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 COUNT BISMAECK 
 
 by 
 
 Ludwig Bamberger. 
 
COUNT BISMARCK. 
 
 A political Biography 
 
 by 
 
 Ludwig Bamberger 
 
 (Member of the Zoll -parliament). 
 
 Translated from th.e German 
 
 by 
 
 CHAKLES LEE LEWES. 
 
 I 
 
 Authorized Edition. 
 
 BRESLAU, ERNEST GÜNTHER, 
 LONDON, TRÜBNER & CO., 
 
 60, Paternoster Row/ 
 
 1869. 
 

 1 
 
 All rights reserved. 
 
Translator's preface. 
 
 The following work on Count Bismarck first appeared 
 in French, at Paris, early in the present year. 
 
 The author has now superintended a translation of 
 it into his own language, German, and has at the same 
 time considerably extended the size of the work. Be- 
 sides making slight additions here and there in the 
 body of the text, he has added two chapters of sup- 
 plementary matter, and also a chapter called "Germany, 
 France, and the Kevolution", designed to serve as an 
 introduction. 
 
 The English translation has been made from the 
 corrected proof-sheets of the German version, and ap- 
 pears simultaneously with it. As the chapter "Germany, 
 
VI 
 
 France, and the Revolution," is not necessarily required 
 as an introduction, and is, it appears to me, to be 
 regarded rather as a separate essay than as an essential 
 part of the work itself, it has here been printed at the 
 end , instead of at the beginning. Certain portions of it 
 which would have no interest for the English public, have, 
 with the Author's permission, been omitted. 
 
 I have only to add that for the headings to the 
 chapters I am responsible, there being none in the French 
 or German editions. In the Table of Contents these 
 headings are collected together, so as to facilitate reference, 
 and afford a general survey of the work. 
 
 Hampstead, December 1868. 
 
Table of Contents. 
 
 Chapter I 
 
 Page 
 
 State of public feeling towards Bismarck before and after the war 1 
 
 Chapter II. 
 
 Bismarck's parentage and opinions. — Sketch of the relations 
 existing between Austria and Prussia during the last century. 
 — Birth of the idea of a regenerated Germany with Prussia 
 at its head 9 
 
 Chapter III. 
 
 Bismarck's conservative and Austrian sympathies. — Eight years 
 ambassador to the Bund. — Change of opinions. — Demand 
 for a reformed Zollverein. — Vacillating conduct of Prussia 
 during the Italian war. — Bismarck ambassador at St. Peters- 
 burg.' — A Prussian Germany or a German Prussia? — Meeting 
 between the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia at Teplitz. — 
 Bismarck's interview with the King at Baden-Baden and its 
 results 35 
 
 Chapter IV. 
 
 Constitutional government in Germany. — Army reorganisation 
 scheme. — Bismarck ambassador at Paris; interviews with 
 Napoleon. — Conduct towards the Chamber, as Minister Pre- 
 sident; acts of his administration. — Preparations for a rupture 
 with Austria. — Austria's "delegate scheme"; its failure; 
 reproduction of the scheme at the Congress of Princes. — 
 Prussia's refusal to accept the scheme. — Her threats of war. — 
 Incredulity of the Public. — Death of the King of Denmark 63 
 
VIII 
 Chapter V . 
 
 Page 
 
 Policy pursued by Bismarck in the Schleswig-Holstein question, 
 more particularly towards Austria and the Bund, with its results 88 
 
 Chapter VI. 
 
 Attitude of the nation at the outbreak of the Avar. — Bis- 
 marck's negotiations with the opposition. — The King's ab- 
 solutist principles. — Relations of the Cabinet Ministers in 
 Prussia to the King. — Characteristics of Bismarck. — His 
 interview with M. Vilbort. — His views on the German cha- 
 racter. — Progress of Germany in the last eighty years. — 
 Education of the sovereign by the people. — Bismarck the 
 embodiment of two contradictory principles ....... 102 
 
 Supplementary Chapters 
 Chapter I 140 
 
 Chapter II 160 
 
 Germany, France, and the Revolution 183 
 
Chapter I. 
 
 State of public feeling towards Bismarck before and after the war. 
 
 When the telegraph announced, on the morning of 
 the 8 th of May 1866, that the day before, five shots from 
 a revolver had been fired from within a few paces at 
 Count Bismarck without even touching him, many an 
 exclamation might have been overheard, which viewed by 
 the light of a strict morality were of a highly ques- 
 tionable character/ For those exclamations revealed the 
 presence of a thought analogous to that which the vo- 
 taries of the black art in the Middle Ages expressed by 
 driving a dagger through the waxen image of a heart*, 
 whilst performing certain ceremonies, and pronouncing 
 
 * The French call it: tuer le Mandarin, in allusion to Jean 
 Jacques Rousseau's casuistical question: What would you do, if your 
 happiness depended upon the death of a Mandarin in China, that is 
 of some one far off and unknown to you, and your mere wish sufficed 
 to send him out of the world? 
 
 Count Bismarck. \ 
 
V 
 
 the name of the person they wished removed from 
 their path. 
 
