%o^^ V-?^>^ %^^f>J\^'^'' \,-'Trr*'A «>:. 6^ V ♦;T7r*' A *^ o *^ ..-•* ^^-n^ "h^ V ^^% ^\* \ ^^^<§^ ^\ <:.''''',> .^^ ^ ^^-'^^ /.vi:;;^:/^ /.•.j^.>o ^^.c:^/-^*, / •°-- ^tff "oV =Co.^V^ 0^ >»JL*% V, ■i!' >^ .. SPEECH OF ^ HON. JAMESBUCMANAN, OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN SUPPORT OF THE VETO POWER, IN REPLY TO MR. CLAY, OF KENTUCKY. V ' DELIVERED IN THE UNITED STATES SENATE, WEDNESDAY, FEB. 2, 1842. Mf. BUCHANAN being eniitled to the floor, ddressed the Senate as follows: Mr. President: I am now sorry that I ever co^- wiitled my. elf to make a speech upon this subject. . assure you that it has become extremely cold; md I ihink I never shall again pledge myselt to .iddress the Senate at the end of a week or ten .lays, to be occupied in the discussion of an in'.er- rening and different question. Cold as the subject !iad becotne, it is now still colder, afier having .yaited for an hour to hear a debate on the mere •jference of a memorial to the Committee on Com- merce. But although the subject may have lest ts freshness to ray mind, and 1 may not be able to •tply to the Senator from Kentucky [Mr. Clay] •tith as much effect as if the discussion on the .'iankfupf bill had not intervened, yet it has lost ^ione of it;; inirin-ic importi^nce. Before I commence the discussion, however, let le clearly .?.nd disiincily stale the question to be ecided by the Senate. Under the Constitution of the United States, as i\. now existj — "Every bill which shall have passed the House of Represent- ;Wes and ihe Senate, shall, before it become a law, be present- 1 to the President of the United Slates; il' he ap|-irove. he shall j.'?n it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections to that ;^ouse in which it shall have originated, whosiiall enter the ob- Mictions at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider it. // , /Ver such reconsideTation tieo thirds of that House shall ttgree to pass the bill, it shall be. sent, togtiher with the ^djections, to the other House, by which it shall li/cewise be re- nsidered, and if approved by iteo thirds of that House, it mU become a law. But, in all such cases, the votes of both [louses shall be determined by yeas and nay?, and the names of he persons voting for and against the bill, shall be entereil on [he Journal of each Ilouee respectively. If any bill shall not be eturoed by the President wiihin ten days (Sundays excepted) ifter it shall have been presented to him, the eanne shall be a aw, in like nianner as if he had signed ii, unless the Congress, ly their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall lOtbe a law." Tbe same cons'.itational rule is applicable to "every order, resolation, or vote to which the con- currence of the Senate and House of Representa- tives may be necessary, except on a ques^icn of ad- journment." The joint resolution offered by the Senator, pro- poses to change the existing Constixuiion, so as to require but a bare majority of all the members be longing to each House to pass any bill into a law* notwithstanding the President's otj^ctioHs. The question then is, whether the Constitution ought to be so amended as to require bt»t a bare majority of all the members of each Hause, instead of two-;hinls of each House, to overrule the Presi- dent's veto; and, in my opinion, there never was a more important question presented to the Senate. Is it wise, or is it republican, to make ihis funda- mental change in our institutions? The great Whig p?,r'y of the cou:itry have iden- tified themselves, m the most solemn mar.n?r, with this proposffd amendment. Feelirg sensibly, by sad experience, that they had suffered since the late Pretideniiai election, from not having previously presented a clear exposition of their princ pies "to the public eye," they determined no longer to suffer fro.-n this cause. Accordingly, the conscript fathers of the church assembled in conveniion at the city of WaJhington, on the 13th September last— at the cl»se of the ever memorable extra session and adopted an address to the people of the United States. This manifesto contains a distinct avowal of the articles of their creed; and, first and fore- most among them all, is a deaunciation of the' veto power. I shall refer very briefly to this address; although to use the language of my friend the present Governor of Kentucky, it contains much good reading. So exasperated were the feel- ings 0/ the party then, and so deeply were they pledged to the abolition ol the veto power, that 3 they solemnly and formally read John Tyler out of the Whig churclf, because he had exercised it against the bills to establish "a fiscal agent" and a "'fiscal corporation" of the United States, The form of eacommunicalion bears a resemblanca lo the Drclaration of Independence which severed this couniry forever from Great Britain. I shall give it in their own emphatic language. They de- clare thai Jv hn Tyler — "By the course he has adopted in respect to the applicaiion of the veto power to two successive bank charters, each of which there was just reason to believe would meet his apjiro- bation; by the withdrawal of confidence from his real friends in Congress and from the members of his Cabinet; by the be- stowal of it upon others notwilhsiandingtheir notorious oppo- sition to leading measures of his Administration, has voluntari- ly separated himself from those by whcs>^ exertions and suf- frages he was elevated to that office through which he reached his present exalted station," &c. , the isource of all political power; but as expounded by their Senators and Represen- tatives in Congress. After eiiumo-rating other duties, they declare that "to the e-aeciuation oi these objects ought ihe exer- tions ti' il-.e Whigs to be hereafter directed." Anil they make a direct appeal to the people by an- nouncing that "those only should be cboien mem- bers oi Congress who are willirig cordially to co- operai' in the accomplishoicnt-of them." Twentv thovi;-.ini1 copies of this mani'c.to vere ordered to be prai.cd aL-.d circulated among tiie people of the United Siates. This appeal to the people, sir, was a vain one. The avowal of their principles destroyed them. The people did not come to the rei-cue. Never was tbe.e a more di-a?trous defeat than theirs, at the laS' i;;ll elections, so immediately after their triuffiph-iint victory. Thank Fleaven ! the people have nit thus far responded to this appeal,, and 1 trust tuCY may nevtr consent to abolish the veto power. Sir, the Democratic party in regard to this power, in the lat^guage of the doughty Barons of England, centuries age, are not willing that the charter of their liberties shall be charged. We shall hold on to this veto power as one of the most efFectut;! ssf-guards of the Union, and one- of the surest means of carrying into effect the will of the people. In my humble judgment, the wise statesman ought equally to avoid a foolish veneration for ancient institutions oa the one hand, and a restless desire i^■s: charge on the other. In this respect, the middle is the safer course. Too great a venetation for antiquity would have kept mankind in bondage; and the plea of despots acd tyrants, in every age, has been, that the wisdom of past geuerations has established institutions which the people ought not to touch with a sacrilegious hand. Our ancestors were great innovators; and had ihey net been so, the darkness and the despotism which existed a thousand years ago would have continued until the present moment. For my own part, I believe that the human race, from generation to genera- tion, hits in the main been advancing, and will con- tinue So advance, in wisdom and knowledge; and whenever experience shall demonstrate th&t a change, even in the Federal Constitution, will pro- mote the happiness and pio?periiy of the people, I shall not hrsilate to vote in favor of such a change. Sti 1, there are circumstances which surround this instrument with peculiar sane- tity. It W.1S framed by cs wise men and as pure patriots a« the sun of heaven ever shone upon. We have every reason to belifve that Providence Jmiled upon their labors, and predes- tined them to bless mankind. Iramedia:ely after the adoption of the Constitution, order arose out of confusion; and a settled Government, capable of performing all its duties to its constituents with energy snd effect, succeeded lo the chaos and dis- order wbi.ih h.'.d previously existed under the Ar- ticles of Confederation. For more than half a century, under this Constitution, we have enjoyed a greater degree of liberty and happiness than has ever fallen to the lot of any other nation on earth. Under such circumstances, the Senator from Ken- tucky, before be can rightfully demand our votes in favor of a radical change of this Constitution, in one of its fundamental articles, ought to make out a clear case. He ought not only to point out the evils which the country has suffered from the existence of the veto power, but ought to con- vince «s, they have been of such mEgnitude, that it is not better "to bear the ills we lave, than fly to others that we kiiow not of." For my own part, 1 believe ttiat tie veto power is one of the strongest aud stateliest columns of that fair temple which our ancestors have dedicated to liberty; and that if you remove it from this liine-hcnored edi- fice, you will essentially if.pair its strecgih and mar its beauty. Indeea tneie wiii then be great danger that in time it may tumble into ruins. S:r, in regurd to this ve'-.o power, as it at present exists, the convention which franked the Constitu- tion, although much divided on other subjects, were unanimous. It is true that in the eai'lier s'ages of (heir proceeding?, it was considerably discjs.-ed, and presented in different aspects. 'Some members were in favor of an absolute veto, and others were opposed to any veto, however qua'ified; but they at length nnanimou'ly adopted the happy mean, and framed the article as it now stands in the Consiitution. According to Mr. Madiscn'^ re- port of the debates and proceedings in the conven- tion, we fi.'id t; at on Saturday the 21st July, .t787, 'the ieif.h resolution giving the Executive a quali- fied veto, requiring two thirds of each branch of th^ Legislature to overrule it, was then ag:eed to nem con." The convention cominued in se.ssiQn for nearly two months after this deci&ion; but so far as I can discover, no member ever attempted to dis- turb this unanimous decision. A principle thus settled ought never to be rashly assailed under the excitemeni of disappointed feel- ings occasioned by the veto of two faverile mea- sures at the extra session, on which Senators had fixed their hearts. There ought to have been lime for pas&ion to cool and reason to resume her em- pire. I know very well that the Senator from Ken- tucky had announced his opposition to the veto power so far back as June, 1840, in his Hanover speech; bui that speech may I'airiy be considered as adeclaraiion of his own individual opinion on thissubject. The great Whig parly never adopted it as one of Ihe cardinal articles of uieir faiih, uniil, smarting under di^-appointvnent, ihay saw ih?ir two favorite measures of the extra ?