 capital, can never be known. Grant thought not, and 
 he was eminently clear-headed and practical. He is 
 said to have declared pithily that his objective was 
 Lee's head-quarters tent. It was, moreover, neces- 
 sary for him not only to defeat Lee, but at the same 
 time to protect Washington, failure to do which had 
 cost McClellan his place. 
 
 No one knew so well as Lee the disastrous conse- 
 quences of this policy of attrition. From August on 
 his letters express plainly his recognition of the terrible 
 fact that his army was wearing down without the hope 
 of his losses being repaired.^ His soldierly prevision 
 enabled him to predict precisel}^ what afterward oc- 
 curred: the extension of Grant's lines to envelop him, 
 and the consequent loss of Richmond.^ 
 
 The design of Grant to capture Petersburg, and, by 
 cutting off Richmond from the South, force the capitu- 
 lation of the Confederate capital, was undoubtedly 
 able strategy, and why it had not been attempted by 
 him before seems even now an enigma, for McClellan 
 had urged it warmly in July, 1862, and a dash had 
 been made to seize Richmond from this side by a dar- 
 ing raid which, possibly, had failed only because of a 
 rise in the James River which prevented the raiding 
 party from crossing; and the mouth of the Appomat- 
 
 The Century Co.'s "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War," vol. IV, 
 p. 182.) And among these were the flower of his army, as gallant 
 oflBcers and men as ever faced death on a battle-field. 
 
 ' Letter to Secretary of War, August 23, 1864. Letter to President 
 Davis, September 2, 18G4. 
 
 ■' Letter of October 10, 1864. 
 
LEE AND GRANT 501 
 
 tox was as securely in the possession of the Union as 
 the mouth of the Delaware. 
 
 Applause has properly been accorded Graiit for his 
 skilful manoeuvre when, after Cold Harbor, he slipped 
 away from Lee and crossed to the south side of the 
 James without molestation. It was a capital piece of 
 work, and showed the utmost ability in moving troops 
 secretly in large bodies under difficult conditions. In 
 truth, however, he failed absolutely in the immediate 
 object of this movement: the securing, as he wrote 
 Halleck, of the city of Petersburg by a coup before the 
 Confederates could get there in much force. ^ 
 
 His plan to seize Petersburg with its slender gar- 
 rison of less than 2,500 men was foiled by Beauregard, 
 to whom only on his urgent request Lee at length sent 
 men from the north side of the James, and though 
 Grant was enabled to take, on June 15, "the formid- 
 able works to the north-east of the town," when he 
 attacked in force on three successive days he was re- 
 pulsed with the loss of 10,000 men, losses which shook 
 and disheartened his army even more, possibly, than 
 the slaughter at Cold Harbor.^ 
 
 The demoralization consequent on Lee's victories 
 from the Wilderness to Petersburg, over "the crippled 
 Army of the Potomac," which now enabled him to de- 
 tach Early and, with a view to repeating the strategy 
 of 1862, send him to the valley of Virginia, followed 
 by that general's signal success, in conjunction with 
 Breckinridge, in clearing the valley of Sigel and Hunter, 
 
 ' Official Records, vol. XI, pp. 1, 12. 
 
 * E. P. Alexander's "Memoirs," chajj. XXI. 
 
502 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 and, after defeating Wallace at Monocacy Bridge, 
 in immediately threatening Washington itself, sent gold 
 up from 168, its rate in May, to 285, the highest point 
 it reached during the war/ 
 
 The authorities in Washington, more alarmed even 
 than when Lee was at Sharpsburg or at Chambersburg, 
 were clamoring for Grant to come and assume personal 
 command of the forces protecting the city. And it is 
 alleged that Grant escaped the fate of his predecessors 
 only because there was no one else to put in his place. 
 It was even charged that he had fallen "back into his 
 old habits of intemperance," a charge which Mr. Lincoln 
 dryly dismissed with a witticism.^ 
 
 Congress, by resolution, requested the President "to 
 appoint a day for humiliation and prayer," and the 
 President, "cordially concurring . . . in the pious sen- 
 timents expressed" in this resolution, appointed the 
 first Thursday in August as a day of national humilia- 
 tion and prayer. Swinton declares that "there was at 
 this time great danger of a collapse of the war." ^ 
 
 The simple truth is that, against great outside clamor. 
 Grant was sustained by the authorities in Washington 
 
 » Rhodes's " History of the United States," IV, p. 509. Swinton, 
 p. 494. 
 
 ^ " Despondency and discouragement," says Rhodes, the latest and 
 among the most thoughtful of all the Northern historians of the war, 
 " are words which portray the state of feeling at the North during the 
 month of July, and the closer one's knowledge of affairs, the gloomier 
 was his view; but the salient facts put into every one's mind the per- 
 tinent question, 'Who shall revive the withered hopes that bloomed 
 on the opening of Grant's campaign?"" This question he quotes from 
 the New York World, a paper which he states was not unfriendly to 
 Grant. ("History of the United States," IV, p. 507.) 
 
 ^ Swinton's "Army of the Potomac," p. 494. 
 
LEE AND GRANT 503 
 
 because he was manifestly the best general in sight, 
 and not because he had proved himself the equal of 
 Lee. That he was retained is a proof of Mr. Lincoln's 
 wisdom, for he was thenceforth to prove the man for 
 the occasion. 
 
 So great was the feeling of despondency at the North 
 at this time that several serious, if somewhat informal, 
 embassies were sent by the authorities at Washington 
 to ascertain the feeling of the Confederate authorities 
 touching peace on the basis of a restoration of the Union, 
 coupled at first with a condition of "an abandonment 
 of slavery," but later without even this condition. 
 
 On the very day that Mr. Davis, yielding to clamor 
 at the South against the Fabian policy of the cau- 
 tious Johnston, who had been falling back before 
 Sherman, relieved that veteran officer of his command, 
 he accorded an interview to two gentlemen who had 
 come on an irregular mission, with the knowledge and 
 consent of Mr. Lincoln, to ask whether any measure 
 could be tried that might lead to peace. Mr. Davis 
 rejected the proposal to make peace, unless with it 
 came the acknowledgment of the right of the South to 
 self-government; "and," declares the historian above 
 quoted, "taking into account the actual military situ- 
 ation, a different attitude on the part of the Richmond 
 government could not have been expected." ^ 
 
 Viewed in the cold light of the inexorable facts, the 
 honors at this time in Virginia were all with the Con- 
 federate general, and later comparisons so invidious to 
 Lee have all been made in the light of subsequent 
 
 ' Rhodes's "History of the United States," IV, pp. 514-516. 
 
504 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 events, over which neither Grant nor Lee exercised 
 control. 
 
 In truth, it was not until long afterward, and after 
 it was found that the resources of the South were ex- 
 hausted, that Grant's costly policy of attrition was 
 accepted by the government or the people, and his star, 
 which had been waning, once more ascended. That it 
 ever ascended again was due in part to his constancy 
 of purpose, and for the rest, to '^successes elsewhere" 
 and to the exhaustion of the South, particularly to the 
 destruction of the means of communication. 
 
 While Grant was dashing his men against Lee's lines 
 with such deadly consequences, Sherman, marching 
 across the country, was forcing Johnston gradually 
 back by manoeuvring and flanking rather than attack- 
 ing in front as Grant attacked Lee. His force was 
 about 100,000 men, while Johnston's army of about 
 40,000, with Polk's force of 19,000, which had been 
 ordered from Mississippi to join him, aggregated less 
 than 60,000. At Altoona, where Johnston awaited at- 
 tack in a strong defensive position, Sherman refused 
 battle and moved westward to Dallas. At New Hope 
 Church, on May 24, Hooker's and Howell's corps as- 
 saulted Johnston's lines, but were repulsed with heavy 
 loss. On the 14th of June, at Pine Knob, the assault 
 was unsuccessful, but the defence cost the life of the 
 gallant General Polk. 
 
 On June 24, and again on the 27th, Johnston was 
 attacked at Kennesaw Mountain, but both attacks 
 were repulsed with heavy loss, and Sherman drew off 
 by the flank and forced Johnston to fall back. John- 
 
LEE AND GRANT 505 
 
 ston's plan was to draw Sherman farther and farther 
 from his base, and then, when opportunity offered, as 
 he felt sure it would in time, attack him and, if success- 
 ful, destroy his army. The people of the country, how- 
 ever, were wild with dismay at Sherman's continued 
 advance and clamored for Johnston's removal. The 
 Confederate President accordingly, after a tart corre- 
 spondence with him, removed Johnston on July 17 and 
 placed General Hood in command. Hood had been 
 assigned to command with the understanding that 
 he must fight, and fight he did, with the result of 
 being defeated and driven into Atlanta, which, a little 
 later on (September 1), he was forced to evacuate to 
 avoid being cut off and captured. On August 23 Ad- 
 miral Farragut captured Mobile. These " successes else- 
 where" did much to relieve the situation at the North, 
 and they were soon followed by others. Sherman hav- 
 ing occupied Atlanta, Hood moved back into Tennessee 
 with the idea of destroying Sherman's communications 
 and recapturing Nashville, believing that this would 
 compel Sherman to abandon his project and return to 
 the West. Sherman, however, after following him for 
 a time, sent Thomas to Nashville, and reinforcing him 
 with the Fourth and Twenty-third army corps, re- 
 turned himself to Atlanta and a little later marched on 
 to the sea, capturing Savannah. 
 
 Hood, with some 35,000 men, having been joined by 
 the noted and able General Forrest, moved on into 
 Tennessee, and on November 30 attacked Schofield 
 at Franklin, and after a furious fight carried his lines 
 and forced him to retire to Nashville. Following him 
 
506 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 up, Hood took position before Nashville. Here he was 
 attacked by Thomas on the 15th and 16th of December, 
 his lines broken and his army totally routed, losing 54 
 guns. His army was, indeed, substantially destroyed. 
 
 No step could have given more aid and comfort to 
 the North, or have been more disastrous to the South, 
 than the removal of Johnston at the moment when, if 
 his strategy had not prepared the way for the possible 
 destruction of the invading force, the veteran general 
 was, at least, preparing to carry out the consistent plan 
 he had laid down from the beginning. Abroad it satis- 
 fied the anxious nations of Europe that the South was 
 at her last gasp and established their hitherto vacillating 
 policy in favor of the Union cause, and the Southern 
 cause thereafter steadily declined to its end. 
 
 The same day that the President of the Confederate 
 States removed Joseph E. Johnston, the President of 
 the United States, appalled at the effect of Lee's mas- 
 terly defence of Richmond, issued a proclamation call- 
 ing for 500,000 men, and before Grant learned of this 
 call he wrote urging a draft of 300,000 immediately.^ 
 
 Europe now changed front. The skilful diplomacy 
 of Charles Francis Adams had prevented the delivery 
 to the Confederacy of the arms w^hich had been built 
 for her; the sympathies of the European nations had 
 shifted, and the South was, as has been well said by 
 the son and namesake of the able diplomat referred 
 to, as securely shut up to perish as if she had been in 
 a vast vacuum. The victories of diplomacy are little 
 considered beside those of the battle-field. But, taking 
 
 » Rhodes, "History of the United States," IV, pp. 506, 507. 
 
LEE AND GRANT 507 
 
 into consideration what the Merrimac had accompHshed 
 during her brief but formidable cruise in Hampton 
 Roads, where she sank the Cumberland, captured the 
 Congress's crew, and drove the famous Monitor into 
 shoal water, it is probable that the blockade of the 
 Southern ports might have been broken had not Mr. 
 Adams's unremitting efforts availed to prevent the 
 Confederate rams being delivered. 
 
 As it was, the end was clearly in view to Lee. The 
 destruction of Hood's army at Nashville removed the 
 only force capable of blocking the way of Sherman 
 across the South, and left him free to march to the sea, 
 and, having got in touch with the fleet there, continue 
 northward through the Carolinas, marking his way 
 with a track of devastation which has been aptly likened 
 to that made when Saxe carried fire and sword through 
 the Palatinate. 
 
 Grant having settled down to the siege of Richmond, 
 Lee, with "Richmond hung like a millstone about his 
 neck," a figure he is said to have employed, was now 
 forced to guard a line extending from the south of 
 Petersburg to the north of Richmond, and to withstand 
 with his thinning ranks his able antagonist with an 
 ever-growing army and an ever-increasing confidence. 
 
 The able and acute critic of the war, already cited, 
 has given it as his opinion that it was not Richmond 
 which hung like a millstone about Lee's neck, but the 
 Tredegar Iron Works at Richmond. These works, he 
 holds, were the "determining factor of Lee's strategy," 
 and indeed of the strategy of the whole Civil War. He 
 argues that, "without the Tredegar Works to supply 
 
508 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 him with artillery and keep his artillery in working order, 
 Lee's army could not have held the field two months." 
 The defence of Richmond, therefore, was not a mere 
 matter of sentiment on the part of the Confederacy, 
 but was vital to the continuance of the contest. No 
 modern army can hold the field unless it has arsenals 
 and machinery for the manufacture and repair of ar- 
 tillery, etc., at its command, and he states it as his 
 opinion that "the capture by us of Richmond, or the 
 abandonment of Richmond by Lee, including as it 
 would the loss of the Tredegar Works, would have 
 brought the war to a termination at any period, and 
 from the very commencement to the end, Richmond, 
 or the Tredegar Iron Works, was the vital point of the 
 Confederacy." ^ 
 
 That this is, at least, a debatable question, Lee him- 
 self would appear to have thought, if he is quoted cor- 
 rectly as having referred to Richmond as the millstone 
 about his neck. But whether it was Richmond or the 
 Tredegar Iron Works which bound him to the line of 
 the James, all that winter Lee lay in the trenches 
 with his "hands tied," while his army withered and 
 perished from want and cold, and while Sherman, 
 almost unopposed, burnt, in sheer riot of destruction, 
 supplies that might, had they been available, have 
 subsisted that army for ten years, and yet by the 
 policy of the Confederate Government were left un- 
 protected. 
 
 By the end of the year all available resources were 
 exhausted. 
 
 * Charles Francis Adams's address on Lee. 
 
LEE AND GRANT 509 
 
 On the 11th of January, 1865, Lee sent this despatch 
 to the Secretary of War: 
 
 Hon. J. A. Seddon: 
 
 There is nothing within reach of this army to be 
 impressed. The country is swept clear. Our only 
 reliance is upon the railroads. We have but two days' 
 supplies. 
 
 R. E. Lee. 
 
 Sherman, on December 21, reached the sea at Sa- 
 vannah, and thus was in a position to connect with 
 Grant by sea or by a sweep up the coast. The latter 
 plan was chosen, possibly in part to let South Carolina 
 feel the iron enter into her soul. Sherman crossed her 
 borders on February 21, and though Charleston was not 
 "sown with salt/' as Halleck had suggested, it felt the 
 full weight of the hostility which prompted the sug- 
 gestion and response. 
 
 Meantime, the navy, that vast force so little con- 
 sidered in all the histories of the war, was consummat- 
 ing its work. It performed the part of holding the 
 South by the throat while the army hammered the 
 life out of her. Following an unsuccessful attempt 
 under Butler at the end of December, the capture of 
 Fort Fisher, on the North Carolina coast, on January 
 15, closed, in Wilmington, the last door through which 
 even the meagre supplies of the blockade-runner could 
 reach the Confederacy, and thenceforth the South was, 
 as has been well said, "hermetically sealed." 
 
 It may be stated, in passing, that Grant, relieved now 
 
510 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 of all political restrictions, promptly relieved Butler 
 after his fiasco at Wilmington in December. At the 
 end of January an attempt was made to bring about a 
 peace through the Hampton Roads Conference, but 
 nothing came of it. 
 
 In this extremity the Confederate authorities at last 
 recognized what many men had long felt : that on Lee 
 now rested the sole hope of the Confederacy, and Mr. 
 Davis finally came to the tardy conclusion that he 
 should be given command of all the armies of the South. 
 He accordingly yielded to the Congress and conferred 
 on Lee what Mr. Lincoln had conferred on Grant nearly 
 a year before: untrammelled command of all the forces 
 of the country. Unfortunately, it was too late. The 
 President of the United States could furnish his gen- 
 eral all the men he required and all the supplies they 
 needed. The President of the Confederate States could 
 furnish his general neither men nor supplies. The 
 "seed corn" of the Confederacy had all been ground. 
 Lee, when he received his appointment, faced an empty 
 and broken-down commissariat, a country denuded of 
 men, swept clean of supplies, with every avenue of en- 
 trance closed and every means of conveyance crippled. 
 The South Atlantic States were clamorous, and not 
 unnaturally, for protection against the army, which, 
 under a vandal leader, was sweeping almost unopposed 
 across them, marking its course with a swath of fire 
 which spared nothing. 
 
 On February 6 Lee was appointed to the command 
 in chief of the armies of the Confederacy. But it was 
 too late. He telegraphed the Secretary of War on 
 
LEE AND GRANT 511 
 
 February 8, 1865, a statement of the deplorable con- 
 dition of his army : 
 
 Sir: All the disposable force of the right wing of the 
 army has been operating against the enemy beyond 
 Hatcher's Run since Sunday. Yesterday, the most in- 
 clement day of the winter, they had to be retained in 
 line of battle, having been in the same condition the 
 two previous days and nights. I regret to be obliged 
 to state that under these circumstances, heightened by 
 assaults and fire of the enemy, some of the men had 
 been without meat for three days, and all were suffer- 
 ing from reduced rations and scant clothing, exposed to 
 battle, cold, hail, and sleet. I have directed Colonel 
 Coler, chief commissary, who reports that he has not 
 a pound of meat at his disposal, to visit Richmond and 
 see if nothing can be done. If some change is not made 
 and the Commissary Department reorganized, I appre- 
 hend dire results. The physical strength of the men, 
 if their courage survives, must fail under such treat- 
 ment. Our cavalry has to be dispersed for want of 
 forage. Fitz Lee's and Lomax's Divisions are scattered 
 because supplies cannot be transported where their 
 services are required. I had to bring William H. F. 
 Lee's Division forty miles Sunday night to get him in 
 position. Taking these facts in connection with the 
 paucity of our numbers you must not be surprised if 
 
 calamity befalls us. . . . -n tt^ t n i 
 
 -^ R. E. Lee, GeneraL 
 
 President Davis endorsed on this report: ''This is 
 too sad to be patiently considered and cannot have 
 occurred without criminal neglect or gross incapac- 
 ity. ..." A comment as true to-day as when Lee 
 set before him plainly the tragic fact that his army 
 was fast perishing at its post. 
 
512 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Unfortunately for the South, the rest of the Presi- 
 dent's endorsement, "Let supphes be had by purchase 
 or borrowing or other possible mode," was inefficacious. 
 There was no longer any possible mode by which sup- 
 plies could be had. The South was exhausted. Vir- 
 ginia had been swept clean and there were no means of 
 transporting supplies from elsewhere. 
 
 Subsistence could not be, or, at least, was not, fur- 
 nished, and while the sword attacked in front, hunger 
 assailed in the rear. His men had, he wrote the War 
 Department in February, endured all that flesh and 
 blood could endure. In the battle line, suffering from 
 cold and exhaustion, they not only had not had meat 
 for three days, but to them came the cry from their 
 starving families at home. His officers reported ''not 
 a few cases" in which men had gone insane from priva- 
 tion, hardship, and strain. No wonder that his num- 
 bers dwindled and that his tardy elevation, in Feb- 
 ruary, to the position of commander-in-chief was futile 
 to recoup the destruction. 
 
 Lee had already carried the fortunes of the Con- 
 federacy on his shoulders for, at least, two years longer 
 than the Confederacy could have survived without his 
 genius to sustain it ; and now the time had come when 
 no mortal power could longer support it.* Its end 
 had come. All had gone except the indomitable and 
 immortal spirit of its people. 
 
 In this desperate state of affairs, however, Lee ap- 
 plied himself to refill his depleted ranks by every pos- 
 sible means. His first general order, after that in 
 
 * E. P. Alexander's "Memoirs," p. 599. 
 
LEE AND GRANT 513 
 
 which he on the 9th of February assumed formally the 
 chief command of the Confederate forces, was one 
 "offering pardon to all deserters and those improperly 
 absent if they returned to duty within twenty days 
 (except those who had deserted to the enemy), and an 
 exhortation to all Southern soldiers to respond to the 
 call of honor and duty." He had for some time ad- 
 vocated the enlistment of negroes as soldiers. "Six 
 months before he had advocated their employment as 
 teamsters, laborers, and mechanics in place of whites, 
 who, being replaced, could be restored to the ranks." ^ 
 He now proposed to employ them as soldiers, feeling 
 assured that he could make as good soldiers of them as 
 the enemy. 
 
 But as imperative as was the need of men, an even 
 more impossible requirement to meet was the supplies 
 and equipment. Wilmington, the last port through 
 which these had dribbled in from the outside world, 
 had, as stated, been closed when Fort Fisher fell; and 
 the main source of supply — capture from the enemy — 
 had been cut off when the army, which had been wont 
 to act as its own ordnance department, was confined 
 to the defensive lines of a siege. 
 
 The Tredegar Iron Works at Richmond, the chief 
 factory for ordnance within the Confederacy, as we have 
 seen, the preservation of which is, perhaps, the key to 
 much of the astonishing stubbornness of the Confederate 
 Government to defend that city to the last, was com- 
 pelled to perform itself every labor which entered into 
 the manufacture of their guns. That is, it was obliged 
 
 IF. Lee's "Lee," p. 307. 
 
514 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 to mine the ore in the mountains, to mine the coal and 
 cut the wood with whicli to smelt this ore, to transport 
 it to the iron works, and to mine the coal with which to 
 manufacture the guns/ 
 
 Thus, Lee, on his promotion, found himself with a 
 barren honor and a useless authority. His appeal to 
 the people to furnish him for his cavalry all saddles, 
 revolvers, pistols, and carbines that might be in their 
 possession is a proof of the extremity to which he had 
 come. 
 
 One of the first acts he performed as commander 
 proved how widely he differed from the authorities in 
 Richmond in his views of the situation. Beauregard 
 was in the South endeavoring, with such troops as 
 could be mustered, to hold Sherman at bay; but the 
 force under his hand was hopelessly inadequate for 
 the task. Lee had Johnston reinstated in command, 
 from which he had been so disastrously removed by 
 the Southern President in the preceding July at the 
 clamor of the South Atlantic States, panic-stricken 
 by his Fabian policy. Lee's reason was unanswerable. 
 "Beauregard has a difficult task to perform," he said 
 to the Secretary of War, "and one of his best officers, 
 General Hardee, is incapacitated by sickness. I have 
 heard that his own health is indifferent; should his 
 health give way there is no one in the department to 
 replace him, nor have I any one to send there. Gen- 
 eral J. E. Johnston is the only officer I know who has 
 the confidence of the army and the people, and if he 
 were ordered to report to me I would place him there 
 
 * Address of Colonel Archer Anderson on the Tredegar Company. 
 
LEE AND GRANT 515 
 
 on duty." He was so ordered on the 23d of February, 
 and was placed on duty in command of the Army of 
 the Tennessee and all troops in the department of 
 South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. But the major 
 portion of the fine army he had commanded in the 
 summer of 1864 had been extirpated on the bloody 
 fields of Franklin and Nashville. Johnston's force be- 
 fore Sherman numbered only 18,761 — truly '^an army 
 in efhgy." With this force, as he wrote Lee, he "could 
 only annoy Sherman, not stop him," for Sherman, after 
 Schofield joined him at Goldsboro, had nearly 90,000 
 men. 
 
CHAPTER XXI 
 
 THE LAST DITCH 
 
 Lee now knew that he had but one chance that gave 
 promise of success. This was to withdraw his depleted 
 arm.}^ from its trenches, where it had wasted away in 
 its long vigil, and, marching around Grant's extended 
 left, head for Danville on the southern border of Vir- 
 ginia, where he could get supplies and where, uniting 
 with Johnston, he might fall on Sherman and destroy 
 him before Grant could come to his rescue. It was a 
 plan which commended itself to both the Southern gen- 
 erals, and Johnston wrote Lee: ''You have only to 
 decide where to meet Sherman. I will be near him." 
 
 It was a difficult and hazardous undertaking, for his 
 lines extended for over thirty miles so close to the lines 
 of his alert and powerful antagonist that the men in the 
 two armies used to call across to each other and ex- 
 change the rough banter of the trenches. A story went 
 the rounds that winter that after one of the movements 
 in which the Confederates had checked decisively the 
 Union advance, they were shouting their exasperating 
 triumph across the trenches. At length the hectoring 
 could be stood no longer and the challenge came back, 
 ''Swap generals with us and we'll come over and lick 
 h — 1 out of you!" 
 
 516 
 
THE LAST DITCH 517 
 
 On the face of conditions there were many chances 
 against the successful accompHshment of Lee's design. 
 Lee's army was terribly enfeebled by the hardship of 
 the winter in the trenches with insufficient shelter and 
 food and the strain of constant duty under deadly fire. 
 His men were shadows, his horses wraiths. His wagon- 
 trains were sent as far away as West Virginia and North 
 Carolina in the effort to collect supplies. 
 
 Grant, on the other hand, had an army not only 
 more than twice as large, but many times as well nour- 
 ished and equipped as that with which Lee had held 
 him at bay so long. 
 
 But for the indomitable spirit which Lee's force 
 displayed, it might, indeed, have appeared but the 
 shadow of an army which, on the night of April 2, 
 with hushed and silent voices, moved in the darkness 
 from the trenches which they had held so long against 
 their foes. 
 
 Another determining factor was Grant himself. He 
 had weathered the storms of the autumn and the win- 
 ter and now possessed the entire confidence of his su- 
 periors at Washington. Sherman's "spectacular raid," 
 as Schofield termed his "march to the sea," and Sheri- 
 dan's sweep down the valley and across the Piedmont 
 to Grant's camp on the Appomattox, had shown that 
 the South was now but a shell, emptied of all that had 
 made her formidable. It was known now in Wash- 
 ington that there was no longer any body to those 
 spectral armies whose tramp had been wont to fly on 
 the wings of rumor and keep Washington city in a con- 
 stant nightmare. Grant had satisfied the authorities 
 
518 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 that the army of the South-west was no longer a peril, 
 that Sherman could handle Johnston and he himself 
 could crush Lee. He was now as well aware as Lee 
 himself that Lee must soon abandon his defensive line 
 or starve in it ; and he prepared to prevent the former 
 by a movement which should envelop and lock him 
 in his trenches and force him to capitulate. 
 
 Lee's perception of the situation at this time was 
 expressed by him to the Secretary of War in terms which 
 could not have been clearer had the events he forecast 
 actually occurred. ''You may expect," he said to 
 General Breckinridge on February 21, "Sheridan to 
 move down the valley and Stoneman from Knox- 
 ville. What, then, will become of those sections of the 
 country? Bragg will be forced back by Schofield, I 
 fear, and until I abandon the James River, nothing 
 can be sent from the army. Grant is preparing to 
 draw out by his left with the intent of enveloping me; 
 he may be preparing to anticipate my withdrawal. 
 Everything of value should be removed from Rich- 
 mond. The cavalry and artillery are still scattered for 
 want of provender, and our supply and ammunition 
 trains, which ought to be with the army in case of 
 a sudden movement, are absent collecting provisions 
 and forage in West Virginia and North Carolina. You 
 will see to what straits we are reduced." 
 
 "To what straits," indeed! 
 
 To his wife, who had sent him "a bag of socks for 
 the army," he wrote on the same day: "You will have 
 to send down your offerings as soon as you can and 
 bring your work to a close, for I think General Grant 
 
THE LAST DITCH 519 
 
 will move against us soon — within a week if nothing 
 prevents — and no man can tell what may be the re- 
 sult. But trusting to a merciful God, who does not 
 always give the battle to the strong, I pray we may not 
 be overwhelmed. I shall, however, endeavor to do my 
 duty and fight to the last. Should it be necessary to 
 abandon our position to prevent being surrounded, 
 what will you do? Will you remain or leave the city? 
 You must consider the question and make up your 
 mind. It is a fearful condition and we must rely for 
 guidance and protection upon a kind providence." ^ 
 
 Thus, notwithstanding the odds against him, Lee, 
 trusting in God and reliant on the heroic remnant of 
 his army that remained, believed that he could extri- 
 cate his army from the enveloping meshes of Grant's 
 steadily extending lines and effect a union with John- 
 ston. He so notified the government in Richmond 
 early in March, and it was understood that he would 
 move as soon as the roads would admit of his doing so. 
 
 The suggestion, slight as it was, of a possibility that 
 something might prevent Grant's moving within a week 
 related to a movement which had already taken form 
 in his mind to make one final effort to forestall Grant 
 and possibly surprise and defeat him. Before aban- 
 doning his defences and taking this final step which 
 would surrender Richmond, he determined to make 
 one last, desperate attempt to break Grant's line in 
 the hope that, should fortune favor him, he might de- 
 feat his resolute antagonist at the very moment when 
 he thought to pluck the fruit of his long waiting. In 
 
 1 Fitzhugh Lee's "Lee," p. 170. 
 
520 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 any event he hoped to compel Grant to withdraw 
 troops from his extended left to protect his right at 
 the point of attack on his right near the Appomattox. 
 This would, at least, defer the enveloping of Lee's right, 
 which Grant was pushing forward, and would postpone 
 the abandonment of Richmond and give him time till 
 the roads became less impassable. 
 
 Arrangements were, therefore, now made to attack 
 the forts on the right of the line held by the Army of 
 the Potomac toward the Appomattox, with a view to 
 seizing Fort Stedman and what were supposed to be 
 a number of forts on the high ground in the rear com- 
 manding it, together with the lines on either side. 
 Accordingly, before dawn on the 25th of March, Gor- 
 don, who now commanded E well's Corps, and who, hav- 
 ing suggested it, and being eager to make the attempt, 
 had been placed in charge of the movement, massed 
 his men, his own corps with a part of Longstreet's and 
 Hill's, behind the cover of the trenches opposite the 
 Federal entrenchment known as Fort Stedman. At 
 this point the opposing lines were only one hundred and 
 fifty yards apart, and the ditches where the pickets lay 
 only fifty yards apart. Fort Stedman, with three forts 
 beyond it, was to be captured by a dash, and through 
 the breach thus made, Gordon's troops and a large 
 body ordered down by General Lee from Longst reefs 
 Corps were to pass, seize the high ground in the rear, 
 and sweep along the entrenchments held by the Ninth 
 Corps, being "joined by the other troops as their fronts 
 were cleared." The cavalry was to pass through the 
 clearing and then "gallop to the rear, dcstro}' Grant's 
 
THE LAST DITCH 521 
 
 railroad and telegraph lines, and cut away his pontoons 
 across the river, while the infantry swept down the 
 rear of the Union entrenchments." 
 
 In the darkness of the hour preceding dawn, Gor- 
 don, with three columns, preceded by a storming 
 party of three hundred picked men, and by picked axe- 
 men to cut away the abatis and fraise in front of the 
 Union lines, led by guides, moved out of the Confeder- 
 are lines, and, having seized and overpowered the pick- 
 ets without the firing of a shot, rushed on, and, with 
 a dash, captured Fort Stedman, together with a num- 
 ber of supporting batteries. This was accomplished 
 with the loss of only a half dozen men, and the troops 
 swept along the breastworks on either side, capturing 
 cannon and mortars and nearly a thousand prisoners, 
 including those in the fort itself, together with Gen- 
 eral McLaughlin, its commander. Having been com- 
 pletely successful thus far, they pressed forward with 
 the expectation of seizing the forts in the rear. It 
 happened, however, that what had been supposed to 
 be forts open at the gorge, were in fact redoubts that 
 had a commanding fire on both Fort Stedman and also 
 on the lines and open batteries to the right and left. 
 In these redoubts the Ninth Corps was now being con- 
 centrated, and as the day broke, its entire force was 
 directed against Gordon's troops in the captured bat- 
 teries below them. The storming parties had pushed 
 forward and the skirmishers were already at the mili- 
 tary railroad and telegraph lines ; but in the melee and 
 the darkness the guides had either deserted or been 
 lost, and the storming parties, finding no forts as they 
 
522 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 expected, fell into confusion and were either forced 
 back or captured. The large body of troops sent by 
 General Lee from Longstreet's Corps had been delayed 
 by the breaking down of trains and failed to reach 
 Gordon in time to render assistance. Thus, daylight 
 found Gordon with his plans only half executed, and 
 General Parke's prompt concentration of his troops on 
 the heights which commanded the captured batteries 
 prevented further progress; and, more than this, it 
 rendered the lines already seized untenable, for they 
 were subjected to a cross-fire of artillery and infantry. 
 Lee, finding that further advance was impossible, or- 
 dered Gordon to retire; but this was far more diffi- 
 cult than the advance had been. Both artillery and 
 infantry swept the space beyond the lines and only 
 a portion got back alive, the loss of the Confederates 
 having been very heavy, including 1,949 prisoners, 
 among whom were 71 officers.^ Thus, came to a dis- 
 astrous end one of the most daring, and what promised 
 to be most brilliant, feats in the history of Lee's army. 
 
 This was, as General Gordon has well said, the in- 
 auguration of the period of more than two weeks of 
 almost incessant battle, which began on the morning 
 of March 25 and ended with the last charge of Lee's 
 army, made likewise by Gordon's men on the morning 
 of April 9 at Appomattox.^ 
 
 As a sequel to these far-reaching conditions, under 
 the policy of attrition which had gone on from month to 
 
 'Humphreys' "Virginia Campaign in 1S64-65." 
 * General John B. Gordon, "Reminiscences of the Civil War," pp. 
 400-^13. 
 
THE LAST DITCH 523 
 
 month, on the fatal 2d of April, Lee, following an ex- 
 tension of Grant's lines around his flank, which broke 
 his connection with the South and threatened to en- 
 velop him, announced to his government that he could 
 no longer maintain the long line from south of Peters- 
 burg to north of Richmond. 
 
 On the 29th of March, as Lee was preparing to evac- 
 uate Petersburg and start south to unite with Johnston 
 and attack Sherman, Grant, who was so apprehensive 
 of such a movement that he said he never awoke with- 
 out expecting to hear that Lee had slipped away, began 
 to move around his right to foil it. To prevent this, 
 Lee was forced to withdraw troops from other parts of 
 his line, and Grant promptly proceeded to take ad- 
 vantage of this fact. 
 
 On the 1st of April, following a repulse on the even- 
 ing before in front of Lee's extreme right, Sheridan 
 attacked and defeated, at Five Forks, Pickett, who had 
 left a long gap of several miles defended only by pickets 
 between his troops and the nearest line. And Grant, 
 having carried Lee's outer defences, ordered a general 
 assault for the next day. Lee, knowing the wasted 
 condition of his army and the impossibility of holding 
 against Grant's contemplated assault his long-stretched 
 line, decided to execute at once, if possible, his plan to 
 abandon the lines he had held for nearly ten months 
 and move southward to effect a junction with Johnston. 
 He notified the government in Richmond, arranged 
 for provisions to meet him at Amelia Court House, 
 and that night executed with skill the difficult feat of 
 extricating his reduced army from its perilous position 
 
524 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 and started on a retreat southward. Such, in general 
 terms, were the steps which led to the abandonment of 
 Richmond. 
 
 In more detail these steps were as follows : 
 
 As early as the middle of March, Grant issued instruc- 
 tions to the Army of the Potomac for its guidance in 
 anticipation of Lee's abandoning his lines. On the 24th 
 of March he issued orders for a general turning m.ove- 
 ment to begin on the 29th, by which he proposed to 
 seize the Danville and South-side (or Lynchburg) Rail- 
 ways and turn Lee's right. It was the next day on 
 which Lee attempted unsuccessfully to break his lines 
 at Fort Stedman. 
 
 On the 27th Grant held a conference with Sherman, 
 who had come from North Carolina for the purpose, 
 and, unfolding to him his plan for a general movement 
 on the 29th, gave him his instructions. He was to 
 threaten Raleigh, and then, turning to the right, strike 
 the Roanoke River near Weldon, on the North Carolina 
 border, from which point he could move to Burkeville, 
 at the junction of the Danville and the Lynchburg 
 Railways, and intercept Lee's retreat on Danville or 
 Lynchburg, or could join Grant before Richmond. 
 
 Grant was now confident of success, and he might 
 well be sanguine. He had 124,700 men ready for duty 
 and 369 guns, while Lee had not over 35,000 muskets 
 and perhaps not over 10,000 artillery and cavalry. 
 Humphreys, in his careful and admirable work, "The 
 Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," states Grant's effec- 
 tive force at the end of March to have been 124,700 men 
 of all arms, and Lee's effective force to have been 
 
THE LAST DITCH 525 
 
 57,000 men of all arms. But General Fitzhugh Lee 
 states that he had at that time "35,000 muskets, but 
 after Five Forks and in the encounter of March 31 and 
 April 1 and 2 he had only 20,000 muskets available, 
 and of all arms not over 25,000, when he began the re- 
 treat that terminated at Appomattox Court House." ^ 
 Whatever the disparity in numbers. Grant's force 
 was so vastly preponderant that he could mass more 
 men at any one point of Lee's line of thirty-odd miles 
 than Lee had in his whole army, and yet threaten with 
 a superior force the entire remainder of those lines. 
 On the 27th, Grant, having determined not to defer his 
 movement till the 29th, as originally planned, but to act 
 at once, despatched Ord with the Army of the James 
 to his extreme left, who, marching by night, was en- 
 abled to take position unobserved in the rear of the 
 Second Corps, thirty-six miles from his former position. 
 Sheridan was ordered next day to cross Hatcher's Run 
 the following morning (the 29th), and proceeding to 
 and beyond Dinwiddie Court House, near which the 
 Second and Fifth Corps would be posted, push on 
 and take a position which would so threaten Lee's 
 right as to force him out of his entrenched lines. If 
 Lee still held his lines, then Sheridan was to proceed 
 against his lines of communication, the Danville and 
 the South-side Railways, and destroy them effectively. 
 This latter alternative was, however, countermanded 
 next day. Humphreys, Warren, and Wright were also 
 set in motion to strengthen Grant's left and carry 
 
 * F. Lee's "Lee," p. 373. E. P. Alexander's. "Military Memoirs," 
 p. 590. 
 
526 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 through the turning movement, and Parke with the 
 Ninth Corps was to occupy Wright's entrenchments 
 when the Sixth Corps should be withdrawn. It was a 
 formidable movement and was so recognized by Lee. 
 But he was prepared to meet it with such force as he 
 had. Having learned, on March 28, that Sheridan's 
 cavalry was held on the left of the Army of the Poto- 
 mac, Lee at once sent General Anderson with Bushrod 
 Johnson's Division and Wise's Brigade to his extreme 
 right, and brought over from his extreme left, on the 
 north side of the James, Fitz Lee's Cavalry Division, 
 and putting him in command of all the cavalry there, 
 sent him to attack Sheridan, who was moving toward 
 the important strategic position of Five Forks, where 
 five roads met some four miles to the westward of Lee's 
 extreme right. Pickett's Division, whch under its 
 brave commander had won for itself imperishable fame 
 on the field of Gettysburg, was brought over from the 
 left and sent to the extreme right to support Fitz Lee 
 and protect that threatened portion of the Confederate 
 line. At the same time Hill extended his line to the 
 right from Hatcher's Run, where Lee's extreme right 
 had rested. A road, known as the White Oak Road, 
 runs westerly to the cross-roads at Five Forks, some 
 four miles distant, where the Ford Road crosses it and 
 the road to Dinwiddie Court House, eight miles to 
 the south-east, joins them. Fitz Lee's Cavalry Divis- 
 ion arrived at Sutherland Station, on the South-side 
 Railroad, on the night of the 29th, and on the morning 
 of the 30th moved to Five Forks, and thence on down 
 the Dinwiddie Court House Road, where it met and 
 
THE LAST DITCH 527 
 
 held back Merritt's division, which was on its way to 
 Five Forks. That evening Pickett seized Five Forks 
 with three brigades of his own division — Corse's, 
 Terry's, and Steuart's — and two of Johnson's Brigades 
 — Ransom's and Wallace's — and was joined by Rosser's 
 and W. H. F. Lee's Cavalry Divisions. 
 
 Next day Lee made his last offensive counter move. 
 
 It rained heavily on the night of the 29th and all day 
 on the 30th, rendering the clay soil so deep as almost 
 to put a stop to Grant's movement, for at half-past 
 eight o'clock on the 31st, corps commanders were noti- 
 fied that there would be no movement of troops that 
 day.* But not so with Lee. He now knew the force 
 in front of him and before turning his back he would 
 strike one more blow. The Fifth Corps had been 
 pushed forward by Sheridan and lay fronting the White 
 Oak Road, on Warren's suggestion that he might be 
 able to interpose between Pickett at Five Forks and 
 the rest of Lee's army and isolate the former. Lee 
 proposed to take advantage of this, and, in connection 
 with Pickett's attack, turn the left flank of the Fifth 
 Corps with a part of Hill's and Anderson's Corps and 
 roll it up. Accordingly, on the morning of the 31st 
 he sent McGowan's and Grade's Brigades to attack 
 Warren's flank, while Hunton's and Wise's Brigades 
 were to attack in front. The opposing forces met as 
 they were proceeding with the movements ordered and 
 a sharp battle ensued, in which the Confederates drove 
 Warren's troops beyond a branch of Gravelly Run to 
 the cover of their artillery, with a loss of 1,400 men; 
 
 'Humphreys' " Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 330. 
 
528 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 but here Humphreys' corps came to their support and 
 the Confederates were in turn driven back to their en- 
 trenchments. Lee thought this movement of sufficient 
 importance to direct it in person. 
 
 Meantime, on the morning of the 31st, Fitz Lee's 
 Cavalry moved forward on the Dinwiddie Road, where 
 Devin's division was encountered, and while Munford's 
 Brigade was left to hold them, Pickett, with Fitz Lee's 
 other two divisions, W. H. F. Lee's and Rosser's, 
 moved by Little Five Forks to flank Sheridan, and after 
 stiff fighting at the crossings of Chamberlain's Run, 
 which were stoutly held by Crook, Davies, and Gregg, 
 they carried the crossings, and Munford having forced 
 Devin back, they drove back Sheridan's cavalry, which 
 ''fought stubbornly," forcing them back to the court- 
 house, where "a spirited and obstinate contest ensued, 
 which lasted until night." ^ This defeat of Sheridan 
 caused so much uneasiness that Meade hastened to send 
 forward heavy reinforcements of infantry to his aid, and 
 a confusion of orders led to a widening of the breach 
 between the commander of the Fifth Corps and the 
 commander of the Army of the Potomac, which bore 
 disastrous consequences for the former next day. The 
 knowledge that these reinforcements were on the way 
 to Sheridan caused Pickett to withrdaw that night to 
 Five Forks, where he posted his command in so isolated 
 a position that it led to its destruction on the following 
 day and contributed to destroy the last chance which 
 Lee might have had to defeat his adversary. 
 
 When he retired to Five Forks, Pickett entrenched 
 
 'Humphreys' " Virginia Campaign of '64 and '65," p. 335. 
 
THE LAST DITCH 529 
 
 along the White Oak Road, with the cross-roads near 
 the centre of his line, which extended for nearly a mile 
 on either side, with a short return at the left. This left 
 an interval of some three miles between his left and 
 the extreme right of Lee's regular defensive works at 
 Hatcher's Run. It has been said that the line of battle 
 itself was sufficiently well posted, with W. H. F. Lee's 
 Cavalry guarding the right with three guns of Pegram's 
 battalion, and Munford's Cavalry guarding the left, 
 with McGregor's battery at the return, and with the 
 brigades of Corse, Terry, Steuart, Ransom, and Wallace 
 in order from right to left along the line, supported by 
 three guns at the Forks. But the long interval of three 
 miles between the left and Lee's works was held only 
 by a line of cavalry pickets and offered a temptation 
 to any enterprising enemy. Such a one now com- 
 manded the army in front of Five Forks. 
 
 When Sheridan, now reinforced by the Fifth Corps, 
 discovered at daylight of the 1st that the force which 
 had driven him back the day before had been with- 
 drawn from his front, he promptly pushed forward 
 again and advanced to within a short distance of the 
 White Oak Road, where he found Pickett posted along 
 the road in line of battle. Having learned of the 
 weakness of Pickett's line with the long interval left 
 between him and the regular entrenchments of Lee's 
 army, he made his disposition to break through this 
 gap and cut Pickett off from the rest of the army. He 
 directed his cavalry against Pickett's right, and or- 
 dered Warren to move forward against Pickett's left, 
 with his troops so disposed as to contain him with a 
 
530 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 portion of them demonstrating against his front, while 
 with the rest he should cross the White Oak Road, 
 attack the angle of the return on White Oak Road, 
 sweep around through the undefended interval and, 
 wheeling, roll up his left flank. The flank movement 
 was carried through successfully, and though the re- 
 turn on Pickett's left was found farther to the westward 
 than had been supposed, the troops of the Fifth Corps, 
 which had passed through the interval and reached his 
 rear, changed their direction and, after a sharp fight 
 at the angle, swept away his left, capturing over 3,000 
 prisoners and a number of colors. From here they 
 swept on down the breastworks, and though they were 
 held back for a while by the stout resistance offered 
 by the Confederates who formed at right angles to 
 the breastworks and held on stubbornly, they were 
 too strong and overlapped the Confederate line too far 
 to be long withstood. 
 
 The contest was, perhaps, too unequal to have been 
 successfully maintained even had the Confederate com- 
 mander been on the field. But both General Pickett 
 and his cavalry conmiander. General Fitzhugh Lee, 
 were several miles away, on the north side of Hatcher's 
 Run. Here, by a curious mischance, owing, it is 
 thought, to the conformation of the ground, the heavy 
 forest, and the atmospheric conditions, the sound of the 
 battle did not reach them until after the Confederate 
 left had been flanked and destroyed. It was said that 
 the two generals were engaged, after the arduous and 
 hungry work of the preceding days, in enjoying a meal 
 which some one had provided for them, when a mes- 
 
THE LAST DITCH 531 
 
 senger dashed up and informed them of the battle that 
 was raging a few miles away and of the disaster which 
 had befallen the Confederate left. They at once 
 mounted and dashed to the front ; but the advance of 
 the Federals had proceeded so far that only General 
 Pickett, who had gotten his horse first and was in ad- 
 vance, was able to cross the bridge over the stream 
 before it was seized, and General Fitzhugh Lee was 
 compelled to ride up the stream some distance to find 
 a crossing place. 
 