 Germany at that time saw a fearful fate impending 
 over her, which she could attribute to no other cause 
 than the perversity — frivolity even it almost seemed — 
 of one single man. The Prussian Minister was beyond 
 a doubt the sole promoter of that fratricidal war, the 
 bare approach of which Europe regarded with a mixed 
 feeling of horror and incredulity. Was it to be conceived 
 that the sons of quiet, peaceful Germany were about to 
 engage in an internecine strife? To what end? To secure 
 the triumph of Freedom's greatest enemy, the cham- 
 pion of the Middle Ages, the trampler upon the people's 
 rights, — of him who had dared to proclaim publicly, 
 that there was but one law in the world, the law of 
 Might? Such were the cries which echoed everywhere, in 
 Prussia as well as in all other German lands and 
 abroad. Deputations were sent to Berlin from many 
 large towns, and the most loyal unions and corporations, 
 to implore the King with earnest entreaties to abandon 
 the unhappy enterprise. More than once, the assembled 
 soldiers refused to march. Weeping wives and mothers 
 followed the departing columns, and called on heaven to 
 curse the author of this disastrous war. 
 
 v Ferdinand Cohn, or Blind (to use the name he had 
 adopted, after his stepfather, Karl Blind), the young fa- 
 
natic who had deliberately risked his life to stop the 
 progress of events, was, like Karl Sand, the assassin of 
 Kotzebue, and Oscar Becker, the author of the attempt 
 on the life of the King of Prussia, one of those German 
 students who in the retirement of a calm studious life 
 mature the idea of political assassination. It is a re- 
 markable fact that in France, where politics have long pene- 
 trated the masses and taken the form of a passion , the 
 fanaticism which leads men on to assassination finds its 
 instruments almost exclusively in the working classes; 
 while in Germany where political consciousness is not yet 
 imbibed with the mother's milk, but is rather the result 
 of mental conviction, its instruments are young and 
 thoughtful students. 
 
 Count Bismarck, in no way disconcerted by the sudden 
 attack, had himself arrested and handed over to the 
 police his assailant, who, after undergoing a preliminary 
 examination before a magistrate, opened an artery, 
 and died with the fortitude of an ancient Roman. This 
 tragic ending to so young and hitherto blameless a life 
 could not but increase the general consternation. By a 
 kind of cruel irony, public feeling was almost in sympa- 
 thy with the crime , whilst justice was necessarily forced 
 to take the part of the great evildoer. 
 
 A few months later, and the same man who had 
 brought down such execrations on his head was making 
 
- 4 - 
 
 his solemn entry into Berlin, with bells ringing, the 
 people tumultuously applauding, welcomed by young 
 girls robed in white, — with all the surroundings, in 
 short, of a Public Triumph. And truly this was some- 
 thing more than a mere ceremony. Although worn out 
 with fatigue and indeed suffering from illness, Count Bis- 
 marck could not escape from this ovation. 
 
 Prodigious as his exertions were at ordinary times, 
 during the last months he had redoubled them: super- 
 intending in person the execution of his plans, even on 
 to the battle field, dismounting from his horse to preside 
 at a council, taking into his own hands with irresistible 
 power the negotiations for peace, surrounded as these 
 were with a mass of conflicting interests and complications, 
 and bringing the gigantic work to a happy issue with 
 incredible rapidity. This excessive activity had at length 
 shaken even his iron frame, and it was only by the 
 greatest effort that he was able to bear up throughout 
 that day of rejoicing, of which, in spite of the wreaths 
 presented to King and Princes, he alone, was the hero. 
 
 Prussia admired him already. Germany and Europe 
 followed, at a distance and as if against their will, with 
 the secret feeling that the power here manifested was 
 an extraordinary one, though perhaps less dangerous 
 than had hitherto been feared. Yet was Count Bis- 
 marck right when he said to a Russian lady of rank, 
 
as he was leaving France, four years before, to take the 
 post of Minister President of Prussia, that before long 
 he should be the most popular man of his country; the 
 Cavour of Germany ? 
 
 The analogies between Italy and Germany are so nu- 
 merous and striking that every chapter of their history na- 
 turally offers a temptation to draw comparisons. Those 
 which one might be inclined to draw between the foun- 
 der of the Italian statuto and the destroyer of the Prus- 
 sian constitution would certainly repay the trouble. But 
 before proceeding to comparisons, we must have know- 
 ledge, and it is precisely because this essential condition 
 to all sound judgment is lacking that it appears indispen- 
 sable to collect first of all the materials which will 
 place the chief events in the most exhaustive manner 
 before the reader. We will therefore endeavour to com- 
 plete the very superficial data upon which the great 
 mass of the public have hitherto been contented to base 
 their estimation of one of the most remarkable men of 
 the day. 
 
 But whatever may be our opinion of Bismarck upon 
 closer examination, we may at once affirm that he arro- 
 gated too much to himself when he asserted, that he should 
 gain at one bound the popularity of Cavour. Probably 
 he was himself too well aware of the difference between 
 himself and Cavour to have meant it quite seriously; and 
 
— 6 — 
 
 we may safely infer that there was a slight touch of irony in 
 the assertion. Neither on the day of his triumphal entry, 
 nor since that day, has Count Bismarck ever been a 
 man after the heart of the people. Apart from the warm- 
 er temperament which nature and climate had given to 
 the Italian, this haughty aristocrat who delights in sar- 
 castic, scornful repartees was never made to be the 
 favourite of a nation. His whole nature and his whole 
 past stretch a deep gulf between him and the genius of 
 popular favour. Moreover, to the incomparable glory of 
 having given to Italy once more a place among the na- 
 tions, Cavour had the good fortune to unite the still 
 greater merit of establishing political liberty within it, 
 in which he leaves the renovator of the German Empire 
 far behind him. 
 
