/ / -> ■■■?■' 
 
 DEFENCE 
 
 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULL= 
 
DEFENCE 
 
 BRIGADIER GENERAL W. HULL. 
 
 Delivered before the General Cotut Mailial, of which Major General \ 
 Dearboiu v.a. i-^-ia<.«*, ^t Aihanv, Mai'ch, 1814. 1 
 
 WITH AN 
 
 ADDRESS TO THE CITIZENS OP THE UNITED STATES. 
 
 WRITTEN BY HIMSELF. 
 Copied from the original Manuscript, and published by his authorif; 
 
 To which are prefixed. 
 
 THE CHARGES AGAINST BRIGADIER GENERAL HULL, AS 
 SPECIFIED BY THE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 BOSTON : 
 
 PUBLISHED BY WELLS AND 
 Court-Street. 
 
 1814, 
 
L3S-: 
 
 H 
 
 DISTRICT OP MASSACTrtUSETTS, TO WIT : 
 
 Disti-ict Clerks Office, 
 BE it i-ememberetl, that on the ninth day of June, anno domini eiglteen htm*, 
 tilled and foUKeen, and in the thirtj-eighth year of the independence of the Uni* 
 ted States of America, William WeUs and Robert Lilly "*" *^- c„;4T>ism«'t, 
 feavs <3opo«t«i ill inis orace the title of a hook, the right whereof theF claim as 
 Proprietors, in the words following, to wit : 
 
 Defence of Brigadier General WillLom Hull. Delivered before tie general 
 Court-Martial, of which Maj. Gen. Deaiboni was President, at Albany, March, 
 one thousand eight hundretl and fourteen. With an Addiess to the Citi2pns of the 
 United States. Written by himself. Copied from the original manuscript, and 
 published by his auUiority. To which ai-e prefixed, the Charges agaiist Gene 
 ral Hull, as specified by the Govermnent. 
 
 ' In confonnity to the Act of the Congress of the United States, intitled " An Act 
 for the Encouragement of Learning, by secm-ing the copies of Maps, Charts and 
 Books, to the Authors and Propi-ietors of such Copies, during the times therein 
 XQcntioned ;" and also to an ^nt intitled, " An Act supplementary to an Act, 
 intitled, an Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by securing the Copies of 
 :Maps, Chaits and Books, to the Authors and Proprietors of such Copies dm-ing 
 the times therein mentioned ; and extending the Benefits thereof to the Aits of 
 Sesisning, Engi-avingand Etching Historical, and other Prints." 
 
 WILLI A JI S. SHAW, Xof MmscKMeett;:. 
 
ADDRESS 
 
 TO THE 
 
 CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES, l 
 
 Fellow-Citizens, ^ 
 
 In submitting my defence to your consideration, i 
 and in making my appeal to your judgment, I 
 have only to ask you to examine with candourj 
 and decide with impartiality. I am sensible the] 
 fate of one man is of little consequence, compared! 
 to the fate of a nation. 
 
 If the sacrifice of me, however innocent, could \ 
 make atonement for the sins of others, redeem;; 
 our misfortunes, and restore the national charac-j 
 ter, it might be justified by precedents in otherl 
 countries;, and perhaps, as a patriot, I ought to he\ 
 satisfied. It is unfortunate for the administration, j 
 and for the other generals who have conducted! 
 our armies, that it cannot have the effect. In coun- 
 tries, where the people are hardly permitted to ■ 
 
iv ADDRESS OF 
 
 think, and their only prerogative is obedience, in- 
 nocence is no shield ; and because there can be no 
 inquiry, the most elevated merit is often brought 
 to the scaffold for the most meritorious conduct. 
 But in a country where justice is the basis of its 
 government, where the people are enlightened by 
 science, and understand both their rights and du- 
 ties, such outrages on justice cannot with impu- 
 nity be committed. 
 
 Under a government thus constituted, when 
 public misfortunes occur, those to whom the ad- 
 ministration is intrusted are in the first instance 
 responsible. They well know the pubhc ven- 
 geance will fall on them, unless they avert it, and 
 too often have no other means of justification, but 
 in the condemnation of others. The power they 
 possess, and the patronage they can give, afford 
 great facilities in effecting the object. It is how- 
 ever our happy lot, that, when this power and pa- 
 tronage are unjustly exercised, a remedy ei^ists ; 
 and that remedy is an appeal to your justiceL ;To 
 that justice I now appeal, in the confident efspec- 
 tation, that you will be satisfied of the purity and 
 rectitude of my conduct, that you will r -verse 
 the unjust sentence which has been pronounced 
 against me, and restore me to that honourable 
 standing in society, which had been acquired by 
 the services of nearly half a century. 
 
GENERAL HULL, v 
 
 1 regret that it is not in my power, in this 
 communication, to present to jou all the testimo- 
 ny and documents, on which my defence is 
 grounded, and which had any relation to the trial. 
 The proceedings of the Court Martial are depo- 
 sited in the office of the Secretary of the De- 
 partment of War, and by law I am entitled to a 
 copy of them. As soon as they are obtained, 
 they will be published in a separate number. 
 
 I believe we are all conscious of the crimes of 
 which we are guilty. When I might have shel- 
 tered myself in the enemy's territory, as a priso- 
 ner of war, I ask you to account for my return 
 to my own country on any other principle, than 
 a consciousness of my innocence, and that I had 
 faithfully done my duty? What other principle 
 could have induced me to have requested an in- 
 vestigation of my conduct? When a Court Mar- 
 tial was ordered to assemble at Philadelphia for 
 my trial, why did I promptly repair there, with- 
 out any restraint, and without even having been 
 divested of my sword ? After the trial was post- 
 poned by the government, without any request on 
 my part ; and having before that time received 
 notice of my exchange from the government, why 
 did I remain more than a year in the country, 
 without any restraint or confinement ? 
 
vi ADDRESS OP 
 
 When the new court was ordered for my trial 
 at Albany, and I was furnished with the volume 
 of capital charges, exhibited against me by the 
 government, why did I voluntarily appear before 
 the Court, and submit to my trial, when it was in 
 my power so easily to have avoided it ? Why, 
 after the trial, did I return alone and unattended 
 to my residence in Massachusetts, and there wait 
 the sentence of the Court Martial ? — I do presume 
 your answer must be, that this conduct only could 
 have resulted from a consciousness of innocenc e, 
 and a full conviction that I had done my duty^ 
 
 I now ask you to consider the conduct of the go- 
 vernment, in relation to me. Did they believe the 
 black catalogue of charges they exhibited against 
 me was true ? If they did, could the administration 
 have been justified in leaving me at perfect liber- 
 ty, for more than a year after I had been furnish- 
 ed with a copy of these charges ? Did the mem- 
 bers of the Court Martial, who pronounced the- 
 sentence, in their consciences believe I was 
 guilty, and deserved punishment? If they did, 
 how can their conduct in directing me, the day 
 after the sentence was concluded, to return to 
 my home in Massachusetts, without any kind of 
 restraint, and without requiring any kind of secu« 
 rity for my appearance to receive the execution 
 of the sentence? This direction was given the 
 
GENERAL HULL. vii \ 
 
 day after the sentence was passed. Can it be < 
 presumed there was a concert between the Presi- ' 
 dent and the Court, and he had directed the Court \ 
 to adopt this measure previous to the sentence ? ] 
 Is it possible it was understood between the Pre- i 
 sident and the Court, previous to the conclusion ■] 
 of the trial, what the sentence should be, and that j 
 it should be remitted by him ? And if both the '] 
 President and the Court had believed in their ] 
 consciences, I had been guilty of the crimes with i 
 which I was charged, could it be reconciled to ] 
 their duty to leave me in a situation, where I could ; 
 so easily avoid the punishment which was to have \ 
 been inflicted ? \ 
 
 :i 
 
 I have stated these facts, and made these ob- ^ 
 servations, to convince you, that my whole con- 1 
 duct has manifested, I myself was conscious | 
 of no crime, and it was not the intention either j 
 of the President, or the Court Martial, that I ] 
 should receive the punishment which had been/ \ 
 ordered. j 
 
 I now ask you, my fellow-citizens, to decide \ 
 
 for yourselves what have been the motives of the \ 
 
 administration in this business ? With respect to j 
 
 two thirds of the members of the Court Martial, i 
 
 they have ordered a sentence, which in their con- j 
 
 sciences they believed ought not to be executed, j 
 
viii ADDRESS OF 
 
 The Court Martial, in justification of their con- 
 duct, in recommending me to the mercy of the 
 President, can appeal to no precedent, not even 
 the proceedings in the trial of admiral Byng. Af- 
 ter the Court had found him guilty of a particular 
 charge, there was nothing left to their discretion. 
 The articles of war provided, that the punishment 
 should be death. In my case the articles of war 
 provided death, or such other punishment as the 
 Court Martial should think proper to order. Why 
 then did not the Court order such a punishment 
 as they believed ought to have been inflicted ? 
 
 From these facts and observations, I do think 
 the motives of the administration must be appa- 
 rent. And indeed, I presume it will not be 
 in your power to reconcile the conduct of the 
 President of the United Statce, and the conduct 
 of the Court Martial, without believing there was 
 a concert and understanding how this business 
 was to be conducted. 
 
 With respect to the lenity of the Court, I in- 
 formed them I did not ask it ; and I requested 
 no other mercy from them, than the mercy of a 
 decision ; that they would decide on my case, and 
 keep me no longer in suspense. 
 
 In regard to the pardon of the President, I had 
 no opportunity of requesting it, because it was 
 
GENERAL HULL. ix 
 
 granted, before I had any knawledge of the sen- 
 tence. Ingratitude, I hope, is no part of my cha= 
 racter. But I do submit to your consideration, 
 whether I ought to feel grateful to him, when the 
 National Intelligencer, a paper published at his 
 door, and under his auspices, in giving an account 
 of the trial and announcing the sentence, states, 
 that' the punishment is more protracted and terri- 
 ble, in consequence of a remission of the sentence. 
 If his object was to aggravate and increase the 
 punishment, it cannot be called an act of mercy, 
 
 Tlier^^ are two very important facts, relating 
 to my sit'iation, as commander of the north-west- 
 ern army, not noticed m my defence. One, the 
 armistice agreed to by general Dearborn, from 
 which my army was expressly excluded. The 
 other, the President's message to Congress, the 
 first session after the capitulation. With regard 
 to the first, the following are the facts. This was 
 an arrangement of Sir George Prevost, for the sole 
 purpose of employing all \M forces against the 
 army I commanded. Havin^fcceived information 
 that the orders in council had been repealed, on 
 the second day of August, eighteen hundred and 
 twelve, he despatched colonel Baynes, his adju- 
 tant general, to the head-quarters of general Dear- 
 born, at Greenbush, near Albany, with an autho- 
 ritv to conclude an armistice — on the uinth of 
 
X ADDRESS OF 
 
 August it was concluded between him and general 
 Dearborn, and my army was excluded. 
 
 Immediately after the departure of colonel 
 Baynes on his mission, major general Sheafe of 
 the British army was ordered to lake Erie, witR a 
 large part of the British force from Montreal, to 
 be placed under the command of general Brock. 
 From the nature of the transaction, it is certain, 
 that general Brock was made acquainted with 
 these circumstances, and informed that he might, 
 with the most perfect safety to his posts at 
 Kingston, York, forts George and Erie, march 
 his whole force against my army, which had in- 
 vaded the province of which he was governour 
 and commander in chief. Calculating the dis- 
 tances, and the celerity with which the British 
 commanders convey important information, there 
 was full time for the purpose. Of this important 
 arrangement, in which the army I commanded had 
 so much interest, I Jiever received any informa- 
 tion from general D^rborn. That general Brock 
 took his whole forcPto Maiden, from fort George 
 and its vicinity, excepting a few men to take care 
 of the cannon and stores, is certain ; and that ge- 
 neral Sheafe arrived from Montreal with the rein- 
 forcements, immediately after general Brock's 
 departure from Fort George, is likewise a fact 
 well inown. That at this time, on the ninth of 
 
GENERAL HULL. M \ 
 
 August, a cessation of hostilities had been cor.- i 
 rJiided. which extended from fort Erie, on the j 
 ^ast part of lake Erie, to Quebec. In my next i 
 number, I shall produce documents to prove the \ 
 facts I have here stated. They are, however, \ 
 all so public, and so well known, that I am fully j 
 authorized in stating them without the documents, j 
 That on the day ^f the capitulation, the sixteenth \ 
 of August, general Brock well knew that a cessa- i 
 lion of hostilities below had taken place, is certain, 
 because on that day he gave me information of it, j 
 and that the orders in council had been repealed, \ 
 and observed, he hoped it would be the founda- \ 
 (ion of a peace. It is likewise well known, this ^ 
 measure was disapproved by the President, and ; 
 principally on account of the effect it would have ] 
 on my army. When general Dearborn v* as or- ; 
 <Jered by the President to make diversions on ] 
 the enemy's posts below me, and ought to have \ 
 been co-operating with me with all his forces, he i 
 was sitting at his ease at Greenbush, and making ! 
 arrangements, which were one great cause of the I 
 destruction of my army. And yet this samej 
 general Dearborn was appointed the president of! 
 the Court Martial which has condemned me for the i 
 misfortune, which his own misconduct had been! 
 a great cause in producing. In sacrificing me,^ 
 he has undoubtedly made some atonement for his! 
 own faults, in the opinion of the administration,! 
 
 B 
 
^li ADDRESS OF 
 
 and may be permitted to remain in the possessios 
 of his nomiiial rank, and in the enjoyment of his 
 emoluments, in the degraded and disgraceful situ- 
 ation, to which he has submitted for more than a 
 year. Thus has general Dearborn, by adopting 
 a measure, which brought the principal part of 
 the enemy's force against my army, exhibited his 
 profound skill in military operations, and his 
 talents and qualifications as commander in chief 
 of the American army, 
 
 I shall now proceed to consider that part of ihe 
 President's message, of the fourth of November, 
 eighteen hundred and twelve, which developed 
 Ihe objects of my unfortunate campaign. It is in 
 the following words. 
 
 "Previous to its declaration, [the declaration 
 " of war] it was deemed proper, as a measure of 
 ^'precaution and forecast, that a considerable 
 ''force should be placed in the Michigan terri- 
 *' iory, with a general view to its security, and in 
 '' the event of war, to such operations in the up- 
 " permost Canada, as would intercept the hostile 
 '^influence of Great Britain over the savages, 
 ^'■obtain the command of the lake on which that 
 ^^ part of Canada borders, and maintain co-ope- 
 " rating relations Avith such forces as might be 
 " most conveuiently employed against other parts. 
 
1 
 GENERAL HULL. xiii = 
 
 *' Our expectation of gaining the command of I 
 ^Uhe lakes, by the invasion of Canada from De- I 
 " troit, having been disappointed, measures were ■ 
 *' instantly taken to provide on them a naval < 
 ''force snperiour to that of the enemj." ] 
 
 I 
 The objects of the force intrusted to my com- I 
 mand, are here particularly stated. They are \ 
 stated by the first magistrate to the legislature - 
 of the nation. This is a document of the hidiest \ 
 authority, and must be considered as conclusive I 
 evidence, that these were the objects, for which J 
 the expedition was ordered, and which the Pre- ! 
 sident expected would have been accomplished. | 
 If it was the expectation of the President, that ! 
 with the few militia under my command, I should ; 
 have obtained possession of the lake, it is unac- I 
 countable, that it never was communicated to me. \ 
 All my instructions from the Department of War ; 
 were laid before the Court Martial^ and there Vv as i 
 not the least intimation of the kind. Indeed i : 
 never had the most distant idea, that this expcc- j 
 tation was entertained, until it was disclosed I 
 in this message. Both in my repeated written I 
 communications, and in frequent conversations j 
 with the President and Secretary of the Depart- i 
 ment of War, I had urged the necessity of a navy < 
 on lake Erie, superiour to the British, in the event: : 
 <>f war with Grea^ Britain. I well knew at thai ) 
 
iiv ADDRESS OF 
 
 tirae, ihey had a strong naval force on the lake, 
 perfectly manned and prepared in everj respect 
 for ofFensive or defensive war. The United 
 States had not a single vessel or gun boat on those 
 waters. All they had was an old unarmed trans- 
 port vessel, repairing on the stocks, and which was 
 Kot launched until near a month after the decora- 
 tion of v.'ar. 
 
 There were but two modes of taking possession 
 of the lake ; one, by taking or destroying the en- 
 emy's naval force ; the other,"by taking posses- 
 sion of all their posts and harbours, both on the 
 main land and islands, an extent of coast more 
 ihrni three hundred miles. I am confident no one 
 will believe it was possible for me, either to have 
 ^aken or destroyed the British fieel then on the 
 lake, w'lih the' means I possessed. The force^ 
 under my commaiad,. was totally inadequate to 
 have effected it in the other way, especially after 
 (he full of Michilimackinac, and all the northern 
 nations of savages were in hostility against me. 
 Although I still entertain the same opinion I gave 
 to the government, before the declaration of war, 
 that a navy on lake Erie was essentially necessary ; 
 yet) I now believe, had an adequate force been 
 sent to the Michigan territory, and sufficient 
 forces had been ordered to have taken possession 
 of forts George and Erie at the same time^ a5<| 
 
GENERAL HULL. :&y\ 
 
 \ 
 
 these armies had co-operated, th« whole of that 1 
 part of the province of Upper Canada, which I 
 borders on lake Erie, might have been in our pos- 1 
 session 'in the campaign of eighteen hmidred and ^ 
 twelve, with all the enemy's harbours on the bor- j 
 ders of the lake, by which means the #aval force j 
 would have been destroyed, or must have sur^ I 
 rendered at the approach of winter. I 
 
 1 
 This idea I suggested to the Secretary of War, | 
 in my memoir of the sixth of March, eighteen ] 
 hundred and twelve, provided the object w^as the 
 reduction of the Canadas, and it was the intention i 
 of the government, contrary to every opinion I ^ 
 had given, not to build a navy on lake Erie. I :| 
 suggested it as the only possible mode, and at the ] 
 same time pointed out all the difficulties which I 
 would attend it. On the sixth of March, at the l 
 time when this memoir was presented, I had no j 
 command in the army, and had uniformly declin- \ 
 ed to accept a military appointment, although I I 
 had been strongly solicited. Being then the gc" \ 
 vernour of the Michigan territory, it was my duty 1 
 to induce the government to provide means for \ 
 its safety. j 
 
 I 
 
 About the eleventh of April, after I had been ; 
 appointed to the command of the north-western j 
 army, unsolicited, and even undesired on my i 
 
 i 
 
xvi ADDRESS OF 
 
 part ; I (hen presented to the President, througli 
 ihe medium of the Department of War, another 
 commiinicalion, in which I represented in the 
 sjirongest and most explicit terms, the necessitj 
 of our having a naval force superiour to the ene- 
 my on th^lakes ; and that without it, and unless 
 the army I was to command was strengthened 
 by additions to its numbers, and unless it were 
 followed by detachments to keep open the com- 
 munication, and insure its supplies from Ohio; 
 and unless it was supported by co-operations on 
 other quarters,^ my army could not be able to 
 maintain itself at Detroit, much less carry on ofFen^ 
 sive operations in the enemy's country. 
 
 After these communications, and under the cir- 
 cumstances in which I v/as placed, I ask you, my 
 fellow-citizens, whether I had any reason to be- 
 lieve it to be the expectation of the government^ 
 that I should ha-ve obtained the command of the 
 lakes? But in this I was mistaken. It really ap- 
 pears, that it w^as, because the President says, in 
 the Message I have quoted, " Our expectation of 
 " gaining the command of the lakes by the inva- 
 *' sion of Canada from Detroit having been disap- 
 *' pointed, measures were instantly taken to pro- 
 " vide on them a naval force, superiour to that of 
 *' the enemy." "J 
 
GENERAL HULL. xvii 
 
 The other object was, " to maintain co-operat- 
 " ing relations with such forces, as might be most 
 "conveniently employed against other parts.'* 
 
 I opened a road of two hundred miles through 
 a savage wilderness, invaded the enemy's coun- 
 try, remained a month in the possession of it, 
 waiting for co-operating relations, until I was in- 
 formed I should receive none ; and uiilil general 
 I Dearborn, instead of co-operations, agreed to a 
 cessation of hostilities, which afforded the enemy 
 an opportunity of concentrating his whole force 
 against my little army. 
 
 By the documents of the government, it thus 
 appears, that these were the objects of my expedi- 
 tion ; and because I disappointed the expectations 
 of the administration in not obtaining the com- 
 mand of the lakes, with the few Ohio militia I com- 
 manded, and did not maintain co-operating rela- 
 tions Vv^ith other forces, when there were none to 
 co-operate with me, I have been condemned. 
 
 I do expect, my fellow-citizens, when you be^ 
 Gome acquainted with the true history of my case, 
 you will reverse the unjust sentence which has 
 been pronounced against me. I am now perfect- 
 ly supported by a consciousness of having done 
 my duty in the most faithful manner, and my only 
 
xvlii ADDRESS OP GEN. HULL> 
 
 desire is, to convince you and posterity of the 
 purity of my motives, and the correctness of my 
 conduct. Under this support I am tranquil and 
 happy. Had I pursued any other course, I should 
 want the consciousness which I now feel, and in 
 sincerity I can adopt the language of Pope, 
 
 " One stlf approring hour whole years outweighs 
 - *' Of stupid starers and of loud huzzas ; 
 "" And more true joy Mai-cellus exiled feels, 
 " Than Caesar with 3 senate at his heels." 
 
 William Hull. 
 
 Newton, (Mass.) June 1st. 1S14. 
 
CHARGES. 
 
 At a general Court Maitial (ordered by the President of the United States) tea- 
 Tened at Albany, in the State of New- York, on the third day of January one 
 thousand eight hundred and fourteen, and continued by adjoui-nments to the 
 twenty-fiftli day of l^Iarch following, brigadier gcnerrd William Hull, of the 
 army of the United States, -was tried on the following charges and speeifica- 
 t'lons, viz : 
 
 CHARGE I, 
 
 Treason against the United States, between the 
 ninth of A\n'i\ and the seventeenth of August, eight- 
 een hundred and twelve. 
 
 First specification. In this : That on the first 
 day of July, in the year eighteen hundred and twelve, 
 before that time and ever since, an open and public 
 war was, and is yet carried on and prosecuted by and 
 between the United States of America and their ter- 
 ritories, and the united kingdom of Great-Britain and 
 Ireland, and the dependencies thereof: and that Wil- 
 liam Hull, a brigadier general in the army of the said 
 United States, a citizen of the said United States, 
 owing allegiance to the said United States, and late 
 commander of the north-western army of the said 
 United States, well knowing the premises, and trai- 
 torously and unlawfully designing and contriving to 
 send and convey intelligence to the said enemies of 
 the said United States, touching a declaration of war 
 by the said United States, against the said uaited 
 kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, and the de- 
 pendencies thereof; and, also, touching the expedition 
 on which the said nortji-western army under hi« com- 
 
XX CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 mand as aforesaid was employed ; and, also, touching 
 the numbers, state and condition of the said north-west- 
 ern army; in prosecution of the said traitorous and un- 
 lawful design, on the said first day of July, in the year 
 aforesaid, at the rapids of the river Miami of the lake, 
 in the territory of Michigan, the said William KuU 
 (then and there being a brigadier general in the army 
 of the United States, and being then and there com- 
 mander of the said north-western army as aforesaid,) 
 did traitorously hire or cause to be hired an unarmed 
 vessel, with the pretended purpose of transporting 
 therein certain sick soldiers, and the principal part of 
 the hospital stores belonging to the said north-western 
 army, from the said rapids of the river Miami of the 
 lake to Detroit, in the said territory of Michigan, but 
 in truth, traitorously contriving and intending that 
 the said unarmed vessel, together with all persons, 
 papers, and things put on board thereof, should be 
 captured by the enemies of the said United States, on 
 the passage of the said unarmed vessel from the said 
 r?-picisof the ilver of the Miami of the lake to Delri;lS: 
 aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan aforesaid : and 
 that the said William Hull, in further prosecution of 
 his said traitorous and unlawful design and contri- 
 vance, (being then and there a brigadier general in 
 the army of the United States as aforesaid, and being 
 then and there commander of the said north-w estern 
 army as aforesaid,) did then and there traitorously put, 
 or traitorously cause to be put on board of the said 
 unarmed vessel, a trunk containing (among other 
 things) the official correspondence of the Secretary of 
 the Department of War and the said brigadier general 
 William Hull, as well touching the expedition on 
 which the said north-western army under his com- 
 mand as aforesaid, w as then employed, as touching a 
 declaration of war by the said United States against 
 the said united kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, 
 and the dependencies thereof, and also, certain otfi* 
 Oial muster-rolls, reports, an<J returnsj of the numbers, 
 
GENERAL HULL. sxi 
 
 slate and condition of the said north-western army, 
 under his command as aforesaid : and that afterwards, 
 to wit : on the second day of July, in the year afore- 
 said, the said vessel, so as aforesaid traitorously hired 
 or traitorously caused to be hired, by the said biiga- 
 dier general ¥/illiam Hull, on its passage from the 
 said rapids of the river Miami of the lake to Detroit 
 aforesaid, wfs captured by the said enemies of the 
 United States, having on board thereof, at the time 
 of the said capture, the said trunk containing the said 
 official correspondence, as well touching the said ex- 
 pedition, as the said declaration of war, and the said 
 official muster-rolls, reports and returns, of the num- 
 bers, state, and condition of the said north-western 
 army (together with certain sick soldiers, and the 
 principal part of the hospital stores belonging to the 
 said north-western army,) and by means of the said 
 capture, and in fulfilment of the said traitorous and 
 unlawful design, contrivance, and intendment of the 
 said brigadier general William Hull, the said official 
 correspondence, as well touching the said expedition, 
 as the said declaration of war, and the said official 
 muster-rolls, reports and returns, of the numbers, state 
 and condition of the said north-western army, (to- 
 gether with certain" sick soldiers, and the principal 
 part of the hospital stores of the said north-western 
 army,) came to the possession, knowledge and use of 
 the enemies of the said United States; giving infor- 
 mation and intelligence to the enemies of the said 
 United States, as v/ell touching the said expedition, 
 as touching the said declaration of war, and, also, 
 touching the numbers, state and condition of the said 
 north-western army of the said United States, then 
 and there under the command of the said brigadier 
 general William Hull as aforesaid; whereby the 
 said William Jiull, on the first day of July, in the 
 year aforesaid, at the rapids of the river Miami of the 
 lake aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan aforesaid, 
 (being tiien and there a brigadier general in the army 
 
icxii CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 of the United States, and being then and there com- 
 mander of the said nc.h-western army as aforesaid, 
 and being then and there a citizen of the said United 
 States, owing allegiance to the said United States,) 
 did then and there traitorously and unlawfully hold 
 correspondence with, and give intelligence to the 
 enemy, and did then and there traitorously, by the 
 means aforesaid, adhere to the enemies of the said 
 United States, giving tliem aid and comfort. 
 
 Second specification. And also, in this : That 
 afterwards and during the said war, so as aforesaid 
 carried on and prosecuted by and between the said 
 United States of America and their territories, and 
 the said united kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, 
 and the dependencies thereof, the said north-western 
 army of the said United States, under the command 
 of the said brigadier general William Hull as afore- 
 said, having entered the said British province of Up- 
 per Canada, and having established a military post 
 at or near Sandwich, in the said British province of 
 Upper Canada, which it was the duly of the said 
 , brigadier general William Hull to maintain and de- 
 fend, in-order that the said war might and should be 
 advantageously carried on and prosecuted on behalf 
 of the said United States, and more es})ecially that a 
 certain British fort called Maiden, otherwise called 
 Amherstburgh, in the siiid British province of Upper 
 Canada, occupied by the enemies of the said United 
 States, might and should !>€ advantageously attacked 
 and taken by the said north-western army of the said 
 United States, under the command of the said briga- 
 dier general V/illiam Hull as aforesaid, yet the said 
 William Hull, (a brigadier general in the army of 
 tlie United States, a citizen of the said United States, 
 owing allegiance to the said United States, and com- 
 mander of the said north-western army of the said 
 United States as aforesaid,) well knowing the premi- 
 ses, on the eighth day of August, in the year one 
 iJiousand eight hundred and twelve, at Sand-wich 
 
GENERAL HULL. xxiii 
 
 aibresaid, in the British province of Upper Canada 
 aforesaid, did then and there traitorously and unlaw- 
 fully conspire and combine with certain enemies of 
 the said United States, (whose names are unknown) 
 to quit and abandon to the enemies of the said United 
 States, the said military post established by the said 
 north-western army of the said United States, at or 
 near Sandwich aforesaid, in the British province of 
 Upper Canada aforesaid, and to prevent the said 
 British fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherst- 
 burgh, from being attacked and reduced, or an attempt 
 being made to reduce the same, by the said north- 
 western army of the said United States, under the 
 command of the said brigadier general William Hull 
 as aforesaid ; and that the said William Hull, (then 
 and there being a brigadier general in the army of the 
 said United States, then and there being commander 
 of the said north-western army of the said United 
 States, and then and there being a citizen of the said 
 United States, owing allegiance to the said United 
 States) in prosecution of the said traitorous conspiracy 
 and combination, did then and there traitorously quit 
 and abandon, and did then and there traitorously cause 
 to be quitted and abandoned, the said military post 
 established by the said north-western army of the 
 said United states as aforesaid, at oi* near Sandwich 
 as aforesaid, in the British province of Upper Canada 
 aforesaid, and did then and there traitorously neglect 
 and omit to make the proper preparations for attack- 
 ing and reducing, or attempting to reduce the said 
 British fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherst- 
 burgh, but on the contrary, did then and there traitor- 
 ously prevent the same from being attacked and re- 
 duced, and an attempt being made to reduce the same 
 by the said north-w^estern army of the said United 
 States, then apd there under his command as afore- 
 said- : and, in further prosecution of the said traitorous 
 conspiracy and combination, did then and there trai- 
 torously march, withdraw and remove, and traitorously 
 c 
 
xxiv CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 order to be marched, withdrawn and removed, ilie 
 maia i3ody of the said north-western B.rmy of the said 
 United States, from the said miiitary post established 
 hj the said north-western army of the said United 
 States, at or near Sandwich aforesaid, to a place out 
 of the said British province of Upper Canada, to wit; 
 to Detroit aforesaid, in tlie territory of Blichigari 
 aforesaid; whereby the said William Hull, on the 
 said eighth day of August, in the year one thousand 
 eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, at Sandwich 
 aforesaid, in the saiti British province of Upper Ca- 
 nada, (being tlien and there a brigadier general in 
 the army of the said United States, and being then 
 and tliere commander of the said nortli-v>'estern army 
 of tb.e said United States, and being then and there a 
 citizen of the said United States, owing allegiance 
 to the said United States,) did then and there trai- 
 torously conspire, combine, and hold correspondence 
 with the enemies of the said United States, and did 
 tlien and there traitorously and shamefully quit and 
 abaridau, and traitorously and shamefully cause to be 
 quitted and abandoned the said military |>ost, so as 
 aforesaid et^tablished by the said north-western army 
 of the said United States, at or near Sandwich afore- 
 said, in the British province of Upper Canada afore- 
 said, and did then and there traitorously neglect and 
 omit to mr.ke the proper preparations for attacking 
 and reducing, or attempting to reduce the said fort 
 called Blalden, otherwise called Amherstburgh, in 
 the said British province of Upper Canada, but did 
 tlien and there traitorously prevent the said British 
 fort palled Maiden, otherwise called Amherstburgh, 
 in the said British province of Upper Canada, from 
 being attacked and reduced, or an attempt being made 
 to reduce the same by the said north-western army 
 of tlie United States, under his command as aforesaid, 
 and by the means aforesaid, did then and there trai- 
 torously adhere to the enemies of the said United 
 vStates, giving them aid and comfort. 
 
GENERAL HULL. xx> 
 
 Third specification. And also, in this : — That 
 afterwards and during the said war, so as aforesaid 
 carried on and prosecuted, by and between the said 
 United States of America and their territories, and 
 the said united kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, 
 and the dependencies thereof, to wit : on the sixteenth 
 day of August, in the year one thousand eight hun- 
 dred and twelve aforesaid, at Detroit, in the Michi- 
 gan territory aforesaid, the said William Hull was 
 then and there a citizen of said United States, owing 
 allegiance to the said United States, and was then 
 and there a brigadier general in the army of the said 
 United States, and was then and there commander of 
 the north-western army of the said United States, and 
 was then and there commander of a certain fort, 
 called Fort Detroit, and belonging to the said United 
 States, erected at or near the town of Detroit, upon a 
 bank of the river Detroit, in the said territory of Mi- 
 chigan ; the works ivhereof, and the guns and gun- 
 carriages belonging thereto, then were, and long be- 
 fore had been decayed, dilapidated, and out of repair. 
 And that the said brigadier general William Hull, 
 then and there did traitorously conspire and combine 
 with certain enemies of the said United States, 
 (whose names are unknown,) then and there traitor- 
 ously and shamefully to surrender and abandon to the 
 enemies of the said United States, the said fort, called 
 Fort Detroit, belonging to the said United States as 
 aforesaid, and then and there under the command of 
 the said brigadier general William Hull as aforesaid, 
 with all the troo})s, regulars as •^^ell as militia, then 
 and there under the command of the said brigadier 
 general Hull as aforesaid, and all the public stores 
 and arms, and all public documents, including every 
 thing else of a public nature, appertaining to the said 
 fort, called Fort Detroit, and to the said north-west- 
 ern army of the said United States, under the com- 
 mand of the said brigadier general William Hull as 
 sforesaid. And that in prosecution of the said trai- 
 
xxvi CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 torous conspiracy and combination, the said brigadier 
 general William Hull did then and there wilfully and 
 traitorously neglect and omit to repair and strengthen 
 the works of the said fort, called Fort Detroit, then 
 and there under his command as aforesaid, and to put 
 the same (together with the said guns and gun-car- 
 liages belonging thereto) into a proper state and 
 condition for resistance and defence against the ap- 
 proaches, attacks, and assaults of the enemies of the 
 said United States. And did then and there wilfully 
 and traitorously neglect and omit to fortify the places 
 and passes at and near to the said fort, called Fort 
 Detroit, by and through which the troops of the ene- 
 mies of the said United States might then and there 
 reasonaiiiy be expected to eipproach, and did approach 
 the said fort, called Fort Detroit, for the purpose of 
 attacking and subduing the same. And diet then and 
 there traitorously neglect and omit to oppose, resist, 
 repel and defeat, and to attempt to repel and defeat 
 the troops of the enemies of the said United States, 
 in their hostile preparations, and approach to and 
 towards the said fort, called Fort Detroit, for the 
 purpose of attacking and subduing the same^ And 
 ilmt in further })rosecution and completion of the said 
 traitorous conspiracy and combination, the said briga- 
 dier general William Hull did then and there traitor- 
 ously and shamefully abandon and surrender the said 
 fort, called Fort Detroit, then and there under his 
 command as aforesaid, (which it was his duty then 
 and there to maintain and defend,) together with all 
 the troops, regulars as well as militia, then and there 
 in the said fort, called Fort Detroit, then and there 
 belonging to the said United States as aforesaid, and 
 then and there under his command as aforesaid, and 
 all the public stores and arms, and i)ublic documents, 
 including every thing else of a public nature, in and 
 appertaining to the said fort, called Fort Detroit, and 
 to the said north-western army of the said United 
 States, then and there under his command as afore^ 
 
GENERAL HULL, xxvii 
 
 said, unto the enemies, of (lie said Unitcu States, to 
 wit :— to the British forces tlien and there under the 
 command of major general Brock ; wiiereby the said 
 William Hull, on the said sixteenth day of August, 
 in the year one thousand eight hundred and twelve 
 aforesaid, at Detroit aforesaid, in the territor^^ of Mi- 
 chigan aforesaid, (being then and there a citizen of 
 the said United States, owing allegiance to the said 
 United States, and being then and there a brigadier 
 general in the army of the said United States, and 
 being then and there commander of the said north- 
 western army of the said United States, and being 
 then and there commander of the said fort, called Fort 
 Detroit, belonging to the said United States as afore- 
 said,) did then and there traitorously and shamefully 
 abandon and surrender the said fort, called Fort De- 
 troit, to the enemies of the said United States, to wit: 
 • — to the said British troops under the command of 
 major general Brock as aforesaid; and did then and 
 there by the means aforesaid, traitorously adhere to 
 the enemies of the said United States, giving them 
 aid and comfort. 
 
 CHARGE ir. 
 
 Cowardice at and in the neighbourhood of Detroit, 
 between the first day of July and the seventeenth day 
 of August, in the year one thousand eight hundred 
 and twelve. 
 
 First specification. In this : — That during the 
 said war so as aforesaid carried on and prosecuted by 
 and between the said United States of America and 
 their territories, and the said united kingdom of Great 
 Britain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, 
 the said brigadier genera] William Hull, commanding 
 the north-western armj^ of the said United States as 
 aforesaid, having entered the said British province of 
 Upper Canada, in prosecution of the said war on be- 
 half of the said United States, and being there in pos- 
 
xxviii CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 session of the town of Sandwich and the adjacent 
 country, in the name and on behalf of the said United 
 States, and having declared and avowed the object 
 and intention of attacking and subduing the British 
 fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherstburgh, in 
 the said British province of Upper Canada, and, ge- 
 nerally, of maintaining and enlarging his position and 
 possession in the said British province of Upper 
 Canada, on the eighth day of August, in the year one 
 thousand eight hundred and twelve, at Sandwich, 
 aforesaid, in the British province of Upper Canada 
 aforesaid, did then and there misbehave himself before 
 the enemy, and shamefully manifest an undue fear 
 and apprehension of danger by a course of conduct 
 and conversation evincing personal alarm, agitation 
 of mind, and privation of judgment, by abandoning 
 the said object and design of attacking the said Bri- 
 tish fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherst- 
 burgh, by quitting the position and possession taken at 
 the town of Sandwich and in the adjacent country, in 
 the British province of Upper Canada as aforesaid, and 
 by retreating abruptly from and out of the said British 
 province of Upper Canada to Detroit, in the territory 
 of Michigan aforesaid, without anj^ cause for so doingy 
 arising from the superiour numbers, state and condition 
 of the British forces which were then and there op- 
 posed to the said army of the said United States, 
 wider the command of the said brigadier general Wil- 
 liam Hull, and without any other just and sufficient 
 cause whatsoever; whereby the officers and soldiers 
 of said north-western army of the said United States, 
 then and there under the command of the said briga- 
 dier general William Hull, were induced to lose and 
 did lose all confidence in the personal courage and 
 the military capacity of their said commantler; the 
 inhabitants of the said British province of Upper 
 Canada were taught to distrust the power and profes- 
 sions of the invading general ; a shade was cast upon 
 the reputation of the American arms j and the service 
 
GENERAL HULL. ^ix 
 
 of the said United States, in the prosecution of the 
 said war, suffered great detriment and disadvantage. 
 Second specification. And, also, in this :■ — That 
 during the said war so as atbresaid carried on and 
 prosecuted by and between the said United States of 
 America and their territories, and the said united king- 
 dom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the dependen- 
 cies thereof, to wit : on the fifteenth day of August, 
 in the year one thousand eight hundred and twelve 
 aforesaid, the enemy having raised certain batteries 
 on the banks of the said river Detroit, in the said 
 British province of Upper Canada, opposite the said 
 fort Detroit, and certain American posts and batteries 
 established and erected near the said fort Detroit, in 
 tlie said territory of Michigan, and a cannonade being 
 commenced from the said batteries of the enemy 
 against and upon the said fort of Detroit and the said 
 American posts and batteries established and erected 
 near thereto, in the said territory of Michigan, the 
 said brigadier general William Hull, on the said fif- 
 teenth day of August, in the year one thousand eight 
 Jiundred and twelve aforesaid, at Detroit aforesaid, in 
 the territory of Michigan aforefeaid, (being then and 
 there commander of the said fort Detroit, and of the 
 said American posts and batteries established and 
 erected near thereto, in the said territory of Michigan, 
 and being then and there commander of the said 
 north-western army of the said United States,) did 
 then and there during the continuance of the cannon- 
 ade aforesaid, shamefully misbehave himself before 
 the enemy, and manifest great fear and apprehension 
 of personal danger by a course of conduct and con- 
 versation evincing personal alarm, agitation of mind, 
 and privation of judgment, and particularly by various 
 timid and cowardly actions and expressions then and 
 there used and uttered in the presence of the officers 
 and soldiers then and there belonging to the said 
 north-western army of the said United States, and then 
 and there under his command as aforesaid, as well in 
 
sxx CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 the public street of the town of Detroit, as in places 
 adjacent to the said fort of Detroit, and the said 
 American posts and batteries established and erect- 
 ed near thereto, in the said territory of Michigan; 
 whereby a fatal encouragement was atforded for the 
 hostile enterprises of the enemy, a pernicious example 
 (calculated to intimidate and to disorganize) was given 
 to the American troops, and the service of the United 
 States in the j)rosecution of the said war, was exposed 
 to hazard, shame, and disappointment. 
 
 Third specification. And, also, in this : — That 
 during the said war, carried on, and prosecuted by and 
 between the said United States of America and their 
 territories, and the said united kingdom of Great Bri- 
 tain and Ireland, and the dependencies thereof, to wit : 
 on the sixteenth day of August, in the year one thou- 
 sand eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, the British 
 forces under the command of mtyor general Brock hav- 
 ing crossed the said river Detroit, having landed at a 
 place called Spring Wells, otherwise called Spring 
 Hill, in the said territory of Michigan; and having 
 thence marched towards the said fort of Detroit, with 
 the design to attack the same, the said brigadier ge- 
 neral Hull, on the said sixteenth day of August, one 
 thousand eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, at De- 
 troit aforesaid, in the said territory of Michigan, (be- 
 ing then and there commander of the said fort of 
 Detroit, and being then and there commander of the 
 «aid north-western army of the said United States) 
 did then and there, during all the time of the enemy's 
 crossing ihe said river Detroit as aforesaid, landing 
 at the said Spring Wells, otherwise called Spring 
 Hill as aforesaid, and marching towards the said fort 
 Detroit as aforesaid, with the design to attack the 
 same as aforesaid, shamefully misbehave himself be- 
 fore the enemy, and manifest great fear and appre- 
 hension of personal danger, by various timid and 
 cov/ardly actions and expressions then and there used 
 and utterred in the presence of the officers acd sol- 
 
GENERAL HULL. xxxi 
 
 diers belonging to the said north-western army of the 
 said United States, then and there under his com- 
 mand as aforesaid; by avoiding all personal danger 
 from making an attempt to prevent the enemy's cross- 
 ing the said river to Detroit and landing at the said 
 Spring Wells, otherwise called Spring Hill ; avoiding 
 all personal danger from reconnoitering and encoun- 
 tering the enemy in battle on the said march of the 
 enemy towards the said fort of Detroit; by hastily 
 sending flags of truce to the enemy with overtures for 
 a capitulation ; by anxiously withdrawing his person 
 from the ximerican troops in the open field to a place 
 of comparative safety, within the walls of the said 
 fort Detroit; by an irresolute fluctuation of orders, 
 sometimes inconsistent with each other, and some- 
 times incoherent in themselves; by forbidding the 
 American artillery to fire on the army on the said 
 march of the enemy towards the said fort Detroit; by 
 calling the American troops from the field, and crowd- 
 ing them in the said fort Detroit, Avhile the enemy 
 was on the said march towards the said fort Detroit; 
 by a precipitate declaration to the enemy, that he 
 surrendered the said fort Detroit, and the said north- 
 western army of the said United States, before termis 
 of capitulation were signed or considered, or even 
 suggested; and generally by a course of conduct and 
 conversation evincing personal fear, agitation of mind, 
 and privation of judgment; whereby the said fort of 
 Detroit, and thesaidnorth-westernarmy of the United 
 States, then and there under the command of the said 
 brigadier general William Hull, were then and there 
 rendered an easy and certain conquest to the approach- 
 ing enemy ; the officers and soldiers of a gallant army 
 (compelled by the obligations of military law to obey 
 the orders of their commander) were exposed to un- 
 merited mortification and reproach ; and the service 
 of the said United States, in the prosecution of the 
 said war, suffered great detriment and discredit^ 
 
sxxii CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 Fourth specification. And, also, in this : — Thai 
 iluriiig the said war so as aforesaid carried on and pro- 
 secuted by and between the said United States of 
 America and their territories, and tlie said united 
 kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the depen- 
 dencies thereof, to wit : on the sixteenth day of Au- 
 gust, in the year one thousand eight hundred and 
 twelve aforesaid, at Detroit aforesaid, in the territory 
 of Michigan aforesaid, the said fort Detroit being then 
 and there well garrisoned and supjilied with cannon, 
 ammunition, and provisions; the said norlh-\\estern 
 army of the sai<l United States being then and there 
 well supplied with arms, ammunition, and provisions ; 
 and the officers and soldiers thereof being then and 
 there in high spirits, and eager to meet and encounter 
 the enemy in battle ; and a fine train of artillery being 
 then and there subject to the orders and disposal of 
 the said brigadier general Hull, for the purposes of 
 defence or attack, yet the said brigadier general Wil- 
 liam Hull (then and there being commander of the 
 said fort Detroit, and of the said north-western army of 
 the said United States) acting upon the impulse of per- 
 sonal fear and apprehension, and contemplating, as 
 the means of personal safety, a shameful abandonment 
 and surrender of the said fort Detroit, and of the said 
 north-western army of the said United States under 
 his command as aforesaid, to the approaching enemy, 
 did then and there shamefully misbehave himself be- 
 fore the enemy, and did then and there enter into a 
 disgraceful capitulation with the enemy, containing no 
 consolatory stipulation that the said garrison and army 
 should march out of the said fort of Detroit with the 
 honours of war ; no just and humane stipulation for the 
 securit}^ and protection of such of the inhabitants of the 
 said British province of Upper Canada as had accept- 
 ed the said brigadier general William Hull's invita- 
 tion to join the American standard; nor any reason- 
 able stipulation for an opportunity of rej)orting to the 
 ♦Secretary for the Department of War the circitm- 
 
GENERAL HULL. xxxiii 
 
 stances of so unexpected and so important an event ; 
 and did then and there shamefully abandon, surrender, 
 and give up the said fort of Detroit, together with all 
 the troops, regulars as w ell as militia, then and there 
 under his command as aforesaid, and all the public 
 stores and arms, and all the public documents, includ- 
 ing; every thing else of a public nature belonging to the 
 said fort of Detroit, and to the said north-western 
 army of the said United States, then and there under 
 his command as aforesaid, to the said approaching 
 enemy, to wit : — to the British forces under the com- 
 mand of major general Brock, without any cause for 
 so doing, arising from the superiour numbers, state and 
 condition of the said British forces; or from the ac- 
 tual want, or just expectation of sudden w^ant, of arms, 
 ammunition, and provisions for the said fort Detroit, 
 and the said north-western army of the said United 
 States, and without any other adequate cause what- 
 soever; whereby the territorial sovereignty, rights, 
 and property of the said United States v, ere shame- 
 fully ceded to the enemy ; a brave and patriotic army 
 was wantonly sacrificed by the personal fears of the 
 commander; and the service of the said United States, 
 in the prosecution of the said war, suffered a great 
 and afflicting loss. 
 
