Book , 
 
 M~ 
 
,-/! 
 
 
 sy^ ^ 
 
REPORT 
 
 ON THE 
 
 ORGANIZATION AND CAMPAIGNS 
 
 ARMY OF THE POTOMAC : 
 
 TO WHICH IS ADDED AN ACCOUNT OF THE 
 
 CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA, 
 
 WITH PLANS OF BATTLE-FIELDS. 
 
 BY 
 
 GEOEGE B?' McCLELLAN, 
 
 MAJOK-GENEEAL UNITED STATES ARMY. 
 
 NEW YOEK: 
 SHELDON & COMPANY, PUBLISHERS, 
 
 335 BROADWAY, cor. WORTH STREET. 
 
 18 64. 
 

 Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1864, by 
 
 SHELDON & CO., 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of tlie United States for the Southern 
 
 District of New York. 
 
 (i* 3 1 ^n \^ 
 i o 6 
 
 Smith & MoDougal, C. S. Westcott & Co. 
 
 Stereotypors. Printers. 
 
When the Report whicli is given in this vohime was 
 prepared and sent to the Adjutant-General, it was impos- 
 sible to include in it the particulars of the Campaign in 
 Western Virginia, for the reason that important papers re- 
 lating to it had not come to my hands. During the various 
 changes which had occurred in the Western Department, 
 they had been moved from place to place, and efforts to 
 reclaim them from among the papers of other officers, 
 succeeded only a few weeks ago. In order to com- 
 plete the history of the campaigns in which I have been 
 engaged, it has seemed proper to prefix to the official 
 report a simple narrative of the Campaign in Western 
 Virginia. 
 
 February 22, 1864. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 The attack upon Fort Sumter on the 12th of April, 1861, 
 took the Northern people by surprise, and found them entirely 
 unprepared to carry on a serious contest. Our people were 
 born and educated amidst the blessings of peace and material 
 prosperity ; they were in the habit of yielding obedience to 
 the laws of the country and the will of the majority as ex- 
 pressed in the elections, and had become accustomed to see 
 great political excitement and animosity calmly subside through 
 the deference of the minority to the decision of the majority. 
 Thus to the last moment it was difficult to realize that a great 
 civil war was imminent ; and men clung fondly to the hope 
 that the good sense of both sections would in the eleventh 
 hour find some honorable solution to the difficulty, as had so 
 often been the case before. 
 
 It is probable that neither section fully realized the power 
 and violence of the passions evoked, and that each flattered 
 itself with the delusive hope that the other would yield some- 
 thing, rather than risk the inevitable and terrible consequences 
 of an appeal to arms. Each underrated the strength, resources 
 and courage of the other. These mutual misunderstandings, 
 ably used by a comparatively small number of ambitious and 
 unscrupulous men, Avere at their height when the insult ofiered 
 the national flag in the harbor of Charleston ai'oused both par- 
 ties to something like a true sense of their condition. The 
 South were warned that they were irrevocably committed to 
 make good their threats, and to establish by force their vaunted 
 right of secession. It was brought clearly to the minds of 
 Northei'n men that it was now too late to inquire what were 
 the original causes of the contest, and that it only remained 
 
6 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 for them to avenge the msult to the flag, and to sustain 
 the government in supporting the inviolabiUty of the con- 
 stitution, maintaining the unity of the nation, and enforcing 
 its laws. There can be no question that these were the true 
 issues which called forth that wonderful enthusiasm mani- 
 fested by our people in 1861. When the President, on the 
 19th of April, 1861, issued his call for seventy-five thousand 
 volunteers to suppress the rebellion, the difficulty was to 
 restrain the ardor of the nation, and to limit the number of 
 volunteers to something like that called for. The struggle 
 then was as to who should be so fortunate as to be received, 
 not as to who should avoid the call. 
 
 The governors of States were besieged by eager crowds, 
 anxious to be permitted to fight for their country ; and they, 
 in turn, importuned the authorities in Washington for permis- 
 sion to increase their quotas — a permission usually very diffi- 
 cult to obtain — for the men were still few who foresaw the 
 magnitude and duration of the struggle in which we had em- 
 barked. 
 
 While there was no difficulty in procuring men, it was no 
 easy task to arm, equip, and organize them, especially in the 
 Western States. 
 
 The scanty supplies of war material at the disposal of the 
 general government were mainly in the East, with the excep- 
 tion of the arms at the St. Louis arsenal, which were not much 
 more than sufficient to meet the demands in Missouri. There 
 was no United States arsenal in the States of Ohio, Indiana, 
 ininois, or Kentucky. The West at that time possessed no 
 establishment capable of manufacturing arms on a large scale, 
 and fevf for the preparation of clothing and equipments. In 
 proportion to the population, there was much less military in- 
 formation in the West than in the East. 
 
 It was under these circumstances that on the 23d of April, 
 1861, I was appointed by Governor Dennison Major-General 
 of the Ohio contingent, under the three months call, and at once 
 undertook the task of rendering available for the field the mass 
 of unorganized and unarmed men who were collecting upon 
 the call of the President. From Ohio thirteen regiments of 
 infantry were demanded ; in a few weeks the same number oi 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 7 
 
 three years regiments was called for, and by the middle of 
 July the number was increased to twenty-two. No cavalry 
 or artillery were embraced in the original call. 
 
 On the 23d of April there were in the State of Ohio one 
 thousand eight hundred and eighty small arms, mostly altered 
 Hint locks ; thirty-one field guns, many of which were unfit 
 for service, and few provided with the indispensable equip- 
 ments; one hundred and tAventy tents; not a regiment yet 
 mustered into the United States service. Such were the prep- 
 arations of a State which has since sent vast armies into the 
 field. Indiana and Illinois were not in a more favorable con- 
 dition. 
 
 All mail communications with Washington were at that 
 time interrupted in consequence of the occurrences at Balti- 
 more, and were for a long period diflicult and uncertain. The 
 attention of the authorities was fully occupied in arranging for 
 the immediate defense of the capital, and— the supplies being 
 limited in amount — but little could be done for the Western 
 States, which were for some weeks compelled to rely on their 
 own resources. Neither the people nor the governors failed 
 in the emergency, but both manfully met the crisis. It was 
 then that the strength and value of the State governments 
 were made fully manifest, for to them was the safety of the 
 West due in that hour of trial. 
 
 I have good reason to know that all the loyal governors of 
 the Western States did their full duty in the emergency, but 
 beino- in more direct personal communication with Governor 
 Dennison of Ohio during the most critical portion of this pe- 
 riod, I desire to bear testimony to the high qualities he then 
 displayed. He manifested a degree of energy, ability, untiring 
 devotion, and disinterested patriotism Avhich was creditable in 
 the extreme. 
 
 As has already been said, the Western States were totally 
 unprepared for the impending struggle. It may be asserted 
 Avith almost literal truth that neither arms, ammunition, nor 
 equipments existed there ; we had nothing but the men, — all 
 else was to be created. Another great difiiculty arose from 
 absence of government funds ; the subsistence department 
 soon supplied its agents with money, but none was received 
 
8 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 from the quarter-master's department until after the 20th of 
 May, and then for some time in insufficient amounts. 
 
 The governors of the States now exerted themselves to the 
 utmost; they were energetically supported by the Legisla- 
 tures, "who authorized them to use the funds and pledge the 
 credit of their States, for the purchase of arms, ammunition, 
 clothing, etc. Without this action on their part, the greater 
 portion of the summer would have passed without the organ- 
 ization of troops in the West. 
 
 On the 3d of May the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois 
 were formed into the Department of the Ohio, which the 
 general-in-chief placed under my command. Immediately 
 upon receiving the order I placed myself in communication 
 with the governors of these three States, and nothing in our 
 power was left undone to push forward military preparations. 
 The governor of Ohio, fully alive to the magnitude of the oc- 
 casion and the insufficiency of the number of trooj^s called for, 
 had, by the close of April, obtained the authority of the Legis- 
 lature to form nine regiments of three months troops for the 
 service of the State, in addition to those called for by the 
 United States. He placed these additional regiments under 
 my command. It was only after repeated effiarts and refusals 
 that a very small number of regular officers were obtained to 
 take charge of the administrative branches of the service, and 
 the task of organization slowly proceeded. 
 
 Supplies did not come in rapidly, and great difficulty was 
 experienced in arming and equipping the troops. 
 
 On the 21st of May the total number of small arms in the 
 State of Ohio was twenty-five thousand one hundred and 
 seventy-nine, of which twenty-two thousand and seventy-five 
 were smooth bores, mostly very inferior specimens of the al- 
 tered flint locks. Infantry equipments were still more difficult 
 to obtain. 
 
 During the month of May the political aspect of affiiirs in 
 Kentucky and Western Virginia was uncertain and threaten- 
 ing. In the latter a convention had been called to assemble 
 at Wheeling, on the 13 th of May, to decide upon the question 
 of separation from the eastern portion of the State, Avhile the 
 election upon the question of ratifying the Richmond ordinance 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 9 
 
 of secession from the United States, was fixed foi- the 23d 
 of the same month. Excitement ran high, and honest men 
 diiFered widely as to the policy that should be pursued by the 
 military authorities of the general government. 
 
 I received a multitude of letters from a large number of 
 sincere Union men who entertained widely divergent views as 
 to the measures adequate to the emergency. Many urged, as 
 early as the beginning of May, that troops should immediately 
 be sent into Virginia, to encourage the Union men and pre- 
 vent the secessionists from gaining a foothold. At least an 
 equal number insisted with equal force that the arrival of 
 troops from other States would merely arouse State pride, 
 throw many wavering men into the rebel ranks, and at once 
 kindle the flames of civil war. 
 
 In Kentucky the struggle was much more bitter than in 
 "Western Virginia. The State government, the arms, and 
 the military organization, were to a great extent in the hands 
 of men who favored the secession of the State ; but so able 
 and determined was the course of the Union leaders, and so 
 marked did the majority of the people soon become in their 
 support, that the secessionist leaders were compelled to content 
 themselves with the avowal of the position of neutrality, while 
 aAvaiting the results of the elections to be held on the 26th 
 June for Congressmen, and on the 4th August for members 
 of the Legislature. 
 
 The policy of the leaders of the Union party was, " To re- 
 main in the Union without a revolution, under all the forms 
 of law, and by their own action." The words of Garret Da- 
 vis were, " We will remain in the Union by voting if we can, 
 by fighting if we must, and if we cannot hold our own, we 
 will call on the general government to aid us." 
 
 It was the desire of these true and able men that no ex- 
 traneous elements of excitement should be introduced in the 
 State until the elections were over ; they felt sure of carrying 
 these elections if left to themselves. I fully coincided with 
 them in their expectations and opinions, and, so far as was in 
 my power, lent them every assistance in cai-rying out their 
 views, among which were the organization of Home Guards 
 and the distribution of arms to Union men. In Missouri, hos- 
 
 1* 
 
10 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 tilities had already broken out, and it was evident that that 
 State was destined to become the seat of serious fighting ; nor 
 was it then supposed that our tenure of St. Louis was en- 
 tirely secure. 
 
 Collections of Southern troops at Memphis and Union City 
 threatened Columbus, Ky., and Cairo, and made it necessary 
 to keep a vigilant watch in that direction. It should also be 
 remembered tliat in the early part of May the national cap- 
 ital was by no means secure, and it was not at that time an 
 improbable contingency that Western regiments might yet be 
 needed to protect or regain Washington. As bearing upon 
 this point, it may be stated that in a letter addressed to the 
 General-in-chief on the 21st May, I informed him that from the 
 information in my possession the indications were that the dis- 
 posable troops in the regular Confederate service, from Missis- 
 sippi, Alabama, Arkansas and Louisiana had gone to the East 
 via Lynchburg ; leaving in Tennessee the State militia, who 
 were badly armed and under no discipline. On the 26th 
 April, when my command was confined to the limits of the 
 State of Ohio, I submitted to the general-in-chief certain sug- 
 gestions, the substance of which was : — That, for the purposes 
 of defense, Cairo should be occupied by two battalions, strongly 
 intrenched, and provided with heavy guns and a gunboat to 
 control the river ; that some eight battalions should be sta- 
 tioned at Sandoval in Illinois to observe St, Louis, sustain the 
 garrison of Cairo, and if necessary, reinforce Cincinnati ; that 
 a few companies should observe the lower Wabash ; that some 
 four thousand men should be posted at Seymour in Indiana to 
 observe Louisville, and be ready to support either Cincinnati or 
 Cairo ; that there should be five thousand men at or near Cin- 
 cinnati, and two battalions at ChiUicothe, Ohio. With the 
 troops disposable for active opei-ations, it was proposed to 
 move up the valley of the Great Kanawha upon Richmond ; 
 this movement to be made with the greatest promptness, that 
 it might not fail to relieve Washington, or to insure the de- 
 struction of the enemy in Eastern Virginia, if aided by a 
 prompt advance on the eastern line of operations. Should 
 Kentucky assume a hostile attitude, it was recommended to 
 cross the Ohio with eighty thousand men, and move straight 
 
THE CAISIPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 11 
 
 on Nashville, acting tlience in concert with a vigoi'ous offen- 
 sive on the Eastern line. It was strongly urged that every- 
 thing possible should be done to hasten the equipment and 
 armament of the Western troops, as the nation Avould be en- 
 tirely deprived of their powerful aid until this should be ac- 
 complished. 
 
 It was not until the 13th May that the order, forming the 
 Department of the Ohio and assigning me to the command, 
 "was received. In the meantime, as much excitement existed 
 at Cincinnati, which city was regarded as a tempting object 
 to the enemy in the uncertain condition of Kentucky, I took 
 steps to concentrate the greater part of the Ohio troops at 
 Camp Dennison, on the Little Miami Railroad, seventeen miles 
 from Cincinnati ; a favorable j^osition for instruction, and pre- 
 senting peculiar facilities for movement in any direction. As 
 soon as the new department was placed under my command, I 
 took steps for the immediate erection of heavy batteries at 
 Cairo. In the letter of May 21st, already referred to, after 
 giving the information obtained in regard to the position of 
 the enemy on the Mississij^pi River, it Avas stated that I was 
 convinced of the necessity of having, without a day's delay, a 
 few efficient gunboats to opei'ate from Cairo as a base ; that if 
 they were rendered shot-proof, they would enable us at least 
 to annoy seriously the rebel camps on the Mississippi, and 
 interfere with their river communications — their main depend- 
 ence ; that I requested authority to make the necessary ex- 
 penditures to procure gunboats, and that I regarded them as 
 an indispensable element in any system of oj^erations, whether 
 offensive or defensive. In the same letter the necessity for 
 light batteries was strongly set forth. 
 
 I now urged to the utmost the organization and equipment 
 of the troops in the three States, and received the most en- 
 ergetic and cordial support from Governors Morton, Yates 
 and Dennison. While awaiting the development of the 
 policy of the general government, and in accordance with the 
 sound advice of the general-in-chief as to the instruction of 
 the troops, I determined to hold the troops in readiness to 
 move wherever they might be needed, and to push the work 
 of instruction and equipment. I also determined to afford 
 
12 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 any assistance in my power that might be required by the 
 commanding officer in Missouri, and so informed him ; to take 
 no steps of a miUtary nature in Kentucky until after the elec- 
 tions, unless that State were invaded from Tennessee, in which 
 case I clearly informed all concerned that I would at once 
 cross the Ohio and drive out the invaders ; and, in regard to 
 Western Virginia, to await the result of the convention of 
 May 13 and the election of May 23, Avith the purpose of 
 moving before that time if the operations of the secessionists 
 became such as to require attention. 
 
 In the early part of May, T declined moving troops into 
 "Western Virginia for the reasons already given, and because 
 I regarded Kentucky as of much greater importance. It was 
 not until the latter part of the month that I became fully sat- 
 isfied as to the favorable tendency of affairs in that quarter. 
 
 It was difficult to obtain accurate information as to the 
 movements of the secessionists in Western Virginia, and the 
 results proved that it was always necessary to make great 
 allowances for the exaggeration which ever attends ignorance 
 of military affiiirs, and the alarm consequent upon the shock 
 produced by a novel and abnormal state of things. Early in 
 May Governor Letcher called out the militia of Western 
 Virginia under the State laws ; Charleston in the Great Ka- 
 nawha Valley, Parkersburg in Wood County, and Grafton in 
 Taylor County, being the points at which they were to be as- 
 sembled. The accounts we received at the time, in regard to 
 the numbers of the militia thus collected, varied much, and 
 great alarm frequently manifested itself on the Ohio frontier 
 lest it should be invaded. To quiet this not unnatural feeling 
 a few arms were distributed among the Home Guards, and 
 about the middle of May some regiments of the Ohio State 
 troops were moved to points convenient to the more exposed 
 portions of the frontier. I did not share the aj^prehensions of 
 an invasion, for I saw no good reason to suspect the existence 
 of the necessary preparations, and did not regard it as prob- 
 able that the Confederates would at that period consider 
 Western Virginia as a suitable base for offensive operations 
 north and west of the Ohio river. I supposed it to be the 
 object of the Richmond authorities to hold possession of 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 13 
 
 "Western Virginia, and to coerce its loyal inhabitants into the 
 secession movement. 
 
 Dispatches from General R. E. Lee to Colonel Porterfield, 
 dated May 4th and later, which were captured at a subsequent 
 period, seem to establish the correctness of this view. In the 
 letter of May 4, Colonel Porterfield was directed to repair to 
 Grafton and select a position for the troops called into the 
 service of the State (Virginia) for the protection and defense 
 of that part of the country. He was informed that orders 
 had already been given for the occupation of Wheeling, and 
 was instructed to take possession of Parkersburg and the rail- 
 way leading thereto. He was ordered to call out the militia 
 in all the counties north of the Great Kanawha Valley, and 
 informed that it was not intended to interfere with the 2)eace- 
 ful use of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. In a letter, dated 
 Richmond, May 24, General Lee regrets that Colonel Porter- 
 field has been unsuccessful in organizing volunteers ; informs 
 him that reinforcements are on the way from Staunton and 
 Harper's Ferry, and hopes that he will spare no pains to pre- 
 serve the integrity of the State, and to prevent the occupation 
 of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad by its enemies. In reply 
 to an inquiry of Colonel Porterfield's as to the treatment of 
 traitors, he says that he cannot believe that any citizen of the 
 State will betray its interests, and that he hoj^es all will unite 
 in supporting the policy she may adopt. 
 
 It was not until the 2Vth May, that the order was given by 
 Governor Letcher, for the seizure of the post-oflices at Harper's 
 Ferry and Grafton, and the appointment of post-masters in 
 the interest of the State government. Information had already 
 been received, that a small camp of secessionist militia was 
 being established in the immediate vicinity of Grafton, when, 
 on the 24 th of May, I received, from the Secretary of War, 
 and the General-in-chief, telegrams confirming the fact of the 
 existence of this camp, and inquiring whether its effect upon the 
 L^nion men of that region could not be counteracted. I replied 
 that it could be done, and that if it were desired, the whole 
 region could be cleared of the secessionists. To this I received 
 no rej)ly, nor did I receive any subsequent communication as 
 to sending troops into Western Virginia. I, however, pro- 
 
14 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 ceeded to make the preparations for sending an expedition to 
 Grafton, as well as another to the Kanawha, the convention 
 of the 13th, having proved largely in favor of dividing the 
 State, and the election of the 23d having resnlted in a decided 
 refusal to ratify the secession ordinance. These preparations 
 were much interfered with, as were all operations for some 
 weeks subsequently, by the fact that, at that time, all the three 
 months United States regiments from Ohio were in the course 
 of transition to three years regiments, so that there were no 
 troops available in Ohio, except the nine regiments in State 
 service. 
 
 While at Camp Dennison, on the afternoon of the 26th May, 
 I received intelligence that the secessionists were advancing 
 from Grafton towards Wheeling and Parkersburg, for the pur- 
 pose of destroying the railroad. Regarding this as an act of 
 hostility, which it was my duty to counteract without delay, 
 I at once returned to Cincinnati, and gave, by telegraph, the 
 orders necessary in the case. In a letter subsequently cap- 
 tured, dated Grafton, May 25th, Colonel Porterfield states to 
 Colonel Willey, that it was essential to the safety of his com- 
 mand that the bridges be destroyed as far west on the rail- 
 road as possible, and directs the latter to proceed on the next 
 train to carry the destruction into effect without delay. The 
 First Regiment (loyal) Virginia Volunteers was in process of 
 organization at Wheeling, under Colonel B. F. Kelly ; the men 
 were provided with muskets, but had no cartridge-boxes, 
 equipments, uniform or camp-equipage. Late in the after- 
 noon, I telegraphed Colonel Kelly to move his regiment at 
 an early hour on the 27th, along the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
 road, in the direction of Fairmount. Colonel Kelly was in- 
 structed to prevent any further destruction of the bridges, 
 and to cover the repairs of those already injured 5 he was 
 directed to move with caution, and to use every effort to pre- 
 serve discipline, to respect the rights and property of the 
 inhabitants, to conciliate the peojile and strengthen the Union 
 feeling. 
 
 Colonel Irwin, commanding the ICth Ohio State Regiment, 
 ■was ordered to move from his camj^ at Bellaire into Virginia, 
 and support the forward movement of the 1st Virginia. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 15 
 
 Colonel Stedman, 14th Ohio, with his own regiment and the 
 18th, and Baniett's State Batteiy, was ordered to take j)Os- 
 session of Parkersburg on the morning of the 27th, and 
 proceed to Grafton under orders similar to those of Colonel 
 Kelly. 
 
 Deeply impressed with the importance of causing the citi- 
 zens of Western Virginia, to understand clearly the true pur- 
 poses of the occupation of their soil, and desirous to infuse a 
 proper feeling among our new troops, I issued the following 
 proclamation to the inhabitants, and address to the troops ! 
 
 PROCLAMATION. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Department of the Ohio. 
 May 26, 1861. 
 To the Union Men of Western Virginia : 
 
 Virginians ! — The general government has long enough 
 endured the machinations of a few factious rebels in your 
 midst. Armed traitors have in vain endeavored to deter you 
 from expressing your loyalty at the polls. Having failed in 
 this infamous attempt to deprive you of the exercise of your 
 dearest rights, they now seek to inaugurate a reign of terror, 
 and thus force you to yield to their schemes, and submit to 
 the yoke of the ti'aitorous conspiracy, dignified by the name 
 of the Southern Confederacy. They are destroying the prop- 
 erty of citizens of your State, and ruining your magnificent 
 railways. The general government has heretofore carefully 
 abstained from sending troops across the Ohio, or even from 
 jjosting them along its banks, although frequently urged to do 
 so by many of your prominent citizens. It determined to 
 await the result of the late election, desirous that no one might 
 be able to say that the slightest effort had been made from 
 this side to influence the free expression of your opinions, 
 although the many agencies brought to bear upon you by the 
 rebels were well known. You have now shown, under the 
 most adverse circumstances, that the great mass of the people 
 of Western Virginia, are true and loyal to that beneficent 
 government, under which we and our fathers have lived so 
 long. As soon as the result of the election was known, the 
 
16 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 traitors commenced their work of destruction. The general 
 government cannot close its ears to the demand you have 
 made for assistance. I have ordered troops to cross the Ohio 
 River. They come as your friends and brothers, — as enemies 
 only to the armed rebels who are preying upon you. Your 
 homes, your families, and your property are safe under our pro- 
 tection. All your rights shall be religiously respected, not- 
 Avithstanding all that has been said by the traitors to induce 
 you to believe that our advent among you will be signalized 
 by interference with your slaves. Understand one thing clear- 
 ly. Not only will we abstain from all such interference, but 
 we will on the contrary, with an iron hand, crush any attempt 
 at insurrection on their part. Now, that we are in your midst, 
 I call upon you to fly to arms and support the general govern- 
 ment. Sever the connection that buids you to traitors ; pro- 
 claim to the world that the faith and loyalty so long boasted 
 by the Old Dominion, are still preserved in "Western Virginia, 
 and that you remain true to the stars and stripes. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 Major-General U. S. A., Comd'g. Dep't. 
 
 ADDRESS. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Department of the Ohio. 
 Cincinnati, May 26, 1861. 
 
 Soldiers ! — You are ordered to cross the frontier, and enter 
 upon the soil of Virginia. 
 
 Your mission is to restore peace and confidence, to protect the 
 majesty of the law, and to rescue our brethren from the grasp 
 of armed traitors. You are to act in concert with Virginia 
 troops, and to support their advance. I place under the safe- 
 guard of your honor, the persons and property of the Virgin- 
 ians. I know that you will respect their feelings and all their 
 rights. 
 
 Preserve the strictest discipline ; — remember that each one 
 of you holds in his keeping, the honor of Ohio and the Union. 
 If you are called upon to overcome armed opposition, I know 
 that your courage is equal to the task ; — but remember, 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 17 
 
 that your only foes are the armed traitors, — and show mercy 
 even to them when they are in your power, for many of 
 them are misguided. When, under your protection, the loyal 
 men of Western Virginia have been enabled to organize and 
 arm, they can protect themselves, and you can then return to 
 your homes, with the proud satisfaction of having saved a gal- 
 lant people from destruction. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 Major-General TJ. S. A., Comd'g. 
 
 I had received no instructions as to the points covered by 
 these documents, nor had I in fact any direct orders to move 
 troops across the Ohio ; nor was there now time to refer to 
 Washington for instructions. These addresses were accordingly 
 prepared in great haste, without consultation, and sent by tele- 
 graph to Wheeling and Marietta immediately after the dispatch 
 of the orders for the movement of the troops. On the 1st June, 
 I wrote to the President, informing him of the cii'cumstances 
 under which the proclamation was written ; that I had en- 
 deavored to express what I had reason to suppose his views to 
 be, and requesting to be informed if I had misconceived the 
 intentions of his Excellency. As I received no reply to this 
 letter, nor any intimation from any quarter that my policy was 
 disapproved, I assumed that I was right, and acted accordingly. 
 
 Early in the afternoon of the 30th, Colonel Kelly, without 
 the loss of a single man, reached Grafton, which the seces- 
 sionists had abandoned upon his approach ; he had repaired 
 the bridges behind him, and established his railway com- 
 munications with Wheeling. Colonel Stedman arrived at 
 Clarksburg somewhat later, and communicated with Colonel 
 Kelly ; great delays had occurred on this line also in conse- 
 quence of the destruction of the bridges. Steps were at once 
 taken to guard the exposed structures on both branches of the 
 railroad, and reinforcements were pushed forward from Ohio 
 and Indiana. The enemy fell back from Grafton upon Phillip])i, 
 a village some 20 miles distant, in the direction of Beverly. 
 Brig.-Gen. T. A. Morris, Indiana Volunteers, was ordered to 
 Grafton, with the 6th, 7th, and 9th Indiana regiments, to as- 
 sume the immediate command. He reached his destination 
 
18 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 about the last day of May, and arranged an expedition to dis- 
 perse or capture the force at Phillippi. He directed the move- 
 ment to be made in two cohimns : one under Colonel Kelly, 
 consisting of five companies of the 1st Va., and detachments 
 of the 15th and 16th Ohio, and 9th Indiana, to march by a 
 country road east of Tygart's Valley river, and thus reach the 
 rear of Phillippi ; while Colonel Dumont, 7th Indiana, was to 
 proceed by the turnpike from Webster, Avith a column con- 
 sisting of the greater part of the 6th and 7th Indiana, and the 
 14th Ohio, and two sections of Barnett's battery, and attack 
 in front. It was intended that the two columns should attack 
 at 4 A.M., on the 3d June ; but Colonel Kelly's command was 
 delayed somewhat by the heavy rain which fell during the 
 night, and rendered the country road it followed very bad. 
 Just before Colonel Kelly reached their camp the enemy re- 
 ceived intelligence of his approach and dispersed. They 
 escaped mth the loss of 15 killed, some wounded and 
 prisoners, many arms, and all their baggage. Our loss was 
 confined to the serious wound received by the gallant Colonel 
 Kelly, who had from the commencement of the movement 
 ffom Wheeling displayed great energy, and high soldierly 
 qualities. All the regiments engaged in these trying marches 
 deserve great credit for their endurance and anxiety to meet the 
 enemy ; none more so than the 1st Virginia, which made this 
 short campaign destitute of all the necessai'ies of a soldier, save 
 their muskets, and the ammunition they carried in their 
 pockets. 
 
 The absence of means of transportation and of cavalry ren- 
 dered it impossible to follow uj) this success ; had it been 
 otherwise our troops might have occuj)ied the Cheat Mountain 
 Pass without opposition, and there probably would have been 
 no immediate necessity for the subsequent campaign in that 
 quarter. As it was, it was necessary to content ourselves with 
 the occupation of Phillippi and the Cheat River line until sub- 
 sequent events called me to the field in person. As fast as the 
 Ohio State regiments were equipped, they were pushed into 
 Western Virginia, and General Morris was thus enabled to 
 provide for the security of the railroad in his rear, and of his 
 advanced positions. Every exertion was now made by Cap- 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 19 
 
 tain J. H. Dickerson, the able chief quarter-master of the de- 
 partment, to provide means of transportation ; but notwith- 
 standing his utmost efforts this work proceeded slowly, and 
 there was a most vexatious delay in all the preparations neces- 
 sary to put the troops in proper condition to take the field. 
 While these measures were being pushed to the utmost, during 
 the early and middle parts of June, intelligence reached me 
 that strong reinforcements had arrived to the enemy at Beverly, 
 from the east; that General Robert S. Garnett had been 
 placed in command, and that he had occupied strong positions 
 at Laurel Hill and Rich Mountain, commanding the two roads 
 leading to Beverly. Reports reached me almost daily to the 
 effect that his force was being rapidly increased, and that he 
 would soon assume the offensive to regain what they had lost 
 in Western Virginia. Although many of these reports were 
 evidently exaggerated, and the danger did not appear so im- 
 minent as some apprehended, I determined to go thither as 
 soon as a sufficient force could be made available, and by taking 
 the initiative, dispose of Garnett before he was in condition to 
 do much mischief The aspect of affiiirs in Missouri and Ten- 
 nessee was at this time such that I did not feel at liberty to 
 make use of the Illinois regiments, but left them for service in 
 the quarter named, and assigned the available Ohio and Indi- 
 ana troops to duty in West Virginia. 
 
 Towards the close of June a considerable amount of trans- 
 portation was ready, and the arrangements for the supply of 
 camp equipage somewhat advanced. As the reports from 
 Grafton were now very alarming, I determined that the 
 proper time had arrived for me to take the field, and on the 
 20th June left Cincinnati for Parkersburg, where I arrived the 
 next morning. The 21st and part of the 22d were spent at 
 that place in hurrying on transportation and supplies, and on 
 the afternoon of the 2 2d I went to Grafton, leaving General 
 Rosecrans at Parkersburg to push forward the troops and 
 material. On the 23d I wrote to the General-in-chief from 
 Grafton, informing him that five regiments and two detached 
 companies of infantry, one battery, and one company of cavalry 
 had reached the vicinity, and that two more regiments of 
 infantry and a battery were expected next day; that the 
 
20 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 information received rendered it more than probable that a 
 rebel force of from one thousand five hundred to three thou- 
 sand with guns was intrenched at Roraney ; that I thought 
 their purpose was to cover the approaches to Winchester 
 against an attack from the west, and suggesting that General 
 Patterson should take care of them. I also stated that it was 
 now certain that the enemy had a force of some kind near Hut- 
 tonsville, with a sti'ong advanced party intrenched near Laurel 
 Mountain, between Phillippi and Beverly, and that their chief 
 object seemed to me to be to furnish and protect guerrilla par- 
 ties, which were then doing much mischief; also that the ap- 
 prehensions which had existed on the part of our people of an 
 atack by this party of the enemy were not well founded ; that 
 as soon as my command was well in hand, and my informa- 
 tion more full, I proposed moving, with all my available force, 
 from Clarksburg on Buckhannon, thence on Beverly, to turn 
 entirely the detachment at Laurel Hill ; the troops at Phillippi 
 to advance in time to follow up the retreat of the enemy in 
 their front. Tliat, after occupying Beverly, I would move on 
 Huttonsville, and drive the enemy into the mountains, whither 
 I did not purpose to follow them unless certain of success. 
 Finally, that after having driven out the mass of their troops, 
 and having occupied the pass by which they might return, I 
 proposed to move small columns through the country, to re- 
 assure the Union men and break up all scattered armed par- 
 ties ; and that, as soon as practicable, I intended to clear out 
 the valley of the Kanawha. 
 
 This letter contained the plan of camj^aign which was 
 eventually carried into efiect ; and it must be observed that 
 its object was simply to drive the enemy out of Western Vir- 
 ginia, and hold it for the general government. 
 
 The movement upon which I was now entering was not in 
 consequence of any specific orders I received from Washing- 
 ton, nor was it a part of any general system of operations. 
 My department was invaded by the enemy, and I proceeded 
 forthwith to drive them out. The idea, very generally enter- 
 tained, that my operations were intended to aid Gen. Patter- 
 son, to threaten Winchester, or menace Richmond, was an 
 erroneous one. I was never informed of the intended plan of 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 21 
 
 campaign in the East, and my suggestion as to movements 
 without the bounds of my department towards the East had 
 not been entertained. I regarded the movement into Western 
 Virginia as a mere interhide, which served to accustom the 
 the troops to marches, hardships, and combats, and I intended 
 to return to Cincinnati when it was over, in order to resume 
 the preparations for the more important movements upon 
 East Tennessee, which would, I hoped, soon be undertaken. 
 
 While at Grafton, the following addresses to the inhabitants 
 of West Virginia and to the troops were issued, as called for 
 by circumstances at the time : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Department of the Ohio, 
 Grafton, Va., June 23, 1861. 
 
 To THE Inhabitants of Western Virginia, — 
 
 The army of this department, headed by Virginia troops, is 
 rapidly occupying all Western Virginia. This is done in co- 
 operation Avith, and in support of such civil authorities of the 
 State as are faithful to the constitution and laws of the United 
 States. The proclamation issued by me, under date of May 
 26, 1861, will be strictly maintained. Your houses, families, 
 proj^erty, and all your rights will be religiously respected ; we 
 are enemies to none but armed rebels, and those voluntarily 
 giving them aid. All officers of this army will be held re- 
 sponsible for the most prompt and vigorous action in repressing 
 disorder, and punishing aggression by those under their com- 
 mand. 
 
 To my great regret, I find that enemies of the United States 
 continue to carry on a system of hostilities prohibited by the 
 laws of war among belligerant nations, and of course far more 
 wicked and intolerable when directed against loyal citizens 
 engaged in the defense of the common government of all. 
 Individuals and marauding parties are pursuing a guerrilla 
 warfare — firing upon sentinels and pickets, burning bridges, 
 insulting, injuring, and even killing citizens, because of their 
 Union sentiments, and committing many kindred acts. 
 
 I do now therefore make proclamation, and warn all per- 
 sons, that individuals or jiarties engaged in this species of war- 
 
22 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 fare — irregular in every view which can be taken of it — thus 
 attacking sentinels, pickets, or other soldiers, destroying pub- 
 lic or private property, or committing injuries against any of 
 the inhabitants because of Union sentiments or conduct, will 
 be dealt with, in their persons and property, according to the 
 severest rules of military law. 
 
 All persons giving information or aid to the public enemies, 
 will be arrested and kept in close custody ; and all persons 
 found bearing arras, unless of known loyalty, will be an-ested 
 and held for examination. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 Major-General U. S. A., Comd'g. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Department of the Ohio, 
 Grafton, Va., June 25th, 1861. 
 
 To THE Soldiers of the Army of the West : 
 
 You are here to support the government of your country 
 and to protect the lives and liberties of your brethren, threat- 
 ened by a rebellious and traitorous foe. No higher and nobler 
 duty could devolve upon you, and I expect you to bring to its 
 performance the highest and noblest qualities of soldiers — dis- 
 cipline, courage, and mercy. I call upon the officers of every 
 grade to enforce the strictest discipline, and I know that those 
 of all grades, privates and officers, will display in battle cool 
 heroic courage, and will know how to show mercy to a dis- 
 armed enemy. 
 
 Bear in mind that you are in the country of fdends, not of 
 enemies ; that you are here to protect, not to destroy. Take 
 nothing, destroy nothing, unless you are ordered to do so by 
 your general officers. Remember that I have pledged my 
 word to the people of Western Virginia, that their rights in 
 person and property shall be respected. I ask every one of 
 you to make good this promise in its broadest sense. We 
 come here to save, not to upturn. I do not appeal to the fear 
 of punishment, but to your appreciation of the sacredness of 
 the cause in Avhich we are engaged. Carry with you into bat- 
 tle the conviction that you are right, and that God is on your 
 side. 
 
 Your enemies have violated every moral law — neither God 
 
THK CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 23 
 
 nor man can sustain them. They have without cause rebelled 
 against a mild and paternal govermhent ; they have seized 
 upon public and private property; they have outraged the 
 persons of Northern men merely because they came from the 
 North, and of Southern Union men merely because they loved 
 the Union ; they have placed themselves beneath contempt, 
 unless they can retrieve some honor on the field of battle. 
 You will pursue a different course. You will be honest, brave 
 and merciful ; you will respect the right of private opinion ; 
 you will puuish no man for opinion's sake. Show to the 
 world that you differ from our enemies in the points of honor, 
 honesty, and respect for private opinion, and that we inaugu- 
 rate no reign of terror where Ave go. 
 
 Soldiers ! I have heard that there was danger here. I have 
 come to place myself at your head and to share it with you. 
 I fear now but one thing — that you will not find foemen 
 worthy of your steel. I know that I can rely upon you. 
 
 Geo. B. McCi.ellan, 
 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 
 It was not until the last of June that the necessary arrange- 
 ments for an advance were completed ; these preparations 
 were much retarded by the fact that while in West Virginia 
 I had no experienced quarter-master with me until the day be- 
 fore I left Grafton for Buckhannon. 
 
 It may be well to state here that the greatest difficulty had 
 been experienced at first from the almost entire want of in- 
 structed officers for the various staff departments. Much time 
 and expense would have been saved had we been better pro- 
 vided in this respect at an earlier day. 
 
 Before moving from Grafton the troops in the field were 
 assigned as follows : 
 
 Phillixjpi. Brigadier-General Morris with the Sixth, Sev- 
 enth, and Ninth Indiana, Fourteenth Ohio, three companies of 
 Fifteenth Ohio, four companies of Sixteenth Ohio, four com- 
 panies of First Virginia, and Colonel Barnett's Ohio Battery ; 
 th« Sixth Ohio was subsequently assigned to this command. 
 
 Grafton, etc. Brigadier-General Hill, Ohio Militia, in 
 charge of the defense of the railroad and Cheat River, with 
 
24 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, Eighteenth, Twentieth and Twenty- 
 second Ohio State troops and Captain Dahn's Virginia Bat- 
 tery ; other Ohio troops were subsequently added to this com- 
 mand. 
 
 Active Column under my own Command. First Brigade, 
 Brigadier-General Rosecrans, Eighth and Tenth Indiana, Sev- 
 enteenth and Nineteenth Ohio ; the Seventeenth Ohio was subse- 
 quently replaced by the Thirteenth Indiana. Second Brigade, 
 Brigadier-General Schleich, with Third, Fourth, Seventh, and 
 Tenth Ohio ; the Seventh and Tenth were both detached, and 
 did not rejoin the main column during the continuance of ac- 
 tive operations. 
 
 Attached to Head-quarters. Captains Barker's and Burd- 
 saU's companies of cavalry. Captains Howe's and Loomis's 
 Batteries, Ninth Ohio Vohmteers, Company I, Fourth United 
 States Artillery, company Chicago Rifles, two companies Sec- 
 ond Virginia Infantry. 
 
 On the 27th June General Morris was directed to proceed 
 next morning to Phillippi and assume command of the forces 
 at that place. His instructions were to place his command in 
 an attitude to move upon the shortest notice ; to keep a 
 watchful eye on the enemy in his front, and to follow closely 
 should they retreat ; and if he learned that any portion had 
 retreated by the roads leading to the north and east, to endea- 
 vor to cut them ofl" and destroy them. 
 
 General Hill, who relieved General Morris at Grafton, re- 
 ceived special instructions as to guarding the base of opera- 
 tions, and was directed to pay particular attention to the 
 Cheat River line. The theatre of operations was that j^ortion 
 of Western Virginia contained between the Ohio and Cheat 
 Rivers in one direction, between the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
 road and tlie Great Kanawha and Gauley Rivers in the other. 
 The afliuents of the Monongahela and the two Kanawhas 
 divide this region into a number of narrow valleys, sepa- 
 rated by rough and difficult hills, which become true moun- 
 tains as they approach the heads of the Little Kanawha 
 and the west fork of the Monongahela. The roads prac- 
 ticable for wagons are few, narrow and difficult. As cul- 
 tivation is generally confined to the valleys, and the moun- 
 
THE C AMP AI GN IN WESTE RN VI RGINIA. 25 
 
 tain sides are obstructed by rocks and a dense growth of 
 timber and underbrush, it is difficult even for skirmishers 
 to move across the country, and it is not possible for troops 
 and trains to march elsewhere than on the narrow roads. 
 Positions suitable for handling artillery are rare, and cavalry 
 is useful in that district only to convey intelligence. The 
 resources of the country are inconsiderable. There are few 
 regions more difficult for the operations of large bodies of 
 troops. The only practicable wagon roads leading across the 
 mountains into this region, between Lewisburg and Moorfield, 
 unite at Huttonsville near the head of Tygart's Valley River ; 
 from this point northward, there is no practicable wagon road 
 across the mountains until the road leading from Leedsville 
 via St. George to West Union and Moorfield is reached. The 
 main turnpike, from Staunton to Wheeling, passes through 
 Huttonsville and Beverly down the Tygart's Valley ; this road 
 was held and intrenched by General Garnett at Laurel Hill, 
 some fifteen miles north of Beverly. At the latter place a 
 good road branches off westward to Buckhannon ; this road 
 was held and intrenched by Colonel Pegrara at Rich Moun- 
 tain, some five miles west of Beverly. This last road again 
 forks at Buckhannon, one branch leading to Weston, the 
 other to Clarksburg. About twelve miles from the latter 
 place, near a bridge over Elk Creek, a cross road comes in from 
 Phillippi. Premising that the mountains separating the val- 
 leys are everywhere impassable for artillery, except by the 
 roads mentioned, it will be easy to understand the movements 
 of the campaign, which were exceedingly simple. The direct 
 and natural retreat of Garnett and Pegram was via Huttons- 
 ville on Staunton ; if cut off from that, their only chance of 
 escape was via Leedsville and St. George. LTpon these data 
 I arranged the plan of campaign sketched in the letter of 
 June 23, already referred to. On the 26th June, three regi- 
 ments of Rosecrans's brigade and Loomis's battery were 
 advanced from Clarksburg, twelve iniles towards Buckhannon 
 to Elk Bridge, where the ci'oss road branches off to Phillippi ; 
 and on the same day the Ninth Ohio was moved from Web- 
 ster to Phillippi, ready at the proper time to join Rosecrans 
 by the cross road above referred to. The object of these dis- 
 
 2 
 
26 THE CAMPAIGN IN" WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 positions was to gain more room for movements, to cover the 
 Elk Bridge, and to deceive the enemy as to our real intentions 
 by drawing their attention to Phillipjii. General Schleich's 
 brigade followed to Elk Bridge on the 28th. General Rose- 
 crans, Avith the three regiments of his own brigade, the Ninth 
 Ohio and Loomis's battery, occupied Buckhannon on the 30th. 
 At four A.M., of the same day. Colonel Tyler, of the Seventh 
 Ohio, occupied Weston after a night march of twenty-eight 
 miles from Clarksburg, ])laced the State officers in possession 
 of the Branch Bank at that place, and \n\t a stop to guerrilla 
 operations in that quarter. As Colonel Tyler was thus but 
 one march from Buckhannon, he was in position to support 
 the main column if necessary. He covered our base of opera- 
 tions, and it was hoped that this apparently divergent move- 
 ment would tend still more to confuse the enemy as to my 
 real designs. General Schleich reached Buckhannon on the 
 2d July. I had not intended to occupy Buckhannon, nor to 
 advance beyond Elk Bridge, until prepared to pass through 
 Buckhannon to Beverly without halting ; but the difficulty of 
 finding proper camping grounds carried some of the troojDS 
 beyond Elk Bridge on the 28th, upon learning which I deter- 
 mined to occupy Buckhannon, in order to prevent the enemy 
 from drawing su])plies or reinforcements from that region. 
 Having completed my prej^arations as far as possible, I left 
 Clarksburg on the 1st July and reached Buckhannon on the 
 2nd. Further delay was incurred here in consequence of the 
 great deficiency in transportation ; it being necessary to send 
 back the trains to bring up supplies before we could pi'oceed 
 further. "While waiting here, and previously at Clarksburg, 
 several expeditions were sent out from Parkersburg, Weston, 
 etc., to protect loyal citizens, cover the approaches to the rail- 
 road, break up guerrilla parties, etc. On the 3rd, instructions 
 were sent to General Hill informing him that, if the enemy at 
 Laurel Hill pei-mitted us to gain their rear at Beverly, their 
 only chance of escape would be by St. George, or by forcing the 
 passage of the Cheat River near Rowlesburg, and directing 
 him to hold his troops in readiness to act should the case 
 occur. 
 
 About this time it became certain that Generals Wise and 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 27 
 
 Floyd had reached the Kanawha Valley with considerable re- 
 inforcements. I therefore instructed General J. D. Cox, Ohio 
 Volunteers, to proceed to that region with the First and 
 Second Kentucky, the Eleventh, Twelfth and Twenty-first 
 Ohio, which last regiment had been for some weeks at Galli- 
 polis in observation. On the 10th July General Cox occupied 
 Point Pleasant ; on the 11th, Guyandotte. The instructions, 
 sent on -the 2nd July, directed him to remain on the defensive 
 near the mouth of Ten Mile Creek, and to hold the enemy 
 near Charleston ; it being my hope to cut them off after we 
 gained the Cheat Mountain Pass. He was instructed to keep 
 out parties to break up the guerrilla bands and protect Union 
 men. On the 6th, General Cox was placed in command of 
 the District of Kanawha, comjnising the country between the 
 two streams of that name. He received instructions for oc- 
 cupying Ripley, Guyandotte and Barboursville, and was in- 
 formed of the steps already taken to occupy certain important 
 county towns. He was now also instructed to endeavor to 
 gain possession of Charleston, to drive the enemy beyond the 
 Gauley Bridge, and to open communication with the main 
 force under my command. 
 
 On the 6th July, instructions were sent to General Morris, 
 directing him to advance next morning to a position near 
 Elliott's farm, within one and a half miles of the enemy, at 
 Laurel Hill. He was instructed to accomplish this movement 
 at all hazards, and from his new position to push out strong 
 infantry reconnoissances to ascertain the exact position, con- 
 dition, and movements of the enemy, as well as to give them 
 the impression that the main attack was to be made by him. 
 He was directed to watch them closely day and night, to use 
 all efforts to retain the enemy at Laurel Hill, the object being 
 to cut off their retreat with the main column at Beverly ; he 
 Avas ordered to hold everything ready to pursue should they 
 retreat, and to follow them closely in that event. 
 
 Finally, he was informed of the intended movements of the 
 main column. On the 8th July, General Mon-is Avas again 
 enjoined to watch the enemy closely, and to follow them up 
 should they attempt to retreat. 
 
 On the 7th July, the advanced guard, consisting of the 
 
28 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 Fourth and Ninth Ohio, Loorais's battery, and the company of 
 Ohio cavahy, all under Colonel R. L. McCook, of the Ninth 
 Ohio, moved from Buckhannon to the Middle Fork Bridge ; 
 they seized this important bridge after a slight skirmish, and 
 halted there during the 8th to await supplies. Rosecrans's 
 brigade was ordered to move to the same point at four a.m., 
 on the 8th ; Schleich's, at a later hour ; head-quarters between 
 the two brigades. 
 
 The Tenth Ohio had just arrived, and was ordered to move 
 with its brigade ; but at the moment when head-quarters were 
 starting, intelligence arrived of a serious attack by the enemy 
 upon a detachment at Glenuville, and it became necessary to 
 detach that regiment to support the troops in that region. 
 
 On the afternoon of the 9th, the main column reached 
 Roaring Fork, some two miles from the intrenchments of the 
 enemy ; the bridge had been destroyed, and the remainder of 
 the day was spent in rebuilding the bridge, and in some 
 general preliminary reconnoissances. On the morning of the 
 loth, the Ninth Ohio and Loomis's battery were sent out as an 
 escort to Lieutenant Poe, of the Topographical Engineers, 
 charged with the reconnoissance of the enemy's position. His 
 pickets were handsomely driven in, and the reconnoissance 
 pushed to within two hundred yards of his works, with a loss 
 of but one man killed, and one wounded on our part. The 
 nature of the ground, and the dense thickets surrounding the 
 enemy's works rendered Lieutenant Poe's task one of extreme 
 difficulty. The general result, confirmed by my own personal 
 observations, was that the enemy's position was well selected 
 near the foot of the moimtain where the road enters the pass. 
 Its very considerable natural strength had been increased by 
 rough intrenchments, and by a quantity of timber felled on all 
 the front and flank approaches which presented great obstacles 
 to an attack. It was clear that a direct attack could succeed 
 only after a great sacrifice of life, and the result of such an 
 undertaking by perfectly raw troops was at least doubtful ; I 
 therefore determined to attempt to turn the position by our 
 right, in conformity with the intention expressed in a letter of 
 July 5, to the General-in-chief, in which I stated that I ex- 
 pected to find the enemy in position on Rich Mountain, just 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 29 
 
 west of Beverly ; that I should, if possible, turn the position to 
 the south, and thus occupy the Beverly road in his rear ; to 
 repeat the manceuvre of Cerro Gordo. I added, that I would 
 not depart from my intention of gaining success by ma- 
 noeuvring rather than by fighting, as I was not willing to throw 
 my raw troops into the teeth of artillery and intrenchments, 
 if it were possible to avoid it. The 13th, 14th, and 15th 
 Indiana had now arrived, or were within a day's marcji. 
 
 I committed the charge of the turning movement to Gene- 
 ral Rosecraus, with a command consisting of the 8th, 10th, 
 and 13th Indiana, the 19tli Ohio, and Burdsall's Ohio cavalry; 
 the effective force of the infantry was eighteen hundred and 
 forty-two. As the route to be pursued by General Rosecraus 
 was in few places more than a mountain path, while at others 
 a new road had to be cut as they advanced, it was impossible 
 to move artillery with this column. His instructions, which 
 were given on the evening of the 10th, wei'e, that he should 
 move at four a.m., on the 11th, and follow a path which led up 
 a ravine to the summit of Rich Mountain, about a mile south 
 of the point where the turnpike from Buckhannon to Beverly 
 crosses the crest at Hart's farm. He was provided with a 
 guide. Upon gaining the crest he was to attack any force 
 that might be there, and gain possession of the turnpike ; then, 
 taking proper j^i'ecautions to guard his rear in the direction of 
 Beverly, he was to move immediately to the west upon the 
 rear of Pegram's defenses. He was also instructed to send 
 back a messenger every hour to report his progress. I also 
 informed him that a little before noon I would have the rest 
 of the troops in position to attack Pegram's works in front, 
 the moment I heard the sound of his musketiy immediately in 
 their rear. 
 
 In accordance with these instructions General Rosecraus 
 moved upon the route indicated, and afler an exceedingly diifi- 
 cult and toilsome march, gained the crest of Rich Mountain 
 unopposed, at about one o'clock. He rapidly formed his com- 
 mand, and advanced along the crest towards the turnpike, 
 before reaching which he encountered the enemy's skirmishers, 
 who were soon driven in upon their supports at Hart's farm. 
 This force numbered some six hundred men, and had two 
 
30 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 guns ; a small and hastily constructed log shelter was their 
 only intrenchment. Genei'al Rosecrans soon attacked this 
 force in the most gallant manner, and after a very spirited 
 contest drove them in confusion, and captured their two guns. 
 The fugitives retired to Pegram's intrenohments. His men 
 being fatigued, General Rosecrans now halted at 2 p.m., in the 
 position he had won, and failed to carry out his orders to move 
 on the rear of Pegram's works. At the hour agreed upon, 
 a little before noon, I formed the regiments remaining with 
 me, (the 3d, 4th and 9th Ohio, 14th and 15th Indiana, Howe's 
 and Loomis's batteries), in position to attack in front. 
 
 I received no message from General Rosecrans, after a dis- 
 patch dated 1 1 a.m. Remaining in person immediately in rear 
 of the picket line, I anxiously awaited news from Rosecrans, 
 or the sound of his approaching musketry. We heard the 
 firing at Hart's farm, but it was distant and stationary, and 
 there was no indication of Rosecrans's approach. Soon after 
 the cessation of the distant firing, an officer was observed to 
 ride into the intrenchments and address the garrison ; we could 
 not distinguish the words he uttered, but his speech was 
 followed by prolonged cheering, which impressed many with 
 the belief, that it had fared badly with our detachment. 
 
 While waiting, I again sent Lieut. Poe to find a j)osition 
 from which our artillery could command the works ; late in 
 the afternoon, I received his report that he had found one, 
 and immediately sent a woi'king party to cut a road to it. It 
 was too late to get the guns in position before dark, and, as I 
 had not yet received a word from General Rosecrans, I re- 
 turned to camp with the command, leaving only the 23ickets, 
 and a guard for the working party. Being now somewhat 
 alarmed as to the fate of our detachment, I determined to put 
 the guns in position immediately after day-break, and, after 
 shelling the works, to attack, in order to relieve Rosecrans. 
 
 As the troops were much fiitigued, some delay occurred in 
 moving from camp in the morning, and just as the guns were 
 moving into position, the pickets sent intelligence, that the 
 enemy had evacuated their works during the night, and fled 
 over the mountains, leaving their wounded, all their guns, 
 means of transportation, ammunition, tents and baggage. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTEEN VIRGINIA. 31 
 
 Then, for the first time siuce 11 o'clock the precedmg day, 1 
 heard from General Rosecrans, who now informed me of what 
 had transpired. Leaving Rosecrans's command to rest, and 
 take care of the captured property, I pushed on without a mo- 
 ment's delay, to Bevferly, with the rest of the command. On 
 reaching that place, I at once posted a j^ortion of the troops in 
 position to resist Garnett, should he endeavor to reach Ilut- 
 tonsville ; and another portion to repel any reinforcements to 
 the enemy, arriving from the direction of the latter place. 
 
 When Colonel Pegram abandoned his works, he endeavored 
 to join General Garnett at Laurel Hill, but the position of our 
 troops preventing this, he was reduced to tlie alternative of 
 starvation or surrender. On the morning of the 13 th, he sent 
 to me a messenger with a proposition to surrender, and I at 
 once received his command as pi'isoners. A portion of his 
 command had escaped singly through the mountains, but the 
 number included in the surrender, was 33 officers, and 560 men. 
 Had General Rosecrans been able to follow his instructions, 
 and moved direct upon Pegram, none of his command could 
 have escaped. At 1 p.m. on the 12th, immediately after reach- 
 ing Beverly, instructions were sent to General Rosecrans, to 
 forward the wounded to that place, and, leaving a small guard 
 over the severely wounded and the ca^^tured projierty, to 
 move his command at once to Beverly. Receiving definite 
 information during the night of the 12th and 13th, that Gen- 
 eral Garnett had retreated by the Leedsville and St. George 
 road, and that the turnpike from Beverly to Phillippi was 
 clear, I at once, as will hereafter appear, gave the necessary 
 orders for the pursuit of Garnett, and on the morning of the 
 13th, marched to Huttonsville with the 3d, 4th and 9th Ohio, and 
 the 14tli and IStli Lidiana. Information had reached me that 
 Coloi>el Scott's Virginia regiment, which had reached Beverly 
 too late to support Pegram, had returned to Huttonsville ; and 
 captured official letters, showed that strong reinforcements 
 were on the march from Staunton ; I therefore determined to 
 lose no time in the endeavor to gain the Ciieat Mountain Pass. 
 We reached Huttonsville on the afternoon of the 13th, driving 
 out a small cavalry force, and occupied the debouche of the 
 pass. On the next day, with a strong advanced guard, well 
 
32 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 supported, I went to the summit of Cheat Mountain, and 
 descended to the river on the other side. No enemy was 
 encountered, although the pass presented many very strong 
 positions, and the evidences of hasty flight were frequently 
 met with, in the shape of abandoned baggage and camp-equip- 
 age. Making arrangements for intrenching and holding the 
 pass, I left the 3d Ohio, 14th and 15th Indiana, Loomis's bat- 
 tery, and Burdsall's cavalry, under Brig.-Gen. Schleicli, to hold 
 the position, and on the IGth returned to the more central 
 position of Beverly with the 4th and 9th Ohio, Howe's bat- 
 tery, and Barker's Illinois cavalry company. 
 
 It is now time to revert to the measures taken for the pur- 
 suit of the forces under Gen. Garnett. That officer, during 
 the night of the 11th and 12th, upon hearing the result of the 
 affair of Rich Mountain, immediately took steps to effect his 
 retreat. During the night he abandoned his position at Laurel 
 Hill, and marched towards Beverly. Arriving within five miles 
 of that place, he found that it was impossible to escape in that 
 direction, and at once retraced his steps to Leedsville, obstruct- 
 ing the roads behind him by felling trees. 
 
 Unfortunately, the extreme darkness of the night, prevented 
 the discovery of the evacuation by General Morris's pickets, 
 until shortly after daylight. The usual difficulty and delay 
 in getting new troops started on the march, and the necessity 
 of feeling the way cautiously through so difficult a couutry, 
 gave the enemy still further advantage, so that it was late in 
 the afternoon before our advance reached Leedsville ; the main 
 body of the command did not get up until late at night, not- 
 withstanding all the efforts of General Morris. At 4 a.m. on 
 the 13th, General Morris resumed the pursuit, over very diffi- 
 cult mountain roads, in a heavy rain. 
 
 His advance, consisting of the 14th Ohio, 7th and 9th 
 Indiana, and a section of Barnett's battery, overtook the 
 enemy towards midday at the main fork of Cheat river. Under 
 the direction of Captain Benham, of the U. S. Engineers, the 
 enemy was promptly attacked, and driven in disorder ; the 
 greater part of his baggage, and all his guns were captured or 
 Boon abandoned, and General Garnett himself, while gallantly 
 striving to rally his rear guard, was killed. So prompt had 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 33 
 
 been the conduct of tlie advance guard, that the action was 
 over just as General Morris came up with the main body. The 
 result of this brilliant affair at Carrick's Ford, was a loss to the 
 enemy of some, twenty killed, fifty prisoners, and two colors, 
 besides their train and guns. Gen. Morris's command, which 
 for thirty-six hours had been almost without food, and had 
 made a most difficult march, was now too much fatigued to 
 render further pursuit possible. 
 
 During the evening of the 12th I informed Gen. Hill, then 
 at Grafton, that Gen. Garnett had abandoned Laurel Hill the 
 previous night, and was then moving towards Eastern Vir- 
 ginia via Leedsville and St. George, and directed him to take 
 the field at once with all the force he could make available to 
 cut off the enemy's retreat. He was also informed that direc- 
 tions had been sent to Col. Chas. J. Biddle, commanding two 
 regiments of Pennsylvania State troops at Cumberland, to 
 move at once to Rowlesburg by exj^ress trains, and report to 
 Gen. Hill for duty. The latter was also instructed to with- 
 draw several companies of the Railroad guards towards 
 Wheeling and Parkersburg, and concentrate them by special 
 trains at Rowlesburg or Oaklands, and that no time Avas to be 
 lost. He was also informed that all the guns and baggage at 
 Rich Mountain had been captured, and that at the time of 
 wi'iting, the evening of the 12th, Garnett was some six miles 
 from Leedsville on the St. George road, with Morris in pur- 
 suit. Gen. Hill acknowledged the receipt of this letter, and 
 stated that measures were taken to obey the orders. 
 
 A railway bridge having been destroyed by the enemy west 
 of Cumberland, it was impossible for Col. Biddle to carry out 
 his orders without cars sent to him from the west; this could 
 not be accomplished in time, and Col. Biddle was obliged to 
 remain near New Creek, where he rendered all the service in 
 his power, and displayed during the next few days, as he had 
 already done in tlie past, great activity and intelligence. 
 
 On the 13th Gen. Hill started with some two thousand five 
 hundred men, followed by considerable supports, which Avere 
 rapidly arriving by rail, and on the morning of the 14th ar- 
 rived at a point beyond the Red House, one and a half miles 
 from the remnants of Garnett's army, who, starved, exhausted, 
 
 2* 
 
34 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 and disorganized, were seeking a little rest before continuing 
 their rapid retreat. For some reason which I have never yet un- 
 derstood, and which the pressure of more important cares soon 
 prevented me from following up, he here abandoned the pur- 
 suit, and ordered a retrograde movement when the game was 
 apparently in his grasp. On the night of the 15th he again 
 resumed the pursuit ; on learning which I at once telegraphed 
 to him, that in my opinion he should have attacked the enemy 
 on the morning of the 14th, and that he had then permitted 
 the favorable moment to pass ; tliat I could see no good result 
 likely to follow from his then too extended movement, which 
 was not in the spirit of his instructions, which were to cut ofi 
 the enemy's retreat and not to go into the heart of Virginia ; 
 that if he was not directly on the enemy's track, and sure to 
 cut him off, he would, on the receipt of the dispatch, abandon 
 the pursuit, which he did. 
 
 The result of these operations was thus to give us undis- 
 puted control of all that portion of Western Virginia north of 
 the Great Kanawha, and of the passes leading in from the east. 
 The enemy lost their general killed, and his second in com- 
 mand taken prisoner, all their guns, transportation, baggage, 
 camp equipage, etc., about one thousand in killed and prison- 
 ers, several colors, and many small arms ; the remains of their 
 force was entirely disorganzed. Our own losses in all these 
 affiiirs were a little less than one hundred men killed and 
 wounded. From the best information that could be obtained, 
 the total effective force in the district under the command of 
 Gen. Garnett was about eight thousand men. 
 
 While these events were in progress our affairs in the Kana- 
 wha Valley became somewhat threatening. On the 1 Gth of July 
 Gen. Cox was at the mouth of the Pocataligo with four com- 
 panies of the 11th Ohio, the whole of the 12th and 21st Ohio, 
 five companies of the 1st Kentucky, four guns, and an imper- 
 fectly equipped company of raw cavalry. The remaining five 
 companies of the 1st Kentucky were at Ripley, under orders 
 to advance to Sissonville ; three companies of the 11th were 
 at Point Pleasant, guarding the depot ; the 2d Kentucky was 
 on the march from Guyandotte via Barboursville, where, on 
 the 16th, they defeated and drove out a force of six hundred 
 
THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 35 
 
 of the enemy. General Cox labored under great disadvantages ; 
 his cavalry amounted to little or nothing ; his artillery was 
 weak and insufficiently manned ; his land transportation en- 
 tirely inadequate, and his supplies deficient. He moved close 
 to the riA'^er, carrying his baggage on steamers. He marched 
 an advance guard on each bank, and held a regiment on 
 steamers ready to land on either shore, as might be necessary. 
 Late on the 16th he was joined by the 2d Kentucky; his force 
 then being about three thousand four hundred men. 
 
 The difficulties in the way of his advance were such that 
 on the l7th he recommended that a part of the force under 
 my immediate command should move into the upper part of 
 the Kanawha Valley from the north ; this request was re- 
 peated on the 19th. On that day Colonel Lowe, of the 
 Twelfth Ohio, with his own regiment, a detachment from the 
 Twenty-first Ohio, a few cavalry and two guns, in all ten 
 hundred and twenty men, came in contact with the enemy on 
 the banks of Scary Creek. Colonel Lowe at once attacked, 
 and according to his report, was on the point of achieving 
 success when his ammunition gave out, and reinforcements 
 arrived to the enemy ; when he fell back in good order, with a 
 loss of nine killed, thirty-eight Avounded and nine missing. 
 He estimated the enemy's original force at sixteen hundred, 
 their reinforcements at six hundred. On the second day after 
 this affi\ir the enemy fell back on Charleston. 
 
 Upon receiving information of these events I determined to 
 move at once in person to the Kanawha Valley via Suttons- 
 ville, Summerville and Dogwood Ridge, and thus cut off 
 whatever force might be in the lower valley. The troops 
 designated to accompany me were the 4th, 6th, Yth, 9th and 
 13th Ohio, and 1st Virginia. The preparations were being 
 rapidly made, the troops were in motion to the rendezvous, and 
 General Cox had been informed of my general plans, when on 
 the 22d July I received the order directing me to turn over 
 my command to General Rosecrans, and proceed at once tc 
 Washington to assume command of the troops in that vicinity. 
 
 At the time of taking the field in the Department of the 
 Ohio, the following was the comjiosition of the stafi': 
 
 Major Seth Williams, Assistant Adjutant-General; Captain 
 
36 THE CAMPAIGN IN WESTERN VIRGINIA. 
 
 N. H. McLean, Assistant Adjutant-General ; Major R. B. 
 Marcy, Acting Inspector-General ; Captain John H. Dicker- 
 son, Chief Quartermaster ; Captain R. Saxton, Assistant 
 Quartermaster ; Captain Wm. Ckaig, Assistant Quartermas- 
 ter ; Captain W. W. Burns, Chief Commissary ; Captain R. 
 Macfeely, Assistant Commissary ; Surgeon J. J. B. Wright, 
 Medical Director ; Surgeon G. G. Shumaed, Surgeon-General 
 Ohio State Troops ; Captain H. W. Benham, Senior Engineer ; 
 Lieutenant O. M. Poe, Topographical Engineer ; Captain C, 
 P. Kingsbury, Chief of Ordnance ; Lieutenant S. Crispin, 
 Assistant Chief of Ordnance ; Colonel T. M. Key, Judge Ad- 
 vocate ; Lieutenant L. A. Williams, A. D. C ; Lieutenant 
 Jos. KiRKLAND, A. D. C ; Colonel F. W. Lander, Volunteer 
 Aid-de-Camp ; Colonel Wm. M. Dunn, Volunteer Aid-de-Camp. 
 
 It was through the cordial support and earnest eiforts of 
 these officers that it became possible to organize the troops 
 and achieve success in the field. Colonel Lander accompanied, 
 by ray order, the troops who moved in May from Parkersburg 
 to Grafton, and also the column to Phillippi, where he took a 
 prominent part in the affiiir. Subsequently at Rich Mountain, 
 he accompanied the column under General Rosecrans, and 
 there, too, distinguished himself in the encouragement and 
 example he afforded the troops by his cool bravery under a 
 severe fire. 
 
 In this brief campaign the telegraph was extensively used 
 in the field operations ; the line was constructed as the army 
 marched forward, and we were seldom without an office 
 at head-quarters. Great credit is due to the superin- 
 tendent, Mr. A. Stager, for his energy and intelligence. 
 
 I cannot close this brief narrative without bearing testimony 
 to the good conduct, enthusiasm, and endurance of the young 
 troops whom I then commanded. That they would be coura- 
 geous was to be expected ; but the patience and endurance 
 they evinced under long marches, privations, and fatigue, ex- 
 ceeded all my anticipations. Their demeanor in this, their 
 first campaign, gave promise of the achievements in which 
 they have since participated on many hard fought fields. 
 
REPORT. 
 
 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 New York, August 4th, 1863. 
 Bkigadier-Geneeal L. Thoisias, 
 Adjutant- General U. S. Army. 
 
 Sir •_! have the honor to submit herem the Official Re- 
 port of the operations of the Army of the Potomac, while 
 under my charge. Accompanying it are the reports of the 
 corps, division and subordinate commanders, pertaimng to 
 the vLrious engagements, battles and occurrences of the cam- 
 paicrns, and important documents connected with its organi- 
 zatfon, supply and movements. These, with list of maps and 
 memoranda submitted, will be found appended, duly arranged 
 and marked for convenient reference. 
 
 Charcred, in the spring of 1861, with the operations m the 
 department of the Ohio, which included the States of Illinois, 
 Indiana, Ohio, and latterly, Western Virginia, it had become 
 my duty to counteract the hostile designs of the enemy in 
 Western Virginia, which were immediately directed to the 
 destruction of tlie Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the pos- 
 session of the Kanawha Valley, with the ultimate object of 
 o-ainino- Wheeling, and the control of the Ohio River. The 
 successful affairs of Phillippi, Rich Mountain, Carrick's Ford 
 etc., had been fought, and I had acquired possession of all 
 Western Virginia, north of the Kanawha Valley, as well as ot 
 the lower portion of that valley. 
 
 I had determined to proceed to the relief of the upper 
 Kanawha Valley, as soon as provision was made for the per- 
 
38 FIRSTPEEIOD. 
 
 maneiit defense of the mountain passes leading from the east 
 into the region under our control, when I received at Beverly, 
 in Randolph County, on the 21st of July, 1861, intelligence of 
 the unfortunate result of the battle of Manassas, fuught on 
 that day. 
 
 On the 22d, I received an order by telegraph, directing me 
 to turn over my command to Brig.-Gen. Rosecrans, and repair 
 at once to Washington. 
 
 I had already caused reconnoissances to be madeforintrench- 
 ments at the Cheat Mountain Pass ; also on the Huntersville 
 road, near Elkwater, and at Red House, near the main road 
 from Roniney to Grafton. During the afternoon and the night 
 of the 22nd, I gave the final instructions for the construction 
 of these works, turned over the command to Brig.-Gen. Rose- 
 crans, and started, on the morning of the 23d, for Washington, 
 arriving there on the afternoon of the 26th. On the 27th, I 
 assumed command of the Division of the Potomac, comprising 
 the troops in and around Washington, on both banks of the 
 river. 
 
 With this brief statement of the events which immediately 
 preceded my being called to the command of the troops at 
 Washington, I proceed to an account from such authentic data 
 as are at hand, of my military operations while commander of 
 the Army of the Potomac. 
 
 The subjects to be considered, naturally arrange themselves 
 as follows : The organization of the Army of tlie Potomac ; 
 the military events connected with the defenses of Washing- 
 ton, from July, 1861, to March, 1862; the campaign on the 
 Peninsula, and that in Maryland. 
 
 The great resources and capacity for powerful resistance, of 
 the South, at the breaking out of the rebellion, and the full 
 proportions of the great conflict about to take place, were 
 sought to be carefully measured ; and I had also endeavored, 
 by every means in my power, to impress upon the authorities 
 the necessity for such immediate and full preparation as alone 
 would enable the government to prosecute the war on a scale 
 commensurate with the resistance to be offered. 
 
 On the 4th of August, 1861, I addressed to the President, 
 the following memorandum, prepared at his request: 
 
MEMORANDUM, 
 
 MEMORANDUM. 
 
 39 
 
 The object of the present war differs from those in which 
 nations are usually engaged, mainly in this : That the purpose 
 of ordinary Avar is to conquer a peace, and make a treaty on 
 advantageous terms. In this contest, it has become necessary 
 to crush a population sufficiently numerous, intelligent and 
 warlike to constitute a nation. We have not only to defeat 
 their armed and organized forces in the field, but to display 
 such an overwhelming strength as will convince all our antag- 
 onists, especially those of the governing aristocratic class, of 
 the utter impossibility of resistance. Our late reverses make 
 this course imperative. Had we been successful in the recent 
 battle (Manassas), it is possible that we might have been 
 spared the labor and expense of a great effort ; now we have 
 no alternative. Their success will enable the political leaders 
 of the rebels to convince the mass of their people that we are 
 inferior to them in force and courage, and to command all 
 their resources. The contest began with a class ; now it is 
 with a people, our military success can alone restore the former 
 
 issue. 
 
 By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their strong 
 places, and pursuing a rigidly protective policy as to private 
 property, and unarmed persons, and a lenient course as to pri- 
 vate soldiers, we may well hope for a permanent restoration of 
 a peaceful Union. But, in the first instance, the authority of 
 the government must be supported by overwhelming physical 
 
 force. 
 
 Our foreign relations and financial credit also imperatively 
 demand that' the military action of the government should be 
 prompt and irresistible. 
 
 The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-field, and it 
 seems proper for us to make the first great struggle there. 
 But while thus directing our main efforts, it is necessary to 
 diminish the resistance there offered us, by movements on other 
 points, both by land and water. 
 
 Without entering at present into details, I would advise that 
 
40 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 a Strong movement be made on the Mississippi, and that the 
 rebels be driven out of Missouri. 
 
 As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky is cor- 
 dially imited with us, I would advise a movement through that 
 State into Eastern Tennessee, for the purpose of assisting the 
 Union men of that region, and of seizing the railroads leading 
 from Memphis to the east. 
 
 The possession of those roads by us, in connection with the 
 movement on the Mississippi, would go fir towards determining 
 the evacuation of Virginia by the rebels. In the meantime, all 
 the passes into Western Virginia, from the east, should be 
 securely guarded ; but I would advise no movement from that 
 quarter towards Richmond, unless the political condition of 
 Kentucky renders it impossible, or inexpedient for us to make 
 the movement upon Eastern Tennessee, through that State. 
 Every eifort should, however, be made to organize, equip and 
 arm as many troops as possible in Western Virginia, in order 
 to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for other 
 operations. At as early a day as practicable, it would be well 
 to protect and re-open the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. 
 
 Baltimore and Fort iMonroe should be occupied by garrisons 
 sufficient to retain them in our possession. The importance 
 of Harper's Ferry and the line of the Potomac, in the direction 
 of Leesburg, will be a- ery materially diminished so soon as our 
 force in this vicinity becomes organized, strong and efficient, 
 because no capable general will cross the river, north of this 
 city, when we have a strong army here, ready to cut off his 
 retreat. 
 
 To revert to the West, it is probable that no very large ad- 
 ditions to the troops now in Missouri, will be necessary to 
 secure that State. 
 
 I presume that the force required for the movement down 
 the Mississippi, will be determined by its commander and the 
 President. If Kentucky assumes the right position, not more 
 than 20,000 troops will be needed, together with those that 
 can be raised in that State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure 
 the latter region and its railroads, as well as ultimately to oc- 
 cupy Nashville. 
 
 The Western Virginia troops, with not more than 5,000 to 
 
MEMORANDUM. 41 
 
 10,000 from Ohio and Indiana, should, under proper manage- 
 ment, suffice for its protection. When we have reorganized 
 our main army here, 10,000 men ought to be enough to protect 
 the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Potomac. Five 
 thousand will garrison Baltimore, 3,000 Fort Monroe, and not 
 more than 20,000 will be necessary, at the utmost, for the de- 
 fense of Washington. 
 
 For the main army of operations, I urge the following com- 
 position : 
 
 250 Regiments of Infantry, say 225,000 men. 
 
 100 Field Batteries, 600 guus 15,000 " 
 
 28 Regiments Cavalry 25,500 " 
 
 5 " Engineer troops 7,500 " 
 
 Total 213,000 
 
 The force must be supplied with the necessary engineer 
 and pontoon trains, and Avith transportation for every thing 
 save tents. Its general line of operations should be so di- 
 rected that water transportation can be availed of, from point 
 to point, by means of the ocean and the rivers emptying into it. 
 An essential feature of the plan of operations, will be the em- 
 ployment of a strong naval force, to protect the movements 
 of a fleet of transports intended to convey a considerable body 
 of troops from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus, 
 either creating diversions, and rendering it necessary to detach 
 largely from their main body, in order to protect such of their 
 cities as may be threatened, or else landing and forming 
 establishments on their coast at any favorable places that 
 ojjportunity might offer. This naval force should also co- 
 operate Avith the main army, in its efforts to seize the impor- 
 tant sea-board towns of the rebels. 
 
 It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads, h?s 
 introduced a new and very important element into war, by 
 the great facilities thus given for concentrating at particular 
 positions, large masses of troops from remote sections, and by 
 creating new strategic points and lines of operations. It is 
 intended to overcome this difficulty by the partial operations 
 suggested, and such other, as the particular case may require. 
 
42 FIESTPEEIOD. 
 
 We must endeavor to seize places on the i-ailways, iu the rear 
 of the enemy's points of concentration, and we must threaten 
 their sea-board cities, in order that each State may be forced, 
 by the necessity of its own defense, to diminish its contingent 
 to the Confederate army. 
 
 The proposed movement down the Mississi23pi, will produce 
 imjiortaut results in this connection. That advance, and the 
 progi'ess of the main army at the East, will materially assist 
 each other l^y diminishing the resistance to be encountered 
 by each. The tendency of the Mississippi movement upon all 
 questions connected with cotton, is too well understood by 
 the President and Cabinet, to need any illustration from me. 
 There is another independent movement which has often been 
 suggested, and which has always recommended itself to my 
 judgment. I refer to a movement from Kansas and Nebraska, 
 through the Indian Territory iipon Red River and Western 
 Texas, for the purpose of protecting and developing the latent 
 Union and free state sentiment, well known to predominate 
 in Western Texas, and Avhich, like a similar sentiment in 
 Western Virginia, will, if protected, ultimately organize that 
 section into a free state. How far it will be possible to sup- 
 port this movement by an advance through New Mexico from 
 California, is a matter which I have not sufficiently examined 
 to be able to express a decided opinion. If at all practicable, 
 it is eminently desirable, as bringing into play the resources 
 and warlike qualities of the Pacific States, as well as identify- 
 ing them with our cause, and cementing the bond of Union 
 between them and the General Government. 
 
 If it is not departing too far from my province, I will ven- 
 ture to suggest the policy of an intimate alliance and cordial 
 understanding with Mexico ; their sympathies and interests 
 are with us ; their antipathies exclusively against our enemies, 
 and their institutions. I think it would not be difficult to 
 obtain from the Mexican government the right to use, at least 
 during the present contest, the road from Guyamas to New 
 Mexico. This concession would veiy materially reduce the 
 obstacles of the column moving from the Pacific. A similar 
 permission to use their territory for the passage of troops be- 
 tween the Panueo and the Rio Grande, would enable us to 
 
MEMORANDUM. 43 
 
 throw a column of troops, by a good road from Tampico, or 
 some of the small harbors north of it, upon and across the Rio 
 Grande, without risk, and scarcely firing a shot. To Avhat ex- 
 tent, if any, it would be desirable to take into service and em- 
 ploy Mexican soldiers, is a question entirely political, on which 
 I do not venture to offer an opinion. 
 
 The force I have recommended is large, the expense is great. 
 It is possible that a smaller force might accomplish tlie object 
 in view ; but I understand it to be the purpose of this great 
 nation to re-establish the power of its government, and to 
 restore peace to its citizens, in the shortest possible time. The 
 question to be decided is simply this : shall we crush the re- 
 bellion at one blow, terminate the war in one campaign, or 
 shall we leave it for a legacy to our descendants ? 
 
 When the extent of the possible line of operations is con- 
 sidered, the force asked for the main army under my command 
 cannot be regarded as unduly large. Every mile we advance 
 carries us further from our base of operations, and renders 
 detachments necessary to cover our communications, wliile the 
 enemy will be constantly concentrating as he falls back. I 
 propose, with the force Avhich I have requested, not only to 
 drive the enemy out of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to 
 occupy Charleston, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile 
 and New Orleans ; in other words, to move into the heart of 
 the enemy's country, and crush out the rebellion in its very 
 heart. 
 
 By seizing and repairing the railroads as we advance, the 
 difficulties of transportation will be materially diminished. It 
 is perhaps unnecessary to state, that in addition to the forces 
 named in this memorandum, strong reserves should be formed, 
 ready to supply any losses that may occur. 
 
 In conclusion, I would submit that the exigencies of the 
 treasury may be lessened by making only partial payments to 
 oar troops, when in the enemy's country, and by giving the 
 obligations of the United States for such supplies as may there 
 be obtained. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-Getieral. 
 
44 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 I do not think the events of the war have proved these 
 views, upon the methods and plans of its conduct, altogether 
 incorrect. They certainly have not proved my estimate of the 
 nimiber of troops and scope of operations too large. It is 
 probable that I did under-estimate the time necessary for the 
 completion of arms and equipments. It was not strange, how- 
 ever, that by many civilians intrusted with authority there 
 should have been an exactly opposite opinion held in both 
 these particulars. 
 
 The result of the first battle of Manassas had been almost to 
 destroy the morale and organization of our army, and to alarm 
 government and people. The national capital was in danger. 
 It w'as necessary, besides holding the enemy in check, to build 
 works for its defense, strong and capable of being held by a 
 small force. 
 
 It w\as necessary also to create a new army for active opera- 
 tions, and to expedite its organization, equipment, and the 
 accumulation of the material of war, and to this not incon- 
 siderable labor all my energies for the next three months were 
 constantly devoted. 
 
 Time is a necessary element in the creation of armies, and I 
 do not therefore think it necessary to more than mention the 
 impatience with which many regarded the delay in the arrival 
 of the new levies, though recruited and pressed forward with 
 unexampled rapidity — the manufacture and supply of arms 
 and equipments, or the vehemence with which an immediate 
 advance upon the enemy's works directly in our front was 
 urged by a patriotic but sanguine people. 
 
 The President too was anxious for the speedy employment 
 of our army, and although possessed of my plans through fre- 
 quent conferences, desired a paper from me upon the condition 
 of the forces umler my command, and the immediate measures 
 to be taken to increase their efficiency. Accordingly, in the 
 latter part of October, I addressed the following letter to the 
 Secretary of War : 
 
 To THE Hon. Simon Cameron, 
 Secretary of War : 
 Sir, — In conformity with a personal understanding with 
 
LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 45 
 
 the President, yesterday, I have the honor to submit the fol- 
 lowing statement of the condition of the army under my com- 
 mand, and the measures required for the preservation of the 
 government and the suppression of the rebellion i — 
 
 It will be remembered that, in a memorial I had the honor 
 to address to the President soon after my arrival in Washing- 
 ton, and in my communication addressed to Lieut.-General 
 Scott, under date of 8tli of August; in my letter to the Presi- 
 dent authorizing him, at his request, to withdraw the letter 
 written by me to General Scott ; and in my letter of the 8th 
 of September, answering your note of inquiry of that date, my 
 views on the same subject are frankly and fully expressed. 
 
 In these several communications I have stated the force I 
 regarded as necessary to enable this army to advance with a 
 reasonable certainty of success, at the same time leaving the 
 capital and the line of the Potomac sufficiently guarded, not 
 only to secure the retreat of the main army, in the event of 
 disaster, but to render it out of the enemy's power to attempt 
 a diversion in Maryland. 
 
 So much time has passed, and the winter is approaching so 
 rapidly, that but two courses are left to the government, viz., 
 either to go into winter quarters, or to assume the offensive 
 with forces greatly inferior in numbers to the army I regarded 
 as desirable and necessary. 
 
 If political considerations render the first course unadvisable 
 the second alone remains. While I regret that it has not been 
 deemed expedient, or perhaps possible to concentrate the 
 forces of the nation in this vicinity, (remaining on the defensive 
 elsewhere,) keeping the attention and efforts of the govern- 
 ment fixed upon this as the vital point, where the issue of the 
 great contest is to be decided, it may still be that, by intro- 
 ducing unity of action and design among the various armies 
 of the land, by determining the courses to be pursued by the 
 various commanders under one general plan, transferring from 
 the other armies the superfluous strength not required for the 
 purpose in view, and thus re-enforcing this main army, Avhose 
 destiny it is to decide the controversy, we may yet be able to 
 move with a reasonable prospect of success before the winter 
 is fairly upon us. The nation feels, and I share that feeling, 
 
46 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 that the army of the Potomac holds the fiite of the country in 
 its hands. The stake is so vast, the issue so momentous, and 
 the effect of the next battle will be so important throughout 
 the future, as well as the present, that I continue to urge, as I 
 have ever done since I entered upon the command of this 
 army, upon the government to devote its energies and its 
 available resources towards increasing the numbers and 
 efficiency of the army on which its salvation depends. 
 
 A statement, carefully prepared by the chiefs of engineers 
 and artillery of this army, gives as the necessary garrison of 
 this city and its fortitications 33,795 men — say 35,000. The 
 present garrison of Baltimore . and its dependencies is about 
 10,000. I have sent the chief of my staff to make a careful 
 examination into the condition of these troops, and to obtain 
 the information requisite to enable me to decide Avhether this 
 number can be diminished or the reverse. At least 5,000 men 
 will be required to watch the river hence to Harper's Ferry 
 and its vicinity ; probably 8,000 to guard the lower Potomac. 
 
 As you are aware, all the information we have from spies, 
 prisoners, &c., agree in showing that the enemy have a force 
 on the Potomac not less than 150,000 strong, well drilled and 
 equipped, ably commanded and strongly intrenched. It is 
 plain, therefore, that to ensure success, or to render it reason- 
 ably certain, the active army should not number less than 
 150,000 efficient troops, with 400 guns, unless some material 
 change occurs in the force in front of us. 
 
 The requisite force for an advance movement by the army 
 of the Potomac may be thus estimated : 
 
 Column of active operations 150,000 men, 400 guns, 
 
 Garrison of the city of Washington - - - 
 To guard the Potomac to Harper's Ferry - 
 
 To guard the lower Potomac 
 
 Garrison for Baltimore and Annapolis - - 
 
 Total effective force required - - - 208,000 men, 488 guns. 
 
 Or an aggregate, present and absent, of about 240,000 men, 
 should the losses by sickness, &c., not rise to a higher per- 
 centage than at present. 
 
 35,000 ' 
 
 40 
 
 5,000 ' 
 
 12 
 
 8,000 ' 
 
 24 
 
 10,000 " 
 
 12 
 
LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 47 
 
 Havinf,^ stated what I regard as the requisite force to enable 
 this army to advance, I now proceed to give the actual strength 
 of the army of the Potomac. 
 
 The aggregate strength of the army of the Potomac by the 
 official report on the morning of the 27th instant was 168,318 
 officers and men of all grades and arms. This includes the 
 troops at Baltimore and Annapolis, on the upper and lower 
 Potomac, the sick, absent, &c. 
 
 The force present for duty was 147,695. Of this number 
 4,268 cavalry were completely unarmed, 3,163 cavalry only 
 partially armed, 5,979 infantry unequipped, making 13,410 
 unfit for the field, (irrespective of those not yet sufficiently 
 drilled,) and reducing the effective force to 134,285, and the 
 number disposable for an advance to 76,285. The infantry 
 regiments are, to a considerable extent, armed with unservice- 
 able weapons — quite a lai-ge number of good arms, which had 
 been intended for this army, were ordered elsewhere, leaving 
 the army of the Potomac insufficiently and, in some cases, 
 badly armed. 
 
 On the 30th of September there were with this army 228 
 field guns ready for the field, so far as arras and equipments 
 are concerned : some of the batteries are still quite raw, and 
 unfit to go into action. I have intelligence that eight new 
 batteries are en route hither : two others are ready for the 
 field. I will still (if the N^ew York batteries have six guns 
 each) be 112 guns short of the nmiiber required for the active 
 column, saying nothing for the present of those necessary for 
 the garrisons and corps on the Potomac, which would make a 
 total deficiency of 200 guns. 
 
 I have thus briefly stated our present condition and wants ; 
 it remains to suggest the means of supplying the deficiencies. 
 
 First. That all the cavalry and infantry arms, as fast as 
 procured, whether manufactured in this country or purchased 
 abroad, be sent to this army, until it is fully prepared for the 
 field. 
 
 Second. That the two companies of the 4th artillery, now 
 understood to be en route from Fort Randall to Fort Monroe, 
 be ordered to this army, to be mounted at once ; also that the 
 
48 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 companies of the 3d artillery, en route from California, be sent 
 here. Had not the order for Smead's battery to come here 
 from Harrisburg, to replace the battery I gave General 
 Sherman, been so often countermanded, I would again ask 
 for it. 
 
 Third. That a more effective regulation may be made, 
 authorizing the transfer of men from the volunteers to the 
 regular batteries, infantry and cavalry; that we may make 
 the best possible use of the invaluable regular " skeletons," 
 
 Fourth. I have no official information as to the United 
 States' forces elsewhere; but from the best information I can 
 obtain from the War Department, and other sources, I am 
 led to believe that the United States troops are, 
 
 In Western Virginia about 30,000 
 
 In Kentucky about 40,000 
 
 In Missouri " 80,000 
 
 In Fortress Monroe about 11,000 
 
 Total, - - 161,000 
 
 Besides these, I am informed that more than 100,000 are 
 in progress of organization in other northern and western 
 states. 
 
 I would therefore recommend that, not intei'fering with 
 Kentucky, there should be retained in Western Virginia and 
 Missouri a sufficient force for defensive purposes, and that the 
 surplus troops be sent to the army of the Potomac, to enable 
 it to assume the offensive ; that the same course be pursued 
 in respect to Fortress Monroe, and that no further outside 
 expeditions be attempted until we have fought the great battle 
 in front of us. 
 
 Fifth. That every nerve be strained to hasten the enroll- 
 ment, organization, and armament of new batteries and regi- 
 ments of infantry. 
 
 Sixth. That all the battalions now raised for the new regi- 
 ments of regular infantry be at once ordered to this army, 
 and that the old mfantry and cavalry en route from California, 
 
LETTER TO THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 49 
 
 be ordered to this army immediately on their arrival in New 
 York. 
 
 I have thus indicated, in a general manner, the objects to 
 be accomplished, and the means by which we may gain our 
 ends. 
 
 A vigorous employment of these means will, in my opinion, 
 enable the army of the Potomac to assume successfully, this 
 season, the ofiensive opei-ations which, ever since entering 
 upon the command, it has been my anxious desire and diligent 
 effort to i^repare for and prosecute. The advance should not 
 be postponed beyond the 25th of November, if possible to 
 avoid it. 
 
 Unity in councils, the utmost vigor and energy in action, 
 are indispensable. The entire military field should be grasped 
 as a Avhole, and not in detached parts. 
 
 One plan should be agreed upon and pursued ; a single Avill 
 should direct and carry out these plans. 
 
 The great object to be accomplished — the crushing defeat 
 of the rebel army [now] at Manassas — should never for one 
 instant be lost sight of, but all the intellect and means and 
 men of the government poured upon that point. The loyal 
 States possess ample force to effect all this, and more. The 
 rebels have displayed energy, unanimity, and wisdom worthy 
 of the most desperate days of the French Revolution — should 
 we do less ? 
 
 The unity of this nation, the preservation of our institutions, 
 are so dear to me that I have willingly sacrificed my 23rivate 
 happiness, with the single object of doing my duty to my 
 country. When the task is accomplished I shall be glad to 
 return to the obscurity from which events have drawn me. 
 
 Whatever the determination of the government may be, I 
 will do the best I can with the army of the Potomac, and will 
 share its fate, whatever may be the task imposed upon me. 
 
 Permit me to add, that on this occasion as heretofore, it has 
 been my aim neither to exaggerate nor underrate the power 
 of the enemy, nor fail to express clearly the means by which, 
 in my judgment, that power may be broken. Urging the 
 energy of preparation and action, which has ever been my 
 choice, but with the fixed purpose by no act of mine to expose 
 
 3 
 
50 FIESTPERIOD. 
 
 this government to hazard by premature movement, and 
 requesting that this communication may be laid before the 
 President, 
 
 I have the honor to be, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 G. B. McClellax, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 When I assumed command in Wasliington on the 27th of 
 July, 1861, the number of troops in and around the .city was 
 about 50,000 infantiy, less than 1,000 cavalry, and 650 artillery 
 men, with nine imperfect field-batteries of thirty pieces. 
 
 On the Virginia bank of the Potomac the brigade organiza- 
 tion of General McDowell still existed, and the troops were 
 stationed at and in rear of Fort Corcoran, Arlington, and Fort 
 Albany, at Fort Runyon, Roa,ch's Mills, Cole's Mill, and in 
 the vicinity of Fort Ellsworth, Avith a detachment at the Theo- 
 logical Seminary. 
 
 There were no troops south of Hunting Creek, and many 
 of the regiments were encamped on the low grounds bordering 
 the Potomac, — seldom in the best positions for defense, and 
 entirely inadequate in numbers and condition to defend the 
 long line fi-om Fort Corcoran to Alexandria. 
 
 On the Maryland side of the river, upon the heights over- 
 looking the Chain Bridge, two regiments were stationed, whose 
 commanders were indeiDcndent of each other. 
 
 There were no troops on the important Tenallytown road, 
 or on the roads entering the city from the south. 
 
 The camps were located without regard to purposes of 
 defense or instruction ; the roads were not picketed, and 
 there was no attempt at an organization into brigades. 
 
 In no quarter were the dispositions for defense such as to 
 offer a vigorous resistance to a respectable body of the enemy, 
 either in the positions and numbers of the troops, or the num- 
 ber and character of the defensive works. Earthworks in the 
 nature of " tetes-de-pont" looked upon the approaches to the 
 Georgetown aqueduct and ferry, the Long Bridge, and Alex- 
 andi'ia by the Little River Turnpike, and some simple defen- 
 sive arrangements Avere made at the Chain Bridfire. With 
 
CONDITION OF THE ARMY. 51 
 
 the latter exception, not a single defensive work bad been 
 commenced on the Maryland side. 
 
 There was nothing to prevent the enemy shelling the city 
 from heights, within easy range, which could be occupied by 
 a hostile column almost without resistance. Many soldiers 
 had deserted, and the streets of Washington were crowded 
 with straggling officers and men, absent from their stations 
 without authority, whose behavior indicated the general want 
 of discipline and organization. 
 
 I at once designated an efficient staff, afterwards adding to 
 it, as opportunity was offered and necessity required, who 
 zealously co-operated with me in the labor of bringing order 
 out of confusion, reassigning troops and commands, projecting 
 and throwing up defensive wgrks, receiving and organizing, 
 equipping and providing for the new levies arriving in the 
 city. 
 
 The valuable services of these officers in their various de- 
 partmeits, during this and throughout the subsequent periods 
 of the history of the army of the Potomac, can hardly be suffi- 
 ciently appreciated. Their names and duties will be given in 
 another part of this report, and they are commended to the 
 favorable notice of the War Department. 
 
 The restoration of order in the city of Washington was 
 effected through the appointment of a provost marshal, whose 
 authority was suppoited by the few regular troops within my 
 command. These troops were thus in position to act as a 
 reserve, to be sent to any point of attack where their services 
 might be most wanted. 
 
 The energy and ability displayed by Col. A. Porter, the 
 provost marshal, and his assistants, and the strict discharge 
 of their duty by the troops, produced the best results, and 
 Washington soon became one of the most quiet cities in the 
 Union. 
 
 The new levies of infjintry, upon arriving in Washington. 
 were formed into provisional brigades, and placed in camps 
 in the suburbs of the city for equipment, instruction, and dis- 
 cipline. As soon as regiments were in fit condition for trans- 
 fer to the forces across the Potomac, they were assigned to 
 the brigades serving there. 
 
52 
 
 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. F. J, Porter, was at first assigned to the charge 
 of the provisional brigades. Brig.-Gen. A. E. Burnside, was 
 the next ofiicer assigned to this duty, from which, however, 
 he was soon reheved by Brig.-Gen. S. Casey, who continued 
 in charge of the newly arriving regiments until the army of 
 the Potomac departed for the Peninsula, in March, 1862. 
 The newly arriving artillery troops, reported to Brig.-Gen. 
 Wm. F. Barry, the Chief of Artillery, and the cavalry to Brig.- 
 Gen. George Stoneman, the Chief of Cavalry. 
 
 By the 15tli of October, the number of troops in and about 
 Washington, inclusive of the garrison of the city and Alexan- 
 dria, the city guard, and the forces on the Maryland shore of 
 the Potomac, below Washington, and as fxr as Cumberland 
 above, the troops under the command of General Dix at But 
 timore, and its dependencies, was as follows : 
 
 Total present for duty 133,201 
 
 " sick 9,290 
 
 " in confinement ....... 1,156 
 
 Aggregate present ..... 143,647 
 
 " absent 8,404 
 
 G-rand ao'greorate 
 
 152,051 
 
 The following table exhibits similar data for the periods 
 stated, including the troops in Maryland and Delaware : 
 
 PRESENT. 
 
 ABSENT. 
 
 PRESENT AND 
 ABSENT. 
 
 
 For Duty. 
 
 Sick. 
 
 In Confine- 
 ment. 
 
 Grand Aggre- 
 gate. 
 
 1861. 
 
 Dec. 1 
 
 1862. 
 
 Jan. 1 
 Feb. 1 
 Mcb. 1 
 
 169,452 
 
 191,480 
 190,806 
 193,142 
 
 15,102 
 
 14,790 
 14,363 
 13,167 
 
 2,189 
 
 2,260 
 2,917 
 2,108 
 
 11,470 
 
 11,707 
 14,110 
 13,570 
 
 198,213 
 
 219,707 
 222,196 
 221,987 
 
ORGANIZATION. 
 
 53 
 
 For convenience of reference, the strength of the army of 
 the Potomac at subsequent periods is given. 
 
 PRESENT. 
 
 ABSENT. 
 
 < a 
 
 
 
 For Duty. 
 
 Sick. 
 
 In Arrest or 
 Contiuement. 
 
 
 < 
 
 - ^ 
 
 1862 
 April 30 
 June 20 
 July 10 
 
 Offi- 
 cers. 
 
 Men. 
 
 Offi- 
 
 Men. 
 
 Offi- 
 
 Men, 
 
 4,725 
 4,665 
 3,a34 
 
 101,610 
 101,160 
 85,715 
 
 233 
 493 
 685 
 
 5,385 
 10,541 
 15,939 
 
 41 
 44 
 
 CO 
 
 356 
 320 
 213 
 
 n5,350 
 
 117.226 
 10:5,466 
 
 11,037 
 
 27,700 
 34,638 
 
 887 
 3,782 
 
 126,387 
 145,813 
 
 144,886 
 
 Including Franklin. 
 
 [Dix. 
 InclndinKMcCall,not 
 (. Including 2 brigades 
 \ of Shield's division, 
 ( about 5,354 men. 
 
 In organizing the army of the Potomac, and preparing it for 
 the field, the first step t.aken was to organize the infantry into 
 brigades of four regiments each ; retaining the newly arrived 
 regiments on the Maryland side, until their armament and 
 equipment Avere issued, and they had obtained some little ele- 
 mentary instruction, before assigning them permanently to 
 brigades. 
 
 When the organization of the brigades was well established, 
 and the troops somewhat disciplined and instructed, divisions 
 of three brigades each were gradually formed. 
 
 As is elsewhere stated in this report, although I was always 
 in favor of the organization into army corps as an abstract 
 principle, I did not desire to form them until the army had 
 been for some little time in the field, in order to enable the 
 general officers, first to acquire the requisite experience as 
 division commanders on active service, and that I might be 
 able to decide from actual trial, who were best fitted to ex- 
 ercise those important commands. 
 
 For a similar reason, I carefully abstained from making any 
 recommendations for the promotion of officers to the grade of 
 Major-General. 
 
 When new batteries of artillery arrived, they also were re- 
 tained in Washington until their armament and equipment 
 were completed, and their instruction sufficiently advanced, to 
 justify their being assigned to divisions. 
 
 The same course was pursued in regard to the cavalry. I 
 regret that circumstances have delayed the Chief of Cavalry, 
 
54 r I R S T P E R I O D . 
 
 Gen. George Stoneman, in furnishing his report u^ion the 
 organization of that arm of service. It will, however, be for- 
 warded as soon as completed, and will, doubtless, show that 
 the difficult and imj^ortant duties intrusted to him, were 
 efficiently 2"»erformed. He encountered and overcame, as far 
 as it was possible, continual and vexatious obstacles arising 
 from the great deficiency of cavalry arms and equipments, and 
 the entire inefficiency of many of the regimental officers first 
 appointed ; this last difficulty, was, to a considerable extent^ 
 overcome in the cavalry, as well as in the infantry and artillery, 
 by the continual and prompt action of courts-martial, and 
 boards of examination. 
 
 As rapidly as circumstances permitted, every cavalry soldier 
 was armed with a sabre and revolver, and at least two squad- 
 rons in every regiment with carbines. 
 
 It was intended to assign at least one regiment of cavalry to 
 each division of the active army, besides forming a cavalry re- 
 serve of the regular regiments, and some picked regiments of 
 volunteer cavalry. Circumstances beyond my control, ren- 
 ^lered it impossible to carry out this intention fully, and the 
 javalry force, serving with the army in the field, was never 
 as large as it ought to have been. 
 
 It w\as determined to collect the regular infantry to form 
 the nucleus of a reserve. The advantage of such a body of 
 troops at a critical moment, especially in an army consti- 
 tuted mainly of new levies, imperfectly disciplined, has been 
 frequently illustrated in military history, and was brought to 
 the attention of the country, at the first battle of Manassas. 
 I have not been disappointed in the estimate formed of the 
 value of these troops. I have always found them to be relied 
 on ; whenever they have been brought under fire, they have 
 shown the utmost gallantry and tenacity. 
 
 The regular infantry, which had been collected from distant 
 posts, and which had been recruited as rapidly as the slow pro- 
 gress of recruiting for the regular service M'ould allow, added 
 to the small battalion with McDowell's army, which I found at 
 Washington, on my arrival, amounted, on the 30th of August, 
 to 1040 men, on the 28th of February, 18G2, to 2682, and on 
 the 30th of April, to 4603. 
 
ARTILLERY. 55 
 
 On the 17th of May, 1862, they were assigned to General 
 Porter's corps, for organization as a division with the 5th 
 regiment of Xew York Vohuiteers, which joined, May 4th, and 
 the 10th New York Vohinteers, which joineil subsequently. 
 They remained from the commencement, under the command 
 of Brig.-Gen. George Sykes, Major 3d Inflintry, U. S. Army. 
 
 ARTILLERY. 
 
 The creation of an adequate artillery establishment, for an 
 army of so large proportions, was a formidable undertaking, 
 and had it not been that the country possessed, in the regular 
 service, a body of accomplished and energetic artillery officers, 
 the task would have been almost hopeless. 
 
 The chai*ge of organizing this most imi^ortant arm was con- 
 fided to Major (afterwards Brigadier-General) Wm. F. Barry, 
 Chief of Artillery, whose industry and zeal achieved the best 
 results. The report of General Barry is aj^pended among the 
 accompanying documents. 
 
 By referring to it, it will be observed that the following 
 principles were adopted as the basis of organization : 
 
 " 1st. That tlie proportion of artillery should be in the ratio 
 of at least 2^ pieces to 1,000 men, to be expanded, if possible, 
 to 3 pieces to 1,000 men. 
 
 " 2d. That the proportion of rifled guns should be restricted 
 to the system of the U. S. Ordnance Department, and of Par- 
 rott, and the smooth bores (with the exception of a few how- 
 itzers for special service) to be exclusively the 12-pounder 
 gun, of the model of 1857, variously called the 'gun-howit- 
 zer,' the 'light 12-pounder,' or the 'Napoleon.' 
 
 " 3d. That each field-battery should, if practicable, be com- 
 posed of 6 guns, and none to be less than 4 guns, and in all 
 cases the guns of each battery should be of uniform calibre. 
 
 " 4th. That the field-batteries were to be assigned to divi- 
 sions, and not to brigades, and in the proportion of 4 to each 
 division, of which one was to be a battery of regulars, the re- 
 mainder of volunteers, the captain of the regular battery to 
 be the commandant of artillery of the division. Li the event 
 of several divisions constituting an army corps, at least one 
 
56 FIRSTPEEIOD. 
 
 half of the divisional artillery was to constitute the reserve 
 artillery of tlie corps. 
 
 " 5th. That the artillery reserve of the whole army, should 
 consist of 100 guns, and should comprise, besides a suf- 
 ficient number of light ' mounted batteries,' all the guns of 
 position, and until the cavalry was massed, all the horse- 
 artillery. 
 
 " 6tli. That the amount of ammunition to accompany the 
 field-batteries, was not to be less than 400 rounds per gun. 
 
 " 7th. A siege train of 50 pieces. This was subsequently 
 exj)anded (for special service at the siege of Yorktown) to 
 very nearly 100 pieces, and comprised the unusual calibres, 
 and enormously heavy v/eight of metal of 2 200-pounders ; 
 5 100-pounders, and 10 thirteen-inch sea-coast mortars." 
 
 As has been before stated, the Chief of Artillery reports : 
 
 "The whole of the field-artillery of the army of the Poto- 
 mac, July 2Sth, 1861, was comprised of 9 imperfectly equip- 
 ped batteries of 30 guns, 650 meti, and 400 horses. In 
 March, 1862, when the whole army took the field, it consisted 
 of 92 batteries of 520 guns, 12,500 men, and 11,000 horses, 
 fully equipped, and in readiness for active field service. Of the 
 whole force, 30 batteries were regulars, and 62 batteries vol- 
 unteers. During the short period of seven months, all of this 
 immense amount of material was issued by the Ordnance De- 
 partment, and placed in the hands of the artillery troops after 
 their arrival in Washington. 
 
 " About one-fourth of all the volunteer batteries, brought 
 with them from tlieir respective States a few guns and car- 
 riages, but they Avere nearly all of such peculiar calibre, as to 
 lack uniformity with the more modern and more serviceable 
 ordnance, with which the other batteries were armed, and 
 they, therefore, had to be Avithdrawn and replaced by more 
 suitable material. While about one-sixth came supplied with 
 horses and harness, less than one-tenth were apparently fully 
 equipped for service when they reported, and every one of 
 these required the supply of many deficiencies of material, and 
 very extensive instruction in the theory and practice of their 
 special arm. 
 
ARTILLERY. 57 
 
 "The operations on the peninsnhx by the army of the Po- 
 tomac, commenced with a fall field-artillery force of 52 bat- 
 teries of 299 guns. To this, must be added the field-artillery 
 of Franklin's division, of McDowell's corps, which joined a 
 few days before the capture of Yorktown, but was not dis- 
 embarked from its transports for service until after the battle 
 of Williamsburg; and the field-artillei-y of McCall's division, 
 of McDowell's corps, (4 batteries, 22 guns), which joined in 
 June, a few days before the battle of JMechanicsville, (.June 
 26th, 1862), making a grand total of field-artillery, at any 
 time Avith the army of the Potomac, of 60 batteries, of 343 
 guns. With this large force serving in six corps-d'armee of 
 eleven divisions, and the artillery reserve, the only general and 
 field-ofticers, were 1 brigadier-general, 4 colonels, 3 lieuten- 
 ant-colonels, and 3 majors ; a number obviously insuflicient, 
 and which impaired, to a great degree, in consequence of the 
 want of rank and ofticial influence of the commanders of corps 
 and division artillery, the efliciency of the arm. As this fiulty 
 organization can be suitably corrected only by legislative ac- 
 tion, it is earnestly hoped, that the attention of the j^roper 
 authorities may be at an eai'ly day invited to it. 
 
 " When there were so many newly organized volunteer field- 
 batteries, many of whom received their first and only instruc- 
 tion in the intrenched camps covering Washington, during the 
 three or four inclement months of the winter of 1861-62, there 
 was, of course, much to be improved. Many of the volunteer 
 batteries, however, evinced such zeal and intelligence, and 
 availed themselves so industriously of the instructions of the 
 regular officers, their commanders, and the examj^le of the 
 regular batteries, their associates, that they made rapid pro- 
 gress, and attained a degree of j^roficiency highly creditable." 
 
68 FIRSTPEKIOD. 
 
 DISTRIBUTION OF REGBIEXTS AXD BATTERIES. 
 
 For a detiiiled statement of the distribution of various regi- 
 ments and batteries, as they arrived in Washington at this 
 period ; and, also, an account of the composition of the army 
 on the 15th of October, 1862, see Appendix A. 
 
 ARMY CORPS. 
 
 On the 8th of March, 1862, the President directed, by the 
 following order, the organization of the active portion of the 
 army of tlie Potomac, into four army corps, and the forma- 
 tion of a fifth corps, from the divisions of Banks and Shields. 
 The following is the text of the President's order : 
 
 Executive Mansion, 
 ■Washington, March 8tli, 1862. 
 
 President's General War Order, No. 2. 
 
 Ordered I fit. That the Major-General commanding the army 
 of the Potomac, proceed, forthwith, to organize that part of 
 said army destined to enter i;pon active operations, (including 
 the reserve, but excluding the troops to be left in the forti- 
 fications about Washington), into four army corps, to be com- 
 manded according to seniority of rank, as follows : 
 
 1st Corps. To consist of four divisions, and to be command- 
 ed by Maj.-Gen. I. McDowell. 
 
 2d Corps. To consist of three divisions, and to be command- 
 ed by Brig.-Geu. E. V. Sumner. 
 
 3d Corps. To consist of three divisions, and to be commanded 
 by Brig.-Gen. S. P. Heintzelman. 
 
 4?A Corps. To consist of three divisions, and to be com- 
 manded by Brig.-Gen. E. D. Keyes. 
 
 2d. That the divisions now commanded by the officers 
 above assigned to the commands of army corps, shall be em- 
 braced in, and form part of their respective corps. 
 
ARMY CORPS. 59 
 
 3d. The forces left for the defense of Wasliington, will bo 
 placed in command of Brig.-Gen. James \Vads\vorth, who 
 shall also be Military Governor of the District of Columbia. 
 
 4th. That this order be executed wnth such promptness and ' 
 dispatch, as not to delay the commencement of the opera- 
 tions already directed to be undertaken by the army of the 
 Potomac. 
 
 5th. A fifth army corps to be commanded by Maj.-Gen. N. 
 P. Banks, will be formed from his own, and General Shields', 
 late General Lander's, division. 
 
 Abraham Lixcolx. 
 
 The following order, which was made as soon as circum- 
 stances permitted, exhibits the steps taken to carry out the 
 requirements of the President's War Order, No. 2 : 
 
 ARMY CORPS. 
 
 He.VD-QcARTERS, ARilY OF THE POTOJIAC, 
 
 Fairfax Court House, Va., March 13th, 1862. 
 General Orders^ No. 101 : 
 
 In compliance with the President's War Order, No. 2, of 
 March 8th, 18G2, the active portion of the army of the Poto- 
 mac, is formed into army corps, as follows : 
 
 1st Corps. Maj.-Gen. Irwin McDowell, to consist, for the 
 present, of the divisions of Franklin, McCall, and King. 
 
 2c? Corps. Brig.-Gen. E. V. Sumner, divisions Richardson, 
 Blenker, and Sedgwick. 
 
 3f? Corps. Brig.-Gen. S. P. Heintzelman, divisions F. J. 
 Porter, Hooker, and Hamilton. 
 
 Uh Corjys. Brig.-Gen. E. D. Keyes, divisions Couch, Smith, 
 and Casey. 
 
 5fh Corps. Maj-Gen. N". P. Banks, divisions Williams, and 
 Shields. 
 
 The cavalry regiments attached to divisions, will, for the 
 l^resent, remain so ; subsequent orders will provide for these 
 regiments, as well as for the reserve artillery, regular infantry, 
 and regular cavalry. 
 
 Arrangements will be made to unite the divisions of each 
 
60 FIRSrPERIOD. 
 
 army corps, as promptly as possible. The commanders of 
 divisions, will at once report in person, or where that is im- 
 possible, by letter to the commander of their army corps. 
 By command of 
 
 Major-General McClellan", 
 
 A. V. CoLBURx, Ass't. Adj't.-Gen'l. 
 
 0RGAN:IZATI0N of the army, APRIL 1, 1862. 
 
 For a detailed statement of the organization and composi- 
 tion of the army, on the 1st April, 18G2, see Appendix B. 
 
 THE STAFF. 
 
 In a staff cliarged with labors so various and important as 
 that of the army of the Potomac, a chief was indispensable to 
 supervise the various departments, and to relieve the com- 
 manding general of details. The office of chief-of-staff, well 
 known in European armies, had not been considered necessaiy 
 in our small peace establishment. The functions of the office 
 were not defined, and, so for as exercised, had been included 
 in the adjutant-generars department. The small number of 
 officers in this department, and the necessity for their employ- 
 ment in other duties, have obliged commanding generals 
 during this war to resort to other branches of the service to 
 furnish suitable chiefs-of-staff. 
 
 On the 4th of September, 1861, I appointed Colonel R. B. 
 Marct, of the inspector-general's department, chief-of-staff, 
 and he entered upon service immediately, discharging the 
 various and important duties with great fidelity, industry, and 
 ability from this period until I was removed from command at 
 Rectortown. 
 
 Many improvements have been made during the war in our 
 system of staff administration ; but much remains to be done. 
 
 Our own experience and that of other armies agree in de- 
 termining tlie necessity for an efficient and able staffi To 
 obtain this, our staff establishment should be based on correct 
 
THESTAFF. 61 
 
 principles, and extended to be adequate to the necessities of 
 the service, and should include a system of staif and line edu- 
 cation. 
 
 The affairs of the adjutant-general's department, while I 
 commanded the army of the Potomac, were conducted by 
 Brig.-Gen. S. Williams, assisted by Lieut.-Col. James A. 
 Hardie, a. D. C. 
 
 Their management of the department duiing the organiza- 
 tion of the army in the foil and winter of 1861, and during its 
 subsequent operations in the field, was excellent. 
 
 They were, during the entire period, assisted by Captain 
 Richard B. Irwin, A. D. C, and during the organization of 
 the army by the following named officers : 
 
 Capt. Jos. KiRKLAND, A. D. C. 
 
 Capt. Arthur McClellan, A. D. C. 
 
 Capt. M. T. McMahon, 
 
 Capt. Wm. p. Mason, 
 
 Capt. W. F. BiDDLE, " 
 
 My personal staff, when we embarked for the peninsula, 
 consisted of. 
 
 Col. Thos. M. Key, additional A. D. C. 
 