 Darkened as was that day of triumph by fresh sor- 
 rows and revived distrust, it was none the less the start- 
 ing point of a remarkable revolution in public opinion 
 towards Count Bismarck. From that time the vitality of 
 his work and the force of his mind have gone on conti* 
 nually increasing in the estimation of Germany and of 
 Europe generally^; and thousands of people who before 
 had execrated him, now submit to see in him, whether 
 rightly or wrongly we will not stop to inquire , the crea- 
 tor of a new order of things, with the will and the ca- 
 pability of leading on the German nation, through many 
 
trials yet perhaps to come, to a happier future. The 
 public conscience could not however accept this new 
 view without feeling deeply struck by the revolution 
 which it had undergone, as it were against its 
 own will. 
 
 It must be admitted that success, even when most 
 illgotten, has never wanted admirers. Cromwell's saying 
 will always remain true. Riding through the streets of 
 London one day in great pomp, and complimented by 
 some sycophant on the great numbers of the crowd: 
 u Yes, but if it were to see me hanged", he said, "how 
 many more would there be!" Nevertheless there is a 
 wide difference, although on the surface it may not be 
 so apparent, between merely gaining the applause of 
 the multitude and gaining the approval of the public 
 conscience. Our time has seen enterprises crowned 
 with success which have reaped all the fruits of vic- 
 tory, without being able to boast that they had con- 
 fused the public ideas of right and wrong. Now, it 
 is precisely this fault — a most serious and harmful 
 one — that many people are at this moment recklessly 
 charging Germany with, and more particulaily the enligh- 
 tened part of the population, as, for example, the great 
 majority of the liberals in Prussia and Baden. Such a 
 phenomenon in itself lends a special interest to any in- 
 quiry into the ideas and development of the man who 
 
was the author of this whole movement. And if his 
 great importance and the mark he . has made in con« 
 temporary history, make him deserving of close and earnest 
 study, the fact that a whole nation has become morally 
 responsible for his deeds, imposes such study upon us 
 as an imperative duty. 
 
Chapter IL 
 
 Bismarck's parentage and opinions. — Sketch of the relations existing 
 
 between Austria and Prussia during the last century. — Birth of the 
 
 idea of a regenerated Germany with Prussia at its head. 
 
 Politics are not a science; they are at most an 
 art. Consequently, where they are concerned there is 
 nothing more dangerous than trusting to ancient, stereo- 
 typed formulas. The French Revolution, immense benefit 
 as it was, did not bequeath only advantages to the world. 
 Human things are not of so unmixed a nature. And his- 
 tory being provided with no list of errata, we have in- 
 herited all the formulas which a flood of new truths had 
 brought into the world, and to which an exaggerated 
 value was attached at the time. Fascinated by the gran- 
 deur of those antitheses, the following generations believed 
 that every problem of real life might be solved by apply- 
 ing the too simple alternative: Revolution or counter- 
 revolution. Bismarck shared this error on his first en- 
 trance into political life. He now to a certain extent atones 
 for it, now that he has discarded it; for those who 
 
- 10 — 
 
 see no welfare, except in the stern application of revolu- 
 tionary formulas, are precisely the most inexorable ene- 
 mies of him who formerly knew no other aim than 
 counter-revolution. 
 
 Otto Edward Leopold von Bismarck-Schönhausen was 
 born on the 1 st of April 1815 on the Schönhausen estate, 
 from which he takes part of his name, — an estate si- 
 tuated in Prussian Saxony. The family originally came 
 from the Mark of Brandenburg, the heart of the Prussian 
 state, and is said to be very ancient : their name occurs in 
 the army muster-rolls for some centuries back. They be- 
 long to what the Germans call the "junker" class, a term 
 for which we have no equivalent. Our word Squire is 
 perhaps the nearest; but for Squire in our sense of the 
 word the Germans have the compound "Krautjunker" 
 (cabbage planting squire), whilst the true junker is es- 
 sentially the scion of a noble house which has devoted 
 itself to military service, a mixture of Cavalier of Charles 
 the First's time, Prussian Lieutenant, German feudal lord, 
 and Spanish Don Quixote. Until the end of the last cen- 
 tury, this aristocracy had possessed the exclusive privi- 
 lege of supplying officers for the army ; and even to this 
 day, as we know, the majority of the officers are of noble 
 blood. The father of Frederick the Great, the most so- 
 ber of realists who ever sat on a throne, the grocer 
 corporal, who when he had sold a patent of nobility to 
 
— 11 — 
 
 some upstart during the day used at night to enter in his 
 cashbook ''Caught another hare, worth 600 Dollars", — even 
 he could not bear the idea of admitting a plebeian amongst 
 his officers. His son, in every other respect the complete 
 reverse of his father, being as great a free-thinker as his 
 father was orthodox a Christian, was full of aristocratic 
 and military prejudices. We possess a letter of his in 
 which he denounces the intention of a lieutenant to marry 
 a burgher's daughter as an intolerable scandal. He 
 decreed that a lieutenant who had made one cam- 
 paign should take precedence of a privy councillor; and 
 it was only as an especial favour that he made councillor 
 Mayer, a burgher who presided over the Court of Ac- 
 counts, a lieutenant, in order that he might not be ob- 
 liged to give the precedence to the youngest officers. 
 