-essicn fall be- neath ihis power. It was then, and not till then, that the resolution, in effect, to abolish it was adopted by them sis a party, in tbeir mat)ife.*to. The, present amendment proposes to carry this re- solution inio execuiion. I should rather rely upon the- judgment of the Se- nator from Kentucky on any other question', thau in regard to ihe veto power. He has suf- fered so much from va exercise as to rencer it almost impossible that he can be an impar- tial judge. History will record the lorg and memorable struggle between himself ond a dis- tinguished ex-President, now in retirement. Tbis was no common party strife. Their mighty war shook the whole Republic to its centre. Tiie one swayed the majority in both Houses of Con- gress; whilst the other was surtaincd by a majority of the people. Under the lead of (he one, Con- gress passed bills to establish a Bank of the United States; — to comm^nceasjstem of i::ternal improve- ments: — and to distribute the proceeds; of the public lands among the several States; whilst the other, strong in his conviction^: ol diiiy, ind strong in bis belief that the voicn^ of the sovereign people would condemn ihese measures of their representative?, vetoed them everyone. And what was the re?ult? Without, upon ibe present ?ainst the tyrannical decrees of the Ssnaie. They retired from the city to the Sacred Mount, and demanded the right- of freemen. They thus extorted from the aristocratic Senate a decree auihorizirg them annually to elect tribunes of the [leople. Oa these tribunes was conferred the power of annulling any decree of the S-nate, by dimply pronouncing the word " refo." Tr is very power was the only one by mi-ans of waich the Democracy of Rome exercised any control over the Government of the Republic. It was their only safeguard against the oppression and cncroach- ment.T of the aristocracy. It is true that it did not enable the people, through Iheir tribunes, to origi- nate laws; but it saved them from all lav^s of the Senate which encroached on their rights and liber- ties. Now, sir, let me ask the Senator from Kentucky, Was tkis an arbitrary and monarchical power? No, sir; it was strictly democratic. And why? Be- cause It was exercised by tribunes elected by the people, and responsible annually to the people; and I shall now attempt to piove that the tret j power, under our Constitution, ii; of a timilar charscter. Who is ths President of the United Slates, by whom this power is to be exercised? He is a citizen, elected by his fellow citizens to Ibe highest official trust in the country, and directly responsible to ihena for the manner in which he ihall discharge his du- ties. From the manner in which he is elected, be more nearly represents a majority of the whole peo- rle of the IJniied Slate- than auy otLer biar ch of the Goveratnent. Sir, one-fourth of the people may elect a decided majority of the Senate. Under the Con- stitution, we are the representatives of sovereign States, and liule Delaware has an equal voice in this body with the Empire State. How is it in re- gard to the House of Repiesentatives? Without a revort to the gerrymandering process which of late years ha^ become so cimmon, it may often hap- pen, from the arrangement of the Congres'^ionaL districts, that a minority of the people of a >AMe will elect a majority of representatives to Con- gress. Not so in regard lo the President of the United S'ates. From necessity, he must be elect- ed by the mai-s of the people in the several States. He is the creature o{ the people— the mere breath of their nostrils — and on him, as the tribune of the people, have they conferred the veto power. ' Is thpr? anf serious danger that suc'i a magis-- trate will ever abuse this powe.? Wh?t earthly inducement can he have to pursue such a course? In ihe first place, during his fir:-i term, ha will ne- cessarily feel anxious to obtain the stamp of pub- lic approbation on bis conduct, by a re election. For this reason, if no other existed, he will not ar- ray himself^ by the exercise of the veto power against a majorily in both Houses of Congres?, un- less in extreme cases, where, from strong convic- lions of public duty, he may be willing to draw down upon himself their hostile influence. In the second place, the Constitution leaves him in a state of dependence on Congress. Without their support, no me&sure recommendeJ by him can become a law, an \ no system of policy which he may have devised can be carried into execution. Deprived of their aid, he can do nothing. Upon their cordial co-operation the success and glrry ol his administration must, in a great degree, depend. Is it, then, at all probable that he would make war upon Congress, by refusing to sanction any one of their favorite measures, unless he felt deeply con- scious that he was acting in obedience to the will of the people, and could appeal to them for sup- poff? Nothing short of such a convicion, unless it be to preserve his oath inviolate to support the Constitution, will ever induce him to exercise a power always odious in the e^es of ihe majority in Congress, against which it is exerted. But there is still ano.her powerful influence ■which will prevent his abase of the veto power The man who has been elevated by his fel- low-citiz?ns to the highest office of trust and dignity which a great nation can bestow, musi necess'-rily feel a strong desire to have his name recorded in untarnished characters on the pase of his country's history, and to live after death in the hearts of bis countrymen. This consideration would forbid the abuse of the veto power. What is posthumous fame in almort every instance ? Is it not the voice of posterity reechoing the opinion of the present generation? And what body on the earth can give so powerful an impulse to public opinion, at least in this country, as th'? Cone;ress ol the United States ? Under all these circumsiances, we must admit that the opinion expressed by the Federalisi is sound, ar.d that "it is evidcni that there would be greater danger of his not using hi-^ power when i-iccessary, ihan tf ^i s using it too often or too much " Such must also have been Mr. Jef- ferson'i' opinion. Wh^n coasulied by Gencal Washiag'on in April, 1792, as to ihe propriety of vetoing "ihe act for an apportiotiment of R^pre- j-entalives among ihe seveial Stales, according to the first enumera'-ion," what was his first reason in favor of the exercise of this power upon that occaJinn? "Viewing the bill," says he, '-either as a violaticn of the. Constitution, or as giving an inconvenient exposition to its words, is it a case wherein ihe Pie- sident ought to interpose bis negative?" "I think it is." "TAe non uslt of his negative power begins already to txcite a belief that no President will ever venture to use il; and consequently, has begotten a de- sire to raise up barriers in the Slate Legislatures against Congress throwing off the conlrcl of the Con stitxdion.'''' I shall not read the oher rea-^ions he has assigned, none of them being necessary for my present purpose. Perilous, indeed, I repeat, is the exercise of the veto power, and "no President will ever venture to use it," uh'ess from the strongest sense of duty, and the strongest conviction that it "Will receive the public appn bation. But, after all, what is the nature of this qualified veto under the Constitution ? It is,'in fact, but an appeal taken by the President from the decision of Congress, in a particular case, to the tribunal of the sovereign people of the several States, who are equally the masters of boih. If they decide against the President, their decision must finally prevail, by the admission of the Senator himself. The same President must either carry it into execution him- self, or the next President whom tht-y elect will do so. The veto never can do more than postpone legislative action on the measure of which it i« the subject, until the will of the people can be fairly expressed. This suspension of action, if the peo- ple should not sustain the President, will noi gene- rally continue longer than two years, audit cannot continue longer than four. If the people, at the next eiecions, should return a majority to Congress hostile to the vsto, and the same measure should be passed a second lime, he must indeed be a bold man, and intent upon his own destruction, who wfuld, a second time, arrest il by his veto. After the popular voice has determined the, question, the President would always submit, unless, by so doing, he clearly believed he would involve himself m the guilt of perjury, by violating his oath to sup- port the Constitution. At the end of four years, however, in any and every event, the popular will must and would be obeyed by the election of another President. Sir, the Senator from Kentucky, in-one of ihose beautiful passages which always abound in his speeches, hai drawn a glowing picture of the iso- lated condition of kings, v;hose ears the voice of public opinion is never permitted to reach ; and he has compared their condition \n this particular, with ihat of the President of the United States. Plere too, he said, the Chief Magistrate occupied an isolated station, where the voice of bi.^ country and the cries of its distress could not reach his ear. But is there any justice in this comparison? Such a picture may be true to the life when drawn for an European monarch; but it has no application whaever to a President of ihe United States. He, sir, is no mcire thsn the first citizen of this free Re- public. No form is required in approaching his person, wh ch can prevent the humblest of his fel- low-citizens from communicating with hini. In approaching him, a freeman of this land is not compelled to detxrale himself in fantastic robes, or adept any psri!eul?,r form of dress, .'^uch as the court etiquette of Europe require.'