 Col. E. H. Wright, " " and Mnjor 6th U. S. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 Col. T. T. Gantt, additional A. D. C. 
 Col. J. J. AsTOR, Jr., volunteer aid-de-camp. 
 Lieut.-Col. A. V. Colburn, additional A. D. C, and 
 
 Captain in adjutant-general's department. 
 Lieut.-Col. X. B. Sweitzer, additional A. D. C,. and 
 
 Captain 1st U. S. Cavalry. 
 Lieut.-Col. E. M. K. Hudson, additional A. D. C, and 
 
 Captain 14th U. S. Infantry. 
 Lieut.-Col. Paul Von Radowitz, additional A. D. C. 
 Maj. H. Von Hammerstein, " " 
 
 Maj. W. W. Russell, U. S. Marine Corps. 
 Maj. F. Lecompte, of Swiss army, volunteer aid-de-camp. 
 Capt. Jos. Kirkland, additional A. D. C. 
 Capt. Arthur McClellan, additional A. D. C. 
 Capt. L. P. D'Orleans, " " 
 
62 riKSTPERIOD. 
 
 Capt. K. D'Okleans, additional A. D. C. 
 Capt. M. T. McMahox, " 
 
 Capt. Wm. p. Mason, Jr., " 
 Capt. Wm. F. Biddle, " 
 
 Capt. E. A. Raymond, " 
 
 To this number I am tempted to add the Prince De Join- 
 viLLE, who constantly accompanied me through the trying 
 campaign of the peninsula, and frequently rendered important 
 service. 
 
 Of these officers, Capt. McMahon was assigned to the per- 
 sonal staff of Brig.-Gen. Franklin, and Capts. Kirkland and 
 Mason to that of Brig.-Geu. F. J. Porter, during the siege 
 of Yorktown : they remained subsequently with those general 
 officers. 
 
 Major Le Compte left the army during the siege of York- 
 town; Col. Gantt, Col. Astor, Maj. Russell, Capts. L. P. 
 D'Orleans, R. D'Orleans, and Raymond, at the close of the 
 Peninsula campaign. 
 
 Before its termination, Capts. W. S. Abert and Charles R. 
 Lowell, of the 6th U. S. Cavalry, joined my staff as aids-de- 
 camp, and remained with me until I was relieved from the 
 command of the army of the Potomac. 
 
 All of these officers served me with great gallantry and devo- 
 tion ; they were ever ready to execute any service, no matter 
 how dangerous, difficult, or fatiguing. 
 
 E N G I X E E R S . 
 
 When I assumed command of the army of the Potomac, I 
 found Major J. G. Barnard, TJ. S. Engineers, subsequently 
 Brig.-Gen. of volunteers, occupying the position of chief engi- 
 neer of that army. I continued him in the same office, and at 
 once gave the necessary instructions for the completion of the 
 defenses of the capital, and for the entire reorganization of the 
 department. 
 
 Under his direction the entire system of defenses was car- 
 ried into execution. This was completed before the army 
 
ENGIJSTEE RS . 63 
 
 departed for Fort Monroe, and is a sufficient evidence of the 
 skill of the engineers and the diligent labor of the troops. 
 
 For some months after the organization of the army of the 
 Potomac was commenced, there were no engineer troojis with 
 it ; at length however three companies were assigned. Under 
 the skillful management of Capt. J. C. Duane, U. S. Engineers, 
 these new companies rapidly became efficient, and, as Avill be 
 seen, rendered most valuable service during the ensuing cam- 
 paigns. 
 
 The number of engineer troops being entirely inadequate to 
 the necessities of the army, an effiDrt was made to partially 
 remedy this defect, by detailing the 15th and 50th New York 
 Volunteers, which contained many sailors and mechanics, as 
 engineer troops. They were first placed under the immediate 
 superintendence of Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexander, U. S. Engi- 
 neers, by whom they were instructed in the duties of pon- 
 tooneers, and became somewhat familiar with those of sappers 
 and miners. Previous to the movement of the army for the 
 Peninsula, this brigade Avas placed under the command of 
 Brig.-Gen, D. P. AVoodbury, Major U. S. Engineers. 
 
 The labor of prejjaring the engineer and bridge trains de- 
 volved chiefly upon Capt. Duane, who was instructed to pro- 
 cure the new model French bridge train, as I was satisfied 
 that the India-rubber pontoon was entirely useless for the 
 general purposes of a campaign. 
 
 The engineer department presented the following complete 
 organization when the army moved for the Peninsula : 
 
 Brig.-Gen. J. G. Barnard, Chief Engineer. 
 
 1st Lieut. H. L. Abbott, Top. Engineers, A. D. C. 
 
 Brigade A^ol. Engineers, Brig.-Gen. Woodbury, Comm'g. 
 loth New York Vols., Col. McLeod AIurphy. 
 50th " " Col. C. B. Stewart. 
 
 * Battalion 3 Cos. U. S. Engineers, Capt. J. C. Duane, com- 
 manding. 
 
 Companies respectively commanded by 
 
 1st Lieut. C. B. Reese, U. S. Engineers. 
 1st Lieut. C. E. Cross, " 
 
 1st Lieut. O. E. Babcock, " 
 
64 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 The chief engineer was ably assisted in his duties by 
 
 Lieut.-Col. R. S. Alexakder, U. S. Engineers. 
 1st Lieut. C. R. Comstock, " " 
 
 1st Lieut. M. D. McAlester, " " 
 
 1st Lieut. Merrill, " " 
 
 Capt. C. S. Stuart, and 2nd Lieut. F. U. Farqtjhar, U. S. 
 Engineers, joined after the army arrived at Fort Monroe. 
 
 The necessary bridge equipage for the operations of a large 
 army had been collected, consisting of batteaux with the 
 anchors and flooring material, (French model,) trestles and 
 engineers' tools, with the wagons for their transportation. 
 
 The small number of oflicers of this corps available ren- 
 dered it impracticable to detail engineers permanently at the 
 head-quarters of corps and divisions. 
 
 The companies of regular engineers never had their proper 
 number of oflicers, and it was necessary, as a rule, to follow 
 the principle of detailing engineer oflicers temporarily, where- 
 ever their services were required. 
 
 TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS. 
 
 To the corps of Topographical Engineers was intrusted the 
 collection of topogra^^hical information and the preparation of 
 campaign maps. Until a short time previous to the departure 
 of the anny for Fort Monroe, Lieut.-Col, Johi!^ W. Macomb 
 was in charge of this department, and prej^ared a large 
 amount of valuable material. He was succeeded by Brig.- 
 Gen. A. A. Humphreys, who retained the position throughout 
 the peninsular campaign. 
 
 These oflicers were assisted by 
 
 Lieut. H. L. Abbott, Topographical Engineers, 
 
 Lieut. O. G. Wagner, " " • 
 
 Lieut. N. BowEN, " " 
 
 Lieut. John M. Wilson, " " 
 
 Lieut. James H. Wilson, " " 
 
 This number, being the greatest available, was so small that 
 much of the duty of the department devolved upon parties 
 
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 65 
 
 furnished by Professor Bache, Superintendent of Coast Sur- 
 vey, and other gentlemen from civil life. 
 
 Owing to the entire absence of reliable topographical maps, 
 the labors of this corps were difficult and arduous in the ex- 
 treme. Notwithstanding the energy and ability displayed by 
 General Humphreys, Lieut.-Col. Macomb, and their subordi- 
 nates, who frequently obtained the necessary information 
 under fire, the movements of the army w^ere sometimes ima- 
 voidably delayed by the difficulty of obtaining knowledge of 
 the country in advance. The result of their labors has been 
 the preparation of an excellent series of maps, which will be 
 invaluable to any array traversing the same ground. 
 
 During the campaign it was impossible to draw a distinct 
 line of demarcation between the duties of the two corps of 
 engineers, so that the labors of reconnoissances of roads, of 
 lines for trenches, of fields for battle, and of the position of the 
 enemy, as well as the construction of siege and defensive 
 works, were habitually performed by detail from either corps 
 as the convenience of the service demanded. 
 
 I desire to express my high appreciation of the skill, gal- 
 lantry, and devotion displayed by the officers of both corps of 
 engineers under the most trying circumstances. 
 
 During the Maryland campaign I united the two corps 
 under Captain J. C. Duane, U. S. Engineers, and found great 
 advantages from this arrangement. 
 
 MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 
 
 For the operations of the medical department I refer to the 
 reports transmitted herewith, of Surgeon Ohas. S. Tripler, 
 and Surgeon Jonathan Letterman, who, in turn, performed 
 the duties of medical director of the array of the Potomac : 
 the former from August 12, 1861, until July 1, 1862, and the 
 latter after that date. 
 
 The difficulties to be overcome, in organizing and making 
 effectual the medical department, were very great, arising 
 principally from the inexperience of the regimental medical 
 officers, many of whom were physicians taken suddenly from 
 
66 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 civil life, who, according to Surgeon Tripler, "had to be 
 instructed in their duties from the very alphabet," and from 
 the ignorance of the line officers as to their relations with the 
 medical officers, which gave rise to confusion and conflict of 
 authority. 
 
 Boards of examination were instituted, by which many 
 incompetent officers were removed, and by the successive 
 exertions of Surgeons Tripler and Letterman the medical corps 
 was brought to a very high degree of efficiency. 
 
 With regard to the sanitary condition of the army while on 
 the Potomac, Dr. Tripler says that the records show a con- 
 stantly increasing immunity from disease. " In October and 
 November, 1861, with an army avei'aging 130,000 men, we had 
 7,932 cases of fever of all sorts; of these about 1,000 were re- 
 ported as cases of typhoid fever. I knew that errors of diag- 
 nosis were frequently committed, and therefore this must be 
 considered as the limit of typhoid cases. If any army in the 
 world can show such a record as this, I do not know when 
 or where it was assembled'." 
 
 From September, 1861, to February, 1862, while the array 
 was increasing, the number of sick decreased from 7 per cent, 
 to 6.18 per cent.; of these, the men sick in the regimental and 
 general hospitals, were less than one-half, the remainder were 
 slight cases under treatment in quarters. " During this time, 
 so far as rumor was concerned, the army was being decimated 
 by disease every month." 
 
 Of the sanitary condition of the army during the peninsular 
 campaign, up to its arrival at Harrison's Landing, Dr. Tripler 
 says : 
 
 " During this campaign the army was favored with excel- 
 lent health. No epidemic disease appeared. Those scourges 
 of modern armies — dysentery, typhus, cholera — were almost 
 unknown. We had some typhoid fever, and more malarial 
 fevers ; but even these never prevailed to such an extent as to 
 create any alarm. The sick reports were sometimes larger 
 than we cared to have them, but the great majority of the 
 cases reported were such as did not threaten life, or perma- 
 nent disability. I regret that I have not before me the 
 retained copies of the monthly reports, so that I might give 
 
MEDICAL DEPARTMENT. 67 
 
 accurate statistics. I have endeavored to recover them, but 
 have been unsuccessful. My recollection is that the whole 
 sick report never exceeded 8 per cent, of the force, and this 
 included all sorts of cases — the trivial as well as the severe. 
 The army of tlie Potomac must be considered to have been 
 the most healthy army in the service of the United States." 
 
 His remarks at the conclusion of his report, upon our sys- 
 tem of medical administration, and his suggestions for its im- 
 provement, are especially worthy of attention. 
 
 The severe labors and privations of the troops during the 
 seven days' battles, had of course a great effect on the health 
 of the army after it reached Harrison's Landing, increasing 
 the number of sick to about 20 per cent, of the whole force. 
 
 The nature of the military operations had also unavoidably 
 placed the medical department in a very unsatisfactory con- 
 dition. Supplies had been almost entirely exhausted, or neces- 
 sarily abandoned ; hospital tents abandoned or destroyed ; and 
 the medical officers deficient in numbers and broken down by 
 fatigue. 
 
 All the remarkable energy and ability of Surgeon Letterman 
 were required to restore the efficiency of his department, but 
 before we left Harrison's Landing he had succeeded in fitting 
 it out throughout with the supplies it required, and the health 
 of the army was vastly improved by the sanitary measures 
 which were enforced at his suggestion. 
 
 The great haste with which the army was removed from the 
 Peninsula, made it necessary to leave at Fort Monroe, to be 
 forwarded afterwards, nearly all the baggage and transporta- 
 tion, including medical stores and ambulances, all the vessels 
 being required to transport the troops themselves and tlieir 
 ammunition ; and when the army of the Potomac returned to 
 Washington, after General Pope's campaign, and the medical 
 department came once more under Surgeon Letterman's con- 
 trol, he found it in a deplorable condition. 
 
 The officers were worn out by the labors they had per- 
 formed, and the few supplies that had been brought from the 
 peninsula had been exhausted or abandoned, so that the work 
 of reorganization and resupplying had to be again performed, 
 and this while the army was moving rapidly and almost in the 
 
68 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 face of the enemy. That it was successfully accomplished is 
 shown by the care and attention which the wounded received 
 after the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, 
 
 Among the improvements introduced into his department 
 by Surgeon Letterman, the principal are, the organization of 
 an ambulance corps, the system of field-hospitals, and the 
 method of supplying by brigades ; all of which were instituted 
 during the Maryland campaign, and have since proved very 
 efiicient. 
 
 QUARTER-MASTER'S DEPARTMENT. 
 
 On assuming command of the troops in and about Wash- 
 ington, I appointed Captain S. Van Vliet, A. Q. M., (after- 
 wards Brigadier-General,) Chief Quarter-master to my com- 
 mand, and gave him the necessary instructions for organizing 
 his department, and collecting the supplies requisite for the 
 large army then called for. 
 
 The disaster at Manassas had but recently occurred, and the 
 army was quite destitute of quarter-masters' stores. 
 
 General Van Vliet, with great energy and zeal, set himself 
 about the task of furnishing the supplies immediately neces- 
 sary, and preparing to obtain the still lai'ger amounts which 
 would be required by the new troops which were moving in 
 large numbers towards the capital. 
 
 The principal depot for supplies in the city of Washington 
 was under charge of Col. D. H. Rucker, A. Q. M., who ably 
 performed his duties. 
 
 Lieut.-Col. R. Ingalls, A. Q. M., was placed in charge of the 
 department on the south side of the Potomac. I directed a 
 large depot for transportation to be established at Perryville, 
 on the left bank of the Susquehanna, a point equally accessible 
 by rail and water. Capt. C. G. Sawtellb, A. Q. M., was de- 
 tailed to organize the camp, and performed his duties to my 
 entii'e satisfaction. Capt. J. J. Dana, A. Q. M., had imme- 
 diate charge of the transportation in and about Washington, 
 as well as of the large number of horses purchased for the use 
 of the artillery and cavalry. The principal difficulties which 
 
QUARTER-MASTER'S DEPARTMENT. 69 
 
 Gen. Van Vliet had to encountei' arose from the inexperience 
 of the majority of the officers of his department in the new 
 regiments and brigades. The necessity of attending person- 
 ally to minor details rendered his duties arduous and haras- 
 sing in the extreme. AlLobstacles, however, were surmounted 
 by the untiring industry of the chief quarter-master and his 
 immediate subordinates, and when the army was prepared to 
 move, the organization of the department was found to be 
 admirable. 
 
 When it was determined to move the army to the penin- 
 sula, the duties of providing water transportation were de- 
 volved, by the Secretary of War, upon his assistant, the Hon. 
 John Tucker. The vessels were ordered to Alexandria, and 
 Lieut.-Col. Ingalls was placed in immediate charge of the em- 
 barkation of the troops, transportation, and material of every 
 description. Operations of this nature on so extensive a scale 
 had no parallel in the history of our country. 
 
 The arrangements of Lieut.-Col. Ingalls, w^ere perfected with 
 remarkable skill and energy, and the array, and its material, 
 were embarked and transported to Fort Monroe in a very 
 short space of time, and entirely without loss. 
 
 During the operations on the Peninsula, until the arrival of 
 troops at Harrison's Landing, General Van Vliet retained the 
 position of Chief Quarter-master, and maintained the thorough 
 organization and efficiency of his department. 
 
 The principal depots of supplies were under the immediate 
 charge of Lieut.-Cols. Ingalls and Sawtelle. 
 
 On the 10th of July, 1862, General Van Vliet, having re- 
 quested to be relieved from duty with the army of the Potomac, 
 I appointed Lieut.-Col. Ingalls Chief Quarter-master, and he 
 continued to discharge the duties of that office during the re- 
 mainder of the Peninsular and the Maryland campaigns, in a 
 manner which fully sustained the high reputation he had pre- 
 viously acquired. 
 
 The immense amount of labor accomplished, often under the 
 most difficult circumstances, the admirable system under which 
 the duties of the department were performed, and the entire 
 success which attended the effi^rts to supply so large an army, 
 reflect the highest credit upon the officers upon Avhom these 
 
70 riRSTPEEIOD. 
 
 onerous duties devolved. The reports of General Van Vliet, 
 and Lieut.-Col. Ingalls, with the accompanying documents, 
 give, in detail, the history of the department, from its organi- 
 zation until I was relieved from the command of the army of 
 the Potomac. 
 
 SUBSISTENCE DEPARTMENT. 
 
 On the 1st of August, 1861, Col. H. F. Clarke, C. S., joined 
 toy staff, and at once entei'ed upon his duties as Chief Com- 
 missary of the army of the Potomac. In order' to realize the 
 responsibilities j)ertaining to this office, as well as to form a 
 proper estimate of the vast amount of labor which must neces- 
 sarily devolve upon its occupant, it is only necessary to con- 
 sider the unprepared state of the country to engage in a war 
 of such magnitude as the present, and the lack of practical 
 knowledge on the part of our officers, with reference to sup- 
 plying and subsisting a large, and, at that time, an unorganized 
 army. Yet, notwithstanding the existence of these great ob- 
 stacles, the manner in which the duties of the commissary depart- 
 ment were discharged, was such as to merit, and call forth the 
 commendation of the entire army. During the stay of the army 
 of the Potomac in the vicinity of Washington, j^rior to the 
 Peninsular campaign, its subsistence was drawn chiefly from 
 the depots which had been established by the commissary de- 
 partment at Washington, Alexandria, Forts Corcoran and 
 Runyon. In the important task of designating and establish- 
 ing depots of supplies, Colonel Clapjce, was ably seconded by 
 his assistants. Col. Amos Beckwitii, C. S., U. S. A., Lieut.- 
 Col. Geo. Bell, C. S., U. S. A., Lieut.-Col. A. P. Porter, C. 
 S., U. S. A., Capt. Thos. Wilsox, C. S., U. S. A., Capt. Brow^- 
 NELL Granger, C. S., U. S. Vols., Capt. W. H. Bell, C. S., 
 U. S. A., Capt. I. H. Woodward, C. S., U. S. Vols., and Capt. 
 W. R. Murphy, C. S., F. S. Vols. For a full knowledge of 
 the highly creditable manner in which each and all of the above 
 mentioned officers discharged their duties, I invite attention 
 to the detailed report of Colonel Clarke. The remarks and 
 suggestions contained in this report, are worthy of attention, 
 
ORDINANCE DEPARTMENT, 71 
 
 as affording valuable rules for the future guidance of the sub- 
 sistence department, in supplying armies in the field. The 
 success of the subsistence department of the army of the Po- 
 tomac, was, in a great measure, attributable to the fixct, that 
 the subsistence department at Washington made ample pre- 
 vious provision for sending supplies to the peninsula, and that 
 it always exercised the most intelligent foresight. It more- 
 over gave its advice and countenance to the officers charged 
 with its duties and reputation in the field, and those officers, I 
 am happy to say, worked with it, and together, in perfect har- 
 mony, for the public good. 
 
 During the entire period that I was in command of the aripy 
 of the Potomac, there was no instance within my knowledge, 
 where the troops were without their rations from any fault of 
 the officers of this department. 
 
 ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT. 
 
 This very important branch of the service, was placed under 
 the charge of Capt. C. P. Kingsbury, ordnance corps, Colonel 
 and A. D, C. Great difficulty existed in the proper organiza- 
 tion of the department, from the want of a sufficient number 
 of suitable officers to perform the duties at the various head- 
 quarters, and depots of supply. But fir greater obstacles had 
 to be surmounted, from the fact, that the supply of small arms 
 was totally inadequate to the demands of a large army, and a 
 vast proportion of tho'se furnished, were of such inferior quali- 
 ty, as to be unsatisfactory to the troops, and condemned by 
 their officers. The supply of artillery was more abundant, but 
 of great variety. Rifled ordnance was just coming into use for 
 the first time in this country, and the description of gun and 
 kind of projectile, which would prove most effective, and 
 should therefore be adopted, was a mere matter of theory. 
 
 To obviate these difficulties, large quantities of small arms 
 of foreign manufacture were contracted for ; private enterprise 
 in the construction of arms and ammunition was encouraged ; 
 and by the time the army was ordered to move to the penin- 
 
72 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 sula, the amount of ordnance and ordnance stores was ample. 
 Much, also, had been done to bring the quality, both of arms 
 and ammunition, up to the proper standard. Boards of offi- 
 cers were in session continually, daring the autumn and winter 
 of 1861, to test the relative merits of new arms and projectiles. 
 The reports of these boards, confirmed by subsequent ex- 
 perience in the field, have done much to establish the respec- 
 tive claims of different inventions and manufiictories. During 
 the campaigns of the Peninsula and Maryland, the officers 
 connected with the department, were zealous and energetic, 
 and kept the troops well supplied, notwithstanding the per- 
 plexing and arduous nature of their duties. One great source 
 of perplexity, was the fiict, that it had been necessary to issue 
 arms of all varieties and calibres, giving an eqiaal diversity in 
 the kinds of ammunition required. Untiring watchfulness was 
 therefore incumbent upon the officers in charge, to prevent 
 confusion, and improper distribution of cartridges. Colonel 
 Kingsbury discharged the duties of his office with great effi- 
 ciency, until the of July, 1862, when his health required 
 
 that he should be relieved. 1st Lieut. Thomas G. Baylor, 
 ordnance corps, succeeded him, and performed his duty during 
 the remainder of the Peninsular and Maryland campaigns, with 
 marked ability and success. The want of reports from Colonel 
 Kingsbury and Lieutenant Baylor, i-enders it impossible for me 
 to enter, at all, into the details of the organization of the de- 
 partment. 
 
 PROVOST- M A PvSHAL'S DEPARTMENT. 
 
 Immediately after I was placed in command of the " Divi- 
 sion of the Potomac," I appointed Col. Andrew Porter, 16th 
 U. S. infentry. Provost Marshal of Washington. All the 
 available regular infiintry, a battery, and a squadron of cav- 
 alry, were placed under his command ; and by his energetic 
 action, he soon corrected the serious evils which existed, and 
 restored oi'der in the city. 
 
 When the army was about to take the field, G-eneral Porter 
 was appointed Provost Marshal General of the army of the 
 
PROVOST marshal's DEPARTMENT. V3 
 
 Potomac, and held that most important position until the end 
 of the Peninsular campaign, when sickness, contracted in the 
 untiring discharge of his duties, compelled him to ask to be 
 relieved from the position he had so ably and energetically 
 filled. The provost marshal general's department had the 
 charge of a class of duties, which had not before, in our service, 
 been defined and grouped under the management of a special 
 department. The following subjects indicate the sphere of 
 this department : 
 
 Suppression of marauding and depredations, and of all 
 brawls and disturbances. 
 
 Preservation of good order, and suppression of drunkenness 
 beyond the limits of the camps. 
 
 Prevention of straggling on the march. 
 
 Suppression of gambling-houses, drinking-houses, or bar- 
 rooms, and brothels. 
 
 Regulation of hotels, taverns, markets and places of public 
 amusement. 
 
 Searches, seizures and arrests. 
 
 Execution of sentences of general courts-martial, involving 
 imprisonment or capital punishment. 
 
 Enforcement of orders prohibiting the sale of intoxicating 
 liquors, whether by tradesmen or sutlers, and of orders re- 
 specting passes. 
 
 Deserters from the army. 
 
 Prisoners of war taken from the enemy. 
 
 Countersigning safe-guards. 
 
 Passes to citizens, within the lines, and for purposes of trade. 
 
 Complaints of citizens as to the conduct of the soldiers. 
 
 General Porter was assisted by the following named officers : 
 Maj. W. H. Wood, 17th U. S. Infantry. 
 Capt. Jas. McMillan, A. A. A. G., U. S. Infantry. 
 Capt. W. P. Gentrv, 17th 
 
 Capt. J. W. Forsyth, i 8th 
 
 Lieut. J. W. Jones, 12th 
 
 Lieut. C. F. Trowbridge, 16th 
 
 Lieut. C. D. Mehaffet, 1st 
 
 4 
 
74 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 The provost guard was composed of the 2d U. S. Cavahy, 
 Major Pleasanton, and a battalion of the 8th and 17th TJ. S. 
 Infantry, Major Willard. 
 
 After General Porter was relieved, Major Wood was in 
 charge of this department, until after the battle of Antietam, 
 when Brig.-Gen Patrick was appointed Provost Marshal 
 General. 
 
 COMMANDANT OF GENERAL HEAD-QUARTERS. 
 
 When the army took the field, for the purpose of securing 
 order and regularity in the camp of head-quarters, and for 
 faciUtating its movements, the office of commandant of general 
 head-quarters was created, and assigned to Mnj. G. O. Haller, 
 Vth U. S. Infantry. Six companies of infantry were jjlaced 
 under his orders for guard and police duty. Among the orders 
 appended to this report, is the one defining his duties, which 
 were always satisfactorily performed. 
 
 JUDGE-ADVOCATE. 
 
 From August, 1861, the position of judge-advocate was 
 held by Col. Tiios. T. Gantt, A. D. C, until compelled by ill 
 health to retire, at Harrison's Landing, in August, 1862. His 
 reviews of the decisions of courts-martial during this period, 
 were of great utility in correcting the practice in military 
 courts, difi'using true notions of discipline and subordination, 
 and setting before the army a high standard of soldierly 
 honor. 
 
 Upon the retirement of Colonel Gantt, the duties of judge- 
 advocate were ably performed by Col. Thomas M. Key, 
 A. D. C. 
 
 SIGNAL CORPS. 
 
 The method of conveying intelligence and orders, invented 
 and introduced into the service by Maj. Albert J, Mter, 
 
TELEGRAPHIC. "75 
 
 signal officer, IT. S. A., was first practically tested in large opera- 
 tions, during the organization of the army of the Potomac. 
 
 Under the direction of Major Myer, a signal corps was 
 formed by detailing officers and men from the diflferent regi- 
 ments of volunteers, and instructing them in the use of the 
 flags by day, and torclies by night. 
 
 The chief signal officer was indefatigable in his exertions to 
 render his corps effective, and it soon became available for 
 service, in every division of the array. 
 
 In addition to the flags and torches. Major Myer introduced 
 a portable insulated telegraph wire, which could be readily 
 laid from point to point, and which could be used under the 
 same general system. 
 
 In front of Washington, and on the lower Potomac, at any 
 point within our lines not reached by the military telegraph, 
 the great usefulness of this system of signals was made mani- 
 fest. But it was not until after the arrival of the army upon 
 the Peninsula, and during the siege and battles of that, and the 
 Maryland campaign, that the great benefits to be derived from 
 it on the field, and under fire, were fully appreciated. 
 
 There was scarcely an action or skirmish in which the sig- 
 • nal corps did not render important services. Often, finder 
 heavy fire of artillery, and not unfrequently while exposed to 
 musketry, the officers and men of this corps gave information 
 of the movements of the enemy, and transmitted directions for 
 the evolutions of our own troops. 
 
 The report of the chief signal officer, with accompanying 
 documents, will give the details of the services of this corps, 
 and call attention to those members of it who Avere particu- 
 larly distinguished. 
 
 TELEGRAPHIC. 
 
 The telegraphic operations of the army of the Potomac 
 were superintended by Major Thomas J. Eckert, and under 
 
 the immediate direction of Mr. ■ Caldwell, who was with 
 
 the corps of opei-atives attached to my head-quarters during 
 the entire campaigns upon the peninsula and in Maryland. 
 
76 FIESTPERIOD. 
 
 The services of this corps were arduous and efficient. Un- 
 der the admirable arrangements of Major Eckert they were 
 constantly provided with all the material for constrnctiug new 
 lines, which were rapidly established whenever the army 
 changed position ; and it was not unfrequently the case that 
 the operatives worked under fire from the enemy's guns, yet 
 they invariably performed all the duties required of them with 
 great alacrity and cheerfulness, and it was seldom that I was 
 without the means of direct telegraphic communication with 
 the War Department, and with the corps commanders. 
 
 From the organization of the army of the Potomac up to 
 November 1, 1862, including the Peninsular and Maryland 
 campaigns, upwards of twelve hundred [1,200] miles of mili- 
 tary telegraph lines had been constructed, in connection with 
 the operations of the army, and the number of operatives and 
 builders employed was about [200] two hundred. 
 
 To Professor Lowe, the intelligent and enterprising aeronaut, 
 who had the management of the balloons, I was greatly 
 indebted for the valuable information obtained during his 
 ascensions. 
 
 I have more than once taken occasion to recommend the 
 members of my staff, both genei'al and personal, for promotion 
 and reward. I beg leave to repeat these recommendations, 
 and to record their names in the history of the army of the 
 Potomac as gallant soldiers, to whom their country owes a 
 debt of gratitude still unpaid, for the courage, ability, and 
 untiring zeal they displayed during the eventful campaigns in 
 which they bore so prominent a part. 
 
 POSITION OF THE ARMY, OCTOBER, 1862. 
 
 On the 15th of October, the main body of the array of the 
 Potomac was in the immediate vicinity of Washington, with 
 detachments on the left bank of the Potomac as far down as 
 Liverpool Point, and as far up as Williamsport and its vicinity. 
 The different divisions were posted as follows : 
 
 Hooker, at Budd's Ferry, lower Potomac. 
 
THE AFFAIR AT BALl's BLUFF. VY 
 
 Heintzelman, at Fort Lyon and vicinity. 
 
 Frankli.v, near the Theological Seminary. 
 
 Blenker, near Hunter's Chapel. 
 
 McDowell, at Upton's Hill and Arlington. 
 
 F. J. Porter, at Hall's and Miner's Hills. 
 
 Smith, at Mackall's Hill. 
 
 McCall, at Langley. 
 
 BuELL, at Tenallytown, Meridian Hill, Emory's Chapel, &c., 
 on the left bank of the river. 
 
 Casey, at Washington. 
 
 Stoxeman's Cavalry, at Washington. 
 
 Hunt's Artillery, " " 
 
 Banks, at Darnstown, with detachments at Pomt of Rocks, 
 Sandy Hook, Williamsport, tfec. 
 
 Stone, at Poolesville. 
 
 Dix, at Baltimore, with detachments on the eastern shore. 
 
 THE AFFAIR AT BALL'S BLUFF. 
 
 On the 19th of October, 1861, Gen. McCall marched to 
 Drainesville with his division, in order to cover reconnoissances 
 to be made in all directions the next day, for the purpose of 
 learning the position of the enemy, and of covering the opera- 
 tions of the topographical engineers in making maps of that 
 region. 
 
 On the 20th, acting in concert with Gen. McCall, Gen. 
 Smith pushed strong parties to Freedom Hill, Vienna, Flint 
 Hill, Peacock Hill, &c., to accomplish the same purpose in 
 that part of the front. 
 
 These reconnoissances were successful. 
 
 On the morning of the 20th I received the following tele- 
 gram from Gen. Banks' head-quarters : 
 
 Daknestown, Oct. 20, 1861. 
 Gen. Marcy, — 
 
 Sir,— The signal station at Sugar Loaf telegraphs that 
 the enemy have moved away from Leesburg. All quiet here. 
 
 R. M. COPELAND, A. A. G. 
 
18 F I R S T P E K I O D . 
 
 Whereui^on I sent to Gen. Stone, at Poolesville, the follow- 
 ing telegram : 
 
 Camp Griffin, Oct. 20, 1861. 
 Brig.-Gen. C. p. Stone, 
 Poolesville, — 
 Gen. McClellan desires me to inform you that Gen. McCall 
 occupied Drainesville yesterday, and is still there. Will send 
 out heavy reconnoissances to-day in all directions from that 
 point. The general desires that you keep a good lookout 
 upon Leesburg, to see if this movement has the effect to drive 
 them away. Perhaj^s a slight demonstration on your part 
 would have the effect to move them. 
 
 A. V. COLBUEK, 
 
 Ass't.-Adj't.-Gen. 
 
 Deeming it possible that Gen. McCalPs movement to Draines- 
 ville, together with the subsequent reconnoissances, might have 
 the effect of inducing the enemy to abandon Leesburg, and 
 the dispatch from Sugar Loaf appearing to confirm this view, 
 I wished Gen. Stone, who had only a line of pickets on the 
 river, the mass of his troops being out of sight of and beyond 
 range from the Virginia bank, to make some display of an 
 intention to cross, and also to watch the enemy more closely 
 than usual. I did not direct him to cross, nor did I intend 
 that he should cross the river in force for the purpose of 
 fighting. 
 
 The above dispatch was sent on the 20th, and reached Gen. 
 Stone as early as 11 a.m. of that day. I expected him to 
 accomplish all that was intended on the same day ; and this 
 he did, as will be seen from the foUoAviug dispatch received 
 at my head-quarters in Washington, from Poolesville, on the 
 evening of October 20th. 
 
 To Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 Made a feint of crossing at this place this afternoon, and 
 at the same time started a reconnoitring party towards Lees- 
 burg from Harrison's Island. The enemy's pickets retired to 
 intrenchments. Report of reconnoitring party not yet re- 
 
THE AFFAIR AT BALL's BLUFF. 79 
 
 ceived. I have means of crossing one hundred and twenty- 
 five men once in ten minutes at each of two points. River 
 falling slowly. 
 
 C. P. Stone, 
 
 Brigadier-General. 
 
 As it was not foreseen or expected that Gen. McCall would 
 be needed to co-operate with Gen. Stone in any attack, he was 
 directed to fall back from Drainesville to his original camp near 
 Prospect Hill, as soon as the required reconnoissances v/ere 
 completed. Accordingly he left Drainesville on his return at 
 about 8 A A.M. of the 21st, reaching his old camj^ at about 
 
 1 P.M. 
 
 In the meantime I was surprised to hear from Gen. Stone 
 that a portion of his troops were engaged on the Virginia side 
 of the river, and at once sent instructions to Gen. McCall to 
 remain at Drainesville if he had not left before the order 
 reached him. 
 
 The order did not reach him until his return to his camp at 
 Langley. He was then ordered to rest his men, and hold his 
 division in readiness to return to Drainesville at a moment's 
 notice, should it become necessary. 
 
 Similar instructions were given to other divisions during 
 the afternoon. 
 
 The first intimation I received from General Stone of the 
 real nature of his movements was in a telegram as follows : 
 
 Edwards' Ferry, 11.10 a.m., Oct. 21. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 The enemy have been engaged opposite Harrison's Island. 
 Our men are behaving admirably. 
 
 C. P. Stone, 
 Brigadier-General. 
 
 At 2 P. M. Gen. Banks' adjutant-general sent the follow- 
 ing : 
 
 Darn'esto-wn, Oct. 21, 1861, 2 P.M. 
 
 Gen. R. B. Marct, — 
 
 Gen. Stone safely crossed the river this morning. Some 
 
80 PIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 engagements have taken place on the other side of the river ; 
 how important is not known. 
 
 R. M. COPELAND, 
 
 A. A. A. G. 
 
 Gen. Stone sent the following dispatches on the same day, 
 at the hours indicated : 
 
 Edwards' Fekrt, Oct. 21, 1861, 2 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McCleixan, — 
 
 There has been sharp firing on the right of our line, and 
 our troops appear to be advancing there under Baker. The 
 left, under Gorman, has advanced its skirmishers nearly one 
 mile, and if the movement continues successful, will turn the 
 
 enemy's right. 
 
 C. P. Stone, 
 Brigadier-Geueral. 
 
 Edward' Ferry, Oct. 21st, 1861, 4 p.m. 
 Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 Nearly all my force is across the river. Baker on the 
 right, Gorman on the left, right sharply engaged. 
 
 C. P. Stone, 
 Brigadier-General. 
 
 Edwards' Ferry, Oct. 21, 1861, 9.30 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 I am occupied in preventing further disaster, and trying to 
 get into position to redeem. We have lost some of our best 
 commanders — Baker dead, Cogswell a prisoner, or secreted. 
 The wounded are being carefully and rapidly removed, and 
 Gorman's wing is being cautiously withdrawn. Any advance 
 from Drainesville must be made cautiously. All was reported 
 going well up to Baker's death, but in the confusion following 
 that, the right wing was outflanked. In a few hours I shall, 
 unless a night attack is made, be in the same position as last 
 night, save the loss of many good men. 
 
 C. P. Stone, 
 Brigadier-General. 
 
 Although no more fully informed of the state of affairs, I 
 had, during the afternoon, as a precautionary measure, ordered 
 
THE AFFAIR AT BALl's BLUFF. 81 
 
 Gen. Banks to send one brigade to the support of the troops 
 at Harrison's Island, and to move with the other two to Seneca 
 Mills, ready to support Gen. Stone if necessary. The 9.30 
 P.M. dispatch of Gen. Stone did not give me an entire under- 
 standing of the state of the case. Aware of the difficulties, 
 and perhaps fatal consequences of recrossing such a river as 
 the Potomac after a repulse, and from these telegi-ams sup- 
 posing his whole force to be on the Virginia side, I directed 
 Gen. Stone to intrench himself, and hold the Virginia side at 
 all hazards until reenforcements could arrive, Avhen he could 
 safely withdraw to the Maryland side, or hold his position on 
 the Virginia side, should that prove advisable. 
 
 Gen. Banks was instructed to move the rest of his division 
 to Edwards' Ferry, and to send over as many men as possible 
 before daylight, to reenforce Stone. He did not arrive in time 
 to effect this, and was instructed to collect all the canal boats 
 he could find, and use them for crossing at Edwards' Ferry in 
 sufficient force to enable the troops already there to hold the 
 opposite side. 
 
 On the 22d I went to the ground in person, and reaching 
 Poolesville learned for the first time the full details of the 
 affair. 
 
 The following extracts from the evidence of Gen. Stone 
 before the " Committee on the Conduct of the War," on the 
 5th of January, 1862, will throw further light on this oc- 
 currence. 
 
 Gen. Stone says he received the orders from ray head-quar- 
 ters, to make a slight demonstration, at about 11 o'clock 
 A.M. of the 20th, and that in obedience to that order he made 
 the demonstration on the evening of the same day. 
 
 In regard to the reconnoissance on the 21st, which resulted 
 in the battle of Ball's Bluff, he was asked the following ques- 
 tions : 
 
 " Question. Did this reconnoissance originate with yourself, 
 or had you orders from the General-in-Chief to make it ?" 
 
 To which he replied : " It originated with myself — the re- 
 connoissance." 
 
 " Question. The order did not proceed from General 
 
 McClellan ?" 
 
 4* 
 
82 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 ^^ Answer. I was directed, the day before, to make a demon- 
 stration. That demonstration was made the day previous.^'' 
 
 " Question. Did you receive an order from the General-in- 
 Chief to make the reconnoissance ?" 
 
 Answer. — " No, sir." 
 
 Making a personal examination on the 23d I found that the 
 position on the Virginia side at Edward's Ferry was not a 
 tenable one, but did not think it wise to withdraw the troops 
 by daylight. I therefore caused more artillery to be placed 
 in position ou the Maryland side, to cover the approaches to 
 the ground held by us, and crossed the few additional troops 
 that the high wind permitted us to get over, so as to be as 
 secure as possible against any attack during the day. Before^ 
 night-fall, all the precautions were taken to secure an orderly 
 and quiet passage of the troops and guns. The movement 
 was commenced soon after dark, under the general supervision 
 oi Gen. Stone, who received the order for the withdrawal at 
 7.15 P.M. By 4 A.M. of the 24th every thing had reached the 
 Maryland shore in safety. 
 
 A few days afterwards I received information, which seems 
 to be authentic, to the effect that large bodies of the enemy 
 had been ordered from Manassas to Leesburg, to cut off our 
 troops on the Virginia side. Their timely withdrawal had 
 probably prevented a still more serious disaster. I refer to 
 Gen. Stone's Report of this battle furnished to the War De- 
 partment, and his published testimony before the " Committee 
 on the Conduct of the War " for further details. 
 
 THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPEDITION. 
 
 The records of the War Department show my anxiety and 
 efforts to assume active offensive operations in the fall and 
 early winter. It is only just to say, however, that the unpre- 
 cedented condition of the roads and Virginia soil would have 
 delayed an advance till February had the discipline, organiza- 
 tion and equipment of the army been as complete at the close 
 of the fall as was necessary, and as I desired and labored, 
 
THE NORTH CAROLINA EXPEDITION. 83 
 
 against every impediment, to make them. While still in 
 command only of the army of the Potomac, namely, in early 
 September, I proposed the formation of a corps of New Eng- 
 enders for coast service in the bays and inlets of the Chesa- 
 peake and Potomac to cooperate with my own command, 
 from which most of its material was drawn. 
 
 On the 1st of November, however, I was called to relieve 
 Lieut.-Gen. Scott in the chief and general command of the 
 armies of the Union. The direction and natm-e of this coast 
 expedition, therefore, were somewhat changed, as will soon 
 appear in the original plan submitted to the Secretary of War, 
 and the letter of instructions later issued to Gen. Burnside, its 
 commander. The whole country indeed had now become the 
 theatre of military operations from the Potomac to and be- 
 yond the Mississippi, and to assist the Navy in perfecting and 
 sustaining the blockade, it became necessary to extend those 
 operations to points on the sea-coast, Roanoke Island, Savan- 
 nah, and New Orleans. It remained also to equip and organize 
 the armies of the West, whose condition was little better than 
 that of the army of the Potomac had been. 
 
 The direction of the campaigns in the West, and of the 
 operations upon the sea-board enabled me to enter upon larger 
 combinations, and to accomplish results the necessity and 
 advantage of which had not been unforeseen, but which had 
 been beyond the ability of the single army formerly under my 
 command, to effect. 
 
 The following letters and a subsequent paper addressed to 
 the Secretary of War sufficiently indicate the nature of those 
 combinations to minds accustomed to reason upon military 
 operations. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 "Washington, Sept. 6, 1861. 
 Hon. Simon Cameron, 
 Secretary of War, 
 
 Sir : I have the honor to suggest the following proposi- 
 tion, with the request that the necessary authority be at once 
 given me to carry it out ; to organize a force of two brigades 
 of five regiments each of New England men, for the general 
 service— but particularly adapted to coast service. The 
 
84 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 officers and men to be sufficiently conversant with boat 
 service to manage steamers, sailing vessels, launches, barges, 
 surf boats, floating batteries, &c. To charter or buy for the 
 command a sufficient number of propellers or tug-boats for 
 transportation of men and supplies, the machinery of which 
 should be amply protected by timber : the vessels to have 
 permanent experienced officers from the merchant service, but 
 to be manned by details from the command. A naval officer 
 to be attached to the staff of the commanding officer. The 
 flank companies of each regiment to be armed with Dahlgren 
 boat-guns, and carbines with water-proof cartridges ; the 
 other companies to have such arms as I may hereafter desig- 
 nate, to be uniformed and equipped as the Rhode Island regi- 
 ments are. Launches and floating batteries, with timber 
 parapets of sufficient capacity to land or bring into action the 
 entire force. 
 
 The entire management and organization of the force to be 
 under my control, and to form an integral part of the army of 
 the Potomac. 
 
 The immediate object of this force is for operations in the 
 inlets of Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac : by enabling me 
 thus to land troops at points where they are needed — this 
 force can also be used in conjunction with a naval force 
 operating against points on the sea-coast. This coast division 
 to be commanded by a general officer of my selection. The 
 regiments to be organized as other land forces. The disbui-se- 
 ments for vessels, &c., to be made by the proper department 
 of the army, upon the requisitions of the general commanding 
 the division, with my approval. 
 
 I think the entire force can be organized in thirty days, 
 and by no means the least of the advantages of this proposi- 
 tion is the fact, that it will call into the service a class of men 
 who would not otherwise enter the army. 
 
 You will immediately perceive that the object of this force 
 is to follow along the coast, and up the inlets and rivers, the 
 movements of the main army when it advances. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 Maj.-Gen. Comdg. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL BURNSIDE. 85 
 
 Owing chiefly to the difficulty in procuring the requisite 
 vessels, and adapting them to the special purposes contem- 
 plated, this expedition was not ready for service until January, 
 1862. 
 
 Then in the chief command I deemed it best to send it to 
 North Carolina with the design indicated in the following 
 letter : 
 
 Head-Quarters op the Army, 
 Washington, Jan. 1, 1862. 
 Brig.-Gen. a. E. Burnside, 
 
 Commanding J^xpedUion. 
 General : In accordance Avith verbal instructions hereto- 
 fore given you — you will, after uniting with flag-officer Golds - 
 borough, at Fort Monroe, proceed under his convoy to Hat- 
 teras Inlet, where you will in connectioii with him, take the 
 most prompt measures for crossing the fleet over the bulk- 
 head into the waters of the sound. Under the accompanying 
 general order constituting the Department of North Carolina, 
 you will assume command of the garrison at Hatteras Inlet, 
 and make such dispositions in regard to that place, as your 
 ulterior operations may render necessary — always being careful 
 to provide for the safety of that very important station in any 
 contingency. 
 
 Your first point of attack will be Roanoke Island and its 
 dependencies. 
 
 It is presumed that the navy can reduce the batteries on the 
 marshes, and cover the landing of your troops on the main 
 island, by which, in connection with a rapid movement of the 
 gun-boats to the northern extremity — as soon as the marsh 
 battery is reduced — it may be hoped to capture the entire 
 garrison of the place. Having occupied the island and its 
 dependencies, you will at once proceed to the erection of the 
 batteries and defenses necessary to hold the position with a 
 small force. Should the flag-officer require any assistance in 
 seizing or holding the debouches of the canal from Norfolk — 
 you will please afibrd it to him. 
 
 The commodore and yourself having completed jonv ar- 
 rangements in regard to Roanoke Island, and the waters 
 
86 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 north of it ; you will please at once make a descent on New- 
 bern ; having gained possession of which, and the railroad 
 passing through it you will at once throw a sufficient force upon 
 Beaufort, and take the steps necessary to reduce Fort Macon 
 and open that port. When you seize Newbern, you will en- 
 deavor to seize the railroad as far west as Goldsborough — 
 should circumstances favor such a movement. The temper of 
 the people, the rebel force at hand, &c., will go far towards 
 determining the question as to how flir west the railroad can 
 be safely occupied and held. Should circumstances render it 
 advisable to seize and hold Raleigh — the main north and 
 south line of railroad passing through Goldsborough, should 
 be so effectually destroyed for considerable distances north 
 and south of that point, as to render it impossible for the 
 rebels to use it to your disadvantage. A great point would 
 be gained in any event, by the effectual destruction of the 
 Wilmington and Weldon Railroad. 
 
 I would advise great caution in moving so far into the 
 interior as upon Raleigh. Having accomplished the objects 
 mentioned — the next point of interest would probably be Wil- 
 mington, the reduction of which may require that additional 
 means shall be afforded you. I would urge great caution in 
 regard to proclamations. In no case would I go beyond a mod- 
 erate joint proclamation with the naval commander, Avhich 
 should say as little as possible about politics or the negro, 
 merely state that the true issue for which we are fighting is 
 the preservation of the Union, and upholding the laws of the 
 general government, and stating that all who conduct them- 
 selves properly, will as far as possible be protected in their 
 persons and property. 
 
 You will please report your operations as often as an oj^por- 
 tunity offers itself. 
 
 With my best wishes for your success. 
 
 I am, &c., &c., 
 
 Geo. B. McCLELLAisr, 
 Maj.-Gen. Com'g. in Chief 
 
OPERATIONS IN THE WEST AND SOUTH. 
 
 OPERATION'S IN THE WEST AND SOUTH. 
 
 The following letters of instructions were sent to Generals 
 Halleck, Buell, Sherman and Butler ; and I also communicated 
 verbally to these officers my views in full, regarding the field 
 of operations assigned to each, and gave them their instruc- 
 tions as much in detail as was necessary at that time. 
 
 Head-Quarters of the Army, 
 ■Washinoton, D. C, November 11, 1861. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, U. S. A. 
 
 ComcVg. Dept. of 3Iissouri. 
 General : — In assigning you to the command of the De- 
 partment of Missouri, it is probably unnecessary for me to state 
 that I have intrusted to you a duty which requires the utmost 
 tact and decision. 
 
 You have not merely the ordinary duties of a military com- 
 mander to perform ; but the far more difficult task of reducing 
 chaos to order, of changing probably the majority of the per- 
 sonnel of the staii of the department, and of reducing to a 
 point of economy consistent with the interests and necessities 
 of the state, a system of reckless expenditure and fraud per- 
 haps unheard of before in the history of the world. 
 
 You will find in your department many general and staff 
 officers holding illegal commissions and appointments not 
 recognized or approved by the President or Secretary of War, 
 you will please at once inform these gentlemen of the nullity 
 of their appointment, and see that no pay or allowances are 
 issued to them until such time as commissions may be author- 
 ized by the President, or Secretai'y of War. 
 
 If any of them give the slightest trouble, you will at once 
 arrest them and send them under guard, out of the limits of 
 your department, informing them that if tliey return they will 
 be placed in close confinement. You will please examine into 
 the legality of the organization of the troops serving in the 
 department. When you find any illegal, unusual, or improper 
 organizations you will give to the officers and men an oppor- 
 tunity to enter the legal military establishment under general 
 
88 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 laws and orders from the War Department ; reporting in full 
 to these head-quarters any officer or organization that may 
 decUne. 
 
 You will please cause competent and reliable staif officers 
 to examine all existing contracts immediately, and suspend all 
 payments upon them until you receive the report in each case. 
 Where there is the slightest doubt as to the propriety of 
 the contract, you will be good enough to refer the matter, 
 with full explanation, to these head-quarters, stating in each 
 case what would be a fair compensation for the services or 
 materials rendered under the contract. Discontinue at once 
 the reception of material or services under any doubtful con- 
 tract. Arrest and bring to prompt trial all officers who have 
 in any way violated their duty to the government. In regard 
 to the political conduct of affiiirs, you will please labor to 
 impress upon the inliabitants of Missouri and the adjacent 
 States, that we are fighting solely for the integrity of the 
 Union, to uphold the power of our national government and 
 to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and good order. 
 
 With respect to military operations, it is probable, from 
 the best information in my possession, that the interests of the 
 government will be best served by fortifying and holding in 
 considerable strength, Rolla, Sedalia, and other interior points, 
 keeping strong patrols constantly moving from the terminal 
 stations, and concentrating the mass of the troops on or near 
 the Mississippi, prepared for such ulterior operations as the 
 public interests may demand. 
 
 I would be glad to have you make, as soon as possible, a 
 personal inspection of all the important points in your depart- 
 ment, and report the result to me. I cannot too strongly im- 
 press upon you the absolute necessity of keeping me constantly 
 advised of the strength, condition, and location of your troops, 
 together with all fiicts that will enable me to maintain that 
 general direction of the armies of the United States which it is 
 my purpose to exercise. I trust to you to maintain thorough 
 organization, discipline and economy throughout your depart- 
 ment. Please inform me, as soon as possible, of everything 
 relating to the gun-boats now in process of construction, as 
 well as those completed. 
 
OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH AND WEST. 89 
 
 The militia force authorized to be raised by the State of 
 Missouri for its defense, will be under your orders. 
 
 I am, General, &c., &c., 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 Maj.-Gen. Com. U. S. A. 
 
 Head-Quarters of the Abut, 
 "WASHmaxox, Nov. 7, 1861. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. D. C. Buell, 
 
 General, — In giving you instructions for your guidance, 
 in command of the Department of the Ohio, I do not design 
 to fetter you. I merely wish to express plainly the general 
 ideas which occur to me in relation to the conduct of opera- 
 tions there. That portion of Kentucky west of the Cumber- 
 laud River is, by its position, so closely related to the States of 
 Illinois and Missouri that it has seemed best to attach it to the 
 Department of Missouri. Your operations, then, in Kentucky 
 will be confined to that portion of the State east of the Cum- 
 berland River. I trust I need not repeat to you that I regard 
 the importance of the territory committed to your care as 
 second only to that occupied by the army under my imme- 
 diate command. It is absolutely necessary that we shall hold 
 all the State of Kentucky ; not only that, but that the majoi'ity 
 of its inhabitants shall be wamnly in favor of our cause, it 
 being that which best subserves their interests. It is possible 
 that the conduct of our political affairs in Kentucky is more 
 important than that of our military operations. I certainly 
 cannot overestimate the importance of the former. You will 
 please constantly bear in mind the precise issue for which we 
 are fighting — that issue is the preservation of the Union, and 
 the restoration of the full authority of the general government 
 over all portions of our territory. We shall most readily sup- 
 press this rebellion and restore the authority of the govern- 
 ment by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. 
 I know that I express the feelings and opinions of the Presi- 
 dent when I say that we are fighting only to preserve the 
 integrity of the Union, and the constitutional authority of the 
 general government. 
 
 The inhabitants of Kentucky may rely upon it, that their 
 
90 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 domestic institutions will in no manner be interfered with, and 
 that they will receive at our hands every constitutional pro- 
 tection, I have only to repeat that you will, in all respects, 
 carefully regard the local institutions of the region in which you 
 command, allowing nothing but the dictates of military neces- 
 sity to cause you to depart from the spirit of these instructions. 
 
 So much in regard to political considerations. The military 
 problem would be a simple one, could it be entirely separated 
 from poHtical influences; such is not the case. Were the 
 population among which you are to operate, wholly or gen- 
 erally hostile, it is probable that Nashville should be your first 
 and principal objective point. It so happens that a large ma- 
 jority of the inhabitants of eastern Tennessee, are in favor of the 
 Union ; it therefore seems proper that you should remain on 
 the defensive on the line from Louisville to Nashville, while 
 you throw the mass of your forces, by rapid marches, by Cum- 
 berland Gap, or "Walker's Gap, on Knoxville, in order to 
 occupy the railroad at that point, and thus enable the loyal 
 citizens of eastern Tennessee to use, while you at the same 
 time cut off, the railway communication between eastern Vir- 
 ginia and the Mississippi. 
 
 It will be prudent to fortify the pass, before leaving it in 
 your rear. I am, &c. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 Maj.-Gen. Com. U. S. A. 
 
 Head-Quarters op the Army, 
 Washington, Nov. 12, 1861. 
 Brig.-Gen. D. C. Buell, 
 
 Comug. DepH. of the Ohio, — 
 General : — Upon assuming command of the department, 
 I will be glad to have you make, as soon as possible, a careful 
 report of the condition and situation of your troops, and of the 
 military and i)olitical condition of your command. The main 
 point to which I desire to call your attention, is the necessity 
 of entering eastern Tennessee as soon as it can be done with 
 reasonable chances of success, and I hope that you will, with 
 the least possible delay, organize a column for that purpose, 
 sufliciently guarding, at the same time, the main avenues by 
 which the rebels might invade Kentucky. Our conversations 
 
OPERATIONS IN THE WEST AND SOUTH. 91 
 
 on the subject of military operations have been so full, and my 
 confidence in your judgment is so great, that I will not dwell 
 further upon the subject, except to urge upon you the neces- 
 sity of keeping me fully informed as to the state of affairs, 
 both military and political, and your movements. 
 
 In regard to pohtical matters, bear in mind that we are 
 fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union, and to 
 uphold the power of the general government ; as far as mili- 
 tary necessity will permit, religiously respect the constitutional 
 rights of all. Preserve the strictest discipline among the 
 troops, and while employing the utmost energy in military 
 movements, be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants, as 
 to conti-act, not widen, the breach existing between us and 
 the rebels. I mean by this, that it is the desire of the govern- 
 ment, to avoid unnecessary irritation by causeless arrests and 
 persecution of individuals. Where there is good reason to 
 beUeve that persons are actually giving aid, comfort, or infor- 
 mation to the enemy, it is of course necessary to arrest them ; 
 but I have always found it is the tendency of subordinates, to 
 make vexatious arrests on mere suspicion. You will find it 
 well, to direct that no arrest shall be made except by your 
 order, or that of your generals, unless, in extraordinary cases, 
 always holding the party making the arrest, responsible for 
 the propriety of his course. It should be our constant aim to 
 make it apparent to all, that their jjroperty, their comfort, and 
 their personal safety, will be best preserved by adhering to the 
 cause of the Union. 
 
 If the military suggestions I have made in this letter, prove 
 to have been founded on erroneous data, you are, of course, 
 perfectly free to change the plan of operations. 
 
 I am, tfcc, &c. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 Maj.-Gen. Com. U. S. A.. 
 
 Head-Quakters of the ARinr, 
 Washington, Feb. 14, 18G2. 
 Brig.-Gen. p. W. Sherman, 
 Com'g. at Port Hoyal., c£:c., — 
 General : — Your dispatches, in regard to the occupation 
 of Dafuskie Island, &c., were received to-day. I saw, also, to- 
 
92 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 day, for the first time, your requisition for a siege train for 
 Savannah. 
 
 After giving the subject all the consideration in my power, 
 I am forced to the conclusion, that under present circum- 
 stances, the siege and capture of Savannah, do not promise 
 results commensurate with the sacrifices necessary. When I 
 learned that it was possible for the gun-boats to reach the 
 Savannah River above Fort Pulaski, two operations suggested 
 themselves to my mind, as its immediate results. 
 
 First. The capture of Savannah by a " coup de main," the 
 result of an instantaneous advance and attack by the army 
 and navy. 
 
 The time for this has passed, and your letter indicates that 
 you are not accountable for the failure to seize the propitious mo- 
 ment, but that, on the contrary, you perceived its advantages. 
 
 Second. To isolate Fort Pulaski, cut oif its supplies, and at 
 least facilitate its reduction by a bombardment. 
 
 Although we have a long delay to deplore, the second course 
 still remains open to us ; and I strongly advise the close block- 
 ade of Pulaski, and its bombardment as soon as the 13-inch 
 mortars and heavy guns reach you. I am confident you can 
 thus reduce it. With Pulaski, you gain all that is really essen- 
 tial ; you obtain complete control of the harbor, you relieve 
 the blockading fleet, and render the main body of your force 
 disposable for other operations. 
 
 I do not consider the possession of Savannah worth a siege, 
 after Pulaski is in our hands. But the possession of Pulaski 
 is of the first importance. The expedition to Fernandina is 
 well, and I shall be glad to learn that it is ours. 
 
 But, after all, the greatest moral effect would be produced 
 by the reduction of Charleston, and its defenses. There the 
 rebellion had its birth ; there the unnatural hatred of our gov- 
 ernment is most intense; there is the centre of the boasted 
 power Olid courage of the rebels. To gain Fort Sumter, and 
 hold Charleston, is a task well worthy of our greatest efforts, 
 and considerable sacrifices. That is the problem I would be 
 glad to have you study. Some time must elapse before we 
 can be in all respects ready to accomplish that purpose. Fleets 
 are en route, and armies in motion, which have certain pre- 
 
OPERATIONS IN THE WEST AND SOUTH. 93 
 
 liininaiy objects to accomplish, before we are ready to take 
 Charleston in hand. But the time will before long arrive, when 
 I shall be prepared to make that movement. In the mean time, 
 it is my advice and wish that no attempt be made upon Savan- 
 nah, unless it can be carried with certainty by a " coup de main." 
 Please concentrate your attention and forces upon Pulaski, 
 and Fernandina. St. Augustine might as well be taken by 
 way of an interlude, Avhile awaiting the preparations for 
 Charleston. Success attends us everywhere at present. 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 Geo. B. McGlellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Com. U. S. A. 
 
 Head-Quarters of the Army, 
 Washington, Feb. 23, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. B. F. Butler, 
 U. S. Volunteers, — 
 General .• — You are assigned to the command of the land 
 forces destined to co-operate with the navy, in the attack upon 
 New Orleans. You will use every means to keep your desti- 
 nation a profound secret, even from your staif officers, with 
 the exception of your chief of staff", and Lieut. Weitzel, of the 
 engineers. The force at your disposal, will consist of the first 
 13 regiments named in your memorandum handed to me in 
 person, the 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan, 
 (old and good regiments from Baltuuore.) 
 
 The 21st Indiana, 4th Wisconsin, and 6th Michigan, Avill 
 await your orders at Fort Monroe. 
 
 Two companies of the 21st Indiana, are well drilled as heavy- 
 artillery. The cavalry force already en route for Ship Island, 
 will be sufficient for your purposes. 
 
 After full consultation with officers well acquainted with 
 the country in which it is proposed to operate, I have arrived 
 at the conclusion that (2) two light batteries fully equipped, 
 and (1) one without horses, will be all that are necessary. 
 
 This will make your force about 14,400 infantry, 275 cavalry, 
 680 artillery; total 1.5,255 men. 
 
 The commanding general of the Department of Key West, is 
 authorized to loan you, temporarily, 2 regiments ; Fort Pickens 
 
94 riKST PERIOD. 
 
 can probably give you another, which will bring your force to 
 nearly 18,000. 
 
 The object of your expedition is one of vital importance, 
 the capture of New Orleans. The route selected is up the 
 Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to be encountered, 
 (perhaps the only one), is in the resistance offered by Forts St. 
 Philip and Jackson. It is expected that the navy can reduce 
 these works ; in that case, you will, after their capture, leave 
 a sufficient garrison in them to render them perfectly secure ; 
 and it is recommended, that on the upward passage, a few 
 heavy guns, and some troops, be left at the Pilot Station, 
 (at the forks of the river), to cover a retreat in the event of a 
 disaster. These troops and guns, will, of course, be removed 
 as soon as the forts are captured. 
 
 Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will land your 
 forces and siege train, and endeavor to breach the works, 
 silence their fire, and carry them by assault. 
 
 The next resistance will be near the English Bend, where 
 there are some earthen batteries ; here it may be necessary for 
 you to land your troops and co-operate with the naval attack^ 
 although it is more than probable, that the navy, unassisted, 
 can accomplish the result. If these works are taken, the city 
 of New Orleans necessarily falls. In that event, it will pro- 
 bably be best to occupy Algiers with the mass of your troops, 
 also, the eastern bank of the river above the city, it may be 
 necessary to place some troops in the city to preserve order, 
 but if there appears sufficient Union sentiment to control the 
 city, it may be best for purposes of discipline, to keep joxvc 
 men out of the city. 
 
 After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be neces- 
 sary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches from the 
 east, and particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. Baton 
 Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will next claim 
 your attention. 
 
 A feint on Galveston may facilitate the objects we have in 
 view. I need not call your attention to the necessity of gain- 
 ing possession of all the rolling stock you can on the different 
 railways, and of obtaining control of the roads themselves. 
 The occupation of Baton Rouge by a combined naval and land 
 
THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 95 
 
 force, should be accomplished as soon as possible after you 
 have gained New Orleans. Then endeavor to open your com- 
 munication with the northern column by the Mississippi, 
 always bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, 
 Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after, or 
 before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing to 
 divert you from obtaining full possession of all the approaches 
 to New Orleans. When that object is accomplished to its 
 fullest extent, it will be necessary to make a combined attack 
 on Mobile, in ordei- to gain possession of the harbor and works, 
 as well as to control the railway terminus at the city. 
 
 In regard to this, I will send more detailed instructions as 
 the operations of the northern column develop themselves. 
 
 I may briefly state that the general objects of the expedition 
 are: Firsts The reduction of New Orleans and all its ap- 
 proaches: then Mobile and its defenses: then Pensacola, 
 Galveston, &c. It is probable that by the time New Orleans 
 is reduced it will be in the power of tlie government to rein- 
 force the land forces sufficiently to accomplish all these objects: 
 in the meantime you will please give all the assistance in your 
 power to the army and navy commanders in your vicinity, 
 never losing sight of the fact, that the great object to be 
 achieved is the capture and firm retention of New Orleans. 
 
 I am, &c., 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 Maj.-Gen. Com'g U. S. A. 
 
 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 
 The plan indicated in the above letters comprehended in its 
 scope the operations of all the armies in the Union — the army 
 of the Potomac as well. It was my intention, for reasons 
 easy to be seen, that its various parts should be carried out, 
 simultaneously, or nearly so, and in cooperation along our 
 whole line. If this plan was wise, and events have failed to 
 prove that it was not, then it is unnecessary to defend any 
 delay which would ho.ve enabled the army of the Potomac to 
 perform its share in the execution of the whole work. 
 
96 FIESTPERIOD. 
 
 But about the middle of January, 1862, upon recovering 
 from a severe illness, I found that excessive anxiety for an 
 immediate movement of the army of the Potomac had taken 
 possession of the minds of the administration. 
 
 A change had just been made in the War Department, and 
 I was soon urged by the new secretary, Mr. Stanton, to take 
 immediate steps to secure the reopening of the Potomac and 
 Ohio Railroad, and to free the banks of the lower Potomac 
 from the rebel batteries which annoyed passing vessels. 
 
 Very soon after his entrance upon office, I laid before him, 
 verbally, my design as to the part of the plan of campaign to 
 be executed by the army of the Potomac, which was to attack 
 Richmond by the lower Chesapeake. 
 
 He instructed me to develop it to the President, which I 
 did. The result was, that the President disapproved it, and 
 by an order of January 31, 1862, substituted one of his own. 
 
 On the 2Vth of January, 1862, the following order was issued 
 without consultation with me : 
 
 Executive Mansion, "Washington, Jan. 27, 1862. 
 Pkesidext's General War Order, No. 1. 
 
 Ordered: That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day 
 for a general movement of the laud and naval forces of the 
 United States against the insurgent forces. 
 
 That, especially. 
 
 The army at and about Fortress Monroe, 
 
 The army of the Potomac, 
 
 The army of Western Virginia, 
 
 The army near Mumfordsville, Kentucky, 
 
 The army and flotilla at Cairo, 
 
 And a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move 
 on that day. 
 
 That all other forces, both land and naval, ^ith their re- 
 spective commanders, obey existing orders for the tim6, and 
 be ready to obey additional orders when duly given. 
 
 That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries 
 of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the 
 General-in-Chief, with all other commanders and subordinates 
 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, 97 
 
 of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict 
 and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order. 
 
 Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 The order of January 31, 1862, is as follows : 
 
 Executive Mansion, 
 Washington, Jan. 31, 1862. 
 President's Special War Orders, N"o. 1. 
 
 Ordered: That all the disposable force of the army of the 
 Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washing- 
 ton, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object 
 of seizing and occnpying a point upon the railroad south- 
 westward of wiiat is known as Manassas Junction, all details 
 to be in the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief, and the 
 expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next, 
 
 Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 I asked his Excellency whether this order Avas to be regarded 
 as iinal, or whether I could be permitted to submit, in writing, 
 my objections to his plan, and my reasons for preferring my 
 own. Permission was accorded, and I therefore prepared the 
 letter to the Secretary of War which is given below. Before 
 this had been submitted to the President, he addressed me the 
 following note: 
 
 ExECCTTVE Mansion, 
 Washington, February 3, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 My Dear Sir, — You and I have distinct and different plans 
 for a movement of the army of the Potomac. Yours to be 
 done by the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, 
 and across and to the terminus of the railroad on the York 
 River : mine to move directly to a point on the railroad south- 
 west of Manassas. 
 
 If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following 
 questions, I shall gladly yield ray plan to yours. 
 
 1st. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expendi- 
 ture of time and money than mine ? 
 
 2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than 
 mine ? 
 
 5 
 
98 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than 
 mine ? 
 
 4th. In fact would it not be less valuable in this ; that it 
 would break no great line of the enemy's communications, 
 while mine would ? 
 
 5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more diffi- 
 cult by your plan than mine ? 
 
 Yours truly, 
 
 Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 These questions were substantially answered by the follow- 
 ing letter of the same date to the Secretary of War. 
 
 Head-Quarters of the Army, 
 Washingtox, Feb. 3, 1862. 
 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 Sir, — I ask your indulgence for the following paper ren- 
 dered necessary by circumstances. 
 
 I assumed command of the troops in the vicinity of Wash- 
 ington on Saturday, July 27, 1861, six days after the Battle 
 of Bull Run. 
 
 I found no army to command ; a mere collection of regi- 
 ments, cowering on the banks of the Potomac, some perfectly 
 raw, others dispirited by the recent defeat. 
 
 Nothing of any consequence had been done to secure the 
 southern approaches to the capital by means of defensive works: 
 — nothing whatever had been undertaken to defend the ave- 
 nues to the city on the northern side of the Potomac. 
 
 The troojis were not only undisciplined, undrilled, and dis- 
 pirited ; they were not even placed in military positions — the 
 city was almost in a condition to have been taken by a dash 
 of a regiment of cavalry. 
 
 Without one day's delay I undertook the difficult task as- 
 signed to me ; that task the Hon. Secretary knows was given 
 to me without my solicitation or foreknowledge. How far I 
 have accomplished it will best be shown by the jjast and the 
 present. 
 
 The capital is secure against attack ; the extensive fortifica- 
 
THE A R 31 Y OF THE POTOMAC. 99 
 
 tions erected by the labor of our troops enable a small garri 
 son to hold it against a numerous array ; the enemy have been 
 held in check; the State of Maryland is securely in our pos- 
 session; the detached counties of Virginia are again Avithin 
 the pale of our Inws — and all apprehension of trouble in Dela- 
 ware is at an end : the enemy are confined to the positions 
 they occupied before the disaster of the 21st July: more than 
 all this, I have now under my command, a well drilled and 
 reliable army, to which the destinies of the country may be 
 confidently committed : this army is young and iintried in 
 battle — but it is animated by the highest spirit, and is capable 
 of great deeds. 
 
 That so much has been accomplished and such an army 
 created, in so short a time, from nothing will hereafter be 
 regarded as one of the highest glories of the administration and 
 the nation. 
 
 Many weeks, I may say many months ago, this army of the 
 Potomac was fully in condition to repel any attack: but there 
 is a vast difference between that and the efliciency required to 
 enable troops to attack successfully an army elated by victory 
 and intrenched in a position long since selected, studied and 
 fortified. 
 
 In the earliest papers I submitted to the President, I asked 
 for an effective and movable force far exceeding the aggre- 
 gate now on the banks of the Potomac. I have not the force 
 I asked for. Even when in a subordinate position, I always 
 looked beyond the operations of the army of the Potomac : I 
 was never satisfied in my own mind with a barren victory — 
 but looked to combined and decisive operations. 
 
 When I was placed in command of the armies of the United 
 States, I immediately turned my attention to the whole field 
 of operations, regarding the army of the Potomac as only one, 
 while the most importtmt, of the masses under my com- 
 mand. 
 
 I confess that I did not then ajjpreciate the total absence of 
 a general plan, which had before existed — nor did I know that 
 utter disorganization and want of ^preparation pervaded the 
 Western armies. 
 
 I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite, in 
 
 L.OT 
 
 fC. 
 
100 FIR8TPERI0D. 
 
 condition to move towards the fulfillment of my plans ; I ac- 
 knowledge that I made a great mistake. 
 
 I sent at once, with the approval of the Executive, oificers 
 I considered competent to command in Kentucky and Missouri 
 — their instructions looked to prompt movements — I soon 
 found that the labor of creation and organization had to be 
 performed there ; transportation, arms, clothing, artillery dis- 
 cipline, all were wanting : these things required time to pro- 
 cure them. The generals in command have done their work 
 most creditably — but we are still delayed. I had hoped that 
 a general advance could be made during the good weather of 
 December ; I was mistaken. 
 
 My wish was to gain possession of the Eastern Tennessee 
 Railroad as a preliminary movement — then to follow it up 
 immediately by an attack on Nashville and Richmond, as 
 nearly at the same time as possible. 
 
 I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of fully 
 preparing ourselves and theri seeking for the most decisive 
 results. I do not wish to waste life in useless battles — but I 
 prefer to strike at the heart. 
 
 Two bases of operations seem to present themselves for the 
 advance of the army of the Potomac. 
 
 1st. That of Washington, its present position, involving a 
 direct attack upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at 
 Centreville, Manassas, &c., or else a movement to turn one or 
 both flanks of those positions : or a combination of the two plans. 
 
 The relative force of the two armies will not justify an attack 
 on both flanks ; an attack on his left flank alone involves a 
 long line of wagon communication, and cannot prevent him 
 from collecting for the decisive battle all the detachments now 
 on his extreme right and left. 
 
 Should we attack his right flank by the line of the Occo- 
 quan, and a crossing of the Potomac below that river and near 
 his batteries, we could, perhaps, prevent the junction of the 
 enemy's right with his centre, (we might destroy the former,) 
 we would remove the obstructions to the navigation of the 
 Potomac, reduce the length of wagon transportation by estab- 
 lishing new depots at the nearest points of the Potomac, and 
 strike more directly his main railway communication. 
 
THE ARMY OP THE POTOMAC. 101 
 
 The fords of the Occoquan, below the mouth of Bull Run, 
 are watched by the rebels ; batteries are said to be placed on 
 the heights in rear, ( concealed by the woods,) and the arrange- 
 ment of his troops is such that he can oppose some consider- 
 able resistance to a passage of that stream. Information has 
 just been received, to the effect that the enemy are intrench- 
 ing a line of heights, extending from the vicinity of Sangsters, 
 (Union Mills,) towards Evansport. Early in January Sprigg's 
 Ford was occupied by Gen. Rhodes with 3,600 men and eight 
 guns. There are strong reasons for believing that Davis's 
 Ford is occupied. These circumstances indicate, or prove 
 that the enemy anticipates the movement in question, and is 
 prepared to resist it. Assuming, for the present, that this 
 operation is determined upon, it may be well to examine 
 briefly its probable progress. In the present state of affaii-s, 
 our columns (for the movement of so large a force must be 
 made in several columns, at least five or six,) can reach the 
 Accotink without danger ; during the march thence to the 
 Occoquan, our right flank becomes exposed to an attack from 
 Fairfax Station, Sangsters, and Union Mills : this danger must 
 be met by occupying, in some force, either the two first-named 
 places, or, better, the point of junction of the roads leading 
 thence to the village of Occoquan. This occupation must be 
 sustained so long as we continue to draw supplies by the 
 roads from this city, or until a battle is won. 
 
 The crossing of the Occoquan should be made at all the 
 fords from Wolf's Run to the mouth, the points of crossing 
 not being necessarily confined to the fords themselves. Should 
 the enemy occupy this line in force, we must, with what 
 assistance the flotilla can aflfbi'd, endeavor to force the passage 
 near the mouth, thus forcing the enemy to abandon the whole 
 line, or be taken in flank himself. 
 
 Having gained the line of the Occoquan, it would be neces- 
 sary to throw a column, by the shortest route, to Dumfries, 
 partly to force the enemy to abandon his batteries on the 
 Potomac, partly to cover our left flank against an attack from 
 the direction of Acquia: and lastly, to establish our communi- 
 cation with the river by the best roads, and thus give us new- 
 depots. The enemy would by this time have occupied the 
 
102 - FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 line of the Oocoquan above Bull Run, holding Brentsville in 
 force, and perhaps extending his lines somewhat further to 
 the south-west. 
 
 Our next step would be to prevent the enemy from crossing 
 the Occoquan between Bull Run and the Broad Run, to fall 
 upon our right flank while moving on Brentsville. This 
 might be effected by occupying Bacon Race Church and the 
 cross-roads near the mouth of Bull Run, or still more effec- 
 tually, by moving to the fords themselves, and preventing 
 him from debouching on our side. 
 
 These operations would possibly be resisted, and it would 
 require some time to effect them. As nearly at the same time 
 as possible, we should gain the fords necessary to our purposes 
 above Broad Run. Having secured our right flank, it would 
 become necessary to carry Brentsville at any cost, for we could 
 not leave it between our right flank and the main body. The 
 final movement on the railroad must be determined by circum- 
 stances existing at the time. 
 
 This brief sketch brings out in bold relief the great advan- 
 tage possessed by the enemy in the strong central position he 
 occupies, with roads diverging in every direction, and a strong 
 line of defense, enabling him to remain on the defensive, with 
 a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything 
 on the other for a decisive action. 
 
 Should Ave place a portion of our force in front of Centre- 
 ville, while the rest crosses the Occoquan, we commit the error 
 of dividing our army by a very difticult obstacle, and by a dis- 
 tance too great to enable the two parts to support each other, 
 should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while 
 the other is held in check. 
 
 I should, perhaps, have dwelt more decidedly on the fact, 
 that the force left near Sangsters, must be allowed to remain 
 somewhere on that side of the Occoquan, imtil the decisive 
 battle is over, so as to cover our retreat, in the event of disas- 
 ter ; imless it should be decided to select and intrench a new 
 base somewhere near Dumfries, a j^i'oceeding involving much 
 time. 
 
 After the passage of the Occoquan by the main army, this 
 coverinsf force could be drawn in to a more central and 
 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 103 
 
 less exposed position, say Brimstone Hill, or nearer the Oc- 
 coquan. 
 
 In this latitude, the weather, will, for a considerable period, 
 be very uncertain, and a movement commenced in force, on 
 roads in tolerably firm condition, will be liable, almost certain, 
 to be much delayed by rains and snow. It will therefore be 
 next to impossible to surprise the enemy, or take him at a 
 disadvantage by rapid mana?uvres. Our slow progress will 
 enable him to divine our purposes, and take his measures ac- 
 cordingly. The probability is, from the best information we 
 possess, that the enemy has improved the roads leading 
 to his lines of defense, while we will have to work as we 
 advance. 
 
 Bearing in mind what has been said, dnd the present un- 
 precedented and impassable condition of the roads, it will be 
 evident that no precise period can be fixed upon for the move- 
 ment on this line. Nor can its duration be closely calculated ; 
 it seems certain that many weeks may elapse, before it is pos- 
 sible to commence the march. Assuming the success of this 
 operation, and the defeat of the enemy as certain, the question 
 at once arises, as to the importance of the results gained. I 
 think these results would be confined to the possession of the 
 field of battle, the evacuation of the line of the upper Potomac by 
 the enemy, and the moral effect of the victory ; important results 
 it is true, but not decisive of the war, nor securing the de- 
 struction of tlie enemy's main army, for he could fall back 
 upon other positions and fight us again and again, should the 
 condition of his troops permit. If he is in no condition to 
 fight us again out of range of the intrenchments at Richmond, 
 we would find it a very difficult and tedious matter to follow 
 him up there, for he would destroy his railroad bridges, and 
 otherwise impede our progress through a region where the 
 roads are as bad as they well can be, and we would probably 
 find ourselves forced, at last, to change the whole theatre of 
 war, or to seek a shorter land route to Richmond, with a 
 smaller available force, and at an expenditure of much more 
 time, than were we to adopt the short line at once. We 
 would also have forced the enemy to concentrate his forces, 
 
104 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 and perfect his defensive measures at the very points where it 
 is desirable to strike him when least prepared. 
 
 II. The second base of operations available for the army of 
 the Potomac, is that of the lower Chesapeake Bay, which 
 aiFords the shortest possible land route to Richmond, and 
 strikes directly at the heart of the enemy's power in the east. 
 
 The roads in that region are passable at all seasons of the 
 year. 
 
 The country now alluded to, is much more favorable for 
 offensive operations, than that in front of Washington, (which 
 is very unfavorable), much more level, more cleared land, the 
 woods less dense, the soil more sandy, the spring some two 
 or three weeks earlier. A movement in force on that line, 
 obliges the enemy to abandon his intrenched position at Ma- 
 nassas, in order to hasten to cover Richmond and Norfolk. 
 He must do this ; for should he permit us to occupy Rich- 
 mond, his destruction can be averted only by entirely defeat- 
 ing us in a battle, in which he must be the assailant. This 
 movement, if successful, gives us the capital, the communica- 
 tions, the supplies of the rebels ; Norfolk would fall ; all the 
 waters of the Chesapeake Avould be ours, all Virginia would 
 be in our power ; and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee 
 and North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy, 
 would be to beat us in a position selected by ourselves ; dis- 
 perse or pass beneath the Caudine Forks. 
 
 Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly secure 
 retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe ; with our 
 flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. During the whole 
 movement our left flank is covered by the water, our right is 
 secure, for the reason that the enemy is too distant to reach 
 us in time ; he can only oppose us in front ; we bring our fleet 
 into full play. 
 
 After a successful battle, our position would be, Burnside 
 forming our hft, Norfolk held securely, our centre connecting 
 Burnside with Buell, both by Raleigh and Lyncliburg, Buell 
 in Eastern Tennessee and Northern Alabama, Halleck at Nash- 
 ville and Memphis. 
 
 The next movement would be to connect with Slierman on 
 the left, by reducing Wilmington and Charleston ; to advance 
 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 105 
 
 our centre into South Carolina and Georgia, to push Buell 
 either towards Montgomery, or to unite with the main army 
 in Georgia, to throw Halleck southward to meet the naval 
 expedition from New Orleans. 
 
 We should then be in a condition to reduce, at our leisure, 
 all the southern seaports ; to occupy all the avenues of commu- 
 nication, to use the great outlet of the Mississippi ; to re-estab- 
 lish our government and arms in Arkansas, Louisiana and 
 Texas ; to force the slaves to labor for our subsistence, instead 
 of that of the rebels ; to bid defiance to all foreign inter- 
 ference. Such is the object I ever had in view ; this is the 
 general plan Avhich I hope to accom])lish. 
 
 For many long months, I have labored to prepare the army 
 of the Potomac to play its part in the programme ; from the 
 day when I was placed in. command of all our armies, I have 
 exerted myself to place all the other armies in such a condi- 
 tion, that they too could perform their allotted duties. 
 
 Should it be determined to operate from the lower Chesa- 
 peake, the point of landing Avhicl^^ promises the most brilliant 
 results, is Urbana, on the lower Rappahannock. This point 
 is easily readied by A^essels of heavy draught, it is neither oc- 
 cupied nor observed by the enemy, it is but one march from 
 West Point, the key of that region, and thence, but two 
 marches to Richmond. A rapid movement from Urbana, 
 would probably cut off Magruder in the Peninsula, and enable 
 us to occupy Richmond before it could be strongly reinforced. 
 Should we fail in that, we could, with the co-operation of the 
 navy, cross the James and show ourselves in rear of Rich- 
 mond, thus forcing the enemy to come out and attack us, for 
 his position would be untenable, with us on the southern bank 
 of the river. 
 
 Should circumstances render it not advisable to land at 
 Ui'bana, we can use Mob Jack Bay — or the worst coming to 
 the worst, we can take Fort Monroe as a base, and operate 
 Avith complete security, although with less celerity and bril- 
 liancy of results, up the Peninsula. 
 
 To reach whatever point may be selected as a base, a large 
 amount of cheap Avater transportation must be collected, con- 
 sisting mainly of canal-boats, barges, Avood-boats, schooners, 
 
106 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 &c., towed by small steamers, all of a very diiferent character 
 from those required for all previous expeditions. This can 
 certainly be accomplished within thirty.days from the time the 
 order is given, I propose as the best possible plan that can, 
 in my judgment, be adopted, to select Urbana as a landing- 
 place for the first detachments. To transport by water four 
 divisions of infiintry with their batteries, the regular infantry, 
 a few wagons, one bridge train, and a few squadrons of 
 cavalry, making the vicinity of Hooker's position the place of 
 embarkation f )r as many as possible. To move the regular 
 cavalry and reserve artillery, the remaining bridge trains and 
 wagons to a point somewhere near Cape Lookout, then ferry 
 them over the river by means of North River ferry-boats, 
 march them over to the Rappahannock (covering the move- 
 ment by an infantry force near Heaths ville) and to cross the 
 Rappahannock in a similar way. The expense and difliculty 
 of the movement will thus be very much diminished (a saving 
 of transportation of about 10,000 horses) and the result none 
 the less certain. 
 
 The concentration of the cavalry, &c., in the lower counties 
 of Maryland, can be effected without exciting suspicion, and 
 the movement made without delay from that cause. 
 
 This movement, if adopted, will not at all expose the city 
 of Washington to danger. 
 
 The total force to be thrown upon the new line would be, 
 according to circumstances, from 110 to 140,000, I hope to 
 use tlie latter number by bringing fresh troops into Washing- 
 ton, and still leaving it quite safe, I fully realize that in all 
 projects offered, time will probably be the most valuable con- 
 sideration. It is my decided opinion, that in that point of 
 view, the second plan should be adopted. It is possible, nay 
 highly probable, that the weather and state of the roads, may 
 be such as to delay the direct movement from Washington, 
 with its unsatisfactory results and great risks — far beyond the 
 time required to complete the second plan. In the first case 
 we can fix no definite time for an advance. The roads have 
 gone from bad to worse — nothing like their present condition 
 has ever been known here before ; they are impassable at pre- 
 sent, we are entirely at the mercy of the weather. It is by no 
 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 107 
 
 means certain that we can beat them at Manassas, On the 
 other line, I regard snccess as certain by all the chances of 
 war. We demoralize the enemy by forcing him to abandon 
 his prepared position for one which we have chosen, in which 
 all is in our favor, and where success must produce immense 
 results. 
 
 My judgment as a general, is clearly in favor of this project. 
 Nothing is certain in war, but all the chances are in favor of 
 this movement. So much am I in favor of the Southern line 
 of operations, that I would prefer the move from Fort Monroe 
 as a base — as a certain though less brilliant movement, than 
 that from Urbana — to an attack upon Manassas. 
 
 I know that his Excellency the President, you and I, all 
 agree in our wishes, and that these wishes are to bring the war 
 to a close, as promptly as the means in our possession will 
 permit. I believe that the mass of the people have entire con- 
 fidence in us. I am sure of it. Let us then look only to the 
 great result to be accomplished, and disregard every thing 
 else. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 G. B. McClella:n^, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 This letter must have produced some effect upon the mind 
 of the President, since the execution of his order was not re- 
 quirefl, although it was not revoked as formally as it had been 
 issued. Many verbal conferences ensued, in which among 
 other things, it was determined to collect as many canal-boats 
 as possible, with a view to employ them largely in the trans- 
 portation of the army to the Lower Chesapeake. The idea 
 was at one time entertained by the President to use them in 
 forming a bridge across the Potomac, near Liverpool Point, 
 in order to throw the army over at that point, but this was 
 subsequently abandoned. It was also found by experience, 
 that it would require much time to prepare the canal-boats for 
 use in transportation to the extent that had been anticipated. 
 
 Finally, on the 27th of February, 1862, the Secretary of 
 War, by the authority of the President, instructed Mr. John 
 Tucker, Assistant Secretary of War, to procure at once the 
 
108 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 necessary steamers and sailing craft to transport the army of 
 the Potomac to its new field of operations. 
 
 The following extracts from the report of Mr. Tucker, dated 
 April oth, will show the nature and progress of this well-exe- 
 cuted service : 
 
 ******* 
 
 "I was called to Washington by telegraph on 17th Janu- 
 ary last, by Assistant-Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott. I 
 was informed that Maj.-Gen. McClellan wislied to see me. 
 From him I learned that he desired to know if transj)ortation 
 on smooth water could be obtained, to move at one time, for 
 a short distance, about 50,000 troops, 10,000 horses, 1,000 
 wagons, 13 batteries, and the usual equipment of such an 
 army. He frankly stated to me, that he had always supposed 
 such a movement entirely feasible until two experienced quar- 
 ter-masters had recently reported it impractica1>le, in their 
 judgment. A few days afterwards, I reported to General 
 McClellan that I was entirely confident the transports could 
 be commanded, and stated the mode by which his object 
 could be accomplished. A week or more afterwards, I had 
 the honor of an interview with the President and General 
 McClellan, when the subject was further discussed, and es- 
 pecially as to the time required. 
 
 " I expressed the opinion, that as the movement of the 
 horses and wagons would have to be made chiefly by schooners 
 and barges, that as each schooner would require to be properly 
 fitted for the protection of the horses, and furnished with a 
 supply of water and forage, and each transport for the troops 
 provided with water, I did not deem it prudent to assume 
 that such an expedition could start within thirty days from 
 the time the order was given. 
 
 " The President and General McClellan both urgently stated 
 the vast importance of an earlier movement. I replied that if 
 favorable winds prevailed, and there was great dispatch in 
 loading, the time might be materially diminished. 
 
 " On the 14th of February, you [Secretary of War] adver- 
 tised for transports of various descriptions, inviting bids. On 
 the 27th February I was informed that the proposed move- 
 ment by water was decided upon. That evening the quarter- 
 
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 109 
 
 master-general was infoi'med of the decision. Directions were 
 given to secure the transportation, and my assistance was 
 tendered. 
 
 " He promptly detailed to this duty two most efficient 
 assistants in his department : Col. Rufus Ingalls was stationed 
 at Annapolis, where it was then proposed to embark the troops, 
 and Capt. Henry C. Hodges was directed to meet me in Phila- 
 delphia, to attend to chartering the vessels. With these 
 arrangements, I left "Washington on the 28th February. 
 ******* 
 
 " I beg to hand herewith a statement prepared by Captain 
 Hodges, of the vessels chartered, which exhibits the prices 
 paid and the parties from whom they were taken, viz. : 
 
 " 113 Steamers, at an average price per day . . |215.10 
 188 Schooners " " " "... 24.45 
 
 88 Barges " " " "... 14.27 
 
 " In thii-ty-seven days from the time I received the order in 
 Wasliington (and most of it was accomplished in thirty days) 
 these vessels transported from Perryville, Alexandria, and 
 Washington to Fort Monroe — (the place of departure having 
 been changed which caused delay) — 
 
 " 121,500 Men, 
 14,592 Animals, 
 1,150 Wagons, 
 44 Batteries, 
 74 Ambulances, 
 
 " Besides pontoon bridges, telegraph materials, and the 
 enormous quantity of equipage, &c., required for an army of 
 such magnitude. The only loss of which I have heard, is 
 eight mules and nine barges, which latter went ashore in a 
 gale within a few miles of Fort Monroe, the cargoes beino- 
 saved. With this trifling exception, not the slightest accident 
 has occurred, to my knowledge. 
 
 " I respectfully, but confidently, submit that, for economy 
 and celerity of movement, this expedition is without a parallel 
 on record. 
 
 " JoHx Tucker, 
 
 " Assistant-Secretary of War." 
 
110 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 THE ENEMY'S BATTERIES ON THE POTOMAC. 
 
 In the meantime the destruction of tlie batteries on the 
 lower Potomac, by crossing our troops opposite them, was 
 considered, and preparations were even made for throwing 
 Hooker's division across the river to carry them by assault. 
 Finally, however, after an adverse report from Brig.-General 
 J. G. Barnard, cliief engineer, given below, who made a recon- 
 noissance of the positions ; and in view of the fact that it was 
 still out of the power of the navy department to furnish suita- 
 ble vessels to co-operate with the land troops, this plan was 
 abandoned as impracticable. A close examination of the 
 enemy's works and their approaches, made after they were 
 evacuated, showed that the decision Avas a wise one. The 
 only means, therefore, of accomplishing the capture of these 
 works, so much desired by the President, was by a movement 
 by land, from the left of our lines, on the right bank of the 
 Potomac, a movement obviously unwise. 
 
 The attention of the Navy Department, as early as August 
 12, 1861, had been called to the necessity of maintaining a 
 strong force of efficient war vessels on the Potomac. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Division of the Potomac, 
 "Washington, August 12, 1861. 
 Hon. Gideon Welles, 
 Sec']/. U. S. JVavi/, — 
 Sir, — I have, to-day, received additional information 
 which convinces me that it is more than probable that the 
 enemy will, within a very short time, attempt to throw a re- 
 spectable force from the mouth of Acquia Creek into Mary- 
 land. This attempt will probably be preceded by the erection 
 of batteries at Mathias and White House Points. Such a 
 movement on the part of the enemy, in connection with others 
 probably designed, would place Washington in great jeopardy. 
 I most earnestly urge that the strongest possible naval force, 
 be at once concentrated near the mouth of Acquia Creek, and 
 that the most vigilant Avatch be maintained day and night, so 
 as to render such passage of the river, absolutely impossible. 
 
THE ENEMY S BATTERIES ON THE POTOMAC. Ill 
 
 I recommend that the Minnesota, and any other vessels 
 available from Hampton Roads, be at once ordered up there, 
 and that a great quantity of coal be sent to that vicinity, 
 sufficient for several weeks' supply. At least one strong war 
 vessel should be kept at Alexandria ; and I again urge the 
 concentration of a strong naval force in the Potomac without 
 delay. 
 
 If the naval department will render it absolutely impossible 
 for the enemy to cross the river below Washington, the 
 security of the capital will be greatly increased. 
 
 I cannot too earnestly urge an immediate compliance with 
 these requests. 
 
 I am sir, very resj^ectfuUy, your ob't. serv't., 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General Com'g. 
 
 It was on the 27th September, 1861, that General Barnard, 
 Chief Engineer, in company with Captain Wyman, of the Po- 
 tomac Flotilla, had been instructed to make a reconnoissance 
 of the enemy's batteries as far as Mathias Point. In his re- 
 port of his observations, he says : — " Batteries at High Point 
 and Cockpit Point, and thence down to Chopawampsic, can- 
 not be prevented. We may, indeed, prevent their construction 
 on certain points, but along here, somewhere, the enemy can 
 establish, in spite of us, as many batteries as he chooses. What 
 is the remedy ? Favorable circumstances, not to be antici- 
 pated nor made the basis of any calculations, might justify 
 and render successful the attack of a particular battery. To 
 suppose that we can capture all^ and by mere attacks of this 
 kind prevent the navigation being molested, is very much the 
 same as to suppose that the hostile army in our own front, can 
 prevent us building and maintaining field-works to protect Ar- 
 lington and Alexandria, by capturing them one and all as fast 
 as they are built." 
 
 In another communication upon the subject of crossing 
 troops for the purpose of destroying the batteries on the Vir- 
 ginia side of the Potomac, General Barnard says : 
 
112 FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 " The operation involves the forcing of a very strong line of 
 defense of the enemy, and all that we would have to do, if we 
 were really opening a campaign against them there. 
 
 " It is true we hope to force this line by turning it, by land- 
 ing on Freestone Point. 
 
 " With reason to believe that this may be successful, it can- 
 not be denied that it involves a risk of failure. 
 
 "Should we then, considering all the consequences which 
 may be involved, enter into the operation merely to capture 
 the Potomac batteries? I think not. 
 
 " Will not the Erricson, assisted by one other gun-boat, 
 capable of keeping along side these batteries, so far control their 
 fire as to keep the navigation sufficiently free as long as we 
 require it ? Captain Wyman says yes." 
 
 It was the opinion of competent naval officei's, and I concur 
 with them, that had an adequate force of strong and well armed 
 vessels, been acting upon the Potomac from the beginning ol 
 August, it would have been next to impossible for the rebels 
 to have constructed or maintained batteries upon the banks 
 of the river. The enemy never occupied Mathias Point, nor 
 any other point on the river, which was out of supporting dis- 
 tance from their main army. 
 
 When the enemy commenced the construction of these 
 batteries, the army of the Potomac was not in condition to 
 prevent it ; their destruction, by our army, would have af- 
 forded but a temporary relief, unless we had been strong 
 enough to hold the entire line of the Potomac. This could be 
 done either by driving the enemy from Manassas and Acquia 
 Creek by main force, or by manoeuvring to compel them to 
 evacuate their positions. The latter course was finally pur- 
 sued, and with success. 
 
 THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD. 
 
 About the 20th of February, 1862, additional measures were 
 taken to secure the re-opening of the Baltimore and Ohio 
 
THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD. 113 
 
 Railroad. The preliminary operations of General Lander for 
 this object are elsewhere described. 
 
 I had often observed to the President, and to members of 
 the Cabinet, that the reconstruction of this railway could not 
 be undertaken, until we were in a condition to fight a battle 
 to secure it. I regarded the possession of Winchester and 
 Strasburg as necessary to cover the railway in rear, and it 
 was not until the month of February, that I felt prepared to 
 accomplish this very desirable, but not vital purpose. 
 
 The whole of Banks's division, and two brigades of Sedg- 
 Avick's division, were thrown across the river at Harper's 
 Ferry, leaving one brigade of Sedgwick's division to observe 
 and guard the Potomac from Great Falls to the mouth of the 
 Monocacy. A sufficient number of troops of all arms, were 
 held in readiness in the vicinity of Washington, either to 
 march via Leesburg, or to move by rail to Harper's Ferry, 
 should this become necessai'y in carrying out the objects in view. 
 The subjoined notes from a communication subsequently ad- 
 dressed to the War Department, will sufficiently explain the 
 conduct of these operations. 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 " When I started for Harper's Ferry, I plainly stated to the 
 President and Secretary of War, that the chief object of the 
 operation would be to open the Baltimore and Ohio Raih'oad, 
 by crossing the river in force at Harper's Ferry ; that I had 
 collected the material for making a permanent bridge by means 
 of canal-boats ; that from the nature of the river, it was doubt- 
 ful whether such a bridge could be constructed ; that if it could 
 not, I would at least occupy the ground in front of Harper's 
 Ferry, in order to cover the rebuilding of the railroad bridge, 
 and finally, when the communications were perfectly secure, 
 move on Winchester. 
 
 " When I arrived at the place, I found the batteau bridge 
 nearly completed ; the holding ground proved better than had 
 been anticipated, the weather was favorable, there being no 
 wind. I at once crossed over the twobris:ades which had ar- 
 
114 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 rivecl, and took steps to huny up the other two, belonging 
 respectively to Banks's and Sedgwick's divisions. The difficulty 
 of crossing supplies had not then become apparent. That 
 nio-ht I telegraphed for a regiment of regular cavalry and four 
 batteries of heavy artillery, to come up the next day (Thursday) 
 besides directing Keyes's division of infantry to be moved up 
 on Friday. 
 
 " Next morning the attempt was made to pass the canal- 
 boats through the lift lock, in order to commence at once the 
 construction of a permanent bridge ; it was then found for the 
 first time that the lock was too small to permit the passage of 
 the boats, it having been built for a class of boats running on 
 the Shenandoah Canal, and too narrow by some four or six 
 inches for the canal-boats. The lift locks above and below are 
 all large enough for the ordinary boats. I had seen them at 
 Edward's Ferry thus used ; it had always been represented to 
 the engineers by the military railroad employees and others, 
 that the lock was large enough, and the difference being too 
 small to be detected by the eye, no one had thought of 
 measuring it, or suspected any difficulty. I thus suddenly 
 found myself unable to build the permanent bridge. A violent 
 gale had arisen, which threatened the safety of our only means 
 of communication : the narrow approach to the bridge was so 
 crowded and clogged with wagons, that it was very clear that 
 under existincc circumstances nothing more could be done than 
 to cross over the baggage and supplies of the two brigades : of 
 these, instead of being able to cross both during the morning, 
 the last arrived only in time to go over just before dark. It 
 was evident that the troops under orders, would only be in the 
 way, should they arrive, and that it would not be possible to 
 subsist them for a rapid march on Winchester. It was there- 
 fore deemed necessary to countermand the order, content our- 
 selves with covering the reopening of the railroad for the pre- 
 sent, and in the mean time use every exertion to establish as 
 promptly as possible, depots of forage and subsistence on the 
 Virginia side, to supply the troops and enable them to move 
 on Winchester, independently of the bridge. The next day 
 (Friday) I sent a strong reconnoissance to Charleston, and under 
 its protection went there myself. I then determined to hold 
 
PREPARATIONS TO MOVE. 115 
 
 th.it place, and to move the troops composing Lander's and 
 Williams's commands at once on Martinsburg and Bunker Hill 
 — thus effectually covering the reconstruction of the railroad. 
 
 " Having done this, and taken all the steps in my power to 
 ensure the rapid transmission of supplies o^er the river, I re- 
 turned to this city, well satisfied with what had been accom- 
 plished. While up the river I learned that the President was 
 dissatisfied with the state of affairs — but on my return here, 
 understood from the Secretary of War, that upon learning the 
 whole state of the case, the President was fully satisfied. I 
 contented myself, therefore, with giving to the Secretary a 
 brief statement, about as I have written it here." 
 
 The design aimed at was entirely compassed, and before the 
 first of April, the date of my departure for the PeninsuLi, the 
 railroad was in running order. As a demonstration upon the 
 left flank of the enemy, this movement no doubt assisted in 
 determining the evacuation of his lines on the eighth and ninth 
 of March. 
 
 PREPARATIONS TO MOVE FROM WASHINGTON. 
 
 Upon my return fi'om Harper's Ferry, on the 28th of Feb- 
 ruary, the preparations necessary to carry out the wishes of 
 the President and Secretary of War in regard to destroying 
 the batteries on the lower Potomac, were at once undertaken. 
 Mature reflection convinced me that this operation would 
 require the movement of the entire army, for I felt sure that 
 the enemy would resist it with his whole strength. I under- 
 took it with great reluctance, both on account of the extremely 
 imfavorable condition of the roads, and my firm conviction, 
 that the proposed movement to the lower Chesapeake would 
 necessarily, as it subse(piently did, force'the enemy to abandon 
 all his positions in front of Washington. Besides, it did not 
 forward ray plan of campaign to precipitate this evacuation by 
 any direct attack, nor to subject the army to needless loss of 
 life and material, by a battle near Washington, which could 
 produce no decisive results. The preparations for a move- 
 
116 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 ment towards the Occoquan, to carry the batteries, were how- 
 ever advanced as rapidly as the season permitted, and I had 
 invited the commanders of divisions to meet at head-quarters 
 on tlie 8th of March, for the purpose of giving them their in- 
 structions, and receiving their advice and opinions in regard 
 to their commands, when an interview with the President in- 
 dicated to me the possibihty of a change in my orders. 
 
 His Excellency sent for me at a very early hour on the 
 morning of the 8th, and renewed his expressions of dissatisfac- 
 tion with the affairs at Harper's Ferry, and with my plans for 
 the new movement down the Chesapeake. Another recital of 
 the same facts which had before given satisfaction to his Ex- 
 cellency, again produced, as I supposed, the same result. The 
 views which I expressed to the President, were reinforced by 
 the results of a meeting of my general officers at head-quarters. 
 At that meeting, my plans were laid before the division com- 
 manders, and were approved by a majority of those present. 
 Nevertheless, on the same day two important orders were 
 issued by the President, without consultation with me. The 
 first of these was the General War Order, No. 2, directing the 
 formation of army corps, and assigning their commanders. 
 
 I had always been in favor of the principle of an organiza- 
 tion into army corps, but preferred deferring its practical exe- 
 cution, until some little experience in campaign, and on the 
 field of battle, should show what general officers were most 
 competent to exercise these high commands ; for it must be 
 remembered that we then had no officers whose experience in 
 war, on a large scale, was sufficient to prove that they pos- 
 sessed the necessary qualifications. An incompetent com- 
 mander of an army corps, might cause irreparable damage, 
 while it was not piobable that an incompetent division com- 
 mander, could cause any very serious mischief. These views 
 had frequently been expressed by me to the President and 
 members of the Cabinet ; it was, therefore, with as much re- 
 gret as surprise, that I learned the existence of this order. 
 
 The first order has been given above, the second order was 
 as follows : 
 
PKEPARATIONSTOMOVE. 117 
 
 ExEcuTrvE Mansion, 
 ■Washington, March 8, 1862. 
 President's General War Order, No. 3. 
 
 Ordered: That no cliange of the base of operations of the 
 army of the Potomac, shall be made without leaving in and 
 about Washington such a force, as, in the opinion of the General- 
 in-Chief, and the commanders of ai'my corps, shall leave said 
 city entirely secure. 
 
 That no more than two army corps (about fifty thousand 
 troops) of said ai'my of the Potomac, shall be moved en route 
 for a new base of operations, until the navigation of the Poto- 
 mac, from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be freed 
 from enemy's batteries, and other obstructions, or until the 
 President shall hereafter give express permission. 
 
 That any movement, as aforesaid, en route for a new base 
 of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, 
 and which mny be intended to move upon the Chesapeake 
 Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay as early as the 18th of 
 March, instant, and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible 
 that it so moves as early as that day. 
 
 'Ordered: That the army and navy co-operate in an im- 
 mediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Poto- 
 mac, between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay. 
 
 Abraham Lincoln. 
 L. Thomas, Adj't. Gen'l. 
 
 After what has been said already in regard to the effect of 
 a movement to the lower Chesapeake, it is unnecessary for me 
 to comment upon this document, further than to say, that the 
 time of beginning the movement, depended upon the state of 
 readiness of the transports, the entire control of which, had 
 been placed by the Secretary of War, in the hands of one of 
 the Assistant Secretaries, and not under the Quarter-master 
 General ; so that, even if the movement were not impeded by 
 the condition imposed in regard to the batteries on the Poto- 
 mac, it could not have been in my power to begin it befoi'e 
 the 18th of March, unless the Assistant Secretary of War had 
 completed his arrangements by that time. 
 
ilS FIRSTPERIOD. 
 
 Meainviiile, important events were occurring, which ma- 
 terially modified the designs for the subsequent campaign. 
 The appearance of the Merrimac off Old Point Comfort, and 
 the encounter with the U. S. Squadron on the 8th of March, 
 threatened serious derangement of the plan for the Peninsular 
 movement. But the engagement between the Monitor and 
 the Merrimac,. on the 9th of March, demonstrated so satisfac- 
 torily, the power of the former, and the other naval preparations 
 were so extensive and formidable, that the security of Fort 
 Monroe as a base of operations, was placed beyond a doubt, 
 and, although the James River was closed to us, the York 
 River, with its tributaries, was still open as a line of 
 water communication with the Fortress. The general plan, 
 therefore, remained undisturbed, although less promising 
 in its details than when the James River was in our con- 
 trol. 
 
 On Sunday the 9th of March, information from various 
 sources made it apparent that the enemy was evacuating his 
 jDOsitions at Centreville and Manassas, as well as on the upper 
 and lower Potomac. The President and Secretary of War 
 were present when the most positive information reached me, 
 and I expressed to them my intention to cross the river im- 
 mediately, and there gain the most authentic information, prior 
 to detei'mining what course to pursue. 
 
 The retirement of the enemy towards Richmond had been 
 expected, as the natural consequence of the movement to the 
 Peninsula ; but their adoi)tion of this course immediately on 
 ascertaining that such a movement was intended, while it re- 
 lieved me from the results of the undue anxiety of my supe- 
 riors, and attested the character of the design, was unfortunate 
 in that the then almost impassable roads between our positions 
 and theirs, deprived us of the opportunity for inflicting dam- 
 age, usually afforded by the withdrawal of a large army in the 
 face of a powerful adversary. 
 
 The retirement of the enemy, and the occupation of the 
 abandoned positions which necessarily followed, presented an 
 opportunity for the troops to gain some experience on the 
 march and bivouac, preparatory to the campaign, and to get 
 rid of the superfluous baggage and otlier " impedimenta," 
 
SECRET SERVICE. 119 
 
 which accumulate so easily around an army encamped for a 
 long time in one locality. 
 
 A march to Manassas and back could produce no delay in 
 embarking for the lower Chesapeake, as the trans))orcs could 
 not be ready for some time, and it afforded a good interme- 
 diate step between the quiet and comparative comfort of the 
 camps around Washington, and the rigors of active operations, 
 besides accomplishing the important object of determining the 
 positions and perhaps the future designs of the enemy, with 
 the possibility of being able to harass their rear. 
 
 I therefore issued orders during the night of the 9th of 
 March for a general movement of the array the next morning 
 towards Centreville and Manassas, sending in advance two 
 regiments of cavalry under Col. Averill, with orders to reach 
 Manassas if possible, ascertain the exact condition of aftairs, 
 and do whatever he could to retard and annoy the enemy, if 
 really in retreat. At the same time, I telegraphed to the 
 Secretary of War, that it would be necessary to defer the 
 organization of army corps until the completion of the pro- 
 jected advance upon Manassas, as the divisions covtld not be 
 brought together in thne. The Secretary replied, requiring 
 immediate compliance with the President's order ; but on ray 
 again representing that this would compel the abandonment 
 or postponement of the movement to Manassa-^, he finally con- 
 sented to its postponement. At noon, on the 1 0th of March, 
 the cavalry advance, reached the enemy's lines at Centreville, 
 passing through his recently occupied camps and works, and 
 finding still burning heaps of military stores and much valua- 
 ble property. 
 
 SECRET SERVICE. 
 
 Immediately after being assigned to the command of the 
 troops around Washington, I organized a secret service force 
 mider Mr. E. J. Allen, a very experienced and efficient person. 
 This force, up to the time I was relieved from command, was 
 continually occupied in procuring, frora all possible sources, 
 information regarding the strength, positions and movements 
 
120 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 of the enemy. All spies, " contrabands," deserters, refugees, 
 and many prisoners of war, coming into our lines from the 
 front, were carefully examined — first, by the outpost and 
 division commanders, and then by my chief-of-staff and the 
 provost-raarshal-general. Their statements, taken in writing, 
 and in many cases under oath, from day to day, for a long 
 period previous to the evacuation of Manassas, comprised a 
 mass of evidence which, by careful digests and collations, en- 
 abled me to estimate with considerable accuracy the strength 
 of the enemy before us. Summaries, showing the character 
 and results of the labors of the secret service force, accompany 
 this report, and I refer to them for the facts they contain, and 
 as a measure of the ignorance which led some journals at that 
 time, and persons in high office, nn wittingly to trifle with the 
 reputation of au army, and to delude the country with Quaker- 
 gun stories of the defenses, and gross understatements of the 
 numbers, of the enemy. 
 
 The following orders were issued for the examination of 
 persons coming from the direction of the enemy : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 Washington, Dec. 16, 1861. 
 
 Circular. — The Major-General commanding directs. That 
 all deserters, prisoners, spies, " contrabands," and all other 
 persons whatever, coming or brought within our lines from 
 Virginia, shall be taken immediately to the quarters of the 
 commander of the division within whose lines they may come 
 or be brought, without previous examination by any one, ex- 
 cept so far as may be necessary for the officer commanding 
 the advanced guard, to elicit information regarding his particu- 
 lar post : That the division commander examine all such per- 
 sons himself, or delegate such duty to a proper officer of his 
 staff, and allow no other persons to hold any communication 
 with them: That he then immediately send them, with a suffi- 
 cient guard, to the provost marshal in this city for further ex- 
 amination and safe keeping; and that stringent orders be 
 given to all guards having such persons in charge not to hold 
 any communication with them whatever ; and further, that 
 the information elicited from such persons shall be immediately 
 
SECRET SERVICE. 121 
 
 communicated to tlie major-general commanding, or to the 
 chief-of-stafF, and to no other person whatever. 
 
 The major-general commanding further directs that a suffi- 
 cient guard be placed around every telegraph station pertain- 
 ing to this army, and that such guards be instrvicted not to 
 allow any person, except the regular telegraph corps, general 
 officers, and such staff officers as maybe authorized by their 
 chief", to enter or loiter around said stations within hearing of 
 the sound of the telegraphic instruments. 
 By command of 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan. 
 
 S, Williams, Asst.-Adj.-Gen. 
 
 Head-Quarters, ARiiY of the Potomac, 
 ■Washington, Feb 26, 1862. 
 
 Ge:^eral Orders, No. 27. 
 ***** 
 
 All deserters from the enemy, prisoners, and other persons 
 coming within our lines will be taken at once to the m-ovost 
 marshal of the nearest division, who will examine them in pre- 
 sence of the division commander, or an officer of his staff de- 
 signated for the purpose. This examination will only refer to 
 such information as may affect the division and those near it ; 
 especially those remote from general head-quarters. 
 
 As soon as this examination is completed, and it must be 
 made as rapidly as possible, the person will be sent under 
 proper guard to the provost-marshal-general, with a state- 
 ment of his replies to the questions asked. Upon i*eceiving 
 him the provost-marshal-general will at once send him with 
 this statement to the chief-of-staff of the Army of the Potomac, 
 who will cause the necessary examination to be made. The 
 provost-marshal-general will have the custody of all such per- 
 sons. Division commanders will at once communicate to other 
 division commanders all information thus obtained which 
 
 affects them. 
 
 ***** 
 
 By command of 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, 
 S. Williams, Asst.-Adj.-Gen. 
 
 6 
 
122 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 In addition to the foregoing orders, the division com- 
 manders were instructed whenever they desired to send out 
 scouts towards the enemy, to make known the object at 
 head-quarters, in order that I might determine whether we 
 had the information it was proposed to obtain, and that I 
 might give the necessary orders to other commanders so that 
 the scouts should not be molested by the guards. 
 
 It will be seen from the report of the chief of the secret 
 service corps, dated March 8th, that the forces of the rebel 
 army of the Potomac at that date were as follows : — 
 
 At Manassas, Centreville, Bull Run, Upper 
 
 Occoquan, and vicinity .... 80,000 men 
 
 At Brooks's Station, Dumfries, Lower Occu- 
 
 quan, and vicinity ..... 18,000 " 
 
 At Leesburg and vicinity .... 4,500 " 
 
 In the Shenandoah Valley .... 13,000 " 
 
 # 
 
 Total Number . . . . 115,500 " 
 
 About three hundred field-guns, and from twenty-six to 
 thirty siege-guns were with the rebel army in front of Wash- 
 ington. 
 
 The report made on the l7th of March, after the evacuation 
 of Manassas and Centreville corroborates the statements con- 
 tained in the report of the 8th, and is fortified by the affidavits 
 of several railroad engineers, conductors, baggage-masters, 
 &c., whose opportunities for forming correct estimates were 
 unusually good. These affidavits will be found in the accom- 
 panying reports of the chief of the secret service corps. 
 
 ENEMY'S WORKS AT AND NEAR MANASSAS. 
 
 A reconnoissance of the works at Centreville made by 
 Lieut. McAlester, U, S. Engineers, on March 14th, 1862, and a 
 survey of those at Manassas made by a party of the U. S. Coast 
 
ENEMY S WORKS AT MANASSAS. 123 
 
 Survey in April, 1862, confirmed also my conclusions as to the 
 strength of the enemy's defenses. 
 
 Those at Centreville consisted of two lines, one facing east, 
 and the other north. 
 
 The former consisted of seven works, viz. : one bastion-fort, 
 two redoubts, two lunettes, and two batteries : all containing 
 embrasures for forty guns, and connected by inf mtry pai'apets 
 and double caponnieres. It extended along the crest of the 
 ridge about one mile and three-quarters from its junction with 
 the northern front, to ground thickly wooded, and impassable 
 to an attacking column. 
 