 WTien Pickett arrived on the field he found his left 
 shattered and almost destroyed, with the remnant that 
 had not been captured falling sullenl}- back along 
 the "VMiite Oak and Ford Roads toward Five Forks, 
 with the Federal infantrv^, both on the flank and rear, 
 pushing them hotly. Ayres's, Griffin's, and Crawford's 
 divisions, under the personal super\^ision of General 
 Warren, were moving on their rear. Pickett tried to 
 stem the advancing tide by taking Terry's Brigade 
 (commanded now by Colonel Mayo) from the entrench- 
 ments to the right and flinging it across the Ford Road 
 to meet the force pushing toward Five Forks on the 
 Confederate rear. Here for a time a stand was made 
 by Mayo's and Ransom's Brigades and McGregor's 
 Batter}^, which had escaped capture wdth the left wing; 
 but the point could not now be held, and Mayo was 
 ordered to get his men out and make his way to the 
 South-side Railroad, the guns of the batter}^ falling 
 into the enemy's hands. Pickett, finding that ^layo 
 could not hold his ground, now withdrew Corse also 
 from the entrenchments and placed him at right angles 
 
532 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 with them to cover the retreat, while Steuart, supported 
 by Pegram's other guns, was still holding on at Five 
 Forks; but they were soon forced to retreat, and the 
 guns, like the others, fell into the enemy's hands, the 
 gallant young Colonel Pegram meeting a soldier's death 
 in his effort to hold on to the last. 
 
 Meantime, Custer with two of his brigades had 
 charged the Confederate right, where W. H. F. Lee was 
 holding the line, and had been held back by a counter 
 charge of one of Lee's Brigades in what the historian 
 of "The Virginia Campaign of 1864-65" terms a brill- 
 iant encounter, ''in which Lee maintained his position." 
 Later Fitzhugh's Brigade of Devin's Division carried 
 the breastworks at Five Forks, capturing the three 
 guns at that point, and Lee was withdrawn to the 
 South-side Railroad, where Fitz Lee was in charge, 
 where he was joined by Munford and the remnant of 
 Pickett's shattered division of infantry. Here they 
 were also joined by Hunton's Brigade of Pickett's 
 Division and later by General R. H. Anderson with 
 three other brigades (Wise's, Grade's, and Fulton's), 
 whom General Lee, on the announcement of Pick- 
 ett's defeat, had sent to cover the retreat and to stop 
 the Federal advance around the right wing of his 
 army. 
 
 The historian of ''The Virginia Campaign of 
 1864-65" has stated, in his admirable work on this 
 campaign, that it appeared a grave mistake to him 
 "to require Pickett to fight at Five Forks," instead of 
 allowing him to retire to Sutherland Station, where he 
 could be reinforced at need from Lee's right. The 
 
THE LAST DITCH 533 
 
 statement would appear to show a misapprehension on 
 his part. Pickett was sent to Five Forks on the 30th 
 to prevent Sheridan's cavahy from seizing the point 
 and destroying the South-side Railroad. At that time 
 there was no infantry force near Dinwiddle Court 
 House. In the battle of the 31st Sheridan was driven 
 back to Dinwiddle Court House and nightfall found 
 Pickett still pressing him back. When during the night, 
 on finding the Fifth Corps coming up on his flank, 
 Pickett withdrew to Five Forks, the situation had so 
 completely changed that he should have promptly noti- 
 fied General Lee of the change, instead of posting his 
 men at the Forks as though it were simply a raiding 
 cavalry force in his front, and going off to the north 
 side of the stream to refresh himself. 
 
 The battle of Five Forks was disastrous to the repu- 
 tation of another gallant soldier and capable general 
 beside the Confederate commander. At nightfall that 
 evening General Sheridan, who had been expressly 
 authorized to do so by General Grant should his judg- 
 ment justify it, relieved General Warren of his com- 
 mand and ordered him to report directly to Grant. It 
 was a sad and almost inexplicable termination of a 
 fine career, for, although Warren was later acquitted 
 of most of the charges formulated before the court of 
 inquiry which he demanded, he was laid aside for the 
 rest of the campaign and failed to be present at the 
 close to which he had contributed so much. Sheri- 
 dan's charge was that Warren did not exert himself to 
 get up his corps as rapidly as he might have done ; that 
 later in the attack on Pickett's entrenchments he 
 
534 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 "became dissatisfied with him"; and that Warren 
 did not exert himself to inspire confidence in his troops. 
 The court's opinion was against there being ground for 
 these charges, for Warren had acted with conspicuous 
 gallantry during a part of the engagement, and it was 
 generally considered among soldiers that the ground of 
 the charges was Warren's "temperament,'' which had 
 from time to time caused friction with his superior 
 officers. He had done the State much service. 
 
 Lee, usually so tolerant of the mistakes of his sub- 
 ordinates, found it hard to forgive the error of Pickett, 
 which cost him so fatal a loss, and but for the complete 
 collapse which followed so soon on the disaster of Five 
 Forks, the commander at Five Forks would probably 
 have been called to account for it. 
 
 The end was now in sight. The troops sent by Lee 
 on the night of the 1st under Anderson to cover the 
 retreat of Pickett's shattered force weakened Lee's al- 
 ready thinned lines to the breaking point, and Grant 
 was prompt to take advantage of it. Knowing that 
 Lee would endeavor to rescue the remnant of the force 
 that had been routed at Five Forks, and fearing that 
 he might fall upon Sheridan and destroy him, and at 
 the same time might withdraw from Petersburg and 
 retreat to Danville, Grant ordered an attack "all along 
 the line" at daylight next morning. To prevent the 
 first, he ordered Humphreys with the Second Corps to 
 assault Lee's right immediately if "a vulnerable point" 
 could be found, and if not, to send Miles's division to 
 Sheridan's aid. A fierce attack was accordingly made 
 on Lee's entrenchments along his left and the pickets 
 
THE LAST DITCH 535 
 
 were driven in ; but, though the assaults were continued 
 through the night, the Hues were held firmly. 
 
 The Army of Northern Virginia was but a remnant — 
 less than one thousand men to a mile of its defences; 
 but that renmant, as the next hours proved, was ''still 
 formidable." 
 
 Lee recognized that the defeat at Five Forks was the 
 end of his defence of Richmond and that Grant knew 
 it equally well. He knew that it would inspire Grant 
 and his lieutenants to bend every energy to reap the 
 fruits of this signal fortune, and that he would promptly 
 endeavor to overwhelm him and prevent his withdrawal 
 and march on Danville. Accordingly, he prepared, as 
 best he might, to meet the assault which was coming 
 and arrange for his escape from Grant's converging 
 lines. The two generals never handled their forces better. 
 
 The night assault on his right by the Second Corps 
 had been repulsed, but with the break of dawn came 
 the flood. The force that had been sent under Ander- 
 son to save Pickett's broken troops and bar Grant's 
 progress around his right was away to the westward 
 confronted by Sheridan's cavalry and the Fifth Corps, 
 flushed with the victory of Five Forks. On his extreme 
 right were four of Hill's Brigades commanded by Heth 
 (McGowan's, McRae's, Cook's, and Scales's), and next 
 on his right lay four more brigades of Hill's Corps 
 (Davis's, McComb's, Lane's, and Thomas's) confront- 
 ing Wright's and Ord's corps. To their left lay Gor- 
 don's Corps confronting Parke, who extended from 
 Lee's centre to the extreme left on the Appomattox. 
 
 On Lee's right the cannon had been roaring fitfully 
 
536 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 # 
 
 all night. On his centre and left they had subsided 
 after midnight, but before the earliest crack of dawn 
 they had begun again with renewed fury, announcing 
 the storm about to break. Before the earliest dawn 
 a signal gun boomed from the darkness in the direction 
 of Fort Fisher, a strong redoubt to the south-west of 
 Petersburg, at the angle where Lee had stopped Grant's 
 endeavor to extend around his right during the winter 
 and had deflected his line to the southward. In a 
 few minutes the troops of the Sixth Corps were found 
 coming out of the darkness, and within a short time 
 a general assault was in progress.^ As far to the east- 
 ward as the bank of the Appomattox the lines w^re 
 aflame, for the Army of Northern Virginia, worn to a 
 skeleton, was making its last concerted stand as a 
 whole against the overwhelming number of the Army 
 of the Potomac. It was a day which for daring and 
 resolution was not exceeded by any day in the war. 
 
 Accompanied by pioneer parties armed with axes 
 and tools to clear away the abatis and chevaux-de- 
 frise, the columns came on like the waves of the sea. 
 In some places they found that there were no abatis or 
 chevaux-de-frise to cut away — they had been burnt 
 for firewood during the deadly rigor of winter to keep 
 the men in the trenches from freezing, or had been 
 opened to give the troops within the trenches "con- 
 venience of access to the front." In some places at 
 the point of Wright's attack on the right there were 
 hardly more muskets than a double picket line to op- 
 pose the enemy. Yet these with the artillery in the 
 
 * Humphreys' "Virginia Campaign in 1864-65." 
 
THE LAST DITCH 537 
 
 redoubts made a stout defence before they were over- 
 whelmed and their Hne carried. The commander of 
 the Sixth Corps reckoned that he lost over 1,000 men 
 in fifteen minutes. Lee's line, however, was pierced, 
 and, leaving a brigade to hold the point, the enemy 
 turned down the entrenchments and captured guns 
 and prisoners as far as Hatcher's Run. While they 
 were thus engaged, Wilcox made a gallant effort to re- 
 cover the line and drove out the brigade left to hold it, 
 but was in turn driven out again by the heavy rein- 
 forcements of Porter's division and two of Turner's 
 brigades of the Twenty-sixth Corps. Thus fought to 
 the end the Army of Northern Virginia. 
 
 The piercing of this line forced Lee to bend his right 
 back to the bank of the Appomattox to close the ap- 
 proach to Petersburg to the force which, having broken 
 through his line, was now heading for the city. So 
 close had they come that General A. P. Hill rode into 
 a party of ''stragglers," and, as he turned to escape, 
 was shot and killed by them. 
 
 Meantime, on Lee's left, his line had to meet a simi- 
 lar assault where Parke's corps on the Jerusalem Plank 
 Road, pursuing the same plan, advanced at dawn with 
 pioneers in front and, breaking through the abatis on 
 either side of Fort Sedgwick, swarmed over the outer 
 works and captured the guns in them and also some 800 
 prisoners. They found it, however, "a man's fight"; 
 every traverse had to be carried, and then the remnant 
 of the defenders fell back to an inner line where Gordon 
 not only maintained himself, but kept them busy during 
 the rest of the day and into the night defending the 
 
538 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 outer line, which they had captured against his at- 
 tempts at recapture. 
 
 Opposite the fort, at a point near what was known as 
 the Crow House, on Lee's right and to the eastward of 
 the Boydton Plank Road, was Humphreys' corps, the 
 Second Corps. It had carried the picket line the even- 
 ing before, but had been stopped by the strong and 
 stoutly held defences in their front. On the morning of 
 the 2d, having been notified by Meade that Wright and 
 Parke both had broken through Lee's lines, General 
 Humphreys made another assault and this time was 
 successful, capturing the works with the guns and a 
 part of the garrison. He now undertook to follow the 
 retreating brigades under Heth, which had been cut 
 off when Wright broke through Lee's line; but Meade 
 directed him against Petersburg, and leaving General 
 Miles's division to hold Heth, as Miles said he could do, 
 Humphreys turned toward Petersburg with his other 
 two divisions. Miles, ever bold, and now flushed with 
 victory, attacked Heth's force, on which, finding itself 
 thus pressed, turned on him, and although two gal- 
 lant assaults were made, he was driven back each time, 
 and it was not until the Confederate force was com- 
 pletely flanked that it yielded. Heth meantime had 
 been called to Petersburg to take command of Hill's 
 Corps on the death of that gallant commander. 
 
 When the commanders of the Second and Sixth 
 Corps headed their commands for Petersburg it might 
 have appeared to them that with the propulsive force 
 of the victory of the morning they would be able to 
 sweep straight on to the heart of the town. But Lee 
 
THE LAST DITCH 539 
 
 was an engineer as well as a soldier. He had long fore- 
 seen the issue of this day, and he had an inner line 
 laid down for this contingency. In the crisis of the 
 last few days Lee had endeavored to strengthen his 
 weakened lines to the westward by bringing Longstreet 
 from the north side of the James, where he commanded, 
 to help defend the chief points of attack. On his ex- 
 treme right where the lines "closed on the Appomattox " 
 the main lines were protected by a creek (Old Town 
 Creek), while a half mile or more to the front lay ad- 
 vanced works in which were two redoubts, Forts Gregg 
 and Whitworth, which commanded the ground about 
 them, including the forks into which the Boydton 
 Plank Road divides as it approaches Petersburg. They 
 were not large nor heavily garrisoned, only some two 
 hundred and fifty men and two or three guns in each, 
 but the men were picked men and were put there for 
 a purpose and they knew it. That purpose was the 
 same which held the Spartans at Thermopylae. In 
 Fort Gregg were detachments from two of Hill's Bri- 
 gades (Thomas's and Lane's) and one of Gordon's 
 (Harris's). The remainder of Harris's Brigade was in 
 Fort Whitworth, which lay nearest to the Appomattox. 
 In the main line of works, stretching on either side, 
 lay "Field's Division of Longstreet's Corps, two of 
 Gordon's Brigades, and some of Wilcox's troops." 
 Against these lines were now thrown the columns of 
 Ord and Wright. Foster's division of Gibbon's corps 
 charged Fort Gregg, but found it more stoutly defended 
 than they had counted on, and on their repulse Tur- 
 ner's brigades were sent to their support. The fight for 
 these forts was one of the most desperate of the whole 
 
540 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 war, and when finally Gibbon's men poured over the 
 parapet of Fort Gregg, which had been almost com- 
 pletely surrounded, they left the space about it like 
 that in front of Fort Whitworth, strewn with the dead 
 and wounded, and the remainder of the garrison that 
 was left alive within the fort was not conquered until 
 after "several determined dashes with the bayonet." 
 
 With the fall of Fort Gregg, Fort Whitworth, at- 
 tacked as it was, was no longer tenable, and Wilcox 
 withdrew such of the garrison as survived to the main 
 lines. 
 
 The possession of these commanding forts by the 
 enemy rendered these lines no longer tenable against 
 the overwhelming forces massed against them, with 
 the impulse of victory upon them, and the end of the 
 long struggle for the possession of this gateway of 
 Richmond was now a matter of but a few hours. 
 
 General Gibbon, who declared that the assault upon 
 Fort Gregg was one of the most desperate of the war, 
 reckoned his own losses, most of which occurred around 
 these two works, at 714 officers and men. 
 
 Thus, even to the last, the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia showed the temper which Lee had given it in his 
 three years' training, and, overwhelmed by sheer might, 
 fought for every foot of ground before yielding. By a 
 little after sunrise Lee knew that Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond were lost and that it was all he would be able to 
 do to hold on till night and try to save his army. He 
 so notified President Davis, and advised that Richmond 
 should be evacuated simultaneously with the with- 
 drawal of his troops that night. His telegram was 
 handed to Mr. Davis in St. Paul's Church during the 
 
THE LAST DITCH 541 
 
 morning service as he was about to take the commun- 
 ion. He immediately left the church. 
 
 It was recognized instantly that something unusual 
 had occurred; and in a short time it was further known 
 from the sinister preparations for its abandonment that 
 Richmond, which through Lee's genius had held out 
 for four years against every assault of war, was lost. 
 
 That night the high officials of the Confederate Gov- 
 ernment left Richmond for Danville. Such military 
 stores and equipment as remained there were destroyed, 
 and from the fire a large part of Richmond was burnt 
 over, thus adding to the terrors of evacuation the 
 horrors of a vast conflagration. 
 
 While Richmond was not unnaturally in a panic and 
 the Confederate Government in confusion, Lee him- 
 self, lying in the face of an overwhelming army in the 
 flush of final victory, was as serene as if he were the 
 victor himself. At three o'clock in the afternoon, Lee 
 wrote Mr. Davis a letter which not only casts a vivid 
 light on the general situation, but shows the serenity 
 and indomitable character of his mind. It deals first 
 with the matter of recruiting negro troops, then reports 
 Pickett's defeat at Five Forks, and finally states his 
 own views as to the abandonment of the James River 
 line. 
 
 Petersburg, Virginia, 3 p. m., April 2, 1865. 
 His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, 
 
 Richmond, Virginia. 
 Mr. President: Your letter of the 1st is just received. 
 I have been willing to detach officers to recruit negro 
 troops, and sent in the names of many who are desirous 
 
542 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 of recruiting companies, battalions, or regiments, to 
 the War Department. After receiving the general or- 
 ders on that subject establishing recruiting depots in 
 the several States, I supposed that this mode of raising 
 the troops was preferred. I will continue to submit 
 the names of those who offer for the service and whom 
 I deem competent to the War Department; but, among 
 the numerous applications which are presented, it is 
 difficult for me to decide who are suitable for the duty. 
 I am glad your Excellency has made an appeal to the 
 governors of the States, and hope it will have a good 
 effect. I have a great desire to confer with you upon 
 our condition, and would have been to Richmond be- 
 fore this, but, anticipating movements of the enemy 
 which have occurred, I felt unwilling to be absent. I 
 have considered our position very critical, but have 
 hoped that the enemy might expose himself in some 
 way that we might take advantage of and cripple him. 
 Knowing when Sheridan moved on our right that our 
 cavalry would be unable to resist successfully his ad- 
 vance upon our communications, I detached Pickett's 
 Division to support it. At first Pickett succeeded in 
 driving the enemy, who fought stubbornly; and, after 
 being reinforced by the Fifth Corps (United States 
 Army), obliged Pickett to recede to the Five Forks on 
 the Dinwiddie Court House and Ford's Road, where, 
 unfortunately, he was yesterday defeated. To relieve 
 him, I had to again draw out three brigades under 
 General Anderson, which so weakened our front line 
 that the enemy last night and this morning succeeded 
 in penetrating it near the Cox Road, separating our 
 troops around the town from those on Hatcher's Run. 
 This has enabled him to extend to the Appomattox, 
 thus enclosing and obliging us to contract our lines to 
 the city. I have directed the troops from the lines on 
 Hatcher's Run, thus severed from us, to fall back 
 
THE LAST DITCH i^io 
 
 toward Amelia Court House, and I do not see how I 
 can possibly help withdrawing from the city to the 
 north side of the Appomattox to-night. There is no 
 bridge over the Appomattox above this point nearer 
 than Goode's and BeviPs over which the troops above 
 mentioned could cross to the north side and be made 
 available to us; otherwise I might hold this position 
 for a day or two longer, but would have to evacuate it 
 eventually, and I think it better for us to abandon the 
 whole line of James River to-night if practicable. I 
 have sent preparatory orders to all the officers, and will 
 be able to tell by night whether or not we can remain 
 here another day, but I think every hour now adds to 
 our difficulties. I regret to be obliged to write such a 
 hurried letter to your Excellency, but I am in the pres- 
 ence of the enemy, endeavoring to resist his advance. 
 I am most respectfully and truly yours, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 No one of all Lee's letters casts more light on his 
 character than this. If any question as to the final 
 result lurked in his mind, it is not revealed here. On 
 this last day of the defence of Richmond, he deals with 
 the questions submitted to. him relating to his army 
 quite as he might have dealt with them on the morning 
 after Seven Pines, when he first assumed command. 
 In the letter speaks the constant soul of the South, to 
 which she is entitled for all that she has achieved in the 
 history of the country. 
 
 From this letter it will be seen that even to the last 
 hour Lee clung tenaciously to his lines to give the Con- 
 federate Government time to withdraw from Richmond. 
 Nothing is more characteristic of him than the courtesy 
 with which he closes this last despatch to the President 
 
544 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 of the Confederacy, at the very moment when the over- 
 whelming forces of the enemy were sweeping over his 
 last lines of defence. 
 
 It is the same spirit which animated him when, at 
 Appomattox, a week later, as he surrendered to Grant, 
 he attired himself as if he were to review his troops. 
 
 His letters show his entire appreciation of the diffi- 
 culty and peril of his situation; but there is not a trace 
 of dismay in all his writing. Never more than now, 
 when he made his last move in the great game of war, 
 did the mens cequa in arduis, that mark of noble minds, 
 which ever distinguished him, shine forth in him. 
 
 His letter to his wife, on the eve of the movement 
 which was to prove the closing act in the great drama of 
 the war, reflects his serenity amid the rising difficulties 
 which were soon to engulf him. He thanks her for 
 the socks she had knitted for his barefooted and suffer- 
 ing men, encloses for her a life of General Scott, for 
 whom he had a word of old-time affection and esteem, 
 and commends her to God. 
 
 That night he executed successfully the difficult 
 movement to which he referred and withdrew his 
 famished troops from their long-held and historic en- 
 trenchments.^ 
 
 ' "The Siege of Petersburg," Capt. W. Gordon McCabe. "Memorial 
 Volume of Army of Northern Virginia." 
 
CHAPTER XXII 
 
 THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 
 
 By nightfall Lee knew that he could no longer remain 
 on the James for another day, and he devoted all his 
 energies to extricating his army. At eight o'clock he 
 began to withdraw from the trenches, and it was late in 
 the night before the last of his infantry moved like 
 shadows through the darkness from the trenches in 
 which valor had made its long and desperate stand 
 against the massed forces of the new era. As he was 
 now hemmed in in a great semicircle, with Grant's 
 army resting on the Appomattox both above and below 
 him, it was necessary to cross the Appomattox to the 
 northward, and, passing up the left bank beyond 
 Grant's army, recross the Appomattox to march south- 
 ward. It must have been after the letter of the 2d was 
 despatched that General Lee issued his final orders for 
 the retreat which was to commence at dark. The artil- 
 lery was to be withdrawn first, then the infantry. The 
 wagon-trains were to follow parallel roads to avoid im- 
 peding the troops. Having withdrawn his troops on the 
 south side from the lines, he crossed the Appomattox in 
 the darkness by the pontoon bridge and the Pocahontas 
 and railway bridges. Longstreet crossed first with 
 Field's Division, Heth's and Wilcox's Divisions of Hill's 
 Corps, and turned up the river. ''Bevil's Bridge," 
 
 545 
 
546 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 which General Lee mentions in his last letter to Mr. 
 Davis, was "out of order/' but at Goode's Bridge a 
 pontoon was laid and the army recrossed here to the 
 south bank. Next to Longstreet, who moved by the 
 river road, was Gordon, who followed what was known 
 as the Hickory Road, and next to him came IMahone's 
 Division, which passed through Chesterfield Court 
 House. 
 
 So close were the lines of the two armies that Ewell, 
 who commanded the troops to the north of the James, 
 was unable to withdraw until after the moon went down. 
 The wagon-trains on the north side of the James were 
 sent up in the afternoon of the 2d to cross at Richmond, 
 and General G. W. C. Lee, at Chaffin's Bluff, crossed the 
 James at Wilton's Bridge, while Kershaw, with Gary's 
 Cavalry Brigade, dismounted, crossed at Richmond, 
 uniting on the night of the 3d near Tomahawk Church. 
 This column was headed for the railroad bridge at 
 Mattoax Station, on the Richmond and Danville Rail- 
 road, which had been repaired for the passage of ar- 
 tillery and troops. 
 
 The Appomattox was reached and crossed on the 
 night of the 4th, and the following day the column, 
 which was joined by the naval battalion under Com- 
 modore Tucker and the artillery battalion from Hew- 
 lett's Bluff, moved to the southward to join the rest of 
 Lee's army. 
 
 The withdrawal of his army from the immediate con- 
 tact in which it lay along its whole line with Grant's 
 great arm}-, with every sense quickened and every 
 nerve strained tense to prevent it, was one of the most 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 547 
 
 skilful movements of Lee's career. On the morning 
 of the 3d of April he had crossed and recrossed the Ap- 
 pomattox with the troops from Petersburg, and having 
 been joined by the other troops, was headed for Amelia 
 Court House, on the Danville Railway, where he had, 
 as stated, ordered supplies to be forwarded from Lynch- 
 burg. Everything appeared propitious for the success 
 of the movement, for the troops from the north side of 
 the James followed the next day and reached him duly. 
 But again, by one of the strange fatalities which so often 
 appeared to frustrate the best-laid plans of the Con- 
 federate leaders, an unkind fate prevented his success. 
 Wlien he arrived at Amelia Court House, where he 
 should have found his supplies, it was found that the 
 supply train which he had ordered had, indeed, been 
 sent, but by some curious and inexplicable misadvent- 
 ure had been ordered away, and had left hours before. 
 Even if his men, inured to hunger, could stagger on 
 without food, it was imperatively necessary to get feed 
 for his horses, and a day was spent in scouring the al- 
 ready well-swept region to find forage and food, a day 
 which under propitious circumstances should have 
 placed him well beyond the power of Grant to overtake 
 him with sufficient force to hold him. But not less fate- 
 ful than this was the curious fact that for a third time 
 Lee's complete plan had fallen in the hands of his oppo- 
 nent and had disclosed to him full information as to his 
 movements. As on the upper Rappahannock, in the 
 summer of 1862, Pope accidentally received information 
 of his plan to cut him off from his communications, and, 
 before Sharpsburg, McClellan, through an accident, got 
 
548 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 a copy of his plans which led to his advance against 
 him in the South Mountains, so now Grant by a simi- 
 lar fortune came into possession of Lee's entire plan 
 of retreat on Danville. It is stated on the authority 
 of General G. W. C. Lee that on the morning of the 
 3d, when the Federal troops took possession of Rich- 
 mond, there was found in some place a letter from Lee 
 which gave his entire route and plan of retreat. This 
 despatch was promptly transmitted to General Grant, 
 and enabled him to counter every move that Lee made 
 and eventually overhaul and surround him with his 
 overwhelming force.^ General G. W. C. Lee's account 
 of it is as follows : 
 
 After I was taken prisoner at Sailor's Creek, with 
 the greater part of the commands of General Ewell 
 and General Dick Anderson, and was on my way to 
 Petersburg with the officers of the three commands, we 
 met the United States engineer brigade under command 
 of General Benham, whom I knew prior to the break- 
 ing out of the war as one of the captains of my own 
 corps— the engineers. 
 
 He did not apparently recognize me, and I did not 
 make myself known to him; but he began talking to 
 General Ewell, in a loud tone of voice which could be 
 distinctly heard by all around. 
 
 I heard General Benham say, among other things, 
 that ''General Weitzel had found, soon after his en- 
 trance into Richmond, a letter from General Lee, giv- 
 ing the condition of the Army of Northern Virginia 
 and what he proposed to do should it become necessary 
 to withdraw from the lines before Richmond and Peters- 
 
 ' Mrs. Davis's "Memoir of Jefferson Davis," II, p. 595; also "A Sol- 
 dier's Recollections," by Dr. R. H. McKim, pp. 265-267. 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 549 
 
 burg, and that the letter was immediately sent to 
 General Grant. In answer to some doubt expressed 
 by General Ewell or some one else, General Benham 
 replied, ''Oh, there is no doubt about the letter, for I 
 saw it myself." 
 
 I received the impression at the time, or afterward, 
 that this letter was a confidential communication to 
 the Secretary of War in answer to a resolution of the 
 Confederate Congress asking for information in 1865. 
 When I mentioned this statement of General Benham 
 to General Lee, some time afterward, the latter said, 
 "This accounts for the energy of the enemy's pursuit. 
 The first day after we left the lines he seemed to be 
 entirely at sea with regard to our movements; after 
 that, though I never worked so hard in my life to with- 
 draw our army in safety, he displayed more energy, 
 skill, and judgment in his movements than I ever 
 knew him to display before." 
 
 G. W. C. Lee. 
 
 [A true copy.] 
 
 It was not until about three o'clock in the morning 
 of the 3d of April that Grant discovered that Lee had 
 slipped away from his front. There were two routes by 
 which Lee's design of joining Johnston might possibly 
 be accomplished: one, the more direct route, by way 
 of the Richmond and Danville Railroad, the other by 
 way of Lynchburg. Grant took as efficient means as 
 possible to provide for both contingencies; but which 
 route Lee would follow would have been a mere con- 
 jecture unless Grant had received the intelligence that 
 he had selected Amelia Court House as his first objec- 
 tive point. 
 
 Thus, the letter stating that Lee would march on 
 
550 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Amelia Court House, where he expected to receive sup- 
 plies, gave Grant precisely the information he needed 
 and enabled him to concentrate all of his energies to 
 seize this point and cut Lee off from the direct route 
 to Danville. Leaving to subordinates the entry into 
 Richmond, the aspiration and destruction of so many 
 hopes, he with characteristic directness applied him- 
 self to the work of capturing Lee's force. After a 
 brief interview with Lincoln in Petersburg early in 
 the morning, he proceeded sturdily with the work in 
 hand. Sheridan with the Fifth Corps was directed 
 at daylight to push forward to the westward and, if 
 possible, strike the Danville Railroad between the Ap- 
 pomattox and its point of juncture with the Lynch- 
 burg Railroad at Burkeville, some thirty miles to the 
 south-west ; while General Meade with the Sixth Corps 
 was to follow Sheridan closely and march on Amelia 
 Court House, and General Ord with the Twenty-fourth 
 Corps and Birney's colored troops and the Ninth Corps 
 was to move directly on Burkeville Junction, along the 
 line of the South-side Railroad. 
 
 Longstreet with the head of Lee's column reached 
 Amelia Court House on the afternoon of the 4th of 
 April. Gordon was but four or five miles behind. Ma- 
 hone's ''fine division" was ten or twelve miles away. 
 Anderson, with Fitz Lee guarding his rear, was at Deep 
 Creek, some ten miles distant, where after a sharp en- 
 gagement between Custer and Fitz Lee at Nimosine 
 Church, to the eastward, Fitz Lee made a stand "in a 
 strong defensive position," with Wise's and Hunton's 
 Brigades in support, and though sharply attacked, held 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 551 
 
 back Merritt and gave Anderson time to march on to 
 Amelia, which he reached next morning, the 5th. The 
 last of Lee's troops, Swell's force from the lines beyond 
 the James, including the naval battalion, arrived about 
 noon. 
 
 Mahone's Division was now assigned to Longstreet, 
 while Anderson retained Bushrod Johnson's Division 
 and what remained of Pickett's Division. The naval 
 battalion remained with G. W. C. Lee's Division. 
 
 Sheridan's advance guard did not strike the Rich- 
 mond and Danville Railway on the 4th until the late 
 afternoon, when Griffin reached the line at Jetersville 
 and Crook struck it at a point some miles south of 
 Jetersville, toward Burkeville Junction. Here Sheridan 
 learned of Lee's presence at Amelia Court House, eight 
 miles away. 
 
 The Fifth Corps entrenched to await reinforcements, 
 while Mackensie of the Twenty-fifth Corps advanced 
 his cavalry to within four miles of the Court House. 
 
 The Second and Sixth Corps, having to give way to 
 the cavalry, did not reach Deep Run until night, and 
 the first of them did not reach Jetersville till in mid- 
 afternoon of the 5th, while the Sixth was yet later. 
 
 Had Lee been able to procure rations at Amelia as 
 he had expected, he might have brushed aside the 
 cavalry force which Sheridan interposed between him 
 and Burkeville and have continued his march to Dan- 
 ville, with the Danville Railroad to keep him sup- 
 plied, and thus, probably, have escaped. As it was, he 
 marched on the 5th straight for Danville, certain that 
 he could sweep Sheridan from his path. Precious 
 
552 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 hours, however, had been lost and Sheridan had now 
 been reinforced. Learning from his cavahy (W. H. F. 
 Lee's) division that "Sheridan had been heavily rein- 
 forced," he countermarched a short distance and 
 turned westward on the road to Farmville, by way of 
 Amelia Springs, Deatonsville, and Rice's Station. 
 
 With this in view Lee, selecting a few of the best- 
 equipped battalions of artillery to accompany the 
 troops, had sent the rest of his artillery (under General 
 Lindsay Walker) toward Lynchburg by a road lying 
 to the north-west of that which the infantry followed, 
 and his wagon-train moved on his right flank by a road 
 yet nearer the Appomattox. The infantry and cavalry 
 thus protected the artillery and wagon-trains. That 
 afternoon, however. Crook's cavalry, scouting toward 
 the Appomattox to ascertain Lee's lines of march, 
 came on and destroyed one of these wagon-trains. It 
 is said that General Lee's head-quarters wagon with 
 most of his papers was among those thus destroyed. 
 
 General Lee, himself, stated, however, that all his 
 '^records, reports, returns, etc., with the head-quarters 
 of the army were needlessly destroyed by the clerks 
 having them in charge on the retreat from Petersburg, 
 and such as had been forwarded to the War Depart- 
 ment in Richmond were either destroyed in the con- 
 flagration or captured at the South in the attempt 
 to save them." ^ General Fitzhugh Lee's head-quar- 
 ters wagon was burned, which probably gave rise to the 
 report that General Lee's wagon had been destroyed. 
 
 'Letter to W. B. Reid, of Pliiladclphia, Pa., in " Recollections and 
 Letters of General Lee," by R. E. Lee, p. 219. 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 553 
 
 Lee, having turned toward Lynchburg, marched all 
 the night of the 5th, hoping to get beyond the possi- 
 bility of being overtaken, and by morning had passed 
 beyond Grant's left on the Danville Road, where he 
 had been disposing his advanced corps to attack him. 
 Longstreet, who was in front, had by sunrise reached 
 Rice's Station, on the Lynchburg Road, where he was 
 soon joined by General Lee, and later by Fitz Lee's 
 Cavalry from Amelia Springs, while Anderson, Ewell, 
 and Gordon were following in the order named. Gen- 
 eral Meade, who had been marching on Amelia Court 
 House, finding that Lee had passed him, turned the 
 Army of the Potomac about and started westward in 
 pursuit, heading the Second Corps, with the Sixth fol- 
 lowing it, for the cross-roads at Deatonsville, the Fifth 
 Corps, by the road for Paineville, on its right. 
 
 Although Lee had again passed beyond Grant, he 
 could not keep ahead of him, for his army was now in a 
 state of complete exhaustion, exhaustion of everything 
 save the spirit of fight. This they retained in full 
 measure, as they were ready to show on every occasion 
 which presented itself. The attack on Petersburg be- 
 gan on the night of the 1st. It was now the 6th, and 
 there had not been an hour's cessation of the struggle. 
 With frames enfeebled by the long strain of the winter, 
 in constant battle-line in the trenches without adequate 
 food or shelter, they had now been fighting or march- 
 ing through bottomless mud for five days without food 
 save what could be secured by foraging in the naked 
 region through which they passed. 
 
 On the road to Deatonsville, beyond Flat Creek, 
 
554 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Gordon, who was covering Lee's rear, found himself 
 harassed by a pursuing force which proved to be the 
 Sixth Corps, and all day this gallant command fought 
 as it marched to hold back the pursuers and give Lee 
 time to save the army. Every defensive position in the 
 broken country was seized and held until it was carried 
 by assault, when they would fall back only to repeat 
 the manoeuvre at the next opportunity. But the losses 
 were heavy and the strain on the men disheartening. 
 
 About four miles west of the cross-roads at Deatons- 
 ville a stream known as "Sailor's Creek" runs north- 
 ward through a little valley to the Appomattox, and on 
 the higher land on the east side above the valley the 
 road from Deatonsville to Rice's Station and Farmville 
 divides, one fork running northward above the valley, 
 the other keeping on west across the creek to Rice's 
 Station. Here Anderson formed line of battle, cover- 
 ing the cross-roads for which Sheridan, with tireless 
 energy, was pushing with a view to cutting off the 
 trains which moved on Lee's right. Crook attacked 
 him here about noon, hoping to break through and 
 strike the trains, but was driven back, and here later 
 Merritt came up and with Crook made another as- 
 sault, only to be again beaten off by Anderson, who was 
 now reinforced by the advance troops of Ewell. Every 
 move was now in the face of the enemy, nnd it was 
 necessary to cover and protect the baggago trains an 
 the right, so that the Confederate forces wcic disas- 
 trously impeded. The men were exhausted, and many 
 were unable, from want of food and sleep, to stand on 
 their feet. Gordon, guarding the rear, arrived at the 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 555 
 
 fork above Sailor's Creek a little later, and Anderson, 
 relieved of the guard of the cross-roads, continued his 
 march and, followed by Ewell, crossed the creek by the 
 direct road to Rice's Station, while Gordon, who stood 
 guard during the passage of the trains, after they had 
 crossed moved along the eastern fork of the road to 
 cross the creek at Perkinson's mill, a few miles lower 
 down Sailor's Creek, on the road to Farmville by 
 High Bridge, the point at which the Lynchburg Rail- 
 way crossed the Appomattox and where there was 
 a wagon bridge. His pursuit was taken up by the 
 Second Corps, while Sheridan followed the troops on 
 the Rice's Station Road, with the Sixth Corps behind 
 him. Ewell, following Anderson, having crossed the 
 creek on the direct road to Rice's Station, was hotly 
 pursued by the Sixth Corps and Sheridan's cavalry, and 
 formed on a crest on the west side to cover the road, 
 Kershaw on his right, G. W. C. Lee on his left, the navy 
 battalion in reserve. 
 
 Sheridan, having pushed across the creek and passed 
 beyond the Confederates, posted his cavalry across the 
 road to Rice's Station, in front of Anderson, while 
 Wright's corps (the Sixth) formed line of battle across 
 the creek and opened with artillery on Ewell, on the 
 crest on the opposite side. The latter had only some 
 3,000 men and no artillery and was in the act of pre- 
 paring to unite with Anderson to dislodge the cavalry 
 from his front when the Sixth Corps came upon them. 
 Seymour's and Wlieaton's divisions attacked them in 
 flank, Getty in front, with the artillery sweeping them 
 with a deadly fire, and Sheridan's dismounted cavalry 
 
556 ROBERT E. LE:E 
 
 in their rear. It was one of the most furious fights of 
 the war, finally becoming a hand-to-hand conflict in 
 which the Confederates, though surrounded and with- 
 out artillery, fought with desperation; but the issue 
 could not be doubtful, and finally, surrounded on all 
 sides by overwhelming numbers and their ranks deci- 
 mated by the fire from every direction, almost the whole 
 of Ewell's command surrendered, as did nearly half of 
 Anderson's command. The rest, some 250 of Ker- 
 shaw's Division, who promptly formed a battalion, and 
 about half of Anderson's men, made their way to Rice's 
 Station, having been met on the road by Mahone's 
 Division, which Longstreet sent back to their assistance. 
 The losses comprised, of Ewell's command, some 3,000 
 men, and of Anderson's command, nearly as many 
 more, and included six generals captured, viz.. Gen- 
 erals Ewell, Kershaw, Custis Lee, Dubose, Hunton, and 
 Corse.* 
 
 That night (the 6th) Lee moved on to Farmville 
 with the force that remained to him — Longstreet 's and 
 Gordon's commands, with the remnant of Ewell's — 
 Fitz Lee's Cavalry bringing up the rear. Longstreet 
 and Fitz Lee crossed the Appomattox at Farmville, 
 Gordon and Mahone at High Bridge, four or five miles 
 below, and marched thence by the railroad line to the 
 town, having only partially destroj^d the railroad 
 bridge before the enemy came up. On the way to the 
 river the}^ met a small force of cavalry under Colonel 
 Washburne and two small regiments of infantry under 
 
 • General E. P. Alexander states the losses at 8,000. ("Memoirs," 
 p. 597.) 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 557 
 
 General Theodore Read, who had been sent forward by 
 Ord to burn the bridges over the Appomattox and were 
 now returning, having been recalled. The small force 
 made a gallant stand to hold back the Confederates, 
 but were soon destroyed, both of the officers named 
 having been killed. But Grant states that their self- 
 devotion enabled him to overtake Lee's army. On the 
 Confederate side General Bearing, Colonel Boston, and 
 Major Thompson were among the killed. 
 
 At Farmville rations were found by Lee for the 
 first time since leaving Petersburg, but not all of the 
 troops were served even then, so close on them pushed 
 Sheridan. 
 
 Next morning Lee, having destroyed the bridges at 
 Farmville, moved on toward Appomattox on the road 
 to Lynchburg, leaving Grant's main army on the south 
 side of the river, which was nearly unfordable for in- 
 fantry. Humphreys with the Second Corps, however, 
 was on the north side, having crossed behind Gordon 
 at High Bridge, lower down the river. Gregg's cavalry 
 was with him, while Crook, who had forded the river 
 at Farmville, was now also on the north side. 
 
 Lee was moving toward Lynchburg by the Stage 
 and Plank Roads, when the rear-guard skirmishing, 
 which had been constant all the while, increased about 
 midday, revealing a serious attack. Gordon's Corps, 
 which was first assaulted by Barlow, lost some wagons, 
 but gave a good account of itself, driving back the pur- 
 suing force. By one o'clock Lee found himself pressed 
 by so large a force that he was forced to form a line of 
 battle to repel the attack, which was successfully done. 
 
558 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 It was the Second Corps which had come up and was 
 endeavoring to hold him until the Twenty-fourth and 
 Sixth Corps could cross the river and attack their 
 redoubtable foe from toward Lynchburg. Gregg's Bri- 
 gade coming up, was charged by Munford and Rosser, 
 and Gregg himself was captured, on which the division 
 was withdrawn. Following Humphreys' lucid account, 
 ''he [Miles] suddenly came in contact with the enemy, 
 who opened on him with Poague's sixteen guns; dis- 
 positions were at once made for attack, and a heavy 
 skirmish line was pressed close up against the enemy, 
 to develop his position. It was soon found from the 
 prisoners taken that Lee's whole army was present in 
 a strong position covering the Stage and Plank Roads 
 to Lynchburg, which had been entrenched sufficiently 
 for cover and had artillery in place. It was on the 
 crest of a long slope of open ground. Fitz Lee's Cav- 
 alry was covering their rear toward Farmville, sup- 
 ported by Heth's Infantry. A heavy skirmish line was 
 pressed against the enemy and an attack threatened 
 with the two divisions, both of which were now up, and 
 an unsuccessful attempt was made to take them in 
 flank. Barlow was now sent for and General Meade 
 informed that Lee's whole remaining force, probably 
 about 18,000 infantry, had been come up with, and 
 suggesting that a corps should- attack Lee from the 
 direction of Farmville at the same time that the Second 
 Corps attacked from the opposite direction. Upon this 
 General Meade sent directions for General Gibbon with 
 the Twenty-fourth Corps and General Wright with the 
 Sixth Corps, both of which were then near Farmville, 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 559 
 
 to cross the river there and attack jointly with the 
 Second Corps." ^ 
 
 It was plain now to many of the officers that the sit- 
 uation of the remnant that remained of the army was 
 desperate, and while at Farmville a number of the su- 
 perior officers got together and held a conference at 
 which it was decided that the cause had become so 
 hopeless that they deemed it wrong to continue the 
 killing of men of both sides and that they should not 
 leave on Lee "the entire trial of initiating the idea of 
 terms with the enemy." General Gordon communi- 
 cated the sense of this conference to General Lee's 
 chief of artillery, General William N. Pendleton, who 
 had been at West Point with Lee and stood very close 
 to him, and General Pendleton was requested to con- 
 sult General Longstreet, and then, if he agreed, to con- 
 vey their views to General Lee. "At first," says Gen- 
 eral Pendleton, "General Longstreet dissented, but, on 
 second thought, preferred that himself should be rep- 
 resented with the rest." General Pendleton, there- 
 fore, sought Lee, who was found "lying alone, resting 
 at the base of a large pine tree." Lee listened quietly, 
 "and then courteously expressing thanks for the con- 
 siderations of his subordinates in desiring to relieve 
 him in part of existing burdens," said that he trusted it 
 had not come to that ; that they certainly had too many 
 brave men to think of laying down their arms. "They 
 still fight with great spirit," he added, "whereas the 
 enemy does not. And besides, if I were to intimate to 
 General Grant that I would listen to terms, he would 
 
 1 » "Virginia Campaign of 1864-65," pp. 388, 399. 
 
560 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 at once regard it as such an evidence of weakness that 
 he would demand unconditional surrender, and sooner 
 than that I am resolved to die. Indeed, we must all 
 determine to die at our posts." 
 
 Pendleton's reply to him was that they were per- 
 fectly willing that he should decide the question, and 
 that every man would no doubt cheerfully meet death 
 with him in discharge of duty.^ 
 
 Grant, however, knew as well as Lee's generals to 
 what desperate straits the retreating Confederates were 
 reduced. He knew, further, that while their cause was 
 hopeless, they "still fought with spirit," and he knew 
 that his pursuing force was rapidly getting beyond the 
 reach of supplies. He had no desire to insist on hard 
 terms. What he wished for was peace through the 
 ending of the war. Accordingly, within twenty-four 
 hours of the time when Lee stated to his chief of ar- 
 tillery his conviction that a request to Grant for terms 
 would bring the same reply which had been given by 
 him at Fort Donelson three years before. Grant him- 
 self made overtures to him that he should surrender 
 the remnant of his army on honorable terms. 
 
 General Grant states that having heard at Farmville 
 of a remark of General E well's as to the condition of 
 Lee's army, and having received from Sheridan a letter 
 saying that he was on the way to Appomattox Station 
 to cut off some supply trains which were there awaiting 
 Lee's arrival, the two facts led him to open negotia- 
 tions with Lee for his surrender. 
 
 • "Life of William N. Pendleton," by S. P. Lee, p. 402. Fitzhugh 
 Lee's "Life of Lee," p. 392. 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 561 
 
 Some historians have undertaken to assert that 'Hhe 
 conditions were not unequal : that Lee might have with- 
 drawn his army and effected a junction with Johnston, 
 but was outgeneralled by Grant." To support this 
 claim they assign to Lee the highest number of men 
 that by any computation could possibly be assigned to 
 him and take no account of the absent and the disabled. 
 