. The President intermingles freely with his fellow-ciiiaens, and nears the opinions of all. The public pre.ss attacks him — political parties, in and ouiof Congress,assaii him, End the thunders of the Syjalor's o^, n denuncia- tory eloquence are reverberated from the Capitol, and reach the White Houjc before its incumhent can lav hi-- head upcn his pillow. His every act issubjectfd to the st-vcrest scrutiny, and he reads in the newspapers of the day the decrees of public opinion. Indeed it is the privilege of every body to assail him. To contend that such a Chief Ma- gistrate i.s isolated from the people, is to base aa argument upon mer" fancy, and not upon facts. No, sir; the Presiflent of the'United States is more directly before the people, and more immediately responsible to the people, than any other department of our Government: and wo be to that President who sha 1 ever affect to withdraw from the public 13 have been in bad taste; bat what do they provt? The Senator does not and cannot say that they ever changed a single vote. In the instances to which he refers, they were the declaration of a fact which was known, or might have been known, to the whole world. A President can only be elected by a majority of the people of the several States. Throughout the canvas*, his opinions and senti- ments un every leading naeasure of public policy, are known and discussed. The last election was an exception to this rule; but another like it will never again occur in our day. If, under such cir- cumstances, an act should pass Congress, notori ously iti viola'ionof some principle of vital im- portance, which was decided b^ tbe people at his election, the President would be faithless to the duty which he owed both to them ?nd to himself, if he did not disapprove the measure. Any person might then declare, in advance, that the President would veto such a bill. Let me imagine one or two cases which may readily occur. Is it not known from one end of the Union to tbe other, and even in every log cabin throughout it* extent, that the Senator fromi IVIissouri [Mr. Benton] has an uncouquerable antipathy to a paper currency, and an equally unconquerable predilection for hard money? Now, if he should be a candidate for the Presidency, — and much more unlikely events have happened than that he should be a successful can- didate — would not his election be conclusive evi- dence that the people were in favor of gold and silver, and against papeil Under such circum- stances, what else could Congress anticipate whilst concocting an old fashioned Bank of the United States, but that he would instantly veto the bill ©n the day it was presented to him, without even takicg time to sit down in his Presidential chair? (Great laughter, in which Mr. Benton and Mr. " -Clay both joined heartily.) Let me present a re- verse case. Suppose the distmguishcd Senator from Kentucky should'be elected President, would ,iie hesitate, or, with his opinions, ought he to hesi- tate, a moment in vetoipg an Independent Treasu- ry bill, jhonid Cosgress present him such a mea- surt? And if I, as a member of the Senate, were to assert, in ths first case which I have supposed, whilst the bank bill was pending, that it would -most certainly be vetoed, to n^hat would this amount? Would it be an attempt to bring Ex- ecutive influence to bear on Congress? Certainly not. It would only be the mere assertion of a well known fact. Would it prove any thing against the veto power? Certainly not; but direct- ly the reverse. It would prove that it f ught to be exercised — 'hat the people had wil'ed, by the Pre- sidential election, that it shoul-l be exercised — and that it was one of the very cases which demanded its exercise. An anucipation of the exercise of the veto power, in cases which had already been decided by the people, ought to exercise a restraining influence over Congress. It should admonish them that they ought not to place tiisinselves in hostile array against the Executive, and thus emb.irrass the ad- ministration of the Government by the adoption of a measure which had been previously condemn- ed by the people. If the measure be right in itself, the people will, at the subseqent elections, reverse their own decision, and then, aud not till then, ought Congress to act. No, sir; when we- elect &■' President, we do it in view of his future course of" action, inferred from his known opinions; and we calculate, with great accuracy, what he will and what he will not do. The people have never yet been deceived in relation to this matter, as has been abundantly shown by their approbation of every important veto since the origin of the Go- vernment. This veto power was conferred upon the Presi- dent to arrest unconstitutional, improvident, and hasty legislation. Its intention (if I may use a word not much according to my taste) was purely conservative. To adopt the language of the Fede- ralist, "it establishes a salutary check upon the le- gislative bodr, calculated to guard the community against the efl^ecls of faction, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to itsfluence a majority of that body," [Congress.] Throughout the whole book, when- ever the occasion offers, a feeling of dread is ex- pressed, lest the legislative power might transcend tbe limits prescribed to it by the Constitution, and ultimately absorb the other powers of the Govern- ment. From first to last, this fear is manifested. We ought never to forget that the representatives of the peop)'» are not the people themselves. The- practical neglect of this distinction has often led to the overthrow of Republican institutions. Eter- nal vigilance is the price of liberty; and the people should regard with a jealous eye, not only their Executive, but their legislative servants. The re- presentative feody, proceeding from the people, and clothed with their confidence, naturally lulls suspi- • cion to sleep; and, when disposed to betray its trust, can execute its purpose almost before their constituents take the alavm. It must have been well founded apprehensions- of such a result which induced Mirabeau to declare, that, without a veto power in the king, who was no more, under the first Constitution of France, thaa the hereditary chief executive magitfrateof a Re- public, he would rather live in Constantinople than in Pafis. The catastrophe proved his wisdom; but it also proved that the veto was no barrier against the encroachments of the Legislative As- sembly; nor would it have saved his own head from the block, bad he not died at the most propitious moment for his fame. I might appeal to many passages in the history of the world to prove that the natural tendency of legislative power has al^rays been to increase it- self; and the accumulation of this power has, ia many instances, overthrown Republican iuslila- lions. Our system of representative Democracy, Hea- ven's last and best political gift to man, when per- verted from its destined purpose, has become the instrument of the most cruel tyranny which the world has ever vitnessed. Thus it is that the best things, when perverted, become the worst. Wit- ness the scenes of anarchy, confusion, and blood, from which huma|^ty and reason equally revoir, which attended the French revolution, du ing the period of the Legislative Assembly and National Convention. So dreadful were these scenes, all enacted in the name of the people, and by the peo- ple's own representatives, that they stand out ia bold relief, from all the records of time, and are. 14 by the universal consent of mankind, denominated "tbe reign of terror." Underthe government of ihe Committee of Public Safety — a commitiee of the National Convention — more blood v as shed and more atrocities committed, than mankind had ever beheld within the same space of time. And yet ali this was doiie in the name of liberty and equaliiy. And what was Ihe result? All this only paved ihe way for the usurpation of Napoleon Bonaparte; and the people sought protection in the arms of despotism from the ryranny and corruption of their own re presentalives. This has ever been the course in which Republics have degenersteu mto military despotisms. L?t these sacred truths be ever kept in mind: that sovereignty belongs to the people alone, and that all their servants should he 'vaiched with the eyes of sleepless jealousy. The Legisla- tive As.-emb!y and the National Convention ol France hf^d usurped all the powers of the Govern- ment. Tftey each, iii their turn, constituted the sole representative body of ibe nation, and no wise checks and barritra were in'erposed to moderate and restrain their iictioa. The example which they pre- 32nied has con virced all mankind of the necessity ol a Senate in a Republic; and similar reasons ought to convince them of ihe necessity of such a qualified veto j;s exists uncer our Ccnstituiion. The people cannot interpose too many barriers against un- wii^e and wicked legislatios, provided they do not thereby impair the necessary powers of the Gc- veinmeDt. I know full v.'ell that saco scenes as 1 have just described cannot occur in America; but stili we may learn lessons of wisdom from thtm to guide our own conduct. Legislative bodies of any considerable nUiriber are mere liable to sudden and violent excitements than individuals. This we have all often witness- ed; and it results from a well known pricciple of human nature. In the midst of such excitement*, Kothiiig is more uatura! ihan hasty, rash, and dan- gerous iegi.sleaion. Individual responsibility is, also, iiimin;.-hed. in proportion to the increase ol the number. Each peison, constituting but a small fractional part of the whole mass,, thinks he can escape re.^ponsibiiity in the midst of the crowd. The restraint of the popular will upon his conduct is thus greatly diminished, and as one of a number he is ready to perform acts which he would not at- tempt upon his own individual responsibility. In order to check such excesses, the Federalist tells us that ihis veto power, or reference of the subject lo the people, was granted. Again, sir, highly excited political parties may exist in legislative assemblies, so intent upon grasp- ing or retaiiiing power, that in the struggle they will forget tLe wishes and the interests of the peo- ple. I m'ght cite several examples of this kind in the h'sory of our own legislation; but I merely refer to lbs odious and unconstitutional alien and sedition lawi. hud on by ambitious and eloquent men « ho have become highly excited in the en- test, li.e triumph of party may become paramount to ilio good cf the countrv. and unconstitutional -and dangerous laws may m the consequence. The veto power is necessary to arrest such encroach- ments en the righls of the States and of the people. But worst of all is the system of "I yg-r oiling," BO prevalent in Congress and tbs State Legisla- tures, which the authors of the Federalist do not seem to have foreseen. This is not a namg, to be snre, for ears polite; yet, though homely, it is so i-ignificant of the thing, that I shall be pardoned for its u^e. Now, sir, this very system of log-rolling in legislative bodies is that which has involved several of the States in debts for internal improve- ments, which I fear some of them may never be able to pay. In order to carry improvements which were useful and uJght have been produc- tive, it was necessary to attach to them works of an oppcsite character. To obtain money to meet these extravagant expenditures, indulgence was granted to the banks at the expense of the people, fnd^.^d it has been a fruitful source of that whole syMtm of ruinous and disastrous measures against which the Detrocracy have be^n warring for years. It hss produced more distress in the country than can be repaired by industry and economy for many days to come. And yet how rarely has any Execu- tive had the courage to apply the remedy which the veto powrer presents? Let us, for a moment, examine the workings of thifi system. It is the more dangerous, bfcau^e it presents itself lo individual member.*; under the garb of devotion to their constituents. One has a mea- sure of mere local advantage to carry, which ought, ifatall, tobe accomplished by individual enter- prL-^e, and which could not pass if it stood alone. He finds that he cannot accomplish his object, if he relies only upon it* merits. He finds thatoher member* have o'her local objects at heart, none of which would receive the support of a majority it separately consideied. These members, then, form a combination suffirienlly powerful to carry the whole; and thus twenty measures may be adopted, not one of which separately could have obtained a respectable vote. Thanks to the wisdom and en- er?.y of Genera! Jacks.cri, this system of Icc^l inter- nal improvemtnts which threatened to extend it- self into every neighborhood of the nation, and overspread the land, was arrested b" Ibe veto pow- er. Hai not this been done, the General Govern- ment might, at ihe present day, have been in .