 The northern front extended about one mile and a quarter 
 to Great Rocky Run, and thence three-quai'ters of a mile fur- 
 ther, to thickly wooded impassable ground in the valley of 
 Cub Run. It consisted of six lunettes and batteries, with 
 embrasures for thirty-one guns, connected by an infantry para- 
 pet in the form of a cremalliere line with redans. 
 
 At the town of Centreville, on a high hill commanding the 
 rear of all the works within range, was a large hexagonal 
 redoubt with ten embrasures. 
 
 Manassas Station was defended in all directions by a system 
 of detached works, Avith platforms for heavy guns arranged 
 for marine carriages, and connected by inflmtry parapets. 
 This system was rendered complete by a very large work with 
 sixteen embrasures, which commanded the highest of the 
 other works by about fifty feet. 
 
 Sketches of the reconnoissances above referred to will be 
 found among the maps appended to this report. 
 
 From this it will be seen that the positions selected by the 
 enemy at Centreville and Manassas were naturally very strong, 
 with impassable streams and broken ground, affording ample 
 protection to their flanks, and that strong lines of intrench- 
 ments swept all the available approaches. 
 
 Although the history of every former war has conclusively 
 shown the great advantages which are possessed by an enemy 
 acting on the defensive and occupying strong positions de- 
 fended by heavy earthworks, yet, at the cosnmencement of 
 this war but few civilians in our country, and, indeed, not all 
 military men of rank, had a just appreciation of the fact. 
 
124 FIRST PERIOD, 
 
 New levies that have nevei* been in battle, cannot be ex- 
 pected to advance without cover under the murderous fire 
 from such defenses, and carry them by assault. This is work 
 in which veteran troops frequently falter, and are repulsed 
 with loss. That an assault of the enemy's positions, in front of 
 Washington, with the new troops composing the army of the 
 Potomac, during the winter of 1861-2, would have resulted 
 in defeat and demoralization, was too probable. The same 
 army, though enured to war in many battles hardly fought 
 and bravely won, has thrice, under other generals, suffered 
 such disasters as it was no excess of prudence then to avoid. 
 
 My letter to the Secretary of War, dated February 3d, 
 1862, and given above, expressed the opinion that the move- 
 ment to the Peninsula, would compel the enemy to retire 
 from his position at Manassas, and free Washington from 
 danger. 
 
 When the enemy first leai'ued of that plan, they did thus 
 evacuate Manassas, During the Peninsula campaign, as at no 
 former period, northern Virginia was completely in our pos- 
 session, and the vicinity of Washington free from the presence 
 of the enemy. The ground so gained was not lost, nor Wash- 
 ington again put in danger, until the enemy learned of the 
 orders for an evacuation of the Peninsula, sent to me at Har- 
 rison's Bar, and were again left free to advance northward, 
 and menace the national capital. Perhaps no one now doubts 
 that the best defense of Washington, is a Peninsular attack on 
 Richmond. 
 
 THE PRESIDENT'S ORDER RELIEVING GENERAL 
 McCLELLAN OF THE COMMAND-IN-CHIEF. 
 
 My order for the organization of the array corps, was issued 
 on the 13 th of March, 
 
 It has been given above. 
 
 While at Fairfax Court House, on March 12th, I was in- 
 formed through the telegraph, by a member of my staff, that 
 the following document had appeared in the "National Intel- 
 ligencer," of that morning. 
 
THE PRESIDENT S ORDER OF RELIEF. 125 
 
 Executive Mansion, 
 Washington, March 11, 1862. 
 President''s War Order, No. 3, — 
 
 Major-General McClellan, having personally taken the field, 
 at the head of the army of the Potomac, until otherwise 
 ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other military 
 departments, he retaining command of the Department of 
 the Potomac. 
 
 Ordered further, That the departments, now under the 
 respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, to- 
 gether with so much of that under General Buell, as lies west 
 of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knox- 
 ville, Tennessee, be consolidated and designated the Depart- 
 ment of the Mississippi, and that until otherwise ordered, 
 Major-General Halleck have command of said department. 
 
 Ordered cdso, That the country, west of the Department of 
 the Potomac, and east of the Department of the Mississippi, 
 be a military department, to be called the Mountain Depart- 
 ment, and that the same be commanded by Major-General 
 Fremont. 
 
 That all the commanders of departments, after the receipt 
 of this order by them, respectively report, severally and 
 directly, to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, full, 
 and frequent reports, will be expected of all and each of 
 them. 
 
 Abraham Lincoln. 
 
 Though unaware of the President's intention to remove me 
 from the position of general-iu-chief, I cheerfully acceded to 
 the disposition he saw tit to make of my services, and so in- 
 formed him in a note, on the 12th of March, in which occur 
 these words : — 
 
 "I believe I said to you some weeks since, in connection 
 with some Western matters, that no feeling of self-interest or 
 ambition, should ever prevent me from devoting myself to the 
 service. I am glad to have the opportunity to prove it, and 
 you will find, that under present circumstances, I shall work 
 
126 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 just as cheerfully as before, and that no consideration of self, 
 will, in any manner, interfere with the discharge of my public 
 duties. Again thanking you for the official and personal kind- 
 ness you have so often evinced towards me, I am, etc., etc." 
 
 A RECONNOISSANCE. 
 
 On the 14th of March, a reconnoissance of a large body of 
 cavalry, with some infantry, under command of General 
 Stoneman, was sent along the Orange and Alexandria railroad, 
 to determine the position of the enemy, and, if possible, force 
 his rear across the Rappahannock, but the roads were in such 
 condition, that, finding it impossible to subsist his men. Gen- 
 eral Stoneman was forced to return, after reaching Cedar Run. 
 The following dispatch from him, recites the result of this 
 expedition : 
 
 Head-Quarters, 
 Union Mills, March 16, 1862. 
 
 Col. Colburn : — We arrived here last evening about dark ; 
 we got corn for horses ; no provisions for men ; Bull Run too 
 high to cross ; had we stayed an hour longer, we should 
 not have got here to-day, owing to the high water in the 
 streams ; felt the enemy cautiously, and found him in force at 
 Warrenton Junction ; saw two regiments of cavalry, and three 
 bodies of infantry, on the other side of Cedar Run ; had we 
 crossed, should not have been able to get back for high water ; 
 had three men of 5th Cavalry hit driving in enemy's pickets; 
 one slightly wounded in the head. 
 
 Enemy acted confidently, and followed us some way back 
 on the road, but did not molest us in any way. Enemy's force 
 consisted of Stuart's and Ewell's cavalry, a battery of artillery, 
 and some infantry ; railroad bridges all burnt down up to 
 Warrenton Junction ; still entire beyond, but all in readiness 
 to burn at a moment's warning, having dry wood piled upon 
 them ; heard cars running during the night before last, joro- 
 bably bringing up troops from Rappahannock ; heard of two 
 regiments of inflvntry at Warrenton, engaged in impressing 
 
DEFENSE OF WASHI:N^GT0]S^. 127 
 
 the militia and securing forage ; heard of a large force of in- 
 fantry this side of Rappahannock River, having come up to 
 Warrenton Junction from Acquia Creek day before yesterday ; 
 bridges all destroyed this side of Broad Run. The aids who 
 take this will give you further particulars. 
 
 "Very respecfuUy, &c., 
 
 Geo. Stonejian, 
 
 Brig.-Gen. Com'g. 
 
 DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON. 
 
 The main body of the army, was, on the 11th of March, 
 moved back to the vicinity of Alexandria to be embarked, 
 leaving a part of General Sumner's corps at Manassas, until 
 other troops could be sent to relieve it. 
 
 Before it was withdrawn a strong reconnoissance under 
 Gen. Howard was sent towards the Rappahannock, the result 
 of which appears in the following dispatch : 
 
 Warrenton Juxctiox, March 29, 1862. 
 General S. Williams, — 
 
 Express just received from Gen. Howard. He drove the 
 enemy across the Rappahannock bridge, and is now iu camp 
 on this bank of and near the Rappahannock River. Th§ 
 enemy blew up the bridge in his retreat. There was skirmish- 
 ing during the march, and a few shots exchanged by the artil- 
 lery, without any loss on our j^art. Their loss, if any, is not 
 known. General Howard M'ill return to this camp to-morrow 
 morning. 
 
 E. V. SUJUNEE, 
 
 Brigadier-Geueral. 
 
 The line of the Rappahannock and the Manassas Gap Rail- 
 road, was thus left reasonably secure from menace by any con- 
 siderable body of the enemy. 
 
 On the 13th of March a council of war was assembled at 
 Fairfax Court House, to discuss the military status. The 
 President's Order No. 3, of March 8th, was considered. The 
 
128 FIRST PEKIOD. 
 
 following is a memorandum of the proceedings of the 
 council : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Fairfax Court House, March 13th, 1862. 
 
 A council of the generals commanding army corps, at the 
 head-quarters of the array of the Potomac, were of the 
 opinion : 
 
 I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gor- 
 donsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the 
 opinion of generals commanding army corps that the opera- 
 tions to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point 
 Comfort, between the York and James Rivers. 
 
 Provided — 
 
 1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimac, can be neutral- 
 ized. 
 
 2d. That the means of transportation sufficient for an im- 
 mediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at 
 Washington and Alexandria, to move down the Potomac, 
 and, 
 
 3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, or aid 
 in silencing the enemy's batteries on the York River. 
 
 4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be 
 siich as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from 
 menace. — (Unanimous.) 
 
 II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be 
 moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock at the 
 earliest possible moment, and the means f )r reconstructing 
 bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with material 
 sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected 
 for both the Orange and Alexandria and Acquia and Rich- 
 mond Railroads. — (Unanimous.) 
 
 N. B. That, with the forts on the right bank of the Poto- 
 mac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a 
 covering force in front of the Vii'ginia line of 25,000 men 
 would suffice. — (Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.) 
 
 A total of forty thousand men for the defense of the city 
 would suffice. — (Sumner.) 
 
 This was assented to by myself and immediately communi- 
 
DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON. 129 
 
 cated to the War Department. The following reply was re- 
 ceived the same day : 
 
 "War Department, March 13, 1862. 
 To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, — 
 
 The President, having considered the plan of operations 
 agreed upon by yourself and the commanders of army corps, 
 makes no objection to the same, but gives the following direc- 
 tions as to its execution ; 
 
 1st. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it 
 entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of 
 that position and line of communication. 
 2d. Leave Washington entirely secure. 
 3d. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac — 
 choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or any where be- 
 tween here and there ; or at all events move such remainder 
 of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by some route. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 My preparations were at once begun in accordance with 
 these directions, and on the 16th of March the following in- 
 structions were sent to Generals Banks and Wadsworth : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 March 16, 1862. 
 
 Sir, — You will post your command in the vicinity of Ma- 
 nassas ; intrench yourself strongly, and throw cavalry pickets 
 well out to the front. 
 
 Your first care will be the rebuilding of the railway from 
 Washington to Manassas, and to Strasburg, in order to open 
 your communications with the Valley of the Shenandoah. As 
 soon as the Manassas Gap Railway is in running order, intrench 
 a brigade of infantry, say four regiments, with two batteries, 
 at or near the point Avhere the railway crosses the Shenandoah. 
 Something hke two regiments of cavah-y should be left in that 
 vicinity to occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour the 
 country south of the railway and up the Shenandoah Yalley, 
 as well as through Chester Gap, which might perhaps be ad- 
 
130 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 vantageously occupied by a detachment of infantry well 
 intrenched. Block houses should be built at all the railway 
 bridges. Occupy by grand guards Warrenton Junction, or 
 Warrenton itself, and also some little more advanced point on 
 the Orange and Alexandria Railway, as soon as the railway 
 bridge is repaired. 
 
 Great activity should be observed by the cavalry. Besides 
 the two regiments at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry 
 will be at your disposal, to scout towards the Occoquan, and 
 probably a fourth towards Leesburg. 
 
 To recapitulate : The most important points which should 
 engage your attention are as follows : 
 
 1st. A strong force, well intrenched, in the vicinity of Ma- 
 nassas, perhaps even Centreville, and another force, (a brigade), 
 also well intrenched, near Strasburg, 
 
 2d. Block houses at the railway bridges. 
 
 3d. Constant employment of the cavalry well to the front. 
 
 4th. Grand guards at Warrenton Junction, and in advance 
 as far as the Rappahannock if possible. 
 
 5th. Great care to be exercised to obtain full and early 
 information as to the enemy. 
 
 6th. The general object is to cover the line of the Potomac 
 and Washington. 
 
 The foregoing is communicated by command of Maj.-Gen. 
 McClellau. 
 
 S. Williams. 
 Assistant- Adjutant-General. 
 
 To Maj.-Gen. N. P. Banks, 
 
 GorncVg. 5 th Corps Army of the Potomac. 
 
 Head-Quarters Army op the Potomac, 
 March 16, 1862. 
 
 Sir : — The command to which you have been assigned, 
 by instructions of the President, as Military Governor of the 
 Disti'ict of Columbia, embraces the geographical limits of the 
 district, and will also include the city of Alexandria, the de- 
 fensive works south of the Potomac, from the Occoquan to 
 Difficult Creek, and the post of Fort Washington. 
 
ORDERS TO GENERAL WADS WORT 11. 131 
 
 I inclose a list of the troops, and of the defenses embraced 
 in these limits. 
 
 General Banks will command at Manassas Junction, with 
 the divisions of WiUiams and Shields, composing the 5th 
 Corps, but you should nevertheless exercise vigilance in your 
 front — carefully guard the approaches in that quarter, and 
 maintain the duties of advanced guards. You will use the 
 same precautions on either flank. 
 
 All troops not actually needed for the police of Washington 
 and Georgetown, for the garrisons north of the Potomac, and 
 for other indicated special duties, should be moved to the 
 south side of the river. 
 
 In the centre of your front you should post the main body 
 of your troops, and proper proportions at suitable distances 
 towards your right and left flanks. Careful patrols will be 
 made, in order thoroughly to scour the country in front from 
 right to left. 
 
 It is specially enjoined upon you to maintain the forts and 
 their armaments in the best possible order, to look carefully 
 to the instruction and discipline of their garrisons, as well as 
 all other troops under your command, and by frequent and 
 rigid inspections to insure the attainment of these ends. 
 
 The care of the railways, canals, depots, bridges and ferries, 
 within the above-named limits, will devolve upon you, and you 
 are to insure their security and provide for their protection by 
 every means in your jjower. You Avill also protect the depots 
 of the public stores, and the transit of stores to troops in 
 active service. 
 
 By means of patrols you will thoroughly scour the neighbor- 
 ing country, south of the eastern branch, and also on your 
 right, and you will use every possible precaution to intercept 
 mails, goods, and persons passing unauthorized to the enemy's 
 lines. The necessity of maintaining good order within your 
 limits, and especially in the capital of the nation, cannot be 
 too strongly enforced. 
 
 You will forward and facilitate the movement of all troops 
 destined for the active .part of the army of the Potomac, and 
 especially the transit of detachments to their proper regiments 
 and corps. 
 
132 FIEST PERIOD. 
 
 The charge of the new troops arriving in Washington, and 
 all troops temporarily there, will devolve upon you. You will 
 form them into provisional brigades, promote their instruction 
 and discipline, and facilitate their equipment. 
 
 Report all arrivals of troops — their strength, composition 
 and equipment — by every opportunity. 
 
 Besides the regular reports and returns, Avhich yoii will be 
 required to render to the adjutant-general of the army, you 
 will make to these head-quarters a consolidated report of your 
 command every Sunday morning, and monthly returns on the 
 first day of each month. 
 
 The foregoing instructions are communicated by command 
 of Major-General McClellan. 
 
 S. Williams, 
 Assistant- Adjutant-General. 
 To Brig.-Gen. J. S. Wadsworth, 
 
 Military Governor of the District of Colmnhia. 
 
 THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN ON THE PENINSULA. 
 
 The Secretary of War had expressed a desire that I should 
 communicate to the War Department my designs with regard 
 to the employment of the army of the Potomac, in an official 
 form. I submitted on the 19th of March the following : — 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Theological Seminary, Va., March 19, 1862. 
 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War : 
 
 Sir : — I have the honor to submit the following notes on 
 the proposed operations of the active portion of the army of 
 the Potomac. , 
 
 The proposed plan of campaign is to assume Fort Monroe as 
 the first base of operations, taking the line by Yorktown and 
 West Point upon Richmond as the line of opei-ations, Rich- 
 mond being the objective point. It is assumed that the fall of 
 Richmond involves that of Norfolk and the whole of Virginia; 
 also that we shall fight a decisive battle between West Point 
 
PLAN OP CAMPAIGN ON THE PENINSULA. 133 
 
 and Richmond, to give wliich battle the rebels will concentrate 
 all their available forces, understanding, as they will, that it in- 
 volves the fate of their cause. It therefore follows : 
 
 1st. That we should collect all our available forces and 
 operate upon adjacent lines, maintaining perfect communica- 
 tion between our columns. 
 
 2d. That no time should be lost in reaching the field of 
 battle. 
 
 The advantages of the Peninsula between the York and 
 James Rivers are too obvious to need explanation. It is also 
 clear that West Point should as soon as possible be reached 
 and used as our main depot, that we may have the shortest 
 line of land transportation for our supplies and the use of the 
 York River. 
 
 There are two methods of reaching this point. 
 
 1st. By moving directly from Fort Monroe as a base, and 
 trusting to the roads for our supplies, at the same time landing 
 a strong corps as near Yorktown as possible, in order to turn 
 the rebel lines of defense south of Yorktown, then to reduce 
 Yorktown and Gloucester, by a siege in all probability, involv- 
 ing a delay of weeks perhaps. 
 
 2d. To make a combined naval and land attack upon York- 
 town, the first object of the campaign. This leads to the 
 most rapid and decisive results. To accomplish this the navy 
 should at once concentrate upon the York River all their 
 available and most powerful batteries. Its reduction should 
 not, in that case, require many hours. A strong corps would 
 be pushed up the York, under cover of the navy, directly up- 
 on West Point, immediately upon the fall of Yorktown, and 
 we could at once establish our new base of operations at a 
 distance of some twenty-five miles from Richmond, with every 
 facility for developing and bringing into play the whole of our 
 available force on either or both banks of the James. 
 
 It is impossible to urge too strongly the absolute necessity 
 of the cooperation of the navy, as a part of this programme ; 
 without it the operations may be prolonged for many wrecks, 
 and we may be forced to carry in front several strong posi- 
 tions, which, by their aid, could be turned without serious loss 
 of either time or men. 
 
134 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 It is also of first importance to bear in mind the fact already 
 alluded to, that the capture of Richmond necessarily involves 
 the prompt fall of Norfolk ; while an operation against Nor- 
 folk, if successful, as the beginning of the campaign, facilitates 
 the reduction of Richmond merely by the demoralization of 
 the rebel troops involved, and that after the flill of Norfolk 
 we should be obliged to undertake the capture of Richmond 
 by the same means which would have accomplished it in the 
 beginning, having meanwhile aflbrded the rebels ample time 
 to perfec^t their defensive arrangements, for they could well 
 know from the moment the army of the Potomac changed its 
 base to Fort Monroe that Richmond must be its ultimate 
 object. 
 
 It may be summed up in few words, that, for the prompt 
 success of this campaign, it is absolutely necessary that the 
 navy should at once throw its whole available force, its most 
 powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There is the most im- 
 portant point — there the knot to be cut. An immediate deci- 
 sion upon the subject matter of this communication is highly 
 desirable, and seems called for by the exigencies of the occa- 
 sion. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your ob't servant, 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 A REDUCTION OF FORCE. 
 
 In the meantime the troops destined to form the active army 
 were collected in camps convenient to the jioints of embarka- 
 tion, and every preparation made to embark them as rapidly 
 as possible, when the transports were ready. 
 
 A few days before sailing for Fort IMonroe, while still en- 
 camped near Alexandria, I met the President by appointment, 
 on a steamer. He then informed me that he had been strongly 
 pressed to take General Blenker's division from my command 
 and give it to General Fremont. His Excellency was good 
 enough to suggest several reasons for not taking Blenker's 
 division from me. I assented to the force of his suggestions, 
 
THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 135 
 
 and was extremely gratified by his decision to allow the divi- 
 sion to remain with the array of the Potomac. It was, there- 
 fore, with surprise that I received on the 31st the following 
 note: 
 
 Executive Mansion, 
 "Washington, March 31, 1862. 
 Major-General McClellan, 
 
 My Dear Sir : — This morning I felt constrained to order 
 Blenker's division to Fremont ; and I write this to assure you 
 that I did so with great pain, understanding that you would 
 wish it otherwise. If you could know the full pressure of the 
 case, I am confident you would justify it, even beyond a mere 
 acknowledgment, that the commander-in-chief may order what 
 he pleases. 
 
 Yours very truly, 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 To this, I replied in substance, that I regretted the order, 
 and could ill-aflTord to lose 10,000 troops, which had been 
 counted upon in forming my plan of campaign, but as there 
 was no remedy I would yield and do the best I could without 
 them. In a conversation with the President a few hours after- 
 wards, I repeated verbally the same thing, and expressed my 
 regret that Blenker's division had been given to Fremont, from 
 any " pressure" other than the requirements of the national 
 exigency. I was partially relieved, however, by the Presi- 
 dent's positive and emphatic assurance that I might leave, con- 
 fident that no more troops beyond these 10,000 .should, in any 
 event, be taken from me, or in any way detached fi-om my 
 command. 
 
 OPERATIONS IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 
 
 At the time of the evacuation of Manassas by the enemy, 
 Jackson was at Winchester, our forces occupying Charlestown, 
 and Shields's reaching Bunker Hill on the 1 1th. On the morn- 
 ing of the 12th, a brigade of General Banks's troops, under 
 General Hamilton, entered Winchester, the enemy having left 
 
136 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 at 5 o'clock the evening before, his rear guard of cavah'y 
 leaving an hour before our advance entered the place. The 
 enemy having made his preparations for evacuation some days 
 before, it was not possible to hitercept his retreat. On the 
 13th, the mass of Banks's corps was concentrated in the im- 
 mediate vicinity of Winchester, the enemy being in the 
 rear of Strasburg. On the 19th, General Shields occupied 
 Strasburg, driving the enemy twenty miles south, to Mount 
 Jackson. 
 
 On the 20th, the first division of Bank's corps, commenced 
 its movement towards Manassas, in compliance with my letter 
 of instructions of the 16th. 
 
 Jackson probably received information of this movement, 
 and supposed that no force of any consequence was left in the 
 vicinity of Winchester, and upon the falling back of Shields 
 to that place on the 20th, for the purpose of enticing Jackson 
 in pursuit, tlie latter promptly followed, whereupon ensued a 
 skirmish on the 22d, in wliich General Shields was wounded, 
 and an affair at Winchester on the 23d, resulting in the defeat 
 of Jackson, who was pursued as rapidly as the exhaustion of 
 our troops, and the difficulty of obtaining supplies, permitted. 
 It is presumed that the full reports of the battle of Winchester, 
 were forwarded direct to the War Department by General 
 Banks. 
 
 It being now clear that the enemy had no intention of re- 
 turning by the Manassas route, the following letter of April 
 1st, was written to General Banks. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 On Board the Commodore, April 1, 1862, 
 Maj.-Gen. N. p. Banks, 
 
 Commanding Fifth Corps^ — 
 General: — The change in affairs in the valley of the 
 Shenandoah, has rendered necessary a corresponding depart- 
 ure, temporarily at least, from the plan we some days since 
 agreed upon. 
 
 In my arrangements, I assume that you have with you a 
 force amply sufficient to drive Jackson before you, provided 
 he is not reinforced largely. I also assume, that you may find 
 
THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. I'Sl 
 
 it impossible to detach any thing towards Manassas for some 
 days, probably not until the operations of the main army 
 have drawn all the rebel force toward Richmond. 
 
 You are aware that General Sumner has for some days 
 been at Manassas Junction, with two divisions of infantry, six 
 batteries, and two regiments of cavalry, and that a recon- 
 noissance to the Rappahannock, forced the enemy to destroy 
 the railroad bridge at Rappahannock Station, on the Orange 
 and Alexandria Railroad. Since that time our cavalry have 
 found nothing on this side of the Rappahannock in that direc- 
 tion, and it seems clear that we have no reason to fear any 
 return of the rebels in that quarter. Their movements near 
 Fredericksburg, also indicate a final abandonment of that 
 neighborhood. I doubt whether Johnson will now reinforce 
 Jackson, with a view of ofiensive operations. The time is 
 l^robably passed when he could have gained any thing by 
 doing so. 1 have ordered in one of Sumner's divisions (that 
 of Richardson, late Sumner's) to Alexandria for embarkation, 
 Blenker's has been detached from the army of the Potomac, 
 and ordered to report to General Fremont. 
 
 Abercrombie is probably at Warrenton Junction to-day ; 
 Geary is at White Plains. 
 
 Two regiments of cavalry have been ordered out, and are 
 now on the way to relieve the two regiments of Sumner. 
 
 Four thousand infantry, and one battery, leave Washington 
 at once for Manassas. Some 3000 more will move in one or 
 two days, and soon after some 3000 additional. 
 
 I v/ill order Blenker to march on Strasburg, and to report 
 to you for temporary duty, so that, should you find a large 
 force in your front, you can avail yourself of his aid. As soon 
 as possible, please direct him on Winchester, thence to report 
 to the adjutant-general of the army for orders, but keep him 
 until you are sure what you have in front. 
 
 In regard to your own movements, the most important 
 thing at present is to throw Jackson well back, and then to 
 assume such a position as to 'enable you to prevent his return. 
 As soon as the railway communications are reestablished, it 
 will be, probably, important and advisable to move on Staun- 
 ton, but this would require secure communications, and a force 
 
138 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 of from 25,000 to 30,000 for active operations. It sliould also 
 be nearly coincident with my own mov*e on Richmond ; at all 
 events, not so long before it as to enable the rebels to concen- 
 trate on you, and then return on me. I fear that you cannot 
 be ready in time, although it may come in very well with a 
 force less than that I have mentioned, after the main battle 
 near Richmond. When General Simmer leaves Warrenton 
 Junction, General Abercrombie, will be placed in immediate 
 command of Manassas and Warrenton Junction, under your 
 general orders. Please inform me frequently, by telegraph, 
 and otherwise, as to the state of things in your front. 
 I am very truly yours, 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 
 
 P. S. — From what I have just learned it would seem that 
 the two regiments of cavalry intended for Warrenton Junc- 
 tion have gone to Harper's Ferry. Of the four additional 
 regiments placed under your orders, two should, as promptly 
 as possible, move by the shortest route on Warrenton Junc- 
 tion. I am, sir, very respectfully. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Com'g. 
 
 This letter needs no fiu'ther explanation than to say that it 
 was my intention, had the operations in that quarter remained 
 under my charge, either to have resumed the defensive posi- 
 tions marked out in the letter of March 16, or to have ad- 
 vanced General Banks upon Staunton, as might in the pro- 
 gress of events seem advisable. It is to be remembered that 
 when I wrote the preceding and following letters of April 1, 
 I had no expectation of being relieved from the charge of the 
 operations in the Shenandoah Valley and in front of Washing- 
 ton, the President's War Order No. 3 giving no intimation of 
 such an intention ; and that, so fir as reference was made to 
 final operations after driving Jackson back and taking such a 
 position as to prevent his return, no positive orders were given 
 in the letter — tiie matter being left for future consideration, 
 when the proper time arrived for a decision. 
 
TROOPS LEFT IN AND NEAK WASHINGTON. 139 
 
 TROOPS LEFT IN AND NEAR WASHINGTON. 
 
 From the following letter to the cadjutant-general, dated 
 April 1, 1862, it will be seen that I left for the defense of the 
 national capital and its approaches, when I sailed for the 
 Peninsula, 73,456 men, with 109 pieces of light artillery, in- 
 cluding the 32 pieces in Washington alluded to, but not enu- 
 merated in my letter to the adjutant-general. It will also be 
 seen that I recommended other available troops in New York 
 (more than 4,000) to be at once ordered forward to reinforce 
 them. 
 
 Headquarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Steamer Commodore, April 1, 1862. 
 Brig.-Gen. L. Thomas, 
 
 Adjutant- General IT. 8. A. 
 
 General : — I have to request that you will lay the fol- 
 lowing communication before the Hon. Secretary of War. 
 
 The approximate numbers and positions of the troops left 
 near and in rear of the Potomac is as follows : — 
 
 Gen. Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, 
 sufficient to give him 5,000 for the defense of Baltimore, and 
 (,988 available for the eastern shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort 
 Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 men. 
 
 The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 
 10,600 men, other disposable troops now with Gen. Wads- 
 worth being about 11,400 men. 
 
 The troops employed in guarding the various railways in 
 Maryland amount to some 3,359 men. These it is designed to 
 relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to 
 send forward to Manassas. 
 
 Gen. Abercrombie occupies Warrenton with a force which, 
 including Col. Geary at White Plains and the cavalry to be at 
 his disposal, will amount to some 7,780 men, with 12 pieces of 
 artillery. 
 
 I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for 
 service in Pennsylvania and New York, and in any of the 
 Eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. I learn from 
 Governor Curtin that there are some 3,500 men now ready in 
 
140 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 Pennsylvania. This force I should be glad to have sent to 
 Manassas. Four thousand men from General Wads worth I 
 desire to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the rail- 
 road guards above alluded to, will make up a force under the 
 command of General Abercrombie of something like 18,639 men. 
 It is my design to push General Blenker's division from 
 Warrenton upon Strasburg. He should remain at Strasburg 
 long enough to allow matters to assume a definite form in 
 that region, before proceeding to his ultimate destination. 
 
 The troops in the valley of the Shenandoah will thus be, in- 
 cluding Blenker's division, 10,028 strong, with 24 pieces of 
 artillery. Banks' 5th Corps, which embraces the command of 
 General Shields, 19,687 strong, with 41 guns — some 3,652 
 disposable cavalry and the railroad guards, about 2,100 men — 
 amount to about 35,467 men. 
 
 It is designed to relieve General Hooker by one regiment, 
 say 850 men, being, with soiue 500 cavalry, 1,350 men on the 
 lower Potomac. To recapitulate : — 
 
 At Warrenton there is to be, 7,780 men. 
 
 At Manassas, say 10,859 " 
 
 In the valley of the Shenandoah, 35,467 " 
 On the lower Potomac, 1,350 " 
 
 In all, 55,456 " 
 
 There would thus be left for the garrisons and the front of 
 Washington under General Wadsworth some 18,000 men, in- 
 clusive of the batteries under instruction. 
 
 The troops oi'ganiziug or ready for service in New York, I 
 learn will probably number more than four thousand. These 
 should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition 
 where their services may be most required. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 The following letter from Gen. Barry shows that thirty-two 
 (32) field-guns with men, horses and equipments, were also 
 left in Washington City when the army sailed. These were 
 the batteries under insti'uction referred to above. 
 
TROOPS LEFT IN AND NEAR WASHINGTON. 141 
 
 Head-Quarters, Inspector of Artillery, 
 Washington, Dec. 16, 1862. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, U. S. A. 
 
 General : — It having been 'stated in vavions public prints, 
 and in a speech of Senator Chandler, of Michigan, in his place 
 in the U. S. Senate, quoting what he stated to be a portion of 
 the testimony of Brig.-Gen. Wadsworth, military governor of 
 Washington, before the Joint Senate and House Committee, 
 on the conduct of the war, that Maj.-Gen. McClellan had left 
 an insufficient force for the defense of Washington, and " not 
 a gun on loheels^'' 
 
 I have to contradict this charge as folloAvs : — 
 From official reports made at the time to me (the chief of 
 artillery of the army of the Potomac) and now in my posses- 
 sion, by the commanding officer of the light artillery trooj)s 
 left in camp in the city of Washington by your order, it ap- 
 pears that the following named field-officers were left : — 
 
 Battery " C" 1st K T. ArtiUery . 
 
 Capt. Barnes, 
 " Crounse, 
 
 2 C 
 6 
 
 luns 
 (1 
 
 "L" 2d " » , . 
 
 " Robinson, 
 
 6 
 
 II 
 
 9th N. Y. Independent Battery 
 16th " " " . . 
 
 " Morozowi, 
 " Locke, 
 
 6 
 
 u 
 
 Battery " A" 2d Battery N. Y. Artillery, 
 
 U (1 'DII (i 11 " 
 
 " Hogan, 
 " McMahon, 
 
 6 
 6 
 
 11 
 
 Total of Batteries, 
 
 32 
 
 II 
 
 With the exception of a few horses, which could have been 
 procured from the quarter-master's department in a fcAV hours, 
 the batteries were all fit for immediate service, excepting the 
 16th N. Y. battery, which, having been previously ordered on 
 Gen. Wadsworth's application, to report to him for special 
 service, was unequipped wifli either guns or horses. 
 I am, general, very respectfully, 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 Wm. F. Barry. 
 Brig.-Gen., Inspec. of Art., U. S. Army. 
 
 It is true that Blenker's division, which is included in the 
 forces enumerated by me, was under orders to reinforce Gen. 
 
142 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 Fremont, but the following clisj^atch from tlie Secretary of 
 "War, dated March 31, 1862, will show that I was authorized 
 to detain him at Strasburg until matters assumed a definite 
 form in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destina- 
 tion ; in other words, until Jackson was disposed of, and had 
 he been detained there, instead of moving on to Harper's 
 Ferry and Franklin, with other orders, it is probable that 
 Gen. Banks would have defeated Jackson, instead of being 
 himself obliged subsequently to retreat to Williamsport. 
 
 War Department, 
 Washington, D. C, March 31, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan. 
 
 The order in respect to Blenker is not designed to hinder or 
 delay the movement of Kichardson or any other force. He 
 can remain wherever you desire him as long as required for 
 your movements, and in any position you desire. The order 
 is simply to place him in position for reinforcing Fremont, as 
 soon as your dispositions will j^ermit, and he may go to Har- 
 per's Ferry, by such route and at such time, as you shall direct 
 — state your own wishes as to the movement — Avhen and how 
 it shall be made. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton", 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 Without including Gen. Blenker's division, there were left 
 67,428 men, and 85 pieces of light artillery, which, under ex- 
 isting circumstances, I deemed more than adequate to insure 
 the 2)erfect security of Washington against any force the ene- 
 my could bi'ing against it, for the following reasons : 
 
 The light trooj)s I had thrown forward under Gen. Stone- 
 man, in pursuit of the rebel army, after the evacuation of Ma- 
 nassas and Centreville, had driven their rear guard across 
 Cedar Run, and subsequent expeditions from Sumner's corps 
 had forced them beyond the Rappahannock; they had de- 
 stroyed all the railroad bridges behind them, thereby indicat- 
 ing that they did not intend to return over that route. In- 
 deed, if they had attempted such a movement, their progress 
 must have been slow and difficult, as it would have involved 
 
TROOPS LEFT IN AND NEAR WASHINGTON. 143 
 
 the reconstruction of the bridges, and if my orders for keeping 
 numerous cavah*y patrols well out to the front, to give timely 
 notice of any approach of the enemy, had been strictly enforced, 
 (and I left seven regiments of cavalry for this express pur- 
 pose,) they could not, by any possibility, have reached Wash- 
 ington before there would have been ample time to concen- 
 trate the entire forces left for its defense, as well as those at 
 Baltimore, at any necessary point. 
 
 It was clear to my mind, as I reiterated to the authorities, 
 that the movement of the army to the Peninsula, would have 
 the effect to draw off the rebel army from Manassas to the 
 defense of their capital, and thus free Washington from menace. 
 This opinion was confirmed the moment the movement com- 
 menced, or rather as soon as the enemy became aware of our 
 intentions ; for, witli the exception of Jackson's force of some 
 15,000, which his instructions show to have been intended to 
 operate in such a way as to prevent ^McDowell's corps from 
 being sent to reinforce me, no rebel force of any magnitude 
 made its appearance in front of Washington during the prog- 
 ress of our operations on the Peninsula ; nor until the order 
 was given for my return from Harrison's Landing was Wash- 
 ington again threatened. 
 
 Surrounded as Washington was with numerous and strong 
 fortifications well garrisoned, it w^as manifest that the enemy 
 could not afford to detach from his main army a force suffi- 
 cient to assail them. 
 
 It is proper to remark, that just previous to my departure 
 for Fort Monroe, I sent my chief-of-staff to Gen. Hitchcock, 
 who at that time held staff relations with his excellency the 
 President and the Secretary of War, to submit to him a list 
 of the troops I proposed to leave for tlie defense of Washing- 
 ton, and the positions in which I designed jiosting them. Gen. 
 Hitchcock, after glancing his eye over the list, observed that 
 he was not the judge of what was required for defending the 
 capital, that Gen. McClellan's position was such as to enable 
 him to understand the subject much better than he did, and 
 he presumed that if the force designated was in his judgment 
 sufficient, nothing more would be i-equired. He was then told 
 by the chief-of-staff that I would be glad to have his ojiinion, 
 
144 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 as an old and exi^erienced officer. To tliis he replied, that as 
 I had had the entire control of the defenses for a long time, I 
 was the best judge of what was needed, and he declined to 
 give any other expression of opinion at that time. 
 
 On the 2d of April, the day following my departure for Fort 
 Monroe, Generals Plitchcock and Thomas were directed by the 
 Secretary of War to examine and repoi-t whether the Presi- 
 dent's instructions to me of March 8th and 13th liad been 
 complied with. On the same day their report was submitted, 
 and their decision was, 
 
 " That the requirements of the President, that this city 
 (Washington) shall be left entirely secure, has not been fully 
 complied with." 
 
 The President, in his letter to me on the 9th of April, says : 
 
 " And now allow me to ask, do you really think I should 
 permit the line from Richmond, via Manassas Junction, to this 
 city to be entirely open, except what resistance could be pre- 
 sented by less than 20,000 unorganized troops ?" 
 
 In the report of Generals Hitchcock and Thomas, alluded 
 to, it is acknowledged that there was no danger of an attack 
 from the direction of Manassas in these words : 
 
 " In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy 
 have destroyed the railroads leading to it, it may be fair to 
 assume that they have no intention of returning for the re- 
 occupation of their late position, and therefore no large force 
 would be necessary to hold that position." 
 
 That, as remarked before, was precisely the view I took of 
 it, and this was enforced by the subsequent movements of the 
 enemy. 
 
 In another paragraph of the report, it is stated that 55,000 
 men was the number considered adequate for the defense of 
 the capital. That General McClellan, in his enumeration 
 of the forces left, had included Banks's army corps, operating 
 in the Shenandoah Valley, but whether this corps should be re- 
 
THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY. 145 
 
 gardecl as available for the protection of Washington, they 
 decline to express an opinion. 
 
 At the time this report Avas made, the only enemy on any 
 approach to Washington, was Jackson's force, in front of 
 Banks in the Shenandoah Valley, with the Manassas Gap Rail- 
 road leading fi-oni this valley to Washington, and it will be 
 admitted, I presume, that Banks occupying the Shenandoah 
 Valley, was in the best position to defend, not only that ap- 
 proach to Washington, but the roads to Harper's Ferry and 
 above. The numbers of troops left by me for the defenses of 
 Washington, as given in my letter to the adjutant-general, 
 were taken from the latest official returns of that date, and 
 these, of course, constitute the most trustworthy and authentic 
 source, from which such information could be obtained. 
 
 Another statement made by General Hitchcock, before the 
 "Committee on the Conduct of the War," in reference to this 
 same order, should be noticed. He was asked the following 
 question : 
 
 " Do you understand now that the movement made by Gen- 
 eral McClellan to Fort Monroe, and up the York River, was 
 in compliance with the recommendation of the council of gen- 
 erals commanding corps, and held at Fairfax Court House, on 
 tne 1.3th of March last, or in violation of it ?" 
 
 To which he replied as follows : 
 
 " I have considered, and do now consider, that it was in 
 violation of the recommendation of that council, in two im- 
 portant particulars ; one particular, being that portion of this 
 report which represents the council as agreeing to the expedi- 
 tion by way of the Peninsula, provided, the rebel steamer 
 Merrimac could first be neutralized. That important provi- 
 sion General McClellan disregarded." 
 
 ******* 
 
 The second particular alluded to by General Hitchcock, was 
 in reference to the troops left for the defense of Washington, 
 which has been disposed of above. 
 
 7 
 
146 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 In regard to the steamer Merrimac, I have also stated, that 
 so far as our operations on York River were concerned, the 
 power of this vessel was neutralized. I now proceed to give 
 some of the evidence which influenced me in coming to that 
 conclusion. 
 
 Previous to our departure for the Peninsula, Mr. Watson, 
 Assistant-Secretary of War, was sent by the President to 
 Fort Monroe, to consult with Flag Officer Goldsborough upon 
 this subject. The result of that consultation is contained in 
 the following extract from the evidence of Admiral Goldsbo- 
 rough before the " Committee on the Conduct of the War," 
 viz. : " I told Mr. Watson, Assistant-Secretary of War, that 
 the President might make his mind perfectly easy about tire 
 Merrimac going up York River, that she could never get there, 
 for I had ample means to prevent that." 
 
 Captain G. V. Fox, Assistant-Secretary of the Navy, testi- 
 fies before the Committee as follows : 
 
 " General McCiellan expected the Navy to neutralize the 
 Merrimac, and I promised that it should be done." 
 
 General Keyes, commanding 4th Army Corps, testifies as 
 follows before the Committee : 
 
 "During the time that the subject of the change of base was 
 discussed, I had refused to consent to the Peninsula line of 
 operations, until I had sent word to the Navy Department and 
 asked two questions. 1st. Whether the Merrimac was cer- 
 tainly neutralized or not ? 2d. Whether the navy was in a 
 condition to co-operate efiiciently with the army, to break 
 through between Yorktovvn and Gloucester Point ? To both 
 of these questions answers were returned in the affirmative, 
 that is, the Merrimac was neutralized, and the navy was in a 
 condition to co-operate efficiently to break through between 
 Yorktown and Gloucester Point." 
 
MANASSAS JUNCTION. 147 
 
 ORDERS FOR THE FORTIFICATION OF 
 MANASSAS JUNCTION. 
 
 Before starting for the Peninsula, I instructed Lieut.-Col. B. 
 S. Alexander, of the U. S. corps of engineers to visit Manassas 
 Junction and its vicinity, for the purpose of determining upon 
 the defensive works necessary to enable us to hold that place 
 with a small force. The accompanying letters from Col. Alex- 
 ander will shew what steps were taken by him to carry into 
 effect this important order. 
 
 I regret to say that those who succeeded me in command of 
 the region in front of Washington, whatever were the fears 
 for its safety, did not deem it necessary to carry out my plans 
 and instructions to him. 
 
 Had Manassas been placed in condition for a strong defense, 
 and its communications secured as recommended by Col. Alex- 
 ander, the result of Gen. Pope's campaign would probably 
 have been different. 
 
 "Washikgton, D. C, April 2, 1862. 
 
 Sir : — You will proceed to Manassas at as early a moment 
 as practicable, and mark on the ground the works for the de- 
 fense of that i^lace, on the positions which I indicated to you 
 yesterday. You will find two carpenters experienced in this 
 kind of work, ready to accompany you, by calling on Mr. 
 Dougherty, the master carpenter of the Treasury Extension. 
 
 The general idea of the defense of this position, is to occupy 
 the fringe of elevations, which lies about half-way between 
 Manassas depot and the junction of the railroad, with a series 
 of works, open to the rear, so that they may be commanded 
 by the work hereafter to be described. 
 
 There will be at least four of these woi'ks, three of them 
 being on the left of the railroad leading from Alexandria, at 
 the positions occupied by the enemy's works. The other on 
 the right of this road, on the positioi) we examined yesterday. 
 The works of the enemy to the north of this latter position, 
 numbered Nos. 1 and 2 on Lieut. Comstock's sketch, may also 
 form a part of the front line of our defenses ; but the sides of 
 
148 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 these works, looking tou'ards Manassas station should be 
 leveled, so that the interior of the works may be seen from 
 the latter position. 
 
 Embrasures should be arranged in all these works for field 
 artillery. The approaches should be such, that a battery can 
 drive into the works. The number of embrasures in each bat- 
 tery Avill depend upon its size and the ground to be commanded. 
 It is supposed that there will be from four to eight embrasures 
 in each battery. 
 
 The other works of the enemy looking towards the east and 
 south, may be strengthened so as to aiford sufficient defense 
 in these directions. The work, No. 3, on Lieut. Comstock's 
 sketch may be also strengthened and arranged for field artil- 
 lery, when time will permit. This work is in a good position 
 to cover a retreat, which Avould be made down the valley in 
 which the railroad runs towards Bull Run. 
 
 At Manassas station there should be a fort constructed. 
 The railroad will pass through this fort, and the depot, if one 
 should be built, should be placed in its rear. This latter work 
 should be regarded as the key of the position. It should be as 
 large as the nature of the ground will permit. 
 
 By going down the slopes, which are not steep, it may be 
 made large enough to accommodate 2,000 or 3,000 men. The 
 top of the position need not be cut away, it will be better to 
 throw up the earth into a large traverse which may also be 
 a bomb proof. Its profile should be strong, and its ditches 
 should be flanked. It should receive a heavy armament of 24 
 or 32 pounders, with some rified (Parrott) 20 or 30 pounders. 
 Its guns should command all the exterior works, so that these 
 works could be of no use to the enemy, should he take them. 
 In accommodating the fort to the ground, this consideration 
 should not be lost sight of. 
 
 After tracing these works on the ground, you will make a 
 sketch embracing the whole of them, showing their relative 
 positions and size. This sketch should embrace the junction 
 of the railroads and the ground for some distance around the 
 mainwork. It need not be made with extreme accuracy. The 
 distances may be paced or measured Avith a tape-line. The 
 bearings may be takpn by compass. 
 
MANASSAS JUNCTION. 149 
 
 Having located the works and prepared your sketch, you 
 will report to Capt. Frederick E. Prime of the corps of en- 
 gineers, Avho will furnish you the means of construction. 
 
 It is important that these works should be built with the 
 least possible delay ; you will therefore expedite matters as fast 
 as possible. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient seiwant, 
 
 B. S. Alexander, 
 
 Lt.-Col. A. D. C. 
 To Capt. Fred, R. Munther. 
 Present. 
 
 Washington, D. C, April 6, 1862. 
 Brtg-Gex. J, G. Barnard, 
 
 Chief Engineer Army of the Potomac. 
 Sir, — I enclose you herewith a copy of the instructions 
 which I gave to Captain Munther, in reference to the defenses 
 of Manassas. 
 
 As there has been a new department created (that of the 
 Rappahannock) it is possible that you and I, as well as General 
 McClellan, are relieved from the further consideration of this 
 subject at the present time. 
 
 I will, however, state for your information, should the sub- 
 ject ever come before you again, that in my opinion the com. 
 munication with Manassas by land should be secured. 
 
 To effect this in the best manner, so far as my observations 
 extended, I think the bridge over Bull Run, near Union Mills 
 and just above the railroad bridge, should be rebuilt or tho- 
 roughly repaired, and that a small work, or perhaps two or 
 three open batteries, should be erected on the adjacent heights, 
 to protect it as Avell as the railroad bridge. 
 
 The communication by land would then be through or near 
 Centreville, over the road used by the enemy. 
 
 I write this for fear something should detain me here, but I 
 hope to leave here to join you to-morrow. My health is much 
 improved. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 B. S. Alexander, 
 
 Lt.-Col. A. D. C. 
 
150 FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 I may be pei-mitted also to mention that the plans (also un- 
 executed by my successor) indicated in my letter of instruc- 
 tions to General Banks dated March 16, 1862, for intrenching 
 Chester Gap and the point where the Manassas Gap Railroad 
 crosses the Shenandoah, were for the purpose of preventing 
 even the attempt at such a raid as that of Jackson in the 
 month of May following. 
 
 MILITARY INCIDENTS OF THE FIRST PERIOD. 
 
 Before taking up the history of the embai-kation and the 
 Peninsular cartipaign, I should remark that during the fall and 
 winter of 1861-2, while the army of the Potomac was in po- 
 sition in front of Washington, recounoissances were made from 
 time to time, and skirmishes frequently occurred, whicli were 
 of great importance in the education of the troops, accustom- 
 ing them to the presence of the enemy, and giving them confi- 
 dence under fire. There were many instances of individual 
 gallantry displayed in these afiairs : the reports of most of 
 them will be found among the documents which accompany 
 this report. 
 
 One of the most brilliant of these afiairs was that which 
 took place at Drainesville on Dec. 20, 1861, when the 3d Bri- 
 gade of McCall's Division, under Brig.-Gen. E. 0. C. Ord, 
 with Easton's Battery, routed and pursued four regiments of 
 infimtry, one of cavalry, and a battery of six pieces. 
 
 The operations of Brig.-Gen. F. W. Lander on the Upper 
 Potomac during the months of January and February, 1862, 
 frustrated the attempts of General Jackson against the Balti- 
 more and Ohio Railroad, Cumberland, &c., and obliged him 
 to fall back to Winchester. His constitution was impaired by 
 the hardships he had experienced, and on the 2d of March the 
 feai'less General Lander expired, a victim to the excessive 
 fatigues of the campaign. 
 
SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 PART I 
 
 THE MOVEMENT TO THE PENINSULA. 
 
 The council, composed of four corps commanders, organ- 
 ized by the President of the United States, at its meeting on 
 the 13th March, adopted Fort Monroe as tlie base of opera- 
 tions for the movement of the army of the Potomac upon 
 Richmond. 
 
 For the prompt and successful execution of the projected 
 operation, it was regarded by all as necessary that the whole 
 of the four corps should be employed, with at least the addi- 
 tion of ten thousand men drawn from the forces in the vicinity 
 of Fortress Monroe : that position and its dependencies being 
 regarded as amply protected by the naval force in its neigh- 
 borhood, and the advance of the main army up the Peninsula, 
 so that it could be safely left with a small garrison. 
 
 In addition to the land forces, the cooperation of the navy 
 was desired in the projected attack upon the battei'ies at York- 
 town and Gloucester, as well as in controlling the York and 
 James Rivers for the protection of our flanks, and the use of 
 transports, bringing supplies to the array. With these expec- 
 tations, and for reasons stated elsewhere in this report, my 
 original plan of moving by Urbana and West Point was aban- 
 doned, and the line with Fort Monroe as a base adopted. In 
 the arrangements for the transportation of the array to the 
 Peninsula by water, the vessels were originally ordered to ren-,^ 
 dezvous mainly at Annapolis, but upon the evacuation of 
 Manassas and the batteries of the lower Potomac by the 
 enemy, it became more convenient to embark the trooj)s and 
 
152 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 material at Alexandria, and orders to that effect were at once 
 given. 
 
 In making the preliminary arrangements for^the movement, 
 it was determined that the 1st Corps (Gen, McDowell's) should 
 move as a unit, first, and effect a landing either at the Saiid- 
 Box^ some four miles south of Yorktown, in order to turn all 
 the enemy's defenses at Ship Point, Howard's Bridge, Big 
 Bethe), etc., or else, should existing circumstances render it 
 preferable, land on the Gloucester side of York River, and 
 move on West Point. 
 
 The transports, however, arrived slowly and few at a time. 
 In order, tlierefore, to expedite matters, I decided to embark 
 the army by divisions as transports arrived, keeping army 
 corps together as much as possible, and to collect the troops 
 at Fort Monroe. In determining the order of embarkation, 
 convenience and expedition were especially consulted, except 
 that the 1st Corps was to be embarked last, as I intended to 
 move it in mass to its point of disembarkation, and to land it 
 on either bank of the York, as might then be determined. 
 
 On the 1 7th of March, Hamilton's division of the 3d corps 
 embarked at Alexandria, and proceeded to Fort Monroe, with 
 the following orders : 
 
 Washington, D. C, March 17, 1862. 
 Gkn. C. S. Hamilton, 
 ConKTij TJivision, — 
 You will, on your arrival at Fort Monroe, report to Gen. 
 Wool, and request him to assign you ground for encamping 
 your division. You Avill remain at Fort Monroe until further 
 orders from Gen. McClellan. Should Gen. Wool require the 
 services of your division in repelling an attack, you will please 
 obey his orders, and use every eftbrt to carry out his views. 
 
 R. B. Makcy, 
 
 Cliicf-of-Staff. 
 
 On the 22d of March, as soon as transportation was ready, 
 Gen. Fitz John Porter's division of the same corps embarked. 
 Gen. Ileintzehnan was ordered to accompany it, under the 
 folio wine: instructions : 
 
TUE MOVEMENT TO THE PENINSULA. 153 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 Seminary, March 22, 1862. 
 Brig.-Gen. S. p. Heintzelman, 
 
 GomcCg Zd Corpse ^ — 
 General, — Upon the disembarkation of Poi'ter's division 
 at Fort Monroe, I have to request that you will move your two 
 divisions (Porter's and Hamilton's) some three or four miles 
 out from the fort, to find good camping places where wood 
 and water can be readily obtained, and where your position 
 will be good in a defensive point of view. You may find it 
 advisable to place one division on or near the road leading to 
 Yorktown from Newport News, the other upon that leading 
 to Yorktown direct from Fort Monroe. 
 
 If you find that the nature of the country will permit easy 
 communication and mutual support between the two divisions, 
 it will be best to place one on each road. It will be best to 
 remain pretty near the fort for the present, in order to give 
 the impression that our object is to attack Norfolk rather than 
 Yorktown. You will do well, however, to push strong recon- 
 noissances well to the front, to ascertain the position of the 
 enemy and his pickets. I will, as soon as possible, reinforce 
 you by the 3d division of your corps, and it is probable that a 
 part or the whole of the 4th Corps will also move from Fort 
 Monroe : this will probably be determined before your disem- 
 barkation is completed, and you will be informed accordingly. 
 
 My desire would be to make no important move in advance 
 until you are fully prepared to follow it up, and give the ene- 
 my no time to recover. 
 
 The quarter-masters of your corps will receive detailed in- 
 structions, in regard to land transportation, from General Van 
 Vliet. 
 
 It will be advisable to mobilize your corps with the least 
 possible delay, and have it prepared for an advance. I have 
 directed extra clothing, ammunition, etc., to be sent to Fort 
 Monroe, so that all deficiencies m.iy be supjilied without 
 delay. 
 
 Please report to me frequently and fully the condition of 
 things on the new field of operations, and whatever intelli- 
 gence you gain as to the enemy. 
 
 7* 
 
]54 S E C O N U PER I O D. 
 
 Engage guides in sufficient numbei's at once, and endeavor 
 to send out spies. 
 
 I ana very truly yours, 
 
 Geo. B. McClellajst, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 The remaining divisions embarked as rapidly as transports 
 could be supplied. 
 
 On the 1st of April I embarked, Avith the head-quarters on 
 the steamer Commodore, and reached Fort Monroe on the 
 afternoon of the 2d. 
 
 In consequence of the delay in the arrival of the horse trans- 
 ports at Alexandria, but a small portion of the cavalry had 
 arrived, and the artillery reserve had not yet completed its 
 disembarkation. 
 
 I found there the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, and the 5th 
 Regular Cavalry ; the 2d Regular Cavalry and a portion of the 
 1st had arrived, but not disembarked: so few wagons had 
 arrived that it was not possible to move Casey's division at 
 all for several days, while the other divisions were obliged to 
 move with scant supplies. 
 
 As to the force and position of the enemy, the information 
 then in our possession was vague and untrustworthy. Much 
 of it was obtained from the staff-officers of General Wool, and 
 was simply to the effect that Yorktown was surrounded by a 
 continuous line of earth-works, with strong water batteries on 
 the York River, and garrisoned by not less than 15,000 troops, 
 under the command of General J. B. Magruder. Maps which 
 had been prepared by the Topographical Engineers under 
 General Wool's command were furnished me, in which, the 
 Warwick River was represented as flowing parallel to, but 
 not crossing the road from Newport News to Williamsburg, 
 making the so-called Mulberry Island a real island ; and we 
 had no information as to the true course of the Warwick 
 across the Peninsula, nor of the formidable line of works 
 which it covered.* 
 
 * The dotted line ou the accompanying raap shows the line of the "Warwick 
 River, as laid down on the maps referred to. 
 
THE MOVEMENT TO THE PENINSULA. 155 
 
 Information which I had collected during the winter placed 
 General Magruder's command at from 15,000 to 20,000 men, 
 independently of General Huger's force at ISTorfolk, estimated 
 at about 15,000. It was also known that there were strong 
 defensive works at or near Williamsburg. 
 
 Knowing that Gen. Huger could easily spare some troops 
 to reinforce Yorktown, that he had indeed done so, and that 
 Johnston's array of Manassas could be brought rapidly by the 
 James and York rivers to the same point, I proceeded to 
 invest that town Avithout delay. 
 
 The accompanying map of Colonel Cram, United States 
 Topographical Engineers, attached to General Wool's staff, 
 given to me as the result of several months' labors, indicated 
 the feasibility of the design. It was also an object of primary 
 importance to reach the vicinity of Yorktown before the ene- 
 my was reinforced sufficiently to enable him to hold in force 
 his works at Big Bethel, Howard's Bridge, Ship Point, etc., 
 on the direct road to Yorktown, and Young's Mills on the road 
 from Newport News. This was the more urgent as it was 
 now evident that some days must elapse before the 1st Corps 
 could arrive. 
 
 Every thing possible was done to hasten the disembarkation 
 of the cavalry, artillery and wagons in the harbor, and on the 
 3d the orders of march were given for the following day. 
 
 There Avere at Fort Monroe and its vicinity, on the 3d, ready 
 to move, two divisions of the 3d Corps, two divisions of the 
 4th Corps, one division of the 2d Corps, and Sykes's brigade of 
 regular infantry, together with Hunt's artillery reserve, and 
 the regiments of cavalry before named, in all about 58,000 
 men and 100 guns. Richardson's and Hooker's divisions of 
 the 2d and 3d Corps had not yet arrived, and Casey's division 
 of the 4th Corps was unable to move for want of wagons. 
 
 ANOTHER REDUCTION OF FORCE. 
 
 Before I left Washington an order had been issued by the 
 War Department, placing Fort Monroe and its dependencies 
 under my control, and authorizing me to draw from the troops 
 
156 
 
 SECOND PERIOD, 
 
 under General Wool, a division of about 10,000 men, which was 
 to be assigned to the 1st Corps. During the night of the 3d 
 I received a telegram from the adjutant-general of the army, 
 stating that, by the President's order, I was deprived of all 
 control over General Wool and the troops under his com- 
 mand, and forbidden to detach any of his troops without his 
 sanction. 
 
 This order left me without any base of operations under my 
 own control, and to this day I am ignorant of the causes which 
 led to it. 
 
 CO-OPERATION OF THE NAVY. 
 
 On my arrival at Fort Monroe the James River was declared, 
 by the naval authorities, closed to the operations of their ves- 
 sels, by the combined influence of the enemy's batteries on its 
 banks and the confederate steamers Merriraac, Yorktown, 
 Jamestown, and Teazer. Flag-officer Goldsborough, then in 
 command of the United States squadron in Plampton Roads, 
 regarded it (and, no doubt, justly) as his highest and most 
 imperative duty to watch and neutralize the Merrimac, and as 
 he designed using his most powerful vessels in a contest with 
 her, he did not feel able to detach, for the assistance of the 
 army, a suitable force to attack the water batteries at York- 
 town and Gloucester. All this was contrary to what had 
 been previously stated to me, and materially aifected my plans. 
 At no time during the operations against Yorktown was the 
 navy prepared to lend us aiiy material assistance in its reduc- 
 tion, until after our land batteries had partially silenced the 
 works. 
 
 ADVANCE FROM FORT MONROE. 
 
 I had hoped, let me say, by rapid movements, to drive be- 
 fore me or capture the enemy on the Peninsula, open the 
 James River, and press on to Richmond before he should be 
 materially reinforced from other portions of his territory. As 
 the narrative proceeds, the causes will be developed which 
 frustrated these apparently well-grounded expectations. 
 
ADVANCE FROM FORT MONROE. 157 
 
 I deterrainetl, then, to move the two divisions of the 4th 
 Corps by the Newpoi't News and Williamsburg road, to take 
 up a position between Yorktown and Williamsburgh, while 
 the two divisions of the 3d Corps moved direct from Fort 
 Monroe upon Yorktown, the reserves moving so as to support 
 either corps, as might prove necessary. I designed, should 
 the works at Yorktown and Williamsburg offer a serious 
 resistance, to land the Tst Corps, reinforced, if necessary, on the 
 left bank of the York, or on the Severn, to move it on 
 Gloucester and West Point, in order to take in reverse Avhat- 
 ever force the enemy might have on the Peninsula, and com- 
 pel him to abandon his positions. 
 
 In the commencement of the movement from Fort Monroe, 
 serious difficulties were encountered from the want of precise 
 topographical information as to the country in advance. 
 
 Correct local maps were not to be found, and the country, 
 though known in its general features, we found to be inaccu- 
 rately described, in essential particulars, in the only maps and 
 geographical memoirs or papers to which access could be had; 
 erroneous courses to streams and roads were frequently given, 
 and no dependence could be placed on the information thus 
 derived. This difficulty has been found to exist with respect 
 to most portions of the State of Virginia, through which my 
 military operations have extended. Reconnoissances, frequently 
 under fire, proved the only trustworthy sources of information. 
 Negroes, however truthful their reports, possessed or were 
 able to communicate, very little accurate and no comprehen- 
 sive topographical information. 
 
 On the 3d the following orders were given for the move- 
 ment of the 4th : 
 
 " Porter's and Hamilton's divisions, and Averill's cavalry of 
 the 3d coi'ps, and Sedwick's division of the 2d Corps, under 
 Brig.-Gen. Heintzelman, commanding 3d Corps, will move to- 
 morrow in the following order : Porter's division, with Ave- 
 rill's cavalry, at 6 a.m., over the New Market and New Bridges 
 to Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge. This division will send 
 forward to the batteries where the Ship Point road intersects 
 the main Yorktown road, a sufficient force to hold that point, 
 
158 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 and cut off the garrison of the Ship Point batteries ; the whole 
 division may be used for this purpose, if necessary, and it 
 possible the batteries should be occupied by our troops to- 
 morrow. The portion of the division not necessary for this 
 purpose will encamp at Howard's Bridge. 
 
 "Hamilton's division will march at 7 a.m. by the New 
 Bridge road to Big Bethel, and will encamp on Howard's 
 Creek. 
 
 "Sedgwick's division will march at 8 a.m. by the New 
 Market Bridge, taking the direct road to Big Bethel, and will 
 also encamp at Ho\Vard's Bridge. 
 
 " Brig.-Gen. Keyes, commanding 4th Corps, will move Avith 
 Smith's and Conch's divisions at 6 a.m. (Smith's division in 
 advance), by the .James River road ; the 5th Regular Cavalry, 
 temporarily assigned to this corps, will move with Smith's di- 
 vision, which will encamp at Young's Mills, throwing forward 
 at least one brigade to the road from Big Bethel to War- 
 wick ; Couch's division will encamp at Fisher's Creek. 
 
 " The reserve cavalry, artillery, and infantry will move at 
 8.30 a.m. by the New Market Bridge to Big Bethel, where it 
 will encamp ; on the march it will keep in the rear of Sedg- 
 wick's division." 
 
 The following is an extract from the orders issued on the 4th 
 for the march of the 5th. 
 
 " The following movements of the army will be carried out 
 to-morrow (5th). 
 
 " General Keyes will move forward Smith's division at 6 
 A.M., via Warwick Court House, and the road leading near 
 the Old Ship Yard, to the Half Way House on the Yorktown 
 and Williamsburg road. 
 
 " General Couch's division will march at 6 a.m. to close up 
 on General Smith's division at the Half Way House. 
 
 " General Keyes' command will occupy and hold the narrow 
 dividing ridge near the Half Way House, so as to prevent the 
 escape of the garrison at Yorktown by land, and prevent rein- 
 forcements being thrown in. 
 
 " General Heintzelman will move forward General Porter's 
 
ADVANCE FROM FORT MONROE. 159 
 
 two rear brigades at 6 a.m. upon the advanced guard, when 
 the entire division will advance to a point about two and three 
 quarters miles from Yorktown, where the road turns abruptly 
 to the north, and where a road comes in from Warwick Court 
 House. General Hamilton's division will move at 6 a.m. and 
 follow General Porter's division, camping as near it as possible. 
 General Sedgwick's division will march at 5 a.m. as far as the 
 Warwick road, which enters the main Yorktown road near Dr. 
 Power's house, and will await further orders. 
 
 The reserves will march at 6 a.m. upon the main Yorktown 
 road, halting for further orders at Dr. Power's house ; the in- 
 fantry leading, the artillery following next, and the cavalry in 
 rear. 
 
 " General Sedgwick's division will, for the present, act with 
 the reserve, and he will receive orders from head-quarters." 
 
 In giving these orders of march for the 4th and 5th, it was 
 expected that there would be no serious opposition at Big 
 Bethel, and that the advance of the 3d Corps beyond that 
 point would force the enemy to evacuate the works at Young's 
 Mills, while our possession of the latter would make it necessary 
 for him to abandon those at Howard's Bridge, and the advance 
 thence on Yorktown would place Ship Point in our possession, 
 together with its garrison, unless they abandoned it promptly. 
 The result answered the expectation. 
 
 During the afternoon of the 4th, General Keyes obtained in- 
 formation of the presence of some 5,000 to 8,000 of the enemy, 
 in a strong position at Lee's Mills : the nature of that position 
 in relation to the Warwick not being at that time understood, 
 I instructed General Keyes to attack and carry this position on 
 coming in front of it. 
 
 Early in the afternoon of the 5th, the advance of each column 
 was brought to a halt : that of Heintzelman (Porter's division) 
 in front of Yorktown, after overcoming some resistance at 
 Big Bethel and Howard's Bridge : that of Keyes (Smith's di- 
 vision) unexpectedly before the enemy's works at Lee's Mills, 
 where the road from Newport Ncavs to Williamsburg crosses 
 Warwick River. The progress of each column had been retarded 
 by heavy rains on that day, which had made the roads almost 
 
160 • SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 impassable to the infantry of Keyes's column and impraeticahle 
 to all but a small portion of the artillery, while the anrmunition, 
 provision, and forage could not be brought up at all. 
 
 When Gen. Keyes's approached Lee's Mills his left flank was 
 exposed to a sharp artillery fire from the further bank of the 
 Warwick, and upon reaching the vicinity of the mill, he found 
 it altogether stronger than was expected, unapproachable by 
 reason of the Warwick River, and incapable of being carried 
 by assault. 
 
 The troops composing the advance of each column were 
 during the afternoon under a warm artillery fire — the sharp- 
 shooters even of the right column being engaged, when cover- 
 ing recounoissances. 
 
 THE FIRST CORPS WITHDRAWN BY ORDER OF 
 THE PRESIDENT. 
 
 It was at this stage and moment of the campaign that the 
 following telegram was sent to me : — 
 
 Adjutant-General's Office, 
 April 4th, 1862. 
 Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 By directions of the President Gen. McDowell's army 
 corps has been detached from the force under your immediate 
 command ; and the general is ordered to report to the Secre- 
 tary of War ; letter by mail. 
 
 L. Thomas, 
 
 Adj't.-Gen. 
 
 The President having promised in our interview following 
 his order of March 31st, withdrawing Blenker's division of 
 10,000 men from my command, that nothing of tlie sort should 
 be repeated, that I might rest assured that the campaign 
 should proceed with no further deductions from the force upon 
 which its operations had been planned, I may confess to hav- 
 ing been shocked at this order, which, with that of the 31st 
 ult., removed nearly 60,000 men from my command, and re- 
 duced my force by more than one-third after its task had been 
 assigned, its operations planned, its fighting begun. To me 
 
THE FIRST CORPS WITHDRAWN. 161 
 
 the blow was most discouraging. It frustrated all my plans 
 for impending operations. It fell when I was too deeply com- 
 mitted to witlidraw. It left me incapable of continuing opera- 
 tions which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of 
 another, a different, and a less effective plan of campaign. It 
 made rapid and brilliant operations imjjossible. It was a flital 
 error. 
 
 It was now of course out of my power to turn Yorktown 
 by West Point, I had therefore no choice left, but to attack it 
 directly in front, as I best could with the force at my com- 
 mand. Reconnoissances made under fire on that and the fol- 
 lowing day determined, that the sources of the Warwick River 
 were uear Yorktown, commanded by its guns, while that 
 stream for some distance from its month on the James River 
 was controlled by the confederate gun-boats ; that the fords 
 had been destroyed by dams, the approaches to which were 
 generally through dense forests and deep swamps, and defended 
 by extensive and formidable works ; that timber felled for de- 
 fensive purposes, and the flooding of the roads caused by the 
 dams had made these works apparently inaccessible and im- 
 possible to turn ; that Yorktown was strongly fortified, armed 
 and garrisoned, and connected with the defenses of the War- 
 wick by forts and intrenchments, the ground of which was 
 swept by the guns of Yorktown. It was also ascertained that 
 the garrisons had been and were daily being reinforced by 
 trooi)S from Norfolk, and the army under Gen. J. E. Johnston. 
 
 Heavy rains made the roads to Fort Monroe impassable and 
 delayed the arrival of troops, ammunition and supplies, while 
 storms prevented, for several days, the sailing of transports 
 from Hampton Roads, and the establishment of depots on the 
 creeks of York River near the army. 
 
 The ground bordering the Warwick River is covered by very 
 dense and extensive forests, the clearings being small and few. 
 This, with the comparative flatness of the country, and the 
 alertness of the enemy, everywhere in force, rendered thorough 
 reconnoissances slow, dangerous and difficult, yet, it was im- 
 possible otherwise to determine whether any assault was any- 
 where practicable, or whether the more tedious, but sure 
 operations of a siege must be resorted to. 
 
162 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 I made, on the 6th and 7th, close personal reconnoissances 
 of the right and left of the enemy's positions, which, with in- 
 formation acquired already, convinced me that it was best to 
 prepare for an assault by the preliminary employment of 
 heavy guns, and some siege operations. Instant assault would 
 have been simple folly. 
 
 On the 7th, I telegraphed to the President as follows : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 April 1, 1862. 
 To THE President, 
 Washington, D. C, — 
 
 Your telegram of yesterday received. In reply I have the 
 honor to state that my entire force for duty, amounts to only 
 about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men. General Wool's 
 command, as you will observe from the accompanying 
 order, has been taken out of my control, although he has 
 most cheerfully co-operated with me. The only use that can 
 be made of his command, is to protect my communications in 
 rear of this point. At this time only fifty-three thousand men 
 have joined me, but they are coming up as rapidly as my 
 means of transportation will permit. 
 
 Please refer to my dispatch to the Secretary of War of to- 
 night, for the details of our present situation. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 On the same day I sent the following : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 In Front of Yorktown, April T, 1862, 7 p.m. 
 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of Wm\ — 
 
 Your telegram of yesterday, arrived here while I was ab- 
 sent examining the enemy's right, which I did pretty closely. 
 
 The whole line of the Warwick, which really heads within 
 a mile of Yorktown, is strongly defended by detached re- 
 doubts, and other fortifications, armed with heavy and light 
 guns. The approaches, except at Yorktown, are covered by 
 
THE FIRST CORPS WIT PI DRAWN. 163 
 
 the Warwick, "over which there is but one, or at most, two 
 passages, both of which are covered by strong batteries. It 
 will be necessary to resort to the use of heavy guns, and some 
 siege operations, before we can assault. All the prisoners state 
 that Gen. J. E. Johnston arrived in Yorktown yesterday with 
 strong reinforcements. It seems clear that I shall have the 
 whole force of the enemy on my hands, probably not less than 
 (100,000) one hundred thousand men, and possibly more. In 
 consequence of the loss of Blenker's division, and the 1st Corps, 
 my force is possibly less than that of the enemy, while they 
 have all the advantage of position. 
 
 I am under great obligations to you for the offer that the 
 whole force and material of the government, will be as fully 
 and speedily under my command as heretofore, or as if the 
 new departments had not been created. 
 
 Since my arrangements were made for this campaign, at 
 least (50,000) fifty thousand men have been taken from my 
 command. 
 
 Since my dispatch of the 5th instant, five divisions have been 
 in close observation of the enemy, and frequently exchanging 
 shots. When my present command all joins, I shall have 
 about (85,000) eighty-five thousand men for duty, from which 
 a large force must be taken for guards, escorts, etc. With 
 this army I could assault the enemy's works, and perhaps carry 
 them, but were I in possession of their intrenchments, and as- 
 sailed by double my numbers, J should have no fears as to the 
 result. 
 
 Under the circumstances that have been developed since my 
 arrival here, I feel fully impressed with the conviction, that 
 here is to be fought the great battle that is to decide the ex- 
 isting contest. I shall, of course, commence the attack as soon 
 as I can get up my siege train, and shall do all in my power 
 to carry the enemy's works ; but to do this with a reasonable 
 degree of certainty, requires, in my judgment, that I should, 
 if possible, have at least, the whole of the 1st Corps to land 
 upon the Severn River, and attack Gloucester in the rear. 
 My present strength will not admit of a detachment sufficient 
 for this purpose, without materially impairing the efticiency 
 of this column. Flag-ofiicer Goldsborough, thinks the works 
 
164 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 too sti-ong for his available vessels, unless I can turn Glouces- 
 ter. I send, by mail, copies of this letter, and one of the com- 
 mander of the gun-boats here. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 THE SIEGE OF YORK TOWN. 
 
 I had provided a small siege train, and moderate supplies of 
 intrenching tools, for such a contingency as the present. Im- 
 mediate steps were taken to secure the necessary additions. 
 
 While the engineer officers were engaged in ascertaining 
 the character and strength of all the defenses, and the config- 
 uration of the ground in front of Yorktown, in order to deter- 
 mine the point of attack, and to develop the approaches, the 
 troojjs were occupied in opening roads to the depots estab- 
 lished at the nearest available points on branches of York 
 River. Troops M^ere brought to the front as rapidly as possi- 
 ble, and on the 10th of April the ai-my was posted as follows : 
 Heintzelman's corps, composed of Porter's, Hooker's and 
 Hamilton's divisions, in front of Yorktown, extending in the 
 oi'der named from the mouth of Wormley's Creek to the War- 
 wick road opposite Winn's Mills ; Sumner's corps, Sedgwick's 
 division only having arrived, on the left of Hamilton, extend- 
 ing down the Warwick and opposite the Winn's Mills works ; 
 Keyes's corps, (Smith's, Couch's, and Casey's divisions,) on the 
 left of Sedgwick, facing the works at the one-gun battery, 
 Lee's Mills, etc., on the west bank of the Warwick. Sumner, 
 after the 6th of April, commanded the left wing, composed of 
 his own and Keyes's corps. 
 
 Throughout the preparations for, and during the siege of 
 Yorktown, I kept the corps under Gen. Keyes, and afterwards 
 the left wing under Gen. Sumner, engaged in ascertaining the 
 character of the obstacles presented by the Warwick, and the 
 enemy intrenched on the right bank, with the intention, if 
 possible, of overcoming them and breaking that line of defense, 
 so as to gain possession of the road to Williamsburg, and cut 
 oif Yorktown from its supports and supplies. The forces 
 
THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 165 
 
 undei' Gen. Heintzelman were engaged in similar efforts upon 
 the works between Winn's Mills and Yorktown. Gen. Keyes's 
 report of the 16th of April, enclosing reports of brigade coru- 
 manders engaged in reconnoissances up to that day, said, 
 "that no part of his (the enemy's line opposite his) line, as far 
 as discovered, can be taken by assault without an enormous 
 waste of life." Reconnoissances on the right flank demon- 
 strated the flict that the Warwick was not passable in that 
 direction except over a narrow dam, the approaches to which 
 were swept by several batteries and intrenchments, which 
 could be filled quickly with supports sheltered by the timber 
 immediately in rear. 
 
 Gen. Barnard, chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, 
 whose position entitled his opinions to the highest considera- 
 tion, expressed the judgment that those formidable works 
 could not, Avith any reasonable degree of certainty, be carried 
 by assault. Gen. Keyes, commanding 4th Army Corps, after 
 the examination of the enemy's defenses on the left, before 
 alluded to, addressed the following letter to the Hon. Ira 
 Harris, U. S. Senate, and gave me a copy. Although not 
 strictly official, it describes the situation at that time in some 
 respects so well that I have taken the liberty of introducing it 
 here. 
 
 Head-Quarters 4th Corps, 
 "Warwick Court House, Va., April 7, 1862. 
 
 My Dear Senator, — 
 
 The plan of campaign on this line was made with the 
 distinct understanding that four army corps should be em- 
 ployed, and that the navy should co-operate in the taking of 
 Yorktown, and also (as I understood it) support us on our left 
 by moving gun-boats up James River. 
 
 To-day I have learned that the 1st Corps, which, by the 
 President's order, was to embrace four divisions, and one 
 division (Blenker's) of the 2d Corps, have been Avithdrawn 
 altogether from this line of operations, and from the army of 
 the Potomac. At the same time, as I am informed, the navy 
 has not means to attack Yorktown, and is afraid to send gun- 
 boats up James River for fear of the Merrimac. 
 
166 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 The above plan of campaign was adopted unanimously by 
 Gen. McDowell and Brig.-Gen's. Sumner, lieintzelman and 
 Keyes, and was concurred in by Major-General McClellau, 
 who first proposed Urbana as our base. 
 
 This army being reduced by forty-five thousand troops, 
 some of them among the best in the service, and without the 
 support of the navy, the plan to which we are reduced bears 
 scarcely any resemblance to the one I voted for. 
 
 I command the James River column, and I left my camp, 
 near Newport News, the morning of the 4th instant. I only 
 succeeded in getting my artillery ashore the afternoon of the 
 day before, and one of my divisions had not all arrived in 
 camp the day I left, and, for the want of transportation, has 
 not yet joined me. So you will observe that not a day was 
 lost in the advance ; and in fact we marched so quickly and 
 so rapidly that many of our animals were twenty-four and 
 forty-eight hours without a ration of forage. But, notwith- 
 standing the rapidity of our advance, we are stopped by a line 
 of defense nine or ten miles long, strongly fortified by breast- 
 works, erected nearly the whole distance, behind a stream or 
 succession of ponds no where fordable, one terminus being 
 Yorktown and the other ending in the James River, which is 
 commanded by the enemy's gun-boats. Yorktown is fortified 
 all around with bastioned works, and on the water side, it 
 and Gloucester are so strong that the navy are afraid to attack 
 either. 
 
 The approaches on our side are generally through low, 
 swampy, or thickly wooded ground, over roads which Ave are 
 obliged to repair or to make, before we can get forward our 
 carriages. The enemy is in great force, and is constantly re- 
 ceiving reinforcements from the two rivers. The line in front 
 of us is therefore one of the strongest ever opposed to an in- 
 vading force in any country. 
 
 You will then ask, why I advocated such a line for our oper- 
 ations ? My reasons are few, but, I think, good. 
 
 With proper assistance from the navy, we could take York- 
 town, and then, with gun-boats on both rivers, we could beat 
 any force opposed to us on Warwick River, because the shot 
 and shells from the gun-boats would neai-Iy overlap across the * 
 
THE SIEGE OF TOEKTOWN. 167 
 
 Peninsula, so that, if the enemy should retreat, and retreat he 
 must, he would have a long way to go without rail or steam 
 transportation, and every soul of his army must fall into our 
 hands or be destroyed. 
 
 Another reason for my supporting the new base and plan 
 was, that this line, it was expected, would furnish water trans- 
 portation nearly to Richmond. 
 
 Now, supposing we succeed in breaking through the line in 
 front of us, what can we do next ? The roads are very bad, 
 and if the enemy retains command of James River, and we do 
 not first reduce Yorktown, it would be impossible for us to 
 subsist this army three marches beyond where it is now. As 
 the roads are at present, it is with the utmost difficulty that 
 we can subsist it in the position it now occupies. 
 
 You will see, therefore, by what I have said, that the force 
 originally intended for the capture of Richmond should be all 
 sent forward. If I thought the four army corps necessary 
 when I supposed the navy would cooperate, and when I 
 judged of the obstacles to be encountered by what I learned 
 from maps and the opinions of officers long stationed at Fort 
 Monroe, and from all other sources, how much more should I 
 think the full complement of troops requisite, now that the 
 navy cannot co-operate, and now that the strength of the ene- 
 my's lines and the number of his guns and men prove to be 
 almost immeasurably greater than I had been led to expect ! 
 
 The line in front of us, in the opinion of all the military men 
 here who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest 
 in the world, and the force of the enemy capable of being in- 
 creased beyond the numbers we now have to oppose to him. 
 Independently of the strength of the lines in front of us, and 
 of the force of the enemy behind them, we cannot advance 
 until we get command of either York River or James River. 
 The efficient co-operation of the navy is, therefore, absolutely 
 essential, and so I considered it when I voted to change our 
 base from the Potomac to Fort Monroe. 
 
 An iron-clad boat must attack Yorktown, and if several 
 strong gun-boats could be sent up James River also, our suc- 
 cess will be certain and complete, and the rebellion will soon 
 be put down. 
 
168 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 On the other hand, we must butt against the enemy's works 
 with heavy artillery and a great waste of time, life and mate- 
 rial. 
 
 If we break through and advance, both our flanks will be 
 assailed from two great water-courses in the hands of the 
 enemy ; our supplies would give out, and the enemy, equal, 
 if not superior, in numbers, would, with the other advantages, 
 beat and destroy this army. 
 
 The gi'eatest master of the art of war has said that " if you 
 would invade a country successfully, you must have one line 
 of oj^erations and one army, under one general." But what 
 is our condition ? The State of Virginia is made to constitute 
 the command, in part or wholly, of some six generals, viz. : 
 Fremont, Banks, McDowell, Wool, Burnside, and McClellan, 
 besides the scrap, over the Chesapeake, in the care of Dix. 
 
 The great battle of the war is to come off here. If we win 
 it, the rebellion will be crushed. If we lose it, the conse- 
 quences will be more horrible than I care to foretell. The 
 plan of campaign I voted for, if carried out with the means 
 proposed, will certainly succeed. If any part of the means 
 proposed are withheld or diverted, I deem it due to myself to 
 say that our success will be uncertain. 
 
 It is no doubt agreeable to the commander of the 1st Corps 
 to have a separate department, and, as this letter advocates his 
 return to General McClellan's command, it is proper to state 
 that I am not at all influenced by personal regard or dislike to 
 any of my seniors in rank. If I were to credit all the opinions 
 which have been poured into my ears, I must believe that, in 
 regard to my present fine command, I owe much to General 
 McDowell and nothing to General McClellan. But I have dis- 
 regarded all such ofiiciousness, and I have from last July to 
 the present day, supported General McClellan and obeyed all 
 his orders with as hearty a good will as though he had been 
 my brother or the friend to whom I owed most. I shall con- 
 tinue to do so to the last, and so long as he is my commander, 
 and I am not desirous to displace him, and would not if I 
 could. He left Washington with the understanding that he 
 was to execute a definite plan of campaign with certain pre- 
 scribed means. The plan Avas good and the means suficient, 
 
THE SIEGE OF YORK TOWN. 169 
 
 and, without modification, the enterpi-ise was certain of suc- 
 cess. But, with the reduction of force and means, the plan is 
 entirely clianged, and is now a bad plan, with means insuf- 
 ficient for certain success. 
 
 Do not look upon this communication as the oiFspring of 
 despondency. I never despond ; and when you see me work- 
 ing the hardest, you may be sure that fortune is frowning upon 
 me. I am working note, to my utmost. 
 
 Please show this letter to the President, and I should like 
 also that Mr. Stanton should know its contents. ' Do me the 
 honor to write to me as soon as you can, and believe me, with 
 perfect respect, 
 
 Your most obedient servant, 
 
 E. D. Keyes, 
 Brig. -Gen. Comd'g 4th Army Corps. 
 Hon. Ira Harris, 
 JJ. S. Senate. 
 
 On the 7th of April, and before the ariival of the divisions 
 of Generals Hooker, Richardson, and Casey, I received the 
 following dispatches from the President and Secretary of 
 War. 
 
 Washington, April 6, 1862. 8 p.m. 
 Gen. G. B. McClellan. 
 
 Yours of 11 A.M. to-day received. Secretary of War in. 
 forms me that the forwarding of transportation, ammunition, 
 and Woodbury's Brigade, under your orders, is not and will 
 not be interfered with. You now have over one hundred 
 thousand troops with you, independent of General Wool's 
 command. I think you had better break the enemy's line from 
 Yorktown to Warwick River at once. This will probably use 
 time as advantageously as you can. 
 
 ^- , A. Lincoln. 
 
 President. 
 
 ■Washington, April 6, 1862. 2 p.m. 
 Gen. G. B. McClellan. 
 
 The President directs me to say that your dispatch to 
 him has been received. General Sumner's corps is on the road 
 
170 SECOND PEE 1.0 D. 
 
 to join you, and will go forward as fast as possible. Frank- 
 lin's division is now on the advance towards Manassas. There 
 is no means of transportation here to send it forward in time 
 to be of service in your present operations. Telegraph fre- 
 quently, and all in the power of tlie government shall be done 
 to sustain you as occasion may require. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 By the 9th of April I had acquired a pretty good knowledge 
 of the position and strength of the enemy's works and the ob- 
 stacles to be overcome. 
 
 On that day I received the following letter from the Presi- 
 dent. 
 
 Washington, April 9th, 1862. 
 Major-General McClellan : — 
 
 My Dear Sir, — Your dispatches, complaining that you are 
 not properly sustained, while they do not offend me, do pain 
 rae very much. 
 
 Blenker's division was withdrawn from you before y^ou left 
 here, and you know the pressure under which I did it, and, as 
 I thought, acquiesced in it, certainly not without reluctance. 
 
 After you left I ascertained that less than twenty thousand 
 unorganized men, without a single field battery, were all you 
 designed to be left for the defense of Washington and Manas- 
 sas Junction ; and part of this even was to go to General 
 Hooker's old position. General Banks' corps, once designed 
 for Manassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on the line 
 of Winchester and Strasburg, and could not leave it without 
 again exposing the upper Potomac, and the Baltimore and 
 Ohio Railroad. This presented (or would present, when 
 McDowell and Sumner should be gone^ ' great temptation to 
 the enemy to turn back from tho,v hannock and sack 
 
 Washington. My explicit order i a", , ^^Aiington should, by 
 the judgment of cdl the commanders of army corps, be left 
 entirely secure, had been neglected. It was precisely this that 
 drove me to detain McDowell. 
 
 I do not forget that I was satisfied with your arj-angement 
 
THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. iVl 
 
 to leave Banks at Manassas Junction ; but wlien that arrange- 
 ment was broken up and nothing was substituted for it, of 
 course I was constrained to substitute something for it myself. 
 And allow me to ask, " Do you really think I should permit 
 the line from Richmond via Manassas Junction to this city to 
 be entirely open, except what resistance could be presented by 
 less than twenty thousand unorganized troops ? This is a 
 question which the country will not allow me to evade. 
 
 There is a curious mystery about the numbers of the troops 
 now with you. When I telegraphed you on the 6th, saying 
 you had over a hundred thousand with you, I had just obtained 
 from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from 
 your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route 
 to you. You now say you will have but 85,000 when all en 
 route to you shall have reached you. How can the discrep- 
 ancy of 23,000 be accounted for ? 
 
 As to General Wool's command, I understand it is doing 
 for you precisely what a like number of your own would have 
 to do, if that command was away. 
 
 I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you 
 is with you by this time, and if so, I think it is the precise 
 time to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively 
 gain ujDon you — that is, he will gain faster, by fortifications 
 and reinforcements, than you can by reinforcements alone. 
 
 And once more, let me tell you, it is indispensable to you 
 that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You 
 will do me the justice to remember, I always insisted that 
 going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at 
 or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a 
 difiiculty ; that we would find the same enemy, and the same 
 or equal intrenchments, at either place. The country will not 
 fail to note — is now noting — that the present hesitation to 
 move upon an intrenched enemy, is but the story of Manassas 
 repeated. 
 
 I beg to assure you that I have never written you, or 
 spoken to you, in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor 
 with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most 
 anxious judgment I consistently can. But you must act. 
 
 Yours, very truly, 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
172 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 With great deference to the opinions and wishes of Hia 
 Excellency the President, I most respectfully beg leave to re- 
 fer to the facts which I have presented, and those contained in 
 the accompanying letter of General Keyes, with the reports of 
 General Barnard and other officers, as furnishing a reply to 
 the above letter. His Excellency could not judge of the 
 formidable character of the works before us as well as if he 
 had been upon the ground, and whatever might have been his 
 desire for prompt action (certainly no greater than mine), I 
 feel confident, if he could have made a personal inspection of 
 the enemy's defenses, he would have forbidden me from risk- 
 ing the safety of the army and the possible successes of the 
 campaign on a sanguinary assault of sn advantageous and 
 formidable position, which, even if successful, could not have 
 been followed up to any other or better result than would 
 have been reached by the regular operations of a siege. Still 
 less could I forego the conclusions of my most instructed 
 judgment for the mere sake of avoiding the personal conse- 
 quences intimated in the President's dispatch. 
 
 The following extracts from the report of the chief engineer 
 (Brig.-Gen. J. G. Barnard), embody the result of our recon- 
 noissances, and give, with some degree of detail, the character 
 and strength of the defenses of Yorktown and the "Warwick, 
 and some of the obstacles which the army contended against 
 and overcame. 
 
 EXTRACTS FROM GEN. BARNARD'S REPORT. 
 
 " The accompanying drawing (map No. 2) gives with accu- 
 racy the outline and armament of the fortifications of York- 
 town proper, with the detached works immediately connected 
 with it. 
 
 " The three bastioned fronts looking towards our approaches 
 appear to have been earliest built, and have about 15 feet 
 thickness of parapet, and 8 feet to 10 feet depth of ditch ; the 
 width varying much, but never leading less, at top of the 
 scarp, than 1 5 feet : I think, generally, much more. 
 
GENERAL BABNAEd's REPORT. 173 
 
 " The works extending around the town, from the western 
 salient of fronts just mentioned, appear to have been finished 
 during the last winter and spring. They have formidable 
 profiles, 18 feet thickness of parapet, and generally, 10 feet 
 depth of ditch. 
 
 " The water-batteries had generally, eighteen feet parapet, 
 the guns in barbette. 
 
 " They were (as Avell as all the works mentioned) carefully 
 constructed with well made sod-revetments. 
 
 "There were numerous traverses between the guns, and 
 ample magazines ; how sufficient in bomb-proof qualities, I am 
 unable to say, 
 
 " The two first guns of the work on the heights, bear upon 
 the water as well as the land, and were of heavy calibre. 
 
 " The list herewith, gives all the guns in position, or for 
 which there Avere emplacements. The vacant emplacements 
 were all occupied before the evacuation by siege-guns, rifled 
 4^ inch, 24-pounders and 18-pounders. 
 
 " In Fort Magruder (the first exterior work) there were 
 found 1 8-inch Columbiad, 1 42-pounder, and 1 8-inch siege- 
 howitzer, the two former ' en barbette.' The sketch will show 
 the emplacements for guns on field and siege-carriages, making, 
 I think, with the foregoing, 22. Two of these were placed 
 behind traverses with embrasures covered by bridges. 
 
 " The two external redoubts, with the connecting parapets, 
 formed a re-entrant with the fronts of attack, and all the guns 
 bore on our approaches. 
 
 " It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches were swept 
 by the fire of at least 49 guns, nearly all of which were heavy, 
 and many of them the most formidable guns known, besides 
 that, two-thirds of the guns of the water-batteries, and all the 
 guns of Gloucester, bore on our right batteries, though under 
 disadvantageous circumstances. 
 
 "The ravine, behind which the left of the Yorktown fronts 
 of attack Avas placed, was not very difficult, as the heads 
 formed depressions in front of their left imperfectly seen by 
 their fire, and from which access could be had to the ditches, 
 but we could not be sure of this fact before the evacuation. 
 The enemy held, by means of a slight breast-work, and rifle 
 
174 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 trenches, a position in advance of the heads of their ravines, as 
 far forward as the Burnt House. 
 
 " The ravines, which head between the Yorktown fortifica- 
 tions and the exterior works, are deep and intricate. They 
 were tolerably well seen, however, by the works which run 
 westwardly from the Yorktown works, and which were too 
 numerous and complicated to be traced on paper. 
 
 "Fort Magruder, the first lunette on our left, appears to 
 have been built at an early period. 
 
 "The external connection between this work, Avas first a 
 rifle trench, probably afterwards enlai'ged into a parapet, with 
 external ditcli, and an emplacement for four guns in or near 
 the small redan in the centre. 
 
 " Behind this they had constructed numerous epaulraents 
 with connecting boyaus not fully arranged for infantry 
 fires, and mainly intended, probably, to protect their camps 
 and reserves, against the destructive eflfects of our artillery. 
 
 " From the ' red redoubt,' these trenches and epaulments, 
 ran to the woods and rivulet which forms a head of the War- 
 wick, and continue almost without break to connect with the 
 works at Winn's Mills. This stream just mentioned, (what- 
 ever be its name, the term 'Warwick,' according to some, ap- 
 plying only to the tidal channel from the James River, up as 
 high as Lee's Mill), Avas inundated by a number of dams, from 
 near where its head is crossed by the epaulments mentioned, 
 down to Lee's Mill. 
 
 " Below Lee's Mill, the Warwick follows a tortuous course 
 through salt marshes of 200 yards or 300 yards in width, from 
 which the land rises up boldly to a height of 30 or 40 feet. 
 
 " The first group of works is at Winn's Mill, where there 
 is a dam and bridge. The next, is to guard another dam be- 
 tween Wynn's and Lee's Mills, (this is the point attacked by 
 General Smith, on the 16th ultimo, and where Lieut. Merrill 
 was wounded ; the object of the attack, was merely to prevent 
 the further construction of works, and feel the strength of the 
 position.) A work, of what extent is not now known, was at 
 the sharp angle of the stream, just above Lee's Mill, and a 
 formidable group of works was at Lee's Mill, where there was 
 also a dam and brido;e. 
 
THE SIEGE OF YORKTOWN. 175 
 
 " From Lee's Mill a line of Avorks extends across Mulberry- 
 Island (or is supposed to do so). 
 
 " At Southall's Landing is another formidable group of 
 works, and from here, too, they extend apparently across the 
 James. 
 
 " These groups of field works were connected by rifle 
 trenches or parapets, for nearly the whole distance. 
 
 " They are far more extensive than may be supposed, from 
 the mention of them I make ; and every kind of obstruction 
 which the country afibrds, such as abattis, marsh, inundation, 
 &c., was skillfully used. The line is certainly one of the most 
 extensive known to modern times. 
 
 " The country on both sides the Warwick, from near York- 
 town down, is a dense forest, with few clearings. It was 
 swampy, and the roads impassable during the heavy rains we 
 have constantly had, except where our own labors had cordu- 
 royed them. 
 
 " If we could have broken the enemy's line across the isth- 
 mus, we could have invested Yorktown, and it must, with its 
 garrison, have soon fallen into our hands. 
 
 " It was not deemed practicable, considering the strength 
 of that line, and the difficulty of handling our forces (owing to 
 the impracticable character of the country), to do so. 
 
 " If we could take Yorktown, or drive the enemy out of 
 that place, the enemy's line was no longer tenable. This we 
 could do by siege operations. It was deemed too hazardous 
 to attempt the reduction of the place by assault." 
 
 The i^lan of the approaches and their defenses, as deter- 
 mined xipon and finally executed, is exhibited in the accom- 
 panying map. It was, in words, to open the first parallel 
 as near as possible to the works of the enemy, and under 
 its protection to establish, almost simultaneously, batteries 
 along the Avhole front, extending from York River, on the 
 right, to the "Warwick, on the left (a chord of about one mile 
 in length, the principal appi'oaches were directed against the 
 east end of the main work (which was most heavily armed, 
 and bore both on the water and land), and lay between 
 Wormley's Creek and York River. There, also, were placed 
 
176 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 the most of the battei'ies designed to act against the land 
 front, to enfilade the water batteries, and to act upon Glou- 
 cester. I designed at the earliest moment to open simultane- 
 ously with several batteries, and as soon as the enemy's guns, 
 which swept the neck of land between Wormley's Creek and 
 the Warwick, were crippled, and their fire kept down, to push 
 the trenches as far forward as necessary, and to assault York- 
 town and the adjacent works. 
 
 The approaches to the batteries, the necessary bridges, and 
 the roads to the depots, had been vigorously pushed to com- 
 pletion by the troops imder Generals Heintzehnan and Sum- 
 ner, and were available for infantry, and in some instances for 
 artillery, on the l7th of April, when the batteries and their 
 connections were commenced, and labor upon them kept up, 
 night and day, until finished. 
 
 Some of the batteries, on easy ground and concealed from 
 the view of the enemy, were early completed and armed, and 
 held ready for any emergency, but not permitted to open, as 
 the return fire of the enemy would interfere too much with 
 the labor on other and more important works. The comple- 
 tion of the more exposed and heaviest batteries was delayed 
 by storms, preventing the landing of guns and ammunition. 
 It having been discovered that the enemy were receiving artil- 
 lery stores at the wharf in Yorktown, on May 1st, Battery 
 No. 1 Avas opened with effect upon the wharf and town. 
 
 On the 22d of April, General Franklin, with his division 
 from General McDowell's corps, had arrived and reported to 
 me. The garrison of Gloucester Point had been reinforced 
 and the works strengthened ; but as this division was too 
 small to detach to the Severn, and no more troops could be 
 spared, I determined to act on Gloucester by disembarking it 
 on the north bank of the York River, under the protection of 
 the gun-boats. The troops were mainly kept on board ship 
 while the necessary preparations were made for landing them, 
 and supporting them in case of necessity. For a full account 
 of this labor, I refer to the report of Lieut.-Col. B. S. Alexan- 
 der, of the Engineer Corps detailed for this expedition. 
 
 While the siege works were being rapidly completed, the 
 roads on the left wing necessary for communication and ad- 
 
THE SIEGE OF Y O K K T O "SV X , 177 
 
 vanoe wevo oponod iiiul corduroyed over the luarslies, batteries 
 were erected to silence the enemy's guns and drive liiin from 
 his works at Winn's and Lee's Mills, preparatory to the gene- 
 ral attack, active reconnoissauces were continually going on, 
 and attempts in force made to drive the enemy from the 
 banks. 
 
 The result of various reconnoissances made under the imme- 
 diate direction of Gen. AV. F. Smith, commanding 2d Division, 
 4th Corps, led to the belief that the weakest point of that part 
 of the enemy's lines, was opposite a field, where it was ascer- 
 tained that there was a dam covered by a battery known to 
 contain at least one gun. It was determined to push a sti'ong 
 reconuoissance on this point, to silence the enemy's fire, and 
 ascertain the actual strength of the position, being prepared to 
 sustain the reconnoitering party by a real attack, if found 
 expedient. 
 
 Gen. "NV. F. Smith was directed to undertake the operation 
 on the 16th of April. He silenced the enemy's guns, dis- 
 covered the existence of other works, previously concealed and 
 unknown, and sent a strong party across the stream, which 
 was finally forced to retire with some loss ; but Gen. Smith 
 intrenched himself in a position immediately overlooking the 
 dam and the enemy's works, so as to keep them under control, 
 and prevent the enemy using the dam as a means of crossing 
 the Warwick to annoy us. 
 
 3Iany times towards the end of the month, the enemy at- 
 tempted to drive in our pickets and take our rifle-pits near 
 Yorktown, but always without success. As the siege pro- 
 gressed it was with great difilculty that the rifle-pits on the 
 right could be excavated and held, so little covering could be 
 made against the hot fire of the enemy's artillery and infiintry. 
 Their guns continued up to a late hour of the night of the 3d 
 of ]\[ay. 
 
 Our batteries would have been ready to open on the morn- 
 ing of the 6th ]May at latest, but on the morning of the 4th it 
 was discovered that the enemy had already been compelled to 
 evacuate his ])osition during the night, leaving behind him all 
 his heavy guns uninjured, and a large amount o( amn\unition 
 and supplies. 
 
178 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 For the details of the labors of the siege, I refer to the ac- 
 companying reports and journals of Brig.-Gen, J. G. Barnard, 
 chief engineer, charged with the selection and laying out, and 
 completion of the approaches and batteries ; of Brig.-Gen, W. 
 F. Barry, chief of artillery, charged with arming and supply- 
 ing with ammunition all the siege and field batteries ; and of 
 Brig.-Gen. Fitz John Porter, director of the siege, to whom 
 was assigned the guarding of the trenches, the assembling and 
 distribution of the working parties, &K., &c. 
 
 THE PURSUIT TO WILLIAMSBURG. 
 
 Early in the morning of the 4th, upon the enemy's abandon- 
 ing his lines at Yorktown, I ordered all the available cavalry 
 force, with four batteries of horse artillery, under Brig.-Gen. 
 Stoneman, chief of cavalry, in immediate pursuit, by the 
 Yorktown and Williamsburg road, with orders to harass the 
 enemy's rear, and try to cut off such of his forces as had taken 
 the Lee's Mill and Williamsburg road. 
 
 Gen. Heintzelman was directed to send Hooker's division 
 forward on the Yorktown and Williamsburg road to support 
 Gen. Stoneman ; and Gen. Smith was ordered to proceed v/ith 
 his division on the Lee's Mill and Williamsburg road for the 
 same purpose ; afterwards the divisions of Generals Kearney, 
 Couch and Casey were put en route, the first on the Yorktown 
 road, and the others on the Lee's Mill road. These roads 
 unite about a quarter of a mile south of Fort Magruder, and 
 are connected by cross-roads at several points between York- 
 town and Williamsburg. After these directions had been 
 given. Gen. Sumner, (the officer second in rank in the army of 
 the Potomac) was ordered to proceed to the front and take im- 
 mediate charge of operations until my arrival. 
 
 Gen. Stoneman moved forward promptly with his command 
 (consisting of four batteries of horse-artillery under Lieut.-Col. 
 Harp, the 1st and 6th U. S. cavalry, the 3d Pennsylvania, and 
 8th Illinois, and Barker's squadron,) meeting with but little op- 
 position until he arrived in front of the enemy's works, about 
 two miles east of Williamsburg. At a point about eight miles 
 
THE PURSUIT TO WILLIAMSBURG. 1*79 
 
 from Yovktown, in accordance with my instructions he de- 
 tached Gen. Emory Avith Benson's battery, the Sd Pennsylvania 
 cavah-y (Col. Averill) and Barker's squadron, to gain the Lee's 
 Mill road, and endeavor, with the assistance of Gen. Smith, to 
 cut off the portion of the enemy's rear-guard, which had taken 
 thnt route. Gen. Emory had some sharp skirmishes with a 
 regiment of cavalry, and a battery under Gen. Stuart, and drove 
 them in the direction of Lee's Mill. Gen. Smith having met 
 with obstructions in his front, had transferred his column by a 
 cross-road to the Yorktown and Williamsburg road, so that 
 Gen. Emory finding no force to co-operate with him was un- 
 able to cut off the rear-guard, and they succeeded in escaping 
 by a circuitous route, along the bank of the James River. 
 
 The position in which Gen. Stoneman encountered the ene- 
 my is about four miles in extent, the right resting on College 
 Creek, and the left on Queen's Creek, nearly three-fourths of 
 its front being covered by tributaries of those two creeks, 
 upon which there are ponds. The ground between the heads 
 of the tributary streams is a cultivated plain, across which a 
 line of detached works had been constructed, consisting of 
 Fort Magruder, a large work in the centre with a bastion 
 front, and twelve other redoubts and epaulments for field- 
 guns. 
 
 The parapet of Fort Magruder is about six feet high and 
 nine feet thick, the ditch nine feet wide and nine feet deep, 
 filled with water. The length of the interior crest is about 
 GOO yards. The redoubts have strong profiles, but are of 
 small dimensions, having faces of about forty yards. The 
 woods in front of the position were felled, and the open ground 
 in front of the works was dotted with numerous rifle pits. 
 
 The roads leading from the lower part of the Peninsula 
 towards Williamsburg, one along the York River, (the York- 
 town road,) and the other along the James, (the Lee's Mill 
 road,) unite between the heads of the tributary streams a short 
 distance in fiont of Fort Magruder, by which they are com- 
 manded, and debouch from the Avoods just before uniting. A 
 branch from the James River road leaves it about one and three 
 quarter miles below Fort Magruder, and unites with the road 
 from Allen's Landing to Williamsburg, which crosses the 
 
180 SECOND PElilOD. 
 
 tributary of College Creek over a dam at the outlet of a pond, 
 and passes just in rear of the line of works, being commanded 
 by the three redoubts on the right of the line. 
 
 At about the same distance from Fort Magruder a branch 
 leaves the York River road, and crosses the tributary of 
 Queen's Creek on a dam, and passing over the position and 
 through the woods in its rear, finally enters Williamsburg. 
 This road is commanded by redoubts on the left of the line of 
 works. 
 
 General Stoneman debouched from the woods with his ad- 
 vance guard, (consisting of a part of the 1st U. S. Cavalry and 
 one section of Gibson's battery, under the command of Gen. 
 Cook,) and the enemy immediately opened on him with sev- 
 eral field-pieces from Fort Magruder, having the correct range 
 and doing some execution. Gibson's battery was brought 
 into position, as rapidly as the deep mud would permit, and 
 returned the fire, while the 6th U. S. Cavalry was sent to feel 
 the enemy's left. This regiment passed one redoubt, which it 
 found unoccupied, and appeared in the rear of a second, when 
 a strong cavalry force, with infantry and artillery, came down 
 upon it ; whereupon the regiment was withdrawn. The 
 rear squadron, under command of Captain Saunders, repelled 
 a charge of the enemy's caA-alry in the most gallant manner. 
 In the meantime the enemy was being reinforced by infantry, 
 and the artillery fire becoming very hot, Gen. Stoneman, hav- 
 ing no infantry to carry the works, ordered the withdrawal 
 of the battery. This was accomplished, with the exception of 
 one piece which could not be extricated from the mud. The 
 enemy attempted to prevent the movement, but their charges 
 were met by the 1st U. S. Cavalry, under command of Lieut.- 
 Col. Grier, and they were driven back, losing several ofiicers 
 and one stand of colors. Gen. Stoneman then took up a de- 
 fensive position a short distance in the rear of the first, to 
 await the arrival of the infantry. The advance of General 
 Smith's column reached Skifi''s Creek about 11^ o'clock, and 
 found the bridge over that stream in flames, and the road im- 
 passable. A practicable route to the Yorktown road having 
 been discovered, the division, by order of General Sumner, 
 moved on by that road, and reached General Stoneman's posi- 
 
THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 181 
 
 tion about 5| o'clock. General Sumner arriving with it, as- 
 sumed command. 
 
 Generals Heintzelman and Keyes also arrived during the 
 afternoon near the Half-Way House. The head of General 
 Hooker's column encountered Smith's division, filing into the 
 road, and was obliged to halt between three and four hours, 
 until it had passed. Gen. Hooker then followed on, and at 
 Chesapeake Church turned off, by Gen. Heintzelman's direc- 
 tion, taking a cross-road, and moved out on the Lee's Mill 
 road thus changing places with Gen. Smith. Marching part 
 of the night, he came in sight of Fort Magruder early in the 
 morning of the 5th. 
 
 General Smith's division having been deployed, General 
 Sumner ordered an attack on the works in his. front, but the 
 lines having been thrown into confusion while moving through 
 the dense forest, and darkness coming on, the attempt, for 
 that night, was abandoned. The troops bivouacked in the 
 woods, and a heavy rain began, which continued until the 
 morning of the 6th, making the roads, already in a very bad 
 condition, almost impassable. 
 
 THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 
 
 During the morning of the 5th, General Sumner reconnoi- 
 tered the position in his front, and at 11 o'clock, ordered Han- 
 cock's brigade, of Smith's division, to take possession of a 
 work on the enemy's left, which had been found to be unoccu- 
 pied. The remainder of Smith's division occupied the woods 
 in front, without being actually engaged. The divisions of 
 Couch and Casey, had received orders during the night to 
 march at daylight, but on account of the terrible condition of 
 the roads, and other impediments, were not able to reach the 
 field until after 1 o'clock, p.m., at- which time the first brigade 
 of Couch's division arrived, and Avas posted in the centre, on 
 Hooker's right. The other two brigades came up during the 
 afternoon, followed by Casey's division. In the meantime. 
 General Hooker having reconnoitered the enemy's position, 
 began the attack at 7^ a.m., and for a while silenced the guns 
 
182 SECOND PE 11 lOD. 
 
 of Fort Magruder, and cleared the ground in his front. But 
 the enemy being continually reinfoi'ced, until their strength 
 greatly exceeded his, made attack after attack, endeavoring to 
 turn his left. For several hours his division struggled gal- 
 lantly against the superior numbers of the enemy. Five guns 
 of Webber's battery were lost, and between 3 and 4 o'clock, 
 his ammunition began to give out. The loss had been heavy, 
 and the exhaustion of the troops was very great. At this 
 time the division of General Kearney came up, who, at 9 a.m., 
 had received orders to reinforce Hooker, and who had suc- 
 ceeded, by the greatest exertion, in passing Casey's troops, 
 and pushing on to the front through the deep mud. General 
 Kearney at once gallantly attacked, and thereby prevented 
 the loss of another battery, and drove the enemy back at every 
 point, enabling General Hooker to extricate himself from his 
 position, and withdraw his wearied troops. 
 
 Peck's brigade, of Couch's division, as has been mentioned 
 before, was immediately on its arrival, ordered by General 
 Sumner to deploy on Hooker's right. This was jjromptly 
 done, and the attacks of the enemy at that point were i-epulsed. 
 General Peck, held his position until late in the afternoon, 
 when he was relieved by the other two brigades of Couch's 
 division, and they were in quiet possession of the ground when 
 night closed the contest. 
 
 The vigorous action of these troops relieved General Hooker 
 considerably. General Emory, had been left with his com- 
 mand, on the night of the 4th, to guard the branch of the 
 Lee's Mill road, which leads to Allen's Farm, and on the 
 morning of the 5th, it was ascertained that by this route the 
 enemy's right could be tuined. A request for infantry for 
 this purpose, was made to General Heintzelman, who, late in 
 the afternoon, sent four regiments and two batteries of Kear- 
 ney's division, tlie first disposable troops he had, and directed 
 General Emory to make the attack. With these reinforce- 
 ments, his force amounted to about 3,000 men, and 3 bat- 
 teries. General Emory, on account of want of knowledge of 
 the gi-ound, and the lateness of the hour, did not succeed in 
 this movement. It involved some risks, but if successful, 
 might have produced important results. At 11 a.m., as be- 
 
THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 183 
 
 fore mentioned, General Smith received orders from General 
 Sumner, to send one brigade across a dam on our right, to 
 occupy a redoubt on the left of the enemy's line ; Hancock's 
 brigade was selected for this purpose. He crossed the dam, 
 took possession of the first redoubt, and afterwards finding the 
 second one 'vacated, he occupied that also, and sent for re- 
 inforcements to enable him to advance further, and take the 
 next redoubt, which commanded the plain between his position 
 and Fort Magruder, and would have enabled him to take in 
 reverse, and cut the communication of the troops engaged 
 with Generals Hooker and Kearney. The enemy soon began 
 to show himself in strength before him, and, as his rear and 
 right flank were somewhat exposed, he repeated his request 
 for reinforcements. General Smith was twice ordered to join 
 him with the rest of his division, but each time the order was 
 countermanded at the moment of execution ; General Sumner 
 not being willing to weaken the centre. At length, in reply 
 to General Hancock's repeated messages for more troops, 
 General Sumner sent him an order to fall back to his first 
 position ; the execution of which, General Hancock deferred 
 as long as possible, being unwilling to give up the advantage 
 already gained, and fearing to expose his command by such a 
 movement. 
 
 During the progress of these events I had remained at York- 
 town, to complete the preparations for the departure of Gen. 
 Franklin's and other troops to West Point by water, and to 
 make the necessary arrangements with the naval commander, 
 for his co-operation. 
 
 By pushing Gen. Franklin, well supported, by water to the 
 right bank of the Pamunkey opposite West Point, it was 
 hoped to force the enemy to abandon whatever works he 
 might have on the Peninsula below that point, or be cut oiF. 
 It was of paramount importance that the arrangements to this 
 end should be promptly made. 
 
 At an early hour of the morning, I had sent two of my aids 
 (Lieut.-Col. Sweitzer and Maj. Hammerstein) to observe the 
 operations in front, with instructions to report to me eveiy- 
 thing of importance that might occur. I received no informa- 
 tion from them leading me to suppose that there was anything 
 
184 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 occurring of more importance than a simple affair of a rear 
 guard, until about 1 o'clock p.m., Avhen a dispatch arrived 
 from one of them that everything was not progressing favora- 
 bly ; this was confirmed a few minutes later by the reports of 
 Governor Sprague and Major Hammerstein, who came dii-ectly 
 from the scene of action. 
 
 Completing the necessary arrangements, I returned to my 
 camp without delay, rode rapidly to the front, a distance of 
 some fourteen miles, through roads much obstructed by troops 
 and wagons, and reached the field between 4 and 5 p.m., in 
 time to take a rapid survey of the ground. I soon learned 
 that there was no direct communication between our centre 
 and the left under Gen. Heintzelman. The centre was chiefly 
 in the nearer edge of the woods situated between us and the 
 enemy. As heavy firing was heard in the direction of Gen. 
 Hancock's command, I immediately ordered Gen. Smith to 
 proceed with his two remaining brigades to support that i^art 
 of the line. Gen. Naglee with his brigade received similar 
 orders. I then directed our centre to advance to the further 
 edge of the woods, mentioned above, which was done ; and 
 attempted to open direct communication with Gen. Heintzel- 
 man, but was prevented by the marshy state of the ground in 
 the direction in Avhich the attempt was made. Before Gen- 
 erals Smith and Naglee could reach the field of Gen. Hancock's 
 operations, although they moved with great rapidity, he had 
 been confronted by a superior force. Feigning to retreat 
 slowly, he awaited their onset, and then turned upon them ; 
 after some terrific volleys of musketry, he charged them with 
 the bayonet, routing and dispersing their whole force ; killing, 
 wounding and capturing from 500 to 600 men, he, himself 
 losing only thirty-one men. 
 