 CHARGE IIL 
 
 Nedect of duty and nnofiicerlike conduct, while 
 commanding a separate army, between the ninth of 
 April and the seventeenth of August, in the ye'dv one 
 thousand eight hundred and twelve. 
 
 First specification. In this : — That before 
 and during the said war, carried on and prosecuted 
 as aforesaid, by and between the said United States 
 of America and their territories, and the said united 
 kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the de- 
 pendencies thereof, the said brigadier general William 
 Hull, being duly appointed to command the north- 
 
Sxxiv- CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 Avestern army of the said United States, did actually 
 take and assume tlie command of the said army, on 
 or about the twenty-fifth day of May, in the year 
 one thousand eight hundred and twelve, at or near 
 Daj^ton, in the state of Ohio, and did thence con- 
 stantly continue in the actual command of said army, 
 as well on the march from Dayton aforesaid, to De- 
 troit, in the territory of Michigan, and at Detroit 
 aforesaid, as in the British province of Upper Cana- 
 da, until his capitulation with the enemy, and the 
 consequent surrender of fort Detroit, in the said Mi- 
 chigan territory, with all the troops, regulars, and 
 militia under his command, to the British forces un- 
 der the command of major general Brock, to wit : — ' 
 at Detroit aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan 
 aforesaid, on the sixteenth day of August, in the year 
 one thousand eight hundred and twelve aforesaid. 
 And that the said brigadier general William Hull, 
 unmindful of the important trust reposed in him, dur- 
 ing all the time aforesaid, and as well on the march 
 of the said army from Dayton aforesaid, to Detroit 
 aforesaid, and at Detroit aforesaid, as in the British 
 province of Upper Canada aforesaid, was guilty of 
 neglect of duty and of unofficerlike conduct, by ne- 
 glecting and omitting, with sutficient care and fre- 
 quency, to inspect, train, exercise, review, and order, 
 and to cause to be inspected, trained, exercised, re- 
 viewed, and ordered, the said army under his com- 
 mand as aforesaid ; and, also, by neglecting and 
 omitting, in due form and time, to prei)are an order 
 of battle, and to make the same known to the said 
 army on the march from Dayton aforesaid, to Detroit 
 aforesaid, in the Michigan territory aforesaid, whereby 
 the discipline of tlie troojis under the command of 
 the said brigadier general William Hull as aforesaid, 
 was in danger of being relaxed ; their comfort was 
 liable to be impaired; their confidence in the military 
 skill pnd dispositions of their commander was dimi- 
 nished ; and the snid army was exposed to the hazard 
 
GENERAL HULL. xxxv 
 
 <^r disorder and defeat in the event of an attack being 
 i>iade thereon by the enemy. 
 
 Second specification. And, also, in this :— 
 That during the said war so as aforesaid carried on 
 and prosecuted by and between the said United 
 States of America, and their territories, and the said 
 united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the 
 dependencies thereof, to wit ; on or about the first 
 day of July, in the year one thousand eight hundred 
 and twelve aforesaid, at the rapids of the river Miami, 
 in the territory of Michigan, the said brigadier gene- 
 ral William Hull, then and there commanding the 
 said north-western army of the said United States, on 
 the march thereof from Dayton, in the state of Ohio, 
 to Detroit aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan 
 aforesaid, then and there having sufficient cause to 
 know or to believe, that war was then existing between 
 the said United States and their territories, and the 
 said united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
 and the dependencies thereof, was guilty of neglect of 
 duty and of unofficerlike conduct, by then and there 
 hiring or causing to be hired an unarmed vessel, and 
 putting or causing to be put on board thereof, to be 
 transported by water-passage from the said rapids of 
 the river Miami of the lake, to Detroit aforesaid, 
 (the said brigadier general William Hull having suf- 
 ficient cause to know or to believe the imminent 
 danger of capture by the enemy to which the said 
 unarmed vessel on the passage aforesaid, would be 
 exposed) certain sick soldiers, and a great part of 
 the hospital stores belonging to the said army, to- 
 gether with a trunk, containing (among other things) 
 the papers hereinafter mentioned, which it was the 
 duty of the said brigadier general William Hull most 
 carefully to keep and preserve from the knov^ledge 
 and view of the enemy, that is to say : tlie official 
 correspondence of the Secretary of the Department of 
 War and the said brigadier general William Hull, as 
 well touching the expedition on which the said north- 
 
 D 
 
xxxTi CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 western army under his command as aforesaid, wa? 
 then employed, as touching a declaration of war by 
 the said United States of America agciinst the said 
 united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and 
 the dependencies thereof; and, also, certain other 
 official muster rolls, reports, and returns of the num- 
 bers, state, and condition of the said army under his 
 command as aforesaid. And the said unarmed ves- 
 sel on the passage aforesaid, from the said rapids of 
 the river Miami of the lake towards Detroit afore- 
 said, afterwards to wit : on or about the second day 
 of July in the year one thousand eight hundred and 
 twelve aforesaid, was captured by the enemy, having 
 on board thereof, at the time of such capture, the 
 said sick soldiers, the said hospital stores, and the 
 said trunk, containing the said olficial correspon- 
 dence, and, also, the said muster rolls, reports, and 
 returns of the numbers, state, and condition of the 
 said arm}^ ; whereby the said sick soldiers were made 
 prisoners of war ; the said hospital stores were lost 
 to the United States ; and the said otlicial correspon- 
 dence, and the said muster rolls, reports, and returns 
 of the numbers, state, and condition of the said army 
 came to the possession, knowledge, and use of the 
 f^nemies of the United States, to the great injury of 
 the said United States. 
 
 Third specification. And, also, in this ; — That 
 during the said war so as aforesaid carried on and 
 prosecuted by and between the said United States of 
 America and their territories, and the said united 
 kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and the de- 
 pendencies thereof, the said brigadier general Wil- 
 liam Hull, having arrived with the said north-western 
 army of the said United States under his command 
 as aforesaid, at Detroit, in the territory of Michigan, 
 OTi the seventh day of July, in the year one thousand 
 eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, and having the 
 possession and command of said fort of Detroit, from 
 that time, constantly, until the abandonment and sur- 
 
GENERAL HULL. xxxvii 
 
 render thereof to the British forces under the command 
 of major general Brockj on the sixteenth day of Au- 
 gust, in the year one thousand eight hunured and 
 twelve aforesaid, and finding upon his said arrival at 
 Detroit aforesaid, that the works of the said fort De- 
 troit were greatly damaged and dilapidated, and that 
 the guns and gun-carriages belonging to said fort of 
 Detroit were also damaged and out of repair; and, 
 moreover, well knowing the importance of the said 
 fort Detroit to the service of the said United States 
 in the operation of the said war, and that the same 
 (together with the said guns and gun-carriages) should 
 be put and kept in proper order and repair, was guilty 
 of neglect of duty by neglecting and omitting, dur- 
 ing all the time of his possession and command as - 
 aforesaid, in proper and sufiicient manner to repair 
 and strengthen, or cause to be repaired and strength- 
 ened, the works of the said fort Detroit, by neglect- 
 ing and omitting, in a proper and sufficient manner, 
 and in due time for the service of the said United 
 States, to repair or cause to be repaired, the said guns 
 and gun-carriages, and generally by neglecting and 
 omitting to put, or cause to be put the said fort of De- 
 troit in a proper state and condition for resistance and 
 defence in the event of an invasion and attack hj 
 the enem}^; whereby the said fort Detroit was left an 
 easy conquest to the enemy ; the said guns and gun- 
 carriages, being afterwards required for the service of 
 the said United States, in the British province of 
 Upper Canada, were still found unfit for transporta- 
 tion and use ; great time was consumed in preparing 
 and fitting them for the said service ; and tlie opera- 
 tions of the war were fatally obstructed and sus- 
 pended. 
 
 Fourth specification. And, also, in this :— 
 That during the said war so as aforesaid carried osi 
 and prosecuted by and between the said United States 
 of America and their territories, and tiie said united 
 'kmzilom of Great Britain and Ireland, and tJie de- 
 
xxxviii CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 pendencies thereof, the said brigadier general Wil- 
 liam Hull, declaring and avowing an intention antl 
 design, with the said north-western army of the said 
 United States under his command as aforesaid, to in- 
 1 ade and enter the British province of Upper Canada, 
 to invest and attack the British fort called Maiden, 
 otherwise called Aniherstburgh, in the said British 
 province, and to maintain and enlarge his position 
 and possessions in the said British province, and well 
 knowing that expedition, resolution, and energy were 
 indispensible to the prosecution and accomplishment 
 of such intention and design, and having arrived at 
 Detroit aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan afore- 
 said, on the seventh day of Julv, in the year one 
 thousand eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, and 
 having invaded the said British province of Upper 
 Canada, on the twelfth day of July, in the year 
 aforesaid, and therein taken possession of the town 
 of Sandwich aforesaid, and having with the main 
 body of his said army evacuated the said British pro- 
 vince of Upper Canada on the eighth day of August, 
 hi the year aforesaid, was guilty of neglect of duty 
 and unofficerlike conduct, by not seasonably repair- 
 ing, titling, and transporting, or causing to be repaired, 
 litted and transported, the guns and gun-carriages 
 which were necessary to the operation of the war in 
 the said British province of Upper Canada, by an 
 useless and injurious waste of time and opportunity 
 at Sandwich aforesaid, in the said British province 
 of Upper Canada, without making an attempt to re- 
 duce the said British fort called MaHen, otherwise 
 called Amherstburgh, by an unnecessary consumption 
 of time, in projects to conciliate the British inhabi- 
 tants of the said British province of Upper Canada, 
 and the neighbouring Indians, without resorting to a 
 more effectual display of a military power, capacity, 
 and disposition to maintain the acquisitions of con- 
 quest, and to perform the promises of protection; by 
 postponing in the first instance, and by abandoning 
 
GENERAL HULL. xxxiis 
 
 in the next, an investment and attack upon the said 
 British fort called Maiden, otherwise calietl Ainherst- 
 bur^h, and by finally evacuating the said British pro- 
 vince of Upper Canada, without having provided 
 effectually, in any respect, for the safety of the inha- 
 bitants thereof who had accepted the said brigadier 
 general William Hull's invitation to join the Ameri- 
 can standard, and without having, in any degree, ac- 
 complished the said intention and design of the said 
 brigadier general William Hull, so as aforesaid de- 
 clared and avowed upon the ijivasion of the said Brit*' 
 ish province as aforesaid ; Avhereby an opportunity 
 was afforded to the enemy to bring into suspicion and 
 contempt the power and the conduct of the Ameri- 
 can commander; to collect and combine the British 
 forces ; to seduce, intimidate, and engage the In- 
 dians ; to awe into submission the wavering inhabi- 
 tants of the said British province of Upper Canada; 
 to reinforce the said British fort called Maiden, other- 
 wise called Amherstburgh ; and to jjrepare for invest- 
 ing and attacking the said fort of Detroit, in the said 
 territory of Michigan; while on the other hand, the 
 said army of the said United States, under the com- 
 mand of the said brigadier general Vf iliiam Hull, as 
 aforesaid, diminishing in effective numbers in con- 
 sequence of sickness and other casualties ; the otScers 
 and soldiers naturally became dissatisfted and dis- 
 gusted with a scene of such inactivity, irresolu- 
 tion, and procrastination ; the hope of support and 
 ^o-operation, as well from the Indians as from the 
 British inhabitants of the said British province of 
 Upper Canada, was destroyed, and the general ardour 
 of the troops, in the prosecution of the war, insensi- 
 bly abated. 
 
 Fifth specification. And, also, in this : — That 
 tluring the continuance of the said v/ar, carried on 
 and prosecuted as aforesaid, by and between the said 
 United States of America and their territories, and 
 the said united kingdom oC Great Britain and Ireland*, 
 d2 
 
xl CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 and the dependencies thereof, the said brigadier 
 general William Hull, with the said north-western 
 army of the said United States under his command as 
 aforesaid, arrived at Detroit aforesaid, in the territory 
 of Michigan aforesaid, to wit ; on the seventh day 
 of July, in the year one thousand eight hundred and 
 isvelve aforesaid; that with the said army under his 
 command as aforesaid, he entered and invaded the 
 said British province of Upper Canada, to wit : on 
 ihe twelfth day of July, in the year aforesaid; that 
 with the main body of the said army under his com- 
 mand as aforesaid, he evacuated the said British pro- 
 vince of Upper Canada on the eighth day of August, 
 in the year aforesaid, thence returning to Detroit 
 aforesaid, in the s?* 1 territory of Blichigan, and that 
 he abandoned, surrendered, and gave up the said fort 
 Detroit, with all the troops, regulars as well as militia, 
 rnder his command as aforesaid, to the British forces 
 under the command of major general Brock, to wit : 
 on the sixteenth day of August, in the year aforesaid. 
 And that during all the movements aforesaid, and 
 during all the time aforesaid, to wit ; from the said 
 seventh day of July, in the year one thousand eight 
 hundred and twelve aforesaid, to and including the 
 said sixteenth day of August, in tlie year aforesaid, 
 it was of high importance to the security and supply 
 of the said fort Detroit, and the said army of the said 
 United States, under the command of the said briga- 
 dier general William Hull as aforesaid, that a free 
 ,nnd open communication should be had and preserv- 
 ed between the said fort of Detroit and the said army 
 of the said United States, under the command of the 
 said brigadier general William Hull as aforesaid, and 
 a certain American settlement and military pest 
 made and established at the river Raisin, in the said 
 territory of Michigan; and that the said brigadier 
 general William Hull, well knowing the premises, 
 but unmindful of the trust reposed in him, was guilty 
 of neglect of duty and unofficerlike conduct, by suf- 
 
GENERAL HULL. xli 
 
 feriiig the enemy to interrupt and cut off the said com- 
 munication between the said fort of Detroit and the 
 said army of the said United States under his com- 
 mand as aforesaid, and the said American settlement 
 and military post made and established at the river 
 Raisin aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan afore- 
 said, to wit ; on the first day of August, in the year 
 one thousand eight hundred and twelve afore:3aid, or 
 on some other day of the said month of August, or 
 on some day of the preceding month of July, in 
 the year aforesaid ; also, by afterwards, to wit : on the 
 fourth day of August, in the year aforesaid, detaching 
 major Thomas B. Van Korn of colonel James Find- 
 lay's regiment of Ohio volunteers, with an inadequate 
 force, (the said brigadier general William Hull having 
 sufficient cause for knowing or believing the same to 
 be inadequate) to attempt again to open the said com- 
 munication between the said fort Detroit, and the said 
 army of the said United States, under the command 
 of the said brigadier general Wiiiiam Hull as afore- 
 said, and the said American settlement and military 
 post on said river Raisin, in the territory of Michigan 
 aforesaid ; also, by afterwards, to wit : on the eiglith 
 day of August, in the year aforesaid, detaching lieute- 
 nant colonel James Miller, of the fifth regiment of 
 United States infantry, with the number or about the 
 number of five hundred men to attempt again to open 
 the said communication between the said fort of De- 
 troit and the said army of the said United States, under 
 the command of the said brigadier general William 
 Hull, and the said American settlement and military 
 post at the said river Raisin, in the territorj^ of Mi- 
 chigan aforesaid, and neglecting to furnish and forward, 
 or cause to be furnished and forwarded, the said last 
 mentioned detachment at or near Brownstown, in the 
 aaid territory of Michigan, on its m.arch aforesaid, 
 upon tlte service aforesaid, an adequate supj)ij of pro- 
 visions, (the said brigadier general William Hull hav- 
 ing sufficient cause to know or to believe that the 
 
slii CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 said last mentioned detachment was at or near Browns* 
 town aforesaid, on its march aforesaid, upon the ser" 
 vice aforesaid, in want of provisions, and that they 
 could not prosecute and accomplisli the said service 
 unless an adequate supply of provisions was furnished 
 and forv, arded to them at or near Brownstown afore- 
 said ;) and, also, by afterwards, to wit : on the four- 
 teenth day of August, in the year aforesaid, detaching 
 colonel Duncan Mac Arthur, colonel of a regiment of 
 Ohio volunteers, and colonel Lewis Cass, colonel of 
 another regiment of Ohio volunteers, with the num- 
 ber or about the number of four hundred men, as 
 well to attempt again to open the said communica- 
 tion between the said fort Detroit and the said 
 army of the said United States, under the command 
 of the said brigadier general V/illiam Hull as afore- 
 said, and the said American settlement and mili- 
 tary post at the river Raisin aforesaid, in the terri- 
 tory of Micliigan aforesaid, as to escort certain pro- 
 visions from the said American settlement and mi- 
 litary post to Detroit aforesaid, without issuing, fur- 
 nishing, and forwarding, or causing to be issued, furnish- 
 ed and forv* arded to the said last mentioned detach- 
 ment an adequate supply of provisions for the service 
 on which they were employed as aforesaid, (the said 
 brigadier general William Hull having sufficient cause 
 to know or to believe that (he said last mentioned de- 
 tachment was in want of a further supply of provi- 
 sions upon the service aforesaid, and that they could 
 not prosecute and accomplish the said service unless 
 such further sup))ly was issued, furnished, and for- 
 y/arded to them ;) Avhereby the said detachment, un- 
 der the said major Thomas B. Van Horn, being en- 
 countered by the enemy with a superiour force, was 
 defeated and returned to Detroit aforesaid, without ac- 
 conij^lishing the service on which they w^ere employ- 
 ed as aforesaid; the said detachment under the said 
 lieutenant colonel James Miller, having achieved a 
 signal victory over the enemy during the march on 
 
GENERAL HULL. xliii 
 
 tlie service aforesaid, at or near Brownstown afore- 
 said, were nevertheless compelled, from the want of 
 an adequate supply of provisions, to abandon the ser- 
 vice on which they were employed as aforesaid, and 
 to return to Detroit aforesaid; the said detachment 
 under the said colonel Duncan Mac Arthur and the 
 said colonel Lewis Cass, from want of an adequate 
 supply of provisions were unable to prosecute and ac- 
 complish the service on which they were employed 
 as aforesaid, and were returning to Detroit afore- 
 said, at the time of the abandonment and surren- 
 der of the said fort Detroit and the said army of 
 the United States to the British forces under the 
 command of major general Brock as aforesaid : and 
 finally, the said communication between the said 
 fort Detroit and the said army of the United States, 
 under the command of the said brigadier general Wil- 
 liam Hull, and the said American settlement and mi- 
 litary post at the said river Raisin, in the territory of 
 Michigan aforesaid, by reasons of the said neglects 
 and omissions of the said brigadier general William 
 Hull as aforesaid, was, and remained interrupted and 
 totally cut off by the enemy, to wit : from the said 
 first day of August, in the year aforesaid, or from some 
 other day in the said month of August, or in the pre- 
 ceding month of July, in the year aforesaid, to and 
 including the said sixteenth day of August, in the year 
 aforesaid. 
 
 Sixth specification. And, also, in this i — That 
 jluring the continuance of the said w ar, so as aforesaid 
 carried on and prosecuted by and between the said 
 United States of America and their territories, and 
 the said united kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, 
 and the dependencies thereof, the said brigadier ge- 
 neral William Hull, with the said north-western army 
 of the said United States, under his command as afore- 
 said, having invaded and entered the said British pro- 
 vince of Upper Canada as aforesaid, and having de- 
 clared and aYO^yed an intention and design of invests 
 
xliv CHARGES AGAINST 
 
 ing and attacking the said British fort called Mai- 
 den, otherwise called Amherstburgh, in the said 
 British province of Upper Canada, and a detach- 
 ment of the said army under his command as afore- 
 said, led by the said colonel Lewis Cass, and the 
 said lieutenant colonel James Miller, having attack- 
 ed and repulsed the enemy, and seized upon a cer- 
 tain bridge over the river, called the river Aux Ca- 
 nard, on tlie rout from Sandwich, in the said Bri- 
 tish province of Upper Canada, to the said British 
 fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherstburgh, 
 and an opportunity having thereby been otfered for 
 an immediate investment and attack upon the said 
 British fort called Maiden, otherwise called Am- 
 herstburgh; yet the said brigadier general William 
 Hull, well knowing the premises, and unmindful of 
 the trust reposed in him, to w it : on or about the 
 eighteenth day of July, in the year one thousand 
 eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, at Sandwich 
 aforesaid, in the British province of Upper Canada 
 aforesaid, was guilty of neglect of duty and un- 
 otHcerlike conduct, by neglecting and omitting to 
 advance with the said army under his command as 
 aforesaid, to maintain or attempt to maintain the 
 possession of the said bridge over the said river, call- 
 ed the river Aux Canard, and by neglecting and 
 omitting to proceed to the immediate investment 
 and attack of the said British fort called Maiden, 
 otherwise called Amherstburgh, in the said British pro- 
 vince of Upper Canatla, whereby the advantage of 
 acquiring and keeping possession of the said bridge 
 over the said river called the river Aux Canard, as 
 aforesaid, w as improvidently lost, and the prospect of 
 a successful investment and attack upon the said Bri- 
 tish fort called Maiden, otherwise called Amherst- 
 burgh, speedily vanished. 
 
 Seve.vtii specification. And, also, in this :— 
 That during the isontinuance of the said war, so a.^ 
 aforesaid curried oa asd prosecuted by and between 
 
GENERAL HULL. slv 
 
 t lie said United States of America and their territories, 
 and the said united kingdom of Great Britain and Ire- 
 land, and the dependencies thereof, the said brigadier 
 general William Hull, with the said north-western ar- 
 my of the said United States under his command as 
 aforesaid, having evacuated the said British province 
 of Upper Canada, returning thence to Detroit afore- 
 said, in the territor}^ of Slichigan aforesaid, the ene- 
 my having afterwards taken possession of the bank of 
 the said river Detroit, opposite to Detroit aforesaid- 
 and thereon erected batteries wherewith to attack and 
 annoy as well the said fort of Detroit, and the Ameri- 
 can posts and batteries erected and estc.blished near 
 thereto, as the town of Detroit in the said territory of 
 Michigan ; the enemy having also manifested an in- 
 tention and design to invade and enter the said terri- 
 tory of Michigan, and to invest and attack the said 
 fort Detroit; and the enemy having also afterwards, 
 in pursuance of such intention and design, landed at a 
 place called Spring Wells, otherwise called Spring 
 Hill, in the neighbourhood of the said fort Detroit, 
 in tlie territory of Michigan aforesaid ; yet the said 
 brigadier general William Hull, well knowing the 
 premises, and unmindful of the trust reposed in him, 
 to w it : from the eleventh day of August, to and in- 
 cluding the sixteenth day of August, in the year one 
 thousand eight hundred and twelve aforesaid, was 
 guilty of neglect of duty and unofficerlike conduct, 
 by neglecting and omitting to prevent, and to attempt 
 to prevent the enemy from erecting the said batteries 
 on the bank of the said river Detroit, opposite to the 
 said fort of Detroit, aforesaid : by neglecting and 
 omitting to fortify the landing place at the said Spring 
 Wells, otherwise called Sprhig Hill, in the territory 
 of Michigan aforesaid ; and by neglecting and omit- 
 ting to a^inoy and attack the enemy on and after his 
 landing at Spring Wells, otherwise called Spring 
 Hill aforesaid, in the territory of Michigan aforesaid; 
 whereby the enemy was enabled securely to ereet 
 
^Ivi CHARGES AGAINST GEN. HULL. 
 
 the said batteries on fche bank of the said river Detroit 
 as aforesaid, for attacking and annoying as well the 
 3aid fort of Detroit, and the American posts and 
 batteries erected and established near thereto, as the 
 «aid town of Detroit, to invade the said territory of 
 Michigan without opposition or loss, and to approach 
 the said fort Detroit with the air and confidence of 
 51 triumph. 
 
 A. J. DALLAS, 
 
 Jutl^e Advocatr. 
 
DEFENCE 
 
 BRIGADIER GENERAL HULL. 
 
 ifr. President, 
 
 And Gentlemen of the Com-t-JIai-tial, 
 
 i. HAVE too long, and too severely felt the effects oT 
 public pr^udice, excited by unfounded reports and 
 groundless clamours, not to rejoice, that the time has 
 arrived, when I may speak in my own vindication, 
 before an impartial and honourable tribunal. 
 
 The charges, upon which you are now to decide, 
 have been propagated through the union, with a seal 
 and industry^ to which my age, my character, and my 
 former services, have been in vain opposed. 
 
 My reputation and feelings have been the sport of 
 every one, who either from malicious, selfisli, or poli- 
 tical motives, chose to traduce me. The time has 
 been, when no one would have dared to couple disho- 
 nour with my name ; when my heart has exulted to 
 find myself mentioned among those who deserved 
 well of tlieir country. But since my efforts to serve 
 
2 DEFENCE OF 
 
 her, have been unsuccessful, how have 1 been tortured 
 ■with cruel and unfounded accusations l—Even con- 
 scious innocence has not always given me fortitude • 
 to bear with this injustice, unmoved.— Knowing the 
 integrity of my own motives, and how zealously I 
 have sought to discharge my duty to the public, my 
 heart has often swollen with indignation, when I have 
 seen the indefatigable pains that have been taken, by 
 repetitions of the foulest calumnies, to excite, and keep 
 alive, prejudices against me. Your own knowledge. 
 Gentlemen, of what has been passing in the world, 
 will convince you, that this is not declamation ; but I 
 shall shew you, in the course of my defence, that men, 
 from whose profession and whose rank it was not to 
 be expected, have been parties in this injustice. 
 
 At length, hov/ever, the time I have so anxiously 
 desired has arrived, when my conduct must be tested 
 by evidence, instead of the misrepresentations of my 
 enemies. And I do eel a confidence, that when 
 YOU have pronounced upon that evidence, I may ap- 
 peal to your judgment to refute the clamours which 
 have been niised against me. 
 
 I cannot but think, Mr. President, that the charges 
 against me are exhibited in a form, hitherto unprece- 
 dented in proceedings of this nature. It was not to 
 be expected, that in a court where the accused, 
 whatever may be his infirmities or incapacity to at- 
 tend to his own defence, is not permitted to have 
 '• the benefit of counsel, the charges would be envelop- 
 
GENERAL HULL. 3 
 
 ed ill such a profusion of words, that it is difiicult for 
 one, iiot accustomed to the technical forms of pleadings 
 in the civil courts, to understand them, and be so 
 complicated by repetitions, that it is still more diffi- 
 cult to reduce them to s.ny order or analysis. 
 
 It is extremely important, however, that the Court 
 should ascertain, and ahvays bear in mind, precisely 
 of what I am accused. The course of proceeding, 
 which has been adopted by the Court, renders this 
 the more necessarj^ as testimony has been given, 
 which certainly cannot be applied to any of the spe- 
 cifications. The Court have thought proper to ad- 
 mit it, with an intimation, that any further objection, 
 ^vhich I might offer to its propriety or relevancy, when 
 I arrived at this stage of my defence, would be con- 
 sidered. — In submission to this decision of the Court, 
 I have omitted to make objections on this ground in 
 several instances. 
 
 I shall not attempt to offer an argument to the 
 Court, to prove the injustice of making one charge 
 against a person, and trying and convicting him on an- 
 other. I did however understand from what passed, 
 when I first submitted to the Court an objection of this 
 nature, that an opinion was entertained by some of the 
 members, that though the testimony might not apply to 
 any specification, yet if the fact intended to be proved 
 would come under either of the general charge^ the 
 testimony would be proper. If this were so, then 
 there would be no use in the specifications. Indeed 
 
4 DEFENCE OF 
 
 they would be worse than useless, for they would only 
 mislead the accused, and induce him to prepare 
 against one accusation, when he might be tried on 
 another. The impropriety of admitting any thing un- 
 der the general charge, for which there is not a spe- 
 cification, I think will appear manifest. Let us sup- 
 pose, that a general charge is made of unofficer-like 
 conduct, and the only specification, insulting a supe- 
 riour. Suppose that under this general charge and 
 specification, testimony should be offered of absence 
 without leave. This would also be unofllicer-like con- 
 duct, and therefore would come under the general 
 charge. But would it not be the height of injustice to 
 try the accused for absenting himself; a crime of 
 which the charges gave him no notice. I trust the 
 Court will see the validity of the objection I am con- 
 sidering, and that they will be careful to give no 
 weight to any part of the testimony, which does not 
 apply to some one of the specifications. 
 
 I do not think it necessary to occupy the time of 
 the Court with a recapitulation of the charges, nor 
 shall I exhaust your patience by attempting, in my 
 defence, to follow the volume on your table, through 
 all its reiterations. It will be found, for the most part, 
 to be a repetition of the same facts, displayed in the 
 jargon of special pleading, with an incongruous dis- 
 semination of such opprobrious epithets, as fancy 
 might furnish to heighten the imputation of guilt. I 
 shall endeavour to arrange and consider the accusa- 
 tions in such order as will enable me to bring my de- 
 
GENERAL HULL. 5 
 
 fence into some compass, and to be the better mider- 
 stood; — I shall particularly notice the charges, which 
 the Judge Advocate, in his opening, mentioned as 
 those which he expected would be substantiated, and 
 I shall not omit to make my defence against every 
 accusation, which there has been the least testimony 
 to support. 
 
 The cardinal accusations, if I may be permitted so 
 to express myself, are founded upon an alleged delay 
 at Sandwich, the retreat from Canada, and the sur- 
 render at Detroit. If I can satisfy the Court thai 
 these acts were in themselves necessary, or justiftablen 
 it will then remain for me to ansv/er suCh of the ac» 
 cusations as relate to the manner in which these acts 
 were done, and to answer also some charges not im- 
 mediately connected with these transactions. This 
 course will enibrace the whole of my defence. Of 
 this latter description, is the first specification, under 
 the charge of treason, which relates to the vessel sent 
 from the Miami, I shall therefore give this a separate 
 consideration ; and as it stands first and highest in the 
 black catalogue of the crimes which are imputed to 
 me, and is repeated m other specifications, 1 shall, in 
 the first instance, ask the attention of the Court to 
 this subject. 
 
 I have already protested against the authority of; 
 this Court to decide upon this charge, because trea- 
 son is a crime of which a court martial has no cog- 
 nisance. Their power is confined to such military 
 
 n% 
 
e DEFENCE OF 
 
 crimes as are specified in the articles of war. And 
 their jurisdiction is so limited, not only by the consti- 
 tution, but by the very articles themselves. 1 have 
 thought it my duty, in the most solemn manner, to make 
 and insist on this protest, for the sake of repelling a 
 dangerous example, and not as it respects myself, or 
 the case now under y©ur consideration ; for my only 
 desire is to acquit myself of the criminal acts and mo- 
 tives which have been so wantonly imputed to me. 
 If I cannot succeed in this, I am indifferent as to the 
 names by which the crimes may be called, and if I 
 do not acquit myself of the other charges, which are 
 the most wounding to the feelings of a soldier, I am 
 equally indifferent to the punishment that may be in- 
 flicted. I have no desire to preserve a life, that shall 
 be stigmatized by a conviction of this Court on the 
 charges of cowardice. 
 
 The first specification, under the charge of treason, 
 relates to sending the vessel, on the first of July, from 
 the Miami, with hospital stores, sick, baggage, and 
 army documents. As to sending the vessel with what 
 she had on board, except the last article, it is not dis- 
 puted; but that for the reasons, which according to 
 the testimony of general Mac Arthur, I assigned for 
 it at the time, it would not have been an improper 
 measure had not war been declared. The whole 
 criminality then, in this respect, rests on the truth of 
 the allegation, that I despatched the vessel, knowing 
 of the war; and with a design to give traitorous in- 
 telligence to the enemy. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 7 
 
 It is very certain that I had no direct intelligence 
 of the war on the first of July, when the vessel was 
 despatched. I had on the twenty-sixth of June re- 
 ceived a letter from the Secretary at War, dated on 
 the day war was declared, the eighteenth of June; 
 and I afterwards received another letter from him of 
 the same date, announcing to me the declaration of 
 war. It seems to have been intimated tliat the letter 
 of the eighteenth of June, which I received on the 
 twenty-sixth, was the letter announcing the war. 
 But I think the testimony of general Mac Arthur 
 settles that point. He acknowledges that I shewed 
 him the letter which I received on the twenty-sixth 
 of June at the time I received it. And also the letter 
 -^yhich I received on the second of July, at the time 
 that letter came to my hands. But if the testimony 
 of general Mac Arthur, and other witnesses, left any 
 doubt on this subject, it must be removed by a reference 
 to a letter from me to the Secretary at War, which has 
 been read by the Judge Advocate, dated at Fort Find- 
 lay on the twenty-sixth June, which acknowledges 
 the receipt of the letter from him of the eighteenth 
 of June, which I had then received. In which I say, 
 "m the event of a war,^' it will be necessary to pur- 
 sue certain measures. I think this is evidence, not 
 only that the letter, which I had received on the twen- 
 ty-sixth of June, was not the letter which announced 
 the war, but that the letter which I did receive, gave 
 me no expectations that war was declared when I 
 wrote. 
 
8 DEFENCE OF 
 
 It may be said, however, in the language of soni^ 
 of the specifications, that though I had no certain iip- 
 formation of the declaration of war when I despatch- 
 ed the vessel, I had " sufficient cause to know or be> 
 " lieve that war then existed." As I have said the first 
 letter from the Secretary at War dated on the eighteenth 
 of June, gave me no cause to know or believe the fact, 
 all that is in that letter which could by any possibility 
 be supposed to have relation to such an event, are 
 these few words, " circumstances have recently oc- 
 " curred, which render it necessary you should pursue 
 "your march to Detroit with all possible expedition." 
 This was but a reiteration of my former orders. In 
 the letter from the Secretary at War of the ninth of 
 April, I am directed " to repair with as little delay as 
 *• possible to Detroit." How then was I to infer, from 
 this letter, that war had been declared ? I did never 
 suppose, that if war was declared, I should receive a 
 peremptory order from Washington, to march my 
 whole army, in all events, to Detroit; thereby leav- 
 ing the enemy at Maiden, eighteen miles in my rear, 
 directly on my line of communication, with all the 
 facilities which he had, by reason of his command of 
 the waters, to cut off my supplies. Such an order ap- 
 peared to me so inconsistent with my military expe- 
 rience, that I did not suppose it could have been found- 
 ed on a declaration of war, or even on a prospect of 
 immediate hostilities. I did suppose, that, in the evGnt 
 of a war, a discretion would have been left me, to 
 conduct my troops in such a manner, as I might judge 
 from circumstances would be most condiicive to their 
 
GENERAL HULL. S 
 
 seciirity, and most likely to effect the destruction of 
 the enemy; and that I should have been left at liberty 
 to post my army in what I might think the most ad- 
 vantageous situation. I did suppose, that when it was 
 seen that war would be immediate and inevitable, I 
 should have been informed of measures taken to re- 
 inforce me, and to keep open the road, which it was 
 known I was obliged to make for near two hundred 
 miles through the wilderness, and on which my army 
 must depend for its supplies. I did suppose, that I 
 should have been informed of co-operations intended 
 for my support, and of means provided for my com- 
 municating with those who might direct those co-ope- 
 rations. And I did suppose, that I should have been 
 informed of measures taken to obtain the command 
 of the waters. All my intercourse, as well previous- 
 ly as subsequently to my appointment, as I shall here- 
 after prove, with the executive officers of the govern- 
 ment, gave me reason to expect, that all these mea- 
 sures would be pursued in the event of a war. How 
 then was I to understand, from this simple intimation, 
 that circumstances had occurred which required that 
 I should pursue my march to Detroit with expedi- 
 tion, that war was actually declared or immediately 
 expected? Besides, it naturally occurred to me, that 
 if the circumstances alluded to by the Secretary were 
 a declaration of war, or such as would immediately 
 lead to it, I should be told so explicitly. I could con- 
 ceive no reason for making his communication to me 
 in ambiguous terms. 
 
 But it may be said, that general Mac Arthur has 
 proved, by the testimony which he has given, relative 
 
10 DEFENCE OP 
 
 to conversations he had with me \vhen I received the 
 letter from the Secretary at War, on the twenty-sixtli 
 June, and when I despatched the vessel on the tirst 
 of July, that I had "sufKcient cause to know or 
 '' believe that war then existed." 
 
 General Mac Arthur's testimony on this subject is 
 as follows : " On the evening of the twenty-sixth of 
 " June, an express arrived from Chillicothe, bearing a 
 " letter for me, another for general Hull. I w ent 
 " with the bearer to general Hull, who opened his let- 
 *' ter and handed it to me. It was from the Secretary 
 " at War, dated June eighteen, eighteen hundred and 
 " twelve. It stated, that circumstances had occurred 
 " that made it necessary that the General should pro- 
 " ceed to Detroit, take measures for defence, and wait 
 '* for further orders. I also received a letter from a 
 " friend, quoting a postscript to a letter from general 
 *' Worthington, a senator in congress, which postscript 
 " said, ' before this reaches you, war will be declared.' 
 " I stated to the General, that colonel Dunlap, the 
 " bearer of the express, had told me, that before that 
 " time war was declared. The General then asked 
 *' me what I thought of the Secretary's letter. I said 
 *' I thought it notice of a declaration of war. The 
 " General said it seemed very much like it. The 
 " General and I had a great deal of conversation on 
 " the information we had, from time to time, received, 
 *' and we appeared to agree that war was certainly 
 " ileclared.'* 
 
GENERAL HULL. 11 
 
 General Mac Arthur further testifies, " that on the 
 '' morning of the day on which we left the encamp- 
 " ment near the Miami, the General sent for me to 
 " his tent, and stated that he thought of sending the 
 " baggage by water from that place. I said I thought 
 " it hazardous, that possibly the British might have 
 " information of war, and might take the vessel. 
 
 " The General replied, he could not imagine 
 " there was any danger, the wind was fair and the ves- 
 " sel would pass in a short time ; adding that he could 
 " not take upon himself the responsibility of carrying 
 '' on the teams any further. I think there was a ver- 
 " bal or written order to embark the baggage. I stat- 
 " ed to the General that I did not like to send on my 
 *• baggage, but if it was a general order it must be 
 *' complied with. We proceeded on towards Detroit, 
 '" and on the first or second evening after, the com- 
 *" mandants of corps were called to the tent of general 
 " Hull, and were informed, that a letter had been re- 
 " ceived from the Secretary at War, announcing the 
 " declaration of war.»* The witness further stated in 
 some part of his examination, that notwithstanding 
 the order, he sent nothing by the vessel but his mess 
 boxes. 
 
 I must beg leave first to remark to the Court, that 
 this testimony of general Mac Arthur affords strong 
 evidence of the fallibility of his memory. For he 
 states, that the letter from the Secretary of War, which 
 I shewed to him at Fort Fiodlay on the twenty-sixth 
 
12 DEFENCE OP 
 
 of June, ordered me to " proceed to Detroit, take mea- 
 sures for defence, and wait for further orders." An order 
 to prepare for defence would have been a much more 
 significant intimation of a declaration of war than any 
 thing the letter contained. A copy of the letter fur- 
 nished by the War Department is before the Court, and 
 will prove how far general Mac Arthur may be mis- 
 taken. The expressions which he gives, as having 
 been contained in the letter which he saw on the 
 tv/enty-sixth of June, are contained in the letter an- 
 nouncing the war, which was shewn to him on the 
 second of July. It cannot be pretended, that he might 
 have seen this last mentioned letter on the twenty- 
 sixth of June, because if that had been so, there could 
 not have been, after the explicit information contain- 
 ed in that letter, any such debate, as he states there 
 was between us on the twenty-sixth of June, as to the 
 possibility of war having been declared. I do not 
 mean to charge general Blac Arthur with a wilful mis- 
 representation. I have no doubt but that the zeal, 
 which he has manifested for my conviction, has led 
 him into this mistake. As this is the highest charge 
 against me, he probably has felt the most anxiety that 
 it should be substantiated ; and his mind has adopted 
 as the impressions of his memory, what are only the 
 results of his wishes. I mark this inaccur:^cy of ge- 
 neral Mac Arthur the more particularly, to shew, that 
 inasmuch as he was so materiall}^ mistaken, with re- 
 spect to the contents of the letter which he states he 
 had in his hand, and deliberately perused, and hag 
 confounded what passed at one time with what occur- 
 
GENERAL HULL. 13 
 
 red at another, he may very possi])ly be as far mis- 
 taken in relation to the conversations he has related. 
 
 I do aver, that, in respect to the conversation which 
 he relates as having passetl between us on the twenty- 
 sixth of June, he is mistaken ; or rather, he represents 
 it in a manner calculated to make impressions alto- 
 gether different from what in truth it ought to do. After 
 he had informed me of the letter he had received, 
 quoting the postscript from general Worthington, and 
 after he had communicated to me what had been said 
 by colonel Dunlap, the bearer of the letters, I might 
 have said, it seemed like war, or matle use of some 
 expression of that sort. But I deny that I ever said 
 that the Secretary's Letter seemed like war ; on the con- 
 trary, that letter induced me to suppose, notwithstand- 
 ing the postscript from general Worthington and the 
 information of colonel Dunlap, that war could not 
 have been declared. 
 
 I beg the Court to remark, that neither the post- 
 script, nor the information of colonel Dunlap did state, 
 or could have stated, that war was declared ; but merely 
 gave their opinions, that war would be declared by 
 the time the letters were received, without stating any 
 grounds for their opinions. Considering however the 
 information of general Worthington as coming from 
 a source entitled to great respect and consideration, 
 it induced me to think it possible, that war might 
 have been declared. But when I found day after day 
 passing without intelligence from the Government, 
 3 
 
14 DEFENCE OP 
 
 when I found that on the first of July, five daj^s had 
 elapsed since the arrival of colonel Dunlap, and when 
 I felt confident that not a moment would be lost in 
 despatching a messenger to me, whenever war was 
 declared, I was satisfied that the information, which 
 had been communicated to me through general 
 Mac Artliur, had no other foundation than those ru- 
 mours and expectations, which had been so long afloat 
 throughout the country. — One circumstance was a 
 strong inducement to believe, that the relations of 
 peace with Great Britain had not been interrupted. 
 When I left Washington, the Secretary of War had 
 told me, it was not expected that war would be de- 
 clared before the fourth of July. This is a fact, 
 though the Secretary at War has answered to the ninth 
 interrogatory addressed to him, that " he had not such 
 ''a recollection of the conversation between us re- 
 " specting the probable time of the declaration of war, 
 "as to enable him to answer satisfactorily on that 
 " subject." 
 