-the same vvretched condition with the most indebted States. Bat ihis system of •'log-roliing"has not been con- fined to mere local affairs, as ihe history of the ex- tra session will testify. It was then adopted in re- gard to important party objects, and was called the "great system of measures of the Whig party." It was openly avowed (hat the majority must take the system in majs, alihough it is weil known that several of the measures, had they stood alone, would have been rejected in detail. We are all perfectly aware that this was the vital principle of the extra session. By means of "log-rolling" ihe sys'em was adopted. That the passage of the Dis- tribution hill v;as the price paid for the Bankrupt bill, was openly avowed on this floor. By what mutual compensationv the other measures were car- ried we are left to infer, and therefore 1 shall not bF.zird the expression of any opinion in this place , on the subject. The ingredient, which one member couid not swallow alone, went down ea'aly as a component part of the healing dose. And what has been the consequence? The extravagant appro- priations and enormous expenses of the extra ses- sion have beggared the Treasury. It is to check this system, that the veto power \^ eye, and seclude himself in the recesses of the Ex- ecutive mansion! The Senator has said, and with truth', that no veto of ^he President hcs ever been overruled, i^ince the origin of the Government. Not one. Although he introduced Ihi.s fsci Jor another pur- pose than that which now induces me to advert to it, yet ii is not the less true en that account, Ls not this the strongest possible armament to prove that there never yet has been a veto, in violation of the public will? [Here Mr. Clay observed that ihere bad been repeated in^iances of majorities in Congress decid- ing against vetoes] Mr. BocHANAN re$urai'd. I sm now speaking of majoriiies, not of Congress, but vf the people. i shall speak of Hiajorities in Conijress presen'lv. Why, iir, has no veto b^en ever overruleo? Simply beciUise thePre.sident has never exercised, and never will exercise this perilous power on any important occasion, unle5.s firmly convinced that he is right, and tha^he will bs sii^tamed by the people. Standirg alone, u'iih ih'? whole re.<:pon sibility of his high officialdutie; pre sssngupon him, he will never br.ive the enorrnou.s power and influ- ence of Ci ngress, unlets he feels a ncoral cer- tain-y tbai tba people will f,orT.e,to the rescue. When he ventures lo differ from C.nsrcss, and ap peal iiube people, the chances are all agaiosc him. The members of the Senaie and iba House are numerous, and are scattered over Ire wVioIe coun- iry, whiht the President is but an individual confined to the oily ofWashington. TiieirpeLsonal influence withih«-irconstiiuentsis,and must be,gr?at. In such a strnggif, he must mainly rely upon the palpable justice of his cause. Urider these circuraslancss, dots it not speak volumes in favor of the discre- tion with which the veto power has been exercised, that it has never once been overruled/ in a single instance, since the origin of Var Government, either by. a majority of the people in (he several States, or by the constitutional majority la Con- gress? It is truly astonishing how rarely this power has ever been exercised. During the pariod of more than half a C'-jntury which has elapsed since the meeting of the first Congre-^s under the Con'ititu- tion, about six ihousand legislative acts have be«n passed. How m?iny of these, sir, do you suppose have been dis^ipproved by the Piendeni?' Twenty, sir; twenty is the whole number. I speak from a Hst now in my hand prepared by one of the felerks of the Senate. And this number embraces not merely tho.-e hills which have been actually ve.oed; but all such as were retained by him under the Constitution, in consequence of hav- ing been presented at so late a period of the ses- sion that he could not prepare his objections pre- vious to the adjournment. Twenty is the ?um total of all ! Let us anal}ze these, vetoes, (fori shall call them ail by that name,) for a few momeots. Of the twep.ty, eight were on bills of small comparative importance, and excited no public attention. Con- gress at once yielded to the President's objections, and in one remarkable instance, a veto of General Jackson was !?_;d upon the table on the motion of the Senator froni Kentucky himself. No attempt was even made to pass the bill in oppositio n to- this veto, and no one Senator contested its pro- priety. Eleven of the twelve remaing vetoes upon this list, relate to only three subjects. These are, a Bank of the United States; internal improvements ' fn diffeient forms; and the distribution of the pro- eeeds of the public lands among the several States, Th:re have been four vetoes of a Bank of the United States; one by Mr Madison, one by Gene- ral Jackson, and two by Mr. Tyler. There have been six vetoes on internal improvements, in dif- ferent forms; one by Mr. Msdison, one by Mr, Monroe, and four by General Jackson. And Ge- neral Jackson vetoed the bill to distribute the pro- ceeds of the sales of the public lands among the Si veial States. These make the eleven. The reuiaining veto was by General Wa^-hing- inston; and it is remarkable that it should be the most questionable exercise of this power which, has ever occurred. I refer to his second and last veto, en the first of March, 1797, and bet three days before he retired from office, on the "Act 10 alter and amend an act, eniitled an act to ascer- lain sod fix the military establishment of the United States." In ihis instaiice, there was a ma- jority of neiirly two-third* in the House of Repre- sentatives, where it originated, in favor of passing ihe act, notwith-t.5ndiiig the objections of the Father of his Country. Tlae vote was lifiy-five ia the affirmative lo ihiiiy-sii' in the negative. This: act provided for the reduclicn r.f the military esta- blishment of the country; and the day will proba- bly never asain arrive when any President will venture to veto an act reducing the standirg army of the United States. Then in tho range of time since the year 1789, there have been but twenty vetoes; and eleven of these related to only three' subjects which have ra- dicsliy divided the tws great political parties of the cf>untry. With the exception of twenty, ail the acts which have -ever passed Congress, have besea allowed to take their course without any Executive interference. Thst this power has never been abtssel, is as clear as the light of the sun. I a^k Senators, and I appeal to you, sir, whether the American people have not sanctioned every one of the vetoes oil the three £reat subj^.c's to whirh I have referred. Ye?, sir, everv one, not excepting those on the Fis- cal Bank and Fiscal Corporation— the leading mea- sures of the ei-tra session- Notwithstanding the solemn denunciation asainst the President, made by the V/hig party, and their appeal to the people, I ibe.-e has been no election held since that session ia which the people have not declared, in a voice of thunder, ibeir approbation of the two vetoes of ! President Tyler. I shall not, upon the present oc- casion, di!rrow, the very men vvhrse principks he had condemned bat yesterday. Such is a King of England. He cSin do no wrong. On one memorable occasion, when the ministers of the crown themselves—I refer to the coali'.ion -adminisiiaiion of Mr. Fox and Lord Nonh — had pasved th»ir East India Bill throu^zh ihe House of Comraoas, it was defeated in the House of Lords by Ihe direct personal .nfluetice of the sovereign. George the Third, it is known, would have vetoed that bill, had it passed the Heuse of Lords; and well he might. It was an attempt by hife own ministers to obtain possession of the wealth and the power of India, aod to u^e them for the purpose of controlling both the sovereign and the people cf England. This was not the common case of a mere struggle between opposiie parties as to which should administer the Goverament, about which the sovereign of England might be perfec'ly indif- ferent; but it was an attetript to deprive the crown of its power and prerogatives. Under such circumst.iuces, can the Senator se- riously contend that, because the veto power has been disused by the kings of England, there- fore, it ought to be takm from the Presideat of the United Stales? The King is a hereditary fnovereign — the. President^u elecive magistrate. The King is not respon.sibie to the people for theadminisira- tionof the Executive Government — the Pre.si;'em- is alone responsible. The King could feel no in- terest in using the veto power, except to maintain the prerogatives of the crown; and it has been shown to be wholly unnece.ssary for this purpo.5e; whilst ihe President has never exerted it on any imporlanc occai,ioo, but in obedience to the public will, and th^n only for the purpose of preventing encioachmcnls by Congress on the CoDstimdon of the country, on the righis of the States, and on Ihe liberties oi the people. The Senator is mista-ken in supposing that the veto power has never been exercised in France. It is true, I believe, that it has never been exerted by the Government of Louis Philippe; but bis Gevern- meni is as yet nothing but a mere experiment. It has now existed less ihan twelve years, and darinjf this short period there have been nineteen different cabinets. I saw a list of them a few days ago, in one of the public journals. To ciie the example of such a Government as authority here, is to prove that a Senator is hard ran f«r arguments. The unfortunate Louis the Sixteenth, used the sus- pensive veto power conferred upon him by the first French Constitution, upon more than one occasion; but he used it not to enfo.-ce the will of the people a? our Presidents have done, but against public opinion, which >V5s at that lime omnipotent in France. The^e vetoes proved but a feeble barrier against ibe tremendous torrent of the Revolution, which was at that time overwhelming all the cor- rupt and tyrannical institutions of the ancient mo- narchy. TheSinator has referred to the Declaration of Independence, to show ih?.t Ihe exercise of this vpto power bv the King on the acts of the colonial Legislatures was one of the causes of the Hevolu- iicn. In that instrument h^ is charged with hav- inj; "refured his assent to laws the rros! w'^clcsome arTd necessary for t^e public good." In iho;e days a douceur was presented, in Pennsylvania, to the Proprieiary Governor, with every act of A -.embly in which the people felt a deep interest. I state this fiict on the authority of Dr. Franklin. After the act was approved by the Governor, it had then to be seat three ihousand miles across the Atlar-tic for ihe apprtbation of a hereditary sovereign, in no manner re.