 The latest of these historians, and among the most 
 broad-minded of the class, has assigned to Lee at the 
 beginning of his retreat 49,000 men, against Grant's 
 113,000, and declares that with 'Hhe game escape or 
 surrender the conditions were not unequal, and Lee was 
 simply outgeneralled." ^ 
 
 Conditions can scarcely be said to have been not un- 
 equal, when Grant, as commander of all the Northern 
 armies, had nearly 1,000,000 men under his command, 
 and Lee, as commander of the Southern armies, had 
 less than 200,000 under his command. If Lee was 
 simply outgeneralled some change must have taken 
 place in the two men, since, with an army never 
 more than 10,000 in excess of the numbers assigned 
 him here,^ Lee fought through the month of May, 
 1864, Grant's army of 140,000, defeated him in battle 
 after battle from the Wilderness to Petersburg, caused 
 him losses of 124,000 men, and must have destroyed 
 him but for his inexhaustible resources of men and 
 munition. 
 
 But, by the records, the statement quoted is errone- 
 ous, and, laying aside the imperfect records of the Con- 
 
 > Rhodes's "History," vol. V. 
 
 * In fact, the 49,000 was before the great losses at the end of February. 
 
562 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 federate army, the evidence is beyond question that 
 when Lee began his retreat he had only about half of 
 the number of men assigned to him by these historians. 
 Colonel Walter H. Taylor, of his staff, estimates that 
 Lee had, on March 31, 33,000 muskets, and General Lee 
 told General Fitz Lee that he had at that time 35,000 
 men; ''but after Five Forks and in the encounters of 
 March 31, April 1 and 2 he had only 20,000 muskets 
 available, and of all arms not over 25,000 when he be- 
 gan the retreat that terminated at Appomattox Court 
 House." ^ 
 
 Wliatever may be the numbers shown on records 
 scatteringly made, and, at best, most imperfect, Lee's 
 statement for those who know him settles the question. 
 
 But even these men were little more than spectres. 
 Ill-fed, ill-clad, kept for ten months on a constant strain 
 in the face of an army that might at any time mass 
 treble their number on either flank; stretched in a 
 line thirty-five miles in length, every point of which 
 it was vital to hold; wasted by hunger, disease, and 
 cold, these veterans made no plea of being outnum- 
 bered. Under Lee they answered every demand and 
 held Grant at bay until not only subsistence, but hope 
 of subsistence, perished. 
 
 Even at the last, when Lee recrossed the Appomattox 
 to the south side beyond Grant's lines and directed his 
 course for Amelia Court House, to which point he had 
 ordered provisions to be sent to meet him, had his orders 
 been obeyed, it is the opinion of many competent 
 critics that he might have eluded Grant's pursuit, 
 
 » Fitzhugh Lee's "Life of Lee," p. 373. 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 563 
 
 prompt and efficient as it was. But no provisions were 
 there. Some one had blundered. It appears that a 
 provision train had arrived on April 1, but had been 
 fatuously ordered to Richmond. However it was, a 
 day was lost in the effort to obtain subsistence from the 
 depleted countryside for his famished army, men and 
 horses, and in the interval Grant was enabled to come 
 up, and thenceforth, in the light of subsequent events, 
 further retreat was unavailing. From this moment 
 it was merely a question of whether the endurance of 
 his starving force would hold out to march and fight 
 until he had outstripped Grant with his preponderant 
 force possessed of ample subsistence and baggage trains. 
 So great was the confidence of his men in Lee that 
 many of them believed that the retreat was a move- 
 ment designed by him to draw Grant from his base 
 of supplies with a view to turning on him and destroy- 
 ing him. 
 
 Every step was in face of the enemy massing in 
 force under the able direction of men like Meade, Ord, 
 and Sheridan. The fighting was almost hourly, and, 
 while fortune varied, the balance of success was largely 
 with the pursuing forces. 
 
 So denuded was the country of all that would sus- 
 tain life, that men thought themselves well off when 
 a corn-house was found with grain yet left in it and 
 corn was distributed to them to be parched. Even 
 this was not always to be had, and as corn was necessary 
 for the artillery horses, guards were posted where they 
 fed to prevent the men from taking it from the horses. 
 They were reduced to the necessity of raking up the 
 
5G4 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 scattered grains from the ground where the horses had 
 been fed and even to picking the grains from the drop- 
 pings of the horses. Many of the men became too 
 weak to carry their muskets. Small wonder that they 
 dropped out of the ranks by hundreds! Yet still the 
 remainder kept on, with unwavering courage, unwa- 
 vering devotion, and unwavering faith in their com- 
 mander. 
 
 In their rags and tatters, ill-clad, ill-shod, ill-fed, ill- 
 armed, and, whenever armed, armed for the most part 
 with the weapons they had captured from brave foes 
 on hard-fought battle-fields, they were the abiding ex- 
 pression of Southern valor and fortitude; the flower 
 of Southern manhood; the pick of every class; the 
 crystallized residue of the Army of Northern Virginia, 
 with which Lee had achieved his fame and on which to 
 future ages shall rest the fame of the South. 
 
 Like a wounded lion that spent and wasted army 
 dragged itself across the desolated land, now turning 
 at bay and at every turn leaving its deep mark on its 
 pursuers, now retreating again without haste or fear, 
 and simply in obedience to the instinct of self-preser- 
 vation, and, at the last, sinking with exhaustion, with 
 crest unlowered, heart undaunted, and face steadfastly 
 set to the foe. As we contemplate their constancy we 
 can but recall Pericles' words over the Athenian dead 
 in the Peloponnesian war: ''Thus choosing to die re- 
 sisting rather than to live submitting, they fled only 
 from dishonor, but met danger face to face, and after 
 one brief moment, while at the sunmiit of their fortune, 
 escaped, not from their fear, but from their glory." 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 565 
 
 The spring rains had made the roads so deep in that 
 region of deep roads as to be wellnigh impassable to 
 the well-equipped troops of Grant, and operations, just 
 before the evacuation of Richmond, had once to be sus- 
 pended. To Lee's ill-fed teams they became at times 
 actually impassable, and batteries had to be aban- 
 doned because the exhausted horses could not longer 
 pull the guns. In some cases the artillerymen armed 
 themselves with muskets picked up on the march 
 and were formed into infantry companies. But in face 
 of Grant's capital generalship, using his great army 
 to best advantage, attacking and capturing bodies of 
 troops da,y after day, the end could no longer be 
 doubtful. 
 
 Long before, in writing to one of his brothers from 
 Mexico, where he contributed so much to the brilHant 
 victories which ended in the capture of the Mexican 
 capital, Lee had said: "We have the right, by the laws 
 of war, of dictating the terms of peace and requiring 
 indemnity for our losses and expenses. Rather than 
 forego that right, except through a spirit of magna- 
 nimity for a crushed foe, I would fight them ten years, 
 but I would be generous in exercising it." ^ 
 
 Would it not be likely that this letter should recur 
 to him in this crisis of his life? 
 
 In another letter he says, in referring to the terms of 
 peace: "These are certainly not hard terms for Mexico, 
 considering how the fortune of war has been against 
 her. For myself, I would not exact more than I would 
 
 * Letter to his brother, Sidney Smith Lee, March 4, 1848, cited in 
 Jones's "Life and Letters of Lee," p. 57. 
 
566 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 have taken before the commencement of hostihties, 
 as I should wish nothing but what was just." * 
 
 Tlie continuous fighting held Lee back and enabled 
 Sheridan, followed by Ord, marching by a parallel 
 route, to reach Appomattox Station before him and 
 bar his further progress. 
 
 This was the end. The final scene has been depicted 
 so often that there is no need to repeat it here for in- 
 formation, and yet the story of Lee and of Grant is not 
 complete without it. In the two weeks between Lee's 
 desperate effort to break Grant's right and their per- 
 sonal meeting at Appomattox, where Lee's surrender 
 took place, both Lee and Grant reached their zenith. 
 In Lee every high quality which had enabled him to 
 carry the Confederacy on his shoulders for more than 
 two years shone forth. In Grant noble and hitherto 
 unsuspected qualities discovered themselves. At the 
 end he stood forth the Grant of the monuments. If 
 magnanimity be a test, then Americans may well be 
 proud of the victor at Appomattox; if dignity be a test, 
 then Americans may well be proud of the vanquished 
 at Appomattox. History there repeated itself, so that 
 it may be truly said, as was said of Caractacus in the 
 triumphal train of Vespasian, that the dignity of the 
 conquered eclipsed the glory of the conqueror. 
 
 In the late afternoon of the 7th of April, General 
 Grant penned his first letter to General Lee, asking the 
 surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. This 
 
 * Letter cited in Jones's "Lee," p. 54. John Russell Young once told 
 the writer that Grant stated to him that he could not have kept up his 
 pursuit a half day longer. 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 567 
 
 letter was sent by his adjutant-general, General Seth 
 Williams, to General Humphreys, commanding the 
 Second Corps, who was on the front line in immediate 
 touch with the Confederate rear, and General Hum- 
 phreys was requested to have it delivered to General 
 Lee. He states that he ''sent it at once through his 
 picket line, at the same time authorizing a truce for an 
 hour at that point," in accordance with a request that 
 had been made him by the Confederates to enable 
 them to gather up their wounded that were lying be- 
 tween the lines. This letter was received by Lee about 
 half-past eight in the evening. General Lee's answer 
 was sent back to him within an hour, and, having been 
 delivered to General Williams, was taken at once to 
 General Grant, who was at Farmville. 
 
 The two letters containing Grant's demand and Lee's 
 response are as follows: 
 
 April 7, 1865. 
 
 General: The result of the last week must convince 
 you of the hopelessness of further resistance on the 
 part of the Army of Northern Virginia in this struggle. 
 I feel that it is so, and regard it as my duty to shift 
 from myself the responsibility of any further effusion 
 of blood by asking of you the surrender of that portion 
 of the Confederate States army known as the Army of 
 Northern Virginia. 
 
 U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
 
 General R. E. Lee. 
 
 April 7, 1865. 
 General: I have received your note of this date. 
 Though not entertaining the opinion you express on 
 the hojoelessness of further resistance on the part of the 
 
568 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate your desire 
 to avoid useless effusion of blood, and, therefore, before 
 considering your proposition, ask the terms you will 
 offer on condition of its surrender. 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. 
 
 General Grant states that Lee's reply was not satis- 
 factory, but he deemed that it required a further com- 
 munication, and the following morning he sent his 
 second letter to General Humphreys, who was in ad- 
 vance in the pursuit, to be forwarded through the lines 
 to General Lee. Lee received this letter only in time 
 to despatch his reply in the later afternoon, and it did 
 not reach Grant until about midnight, when he had 
 halted for the night at Curdsville, some ten miles in 
 Lee's rear. These letters run as follows: 
 
 April 8, 1865. 
 
 General: Your note of last evening in reply to mine 
 of same date, asking the condition on which I will 
 accept the surrender of the Ai-my of Northern Virginia, 
 is just received. In reply, I would say that peace being 
 my great desire, there is but one condition I would in- 
 sist upon, namely, that the men and officers surrendered 
 shall be disqualified for taking up arms again against 
 the Government of the United States until properly 
 exchanged. I will meet you, or will designate officers 
 to meet any officers you may name for the same pur- 
 pose, at any point agreeable to you, for the purpose of 
 arranging definitely the terms upon which the surrender 
 of the Army of Northern Virginia will be received. 
 U. S. Grant, Lieuienant-General. 
 
 General R. E. Lee. 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 569 
 
 April 8, 1865. 
 
 General: I received at a late hour your note of to-day. 
 In mine of yesterday I did not intend to propose the 
 surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, but to ask 
 the terms of your proposition. To be frank, I do not 
 think the emergency has arisen to call for the surrender 
 of this army, but as the restoration of peace should be 
 the sole object of all, I desire to know whether your pro- 
 posals would lead to that end. I cannot, therefore, 
 meet you with a view to surrender the Army of Northern 
 Virginia, but as far as your proposal may affect the 
 Confederate States forces under my command, and 
 tend to the restoration of peace, I should be pleased 
 to meet you at 10 a. m. to-morrow on the old Stage Road 
 to Richmond, between the picket lines of the two armies. 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. 
 
 Grant, meanwhile, had given orders to Humphreys 
 to continue the pursuit ; but Humphreys, after having 
 resumed the march, "finding his men dropping out of 
 the ranks from exhaustion, owing to want of food and 
 to fatigue, halted the head of his column at midnight, 
 after a march of twenty-six miles," about three miles 
 in the rear of Longst reefs troops. 
 
 A proposal was made to Lee by General E. P. Alex- 
 ander that the army should scatter and make its way 
 to Johnston by various routes. This plan Lee promptly 
 disposed of. He declared that they had no right as 
 Christian men to consider only how the surrender 
 would affect them — they must consider its effect on 
 the country as a whole, and, after explaining his views 
 of the demoralizing effect of such a course, he added 
 
570 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 that he would go to General Grant and surrender him- 
 self, though he went alone, and take the consequences 
 of his acts/ 
 
 On the 8th of April orders were issued for a last 
 effort. The artillery was directed to be brought up 
 during the night and massed with a view to breaking 
 through Grant's forming lines, and steps were taken 
 to deliver battle once more. All night the men toiled, 
 but next morning the officer charged with the task ^ 
 notified Gordon that his utmost efforts had been able 
 to bring up only two batteries — the rest of the artillery 
 had taken another route and could not be reached — 
 the horses of the other batteries available were gone; 
 the residue of that artillery which had once helped to 
 make the artillery duels of Lee and Grant the fiercest 
 in the records of war was silenced forever. 
 
 On this small fragment of his once redoubtable ar- 
 tillery, and on the remnant of his infantry and cavalry, 
 one more call was made by Lee. As the sun rose on 
 the morning of the 9th of April, the worn and wasted 
 squadrons, with a response as prompt and generous as 
 in the best days of his most victorious campaigns, ad- 
 vanced to their last charge to drive for the last time 
 their foes before them. The first onset was successful. 
 Sheridan's cavalry was driven back in confusion and 
 the situation was possibly saved only, as the support- 
 ing general himself stated, by the timely arrival of 
 Ord, the conmiander of the Army of the James, with 
 
 ' "Military Memoirs of General E. P. Alexander," p. 605. 
 - Colonel Thomas H. Carter, a gallant and efficient soldier and Lee's 
 near kinsman. 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 571 
 
 abundant troops to bar the way.* And Gordon sent 
 Lee word that he had fought his troops "to a frazzle/' 
 and could do nothing more unless heavily supported 
 by Longstreet's Corps. "Then," said Lee, "there is 
 nothing left for me but to go and see General Grant, 
 and I would rather die a thousand deaths." But he 
 went, and by this act he saved the South from the hor- 
 rors of Jacobinism. 
 
 On the morning of the 9th, General Grant, who was 
 still at Curdsville, wrote, and forwarded through Gen- 
 eral Humphreys, his third letter to General Lee. It 
 is a noble letter: 
 
 April 9, 1865. 
 
 General: Your note of yesterday is received. I have 
 no authority to treat on the subject of peace. The meet- 
 ing proposed for 10 a. m. to-day could lead to no good. 
 I will state, however, general, that I am equally anxious 
 for peace with yourself, and the whole North entertains 
 the same feeling. The terms upon which peace can be 
 had are well understood. 
 
 By the South laying down their arms they will hasten 
 that most desirable event, save thousands of human 
 lives, and hundreds of millions of property not yet de- 
 stroyed. 
 
 Seriously hoping that all our difficulties may be 
 settled without the loss of another life, I subscribe 
 myself, etc., 
 
 U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
 
 General R. E. Lee. 
 
 »"Ord left Petersburg with 20,000 troops, all arms; Fifth Corps, 
 15,973 (report of March 31, 1865); Sheridan's cavalry, 13,810; to 
 which add 1,000 for the Fifth Corps Artillery, makes 50,783." (Fitz- 
 hugh Lee's "Life of Lee," p. 388, note.) 
 
572 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 This letter was received by General Lee as he was 
 on his way toward his rear to meet the appointment he 
 had suggested for that day at ten o'clock on the Old 
 Stage Road to Richmond, should Grant have seen fit 
 to act affirmatively on the suggestion. As soon as he 
 had read the letter, Lee dictated a reply to it, Colonel 
 Marshall, of his staff, acting as his amanuensis. This 
 letter, which was written about nine o'clock in the 
 morning, was then despatched by Colonel Whittier 
 "with verbal messages to General Grant from General 
 Lee expressive of regret at not having met him," and 
 ran as follows : 
 
 Ajyril 9, 1865. 
 
 General: I received your note of this morning on the 
 picket line, whither I had come to meet you and ascer- 
 tain definitely what terms were embraced in your pro- 
 posal of yesterday with reference to the surrender of 
 this army. I now ask an interview in accordance with 
 the offer contained in your letter of yesterday for that 
 purpose. 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. 
 
 This letter was delivered by Colonel Whittier to 
 General Meade at about ten o'clock, and was forwarded 
 by him to General Grant, who had ridden in the direc- 
 tion of Appomattox Court House and had taken a cross- 
 road for this purpose. Grant was overtaken at a point 
 about eight miles from Appomattox Court House, and 
 immediately wrote his reply to General Lee. Though 
 Lee had declared to General Alexander his conviction 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 573 
 
 that Grant would offer as good terms as he was entitled 
 to receive, as he now awaited his reply with Longstreet 
 beside him, he, as Alexander says, could not feel con- 
 fidence that Grant "might not demand unconditional 
 surrender." And as Grant's messenger approached, 
 the last thing said was by Longstreet, who knew no 
 fear: "General, unless he offers us honorable terms, 
 come back and let us fight it out," ^ It was the spirit 
 of the South. But Grant was not less noble. He had 
 resolved to do all he could to spare a vanquished foe. 
 He offered terms not only honorable, but magnanimous. 
 His last note was as follows: 
 
 April 9, 1865. 
 General R. E. Lee, Commanding C. S. A.: 
 . Your note of this date is but this moment (11.50 a. m.) 
 received. In consequence of my having passed from 
 the Richmond and Lynchburg Road to the Farmville 
 and Lynchburg Road, I am, at this writing, about four 
 miles west of Walker's Church, and will push forward 
 to the front for the purpose of meeting you. 
 
 Notice sent to me on this road where you wish the 
 interview to take place will meet me. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
 
 On the receipt of General Grant's last note, which 
 was brought to him by Colonel Babcock, of Grant's 
 staff. General Lee, accompanied by Colonel Marshall, 
 of his staff, Colonel Babcock, and a mounted orderly, 
 rode into the little village of Appomattox Court House, 
 and, requesting of Mr. McLean, of that place, to be 
 
 ' E. P. Alexander's "Memoirs," p. 609. 
 
574 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 allowed the use of his sitting-room, awaited General 
 Grant's arrival. Here, after a meeting which was so 
 pleasant that Grant says he was in danger of forgetting 
 the business that had called them together, the terms 
 of the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia were 
 quickly arranged. Grant, taking his seat at a marble- 
 topped table in the centre of the room, quickly drafted 
 the terms, and upon the paper being handed to Lee, 
 who sat at a small table by a window, the latter drafted 
 his acceptance of them. They are as follows: 
 
 Appomattox Court House, Va., April 9, 1865. 
 
 General: In accordance with the substance of my 
 letter to you of the 8th inst., I propose to receive the sur- 
 render of the Army of Northern Virginia on the follow- 
 ing terms, to wit: Rolls of all the officers and men to 
 be made in duplicate, one copy to be given to an officer 
 to be designated by me, the other to be retained by such 
 officer or officers as you may designate. The officers 
 to give their individual paroles not to take up arms 
 against the Government of the United States until 
 properly exchanged, and each company and regimental 
 commander sign a like parole for the men of their 
 commands. The arms, artillery, and public property 
 to be parked and stacked and turned over to the officers 
 appointed by me to receive them. This will not em- 
 brace the side arms of the officers nor the private 
 horses or baggage. This done, each officer and man 
 will be allowed to return to his home, not to be dis- 
 turbed by United States authority so long as he ob- 
 serves his parole and the laws in force where he may 
 reside. 
 
 U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. . 
 
 General R. E. Lee. 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 575 
 
 Head-quarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 April 9, 1865. 
 
 General: I received your letter of this date, contain- 
 ing the terrns of the surrender of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia as proposed by you. As they are substan- 
 tially the same as those expressed in your letter of the 
 8th instant, they are accepted. I will proceed to des- 
 ignate the proper officers to carry the stipulation into 
 effect. 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant. 
 
 The attitude of the commanding generals toward 
 each other at the close of the surrender is one on which 
 the outside world gazed with astonishment, and to 
 which we may all look back with pride. 
 
 General Long in his memoirs of Lee relates an anec- 
 dote which casts a pleasant light on the situation. It 
 appears that on the afternoon of the day of the sur- 
 render, Meade paid a friendly visit to Lee at his head- 
 quarters, and in the course of conversation ^'Lee turned 
 to Meade, who had been associated with him as his 
 officer of engineers of the 'old army,' and said pleas- 
 antly: 'Meade, years are telling on you. Your hair 
 is getting quite gray.' 'Ah, General Lee,' was Meade's 
 prompt reply, 'this is not the work of years. You 
 are responsible for my gray hairs.'" 
 
 Lee, after his surrender, asked for 25,000 rations, 
 and this is accepted as the number of his army. But 
 the actual number of muskets surrendered on the 9th 
 of April was by his report less than 9,000. Lee had 
 fought his army until it had simply worn away. 
 
576 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Wliatever men Lee had on his rolls, whether 10,000, 
 25,000, or 40,000, they were, in their famished and 
 spent condition, too few to defeat Grant's ably led 
 force, whether that force were 100,000 or 180,000, and 
 Lee, acting in accord with the views of his general 
 officers who had urged on him this course, was right to 
 avail himself of Grant's generous proposal. It is to 
 Grant's eternal honor that he offered him such honor- 
 able terms for the surrender of what remained of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia. A detached portion of the 
 cavalry had broken through and started to make its way 
 to Johnston, but Lee recalled the officer in command 
 and informed him that he was included in his surrender. 
 
 The greatness of the occasion appears to have lifted 
 Grant to a higher plane than that of the mere soldier 
 from which he had looked apparently unmoved on the 
 sacrifice of the thousands of gallant men and officers 
 who, from the Wilderness to Cold Harbor, had died at 
 his bidding, and from which he had refused with cold 
 calculation the offers of the South to exchange prisoners 
 and had left men to die like sheep in prisons made 
 noisome largely by their numbers. 
 
 In the long vigils before Petersburg, faced by a 
 brave and steadfast foe, his mind had apparently been 
 elevated as it mainly became in the presence of a great 
 crisis — as it became years afterward when, clutched 
 fast in the grip of his last and conquering foe, he held 
 death at bay while he completed the remarkable work 
 on which his family were to depend for their support. 
 However this was, his generosity justified Lee's dec- 
 laration that he would give his army as good terms as 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 577 
 
 it had a right to expect, and his correspondence with 
 Lee will bear comparison with that of any victor in 
 history/ 
 
 The following day Lee issued his farewell address 
 to his army: 
 
 Head-quarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 April 10, 1865. 
 After four years of arduous service, marked by un- 
 surpassed courage and fortitude, the Army of Northern 
 Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming 
 numbers and resources. I need not tell the survivors 
 of so many hard-fought battles who have remained 
 steadfast to the last, that I have consented to this re- 
 sult from no distrust of them, but, feeling that valor 
 and devotion could accomplish nothing that could com- 
 pensate for the loss that would have attended the con- 
 tinuation of the contest, I have determined to avoid 
 
 * An incident of the surrender, told by Grant to Dr. Fordyce Barker, 
 was related by him to Dr. William M. Polk. Dr. Barker asked Grant 
 how he felt when he met Lee at Appomattox. Was he not sensible of 
 great elation over his achievement? 
 
 Grant replied that, on the contrary, he was sensible rather of humilia- 
 tion. When he found Lee in full-dress uniform, while he himself was in 
 a simple fatigue-suit — a private's blouse, with only a general's shoulder- 
 straps to denote his rank, and with his boots spattered to their tops — 
 he was afraid that Lee might imagine that he intended a discourtesy 
 to him because of an incident that had occurred in Mexico. General 
 Scott, he said, was exceedingly particular as to all matters of etiquette, 
 and had given orders that no oflBcer should appear at head-quarters 
 without being in full dress. On some occasion thereafter Grant had 
 gone to head-quarters in an ordinary fatigue-uniform, and that not as 
 neat, perhaps, as it should have been, and had reported to Lee, who 
 was at the time serving on Scott's staff. After the business had been 
 transacted, Lee said : " I feel it my duty, Captain, to call your atten- 
 tion to General Scott's order that an oflBcer reporting at head-quarters 
 should be in full uniform." 
 
 This incident, said the general, suddenly flashed across his mind and 
 made him uncomfortable lest General Lee should recall it also and 
 imagine that he intended to affront him. 
 
578 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the useless sacrifice of those whose past services have 
 endeared them to their countrymen. 
 
 By the terms of the agreement officers and men can 
 return to their homes, and remain there until exchanged. 
 You will take with you the satisfaction that proceeds 
 from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed, 
 and I earnestly pray that a merciful God will extend 
 to you His blessing and protection. 
 
 With an increasing admiration of your constancy 
 and devotion to your country, and a grateful remem- 
 brance of your kind and generous consideration of my- 
 self, I bid you an affectionate farewell. 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 On the 12th of April he announced to President Davis 
 the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia.^ Like 
 all of his papers, it is direct and casts a light on his 
 character. Moreover, it gives the simplest and most 
 authoritative account of the retreat to Appomattox 
 that is on record. 
 
 Ten days after Lee's surrender, Sherman, moved 
 thereto by a more generous impulse than had hitherto 
 appeared to inspire him, and plainly influenced by 
 Grant s magnanimity, offered to Johnston term^ not 
 more generous but more far-reaching, if possible, than 
 Grant had proposed to Lee, and after a brief period of 
 negotiation, in which Sherman's far-sighted views were 
 scornfully disavowed and rejected by the authorities 
 in Washington, just unbridled by the tragic death of 
 Lincoln, Johnston surrendered on the same terms that 
 Lee had accepted. 
 
 In this convention all the remaining forces of the 
 
 * Report to be found in the Appendix. 
 
THE RETREAT TO APPOMATTOX 579 
 
 South were included, and, in so far as the South could 
 effect it, the war was over. The war, however, prac- 
 tically ended when Lee surrendered his army at Appo- 
 mattox. 
 
 The highest tribute to this army is the simple fact 
 that with its surrender the war was over. The fort- 
 unes of the Confederacy had been nailed to its tattered 
 standards and with them went down. 
 
CHAPTER XXIII 
 
 GENERAL LEE AND THE CONFEDERATE 
 GOVERNMENT 
 
 The student of the Civil War will be likely to reach the 
 conclusion that for at least the last two years of the 
 struggle General Robert E. Lee carried the fortunes of 
 the Confederacy on his shoulders. 
 
 It will possibly always be a question how far Lee's 
 military operations were affected by his relation to the 
 Confederate Government, and to what extent he was 
 interfered with by the Richmond authorities. That 
 he was much hampered by them seems quite certain, 
 both from the nature of his subordinate relation to 
 Mr. Davis and from the interference which is continu- 
 ally disclosed in the correspondence that took place 
 between them. 
 
 The great generals of history have almost invariably 
 had a free hand in their campaigns and have been able 
 to call to their aid all the powers of their government. 
 Alexander, Caesar, Hannibal, Cromwell, Frederick, Na- 
 poleon were supreme wherever the interests of their 
 armies were concerned. Turenne, Eugene, and Wel- 
 lington had the fullest and most absolute backing of 
 their governments. Moreover, they lived under differ- 
 ent conditions from those of our time and subsisted 
 their armies on the countries in which they operated. 
 Until Grant received command the Union generals were 
 
 580 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 581 
 
 hopelessly interfered with by the Washington govern- 
 ment, and it was only when Grant stipulated that he 
 should be commander in fact as well as in title that 
 success, after long delay, rewarded the Northern arms. 
 
 On the Southern side, though the interference was 
 never so flagrant, and though Lee appears to have 
 always had the confidence of President Davis, and, 
 from the time when he assumed command of the Army 
 of Northern Virginia, to have had that of the Confeder- 
 ate Government, yet it is a question whether the inter- 
 ference, or, what was equally disastrous, the lack of 
 prompt, practical, and efficient support on the part of 
 the government, was not in the end as fruitful of mis- 
 fortune. Colonel Henderson, in his "Life of Stonewall 
 Jackson," declares that "a true estimate of Lee's 
 genius is impossible, for it can never be known to 
 what extent his designs were thwarted by the Con- 
 federate Government." 
 
 It may, indeed, be said briefly that a confederated 
 government based frankly on the supreme power of 
 the civil government over the military is not one under 
 which a revolution can be fought out with best results. 
 In the constitution of things the Confederate Govern- 
 ment of the Southern States was inefficient to carry on 
 such a war as that between the States. Each State 
 was of equal dignity and authority with the others. 
 Each one was of more importance in its own eyes than 
 any of her sisters. Most of them were at times seriously, 
 if not equally, threatened, and it was quite natural, 
 when States' Rights were the corner-stone of the confed- 
 eration, that each one should feel that her own interests 
 
582 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 were to her paramount to those of her sister States. 
 Certainly, this was the case, and at times, particularly 
 toward the close of the struggle, more than one of the 
 South Atlantic States was in a ferment of opposition to 
 the Richmond authorities bordering on secession. 
 
 The Confederate Government, indeed, was founded 
 on certain principles of civil equality, which, however 
 sound in themselves and making for liberty, yet fur- 
 nished but a cumbrous machine with which to carry 
 on a war. Theory, extending to dogma, controlled the 
 minds of its legislators and of its officials. A few 
 instances will illustrate this. 
 
 The war on the Southern side was conducted on the 
 dogma of constitutional rights, and thus was limited 
 during its earliest and most propitious stages to repel- 
 ling invasion. No victory — not even one as com- 
 plete as Bull Run — was considered to give warrant to 
 invade non-seceded States, and while the government 
 at Washington was with a strong hand breaking up 
 sessions of the Maryland Legislature, making whole- 
 sale arrests and flooding the territory of "neutral" 
 Kentucky with armed forces to prevent her seceding, 
 the armies of the South were held on the south side of 
 the Potomac and the Ohio until the time had expired 
 when they might, by an advance, have changed the 
 destiny of the States and of the country. 
 
 The Confederate Government had theories about 
 cotton; theories about political economy in which 
 cotton played a controlling part; theories about the 
 necessity of the South 's being recognized by the lead- 
 ing powers of Europe. They held the opinion that not 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 583 
 
 only the North, but Europe, was dependent on cotton 
 — "King Cotton," as it was termed. To control the 
 supply of cotton and withhold it from Europe was, in 
 their opinion, to compel the recognition of the South- 
 ern Confederacy by Great Britain and France. Thus, 
 tliough the Southern armies starved and supplies could 
 have been had for cotton, the government forbade the 
 transactions which might have relieved the situation, 
 and while the ports of the South were being steadily 
 sealed up, one after another, by blockade squadrons, 
 and the cotton was being captured, abandoned, or 
 burned, they still followed to the end the fatal ignis 
 fatuus of foreign intervention, and failed to utilize to 
 the utmost their own resources. The leaders were 
 more high-minded than practical. 
 
 The Confederate Government had theories of finance. 
 So, though the necessaries of life in the region where 
 the war was carried on rose till it was said that it took 
 a basketful of bills to buy in the market a pocketful of 
 food, they went on printing the money. In this they 
 were ably seconded by the printing establishments of 
 the North, which at times did a thriving business print- 
 ing Confederate bills. Lee is said to have had meat on 
 his table only twice a week on principle, and he pro- 
 tested against the order allowing officials in Richmond 
 to get government meat at government prices while 
 the men "in the field were on starvation rations," but 
 was overruled in the matter. Lee advocated at one 
 time making Confederate money a legal tender, but 
 this did not commend itself to those who controlled the 
 Confederate finances. 
 
584 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 In fact, the Confederate Government — by which is 
 signified its officials — had theories about nearly every- 
 thing — on which, indeed, they were quite willing to 
 stake their lives, if this would have done any good. 
 
 Unfortunately, however, these views, whatever their 
 soundness in the abstract, when put to the practical 
 test in the crucible of war did not result in success, 
 and the sincerity with which they were held did not 
 add to their value. Lee's army starved and dwindled 
 while the Confederate Congress debated and debated, 
 often debating for weeks the most important measures 
 till the exigency of the occasion had passed and the 
 necessity for the particular action debated had been 
 crowded from the stage by some new demand. Mr, 
 Davis, in his Message to Congress on the 13th of 
 March, 1865, complains of the ''long deliberation and 
 protracted debate," which caused a dela}' that "in 
 itself was a new source of peril." Even when earlier 
 there had been abundant supplies in the country, and 
 the transportation was fully adequate, these "were 
 not under control." It was not, indeed, until March, 
 1865, that the railroads were taken by the government. 
 Up to this time no right was asserted.^ Yet, that the 
 public men of the South were in the main good, high- 
 minded, and patriotic men there can be no doubt. 
 The truth was that such a form of government was 
 not suited to the needs of a revolution. What was 
 required was the power to direct vested in one man 
 responsible for the result. This was recognized at the 
 time by many. The Confederate Congress in the early 
 
 ' Letter of Judge John A. Campbell. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 585 
 
 spring of 1862 passed an act creating the office of com- 
 mander-in-chief with a view to having the conduct of 
 the mihtary operations free from the control of the 
 civil power. This bill Mr. Davis vetoed as unconsti- 
 tutional — as indeed it was — but he ''assigned" Gen- 
 eral Lee "to duty at the seat of government and under 
 the direction of the President," where he was ''charged 
 with the conduct of military operations in the armies 
 of the Confederacy." The first clause of this order 
 governed the whole. He was "under the direction 
 of the President." And the President exercised his 
 authority. No strategy on a grand scale could be 
 attempted without securing the approval of the Rich- 
 mond authorities. 
 
 The chief disaster, perhaps, was the persistent policy 
 of the government to attempt to hold all of the South 
 instead of adopting the military policy, urged by Lee, 
 of concentrating its armies and dealing the adversary 
 a crushing blow. Joseph E. Johnston, when in com- 
 mand, proposed a campaign for the invasion of the 
 North, in which Beauregard agreed with him; but the 
 plan was not in accordance with the views of the Con- 
 federate Government and was rejected. Later on, Lee 
 likewise was hampered in the same fashion, and to the 
 end submitted his most far-reaching plans to the Presi- 
 dent for the approval of the government. It was a 
 matter of common repute that toward the close of the 
 struggle people constantly discussed the advisability 
 of vesting in General Lee the power of dictator. Lee 
 would have been the last man in the Confederacy to 
 consent to this; but possibly it was the only way in 
 
586 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 which the South could have achieved its independence. 
 It would, at least, have prevented the interference 
 which kept the armies from reaching their highest 
 efficiency. 
 
 When, after the expedition to Romney, the Rich- 
 mond government, through Mr. Benjamin, the Secre- 
 tary of War, on a remonstrance of subordinate officers 
 in Loring's command, reversed an order of Stonewall 
 Jackson's, and directed him to recall Loring's force 
 from Ronrney, Jackson complied promptly with their 
 instruction and then tendered his resignation. John- 
 ston, who had likewise been slighted, remonstrated 
 with him, but Jackson said that "the authorities in 
 Richmond must be taught a lesson or the next victims 
 of their meddling will be Johnston or Lee." They 
 learned the lesson so far as not to go again to such an 
 extreme, but they meddled much in a different way, 
 and both Johnston and Lee were the "victims." 
 Johnston, who commanded in Georgia, in 1864, was 
 finally, in response to public clamor, removed from his 
 command at the most critical period of his campaign, 
 and with results so disastrous to his command that, 
 whatever the alternative, nothing could have been 
 worse. Happily for Lee's peace of mind, he was of a 
 temper and held views as to the relative province of the 
 civil and military authority which prevented friction 
 and saved him all heart-burning. "As obedient to law 
 as Socrates," was w.ell said of him. If the law em- 
 powered others with authority he recognized it as fully 
 as they themselves and governed his course accord- 
 ingly. He did his duty and left consequences to God. 
 
 I 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 587 
 
 But this did not alter the unhappy mistakes made in 
 Richmond. 
 
 He differed with the authorites radically on many 
 vital matters, as may be gathered inferentially from 
 his correspondence and action, but he neither inter- 
 fered nor criticised. His duty, as he apprehended it, 
 was to obey those above him and conmiand those under 
 him. He was a soldier, and as a soldier he handled 
 his army, leaving the rest to those on whom the respon- 
 sibility devolved. The difference at times touched him 
 nearly, for it touched his army. The authorities be- 
 lieved in the popular election of officers by their men. 
 Inasmuch as the government of the Confederate States 
 was a free government, based on the will of the people, 
 it was decided that her soldiery, as free citizens of a 
 republic, should have the privilege of electing their 
 officers below the rank of brigadier-general; this, too, 
 in the face of the enemy and though the election 
 was destructive of discipline. Lee knew that it would 
 result in demoralization, but his reference to it was 
 simply that we are "in the midst of the fermenta- 
 tion " incident to the reorganization of the army. Many 
 of the most efficient and experienced officers of the line 
 were, in fact, thereby deprived of their commands and 
 supplanted by men who might never have worn a sword 
 and "smelt damnably of the halberd." The Confeder- 
 ate authorities believed that England and France would 
 certainly come to the aid of the South after "the Trent 
 affair." Lee foresaw with clearer vision that the Fed- 
 eral Government would yield and surrender the envoys 
 with apologies, and in private letters he stated the 
 
588 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 necessity of abandoning all expectation of foreign 
 intervention and substituting therefore self-reliance 
 and fortitude. 
 
 However on questions of vital policy he differed with 
 the civil authorities, he acted under their authority 
 with unabated zeal. For example, on the subject of 
 the employment of the negroes as soldiers, Lee held 
 very different views from those of the authorities at 
 Richmond. Many of them had been in the service all 
 along as teamsters, axemen, and farriers, and by the 
 autumn of 1864 the question was seriously debated 
 whether they should not be armed and employed as 
 soldiers. Lee was strongly of the opinion that they 
 should be. He knew as no one else did the importance 
 of filling his depleted ranks. He felt as well as others 
 the difficulties of the measure he advocated, but he 
 believed they could be overcome. He knew that the 
 enemy used them by tens of thousands, and that under 
 proper training and conunand they made good soldiers. 
 He felt that it would only be proper to give them the 
 reward of freedom. But on this point the authorities 
 held different views, and the result was destructive. 
 
 They had theories about the institution of slavery, 
 and in the main sound theories — moreover, it was a 
 most complex and delicate matter to handle with ref- 
 erence to domestic concerns, and the new complication 
 growing out of war and invasion. So, though the Union 
 armies had mustered in some two hundred thousand 
 negroes, it was not until the winter of 1864-65 when 
 the Army of Northern Virginia had almost perished that 
 it was decided to recruit negroes for service in the field. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 589 
 
 The plan was proposed in the autumn, was agitated 
 all winter, and was acted on only as Lee was being 
 forced out of his entrenchments before Richmond, and 
 then in a form which robbed it of the essential feat- 
 ure of granting freedom, which alone could have made 
 it effective. Lee's last letter before Petersburg dealt 
 with this matter. 
 
 Lee's views are expressed in a letter which he wrote 
 to a prominent Virginian in February, who had asked 
 his views on the subject. 
 
 Head-quarters Confederate States Armies, 
 
 ■u- T7I -o February 18, 1865. 
 
 Hon. E. Barksdale, ^ ' 
 
 House of Representatives, Richmond. 
 
 Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
 your letter of the 12th instant, with reference to the 
 employment of negroes as soldiers. I think the meas- 
 ure not only ^expedient but necessary. The enemy will 
 certainly use them against us if he can get possession of 
 them; and as his present numerical superiority will 
 enable him to penetrate many parts of the country, I 
 cannot see the wisdom of the poHcy of holding them to 
 await his arrival, when we may, by timely action and 
 judicious management, use them to arrest his progress. 
 I do not think that our white population can supply the 
 necessities of a long war without overtaxing its capac- 
 ity and imposing great suffering upon our people ; and 
 I believe we should provide resources for a protracted 
 struggle — not merely for a battle or a campaign. 
 
 In answer to your second question, I can only say 
 that in my opinion the negroes, under proper circum- 
 stances, will make efficient soldiers. I think we could 
 at least do as well with them as the enemy, and he 
 attaches great importance to their assistance. Under 
 
590 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 good officers and good instructions, I do not see why 
 they should not become soldiers. They possess all the 
 physical qualifications, and their habits of obedience 
 constitute a good foundation for discipline. They fur- 
 nish a more promising material than many armies of 
 which we read in history, which owed their efficiency 
 to discipline alone. I think those who are employed 
 should be freed. It would neither be just nor wise, in 
 my opinion, to require them to serve as slaves. The 
 best course to pursue, it seems to me, would be to call 
 for such as are willing to come with the consent of their 
 owners. An impressment or draft would not be likely 
 to bring out the best class, and the use of coercion would 
 make the measure distasteful to them and to their owners. 
 
 I have no doubt that if Congress would authorize 
 their reception into service, and empower the President 
 to call upon individuals or States for such as they are 
 willing to contribute, with the condition of emancipa- 
 tion to all enrolled, a sufficient number would be forth- 
 coming to enable us to try the experiment. If it proved 
 successful, most of the objections to the measure would 
 disappear, and if individuals still remained unwilling 
 to send their negroes to the army, the force of public 
 opinion in the States would soon bring about such leg- 
 islation as would remove all obstacles. I think the 
 matter should be left, as far as possible, to the people 
 and to the States, which alone can legislate as the ne- 
 cessities of this particular service may require. As to 
 the mode of organizing them, it should be left as free 
 from restraint as possible. Experience will suggest the 
 best course, and it will be inexpedient to trammel the 
 subject with provisions that might, in the end, prevent 
 the adoption of reforms suggested by actual trial. 
 
 With great respect. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 591 
 
 The proposition to enlist negroes, though introduced 
 in November, was not passed until March, 1865, and 
 then the bill merely authorized the President to accept 
 for service such slaves as the masters might choose 
 to put into military service, and General Lee's recom- 
 mendation as to their emancipation was not acted on. 
 It came to nothing, and it is quite possible that it might 
 have done so even had the measure been adopted in 
 time; but the delay and the failure to approve Gen- 
 eral Lee's recommendation illustrate the difficulties 
 with which Lee had to contend in dealing with the 
 government. It was inherent in the existing condi- 
 tions. 
 
 The interference of the government affected even the 
 constituency of his army. 
 
 ''The government, at the opening of the year 1864," 
 says one familiar with the subject, "estimated that the 
 conscription would place four hundred thousand troops 
 in the field." ^ Lee saw with clearer eyes. The meas- 
 ure not only failed to provide what was expected of it, 
 but by the end of the year it was, in the opinion of Lee, 
 "diminishing rather than increasing the strength of 
 his army." ^ 
 
 The pernicious system of details which prevailed con- 
 trary to Lee's "wishes, and the not less pernicious habit 
 of setting aside the findings of the courts-martial and 
 pardoning deserters contributed to render his difficult 
 position one of yet more extreme difficulty. 
 
 Desertions were perilously frequent, and the govern- 
 
 » "Life of General Lee," by J. D. McCabe (1866), p. 573. 
 '^Letter of December 31, 1864. 
 
592 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 ment at Richmond prevented the execution of sentence 
 on the culprit. Longstreet protested and Lee endorsed 
 on his protest, ''Desertion is increasing in the army 
 notwithstanding all my efforts to stop it. I think a 
 rigid execution of the law is mercy in the end. The 
 great want in our army is firm discipline." 
 
 To this, which was referred by the Secretary of War 
 to the President for his information, Mr. Davis, on No- 
 vember 29, 1864, replied: "When deserters are arrested 
 they should be tried, and if the sentences are reviewed 
 and remitted, that is not a proper subject for the criti- 
 cism of a military commander." 
 
 Hardly any fact lets in a clearer light than this on 
 one of the basic difficulties with which Lee had to con- 
 tend in his titanic task of defending the South. Mr. 
 Davis was so jealous of his constitutional rights that 
 he could insist on them in face of Lee's solemn state- 
 ment that his army, the chief bulwark of the whole 
 Confederate fabric, was being undermined by the erro- 
 neous exercise of the right. 
 
 The idea had got abroad that men who left Lee's 
 army could be enrolled for service in organizations 
 nearer home, and under this temptation in the fearful 
 winter of 1864-65 numbers of men left his lines and went 
 to their own States with this in view. Indeed, it might 
 almost be said that toward the latter part of the war 
 the people of more than one of the States to the south- 
 ward considered themselves so neglected by the govern- 
 ment as to be almost ready for open revolt against the 
 Confederacy. At least three States had "passed laws 
 to withdraw from service men liable to it under exist- 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 593 
 
 ing laws." ^ And as late as the 13th of March, 1865, 
 Mr. Davis sent in a message asking the Congress to pro- 
 vide a law for organizing the militia and empowering 
 him to call them out. He stated in this message that 
 the governor of one State had declared that he had no 
 power to call the militia to cross a county line, while 
 the executive of another State had ''refused to allow 
 the militia to be employed in the service of the Con- 
 federate States in the absence of a law for that pur- 
 pose." ^ The government had doubtless done the best 
 that it could do ; but it is certain that if it had not lost 
 the confidence of the people at large, it was rapidly 
 doing so. By the end of 1864, all eyes were turned to 
 Lee. He was recognized as the sole hope of the Con- 
 federacy. In January, 1865, the Virginia Legislature 
 testified unmistakably its lack of confidence in the gen- 
 eral government, and a committee with the speaker at 
 its head waited on the President to inform him of the 
 fact, while a yet more significant omen was the opposi- 
 tion of the Congress. Before the close of the last ses- 
 sion of the Congress, they were almost at an open 
 breach, as is shown by the tart reply of the Senate Com- 
 mittee to the President's message of March 13, 1865, 
 taking them to task for their "protracted debate" on 
 vital subjects. Among other resentful charges, they 
 twit him with their having created the office of general- 
 in-chief, without any suggestion from him, "with a 
 view to the restoration of public confidence and the 
 
 * Letter of Judge John A. Campbell to General John C. Breckinridge, 
 Secretary of War, March 5, 1865. 
 