 This was one of the most brilliant engagements of the war, 
 and Gen. Hancock merits the highest praise for the soldierly 
 qualities displayed, and his perfect appreciation of the vital 
 importance of his position. 
 
 Night put an end to all the oi^erations here, and all the 
 troops who had been engaged in this contest slept on the 
 muddy field, without shelter, and many without food. 
 
 Notwithstanding the report I received from Gen. Heintzel- 
 
THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBTJBG. 185 
 
 man during the night, that Gen. Hooker's division had suf- 
 fered so much that it could not be relied upon next day, and 
 that Kearney's could not do more than hold its own, without 
 reinforcements — being satisfied that the result of Hancock's 
 engagement was to give us possession of the decisive point of 
 the battle-field — during the night I countermanded the order 
 for the advance of the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, 
 and directed them to return to Yorktown, to proceed to West 
 Point by water. 
 
 Our loss during the day, the greater part of which was sus- 
 tained by Hooker's division, was as follows : killed, 456 ; 
 wounded, 1,400; missing, 372. Total, 2,228. 
 
 On the next morning we found the enemy's position aban- 
 doned, and occupied Fort Magruder and the town of Wil- 
 liamsburg, which was filled with the enemy's wounded, to 
 whose assistance eighteen of their surgeons were sent by Gen- 
 eral J. E. Johnston, the officer in command. Several guns and 
 caissons which the enemy could not carry off on account of 
 the mud were secured. 
 
 Colonel Averill was sent forward at once with a strong cav- 
 alry force, to endeavor to overtake the enemy's rear guard. 
 He found several guns abandoned and picked up a large num- 
 ber of stragglers, but the condition of the roads and the state 
 of his supplies forced him to return after advancing a few 
 miles. 
 
 It is my opinion that the enemy opposed us here with only a 
 portion of his army. When our cavalry first appeared, there 
 was nothing but the enemy's rear guard in Williamsburg : al- 
 though troops were brought back during the night and the 
 next day, to hold the works as long as possible, in order to 
 gain time for the trains, etc., already well on their way to 
 Richmond, to make their escape. 
 
 Our troops w^ere greatly exhausted by the laborious march 
 through the mud from their positions in front of Yorktown, 
 and by the protracted battle through which they had just 
 passed ; many of them were out of rations and ammunition, 
 and one division, in its anxiety to make a prompt movement, 
 had marched Avith empty haversacks. The supply trains had 
 been forced out of the roads on the 4th and 5th, to allow the 
 
186 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 troops and artillery to pass to the front, and the roads were 
 now in such a state, after thirty-six hours continuous rain, that 
 it was almost impossible to pass even empty wagons over them. 
 General Hooker's division had suffered so severely that it was 
 in no condition to follow the enemy even if the roads had been 
 good ; under these circumstances, an immediate pursuit was 
 impossible. 
 
 Steps were at once taken to care for and remove the 
 wounded, and to bring up provisions, ammunition, and forage. 
 The condition of the roads, as has been said, rendered it next 
 to impossible to accomplish this by land from Yorktown : a 
 temporary depot was therefore promptly established on Queen's 
 Creek, and supplies drawn, and the wounded shipped from 
 that point. 
 
 ADVANCE TO THE CHICKAHOMINY. 
 
 The divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and Richard- 
 son were sent from Yorktown by Avater to the right bank of 
 the Pamunkey, in the vicinity of West Point. The remaining 
 divisions, the trains, and the reserve artillery moved subse- 
 quently by land. 
 
 Early on the morning of the 7th, General Franklin had com- 
 pleted the disembarkation of his division, and had placed it in 
 a good position to cover the landing place, both his flanks and 
 a large portion of the front being protected by water, 
 
 Dana's brigade of Sedgwick's division arrived during the 
 morning. 
 
 At about 9 A.M. a large force of the enemy appeared, con- 
 sisting of Whiting's division and other troops, and between 10 
 and 11, they attacked the part of the line held by Newton's 
 brigade. 
 
 The action continued until 'S p.m., when the enemy retired, 
 all his attacks having been repulsed. This aftair, the most im- 
 portant in which the division had yet been engaged, was highly 
 creditable to General Franklin and his command. For the de- 
 tails I refer to his report, which is herewith submitted. Our 
 
ADVANCE ON THE CHIC KAHO MINT. 187 
 
 loss was 49 killed, 104 wounded, and 41 missing. Total 194, 
 which iticludes a large proportion of officers. 
 
 Cavalry reconnoissances were sent out from Williamsburg on 
 the 6th and Vth, and on the 8th General Stoneraan moved, with 
 an advance guard of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, to open 
 communication with General Franklin. 
 
 As soon as our supplies had been received, and the condition 
 of the roads had become a little better, though still very bad, 
 the advance of the remaining troops was begun. Smith's divi- 
 sion moving on the 8th. 
 
 On the 10th, head-quarters were at Roper's Church, 19 
 miles from WiUiamsburg. All the divisions which had moved 
 by land (except Hooker's) being in the vicinity of that place. 
 We were now in direct communication with the portion of the 
 army which had gone by water, and we began to draw sup- 
 pUes from Eltham. On account of the small number and nar- 
 rowness of the roads in this neighborhood, movements were 
 difficult and slow. 
 
 On the 13th, head-quarters, and the divisions of Franklin, 
 Porter, Sykes and Smith, reached Cumberland, which was 
 made a temporary depot. Couch and Casey Avere then near 
 New Kent Court-house, Hooker and Kearney near Roper's 
 Church, and Richardson and Sedgwick near Eltham. 
 
 On the 14 th and 15th much rain fell. 
 
 On the 15th and 16th the divisions of Franklin, Smith and 
 Porter were with great difficulty moved to White House, five 
 miles in advance. So bad was the road that the train of one 
 of these divisions required thirty-six hours to pass over this 
 short distance. 
 
 General Stoneman had occupied this place some days before, 
 after several successful skirmishes, in which our cavnlry proved 
 superior to that of the enemy. The reports of these affixirs 
 are appended. 
 
 About this time, with the consent of the President, two ad- 
 ditional corps were organized, viz. : the 5th Provisional Corps, 
 consisting of the divisions of Porter and Sykes, and the Re- 
 serve Artillery, under the command of F. J. Porter ; and the 
 6th Provisional Corps, consisting of the divisions of Franklin 
 and Smith, under the command of Gen. W. B. Franklin. 
 
188 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 Head-quarters reached White House on the 16th, and a per- 
 manent depot was at once organized there. 
 
 On the 19th head-quarters, and the corps of Porter and 
 Franklin, moved to Tuustall's Station, five miles from White 
 House. 
 
 On the 20th more rain fell. 
 
 On the 21st the position of the troops was as follows : — 
 
 Stoneman'' s Advance Guard, one mile from Xew Bridge. 
 
 FranMiii's Cor^ys, three miles from Xew Bridge, with 
 
 Poi'fe/'^s Coq)s, at supporting distance in its rear. 
 
 Sumner's Corps, on the railroad, about three miles from 
 the Chickahominy, connecting the right with the left. 
 
 Keyes''s Corps, on Xew Kent Road, near Bottom's Bridge, 
 with 
 
 Seintzdmaiv s Corps, at supporting distance in its rear. 
 
 The ford at Bottom's Bridge was in our possession, and the 
 rebuilding of the bridge, which had been destroyed by the 
 enemy, was commenced. 
 
 On the 2 2d head-quarters moved to Coal Harbor. 
 
 On the 26th the railroad was in operation as far as the 
 Chickahominy, and the railroad bridge across that stream 
 nearly completed. 
 
SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 PART II 
 
 OPERATION'S BEFORE RICHMOND. 
 
 When, on the 20th of May, our advanced light troops 
 reached the banks of the Chickahominy River, at Bottom's 
 Bridge, they found that this, as well as the railroad bridge, 
 about a mile above, had been destroyed by the enemy. 
 
 The Chickahominy in this vicinity is about forty feet wide, 
 fringed^ith a dense growth of heavy forest trees, and bor- 
 dered l3y low, marshy bottom-lauds, varying from half a mile 
 to a mile in width. 
 
 Our operations embraced that part of the river between 
 Bottom's and Meadow bridges, which covered the principal 
 approaches to Richmojid from the east. 
 
 Within these limits the firm ground, lying above high-water 
 mark, seldom approaches near the river on either bank, and 
 no locality was found within this section, where the high 
 ground came near the stream on both sides. It was subject 
 to frequent, sudden and great variations in the volume of 
 water, and a rise of a few feet overflowed the bottom-lands 
 on both sides. 
 
 At low water it could be forded at almost any point, but 
 during high water it rose above a fording stage, and could 
 then be crossed only at the few points where bridges had 
 been constructed. These bridges had all been destroyed by 
 the enemy on our approach, and it was necessary not only to 
 reconstruct these, but to build several others. 
 
 The west bank of the river, opposite the New and Mechan- 
 icsville bridges, was bordered by elevated blufls, which af- 
 
190 SECOND PEEIOD. 
 
 forded the enemy commanding positions to fortify, establish 
 his batteries, enfilading the approaches upon the two principal 
 roads to Riclimond, in one night, and resist the reconstruction 
 of the important bridges. This obliged us to select other less 
 exposed points for our crossings. 
 
 As the enemy was not in great force opposite Bottom's 
 Bridge, on the arrival of our left at that point, and as it was 
 iinjoortant to secure a lodgment upon the right bank before he 
 should have time to concentrate his forces and contest the pas- 
 sage, I forthwith ordered Casey's division to ford the river 
 and occupy the opposite heights. This was promptly done 
 on the 20th, and reconnoissances were at once pushed out in 
 advance. 
 
 These troops were directed to throw up defenses in an ad- 
 vantageous position to secure our left flank. Gen. Heintzel- 
 man's corps was thrown forward in support, and Bottom's 
 Bridge immediately rebuilt. 
 
 In the meantime our centre and right were advanced to the 
 river above, and on the 24th Ave carried the village .of Me- 
 chanicsville, driving the enemy out with our artillery, and for- 
 cing them across the bridge which they destroyed. Gen. Nag- 
 lee on the same day dislodged a force of the enemy fi-om the 
 vicinity of the " Seven Pines," on the Bottom's Bridge road, 
 and our advance on the left secured a strong position near that 
 place. 
 
 All the information obtained from deserters, negroes and 
 spies indicated that the enemy occupied in force all the ap- 
 proaches to Richmond from the east, and that he intended to 
 dispute every step of our advance beyond the Chickahominy, 
 and the passage of the stream opposite our right. That their 
 army was superior to ours in numbers did not admit of a doubt. 
 Strong defenses had been constructed around Richmond. 
 
 Impressed by these facts with the necessity of strengthen- 
 ing the army for the struggle, I did not fail to urge repeatedly 
 upon my superiors the importance of reinforcing the army of 
 the Potomac with every disposable man, in order to insure the 
 success of an attack upon the rebel capital. 
 
 On the 1 0th of May I telegraphed as follows : — 
 
operations before richmond. 191 
 
 Camp at Ewell's Farm, three Miles betoxd "Williamsburg, 
 
 May 10, 1862, 5 a.m. 
 Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, — 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 From the information reaching rae from every source, I 
 regard it as certain that the enemy will meet ns with all his 
 force, on or near the Chickahominy. They can concentrate 
 many more men than I have, and are collecting troops from 
 all quarters, especially well-disciplined troops from the South. 
 Casualties, sickness, garrisons and guards, have much reduced 
 my numbers, and will continue to do so. I shall fight the 
 rebel army with whatever force I may have ; but duty requires 
 me to urge that every effort be made to reinforce me without 
 delay with all the disposable troops in Eastern Virginia, and 
 that we concentrate all our forces, as far as possible, to fight 
 the great battle now impending, and to make it decisive. 
 
 It is possible that the enemy may abandon Richmond with- 
 out a serious struggle ; but I do not believe he will — and it 
 would be unwise to count upon anything but a stubborn and 
 desperate defense, a life and death contest. I see no other 
 hope for him than to fight this battle, and Ave must win it. I 
 shall fight them whatever their force may be ; but I ask for 
 every man that the Department can send me. No troops 
 should now be left unemployed. Those who entertain the 
 opinion that the rebels will abandon Richmond without a 
 struggle, are in my judgment badly advised, and do not com- 
 prehend their situation, which is one requiring desperate 
 measures. 
 
 I beg that the President and Secretary will maturely weigh 
 what I say, and leave nothing undone to comply with my re- 
 quest. If I am not reinforced, it is probable that I will be 
 obliged to fight nearly double my numbers, strongly intrenched. 
 I do not think it will be at all possible for me to bring more 
 than (70,000) seventy thousand men upon the field of battle. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 On the 14th of May I sent the following telegram to the 
 President : 
 
192 
 
 SECOND PERIOD, 
 
 Camp at Cumberland, May 14-, 1862. 
 His Excellency, Abraham Lincoln, 
 
 President of the IT. 8. 
 
 I have more than twice telegraphed to the Secretary of 
 War, stating, that in my opinion the enemy were concentrat- 
 ing all their available force to fight this army in front of Rich- 
 mond, and that such ought to be their policy. I have received 
 no reply whatever to any of these telegraphs. 
 
 I beg leave to repeat their substance to your Excellency, and 
 to ask that kind consideration which you have ever accorded 
 to my representations and views. All my information from 
 every source accessible to me, establishes the fixed purpose of 
 the rebels to defend Richmond against this army by offering 
 us battle with all the troops they can collect from east, west, 
 and south, and my own opinion is confirmed by that of all my 
 commanders whom I have been able to consult. 
 
 Casualties, sickness, garrisons, and guards have much weak- 
 ened my force, and will continue to do so. I cannot bring 
 into actual battle against the enemy more than eighty thou- 
 sand men at the utmost, and with them I must attack in 
 position, probably intrenched, a much larger force — perhaps 
 double my numbers. It is possible that Richmond may be 
 abandoned Avithout a serious struggle, but the enemy are 
 actually in great strength between here and there, and it 
 would be unwise, and even insane for me to calculate upon 
 anything but a stubborn and desperate resistance. If they 
 should abandon Richmond, it may well be that it is done with 
 the purpose of making the stand at some place in Virginia 
 south or west of there, and we should be in condition to press 
 them without delay. The confederate leaders must employ 
 their utmost efforts against this army in Virginia, and they 
 will be supported by tlie whole body of their military ofiicers, 
 among whom there may be said to be no Union feeling, as 
 there is also very little among the higher class of citizens in 
 the seceding states. 
 
 I have found no fighting men in this Peninsula — all are in 
 the ranks of the opposing foe. 
 
 Even if more troops than I now have should prove unneces- 
 sary for purposes of military occupation, our greatest display 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND, 193 
 
 of imposing force in the capital of the rebel government will 
 have the best moral effect. I most respectfully and earnestly 
 urge upon your Excellency that the opportunity has come for 
 striking a fatal blow at the enemies of the constitution, and I 
 beg that you will cause this army to be reinforced without 
 delay by all the disposable troops of the government. I ask 
 for every man that the government can send me. Any com- 
 mander of the reinforcements, whom your Excellency may 
 designate, will be acceptable to me, whatever expression I 
 may have heretofore addressed to you on that subject. 
 
 I will fight the enemy, whatever their force may be, with 
 whatever force I may have, and I firmly believe that we shall 
 beat them, but our triumph should be made decisive and com- 
 plete. The soldiers of this army love their government, and 
 will fight well in its support : you may rely upon them. 
 They have confidence in me as their general, and in you as 
 their President. Strong reinforcements will at least save the 
 lives of many of them. The greater our force, the more per- 
 fect will be our combinations, and the less our loss. 
 
 For obvious reasons, I beg you to give immediate consider- 
 tion to this communication, and to inform me fully at the 
 earliest moment of your final determination. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General Com'g. 
 
 To which, on the 18th of May, I received this reply : 
 
 Head-Quaeters, Department Potomac, 
 May 18th, 1862. 
 To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, — 
 
 Comer g Army of Potomac before Richmond, — 
 General, — Your dispatch to the President, asking rein- 
 forcements, has been received and carefully considered. 
 
 The President is not willing to uncover the capital entirely, 
 and it is believed that even if this were prudent it would re- 
 quire more time to effect a junction between your army and 
 that of the Rappahannock, by the way of the Potomac and 
 York River, than by a land march. In order therefore to 
 increase the strength of the attack upon Richmond at the 
 earliest moment. Gen. McDowell has been ordered to march 
 
 9 
 
194 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 upon that city by the shortest route. He is ordered, keeping 
 himself always in position to save the capital from all possible 
 attack, so to operate as to put his left wing in communication 
 with your right Aving, and you are instructed to co-operate so 
 as to establish this communication as soon as possible, by ex- 
 tending your right wing to the north of Richmond. 
 
 It is believed that this communication can be safely estab- 
 lished either north or south of the Pamunkey River. 
 
 In any event, you will be able to prevent the enemy's forces 
 from leaving Richmond, and falling in overwhelming force 
 upon General McDowell. He will move with between thirty- 
 five (35) and forty thousand (40,000) men. 
 
 A copy of the instructions to General McDowell are with 
 this. The specific task assigned to his command, has been to 
 provide against any danger to the capital of the nation. 
 
 At your earnest call for reinforcements, he is sent forward 
 to co-operate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged, in 
 attempting this, not to uncover the city of Washington, and 
 you will give no order, either before or after your junction, 
 which can put him out of position to cover this city. You 
 and he will communicate with each other by telegraph or 
 otherwise, as frequently as may be necessary for suflicient co- 
 operation. When General McDowell is in position on your 
 right, his supplies must be drawn from West Point, and you 
 will instruct your stafi'-ofiicers to be prepared to supply him 
 by that route. 
 
 The President desires that General McDowell retain the 
 command of the Department of the Rappahannock, and of the 
 forces with which he moves forward. 
 By order of the President. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 From "Washington, May 18, 2 P.M. 
 
 It will be observed, this order rendered it impossible for me 
 to use the James River as a line of operations, and forced me 
 to establish our depots on the Pamunkey, and to approach 
 Richmond from the north. 
 
 I had advised, and preferred, that reinforcements should be 
 sent by water, for the reasons that their arrival would be more 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 19o 
 
 safe and certain, and that I would be left free to rest the army 
 on the James River, whenever the navigation of that stream 
 should be opened. The land movement obliged me to expose 
 my right in order to secure the junction, and, as the order for 
 General McDowell's march was soon countermanded, I in- 
 curred great risk, of which the enemy finally took advantage, 
 and frustrated the plan of the campaign. Had General Mc- 
 Dowell joined me by water, I could have approached Rich- 
 mond by the James, and thus avoided the delays and losses 
 incurred in bridging the Chickahominy, and would have had 
 the array massed in one body instead of being necessarily 
 divided by that stream. 
 
 The following is a copy of the instructions to General Mc- 
 Dowell. 
 
 "War Department, 
 Washington, D. C, May 17, 1862. 
 To General McDowell, 
 
 Goni'g. DejH. of Rappahannock, — 
 General: — Upon being joined by General Shield's divi- 
 sion, you will move upon Richmond by the general route of 
 the Richmond and Fredericsburg Railroad, co-operating with 
 the forces under General McClellan, now threatening Rich- 
 mond from the line of the Pamunkey, and York Rivers. 
 
 While seeking to establish, as soon as possible, a com- 
 munication between your left wing, and the right wing of 
 General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such posi- 
 tion, as to cover the capital of the nation against a sudden 
 dash of any large body of the rebel forces. 
 
 General McClellan will be furnished with a copy of these 
 instructions, and will be directed to hold himself in readiness, 
 to establish communication with your left wmg, and to pre- 
 vent the main body of the enemy's army from leaving Rich- 
 mond, and throwing itself upon your column, before the junc- 
 tion of the two armies is effected. 
 
 A copy of his instructions in regard to the employment of 
 your force is annexed. 
 
 By order of the President, 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
196 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 Having some doubts from the wording of the foregoing 
 orders, as to the extent of my authority over the troops of 
 General McDowell, and as to the time when I might antici- 
 pate his arrival, on the 21st of May I sent this dispatch : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of thb Potomac, 
 Camp near Tunstall's Station, Va., May 21, 1862, 11 p.m. 
 
 His Excellency Abraham Lincoln, 
 
 President of the United States^ — 
 
 Your dispatch of yesterday respecting our situation and 
 the batteries at Fort Darling, was received while I was absent 
 with the advance, where I have been all this day. I have com- 
 municated personally with Capt. Goldsborough, and by letter 
 with Capt. Smith. The vessels can do nothing without co- 
 operation on land, which I will not be in condition to afford, 
 for several days; circumstances must determine the propriety 
 of a land attack. 
 
 It rained again last night, and rain on this soil soon 
 makes the roads incredibly bad for army transportation. 
 I personally crossed the Chickahominy to day, at Bottom's 
 Bridge Ford, and went a mile beyond, the enemy being about 
 half a mile in front. I have three regiments on the other 
 bank, guarding the rebuilding of the bridge, Keyes's coi'ps 
 is on the New Kent Road, near Bottom's Bridge. Heintzel- 
 man is on the same road, within supporting distance. Sumner 
 is on the railroad, connecting right with left. Stoneman, with 
 advanced guard, is withm one mile of New Bridge. Frank- 
 lin, with two divisions, is about two miles this side of Stone- 
 man. Porter's division, with the reserves of infantry and 
 artillery, is within supporting distance. Head-quarters will 
 probably be at Coal Harbor to-morrow, one mile this side of 
 Franklin. All the bridges over the Chickahominy are. de- 
 stroyed. The enemy are in force on every road leading to 
 Richmond, within a mile or two west of the stream. Their 
 main body is on the road from New Bridge, encamped along it 
 for four or five miles, spreading over the open ground on both 
 sides. Johnston's head-quarters are about two miles beyond 
 the bridge. 
 
 All accounts report their numbers as greatly exceeding our 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 197 
 
 own. The position of the rebel forces, the declaration of the 
 rebel authorities, the resolutions of the Virginia legislature, 
 the action of the city government, the conduct of the citizens, 
 and all other sources of information accessible to me, give 
 positive assurance that our approach to Richmond involves a 
 desperate battle between the opposing armies. 
 
 All our divisions are moving towards the foe. I shall 
 advance steadily and carefully, and attack them according to 
 my best judgment, and in such manner as to employ my 
 greatest force. 
 
 I regret the state of things as to General McDowell's com- 
 mand. We must beat the enemy in front of Richmond. One 
 division added to this army for that effort would do more to 
 protect Washington than his whole force can possibly do any- 
 w^here else in the field. The rebels are concentrating from all 
 points for the two battles at Richmond and Corinth. I would 
 still most respectfully suggest the policy of your concentrating 
 here by movements on water. I have heard nothing as to the 
 probabilities of the contemplated junction of McDowell's 
 force with mine. I have no idea when he can start, what are 
 his means of transportation, or when he may be expected 
 to reach this vicinity. I fear there is little hope that he can 
 join me overland, in time for the coming battle ; delays, on 
 my part, will be dangerous. I fear sickness and demoraliza- 
 tion. This region is unhealthy for northern men, and unless 
 kept moving I fear that our soldiers may become discouraged. 
 At present our numbers are weakening from disease, but our 
 men remain in good heart. 
 
 I regret, also, the configuration of the Department of the 
 Rappahannock. It includes a portion even of the city of 
 Richmond. I think that my own department should embrace 
 the entire field of military operations designed for the capture 
 and occupation of that city. 
 
 Again I agree with your Excellency, that one bad general 
 is better than two good ones. 
 
 I am not sure that I fully comprehend your orders of the 
 iTth inst., addressed to myself and Gen. McDowell. If a 
 junction is effected before we occupy Richmond, it must 
 necessarily be east of the railroad to Fredericksburg, and 
 
198 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 within my department. This fact, my superior rank, and the 
 express language of the 62d article of war, will place his 
 command under my orders, unless it is otherwise specially 
 directed by your Excellency, and I consider that he will be 
 under my command, except that I am not to detach any por- 
 tion of his forces, or give any orders which can put him out 
 of position to cover Washington. If I err in my construction 
 I desire to be at once set right. Frankness compels me to 
 say — anxious as I am for an increase of fore — that the march 
 of McDowell's force upon Richmond, by the shortest route, 
 will, in my opinion, uncover Washington, as to any interposi- 
 tion by it, as completely as its movement by water. The 
 enemy cannot advance by Fredericksburg on Washington. 
 
 Should they attempt a movement, which to me seems utterly 
 improbable, their route would be by Gordonsville and Manas- 
 sas. I desire that the extent of my authority over McDowell 
 may be clearly defined, lest misunderstandings and conflicting 
 views may produce some of those injurious results, which a 
 divided command has so often caused. I would respectfully 
 suggest that this danger can only be surely guarded against 
 by explicitly placing General McDowell under my orders in 
 the ordinary way, and holding me strictly responsible for the 
 closest observance of your instructions. I hope, Mr. Presi- 
 dent, that it is not necessary for me to assure you that your 
 instructions would be observed in the utmost good faith, and 
 that I have no personal feelings which could influence me to 
 disregard them in any particular. 
 
 I believe that there is a great struggle befoie this army, but 
 I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen 
 its force as much as I can, but in any event I shall fight it with 
 all the skill, caution and determination that I possess, and I 
 trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent 
 confidence of my government, or that it may close my career. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 On the 24th I received the following reply : — 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 199 
 
 May 24, 1862. 
 From WAsmNQTOx. 24th. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClbllan, — 
 
 I left General McDowell's camp at dark last evening. 
 Shields's command is there, but is so worn that he cannot 
 move before Monday morning, the twenty-sixth (26th), We 
 have so thinned our line to get troops for other places, that it 
 was broken yesterday at Front Royal, with a probable loss to 
 us of one (1) regiment infantry, two (2) companies cavalry, 
 putting General Banks in some peril. 
 
 The enemy's forces under General Anderson, now opposing 
 General McDowell's advance, have as their line of supply and 
 retreat the road to Richmond. 
 
 If, in conjunction with McDowell's movement against Ander- 
 son, you could send a force from your right to cut off the enemy's 
 supplies from Richmond, preserve the railroad bridges across the 
 two (2) forks of the Pamuukey, and intercept the enemy's re- 
 treat, you will prevent the array now opposed to you fiom receiv- 
 ing an accession of numbers of nearly fifteen thousand (15,000) 
 men, and if you succeed in saving the bridges, you will secure 
 a line of railroad for supplies in addition to the one you now 
 have. Can you not do this almost as well as not, while you 
 are building the Chickahominy bridges ? McDowell and 
 Shields both say they can, and positively will, move Monday 
 morning. I wish you to march cautiously and safely. 
 
 You will have command of McDowell after he joins you, 
 precisely as you indicated in your long dispatch to us of the 
 twenty-first (21st), 
 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President, 
 
 This information that McDowell's corps would march for 
 Fredericksburg on the following Monday (the 26th), and that 
 he would be under my command, as indicated in my telegram 
 of the 21st, was cheering news, and I now felt confident that 
 we would, on his arrival, be sufficiently strong to overpower 
 the lai'ge army confronting us. 
 
 At a later hour on the same day I received the following : — 
 
200 SECOND PEBIOD. 
 
 May 24, 1862. 
 From Washington, 4 p.m., 24th. 
 Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, — 
 
 In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I have 
 been compelled to suspend General McDowell's movements to 
 join you. The enemy are making a desperate push upon Har- 
 per's Ferry, and we are trying to throw General Fremont's 
 force and part of General McDowell's in their rear. 
 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 From which it will be seen that I could not expect General 
 McDowell to join me in time to participate in immediate opei'- 
 ations in front of Richmond, and on the same evening I replied 
 to the President that I would make my calculations accord- 
 ingly. 
 
 It then only remained for me to make the best use of the 
 forces at my disposal, and to avail myself of all artificial 
 auxiliaries, to compensate as much as possible for the inade- 
 quacy of men. I concurred fully with the President in the 
 injunction contained in his telegram of the 24th, that it was 
 necessary with my limited force to move " cautiously and 
 safely." In view of tlie peculiar character of the Chickahom- 
 iny, and the liability of its bottom-lands to sudden inundation, 
 it became necessary to construct between Bottom's Bridge 
 and Mechanicsville eleven (11) new bridges, all long and diflS- 
 cult, with extensive log-way approaches. 
 
 The entii-e army could probably have been thrown across 
 the Chickahominy immediately after our arrival, but this would 
 have left no force on the left bank to guard our communica- 
 tions, or to protect our right and rear. If the communication 
 with our supply depot had been cut by the enemy, with our 
 army concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and 
 the stage of water as it was for many days after our arrival, 
 the bridges carried away, and our means of transportation not 
 furnitshing a single day's supplies in advance, the troops must 
 have gone without i-ations, and the animals without forage ; the 
 army would have been paralyzed. 
 
 It is true, I might have abandoned my communications and 
 
OPKRATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 201 
 
 pushed forward towards Richmond, trusting to the speedy de- 
 feat of the enemy and the consequent fall of the city, for a re- 
 newal of supplies ; but the approaches were fortified, and the 
 town itself was surrounded with a strong line of intrench- 
 ments requiring a greater length of time to reduce than our 
 troops could have dispensed with rations. 
 
 Under these circumstances, I decided to retain a portion of 
 the army on the left bank of the river until our bridges were 
 completed. 
 
 It will be remembered that the order for the co-operation 
 of General McDowell was simply suspended, not revoked, and 
 therefore I was not at liberty to abandon the northern approach. 
 A very dashing and successful reconnoissance Avas made 
 near New Bridge on the 24th of May, by Lieutenant Bowen, 
 Topographical Engineers, escorted by the 4th Michigan Volun- 
 teers and a squadron of the 2d U. S. Cavalry, commanded re- 
 spectively by Colonel Woodbury and Captain Gordon. 
 
 Our troops encountered a Louisiana regiment, and, with lit- 
 tle loss, drove it back upon its brigade, killing a large number 
 and capturing several prisoners. Great credit is "due to the 
 staffs officers, as well as to Colonel Woodbury, Captain Gor- 
 don, and their commands, for their conduct on this occasion. 
 
 The work upon the bridges was connnenced at once, and 
 pushed forward with great vigor; but the rains which from 
 day to day continued to fall, flooded the valley, and raised the 
 water to a greater height than had been known for twenty 
 years. This demolished a great amount of our labor, and our 
 first bridges with their approaches, which were not made with 
 reference to such extreme high water, were carried off or ren- 
 dered impassable. We were obliged, with immense labor, to 
 construct others much longer, more elevated, and stable. Our 
 men worked in the water, exposed to the enemy's fire from the 
 opposite bank. 
 
 On the 25th of May I received the following telegram. 
 
 "Washington, May 25, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan. 
 
 Your dispatch received. General Banks was at Strasburg 
 
 with about 6,000) six thousand men. Shields having been 
 
202 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 taken from him to swell a column for McDowell to aid you at 
 Richmond, and the rest of his force scattered at various places. 
 On the twenty-third (23d) a rebel force of seven (7) to ten 
 thousand (10,000) fell upon one regiment and two companies 
 guarding the bridge at Front Royal, destroying it entirely — 
 crossed the Shenandoah, and on the (24th) twenty-fourth, yes- 
 terday, pushed on to get north of Banks on the road to Win- 
 chester. General Banks ran a race with them, beating them 
 into Winchester yesterday evening. This morning a battle 
 ensued between the two forces, in which General Banks was 
 beaten back into full retreat towards Martinsburg, and proba- 
 bly is broken up into a total rout. Geary on the Manassas 
 Gap Railroad, just now reports that Jackson is now near 
 Front Royal with ten thousand (10,000) following up and sup- 
 porting, as I understand, the force now pursuing Banks. Also 
 that another force of ten thousand is near Orleans, following 
 on in the same direction. Stripped bare as we are here, I will 
 do all that we can do to prevent them crossing the Potomac 
 at Harper's Ferry or above. McDowell has about 20,000 of 
 his forces moving back to the a icinity of Front Royal, and 
 Fremont, who was at Franklin, is moving to Harrisonburg, 
 both these movements intended to get in the enemy's rear. 
 
 One more of McDowell's brigades is ordered through here 
 to Harper's Ferry ; the rest of his forces remain for the pres- 
 ent at Fredericksburg. We are sending such regiments and 
 dribs from here and Baltimore as we can spare to Harper's 
 Ferry, supplying their places in some sort by calling in militia 
 from the adjacent States. We have also eighteen cannon on 
 the road to Harper's Ferry, of which arm there is not a single 
 one at that point. 
 
 This is now our situation. If McDowell's force was now 
 beyond our reach we should be entirely helpless. Apprehen- 
 sions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain 
 you has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's 
 forces from you. 
 
 Please understand this, and do the best you can with the 
 forces you have. 
 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RIOIIMOND. 203 
 
 On the 25th, the following was also received : 
 
 Washington, May 25, 1862, 2 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive Gen. 
 Banks before him ; precisely in what force we cannot teU. 
 He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary on the Manassas 
 Gap Railroad from both north and south — in precisely what 
 force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and 
 a concerted one, such as could not be if he was acting upon 
 the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think 
 the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or 
 give up the job, and come back to the defense of Washington. 
 Let me hear from you instantly. 
 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 To which I repUed as follows : 
 
 Coal Harbor, May 25, 1862. 
 
 Telegram received. Independently of it, the time is very 
 near when I shall attack Richmond. The object of the move- 
 ment is probably to prevent reinforcements being sent to me. 
 All the information obtained from balloons, deserters, prison- 
 ers, and contrabands, agrees in the statement that the mass of 
 the rebel troops are still in the immediate vicinity of Richmond, 
 ready to defend it. 
 
 I have no knowledge of Banks's position and force, nor 
 what there is at Manassas, therefore cannot form a definite 
 opinion as to the force against him. 
 
 I have two corps across Chickahominy, within six miles of 
 Richmond, the others on this side at other crossings, within 
 same distance, and ready to cross when bridges are com- 
 peted. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 His Excellent A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 On the 26th, I received the following: 
 
204 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 "Washington, May 26, 1862, 12.40 a.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 We have Gen. Banks's official report. He has saved his 
 army and bas^gage, and has made a safe retreat to the river, 
 and is probably safe at Williamsport. He reports the attack- 
 ing force at fifteen thousand (15,000.) 
 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 On the 26th I received the following : 
 
 Washincton, May 26, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. G, B. McClellan, — 
 
 Can you not cut the Acquia Creek Railroad, also wliat im- 
 pression have you as to intrenched woi'ks for you to contend 
 with in front of Richmond. Can you get near enough to 
 throw shells into the city ? 
 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 On the same day I sent the following : 
 
 Coal Harbor, May 26, 1862. 
 Have cut the Virginia Central road in three places between 
 Hanover C. H. and the Chickahominy. Will try to cut the 
 other. I do not think Richmond intrenchments formidable, 
 but am not certain. Hope very soon to be within shelling 
 distance. Have railroad in opera^on from White House to 
 Chickahominy. Hope to have Chickahominy bridge repaired 
 to-night. Nothing of interest to-day. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 His Escellency A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. % 
 
 The interruption of the railroad here referred to was effected 
 by the command of Brig.-Gen. Stoneman, and was intended to 
 prevent the enemy from drawing supplies by that route, or 
 from sending reinforcements to Anderson or Jackson. 
 
 At 10 A.M. I also sent the following dispatch : 
 
HANOVER COUKT HOUSE. 205 
 
 " Telegrams of last night received. I am glad to know 
 afiairs are not so bad as might have been. I would earnestly 
 call your attention to ray instructions to Gen. Banks, of March 
 16 th, to Gen. Wads worth of same date, and to my letter of 
 April 1st to the adjutant-general. I cannot but think that a 
 prompt return to the princii^les there laid down would I'elieve 
 all probability of danger. I will forward copies by mail. I 
 beg to urge the importance of Manassas and Front Royal in 
 contradistinction to Fredericksburg. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 His Excellency, A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 Late on the 26th, I sent the following : 
 
 Casip near New Bridge, 
 May 26, 1862, 7. 30 p.m. 
 Have arranged to carry out your last orders. We are 
 quietly closing in upon the enemy preparatory to the last 
 struggle. Situated as I am I feel forced to take every possible 
 precaution against disaster, and to secure my flanks against 
 the probably superior force in front of me. My arrangements 
 for to-morrow are very important, and if successful, will leave 
 me free to strike on the return of the force detached. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 His Excellency, A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 BATTLE OF HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 
 
 On the same day I received intelligence that a very consider- 
 able force of the enemy was in the vicinity of Hanover Court 
 House, to the right and rear of our army, thus threatening our 
 communications, and in a position either to reinforce Jackson, 
 or to impede McDowell's junction, should he finally move to 
 unite with us. 
 
 On the same day I also received information from General 
 
206 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 McDowell, through the Secretary of War, that the enemy had 
 fallen back from Fredericksburg towards Richmond, and that 
 Gen. McDowell's advance was eight miles south of the Rappa- 
 hannock. It was thus imperative to dislodge or defeat this 
 force, independently even of the wishes of the President, as 
 expressed in his telegram of the 26th. I intrusted this task to 
 Brig.-Gen. Fitz John Porter, commanding the 5th Corps, with 
 orders to move at daybreak on the 27th. 
 
 Through a heavy rain and over bad roads, that officer moved 
 his command as follows : 
 
 Brig.-Gen. W. H. Emory led the advance with the 5th and 
 6th Regiments XT. S. Cavalry and Benson's horse battery of the 
 2d U. S. Artillery, taking the road from New Bridge via 
 Mechanicsville to Hanover Coui't House. 
 
 Gen. Morell's division, composed of the brigades of Martin- 
 dale, Buttertield and McQuade, with Berdan's regiment of 
 shai'pshooters, and three batteries under Capt. Chas. Griffin, 
 5th U. S. Artillery, followed on the same road. 
 
 Col. G. K. Warren, commanding a provisional brigade com- 
 posed of the 5th and 13th New York, the 1st Connecticut 
 Artillery acting as infantry ; the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry and 
 Weeden's Rhode Island battery moved from his station at Old 
 Church, by a road running to Hanover Court House, parallel 
 to the Pamunkey. After a fatiguing march of fourteen miles 
 through the mud and rain Gen. Emory at noon reached a point 
 about two miles from Hanover Court House, where the road 
 forks to Ashland, and found a portion of the enemy formed in 
 line across the Hanover Court House road. 
 
 Gen. Emory had before this been joined by the 25th New 
 York (of Martindale's brigade) and Berdan's sharpshooters ; 
 these regiments were deployed with a section of Benson's bat- 
 tery, and advanced slowly towards the enemy until reinforced 
 by Gen. Butterfield with four regiments of his brigade, when 
 the enemy was charged and quickly routed, one of his guns 
 being captured by the 17th New York under Col. Lansing, 
 after having been disabled by the fire of Benson's battery. 
 The firing here lasted about an hour. The cavalry and Benson's 
 battery were immediately ordered in pursuit, followed by 
 Morell's infantry and artillery, with the exception of Martin- 
 
HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 207 
 
 dale's brigade. Warren's brigade having been delayed by re- 
 pairing bridges, &c., now arrived too late to participate in 
 this affair ; a portion of this command was sent to the Pa- 
 munkey to destroy bridges and captured quite a number of 
 prisoners ; the remainder followed Morell's division. In the 
 mean time Gen. Martindale, with the few remaining regiments 
 of his brigade and a section of artillery advanced on the Ash- 
 land road, and found a force of the enemy's infantry, cavalry 
 and artillery in position near Peake's Station on the Virginia 
 Central Railroad ; he soon forced them to retire towards Ash- 
 land. 
 
 The 25th New York having been ordered to rejoin him, 
 General Martindale was directed to form his brigade and move 
 up the railroad to rejoin the rest of the command at Hanover 
 Court House. 
 
 Pie sent one regiment up the railroad, but remained with 
 the 2d Maine, afterwards joined by the 25th New York, to 
 guard the rear of the main column. 
 
 The enemy soon returned to attack General Martindale, who 
 at once formed the 2d Maine, 25th New York, and a portion 
 of the 44th New Jersey, with one section of Martin's battery, 
 on the New Bridge road, facing his own position of the morn- 
 ing, and then held his ground for an hour against large odds 
 until reinforced. 
 
 General Porter was at Hanover Court House, near the head 
 of his column, when he learned that the rear had been attacked 
 by a large force. He at once faced the whole column about, 
 recalled the cavalry sent in pursuit towards Ashland, moved 
 the 13th and 14th New York and Griffin's battery direct to 
 Martindale's assistance, pushed the 9th Massachusetts and 
 62d Pennsylvania of McQuade's brigade through the woods 
 on the right (our original left) and attacked the flank of the 
 enemy, while Butterfield with the 83d Pennsylvania and 16th 
 Michigan hastened towards the scene of action by the railroad 
 and through the woods further to the right, and completed the 
 rout of the enemy. During the remainder of this and the fol- 
 lowing day our cavalry was active in the pursuit, taking a 
 number of prisoners. Captain Harrison, of the 5th U. S. 
 Cavalry, with a single company, brought in as prisoners two 
 
208 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 entire companies of infantry, with their arms and ammunition. 
 A part of Rush's Lancers also captured an entire company 
 with their arms. 
 
 The immediate results of these affairs were some two hun- 
 dred of the enemy's dead buried by our troops, seven hundred 
 and thirty prisoners sent to the rear, one 12-pounder howitzer, 
 one caisson, a large number of small arms, and two railroad 
 trains captured. 
 
 Our loss amounted to 53 killed, 344 wounded and missing. 
 
 The force encountered and defeated was General Branch's 
 division of North Carolina and Georgia troops, supposed to 
 have been some 9,000 strong. Their camp at Hanover Court 
 House was taken and destroyed. 
 
 Having reason to believe that General Anderson, with a 
 strong force, was still at Ashland, I ordered General Sykes' 
 division of regulars to move on the 28th, from New Bridge 
 toward Hanover Court House, to be in position to support 
 General Porter. They reached a point within three miles of 
 Hanover Court House, and remained there until the evening 
 of the 29th, Avhen they returned to their original camp. 
 
 On the 28th General Stoneman's command of cavalry, horse 
 artillery, and two regiments of infantry, were also placed under 
 General Porter's orders. 
 
 On the same day I visited Hanover Court House, whence I 
 sent the following dispatch. 
 
 Hanover Court House, May 28. 2 p.m. 
 
 Porter's action of yesterday was truly a glorious victory — 
 too much credit cannot be given to his magnificent division 
 and its accomplished leader. The rout of the rebels was com- 
 plete, not a defeat but a complete rout. Prisoners are con- 
 stantly coming in, two companies have this moment arrived, 
 with excellent arms. 
 
 There is no doubt that the enemy are concentrating every- 
 thing on Richmond. I will do my best to cut off Jackson, but 
 am doubtful whether I can. 
 
 It is the policy and duty of the government to send me by 
 water all the well drilled troops available. I am confident that 
 
HANOVER COURT HOUSE. 209 
 
 Washington is in no danger. Engines and cars in large num- 
 bers have been sent up to bring down Jackson's command. 
 
 I may not be able to cut them off, but will try ; we have cut 
 all but the F. & R. R. R. The real issue is in the battle about 
 to be fought in front of Richmond. All our available troops 
 should be collected here, not raw regiments, but the well drilled 
 troops. It cannot be ignored that a desperate battle is before 
 us ; if any regiment of good troops remain unemployed it will 
 be an irreparable fault committed. 
 
 G. B. McClellan. 
 
 Major-General. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 Having ascertained the state of affairs, instructions were 
 given for the operations of the following day. 
 
 bn the 28th a party under Major Williams, 6th U. S. Cav- 
 alry, destroyed the common road bridges over the Pamun- 
 key and the Virginia Central Railroad bridge over the South 
 Anna. 
 
 On the 29th, he destroyed the Fredericsburg and Richmond 
 Railroad bridge over the South Anna, and the Turnpike-bridge 
 over the same stream. 
 
 On the same day, and mainly to cover the movement of 
 Major Williams, General Emory moved a column of cavalry 
 toward Ashland, from Hanover Court House, the advance of 
 this column, under Capt. Chambliss .5tli U. S. Cavalry, entered 
 Ashland, driving out a party of the enemy, desti'oyed the rail- 
 road bridge over Stoney Creek, and broke up the railroad 
 and telegraph. 
 
 Another column, of all arms, under Col. Warren, was sent 
 on the same day, by the direct road to Ashland, and entered 
 it shortly after General Emory's column had retired, capturing 
 a small party there. 
 
 General Stoneman, on the same day, moved on Ashland by 
 Leach's Station, covering well the movements of the other 
 columns. 
 
 The objects of the expedition having been accomplished, and 
 it being certain that the 1st Corps would not join us at once, 
 
210 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 General Porter withdrew his command to their camps with 
 the main army, on the evening of the 29th. 
 
 On the night of the 27th and 28th, I sent the following dis- 
 patch to the Secretary of War. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp near New Bridge, May 28, 1862, 12.30 a.m. 
 
 Porter has gained two complete victories over superior 
 forces, yet I feel obliged to move there in the morning with 
 reinforcements, to secure the complete destruction of the rebels 
 in that quarter. In doing so, I run some risk here, but I can- 
 not help it. The enemy are even in greater force than I had 
 supposed. I will do all that quick movements can accomplish, 
 but you must send me all the troops you can, and leave to me 
 full latitude as to choice of commanders. It is absolutely 
 necessary to destroy the rebels near Hanover Court House, 
 before I can advance. 
 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 In reply to Avhich, I received the following from the Presi- 
 dent : 
 
 Washington, May 28, 1862. 
 
 MaJOR-GeNERAL McCr.ELLAN, 
 
 I am very glad of Gen. F. J. Porter's victory ; still, if it was 
 a total rout of the enemy, I am puzzled to know why the Rich- 
 mond and Fredericksburg Railroad was not seized again, as 
 you say you have all the railroads but the Richmond and 
 Fredericksburg, I am puzzled to see how, lacking that, you 
 can have any, except the scrap from Richmond to West 
 Point ; the scrap of the Virginia Central, from Richmond to 
 Hanover Junction, without more, is simply nothing. That 
 the whole of the enemy is concentrating on Richmond, I think 
 cannot be certainly known to you or me. Saxton, at Harper's 
 Ferry, informs us that a large force, supposed to be Jackson's 
 and Ewell's, forced his advance from Charlestown to-day. 
 General King telegraphed us from Fredericksburg, that con- 
 trabands give certain information, that fifteen thousand left 
 
HANOVER COURT HOUSH:. 211 
 
 Hanover Junction Mondcay morning, to reinforce Jackson. 
 I am painfully impressed with the importance of the struggle 
 before you, and shall aid you all I can consistently with my 
 view of due regard to all points. 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 At 6 P.M. of the 29th, I sent the Secretary of War the fol- 
 lowing dispatch. 
 
 Head-Quartees, Army of the Potomac, 
 May 29, 1862, 6 p.m. 
 
 General Porter has gained information, that General Ander- 
 son left his position in vicinity of Fredericksburg, at 4 a.m., 
 Sunday, with the following troops: — 1st S. C, Col. Hamilton, 
 1 battalion S. C. Rifles, 34th and 38th N, C, 45th Georgia, 
 12th, 13th and 14th S. C, 3d Louisiana, 2 batteries of 4 guns 
 each, namely, Letcher's Va., and McLitosh's S. C. batteries. 
 General Anderson and his command, passed Ashland yesterday 
 evening, en route for Richmond, leaving men behind to destroy 
 bridges over the telegraph road, which they traveled. This 
 information is reliable. It is also positively certain, that 
 Branch's command was from Gordonsville, bound for Rich- 
 mond, whither they have now gone. 
 
 It may be regarded as positive, I think, that there is no 
 rebel force between Fredericksburg and Junction. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 The following was also sent on the same day : — 
 
 Head- Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 May 29, 1862. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 Secretary of War, — 
 
 A detachment from Gen. F. J. Porter's command, under 
 Major Williams, 6th Cavalry, destroyed the South Anna rail- 
 road bridge, at about 9 a.m. to-day. A large quantity of con- 
 
212 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 federate public property was also destroyed at Ashland this 
 morning. 
 
 R. B. Marcy, 
 
 Chief-of-StafiF. 
 
 In reply to which the following was received : — 
 
 ■Washington, May 29, 1862. 
 Gen. R. B. Marcy :— 
 
 Your dispatch, as to South Anna and Ashland being seized 
 by our forces this morning, is received. Understanding these 
 points to be on the Richmond and Fredericksburg Railroad, I 
 heartily congratulate the country, and thank Gen. McClellan 
 and his army for the seizure. 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 On the 30th I sent the following : — 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 May 30, 1862. 
 
 From tone of your dispatches and President's, I do not 
 think that you at all appreciate the value and magnitude of 
 Porter's victory. It has entirely relieved my right flank, 
 which was seriously threatened, routed and demoralized a con- 
 siderable portion of the rebel forces, taken over seven hundred 
 and fifty prisoners, killed and wounded large numbers ; one 
 gun, many small arms, and much baggage taken. It was one 
 of the handsomest things in the war, both in itself and its re- 
 sults. Porter has returned, and my army is again well in 
 hand. Another day will make the probable field of battle 
 passable for artillery. It is quite certain that tliere is nothing 
 in front of McDowell — (Fredericksburg). I regard the burn- 
 ing of South Anna bridges as the least important result of 
 Porter's movements. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 The results of the brilliant operation of Gen. Porter were 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 213 
 
 the dispersal of Gen. Branch's division, and the clearing of 
 our right flank and rear. It was rendered impossible for the 
 enemy to communicate by rail with Fredericksburg, or with 
 Jackson via Gordonsville, except by the very circuitous route 
 of Lynchburg, and the road was left entirely open for the ad- 
 vance of McDowell, had he been permitted to join the army 
 of the Potomac. 
 
 His withdrawal towards Front Royal was, in my judgment, 
 a serious and fatal error ; he could do no good in that direc- 
 tion ; while, had he been permitted to carry out the orders of 
 May 17, the united forces would have driven the enemy within 
 the immediate intrench ments of Richmond before Jackson 
 could have retui-ned to its succor, and probably would have 
 gained posseesion of that place. I respectfully refer to the 
 reports of General Porter and his subordinate commanders, 
 for the names of the officers who deserve especial mention for 
 the parts they took in these affairs. But I cannot omit here 
 my testimony to the energy and ability displayed by General 
 Porter on this occasion, since to him is mainly due the suc- 
 cesses there gained. 
 
 OPERATIONS BEFOR.E RICHMOND. 
 
 On the 20th of May a reconnoissance was ordered on the 
 south side of the Chickahominy, towards James River. This 
 was accomplished by Brig.-Gen. H. M. Naglee, who crossed 
 his brigade near Bottom's Bridge, and pushed forward to 
 within two miles of James River, without serious resistance, 
 or finding the enemy in force. 
 
 The rest of the 4th Corps, commanded by Gen, E. D. Keyes, 
 crossed the Chickahominy on the 23d of May. 
 
 On the 24th, 25th and 26th, a very gallant reconnoisance 
 was pushed by Gen. Naglee, with his brigade, beyond the 
 Seven Pines, and on the 25th the 4th Corps was ordered to take 
 up and fortify a position in the vicinity of the Seven Pines. The 
 order was at once obeyed ; a strong line of rifle-pits opened, 
 and an abattis constructed a little in rear of the point where 
 the Nine Mile road comes into the Williamsbursrh road. 
 
214 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 On the same day General Heintzelman was ordered to cross 
 Avith his corps (the 3d), and take a position two miles in ad- 
 vance of Bottom's Bridge, watching the crossings of White 
 Oak Swamp, and covering the left and the rear of the left 
 wing of the army. Being the senior officer on that side the 
 river, he was placed in command of both corps, and ordered 
 to hold the Seven Pines at all hazards, but not to withdraw 
 the troops from the crossings of White Oak Swamp, unless in 
 an emergency. 
 
 On the 28th General Keyes was ordered to advance Casey's 
 division to " Fair Oaks" on the Williamsburg road, some 
 three-quarters of a mile in front of the Seven Pines, leaving 
 General Couch's division at the line of rifle-pits. A new line 
 of rifle-pits and a small redoubt for six field-guns were com- 
 menced, and considerable of the timber in front of the line 
 was felled on the two days following. The picket line was 
 established, reaching from the Chickahominy to White Oak 
 Swamp, 
 
 On the 30th General Heintzelman, representing that the ad- 
 vance had met with sharp opposition in taking up their posi- 
 tion, and that he considered the point a critical one, requested 
 and obtained authority to make such dispositions of his troops 
 as he saw fit to meet the emergency. He immediately ad- 
 vanced two brigades of Kearney's division about three-fourths 
 of a mile in front of Savnge's Station, thus placing them within 
 supporting distance of Casey's division, which held the advance 
 of the 4th Corps. 
 
 BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 
 
 On the 30th the troops on the south side of the Chickahom- 
 iny were in position as follows : 
 
 Casey's division on the right of the Williamsburg road, at 
 right angles to it, the centre at Fair Oaks ; Couch's division 
 at the Seven Pines ; Kearney's division on the railroad, from 
 near Savage's Station towards the bridge ; Hooker's division 
 on the borders of White Oak Swamp. Constant skirmishing 
 had been kept up between our pickets and those of the enemy. 
 
BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 215 
 
 while these lines were being taken up and strengthened. Large 
 bodies of Confederate troops were seen immediately to the front 
 and right of Casey's position. 
 
 During the day and night of the 30th of May a very violent 
 storm occurred. The rain, falling in torrents, rendered work 
 on the rifle-pits and bridges impracticable, made the roads 
 almost impassable, and threatened the destruction of the 
 bridges over the Chickahominy. 
 
 The enemy, perceiving the unfavorable position in which we 
 were placed, and the possibility of destroying that part of our 
 army which was apparently cut ofi" from the main body by the 
 rapidly rising stream, threw an overwhelming force (grand 
 divisions of Generals D. H. Hill, Huger, Longstreet and 
 G. W. Smith) upon the position occupied by Casey's division. 
 
 It appears, from the ofiicial reports of General Keyes and 
 his subordinate commanders, that, at 10 o'clock a.m., on the 
 31st of May, an aid-de-camp of General J. E. Johnston was 
 captured by General Naglee's pickets. But little information 
 as to the movements of the enemy Avas obtained from hira, but 
 his presence so near our lines excited suspicion and caused in- 
 creased vigilance, and the troops were ordered by Gen. Keyes 
 to be under arms at 11 o'clock. 
 
 Between 1 1 and 1 2 it was reported to General Casey that 
 the enemy were approaching in considerable force on the Wil- 
 liamsburg road. At this time Casey's division was disposed 
 of as follows : 
 
 Naglee's brigade, extending from the Williamsburg road to 
 the Garnett field, having one regiment across the railroad. 
 General Wessels' brigade in the rifle-pits, and Gen. Palmer's 
 in the rear of General Wessels ; one battery of artillery in ad- 
 vance, with General Naglee, one battery in rear of rifle-pits, 
 to the right of the redoubt ; one battery in rear of the re- 
 doubt, and another battery unharnessed in the redoubt. 
 
 General Couch's division, holding the second line, had Gen- 
 eral Abercrombie's brigade on the right, along the Nine Mile 
 road, with two regiments and one battery across the railroad, 
 near Fair Oaks Station ; General Peck's brigade oti the right, 
 and General Devin's in the centre. 
 
 On the approach of the enemy, General Casey sent forward 
 
216 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 one of General Palmer's regiments to support the picket line ; 
 but this regiment gave way, without making much, if any, 
 resistance. 
 
 Heavy firing at once commenced, and the pickets were 
 driven in. General Keyes ordered General Couch to move 
 General Peck's brigade to occupy the gi'ound on the left of 
 the Williamsburg road, which had not before been occupied 
 by our forces, and thus to support General Casey's left, where 
 the first attack was the most severe. Tlie enemy now came 
 on in heavy force, attacking General Casey simultaneously in 
 front and on both flanks. 
 
 Gen. Keyes sent to Gen. Heintzelman for reinforcements, 
 but the messenger was delayed, so that orders were not sent 
 to Generals Kearney and Hooker until near 3 o'clock, and it 
 was nearly 5 p.m. when General Jamison's and Berry's 
 brigades, of Gen. Kearney's division, arrived on the field. 
 Gen. Birney was ordered up the railroad, but, by Gen. Kear- 
 ney's order, halted his brigade before arriving at the scene of 
 action. Orders were also dispatched for Gen. Hooker to move 
 up from White Oak Swamp, and he arrived after dark at 
 Savage's Station. 
 
 As soon as the firing was heard at head-quarters, orders 
 were sent to Gen. Sumner to get his command under arms, 
 and be ready to move at a nroment's warning. His corps, 
 consisting of Generals Richardson's and Sedgwick's divisions, 
 was encamped on the north side of tlie Chickahominy, some 
 six miles above Bottom's Bridge. Each division had thrown 
 a bridge over the stream opposite to its own position. 
 
 At 1 o'clock Gen. Sumner moved the two divisions to their 
 respective bridges, Avitb instructions to halt and await further 
 orders. 
 
 At 2 o'clock orders were sent from head-quarters to cross 
 these divisions without delay, and push them rapidly to Gen. 
 Heintzelman's support. This order was received and com- 
 municated at half-past two, and the passage was immediately 
 commenced. 
 
 In the mean time Gen. Naglee's brigade, with the batteries 
 of Gen. Casey's division, which Gen. Naglee directed, struggled 
 gallantly to maintain the redoubt and rifle-pits against the 
 
BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 217 
 
 overwhelming masses of the enemy. They were reinforced 
 by a regiment from Gen. Peck's brigade. 
 
 The artillery under the command of Col. G. D. Bailey, 1st 
 New York Artillery, and afterwards under Gen. Naglee, did 
 good execution on the advancing columns. The left of this 
 position was, however, soon turned, and a sharp cross-fire 
 opened upon the gunners and men in the rifle-pits. Col. Bai- 
 ley, Major Van Valkeuburg, and Adjutant Ramsey, of the 
 same regiment, were killed. Some of the guns in the redoubt 
 were taken, and the whole line was driven back upon the posi- 
 tion occupied by General Couch. The brigades of Generals 
 Wessels and Palmer, with the reinforcements Avhich had been 
 sent them from General Couch, had also been driven from the 
 field with heavy loss, and the whole position occupied by Gen. 
 Casey's division was taken by the enemy. 
 
 Previous to this time, Gen. Keyes ordered Gen, Couch to 
 advance two regiments to relieve the pressure upon General 
 Casey's right flank. In making this movement General Couch 
 discovered large masses of the enemy pushing towards our 
 right and crossing the railroad, as well as a heavy column 
 which had been held in reserve, and which was now making 
 its way towards Fair Oaks Station. General Couch at once 
 engaged this colunni with these two regiments, but, though 
 reinforced by two additional regiments, he was overpowered, 
 and the enemy pushed between him and the main body of his 
 division. With these four regiments and one battery General 
 Couch fell back about half a mile towards the Grape- Vine 
 Bridge, where, hearing that General Sumner had crossed, he 
 formed line of battle facing Fair Oaks Station, and prepared 
 to hold the position. 
 
 Generals Berry's and Jamison's brigades had by this time 
 an-ived in front of the Seven Pines, Gen. Berry was ordered 
 to take possession of the woods on the left, and push forward 
 so as to have a flank fire on the enemy's lines. This move- 
 ment was executed brilliantly ; Gen. Berry pushing his regi- 
 ments forward through the woods, until their rifles commanded 
 the left of the camp and works occupied by General Casey's 
 division in the morning. Their fire on the pursuing columns 
 of the enemy was very destructi^'e, and assisted materially in 
 
 10 
 
218 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 checking tlie pursuit in that part of the field. He held his 
 position in these woods against several attacks of superior 
 numbers, and after dark, being cut off by the enemy from the 
 main body, he fell back towards White Oak Swamp, and, by 
 a circuit, brought his men into our lines in good order. 
 
 General Jamison, with two regiments — the other two of his 
 brigade having been detached, one to General Peck and one 
 to General Birney — moved I'apiilly to the front on the left of 
 the Williamsburg road, and succeeded for a time in keeping 
 the abattis clear of the enemy ; but large numbers of the ene- 
 my pressing past the right of his line, he too was forced to 
 retreat through the woods towards White Oak Swamp, and 
 in that way gained camp under cover of night. 
 
 Brig.-Gen. Devins, who had held the centre of General 
 Couch's division, had made repeated and gallant efforts to 
 regain portions of the ground lost in front, but each time Avas 
 driven back, and finally withdrew behind the rifle pits near 
 Seven Pines. 
 
 Meantime, General Sumner had arrived with the advance 
 of his corps. General Sedgwick's division, at the point held by 
 General Couch with four regiments and one battery. The 
 roads leading from the bridge, were so mirey, that it was only 
 by the greatest exertion. General Sedgwick had been able to 
 get one of his batteries to the front. 
 
 The leading regiment (1st Minnesota, Col. Sully) was im- 
 mediately deployed to the right of Couch to protect the flank, 
 and the rest of the division formed in line of battle. Kir'by's 
 battery near the centre in an angle of the woods. One of 
 Gen. Couch's regiments was sent to open communication with 
 Gen. Heintzelman. No sooner were these dispositions made, 
 than the enemy came in strong force, and opened a heavy fire 
 along the line. He made several charges, but was repulsed 
 with great loss, by the steady fire of the infantry, and the 
 splendid practice of the battery. After sustaining the enemy's 
 fire for a considerable time, General Sumner ordered five regi- 
 ments (the 34th New York, Col. Smith, 82d New York, Lieut.- 
 Col. Hudson, 15th Mass., Lieut.-Col. Kimball, 20th Mass., Col. 
 Lee, 7th Michigan, Major Richardson, the three former, of Gen. 
 Gorman's brigade, the two latter, of General Dana's brigade) 
 
BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 219 
 
 to advance and charge with bayonet. This cliarge was executed 
 in the most brilliant manner. Our troops, springing over two 
 fences which were between them and the enemy, rushed upon his 
 lines and drove him in confusion from that part of the field. 
 Darkness now ended the battle for that day. 
 
 During the night, dispositions were made tor its early renewal. 
 General Couch's division, and so much of General Casey's as 
 could be collected together, with General Kearney's, occupied 
 the rifle-pits near Seven Pines. General Peck, in falling back 
 on the left, had succeeded, late in the afternoon, in rallying a 
 considerable number of stragglers, and was taking them once 
 more into the action, when he was ordered back to the in- 
 trenched camp by General Kearney. General Hooker brought 
 up his division about dark, having been delayed by the heavi- 
 ness of the roads, and the throng of fugitives from the field, 
 through whom, the Colonel of the leading regiment (Starr) 
 reports, he " was obliged to force his way with the bayonet." 
 This division bivouacked for the night, in rear of the right of 
 the rifle-pits, on the other side of the railroad. General Rich- 
 ardson's division also came upon the field about sunset. He 
 had attempted the passage of the Chickahominy by the bridge 
 opposite his own camp, but it was so fir destroyed, that he 
 was forced to move General Howard's and Meagher's brigades, 
 with all his artillery, around by General Sedgwick's bridge, 
 while General French's brigade, with the utmost difliculty, 
 crossed by the other. General Sedgwick's division, with the 
 regiments under General Couch, held about the same position 
 as when the fight ceased ; and General Richardson, on his 
 arrival, was ordered to place his division on the left, to connect 
 with General Kearney. General French's brigade Avas posted 
 along the railroad, and General Howard's and Meagher's 
 brigades, in second and third lines. All his artillery had been 
 left behind, it being impossible to move it forward through 
 the deep mud, as rapidly as the infantry pushed toward the 
 field, but during the night, the three batteries of the division 
 were brought to the front. 
 
 About five o'clock in the morning of the 1st June, skirmishers, 
 and some cavalry of the enemy, were discovered in front of 
 General Richardson's division. Capt. Pettit's battery (B, 1st 
 
220 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 N". Y.) liaving come upon the ground, threw a few shells 
 among tliem, when they dispersed. There was a wide interval 
 between General Richardson and General Kearney. To close 
 this, General Richardson's line was extended to the left, and 
 his first line moved over the railroad. Scarcely had they 
 gained this position, when the enemy appearing in large force, 
 from the woods in. front, opened a heavy fire of musketry at 
 short range, along the whole line. He aj)proached very 
 rapidly with columns of attack, formed on two roads which 
 crossed the railroad. These columns were supported by in- 
 fantry in line of battle on each side, cutting General French's 
 line. He threw out no skirmishers, but appeared determined 
 to carry all before him by one crushing blow. For nearly an 
 hour the first line of General Richardson's division, stood and 
 returned the fire, the lines of the enemy being reinforced and 
 relieved, time after time, until finally General Howard was 
 ordered, with his brigade, to go to General French's assistance. 
 He led his men gallantly to the front, and in a few minutes 
 the fire of the enemy ceased, and his whole line fell back on 
 that ])art of the field. 
 
 On the opening of the firing in the morning. General Hook- 
 er pushed forward on the railroad, with two regiments (5th 
 and 6th New Jersey), followed by General Sickles' brigade. 
 It was found impossible to move the artillery of this division 
 from its position, on account of the mud. On coming near the 
 woods, which were held by the enemy in foi-ce. General Plook- 
 er found General Birney's brigade. Colonel J. Hobart Ward 
 in command, in line of battle. He sent back to hasten General 
 Sickles' brigade, but ascertained that it had been turned off to 
 the left by General Heintzelman to meet a column advancing 
 in that direction. He at once made the attack with the two 
 New Jersey regiments, calling upon Colonel Ward to support 
 him with General Birney's brigade. This was well done, our 
 troops advancing into the woods under a heavy fire, and }>ush- 
 ing the enemy before them for more than an hour of hard fight- 
 ing. A charge with the bayonet was then ordered by General 
 Hooker, with the 5th and 6th New Jersey, 3d Maine, and 38th 
 and 40th New York, and the enemy fled in confusion, throw- 
 ins: down arms and even clothinc: in his flicrht. General Sic- 
 
BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 221 
 
 kles having been ordered to the right, formed line of battle on 
 both sides of the Williamsburg road, and advanced under a 
 sharp fire from the enemy deployed in the woods in front of 
 him. After a brisk interchange of musketry fire while crossing 
 the open ground, the Excelsior brigade dashed into the timber 
 with the bayonet, and put the enemy to flight. 
 
 On the right the enemy opened fire after half an hour's ces- 
 sation, which was promptly responded to by General Richard- 
 son's division. Again the most vigorous efforts were made to 
 break our line, and again they were frustrated by the steady 
 courage of our troops. In about an hour General Richardson's 
 whole line advanced, pouring in their fire at close range, which 
 threw the line of the enemy back in some confusion. This was 
 followed up by a bayonet charge, led by General French in 
 person, with the 57th and 66th New York, supported by two 
 regiments sent by General Heintzelman, the 7 1st and 73d New 
 York, which turned the confusion of the enemy into precipitate 
 flight. One gun captured the previous day was retaken. 
 
 Our troops pushed forward as far as the lines held by them 
 on the 31st, before the attack. On the battle field there were 
 found many of our own and the Confederate wounded, arms, cais- 
 sons, wagons, subsistence stores, and forage, abandoned by the 
 enemy in his rout. The state of the roads, and the impossibil- 
 ity of mancBuvring artillery, prevented further pursuit. 
 
 On the next morning a reconnoissance was sent forward, 
 which pressed back the pickets of the enemy to within five 
 miles of Richmond, but again the impossibility of forcing even 
 a few batteries forward, precluded our holding permanently 
 this position. The lines held previous to the battle were there- 
 fore resumed. 
 
 General J. E. Johnston reports loss of the enemy in 
 Longstreet's and G. W. Smith's divisions at 4,283 
 
 General D. H. Hill, who had taken the advance in 
 the attack, estimates his loss at . . . 2,500 
 
 Which would give enemy's loss . . . 6,783 
 
 Our loss in General Sumner's corps 1,223 
 
 " General Heintzelman's corps 1,394 
 
 " General Keyes' corps 3,120 
 
 Total 5,737 
 
222 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 Previous to the arrival of General Sumner upon the field of 
 battle on the 31st of May, General Heintzelman, the senior 
 corps commander present, was in the immediate command of 
 the forces engaged. The first information I received that the 
 battle was in progress, was a dispatch from him stating that 
 Casey's division had given way. During the night of the 31st 
 I I'eceived a dispatch from him dated 8.45 p.m., in which he 
 says : " I am just in — when I got to the front, the most of Gen- 
 eral Casey's division had dispersed." * * * 
 " The rout of General Casey's men had a most dispiriting 
 effect on the troops as they came up. I saw no reason why 
 we should have been driven back." 
 
 This official statement, together with other accounts, re- 
 ceived previous to my arrival upon the battle-field, to the 
 effect that Casey's division had given way without making a 
 proper resistance, caused me to state in a telegram to the Sec- 
 retary of War on the 1st, that this division " gave way unac- 
 countably and discreditably." Subsequent investigations, 
 however, greatly modified the impressions first received, and 
 I accordingly advised the Secretary of War of this in a dis- 
 patch on the 5th of June. 
 
 The official reports of Generals Keyes, Casey and Naglee, 
 show that a very considerable portion of this division fought 
 well, and that the brigade of General Naglee is entitled to 
 credit for its gallantry. This division, among the regiments 
 of which were eight of comparatively new tioops, was attacked 
 by superior numbers ; yet, according to the reports alluded to, 
 it " stood the attack for three hours before it was reinforced." 
 A portion of the division "vvas thrown into great confusion 
 upon the first onslaught of the enemy, but the personal efforts 
 of General Naglee, Colonel Bailey and others, who boldly 
 went to the front and encouraged the men by their presence 
 and example at this critical -juncture, rallied a great part of 
 the division, and thereby enabled it to act a prominent part 
 in this severely contested battle. It therefore affords me great 
 satisfaction to withdraw the expression contained in my first 
 dispatch, and I cordially give my indorsement to the conclu- 
 sion of the division commander, " that those parts of his com- 
 mand which behaved discreditably were exceptional cases." 
 
BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 223 
 
 On the 31st, when the battle of Fair Oaks commenced, we 
 had two of our bridges nearly completed, but the rising 
 waters floated the log-way approaches and made them almost 
 impassable, so that it Avas only by the greatest efibrts that 
 General Sumner crossed his corps and participated in that 
 hard-fought engagement. The bridges became totally useless 
 after this corps had passed, and others on a more permanent 
 jilan were commenced. 
 
 On my way to head-quartfers, after the battle of Fair Oaks, 
 I attempted to cross the bridge where General Sumner had 
 taken over hjs corps on the day previous. At the time Gen- 
 eral vSumner crossed this was the only available bridge above 
 Bottom's Bridge. I found the approach from the right bank 
 for some 400 yards submerged to the depth of several feet, 
 and on reaching the place where the bridge had been, I found 
 a great part of it carried away, so that I could not get my 
 horse over, and was obliged to send him to Bottom's Bridge, 
 six miles below, as the only practicable crossing. 
 
 The approaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges were 
 also overflowed, and both of them were enfiladed by the ene- 
 my's batteries, established upon commanding heights on the 
 opposite side. These batteries were supported by strong 
 forces of the enemy, having numerous rifle-pits in their front, 
 which would have made it necessary, even had the approaches 
 been in the best possible condition, to have fouglit a san- 
 guinary battle, with but little prospect of success, before a 
 passage could have been secured. 
 
 The only available means, therefore, of uniting our forces at 
 Fair Oaks for an advance on Richmond soon after the battle, 
 was to march the troops from Mechanicsville and other points 
 on the left bank of the Chickahominy down to Bottom's 
 Bridge, and thence over the Williamsburg road to the posi- 
 tion near Fair Oaks, a distance of about twenty-three (23) 
 miles. In the condition of the roads at that time, this march 
 could not have been made with artillery in less than two days 
 by which time the enemy would have been secure within his 
 intrenchments around Richmond. In short, the idea of unit- 
 ing the two wings of the army in time to make a vigorous 
 pursuit of the enemy, with the i)rospect of overtaking him 
 
224 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 before he reached Richmond, only hve miles distant from the 
 field of battle, is simply absurd, and was, I j^resume, Jiever for 
 a moment seriously entertained by any one connected with 
 the army of the Potomac. An advance involving the separa- 
 tion of the two wings by the impassable Chickahominy would 
 have exposed each to defeat in detail. Therefore I held the 
 position already gained, and completed our crossings as rap- 
 idly as possible. 
 
 In the meantime the troops at Fair Oaks were directed to 
 strengthen their positions by a strong line of intrenchments, 
 which protected them while the bridges were being built, 
 gave security to the trains, liberated a large fighting force, and 
 offered a safe retreat in the event of disaster. 
 
 On the 2d of June I sent the following dispatch : — 
 
 Head-Quartees, ARinr op the Potomac, 
 New Bridge, June 2d, 1862. 10.30 a.m. 
 
 Our left is everywhere advanced considerably beyond the 
 positions it occupied before the battle. 
 
 I am in strong hopes that the Chickahominy will fall suffici- 
 ently to enable me to cross the right. We have had a terrible 
 time with our communications ; bridges and causeways, built 
 with great care, having been washed away with the freshet, 
 leaving us almost cut off from communication. All that 
 human labor can do is being done to accomplish our purpose. 
 
 Please regard the portion of this relating to condition of 
 Chickahominy as confidential, as it would be serious if the 
 enemy were aware of it. I do not yet know our loss ; it has 
 been very heavy on both sides, as the fighting was desperate ; 
 our victory complete. I expect still more fighting before we 
 reach Richmond. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major- General. 
 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of "War. 
 
 On the same day I received the following from the Secretary 
 of War : — 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 225 
 
 Washington, June 2, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan : — 
 
 Your telegram has been received, and we are greatly re- 
 joiced at your success, not only in itself, but because of the 
 dauntless spirit and courage it displays in your troops. You 
 have received, of course, the order made yesterday in respect 
 to Fortress Monroe. The object Avas to place at your com- 
 mand the disposable force of that department. The indica- 
 tions are that Fremont or McDowell will fight Jackson to-day, 
 and as soon as he is disposed of another large body of troops 
 will be at your service. The intelligence from Halleck shows 
 that the rebels are fleeing, and pursued in force from Corinth. 
 All interest now centres in your operations, and full confidence 
 is entertained of your brilliant and glorious success. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 
 
 On the 3d I received the following from the President : — 
 
 Washington, June 3, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 With these continuous rains, I am very anxious about the 
 Chickahominy, so close in your rear and crossing your line of 
 communication. Please look well to it. 
 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 To which I replied as follows : — 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 New Bridge, June 3d, 1862. 
 
 Your dispatch of 5 p.m. just received. As the Chicka- 
 hominy has been almost the only obstacle in my way for 
 several days, your Excellency may rest assured that it has not 
 been overlooked. Every effort has been made, and will con- 
 
226 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 tinue to be, to protect the communications across it. Nothing 
 of importance, except that it is again raining. 
 
 G. B. McClellan", 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g, 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President, Washington. 
 
 My views of the condition of our army on the 4th are ex- 
 plained in the following dispatch to the President : — 
 
 Head-Quarters, Armt of the Potomao, 
 New Bridge, June 4tli, 1862. 
 
 Terrible rain storm during the night and morning ; not 
 yet cleared off; Chickahominy flooded; bridges in bad con- 
 dition, and still hard at work at them. I have taken every 
 possible step to insure the security of the corps on the right 
 bank, but I cannot reinforce them from here until ray bridges 
 are all safe, as my force is too small to insure my right and rear, 
 should the enemy attack in that direction, as they may prob- 
 ably attempt. I have to be very cautious now. Our loss in 
 the late battle will probably exceed (5,000) live thousand. I 
 have not yet full returns. On account of the effect it might 
 have on our own men and the enemy, I request that you will 
 regard this information as confidential for a few days. I am 
 satisfied that the loss of the enemy was very considerably 
 greater ; they were terribly punished. I mention these facts 
 now merely to show you that the army of the Potomac has 
 had serious work, and that no child's play is before it. 
 
 You must make your calculations on the supposition that I 
 have been correct from the beginning, in asserting that the 
 serious opposition was to made here. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. , 
 
 And in the following to the Secretary of War on the same 
 day; 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 New Bridge, June 4, 1862. 
 Please inform me at once what reinforcements, if any, I can 
 
 \ 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMONB. 227 
 
 count upon having at Fortress Monroe or White House within 
 the next three days, and when each regiment may be expected 
 to arrive. It is of the utmost importance that I should know 
 this immediately. The losses in the battle of the 31st and 1st 
 will amount to (7,000) seven thousand. Regard this as confi- 
 dential for the present. 
 
 If I can have (5) five new regiments for Fort Monroe and 
 its dependencies, I can draw (3) three more old regiments 
 from there safely. I can well dispose of four more raw regi- 
 ments on my communications. I can well dispose of from 
 (15) fifteen to (20) twenty well-drilled regiments among the 
 old brigades, in bringing them up to their original effective 
 strength. Recruits are especially necessary for the regular 
 and volunteer batteries of artillery, as well as for the regular 
 and volunteer regiments of infantry. After the losses in our 
 last battle, I trust that I will no longer be regarded as an 
 alarmist. I believe we have at least one more desperate 
 battle to fight. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of "War. 
 
 Also in my dispatch to the Secretary of War on the 5th : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Armt op the Potomac, 
 New Bridge, June 5, 1862. 
 Rained most of the night — has now ceased, but it is not 
 clear. The river still very high and troublesome. Enemy 
 opened with several batteries on our bridges near here this 
 morning : our batteries seem to have pretty much silenced 
 them, though some firing still kept up. The rain forces us to 
 remain in statu quo. With great difficulty a division of 
 infantry has been crossed this morning to support the troops 
 on the other side should enemy renew attack. I felt obliged 
 to do this, although it leaves us rather weak here. 
 
 G, B. McClellan, 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 Hon. E, M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
228 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 On the 5th the Secretary telegraphed me as follows : 
 
 "WASHiNaTON, June 5, 1862, 8.30 P.M. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 I will send you (5) five new regiments as fast as transporta- 
 tion can take them: the first to start to-moiTow from Balti- 
 more. I intend sending you part of McDowell's force as soon 
 as it can return from its trip to Front Royal, probably as many 
 as you want. The order to ship the new regiments to Fort 
 Monroe has already been given. I suppose that they may be 
 sent directly to the Fort. Please advise me of this as you 
 desire. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 On the Yth of June I telegraphed as follows : 
 
 Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac, 
 June 7, 1862, 4.40 P.M. 
 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, — 
 
 In reply to your dispatch of 2 p.m. to-day, I have the honor 
 to state that the Chickahominy River has risen so as to flood 
 the entire bottom to the depth of three and four feet. I am 
 pushing forward the bridges in spite of this, and the men are 
 working night and day, up to their waists in water, to com- 
 plete them. 
 
 The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, entirely im- 
 passable for artillery or even cavalry, except directly in the 
 narrow roads, which renders any general movement either of 
 this or the rebel army utterly out of the question, until we 
 have more favorable weather. 
 
 I am glad to learn that you are pressing forward reinforce- 
 ments so vigorously. I shall be in perfect readiness to move 
 forward and take Richmond the moment McCall reaches here, 
 and the ground will admit the passage of artillery. I have 
 advanced my pickets about a mile to-day, driving off the rebel 
 pickets, and securing a very advantageous position. 
 
 The rebels have several batteries established, command- 
 ing the debouches from two of our bridges, and fire upon 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 229 
 
 our working parties continually, but as yet they have killed 
 but very few of our men. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 As I did not think it probable that any more reinforcements 
 would be sent me in time for the advance on Richmond, I 
 stated in the foregoing dispatch that I should be ready to move 
 when Gen. McCall's Division joined me ; but I did not intend 
 to be understood by this, that no more reinforcements were 
 wanted, as will be seen from the following dispatch : 
 
 June 10, 1862, 3.30. P.M. 
 I have again information that Beauregard has arrived, and 
 that some of his troops are to follow him. No great reUance, 
 perhaps none whatever, can be attached to this ; but it is pos- 
 sible, and ought to be their policy. 
 
 I am completely checked by the weather. The roads and 
 fields are Hterally impassable for artillery, almost so for infantry. 
 The Chickahominy is in a dreadful state ; we have another 
 rain storm on our hands. 
 
 I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will permit ; 
 but there will be a delay, the extent of which no one can fore- 
 see, for the season is altogether abnormal. 
 
 In view of these circumstances, I present for your considera- 
 tion the propriety of detaching largely from Halleck's army to 
 strengthen this ; for it would seem that Halleck has now no 
 large organized force in front of him, while we have. 
 
 If this cannot be done, or even in connection with it, allow 
 me to suggest the movement of a heavy column from Dalton 
 upon Atlanta. If but the one can be done, it would better 
 conform to military principles to strengthen this army ; and 
 even although the reinforcements might not arrive in season to 
 take part in the attack upon Richmond, the moral effect would 
 be great, and they would furnish valuable assistance in ulterior 
 movements. 
 
 I Avish to be distinctly understood that whenever the weather 
 permits, I will attack with whatever force I may have, although a 
 larger force would enable me to gain much more decisive results. 
 
230 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 I would be glad to have McCall's infantry sent foi'ward by 
 water at once, without waiting for his artillery and cavalry. 
 
 If Gen. Prim returns via Washington, please converse with 
 him as to the condition of affairs here. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, — 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 Our work upon the bridges continued to be pushed forward 
 vigorously until the 20th, during which time it rained almost 
 every day, and the exposure of the men caused much sickness. 
 
 On the 11th the following was received from the Secretary 
 of War. 
 
 ■Washington, June 11, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Your dispatch of three thirty (3.30) yesterday has been 
 received. I am fully impressed with the difficulties mentioned, 
 and which no art or skill can avoid, but only endure, and am 
 striving to the uttermost to render you every aid in the power 
 of the Government. 
 
 Your suggestions will be immediately communicated to 
 Gen. Halleck, with a request that he shall conform to them. 
 At last advice he contemplated sending a column to operate 
 with Mitchell against Chattanooga, and thence upon East 
 Tennessee. Buell reports Kentucky and Tennessee to be in a 
 critical condition demanding immediate attention. Halleck 
 says the main body of Beauregard's force is with him at Oka- 
 lona. McCall's force was reported yesterday as having em- 
 barked and on its way to join you. It is intended to send the 
 residue of McDowell's force also to join you as speedily as 
 possible. Fremont had a hard fight day before yesterday, 
 with Jackson's force at Union Church, eight miles from Har- 
 risonburg. He claims the victory, but was pretty badly 
 handled ; it is clear tha,t a strong force is operating wdth Jack- 
 eon, for the purpose of detaining the forces here from you. I 
 am urging as fast as possible the new levies. 
 
 Be assured, general, that there never has been a moment 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 231 
 
 when my desire has been otherwise than to aid you with my 
 whole heart, mind and strength since the hour we first met, 
 and whatever others may say for their own purposes, you have 
 never had and never can have any one more truly your friend, 
 or more anxious to support you, or more joyful than I shall 
 be at the success, which I have no doubt, will soon be achieved 
 by your arms. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 On the 12th and 13th General McCall's division arrived. 
 
 On the 13th of June two squadrons of the 5th U. S. Cav- 
 alry, under the command of Captain Royall, stationed near 
 Hanover Old Church, were attacked and overpowered by a 
 force "of the enemy's cavalry, numbering about fifteen hundred 
 men, with four guns. They pushed on towards our depots, 
 but at some distance from our main body, and, though pur- 
 sued, very cleverly made the circuit of the army, repassing the 
 Chickahominy at Long Bridge. 
 
 The burning of two schooners laden with forage and four- 
 teen government wagons, the destruction of some sutlers' 
 stores, the killing of several of the guard and teamsters at 
 Garlick's Landing, some little damage done at Tunstall's Sta- 
 tion, and a Httle eclat, were the precise results of this expe- 
 dition. 
 
 On the 14th I sent the following to the Secretary of War. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Armt of the Potomac, 
 Camp Lincoln, June 14, 1862. Midnight. 
 
 All quiet in every direction. The stampede of last night 
 has passed away. Weather now very favorable. I hope two 
 days more will make the ground practicable. I shall advance 
 as soon as the bridges are completed, and the ground fit for 
 artillery to move, at the same time I would be glad to have 
 whatever troops can be sent to me. I can use several new 
 regiments to advantage. It ought to be distinctly understood 
 that McDowell and his troops are completely under my con- 
 trol. 
 
232 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's di- 
 vision might be placed so as to join him immediately on his 
 arrival. 
 
 That request does not breathe the proper spirit ; whatever 
 troops come to me must be disposed of so as to do the most 
 good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in 
 which I am now placed, General McD. should wish the general 
 interests to be sacrificed for the purpose of increasing his com- 
 mand. 
 
 If I cannot fully control all his troops, I want none of them, 
 but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let 
 others be I'esponsible for the results. 
 
 The department lines should not be allowed to interfere 
 with me, but General McD. and all his troops sent to me, 
 should be placed completely at my disposal, to do with them 
 as I think best. In no other way can they be of assistance to 
 me. I therefore request that I may have entire and full con- 
 trol. The stake at issue is too great to allow personal con- 
 siderations to be entertained. You know that I have none. 
 The indications are, from our balloon reconnoissances, and from 
 all other sources, that the enemy are intrenching, daily increas- 
 ing in numbers, and determined to fight desperately. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of "War. 
 
 On the 20th the following was communicated to the Presi- 
 dent. 
 
 Head-Quarters Army op the Potomac, 
 Camp Lincoln, June 20, 1862. 2 p.m. 
 
 Your Excellency's dispatch of (11) a.m. received, also that 
 of General Sigel. 
 
 I have no doubt that Jackson has been reinforced from here. 
 There is reason to believe that General R. S. Ripley has re- 
 cently joined Lee's army, with a brigade or division from 
 Charleston. Troops have arrived recently from Goldsboro. 
 There is not the slightest reason to suppose that the enemy in- 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 233 
 
 tends evacuating Richmond ; he is daily increasing his de- 
 fenses. I find hini everywhere in force, and every reconnois- 
 sance costs many vahiable lives. Yet I am obliged to feel my 
 way foot by foot at whatever cost, so great are the difficulties 
 of the country. By to-morrow night the defensive works 
 covering our position on this side the Chickahominy should be 
 completed. I am forced to this by my inferiority of numbers 
 so that I may bring the greatest possible numbers into action, 
 and secure the army against the consequences of unforeseen 
 disaster. I would be glad to have permission to lay before 
 your Excellency by letter or telegraph, my views as to the 
 present state of military affairs throughout the whole country. 
 In the mean time I would be pleased to learn the disposition, 
 as to numbers and position, of the troops not under my com- 
 mand, in Virginia and elsewhere. 
 
 G. B. McClellan. 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 His Excellency, A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 To which I received this reply : — 
 
 Washington, June 21, 1862. 6 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, — 
 
 Your dispatch of yesterday, two (2) p.m., was received 
 this morning. If it would not divert too much of your time 
 and attention from the army under your immediate command, 
 I would be glad to have your views as to the present state of 
 military affairs throughout the whole country, as you say you 
 would be glad to give them. I would rather it should be by 
 letter than by telegraph, because of the better chance of se- 
 cresy. As to the numbers and positions of the troops not 
 under your command in Virginia and elsewhere, even if I 
 could do it with accuracy, which I cannot, I would rather not 
 transmit either by telegraph or letter, because of the chances 
 of its reaching the enemy. I would be very glad to talk with 
 you, but you cannot leave your camp, and I cannot well leave 
 
 here. 
 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
234 SECOND PERIOD, 
 
 To which I sent the following reply : — 
 
 Camp Lincoln, June 22, 1 p.m. 
 I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your tele- 
 gram of 8 P.M. yesterday. 
 
 Under the circumstances as stated in your dispatch, I per- 
 ceive that it Avill be better, at least, to defer for the present 
 the communication I desired to make. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 His Excellency, the President. 
 
 All the information I could obtain, previous to the 24th of 
 June, regarding the movements of General Jackson, led to the 
 belief that he was at Gordonsville, where he was receiving re- 
 inforcements from Richmond, via Lynchburg and Stanton ; 
 but what his purposes were did not appear until the date 
 specified, when a young man, very intelligent, but of sus- 
 picious appearance, was brought in by our scouts from the 
 direction of Hanover Court-house. He at first stated that he 
 Avas an escaped prisoner from Colonel Kenley's Maryland regi- 
 ment, captured at Front Royal, but finally confessed himself 
 to be a deserter from Jackson's command, which he left near 
 Gordonsville on the 21st. Jackson's troops were then, as he 
 said, moving to Frederickshall, along the Virginia Central 
 Railroad, for the purpose of attacking my rear on the 28th. 
 I immediately dispatched two trusty negroes to proceed along 
 the railroad, and ascertain the truth of the statement. They 
 were unable, however, to get beyond Hanover Court-house, 
 where they encountered the enemy's pickets, and were forced 
 to turn back without obtaining the desired information. On 
 that day I sent the following dispatch : — 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomao, 
 June 24, 12 p.m., 1862. 
 
 A very peculiar case of desertion has just occurred from the 
 enemy. The party states he left Jackson, Whiting and 
 Ewell, fifteen brigades, at Gordonsville, on the 21st; that 
 they were moving to Frederickshall, and that it was in- 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 235 
 
 intended to attack my rear on the 28th. I would be glad to 
 learn, at your earliest convenience, the most exact information 
 you have as to the position and movements of Jackson, as 
 well as the sources from which your information is derived, 
 that I may the better compare it with what I have. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 The following is his reply : — 
 
 "Washington, Juno 25. 2.35. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 We have no definite information as to the numbers or posi- 
 tion of Jackson's force. General King yesterday reported a 
 deserter's statement that Jackson's force was, nine days ago, 
 forty thousand men. Some reports place ten thousand rebels 
 under Jackson at Gordonsville ; others that his force is at 
 Port Republic, Harrisonburg and Luray. Fremont yester- 
 day reported rumors that Western Virginia was threatened, 
 and General Kelly that Ewell was advancing to New Creek, 
 where Fremont has his depots. The last telegram from Fre- 
 mont contradicts this rumor. The last telegram from Banks 
 says the enemy's pickets are strong in advance at Luray. 
 The people decline to give any information of his where- 
 abouts. Within the last two (2) days, the evidence is strong 
 that for some purpose the enemy is circulating rumors of 
 Jackson's advance in various directions, with a view to con- 
 ceal the real point of attack. Neither McDowell, who is at 
 Manassas, nor Banks and Fremont, who are at Middletown, 
 appear to have any accurate knowledge of the subject, A let- 
 ter transmitted to the department yesterday, purporting to be 
 dated Gordonsville, on the fourteenth (14th) inst,, stated that 
 the actual attack was designed for Washington and Balti- 
 more, as soon as you attacked Richmond ; but that the report 
 was to be circulated that Jackson had gone to Richmond, in 
 order to mislead. This letter looked very much like a blind, 
 and induces me to suspect that Jackson's real movement now 
 
236 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 is toward Richmond. It came from Alexandria, and is cer- 
 tainly designed, like the numerous rumors put afloat, to mis- 
 lead. I think, therefore, that while the warning of the de- 
 serter to you may also be a blind, that it could not safely be 
 disregarded. I will transmit to you any further information on 
 this subject that may be received here. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of "War. 
 
 On the 25th, our bridges and intrenchments being at last 
 completed, an advance of our picket line on the left was 
 ordered, preparatory to a general forward movement. 
 
 Immediately in front of the most advanced redoubt on the 
 Williamsburg road was a large open field ; beyond that a 
 swampy belt of timber some five hundred yards wide, which 
 had been disputed ground for many days. Further in advance 
 was an open field crossed by the Williamsburg road and the 
 railroad, and commanded by a redoubt and rifle-pits of the 
 enemy. It was decided to push our lines to the other side of 
 these woods, in order to enable us to ascertain the nature of 
 the ground, and to place Generals Heintzelman and Sumner in 
 position to support the attack intended to be made on the old 
 Tavern on the 26th or 27th by Gen. Franklin, by assaulting 
 that position in the rear. 
 
 Between 8 and 9 o'clock on the morning of the 25th the 
 advance was begun by Gen. Heintzelman's corps. The enemy 
 were found to be in strong force all along the line, and con- 
 tested the advance stubbornly, but by sunset our object was 
 accomplished. The troops engaged in this afiair were the 
 whole of Heintzelman's corps. Palmer's brigade of Couch's 
 division of Keyes's corps, and a part of Richardson's division 
 of Sumner's corps. For the details I refer to the report of 
 Gen. Heintzelman. 
 
 The casualties, (not including those in Palmer's brigade, 
 which have not been reported,) were as follows : — Officers 
 killed 1, wounded 14, missing 1 : Enlisted men killed 50, 
 wounded 387, missing 63 : Total 516. 
 
 The following telegrams were sent to the Secretary of War 
 during the day from the field of operations : 
 
OPERATIONS BEFORE RICHMOND. 237 
 
 Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862, 1.30 p.m. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, — 
 
 "We have advanced our pickets on the left considerably, 
 under sharp resistance. Our men behaved very handsomely. 
 Some firing still continues. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862. 3.15 p.m. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War, — 
 The enemy are making a desperate resistance to the advance 
 of our picket lines. Kearney's and one-half of Hooker's are 
 where I want them. 
 
 I have this moment reinforced Hooker's right with a brigade 
 and a couple of guns, and hope in a few minutes to finish the 
 work intended for the day. Our men are behaving splendidly. 
 The enemy are fighting well also. 
 
 This is not a battle, merely an afiair of Heintzelman's corps, 
 supported by Keyes, and thus far all goes well. We hold 
 every foot we have gained. If we succeed in what we have 
 undertaken, it will be a very important advantage gained. 
 Loss not large thus far. The fighting up to tliis time has been 
 done by Gen. Hooker's division, which has behaved as usual, 
 that is most splendidly. 
 
 On our right, Porter has silenced the enemy's batteries in 
 his front. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 Major-G-eneral Comd'g. 
 
 Redoubt No. 3, June 25, 1862. 5 p.m. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War, — 
 The afiair is over, and we have gained our point fully, 
 and with but little loss, notwithstanding the strong opposition. 
 Our men have done all that could be desired. The afiair was 
 partially decided by two guns that Capt. De Russy brought 
 gallantly into action under very difficult circumstances. The 
 enemy was driven from the camps in fiont of this place, and 
 is now quiet. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 
238 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 Also, on the same day, the following : 
 
 Head-Quarters,- Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp Lincoln, June 25, 1862, 6.15 p.m., 
 
 I have just returned from the field, and found yonr dispatch 
 in regard to Jackson. 
 
 Several contrabands just in, give information confirming 
 supposition, that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover 
 Court House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong re- 
 inforcements, in Richmond yesterday. 
 
 I incline to think, that Jackson will attack my right and rear. 
 The rebel force is stated at (200,000) two hundred thousand, 
 including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend 
 against vastly superior odds if these reports be true. But 
 this army will do all in the power of men, to hold their position 
 and repulse any attack. 
 
 I regret my great inferiority in numbers, but feel that I am 
 in no way responsible for it, as I have not filled to represent, 
 repeatedly, the necessity of reinforcements, that this was the 
 decisive point, and that all the available means of the govern- 
 ment, should be concentrated here. I will do all that a Gen- 
 eral can do, with the splendid army I have the honor to com- 
 mand, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at 
 least, die with it, and share its fate. 
 
 But if the result of the action, which will probably occur to- 
 morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsi- 
 bility can not be thrown on my shoulders, it must rest where 
 it belongs. Since I commenced this, I have received additional 
 intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's 
 movements, and Beauregard's arrival. I shall probably be 
 attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chick- 
 ahominy, to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that 
 there is no use in my again asking for reinforcements. 
 
 G. B. McCr-ELLAN, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of "War. 
 
THE SEVEN DAYS. 239 
 
 NUMBERS OF THE ENEMY. 
 
 The report of the Chief of the "Secret Service Corps," here- 
 with forwarded, and dated 26th June, shows the estimated 
 strength of the enemy, at the time of the evaciaation of York- 
 town, to have been from 100,000 to 120,000. The same report 
 puts his numbers on the 26th of June, at about 180,000, and 
 the sjsecific information obtained regarding their organization, 
 warrants the behef, that this estimate did not exceed his actual 
 strength. 
 
 It will be observed, that the evidence contained in the re- 
 port, shows the following organizations, viz. : — two hundred 
 regiments of infantry and cavalry, including the forces of Jack- 
 son and Ewell, just arrived ; eight battalions of independent 
 troops ; five battalions of artillery ; twelve companies of in- 
 fantry and independent cavalry, besides forty-six companies 
 of artillery ; amounting in all, to from forty to fifty brigades. 
 There were, undoubtedly, many others whose designations 
 we did not learn. The report also shows, that numerous and 
 heavy earth- works had been completed for the defense of Rich- 
 mond, and that in thirty-six of these, were mounted some two 
 hundred guns. 
 
 THE SEVEN DAYS. 
 
 On the 26th, the day upon which I had decided as the time 
 for our final advance, the enemy attacked our right in strong 
 force, and turned my attention to the protection of our com- 
 munications, and depots of supply. 
 
 The event was a bitter confirmation of the mihtary judg- 
 ment, which had been reiterated to my superiors from the 
 inception, and through the progress of the Peninsular cam- 
 paign. 
 
 I notified the Secretary of War in the following dispatch : 
 
240 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Armt of the Potomac, 
 Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862, 12 m. 
 
 I have jnst heard that our advance cavalry-pickets, on the 
 left bank of the Chickahominy, are being driven in ; it is, pro- 
 bably, Jackson's advanced guard. If this be true, you may 
 not hear from me for some days, as my communications will 
 probably be cut off. The case, is, perhaps, a difficult one, 
 but I shall resort to desperate measures, and will do my best 
 to out-manoeuver, outwit, and outfight the enemy. Do not 
 believe reports of disaster, and do not be discouraged, if you 
 learn that my communications are cut off, and even Yorktown 
 in possession of the enemy. Hope for the best, and I will 
 not deceive the hopes you formerly placed in me. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp Lincoln, June 26, 1862. 2.30 p.m. 
 Your dispatch and that of President received. Jackson is 
 driving in my pickets, &c., on other side of the Chickahominy. 
 It is impossible to tell where reinforcements ought to go, as I 
 am yet unable to predict result of approaching battle. It will 
 probably be better that they should go to Fort Monroe, and 
 thence according to state of affairs when they arrive. 
 
 It is not probable that I can maintain telegraphic com- 
 munication more than an hour or two longer. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 Major-General. 
 Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 Secretary of "War. 
 
 On the same day I received the following dispatches from the 
 Secretary of War : 
 
 "Washington, June 25, 1862. 11.20 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, — 
 
 Your telegram of (6.15) has just been received. The 
 circumstances that have hitherto rendered it impossible for the 
 
THE SEVEN DAYS. 241 
 
 govornmeut to send you any more reinforcements than has 
 been done, have been so distinctly stated to you, by the Pre- 
 sident, that it is needless for me to repeat them. 
 
 Every effort has been made by the President and myself to 
 strengthen you. King's division has reached Falmouth. 
 Shield's division and Pickett's division are at Manassas. The 
 President designs to send a part of that force to aid you as 
 speedily as it can be done. 
 
 E. M. Stanton, 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 Washington, June 26, 1862. 6 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan, — 
 
 Arrangements are being made rapidly as possible to send 
 you five thousand (5000) men as fast as they can be brought 
 from Manassas to Alexandria, and embarked, v^'hich can be 
 done sooner than to wait for transportation at Fredericksburg. 
 They will be followed by more, if needed. McDowell, Banks 
 and Fremont's force will be consolidated as the army of Vir- 
 ginia, and will operate promptly in your aid by land. Noth- 
 ing will be spared to sustain you, and I have undoubting 
 faith in your success. Keep me advised fully of your con- 
 dition. 
 
 Edwin M. Stanton, 
 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 But 5000 of the reinforcements spoken of in these communica- 
 tions came to the army of the Potomac, and these reached us 
 at Harrison's Bar after the Seven Days. 
 
 In anticipation of a speedy advance on Richmond, to pro- 
 vide for the contingency of our communications Avith the depot 
 at the White House being severed by the enemy, and at the 
 same time to be prepared for a change of the base of our 
 operations to James River, if circumstances should render it 
 advisable, I had made arrangements more than a week pre- 
 vious (on the 18th) to have transports with supplies of pro- 
 visions and forage, under a convoy of gun-boats, sent up 
 James River. They reached Harrison's Landing in time to be 
 available for the army on its arrival at that ])oint. Events 
 
 11 
 
242 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 Boon proved this change of base to be, though most hazardous 
 and difficult, the only prudent course. 
 
 In order to relieve the troops of the 6th Corps on the 19th 
 of June, Gen. Reynolds and Gen. Seymour's brigades of Gen. 
 McCall's division (Pennsylvania Reserves) were moved from 
 Gaines's Farm to a position on the Beaver Dam Creek; Gen. 
 Meade being held in reserve in front of Gaines's Farm. One 
 regiment and a battery were thrown forward to the heights 
 overlooking Mechanicsville, and a line of pickets extended 
 along the Chickahominy River, between the Mechanicsville 
 and Meadow Bridges. 
 
 As has already been stated, I received, while engaged on 
 the 25th, in directing the operations of Heintzelman's corps, 
 information which strengthened my suspicions that Jackson 
 was advancing with a large force upon our right and rear. 
 On this day. Gen. Casey, at the White House, was instructed 
 to prejjare for a vigorous resistance, and defensive works were 
 ordered at Tunstall's Station. Early on the 25th, Gen. Porter 
 was instructed to send out reconnoitering parties towai'ds 
 Hanover Court House to discover the position and force of 
 the enemy, and to destroy the bridges on the Tolopotaray as 
 far as possible. 
 
 Up to the 26th of June, the operations against Richmond 
 bad been conducted along the roads leading to it from the 
 east and north-east. The reasons which compelled the choice 
 of this line of a2)proach and our continuance ujjon it have been 
 alluded to above. 
 
 The superiority of the James River route, as a line of attack 
 and supply, is too obvious to need exposition. My own opin- 
 ion on that subject had been early given, and need not be re- 
 peated here. The dissipation of all hope of the co-operation 
 by land of General McDowell's forces, deemed to be occupied 
 in the defense of Washington, their inability to hold or defeat 
 Jackson, disclosed an opportunity to the enemy, and a new 
 danger to my right, and to the long line of supplies from the 
 White House to the Chickahominy, and forced an immediate 
 change of base across the Peninsula. To that end, from the 
 evening of the 26th, every energy of the army was bent. 
 Such a change of base, in the presence of a powerful enemy, 
 
THE SEVEN DAYS. 248 
 
 is one of the most difficult undertakings in war, but I was 
 confident in the valor and discipline of my brave army, and 
 knew that it could be trusted equally to retreat or advance, 
 and to fight the series of battles now inevitable, whether re- 
 treating from victories, or marching through defeats ; and, in 
 short, I had no doubt whatever of its ability, even against 
 superior numbers, to fight its way through to the James, and 
 get a position whence a successful advance upon Richmond 
 would be again possible. Their superb conduct through the 
 next seven days justified, my faith. 
 
 On the same day (26th), General Van Vliet, Chief Quarter- 
 master of the army of the Potomac, by my orders tel^raphed 
 to Colonel Ingalls, Quarter-master at the White House, as fol- 
 lows : " Run the cars to the last moment, and load them with 
 provisions and ammunition. Load every wagon you have 
 with subsistence, and send^tiiem to Savage's Station by way 
 of Bottom's Bridge. If you are obliged to abandon White 
 House, burn everything that you cannot get off. You must 
 throw all our sup])lies up the James River as soon as possible, 
 and accompany them yourself with all your force. It will be 
 of vast importance to establish our depots on James River 
 without delay, if we abandon White House. I will keep you 
 advised of every movement so long as the wires work; after 
 that, you must exercise your own judgment." 
 
 All these commands were obeyed. So excellent were the 
 dispositions of the different officers in command of the troops, 
 depots and gun-boats, and so timely the warning of the ap- 
 proach of the enemy, that almost everything was saved, and 
 but a small amount of stores destroyed, to prevent their falling 
 into the hands of the enemy. 
 
 General Stoneman's communications with the main army 
 being cut off, he fell back upon the White House, and thence 
 to Yorktown Avhen the White House was evacuated. 
 
 On the 26th orders were sent to all the corps commanders 
 on the right bank of the Chickahominy to be prepared to send 
 as many troops as they could spare on the following day to 
 the left bank of the river, as will be seen from the appended 
 telegi"ams. General Franklin received instructions to hold 
 General Slocum's division in readiness by daybreak of the 
 
244 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 27Lh, and if heavy firing should at that time be heard in the 
 direction of General Porter, to move it at once to his assist- 
 ance without further orders. 
 
 BEAVER DAM CREEK. 
 
 At noon, on the 26th, the approach of the enemy, who had 
 crossed above Meadow Bridge, was discovered by the ad- 
 vanced pickets at that point, and at 12.30 p.m. they were at- 
 tacked and driven in. All the pickets were now called in, 
 and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville withdrawn. 
 
 Meade's brigade was ordered up as a reserve in rear of the 
 line, and shortly after Martindale's and Griffin's brigades, of 
 Morell's division, were moved forward, and deployed on the 
 right of McCall's division, towards Shady Grove Church, to 
 cover that flank. Neither of these three brigades, however, 
 were warmly engaged, though two of Griffin's regiments re- 
 lieved a portion of Reynolds's line just at the close of the 
 action. 
 
 The position of our troops was a strong one, extending along 
 the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, the left resting on the 
 Chickahominy, and the right in thick Avoods beyond the upper 
 road from Mechanicsville to Coal Harbor. The lower or river 
 road crossed the creek at Ellison's Mills. Seymour's brigade 
 held the left of the hue, from the Chickahominy to beyond the 
 mill, partly in woods and partly in cleared ground, and Rey- 
 nolds the right, principally in the woods and covering the up- 
 per road. The artillery occupied positions commanding the 
 roads and the open ground across the creek. 
 
 Timber had been felled, rifle-pits dug, and the position gen- 
 erally prepared with a care that greatly contributed to the 
 success of the day. The passage of the creek was difficult 
 alono- our whole front, and impracticable for artillery, except 
 by the two roads, where the main efibrts of the enemy were 
 dii'ected. 
 
 At 3 P.M. he formed his line of battle, rapidly advanced his 
 skirmishers, and soon attacked our whole line, making at the 
 same time a determined attempt to force the passage of the 
 
BEAVER DAM CREEK. 245 
 
 upper road, which was successfully resisted by General Rey- 
 nolds. After a severe struggle he was forced to retire, with 
 very heavy loss. 
 
 A rapid artillery fire, with desultory skirmishing, was main- 
 tained along the whole front, while the enemy massed his 
 troops for another effort at the lower road about two hours 
 later, which was likewise repulsed by General Seymour, with 
 heavy slaughter. The firing ceased and the enemy retired 
 about 9 P.M., the action having lasted six hours, with entii e 
 success to our arms. But few, if any, of Jackson's troops 
 were engaged on this day ; the portion of the enemy encoun- 
 tered were chiefly from the troops on the right bank of the 
 river, who crossed near Meadow Bridge and at Mechanicsville. 
 The information in ray possession soon after the close of this 
 action convinced me that Jackson was really approaching in 
 largo force. The position on Beaver Dam Creek, although so 
 successfully defended, had its right flank too much in the air, 
 and was too far from the main army to make it advisable to 
 retain it longer. I therefore determined to send the heavy 
 guns at Hogan's and Gaines's houses over the Chickahominy 
 during the night, with as many of the wagons of the 5th Corps 
 as possible, and to withdraw the corps itself to a position 
 stretching around the bridges, where its flanks would be rea- 
 sonably secure, and it would be within supporting distance of 
 the main army. General Porter carried out my orders to that 
 effect. It was not advisable at that time, even had it been 
 practicable, to withdraw the 5th Corps to the right bank of 
 the Chickahominy. Such a movement would have exposed 
 the rear of the army, placed us between two fires, and enabled 
 Jackson's fresh troops to interrupt the movement to James 
 River, by crossing the Chickahominy in the vicinity of Jones 
 Bridge before w^e could reach Malvern Hill with our trains. I 
 determined, then, to resist Jackson with the 5th Coi-ps, rein- 
 forced by all our disposable troops, in the new position near 
 the bridge heads, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains 
 and heavy guns, and to give time for the arrangements to se- 
 cure the adoption of the James River as our line of supplies 
 in lieu of the Pamunkey. The greater part of the heavy guns 
 and wagons having been removed to the right bank of the 
 
246 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 Chickahominy, the delicate oiDeration of withdrawing the 
 troops from Beaver Dam Creek was commenced shortly before 
 daylight, and successfully executed. 
 
 Meade's and Griffin's brigades were the first to leave the 
 ground. Seymour's brigade covered the rear with the horse 
 batteries of Captains Robertson and Tidball ; but the with- 
 drawal was so skillful and so gradual, and the repulse of the 
 preceding day so complete, that although the enemy followed 
 the retreat closely, and some skirmishing occurred, he did not 
 appear in front of the new line in force till about noon of the 
 27th, when we were pi*epared to receive him. 
 
 About this time General Porter, believing that General 
 Stoneman would be cut oif from him, sent him orders to fall 
 back on the White House, and afterwards rejoin the army as 
 best he could. 
 
 GAINES'S MILL. 
 
 On the morning of the 27th of June, during the withdrawal 
 of his troops from Mechanicsville to the selected position 
 already mentioned, General Porter telegraphed as follows : 
 
 " I hope to do without aid, though I request that Franklin 
 or some other command be held ready to reinforce me. The 
 enemy are so close that I expect to be hard pressed in front. 
 I hope to have a portion in position to cover the retreat. This 
 is a delicate movement, but relying on the good qualities of 
 the commanders of divisions and brigades, I expect to get 
 back and hold the new line." 
 
 This shows how closely Portei*'s retreat was followed. 
 
 Notwithstanding all the efforts used during the entire night 
 to remove the heavy guns and wagons, some of the siege guns 
 were still in position at Gaines's House after sunrise, and were 
 finally hauled off" by hand. The new position of the 5th Corps 
 was about an arc of a circle, covering the approaches to the 
 bridges which connected our right wing with the troops on 
 the opposite side of the river. 
 
 Morell's division held the left of the line, in a strip of woods 
 on the left bank of the Gaines's Mill stream, lesting its left 
 
GAINES'SMILL. 247 
 
 flank on the descent to the Chickahominy, which was swept 
 by our artillery on both sides of the river, and extending into 
 open ground on the right towards New Coal Harbor. In this 
 line General Butterfield's brigade held the extreme left, Gen. 
 Martindale's joined his right, and General Griffin still further 
 to the right, joined the left of General Sykes' division, which, 
 partly in Avoods and partly in open ground, extended in rear 
 of Coal Harbor. 
 
 Each brigade had in reserve two of its own regiments ; 
 McCall's division, having been engaged on the day before, was 
 formed in a second line in rear of the tirst ; Meade's brigade 
 on the left, near the Chickahominy ; Reynolds' brigade on the 
 right, covering the approaches from Coal Harbor and Dispatch 
 Station to Sumner's Bridge, and Seymour's in reserve to the 
 second line still further in rear. General P. St. G. Cooke, 
 with five companies of the 5th Regular Cavalx-y, two squad- 
 rons of the 1st Regular Cavalry, and three squadrons of the 
 1st Pennsylvania Cavalry (lancers), were posted behind a hill 
 in rear of the position, and near the Chickahominy, to aid in 
 watching the left flank and defending the slope to the river. 
 
 The troops were all in position by noon, with the artillery 
 on the commanding ground, and in the intervals between the 
 divisions and brigades. Besides the division batteries, there 
 were Robertson's and Tidball's horse batteries from the artil- 
 lery reserve ; the latter j^osted on the right of Sykes' division, 
 and the foi-mer on the extreme left of the line, in the valley of 
 the Chickahominy. 
 
 Shortly after noon the enemy were discovered approaching 
 in force, and it soon became evident that the entire position 
 was to be attacked. His skirmishers advanced rapidly, and 
 soon the fire became heavy along our whole front. At 2 p.m. 
 General Porter asked for reinforcements. Slocum's division 
 of the 6th Corps was ordered to cross to the left bank of the 
 river by Alexander's Bridge, and proceed to his support. 
 
 General Porter's first call for reinforcements, through Gen. 
 Barnard, did not reach me, nor his demand for more axes 
 through the same officer. By 3 p.m. the engagement had 
 become so severe, and the enemy were so greatly superior in 
 numbers, that the entire second line and reserves had been 
 
248 SECOND PERIOD, 
 
 moved forward to sustain the first line against repeated and 
 desperate assaults along the whole front. 
 
 At 3.30 Slocura's division reached the field, and was imme- 
 diately brought into action at the weak points of our line. 
 
 On the left the contest was for the strip of woods running 
 almost at right angles to the Chickahominy in front of Adam's 
 House, or between that and Gaines's House. The enemy 
 several times charged up to this wood, but were each time 
 driven back with heavy loss. The regulars of Sykes' division 
 on the right also repulsed several strong attacks. 
 
 But our own loss, under the tremendous fire of such greatly 
 superior numbers, was very severe, and the troops, most of 
 whom had been under arms more than two days, were rapidly 
 becoming exhausted by the masses of fresh men constantly 
 brought against them. 
 
 When General Slocum's division arrived on the ground, it 
 increased General Porter's force to some 35,000, who were, 
 probably, contending against about 70,000 of the enemy. The 
 line was severely pressed in several points, and, as its being 
 pierced at any one would have been fatal, it was unavoidable 
 for General Porter, who was required to hold his position 
 until night, to divide Slocum's division, and send parts of it, 
 even single regiments, to the points most threatened. About 
 5 P.M., General Porter having reported his position as critical, 
 French's and Meagher's brigades, of Richardson's division, 
 (2d Corps), were ordered to cross to his support. The enemy 
 attacked again, in great force, at 6 p.m., but failed to break 
 our lines, though our loss was very heavy. 
 