-^ponsibte to the people of this country. It tvouid have been stran£,e, indeed, had not this power been abused uader such circumstances. This was like the veto of Augus'us after he had usurped the liberties of the Roman people, and raade himself sole tribune— not like that of the iriliunes annually elected by Ihe Roman people. This was not the veto of James Madison, Andrew Jackson, or John Tyler— not the veto of a free- man, responsible to his fellow-freemen for the faithlui and honest exercise of his imprrtant 'rust. Thi^ power is either democratic or arbitra- ry, as the authority exercLsing it may be dependent on the people or independent of them. But, sir, this veto power, which I humbly appre- h.-'ijd to be u.-.eful in every Sale Guvernojent, be- cnmes ab3olu.:ely necessary under the peculiar and complex form of the Federal Government. To this pci'it I desire especially to direct the attention of the Senate. The Federal Constitution was a work of mutual compromise and concession; and the States which became parties to it, must take the evil with the good. A majority of the people within each of the several States have the inherent right to c.knjre, modify, and amend their Constitu.ion at pleasure. Not so with respect to the Federal Con- stitution. In regard to it, a majority of the people of Ihe United Stales can exercise no such power. And tvhyl Simply because they have solemnly surrendered it, in consideraiioa of obtaining by this surrender all the blessings and benefits of our glori- ous Union. It requires two-thirds of the representa- tives of the States in the Senale, and two-thirds of ihf^ Representatives of the people in the House, even to propose an amendment to Ihe Constitution; and this must be ratified by three-fonrlhs of the 8 States before it can take effect. Even if twenly- fiveof the twenty-six States of which the Union is composed should determine to deprive "little Dela- ware" of her equal representation in the Senate,' she could defy them all, whilst this Consiiluiion shall endure. It declares that "ho State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." As the Constitution could not have been adopted except by a majority of the people in every Siaie of the Union, the members of the convention be- lieved that it would be reasonable and just to re- quire that three-fourths of the States should concur in changing that which all had adopted, and to which ff^ had become parties. To give it a bind- ing force upon the conscience of every public func- tionary, each Senator and Representative, whether in Congress or the several Stale Legislatures, and every executive and judicial oflScer, whether State or Federal^is bound solemnly to swear or affirm that he will support tte Consiituuon. Now, sir, it has been said, and said truly by the Senator, that the will of the majority ought to pre vail. This is an axiom in the science of liberty which no'&oJy will at the present day dispute. Urder the Federal Constitution, this will must be declared in the manner which it has prescribed; and sooner or later, the m&jority must and will be obeyed in the enactment of laws. But what is this majority to wh'ch we are all bound to yiJd? Is it ihe xnajority of Senators and Representatives in Congress, or a majoriiy of the people themselves? The fallacy of the Senator's, argument, from beginning to end, consists in the assuojption that Congress, in every situation and under every circumstance, truly repre- sent the deliberate v;ill of ib.c people. The fraraers of the Constitu'.ioa believed it might be otherwise; and therefore they imposed the restriction of ihe qiialified veto of the President upon the legislative action of Congress. What is ihe most glorious and useful invention of modern time* in the s-cience of free Governmeni? Undoubtedly, wriiien Coniiituiions. For want of these, the ancient Republics were scenes of turbu- lence, violfiice and dii;nrder, and ended in &elf-de- strucnon. And whai are all our constitutions, bui restraints imposed, not by arbitrary authoritv, but by the people upon themselves and their own Repre- sentatives'? Such ihrcughout is the character of the Federal Constitution. And it is this Conslimtion. thus restricted, which h?!S so ling secured our li- berty and prosperity, and has endeared itself to the heart of every good citizen. This system of self-imposed restraints is a ne- cessary element of our :«ocial condition. Every wise and virtuous man adopts resolutions by which he regulates his conduct, for the purpose of coun teracting the evil propensities of his nature, and preventing him from yielding under the impulses of sudden and strong temp ation. Is :uch a man the less free — the less independent, because he chooses to submit to these self-imposed restraints? la like manner, is the majority of the people les« free and less irjdependcnt, because it has chosen to impose constitutional restrictions upon itself and its Representatives? Is this any abridgement of popular liberty? The true philc^ophy of Republi- can Government, as Ihe history of the world has de- monstrated, consists in the establishment of such counteracting powers, — powers always^ created by the people themselves, — as shall render it morally certain that no law can be passed by their servants which shall not be in accordance with their will, and calculated to promote their good. It is for this reason that a Senate has been esta- blished in every State of the Union to control the House of Rcpreseniative?:- and 1 presume there is now scarcely an individual' in the country who is not convinced of its necessity. Ffty years ago, opinions were much divided upon this subject, and nothing but experience has settled the qufstion. In France, the National Assembly, although they re- tained the King, rejected a Senate as aristocratic, and our own Franklin was apposed to it. He thought that ibe popular branch was alone neces- sary 10 reflect the will of the people, and that a Senate would be but a mere incumbrance. His influence prevailed in the Convention which framed the first Constitution for Pennsylvania, and we had no Senate. The Doctor's argument against it was contained in one of his homely. but striking illus- trations. Why, said he, will you place a horse in front cf a cart to draw it forward, ar,d another be- hind to pull it back? Experience, which is the wisest teacher, has demonstrated the fallacy of ibis and all other similar arguments, and public opinion is now unanimous on the subject. Where is the man who does not now feel that the control of a Senate is necessary to restrain and modify the action of the popular branch? And how is our own Senate composed? One- fourth of. the people of this Union, through the Hgency of the Slate Legislatures, can send a ma- jority into this chamber. A bill may pass the House of Representatives by a unanimous vote, and jet be defeattd here by a majority, of Senators tepiesenting but one-fourth of the people of the Uiiited States. Why does not the Senator from Kentucky propose lo abolish she Senate? His^ ar- gument would' be much stronger against its ex'v- tence than asainst that of the veto power in the hands of a Chief Magistrate, who, in this particu- lar, is the true representative oi the majority of the whole people. All the beauty and harmony and order of the universe arise from counteracting influences. When its great Author, in the beginning, gave the planets their projectile impuke, they would have rushed in a straight line through the realms of boundless space, had he not restrained ihem within iheir pre-. cribed orbits by the counteracting iuflu- t«vice tf gravitation. All the valuable inventions in mechanics consist m blending simple powers together so as to restrain and renged. unless not only a majority in each House of Con- gress, but the President also, shall sanction the change. By these wise and wholesome restrictions,. they have secured themselves, .so far as human prudence can, against hasty, oppressive, and dan- gerous legiblation. The rights of the weaker portions of the Union will find one of their g.eatest securities in the veto power. It would be easy to imagine interests of ihp deepest importance, to particular sections which might be seriously endangered by its destruction. For example, not more than one-third of the Sates have sny direct inte- rest in the coasting trade. Tr;i.? trade is now se cured to American vsssels, not merely by a protec live duty, but by an ab.solute prohibition of all fo- reign competition. Suppose the advocates of free traderun mad should excite the jealousy of the Senators and Representatives from the other two- thirdjofthe Stales, against this comparatively lo- cal interest, and convince them that this trade ought to be thrown open to foreign navigation. By such a competition, they mifeht contend that the price of freight would be reduced,, and that the pro- ducers of cotton, wheat, and other articles, ought not to be taxed in order to sustain such a mono- poly in favor of our own ship building and naviga- ting interest. Siiould Congress, influenced by these or any other considerations, ever pass an act to open this trade to the competition of fo- reisntrs, there is no man fit to fill the Exe- cutive tiiair who would not place his veto upon It, and thus refer the subject to the sober deiermi- nalioa of the American people. To depiivr the navigating States of this privilege, woiiiu be to aim a deadly bio?/ at the very exisieisce of the Union. Let me suppose another case of a much more dangerfu-s character. In the Southern Sates, which compose the weaker portion of the Union, a species of property exists which is now attract- ing the attention of the whole civilized world. These Slates never would have become parties to the Union, had not their rights in thi? property- been secured by the Federal Constitution. Fo- reign and domestic fanatics — some from the belief that they are doing God's .service, and others ircm a desire lo divide and destroy this glorious Repub- lif — have conspired to emancipate the Southern .slaves. On this qaestion, the people of the Souih, beyjjnd the limiis of their own States, st§ind alone and unsupported by any power on earilii, e>.c, pt that of the Northern Democracy. These fanaii'cal philanthropists are no^/ conducting a cru-aJe over the whole world, and are endeavoring to con- cent! ate the public opinion of all mankind against this r'ght of property. Suppose they should ever ii;ifluence a msjority in both Houses of Cor.t.'rf'.s to pai-s a law, not to abolish this property — lor that would be too palpable a violation of the Constitu- tion — but 10 render it of no value, under tl^e ieiter, but against the spirit of some one of the powers granted: will any lov?r of his country say that the President ought not to possess the power of arrest- in?, such an act by his veto, until the solemn de- cision of the people should be known on this ques- tion, involving the life or death cf the' U.'iion'? W«=, sir, of the non-slaveholdin^ States, en- tered the Union upctn the expre.ss contiitioa ;hat thi»; property should be protected. Whr-.ievcr may be onr own private Oprniotrs in regard to sla- trery in the abstract, cusht we to hazard all the bleisings of our free institutions — our Union and our strength — in st'ch a crusade against our bre- 'hren of theSouth? Ought we to jeopard every po- hiical right we ho d dear»for the sake of enabling these fanatics to invatie Southern rights, and render ihat fair portion