 But as I had not on the first of July, when I des- 
 patched the vessel, received mj'self any information 
 of the declaration of war, I was to presume, that the 
 enemy could not have been apprised of that event. 
 It appeared to me an inadmissible imputation on the 
 administration, to suppose it possible, that they would 
 suffer information of intended hostilities to be convey- 
 ed to the enemy, before it could reach their own Ge- 
 neral—Yet it was fourteen days after war was de- 
 clared before I had any information of it : though 
 it appears, that a letter from the Secretary at War, 
 
GENERAL HULL. 15 
 
 written on the eighteenth of June, had reached me at 
 Fort Findlay in seven days, and an attention to the 
 dates of the correspondence between me and the War 
 I>epartment will shew, that the commmiication be- 
 tween the City of Washington and the army, even 
 when it was in Canada, might be made in eight or ten 
 days. In the Secretary's letter to me of the first of 
 August, which has been read, he acknowledges the 
 l-eceipt of mine of the nineteenth of July by captain 
 Curtis, who left my head quarters at Sandwich on the 
 twentieth of July. I never heard that any duplicate 
 of the letter of the eighteenth of June was written to me, 
 or that the letter was delayedby any accident; nordo 
 I know that any letter was Written to me by the ad- 
 ministration, after war was declared, except the one 
 of the eighteenth of June, till the ttventy-fourth of the 
 same month, when six days had elapsed. A letter 
 written at Washington on the eighteenth of June 
 might have reached me by express in five days. But 
 the letter which was to give me the first information 
 of the war, if it left Washington on the eighteenth or 
 nineteenth of June, could not have travelled at a 
 greater rate than thirty miles a day. 
 
 I think, after this statement, the Court will not say, 
 that it was treasonable in me to conclude, that it was 
 impossible the administration should have left me ig- 
 norant of the war, when it might be known to the 
 enemy. 
 
 I beg to direct the attention of the Court to the 
 testimony of general Cass upon this point. He had 
 
16 DEFENCE OP 
 
 a perfect knowledge of all the circumstances, with 
 which general Mac Arthur and myself were accjuaint- 
 ed. He had seen the letter of the eighteenth of June 
 from the Secretary at War, which I received on the 
 twenty-sixth. He knew what information general 
 Mac Arthur had received from his correspondent and 
 from colonel Dunlap. He testifies, that v/hen the 
 vessel was despatched from the Miami, he had no rea- 
 son to believe that, at that, tjme, IJtnew of the war. 
 He had no conversation with me, which could induce 
 such a belief. He sent his own baggage and servant 
 by the vessel which, on his cross examination, he says 
 Tie c^i 'a-inly should not have done, if he had had any 
 thought that war then existed^ 
 
 But it appears, that, immediately after the receipt 
 of the letter announcing to me the declaration of war, 
 I used every possible exertion to recal the vessel. I 
 refer the Court on this point to the testimony of cap- 
 tain Fuller. This conduct is entirely inconsistent 
 with the criminal intentions which are imputed to 
 me in respect to this transaction. 
 
 It remains for me to notice that part of this charge, 
 which slates, that I put on board the army documents 
 and papers, whereby the enemy were made acquaint- 
 ed with the force of the army, the designs of the 
 government, and with the declaration of war. 
 
 I do not hesitate to acknowledge, that it was im- 
 proper to trust the documents which were put on 
 
GENERAL HULL. 17 
 
 board that vessel to such a conveyance, or even for 
 me to part with them in any way, whether in peace or 
 war. But I trust it has satisfactorily appeared to the 
 Court, from the testimony of captain Hull, that this 
 was owing to an accident, which might have hap- 
 pened to the most careful commander. I had ordered 
 my baggage to be put on board the vessel, not sup- 
 posing it possible that the trunk, containing my pa- 
 pers, could have been considered by my aids-de-camp 
 included in that order, and it was not till after the vesr 
 sel had departed, that with equal surprise and regret I 
 learnt that my aids-de-camp had, with my baggage, 
 shipped a trunk which contained nothing but papers. 
 There is one allegation in this charge, that I feel my- 
 self authorized to repel with some indignation, because 
 I think it could only have been made with a view to 
 exculpate others from misconduct at my expense, by 
 an attempt to make it be believed, that the enemy de- 
 rived a knowledge of the war from the capture of this 
 vessel- If this were so. how is it to be accounted for, 
 that the enemy should have assailed her in a hostile 
 manner before she v/as captured ? 
 
 The Court will recollect, that lieutenant Goodding 
 states, that when the vessel was off Bois Banch Island, 
 the enemy's armed brig- Hunter bore down upon her, 
 and that she was pursued by a batteau from Maiden, 
 filled with armed men. But the suggestion, that the 
 enemy derived their knowledge of the declaration of 
 war from the papers found on board the vessel, is re- 
 pelled by the fact, that this vessel had no documents on 
 board which couid possibly give them that information. 
 
18 DEFENCE OF 
 
 SJie could not have had, for 1 had no such documents 
 in my possession at the time she sailed from the Rapids 
 of the Miami. It is also a fact, M'hich is now notorious; 
 that the enemy had received information of the passing 
 of the act declaring war, several days before I had any 
 communication from Washington on the subject. It is 
 as ungenerous as it is unjust, to charge the enemy's 
 prior knowledge of the declaration of war to any act 
 of mine. 
 
 1 have now closed my defence on this first specifi- 
 cation under the charge of treason. And although I 
 persist in my olyection to this Court's taking cognizance 
 of that crime, yet I have given the charge a full exami- 
 nation, because the same facts are specified under the 
 charge of unofficer-like conduct. And I shall rely upon 
 what I have now said for my vindication against the 
 specification which relates to this subject under that 
 charge. 
 
 To sustain this charge of treason there are two other 
 gpecincations, one relating to the sup])osed delay in at- 
 tacking Maiden and the retreat from Sandwich : the 
 other to the surrender of Detroit. But as there is a 
 repetition of thes^ specifications under the two other 
 charges, I shall not now notice them further than to 
 observe, that these specifications, under the charge of 
 trecson, allege, that the delay, the retreat, and the sur- 
 render, were all in pursuance of a traitorous combina- 
 tion and conspiracy between me and certain enemies 
 of the United States, whose names are unknown. If 
 the Court had cognizance of this crime of treason, I 
 
GENERAL HULL. 19 
 
 could not be convicted, unless the traitorous combina- 
 tion and conspiracy were proved. I might ask, where 
 is the evidence of any combination or conspiracy be- 
 tween me and the enemy ? But I forbear with indigna- 
 tion the examination of such a question — And now, 
 when the Court has before it all the testimony that the 
 utmost efforts of my prosecutors have been able to bring 
 against me, I ask them to judge from what malignant 
 source the information which could have suggested 
 this charge must have been drawn. Some of the wit- 
 nesses who have testified against me, must have fur- 
 nished the materials, from which the gentleman em- 
 ployed by the government to frame the charges must 
 have drawn them. They must then have made sug- 
 gestions to him, which they dare not attempt to sup- 
 port by their own oaths, or by one particle of proof; 
 and which could have resulted only from the bitterness 
 of their own hearts towards me. 
 
 Pursuant to the arrangement of my defence, which 
 I have before suggested, I shall next consider the spe- 
 cifications, which charge me with crimes, or miscon- 
 duct, in delaying to attack Maiden; in withdrawing the 
 army from Canada ; and in making the final surrender. 
 
 There are, as I have said, accusations, which are 
 not immediately connected with these transactions, 
 and these I shall notice in the course of my defence. 
 But if I should satisfy this Court, that these cardinal 
 accusations are unsupported, that the measures to 
 which they refer were fit and proper, and such as cir- 
 
20 DEFENCE OF 
 
 ciimstances required ; or if it should now appear, that 
 a different course in respect to either of these meas- 
 ures ought to have been adopted, yet if I should sa- 
 tisfy the members of this Court, that in my conduct 
 upon these occasions, I have been actuated by the 
 purest motives, and a sense of duty, I trust I shall 
 not be judged criminal. I shall not pretend, that I 
 may not have erred, but error and crime are not con- 
 vertible terms. 
 
 When I accepted a commission from the govern- 
 ment, I pledged to them my utmost zeal and ability, 
 in discharge of the duties of the office they conferred 
 upon me ; and I trust that pledge will not be consid- 
 ered as forfeited, though it should appear to this 
 Court, that on some occasions my judgment may 
 have misdirected me. The profession of a soldier 
 would not be longer honourable, if neither the purest 
 intentions, nor the most zealous exertions could shield 
 him from criminal imputations on the errors of his 
 judgment. 
 
 My defence, Mr. President, on these points, as 
 well as all others, will be a relation of facts and cir- 
 cumstances, and an exposition of the considerations 
 and motives which have governed my conduct. 
 
 You cannot, Gentlemen, form a just decision upon 
 my case, nor judge of the considerations which have 
 influenced my conduct, unless you understand what 
 were my views, and the views and expectations of the 
 
GENERAL HULL, 21 
 
 ex'^ciitive officers of the government of the United 
 States, in respect to the north-western army, its rela- 
 tions, and objects, when I accepted my commission in 
 April, eighteen hundred and twelve. 
 
 I feel some embarrassment, in presenting to you this 
 part of my case. I am well aware, that it may be 
 said, that I am attempting to exculpate myself by 
 censuring others. I well know too, that the political 
 feelings of many persons are so sensible and warm, 
 that the slightest imputation of misconduct against 
 the administration will excite their prejudice, and 
 that such prejudices are the more likely to be roused, 
 when the charge is made by one, who is prosecuted 
 by the administration. But, Gentlemen, I shall say 
 nothing pf the officers of the government, which is not 
 supported by irrefragable testimony. I shall only pre- 
 sent for your consideration facts, which are proved by 
 documents before you, and shall make no observations 
 upon them, which are not obviously and absolutely 
 necessary for my defence. Much less shall I attempt 
 to charge the administration with any wilful miscon- 
 duct. I believe every member of it to have bepn ac- 
 tuated by the purest motives, and the most ardent zeal 
 in preparations for and prosecution of an inevitable 
 war. A wai\ in which I should never have enlisted, 
 had I not believed it both just and nee : ry. And 
 while my country is engaged in such . >ntest, let my 
 former services to her, let my form- character shield 
 me from the suspicion, that I wj^ idd voluntarily say 
 one word, that shall lessen the confidence of my 
 
22 DEFENCE OP 
 
 countrymen in those, under whose auspices our bat- 
 tles must be fought, and by whose wisdom and strength 
 our misfortunes are to be redeemed, and our honour is 
 to be saved. 
 
 But in my own vindication, and in defence of that 
 honour, which the government have now put at stan 
 I am obliged to say, that the army I commanded \ . 
 not that co-operation and support, which, when I : 
 cepted my commission, the government gave me r 
 son to expect, and without the prospect of whicl . 
 should never, v/ith the force that was placed un* ♦ 
 my command, have thought of carrying on offensi ; 
 operations against Upper Canada; nor even he ■>■ 
 placed my army, unless in obedience to orders, in i | 
 situation, in which it was, after its arrival on the ^ , 
 tei-s of lake Erie. a 
 
 When I accepted the command of the north-wt 
 ern army, I did not suppose, that, in the event o 
 war with Great Britain, the force of that army wo . 
 be adequate to conquer Upper Canada; nor did I 
 lieve, that the administration had such an opini 
 But on the contrary, I did understand, and such 
 will appear was the understanding of the executi 
 officers of the government, that in the event of a w 
 the operations of my army would be strengthei 
 and secured by a competent naval force on laa.. 
 Erie, and by the direction of other forces against the 
 enemy's territory. 
 
 Had these expectations been realized, instead of 
 having lingered out so many months as a prosecuted 
 
GENERAL HULL. 23 
 
 criminal ; instead of now standing before you as an 
 accused, I might still have shared my country's con- 
 fidence. 
 
 The foul charges, to which I am now to answer, 
 
 would not have thus blasted the laurels of my youth ; 
 
 ?^'^even in the wilds of Canada, and amidst these 
 
 ^tened locks, they might have retained their pris- 
 
 e verdure. 
 
 i 
 
 proceed, Gentlemen, to turn your attention to the 
 
 , ;uments, by a reference to which I mean to shew, 
 
 ,at were my views and expectations, and what I 
 
 I a right to suppose were the views and expecta- 
 
 , js of the administration, on the subject which we 
 
 . now considering. 
 
 The first paper read by the Judge Advocate w^as a 
 norial addressed by me, in eighteen hundred and 
 e, to the then Secretary at War. 
 
 Vom this memorial the following is an extract : — ■ 
 
 My residence at Detroit, for four years, has given 
 e some knowledge of our northern and western 
 ontier, and I take the liberty of communicating to 
 Du such facts as have fallen under my observation, 
 le opinion I have' formed, and the measures, which 
 
 *"-^3pear to me the most expedient under the existing 
 
 " state of things." 
 
 After a variety of suggestions, and among others, 
 that though war should not take place, it would be 
 
24 DEFENCE OP 
 
 necessary to have a larger force in Upper Canada 
 than was then there. The memorial is as follows : — 
 
 " I would likewise suggest, for consideration, the ex- 
 '* pediency of building some armed vessels on lake 
 *' Erie, for the purpose of preserving the communica- 
 " tion. Consider, you have three military posts to the 
 " north and west of these waters, and no other com- 
 " munication with them." 
 
 It is true, this memorial was written in time of 
 peace, but the suggestion, as to the naval force, could 
 only be with reference to its use in war. 
 
 I do not know for what purpose this memorial was 
 read by the Judge x\dvocate, unless it were to shew, 
 of what importance I thought our possession of De- 
 troit. Sir, my opinion on that subject has ever been, 
 and is yet the same, as expressed in that memorial. 
 I thought the administration had the same sentiments, 
 and therefore I was the more firmly persuaded, that 
 they would have taken every possible means to sup- 
 port the army, which was sent for its protection. 
 At the moment I was surrendering that fortress, a 
 conviction of its great importance increased the 
 poignant regret, which I felt for the necessity of the 
 measure. 
 
 On the sixth March, eighteen hundred and twelve, 
 ■which was about a month before I was appointed to 
 a command in the army, I addressed another me- 
 morial to the administration, which is so important 
 
GENERAL HULL. 25 
 
 to shew my views, with respect to the force to be di- 
 rected against Upper Canada in the event of a Avar, 
 that 1 beg leave to read the whole of it. It is in the 
 following words : 
 
 €OPY.) 
 
 ^^ Washington, March 6, 1812. 
 
 *' SIR, 
 
 "The prompt manner in which you have adopted 
 measures for the protection of Detroit, and the other 
 settlements in the territory of Michigan, inspires me 
 with confidence, that such ulteriour arrangements will 
 speedily be made, as the peculiar situation of that 
 section of the United States may require. 
 
 " How far the measures already adopted will give 
 security to that part of the country, in the event of 
 war with Great-Britain, is a subject worthy of con- 
 sideration. 
 
 " Officers of a company have been appointed, with 
 orders to recruit in the territory. 
 
 " The Secretary, acting as Governour, has been au- 
 thorized to make a detachment of four companies of 
 militia, and call them into actual service. 
 
 " The commanding officer of Fort Detroit has been 
 directed to erect batteries on the banks of the river 
 Detroit, for the protection of the town. 
 
 4 
 
26 DEFENCE OF 
 
 " These, as incipient measures, I very much approve, 
 and was particularly pleased with the decisive man* 
 ner they were adopted. It must be apparent, how- 
 ever, they add no physical strength to that section of 
 the country ; the force already there is only better 
 organized and prepared to be called into action. The 
 comparing of this force with the force which may be 
 opposed to us, will evince the necessity of additional 
 means of defence, if the country is worth preserving- 
 
 "In the fort of Detroit, I understand by the last re- 
 turns, there are less than one hundred regulars. The 
 population of the territory is less than five thousand, 
 and this population of the territory principally of Ca- 
 nadian character. Connected with the post of De- 
 troit, and three hundred miles north, is the island of 
 iMichilimackinac, where is a fort garrisoned by a 
 company of regulars. Near the south bend of lake 
 Michigan, on the westerly side, is Fort Dearborn, 
 likewise garrisoned by a company of regulars. 
 
 " This is all the force on which we can at present 
 calculate, for the safety of our frontier, and for the 
 protection of the Indians, which the United States 
 are bound by treaties to afford. 
 
 " No support can be derived from the Indian nations, 
 even in the event of war, because our officers are in- 
 structed to advise them to remain neuter, and not to 
 accept their services if they should be offered. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 27 
 
 *' I will now consider the British force opposed to 
 this part of the United States. A fort at Amherst* 
 burgh, at the mouth of the Detroit river, garrisoned 
 by about one hundred British troops. Another fort 
 on the island of St. Joseph's^ at the mouth of the river 
 St. Mary's, garrisoned by about fifty British troops. 
 Two armed ships on lake Erie, which command the 
 waters, and would prevent all communication from the 
 States through that channel. A population of at leas! 
 fifty thousand in that part of Upper Canada, which is 
 connected with the Detroit river and lake Erie, and 
 could easily be brought to operate against our settle- 
 ments. 
 
 " About four thousand men, principally Canadians, 
 employed in the Indian trade and under British in- 
 fluence ; and lastly may be reckoned all the Indians 
 in Upper Canada, and a large proportion of the pow- 
 erful nations residing in the territory of the United 
 States, who now hold a constant and friendly inter^ 
 course with the British agents, and are liberally fed 
 and clothed by the bounty of the British government. 
 
 " It appears, from this statement, that the British 
 force which can be brought to operate against us in 
 the territory, is more than ten to one, w ithout includ- 
 ing the Indians. 
 
 "It requires no ditScult reasoning to determine what 
 must be the consequence. That part of the United 
 States must fall into the hands of ^e British govern- 
 
28 DEFENCE OF 
 
 ment, with all the inhabitants, the forts at Chicago., 
 Michilimackinac and Detroit, and all the public stores, 
 with the public and private vessels on the lake. 
 This will give our enemies the entire command of all 
 the country north and north-west of the Miami of 
 lake Erie; and the settlements on the western part 
 of the state of Ohio will be subject to the depreda- 
 tions of the powerful northern nations of savages. 
 There is nothing in my opinion (in the event of war) 
 can prevent this state of things, but an adequate force 
 on the Detroit river, opposite to the settlements in 
 Upper Canada. 
 
 " It may be asked, how is this force to be placed 
 there, and how is it to be supported ? If, Sir, we can- 
 not command the ocean, Ave can command the inland 
 lakes of our country. I have always been of the 
 opinion that we ought to have built as many armed 
 vessels on the lakes as would have commanded them. 
 We liave more interest in them than tlie British na- 
 tion, and can build vessels with more convenience. 
 If however there is no intention of the kind, that 
 communication must be abandoned until we take 
 possession of the Canadas. 
 
 • The army which marches into the country must 
 open roads through the wilderness, and the supplies 
 of provisions, and whatever else may be necessary,, 
 must pass by land through the state of Ohio. 
 
 " If the conquest of the Canadas is the object of the 
 Government, they will there have an army in a 
 
GENERAL HULL. 2& 
 
 proper situation to coinmence operations, and at 
 the same time protect the defenceless inhabitants, and 
 controul the Indians within our territory. The answer 
 pro])ably may be, it is more expedient to leave the 
 Michigan territory to its fate and direct the force to 
 Montreal. This will prevent all communication by 
 the St. Lawrence with Upper Canada, and it must of 
 course surrender. In this expectation I think it 
 probable there would be a disappointment, if a force 
 is not sent sufficient to oppose the British force, which 
 may be collected at Amherstburgh and its vicinity. 
 Detroit, Michilimackinac, and Chicago must fall. 
 The inhabitants must once more change their alle- 
 giance, and the Indians become the exclusive friends 
 and allies of the king, their great father, 
 
 " In the garrisons at these places they will find large 
 quantities of arms and military stores of every kind. 
 Upper Canada and our country, of which they v/ill be 
 in the possession, will famish them with provisions. 
 How then will Upper Canada be conquered, ]3y pos- 
 sessing Montreal ? They will be in the quiet posses- 
 sion of their country, and a part of ours, and how are 
 they to be approached ? You cannot approach them 
 by water, because they command the lakes. In ap- 
 proaching by land, you must pass through a wilder- 
 ness, filled with savages, under British controul, and 
 devoted to British interest. — The consequences of 
 such an attempt may probably be best learned from 
 the history of the campaign in that very country, 
 conducted by generals Harmer, St. Clair, and Wayne. 
 
30 3DEFENCE OF 
 
 In Upper Canada they have a governour, who is a 
 major-general in their army, and who commands the 
 regular troops, the militia, and the Indians. The whole 
 force of the country is therefore combined under 
 Ills command, and may be directed to a single point 
 without any collision. 
 
 " From the preceding statement of facts and obseF- 
 vations it must be apparent, that Fort Detroit and 
 the settlements in its neigh]30urhood, and likewise 
 Michilimackinac and Chicago, under present circum- 
 stances, are in the power of the British, and that their 
 possession of them would be extremely calamitous to 
 the United States. 
 
 " In the event of peace with England, I am of the 
 opinion, that the northern frontier ought to be bett^ 
 protected than it is at present. In the event of waK, 
 and the object being the reduction of the provinces 
 of Upper and Lower Canada, I think it must be evi- 
 dent, that the establishment of an army at Detroit, 
 sufficient to defend that part of the country, controul 
 the Indians, and commence operations on the weakest 
 points of defence of the enemy, would be an incipient 
 measure, indispensably necessary. With respect to 
 the other points of attack, I shall make no observa- 
 tions, as I probably shall have no agency in them. 
 
 "In considering this subject, I have endeavoured to 
 divest myself of all local feelings, and have grounded 
 my observations and opinions on public considerations 
 
GENERAL HULL. 81 
 
 alone. Two things appear to me to be certain, one 
 is, that in the event of war, the enemy will attempt to 
 take possession of that country, with a view to obtain 
 the assistance of the Indians residing in our territory; 
 and the other, that under its present circumstances 
 of defence it will be in their power to do it. A part 
 of your army, now recruiting, may be as well support- 
 ed and disciplined at Detroit as at any other place. 
 A force adequate to the defence of that vulnerable 
 point, would preverda^war with the savages, and pro- 
 bably induce the enemy to abandon the province of 
 Upper Canada without opposition. The naval force 
 on the lakes would, in that event, fall into our pos- 
 session, and we should obtain the command of the 
 waters, without the espense of building such a force. 
 
 " The British cannot hold Upper Canada without 
 the assistance of the Indians, and that assistance they 
 cannot obtain if we have an adequate force in the 
 situation I have pointed out. 
 
 " There is another consideration very important. It 
 will do more to prevent a general Indian War with 
 the Indians, as far west and beyond the Mississipi, than 
 any other measure. The Indians cannot conduct a 
 war without the assistance of a civilized nation. The 
 British establishment at Amherstburgh is the great 
 emporium, from which even the most distant Indians 
 receive their supplies. A force, at the point I men- 
 tioned, would prevent all communication of the Indians 
 with that post. Indeed, Sir, in every point of view 
 
32 DEFENCE OF 
 
 in V, hich the subject can be consitlered, it appears to 
 me of the first importance to adopt the measure. 
 
 " I am vpry respectfully, 
 
 "Your most obedient servant, 
 
 "William Hull." 
 
 To this document is annexed a copy of a letter 
 from me to the Secretary at War, and the two docu- 
 ments are certified as authentic documents in the fol- 
 lowing words : *^ 
 
 " Copy of the original on file in the War-office. 
 
 " D. Parker, Chief Clerk." 
 
 Can it be supposed, after this exposition of my 
 views of what w ould be the enemy's force and situa- 
 tion, that I could ever have taken the command of 
 about four hundred regular troops, and sixteen hun- 
 dred militia, to effect, by means of such a force, with- 
 out any assistance or co-operation, the conquest of a 
 province, a part only of which I had represented as 
 containing fifty thousand inhabitants? That I could 
 have contemplated an attack on an enemy, having at 
 its disposal, a body of regular troops, the controul over 
 countless savages, and the great advantage of the 
 command of the lakes and waters ? This memorial 
 was received and approved by the Government. This 
 in itself is proof of their adoption of its sentiments, 
 and that it was their opinion, as well as mine, that 
 in the event of a war, snch an army as was put under 
 my command could do nothing offensive, unless y^e 
 
GENERAL HULL. 33 
 
 had a naval force on the upper lakes; and without a 
 co-operation on other parts of the enemy's territory, 
 which should distract his attention, and prevent his 
 bringing the greatest weight of his power on a single 
 point. 
 
 A few days after I was appointed to the command 
 of the north western army, I presented another me- 
 morial to the President, through tlic War Depart- 
 nient, in which I was explicit, as to what might be 
 expected from such a force, as I was to lead; as 
 to the necessity of reinforcements; of our com- 
 manding the lakes ; and of a co-operation in other 
 quarters. My draft of this memorial I have lost, in 
 the way which I shall hereafter explain. The ex- 
 istence of the original, and its general purport, is 
 proved by Mr. Eustis, who, in his answ er to the sixth 
 and seventh interrogatories, addressed to him, says, 
 " I have a perfect recollection of your having present- 
 '' ed the memQri|il referred to in the interrogatory. I 
 " recollect," he adds, " your attendance, by appoint- 
 " ment, at the War Office. The memorial, or that part 
 " of it which related to the naval defence of lake Erie, 
 " was referred, or communicated, to the Secretary of 
 "the Navy, who was present. The brig Adams, 
 ' which had been employed as a transport, under di- 
 " reotion of the War Department, became the subject 
 *' of conversation. Whether she was (being tjien on 
 " the stocks repairing) actually transferred to the Navy 
 " Department, I do not distinctly recollect. If that 
 " was the case, the evidence is on record," 
 
34 DEFENCE OP 
 
 Yet this memorial, or a copy of it, I have never 
 been able to obtain. I have applied for it to the Se- 
 cretary at War. He referred me to the Secretary of 
 the Navy; the Secretary of the Navy to Mr. Dallas; 
 to him I applied, and he referred me to the present 
 Judge Advocate, who knows nothing of it. 
 
 And finally, when my trial commenced in this 
 city, I addressed a letter to the President of the 
 United States, requesting him, to interpose his autho- 
 rity to procure me a document, which I considered 
 so important in my defence. 
 
 It was, Sir, too much for me to have expected an 
 answer from the President himself, though the time 
 f has been, when such an answer would not have been 
 considered as conferring too great an honour. 
 
 The President referred my letter to the gentlemen 
 at the head of the War and Navy Dep^ir^ments. They 
 also would not condescend to answer my letter, but 
 handed it over to their clerks. The elevation of these 
 gentlemen seems to have rendered them giddy. I 
 ask, would it not have comported Avith the importance 
 of the occasion, the decorum due to an old man, and 
 a veteran soldier, not yet convicted of any crime, for 
 the Secretaries themselves to have addressed me ? 
 
 But in answer to my letter, I received a letter from 
 the ChiefClerkinthe War Office, dated twelfth of Fe- 
 )3mary, onelhousand eight hundred and fourteen; with 
 
GENERAL HULL. • 35 
 
 a certificate from the chief clerk in the Navy Depart- 
 ment. The letter from the War Office is in the fol- 
 lowing words : 
 
 " War Office, February 12th, 1814. 
 
 '' SIR, 
 
 Your letter of the first instant, addressed to the Pre« 
 sident of the United States, has been referred to me. In 
 answer to which, I have the honour to state, that all 
 your communications to the War Department, after you 
 were appointed brigadier general in the army, have 
 bten transmitted to P. S. Parker, esquire, judge advo- 
 cate of the court-martial, now sitting at Albany, togeth- 
 er with such others as you had required, as far as they 
 could be found on the files of this office. The pub- 
 lic records of papers of the War Department have 
 been constantly within my observation and charge for 
 several years past, and I assure you, Sir, I have 
 never s^en or heard of a memoir, pointing out the ne- 
 cessity of a navy on lake Erie. 
 
 " Since the receipt of your letter, I have carefully 
 examined the files, and inquired of every gentleman 
 attached to the Department, without being able to 
 give any information on the subject. 
 
 '" I have the honour to be, Sir, 
 
 " Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 " Daniel Parker, C G. 
 •brig. gen. william hull, j 
 
 " ALBANY." 5 
 
30 • DEFENCE OP 
 
 It is unaccountable, Mr. President, that a public 
 document of this nature should be lost. That it did 
 exist, and was on the files of the War Office, is proved 
 beyond controversy, by the deposition of the late 
 Secretary at War, who swears that he has a perfect 
 ^recollection of it. But a most extraordinary part of 
 this letter from the War Department, is that which 
 states, that the writer has had the public records, and 
 papers of the War Department, constantly under his 
 charge and observation for several years past; yet, 
 that he never knew or heard of a memorial, pointing 
 out the necessity of a navy on lake Erie. Mr. Pre- 
 sident, it is a fact hardly to be credited, that the copy 
 of the memorial of the sixth of March, eighteen hun- 
 dred and twelve, from which I made tliat copy which 
 I have just read to the Court, is certified as a true 
 copy from the files of the War Office, by the very gen- 
 tleman, who writes me the letter of the twelfth of 
 February. Let me quote from the memorial of the 
 sixth of March, or rather from the copy certified as I 
 have mentioned above, a passage which is in the fol- 
 lowing words : 
 
 " If, Sir, we cannot command the ocean, we can 
 " command the inland lakes of our country. I have 
 " always been of opinion that we ought to have built 
 " as many armed vessels on the lakes as would have 
 " commanded them. We have more interest in them 
 " than the British nation, and can build vessels with 
 " more convenience. If, however, there is no inten- 
 
GENERAL HULL. 37 
 
 '* tion of tlie kind, that communication must be aban- 
 " doned until we take possession of the Canadas." 
 
 When the writer of the letter had certified a copy 
 of this memorial but a few days ago, how could he 
 say, that he never knew or heard of a memorial point- 
 ing out the necessity of a navy on lake Erie ? 
 
 I will not presume. Sir, that tlie writer of the let- 
 ter intends an equivocation, and designs that his mean- 
 ing shall turn upon the use of the word necessity. 
 This I think would not be consistent with the solem- 
 nity of the occasion on which his letter is written ; 
 nor, Sir, would it serve him : because it is impossible 
 to read my memoir of the sixth of March, without 
 perceiving, that I do, from the beginning to the end, 
 point out the necessity of a navy, in every sense in 
 which the word necessity can be applied on such a 
 subject. I am very far. Sir, from meaning to insinuate, 
 in the remotest degree, that the letter from the Clerk 
 of the War Department contains any intentional mis- 
 representation. His character and station protect 
 him from such a suspicion, and as the memorial which 
 proves the inconsistency of the letter has been fur- 
 nished, the declaration in the letter could not have 
 been made with any sinister design ; and I have only 
 trespassed on the patience of the Court with these 
 observations on this subject, to shew, that as the me- 
 morial of the sixtli of March, eighteen hundred and 
 twelve, has been so entirely forgotten at the War 
 Office, the eertificate from thence, that a memorial 
 5 
 
38 DEFENCE OF 
 
 pointing out the necessity of a navy on lake Erie, 
 was never read or heard of there, is no sort of evi- 
 dence that another such memorial may not have ex- 
 isted as well as that of the sixth of March. 
 
 The certificate from the Navy Department has heen 
 read. It will appear in the minutes, and I shall trou- 
 ble the Court with no remarks upon it. 
 
 In respect to this memorial I can now only rest 
 upon my own declarations, which I think, when I am 
 in this manner deprived of the benefit of the paper, 
 I am authorized to make. It did contain a represen- 
 tation, in the most explicit and strongest terms, of 
 the necessity of our having a naval force superiour to 
 the enemy on the lakes ; and that without it, and un- 
 less the army I was to command, was strengthened 
 by additions to its numbers ; and unless it were fol- 
 lowed by detachments, to keep open the communica- 
 tion, and insure its supplies from Ohio ; and unless it 
 "vvas supported by co-operations, on other quarters, my 
 army could not be able to maintain itself at Detroit, 
 much less carry on offensive operations in the enemy's 
 country. 
 
 That such were the views and sentiments of the 
 government as to my expedition, as well as my own, 
 and that I was not expected to do more than protect 
 Detroit, and that quarter, and to keep in awe the In- 
 dians, will further appear, from the facts and docu- 
 ments, to ^vhich I shall now refer. 
 
GENERAL HULL. ff9 
 
 Upon this subject, I beg to turn the attention of 
 the court to the testimony of general Porter. It will 
 prove, how pressing I was on the subject of a naval 
 force, not only with the Secretaries, but with the 
 President himself. 
 
 The deposition of captain Charles Steward, of the 
 navy, states, that, at an interview he had with the 
 Secretary of the Navy, in the beginning of April 
 eighteen hundred and twelve, the Secretary informed 
 him, " that it was contemplated to give him the com- 
 *' mand on the lakes ; that a naval force superiour to the 
 " British on the lakes, had been strongly urged by 
 " general Hull, as essential, and as a certain means 
 " of insuring to the army success." 
 
 I beg the court to notice that it is here stated, that 
 I had strongly urged that the command of the lakes 
 was essential to success. 
 
 The first letter which I received from the Secretary 
 of War, after my appointment, and which is dated 
 the ninth of April, eighteen hundred and twelve, 
 describes the force which w^as to be under my com- 
 mand. The description, of itself, I presume, must pre- 
 clude an idea, that it could have been intended for 
 invasion or conquest. But its objects are expressed 
 in this letter. I am directed, as the commander of that 
 force, to " adopt such measures with the chiefs of the 
 " several tribes of Indians, as might, in my judgment, 
 
40 DEFENCE OF 
 
 ^'^ appear to be best calculated to secure the peace of 
 " the country." 
 
 In the first letter which I received from the War 
 Department, dated the eighteenth of June, and which 
 was delivered to me on the twenty-sixth of the same 
 month, I am directed to pursue my march to Detroit 
 with all possible exi)edition ; and the second letter 
 from the Secretary at War, of the same date, which 
 announced to me the war, gives me the same positive 
 command to proceed to that post. If the army I 
 commanded, had been deemed competent to carry on 
 offensive operations against the enemy without any 
 assistance or support, my orders would certainly have 
 been of a different nature. 
 
 It would have been left to my discretion, to pur- 
 sue such measures as I might have judged most effi- 
 cacious. With an army, competent to make an inva- 
 sion, Detroit would not have been the point from 
 which it should have been matle. 
 
 A station opposite Amherstburgh would have been 
 on many accounts a preferable position, but Detroit 
 was the proper situation for the army, for the purpose 
 of protecting the territory and inhabitants of Michi- 
 gan, and of keeping in awe the savage tribes. 
 
 I beg that it may be observed, that I do not pre- 
 tend, that it was not contemplated, that the army I 
 commanded, when I was appointed to it, might be 
 
GENERAL HULL. 41 
 
 employed in ofiTensive operations against the British^, 
 in the event of a war; but I am endeavouring to 
 shew, and I trust shall satisfy the Court, that neither 
 myself, nor the officers of the government, ever sup- 
 posed it would be competent to act as an ojEfensive 
 army, unless it was assisted and supported ; or unless, 
 as was supposed might be the case, such a (lefection cA' 
 the inhabitants of Canada to the government, and a 
 union of the Indians with us, should happen on the 
 appearance of my army, as would in a great measure 
 destroy the enemy's means of resistance. 
 
 The next letter I received from the Secretary at 
 War, is dated the twenty-fourth June, eighteen hun- 
 dred and twelve. This letter informs me, that I am 
 authorized to commence oflensive operations. This 
 would not have been the language addressed to me 
 Mpon this occasion, if the government had supposed 
 I had a force sufficient to commence such operations. 
 In that case I should have received a command in- 
 stead of an authority. 
 
 In thi^ letter, the Secretary adverts to my taking; 
 possession of Maiden; but not as if he supposed I 
 had the power of doing it. I am not to make the at- 
 tempt, unless the force under my command, should be 
 equal to the enterprise, nor unless I could do it, con- 
 sistently with the safety of my own posts. 
 
 The caution, which it is thought necessary to com- 
 municate to me, by this letter, to be limited i*i itiy 
 
 5* 
 
42 DEFENCE OF 
 
 assurances of protection to the Canadians, and the 
 notice that it conveys me, that an adequate force 
 cannot be relied upon, for the reduction of the enemy's 
 posts below, is evidence, that my annj^ was not thought 
 sufficient to maintain itself in the enemy's country, 
 without assistance and co-operation. 
 
 In my letter to the Secretary at War of the ninth 
 of July, eighteen hundred and twelve, which is in 
 answer to that I have last mentioned, in which I am 
 told, that I am authorized to commence offensive 
 operations, I expressed, in the most explicit terms, 
 jny opinion of the inadequacy of my force to the 
 only offensive operation which could be undertaken 
 from that quarter. My words are, " the British com- 
 *' mand the water and the savages ; I do not think 
 '• the force here equal to the reduction of Amherst- 
 " bargh ; you must not therefore be too sanguine." 
 
 I beg the Court to remark, that this letter was writ- 
 ten immediately after my arrival at Detroit, and a 
 few days before I passed into Canada ; of course be- 
 fore I had any knowledge of the fall of Michili- 
 mackinac, an event which had so decisive an influ- 
 ence on my subsequent operations. 
 
 On the tenth of July, I wfote two letters to the 
 Secretary at War, both on the subject of provisions 
 for the army. I mention to him in the first, that the 
 contractor could not furnish the supplies, on account 
 of the lakes being closed against us, by the British 
 naval force. In the second letter, I reiterate the 
 
GENEilAL HULL. 43 
 
 same information; and also inform the Secretary, 
 that 1 have made a new contract for provisions, which, 
 as they cannot be transported on the lake, must be 
 carried on horses from Ohio, through the wilderness. 
 My letter concludes with these words ; " The com- 
 " munication must be secured, or this army will be 
 *' without provisions. Troops will be absolutely ne- 
 ^' cessary on the road, to protect the provisions. This 
 " must not be neglected. If it is, this army will perish 
 " by hunger." 
 
 The receipt of these letters is acknowledged by 
 the Secretary at War, in his letter to me of the twen- 
 ty-sixth of July, eighteen hundred and twelve. To 
 this letter, from the War Department, I wish particu^ 
 larly to direct the attention of the Court. 
 
 It shews, that the government well understood the 
 situation of my army, and how much it stood in need 
 ®f assistance and support. 
 
 By this letter I am informed, that governour Meigs 
 has been directed to furnish troops to guard the road, 
 and insure the transportation of provisions; — that 
 general Winchester had been ordered to reinforce 
 me with fifteen hundred men; — that a force was 
 collecting at Niagara ; — that the commander in chief 
 would be apprised of my situation, and directed to 
 take measures to afford me the necessary support. 
 
 It is not my intention, at this moment, to shew, 
 that none of the expectations, which this letter au- 
 
44 DEFENCE OF 
 
 thorized, were ever realized. I now refer to it, only 
 as I have mentioned, to prove, that the officers oi' the 
 executive government must have considered my army, 
 situated as it was, incompetent to carry on, of itself, 
 effectual operations against the enemy. 
 
 In my letter to the Secretary at War, of the nine- 
 teenth of July, eighteen hundred and twelve, are the 
 following paragraphs : 
 
 " If you have not a force at Niagara, the whole 
 force of the province will be directed against this 
 army." 
 
 " It is all important, that Niagara should be invest- 
 ed — all our success will depend on it." 
 
 There has been read by the Jutlge Advocate, a 
 letter from the Secretary of War to me, dated the first 
 of August. This letter I never received. It, however^ 
 shews no less, on that account, how necessary it was 
 thought, that a diversion should he made, in favour 
 of the army I commanded. I 'therefore extract from 
 it the following paragraph : 
 
 " On the twenty-sixth July, your letters of the se- 
 venth and tenth were enclosed to general Dearborn, 
 with a copy of mine to you of the twenty-sixth, ac- 
 companied with a request, that he would make a di- 
 version in your favour. The General must have 
 received this letter at Albany. By the mail of this 
 evening, yours of the twenty-ninth is enclosed ta 
 
GENERAL HULL. 45 
 
 him, with an instruction, to make a diversion at 
 Niagara and Kingston, as soon as practicable." 
 
 In another letter from the Secretary of War of the 
 first of August, he acknowledges the receipt of my 
 proclamation to the Canadians. I now refer to that 
 proclamation, merely to direct the attention of the 
 Court to that part in which I say, that the force I 
 commanded was " but the vanguard of a much great- 
 er." I do this to shew the confidence I then had, 
 that the corps I commanded was to be reinforced and 
 supported. 
 
 On the twentieth of August, the Secretary of War 
 addressed a letter to me, which T did not receive, but 
 from which I here quote a paragraph, to shew how 
 necessary he thought co-operation was for my sup- 
 port. The paragraph is in the following words : 
 
 " Orders have been given to general Dearborn to 
 " attack the enemy's posts at Niagara and Kingston, 
 " as soon as may be practicable. Our force at Nia- 
 " gara, according to general Dearborn's account, will 
 " amount to twenty-four hundred, and he w ill notify 
 '' you of such movements and operations, as he may 
 -' order," 
 
 It is from these documents, which have all been 
 introduced by the Judge Advocate, that I prove what 
 I undertook to do, that when I took command of the 
 north-western army, it was understood by the ad- 
 
46 DEFENCE OF 
 
 ministration, as well as by myself, that in the event 
 of a war with Great-Britain, my force was to be aug- 
 mented ; that my communication with the state of 
 Ohio was to be preserved, by troops from that quar- 
 ter ; that the lakes were to be commanded by us ; 
 and that my operations v, ere to be facilitated by di- 
 versions on the frontiers below me. 
 
 The Court will hereafter i)erceive, what an impor- 
 tant influence a disappointment in all these particu- 
 lars had on the events under consideration ; and will 
 not therefore, I hope, think 1 have uselessly trespass- 
 ed on their time, by detaining them so long on this 
 part of the subject. 
 
 1 cannot, however, omit one farther remark. I 
 would ask the Court, if subsequent events do not ex- 
 clude a supposition, that the administration did ex- 
 pect, that my army was in all events to be of itself 
 adequate to the invasion and conquest of the enemy's 
 country; unless it be admitted, that there was an 
 entire ignorance of what was necessary to accomplish 
 these objects ? For we have since seen general 
 Harrison, with an army more than quadruple to that 
 which I led, for more than a year, threatening the 
 enemy on the same point, at which he was invaded by 
 my army ; and though ten thousand troops were co- 
 operating with him, on the points where I had been 
 led to expect co-operation, yet he dared not to set his 
 foot on the enemy's shore, till after our glorious naval 
 victory on lake Erie, and was then obliged to content 
 
GENERAL HULL. 47 
 
 himself with the possession of no greater territory 
 than his troops coukl cover. 
 
 I must intreat the Court, before I proceed to the 
 consideration of other matters, to indulge me with 
 the repetition of a remark which is so necessary for 
 understanding the subsequent parts of my defence, 
 that I am anxious to impress it on their minds. 
 
 It is, that though, as I have said, and I trust I have 
 proved, it was understood both by the administration 
 and by myself, that the force which I commanded 
 would not in all events, in case of war, be competent 
 to the invasion and conquest of Canada, yet both 
 the officers of the executive government and myself, 
 did contemplate, that in certain events, I might, with 
 the army which I led, subdue the enemy's posts in the 
 Upper Canada. It was contemplated and believed, 
 that there would be a very general defection of the 
 inhabitants of that province, and that many of them 
 would arrange themselves under the American stan- 
 dard ; and it was also contemplated and believed, that 
 it would be possible for me to draw from them the aid 
 of the savages. When I landed in Canada, and pre- 
 viously to the fall of Michilimackinac, there was every 
 reason to suppose, that these expectations v/ould be 
 realized. Until that event took place, of which the 
 enemy had notice about the second of August, I had 
 those sanguine hopes of success which I expressed in 
 my proclamation, and in my communications with 
 the War Office. But after that misfortune, the scene 
 
4S DEFENCE OP 
 
 was entirely changed. From that moment, I saw, 
 that although it was possible that I might obtain 
 temporary advantages, yet that they would eventuate 
 in the greatest disasters, unless I was aided and sup- 
 ported from other quarters. 
 
 Thus, Gentlemen, I have endeavoured to shew you, 
 that I took the command under the expectation, that, 
 in the event of a war, the operations of my army 
 would be assisted, by a competent force upon the 
 lakes, by detachments to keep clear the communica- 
 tion which I had opened through the wilderness, and 
 by the co-operation, or at least such a demonstration 
 of force against other parts of the enemy's territories, 
 as would prevent his directing all his energies to the 
 point where I might meet him. But it unfortunately 
 happened, that none of these expectations were ful- 
 filled. The effects of these disappointments will after- 
 wards be considered. 
 
 I now resume my vindication of the measures, which 
 form the most prominent features in my accusation ; 
 that is to say, the delay at Sandmch ; tJie retreat from 
 thence ; and tlu surrender at Detroit. 
 
 It is necessary for me to explain the views and 
 intentions I had, when I yielded to the importunities 
 of my officers, and crossed to the enemy's country. 
 
 It must be recollected, that the order I received in 
 the letter of the eigliteenth of June, which amiounced 
 
GENERAL HULL. 49 
 
 the war, directed me to proceed to Detroit, and there 
 to wait for further orders. 
 
 Finding that an impatience^ to cross had been ex- 
 cited in tlie army, which was likely to be extremely 
 injurious to my authority, and the discipline of the 
 troops, I called a council of war, and laid before the 
 officers, the orders by which I w as then boiind ; and 
 asked their advice, as to the expediency of crossing. 
 The council, notwithstanding my orders, were of 
 opinion, that I ought to cross. I did not feel myself 
 at liberty to follow their advice, and determined not 
 to do so. But on the same day, I received the Se- 
 cretary of War's letter of the twenty-fourth of June, 
 in which he says, " should the force under your com- 
 " mand be equal to the enterprise, consistently with the 
 "safety of your own posts, you will take possession 
 '•of Maiden, and extend your conquests, as circum- 
 "■^ stances may justify." 
 