 ="'The Civil War during the Year 1865," by John A. Campbell, 
 pp. 49, 50. 
 
594 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 energetic administration of military affairs." It was 
 apparent at last that some other plan of conducting 
 the war than that which had hitherto been followed was 
 necessary. A change was made in the War Depart- 
 ment, and General Breckinridge became Secretary of 
 War, while General Lee was made Commander of the 
 Armies of the Confederacy. The Legislature of Vir- 
 ginia passed a resolution declaring that the appoint- 
 ment of General Robert E. Lee to the command of all 
 the armies of the Confederate States ''would promote 
 their efficiency and operate powerfully to reanimate 
 the spirits of the armies, as well as of the people of the 
 several States, and to inspire increased confidence in 
 the final success of our cause." To this Mr. Davis 
 replied with dignity that the opinion expressed by the 
 General Assembly in regard to General Lee had his full 
 concurrence; and that Virginia could not have a higher 
 regard for him or greater confidence in his character 
 and ability than was entertained by him. "When 
 General Lee," he added, "took command of the Army 
 of Northern Virginia he was in command of all the 
 armies of the Confederate States by my order of assign- 
 ment. He continued in this general command of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia as long as I would resist 
 his opinion that it was necessary for him to be relieved 
 from one of these two duties. Ready as he has ever 
 shown himself to perfonn any service that I desired 
 him to render to his country, he left it to me to choose 
 between his withdrawal from the command of the army 
 in the field and relieving him of the general command 
 of all the armies of the Confederate States. It was 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 595 
 
 only when satisfied of the necessity that I came to the 
 conclusion to relieve him of the general command, be- 
 lieving that the safety of the capital and the success of 
 our cause depended, in a great measure, on the retain- 
 ing him in the command in the field of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia. On several subsequent occasions, 
 the desire on my part to enlarge the sphere of General 
 Lee's usefulness has led to renewed consideration of the 
 subject, and he has always expressed his inability to 
 assume command of other armies than those now con- 
 fided to him, unless relieved of the immediate command 
 in the field of that now opposed to General Grant." 
 
 Mr. Davis, however, had unyieldingly opposed the 
 proposition for Congress to call Lee to the position as 
 an infringment on his consitutional rights, and earlier 
 in the war had, as already stated, vetoed the bill passed 
 for this purpose. Alexander H. Stephens declares that 
 Lee asked to be relieved from the position of responsi- 
 bility because he had no power. In the imminent dan- 
 ger of immediate collapse it was now agreed that the 
 Congress should provide the position, and the Presi- 
 dent then appointed Lee to fill it, the order being dated 
 February 5, 1865. The measure even in this form was 
 opposed by many of Mr. Davis's friends, and one of the 
 historians of the time states that on the final passage 
 of the bill fourteen of the President's friends voted 
 against it, and that Mrs. Davis declared that had she 
 been in the President's place, before she would have 
 submitted to the humiliation of being deprived of her 
 rights in this matter she would have been hanged.^ 
 
 1 McCabe's "Life of General R. E. Lee." 
 
596 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Anotner difficulty, however, stood in the wa}'. Lee 
 himself had declared that he would not accept the 
 position in opposition to Mr. Davis, but only at his 
 hands. The phrase in his first general order to his 
 armies is significant of his point of view: 
 
 Head-quarters, Confederate Army, 
 
 February 9, 1865. 
 General Order No. 1. In obedience to General Order 
 No. 3 ... I assume command of the military forces 
 of the Confederate States. . . . 
 
 Longstreet declares his astonishment at Lee's failure 
 to exercise the enormous powers now vested in him. 
 But it was too late now for any exercise of power to 
 have changed the issue. 
 
 Fortunately for Lee, the relations between him and 
 the President of the Confederacy were ever of the most 
 cordial kind. They had known each other long and 
 well, and each recognized in the other the qualities that 
 ennobled them. During a considerable portion of the 
 war the President kept near him General Lee's eldest 
 son. General Custis Lee, himself an accomplished en- 
 gineer and soldier. Mr. Davis was a man of the highest 
 character and of absolute devotion to the consitutional 
 principles, to whose preservation he pledged his life and 
 powers. He was a trained soldier, and in the Mexican 
 war had displayed marked dash, courage, and ability as 
 a regimental commander. Moreover, he had had great 
 experience, and as Secretary of War of the United 
 States had made a reputation for breadth of view and 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 597 
 
 power of organization which to-day places him second 
 to none among those who have held that important 
 office. It was under him that the first regiments of 
 cavalry as an independent arm of the service were or- 
 ganized, and one of these Lee had commanded. Thus 
 the two men knew and respected each other, and when, 
 after the unsuccessful "West" Virginia campaign, Lee 
 was the object of much foolish criticism and clamor, 
 Mr. Davis stood by him and not only relied on him as 
 his military adviser, but, on Johnston's being wounded 
 at Seven Pines, appointed him commander of the army 
 before Richmond — the Army of Northern Virginia. 
 Wlien he assigned Lee to the duty of defending the 
 South Atlantic coast, and protest was made against 
 his choice, he wrote to the governor of South Car- 
 olina: "If Lee is not a general, I have none to send 
 you." 
 
 "As he was courageous, physically and morally he 
 was a man of convictions — absolutely direct, frank, 
 and positive," says one of his friends of Mr. Davis (Gen- 
 eral Breckinridge). Or, to use Lee's own expression 
 about him, who ever held him in high and affectionate 
 esteem, he was "very tenacious in opinion and purpose." 
 This, however, did not prevent Mr. Davis's being a doc- 
 trinaire, and one whose theories, at times, honest as 
 they were, interfered disastrously with practical action. 
 Possibly he was too positive. At least he had the cour- 
 age of his convictions, and, conscious of his own recti- 
 tude of intention and conduct, he was hard to change. 
 He was subject to strong impressions, and was conse- 
 quently not only inclined to favoritism, but was liable 
 
598 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 to be influenced by persons of strong convictions and 
 determined will who might be about him ; and at times 
 he displayed what was not far from sheer obstinacy. 
 He was described by an enemy — and he had many — 
 as ''standing in a comer telling his beads and relying 
 on a miracle to save the country." It was not true; 
 but it contained this grain of truth, that he shut his 
 eyes at times to facts plain to other men, and stood firm 
 for a policy which, sound under other conditions, was 
 now destructive. Against all criticism of him — and he 
 was the target for much abuse and adverse criticism — 
 we have Lee's judgment that he did "as well possibly 
 as any other man could have done in the same posi- 
 tion." 
 
 Toward Lee he was ever considerate and kind, yet 
 he held on to his own power even where Lee was con- 
 cerned. Lee could only get Major — afterward Gen- 
 eral — Long promoted to the rank he wished him to 
 have, by appointing him his military secretary, and 
 his request for the appointment of his chief of staff was 
 not granted. And though, as we have seen, Mr. Davis 
 declared afterward in his autobiography that Lee had 
 long been, to all intents and purposes, conmiander-in- 
 chief of the Confederate States armies, every experi- 
 enced man knows the vast difference between being the 
 untitled adviser of an official and the responsible official 
 himself. 
 
 The difference would have been peculiarly marked 
 in Lee, who never exceeded authority nor shirked 
 responsibility. Had he been commander of all the 
 armies of the Confederacy, Jolinston would probably 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 599 
 
 not have retired from the hne of the Rappahannock in 
 1862. And it is certain that he would not have been 
 relieved from command before Sherman in the summer 
 of 1864. It is also probable that the wellnigh impreg- 
 nable line of the North Anna would have been selected 
 as the defensive line against Burnside and Hooker 
 instead of the heights of Fredericksburg, which in 
 the judgment of critics, though likewise impregnable, 
 did not present the advantage of a field for efficient 
 pursuit of the defeated assailants. But, quite apart 
 from these errors, had Lee been in supreme command 
 of the armies of the South, his handling of the weapon 
 with which he fought McClellan and Pope and Burn- 
 side and Hooker and Grant would have been freer, and 
 probably it would have been a more efficient weapon 
 than it was, as efficient as Grant's casualty list proves 
 it to have been. 
 
 Not only was Lee's judgment as to strategy and the 
 disposition of troops, even in the face of the enemy, often 
 in overwhelming force, cramped by the need to defer 
 to the authorities in Richmond ; but the very life of the 
 army was subject to the same disastrous influences. 
 Reinforcements, exemption, straggling, desertion, pro- 
 motion of inferior men and failure to promote superior 
 men, subsistence, and equipment were all dealt with by 
 the Richmond government. 
 
 And Lee, already overburdened, was weighted down 
 by the additional burden of having to bow to the inev- 
 itable in the form now of political interference, and 
 now of personal incompetence. 
 
 Lee repeatedly found himself obliged to write to the 
 
600 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 President urging with insistence the absolute necessity 
 of upholding his hands with respect to the suppression 
 of straggling and desertion and other offences that were 
 ''injurious to the cause." His urgency appears, as has 
 been stated, to have been taken, in one case at least, 
 as a usurpation of executive authority. 
 
 That "an army moves on its belly" has as good 
 authority as Napoleon. But the belly of the Confed- 
 erate armies was nearly always empty. The commis- 
 sary-general of subsistence was an old comrade and a 
 favorite with the head of the government, and he had 
 theories as to the regular way in which to gather sup- 
 plies and subsist an army which nothing could shake. 
 It mattered not that the armies starved and the generals 
 protested. He took orders only from the President, 
 and naught could move him. That he was patriotic 
 and honest did not make amends for his unpractical 
 theories or fill the haversacks of the Confederate sol- 
 diery. Johnston said his army had not more than two 
 days' provisions stored, and we know what the neces- 
 sities of Lee's army were during the years he fought 
 it, and the well-meaning incompetents of the Commis- 
 sary Bureau undertook with so little success to feed it. 
 Lee at times had not one day's rations. The tale of 
 the killed and wounded in battle may be arrived at 
 with reasonable approximation ; the tale of the starved 
 and depleted victims of incompetence will never be 
 imagined. But we know that among the most disas- 
 trous consequences of Lee's dependence on the civil 
 authority was his inability to command the production 
 of the necessary supplies for his army. An illustration 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 601 
 
 may be found in his correspondence with the govern- 
 ment at Richmond in the winter of 1863, when his army 
 was at Fredericksburg, after the victory of Fredericks- 
 burg and before that of Chancellorsville. 
 
 On the 26th of January he wrote to Mr. Seddon, the 
 Secretary of War — himself a high-minded and unselfish 
 patriot of large experience: "As far as I can learn, we 
 have now about one week'« supply: four days' fresh 
 beef and four days' salt meat of the reduced ration/ 
 After that is exhausted I know not whence further sup- 
 plies can be drawn. The question of provisioning the 
 army is becoming one of greater difficulty every day. 
 The country north of us is pretty well drained of every- 
 thing the people are willing to part with, except some 
 grain and hay in Loudoun. Nor can impressment be 
 resorted to with advantage, inasmuch as provisions 
 retained for domestic use are concealed. A resort to 
 impressment would, in my opinion, in this region pro- 
 duce aggravation and suffering among the people with- 
 out much benefit. But I think if the citizens in the 
 whole country were appealed to they would be willing 
 to restrict themselves and furnish what they have to 
 the army. 
 
 *'I am more than usually anxious about the supplies 
 of the army, as it will be impossible to keep it together 
 without food." 
 
 On this letter the following endorsement was made 
 at Richmond by General L. B. Northrup, the com- 
 missary-general of subsistence: 
 
 ' One-quarter pound. Lee's letter to J. A. Seddon, Secretary of 
 War, April 17, 1863. 
 
602 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Subsistence Department, 
 
 January 28, 1863. 
 Fifteen months ago this bureau foresaw that the sup- 
 ply of cattle in Virginia would be exhausted. . . . The 
 meat has held out longer than was expected. . . . The 
 order of the War Department reducing the ration of 
 meat and increasing that of flour as referred to has not 
 been observed in the Army of Virginia for a period of 
 between three and four months by order of General Lee, 
 and the use of the whole beef (necks and shanks in- 
 cluded) which was attempted to be instituted by the 
 commissary-general of subsistence has not been ob- 
 served in that army, the discontent and other obstacles 
 being urged as insurmountable in the field. . . . All 
 the transportation that can be begged will be needed 
 to get wheat to be converted into flour for the same 
 army that now wants meat. General Lee's suggestion 
 that an appeal be made to the citizens to forward sup- 
 plies is noted by this bureau and is not approved. . . . 
 Respectfully, 
 
 L. B. NORTHRUP,^ 
 
 Commissary-General of Subsistence. 
 
 Could anything be imagined more tragic than this — 
 a commissary-general disallowing the suggestion of a 
 commanding general as to food for his army, and rebuk- 
 ing him for insubordination? 
 
 It is small wonder that Lee's health gave way that 
 winter and that a year later he asked for his son to 
 come and act as his chief of staff, on the ground that 
 he was sensible of a diminution of his strength since 
 this illness. 
 
 ' O. R., VIII, pp. 674, 675. Bigelow's " Chancellorsville Campaign," 
 pp. 33, 34. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 603 
 
 Two years after this, Sherman destroyed what he 
 estimated as one hundred million dollars' worth of 
 crops in the South and made other disposition of the 
 transportation which the commissary-general of sub- 
 sistence could only secure by begging. 
 
 All during the winter of 1863 and early spring of 
 1864, and, indeed, throughout that winter, Lee's offi- 
 cial correspondence shows with what clear eyes he 
 viewed the situation and how he was powerless to 
 meet it. From time to time he shows impatience at 
 the publication of his plans through the press, and 
 time and again we discover in his letters the disas- 
 trous want of the supplies absolutely needed to enable 
 him to use his army efficiently. Even as far back as 
 the 19th of October, 1863, for example, he writes to 
 Brigadier-General A. R. Lawton, the quartermaster- 
 general at Richmond, and to the Hon. James A. 
 Seddon, the Secretary of War, letters which show this 
 need: 
 
 Head-quaeters Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 October 19, 1863. 
 Lawton, Brigadier-General, A. R., 
 Quartermaster-General, Richmond, Va. 
 
 General: I have received your letter of the 12th, and 
 am very glad to find that your exertions to supply the 
 army have been so successful. The want of the sup- 
 plies of shoes, clothing, overcoats, and blankets is very 
 great. Nothing but my unwillingness to expose the 
 men to the hardships that would have resulted from 
 moving them into Loudoun in their present condition 
 induced me to return to the Rappahannock. But I 
 was averse to marching them over the rough roads of 
 
604 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 that region, at a season, too, when frosts are certain and 
 snows probable, unless they were better provided to 
 encounter them without suffering. 
 
 I should otherwise have endeavored to detain Gen- 
 eral Meade near the Potomac, if I could not throw him 
 to the north side. 
 
 The supplies that you now have at your disposal for 
 this army will be most welcome, and I trust that your 
 exertions to increase them will meet with full success. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General.^ 
 
 Head-quarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 19 October, 1863. 
 Hon. James A. Seddon, 
 
 Secretary of War, Richmond, Va. 
 Sir: I have had the honor to receive your letter of 
 the 16th inst. I am doubtful as yet whether General 
 Meade will remain on the defensive. . . . 
 
 If General Meade is disposed to remain quiet where 
 he is, it was my intention, provided the army could be 
 supplied with clothing, again to advance and threaten 
 his positions. Nothing prevented my continuing in 
 his front but the destitute condition of the men, thou- 
 sands of whom are barefooted, a greater number par- 
 tially shod, and nearly all without overcoats, blankets, 
 or warm clothing. I think the sublimest sight of the 
 war was the cheerfulness and alacrity exhibited by 
 this army in the pursuit of the enemy under all the 
 trials and privations to which it was exposed. . . . 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General' 
 
 On January 2, he writes to the President that he can 
 learn of no supply of meat on the road to the army, 
 
 • Long's " Lee," p. 629. => Ibid., p. 629. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 605 
 
 and he fears that he will be unable to retain it in the 
 field. Three days later he writes to the commissary- 
 general, Colonel L. B. Northrup, that he regrets very 
 much to learn that the supply of beef for the army is 
 so nearly exhausted; that no beef had been issued to 
 the cavalry corps by the chief commissary for eighteen 
 months, and that "during that time it has supplied 
 itself, and has now, I understand, sufficient to last until 
 the middle of February. . . . 
 
 '^I cannot adopt," he says, ''your suggestion to em- 
 ploy the organisation of your bureau to impress pro- 
 visions. Neither the law nor regulations of the War 
 Department, in my opinion, give me that power. ..." 
 
 To President Davis, who had written suggesting 
 that he should go to North Carolina and take charge 
 of the expedition to capture Newberne, he writes on 
 the 20th of January: "In view of the opinion expressed 
 in your letter, I would go to North Carolina myself; 
 but I consider my presence here always necessary, 
 especially now when there is such a struggle to keep 
 the army fed and clothed." 
 
 On the 3d of February he writes him that "the ap- 
 proach of spring causes me to consider with anxiety 
 the probable action of the enemy, and the possible 
 operations of ours in the ensuing campaign. If we 
 could take the initiative and fall upon them unexpect- 
 edly, we might derange their plans and embarrass 
 them the whole summer. There are only two points 
 east of the Mississippi where it now appears this could 
 be done." . . . "We are not in a condition, and never 
 have been, in my opinion, to invade the enemy's coun- 
 
606 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 try with a prospect of permanent benefit. But we 
 can alarm and embarrass him to some extent, and 
 thus prevent his undertaking anything of magnitude 
 against us." 
 
 On April 12, 1864, he writes to President Davis: 
 "My anxiety on the subject of provisions for the army 
 is so great that I cannot refrain from expressing it to 
 your Excellency. I cannot see how we can operate 
 with our present supplies. Any derangement in their 
 arrival or disaster to the railroad would render it im- 
 possible for me to keep the army together, and might 
 force a retreat into North Carolina. There is nothing 
 to be had in this section for men or animals. We have 
 rations for the troops to-day and to-morrow. I hope 
 a new supply arrived last night, but I have not yet had 
 a report. Every exertion should be made to supply 
 the depots at Richmond and at other points. All 
 pleasure travel should cease and everything be devoted 
 to necessary wants." 
 
 This letter he follows up on the 15th of April, when 
 he writes the President: "We shall have to glean 
 troops from every quarter to oppose the apparent 
 combination of the enemy. If Richmond could be 
 held secure against the attack from the east, I would 
 propose that I draw Longstrcct to me and move right 
 against the enemy on the Rappahannock. Should 
 God give us a crowning victory there, all their plans 
 would be dissipated, and their troops now collecting on 
 the waters of the Chesapeake would be recalled to the 
 defence of Washington. But to make this move I 
 must have provisions and forage. I am not yet able 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 607 
 
 to call to me the cavalry or artillery. If I am obliged 
 to retire from this line, either by a flank movement of 
 the enemy or the want of supplies, great injury will 
 befall us. I have ventured to throw out these sugges- 
 tions to your Excellency in order that in surveying the 
 whole field of operations you may consider all the cir- 
 cumstances bearing on the question. Should you de- 
 termine it is better to divide this army and fall back 
 toward Richmond, I am ready to do so. I, however, 
 see no better plan for the defence of Richmond than 
 that I have proposed." 
 
 Subordination to the civil authority was the key to 
 Lee's action throughout the war. It speaks in all of 
 his correspondence and utterances relating to the civil 
 government of the Confederacy. It is found in the 
 very beginning of the war in a letter to Mrs. Lee, where 
 in reply to her suggestion of the rumor that he was to 
 be made commander-in-chief, he stated simply that 
 this position was held by President Davis. It is found 
 at the end of the war in his reply to General Gordon, 
 who, in an interview with him in the beginning of Feb- 
 ruary, 1865, having learned from his lips his view of the 
 almost desperate situation, inquired if he had made his 
 views known to President Davis or to the Congress. 
 He received the reply, states his corps commander, 
 "that he scarcely felt authorized to suggest to the civil 
 authorities the advisability of making terms with the 
 government of the United States. He said that he was 
 a soldier, that it was his province to obey the orders of 
 the government, and to advise or counsel with the civil 
 authorities only upon questions directly affecting his 
 
608 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 army and its defence of the capital and the country." ^ 
 Though his administration of every office which he 
 ever filled showed his ability to grapple successfully 
 with whatever problems life presented to him, he was 
 careful to abstain from all that savored of political 
 work. He gave his advice frankly when it was re- 
 quested; but beyond this held himself scrupulously 
 aloof from interference in political matters. His views 
 on this subject were set forth clearly when on one occa- 
 sion, toward the end of the war, Senator B. H. Hill, of 
 Georgia, approached him with the suggestion that he 
 should give his views on ''the propriety of changing 
 the seat of government and going further South." 
 
 His reply was: "That is a political question, Mr. 
 Hill, and you politicians must determine it. I shall 
 endeavor to take care of the army, and you must make 
 the laws and control the government." 
 
 "Ah, General, but you will have to change that rule," 
 said the Georgia senator, "and form and express po- 
 litical opinions; for if we establish our independence 
 the people will make you Mr. Davis's successor." 
 
 "Never, sir," said Lee; "that I will never permit. 
 Whatever talents I may possess (and they are but lim- 
 ited) are military talents. My education and training 
 are military. I think the military and civil talents are 
 distinct if not different, and full duty in either sphere 
 is about as much as one man can qualify himself to 
 perform. I shall not do the people the injustice to 
 accept high civil office with whose questions it has 
 not been my business to become familiar." 
 
 ' "Reminiscences of the Civil W^ar," General John B. Gordon, p. 390. 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 609 
 
 ''Well — but, General," persisted Hill, "history does 
 not sustain your view. Caesar, Frederick of Prussia, 
 and Bonaparte were great statesmen as well as great 
 generals." 
 
 "And great tyrants," replied Lee promptly. "I 
 speak of the proper rule in republics, where I think we 
 should have neither military statesmen nor political 
 generals." 
 
 "But Washington was both/' urged Hill, "and yet 
 not a tyrant." 
 
 "Washington was an exception to all rules and there 
 was none like him," said he, smiling. 
 
 It was doubtless this conversation which led Hill in 
 after years, in pronouncing his eulogy on General Lee, 
 to utter the fine saying that "he was Caesar without 
 his ambition, Frederick without his tyranny, Napoleon 
 without his selfishness, and Washington without his 
 reward." 
 
 Lee also held different views from those which con- 
 trolled in the Confederate civil councils on the more 
 vital subject of proposals for peace. 
 
 When he first crossed the Potomac he had in mind 
 the possibility of its leading to negotiations for peace, 
 and so wrote Mr. Davis.^ And again, on the eve of his 
 second invasion of the North, he addressed to Mr. 
 Davis a letter advocating measures for encouraging 
 "the rising peace party of the North," almost urgent 
 in its- terms. ^ "Nor do I think," he wrote, "we should 
 in this connection make nice distinction between those 
 
 * Letter of September 8, 1862, quoted ante. 
 ^ Letter of June 10, 1863, quoted ante. 
 
610 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 who declare for peace unconditionally and those who 
 advocate it as a means of restoring the Union, how- 
 ever much we may prefer the former. . . . When peace 
 is proposed it will be time enough to discuss its terms, 
 and it is not the part of providence to spurn the propo- 
 sition in advance." This was certainly a very differ- 
 ent view of the case from that held by the civil rulers 
 in Richmond, who, even as late as the Hampton Roads 
 Conference, were as firm in their demands for independ- 
 ence as on the day after First Manassas. They could 
 not understand that conditions had changed since the 
 preceding summer, and they were still misled by ac- 
 counts of disaffection at the North and by the ig?iis 
 fatuus of foreign intervention. 
 
 Thus we see that however little inclined Lee was to 
 interfere in civil matters, he was ready, at need, to lend 
 his aid to further the cause of peace whenever it was 
 desired by the civil authorities. Such an occasion 
 occurred in February, 1865, and Lee, on finding that it 
 was the wish of the President, acceded to the suggestion 
 to open a correspondence with Grant, who had been 
 reported as desirous to discuss with him the possibility 
 of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment of the unhappy 
 difficulties in the way of a peace settlement by means 
 of "a military convention." 
 
 Longstreet, who it appears was first approached on 
 the subject, has given the following account of the 
 negotiations. He states that on the 20th of February, 
 1865, General Ord, conmianding the Army of the James, 
 sent him a note asking him to arrange a meeting with 
 him with a view to putting a stop to the bartering 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 611 
 
 which went on between the troops on the picket lines; 
 and that inasmuch as Ord knew that he could at any 
 time put a stop to his men doing this by a simple order, 
 he surmised that there must be some other matters 
 which he wished to discuss with him, and accordingly 
 acceded to his request. They met next day between 
 the lines, and presently Ord asked for a "side inter- 
 view," which was acceded to. 
 
 "When he spoke of the purpose of the meeting," 
 says Longstreet, "I mentioned a simple manner of cor- 
 recting the matter, which he accepted without objec- 
 tion or amendment. Then he spoke of affairs military 
 and political. 
 
 "Referring to the recent conference of the Confed- 
 erates with President Lincoln at Hampton Roads, he 
 said that the politicians of the North were afraid to 
 touch the question of peace, and there was no way to 
 open the subject except through officers of the armies. 
 On his side they thought the war had gone on long 
 enough ; that we should come together as former com- 
 rades and friends and talk a little. He suggested that 
 the work as belligerents should be suspended; that 
 General Grant and General Lee should meet and have 
 a talk ; that my wife, who was an old acquaintance and 
 friend of Mrs. Grant in their girlhood days, should go 
 into the Union lines and visit Mrs. Grant with as many 
 Confederate officers as might choose to be with her. 
 Then Mrs. Grant would return the call under escort of 
 Union officers and visit Richmond ; that while General 
 Lee and General Grant were arranging for better feel- 
 ing between the armies they could be aided by inter- 
 
612 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 course between the ladies and officers until terms hon- 
 orable to both sides could be found. 
 
 ''I told General Ord that I was not authorized to 
 speak on the subject, but could report upon it to Gen- 
 eral Lee and the Confederate authorities, and would 
 give notice in case a reply could be made. 
 
 "General Lee was called over to Riclnnond and we 
 met at night at the President's mansion. Secretary of 
 War Breckinridge was there. The report was made, 
 several hours were passed in discussing the matter, and 
 finally it was agreed that favorable report should be 
 made as soon as another meeting could be arranged 
 with General Ord. Secretary Breckinridge expressed 
 especial approval of the part assigned for the ladies. 
 
 "As we separated I suggested to General Lee that 
 he should name some irrelevant matter as the occasion 
 of his call for the interview with General Grant, and 
 that once they were together they could talk as they 
 pleased. A telegram was sent my wife that night at 
 Lynchburg calling her to Richmond, and the next day 
 a note was sent General Ord asking him to appoint a 
 time for another meeting. 
 
 "The meeting," continues Longstreet, "was ap- 
 pointed for the day following, and the result of the 
 conference was reported. General Ord asked to have 
 General Lee write General Grant for an interview, stat- 
 ing that General Grant was prepared to receive the 
 letter, and thought that a way could be found for a 
 military convention, while old friends of the military 
 service could get together and seek out waj^s to stop 
 the flow of blood. He indicated a desire on the part of 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 613 
 
 President Lincoln to devise some means or excuse for 
 paying for the liberated slaves, which might be arranged 
 as a condition and part of the terms of the convention 
 and relieve the matter of political bearing; but those 
 details were in the form of remote probabilities to be 
 discussed when the parties became advanced in their 
 search for ways of settlement." 
 
 On the 1st of March, Longstreet wrote General Lee, 
 giving a report of the second interview with Ord, and 
 on the 2d of March, Lee wrote Grant the following 
 letter: 
 
 Head-quarters Confederate States Armies, 
 
 March 2, 1865. 
 Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, 
 Commanding United States Armies. 
 
 General: Lieutenant-General Longstreet has informed 
 me that in a recent conversation between himself and 
 Major-General Ord as to the possibility of arriving at a 
 satisfactory adjustment of the present unhappy diffi- 
 culties by means of a military convention. General Ord 
 states that if I desired to have an interview with you 
 on the subject you would not decline, provided I had 
 authority to act. Sincerely desiring to leave nothing 
 untried which may put an end to the calamities of war, 
 I propose to meet you at such convenient time and 
 place as you may designate, with the hope that upon an 
 interchange of opinions it may be found practicable to 
 submit the subjects of controversy between the bellig- 
 erents to a convention of the kind mentioned. In such 
 event I am authorized to do whatever the result of the 
 proposed interview may render necessary or advisable. 
 Should you accede to this proposition, I would suggest 
 that, if agreeable to you, we meet at the place selected 
 
614 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 by Generals Ord and Longstreet for their interview, at 
 11 A. M. on Monday next. 
 Very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 This letter was sent to Longstreet open, with instruc- 
 tions to read, seal, and forward. Longstreet, having 
 read it, disapproved of the true object of the interview 
 being so frankly mentioned, and, as he states, ''rode 
 into Richmond to ask that some other business should 
 be named as the cause of the call for the interview, but 
 he [Lee] was not disposed to approach his purpose by 
 diplomacy, and ordered the letter to be delivered. He, 
 however, wrote and sent another letter also, which 
 related to the exchange of prisoners, and closed by 
 saying: 'Should you see proper to assent to the inter- 
 view proposed in my letter of this date, I hope it may 
 be found practicable to arrive at a more satisfactory 
 understanding on this subject. ' " 
 
 To this proposal of Lee's, Grant replied two days 
 later in a letter, the first part of which related to the 
 question of the exchange of prisoners mentioned in 
 Lee's second note. As to the matter suggested by Ord, 
 he replied, declining the interview, saying: 
 
 "... In regard to meeting you on the 6th instant, 
 I would state that I have no authority to accede to 
 your proposition for a conference on the subject pro- 
 posed. Such authority is vested in the President of the 
 United States alone. General Ord could only have 
 meant that I would not refuse an interview on any 
 subject on which I have a right to act, which, of course, 
 
THE CONFEDERATE GOVERNMENT 615 
 
 would be such as are of a military character, and on 
 the subject of exchanges which has been intrusted 
 to me. 
 
 U. S. Grant, Lieutenant-General. 
 
 It appears that Grant, on receiving Lee's letter, 
 notified the government in Washington, and Mr. Lin- 
 coln sent him, through Stanton, on the 3d of March, a 
 telegram instructing him to "have no conference with 
 General Lee, unless it were for the capitulation of Lee's 
 army," or on some minor and purely military matter, 
 and stated further that Grant was "not to decide, dis- 
 cuss, or confer upon any political question." 
 
 This third effort which Lee had made to bring about 
 peace having disappeared, Lee went back to his post 
 behind the trenches in which his army, now but a 
 wraith, still held back the foe, in no small part by 
 the awe which its valor and fortitude had inspired. 
 Here, still obedient to the civil government, as he 
 deemed it his duty to be, he held on until swept away 
 by Grant's irresistible numbers ably thrown against 
 him. And even then by a tragic fate he was the victim 
 of the incompetence of the civil authorities. He had 
 successfully accomplished one of the most difficult 
 movements of his career. He had withdrawn his army 
 by night from Grant's front extending against his lines 
 for thirty-odd miles, in places so close that the move- 
 ment could not be begun till the moon set. He had 
 crossed the Appomattox twice and, marching past 
 Grant's left, was well on his way to Danville when the 
 disastrous consequence of civil incompetence overtook 
 
616 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 him. In the first place, as we have seen, a letter in 
 which Lee had stated the condition of his army and his 
 plans to the civil authorities had been left in Rich- 
 mond and fell into the hands of the Union commander, 
 thus apprising him fully of Lee's route and the desper- 
 ate condition of his army. And secondly, when Lee 
 reached Amelia Court House, where he had ordered 
 that rations should meet his army, it was found that 
 though they had been sent, the train carrying them had 
 been ordered away again a few hours before his arrival. 
 It used to be charged that this train was ordered back 
 to Richmond to help take away the retiring government 
 officials ; but this charge Mr. Davis indignantly denied, 
 and no one has since believed it. As to the effect of 
 this disaster we have Lee's own views given in his final 
 report of the surrender at Appomattox : 
 
 "... Not finding the supplies ordered to be placed 
 there," he says, "nearly twenty-four hours were lost 
 in endeavoring to collect in the country subsistence 
 for men and horses. This delay was fatal and could 
 not be retrieved." 
 
 When Lee sheathed his sword the Confederate Gov- 
 ernment vanished like a morning cloud. Of its policy, 
 he declared, he knew nothing and "had no hand nor 
 part in it." He was only a soldier, obeying his coun- 
 try's laws, and striving with all his might to preserve 
 the blessing of peace. 
 
 With this report to the President of the Confederate 
 States the Army of Northern Virginia passed into his- 
 tory. 
 
CHAPTER XXIV 
 
 LEE'S CLEMENCY 
 
 As the years pass by, the military genius of Lee must 
 be more and more restricted to the study of a class. 
 His character will ever remain the precious possession 
 of his kindred and his people. In all the annals of his 
 race none has excelled it. 
 
 Possibly Lee's chief, if not his one, fault as a soldier 
 was that he was not always rigorous enough with his 
 subordinates; that is, if such a thing be possible, he 
 was too magnanimous. He took blame on himself 
 where it should rightly have been adjudged to others. 
 Yet, this weakness as a soldier but added to his nobility 
 as a man, and it is as a man that we would now con- 
 sider him. 
 
 While many competent critics in his army were 
 charging Longstreet with having been the cause of the 
 disaster at Gettysburg, Lee gave no hint of dissatis- 
 faction with him. His reports contain no suggestion 
 that he had failed to secure his approval. He wrote 
 him a letter such as only a man of noble nature could 
 have written to an old comrade who had failed him. 
 He showed him a magnanimity which was ill requited 
 when Longstreet wrote his own story of the war. 
 
 Among his characteristics his humanity stands forth 
 to distinguish him forever from possibly nearly all his 
 
 617 
 
618 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 noted contemporaries. Colonel Charles Marshall, of his 
 staff, who knew him best among men, declares that he 
 never put a spy to death, and the story is well known of 
 his clemency in the case of a deserter who had been 
 found guilty by a court-martial and condemned to death. 
 It was during the terrible campaign of 1864, when the 
 women at home wrote such heart-rending accounts of 
 their want to their husbands in the field, that Lee was 
 compelled to forbid the mails to be delivered. A soldier 
 who had disappeared from his regiment and gone home 
 was arrested and tried as a deserter. His defence was 
 a letter which he had received from his wife, which 
 showed that she and her children were starving. It 
 was held insufficient, and he was sentenced to be shot. 
 The case, however, was so pitiful that it was finally 
 presented to General Lee. Lee's views on the mistaken 
 mercy of reversing courts-martial in cases of desertion 
 have been set forth. In this case, however, he wrote 
 beneath the finding his approval, and then below this 
 an order that the man should immediately rejoin his 
 regiment. There were, of course, unhappily, other in- 
 stances enough in which discipline had to be enforced, 
 and when the exigency arose he was rock. But, as has 
 been well said by Mr. Charles Francis Adams, possibly 
 his surest and loftiest title to enduring fame was "his 
 humanity in arms and his scrupulous regard for the 
 most advanced rules of modern warfare." ^ 
 
 An incident, small in itself but illustrative of the 
 compassionate character of Lee, occurred during one 
 of his fiercest battles. He was standing with officers 
 
 ' Address delivered at Lexington, Va., January 19, 1907. 
 
LEE'S CLEMENCY 619 
 
 of his staff in the yard of a dwelling on an eminence, 
 when the group attracted the attention of the enemy 
 and a hot fire was directed on them. General Lee sug- 
 gested to his companions to go to a less exposed spot, 
 but he himself remained where he was. A little later, 
 as he moved about, he stooped and picked up a young 
 bird, and, walking across the yard, placed the fledgling 
 on a limb. 
 
 It was characteristic of him that ordinarily, wherever 
 he might be, he slept in a tent, for fear of incommoding 
 the occupants of the houses he might have taken for 
 his head-quarters, and at times when he was inspecting 
 the long lines from Richmond to Petersburg, he even 
 hesitated to seek shelter at night in the camp of an 
 acquaintance lest he might inconvenience him.^ On 
 his return from Appomattox he, even at his brother's 
 home, slept in a tent in his yard. 
 
 We have seen how in the midst of the arduous duties 
 of commander of the army, he took the trouble to carry 
 out his father-in-law's directions about the manumis- 
 sion of his slaves. He writes later, during the stress of 
 war, to his eldest son: "... I hope we will be able to 
 do something for the servants. I executed a deed of 
 manumission embracing all the names sent me by 
 your mother and some that I recollected, but as I had 
 nothing to refer to but my memory, I fear many were 
 omitted. It was my desire to manumit all the people 
 of your grandfather, whether present on the several 
 estates or not. I believe your mother only sent me 
 the names of those present at W.^iite] H.[ouse] and 
 
 ' Long's "Lee," quoting Colonel Thomas H. Carter. 
 
620 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Romancoke. Those that have left with the enemy 
 may not require their manumission. Still, some may 
 be found hereafter in the State, and, at any rate, I 
 wished to give a complete list, and to liberate all to 
 show that your grandfather's wishes, so far as I was 
 concerned, had been fulfilled. ... I shall pay wages 
 to Perry [his body-servant], and retain him until he or 
 I can do better. You can do the same with Billy. The 
 rest that are hired out had better be furnished with 
 their papers and be let go. But what can be done with 
 those at the W. H. and Romancoke? Those at and 
 about Arlington can take care of themselves, I hope, 
 and I have no doubt but all are gone who desire to do 
 so. At any rate, I can do nothing for them now." ^ 
 
 In another letter, dated March 31, 1863, he writes 
 further, showing his solicitude about his freed servants. 
 One he wishes a place gotten for on a railway; two 
 others, who had been hired out, he advises to remain 
 where they are till the end of the year, when they are 
 to have their earnings devoted to their own benefit. 
 "But what can be done," he asks, '^with poor little 
 Jim? It would be cruel to turn him out on the world. 
 He could not take care of himself." ^ 
 
 This is an epitome of the old Virginian's relation to 
 his servants, and it will be observed that this represen- 
 tative of his class never speaks of them as his slaves, 
 even in discussing intimately with his son their legal 
 status. 
 
 His love of children and his companionship with 
 
 » Letter to General G. W. C. Lee, January 11, 1863. 
 "Jones' "Life and Letters of Robert E. Lee," pp. 286, 287. 
 
LEE'S CLEMENCY 621 
 
 them shine forth in his letters and mark the simplicity 
 that is so often allied to true greatness. In one of his 
 letters to his wife long before the war, when he was on 
 duty in the West, he gives a glimpse of this tenderness 
 toward children which ever distinguished him. He says 
 of a ride he took: '^ . . I saw a number of little girls, 
 all dressed up in their white frocks and pantalets, their 
 hair plaited and tied up with ribbons, running and chas- 
 ing each other in all directions. I counted twenty- 
 three nearly the same size. As I drew up my horse to 
 admire the spectacle, a man appeared at the door with 
 the twenty-fourth in his arms. 'My friend,' said I, 
 'are all these your children ?' 
 
 '''Yes,' he said, 'and there are nine more in the 
 house, and this is my youngest.' 
 
 "Upon further inquiry, however, I found that they 
 were only temporarily his. He said, however, that he 
 had been admiring them before I came up, and just 
 wished that he had a million of dollars, and that they 
 were all his in reality. I do not think the eldest ex- 
 ceeded seven or eight years old. It was the prettiest 
 sight I have seen in the West, and, perhaps, in my 
 life. ..." This love of children ever distinguished him. 
 
 Such was the heart of this great captain, who, to 
 some, seemed cold and aloof when, as Emerson says, 
 genius was only protecting itself by solitude. 
 
 Writing from before Petersburg, years after, to his 
 wife of three little girls, the children of an old neighbor 
 in happier days at Arlington, who had paid him a visit 
 in his camp, each with a basket in which they had 
 brought him fresh eggs, pickles, and a pair of socks. 
 
622 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 "I begged them," Lee said, "to bring me nothing but 
 their kisses and to keep the eggs, corn, etc., for them- 
 selves." 
 
 Of Lee's tranquil mind, even amid the most difficult 
 conditions, we have constant proof. No apparent dis- 
 advantage of position, no threats or impending dangers, 
 appear to have disturbed that equanimity which so 
 marks him as among the great. 
 
 While McClellan, accepting the wildest statements of 
 'intelligent contrabands," was rating the force in his 
 front at two and a half times its actual numbers and 
 was throwing away precious weeks while he clamored 
 for reinforcements, and while his successors often saw 
 a vast army in their front whose shadows caused them 
 much delay, Lee, from the first, even amid the deepest 
 darkness of the situation, saw with a clearness which no 
 gloom could obscure. Writing from his camp, during 
 the Western Virginia campaign, he saj^s: ''The force of 
 the enemy, estimated by prisoners captured, is put 
 down at from 17,000 to 20,000. General Floyd thinks 
 18,000. I do not think it exceeds 9,000 or 10,000, but 
 it exceeds ours." ^ 
 
 From camp near Orange Court House he writes on 
 the eve of the battle of Second Manassas, under date 
 of August 17, 1862: "General Pope says he is very 
 strong and seems to feel so, for he is moving apparently 
 up the Rapidan. I hope he will not prove stronger than 
 we are. I learn since I have left that General McClellan 
 has moved down the James River with his whole army, 
 
 » Letter to Mrs. Lee, October 7, 1861; letter to his son, Major W. H. 
 F. Lee, October 12, 1861. 
 
LEE'S CLEMENCY 623 
 
 so we shall have busy times. Burnside and King, from 
 Fredericksburg, have joined Pope, which, from their 
 own report, has swelled Pope to 92,000. I do not be- 
 lieve it, though I believe he is very big." 
 
 ''General Hooker," he wrote, ''is agitating some- 
 thing on the other side, or, at all events, he is agitating 
 his troops. . . . Yesterday he was marching his men 
 up and down the river. ..." 
 
 If Hooker prided himself on his fine army, Lee had 
 no less confidence in his own, however outnumbered. 
 "I agree with you," he wrote Hood, "in believing that 
 our army would be invincible if properly organized 
 and officered. There never were such men in an army 
 before. They will go anywhere and do anything if 
 properly led. But there is the difficulty — proper com- 
 manders. Where can they be obtained?" ^ 
 
 It has been customary to think of piety as the peculiar 
 attribute of Jackson, the Puritan in type, rather than of 
 Lee, the cavalier. But, if possible, Lee was even more 
 pious than his great lieutenant. In fact, both were 
 men who, in the early prime of their manhood, conse- 
 crated themselves to God, and thenceforth served Him 
 with a single heart. It shines forth in every page they 
 ever penned, in every act they ever performed. It 
 was the basis of their character; it formed the foun- 
 dation of that wonderful poise which, amid the most 
 difficult and arduous situations, left them the supreme 
 tranquillity which was the atmosphere in which their 
 powers found vitality. No one can familiarize himself 
 with Lee's life without seeing that he was a man con- 
 
 ' Letter to General J. B. Hood, May 21, 1863. 
 
624 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 secrated to the work of his divine Master, and amid all 
 conditions possessing a mind stayed on Him. 
 
 Not Cromwell's army was more religious than that 
 which followed Lee, and the great Protector was not 
 so pious as the great captain who led the Army of 
 Northern Virginia. 
 
 The principle on which he acted was stated in one of 
 his letters. ''We are all in the hands of a kind God," 
 he wrote, *'who will do for us what is best, and more 
 than we deserve, and we have only to endeavor to de- 
 serve more and to do our duty to Him and to ourselves. 
 May we all deserve His mercy, His care, and His pro- 
 tection." ^ 
 
 Such was the man to whom first Virginia, and later 
 the entire South, confided the leadership of her soldiery, 
 and on whom they laid the burden of their destiny. 
 
 His advice to his youngest son, whom he had advised 
 on leaving college to enlist in a good company, was 
 characteristic of him: ''To be obedient to all authority, 
 and to do his duty in everything, great or small." ^ 
 
 It was also characteristic alike of him and of the 
 soldiery of the South that he should have refused to 
 procure for this son a commission, as long afterward he 
 promptly discountenanced the idea of promoting his 
 eldest son (though a soldier so accomplished that he 
 wished for him as his chief of staff) over the heads of 
 officers who had served under him and proved their 
 capacity under his eye. 
 
 "I do not think," says the former, in his interesting 
 
 * Letter of September 1, 1856; cited in Jones' "Lee," p. 8L 
 
 * "Recollections of General Lee," by Captain R. E. Lee. 
 
LEE'S CLEMENCY 625 
 
 ''Recollections" of his father, ''that it ever occurred to 
 my father to have me, or rather get me, a position in 
 the army. I know it never occurred to me, nor did I 
 ever hear at that time, or afterward, from any one that 
 I might have been entitled to better rank because of 
 my father's prominence in Virginia and in the Confed- 
 eracy." ^ 
 
 It was not until that son had fought as a private 
 through the valley campaigns of Jackson, the battles 
 around Richmond, the Maryland campaign, and had 
 distinguished himself,^ that he received the promotion 
 to the staff of his brother. General William H. F. Lee. 
 
 Indeed, among the troubles with which Lee had to 
 contend were the efforts made by politicians in the civil 
 government to procure commissions and promotions 
 for their constituents, and the delay experienced in 
 getting his recommendations for promotion for merit 
 acted on. 
 
 The fact constitutes one of the few complaints in his 
 letters, and he set the example by steadfastly setting 
 his face against any favoritism toward his own family. 
 His two sons, who became generals, were both officers 
 in the old army and were both in the retreat to Appo- 
 mattox until one of them was captured, with five other 
 general officers and some 6,000 men, at Sailor's Creek, 
 in one of the last fights of the war. Of their character 
 some idea may be formed from the fact that when one 
 of them. General William H. F. Lee, was held as a 
 hostage under sentence of death, the other. General 
 
 * "Recollections of General Lee," by R. E. Lee. 
 
 ^ Moore's " Recollections of a Cannoneer under Jackson." 
 
626 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 G. W. C. Lee, wrote, asking to be accepted as a hostage 
 in his stead, placing the offer on the ground that his 
 brother had a wife and child, while he, his equal in 
 rank and the eldest son, was unmarried. 
 