 This tender care of royalty for the junker class could 
 not fail to make the latter the most devoted supporters 
 of the throne, although occasionally the unruly spirit engen- 
 dered by the consciousness of privileged rank would lead 
 to conflicts between royalty and nobility. A certain Herr 
 von Schlubhut, who had been found guilty of appropria- 
 ting the public moneys, and who had provoked the dis- 
 pleasure of the King, Frederick William the First, by 
 saying that a scaffold had never been erected for a noble- 
 man, was hanged on the very same day by special order; 
 which, however, has not prevented his compeers often since 
 
— 12 — 
 
 down even to the present time, from meeting any inclinations 
 towards progress on the part of the sovereign, with the 
 meaning reminder that, after all, they were the masters be- 
 fore the Burgraves of Nuremberg ever came into the land. 
 
 Count Bismarck, although the son of a major, follow- 
 ed the military profession only for the regulation year. 
 He was destined for the civil service, for which he qua- 
 lified himself by the study of the law. He remained 
 however unreservedly attached to the feudal traditions 
 which he had inherited, and, with that fiery nature ot 
 which he has since given so many proofs, he soon became 
 a perfect type of the overbearing, intolerant, pugnacious 
 junker. Exuberant animal spirits, and an ambition reined 
 in by narrow circumstances yet secretly stimulated by 
 the spur of his still slumbering power, scon drove him 
 into the most extreme section of his party; and when at 
 the age of thirty- two he entered political life, he lost no 
 time in drawing upon himself the hatred of his adversaries. 
 
 If extremes meet, it is because they all fly off at a 
 tangent from the truth. Just as the ultra-protestants 
 incline to the papacy, the Ultra-Prussians of the feudal 
 party have always inclined to Austria. Faithful to this tra- 
 dition, the man who was afterwards to force Austria out 
 of the German Union began his career, not only by de- 
 fending Austria's cause, but by going so far as to ad- 
 vocate the humble submission of Prussia to the legitimate 
 
— 13 — 
 
 supremacy of the House of Hapsburg. /To understand the 
 full meaning of this contradiction between the worship of 
 Austria on the one hand and the natural tendency of the 
 Prussian State on the other, it is necessary to go back 
 at least a century. 
 
 Let us therefore rapidly sketch the most striking 
 incidents of this dynastic antagonism, an antagonism 
 spreading through long years, now breaking out into open 
 war, now lying silently slumbering under the delusive 
 mask of a cordial alliance, until at last in our days it re- 
 ceived a final solution, the violence of which revealed the 
 deadly character of the enmity. The struggle between 
 the two courts is so entirely the point on which the events 
 of the year 1866 turn that, without making ourselves fa- 
 miliar with preceding history, we cannot hope to under- 
 stand either the real significance or the actual motives 
 of those events.* 
 
 The principle of hostility between Austria and Prussia, 
 although signs of it are not wanting in the time of the 
 great Elector, dates properly speaking from the reign of 
 Frederick the Great; but it is neither synonymous nor 
 contemporaneous with the rivalry for the German hege- 
 mony. Of the four wars which Frederick waged with 
 
 * See Ad. Schmidt's interesting book: "Preussen's deutsche 
 Politik", Leipzig 1867, which we have largely availed ourselves of 
 in the narration of the episode from 1785 to 1806. 
 
Austria, and from which his kingdom emerged increased 
 in size , firmly consolidated, and containing the germs of 
 its wonderful after- development , the first and third had 
 solely in view an extension of territory which was indis- 
 pensable in order to establish the new kingdom on a 
 firm basis. In the intrigues which sprang up around the 
 question of the partition of Poland, and especially during 
 the second act of that sad drama, the antagonism between 
 the two powers had attained a degree of intensity com- 
 parable only to that of 1866, though there was not then 
 the least question of the leadership or national supremacy. 
 It w r as simply the struggle between two rapacious powers, 
 fighting for the booty without the veriest shadow of an 
 excuse. Alternately however with these party- wall, or 
 neighbours' quarrels, there were hostilities of a wider bearing 
 and deeper import. In the so-called war of the Austrian 
 succession, the recognition of the Pragmatic Sanction 
 played a very subordinate part beside the conquest of 
 Silesia. In the following, or second Silesian war, the idea 
 of obtaining the preponderance in Germany becomes 
 clearly visible. After another war of entirely dynastic and 
 European interests, viz : the Seven Years' war, Frederick 
 in his last campaign again set up and then quite openly 
 the standard of intestine and national strife. But those 
 who can see beyond the surface of things will readily de- 
 tect this deeper political thought even in the complications 
 
where it would be most likely to be absent. Notwith- 
 standing Frederick's efforts to prevent it, the death oi 
 Charles VII of Bavaria and the efforts of diplomacy 
 had twice brought back the crown of the German Empire 
 to the House of Austria, in the persons of Francis the 
 First and Joseph the Second. The King of Prussia had 
 been compensated by some territorial concessions, which 
 were to give him the requisite strength for carrying out 
 his delayed projects when the moment arrived, projects 
 which he had distinctly formed and had made known to 
 the intimate circle around him quite at the beginning of 
 the Seven years' war. General Winterfeld, the confidant of 
 the king, had already at that time boldly recommended 
 that the whole of Germany should be conquered and uni- 
 ted into one single state so as to enable it to resist 
 foreign powers. In May 1757, he declared openly 
 and without reserve that "in less than two years they 
 would see the constitution overthrown and Frederick seat- 
 ed on the throne of the German Emperors." If we add that 
 he suggested at the same time an advance into Hungary 
 and an appeal to the malcontents, we shall find Bismarck's 
 entire programme even down to the negotiations with Kos- 
 suth and Klapka, anticipated by a hundred and ten years. 
 From that time, Frederick was fully determi- 
 ned at any price to prevent the Hapsburgs extend- 
 ing their dominion in Germany. He maintained this 
 