 I did not think the force, under my command, equal 
 to the conquest of Maiden, nor did I think, that with 
 such a length of line of communication, as it was re- 
 quisite for me to keep open, I ought to make the at- 
 tempt. My letter to the Secretary at War, dated on 
 this same ninth of July, which I have already quoted, 
 expresses this opinion of the incompetency of my 
 force, in terms not to be misunderstood. 
 
 Yet, as soon as I had received this last mentioned 
 letter from the Secretary, 1 determined to take post 
 6 
 
00 DEFENCE OF 
 
 in the enemy's country. IMy reasons for this deter- 
 jnination were, that I hoped thereby to satisfy the 
 impatience of my officers, and preserve the confidence 
 of my army ; which expressions of discontent were 
 likely to impair. — I should command the streights, 
 and tliereby prevent the enemy from sending succours 
 to their northern posts, or carrying on the important 
 trade of their north-western company. 
 
 I knew, that it would have a great effect upon the 
 Indians, to shew them the American flag flying on 
 both shores; and I hoped, by establishing myself at 
 Sandwich, to facilitate and increase the defection from 
 the British stamlard, which had manifested itself 
 among the inhabitants and militia, and their Indian 
 allies. My views, in taking post in the enemy's ter- 
 ritory, are expressed in my letters to the Secretary of 
 War. In my letter of the ninth of July, I had, as I 
 have above mentioned, told him, I thought my force 
 incompetent to attack Maiden. In my letter of the 
 thirteenth, written from Sandwich, I say, " I consider 
 " the possession of tliis bank as highly important ; by 
 "erecting one or two batteries, opposite the batteries 
 " at Detroit, the river will be completely commanded. 
 " In the rear of the army, on the Detroit river, lake St. 
 ' Clair, and the river Le Trench, is a populous and 
 " valuable part of the province. It is likewise pro- 
 " bable, when the Indians see the American standard 
 " on both sides the river, it will have a favourable 
 "effect." I intended, nevertheless, without loss of 
 time, to make preparations for putting in a state of 
 
iJJENERAL HULL. 51 
 
 service my field arlilleiy, for an at lack on Maiden ; 
 and whenever that shoukl be ready, and I should find 
 tliat the enemj^'s force was not likely to be further 
 weakened by desertions, I would make the attack, if 
 I had a prospect of co-operation and support from 
 below, without which I thought, and I think recent 
 events will prove that I thought correctly, I could 
 neither preserve my own posts on our side of the 
 river, nor that which the enemy then possessed, if I 
 should be so fortunate as to Avrest it from him. 
 
 My officers, however, were not less importunate, 
 for proceeding immediately against Maiden, than they 
 had been to cross the river. 
 
 I felt myself compelled to yield to their importu- 
 nity, and had appointed a day for the attack. But, 
 before that day arrived, I received intelligence, that 
 determined me to postpone the enterprise, and to re- 
 cross to Detroit. 
 
 As preliminary to my vindication of these measures, 
 it is important to consider, what numerical force I 
 could command when I crossed into Canada; its 
 nature ; and the probable force and strength of the 
 enemy. 
 
 In every stage of this trial, I have felt as a great 
 misfortune, the want of that documentary evidence, 
 which might be expected from me. This arises from 
 the loss of the packet, which sailed from the Miami ; 
 
:)2 DEFENCE OF 
 
 . and from the more recent loss of all my baggage, and 
 most of my papers. When I left Detroit, a prisoner, 
 I left my baggage with my daughter, Mrs. Hickman, 
 to be carried to mj^ home by her. She soon after 
 embarked in the enemj^'s brig Adams, for fort Erie. 
 
 On her arrival there, she was permitted to go to 
 Buffalo, leaving her own and my baggage on board 
 the brig. The same night the brig was taken by 
 commodore Elliot, retaken by the enemy, and burnt 
 with all my baggage on board. 
 
 This loss of my documents has left the witnesses, 
 who testified against me, to speak on many important 
 points, from estimation and conjecture, and they seem- 
 ed, to have availed themselves of the liberty, so as 
 always to make their estimates such, as would be most 
 against me. 1 shall myself be obliged often to speak . 
 of numbers from conjecture and estimate, but when I 
 do so, I shall endeavour to present to the Court the 
 data, on which my estimates are founded. 
 
 Major Jessup, the brigade major, says, that we 
 moved into Canada with sixteen or eighteen hundred 
 men. Now, neither the Michigan legion, or the Michi- 
 gan militia, crossed with the army into Canada. And 
 besides, there were, as the Court will recollect has 
 been testified by several of the witnesses, a portion of 
 the Ohio volunteers who refused to cross. This num- 
 ber was about one hundred and eighty. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 53 
 
 Major Jessup further testifies, " That some time 
 "early in August, a few days previous to leaving 
 " Canada, he was called into a council of war, to ex- 
 " plain a report of brigade, and that there were then 
 " eighteen hundred effective men in Canada and at 
 ^^ Detroit. The Michigan legion were included in 
 " the eighteen hundred, Ijut the Michigan militia were 
 "not," 
 
 Now, if there were but eighteen hundred belonging 
 to the brigade at this time, including all that were 
 either with me in Canada, or at Detroit, and includ- 
 ing the legion, how could sixteen or eighteen hun- 
 dred have crossed with me ? At the time that this 
 report of major Jessup's was made, we had lost but 
 few of the troops that had crossed; and from the 
 amount, which he gives of the whole forces, at that 
 time, to ascertain what was the number that crossed, 
 must be deducted the Michigan legion, and the Ohio 
 volunteers that refused to pass the river. This 'will 
 leave an amomit much short of ihe sixteen or eighteen 
 hundred, with which, major Jessup says, we passed 
 into Canada. 
 
 The Court will remember, that by a muster roll and 
 return, made at Fort Findlay on the twenty-sixth of 
 June, which has been exhibited by the Judge Advo- 
 cate, the whole force which I then had under my 
 command, amounted to one thousand, nine hundred 
 and fifty,. I was obliged to leave detachments, at 
 Mac Arthur's Block-house, at Fort Fiadlay, and at 
 
54 DEFENCE OF 
 
 the Miami. There were about forty invalids taken 
 ill the vessel, that sailed from the Miami. I left 
 some sick at the river Raisin, and the whole force 
 with Avhich I arrived at Detroit, I am convinced, did 
 not exceed fifteen hundred men* And I am confi- 
 dent, that the force with which I passed into Canada, 
 did not exceed fourteen hundred. What proportion 
 of the militia, which I had with me at Sandwich, 
 would have been effective to lead against the enemy, 
 the Court may judge from general experience. 
 
 Major Van Horn has testified, that when detach- 
 ments were ordered, it was always found, that not 
 more than two thirds of the command ordered could 
 be marched. I do not believe, that at any time, I 
 could have led thirteeen hundred effective men against 
 Maiden. Of these, there was only colonel Miller's 
 regiment, of less than three hundred, that had seen any 
 service. The rest were militia, who, though they 
 vrere very ardent and patriotic in their expressions 
 had had no experience, and neither men nor officers, 
 had ever been tried. It is not extraordinary, that I 
 should have felt some want of confidence in these 
 raw troops, for such a contest, as we must have ex- 
 pected before Maiden ; when it appears, by the testi- 
 mony of colonel Miller, that their own officers were 
 not willing to be responsible for their firmness in an 
 assault. Colonel Miller states, tliat in a council, in 
 which the propriety of attacking Maiden was discuss- 
 ed, at which general Mac Arthur, general^ass, and 
 colonel Findlay, were present; "General Hull said-. 
 
GENERAL HULL. ^ 
 
 if we would answer for our men, he would lead us 
 " to Maiden. I told him, I would answer for the men 
 " I commanded ; but the others said, they would not 
 *' be responsible for their men, but believed they would 
 *' behave well." 
 
 I know, sir, that it may be said, that my proclama- 
 tion to the Canadians, and my letters to the Secretary 
 at War, hold a different language. That in these I 
 speak with coniidence of attacking Maiden, and of 
 the excellence and sufficiency of my force. And I 
 presume the specifications refer to my proclamation, 
 and to these letters, when they allege that I had 
 declared and avowed my intention of attacking and 
 subduing Maiden. I cannot conceive, that these 
 declarations could prove me guilty, if my measures 
 ■without them would not have been so. I do not see, 
 that they can in any way be made the test of the 
 propriety, or impropriety, of the course I pursued. 
 It would be hard, indeed, if every general were to be 
 judged criminal, who did not accomplish all the in- 
 tentions he may have avowed — this would be a rule, 
 which I presume there are mani/ generals would not 
 consent to establish. If it were adopted, no change 
 of circumstances would justify the relinquishment of 
 a design, once formed. 
 
 I think, when it is considered under what circum- 
 stances my proclamation was published, it will not 
 be thoU§ht just, to adduce it as evidence against me 
 on this occasion. I was then in an enemy's country, 
 the inhabitants of which were sufficient, independent 
 
56 DEFENCE OF 
 
 of his regular force, which was establislied near mc, 
 and of his Indian allies, to overwhelm the army I 
 commanded. I had no prospect of even maintaining 
 myself, much less of making conquests ; unless I could 
 induce a great portion of those inhabitants to forsake 
 his standard. It was incumbent on me to use all 
 means to deprive him of aid from the savage tribes. 
 I knew that these two objects could only be effected 
 by representing myself as having the utmost confi- 
 dence in the force I commanded, and that it was able 
 to overcome all opposition. With these views I pub- 
 lished the proclamation. And, indeed, the force I 
 commanded, would have been equal to all I represent- 
 ed, had the same spirit of desertion and defection con- 
 tinued, which had manifested itself in the enemy's 
 country, when we first invaded Canada. 
 
 But unfortunately, before we retreated, all calcula- 
 tions founded on this basis had failed. 
 
 In my letters to the War Department, down to the 
 latter end of July, I speak with confidence of attack- 
 ing Maiden, whenever the field artillery shall be pre- 
 pared. But I beg the Court to recollect, that this 
 confidence was grounded upon the expectation, that 
 I then entertained, that the enemy would be w eaken- 
 ed by the desertion of his militia, and the abandon- 
 ment of the Indians. In all my letters, which speak 
 of the intended attack, I mention also the daily de- 
 sertions from the enemy's standard. That Ldid not 
 rely on the competency of mj^ own force, till the ene- 
 py's should be reduced, must appear from my letter 
 
GENERAL HULL. 57 
 
 of the ninth of July, to which I have more than once 
 referred. 
 
 About the first of August, we received the account 
 of the fall of Michilimackinac. On the fourth, I 
 wrote a letter to the Secretary, from which the follow- 
 ing are extracts. 
 
 " At the time the army under my command took 
 " possession of this part of the province of Upper 
 " Canada, every thing appeared favourable, and all 
 " the operations of the army have been successful. 
 "Circumstances have since occurred, which seem 
 -' materially to change our future prospects. 
 
 "The miexpected surrender of Michilimackinac, 
 " and the tardy operations of the army at Niagara, 
 " are the circumstances to which I allude. I have 
 " every reason to expect, in a very short time, a large 
 " body of savages from the north, whose operations 
 " will be directed against this army," &c. 
 
 After these observations, I do not believe, that the 
 Court will think, that it is to be justly inferred, either 
 from my proclamation, or from my letters, that I con- 
 sidered my force under any circumstances, which 
 existed before we left Canada, competent to the re- 
 duction of Maiden. 
 
 The force of the enemy, lieutenant Forbish states, 
 wasj towards the last of July, about one hundred and 
 
38 DEFENCE OF 
 
 seventy regulars, and five hundred and fifty militia.. 
 The Indian force could never be ascertained with 
 any precision; it could not have been, less than 
 near a thousand. I always supposed the enemy's 
 force greater than this information makes it. But 
 whatever may have been the force of the enemy, it 
 must have been estimated as very considerable, by 
 some of my officers, as well as by myself. The Court 
 will recollect, that when I made the detachment under 
 colonel Van Horn, to the river Raisin, and colonels 
 Cass and Mac Arthur remonstrated with me against 
 the sufficiency of his force, they each proposed to go 
 on that expedition witli his regiment. If the enemy 
 had not appeared to be somewhat formidable to them, 
 they could never have advised me to make so large 
 a detachment as six hundred men, on a service in 
 which they could only have expected to meet a small 
 part of his force. Colonel Mac Arthur has affi)rded 
 other evidence of his opinion of the power of the 
 enemy. For when I proposed to leave him, with his 
 regiment, on the Canada shore, he charged me with 
 having an intention to sacrifice him, by leaving him 
 with such a force at that post; although he would have 
 been in an entrenched camp with artillery, where he 
 would also have had some protection from the guns 
 at Detroit, and would be in reach of instant support 
 from thence. 
 
 The fort at Maiden, I was well acquainted with. 
 In time of peace, I had often been in it. I knew that 
 it was capable of being made a place of strength, and 
 
GENERAL HULL. 59 
 
 fliat, ill contemplation of a war, the British for some 
 lime had been using great exertions to put it in the 
 best possible state of defence. I knew, that for near 
 twenty years, a field officer had commanded, and 
 about an hundred regular troops had constantly been 
 stationed in it ; and that there always had been a regu- 
 lar corps of British artillery attached to the com- 
 mand. The question was, whether, with the troops 
 I had under my command, so few of whom had ever 
 been tried, I was to attempt to carry this fortress with 
 the bayonet ? For myself, particularly, when I con- 
 sidered, what would have been the consequences of 
 an unsuccessful attempt, I had a strong conviction 
 that it would be wrong to make the effort, till we 
 could have the advantage of heavy artillery. But 
 finding that many of my officers, who had seen no 
 service, were impatient at delay, and were destroying 
 my influence with the army, and its discipline, l}y 
 their complaints and censures — for tlieir satisfac- 
 tion, and not for my own, nor for my own justification, 
 two days after I crossed, that is, on the fourteenth of 
 July, I called a council of war, in which it was decid- 
 ed, that no attempt ought to be made on Maiden, with- 
 out the heavy artillerj^ 
 
 My utmost exertions were then used, to get in 
 readiness the two twenty-four pounders, and two how- 
 itzers, which were at Detroit. Carriages were to be 
 made for them entirely new. Though a delay, in these 
 preparations, is one of the charges made against me, 
 not a witness has attempted to support it. Indeed, 
 
60 DEFENCE OP 
 
 Gentlemen, I dare appeal to every officer, who was 
 with me, and who is willing to speak the truth, 
 whether I did not use all possible means, and make 
 all personal exertion, to accomplish, as speedily as 
 possiljle, this desirable object. I several times cross- 
 ed the river myself, to inspect and hasten the artificers. 
 I ordered planks to be taken off my own house, to fur- 
 nish a necessary part of the materials for the gun 
 carriages. 
 
 Captain Dallaba, in his second examination, states, 
 that he received an order to prepare the heavy ar- 
 tillery, after the army had crossed to Canada; he 
 thinks it was on the fifteenth or sixteenth of July. 
 My recollection is, that the order was given on the 
 fourteenth, that is, the day afte£_ we crossed ; and on 
 the very day that the council of war advised, that the 
 attack should not be made without the heavy can- 
 non. From that time, it is not pretended there was 
 any delay in preparing them for service, and could 
 not have been, without the fault of the officer, who 
 was trusted with the service. Till we crossed to 
 Sandwich, the artificers were employed, as appears 
 by the testimony of the same witness, in mounting 
 the guns of fort Detroit. I beg the Court also to 
 notice the testimony of colonel Miller on this point- 
 he says, he saw no want of exertion in preparing the 
 artillery. 
 
 The necessary field artillery was not prepared till 
 the seventh of August. Two days previous to this, 
 
GENERAL HULL. 61 
 
 J had called another council. The members deter- 
 mined it would be advisable to wait two days for 
 the artillery, and if it was not then ready, the attack 
 ought to be made without it. I did not concur in this 
 opinion. Indeed, the opinion of the officers in this, 
 and the former council, appeared to me inconsistent. 
 For if, according to the decided opinion of the first 
 council, it was then improper to make the attack 
 without heavy ordnance, why was it not as necessary 
 when the last mentioned council sat ? And if it were 
 proper to wait two days for the artillery, according to 
 the opinion of the last council, why was it not proper 
 to wait longer ? 
 
 It may be said, that between the first and second 
 council, the enemy's force had diminished by deser- 
 tion. No doubt it had as to numbers. Great part of 
 the militia had left them, and many of their Indian 
 allies ; but the fort of Maiden retained all its strength, 
 and there was no doubt, but that their regular force, 
 (of which not an individual had deserted,) and their 
 Femaining militia were sufficient to man it. Indeed, 
 reinforcements had arrived from Fort George, both in 
 the brig Hunter and one other vessel. At this coun- 
 cil, I found that nothing would satisfy my officers, or 
 the army, but a movement towards the enemy. I felt 
 myself obliged to yield to the advice of the council, 
 and did, as general Cass has testified, declare that I 
 would lead the army against Maiden, as soon as the 
 artillery should be completed. 
 7 
 
62 DEFENCE OF 
 
 My opinion was, that an attempt on Maiden should 
 never be made until there was an absolute certainty 
 of success. This opinion was founded, not only on 
 considerations which I shall hereafter mention, but 
 upon the orders I had received from the War De- 
 partment, in the Secretary's letter of the twenty-fourth 
 of June, which I have so often quoted ; and by which 
 I was directed not to attack Maiden, unless I judged 
 my force was equal to the enterprise, nor unless I 
 could do it consistently with the safety of my own 
 posts. I thought, by delay, I was every day strength- 
 ening the probability of success in the entei-prise, 
 because the force of the enemy was daily diminishing 
 by the desertion of his militia and Indians. 
 
 But I thought myself bound to delay, till I had 
 possessed myself of every possible means of insuring 
 success, from a consideration of what would be the 
 consequences of a defeat. 
 
 The anny would have been destroyed ; if not by 
 the tomahawk of the Indians, they must, after a de- 
 feat, have perished for want of supplies. A defeat 
 would have been the signal for all the hordes of sa- 
 vages in the surrounding wilderness, to fall upon the 
 unsuccessful troops. Every path would have been 
 filled with these remorseless warriours. But it was 
 not only the fate of the army that I anticipated on 
 such an event; the horrours that it would let loose on 
 the neighbouring country, and throughout our exten- 
 sive borders, were presented to my mind, I knew, 
 
GENERAL HULL. 63 
 
 that if the army I commanded v. ere beaten in battle, 
 there would be nothing to restrain the ravages of that 
 part of our enemy, which, when a battle is decided in 
 their favour, makes the vanquished, and their de- 
 fenceless country and people, their prey. 
 
 In the ungenerous letter which colonel Cass wrote 
 to the government, (and which, as I think, was most 
 unwarrantably published) he seems to think, that 
 these are philanthropic considerations, unworthy a 
 soldier. But, Sir, though brought up in the field, and 
 though I have seen something of the horrours of war, 
 I am not yet such a soldier, as that I can think of 
 such scenes with indifference. When I considered 
 what would be the condition of the territory, over 
 which I had so long presided, and over which I was 
 then Govemour, in case the force I commanded should 
 be beaten in battle, and the inhabitants be left to the 
 mercy of the savages, without any stipulation or force 
 for their protection, I thought I should deserve the 
 heaviest curses, if I risked a battle, before I had taken 
 every means in my power to insure victory. 
 
 These were the considerations, that induced me to 
 resist the urgency of my officers to move to the attack 
 of Maiden, till the eighth of August. It had been 
 ascertained on the sixth, that the cannon would be 
 ready on the eighth ; and on the sixth I issued an 
 order for the army to prepare to move to the attack 
 on the eighth. Every thing was in readiness for the 
 ^nterpi^isie on the seventh. But on that evening, I 
 
t34 DEFENCE OP 
 
 crossed with the whole army to Detroit, except a de- 
 tachment of about three hundred men, under major 
 Denny, which was left intrenched at Sandwich, and 
 which was also moved over on the eleventh. 
 
 This retreat from the enemy's shore is one of the 
 acts of treason, cowardice, and unofficer-like conduct, 
 of which I am accused. I proceed to submit to your 
 consideration my answer to this accusation, and the 
 reasons which then governed my conduct, and which 
 I yet believe to have been correct. 
 
 About the first of August, as appears by my letter 
 of the fourth, I received an account of the fall of Mi- 
 chilimackinac. Lieutenant Hanks, with his men and 
 some Indians, had arrived at my encampment. The 
 eifect of this great misfortune was immediately seen 
 and felt in the vicinity of my post. The Wyandot 
 Indians settled at Brownstown, who had previously 
 shewn the most friendly dispositions, and given the 
 strongest assurances of their neutrality, joined the 
 British. For though they passed over under the 
 pretence of having been made prisoners, the circum- 
 stances which then occurred left no doubt but that 
 they had formed an alliance with the enemy. This 
 procedure of this tribe of Indians, was not only evi- 
 dence of their own, but of the defection of the sur- 
 rounding nations, who are all united by some sort of 
 confederacy, in which the Wyandots have a superiour 
 influence, which is acknowledged by the other tribes, 
 speaking of them as their fathers. When, therefore, 
 
GENERAL HULL. 65 
 
 i learned that this nation had joined the standard of 
 the enemy, I knew that the Chippeways, Ottaways, 
 Pottawattamies, Munsees, the Shawanees, Senekas, 
 and other tribes, who altogether could furnish between 
 two and three thousand warriours, would also be an 
 addition to his force. 
 
 At the same time I received intelligence, as ap- 
 pears by another letter of mine to the Secretary at 
 War of the same date, (fourth of August,) that a 
 British officer, with fifty-five regular soldiers and two 
 brass field pieces, had landed on the west part of lake 
 Ontario, had penetrated to the head waters of the 
 river Le Trench, and was collecting the militia and 
 Indians in that quarter to lead them against my army. 
 From the information I had received, I had reason 
 to think, and so I mention in my letter to the Secre- 
 tary, his force would amount to six or seven hundred. 
 The fall of Michiiimackinac also changed the dispo- 
 sition of the inhabitants of Canada, and from the time 
 that accounts were received of that event, there were 
 no more of their militia came over to us. I had also 
 been informed of the arrival of the British colonel 
 Proctor at Maiden, and it was generally believed, 
 that he had brought with him some reinforcements, as 
 well naval as military. To the enemy's naval force 
 I had nothing to oppose. By it, the enemy might 
 command the lake ; obtain his supplies without the 
 least interruption ; transport his troops at his pleasure, 
 and co-operate with land movements on the margin 
 
 of the waters. I had also intercepted a letter from a 
 
 7# 
 
66 DEFENCE OF 
 
 Mr. Mac Kenzie, at Fort William, to a Mr. Mac Intosh, 
 at Sandwich, dated the nineteenth of July, from 
 
 " The declaration of war reached us on the six- 
 *' teenth instant, but we are neither astonished nor 
 " alarmed. Our agents ordered a general muster, which 
 " amounted to twelve hundred, exclusive of several 
 " hundred of the natives. We are now equal, in all, 
 *' to sixteen or seventeen hundred strong. One of 
 *' our gentlemen started on the seventeenth, with 
 " several light canoes, for the interiour country, to 
 " rouse the natives to activity, which is not hard to 
 " do on the present occasion. We likewise despatch^ 
 ^' ed messengers in all directions with the news. I 
 " have not the least doubt but our force will, in ten 
 " days hence, amount to at least five thousand eflfec- 
 *' tive men. Our young gentlemen and engagees 
 " offered most handsomely to march immediately for 
 " Michilimackinac. Our chief, Mr. Shaw, expressed 
 " his gratitude, and drafted one hundred — they are to 
 " proceed this evening for St. Joseph's. He takes 
 " about as many Indians. Could the vessel contain 
 *' them, he might have had four thousand more. It 
 *' now depends on what accounts we receive from St. 
 " Joseph's, whether these numerous tribes from the 
 *' interiour will proceed to St. Joseph's or not. 
 
 At the time that this intercepted letter fell into my 
 hands, I was informed by lieutenant Hanks, that be* 
 fore he left Michilimackinac, several agents of the 
 
GENERAL HULL. (>7 
 
 north-west territory had arrived at that post, after its 
 surrender, from Fort William, on the north side of lake 
 Superiour, who stated, that a large force of Canadians 
 and Indians were collected at Fort William, ready to 
 descend the lakes, and that there was also a force of 
 the same description, collected at the outlet of lake 
 Superiour. I was further informed by lieutenant 
 Hanks, that immediately after the surrender of Michi- 
 limackinac, which was on the eighteenth of July, the 
 British commander had sent an express to Little 
 York ; and it was supposed, that on the return of the 
 express, all the forces which had been collected and 
 were collecting in the northern regions, would be 
 ordered to Maiden. - The death of lieutenant Hanks 
 deprives me of the benefit of his testimony. But 
 'this is sufficiently supplied by the evidence of Mr. 
 Stone, and doctor Day, gentlemen who were at Mi- 
 ehilimackinac when it surrendered, and who accom- 
 panied lieutenant Hanks to my head quarters at Sand- 
 wich, and doctor Day was present when lieutenant 
 Hanks made the communication to me. 
 
 It may be said, that this information ought not to 
 have had any influence upon my conduct, because 
 the northern Indians could not, and in fact did not 
 arrive in a great length of time. 
 
 I presume that no testimony is wanting to prove 
 to this Court, that from the points where they were 
 collected, they might have descended in a very few 
 days. The savages of our country have an advan- 
 
68 DEFENCE OF 
 
 tage of ail other troops, in the celerity and facility 
 with which they make their movements. These too, 
 were to be aided by the means of the north-west 
 company, which were particularly adapted to trans- 
 portation, from the nature of their trade upon the 
 waters of the lakes. 
 
 As to the fact, that the northern savages did not 
 arrive at Maiden till long after the surrender. < — • 
 
 The testimony of captain Eastman is, that he re- 
 Tiiained at Detroit twenty-four days after the capitu- 
 lation; that the Sagganau Indians, with about sixty 
 warriours, arrived three days after the surrender ; that 
 the Michilimacldnac Indians, with about eleven or 
 twelve hundred warriours arrived about the tenth or 
 eleventh of September. It may be well to remark 
 here, how formidable this force proved to be, although 
 it was but a small portion of that which would have 
 come, had not Detroit been surrendered. But can it 
 be concluded that this force would not have arrived 
 earlier, had not intelligence of the fall of my army 
 reached them, which it must have done a few days 
 after the event happened ? When information of so 
 many adverse circumstances had reached me from 
 various quarters, the fate of my army appeared in- 
 evitable. I had but one of two courses to pursue, and 
 either seemed to me almost a desperate alternative. 
 I must either advance or retreat. If I had seen 
 nothing that I was to regard, but the power of the 
 enemy, I had no doubt but that I ought to have 
 
GENERAL HULL. 6§ 
 
 adopted the former expedient. I was obliged to con- 
 sider the effect a retreat would have in my own camp. 
 The young and inexperienced officers I had under 
 my command, who could see no danger that was not 
 immediately before their eyes ; who thought and said 
 that they were very brave, but with a few exceptions, 
 do not know it to this day from any trials of their 
 courage; who despised all precaution, and thought all 
 generalship consisted in inconsiderate and impetuous 
 advances — I knew well, would pursue the conduct 
 which they afterwards did, and, by representing a re- 
 treat as proceeding from the most unworthy and un- 
 justifiable motives, destroy the efficiency of the army, 
 by robbing me of its confidence. The cabals, which 
 had risen to such a height as to mature a plan of mu- 
 tiny, in which my chief officers were to be the ring- 
 leaders, could not be entirely concealed from me; 
 although, till I saw the confession published to the 
 world, by one of the conspirators, I did not know the 
 extent of their design. 
 
 Under these awful circumstances, dangerous as the 
 attempt on Maiden appeared to me to be, I thought 
 it might be less so, than a retreat. I determined to 
 attack Maiden, and on the sixth of August issued 
 orders to have every thing prepared for the move- 
 ment of the army on the eighth. And, Gentlemen, 
 there is no part of my conduct, since I ha^^e been a 
 soldier, that I reflect upon with so much self conviO' 
 tiou of errour, as \ do upon this. 
 
/O DEFENCE OP 
 
 I look back with regret upon the moment when I 
 yielded to the councils of the inexperienced officers 
 I commanded, and determined to make an attempt, 
 ^vhich my own judgment did not approve, which was 
 contrary to all military knowled3i;e, and which even 
 success might not justify. I thought, however, it was 
 possible, that if I were successful, and should possess 
 myself of the enemy's fortress, I might possibly main- 
 tain mj^self there for some short time ; and in that time 
 I hoped I might have some succour and security from 
 my own country, and her armies, that I had been led 
 to expect would be operating below me. 
 
 On the seventh of August every thing was in rea- 
 diness for the intended movement, but on that day 
 at about one o'clock, an express arrived Avith letters 
 to me from the commanding officers on the Niagara 
 frontier, two from major-general Hall, and the other 
 from general P. B. Porter. These letters were sent 
 to me by express, to inform me, that a large force from 
 the neighbourhood of Niagara were moving towards 
 my army. But what was more decisive in its influ- 
 ence on ray measures, was, that I learned from those 
 letters, that I was not to expect that these movements 
 of the enemy were to be checked, or that my army 
 would be sustained, by any operations against the 
 enemy in any quarter. I found that the invasion of 
 Canada, and the whole war, was to be carried on 
 by the three hundred regular troops under colonel 
 Miller, and the twelve or fourteen hundred militia, 
 which bad been placed under my command. I must 
 
GENERAL HULL, It 
 
 liere again beg leave to turn the attention of the 
 Court Martial to the correspondence between the 
 Secretary at War and mj^elf, to remind the Court 
 Martial of the reasons I had t6 expect supplies, as^ 
 sistance, and co-operation, when I took the command 
 of the north-western army. When I received these 
 letters from generals Hall and Porter, my situation 
 became embarrassing and distressing to a great de^ 
 gree. I had but a few hours before, w ith w hat re- 
 luctance appears from the testimony of general Cass, 
 yielded to importunities of my officers, and given 
 them expectation, that I would lead the army against 
 Maiden. I had issued orders for making the neces- 
 sary preparations, and fixed a time for the movement* 
 I knew well what would be the effect of disappoint- 
 ing the expectations which those measures had rais- 
 ed. But as general Mac Arthur has testified, I told 
 him, as commander of that army, I felt myself res- 
 ponsible for its moveinents, and its fate. Under an 
 awful sense of that responsibility, I determined to 
 recross the river, with the greater part of the army. 
 In making this movement, I had no design of relin- 
 quishing the attack of Maiden. My intention was to 
 take post at Detroit, and there to wait until some na- 
 val force on the lake, and a co-operation from below, 
 uhich, from the beginning, I had relied upon, and 
 which the letters I had received from generals Hall 
 and Porter gave me reason to expect, would com- 
 mence at some future but probably distant period-, 
 afforded some hopes of success, and of advantage 
 from success. My forlher intention \wo3- to concen- 
 
T2 DEFENCE OF 
 
 trate my forces at Detroit, that I might from thence 
 open and secure my communication with the state of 
 Ohio; upon which, in my judgment, the salvation 
 of the army depended. This consideration had so 
 much influence on my measures, not only at this time, 
 but throughout the campaign, and in the final surren- 
 der, that it Avill be proper to present it to the Court, 
 in such a view, as that they may judge of its impor- 
 tance. 
 
 From Urbana to the Miami of the lake, is a per- 
 fect wilderness. Through this wilderness^ a distance 
 of a hundred and twenty miles, and through a countiy 
 of which the Indians were the inhabitants and pro- 
 prietors, the army had to cut a road, when they ad- 
 vanced ; and it was the only road by w hich supplies 
 of any kind could be received. From the Miami to 
 the settlements on the Detroit river, the country is 
 little better than a wilderness, there being only two 
 or three little settlements. Along the Detroit river 
 the country is partially cleared and cultivated. The 
 improvements extend from half a mile to a mile 
 back from the river, and in part of these improve- 
 ments, on the margin of the streights, is the road to 
 tlie town of Detroit. The whole country from Ur- 
 bana to the town of Detroit is filled with savages, 
 all of whom, with very unimportant exceptions, be- 
 came hostile to us, and infested every part of the 
 road which w^as not protected by an armed force. 
 From the Miami to Detroit, a distance of seventy- 
 two miles, the road runs so near the waters of lake 
 
GENERAL HULL. . 73 
 
 Erie, and of the streiglits, that the enemy having the 
 command of those waters, could, with the greatest fa- 
 cility, transport from their shore, and from one point 
 to another, detachments to intercept the communi- 
 cation. Their vessels too, would always afford them 
 a secure retreat, in case of disaster. There were, in 
 the whole Michigan territory, less than five thousand 
 white inhabitants ; about two thousand of whom were 
 settled along the Detroit river. The soil, thougli 
 fertile, was but little cultivated : the inhabitants 
 greatly relying for their support upon the supplies of 
 fish and venison, which the woods and waters afforded. 
 The territory has never furnished sufficient provi- 
 sions for its ov/n inhabitants ; there are annually, as 
 appears from the testimony before you, large quanti- 
 ties of pork and beef brought in from the state of 
 Ohio ; and, notwithstanding the testimony of some of 
 the witnesses, I assert, that at the time the army was 
 in that quarter, they could not have taken the neces- 
 sary supplies from the country for any length of time, 
 without distressing the inhabitants. It has been 
 proved, that even in time of peace the few troops 
 who were stationed at Detroit were fed by supplies 
 from Ohio. The country must afford insufficient 
 provisions for an army, or there could be no necessity 
 for furnishing general Harrison from the western 
 states, at the immense expense, which his supplies 
 have cost. The testimony of general Mac Arthur 
 affords some evidence of the state of the country in 
 respect to provisions. He stated that from the morn- 
 ing of the fourteenth of August, when he marched 
 
74 DEFENCE OF 
 
 from Fort Detroit with a detachment, till the sixteenth, 
 when they met with and killed an ox, in a march of 
 near thirty miles, he saw nothing that was food for 
 man, except some unripe corn and some honey. The 
 opposite shores of the enemy were not more produc- 
 tive in supplies. The whole of the country border- 
 ing on the streights and on the lake, is a wilderness, 
 except the settlement at Amherstburgh, and a very 
 thin population on the banks of the Detroit river, 
 and a small place on lake Erie, known by the name 
 of the New-settlement. Above, on the river Trench, 
 at about the distance of sixty miles, is the most fruit- 
 ful and valuable part of the country. Independent 
 of these settlements, which had been exhausted by the 
 two armies, the whole is wilderness. After the fall 
 of Michilimackinac, when all the hives of northern 
 Indians became hostile, and were let loose upon us, 
 when the north-west company, as appears by the let- 
 ter of Mr. Mac Kenzie, had arrayed against us their 
 numerous retainers, and when the navigation of the 
 upper as well as of the lower lakes was free to the 
 enemy, no supplies could have been obtained from 
 the river Trench, or the bordering country. 
 
 It must be remarked, that from the time the army 
 arrived at Detroit, not one pound of provisions had 
 been received. From the moment the declaration of 
 war was known to iiie enemy, he had intercepted the 
 only line of communication, and thus cut off all sup- 
 plies. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 75 
 
 It appears from a return made outhe day the army 
 arrived at Detroit, and -which is mentioned in the 
 minutes of a council of war, held on the ninth, tliat 
 there were then in store 
 
 125,000 rations of flour, and 
 70,666 rations of meat. 
 
 This stock, as it was never replenished, must have 
 been proportionately exhausted, at the time of the re- 
 treat from Canada, and at the time of the final surren- 
 der. And, indeed, would have been entirely so, 
 had we not drawn, as far as we could, our supplies 
 from the country, which every day became the more 
 stripped, and the less able to afford them. 
 
 A return made to me by the contractor, on the 
 twenty-fifth of July, shews not only the quantity of 
 provisions on hand at that date, but it shews, by a 
 comparison with the return of the ninth of the same 
 month, the rate at which the provisions were con- 
 sumed. This return has been proved and read in 
 evidence. It is as follows : " Provisions on hand at 
 " Fort Detroit, twenty-fifth of July, eighteen hundred 
 '- and twelve — 
 
 " 70,000 rations flour, 
 " 21,000 salted meat, 
 " 100,000 whiskey." 
 
 It has been said by generals Cass and Mac Arthur, 
 and by other witnesses, that they never heard com- 
 
76 DEFENCE OF 
 
 plaints of a want of provision. This is certainly tine. 
 There was not, previously to the surrender, an actual 
 want or deficiency of provisions. Our stores were 
 not then entirely exhausted; but there was a certain- 
 ty that they would soon be so. 
 
 Such then was my situation when I determined to 
 retreat from Canada. I had above me hordes of hos- 
 tile savages. I had below me an enemy in a fortress, 
 which I believed to be a work of strength, and suf- 
 ficiently manned for its defence. I found that he had 
 been left at liberty to augment his force, by drawing 
 'his troops from all other points. I commanded an 
 army, the troops of which (except a few regulars of 
 the fourth regiment) had no experience, and had never 
 been tried ; and this army was otficered by men, the 
 chief of whom had not hesitated to express, in the 
 most indecent terms, his want of confidence in me. I 
 vvas told, that I must not expect any co-operation or 
 assistance ; I saw that my provisions would be soon 
 exhausted, and that neither my own nor the enemy's 
 country would afford supplies for any length of time. I 
 saw that my only communication was cut off, and 
 unless it were opened the army would be subdued by 
 want. 
 
 Under these circumstances, I determined to recross 
 the river, take the principal part of the army, not 
 with an intent, as I have said, to relinquish the en- 
 terprise against Maiden and the Upper Province, but 
 to writ for a co-operation and assistance, which might 
 afford more favourable prospects, and in the me?\n 
 
GENERAL HULL, 77 
 
 iinie, Avhicli I considered a duty of the first impor- 
 tance, to open the only communication by which I 
 coukl obtain supplies. An attack on Maiden was an 
 alternative, which, as I have said, presented itself to 
 my mind. It was one which I had the most powerful 
 inducements to adopt. I well knew what rewards of 
 honour and glory awaited an achievement, which my 
 country had been led to expect with so much certain- 
 ty and anxiety. I knew what were the expectations 
 of my officers, and what resentment a disappointment 
 would create. I knew a retrograde movement would 
 expose me to censures, and to the malice of my ene- 
 mies; but in deliberating on this alternative, I could 
 not but take into view the possibilitj^ of a defeat in 
 the attempt, and the consequences which, as I have 
 before mentioned, would result not only to the arm}'', 
 but to the people of the territory. A more decisive 
 consideration, however, induced me to reject this al- 
 ternative. I then felt confident, and I do naw feel 
 most confident, that if I had attacked Maiden, and 
 had been successful, it would have been but a useless 
 waste of blood. It would have been utterly impossible 
 to have maintained the fortress. It must have fallen 
 for w^ant of supplies. It must be remembered, that the 
 waters of the lakes were shut against us. There could 
 have been no possible communication with the fortress^ 
 but, by the road which I had cut through the wilder- 
 ness. How was that road to have been kept open ? 
 
 Most probably, after an engagement, cr after car- 
 lying the works by storm, I could have taken into 
 8* 
 
78 DEFENCE OF 
 
 Maiden but a few hundred men. Could I have 
 made sufficient detachments from the garrison, to have 
 performed this service ? Let it be remembered, that 
 generals Mac Arthur and Cass censured me for send- 
 ing so small a detachment as two hundred men in this 
 duty ; and thought the force ought to have been 
 double or equal to one of their regiments. And when 
 colonel Miliar, with six hundred men, two hundred 
 and eighty of wb.om were almost the whole of the 
 regular force under my command, had defeated the 
 enemy near Maguago, he thought it necessary to send 
 to me for a reinforcement of one hundred and fifty, or 
 two hundred, to enable him to secure his passage to 
 and from the river Raisin, though his loss in the bat^ 
 tie did not exceed eighty, and though he knew at the 
 river Raisin he was to be joined by the detachments 
 under captain Brush, and the companies under cap- 
 tains Campbell and Rov.land. 
 
 If the road could have been opened, still no sup- 
 plies could have passed into the fort, without crossing 
 the water, and on that the British had a force, to 
 which we had nothing to oppose. If we had possess- 
 ed the fort, it would have been pressed by the north- 
 west company, and its retainers from the north, with 
 all the hosts of savages of those regions. A British 
 force no doubt \Vould have approached it from lake 
 Ontario, by the river Le Trench. On the water it 
 Vr'ould have been attacked by tlie naval force, and all 
 this it m (St have encountered, without the possibility 
 of obtaining supplies, and wiliiout the least prospect 
 of relief or assistance. 
 
GENERAL HULL. n 
 
 My judgment, Mr. President, may mislead me now, 
 as it did then ; but yet I think, that if I had led t)te 
 army I commanded to the conquest of Maiden, under 
 such circumstances as I have stated, it woiiid have 
 been as great a crime as any of which I am accus- 
 ed. Certain I am, that I should have wanted that 
 consciousness of having acted from the purest motives, 
 and according to my best judgment, which has been 
 my only consolation in all I have suffered. 
 
 If it be true, as I have stated, and as I think the 
 testimony proves, that my army had not provisions 
 for any length of time, and that neither my own, nor 
 the enemy's country would have been capable of fur- 
 nishing them, I need hardly state to the members of 
 this tribunal, how important it was for me to keep 
 open the road I had made through the wilderness, the 
 only communication by which supplies could appi;oach 
 me. 
 
 In modern warfare, the first great object of each 
 contending party, is the resources of his enemy. The 
 fate of armies is found to depend upon the abundance 
 of their resources, on their security, and in the facility 
 of keeping up a communication with them. It has be- 
 come a principle to manoeuvre in such a manner, as to 
 cover the places from whence supplies may be drawn; 
 not to go far from them, but with great caution, and ne- 
 ver to cease preserving with them those connections, in 
 which the strength of an army consists, and on which 
 its success depends. These are the sentiments of a 
 
80 DEFENCE OP 
 
 modern military writer of great celebrity. The ex-* 
 perience of all military movements in latter times, 
 proves their correctness. I always felt the force of 
 them. It was a great violation of these principles, 
 and therefore as I considered a great mistake, to 
 march the army I commanded, after the war had 
 commenced, to Detroit, leaving a British garrison 
 eighteen miles in our rear, directly upon our line of 
 communication, which from its proximity to the lake, 
 and his force upon the water, the enemy had the 
 means of intercepting with peculiar facility. But the 
 orders I received in the letter of the Secretary of 
 War, which announced to me the declaration of 
 war, w^ere positive upon this point. They left me 
 no discretion. I was to march to Detroit, and there 
 to wait for further orders. I had seen the necessity of 
 keeping open the communication, Avhen I w as on the 
 march, and therefore I built and garrisoned block- 
 houses on the road. When in the enemy's country, 
 I felt every day, more strongly, the force of this ne- 
 cessity, and therefore detached major Van Horn on 
 that service. Whether that was a proper detachment, 
 as it is made a separate charge, will be a subject of 
 separate consideration, in a subsequent part of my de- 
 fence. After the defeat of major Van Horn, and 
 when I found the situation of my army immediately 
 before I left Sandwich, such as I have before describ- 
 ed, I was perfectly convinced that no success, not 
 even the capture of Maiden, could save it from even- 
 tual destruction, if my communication with Oliio was 
 not opened. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 81 
 
 The Court will recollect, that general Mac Arthur 
 and general Cass have stated in their testimony, that 
 when they objected to the sufficiency of the force I de- 
 tached under major Van Horn, they each recommended 
 that I should send him with his regiment on that duty. 
 This shews what force, in their estimation, was ne- 
 cessary for the purpose. What force colonel Miller 
 thought necessary, I have already stated. If these 
 gentlemen were correct on this point, my army could 
 not be in a proper situation, when I must have 
 stretched back with nearly half and the most etficient 
 part of my command, to insure me supplies. It must 
 be recollected also, that it was not a temporary de- 
 tachment, that would have answered any purpose. I 
 must have kept always separated from the army, a 
 sufficient force to have kept open the road from De- 
 troit to Ohio, a distance of about two hundred miles, 
 I do not believe, that after the fall of Michilimackinac, 
 when the savages became arrayed against us, and in- 
 fested every part of the road, that my whole force 
 would have been sufficient to have protected so ex- 
 tensive a line. 
 
 These, Gentlemen, were the grounds on which I 
 made a retrograde movement, with a part of the army, 
 to Detroit. It was from thence to open the only 
 channel, through which it could derive the means of 
 its existence. I repeat, my judgment may have mis- 
 led me. If it did, it continues yet to mislead me ; 
 for every day that I have lived I have become more 
 coaMent, that I did right to leave the enemy's coun» 
 
82 DEFENCE OP 
 
 fry. Had I followed the dictates of my own judg- 
 ment, I should have made my retreat to the Miami 
 and there waited for co-operation and assistance. The 
 distance from thence to the Ohio would have been 
 ^ comparatively short ; I should have had no enemy 
 in my rear but scattering savages, and he could not 
 then have availed himself of the great advantage he 
 derived from the command of the waters. 
 
 For the reason that I did not do so, let me appeal 
 to the testimony of the two officers next in command. 
 