 About 7 P.M., they threw fresh troops against General Por- 
 ter with still greater fury, and finally gained the woods held 
 by our left. This reverse, aided by the confusion that followed 
 an unsuccessful charge by five companies of the 5th Cavalry, and 
 followed, as it was, by more determined assaults on the 
 remainder of our lines, now outflanked, caused a general 
 retreat from our position, to the hill in rear, over-looking the 
 bridge. 
 
 French's and Meagher's brigades now appeared, driving be- 
 fore them the stragglers, who were thronging towards the 
 bridge. 
 
GAINES'S MILL. 249 
 
 These brigades advanced boldly to the front, and by their 
 example, as well as by the steadiness of their bearing, reani- 
 mated our own troops, and warned the enemy that reinforce- 
 ments had arrived. It was now dusk. The enemy, already 
 repulsed several times, with terrible slaughter, and hearing 
 the shouts of the fresh troops, failed to follow up their ad- 
 vantage. This gave an opportunity to rally our men behind 
 the brigades of General French and Meagher, and they again 
 marched up the hill, ready to repulse another attack. During 
 the night, our thinned and exhausted regiments were all with- 
 drawn in safety, and by the following morning, all had reached 
 the other side of the stream. The regular infantry formed 
 the rear guard, and about 6 o'clock, on the morning of 
 the 28th, crossed the river, destroying the bridge behind 
 them. 
 
 Our loss in this battle, in killed, woimded and missing, was 
 very heavy, especially in officers, many of whom were killed, 
 wounded or taken prisoners, while gallantly leading on their 
 men, or rallying them to renewed exertions. It is impossible 
 to arrive at the exact numbers lost in this desperate engage- 
 ment, owing to the series of battles which followed each other 
 in quick succession, and in which the whole array was engaged. 
 No general returns were made, until after we had arrived at 
 Harrison's Landing, when the losses for the whole seven days 
 were estimated together. 
 
 Although we were finally forced from our first line, after 
 the enemy had been repeatedly driven back, yet the objects 
 sought for, had been attained. The enemy was held at bay, 
 our siege-guns and material were saved, and the right wing 
 had now joined the main body of the army. 
 
 The number of guns captured by the enemy at this battle, 
 was 22. Three of which were lost by being run off" the bi-idge 
 during the final withdrawal. 
 
 Great credit is due for the efiiciency and bravery, wnth 
 which this arm of the service (the artillery) was fought, and 
 it was not until the last successful charge of the enemy, that 
 the cannoneers were driven from their pieces, or struck down, 
 and the guns captured. Deidrich's, Knieriem's, and Grimmis's 
 batteries, took position during the engagement, in the front 
 
250 SECONB PERIOD. 
 
 of General Smith's line, on the right bank of the stream, and 
 with a battery of siege-guns, served by the First Connecticut 
 Artillery, helped to drive back the enemy in front of General 
 Porter. 
 
 So threatening were the movements of the enemy, on both 
 banks of the Chickahominy, that it was impossible to decide, 
 until the afternoon, where the real attack would be made. 
 Large forces of infantry were seen during the day, near the 
 Old Tavern, on Franklin's right, and threatening demonstra- 
 tions were frequently made along the entire line, on this side 
 of the liver, which rendered it necessary to hold a considera- 
 ble force in position to meet them. 
 
 On the 26th a circular was sent to the corps commanders on 
 the right bank of the river, asking them how many of their 
 troops could be spared to reinforce General Porter, after re- 
 taining sufficient to hold their positions for twenty-four hours. 
 
 To this the following replies were received : 
 
 Head-Quarters, 3d Corps, 
 Juue 26. 4 P.M. 
 Gen. R. B. Marct :— 
 
 I think I can hold the intrenchments with four brigades for 
 twenty-four hours. That would leave two brigades disposable 
 for service on the other side of the river, but the men are so 
 tired and worn out that I fear they would not be in a condi- 
 tion to fight after making a march of any distance. * * * 
 
 S. P. Heintzelman, 
 
 Brigadier-General. 
 
 Telegrams from General Heintzelman on the 25th and 26th 
 had indicated that the enemy was in large force in front of 
 Generals Hooker and Kearney, and on the Charles City road 
 (Longstreet, Hill and Huger), and General Heintzelman ex- 
 pressed the opinion on the night of the 25th that he could not 
 hold his advanced position without reinforcements. 
 
 General Keyes telegraphed : 
 
 "As to how many men will be able to hold this position for 
 
GAINES'S MILL. 251 
 
 twenty-four hours, I must answer, all I have, if the enemy is 
 as strong as ever in front, it having at all times appeared to 
 me that our forces on this flank are small enough." 
 
 On the morning of the 27th the following dispatch was sent 
 to General Sumner : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 June 27. 8.45 a.m. 
 Gen. E. V. Sumner : — 
 
 " General Smith just reports that ' six or eight regiments 
 have moved down to the woods in front of General Sum- 
 ner.' " 
 
 R. B. Marcy, 
 
 Chief-of-Staff. 
 
 At 11 o'clock A.M. General Sumner telegraphed as follows : 
 " The enemy threatens an attack on my right, near Smith." 
 At 12.30 P.M. he telegraphed : 
 " Sharp shelling on both sides." 
 At 2.45 P.M. : 
 
 " Sharp musketry firing in front of Burns. We are reply- 
 ing with artillery and infantry. The man on the look-out re- 
 ports some troops drawn up in line of battle about opposite 
 my right and Smith's left ; the number cannot be made out." 
 
 In accordance with orders given on the night of the 26th, 
 General Slocum's division commenced crossing the river to 
 support General Porter, soon after daybreak on the morning 
 of the 27th ; but, as the firing in front of General Porter 
 ceased, the movement was suspended. At 2 p.m. General 
 Porter called for reinforcements. I ordered them at once, and 
 at 3.25 P.M. sent him the fallowing: 
 
 " Slocutn is now crossing Alexander's Bridge with his whole 
 
252 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 command. Enemy has commenced an infontry attack on 
 Smith's left. I have ordered down Sumner's and Heintzel- 
 man's reserves, and you can count ou the whole of Slocum's. 
 Go on as you have begun." 
 
 During the day the following dispatches were received, 
 wliich will show the condition of affairs on the right bank of 
 the Chickahominy : 
 
 June 21, 1862. 
 To CoL. A. V. COLBUEN, 
 
 Ass^t.-AdJ.- Gen. 
 
 General Smith thinks the enemy are massing heavy col- 
 umns in the clearings to the right of James Garnett's House, 
 and on the other side of the river opposite it. Three regi- 
 ments are reported to be moving from Sumner's to Smith's 
 front. The arrangements are very good — made by Smith. 
 
 W. B. Franklin, 
 
 Brigadier-General. 
 
 Afterwards he telegraphed : 
 
 " The enemy has begun an attack on Smith's left with in- 
 fantry. I know no details." 
 
 Afterwards the following : 
 
 " The enemy has opened on Smith from a battery of three 
 pieces, to the light of the White House. Our shells are 
 bursting well, and Smith thinks Sumner will soon have a cross 
 fire upon them that will silence them." 
 
 Afterwards, at 5.50 p.m., the following was sent to General 
 
 Keyes : 
 
 " Please send one brigade of Couch's division to these head- 
 quarters without a moment's delay. A stafi" officer will be 
 here to direct the brigade where to go." 
 
GAINES'S MILL. 253 
 
 Subsequently the following was sent to Generals Sumner and 
 Franklin : 
 
 " Is there any sign of the enemy being in force in your front ? 
 Can you spare any more force to be sent to General Porter ? 
 Answer at once." 
 
 At 5.15 P.M. the following was received from General 
 Franklin : 
 
 " I do not think it prudent to take any more troops from 
 here at present." 
 
 General Sumner replied as follows : 
 
 " If the general desires to trust the defense of my position to 
 my front line alone, I can send French with three regiments, 
 and Meagher with his brigade to the right ; every thing is so 
 uncertain, that I think it would be hazardous to do it." 
 
 These two brigades were sent to reinforce General Porter, 
 as has been observed. 
 
 At 5.25, I sent the following to General Franklin : 
 
 " Porter is hard pressed, it is not a question of prudence, 
 but of possibilities. Can you possibly maintain your position 
 until dark with two brigades ? I have ordered eight regi- 
 ments of Sumner's to support Porter, one brigade of Couch to 
 this place ; Heintzelman's reserve to go in rear of Sumner. If 
 possible send a brigade to support Porter ; it should follow 
 the regiments ordered from Sumner," 
 
 At 7.35, the following was sent to General Sumner : 
 
 " If it is possible send another brigade to reinforce General 
 Smith. It is said three heavy columns of infantry are moving 
 on him." 
 
 From the foregoing dispatches it will be seen that all dis- 
 
254 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 posable troops were sent from the right bank of the river to 
 reinforce General Porter, and that the corps commanders were 
 left with smaller forces to hold their positions than they 
 deemed adequate. 
 
 To have done more, even though Porter's reverse had been 
 prevented, would have had the still more disastrous result, of 
 imperilling the whole movement across the Peninsula. 
 
 CHANGE OF BASE. 
 
 The operations of this day proved the numerical superiority 
 of the enemy, and made it evident that while he had a large 
 army on the left bank of the Chickahominy, which had already 
 turned our right, and was in position to intercept the com- 
 munications with our depots at the White House ; he was also 
 in large force between our army and Richmond. I therefore 
 effected a junction of our forces. 
 
 This might probably have been executed on either side of 
 the Chickahominy, and if the concentration had been effected 
 on the left bank, it is possible we might, Avith our entire force 
 have defeated the enemy there ; but at that time they held the 
 roads leading to the White House, so that it would have been 
 impossible to have sent forward supply trains in advance of 
 the army in that direction, and the guarding of these trains 
 would have seriously embarrassed our operations in the battle. 
 We would have been compelled to fight if concentrated on that 
 bank of the river. Moreover, we would at once have been 
 followed by the enemy's forces upon the Richmond side of the 
 river operating upon our rear, and if in the chances of war, 
 we had been ourselves defeated in the effort, we would have 
 been forced to fall back to the White House, and probably to 
 Fort Monroe ; and as both our flanks and rear would then 
 have been entirely exposed, our entire supply train, if not the 
 greater part of the army itself might have been lost. 
 
 The movements of the enemy showed that they expected 
 this, and as they themselves acknowledged, they were pre- 
 pared to cut off our retreat in that direction. I therefore con- 
 centrated all our forces on the right bank of the river during 
 
CHANGE OF BASE. 255 
 
 the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th, all our wagons, 
 heavy guns, ,&c., were gathered there. 
 
 It may be asked, why, after the concentration of our forces 
 on the right bank of the Chickahominy, with a large part of 
 the enemy drawn away from Richmond, upon the opposite 
 side, I did not, instead of striking for James River tifteen 
 miles below that place, at once march directly on Richmond. 
 
 It will be remembered, that at this juncture the enemy was 
 on our rear, and there was every reason to believe that he 
 would sever our commimications with our supply depot at the 
 White House. 
 
 We had on hand but a limited amount of rations, and if we 
 had advanced directly on Richmond it would have required 
 considerable time to carry the strong works around that place, 
 during which our men would have been destitute of food ; and 
 even if Richmond had fallen before our arms, the enemy could 
 still have occupied our supply communications between that 
 place and the gun-boats, and turned their disaster into victory. 
 If, on the other hand, the enemy had concentrated all his 
 forces at Richmond during the progress of our attack, and we 
 had been defeated, we must in all probability have lost our 
 trains before reaching the flotilla. 
 
 The battles which continued day after day, in the progress 
 of our flank movement to the James, with the exception of 
 the one at Gaines's Mill, were successes to our arms, and the 
 closing engagement at Malvern Hill was the most decisive 
 of all. 
 
 On the evening of the 2'7th of June, I assembled the corps 
 commanders at my head-quarters, and informed them of the 
 plan, its reasons, and my choice of route and method of exe- 
 cution. 
 
 Gen. Keyes was directed to move his corps, with its artillery 
 and baggage, across the White Oak Swamp bridge, and to seize 
 strong positions on the opposite side of the swamp, to cover 
 the passage of the other troops and trains. 
 
 This order was executed on the 28th by noon. Before day- 
 break on the 28th I went to Savage's Station, and remained 
 there during the day and night, directing the withdrawal of 
 the trains and supplies of the army. 
 
256 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 Orders were given to the different commanders to load their 
 wagons with ammunition and provisions, and the necessary 
 baggage of the officers and men, and to destroy all property 
 which could not be transported with the army. Oiders were 
 also given to leave with those of the sick and wounded who 
 could not be transported, a proper complement of surgeons 
 and attendants, with a bountiful supply of rations and medical 
 stores. 
 
 The large herd of 2,500 beef cattle was, by the chief com- 
 missary, Col. Clark, transferred to the James River without 
 loss. 
 
 On the morning of the 28th, while Gen. Franklin was with- 
 drawing his command from Golding's farm, the enemy opened 
 upon Gen. Smith's division from Garnett's Hill, from the Val- 
 ley above, and from Gaines's Hill on the opposite side of the 
 Chickahorainy, and shortly afterwards two Georgia regiments 
 attempted to carry the Avorks about to be evacuated, but this 
 attack was repulsed by the 23d New York, and the 49th 
 Pennsylvania Volunteers on picket, and a section of Mott's 
 battery. 
 
 Porter's corps was moved across White Oak Swamp during 
 the day and night, and took up positions covering the i-oads 
 leading from Richmond towards White Oak Swamp and Long 
 Bridge. McCall's division was ordered, on the night of the 
 28th, to move across the Swamp and take a proper position 
 to assist in covering the remaining troops and trains. During 
 the same night the corps of Sumner, Heintzelman, and the 
 division of Smith, were ordered to an interior line, the left 
 resting on Keyes' old intrenchments, and curving to the right 
 so as to cover Savage's Station. General Slocum's division, 
 of Franklin's corps, was ordered to Savage's Station in reserve. 
 They were ordered to hold this position until dark of the 
 29th, in order to cover the withdrawal of the trains, and then 
 to fall back across the Swamp and unite with the remainder 
 of the army. 
 
 On the 28th I sent the following to the Secretary of War: 
 
CHANGE OF BASE. 257 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Savage's Station, June 28, 1862. 12.20 a.m. 
 
 I now know the whole history of the day. On this side of 
 the river, the right bank, we repulsed several strong attacks ; 
 on the left bank our men did all that men could do — all that 
 soldiers could accomplish, but they were overwhelmed by 
 vastly superior numbers soon after I had brought ray last re- 
 serves into action. The loss on both sides is terrible. I be- 
 lieve it will prove to be the most desperate battle of the war. 
 The sad remnants of my men behave as men — those battalions 
 who fought most bravely, and suiFered most, are still in the 
 best order. My regulars were superb ; and I count upon what 
 are left to turn another battle in company with their gallant 
 comrades of the volunteers. Had I (20,000) twenty thousand, 
 or even (10,000) ten thousand fresh troops to use to-morrow, 
 I could take Richmond ; but I have not a man in reserve, and 
 shall be glad to cover my retreat, and save the material and 
 personnel of the army. 
 
 If we have lost the day, we have yet preserved our honor, 
 and no one need blush for the army of the Potomac. I have 
 lost this battle, because my force was too small. 
 
 I again repeat that I am not responsible for this, and I say 
 it with the earnestness of a general, who feels in his heart, the 
 loss of every brave man who has been needlessly sacrificed to- 
 day. I still hope to retrieve our fortunes, but to do this, the 
 government must view the matter in the same earnest light 
 that I do. You must send me very large reinforcements, and 
 send them at once. 
 
 I shall draw back to this side of the Chickahorainy, and 
 think I can withdraw all our material. Pleasa understand 
 that in this battle we have lost nothing but men, and those 
 the best we have. 
 
 In addition to what I have already said, I only wish to say 
 to the President, that I think he is wrong in regarding me as 
 ungenerous, when I said that my force was too weak. I 
 merely reiterated a truth, which to-day has l)een too plainly 
 proved. If, at this instant, I could dispose of (10,000) ten 
 thousand fresh men, I could gain the victory to-morrow. 
 
 I know that a few thousand more men, would have changed 
 
258 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 this battle from a defeat to a victory ; as it is, the government 
 must not, and cannot, hold me responsible for the result. 
 
 I feel too earnestly to-night, I have seen too many dead and 
 wounded comrades, to feel otherwise than that the govern- 
 ment lias not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, 
 the game is lost. 
 
 If I save this army now, I tell yon plainly that I owe no 
 thanks to you, or to any other persons in Washington. 
 You have done your best to sacrifice this army. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General, 
 To Hon. E. M. Stanton, 
 Secretary of War. 
 
 The head-quarters' camp, at Savage's Station, was broken 
 up early on the morning of the 29th, and moved across White 
 Oak Swamp. 
 
 As the essential part of this day's operations was the passage 
 of the trains across the Swamp, and their protection against 
 attack from the direction of New Market and Richmond, as 
 well as the immediate and secure establishment of our com- 
 munications with the gun-boats, I passed the day in examining 
 the ground, directing the posting of the troops, and securing 
 the uninterrupted movement of the trains. 
 
 In the afternoon, I instructed General Keyes to move during 
 the night to James River, and occupy a defensive position 
 near Malvern Hill, to secure our extreme left flanks. 
 
 General F. J. Porter was ordered to follow him, and pro- 
 long the line towards the right. The trains were to be pushed 
 on towards James River in rear of these corps, and placed 
 under the protection of the gun-boats as they arrived. 
 
 A sharp skirmish with the enemy's cavalry, early this day 
 on the Quaker Road, showed that his efforts were about to 
 be directed towards impeding our progress to the river, and 
 rendered my presence in that quarter necesssary. 
 
Allen's field. 259 
 
 ALLEN'S FIELD 
 
 General Sumner vacated his works at Fair Oaks on June 
 29th, at clay-Ught, and marched his command to Orchard 
 Station, halting at Allen's Field, between Orchard and Savage's 
 Stations. 
 
 The diAdsions of Richardson and Sedgwick, were formed on 
 the right of the railroad, facing towards Richmond, Richard- 
 son holding the right, and Sedgwick joining the right of 
 Heintzelman's corps. 
 
 The first hne of Richardson's division was held by General 
 French, General Caldwell supporting in the second. A log 
 building in front of Richardson's division, was held by Col. 
 Brooks with one regiment, (53d Pennsylvania volunteers,) 
 Avith Hazzard's battery on an elevated piece of ground, a little 
 in rear of Col. Brooks's command. 
 
 At 9 A.M., the enemy commenced a furious attack on the 
 right of General Sedgwick, but were repulsed. The left of 
 General Richardson was next attacked, the enemy attempting 
 in vain to carry the position of Col. Brooks. Capt. Hazzard's 
 battery, and Capt. Pettit's battery, which afterwards replaced 
 it, were served with great effect, while the 53d Pennsylvania, 
 kept up a steady fire on the advancing enemy, compelhng 
 them at last to retire in disorder. The enemy renewed the 
 attack three times, but were as often repulsed. 
 
 SAVAGE'S STATION. 
 
 General Slocum arrived at Savage's Station at an early horn- 
 on the 29th, and was ordered to cross White Oak Swamp and 
 relieve General Keyes' corps. As soon as General Keyes was 
 thus relieved, he moved towards James River, which he 
 reached in safety, with all his artillery and baggage, early on 
 the morning of the 30th, and took up a position below Turkey 
 Creek Bridge. 
 
 During the morning General Frankhn heard that the enemy, 
 after having repaired the bridges, was crossing the Chick- 
 
260 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 ahorainy in large force, and advancing toward Savage's 
 Station. He communicated this information to General Sum- 
 ner at Allen's Farm, and moved Smith's division to Savage's 
 Station. 
 
 A little after noon General Sumner united his forces with 
 those of General Franklin, and assumed command. 
 
 I had ordered General Heintzelman, with his corps, to hold 
 the Williamsburg road until dark at a point where were seve- 
 ral field works, and a skirt of timber between these works and 
 the railroad ; but he fell back before night, and crossed White 
 Oak Swamp at Brackett's Ford. 
 
 General Sumner, in his report of the battle of Savage's Sta- 
 tion, says : " When the enemy appeared on the Williamsburg 
 road, I could not imagine why General Heintzelman did not 
 attack him, and not till some time afterwards did I learn, to 
 my utter amazement, that General Heintzelman had left the 
 field and retreated with his whole corps (about 15,000 men) 
 before the action commenced. This defection might have been 
 attended with the most disastrous consequences, and although 
 we beat the enemy signally and drove him from the field, we 
 should certainly have given him a more crushing blow if Gen- 
 eral Heintzelman had been there with his corps." 
 
 General Heintzelman, in the report of the operations of his 
 corps, says : 
 
 " On the night of the 28th of June I received orders to 
 withdraw the troops of my corps from the advanced position 
 they had taken on the 25th of June, and to occupy the in- 
 trenched lines about a mile in rear. A map was sent me show- 
 ing me the positions General Sumner's and General Franklin's 
 corps would occupy. About sunrise the next day our troops 
 slowly fell back to the new position, cautiously followed by 
 the enemy taking possession of our camps as soon as we left 
 them. 
 
 " From some misapprehension General Sumner held a more 
 advanced position than was indicated on the map furnished 
 me, thus leaving a space of about three fourths of a mile be- 
 tween the right of his corps and General Smith's division of 
 General Franklin's corps, * * * * 
 
savage's station. 261 
 
 At 11 a.m. on the 29th the enemy commenced an attack on 
 General Sumner's troops, a few shells falling within my lines. 
 Late in the afternoon reports reached me that the rebels were 
 in possession of Dr. Trent's house, only a mile and a half from 
 Savage's Station. I sent several cavalry reconnoissances, and 
 finally was satisfied of the fact. General Franklin came to my 
 head-quarters, when I learned of the interval between his left 
 and General Sumner's right, in which space Dr. Trent's house 
 is. Also that the rebels had repaired one of the bridges across 
 the Chickahominy, and were advancing. * * 
 
 " I rode forward to see General Sumner, and met his 
 troops falling back on the Williamsburg road, through my 
 lines. General Sumner informed me that he intended to make 
 a stand at Savage's Station, and for me to join him to deter- 
 mine upon the position. This movement of General Sumner's 
 uncovering ray right flank, it became necessary for me at once 
 to withdraw my troops. * * * * 
 
 " I rode back to find General Sumner; after some delay from 
 the mass of troops in the field, I found him and learned that 
 the course of action had been determined on : so returned to 
 my command, and to give the necessary orders for the destruc- 
 tion of the railroad cars, ammunition, and provisions still re- 
 maining on the ground. * * * * 
 
 " The whole open space near Savage's Station was crowded 
 with troops, more than I supposed could be brought into action 
 judiciously. An aide from the commanding general had in the 
 morning reported to me, to point out a road across the White 
 Oak Swamp, starting from the left of General Kearney's posi- 
 tion and leading by Brackett's Ford. * * * The advance 
 of the column reached the Charles City road at 6i p.m., and 
 the rear at 10 p.m., without accident." 
 
 The orders given by me to Generals Sumner, Heintzelman 
 and Franklin, were to hold the positions assigned them until 
 dark. As stated by General Heintzelman, General Sumner did 
 not occupy the designated position, but as he was the senior 
 ofiicer present on that side of the White Oak Swamp, he may 
 have thought that the movements of the enemy justified a 
 deviation from the letter of the orders. It appears from his 
 
262 SECOND PEKIOD. 
 
 report that he assumed command of all the troops near Sav- 
 age's Station, and determined to resist the enemy there, and 
 that he gave General Heintzelman orders to hold the same 
 position as I had assigned him. 
 
 The aide sent by me to General Heintzelman, to point out 
 the road across the swamp, was to guide him in retiring after 
 dark. 
 
 On reaching Savage's Station, Sumner's and Franklin's com- 
 mands were drawn up in line of battle in the large open field 
 to the left of the railroad, the left resting on the edge of the 
 woods, and the right extending down to the railroad. 
 
 General Brooks, with his brigade, held the wood to the left 
 of the field, where he did excellent service, receiving a wound, 
 but retaining his command. 
 
 General Hancock's brigade was thrown into the woods on 
 the right and front. 
 
 At 4 P.M. the enemy commenced his attack in large force by 
 the Williamsburg road. It was gallantly met by General 
 Burns' brigade, supported and reinforced by two lines in 
 reserve, and finally by the New York 69th, Hazzard's and 
 Pettit's batteries again doing good service. Osborne's and 
 Bramhall's batteries also took part effectively in this action, 
 which Avas continued with great obstinacy until between 8 and 
 9 P.M., when the enemy Avere driven from the field. 
 
 MOVEMENTS TOWARD JAMES RIVER. 
 
 Immediately after the battle the orders were repeated for 
 all the troops to fall back and cross White Oak Swamp, which 
 was accomplished during the night, in good order. 
 
 By midnight all the troops Avere on the road to White Oak 
 Swamp Bridge, General French, with his brigade, acting as 
 rear guard, and at 5 a.m. on the 30th all had crossed, and the 
 bridge was destroyed. 
 
 On the afternoon and night of the 29th I gave the corps 
 commanders their instructions for the opei'ations of the follow- 
 ing day. As stated before. Porter's corps was to move for- 
 ward to James River, and with the corps of General Keyes, 
 
MOVEMENTS TOWARD JAMES RIVER. 263 
 
 to occupy .1 position at or near Turkey Bend, on a line perpen- 
 dicular to the river, thus covering the Charles City road to 
 Richmond, opening communication with the gun-boats, and 
 covering the passage of the supply trains, which were pushed 
 forward as rapidly as possible upon Haxall's plantation. The 
 remaining corps were pressed onward, and posted so as to 
 guard the approaches from Richmond as well as the crossing 
 of the White Oak Swamp, over which the army had passed. 
 
 General Franklin was ordered to hold the passage of White 
 Oak Swamp Bridge, and cover the withdrawal of the trains 
 from that point. His command consisted of his own corps, 
 with General Richardson's division and General Naglee's 
 brigade placed under his orders for the occasion. 
 
 General Slocum's division was on the right of the Charles 
 City road. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th I again gave to the corps com- 
 manders within reach instructions for posting their troops. I 
 found that, notwithstanding all the efforts of my personal staff 
 and other officers, the roads were blocked by wagons, and 
 there was great difficulty in keeping the trains in motion. 
 
 The engineer officers whom I had sent forward on the 28th 
 to reconnoitre the roads had neither returned nor sent me any 
 reports or guides. 
 
 Generals Keyes and Porter had been delayed, one by losing 
 the road, and the other in repairing an old road, and had not 
 been able to send me any information. We then knew of but 
 one road for the movement of troops and our immense 
 trains. 
 
 It was therefore necessary to post the troops in advance of 
 this road, as well as our limited knowledge of the ground per- 
 mitted, so as to cover the movement of the trains in rear. 
 
 I then examined the whole line from the swamp to the left, 
 giving final instructions for the posting of the troops and the 
 obstruction of the roads towards Richmond, and all corps 
 commanders were directed to hold their positions until the 
 trains had passed, after which a more concentrated position 
 was to be taken up near James River. 
 
 Our force was too small to occupy and hold the entire line 
 from the White Oak Swamp to the river, exposed as it was 
 
264 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 to be taken in reverse by a movement across the lower part 
 of the swamp, or across the Chickahommy below the swamp. 
 Moreover, the troops were then greatly exhausted, and re- 
 quired rest in a more secure position, 
 
 I extended my examinations of the country as far as Haxall's, 
 looking at all the approaches to Malvern, which position I per- 
 ceived to be the key to our operations in this quarter, and was 
 thus enabled to expedite very considerably the passage of the 
 trains, and to rectify the positions of the troops. 
 
 Everything being then quiet, I sent aids to the different 
 corps commanders to inform them what I had done on the 
 left, and to bring me information of the condition of affairs on 
 the right. I returned from Malvern to Haxall's, and, having 
 made arrangements for instant communication from Malvern 
 by signals, went on board of Captain Rodgers's gun-boat, lying 
 near, to confer with him in reference to the condition of our 
 supply vessels, and the state of things on the river. 
 
 It was his opinion that it would be necessary for the army 
 to fall back to a position below City Point, as the channel there 
 was so near the southern shore that it would not be possible 
 to bring up the transports, should the enemy occupy it. Har- 
 rison's Landing was, in his opinion, the nearest suitable point. 
 Upon the termination of this interview, I returned to Malvern 
 Hill, and remained there until shortly before daylight. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th General Sumner was ordered 
 to march with Sedgwick's division to Glendale (" Nelson's 
 Farm"). 
 
 General McCall's division (Pennsylvania Reserves) was 
 halted during the morning on the New Market road, just in 
 advance of the point where a road tui-ns off to Quaker Church. 
 His line was formed perpendicularly to the New Market road, 
 with Meade's brigade on the right, Seymour's on the left, and 
 Reynolds's brigade, commanded by Colonel S. G. Simmons, 
 of the 5th Pennsylvania, in reserve. Randall's regular battery 
 on the right, Kern's and Cooper's batteries opposite the cen- 
 tre, and Deitrich's and Kauerhem's batteries, of tlie artillery 
 reserve, on the left — all in front of the infantry line. The 
 country in General McCall's front was open, intersected to- 
 wards the right by the New Market road, and a small strip 
 
MOVEMENTS TOWARD JAMES RIVER 
 
 265 
 
 of timber parallel to it. The open front was about 800 yards, 
 its depth about 1,000 yards. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th General Heintzelman ordered 
 the bridge at Brackett's Ford to be destroyed, and trees to be 
 felled across that road and the Charles City road. 
 
 General Slocum's division was to extend to the Charles City 
 
 road. , 
 
 General Kearney's right to connect with General Slocum s 
 
 left. ^ , ^ ^ ., 
 
 General McCall's position was to the left of the Long Bridge 
 road, in connection with General Kearney's left. General 
 Hooker was on the left of General McCall. 
 
 WHITE-OAK SWAMP BRIDGE. 
 
 Between 12 and 1 o'clock the enemy opened a fierce can- 
 nonade upon the divisions of Smith and Richardson and Na- 
 glee's brigade at White-Oak Swamp Bridge. This artillery fire 
 was continued by the enemy through the day, and he crossed 
 some infantry below our position. Richardson's division suf- 
 fered severely. Capt. Ayres directed our artillery with great 
 efiect. Capt. Hazzard's battery, after losing many cannoneers, 
 and Capt. Hazzard being mortally wounded, was compelled to 
 retire. It was replaced by Pettit's battery, which partially 
 silenced the enemy's guns. 
 
 General Franklin held his position until after dark, repeat- 
 edly driving back the enemy in their attempts to cross the 
 White-Oak Swamp. 
 
 CHARLES CITY CROSS-ROADS, &c. 
 
 At 2 o'clock in the day the enemy were reported advancing 
 in force by the Charles City road, and at half-past 2 o'clock 
 the attack was made down the road on Gen. Slocum's left, but 
 was checked by his artillery. After this the enemy, in large 
 force, comprising the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, 
 attacked Gen. McCall, whose division, after severe fighting, was 
 
 compelled to retire. 
 
 ^ 12 
 
266 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 General McC.ill, in his report of the battle says : 
 ***** 
 
 " About half past two my pickets were driven in by a strong 
 advance, after some skirmishing without loss on our part. At 
 3 o'clock the enemy sent forward a regiment on the left centre 
 and another on the right centre, to feel for a weak point. 
 They were under cover of a shower of shells, and boldly ad- 
 vanced, but were both driven back, on the left by the 12th 
 regiment, and on the right by the 7th regiment. * * 
 
 For near two hours the battle raged hotly here. * * 
 
 " At last the enemy was comjielled to retire before the well- 
 directed musketry fire of the reserves. The German batteries 
 were driven to the rear, but I rode up and sent them back. 
 It was however of little avail, and they were soon after aban- 
 doned by the cannoneers. ***** 
 The batteries in front of the centre were boldly charged upon, 
 but the enemy was sj)eedily forced back. * * * 
 
 " Soon after this a most determined charge was made on 
 Randall's battery by a full brigade advancing in wedge-shape, 
 without order, but in perfect recklessness. 
 
 " Somewhat similar charges had, I have stated, been pre- 
 viously made on Cooper's and Kern's batteries by single regi- 
 ments without success, they having recoiled before the storm 
 of canister hurled against them. 
 
 " A like result was anticipated by Randall's battery, and 
 the 4th regiment was requested not to fire until the battery 
 had done with them. Its gallant commander did not doubt 
 his ability to repel the attack, and his guns did indeed mow 
 down the advancing host, but still the gaps were closed, and 
 the enemy came in upon a run to the very muzzle of his guns. 
 
 " It was a perfect torrent of men, and they were in his bat- 
 tery before the guns could be removed. Two guns that were 
 indeed successfully limbered had their horses killed and 
 wounded, and w^ere overturned on the spot, and the enemy 
 dashing past drove the greater part of the 4th regiment before 
 them. The left company (B) nevertheless stood its ground, 
 with its captain, Fred. A. Conrad, as did likewise certain men 
 of other companies. I had ridden into the regiment and en- 
 deavored to check them, but with only partial success. 
 
MOVEMENTS TOWAED JAMES RIVER. 267 
 ***** 
 
 " There was no running ; but my division, reduced by the 
 previous battles to Jess than (6,000) six thousand, had to con- 
 tend with the divisions of Longstreet and A. P. Hill, considered 
 two of the strongest and best among many of the Confederate 
 army, numbering that day 18,000 or 20,000 men, and it was 
 reluctantly compelled to give way before heavier force accu- 
 mulated uj)on them." 
 
 * * * * * * 
 
 General Heintzelman states, that about 5 p.m. Gen. McCall's 
 division was attacked in large force, evidently the principal 
 attack ; that in less than an hour the division gave way, and 
 adds : 
 
 " General Hooker, being on his left, by moving to the right, 
 
 repulsed the rebels in the handsomest manner, with great 
 
 slaughter. Gen. Sumner, who was with Gen. Sedgwick in 
 
 McCall's rear, also greatly aided with his artillery and infantry 
 
 in driving back the enemy. They now renewed their attack 
 
 with vigor on Gen. Kearney's left, and were again repulsed 
 
 with heavy loss. 
 
 ****** 
 
 " This attack commenced about 4 p.m., and was pushed by 
 heavy masses with the utmost determination and vigor. Capt. 
 Thompson's battery, directed with great precision, firing 
 double charges, swept them back. The whole open space, 
 200 paces wide, was filled with the enemy; each repulse brought 
 fresh troops. The third attack was only repulsed by the rapid 
 volleys and determined charge of the 63d Pennsylvania, Col. 
 Hays, and half of the 3Yth New York Volunteers." 
 
 General McCall's troops soon began to emerge from the 
 woods into the open field. Several batteries were in position 
 and began to fire into the woods over the heads of our men in 
 front. Captain De Russy's battery was placed on the right of 
 General Sumner's artillery, with orders to shell the woods. 
 General Burns's brigade was then advanced to meet the enemy, 
 and soon drove him back. Other troops began to return from 
 the "White Oak Swamp. 
 
 Later in the day, at the call of General Kearney, General 
 Taylor's 1st New Jersey brigade, Slocum's division, was sent 
 
268 SECOND PKRIOD. 
 
 to occupy a portion of General McCall's deserted position, 
 a battery accompanying the brigade. They soon drove back 
 the enemy, who shortly after gave up the attack, contenting 
 themselves with keeping up a desultory firing till late at night. 
 Between 12 and 1 o'clock at night General Heintzelman com- 
 menced to withdraw his corps, and soon after daylight both 
 of his divisions, with General Slocum's division, and a portion 
 of General Sumner's command, reached Malvern Hill, 
 
 On the morning of the 30th General Sumner, in obedience 
 to orders, had moved promptly to Glendale, and upon a call 
 from General Franklin for reinforcements, sent him two bri- 
 gades, Avhich returned in time to participate and render good 
 service in the battle near Glendale. General Sumner says of 
 this battle : 
 
 " The battle of Glendale was the most severe action since 
 the battle of Fair Oaks. About 3 o'clock p.m. the action com- 
 menced, and after a furious contest, lasting till after dark, the 
 enemy was routed at all points and driven from the field." 
 
 The rear of the supply trains and the reserve artillery of the 
 army reached Malvern Hill about 4 p.m. At about this time 
 the enemy began to appear in General Porter's front, and at 5 
 o'clock, advanced in large force against his left flank, 2')osting 
 artillery under cover of a skirt of timber, with a view to en- 
 gage our force on Malvern Hill, while with his infantry and 
 some artillery, lie attacked Colonel Warren's brigade. A con- 
 centrated fire of about thirty guns was brouglit to bear on the 
 enemy, which, with the infantry fire of Colonel Warren's com- 
 mand, compelled him to retreat, leaving two guns in the hands 
 of Colonel Warren. 
 
 The gunboats rendei-ed most efiicient aid at this time, and 
 helped to drive back the enemy. It was very late at night be- 
 fore my aides returned to give me the results of the day's 
 fighting along the whole line, and the true position of affairs. 
 While waiting to hear from General Franklin before sending 
 orders to Generals Sumner and Heintzehiian, I received a mes- 
 sage from the latter that General Franklin was falling back ; 
 whereupon I sent Colonel Colburn of my staflf with orders to 
 verify this, and if it were true, to order in Generals Sumner 
 
MALVKKN HILL. 269 
 
 and Heintzelman at once. He had not gone f;ir when he met 
 two officers sent from General FrankUn's head-quarters with 
 the information that he was faUing back. Orders were then 
 sent to Generals Sumner and Heintzelman to fall back also, and 
 definite instructions were given as to the movement, which 
 was to commence on the right. The orders met these troops 
 already en route to Malvern. Instructions were also sent to 
 General Franklin as to the route he was to follow. 
 
 General Barnard then received full instructions for posting the 
 troops as they arrived. I then returned to Haxall's, and again 
 left for Malvern soon after daybreak, accompanied by several 
 general officers. I once more made the entire circuit of the 
 position, and then returned to Haxall's, whence I went with 
 Captain Rodgers to select the final location for the army and 
 its depots. I returned to Malvern before the serious fighting 
 commenced, and after riding along the lines and seeing most 
 cause to feel anxious about the right, remained in that vicinity. 
 
 MALVERN HILL. 
 
 The position selected for resisting the further advance of the 
 enemy on the 1st of July, was with the left and centre of our 
 lines resting on " Malvern Hill," while the right curved back- 
 wards through a wooded country toward a point below Hax- 
 all's on James River. Malvern Hill is an elevated plateau 
 about a mile and a half by three-fourths of a mile area, well 
 cleared of timber, and with several converging roads running 
 over it. In front are numerous defensible ravines, and the 
 ground slopes gradually toward the north and east to the wood 
 land, giving clear ranges for artillery in those directions. 
 Toward the northwest the plateau falls oflf more abruptly into 
 a ravine which extends to James River. From the position 
 of the enemy, his most obvious lines of attack would come 
 from the directions of Richmond and White Oak Swamp, and 
 would almost of necessity strike us upon our left wing. Here, 
 therefore, the lines were strengthened by massing the troops, 
 and collecting the principal part of the artillery. Porter's 
 corus held the left of the line (Sykes' division on the left, Mo- 
 
270 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 rell's on the right) with the artillery of his two divisions advan- 
 tageously posted ; and the artillery of the reserve so disposed 
 on the high ground, that a concentrated fire of some sixty guns 
 could be brought to bear on any point in his front or left. 
 Colonel Tyler also had, with great exertion, succeeded in get- 
 ting ten of his siege guns in position on the highest point of 
 the hill. 
 
 Couch's division was placed on the right of Porter, next 
 came Kearney and Hooker, next Sedgwick and Richardson, 
 next Smith and Slocum, then the remainder of Keyes' corps, 
 extending by a backward curve nearly to the river. The 
 Pennsylvania Reserve Corps was held in reserve, and stationed 
 behind Porter's and Couch's position. One brigade of Porter's 
 was thrown to the left on the low ground, to protect the flank 
 from any movement direct from the Richmond road. The line 
 was very strong along the whole front of the open plateau ; 
 but from thence to tlie extreme right, the troops were more 
 deployed. This formation was imperative, as an attack would 
 probably be made upon our left. 
 
 The right was rendered as secure as ^^ossible by slashing the 
 timber and by barricading the roads. Commodore Rodgers, 
 commanding the flotilla on James River, placed his gun-boats 
 so as to protect our flanks, and to command the approaches 
 from Richmond. 
 
 Between 9 and 10 a.m. the enemy commenced feeling along 
 our whole left wing with his artillery and skirmishers, as far 
 to the right as Hooker's division. 
 
 About two o'clock a column of the enemy was observed 
 moving towards our right, within the skirt of woods in front 
 of Heintzehnan's corps, but beyond the range of our artillery. 
 Arrangements were at once made to meet the anticipated at- 
 tack in that quarter ; but though the column was long, occu- 
 pying more than two hours in passing, it disappeared, and was 
 not again heard of The presumj^tion is, that it retired by the 
 rear, and participated in the attack afterwards made on our 
 left. 
 
 About 3 P.M. a heavy fire of artilleiy opened on Kearney's 
 left, and Couch's division, speedily followed up by a brisk 
 attack of infintry on Couch's front. The artillery was replied 
 
MALVERN HILL. 271 
 
 to with good effect by our own, and the infantry of Couch's 
 division remained lying on the ground until the advancing 
 column was within short musketry range, when they sprang 
 to their feet, and poured in a deadly volley, which entirely 
 broke the attacking force, and drove them in disorder back 
 over their own ground. This advantage was followed up until 
 we had advanced the right of our line some seven or eight 
 hundred yards, and rested upon a thick clump of trees, giving 
 us a stronger position, and a better fire. 
 
 Shortly after four o'clock the firing ceased along the whole 
 front ; but no disposition was evinced on the part of the enemy 
 to withdraw from the field. 
 
 Caldwell's brigade having been detached from Richardson's 
 division was stationed upon Couch's right, by General Porter, 
 to whom he had been ordered to report. The whole line, was 
 surveyed by the generals, and every thing held in readiness to 
 meet the coming attack. At six o'clock the enemy suddenly 
 opened upon Couch and Porter with the whole strength of 
 his artillery, and at once began pushing forward his columns 
 of attack to carry the hill. Brigade after brigade formed 
 under cover of the woods, started at a run to cross the open 
 space and charge our batteries ; but the heavy fire of our guns, 
 with the cool and steady volleys of our infantry, in every case, 
 sent them reeling back to shelter, and covered the ground with 
 their dead and wounded. In several instances our infantry 
 withheld their fire until the attacking columns, which rushed 
 through the storm of canister and shell from our artillery, 
 had reached within a few yards of our lines. They then poured 
 in a single volley, and dashed forward with the bayonet, cap- 
 turing prisoners and colors, and driving the routed columns in 
 confusion from the field. 
 
 About seven o'clock, as fresh troops were accumulating in 
 front of Porter and Couch, Meagher and Sickles were sent 
 with their brigades as soon as it was considered prudent to 
 withdraw any portion of Sumner's and Heintzelman's troops to 
 reinforce that part of the line, and hold the position. These 
 brigades relieved such regiments of Porter's corps and Couch's 
 division, as had expended their ammunition, and batteries from 
 the reserve were pushed forward to replace those whose boxes 
 
272 SECOND PERIOD. 
 
 were empty. Until dark the enemy persisted in his efforts to 
 take the position so tenaciously defended ; but despite his 
 vastly superior numbers, his repeated and desperate attacks 
 were repulsed with fearful loss, and darkness ended the battle 
 of Malvern Hill, though it was not until after nine o'clock that 
 the artillery ceased its fire. 
 
 During the whole battle Commodore Rodgers added greatly 
 to the discomfiture of the enemy, by throwing shells among 
 his reserves and advancing columns. 
 
 As the army, in its movement from the Chickahorainy to 
 Harrison's Landing, was conticually occupied in marching by 
 night and fighting by day, its commanders found no time or 
 opportunity for collecting data, which would enable them to 
 give exact returns of casualties in each engagement. The ag- 
 gregate of our entire losses, from the 26th of June to the 1st 
 of July, inclusive, was ascertained, after arriving at Harrison's 
 Landing, to be as follows : — 
 
 List of the killed, loounded and missing, in the army of the 
 Potomac, from the 2Qth of June, 1862, to the \st of July, 
 1862, inclusive. 
 
 CORPS. KILLED. 
 
 1st. — McCall's Pemi. Reserves, 253 
 
 2d. — Sumner's, - - 187 
 
 3tl. — Heintzelmaa's, - - 189 
 
 4th.— Keyes', ... 69 
 
 5th.— Porter's, - - - 620 
 
 6th.— Franklin's, - - 245 
 Engineers, - - - 
 
 Cavalry, - - - 19 
 
 Total, - ■ 1,582 7,709 5,958 15,249 
 
 MOVEMENT TO HARRISON'S LANDING. 
 
 Although the result of the battle of Malvern was a complete 
 victory, it was nevertheless necessary to fall back still further, 
 in order to reach a point where our supplies could be brought 
 to us with certainty. As before stated, in the opinion of Cap- 
 
 BOUNDED. 
 
 MISSING. 
 
 AGO REG ATE. 
 
 1,240 
 
 1,581 
 
 3,074 
 
 1,076 
 
 848 
 
 2,111 
 
 1,051 
 
 833 
 
 2,073 
 
 507 
 
 201 
 
 777 
 
 2,460 
 
 1,198 
 
 4,278 
 
 1,313 
 
 1,179 
 
 2,737 
 
 2 
 
 21 
 
 23 
 
 60 
 
 97 
 
 176 
 
MOVEMENT TO HARRISON's LANDING. 273 
 
 tain Rodgers, commanding the gun-boat flotilla, this could 
 only be done below City Point. Concurring in his opinion, I 
 selected Harrison's Bar as the new position of the army. The 
 exhaustion of our supplies of food, forage and ammunition, 
 made it imperative to reach the transports immediately. 
 
 The greater portion of the transportation of the army hav- 
 ing been started for Harrison's Landing during the night of 
 the 30th of June and 1st of July, the order for the move- 
 ment of the troops was at once issued upon the final repulse 
 of the enemy at Malvern Hill. 
 
 The order prescribed a movement by the left and rear. 
 General Keyes' corps to cover the manoeuvre. It was not 
 carried out in detail as regards the divisions on the left, the 
 roads being somewhat blocked by the rear of our trains. 
 Porter and Couch were not able to move out as early as had 
 been anticipated, and Porter found it necessary to j^lace a 
 rear-guard between his command and the enemy. Colonel 
 Averill, of the 3d Pennsylvania Cavalry, was entrusted with 
 this delicate duty. He had under his command his own regi- 
 ment and Lieutenant-Colonel Buchanan's brigade of regular 
 infantry, and one battery. By a judicious use of the resources 
 at his command, he deceived the enemy so as to cover the 
 withdrawal of the left wing without being attacked, remain- 
 ing himself on the previous day's battle-field until about V 
 o'clock of the 2d July. Meantime, General Keyes having re- 
 ceived his orders, commenced vigorous preparations for cover- 
 ing the movement of the entire army, and protecting the 
 trains. It being evident that the immense number of wagons 
 and artillery carriages pertaining to the army could not move 
 with celerity along a single road. General Keyes took advan- 
 tage of every accident of the ground to open new avenues, 
 and to facilitate the movement. He made preparations for 
 obstructing the roads after the army had passed, so as to pre- 
 vent any rapid pursuit, destroying effectually Turkey Bridge, 
 on the main road, and rendering other roads and approaches 
 temporarily impassable by felling trees across them. He kept 
 the trains well closed up, and directed the march so that the 
 troops could move on each side of the roads, not obstructing 
 the passage, but being in good position to repel an attack 
 
274 SECOND PEKIOD. 
 
 from any quarter. His dispositions were so successful that, 
 to use his own words : " I do not think more vehicles or more 
 public property were abandoned on the march from Turkey 
 Bridge than would have been left, in the same state of the 
 roads, if the army had been moving toward the enemy, in- 
 stead of away from him ; and when it is understood that the 
 carriages and teams belonging to this army, stretched out in 
 one line, would extend not far from forty miles, the energy 
 and caution necessary for their safe withdrawal from the pres- 
 ence of an enemy vastly superior in numbers, will be appre- 
 ciated." 
 
 The last of the wagons did not reach the site selected at 
 Harrison's Bar, until after dark on the 3d of July, and the 
 rear guard did not move into their camp until every thing was 
 secure. The enemy followed up with a small force, and on 
 the 3d threw a few shells at the rear guard, but were quickly 
 dispersed by our batteries, and the fire of the gun-boats. 
 
 Great credit must be awarded to General Keyes, for the 
 skill and energy which characterized his performance of the 
 important and delicate duties entrusted to his charge. 
 
 High praise is also due to the officers and men of the 1st 
 Connecticut Artillery, Col. Tyler, for the manner in which they 
 withdrew all the heavy guns during the seven days, and from 
 Malvern Hill. Owing to the crowded state of the roads, the 
 teams could not be brought witliin a couple of miles of the 
 position, but these energetic soldiers removed the guns by 
 hand for that distance, leaving nothing behind. 
 
THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN". 
 
 On the 1st of July, I received the following from the Presi- 
 dent : 
 
 Washington, July 1, 1862. 3.30 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan,— 
 
 It is impossible to reinforce you for your present emergency. 
 If we h.ad a million of men, we could not get them to give you 
 in time. We have not the men to send. If you are not strong 
 enough to face the enemy, you must find a place of security 
 and wait, rest and repair. 
 
 Maintain your ground if you can, but save the army at all 
 events, even if you fall back to Fort Monroe. We still have 
 strength enough in the country, and will bring it out. 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 In a dispatch from the President to me on the 2d of July, 
 he says : 
 
 " If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond 
 just now, I do not ask you to. Try just now to save the army 
 material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive 
 again as fast as I can. 
 
 "The governors of eighteen (18) states offer me a new levy 
 of three hundred thousand, which I accept." 
 
 On the 3d of July, the following kind dispatch was received 
 from the President : 
 
276 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 {Extract.) 
 
 "Washinoton, July 3, 1862. 3 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, — 
 
 Yours of 5.30, yesterday, is just received. I am satisfied 
 that yourself, officei-s and men have done the best you could. 
 All accounts say better fighting was never done. Ten thousand 
 thanks for it. 
 
 * * * * 4: * * 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 On the 4th, I sent the following to the President : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Harrison's Bar, James River, July 4, 1862. 
 To THE President : — 
 
 I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your dispatch 
 of the 2d instant. 
 
 I shall make a stand at this place, and endeavor to give my 
 men the repose they so much require. 
 
 After sending my communication on Tuesday, the enemy 
 attacked the left of our lines, and a fierce battle ensued, lasting 
 until night ; they were repulsed with great slaughter. Had 
 their attack succeeded, the consequences would have been 
 disastrous in the extreme. This closed the hard fighting 
 which had continued from the afternoon of the 26th ult,, in 
 a daily series of engagements, wholly unparalleled on this con- 
 tinent for determination and slaughter on both sides. 
 
 The mutual loss, in killed and wounded, is enormous. That 
 of the enemy certainly greatest. On Tuesday evening the 1st, 
 our army commenced its movement from Haxall's to this point. 
 Our line of defense there, being too extended to be maintained 
 by our weakened forces. Our train was immense, and about 
 4 A.M. on the 2d, a heavy storm of rain began, which con- 
 tinued during the entire day, and until the forenoon of yes- 
 terday. 
 
 The road became horrible. Troops, artillery and wagons, 
 moved on steadily, and our whole army, men and material, 
 was finally brought safe into this camp. The last of the 
 wagons reached here at noon yesterday. The exhaustion was 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 277 
 
 very great, but the army }Dreserved its morale, and Avould 
 have repelled any attack which the enemy was in condition to 
 make. 
 
 We now occupy a line of heights about two miles from the 
 James, a plain extending from there to the river. Our front is 
 about three miles long. These heights command our whole 
 position, and must be maintained. The gunboats can render 
 valuable support upon both flanks. If the enemy attack us in 
 front, we must hold our ground as best we may, and at what- 
 ever cost. 
 
 Our positions can be carried only by overwhelming num- 
 bers. The spirit of the army is excellent. Stragglers are find- 
 ing their regiments, and the soldiery exhibit the best results 
 of disclphne. Our position is by no means impregnable, es- 
 pecially as a morass extends on this side of the high ground, 
 from our centre to the James on our right. The enemy may 
 attack in vast numbers, and if so our front will be the scene 
 of a desperate battle, which, if lost, will be decisive. Our 
 army is fearfully weakened by killed, wounded, and prisoners. 
 I cannot now approximate to any statement of our losses, but 
 we were not beaten in any conflict. The enemy were unable 
 by their utmost efibrts to drive us from any field. Never did 
 such a change of base, involving a retrograde movement, and 
 under incessant attacks from a most determined and vastly 
 more numerous foe, partake so little of disorder. We have 
 lost no guns, except 25 on the field of battle, 21 of which were 
 lost by the giving way of McCall's division under the onset of 
 superior numbers. 
 
 Our communications by the James River are not secure. 
 There are points where the enemy can establish themselves 
 with caruion or musketry and command the river, and where 
 it is not certain that our gunboats can drive them out. In 
 case of this, or in case our front is broken, I will still make 
 every efibrt to preserve at least the personnel of the army, and 
 the events of the last few days leave no question that the 
 troops will do all that their country can ask. Send such rein- 
 forcements as you can. I will do what I can. We are ship- 
 ping our wounded and sick, and landing supplies. The navy 
 department should co-operate with us to the extent of its re- 
 
278 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 sources. Captain Rodgers is doing all in his power, in the kind- 
 est and most efficient manner. 
 
 When all the circumstances of the case are known, it will be 
 acknowledged by all competent judges, that the movement 
 just completed by this army is unparalleled in the annals of war. 
 Under the most difficult circumstances, we have preserved our 
 trains, our guns, our material, and, above all, our honor. 
 
 Geo. B. McCLELLAif, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 To which I received the following reply : 
 
 WASniNGTOK, July 5, 1862. 9 a.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Commanding Army of the Potomac. 
 A thousand thanks for the relief your two dispatches of 
 12 and 1 p.m. yesterday, gave me. Be assured, the heroism 
 and skill of yourself, officers, and men, is and for ever will be 
 appreciated. 
 
 If you can hold your present position we shall hive the 
 enemy yet. 
 
 A. LiNCOLiSr. 
 
 The following letters were received from his Excellency the 
 President. 
 
 "War Department, 
 Washington City, D. C, July 4th, 1862. 
 
 Major-General McClellan, 
 
 I understand your position, as stated in your letter, and 
 by General Marcy, To reinforce you so as to enable you to 
 resume the offensive within a month, or even six weeks, is im- 
 possible. In addition to that arrived and now arriving from 
 the Potomac (about ten thousand, I suppose), and about ten 
 thousand I hope you will have from Burnside very soon, and 
 about five thousand from Hunter a little later, I do not see 
 how I can send you another man within a month. Under 
 these circumstances, the defensive, for the present, must be 
 your only care. Save the army first, where you are, if you 
 
CLOSK OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 2*79 
 
 can, and, secondly, by removal, if you must. You, on the 
 ground, must be the judge as to which you will attempt, and 
 of the means for eifecting it. I but give it as my opinion, that 
 with the aid of the gunboats and the reinforcements mentioned 
 above, you can hold your present position, provided, and so 
 long as, you can keep the James River open below you. If 
 you are not tolerably confident you can keep the James River 
 open, you had better remove as soon as possible. I do not re- 
 member that you have expressed any apprehension as to the 
 danger of having your communication cut on the river below 
 you, yet I do not suppose it can have escaped your attention. 
 
 Yours, very truly, 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 P. S. — If at any time you feel able to take the offensive, you 
 are not restrained from doing so. 
 
 A. L. 
 
 The folio Aving telegram was sent on the 7th : — 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, July 7, 1862. 8.30 a.m. 
 
 As boat is starting, I have only time to acknowledge 
 receipt of dispatch by General Marcy. Enemy have not 
 attacked. My position is very strong, and daily becoming 
 more so. If not attacked to-day, I shall laugh at them. I 
 have been anxious about my communications. Had long con- 
 sultation about it with Flag-officer Goldsborough last night ; 
 he is confident he can keep river open. He should have all 
 gun-boats possible. Will see him again this morning. My 
 men in splendid spirits, and anxious to try it again. 
 
 Alarm yourself as little as possible about me, and don't lose 
 confidence in this army. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 While General-in-Chief, and directing the operations of all 
 our armies in the field, I had become deeply impressed with 
 
280 THIKD PERIOD. 
 
 the importance of adopting and carrying out certain views re- 
 garding the conduct of the war, which, in my judgment, 
 were essential to its objects and its success. During an active 
 campaign of three months in the enemy's country these were 
 so fully confirmed that I conceived it a duty, in the critical 
 position we then occupied, not to withhold a candid expression 
 of the more important of these views from the commander-in- 
 chief whom the constitution places at the head of the armies 
 and navies, as well as of the government of the nation. The 
 following is a copy of my letter to Mr. Lincoln : — 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp near Harrison's Landing, Ya., July 7, 1862. 
 
 Mr. Presideistt, — 
 
 You have been fully informed that the rebel army is in our 
 front, with the purpose of overwhelming us by attacking our 
 positions or reducing us by blocking our river communications. 
 I can not but regard our condition as critical, and I earnestly 
 desire, in view of possible contingencies, to lay before your 
 Excellency, for your private consideration, my general views 
 concerning the existing state of the rebellion, although they 
 do not strictly relate to the situation of this army, or strictly 
 come within the scope of my official duties. These views 
 amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon my 
 mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned ; it is 
 the cause of free institutions and self government. The Con- 
 stitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be 
 the cost in time, treasure and blood. If secession is successful 
 other dissolutions are clearly to be seen in the future. Let 
 neither military disaster, political faction, nor foreign war, 
 shake your settled purpose to enforce the equal operation of 
 the laws of the L^nited States upon the people of every 
 State. 
 
 The time has come when the government must determine 
 upon a civil and military policy covering the whole ground of 
 our national trouble. The responsibility of determining, 
 declaring and supporting such civil and military policy, and 
 of directing the whole course of national affiiirs in regard to 
 the rebellion must now be assumed and exci'cised by you, or 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 281 
 
 our cause will be lost. The constitution gives you power 
 sufficient even for the present terrible exigency. 
 
 This rebellion has assumed the character ot war ; as such it 
 should be regarded ; and it should be conducted upon the 
 highest principles known to Christian civilization. It should 
 not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any 
 state in any event. It should not be at all a war upon popu- 
 lation, but against armed forces and political organizations. 
 Neither confiscation of property, political executions of per- 
 sons, territorial organization of states, or forcible abolition of 
 slavery should be contemplated for a moment. In prosecuting 
 the wai", all private property and unarmed persons should be 
 strictly protected, subject only to the necessity of military 
 operations. All private property taken for military use should 
 be paid or receipted for : pillage and waste should be treated 
 as high crimes : all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, 
 and offensive demeanor by the military towards citizens 
 promptly rebuked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, 
 except in places where active hostilities exist, and oaths not 
 required by enactments constitutionally made, should be 
 neither demanded nor received. Military government should 
 be confined to the preservation of public order and the protec- 
 tion of political rights. Military power should not be allowed 
 to interfere with the relations of servitude, either by support- 
 ing or impairing the authority of the master, except for re- 
 pressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves contraband under 
 the act of Congress, seeking military protection, should receive 
 it. The right of the government to appropriate permanently 
 to its own service, claims to slave labor, should be asserted, 
 and the right of the owner to compensation therefor should be 
 recognized. 
 
 This principle might be extended, upon grounds of military 
 necessity and security, to all the slaves within a particular 
 State, thus working manumission in such State ; and in Mis- 
 souri, perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in 
 Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a question 
 of time. 
 
 A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and 
 pervaded by the influences of Chiistianity and freedom, would 
 
282 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply 
 impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might 
 be humbly hoped that it would commend itself to the favor of 
 the Almighty, 
 
 Unless the principles governing the future conduct of our 
 struggle shall be made known and approved, the effort to ob- 
 tain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. A declaration 
 of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disinte- 
 grate our present armies. 
 
 The policy of the government must be supported by con- 
 centrations of military power. The national forces should not 
 be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous 
 armies, but should be mainly collected into masses, and brought 
 to bear upon the armies of the confederate states. Those 
 armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they 
 support would soon cease to exist. 
 
 In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, 
 you will require a commander-in-chief of the army ; one who 
 possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who 
 is competent to execute your orders by directing the military 
 forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by 
 you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am will- 
 ing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I 
 will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior. 
 
 I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope for forgive- 
 ness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity 
 towards you, and from love for my country. 
 
 Very respectfully, your ob't servant, 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 His Excellency A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 I telegraphed the President on the 11th as follows : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomao, 
 Berkeley, July 11, 1862. 3 p.m. 
 ***** 
 
 We are very strong here now so far as defensive is con- 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 283 
 
 cerned. Hope you will soon make us strong enough to advance 
 and try it again. All in fine spirits. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 These telegrams were sent on the 12th, 17th and 18th, to 
 his Excellency the President. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkelet, July 12, 1862. 7.15 a.m. 
 
 Hill and Longstreet crossed into New Kent County via 
 Long Bridge. I am still ignorant what road they afterwards 
 took, but will know shortly. 
 
 Nothing else of interest since last dispatch, rain ceased and 
 everything quiet. Men resting well, but beginning to be im- 
 patient for another fight. 
 
 I am more and more convinced that this army ought not to 
 be withdrawn from here ; but promptly reinforced and thrown 
 again upon Richmond. If we have a little more than half a 
 chance we can take it. I dread the effects of any retreat upon 
 the morale of the men. 
 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 G. B. McClellan. 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Head-Quarters, ARinr op the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, July 18, 1862. 8 a.m. 
 I have consulted fully with General Burnside, and would 
 commend to your favorable consideration the general's plan for 
 bringing (7) seven additional regiments from North Carolina, 
 by leaving Newbern to the care of the gun-boats. It appears 
 manifestly to be our policy to concentrate here every tiling we 
 can possibly spare from less important points, to make sure of 
 crushing the enemy at Richmond, which seems clearly to be 
 the most important point in rebeldom. Nothing should be 
 left to chance here. I Avould recommend that General Burn- 
 
284 THIRD PERIOD, 
 
 side, with all his troops, be ordered to this army, to enable it 
 to assume the offensive as soon as possible. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, July 18, 1862. 8 a.m. 
 No change worth reporting in the state of afi;\irs. Some 
 (20,000) twenty to (25,000) twenty-five thousand of enemy 
 at Petersburg, and others thence to Richmond. Those at 
 Petersburg say they are part of Beauregard's army. New 
 troops arriving via Petersburg. Am anxious to have deter- 
 mination of Government, that no time may be lost in preparing 
 for it. Hours are very precious now, and perfect unity of action 
 necessary. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 The following was telegraphed to General Halleck on the 
 28th :— 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, July 28, 1862. 8 a.m. 
 Nothing especially new except corroboration of reports 
 that reinforcements reaching Richmond from South. It is not 
 confirmed that any of Bragg's troops are yet here. My 
 opinion is more and more firm, that here is the defense of 
 Washington, and that I should be at once reinforced by all 
 available troops, to enable me to advance. Retreat would be 
 disastrous to the army and the cause, I am confident of 
 that. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g. U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. 
 
 On the 30th I sent the following to the general-in-chief : — 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 285 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, July 30, 18G2. 7 a.m. 
 * ' * * * * 
 
 I hope that it may soon be decided what is to be done by 
 this army ; and that the decision may be to reinforce it at once. 
 We are losing much valuable time, and that at a moment when 
 energy and decision are sadly needed. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 Comd'g U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. 
 
 About half an hour after midnight, on the morning of 
 August 1st, the enemy brought some light batteries to Cog- 
 gin's Point and the Coles House, on the right bank of James 
 River, directly opposite Harrison's Landing, and opened a 
 heavy fire upon our shipping and encampments. It was con- 
 tinued rapidly for about thirty minutes, when they were driven 
 back by the fire of our guns. This affair was reported in the 
 following dispatch : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 2, 1862. 8 a.m. 
 Firing of night before last killed some (10) ten men, and 
 wounded about (15) fifteen. No harm of the slightest con- 
 sequence done to the shipping, although several struck. Sent 
 party across river yesterday to the Coles House ; destroyed it 
 and cut down the timber ; will complete work to-day ; and 
 also send party to Coggin's Point, which I will probably oc- 
 cupy. I will attend to your telegraph about pressing, at once, 
 will send Hooker out. Give me Burnside and I will stir these 
 people up. I need more cavalry, have only (3700) thirty-seven 
 hundred for duty in cavalry division. 
 
 Adjutant-general's ofiice forgot to send Sykes's commission 
 as major-general, with those of other division commanders. 
 Do me the favor to hurry it on. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-Gen. Com'g. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
286 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 To prevent another demonstration of this character, and to 
 secure a debouche on the south side of the James, it became 
 necessary to occupy Coggin's Point, which was done on the 
 3d, and the enemy, as will be seen from the following dispatch, 
 driven back towards Petersburg : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Ariit of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug 3, 1862. 10 p.m. 
 
 Coggin's Point was occupied to-day, and timber felled so as 
 to make it quite defensible. I went over the ground myself, 
 and found that Duane, had, as usual, selected an admirable 
 position, which can be intrenched with a small amount of 
 labor, so as to make it a formidable tete-de-pont, covering the 
 landing of a large force. I shall begin intrenching it by the 
 labor of contrabands to-morrow. The position covers the 
 Coles House, which is directly in front of Westover. We 
 have now a safe debouche on the south bank, and are secure 
 against midnight cannonading. A few thousand more men 
 would place us in condition at least to annoy and disconcert 
 the enemy very much. 
 
 I sent Col. Averill this morning with (300) three hundred 
 cavalry, to examine the country on south side of the James, 
 and try to catch some cavalry at Sycamore Church, which is 
 on the main road from Petersburg to Suffolk, and some (5) 
 five miles from Coles House. 
 
 He foxmd a cavalry force of (550) five hundred and fifty 
 men, attacked them at once, drove in their advanced guard to 
 their camp, where he had a sharp skirmish, and drove them 
 off in disorder. 
 
 He burned their entire camp, with their commissary and 
 quarter-master's stores, and then returned and re-crossed the 
 river. He took but 2 pi'isoners, had one man wounded by a 
 ball, and one by a sabre cut. Capt. Mcintosh made a hand- 
 some charge. The troops engaged were of the (5) Fifth 
 Regulars, and the (3d) Third Pennsylvania Cavalry. 
 
 Col. Averill conducted this affair, as he does every thing he 
 undertakes, to my entire satisfaction. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Comd'g. U. S. Army, "Washington, D. C. 
 
CLOSE OF THE PEXINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 287 
 
 On the 1st of August, I received the following dispatches : 
 
 "Washington, July 30, 1862. 8 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan,— 
 
 A dispatch just received from General Pope, says that de- 
 serters report that the enemy is moving south of James River, 
 and that the force in Richmond is very small. I suggest that 
 he be pressed in that direction, so as to ascertain the facts of 
 
 the case. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 "Washington, July 30, 1862. 8 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, — 
 
 In order to enable you to move in any direction, it is neces- 
 sary to reheve you of your sick. The surgeon-general has 
 therefore been directed to make arrangements for them at 
 other places, and the quarter-master-general to provide trans- 
 portation. I hope you will send them away as quickly as 
 possible, and advise me of their removal. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 It is clear that the general-in-chief attached some weight to 
 the report received from General Pope, and I was justified in 
 supposing that the order in regard to removing the sick, con- 
 templated an offensive movement, rather than a retreat, as I 
 had no other data than the telegrams just given, from which 
 to form an opinion as to the intentions of the government. 
 The following telegram strengthened me in that belief. 
 
 "Washington, July 31, 1862. 10 a.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellax, — 
 
 General Pope again telegraphs that the enemy is reported 
 to be evacuating Richmond, and falling back on Danville and 
 Lynchburg. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
288 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 In occupying Coggin's Point, as already described, I was 
 influenced by the necessity of possessing a secure debouche 
 on the south of the James, in order to enable me to move on 
 the communications of Richmond in that direction, as well as 
 to prevent a repetition of midnight cannonades. 
 
 To carry out General Halleck's first order of July 30th, it 
 was necessary first to gain possession of Malvern Hill, which 
 was occupied by the enemy, apparently in some little force, 
 and controlled the direct approach to Richmond. Its tempo- 
 rary occupation, at least, was equally necessary in the event 
 of a movement upon Petersburg, or even the abandonment of 
 the Peninsula. General Hooker, with his own division and 
 Pleasanton's cavalry, was therefore directed to gain possession 
 of Malvern Hill on the night of the 2d of August. He failed 
 to do so, as the following dispatch recites : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 3, 1862. 10.20 p.m. 
 
 The movement undertaken up the river last night failed, on 
 account of the incompetency of guides. The proper steps 
 have been taken to-day to remedy this evil, and I hope to be 
 ready to-morrow night to carry out your suggestions as to 
 pressing ; at least, to accomplish the first indispensable step. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-G-en. Comd'g. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g U. S. Army. 
 
 On the 4th General Hooker was reinforced by General 
 Sedgwick's division, and, having obtained a knowledge of the 
 roads, he succeeded in turning Malvern Hill, and driving the 
 enemy back towards Richmond. 
 
 The following is my report of this afiair at the time : 
 
 Malvern Hill, Aug. 5, 1862. 1 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 Gomd^g. U. S. Army : 
 General Hooker, at 5.30 this morning, attacked a very 
 considerable force of infantry and artillery stationed at this 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 289 
 
 place, and carried it handsomely, driving the enemy towards 
 New Market, Avhich is four miles distant, and where it is said 
 they have a large force. We have captured 100 prisoners, 
 Jcilled and wounded several, with a loss on our part of only 
 three killed and eleven wounded — among the latter two offi- 
 cers. 
 
 I shall probably remain here to-night, ready to act as cir- 
 cumstances may require, after the return of my cavalry recon- 
 noissances. 
 
 The mass of the enemy escaped under the cover of a dense 
 fog, but our cavalry are still in pursuit, and I trust may suc- 
 ceed in capturing many more. 
 
 This is a very advantageous position to cover an advance on 
 Richmond, and only 14| miles distant, and I feel confident 
 that, with reinforcements, I could march this army there in 
 five days. 
 
 I this instant learn that several brigades of the enemy are 
 four miles from here, on the Quaker road, and I have taken 
 steps to prepare to meet them. 
 
 General Plooker's dispositions were admirable, and his offi- 
 cers and men displayed their usual gallantry. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 On the same day the following telegram was sent : 
 
 MALTER>f Hill, Aug. 5, 1862. 8 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 ComcVg JJ. S. Anny : 
 Since my last dispatch Colonel Averill has retui-ned from 
 a reconnoissance in the direction of Savage's Station, towards 
 Richmond. He encountered the 10th Virginia Cavalry near 
 White Oak Swamp Bridge, charged and drove them some dis- 
 tance towards Richmond, cajjtured 28 men and horses, and 
 killing and wounding several. 
 
 Our troops have advanced (12) twelve miles in one direc- 
 tion, and (17) seventeen in another, towards Richmond, to- 
 day. 
 
 We have secured a strong position at Coggin's Point, oppo- 
 
 13 
 
290 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 site our quarter-master's depot, which will effectually prevent 
 the rebels from using artillery hereafter against our camps. 
 
 I learn this evening that there is a force of 20,000 men 
 about six miles back from this point, on the south bank of the 
 river, what their object is I do not know, but will keep a sharp 
 look out on their movements. 
 
 I am sending off sick as rapidly as our transports will take 
 them. I am also doing everything in my power to carry out 
 your orders, to push reconnoissances towards the rebel capital, 
 and ho^De soon to find out whether the reports regarding the 
 abandonment of that place are true. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 
 To the dispatch of 1 p.m., August 5, the following answer 
 was received : — 
 
 WASmNGTON, August 6, 1862. 3 A.M. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, — 
 I have no reinforcements to send you. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General, 
 
 And soon after the following : — 
 
 Washington, August 6, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, — 
 
 You will immediately send a regiment of cavahy and several 
 batteries of artillery to Burnside's command at Acquia Creek. 
 It is reported that Jackson is moving north with a very large 
 force. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 On the 4th I had received General Halleck's order of the 
 3d (which appears below), directing me to withdi-aw the army 
 to Acquia, and on the same day sent an earnest jDrotest against 
 it. 
 
 A few hours before this, General Hooker had informed me 
 
CLOSE OP THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 291 
 
 that his cavah-y pickets reported large bodies of the enemy 
 advancing and driving them in, and that he would probably 
 be attacked at daybreak. Under these circumstances I had 
 determined to support him, but as I could not get the whole 
 army in position until the next afternoon, I concluded, upon 
 the receipt of the above telegram from the general-in-chief, 
 to withdraw General Hooker, that there might be the least 
 possible delay in conforming to General Halleck's orders. I 
 therefore sent to General Hooker the following letter : — 
 
 Head-Qtjartees, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, August 6, 1862. 10 p.m. 
 My Dear General, — 
 
 I find it will not be possible to get the whole army in posi- 
 tion before some time to-morrow afternoon, which will be 
 too late to support you and hold the entire position, should 
 the enemy attack in large force at daybreak, which there is 
 strong reason to suppose he intends doing. 
 
 Should we fight a general battle at Malvern, it will be nec- 
 essary to abandon the whole of our works here, and run the 
 risk of getting back here. 
 
 Under advices I have received from Washington, I think it 
 necessary for you to abandon the position to-night, getting 
 everything away before daylight. 
 
 Please leave cavalry pickets at Malvern, with orders to 
 destroy the Turkey Creek Bridge when they are forced back. 
 
 The roads leading into Haxalls from the right should be 
 strongly watched, and Haxalls at least held by strong cavalry 
 force and some light batteries, as long as possible. 
 
 I leave the manner of the withdrawal entirely to your dis- 
 cretion. 
 
 Please signal to the fleet when the withdrawal is about 
 completed. 
 
 Report frequently to these head-quarters. General Sumner 
 was ordered up to support you, but will halt where this passes 
 him, and will inform you where he is. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 General J. Hooker, 
 
 Comd'g at Malvern Hill. 
 
292 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 And the following reply was sent to General Halleck : — 
 
 Head -Quarters, Army of the Potomac. 
 Berkeley, Aug. 6, 1862, 11.30 p.m. 
 Dispatch of to-day received. I have not quite (4,000) four 
 thousand cavalry for duty in cavalry division, so that I cannot 
 possibly spare any more. I really need many more that I now 
 have, to carry out your instructions. 
 
 The enemy are moving a large force upon Malvern Hill. In 
 view of your dispatches, and the fact that I can not place the 
 whole army in position before daybreak, I have ordered 
 Hooker to withdraw during the night, if it is possible. If he 
 can not do so, I must support him. Until this matter is devel- 
 oped, I can not send any batteries. I hope I can do so to- 
 morrow, if transportation is on hand. 
 
 I will obey the order as soon as circumstances will permit. 
 My artillery is none too numerous now. I have only been able 
 to send oiF some (1,200) twelve hundred sick; no transporta- 
 tion. There shall be no delay that I can avoid, 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan^, 
 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g. U. S. Army. 
 
 Five batteries, with their horses and equipments complete, 
 were embarked on the Vth and 8th. Simultaneously with Gen- 
 eral Hooker's operations upon Malvern, I dispatched a caValry 
 force under Colonel Averill towards Savage's Station, to as- 
 certain if the enemy were making any movements towards our 
 left flank. He found a rebel cavalry regiment near the White 
 Oak Swamp bridge, and completely routed it, pursuing well 
 towards Savage's Station. 
 
 These important preliminary operations assisted my prepara- 
 tions for the removal of the army to Acquia Creek, and the 
 sending off our sick and supplies was pushed both day and 
 night as rapidly as the means of transportation permitted. 
 
 On the subject of the withdrawal of the army from Harri- 
 son's Landing, the following correspondence passed between 
 the General in Chief and myself while the reconnoissances to- 
 wards Richmond were in progress. 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CASirAIGN. 293 
 
 On the 2(1 of August I received the following. 
 
 "Washington, August 2, 1862. 3.45 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, 
 
 You have not answered my telegram [of July 30, 8 p.m.] 
 about the removal of your sick. Remove them as rapidly as 
 possible, and telegraph me M'hen they will be out of your way. 
 The President wishes an answer as early as possible. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 To which this reply was sent, 
 
 Head-Quarters Army op the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 3, 1862. 11 p.m. 
 
 Your telegram of [2d] second is received. The answer 
 [to dispatch of July 30] was sent this morning. We have 
 about (12,500) twelve thousand five hundred sick, of whom 
 perhaps (4,000) four thousand might make easy marches. We 
 have here the means to transport (1,200) twelve hundred, and 
 will embark to-morrow that number of the worst cases. With 
 all the means at the disposal of the medical director, the i-e- 
 mainder could be shipped in from (7) seven to (10) ten days. It 
 is impossible for me to decide what cases to send off, unless I 
 know what is to be done with this army. 
 
 Were the disastrous measures of a retreat adopted, all the 
 sick who can not march and fight should be despatched by wa- 
 ter. Should the army advance, many of the sick could be of 
 service at the depots. If it is to remain here any length of 
 time, the question assumes still a different phase. 
 
 Until I am informed what is to be done, I cannot act under- 
 standingly, or for the good of the service. If I am kept longer 
 in ignorance of what is to be effected, I cannot be expected to 
 accomplish the object in view. In the mean time I will do all 
 in my power to carry out what I conceive to be your wishes. 
 
 G. B. McClellax, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 Maj.-Gkx. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g U. S. Array, Washington, D. C. 
 
294 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 The moment I received the instructions for removing the 
 sick, I at once gave the necessary directions for carrying tliem 
 out. With the small amount of transportation at hand, the 
 removal of the severe cases alone would necessarily take sev- 
 eral days, and in the mean time I desired information to deter- 
 mine what I should do with others. 
 
 The order required me to send them away " as quickly as 
 possible, and to notify the General in Chief when they v^ere 
 removed.'''' 
 
 Previous to the receipt of the dispatch of the 2d of August, 
 not having been advised of what the army under my command 
 was expected to do, or which way it was to move, if it moved 
 at all, I sent the following dispatch. 
 
 He^\j)-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 3, 1862. 
 
 I hear of sea steamers at Fort Monroe : are they for remov- 
 ing my sick ? If so, to what extent am I required to go in 
 sending them off? 
 
 There are not many who need go. 
 
 As I am not in any way informed of the intentions of the 
 government in regard to this army, I am unable to judge what 
 proportion of the sick should leave here, and must ask for 
 specific orders. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g U. S. A., Washington'. 
 
 If the ai-my was to retreat to Fort Monroe, it was important 
 that it should be unincumbered with any sick, wounded, or 
 other men who might at all interfere with its mobility ; but if 
 the object was to operate directly on Richmond from the 
 position we then occupied, there were many cases of slight 
 sickness which would speedily be cured, and the patients re- 
 turned to duty. As the service of every man would be im- 
 portant in the event of a forward offensive movement, I con- 
 ceived it to be of the utmost consequence that I should know 
 what was to be done. It was to ascertain this that I sent 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 295 
 
 the dispatch of 11 p.m. on the 3d, before receiving the fol- 
 lowing telegram. 
 
 Washington, Aug. 3, 1862. 7.45 p.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan,— 
 
 I have waited most anxiously to learn the result of your 
 forced reconnoissance towards Richmond, and also whether all 
 your sick have been sent away, and I can get no answer to my 
 telegram. It is determined to withdraw your army from the 
 Peninsula to Acquia Creek. You will take immediate meas- 
 ures to effect this, covering the movement the best you can. 
 Its real object and withdrawal should be concealed even from 
 your own officers. Your material and transportation should 
 be removed first. You will assume control of all the means 
 of transportation within your reach, and apply to the naval 
 forces for all the assistance they can render you. You will 
 consult freely with the commander of these forces. The entire 
 execution of the movement is left to your discretion and judg- 
 ment. You will leave such forces' as you may deem proper at 
 Fort Monroe, Norfolk, and other places which we must 
 
 occupy. 
 
 W. H. Halleck, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g U. S. A. 
 
 I proceeded to obey this order with all possible rapidity, 
 firmly impressed, however, with the conviction that the with- 
 drawal of the army of the Potomac from Harrison's Landing, 
 where its communications had, by the co-operation of the gun- 
 boats, been rendered perfectly secure, would at that time have 
 the most disastrous efiect upon our cause. I did not, as the 
 commander of that army, allow the occasion to pass without 
 distinctly setting forth ray views upon the subject to the au- 
 thorities, as in the following telegram. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 4, 1862. 12 m. 
 
 Your telegram of last evening is received. I must con- 
 fess that it has caused me the greatest pain I ever experienced. 
 
296 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 for I am convinced that the order to withdraw this army to 
 Acquia Creek will prove disastrous to our cause. 
 
 I fear it will be a fatal blow. 
 
 Several days are necessary to complete the preparations for 
 80 important a movement as this ; and while they are in pro- 
 gress I beg that careful consideration may be given to my 
 statements. 
 
 This army is now in excellent discipline and condition. We 
 hold a debouche on both banks of the James River, so that 
 we are free to act in any direction, and, with the assistance of 
 the gun-boats, I consider our communications as now secure. 
 We are (25) twenty-five miles from Richmond, and are not 
 likely to meet the enemy in force sufficient to fight a battle, 
 until we have marched (15) fifteen to (18) eighteen miles, 
 which brings us practically within (10) ten miles of Richmond. 
 Our longest line of land transportation would be from this 
 point (25) twenty-five miles ; but with the aid of the gun- 
 boats we can supply the army by water during its advance, 
 certainly to within (12) miles of Richmond. 
 
 At Acquia Creek we would be (75) seventy-five miles from 
 Richmond, with land transportation all the way. 
 
 From here to Fort Monroe is a march of about (70) seventy 
 miles ; for I regard it as impracticable to withdraw this army 
 and its material except by land. 
 
 The result of the movement would thus be a march of (145) 
 one hundred and forty-five miles to reach a point now only 
 (25) twenty-five miles distant, and to deprive ourselves entirely 
 of the powerful aid of the gun-boats and water transportation. 
 Add to this the certain demoralization of this army, which 
 would ensue, the terribly depressing effect upon the people of 
 the North, and the strong probability that it would influence 
 foreign powers to recognize our adversaries, and there aj^pear 
 to me sufficient reasons to make it my imperative duty to urge, 
 in the strongest terms afibrded by our language, that this 
 order may be rescinded, and that, far from recalling this army, 
 it be promptly reinforced to enable it to resume the offensive. 
 
 It may be said that there are no reinforcements available. 
 I point to Burnside's force, to that of Pope, not necessary to 
 maintain a strict defensive in front of Washington and Har- 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 297 
 
 per's Ferry, to those portions of the army of the west not 
 required for a strict defensive there. Here, directly in front 
 of this army, is the heart of the rebellion ; it is here that all 
 our resources should be collected to strike the blow which will 
 determine the fate of the nation. All points of secondary im- 
 portance elsewhere should be abandoned, and every available 
 man brought here — a decided victory here, and the military 
 strength of the rebellion is crushed — it matters not what par- 
 tial reverses we may meet with elsewhere. Here is the true 
 defense of Washington ; it is here, on the banks of the James, 
 that the fate of the Union should be decided. 
 
 Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the conscious- 
 ness that I have ever been, and still am actuated solely by 
 love of my country, knowing that no ambitious or selfish 
 motives have influenced me from the commencement of this 
 war, I do now, what I never did in my life before, I entreat 
 that this order may be rescinded. 
 
 If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart obey 
 your orders to the utmost of my power, directing to the move- 
 ment, which I clearly foresee will be one of the utmost delicacy 
 and difficulty, whatever skill I may possess. 
 
 Whatever the result may be, and may God grant that I am 
 mistaken in my forebodings, I shall at least have the internal 
 satisfaction that I have written and spoken frankly, and have 
 sought to do the best in my power to avert disaster from my 
 country. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General Comd'g U. S. A. 
 
 Soon after sending this telegram, I received the following 
 in reply to ming of 1 1 p.m. of the 3d : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 4, 1862, 12.45 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, — 
 
 My telegram to you of yesterday will satisfy you in regard 
 to future operations. It was expected that you would have 
 sent off your sick as directed, without waiting to know what 
 
298 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 were or would be the intentions of the government respecting 
 future movements. The President expects that the instruc- 
 tions which were sent to you yesterday, with his appi'oval, 
 will be carried out with all possible dispatch and caution. 
 The quarter-master-geueral is sending to Fort Monroe all the 
 transportation he can collect. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General, 
 
 To which the following is my reply : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 5, 1862. 1 a.m. 
 Your telegram of yesterday received, and is being carried 
 out as promptly as possible. With the means at my command, 
 no human power could have moved the sick in the time you 
 say you expected them to be moved. 
 
 ******* 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g U. S. A. 
 
 My efforts for bringing about a change of policy were un- 
 successful, as will be seen from the following telegram and 
 letter received by me in reply to mine of 12 m. of the 4th : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 5, 1862. 12 m. 
 Maj.-Gen, G. B. McClellan, — 
 
 You cannot regret the order of withdrawal more than I 
 did the necessity of giving it. It will not be rescinded, and 
 you will be expected to execute it Avith all possible prompt- 
 ness. It is believed that it can be done now without serious 
 danger. This may not be so if there should be any delay. 
 I will write you my views more fully by mail. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g U. S. A. 
 
 The letter was as follows : 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 299 
 
 Head-Quarters of the Army, 
 WASmNGTOX, Aug. 6, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 GonicVg. <&c., Berkeley^ Va. 
 General, — Your telegram of yesterday was received 
 this morning, and I immediately telegraphed a brief reply, 
 promising to write you more fully by mail. 
 
 You, General, certainly could not have been more pained at 
 receiving my order, than I was at the necessity of issuing it. 
 I was advised by high officers, in whose judgment I had great 
 confidence, to make the order immediately on my arrival here, 
 but I determined not to do so until I could learn your wishes 
 from a personal interview : and even after that interview I 
 tried every means in my power to avoid withdrawing your 
 army, and delayed my decision as long as I dared to delay it. 
 
 I assure you. General, it was not a hasty and unconsidered 
 act, but one that caused me more anxious thoughts than any 
 other of my life. But after f\ill and mature consideration of 
 all the pros and cons^ I was reluctantly forced to the conclusion 
 that the order must be issued. There was, to my mind, no al- 
 ternative. 
 
 Allow me to allude to a few of the facts in the case. You 
 and your officers, at our interview, estimated the enemy's 
 forces in and around Richmond at two hundred thousand men. 
 Since then, you and others report that they have received and 
 are receiving large reinforcements from the South. 
 
 General Pope's army, now covering Washington, is only 
 about forty thousand. Your effective force is only about ninety 
 thousand. You are about thirty miles from Richmond, and 
 General Pope eighty or ninety, with the enemy directly be- 
 tween you, ready to fall with his superior numbers upon one 
 or the other, as he may elect. Neither can reinforce the other 
 in case of such an attack. If General Pope's army be dimin- 
 ished to reinforce you, Washington, Maryland, and Pennsyl- 
 vania would be left uncovered and exposd. If your force be 
 reduced to strengthen Pope, you would be too weak to even 
 hold the position you now occupy, should the enemy turn 
 round and attack you in full force. In other words, the old 
 army of the Potomac is split into two parts, with the entire 
 
300 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 force of the enemy directly between them. They can not be 
 united by land without exposing both to destruction, and yet 
 they must be united. To send Pope's forces by water to the 
 Peninsula, is, under present circumstances, a military impossi- 
 bility. The only alternative is to send the forces on the Penin- 
 sula to some point by water, say Fredericksburg, where the 
 two armies can be united. 
 
 Let rae now allude to some of the objections which you have 
 urged. You say that the withdrawal from the present position 
 will cause the certain demoralization of the army, " which is 
 now in excellent discipline and condition." I can not under- 
 stand Avhy a simple change of position to a new and by no 
 means distant base, will demoralize an army in excellent disci- 
 pline, unless the officers themselves assist in that demoraliza- 
 tion, which I am satisfied they will not. Your change of front 
 from your extreme right at Hanover Court House to your 
 present position was over thirty miles, but I have not heard 
 that it demoralized your troops, notwithstanding the severe 
 losses they sustained in effecting it. 
 
 A new base on the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg brings 
 you within about sixty miles of Richmond, and secures a re- 
 inforcement of forty or fifty thousand fresh and disciplined 
 troops. This change with such advantages, will, I think, if 
 properly represented to your army, encourage rather than de- 
 moralize your troops. Moreover, you yourself suggested that 
 a junction might be effected at Yorktown ; but that a flank 
 march across the Isthmus would be more hazardous than to 
 retire to Fort Monroe. You will remember that Yorktown is 
 tAvo or three miles further from Richmond than Fredericks- 
 burg is. Besides, the latter is between Richmond and Wash- 
 ington, and covers Washington from any attack by the 
 enemy. 
 
 The political effect of the withdrawal may at first be unfav- 
 orable ; but I think the public are beginning to understand its 
 necessity, and that they will have much more confidence in a 
 united array, than in its separated fragments. 
 
 But you will reply, why not reinforce me here, so that I can 
 strike Richmond from my present position ? To do this you 
 said at our interview, that you required thirty thousand addi- 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 301 
 
 tional troops. I told you tho,t it was impossible to give you so 
 many. You finally thought you would have " some chance " 
 of success with twenty thousand. But you afterwards tele- 
 graphed me that you would require thirty-five thousand, as the 
 enemy was being largely reinforced. If your estimate of the 
 enemy's strength was correct, your requisition was perfectly 
 reasonable ; but it was utterly impossible to fill it until new 
 troops could be enlisted and organized, which would require 
 several weeks. 
 
 To keep your army in its present position until it could be 
 so i-einforced, would almost destroy it in that climate. The 
 months of August and September are almost fatal to whites 
 who live on that part of James' River, and even after you 
 receive the reinforcements asked for, you admitted that you 
 must reduce Fort Darling and the river batteries, before you 
 could advance on Richmond. It is by no means certain that 
 the reduction of these fortifications would not require con- 
 siderable time, perhaps as much as those at Yorktown. This 
 delay might not only be flital to the health of your army ; but 
 in the mean time General Pope's forces would be exposed to 
 the heavy blows of the enemy without the slightest hope of 
 assistance from you. 
 
 In regard to the demoralizing effect of a withdrawal from 
 the Peninsula to the Rappahannock, I must remark that a lai-ge 
 number of your highest officers, indeed, a majority of those 
 whose opinions have been reported to me, are decidedly in 
 favor of the movement. Even several of those who originally 
 advocated the line of the Peninsula, now advise its abandon- 
 ment. 
 
 I have not inquired, and do not wish to know by whose 
 advice, or for what reasons the army of the Potomac was sep- 
 arated into two parts with the enemy beiween them. I must 
 take things as I find them. I find the forces divided, and I 
 wish to unite them. Only one feasible plan has been presented 
 for doing this. If you or any one else had presented a better 
 plan, I certainly should have adopted it. But all of your plans 
 require reinforcements, which it is impossible to give you. It 
 is very easy to ask for reinforcements ; but it is not so easy to 
 give them when you have no disposable troops at your command. 
 
302 THIRD PEEIOD. 
 
 I have written very plainly, as I understand the case, and I 
 hope you will give me credit for having fully considered the 
 matter, although I may have arrived at vei-y different conclu- 
 sions from your own. 
 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General in Chief. 
 
 On the 7th I received the following telegram : 
 
 ■Washington, Aug. 7, 1862. 10 a.m. 
 MAj.-GEisr. Geo. B. McClellan, — 
 
 You will immediately report the number of sick sent off 
 since you received my order ; the number still to be shipped, 
 and the amount of transportation at your disposal ; that is, 
 the number of persons that can be carried on all the vessels 
 which by my order you were authorized to control. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 To which I made this reply : 
 
 Head-Quartees, Army of the Potomac, 
 Aug. 7, 1862. 10.40 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Comd^g. XT. jS. Army, — 
 In reply to your dispatch of 10 a.m. to-day, I report the 
 number of sick sent off since I received your order, as follows : 
 3,740, including some that are embarked to-night, and will 
 leave to-morrow morning. The number still to be shipped, is, 
 as nearly as can be ascertained, 5,700. 
 
 The embarkation of five batteries of artillery, with their 
 horses, wagons, etc., required most of our available boats, ex- 
 cept the ferry-boats. All the transports that can ascend to 
 this place, have been ordered up, they will be here to-morrow 
 evening. Col. Ingalls reports to me that there are no trans- 
 ports now available for cavalry, and will not be for two or 
 three days. As soon as they can be obtained, I shall send off 
 the 1st New York cavalry. 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 303 
 
 After the transports with sick and -wounded have returned, 
 including some heavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe, that can- 
 not come to this point, we can transport 25,000 men at a time. 
 We have some propellers here, but they are laden with com- 
 missary supplies, and are not available. The transports now 
 employed in transporting sick and wounded, will carry 12,000 
 well infantry soldiers. Those at Fort Monroe, and of too 
 heavy draft to come here, will carry 8,000 or 10,000 infantry. 
 Several of the largest steamers have been used for transport- 
 ing prisoners of war, and have only been available for the sick 
 to-day. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 The report of my chief-quarter-master upon the subject, is 
 as follows : 
 
 Head-Quahters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Office of Chief-Qdarter-Master, 
 Harrison's Landing, Aug*. 7 1862. 
 
 General : — I have the honor to return the papers herewith, 
 which you sent me, with the following remarks : 
 
 We are embarking five batteries of artillery, with their 
 horses, baggage, etc., which requires the detailing of most of 
 our available boats, except the ferry-boats. 
 
 The medical department has 10 or 12 of our largest trans- 
 port vessels, which, if disposable, could carry 12,000 men. 
 Besides, there are some heavy draft steamers at Fort Monroe, 
 that cannot come to this point, but which can carry 8,000 or 
 10,000 infantry. 
 
 I have ordered all up here that can ascend to this depot. 
 They will be here to-morrow evening. As it 7ioio is, after 
 the details already made, we cannot transport from this place 
 more than 5,000 infantry. 
 
 There are no transports now available for cavalry. From 
 and after to-morrow, if the vessels arrive, I could transport 
 10,000 infantry. In two or three days, a regiment of cavalry 
 can be sent if required. 
 
 If you wait and ship from Yorktown or Fort Monroe, after 
 
304 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 the sick and wounded transports are at ray disposal, we can 
 transport 25,000 at a time. The number that can be trans- 
 ported, is contingent on circumstances referred to. 
 
 Most of the propellers here are laden with commissary, or 
 other supplies, and most of the tugs are necessary to tow off 
 sail craft, also laden with supplies. 
 
 I am very respectfully, your most ob't. servant, 
 
 RuFus Ingalls, 
 Ohief-Quarter-Master. 
 Gen. R. B. Marct, 
 
 Chief-of-Staff. 
 
 On the 9th, I received this dispatch : 
 
 WAsniXGTON, Aug. 9, 1862. 12.45 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellax, — 
 
 I am of opinion that the enemy is massing his forces in front 
 of Generals Pope and Burnside, and that he expects to crush 
 them and move forward to the Potomac. You must send re- 
 inforcements instantly to Acquia Creek. 
 
 Considering the amount of transportation at your disposal, 
 your delay is not satisfactory, you must move with all possible 
 celerity. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Maior-General. 
 
 To which I sent the following reply : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 10, 1862. 8 a.m. 
 Telegram of yesterday received. The batteries sent to 
 Burnside, took the last available transport yesterday morning. 
 Enough have since arrived to ship one regiment of cavalry to- 
 day. 
 
 The sick are being embarked as rapidly as possible. There 
 has been no unnecessary delay as you assert, not an hour, but 
 every thing has been, and is being pushed as rapidly as possible 
 to carry out your orders. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g. U. S. Army. 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 305 
 
 The following report, made on the same day by the officer 
 then in charge of the transports, exposes the injustice of the 
 remark in the dispatch of the geueral-in-chief, that, " consider- 
 ing the amount of transportation at your disposal, your delay 
 is not satisfactory." 
 
 Assistant Quarter-Master's Office, 
 Army of the Potomac, 
 Harrison's Landing, Va., Aug. 10, 1862. 
 
 Gen, M. C. Meigs, 
 
 Quarter- Master General IT. S. Army, Washingtoti : 
 Colonel Ingalls being himself HI, has requested me to tele- 
 graph to you concerning the state and capacity of the trans- 
 ports now here. 
 
 On the night of the 8th I dispatched eleven steamers, prin- 
 cipally small ones, and six schooners, with five batteries of 
 heavy horse artillery, none of which have yet returned. 
 
 Requisition is made this morning for transportation of one 
 thousand cavalry to Acquia Creek. All the schooners that 
 had been chartered for carrying horses, have been long since 
 discharged or changed into freight vessels. 
 
 A large proportion of the steamers now here are still loaded 
 with stores, or are in the floating hospital service, engaged in 
 removing the sick. To transport the one thousand cavalry 
 to-day will take all the available steamers now here not en- 
 gaged in the service of the harbor. These steamers could 
 take a large number of infantry, but are not well adapted to 
 the carrying of horses, and much space is thus lost. 
 
 Several steamers are expected here to-day, and we are un- 
 loading schooners rapidly. Most of these are not chartered, 
 but are being taken for the service required at same rates of 
 pay as other chartered schooners. 
 
 If you could cause a more speedy return of the steamers 
 sent away from here, it would facilitate matters. 
 
 C. G. Sawtelle, 
 Capt. and A. Q. M., Comd'g. Depot. 
 
 Our wharf facilities at Harrison's Landing were very limited, 
 admitting but few vessels at one time. These were continually 
 
306 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 in use as long as there were disj^osable vessels, and the officers 
 of the medical and quarter-master's departments, with all their 
 available forces, were incessantly occupied, day and night, in 
 embarking and sending off the sick men, troops and material. 
 Notwithstanding the repeated representations I made to the 
 gen eral-in-chief that such were the facts, on the 10th I received 
 the following : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 10, 1862. 12 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellax, — 
 
 The enemy is crossing the Rapidan in large force. They 
 are fighting General Pope to-day ; there must be no further 
 delay in your movements. That which has already occurred 
 was entirely unexpected and must be satisfactorily explained. 
 Let not a moment's time be lost, and telegraph me daily what 
 progress you have made in executing the order to transfer 
 your troops. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 To which I sent this reply : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 10, 1862. 11.30 p.m. 
 
 Your dispatch of to-day is received. I assure you again 
 that there has not been any unnecessary delay in carrying out 
 your orders. You are probably laboring under some great 
 mistake as to the amount of transpoi'tation available here. I 
 have pushed matters to the utmost in getting off our sick, and 
 the troops you ordered to Burnside. 
 
 Colonel Ingalls has more than once informed the Quarter- 
 master General of the condition of our water transportation. 
 From the fact that you directed me to keep the order secret, 
 I took it for granted that you would take the steps necessary 
 to provide the requisite transportation. A large number of 
 transports for all arms of service, and for wagons, should at 
 once be sent to Yorktown and Fort Monroe. I shall be ready 
 to move the whole army by land, the moment the sick are dis- 
 posed of You may be sure that not an hour's delay will 
 
 i 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN, 307 
 
 occur that can be avoided. I fear you do not realize the diffi- 
 culty of the operation proposed. The regiment of cavah-y for 
 Burnside has been in course of embarkation to-day and to- 
 night. (10) ten steamers were required for the purpose. 
 (1,258) twelve hundred and fifty-eight sick loaded to-day and 
 to-night. Our means exhausted, except one vessel returning 
 to Fort Monroe in the morning, which will take some (500) 
 five hundred cases of slight sickness. 
 
 The present moment is probably not the proper one for me 
 to refer to the unnecessarily harsh and unjust tone of your 
 telegrams of late. It will, however, make no diftcrence in my 
 official action. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 Comd'g. U. S. Army. 
 
 On the 11th this report was made : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug 11, 1862. 11.30 p.m. 
 The embarkation of (850) eight hundred and fifty cavalry 
 and (l) one brigade of infantry will be completed by (2) two 
 o'clock in the morning, (500) five hundred sick were embarked 
 to-day ; another vessel arrived to-night, and (600) six hundred 
 more sick are now being embarked. I still have some (4,000) 
 four thousand sick to dispose of. You have been grossly mis- 
 led as to the amount of transportation at my disposal. Vessels 
 loaded to their utmost capacity with stores, and others indis- 
 pensable for service here, have been reported to you as avail- 
 able for carrying sick and well. I am sending off all that can 
 be unloaded at Fort Monroe to have them return here. I 
 repeat that I have lost no time in carrying out your orders. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g. U. S. Army. 
 
 On the same day I received the following from the quarter- 
 master in charge of the depot : 
 
308 THIRDPERIOD. 
 
 Assistant Quarter-Master's Office, 
 ARiiY OF THE Potomac, 
 Harrison's Landing, Va., Aug. 11, 1862. 
 Colonel : — In reply to the communication from Gen. Marcy, 
 which was referred to me by you, I have to state that there are 
 now in this harbor no disposable transports not already detailed 
 either for the use of the hospital department, for the transporta- 
 tion of the N. Y. cavalry, or for the necessary service of the 
 harbor. I think the steamers loading, and to be loaded with 
 cavalry, could take in addition, three thousand infantry / these 
 boats are however directed to leave as fast as they are loaded ; 
 some have already started. The embarkation of this cavalry 
 regiment is going on very slowly, and it is not in my power to 
 hurry the matter, although I have had several agents of the 
 department, and one commissioned officer at the wharf, to 
 render all the assistance possible. The entire army is this 
 morning turning in, to be stored on vessels, knapsacks^officer's 
 baggage, and other surplus property, and with our limited 
 wharf facilities, it is impossible, unless the regular issues of 
 forage, &c. are suspended, to avoid great confusion and delay 
 with what is already ordered to be done ; of course, if any in- 
 fantry is ordered to embark on these cavalry transports, the 
 confusion and difficulties will be increased. 
 
 I know of no boats that may be expected here to-day, except 
 the " South America " and " Fanny Cadwallader " (a pro- 
 peller) which were ordered to be sent back from Fort Monroe. 
 The transports with the artillery left for Acquia Creek on 
 the night of the 8th and the morning of the 9th. They were 
 ordered to return immediately. 
 
 I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 C. G. Sawtellk, 
 Capt. and A. Q. M., Comd'g. Depot. 
 LiEUT.-CoL. RuFus Ingalls, 
 
 A. D. C. and Chief Q. M., Army of the Potomac. 
 
 On the 12th I received the following: 
 
 Washington, Aug. 12, 1862. 12 m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, 
 
 The quarter-master-general informs me that nearly every 
 
CLOSE OF TUB PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 309 
 
 available steam vessel in the country is now under your control. 
 To send more from Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New York 
 would interfere with the transportation of army supplies, and 
 break up the channels of travel by which we are to bring for- 
 ward the new troops. Burnside moved nearly thirteen thou- 
 sand (13,000) troops to Acquia Creek in less than two (2) 
 days, and his transports were immediately sent back to you. 
 All vessels in the James River and Chesapeake Bay were 
 placed at your disposal, and it was supposed that (8) eight or 
 (10) ten thousand of your men could be trans])orted daily. In 
 addition to steamers, there is a large fleet of sailing vessels 
 which could be used as transports. The bulk of your material 
 on shore, it was thought, could be sent to Fort Monroe 
 covered by that part of the army which could not get water 
 transportation. Such were the views of the government here ; 
 perhaps we were misinformed as to the tacts ; if so, the delay 
 could be explained. Nothing in my telegram was intention- 
 ally harsh or unjust; but the delay was so unexpected, that 
 an explanation was required. There has been and is the most 
 urgent necessity for dispatch, and not a single moment must 
 be lost in getting additional troops in front of Washington. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 I telegraphed the following reply : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 12, 1862. 11 p.m. 
 
 Your dispatch of noon to-day received. It is positively the 
 fiict that no more men could have embarked hence than have 
 gone, and that no unnecessary delay has occurred. Before 
 your orders were received. Col. Ingalls directed all available 
 vessels to come from Monroe. Officers have been sent to take 
 personal direction. Have heard nothing here of Burnside's 
 fleet. There are some vessels at Monroe, such as Atlantic and 
 Baltic, which draw too much to come here. Hospital accom- 
 modations exhausted this side New York, Propose filling 
 Atlantic and Baltic with serious cases for New York, and to 
 encamp slight cases for the present at Monroe. In this way 
 
310 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 can probably get off the (3400) thirty-four hundred sick still 
 on hand by day after to-morrow night. I am sure that you 
 have been misinformed as to the availability of vessels on hand. 
 We cannot use heavy loaded supply vessels for troops or 
 animals, and such constitute the mass of those here, which 
 have been represented to you as capable of transporting this 
 army. I fear you will find very great delay in embarking troops 
 and material at Yorktown and Monroe, both from want of ves- 
 sels and of facilities for embarkation. At least two additional 
 wharves should be built at each place. I ordered two at the 
 latter some (2) two weeks ago, but you countermanded the 
 order. 
 
 I learn that wharf accommodations at Acquia are altogether 
 inadequate for landing troops and supplies to any large extent. 
 Not an hour should be lost in remedying this. Great delays 
 will ensue there from shallow water. You will find a vast 
 deficiency in horse transports ; we had nearly (200) two hun- 
 dred when we came here. I learn of only (20) twenty pro- 
 vided now ; they cany about (50) fifty horses each. More 
 hospital accommodations should be provided. We are much 
 impeded here because our wharves are used night and day to 
 land current supplies. At Monroe a similar difficulty will 
 occur. With all the facilities at Alexandria and Washington, 
 (6) six weeks about were occupied in embarking this army and 
 its material. 
 
 Burnside's troops are not a fair criterion for rate of embarka- 
 tion. All his means were in hand ; his outfit specially pre- 
 pared for the purpose, and his men habituated to the move- 
 ment. 
 
 There shall be no unnecessary delay, but I cannot manufiic- 
 ture vessels. I state these difficulties from experience, and 
 because it appears to me that we have been lately working at 
 cross purposes, because you have not been properly informed 
 by those around you who ought to know the inherent difficul- 
 ties of such an undertaking. 
 
 It is not possible for any one to place this army where you 
 wish it, ready to move, in less than a month. If Washington 
 is in danger now, this army can scarcely arrive in time to save 
 it ; it is in much better position to do so from here than from 
 
CLOSE OF THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 311 
 
 Acquia. Our material can only be saved by using the whole 
 army to cover it if we are pressed. If sensibly weakened by 
 detachments the result might be the loss of much material 
 and many men. I will be at the telegraph office to-morrow 
 morning to talk with you. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 "Washington, D. C. 
 
 To the reasons given in the foregoing dispatch, to show 
 why General Burnside's movement from Fort Monroe was not 
 a fair criterion for our operations, the following may be 
 added : 
 
 He was not encumbered by either sick or wounded men. 
 
 He had no cavalry, artillery, wagons or teams. His force 
 consisted of infantry alone, with a few ambulances and officers' 
 horses. 
 
 His baggage was already on the transports, where it had 
 remained since his arrival from North Carolina, and his men 
 had only to resume their places on board. 
 
 The cavalry and artillery mentioned in my dispatches of the 
 7th, 10th and 11th were sent to supply his total deficiency in 
 those arms. 
 
 I may also repeat that the vessels used by General Burnside 
 had not returned from Acquia when the army left Harrison's 
 Bar. 
 
 It will be seen, from the concluding paragraph of the fore- 
 going dispatch, that in order to have a more direct, speedy 
 and full explanation of the condition of affiiirs in the army 
 than I coiild by sending a single dispatch by steamer to the 
 nearest telegraph office at Jamestowai Island, some seventy 
 miles distant, and waiting ten hours for a reply, I proposed to 
 go in person to the office. This I did. On my arrival at James- 
 town Island there was an interruption in the electric current, 
 which rendered it necessary for me to continue on to Fort 
 Monroe, and cross the Chesapeake Bay to Cherry Stone Inlet 
 on the " Eastern Shore," where I arrived late in the evening, 
 and immediately sent the annexed dispatches. 
 
312 THIKD PERIOD. 
 
 Cheery Stone, Aug. 13, 1862. 11.30 p.m. 
 Please come to office : wish to talk to you. What news 
 from Pope ? 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Washington. 
 
 Cherry Stone Inlet, Aug. 14, 1862. 12.30 a.m. 
 Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you ; found cable 
 broken, and came here. Please read my long telegram. [See 
 above dispatch of Aug. 12, 11 p.m.] All quiet at camp. 
 Enemy burned wharves at City Point yesterday. No rebel 
 pickets within (8) miles of Coggin's Point yesterday. Rich- 
 mond prisoners state that large force, with guns, left Richmond, 
 northward, Sunday. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major- General. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Washington. 
 
 To which the following reply was received. 
 
 Washington, Aug. 14, 1862. 1.40 a.m. 
 I have read your dispatch. There is no change of plans. 
 You will send up your troops as rapidly as possible. There is 
 no difficulty in lauding them. According to your own ac- 
 counts there is now no difficulty in withdrawing your forces. 
 Do so with all possible rapidity. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan. 
 
 Before I had time to decipher and reply to this dispatcli, the 
 telegraph operator in Washington informed me that General 
 Halleck had gone out of the office immediately after writing 
 this dispatch, without leaving any intimation of the fact for 
 me or waiting for any further information as to the object of 
 my journey across the bay. As there was no possibility of 
 
CLOSE OP THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN. 313 
 
 Other commuiiication with him at that time, I sent the follow- 
 ing dispatch and returned to Harrison's Landing. 
 
 Cherry Stone Inlet, Aug. 14, 1862. 1.40 a.m. 
 Your orders will be obeyed, I return at once. I had 
 hoped to have had a longer and fuller conversation with you, 
 after traveUng so far for the purpose. 
 
 G. B. McClkllan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 "Washington, D. 0. ' 
 
 On the 14th and 15th, and before we had been able to em- 
 bark all our sick men, two army corps were put in motion 
 towards Fort Monroe. This was reported in the annexed 
 dispatch. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, August 16, 1862. 11 p.m. 
 
 Movement has commenced by land and water. All sick 
 will be away to-morrow night. Every thing being done to 
 carry out your orders. I don't like Jackson's moA^ements, he 
 will suddenly appear where least expected. Will telegraph 
 fully and understandingly in the morning. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 "Washington, D. 0. 
 
 The phrase " movement has commenced," it need not be re- 
 marked, referred obviously to the movement of the main army, 
 after completing the necessary preliminary movements of the 
 sick, etc., etc. 
 
 The perversion of the term to which the general in chief 
 saw fit to give currency in a letter to the Secretary of War, 
 should have been here rendered impossible by the dispatches 
 which precede this of the 14th, which show that the move- 
 ment really began immediately after the receipt of the order 
 of August 4th. 
 
 14 
 
314 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 The pi'ogress made in the movement ou the 15 th was re- 
 ported in the following dispatches. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 August 15, 1862. 12 M. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 ComcVg. U. S. A. 
 Colonel Ingalls this moment reports that after embarking 
 the remaining brigade of McCall's division, with the sick 
 which are constantly accumulating, the transports now dis- 
 posable will all be consumed. 
 
 Two of my army corps marched last night and this morn- 
 ing en route for Yorktown, one via Jones's Bridge, and the 
 the other via Barrett's Ferry, where we have a pontoon bridge. 
 The other corps will be pushed forward as fast as the roads 
 are clear, and I hope before to-morrow morning, to have the 
 entire army in motion. 
 
 A report has just been received from my pickets that the 
 enemy in force is advancing on us from the Chickahominy, but 
 I do not credit it — shall know soon. Should any more trans- 
 ports arrive here before my departure, and the enemy do not 
 show such a force in our front as to require all the troops I 
 have remaining to insure the safety of the land movement with 
 its immense train, I shall send every man by water that the 
 transports will carry. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 15, 1862. 1.30 p.m. 
 
 The advance corps and the trains are fairly started. I learn 
 nothing more in relation to reported advance of rebels via 
 Jones's Bridge. Shall push the movement as rapidly as pos- 
 sible. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Washington, D. 0. 
 
the eeturn to the potosiac. 315 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Berkeley, Aug. 15, 1862. 10 p.m. 
 
 Coggin's Point is abandoned. The whole of McCall's divi- 
 sion, with its artillery, is now en route for Biirnside. We 
 have not yet transportation sufficient for our sick. I hope 
 will get it to-morrow. Porter is across the Chickahominy, 
 near its mouth, with his wagons and the reserve artillery. 
 
 Heintzelman at Jones's Bridge, with a portion of his corps. 
 They will all be up by morning. 
 
 Averill's cavalry on the other side. All quiet thus far. I 
 cannot get the last of the wagons as far as Charles City 
 Court-house before some time to-morrow afternoon. I am 
 hurrying matters with the utmost rapidity possible. Wagons 
 will move all night. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj-Gen. Corad'g. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 After the commencement of the movement, it was continued 
 with the utmost rapidity, until all the troops and material were 
 en route, both by land and water, on the morning of the 16th. 
 
 Late in the afternoon of that day, when the last man had 
 disappeared from the deserted camps, I followed with my per- 
 sonal staff in the track of the grand army of the Potomac, bid- 
 ding farewell to the scene still covered with the marks of its 
 presence, and to be forever memorable in history as the vicin- 
 ity of its most brilliant exploits. 
 
 THE RETURN" TO THE POTOMAC. 
 
 Previous to the departure of the troops, I had directed Cap- 
 tain Duane, of the Engineer Corps, to proceed to Barrett's 
 Ferry, near the mouth of the Chickahominy, and throw across 
 the river at that point a pontoon bridge. This was executed 
 promptly and satisfactorily, under the cover of gun-boats, and 
 an excellent bridge of about 2,000 feet in length was ready 
 for the first arrival of troops. The greater part of the array, 
 with its artillery, wagon trains, &c., crossed it rapidly, and in 
 
316 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 perfect order and safety, so that, on the night of the 17th, 
 everything was across the Chickahominy, except the rear- 
 guard, Avhich crossed early on the morning of the 18th, when 
 the pontoon bridge was immediately removed. 
 