— 16 — 
 
 policy victoriously on the death, without issue, of the 
 Elector Maximilian Joseph, in 1777, by supporting the 
 Palatinate against the pretensions of Austria to the Ba- 
 varian succession; and at the peace of Teschen the matter 
 was decided in his favour. But Austria felt only the 
 more keenly the necessity of spreading her influence in 
 South Germany. Bavaria and Wurtemberg appeared to 
 her then, as they have done recently, the natural basis of all 
 operations directed towards combating the ambition of Prus- 
 sia. As she had failed to get these countries by force of arms, 
 she set about obtaining them by negotiation. The ground 
 was carefully sounded in Wurtemberg; and an exchange of 
 provinces was boldly proposed to the new Elector of Bavaria. 
 
 It was at this period that the famous project was 
 first broached of exchanging Belgium for Bavaria, a pro- 
 ject, which was prosecuted by Austria with her proverbial 
 tenacity through vicissitudes of all kinds, and which was 
 continually re-appearing even down to her negotiations with 
 the National Convention and the Directory. This persistent 
 attempt of Austria to increase her power in Germany 
 spurred Frederick on to seek by means of an equally 
 well considered plan some wider combination which 
 should be based on a principle capable of expansion. 
 
 For the first time since the peace of West- 
 phalia which had virtually annihilated Germany's po- 
 litical existence, the idea of a possible and durable 
 
— 17 — 
 
 fusion of the German States into one great whole took 
 a definite shape. Frederick and his ministers drew out 
 a plan, the avowed object of which was primarily to re- 
 sist the invasions of Austria. Prussia had recourse to the 
 same argument with which in a similar position Austria 
 has since retorted upon her. She showed the small 
 Princes the danger they ran from Austria's insatiable 
 appetite and called upon them to place themselves under 
 the King's protection if they would save their crowns. 
 
 In a letter to his ministers Frederick expresses him- 
 self as follows: "It is of the utmost importance that we 
 should direct all our efforts towards establishing a kind of 
 league such as that of Schmalkalden. The object of this 
 union must be to maintain the rights of the small Prin- 
 ces against the meditated attacks of Austria. We must", 
 he adds, "make these people (the princes) feel that they 
 can reckon upon our assistance and that it is their own 
 interests which make this association necessary; but we 
 must not remain with our arms folded. These people 
 will never initiate anything themselves. So strike while 
 the iron is hot." This letter is dated the 6 th of March 1784. 
 From that time not a day was allowed to pass without 
 his stirring up his ministers to let him have a plan of 
 a constitution as quickly as possible; and at last tired of 
 waiting, he, on the 24 th of October, took them himself a 
 work entitled "Plan for a league between the German 
 
— 18 — 
 
 Princes on the pattern of the Schmalkalden league". But 
 things did not advance fast enough to suit his impa- 
 tience. Not to take into account the various obstacles 
 thrown in the way by foreign powers, six months of 
 diplomatic negotiations were necessary before an under- 
 standing could be come to with the German Princes. 
 Then as now, France and Prussia watched one another 
 with suspicious eyes, each striving to find out and check- 
 mate the other's designs. 
 
 "The French court", wrote Baron Goltz, the Prussian 
 ambassador at Paris in March 1785, "the French court 
 will not find this league to its taste, preferring to keep 
 the South German Princes under its exclusive subjection." 
 Frederick answered by return courier: "Whether France 
 approve or not of an alliance between German Princes 
 is after all a matter of indifference to us. The thing is 
 good in itself, and that is what we must chiefly look at. 
 I opine that we should be the servants neither of the 
 French nor of the Austrians nor of the Russians." At 
 last, in the month of July 1785, the treaty was signed by 
 Saxony, Hanover, and Prussia, with the express stipulation, 
 that the other Princes should afterwards be invited to 
 join. It was couched in rather general terms, with seve- 
 ral secret clauses. These clauses related principally to 
 the resistance to be offered, firstly to an exchange of Bel- 
 gium for Bavaria, and secondly to the election of an Aus- 
 
— 19 — 
 
 trian Prince when the throne of the German Empire 
 should again become vacant. Fourteen Princes entered 
 the confederation; and, which is specially worthy of remark 
 viewed by the analogy of recent events , no sooner were 
 the first three signatures obtained than Frederick took 
 steps for concluding Military Conventions with the other 
 Princes, by virtue of which the troops of those states 
 were under certain conditions to be handed, over to Prus- 
 sia, who was to incorporate them in her army and pay 
 them from her treasury. But Frederick was too near his 
 end to introduce radical and permanent changes into the 
 political relations of Europe. In the following year, the 
 whole scheme was buried with him. 
 