of our common inheritance a scene of .verviie war, rapine and murder? Shall we apply ihe torch to the magnificent temple of humisn liberty which our forefathers reared at the price of their blood and treasure., and permit all we hold dear to perish in the coLflagraiion'? I trust not. It is possible that at some future day the majo- rity in Congress may fitt'-rapt, by indirect means, to tmancipats the slaves of the South. ; There is no knowing through what channel the ever acave spi- rit of fanaticism may seek to accomplish its object. The attempt may be made through the taxing power, or some other express power granted by the Constitution. God only knows how it may be made. It is hard to say what means fanaticism may not adopt to acccmphsh its purpose. Do we feel so 10 secure, ia ihLs hour of peril frbm abroad and peril at borne, as to be willing to prostrate any of the barriers which the Constiiution has reared against hasly and dangerous legislation? No, sir, never ■was -the value ot the veto power more manifest than at the present moment. For the weaker por tlon of the Union, whose constitutional rights are now assailed with such violence, to think of aban- doning this safeguard, would be almost suicidal. It is my solemn conviciion, that there never was a wiser or more beautiful adapfation of theory to prac;ice in any Govsrnment than that which re- quif es a majarity of two-thirds in both Houses tf CoEgrejs to pass an act returned by (he President with his objections, under all the high responsibili- ties which he 'owes to his country. Sir, ours is a glorious Constiiution. Let us ve- peraie it— let hs stand by it a's the work of fi;reat and good men, unsurpassed in the history of" any age or nation. Let us not assail it rashly with our invading hands, but honor it as ihe fountain of our prosperity and po.ver. Let us protect it as the oniy system of Government which could have ren- dered us what we are la half a century, and ena- bled us to taice the front rank among the nations of the earth. In niy opinion, it is the only form of Government which can preserve the blessings of liberty and prO);periiy to the people, and at the same time secure the rights and sovereignly of the S'a'es. Sir, the great mass of the people are un- willing that it shall be changed. Although the Senator from Kentucky, to whom I cannot and do not attribuie any but patriotic motives, has brought him. elf t(.) believe that a change is necessary, pspe- ciaily in the veto power, I must differ from him eatirely, convinced that his opinions on this subject are ba'^ed upon fallacious theories of the nature of our institutions. This view of his opinions is strengthened by his declarations the other day as to the ijliraitable rights of the majority in Congress. On thra point he differs, essisntialiy from the f ramer> vC the Constitution. They believed that the people of the different States had rights which might be violated by such a majority, and the veto power ■was one of the modes which they devised for pre- venting these rights from being invaded. The Senator, in support of his objections to the veto power, ha« used what he denominates a nu- merical argument, and asks, can it be supposed that any President will possess more wisdom than nine Senators and forty Repre'-eD'atives. (This i? the number more than a bare majority of each body which would nt present be required to pass a bill by a majority of two thirds.) To this qaestion, my answer is, no, it is not to be so supposed at all All that we have to suppose is, what our ancestors, in their acknowledged wisdom, did suppose; that Senators and Repres-fntatives are but mortal men, endowed with mortal passions and subject to mor- tal infirmities; that ihsy are susceptible of selfiih and unwise impulses, and that they do not always-, and under all circumstances, truly reflect the will of their constituents. These founders of our Go- vernment, therefore, supposed the possibility that Congress might pass an act through the influence of unwise or improper motives; and that the best mode of saving the country from the evil effects of such legislation was to place a qualified veto in the hands of the people's own representative, the Pre- sident of the United States, by means of which, un- less two-thirds of each House of Congress should repass the bill, the question must be brought di- rectly before the people themselves. These wise men had made the President so dependent on Con- gress that they knew he would never abuse this power, nor exert it unless from the highest and most solemn convictions of duty; and experience has established their wisdom and foresight. As to the Senator's numerical argument, I might as well as^k him, is it to be supposed that we are ,so superior in wisdom to the members of the House that the vote of one Senator ought to annul the votes of thirty-two Representatives? And yet the bill to repeal the Bankrupt law has just been de- feated in this body by a majority of one, although it had passed the House by a majority of thirty-two. The Senator's numerical argument, if it be good for any thing at all, would be good fur the abolitioQ of the Senate as well as of the veto; and would lead at once to ibe investment of all the powers of legis- lation in the popular branch alone. But experi- ence has long exploded this theory throughout the world. The framers of the Constitution, in con- summate wi.'dom, thought proper to impose checks, and balances, and restrictions on their Governmental agents; and wo betide us, if the day should ever arrive when they shall be removed. But I must admit that another of the Sena-or's a^'gnmen's is perhaps not quite so easily refuted, though, I think, it is not very difficult to demon- strate its fallacy. It is um!oubte.'ly his strongest position. He says that the tendency of the veto power is to draw after it all the powers of legisla- tion; and that Congress, in passing laws, wiil be compelled to consult, n6t the good of the country alone, but to ascertain, in the first instance, what the President will approve, and then regulate their conduct according to his predetermined will. This argument presupposes the existence of two facts, which must be established before it can have the least forci. First, that the Preiident would de- part from his proper sphere, and attempt to influ- ence the initiatory Ipgislation of Congress: and, se- cond, that Congress would be so subservient as to orii?;ina'e and pass laws, not according to the dic- tates of their own judgment, but in obedience to ^ his expressed wishes. Now, sir, does not the Se-' nator perceive that his argument proves too much? Would not the President ha.ve precisely the same influence over Congress, so far as his patronage exterds, as if the veto -had never existed at all? He would then resemble t' e King of England, whose veto povt-er has been almost abandoned for the last hundred and fifty years. If the President's power and patronage were coextennvs with that of the King, he could exercise an influence over Con- >Tress similar to that which is now exerted over ihe British Parliament, and might control legislation in the same manner. Thus, sir, you perceive that to deprive the Presi- dent of the veto powsr, would afford no remedy against Executive influence in Conaress, if the President were disposed to exert it. Nay, more — . it would encourage him to inteifere secretly with our legislative functions, because, deprived of the veto power, his only resource would be to intrigne 11 wilh members of Congress for the purpose of pre- venting the passage of measures which he might disapprove. At present this power enables him to act openly and boldly, and to state his reasons to the cocntry for refusing his assent to any act passed by Congres?. Again: does not the Senator perceive that this argument is a direct attack upon the character of Congress? Does he not feel that the wkole weight of his argument in favor of abolishing the veto power, res's upon the wisdom, iniegrity, and inde- pendence of that l)ody? And yet we are told that in order to prevent the application of the veto, we shall become so subiervient to the Executive, that in the passage of laws v/e will consult his wi.-hes rather than our own independent judgment. The venality and baseness of Congress are the only foundations on which such an argument can resi; and yet it is the presumption of tht-ir integrity and ■wisdom on which the Senator relies for the pur- pose of proving that the veto pi:wer is wholly un- necessary, and ought to be abolished. In regard to this thing of lixecutive influence over Congress, I have a few words to say. Sir, I have been an attentive observer of Congressional proceedings for the lavt twenty years, and have watched its operations with an obs.erving eye. I shall not pretend to say that it does net exist to somQ extent; but its power has been greatly over- raied. It can never become dangerous to liberty, unless ths patronage nf the Government should be enormously increased by the pa3^age of such un- cons'iituiional and encroaching laws as have hi- therto fallen under the blow of the veto power. The Executive, indeed, will always have pc^r- sonai friends, as well as ardent political supporters of his administration in Congress, who will strongly incline to view his measures with a favorable eye. He will, alsc, have, both in and out of Congress, expectants who look to him for a share of the patronage at his disposal. But, after all, to what does this amoun 1 Whilst the canvass is proceeding previous to his election, the expectations of candidates for office will array aroand him a host of ajdent and active friends. But what is his ci'ndilicn after the. elec- tion has parsed, snd the patronage has been distrt- buted? Let me appeal to the scene which wrt all witnessed in this city, at and after the inauguration of the late Ir^msnted President. It is almost im- po-sibie that one office seeker in fifty could Isave been gratified. Vi^hat is the natural and necessary result of such numerous disappointments? It is to irritate the feelings and sour ttie minds of the un- successful applicants. They maki? comparisons br- ■(ween them.wlves and those who have been suc- cessful, and self love always exaggerates iheir own merits and depreciaies those of their successful rivals, to sach an extent, that they believe them- selves to have beot^ injured. The President thus often makes one inactive friend, because he feels himself secure in office, and twenty secret enemies awaiting the opportunity to give him a stab when- ever a favorable occasion may offer. The Sena- tor greatly overrates the powei of Executive in- fluence either among the people or in Congress. By the time the offices have been all_distributed, which is usually done between the inauguration and the first regular meeting of Congress thereaf- ter, the President has but few boons to oflfer. Again: it is always an odious exercise of Exe- cutive power to confer offices on members Congress, unless under peculiar circumstances, where the office seeks the man rather than the man the office. In point of fact, but few members can receive ap- pointments; and those soliciting them are always dete.cted by their conduct. They are immediately noted for their subserviency; and from that mo- raens their influence with their fellow members is gone. By far the greatest influence which a President cm acquire over Congress, is a reflected influence from thf people upon their Representatives This- is dependent upon the personal popularity of the President, and can never be powerful, unless, from the force of his character, and the value of his past :«ervices, he has inspired the people with an enthu- siastic attachment. A remarkable example of this reflected influence was presented in the case of General Jackson; and jet it is a h gh compliment to the independence, if not to the wisdom of Con- gress, that even he could rarely command a ma- jority in both its t)ranclies. Still it is certain, not- wi'.hstanding, that he presented a most striking, example of a powerful Expcutive; and this chiefly because he was deservedly strong in the sfFec- lions of the people. In the vicissitude of human events, we shall sometimes have Prei-tdenfd who can, if they please, exercise too much, and those who possess too little influence over Congress. If we witnessed the one extreme during General Jackson's administration, we now have the other before our eye,s. For the ^ake of the contrast, and without the slightest dis- respect towards the worthy and amiable individual who now occupi^-s the Presidential chair, I would s.