 General Porter's corps, which was the first to march from 
 Harrison's Landing, had been pushed forward rapidly, and on 
 the 16th reached Williamsburg, where I had directed him to 
 halt until the entire army was across the Chickahominy. 
 
 On his arrival at Williamsburg, however, he received an in- 
 tercepted letter, which led to the belief that General Pope 
 would have to contend against a very heavy force then in his 
 front. General Porter, therefore, very properly took the re- 
 sponsibility of continuing his march directly on to Newport 
 News, which place he reached on the morning of the 18th of 
 August, having marched his corps sixty miles in the short 
 period of three days and one night, halting one day at the 
 crossing of the Chickahominy. 
 
 The embarkation of this corps commenced as soon as trans- 
 ports were ready, and on the 20th it had all sailed for Acquia 
 Creek. I made the following report from Barrett's Ferry : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Barrett's Perry, Chickahominy, 
 Aug. 17, 1862. 11 A.M. 
 
 Everything is removed from our camp at Harrison's Bar — 
 no property nor men left behind. The (5th) Fifth Corps is at 
 Williamsburg, with all its wagons and the reserve artillery. 
 The (3d) Third Corps is on the march from Jones's Bridge to 
 Williamsburg, via Diascund Bridge, and has probably passed 
 the latter before this hour. Averill's cavalry watches every- 
 thing in that direction. 
 
 The mass of the wagons have passed the pontoon bridge 
 here, and are parked on the other side. Peck's wagons arc 
 now crossing ;'his division will soon be over. Head-quarters 
 Avagons follow Peck's. I hope to have everything over to- 
 night, and the bridge removed by daylight. May be delayed 
 beyond that time. Came here to see Burnside ; otherwise 
 should have remained with the rear-guai'd. Thus far all is 
 quiet, and not a shot fired that I know of since we began the 
 
THE RETURN TO THE POTOMAC. 317 
 
 march. I shall not feel entirely secure until I have the whole 
 army beyond the Chickahominy. I will then begin to forward 
 troops by water as fast as transportation permits. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-Gen. Comd'g. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g. TJ. S. Arm}^, "Washington, D. G. 
 
 On the 18th and 19th our march was continued to Williams- 
 burg and Yorktown, and on the 20th the remainder of the 
 army was ready to embark at Yorktown, Fort Monroe, and 
 Newport ISTews, The movement of the main body of the 
 army on this march was covered by General Pleasanton, with 
 his cavalry and horse-artillery. That officer remained at Hax- 
 all's until the army had passed Charles City Court-house, when 
 he gradually fell back, picking up the stragglers as he pro- 
 ceeded, and crossed the bridge over the Chickahominy after 
 the main body had marched towards Williamsburg. His 
 troops were the last to cross the bridge, and he deserves great 
 credit for the manner in which he performed this duty. Gen- 
 eral Averill did a similar service in the same satisfactory way, 
 in covering the march of the 3d Corps. 
 
 As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated here, I cannot 
 close this part of ray report without giving an expression of 
 my sincere thanks and gratitude to the officers and men whom 
 I had the honor to command. 
 
 From the commencement to the termination of this most 
 arduous campaign, the army of the Potomac always evinced 
 the most perfect subordination, zeal, and alacrity in the per- 
 formance of all the duties required of it. 
 
 The amount of severe labor accomplished by this army in 
 the construction of intrenclnnents, roads, bridges, &c., was 
 enormous ; yet all the work was performed with the most 
 gratifying cheerfulness and devotion to the interests of the 
 service. 
 
 During the campaign ten severely contested and sanguinary 
 battles had been fought, besides numerous small engagements, 
 in which the troops exhibited the most determined enthusiasm 
 and bravery. They submitted to exposure, sickness, and even 
 
318 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 death without a murmur. Indeed, they had become veterans 
 in their country's cause, and richly deserved the warm com- 
 mendation of the government. 
 
 It was in view of these facts that this seemed to me an ap- 
 propriate occasion for the general-in-chief to give, in general 
 orders, some appreciative expression of the services of the 
 army while upon the Peninsula. Accordingly, on the 18th, I 
 sent him the following dispatch : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 August 18, 1862. 11 P.M. 
 
 Please say a kind word to my army, that I can repeat to 
 them in general orders, in regai'd to their conduct at Yorlctown, 
 Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court-House, and on the 
 Chickahominy, as well as in regard to the (V) seven days, and 
 the recent retreat. 
 
 No one has ever said anything to cheer them but myself. 
 Say nothing about me, merely give my men and officers credit 
 for what they have done. It will do you much good, and will 
 strengthen you much with them if you issue a handsome order 
 to them in regard to what they have accomplished. They 
 deserve it. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g. U. S. Army, Washington, D. C. 
 
 As no reply was received to this communication, and no 
 order was issued by the general-in-chief, I conclude that ray 
 suggestion did not meet with his approbation. 
 
 All the personnel and material of the army had been trans- 
 ferred from Harrison's Landing to the different points of em- 
 barkation in the very brief period of five days, without the 
 slightest loss or damage. Porter's corps sailed from Newport 
 News on the 19th and 20th; Heintzelman's corps sailed from 
 Yorktown on the 21st. On that day I received the following 
 telegram from the general-in-chief: 
 
THE RETURN TO THE POTOMAC. 319 
 
 ■Washingwon, Aug. 21, 1862. 6 p.m. 
 General McClellan, — 
 
 Leave such garrisons in Fort Monroe, Yorktown, &c., as 
 you may deem proper. They will be replaced by new troops 
 as rapidly as possible. The forces of Burnside and Pope are 
 hard pushed, and require aid as rapidly as you can send it. 
 Come yourself as soon as you can. By all means see that the 
 troops sent have plenty of ammunition. We have no time 
 here to supply them. Moreover they may have to fight as 
 soon as they land. 
 
 W. H. Halleck, 
 
 Maj.-G-en. Comd'g. U. S. A. 
 
 To which the following are replies : 
 
 Head-Quaetees, Aemt of the Potomac, 
 Fort Monroe, August 21, 1862. 7.30 p.m. 
 Your dispatch of (6) p.m. received. I have not lost an 
 hour in sending troops, nor will I. Franklin is here, and I 
 will try to get some of his troops on board to-night. I had 
 already ordered all the ammunition forward. I will put head- 
 quarters on board ship early to-morrow morning, so that I 
 can leave at a moment's notice. I hope that I can get off to- 
 morrow. Shall I go in person to Acquia, or do you wish to 
 see me first in Washington ? If you wish it, I can probably 
 ship quite an amount of ammunition for other troops than this 
 army. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Aemy of the Potomac, 
 Fort Monroe, Aug. 21, 1862. 10.25 p.m. 
 
 I have ample supplies of ammunition for infantry and artil- 
 lery, and will have it up in time. I can supply any deficiencies 
 that may exist in General Pope's army. Quite a number of 
 rifled field-guns are on hand here. The forage is the-only 
 question for you to attend to. Please have that ready for 
 
320 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 me at Acquia. I want many more schooners for cavalry- 
 horses. They should have water on board when they come 
 here. 
 
 If you have leisure, and there is no objection, please com- 
 municate to me fully the state of afiairs, and your plans. I 
 will then be enabled to arrange details uuderstandingly. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 "Washington. 
 
 Immediately on reaching Fort Monroe, I gave directions for 
 strengthening the defenses of Yorktown, to resist an attack 
 from the direction of Richmond, and left General Keyes, with 
 his corps, to perform the work, and temporarily garrison the 
 place. 
 
 I telegraphed as follows on the 22d : 
 
 Head-Quautebs, Army op the Potomac, 
 Fort Monroe, Aug. 22, 1862. 2.15 p.m. 
 
 Dispatch of to-day received. Franklin's corps is embarking 
 as rapidly as possible. Sumner's corps is at Newport News, 
 ready to embark as fast as transportation arrives. Keyes is 
 still at Yorktown, putting it in a proper state of defense. I 
 think that all of Franklin's corps will get off to-day, and hope 
 to commence with Sumner to-morrow. I shall then push oif 
 the cavalry and wagons. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Ma J. Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Fort Monroe, Aug. 22, 1862. 3.40 p.m. 
 
 Two (2) good ordnance sergeants are needed immediately 
 at Yorktown and Gloucester. The new defenses are arranged 
 and commenced. I recommend that (5,000) five thousand new 
 troops be sent immediately to garrison York and Gloucester. 
 They should be commanded by an experienced general-oificer, 
 who can discipline and instruct them. About (900) nine 
 
CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. 321 
 
 hundred should be artillery. I recommend that a new regi- 
 ment, whose colonel is an artillery officer, or graduate, be 
 designated as heavy-artillery, and sent there. A similar regi- 
 ment is absolutely necessary here. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-Generai 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g. U. S. Army. 
 
 On the 23d Franklin's corps sailed. I reported this in the 
 following dispatch : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Fort Monroe, Aug. 23, 1862. 1.30 p.m. 
 
 Franklin's corps has started. I shall start for Acquia in 
 about half-an-hour. No transports yet for Sumner's corps. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 Comd'g. U. S. Army. 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. 
 
 On that evening I sailed with my staff for Acquia Creek, 
 where I arrived at daylight on the following morning, report- 
 ing as follows : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Acquia Creek, Aug. 24, 1862. 
 
 I have reached here, and respectfully report for orders. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g. U. S. Army. 
 
 I also telegraphed as follows : 
 
 14* 
 
322 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 Head-Quartkrs, Army of the Potomao, 
 AcQuiA Creek, Aug. 24, 1862. 2 p.m. 
 Your telegram received. Morell's scouts report Rappahan- 
 nock Station burned and abandoned by Pope, without any 
 notice to Morell or Sykes. This was telegraphed you some 
 hours ago. Reynolds, Reno and Stevens, are supposed to be 
 with Pope, as nothing can be heard of them to-day. Morell 
 and Sykes are near Morrisville Post Office, watching the lower 
 fords of Rappahannock, with no troops between them and 
 Rappahannock Station, which is reported abandoned by Pope. 
 Please inform me immediately exactly where Pope is, and 
 what doing ; until I know that, I cannot regulate Porter's 
 movements ; he is much exposed now, and decided meas- 
 ures should be taken at once. Until I know Avhat my com- 
 mand and position are to be, and whether you still intend to 
 place me in the command indicated in your first letter to me, 
 and orally through General Burnside at the Chickahominy, I 
 cannot decide Avhere I can be of most use. If your determina- 
 tion is unchanged, I ought to go to Alexandria at once. Please 
 define my position and duties. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleok, 
 
 Comd'g U. S. Army. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 To which I received the following reply. 
 
 Washington, August 24, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAISr, 
 
 You ask me for information which I can not give. I do 
 not know either where General Pope is, or where the enemy 
 in force is. These are matters which I have been all day most 
 anxious to ascertain. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chiefi 
 
 On the 26th, I received the following : 
 
 Washington, August 26lh, 1862. 11 a,m. 
 Major-General G. B. McClellan, 
 
 There is reason to believe that the enemy is moving a large 
 force into the Shenandoah Valley. Reconnoissances will soon 
 determine. General Heintzelman's corps was ordered to re- 
 
CAMPAGN OF GENERAL POPE. 323 
 
 port to General Pope, and Kearney's will probably be sent to- 
 day against the enemy's flank. Don't draw any troops down 
 the Rappahannock at present. We shall probably want them 
 all in the direction of the Shenandoah. Perhaps you had bet- 
 ter leave General Burnside in charge at Acquia Creek, and 
 come to Alexandria, as very great irregularities are reported 
 there. General Franklin's corps will march as soon as it re- 
 ceives transportation. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Genoral-in-Chief. 
 
 On receipt of this, I immediately sailed for Alexandria, and 
 reported as follows. 
 
 Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862. 8 a.m. 
 I arrived here last night, and have taken measures to ascer- 
 tain the state of affairs here, and that proper remedies may be 
 applied. Just received a rumor that railway bridge over Bull 
 
 Run was burnt last night. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g. U. S. A. 
 
 Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862. 9.40 a.m. 
 The town is quiet, although quite full of soldiers who are 
 said to be chiefly convalescents. The affairs of the quarter- 
 master's department are reported as going on well. It is said 
 that the Bull Run bridge will be repaired by to-morrow. The 
 disembarkation of Sumner's corps commenced at Acquia yes- 
 terday afternoon. I found that he could reach Rappahan- 
 nock Station earlier that way than from here. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gex. H. W. Halleck, 
 Comd'g. U. S. A 
 
 On the same day I received the following : 
 
 Washington, August 27, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McGlellan. 
 
 Telegrams from General Porter to General Burnside just 
 received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville. McDowell, Sigel, 
 
324 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 and Ricketts near Warreuton, Reno on his right. Porter is 
 marching on Warrenton Junction to reinforce Pope. Nothing 
 said of Heintzelman. Porter reports a general battle immi- 
 nent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, 
 carrying three or four days' provisions, and to be supplied as 
 far as possible by railroad. Perhaps you may prefer some 
 other road than to Centreville. Colonel Haupt has just tele? 
 graphed about sending out troops, &c. Please see him and 
 give him your directions. There has been some serious neg- 
 lect to guard the railroad, which should be immediately reme- 
 died. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
 I replied as foUows : 
 
 Alexandria, August 21, 1862. 10.20 a.m. 
 Telegram this moment received. I have sent orders to 
 Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to 
 repair here in person to inform me as to his means of trans- 
 portation. Kearney was yesterday at Rappahannock Station. 
 Porter at Bealton, Kelly's, Darnell's, &c. Sumner will com- 
 mence reaching Falmouth to-day. Williams's Massachusetts 
 Cavalry will be mostly at Falmouth to-day. I loaned Burn- 
 side my personal escort, 1st squadron (4th) Fourth Regulars, 
 to scout down Rappahannock. I have sent for Couch's di- 
 vision to come at once. As fast as I gain any information I 
 will forward it, although you may already have it. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 ■Washington, D. 0. 
 
 I also received the following telegrams. 
 
 ■Washington, August 21, 1862. 
 Maj.-Geit. McClellak, 
 
 Direct Gen. Casey to furnish you about five thousand of the 
 new troops under his command. Take entire direction of the 
 sending out of the troops from Alexandria. Determine ques- 
 
CAMPAIGN OF GENEEAL POPE. 325 
 
 tions of priority in transportation, and the places they shall 
 occupy. Pope's head-quarters are near Warrenton Junction, 
 but I cannot ascertain the present position of his troops. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
 "Washington, Aug. 27, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 I can get no satisfactory information from the front, either 
 of the enemy or our troops. There seems to have been great 
 neglect and carelessness about Manassas. Franklin's coi'ps 
 should march in that direction as soon as possible. A compe- 
 tent officer should be sent out to take direction of affairs in 
 that vicinity. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
 Upon the receipt of these I immediately sent the following 
 telegram to Generals Heintzelman and Porter : 
 
 Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862. 
 Where are you, and what is state of affiiirs ? What troops 
 in your front, right and left ? Sumner is now landing at 
 Acquia. Where is Pope's left, and what of enemy ? Enemy 
 burned Bull Run bridge last night with cavalry force. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. Heintzelman, 
 
 "Waeeenton. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Porter, 
 
 Bealton. 
 
 p. S. If these general officers are not at the places named, 
 nearest operator will please have message forwarded. 
 
 I also telegraphed the General-in-Chief as follows : 
 
 Alexandria, Aug. 27, 1862. 10.50 p.m. 
 I have sent all the information I possess to Burnside, 
 instructing him to look out well for his right flank between 
 the Rappahannock and Potomac, and to send no trains to 
 
326 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 Porter without an escort. I fear the cavalry who dashed at 
 Bull Run last night may trouble Burnside a little. I have 
 sent to communicate with Porter and Heintzelman via Fal- 
 mouth, and hope to give you some definite information in a 
 few hours. I shall land the next cavalry I get hold of here, 
 and send it out to keejD open the communication between Pope 
 and Porter, also to watch vicinity of Manassas. Please send 
 mB a number of copies of the best majis of present field of 
 operations. I can use (50) fifty to advantage. 
 
 G. B. McClellan. 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Comd'g. U. S. A. 
 
 Alexandria, Aug. 21, 1862. 11.20 a.m. 
 In view of Burnside's dispatch, just received, would it not 
 be advisable to throw the mass of Sumnei''s corps here, to move 
 out with Franklin to Centreville or vicinity ? If a decisive 
 battle is fought at Warrenton, a disaster would leave any 
 troops on lower Rappahannock in a dangerous position. They 
 would do better service in front of Washington. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 Arexandria, Aug. 27, 1862. 12.5 p.m. 
 My aid has just returned from General Franklin's camp. 
 Reports that Generals Franklin, Smith, and Slocum are all in 
 Washington. He gave the order to the next in rank to place 
 the corps in readiness to move at once. I learn that heavy 
 firing has been heard this morning at Centreville, and have 
 sent to ascertain the truth. I can find no cavalry to send out 
 on the roads. Are the works garrisoned and ready for 
 defense ? 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Washington. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. 32Y 
 
 Alexandria, August 27, 1862. 12.20 p.m. 
 What bridges exist over Bull Run? Have steps been 
 taken to construct bridges for the advance of troops to rein- 
 force Pope, or to enable him to retreat if in trouble ? There 
 should be two gun-boats at Acquia Creek at once. Shall I 
 push the rest of Sumner's corps here, or is Pope so strong as 
 to be reasonably certain of success ? I have sent to inspect 
 the works near here, and their gai-risons. As soon as I can 
 find Gen. Casey, or some other commanding officer, I will see 
 to the railway, etc. It would be well to have them report to 
 me, as I do not know where they are. I am trying to find 
 them, and will lose no time in carrying out your orders. 
 "Would like to see Burnside. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 "Washington. 
 
 Alexandria, Aug. 21, 1862. 1.15 p.m. 
 Franklin's artillery have no horses, except for (4) four guns 
 without caissons ; I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these 
 facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water 
 as rapidly as possible ; to make immediate arrangements for 
 placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient con- 
 dition of defense. I have no means of knowing the enemy's 
 force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his 
 artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front ? Should 
 not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and 
 Acquia, at tlie same time covering the retreat of any of Pope's 
 troops who may fall back in that direction. I do not see that 
 we have force enough in hand to form a connection with Pope, 
 whose exact position we do not know. Are we safe in the 
 direction of the valley ? 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Washington. 
 
 Alexandria, Aug. 21, 1862. 1.35 p.m. 
 I learn that Taylor'^ brigade sent this morning to Bull Run 
 
328 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 bridge, is either cut to pieces or captured. That the force 
 against them had many guns, and about (5,000) five thousand 
 infantry, receiving reinforcements every moment. Also, that 
 Gaiusville is in possession of the enemy. Please send some 
 cavalry out towards Drainesville via Chain Bridge, to watch 
 Lewinsville and Drainesville, and go as far as they can. If you 
 will give me even one squadron of good cavalry here, I will 
 ascertain the state of the case. I think our policy now is to 
 make these works perfectly safe, and mobihze a couple of corps 
 as soon as possible ; but not to advance them until they can 
 have their artillery and cavalry. I have sent for Colonel Tyler 
 to place his artillerymen in the works. Is Fort Maroy securely 
 held ? 
 
 McClellan. 
 Gen, Halleck. 
 
 AiiEXANDRlA, Aug. 27, 1862. 2.30 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 Conid''g. U. S. Army : 
 Sumner has been ordered to send here all of his corps that 
 are within reach. Orders have been sent to Couch to come 
 here from Yorktown with the least possible delay. But one 
 squadron of my cavalry has arrived, that will be disembarked 
 at once, and sent to the front. If there is any cavalry in 
 Washington it should be ordered to report to me at once. 
 
 I still think that we should first provide for the immediate 
 defense of Washington on both sides of the Potomac. I am 
 not responsible for the past, and can not be for the future, 
 unless I receive authority to dispose of the available troops 
 according to my judgment. Please inform me at once, what 
 my position is. I do not wish to act in the dark. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Alexandkia, Aug. 21, 1862. 6 P.M. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 ConuVg U. S. Army : 
 I have just received the copy of a dispatch from General 
 Pope to you, dated 10 a,m, this morning, in which he says : 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. 329 
 
 " All forces now sent forward should be sent to my right at 
 Gainsville." 
 
 I now have at ray disposal here about (10,000) ten thousand 
 men of Franklin's corps, about (2800) twenty-eight hundred 
 of General Tyler's brigade, and Colonel Tyler's 1st Connecti- 
 cut artillery, which I recommend should be held in hand for 
 the defense of Washington, If you wish me to order any 
 part of this force to the front, it is in readiness to march at a 
 moment's notice to any point you may indicate. 
 
 In view of the existing state of things in our front, I have 
 deemed it best to order General Casey to hold his men for 
 Yorktown in readiness to move ; but not to send them off till 
 further orders. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 On the 28th I telegraphed as follows : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Camp near Alexandria, 
 
 Aug. 28, 1862. 4.10 p.m. 
 General Franklin is with me here. I will know in a few 
 minutes the condition of artillery and cavalry. We are not 
 yet in condition to move, may be by to-morrow morning. 
 Pope must cut through to-day, or adopt the plan I suggested. 
 I have ordered troops to garrison the works at Upton's Hill. 
 They must be held at any cost. As soon as I can see the way 
 to spare them, I will send a corps of good troops there. It is 
 the key to Washington, which can not be seriously menaced as 
 long as it is held. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen Halleck, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 
 I received the following from the general-in-chief : — 
 
 ■Washington, August 28, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 I think you had better place Sumner's corps, as it arrives, 
 near the guns, and particularly at the Chain Bridge. The 
 
330 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 principal thing to be feared now is a cavalry raid into this city, 
 especially in the night-time. Use Cox's and Tyler's brigade 
 and the new troops for the same object, if you need them. 
 Porter writes to Burnside from Bristol, 9.30 a.m., yestei'day, 
 that Pope's forces were then moving on Manassas, and that 
 Burnside would soon hear of them by way of Alexandria. 
 General Cullum has gone to Harper's Ferry, and I have only 
 a single regular officer for duty in the office. Please send 
 some of your officers to-day to see that every precaution is 
 taken at the forts against a raid ; also at the bridge. Please 
 answer. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Genera]-ia-Chie£ 
 
 On the 29th the following dispatch was telegraj^hed : 
 
 Camp neak Alexandria, Aug. 29, 18G2. 10.30 a.m. 
 
 Franklin's corps is in motion. Started about (6) six a.m. I 
 can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. I propose mov- 
 ing General Cox to Upton's Hill, to hold that important point, 
 with its works, and to push cavalry scouts to Vienna via 
 Freedom Hill and Hunter's Lane. Cox has (2) two squadrons 
 cavalry. Please answer at once whether this meets your ap- 
 proval. I have directed Woodbury, with the engineer brigade, 
 to hold Fort Lyon. Sumner detached last night two regiments 
 to vicinity of Forts " Ethan Allen" and " Marcy." Meagher's 
 brigade is still at Acquia. If he moves in support of Franklin 
 it leaves us without any reliable troops in and near "Washing- 
 ton, yet Franklin is too Aveak alone. What shall be done ? 
 No more cavalry arrived ; have but (3) three squadrons. 
 Franklin has but (40) forty rounds of ammunition, and no 
 wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condi- 
 tion to accomplish much if he meets with serious resistance. 
 
 I should not have moved him but for your pressing order 
 of last night. What have you from Vienna and Drainesville ? 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Washington. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. 331 
 
 To which the following is a reply : 
 
 Washington, August 29, 1862. 12 m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, 
 
 Upton's Hill arrangement all right. We must send wagons 
 and ammunition to Franklin as fast as they arrive. Meagher's 
 brigade ordered up yesterday. Fitzhugh Lee was, it is said 
 on good authority, in Alexandria on Sunday last for three 
 hours. I have nothing from Drainesville. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
 On the same day the following was received from his Excel- 
 lency the President : 
 
 "Washington, August 29, 1862. 2.30 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, 
 
 What news from direction of Manassas Junction ? What, 
 
 generally ? 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 To which I replied as follows : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862. 2.45 p.m. 
 The last news I received from the direction of Manassas 
 was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacu- 
 ating Centreville and retiring towards Thoro'fare Gap. This 
 by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses 
 should be adopted: 1st. To concentrate all our available 
 forces to open communication with Pope. 2d. To leave Pope 
 to get out of his scrape, and at once use all our means to make 
 the capital perfectly safe. No middle ground will now answer. 
 Tell me what you wish me to do and I will do all in my 
 power to accomplish it. I wish to know Avhat my orders and 
 authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders 
 you give. I only ask a prompt decision, that I may at once 
 give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay any longer. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 A. Lincoln, 
 
 President. 
 
 and copy to Gen. Halleck. 
 
332 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 To which the following is a reply : 
 
 "Washington, Aug. 29, 1862. 410 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gknt, McClellan, 
 
 Yours of to-day just received. I think your fii'st alternative, 
 to wit : " To concentrate all our available forces to open com- 
 munication with Pope," is the right one, but I wish not to 
 control. That I now leave to General Halleck, aided by your 
 counsels. 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 
 It had been officially reported to me from "Washington that 
 the enemy in strong force Avas moving through Vienna, in the 
 direction of the Chain Bridge, and had a large force at Vienna. 
 This report, in connection with the dispatch of the general-in- 
 chief on the 28th, before noted, induced me to direct Franklin 
 to halt his command near Annandale, until it could be deter- 
 mined by reconnoissances to Vienna and towards Manassas, 
 whether these reports were true. General Cox was ordered 
 to send his small cavalry force from Upton's Hill towards 
 Vienna and Drainesville in one direction, and towards Fairfax 
 Court-House in the other, and Franklin to push his (2) two 
 squadrons as far towards Manassas as possible, in order to 
 ascertain the true position of the enemy. With the enemy in 
 force at Vienna and towards Lewinsville, it w^ould have been 
 very injudicious to have pushed Franklin's small force beyond 
 Annandale. It must be remembered that at this time we were 
 cut off from direct communication with General Pope ; that 
 the enemy was, by the last accounts, at Manassas in strong 
 force; and that Franklin had only from 10,000 to 11,000 men, 
 with an entirely insufficient force of cavalry and artillery. 
 
 In order to represent this condition of affairs in its proper 
 light to the general-in-chief, and to obtain definite instructions 
 from him, I telegraphed as follows : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862. 12 m. 
 Have ordered most of the (12th) Twelfth Pennsylvania 
 Cavalry to report to General Barnard for scouting duty to- 
 wards Rockville, Poolesville, etc. If you apprehend a raid of 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. 333 
 
 cavalry on your side of the river, I had better send a brigade 
 
 or two of Sumner's to near Tenallytown, where, with two or 
 
 three old regiments in Forts Allen and Marcy, they can watch 
 
 both Chain Bridge and Tenallytown. Would it meet your 
 
 views to post rest of Sumner's corps between Arlington and 
 
 Fort Corcoran, whence they can either support Cox, Franklin, 
 
 or Chain Bridge, and even Tenallytown. Franklin has only 
 
 between (10,000) ten thousand and (11,000) eleven thousand 
 
 for duty ? How far do you wish this force to advance ? 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Washington. 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862. 1 p.m. 
 
 I anxiously await reply to my last dispatch in regard to 
 Sumner. Wish to give the order at once. Please authorize 
 me to attach new regiments permanently to my old brigades. 
 I can do much good to old and new troops in that way. I 
 shall endeavor to hold a line in advance of Forts Allen and 
 Marcy, at least with strong advanced guards. I wish to hold 
 the line through Prospect Hill, Mackall's, Minor's and Hall's 
 Hills. This will give us timely warning. Shall I do as seems 
 best to me with all the troops in this vicinity, including 
 Franklin, who, I really think, ought not, under present cir- 
 cumstances, to advance beyond Anuandale ? 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Gen. Halleck. 
 
 On the same day I received a dispatch from the general-in- 
 chief, in which he asks me why I halted Franklin at Annan- 
 dale, to which I replied as follows : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862. 8 p.m. 
 
 By referring to my telegrams of 10.30 a.m., 12 m., and 1 p.m., 
 together with your reply of 2.48 p.m., you will see why Frank- 
 lin's corps halted at Annandale. His small cavalry force — all 
 I had to give him — was ordered to push on as far as possible 
 
334 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 towards Manassas. It was not safe for Franklin to move be- 
 yond Annandale under the circumstances, until we knew what 
 was at Vienna; General Franklin remained here until about 
 1 P.M., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. 
 I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see 
 that either Avas in disobedience to your orders. Please give 
 distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements to-mor- 
 row. I have sent to Colonel Haupt to push out construction 
 and supply trains as soon as possible. General Tyler to fur- 
 nish the necessary guards. I have directed General Banks's 
 supply trains to start out to-night at least as far as Annan- 
 dale, with an escort from General Tyler. In regard to to- 
 morrow's movements, I desire definite instructions, as it is not 
 agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when 
 I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to 
 me. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL • 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 "Washington, D. C. 
 
 On the same evening I sent the following dispatches : 
 
 Camp near Alesandria, Aug. 29, 1862. 10 p.m. 
 Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to General Frank- 
 lin, to place himself in communication with General Pope as 
 soon as possible, and at the same time, cover the transit of 
 Pope's supplies. Orders have been given for railway and 
 wagon trains to move to Pope, with least possible delay. I 
 am having inspections made of all the forts around city by 
 members of my stafi", with instructions to give all requisite 
 orders. I inspected Worth and Ward myself this evening; 
 found them in good order. Reports, so far as heard from, 
 are favorable as to condition of works. 
 
 G. B. McClellak, 
 
 Major-Greneral. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 Washington. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. 335 
 
 Camp kear Alexandria, Aug. 29, 1862. 10 p.m 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 General-in-Chief U. S. A., 
 
 "Washington, D. C, — 
 Your dispatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered 
 to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about 
 fourteen thousand infantry, without cavalry or artillery, here. 
 Cox's brigade of four regiments is here, with two batteries of 
 artillery. Men of two regiments, much fatigued, came in to- 
 day. Tyler's brigade of three new regiments but little drilled, 
 is also here. All these troops will be ordered to hold them- 
 selves ready to march to-morrow morning, and all, except 
 Franklin's, to await further orders. If you wish any of them 
 to move towards Manassas, please inform me. 
 
 Col. Wagner, 2d New York artillery, has just come in from 
 the front. He reports strong infantry and cavalry force of 
 rebels, near Fairfax Court House; reports rumors from 
 various sources, that Lee and Stuart, with large forces, are 
 at Manassas. That the enemy with 120,000 men, intend 
 advancing on the forts near Arlington and Chain Bridge, with 
 a view of attacking Washington and Baltimore. General Bar- 
 nard telegraphs me to-night, that the length of the line of 
 fortifications on this side of the Potomac, requires 2,000 addi- 
 tional artillery men, and additional troops to defend intervals, 
 according to circumstances. At all events, he says an old 
 regiment should be added to the force at Chain Bridge, and a 
 few regiments distributed along the lines, to give confidence 
 to our new troops. I agree with him fully, and think our forti- 
 fications along the upper part of our line, on this side the river, 
 very unsafe with their present garrisons, and the movements 
 of the enemy seem to indicate attack upon those works. 
 
 G. B. McClellan", 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 30, 1862. 11.30 a.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 General-in- Chiefs — 
 Your telegram of 9 a.m. received. Ever since General 
 Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexan- 
 dria, he has been endeavoring to get transportation from the 
 
336 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 quarter-master at Alexandria, but he has uniformly been told 
 that there was none disposable, and his command marched 
 without wagons. After the dejjarture of his corps, he pro- 
 cured twenty wagons to carry some extra ammunition, by un- 
 loading Banks's supply train. General Sumner endeavored, by 
 application upon the quarter-master's department, to get wagons 
 to carry his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was 
 obliged to march with what he could carry in his cartridge- 
 boxes. I have this morning directed that all my head-quarters 
 wagons that are landed, be at once loaded with ammunition 
 for Sumner and Franklin, but they will not go far towards 
 supplying the deficiency. 
 
 Eighty-five wagons were got together by the quarter-masters 
 last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward at 1 a.m., 
 with an escort via Annandale. Every eflfort has been made 
 to carry out your orders promjjtly. The great difficulty seems 
 to consist in the fact, that the greater part of the transporta- 
 tion on hand at Alexandria and Washington, has been needed 
 for current supplies of the garrisons. Such is the state of the 
 case, as represented to me by the quarter-masters, and it ap- 
 pears to be true. I take it for granted, that this has not been 
 properly explained to you. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 On the morning of the 30th, heavy artillery firing was heard 
 in the direction of Fairfax Court House, which I reported to the 
 general-in-chief. At 11 a.m. the following telegram was sent. 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 30. 1862. 11 a.m. 
 Have ordered Sumner to leave (1) one brigade in vicinity of 
 Chain Bridge, and to move the rest via Columbia pike on An- 
 nandale and Fairfax Court House. Is this the route you wish 
 them to take ? He and Franklin are both instructed to join 
 Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move out also 
 
 when he arrives ? 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 "Washington. 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE, 33 7 
 
 On the same day I received the following : 
 
 "Washington, Aiig. 30, 1862. 1.45 a.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, 
 
 Ammunition, and particularly for artillery, must be immedi- 
 ately sent forward to Centreville for General Pope. It must 
 be done with all possible dispatch. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
 To which the following reply was made : 
 
 Camp neae Alexandria, Aug. 30, 1862. 2.10 p.m. 
 
 I know nothing of the calibres of Pope's artillery. All I 
 can do is to direct my ordnance officer to load up all the 
 wagons sent to him. I have already sent all my head-quarters 
 wagons. You will have to see that wagons are sent from 
 Washington. I can do nothing more than give the order that 
 every available wagon in Alexandria shall be loaded at once. 
 The order to the brigade of Sumner that I directed to remain 
 near Chain Bridge and Tenallytown, should go from your 
 head-quarters, to save time. I understand you to intend it 
 also to move. I have no sharpshooters except the guard 
 around my camp. I have sent off every man but those, and 
 will now send them with the train as you direct. I will also 
 send my only remaining squadron of cavalry with General 
 Sumner. I can do no more. You now have every man of 
 the army of the Potomac who is within my reach. 
 
 G. B. McCletxan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. II. W. Halleck. 
 
 At 10.80 P.M. the following telegram was sent : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 30, 1862. 10.30 p.m. 
 I have sent to the front all my troops, with the exception 
 of Couch's division, and have given the orders necessary to 
 insure its being disposed of as you directed. I hourly expect 
 the return of one of my aides, who will give authentic news 
 from the field of battle. 
 
 15 
 
S38 THIRD PEEIOD. 
 
 ( 
 
 I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I have 
 experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound of the 
 firing of my men. As I can be of no further use here, I re- 
 spectfully ask that if there is a probability of the conflict being 
 renewed to-morrow, I may be permitted to go to the scene of 
 battle with ray staff, merely to be Avith my own men, if 
 nothing more ; they will fight none the worse for my being 
 with them. If it is not deemed best to intrust me with the 
 command even of my own army, I sim])ly ask to be permitted 
 to share their fate on the field of battle. Please reply to this 
 to-night. 
 
 I have been engaged for the last few hours in doing what I 
 can to make arrangements for the wounded. I have started 
 out all the ambulances now landed. 
 
 As I have sent my escort to the front, I wo aid be glad to 
 take some of Gregg's cavalry with me, if allowed to go. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-GeneraL 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 Comd'g U. S. A., Washington, D. C. 
 
 To which on the following day I received this answer : 
 
 Washingtox, Aug. 31, 1862. 9.18 a.m. 
 Maj.-Gex. McClellan, 
 
 I have just seen your telegram of 11.5 last night. The sub- 
 stance was stated to me when received, but I did not know 
 that you asked for a reply immediately. I cannot anwer 
 without seeing the President, as General Pope is in command, 
 by his orders, of the department. 
 
 I think Couch's division should go forward as rapidly as 
 possible, and find the battle-field. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chiet 
 
 On the same day the following was received : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 31, 1862, 12.45 p.m. 
 Maj-'Gen-. McClbllan, — 
 
 The subsistence department are making Fairfax Station 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. o.l9 
 
 their principal depot : it should be well guarded. The officer 
 in charge should be directed to secure the depot by abattis 
 against cavalry. As many as possible of the new regiments 
 should be prepared to take the field. Perhaps some more 
 should be sent in the vicinity of Chain Bridge. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
 THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC REMOVED FROM 
 GENERAL McCLELLAN'S COMMAND. 
 
 At 2.30 P.M. the following dispatch was telegraphed : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 31, 1862. 2.30 p.m. 
 
 Major Haller is at Fairfax Station, with my provost and 
 head-quarters guard and other troops. I have requested (4) 
 four more companies to be sent at once, and the precautions 
 you direct to be taken. 
 
 Under the War Department order of yesterday, I have no 
 control over anything except my staff, some one hundred men 
 in my camp here, and the few remaining near Fort Monroe. 
 
 I have no control over the new regiments ; do not know 
 where tliey are or anything about them, except those near 
 here. Their commanding officers and those of the works are 
 not under me. Where I have seen evils existing under my 
 own eye I have corrected them. I think it is the business of 
 General Casey to prepare the new regiments for the field, and 
 a matter between him and General Barnard to order others to 
 vicinity of Chain Bridge. Neither of them is under my com- 
 mand, and by the War Department order I have no right to 
 
 give them orders. 
 
 G. B. McClellan. 
 GenePvAL Halleck, 
 
 "Washington. 
 
 To which the following is an answer : 
 
 Washington, Aug. 31, 1862. 10.7 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 Since receiving your dispatch, relating to command, I have 
 
340 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 not been able to answer any not of absolute necessity. I have 
 not seen the order as published, but will write to you in the 
 morning. You will retain the command of everything in this 
 vicinity not temporarily to be Pope's army in the field. 
 
 I beg of you to assist me in this crisis with your ability and 
 experience. I am entirely tired out. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-iu-ChieC 
 
 The order referred to in the preceding dispatches was as 
 follows : 
 
 "War Department, Aug. 30, 1862. 
 
 The following are the commanders of the armies operating 
 in Virginia : 
 
 General Bumside commands his own corps, except those 
 that have been temporarily detached and assigned to General 
 Pope. 
 
 General McClellan commands that portion of the Army of 
 the Potomac that has not been sent forward to General Pope's 
 command. 
 
 General Pope commands the Army of Virginia, and all the 
 forces temporarily attached to it. 
 
 All the forces are under the command of Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
 E. D. TOWXSEND, 
 
 Assistant- Adj.-General. 
 
 I was informed by Col. Townsend that the above was pub- 
 lished by order of the Secretary of War, 
 At 11.30 P.M. I telegraphed the following : 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Aug. 31, 1862. 11.30 p.m. 
 The squadron of 2d Regular Cavalry that I sent with Gen. 
 Sumner was captured to-day, about 2 p.m, some three miles 
 from Fairfax Court House, beyond it on the Little River Pike, 
 by Fitzhugh Lee, with 3,000 cavalry and (3) three light bat- 
 teries. I have conversed with the 1st sergeant, who says that 
 when he last saw them they were within a mile of Fairfax. 
 Pope had no troops on that road, this squadron getting there 
 
THE CAMPAIGN OF GENERAL POPE. 341 
 
 by mistake. There is nothing of ours on the right of Centre- 
 ville but Sumner's corps. There was much artillery firing 
 during the day. A rebel major told the serjeant that the 
 rebels had driven in our entire left to-day. He says the road 
 is filled with wagons and stragglers coming towards Alexan- 
 dria. It is clear, from the Serjeant's account, that we were 
 badly beaten yesterday, and that Pope's right is entirely 
 exposed. 
 
 I recommend that no more of Couch's division be sent to 
 the front, that Burnside be brought here as soon as practicable, 
 and that everything available this side of Fairfax be drawn in 
 at once, including the mass of the troops on the railroad. I 
 apprehend that the enemy will, or have by this time, occupied 
 Fairfax Court-House, and cut ofi'Pope entirely, unless he falls 
 back to-night via Sangster's and Fairfax Station. I think 
 these orders should be sent at once. I have no confidence in 
 the dispositions made, as I gather them. To speak frankly, 
 and the occasion requires it, there appears to be a total ab- 
 sence of brains, and I fear the total destruction of the army. 
 I have some cavalry here that can carry out any orders you 
 may have to send. The occasion is grave, and demands grave 
 measures. The question is the salvation of the country. I 
 learn that our loss yesterday amounted to (15,000) fifteen 
 thousand. We cannot afibrd such losses without an object. 
 It is my deliberate opinion that the interests of the nation de- 
 mand that Pope should fall back to-night if possible, and not 
 one moment is to be lost. I will use all the cavalry I have to 
 watch our right. Please answer at once. I feel confident you 
 can rely upon the information I give you. I shall be up all 
 night, and ready to obey any orders you give me. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Gen. Halleck, 
 
 Washington. 
 
 To which this reply was received : 
 
 ■Washington, Sept. 1, 1862. 1.30 a.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 Burnside was ordered up very early yesterday morning. 
 Retain remainder of Couch's forces, and make arrangements 
 
342 THIRD PERIOD. 
 
 to stop all retreating troops in line of works, or where you can 
 best establish an outer line of defense. My news from Pope 
 w^as up to 4 P.M., he was then all right. I must wait for more 
 definite information before I can order a retreat, as the falling 
 back on the line of works must necessarily be directed, in case 
 of a sei'ious disaster. 
 
 Give me all additional news that is reliable. I shall be up 
 all night, and ready to act as circumstances may require. I 
 am fully aware of the gravity of the crisis, and have been for 
 weeks. 
 
 H. W. Hallkck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
 It will be seen from what has preceded that I lost no time 
 that could be avoided in moving the army of the Potomac 
 from the Peninsula to the support of the army of Virginia; 
 that I spai-ed no efibrt to hasten the embarkation of the 
 troops at Fort Monroe, Newport News and Yorktown, re- 
 maining at Fort Monroe myself until the mass of the army had 
 sailed ; and that after my arrival at Alexandria I left nothing 
 in my power undone to forward supplies and reinforcements 
 to General Pope. I sent with the troops that moved all the 
 cavalry I could get hold of, even my personal escort was sent 
 out upon the line of the railway as a guard, with the provost 
 and camp guard at head-quarters, retaining less than one hun- 
 dred men, many of whom were orderlies, invalids, members of 
 bands, etc. ; all the head-quarter teams that arrived were sent 
 out with supplies and ammunition, none being retained even 
 to move the head-quarters caiup. The squadron that habitu- 
 ally served as my personal escort was left at Falmouth with 
 General Burnside, as he w^as deficient in cavalry. 
 
FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 On the 1st of September, I went into Washington, where 
 I had an interview with the general-in-chief, who instructed 
 me verbally, to take command of its defenses, expressly limit- 
 ing ray jurisdiction to the works and their garrisons, and pro- 
 hibiting me from exercising any control over the troops actively 
 engaged in front under General Pope. During this interview, 
 I suggested to the general-in-chief, the necessity of his going 
 in person, or sending one of his personal staff", to the army 
 under General Pope, for the purpose of ascertaining the exact 
 condition of affairs. He sent Colonel Kelton, his assistant- 
 adjutant-general. 
 
 During the afternoon of the same day, I received a message 
 from the general-in-chief, to the effect that he desired me to go 
 at once to his house to see the President. The President in- 
 formed me that he had reason to believe, that the army of the 
 Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating with, and supporting 
 General Pope, that he had " always been a friend of mine," 
 and now asked me as a special favor, to use my influence in 
 correcting this state of things. I replied, substantially, that I 
 was confident that he was misinformed, that I was sure, what- 
 ever sentiment the army of the Potomac might entertain 
 towards General Pope, that they would obey his orders, sup- 
 port him to the fullest extent, and do tlieir Avhole duty. The 
 President, who was much moved, again asked me to telegraph 
 to " Fitz John Porter, or some other of my friends," and try 
 to do away with any feeling that might exist, adding that I 
 could rectify the evil, and that no one else could. I there- 
 upon told him that I would cheerfully telegraph to General 
 Porter, or do any thing else in my power, to gratify his wishes 
 
544 FOURTH PEEIOD. 
 
 and relieve his anxiety, upon which he thanked me very 
 warmly, assured me that he could never forget my action in 
 the matter, etc., and left. 
 
 I then wrote the following telegram to Gen. Porter, which 
 was sent to him by the general-in-chief : 
 
 ■Washington, Sept. 1, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. Porter, 
 
 I ask of you for my sake, and that of the country, and the 
 old army of the Potomac, that you and all my friends, will 
 lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation to General Pope, 
 in all the operations now going on. The destinies of our 
 country, the honor of our army are at stake, and all depends 
 now upon the cheerful co-operation of all in the field. This 
 week is the crisis of our fate. Say the same thing to my friends 
 in the Army of the Potomac, and that the last request I have 
 to make of thera is, that for their country's sake they will 
 extend to General Pope, the same suj^port they ever have 
 to me. 
 
 I am in charge of the defenses of Washington, and am doing 
 all I can to render your retreat safe, should that become 
 necessary. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan. 
 
 To which he sent the following reply : 
 
 Fairfax Court House, 10 a.m., Sept. 2, 1802. 
 " You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as every 
 lover of his country, will ever give, as they have given, to Gen- 
 eral Pope their cordial co-operation and constant support, in 
 the execution of all orders and plans. Our killed, wounded 
 and enfeebled troops, attest our devoted duty." 
 
 F. J. Porter, 
 Gen. Geo. B. McClellax, Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 Wasiiinoton. 
 
 Neither at the time I wrote the telegram, nor at any other 
 time, did I think for one moment, that General Porter had been, 
 or would be in any manner, derelict in the performance of his 
 duty to the nation and its cause. Such an impression never 
 
EECALL TO THE COMMAND. 345 
 
 entered my mind. The dispatch in question was written 
 purely at the request of the President. 
 
 On the morning of the 2d, the President and General Hal- 
 leck came to my house, when the President informed me that 
 Colonel Kelton had returned from the front ; that our affairs 
 were in bad condition ; that the army was in full retreat upon 
 the defenses of Washington ; the roads filled with sti-agglers, 
 &c. He instructed me to take steps at once to stop and col- 
 lect the stragglers, to place the works in a proper state of de- 
 fense, and to go out to meet, and take command of the army 
 when it approached the vicinity of the works ; then to put the 
 troops in the best position for defense ; committing every thing 
 to my hands.* 
 
 I immediately took steps to carry out these orders, and I 
 sent an aide to General Pope with the following letter : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Washington-, Sept. 2, 1862, 
 Maj.-Gen. John Pope, 
 
 ConicVg. Army of Virginia: 
 Geneeal, — General Halleck instructed me to repeat to 
 you the order he sent this morning to withdraw your army to 
 Washington without unnecessary delay. He feared that his 
 messenger might miss you, and desired to take this double 
 precaution. 
 
 In order to bring troops upon ground with which they are 
 already familiar, it would be best to move Porter's corps upon 
 Upton's Hill, that it may occupy Hall's Hill, etc. ; McDowell's 
 to Upton's Hill ; Franklin's to the works in front of Alexan- 
 dria ; Heintzelman's to the same vicinity ; Couch to Fort 
 Corcoran, or, if practicable, to the Chain Bridge ; Sumner either 
 
 ■"■ The following, which was the only order issued on the subject, was pub- 
 lished on the 2d September. It was accidentally omitted in preparing the 
 report. 
 
 Wab-Depabtment, Abjutant-Genebal's Office, 
 Washington, Sept. 2, 1862. 
 Major-General McClellan will have command of the fortifications of Wash- 
 ington, and of all the troops for the defense of the capital. 
 
 By order of Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 E. D. TOWNSEND, 
 
 Ass' t.-Adg' t. -GeneraL 
 
346 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 to Fort Albany or to Alexandria, as may be most conve- 
 nient. 
 
 In haste, General, 
 
 Very truly yours, 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Mcj.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
 In the afternoon I crossed the Potomac and rode to the 
 front, and at Upton's Hill met the advance of McDowell's 
 corps, and with it Generals Pope and McDowell. After get- 
 ting what information I could from them, I sent the few aids 
 at my disposal to the left, to give instructions to the troops 
 approaching in the direction of Alexandria ; and hearing artil- 
 lery firing in the direction of the Vienna and Langley road, by 
 which the corps of Sumner, Porter and Sigel were returning, 
 and learning from General Pope that Sumner was probably 
 enoraged, I went with a single aide and three orderlies by the 
 shortest line to meet that column. I reached the column after 
 dark, and proceeded as far as Lewinsville, where I became 
 satisfied that the rear corps (Sumner's) would be able to 
 reach its intended position without any serious molestation. 
 I therefore indicated to Generals Porter and Sigel the posi- 
 tions they were to occupy, sent instructions to General Sum- 
 ner, and at a late hour of the night returned to Washington. 
 
 ISText day I rode to the front of Alexandria, and was en- 
 gaged in rectifying the positions of the troops, and giving 
 orders necessary to secure the issuing of the necessary sup- 
 plies, etc. I felt sure on this day that we could repulse any 
 attack made by the enemy on the south side of the Potomac. 
 
 THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 
 
 On the 3d the enemy had disappeared from the front of 
 Washington, and the information which I received induced 
 me to believe that he intended to cross the upper Potomac 
 into lilaryland. This materially changed the aspect of affairs 
 and enlarged the sphere of operations, for, in case of a cross- 
 ing in force, an active campaign would be necessary to cover 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 34V 
 
 Baltimore, prevent the invasion of Pennsylvania, and clear 
 Maryland. 
 
 I therefore on the 3d ordered the 2d and 12th Corps to 
 Tenallytown, and the 9th Corps to a point on the 1th Street 
 road near Washington, and sent such cavalry as was available 
 to the fords near Poolesville, to watch and impede the enemy 
 in any attempt to cross in that vicinity. 
 
 On the 5th the 2d and 12th Corps were moved to Rock- 
 ville, and Couch's division (the only one of the 4th Corps that 
 had been brought from the Peninsula) to Offut's Cross Roads. 
 
 On the 6th the 1st and 9th Corps were ordered to Lees- 
 boro, the 6th Corps and Sykes's division of the 5th Corps to 
 Tenallytown. 
 
 On the 1th the 6th Corps was advanced to Rockville, to 
 which place my head-quarters were moved on the same day. 
 
 All the necessary arrangements for the defense of the city, 
 under the new condition of things, had been made, and Gen- 
 eral Banks was left in command, having received his instruc- 
 tions from me. 
 
 I left Washington on tlie 1th of September. At this time 
 it Avas known that the mass of the rebel army had passed up 
 the south side of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, 
 and that a portion of that army had crossed into Maryland ; 
 but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force, 
 with a view to turn Washington by a flank movement down 
 the north bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to 
 invade Pennsylvania, were questions which at that time we 
 had no means of determining. This uncertainty as to the 
 intentions of the enemy obliged me, up to the 13th of Septem- 
 ber, to march cautiously, and to advance the army in such 
 order as continually to keep Washington and Baltimore cov- 
 ered, and at the same time to hold the troops Avell in hand, so 
 as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy 
 took the direction of Pennsylvania, or to return to the defense 
 of Washington, if, as was greatly feared by the authorities, 
 the enemy should be merely making a feint Avith a small force 
 to draw off our army, while with their main forces they stood 
 ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to a.ttack the 
 capital. 
 
348 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 In the meantime the process of reorganization rendered 
 necessary after the demorahzing effects of the disastrous cam- 
 paign upon the other side of the Potomac, was rapidly pro- 
 gressing, the troops were regaining confidence, and their former 
 soldierly appearance and discipline were fast returning. My 
 cavalry was pushed out continually in all directions, and all 
 possible steps taken to learn the positions and movements of 
 the enemy. 
 
 The following table shows the movements of the army from 
 day to day, up to the 14th of September. 
 
 [See o2:)2)osite 2Jage.'\ 
 
 The right wing, consisting of the 1st and 9th Corps, under 
 the command of Major-General Burnside, moved on Frederick, 
 the 1st Corps via Brookville, Cooksville and Ridgeville, and 
 the 9th Corps via Damascus and New Market. 
 
 The 2d and 12th Corps, forming the centre, under the com- 
 mand of General Sumner, moved on Frederick ; the former 
 via Clarksburg and Urbana, and the 12th Corps on a lateral 
 road between Urbana and New INIarket, thus maintaining the 
 communication with the right wing, and covering the direct 
 road from Frederick to Washington. 
 
 The 6th Corps under the command of General Franklin, 
 moved to Buckeystown via Daniestown, Dawsonville, and 
 Barnville, covering the road from the mouth of the Monocacy 
 to Rockville, and being in a position to connect with and 
 su]>port the centre should it have been necessary (as was sup- 
 posed) to force the line of the Monocacy. 
 
 Couch's division moved by the " River Road," covering that 
 approach, watching the fords of the Potomac, and ultimately 
 following and supporting the 6th Corps. 
 
 The following extracts from telegrams received by me after 
 my departure from Washington will show how little was 
 known there about the enemy's movements, and the fears 
 which were entertained for the safety of the capital. 
 
 On the 9th of September, Genei'al Halleck telegraphed me 
 as follows : 
 

 
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 349 
 
350 FOURTH PEEIOD, 
 
 " Until Ave can get better advices about the numbers of the 
 enemy at Drainesville, I think we must be very cautious about 
 stripping too much the forts on the Virginia side. It may be 
 the enemy's object to draw off the mass of our forces, and then 
 attempt to attack from the Virginia side of the Potomac. 
 Think of this." 
 
 Again on the 11th of September, General Halleck tele- 
 graphed me as follows : 
 
 " Why not order forward Keyes or Sigel ? I think the 
 main force of the enemy is in your front ; more troops can be 
 spared from here." 
 
 This dispatch, as published by the Committee on the Con- 
 duct of the War, and furnished by the general-in-chief reads 
 as follows : " Why not order forward Porter's corps, or 
 Sigel's ? If the main force of the ene^ny is in your fi'ont, more 
 troops can be spared from here." 
 
 I remark that the original dispatch as received by me from 
 the telegraph operator, is in the words quoted above : " 1 
 thinhthe main force of the enemy, «^c." 
 
 In accordance with this suggestion, I asked on the same 
 day, that all the troops that could be spared should at once be 
 sent to reinforce me ; but none came. 
 
 On the 12th I received the following telegram from his Ex- 
 cellency the President : 
 
 " Governor Curtin telegraphs me : 'I have advices that 
 Jackson is crossing the Potomac at Williamsport, and pro- 
 bably the whole rebel army will be drawn from Maryland.' " 
 The President adds : " Receiving nothing from Harper's Ferry 
 or Martinsburg to-day, and positive information from Wheel- 
 ing, that the line is cut, corroborates the idea, that the enemy 
 is recrossing the Potomac. Please do not let him get off with- 
 out being hurt." 
 
 On the 13th General Halleck telegraphed as follows : 
 
 " Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of 
 the Potomac, you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I 
 am of the opinion that the enemy will send a small column to- 
 wards Pennsylvania to draw your forces in that direction, then 
 suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the 
 Potomac, and those he may cross over." 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 351 
 
 Again on the 14th, General Halleck telegraphed me that 
 " scouts report a large force still on the Virginia side of the 
 Potomac. If so, I fear you are exposing your left and rear." 
 
 Again, as late as the 16th, after we had the most positive 
 evidence that Lee's entire army was in front of us, I received 
 the following : 
 
 War Department, Sept. 16, 1863. 12.30 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 Yours of 1 A.^i. is this moment received. As you give me 
 no information in regard to the position of your forces, except 
 those at Sharpsburg, of course I cannot advise. I think, how- 
 ever, you will find that the whole force of the enemy in your 
 front has crossed the river. I fear now more than ever that 
 they will recross at Harper's Ferry or below, and turn your 
 left, thus cutting you offfromWashington. This has appeared 
 to me to be a part of their plan, and hence my anxiety on the 
 subject. A heavy rain might prevent it. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
 The importance of moving with all due caution, so as not to 
 uncover the national capital, until the enemy's position and 
 plans were developed, was, I believe, fully appreciated by me ; 
 and as my troops extended from the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
 road to the Potomac, with the extreme left flank movins: alono- 
 
 1 o o 
 
 that stream, and with strong pickets left in rear to watch and 
 guard all the available fords, I did not regard my left or rear 
 as in any degree exposed. But it appears from the foregoing 
 telegrams that the general-in-chief was of a diflerent opinion, 
 and that my movements were, in his judgment, too precipitate, 
 not only for the safety of Washington, but also for the security 
 of my left and rear. 
 
 The precise nature of these daily injunctions against a pre- 
 cipitate advance may now be perceived. The general-in-chief, 
 in his testimony before the " Committee on the Conduct of the 
 War," says : " In respect to Gen. McClellan's going too fast, 
 or too far from Washington, there can be found no such tele- 
 gram from me to him, he has mistaken the meaning of the 
 
352 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 telegrams I sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going 
 too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving 
 General Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and 
 get between him and Washington. I thought Gen. McClel- 
 lan should keep more on the Potomac, and j^ress forward his 
 left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve 
 Harper's Ferry." 
 
 As I can find no telegram from the general-in-chief recom- 
 mending me to keep my left flank nearer the Potomac, I am 
 compelled to believe that when he gave this testimony he had 
 forgotten the purport of the telegrams above quoted ; and had 
 also ceased to remember the fact, well known to him at the 
 time, that my left, from the time I left Washington, always 
 rested on the Potomac, and that my centre was continually 
 in position to reinforce the left or right as occasion might re- 
 quire. Had I advanced my left flank along the Potomac more 
 rapidly than the other coluiBns marched upon the roads to the 
 right, I should have thrown that flank out of supporting dis- 
 tance of the other troops, and greatly exposed it. And if I 
 had marched the entire army in one column along the banks 
 of the river, instead of upon five diflEerent parallel roads, the 
 column, with its trains, would have extended about fifty miles, 
 and the enemy might have defeated the advance before the 
 rear could have reached the scene of action. Moreover, such 
 a movement would have uncovered the communications with 
 Baltimore and Washington on our right, and exposed our left 
 and rear. 
 
 I presume it will be admitted by every military man that it 
 was necessary to move the army in such order that it could at 
 any time be concentrated for battle, and I am of opinion that 
 this object could not have been accomplished in any other way 
 than the one employed. Any other disposition of our forces 
 would have subjected them to defeat in detached fragments. 
 
 On the 10th of September, I received from my scouts infor- 
 mation which rendered it quite probable that General Lee's 
 army was in the vicinity of Frederick, but whether his inten- 
 tion was to move towards Baltimore or Pennsylvania was not 
 then known. 
 
THE MARYLAND CAMPAIGN. 853 
 
 On the 11th I ordered General Burnside to push a strong 
 reconnoissance across the National Road and the Baltimore 
 and Ohio Railroad towards New Market, and if he learned 
 that the enemy had moved towards Hagerstown, to press on 
 rapidly to Frederick, keeping his troops constantly ready to 
 meet the enemy in force. A corresponding movement of all 
 the troops in the centre and on the left was ordered in the 
 direction of Urbana and Poolesville. 
 
 On the 12th a portion of the right wing entered Frederick, 
 after a brisk skirmish at the outskirts of the city and in the 
 streets. On the 13th the main bodies of the right wing and 
 centre passed through Frederick. 
 
 It was soon ascertained that the main body of the enemy's 
 forces had marched out of the city on the two previous days, 
 taking the roads to Boonsboro' and Harper's Ferry, thereby 
 rendering it necessary to force the passes through the Catoc- 
 tin and South Mountain ridges, and gain possession of Boons- 
 boro' and Rohrersville before any relief could be extended to 
 Col. Miles at Harper's Ferry. 
 
 On the 13th, an order fell into my hands issued by General 
 Lee, which fully disclosed his plans, and I immediately gave 
 orders for a rapid and vigorous forward movement 
 
 The following is a copy of the order referred to : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op Northern Vhiginia. 
 Sept. 9, 1862. 
 
 Special Orders, No. 191. 
 
 The army will resume its march to-morrow, taking the 
 Hagerstown road. General Jackson's command will form the 
 advance, and after passing Middletown, with such portion as 
 he may select, will take the route towards Sharpsburg, cross the 
 Potomac at the most convenient point, and by Friday night 
 take possession of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, capture 
 such of the enemy as may be at Martinsburg, and intercept 
 such as may attempt to escape from Harper's Ferry. 
 
 General Longstreet's command will pursue the same road 
 as far as Boonsboro', where it will halt with the reserve, supply 
 and baggage trains of the army. 
 
354 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 General McLaws, with his own division and that of General 
 R. H. Anderson, Avill follow General Longstreet. On reaching 
 Middletown, he will take the route to Harper's Ferry, and by 
 Friday morning possess himself of the Maryland Heights, 
 and endeavor to capture the enemy at Harper's Ferry and 
 vicinity. 
 
 General Walker, with his division, after accomplishing the 
 object in which he is now engaged, will cross the Potomac at 
 Cheek's Ford, ascend its right bank to Lovettsville, take pos- 
 session of Loudon Heights if practicable, by Friday morning, 
 Keys' ford on his left, and the road between the end of the 
 mountain and the Potomac on his right. He will, as far as 
 practicable, co-operate with General McLaws and General 
 Jackson, in intercepting the retreat of the enemy. 
 
 General D. H. Hill's division will foi-m the rear guard of 
 the army, pursuing the road taken by the main body. The 
 reserve artillery, ordnance, and supply trains, &c., will precede 
 General Hill. 
 
 General Stuart will detach a squadron of cavalry to accom- 
 pany the commands of General Longstreet, Jackson, and Mc- 
 Laws, and with the main body of the cavalry will cover the 
 route of the army, and bring up all stragglers that may have 
 been left behind. 
 
 The commands of General Jackson, McLaws, and "Walker, 
 after accomplishing the objects for which they have been de- 
 tached, will join the main body of the army at Boonsboro or 
 Hagerstown. 
 
 Each regiment on the march, will habitually carry its axes 
 in the regimental ordnance wagons, for use of the men at their 
 encampments to procur'e wood, &c. 
 
 By command of Gen. R. E. Lee, 
 
 R. H. Chiltox, 
 
 A. A. General. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. D. H. Hill, 
 
 Comd'g. Division. 
 
HARPERS FERRY. 355 
 
 HARPER'S FERRY. 
 
 In the report of a military commission, of which Major-Gen- 
 eral D. Hunter was President, which convened at Washington, 
 for the purpose of investigating the conduct of certain officers 
 in connection with the surrender of Harper's Ferry, I find the 
 following : 
 
 " The commission has remarked freely on Colonel Miles, an 
 old officer, who has been killed in the service of his country, 
 and it can not, from any motives of delicacy, refrain from cen- 
 suring those in high command, when it thinks such censure 
 deserved. 
 
 " The general-in-chief has testified, that General McClellan, 
 after having received orders to repel the enemy invading the 
 State of Maryland, marched only six miles per day, on an 
 average, when pursuing this invading enemy. 
 
 "The general-in-chief also testifies, that in his opinion 
 he could, and shoxxld have relieved and protected Harper's 
 Ferry ; and in this opinion the commission fully concur." 
 
 I have been greatly surprised that this commission, in its 
 investigations, never called upon me, nor upon any officer of 
 my staiF, nor, so far as I know, upon any officer of the army 
 of the Potomac, able to give an intelligent statement of the 
 movements of that army. But another paragraph in the same 
 report, makes testimony from such sources quite superfluous. 
 It is as follows : 
 
 " By a reference to the evidence it will be seen that at the 
 very moment Colonel Ford abandoned Maryland Heights, his 
 little army was in reality relieved by General Franklin's and 
 Sumner's corps at Crampton's Gap, within seven miles of his 
 position." 
 
 The corps of Generals Franklin and Sumner were a part of 
 the army which I at that time had the honor to command, and 
 they were acting under my orders at Crampton's Gap, and 
 
356 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 elsewhere, and if, as the commission states, Colonel Ford's 
 " little army was in reality relieved" by tliose officers, it was 
 relieved by me. 
 
 I had, on the morning of the lOtb, sent the following dis- 
 patch in relation to the command at Harpei''s Ferry : 
 
 Camp near Rocktille, Sept. 10, 1862. 9.45 a.m. 
 Maj.-Gex. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Washington, D. C. 
 Colonel Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, as I understand, 
 with nine thousand troops. He can do nothing where he is, 
 but could be of great service if ordered to join me, I suggest 
 that he be ordered to join me by the most practicable route. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 To this I received the following reply : 
 
 " There is no way for Colonel Miles to join you at present, 
 his only chance is to defend his works till you can open com- 
 munication with him. 
 
 "H. W. Halleck." 
 
 It seems necessary for a distinct understanding of this mat- 
 ter, to state that I was directed on the 12th to assume com- 
 mand of the garrison of Harper's Ferry, as soon as I should 
 open communication with that place, and that when I received 
 this order all communication from the direction in which I was 
 approaching was cut off. Up to that time, however, Colonel 
 Miles could, in my judgment, have marched his command into 
 Pennsylvania, by crossing the Potomac at Williamsport or 
 above, and this opinion was confirmed by the fact that Colonel 
 Davis marched the cavalry j^art of Colonel Miles's command 
 from Harper's Ferry on the 14th, taking the main road to 
 Hagerstown, and he encountered no enemy excepting a small 
 picket near the mouth of the Autietam. 
 
 Before I left Washington, and when there certainly could 
 have been no enemy to prevent the withdrawal of the forces 
 of Colonel Miles, I recommended to the proper authorities 
 that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should be withdrawn via 
 
harper's ferry. 357 
 
 Hagerstown, to aid in covering the Cumberland Valley, or 
 that, taking up the jjontoon bridge and obstructing the rail- 
 road bridge, it should fall back to the Maryland Heights, and 
 there hold out to the last. In this position it ought to have 
 maintained itself many days. It was not deemed proper to 
 adopt either of these suggestions, and when the matter was 
 left to my discretion it was too late for me to do anything but 
 endeavor to relieve the garrison, I accordingly directed ar- 
 tillery to be fired by our advance at frequent intervals, as a 
 signal that relief was at hand. This was done, and as I after, 
 wards learned, the reports of the cannon were distinctly heard 
 at Harper's Ferry. It was confidently expected that Colonel 
 Miles would hold out until we had carried the mountain passes, 
 and were in condition to send a detachment to his relief The 
 left was therefore ordered to move through Crampton's Pass 
 in front of Burkettsville, while the centre and right marched 
 upon Turner's Pass in front of Middletown. 
 
 It may be asked by those who are not acquainted with the 
 topography of the country in the vicinity of Harper's Ferry, 
 why Franklin, instead of marching his column over the cir. 
 cuitous road from Jefferson via Burkettsville and Brownsville, 
 was not ordered to move along the direct turnpike to Knox- 
 ville, and thence up the river to Harper's Ferry. It was for 
 the reason that I had received information that the enemy 
 were anticipating our approach in that direction, and had es- 
 tablished batteries 'on tlie south side of the Potomac which 
 commanded all the approaches to Knoxville ; moreover, the 
 road from that point winds directly along the river bank at the 
 foot of a precipitous mountain, where there was no oppor- 
 tunity of forming in line of battle, and where the enemy could 
 have placed batteries on both sides of the river to enfilade our 
 narrow approaching columns. The approach through Cramp- 
 ton's Pass, which debouches into Pleasant Valley in rear of 
 Maryland Heights, was the only one which offered any reason- 
 able prospect of carrying that formidable position. At the 
 same time the troops upon the road were in better relation to 
 the main body of our forces. 
 
 On the morning of the 14th a verbal message reached me 
 from Colonel Miles, which was the first authentic intelligence 
 
358 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 I had received as to the condition of things at Harper's Ferry. 
 The messenger informed me that on the preceding afternoon 
 Maryland Heights had been abandoned by our troops after 
 repeUing an attack of the rebels, and that Colonel Miles's 
 entire force was concentrated at Harper's Ferry ; the Mary- 
 land, Loudon, and Bolivar Heights having been abandoned by 
 him, and occupied by the enemy. The messenger also stated 
 that there was no apparent reason for the abandonment of the 
 Maryland Heights, and that Colonel Miles instructed him to 
 say, that he could hold out Avith certainty two days longer. I 
 directed him to make his way back, if possible, Avith the in- 
 formation, that I was approaching rapidly, and felt confident I 
 could relieve the place. 
 
 On the same afternoon I wrote the following letter to Col. 
 Miles, and dispatched three copies by three different couriers, 
 on different routes. I did not, however, learn that any of 
 these men succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry. 
 
 Mu)DLETOWN, Sept. 14, 1862. 
 Colonel D. S. Miles, 
 
 Colonel : The army is being rapidly concentrated here. 
 We are now attacking the pass on the Hagerstown road over 
 the Blue Ridge. A column is about attacking the Burketts- 
 ville and Boonsboro' Pass. You may count on our making 
 every effort to relieve you ; you may rely upon my speedily 
 accomplishing that object. Hold out to the last extremity. 
 If it is possible, reoccupy the Maryland Heights with your 
 whole force. If you can do that, I will certainly be able to 
 relieve you. As the Catoctin Valley is in our possession you can 
 safely cross the river at Berlin or its vicinity, so far as opposi- 
 tion on this side of the river is concerned. Hold out to the 
 last. 
 
 G. B. McClellan. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 On the previous day I had sent General Franklin the follow- 
 ing instructions : 
 
HARPER S FERRY. 359 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp near Frederick, Sept. 13, 1862. 6.20 p.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. W. B. Franklin, — 
 Gonid^g. 6th Corps. 
 General : — I have now full information as to movements 
 and intentions of the enemy. Jackson has crossed the Upper 
 Potomac to capture the garrison at Martin sburg, and cut off 
 Miles's retreat towards the west. A division on the south 
 side of the Potomac Avas to carry Loudon Heights, and cut off 
 his retreat in that direction. McLaws, Avith his own com- 
 mand and the division of R. H. Anderson was to move by 
 Boonsboro' and Rohrersville to carry the Maryhxnd Heights. 
 The signal officers inform me that he is now in Pleasant Val- 
 ley. The firing shows that Miles still holds out. Longstreet 
 was to move to Boonsboro', and there halt with the reserve 
 trains, D. H. Plill to form the rear guard, Stuart's cavalry to 
 bring up stragglers, &c. We have cleared out all the cavalry 
 this side the mountains, and north of us. The last I heard 
 from Pleasanton he occupied Middletown after several sharp 
 skirmishes. A division of Burnside's started several hours 
 ago to support him. The whole of Burnside's command, in- 
 cluding Hooker's corps, march this evening and early to- 
 morrow morning, followed by the corps of Sumner, and Banks's 
 and Sykes's division upon Boonsboro', to carry that position. 
 Couch has been ordered to concentrate his division and join 
 you as rapidly as possible. Without. waiting for the whole of 
 that division to join you, you will move at day -break in the 
 morning by Jefferson and Burkettsville upon the road to 
 Rohrersville ; I have reliable information that the mountain 
 pass by this road is practicable for artillery and wagons. If 
 this pass is not occupied by the enemy in force, seize it as 
 soon as practicable, and debouch upon Rohrersville in order to 
 cut off the retreat of or destroy McLaw's command. If you 
 find this pass held by the enemy in large force, make all your 
 dispositions for the attack, and commence it about half an hour 
 after you hear severe firing at the pass on the Hagerstown 
 pike, where the main body will attack. Having gained the 
 pass, your duty will be first to cut off, destroy, or capture 
 McLaw's command, and relieve Colonel Miles. If you effect 
 
360 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 this you will order him to join you at once with all his dis- 
 posable troops, first desti'oying the bridges over the Potomac, 
 if not already done, and leaving a sufficient garrison to pie- 
 vent the enemy from passing the ford ; you will then return 
 by Rohrersville on the direct road to Boonsboro' if the main 
 column has not succeeded in its attack. If it has succeeded, 
 take the road from Rohrersville to Sharpsburg and Williamsport, 
 in order either to cut off the retreat of Hill and Longstreet 
 towards the Potomac, or to prevent the repassage of Jackson. 
 My general idea is to cut the enemy in two, and beat him in 
 detail. I belieye I have sufficiently explained my intentions. 
 I ask of you at this important moment all your int'^-^!. .jt, and 
 
 the utmost activity that a general can exercise. 
 
 ******* 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gren. Comd'g. 
 
 Again on the 14th I sent him the following ; 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 Frederick, Sept. 14, 1862. 2 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. Franklin, 
 
 Your dispatch of 12.30 just received. Send back to hurry 
 up Couch. Mass your troops and carry Burkettsville at "any 
 cost. We shall have strong opposition at both passes. As 
 fast as the troops come up, I will hold a reserve in readiness 
 to support you. If you find the enemy in very great force at 
 the pass, let me know at once, and amuse them as best you 
 can, so as to retain them there. In that event I will probably 
 throw the mass of the army on the pass in front of here. If I 
 carry that, it will clear the way for you, and you must then 
 follow the enemy as rapidly as possible. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 
 
 General Franklin pushed his corps rajjidly forward towards 
 Crampton's Pass, and at about 12 o'clock on the 14th arrived 
 
CKAMPTON S GAP. 361 
 
 at Burkettsville, immediately in rear of which he found the 
 enemy's infantry posted in force on botli sides of the road, 
 with artillery in strong positions to defend the approaches to 
 the pass. 
 
 Slocum's division was formed upon the right of the road 
 leading through the gap, and Smith's upon the left. A line 
 formed of Bartlett's and Torbert's brigades, supported by 
 Newton, whose activity was conspicuous, advanced steadily 
 upon the enemy at a charge on the right. The enemy were 
 driven from their position at the base of the mountain, where 
 they were protected by a stone wall, and steadily forced back 
 up the slope until they reached the position of their battery 
 on the road, Avell up the mountain. Here they made a stand. 
 They were, however, driven back, retiring their artillery in 
 echelon, until, after an action of three hours, the crest was 
 gained, and the enemy hastily fled down the mountain on the 
 other side. 
 
 On the left of the road Brooks's and Irwin's brigades of 
 Smith's division, formed for the protection of Slocum's flank, 
 charged up the mountain in the same steady manner, driving 
 the enemy before them until the crest was carried. Four him- 
 dred prisoners from seventeen different organizations, seven 
 hundred stand of arms, one piece of artillery, and three colors, 
 were captured by our troops in this brilliant action. It was 
 conducted by General Franklin in all its details. These 
 details are given in the report of General Franklin, herewith 
 submitted, and due credit awarded to the gallant officers and 
 men engaged. The loss in General Franklin's corps Avas one 
 hundred and fifteen killed, four hundred and sixteen wounded, 
 and two missing. The enemy's loss was about the same. 
 The enemy's position was such that our artillery could not be 
 used with any effect. 
 
 The close of the action found General Franklin's advance in 
 Pleasant Valley on the night of the 14th, within three and a 
 half miles of the point on Maryland Heights, (where he might 
 on the same night, or on the morning of the 15th, have formed 
 a junction with the garrison of Harper's Ferry, had it not been 
 previously withdrawn from Maryland Heights,) and within six 
 miles of Harper's Ferry. 
 
 16 
 
362 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 On the night of the 14th the following dispatch was sent to 
 General Franklin : 
 
 BOLIYAR, Sept. 15. 1 A.M. 
 
 General, 
 
 ******* 
 
 The commanding general directs that you occupy with 
 your command the road from Rohrersville to Harper's Ferry, 
 l^lacing a sufficient force at Rohrersville to hold that position, 
 in case it should be attacked by the enemy from Boonsboro', 
 Endeavor to open communication Avith Colonel Miles at Har- 
 per's Ferry, attacking and destroying such of the enemy as 
 you may find in Pleasant Valley. Should you succeed in 
 opening communication with Colonel Miles, direct him to join 
 you with his whole command, Math all the guns and ))ublic 
 property he can carry with him. The remainder of the guns 
 will be spiked or destroyed ; the rest of the public property 
 will also be destroyed. You will then proceed to Boonsboro', 
 — which place the commanding general intends to attack to- 
 morrow, — and join the main body of the army at that place. 
 Should you find, however, that the enemy has retreated from 
 Boonsboro' towards Sharpsburg, you will endeavor to fall 
 upon him and cut oft' liis retreat. 
 
 By command of Major-General McClellan. 
 
 Geo. D. Ruggles, 
 
 Col. and A. D. 0. 
 Gen. Franklin. 
 
 On the 15th the following were received from General 
 Franklin : 
 
 At the Foot of the Mountaint in Pleasant Yallet, 
 Three Miles from Rohrersville, September 15. 8.50 a.m. 
 
 General, — 
 
 My command started at daylight this morning, and I am 
 waiting to have it closed up here. Gen. Couch arrived about 
 10 o'clock last night. I have ordered one of his brigades and 
 one battery to Rohrersville, or to the strongest point in its 
 vicinity. The enemy is drawn up in line of battle about two 
 miles to our front — one brigade in sight. As soon as I am 
 
crampton's gap. 363 
 
 sure that Rohrersville is occupied, I shall move forward to 
 
 attack the enemy. This may be two hours from now. If 
 
 Harper's Ferry is fallen, and the cessation of firing makes me 
 
 fear that it has, it is my opinion that I should be strongly 
 
 reinforced. 
 
 ***** 
 
 W. B. Fraxklin, 
 
 Maj.-General Comd'g 6th Corps. 
 
 Gen. G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Sept. 15, 11 A.M. 
 General, — 
 
 I have received your dispatch by Capt. O'Keefe. The ene- 
 my is in large force in my front, in two lines of battle stretch- 
 ing across the valley, and a large column of artillery and' 
 infantry on the right of the valley, looking towards Harper's 
 Ferry. They outnumber me two to one. It of course will 
 not answer to pursue the enemy under these circumstances, 
 I shall communicate with Burnside as soon as possible. In 
 the meantime I shall wait here until I learn what is the pros- 
 pect of reinforcement. I have not the force to justify an 
 attack on the force I see in front. I have had a very close 
 view of it, and its position is very strong. 
 
 Respectfully, 
 
 W. B. Franklin, 
 
 Major-General. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Commanding. 
 
 Col. Miles surrendered Harper's Ferry at 8 a.m. on the 15th, 
 as the cessation of the firing indicated, and Gen. Franklin was 
 ordered to remain where he was, to watch the large force in 
 front of him, and protect our left and rear, until the night of 
 the 16th, when he was ordered to join the main body of the 
 army at Keedysville, after sending Couch's division to Mary- 
 land Heights. 
 
 While the events which have just been described were 
 taking place at Crampton's Gap, the troops of the centre and 
 right wing, which h^d united at Frederick on the 13th, were 
 engaged in the contest for the possession of Turner's Gap. 
 
364 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 On the morning of the 13th, Gen. Pleasanton was ordered 
 to send McReynohls's brigade and a section of artillery in the 
 direction of Gettysburg, and Rush's regiment towards JeiFer- 
 son, to communicate with Franklin, to whom the 6th U. S. 
 Cavalry and a section of artillery had previously been sent, 
 and to proceed with the remainder of the force in the direc- 
 tion of Middletown in pursuit of the enemy. 
 
 After skirmishing with the enemy all the morning, and 
 driving them from several strong positions, he reached Tur- 
 ner's Gap of the South Mountain in the afternoon, and found 
 the enemy in force, and apparently determined to defend the 
 pass. He sent back for infantry to Gen. Burnside, who had 
 been directed to support him, and proceeded to make a recon- 
 noissance of the position. 
 
 The South Mountain is at this point about one thousand 
 feet in height, and its general direction is from north-east to 
 south-west. The National Road from Frederick to Hagers- 
 town crosses it nearly at right angles through Turner's Gap, 
 a depression which is some four hundred feet in depth. The 
 mountain on the north side of the turnpike is divided into 
 two crests or ridges by a narrow valley, which, though deep 
 at the pass, becomes a slight depression at aboiit a mile to the 
 north. There are two country roads, one to the right of the 
 turnpike, and the other to the left, which give access to the 
 crests overlooking the main road. The one to the left, called 
 the " old Sharpsburg road," is nearly parallel to, and about 
 half a mile distant from the turnpike, until it reaches the crest 
 of the mountain, when it bends off to the left. 
 
 The other road, called the " old Hagerstown road," passes 
 up a ravine in the mountain, about a mile from the turnpike, 
 and, bending to the left over and along the first crest, enters 
 the turnpike at the Mountain House near the summit of the 
 pass. 
 
 On the night of the 13th the positions of the different corps 
 were as follows : 
 
 Reno's Corps, at Middletown, except Rodman's division at 
 Frederick. 
 
 Hooker's Corps, on the Monocacy, two miles from Fred- 
 erick. 
 
SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 365 
 
 Sumner's Corps, near Frederick. 
 
 Banks's Cop.ps, " " 
 
 Sykes's Division, " " 
 
 Franklin's Corps, at Buckeystown. 
 
 Couch's Division, at Licksville. 
 
 The orders from head-quarters, for the march on the 14th, 
 were as follows : 
 
 13th, 11.30 p.m. — Hooker to march at daylight to Middle- 
 town. 
 
 13th, 11.30 p.m. — Stkes to move at 6 a.m., after Hooker, on 
 the Middletown and Hagerstown road. 
 
 lith, 1 A.M. — Artillery Reserve to follow Sykes closely. 
 
 13th, 8.45 p.m. — Sumner to move at 7 a.m. 
 
 14th, 9 A.M. — Sumner ordered to take the Shookstown road 
 to Middletown. * 
 
 13th, 6.45 P.M. — Couch ordered to move to Jefferson with 
 his whole division. 
 
 On the 14th General Pleasanton continued his reconnois- 
 sance. Gibson's battery, and afterwards Benjamin's battery 
 (of Reno's corps), were placed on high ground to the left of 
 the turnpike, and obtained a direct fire on the enemy's position 
 in the gap. 
 
 General Cox's division, which had been ordered up to sup- 
 port General Pleasanton, left its bivouac near Middletown at 
 6 A.M. The first brigade reached the scene of action about 9 
 A.M., and was sent up the old Sharpsburg road by General 
 Pleasanton, to feel the enemy and ascertain if he held the crest 
 on that side in strong force. This was soon found to be the 
 case, and General Cox having arrived with the other brigade, 
 and information having been received from General Reno that 
 the column would be supported by the whole corps, the divi- 
 sion was ordered to assault the position. 
 
 Two 20-pound Parrotts of Simmons's battery and two sec- 
 tions of McMullin's battery were left in the rear in position 
 near the turnpike, where they did good service during the day 
 against the enemy's batteries in the gap. 
 
 Colonel Scammon's brigade was deployed, and, well covered 
 by skirmishers, moved up the slope to the left of the road, 
 with the object of turning the enemy's right if possible. It 
 
366 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 succeeded in gaining the crest and establishing itself there in 
 spite of the vigorous resistance of the enemy, who was posted 
 behind stone walls and in the edges of timber, and the fire of 
 a battery which poured in canister and case-shot on the regi- 
 ment on the right of the brigade. 
 
 Colonel Crooke's brigade marched in column, at supporting 
 distance. A section of McMullin's battery, under Lieutenant 
 Croorae (killed while serving one of his guns), was moved up 
 with great difficulty, and opened with canister at very short 
 range on the enemy's infantry, by whom (after having done 
 considerable execution) it was soon silenced and forced to 
 withdraw. 
 
 One regiment of Crooke's brigade was now deployed on 
 Scammon's left, and the other two in his rear, and they several 
 times entered the first line and relieved the regiments in front 
 of them when hard pressed. A section of Simmon's battery 
 was brought up and placed in an open space in the woods, 
 whei'e it did good service during the rest of the day. The 
 enemy several times attempted to retake the crest, advancing 
 with boldness, but were each time repulsed. They then with- 
 drew their battery to a point more to the right, and formed 
 columns on both our flanks. 
 
 It was now about noon, and a lull occurred in the contest, 
 which lasted about two hours, during which the rest of the 
 corps was coming up. General Wilcox's division was the 
 first to arrive. When he reached the base of the mountain, 
 General Cox advised him to consult General Pleasanton as to 
 a jDOsition. The latter indicated that on the right, afterwards 
 taken up by General Hooker. General Wilcox was in the act 
 of moving to occupy this ground when he received an order 
 from General Reno to move up the old Sharpsburg road, and 
 take a position to its right, overlooking the turnpike. Two 
 regiments w^ere detached to support General Cox, at his re- 
 quest. One section of Cook's battery was placed in position 
 near the turn of the road (on the crest), and opened fii'e on the 
 enemy's batteries across the gap. The division was proceed- 
 ing to deploy to the right of the road when the enemy sud- 
 denly opened (at 150 yards) with a battery which enfiladed 
 the road at that jooint, drove off Cook's cannoneers with their 
 
SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 367 
 
 limbers, and causing a temporary panic, in which the guns 
 were nearly lost. But the 79th New York and 17th Michigan 
 promptly rallied, changed front under a heavy fire, and moved 
 out to protect the guns, with which Captain Cook had re- 
 mained. Order was soon restored, and the division formed in 
 line on the right of Cox, and was kept concealed as much as 
 possible under the shelter of the hill-side until the whole line 
 advanced. It was exposed not only to the fire of the battery 
 in front, but also to that of the batteries on the other side of 
 the turnpike, and lost heavily. 
 
 Shortly before this time Generals Burnside and Reno ar- 
 rived at the base of the mountain; and the former directed 
 the latter to move up the divisions of Generals Sturgis and 
 Rodman to the crest held by Cox and Wilcox, and to move 
 upon the enemy's position with his whole force as soon as he 
 was informed that General Hooker (who had just been dii-ected 
 to attack on the right) was well advanced up the mountain. 
 General Reno then went to the front and assumed the direction 
 of affairs, the positions having been explained to him by Gen. 
 Pleasanton. 
 
 Shortly before this time I arrived at the point occupied by 
 General Burnside, and my head-quarters were located there 
 until the conclusion of the action. 
 
 General Sturgis had left liis camp at 1 p.m., and reached the 
 scene of action about 3^ p.m. Clark's battery of his division 
 was sent to assist Cox's left, by order of General Reno, and 
 two regiments (2d Maryland and Gth New Hampshire) were 
 detached by General Reno and sent forward a short distance 
 on the left of the turnpike. His division was formed in rear 
 of Wilcox's, and Rodman's division was divided. Colonel 
 Fairchild's brigade being placed on the extreme left, and 
 Colonel Harland's under General Rodman's personal super- 
 vision on the right. 
 
 My order to move the whole line forward, and take or 
 silence the enemy's batteries in front, was executed with en- 
 thusiasm. The enemy made a desperate resistance, charging 
 our advancing lines with fierceness, but they were everywhere 
 routed, and fled. Our chief loss fell on Wilcox's division. 
 The enemy's battery was found to be across a gorge and be- 
 
368 FOURTH PEKIOD. 
 
 yond the reach of our infantry, but its position was made 
 untenable, and it was hastily removed and not again put in 
 position near us. But the batteries across the Gap still kept 
 up a fire of shot and shell. 
 
 General Wilcox praises very highly the conduct of the iVth 
 Michigan in this advance — a regiment which had been organ- 
 ized scarcely a month, but which charged the advancing enemy 
 in flank in a. manner worthy of veteran troops : and also that 
 of the 45th Pennsylvania, which bravely met them in front. 
 
 Cook's battery now re-opened fire, Sturgis's division was 
 moved to the flank of Wilcox's, occupying the new ground 
 gained on the further side of the slope, and his artillery opened 
 on the batteries across the Gap. The enemy made an eflibrt 
 to turn our left about dark, but were repulsed by Fairchild's 
 brigade and Clark's battery. 
 
 At about V o'clock the enemy made another efibrt to regain 
 the lost ground, attacking along Sturgis's front and part of 
 Cox's. A lively fire was kept up until nearly 9 o'clock, several 
 charges being made by the enemy and repulsed with slaughter, 
 and we finally occupied the highest jDart of the mountain. 
 General Reno was killed just before sunset, while making a 
 reconnoissance to the front, and the command of the corps 
 devolved upon General Cox. 
 
 In General Reno the nation lost one of its best general ofli- 
 cers. He was a skillful soldier, a brave and honest man. 
 
 There was no firing after ten o'clock, and the troops slept 
 on their arms, ready to renew the fight at daylight ; but the 
 enemy quietly retired from our front during the night, aban- 
 doning their wounded and leaving their dead in large numbers 
 scattered on the field. 
 
 While these operations were progressing on the left of the 
 main column, the right, under General Hooker, was actively 
 engaged. His corps left the Monocacy early in the morning, 
 and its advance I'eaclied the Catoctin Creek about 1 p.m. 
 General Hooker then went forward to examine the ground. 
 
 At about 1 o'clock General Meade's division was ordered to 
 make a diversion in favor of Reno. The following is the order 
 sent: 
 
SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 369 
 
 September 14. 1 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. Hooker, 
 
 General, — General Reno requests that a division of yours 
 may move up on the right (north) of the main road. General 
 McClellan desires you to comply with this request, holding 
 your whole corps in readiness to support the movement, and 
 taking charge of it yourself. Suraners's and Banks's corps have 
 commenced arriving. Let General McClellan be informed as 
 soon as you commence your movement. 
 
 Geo. D. Ruggles, 
 Colonel, A.-A.-G & A.-D.-C. 
 
 Meade's division left Catoctin Creek about 2 o clock, and 
 turned off to the right fi-om the main road on the old Hagers- 
 town road to Mount Tabor Church, where Gen. Hooker was, 
 and deployed a short distance in advance, its right resting 
 about one and a half miles from the turnpike. The enemy 
 fired a few shots from a battery on the mountain side, but did 
 no considerable damage. Cooper's Battery " B," 1st Pennsyl- 
 vania Artillery, Avas placed in position on high ground at about 
 3.^ o'clock, and fired at the enemy on the slope, but soon ceased 
 by order of Gen. Hooker, and the position of our lines prevented 
 any further use of artillery by us on this part of the field. The 
 1st Massachusetts Cavalry was sent up the valley to the right 
 to observe the movements, if any, of the enemy in that direc- 
 tion, and one regiment of Meade's division, posted to watch a 
 road coming in in the same direction. The other divisions 
 were deployed as they came up. General Hatch's on the left, 
 and General Ricketts', which arrived about 5 p.m., in the rear. 
 
 General Gibbon's brigade was detached from Hatch's divi- 
 sion by General Burnside for the purpose of making a demon- 
 stration on the enemy's centre up the main road, as soon as 
 the movements on the right and left had sufiiciently pro- 
 gressed. 
 
 The 1st Pennsylvania Rifles, of General Seymour's brigade, 
 were sent forward as skirmishers to feel the enemy, and it was 
 found that he was in force. Meade was then directed to ad- 
 vance his division to the right of the road, so as to outflank 
 them if possible, and then to move forward and attack, while 
 
SYO FOURTH PERIOD, 
 
 Hatch was directed to take, with liis division, the crest on the 
 left of the old Hagerstown road, Rickett's division being held 
 in reserve. 
 
 Seymour's brigade was sent up to the top of the slope on 
 the right of the ravine, through wliicli tlie road runs, and then 
 move along the summit parallel to the road, while Col. Galla- 
 gher's and Col. Magilton's brigades moved in the same direc- 
 tion along the slope and in the ravine. The ground was of 
 the most difficult character for the movements of troops, the 
 hillside being very steep and rocky, and obstructed by stone 
 walls, fences, and timber. The enemy was soon encountered, 
 and in a short time the action became general along the whole 
 front of the division. The line advanced steadily up the moun- 
 tain side, where the enemy Avas posted behind trees and rocks, 
 from which he was gradually dislodged. During this advance 
 Col. Gallagher, commanding 3d brigade, was severely wounded, 
 and the command devolved upon Lieut.-Col. Robt. Anderson. 
 
 General Meade, having reason to believe that the enemy 
 were attempting to outflank him on his right, applied to Gen. 
 Hooker for reinforcements. General Duryea's brigade, of 
 Rickett's division, was ordered up, but it did not arrive until 
 the close of the action. It was advanced on Seymour's left, 
 but only one regiment could open fire before the enemy re- 
 tired, and darkness intervened. General Meade speaks highly 
 of General Seymour's skill in handling his brigade on the ex- 
 treme right, securing by his manoeuvres the great object of the 
 movement, the outflanking of the enemy. 
 
 While General Meade was gallantly driving the enemy on 
 the right. General Hatch's division was engaged in a severe 
 contest for the possession of the crest on the left of the ravine. 
 It moved up the mountain in the following order : two regi- 
 ments of General Patrick's brigade deployed as skirmishers, 
 with the other two regiments of the same brigade supporting 
 them : Col. Phelps's brigade in line of battalions in mass at 
 deploying distance : General Doubleday's brigade, in the same 
 order, bringing up the rear. The 21st New York having gone 
 straight up the slope, instead of around to the right, as 
 directed, the 2d United States Sharpshooters was sent out in 
 its place. 
 
SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 3*71 
 
 Phelps's and Doubleday's brigades were deployed in turn as 
 they reached the woods, which began about half way up the 
 mountain ; Gen. Patrick, with his skirmishers, soon drew the 
 fire of the enemy, and found him strongly posted behind a 
 fence which bounded the cleared space on the top of the ridge, 
 having in his front the woods, through which our line was ad- 
 vancing, and in his rear a cornfield, full of rocky ledges, which 
 aflforded good cover to fall back to if dislodged. 
 
 Phelps's brigade gallantly advanced under a hot fire, to close 
 quarters, and after ten or fifteen minutes of heavy firing on 
 both sides, (in which General Hatch was wounded while urg- 
 ing on his men), the fence was carried by a charge, and our 
 line advanced a few yards beyond it, somewhat sheltered by 
 the sloj)e of the hill. Doubleday's brigade, now under the 
 command of Lieut.-Col. Hoffman, (Col. Wainwright having 
 been wounded), relieved Phelps's, and continued firing for an 
 hour and-a-half, the enemy, behind ledges of rocks some thirty 
 or forty paces in our front, making a stubborn resistance, and 
 attempting to charge on the least cessation of our fire. About 
 dusk Colonel Christian's brigade, of Rickett's division, came 
 up and relieved Doubleday's brigade, Avhich fell back into line 
 behind Pheli^s, Christian's brigade continued the action for 
 thirty or forty minutes, when the enemy retired, after having 
 made an attempt to flank us on the left, which was repulsed 
 by the 76th New York, and Yth Indiana. 
 
 The remaining brigade of Rickett's division, (General Hart- 
 suS"'s), was moved up in the centre, and connected JMeade's 
 left with Doubleday's right. We now had possession of the 
 summit of the first ridge, which commanded the turnpike on 
 both sides of the mountain, and the troops were ordered to 
 hold their positions until further orders, and slept on their 
 arms. Late in the afternoon, General Gibbon, with his bri- 
 gade, and one section of Gibbon's battery, (B, 4th U.S. artillery), 
 was ordered to move up the main road on the enemy's centre. 
 He advanced a regiment on each side of the road, preceded by 
 skirmishers, and followed by the other two regiments in double 
 column ; the artillery moving on the road until within range 
 of the enemy's guns, which were firing on the column from 
 the gorge. The brigade advanced steadily, driving the enemy 
 
372 FO U R T U P E R I O D . 
 
 before it from his positions in the woods and behind stone 
 walls, until it reached a point well up towards the top of the 
 pass ; when the enemy, having been reinforced by three regi- 
 ments, opened a heavy tire on the front, and on both flanks. 
 The fight continued until 9 o'clock, the enemy being entirely 
 repulsed ; and the brigade, after having sufiered severely, 
 and having expended all its ammunition, including even the 
 cartridges of the dead and wounded, continued to hold the 
 ground it had so gallantly won until 12 o'clock, when it was 
 relieved by General Gorman's brigade, of Sedgwick's division, 
 Sumner's corps, (except the 6th Wisconsin, which remained 
 on the field all night.) General Gibbon, in this delicate move- 
 ment, handled his brigade with as much precision and cool- 
 ness, as if upon parade, and the bravery of his troops could 
 not be excelled. 
 
 The 2d Corps, (Sumner's), and the 12th Corps, (Williams), 
 reached their final positions shortly after dark. General Rich- 
 ardson's division was placed near Mount Tabor Church, in a 
 position to support our right if necessary ; the 12th Corps, and . 
 Sedgwick's division, bivouacked around Bolivar, in a position 
 to support our centre and letl. 
 
 General Sykes's division of regulars, and the artillery reserve, 
 halted for the night at Middletown, so that, on the night of 
 the 14th, the whole army was massed in the vicinity of the 
 field of battle, in readiness to renew the action the next 
 day, or to move in pursuit of the enemy. At daylight our 
 skirmishers were advanced, and it was found that he had re- 
 treated dui'ing the night, leaving his dead on the field, and his 
 wounded uncared for. About fifteen hundred prisoners were 
 taken by us during the battle, and the loss to the enemy in 
 killed, was much greater than our own, and probably also 
 ill wounded. It is believed that the force opposed to us at 
 Turner's Gap, consisted of D. H. Hill's corps, (15,500), and a 
 part, if not the whole of Longstreet's, and perhaps a portion 
 of Jackson's; probably some 30,000 in all. We went into 
 action with about 30,000 men, and our losses amounted to 
 1,568, aggregate; (312 killed, 1,234 wounded, 22 missing.) 
 
 On the next day I had the honor to receive the following 
 very kind dispatch from his Excellency the President : 
 
ANTIETAJI. 373 
 
 "War Department, 
 "Washington, Sept. 15, 1862. 2.45 p.m. 
 Your dispatch of to-day received. God bless you, and all 
 with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible. 
 
 A. Lincoln. 
 To Maj.-Gen. McClellan. 
 
 ANTIETAM. 
 
 On the night of the battle of South Mountain, orders were 
 given to the corps commanders to press forward their pickets 
 at early dawn. This advance revealed the fact that the enemy 
 had left his positions, and an immediate pursuit was ordered ; 
 the cavalry, under General Pleasanton, and the three corps 
 under Generals Sumner, Hooker and Mansfield, (the latter of 
 whom had arrived that morning and assumed command of the 
 12th [Williams's] corps,) by the national turnpike and Boons- 
 boro ; the corps of Generals Burnside and Porter (the latter 
 command at that time consisting of but one weak division, 
 Sykes's) by the old Sharpsburg road ; and General Franklin to 
 move into Pleasant Valley, occupy Rohrersville by a detach- 
 ment, and endeavor to relieve Harper's Ferry. 
 
 Generals Burnside and Porter, upon reaching the road from 
 Boonsboro to Rohrersville, were to reinforce Franklin or to 
 move on Sharpsburg, according to circumstances. 
 
 Franklin moved towards BroAvnsville, and found there a 
 force of the enemy much superior in numbers to his own, 
 drawn up in a strong position to receive him. 
 
 At this time the cessation of firing at Harper's Ferry indi- 
 cated the surrender of that place. 
 
 The cavalry overtook the enemy's cavalry in Boonsboro, 
 made a dashing charge, killing and Avounding a number, and 
 capturing 250 prisoners and two guns. 
 
 General Richardson's division of the 2d Corps, pressing the 
 rear guard of the enemy with vigor, passed Boonsboro and 
 Keadysville, and came upon the main body of the enemy, oc- 
 cupying in large force a strong position a few miles beyond 
 the latter place. 
 
374 POURTHPERIOD. 
 
 It had been hoped to engage the enemy on the 15th, accord- 
 ingly instructions were given that if the enemy were over- 
 taken on the march, they should be attacked at once ; if found 
 in heavy force and in position, the corps in advance should be 
 placed in position for attack and await my arrival. On reach- 
 ing the advanced position of our troops, I found but two 
 divisions, Richardson's and Sykes's, in position, the other 
 troops were halted in the road, the head of the column some 
 distance in rear of Richardson. 
 
 The enemy occupied a strong position on the heights, on the 
 west side of Antietam Creek, displaying a large force of in- 
 fantry and cavalry, with numerous batteries of artillery, which 
 opened on our columns as they appeared in sight on the 
 Keadysville and Shorpsburg turnpike, Avhich fire was returned 
 by Captain Tidball's light battery, 2d United States Artillery, 
 and Pettit's battery, 1st New York Artillery. 
 
 The division of General Richardson, following close on the 
 heels of the retreating foe, halted and deployed near Antietam 
 River, on the right of the Sharpsburg road. General Sykes, 
 leading on the division of regulars on the old Sharpsburg road, 
 came up and deployed to the left of General Richardson, on 
 the left of the road. 
 
 Antietam Creek, in this vicinity, is crossed by four stone 
 bridges, the upper one on the Keadysville and Williamsport 
 road ; the second on the Keadysville and Sharpsburg turnpike, 
 some two and a half miles below ; the third about a mile be- 
 low the second, on the Rohrersville and Sharpsburg road ; and 
 the fourth near the mouth of Antietam Creek, on the road lead- 
 ing from Harper's Ferry to Sharpsburg, some three miles below 
 the third. The stream is sluggish, with few and difficult fords. 
 
 After a ra^ml examination of the position, I found that it 
 was too late to attack that day, and at once directed the pla- 
 cing of the batteries in position in the centre, and indicated 
 the bivouacs for the different corps, massing them near and on 
 both sides of the Sharpsburg turnpike. The corps were not 
 all in their positions until the next morning after sunrise. 
 
 On the moi-ning of the 16th it was discovered that the 
 enemy had changed the position of his batteries. The masses 
 of his troops, were, however, still concealed behind the oppo- 
 
ANTIETAM. 375 
 
 site heights. Their left and centre were upon and in front of 
 the Shavpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike, hidden by woods 
 and irregularities of the ground ; their extreme left resting 
 upon a wooded eminence near the cross roads to the north of 
 J. Miller's farm, their left resting upon the Potomac. Their 
 line extended south, the right resting upon the hills to the 
 south of Sharpsburg, near Snaveley's farm. 
 
 The bridge over the Antietam, described as No. 3, near this 
 point, was strongly covered by riflemen protected by rifle-pits, 
 stone fences, &c., and enfiladed by artillery. The ground in 
 front of this line consisted of undulating hills, their crests in 
 turn commanded by others in their rear. On all favorable 
 points the enemy's artillery was posted, and their reserves, 
 hidden from view by the hills on which their line of battle was 
 formed, could manoeuvre unobserved by our army, and from 
 the shortness of their line, could rapidly reinforce any point 
 threatened by our attack. Their position stretching across the 
 angle formed by the Potomac and Antietam, their flanks and 
 rear protected by these streams, was one of the strongest to 
 be found in this region of country, which is well adapted 
 to defensive warfare. 
 
 On the right near Keadysville, on both sides of the Sharps- 
 burg turnpike were Sumner's and Hooker's corps. In advance, 
 on the right of the turnpike, and near the Antietam river, 
 General Richardson's division of General Sumner's corps was 
 posted. General Sykes' division of General Porter's corps 
 was on the left of the turnpike, and in line with General 
 Richardson, protecting the bridge, No. 2, over the Antietam. 
 The left of the line opposite to, and some distance from bridge 
 No. 3, was occupied by General Bitrnside's corps. Before 
 givmg General Hooker his orders to make the movement which 
 will presently be described, I rode to the left of the line to 
 satisfy myself that the troops were properly posted there to 
 secure our left flank from any attack made along the left bank 
 of the Antietam, as well as to enable us to carry bridge No. 3. 
 
 I found it necessary to make considerable changes in the 
 position of General Burnside's corps, and directed him to ad- 
 vance to a strong position in the immediate vicinity of the 
 bridge, and to reconnoitre the approaches to the bridge carefully. 
 
376 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 In rear of Generals Sumner's and Hooker's corps, near 
 Keadysville, General Mansfield's corps was massed ; the 
 cavalry on the turnpike in rear of Keadysville. On the ridge 
 of the first line of hills overlooking the Antietam, and be- 
 tween the turnpike and Fry's house, on the right of the road, 
 were placed Captains Taft's, Langner's, Von Kleizer's, and 
 Lieutenant Weaver's batteries of 20-pounder Parrott guns. 
 On the crest of the hill, in the rear and right of bridge No. 3, 
 Captain Weed's 3-inch, and Lieutenant Benjamin's 20-pounder 
 batteries. General Franklin's corps, and General Couch's di- 
 vision held a jjosition in Pleasant Valley, in front of Browns- 
 ville, with a strong force of the ene my in their front. Gen. 
 Morell's division of Porter's corps was en route from Boons- 
 boro', and General Humphrey's division of new troops, en 
 route from Frederick, Md. About daylight on the 16th the 
 enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery on our guns in position 
 which was promptly returned. Their fire was silenced for the 
 time, but was frequently renewed during the day. In the 
 heavy fire of the morning. Major Arndt, commanding 1st bat- 
 talion 1st New York Artillery was mortally wounded, while 
 directing the operations of his batteries. 
 
 It was afternoon before I could move the troops to their po- 
 sitions for attack, being compelled to spend the morning in 
 reconnoitering the new position taken up by the enemy, 
 examining the ground, finding fords and clearing their ap- 
 proaches, and hurrying up the ammunition and supply trains, 
 which had been delayed by the rapid march of tlie troops over 
 the few practicable approaches from Frederick. These had 
 been crowded by the masses of infantry, cavalry and artillery, 
 pressing on with the hope of overtaking the enemy before he 
 could form to resist an attack ; many of the troops were out 
 of rations on the previous day, and a good deal of their am- 
 munition had been expended in the severe action of the 14th. 
 
 My plan for the impending general engagement was to attack 
 the enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mansfield, sup- 
 ported by Sumner's, and if necessary, Franklin's, and as soon 
 as matters looked favorably there to move the corps of Gen. 
 Burnside against the enemy's extreme right, upon the ridges 
 running to the south and rear of Sharpsburg, and having car- 
 
A NTI ET AM. 377 
 
 ried their position to press along the crest towards our right ; 
 and whenever either of these flank movements should be suc- 
 cessful to advance our centre with all their forces then 
 disposable. 
 
 About 2 P.M. General Hooker, with his corps consisting of 
 General Rickett's, Meade's and Doubleday's divisions was 
 ordered to cross the Antietam at a ford, and at bridge No. 1, 
 a short distance above, to attack, and if possible turn the 
 enemy's left. General Sumner was ordered to cross the corps 
 of General Mansfield (the 12th) during the night, and hold his 
 own (the 2d) corps ready to cross early the next morning. On 
 reaching the vicinity of the enemy's left, a sharp contest com- 
 menced with the Pennsylvania reserves, the advance of Gen. 
 Hooker's corps, near the house of Dr. Miller. The enemy 
 was driven from the strij) of woods where he was first met, 
 the firing lasted until after dark, when General Hooker's corps 
 rested on their arms, on ground won from the enemy. 
 
 During the night General Mansfield's corps, consisting of 
 Generals Williams's and Green's divisions, crossed the An- 
 tietam at the same ford and bridge that General Hooker's 
 corps had passed, and bivouacked on the farm of J. PoiFen- 
 berger, about a mile in rear of General Hooker's position. At 
 daylight, on the 17th, the action was commenced by the skir- 
 mishers of the Pennsylvania Reserves. The whole of General 
 Hooker's corps was soon engaged, and drove the enemy from 
 the open field in front of the first line of woods, into a second 
 line of woods beyond, which runs to the eastward of and 
 nearly j^arallel to the Sharpsburg and Hagerstown turnpike. 
 
 This contest was obstinate, and as the troops advanced the 
 opposition became more determined, and the numbers of tlie 
 enemy greater. General Hooker then ordered up the corps 
 of General Mansfield, which moved promptly towards the 
 scene of action. The first division. General Williams, was 
 deployed to the right on approaching the enemy ; General 
 Crawford's brigade on the right, its right resting on the 
 Hagerstown turnpike, on his left General Gordon's brigade. 
 The 2d Division, General Green's, joining the left of Gordon's, 
 extended as far as the burnt buildings to the north and east 
 of the white church on the turnjiike. During the deploy- 
 
378 "* FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 ment that gallant veteran, General Mansfield, fell mortally 
 wounded while examining the ground in front of his troops. 
 General Hartsuff, of Hooker's corps, was severely wounded 
 while bravely pressing forward his troops, and was taken 
 from the field. 
 
 The command of the 12th corps fell upon General Williams. 
 Five regiments of the 1st division of this corps were new 
 troops. One brigade of the 2d division was sent to support 
 General Doubleday's. The 124th Pennsylvania Volunteers 
 were pushed across the turnpike into the woods beyond J. 
 Miller's house, with orders to hold the position as long as 
 possible. 
 
 The line of battle of this corps was formed and it became 
 engaged at about 7 a.m., the attack being opened by Knapp's 
 Pennsylvania, Cothran's New York and Hampton's Pittsburg 
 batteries. To meet this attack the enemy had pushed a 
 strong column of troops into the open fields in front of the 
 turnpike, while he occupied the woods on the west of the 
 turnpike in strong force. The woods (as was found by sub- 
 sequent observation,) were traversed by the out-cropping 
 ledges of rock. Several hundred yards to the right and rear 
 was a line which commanded the debouche of the woods, and 
 in the fields between was a long line of stone fences, continued 
 by breastworks of rails, which covered the enemy's infantry 
 from our musketry. The same woods formed a screen behind 
 which his movements were concealed, and his batteries on the 
 hill and the rifle works covered from the fire of our artillery 
 in front. 
 
 For about two hours the battle raged with varied success, 
 the enemy endeavoring to drive our troops into the second 
 line of wood, and ours in turn to get possession of the line in 
 front. Our troops ultimately succeeded in forcing the enemy 
 back into the woods near the turnpike, General Green, with 
 his two brigades, crossing into the woods to the left of the 
 Dunker church. During this conflict General Crawford, com- 
 manding 1st division after General Williams took command 
 of the corps, was wounded, and left the field. General Green, 
 being much exposed and applying for reinforcements, the 13th 
 
A NTIET A U. 379 
 
 New York and 2Ytli Indiana, and the 3d Maryland were sent 
 to his support with a section of Knapp's battery. 
 
 At about 9 o'clock a.m., General Sedgwick's division of 
 General Sumner's corps arrived. Crossing tlie ford pre- 
 viously mentioned, this division marched in three columns to 
 the support of the attack on the enemy's left. On nearing the 
 scene of action the columns were halted, faced to the front, 
 and established by General Sumner in three parallel lines by 
 brigade, facing towards the south and west; General Gor- 
 man's brigade in front, General Dana's second and General 
 Howard's third, with a distance between the lines of some 
 seventy paces. 
 
 The division was then put in motion, and moved upon the 
 field of battle under fire from the enemy's concealed batteries 
 on the hill beyond the woods, passing diagonally to the front 
 across the open space, and to the front of the 1st division of 
 General Williams's corps : this latter division withdrew. 
 
 Entering the woods on the west of the turnpike, and driving 
 the enemy before them, the first line was met by a heavy fire 
 of musketry and shell from the enemy's breastworks and the 
 batteries on the hill commanding the exit from the woods. 
 Meantime a heavy column of the enemy had succeeded in 
 crowding back the troops of General Green's division, and 
 appeared in rear of the left of Sedgwick's division. By com- 
 mand of General Sumner, General Howard fiiced the third 
 line to the rear, preparatory to a change of front, to meet the 
 column advancing on the left, but this line now suffering from 
 a destructive fire both in front and on its left, which it was 
 unable to return, gave way towards the right and rear in con- 
 siderable confusion, and was soon followed by the first and 
 second lines. 
 
 General Gorman's brigade, and one regiment of General 
 Dana's, soon rallied and checked the advance of the enemy on 
 the right. The second and third lines now formed on the left 
 of Gelieral Gorman's brigade, and poured a destructive fire 
 upon the enemy. 
 
 During General Sumner's attack, he ordered General Wil- 
 liams to support him. Brigadier-General Gordon, with a por- 
 tion of his brigade, moved forward, but when he reached the 
 
380 FOURTH PERIOD. '^ 
 
 woods the left of General Sedgwick's division had given way, 
 and finding himself, as the smoke cleared up, opposed to the 
 enemy in force, with his small command, he Avithdrew to the 
 rear of the batteries at the second line of woods. As General 
 Gordon's troops unmasked our batteries on the left, they 
 opened with canister, the batteries of Captain Cothi'an, 1st 
 New York, and " I," 1st U. S. Artillery, commanded by Lieut. 
 Woodruff, doing good service. Unable to stand tliis deadly 
 fire in front and the musketry fire from the right, the enemy 
 again sought shelter in the woods and rocks beyond the turn- 
 pike. 
 
 During this assault Generals Sedgwick and Dana were 
 seriously wounded and taken from the field. General Sedg- 
 wick, though twice wounded and faint from loss of blood, re- 
 tained command of his division for more than an hour after 
 his first wound, animating his command by his presence. 
 General Howard assumed command after General Sedgwick 
 retired. 
 
 About the time of General Sedgwick's advance. General 
 Hooker, while urging on his command, was seriously wounded 
 in the foot and taken from the field. The repulse of the 
 enemy offered opportunity to re-arrange the lines and re-or- 
 ganize the commands on the right, now more or less in confu- 
 sion. The batteries of the Pennsylvania Reserve, on high 
 ground near I. Pofifenburger's house, opened fire and checked 
 several attempts of the enemy to establish batteries in front 
 of our right, to turn that flank and enfilade the lines. 
 
 While this conflict was so obstinately raging on the right. 
 General French was pushing his division against the enemy 
 still further to the left. This division crossed the Antietara 
 at the same ford as General Sedgwick, and immediately in his 
 rear. Passing over the stream in three columns, the division 
 marched about a mile from the ford, then facing to the left, moved 
 in three lines towards the enemy. General Max Weber's brigade 
 in front. Colonel D wight Morris's brigade of raw troops, un- 
 drilled and moving for the first time under fire, in the second, 
 and General Kimball's brigade in the third. The division 
 was first assailed by a fire of artillery, but steadily advanced, 
 driving the enemy's skirmishers, and encountered the in- 
 
ANTIETAM. 381 
 
 fantry in some force at the group of houses on Roulette's 
 farm. General Weber's brigade gallantly advanced with an 
 unwavering front, and drove the enemy from their j^osition 
 about the houses. 
 