 When I proposed this measure to colonel Cass, his 
 answer was, that if I did under the then existing 
 circumstances, every man of the Ohio volunteers 
 would leave me. His language in substance was, as 
 he states it himself, that the volunteers would retreat 
 with me, if they thought a retreat necessary. But as 
 they undertook to judge, that it was not then necessa- 
 ry, they would leave me and not a man would retreat 
 under my command. Colonel Cass's testimony on 
 this subject is in the following words : " I recollect a 
 "conversation with general Hull, after the retreat 
 '* from Canada, and before we went to the river Rai- 
 "sin, in which general Hull suggested, that as he 
 " heard of no co-operation from below, it might be 
 " necessary to take post at the Miami. I think I told 
 " general Hull, that, if under existing circumstances, 
 " he took such a step, the Ohio militia would desert 
 " him to a man. Whether I told general Hull so or 
 '' not, I am confident it would have been the case." 
 
GENERAL HULL. 83 
 
 It may be well to remark, that this testimony of 
 colonel Cass is evidence of the insubordination that 
 was among the troops. By whom, and by what 
 means, it had been encouraged, the Court may judge. 
 
 Upon this part of the subject, that is to say, the re- 
 treat from Canada, I have but a few words more to 
 say. I retreated for the purpose of being enabled to 
 take effective measures for opening my communica- 
 tion. The importance of accomplishing this design, 
 I have endeavoured to shew. But it seems that the 
 government, or whoever it may have been that drew 
 the charges, that are now before you, were also sensi- 
 ble of this importance ; for one of the accusations, that 
 I am to answer, is, that I did not keep open this com- 
 munication, and yet the measure I took to accom- 
 plish this object, and which was the only measure 
 that afforded any prospect of success, that is to say, 
 withdrawing the army from Canada, is also made a 
 ground of crimination. 
 
 I beg the Court to notice, that these reasons for the 
 retreat are such as I assigned for it at the time, as well 
 as now. For the evidence of this I refer to my let- 
 ters to the Secretary at War of the fourth and eighth 
 of August. My letter to governour Scott, of the 
 ninth of August, and my letters to governour Meigs 
 and colonel Wells of the eleventh of August, all 
 shew, that I abandoned Canada because I had as- 
 certained that I should soon be surrounded by an 
 
84 DEFENCE OP 
 
 overwhelming force ; because my commmiication, if 
 I remained where I was, would inevitably be cut off; 
 and because I found that the few regulars and militia 
 I commanded, were to be left to carry on, without any 
 assistance or co-operation, the offensive war, which 
 the United States had declared against one of the 
 most powerful nations on earth. 
 
 It appears, that the view which my officers had of 
 our situation, about the time of the retreat and sur- 
 render, was very different from what it would appear 
 to have been, from the testimony they have given 
 before you ; at least, this observation applies to ge- 
 neral Cass. The testimony of Mr. Silliman, (the 
 general's brother-in-law,) of Mr. Mills, and of Mr. 
 Converse, his neighbour, proves, that in letters writ- 
 ten by him, at the times to which his testimony re- 
 lates, he had different sentiments from those he ha& 
 here expressed. 
 
 In a letter of the third of August, at which time 
 we were in possession of the enemy's territory, and 
 all the resources that might be drawn from thence, 
 general Cass tells Mr. Silliman, that provisions would 
 become necessary for the existence of the troops. 
 
 In a letter to Mr. Silliman after the fall of Michili- 
 mackinac, general Cass says, that the impression made 
 by the fall of Michilimackinac could scarcely be con- 
 ceived. In the same, or some other letter, according 
 
GENERAL HULL. U 
 
 lo the testimony of Mr. Sillirrian, general Cass pressed 
 him to use Ms influence to procure reinforcements for 
 the army, and expresses his surprise, that we were 
 left without co-operation, by putting to his correspon- 
 dent the following interrogation : " Is there nothing 
 *' to be done in the lower end of the lakes, to make a 
 •^ diversion in our favour ?" In a letter from general 
 Cass to the same gentleman, dated on the twelfth of 
 August, general Cass says, " think our situation as 
 ' bad as you may, it is still worse." 
 
 It is most unfortunate for me, that I have in the 
 course of this prosecution so often to feel the want of 
 documents. I want to prove the contents of a me- 
 morial, v/hich was tiled on record in the War Depart- 
 ment. I ask for the record, and it is lost. I am im- 
 peached for not having regularly issued orders to the 
 army. The witnesses who are to support this charge 
 prove, that there were orderly books in v/hich my or- 
 ders were entered ; but they have either been lost, or 
 what is more extraordinary, left at home. Captain 
 Mac Commick has an orderly book, but when he was 
 called here as a witness, he left his book behind him. 
 Other officers seem very unaccountably to have 
 thought the order to ship their baggage at the Miami 
 included their orderly books, and they have been lost 
 by that means. And now these letters from genera! 
 Cass to Mr. Silliman, the contents of which it might 
 be so important to me to contrast with the General's 
 testimony, it appears, were intrusted to tlie General's 
 ■ivifc, and they too have been lost, 
 9 
 
86 DEFENCE OF 
 
 But I ask the Court, do not even the slender ac- 
 founts which we have had of the contents of these 
 letters shew, that general Cass, at the time they were 
 written, did believe that the army would be in want of 
 provisions ? — that reinforcements were necessary ? — 
 <hat tlie foil of Michilimackinac was to have a decisive 
 operation on the fate of the army ? — that our hopes 
 rested on co-operation from below, and that the situ- 
 ation of the army was critical in the extreme ? — If 
 these were general Cass's sentiments, when he wrote 
 the letters, I must leave it to the Court to reconcile 
 them to the testimony he has given. 
 
 Tie surrender of the fortress of Detroit, and of the 
 forces in the Michigan territory under my command, 
 is another charge, against which I am now to defend 
 myself. I beg the court to observe, that the course I 
 am pursuing, is to examine, in the first instance, the 
 propriety or necessity of these principal measures ; 
 the circumstances attending their accomplishment be- 
 ing ground of distinct accusation, I propose to give 
 them distinct considerations. 
 
 As to the point, on which I am now about to make 
 my defence, I must beg the Court to bear in mind 
 what I have said in relation to the delay in attacking 
 Maiden, and to recrossing the river ; much of what I 
 have said upon these subjects will be applicable to the 
 cli^arge now^ under consideration. The same facts are 
 reiterated in the specifications in so many different 
 forms, tliat it is difficult to analyze them, and might 
 
GENERAL HULL. 87 
 
 excuse repetition. But I shall endeavour, as much as 
 possible, to avoid trespassing on the patience of the 
 Court ; and shall not repeat what I have already said, 
 further than may be absolutely necessary to make my- 
 •self clearly undei-stood. 
 
 The extent and state of the force under my com- 
 mand, at the time of the attack on the fifteenth and six- 
 teenth of August, must be ascertained, before my con- 
 duct can be duly appreciated. The detachments under 
 colonels Mac Arthur and Cass, consisting of four hun- 
 dred of the most eifective men of their regiments, were 
 absent on the expedition to the river Raisin. 
 
 On the morning of the sixteenth, the brigade major 
 Jessup, as appears by his cross examination, had, by 
 my order, made a report of the effective men under my 
 command. He stated the number, as appears by a 
 document before you, in the three Ohio regiments, to 
 be seven hundred, including the Michigan legion and 
 waggoners, but not the Michigan militia. The arm- 
 ed inhabitants which some of the witnesses have 
 mentioned, I presume were not intended to be includ- 
 ed, and indeed should not have been. For although it 
 may have been agreeable to the disposition of some 
 who have testified in this cause, to mention them here, 
 that they might swell my numbers in the eyes of the 
 Court, yet I believe it will not be thought, that I 
 ought to have taken them into calculation in estimate 
 ins: mv means of defence. In the field thev wer*i 
 
88 DEFENCE OF 
 
 only likely to be the first to set an example of disor- 
 der, and in a siege they would only have increased 
 the consumption of provisions. 
 
 Major Jessup says, that on the fifteenth he received 
 an estimate from one of the adjutants of the number 
 of men fit for duty. He thinks it exceeded one thou- 
 sand. This estimate was not delivered to me, but wa» 
 given to general Cass the day after the battle, for what 
 purpose does not appear. I wish general Cass had 
 produced it on this occasion. 
 
 Of the one thousand, if there were so many effec- 
 tive, only three hundred and twenty were regulars j 
 that being major Snelling's estimate of the effective 
 force of the fourth regiment on the day of the surren- 
 der. The rest of this thousand consisted of the Ohio 
 vohmteers and Michigan militia. In my letters to 
 the government, and in my official account of the 
 unfortunate termination of the expedition under my 
 command, I have always spoken of the zeal and 
 bravery of these troops, in terms of respect; and I still 
 think they merited all I have said of them in these re- 
 spects. Yet, in estimating their probable services in 
 an arduous conflict, I could not but consider their real 
 character. My experience in the revolutionary war 
 had fixed in my mind a mistrust of the services of un- 
 disciplined militia, however ardent and valorous they 
 might by language, and even by actions, when not 
 liefore the enemy, make themselves appear. Indeed 
 
GENERAL HULL. 89 
 
 ?iie organisiation of the militia corps I had with me 
 was particularly calculated to create distrust with re- 
 spect to them. All their officers held their commis- 
 sions in virtue of an election, mediate or immediate, 
 of the men of whom they were the nominal comman- 
 ders. My second in command, colonel Mac Arthur, 
 lias prefaced his testimony, by telling you that at such 
 a time he was elected colonel. 
 
 Colonel Van Horn was elected major ; Mr. Mac 
 Commick was elected a lieutenant. From what sta- 
 tions or what occupations these gentlemen were elect- 
 ed to high military rank, I do not know. It would 
 seem, however, that notwithstanding all the experi- 
 ence they have had in the field, they have not yet 
 learned even military language ; or forgotten what 
 were probably the phrases of their former occupa- 
 tions. 
 
 General Mac Arthur, in describing the disposition 
 he intended to make of his regiment in case of an 
 attack, spoke as he would of the gate of a cow-pen — 
 of swinging it into the rear line of a hollow square. 
 And most of the witnesses against me have spoken 
 of the balance of a detachment, as they would of the 
 foot of an account in a shop book. Elected officers 
 can never be calculated upon as great disciplinarians. 
 In every station, the elected will be umvilling to in- 
 ciu' the displeasure of the electors. Indeed, he will 
 often be found to court their favour, by a familiarity 
 and condescension, which are totally incompatible 
 9# 
 
m DEFENCE 01? 
 
 ^vith military discipline. The man who votes his 
 olficer his commission, instead of being implicitly 
 obedient, as every soldier ought to be, will be dispo- 
 sed to question and consider the propriety of the offi- 
 cer's conduct, before he acts. This system has not 
 only an injurious effect upon the soldiers, but it has a 
 retro-active effect upon the officers. They, knowing 
 how far they are responsible to their electors, and 
 what deference is due from them to a majority of 
 votes, are under the influence of their own feelings, 
 in intercourse with tneir superiours. 
 
 The Court must have observed, with what confi- 
 dence, the officers who have testified against me, have 
 pronounced every thing to have been done wrong, that 
 was not done according to their advice. They seem 
 to have thought, that when a Council of War was 
 called, it was to be governed by the laws of a town 
 meeting ; and that a general was absolutely bound by 
 the voice of a majority. 
 
 The testimony of major Van Horn is a remarkable 
 elucidation of the ideas of some of my officers in this 
 respect. He seems to think, that I was guilty of great 
 violation of duty, in not being careful to ascertain 
 accurately the votes of the members then present. 
 Though, as was actually the case, I had omitted to 
 take the vote of a gentleman, whose opinions coin- 
 cided with my own. 
 
 Mr. President, my Ideas of a Council of War are, 
 that it is called to advise the responsible officer as to 
 
GENERAL HULL, 91 
 
 any question which he may think proper to submit 
 to its members ; that he ought to hear and weigh, with 
 what deliberation circumstances will admit, their 
 sentiments and opinions. But that after all, he is 
 bound to act according to the dictates of his own 
 judgment, be the opinions of his officers what they 
 may. And inasmuch, as the advice of a council will 
 not, in all cases, justify misconduct, I hope it will not 
 be considered, that a measure, although it should 
 have been wrong, or turned out unfortunate, must be 
 condemned, because it was not sanctioned by a ma- 
 jority of votes. 
 
 These are considerations, which I think it neces^ 
 sary to impress strongly upon the minds of the Court. 
 It unfortunately happened, that on most questions- 
 which I submitted to the deliberation of my officers, 
 their opinion and mine did not coincide, and many of 
 the witnesses seem to think, that therefore they must 
 be condemned. But such a principle will not, I hope, 
 be adopted by this Court. The decisions of the 
 councils should have the less influence, because it 
 must be recollected, that I could not, with the ex- 
 ception only of the officers of the fourth regiment, 
 call for the advice of any one who had seen the least 
 service, or had the least experience. For though 
 most of the witnesses who have been produced on 
 the part of the government, have appeared with the 
 / titles and badges of high military rank, yet it is cer- 
 " tain, that most of these gentlemen when they joined 
 my army, knew no more of the duties of a soldier 
 
52 DEFENCE OF 
 
 than was to be learned from militia musters and pa^ 
 i-ades about their own homes. What services they 
 may have since performed to entitle them to the 
 lionours tliey have attained, I am ignorant ; and only 
 hope, that their elevated rank (as it ought to be pre- 
 sumed it was not intended it should,) will not give 
 them any other weight, than they would have had, if 
 they had remained in their former subordinate situa- 
 tions until they had given their testimony against me. 
 
 These observations are made, in reference to the 
 principal part of the troops I had under my command ; 
 and to shew, that although, as men, they might be 
 brave and patriotic, as I have always believed they 
 were, and as I have always spoken both of the officers 
 and soldiers, yet from the manner of their organization, 
 and from their want of discipline and experience, 
 they were not that kind of force upon which a com- 
 mander could feel, in an arduous conflict, the firmest 
 reliance. So far as we had any opportunity of judg- 
 ing from trial, this want of confidence in forces of 
 this description was justified. 
 
 The expedition under major Van Horn was the 
 only instance in which the volunteers acted bj^ them- 
 selves in any affair of consequence ; for the rencontre 
 at the Aux Canard bridge, falthough both the officers 
 and men behaved well) was but a skirmish, which 
 could hardly be a test either of courage or discipline. 
 The detachment under major Van Horn, as he has 
 testified, were not surprised. He had fully prepared 
 
GENERAL HULL. 93 
 
 Uiem, according to his statement, to expect their foe, 
 and yet his party was disordered by the first fire of 
 the enemy. Notwithstanding all the gallant exer- 
 tions which, as he has stated, he made, he was unable 
 to rally them, or to prevent their flying' in confusion 
 in the very first moments of attack by nothing but 
 savages. 
 
 In submitting to your consideration, Gentlemen, 
 the state of the forces under my command, I must not 
 omit, painful as it fs to me, to advert to the un- \ 
 happy terms in which I was with my officers. They 
 took no pains to conceal what they have here testified 
 to, that they had lost all confidence in me ; many of 
 them manifested it, as appears from their own testi- 
 mony, by the most indecent conduct and expressions. 
 
 The Court must recollect the language, which 1 
 forbear to repeat, that my second in command, colonel 
 Mac Arthur {now Brigadier General Mac Arthur,) 
 represents that he addressed to me, when I proposed 
 to him to remain with his regiment at Sandwich. • 
 Let it be remembered too, that the Brigadier General 
 has stated, that when we were in the face of the ene- 
 my, and he might hourly be expected to be called to 
 battle, he used this language with an expectation, 
 that he should be arrested : with an expectation, that 
 at such a moment, he would be put in a situation that 
 he could not be called upon to use his sword. Briga- 
 dier General Mac Arthur has said, that these expres- 
 sions were extorted from him, by insinuations of cow- 
 
94 DEFENCE OP 
 
 ardice. I meant no such insinuation. His declaration, 
 that he felt his single self able to cany the fortress 
 at Sandwich against any garrison, left no room to 
 doubt his own good opinion of his prowess. When 
 general Mac Arthur addressed such language to me, 
 I had never seen any thing that would have w arrant- 
 ed such an insinuation as he conceives I made. But 
 if any thing would justify an impeachment of that 
 officer's courage, it would be, siich conduct at such ditime. 
 /It may be thought, that I ought to have arrested gene- 
 ' ral Mac Arthur. It is not one of the charges against 
 me that I did not ; and therefore I shall not tligress 
 further from the course of my defence, thaai to say, the 
 peculiarity of my situation alone prevented my doing it. 
 
 If I had taken such a step, I have no doubt his 
 men, who had elected him a colonel, would have turn- 
 ed their arms against me, with as much alacrity as 
 they professed to use them against the enemy. I 
 might, and believe 1 should have had a civil war in 
 my camp. But to shew what was the disposition of 
 my officers towards me, I have only to refer the Court, 
 once more to Colonel Cass's {no7v Brigadier General 
 Cass) letter to the Government, of the tenth of Sep- 
 tember, in which he states, that he, and others, had 
 formed a conspiracy to w rest the command from me. 
 Whether this was, or was not, a treasonable design, is 
 not for me to determine. But what confidence could 
 I place in officers, whose conduct had been such as 
 they themselves have described ? 
 
GENERAL HULL. 95 
 
 I know, Mr. President, that my letters to the Sec- 
 retary at War, and my official account of the surren- 
 der, may be appealed to on this subject. I wish they 
 may be — what I have written of the volunteers and 
 their officers is just, and what I yet say. They were 
 brave, zealous men. It is my pride, that in the very 
 hour of misfortune, I had the magnanimity to give 
 them all the credit that was due to them, and to take 
 upon myself the whole resi)onsibility of a measure 
 which I knew would be the subject of so much cen- 
 sure. Would, sir, that I could have observed a little 
 of the same spirit in my accusers ! That they had 
 been willing to take some share of the blame that is 
 justly due to them ! And that they had not, in the tri- 
 umph of their own elevation on my depression, repre- 
 sented, with the most uncharitable bitterness, a man 
 whose smiles they once courted. 
 
 I must be pardoned, Mr. President, for yielding to 
 my feelings, in these digressions. I have stated to 
 you, the numbers, nature, and situation, of the force 
 which I had to oppose to the enemy. I shall now 
 state what force he brought, or might bring, against 
 me. I say. Gentlemen, might bring, because it was 
 that consideration which induced the surrender, and 
 not the force which was actually landed on the Amer- 
 ican shore on the morning of the sixteenth. It is 
 possible, that I might have met and repelled that 
 force, and if I had had no farther to look than to the 
 event of a contest at that time, I should have trusted 
 to the issue of a battle. I beg leave first to examine, 
 
96 DEFENCE OF 
 
 what was the extent of the enemy's force landed at 
 Spring Wells on the morning of the sixteenth. 
 
 Major Snelling, who says he made some attempt to 
 count the enemy's force, supposes that there were no 
 more than seven hundred and fifty whites, of whom 
 one third were regulars, and (he rest militia and volun- 
 teers — the number of Indians he could not ascertain. 
 As he was going to his lodgings, after having satisfied 
 himself about the white force, he saw, he says, some 
 hundred and fifty liidians in array. He does admit, 
 however, that there were some more in the back of 
 the town, killing horses, and stealing cattle. But it 
 is very evident, that Major SnelJing, as well as other 
 witnesses, meant to convey to the Court an impres- 
 sion, that they consitlered the Indian force very in- 
 significant, both as to numbers and effect. And yet 
 it is very extraordinary, that when my conduct would 
 be censurable, in proportion as the Indian force in the 
 power of the British might be considered numerous 
 and effective, their numbers and powers are augment- 
 ed. I am charged with having sent out too small a 
 detachment under major Van Horn. To prove that 
 I did so, the major has testified, that according to 
 the, information he received, three hundred Indians 
 crossed from the British side the day his party was 
 routed. It is necessary to heighten my criminality, 
 that in one instance the British Indian force should 
 appear to be very small and very insignificant, and 
 in the other, very numerous, and very formidable. 
 It is well known, however, that all the savages in that 
 
GENERAL HULL. 9? 
 
 quarter had immediately after the fall of Michili 
 mackinac, joined the British. I had had in council, 
 between the fourteenth and twentieth of July, the 
 chiefs of nine nations, whose warriours amounted to 
 between two and three thousand, or more. Is it not 
 extremely improbable, that with a large force of this 
 nature at their disposal, the British should have em- 
 ployed but a small part of it in their enterprise against 
 Detroit ? Is it not rather to be presumed, that in an 
 undertaking in which they must have been very am- 
 bitious of success, they should have employed all their 
 disposable force, w hether white or red ? 
 
 The force brought against me, I am very confident, 
 was not less than one thousand whites, and at least 
 as many savage warriours. 
 
 But it was not only against this force, on our own 
 shores, I was to defend mj^self. Their batteries from 
 Sandwich were effectually co-operating with them, 
 and their ships of war were ready to lend them assis- 
 tance in the moment of attack, to cover their retreat, 
 and to afford them shelter in case of defeat. 
 
 If the British, landed at Spring Wells, were not much 
 more numerous than my own troops, I knew they 
 must have a powerful force in reserve, which they 
 could bring to operate upon me, either by crossing them 
 above the town of Detroit, or by transporting them 
 in their ships to that point, and thus attack the fort 
 on all sides, and place my army between their fire. 
 10 
 
9S DEFENCE OF 
 
 I should not, however, have yielded to all these coii 
 siderations, had the war I was carrymg on, been only 
 against civilized men. In that case, those only who 
 were in the contest, would have suffered. But I knew 
 how sanguinary and remorseless the savages would 
 be, should my army be subdued, and the fortress be 
 obliged to yield. The whole countiy would have 
 been deluged with the blood of its inhabitants- — nei- 
 ther women nor children would have been spared. 
 The large detachment, which was out under the com- 
 mand of colonels Mac Arthur and Cass, of which I 
 could get no intelligence, and the detachment under 
 captain Brush, at the river Raisin, would most pro- 
 bably have been the victims of savage fury, Avhich is 
 always excited bj^ battle, and rendered more sangui- 
 nary l>y victory. These appeared to me the certain 
 and dreadful consequences of unsuccessful resistance. 
 If, after a conflict, I should have been able for that 
 time to have repulsed the enemy, I might have pur- 
 chased fame, and have avoided all I have suffered, 
 and wliat I now suffer, in being obliged thus, at my 
 lime of life, to vindicate my honour, and plead my 
 cause before yon. But at what price should I have 
 done this ? How many of the lives of the brave men 
 I commanded, would it have cost ? How many of the 
 persons, who now appear to witness against me, might 
 1 not have sacriticed ? It might, indeed, Mr. Presi- 
 dent, have given me an honourable grave — and if 
 mine were the only life concerned, I wish it had been 
 so, rather than that the foul crimes of which I am 
 a(*cu?ed should be coupled with a name, io which my 
 
GENERAL HULL. 99 
 
 country of late, as well as heretofore, has ackiiow^ 
 lodged some obligations. 
 
 But I had rather even that this should be. I railiei 
 -tand before you accused, as I am, than have useless- 
 ly and wantonly sacrificed a singk life, though it 
 should have insured me immortal fame. 
 
 If the attack of the enemy had been repelled, our 
 triumph would have been but temporary. My num 
 hers must have been diminished by Ios« in battle. 
 They would have daily lessened by the cannon of the 
 enemy from the opposite shore. The force of tlie ene- 
 my, augmented as it was by reinforcements under 
 colonel Proctor, major Chambers, and the commandei' 
 in chief general Brock, would have been daily aug- 
 menting. The force from Michilimackinac and St. 
 Joseph's, which would have amounted to several thou- 
 sand savage warriours ; the savages, with the addi- 
 tion of some hundred white men, mentioned in the 
 intercepted letter of Mr. Mac Kenzie ; collected at 
 Fort William, v/ould, in a few days, have descended 
 upon us. The Canadian militia had all returned to 
 their allegiance. The enemy's naval force and means 
 of transportation on the lakes were augmented. 
 There was no co-operation witli my army from any 
 quarter. The letter I had received from generals 
 Hall and Porter had not only satisfied me that my 
 expectations in this respect were disappointed, but 
 that no diversion in my favour was soon to be expect- 
 ed. My army was in a corner, surrounded by a wii- 
 
100 DEFENCE OP 
 
 derness of waters, and a wilderness of woods. Ail 
 commmiication with my country, either by land of 
 water, cut off, my stores of provision and ammunition 
 but sufficient for a short duration ; add to all this, that 
 at the moment of expected conflict, I received infor- 
 mation that a part of my own troops had gone over to 
 the enemy^ and that a larger body were about to join 
 him. Under such a combination and pressure of ad- 
 verse circumstances, the army must have yielded in 
 a little time, notwithstanding any temporary success. 
 I did not think I should be justifiable or even excus- 
 able, if I risked a battle when victory could purchase 
 no real good. And w hen the consequence of defeat, 
 or even the consequences of being driven into the 
 fort, would lie to sulimit the whole country which I 
 was sent to protect, and ihat part of my force, which 
 w as on detachment, to '' the ruthless ferocity of sav- 
 '■ ages, armed with the horrours of those instruments 
 '• of carnage and torture, w hich are known to spare 
 - neither age nor sex,'' 
 
 From such calamity, I knew a ca))iiulation would 
 »)e a protection. The British, if made masters of the 
 country without a battle, would be able to restrain 
 their merciless allies, w hich they could not do after a 
 contest, even if it should be only so far successful as to 
 oblige us to retreat into the fort. A savage will have 
 blood for blood, though he draws it from the veins of 
 the defenceless — victorj^ only heightens his inhuman 
 thirst. 
 
GENERAL ETULL. 101 
 
 1 offered a capitulation and surrendered. " I well 
 ^'knew the high responsibility of the measure, and 
 *' take the -whole of it upon myself. It was dictated 
 '' by a sense of duty, and a full conviction of its ex- 
 "pediency. If aught has taken place during the 
 "campaign, which is honourable to the army, my 
 " officers are entitled to a large share of it. If the 
 " last act should be disapproved, no part of the cen- 
 " sure belongs to them.'' 
 
 These, Sir, are the words of my official communi- 
 cation of this unhappy event to the Secretary at War. 
 I repeat them. It was, Sir, a sense of duty which 
 drove me to the measure. It was a sense of what 
 I owed to the protection of the inhabitants of the 
 territory I had so long governed. I felt myself bound 
 to sacrifice every private feeling, and in spite of 
 themselves, to save from useless waste the blood of 
 the brave men I commanded. Nor, Sir, will I con- 
 ceal, that in the midst of the carnage that might en- 
 sue a battle, my parental feelings saw a daughter and 
 her offspring, who were with me in the fort, bleeding 
 under the tomahawk of a savage. 
 
 If these be considerations unworthy of a soldier, 
 then I am without excuse. Then, indeed, you may 
 pronounce your utmost doom. But, do not let me 
 transmit to my posterity a name, tarnished by the 
 foul crimes imputed to me. I say, I am as free from 
 the sins of that black catalogue as any man who 
 hears me. But if a propitiation be necessary, and U 
 
i02 DEFENCE OF 
 
 must be the remnant of the life of a man, whose coun- 
 try has heretofore acknowledged his claims to her 
 gratitude, and who has not ceased to deserve it— 
 here is one that I offer. I would freely part with it, 
 if you will not take from me, and from my family and 
 posterity, my honour and character. 
 
 I now appeal with some confidence, to this tribunal, 
 for their decision upon the accusations which I have 
 hitherto considered. Was either of the acts to which 
 the attention of the Com-t has been directed, in them- 
 selves, and abstractedly considered, unjustifiable, oc 
 rather (and this is the true question) was either of 
 them so manifestly wrong, so egregiously erroneous, 
 that it is of itself, evidence of treason, cowardice, or 
 inioiiicer-like conduct ? Are there not so many rea- 
 sons for my conduct, in regard to these transactions, 
 that I may be supposed to have acted honestly, though 
 it should now appear to the Court that it was err<j- 
 neously ? 
 
 If an act may have proceeded from pure intentions, 
 it would be the height of injustice and misanthropy, 
 to impute it to bad motives. 
 
 I shall now proceed to make my defence against 
 the other accusations. I shall endeavour to arrange 
 them in the order of time in which the facts, by the 
 specifications, are supposed to have occurred. 
 
 Hitherto, Mr. President, my defence has chieily 
 rested on documentary evidence, or upon facts of 
 
GENERAL HULL. 1Q3 
 
 general notoriety. As to all that follows, the charge^ 
 depend entirely upon parole testimony. 
 
 It seems extraordinary, that there has not been a 
 witness examined on the part of the prosecution who 
 lias not been promoted since he was under my com- 
 mand. 
 
 ^ great majority of the young gentlemen who have 
 been called by the Judge Advocate, have appeared 
 decorated with their two epaulets. These have been 
 bestowed, and sometimes with the augmentation of a 
 star, upon gentlemen who began their military ca- 
 reer with my unfortunate campaign. 
 
 By what services many of these gentlemen have 
 merited such rapid promotion, I have not learned. 
 But if it all arises out of their achievements while 
 under my command, I must say, that it appears to 
 me that my expedition was more prolific of promo- 
 tion, than any other unsuccessful military enterprise 
 I ever heard of. 
 
 It cannot be, that it has been intended to give a 
 v/eight to the testimony of these witnesses, by giving 
 them ranks and honours, which it would not other- 
 wise have had. But, Sir, when my military charac- 
 ter and measures are to be tested by the opinions of 
 gentlemen, with high sounding titles of military rank, 
 I think it necessary to remind the Court, that, with 
 the exception of a few of the younger officers, there 
 
104 DEFENCE OF 
 
 are none of them who have not been promoted to 
 their high stations, without having had any military 
 experience, and without, so far as I have heard, ever 
 having discovered any military talents or genius. 
 
 If the opinions of witnesses on military conduct 
 ought in any case to be listened to, (which I conceive 
 ought not to be,) yet, I think the opinions of men 
 of these descriptions, ought to be received with the 
 greatest caution. 
 
 The extraordinary promotions w hich the witnesses 
 against me have generally attained, I think may be 
 accounted for by a recurrence to the fact, of which 
 this trial has afforded the most conclusive evidence ; 
 which is, that each of the witnesses, from the gene- 
 rals to the youngest and lowest officer that has been 
 called by the Judge Advocate, is himself, in his own 
 opinion at least, a hero. 
 
 From general Mac Arthur, who thought himself 
 capable of fighting a wiiole garrison, down to the 
 lowest rank, every officer seems to have thought, that 
 if he had been the commanding general, or if I had 
 taken his advice, all would have gone well. No 
 doubt, they have, in justice to themselves, made these 
 representations to the government. And their rank 
 must be considered as a reward for the great things, 
 which they said they would have done, rather than 
 to have been acquired by any actual service?. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 105 
 
 But, Gentlemen, before I proceed to examine the 
 parole testimony, let me call your attention to another 
 subject connected with it. I mean the indefatigable 
 pains, which have been taken, to propagate and keep 
 alive the most hateful prejudices against me. Sir, I 
 believe there never was a greater outrage committed 
 on the administration of justice, and towards an in- 
 dividual, than was the publication of colonel Cass's 
 (now brigadier-general Cass,) letter to the government 
 of the tenth of September. 
 
 That such a letter should be published, under the 
 sanction of the administration, against a man, whom 
 the administration w as about to put upon trial for his 
 life, I believe is a proceeding of which no country/ 
 on earth has before afforded an example. 
 
 That the administration should, under such cir- 
 cumstances, permit the publication of such a letter 
 as general Cass's, one that labours to represent my 
 conduct in the most odious point of view, and takes 
 pains to heighten the public resentment against me, 
 by a colouring which colonel Cass could not know 
 of his ow n knowledge, was true, appears to me to be 
 a violation of every principle of justice. 
 
 The Court will please to recollect, that colonels 
 Cass and Mac Arthur left Detroit with the detach- 
 ment to the river Raisin on the fourteenth of August, 
 and did not return to the fort till the evening of the 
 sixteenth ; of course they could not know, of their 
 own knowledge, what passed in the interim. 
 
lot) DEFENCE OF 
 
 No person, reading colonel Cass's letter, but would 
 (Suppose, he was an eye w itness of all he relates. 
 
 It is impossible to discover, that he was absent 
 in the expedition to the river Raisin. Yet general 
 Cass states, as if it was a matter within his own 
 knowledge, that when the troops received orders to 
 retreat into the fort, " one universal burst of indigna- 
 " tion was apparent upon the receipt of tliis order." 
 I beg to quote from this letter another paragraph, to 
 shew what w as the spirit with which it was written ; 
 the design of its publication I must leave the Court 
 to infer. 
 
 " To see the whole of our men flushed with victory, 
 " eagerly awaiting the approaching contest ; to see 
 " them afterwards hopeless, dispirited, and despond- 
 " ing, at least five hundred shedding tears, because 
 *•' they were not allowed to meet their country's foe, 
 " and to fight their country's battles, excited sensa- 
 " tions, which no American has ever before had." 
 
 Would not every one imagine, that colonel Cass 
 was here describing a scene which passed before his 
 own eyes ? 
 
 Did he actually see at least five hundred men shed- 
 ding tears, or does the Court believe that this is a 
 representation of a fact which really occurred ? If it 
 were so, it is extraordinary that not a witness has 
 testified to it. Captain Mac Commick says, he ob- 
 
GENERAL HULL. 101 
 
 served some men sliedding tears, but this falls greatly- 
 short of general Cass's five hundred. But who were 
 these weeping troops ? It is not to be presumed, that 
 it was intended that we should believe they were the 
 regulars ; they are rot commonly much given to weep-^ 
 ing. They were not the Michigan militia, because a 
 part of them deserted, and the rest were disposed to 
 goj>ver to the enemy rather than fight him. The 
 men then who shewed this very extraordinary sensi- 
 bility, must have been colonel Cass's patriotic volun- 
 teers. The same volunteers, who mutinied in the 
 camp at Urbana, and would not march till they were 
 compelled to do so by the regular troops. The same 
 vohintecTs, who rode the officers of one of their com- 
 panies on a rail. The same volunteers, one hundred 
 and eighty of whom refused to cross into Canada; 
 and the same volunteers, who, when they had an op- 
 {)ortunity, under major Van Horn, to gratify their 
 eager wishes to meet the enemy in combat, ran away 
 at the first fire, and left their officers to be massacred. 
 
 If general Cass did not witness this scene, why did 
 he make such a representation ? There can be no 
 other reason, than that this kind of inflated descrip- 
 tion was intended to recommend himself to the go- 
 vernment, by representing himself and his troops in 
 the most favourable point of view, and me in the most 
 unfavourable, that even hyperbolical language would 
 admit. 
 
 Sir, this is not the only means that have been re- 
 sorted io, to excite and keep alive the popular 
 
108 . DEFENCE OF 
 
 clamour against me. Others of my officers finding 
 what favour the publication of his letter gave him, in" 
 the eyes of the administration, have seen that the 
 same road of preferment was open to them ; and the 
 news-papers, from one end of the continent to the 
 other, have been filled with letters concerning me, 
 expressed in terms which neither truth, justice, nor 
 even the laws of decorum can sanction. Down to 
 this very time. Sir, the same system is pursued. Now, 
 while I have been on my trial, publications have 
 appeared in the public prints of this city, commend- 
 ing the principal and leading witness, for the manner 
 in which he gave his testimony against me, that those 
 who were to come after him might be encouraged to 
 follow his example. 
 
 And, Sir, at this very moment, at the very door of 
 this building, is hawked for sale, a work printed within 
 this few days in sight of this capitol, entitled Views 
 of the Campaigns of the North-western Army, in 
 which my conduct or motives are most grossly mis- 
 represented. Who are thci/ that thirst so for my 
 blood, and take these means to obtain it ? 
 
 It is not the ostensible author of this performance. 
 His insignificance, and the contemptible talents em- 
 ployed in the work, shew him to be too mean to have 
 a motive of his own. I know not who may be the 
 authors or instigators of such outrages fepon justice. 
 If such things are permitted, and can have any influ- 
 ence, then the scc^Jcs ought to be torn from the hand 
 
GENERAL HULL. 109 
 
 c^f the figure which adorns the hall wherein you sit. 
 She ought only to be left the sword with which she 
 is decorated, and she ought to wave that as an emblem^ 
 that vengeance^ and not justice^ is administered under 
 this roof. 
 
 But, Gentlemen, for whatever purpose these acts 
 may have been intended, I rely with a perfect confi- 
 dence that you will rise superiour to them. If I 
 wanted other assurance of it than that which is de- 
 rived from your characters, I shoukl have it in the 
 patience and impartiality with which this prosecu- 
 tion, so far as depended on you, has been conducted. 
 
 Before I enter on an examination of the parole 
 testimony, I must be permitted to remark, that I can- 
 not but think that the course which has been pursued, 
 of examining each witness in the presence of the rest, 
 has been unfortunate for me. Till this Court de- 
 cided that it should be so, I did think it was a well 
 established rule of martial taw, that the witnesses 
 should be examined separately. The justice and 
 propriety of this rule, I have very sensibly felt on this 
 occasion. In a case where so much may depend 
 upon the language or phrases in which the witnesses 
 express themselves, it would have been desirable, 
 that each should haye been left to the necessity of 
 selecting his own language to ex|>ress his meaning. 
 But according to the course pursued, each witness 
 was at liberty to adopt the words, which had been 
 used by any other witness on the same point. The 
 11 
 
no DEFENCE OF 
 
 disposition of several of the -vvitnesses to do so, has 
 been very plainly manifested by their answering, 
 ivhen interrogated as to my personal behaviour, that 
 It was the saine as had been represented by a prior 
 v.itness. 
 
 It is true, Gentlemen, that the Judge Advocate 
 ivoukl not accept these answers, and I presume has 
 not taken them down, but they nevertheless shew the 
 natural disposition of the witness to borrow the words 
 of another, and I have no doubt they have very con- 
 •cientiouslj^, and often without knowing it, borrowed 
 ideas also. 
 
 Gentlemen, in these Courts Martial, where the 
 members, among whom there may be great inequality 
 of grades, are intended to be put upon an equal foot- 
 ing as judges, care has been taken, to avoid, as far as 
 possible, the influence likely to arise from authority. 
 It is on this account that the opinion of the youngest 
 member is always first taken. And it was on the 
 same account, as I conceive, that the rule was es- 
 tablished, that witnesses should be examined sepa- 
 rately, that the younger might not be influenced in 
 his testimony by what might be said by his superiour. 
 It would be contrary to experience of the human 
 disposition, to suppose, that after a subaltern has 
 heard two or three generals and officers of higher 
 rank than himself testify, to whose authority he is 
 perhaps subservient, or to whose good word he may 
 have owed or expects to owe his promotion, he will 
 
GENERAL HULL.' HI 
 
 he wiliiag to contradict what his superiours have saidj 
 or even to make a representation which will varj 
 from theirs. 
 
 If on any case, Sir, the w eight of this sort of influ- 
 ence coukl be felt on the testimony, the course pur- 
 sued on this occasion would give it the fairest scope. 
 For the witnesses seem to have been arranged and 
 produced, in the first instance, very much according 
 to their rank, (except colonel Miller.) After the Ge- 
 nerals had been examined, then came the subordi- 
 nates. The exception to this general course as to 
 colonel Miller struck me as a little singular. I did 
 not know why he should have been examined the 
 last, particularly as he was the highest officer of the 
 regular army which had been engaged in the cam- 
 paign. He was with me during the whole time, antl 
 had the most intimate knowledge of the transactions 
 to which the Other Gentlemen testified. But when 
 I found that colonel Miller's testimony was much 
 less unfavourable to me than the testimony of the 
 witnesses who had preceded him, and that he would 
 not support them in the most material parts of their 
 testimony, I was at no loss to account for this course 
 of proceeding. 
 
 The next accusation which I shall consider, is spe- 
 cified under the charge of unofficer-like conduct, and 
 refers to the commencement of the march of the ar- 
 my. It is in substance, that from the time I took the 
 command, I omitted to exercise, inspect, train, review^ 
 
112 DEFENCE OF 
 
 aod order the troops. I cannot believe, Gentlemeiij 
 that it will be necessary for me to say much on this 
 isubject. I did expect, that if any part of my conduc t 
 eould have escaped the censure of my enemies, it 
 
 \ would have been the manner in which I led the troops 
 through the wilderness. When it is recollected, what 
 an extent of road it was necessary for me to cut; 
 that a great proportion of the men were constantly 
 employed in this duty ; that those w ho were not so, 
 were most generally fatigued w ith their turn of this lar 
 
 . borious service, I believe the Court will think w ith 
 colonel Miller, that there was neither time, nor op* 
 portunity, for that sort of discipline and exercise, 
 which, under other circumstances, would haA^e been 
 proper. The commandants of regiments have testi- 
 fied, that, as to their respective commands, there was 
 no omission of what was their duty in this respect. 
 The fault charged to me is then, that in' th^ depths of 
 the forest, through which we w ere marching, I did 
 not call off my fatigue parties, guards, and advances, 
 
 (' and go through the ceremonies of military parade. 
 And yet, as if every thing that I could have done, 
 must, in the opinion of my officers, be condemned, 
 my omissions to have these parades are not more 
 severely censured than my conduct has been for 
 making some display of the troops, and passing them 
 in review on some few occasions, when I thought it 
 w as consistent with our situation. When the corps 
 passed me by sections, after we had crossed the Miami, 
 general Mac Arthur thinks it was not a review, be- 
 cause I was not, according to his experience, in tha 
 
GENERAL HULL. 113 
 
 situation which a reviewing general ought to liave 
 been ; though, he admits that the officers at the heads 
 of sections saluted me, and he admits that it is possible 
 he might have saluted me himseh". At the river 
 Raisin, I also passed the troops in review. I did the 
 same at Spring Wells, and marched the troops front 
 thence to Detroit and back. But these parades seem 
 to have excited the indignation of general Mac Ar- 
 thur, as it did, according to his testimony, of other 
 officers ; . but for wiiat reason I have not been able to 
 learn. The truth is, that from the moment we com- 
 menced our march, the troops were always under my 
 eye. I saw them on their line of march. I saw them 
 in their working parties, and in their encampments. I 
 thought it woukl be as ridiculous as useless to make 
 parades in the midst of the woods. Whenever the 
 country opened^ so that there was any room for dis- 
 play, I availed myself of it ; not only that I might 
 see the troops, and put them in military array, but|I 
 thought it would have a good effect to shew our line 
 to the best advantage at the little settlements Avhich 
 we passed, and on our arrival in the neighbourhood 
 of Detroit. 
 
 I shall trouble the Court with nothing further hi 
 relation to this charge, than the following quotation 
 from general Cass and colonel Miller's testimony : ge- 
 neral Cass states, that " from the time they left Urbana, 
 " the march was conducted v/ith all possible expedition. 
 " There was no time te^kcipline the troops." Colo- 
 nel Miller, on his cross-examination, says, " On the 
 11^ 
 
114 DEFENCE OF 
 
 " march there was no opportunity to discipline the 
 " troops. The fatigues of the march, and cutting the 
 " road, and making the encampments, were as much 
 " as the troops could endure." 
 
 Connected with the accusation which I have last an- 
 swered, is another which is in substance, that I did not 
 during the march, prepare, and make known, an order 
 of battle. That I prepared and published an order of 
 march is admitted; a plan ofit, which has been proved 
 by several witnesses, is before you. This plan, as ap- 
 pears from the testimony of general Van Rensselear, 
 and other witnesses, is that which was adopted by gene- 
 ral Wayne, in the expedition which he commanded 
 and marched through the same country. This order 
 of march was in fact an order of battle, or at least, so 
 little change of the disposition of the troops was ne- 
 cessary, in case of an attack, that it could be made 
 in a moment, and was so obvious that it could neves 
 be mistaken. It is remarkable, that the commanding 
 officers, whose testimony was expected to support 
 this accusation, all say, that they knew how their re- 
 spective corps were to form in case of attack ; though, 
 as they say, they never heard of any order of battle. 
 It seems then, that an arder of battle was made known, 
 and the accusation must then rest upon the allegation, 
 that the order was not made or published by me. 
 
 General Cass's testimony on this subject is as follows: 
 " I think, when v/q arrived near the river Huron, or 
 "between that and Swan Creek, the commanding 
 '' ofiicers of regiments, under an expectation of an 
 
GENERAL HULL. 11^ 
 
 '' attack, applied to the general, and he permitted them 
 " to form an order of battle. I do not recollect, that 
 " the general assisted in making the order. I think 
 " the plan originated with colonel Miller. I do not 
 *' recollect that the order was afterwards submitted to 
 " general Hull. I presume there was an orderly book^ 
 " as orders were issued." 
 