-.y that if General Jackson presented an example of the strengih, the present President presents an equally striking example of ihefecbienes?, of Execu- tive influence. I ask what has all the patronage of his higti iffice done for him? How many friends has it secured? i most sincirrely wish, for the good of the country, and for the success of his ad- ministration, that he had a much greater degree of influence in Congress than he povse-.ses. It is for this reascn that 1 was glad to ob=eive, a few days ago, some symptoms of returning favor on this (ihe V/iiiu) side of the house towards John Ty- ler. It is better, much better, even thus late, that they should come forward and extend to him a helping hand, than wishing to do so, still keep at a dis'ance merely to preserve an appearance of consiiiency. I am sorry to see that from this mere p.fFeciaiioD, they should appear so coy, and leave the country to suffer all the embarrassments which result from a weak Admistration. [Here several of the Whig Sejnators asked jocosely why the De- mocrats did not volunteer tl!eir.Teivice.s lo strength- en the Government.] ,0a ! said Mr. B. we cannot do that. What is merely an apparent inconsis- tency in the Whigs, would be a real inconsistency ia us. We cannot go for the Whig measures which were approved by President Tyler at the extra session. We cannot support the great Go- vernment Exchequer Bank of discount and ex- change, wiih its three for-one paper currency, i 12 think, however, with all deference, that my Whig friends on this sideoflhe Flouse ought not to be squeamish ou that subject. I think my friend from Georgia [Mr. Berkjen] ousbt to go heart and hand for the Excktquer Bank. It is in sub stance his own fchenee of s. "Fi-cal Corporation," transferred into [he Treasury cf the Uniied Siaies, and diverted of private sioiikholdeis. Let me as- sure gentlemeu that their char.'s.cer for con.sistency wii! not suffer by suppor'ii g!h:s measure. And yet, with the ezamp'e of this Administra tion before their eyes, the Whigs dread Executive influence so much that they wish to abolish the veto powcr, lest ibe President may be able lo ihaw within its vortex e!! the legislative powers of Congress ! What a world we live ;n ! This authentic history is the best answer to ano- ther position of the Senator. W.hilst he believes that there have been nofncroachrrients of ihe Ge- ncial Government on the lights of the States, but on the contrary that it is fast sinking into the weak- ness and imbecility of the Confederation; he com- plains of the encroachmpn!s wh'ch he alkses to have been made by ihe President on the kgiiimate powers of Congress. 1 differ from him eniiiely in both these propositions, and am only sorry thai the subject of the veto power b one so va^t that lime will not permit me to discuss iheia at present. This I sball, however, say, that the slr< ng tendency cf the Federal Government has, in my opinion, ■ever been to encroach upon the rights of the States end their pecp!t; and I migiit appeal to its history to esisb.'ish the positioTi. Every Violent struggle, threatening the existence of the Union, which has existed in this country from the beginning, has arisen from the exercise of coiistruciiveand doubt- ful powers, not by the Previdf^nt, but by "Congress. Bu' enough of this for the present. The Senator from Kentucky contends, thdt whe- ihenheExectuivebe strong or weak, Congress must conform its action to bii v/ishes; and if they can- not obtain what they desire^ they must take what (hey can get. Such a principle of action is al- ways wrong in itself, arid must always lead to th» destruction of the party vhich adopts it. ThiJ was the fatal error of the Senaior and his friends at the extra session. He has informed vis that nei- ther "the Fiscal Bank" nor "the Fiscal Corpora- lion" of that never to be forgotten session would have leceived twenty votes iu either House, had the minds of members been kfi uninfluenced by the, expected action of the Executive. This was the most severe censure which he could have passed on his party in Congress. It is now ad^'it'ed that the Whig party earnestly advocated and adopted two most importatit measures, not because they approved them in the form in which they were presented, but for the sake of conciliating Mr. Tyler. Never was there a more striking example of retributive justice than the veto of both these measures. Whether it be the fact, as the Senator alleges, that the Whigs in Congress took the Fis- cal Corporation bill, letier for letter, as it came from the President lo th>?m, I shall not pretend to decide. It is not for me to compose such strifes. I leave this to their own file leaders. Without en teringHpon this question, I shall never fail, when a £l opportunity offers, to express tht? gratitude which I feel, in common with the whole country, to the Pre- sident for having vetoed those bills which it now ap- pears never received the approbation of any person. It docs astonish me, however, that ihis pioceeding between the President and his party in Congress should ever have been made an argument in la* vor of abolishing the veto power. This argument, if it prove any thing at all, .«=ets the teal of condemnation to the measures of the late esira session, and to the extra se.^'ion it.'^elf. It is a demonstration of the hasty, inconsiderate and immalLue legislation of (hat session. In the flush of .party triumph, iHe Whig? rushed into it, before paction had time to cool down into that calm deliberation, so essential to the wise and har- monious co-operation of the different branches of the Government. They took so liiile Dine to con- sult and to deliberate, to reconcile their conflicting opinions and intercHs, and above all to ascertain and fix their real political principles \'?hirh tWey had so sedulously concealed from the public eye throughout the contest, that none but those who were hea'ed sr.d excited beyond the bounds of rea- ' son ever anticipated any re.'-ult but division, dis- as:er and defeat, from ihe extra se!?sicn. The party first pursued a course which must have inevitably led to ihs defeat which they have exp-?rif need ; and would then revenge themselves for their own mis- cotiduct by assailing the veio power. The lesson which we have received will teach Consress hereafter not to sacrifice its independence by consulting the Executive will. Let ihem honestly ?.nd firmly pass such ac!s ?.s they believe the public good requires. They v/ill then have done their duy. Afterwards let the Executive exercise the same honesty and firmness i> approving these ac's. If he vetoes any one of them, he is respon- sible to the people, and there he ougnt to be left. Had this course been pursued at the extra ses- sion. Congress would have passed an set to esta- blish an old fashioned Bank of the United States, which would have been vfttced by the President. A fair issue would thus have been made for the decision of their common constituents. There would then have been no pece.'siiy for my friends on this side of ihe boure to submit lo the humilia- tion of justifying themselves before the people, on tht,' principle that they were wilbng to accept someihicg v/hich they knew lo be very bad, be- cause they could not obtain that which they thought ihR public good demanded. This whole proceeding, sir, presents no argu- ment against the veto power; al hough it docs pre- sent, in a striking; bghi, ihe subserviency of the Whig party in Corgress to E-xeculive dictation. We may, indeed, if insensible to our own rights and independence, give an undue infijence lo the veto pow.-'r; but we shall never produce this effect if we confine ourselves lo our own appropriate <3a- ties, and leave theE.xecuiive to perform his. This example will nevtr, i think, be imitated by any psriy in the ccun'.ry, and we shall then never ^gain be tempted to make war on the veto power. To show that this power ought to be abolished, the Senator has referred to intimations given on this floor, during the administration of General Jackson, that such and such acts then pending would be vetoed, if passed. Such intimations may 15 can be most usefully and properly applied. The President of the United Stales stands "solitary and alone," in his responsibility to the people. In the ex- ercise of this power, he is emphatically the repre- sentative ot the whole people. He has the same feeling of respcnsibility towards the people at large, which actuates us towards our immediate constitu- ents. To him the mass of the p opie must look as their especial agent ; and human ingenuity cannot deVue a better mode of giving them the necessary control than by enabling him to appeal to themselves in such cases, by means of the veto power, for the purpose of asrei- taining wheiht-r they will sanction the acts of their Representative?. He can bring each of those mea- sures distinctly before the people for their separate consideration, which may have been adopted by log-rolling as parts of a great system. The veto power has long ben in exislence in Pennsylvania, and has been often exercised, anri yet, to ray knov/ledg..', it never has been eyerted in any important case, except m obedience to the public will, or in promotion of the interests of the people Simon Snytier, ■Rhofe far-seeing sag=.city delected the evils of our present banking system, whilst they were yet comparatively in embryo, has rendereO himself immonal by his veto of the forty banks. The system, however, was only arrested, not de- stroyed, and we are now suffering the evils. The present Governor has had the wisdom and courage repeatedly to exeicise the veto power, and always, I believe, with public approbation. In a late s g nal instance, his veto was ovenuled, and the law passed by a majority of two-thirds in both Houses, altkough I am convinced that at least three fourths of the people of the State are opposed to the mea sure. In the State of