 Of his son's confinement under sentence as a hostage, 
 which, the father says, was ''grievous" to him, Lee 
 writes to his other son. ''I had seen in the papers the 
 intention announced by the Federal Government of 
 holding him as a hostage for the two captains selected 
 to be shot. If it is right to shoot those men this should 
 make no difference in their execution; but I have not 
 thought it right to shoot them, and differ in my ideas 
 from most of our people on the subject of reprisal. 
 Sometimes I know it to be necessary, but it should not 
 be resorted to at all times, and in our case policy dic- 
 tates that it should be avoided whenever possible." * 
 
 Happy the people that can produce such a father 
 and such sons! 
 
 It is told of Sidney, that, when wounded and perish- 
 ing of thirst, some one brought him water, and he or- 
 dered it given to a dying soldier, whose need was greater 
 than his. Lee's army was full of soldiers who would 
 have done that which gave Sidney fame, and the same 
 thing may be said of the better element of the Army 
 of the Potomac. Such was the temper and character 
 of the men who followed Lee, and such was the temper 
 and character of their beloved commander, whom they 
 loved to call in affectionate phrase, "Marse Robert." 
 He was their idol and their ideal, and his impress was 
 stamped on his army. 
 
 > Letter to General G. W. C. Lee, August 7, 1863. 
 
LEE'S CLEMENCY 627 
 
 The Master whom he so faithfully and humbly tried 
 to serve, whose precepts were ever in his heart and 
 whose spirit shone ever in his life, had laid down for 
 him the law as had His forerunner and prophet: '^And 
 ":o the soldiers he said, Do violence to no man." 
 
 This high rule, like all others of his divine Master, 
 Lee ever followed, and, so far as possible, inculcated on 
 his army, by whom, to their eternal honor be it said, 
 the noble example was nobly followed. Unhappily for 
 the world, and for the future reputation of some who 
 otherwise might as able soldiers have won the admira- 
 tion of a whole people, rather than of a mere section 
 of that people, though McClellan, McDowell, Burnside, 
 and numberless gentlemen who followed them con- 
 ducted war on high principles, it was not the invariable 
 rule among all commanders. 
 
 Butler had damned himself to everlasting fame by 
 orders and acts in Louisiana which no soldier can think 
 of without a blush. ^ Hunter, in despite of expostula- 
 tions, had burnt his way through the beautiful valley 
 where Lee was to find his last resting place, and had 
 left in his track the scarred and blackened ruins of 
 countless dwellings. To the honor of the brave men he 
 commanded it is said that he "had to deprive forty of 
 his commissioned officers of their conomands before he 
 could carry into execution his infamous orders." ^ Even 
 
 'In his infamous "Order 28" he had ordered that any woman in 
 New Orleans who should " by word, or gesture, or movement insult or 
 show contempt for any officer or soldier of the United States, should be 
 regarded and treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation." 
 
 2 "Official Report of History Com., Grand Camp C. V.," in "The 
 Confederate Cause," p. 103. 
 
628 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Halleck declared his action "barbarous." ^ It was re- 
 served for Sherman, possibly the second greatest gen- 
 eral on the Northern side, to reverse most completely 
 the advances of civilization and hark back almost to 
 the ferocious methods of mediaevalism. To find the 
 proof of this, one has no need to go outside of this 
 officer's own recorded words. 
 
 "War is hell," he was quoted long after as saying. 
 He did more than all others to make it so. He ruth- 
 lessly devastated, not only for the needs of his army 
 and to deprive his enemy of subsistence, but to horrify 
 ^.and appall. He made war not only on men, but on 
 ' ^ women and children. He shelled defenceless towns 
 which had net an armed man in them and had offered 
 to surrender. 
 
 "In nearly all his despatches after he had reached the 
 sea," says Rhodes, an historian from his State, who is 
 his apologist and his admirer, "he gloated over the de- 
 struction of property." ^ 
 
 He gloated over the havoc he wrought, first, in an- 
 ticipation, as he wrote, how he could "make a wreck of 
 the country from Chattanooga to Atlanta, including the 
 latter city," ^ and again, how he could "make Georgia 
 howl"; * next, in the act of its perpetration, as he issued 
 his orders for his army to "forage liberally on the coun- 
 try," and expressly forbade his officers to give receipts 
 for property taken ; authorized the wanton destruction 
 of mills and houses; and while subordinate officers, like 
 
 » Sherman's "Memoirs," II, p. 129. 
 2 Rhodes' "History of the United States," vol. V, p. 22. 
 =» Official Records, vol. XXXIX, part 2, p. 202. 
 *Ibid., parts, p. 1G2. 
 
I 
 
 LEE'S CLEMENCY 629 
 
 Howard and Cox and Schofield, were writhing under 
 the robberies of defenceless women, extending even to 
 the tearing of rings from their fingers, he chuckled over 
 the robberies committed by his men — who quoted his 
 orders to his face — and reviewed his "bummers," an 
 organized corps of robbers, who have never had their 
 counterpart since the Free Companies passed from 
 the stage under the awakening conscience of modern 
 Europe, 
 
 If these are strong words they are largely taken from 
 his own writings. 
 
 He sent an express message to the corps commander, 
 General Davis, at General Howell Cobb's plantation, 
 "to explain whose plantation it was and instruct him 
 to spare nothing." ^ This was but warring on women, 
 for General Howell Cobb was far away at his post of 
 duty in command of his brigade in Virginia and his 
 brother, General Thomas Cobb, was in his honored 
 grave two years ere this, having fallen at the foot of 
 Marye's Heights, as a brave man falls, holding back 
 brave men. "I would not restrain the army," Sher- 
 man wrote coolly, "lest its vigor and energy should be 
 impaired." ^ 
 
 Speaking of the burning of Columbia, which Sher- 
 man wrote his brother he had in his report "dis- 
 tinctly charged to General Wade Hamilton," he adds, 
 "I confess I did so pointedly to shake the faith of his 
 people in him." ' A distinguished historian from his 
 own State has declared of this destruction of Columbia, 
 
 ^ Sherman's "Memoirs," II, p. 185. 
 
 Uhid., II, p. 255. ^lUd., II, p. 287. 
 
630 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 a defenceless city which had surrendered, that ''it was 
 the most monstrous barbarity of this barbarous march. 
 Before his movements began, General Sherman had 
 begged permission to turn his army loose in South Caro- 
 lina and devastate it. He used this permission to the 
 full. He protested that he did not wage war upon 
 women and children. But under the operations of his 
 orders the last morsel of food was taken from hundreds 
 of destitute families that his soldiers might feast in 
 needless and riotous abundance. Before his eyes rose, 
 day after day, the mournful clouds of smoke on every 
 side that told of old people and their grandchildren 
 driven in mid-winter, from the only roofs that were to 
 shelter them, by the flames which the wantonness of 
 his soldiers had kindled. Yet, if a single soldier was 
 punished for a single outrage or theft during that entire 
 movement we have found no mention of it in all the 
 voluminous records of the march." ^ 
 
 Place Lee's general order from Chambersburg on in- 
 vading Pennsylvania beside Sherman's correspondence 
 with Halleck, and let posterity judge thereby the char- 
 acter of the commanders. Halleck, chief of staff and 
 military adviser to President Lincoln, writes to Sher- 
 man, ''Should you capture Charleston, I hope that by 
 some accident the place might be destroyed, and if a 
 little salt should be sown upon its site it might pre- 
 vent the growth of future crops of nullification and 
 secession," and Sherman replies,^ "I will bear in mind 
 
 * "Ohio in the War," by Hon. AVhitelaw Reid. 
 
 ^Despatch of December 24, 1864. Sherman's "Memoirs," II, pp. 
 223, 227, 228. 
 
LEE'S CLEMENCY 631 
 
 your hint as to Charleston, and do not think salt will 
 be necessary. When I move on, the Fifteenth Corps 
 will be on the right wing, and their position will 
 bring them naturally into Charleston first, and if you 
 have watched the history of that corps you have re- 
 marked that they generally do up their work pretty 
 well." 
 
 While this general was giving orders to burn mills 
 and destroy all food sources on which non-combatants 
 depended for life, and to convey prisoners first, or if 
 prisoners were wanting, then non-combatant inhabi- 
 tants, over all bridges and other places suspected of 
 being mined, and ''could hardly help laughing at their 
 stepping so gingerly along the road where it was sup- 
 posed sunken torpedoes might explode at each step"; ^ 
 and while even Grant, not yet risen to his last splendid 
 act of magnanimity, as he was brought to do in the long 
 vigils before Petersburg, was expressing his hope to 
 Hunter that his troops would "eat out Virginia clear 
 and clean, as far as they could go, so that crows flying 
 over it for the balance of the season would have to carry 
 their provender with them"; ^ Lee, as he marched into 
 Pennsylvania, issued orders to his troops to remember 
 that they made war only on armed men, and that no 
 greater disgrace could befall the army, and through it 
 the whole South, than the perpetration of barbarous 
 outrages on the innocent and defenceless. This whole 
 order can never be too frequently repeated. It gives 
 the man as he was. 
 
 > Sherman's "Memoirs," II, p. 194. 
 
 2 Official Records, vol. XXXVII, part 2, pp. 300, 301. 
 
632 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Hdqrs. Army of Northern Va., 
 
 Chambersburg, Pa., June 27, 1863. 
 Genl. Order, No. 72. 
 
 The commanding general has observed with marked 
 satisfaction the conduct of the troops on the march, 
 and confidently anticipates results commensurate with 
 the high spirit they have manifested. No troops could 
 have displayed greater fortitude or better performed 
 the arduous marches of the past ten days. Their con- 
 duct in other respects has, with few exceptions, been 
 in keeping with their character as soldiers and entitles 
 them to approbation and praise. 
 
 There have, however, been instances of forgetfulness 
 on the part of some that they have in keeping the yet 
 unsullied reputation of the army, and that the duties 
 exacted of us by civilization and Christianity are not 
 less obligatory in the country of the enemy than in 
 our own. The commanding general considers that no 
 greater disgrace would befall the army, and through it 
 our whole people, than the perpetration of the bar- 
 barous outrages upon the innocent and defenceless, 
 and the wanton destruction of private property, that 
 have marked the course of the enemy in our own 
 country. Such proceedings not only disgrace the per- 
 petrators and all connected with them, but are sub- 
 versive of the discipline and efficiency of the army 
 and obstructive to the ends of our present movements. 
 It must be remembered that we make war only on 
 armed men, and that we cannot take vengeance for the 
 wrong our people have suffered without lowering our- 
 selves in the eyes of all whose abhorrence has been 
 excited by the atrocities of our enemy, and offending 
 against Him to whom vengeance belongeth, without 
 whose favor and support our efforts must all prove in 
 vain. 
 
LEE'S CLEMENCY 633 
 
 The commanding general, therefore, earnestly ex- 
 horts the troops to abstain with most scrupulous care 
 from unnecessary or wanton injury to private prop- 
 erty, and he enjoins upon all officers to arrest and 
 bring to summary punishment all who shall in any 
 way offend against the orders on this subject. 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
 Colonel Freemantle, of the British army, who was 
 along with the army, says: "I saw no straggling into 
 the houses ; nor were any of the inhabitants disturbed 
 or annoyed by the soldiers. I went into Chambers- 
 burg and witnessed the singular good behavior of the 
 troops toward the citizens. To one who has seen the 
 ravages of the Northern troops in Southern towns, this 
 forbearance seems most commendable and surprising." 
 
 In this he is sustained by the testimony of a multi- 
 tude of reliable witnesses.^ It is an error to imagine 
 that Lee was lax in the enforcement of his orders. It 
 was only with those higher officers whom he could not 
 replace that he overlooked failure to comply with his 
 orders. An excellent illustration of this is the story 
 of his having sent for a colonel of artillery whose com- 
 mand had rendered conspicuous service in a battle a 
 few days before. It was supposed that the summons 
 was for the purpose of complimenting the colonel. 
 But on his arrival all he received was a reprimand from 
 
 ^ Colonel William Nelson, of the artillery, on the retreat from Gettys- 
 burg, witnessed a cow break out of her pasture and join the beef herd 
 which was passing by. The farmer's wife was in much distress. Riding 
 back, Colonel Nelson directed Captain Woolfork, who was near by, to 
 order one of his lieutenants to take a squad of reliable men and cut 
 the cow out of the herd and return her to her mistress. 
 
634 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 the general for having allowed some of his men to ride 
 on his guns, which was against orders. The colonel 
 used to say that he thought of replying that if the 
 general had seen his men in the battle next day he 
 would have seen many of those same men lying un- 
 der the guns. But he did not say it. Few men in the 
 Army of Northern Virginia, whatever their devotion 
 to "Marse Robert/' ventured to reply to him. They 
 stood mightily in awe of him. 
 
 His orders against depredation, even in the enemy's 
 country, were rigidly enforced, and having seen a soldier 
 running away from a farm yard with a stolen pig, he is 
 said to have promptly ordered his execution. Whether 
 this story be authentic or not, it is unquestioned that 
 he was stern in enforcing discipline in this regard. 
 The story is known how, on being told by a bare- 
 headed prisoner in reply to the question, "Where is 
 your hat?" that a soldier had taken it, he had a search 
 made and the hat returned. 
 
 In his admirable "Review of the Gettysburg Cam- 
 paign," Colonel David G. Mcintosh, whose battalion 
 was among the most noted for service on that fatal field, 
 and who was in the fight from the first morning, re- 
 lates that when on the retreat to the Potomac his com- 
 mand reached St. James's College, it was given the first 
 opportunity to rest and cook rations which it had had 
 since the struggle began on the first day. Having gone 
 into camp in a grove, he was so worn out that he flung 
 himself on the ground and was at once asleep. He was 
 soon aroused by a message that General Lee wished to 
 see him, and on making his way to where the general 
 
LEE'S CLEMENCY 635 
 
 was, he was received "with great austerity of manner" 
 and suddenly "awoke to the fact that a long row of 
 camp-fires were blazing brightly in full view, piled high 
 with fence rails." Pointing to the fires. General Lee 
 inquired if he had received "Order No. 72." He re- 
 plied that he had, and that the order had been duly 
 published. "Looking at me for a moment," continues 
 Colonel Mcintosh, "he said: 'Then, sir, you must not 
 only have them published, but you must see that they 
 are obeyed,' and with a bow and majestic wave of the 
 hand, he turned and rode away, leaving me decidedly 
 crestfallen." 
 
 Illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely to show 
 that, while he fought with all his might, he fought only 
 armed enemies, and, whatever the provocation, bore 
 himself toward others with knightly consideration. 
 
 It is a record of general and of men of which the 
 South may well boast and of which the whole nation 
 will some day be proud. 
 
CHAPTER XXV 
 LEE IN DEFEAT 
 
 And now, having endeavored to picture Lee during 
 those glorious campaigns which must, to the future 
 student of military skill, place him among the first 
 captains of history, I shall not invite attention further 
 to Lee the soldier — to Lee the strategist — to Lee the 
 victorious, but to a greater Lee — to Lee the defeated. 
 As glorious as were these campaigns, it is on the last 
 act of the drama — the retreat from Petersburg, the sur- 
 render at Appomattox, and the dark period that fol- 
 lowed that surrender — that we must look to see him at 
 his best. His every act, his every word, showed how 
 completely he had surrendered himself to Duty, and 
 with what implicit obedience he followed the command 
 of that 
 
 ''Stem daughter of the voice of God." 
 
 "Are you sanguine of the result of the war?" asked 
 Bishop Wilmer of him in the closing days of the struggle. 
 His reply was : 
 
 "At present I am not concerned with results. God's 
 will ought to be our aim, and I am quite contented 
 that His designs should be accomplished and not mine." 
 
 On that last morning when his handful of worn and 
 starving veterans had made their last charge, to find 
 themselves shut in by ranks of serried steel, hemmed 
 
 636 
 
LEE IN DEFEAT 637 
 
 in by Grant's entire army, he faced the decree of Fate 
 with as much constancy as though that decree were 
 success, not doom. 
 
 ''Wliat will history say of the surrender of an army 
 in the field?" asked an officer of his staff in passionate 
 grief. 
 
 ''Yes, I know they will say hard things of us; they 
 will not understand that we were overwhelmed by 
 numbers; but that is not the question, colonel. The 
 question is, is it right to surrender this army? If it is 
 right, then I will take all of the responsibility." 
 
 It was ever the note of duty that he sounded. 
 
 ''You will take with you," he said to his army in 
 his farewell address, "the satisfaction that proceeds 
 from the consciousness of duty faithfully performed." 
 
 "We are conscious that we have humbly tried to do 
 our duty," he said, a year or more after the war, when 
 the clouds hung heavy over the South ; " we may, there- 
 fore, with calm satisfaction trust in God and leave 
 results to Him." 
 
 The sun which has shone in the morning, but has 
 become obscured by clouds in the afternoon, sometimes 
 breaks forth and at its setting shines with a greater 
 splendor than it knew even at high noon. 
 
 So here. Sheathing his stainless sword, surrender- 
 ing in the field the remnant of an army that had once 
 been the most redoubtable body of fighting men of 
 the century, the greatest captain, the noblest gentle- 
 man of our time, expecting to slip into the darkness of 
 oblivion, suddenly stepped forth from the gloom of de- 
 feat into the splendor of perpetual fame. 
 
638 ROBERT E. LEE ^^| 
 
 I love to think of Grant as he appeared that April 
 day at Appomattox: the simple soldier, the strenuous 
 fighter who, though thrashed, was always ready to fight 
 again; who, now though he had achieved the prize 
 for which he had fought so hard and h*ad paid so dearly, 
 was so modest and so unassuming that but for his 
 shoulder-straps and that yet better mark of rank, his 
 generosity, he might not have been known as the vic- 
 tor. Southerners generally have long forgiven Grant 
 all else for the magnanimity that he showed that day 
 to Lee. By his orders no salutes of joy were fired, no 
 public marks of exultation over his fallen foe were 
 allowed. History contains no finer example of great- 
 ness. Not Alexander in his generous youth excelled 
 him. 
 
 Yet, it is not more to the victor that Posterity will 
 turn her gaze than to the vanquished, her admiration 
 at the glory of the conqueror wellnigh lost in amaze- 
 ment at the dignity of the conquered. 
 
 Men who saw the defeated general when he came 
 forth from the chamber where he had signed the ar- 
 ticles of capitulation say that he paused a moment as 
 his eyes rested once more on the Virginia hills, smote his 
 hands together as though in some excess of inward 
 agony, then mounted his gray horse, Traveller, and 
 rode calmly away. 
 
 If that was the very Gethsemane of his trials, yet 
 he must have had then one moment of supreme, if 
 chastened, joy. As he rode quietly down the lane 
 leading from the scene of capitulation, he passed into 
 view of his men — of such as remained of them. The 
 
LEE IN DEFEAT 039 
 
 news of the surrender had got abroad and they were 
 waiting, grief -stricken and dejected, upon the hill-sides, 
 when they caught sight of their old commander on the 
 gray horse. Then occurred one of the most notable 
 scenes in the history of war. In an instant they were 
 about him, bare-headed, with tear-wet faces; throng- 
 ing him, kissing his hand, his boots, his saddle ; weep- 
 ing ; cheering him amid their tears ; shouting his name 
 to the very skies. He said: "Men, we have fought 
 through the war together. I have done my best for 
 you. My heart is too full to say more." 
 
 The cheers were heard afar off over the hills where the 
 victorious army lay encamped, and awakened some 
 anxiety. It was a sound they well knew: 
 
 "The voice once heard through Shiloh's woods, 
 And Chickamauga's soHtudes, 
 The fierce South cheering on her sons." 
 
 It was reported in some of the Northern papers that 
 it was the sound of jubilation at the surrender. But 
 it was not. It was the voice of jubilation, yet not for 
 surrender: but for the captain who had surrendered 
 their muskets but was still the commander of their 
 hearts. 
 
 This is Lee's final victory and the highest tribute to 
 the South: that the devotion of the South to him was 
 greater in the hour of defeat than in that of victory. 
 It is said that Napoleon was adored by the men of 
 France, but hated by the women. It was not so with 
 Lee. No victor ever came home to receive more signal 
 evidences of devotion than this defeated general. 
 
040 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Richmond was in mourning. Since the Union army 
 had entered her gates, every house had been closed as 
 though it were the house of death. One afternoon, a 
 few days after the surrender, Lee, on his gray horse. 
 Traveller, attended by two or three officers, crossed the 
 James and rode quietly up the street to his home on 
 Franklin Street, where he dismounted. That evening 
 it was noised abroad that General Lee had arrived; 
 he had been seen to enter his house. Next morning 
 the houses were open as usual ; life began to flow in its 
 accustomed channels. Those who were there have 
 said that when General Lee returned they felt as safe 
 as if he had had his whole army at his back. 
 
 His first recorded words on his arrival were a tribute 
 to his successful opponent. "General Grant has acted 
 with magnanimity," he said to some who spoke of the 
 victor with bitterness. It was the keynote to his after 
 life. 
 
 Indeed, from this record a few facts stand forth be- 
 yond all others: Lee's nobility and genius; the forti- 
 tude of the Southern people; Grant's resolution and 
 magnanimity, and the infinite valor of the American 
 soldier. 
 
 Over forty years have gone by since that day in April 
 when Lee, to avoid further useless sacrifice of life, sur- 
 rendered himself and all that remained of the Army of 
 Northern Virginia and gave his parole d'honneur to 
 bear arms no more against the United States. To him, 
 who with prescient mind had long borne in his bosom 
 knowledge of the exhausted resources of the Confeder- 
 acy, and had seen his redoubtable army, under the 
 
LEE IN DEFEAT 641 
 
 ''policy of attrition," dwindle away to a mere ghost of 
 its former self, it might well appear that he had failed, 
 and, if he ever thought of his personal reputation, that 
 he had lost the soldier's dearest prize; that Fame had 
 turned her back and Fate usurped her place. Thence- 
 forth he who had been the leader of armies, whose 
 glorious achievements had filled the world, who had 
 been the prop of a high-hearted nation's hope, was to 
 walk the narrow by-way of private life, defeated, im- 
 poverished, and possibly misunderstood. 
 
 But to us who have survived for the space of more 
 than a generation, how different it appears. We know 
 that time, the redresser of wrongs, is steadily righting 
 the act of unkind Fate; and Fame, firmly established in 
 her high seat, is ever placing a richer laurel on his brow. 
 
 Yea, ride away, thou defeated general ! Ride through 
 the broken fragments of thy shattered army, ride 
 through thy war-wasted land, amid thy desolate and 
 stricken people. But know that thou art riding on 
 Fame's highest way: 
 
 "This day shall see 
 Thy head wear sunlight and thy feet touch stars." 
 
CHAPTER XXVI 
 AFTER THE WAR 
 
 The sternest test of Lee's character was yet to come. 
 Only those who went through it can know the depth of 
 the humihation in which, during the next few years, 
 mahgnity, with ignorance for ally, strove to steep the 
 South. 
 
 Out of it Lee came without a trace of rancor or of 
 bitterness. In all the annals of our race no man has\ 
 ever shown a nobler or more Christian spirit. i 
 
 Lincoln, who was of Southern blood and whose pas- 
 sion was a reunited Union, was in his grave, slain by 
 a madman, and after life's fitful fever was sleeping 
 well, his last message being one of peace and good-will. 
 His successor began by flinging himself into the arms 
 of those who had hated Lincoln most. 
 
 On the 29th of May President Johnson issued a 
 proclamation of amnesty, but General Lee, with all 
 others of rank, was excluded from its operation, and 
 he was indicted for treason by a grand jury, composed 
 partly of negroes, especially selected for the purpose of 
 returning indictments against him and Mr. Davis. 
 There were those who stood proudly aloof and gave no 
 sign of desiring reinstatement as citizens. Some scorn- 
 fully declared their resolution to live and die without 
 accepting parole. Not so the broad-minded and wise 
 Lee. He immediately wrote (on June 13) to the Presi- 
 
 642 
 
AFTER THE WAR 643 
 
 dent, applying for the "benefits and full restoration of 
 all rights and privileges extended to those included in 
 the terms of the proclamation." This application he 
 enclosed on the same day in a letter to General Grants 
 informing him that he was ready to meet any charges 
 that might be preferred against him and did not wish 
 to avoid trial, but that he had supposed that the officers 
 and men of the Army of Northern Virginia were by the 
 terms of surrender protected by the United States 
 Government from molestation so long as they con- 
 formed to its conditions. 
 
 Grant immediately rose to the demand of the occa- 
 sion — as he had a way of doing in great emergencies. 
 He informed General Lee that his understanding of 
 the convention at Appomattox was identical with his ; 
 and he is said to have threatened Johnson with the 
 surrender of the command of the army unless the 
 indictment were quashed and the convention honora- 
 bly observed. 
 
 The assassination of Lincoln had played perfectly 
 into the hands of the radical element of his party, which 
 had fought him with virulence, and now turned the 
 outbreak of popular vengeance at the North to their 
 own profit. They surpassed Johnson, and Johnson, 
 finding himself confronted by an ever-strengthening 
 phalanx of enemies within his own party, the same who 
 had fought Lincoln so bitterly, enlarged by the new 
 contingent of his personal foes, soon, for his own 
 reasons, underwent a change of heart. From de- 
 nouncing against the South measures that should 
 "make treason odious," he began to speak of the South 
 
644 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 to Southerners in a more conciliatory manner. Gov- 
 ernor Letcher, of Virginia, who had been arrested, was 
 treated in Washington with kindness and considera- 
 tion. It was on learning of this that General Lee de- 
 clared his opinion that the decision of war having been 
 against the South, it was "the part of wisdom to ac- 
 quiesce in the result, and of candor to recognize the 
 fact." The interests of the State of Virginia, he said, 
 were the same as those of the United States. Its 
 prosperity would rise or fall with the welfare of the 
 country. The duty of its citizens then appeared to 
 him too plain to admit of doubt. He urged that all 
 should unite in honest efforts to obliterate the effects 
 of war and to restore the blessings of peace. That they 
 should remain, if possible, in the country; promote 
 harmony and good feeling; qualify themselves to vote 
 and elect to the State and general legislatures wise 
 and patriotic men who would devote their abilities to 
 the interests of the country and the healing of all dis- 
 sensions. "I have," he asserted, "invariably recom- 
 mended this course since the cessation of hostilities, 
 and have endeavored to practise it myself." ^ 
 
 From this time he gave all the weight of his great 
 name to the complete re-establishment of the Union, 
 and as his old soldiers followed and obeyed him on the 
 field of battle, so now the whole South followed him 
 in peace. Only the South knows as yet what the 
 Union owes to Lee, 
 
 Happily, as we know, his serene soul, lifted too high 
 to be flisturbed by any storms of doubt, was untroubled 
 
 * Letter of August 28, 1865, to ex-Govemor Letcher. 
 
AFTER THE WAR 645 
 
 by any question born of his failure. "I did nothing 
 more," he said to General Hampton, one of his most 
 gallant lieutenants, "than my duty required of me. 
 I could have taken no other course without dishonor, 
 and if it were all to be done over again, I should act in 
 precisely the same manner." 
 
 Thus, in the lofty calm of a mind conscious of hav- 
 ing tried faithfully to follow ever the right, of having 
 obeyed without question the command of duty, in sim- 
 ple reliance on the goodness of God, the great captain 
 passed the brief evening of his life, trying, by his con- 
 stant precept and example, to train the young men of 
 the South as Christian gentlemen. 
 
 A story was told just after the war which illustrates 
 the devotion of Lee's old soldiers to their defeated 
 general. 
 
 Not long after the surrender, a soldier rang at Gen- 
 eral Lee's door and called for the general. "General," 
 said he, as General Lee entered, "I'm one of your sol- 
 diers, and I've come here as the representative of four 
 of my comrades who are too ragged and dirty to ven- 
 ture to see you. We are all Virginians, general, from 
 Roanoke County, and they sent me here to see you on 
 a little business. They've got our President in prison, 
 and now — they — talk — about — arresting — you. And, 
 general, we can't stand — we'll never stand and see that. 
 Now, general, we five men have got about two hundred 
 and fifty acres of land in Roanoke — very good land, 
 too, it is, sir — and if you'll come up there and live, I've 
 come to offer you our land, all of it, and we five men 
 will work as your field hands, and you'll have very little 
 
646 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 trouble in managing it with us to help you. And, gen- 
 eral, there are near about a hundred of us left in old 
 Roanoke, and they could never take you there, for we 
 could hide you in the hollows of the mountains, and the 
 last man of us would die in your defence." 
 
 With a great deal of delicacy he went on to suggest 
 that the ladies of General Lee's family would lack 
 society on a lonely mountain farm, but said that the 
 Springs were hard by, and that out of the proceeds of 
 the farm General Lee and his family could afford to 
 spend all theii summers there and thus find the society 
 which these devoted field-hands did not dare to offer. 
 
 General Lee was, of course, forced to decline; but 
 he would not allow the brave fellow to depart until he 
 was better clad than when he came in.* 
 
 He was much disturbed about this time by the ten- 
 dency of some of his old friends in their despair to emi- 
 grate from the South. That constant soul knew no 
 defeat, much less despair, and he had not despaired 
 of the South. He protested against leaving the State 
 for any reason, avowing his unalterable belief in the 
 duty of every man to remain and bear his part in what- 
 ever trials might befall. "The thought of abandoning 
 the country and all that must be left in it," he wrote, 
 ''is abhorrent to my feelings, and I prefer to struggle 
 for its restoration and share its fate rather than to give 
 up all as lost, and Virginia has need for all her sons." ' 
 And this devotion he exemplified to the fullest extent 
 in his life. 
 
 ' George W. Bagby's "Old Virginia Gentleman," p. 62. 
 * Letter to Commodore M. F. Maury, September 8, 1865. 
 
AFTER THE WAR 647 
 
 The war had scarcely ceased and his condition of 
 narrow circumstances become known, when offers of 
 places of honor and profit began to come to him : offers 
 of the presidency of insurance companies and of other 
 industrial enterprises — proposals that he should allow 
 his name to be used for the highest office in the gift of 
 the State ; even offers from admirers in the old country 
 of an asylum on that side of the water, where a hand- 
 some estate was tendered him, as a tribute of admira- 
 tion, so that he could spend the residue of his life in 
 peace and comfort. 
 
 His reply to all these allurements was that which 
 we now know was the only one he could make : a gra- 
 cious but irrevocable refusal. During the war, when a 
 friend had suggested to him the probability that the 
 people of the South would demand that he should be 
 their president, he had promptly and decisively de- 
 clared that he would never accept such a position. So 
 now, when the governorship of Virginia was proposed 
 to him, he firmly refused to consider it. With the 
 same firmness he rejected all proposals to provide 
 him with honorable commercial positions at a high 
 salary. 
 
 On one of these occasions he was approached with a 
 tender of the presidency of an insurance company at a 
 salary of $50,000 a year. He declined it on the ground 
 that it was work with which he was not familiar. 
 "But, general," said the gentleman who represented 
 the insurance company, "you will not be expected 
 to do any work; what we wish is the use of your 
 
648 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 "Do you not think/' said General Lee, "that if my 
 name is worth $50,000 a year, I ought to be ver^'- care- 
 ful about taking care of it?" 
 
 Amid the commercialism of the present age tliis 
 sounds as refreshing as the oath of a knight of the 
 Round Table. 
 
 Defeated in one warfare, he was still a captain mili- 
 tant in the service of Duty : Duty that, like the moon, 
 often shows her darkened face to her votary, though 
 in the future she may beam with radiance. 
 
 Duty now appeared to him to send her summons from 
 a little mountain town in which was a classical school 
 which Washington had endowed, and Lee, turning 
 from all offers of wealth and ease, obeyed her call. 
 
 "They are offering my father everything," said one 
 of his daughters, "but the only thing he will accept: 
 a place to earn honest bread while engaged in some use- 
 ful work." That speech, made to a trustee of the in- 
 stitution referred to, brought Lee the offer of the presi- 
 dency of Washington College at a salary of $1,500 a 
 year; and after some hesitation, due to his fear that 
 his association with an institution might in the state 
 of political feeling then existing prove an injury rather 
 than a benefit to it, he accepted it. So poor were the 
 people that Judge Brockenborough, the trustee who 
 bore the invitation, had to borrow a suit of clothes from 
 a friend to make himself presentable. 
 
 Thus, the first captain of his time, and almost, if 
 not quite, the most famous man in the world, with 
 offers that might well, in that hour of trial, have allured 
 even him with all his modesty, turned his back on the 
 
AFTER THE WAR 649 
 
 world, and following the lamp with which Duty ap- 
 peared to light his way, rode quietly to that little 
 mountain town in Rockbridge County to devote the 
 remainder of his life to fitting the sons of his old soldiers 
 to meet the exactions of the coming time. On his old 
 war horse he rode into Lexington alone, one afternoon 
 in the early autumn, and, after a hush of reverent 
 silence at his first appearance, was greeted on the streets 
 by his old soldiers with the far-famed rebel yell which 
 he had heard last as he rode down the lane from 
 Appomattox. 
 
 Ah ! ride on alone, old man, with Duty at thy bridle- 
 bit: behind thee is the glory of thy military career; 
 before thee is the transcendent fame of thy future. 
 Thou shalt abide there henceforth; there shall thy 
 ashes repose ; but thou shalt make of that little town a 
 shrine to which pilgrims shall turn with softened eyes 
 so long as men admire virtue and the heart aspires to 
 the ideal of Duty. 
 
 He was sworn in as president on the 2d of October, 
 1865, in the presence of a few professors and friends, 
 and thenceforth his life was devoted to the new service 
 he had entered on with the same zeal with which he 
 always applied himself to the duty before him. 
 
 In the winter of 1865-6, when the radical element 
 that had secured control of the government at Washing- 
 ton were reaching out in every direction to try to find 
 some evidence that would implicate Mr. Davis and 
 General Lee in the conspiracy to murder Mr. Lincoln, 
 General Lee was, with many others, summoned to 
 Washington to appear before the committee of the 
 
650 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Congress having the investigation in charge. His ex- 
 amination covered a wide range and throws so much 
 light, not only on his character, but on the situation 
 at that time, that it justifies giving a summary- of the 
 whole and its most important parts in full/ His 
 answers are a complete refutation of the idea held — 
 possibly even now — by many, that the reconstruction 
 measures adopted by the radical wing of the party 
 whom Lincoln's death had brought in power had some 
 justification. It had not a shred. 
 
 In reply to direct questions by his inquisitors as to 
 what was the state of feeling toward the government 
 of the United States of the "secessionists" in Virginia, 
 he stated that he had been "living very retired" in 
 Lexington for the last five months and had "had but 
 little communication with politicians"; that he knew 
 nothing save from his own observation, and such facts 
 as had come to his knowledge; that he did not know 
 of a single person who either felt or contemplated any 
 resistance or opposition to the government of the 
 United States; that he believed that the people of the 
 South entirely acquiesced in the government of the 
 United States, and were for co-operating with Presi- 
 dent Johnson in his policy of reconstruction, in the 
 wisdom of which they had great confidence, and to 
 which they looked forward as a hope of restoration. 
 He believed that they expected to pay their share of 
 the taxes levied by the government, including the war 
 debt, and had never heard of any opposition to such 
 payment, or of their making any distinction between 
 
 * Report of Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 39th C!ong., p. 133. 
 
AFTER THE WAR 651 
 
 that and other just debts. Indeed, he believed; from 
 his knowledge of the people of Virginia, that they would 
 be willing to pay the Confederate debt also, though he 
 thought the people generally looked upon it as lost 
 entirely. 
 
 This was far from what his inquisitors wished to hear, 
 and they pressed him along other lines, among them as 
 to the feeling of the "secessionists" in Virginia toward 
 the freedmen, whom they were supposed to be oppress- 
 ing. In reply, he declared, what every one now knows 
 to have been the fact, that every one with whom he 
 associated expressed the kindest feelings toward the 
 freedmen, and wished to see them get on in the world, 
 and particularly to take up some occupation for a living 
 and to turn their hands to some work, and that efforts 
 were being made among the farmers near his home to 
 induce them to engage for the year at regular and fair 
 living wages. He did not know, he stated, of any com- 
 bination to keep down wages or establish any rate 
 which the people did not think fair. 
 
 He further stated that where he had been the peo- 
 ple were not only willing that the blacks should be 
 educated, but were of the opinion that this would be 
 for the advantage of both the blacks and the whites. 
 He personally did not think that the black man was 
 as capable of acquiring knowledge as the white man, 
 though some were more apt than others, and he had 
 known some to acquire knowledge in their trade or 
 profession, and had had certain ones of his own who 
 had learned to read and write very well. 
 
 He had heard of no combination having in view the 
 
652 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 disturbance of the peace or any improper or unlawful 
 acts, and had seen no evidence of it. On the contrary, 
 wherever he had been they were "quiet and orderly, 
 not disposed to work, or, rather, not disposed to any 
 continuous engagement to work, but just very short 
 jobs to provide them with the immediate means of 
 subsistence," as they tended to "look rather to the 
 present time than to the future." 
 
 In response to further questions, he stated that he 
 did not believe in an amendment to the Constitution 
 extending the suffrage to the colored people, as it 
 "would open the door to a good deal of demagogism 
 and lead to embarrassments in various ways. Wliat 
 the future may prove," he added, "how intelligent 
 they may become, with what eyes they may look upon 
 the interests of the State in which they may reside, I 
 cannot say more than you can." 
 
 When further pressed on the subject, in reply to 
 direct questions, he expressed as his opinion that it 
 would be for the benefit of Virginia, both then and in 
 the future, if she were relieved of the burden of her 
 colored population by their moving to the Cotton 
 States. "That is no new opinion with me," he added. 
 "I have always thought so, and have always been in 
 favor of emancipation — gradual emancipation." 
 
 In reply to the question whether "in the event of a 
 war between the United States and any foreign power, 
 such as England or France, if there should be held out 
 to the secession portion of the people of Virginia or the 
 other recently 'rebel' States a fair prospect of gaining 
 their independence and shaking off the government of 
 
AFTER THE WAR 653 
 
 the United States/' it was or was not his opinion that 
 they would "avail themselves of that opportunity/' 
 he declared that he could not speak with any certainty 
 on that point ; that he did not know how far they might 
 be actuated by their feelings, and had nothing whatever 
 to base his opinion on; but that, so far as he knew, 
 they contemplated nothing of the kind at that time; 
 and that, so far from having heard in his intercourse 
 expressions of a hope that such a war might break out, 
 he had heard those with whom he associated express 
 the hope that the country might not be led into 
 a war. 
 
 Having been pressed at this point by the question, 
 what, in such an event, would be his own choice, he 
 settled the matter by saying quietly, ''I have no dis- 
 position now to do it, and I never have had." 
 
 On the point whether, during the Civil War, it was 
 not contemplated by the government of the Confeder- 
 acy to form an alliance with some foreign nation, if 
 possible, he stated his belief that it had been their 
 wish to do so if they could, as it had been their wish 
 to have the Confederate Government recognized as 
 an independent government, but that he knew nothing 
 of the policy of the government, and "had no hand or 
 part in it." 
 
 Touching the question as to the bearing of the peo- 
 ple in the South toward the people of the North, he 
 stated as his opinion that they accepted frankly the 
 results of the war; that they were endeavoring to work 
 and improve their conditions; and that their relation 
 to Northerners who went down there would depend 
 
654 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 upon the personal attitude of the latter and their 
 manner of conducting themselves; that they felt that 
 the North could afford to be generous, and their gen- 
 erosity and liberality toward the entire South would 
 be the surest and the speediest means of regaining 
 their good opinion. 
 
 The questions then turned upon the political views of 
 the Southern people, and he was asked whether, if the 
 Southern States were again given the opportunity of 
 seceding, as they had been given under Mr. Buchanan, 
 they would, in his opinion, avail themselves of that 
 opportunity. He thought that this would depend upon 
 the circumstances existing at the time, and that they 
 might do so if they thought that it was to their interest; 
 but he did not know of any deep-seated dislike or dis- 
 content against the government of the United States 
 among the ' ' secessionists ' ' generally. He believed that 
 they would perform all the duties that they were re- 
 quired to perform, and that the policy of President 
 Johnson would naturally result in restoring the ''old 
 feeling," and in improving the material interests of the 
 country. 
 
 Possibly with a view to entangle him the question 
 was put to him whether "it would be practicable to 
 convict a man in Virginia of treason for having taken 
 part in this rebellion against the government, by a 
 Virginia jury, without picking it with direct reference 
 to a verdict of guilty." To this he replied : ''On that 
 point I have no knowledge, and I do not know what 
 they would consider treason against the United States, 
 if you refer to past acts." 
 
AFTER THE WAR 655 
 
 He was then asked a more direct question, which, 
 indeed, discovered the object of the entire inquisition: 
 ''Suppose a juiy was empanelled in your own neigh- 
 borhood, taken by lot, would it be possible to convict, 
 for instance, Jeff Davis for having levied war upon the 
 United States, and thus having committed the crime 
 of treason? His reply was: "I think it is very proba- 
 ble that they would not consider he had committed 
 treason." 
 
 This was interesting, and the examination was pressed 
 as follows: Q. Suppose the jury should be clearly and 
 plainly instructed by the court that such an act of war 
 upon the part of Mr. Davis, or any other leading man, 
 constituted in itself the crime of treason under the Con- 
 stitution of the United States, would the jury be likely 
 to heed that instruction, and, if the facts were plainly 
 before them, commit the offender? A. Ido not know, 
 sir, what they would do on that question. 
 
 Q. They do not generally suppose that it was trea- 
 son against the United States, do they? A. I do not 
 think that they so consider it. 
 
 Q. In what light would they view it? ^\Tiat would 
 be the excuse or justification? How would they es- 
 cape in their own mind? I refer to the past. I am 
 referring to the past and the feelings they would have. 
 A. So far as I know, they look upon the action of the 
 State in withdrawing itself from the government of 
 the United States as carrying the individuals of the 
 State along with it; that the State was responsible 
 for the act, not the individuals, and that the ordinance 
 of secession, so called, or those acts of the State which 
 
656 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 recognized a condition of war between the State and 
 the general government, stood as their justification 
 for their bearing arms against the government of the 
 United States. Yes, sir, I think they would consider 
 the act of the State as legitimate ; that they were merely 
 using the reserved rights, which they had a right to do. 
 
 Q. State, if you please — and if you are disinclined 
 to answer the question you need not do so — what your 
 own personal views on that question are. A. That 
 was my view, that the act of Virginia, in withdrawing 
 herself from the United States, carried me along as a 
 citizen of Virginia, and that her laws and her acts were 
 binding on me. 
 
 Q. All that you felt to be your justification in taking 
 the course you did? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 In this he had set forth the whole principle on which 
 the South stood. He repudiated the idea that he had 
 ever stated that he had been "wheedled or cheated" 
 into his course by politicians. ''I may have said," he 
 explained, "and may have believed, that the positions 
 of the two sections which they held to each other was 
 brought about by the politicians of the country; that 
 the great masses of the people, if they understood the 
 real questions, would have avoided it; but not that I 
 had been individually wheedled by the politicians. . . . 
 I may have said that, but I do not recollect it ; but I 
 did believe at the time that it was an unnecessary con- 
 dition of affairs and might have been avoided if for- 
 bearance and wisdom had been practised on both 
 sides." 
 
AFTER THE WAR 657 
 
 Having failed to entangle him in admissions of trea- 
 son, one more ground for hope still remained. The 
 inquisitors hoped to connect him and Mr. Davis with 
 the cruelties charged to have been practised in South- 
 ern prisons. Accordingly, he was examined as to what 
 knowledge he had of the cruelties practised toward the 
 Union prisoners at Libby Prison and on Belle Isle. His 
 answer was complete: "I never knew that any cruelty 
 was practised, and I have no reason to believe that it 
 was practised. I can believe, and have reason to be- 
 lieve, that privations may have been experienced by the 
 prisoners, because I know that provisions and shelter 
 could not be provided for them." 
 
 Q. Were you not aware that the prisoners were dying 
 from cold and starvation? 
 
 A. I was not. 
 
 "I desire that you will speak your mind fully and 
 freely on this subject," said his questioner (Mr. How- 
 ard), "for it is useless to conceal from you the fact that 
 there seems to have been created a sad feelii^g in the 
 hearts of the people at the North." To this Lee replied : 
 "As regards myself, I never had any control over the 
 prisoners, except those that were captured on the field 
 of battle, when it was then my business to send them 
 to Richmond, to the proper officer, who was then the 
 provost-marshal-general. In regard to their disposi- 
 tion afterward I had no control. I never gave any 
 order about it. It was entirely in the hands of the 
 War Department." 
 
 Q. And not in your hands? A. And not in mine. 
 
 Q. Did these scenes come to your knowledge at all? 
 
658 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 A. Never. No report was ever made to me about 
 them. There was no' call for any to be made to me. 
 I did hear — it was mere hearsay — that statements had 
 been made to the War Department, and that every- 
 thing had been done to relieve them that could be 
 done, even finally so far as to offer to send them to 
 some other points — Charleston was one point named — 
 if they would be received by the United States author- 
 ities and taken to their homes; but whether this is true 
 or not I do not know. It was merely a report that I 
 heard. 
 
 Q. Were you in the same ignorance of the scenes at 
 Andersonville and Salisbury? A. I never knew the 
 commandant at Andersonville until I saw by the papers, 
 after the cessation of hostilities, that Captain Wirz had 
 been arrested on that account, nor do I know now who 
 commanded at Salisbury. 
 
 Q. And of course you know nothing of the scenes of 
 cruelty about which complaints have been made at 
 those places? A. Nothing in the world, as I said be- 
 fore. I suppose they suffered from the want of ability 
 on the part of the Confederate States to supply their 
 wants. At the very beginning of the war I knew that 
 there was suffering of prisoners on both sides, but as 
 far as I could I did everything in my power to relieve 
 them and to establish the cartel which was established. 
 