 General Mac Arthur's testimony on this point is as^ 
 follows : " On the day we passed the river Raisin our 
 " march was about nine miles, and we encamped near 
 *' Swan Creek. Rumours were among the inhabitants 
 *' that we should be attacked by Indians, who were 
 *' assembled at the Huron, about six miles in advance. 
 " Myself, and colonel Findlay, called on the General^ 
 "and stated that some plan of battle ought to be 
 •' agreed upon. In the march my regiment was di- 
 " vided ; a battalion marched on each side of the road, 
 " in the rear of colonels Findlay and Cass. I mentioned 
 "to the General, that thus situated, it was impossible 
 '' for me to be with both my battalions, and I w ished 
 " to be permitted, in case of attack, to form them in 
 "one line. The General thought it would be well 
 " enough to do so. I suggested the propriety of my 
 '* battalions being so formed on the march, in the rear 
 " of the regiments, as that, in case of an attack, I 
 ^' might swing my regiment round, and form the rear 
 " line of a hollow square. The General gave me his 
 " permission to adopt this plan, I then left him, whether 
 " J left the other officers with him or not, I do not knowP 
 Major Jessup testifies, that I issued orders on the 
 
116 DEFENCE OP 
 
 march; that they were generailv sent to him by 
 one of my aids-de-camp ; that he assembled the 
 adjutants, and communicated to them my orders. He 
 further stated, that the orderly books generally were 
 surrendered, but that captain Mac Commick and 
 captain Rutleff, who were adjutants of Mac Arthur 
 and Findlay's regiments, had preserved theirs. It un- 
 fortunately happens, that these books have not been 
 brought on by these gentlemen. Had they been so, 
 it would then have appeared what orders I did issue, 
 and this matter would not have been left to the un- 
 certain recollection of witnesses. 
 
 As I am accused of having omitted to issue orders, 
 and of having given improper orders, I submit to the 
 Court, whether I had not a right to expect, that the or- 
 derly books, which were in the possession of witnesses^ 
 brought forward by the prosecution, would have been 
 produced; especially as I requested major Jessup 
 might be summoned, with a duces teciim^ to bring be- 
 fore the Court all the official documents in his posses- 
 sion, and the orderly book. But I proceed to exa- 
 mine the testimony in relation to the order of battle. 
 
 Colonel Miller testifies, " That an order of march 
 " was published at Urbana, and was generally known 
 " to the army ; that the army commonly marched ac- 
 " cording to that order. It was my underetanding, 
 '-' says colonel Miller, that in case of an attack in 
 " front, my regiment was to form the line in fi'ont. In 
 '' case of an attack on the right flank, we were to 
 
GENERAL HULL. 117 
 
 ■ form by facing the enemy ; and so in case of an at= 
 " tack on the left. This was a general understanding, 
 " but I do not recollect to have seen any order to this 
 " purport, either written or verbal. I understood it 
 " from conversations with general Hull, and I believe 
 " it was so understood by the other officers. The 
 " General told me, that the order of march which he 
 " had adopted, was that which had been pursued by 
 " general Wayne. I know nothing to the contrar}^" 
 Colonel Miller adds, " of the General's having been 
 " almost always, when we were on the march, in a 
 " situation to direct the movements of the troops. For 
 -' the greatest part of the time, the General rode near me 
 '' in front. Sometimes he passed to the rear. Gene- 
 " rally the army encamped in a hollow square. After 
 "■'' we apprehended danger, we commonly formed a 
 " breast-work, and encamped within it. By a general 
 '' order, each line was to form in front of its tents, if 
 '' attacked in camp. There was also a general order 
 •' for turning out the troops by taps of the drum, pro- 
 ' ceeding from head-quarters along the lines. This 
 -' method was practised, and the troops were called io 
 ■' arms every morning, before dawn, by these signals." 
 
 I believe. Gentlemen, that this is the whole of the 
 testimony, on this point, which can be considered as 
 of any importance. It cannot be disputed then, but 
 that there was an order of battle ; but general Cass's 
 testimony seems intended to leave an impression, that 
 the order did not originate with me, but that it was 
 suggested by my officers, and adopted by them, with 
 
lis DEFENCE OP 
 
 my assent, without my having given myself much 
 trouble about it. I cannot but think, that in this in- 
 stance there is a display of the spirit with wliich 
 much of testimony has been given in this cause. It 
 f seems to have been determined, that I shall not even 
 share in the credit of any thing that was done that 
 ought to have been done. My officers claim every 
 thing that is meritorious as theirs. 
 ♦ 
 General Cass says, he does not recollect whether I 
 assisted in making the order, or whether it was sub- 
 mitted to me after it was made. This is one of the 
 instances in which it is extremely unfortunate for me, 
 that the recollection of the witnesses entirely fails 
 them as to matters of the greatest importance, and 
 which might be decisive, if in my favour, as to the 
 particular accusation ; while their memories serve them 
 with remarkable correctness and minuteness, as to 
 circumstances which are unfavourable to me. 
 
 I hope I may be permitted to digress, so far as to 
 remark another instance of the same unfortunate 
 want of recollection, though it relates to a different 
 point. 
 
 Major Jessuf), after having stated, that he came to 
 me in the fort, after the flag was hoisted on the six- 
 teenth of August, adds, '^ 1 inquired of tlie General if 
 " it were possible we were about to surrender. The 
 " General said something about the enemy^s force, and 
 " something about terms, which I do not recollect." 
 
GEiXERAL HULL. 119 
 
 Major Jessiip then goes on to state very particular- 
 ly what he said to me, to express his strong aversion 
 to the surrender. I have surely great reason to re- 
 gret, that major Jessup's memory v^ould not enable 
 liim to state what I said, when it might have been sO 
 hnportant to shew the motives of my conduct, while 
 every thing that he said to me, which was calculated 
 to set his own conduct in the most favourable point of 
 view, made so deep an impression on his mind, that 
 he could undertake to relate the very expressions lie 
 had used. But to return to w hat respects the order of 
 battle. 
 
 General Mac Arthur states, that after, on his sug- 
 gestion, he had settled with me how^ he was to swing 
 his regiment in case of an attack, " I then left the 
 " General ; whether I left the other officers with him, 
 " or not, I do not know." It appears then, that this 
 arrangement, about the order of battle, was concluded 
 in the presence *of other officers ; what othei*s, general 
 Mac Arthur does not state. 
 
 Colonel Miller says, he understood, from conversa- 
 tions with me, what was to be the disposition of his 
 corps, in. case of an attack. 
 
 Thus it appears, that colonel Mac Arthur, colonel 
 Cass, colonel Findlaj'-, and colonel Miller, all knew 
 w^hat they were to do, if an enemy was to approach 
 us. What foundation is there then for a charge, that 
 
120 DEFENCE OF 
 
 RO order of battle was made known ? If the subofdi- 
 uate officers were not instructed as to their duty, in 
 the event of an attack, was it not the fault of these 
 commandants of corps and not mine ? Suppose there 
 had been no written order of battle; but that after the 
 order of march, which so nearly approached the order 
 of battle, had been formed, I had explained to the 
 commandants the disposition I intended, in case of an 
 attack ; could any man say, I was deficient in duiy^ 
 because I had not explained my intentions in a writ- 
 ten order ? I believe no one acquainted with military 
 history or practice, will think a general is bound to 
 make an exposure of his plans, in every orderly book 
 in his army. If the witnesses, in whose opinions 
 these charges and specifications have been framed, 
 liave entertained such erroneous ideas of the duties of 
 a commander, as this accusation seems to indicate, I 
 hope now, that some of them have attained a rank 
 which may give them the command of armies, they 
 will learn, that to give a general publicity in their 
 orderly books to their designs in case of an attack, 
 will be a departure from their duty, and that they 
 may often thereby afford their enemy an opportunity" 
 of gaining information, which he ought not to have. 
 
 As to the order of battle at night, it is proved by 
 the testimony of colonel Miller, that that was settled 
 by a general order, which was made known to all ; 
 and when the Court considers what was the nature 
 of our lines of march ; how nearly it approached the 
 only order of battle, which could have been proper, 
 
GENERAL HULL. -121 
 
 ill the warfare ^Nhich Ave were to expect; liow in- 
 stantly the order of march was made the order of bat- 
 tle ; and consider also, that I was always at the head 
 of the troops while thej^ were on the march, I am 
 persuaded the Court will think, there is no foundatiott 
 for this accusation. If it has not originated in malicej 
 it certainly has in ignorance. 
 
 I am unwilling to detain the Court longer on a 
 charge, which, in my own opinion, is sufficiently an- 
 swered; but I know I ought not to place so much 
 confidence in my own opinion, as not to avail myself 
 of any thing which may have an influence on the 
 opinions of others. I must therefore advert to other 
 testimony, which I believe ought to be conclusive on 
 this point. I mean my letters to the War Department- 
 Tho-se to which I shall refer for this purpose, the 
 Court will recollect were read by the Judge Advo- 
 cate. If I had offered them, they certainly would not 
 have been conclusive evidence in my favour; but 
 when introduced on the part of the prosecution, so 
 far as they establish any thing in my favour, they are 
 as good evidence as they are to prove any thing 
 against me. It would be a manifest violation of jus- 
 tice, if this sort of testimony should be resorted to for 
 my crimination, and I should not be permitted to 
 avail myself of it, so far as it might serve for my 
 exculpation. It is a general rule, which applies to the 
 administration of justice in all courts, that wherever 
 a docimient is read by one side, the whole of it be- 
 comes evidence, of which either party may avijil 
 12 
 
122 DEFENCE OF 
 
 himself. I beg leave to remind the Com-t that this 
 rule has been acknowledged by the Judge Advocate. 
 The Court Avill recollect, that in the course of the 
 examination of captain Fuller, major Parker objected 
 to take down his answer to a question which I put 
 to the witness, as being unnecessary, because the fact 
 as to which I interrogated him, was sufficiently 
 proved by my letters to the Secretary at"War. 
 
 In my letter, dated Solomon's Town, eighteenth 
 June, eighteen hundred and twelve, I say, " My or- 
 *^' der of march is in two columns, with strong front 
 " and rear guards ; the columns flanked by the rifle- 
 " men and cavalry, where the ground will admit ; the 
 " baggage, provisions, &:c. between the columns. The 
 " army has been practised from the two columns to 
 " form two lines, either in front, rear, or on either 
 " flank, or to form a square facing outward. My order 
 " of encampment at night is a square, facing outward 
 " with all the baggage in the centre, &c." 
 
 My letters of the twenty-fourth June, eighteen 
 hundred and twelve, from near Blanchard's Creek, 
 enclosed to the Secretary at War the order of march 
 which has been given in evidence. Among the 
 manuscript notes subjoined to that order, is one in the 
 following words : " The columns are in a situation to 
 " form two lines in front, rear, or on either flank, or to 
 " form a square." 
 
 After these observations, I cannot but be satisfied- 
 that the Court will think that there was no ffroiiiid 
 
GENERAL HULL. 123 
 
 lor charging me with neglecting to discipline and re^ 
 view my troops, or omitting to prepare and make 
 known an order of battle. 
 
 The next accusations that I shall consider are, that 
 I neglected to repair and put in order the cannon at 
 Detroit ; and to put the place in a state of defence :-r— 
 that I did not seasonably repair, and put in a state 
 of service, the artillery necessary for the operations in 
 Canada; and that I did not transport them to the 
 enemy's shore, so soon as I ought to have done. I 
 have already had occasion incidentally to notice these 
 accusations, and I shall give no further answer to 
 them than to refer the Court to the testimony of 
 captain Dallaba. He states, that when I arrived at 
 Detroit, " (he fort was generally in good order, and 
 "^' m a good state of repair." On his cross-examina- 
 tion, captain Dallaba says, " the fort was in the state 
 " of defence I have described, except as to some im- 
 " material matters, on the fourth day of July, before 
 "the arrival of the army. Afterwards, something 
 " was done with the ordnance stores, and mounting 
 '' the cannon ; but every thing designed for the de- 
 " fence of the fort exclusively, was completed on the 
 " fourth of July. After the general's arrival at De- 
 " Iroit, industry and exertions were used to put in 
 '' order the field pieces and heavy artillery for the 
 " siege of Maiden. This was done (says the witness) 
 " under my superintendance, and by order of general 
 
 ■ Bun:' 
 
124 DEFENCE OP 
 
 This witness was examined on the eighth of Fe- 
 kruaiy : four days afterwards, on the twelfth, he isagaia 
 called, by the Judge Advocate, and then he testifies 
 as follows, " I have before stated, that no alterations 
 " had been made subsequently to the fourth of July, 
 " for defence of the fort. 
 
 " Some few artificers, immediately after the arrival 
 " of general Hull, went to work to repair and mount 
 " some heavy cannon on trucks, to be placed in the 
 " batteries on the banks of the river. And some re- 
 " pairs were made to three brass field pieces, and a 
 " small quantity of ammunition was fixed for them. 
 " But no order was received, to my knowledge, to 
 " prepare the heavy field artillery, till after the army 
 " went to Canada. I have the order, and think it 
 " Avas dated on the fifteenth or sixteenth of July." 
 
 I have already made some remarks on this testi- 
 .^nony, and stated, that the order was in fiict given on 
 the fourteenth of July. Till that time, the artificer 
 had been othervvise employed. I will remind the 
 Court here of the objection I offered, and which was 
 overruled by the Court, to this mode of re-examining 
 a witness. If to examine the witnesses in the pre- 
 sence of each other be a departure from the usages of 
 Courts Martial, it is certainly a much wider and more 
 important deviation from that usage, to call up a wit- 
 ness, and to alloy*' him to make important alterations 
 in his testimony, after he has been listening for tlays 
 in the testimony of other witnesses. I now mark 
 
GENERAL HULL. 125 
 
 this irregularity, as I conceive it to be, for the sake 
 of presenting it, as well as the fact of all the witnesses 
 having been, pursuant to a determination of this 
 Court, examined in the presence of each other, to the 
 attention of the high officer, who has authority to 
 review these proceedings. 
 
 Colonel Miller testifies, that he "discovered n© 
 " want of exertion in respect to preparing the heavy 
 " and light field artillery, after the army arrived at 
 ''Detroit." 
 
 General Taylor says, " I believe no time was lost 
 " in preparations. Timber and some large wheels were 
 "got out." 
 
 Again, the same witness says, that he visited the 
 artificers every day, to hurry the preparations, with 
 orders from general Hull ; " and I must say, (adds the 
 " witness) that general Hull shewed great anxiety in 
 " getting the artillery ready." 
 
 I pray leave to make one remark on this language 
 of general Taylor's, which I am aware may have the 
 appearance of being hypercritical ; but I beg the in- 
 dulgence of the Court, till I have explained my rea- 
 sons for noticing a circumstance apparently trivial. 
 Why should general Taylor preface his testimony of 
 this fact in my favour, with the phrase, " I must say ?" 
 It seems as if to state any circumstance favourable to 
 me was the result of a compulsion, to which his mind 
 12* 
 
126 DEFENCE OF 
 
 unwillingly submitted. In this instance, he speaks like 
 a penitent, whose conscience obliges him to make the 
 acknowledgment of a fact, w hich his inclination would 
 prompt him to conceal. I had a right to expect, that 
 when the witnesses could testify any thing in my 
 favour, they would speak in the same unreserved 
 language, which they used, when they intended to 
 expose my misconduct. 
 
 Upon most occasions, observations on circum- 
 stances apparently so light, might not be proper or 
 necessary. But, Gentlemen, I beg you to recollect, 
 that the witnesses have undertaken to interpret my 
 looks, and have ventured to infer from my countenance, 
 from my appearance and manner, w hat was passing in 
 my mind, and by w hat motives I was actuated. They 
 have not hesitated to express opinions derived from 
 no other indications, when they knew, that these 
 opinions might affect my Jionour and my life. It 
 cannot be improper then, that I should ask you to 
 remark even the slightest expression of a witness, 
 which I may think will betray the disposition with 
 which lie testifies. It is with reluctance that I at- 
 tempt to impeach the testimony of any witness who 
 has been called against me. I have been taught to 
 venerate a soldier from my infancy. I know that 
 the profession of arms generally adds lustre to the 
 most noble virtues. But I know that men do not 
 change their natures by becoming soldiers, nor by 
 attaining the most elevated rank. And when they 
 can reconcile to themselves to accuse me of cowai'd- 
 
GENERAL HULL. 127 
 
 ice, from appearances so fallacious, surely I may re- 
 mark, that expressions they have used indicate bias, 
 partiality, or prejudice. 
 
 Without detaining the Court with a particular re- 
 capitulation of more of the evidence on this point, 
 I shall content myself with referring it to the very 
 important and decisive testimony of captain Dyson, 
 to the testimony of captain Bacon, and finally to the 
 testimony of Mr. Watson ; who says, that after my 
 arrival at Detroit, no man could have been more in- 
 dustrious and indefatigable than I was. 
 
 I proceed to a new^ subject, and shall now make 
 my defence against the accusation, which is in sub- 
 stance ; that I did not avail myself of the opportu- 
 nity, which the defeat of the enemy by colonels Ca^a 
 and Miller, and their possession of the bridge over 
 the river Aux Canards, on the ei^hteenlh of July af- 
 forded of making an attempt on Maiden ; and that I 
 did not maintain possession of the bridge. This 
 forms tlie sixth specification under the charge of un- 
 officer-Uke conduct. . 
 
 The expcsition I have already presented of my 
 views and designs when I crossed to Canada, would, 
 I humbly conceive, afford a sufficient answer to these 
 accusations. I did not think it expedient to attack 
 Maiden, under any circumstances, which existed 
 previous to our leaving Canada. Why I thought it 
 inexpedient I have already explained. The advaii- 
 
1^8 DEFENCE OF 
 
 tages which I thought were to be gained by delay ; 
 a regard which my orders compelled me to pay to the 
 security of my own posts ; the necessity of keeping 
 open my communication ; the certain consequences 
 of defeat, and the probable consequences of victory, 
 have all been considered, in making my defence 
 against the charge of undue delay in Canada. If I 
 was justifiable, or even excusable, in deferring the at- 
 tack on Maiden, I must be so in having omitted to 
 avail myself of the possession of the bridge, and in 
 not having attempted to maintain it. It would have 
 been absurd to have attempted to maintain a post so 
 far in advance, unless it was with a view to an im- 
 mediate movement on Maiden. But I beg the Court 
 to advert to the date of this transaction. It was not 
 on the eighteenth of July, as mentioned in the speci- 
 fication, but on the seventeenth, as appears by my 
 letter to colonel Cass. This was the fifth day after we 
 moved into Canada.^ At that time, the deliberations 
 of my officers in Canada had uniformly resulted in the 
 expression of an opinion, that the attempt on th« 
 enemy's fortress should be deferred, till the artillery 
 was prepared; and it was immediately after the 
 council at Sandwich, in which colonel Cass himself, 
 as appears by the testimony of judge Witherill, had 
 advised that the attack on Maiden should not be made 
 without cannon. 
 
 My views in sending this detachment, or rather in 
 permitting general Cass to march it, appear from his 
 testimony. I meant it as a reconnoitring party, and 
 
GENERAL HULL. 129 
 
 by no means intended that the commandmg officer 
 should pursue measures which might expose the de- 
 tachment to be sacrificed, or oblige me to abandon 
 the system I had adopted, by leading my whole army 
 to its support. Colonel Cass testifies, that a day or 
 two after colonel Mac Arthur was detached to the river 
 Trench, he (colonel Cass,) requested me to permit 
 him to reconnoitre the ground between Sandwich and 
 Maiden; that I did permit it, and a detachment of 
 two hundred and eighty men were ordered for that 
 service. 
 
 General Taylor states, that he was present when 
 news arrived that colonel Cass had taken the Aux 
 Canards bridge. " That I expressed my astonishment, 
 " that colonel Cass should have commenced hostilities, 
 '' as I vv^as not ready with the artillery ; that I appeared 
 " to be irritated, because colonel Cass had taken upon 
 " himself to act, without my authority : the detach- 
 "' raent having only been sent out for observation." 
 
 It cannot be doubled, but that general Cass knew 
 my views, and the objects of his detachment. How 
 far he w^as justiSable, in pursuing measures so con- 
 trary to them, not only in making an attack, which 
 might have forced me to a general and decisive action 
 for his support, but after my verbal orders to retire, 
 persisting to maintain his situation, till he tried the 
 effect of a written remonstrance to me, it is unneces- 
 sary now to consider. I do now believe, that the 
 whole of this proceeding was a manoeuvre, to afford 
 
130 DEFENCE OF 
 
 grounds for new clamours against me, and ^^eaken 
 my authority. My officers, long before they had ma- 
 tured their conspiracy to wrest the command from 
 me by actual violence to my person, had formed a 
 plan, of which I firmly believe this was a part, to 
 place me in such situations as would oblige me to be 
 obedient to their schemes. If any thing successful 
 was done, they would claim all the merit. In case 
 of disaster, the blame could easily be thrown on the 
 commanding general. If I had led the army to the 
 Canards, which probably I must have done to have 
 maintained the bridge, instead of its being alleged 
 against me as a crime, that I did not do so, do you 
 not believe, Gentlemen, in case we had been defeated, 
 I should have been charged with misconduct, in hav- 
 ing acted in opposition to the advice of all the coun- 
 cil, not to move on Maiden without artillery ? And 
 when it is considered, that colonel Mac Arthur was 
 absent with a large detachment; that I had received 
 no intelligence from him ; that I was under great un- 
 easiness on his account, I do think that if I had left 
 him in my rear, and witli only a part of my army had 
 taken ground, which might have been the field of a 
 general action with the enemy's whole force, which 
 was then either in respect to its regulars, militia, or 
 savages, unascertained, and at that time but incon- 
 siderably weakened by desertion, I should have been 
 highly culpable. 
 
 Colonel Miller's account of this transaction is as 
 follows ; "in answer to a message sent to general Hull, 
 
GENERAL HULL. 131 
 
 " he sent us an order to return. The purport of his 
 " message wns, that he could not soon be ready for 
 " the attack on Maiden, and could not thuik of divid- 
 " ing the firmy. We then wrote to him and pressed 
 " in strong terms the necessity of maintaining the 
 " bridge, in answer to which he sent a written dis- 
 " cretionary order to us, expressing his anxiety about 
 " general Mac Arthur, &c." 
 
 This order has been proved. It is in the following 
 words : 
 
 Sandwich, July 17, 1812. 
 Sir, 
 
 I have received your letter of this morn- 
 ing. To my astonishment I have received not the 
 least information from Mac Arthur. It is possible 
 something unpleasant has taken place. It will pro- 
 bably be a week before the cannon will be mounted. 
 I am sensible of the advantages of holding the bridge. 
 I would not, however, hazard too much for the pur- 
 pose. The enemy may pass the ford above, and 
 come in the rear. I will, however, leave it to your 
 discretion, and colonel Miller's, under all the circum- 
 stances of the case to do that which you judge most 
 expedient. Twelve miles is a great distance, and 
 the enemy can either land in boats above the mouth 
 of the river, or pass at the ford to attack you. You 
 know the ground better than I do, and as I before 
 observed, I ayIU leave the measure and the force to 
 
132 DEFENCE OF 
 
 your tliscretion and colonel Miller's, and the best 
 mode of security to the party. 
 
 I am very respectfully, 
 
 your most obedient servant. 
 William Hull, 
 
 Brigadier General, conimaiKliug. 
 
 Colonel Cass. 
 
 Colonel Miller further testifies, that, " upon the rc- 
 " ceipt of this letter, the officers were called together, 
 " and it w as decided, that unless the bridge, being 
 " twelve or fourteen miles from our camp, and only 
 " four or five from the enemy, could be supported by 
 " our whole force, we had better return ; and that as we 
 " had not the disposition of the whole force, which 
 " was thought necessary, we ought not to take the 
 " responsibility." 
 
 This testimony, I think, developes too plainly to 
 hQ misunderstood, the design of these proceedings. 
 I was to be compelled to abandon my own plans, and 
 to adopt those of my officers. I was to be compelled 
 to lead my whole force in a manner under the walls 
 of Maiden, without being provided with artillerj^ and 
 I was urged to do this, by the commandant of the de- 
 tachment, who but a day or two previously had given 
 a decisive opinion, in council, that the attack on 
 3Ialden should not be made till the ordnance was 
 prepared. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 133 
 
 But when it was found, that my order left the offi- 
 cers of the detachment a discretion, and that if an 
 attempt to maintain the bridge should be attended 
 •with any disaster, the officers must share the respon- 
 sibility, then there was no doubt as to the measures 
 to be pursued. It would have disappointed the whole 
 design if I should escape any part of the odium. 
 
 But however this affair of the bridge has been 
 magnified, it is a fact, that the possession of that pass 
 by the enemy never was contemplated as an obstacle 
 to a movement on Maiden. They, in truth, never 
 attempted to maintain possession of it. Colonel 
 Cass's rencontre was only Avith a reconnoitring party. 
 According to the testimony of colonel Miller, they 
 saw no more than fifty of the enemy. He saj s they 
 had about twenty five men on the bridge, and about 
 twenty five on our side, and that some men were dis- 
 covered in the woods. After this, there were, as ap- 
 pears from the testimony of colonel Cass, repeated de- 
 tachments sent from Sandwich to the bridge. They 
 always found it unoccupied by the enemy. It could 
 then have been no object to have moved the army to 
 that post, until the attack on Maiden was determined 
 upon. 
 
 It is curious to observe, Vv^hat trivial and irrelevant 
 circumstances ingenuity can bring together to create 
 false appearances. Some of the gentlemen, who 
 were prisoners with the enemy at the time of this 
 transaction, have been produced to testify, that wheri 
 13 
 
134 DEFENCE OP 
 
 accounts reaciied Amherstburgh that our detachment 
 had appeared in the Aux Canards, it created great 
 consternation ; and it was intended that it should be 
 believed, that the enemy were ready to abandon their 
 post at our approach. But it turns out, upon further 
 explanation from witnesses of the same description, 
 that the disposition to fly was only manifested by the 
 town's people, who thought it unnecessary to expose 
 their persons and effects in a place which was likely 
 to be invested. This, so far from being evidence of 
 an intention to yield the place without contest, is not 
 an uufrequent measure when the most obstinate re- 
 sistance is intended. 
 
 In my letter to the Secretary at War of the nine- 
 teenth of July, I mention the affair at the Aux Ca- 
 nard bridge, and say, great credit is due to colonel 
 Cass and his detachment. For firmness, to colonel 
 Cass and the other volunteers, when supported by the 
 proportion of regulars, which were with them in this 
 first encountre with any enemy, I did think credit 
 was due, both to men and officers. — But when I wrote 
 that letter, I had not the same view of the designs 
 formed against me which subsequent circumstances 
 have expressed. I did not then see, that a plan 
 which has been so successful, was settled to make 
 my destruction a merit, which was to give another 
 my place, and some of his accomplices, rank and 
 fortune, 
 
 I am charged with unofficer-Iike conduct in sufier- 
 ing my communication with the river Raisin to be 
 
GENERAL HULL. ISj 
 
 cut off. This imputation is among the last that I ex- 
 pected to find in the catalogue of my accusations. 
 If it had been intended to shew, that nothing that I 
 did, or intended to do, could escape censure, this spe- 
 cification would afford strong evidence of such a dis- 
 position. For the means that I took to open this 
 communication are also made the subjects of accusa- 
 tion. The detachment under colonel Van Horn, 
 the retreat from Canada, the detachment under co- 
 lonel Miller, and under colonels Mac Arthur and 
 Cass, although they were all measures which were 
 dictated by the strong necessity, which I saw and 
 felt, to keep open the communication in question, are 
 all set down as instances of misconduct. Bui I 
 would ask those, at whose instigation these charges 
 have been made, what measures I should have pur- 
 sued to have effected this object? It must be remem- 
 bered, that it was utterly in vain to have opened the 
 communication to the river Raisin only. No sup- 
 plies could come from thence that were not drawn 
 from the western states. I must therefore have pro- 
 tected the road all the way from Ohio. Was this to 
 have been done by stretching back so great a dis- 
 tance with a sufficient force ? If so, my whole army 
 would have been insufficient for the purpose. The 
 two hundred men I sent under major Van Horn my 
 two senior officers thought insufficient. In their 
 opinion, I ought to have detached, for this duty, one 
 of their regiments. Colonel Miller, after he had de- 
 feated the enemy, had more than five hundred men 
 left, and was within fourteen miles of his destination. 
 
130 DEFENCE- OF 
 
 He thought it necessary to send back io me for a rc- 
 hifoFcement of one hundred and fifty, or two hundred j 
 before he could proceed, although he knew that at the 
 liver Raisin he was to be joined, and would be 
 strengthened in his march back, by the detachment 
 under captain Brush, which had escorted the provi- 
 sions to the river Raisin. If so great a number of 
 men was requisite merely to force a passage to the 
 river Raisin and back, how great a portion of my 
 army would have been necessary to keep open the 
 road to Ohio, or even that portion of it which was 
 between Detroit and the river Raisin ? 
 
 1 think it must appear to the Court, that I could 
 not have kept open this extensive line of communi- 
 cation, without distributing my whole armj'^ along the 
 road ; and yet, according to the inferences to be drawn 
 from the charges and specifications, I was criminal 
 in not carrying on an offensive war in Canada, and 
 in not performing, at the same time, another service, 
 which would have required all my troops. 
 
 That this communication ought to have been kept 
 open is most certain, I tlid expect it would have been. 
 I did suppose that a force would have been sent after 
 me, adequate not only to this purpose, but to augment 
 my army. The grounds I had for these expectations 
 will appear from documeiits, which are before the 
 Court, to some of which I have already adverted. 
 
 It is alleged, that I was guilty of misconduct in 
 sending the detachment under major Van Horn, be- 
 
GENERAL HULL. 137 
 
 cause it was inadequate to the purpose for wliich it 
 was intended. The proof of the inadequacy, I presume, 
 is, that it was defeated. It appears, however, that it 
 was not owing to want of numbers tliat this defeat 
 happened. According to major Van Horn's own ac- 
 count, the party that attacked him, he judged from 
 the fire, was from one hundred and fifty to two hun- 
 dred. This was conjecture, for more than forty sav- 
 ages were not seen. But these volunteers, the same 
 patriotic men who are said to have wept so bitterlj^ 
 because they were not allov/ed to fight at Detroit, 
 fled in the first moments of an attack, with the utmost 
 disorder and precipitation. Had not this been the 
 case the detachment was sufficient. If it had fought 
 the enemy, there can be no doubt but it would have 
 made its way good to the river Raisin, where it would 
 have been joined by a large detachment under cap- 
 tain Brush. If the detachment had been ever so 
 large, it would have been insufficient, if the men be- 
 haved no better than those major Van Horn com- 
 manded did upon this occasion. But, Sir, the true 
 foundation for this charge is, that I did not think pro- 
 per to be obedient to the advice of my two senior 
 officers. It was placed in this black catalogue, solely 
 for the purpose of giving them an opportunity of pro- 
 claiming to the v7orld their own superiour sagacity 
 and judgment. It was to give tkcm an opportunity 
 to prove by their own testimony, that whatever I did 
 was wrong, and that whatever they advised would 
 have been right. 
 13* 
 
138 DEFENCE OF 
 
 But possibly I ought to have suffered the advice of 
 these officers upon this occasion to have had more 
 v/eight. I should have reflected, that they had the 
 best opportunity of knowing the character of their 
 own troops, and might have anticipated their shame- 
 ful conduct; but then I think, I have reason to com- 
 plain, that colonels Cass and Mac Arthur were not at 
 this time as candid, as they were when it was pro- 
 posed to attempt Blalden by assault, and that they did 
 not tell me, as they did then, that they could not be 
 responsible for their men. If thej^ had told me this, 
 I might have thought it right to increase the force of 
 the detachment, and to have added to it some regu- 
 Urs; whose presence might, as it did at the Aux Ca- 
 nards, have encouraged the volunteers to have faced 
 the enemy, or made them more afraid to run away 
 than to fight. 
 
 The next accusation is one, that can only have 
 been set down to swell the list of offences imputed' 
 to me ; for it is without any manner of foundation. 
 It charges me with unofficer-like conduct, in having 
 detached colonel Miller on the eighth of August, and 
 not having supplied him with provisions, when he w as 
 near Brownstown. 
 
 While, Sir, I feel myself bound to acknowledge the 
 liberality with which I have been treated by the 
 •ludge Advocate, in the course of this trial, and the 
 delicacy with which he has in general refrained from 
 repeating the odious epithets, vvhich are so profusely 
 
GENERAL HULL. 139 
 
 and wantonly used in the specifications, I cannot but 
 regret, that he has, in respect to this charge, departed 
 from his general observance ; and that he should, upon 
 Such evidence as was before him, have thought him- 
 self justifiable in imputing to my misconduct, on this 
 occasion, an useless waste of American blood. Sir, 
 the American blood that was spilled in the contest at 
 Brownstown was gloriously shed. It purchased a 
 victory that did honour to our arms. True, it was 
 inefifectually shed— but to lay the failure of the enter- 
 prise to me, and to reproach me with this waste of 
 blood, is as unjust as it is inhuman. 
 
 I do not understand, that I am supposed to have 
 •lone v.rong in sending the detachment, or in not 
 making it of greater force. By the testimony of 
 colonel Bliller it appears, that he marched with six 
 hundred men, instead of five hundred, as is mentioned 
 in the specification. But the misconduct imputed to 
 me is, as I understand, solely, that I omitted to sup- 
 ply colonel Miller with provisions after the battle at 
 Brownstown. With respect to the want of provisions, 
 it appears, that the detachment was amply provided 
 when it left Detroit. The march they were to per- 
 form, was about thirty miles; and colonel Miller 
 states, that they Avere furnished with a supply for two 
 days when they set out. But he says, that the pro- 
 visions were thrown away with the men's knapsacks 
 when they were attacked, and though he represents 
 the enemy to have been entirely beaten, and so far 
 driven from off his rout, that captain Maxwell went 
 
140 DEFENCE OF 
 
 from him to Brownstown and back, and reported^ 
 that the enemy were all gone : and though colonel 
 Miller states, that he returned to the battle ground 
 with his whole force, and was, in fact, undisturbed on 
 that ground nearly two days, yet he says in his cross- 
 examination, that the provisions were not recovered, 
 because he could not suffer his men to separate to 
 take them up. I cannot conceive what necessity 
 there could have been for his men's separating. It 
 appears to me, that he would only have had to march 
 his whole detachment over the ground where the at- 
 tack was made, and the provisions might have been 
 recovered with as much security to the detachment, as 
 w hen they were remaining inactive in the position to 
 which they had retrograded. Colonel Miller, iu his 
 account of this transaction, states, that he considered 
 that his victory opened the communication to the 
 river Raisin sufficiently for him' to have proceeded — 
 that on the evening of the day on which the battle 
 was fought, that is, the ninth, he sent major Snelling 
 to make a report to me, to inform me of the loss of 
 the provisions, and to request, that I would send boats 
 or waggons with provisions, and to take back the 
 wounded. He was also to request a reinforcement for 
 colonel Miller, which colonel Miller, on his cross-ex- 
 amination says, he suggested should be from one hun- 
 dred and fifty to two hundred men. Colonel Miller 
 also states, that colonel Mac Arthur came down the 
 next morning (that is on the tenth) with eight or nine 
 boats, and brought with him no more than two barrels of 
 flour, one barrel of pork, and half a barrel of whiskey ^ — 
 
GENERAL HULL. 141 
 
 fhat the place where the battle was fought was 
 about fourteen miles from Detroit, and sixteen to the 
 river Raisin, between Maguago and Brownstown ; it 
 being late in the day before the wounded men could 
 be got on board the boats, he knew that he could not 
 get through before the next night, (that is the eleventh) 
 moving as cautiously as they ought to do ; — that the 
 men still complaining of hunger, he concluded that 
 he could send to Detroit that evening, (that is the 
 tenth) and have provisions the next morning ; — that 
 he accordingly sent an express to me on the evening 
 of the tenth, requesting that I would send him two 
 day's provisions ; — that no messenger from me came 
 to him till sun down the next day, (that is the eleventh) 
 that the messenger informed him, he had been 
 detained by losing his way; — that this messenger 
 brought him an order from me to return to Detroit, 
 and informed him that he would find provisions at the 
 river Ecorce ; — that on the same evening he took up 
 his march for Detroit, and arrived there the next day, 
 (the twelfth ;) that his force was two hundred and 
 eighty regulars, and three hundred and twenty militia, 
 some of the Michigan militia, and some of the Detroit 
 horse ; — that the militia behaved well ; — that his loss 
 was seventeen killed, and sixty-four wounded. 
 
 Sir, it has always appeared to me most unaccount- 
 able, that colonel Miller, after he had disposed of his 
 wounded men on the tenth, and when, according to 
 his own testimony, he considered that his victory had 
 opened his communication to the river Raisin, did not 
 
142 DEFENCE OF 
 
 proceed. He had but sixteen miles to march. He re- 
 mained in the position he had taken from the even- 
 ing of the tenth, when he had embarked his wounded 
 men, till the evening of the eleventh, that is twenty- 
 four hours, when he might have accomplished hia 
 march, as I should think, in four or five hours. At the 
 end of it he was sure not only to meet the provisions 
 he was sent to escort, but a strong reinforcement from 
 the detachment under captain Brush. He says, how- 
 ever, that on the evening of tlie tenth, he determined 
 to halt where he was, and to wait the return of an ex- 
 press from me, because he should be obliged to move 
 with so much caution ; that he knew he could not get 
 through until the next night — a very extraordinary 
 caution indeed must have been necessary, that could 
 have retarded for so long a time the march of a body 
 of troops for sixteen miles, through a space, which it 
 had been ascertained by the report of captain Maxwell, 
 was, as far as Brownstown at least, free from an ene- 
 my. But if the want of provisions was a reason for 
 not proceeding to the river Raisin, whj^ did not colo- 
 nel Miller push on to Brownstown — there was an In- 
 dian settlement, which, without doubt, vsas at least 
 capable of supplying his immediate Avants, and from 
 which he could not have been distant but a very few 
 miles. If there he could have got but one meal for 
 his troops, it does appear to me, that there would not 
 have been any great enterprise in undertaking the 
 rest of the march, which might have been twelve or 
 fourteen miles, without any further provisions. It did 
 appear to me not less extraordinar)^ that when colonel 
 
GENERAL HliTLL. 143 
 
 Miller advised me when he had gained so decisive 
 a victory that he considered his road to the river 
 Raisin as opened, and he had ascertained that there 
 was no enemy between him and Brownstown, that 
 he should, at the same time, have made a demand 
 on me for a reinforcement of one hundred and fifty or 
 two hundred men — when, after his battle, he had five 
 hundred and twenty effective men, two hundred and 
 eighty of whom were of his own regiment, and were 
 almost the whole force of that description which I 
 had under my command. Let me here remark, if so 
 great a force, that is to say, between seven and eight 
 hundred men, v^^ere necessary, to force their way to 
 the river Raisin, what proportion of my troops nmst 
 have been necessary, not only to keep open the com- 
 munication for that distance, but to guard the line all 
 the way to the state of Ohio ? 
 
 But it is not my business to examine the conduct 
 of colonel Miller, further than to shew, that when I 
 despatched him with so large a detachment, with ra- 
 tions for two days, I had made every provision which 
 I had any reason to think his exigencies would re- 
 quire. 
 
 When, however, I received his demand for provi- 
 sions, I took every measure that the duty of my sta- 
 tion required to supply him. Colonel Mac Arthur 
 was charged with this service, and I beg to present 
 to t]ie Court his account of the manner in which he 
 performed it. 
 
144 DEFENCE OF 
 
 " On the day we crossed from Canada," says colo- 
 nel Mac Arthur, (that is the eighth of August,) " Colo- 
 " nel Miller was sent with a detachment for the pur- 
 " pose, as was stated, of opening a communication 
 *' with the river Raisin. The night succeeding colo- 
 " nel Miller's battle at Maguago, (perhaps the ninth,) 
 " the General sent for me — the night was w^et; he in- 
 " formed me of the battle, and directed me to take one 
 " hundred of my regiment, to take the boats along 
 " the river, and to descend to colonel Miller's en- 
 " campment, for the purj)ose of bringing up the w ound- 
 " ed men. He directed me to get one day's provision, 
 "for colonel Miller's detachment. I called at the 
 *' commissary's and was detained three or four hours 
 " in getting it — I got what I could." 
 
 It has been my misfortune, Sir, that I have not 
 been able to obtain the testimony of Mr. Beard, the 
 commissary. He has been regularly summoned by 
 the Judge Advocate, at my request ; and 1 have se- 
 veral times written to him, but he has not made his 
 appearance. The Judge Advocate, however, with 
 his wonted candour, has admitted a document which 
 in some measure supplies his testimony. It is an order 
 which I issued to the contractor on the ninth of Au- 
 gust, for delivering rations to colonel Mac Arthur for 
 colonel Miller's detachment. The receipt of which 
 order is acknowledged by the contractor, or a copy 
 thereof, which is in the following words : 
 
 " The contractor will issue six hundred rations 
 " of bread or flour, six hundred rations of pork, and 
 
GENERAL HULL. 145 
 
 '• twelve liuntlred rations of whiskey, to be sent to the 
 " detachment under the command of lieutenant colo- 
 " nel Miller. 
 
 " By order of brigadier general Hull, 
 
 " H. H. Hickman, 
 
 August 9th, 1812. " Captain, Infanti-j'." 
 
 " (correct copy.) 
 
 "■ D. Beard." 
 
 Now, Sir, it appears that general Mac Arthur knew, 
 that one purpose of sending him to colonel Miller's 
 detachment was to carry provisions. He says, I di- 
 rected him to take one day's provisions for colonel 
 Miller's men ; that he was detained by the contractor 
 three or four hours, and took what he could get. And 
 it appears that he arrived at colonel Miller's encamp- 
 ment with only two barrels of flour, one barrel of 
 pork, and half a barrel of whiskey. When I had 
 given the order to colonel Mac Arthur, to take the 
 provisions ; when I had issued the order to the proper 
 officer to issue them to him, had I not done every 
 thing that was incumbent on me, as commanding 
 officer ? Was it my duty to go to the commissary's 
 store, and to superintend the issues ? If colonel Mac 
 Arthur found the commissary disobedient to my order, 
 and unduly detaining him, why did he not report to 
 me ? How will colonel Mac Arthur excuse his having 
 departed on this service, without having with him the 
 quantity of provisions I had ordered ? Is it sufficient 
 for him to say, that he took what he could get ? If 
 14 
 
146 DEFENCE OF 
 
 ilicre was any deficiency he ought to have informed 
 me of it ; he could have had communication with me 
 in five minutes. If want of [)rovisions was the rea- 
 son why the American blood that was spilled at the 
 battle of Brownstown was shed in vain, I again ask, 
 was it not most unjust to charge that waste to nie ? 
 
 On the tenth of August, I issued another order for 
 provisions for colonel Miller's detachment. This has 
 also been read, and is in the following words : 
 
 "Detroit, August 10th, 1812. 
 " The contractor will issue, for colonel Miller's de- 
 " tachment, two thousand complete rations. 
 
 " A. F. Hull, 
 
 " Aid-de-camp." 
 
 These provisions were sent by the contractor to 
 colonel Miller's detachment. Colonel Miller met 
 Ihem on his return, and brought them back with him. 
 
 An accusation of the same nature v/ith that which 
 I last considered, is, that I also omitted to supply with 
 provisions the detachment which left Detroit on the 
 fourteenth of Au,2;ust, under colonels Mac Arthur and 
 Cass. General Mac Arthur's testimony on this sub- 
 ject is as follows : That on the fourteenth of Au- 
 gust, about noon, as he thought, I sent for him, and 
 informed him, that I had just received intelligence 
 from captain Brush, that lie had arrived at the river 
 Raisin with provisions, and said, I wished to send 
 out a detachment to meet him. That he replied, he 
 
GENERAL HULL. 1^7 
 
 was ready to obey my order. Colonel Cass sakl the 
 same thing. That they (the witness and colonel 
 Cass) then returned to camp, and shortly after receiv- 
 ed an order to detach one imndred and fifty men from 
 ^ acli of their regiments. That in the evening I came 
 along, and asked if they were ready to march. The 
 witness answered, that they were not, but as usual had 
 not a bite of any thing to eat. That I said tlie de- 
 tachment must not be delayed, and I would send 
 provisions after them. The witness then gives an 
 account of the proceedings of the detachment till its 
 return to Detroit, and states, that they never received 
 any provisions from the fort. 
 
 I cannot but think, that this account of general 
 Mac Arthur's conduct, though given by himself, will 
 excite the surprise of the Court. 
 
 He was ordered to march a detachment at about 
 twelve o'clock. He does not move till evening, and 
 I then find that he has not obeyed the order. He 
 gives me to understand that he has been waiting for 
 provisions. If there was no order for provisions, Avhy 
 did he not apply to me on the subject ? But there was 
 one, and I think general Mac Arthur's testimony 
 shews it. 
 
 When he sees me, he does not complain of the 
 want of an order, but that he cannot get the provi- 
 sions, if there was an order, and the proper officer 
 did not obey it, why was not the disobedience report- 
 
148 DEFENCE OP 
 
 €(l to me ? Instead of pursuing so obvious a course, 
 colonel Mac Arthur chose rather to remain in his 
 camp five or six hours, and if I had not accidentally 
 met \Yith him, how much longer he would have con- 
 sidered his delay warranted by the same cause, it is 
 impossible to say. It does appear to me, that this 
 conduct of general Mae Arthur is very unaccounta- 
 ble. Perhaps he had no inclination for the service 
 he had been ordered to perform, or it may be, he 
 thought, that by the delay, or by going without pro- 
 visions, he should bring blame on me. The beha- 
 viour of general Mac xVrthur upon these two occa- 
 sions, that is to say, in respect to the provisions 
 which he ^Yas to take for colonel Miller, and in re- 
 spect to provisions for his own detachment, it appears 
 to me, manifests very strongly that there was some 
 hidden motive for his conduct. And in this last in- 
 stance' tliere is a mystery, which I am sure is not ex- 
 plained by any thing he has said. It never can be 
 believed that he waited so many hours, solely for the 
 purpose of obtaining an order for provisions, or if he 
 Iiad an order, that his delay was merely for the pur-* 
 pose of having it executed. If his only object had 
 been to procure provisions, the means of doing so, by 
 an application to me, were so obvious and direct, that 
 he could not have hesitated to pursue it. But if the 
 Court will recollect that at this time the conspiracy 
 had been formed to take the command from me, and 
 that general Cass, in his letter to the government, has 
 stated, that the execution of it was only prevented by 
 his and general Mac Arthur's having been sent on 
 
GENERAL HULL. 149 
 
 iliis tletacliment, it may account for the conduct of 
 these officers. The delay was possibly to mature 
 their plot, and to put it in practice. 
 