 But little of the great monarch's genius was inheri- 
 ted by those who succeeded to the kingdom which he had 
 enlarged and consolidated. The Prussian historians have 
 spared no pains to leave us ideal portraits of these suc- 
 cessors. But despite the labour which either real or af- 
 fected veneration has spent on this task, we cannot be 
 blind to the fact that after Frederick's death a series of 
 rulers followed who, if utterly wanting in principle, were 
 represented as extraordinarily clever, or, if utterly wanting 
 in talent, were represented as extraordinarily virtuous. 
 They were all equally imbued with that intolerable self- 
 deification which naturally results from the literal accep- 
 tation of the theory of Divine right. As the anointed of 
 
— 20 — 
 
 the Lord they were themselves the highest objects of their 
 worship, and next to themselves they worshipped petty 
 detail. We see pass before us in one dreary round, volup- 
 tuous mysticism and austere orthodoxy, romantic ardour 
 and invincible cowardice, and as a final result a vacilla- 
 ting, finessing, and utterly incapable foreign policy. 
 
 They could not bring themselves either to rise up 
 against the Austrian supremacy or to submit to it quietly. 
 The jealousy and mistrust still remained, but the energy 
 of Frederick's warlike time had fled. Prussia fought side 
 by side with Austria against the French Revolution, while 
 at the very same moment she was in open hostility with 
 Austria in Poland. The generals following the example 
 set by the cabinets, perpetually refused to march at the 
 call of their allies, and exasperated them by wretched 
 cavils, recriminations, and monetary stipulations. This 
 state of things was brought to an end by the peace of 
 Bale. 
 
 Of Frederick's degenerate successors the one who 
 reigned the longest was also the most insignificant. 
 Frederick William the Third was the contemporary of the 
 French Revolution, of the Empire, of the Restoration 
 and of the July monarchy, and was therefore in the fore- 
 ground of events throughout a long, varied, and deeply 
 agitated period. From beginning to end he appears as 
 a poor-spirited creature, destitute of all energy of body 
 
— 21 — 
 
 or mind. The official panegyrists have endeavoured to 
 dignify as honest firmness that which was nothing but 
 dry insipidity, capable on occasion of turning into sullen 
 obstinacy. After the events of 1815 he committed one 
 of the blackest acts of ingratitude which a nation has 
 ever experienced from a sovereign, and that is saying a 
 great deal. From a victory which had been won at the 
 price of incredible sacrifices and most precious blood 
 (the flower of the youth of all classes having entered the 
 ranks as common soldiers), the sole fruits obtained 
 were : the re-establishment of a barren despotism ; the 
 persecution of those whose devotion had saved the throne; 
 a weak submission to the knout of the Emperor Nicho- 
 las; and the open violation of the king's pledged word; 
 for the representative constitution which he had solemnly 
 promised in the hour of danger was never granted. 
 
 If Count Bismarck sometimes complains of the mistrust 
 which meets him now in the execution of his great 
 projects, he should remember that there was a time 
 when he took a pleasure in provoking these suspicions by 
 standing up as the champion of the crying injustice of 
 former days. In a speech which he made in 1847 in 
 the United Diet, he declared that the sacrifices of 1813 
 had not given the Prussian nation any right to a^c aa- 
 atitiiition; that the Prussian sovereigns ruled by the 
 grace of God and not by the favour of the people; and 
 
— 22 — 
 
 that anything which they chose to grant was to be ac- 
 cepted as an act of spontaneous liberality. The man who 
 has since introduced universal suffrage on the ground 
 that it was necessary to "lift Germany into the saddle" 
 would certainly not hold that language now. But life 
 would be too pleasant if we could absolve ourselves from 
 our past sins by a simple change of opinions. A Neme- 
 sis takes care to remind Man of the continuity of his 
 being, when his interests would naturally lead him to de- 
 sire to annul the past. It is unavoidable that the Bis- 
 marck of 1847 should sometimes rise up between the 
 Bismarck of to day and those whose confidence would 
 often be of infinite value to him. 
 
 But before entering more particularly into the history 
 of the statesman, there remains the task of relating one 
 of the most remarkable episodes in the history of the 
 political idea which he was to realize. 
 
 In the summer of 1806, the complete subjection 
 of South Germany to France was sealed. The Rhenish con- 
 federation was nothing less than a special form of servitude. 
 The Princes who had put on the livery of their protec- 
 tor, received an advance in pay and rank, and their lands 
 were enlarged at the expense of their oppressed neigh- 
 bours. Prussia had looked on at Austria's defeat , and 
 had withdrawn from her alliance with England, in order 
 to enjoy in peace the possession of Hanover, the price 
 
— 23 — 
 
 of her neutrality. The moment was auspicious for attempt- 
 ing a step in advance. Austria , conquered and cast 
 down, had left a place vacant in the former empire; the 
 "cousins" had all been promoted, the landgrave to duke, 
 the duke to grandduke, and the grandduke to king. 
 Prussia could not but expect an increase of rank as well. 
 Moreover, the alternative was clearly imposed upon her 
 of either extending her power sufficiently to enable her 
 to hold her own, or of sharing the common fate, that 
 of subjection to France. For the hour of reckoning 
 approached, and the lion's insatiable appetite was con- 
 tinually growing. Ambition, rivalry, instinct of self-preser- 
 vation, all pointed to the same conclusion: that it was 
 necessary to take in hand again the projects of Frederick 
 the Great, to realise the plan of 1785, mutatis mutandis. 
 The king himself, it may be imagined, was not the man 
 to originate such ideas; but his entourage was better 
 provided with brains. Amongst the Princes there was 
 the impetuous , high-spirited Louis-Ferdinand ; ' amongst 
 the councillors Baron Stein, the indefatigable adversary 
 of Napoleon, the man who more than any other had al- 
 ways laid stress upon the necessity of creating a Ger- 
 man Fatherland, and who was in those days prepared to 
 go further than any one has yet ventured to go. 
 