 Q. (By Mr. Blow.) It has been frequently asserted 
 that the Confederate soldiers feel more kindly toward 
 the government of the United States than other persons 
 or other people of the South. Wliat are your obser- 
 vations on that point? A. From the Confederate sol- 
 
AFTER THE WAR 659 
 
 diers I have heard no expression of any other opinion. 
 They looked upon the war as a necessary evil and went 
 through it. I have seen them relieve the wants of 
 Federal soldiers on the field. The orders always were 
 that the whole field should be treated alike. Parties 
 were sent out to take the Federal wounded as well as 
 the Confederate, and the surgeons were told to treat 
 the one as they did the other. These orders given by 
 by me were respected on every field. 
 
 Thus, we have the highest authority — Lee's own 
 word — that a wounded foe was treated by him as a 
 friend. 
 
CHAPTER XXVII 
 
 LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 
 
 No part of his life reflects greater honor on his memory 
 than that which was now to come. Here, as in every- 
 thing else, he addressed all his powers to the work in 
 hand. He found the institution merely an old, de- 
 nominational college, dilapidated and wellnigh ruined, 
 without means and without students. The mere fact 
 of his connection with it gave it at once a reputation. 
 He changed the little college, as if by an enchanter's 
 wand, from a mere academy, with but forty students 
 and less than a half dozen professors, to a great institu- 
 tion of learning.^ He instituted or extended the honor 
 system — that Southern system which reckons the es- 
 tablishment of character informed with culture to be 
 at once the basis and end of all education. Students 
 flocked there from all over the South. He knew them 
 all, and, what is more, followed them all in their work. 
 He was as prompt at chapel as the chaplains; as inter- 
 ested in the classes as the professors and certainly more 
 than the students. The standard he ever held up was 
 that of duty. 
 
 One of his pleasures was the planting of trees, and 
 the beautiful trees about the institution to-day are a 
 part of the legacy he left. 
 
 His old soldiers, often at great sacrifice, sent their 
 
 • Address on Lee as a college president, by Dr. Edward S. Jaynes. 
 
 660 
 
I 
 
 LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 661 
 
 sons to be under his direction, and to learn at his feet 
 the stern lesson of duty. But it was he who made 
 the college worthy of their confidence. He elevated 
 the standards, broadened the scope, called about him 
 the most accomplished professors to be found and in- 
 spired them with new enthusiasm. No principle was 
 too abstruse for him to grasp, no detail too small for 
 him to examine. He familiarized himself alike with 
 the methods employed at the best institutions, and 
 with the conduct and standing of evefy student at his 
 own. 
 
 An educational official has stated that of a number 
 of college presidents to whom he addressed an inquiry 
 relating to educational matters, General Lee was the 
 only one who took the trouble to send him an answer. 
 He who had commanded armies, 'Hhe lowliest duties 
 on himself did lay." He audited every account; he 
 presided at every faculty meeting; studied and signed 
 every report. 
 
 In fact, the chief stimulus to the students was the 
 knowledge that General Lee was familiar with every 
 student's standing, and, to some extent, with every 
 man's conduct. An invitation to visit him in his office 
 was the most dreaded event in a student's life, though 
 the actual interview was always softened by a noble 
 courtesy on the president's part into an experience 
 which left an impress throughout life and ever remained 
 a cherished memory. 
 
 To one thus summoned, the general urged greater at- 
 tention to study, on the ground that it would prevent the 
 failure which would otherwise inevitably come to him. 
 
662 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 ''But, general, you failed," said the 3'outli, meaning, 
 as he explained afterward, to pay him a tribute. 
 
 "I hope that you may be more fortunate than I," 
 replied the general quietly. 
 
 On another occasion, a youth from the far South 
 having "cut lectures" to go skating, an accomplish- 
 ment he had just acquired, was summoned to appear 
 before the president, and, having made his defence, was 
 told by the general that he should not have broken the 
 rule of the institution, but should have requested to be 
 excused from attendance on lectures. 
 
 "You understand now?" 
 
 "Yes, sir. Well, general, the ice is fine this morning. 
 I'd like to be excused to-day," promptly replied the 
 ready youngster. 
 
 It was occasionally the habit of the young orators 
 who spoke in public at celebrations to express their 
 feelings by indulging in^ compliments to General Lee 
 and the ladies, and the reverse of compliments to "the 
 Yankees." Such references, clad in the glowing rhet- 
 oric and informed with the deep feeling of youthful 
 oratory, never failed to stir their audiences and evoke 
 unstinted applause. General Lee, however, notified 
 the speakers that such references were to be omitted. 
 He said: "You 3'Oung men speak too long, and you 
 make three other mistakes : what you say about me is 
 distasteful to me; what you say about the North tends 
 to promote ill feeling and injure the institution, and 
 your compliments to the ladies are much more valued 
 when paid in private than in public." 
 
 Among the students at this time were quite a num- 
 
LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 663 
 
 ber who had been soldiers and were habituated to a 
 degree of freedom. Pranks among the students were, 
 of course, common, and were not dealt with harshly. 
 But he let them know that he was the president. 
 Wlien the Freedmen's Bureau agent was hooted by 
 a number of persons, two students who were in the 
 party were "sent home," a phrase which General Lee 
 preferred to/' dismissal." One episode occurred which 
 showed the strong hand in the soft gauntlet. 
 
 Prior to General Lee's installation as president, it 
 had always been the custom to grant at least a v/eek's 
 holiday at Christmas. This custom the faculty, under 
 the president's lead, did away with, and thenceforth 
 only Christmas Day was given as a holiday. 
 
 A petition to return to the old order having failed, 
 a meeting of the students was held and a paper was 
 posted, containing many signatures, declaring the sign- 
 ers' determination not to attend lectures during Christ- 
 mas week. Some manifestation appeared on the part 
 of certain of the faculty of giving in to the students' 
 demand. General Lee settled the matter at once by 
 announcing that any man whose name appeared on 
 the rebellious declaration would be expelled from the 
 college. And if every student signed it, he said, he 
 would send every one home and simply lock up the 
 college and put the key in his pocket. 
 
 The activity displayed in getting names off the pa- 
 per was amusing, and the attendance at lectures that 
 Christmas was unusually large. 
 
 Many stories have been told of his method of ad- 
 ministering a rebuke where he thought it needed. 
 
664 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 One was related by a gallant engineer officer to whose 
 attention, when before Petersburg, the general had 
 called some defect in the defences which were under 
 his charge. The officer assured him that the matter 
 should be attended to at once, and accordingly gave 
 orders that it should be done. A day or two later the 
 general met him and asked if the work had been done, 
 and he in good faith said it had, on which the general 
 said he would go and inspect it and invited him to 
 attend him. To his dismay, on arrival at the spot, the 
 work had not been done at all, and he found himself 
 in the embarrassing position of having to explain that 
 he had given orders to have it done. The general 
 said nothing further, but soon after remarked on the 
 mettlesomeness of the fine horse which the officer was 
 riding, and the officer, glad to get off the subject of 
 the neglected defences, explained that it was his wife's 
 riding horse, but had proved so wild that he had taken 
 it to get it suited to her hand. As they parted the 
 general said quietly: '^Captain, I think it might prove 
 a good way to train that horse to ride him a little more 
 over that rough ground along the trenches." 
 
 I cannot forbear to relate a personal incident which 
 I feel illustrates well General Lee's method of dealing 
 with his students. I was so unfortunate while at col- 
 lege as to have always an early class, and from time 
 to time on winter mornings it was my habit "to run 
 late," as the phrase went. This brought me in danger 
 of meeting the president on his way from chapel, a 
 contingency I was usually careful to guard against. 
 One morning, however, I miscalculated, and as I turned 
 
LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 665 
 
 a corner came face to face with him. His greeting was 
 most civil, and touching my cap I hurried by. Next 
 moment I heard my name spoken, and turning I re- 
 moved my cap and faced him. 
 
 ''Yes, sir." 
 
 "Tell Miss " (mentioning the daughter of my 
 
 uncle, General Pendleton, who kept house for him) 
 "that I say will she please have breakfast a little ear- 
 lier for you." 
 
 "Yes, sir." And I hurried on once more, resolved 
 that should I ever be late again I would, at least, take 
 care not to meet the general. 
 
 Craving due allowance alike for the immaturity of 
 a boy and the mellowing influence of passing years, I 
 will try to picture General Lee as I recall him, and as 
 he must be recalled by thousands who yet remember 
 him. He was, in common phrase, one of the hand- 
 somest men I ever knew and easily the most impressive- 
 looking. His figure, which in earlier life had been tall 
 and admirably proportioned, was now compact and 
 rounded rather than stout, and was still in fine propor- 
 tion to his height. His head, well set on his shoulders, 
 and his erect and dignified carriage made him a dis- 
 tinguished and, indeed, a noble figure. His soft hair 
 and carefully trimmed beard, silvery white, with his 
 florid complexion and dark eyes, clear and frank, gave 
 him a pleasant and kindly expression, and I remember 
 how, when he smiled, his eyes twinkled and his teeth 
 shone. He always walked slowly, and even pensively, 
 for he was already sensible of the trouble which finally 
 struck him down; and the impression that remains 
 
666 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 with me chiefly is of his dignity and his gracious cour- 
 tesy. I do not remember that we feared him at all, or 
 even stood in awe of him. Collegians stand in awe of 
 few things or persons. But we honored him beyond 
 measure, and after nearly forty years he is still the 
 most imposing figure I ever saw. Efforts were made 
 time and time again to induce him to accept a position 
 at the head of some establishment or enterprise, the 
 emoluments of which would enable him to live in ease 
 for the rest of his life; but all such invitations he 
 promptly declined. To one of these invitations urg- 
 ing him to accept a position ''at the head of a large 
 house to represent Southern coromerce, . . . reside in 
 New York, and have placed at his disposal an immense 
 sum of money," he replied: ''I am grateful, but I have 
 a self-imposed task which I must accomplish. I have 
 led the young men of the South in battle ; I have seen 
 many of them die on the field; I shall devote my re- 
 maining energies to training young men to do their 
 duty in life." ^ 
 
 Even here, in his seclusion, while honored by the 
 best of those who had bravely fought against him, he 
 was pursued by the malignity of those haters of the 
 South whOf having kept carefully concealed while the 
 guns were firing, now that all personal danger was 
 over, endeavored to make amends by assailing with 
 their clamor the noblest of the defeated. It was a pe- 
 riod of passion, and those who, under other conditions, 
 might have acted with deliberation and reason, gave 
 the loose to their feeling and surrendered themselves 
 
 * R. E. Lee's " Recollections of General Lee," p. 376. 
 
LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 667 
 
 blindly to the direction of their wildest and most passion- 
 ate leaders. Those against whose private life the purity 
 of his life was an ever-burning protest reviled him most 
 bitterly. The hostile press of the time was filled with 
 railing against him; the halls of Congress rang with 
 denunciation of him as a traitor — the foolish and futile 
 yelping of the cowardly pack that ever gather about 
 the wounded and spent lion. And with what noble 
 dignity and self-command he treated it all! To the 
 nobility of a gentleman he added the meekness of a 
 Christian. When, with a view to setting an example 
 to the South, he applied to be included in the terms of 
 the general amnesty finally offered, his application was 
 ignored, and to his death he remained "a prisoner on 
 parole." 
 
 He was dragged before high commissions and was 
 cross-examined by hostile prosecutors panting to drive 
 or inveigle him into some admission which would com- 
 promise him, but without avail, or even the ignoble 
 satisfaction to his enemies that they had ruffled his 
 unbroken calm. 
 
 "Seest thou not how they revile thee?" said a 
 youth to Diogenes. "Yea; but seest thou not how I 
 am not reviled?" said the philosopher. 
 
 He read little on the war, though he at one time 
 contemplated writing a history of the campaigns of the 
 Army of Northern Virginia in which he had been en- 
 gaged, and he began, indeed, to collect the materials 
 for the work. He wrote letters to some of his friends, 
 and issued a circular to his old officers asking their co- 
 operation. "I am desirous," he wrote to his former 
 
668 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 adjutant-general, Colonel W. R. Taylor, 'Hhat the 
 bravery and devotion of the Army of Northern Vir- 
 ginia shall be correctly transmitted to posterity. This 
 is the only tribute that can now be paid to the worth 
 of its noble officers and soldiers." 
 
 Wlien he applied to the War Department in Washing- 
 ton for permission to copy papers and documents in the 
 department, the request was refused, and the labor of 
 collecting the materials from other sources was so 
 great that, taken in connection with his other duties, 
 he put aside the work and contented himself with 
 writing a brief memoir of his honored father to accom- 
 pany a new and revised edition which he edited of the 
 latter's ''Memoirs of the War in the Southern Depart- 
 ment of the United States." Long states that "he 
 relinquished the work with less reluctance because he 
 felt that its truths and indispensable facts must ex- 
 pose certain persons to severe censure." ^ 
 
 That he did not, however, abandon the idea is ap- 
 parent from a letter which he wrote to a kinsman of 
 his in the early summer of 1870, but a few months 
 before his death. 
 
 Lexington, Va., &h June, 1870. 
 
 My Dear Cassius: I am very much obliged to you 
 for your letter of the 1st, and the interest you evince 
 in the character of the people of the South, and their 
 defence of the rights which they believed were guar- 
 anteed by the Constitution. The reputation of indi- 
 viduals is of minor importance to the opinion which 
 
 * Long's " Memoirs of Robert E. Lee,' p. 422. 
 
LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 669 
 
 posterity may form of the motives which governed 
 the South in their late struggle for the maintenance of 
 the principles of the Constitution. I hope, therefore, a 
 true history will be written and justice be done them. 
 A history of the military events of the period would 
 also be desirable. I have had it in view to write one 
 of the campaigns in Virginia in which I was more par- 
 ticularly engaged. I have already collected some ma- 
 terials for the work, but lack so much that I wish to 
 obtain that I have not commenced the narrative. I 
 am very much obliged to you for the offer of the mate- 
 rials which you have collected. I think it probable 
 that I have all the official reports, and I would not 
 like to resort to any other source for a statement of 
 facts. . . . 
 
 I am, very truly, your cousin, 
 
 R. E. Lee. 
 C. F. Lee, Jr., Alexandria, Va. 
 
 It was his diversion to ride his old war horse, Traveller, 
 among the green hills of that beautiful country about 
 Lexington, at times piloting through the bridle patlis 
 the little daughters of some professor, sun-bonneted 
 and rosy, riding two astride the same horse; or now 
 and then meeting an old soldier who asked the privilege 
 of giving for him once more the old cheer, which in 
 past days had at sight of him rung out on so many a 
 hard-fought field. 
 
 In a horseback ride to the peaks of Otter, in the 
 sunmaer of 1867, he was accompanied by one of his 
 daughters, who related afterward this pleasant inci- 
 dent of the trip. Having crossed the James at a ferry, 
 where the ferryman, an old soldier, refused to accept 
 
670 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 any payment from his old general, they were riding up 
 a steep hill when they came on a group of little children 
 playing in the road, with hands and faces both much 
 besmeared with dirt. The general, as they passed, 
 rallied them on their muddy faces, and they suddenly 
 dashed away and scampered off up the hill. A few 
 minutes later, as the general and his daughter rounded 
 the hill, from a little cabin on the roadside rushed the 
 same children, with their faces washed, their hair 
 brushed, and the girls with clean aprons, and as they 
 passed one of them called out: ''We know you are 
 General Lee. We have got your picture." ^ It was the 
 epitome of the South : his picture and his influence are 
 in every Southern heart. 
 
 His love for children, which, as mentioned before, 
 had always been a noted trait of his character, still 
 marked his life, and many stories are told of its mani- 
 festation, as well as of their love for him. On one 
 occasion, having learned during a visit to a friend 
 (Colonel Preston) that two little boys in the family 
 were sick with croup, he trudged back next day in the 
 midst of a storm with a basket of pecans and a toy for 
 his two little friends. 
 
 As he rode in the afternoons on Traveller, he was 
 often greeted by the children, to whom at times he ex- 
 tended an invitation to come and ride with him, and 
 this invitation came to be a coveted honor. On an- 
 other occasion as he was riding he came on two little 
 daughters of ex-Governor Letcher, the elder of whom 
 was vainly trying to get her six-year-old sister to re- 
 
 > R. E. Lee's " Recollections of General R. E. Lee," p. 271. 
 
f 
 
 LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 671 
 
 turn home. As General Lee rode up, she accosted him: 
 "General Lee, won't you please make this child go 
 home to her mother?" The general stopped and in- 
 vited the little rebel to ride home with him, which she 
 graciously consented to do, and was thereupon lifted 
 up in front of him, and "was thus grandly escorted 
 home." When the mother asked the other child why 
 she had given General Lee so much trouble, she said : 
 "I couldn't make Fan go home, and I thought he could 
 do anything." 
 
 Another pretty story was of a little boy (the son 
 of the Rev. Dr. J. William Jones, one of General 
 Lee's earliest biographers) who, during a college com- 
 mencement, slipped from his mother's lap, and going 
 upon the platform where the general sat, seated him- 
 self at his feet, and snuggling against his knees, fell fast 
 asleep, the general sitting motionless all the while, so 
 as not to disturb the child. ^ 
 
 One of his biographers^ relates that seeing him one 
 day talking at his gate with a stranger to whom, as 
 he ended, he gave some money, he inquired who the 
 stranger was. "One of our old soldiers," said the gen- 
 eral. "To whose command did he belong?" "Oh, he 
 was one of those who fought against us," said General 
 Lee. "But we are all one now, and must make no 
 difference in our treatment of them." Indeed, that 
 Lee had never any bitterness is evidenced by an inci- 
 dent which General Long mentions. During the cam- 
 paign of strategy which followed Gettysburg, when Lee 
 
 1 R. E. Lee's " Recollections of General Lee," pp. 266, 267, 325. 
 * Rev. Dr. J. William Jones. ' ,'-^ , 
 
 .v'-^^'l ,■ .. ■■"•[.'.<■■• . 
 
 *^»-'' 
 
672 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 manoeuvred Meade back from the Rapidan, as his army- 
 passed through Culpeper, from which Meade had re- 
 tired, a lady of the place who had been "somewhat 
 scandalized by the friendly relations between some of 
 her neighbors and the Yankees, took occasion to com- 
 plain to the general that certain young ladies, then 
 present, had been in the habit of visiting General Sedg- 
 wick at his head-quarters, which was pitched in the 
 ample grounds of a citizen whose house he had de- 
 clined to use. The young ladies were troubled, for the 
 general looked very grave; but they were soon relieved, 
 for he said: ''I know General Sedgwick very well. It 
 is just like hirri" to be so kindly and considerate, and to 
 have his band there to entertain them. So, young 
 ladies, if the music is good, go and hear it as often as 
 you can, and enjoy yourselves. You will find that 
 General Sedgwick will have none but agreeable gentle- 
 men about him." 
 
 Thus, in simple duties and simple pleasures, un- 
 touched by the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune, 
 he passed life's close among his own people, a hallowed 
 memory forever to those who knew him, an example to 
 all who lived in that dark time or shall live hereafter; 
 the pattern of a Christian gentleman, who did justice, 
 loved mercy, and walked humbly with his God. 
 
 The board of trustees wished to give him as a home 
 the house erected for him as president. He superin- 
 tended the erection of the house — which he always was 
 careful to speak of as "the president's house, "and never 
 as "my house" — but declined to accept the gift of it 
 for himself or family. He wrote to the board of trus- 
 
LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 673 
 
 tees: ''Though fully sensible of the kindness of the 
 board, and justly appreciating the manner in which 
 they sought to administer to my relief, I am unwilling 
 that my family should become a tax to the college ; but 
 desire all its funds should be devoted to the purposes of 
 education. I know that my wishes on this subject are 
 equally shared by my wife." 
 
 Knowing that Lee and his family had lost every- 
 thing by the war, and were without means, efforts were 
 made by friends and admirers to add to his comfort by 
 increasing his salary; but, while assuring them of his 
 appreciation of their kindness, he firmly declined to ac- 
 cept anything beyond his salary, either for himself or 
 his family. General Ewell made a donation of $500 to 
 the board of trustees of the college, with the stipulation 
 that it should be used to increase General Lee's salary. 
 Lee refused to accept it, and in a clear and forcible 
 statement showed the needs of the college. Somewhat 
 later, when his declining health had begun to cause his 
 family and friends anxiety, he was induced to take a 
 trip to the South, and while he was absent the board 
 of trustees of the college voted an annuity of $3,000 to 
 his family. This also, however. General Lee declined, 
 though he must have known, as every one else knew, 
 that his connection with the institution was worth many 
 thousands of dollars a year to it. In fact, he was above 
 not only all sordid but all material motives. In peace 
 as in war his high soul by a natural law reached the 
 highest elevation to which human nature may attain. 
 
 The following facts appear pertinent as illustrative 
 of Lee's character. His abstemiousness was well 
 
674 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 known to his army, and, like his piety, was held as an 
 example which all admired even though they might 
 not always emulate it. His wife stated that on his re- 
 turn home from the Mexican campaign he brought 
 back unopened a bottle of brandy which she had sent 
 along in case of sickness. 
 
 On one occasion he illustrated his ideas on this sub- 
 ject in the quiet way that he had, when, before Peters- 
 burg, he one evening walked in on a number of young 
 officers of his staff who were discussing earnestly a 
 mathematical problem, with a stone jug and two tin 
 cups on the table beside them. He made no comment 
 at the time, but next morning when one of the young 
 officers mentioned the fact that he had had a strange 
 dream the night before, the general observed that 
 ''when young gentlemen discuss at midnight mathe- 
 matical problems, the unknown quantities in which 
 are a stone jug and tin cups, they may expect to have 
 strange dreams." 
 
 After the war, when a friend commented on his ab- 
 stemiousness, he said that on taking command he knew 
 he should inevitably make many mistakes, and he de- 
 termined that at least it should not be charged to 
 intemperance. 
 
 Lee's personal piety shines so through every letter 
 he ever wrote that it would appear almost superfluous 
 to mention it; j'et it is quite certain that it was one 
 of the mainsprings not only of his daily life, but of his 
 genius. That serene mental composure in which he 
 worked out his most difficult problems sprang from his 
 abiding confidence in the divine wisdom and trust in the 
 
LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 675 
 
 divine goodness. Not a chaplain in his army excelled 
 him in personal piety or in devoutness. The result was 
 a spiritual gain to his army which has never been suffi- 
 ciently considered in the reckoning of its forces. Time 
 and again during the war a wave of spiritual awaken- 
 ing swept over the army whose head was the most pious 
 and devout Christian that any army ever followed. 
 
 No misfortune ever dimmed for him this light, and 
 the darkest cloud only served to increase his faith. 
 After the war universal and ever-increasing gloom 
 rolled over the South, not from the defeat of her 
 armies, but from the profound humiliation in which 
 the defeat enabled her political enemies to steep her. 
 Yet even amid this, Lee's constant mind, stayed on 
 God, suffered no arrows, not the most poisoned, to 
 pierce him. 
 
 As illustrating his serene piety, we may take this 
 from one of many similar letters to his children: 
 
 "... And though the future is still dark and the 
 prospects gloomy, I am confident that if we all unite 
 in doing our duty and earnestly work to extract what 
 good we can out of the veil that now hangs over our 
 dear land, the day will soon come when the angry 
 cloud will be lifted from our horizon and the sun in his 
 pristine brightness again shine forth. I therefore again 
 anticipate for you many years of happiness and pros- 
 perity, and in my daily prayers to the God of mercy 
 and truth, I invoke His choicest blessings upon you. 
 May He gather you under the shadow of His almighty 
 wing, direct you in all your ways, and give you peace 
 and everlasting life. It would be most pleasant to my 
 
676 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 feelings could I again, as you propose, gather you all 
 around me; but I fear that will not be in this world. 
 Let us all so live that we may unite in that world 
 where there is no more separation, and where sorrow 
 and pain never come. I think after next year I will 
 have done all the good I can for the college, and I 
 should then like, if peace is restored to the country, 
 to retire to some quite spot east of the mountains 
 where I might prepare a home for your mother and 
 sisters after my death, and where I could earn my 
 daily bread." ^ 
 
 Most men who think, set down on paper, from 
 time to time, the result of their reflections. These 
 reflections are rather memorabilia for ourselves than 
 for others. It throws light on Lee's mind to find 
 among his papers thoughts, set down here and there 
 for his own guidance, which are so in keeping with 
 his conduct that they might almost appear to have 
 been written on the tablets of his heart. Among 
 them we find these : 
 
 ''God disposes. This ought to satisfy us." 
 
 "Charity should begin at home. So says ? No. 
 
 Charity should have no beginning or ending." 
 
 "Those who oppose our purposes are not always to 
 be regarded as our enemies. We usually think and act 
 from our inmiediate surroundings. (See Macaulay on 
 Machiavelli.) " 
 
 "The better rule is to judge our adversaries from 
 their standpoint, not from ours." ^ 
 
 ■ R. E. Lee's " Recollections of General Robert E. Lee," p. 260 
 * Quoted from Long's " Memoir," pp. 485, 486. 
 
LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 677 
 
 Though Lee was too grave to be generally humorous, 
 yet he had a certain dry humor of his own — too shy to 
 be exhibited in public, and too delicate to bear trans- 
 lation in print. To those who knew him it gleams in 
 his letters often with a pleasant glint — as, for example, 
 where he amuses himself over his young unmarried 
 daughter giving advice on the management of hus- 
 bands and children, or when he writes home from the 
 Springs: ''You do not mention the cow; she is of 
 more interest to me than the cats, and is equally 
 destructive of rats." In a letter to one of his sons he 
 says: ''We are all as usual — the women of the family 
 very fierce, and the men very mild," a picture which 
 will be appreciated by those who recall the days fol- 
 lowing the war. 
 
 At the end of December, 1868, some one wrote to 
 General Lee suggesting that General Grant, then Presi- 
 dent of the United States, should be invited to Wash- 
 ington College, to which General Lee replied, under 
 date of January 8, thanking the gentleman for his 
 •letter, and saying: "I should be glad if General Grant 
 would visit Washington College, and I should endeavor 
 to treat him with the courtesy and respect due the 
 President of the United States; but if I were to invite 
 him to do so, it might not be agreeable to him, and I 
 fear my motives might be misunderstood at this time, 
 both by himself and others, and that evil would result 
 instead of good. I will, however, bear your suggestion 
 in mind, and should a favorable opportunity offer, I 
 shall be glad to take advantage of it." ^ 
 
 » R. E. Lee's " Recollections of General R. E. Lee," p. 334. 
 
678 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Though General Grant never visited Washington Col- 
 lege, and was never formally invited to do so, General 
 Lee had an informal interview with him at the White 
 House a few months later, when at the end of April 
 he was returning from Baltimore, where he had been 
 attending a meeting with a view to getting the Bal- 
 timore and Ohio Railway extended from, Staunton to 
 Lexington. It having been intimated to him that it 
 would be most agreeable to General Grant to receive 
 him, he went to Washington from Baltimore on an 
 early train, accomjoanied by his host and hostess (Mr. 
 and Mrs. Tagart), and was driven imniediately to the 
 White House. 
 
 It would be most interesting if the minutes of this 
 last meeting between Lee and Grant had been kept, 
 but unfortunately nothing is known of what took place, 
 beyond the fact stated by Captain Lee in his ''Recol- 
 lections" of his father, that "this meeting was of 
 no political significance whatever; but General Lee's 
 visit was simply a call of courtesy," and that dur- 
 ing the fifteen minutes of the interview ''neither 
 General Lee nor the President spoke a word on politi- 
 cal matters." 
 
 In the winter of '69 '70, the old trouble of rheumatic 
 pain about the heart, which had first begun during the 
 winter spent "in front of Fredericksburg," recurred, 
 and General Lee was sent off by his physicians to the 
 South in hopes of relieving him. He was accompanied 
 by one of his daughters. Miss Agnes, and his trip was 
 one continued ovation from beginning to end. The 
 whole population wherever he went turned out to do 
 
LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 679 
 
 him honor^ and to testify their devotion to him. This 
 reception, however touching to him, was, as he well 
 recognized, not conducive to his restoration. Toward 
 the end of April he turned homeward. "Though the 
 rest and change, the meeting with many old friends, 
 and the great love and kindness shown him by all had 
 given him much pleasure, and for a time it was thought 
 that he was better, the main cause of his trouble was 
 not removed," and in his letters to his wife he was 
 forced to admit that though he felt stronger than when 
 he came, and the warm weather had dispelled some of 
 the rheumatic pains in the back, he could "perceive no 
 change in the stricture in his chest." "If I attempt 
 to walk beyond a very slow gait," he says in one letter, 
 "the pain is always there." And in another: "I hope 
 I am better, and I know that I am stronger; but I still 
 have the pain in my chest whenever I walk." 
 
 He returned quietly to his work, and at the begin- 
 ning of the ensuing session no one would have known 
 that he was not in his usual health. But the burden 
 he had so long carried had been too heavy. The over- 
 taxed heart at length gave way. His last active work 
 was done in a vestry meeting of his church, whose rec- 
 tor was one of his old lieutenants, the Rev. Dr. William 
 N. Pendleton, formerly his chief of artillery; his last 
 conscious act was to ask God's blessing at his board. 
 As he ended, his voice faltered and he sank in his chair. 
 
 Surrounded by those who honored and loved him 
 best, he lingered for a few days, murmuring at times 
 orders to one of the best of his lieutenants, the gallant 
 A. P. Hill, who had fallen at Petersburg, after the dis- 
 
680 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 aster of Five Forks, till, on the twelfth day of October, 
 1870, he that was valiant for truth passed quietly to 
 meet the Master he had served so well, "and all the 
 trumpets sounded for him on the other side." 
 
 Many places claimed the honor of guarding his sepul- 
 chre; but to Lexington it was fittingly awarded. Here 
 he lived and here he died, and here in the little mountain 
 town in the Valley of Virginia his sacred ashes lie hard 
 by those of his great lieutenant, who, in the fierce 'six- 
 ties, was his right arm. Well may we apply to him his 
 own words, written about the proposal to remove the 
 remains of the Confederate dead from Gettysburg: "I 
 know of no fitter resting-place for a soldier than the 
 field on which he has nobly laid down his life." 
 
 Happy the town that has two such shrines ! Happy 
 the people that have two such examples! Both have 
 forever ennobled the soldier's profession, where to face 
 death in obedience to duty is a mere incident of life, 
 and whose highest function is not to make war, but to 
 end it. Both were worthy successors of that noble 
 centurion of whom Christ said: ''I have not found so 
 great faith; no, not in Israel." 
 
 To those of us who knew him in the impressionable 
 time of our youth, as, untouched by the furious railing 
 of his enemies, he passed the evening of his life in un- 
 ruffled calm, he seems the model of a knightly gentle- 
 man, ever loyal to duty and ever valiant for truth. 
 
 Well might he have said with that other Valiant-for- 
 Truth: ''My sword I give to him that shall succeed me 
 in my pilgrimage, and my courage and skill to him that 
 can get it. My marks and scars I carry with me to be 
 
LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 681 
 
 a witness for me that I have fought His battles who 
 will now be my re warder." 
 
 No sooner had he passed away than the ignoble 
 enemies of the South, safe at the moment from her re- 
 sentment, set forth anew to insult her people by the 
 rancor of their insults to her honored dead. While 
 her bells were tolling, the halls of Congress and the 
 hostile press rang anew with diatribes against her fallen 
 leader who was, to use the words of one of them, to be 
 left to "the avenging pen of history." 
 
 But the wolfish hatred that had hounded him so long 
 and now broke forth in one last bitter chorus was soon 
 drowned in the acclaim of the world that one had passed 
 away whose life had honored the whole human race. 
 The avenging pen of history had already begun to draw 
 the portrait of one worthy to stand beside Washington. 
 
 The world had already recognized and fixed him for- 
 ever among her constellation of great men, and the 
 European press vied with that of the South in render- 
 ing him the tribute of honor. Thus, the only effect of 
 the attacks made on him by the enemies of the South 
 was to secure for them the hatred or contempt of the 
 Southern people. 
 
 "As obedient to law as Socrates," wrote of him one 
 who had studied his character well, and the type was 
 well chosen. All through his life he illustrated this 
 virtue. Among the foolish charges made by some in 
 the hour of passion was this : that he believed the South 
 would win in the war and achieve its independence, 
 whereupon he would be its idol. In other words, that 
 he was lured by Ambition. Only ignorance wedded to 
 
682 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 passion could assert so baseless a charge. Even had 
 he thus imagined that the South might win its inde- 
 pendence, Lee was, of all men, the last to be swayed 
 by such a consideration. But, as a fact, we know that 
 it was at a great sacrifice he made his choice and that 
 only the purest motives of love of liberty and obedience 
 to duty influenced his choice. The entrance of Virginia 
 into the Confederacy of the South threw him out of 
 the position to which his rank entitled him. But while 
 others wrangled and scrambled for office and rank, he 
 with utter self-abnegation declared himself "willing to 
 serve anywhere where he could be most useful." And 
 it is known to those who knew him well that at one time 
 he even thought of enlisting as a private in the com- 
 pany commanded by his eldest son. Captain G. W. C. 
 Lee.^ Such simplicity and virtue are antique. 
 
 Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley, referring long after- 
 ward to his first meeting with Lee, in the summer of 
 1862, says: "Every incident in that visit is indelibly 
 stamped on my memory. All he said to me then and 
 during subsequent conversations is still fresh in my 
 recollection. It is natural it should be so, for he was 
 the ablest general and to me seemed the greatest man 
 I ever conversed with, and yet I have had the privilege 
 of meeting Von Moltke and Prince Bismarck. General 
 Lee was one of the few men who ever seriously impressed 
 and awed me with their inherent greatness. Forty 
 years have come and gone since our meeting and yet 
 the majesty of his manly bearing, the genial, winning 
 grace, the sweetness of his smile, and the impressive 
 
 ' Jones's "Life and Letters of Robert E. Lee," p. 164. 
 
LEE AS COLLEGE PRESIDENT 683 
 
 dignity of his old-fashioned style of dress come back 
 to me among my most cherished recollections. His 
 greatness made me humble, and I never felt my own 
 insignificance more keenly than I did in his presence. 
 . . . He was, indeed, a beautiful character, and of him 
 it might truthfully be written, 'In righteousness did 
 he judge and make war!'" 
 
CHAPTER XXVIII 
 
 SOURCES OF CHARACTER 
 
 There is something in all of us that responds to the 
 magic of military prowess. That wise observer, Dr. 
 Johnson, once said: "Every man thinks meanly of 
 himself for not having been a soldier or been at sea"; 
 and when Boswell said, "Lord Mansfield would not be 
 ashamed of it," he replied, "Sir, if Lord Mansfield were 
 in the presence of generals and admirals who had seen 
 service, he would wish to creep under the table. . . . 
 If Socrates and Charles XII of Sweden were in com- 
 pany, and Socrates should say, 'Follow me and hear 
 a lecture on philosophy,' and Charles XII should say, 
 'Follow me and help me to dethrone the Czar,' a man 
 would be ashamed to follow Socrates." 
 
 Military glory is so dazzling that it blinds wholly 
 most men, and a little all men. An Alexander con- 
 quering worlds until he weeps because no more are left 
 to conquer ; a Hannibal crossing the Alps and blowing 
 his trumpets outside the very gates of Rome; Caesar 
 and Napoleon oversweeping Europe with their victo- 
 rious eagles, are so splendid that the radiance of their 
 achievements makes us forget the men they were. 
 Alexander carousing at Babylon; Caesar plotting to 
 
 684 
 
SOURCES OF CHARACTER 685 
 
 overthrow his country's liberties; Napoleon steeping 
 the world in blood, but bickering in his confinement 
 at St. Helena, are not pleasant to contemplate. There 
 the habiliments of majesty are wanting; the gauds of 
 pomp are stripped off and we see the men at their true 
 worth. 
 
 Now, let us turn for a moment to Lee. Had we 
 known him only as the victor of Gaines's Mill, Freder- 
 icksburg, Manassas, Chancellorsville, and Cold Harbor, 
 we should have, indeed, thought him a supreme soldier. 
 But should we have known the best of him? Without 
 Gettysburg, without the long campaign of 1864, with- 
 out the siege of Petersburg, and without Appomattox, 
 should we have dreamed of the sublime measure of the 
 man? 
 
 History may be searched in vain to find Lee's superior, 
 and only once or twice in its long course will be found 
 his equal. To find his prototype, we must go back to 
 ancient times, to the antique heroes who have been 
 handed down to us by Plutarch's matchless portraiture ; 
 yet, as we read their story, we see that we have been 
 given but one side of their character. Their weak- 
 nesses have mainly been lost in the lapse of centuries, 
 and their virtues are magnified in the enhaloing 
 atmosphere of time. But, as to Lee, we know his 
 every act. 
 
 There was no act nor incident of his life on which a 
 light as fierce as that which beats upon a throne did 
 not fall. He was investigated by high commissions; 
 his every act was examined by hostile prosecutors. 
 His conduct was inquired into by those who had every 
 
686 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 incentive of hostility to secure his downfall and his 
 degradation. Yet, amid these fierce assaults, he re- 
 mained as unmoved as he had stood when he had 
 held the heights of Fredericksburg against the furious 
 attacks of Burnside's intrepid infantry. From this in- 
 quisition he came forth as unsoiled as the mystic 
 White Knight of the Round Table. In that vivid 
 glare he stood revealed in the full measure of nobility — 
 the closest scrutiny but brought forth new virtues and 
 disclosed a more rounded character : 
 
 " Like Launcelot brave, like Galahad clean.' 
 
 Had he been Regulus, we know that he would have 
 returned to Carthage with undisquieted brow to meet 
 his doom. Had he been Aristides, we know that he 
 would have faithfully inscribed his name on the shell 
 intrusted to him for his banishment. Had he been 
 Csesar, none but a fool would have dared to offer him a 
 crown. Ambition could not have tempted him; ease 
 could not have beguiled him; pleasure could not have 
 allured him. 
 
 Should we come down to later times, where shall 
 we find his counterpart, unless we take the Bayards, 
 the Sidneys, and the Falklands, the highest of the 
 noblest? 
 
 So, to get his character as it is known to thousands, 
 we must take the best that was in the best that the 
 history of men has preserved. Something of Plato's 
 calm there was; all of Sidney's high-mindedness ; of 
 Bayard's fearless and blameless life; of the constancy 
 of William the Silent, tmnquillus in arduis. 
 
 ^^i 
 
SOURCES OF CHARACTER 687 
 
 But, most of all, he was like Washington. Here — 
 in that great Virginian — and here only, do we find what 
 appears to be an absolute parallel. 
 
 Something must account for this wonderful develop- 
 ment. Character does not reach such consummate 
 flowering alone and by accidental cause ! It is a prod- 
 uct of urgent forces, and such a character as Lee's is 
 the product of high forces met in conjunction. Genius 
 may be born anywhere; it is a result of prenatal 
 forces. A Keats may come from a horse-jobber's 
 fireside; a Columbus may spring from a wool- 
 comber's home; a Burns may issue from an Ayrshire 
 cottage; but it is a law of nature that character is 
 a result largely of surrounding conditions, previous 
 or present. 
 
 A distinguished scholar has called attention to the 
 resemblance between the Southerners in the Civil War 
 and the Southern Greeks in the Peloponnesian War. 
 He has especially noted the resemblance in certain 
 fundamental elements of character between the Vir- 
 ginians and both the Greeks and the Romans, among 
 the elements of which were a passion for liberty and a 
 passion for dominance. He marks particularly their 
 poise, a poise unaffected by conditions which might 
 startle or seduce. Both, peoples of the South, like the 
 Southern people, their successes were founded upon 
 their character as a people. It was this poise which 
 Lee illustrated so admirably throughout life, a poise 
 which, as Dr. Gildersleeve has said, gave opportunity 
 for, first, the undazzled vision, and then the swoop of 
 the eagle. 
 
688 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 Whatever open hostility or carping criticism may 
 say in derogation of Southern hfe, and it may be ad- 
 mitted that there was liable to be the waste and inertia 
 of all life that is easy and secluded; yet, the obvious, 
 the unanswerable reply is that it produced such a 
 character as Robert E. Lee. As Washington was the 
 consummate flower of the life of Colonial Virginia, so 
 Lee, clinging close to "his precious example," became 
 the perfect fruit of her later civilization. 
 
 It was my high privilege to know him when I was a 
 boy. It was also my privilege to see something of that 
 army which 'followed him throughout the war, and on 
 whose courage and fortitude his imperishable glory as 
 a captain is founded. I question whether in all the 
 army under his command was one man who had his 
 genius; but I believe that in character he was but the 
 t3T)e of his order, and as noble as was his, ten thousand 
 gentlemen marched behind him who, in all the ele- 
 ments of private character, were his peers. 
 
 As I have immersed myself in the subject of this 
 great captain and noble gentleman, there has appeared 
 to troop before me from a misty past that army on 
 whose imperishable deeds, inspired by love of liberty, 
 is founded the fame of possibly the greatest soldier of 
 our race — that army of the South, composed not only 
 of the best that the South had, but wellnigh of all she 
 had. Gentle and simple, old and young, rich and poor, 
 secessionist and anti-secessionist, with every difference 
 laid aside at the call of duty, animated by one common 
 spirit; love of liberty, they flocked to the defence of 
 
SOURCES OF CHARACTER 689 
 
 the Southern States. Through four years they with- 
 stood to the utmost the fiercest assaults of fortune, 
 and submitted only with their annihilation. 
 
 "The benediction of the o'ercovering heavens 
 Fall on their heads like dew, for they were worthy 
 To inlay heaven with stars." 
 
 Of them, in conclusion, we may use the words of 
 Pericles, spoken over the Athenian dead who fell in 
 the Peloponnesian War: 
 
 "So died these men as became Athenians. You, 
 their survivors, must determine to have as unfaltering 
 a resolution in the field, though you may pray that it 
 may have a happier issue. . . . You must yourselves 
 realize the power of Athens, and feed your eyes upon 
 her from day to day, till love of her fills your hearts; 
 then when all her greatness shall break upon you, you 
 must reflect that it was by courage, sense of duty, and 
 the keen feeling of honor in action that men were en- 
 abled to do all this, and that no possible failure in an 
 enterprise could make them consent to deprive their 
 country of their valor, but they laid it at her feet as 
 the most glorious contribution they could offer. For 
 this offering of their lives, made in common by them 
 all, each of them individually received that renown 
 which never grows old, and for a sepulchre not so 
 much that in which their bones have been deposited, 
 but that noblest of shrines wherein their glory is laid 
 up to be eternally remembered upon every occasion 
 on which deed or story shall call for commemoration. 
 For heroes have the whole earth for their tomb, and in 
 
690 ROBERT E. LEE 
 
 lands far from their own where the column with its 
 epitaph declares it, there is enshrined in every breast 
 a record unwritten, with no tablet to preserve it, ex- 
 cept that of the heart." 
 
 Through more than twice four years their survivors 
 and their children endured what was bitterer than war, 
 and, strong in the consciousness of their rectitude, came 
 out torn and bleeding but victorious, having saved 
 constitutional government for the Union. Such forti- 
 tude, such courage, and sublime constancy cannot be 
 in vain. The blood of patriots is the seed of libertj^ 
 The history of their valor and their fortitude in 
 defence of constitutional liberty is the heritage of the 
 South, a heritage in which the North will one day be 
 proud to claim a share, as she will be the sharer in 
 their work. 
 
 No better words can be used in closing this rec- 
 ord than Lee's own words after the battle of Gettys- 
 burg : 
 
 ''They deserved success so far as it can be deserved 
 by heroic valor and fortitude. More may have been 
 required of them than they were able to perform; but 
 my admiration for their noble qualities and confidence 
 in their ability to cope successfully with the enemy 
 have suffered no abatement from the issue of this pro- 
 tracted and sanguinary conflict." 
 
 Some day, doubtless, there will stand in the nation's 
 capital a great monument to Lee, erected not only by 
 the Southern people, whose glory it is that he was the 
 fruit of their civilization and the leader of their armies, 
 but by the American people, whose pride it will be that 
 
SOURCES OF CHARACTER 691 
 
 he was their fellow citizen. Meantime, he has a nobler 
 monument than can be built of marble or of brass. 
 His monument is the adoration of the South; his shrine 
 is in every Southern heart. 
 

 1^ 
 
APPENDIXES 
 
; 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
 lee's order for the battle of Gaines's mill 
 
 Head-quarters Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 June 24, 1862. 
 General Orders No. 75. 
 
 1. General Jackson's command will proceed to-morrow from 
 Ashland toward the Slash Church, and encamp at some con- 
 venient point west of the Central Railroad. Branch's Brigade, 
 of A. P. Hill's Division, will also to-morrow evening take position 
 on the Chickahominy near Half-Sink. At three o'clock Thurs- 
 day morning, 26th inst., General Jackson will advance on the 
 road leading to Pole Green Church, communicating his march 
 to General Branch, who will immediately cross the Chickahominy 
 and take the road leading to Mechanicsville. As soon as the 
 movements of these columns are discovered, General A. P. Hill, 
 with the rest of his division, will cross the Chickahominy near 
 Meadow Bridge and move directly upon Mechanicsville. To 
 aid his advance the heavy batteries on the Chickahominy will, 
 at the proper time, open upon the batteries at Mechanicsville. 
 The enemy being driven from Mechanicsville and the passage 
 across the bridge opened, General Longstreet, with his division 
 and that of General D. H. Hill, will cross the Chickahominy at 
 or near that point. General D. H. Hill moving to the support of 
 Jackson and General Longstreet supporting General A. P. Hill. 
 The four divisions — keeping in communication with each other, 
 and moving en echelon on separate roads, if practicable, the left 
 division in advance, with skirmishers and sharp-shooters extend- 
 ing their front — will sweep down the Chickahominy and en- 
 deavor to drive the enemy from his position above New Bridge, 
 
 695 
 
696 APPENDIX A 
 
 General Jackson bearing well to his left, turning Beaver Dam 
 Creek, and taking the direction toward Cold Harbor. They 
 will then press forward toward the York River Railroad, closing 
 upon the enemy's rear and forcing him down the Chickahominy. 
 Any advance of the enemy toward Richmond will be prevented 
 by vigorously following his rear and crippling and arresting his 
 progress. 
 
 2. The divisions under Generals Huger and Magruder will 
 hold their positions in front of the enemy against attack and make 
 such demonstrations on Thursday as to discover his operations. 
 Should opportunity offer, the feint will be converted into a real 
 attack, and should an abandonment of his entrenchments by the 
 enemy be discovered, he will be closely pursued. 
 