Pennsylvania, we regard the veto power with peculiar favor. la the convention of 1837, which was held for the purpose of proposing amendments to our Con^'itutrot), the identical pro- position now rap.de by ihe Senator from K'-ntucky was brought forward, and vi'as repudiated by a vote of 103 to 14. This convention was composed ol he ablest and most practical men in the S.ate, and was almost equally divided between the two great rival parties of the country; and yet, in that body, but fourteen individuals could be found who were willing to change the Constitution in this particular. Whilst the framers of the Constitution thought, and thought wisely, that in order to give this powe? the practical effect they designed, it was necessary that any bill which was vetoed should be arrested, notwithstanding a majority of Congress might af- terwards approve the measure; on the other hand, they restrained the power, by conferiing on two- thirds of each House the authority to enact the bill into a law, notwithstanding the veto of the Presi- ■dent. Thus the existence, the exercise, and the re- straint of the power are all harmoniously blended. and afford a striking example of the mutual checks and ba ances of the Constitution, so admi rably adapied to preserve the rights ot the States and of the people. The last reason to which I shall advert why the veto power was adopted, and ought to be preserv- ed, I shall state in the language of the seventy-third number of the Federalist: "Th« propensity (says the author) of the Legislative Depart- 016111 to intrude upon the rights, and w absorb the powers of ttis other departmenta, has been already more than once suggested. The insufficiency ofa mere parchment delineation of the boun- daries of each, has also l)een remarlced upon, and the necessity of furnishing each with constitutional arms lor its own defence, has been interred and proved. From these clear and indubita- ble principles results the propriety of a negative, eiiher abso- lute or (jualified, in the Executive, upon the acts of the legisla- tive branches." The Executive, which is the weaker branch, in the opinion of the Federalist, ought not be left at the mercy of Congrcs.s, "but ought to possess a con.'tiiulional and effectual power of self-defence." It ought to be able to resist encroachments on its constitutional rights. ' I admit that no necessity has ever existed to use the veto power for the protection of the Executive, unless it may possibly have been in a single in- stance; ai^d in it there was evidently no intention to invade his rightful power.?. I rufer to the "Act to appoint a dsy for the aniiual meeting of Congress." This act had pas.sed the Set a'e by a majirity of 34 to 8; but when it was returned to this body by General Jackson with his objection?, the majority was reversed, and the vote stood but 16 in favor to 23 against its passage. The knowledge of the exis'ence of this veto power, as the framers of the Constitution foresaw, has doub'less exerted a restraining influence on Congress. That body have never attempted to in- vade any of the high Eiecutive powers. Whilst such attempts have been made by them to violate the righti;of the States and of the people, and have been vetoed, a sense of justice, as well as the .'^ilent restraining influence which proceeds from a know- ledge thai the President possesses the means of self protection, has relieved him from the necessity of using the veto for- this purpose. Mr. President, I did not think, at the time of its delivery, that the speech of the distinguished Sena- tor from Kentucky was one of great power; al- though we all know that nothing he can utter is de- void of eloquence and interest. 1 mean only to say that I did not then believe his speech was charac- terized by his u-.ual ability; and i was di.'^posed to attribute this to the fecb'e state of his health and the consequent want of his usual buoyancy of spirit. Since ! have seen it in print, I have ohangM my opinion; and foj the first time in my life I have believed that a speech of his could appear better and more effecti.e in the reading than in tiie de- livery. I do lot mean to insinuate that any thing was added in the report of it; for I believe it con- tains all the arguments used by the Senator and ;io more; but I was astonished to find, upon a care- ful examination, that every possible argument had besn urged which could be used in a cause so hope- less. This is my apology lor having detained the Senate so long in attempting to answer it. [Mr. Clay observed that he never saw the speech, as written out by the Reporter, till he read it in print the next morning; and, although he found some ejrors and mi.'sconceptions, yet, on the whole, it was very correct, and, as well as he could recol- lect, contained all the arguments he did make use of, and no more.] Mr. Buchanan. I did not intend, as must hsve been evident to the Senator, to produce the impres- siotl that any thing had been added. My only purpose was to say that it was a better speech fhaa thad supposed, and thus to apologise to the Senate for the time I had consumed in answering it. I shall briefly refer to two other arguments urgeti 16 ty the Senator, and shall then take my seat. Why, says he, should the President possess the veto pow- er for his protection, whilst it is not accorded to the Judiciary? The answer is very easy. It is true that this power has not been granted to the Judiciary in form; but they posses? it in fact to a much greater extent than the Presi'ient. The Chief Justice tf the United Slates and his asst ciate?, sitting in the gloomy chamber beneath, (xercive the tremendous and irrcponsible power of saying to ail the departments of the Government, "hitherto shalt thou go, and no further." They exercis-e the prerogative of anu'iling laws passed by Congress, and approved by the President, whenever in their opinion, the legislative authority has trprt.-cended its constitutional limits. Is not this a self-protect- ing power much more formidable than the veto of the President? Two-thirds of Congress; may over- rule tiie Executive veto; but the whole of Congress and the President united, cannot overrule the de- cisions of the Supreme Court. Theirs is a vet.' on the action of the whole Government. I do not say ihai ihiis power, formidable as it may be, ought not to exist: on the contrary, I consider it lo be one of the wise checks which the frame rs of the Constitution have provided against hasty and uncon- stitutional legislation, and is a part of (he great system of mutual restraints which the p=ople have im- posed on their servants for their own protection. This, hov/ever, I will say, and that wih the most sincere respect for the individual judges; that in my opinion, the whole train of their decisions from the beginning favors the power ot the Genera! Go- vern nient at the, expense of State rights and S a'e Fovereignty. Where, I ask, is the case to be found upon their record*, in which they have ever dfcided that any act of Cungrets, from the alien an! s dition laws un'il the present day, was un- censntutional, provided it extended the powers of the Federal Government? Truly they are abundantly able to protect their own rights and jurisdiction against eriiier Congress or the Executive, or both unire-i. Again: the Senator asks, why has not the veto heen ^'wen to the President on iha acts of coaven- tions held for the purpose of amending our Consti^ tutious? ir it be necessary to restrain Congress, it is equally necessary, say.-< be, to restrain conven- tions. The answer to this argument is equally easy. It T«fould be absurd to grant an appeal, through the intervention of the veto, to the people themselves, against their own acl-f. They create conventions by virtue of their oxn undelegated and inalienable sovereignty; and when they apeak, fheir servants, whether Legislative, Executive, or Judicial, must be silent. Besides, when they pro- ceed to exercise their sovereign power in changing the forais of their Government, they are peculiarly careful in the selection of their delegates — they watch over the proceedings with vigilant care, and the Consiilu'.ion proposed, by such a convention, h never adopted untii after it has been submitted 10 'h:' vote of the peop!e. It is a mere proposition to ;hc people themselves, aod leaves no room for the action of the veto power. [Here iMr. Clay observed, that Cotesiftutions, thus formed, were not afterwards submitted to the ^people.] % Mr. Buchanan. For many years past, I believe that this has always been done, as it always ought to 6e done, in the States: and the Federal Consti- tution was not adopted until after it had been s),. mi tied to a convention of the people of evei State in the Union. So much in regard to the States. The Senatp; argument hasnoapplicaiion whatever to the Feder; Con- tituuon, which has provided the mode of its aw amendment. It requires two-thirds of both Hoase the very majority required to overrule a Presidei tial veto, even to propose any amendment; and b fore such an amendment can be adopted, it mu be ratified by the Lrgislature?, or by convention! iH three-fourihs of the several Staies. To stai this proposition, is to manifest the absurdity, na.' the impossibility of applying the veto power of ti President to amendments, which have thus bee previously ratified by such an overwhelming e: pression of the public will. This Constilution ( ours, with ail its checks and balances, is a wondie ;ul invs"uticn of human wisdom. Founded upc the most just philos; phical principles, and l\ deepest knowledge of the nature of man, it pre duces harmony, happiness, and order, from el ments, which, to the superficial observer, mi^ appear to be discordant. On the whole, I trust not only that this ve power may not be destroyed, bat that the vote f the Senator's amendment may be of suchachara ter as to settle the question, at least during the pr sent generation. Sir, of all the Executive power it is the one least to be dreaded. li cannot creat it can originate no measure; it can change i exi-titig law; it can destroy no existing instiiutio) It is a mere power to arrest haily and inconsid' rale changes, until the voice of the people, who at alike the masters of Senators, Representatives ac President, shall be heard.. When it speaks, v must all bow with deference lo the decree. Publ opinion is irresistible in ihi-j country. It will a<' complish its purpo.e by the removal of Senator Representatives, or President, who may stand any important constitutional measure which they desired, ' would sign his own political death warrant. No Preside will ever knowingly attempt to do it; and his means of kno^ ledge, from tile ordeal through which he must have passed pr vious to his election, are superior to those of any other inaiv dual. He will never, unless in cases scarcely to'be imagine( resist the public will when fairly expressed. It is beyond th nature of things to believe otherwise. The veto power is ths feature of our Constitution which is most conservative of it rights of the Slates and the rights of the people, May it be pe petUal I HA . ♦ rf55.\n*'- ^T* .v <^^ •^^'^^.* ^^' ' '^V'^^V'' ^V^^"'./"^ '*V'^^V^ %-... !i!|j''!':-r. i;ii;I!iil!:ii;|iii|iiiSiiiillii ii^lpi^nii^^^iSli^iiilii