 If general Mac Arthur was on his trial for miscon- 
 duct in relation to these transactions, I am persuaded 
 that his testimony ought rather to convict him than 
 me. 
 
 But I did take measures for supplying the detach- 
 ment with the necessary provisions. My information 
 from captain Brush was, that he would be on his 
 march with the provisions under his escort, with the 
 expectation of meeting a detachment frpm Detroit 
 for his support. 
 
 It appeared to me, that not a moment ought to be 
 lost, in sending a force to meet him ; and when I 
 found that general Mac Arthur had delayed to exe- 
 cute my orders for so many hours, I determined that 
 the departure of the detachment should not be longer 
 postponed. I therefore ordered it to march, and de- 
 termined to send provisions after it on pack horses. 
 I immediately gave the necessary orders to the acting 
 Commissary General, for that purpose. This is 
 proved by the testimony of general Taylor. He says 
 that on the fourteenth of August, I did give him an 
 order to furnish pack horses to carry provisions for 
 the detachment going to the river Raisin, under 
 colonels Mac Arthur and Cass. That he did not 
 know whether the provisions were sent, but that pack 
 14^ 
 
IbO DEFENCE OF 
 
 horses were furnished for the purpose, and he pre^ 
 sumes the provisions were sent. That I gave all 
 the necessarj^ orders for sending them is certain, and 
 if my orders were not complied with, I do not think 
 I am the person, that ought to be called to an- 
 swer for it. It never can be expected, that a com- 
 manding officer should not only give orders, but 
 should attend to the execution of the details. 
 There was, as Mr. Watson has tes^tified, a want of 
 system in every department of the army, which it 
 was impossible for me to remedy, because the heads 
 of them were totally inexperienced. However, the 
 fact is, that the provisions in this case were sent. 
 But as the detachment, pursuant to my orders, took 
 an unusual and obscure road, the guides, as I have 
 lieard, misled the provisions, and they were not heard 
 of before the surrender. 
 
 In the seventh specification, under ihe charge c4* 
 unofficer-Iike conduct, is assembled a variety of accu- 
 sations. The first is a little incongruous in its lan- 
 guage. It is stated, that the enemy having erected 
 batteries opposite to Detroit, I was, from the eleventh 
 day of August, to and including the sixteenth day of 
 the same month, guilty of a neglect of duty, in not 
 preventing the enemy from erecting the said batteries. 
 
 It would be an answer to this charge to say, that I 
 could not have prevented the erection of batteries^ 
 which it is stated were already in existence. But 
 though I think there are many incongruities of the 
 
GENERAL HULL, 151 
 
 same nature in the specifications^ I have not attempted 
 to avail myself of them, and shall no further notice 
 this. 
 
 The Court will observe, that this accusation is 
 connected v/ith, and indeed entirelj^ rests upon a pre- 
 vious allegation, that I v/ell knew these batteries 
 were erected by the enemy with an intention to an- 
 noy Detroit, and with a design to facilitate the in- 
 vasion of the Michigan territory. The fact is, I 
 had no such knowledge. I had a firm persuasion 
 that the enemy would not invade our territory. I 
 did believe that the war on their part would be en- 
 tirely a defensive war, and that these batteries were 
 only intended for the defence of their own shores. I 
 admit. Sir, that my opinions in this respect, subsequent 
 events have proved were entirely erroneous. But I 
 cannot believe that a mistake in opinion or judgment 
 is to be punished as a crime. This would be less a 
 defence to an accusation of this nature, was not the 
 char2;e so connected, as I have mentioned, with the 
 allegation, that I knew how the enemy intended to 
 employ their batteries. The question must be first 
 asked, had I this knowledge ? There is not'^ particle 
 of evidence that I had ; and if this question must be 
 answered in the negative, the accusation is not sup- 
 ported. But 1 do not rest this part of my defence on 
 this ground. 
 
 That the enemy did erect batteries opposite to 
 Detroit, and that I did not attempt to annoy them. 
 
152 DEFENCE OF 
 
 lill they commenced their fire on the fifteenth, are 
 facts not to be disputed. I did not annoy them for 
 the reason I have ahove mentioned, that I considered 
 them as mere defensive Morks. But a desire to pre- 
 serve my own ammunition was the principal reason 
 for this conduct. I might have hindered the enemy 
 from progressing in the day time, but in the night, 
 any annoyance 1 could have given them would have 
 been ineffectual. Captain Dallaba has given a state- 
 ment of the ammunition. Captain Dyson of the 
 artillery supposes it would not have lasted more 
 than three or four days, if we had commenced and 
 continued firing. The fixed ammunition, he says, 
 could not have lasted more than two days. Captain 
 Bacon testifies, that on the morning of the sixteenth, 
 he examined by my orders the magazine, and could 
 find but one box of twenty-four pound cartridges, 
 and that he reported to me they were nearly ex- 
 pended. The testimony of all the witnesses who 
 have spoken shews, that my mind was impressed w ith 
 the necessity of sparing the ammunition, and that this, 
 as well as the expectation that the enemy did not 
 intend, as long as I did not provoke, offensive opera- 
 tions, w ere the reasons -why I did not cannonade the 
 enemy while they were fortifying on the opposite 
 shore. Major Trimble testifies, that when he pro- 
 posed to me to fire on a party of the enemy, which 
 made its appearance on the fourteenth of August at 
 Sandwich, I answered that it would not do to expend 
 the ammunition uselessly. Captain Bacon says, that 
 on the morning of the sixteenth, he was directed by 
 
GENERAL HULL. 153 
 
 me to go to captain Dyson, at the battery where he 
 commanded, and inform him that the twenty-four 
 pound ammunition was nearly exhausted, and that he 
 must not fire but when there was a prospect of his 
 doing execution. 
 
 Another of the accusations which are assembled in 
 this specification is, that I omitted to fortify Spring 
 Welis. I do not know why it might not as well have 
 alleged that I omitted to fortify any other position in 
 ihe river Detroit. 
 
 It is not in proof that that spot was particularly 
 adapted to a fortification. If it had been fortified, the 
 enemy would not probably have selected it as their 
 place of debarkation ; almost any other spot within 
 the same distance, above or below the fort, was as 
 well calculated to afford them a landing. This spe- 
 cification also accuses me of having neglected to an- 
 noy the enemy after he had landed at Spring Wells. 
 Gentlemen, the answer to this specification is em- 
 biTiced in the defence I have made as to the final 
 surrender. 
 
 I had made preparations for attacking ; the troops 
 w ere drawn out, and formed in line of battle ; but 
 before the enemy came up, I determined to surrender. 
 My reasons for this measure, I have already explain- 
 ed. I shall not repeat them. I will only beg you to 
 observe, that the reasons I have offered have not 
 been suggested merely for the present occasion. Ma- 
 
154 DEFENCE OF 
 
 jor Munson testifies, that he-sawme the day after the 
 surrender ; that I told him I expected to be censured 
 for what I had done, but said, " I have done, what 
 " under all circumstances was most proper, and I 
 *' have saved Detroit and the territory from the hor- 
 " rours of an Indian massacre." 
 
 But I am accused of having made the surrender in 
 an unofficer-Iike manner ; in having made it before 
 the articles of capitulation w ere signed ; in not stipu- 
 lating for the honours of war, or for the security of 
 the friendly inhabitants of Canada, who had taken 
 protection from us. Before I make observations on 
 this subject, I beg leave to' present to the Court col- 
 lectedly, the testimony which relates to it. 
 
 Major Snelling testifies in substance, that immedi- 
 ately after the second shot which did execution in 
 the fort was fired, captain Hull was sent across the 
 river with a flag, and that he (major Snelling) was 
 sent to order colonel Findlay into the fort. The 
 witness having performed this duty, went to one of 
 the batteries ; while there, a British officer with a 
 flag, came to inquire w hat was the meaning of send- 
 ing the flag across the river, when general Brock was 
 on the American side ? Lieutenant Hunt then went 
 w ith the information to me, and returned with a sealed 
 letter, and orders that he (the witness) should carry 
 it to general Brock. That the witness met general 
 Brock at the head of his troops, about three quarters 
 of a mile from the fort, where they were not in sight 
 from the fort. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 155 
 
 The wiiness having delivered the letter, of which 
 lie was the bearer, general Brock asked the witness 
 '^ifhc was authorised to a^ree on terms ?^* The witness 
 said not. General Brock then asked two of his offi- 
 cers to go with the witness to the fort. 
 
 As they approached the fort, they were met by 
 some persons who conducted tliem to a tent, which 
 had been erected by my orders, where they were met 
 by colonels Miller and Brush, commissioners ap- 
 pointed by me, and the capitulation was there signed 
 by the commissioners. 
 
 The contents of the note, the witness says, were no 
 more than these words : " Sir, I agree to surrender 
 *' the town and fort of Detroit." He would not un- 
 dertake to say, that the words he gave were the whole 
 substaMce of the note, but he believed they were. 
 
 Major Snelling further testifies, that before the ca- 
 pitulation was signed, he saw me near the marquee 
 in conversation with colonel Findiay, and with the 
 British officers, colonel Mac Donald and captain 
 Clegg, who were within the marquee. The witness 
 said, he did not recollect that I took any part in 
 drawing up the capitulation. That I ordered oflT a 
 number of our officers, who were collected about the 
 marquee, and among the rest the witness. 
 
 In a subsequent part of his examination he says, 
 that before the capitulation was signed, colonel Find- 
 
156 DEFENCE OF 
 
 lay's regiment was marched into the fort, which was 
 very much crowded. 
 
 Captain Mac Commick testifies, that after colonel 
 Findlay's regiment had been ordered into the fort, he 
 met colonel Findlay as he was going into the fort ; 
 that they there saw me ; that I requested colonel 
 Findlay to join colonel Miller, to treat with the ene- 
 my, and said that we could then get better terms 
 than we should, if we waited till they attempted to 
 storm the fort. Captain Mac Commick further testi- 
 fies, that as he went out of the fort, he saw the British 
 officers, colonel Mac Donald and captain Clegg, 
 coming towards the fort. Some one said, it was im- 
 proper they should be permitted to come in, and they 
 went to the tent. Shortly after the British officers, 
 with colonel Mil fir and colonel Brush, came into the 
 fort, and were there together in Dyson's quarters, 
 where, as he supposes, the capitulation was signed. 
 The witness further testifies, that before this, and at 
 about the time the British officers and colonels Miller 
 and Brush went into Dyson's quarters, nearly all the 
 troops w ere marched into the fort. 
 
 In his cross-examination, captain Mac Commick 
 says, it might have been ten minutes, half an hour, or 
 more, after the firing ceased, before the troops were 
 ordered to march into the fort. That he himself did 
 not come into the fort, till half an hour after the firing 
 had ceased. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 157 
 
 Major Van Horn testifies, that on the morning of 
 the sixteenth, captain Hull came to the tent of colo- 
 nel Findlay, in which the witness also quartered, and 
 informed colonel Findlay, that it was my orders that 
 his regiment should move to and form on the south- 
 west of the fort. 
 
 The witness then describes the position of colonel 
 Findlay 's regiment in the line, and the manner in 
 which the whole line was formed. He then further 
 testifies, that after the line was formed, and about an 
 hour, or half an hour before the flag was hoisted, I 
 came to the line. That this was during the can- 
 nonade. 
 
 British officers were then seen passing to and from 
 the Indians. That I appeared satisfied with the po- 
 sitions of the troops. That the witness said to me, 
 we shall be able to give a good account of them. 
 About the time the firing ceased, witness turned 
 round and saw a flag hoisted in the fort, and at about 
 the same time, captain Snelling came with orders 
 from me to colonel Findlay to march his regiment 
 into the fort, and said, that it was my directions that 
 as the flag was out it should not be violated. 
 
 The witness further testifies, that I remained at 
 the line formed by the troops about three, or it 
 might have been, five minutes ; — that colonel Find- 
 lay expressed dissatisfaction with the order, but said, 
 15 
 
158 DEFENCE OF 
 
 it must be obeyed, and directed the witness to march 
 Ills battalion towards the fort, which he did, but halt- 
 ed near the fort some minutes ;— that finally he 
 marched his men into the fort, and they there stacked 
 their arms ; — that colonel Findlay did not come in 
 (ill some time afterwards. The witness further testi- 
 fies, that when he got into the fort he saw me, but 
 was not certain that I was there when he entered ; — 
 that some time after the witness had been in the 
 fort, I addressed him, and several other officers at the 
 «ame time, and invited them into the room of one of 
 the officers ; that I told them I had surrendered the 
 (fort, and was about to make the terms ; — that I asked, 
 if they thought of any thing as a condition, I should 
 be glad to know what it was ; — that the witness did 
 not go into the room ; — that when he first saw me I 
 was on the steps, going into one of the rooms ; — that 
 some time after this, colonel Mac Donald and captain 
 Clegg rode up, came into the fort, and went into the 
 room where I was : — that the witness does not know 
 whether I did or did not go into the marquee before 
 the British officers came in ; that our whole line, as 
 he believes, had marched into the fort and stacked 
 their arms ; — that this had taken place before the Bri- 
 tish officers came in. 
 
 Major Jessup testifies, tliat he had observed our 
 troops retreating, and saw the flag flying. He met 
 colonel Findlay, who requested him to ride towards 
 the fort, and learn the reason of the retreat j — that 
 
GENERAL HULL. 159 
 
 lie found me in the fort, and thought me very much 
 frightened ; — that after a conversation ^vith me, of 
 \vliich he has repeated his own gaihmt expressions, but 
 inifortunately cannot recollect what I said, he went 
 out and met colonel Findlaj', and said to him all was 
 lost; — that when he saw me at the time, the terms of 
 capitulation had been agreed upon, that he met me in 
 a piazza, before captain Dyson's quarters; — that I wa« 
 then perfectl}^ composed. 
 
 He then relates a conversation with me, vviiicli 
 concluded with a request that he would continue to 
 act in his station, till the troops were marched out of 
 the fort; — that he consented to this, and received 
 from me, or one of my aids, a copy of the capitulation, 
 which I directed him to read to the troops ; and that 
 he did this when the troops were marched out at 
 about twelve o'clock. 
 
 The witness further states, that he thinks a detach- 
 ment of the enemy came into the fort before the ar- 
 ticles of capitulation w^ere signed ; but that he is not 
 certain whether the enemy's troops marched in before 
 the- American troops marched out, but knows that 
 the American troops did not march out till after the 
 capitulation was signed. 
 
 Captain Burton testifies, that he knew when the 
 capitulation w as agreed upon ; — that it was done in 
 captain Dyson's quarters, where he saw me, general 
 
160 DEFENCE OP 
 
 Brock, and two or three British officers; — that they 
 were writing and preparing the articles of capi- 
 tulation; — that he heard remarks which induced 
 him to believe, that the articles of capitulation 
 were not agreed upon; — that he could not say, 
 whether the American troops were then in the fort, 
 but there were, at that time, one hundred and fifty 
 British troops standing with advanced arms in the 
 fort ; — the enemy were at or about this time placing 
 guards in and about the fort ; — that the reason why 
 he supposes that the articles were not at this time 
 finally agreed upon, was, that he saw general Brock, 
 with a paper from which he struck out two or three 
 lines, which as he understood related to the regular 
 troops returning home, which general Brock said he 
 would not agree to ; — that at about this time, he saw 
 one of the British officers writing. Before this he 
 had seen the British officers and American officers at 
 the marquee, and that I also had been there ; — that 
 it was about three quarters of an hour after he saw 
 the British officers going with me to the marquee, 
 before he saw the British officers in Dyson's quar- 
 ters. 
 
 On his cross-examination by the Court, major Jes.- 
 sup says, when the terms of the capitulation were 
 discussing, the American troops were crowded in the 
 fort, in the utmost disorder, and the enemy were per- 
 mitted to approach so near the fort as to be able to 
 take possession of the batteries. 
 
GENERAL HULL. Vol 
 
 Captain Fuller testifies, that soon after the white 
 jlag was hoisted, he went to the fort, and there met 
 colonel Mac Donald and major Clegg; — that I was 
 standing near the gate, one of the British officers said 
 to me, that they were sent by general Brock in con- 
 sequence of seeing a flag hoisted, to receive any com- 
 munications ; — that I replied, that I should surrender, 
 and desired them to go to the marquee, where I would 
 go or send to them ; — that major Clegg requested the 
 witness to go with him to the marquee for fear our 
 militia might fire on him ; — that he went with 'him 
 to the marquee ; — they were furnished with pen, ink, 
 and paper by major Snelling ; — that soon after they 
 got to the marquee, I, colonels Miller and Brush 
 came; — that he staid near the marquee about ten 
 minutes, and then went to the fort, leaving me at the 
 marquee ; — that when he returned to the fort, he 
 found our troops were in and had stacked their arms ;— 
 that some time after he saw the British officers, 
 Mac Donald and Clegg, come out of Dyson's quar- 
 ters, one of them having a paper, which he said had 
 been signed by me, and that he was going to take it 
 to general Brock for his approbation, and wished the 
 witness to go with him for the same purpose ; — that 
 he accompanied him to the marquee ; — that the wit- 
 ness went and found the British column led by colo- 
 nel Proctor about half a mile below the fort ; — tliat 
 he left colonel Mac Donald and returned to the fort. 
 
 Colonel Miller testifies, that on the morning of the 
 sixteenth I was in the fort j — that it was reported in 
 
162 DEFENCE OF 
 
 me that the enemy were advancing, and that part of 
 tlie Michigan militia had joined the enemy ; — that 
 upon this I asked him if I had not better send out a 
 flag. He told me he did not know. I had better con- 
 .sult the officers who were without the fort, that they 
 had the best opportunity of judging; — that I said 
 there was no time for consultation, that I would send 
 a flag, and that I did so; — that some time after this, 
 colonel Findlay's regiment marched into the gar- 
 rison ; — that I went to a tent and sent for him ; — that 
 when he approached the tent, I was standing in the 
 lent with my back towards him ; — that he heard me 
 say to the British officers in the tent, " I will surren- 
 der ;" — that I then requested him, with colonel Brush, 
 to assist in drawing up some articles of capitulation ; — 
 that he remained at the tent, lying on the ground, 
 in a violent fit of the fever and ague, while colonels 
 Brush and Mac Donald were penning the articles. 
 
 The original articles of capitulation were then 
 shewn to the witness, and he said he believed thera 
 to be those which he had signed, but said he was 
 strongly impressed with a belief that when they were 
 read to him, and he signed them, they contained a 
 ])rovision that the garrison should march out with the 
 honours of war. 
 
 In his cross-examination by the Court, colonel 
 Miller states, that according to his best recollection, 
 he went to the tent between ten and eleven o'cloek. 
 
GENERAL HULL. , tC3 
 
 On the morning of the sixteenth ; — that he remained 
 about three quarters of an hour ; — that after he had 
 signed the capitulation, he went to the fort and went 
 to bed. There were then no British troops in the 
 fort, but he saw as he went in, a company of about one 
 hundred British soldiers, standing near the gate of the 
 fort. In a subsequent part of his cross-examination, 
 he states, that I tokl him I was willing that he should 
 make a surrender the basis of a treaty, and that he 
 must get the best terms he could. He further says, 
 that when I sent out the flag, I mentioned to him that 
 I did it to gain time ; that I expected to procure a 
 cessation of hostilities, and that I might in the mean 
 time hear from colonels Mac Arthur and Cass. Colo- 
 nel Miller Avas called again a few days after his first 
 examination, and he then stated, that after the first 
 flag was sent out, and before an answer was returned, 
 colonel Brush came to me, and having been inform- 
 ed, that Enagg's men, who had the advanced post be- 
 low the fort, had deserted to the enemy, colonel 
 Brush exclaimed, that " By God, or that, he believed 
 " by God, his men would desert to a man." 
 
 I believe, may it please the Court, I have here col- 
 lected all the testimony that is material, Avhether it 
 be for or against me, which in any wise relates to the 
 matter now under consideration. I do not pretend 
 that I have given the very words of the witnesses in 
 all instances ; but I have done so, as nearly as my 
 own recollection, and the notes of my counsel, would 
 
1G4 DEFENCE OF 
 
 permit. If there be any errours, or omissions, they 
 certainly cannot be intentional ; because I know that 
 the members of the Court will have recourse to their 
 own minutes, and to the record of the Judge Advo- 
 cate ; and if it should appear that I have, in any re- 
 spect, wilfully perverted the testimony, it would be an 
 artifice from which I would derive no benefit. 
 
 In reviewing the testimony, the Court, I think, must 
 at once perceive a strange variety in the statements 
 of the different witnesses. Though the times at which 
 the difilerent transactions took place are all impor- 
 tant, hardly any two of the witnesses agree in this 
 respect. 
 
 The Court will recollect, that there are three docu- 
 ments in evidence, which appear to form the articles 
 of capitulation. These are all dated on the sixteenth 
 of August. One, purporting to be the articles of capitu- 
 lation; the other purporting to be a supplement to the 
 articles; and the third purporting to be an addition 
 to the supplemental articles. There is also a fourth 
 document, being a letter directed to the commanding 
 officer of the Rapids, which purports to be an expla- 
 nation of the articles of capitulation. Before I make 
 any observations on this testimony, I will give the 
 Court a relation of my conduct in respect to the sur> 
 render, and state the motives, which influenced me. 
 If a departure from the forms, ceremonies, and eti- 
 quette of modern warfare, where civilized men are the 
 
GENERAL HULL. 163 
 
 belligerents, will condemn me, I must submit. But I 
 do persuade myself, that this Court will consider my 
 peculiar situation, and the character of the enemy 
 which was opposed to me ; and that I will be thought 
 excusable, if I permitted a precipitation to which 
 some forms and pageantry were sacrificed, with a 
 view to save from the cruelty of the savages, many 
 brave men, and many families of parents and chil- 
 dren. 
 
 As soon as I found that the enemy intended a se- 
 rious attack upon Detroit, I knew that sooner or later 
 my army must fall. I knew, that even victory would 
 not save me, and could be but a temporary advantage. 
 The certain consequences of defeat I could not con- 
 template without horrour. It presented a scene, which 
 I need not attempt to describe. It is obvious, that 
 it would have left our savage enemies to indulge, with- 
 out restraint, their passion for rapine and cruelty. 
 The small body of regulars which I had with me, I 
 was obliged to keep in the fort, for its protection. I 
 had no other troops that understood the management 
 of cannon. With one third of the residue of my force 
 absent, and with nothing to rely upon out of the fort, 
 but untried and undisciplined militia, officered by 
 men, most of whom were in hostility to me, and had 
 even conspired against me, what was I to expect from 
 a contest ? 
 
 I determined at any rate, that I ought, if it were 
 possible, to ward off the attack, and gain time, till the 
 
IGo DEFENCE OF 
 
 tletaclimeiit under colonels Mac Arthur and Cass^ 
 who were my two senior officers, might return. 
 
 The Court will recollect, that I had sent an ex- 
 press for them, as soon as I received general Brock's 
 summons on the fifteenth. After the line was formed 
 on the sixteenth, as appears by the testimony of cap- 
 tain Mac Commick, colonel Van Horn, and major 
 Snelling, I visited the troops where they were drawn 
 up. I then went to the fort, in expectation of hear- 
 ing of the absent detachment ; but receiving no intel- 
 ligence from them, I determined to propose a cessa- 
 tion of hostilities to treat of a surrender. I accord- 
 ingl}'^ sent a flag over the river, and when the British 
 officer came to inquire the meaning of that flag, I 
 sent the note to general ]5rock, of which major Snel- 
 ling speaks. That these were my views when I sent 
 this flag, appears by the testimony of colonel Miller, 
 to whom I explained myself on the subject. I do not 
 recollect what were the precise words of this note, 
 but I think it will appear very evident to the Court, 
 that the contents of it could not have been, as major 
 Snelling has stated, neither more nor less than an 
 offer of unconditional surrender. For, according 
 to major Snelling, tl;*^ first question general Brock 
 put to him, after he had read the note, was to ask 
 major Snelling if he " was authorized to agree on 
 terms." No such question would have been asked if 
 I had offered to surrender without terms. 
 
 As soon as I had determined to negotiate, I also de- 
 termined to change my positions for defence. I thought 
 
GENERAL HULL- 167 
 
 it better to draw the troops to the fort, and if I made 
 a resistance, it was my opinion that I could do it to 
 most advantage, by manning the fort with a full com- 
 plement, and forming a line, supported on the right 
 by the fort, and on the left by the citadel and the 
 batteries on the bank of the river ; having in front a 
 line of pickets wliich extended from the fort to the 
 citadel, and which was intended to cover the commu- 
 nication between one and the other. With these 
 views and intentions, I ordered the troops to the fort, 
 intending to post them from thence before the negoti- 
 ation should break off, if there should be no terms 
 agreed upon. When these orders were given, I had 
 appointed colonels Brush and Miller to repair to a 
 tent without the fort, and treat with the enemy. At 
 this moment I received the intelligence, that the two 
 companies mentioned by major Anderson, Knagg's 
 and Shover's, had gone over to the enemy ; and heard 
 from colonel BrusJi, the declaration, that " ly God" 
 every man of his regiment had or would desert. The 
 consequences of such a defection immediately occur- 
 red tome. Colonel Brush's troops had been posted 
 to guard the upper part of the settlement. If they 
 made no resistance, there v^^as nothing to hinder the 
 British and their savages from landing above the 
 town ; and, while we should be engaged with the in- 
 vaders from the south, the savages would be making 
 indiscriminate slaughter of the inliabitants, through 
 tlie whole extent of the northern part of the settle- 
 ment. 
 
1G8 DEFENCE OF 
 
 From this moment I determined to surrender on the 
 best terms I could obtain. I told colonel Miller, that 
 this was my determination. I went to the tent. Colo- 
 nel Miller had not arrived there. I had mentioned to 
 colonel Brush and the British officers, the terms I 
 should insist upon, and concluded by saying, " 1 shall 
 surrender ;'' meaning, on the terms I had previously 
 mentioned. This was the declaration colonel Miller 
 heard. After I had explained the terms I had ex- 
 l>ectcd, I left the tent and returned to the fort. On my 
 arrival there, I found to my surprise that all the troops 
 bad crowded into the fort, had stacked their arms, and 
 were in a state of entire insubordination. Let it be 
 remembered, that neither of these steps had been 
 taken by my orders. I had ordered colonel Findlay's 
 regiment onh'^ into the fort ; and it is not proved, or 
 pretended, that I gave any orders for stacking the 
 arms. I now became impatient to put the place un- 
 der the protection of the British. I knew that there 
 were thousands of the savages around us. Every mo- 
 ment reports were brought to me of their depredations, 
 and in the situation in which my troops then were, I 
 could afford no protection to the inhabitants. I was 
 anxious, that our enemies should have the command 
 and government, that they might be able to put a re- 
 straint on their savage allies, which I had no power to 
 do. An additional weight on my mind, that had 
 great influence on my conduct, was what I considered 
 might be the dangerous situation of the detachment 
 under colonels Mac Arthur and Cass. I thought i^ 
 possible it might be at a distance, and might be 
 
GENERAL HULL. 169 
 
 cut off. If we should unsuccessfully resist, I was sure 
 it would. Ill this state of things, the articles of 
 capitulation were brought to me from the tent, signed 
 and executed. I accepted them. I gave a copy of 
 them to major Jessup, as he has testified, and he after- 
 wards read them to the troops, when they marched 
 out at twelve o'clock. These must be considered 
 as the articles of capitulation, and by these my con- 
 duct must be tested. For the two other documents, 
 the one styled supplemental articles, and the other an 
 addition to the supplemental articles, are rather to be 
 considered as an agreement between myself and the 
 enemy's general than as parts of the capitulation. I 
 admit, that when these Avere signed 1 had no power 
 to resist if he had not chosen to agree to them, and 
 therefore they are no more te be considered as a part 
 of the capitulation, than the letter which bears date 
 the next day. It was these supplemental articles, 
 which were signed in capfein Dyson's quarters, and 
 most of the witnes'ses, who speak of what was done 
 before or after the capitulation was signed, obviously 
 speak with reference to the execution of these instru- 
 ments. 
 
 God knows tlie articles are not what I would have 
 wished to have had them. If I had been warring 
 with civilized man, where the blood of combatants 
 only could be shed, I ought not, I would not have 
 accepted them. But when upon the consequences of 
 refusing them, depended the lives of so many innocent 
 people, I did not feel myself authorized to reject 
 them. 
 
 16 
 
170 DEFENCE OF 
 
 Having put before the Court the testimony whicli 
 relates to this specification, and given my own ac- 
 count of the transactions to which it relates, I will 
 asfain notice the accusations, and make some few ob- 
 servations upon them. 
 
 Tlie first accusation is, that I surrendered before 
 the capitulation was signed. This is certainly dis- 
 proved. There w^as not an enemy in the fort before 
 the capitulation was brought to me from the tent, nor 
 before I delivered a copj^ cf it to major Jessup.' * The 
 testimony of colonel Miller is conclusive upon this 
 point. He says, there were no British troops in the 
 fort when he brought me the capitulation from the 
 
 tent. 
 
 * 
 
 A second accusation is, that I did not stipulate for the 
 lionours of war. Among the variety of circumstances, 
 in my situation, which I ftml to deplore, and which 
 agitated my mind to a great degree, there was none 
 that excited my own feelings more, than to find, that 
 though this provision had been inserted in the articles, 
 as originally drawn by the commissioners, it had been 
 stricken out. I tliought of rejecting the articles on 
 this account. I nuist have then opened a new nego- 
 ciation. I have already stated what appeared to me as 
 tlie consequences of further delay. The savages were 
 unrestrained. I determined not to expose the lives 
 of the inhabitants to their fury for the sake of obtain- 
 ing so useless a pageantry. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 171 
 
 The articles are also condemned, because tliey con- 
 tained no stipulation for the security of the friendly 
 inhabitants of Canada. With respect to the people 
 (of Canada who had been friendly to us, and who had 
 ■remained in their own country when we retreated, no 
 stipulation in their favour was necessary. The Bri- 
 tish had ofifered full pardon to all their subjects who 
 had shewn any disaffection ; and when the capitula- 
 tion was signed, there were none in Canada who had 
 not availed themselves of this offer. With respect to 
 those who were with us, the capitulation does contain 
 an article in their favour. They are unquestionably 
 included in the third article, which provides that 
 "private persons, and property of every description^ 
 " shall be respected." 
 
 But, Sir, a stipulation in favour of Canadians, who 
 were with us at the time of the surrender, was, in fact, 
 entirely a matter of supererogation ; because, accord- 
 ing to the best of my recollection, there was but one 
 person of that description with us, at the time of the 
 capitulation, ^nd he is now an officer of rank in our 
 army. 
 
 The evidence, that any stipulation for the security 
 of the Canadians, other than what the articles con- 
 tained, was unnecessary, is, that it is the undoubted 
 fact, that from the time we retreated from Canada, 
 no individual has suffered, either in his person or pro- 
 perty, on account of any part he may have taken 
 against his own government, or on account of any 
 connection which he may have had with our army. 
 
172 DEFENCE OP 
 
 The specification states other olyections to the 
 capitulation, but as they are of an inferiour nature, and 
 must be excusable if those I have noted are so, I 
 f*ha!l not trouble the Court with any remarks upon 
 them. 
 
 Something has been said in the course of the trial, 
 as to my having after the capitulation consented to 
 the surrender of some distant posts. It might be 
 enough to say, that there is no specification on thi& 
 subject ; but I will only observe, that so far from this 
 being a concession to the enemy, it originated in my 
 suggestion. I reflected, that if they should hear of 
 the capitulation, before they were informed that they 
 v.ere included i*the surrender, they might retreat, if 
 they should judge it in their power to do so — but if 
 early intelligence of the surrender should not reach 
 them, tliey would be exposed to the whole savage 
 force of the enemy, and might be sacrificed, unless 
 they were protected by the capitulation. Much tes- 
 timony has also been given in relation to the situation 
 of the British troops before the surrender, and to shew 
 that they were suffered to approach too near our w orks 
 before the capitulation v/as signed. It would be easy 
 to sheAv the strange contradiction of testimony on 
 this point, and to prove that such an accusation would 
 be without foundation. But certainly the accusations 
 against me, and which I am obliged to answer, are 
 sufRciently numerous. The Court would hardly think 
 me excusable in trespassing on their patience, to 
 make a defence against accusations not preferred— ^ 
 
C4ENEIIAL HULL. 173 
 
 I shall therefore say nothing further as to this sug- 
 gestion, than that a specification founded upon it is 
 not to be found under any of the charges. 
 
 There is, Gentlemen, one other charge which I 
 have to answer. It is an accusation which has been 
 the most woundmg to my feelings, and the discussion 
 of which is the most painful task I have yet had to 
 perform. Not because I have any doubt but that I 
 shall convince you it is as much without foundation 
 as any other, but because it imposes upon me the ne- 
 cessity of examining testimony, which no man, how- 
 ever innocent he may be, can repeat without disgust. 
 
 If in the embarrassing and difficult situations in 
 which I was placed during my late command, I have 
 committed some errours, surely what I have suffered 
 by this prosecution, and what I must now suffer in 
 making this pe.rt of my defence, will be some atone^ 
 ment. 
 
 For more than half a century I supported a charac- 
 ter without reproach. My youth was devoted to the 
 service of my country. I fought her battles in that 
 war which achieved her liberty and independence, 
 and which was ended before many of yon, Gentlemen, 
 who are my judges, were born. 
 
 If, upon any occasion, a man may speak of his own. 
 merits, it is at sucli a time as this, and I hope I may 
 be permitted to present to you, in very few words, ii 
 16* 
 
174 DEFENCE OF 
 
 narrative of my life, while I was engaged in scenes 
 which were calculated to prove a man's firmness and 
 courage. I shall do -it with the less reluctance, because 
 the testimony I have offered of the venerable men 
 who served with me in the revolutionary war will 
 vouch for all I have to say. 
 
 In the year seventeen hundred and seventy-five, at 
 the age of about twejijy-one j ears, I was appointed a 
 captain in one of the Connecticut regiments. During 
 that campaign, and until March, seventeen hundred 
 and seventy-six, when the enemy evacuated Boston, 
 I served with the army at Cambridge and Roxbmy, 
 nnder the immediate command of general Washington? 
 1 was with that part of the army in March, seventeen 
 hundred and seventy -six, which took possession of 
 Dorchester Heights, the movement which compelled 
 the enemy to evacuate Boston. The next day, the 
 regiment to which I belonged marched for New-York. 
 I was on Long Island when the enemy landed, and 
 remained until the night the wlioie army retreated. 
 1 was in several small skirmishes, both on Long 
 fsland and York I slan(J before Ihe army retired to 
 the White Plains. I then belonged to colonel Charles 
 Webb's regiment, of Connecticut. 
 
 This regiment was in the severest part of the ac- 
 tion on Chatterdon's Hill, a little advanced of the 
 White Plains, a few days after the main body of the 
 army abandoned New-York. This battle is memora- 
 ble in the history of our country, and the regiment to 
 
GENERAL HULL. TT5 
 
 which I belonged received the particular thanks of 
 general Washington, in his public orders, for its bra- 
 very and good conduct on the occasion. It was par- 
 ticularly distinguished from all the other troops en- 
 gaged in the action. I received a slight wound by a 
 musket ball in my side, but it did not prevent me 
 from remaining at the head of my company. I was 
 in the battle at Trenton, when the Hessians were 
 taken, in December, seventeen hundred and seventy- 
 six, and being one of the youngest captains in the 
 army, w^as promoted by general Washington, the day 
 after the battle, to a majority, for my conduct on that 
 occasion. 
 
 The first of January, seventeen hundred and seven- 
 ty-seven, I was in the battle of Princeton. In the 
 campaign of the same year, the regiment to which I 
 belonged served in the northern army. I was early 
 in the spring ordered to Ticonderoga, and commanded 
 the regiment (being the senior officer present) under 
 general Saint Clair, and I was with that officer in his 
 retreat from that post. After general Saint Clair's 
 army formed a junction with general Schuyler's army, 
 on the North river, at Fort Edward, the regiment to 
 which I belonged was detached and marched to Fort 
 Schuyler, and relieved that post which was besieged 
 by general Saint Ledger. On the retreat of general 
 Schuyler's army from Fort Edward, I commanded the 
 rear guard of the army, and being two miles in the 
 rear, was attacked by a large body of British troops 
 and Indians at day light in the morning, in which 
 
176 DEFENCE 01?^ 
 
 action were killed and wounded between thirty and 
 forty of my guard, and I received the particular thanks 
 of general Schuyler for my conduct on the occasion, 
 
 I was in the two memorable battles on the nine- 
 teenth of September, and the seventh of October, on 
 Bhemus's Heights, against general Burgoyne's army, 
 previous to its surrender. In the action of the nine- 
 teenth September, I commanded a detachment of 
 three hundred men, who fought the principal part of 
 the afternoon, and more than one half of them were 
 killed and wounded. 
 
 On the seventh of October I likewise commanded 
 a detachment from the brigade, which assisted in at- 
 tacking the enemy on the left of our position, defeated 
 him, followed him to the right of his lines, stormed 
 his entrenchments, and took and held possession of 
 the right of his position, which compelled him to re- 
 treat to Saratoga, and there capitulate. 
 
 After the memorable event of the capitulation of 
 general Burgoyne's army, the regiment to which I 
 belonged was ordered to Pennsylvania, to join the 
 army under the command of general Washington. 
 
 I remained with the army the winter of seventeen 
 hundred and seventy-seven, at Valley Forge, and in 
 the spring of seventeen hundred and seventy-eight, 
 when the British army evacuated Philadelphia, I was 
 in the battle of Monmouth. From December, sevea 
 
GENERAL HULL. 177 
 
 teen hundred and seventy-eight to May seventeen 
 hundred and seventy-nine, I commanded the Ameri- 
 can posts in advance of the White Plains, near 
 Kingsbridge, during which time I had various skir- 
 mishes with the enemy. In May, seventeen hundred 
 and seventy-nine, the principal part of the British 
 army advanced up the North river to Verplancks 
 and Stony Point, and I was ordered to retreat before 
 them to West Point. 
 
 I then joined the light infantry under the command 
 of general AVayne, and was in the memorable attack 
 on Stony Point, with a separate command of four 
 hundred light infantry. 
 
 For my conduct on this occasion, I received the 
 j)articular thanks of general Wayne, general Wash- 
 ington, and Congress. 
 
 In the summer and autumn of seventeen hundred 
 and eighty, I commanded the advanced posts of the 
 army, and in December of that j^ear I commanded 
 an expedition against the enemy stationed at Morri- 
 siana, which was successful, and for which I re- 
 ceived the thanks of general Washington in his 
 general orders to the army, and likewise the thanks 
 of Congress. 
 
 General Washington in his orders, I well remember, 
 made use of these words, " he thanked me for my ju- 
 
178 DEFENCE OP 
 
 " dicioiis arrangements in the plan of operation, and 
 " for my intrepidity and valour in the execution." 
 
 From the conclusion of the revolutionary war I 
 have lived with the respect of my countrymen, and 
 have enjoyed repeated marks of their confidence in 
 the offices which have been bestowed upon me. 
 When I found that the independence for which I had 
 BO often fought was assailed ; that again my 'country 
 must appeal to arms to avenge her wrongs, and to 
 protect her rights, I felt that I might yet do. her some 
 service. For though many years had passed since I 
 had fought under her standard, and though my arm 
 might not have its wonted strength, yet my spi- 
 rit was unbroken, and my devotion to her unimpaired. 
 I thought, in the field, where there could be but few 
 who had any military experience, what I had learned 
 in the most active scenes of a seven years war, might 
 be useful. I fondly hoped that in my age, as well as 
 in my youth, I might render services that should de- 
 serve the gratitude of my country. That if I fell by 
 the sword of her enemies, my grave would be moist- 
 ened with the tears of my countrymen, that my de- 
 scendants would be proud of my name and fame : but 
 how vain is anticipation ! I am now accused of 
 crimes which would blast my former honours, and 
 transmit my memory with infamy to posterity. And 
 in that hideous catalogue, there is none from the im- 
 putation of which my nature and my feelings have 
 more recoiled than from that of cowardice, to which 
 1 am now to answer. I shall confine myself under 
 
GENERAL HULL. 179 
 
 this cliarge to the specifications, or to such part of 
 the- specifications, as relate to my personal deport- 
 ment. 
 
 Almost every omission or commission timing the 
 campaign, which it has been thought proper to cen- 
 sure, has been assembled under this charge, and 
 they have all been imputed to cowardice. But as 
 most of the acts have been specified in support of 
 other charges, I shall not again notice them, but con- 
 fine myself to the allegation that I shewed personal 
 fear and a want of courage. 
 
 However painful the recapitulation of the testimony 
 on this point must be to me, it is so necessary that it 
 should be brought together, to the end you may have 
 it before you in one view, that I shall go through the 
 disagreeable task of repeating it. 
 
 The first witness in point of fact, as well as of im- 
 portance, is major Snelling. He was a captain when 
 he joined the army at Urbana ; but is now a colonel. 
 
 He testifies as follows. " During the cannonade I 
 " frequently saw^ the General. I once saw him stand- 
 " ing ; he might have risen twice ; most of the time he 
 " was sitting on an old tent, under the curtain of the 
 " fort opposite the enemy's batteries. 
 
 " I have been taught to believe, that there are cer« 
 " tain human passions which are indicated by appear- 
 
180 . DEFENCE OF 
 
 *' ances, and the appearances of general Hull accord- 
 " ing to my mind indicated fear. 
 
 " The reasons that induced me to draw tliat con- 
 " elusion were, that the General selected the safest 
 " place in the fort for his seat ; his voice trembled 
 " when he spoke ; he apparently unconsciously filled 
 " his mouth with tobacco, so that his cheeks were 
 "extended by it; the saliva ran from his mouth on 
 *' his neckcloth and cloaths ; he often rubbed his 
 "face with his hands, and distributed the tobacco 
 *' juice about his face." 
 
 He further testified in his cross-examination, that 
 when he returned from Spring Wells, at the dawn of 
 day on the morning of the sixteenth, he went into 
 the fort to make his report to general Hull, but could 
 not find him, nor find any one who knew where he 
 w^as. 
 
 He said, he did not know if general Hull was in 
 the fort at the time the officers were killed. He saw 
 him immediately afterwards. After the men were 
 killed it might have been fifteen or twenty. minutes 
 before he saw captain Hull with the white flag. It 
 might have been an hour, but he did not think it was. 
 
 The witness could not say that he saw general 
 Hull in the situation he has described between the 
 time the men were killed and the sending the f?ag by 
 captain Hull. He recollects that at the time captain 
 
GENERAL HULL. 181 
 
 Hull was fixing the flag, general Hull was standing, 
 and was in the situation he has described. General 
 Hull was out of the fort early that morning, but the 
 witness does not know where he was. At the time 
 the enemy was crossing, the General was standing on 
 the parade. 
 
 I wish the Court to notice the great attention, 
 which major Snelling paid, to be particular in very 
 minute circumstances in giving his testimony ; not 
 only as to the positions in which he saw me, but when 
 his examination was read over to him, and he found 
 that, as it stood, it represented him as saying that I 
 had distributed the tobacco over my face, he desired 
 it might be corrected, so as to state that what he had 
 said, was confined to the lower part of my face. 
 
 Captain Mac Commick testifies as follows, " I was 
 " not present when colonel Findlay received orders 
 " to march into the fort. I joined him as he was 
 ''- going into the fort ; he told me of the order, and said 
 " he would not obey it ; but would go into the fort 
 " himself, and directed me to form the regiment. 
 " The colonel then came back so near to me, as to 
 " tell me to let the companies marcli up, and I did 
 '' so." The witness then relates what passed between 
 colonel Findlay and myself, and proceeds as follows* 
 " The General appeared very much agitated. He 
 " a])peared to be under as much alarm as I ever sa^v 
 " a person. He had been chewing tobacco, and the 
 17 
 
182 DEFENCE OF 
 
 *' lower part of bis face and his vest were covered 
 " with it." 
 