 3. The 3d Virginia Cavalry will observe the Charles City 
 Road. The 5th Virginia, the 1st North Carolina, and the Hamp- 
 ton Legion (cavalry) will observe the Darbytown, Varina, and 
 Osborne Roads. Should a movement of the enemy down the 
 Chickahominy be discovered, they will close upon his flank and 
 endeavor to arrest his march. 
 
 4. General Stuart with the 1st, 4th, and 9th Virginia Cavalry, 
 the cavalry of Cobb's Legion, and the Jeff Davis Legion, will 
 cross the Chickahominy to-morrow and take position to the left 
 of General Jackson's line of march. The main body will be 
 held in reserve with scouts well extended to the front and left. 
 General Stuart will keep General Jackson informed of the move- 
 ments of the enemy on his left, and will co-operate with him in 
 his advance. The 10th Virginia Cavalry, Colonel Davis, will 
 remain on the Nine Mile Road. 
 
 5. General Ransom's Brigade, of General Holmes's command, 
 will be placed in reserve on the Williamsburg road by General 
 Huger, to whom he will report for orders. 
 
 6. Commanders of divisions will cause their commands to be 
 provided with three days' cooked rations. The necessary am- 
 bulances and ordnance trains will be ready to accompany the 
 divisions and receive orders from their respective commanders. 
 Officers in charge of all trains will invariably remain with them. 
 
APPENDIX A 697 
 
 Batteries and wagons will keep on the right of the road. The 
 chief engineer, Major Stevens, will assign engineer officers to 
 each division, whose duty it will be to make provision for over- 
 coming all difficulties to the progress of the troops. The staff 
 departments will give the necessary instructions to facilitate the 
 movements herein directed. 
 By command of General Lee. 
 
 (Signed) R. H. Chilton, 
 
 Assistant Adjutant-General. 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
 EXTRACTS FROM LETTER TO AUTHOR FROM GENERAL 
 MARCUS J. WRIGHT 
 
 Washington, September 26, 1907. 
 ******** 
 
 The military population (men between eighteen and forty- 
 five years old, not exempt by law) of the Northern States in 1860 
 was 3,769,020, omitting California, Colorado, Dakota, District 
 of Columbia, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Wash- 
 ington Territory, and West Virginia, not given in the tables, but 
 which may be stated as aggregating 135,627. This, added to 
 3,769,020, the military population of eighteen Northern States, 
 makes a total of 3,904,647 subject to military duty in the States 
 and Territories of the North. 
 
 The military population of the Southern States (exclusive 
 of Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri) in 1860 was 1,064,193. 
 Deducting from this number the 86,000 that entered the Federal 
 service and 80,000, the estimated number of Union men who 
 did not take up arms, there remained to the Confederacy 898,184 
 men capable of bearing arms from which to draw. 
 
 It stands thus: 
 
 Military population of the North .... 3,904,647 
 Military population of the South .... 898,184 
 
 Difference in favor of the North . . . 3,006,463 
 
 The military population in 1860: 
 
 Of Kentucky 180,589 
 
 Of Maryland 102,715 
 
 Of Missouri 232,781 
 
 516,085 
 698 
 
APPENDIX B 699 
 
 These three States gave to the Federal army 231,509 men. 
 Of these 190,744 were whites and 40,765 were negroes. 
 
 An official published statement of the Adjutant- General of 
 the United States Army gives the total number of men called for 
 and furnished to the United States army from April 15, 1861, to 
 the close of the war as 2,865,028 men. Of this number 186,017 
 were negroes and 494,900 were foreigners. 
 
 From all reliable data that could be secured, it has been esti- 
 mated by the best authorities that the strength of the Confederate 
 armies was about 600,000 men, and of this number not more 
 thc,n two- thirds were available for active duty in the field. The 
 necessity of guarding a long line of exposed sea-coast, of main- 
 taining permanent garrisons at different posts on inland waters 
 and at numerous other points, deprived the Confederate army 
 in the field of an accession of strength. 
 
 The large preponderance of Federal forces was manifest in 
 all he important battles and campaigns of the war. The largest 
 foroe ever assembled by the Confederates was at the Seven Days' 
 fight around Richmond. 
 
 General Lee's report showed 80,835 men present for duty 
 when the movement against General McClellan commenced, 
 and the Federal forces numbered 115,249. 
 
 At Antietam the Federals had 87,164 and the Confederates 
 35,255. 
 
 At Fredericksburg the Federals had 110,000 and the Con- 
 federates 78,110. 
 
 At Chancellorsville the Federals had 131,661, of which number 
 only 90,000 were engaged, and the Confederates had 57,212. 
 
 At Gettysburg the Federals had 95,000 and the Confederates 
 44,000. 
 
 At the Wilderness the Federals had 141,160 and the Con- 
 federates 63,981. 
 
 At the breaking of the Confederate lines at Petersburg, 
 April 1, 1865, General Lee commenced his retreat with 32,000 
 men, and eight days after he surrendered to General Grant, who 
 had a force of 120,000 men. 
 
700 APPENDIX B 
 
 From the latter part of 1862 until the close of the war, in 1865, 
 there was a constant decrease of the numerical strength of the 
 Confederate army. On the other hand, the records show that 
 during that time the Federal army was strengthened to the extent 
 of 363,390 men. 
 
 The available strength of the Confederate army at the close 
 of the war has been the subject of much discussion. 
 
 Estimates have been made varying from 150,000 to 250,000 men. 
 
 The number of paroles issued to Confederate soldiers may be 
 taken as a basis of calculation. Mr. Edwin M. Stanton, Secre- 
 tary of War, on November 22, 1865, made the following official 
 statement of prisoners surrendered by different Confederate 
 armies that were paroled : 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia 27,805 
 
 Army of Tennessee 31,243 
 
 Army of Missouri 7,978 
 
 Army of Department of Alabama 42,293 
 
 Army of Trans-Mississippi Department . . 17,686 
 
 Army of Department of Florida 6,428 
 
 133,433 
 
 Miscellaneous Departments of Virginia . . . 9,072 
 
 Cumberland, Maryland, etc 9,377 
 
 Department of Washington 3,390 
 
 In Virginia, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, 
 
 Louisiana, and Texas 13,922 
 
 Nashville and Chattanooga 5,029 
 
 40,790 
 
 These two lists aggregate 174,223, the number of paroled 
 Confederates reported by Secretary Stanton. Those who have 
 estimated the strength of the Confederate army at the close of 
 the war at 250,000 reached that result by adding to the 174,223 
 the number of men, 75,777, which they assumed to have re- 
 turned to their homes without paroles. If this were true, it 
 would appear, taking into account the 40,790 men reported as 
 
APPENDIX B 701 
 
 paroled at various places, that 116,567 Confederate soldiers did 
 not surrender, and were not paroled with the armies to which 
 they belonged. 
 
 This is at variance with the estimated strength of these armies 
 just previous to the surrender. 
 
 The report of Secretary Stanton is misleading, because it con- 
 veys the impression that the 174,223 men reported as paroled 
 were bearing arms at the time of their surrender. An examina- 
 tion of the parole lists shows that such was not the case. These 
 lists embrace men in hospitals, men retired from the army by 
 reason of disability, and non-arms-bearing men who sought pa- 
 roles as a safeguard. There were Confederate soldiers who re- 
 turned to their homes without paroles, but they did not exceed 
 in number those embraced in Secretary Stanton's list that were 
 not borne upon the roll. 
 
 In April, 1865, the aggregate of present and absent showed the 
 strength of the Confederate army to be about 275,000 men. Of 
 this number 65,387 were in Federal military prisons and 52,000 
 were absent by reason of disability and other causes. Deduct- 
 ing the total of these two numbers, 117,387, from 275,000, we 
 have 157,613 as showing the full effective strength of the Con- 
 federate army at the close of the war: 
 
 SUMMARY 
 
 Strength of Federal army at close of war: 
 
 Present 797,807 
 
 Absent 202,700 
 
 1,000,507 
 
 Strength of Confederate army at close of war: 
 
 Present 157,613 
 
 Absent 117,387 
 
 275,000 
 
 4: :{: H: ^ H: 
 
 (Signed) Marcus J. Wright. 
 
702 APPENDIX B 
 
 EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO AUTHOR FROM COLONEL 
 THOMAS L. LIVERMORE 
 
 grant's army present for duty 
 
 On the Rapidan and James, April 30, 1864 (68 War Records, 
 
 168,198—69 W. R., pp. 195-198-427). 
 On the James, May 31, 1864, 133,728 (69 W. R., pp. 426, 427). 
 On the James, January 31, 1865, 99,214 (95 W. R., p. 61). 
 On the James, February 25, 1865, 98,457 (ibid.). 
 On the James, March 31, 1865, 100,907 (ibid.). 
 
 lee's army present for duty 
 
 On the Rapidan and James, Army of Northern Virginia, April 
 30, 1864, 54,344 (60 W. R., pp. 1,297, 1,298). 
 
 Two divisions and McLaws's Brigade (estimated 1,253) of Long- 
 street's Corps, March 31, 1864, 10,428 ' (59 W. R., p. 721). 
 
 Department of Richmond, April 20, 1864, 7,265 (60 W. R., 
 p. 1,299). 
 
 Total, 72,037. 
 
 On the James, January 31, 1865, 57,387 ' (95 W. R., pp. 386— 
 
 95 W. R., pp. 387, 388, 389, 390). 
 On the James, February 25, 1865, 63,500.' * 
 
 On the James, March 31, 1865, 56,840 * (97 W. R., p. 1,331 ; 
 
 Warren Court, p. 482). 
 
 (Signed) T. L. Livermore. 
 
 * Colonel Taylor, of Lee's staff, and Longstreet in their books estimate 
 Longstreet's command at 10,000. 
 
 ^ Excluding the cavalry of the Valley District, the number of which 
 is not reported, but probably was about 1,000. (Warren Court, p. 482.) 
 
 ^ The number of the infantry estimated at about 7 per cent and the 
 cavalry at about 15 per cent more than the "effectives" reported. 
 
 * The result of deducting estimated losses and desertions reported 
 and estimated, at 6,760 for March, from number given above for 
 February 25. 
 
APPENDIX C 
 
 lee's report of the GETTYSBURG CAMPAIGN 
 
 Head-quarters Army Northern Virginia, 
 
 July 31, 1863. 
 General S. Cooper, 
 
 A. and I. General, Richmond, Va. 
 
 General: I have the honor to submit the following outline of 
 the recent operations of this army for the information of the 
 department: 
 
 The position occupied by the enemy opposite Fredericksburg 
 being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was 
 determined to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose 
 embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops 
 that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and 
 spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities 
 north of the Potomac. 
 
 It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part 
 of the enemy, to which those contemplated by us would proba- 
 bly give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at 
 the army therein, commanded by General Hooker, and that in 
 any event that army would be compelled to leave Virginia, and 
 possibly to draw to its support troops designed to operate against 
 other parts of the country. In this way it was supposed that the 
 enemy's plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up, 
 and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the 
 formation of new combinations and the preparations that they 
 would require. 
 
 In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valu- 
 able results might be attained by military success. 
 
 703 
 
704 APPENDIX C 
 
 Actuated by these and other important considerations that 
 may hereafter be presented, the movement began on the 3d of 
 June. McLaws's Division of Longstreet's Corps left Fredericks- 
 burg for Culpeper Court House, and Hood's Division, which was 
 encamped on the Rapidan, marched to the same place. 
 
 They were followed on the 4th and 5th by Ewell's Corps, leav- 
 ing that of A. P. Hill to occupy our lines at Fredericksburg. 
 
 The march of these troops having been discovered by the 
 enemy, on the afternoon of the 5th and the following day he 
 crossed a force, amounting to about one army corps, to the south 
 side of the Rappahannock on a pontoon bridge laid down near 
 the mouth of Deep Run. General Hill disposed of his command 
 to resist their advance; but as they seemed intended for the 
 purpose of observation rather than attack, the movements in 
 progress were not arrested. 
 
 The forces of Longstreet and Ewell reached Culpeper Court 
 House by the 8th, at which point the cavalry, under General 
 Stuart, was also concentrated. 
 
 On the 9th a large force of Federal cavalry, strongly supported 
 by infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Beverley's and Kelly's 
 Fords and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement 
 ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the 
 afternoon, when the enemy was forced to recross the river, with 
 heavy loss, leaving 400 prisoners, 3 pieces of artillery, and several 
 colors in our hands. 
 
 General Jenkins, with his cavalry brigade, had been ordered 
 to advance toward Winchester to co-operate with the infantry 
 in the proposed expedition into the lower valley, and at the same 
 time General Imboden was directed, with his command, to make 
 a demonstration in the direction of Romney, in order to cover 
 the movement against Winchester and prevent the enemy at 
 that place from being reinforced by the troops on the line of 
 the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Both of these officers were 
 in position when General Ewell left Culpeper Court House on 
 the 10th. Crossing the Shenandoah near Front Royal, he de- 
 tached Rodes's Division to Berryville, with instructions, after 
 
APPENDIX C 705 
 
 dislodging the force stationed there, to cut off the communica- 
 tion between Winchester and the Potomac. With the divisions 
 of Early and Johnson, General Ewell advanced directly upon 
 Winchester, driving the enemy into his works around the town 
 on the 13th. On the same day the troops at Berryville fell back 
 before General Rodes, retreating to Winchester. On the 14th 
 General Early stormed the works at the latter place, and the 
 whole army of General Milroy was captured or dispersed. Most 
 of those who attempted to escape were intercepted and made 
 prisoners by General Johnson. Their leader fled to Harper's 
 Ferry with a small party of fugitives. 
 
 General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, en- 
 tering the latter place on the 14th, where he took 700 prisoners, 
 5 pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of stores. These 
 operations cleared the valley of the enemy, those at Harper's 
 Ferry withdrawing to Maryland Heights. More than 4,000 
 prisoners, 29 pieces of artillery, 270 wagons and ambulances, 
 with 400 horses, were captured, besides a large amount of military 
 stores. Our loss was small. On the night that Ewell appeared 
 at Winchester, the Federal troops in front of A, P. Hill at Fred- 
 ericksburg recrossed the Rappahannock and the next day dis- 
 appeared behind the hills of Stafford. 
 
 The whole army of General Hooker withdrew from the line 
 of the Rappahannock, pursuing the roads near the Potomac, 
 and no favorable opportunity was offered for attack. It seemed 
 to be the purpose of General Hooker to take a position which 
 would enable him to cover the approaches to Washington city. 
 With a view to draw him farther from his base, and at the same 
 time to cover the march of A. P. Hill, who, in accordance with 
 instructions, left Fredericksburg for the valley as soon as the 
 enemy withdrew from his front, Longstreet moved from Culpeper 
 Court House on the 15th, and advancing along the east side 
 of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. His 
 force had been augmented while at Culpeper by General Pickett 
 with three brigades of his division. 
 
 The cavalry, under General Stuart, was thrown out in front 
 
706 APPENDIX C 
 
 of Longstreet to watch the enemy, now reported to be moving 
 into Loudoun. On the 17th his cavalry encountered two brigades 
 of ours under General Stuart, near Aldie, and was driven back 
 with loss. The next day the engagement was renewed, the 
 Federal cavalry being strongly supported by infantry, and Gen- 
 eral Stuart was in turn compelled to retire. 
 
 The enemy advanced as far as Upperville and then fell back. 
 In these engagements General Stuart took about 400 prisoners 
 and a considerable number of horses and arms. 
 
 In the meantime a part of General Swell's Corps had entered 
 Maryland, and the rest was about to follow. General Jenkins 
 with his cavalry, who accompanied General Ewell, penetrated 
 Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg. As these demonstra- 
 tions did not have the effect of causing the Federal army to 
 leave Virginia, and as it did not seem disposed to advance upon 
 the position held by Longstreet, the latter was withdrawn to the 
 west side of the Shenandoah, General Hill having already 
 reached the valley. 
 
 General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains 
 and observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was in- 
 structed to harass and impede as much as possible should he 
 attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event, General Stuart 
 was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac east 
 or west of the Blue Ridge, as in his judgment should be best, 
 and take position on the right of our column as it advanced. 
 
 By the 24th the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that 
 the rest of the army should be in supporting distance, and Long- 
 street and Hill marched to the Potomac. The former crossed 
 at Williamsport and the latter at Shepherdstown. The columns 
 reunited at Hagerstown, and advanced thence into Pennsylvania, 
 encamping near Chambersburg on the 27th. 
 
 No report had been received that the Federal army had crossed 
 the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impos- 
 sible to obtain accurate information. In order, however, to 
 retain it on the east side of the mountains, after it should enter 
 Maryland, and thus leave open our communications with the 
 
APPENDIX C 707 
 
 Potomac through Hagerstown and WilHamsport, General Ewell 
 had been instructed to send a division eastward from Cham- 
 bersburg to cross the South Mountains. Early's Division was 
 detached for this purpose, and proceeded as far east as York, 
 while the remainder of the corps proceeded to Carlisle. 
 
 General Imboden, in pursuance of the instructions previously 
 referred to, had been actively engaged on the left of General 
 Ewell during the progress of the latter into Maryland. We had 
 driven off the forces guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
 destroying all the important bridges on that route from Cumber- 
 land to Martinsburg and seriously damaged the Chesapeake 
 and Ohio Canal. 
 
 He subsequently took position at Hancock, and, after the 
 arrival of Longstreet and Hill at Chambersburg, was directed 
 to march by way of McConnellsburg to that place. 
 
 Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg; 
 but on the night of the 28th information was received from a 
 scout that the Federal army, having crossed the Potomac, was 
 advancing northward, and that the head of the column had 
 reached the South Mountains. As our communications with 
 the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his 
 further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on 
 the east side of the mountains. Accordingly, Longstreet and 
 Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, 
 to which point General Ewell was also instructed to march from 
 Carlisle. 
 
 General Stuart continued to follow the movements of the 
 Federal army south of the Potomac after our own had entered 
 Maryland, and, in his efforts to impede its progress, advanced as 
 far eastward as Fairfax Court House. Finding himself unable 
 to delay the enemy materially, he crossed the river at Seneca 
 and marched through Westminster to Carlisle, where he arrived 
 after General Ewell had left for Gettysburg. By the route he 
 pursued, the Federal army was interposed between his command 
 and our main body, preventing any communication with him 
 until his arrival at Carlisle. 
 
708 APPENDIX C 
 
 The march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly 
 than it would have been had the movements of the Federal 
 army been known. 
 
 The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Get- 
 tysburg on the morning of the 1st of July. Driving back these 
 troops to within a short distance of the town, he there encountered 
 a larger force, with which two of his divisions became engaged. 
 Ewell, coming up with two of his divisions by the Heidlers- 
 burg Road, joined in the engagement. The enemy were driven 
 through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about 5,000 pris- 
 oners and several pieces of artillery. 
 
 He retired to a high range of hills south and east of the town. 
 The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force 
 being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the 
 arrival of the rest of our troops. 
 
 Orders were sent to hasten their march, and in the meantime 
 every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and position of 
 the enemy and find the most favorable point of attack. It had 
 not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance 
 from our base unless attacked by the enemy; but finding our- 
 selves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became 
 a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with 
 our large trains. At the same time the country was unfavorable 
 for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main 
 body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occu- 
 pying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. 
 A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable. Encouraged 
 by the successful issue of the engagement of the first day, and in 
 view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of 
 the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew 
 the attack. 
 
 The remainder of Ewell's and Hill's Corps having arrived, 
 and two divisions of Longstrect's, our preparations were made 
 accordingly. During the afternoon intelligence was received of 
 the arrival of General Stuart at Carlisle, and he was ordered 
 to march to Gettysburg and take position on the left. A full 
 
APPENDIX C 709 
 
 account of these engagements cannot be given until the reports 
 of the several commanding officers shall have been received, 
 and I shall only offer a general description. 
 
 The preparations for attack were not completed until the after- 
 noon of the 2d. 
 
 The enemy held a high and commanding ridge, along which he 
 had massed a large amount of artillery. General Ewell occupied 
 the left of our line, General Hill the centre, and General Long- 
 street the right. In front of General Longstreet the enemy held 
 a position, from which, if he could be driven, it was thought that 
 our army could be used to advantage in assailing the more ele- 
 vated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of 
 the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this 
 position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground 
 on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. 
 General Hill was instructed to threaten the centre of the Federal 
 line, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent to either wing, 
 and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself 
 to attack. 
 
 After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting posses- 
 sion of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some 
 of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such 
 as to lead to the belief that he would ultimately be able to dis- 
 lodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark. 
 
 These partial successes determined me to continue the assault 
 next day. Pickett, with three of his brigades, joined Longstreet 
 the following morning, and our batteries were moved forward 
 to the position gained by him the day before. 
 
 The general plan of attack was unchanged, except that one 
 division and two brigades of Hill's Corps were ordered to support 
 Longstreet. 
 
 The enemy in the meantime had strengthened his line with 
 earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary prepara- 
 tions, and the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3d 
 and raged with great violence until sunset. Our troops suc- 
 ceeded in entering the advanced works of the enemy and getting 
 
710 APPENDIX C 
 
 possession of some of his batteries; but our artillery having 
 nearly expended its ammunition, the attacking columns became 
 exposed to the heavy fire of the numerous batteries near the 
 summit of the ridge, and, after a most determined and gallant 
 struggle, were compelled to relinquish their advantage and fall 
 back to their original positions with severe loss. 
 
 The conduct of the troops was all that I could desire or ex- 
 pect, and they deserved success so far as it can be deserved by 
 heroic valor and fortitude. More may have been required of 
 them than they were able to perform, but my admiration of their 
 noble qualities and confidence in their ability to cope success- 
 fully with the enemy have suffered no abatement from the issue 
 of this protracted and sanguinary conflict. 
 
 Owing to the strength of the enemy's position and the reduc- 
 tion of our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not 
 be hazarded, and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered 
 it impossible to continue longer where we were. Such of the 
 wounded as were in condition to be removed and part of the 
 arms collected on the field were ordered to Williamsport. The 
 army remained at Gettysburg during the fourth and at night 
 began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it about 
 4,000 prisoners. Nearly 2,000 had previously been paroled, but 
 the enemy's numerous wounded that had fallen into our hands 
 after the first and second days' engagements were left behind. 
 
 Little progress was made that night, owing to a severe storm 
 which greatly embarrassed our movements. The rear of the 
 column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after day- 
 light on the 5th. 
 
 The march was continued during that day without interrup- 
 tion by the enemy, except an unimportant demonstration upon 
 our rear in the afternoon when near Fairfield, which was easily 
 checked. Part of our train moved by the road through Fairfield, 
 and the rest by the way of Cashtown, guarded by General 
 Imboden. In passing through the mountains in advance of the 
 column, the great length of the trains exposed them to attack 
 by the enemy's cavalry, which captured a number of wagons 
 
APPENDIX C 711 
 
 and ambulances, but they succeeded in reaching Williamsport 
 without serious loss. 
 
 They were attacked at that place on the 6th by the enemy's 
 cavalry, which was gallantly repulsed by General Imboden. 
 The attacking force was subsequently encountered and driven 
 off by General Stuart, and pursued for several miles in the 
 direction of Boonsboro. The army, after an arduous march, 
 rendered more difficult by the rains, reached Hagerstown on the 
 afternoon of the 6th and morning of the 7th of July. 
 
 The Potomac was found to be so much swollen by the rains 
 that had fallen almost incessantly since our entrance into Mary- 
 land as to be unfordable. Our communications with the south 
 side were thus interrupted, and it was difficult to procure either 
 ammunition or subsistence, the latter difficulty being enhanced 
 by the high waters impeding the working of the neighboring mills. 
 The trains with the wounded and prisoners were compelled to 
 await at Williamsport the subsiding of the river and the construc- 
 tion of boats, as the pontoon bridge left at Falling Waters had 
 been partially destroyed. The enemy had not yet made his 
 appearance; but as he was in condition to obtain large rein- 
 forcements, and our situation, for the reasons above mentioned, 
 was becoming daily more embarrassing, it was deemed advisable 
 to recross the river. Part of the pontoon bridge was recovered 
 and new boats built, so that by the 13th a good bridge was thrown 
 over the river at Falling Waters. 
 
 The enemy in force reached our front on the 12th. A posi- 
 tion had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from 
 Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack was awaited dur- 
 ing that and the succeeding day. This did not take place, 
 though the two armies were in close proximity, the enemy being 
 occupied in fortifying his own lines. Our preparations being 
 completed, and the river, though still deep, being pronounced 
 fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the south side 
 on the night of the 13th. 
 
 Ewell's Corps forded the river at Williamsport, those of Long- 
 street and Hill crossed upon the bridge. Owing to the condi- 
 
712 APPENDIX C 
 
 tion of the roads, the troops did not reach the bridge until after 
 daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not completed until 
 1 p. M., when the bridge was removed. The enemy offered no 
 serious interruption, and the movement was attended with no 
 loss of material except a few disabled wagons and two pieces of 
 artillery which the horses were unable to move through the 
 deep muxl. Before fresh horses could be sent back for them, the 
 rear of the column had passed. 
 
 During the slow and tedious march to the bridge, in the midst 
 of a violent storm of rain, some of the men lay down by the way 
 to rest. Officers sent back for them failed to find many in the 
 obscurity of the night, and these, with some stragglers, fell into 
 the hands of the enemy. 
 
 Brigadier-General Pettigrew was mortally wounded in an 
 attack made by a small body of cavalry, which was unfortu- 
 nately mistaken for our own and permitted to enter our lines. 
 He was brought to Bunker Hill, where he expired a few days 
 afterward. He was a brave and accomplished officer and 
 gentleman, and his loss will be deeply felt by the country and 
 the army. 
 
 The following day the army marched to Bunker Hill, in the 
 vicinity of which it encamped for several days. The day after 
 its arrival, a large force of the enemy's cavalry, which had crossed 
 the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, advanced toward Martinsburg. 
 It was attacked by General Fitz Lee near Kearneysville, and 
 defeated with heavy loss, leaving its dead and many of its 
 wounded on the field. 
 
 Owing to the swollen condition of the Shenandoah River, the 
 plan of operations which had been contemplated when we re- 
 crossed the Potomac could not be put in execution, and before 
 the waters had subsided the movements of the enemy induced 
 me to cross the Blue Ridge and take position south of the Rappa- 
 hannock, which was accordingly done. 
 
 As soon as the reports of the commanding officers shall be 
 received, a more detailed account of these operations will be 
 given, and occasion will then be taken to speak more particularly 
 
APPENDIX C 713 
 
 of the conspicuous gallantry and good conduct of both officers 
 and men. 
 
 It is not yet in my power to give a correct statement of our 
 casualties, which were severe, including many brave men and 
 an unusual proportion of distinguished and valuable officers. 
 Among them I regret to mention the following general officers: 
 Major-Generals Hood, Pender, and Trimble, severely, and 
 Major-General Heth slightly, wounded. 
 
 General Pender has since died. This lamented officer has 
 borne a distinguished part in every engagement of this army, 
 and was wounded on several occasions while leading his com- 
 mand with conspicuous gallantry and ability. The confidence 
 and admiration inspired by his courage and capacity as an officer 
 were only equalled by the esteem and respect entertained by all 
 with whom he was associated, for the noble qualities of his 
 modest and unassuming character. Brigadier-Generals Barks- 
 dale and Garnett were killed and Brigadier-General Semmes 
 mortally wounded while leading their troops with the courage 
 that always distinguished them. These brave officers and pa- 
 triotic gentlemen fell in the faithful discharge of duty, leaving 
 the army to mourn their loss and emulate their noble examples. 
 
 Brigadier-Generals Kemper, Armistead, Scales, G. T. Ander- 
 son, Hampton, J. M. Jones, and Jenkins were also wounded. 
 Brigadier-General Archer was taken prisoner. General Petti- 
 grew, though wounded at Gettysburg, continued in command 
 until he was mortally wounded near Falling Waters. 
 
 The loss of the enemy is unknown, but from observations on 
 the field and his subsequent movements, it is supposed that he 
 suffered severely. 
 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
APPENDIX D 
 
 EXTRACT FROM LETTER TO AUTHOR FROM ANDREW 
 
 R. ELLERSON, ESQ., OF ELLERSON's, HANOVER 
 
 COUNTY, VA. 
 
 Richmond, Virginia, June 10, 1908. 
 
 Before the battles around Richmond began, my regiment (4th 
 Virginia Cavalry) was encamped on the extreme left of the army, 
 in the neighborhood of Goodall's. The day before the battle 
 of Mechanicsville my company (Company G) was detached 
 from the regiment and camped that night at Emanuel Church, 
 a few miles north of Richmond. The next morning Jack Stark 
 and myself were ordered to report to General Longstreet — for 
 what purpose we had no idea, but congratulated ourselves upon 
 the fact that we should at least make a good breakfast. * * * 
 The evening of the battle of Cold Harbor, General Longstreet got 
 each division of his corps and placed them in position. This 
 was just before the battle commenced. I stood in the front until 
 the bullets were flying thick and fast, and feeling very uncom- 
 fortable, and having no business there, I thought I would retire 
 to a hill in the rear where I could have the pleasure of looking 
 on at a battle without being in any apparent danger. Upon 
 this hill I found General Jackson seated entirely alone upon his 
 horse. We had been there some time when a shell burst some 
 few feet to his left, and in a few minutes a second shell burst. 
 Even before this time I had become again very uncomfortable, 
 and would have liked very much to change my position, but I 
 did not like to show the white feather in the presence of General 
 Jackson, who had not winced, but after the second shell had 
 burst near him, he remarked in a quiet way, "When two shells 
 
 714 
 
APPENDIX D 715 
 
 burst near you it is well to change your position if you can do 
 so," so we both rode some distance to our right and got out of 
 range of the bullets. 
 
 That night General Lee and General Longstreet made their 
 head-quarters in Hogan's dwelling. I was sitting on the steps 
 of this building about ten o'clock, when General Jackson rode 
 up with Lincoln Sydnor, who was his guide on this occasion. 
 General Jackson gave his horse to Sydnor to hold and went into 
 the house, as I afterward learned, for a consultation with all 
 of the higher officials of the army, Sydnor told me that the 
 reason General Jackson reached Cold Harbor as late as he did 
 was due to the fact that, although he was very near his old home, 
 and where he was perfectly familiar with the country, the Yankees 
 had cut down so many trees and made so many new roads that 
 he actually got lost, and that just before reaching the point to 
 which General Jackson had directed him to guide him, he found 
 that he was on the wrong road, and had to turn round the 
 artillery in the woods and had to countermarch for quite a dis- 
 tance, which delayed them very materially, Sydnor told me that 
 General Ewell, who was present, wanted to hang him to a tree, 
 but General Jackson said it was all right; that we would get 
 there in plenty of time. You know General Jackson has been 
 frequently blamed for being late on this occasion, and it has 
 often occurred to me that this simple reason may have been the 
 cause of it, although I never heard it so stated. * * * 
 
 With best wishes and kind remembrances, I am * * * 
 
 Yours, 
 
 A, R. Ellerson. 
 
APPENDIX E 
 
 REPORT OF THE SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX 
 
 Near Appomattox Court House, Va., 
 
 April 12, 1865. 
 His Excellency, Jefferson Davis. 
 
 Mr. President: It is with pain that I announce to your Excel- 
 lency the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. The 
 operations which preceded this result will be reported in full. 
 I will, therefore, only now state that upon arriving at Amelia 
 Court House on the morning of the 4th with the advance of the 
 army on the retreat from the lines in front of Richmond and 
 Petersburg, and not finding the supplies ordered to be placed 
 there, nearly twenty-four hours were lost in endeavoring to col- 
 lect in the country subsistence for men and horses. This delay 
 was fatal, and could not be retrieved. The troops, wearied by 
 continual fighting and marching for several days and nights, 
 obtained neither rest nor refreshment, and on moving, on the 
 5th, on the Richmond and Danville Railroad, I found at Jeters- 
 ville the enemy's cavalry, and learned the approach of his 
 infantry and the general advance of his army toward Burke- 
 ville. This deprived us of the use of the railroad, and rendered 
 it impracticable to procure from Danville the supplies ordered 
 to meet us at points of our march. Nothing could be obtained 
 from the adjacent coimtry. Our route to the Roanoke was, 
 therefore, changed and the march directed upon Farmville, 
 where supplies were ordered from Lynchburg. The change of 
 route threw the troops over the roads pursued by the artillery 
 and wagon trains west of the railroad, which impeded our 
 advance and embarrassed oux movements. On the morning of 
 the 6th General Longstreet's Corps reached Rice's Station, on 
 
 716 
 
APPENDIX E 717 
 
 the Lynchburg Railroad. It was followed by the commands of 
 Generals R. H. Anderson, Ewell, and Gordon, with orders to 
 close upon it as fast as the progress of the trains would permit 
 or as they could be directed on roads farther west. General 
 Anderson, commanding Pickett's and B. R. Johnson's Divisions, 
 became disconnected with Mahone's Division, forming the rear 
 of Longstreet. The enemy's cavalry penetrated the line of 
 march through the interval thus left and attacked the wagon 
 train moving toward Farmville. This caused serious delay in 
 the march of the centre and rear of the column and enabled 
 the enemy to mass upon their flank. After successive attacks 
 Anderson's and Ewell's Corps were captured or driven from 
 their position. The latter general, with both of his division 
 commanders, Kershaw and Custis Lee, and his brigadiers were 
 taken prisoners. Gordon, who all the morning, aided by Gen- 
 eral W. H. F. Lee's Cavalry, had checked the advance of the 
 enemy on the road from Amelia Springs and protected the trains, 
 became exposed to his combined assaults, which he bravely 
 resisted and twice repulsed; but the cavalry having been with- 
 drawn to another part of the line of march, and the enemy, mass- 
 ing heavily on his front and both flanks, renewed the attack 
 about 6 P. M. and drove him from the field in much confusion. 
 The army continued its march during the night, and every effort 
 was made to reorganize the divisions which had been shattered 
 by the day's operations ; but the men being depressed by fatigue 
 and hunger, many threw away their arms, while others followed 
 the wagon trains and embarrassed their progress. On the morn- 
 ing of the 7th rations were issued to the troops as they passed 
 Farmville, but the safety of the trains requiring their removal 
 upon the approach of the enemy, all could not be supplied. 
 The army, reduced to two corps under Longstreet and Gordon, 
 moved steadily on the road to Appomattox Court House ; thence 
 its march was ordered by Campbell Court House, through Pitt- 
 sylvania, toward Danville. The roads were wretched and the 
 progress slow. By great efforts the head of the column reached 
 Appomattox Court House on the evening of the 8tU 9Ad the 
 
718 APPENDIX E 
 
 troops were halted for rest. The march was ordered to be 
 resumed at 1 a. m. on the 9th. Fitz Lee with the cavalry, sup- 
 ported by Gordon, was ordered to drive the enemy from his 
 front, wheel to the left and cover the passage of the trains, while 
 Longstreet, who from Rice's Station had formed the rear guard, 
 should close up and hold the position. Two battalions of artil- 
 lery and the ammunition wagons were directed to accompany 
 the army, the rest of the artillery and wagons to move toward 
 Lynchburg. In the early part of the night the enemy attacked 
 "Walker's artillery train near Appomattox Station, on the Lynch- 
 burg Railroad, and were repelled. Shortly afterward their 
 cavalry dashed toward the Court House till halted by our line. 
 During the night there were indications of a large force massing 
 on our left and front. Fitz Lee was directed to ascertain its 
 strength and to suspend his advance till daylight if necessary. 
 About 5 A. M. on the 9th, with Gordon on his left, he moved 
 forward and opened the way, A heavy force of the enemy was 
 discovered opposite Gordon's right, which, moving in the direc- 
 tion of Appomattox Court House, drove back the left of the 
 cavalry and threatened to cut off Gordon from Longstreet, his 
 cavalry at the same time threatening to envelop his left flank. 
 Gordon withdrew across the Appomattox River, and the cavalry 
 advanced on the Lynchburg Road and became separated from 
 the army. Learning the condition of affairs on the lines, where 
 I had gone under the expectation of meeting General Grant to 
 learn definitely the terms he proposed in a communication re- 
 ceived from him on the 8th, in the event of the surrender of the 
 army, I requested a suspension of hostilities until these terms 
 could be arranged. In the interview which occurred with Gen- 
 eral Grant in compliance with my request, terms having been 
 agreed on, I surrendered that portion of the Army of Northern 
 Virginia which was on the field, with its arms, artillery, and 
 wagon trains, the officers and men to be paroled, retaining their 
 side arms and private effects. I deemed this course the best 
 under all the circumstances by which we were surrounded. On 
 the morning of the 9th, according to the reports of the ordnance 
 
APPENDIX E 719 
 
 officers, there were 7,892 organized infantry with arms, with an 
 average of seventy-five rounds of ammunition per man. The 
 artillery, though reduced to sixty-three pieces with ninety-three 
 rounds of anamunition, was sufficient. These comprised all the 
 supplies of ordnance that could be relied on in the State of Vir- 
 ginia. I have no accurate report of the cavalry, but believe it 
 did not exceed 2,100 effective men. The enemy was more than 
 five times our numbers. If we could have forced our way one 
 day longer, it would have been at a great sacrifice of life, and at 
 its end I did not see how a surrender could have been avoided. 
 We had no subsistence for man or horse and it could not be 
 gathered in the country. The supplies ordered to Pamplin's 
 Station from Lynchburg could not reach us, and the men, 
 deprived of food and sleep for many days, were worn out and 
 exhausted. 
 
 With great respect, your obedient servant, 
 
 R. E. Lee, General. 
 
ill 
 
J 
 
INDEX 
 
INDEX 
 
 Note. — Union officers are indicated by U.; Confederate officers by C. 
 
 Adams, Charles Francis, Sr., 
 45, 67; his opinion of Lee's 
 army, 304-305; prevents the 
 delivery of iron-clads by Eng- 
 land to the Confederacy, 506- 
 507; quoted, 508. 
 
 Adams, John Quincy, his views on 
 secession, 45, 46. 
 
 Alexander, Gen. E. P., C, quoted, 
 293, 336; 340, 344, 423, 569, 
 572 573. 
 
 Allan,' Col.' Wm., C, quoted, 159, 
 163, 170, 179, 188. 
 
 Amelia Court House, Lee at, 549 ff. 
 
 Anderson, Gen. G. T., C, 402, 
 713. 
 
 Anderson, Gen. J. R., C, 165. 
 
 Anderson, Gen. R. H., C, 199, 
 207, 236, 270, 271, 274, 275, 277, 
 278, 289, 292, 293, 298, 321, 
 322, 328, 336, 337, 341, 390, 
 396, 399, 402, 404, 407, 420, 431, 
 436, 437, 438, 449, 453, 466, 475, 
 477, 478, 479, 526, 527, 532, 535, 
 542, 548, 550, 551, 553, 554, 555, 
 556. 
 
 Anne, Queen, 4. 
 
 Antietam, battle of, 231 ff. 
 
 Archer, Gen. J. J., C, 165, 166, 
 258, 278, 322, 325, 326, 330. 
 
 Armistead, Gen. Lewis A., C, 141, 
 159, 181, 182, 713. 
 
 Averell, Gen. Wm. W., U., 286, 
 386, 445, 469. 
 
 Ayres, Gen. R. B., U., 531. 
 
 Babcock, Col. O. E., U., 573. 
 
 Banks, Gen. N. P., U., 129, 135, 
 136, 149, 157, 192, 194, 199. 
 
 Barker, Dr. Fordyce, 577. 
 
 Barksdale, The Hon. E., Lee's let- 
 ter to, 589-590. 
 
 Barksdale, Gen. Wm., C, 256, 336, 
 713. 
 
 Barlow, Gen. Francis C, U., 278, 
 280, 281, 282, 327, 412, 440, 476, 
 557 558 
 
 Bartlett, Gen. Wm. F., U., 474. 
 
 Battle, Gen. Cullen A., C, 413. 
 
 Beauregard, Gen. P. G. T., C, 63, 
 89, 301, 302, 426, 427, 428, 429, 
 431, 447, 451, 452, 480, 501, 512, 
 585 
 
 Benham, Gen. H. W., U., 548, 549. 
 
 Benjamin, C. F., Sec'y of War, C, 
 586. 
 
 Bennings, Gen. H. L., C, 336, 402. 
 
 Berry, Gen. Hiram G., U., 282. 
 
 Bigelow, John, quoted, 491-492. 
 
 Birney, Gen. D. B., U., 334, 454, 
 455, 475, 476, 479, 550. 
 
 Blair, The Hon. Francis P., U., 39. 
 
 Blair, The Hon. Montgomery, 39. 
 
 Bledsoe, Professor, 297. 
 
 Blow, Henry T., 658. 
 
 Boston, Colonel, C, death of, 557. 
 
 Bragg, Gen. Braxton, C, 218, 302, 
 365, 518. 
 
 Branch, Gen. L. O'Brien, C, 160, 
 165, 166, 178, 695. 
 
 Breckinridge, Gen. J. C, C, 424, 
 431, 436, 437, 439, 441, 444, 446, 
 501, 518, 593; secretary of war, 
 594; 597, 612. 
 
 Brockenborough, Judge, offers Lee 
 presidency of Washington Col- 
 lege, 648. 
 
 Brockenborough, Lieut. Austin, 
 C. 322. 
 
 Brooks, Gen. J. A. J., U., 260. 
 
 Brown, Col. J. T., C, 278. 
 
 Buchanan, Pres. James, 654. 
 
 Buckner, Gen. S. B., C, 124, 302. 
 
 Buell, Gen. D. C, U., 124, 218. 
 
 Buford, Gen. John, U., 323, 325, 
 326. 
 
 Bull Run, battles of; see Manas- 
 sas. 
 
 723 
 
724 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Burnside, Gen. A. E., U., 88, 100, 
 193, 199, 218, 231, 237, 248; su- 
 persedes McClellan and changes 
 plan of campaign against Lee, 
 253_^. ; loses battle of Fredericks- 
 burg, 255 ff.; superseded by 
 Hooker, 261; 384, 414, 415, 417, 
 419, 420, 421, 429, 432, 434, 436, 
 437, 439, 440, 444, 470, 472, 473, 
 599, 623, 627, 686. 
 
 Butler, Gen. Benj. F., U., 124, 
 384, 385, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 
 441, 447, 450, 451, 457, 465, 478, 
 482, 484, 499, 509; relieved, 510; 
 627. 
 
 Butler, Gen. M. C, C, 435. 
 
 Cameron, The Hon. Simon, U., 
 
 quoted, 39. 
 Campbell, Judge J. A., quoted, 
 
 584, 593. 
 Carter, Anne, mother of R. E. Lee, 
 
 5, 12. 
 Carter, Robert, 12. 
 Carter, Col. Thos. H., C, 290, 
 
 570; quoted, 619. 
 Carter, Capt. William Page, 417. 
 Casey, Gen. Silas, U., 159. 
 Chancellorsville, battle of, 266 ff.; 
 
 credit for Confederate victory, 
 
 296/. 
 Charles II, offered a kingdom in 
 
 Virginia by Richard Lee, 4. 
 Chilton, Gen. R. H., C, 697. 
 Clingman, Gen. Thos. L., C, 426. 
 Cobb, Gen. Howell, C, 629. 
 Cobb, Gen. Thos. R. R., C, 629. 
 Cochrane, Gen. John, U., 260. 
 Cold Harbor, battle of, 173; second 
 
 battle of, 438 ff. 
 Coler, Colonel, C, 511. 
 Cook, Gen. J. R., C, 535. 
 Cooper, Gen. S., C, Lee's report 
 
 of the Gettysburg campaign to, 
 
 703-713. 
 Corse, Gen. M. D., C, 527, 529, 
 
 531; captured, 556. 
 Couch, Gen. D. N., C, 287, 292, 
 
 319 
 Cox, Gen. J. D., U., 218, 237, 629. 
 Crawford, Gen. G. W., U., 477, 531. 
 Crook, Gen. George, U., 445, 469, 
 
 528, 552, 554, 557. 
 Cross Keys, battle of, 137, 157. 
 
 Custer, Gen. Geo. A., U., 339, 376, 
 
 532, 550. '< 
 
 Custis, Mary Parke, 'h^k marriage 
 
 to R. E. Lee, 18; Lee s letters to, 
 
 cf. Lee, R. E. 
 Cutler, Gen. Lysander, U., 325. 
 Cutshaw, Maj. W. E., C, 417, 469. 
 
 Dahlgren, Col. Ulric, U., 375, 
 376. 
 
 Dana, Richard H., quoted, 381- 
 382. 
 
 Daniel, John W., 417. 
 
 Daniel, Gen. Junius, C, 321, 413; 
 killed, 419. 
 
 Davies, Gen. H. E., Jr., U., 528. 
 
 Davis, Jefferson, 93, 94; quoted, 
 114; 115; his high opinion of 
 Lee, 115, 116; 118-119, 131, 133, 
 136; appoints Lee in command 
 of Confederate forces, 141; 
 quoted, 146-147; 152, 199, 
 216 ff., 268, 301-303, 325; cor- 
 respondence with Lee, 358-362; 
 366, 377, 402; Lee's letter to, 
 495; 503, 510, 511, 512; notified 
 by Lee that Richmond should 
 be evacuated, 540; Lee's letter 
 to, 541-543; notified of Lee's 
 surrender, 578; the interference 
 of his administration in Lee's 
 plans, 580 ff. ; his confidence in 
 Lee, 581; 592, 593; quoted, 594- 
 595; his high opinion of Lee, 
 596; 605; Lee's letters to, 605 #.; 
 608, 609, 616, 642, 649, 655; 
 Lee's report to, of the surrender 
 at Appomattox, 716-719. 
 
 Davis, Gen. J. C, U., 629. 
 
 Davis, Col. J. L., C, 696. 
 
 Davis, Gen. J. R., C, 535. 
 
 Dearing, Gen. James, C, 426, 450, 
 477; death of, 557. 
 
 Deshler, Lieut. James, C, 95. 
 
 Devin, Gen. Thos. C, U., 323, 528, 
 532. 
 
 Dix, Governor, 315. 
 