 While General Weber was hotly engaged with the first line 
 of the enemy, General French received orders from General 
 Sumner, his corps commander, to push on with renewed vigor 
 to make a diversion in favor of the attack on the right. Leav- 
 ing the new troops, who had been thrown into some confusion 
 from their march through corn-fields, over fences, &c., to form 
 as a reserve, he ordered the brigade of General Kimball to the 
 front, passing to the left of General Weber. The enemy was 
 pressed back to near the crest of the hill, where he was en- 
 countered in greater strength, posted in a sunken road running 
 in a northwesterly direction and forming a natural lifle-pit. 
 In a corn-field in rear of this road were also strong bodies of 
 the enemy. As the line reached the crest of the hill, a galling 
 fire was opened on it from the sunken road and corn-field. 
 Here a terrific fire of musketry burst from both lines, and the 
 battle raged along the whole line with great slaughter. The 
 enemy attempted to turn the left of the line, but were met by 
 the Vth Virginia and 132d Pennsylvania Volunteers, and re- 
 pulsed. 
 
 Foiled in this, the enemy made a determined assault on the 
 front, but was met by a charge from our lines, which drove 
 him back with severe loss, leaving in our hands some three 
 hundred prisoners, and several stands of colors. Tlie enemy 
 having been repulsed by the terrible execution of the batteries, 
 and the musketry fire on the extreme right, now attempted to 
 assist the attack on General French's division, by assailing 
 him on his right, and endeavoring to turn his flank, but this 
 attack was met and checked by the 14th Indiana and 8th Ohio 
 volunteers, and by canister from Captain Tompkins's battery, 
 1st Rhode Island Artillery. Having been under an almost 
 continuous fire for nearly four hours, and their ammunition 
 being nearly exhausted, this division now took position im- 
 mediately below the crest of the heights on which they had 
 so gallantly fought, the enemy making no attempt to regain 
 their lost ground. 
 
382 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 On the left of General French, General Richardson's divi- 
 sion was hotly engaged. Having crossed the Antietam about 
 9.30 A.M., at the ford crossed by the other divisions of Sumner's 
 corps, it moved on a line nearly parallel to the Antietam, and 
 formed in a ravine behind the high grounds over-looking 
 Roulette's house. The 2d (Irish) brigade, commanded by 
 General Meagher, on the right, the 3d brigade, commanded 
 by General Caldwell, on his left, and the brigade commanded 
 by Colonel Brooks, 53d Pennsylvania Volunteers, in support. 
 As the division moved forward to take its position on the field, 
 the enemy directed a fire of artillery against it, but owing to 
 the irregularities of the ground, did but little damage. 
 
 Meagher's brigade advancing steadily, soon became engaged 
 with the enemy posted to the left and in front of Roulette's 
 house. ■ It continued to advance under a heavy fire nearly to 
 the crest of the hill overlooking Piper's house, the enemy being 
 posted in a continuation of the sunken road, and corn-field, 
 before referred to. Here the brave Irish brigade opened upon 
 the enemy a terrific musketry fire. All of General Sumner's 
 corps was now engaged, General Sedgwick's on the right, 
 General French in the centre, and General Richardson on the 
 left. The Irish brigade sustained its well earned reputation. 
 After suffering terribly in officers and men, and strewing the 
 ground with their enemies as they drove them back, their 
 ammunition nearly exj^ended, and their commander, General 
 Meagher, disabled by the fill of his horse, shot under him, this 
 brigade was ordered to give place to General Caldwell's bri- 
 gade, which advanced to a short distance in its rear. The 
 lines were passed by the Irish brigade, breaking by company 
 to the rear, and General Caldwell's, by company to the front, 
 as steadily as on drill. Colonel Brooks's brigade, now became 
 the second line. 
 
 The ground over which General Richardson's and French's 
 divisions were fighting was very irregular, intersected by 
 numerous ravines, hills covered with growing corn, enclosed 
 by stone walls, behind which the enemy could advance un- 
 observed upon any exposed point of our lines. Taking ad- 
 vantage of this, the enemy attempted to gain the right of 
 Richardson's position in a corn-field, near Roulette's house, 
 
ANTIETAM. 383 
 
 where the division had become separated from that of Gen- 
 eral French. A change of front by the 52d New York 
 and 2d Delaware Volunteers, of Colonel Brooks's brigade, 
 under Colonel Frank, and the attack made by the 53d Penn- 
 sylvania Volunteers, sent further to right by Colonel Brooks 
 to close this gap in the line, and the movement of the 132d 
 Pennsylvania and 7th Virginia Volunteers, of General French's 
 division, before referred to, drove the enemy from the corn- 
 field, and restored the line. 
 
 The brigade of General Caldwell, with determined gallantry, 
 pushed the enemy back opposite the left and centre of this 
 division, but sheltered in the sunken road they still held our 
 forces on the right of Caldwell in check. Colonel Barlow, 
 commanding the 61st and 64th New York regiments, of Cald- 
 well's brigade, seeing a favorable opportunity, advanced these 
 regiments on the left, taking the Hne on the sunken road in 
 flank, and compelled them to surrender, capturing over three 
 hundred prisoners, and three stands of colors. 
 
 The whole of the brigade, with the 57th and 66th New 
 York regiments of Colonel Brooks's brigade, who had moved 
 these regiments into the first line, now advanced with gal- 
 lantry, driving the enemy before them in confusion into the 
 corn-field beyond the sunken road. The left of the division 
 was now well advanced, when the enemy, concealed by an 
 intervening ridge, endeavored to turn its left and rear. Col. 
 Cross, 5th N. H., by a change of front to the left and rear, 
 brought his regiment facing the advancing line. Here a 
 spirited contest arose to gain a commanding height — the two 
 opposing forces, moving parallel to each other, giving and 
 receiving fire. The 5th., gaining the advantage, faced to the 
 right and delivered its volley. The enemy staggered, but 
 ralUed and advanced desperately at a charge. Being rein- 
 forced by the 81st Pennsylvania regiment, these regiments 
 met the advance by a counter charge. The enemy fled, leav- 
 ing many killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the colors of 
 the 4th North Carolina in our hands. 
 
 Another column of the enemy, advancing under shelter of a 
 stone wall and corn-field, pressed down on the right of the 
 division; but Col. Barlow again advanced the 61st and 64th 
 
384 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 New York against these troops, and, with the attack of Kim- 
 ball's brigade on the right, drove them from this position. 
 
 Our troops on the left of this part of the line, having driven 
 the enemy far back, they, with reinforced numbers, made a 
 determined attack directly in front. To meet this. Col. Bar- 
 low brought his two regiments to their position in line, and 
 drove the enemy through the corn-field into the orchard be- 
 yond, under a heavy fire of musketry, and a fire of canister 
 from two pieces of artillery in the orchard and a battery fur- 
 ther to the right, throwing shell and case-shot. This advance 
 gave us possession of Piper's house, the strong point contended 
 for by the enemy at this part of the line, it being a defensible 
 building, several hundred yards in advance of the sunken 
 road. 
 
 The musketry fire at this point of the line now ceased. 
 Holding Piper's house. General Richardson withdrew the line 
 a little way to the crest of a hill, a more advantageous posi- 
 tion. Up to this time this division was without artillery, and 
 in the new position sufiTered severely from artillery fire, which 
 could not be replied to, A section of Robertson's horse bat- 
 tery, commanded by Lieut. Vincent, 2d U. S. Artillery, now ar- 
 rived on the ground, and did excellent service. Subsequently 
 a battery of brass guns, commanded by Capt. Graham, 1st U. 
 S. Artillery, arrived, and was jDosted on the crest of the hill, 
 and soon silenced the two guns in the orchard. A heavy fire 
 soon ensued between the battery further to the right and our 
 own. Captain Graham's battery was bravely and skilfully 
 served, but, unable to reach the enemy, who had rifled guns of 
 greater range than our smooth bores, retired by order of Gen. 
 Richardson, to save it from useless sacrifice of men and horses. 
 The brave general was himself mortally wounded while per- 
 sonally directing its fire. 
 
 General Hancock was placed in command of the division 
 after the fiill of General Richardson. General Meagher's 
 brigade, now commanded by Col. Burke of the 63d New 
 York, having refilled their cartridge boxes, was again ordered 
 forward, and took position in the centre of the line. The 
 division now occupied one line in close proximity to the enemy, 
 who had taken up a position in the rear of Piper's house. 
 
ANTIETAM. 385 
 
 Col. Dwiglit Morris, with the 14th Connecticut and a de- 
 tachment of the 108th New York, of Gen. French's division, 
 was sent by Gen. French to the support of Richardson's 
 division. This command was now placed in an interval in the 
 line between General Caldwell's and the Irish Brigade. The 
 requirements of the extended line of battle had so engaged the 
 artillery that the application of General Hancock for artillery 
 for his division could not be complied with immediately by the 
 chief of artillery, or the corps commanders in his vicinity. 
 Knowing the tried courage of the troops, General Hancock 
 felt confident that he could hold his position, although sufi'er- 
 ing from the enemy's artillery, but was too weak to attack, as 
 the great length of the line he was obliged to hold prevented 
 him from forming more than one line of battle ; and, from his 
 advanced position, this line was already partly enfiladed by 
 the batteries of the enemy on the right, which were protected 
 from our batteries opposite them by the woods at the Dunker 
 church. 
 
 Seeing a body of the enemy advancing on some of our 
 troops to the left of his position, General Hancock obtained 
 Hexamer's battery from General Franklin's corps, which 
 assisted materially in frustrating this attack. It also assisted 
 the attack of the 7th Maine of Franklin's corps, which, with- 
 out other aid, made an attack against the enemy's line and 
 drove in skirmishers who were annoying our artillery and 
 troops on the right. Lieutenant Woodrufi", with battery " I," 
 2d IT. S. Artillery, relieved Capt. Hexamer, whose ammunition 
 was expended. The enemy seemed at one time to be about 
 making an attack in force upon this part of the line, and ad- 
 vanced a long column of infantry towards this division, but, 
 on nearing the position. General Pleasanton opening on them 
 with sixteen guns, they halted, gave a desultory fire, and re- 
 treated, closing the operations on this portion of the field. 
 
 To return to the incidents occurring still further to the 
 right. 
 
 Between 12 and 1 p.m. General Franklin's corps arrived on 
 the field of battle, having left their camp near Crampton's 
 Pass at 6 a.m., leaving General Couch with orders to move 
 with his division to occupy Maryland heights. 
 
 17 
 
386 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 General Smith's division led the column, followed by General 
 Slocura's. 
 
 It was first intended to keep this corps in reserve on the 
 east side of the Antietam, to operate on either flank or on the 
 centre, as circumstances might require. But, on nearing 
 Keadysville, the strong opposition on the right, developed by 
 the attacks of Hooker and Sumner, rendered it necessary to 
 send this corps at once to the assistance of the right wing. 
 On nearing the field, hearing that one of our batteries (" A," 
 4th United States Artillery), commanded by Lieut. Thomas, 
 who occupied the same position as Lieut. "Woodruff's battery 
 in the morning, was hotly engaged, without supports, General 
 Smith sent two regiments to its relief from General Hancock's 
 brigade. On inspecting the ground. General Smith ordered 
 the other regiments of Hancock's brigade, with Frank's and 
 Cowen's batteries, 1st New York Artillery, to the threatened 
 position ; Lieut. Thomas and Captain Cothran, commanding 
 batteries, bravely held their positions against the advancing 
 enemy, handling their batteries with skill. 
 
 Finding the enemy still advancing, the 3d brigade of Smith's 
 division, commanded by Colonel Irwin, 49th Pennsylvania 
 Volunteers, was ordered up, and, passing through Lieutenant 
 Thomas's battery, charged upon the enemy and drove back 
 the advance until abreast of the Dunker Church. As the 
 right of the brigade came opposite the Avoods, it received a 
 destructive fire which checked the advance and threw the 
 brio;ade somewhat into confusion. It formed again behind 
 a rise of ground in the open space in advance of the batteries. 
 General French having reported to General Franklin that his 
 ammunition was nearly expended, that officer ordered General 
 Brooks, with his brigade, to reinforce him. General Brooks 
 formed his brigade on the right of General French, where 
 they remained during the remainder of the day and night, 
 frequently under the fire of the enemy's artillery. It was 
 soon after the brigade of Colonel Irwin had fallen back behind 
 the rise of ground that the Vth Maine, by order of Colonel 
 Irwin, made the gallant attack already referred to. 
 
 The advance of General Franklin's corps was opportune. 
 The attack of the enemy on the position, but for the timely 
 
AXTIETAM. 387 
 
 arrival of his corps, must have been disastrous, had it suc- 
 ceed in piercing the line between General Sedgwick's and 
 French's divisions. 
 
 General Franklin ordered two brigades of General Slocuni's 
 division, General Newton's and Colonel Torbert's, to form in 
 column to assault the woods that had been so hotly contested 
 before, by Generals Sumner and Hooker ; General Bartlett's 
 brigade was ordered to form as a reserve ; at this time Gene- 
 ral Sumner having command on the riglit, directed further 
 offensive operations to be postponed, as the repulse of this, the 
 only remaining corps available for attack, would peril the 
 safety of the whole army. 
 
 General Porter's corps, consisting of General Sykes's division 
 of regulars and volunteers, and General Morell's division of 
 volunteers, occupied a position on the east side of Antietam 
 Creek, upon tlie main turnpike leading to Sharpsburg, and 
 directly opposite the centre of the enemy's line. This corps 
 filled the interval between the right wing and General Burn- 
 side's command, and guarded the main approach from the 
 enemy's position to our trains of supplies. 
 
 It was necessary to watch this part of our line with the 
 utmost vigilance, lest the enemy should take advantage of the 
 first exhibition of weakness here, to push upon us a vigorous 
 assault for the purpose of piercing our centre and turning 
 our rear, as well as to capture or destroy our supply trains. 
 Once having penetrated this line, the enemy's passage to our 
 rear could have met with but feeble resistance, as there were 
 no reserves to reinforce or close up the gap. 
 
 Towards the middle of the afternoon, proceeding to the 
 right, I found that Sumner's, Hooker's and Mansfield's corps 
 had met with serious losses. Several general ofticers had been 
 carried from the field severely wounded, and the aspect of 
 aflfairs was anything Jbut promising. At the risk of greatly 
 exposing our centre, I ordered two brigades from Porter's 
 corps, the only available troops, to reinforce the right. Six 
 battalions of Sykes's regulars had been thrown across the 
 Antietam bridge on the main road, to attack and drive back 
 the enemy's sharpshooters, who were annoying Pleasanton's 
 horse batteries in advance of the bridge. Warren's brigade 
 
388 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 of Porter's corps was detached to hold a position on Burn- 
 side's right and reai-, so that Porter was left at one time with 
 only a portion of Sykes's division, and one small brigade of 
 Morell's division (but little over three thousand men) to hold 
 his important position. 
 
 General Sumner expressed the most decided opinion against 
 another attempt during that day to assault the enemys position 
 in front, as portions of our troops were so much scattered and 
 demoralized. In view of these circumstances, after making 
 changes in the positions of some of the troops, I directed the 
 different commanders to hold their positions and, being satisfi- 
 ed that this could be done without the assistance of the two 
 brigades from the centre, I countermanded the order which 
 was in course of execution. 
 
 General Slocum's division replaced a portion of General 
 Sumner's troops, and positions were selected for batteries in 
 front of the woods. The enemy opened several heavy fires 
 of artillery on the position of our troops after this, but our 
 batteries soon silenced them. 
 
 On the morning of the 17th General Pleasanton, with his 
 cavalry division and the horse batteries under Captains Robert- 
 son, Tidball and Lieutenant Haines, of the 2d U. S. artillery, and 
 Capt. Gibson, 3d U. S. artillery, was ordered to advance on the 
 turnpike towai'ds Sharpsbui'g across bridge No. 2, and support 
 the left of General Sumnei''s line. The bridge being covered 
 by a fire of artillery and sharpshooters, cavalry skirmishers 
 were thrown out and Captain Tidball's battery advanced by 
 piece, and drove ofi" the sharpshooters with canister sufiicient- 
 ly to establish the batteries above mentioned, which opened on 
 the enemy with efiect. The firing was kept up for about two 
 hours, when, the enemy's fire slackening, the batteries were re- 
 lieved by Randall's and Van Reed's batteries, U. S. Ai'tillery. 
 About 3 o'clock Tidball, Robertson and Haines returned to their 
 positions on the west of Antietam, Captain Gibsoni having 
 been placed in position on the east side to guard the ap- 
 proaches to the bridge. These batteries did good service, 
 concentrating their fire on the column of the enemy about to 
 attack General Hancock's position, and compelling it to find 
 shelter behind the hills in rear. 
 
ANTI ET A M. ' 389 
 
 General Sykes's division bad been in position since tbe 15th, 
 exposed to tbe enemy's artillery and sbarpsbooters. 
 
 General Morell had come up on tbe 16tb and relieved Gen- 
 eral Richardson on tbe right of General Sykes, and, continual- 
 ly under the vigilant watch of the enemy, tbis corps guarded 
 a vital point. 
 
 The position of the batteries under General Pleasanton 
 being one of great exposure, tbe battalion of tbe 2d and lOtb 
 United States Infantry under Capt. Poland, 2d U. S. Infxntry, 
 was sent to bis support. Subsequently, four battalions of regu- 
 lar infantry under Captain Dwyer, 4th U. S. Infentry were sent 
 across to assist in driving off tbe sharpshooters of the enemy. 
 
 Tbe battalion of the 2d and lOtb U. S. Infantry advancing far 
 beyond tbe batteries, compelled tbe cannoneers of a battery 
 of tbe enemy to abandon their guns. Few in number and 
 unsupported, they were unaHe to bring them off. Tbe heavy 
 loss of tbis small body of men attests their gallantry. 
 
 The troops of General Burnside held tbe left of the line 
 opposite bridge No. 3. Tbe attack on the right was to have 
 been supported by an attack on the left. Preparatory to this 
 attack, on tbe evening of tbe 16tb General Burnside's corps 
 was moved forward and to the left, and took up a position 
 nearer the bridge. 
 
 I visited General Burnside's position on tbe 16tb and, after 
 pointing out to bira tbe proper dispositions to be made of bis 
 troops during the day and night, informed him tbat be would 
 probably be required to attack tbe enemy's right on the follow- 
 ing morning, and directed bim to make careful reconnoissances. 
 General Burnside's corps, consisting of the divisions of Gen- 
 erals Cox, Wilcox, Rodman, and Sturgis, was posted as fol- 
 lows : Colonel Brooks's brigade. Cox's division, on the right. 
 Gen. Sturgis's division immediately in rear. On the left was 
 Gen. Rodman's division, with Gen. Scammon's brigade, Cox's 
 division in support. 
 
 General Wilcox's division was held in reserve. 
 Tbe corps bivouacked in position on the night of tbe 16tb. 
 Early on tbe morning of tbe IVtb I ordered General Burn- 
 side to form bis troops and bold them in readiness to assault 
 tbe bridge in bis front, and to await further orders. 
 
 At 8 o'clock an order was sent to him by Lieutenant Wil- 
 
390 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 son, Topographical Engineers, to carry the bridge, then to 
 gain possession of the heights beyond, and to advance along 
 their crest upon Sharpsburg and its rear. 
 
 After some time had elapsed, not hearing from him, I dis- 
 patched an aide to ascertain what had been done. The aide 
 returned with the information that but little progress had been 
 made. I then sent him back with an order to General Burn- 
 side to assault the bridge at once, and carry it at all hazards. 
 The aide returned to me a second time, with the report that the 
 bridge was still in the possession of the enemy. Whereupon 
 I directed Colonel Sackett, inspector-general, to deliver to 
 General Burnside ray positive order to push forward his troops 
 without a moment's delay, and, if necessary, to carry the bridge 
 at the point of the bayonet, and I ordered Colonel Sackett to 
 remain with General Burnside and see that the order was 
 executed promptly. 
 
 After these three hours' delay, the bridge was carried at 1 
 o'clock by a brilliant charge of the 51st New York and 51st 
 Pennsylvania Volunteers. Other troops were then thrown 
 over and the opposite bank occupied, the enemy retreating to 
 the heights beyond. 
 
 A halt was then made by General Burnside's advance until 
 3 P.M., upon hearing which I directed one of my aides — Col, 
 Key — to inform General Burnside that I desired him to push 
 forward his troops with the utmost vigor and carry the enemy's 
 position on the heights, that the movement was vital to our 
 success, that this was a time Avhen we must not stop for loss 
 of life if a great object could be thereby accomplished. That 
 if in his judgment his attack would fail, to inform me so at 
 once, that his troops might be withdrawn, and used elsewhere 
 on the field. He replied that he would soon advance, and 
 would go up the hill as far as a battery of the enemy on the 
 left would permit. Upon this report I again immediately sent 
 Colonel Key to General Burnside, with orders to advance at 
 once, if possible, to flank the battery or storm it and carry the 
 heights, repeating that if he considered the movement imprac- 
 ticable to inform me so, that his troops might be recalled. The 
 advance was then gallantly resiimed, the enemy driven from 
 their guns, the heights handsomely carried, and a portion of 
 
A NTI ETAM. 
 
 391 
 
 the troops even reached the outskirts of Sharpsburg. By this 
 time it was nearly dark, and strong reinforcements just then 
 reaching the enemy from Harper's Ferry, attacked General 
 Burnside's troops on their left flank, and forced them to retire 
 to a lower line of hills nearer the bridge. 
 
 If this important movement had been consummated two 
 hours earlier, a position would have been secured upon the 
 heights from which our batteries might have enfiladed the 
 greater part of the enemy's line, and turned their right and 
 rear. Our victory might have been much more decisive. 
 
 The following is the substance of General Burnside's opera- 
 tions, as given in his report. 
 
 Colonel Crook's brigade was ordered to storm the bridge. 
 This bridge No. 3 is a stone structure of three arches, with 
 stone pariTpets. The banks of the stream on the opposite side 
 are precipitous, and command the eastern approaches to the 
 bridge. On the hill side immediately by the bridge was a 
 stone fence running parallel to the stream, the turns of the 
 roadway as it wound up the hill were covered by rifle-pits and 
 breastworks of rails, &c. These works and the woods that 
 covered the slopes were filled with the enemy's riflemen, and 
 batteries were in position to enfilade the bridge and its ap- 
 
 General Rodman was ordered to cross the ford below the 
 bridge. From Colonel Crook's position it was found impos- 
 sible to carry the bridge. _ 
 
 General Sturgis was ordered to make a detail from his divi- 
 sion for that purpose. He sent forward the 2d Maryland and 
 6th New Hampshire. These regiments made several succes- 
 sive attacks in the most gallant style, but were driven back. _ 
 
 The artillery of the left were ordered to concentrate their 
 fire on the woods above the bridge. Colonel Crook brought a 
 section of Captain Simmon's battery to a position to command 
 the bridge. The 5 1 st New York, and 5 1 st Pennsylvania, were 
 then ordered to assault the bridge. Taking advantage of a 
 small spur of the hills which ran parallel to the river, they 
 moved toward the bridge. From the crest of this spur, they 
 rushed with bayonet fixed and cleared the bridge. 
 
 The division followed the storming party, also the brigade 
 
392 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 of Colonel Crook, as support. The enemy withdrew to still 
 higher ground some five or six hundred yards beyond, and 
 opened a fire of artillery on the troops in the new positions on 
 the crest of the hill above the bridge. 
 
 General Rodman's division succeeded in crossing the ford, 
 after a sharp fire of musketry and artillery, and joined on the 
 left of Sturgis ; Scammon's brigade crossing as support. Gen- 
 eral Wilcox's division was ordered across to take position on 
 General Sturgis's right. 
 
 These dispositions being completed about 3 o'clock, the com- 
 mand moved forward, except Sturgis's division left in reserve. 
 Clark's and Darell's batteries accompanied Rodman's division ; 
 Cook's battery with Wilcox's division, and a section of Sira- 
 mons's battery with Colonel Crook's brigade. A section of Sim- 
 mons's battery, and Mullenburgh's and McMullin's batteries 
 were in position. The order for the advance was obeyed by the 
 troops with alacrity. General Wilcox's division, with Crook in 
 support, moved up on both sides of the turnpike leading from the 
 bridge to Sharpsburg. General Rodman's division, supported 
 by Scammon's brigade, on the left of General Wilcox. The 
 enemy retreated before the advance of the troops. The 9th 
 New York, of General Rodman's division, captured one of 
 the enemy's batteries, and held it for some time. As the com- 
 mand was driving the enemy to the main heights on the left 
 of the town, the light division of General A. P. Hill, arrived 
 upon the field of battle from Harper's Ferry, and with a heavy 
 artillery fire made a strong attack on the extreme left. To 
 meet this attack, the left divisioi^j diverged from the line of 
 march intended, and opened a gap between it and the right. 
 To fill up this, it was necessary to order the troops from the 
 second line. During these movements. General Rodman was 
 mortally wounded. Colonel Harland's brigade, of General 
 Rodman's division, was driven back. Colonel Scammon's bri- 
 gade, by a change of front to rear on his right flank, saved 
 the left from being driven completely in. The fresh troops of 
 the enemy pouring in, and the accumulation of artillery against 
 this command, destroyed all hope of its being able to accom- 
 phsh any thing more. 
 
 It was now nearly dark. General Sturgis was ordered for- 
 
ANTIETAM. 393 
 
 ward to sajiport the left. Notwithstanding the hard work in 
 the early part of the day, his division moved forward with 
 spirit. With its assistance, the enemy were checked and held 
 at bay. 
 
 The command was ordered to fall back by General Cox, who 
 commanded, on the field, the troops engaged in this attack be. 
 yond the Antietam. The artillei-y had been well served during 
 the day. Night closed the long and desperately contested 
 battle of the 17th. Nearly two hundred thousand men, and 
 five hundred pieces of artillery, were for fourteen hours en- 
 gaged in this memorable battle. We had attacked the enemy 
 in a position selected by the experienced engineer then in per- 
 son directing their operations. We had driven them from 
 their line on one flank, and secured a footing within it on the 
 other. The army of the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral 
 effect incident to previous reverses, had achieved a victory 
 over an adversary invested with the prestige of recent success. 
 Our soldiers slept that night, conquerors, on a field won by 
 their valor, and covered with the dead and wounded of the 
 enemy. 
 
 CONDITION OF THE ARMY AFTER ANTIETAM. 
 
 The night, however, brought with it grave responsibilities. 
 Whether to renew the attack on the 1 8th, or to defer it, even with 
 the risk of the enemy's retirement, was the question before me. 
 After a night of anxious deliberation, and a full and careful sur- 
 vey of the situation and condition of our army, and the strength 
 and position of the enemy, I concluded that the success of an at- 
 tack on the 18th was not certain. I am aware of the fact, that 
 under ordinary circumstances, a general is expected to risk a 
 battle if he has a reasonable prospect of success ; but at this 
 critical juncture, I should have had a narrow view of the con- 
 dition of the country, had I been willing to hazard another 
 battle with less than an absolute assurance of success. At that 
 moment — Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland in- 
 vaded — the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. One 
 battle lost, and almost all would have been lost. Lee's army 
 
394 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 might tlien have marched as it pleased on Washington, Balti- 
 more, Philadelphia, or New York. It could have levied its 
 supplies from a fertile and undevastated country ; extorted 
 tribute from wealthy and populous cities ; and nowhere east 
 of the Alleghanies, was there another organized force able to 
 arrest its march. 
 
 The following are among the considerations which led me 
 to doubt the certainty of success in attacking before the 19th. 
 
 The troops were greatly overcome by the fatigue and ex- 
 haustion attendant upon the long continued and severely con- 
 tested battle of the 17th, together with the long day and night 
 marches to which they had been subjected during the previous 
 three days. 
 
 The supply trains were in the rear, and many of the troops 
 had suffered from hunger. They required rest and refresh- 
 ment. 
 
 One division of Sumner's, and all of Hooker's corps, on the 
 right, had, after fighting most valiantly for several hours, been 
 overpowered by numbers, driven back in great disorder, and 
 much scattered ; so that they were for the time somewhat 
 demoralized. 
 
 In Hooker's corps, according to the return made by General 
 Meade, commanding, there were but 6729 men present on the 
 18tli: whereas, on the morning of the 22d, there were 13,093 
 men present for duty in the same corps, showing that previous 
 to, and during the battle, 6364 men were separated from their 
 command. 
 
 General Meade, in an official communication upon this sub- 
 ject, dated Sept. 18, 1862, says: " I enclose a field return of 
 the corps made this afternoon, which I desire you Avill lay 
 before the commanding-general. I am satisfied the great 
 reduction in the corps since the recent engagements, is not due 
 solely to the casualties of battle, and that a considerable num- 
 ber of men are still in the rear, some having dropped out on 
 the march, and many dispersing and leaving yesterday during 
 the fight. I think the efficiency of the corps, so far as it goes 
 good. To resist an attack in our present strong position, 
 I think they may be depended on ; and I hope they will per- 
 form duty in case we make an attack, though I do not think 
 
ANTIETAM, 395 
 
 their morale is as good for an offensive as a defensive move- 
 ment." 
 
 One division of Sumner's corps had also been overpowered, 
 and Avas a good deal scattered and demoralized. It was not 
 deemed by its corps commander, in proper condition to attack 
 the enemy vigorously the next day. 
 
 Some of the new troops on the left, although many of them 
 fought well during a part of the battle, and are entitled to 
 great credit, were, at the close of the action, driven back, and 
 their morale impaired. 
 
 On the morning of the 18th, General Burnside requested me 
 to send him another division to assist in holding liis position 
 on the other side of the Antietam, and to enable him to with- 
 draw his corps if he should be attacked by a superior force. 
 He gave me the impression that if he were attacked again that 
 morning, he would not be able to make a very vigorous 
 resistance. I visited his position early, determined to send 
 General Morell's division to his aid, and directed that it should 
 be placed on this side of the Antietam, in order that it might 
 cover the retreat of his own corps from the otlier side of the 
 Antietam, should that become necessary, at the same time it 
 was in position to reinforce our centre or right, if that were 
 needed. Late in the afternoon, I found that although he had 
 not been attacked. General Burnside had withdrawn his own 
 corps to this side of the Antietam, and sent over Morell's 
 division alone to hold the opposite side. 
 
 A large number of our heaviest and most efficient batteries 
 had consumed all their ammunition on the 16th and 17th, and 
 it was impossible to supply them until late on the following 
 day. 
 
 Supplies of provision and forage had to be brought up and 
 issued, and infantry ammunition distributed. 
 
 Finally, reinforcements to the number of 1 1,000 men, to say 
 nothing of troops from Pennsylvania, had not arrived, but 
 were exj^ected during the day. 
 
 The 18th was therefore spent in collecting the dispersed, 
 giving rest to the fetigued, removing the wounded, burying 
 the dead, and the necessary preparations for a renewal of the 
 battle. 
 
396 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 Of the reinforcements, Couch's division, marching with 
 commendable rapidity, came up into position at a late hour in 
 the morning. Humphrey's division of new troops, in their 
 anxiety to participate in the battle, which was raging when 
 they received the order to march from Frederick, at about 
 half-past 3 p.m. on the 17th, pressed forward during the entire 
 night, and the mass of the division reached the army on the 
 following morning. Having marched more than twenty-three 
 miles after 4^ o'clock on the preceding afternoon, they were of 
 course greatly exhausted, and needed rest and refreshment. 
 Large reinforcements expected from Pennsylvania never ar- 
 rived. 
 
 During the 18th, orders were given for a renewal of the 
 attack at daylight on the 19th. 
 
 On the night of the 18th, the enemy, after passing troops in 
 the latter part of the day from the Virginia shore to their 
 position behind Sharpsburg, as seen by our officers, suddenly 
 formed the design of abandoning their position and retreating 
 across the river. 
 
 As their line was but a short distance from the river, the 
 evacuation presented but little difficulty, and was effected 
 before daylight. 
 
 About 2,700 of the enemy's dead were, under the direction 
 of Major Davis, assistant-inspector-general, counted and buried 
 upon the battle-field of Antietam. A portion of their dead 
 had been previously buried by the enemy. This is conclusive 
 evidence that the enemy sustained much greater loss than we. 
 
 Thirteen guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of fifteen thou- 
 sand stand of small arms, and more than six thousand prisoners, 
 were the trophies which attest the success of our arms in the 
 battles of South Mountain, Crampton's Gap, and Antietam. 
 
 Not a "single gun or color was lost by our army during these 
 battles. 
 
ANTIETAM 
 
 397 
 
 Tabular Beiwrt of Casualties in the Army of the Potomac 
 
 in the Battle of Autietam, on the Uth and 11 th 
 
 of September^ 1862, 
 
 
 General 
 Officers 
 
 Other 
 Officers 
 
 Enlisted Men 
 
 Aggregate 
 
 Grand 
 
 Aggreg. 
 
 
 -3 
 
 C 
 
 r3 
 
 ■a 
 
 a 
 
 3 
 
 o 
 
 13 
 
 a 
 
 3 
 
 o 
 
 Ml 
 
 i 
 
 "3 
 
 5 
 
 •a 
 o 
 
 i 
 
 
 \st Corps. 
 MAJ.-GEN. HOOKER. 
 
 1st Division 
 
 — 
 
 1 
 2 
 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 98 
 153 
 97 
 
 669 
 
 898 
 449 
 
 1 
 
 95 
 
 137 
 
 23 
 
 862 
 
 1188 
 
 8r(l Division 
 
 
 Total 
 
 20 
 21 
 
 39 
 
 50 
 
 192 
 355 
 272 
 
 860 
 1577 
 1271 
 
 24 
 321 
 203 
 
 348 
 
 2016 
 
 255 
 
 2619 
 
 2nd Corps. 
 MAJ.-GEN. SUMNER. 
 
 212 
 355 
 293 
 
 900 
 1579 
 1322 
 
 24 
 321 
 
 '203 
 
 11.36 
 2255 
 
 
 3rd Division 
 
 
 Total 
 
 4 
 
 41 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 2 
 7 
 8 
 5 
 
 22 
 
 9 
 
 6 
 
 15 
 
 89 
 
 819 
 
 3708 
 
 548 
 
 SCO 
 
 3801 
 
 548 
 
 5209 
 
 5th Corps. 
 MAJ.-GEN. F. J. PORTER. 
 
 2 
 
 13 
 
 7 
 
 92 
 13 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 13 
 
 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 108 
 
 
 94 1 
 
 Artillery Reserve 
 
 
 I 
 
 
 Total 
 
 2 
 
 20 
 
 105 
 
 2 
 
 21 
 
 107 
 
 2 
 
 130 
 
 dth Corps. 
 MAJ.-GEN. FRANKLIN. 
 
 20 
 29 
 
 40 
 
 7 
 
 35 
 26 
 
 61 
 
 44 
 121 
 212 
 
 33 
 
 410 
 
 151 
 
 107 
 
 1 
 
 259 
 
 264 
 493 
 743 
 145 
 
 1645 
 
 827 
 
 481 
 
 1£ 
 
 1328 
 
 
 5 
 65 
 
 70 
 
 58 
 
 2 
 
 65 
 373 
 
 
 
 Total 
 
 335 
 
 33 
 
 438 
 
 9th Corps. 
 MAJ.-GEN. BURNSIDE. 
 
 7 
 20 
 70 
 23 
 
 46 
 128 
 220 
 
 38 
 
 284 
 522 
 783 
 152 
 
 7 
 
 20 
 70 
 23 
 
 337 
 
 670 
 
 1073 
 
 213 
 
 
 
 4th Division 
 
 Total 
 
 120 
 
 54 
 
 30 
 
 1 
 
 85 
 
 432 
 
 1741 
 
 120 
 
 2293 
 
 12th Corps. 
 
 (Gen. Banks.) 
 
 BRIG.-GEN. WILLIAMS, 
 
 Comd'a;. 
 
 10( 
 
 113 
 
 1 
 
 862 
 
 507 
 
 15 
 
 54 
 30 
 1 
 
 1076 
 
 650 
 
 17 
 
 
 Artillery 
 
 Total 
 
 2J4 
 
 |l3S4 
 
 85 
 
 1743 
 
398 
 
 F OURTH PERIOD 
 
 
 General 
 Officers 
 
 Other -c.„. 
 Officers ^°' 
 
 1 
 
 sted Men 
 
 Aggi'egate 
 
 Grand 
 Aggreg. 
 
 
 r3 
 
 3 
 
 a 
 
 3 
 o 
 
 ■a 
 1 
 
 ■a 
 c 
 
 3 
 
 o 
 
 ■d 
 S 
 
 ■6 
 c 
 
 o 
 
 C 
 1 
 
 
 -a 
 
 o 
 
 to 
 
 c 
 
 
 MAJ. GEN. COUCH'S 
 
 IHvision 
 
 BRIG. GEN. PLEASANTON 
 Cavalry IHvision 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 
 
 8 
 
 
 5 
 
 9 
 
 23 
 
 
 9 
 
 28 
 
 Grand Total 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ! 2010 '941 61043 
 
 12409 
 
 Official. 
 
 Head-Quartees Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp near Sharsburg, Sept. 29, 1862 
 
 S. Williams, 
 Assistant Adjutant General. 
 
 An estimate of the forces under the confederate General 
 Lee, made up by direction of General Banks from information 
 obtained by the examination of prisoners, deserters, spies, &c., 
 previous to the battle of Antietam, is as follows : 
 
 G-eneral T. J. Jackson's Corps, . 
 " James Longstreet's Corps, . 
 " D. H. Hill's 2 Divisions, 
 " J. E. B. Stuart's Cavalry, 
 " Ransom's and Jenkins's Brigades, . 
 
 Forty-sis Regiments not included in above. 
 
 Artillery, estimated at 400 guns. 
 
 Total, 
 
 . 24,778 Men. 
 
 23,342 
 
 . 15,525 
 
 6,400 
 
 . 3,000 
 
 18,400 
 
 . 6,000 
 
 97,445 
 
 These estimates give the actual numbers of men present and 
 fit for duty. 
 
 Our own forces at the battle of Antietam were as follows : 
 
 1st Corps, ....... 14,856 Men. 
 
 2d Corps, 18,813 " 
 
 5tb Corps, (one division not arrived,). . 12,930 " 
 
 6th Corps, ...... 12,300 " 
 
 9th Corps ' . . 13,819 " 
 
 12th Corps, 10,126 " 
 
 Cavalry Division, 4,320 " 
 
 Total in action. 
 
 87,164 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 399 
 
 OPERATIONS AFTER A:N'TIETAM. 
 
 When our caA^alry advance reached the river on the morn- 
 ing of the 19th, it was discovered that nearly all the enemy's 
 forces had crossed into Virginia during the night, their rear 
 escaping under the cover of eight batteries, placed in strong 
 positions upon the elevated bluffs on the opposite bank. 
 
 General Porter, commanding the 5th Corps, ordered a de- 
 tachment from Griffin's and Barnes's brigades, under General 
 Griffin, to cross the river at dark and carry the enemy's bat- 
 teries. This was gallantly done under the fire of the enemy. 
 Several guns, caissons, etc., were taken, and their supports 
 driven back half a mile. 
 
 The information obtained during the progress of this affixir, 
 indicated that the mass of the enemy had retreated on the 
 Charlestown and Martinsburg roads towards Winchester. To 
 verify this, and to ascertain how far the enemy had retreated. 
 General Porter was authorized to detach from his corps, on 
 the morning of the 20th, a reconnoitering party in greater 
 force. This detachment crossed the river, and advanced about 
 a mile, when it was attacked by a large body of the enemy 
 lying in ambush in the woods, and driven back across the 
 river with considerable loss. This reconnoissance showed 
 that the enemy was still in force on the Virginia bank of the 
 Potomac, prepared to resist our further advance. 
 
 It was reported to me on the 19th that General Stuart had 
 made his appearance at Williamsport with some four thousand 
 cavalry and six pieces of artillery, and that ten thousand in- 
 fantry were marching on the same point from the direction of 
 Winchester. I ordered General Couch to march at once with 
 his division, and a part of Pleasanton's cavalry, with Frank- 
 lin's corps within supporting distance, for the purpose of en- 
 deavoring to capture this force. General Couch made a prompt 
 and rapid march to Williamsport, and attacked the enemy 
 vigorously, but they made their escape across the river. 
 
 I dispatched the following telegraphic report to the general- 
 in-chief : 
 
400 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 Sharpsburg, Sept. 19, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. TV. Halleck, 
 Comcfg. XT. S. Army^ — 
 I have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely freed 
 from the presence of the enemy, Avho has been driven across 
 the Potomac. No fears need now be entertained for the safety 
 of Pennsylvania. I shall at once occupy Harper's Ferry. 
 
 G. B. McClellan. 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 On the following day I received this telegram : 
 
 "Washington, Sept. 20, 1862. 2 p.m. 
 Major-General G. B. McClellan, 
 
 We are still left entirely in the dark in regard to your own 
 movements and those of the enemy. This should not be so. 
 You should keep me advised of both, so far as you know them. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 G-eneral-in-Chief. 
 
 To which I answered as follows : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Near Sharpsburg, Sept. 20, 1862. 8 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck. 
 General-in- Chiefs 
 
 Washington. 
 Your telegram of to-day is received. I telegraphed you 
 yesterday all I knew, and had nothing more to inform you of 
 until this evening, Williams's corps (Banks's) occupied Mary- 
 land Heights at 1 p.m. to-day. The rest of the army is near 
 here, except Couch's division, which is at this moment engaged 
 with the enemy in front of Williamsport. The enemy is re- 
 tiring via Charlestowu and Martinsburg on Winchester. He 
 last night re-occupied Williamsport by a small force, but Avill 
 be out of it by morning. I think he has a force of mfantry 
 near Shepherdstown. 
 
 I regret that you find it necessary to couch every dispatch 
 I have the honor to receive from you, in a spirit of fault-find- 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 401 
 
 ing, and that you have not yet found leisure to say one word 
 in commendation of the recent achievements of this army, or 
 even to aUude to them. 
 
 I have abstained from giving the number of guns, colors, 
 small arms, prisoners, &c., captured, until I could do so with 
 some accuracy. I hope by to-morrow evening to be able to 
 give at least an approximate statement. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 
 On the same day I telegraphed as follows : 
 
 EteAD-QUARTERS, ArMY OF THE POTOMAO, 
 
 September 20, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 Gom(Vg. U. S. Army. 
 As the rebel army, now on the Virginia side of the Poto- 
 mac, must in a great measure be dependent for supplies of 
 ammunition and provisions upon Richmond, I would respect- 
 fully suggest that General Banks be directed to send out a 
 cavalry force to cut their supply communications opposite 
 Washington. This would seriously embarass their operations, 
 and will aid this army materially. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 
 Maryland Heights were occupied by General Williams's 
 corps on this day, and on the 22d General Sumner took pos- 
 session of Harper's P^erry. 
 
 It will be remembered that at the time I was assigned to the 
 command of the forces for the defense of the national capital, 
 on the 2d day of September, 1862, the greater part of all the 
 available troops were suffering under the disheartening in- 
 fluences of the serious defeat they had encountered during the 
 brief and unfortunate campaign of General Pope. Their num- 
 bers were greatly reduced by casualties — their confidence was 
 much shaken, and they had lost something of that esprit-dvr 
 corps Avhich is indispensable to the efficiency of an army. 
 Moreover they had left behind, lost, or worn out the greater 
 part of their clothing and camp equipage, which required re- 
 
402 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 newal before they could be in proper condition to take the field 
 again. 
 
 The intelligence that the enemy was crossing the Potomac 
 into Maryland, was received in Washington on the 4th of 
 September, and the Army of the Potomac was again put in 
 motion, under my direction, on the following day — so that but 
 a very brief interval of time was allowed to reorganise, or 
 procure supplies. 
 
 The sanguinary battles of South Mountain and Antietam, 
 fought by this army a few days afterwards, with the recon- 
 noissances immediately following, resulted in a loss to us of 
 ten general officers, many regimental and company officers, 
 and a large number of enlisted men ; amounting in the aggre- 
 gate to (15,220) fifteen thousand two hundred and twenty. 
 Two army corps had been badly cut up, scattered and some- 
 what demoralised in the action of the 17th. 
 
 In General Sumner's corps alone, (41) forty-one commis- 
 sioned officers and (819) eight hundred and nineteen enlisted 
 men had been killed ; (4) four general officers, (89) eighty-nine 
 other commissioned officers, and (3,708) three thousand seven 
 hundred and eight enlisted men had been wounded ; besides 
 (548) five hundred and forty-eight missing ; making the aggre- 
 gate loss of this splendid veteran corps, in this one battle, 
 (5,209) five thousand two hundred and nine. 
 
 In General Hooker's corps the casualties of the same engage- 
 ment amounted to (2,019) two thousand six hundred and nine- 
 teen. 
 
 The entire army had been greatly exhausted by unavoida- 
 ble overwork, fatiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep 
 and rest, previous to the last battle. 
 
 When the enemy recrossed the Potomac into Virginia, the 
 means of transportation at my disposal were inadequate to 
 furnish a single day's supply of subsistence in advance. 
 
 Many of the troops were new levies, some of whom had 
 fought like veterans, but the morale of others had been a good 
 deal impaii'ed in those severely contested actions, and they re- 
 quired time to recover, as well as to acquire the necessary drill 
 and discipline. 
 
 Under these circumstances, I did not feel authorized to 
 cross the river with the main army, over a very deep and 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 403 
 
 difficult ford in pursuit of the retreating enemy, known to bo 
 in strong force on the south bank, and thereby place that 
 stream, which was liable at any time to rise above a fordino- 
 stage, between my army and its base of supply. 
 
 I telegraphed on the 22d to the General-in-chief as follows : 
 
 " As soon as the exigencies of the service will admit of it, 
 this army should be reorganised. It is absolutely necessary to 
 secure its efficiency, that the old skeleton regiments should be 
 filled up at once, and officers appointed to supply the numerous 
 existing vacancies. There are instances where captains are 
 commanding regiments, and companies are without a single 
 commissioned officer." 
 
 On the 23d, the following was telegraphed to the General- 
 in-chief: 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 Near Shepherdstown, Sept. 23, 1862. 9.30 a.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in- Chiefs Washington. 
 
 From several different sources, I learn that General R. E. 
 Lee is still opposite to ray position at Leestown, between 
 Shepherdstown and Martinsburg, and that General Jackson is 
 on the Opequau Creek, about three miles from its mouth, both 
 with large force. There are also indications of heavy rein- 
 forcements moving towards them from Winchester and 
 Charlestown. I have therefore ordered General Franklin to 
 take position with his corps at the cross roads, about one mile 
 northwest of Bakersville, on the Bakersville and Williamsport 
 road, and General Couch to establish his division near Downs- 
 ville, leaving sufficient force at Williamsport to watch and 
 guard the ford at that place. The fact of the enemy remain- 
 ing so long in our front, and the indications of an advatice of 
 reinforcements, seem to indicate that he will give us another 
 battle with all his available force. 
 
 As I mentioned to you before, our army has been very 
 much reduced by casualties in the recent battles, and in my 
 judgment all the reinforcements of old troops that can pos- 
 sibly be dispensed with around Washington and other places, 
 should be instantly pushed forward by rail to this army. A 
 
404 FOUKTH PERIOD. 
 
 defeat at this juucture would be ruinous to our cause. I can- 
 not think it possible that the enemy will bring any forces to 
 bear upon Washington till after the question is decided here, 
 but if they should, troops can soon be sent back from this 
 army by rail to reinforce the garrison there. 
 
 The evidence that I have that reinforcements are coming to 
 the rebel army, consists in the facts, that long columns of dust 
 extending from Winchester to Charlestown, and from Charles- 
 town in this direction, and also troops moving this way, were 
 seen last evening. This is corroborated by citizens. General 
 Sumner, with his corps and Williams's, (Banks's), occupies 
 Harper's Ferry, and the surrounding heights. I think he will 
 be able to hold his position until reinforcements arrive. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 ^ Major-Geueral. 
 
 On the 27th I made the following report : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Sept. 27, 1862. 10 a.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gex. Halleck, 
 
 General-in- Chief, Washington, — 
 All the information in my possession, goes to prove that 
 the main body of the enemy is concentrated not far from 
 Martinsburg, with some troops at Charlestown, not many in 
 Winchester. Their movements of late, have been an extension 
 towards our right, and beyond it. They are receiving re- 
 inforcements in Winchester, mainly, I think, of conscripts, 
 perhaps entirely so. 
 
 This army is not now in condition to undertake another 
 campaign, nor to bring on another battle, unless great ad- 
 vantages are offered by some mistake of the enemy, or press- 
 ing military exigencies render it necessary. We are greatly 
 deficient in officers. Many of the old regiments are reduced 
 to mere skeletons ; the new regiments need instruction. Not 
 a day should be lost in filling the old regiments — our main 
 dependence ; and in supplying vacancies among the officers by 
 promotion. 
 
 My present purpose is to hold the army about as it is now, 
 rendering Harper's Ferry secure, and watching the river close- 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 405 
 
 ly, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross 
 to this side. 
 
 Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives ns the great advan- 
 toge of a secure debouche, but we cannot avail ourselves of it 
 until the railroad bridge is finished, because we cannot other- 
 wise supply a greater number of troops than we now have 
 on the Virginia side at that point. When the river rises so 
 that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating 
 the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry, and there acting 
 according to circumstances, viz. : moving on Winchester, if, 
 from the position and attitude of the enemy, we are likely to 
 o-ain a oreat advantage by doing so, or else devoting a reason- 
 able time to the organization of the army and instruction of 
 the new troops, preparatory to an advance on whatever line 
 may be determined. In any event, I regard it as absolutely 
 necessary to send new regiments at once to the old corps for 
 purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments be filled at 
 once. I have no fears as to an attack on Washington by the 
 line of Manassas. Holding Harper's Ferry as I do, they will 
 not run the risk of an attack on their flank and rear, while 
 they have the garrison of Washington in their front. 
 
 I rather apprehend a ren%wal of the attempt on Maryland, 
 should the river remain Ioav for a great length of time, and 
 should they receive considerable addition to their force. 
 
 I would be glad to have Peck's division as soon as possible. 
 I am surprised that Sigel's men should have been sent to 
 Western Virginia without my knowledge. The last I heard 
 from you on the subject, was, that they were at my disposition. 
 In the last battles, the enemy was undoubtedly greatly superior 
 to us in number, and it was only by very hard fighting, that 
 we gained the advantages we did. As it was, the result was 
 at one period very doubtful, and Ave had all we could do to 
 win the day. If the enemy receives considerable reinforce- 
 ments, and we none, it is possible that I may have too much 
 on my hands in the next battle. 
 
 My own view of the proper policy to be pursued is, to re- 
 tain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, 
 and to send everything else available to reinforce this ai-my. 
 The railways give us the means of promptly reinforcing Wash- 
 
406 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 iijgton, should it become necessary. If I am reinforced as I 
 ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold my- 
 self responsible for the safety of Washington. Several per- 
 sons, recently from Richmond, say that there are no troops 
 there except conscripts, and they few in number. 
 
 I hope to be able to give you details as to late battles by 
 this evening. I am about starting again for Harper's Ferry 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 REORGANIZATION AND SUPPLIES. 
 
 The work of reorganizing, drilling, and supplying the army 
 I began at the earliest moment. The different corps were 
 stationed along the river in the best positions to cover and 
 guard the fords. The great extent of the river front, from 
 near Washington to Cumberland, (some one hundred and fifty 
 miles,) together with the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
 road, was to be carefully watched and guarded, to prevent, if 
 possible, the enemy's raids. Reconnoissances upon the Vir- 
 ginia side of the river, for the purpose of learning the enemy's 
 positions and movements, were m^de frequently, so that our 
 cavalry, which, from the time we left Washington, had per- 
 formed the most laborious service, and had from the com 
 mencement been deficient in numbers, was found totally inad- 
 equate to the requirements of the army. 
 
 This overwork had broken down the greater part of the 
 horses, disease had appeared among them, and but a very 
 small portion of our original cavalry force was fit for service. 
 
 To such an extent had this arm become reduced, that when 
 Gen. Stuart made his raid into Pennsylvania on the 11th of 
 October with 2,000 men, I could only mount 800 men to fol- 
 low him. 
 
 Harper's Ferry was occupied on the 22d, and in order to 
 prevent a catastrophe similar to the one which had happened 
 to Col. Miles, I immediately ordered Maryland, Bolivar, and 
 Loudon Heights to be strongly fortified. This was done as 
 far as the time and means at our disposal permitted. 
 
 The main army of the enemy during this time remained in 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 407 
 
 the vicinity of Mavtinsburg and Bunker Hill, and occupied 
 itself in drafting and coercing every able-bodied citizen into 
 the ranks, forcibly taking their property where it was not 
 voluntarily oftered, burning bridges, and destroying railroads. 
 
 On the first day of October, his Excellency the President, 
 honored the army of the Potomac with a visit, and remained 
 several days, during which he went through the difi:erent en- 
 campments, reviewed the troops, and went over the battle- 
 fields of South Mountain and Antietara. I had the oppor- 
 tunity during this visit to describe to him the operations of 
 the army since the time it left Washington, and gave him 
 my reasons for not following the enemy after he crossed the 
 Potomac. 
 
 On the 5th of October the division of General Cox (about 
 5,000 men,) was ordered from my command to Western Vir- 
 ginia. 
 
 On the 7th of October I received the following telegram : 
 
 Washington, D. C, Oct. 6, 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. McClellan, — 
 
 I am instructed to telegraph you as follows : The President 
 directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the 
 enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now, 
 while the roads are good. If you cross the river between the 
 enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your opera- 
 tions, you can be reinforced with 30,000 men. If you move up 
 the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 
 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior fine 
 between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. 
 He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. 
 You will immediately report what line you adopt, and when 
 you intend to cross the river. Also, to what point the rein- 
 forcements are to be sent. It is necessary that the plan of 
 your operations be positively determined on before orders 
 are given for building bridges and repairing railroads. I am 
 directed to add, that the Secretary of War and the General- 
 in-chief fully concur with the President in these instructions. 
 , H. W. Hali.eck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
408 FOURTH PERIOD. , 
 
 At this time General Averill, with the greater part of our 
 efficient cavahy, was in the vicinity of Cumberland, and Gen- 
 eral Kelly, the commanding officer, had that day reported that 
 a large force of the enemy was advancing on Colonel Camp- 
 bell at St. John's Run. This obliged me to order General 
 Averill to proceed with his force to the support of Colonel 
 Campbell, which delayed his return to the army for several 
 days. 
 
 On the 10th of October Stuart crossed the river at McCoy's 
 Ferry, Avith 2,000 cavalry and a battery of horse artillery, on 
 his raid into Maryland and Pennsylvania, making it necessary 
 to use all our cavalry against him. This exhausting service 
 completely broke down nearly all of our cavalry horses, and 
 rendered a remount absolutely indispensable, before we could 
 advance on the enemy. 
 
 The following were the dispositions of troops made by me 
 to defeat the purposes of this raid. 
 
 General Averill, then at Green Spring, on the Upper Poto- 
 mac, was ordered to move rapidly down upon the north side 
 of the river, with all his disposable cavalry, using every exer- 
 tion to get upon the trail of the enemy and follow it up vigor- 
 ously. 
 
 General Pleasanton, with the remaining cavalry force, was 
 ordered to take the road by Cavetown, Harmon's Gap, and 
 Mechanicsville, and cut off the retreat of the enemy, should 
 he make for any of the fords below the position of the main 
 army. His orders were to pursue them with the utmost 
 rapidity, not to spare his men or liorses, and to destroy or 
 capture them if possible. 
 
 General Crook, at that time commanding Cox's division at 
 Hancock, en route for Western Virginia, was ordered to halt, 
 place his men in cars, and remain in readiness to move to any 
 point above, should the enemy return in that direction, keep- 
 ing his scouts well out on all the roads leading from the direc- 
 tion of Chambersburg to the Upper Potomac. 
 
 The other commanders between Hancock and Harper's 
 Ferry were instructed to keep a vigilant watch upon all the 
 roads and fords, so as to prevent the escape of tbe rel-els 
 within these limits. 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 409 
 
 General Burnsicle was ordered to send two brigades to the 
 Monocacy crossing, there to remain in cars, with steam up, 
 ready to move to any point on the raih-oad to which Stuart 
 might be aiming. While Colonel Rush, at Frederick, was di- 
 rected to keep his lancers scouting on the approaches from 
 Chambersburg, so as to give timely notice to the commander 
 of the two brigades at the Monocacy crossing. 
 
 General Stoneman, whose head-quarters were then at Pooles- 
 ville, occupying with his division the different fords on the 
 river below the mouth of the Monocacy, was directed to keep 
 his cavalry well out on the approaches from the direction of 
 Frederick, so as to give him time to mass his troops at any 
 point where the enemy might attempt to cross the Potomac 
 in his vicinity. He was informed of General Pleasanton's 
 movements. 
 
 After the orders were given for covering all the fords upon 
 the river, I did not think it possible for Stuart to recross, and 
 I believed that the capture or destruction of his entire force 
 was perfectly certain, but owing to the fact that my orders 
 were not in all cases carried out as I expected, he effected his 
 escape into Virginia without much loss. 
 
 The troops sent by General Burnside to the Monocacy, 
 owing to some neglect in not giving the necessary orders to 
 the commander, instead of remaining at the railroad crossing 
 as I directed, marched four miles into Frederick, and there re- 
 mained until after Stuart had passed the raih-oad only six 
 miles below, near which point it was said he halted for break- 
 fast. 
 
 General Pleasanton ascertained after his arrival at Mechan- 
 icstown that the enemy were only about an hour ahead of him, 
 beating a hasty retreat towards the mouth of the Monocacy. 
 He pushed on vigorously, and near to its mouth overtook them 
 with a part of his force, having marched seventy-eight miles 
 in twenty-four hours, and having left many of his horses broken 
 down upon the road. He at once attacked with his artillery, 
 and the firing continued for several hours, during which time, 
 he states that he received the support of a small portion of 
 General Stoneman's command, not sufficient to inflict any ma- 
 terial damage upon the enemy. 
 
 I 
 
410 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 General Stoneman reports, that in accordance with his in- 
 structions, he gave all necessary orders for intercepting the 
 return of the rebels, and Colonel Staples commanding one of 
 his brigades, states that he sent two regiments of infantry to 
 the mouth of the Monocacy,* and one regiment to White's 
 Ford. That On the morning of the 12th, about 10 o'clock he, 
 by General Stoneraan's order, marched the remaining three 
 regiments of his command from Poolesville towards the mouth 
 of the Monocacy ; that before getting into action, he was re- 
 lieved by General Ward, who states that he reported to Gene- 
 ral Pleasanton with his command while the enemy was crossing 
 the river, and was informed by him (General Pleasanton) that 
 he was too late, and that nothing could be done then. 
 
 General Pleasanton in his report of this affair says : 
 
 " It was at this time that Colonel Ward reported to me fi-om 
 General Stoneman's division, with a brigade of infantry, a 
 regiment of cavalry, and a section of artillery. I told him that 
 his command could be of no use, as the enemy had then crossed 
 the river. These are the only troops that I knew of, that were 
 in that vicinity, and this was the first intimation that I re- 
 ceived that any troops were endeavoring to assist me in cap- 
 turing the rebels. I succeeded in preventing the enemy from 
 crossing at the mouth of the Monocacy, and drove him to 
 White's Ford, three miles below. Had White's Ford been 
 occupied by any force of ours previous to the time of the oc- 
 cupation by the enemy, the capture of Stuart's whole force 
 would have been certain and inevitable ; but with my small 
 force, which did not exceed one-fourth of the enemy's, it Avas 
 not i^racticable for me to occupy that ford, while the enemy 
 was in front." 
 
 It would seem from the report of General Stoneman that the 
 disposition he made of his troops previous to the arrival of 
 Stuart, was a good one. He stationed two regiments at the 
 mouth of the Monocacy, and two regiments at White's Ford, 
 the latter in the very place where the crossing was made, and 
 the former only three miles off, with a reserve of three regi- 
 ments at Poolesville, some six miles distant. General Pleasan- 
 ton's report shows that from the time the firing commenced, 
 imtil the enemy were across the river was about four and a-half 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 411 
 
 hours. General Stoneman states that he started the reserve 
 from Poolesville at about nine o'clock ; but it appears from 
 the report of General Pleasanton, that it did not reach him 
 till half-past one. 
 
 At the time I received the (fi'der of October 6th, to cross 
 the river and attack the enemy, the army vi^as wholly deficient 
 in cavalry, and a large part of our troops were in want of 
 shoes, blankets, and other indispensable articles of clothing, 
 notwithstanding all the efibrts that had been made since the 
 battle of Antietam, and even prior to that date, to refit the 
 army with clothing as well as horses. I at once consulted 
 with Colonel Ingalls, the chief quarter-master, who believed 
 that the necessary articles coitld be supplied in about three 
 days. Orders were immediately issued to tlie difierent com- 
 manders who had not already sent in their requisitions, to do 
 80 at once, and all the necessary steps were forthwith taken by 
 me to ensui-e a prompt delivery of the supplies. The requisi- 
 tions were forwarded to the jjroper department at Washing- 
 ton, and I expected that the articles would reach our depots 
 during the three days specified ; but day after day elapsed, 
 and only a small portion of the clothing arrived. Corps com- 
 manders upon receiving notice fi'om the quarter-masters, that 
 they might expect to receive their supplies at certain dates 
 sent their trains for them, which after waiting were compelled 
 to return empty. Several instances occurred where these 
 trains went back and forth, from the camp to the depots, as 
 often as four or five different times, without receiving their 
 supplies ; and I was informed by one corps commander, that 
 his wagon train had traveled over 150 miles, to and from the 
 depots, before he succeeded in obtaining his clothing. 
 
 The corps of General Franklin did not get its clothing until 
 after it had crossed the Potomac, and was moving into Vir- 
 ginia. 
 
 General Reynolds's corps was delayed a day at Berlin to 
 complete its sup[)lies, and General Portei" only completed his 
 on reaching the vicinity of Harper's Feny. 
 
 I made every exertion in my jjower, and my quarter-master 
 did the same, to have these supplies hurried forward rapidly, 
 and I was repeatedly told that they had filled tlie requisitions 
 
412 FOURTH PEBIOD. 
 
 at Washington, and that the supplies had been forwarded. 
 But they did not come to us, and of course were inaccessible 
 to the army. I did not fail to make frequent representations 
 of this condition of things to the General-in-chief, and it appears 
 that he referred the matter to the quarter-master-general, wlio 
 constantly replied, that the supplies had been promptly 
 ordered ; notwithstanding this they did not reach our depots. 
 The following extracts are fi-om telegrams upon this sub- 
 ject: 
 
 Head-Quarters, Armt of the Potomac, 
 ' October 11, 1862. 9 a.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. H allege, 
 
 General-in- Chief, Washington, 
 
 ******* 
 
 " We have been making every effort to get supplies of 
 clothing for this army, and Colonel Ingalls has received advices 
 that it has been forwarded by railroad, but owing to bad man- 
 agement on the roads, or from some other cause, it comes in 
 very slowly, and it will take a much longer time than was an- 
 ticipated to get articles that are absolutely indispensable to the 
 army, unless the railroad managers forward supplies more 
 rapidly." 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General, 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 October 11, 1862. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Commander-in- Chief, Washi7igton. 
 " I am compelled again to call your attention to the great 
 deficiency of shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing 
 that still exist in some of the corps of this ai'my. Upon the 
 assurances of the chief quarter-master, who based his calcula- 
 tions upon information received from Washington, that cloth- 
 ing would be forwarded at certain times, corps commanders 
 sent their wagons to Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry for it. 
 It did not arrive as promised, and has not yet arrived. Unless 
 some measures are taken to insure the prompt forwarding of 
 these supplies there will necessarily be a corresponding delay 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 413 
 
 in getting the array ready to move, as the men cannot march 
 without shoes. 
 
 " Every thing has been done that can be done at these head- 
 quarters, to accompUsh the desired results." 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 October 15, 1 p.m., 1862. 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 Generalrin- Chief. 
 
 ******* 
 
 " 1 am using every possible exertion to get this army ready 
 to move. It M^as only yesterday that a part of our shoes and 
 clothing arrived at Hagerstown. It is being issued to the 
 troops as rapidly as possible." 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 October 15, 1862. 7.30 p.m. 
 Col. R. Ingalls, 
 Care Col. Rucker, 
 
 Quarter- Master, Washiugton. 
 " General Franklin reports that there is by no means as 
 much clothing as was called foi-, at Hagerstown. I think, 
 therefore, you had better have additional supplies, especially 
 of shoes, forwarded to Harper's Ferry as soon as possible." 
 
 R. B. Marcy, 
 
 Chief of Staff. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 October 16, 1862. 
 
 Col. R. Ingalls, 
 
 Care Col. Rucker, 
 
 Quartej'-3Iaster, Washington. 
 
 General J. F. Reynolds just telegraphs as follows : " My 
 quarter-master reports that there are no shoes, tents, blankets, 
 or knapsacks, at Hagerstown. He was able to procure only a 
 complete supply of overcoats and pants, with a few socks, 
 
414 FOURTH PERIOD, 
 
 drawers, and coats. This leaves many of the men yet with- 
 out a shoe. My requisitions call for 5,255 pairs of shoes." 
 
 Please push the shoes and stockings up to Harper's Ferry 
 as fast as possible. 
 
 R. B. Marcy, 
 
 Chief of Staff. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp near Knoxville, Md., October 9, 1862. 
 
 CoL. C. G. Sawtelle, 
 
 Depot Quarter-Master^ 'Washington. 
 
 You did right in sending clothing to Harper's Ferry. You 
 will not be able to send too much or too quickly. We want 
 blankets, shoes, canteens, &c., very much. 
 
 RuFus Ingalls, 
 Lt.-CoL & A. D. C, Chief Qr.-Master, 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Camp near Knoxville, Md., Oct. 10, 1862. 
 
 Capt. Augustus Botd, 
 
 Quarter- blaster, Philadelphia, — 
 Shipments to Hagerstown must be made direct through, 
 to avoid the contemptible delays at Harrisburg. If Col. Cross- 
 man was ordered to send clothing, I hope he has sent it, for 
 the suffering and imjjatience are excessive. 
 
 ***** 
 
 RuFus Ingalls, 
 Lt.-Col. and A. D. C, Chief Quarter-Master. 
 
 Head-Quarters Army op the Potomac. 
 Camp near Knoxville, Oct. 13, 1862. 
 Capt. Geo. H. Weeks, 
 
 Depot Quarter- Master, Jlagerstoicn, — 
 
 Has the clothing arrived yet ? if not, do you know where 
 it is ? What clothing was taken by the rebels at Chambers- 
 burg ? Did they capture any property that was en route to 
 you? Have we not got clothing at Harrisburg? Send an 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 415 
 
 agent over the road to obtain information, and hurry up the 
 supjDhes. Reply at once. 
 
 RuFus Ingalls, 
 
 Lt.-Col. and A. D. C, Chief Quarter-Master. 
 
 ShaepsburCt, Oct. 15, 1862. 
 General Ingalls, 
 
 I have just returned from Hagerstown, where I have been 
 for the clothing for this corps. There was nothing there but 
 overcoats, trowsers, and a few uniform coats and socks. There 
 were not any shoes, blankets, shirts or shelter tents. Will 
 you please tell me where and when the balance can be had ? 
 Shall I send to Harper's Ferry for them to-morrow? The 
 corps surgeon has just made a requisition for 45 hospital tents. 
 There are none at Hagerstown. 
 
 Will you please to inform me if I can get them at Harper's 
 Ferry ? 
 
 Fielding Lowkt, 
 Captaia and Quarter-AIaster. 
 
 Colonel Ingalls, Hagerstown, Oct. 15, 1862. 
 
 Quarter-Master^ — 
 I want at least ten thousand (10,000) suits of clothing, in 
 addition to what I have received. It should be here now. 
 
 G. W. Weeks, 
 Acting Quarter-Master. 
 
 General Ingalls, Harper's Ferry, Oct. 22, 1862. 
 
 Chief Quarter- Master^ dc, — 
 We have bootees 12,000 ; great coats 4,000 ; drawers and 
 shirts are gone; blankets and stockings nearly so. 15,000 
 each of these four articles are wanted. 
 
 Alexander Bliss, 
 Captain and Acting Quarter-Master. 
 
 McClellan's Head-Quarters, Oct. 24, 11 a.m., 1862. 
 Capt. D. G. Thomas, 
 
 Military Store-Jceeper^ Washington, — 
 
 Please send to Captain Bliss, at Harper's Ferry, 
 
 10,000 blankets. 
 12,000 caps. 
 
416 FOUETH PERIOD. 
 
 5,000 overcoats. 
 10,000 pairs bootees. 
 
 2,000 pairs artillery and cavalry boots. 
 15,000 pairs stockings. 
 15,000 pairs drawers. 
 15,000 pairs pants. 
 
 The clothing arrives slowly ; can it not be hurried along 
 faster. May I ask you to obtain authority for this shipment. 
 
 RuFus Ingalls, 
 Lt.-Co]. and A. D. C, Chief Qt.-Master. 
 
 Haoerstown, Oct. 30. 
 Colonel Ingalls, 
 
 Clothing has arrived this morning. None taken by rebels. 
 Shall I supply Franklin, and retain portions for Porter and 
 Reynolds until called for. 
 
 G. W. Wkeks, 
 Captain and Ass't. Qt.-Master. 
 
 The following statement, taken from a report of the chief 
 quarter-master with the army, will show Avhat progress was 
 made in supplying the army with clothing, from the 1st of 
 September, to the date of ci'ossing the Potomac on the 31st of 
 October, and that the greater part of the clothing did not 
 reach our depots, until after the 15th of October. 
 
 [See opposite page.^ 
 
 Colonel Ingalls, chief quarter-master, in his report upon this 
 subject, says : 
 
 " There was great delay in receiving our clothing. The 
 orders were promptly given by me and approved by General 
 Meigs, but the roads were slow to transport, particularly the 
 Cumberland Valley road. 
 
 "For instance, clothing ordered to Hagerstown on the Vth 
 October for the corps of Franklin, Porter and Reynolds, did 
 not arrive there until about the 18th, and by that time, of 
 course there were increased wants, and changes in the position 
 of troops. 
 
 " The clothins: of Sumner arrived in cjreat Quantities near 
 
OPERATIONS APTER ANTIETAM 
 
 417 
 
 ^ 
 
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 25th 
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 3S1--!? 
 
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418 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 the last of October, almost too late for issue, as the army was 
 crossing into Virginia. 
 
 " We finally left 50,000 suits at Harpers' Ferry, partly on 
 the cars just arrived^ and jjartly in store." 
 
 The causes of the reduction of our cavalry force have already 
 been recited. The difficulty in getting new supplies from the 
 usual sources led me to apply for and obtain authority for 
 the cavalry and artillery officers to purchase their own horses. 
 The following are the telegrams and letters on this subject : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 October, 12, 18f52*. 12.45 P.M. 
 MAJOR-GENERAIi HaLLECK, 
 
 General-in- Chief, — 
 It is absolutely necessary that some energetic means be 
 taken to supply the cavalry of this army with remount horses. 
 The present rate of supply is (1050) ten hundred and fifty per 
 week, for the entire army here and in front of Washington. 
 From this number the artillery draw for their batteries. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 MaJ.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 The general-in-chief, in a letter to me, dated " Washing- 
 ton, D. C, Oct. 14th, 1862," replies to this dispatch in the 
 following language : 
 
 " I have caused the matters complained of in your telegrams 
 
 of the 11th and 12th to be investigated." 
 
 ******* 
 
 " In regard to horses, you say that the present rate of sup- 
 ply is only (150) per Aveek for the entire army here and in 
 front of Washington. I find from the records that the issues 
 for the last six Aveeks has been 8,754, making an average per 
 week of 1459." 
 
 One thousand and fifty (1050) is the number stated in the 
 original dispatch noAV in my possession, and as not only 
 figures were used, but the number Avas written out in full, I 
 can hardly see how it is possible for the telegraphic operator 
 to have made a mistake in the transmission of the message. 
 
operations after antietam. 419 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 October 14, 1862. 7 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gex. H. W. IIalleck, 
 Goratnander-in- Chiefs — 
 ******* 
 
 With my small cavalry force it is impossible for me to 
 watch the line of the Potomac properly, or even make tlie 
 reconnoissances that are necessary for our movements. This 
 makes it necessary for me to weaken my line very much, by 
 extending the infantry to guard the innumerable fords. This 
 will continue until the river rises, and it will be next to im- 
 possible to prevent the Vebel cavalry raids. My cavalry force, 
 as I urged this morning, should be largely and immediately 
 increased under any hypotliesis, whether to guard the river 
 or advance on the enemy, or both. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General. 
 
 The following is an extract from the official report of Colo- 
 nel Ingalls : 
 
 " Immediately after the battle of Antietam, efforts were 
 made to supply deficiencies in clothing and horses. 
 
 " Large requisitions were prepared and sent in. The artil- 
 lery and cavalry required large numbers to cover losses sus- 
 tained in battle, on the march, and by diseases. Both of 
 these arms were deficient when they left Washington. 
 
 " A most violent and destructive disease made its appear- 
 ance at this time, which put nearly 4,000 animals out of ser- 
 vice. Horses reported perfectly well one day, would be dead 
 lame the next, and it was difficult to foresee where it would 
 end or what number would cover the loss. They were attacked 
 in the hoof and tongue. No one seemed able to account 
 for the appearance of this disease. Animals kept at rest 
 would recover in time, but could not be xoorked. I made 
 application to send West and purchase horses at once, but it 
 was refused on the ground that the outstanding contracts pro- 
 vided for enough ; lut they ivere not delivered sufficiently 
 fast, nor in sufficient numbers, until late in October and early 
 in November. I v/as authorised to buy 2,500 late in October, 
 
420 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 but the delivery was not completed until late in November, 
 after we had reached Warrenton." 
 
 In a letter from General Meigs, written on the 14th of Oc- 
 tober, and addressed to the general-iu-chief, it is stated, 
 " There have been issued, therefore, to the army of the Poto- 
 mac, since the battles in front of Washington, to replace losses, 
 (9,254) nine thousand two hundred and fifty-four horses." 
 
 What number of horses were sent to General Pope before 
 his return to Washington, I have no means of determining, 
 but the following statements, made upon my order by the 
 chief quarter-master with the army, and who had means for 
 gaining accurate information, forces upon my mind the con- 
 clusion that the quarter-master-general was in error : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Chief-Quarter-Master's Office, Oct. 31, 1862. 
 
 nOBSES. 
 
 Horses purchased since Gth Sept. 1362, by Col. Ingalls, Chief Quarter- 
 master, and issued to the forces under the immediate command of 
 Major-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan . . . . .1,200 
 
 Issued and turned over to the above force by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assis- 
 tant Quarter-master (in "Washington) .... 2,261 
 
 Issued to forces at and near "U'ashington, which have since joined 
 this command ....... 352 
 
 Total purchased by Col. Ingalls, and issued and turned over by Capt. 
 
 Dana to the forces in this immediate command . . . 3,813 
 
 Issued by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarter-master, to the forces in 
 
 the vicinity of Washington ..... 3,363 
 
 Grand total purchased by Col. R. Ingalls, Chief Quarter-master, and 
 issued and turned over by Capt. J. J. Dana, Assistant Quarter-mas- 
 ter, to the entire army of the Potomac and the forces around 
 Washington . . . . . . .7,176 
 
 About 3,000 horses have been turned over to the quarter-mas- 
 ter department by officers, as unfit for service. Nearly 1,.500 
 should now be turned over also, being worn out and diseased. 
 
 Respectfully submitted, 
 
 Fred. Myers, 
 
 Lt. -Colonel & Quarter-master, 
 
 This oflficial statement made up from the reports of the 
 quarter-masters who received and distributed the horses, ex- 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 421 
 
 hibits the true state of the case, and gives the total number 
 of horses received by the army of the Potomac and the troops 
 around Washington, during a period of eight weeks, as (7,176) 
 seven thousand one hundred and seventy-six, or (2,078) two 
 thousand and seventy-eight less than the number stated by 
 the quarter-mastei'-general. 
 
 Supposing that (1,500) fifteen hundred were issued to the 
 army under General Pope previous to its return to Washing- 
 ton, as General Meigs states, there would still remain (578) 
 five hundred and seventy-eight horses which he does not ac- 
 count for. 
 
 The letter of the general-in-chief to the Secretary of War, on 
 the 28th of October, and the letter of General Meigs to the 
 general-in-chief on the 14th of October, convey the impression 
 that, upon my urgent and repeated applications for cavalry 
 and artillery horses for the army of the Potomac, I had re- 
 ceived a much greater number than was really the case. 
 
 It will be seen from Colonel Myers's report, that of all the 
 horses alluded to by General Meigs, only (3,813) three thou- 
 sand eight hundred and thirteen came to the army with which 
 I was ordered to follow and attack the enemy. Of course the 
 remainder did not in the slightest degree contribute to the 
 efficiency of the cavalry or artillery of this army, with which I 
 was to cross the river, neither did they in the least facilitate 
 any preparations for carrying out the order to advance upon the 
 enemy, as the general-in-chief 's letter might seem to imply. 
 
 During the same period that we were receiving the horses 
 alluded to, about (3,000) three thousand of our old stock were 
 turned into the quarter-master's department, and 1,500 more 
 reported as in such condition that they ought to be turned in 
 as unfit for service, thus leaving the active army some 700 
 short of the number required to make good existing defi- 
 ciencies, to say nothing of providing remounts for men whose 
 horses had died or been killed during the campaign, and those 
 previously dismounted. 
 
 Notwithstanding all the efibrts made to obtain a remount, 
 there Avere, after deducting the force engaged in picketing the 
 river, but about a thousand serviceable cavalry horses on the 
 21st day of October. 
 
422 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 In a letter, dated October 14th, 1802, the general-iu-chief 
 says : " It is also reported to me that the number of animals 
 with yom- army in the field is about 31,000. It is believed 
 that your present proportion of cavalry and of animals is 
 much larger than that of any other of our armies." 
 
 What number of animals our other armies had I am not 
 prepared to say, but military men in European armies have 
 been of the opinion that an army to be efficient, while carrying 
 on active operations in the field, should have a cavalry force 
 equal in numbers to from one-sixth to one-fourth of the in- 
 fantry force. My cavalry did not amount to one-twentieth 
 part of the army, and hence the necessity of giving every one 
 of my cavalry soldiers a serviceable horse. 
 
 Cavalry may be said to constitute the antennoe of an army. 
 It scouts all the roads in front, on the flanks, and in rear of 
 the advancing columns, and constantly feels the enemy. The 
 amount of labor falling upon this arm during the Maryland 
 campaign was excessive. To persons not familiar with the 
 movements of troops, and the amount of transportation re- 
 quired for a large army marching away from water or railroad 
 communications, the number of animals mentioned by the 
 general-in-chief may have appeared unnecessarily large, but 
 to a military man who takes the trouble to enter into an accu- 
 rate and detailed computation of the number of pounds of 
 subsistence and forage required for such an army as that of the 
 Potomac, it will be seen that the 31,000 animals were consider- 
 ably less than was absolutely necessary to an advance. As we 
 were required to move through a country which could not be 
 depended upon for any of our sup2:)lies, it became necessary to 
 transport every thing in wagons, and to be prepared for all 
 emergencies. I did not consider it safe to leave the river with- 
 out subsistence and forage for ten days. 
 
 The oflicial returns of that date show the aggregate strength 
 of the army for duty to have been about 110,000 men of all 
 arms. This did not include teamsters, citizen employees, ofii- 
 cers' servants, &c., amounting to some 12,000 men, which 
 gives a total of 122,000 men. The subsistence alone of this 
 army for ten days required for its transportation 1,830 wagons 
 at 2,000 pounds to the wagon, and 10,980 animals. 
 
OPEBATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 423 
 
 Our cavalry horses, at that time, amounted to 5,046, and 
 cm- artillery horses to 6,836. 
 
 To trans^jort full forage for these 22,862 animals for ten 
 days required 17,832 additional animals, and this forage would 
 only supply the entire number (40,694) of animals with a small 
 fraction over half allowance for the time specified. 
 
 It will be observed that this estimate does not embrace the 
 animals necessary to transport quarter-master's supplies, bag- 
 gage, camp equipage, ambulances, reserve ammunition, forage 
 for oflScers' horses, etc., etc., which would greatly augment 
 the necessary transportation. 
 
 It may very truly be said that we did make the march with 
 the means at our disposal, but it will be remembered that we 
 met with no serious opposition from the enemy, neither did 
 we encounter delays from any other cause. The roads were 
 in excellent condition, and the troops marched with the most 
 commendable order and celerity. 
 
 If we had met with a determined resistance from the enemy, 
 and our progress had been very much retarded thereby, we 
 would have consumed our supplies before they could have 
 been renewed. A proper estimate of my responsibilities as 
 the commander of that army did not justify me in basing my 
 prej^arations for the expedition upon the supposition that I 
 was to have an uninterrupted march. On the contrary, it was 
 my duty to be prepared for all emergencies, and not the least 
 important of my responsibilities was the duty of making ample 
 provision for supplying my men and animals with rations and 
 forage. 
 
 Knowing the solicitude of the President for an early move- 
 ment, and sharing with him fully his anxiety for prompt 
 action, on the 21st of October I telegraphed to the General-in- 
 chief as follows : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 October 21, 1862. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in- Chiefs Washinr/ton, — 
 Since the receipt of the President's order to move on the 
 enemy, I have been making every exertion to get this army 
 
424 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 supplied with clothing absolutely necessary for marching. 
 This, I am happy to say, is now nearly accomplished ; I have 
 also during the same time repeatedly urged upon you the im- 
 jjortance of supplying cavalry and artillery horses, to replace 
 those broken down by hard service, and steps have been taken 
 to insure a prompt delivery. Our cavalry even when well 
 suj^plied with horses, is much inferior in numbers to that of 
 the enemy ; but in efficiency has proved itself superior. So 
 forcibly has this been impressed upon our old regiments by 
 repeated successes, that the men are fully persuaded that they 
 are equal to twice their number of rebel cavalry. 
 
 Exclusive of the cavalry force now engaged in picketing the 
 river, I have not at present over about (lOOO) one thousand 
 horses for service. Officers have been sent in various direc- 
 tions to purchase horses, and I expect them soon. Without 
 more cavalry horses our communications, from the moment we 
 march, would be at the mercy of the large cavahy forces of 
 the enemy, and it would not be possible for us to cover our 
 flanks properly, or to obtain the necessary information of the 
 position and movements of the enemy in such a way as to in- 
 sure success. My experience has shown the necessity of a 
 large and efficient cavalry force. Under the foregoing circum- 
 stances I beg leave to ask whether the President desires me to 
 march on the enemy at once, or to await the reception of the 
 new horses, every possible step haviug been taken to insure 
 their prompt arrival. 
 
 G. B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. Comd'g. 
 
 On the same day General Halleck replied as follows ; 
 
 Washington, Oct. 21, 1862. 3 p.m. 
 Your telegraph of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. 
 He directs me to say, that he has no change to make in his 
 order of the 6th inst. If you have not been, and are not now 
 in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of 
 ability. The President does not expect impossibilities ; but 
 he is very anxious that all this good weather should not be 
 wasted in inactivity. 
 
OPERATIONS AFTER ANTIETAM. 425 
 
 Telegraph when you will move, and on what lines yon pro- 
 pose to march. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan. 
 
 From the tenor of this dispatch I conceived that it was left 
 for my judgment to decide whether or not it was possible to 
 move with safety to the army at that time, and this responsi- 
 bility I exercised with the more confidence in view of the 
 strong assurances of his trust in me as commander of that army, 
 with which the President had seen fit to honor me during his 
 last visit. 
 
 The cavalry requirements without which an advance would 
 have been in the highest degree injudicious and unsafe, were 
 still wanting. 
 
 The country before us was an enemy's country, Avhere the 
 inhabitants furnished to the enemy every possible assistance, 
 providing food for men and forage for animals, giving all in- 
 formation concerning our movements, and rendering every aid 
 in their power to the enemy's cause. 
 
 It was manifest that we should find it, as we subsequently 
 did, a hostile district, where we could derive no aid from the 
 inhabitants that would justify dispensing with the active co- 
 operation of an efficient cavalry force. Accordingly, I fixed 
 upon the 1st of November as the earliest date at which the 
 forward movement could well be commenced. 
 
 The general-in-chief, in a letter to the Secretary of War on 
 the 28th of October, says : " In my opinion there has been no 
 such want of supplies in the army under General McClellan, as 
 to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against 
 the enemy." 
 
 Notwithstanding this opinion expressed by such high author- 
 ity, I am compelled to say again that the delay in the recep- 
 tion of necessary supplies up to that date, had left the army in 
 a condition totally unfit to advance against the enemy; that 
 an advance under the existing circumstances would, in my 
 judgment, have been attended with the highest degree of peril, 
 with great suffering and sickness among the men, and with 
 
426 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 imminent dangei- of being cut off from our supplies by the 
 superior cavalry force of the enemy, and with no reasonable 
 jjrospect of gaining any advantage over him. 
 
 I dismiss this subject with the remark, that I have found it 
 impossible to resist the force of my own convictions, that the 
 commander of an army, who, from the time of its organization, 
 has for eighteen mouths been in constant communication with 
 its officers and men, the greater part of the time engaged in 
 active service in the field, and who has exercised this command 
 in many battles, must certainly be considered competent to 
 determine whether his army is in proper condition to advance 
 on the enemy or not ; and he must necessarily possess greater 
 facilities for forming a correct judgment in regard to the Avants 
 of his men, and the condition of his supplies, than the General- 
 in-chief in his office at Washington City. 
 
 ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA. 
 
 The movement from Washington into Maryland, which cul- 
 minated in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam, was 
 not a part of an offensive campaign, with the object of the 
 invasion of the enemy's territory, and an attack upon his capi- 
 tal, but was defensive in its purposes, although offensive in its 
 character, and would be technically called a " defensive-offen- 
 sive" campaign. 
 
 It was undertaken at a time when our army had experienced 
 severe defeats, and its object was to preserve the national cap- 
 ital and Baltimore, to protect Pennsylvania from invasion, and 
 to drive the enemy out of Maryland. These purposes were 
 fully and finally accomplished by the battle of Antietam, 
 w^hich brought the army of the Potomac into what might be 
 termed an accidental position on the upper Potomac. 
 
 Having gained the immediate object of the campaign, the 
 fii-st thing to be done was to insure Maryland from a return 
 of the enemy; the second, to prepare our own army, ex- 
 hausted by a series of severe battles, destitute to a great ex- 
 tent of supplies, and very deficient in artillery and cavalry 
 horses, for a definite offensive movement, and to determine 
 upon the line of operations for a further advance. 
 
ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA. 427 
 
 At the time of the battle of Antietara the Potomac was very- 
 low, and presented a comparatively weak line of defense, un- 
 less watched by large masses of troops. The re-occupation of 
 Harper's Ferry, and the disposition of troops above that point, 
 rendered the line of the Potomac secure against everything 
 except cavalry raids. No time was lost in i^lacing the army 
 in proper condition for an advance, and the circumstances 
 which caused the delay after the battle of Autietam have been 
 fully enumerated elsewhere. 
 
 I never regarded Harper's Ferry or its vicinity as a proper 
 base of operations for a movement upon Richmond. I still 
 considered the line of the Peninsula as the true approach, but, 
 for obvious reasons, did not make any proposal to return to it. 
 
 On the 6th of October, as stated above, I was ordered by 
 the President, through the general-in-chief, to cross the Poto- 
 mac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Two 
 lines wex'e presented for my choice: 1st, Up tlie valley of the 
 Shenandoah, in which case I was to have 12,000 to 15,000 ad- 
 ditional troops : 2d. To cross between the enemy and Wash- 
 ington, that is, east of the Blue Ridge, in which event I was 
 to be reinforced with 30,000 men. 
 
 At first I determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah, 
 for these reasons : The Harper's Ferry and Winchester Rail- 
 road, and the various turnpikes converging upon Winchester, 
 afforded superior facilities for supplies. 
 
 Our cavalry being weak, this line of communication could 
 be more easily protected. There was no advantage in inter- 
 posing, at that time, the Blue Ridge and the Shenandoah 
 between the enemy and myself. 
 
 At the period in question the Potomac was still very low, 
 and I apprehended that if I crossed the river below Harper's 
 Ferry, the enemy would promptly check the movement by 
 recrossing into Maryland, at the same time covering his rear 
 by occupying in strong force the passes leading through the 
 Blue Ridge from the south-east into the Shenandoah Valley. 
 
 I anticipated, as the result of the first course, that Lee 
 would fight me near Winchester, if he could do so under 
 favorable circumstances ; or else that he Avould abandon the 
 lower Shenandoah and leave the army of the Potomac free to 
 
428 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 act upon some other line of operations. If he abandoned the 
 Shenandoah, he ■\vould naturally fall back upon his railway 
 communications. I have since been confirmed in the belief, 
 that if I had crossed the Potomac below Harper's Ferry in 
 the early part of October, General Lee Avould have recrossed 
 into Maryland. 
 
 As above explained, the army was not in condition to move 
 until late in October, and in the meantime circumstances had 
 changed. 
 
 The period had arrived when a sudden and great rise of 
 the Potomac might be looked for at any moment ; the season 
 of bad roads and difficult movements was ajiproaching, which 
 would naturally deter the enemy from exjiosing himself very 
 far from his base, and his movements all appeared to indicate 
 a filling back from the river towards his supplies. Under 
 these circumstances, I felt at liberty to disregard the possi- 
 bility of the enemy recrossing the Potomac, and determined 
 to select the line east of the Blue Ridge, feeling convinced 
 that it ■would secure me the largest accession of force, and the 
 most cordial support of the President, whose views from the 
 beginning were in favor of that line. 
 
 The subject of the defense of the line of the upper Potomac, 
 after the ad\ance of the main army, had long occupied my 
 attention ; I desired to place Harper's Ferry and its depend- 
 encies in a strong state of defense, and frequently addressed 
 the general-in-chief upon the subject of the erection of field- 
 Avorks and permanent bridges there, asking for the funds 
 necessary to accomplish the purpose. Although I did my 
 best to explain as clearly as I was able that I did not wish to 
 erect permanent works of masonry, and that neither the 
 works nor the permanent bridges had any reference to the ad- 
 vance of the army, but solely to the permanent occupation of 
 Harper's Ferry, I could never make the General-in-chief 
 understand my wishes, but was refused the funds necessary to 
 erect the field-works, on the ground that there was no appro- 
 priation for the erection of permanent fortifications ; and was 
 not allowed to build the permanent bridge on the ground that 
 the main army could not be delayed in its movements until its 
 completion. Of course I never thought of delaying the ad- 
 
ADVANCE INTO V I E G I N A. 429 
 
 vance of the army for that purpose, and so stated re- 
 l^eatedly. 
 
 On the 25th of October I sent the General-in-chief the fol- 
 lowing telegram : 
 
 Head-Qtjarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 October 25, 1862. 10.45 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. Halleck, 
 
 General-in- Chiefs Washingtim^ — 
 As the moment is at hand for the advance of the army, a 
 question arises for the decision of the general-in-chief; which, 
 although perhaps implicitly decided by the President in his 
 letter of the ISth, should be clearly presented by me, as I do 
 not regard it as in my province to determine it. Tliis question 
 is the extent to which the line of the Potomac should be 
 guarded, after the army leaves, in order to cover Maryland 
 and Pennsylvania from invasion by large or small parties of 
 the enemy. It will always be somewhat difficult to guard the 
 immediate line of the river, owing to its great extent and the 
 numerous passages which exist. It has long appeared to me 
 that the best way of covering this line would be by occupying 
 Front Royal, Strasburg, Wardensville and Morefields, at the 
 debouches of the several valleys in Avhich they are situated. 
 These points, or suitable places in their vicinity, should be 
 strongly intrenched and permanently held ; one great advan- 
 tage of this arrangement Avould be the covering the Balti- 
 more and Ohio raih-oad, and an essential part of the system 
 would be the construction of the link of railway from Win- 
 chester to Strasburg, and the rebuilding of the Manassas 
 Gap Railway bridge over the Shenandoah. 
 
 The intrenchment of Manassas Junction would complete 
 the system for the defense of the approaches to Washington 
 and the upper Potomac. Many months ago I recommended 
 this arrangement, in fact gave orders for it to be carried into 
 effect. I still regard it as essential under all circumstances. 
 
 The views of the chief engineer of this army in regard to 
 the defenses and garrison of Harper's Ferry and its depend- 
 encies, are in your possession. 
 
 The only troops under my command outside of the organ- 
 
430 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 ization of the army of the Potomac are the Maryland Brigade 
 under General Kenly, the 54th Pennsylvania, Colonel Voss ; 
 12th Illinois Cavalry and Colonel Davis's 8th New York 
 Cavalry; total, 2,894 infantry, one battery and about 900 
 cavalry-men. There are also two of my re'giments of cavalry 
 (about VoO men) guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 
 between Hancock and Cumberland. 
 
 As I have no department, and command simply an active 
 army in the field, my responsibility for the safety of the line 
 of the Potomac and the States north of it, must terminate the 
 moment I advance so far beyond that line as to adopt another 
 for my base of operations. The question foi- the general-in- 
 chief to decide, and which I regard as beyond my province, 
 is this : 
 
 1st. Shall the safety of Harper's Ferry, and the line of the 
 Potomac, be regarded as assured by the advance of the army 
 south of the Blue Ridge, and the line left to take care of 
 itself? 
 
 2d. If it is deemed necessary to hold the line, or that herein- 
 before indicated in advance of it, how many troops shall be 
 placed there, at what points, (and in what numbers, and of 
 what composition at each), and whence shall they be supplied, 
 i. e. from this army, or from other sources ? 
 
 Omitting the detached trooj^s mentioned above, and the 
 small garrisons of Boonsboro and Frederick, the last returns 
 show the strength of this army for duty, to be about (116,000) 
 one hundred and sixteen thousand officers and men. This 
 includes the divisions of Stoneman and Whipple, but does not 
 include Heintzelman, Sigel and Bayard. 
 
 If Harper's Ferry, and the river above, are rendered fully 
 secure, it is possible that the active array, if it supplies the 
 garrisons, may be reduced so much as to be inadequate to the 
 purposes contemplated ; if it is preserved intact, Maryland, 
 Pennsylvania, and the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad may be 
 unduly exposed. 
 
 I leave the decision of these grave questions to the general- 
 in-chief I know nothing of the number of troops in Balti- 
 more, &c. 
 
 An important element in the solution of this problem, is the 
 
ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA. 431 
 
 fact, that a great portion of Bragg's army is probably now 
 at liberty to unite itself with Lee's command. 
 
 I commence crossing the river at Berlin in the morning, 
 and must ask a prompt decision of the questions proposed 
 herein. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 
 To which I received the following reply : 
 
 Washington, Oct. 26, 1862. 1.35 p.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, 
 
 In addition to the command which you had when I came 
 here, you also have the greater part of that of Maj.-Gen Pope. 
 Moreover, you have been authorized to use any troops within 
 your reach in General Wool's department, and in Western 
 Virginia. General Banks's command is also under your direc- 
 tion, with the single restriction, that he is not to remove troops 
 from Washington, until he has notified me of his orders. 
 Since you left Washington, I have advised and suggested in 
 relation to your movement!, but I have given you no orders. 
 I do not give you any now. The government has intrusted 
 you with defeating and driving back the rebel army in your 
 front. I shall not attempt to control you in the measures you 
 may adopt for that purpose ; you are informed of my views, but 
 the President has left you at liberty to adopt them or not, as 
 you may deem best. You will also exercise your own discre- 
 tion in regard to what points on the Potomac, and the Balti- 
 more and Ohio Railroad are to be occupied or fortified. I will 
 only add that there is no appropriation for 2yen7ianent intrench- 
 ments on that line. Moreover, I think it will be time enough 
 to decide upon fortifying Front Royal, Strasburg, Warden- 
 ville and Morefield, when the enemy is driven south of them, 
 and they come into our possession. I do not think that we 
 need have any immediate fear of Bragg's army. You are 
 within (20) twenty miles of Lee's, while Bragg is distant about 
 (400) four hundred miles. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chie£ 
 
432 FOURTU PERIOD. 
 
 And on the 29th I sent the following: 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac. 
 Oct. 29, 1862. 1.15 p.m. 
 
 Maj.-Gen. H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in- Chiefs Washington^ — 
 On the 25th instant, I sent you a dispatch, requesting you 
 to decide what steps should be taken to guard the line of the 
 Potomac, when the army leaves here. To this I received your 
 reply, that I had been intrusted by the President, with defeat- 
 ing and driving away the rebel army, that you had given me 
 no orders heretofore, did not give me any then, etc. Under 
 these circumstances, I have only to make such arrangements 
 for guarding this extended line, as the means at my disposal 
 will permit, at the same time keeping in view the supreme 
 necessity of maintaining the moving army in adequate force 
 to meet the rebel army before us. 
 
 The dispositions I have ordered are as follows, viz. : Ten 
 thousand men to be left at Harper's Ferry, one brigade of 
 infantry in front of Sharpsburg; Kenly's brigade of infantry at 
 Williamsport ; Kelly's brigade, including Col. Campbell's 54th 
 Pennsylvania Infantry, at Cumberland ; and between that point 
 and Hancock I have also left four small cavalry regiments, to 
 patrol and watch the river and the Baltimore and Ohio Rail- 
 road from Cumberland down to Harper's Ferry. 
 
 I do not regard this force as sufficient to cover securely this 
 great extent of line, but I do not feel justified in detaching 
 any more troops from my moving columns. I would there- 
 fore recommend that some new regiments of infantry and 
 cavalry be sent to strengthen the forces left by me. 
 
 There should be a brigade of infantry and section of artil- 
 lery in the vicinity of Cherry Run ; another brigade at Han- 
 cock, an additional brigade at Williamsport, one regiment at 
 Hagerstown, and one at Chambersburg, with a section of 
 artillery at each place if possible. This is on the supposition 
 that the enemy retain a considerable cavalry force west of the 
 Blue Ridge. If they go east of it, the occupation of the points 
 named in my dispatch of the 25th inst., will obviate the ne- 
 cessity of keeping many of these troops on the river. 
 
ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA. 433 
 
 There are now seveval hundred of our wounded, indnding 
 General Richardson, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg, that cannot 
 possibly be moved at present. 
 
 I repeat that I do not look upon the forces I have been able 
 to leave from this army as sufficient to prevent cavalry raids 
 into Maryland and Pennsylvania, as cavalry is the only de- 
 scription of troops adequate to this service, and I am, as you 
 are aware, deticient in this arm. 
 
 Geo. B. McClellan, 
 
 Major-General Comd'g. 
 
 To which I received, on the 30th, this reply : 
 
 Washington, Oct. 30, 1862. 11.30 a.m. 
 Maj.-Gen. G. B. McClellan, — 
 
 Your telegram of yesterday was received late last evening. 
 The troops proposed for Thoroughfare Gap will be sent to 
 that place whenever you are in position for their co-operation, 
 as previously stated ; but no new regiments can be sent from 
 here to the uj^per Potomac. The guarding of that line is left 
 to your own discretion, with the troops now under your com- 
 mand. 
 
 H. W. Halleck, 
 
 General-in-Chief. 
 
 I accordingly left the 12th Corps at Harper's Ferry, de- 
 taching one brigade to the vicinity of Sharpsburg. General 
 Morell was placed in command of tlie line from the mouth of 
 the Antietam to Cumberland, General Slocum in command of 
 Harper's Ferry and the line east of the mouth of the An- 
 tietam. 
 
 The orders given to these officers were as follows : 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, 
 Oct 29, 1862. 1 P.M. 
 
 Gen. H. W. Slocum, 
 
 ComcVg Army Corps, Harper'' s Ferry, — 
 
 The general commanding directs that you send one 
 brigade of your corps, to march at once to the position now 
 occupied by Gen. F. J. Porter's corps in front of Sharpsburg, 
 
434 FOURTH PEEIOD. 
 
 to watch and guard the line of the river from the ford near 
 the mouth of the Antietam Creek to the mouth of the Ope- 
 quan Creek. The officer in command will also take steps to 
 afford proper protection to the sick and wounded in the hos- 
 pitals in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Boonsboro'. The 
 regiment now at Boonsboro' "will be placed under his orders. 
 General Kenly, at Williamsport, will guard the river from the 
 mouth of the Opequan above, including the ford at the mouth 
 of the Opequan. 
 
 The commanding general also directs that you take imme- 
 diate steps to establish the remainder of your corps as follows, 
 viz., one brigade on Maryland Heights, one brigade on Lou- 
 don Heights, with the remainder on Bolivar Heights and at 
 Harper's Ferry. These dispositions should be made at once, 
 so that General Couch can move with his corps. Please ac- 
 knowledge receipt of this. 
 
 R. B. Marcy, 
 
 Chief-of-Staff. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Army op the Potomac, 
 October 3], 1862. 
 
 Gen. G. W. Morell, 
 
 Cominanding Upper Potomac. 
 General, — I am instructed by the commanding general 
 to say to you th,at he has selected you to perform the highly 
 important and responsible duty of taking charge of, and com- 
 manding the troops left for the defense of the line of the Poto- 
 mac River, from the mouth of the Antietam to Cumberland, 
 as well as any other troops that may hereafter be sent for the 
 protection of the Maryland and Pennsylvania frontier within the 
 limits of the line herein specified. The force which has been left 
 to guard the line, is not deemed adequate to prevent cavalry 
 raids, but it is all that the commanding general feels author- 
 ized to detach from the army of the Potomac at the present 
 time, and it devolves upon you to make the best use of this 
 force in your power. You will have four cavalry regiments 
 vmder your command, which should, be so distributed along 
 the river as to watch all the available fords, and give timely 
 notice to the infantry of the approach of any force of rebels. 
 
ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA. 435 
 
 You will afford all the protection in your power to the Bal- 
 timore and Ohio Railroad. 
 
 You will endeavor to prevent any cavalry raids into Mary- 
 land and Pennsylvania. 
 
 You will take ste[)S to have all the sick and wounded of our 
 army, as Avell as of the rebel army, within your lines, properly 
 taken care of, until they can be sent to general hospitals, or dis- 
 charged, or paroled. 
 
 You will make your head-quarters at Hagerstown, and oc- 
 casionally visit the different parts of your line. 
 
 You will please report promptly to these head-quarters, 
 everything of importance that occurs within the limits of your 
 command. The three brigades now at Cumberlan<3, Williams- 
 port, and Sharpsburg, including the 54tli Pennsylvania Volun- 
 teers near Cumberland, will be under your command. They 
 are commanded by Generals Kelly, Kenly, and Gordon. 
 Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 S. Williams, 
 Assistant Adjutaut-Geueral. 
 
 On the 25th of October the pontoon bridge at Berlin was 
 constructed, there being already one across the Potomac, and 
 another across the Shenandoah at Harper's Ferry. 
 
 On the 26th two divisions of the 9th Corps and Pleason- 
 ton's brigade of cavalry, crossed at Berlin and occupied Lo- 
 vettsville. 
 
 The 1st, 6th, and 9th Corps, the cavalry and reserve artil- 
 lery, crossed at Berlin, between the 26th of October and the 
 2d of November. 
 
 The 2d and 5th Corps crossed at Harper's Ferry between 
 the 29th of October and 1st of November. 
 
 Heavy rains delayed the movement considerably in the be- 
 ginning, and the 1st, 5th, and 6th Corps were obliged to halt 
 at least one day at the crossings, to complete, as far as possible, 
 the necessary supplies that could not be procured at an earlier 
 period. 
 
 The plan of campaign I adopted during the advance, was 
 to move the army well in hand parallel to the Blue Ridge, 
 taking Warrenton as the point of direction for the main body, 
 
436 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 seizing each pass in the Blue Ridge by detachments, as we ap- '' 
 preached it, and guarding them after we had passed, as long 
 as they would enable the enemy to trouble our communications 
 with the Potomac. It was expected that we would unite with 
 the 11th Corps and Sickles's division near Thoroughliire Gap. 
 We depended upon Harper's Ferry and Berlin for supplies, 
 until the Manassas Gap Railway was reached ; when that oc- 
 curred the passes in our rear were to be abandoned, and the 
 army massed ready for action or movement in any direction. 
 
 It was my intention, if upon reaching Ashby's, or any other 
 pass, I found that the enemy were in force between it and the 
 Potomac, in the valley of the Shenandoah, to move into the 
 valley and endeavor to gain their rear. I hardly hoped to ac- 
 complish this, but did expect that by striking in between Cul- 
 pepper Court House and Little Washington, I could either 
 separate their army and beat them in detail, or else force them 
 to concentrate as far back as Gordousville, and thus place the 
 army. of the Potomac in jDosition either to adopt the Freder- 
 icksburg line of advance uj^on Richmond, or to be removed to 
 the Peninsula, if, as I apprehended, it were found impossible 
 to supply it by the Orange and Alexandria Railroad beyond 
 Culpepper. 
 
 On the 27th of October, the remaining divisions of the 9th 
 Corps crossed at Berlin, and Pleasonton's cavalry advanced to 
 Purcellville. The concentration of the 6th Corps, delayed 
 somewhat by intelligence as to the movements of the enemy 
 near Hedgesville, &c., was commenced on this day ; and the 
 1st Corps was already in motion for Berlin. 
 
 On the 28th the 1st Corps and the general head-quarters 
 reached Berlin. 
 
 On the 29th the reserve artillery crossed an^d encamped near 
 Lovettsville ; Stoneman's division, temporarily attached to the 
 9th Corps, occupied Leesburg ; Averill's cavalry brigade 
 moved towards Berlin from Hagerstown. Two divisions of 
 the 9th Corps moved to Wheatland, and one to Waterford. 
 The 2d Corps commenced the passage of the Shenandoah at 
 Harper's Ferry, and moved into the valley east of Loudon 
 Heights. 
 
 On the 30th the 1st Corps crossed at Berlin and encamped 
 
ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA. 437 
 
 near Lovettsville; the 2d Corps completed the passage of the 
 Shenandoali ; the 5th Corps commenced its march from Sharps- 
 burg to Harper's Ferry, 
 
 On the 31st the 2d Corps moved to the vichiity of Hills- 
 borough ; the 6th Corps reached Boonsboro' ; the 5th Corps 
 reached Harper's Ferry, one division crossing the Shenandoah. 
 
 On the 1st of November the 1st Corps moved to Purcell- 
 ville and Hamilton ; the 2d Corps to Woodgrove ; the 5th 
 Corps to Hillsborough ; the 6th Corps reached Berhn, one di- 
 vision crossing. Pleasonton's cavalry occupied Philemont, 
 having a sharp skirmish there, and at Bloomfield. 
 
 On November 2 the 2d Corps occupied Snicker's Gap ; the 
 5th Corps Snickersville ; the 6th Corps crossed the Potomac, 
 and encamped near Wheatland ; the 9th Corps advanced to 
 Bloomfield, Union, and Philemont ; Pleasonton drove the 
 enemy out of Union ; Averill was ordered to join Pleasonton. 
 The enemy offered no serious resistance to the occupation of 
 Snicker's Gap, but advanced to regain possession of it with a 
 column of some 5000 to 6000 infantry, who were driven back 
 by a few rounds from our rifled guns. 
 
 On the 3d the 1st Corps moved to Philemont, Union, 
 Bloomfield, &c. ; the 2d Corps to vicinity of Upperville ; the 
 the 5th Corps remained at Snicker's Gap ; the 6th Corps moved 
 to Purcellville ; the 9th Corps moved towards Upperville. 
 Pleasonton drove the enemy out of Upperville after a severe 
 fight. 
 
 On the 4th the 2d Corps took possession of Ashley's Gap ; 
 the 6th Corps reached Union ; the 9th Corps Upperville ; the 
 cavalry occupied Piedmont. 
 
 On the 5th the 1st Corps moved to Rectortown and White 
 Plains ; one division of the 2d Corps to the intersection of 
 the Paris and Piedmont with the Upperville and Barber's 
 road ; the 6th Corps to the Aldie turnpike, east of Upperville; 
 the 9th Corps beyond the Manassas Railroad, between Pied- 
 mont and Salem, with a brigade at Manassas Gap ; the cavalry 
 nnder Averill had a skirmish at Manassas Gap, and the brigade 
 of Pleasonton gained a handsome victory over superior num- 
 bers at Barber's cross-roads ; Bayard's cavalry had some sharp 
 skirmishing in front of Salem. 
 
438 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 On the 6th the 1st Corps advanced to Warrenton ; the 2d 
 to Rectortown ; the 5 th Corps commenced its movement from 
 Snicker's Gap to White Plains ; the 9th Corps to Waterloo 
 and vicinity, on the Rappahannock; the 11th Corps was at 
 New Baltimore, Thoroughfare, and Hopewell's Gaps; Sickles's 
 division guarding the Orange and Alexandria railroad from 
 Manassas Junction, towards Warrenton Junction ; the cavalry- 
 near Flint Hill ; Bayard to cut oif Avhat there might be in 
 Warrenton, and to proceed to the Rappahannock Station. 
 
 JSTovember 'Zth, General Pleasonton was ordered to move to- 
 wards Little Washington and Sperryville, and thence towards 
 Culpei^per Court House. 
 
 November 8th, the 2d Corps moved half way to Warrenton ; 
 the 5th Corps to New Baltimore. 
 
 November 9th, the 2d and 5th Corps reached Warrenton ; 
 the 6th Corps New Baltimore. 
 
 Late on the night of the 7th I received an order relieving 
 me from the command of the army of the Potomac, and direct- 
 ing me to turn it over to General Burnside, which I at once 
 did. 
 
 I had already given the orders for the movements of the 8th 
 and 9th ; these orders were carried into effect without change. 
 
 The position in which I left the army, as the result of the 
 orders I had given, was as follows : 
 
 The 1st, 2d and 5th Corps, reserve artillery, and general head- 
 quarters at Warrenton ; the 9th Corps on the line of the Rap- 
 pahannock, in the vicinity of Waterloo ; the 6th Corps at New 
 Baltimore; the 11th Corps at New Baltimore, Gainesville and 
 Thoroughfare Gap ; Sickles's division of the 3d Corps on the 
 Orange and Alexandria railroad, from Manassas Junction to 
 Warrenton Junction; Pleasonton across the Rappahannock, 
 at Amissville, Jefferson, tfcc, with his pickets on Hazel River, 
 facing Longstreet's, six miles from Culpepper Court House; 
 Bayard near Rajipahannock Station. 
 
 The army was thus massed near Warrenton, ready to act 
 in any required direction, perfectly in hand, and in admirable 
 condition and spirits. I doubt whether during the whole pe- 
 riod that I had the honor to command the army of the Poto- 
 mac, it was in such excellent condition to fight a great battle. 
 
ADVANCE INTO VIRGINIA. 439 
 
 When I gave up the command to General Burnside, the best 
 information in our possession indicated that Lougstreet was 
 immediately in our front near Culpepper ; Jackson with one, 
 perhaps both, of the Hills near Chester and Thornton's Gaps, 
 with the mass of their forces west of the Bine Ridge. The 
 reports from General Pleasont«!>n, in the advance, indicated the 
 possibility of separating the two wings of the enemy's forces, 
 and either beating Longstreet separately, or forcing him to fall 
 back, at least upon Gordonsville, to effect his junction with 
 the rest of the army. 
 
 The following is from the report of General Pleasonton : 
 
 " At this time and from the Vth instant, my advance pickets 
 were on Hazel Iliver, within six miles of Culpepper, besides 
 having my flank pickets towards Chester and Thornton's Gaps, 
 extended to Gaines's Cross Roads and Newby's Cross Roads, 
 with numerous patrols in the directions of Woodville, Little 
 Washington, and Sperryville. The information gained by 
 these parties, and also from deserters, prisoners, contrabands, 
 as well as citizens, established the fact of Longstreet with 
 his command being at Culpepper, while Jackson with D. H. 
 Hill, with their respective commands, were in the Shenan- 
 doah Valley, on the western side of the Blue Ridge, covering 
 Chester and Thornton's Gaps, and expecting us to attempt to 
 pass through and attack them. As late as the lYth of Novem- 
 ber, a contraband just from Strasburg came into my camp and 
 reported that D. H. Hill's corps was tAvo miles beyond that 
 place, on the railroad to Mount Jackson. Hill was tearing up 
 the road and destroying the bridges, under the impression 
 that we intended to follow into that vaUey, and was en route 
 for Staunton. Jackson's corps was between Strasburg and 
 Winchester. Ewell and A. P. Hill were with Jackson. Pro- 
 visions were scarce, and the rebels were obliged to keep mov- 
 ing to obtain them." 
 
 Had I remained in command, I should have made the at- 
 tempt to divide the enemy, as before suggested, and could he 
 have been brought to a battle within reach of my supplies, I 
 cannot doubt that the result would have been a brilliant vic- 
 tory for our army. 
 
440 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 On the 10th of November General Pleasonton was attacked 
 by Longstreet, with one division of infantry and Stuart's cav- 
 ahy, but repulsed the attack. 
 
 This indicates the relative position of our army and that of 
 the enemy at the time I was relieved from the command. 
 
 ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL CONDUCT OF 
 MILITARY OPERATIONS. 
 
 It would be impossible to participate in operations such as 
 those described in the foregoing pages, without forming fixed 
 oi^inions upon subjects connected with the organization of our 
 armies and the general conduct of military operations. 
 
 This report would be incomplete without a brief allusion to 
 some general considerations which have been firmly impressed 
 upon me by the events which have occurred. 
 
 To my mind the most glaring defect in our armies is the ab- 
 sence of system in the appointment and promotion of general 
 and other officers, and the want of means for the theoretical 
 instruction of the mass of officers. 
 