 The map of Europe had undergone so much altera- 
 tion since 1801, that the idea had sprung up in the 
 
— . 24 — 
 
 heads of many patriots that the time had come to take 
 advantage of the general confusion to establish a united 
 Germany. In memorials to the king, in pamphlets, and 
 in the newspapers, the favourable nature of the moment 
 was perpetually dwelt on. As regarded the choice of the 
 remedy, there was no more unanimity than now. It was 
 discussed whether there should be one great united Ger- 
 many or only a North Germany (the provisional line of 
 demarcation drawn at the peace of 1795 had first suggested 
 the idea of this division); whether the lesser Princes 
 should be indirectly subordinated to the higher powers 
 or united into a confederation. 
 
 In the year 1804 the temptation had come from 
 quite an opposite quarter. Napoleon, on the eve of pro- 
 claiming an hereditary empire, and inwardly desiring to 
 be received as an equal by the ancient reigning families, 
 had taken Frederick William the Third into his confi- 
 dence, and had proposed that he should also assume the 
 title of emperor. The King had warmly encouraged the 
 first Consul to introduce the change into France, without, 
 however, betraying his intentions as regarded his own 
 position; and after an interchange of opinions had been 
 carried on for some months, he at last declared that "he 
 was contented with his lot, and desired nothing further 
 than to keep the position which Providence had assign- 
 ed to his house." In this answer we have the two 
 
— 25 — 
 
 elements which characterised both the man and the si- 
 tuation: a well founded distrust of all the allurements 
 of a dangerous tempter, and a repugnance to every step 
 at all hazardous, especially if it had the remotest sus- 
 picion of a revolutionary origin. A sovereign who had 
 felt within him the stirrings of a great ambition, would 
 not so soberly have resisted this temptation; and the 
 dry, selfsatisfied tone in which the refusal is conveyed, 
 bears so manifestly the stamp of the king's mind that 
 we must look for the explanation not in his prudence, 
 but rather in his lack of ambition. Had distrust of 
 Napoleon been the sole motive of his refusal, he would 
 not have vacillated during the war of 1805 — 1806 be- 
 tween Austria and France, between alliance and resistance, 
 between a policy of petty devices and one of moral in- 
 dignation, intent above everything on assuring himself of 
 the newly acquired possession of the electorate of Hanover. 
 At last came the year 1806. France, after the Rhe- 
 nish confederation had been formed, and the Emperor 
 Francis the Second had laid down the crown of the Ger- 
 man Empire, proposed to Prussia for the second time 
 that she should place herself at the head of a North 
 German confederation. On the 22 nd of July, immediately 
 after the signing of the deed establishing the Rhenish 
 confederation, Talleyrand sent to Laforest, the French 
 ambassador at Berlin, a copy of the document accom- 
 
 Count Bismarck. o 
 
— 26 — 
 
 panied by the following commentary: "The moment has 
 arrived for Prussia to profit by this favourable oppor- 
 tunity for extending and consolidating her position; 
 she will find the Emperor Napoleon inclined to forward 
 her views and projects. She can either reunite, by 
 means of a new federal constitution, those states which 
 still belong to the German Empire, and obtain the 
 imperial crown for the house of Brandenburg. Or, if 
 she prefers it, she can form a confederation of the North 
 German States lying nearer to her frontiers. The Em- 
 peror gives, in anticipation, his approval to any arrange- 
 ment of the kind which it is convenient to Prussia to 
 make." The King at once replied in the warmest and 
 most unqualified terms. 
 
 "The King," said Herr von Haugwitz to Laforest, 
 "is highly delighted; he regards himself not only as the 
 ally of France but as the personal friend of the Emperor 
 Napoleon." Still he refused for the moment to give effect 
 to these proposals; not that he despised the proposition 
 in itself; but his dynastic and legitimist feelings rebelled 
 against the idea of introducing this innovation unless 
 with the consent of his brother princes. He even wished 
 to gain that of the Emperor of Austria, who was 
 accordingly sounded indirectly on the subject. His scru- 
 ples, it will be seen, were precisely the same as those 
 which forty -three years later prevented his son from 
 
— 27 — 
 
 accepting the German crown when offered to him by the 
 Frankfort National Assembly. 
 
 The rupture between Prussia and France, like the 
 rupture between Prussia and Austria in 1866, came about 
 in connection with the negotiations with the German 
 petty states. Before M. de Talleyrand's overtures, Prus- 
 sia had already invited the courts of Saxony and Elec- 
 toral Hesse to form with her a North German federation, 
 on the understanding that all the other states not be- 
 longing to the Rhenish confederation should ultimately be 
 also urged to join. 
 
 On the 12 th of July appeared the first draft of a scheme, 
 entitled: ''Suggestions for a confederated North German Em- 
 pire" ; and after this had been twice revised, the definitive 
 scheme consisting of twenty four articles and a supplementary 
 paragraph appeared in the middle of August. By the second 
 article of this scheme, the King of Prussia "upon the invita- 
 tion of the Electors of Saxony and Hesse" was to accept the 
 dignity of "Emperor of North Germany"; the two Electors 
 "upon the invitation of Prussia" to take the title of 
 King. The number of contingents which each was to 
 contribute to the federal army was determined. In time 
 of war the Emperor was to have the supreme command. 
 There was to be a federal assembly of delegates from 
 the allied courts. — So far the resemblance to the la- 
 test constitution is striking; but there is one point, and 
 
 2* 
 
— 28 — 
 
 that the most important, in which the two organisations 
 differ; there is no question in the older one of an elec- 
 ted representation of the people; there was to be merely 
 a federal tribunal. 
 