 Doles, Gen. Geo., C, 322, 413, 420. 
 
 Doubleday, Gen. A., U., 232, 233, 
 326. 
 
 Douglass, Col. M., C, 232. 
 
 Dubose, Gen. D. M., C., captured, 
 556. 
 
 DuPont, Adm. Sam. F., U., 124. 
 
INDEX 
 
 725 
 
 Early, Gen. J. A., C, 233, 234, 
 246, 256, 258, 279, 292, 293, 298, 
 
 318, 321, 327, 330, 338, 370, 412, 
 414, 415, 417, 436, 437, 438, 439, 
 440, 444, 446, 447, 459; saves 
 Lynchburg, 460; sent by Lee to 
 threaten Washington, 460 ff., 
 468, 469, 477, 479, 501, 705, 707. 
 
 Egan, Gen. Thos. W., U., 483. 
 
 Ellerson, Andrew R., 187; his 
 letter to author, 714-715. 
 
 ElHott, Gen. St., Jr., C, 473, 474. 
 
 Elzey, Gen. A., C, 302. 
 
 Evans, Gen. N. C., C, 209, 418. 
 
 Ewell, Gen. Rich. S., C, 153, 168, 
 174, 175, 176, 181, 187, 197, 205, 
 208; succeeds Stonewall Jack- 
 son, 298; 310, 314, 315, 316, 318, 
 
 319, 320, 321, 322, 324, 325, 327, 
 328, 329, 330, 332, 334, 337, 339, 
 341, 350, 355, 367, 370, 396, 397, 
 398, 404, 411, 420, 422, 431, 436, 
 480, 546, .548, 549, 551, 553, 554, 
 555; captured, 556; 560, 673, 
 704, 705, 706, 708, 709, 711, 715, 
 717. 
 
 Farragut, Adm. D. G., U., flag 
 
 officer, 124, 505. 
 Ferrero, Gen. Edw. U., 260, 473. 
 Field, Gen. Chas. W., C, 165, 166, 
 
 400, 402, 403, 451, 453, 471, 475, 
 
 478, 484, 539. 
 Five Forks, battle of, 529 /. 
 Floyd, Gen. John B., C, 102, 104, 
 
 106, 110-111, 622. 
 Forrest, Gen. N. B., C, 505. 
 Foster, Gen. R. S., U., 539. 
 Franklin, Gen. Wm. B., U., 149, 
 
 150, 170, 180, 212, 227, 238, 257, 
 
 259, 260, 468. 
 Fr-isier's Farm, battle of, 178-179. 
 r rdericksburg, battle of, 255 ff. 
 F-eemantle, Colonel, 633. 
 Fremont, Gen. John C., U., 135, 
 
 136, 138, 144, 149, 157, 192, 194. 
 x'rench, Gen. Wm. H., U., 170, 
 
 173, 236, 369. 
 Fulton, Colonel, C, 532. 
 
 Gaines's Mill, battle of, 173. 
 Gamble, Gen. W., U., 323. 
 Garber, A. W., 417. 
 Garnett, Gen. R. B., C, 713. 
 
 Garnett, Gen. Robert S., C, 99. 
 
 Gary, Gen. M. W., C, 484, 546. 
 
 Gemieson, Major, 7. 
 
 Getty, Gen. Geo. W., U., 397, 399, 
 463, 555. 
 
 Gettysburg, battle of, 304 ff., 
 320 jf. 
 
 Gibbon, Gen. John, U., 257, 540, 
 558. 
 
 Gildersleeve, Dr., 687. 
 
 Glendale, battle of, 178-179. 
 
 Gordon, Gen. G. H,, U., quoted, 
 241. 
 
 Gordon, Gen. J. B., C, 321, 327, 
 329, 389, 404, 411, 413, 419, 520, 
 521, 522, 535, 537, 539, 541, 550, 
 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 559, 570, 
 571, 717, 718. 
 
 Gorgas, Gen. Josiah, C, 73. 
 
 Gracie, Gen. Arch., C, 451, 527, 
 532. 
 
 Grant, General U. S., U., as a slave- 
 holder, 57; as a commander, 68; 
 148, 245, 253, 306; supersedes 
 Meade, 357, 379 /.; author's 
 opinion of his character, 379- 
 380; R. H. Dana's description 
 of, 381-382; Meade's relation 
 to, 382-383; plans destruction 
 of Lee's army, 383 ff.; crosses 
 the Rapidan, 385; in the Wilder- 
 ness campaign, 388 ff., 395 ff.; 
 at Spottsylvania Court House, 
 410 ff.; fails to destroy Lee's 
 army, 429; crosses the Pamun- 
 key, 434; defeated at Second 
 Cold Harbor, 438; crosses to the 
 south side of the James, 447; 
 his Wilderness campaign dis- 
 cussed, 448; plans to seize 
 Petersburg, 449; fails to cap- 
 ture Petersburg by assault, 452- 
 454, 470 /.; sends Wright to 
 strengthen Washington against 
 Early, 463; Halleck's depend- 
 ence on, 468; compared with 
 Lee, 488 ff.; commands com- 
 plete confidence in Washington, 
 517; compels Lee to abandon 
 Richmond, 535; his army at 
 Appomattox compared with 
 Lee's, 561 ff.; reaches his 
 zenith, 566; asks Lee to sur- 
 render, 566; letters with Lee 
 
726 
 
 INDEX 
 
 concerning surrender, 567 ff.; 
 generous toward Lee in condi- 
 tions of surrender, 574 ff. ; 599 ; 
 his desire for peace, 611 ^.; his 
 magnanimity at Appomattox 
 praised, 638; his noble attitude 
 toward Lee after the war, 643; 
 677; Lee's interview with, at 
 the White House, 678; statistics 
 of his armies, 698-702, 718. 
 
 Grant, Mrs. U. S., 611. 
 
 Gravelly Run, battle of, 527. 
 
 Gray, Lieut.-Col., 166. 
 
 Greeley, Horace, criticises Lin- 
 coln's methods, 241. 
 
 Greene, General, quoted, 9. 
 
 Gregg, Gen. D. McM., U., 316, 
 364, 367, 475, 476, 483, 528, 557, 
 558 
 
 Gregg, Gen. John, C, 402. 
 
 Gregg, Gen. J. I., U., 339. 
 
 Gregg, Gen. M., C, 165, 166, 258. 
 
 Griffin, Gen. C., U., 396, 531, 
 551. 
 
 Grigsby, Col. A. J., C, 233, 244. 
 
 Hagood, Gen. J., C, 478. 
 
 Halleck, Gen. H. W., U., ap- 
 pointed commander-in-chief of 
 U. S. army, 192; 197, 202, 212, 
 230, 251, 319, 349, 353, 444, 445, 
 447, 501, 628, 630. 
 
 Hallowell, R. E. Lee's teacher, 
 15-16. 
 
 Hampton, Gen. Wade, C, 64, 412, 
 435, 444, 446, 455, 476, 483, 629, 
 645, 713. 
 
 Hancock, Gen. W. S., U., 317, 328, 
 329, 330, 331, 338, 384, 396, 397, 
 398, 400, 403, 404, 412, 413, 417, 
 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 429, 430, 
 432, 434, 436, 437, 439, 440, 450, 
 454, 470, 471, 472, 475, 476, 477, 
 478, 479, 481. 482, 483. 
 
 Hardee, Gen. W. J., C, 514. 
 
 Harris, Gen. N. H., C, 419; cf. 
 539. 
 
 Hays,' Gen. Alex., U., 232, 282, 
 321 338 
 
 Heckman, Gen. Chas. A., U., 428. 
 
 Heintzelman, Gen. Sam. P., U., 
 137, 139, 150, 159, 180. 
 
 Henderson, Gen. G. F. R., quoted, 
 48, 57-60, 69-70, 74 n., 75 n., 76, 
 
 77-78, 163, 171, 172, 188, 201, 
 212, 214, 220, 235-236, 237, 239, 
 240, 247-248, 265, 286, 297. 300- 
 301, 307, 347-348, 393, 581. 
 
 Heth, Gen. Henry, C, 289, 298, 
 309, 321, 322, 325, 326, 327, 330, 
 341, 356, 397, 398, 399, 401, 412, 
 439, 471, 477, 483, 535; takes 
 Hill's place on latter's death, 
 538, 545, 558, 713. 
 
 Hill, Gen. A. P., C, 146, 151, 161, 
 162, 163, 164, 165, 166-167, 168, 
 169, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 
 183, 188, 191, 198, 229, 237, 256, 
 258, 285, 286, 298, 310, 315, 316, 
 318, 321, 322, 325, 326, 327, 328, 
 330, 334, 337, 353, 367, 419, 421, 
 455, 477, 478, 526, 527, 535; 
 death of, 537; 679, 695, 704, 705, 
 706, 707, 708, 709, 711; cf. 140, 
 
 208, 209, 228, 234, 324, 396, 401, 
 411, 431, 436, 439, 449, 453, 471, 
 480. 
 
 Hill, Senator B. H., 608-609. 
 
 Hill, Gen. D. H., 151, 159, 160, 164, 
 167, 168, 181, 182, 185, 221, 223, 
 224, 226, 227, 233, 236, 256, 302, 
 695; cf. 140, 208, 209, 228, 234. 
 
 Hoke, Gen. R. F., C, 321, 338, 428, 
 431, 437, 438, 451, 471, 481, 484, 
 498. 
 
 Holcombe, quoted, 16. 
 
 Holmes, Gen. T. H., C, 91, 143, 
 177, 178, 180, 181, 696. 
 
 Hood, Gen. John B., C, 146, 168, 
 171, 172, 209, 231, 232, 233, 234, 
 239, 265, 298, 322, 335, 336, 341, 
 346, 365; supersedes Johnston, 
 506; 623, 704, 713. 
 
 Hooker, Gen. Joseph, U., 159, 178, 
 
 209, 231, 232, 233, 260; super- 
 sedes Burnside in command of^ 
 Army of the Potomac, 261 ; Liq« 
 coin's letter to, 264-265; def 
 feated at Chancellorsville, ^67^ 
 Lee's opinion of, 268, 295-296;^ 
 defeated at Salem Church, ,i.t/3: 
 retreats across the Rappahan- 
 nock, 294; is superseded bj^ 
 Meade, 319; 339, 355, 356, 378, 
 386, 395, 504, 599, 623, 703, 705. 
 
 Howard, Jacob M., 657. 
 Howard, Gen. O. O., U., 270, 276, 
 278, 279, 280, 281, 326, 629. 
 
INDEX 
 
 727 
 
 Howell, Col. J. B., U., 504. 
 Huger, Gen. Benj., C, 131, 139, 
 
 141, 151, 164, 170, 176, 178, 180, 
 
 181, 183, 191, 696. 
 Humphreys, Gen. A. A., U., 292, 
 
 334, 405, 408, 410; quoted, 425, 
 
 427, 429, 438, 442, 485; 524, 525, 
 
 528, 534, 538, 557, 558, 567, 568, 
 
 569, 571. 
 Hunter, Gen. David, U., 218; his 
 
 ruthless destruction, 444-446 ; 
 
 447, 460, 467, 501, 627-628, 631. 
 Hunter, Robert M., 417. 
 Hunton, Gen. E., C, 438, 527, 550; 
 
 captured, 556. 
 
 Imboden, Gen. J. D., C, 322, 445, 
 
 704, 707, 710, 711. 
 Iverson, Gen. A., C, 321. 
 
 Jackson, Andrew, 16. 
 
 Jackson, Gen. H. R., C, 102, 110, 
 120. 
 
 Jackson, Gen. Thos. J. ("Stone- 
 wall"), C, 87, 91, 100, 128, 135, 
 137, 146, 149; Lee's letter to, 
 152; 156-160; his delay at 
 Ashland, 161-168; explanation 
 thereof, 171; 177, 178, 180, 181, 
 183; his slowness around Rich- 
 mond, 185-188; 195; advances 
 against Pope, 197-199; sent by 
 Lee to circle Pope's right, 202; 
 successful in battle of Second 
 Manassas, 206 #.; 220,222,223, 
 226, 227; captures Harper's 
 Ferry, 228; 231, 234, 235, 239, 
 240, 246, 249; Lee's letter to, 
 250-251; 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 
 260, 261, 266, 270, 274, 275, 276; 
 dnt by Lee around Hooker's 
 ri:;ht at Chancellors ville, 266 ff. ; 
 s lot by accident at moment of 
 '.actory, 283 ff. ; Lee's high opin- 
 ion ^f, 287-288; given credit for 
 victory at Chancellorsville, 288, 
 291, 297; death of, 296; 392, 
 'i58, 488, 586, 695, 696, 714; 
 explanation of his delay at Cold 
 Harbor, 715. 
 
 Jaynes, Dr. Edward S., quoted, 
 660, 
 
 Jefferson, Thomas, 10. 
 
 Jenkins, Gen. M., C, 178, 389; 
 death of, 403; 704, 706, 713. 
 
 Johnson, Pres. Andrew, 642, 643, 
 650, 654. 
 
 Johnson, Gen. Bradley T., C, 455, 
 462. 
 
 Johnson, Gen. Bushrod R., C, 
 498, 526, 551, 717. 
 
 Johnson, Gen. Edw. C, 103, 298, 
 321, 338, 341, 411, 417, 418, 
 451, 457, 471, 527, 705. 
 
 Johnson, Hon. Reverdy, Lee's let- 
 ter to, 40. 
 
 Johnston, Gen. Albert Sydney, C, 
 28, 124, 380, 392; cf. 360. 
 
 Johnston, Gen. Joseph E., C, 
 17-18, 28, 87-88, 91, 119, 123, 
 127, 129, 131, 132; assumes 
 command against McClellan, 
 133; 134, 138; death of, 140; 
 253, 308, 392, 488, 490, 503, 504; 
 superseded by Hood, 505; 506; 
 reinstated by Lee, 514; 515, 516, 
 518, 519, 523; surrenders to 
 Sherman, 578; 585, 586, 597, 
 600. 
 
 Johnston, R. H., 418. 
 
 Jones, Gen. D. R., C, 237. 
 
 Jones, Col. Hilary P., C, 290. 
 
 Jones, Gen. J. M., C, 713. 
 
 Jones, Gen. J. R., C, 232, 233, 
 321, 445. 
 
 Jones, Rev. Dr. J. W., quoted, 55, 
 498; 671. 
 
 Kautz, Gen. Albert, U., 450, 456, 
 
 482. 
 Kearny, Gen. Phil., U., 159, 209, 
 
 213. 
 Kemper, Gen. J. L., C, 713. 
 Kershaw, Gen. J. B., C, 334, 336, 
 
 389, 400, 402, 422, 438, 439, 453, 
 
 469, 471, 546, 555; captured, 
 
 556; 717. 
 Keyes, Gen. E. D., U., 137, 139, 
 
 143, 150. 
 Kilpatrick, Gen. Judson, U., 351, 
 
 367, 376. 
 King, Gen. Rufus, U., 205, 623. 
 
 Lane, Gen. J. H., C, 258, 322, 
 
 419, 420, 535, 539. 
 Lang, Col. David, C, 336, 337. 
 Latane, Capt. Wm., 154. 
 
728 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Law, Gen. E. McI., C, 168, 333, 
 335, 336, 402. 
 
 Lawler, Colonel, 77. 
 
 Lawton, Gen. A. R., C, 153, 168, 
 232, 233; Lee's letters to, 495- 
 496, 603-604. 
 
 Lee, Richard, founder of the Lee 
 family in America, offers Charles 
 II a kingdom in Virginia, 4, 6. 
 
 Lee, Thomas, grandson of Richard 
 Lee, builds "Stratford" in Vir- 
 ginia, 3-4. 
 
 Lee, Francis Lightfoot, uncle of 
 R. E. Lee, 4. 
 
 Lee, Richard Henry, father of 
 R. E. Lee, 4; active in Revolu- 
 tionary War, 6-9; 10, 11; his 
 letter to Mr. Madison, 44. 
 
 Lee, Robert E., birth of, 4; ances- 
 try of, 5-9; influence of Wash- 
 ington's character on, 9-13; 
 his boyhood character and de- 
 votion to his mother, 13-14; 
 early education, 15; enters West 
 Point, 16; Joseph E. Johnston's 
 opinion of, 17-18; marries 
 Mary Parke Custis, 18; his first 
 service, 19-20; his engineering 
 work on the Mississippi, 21; his 
 work at Ft. Hamilton, 22; brill- 
 iant service in the Mexican War, 
 22-27; superintendent of West 
 Point, 28; service on the south- 
 western frontier, 28; captures 
 John Brown, 29; letters to his 
 wife quoted, 30-31; his love for 
 children and animals, 32-33; 
 letters to his oldest son, 34-35; 
 manumits his slaves, 37; his 
 views on slavery, 37-38; offered 
 command of U. S. army by 
 Lincoln, 38-^0; resigns his com- 
 mission in U. S. army, 40; his 
 attitude toward secession dis- 
 cussed, 41-49; letter to his wife 
 showing his feeling for the United 
 States, 52-53; his opposition to a 
 dissolution of the Union, 53-54; 
 letter to Gen. Scott, 55-56; let- 
 ters to his brother and sister, 61- 
 62; letter to his wife, 63; letter to 
 General Beauregard, 63-64; his 
 letter to Capt. James May, 64; 
 his greatness as a soldier and 
 
 the resources at his command, 
 67-79; receives commission of 
 major-general of the Virginia 
 forces, 80-81; his reply to Hon. 
 John Janney, 81-82; letters to 
 his wife, 83-84, 92-94; his far- 
 sightedness as to the length of 
 tlie war, 96-98; assumes com- 
 mand of West Virginia, 103; 
 letter to his wife, 103-105, 106, 
 108-109; letter to Governor 
 Letcher, 109-110; fails to capt- 
 ure Rosecrans at Sewell Moun- 
 tain, 110-113; letter to his wife, 
 1 1 1-1 12 ; failure of his first cam- 
 paign, 114-115; designs and 
 constructs Carolina coast de- 
 fences, 115-118; letters to his 
 wife, 117-118; appointed mili- 
 tary adviser to Jefferson Davis, 
 118; letter to his wife, 130; his 
 proposed plan of campaign 
 against McClellan, 133, 134; 
 offers to assist Johnston, 140; 
 placed in command of the Con- 
 federate forces, 141; his first or- 
 der to the Confederate Army, 
 142; meets his generals at con- 
 ference, 145-147; repulses Mc- 
 Clellan on the Chickahominy 
 and at Malvern Hill, 148; his 
 plans for McClellan 's destruction, 
 152-153; defence of Richmond, 
 145-184; defeats McClellan at 
 Gaines's Mill and Cold Harbor, 
 173; his report quoted, 175-176; 
 pursues McClellan and saves 
 Richmond, 176-185, 189-190; 
 his plans against Pope, 197; 
 sends Jackson to circle Pope's 
 right, 202; wins battle of Second 
 Manassas, 206 ff.; letters to 
 Jefferson Davis, 216-219; his 
 proclamation to Marjdand fails 
 to win response, 220; his audac- 
 ity against McClellan, 225 ff.; 
 makes a stand at Sharpsburg, 
 231 ff.; refuses to retreat after 
 Antictam, 240; declaration to 
 his army, 242-243; letter to 
 Jackson, 250-251; wins battle 
 of Fredericksburg, 255 ff.; at 
 the zenith of his fame, 262; 
 letter to his wife showing his 
 
INDEX 
 
 729 
 
 modesty, 262-263; wins at 
 Chancellorsville, 267 ff.; gives 
 Jackson credit for victory at 
 Chancellorsville, 288, 291, 297; 
 defeats Hooker at Salem Church, 
 293; compels Hooker to retreat 
 across the Rappahannock, 294; 
 his general plan of campaign 
 presented in letter to Jefferson 
 Davis, 301-303; plans to invade 
 the North, 309; not informed 
 by Stuart that Meade was at 
 Gettysburg, 309; marches his 
 arniy into Maryland and Penn- 
 sylvania, 309; letter to his wife, 
 311; iii letter to Jefferson Davis 
 he indicates the need of making 
 peace, 312-314; at Gettysburg, 
 305/., 320/.; does not charge 
 Longstreet with responsibility 
 for defeat at Gettysburg, 344; 
 Lee's letters to his wife, 351, 352, 
 354, 355; correspondence with 
 Jefferson Davis after Gettys- 
 burg, 351, 357, 358-362; letter 
 to his wife, 366, 368-369, 371, 
 373; 375; letter to his son, 374- 
 375; letters showing condition 
 of Confederate army after Get- 
 tysburg, 372 /.; narrowly es- 
 capes capture, 375; defends 
 Richmond in the Wilderness 
 campaign, 388 /., 395 /.; 
 thwarts Grant at Spottsylvania 
 Court House, 410/.; outstrips 
 Grant for the North Anna, 430; 
 his sudden illness at the North 
 Anna, 434; letter to his wife. 
 434; wins battle of Second 
 Cold Harbor, 438/.; stops Hun- 
 ter's destructive course, 444 / ; 
 crosses the Chickahominy, 449; 
 hastens to aid Beauregard at 
 Petersburg, 453; sends Early to 
 threaten Washington, 460; his 
 defence of Petersburg and Rich- 
 mond, 476/.; condition of his 
 army during last winter of 
 war, 486, 492-^93; compared 
 with Grant, 488 /.; letters to 
 his wife, to Jefferson Davis, and 
 to others, showing lack of sujj- 
 plies in his army, 494 /.; too 
 tardily given complete command 
 
 of all the Confederate armies, 
 510; reinstates Johnston, 514; 
 plans destruction of Sherman's 
 army, 516; letter to his wife, 
 518-519; advises evacuation of 
 Richmond, 540; letters to Jef- 
 ferson Davis, showing his se- 
 renity, 541-543; at "the last 
 ditch," 519/.; defeated at Five 
 Forks, 533 / ; withdraws from 
 the James, 545; his retreat to 
 Appomattox, 545 /.; his plan 
 of retreat on Danville found 
 by Weitzel, 547 /.; at Amelia 
 Court House, 549 /. ; at Rice's 
 Station, 554 /.; rejects idea of 
 unconditional surrender, 559- 
 560; his army at that time com- 
 pared with Grant's, 561 /.; 
 reaches his zenith, 566; asked 
 by Grant to surrender, 566; let- 
 ters of negotiation of surrender, 
 567 / ; fights his last battle, 570; 
 conditions of surrender, 574; 
 Grant's generosity toward, 
 574 /.; Lee's farewell address 
 to his army, 577-578; his rela- 
 tion to the Confederate Govern- 
 ment, and its interference in 
 his plans, 580 /.; his letter to 
 the Hon. E. Barksdale quoted, 
 589-590; his personal relations 
 to Jefferson Davis, 596 /.; his 
 army's lack of food and supplies, 
 600/.; letters to Jefferson Davis 
 quoted, 605 /.; his freedom 
 from political ambition, 608- 
 609, 643; Senator Hill's eulogy 
 of, 609; letter to Grant regard- 
 ing military convention, 613- 
 614; Lee's clemency, 617-635; 
 letters to his wife, to G. W. C. 
 Lee, and others, 619 /.; his 
 general order from Chambers- 
 burg on invading Pennsylvania, 
 forbidding devastation, 632-633; 
 Lee's supreme greatness in de- 
 feat, 636 /.; his noble dignity 
 after the war, 642 /.; uses his 
 influence for the re-establish- 
 ment of the Union, 643, 644/.; 
 the devotion of his soldiers to, 
 645-646; refuses governorship 
 of Virginia, 647; refuses com- 
 
730 
 
 INDEX 
 
 mercial offers, 647-648, 600; 
 accepts presidency of Washing- 
 ton College, 648; feeling in the 
 North against, 649 ff.; his ex- 
 amination by the committee of 
 Congress, 650^.; his views on 
 negro suffrage, 652; his own 
 views on secession, 656; as col- 
 lege president, 660 ^. ; author's 
 impression of his personal ap- 
 pearance, 665-666; plans writ- 
 ing a history of the campaigns 
 of his army, 667 ff. ; his love for 
 children, Q>70 ff.; his piety, 675- 
 676; his humor, 677; his inter- 
 view with Grant at the White 
 House, 678; illness and death 
 of, 678 ff.; Viscount Wolseley's 
 high opinion of, 682-683; his 
 character, 684-691; his order 
 for the battle of Gaines's Mill, 
 quoted, 695-697; statistics of 
 his armies, 698-702; his report 
 of the Gettysburg campaign, 
 703-713; his report of the sur- 
 render at Appomattox, 716-719. 
 
 Lee, Anne, sister of R. E. Lee, 6. 
 
 Lee, Mildred, sister of R. E. Lee, 6. 
 
 Lee, Henry, brother of R. E. Lee, 
 6, 11. 
 
 Lee, Charles Carter, brother of 
 R. E. Lee, 6. 
 
 Lee, Sidney Smith, brother of 
 R. E. Lee, 6, 565. 
 
 Lee, Agnes, daughter of R. E. Lee, 
 678. 
 
 Lee, Gen. G. W. C, C, son of 
 R. E. Lee, 63, 84, 471, 546; 
 captured, 548-549, 556; 551, 
 555, 596; Lee's letter to, 619- 
 620; 625-626, 682, 717. 
 
 Lee, Gen. W. H. F., C, son of 
 R. E. Lee, 269, 369, 455, 471, 
 476, 552, 625, 717. 
 
 Lee, R. E., son of Robert E. Lee, 
 quoted, 624-625, 666, 675-676, 
 677, 678. 
 
 Lee, Gen. Fitzhugh, C, nephew of 
 R. E. Lee, quoted, 115; 276, 277, 
 278, 279, 316, 374, 408, 435, 437, 
 439, 444, 446, 456, 466, 471, 511, 
 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 532, 
 550, 552, 553, 556, 558, 562, 571, 
 712,718. 
 
 Lee, Gen. Charles, quoted, 15. 
 
 Lee, C. F., Jr., Lee's letter to, 668- 
 669. 
 
 Lee, Gen. Stephen D., C, quoted, 
 240; 241. 
 
 Lee, Adm. S. P., U., 427. 
 
 Leigh, Maj. Watkins, C, 285. 
 
 Letcher, Gov. John, Lee's letters 
 to, 109-110, 644. 
 
 Lewis, Gen. Wtu. G., C, 431. 
 
 Lincoln, Abraham, offers Lee 
 chief command of Union forces, 
 39-40; 92, 102, 125, 157; \isits 
 McClellan's army, 192; 195, 220, 
 252, 264-265, 295, 302, 377, 378; 
 appoints Grant in command of 
 U. S. army, .381; 383, 456, 468, 
 502, 503, 510, 550, 578, 611, 615, 
 642; assassination of, 643, 649, 
 650. 
 
 Lindsay, Lieutenant, 7. 
 
 Livormore, Col. Thomas L., quoted 
 75, 423; his letter to author 
 containing statistics of Confed- 
 erate and of Federal armies, 
 quoted, 702. 
 
 Lomax, Gen. L., C, 511. 
 
 Long, Gen. A. L., C, quoted on 
 Lee's resignation from U. S. 
 army, 61; 95, 140; quoted, 147; 
 151; quoted, 152, 163, 330, 376- 
 377, 497, 668. 
 
 Longstreet, Gen. James, C, 131, 
 132, 133, 139, 140-141, 143; his 
 opinion of Lee, 145-146; 150- 
 151, 158, 159, 165, 167, 168; 
 quoted, 169-170, 171; 177, 178, 
 179, 180, 181, 182; quoted, 183- 
 184; 185, 186, 188, 191, 199, 202, 
 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 
 212, 213, 223, 224, 226, 227, 231, 
 236, 239, 249, 251, 254, 255, 256, 
 257, 265, 287, 298, 299; his atti- 
 tude toward Lee, 307 jf.; 314, 
 315, 316, 317, 320, 321, 322, 330, 
 331; his conduct at Gettysburg 
 responsible for the defeat of Lee, 
 331 ff. ; his defence of his failure 
 to attack at Gettysburg, 344^.; 
 365, 366, 387; wounded, 389, 
 403; 392, 396, 398, 399, 401, 404, 
 406, 407, 411, 413, 436, 438, 439, 
 471, 478, 484, 520, 522, 539, 545, 
 550, Jol, 556, 559, 569, 571, 573, 
 
INDEX 
 
 731 
 
 592, 596, 610, 611, 613, 617, 695, 
 702, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 
 711, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718. 
 
 Longstreet, Mrs. James, 611. 
 
 Loring, Gen. W. W., C, 95, 103, 
 104, 586. 
 
 McCabe, J. D., quoted, 591. 
 
 McCall, Gen. Geo. A., U., 179, 
 
 McClellan, Gen. G. B., U., 92; suc- 
 cessful against Garnett, 99 ff. ; as- 
 sumes command of Union forces, 
 101; 118, 119, 120; his campaign 
 against Richmond, 125-144; re- 
 pulsed by Lee on the Chicka- 
 hominy, and at Malvern Hill, 
 148; his army circuited by 
 Stuart, 153-155; defeated by 
 Lee at Gaines's Mill and Cold 
 Harbor, 162-173; retreats 
 across White Oak Swamp, 175- 
 177; 192, 19.3, 194, 197, 199, 212, 
 218, 220, 221; fails to relieve 
 Harper's Ferry, 228; condition 
 of his army, 230; fails to defeat 
 Lee at Antietam, 231 ff.; fails 
 to pursue Lee, 246; relieved of 
 his command, 252; Lee's opin- 
 ion of, 252-253; 392, 393, 395, 
 435, 449, 458, 459, 494, 500, 547, 
 599, 622, 627, 699. 
 
 McComb, Colonel, his opinion of 
 Lee, 20. 
 
 McComb, Col. W., C, 535. 
 
 McCoy, Colonel, 258. 
 
 McDowell, Gen. Irwin, XJ., 9.0-91, 
 120, 131, 135, 136, 138, 143- 
 144, 149, 192, 194, 207, 209, 210, 
 627. 
 
 McElroy, Colonel, C, 166. 
 
 McGowan, Gen. S., C, 322, 419, 
 527, 535. 
 
 McGowen, Colonel, C, 166. 
 
 McGregor, battery of, C, 529, 
 531. 
 
 McGuire, Hunter, 244. 
 
 Mcintosh, Maj. D. S., C, 237, 238, 
 325; quoted, 342-343, 634-635. 
 
 McLaughlin, Gen. N. B., U., 521. 
 
 McLaws, Gen. Lafayette, C, 177, 
 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 233, 
 234, 235, 275, 277, 289, 292, 293, 
 298, 322, 334, 335, 336, 337, 341, 
 365, 702, 704. 
 
 McLean, Wilmer, 573. 
 
 McParlin, quoted, 442. 
 
 McPherson, Gen. J. B., TJ., 379. 
 
 McRae, Gen. D., C, 535. 
 
 Mackenzie, Gen. R. S., U., 551. 
 
 Magruder, Gen. J. B., C, 129, 130, 
 151, 164, 170, 176, 177, 178, 180, 
 181, 182, 191, 696. 
 
 Mahone, Gen. Wm., C, 141, 159, 
 337, 402, 404, 415, 419, 421, 422, 
 439, 455, 456, 471, 473, 474, 476, 
 477, 478, 483, 546, 550, 551, 556, 
 717. 
 
 Malvern Hill, battle of, 148. 
 
 Manassas, first battle of, 90-92; 
 second battle of, 206 ff. 
 
 Mansfield, Gen. J. K. F., U., 232, 
 233. 
 
 Marshall, Col. Charles, C, quoted, 
 372-373, 572, 573, 618. 
 
 Marshall, Capt. Louis H., U., 
 193. 
 
 Martin, Gen. J. G., C, 426. 
 
 May, Capt. James, mentioned, 64. 
 
 Mayo, Col. Jos., C, 531. 
 
 Meade, Gen. Geo. G., U., 232, 233, 
 257,270,292,299, 309; super- 
 sedes Hooker, 319; 320, 322; at 
 Gettysburg, 319^.; superseded 
 by Grant, 357, 378; 364; his 
 relation to Grant, 382-383; 407, 
 441, 450, 453, 454, 465, 468, 476, 
 479, 482, 485, 494, 528, 538, 550, 
 553, 558, 563, 572, 575, 604, 672, 
 708. 
 
 Meade, Rev. Dr. William, men- 
 tioned, 18. 
 
 Meagher, Gen. Thos. F., U., 170, 
 173. 
 
 Meigs, General, his opinion of Lee, 
 22. 
 
 Meredith, Gen. Sol., U., 325. 
 
 Merritt, Gen. W., U., 527, 551, 
 554. 
 
 Miles,' Gen. N. A., U., 534, 538, 
 558. 
 
 Milledge's Battery, C, 342. 
 
 Milroy, Gen. R. H., U., 136, 149, 
 311, 315, 705. 
 
 Morell, Gen. G. W., U., 162, 246. 
 
 Morrison, of Hill's staff, C, 285. 
 
 Mosby, Col. John S., C, 317. 
 
 Munford, Gen. Thos. T., C, 227, 
 277, 279, 528, 529, 532, 558. 
 
732 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Nelson, Col. William, C, 342, 
 
 633. 
 Newton, Gen. John, U., 260. 
 Northrop, Col. L. B., Lee's letter 
 
 to, 495; quoted, 601-602, 605. 
 
 O'Neal, Gen, E. A., C, 321. 
 
 Ord, Gen. E. O. C, U., 472, 479, 
 480, 525, 535, 539, 550, 557, 563, 
 566, 570, 571, 610, 611, 612. 
 
 Page, Maj. R. C. M., C, 417. 
 
 Parke, Gen. J. G., U., 477, 480, 
 482, 483, 522, 526, 535, 537, 538. 
 
 Patterson, Gen. Robert, U., 88. 
 
 Pegram, Gen. John, 100, 418. 
 
 Pegram, Maj. W. J., C, 325, 532. 
 
 Pelham, John, 257. 
 
 Pender, Gen. Wm. D., C, 165, 
 166, 285, 298, 321, 322, 327, 341; 
 Lee's high opinion of, 713. 
 
 Pendleton, Colonel, C, 350. 
 
 Pendleton, Col. Alex. G., 187. 
 
 Pendleton, Gen. Wm. N., C, 245, 
 246, 254, 260, 271, 286, 331, 559, 
 560, 679. 
 
 Perrin, Gen. Abner, C, death of, 
 419. 
 
 Perry, Gen. E. A., C, 337. 
 
 Petersburg, siege of, 467 ff. 
 
 Pettigrevv, Gen. J. J., C, 321, 341, 
 712, 713. 
 
 Pickett, Gen. Geo. E., C, 169, 265, 
 298, 322, 336, 337, 338, 339, 341, 
 356, 365, 426, 431, 437, 438, 451, 
 498, 523, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 
 531, 532, 533; his error at Five 
 Forks, 534; 535, 541, 542, 551, 
 705, 709. 
 
 Pleasanton, Gen. Alfred, U., 269, 
 278, 281, 282, 292, 310, 311, 
 316. 
 
 Poague, Col. Wm. T., C, quoted, 
 331-332, 558. 
 
 Polk, Gen. L., C, death of, 504. 
 
 Polk, Dr. William M., 577. 
 
 Pope, Gen. John, U., 192, 193, 
 194, 197, 200; defeated at Sec- 
 ond Manassas, 206 jf. ; 218,221, 
 366, 367, 547, 599, 622. 
 
 Porter, Gen. Fitz John, U., 88, 146, 
 150, 152, 160, 164, 165, 169, 
 170, 172, 173, 180, 183, 191, 209, 
 
 210, 211, 212, 214, 231, 245, 246; 
 
 charged by Pope with loss of 
 
 battle of Second Manassas, 252; 
 
 276. 
 Posey, Gen. C, C, 337. 
 Potter, Gen. R. B., U., 419, 420, 
 
 470; cf. 537. 
 Preston, Colonel, 670. 
 
 Ramseur, Gen. S. D., C, 321; 
 
 wounded, 419; 461. 
 Randolph, General, 131, 132. 
 Ransom, Gen. Robt., C, 159, 265, 
 
 428, 527, 529, 531, 696. 
 Read, Gen. Theo., U., 557. 
 Reid, Hon. Whitelaw, quoted, 
 
 630. 
 Reno, Gen. J. L., U., 209. 
 Reynolds, Gen. J. F., U., 102, 107, 
 
 110, 211, 257, 292, 319, 323; 
 
 death of, 326, 328. 
 Rhodes, J. F., quoted, 393, 499, 
 
 502, 503, 561, 628. 
 Richardson, Gen. I. B., U., 140, 
 
 159 234 236. 
 Ricketts, Gen. J. B., U., 207, 232, 
 
 233. 
 Ripley, Gen. R. S., C, 143. 
 Robertson's Texans, 336. 
 Rodes, Gen. R. E., C, 279, 280, 
 
 281, 298, 321, 327, 330, 411, 413, 
 
 419, 437, 461, 704, 705. 
 Rodgers, Commodore John, U., 
 
 123. 
 Ropes, John C, quoted, 50-52, 
 
 162, 163, 201, 203, 225, 230, 232, 
 
 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 245, 254. 
 Rosecrans, Gen. W. S., U., 102, 
 
 110-111, 308, 365. 
 Rosser, Gen. T. L., C, 469, 527, 
 
 528 558 
 Russell, Gen. D. A., U., 369. 
 
 Salem Church, battle of, 293. 
 
 Santa Anna, 24. 
 
 Scales, Gen. A. M., C, 322, 330, 
 
 535 713. 
 Schofield, Gen. J. M., U., 505, 515, 
 
 517, 518, 629. 
 Schurz, Gen. Carl, U., quoted, 271, 
 
 280; 327. 
 Scott, Gen. W., U., his opinion of 
 
 Lee, 21, 23, 25; calls Lee "the 
 
INDEX 
 
 733 
 
 greatest soldier now living in 
 the world," 26; Lee's letter of 
 resignation to, 55-56; 85, 88, 
 189, 544, 577. 
 
 Seddon, J. A., Secretary of War, C, 
 308, 492, Lee's despatch to, 
 509; 601; Lee's letter to, 604. 
 
 Sedgwick, Gen. John, U., 139, 234, 
 235, 237, 266, 269, 270, 271, 275, 
 277, 280, 292, 293, 294, 310, 333, 
 346, 369, 375, 3S4, 396, 397, 399, 
 405, 412, 417, 672. 
 
 Semmes, Gen. P. J., C, 336, 713. 
 
 Seven Pines, battle at, 139-140. 
 
 Seymour, Gen. Truman, U., 405, 
 555. 
 
 Shaler, Gen. Alex., U., 405. 
 
 Sharpsburg, battle of, 231 ff. 
 
 Sheridan, Gen. P. H., U., 384, 408, 
 433, 435, 436, 437, 438, 446, 467; 
 appointed in charge of forces 
 guarding Washington, 469; 471, 
 479, 485, 517, 525, 527, 528, 529, 
 533, 534, 542, 550, 551, 552, 554, 
 556, 560, 563, 566, 570, 571. 
 
 Sherman, Gen. W. T., U., 379, 385, 
 458, 503, 504, 505, 508, 509, 512, 
 515, 516, 518, 523; offers John- 
 ston terms of surrender, 578; 
 599, 603; his ruthless devasta- 
 tions, 629 /. 
 
 Shields, Gen. J., U., 136, 157. 
 
 Sickles, Gen. D. E., U., 278, 279, 
 280, 281, 282, 289, 292, 326, 334, 
 335, 336, 338, 344. 
 
 Sigel, Gen. Franz, U., 206, 207, 
 208, 385, 386, 424, 445, 461, 501. 
 
 Slocum, Gen. H. W., U., 170, 180, 
 237, 270, 287, 292, 326. 
 
 Smith, Gen. G. W., C, 139, 140, 
 143; cf. 131. 
 
 Smith, Capt. J. P., C, 285. 
 
 Smith, Gen. Wm., C, 321. 
 
 Smith, Gen. Wm. F., U., 237, 260, 
 428, 429, 436, 438, 439, 440, 449, 
 450, 457. 
 
 South Anna, 430 ff. 
 
 Spottsylvania Court House, battle 
 of, 410/. 
 
 Stanton, E. M., Secretary of War, 
 U., 157, 700, 701. 
 
 Stark, Jack, 714. 
 
 Starke, Gen. Wm. E., C, 113, 232. 
 
 Steele, quoted, 356. 
 
 Stephens, The Hon. Alex. H., 82- 
 83, 93; quoted, 116; 118, 119, 
 595. 
 
 Steuart, Gen. George H., C, 418, 
 527, 529, 532. 
 
 Stevens, Major, C, 697. 
 
 Stevenson, Colonel, C, 95. 
 
 Stevenson, Gen. T. G., U., 403. 
 
 Stoneman, Gen. Geo., U., 269, 
 518. 
 
 Stuart, Gen. J. E. B., C, 29, 91, 
 152; makes a complete circuit 
 of McClellan's army twice, 153- 
 155, 160, 246-247; 174, 175, 191, 
 198, 200, 204, 205, 211, 220, 223, 
 224, 233, 234, 241, 256, 257, 269, 
 270, 276, 286, 289, 290, 309, 311, 
 315, 316, 317, 320, 321, 322, 338, 
 339, 355; his delay at Gettys- 
 burg, 356; 364, 367, 390, 404, 
 406, 407, 696, 704, 705, 706, 707, 
 708, 711. 
 
 Sturgis, Gen. S. D., U., 260. 
 
 Sumner, Gen. E. V., U., 28, 139, 
 140, 143, 170, 177, 180, 231, 234, 
 235, 237, 254, 257, 259; quoted, 
 391. 
 
 Sydnor, Lincoln, 187, 715. 
 
 Sykes, Gen. Geo., U., 166, 246. 
 
 Tagart, , 678. 
 
 Taliaferro, Gen. W. B., C, 256, 
 
 258. 
 Tatnall, Commodore Jos., C, 134. 
 Taylor, Col. Walter H., C, Lee's 
 
 adjutant-general, 95, 104, 114, 
 
 163; quoted, 209, 259, 302-303; 
 
 328; quoted, 393, 404-405, 407, 
 
 562, 668, 702. 
 Terry, Gen. H. D., U., 451. 
 Terry, Gen. W. R., C, 527, 529, 
 
 531. 
 Thomas, Gen. E. L., C, 166, 258, 
 
 322, 535, 539. 
 Thomas, George A., 88. 
 Thomas, Gen. George B., U., 102, 
 
 123, 379, 505. 
 Thompson, Major, C, death of, 
 
 557. 
 Tombs, Gen. Robert, C, 151. 
 Trent, ship, 98. 
 Trimble, Gen. I. R., C, ?.32, 341, 
 
 713. . - . - 
 
734 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Tucker, Com. J. R., C, 546. 
 Turner, Gen. John W., U., 537, 
 539. 
 
 Upton, Gen. Emory, U., 413, 421. 
 
 Vatjghan, Gen. A. J., C, 445. 
 Vincent, Gen. Strong, U., 335, 336. 
 
 Wadsworth, Gen. J. S., U., 326, 
 330, 399; wounded, 403. 
 
 Walker, Gen. J. A., C, 321. 
 
 Walker, Col. J. C, C, 232. 
 
 Walker, Gen. J. G., C, 223, 226, 
 234. 
 
 Walker, Gen. R. Lindsay, C, 552, 
 718. 
 
 Walker, Gen. W. S., C, 414. 
 
 Wallace, Gen. Lew, U., 462, 465, 
 502 527 529. 
 
 Warren, Gen. G. K., U., 335, 336, 
 367, 371, 384, 396, 407, 408, 411, 
 412, 417, 420, 421, 422, 432, 436, 
 437, 439, 447, 449, 472, 474, 477, 
 478, 480, 482, 483, 525, 527, 529, 
 531; relieved of his command 
 by Sheridan, 533; 534. 
 
 Washburne, Col. Francis, U., 556. 
 
 Washington, George, 8; portrait 
 of, given to grandmother of 
 R. E. Lee, 10; his character 
 influencing Lee, 9-13, 60-61, 
 63-64; as a commander, 68; 609, 
 687. 
 
 Washington, Col. J. A., C, 104; 
 death of, 108-109, 110, 114. 
 
 Wayne, Mad Anthony, 8. 
 
 Weed, Gen. S. H., U., 336. 
 
 Weems, Parson, 12. 
 
 Weiseger, Col. D. A., C, 473. 
 
 Weitzel, Gen. G., U., 548. 
 
 Wheaton, Gen. F., U., 555. 
 
 Whiting, Gen. W. H. C, C, 146, 
 151, 153, 168, 170, 171, 172, 181, 
 183 428 
 
 Whittier, Colonel, C, 572. 
 
 Wickham, William F., 351. 
 
 Wilbourn, Capt. R. E., C, 285. 
 
 Wilcox, Gen. C. M., C, 169, 209, 
 292, 293, 336, 341, 397, 398, 399, 
 401, 415, 419, 420, 439, 455, 471, 
 475, 478, 483, 537, 539, 540, 545. 
 
 Wilderness campaign, the, 388 ff., 
 395 jf. 
 
 Williams, Col. J. M., C, 321. 
 
 Williams, S., 296. 
 
 Williams, Gen. Seth, U., 567. 
 
 Williamsburg, battle at, 134. 
 
 Wilmer, Bishop, 636. 
 
 Wilson, Gen. James H., U., 394, 
 405, 436, 449, 455, 456. 
 
 Winder, Gen. C. S., C, 168. 
 
 Wirz, Captain, 658. 
 
 Wise, Gen. Henry A., C, 102, 
 104, 105, 106, 110-111, 426, 448, 
 450, 451, 526, 527, 532, 550. 
 
 Wofford, Gen. W. T., C, 336, 402. 
 
 Wolselej'-, Viscount, quoted, 5, 
 247, 682. 
 
 Woolfork, Captain, C, 633. 
 
 Wright, Gen. A. R., C, 159, 181, 
 182, 336, 337, 422, 473. 
 
 Wright, Gen. H. G., U., 412, 417, 
 421, 437, 439, 440, 463, 525, 526, 
 535, 538, 539, 555, 558. 
 
 Wright, Gen. Marcus J., C, 75; 
 his letter to author containing 
 statistics of Confederate and of 
 Federal armies quoted, 698-701. 
 
 Young, John Russell, 566. 
 
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