 The expansion of the army was so great and so rapid at 
 the commencement of the existing war, that it was perhaps 
 impossible, in the great scarcity of instructed officers, to have 
 adopted any other course than that which was pursued ; but 
 the time has arrived when measures may be initiated to remedy 
 existing defects, and provide against their recurrence, 
 
 I think that the army should be regarded as a permanent 
 one, that is to say, its affairs should be administered precisely 
 as if all who belonged to it had made it their profession for 
 life; and those rules for promotion, &c., which have been 
 found necessary in the best foreign armies to excite honorable 
 emulation, produce an es2)rit du corps^ and secure efficiency, 
 should be followed by us. 
 
 All officers and soldiers should be made to feel that merit, 
 that is to say, courage, good conduct, the knowledge and per- 
 formance of the duties of their grade, and fitness to exercise 
 those of a superior grade, will ensure to them advancement in 
 their profession, and can alone secure it for them. 
 
 Measures should be adopted to secure the theoretical in- 
 
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS. 441 
 
 struction of staiF officers at least, who should as fai' as possible 
 be selected from officers having a military education or who 
 have seen actual service in the field. 
 
 The number of cadets at the military academy should be at 
 once increased to the greatest extent permitted by the ca- 
 pacity of the institution. 
 
 The regular army should be increased and maintained com- 
 plete in numbers and efficiency. 
 
 A well organized system of recruiting and of depots for 
 instruction should be adopted, in order to keep the ranks of 
 the regiments full, and sujjply promptly losses arising from 
 battle or disease. This is especially necessary for the artillery 
 and cavalry arms of the service, which, from the beginning 
 of the war, have rendered great services, and which have 
 never been fully appreciated by any but their comrades. We 
 need also large bodies of well instructed engineer troops. 
 
 In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns, the direction 
 should be left to professional soldiers ; a statesman may, per- 
 haps, be more competent than a soldier to determine the 
 political objects and direction of a campaign, but those once 
 decided upon, everything should be left to the responsible mili- 
 tary head, without interference from civilians. In no other 
 manner is success probable. The meddling of individual 
 members or committees of Congress with subjects which, 
 from lack of experience, they are of course incapable of com- 
 prehending, and which they are too apt to view through the 
 distorted medium of partisan or personal prejudice, can do no 
 good, and is certain to jiroduce incalculable mischief. 
 
 I cannot omit the expression of my thanks to the President 
 for the constant evidence given me of his sincere personal 
 regard, and his desire to sustain the military plans which my 
 judgment led me to urge for adoption and execution. I can- 
 not attribute his failure to adopt some of those plans, and to 
 give that support to others which was necessary to their suc- 
 cess, to any want of confidence in me, and it only remains for 
 me to regret that other counsels came between the constitu- 
 tional commander-in-chief and the general whom he had 
 placed at the head of his armies, counsels which resulted in 
 the failure of great campaigns. 
 
442 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 If the nation possesses no generals in service, competent to 
 direct its military affairs without the aid or supervision of 
 politicians, the sooner it finds them and places them in position 
 the better will it be for its fortunes. 
 
 I may be pardoned for calling attention to the memorandum 
 submitted by me to the President on the 4th of August, 1861, 
 my letter to him of July Vth, 1862, and other similar com- 
 munications to him and to the Secretary of War, contained in 
 this report. I have seen no reason to change in any material 
 regard the views there exjjressed. 
 
 After a calm, impartial and patient consideration of the 
 subject, a subject which demands the closest thought on the 
 part of every true lover of his country, I am convinced that 
 by the proper employment of our resources it is entirely possi- 
 ble to bring this Avar to a successful military issue. I believe 
 that a necessary preliminary to the re-establishment of the 
 Union is the entire defeat or virtual destruction of the organ- 
 ized military power of the Confederates, and that such a result 
 should be accompanied and followed by conciliatory measures; 
 and that by pursuing the political course I have always advised, 
 it is possible to bring about a permanent restoration of the 
 Union ; a reunion by which the rights of both sections shall 
 be preserved and by which both parties shall preserve their 
 self-respect, while they respect each other. 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 In this report I have confined myself to a plain narrative of 
 such facts as are necessary for the i)ur2:)oses of history. 
 Where it was possible I have preferred to give these facts in 
 the language of dispatches, written at the time of their occur- 
 rence, rather than to attempt a new relation. 
 
 The reports of the subordinate commanders, hereto annexed, 
 recite what time and space would fail me to mention here, 
 those individual instances of conspicuous bravery and skill 
 by which every battle was marked. To them I must es- 
 pecially refer, for without them, this narrative would be in- 
 complete, and justice fail to be done. But I cannot omit to 
 
GENERAL REVIEW. 443 
 
 tender to my corps commanders, and to the general officers 
 nnder them, sucli ample recognition of their cordial co-opera- 
 tion and their devoted services, as those reports abundantly 
 avouch. 
 
 I have not sought to defend the army which I had the honor 
 to command, nor myself, against the hostile criticisms once so 
 rife. 
 
 It has seemed to me that nothing more was required than 
 such a plain and truthful narrative, to enable those whose right 
 it is to form a correct judgment on the important matters 
 involved. 
 
 This report is, in fact, the history of the army of the Poto- 
 mac. During the period occupied in the organization of that 
 army, it served as a barrier against the advance of a lately 
 victorious enemy, while the fortification of the capital was in 
 progress, and under the discipline which it then received it 
 acquired strength, education, and some of that experience 
 which is necessary to success in active operations, and which 
 enabled it afterward to sustain itself under circumstances try- 
 ing to the most heroic men. Frequent skirmishes occurred 
 along the lines, conducted Avith great gallantry, which inured 
 our troops to the realities of war. 
 
 The army grew into shape but slowly, and the delays which 
 attended on the obtaining of arms, continued late into the 
 winter of 1861-2, were no less trying to the soldiers, than to 
 the people of the country. Even at the time of the organization 
 of the Peninsular campaign, some of the finest regiments were 
 without rifles, nor were the utmost exertions on the part 
 of the miUtary authorities adequate to overcome the ob- 
 stacles to active service. 
 
 When at length the army was in condition to take the field, 
 the Peninsular campaign was planned, and entered upon with 
 enthusiasm by officers and men. Had this campaign been fol- 
 lowed up as it was designed, I cannot doubt that it would 
 have resulted in a glorious triumph to our arms, and the per- 
 manent restoration of the power of the government in Virginia 
 and North Carolina, if not throughout the revolting states. 
 It was, however, otherwise ordered, and instead of reporting 
 a victorious campaign, it has been my duty to relate the heroism 
 
444 FOURTH PERIOD. 
 
 of a reduced army, sent upon an expedition into an enemy's 
 country, there to abandon one, and originate another and new 
 plan of campaign, which might and would have been success- 
 ful if supported with aj^preciation of its necessities, but which 
 failed because of the repeated failure of promised support, at 
 the most critical, and, as it proved, the most fatal moments. 
 
 That heroism surpasses ordinary description. Its illustra- 
 tion must be left for the pen of the historian in times of calm 
 reflection, Avhen the nation shall be looking back to the past 
 from the midst of peaceful days. 
 
 For me, now, it is sufticient to say, that my comrades were 
 victors on every field save one, and there the endurance of a 
 single corps accomplished the object of its fighting, and, by 
 securing to the array its transit to the James, left to the enemy 
 a ruinous and barren victory. 
 
 The army of the Potomac was first reduced by the with- 
 drawal from ray command of the division of General Blenker, 
 which was ordered to the Mountain Department, under Gen- 
 eral Fremont. We had scarcely landed on the Peninsula, 
 when it was further reduced by a dispatch, revoking a pre- 
 vious order giving me command of Fortress Monroe, and 
 under which I had expected to take ten thousand men from 
 that point, to aid in our operations. Then, when under fire 
 before the defenses of Yorktown, we received the news of the 
 withdrawal of General McDowell's corps, of about 35,000 men. 
 This completed the overthrow of the original plan of the cam- 
 paign. About one-third of my entire army, (five divisions out 
 of fourteen, one of the nine remaining being but little larger 
 than a brigade), Avas thus taken from me. Instead of a rapid 
 advance which I had planned, aided by a flank movement up 
 the York River, it was only left to besiege Yorktown. That 
 siege was successfully conducted by the array, and when these 
 strong works at length yielded to our approaches, the troops 
 rushed forward to the sanguinary but successful battle of Wil- 
 liarasburgh, and thus opened an almost unresisted advance to 
 the banks of the Chickahominy. Richmond lay before them 
 surrounded with fortifications, and guarded by an army larger 
 than our own ; but the prospect did not shake the courage of 
 the brave men who composed my command. Relying still on 
 
GENERAL REVIEW. 445 
 
 the support which the vastness of our undertaking, and the 
 grand results depending on our success seemed to insure us, 
 we pressed forward. The weather was stormy beyond pre- 
 cedent, the deep soil of the Peninsula was at times one vast 
 morass. The Chickahominy rose to a highei* stage than had 
 been known for years before. Pursuing the advance, the 
 crossings were seized, and the right wing extended to effect a 
 junction with reinforcements now promised and earnestly 
 desired, and upon the arrival of which the complete success 
 of the campaign seemed clear. The brilliant battle of Hano- 
 ver Court House was fought, which opened the way for the 
 first corps, with the aid of which, had it come, we should then 
 have gone into the enemy's capital. It never came. The 
 bravest army could not do more, under such overwhelming 
 disappointment, than the army of the Potomac then did. Fair 
 Oaks attests their courage and endurance, when they hurled 
 back again and again the vastly superior masses of the enemy. 
 But mortal men could not accomplish the miracles that seem 
 to have been expected of them. But one course was left; a 
 flank march in the face of a powerful enemy, to another, and 
 better base, one of the most hazardous movements in war. 
 The army of the Potomac holding its own safety, and almost 
 the safety of our cause, in its hands, was equal to the occasion. 
 The Seven Days are classical in American history ; those days 
 in which the noble soldiers of the Union and Constitution, 
 fought an overwhelming enemy by day, and retreated from 
 successive victories by night, through a week of battle, closing 
 the terrible scenes of conflict with the ever memorable victory 
 at Malvern, where they drove back, beaten and shattered, the 
 entire eastern army of the confederacy, and thus secured for 
 themselves a place of rest, and a jDoint for a new advance upon 
 the capital from the banks of the James. 
 
 Richmond was still within our grasp, had the army of the 
 Potomac been reinforced and permitted to advance. But 
 counsels, which I cannot but think subsequent events proved 
 unwise, prevailed in Washington, and we were ordered to 
 abandon the campaign. Never did soldiers better deserve the 
 thanks of a nation than the army of the Potomac for the 
 deeds of the Peninsular campaign, and although that meed was 
 
446 FOUETH PERIOD. 
 
 withheld from them by the authorities, I am persuaded they 
 have received the applause of the American people. The 
 army of the Potomac was recalled from within sight of Rich- 
 mond, and incorporated with the army of Virginia. The dis- 
 appointments 6f the campaign on the Peninsul?,, had not 
 dampened their ardor or diminished their patriotism. They 
 fought well, faithfully, gallantly under General Pope ; yet were 
 compelled to fall back on Washington, defeated and almost 
 demoralized. The enemy, no longer occupied in guarding his 
 own capital, poured his troops northward, entered Maryland, 
 threatened Pennsylvania, and even Washington itself Elated 
 by his recent victories, and assured that our troops were dis- 
 organized and dispirited, he was confident that the seat of war 
 was now permanently transferred to the loyal States,- and that 
 his own exhausted soil was to be relieved from the burden of 
 supporting two hostile armies. But he did not understand 
 the spirit which animated the soldiers of the Union. I shall 
 not, nor can I living forget that, when I was ordered to the 
 command of the troops for the defense of the capital, the 
 soldiers with whom I had shared so much of the anxiety and 
 pain and suffering of the war, had not lost their confidence in 
 me as their commander. They sprang to my call with all 
 their ancient vigor, discipline and courage. I led them into 
 Maryland. Fifteen days after they had fallen back defeated 
 before Washington, they vanquished the enemy on the rugged 
 heights of South Mountain, pursued him to the hard fought 
 field of Antietam, and drove him, broken and disappointed, 
 across the Potomac into Virginia. 
 
 The army had need of rest. After the terrible experiences of 
 battles and marches, with scarcely an interval of rejDose, which 
 they had gone through from the time of leaving for the Penin- 
 sula, the return to Washington, the defeat in Virginia, the victory 
 at South Mountain, and again at Antietam, it Avas not surprising 
 that they were, in a large degree, destitute of the absolute 
 necessaries to effective duty. Shoes were worn out, blankets 
 were lost, clothing was in rags ; in short the army was unfit 
 for active service, and an interval for rest and equipment was 
 necessary. 
 
 When the slowly forwarded supplies came to us I led the 
 
GENERAL REVIEW. 447 
 
 army across the river renovated and refreshed, in good order 
 and discipline, and followed the retreating foe to a position 
 where I was confident of decisive victory, when in the midst 
 of the movement, while my advanced guard was actually in 
 contact with the enemy, I was removed from the command. 
 
 I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign with 
 this brave army was crowned with a victory which saved the 
 nation from tlie greatest peril it had then undergone. 
 
 I have not accomplished mypurpose if, by this report, the 
 army of the Potomac is not placed high on the roll of the 
 historic armies of the world. 
 
 Its deeds ennoble the nation to which it belongs. Always 
 ready for battle, always firm steadfast and trustworthy, I 
 never called on it in vain; nor will the nation ever have cause 
 to attribute its want of success, nnder myself or under other 
 commanders, to any failure of patriotism or bravery in that 
 noble body of American soldiers. 
 
 No man can justly charge upon any portion of that army, 
 from the commanding general to the private, any lack of devo- 
 tion to the service of the United States government, and to 
 the cause of the Constitution and the Union. They have 
 proved their fealty in much sorrow, suffering, danger, and 
 through the very shadow of death. Their comrades dead on 
 all the fields where we fought, have scarcely more claim to 
 the honor of a nation's reverence than the survivors to the 
 justice of a nation's gratitude. 
 
 I am, sir, very respectfully. 
 
 Your obedient servant, 
 
 George B. McClellan, 
 
 Maj.-Gen. U. S. A. 
 
APPENDIX A. 
 
 ORGANIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION. 
 
 The designations of the different Batteries of Artillery, both 
 Regular and Volunteer, follow within a few pages. 
 
 The following distribution of Regiments and Batteries was 
 made as a preliminary organization of the forces at hand, 
 shortly after my arrival at Washington. 
 
 The Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry, as fast as collected 
 and brought into primary organization, were assigned to 
 Brigades and Divisions as indicated in the subjoined state- 
 ments. 
 
 ORGMIZATIOX OF THE DIYISION OF TIIE POTOMAC. 
 August 4tJi, 1861. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL HUNTER'S BRIGADE. 
 23rd Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 2oth " " » 
 
 35th " " " 
 
 37th " " 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL HEINTZELMAN'S BRIGADE. 
 5 th Regiment Maine Volunteers. 
 IGth " New York " 
 
 26th " " " 
 
 27th " " " 
 
 Tidball's Battery ("A") 2nd U. S. Artillery. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN'S BRIGADE.. 
 14th Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 9 th " Massachusetts " • 
 
 De Kalb " New York " 
 
 4th " Michigan ' 
 
 Hamilton's Battery ("E") 3rd U. S. Artillery. 
 Company "I" 2nd " Cavalry. 
 
450 APPENDIX A. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL KEARNEY'S BRIGADE. 
 
 1st Regiment New Jersey Volunteers. 
 2nd " " " 
 
 3rd 
 
 Green's Battery ("G") 2nd U. S. Artillery. 
 Company " G " 2nd " Cavalry. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL HOOKER'S BRIGADE. 
 
 1st Regiment Massachusetts Volunteers, 
 nth 
 
 2nd " New Hampshire " 
 
 26th " Pennsylvania' " 
 
 COLONEL KEYES'S BRIGADE. 
 
 22ud Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 
 24th 
 
 30th " " 
 
 14th " " State Militia. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL FRANKLIN'S BRIGADE. 
 
 15th Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 18th " " " 
 
 31st " " " 
 
 32ud " " " 
 
 Piatt's Battery (" M") 2nd U. S. ArtiUery. 
 
 Company " C" New York (Lincoln) Cavalry. 
 
 COLONEL -BLENKER'S BRIGADE. 
 
 8th Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 27th " " " 
 
 27 th " Pennsylvania " 
 
 Garibaldi Guard, New York " 
 
 COLONEL RICHARDSON'S BRIGADE. 
 
 12th Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 2nd " Michigan " 
 
 3rd " " " 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL STONE'S BRIGADK 
 
 * 34th Regiment New York Volunteers. 
 
 Tammany " " " 
 
 1st " Minnesota " 
 
 2nd " New York State Mihtia. 
 
ORGANIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION. 451 
 
 COLONEL WM. F. SMITH'S BRIGADE. 
 
 3rd Regiment Vermont Volunteers. 
 
 6th " Maine " 
 
 2nd " Vermont " 
 
 33rd " New York " 
 
 Company "H" 2nd U. S. Cavalry. 
 Captain Mott's New York Battery. 
 
 COLONEL COUCH'S BRIGADE. 
 
 2nd Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers. 
 
 7th " Massachusetts " 
 
 10th " " " 
 
 36th " New York " 
 
 The 2nd Regiment Maine Volunteers, 
 
 2nd " Wisconsin " and the 
 
 13th " New York " stationed 
 
 at Fort Corcoran. 
 
 The 21st Regiment New York Volunteers, 
 stationed at Fort Runyon. 
 
 The I'Zth Regiment New York Volunteers, 
 stationed at Forth Ellsworth. 
 
 By October the new levies had arrived in sufficient numbers, 
 and the process of organization was so far carried on, that the 
 construction of Divisions had been effected. 
 
 The following statement exhibits the composition of the 
 Army, October 15th, 1861. 
 
 OPtGMIZATIOiX OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. 
 October Ibth, 1861. 
 
 I. 
 
 BRIGADIER-GENERAL STONEMAN'S CAVALRY COMMAND. 
 
 6th U. S. Cavalry. 
 
 4th Pennsylvania Cavalry. 
 
 Oneida Cavalry (1 Company), 
 nth Pennsylvania Cavalry (Harlans). 
 
 Barker's Illinois Cavalry (1 Company). 
 
452 APPENDIX A. 
 
 II. 
 
 COLONEL H. J. HUNT'S ARTILLERY RESERYE. 
 Battery "L" 2nd U. S. Artillery. 
 
 U U A " II U II 
 
 (I (1 T> ') U II 11 
 
 " "K" 3rd " " 
 
 ti II ■p )i II II II 
 
 « "K" 4th " " 
 
 " "H" 1st " " (Lieut. Hall) 
 
 " "A" 5th " " 
 
 III. 
 CITY GUARD, BRIGADIER-GENERAL ANDREW PORTER. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 Companies " A " and " E " 4th U. S. Cavalry. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Battery "K" 5th U. S. Artillery. 
 
 I7ifaiitry. 
 Battalion 2nd U. S. Infantry.. 
 
 " 3rd '' u \ 
 
 Company 8th " " 
 
 " 1st 
 
 " Sturgis Rifles (Illinois Volunteers). 
 
 IV. 
 
 BANKS' DIVISION. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 3rd Regiment N. Y. Cavalry (Van Alen) 4 Companies. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Best's Battery " I " 4th U. S. Art'y. Detachment 9th N. Y. Artillery. 
 Matthew's" "F"lstPenn. " Tompkins' Batt'y "A" 1st R. L " 
 
 I)ifani7-y. 
 
 AhercromMe^s Brigade. Stiles's Brigade. Gordon^s Brigade. 
 
 12th Mass. Vols. 3rd Wis. Vols. 2nd Mass. Vols. 
 
 12th Ind. " 9th N. Y. S. M. 28th N. Y. 
 
 16th " " 29th Penn. Vols. 19th " 
 
 30th Penn. " 13th Mass. " 5th Conn. 
 
 46th Penn. 
 28th " 
 1st Md. 
 
ORGANIZATION AND DISTRIBUTION. 453 
 
 
 MCDOWELL'S DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 
 2nd New York Cavalry (Harris' Light) 
 
 CoL Davies. 
 
 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 
 Battery 
 
 "M 
 
 " 2nd U. S. Artillery. 
 
 
 
 "G- 
 
 ' 1st " 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 
 Reyes's Brigade. 
 
 
 WadsicorUCs Brigade.- 
 
 King's Brigade. 
 
 14th N. Y. S. M. 
 
 
 12th N. Y. Vols. 
 
 2nd Wis. Vols. 
 
 22nd " Vols. 
 
 
 21st " 
 
 6th " 
 
 24th " 
 
 
 23rd " " 
 
 7 th " 
 
 30th " " 
 
 
 35th « " 
 
 19th Ind. " 
 
 HEINTZBLMAN'S DIVISION. 
 Cavalry. 
 1st New Jersey Cavalry. Col. Halstead. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Thompson's Battery "G" 2nd U. S. Artillery. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Richardson's Brigade. Sedgwick's Brigade. Jayneson's Brigade. 
 
 2nd Mich. Vols. 3rd Maine Vols. 32nd Penn. Vols. 
 
 3rd " " 4th " " 63rd " " 
 
 5th " " 38th N. Y. " 61st " " 
 
 Snh N. Y. " 40th " " 45th " 
 
 Penn. Vols. (Wild Cat Reg't.) 
 
 F. J. PORTER'S DIVISION. 
 Cavalry. 
 3rd Penn. Cavalry (Kentucky Cavalry). Col. Averill. 
 8th " " Col. Gregg. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Battery "E" 2nd U. S. Art'y. 
 
 " "E" 3rd " " {Mte. — Transferred to Sherman's Exped.) 
 
 Infantry. 
 MorelVs Brigade. Martindale's Brigade. ButterfieWs Brigade. 
 
 14th N. Y. Vols. 13th N. Y. Vols. 50th N. Y. Vols. 
 
 33rd Penn. " 2nd Maine " Stockton's Ind. Mich. Reg't. 
 
 4th Mich. " — N.Y.(De Kalb Reg't) 83d Penn. V. (Col. McLane). 
 
 9th Mass. " 18th Mass. Vols. Itth N. Y. Vols. 
 
 25th " " 
 
454 APPENDIX A. 
 
 - FRANKLIN'S DIVISION. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 1st New York Cavalry. Colonel McReynolds. 
 
 Artilkry. 
 Battery " D " 2nd U. S. Artillery. Hexamer's Battery (N. J. Vols.) 
 
 u " Gr " " " " 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 
 Kearney's Brigade. 
 
 Slocum^s Brigade. 
 
 Newton's Brigade. 
 
 1st N. J. Vols. 
 
 16th N. Y. Vols. 
 
 15th N. Y. Vols. 
 
 2nd " " 
 
 26th " " 
 
 18th " 
 
 3rd " 
 
 2nh " " 
 
 31st " 
 
 4th " " 
 
 6th Maine " 
 
 32rd " •' 
 
 STONE'S DIVISION. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 6 Companies 3rd New York (Van Alen) Cavalry. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Kirby's Battery " I " 1st U. S. Bunting's 6th N. Y. Independ. Batt. 
 
 Vaughns' " "B" 1st R. I. 
 
 Infantry. 
 Gorman's Brigade. Landefs Brigade. 
 
 2nd N. Y. S. M. 19th Mass. Vols. 
 
 1st Minn. Vols. 20th " " 
 
 — N. Y. Vols. (Tammany Reg't.) 7th Mich. " 
 
 15th Mass. " Comp. Mass. Sharpshooters. 
 
 34th N.Y. " 
 
 BAKER'S BRIGADE. 
 
 Penn. Vols. (1st California). 
 
 " " (2nd California). 
 
 " " (3rd California). 
 
 BUELL'S DIVISION. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Battery " D " 1st Penn. Artillery, 
 ti "H" " " " 
 
 Infantry. 
 Couclos Brigade. Graham's Brigade. Feck's Brigade. 
 
 2nd R. I. Vols. 23rd Penn. Vols. 13th Penn. Vols. 
 
 7th Mass. " 31st " " 21st " 
 
 10th Mass. Vols. 67th N. Y. (1st L. I.) Vols. 62d N. Y. V. (Anderson 
 
 36th N.Y. " 65th N.Y.V. (1st U.S.Chass.) Zouaves) 
 
 55th N. Y. Vols. 
 
OEGANIZATION AND DISTKIBUTION. 
 
 455 
 
 
 McCALL'S DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 
 1st Penn 
 
 . Reserve Cavalry. CoL 
 Artillery. 
 
 Bayard. 
 
 Easton's 
 
 Battery " A " 1st Penn. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Ck)oper's 
 
 " "B" 1st " 
 
 It 
 
 Kein's 
 
 " "G" 1st " 
 Infantry. 
 
 <i 
 
 Meade's Brigade. 
 
 Brigade. 
 
 Brigade. 
 
 1st Rifles Penn. Res. 
 
 5th Penn. Res. Inf. 
 
 10th Penn. Res. Inf. 
 
 4th Penn. Res. Inf. 
 
 1st " " " 
 
 6th " " " 
 
 3rd " " " 
 
 8th " " " 
 
 9th " " " 
 
 7th " " " 
 
 
 12th " " " 
 
 llth " " " 
 
 
 
 2nd " " " 
 
 
 
 HOOKER'S DIVISION. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 3rd Indiana Cavalry (8 Companies). Lieut.-Col. Carter. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Elder's Battery "E" 1st U. S. Artillery. 
 
 Brigade. 
 
 1st Mass. Vols, 
 llth " " 
 2nd N. H. " 
 26th Penn. " 
 1st Mich. " 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Sickles' Brigade. 
 1st Reg't Excelsior Brig. N. Y. Vols. 
 
 2nd " " " 
 
 3rd " " " " 
 
 4th " " " 
 
 5th " " " " " 
 
 SMITH'S DIVISION. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 5th Penn. Cavalry (Cameron Dragoons). Col. Friedman. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Ayre's Battery " F " 5th U. S. Artillery. 
 Mott's 2nd New York Independent Batteiy 
 Barr's Battery " E " 1st Penn. Artillery. 
 
 Brigade. 
 2nd Vermont Vols. 
 8rd " " 
 
 4th " " 
 
 5th " " 
 
 Infantry. 
 Steven''s Brigade. 
 33rd N. Y. Vols. 
 7 9th " S. M. 
 6th Maine Vols. 
 49th N. Y. " 
 Cos. "B" and "E'' 
 
 Hancoclc's Brigade. 
 4'7tli Penn. Vols. 
 49th " 
 43rd N. Y. " 
 5th Wis. " 
 
 Berdan's Sharpshooters. 
 
 Note.— The 47 th Penn. Vols, and the 79th N. Y. S. M. transferred to 
 General Sherman's Expedition. 
 
456 APPENDIX A. 
 
 CASEY'S PROVISIONAL BRIGADE. 
 6th New Jersey Vols. — Penn. Vols. (Round Head Reg't.) 
 
 6th " " " Battalion D. 0. Vols, 
 
 fth " " " 40th Penn. " 
 
 8th « " " 4th N. H. 
 
 Note. — Round Head Reg't transferred to Gen. Sherman's Expedition. 
 
 GARRISON OP ALEXANDRIA. BRIG.-GEN. MONTGOMERY. 
 Military Governor. 
 Penn. Volunteers (Cameron Guards). 
 
 GARRISON OF FORT ALBANY. 
 14th Mass. Volunteers. 
 
 GARRISON OF FORT RICHARDSON. 
 
 4th Connecticut Volunteers. 
 
 GARRISON OP FORT WASHINGTON. 
 Co. "D" 1st. U. S. Artillery. 
 Co. "II" 37th N. Y. Volunteers. 
 Co. "I" " " " 
 
 U. S. Recruits unassigned. 
 
 VI. 
 
 DIX'S DIVISION, BALTIMORE. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 Company Penn. Cavalry. 
 
 A7-till€ry. 
 
 Battery " I " 2nd U. S. Art'y. 2nd Mass. Light Balt'y. 
 
 " N. Y. Art'y. 
 
 I».fa?itry. 
 3rd New York Volunteers. 
 4th " " 
 
 5th " " 
 
 17th Mass. « 
 
 25th " " 
 
 2l8t Indiana " 
 
 6th Michigan " 
 
 4th Wisconsin " 
 
 7th Maine " 
 
 2nd Maryland Battalion. 
 Reading City Guard. 
 
APPENDIX B. 
 
 I add a Statement of the Organization and Composition of 
 the Troops on April 1st, commencing with the portion of the 
 Army of the Potomac, which went to the Peninsula ; giving 
 afterwards the Regiments and Batteries left on the Potomac 
 and in Maryland and Virginia after April 1st, 1862. 
 
 TROOPS OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC SENT TO THE 
 PENINSULA IN MARCH AND EARLY IN APRIL, 1862. 
 
 CAVALRY RESERVE. 
 Emory^s Brigade. 
 5th U. S. Cavalry. 
 6th " 
 6th Penn. " 
 
 BRIG.-GEN. P. ST. G. COOKE. 
 
 Blake's Brigade. 
 1st U. S. Cavalry. 
 8th Penn. " 
 Barker's Squadron 111. Cavalry. 
 
 II. 
 
 ARTILLERY RESERVE. COL. HENRY J. HUNT. 
 
 Graham's Battery "K" & "G; 1st U. S. 
 
 Randal's 
 
 (1 
 
 "E" 
 
 1st 
 
 Cariisle's 
 
 u 
 
 "E" 
 
 2nd 
 
 Robertson's 
 
 11 
 
 
 2nd 
 
 Benson's 
 
 11 
 
 "M" 
 
 2nd 
 
 Tidball's 
 
 II 
 
 "A" 
 
 2nd 
 
 Edward's 
 
 ll 
 
 "L"<&;"M' 
 
 '3rd 
 
 Gibson's 
 
 11 
 
 "C"& "G'' 
 
 ' 3rd 
 
 Livingston's 
 
 " 
 
 "F" &"K" 
 
 ' 3rd 
 
 Howe's 
 
 11 
 
 "G" 
 
 4th 
 
 De Russy's 
 
 11 
 
 "K" 
 
 4th 
 
 "Weed's 
 
 II 
 
 "I" 
 
 5th 
 
 Smead's 
 
 ll 
 
 "K" 
 
 5th 
 
 Ames's 
 
 "A" 
 
 5th 
 
 6 Nixpoleon guns. 
 
 6 " " 
 
 6 20-pds. Parrott guns. 
 
 6 3-in. ordnance. 
 
 g II II II 
 
 6 " " " 
 
 6 lO-pds. Parrott " 
 
 6 3-in. ordnance " 
 
 4 10-pds. Parrotts " 
 
 6 Napoleon " 
 6 
 
 6 3-in. ordnance " 
 
 4 Napoleon " 
 4 10-pds. Parrotts | 
 2 Napoleon J 
 
 guns. 
 
458 APPENDIX B. 
 
 ARTILLERY REBEBTV E.—Oontinued. 
 Diederick's Battery "A" N. Y. Art. Batt'a 6 20 pds. Parrott guns. 
 
 Voegelie's " "B" 
 Knieriem's " " C" 
 Grimm's " "D" 
 
 (I <1 u 4. (I «l <i 
 
 il « li ^ (i 11 « 
 " " " 6 32-pds. Howitzers. 
 
 
 100 guns. 
 
 
 in. 
 
 VOLUNTEER ENGINEER TROOPS. GEN. WOODBURY. 
 15th New York Volunteers. 
 50th " " 
 
 REGULAR ENGINEER TROOPS. CAPT. DUANE. 
 Companies "A," "B," and "C," U. S. Engineers. 
 
 ARTILLERY TROOPS WITH SIEGE TRAIN. 
 1st Connecticut Heavy Artillery. Col. Tyler. 
 
 SECOND CORPS. GEN. SUMNER. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 8th Illinois Cavalry. Col. Farnsworth. 
 One Squadron 6th New York Cavalry. 
 
 RICHARDSON'S DIVISION. 
 
 Artillery. 
 Clark's Battery " A" & " C" 4th U. S. 6 Napoleon guns. 
 Frank's " " G" 1st N. Y. 6 lO-pds. Parrott guns. 
 
 Pettit's " "B" 1st " 6 " " " 
 
 Hogan's " "A" 2nd " 6 " " " 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Hoioard^s Brigade. Meagher^s Brigade. Frenches Brigade. 
 
 5th N. H. Vols. 69th N. Y. Vols. 52nd N. Y. Vols. 
 
 81st Penn. " 63rd " " 57th " " 
 
 6l3t N. Y. " 88th " " 66th " " 
 
 64th " " 53rd Penn. " 
 
 SEDGWICK'S DIVISION. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Kirby's Battery "I" 1st U. S. 6 Napoleon guns. 
 
 ( 4 10 -pds. Parrott ) 
 Tompkin's " " A" 1st R. I. 6 { 3 ^^.^^^^ Howitzers \ ^'^^ 
 
 „ ( 4 10-pds. Parrott ) 
 Eartlett's " "B" 1st " «] 2 12-pds. Howitzers [ g"°^- 
 
 Owen's " " G" 6 3-iri. ordnance guns. 
 
ORGANIZATION IN APRIL, 1862. 
 
 459 
 
 Gorman's Brigade. 
 2nd N. Y. S. M. 
 15th Mass. Vols. 
 34rd N. T. " 
 1st Minn. " 
 
 Infantry. 
 JBurns's Brigade. 
 69th Penn. Vols. 
 71th " 
 72nd " " 
 106th " " 
 
 Dana's Brigade. 
 19th Mass. Vols. 
 7th Mich. " 
 42nd N. Y. " 
 20 th Mass. " 
 
 Note. — Blenker's Division detached and assigned to the Mountain Depart- 
 ment. 
 
 THIRD CORPS. GENERAL HEINTZELMAN . 
 
 Cavalry. 
 3rd Pennsylvania Cavalry. 
 
 Col. Averill. 
 
 PORTER'S DIVISION. 
 
 Griffin's Battery " K" 
 Weeden's " "C" R. I. 
 Martin's " "C" Mass. 
 Allen's " "E" " 
 
 Artillery. 
 5th U. S. 6 10-pds. Parrott guns. 
 
 6 Napoleon guns. 
 
 6 3-in. ordnance guns. 
 
 Martindale's Brigade. 
 2d Maine Vols. 
 18th Mass. " 
 22nd " " 
 25th N. Y. " 
 13th " " 
 1st Berdan Sharpshooters. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 MoreWs Brigade. 
 
 14tb N. Y. Vols. 
 
 4th Mich. " 
 
 9 th Mass. " 
 
 62nd Penn. " 
 
 Butierfield's Brigade. 
 17th N. Y. Vols. 
 83rd Penn. " 
 44th N. Y. " 
 Stockton's Michigan. 
 12th N. Y. Vols. 
 
 HOOKER'S DIVISION. 
 Artillery. 
 
 ( 4 10-pds. Parrott ) 
 HaU's Battery "H" 1st U. S. 6 j 3 12-pds. Howitzers f S"^' 
 
 Smith's " 4th N. Y. Battery 6 10-pds. Parrott " 
 
 Bramhall's " 6th " " 6 3-in. ordnance " 
 
 Osborn's " " D" 1st N. Y. Arty. 4 " 
 
 Infa7itry. 
 
 Sickles's Brigade. Naglee's Brigade. 
 
 1st Excelsior (N. Y.) 1st Mass. Vols. 
 
 2nd " " nth " 
 
 3rd " " 2Gth Penn. " 
 
 4th " " 2nd N. H. " 
 
 5th 
 
 Col. Starr's Brigade. 
 5th N. J. Vols 
 6th ' 
 7th " " 
 8th " " 
 
460 APPENDIX B. 
 
 HAMILTON'S DIVISION. 
 
 
 
 
 Ariilkry. 
 
 
 
 Thompson's Battery- 
 
 "G' 
 
 ' 2nd U. S. 6 
 
 Napoleon 
 
 I guns. 
 
 Beam's 
 
 "B" 
 
 N. J. 6J 
 
 4 1 0-pds. Parrott i 
 
 2 Napoleon \ S"^^' 
 
 Randolph's " 
 
 "E" 
 
 R. I. 6 ■ 
 
 4 10-pds. Parrott j „ 
 2 Napoleon " 
 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 
 
 Jameson^s Brigade. 
 
 
 Birney^s Brigade. 
 
 
 Brigade. 
 
 105th Penn. Vols. 
 
 
 38th N. Y, Vols. 
 
 2nd Mich, Vols. 
 
 63rd 
 
 
 40th " 
 
 
 3rd " " 
 
 57th 
 
 
 3rd Maine " 
 
 
 5th " 
 
 87th N. Y. " 
 
 
 4th " " 
 
 
 37 N. Y. " 
 
 FOURTH CORPS. GENERAL KEYES. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 COUCH'S DIVISION. 
 
 Artillery. 
 McCarthy's Battery "C" 1st Penn. 4 10-pds. Parrott guna 
 Flood's " "D" 1st " 6 " " " 
 
 Miller's " "E" 1st " 4 Napoleon " 
 
 Brady'a " "F" 1st " 4 lO-pds. Parrott " 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 . Graham's Brigade. Peck's Brigade. Brigade. 
 
 67th N. Y. Vols. (1st L. I.) 98th Penn. Vols. 2nd R. I. Vols. 
 
 65th " " (1st U. S. Chass.) 102nd " " 7th Mass. " 
 
 23rd Penn. " 93rd " " 10th " 
 
 31st " " 62nd N. Y. " 36th N. Y. " 
 
 61st " " 55th " 
 
 SMITH'S DIVISION. 
 Artillery. 
 
 ( 4 10-pds. Parrott ) 
 Ayre's Battery " P" 5th US. 6 | 3 Napoleon \ S'^^'' 
 
 ( 4 10-pds. Parrott l 
 Mott's " 3rd N. Y. Battery 6 j ^ Napoleon \ 
 
 Wheeler's " " E" 1st N. Y. 4 3-in. ordnance " 
 
 Kennedy's " 1st N. Y. Battery 6 " " " 
 
OKGANIZATION IN APKIL, 1862 
 
 461 
 
 Eancoch^s Brigade. 
 5th Wis. Vols. 
 49tli Penn. " 
 43rd N. Y. " 
 6tli Maine " 
 
 Infantry. 
 Brooks's Brigade. 
 2n(i Vermont Vols. 
 3rd " " 
 
 4th " " 
 
 5th " " 
 
 6th " '< 
 
 Davidson's Brigade. 
 33rd N. Y. Vols. 
 7nh " " 
 49th " " 
 7 th Maine " 
 
 Regan's Battery 
 Fitch's " 
 
 Bates' " 
 
 Spratt's " 
 
 Keirti's Brigade. 
 85th Penn. Vols. 
 101st " " 
 103rd " " 
 96th N. Y. " 
 
 CASEY'S DIVISION. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 7 th N. Y. Battery 6 3 -in. ordnance guns. 
 
 8th " " 6 " " " 
 
 "A" 1st N. Y. Art'y 6 Napoleon " 
 
 "H" 1st " " 4 3-in. ordnance " 
 
 Infantry. 
 Palmefs Brigade. 
 85th N. Y. Vols. 
 98th " " 
 92nd " " 
 81st " " 
 93rd " " 
 
 Brigade. 
 
 104th Penn. Vols. 
 52nd " " 
 56th N. Y. " 
 100th " " 
 
 lltli Maine " 
 
 V. 
 
 PROVOST GUARD. 
 
 2nd U. S. Cavalry. 
 
 Battahon 8th and 17th U. S. Infantry. 
 
 AT GENERAL HEAD-QUARTERS. 
 
 2 Cos. 4th U. S. Cavalry. 1 Co. Oneida Cav. (N. Y. Vols.) 
 1 Co. Sturgia Rifles (111. Vols.) 
 
 The following troops of the army of the Potomac were left 
 behind, or detached, on and in front of the Potomac for the 
 defense of that line, April 1st, 1862. Franklin's and McCall's 
 divisions at subsequent and different dates joined the active 
 portion of the army on the Peninsula. Two brigades of 
 Shield's division joined at Harrison's Landing. 
 
462 APPENDIX B. 
 
 FIRST COEPS. GENERAL McDOWELL. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 1st New York Cavalry. 4th New York Cavalry. 
 
 2nd " " 1st Pennsylvania " 
 
 Sharpshooters. 
 
 2nd Eegiment Berdan's Sharpshooters. 
 
 FRANKLIN'S DIVISION. 
 Artillery. 
 Piatt's Battery "D" 2nd U. S. 6 Napoleon guns. 
 
 (4-10 pds. Parrott ) 
 Porter's " " A" Mass. 6 j ^ lo.pds. Howitzers } g"°«- 
 
 ( 4 10-pds. Parrott i ,, 
 Hexamer's " " A" N. J. 6 j ^ j2-pds. Howitzers \ 
 
 Wilson's " " F" 1st N. Y. Art'y 4 3-in. ordnance " 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 Kearney^s Brigade. Slocum's Brigade. Newton's Brigade. 
 
 1st N. J. Vols. IGth N. Y. Vols. 18th N. Y. Vols. 
 
 2nd " " 27th " " 31st " " 
 
 3rd " " 5th Maine " 32rd " " 
 
 4th " " 9Gth Penn. " 95th Penn. " 
 
 McC ALL'S DIVISION. 
 Artillery. 
 Seymour's Battery " C" 5th U. S. 6 Napoleon guns. 
 Eaton's " "A" 1st Penn. 4 " " 
 
 Cooper's " "B" 1st ♦' 6 10-pds. Parrott guns. 
 
 ( 2 10-pds. Parrott ) 
 
 Infantry. 
 Reynolds's Brigade. Meade's Brigade. Ord's Brigade. 
 
 1st Penn. Ees. Reg't. 3rd Penn. Res. Reg't. 6th Penn. Res. Reg't. 
 
 2nd " " " 4th " " " 9th " " " 
 
 5th " " " nh " " "" 10th " " " 
 
 8th " " " 11th " " " 12th " " " 
 
 1 Penn. Reserve Rifles. 
 
 KING'S DIVISION. 
 Artillery. 
 
 Gibbon's Battery " B" 4th U. S. 
 
 6 Napoleon guns. 
 
 Monroe's " "D"lstR. L 
 
 6 10-pds. Parrotts guns. 
 
 Gerrish's " "A" N. H. 
 
 6 Napoleon " 
 
 DurreU's " Penn. 
 
 6 10-pds. Parrott " 
 
ORGANIZATION IN APRIL, 1862 
 
 463 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 
 Brigade. 
 
 Patrick's Brigade. 
 
 Augur's Brigade. 
 
 2nd Wis. Vols. 
 
 20th N. T. S. M. 
 
 14th N. Y. S. M. 
 
 6th " 
 
 21st " Vols. 
 
 22nd " Vols 
 
 7th " " 
 
 23rd " 
 
 24th " 
 
 19th Ind. " 
 
 25th " 
 
 30th " " 
 
 FIFTH CORPS. GENERAL BANKS. 
 
 1st Maine Cavalry. 
 1st Vermont " 
 1st Michigan " 
 1st R. I. 
 
 28th Penn. Vols. 
 
 Cavalry. , 
 
 5th New York Cavalry, 
 8th 
 
 Keyes's Battalion Penn. Cavalry. 
 18 Cos. Maryland " 
 
 1 Squadron Virginia " 
 
 Unattached. 
 4th Reg't Potomac Home Guard (Maryland Vols.) 
 
 WILLIAMS'S DIVISION. 
 
 Artillery. 
 
 Best's Battery 
 Hampton's " 
 Thompson's " 
 Mathew's " 
 
 "F" 4th U. St, 
 Maryland 
 
 Knapp's " 
 McMahon's " 
 
 Ahercrombie's Brigade. 
 12th Mass. Vols. 
 2nd " 
 16th Ind, " 
 
 1st Potom. Home Brig. (Md. Vols. 
 1 Co. Zouaves d'Afrique (Penn. Vols 
 
 " F" Penn. 
 
 " M" 1st N. Y. 
 
 Penn. 
 
 N. Y. 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 — Brigade. 
 
 9th N. Y. S. M. 
 
 29th Penn. Vols. 
 
 27th Ind. " 
 
 3rd Wis. " 
 
 6 Napoleon guns. 
 
 4 10-pds. Parrott guns. 
 
 4 <. 
 
 6 3-in. ordnance 
 
 6 10-pds. Parrott 
 
 6 " 
 
 6 3-in. ordnance 
 
 Brigade. 
 
 28th N. Y. Vols. 
 5th Conn. 
 46th Penn. 
 1st Maryland' 
 
 12 th Ind. 
 
 13 th Mass. 
 
 Clark's Battery 
 Jenk's " 
 
 Davy's " 
 
 Huntington's" 
 
 Robinson's " 
 
 SHIELD'S DIVISION. 
 Artillery. 
 " E" 41h U. S. 6 10-pds. Parrott 
 
 " A" 1st Va. 
 
 "B" 1st " 
 " A" 1st Ohio 
 
 "L" 1st " 
 4th Ohio Infy 
 
 I 4 10-pds. Parrott ) 
 ^ j 2 6-pds. ) 
 
 2 10-pds. Parrott guns. 
 6 13-pds. James " 
 2 12-pds. Howitzers 
 
 4 6-pds. guns. 
 1 6-pds. gun. 
 
 ■ guns. 
 
 guns. 
 
u 
 
 APPENDIX B 
 
 • 
 
 
 Infantry. 
 
 
 Brigade. 
 
 Brigade. 
 
 Brigade. 
 
 14th Ind. Vols. 
 
 5th Ohio Vols. 
 
 •7 th Ohio Vols. 
 
 4th Ohio 
 
 62nd " 
 
 29th " " 
 
 8th " 
 
 66th " " 
 
 7th " 
 
 Tth Ya. " 
 
 13th Ind. " 
 
 1st Va. " 
 
 enh Ohio " 
 
 39th 111. " 
 
 11th Penn. " 
 
 84th Penn. " 
 
 
 Andrew Sharpshooters. 
 
 GENERAL WADSWORTH'S COMMAND. 
 
 Cavalry. 
 
 1st New Jersey Cavalry. At Alexandria. 
 4th Pennsylvania " East of the Capital. 
 
 10th New Jersey Vols. 
 
 104th N. T. Vols. 
 
 1st "Wis. Heavy Art'y. 
 
 3 Batteries N. Y. " 
 
 Depot of N. Y. Light Art'y 
 
 2nd D. C. A^ols. 
 
 26th Penn. " 
 
 26th N.Y. " 
 
 95th " " 
 
 94th ' " 
 
 88th Penn. 
 
 91st " " 
 
 4th N. Y. Art'y 
 
 112th Penn. Vols, 
 
 76th N. Y. " 
 
 59th " " 
 
 88th Penn. " 
 
 99th " 
 
 2nd N. Y. Light Art'y 
 
 Artillery and Infantry. 
 
 Bladensburg Road. 
 
 Kalorama Heights. 
 
 Fort " Cass," Va, 
 
 Forts " Ethan Allen" and " Marcy." 
 
 Camp " Barry." 
 
 Washington City. 
 
 " G" St. Wharf. 
 
 Fort Lyon. 
 
 Camp "Thomas." 
 
 Alexandria. 
 
 (Detachment) 
 
 (Detachment) 
 
 107th Penn. Vols. 
 
 54th " " 
 
 Dickerson's Light Art'y 
 
 86th N. Y. Vols. 
 
 88th Penn. " (Detachment) 
 
 14th Mass. 
 56th Penn. 
 
 (Heavy Art'y 
 
 Franklin Square Barracks. 
 Forts " Can-oil" and " Greble." 
 Fort "Saratoga." 
 
 " "Massachusetts." 
 
 " " Pennsylvania." 
 Fort " Good Hope." 
 
 " " Mahan." 
 Forts "Ward," "Worth," and 
 
 " Blenker." 
 Kendall Green. 
 
 East of the Capital. 
 
 r Forts "Albany," " Tellinghast," 
 - ' " Richardson," " Runyon," 
 
 "Jackson," "Barnard," "Craig," 
 
 " Scott." 
 
ORGANIZATION IN APRIL, 1862. 465 
 
 (Artillery and Infantry. Continued.) 
 4th U. S. Art'y (Detachment | i Fort " "Washington." 
 
 37th N. Y. Vols. (Detachment ) "i " 
 
 97th " " Fort " Corcoran." 
 
 101st " " 
 
 12th Va. " 
 91st N, Y. " 
 
 IN CAMP NEAR WASHINGTON. 
 
 6th New York Cavalry. Dismounted. 
 
 10th " " " 
 
 Swaim's '* " " 
 
 2nd Pennsylvania " " 
 
 (These troops, 3,359 men, were ordered to report to Col. Miles, command- 
 ing Rail Road Guard, to relieve 3,306 older troops, ordered to be sent to 
 Manassas to report to Gen. Abercrombie.) 
 
 GENERAL DIX'S COMMAND. (BALTIMORE.) 
 
 Cavalry. 
 1st Maryland Cavalry. Detachment of Car. Purnell Legion. 
 Artillery. 
 Battery "I" 2nd U. S. Artillery. 
 " — Maryland Artillery. 
 " "L" 1st New York Artillery. 
 2 Independent Batteries, Pennsylvania Artillery. 
 
 Infantry. 
 3rd New York Volunteers. 
 4th " " 
 
 11th Pennsylvania " 
 87th " " 
 
 111th " " 
 
 21st Massachusetts " (Detachment.) 
 
 2nd Delaware " 
 
 2nd Maryland " 
 
 1st Eastern Shore Home Guards (Maryland Volunteers.) 
 2nd " " " " " " 
 
 Purnell Legion " " 
 
 2 Battalions 
 
 Note. — Mr. Allen Pinkerton was the trustworthy and eiBcient chief of the 
 Secret Service Corps. He is mentioned at page 119 under his assumed name 
 Mr. E. J. Allen. 
 
 Capt. G. a. Custar, additional A. D. C. and Lieutenant U. S. Cavalry, was 
 added to the Staff of the Commanding General when on the Chickahominy. 
 His name should appear on page 62. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 ABBOTT, Lieut. H. L., 63. 
 Abercronibie, Gen., 137, 138, 
 139, UO. 
 Abert, Capt. W. S., 62. 
 Address to troops, 16, 22. 
 Advance from Fort Monroe, 156. 
 
 TO THE Chickahomixv, 186. 
 
 Into Virginia after Antietam, 426. 
 Allen, Mr. E. J., 119. 
 Alexander, Lieut. -Col. B. S., 63, 64. 
 
 Reports of, 147, 149, 176. 
 Alexandria, 50. 
 
 Transports ordered to, 69. 
 Allen's Field, 259. 
 Appointment and promotion of officers, 
 
 440. 
 Annapolis, 47. 
 
 Anderson, Southern Gen., 199, 204, 
 208, 211. 
 
 Forces under, 211. 
 Antietam, battle of, 373. 
 
 Plan for battle of, 375. 
 
 Preliminary position of troops, 
 375, 376. 
 
 Duration of battle of, 393. 
 
 Numbers engaged at, 393. 
 
 Condition of llio army after, 393. 
 
 Casualties at, 397. 
 
 Orders for renewal of battle, 396. 
 
 Enemy retire, 390. 
 
 Trophies of, 396. 
 
 Rebel forces at, 398. 
 
 U. S. forces at, 398. 
 
 Operations after, 399. 
 
 Map of, Frontispiece, 
 iirdor of volunteering, 6. 
 Arlington, 50. 
 Arms in Ohio, 7. 
 
 In Indiana, 7. 
 
 In Illinois, 7. 
 A.rmy, U. S., McClellan's estimate for 
 strength of, 46. 
 
 Actual strength, 48. 
 
 Ought to be regarded as perma- 
 nent, 440. 
 
 Army Corps, organization of, 53. 
 
 President's order, 58. 
 
 Order of McClellan organizing, 59. 
 
 Principle of, 116. 
 
 Postponement of, 119. 
 
 First Corps, 157, 160, 197, 198, 
 199, 200, 209, 345, 346, 347, 
 348, 350, 369, 402, 435, 436, 
 437, 438. 
 
 Losses at South Mountain 
 and Antietam, 402. 
 
 Second Corps, 157, 164, 188, 
 196, 216, 231, 236, 248, 256, 
 259, 260, 261, 262, 272, 320, 
 321, 323, 326, 327, 329, 333, 
 334, 345, 346, 347, 348, 350, 
 309, 373, 375, 376, 377, 379, 
 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 
 386, 387, 394, 395, 397, 398, 
 402, 404, 434, 435, 436, 437, 
 438. 
 
 Losses at South Mountain 
 and Antietam, 402. 
 
 Third Corps, 157, 159, 164, 188, 
 190, 196, 214, 216, 221, 231, 
 237, 242, 256, 260, 261, 272, 
 
 315, 316, 318, 322, 345. 
 Fourth Corps, 157, 158, 164, 
 
 165, 188, 196, 213, 214, 221, 
 236, 237, 255, 258, 259, 262, 
 263, 272, 273, 347, 437. 
 Fifth Corps, 187, 188, 206, 242, 
 245, 246, 247, 256, 258, 262, 
 263, 268, 269, 272, 273, 315, 
 
 316, 318, 345, 346, 347, 373, 
 375, 378, 387, 388, 389, 397, 
 398, 399, 411, 433, 435, 437, 
 438. 
 
 Sixth Corps, 187, 188, 236, 242, 
 247, 256, 262, 263, 272, 320, 
 321, 323, 324, 325, 329, 330, 
 332, 333, 335, 336, 345, .347, 
 348, 350, 376, 385, 386, 387, 
 397, 398, 411, 435, 436, 437. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 467 
 
 Ninth Corps, 347, 348, 350, 373, 
 375, 376, 388, 389, 390, 397, 
 398, 435, 436, 437, 438. 
 Eleventh Corps, 346, 436, 438. 
 Twelfth Corps, 347, 348, 350, 
 369, 373, 376, 377, 378, 379, 
 386, 387, 397, 398, 400, 401, 
 404, 433. 
 Army, rebel, number of, 122. 
 Army exhausted at Anlietam, 402. 
 Army of Potomac, strength of, 27th 
 Oct. 1861, 47. 
 
 Field guns, 30th Sept. 1861, 47. 
 Organization of, 53. 
 Strensith at different periods, 53. 
 Ariillerv of, July 28, 1861, 56. 
 Artillery of, March, 1862, 56. 
 Artillery of, June, 1862, 57. 
 Sanitary condition of, 66. 
 Fever in, 66. 
 
 Strength after withdrawal of Mc- 
 Dowell, 162. 
 Strength of, Oct. 25th, 1862, 430. 
 McClellan's views as to condition 
 
 of, 226. 
 Removed from McClellan's com- 
 mand, 339. 
 Report a history of, 448. 
 Reduction of, 443. 
 McClellan relieved from com- 
 mand, 438. 
 Position when McClellan was re- 
 lieved, 438. 
 Condition when McClellan was 
 
 relieved, 438. 
 Deserves nation's thanks, 445. 
 Army of Virginia to be formed, 241. 
 Arndt, Maj., 376. 
 Arrests, causeless, 91. 
 Artillery, armament of, 53. 
 Artillery troops, 52. 
 Artillery, organization of, 55. 
 Artillery force, July 28tli, 1861, 56. 
 Artillery ordered to Acquia Creek, 
 290. 
 
 Sent to Acquia Creek, 292. 
 Artillery, services of, 441. 
 Astor, Col. J. J., 61, 62. 
 Averell, Col., 119, 157, 179, 185, 273, 
 286, 289, 292, 316, 315, 317, 408, 
 436, 437. 
 
 Affair of, at Sycamore Church. 
 286. 
 Ayres, Capt., 265. 
 
 BABCOCK, Lieut. 0. E., 63. 
 Bache, Prof., 65. 
 Bailey, Col. G. D., 217, 222. 
 Baker, Gen., death of, 80. 
 Balloons, 76. 
 B \.ll's Bluff, 77. 
 Baltimore, 46, 47. 
 Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 961, 112. 
 Baltimore & Ohio R. R., destruction of 
 
 bridges of, 14. 
 Banks, Gen. N. P.. 59, 77, 113, 135, 
 140, 142, 144, 145, 150, 171, 
 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 235, 
 241, 323, 334, 347, 401, 431. 
 Placed in command at Washing- 
 ton, 347. 
 McClellan's orders to, 129. 
 In peril, 199. 
 At Strasburg, 201. 
 Barboursville, afflur at, 35. 
 Barker, Capt., 24. 
 Barker's Squadron, 32, 178, 179. 
 Barlow, Col., 383, 384. 
 Barnard, Gen. J. G., 62, 63, 111, 
 165, 172, 178, 247, 269, 332, 335, 
 339. 
 
 Report on Yorktown, 172. 
 Barnes, Capt., 141. 
 Barnes, Col., 399. 
 Barnett, Col., 14, 18. 
 Barnctt's Ohio Battery, 15, 18, 23, 32. 
 Barrett's Ferry, 315. 
 Barry, Gen. W. F., 52, 55, 178. 
 
 Letter of, 140. 
 Bartlett, Gen., 387. 
 Baton Rouge, McClellan's instructions 
 
 regarding, 93. 
 Battalion of Engineer troops, 63. 
 Batteries, rebel, on Potomac, 110, 115, 
 
 117. 
 Batteries at Coggin's Point, 285. 
 Battle of Williamsburg, 181. 
 Bayard, Gen., 430, 437, 438. 
 Baylor, Lieut. I. G., 72. 
 Beauregard, Southern Gen., 229, 238, 
 1 284. 
 Beaver Dam Creek, affair of,_244. 
 
 Position abandoned, 245. 
 Beckwith, Col. A., 70. 
 Bell, Col. Geo., 70. 
 Bell, Capt. W. H., 70. 
 Benham, Capt. H. W., 33, 36. 
 Benjamin, Lieut., 376. 
 Benson's battery, 179, 206. 
 
468 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Berdan, Col., 206. 
 
 Berlin, pontoon bridge at, 435. 
 
 Berry, Gen., 216, 217. 
 
 Beverly, 38. 
 
 Biddle, Col. C. J., 33. 
 
 Biddie, Capt. W. F., 61, 62. 
 
 Birney, Gen., 216, 218, 220. 
 
 Blanker, Gen. L., 59, 77, 137, 140, 
 141, 142, 160, 163, 170. 
 Withdrawn from McClellan, 134. 
 
 Bliss Capt., 415. 
 
 Bottom's Bridge, arrival at, 188. 
 
 Bottom's Bridge Ford, 196. 
 
 Bovven, Lieut. N., 64, 201. 
 
 Brackett's Ford bridge destroyed, 
 265. 
 
 Bragg. Southern Gen,, 284, 431. 
 
 Bramhall's battery, 262. 
 
 Branch, Southern Gen., 208, 211, 213. 
 
 Bridge trains, 63. 
 
 Bridges, eleven new, across Chicka- 
 hominy, 200. 
 
 Bridge at Antietam, Burnside's report, 
 391. 
 
 Bridge of canal boats at Harper's 
 Ferry, 113. 
 
 Brigades, provisional, 52. 
 Organization of, 53. 
 
 Brooks, Col., 259, 382, 383. 
 
 Brooks, Gen., 262, 386. 
 
 Brooks, Col., (Cox's Division,) 389. 
 
 Buckhannon occupied, 26. 
 
 Buchanan, Lieut-Col., 273. 
 
 Buell, Gen. D. C, 77, 105, 125, 230. 
 Instructions of McClellan to, 89, 
 90. 
 
 Burdsall, Capt., 24. 
 
 Burdsall's Ohio Cavalry, 24, 29, 32. 
 
 Burke, Col., 384. 
 
 Burns, Gen., 36, 251, 262, 267. 
 
 Burnside, Gen. A. E., 52, 105, 278, 
 283, 285, 290, 296, 304, 306, 309, 
 310, 311, 315, 316, 322, 323, 324, 
 325, 326, 327, 330, 340, 341, 342, 
 348, 350, 369, 373. 375, 376, 388, 
 389, 390, 391, 395, 409, 439. 
 
 Expedition to North Carolina, 82. 
 report of operations at Antietam, 
 
 391. 
 Placed in command of army of 
 Potomac, 438. 
 
 Butler, Gen. B. F., 93. 
 
 Sent to New Orleans, 93. 
 
 Butterfield, Gen., 206, 207, 247. 
 
 CADETS at Military Academy, in- 
 crease of, 441. 
 Caldwell, Mr., 75. 
 Caldwell, Gen., 259, 271, 382, 383, 
 
 385. 
 Campaign in "Western Virginia, 5. 
 In the West, 82. 
 On Peninsula proposed, 104. 
 Of Gen. Pope, 321. 
 Into Virginia after Antietam, 
 
 plan of, 435. 
 Conduct of, 441. 
 Camp equipage deficient, 401. 
 Campbell, Col, 408, 432. 
 Canal boats, too large for work, 1 14. 
 Capital, President unwilling to uncover, 
 
 193. 
 Captains commanding regiments, 403. 
 Carrick's Ford, affair of, 33, 37. 
 
 , Gen. S., 52, 59, 77, 154, 155, 
 164, 169, 178, 181, 182, 187, 190, 
 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 222, 242, 
 324, 327, 329, 339. 
 Cavalry, equipment of, 53. 
 Arming of, 54. 
 Losses in seven days, 292. 
 Ordered to Acquia Creek, 290. 
 Deficiency of, 411. 
 McClellan's correspondence with 
 
 Halleck about, 418. 
 Affair at Manassas Gap, 437. 
 Affair at Barber's Cross Roads, 
 
 437. 
 Affair at Salem, 437. 
 Services ofj 441. 
 Centreville, enemy's works at, 123. 
 Cerro Gordo, manoeuvre of, 29. 
 Chambliss, Capt., 209. 
 Chandler, Senator, speech of, 141. 
 Change of base, preparation for, 241. 
 
 To James River, 254. 
 Charles City Cross Roads, 265. 
 Charleston, 43, 91. 
 Cheat Mountain Pass, 32, 38, 39. 
 Cheat River, 33. 
 
 Cherrystone Inlet, McClellan visits, 
 311. 
 
 McClellan returns, 313. 
 Chesapeake Bay, lower, base for oper- 
 ating on Richmond, 104. 
 Chickahominy, advance to, 186. 
 Description of, 189. 
 Bridges over, destroyed, 196. 
 New bridges to be built, 200. 
 
INDEX 
 
 469 
 
 Chickahominy, why whole army not 
 thrown over upon arrival, 200. 
 Bridges over, commenced, 201, 
 Chief of Staff, Gen. McClellan's, 60. 
 Cliief Engineer, 62. 
 City Point, enemy burns wharves, 312. 
 Civilians, interference of, 441, 
 Civil war une.Kpected, 5. 
 Clark's battery, 368, 392. 
 Clarke, Col. H. F., 70, 256. 
 Close of the Peninsular campaign, 275. 
 Clothing of army deficient, 401. 
 Delays in receipt of, 411. 
 Tabular statement of receipt, 417. 
 Coal Harbor, arrival at, 183. 
 Head-quarters at, 196. 
 Coggin's Point, batteries at, 285. 
 Occupied, 286. 
 Abandoned, 315. 
 Cogswell, Col., prisoner, 80. 
 Colburn, Col., A. V., 61, 268. 
 Cole's Mill, 50. 
 Commandant of general head-quarters, 
 
 74. 
 Commander of an army proper judge 
 
 of its condition, 426. 
 Committee on conduct of the war, 81, 
 
 141, 145, 146. 
 Committees of Congress, 441, 
 Companies without commanding offi- 
 cers, 403. 
 Comstock, Lieut. C. R., 64, 147, 148. 
 Conciliatory measures, 442. 
 
 CONCLUSIO>J, 442. 
 
 Condition of the army after Antietam, 
 393. 
 
 When McClellan was relieved, 
 
 438. 
 Conduct of campaigns, 441. 
 Conrad, Capt. F. A., 266. 
 Constitutional rights to be respected, 
 
 89, 90, 
 Contrabands, 120. 
 Cooke, Col. P. St. G., 180, 247. 
 Cook's battery, 368, 392. 
 Co-operation of navy, 156. 
 Cooper's battery, 264, 266, 369, 
 Corps, Army : See Army Corps. 
 Corps commanders, thanks to, 443. 
 Cothran's battery, 378, 380, 386. 
 Cotton. Mississippi movement effect on 
 
 42. ■ 
 Couch, Gen., 59, 158, 164, 178, 181, 
 
 182, 187, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 
 
 219, 236, 252, 253, 270, 271, 273, 
 324, 328, 336, 337, 338, 341, 345, 
 347, 348, 350, 376, 385, 396, 398, 
 399, 400, 403, 434. 
 
 Council of war at Fairfax C. H., 127. 
 
 Cowan's battery, 386. 
 
 Cox, Gen. J. D., 27, 34, 35, 330, 332, 
 333, 335, 389, 393, 407, 408. 
 
 Craig, Capt. W., 36. 
 
 Cram, Col. T. J., 155. 
 
 Crawford, Gen., 377, 378. 
 
 Crispin, Lieut. S., 3G. 
 
 Crooke, Col. 391, 392, 408, 
 
 Cross, Col., 383. 
 
 Cross, Lieut. C. B., 63, 
 
 Crossman, Col. 414. 
 
 Crounse, Capt., 141. 
 
 Curtin, Gov., 350. 
 
 CuUum, Gen., 330. 
 
 Cumberland, arrangements for per- 
 manent occupation of, 432. 
 
 Custer, Capt. G. A. See note to Ap- 
 pendix B., 466. 
 
 DAHN, Capt., 24. 
 Dana, Gen., 218, 379, 380. 
 Dana, Capt. J. J., 68. 
 Darell's battery, 392. 
 Davis, Major N. II., 396. 
 Davis, Col., 430. 
 Davis, Hon. Garrett, 9. 
 Defense of Washington, 127. 
 Defect in our armies, 440. 
 Delay in December, 1861, 100. 
 Department of Ohio organized, 8. 
 Operations in, 37. 
 McClellan's instructions to Buell, 
 89, 90. 
 Departments, various, created, 125. 
 Depots of instruction, 441. 
 Depredations, suppression of, 73, 
 Dennison, Gov., 6, 11, 
 
 Patriotism of, 7. 
 Dennison, camp, 11. 
 Destruction of military power of Con- 
 federates necessary, 442. 
 DeRussy's battery, 267. 
 DeRussy, Capt., 237. 
 Devins, Gen,, 215, 218. 
 Diedrich, Capt., 249, 264. 
 Dickerson, Capt. J. H., 19, 36. 
 DireclioD of campaigns, 441. 
 Distribution of regiments, 58, 
 See Appendix A, B, 
 
470 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Dix, Gen. John A., 52, 71, 139. 
 Doubleday, Gen., 377, 378. 
 Dougherty, Mr., 147. 
 Drairisville, affair at, 150. 
 Dryer, Capt., 389. 
 Duane, Capt. J. C, 63, 65, 315. 
 Dumont, Col., 18. 
 Dunn, Col. W. M., 36. 
 
 EASTON'S battery, 150. 
 Eckert, Maj. Thos. J., 75, 76. 
 Klkwater, 38. 
 
 Emory, Gen., 179, 182, 206, 209. 
 Enemy's works at Manassas, 122. 
 Losses in Western Virginia, 34. 
 Numbers of, before Richmond, 
 
 196. 
 Numbers of, June 26, 1862, 239. 
 Pope reports evacuating Rich- 
 mond, 287. 
 Pursuit of^ after South Mountain, 
 
 373. 
 Position of, at Antietam, 374. 
 Position of, when McClellan was 
 relieved, 439. 
 Engineers, 62. 
 
 Engineer troops, regular, 63. 
 Volunteer, 63. 
 Brigade, volunteer, 330. 
 Losses in seven days, 272. 
 Engineers, topographical, 64. 
 Engineer troops needed, 441. 
 Equipage, tabular statement of re- 
 ceipt of, 417. 
 Evacuation of Manas.sas, 118. 
 Ewell, Southern Gen., 126, 210, 234, 
 
 235, 239, 439. 
 Examination of deserters, etc., 120, 
 
 121. 
 Excelsior brigade, 221. 
 Expedition, Burnsido's, to North Car- 
 olina, 82. 
 
 FAIRCHILD, Col., 368. 
 Fair Oaks, battle of, 214. 
 Results of, and losses at, 221. 
 Enemy's losses at, 221. 
 Reasons why enemy not pursued 
 
 after, 221, 223. 
 Condition of bridges during and 
 after, 223. 
 Farquhar, Lieut., F. U., 64. 
 Femandina, Lieut., 93. 
 Field batteries, composition o^ 55. 
 First Period, 37. 
 
 First corps withdrawn, 160. 
 Flood in Chickahominy, 201. 
 Floyd. Southern Gen., 27. 
 Fortress Monroe, base of operations, 
 105. 
 Arrival of McClellan at, 154. 
 Advance from, 156. 
 Fox, Ass't Sec'y., G. V., 146. 
 Force reduced, 134. 
 
 Reduced again, 155. 
 Reduced again, 160. 
 Of enemy, 122. 
 Forsyth, Capt. J. W., 73. 
 Fort Runyon, 50. 
 Ellsworth, 50. 
 Corcoran, 50. 
 
 Magruder, at Williamsburg, 179. 
 
 Fortification of Manassas Junction, 
 
 orders for, 147. 
 
 of Manassas Junction, neglected, 
 
 147. 
 
 Fortification of Yorktown, Barnard's 
 
 report, 172. 
 Fourth Period, 343. 
 Franklin, Gen., 59, 77, 170, 175, 176, 
 183, 186, 187, 188, 196, 236, 243, 
 246, 250. 252, 253. 256, 259, 260, 
 261, 262, 263, 205, 268, 269, 319, 
 324, 326, 327, 329, 330, 331, 332, 
 333, 334, 335, 336, 348, 350, 373, 
 370, 385, 387, 399, 403, 411, 413, 
 416. 
 Frank's batteiy, 386. 
 French, Gen., 219, 220, 221, 248, 249, 
 253, 259, 262, 380, 381, 382, 383, 
 385, 386. 
 Fremont, Gen, J. C, 125, 134, 137, 
 
 142, 200, 225, 230, 235, 241. 
 Front Royal, 199. 
 
 Line broken at, 199. 
 Occupation of, advised, 429. 
 Funds, government, wanted in the 
 West, 7. 
 
 GAINES'S Mill, battle of; 246. 
 Results of and losses at, 249. 
 Galveston, McOlellan's instructions 
 
 regarding, 93. 
 Gantt, Colonel T. T., 61, 62, 74. 
 Garnett, Gen. R. S. (Southern), 19, 25, 
 31, 32. 
 
 Death of; 33. 
 Garrison necessary for Washington, 
 46 
 
INDEX. 
 
 471 
 
 Geary, Gen., 137, 139, 202, 203. 
 
 General officers, tlianks to, 443. 
 
 General considerations, 440. 
 
 General review, 443. 
 
 Gentry, Capt. W. P., 73. 
 
 Georgia, McClellan's instructions to 
 
 Sherman, 91. 
 Gibbon, Gen. John, 369. 
 Gibson's battery, 180. 
 Gibson, Capt, 388. 
 Glendale, 268. 
 Glennville, attacked by the enemy, 
 
 28. 
 Golding's farm, affair of, 256. 
 Goldsborough, Admiral, 146, 156, 
 
 163, 196, 279. 
 Gordon, Gen., 377, 379, 380,435. 
 Gordon, Capt. 201. 
 Gorman, Gen., 80, 379, 218. 
 
 Governors of Western States, 7. 
 
 Grafton, 38. 
 
 Occupied, 38. 
 
 Camp of secessionists at, 13. 
 
 Graham, Capt., 384. 
 
 Granger, Capt. B., 70. 
 
 Green, Gen., 377, 378, 379. 
 
 Gregg, Col., 338. 
 
 Grier, Lieut.-Col., 180. 
 
 Griffin, Gen., 206, 207, 244, 246, 247, 
 399. 
 
 Grimmis, Capt., 249. 
 
 Guaymas, 42. 
 
 Guns, proportion of, 55. 
 
 Gun-boats assist at Malvern Hill, 270. 
 
 Gun-boats on Mississippi river, recom- 
 mended by McClellan, 11. 
 
 HAINES, Lieut., 388. 
 Halieck, Gen., 105, 125, 225, 
 229, 230, 288, 290, 291, 332, 340, 
 345, 348. 
 
 Instructions of McClellan to, 87. 
 Advises abandonment of Penin- 
 sular campaign, 299. 
 Views of, about Maryland cam- 
 paign, 349, 350, 351, 352. 
 Haller, Maj. G. 0., 374, 339. 
 Hamilton, Gen., 59, 135, 152, 153, 
 
 157, 158, 169, 164. 
 Hammerstein, Maj. H. Von, 61, 183 
 
 184. 
 Hampton's battery, 378. 
 Hancock, Gen. W. S., 181, 183, 184, 
 262, 384, 385, 386, 388. 
 
 Hanover Court House, b.^ttle of 
 205. 
 
 Results of, 208. 
 Losses at, 208. 
 McClellan's dispatch to President 
 
 about, 208. 
 President's dispatches to McClel- 
 lan, 210, 212. 
 Enemy's force engaged at, 208. 
 Hardie, Col. J. A., 61. 
 Harland, Col., 392. 
 Harper's Ferry, 40, 46, 200. 
 Operations at, 113. 
 Fortified, 406. 
 Permanent occupation of, advised, 
 
 428. 
 Arrangements for, 432. 
 Harrison, Capt, 207. 
 Harrison's Landing, selected as posi- 
 tion, 264. 
 
 Movement to, 272. 
 Arrival at, 274. 
 Evacuation of, 315. 
 Hartsuff, Gen., 378. 
 Hart's farm, 29. 
 Hatch, Gen., 369. 
 Haupt, Col. H., 324, 334. 
 Haxall's supply trains sent to, 263. 
 
 McClellan examines, 264. 
 Hays, Col., 178, 267. 
 Hazzard's battery, 259, 262, 265. 
 Hazzard, Capt., 257. 
 
 Mortally wounded, 265. 
 Heintzelmau, Gen. S. P., 58, 59, 77. 
 152, 153, 157, 158, 159, 164, 165, 
 176, 178, 181, 182, 184, 188, 190, 
 196, 214, 216, 218, 220, 221, 222, 
 236 237, 242, 250, 252, 253, 256, 
 260, 261, 262, 265, 267, 268, 269, 
 270, 271, 315, 324, 325, 326, 430. 
 Report of Savage's Station, 260. 
 Heroism of the army, 444. 
 Hexamer, Capt., 385. 
 Hill, Gen., 23, 24, 26, 33, 34. 
 
 Instructions to, 24. 
 Hill Southern Gen. A. P., 265, 267, 
 
 283, 392, 439. 
 Hill, Southern Gen. D. H., 215, 
 
 221, 250, 398, 439. 
 Hitchcock, Gen. E. A., on defense of 
 Washington, 143, 144. 
 
 Statement before committee, 145 
 Hodges, Capt H. C, 109. 
 Hogan, Capt., 141. 
 
472 
 
 INDEX, 
 
 Hooker, Gen., 59, 76, 140, 155, 164, 
 169, 170, 178, 181, 182, 183, 185, 
 186, 187, 214, 216, 219, 220, 237, 
 250, 265, 267, 270, 288, 290, 291, 
 368, 369, 370, 373, 375, 376, 377, 
 378, 380, 386, 387, 394. 
 
 Horses, Col. Myers's report on, 420. 
 Numbers in army of Potomac, 
 418. 
 
 Howard, Gen., 127, 219, 220, 379, 
 380. 
 
 Howe, Capt., 24. 
 
 Howe's battery, 30, 32. 
 
 Hudson, Col. E. M. K., 61, 218. 
 
 Huger, Southern Gen. B., 155, 215, 
 250. 
 
 Humphreys, Gen. A. A., 64, 65, 376, 
 396. 
 
 Hunt, Col. H. J., 77, 155. 
 
 Hunter, Gen., 125, 278. 
 
 Hunting Creek, 50. 
 
 ILLINOIS, arms in, 7. 
 Illinois cavalry, Barker's squad- 
 ron, 24, "S2, 178, 179. 
 Illinois infantry, Chicago rifles, 24. 
 Incidexts, Military, 150. 
 Indiana, arms in, 7. 
 Individual instances of bravery, 442. 
 Infantry, regular, assigned to Porter's 
 
 corps, 55. 
 Infantry, regular, 54. 
 
 30th August, 1861, and 30th 
 April, 1862, 54. 
 Ingalls, Col. R., 68, 69, 70, 109, 243, 
 
 302, 305, 306, 309, 314, 411. 
 Instruction, depots of, 441. 
 Irish brigade, 382, 384, 385. 
 Irwin, Capt. R. B., 61. 
 Irwin, Col., 14, 386. 
 
 JACKSON, Miss., McClellan directs 
 Butler concerning, 93. 
 Jackson, Southern Gen. T. J., 135, 136, 
 137, 138, 142, 143, 145, 150, 202, 
 204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213, 225, 
 230, 232, 234, 235, 238, 239, 240, 
 242, 245, 290, 313, 350, 398, 403, 
 439. 
 James River closed by Merrimac, 118, 
 150. 
 
 Impossible to use as base, 194. 
 McClellan desired to use as base, 
 195. 
 
 Preparations for change of base 
 to, 241. 
 
 Change of base to, 254. 
 Jamison, Gen., 216, 217, 218. 
 Jenkins, Southern Gen., 398. 
 Johnston, Southern Gen. J. E. 137, 
 
 155, 161, 163, 185, 196, 215, 221. 
 Joinville, Prince de, 62. 
 Jones, Lieut. J. W., 73. 
 Judge Advocate, 74. 
 
 KANAWHA District, Cox placed 
 in command of, 27. 
 
 Kanawha Valley, 37. 
 
 Kearney, Gen. P. A., 178, 182, 183, 
 185, 187, 214, 216, 219, 220, ^7, 
 250, 265, 270, 267, 270, 323, 324. 
 
 Kelly, Gen. B. P., 14, 17, 18, 235, 
 408, 432, 434, 435. 
 
 Kelton, Col., 343, 345. 
 
 Kentucky, state of political afifairs, 9. 
 Policy of Union leaders in, 9. 
 McClellan's instructions to Buell 
 in, 89, 90. 
 
 Key, Col. Thos. M., 36, 61, 74, 390. 
 
 Keyes, Gen. E. D., 58, 59, 146, 158, 
 159, 160, 164, 165, 172, 181, 188, 
 196, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 221, 
 222, 236, 237, 250, 252, 255, 256, 
 258, 203, 270, 27.3, 320, 350. 
 Letter to Hon. I. Harris, 105. 
 
 Kenlej^, Gen., 234, 430, 432, 435. 
 
 Kern's battery, 264, 266. 
 
 Kimball, Lt.-Col, 218. 
 
 Kimball, Gen., 380, 381, 384. 
 
 King, Gen., 59, 210, 235, 241. 
 
 Kingsbury, Capt. C. P., 71, 72. 
 
 Kirby, Lieut., 218. 
 
 Kirkland, Capt. Jos., 36, 61, 62. 
 
 Knapp's battery, 378, 379. 
 
 Knierim, Capt., 249, 264. 
 
 LANDER, Gen. F. "W., 36, 59, 113, 
 115. 
 Operations of, 150. 
 Death of, 150. 
 Langner, Capt., 376. 
 Lansing, Col., 206. 
 Lecomptc, Maj. F., 61. 
 Lee, Col, 218. 
 
 Lee, Southern Gen. R. E., 13, 232, 
 335, 351, 352, 398, 403, 427, 428, 
 431. 
 Lee, Fitzhugh, Southern Gen., 331, 340. 
 Lee's Mills, enemy at, 159. 
 
INDEX 
 
 473 
 
 Leesburg, 40. 
 
 Letcher, Gov., (Southern), 12, 113. 
 Letter of Gen. Keyes to Senator Hams, 
 165. , 
 
 Of President, promising to send 
 
 McDowell, 193. 
 Of Gen. McClellan, inquiring his 
 authority over McDowell's 
 troops, 196. 
 Reply thereto, 199. 
 To the President, July 1, 1862, 
 280. 
 Letterman, Surgeon J., 65, 67. 
 Locke, Capt. F., 141. 
 Lot'way approaches to bridges, 200. 
 Lon<'street, Southern Gen., 215, 221, 
 
 250, 265, 267, 283, 398, 438, 439. 
 Loomis, Capt., 24, 25. 
 Loomis's battery, 30, 32. 
 Losses in Seven Days, 272. 
 Losses in Western Virginia, 34. 
 Louisiana, McClellan's instructions to 
 
 Butler, 93. 
 Lowe, Col., 35. 
 Lowe, Prof., 76. 
 Lowell, Capt. 0. R., 62. 
 
 MACOMB, Col. Jno. "W., 64, 65. 
 Macfeely, Capt. R , 36. 
 Magruder, Southern Gen. J. B., 105, 
 
 154, 155. 
 Major-General, grade of, 53. 
 Malvern Hill, Keyes sent to occupy, 
 258. 
 Key to operations, 264. 
 Enemy appear at, 268. 
 Battle of, 269. 
 Hooker sent to, 288. 
 "Withdrawn from, 291. 
 Maps. Battle of Antietam, frontis- 
 piece. 
 The Peninsula, to face page 154. 
 Siege of Yorktown, to face 176. 
 Vicinity of Richmond, " 360. 
 Marcy, Gen. R. B., 36, 60, 278, 279, 
 
 308.. 
 Marauding, suppression of, 73. 
 Martin, Capt, 207. 
 Manassas, first battle of, 38, 44. 
 Manassas, reasons for not advancing 
 on, 100. 
 Rebel evacuation of; 118. 
 March toward, 118. 
 Enemy's works at, 122. 
 Orders to fortify, 147. 
 
 Manassas Junction, intrenchment of, 
 
 429. 
 Mansfield, Gen., 373, 376, 377, 387. 
 
 Death of, 378. 
 Munther, Capt. F. R., U9. 
 Maps, incorrect, 157. 
 Martindale, Gen., 206, 207, 244, 
 
 247. 
 Maryland campaign, 346. 
 
 Nature of, 426. 
 Maryland Heights occupied, 401. 
 Mason, Capt. W. P., 61, 62. 
 McAlester, Lieut. M. D., 64, 122. 
 McCall, Gen., 59, 77, 150, 228, 229, 
 230 231, 232, 242, 244, 247, 356, 
 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 277, 314, 
 315. 
 
 Occupies Drainesville, 78. 
 Falls back, 79. 
 
 Report of Charles City Cross- 
 roads, 266. 
 McClellan, Gen. G. B., 
 
 Maj.-Gen. of Ohio Vols., 6. 
 Assigned to command of depart- 
 ment of Ohio, 11. 
 Goes to Western Virginia, 19. 
 Turns over command to Gen. 
 
 Rosecrans, 35. 
 Called to Washington, 35, 38. _ 
 Assumes command of the division 
 
 of the Potomac, 38. 
 Memorandum to the President, 39. 
 At Edward's Ferry, 82. 
 At Harper's Ferry, 113. 
 At Fairfax Court House, 124. 
 Relieved of command-in-chief, 125. 
 At Alexandria, 134. 
 Embarks for Fort Monroe, 154. 
 At Yorktown, 164. 
 At Williamsburgh, 184. 
 On the Chickaliominy, 186. 
 At Hanover Court House, 208. _ 
 Desires to lay before President his 
 views as to general condition of 
 affairs, 233. 
 President requests his opinion, 23. 
 Writes letter to President, 280. 
 At Malvern, 264. 
 At Harrison's Landing, 274. 
 Crosses Chesapeake Bay to Cher- 
 rystone Inlet, 311. 
 Returns to Harrison's Landing, 
 
 313. 
 Leaves Harrison's Bar, 315. 
 Goes to Acquia Creek, 321. 
 
474 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 To Alexandria, 323. 
 Deprived of army, 329. 
 In command of less than one hun- 
 dred men, 342. 
 In Washington, 343. 
 Ordered to take command of de- 
 fenses of Wasliington, 344. 
 And of all the troops, 345. 
 Crosses the Potomac, 346. 
 At Alexandria, 346. 
 Leaves Washington for Marj-land 
 
 campaign, 347. 
 At South Mountain, 367. 
 At Antietam, 374. 
 At Berlin, 4:!6. 
 At Warrenton, 438. 
 Relieved of command, 438. 
 McClellan. Capt. Artiiur, 61. 
 McCook, Col. R. L., 28. 
 McDowell, Gen. I., 50, 64, 58, 59, 77, 
 143, 152, 170, 176. 193, 194, 195, 
 196, 197, 198, 199,' 200, 201, 202, 
 205, 306, 212, 213, 225, 228, 230, 
 231, 232, 235, 241, 242, 323, 346. 
 Ordered to join McClellan, 193. 
 To retain command of department 
 
 of Rappahaimock, 194. 
 Secrotar}' of War's instructions 
 
 to, 195. 
 Official order to join Gen. McClel- 
 lan, 195. 
 Gen. McClellan's authority over 
 
 troops of, 196, 198. 
 To move positively, 199. 
 Cheering news of his advance, 
 
 199. 
 Sent to Front Royal, 202. 
 Never came, 445. 
 McDowell's corps, intended u.se of, at 
 York town, 152. 1 
 
 " Withdrawn from Peninsular cam- I 
 paign, 160. j 
 
 Mclntosli, Capt., 286. j 
 
 McLean, Capt. N. II., 35. l 
 
 McMahon, Capt. M. T., 61, 141. ' 
 
 McMillen, Capt. Jas., 73. i 
 
 McMullins's battery, 392. 
 McQuade, Col, 206, 207. 
 Meade, Gen.. 242, 243. 246, 247, 
 264, 368, 369. 377, 394. 
 
 Communications from, concern- 
 ing Antietam, 394. 
 Meagher, Gen., 219, 248, 249, 253, 
 
 271, 330, 331, 382, 384. ! 
 
 Mechanicsville occupied, 190. i 
 
 Medical Department, 65. 
 Difficulties in, 65. 
 Improvements in, 68. 
 Medical director, 65. 
 Mehafifey, Lieut. C. D., 73. 
 Meigs, Gen., 416, 420, 421. 
 Memorandum, Gen. McClellau to tlio 
 
 President, 59. 
 Merit, true ground of promotion, 440. 
 Merrimac, the, 118, 156. 
 
 Neutralization of, 145, 146, 156. 
 Merrill, Lieut., 64, 174. 
 Michigan artillery, Loomis's battery, 
 
 24, 25, 26, 28. 
 Mississippi river, mouth of, McClel- 
 lan'.s instructions regarding, 93. 
 I Mississippi, department of, created, 125. 
 Missouri, arms in, 6. 
 Miles, Col., 406. 
 Military Incidents, 150. 
 Military Operations, organization 
 
 and general conduct of, 440. 
 Military academy, increase of cadets, 
 
 441. 
 Mobile, 43. 
 
 McClellan's instructions regard- 
 ing, 93. . 
 Monitor, the, and Merrimac, 118. 
 Montgomery, 43. 
 Morozowi, Capt., 141. 
 Morell, Gen., 206, 207, 244, 246, 
 269, 322, 376, 387, 388, 389, 395, 
 433. 
 Morris, Col., Dwight, 380, 385. 
 Morris, Gen. T. A., 17, 18, 23, 24, 27, 
 32, 33. 
 
 Instruction to, 24, 27. 
 Morton, Gov., 11. 
 Mott, Capt., 256. 
 
 Mountain department created, 125. 
 Movement TO Peninsula, 151. 
 Towards James River, 262. 
 To Harrison's Landing, 272. 
 Muhlen burg's battery, 392. 
 Murphy, Capt. W. R., 70. 
 Myor, Maj. Albert J., 74, 75. 
 Myers, Lieut. -Col. F., 421. 
 Report on horses, 420. 
 
 NAGLEE, Gen., 184, 190, 213, 215, 
 216, 222, 263, 265. 
 Reconnoissance of, 213. 
 Nashville, McClellan's designs on, 100. 
 Nation, not prepared for the war, 5. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 475 
 
 Navy Department, asked to watch 
 
 Potomac, 110. 
 Navy, co-operation of, desired, 151. 
 
 Co-operation of, 156. 
 New Bridge, arrival at, 188. 
 
 Reconaoissance near, 200. 
 New Jersey, First Brigade, 2(57. 
 New Mexico, 42. 
 New Orleans, 43. 
 
 Expedition to, 93. 
 Newton, Gen., 186, 387. 
 North Carolina expedition, 82. 
 North Carolina, (rebel,) 4th Regiment, 
 
 383. 
 Northern approach to Richmond could 
 
 not be abandoned, 201. 
 
 OHIO, arms in, 6. 
 Regiments, 6. 
 Regiments in service of state of, 8. 
 Troops, disposition o^ 11 . 
 Ohio River, measures advised for de- 
 fense of, 10. 
 One gun battery, affair of, 177. 
 Operations iu west and south, 87. 
 In Shenandoah Valley, 135. 
 Before Richmond, 189, 213. 
 After Antietam, 399. 
 Orchard Station, Sumner at, 259. 
 Ord, Gen., at Drainesville, 150. 
 Order organizing array corps, 59. 
 
 President's general war. No. 1, 
 
 96. 
 President's general. No. 2, 116. 
 President's general, No. 3, 117. 
 Withdrawing First Corps, 1(30. 
 Orders to Gen. Banks, 129. 
 Gen. Wadsworth, 130. 
 Gen. McDowell to join Gen. 
 McClellan, 195. 
 Ordnance department, 71. 
 
 Quality of, 72. 
 Organization of Army, 00. 
 Organization and General Con- 
 duct OF Military Operations, 
 440. 
 Orleans, Capt. L. P. d', 61, 62. 
 
 Capt. R. d', 62. 
 Osborne's battery, 262. 
 
 PALMER, Gen., 215, 216, 217, 
 236. 
 Panuco River, 42. 
 Patrick, Gen. M. R., 74. 
 Patterson, Gen., 20. 
 
 Peck, Gen. J., 182, 215, 216, 217, 
 
 218, 219, 316, 405. 
 Pegram, Col, (Southern), 25, 29, 30, 
 
 31. 
 Peninsula, movement to, 151. 
 Peninsular Campaign proposed, 
 104. 
 Plan of; 132. 
 Frustrated, 161. 
 Abandonment of, 295. 
 McClellan's views on, 295. 
 Close of the, 275. 
 Point of termination of, 317. 
 Pennsylvania, troops e.xpected after 
 Antietam, 395. 
 
 Did not arrive, 396. 
 Pennsylvania Reserves, 377, 378. 
 Pensacola, 43. 
 Period First, 37. 
 
 Second, Part I., 151. 
 Second, Part II., 189 
 Third, 275. 
 Fourth, 343. 
 Perryvillo, depot at, 68. 
 Pettit, Capt., 219, 259, 374. 
 Pettit's battery, 259, 262, 265. 
 Phillippi, affair of, 18, 37. 
 Pinkerton, Mr. Allen. See note to 
 
 Appendi.x B, 465. 
 Plan of entire war, McCleUan's, 42, 
 
 44. 
 Plan of campaign, McClellan's, 98. 
 Plan, want of, 99.- 
 Plan of campaign on Peninsula, 132. 
 Pleasonton, Gen. A., 74, 288, 317, 
 373, 385, 337, 383, 389, 393, 399, 
 408, 409, 411, 435, 436, 437, 438, 
 439. 
 
 Report on Stuart's raid, 410. 
 Report on position, 7 th Nov., 
 
 1862, 439. 
 Attacked by Longstreet, 439. 
 Poe, Lieut. 0. M., 28, 30, 36. 
 Poland, Capt., 389. 
 Political objects of campaigns, 441. 
 Pope, Gen. J., 287, 296, 299, 300, 
 301, 304, 306, 312, 316, 319, 322, 
 323, 325. 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 
 331, 332, 334, 336, 337, 338, 340, 
 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 401, 
 420, 421, 431, 446. 
 Campaign of, 321. 
 Position of army, Oct., 1362, 76. 
 
 When McClellan was relieved, 
 438. 
 
476 
 
 INDEX 
 
 Potomac, banks of, batteries on, 96. 
 Enemy's batteries on, 110, 115, 
 
 117. 
 Return to, 315. 
 Potomac, Upper, defense o^ 428. 
 Porter, G-en. Andrew, 51, 72. 
 Porter, Col. A. P., 70. 
 Porter, Gen. F. J., 52, 55, 59, 77, 
 152, 153, 157, 159, 164, 178, 186, 
 187, 188, 196, 206, 207, 208, 210, 
 211, 212, 213, 237, 242, 243, 245, 
 246, 247, 248, 230, 251, 253, 254, 
 256, 258, 262, 263, 268, 270, 271, 
 273,315,322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 
 330, 343, 344, 346, 350, 373, 375, 
 387, 388, 399, 411, 416, 433. 
 Porterfield, Southern Col., 13, 14. 
 Preparations to move from Washing- 
 ton, 114. 
 Presidext's first call for volunteers, 5. 
 General war order No. 1, 96. 
 General war order No. 1, not en- 
 forced, 107. 
 Special order No. 1, 97. 
 Plans for movement of the army, 
 
 97. 
 Answer to McClellan's plan, 98. 
 Proposes to bridge Potomac, 
 
 107. 
 General war order No. 2, 116. 
 General war order No. 3, 117. 
 Order relieving McGlellan of the 
 
 comraand-in-chief, 124. 
 Promises that McDowell shall join, 
 
 199. 
 Suspends McDowell's movement, 
 
 200. 
 Assents to McClellan's desire to 
 lay his views before him, 233. 
 McClellan's interview with, 343, 
 
 345. 
 Visits army of Potomac, 407. 
 Orders McGlellan to cross Poto- 
 mac, 407. 
 Thanks to the, 441. 
 Prim, Gen., 230. 
 Prime, Capt. P. E., 149. 
 Prisoners to be examined, 120, 121. 
 Proclamation to Western Virginians, 
 
 15, 21. 
 Proclamations, Gen. McClellan on, 86. 
 Promotion, rules for, 440. 
 Provisional brigades, 52. 
 Provost Marshal's Department, 
 72. 
 
 Provost Marshal, duties of, 73. 
 Pulaski, Fort, expedition against, 91. 
 
 QUARTER-MASTER'S Depart- 
 ment, 63. 
 Queen's Creek, 179. 
 
 RADOWITZ, Col. Paul Von, 61. 
 Raid, Stuart's, into Maryland,408. 
 Ramsey, Adjutant, 217. 
 Randall's battery, 264, 266. 
 Randall, Capt., 388. 
 Ransom, Southern Gen., 398. 
 Rappahannock, department ofj 197. 
 Raymond, Capt. E. A., 62. 
 Rebel army, numbers of, 122. 
 Rebel forces at Antietam, 398. 
 Rebel batteries on Potomac, 110, 115, 
 
 117. 
 Reconnoissance, a, 125. 
 Recruiting system, 441. 
 Red House, 34, 38. 
 Red River, 42. 
 Reduction of force, 134. 
 Another, 155. 
 Another, 160. 
 Reese, Lieut. C. B., 63. 
 Regimexts. 
 
 Co.v.VECTicuT, l.st Artillery, 206, 
 250, 270, 274, 328, 329. 
 14th Infantry, 385. 
 Delaware, 2d, 383. 
 Illixols, 8th Cavalry, 178. 
 
 12th Cavalry, 430' 
 Indiana, Otli, 17, 18, 23. 7th, 17, 
 18,23,32. 8th, 29. 9th, 17, 18, 
 23, 32. lOtli, 24, 29. 13th, 24, 
 29. 14th, 29, 30, 31, 32, 38. 
 15th, 29, 30, 31, 32. 21st, 93. 
 27tii, 379. 
 Kentucky, 1st, 27, 34. 
 
 2nd, 27, 35. 
 Maine, 2d, 207. 3d, 220. 7th, 
 
 383, 386. 
 Massachusetts, 1st Cav.alry, 324, 
 369. 9ih Infantry, 207. 15th, 
 218. 20th, 218. 
 Maryland, 1st, 234. 2d, 391. 3d, 
 
 379. 
 Michigan, Vols., 4th, 201. 6th, 93, 
 
 207. 7th, 218. 17th, 368. 
 Minxesota, 1st, 218. 
 New Hampshire, 5th, 383. 
 
 6th, 391. 
 New Jersey, 5th, 220. 6th, 220. 
 
INDEX. 
 
 4Yr 
 
 New York, 1st Artillery, 141, 
 217, 219, 374, 376, 380, 336. 
 2d., 141, 335. 
 
 9th Independent Battery, 141. 
 16th " " 141. 
 
 2nd Battalion " 141. 
 
 8th Cavalry, 430. 5th Infantry, 
 55, 206. 9tli, 392. 10th, 55. 
 13th, 206, 207, 379. 14th, 207. 
 15th, 63. 17th, 206. 23d, 256. 
 25th, 206, 207. 34th, 218. 37th, 
 267. 38lh, 220. 40th, 220. 
 44th, 207. 50th, 63. 51st, 390, 
 391. 52nd, 383. 57th, 221, 383. 
 61st, 383, 384. 63d, 384. 64th, 
 383, 384. 66th, 221, 383. 69tli, 
 262. 71st, 221. 73d, 221. 82d, 
 218. 108th, 384. 
 
 Ohio, 3d, 24, 30, 31, 32. 4th, 24, 
 28, 30, 31, 32, 35. 6th, 23, 35. 
 7th, 24, 26, 35. 8th, 391. 9th, 
 24, 25, 26, 23, 30, 31, 32. 10th, 
 24, 28. Utli, 27, 34, 35. 12th, 
 27, 34, 35. 13lh, 35. 14th, 15, 
 18, 23, 32. 15th, 18, 23, 24. 
 16th, 14, 18, 23, 24. 17th, 24. 
 18tli, 15, 24. 19tii, 24, 29. 20th, 
 24. 21st, 27, 34, 35. 22nd, 24. 
 
 Pennsylvania, 1st Cavalry, 247. 
 3d, 154, 178, 179, 273, 286. 
 6th, 206. 8tli, 338. 12cli, 332. 
 1st Rifles, 369. 4th Infantry, 266. 
 5tb, 264. 7th, 266. 12tii, 266. 
 45lh, 368. 49th, 256. 336. 51st, 
 890,391. 53d, 382, 383. 54th, 
 430, 432, 435. 62d, 207. 63d, 
 267. 81st, 383. 83rd, 207. 
 124tli, 378. 132nd, 381, 383. 
 
 B,HODE Island, 1st Artillery, 381. 
 
 Virginia, (loyal) 1st, 14, 18, 23, 35. 
 2d, 24. 7th, 381, 383. 
 
 "Wisconsin, 4th, 93. 
 
 United States Regulars, 1st Ar- 
 tillery, 218, 380, 384. 2d, 206, 
 374, 384, 385, 388. 3d, 48, 388. 
 4th, 24, 47, 386. 5th, 206, 207. 
 1st Cavalry, 154, 178, 180, 247. 
 2d, 74, 154, 201, 340. 4th, 324. 
 5th, 154, 158, 206, 207, 209, 231, 
 247, 248, 286. 6th, 178, 180, 
 206, 207. 2d lofaatry, 389. 4th, 
 389. 7th, 74. 8th, 74. 10th, 
 389. 16th, 72. 17th, 74. 
 Regiments, complete arrangement of, 
 Appendix A, B. 
 
 Distribution ofj 58. 
 To be filled up, 403. 
 Commanded by captains, 403. 
 Regular Infantry, value of, 54. 
 
 Infantry, 30th Aug., 1861, and 
 
 30th April, 1862, 54. 
 Assigned to Porter's corps, 55. 
 Array should be increased, 441. 
 Reinforcements called for, 190, 191, 
 
 192. 
 Relative, position of armies when Mc- 
 
 Clellan was relieved, 440. 
 Reorganization and supplies, 406. 
 Reno, Gen., 322, 324, 350, 364, 365, 
 366, 367. 
 Death of, 368. 
 Reports of subordinate commanders, 
 
 442. 
 Reports, 37. 
 Reserve, 54. 
 Reynolds, Gen., 242, 244, 245, 247, 
 
 264, 322,411, 413, 416. 
 Return to the Potomac, 315. 
 Rhode Island battery, Weeden's, 206. 
 Richardson, Gen., 59, 137, 142, 155, 
 169, 185, 186, 187, 216, 218, 219, 
 220, 221, 236, 248, 259, 263, 265. 
 270, 271, 373, 374, 375, 382, 384, 
 385, 389, 433. 
 
 Mortally wounded, 384. 
 Richmond, 43. 
 
 Base for operations on, 104. 
 McClellan anticipates strong de- 
 fense of, 191, 192. 
 Approach to, from north necesa- 
 
 sary, 194. 
 Operations before, 189, 213. 
 Northern approach to, could not 
 
 be abandoned, 301. 
 Gen. Pope reports evacuation of, 
 287. 
 Rich Mountain, approach to, 28. 
 
 Strength of enemy's position at, 
 
 28 
 Affair of, 29, 37, 
 Ricketts, Gen., 241, 324, 369, 377. 
 Right w.ng, Sec'y of War orders ex- 
 tended north of Richmond, 194, 195. 
 Rio Grande, 42, 43. 
 Ripley, Southern Gen., 232. 
 Roach's Mills, 50. 
 
 Robertson, Capt., 246, 247, 384, 388. 
 Robinson, Capt., 141. 
 Rodman, Gen., 389, 391, 392. 
 
478 
 
 INDEX. 
 
 Rodgers, Capt. John, U. S. N., 264, 
 
 269, 270, 272, 273, 278. 
 Romney, 38. 
 Royall, Capt., 231. 
 
 Rosecraus, Gen., 19, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 
 30, 31, 35, 36, 38. 
 Placed in command in "Western 
 Virginia, 36. 
 Rucker, Col., D. H., 68. 
 Rush, Col., 208, 409. 
 RusseU, Maj. W. W., 61, 62. 
 
 SACKETT, Col, 390. 
 Saunders, Capt., 180. 
 Savage's Statiox, 259. 
 Savannah, 43. 
 
 Sherman's instructions about, 91. 
 Sawtelle, Capt. C. G., 63, 305, 308. 
 Saxton, Gen. R., 36, 210. 
 Scammon, Gen. E. P., 389, 392. 
 Schleich, Gen. N., 24, 26, 28. 
 Scary Creek, affair at, 35. 
 Scott, Southern Col, 31. 
 Second Period, Part I., 151. 
 
 Part II., 189. 
 Secret Service, 119. 
 
 Corps report of chief of, 239. 
 Sedgwick, Gen., 59, 113, 157, 158, 
 159, 164, 185. 186, 187, 216, 218, 
 219, 259, 264, 267, 270, 379, 380, 
 382. 
 Seven Days, 239. 
 
 Aggregate losses in, 272. 
 Classical 444. 
 Seymour, Gen., 242, 244, 245, 246, 
 
 247, 264, 309. 
 Sharpsburg, arrangements for perma- 
 nent occupation of, 432. 
 Shenandoah Valley, operations in, 135. 
 
 Orders to Banks, 129, 136, 150. 
 Shenandoah Valley, Jackson's raid in, 
 200. 
 
 McClellan's opinion of ot)ject, 203. 
 Sherman, Gen. T. W., 48. 
 
 Instructions of McClellan to, 91. 
 Shields, Gen., 59, 135, 136, 140, 195, 
 
 199, 201, 241. 
 Shield's command badly worn, 199. 
 Ship Point batteries, 158. 
 Shumard, Surgeon G. G., 36. 
 Sick, numbers of, at Harrison's Land- 
 ing, 293. 
 
 Embarkation of, 293, 302. 
 Sickles, Gen., 220, 271, 436, 438. 
 Siege guns at Malvern, 270. 
 
 Simmons, Col. S. G., 264. 
 
 Capt., 391. 
 Simmons's balterv, 391, 392. 
 Sigel, Gen. F., 232, 323, 346, 350, 
 
 405, 430. 
 Signal Corps, 74. 
 
 Slocum, Gen., 243, 247, 248, 251, 252, 
 256, 259, 263, 265, 267, 268, 270, 
 326, 386, 387, 388, 433. 
 Small arms in Ohio, May 21, 1861, 8. 
 Smead's battery, 48. 
 Smith, Gen. W. F., 59, 77, 158, 159, 
 164, 174, 177, 178, 179, 181, 183, 
 184, 187, 250, 251, 252, 253. 256, 
 265. 270, 326, 386. 
 Smith, G. W., Southern Gen. 215, 221. 
 Smith, Capt., U. S. K, 196. 
 Smith, Col, 218. 
 Snicker's Gap occupied, 437. 
 Soldiers, professional, to conduct cam- 
 paigns, 441. 
 South, resources of the, 38. 
 South Carolina, McClellan's instruc- 
 tions to Sherman, 91. 
 South and West, operations in, 87. 
 South Anna, bridges over, destroyed, 
 
 209. 
 South Mountain, 360. 
 Description of, 364. 
 Pursuit of enemy after battle of, 
 
 373. 
 President's dispatch about, 373. 
 Sprague, Gov. 184. 
 Staff in Department of Ohio, 35. 
 
 Thanks to, 35. 
 Staff, 60. 
 
 Recommendations of, 76. 
 Officers, instruction of 441. 
 Selection of, 441. 
 Stager, Mr. A., 36. 
 Starr, Col, 219. 
 
 State governments, value of, 7. 
 Statement, tabular, of clothing and 
 
 equipage, 417. 
 Statesman, duty of, 441. 
 St. Augustine, 93. 
 Stedmau, Col, 14, 17. 
 Stewart, Capt. C. S., 64. 
 Stevens, Gen. I. I., 322. 
 St. Louis Arsenal, 6. 
 Stone, Gen., 77, 78. 
 
 Evidence before committee on 
 conduct of war, 81. 
 Stoneman, Gen. George, 52, 54, 77, 
 126, 142, 178, 179, 180, 187, 188, 
 
INDE X. 
 
 4V9 
 
 196, 204, 208, 209, 243, 246, 409, 
 411, 430, 436. 
 
 Report on Stuart's raid, 410. 
 
 Strasburg, occupation of, advised, 429. 
 
 Stuart, South. Gen., J. E. B., 126, 179, 
 335, 398, 399, 406, 409, 410. 
 Raid on Peninsula, redults of, 
 
 231. 
 Raid into Maryland, 408. 
 
 Sturgis, Gen., 368, 389, 391, 392. 
 
 Subsistence Department, 70. 
 
 Sully, Col. 218. 
 
 Sumner, Gen. E. V., 58, 59, 127, 137, 
 188, 164, 170, 176, 180, 181, 182, 
 183, 196, 216, 217, 218, 221, 222, 
 223, 236, 251, 252, 253, 256, 259, 
 260, 261, 262, 264, 267. 268, 269, 
 271, 291, 324, 325, 328, 330, 333, 
 335, 336, 337, 340, 346, 369, 373, 
 375, 376, 377, 379, 381, 382, 386, 
 387, 388, 394, 395, 401, 404, 416, 
 Report of Savage's Station, 260. 
 
 Sumter, Fort, 5, 91. 
 
 Supplies of war material at outbreak 
 of war, 6. 
 
 Supplies and Reorganization, 406. 
 
 Supplies, delays in receipt of, 411. 
 
 Sweitzer, CoL N. B., 61, 183. 
 
 Sycamore Church, Averell at, 286. 
 
 Sykes, Gen. Geo., 55, 155, 187, 208, 
 247, 248, 269, 285, 322, 347, 350, 
 373, 374, 375, 387, 388, 389. 
 
 n-^ABLE of troops, 1861-62, 52. 
 X Taft, Gapt., 376. 
 
 Tampico, 44. 
 
 Taylor, Gen., 267, 327. 
 
 Telegraphic, 75. 
 
 Tennessee Eastern, McClellan's in- 
 structions regarding, 90. 
 
 Tidball, Capt., 246, 247, 374, 388. 
 
 Thanks to soldiers. McClellan asks, 
 318. 
 
 Thanks to President, 441, 
 
 Third Period, 275. 
 
 Thomas, Gen. L., 144. 
 
 Thomas, Lieut, 386. 
 
 Thompson's Capt. battery, 267. 
 
 Tompkin's Capt., 381. 
 
 Topographical Engineers, 64. 
 
 Torbert, Col., 387. 
 
 Transportation to Peninsula, 108. 
 
 Tripler, Surgeon, C. S., 65, 66. 
 
 Troops left at Washington, 139. 
 
 In Western Virginia, good con- 
 duct of, 36. 
 Trowbridge, Lieut. C. F., 73. 
 Tucker, Hon. John, 69, 107, 108. 
 Turkey bridge destroyed, 273. 
 Tyler, Col. R. 0., 270, 274, 328, 329, 
 
 330. 
 Tyler, Gen. E. B., 26, 329, 334, 335. 
 
 UNION party in Kentucky, 9. 
 Union, reestablishment of, 442. 
 Urbana, 106. 
 
 Movement to, abandoned, 151. 
 U. S. Infantry, 208, 248, 249, 257, 
 387, 389. 
 
 VACANCIES to be filled, 403. 
 Von Kleizer, Capt., 376. 
 Van Reed, Capt., 388. 
 Van Valkenburg, Maj., 217. 
 Van Vliet, Gen. S., 68, 70, 243. 
 Vessels chartered for Peninsula, 109. 
 Vincent, Lieut., 384. 
 Volunteers, numbers of, 6. 
 Volunteer Engineer troops, 63. 
 Voss, CoL, 430. 
 
 Virginia^ army of^ to be formed, 241. 
 Virginia battery, Dahn's, 24. 
 Virginia, advance into, after Antietam, 
 
 426. 
 Virginia Western, Campaign of, 
 
 37. 
 
 WADSWORTS, Gen. James, 59, 
 139, 140, 205. 
 
 McClellan's orders to, 130. 
 Wagner, Lieut. 0. G., 64. 
 Wagner, Col. G., 335. 
 War, commencement ofj 5. 
 
 Objects of; 91. 
 
 Can be brought to successful end, 
 442. 
 Ward, Gen. J. H., 220, 410. 
 Wardens ville, occupation, advi3ed,429. 
 Warren, Gen. G. K., 206, 207, 209, 
 
 268, 387. 
 Warwick River, line of; 154 
 
 Banks of; 161, 163. 
 Washing'ton, estimated garrison of, 46. 
 
 Position of troops, July, 1861, 50 
 
 Troops in, 27th July, 1861, 50. 
 
 Order restored to, 51. 
 
 Troops in, 15th Oct., 1861, 52. 
 
 Provost marshal of, 72. 
 
480 
 
 INDEX, 
 
 Not endangered by Peninsular 
 movement, 106. 
 
 Preparations to move from, 114. 
 
 Defense of, 127. 
 
 Troops left at, 139. 
 
 President's apprehensions, 170. 
 Watson, Mr. P., 146. 
 Weaver, Lieut., 376. 
 Webber's battery, 182. 
 Weber, Gen. Max, 380, 381. 
 Weed, Capt., 376. 
 Weeden, Capt., 206. 
 Weitzel, Lieut, 93. 
 Wessels, Gen., 215, 217. 
 West, poorly supplied for war, 6. 
 
 Armies of, 82. 
 West and South, operations in, 87. 
 Western States unprepared for war, 7. 
 Western troops, proposed operations 
 
 of, 10. 
 West Point, Virginia, Franklin to go 
 to, by water, 183. 
 
 Disembarkation of Franklin, 18G. 
 
 Aflfair at, 186. 
 West Point Academy, increase of ca- 
 dets at, 441. 
 Western Virginia, Campaign in, 5, 
 37. 
 
 Political affairs in, 8. 
 
 Movements of secessionists in, 
 12. 
 
 U. S. troops ordered into, 14. 
 
 Plan of campaign in, 20. 
 
 Forces in, 23. 
 
 Description of, 24. 
 
 Results of campaign, 34. 
 
 Cox ordered to, 407. 
 Weston occupied, 26. 
 Wheehng, 37. 
 Whipple, Gen. A., 430. 
 White House, arrival at, 188. 
 
 Removal of stores from, 243. 
 White Oak Swamp, head-quarters 
 crosses, 258. 
 
 Slocum crosses, 259. 
 
 Heintzelman crosses, 260. 
 
 Crossing complete, 262. 
 
 White Oak Swamp Bridge, 265. 
 
 Whiting, Southern Gen., 186, 234. 
 
 Wilcox, Gen. 0., 368, 389, 392. 
 
 Willard, Maj., 74. 
 
 Willey, Southern Col., 14. 
 
 Williams, Maj. L. A., 36, 209, 211. 
 Destroys South Anna bridges, 209. 
 
 Williams, Col. R., 324. 
 
 WQliams, Gen. A. S., 59, 115, 349, 
 377, 378, 379, 400, 404. 
 
 Williams, Gen. S., 35, 61. 
 
 Wilnamsburg, pursuit to, 178. 
 Approach to, 179, 180. 
 Battle of, 181. 
 
 Williamsport, Couch attacks at, 399. 
 Arrangements for permanent oc- 
 cupation of, 432. 
 
 Wilson, Lieut., 389. 
 
 Wilson, Lieut. Jas. H., 64. 
 
 Wilson, Lieut. John M., 64. 
 
 Wilson, Capt. Thos., 70. 
 
 Winchester, proposal to march on, 
 114. 
 
 Winchester & Strasburg R. R., con- 
 struction of, advised, 429. 
 
 Wise, Southern Gen., 26. 
 
 Wood, Maj. W. II., 73. 
 
 Woodbury, Col., 201, 330. 
 
 Woodbury, Gen. D. P., 63, 330. 
 
 Woodbury's brigade, 169. 
 
 Woodruff, Lieut., 380, 385, 386. 
 
 Wool, Gen. J. E., 152, 154, 156, 162, 
 169, 171, 431. 
 
 Wright, Col. E. IL, 61. 
 
 Wright, Surgeon J. J. B., 36. 
 
 Wyman, Capt., U. S. N., Ill, 112. 
 
 YATES, Gov., 11. 
 Yorktown, strength of, 161. 
 Defenses of, 154. 
 Siege o^ determined on, 162. 
 Siege of, 164. 
 Barnard's report on, 172. 
 Plan of approaches against, 175. 
 Progress of siege of, 176, 
 Battery No. 1 opens on, 176. 
 Capture of, 177. 
 
I