 On his cross examination he testified, that it might 
 have been ten minutes, or half an hour, or more, after 
 the firing ceased, before the troops were ordered to 
 march into the fort ; — that it was at least half an 
 Iiour after the firing before the witness went into the 
 fort; — that he saw me once that morning out of the 
 fort, and thinks I was near where colonel Findlay's 
 regiment was forming the line of battle behind the 
 picket fence. Colonel Van Horn, who was a major 
 of colonel Findlay's corps, testifies, that after colo- 
 nel Findlay's regiment was formed on the morning of 
 the sixteenth of August, and about an hour or half 
 an hour before the flag was hoisted, I was at the 
 line ; — that this was during the cannonade ; — that at 
 about the time the firing ceased, captain Snelling 
 came, with orders that colonel Findlay should return 
 with his regiment to the fort ; — the cannonade had 
 then ceased ; — the witness turned round, and saw the 
 flag hoisted on the fort. The witness further stated, 
 that he then went into tlie fort with his battalioji, and 
 after he got in he saw me, but is not certain whether 
 I was there when he entered. The witness then 
 proceeded as follows, " when I first saw general Hull 
 "' he was on the steps going into one of the rooms. 
 " His face was discoloured with tobacco juice. It was 
 " over the lower part of his face, and a spot was over 
 " his eye. I thought he was under the influence of 
 "fear. I had no doubt.of it.'' On his cross-exami- 
 
GENERAL HULL. 183 
 
 nation he says, that he saw me on the night of the 
 fifteenth, and as he thinks, about midnight, and before 
 the cannonading had ceased, at the place where colo- 
 nel Findlay's regiment was formed that night. He 
 saw me the next morning out of tlie fort at colonel 
 Findlay's quarters, and again at the line of battle. 
 When the witness was asked, whether care and anxiety 
 might not have produced the appearance he describ- 
 ed, he answered, that care and anxiety might have^ 
 added to those appearances, but upon comparing faces 
 he thought mine had the indication of fear. 
 
 Captain Baker testifies as follows, " I saw general 
 " Hull on the morning of the sixteenth. He appeared 
 " to be embarrassed, and at a loss how to act. I had 
 *' but one opinion, which was that he was under the 
 " influence of personal fear. I could not account for 
 « the surrender in any other way." On his cross-ex- 
 amination he said, " on the morning of the sixteenth, 
 *' during the cannonade, I saw the General in the 
 "fort sometimes sitting, sometimes walking, and 
 '' sometimes standing.'' 
 
 Lieutenant Stansbury testifies, that on the night of 
 the fifteenth of August, he found me at about eleven 
 o'clock at night, lying on the piazza of the barracks 
 in the fort, with my boots and cloaths on ;— that in 
 the morning when he awoke at day break 1 was not 
 there. " I saw the General," says he, " on a tolerably 
 " safe place ; as to his being afraid, I cannot say whe- 
 " ther he was or not." " I saw the General on the 
 
184 DEFENCE OF 
 
 " parade ground. I did not see any necessity for his 
 " exposing himself more than he did." 
 
 Major Jessup testifies, that on the fifteenth, after 
 the cannonade commenced, he in company with Mr. 
 Diigan met me on horseback in the street near the 
 second battery. He says, " the General appeared to 
 *' be agitated ; either Mr. Dugan or myself observed, 
 " the General was frightened; one of us said, we 
 " must cheer him up. We approached him, spoke to 
 " him, he appeared pale and confused, immediately 
 " dismounted and led his horse towards the fort." 
 
 " I did not see general Hull till about break of day 
 " on the morning of tlie sixteenth, when the General 
 " came to my tent, and directed me to write an order 
 " for the return of colonels Cass and Mac Arthur." 
 
 The witness further testifies, that shortly after the 
 enemy commenced their fire, at the request of 
 colonel Findlay, he went to me to have an explana- 
 tion of an order which had been delivered by my 
 aid-de-camp ; — that he found me and received direc- 
 tions from me, for forming the line of battle ; — that 
 while he was attempting to collect some dragoons, of 
 whicli I had directed him to take the command, he 
 saw that our line was breaking and retreating towards 
 the fort ; — he then looked towards tJie fort, and saw 
 the white flag flying from it ; — that at the request of 
 colonel Findlay, he then went to the fort. The wit- 
 ness then proceeds as follows, " I found the General 
 
GENERAL HULL. 185 
 
 '*' in the fort. I thought him very much frightened. 
 " When I met him, I inquired of him, if it were pos- 
 " sible we were about to surrender. He said some- 
 " thing about terms, and something about the enemy's 
 " force, which I do not recollect. His voice at that 
 "time was tremulous. I observed, we could at least 
 " liold out till joined by colonels Cass and Mac Ar- 
 « thur. He replied, my God, what shall I do with 
 " these women and children !" The witness then 
 states, that he left the fort, went to colonel Findlay, 
 and did not see me till terms of capitidation had been 
 agreed upon; — that then I was perfect!}^ composed. 
 The witness also testifies as follows : — "When I came 
 " to report to the General, after reconnoitring the 
 " enemy, I found him on the side of the fort next the 
 '^ enemy, completely sheltered, sitting on a tent be^ 
 "side a bed. At the same time I reported that our 
 '' guard, the most advanced towards the enemy, had 
 "surrendered. The General said that colonel Brush 
 " had reported to him that his men were leaving himc 
 " After this when 1 met the General in the fort, and 
 ^' after the flag was hoisted, he exclaimed that four 
 '' men had been killed by one shot ;— he appeared so 
 *' alarmed as not to know what he was doing." The 
 witness then describes my appearance at that time 
 nearly in tiie words which had been used by other 
 witnesses. 
 
 The witness on a subsequent part of his examina- 
 tion stated, that at the moment when he was in con- 
 versation with me on the evening of the fifteenths . 
 
 17* 
 
186 DEFENCE OF 
 
 near the second battery, a shot struck a stone house 
 near me ; — that I appeared much agitated, dismounted 
 my horse, and walked off without making him a reply. 
 " Whenever I saw the General," says the witness, 
 '' before the capitulation was signed, he appeared agi- 
 " tated ; afterward, entirely composed. Whether the 
 " agitation proceeded from the novelty of his situa- 
 " tion or fear, I cannot say, but I believe the latter, 
 '' if not both." 
 
 Captain Eustman testifies as follows, " on the even- 
 " ing of the fifteenth, a shell appeared to be coming 
 " into the fort. General Hull ran towards the north- 
 " west bastion, apparently to avoid it, and to get un- 
 " der cover of the platform. The General appeared 
 *' alarmed and frightened, as I also observed to my 
 " companions at the time." 
 
 Lieutenant Philips testifies as follows, " I saw ge- 
 " neral Hull on the morning of the sixteenth. Most 
 " part of the time during the cannonade he was sitting 
 " with his back to the parapet next the enemy. He 
 " was sitting there with a number of gentlemen. I re- 
 " collect one gentleman and one lady near to him. He 
 " appeared to me under the influence of fear. He ap- 
 " peared very much agitated. I think doctor Cun- 
 "ningham was the gentleman that was with him. 
 " There might have been other officers with him, but 
 " I do not recollect." 
 
GENERAL HULL. 187 
 
 Colonel Miller testifies as follows, " I did not dis- 
 " cover any agitation in the General on the fifteenth. 
 " On the sixteenth he did appear mucli agitate^. He 
 " was on the fort. He was sometimes sitting, some- 
 " times standing, and sometimes walking. Whether 
 " his agitation proceeded from anxiety on account of 
 " the responsibility he was taking, or from personal 
 '* alarm, I cannot say. After the surrender he told 
 *' me he was afraid, if he had fought the enemy, they 
 *' would have taken advantage of that part of his pro- 
 " clamation, which declared that no white man taken 
 '•'■ fighting with an Indian should be spared." 
 
 On his cross-examination, colonel Miller said, " I 
 '' saw no act of the General's on the morning of the 
 " sixteenth which I can say might not have proceed- 
 '• ed from the fatigue and responsibility he was under." 
 
 I put to colonel Miller the following question:— -Can 
 you mention any act of mine on the sixteenth, which 
 you did then or do now impute to personal fear ? — 
 To this the witness answered :—" Yes, I did think 
 " such an immediate surrender must have proceeded 
 " from your fears." 
 
 To the following question : — Did you see me, while 
 I was in the fort, in any place or situation unfit for a 
 commanding officer ?— The Colonel answered : — " I 
 '* can describe to the Court where the General wa?, 
 ** and the Court can judge." 
 
188 DEFENCE OF 
 
 " He was generally near the easterly parapet of the 
 " fort. I was there part of the time mj^self. The 
 " Gei^eral leaned down. The whole easterly side of 
 " the fort was as safe as the spot where the General 
 '^ was for the most part of the time. The General's 
 " station was the most convenient to receive commu- 
 " nications from without the fort." 
 
 Colonel Miller, upon a re-examination, further tes- 
 tifies, that he had frequently observed a habit which 1 
 had when I w as much engaged, of chewing tobacco to 
 excess, and taking it from my mouth with my fingers, 
 and rolling it in my fingers, and putting it in my mouth 
 again, and rolling it from my mouth to my fingers 
 alternately. That he observed more of this habit on 
 the sixteenth than usual, and thought the addition 
 might be owing to v^-ant of rest from fatigue. 
 
 Major Whistler says, my appearance induced him 
 to tliink I was under the influence of personal fear. 
 
 Lieutenant Peckham testifies, that he saw me on 
 the sixteenth of August, and says, " I had no doubt 
 *' but that the General was under the influence of per- 
 " sonal fear, from his embarrassment, as he sat still and 
 *' gave no orders."' 
 
 Major Munson testifies, that he saw me on the fif- 
 teenth of August, and saw me again on the sixteenth, 
 after the capitulation was settled. He adds, " The 
 '** General's gituittion was critical. If he had had any 
 
GENERAL HULL. I8§ 
 
 " feelings, he must have had great care and anxiety. I 
 " saw nothing which might not have been accounted 
 " for, without resorting to the impression of personal 
 " fear." On his cross-examination by the Court, this 
 witness says, "It was ten or fifteen minutes after the 
 " officers were killed, that he saw me sitting in one of 
 " the officers' quarters; but does not recollect that it 
 " was during the cannonade, either on the fifteenth or 
 "' sixteenth, that he saw me." 
 
 Captain Maxwell testifies, that he served in the re- 
 volutionary war ; v^^as engaged in the affair at Browns- 
 town under colonel Miller, which made the twenty- 
 third battle in which he had fought; — that after the 
 cannonading commenced on the fifteenth, he saw me on 
 horseback at one of tJie batteries ; — that I had a con- 
 versation with the officer commanding at the time the 
 balls were passing and repassing ; — that he took notice 
 of my countenance, and that I appeared firm, collect- 
 ed, and cool ; — that I sat four or five minutes on my 
 horse, and rode off again ; — that he did not see me on 
 the sixteenth ; — that at the time the army was re- 
 treating from Sandv/ich, there was a clamour, that I 
 was intimidated, and that was the reason why, on the 
 evening of the sixteenth, he particularly observed my 
 countenance. 
 
 General Taylor testifies, that he saw me several 
 times on the evening of the fifteenth, during the can- 
 nonade ; — that there was no impression made on his 
 mmd of my being under personal fear on that day or 
 
100 DEFENCE OF 
 
 evening ; — that I appeared to be thoughtful and very 
 low spirited ; — that he heard no indication of inspirit- 
 ing the men ; — that my countenance was dull ; — that 
 he saw me near the gateway, and that I ordered colo- 
 nel Findlay to move from the upper to the lower side 
 of the fort, without any specific orders how to form. 
 Early on the sixteenth, information came that the 
 enemy were preparing to cross, and no orders were 
 given to resist them ; — that my appearance displayed 
 more of the marks of tobacco than he had generally 
 seen in a neat man ; — that his impression was, that I 
 was under the influence of personal fear ; — that he did 
 not see me again till the flag was hoisted ; — that when 
 he saw me near the gate on the sixteenth, he saw 
 many officers with me, and among the rest captain 
 Snelling; — that he did not consider being there as 
 shrinking from danger. 
 
 Captain Bacon testifies, that he saw me in the fort 
 very frequently on the fifteenth and sixteenth ; — that 
 on the sixteenth he saw me, with doctor Cunningham 
 and his wife, sitting on some planks ; — that he also saw 
 other persons there, some of Avhom he thinks were offi- 
 cers ; — that during the cannonade he saw me on the 
 parapet of the fort, once on the evening of the fifteenth, 
 and once on the sixteenth ; — that he s^w me in differ- 
 ent places about the garrison, during the cannonade ; 
 — that I seemed engaged as usual, but agitated on the 
 morning of the sixteenth more than common ; — that he 
 did not know the cause ; — that he had no suspicion 
 that it was personal fear, neither did he hear such a 
 
GENERAL HULL. 191 
 
 suspicion expressed by any of the officers ;— .that after 
 the shot came in which did execution, the officers 
 and men very generally were in the eastern side of 
 the fort, under the protection of the parapet next the 
 enemy. 
 
 Judge Witherell testifies, that he saw me on the 
 fifteenth, during the cannonade, near one of our bat- 
 teries, when, from all he saw, 1 was cool and collected. 
 
 1 believe, Gentlemen, I have now collected and 
 presented to you in connection, every syllable of the 
 testimony which has been offered in support of the 
 specifications under this charge which relate to my 
 personal ap[)earance and deportment. Such parts of 
 the testimony as have the most bearing, I have endea- 
 voured to repeat in the witnesses' own words, and 
 have done it with as much accuracy as the notes 
 taken by my counsel w^ould permit 
 
 Before, Gentlemen, I proceed further on the exami- 
 nation of this testimony, aHow me to lay before you an 
 extract from an author of great respectability, contain- 
 ing rules not inapplicable to the present occasion, by 
 which the credibility of a witness ought to be tested. 
 
 " A witness," says Mr. Tytler, in his essay on Mi- 
 litary Law, " who amplifies his testimony, unneces- 
 " sarily enlarging upon circumstances unfavourable to 
 "a party; who seems to be gratified by the opportu- 
 ^' nity of furnishing condemnatory evidence, or mant- 
 
192 DEFENCE OP 
 
 " festly betrays passion or prejudice in the substance of 
 " his testimony, or in the manner of delivering it, is 
 " to be listened to with suspicion of his veracity. If 
 ■•' a witness," the author adds, " takes upon him to re- 
 " member with the greatest minuteness ail the cir- 
 *' CLimstances of a transaction long since passed, and 
 " which are of a frivolous nature, and not likely to 
 " dwell on the memory, his testimony is thereby ren- 
 " dered very susiricious." 
 
 I ask the members to test the testimony which has 
 been given against me by these rules. Were there 
 not many of the witnesses who amplified their testi- 
 mony, and unnecessarily enlarged upon circumstances 
 unfavourable to me ; who seemed to be gratified by 
 the opportunity of furnishing condemnatory evidence ? 
 I appeal to the Court to judge of the manner in which 
 the testimony of some of the witnesses was delivered, 
 and whether they did not betray a warmth, that could 
 not leave them free from a suspicion of strong preju- 
 dice or bias ? 
 
 Major Snelling has certainly taken upon himself 
 to remember with the greatest minuteness circum- 
 stances of a frivolous nature. He remembered that 
 my cheeks were swelled with the tobacco I put in 
 my mouth. He remembered that my neckcloth and 
 vest were soiled, and the tobacco was distributed about 
 my face. And when his examination was read over 
 to him, his recollection was so extremely accurate 
 as to the most minute circumstance, that he insisted 
 
GENERAL HULL. . 193 
 
 that what had been written, should be so corrected, 
 as to read that it was the lower part of my face which 
 was soiled. Though, on this particular, he is contra- 
 dicted by colonel Van Horn, who it appears w as no 
 less observing of minute circumstances, and whose 
 memory is not less tenacious of them. Colonel Van 
 Horn recollects, and has been very particular in, 
 stating, that there was a mark made by the tobacco 
 over one of my eyes. He was so very minute as to 
 observe, that it was over my left eye, though I be- 
 lieve it is not so recorded in his testimony. 
 
 Major Snelling's correction, with respect to the 
 situation of the tobacco on my face, will not appear 
 in the record of his testimony. But it will be brought 
 to the remembrance of the Court, by my reminding 
 them, that when major Snelling proposed the altera- 
 tion in the record, so as to state that he meant to have 
 spoken only of the lower part of my face, I objected 
 to its being altered in the minutes, and wished that it 
 might appear from the record of the evidence, that 
 this was a correction of his. 
 
 But, Gentlemen, the opinion of major Snelling that 
 I was under the influence of personal fear, as well as 
 the same opinion of other witnesses, who have very 
 nearly followed his words in their description, is 
 formed, as they avow, from my appearance, and from 
 my situation and conduct in the fort, 
 18 
 
194 DEFENCE OF 
 
 A correct and certain judgment of the emotions of 
 the mind from indications of the countenance, or from 
 mere personal appearances, can liardly ever be formed. 
 And it must be infinitely difficult to do so when fa- 
 tigue, anxiety, and a great responsibility may, all at 
 the same time, be producing their effect. 
 
 iMajor Snelling, though a very young gentleman, it 
 is to be presumed has great acquirements, and it 
 would seem from his testimony, that the human pas- 
 sions have been the objects of his etudy. He intro- 
 duces his testimony on this point, with these words : 
 " I have been taught to believe that there are certain 
 " human passions which are indicated by appearances, 
 *' and the appearance of general Hull, in my mind, 
 *' indicated fear.'' 
 
 I hope that these professions of major Snelling will 
 not give his opinion an undue weight, because he has 
 not told us in what school he acquired his science in 
 physiognomy. Nor has he given us the rules by 
 which, when the mind may be under various excite- 
 ments, he can distinguish the appearances which will 
 indicate the prevalence of one over the other. 
 
 Blajor Snelling, I have no doubt, when he gains 
 more age and experience, will find that the indica- 
 tions of appearances iii respect to the human mind 
 are fallacious. His own case may afford an evidence 
 of it. 
 
GENERAL HULL. 195 
 
 I myself, and many who heard his testimony, and 
 that of many other of the witnesses, and marked the 
 manner of it, thought that they manifested great pas- 
 sion and prejudice against me ; that they seemed gra- 
 tified with the opportunity of furnishing condemnato- 
 ry evidence. These appearances may have been fal- 
 lacious, but if they were so, it is strong evidence that 
 the most erroneous conclusions may be drawn from 
 expressions of countenance, tone of voice, and eager- 
 ness of manner. 
 
 I beg it may be observed, that most of the witnes- 
 ses, except major Snelling, who have given their tes- 
 limony on this point, did not see me in the fort, tilW 
 after the flag was hoisted, when there was of course a 
 cessation of hostilities, nor till after I returned from the 
 tent. The witnesses have all endeavoured to impress 
 on the minds of the Court, that I intended in all events 
 to make an unconditional surrender. If this were the 
 case, where was the occasion for personal fear, after I 
 had invited, by the flag, a negotiation, and had stop- 
 ped the enemy's fire ? Major Jessup says, that when 
 be saw me before the capitulation was signed, I ap- 
 peared greatly agitated, but that afterwards I was en- 
 tirely composed. And yet, as major Jessup did not 
 see me in the fort on the sixteenth, till after the nego- 
 tiation was commenced, there was no more ground for 
 agitation from personal fear, w hen he saw me on that 
 day previously to the capitulation, than there was 
 after that eveut 
 
196 DEFENCE OP 
 
 There is a part of major Jessup's testimonj^ wliicli 
 is certainly worthy of remark. His power of judging 
 of the human passions from appearances is even supe- 
 riour to major Snelling's, because, from his testimony, 
 it seems he can perceive the appearances, when the 
 object is at some distance. He states, that when he 
 and Mr. Dugan saw me on horseback, on the fifteenth, 
 I appeared to be frightened, one of them said, we must 
 cheer him up; we then approached him, says the wit- 
 ness, and spoke to him ; he appeared pale, &c. So 
 that they had, according to this testimony, perceived 
 that I was frightened, while I was on horseback, in 
 
 ^the face of the enemy's fire, and before they had ap- 
 
 ^proached me, or spoke to me. 
 
 I do not deny that on the morning of the sixteenth 
 I was greatly agitated. My body w as worn with fa- 
 tigue, and my mind was filled with the deepest anxiety. 
 On the one hand, I well knew the consequences of a 
 surrender. I knew how unfortunate it was for my 
 country, that I should be obliged to yield. I saw the 
 consequences to myself, I knew that the disappoint- 
 ment of the high expectations which had been raised, 
 would be charged to me. And that all the faults o£ 
 others, to which, in fact, the failure of the expedition 
 was owing, would be laid at my door. I saw too, 
 what was intended to be the effect of the opposition of 
 ray officers to a measure, they knew I must, or would 
 pursue. In proportion as they found me decided on 
 this final step, they became insolent in their opposi- 
 tion, and were most so when it was ascertained, that 
 
GENERAL HULL. 19^ 
 
 they would not meet the enemy, and could not be 
 punished by me. They foresav/, that great reputation 
 was to be purchased at so cheap a rate, as appearing 
 highly averse to the surrender, and afterward pub- 
 lishing to the world all they said and did, as evidence 
 of my criminality and their own heroism. 
 
 While ail these considerations enlisted every pri- 
 vate feeling against the surrender; my mind was agi= 
 tated by the opposite demands of duty. The dread- 
 ful consequence of unsuccessful resistance, or indeed, 
 of any thing less than a most decisive victory, filled 
 my thoughts. In the midst of a people, among whom 
 I had lived so long, as to be known to almost every 
 inhabitant, all of whom looked to me for protection, 
 and many of whom had sought safety in the fort ; t 
 could not reflect on the horrours of a general massacre, 
 wiiich would have been the consequence of a defeat, 
 without emotion. He, who in such a situation, could 
 have been perfectly tranquil, whose appearances 
 should have discovered no agitation, must have been 
 either less, or more than man. He must have been 
 denied the sensibilities common to our nature, or 
 been endowed with faculties more than human. 
 
 When the Court considers my situation, how many 
 causes there w^ere to excite strong emotion, will they 
 believe that the witnesses, who have testiiied on this 
 point, were capable of such discrimination, as w^ould 
 enable them to ascertain, that the appearances which 
 they have described, proceeded from personal fear ? 
 18* 
 
198 DEFENCE OF 
 
 Major Snelling professed to have been instmcted lii 
 this branch of science. But captain Mac Commick, 
 who was not in the fort till after Findlay's regiment 
 bad marched in, made no such pretensions. He ap- 
 peared to found his judgment on his natural instinct, 
 and indeed he did right not to make a claim, which 
 was beyond the first stage of civilization; to which 
 rank, notwithstanding his tawdry regimentals, it was 
 evident he belongetL 
 
 Several of the witnesses have given their opinion 
 on this subject, with less confidence, and some quali- 
 fications. Colonel Van Horn has admitted that care 
 and anxiety might have added to the appearances 
 which he described. His belief, however, as to what 
 related to personal fear, he saj s, he formed from a 
 comparison of faces, by which he judged, that mine 
 indicated fear. 
 
 I believe. Sir, that in the comparison of counte- 
 nances, when I was surrounded by my officers at the 
 time of the surrender, a vast difference might have 
 been observed, between the expression of many of 
 theirs and mine. If my countenance expressed what 
 I felt, it must have shewn traces of the painful anxiety 
 by which I had been oppressed, and marks of the 
 deepest regret for the measures I had been obliged to 
 pursue ; while other faces might perhaps have beamed 
 with the exultation, which the minds of some can feel, 
 when they look upon what they may think a fallen 
 man. 
 
GENERAL HULL* 199 
 
 Possibly, there may have been around me, those 
 who felt, and whose countenances expressed a joy, 
 that by the capitulation, thej^ had purchased personal 
 security, and avoided a bloody contest, at the expense, 
 as they supposed, of my character and honour. 
 
 General Taylor also concluded from my appear- 
 ance that I was under the influence of personal fear. 
 He gives you the grounds, on which he drew his 
 conclusion. They are, that I appeared thoughtful, 
 and very low spirited ;— that my countenance was 
 dull, and that he saw about me more of the marks of 
 tobacco, than was consistent with neatness. Are 
 these grounds which will warrant a conclusion, that 
 is to affect the life of a man ? As to w hat has been 
 said on this disgusting subject of the tobacco, I will 
 dismiss it as to all the witnesses, with a reference to 
 the testimony of colonel Miller, who proves, that I 
 had a habit, which might have produced all the ap- 
 pearances, which the witnesses say my chewing had 
 produced. It is known, that where there is a habit 
 of using tobacco, it is commonly, unconsciously, taken 
 to excess, whenever the mind is much occupied. 
 Even the excitement that some of the witnesses, who 
 use tobacco, felt, while they w ere untler examination, 
 deluged this floor with their expectorations. 
 
 Major Munson saw me in the fort, fifteen minutes 
 after the officers were killed. He does not recollect, 
 that the cannonade then»*continued ; but I beg the 
 Court to remark, that he speaks of a time, to which 
 
200 DEFENCE 01? 
 
 tile testimony of many of the officers who have spoken 
 of my personal appearance, must refer. He says, he 
 saw nothing which might not have been accounted 
 for, without resorting to the supposition of personal 
 fear. 
 
 Captain Maxwell did not see me on the sixteenth, 
 but on the fifteenth he saw me in a situation, where 
 I was exposed to the fire of the enemy. He says that 
 I was collected and cool. He informs you, why he 
 was induced to notice my appearance, and his testi- 
 mony is of some importance, because it shews, that 
 as early as the retreat from Canada, my officers had 
 begun to propagate imputations on my courage ; and 
 because his testimony must relate to the same time, 
 when major Jessup says, he saw me on horseback, 
 and observed such strong indications of fear. If, Sir, 
 the opinions of these two witnesses are in opposition, 
 the Court must determine, whether they will rely on 
 the veteran, who has been twenty-three times engaged 
 with the enemies of his country, or the young gentle- 
 man who, at the time he speaks of, was about twenty- 
 five years of age, and who knew no more of battles, 
 than what he had heard or learned from books. The 
 testimony of judge Witherell, who was a revolutionary 
 officer, who also saw me on the evening of the fifteenth, 
 is likewise in opposition to the testimony of major 
 Jessup. 
 
 Captain Bacon says, iVas much agitated on the 
 morning of the sixteenth, but that he had no suspicion 
 
(GENERAL HULLo 201 
 
 iiwas personal fear; neither did he hear such a suspi- 
 cion expressed by any of the officers. 
 
 The deposition of major Anderson, I have not been 
 able to procure in time, to submit to my counsel, pre- 
 viously to my defence being closed. It is very im- 
 portant, not only as it respects the point now under 
 consideration, but the Court will 'find, that there is 
 a great variati-3n between his testimony, and that of 
 general Mac Arthur, in relation to the fortification at 
 Sandwich, but as I would not ask another postpone- 
 ment of the Court, for the sake of making any further 
 observations on the testimony of major Anderson, I 
 must rely upon the Court to examine his deposition, 
 and to give his testimony its due weight. 
 
 There are some of the witnesses who have given 
 a more naked opinion, that I was under the influence 
 of personal fear, without assigning any reasons for 
 their opinion, whose testimony I shall not notice. It 
 is impossible it can have any influence in the minds 
 of the Court. 
 
 Major Jessup said, that whether the agitation which 
 he described, proceeded from the novelty of my situ- 
 ation, or fear, he could not say, but he believed the 
 latter, if not both. Captain Baker said, he was of 
 opinion, that I was under the influence of fear, as he 
 could not account for the surrender in any other way. 
 This explanation of captain Baker may afford a key 
 to much of the testimony on this point. He» like 
 
202 DEFENCE OF 
 
 many other of the officers, thought the surrender un« 
 necessary. They did not concern themselves with 
 considerations of what might be the consequences of 
 resistance. They therefore saw no other motive for 
 the step I had taken, than my own fears. They 
 therefore, when questioned on this point, said, they 
 thought I was under the influence of personal fear, 
 because I surrendered. 
 
 I beg the Court to note, that colonel Miller's an- 
 swer to the interrogatory put to him on this subject, 
 is to the same effect, although he was stationed in the 
 fort, and I had been in his sight whenever I was in 
 the fortress, from the commencement of the cannonade, 
 till the surrender. He says, he saw no conduct of 
 mine, which might not have proceeded from fatigue, 
 and the responsibility of my situation, and that he 
 could mention no act of mine, which he did then, or 
 does now, impute to personal fear, but the surrender ; 
 and yet colonel Miller had better opportunities of ob- 
 serving me, than any other witness. He was an older., 
 and a more experienced soldier, than any who have 
 given their testimony ; many of whom heard the re- 
 port of an enemy's gun for the first, at the time to 
 which their testimony relates. 
 
 If, Gentlemen, your decision upon this point could 
 rest upon the weight of the opinions given by the 
 witnesses called by the Judge Advocate, the prepon- 
 derance would be in my favour. The opinions of 
 colonel Miller, he having been placed in a situation 
 
GENERAL HULL. 203 
 
 which gave him such superiour advantages for con- 
 tinual deliberate observation, must deserve more re- 
 spect, than the testimony of all the inexperienced and 
 young men, who only saw me occasionally, on the 
 morning of the sixteenth, and who have attempted to 
 support this charge by their opinions. 
 
 So far as any of the witnesses have founded their 
 opinion, that I was under the influence of personal 
 fear, from the act of surrender, as is the case with 
 colonel Miller, and captain Baker, and others, their 
 testimony can have no weight. The Court have the 
 same opportunity of drawing a conclusion from that 
 fact, that they had. I have endeavoured to satisfy 
 the Court, that that act was justifiable, or at least, 
 that I had strong reasons for thinking it so, and if this 
 were the case, it cannot be made the ground of con- 
 demnation, because witnesses may have made it the 
 foundation of their opinion of my want of courage. 
 
 But, Gentlemen, there is no example of the opinion 
 of witnesses on this subject, ever having been re- 
 ceived as evidence on which to ground a conviction. 
 Expressions of the human countenance, and the man- 
 ners of men, are but fallible indications of the work- 
 ings of the human mind. The difference in appear- 
 ances, produced by the excitements of different pas- 
 sions, are too subtle, to admit of observations, from 
 w hich any certain conclusions may be drawn — much 
 depends upon constitution, and often much upon the 
 temporary physical condition of the body. 
 
204 BEFENCE OP 
 
 A man, worn with fatigue of body or mind, and 
 pressetl with a thousand dreadful anxieties, may, 
 ihough on the point of inevitable destruction, forget 
 his own fate, and be moved only by the condition of 
 those around him, while the superficial observer 
 would impute his agitation to the dread cf death. The 
 uneducated spectator, who has not been taught, as 
 major Snelling has been, the indications of the human 
 pasf?ions, would most probably see, in the countenance 
 ana lanner of the Laocoon, only expressions of terror 
 and bodily pain ; and would not understand, that the 
 artist has expressed, in the countenance and convul- 
 sive agitation of a dying father, agony of mind ex- 
 cited by the torture of his expiring children. 
 
 There never has been, and in justice, never can 
 be a conviction, under this charge of cowardice, but 
 where a want of courage is indicated, by the omission^ 
 or cmnmission of some act in violation of the duty of 
 the person, against v/hom the charge is made. 
 
 I shall conclude my observations upon that part of 
 the evidence, which relates to my personal appear- 
 ance, with some extracts from an English historian, 
 Avho gives an account of the trial of Lord George 
 Sackville, who was tried for misconduct at the battle 
 of Minden. Dr. Smollet having stated, that some 
 testimony was given to prove, that when certain or- 
 ders were delivered to Lord George, he was alarmed 
 in a very great degree, and seemed in the utmost 
 confusion ; subjoins remarks, from which tli€ follow- 
 
GENERAL HULL. 205 
 
 iog are extracts : " The candid reader will of himself 
 " determine, whether a man's heart is to be judged 
 " by any change of his complexion. Granting such a < 
 " change to have happened, whether it was likely, 
 " that an officer, who had been more than once in 
 " actual service, and behaved without reproach, so as 
 " to attain an eminent rank in the army, should ex- 
 " hibit symptoms of fear or confusion, when in reality « 
 *' there was no appearance of danger. 
 
 " With respect to the imputation of cowardice le 
 " veiled at Lord George, by the unthinking multitude, 
 " and circulated with such industry and clamour, we 
 -' ought to consider it as a mob accusation, w hich the 
 ^- bravest of men, even the great Duke of Marlborough 
 '•' could not escape. We ought to view it as a dan- 
 -' gerous suspicion, which strikes at the root of cha- 
 " racter, and may blast that honour in a moment, 
 • which the soldier has acquired, in a long course of 
 " painful services, and at the continual hazard of his 
 " life. We ought to distrust it as a malignant charge, 
 " altogether inconsistent with the former conduct of 
 *' the person accused." 
 
 The testimony of some of the witnesses appears to 
 have been intended to prove, that I manifested a 
 want of courage, by certain acts during the cannon- 
 ade, as well on the fifteenth as on the sixteenth. 
 These are, that on the fifteenth, I dismounted and 
 ivent towards the fort, when a shot struck a house 
 19 
 
i^oe DEFENCE OF 
 
 p.ear me ; that I avoided a shell which appeared to 
 be coming into the fort ; and that I remained in the 
 fort in a place of security, during the cannonade. 
 
 It does appear to nle, Gentlemen, that if all these 
 facts were exactly as the Avitnesses would wish them 
 to appear, they would not support any charge. 
 
 If I found myself unnecessarily exposed to the shot 
 of the enemy by being on horseback, was it not my 
 duty to dismount ? Is it to be considered a dereliction 
 of duty in an officer, to avoid the explosion of a shell ? 
 Or is it unjustifiable in a commander, when in a for- 
 tress that is bombarded, to put himself in a place of 
 security, provided he be in such situation, as that he 
 may give his orders, and perform the necessary duty 
 of his station? Judging from what I have seen of ser- 
 vice, with the bravest men our country ever pro- 
 duced, I may venture to say, that the Court would 
 answer these (Questions in the negative. But yet I 
 jnust ask the patience of the Court while I give the 
 testimony which has been offered on one of these 
 points, (that is to say,) my remaining in the fort, and 
 my situation there, a slight examination. The others 
 I do not thiulv worthj^ my attention. 
 
 Major Snelling went into the fort when he returned 
 ©n the morning of (he sixteenth from Spring Wells. 
 He was roused from a repose, after having been at a 
 post all night, by the commencement of the cannon- 
 ade. He remained there till after the flag w ent out, 
 
GENERAL HULL. 20^ 
 
 when he was sent with orders to colonel Findlay's 
 regiment. He appears to have returned to the fort 
 again, about the time that the British officers went 
 into captain Dyson's quarters. Li short, major Snell- 
 ing was in the fort, according to his account, durinpj 
 the whole tune of the cannonade on the sixteenth, 
 and until the British troops marched in, with the ex- 
 ception of a very short interval between the sending 
 of the flag and the final surrender. Now, during the 
 time of the cannonade, major Snelling saw me stand- 
 ing but once. His memory is so extremely tenacious 
 of the minutest circumstances, even of a frivolous 
 nature, that he will only admit as a possibility, that I 
 may have risen twice. The words of major Snelling 
 are, 
 
 " During the cannonade, I frequently saw the Ge- 
 " neral. I once saw him standing ; he might have 
 " risen twice ; most of the time he was sitting on an 
 " old tent, under the curtain of the fort, opposite the 
 " enemy's batteries." 
 
 Whether I was sitting or standing in the situation 
 which major Snelling describes, is immaterial. I 
 should have been equally safe in either position. It 
 is, therefore, extraordinary that so unimportant a cir- 
 cumstance should have made such a lasting impres- 
 sion on his mind. 
 
 The testimony, however, of the other witnesses 
 called by the Judge Advocate does not appear to cor- 
 respond with the recollection of major Snelling. 
 
208 DEFENCE OF 
 
 General Taylor's testimony is certainly worthy of 
 remark. It appears, that though major Snelling 
 thought, that my taking a position under cover of the 
 parapet of the fort during the cannonade was evidence 
 of cowardice, yet major Snelling himself, it seems, 
 thought he was at liberty to avail himself of the very 
 same protection. General Taylor says, he saw ma- 
 jor Snelling, as well as many other of the officers, in 
 the same situation that I generally occupied, during 
 the firing, when I was in the fort. 
 
 Captain Baker says, " on the morning of the six- 
 '^ teenth, during the cannonade, I saw the General in 
 " the fort, sometimes sitting, sometimes walking, and 
 '• sojnetimes standing." Colonel Miller also states, 
 that I was sometimes sitting, sometimes standing, and 
 sometimes walking. 
 
 ' Indeed, there could, have been no reason for my 
 remaining precisely in one situation during the can- 
 nonade, if I had been actuated by an undue regard 
 to personal safety. For it appears, that the whole 
 eastern side of the fort was as secure in one part as 
 another. If there were any reasons for giving prefer- 
 ence to the spot where the witnesses say I was sit- 
 ting, it is, that it was near the gate, a situation where 
 I could easily be found, and where it was most con- 
 venient, as colonel Miller has testified, to receive re- 
 ports, and to give my orders. 
 
 From this post, I had the whole interiour of the 
 fort under my view, and could communicate my or- 
 
GENERAL HULL. 209 
 
 ders to any part. Was I not then in a proper situa- 
 tion for a commander? The Court will recollect, 
 that colonel Bliller stales, that he himself was some- 
 times with me, while I was in the place the witnesses 
 have described. And the fact is, that every officer 
 in the fort placed himself under the protection of the 
 eastern parapet, when his duty did not require that he 
 should be in a more exposed situation. 
 
 But it has been attempted to prove, that I remained 
 in the fort, and took no measures, and issued no or- 
 ders for a disposition of the troops, after the cannon- 
 ade commenced. 
 
 Major Jessup states, that shortly after the answer 
 had been returned to the British summons on the fif- 
 teenth, he met me on horseback, and that I then gave 
 him directions for the disposition which was to be 
 made of the troops, for the defence of the town. It 
 is also proved by the testimony of major Jessup, that 
 in the evening of the fifteenth, I was on horseback, 
 % isiting the batteries while the cannonade continued. 
 
 Major Munson met me on the same evening on 
 horseback, when I was visiting the posts. Major 
 Jessup said, he met me on the night of the fifteenth, 
 at about midnight, at the position which colonel Find- 
 lay's corps had taken up for that night. I was also, 
 as he testifies, at his quarters about day break on the 
 morning of the sixteenth, while he was writing by 
 candle light, and gave him directions to despatch an 
 10* 
 
210 DEFENCE OF 
 
 order for colonels Mac Arthur and Cass. And cap- 
 tain Mac Gommick testifies, that he saw me on horse- 
 back at the thue on which the troops were formed, a 
 short time before the firing ceased. Several other 
 witnesses prove, that they saw me out of the fort at 
 several times, as well on the fifteenth, as the sixteenth. 
 V/hat foundation is there, therefore, for the charge, 
 that during the whole time of the cannonade I took 
 slielter in the fort ? 
 
 Major Snelling's testimony is so important, as to 
 my ersonal appearance, that I cannot but direct the 
 attention of the Court to any circumstance in his tes- 
 timony on any other point, which I think may de- 
 velop the spirit or disposition with which he has 
 testified. With this view, I beg the Court to notice, 
 that major Sneiling has testified, that when he re- 
 turned from the S})ring Wells, on the morning of the 
 sixteenth, at dawn of day, he went into the fort to 
 make his report to me. " But," says the major, " I 
 •could not find the General, nor find any one who 
 •' knew where he was." It has been proved by other 
 witnesses, that I was out of the fort at that time. 
 Now, when major Sneiling could not find me in the 
 fort, nor find any body that knew I was there, it 
 seems to me, he might have ventured to say, I was 
 not in the fort at that time. I do think, he had at 
 least as good grounds to draw that conclusion, as he 
 iiad to infer, that I was under personal fear, from the 
 appearances he observed. Major Sneiling does, in a 
 subsequent part of bis examination, say, that I was 
 
GENERAL HULL. 211 
 
 out of the fort early that morning. But whether this 
 refers to the time when he made his report or not, I 
 do not know. 
 
 I have now, Gentlemen, done with this charge, so 
 far as it respects my personal appearance and deport- 
 ment. You, who I am to presume, and do believe 
 are brave and honourable men, will judge of w hat I 
 must have suffered, to have sat here day after day, 
 listening to imputations, of all others the most wound- 
 ing to the feelings of a soldier ; to have these impu- 
 tations cast upon me, by representations intended to 
 make me appear abjectly and disgustingly base;*to 
 })e obliged to hear my name and fame polluted by the 
 testimony which has been given ; to be obliged to 
 repeat the language of the witnesses in my defence, 
 are in themselves punishments hardly inferiour to that, 
 wluch would be the consequence of your pronounc- 
 ing me guilty. But, Gentlemen, of that, upon this 
 charge of cowardice, I am bold to say I have no 
 dread. 
 
 I h^ive fought more battles, than many of the young 
 men who have impeached me of this crime, have 
 aumbered years. 
 
 I appeal to the history that bears record of those 
 who were engaged in the bloody contests for our 
 liberties. There you shall often find my name, but 
 Rot as a coward ! 
 
212 BEFENCE OF 
 
 I have brought before you the testimony of the few 
 who remain of those, who were my companions in 
 arms, in times that tried men's souls. Do they say 
 I am a coward ? 
 
 I invoke the spirits of the departed heroes, who 
 have died at my side by the sword of the enemy, to 
 say if I am a coward ! 
 
 I would call the shades of Gates, Wayne, Schuyler, 
 and of Washington, to tell you how often they have 
 led me to battle, and to say if they found me a coward. 
 
 * • 
 
 Will you believe, that the spirit, which has so 
 often prompted me to risk my life for my country, 
 should now so far have forsaken me, as that I should 
 liave become a traitor and a coward ? 
 
 Will you believe, that the years in which I have 
 grown gray in my country's service, should so far 
 have changed my nature, as that I could have been 
 the base and abject thing my enemies have repre- 
 sented ? 
 
 No, Gentlemen, that blood which animated my 
 youth, age has not chilled. I at this moment feel its 
 influence, and it makes me dare to say, that no man 
 ever did, or can think me a coward. 
 
 Before I conclude, permit me to say a few words. 
 It may be thought, that I have spoken of the officers 
 
GENERAL HULL. 213 
 
 who have been witnesses against me, with too much 
 asperity. They have, in my opinion, forfeited all 
 claims to my respect ; but I do not mean to charge 
 any of them with wilful perjury. I believe they have 
 imbibed a prejudice and bias against me, which has 
 influenced the perceptions of their own minds. 
 
 My object, by the examination I have given theif 
 testimony, has been to make that bias and prejudice 
 appear to yo i. Many of them are young men, who 
 give their country great promise. Many of them, I 
 believe, have good hearts ; and such I know will one 
 day regret, that they should have yielded to an in-f 
 fluence, which has induced them to represent me in 
 colours that they will be conscious I have not de- 
 served. I know the time will come, when they will 
 consider how they courted my favour when I was in 
 power, and how they treated me when they thought 
 I was in disgrace, and saw me in adversity. 
 
 When that time comes, as come I am sure it will, 
 let it be a consolation to them to know, that what- 
 ever may be my fate, I pity and from my heart for- 
 give them. 
 
 I have now. Gentlemen, concluded my defence. 
 I have noticed every accusation which the Judge 
 Advocate, in the opening of the cause, mentioned as 
 those which he should rely upon, and which he ex- 
 pected to maintain. 
 
214 • DEFENCE OP 
 
 I have not left, as I believe, any part of the speci- 
 fications to which any testimony whatever was offer- 
 ed, unanswered. 
 
 Allow me, Mr. President, and Gentlemen of the 
 Court, with tlie most heartfelt sensibility to return 
 you my sincere thanks, for the manner in which thig 
 trial has been conducted. For though, as I humbly 
 conceive, there has been some departure from accus- 
 tomed forms, in respect to the examination of wit- 
 nesses, I know that the Court has been governed by 
 nothinj^ but its own sense of propriety. 
 
 The conduct of the members of this Court, and of 
 the Judge Advocates, has been such as I had antici- 
 pated ; and every thing that I could expect from 
 
 honourable, impartial, and humane men. 
 
 1 
 
 AVhatever may be the sentence, I shall ahvavti 
 ' with gratitude acknowhMlge that I have had a fair, 
 ' candid, and |)atient hearing. 1 do feel myself bound 
 ' to make particular acknowledgments to the special 
 
 Judge Advocate, for the delicacy and propriety of 
 ' his deportment towards me, and though I may feel 
 ^ the force of the talents with which he has conducted 
 * this projspcutiou, it shall not make me forget what I 
 
 owe to his humanity and liberality. 
 
 ^ Gentlemen, my life i* in your hands. But you are 
 
 ^ guardians of what is more dear to me ; you are the 
 
 guardians of my honour I with you iu sacred deposite 
 
 RD-94 < 
 
 ii 
 
GENERAL HULL. 215 
 
 is that swortl, which has been my companion in times 
 that might have appalled the weak hearted. It 
 lias been taken from me, (ill you shall pronounce 
 that I am not unwortiiy to wear it. I feel, that ia 
 justice, 1 may demand it of you. And Avhen I shall 
 receive it at your hands, believe me, that here is yet 
 enough of heart and life, and in this arm is yet nerve 
 enough, to draw it in vindication of my country's 
 rights. If 1 should receive it, imtaryiishcd by your 
 judgment, I may yet live, to |)rove by ni} future, as^ 
 well as 1»5' my past coiuluct, how I have been caUnn- 
 niated, and the Justice of your }>€nicn<:c. 
 
^