 We will not linger here over all the wearisome 
 formalities through which this scheme, destined never 
 to come into operation, had to pass. Whilst Napoleon 
 and Frederick William were publicly assuring each other 
 of their friendly intentions, they carried on secretly 
 a bitter diplomatic warfare, Frederick William to 
 establish his confederation without the assistance of 
 France, whose goodwill, became increasingly unreliable; 
 Napoleon to cut the ground from beneath the feet of the 
 potentate whom he had so often encouraged to advance. 
 Napoleon frightened first the Elector of Saxony, and then 
 the Elector of Hesse, by those insinuations and cold two- 
 edged menaces which he was so fond of employing. Much 
 was not needed to shatter the Prussian plans , objection- 
 able as these were in themselves to Princes whose only 
 feelings towards Prussia and towards one another were 
 those of jealousy. 
 
 We know the early end which awaited all these vain 
 efforts for a confederation ; how the court of Berlin, meet- 
 ing Napoleon's secret wishes , and mistaking its own 
 strength in an inconceivable manner, threw itself into 
 that sad venture of Jena, which swept it away at one 
 
— 29 — 
 
 blow. But the ideas which were buried under the ruins 
 of Frederick William's kingdom had nevertheless acquired 
 greater importance in appearing for the second time, — and 
 this too in a more definite shape than when they had 
 been first evolved by Frederick the Great. Link by link 
 in one long chain, this traditional mission extends through 
 the whole of modern German history; and without assert- 
 ing that the mere fact of these historical precedents 
 justifies further attempts in the same direction, it is of 
 immense importance to demonstrate to contemporaries 
 that the original causes of the undertakings of our days 
 are not to be referred to any accidental ambitions or to 
 arbitrary covetousness. Good or bad, it is an idea which, 
 for the last hundred years and more, has forced itself 
 upon the best patriots, whenever events have aroused 
 Germany out of her sloth to a consideration of her in- 
 sensate state of dismemberment. What especially invali- 
 dates the accusations brought against the Hohenzollerns 
 of a grasping selfishness, and diminishes the distrust 
 created by that dynasty, is the fact that, with the ex- 
 ception of Frederick the Great, the heads of that house 
 have always been most inaccessible to ideas of aggrandize- 
 ment. The kings do not give the impulsion ; they simply 
 follow it. And when they do so, it is against their will, 
 with backslidings and half measures. The only one who 
 was an exception to this rule was the only one who knew 
 
— 30 — 
 
 how to identify himself with the general views. At his 
 death, the thinkers of the nation, the patriots, authors 
 and savants, succeeded to the heritage of his thought 
 The kings were incapable of soaring above that memo- 
 rable avowal: We are contented with our lot and with 
 the position which Providence has assigned to our house. 
 In the year 1813 the great uprising of the people 
 against foreign dominion naturally carried the ideas of 
 patriots back to the projects of 1806 and earlier. Logic 
 and justice seemed to demand the suppression of the 
 small principalities, the more stringently that they had 
 followed Napoleon even against Germany itself. But Fre- 
 derick William preferred to ally himself with the Princes, 
 and, as a natural sequel, went so far later on as to em- 
 prison those who had forced him to unsheathe the sword. 
 The story has been told sufficiently often, of how, struck 
 with dismay at the news of the Convention of Tauroggen, 
 he would hear at first of nothing less than bringing 
 General York, who had concluded the treaty which was 
 to give him back his kingdom, before a court-martial; 
 and who knows what would have happened if the patrio- 
 tic partyhad not withdrawn him from the French influences 
 at work around him. It is further related, that it was 
 suggested to him that the French ambassador was 
 making arrangements to carry him off from Berlin under 
 cover of the night, and that it was by this means alone 
 
— 31 — 
 
 that he was persuaded to repair to Breslau, where those 
 near him succeeded in inducing him to declare war 
 against Napoleon. This man who had often shown him- 
 self to be, like all his race, in no wise deficient in per- 
 sonal bravery, was utterly destitute of that higher courage 
 with which a steadfast political idea inspires kings as 
 well as citizens. 
 
 Finally in 1849 the same spectacle was renewed 
 once more for the fourth time. In March of 1848, after 
 the victory won by the people, Frederick William the 
 Fourth seized the tricolour, paraded the streets of Berlin, 
 and let himself be greeted as Emperor of Germany. A 
 year later, after the triumph of the European reaction, 
 he contemptuously refused the crown of Emperor when 
 offered to him by a German deputation sent from the 
 Frankfort Parliament, It is therefore clear that the idea \ 
 of regenerating Germany by the aggrandizement of Prussia J 
 cannot be looked upon as a royal tradition. On the con-^ 
 trary, as often as events caused a political excitement 
 in the nation and made the national thoughts tell, that 
 idea came to the surface; as soon as the pressure from 
 below relaxed and the power of the throne once more be- 
 came firm , it was suppressed. Foolish as it may be to 
 demand that the nation should trust the security of its 
 future to the tender mercies of the Hohenzollerns, or of 
 any other royal family armed with the supremacy in 
 
— 32 — 
 
 Germany; stigmatise as one will the violent and mischievous 
 measures adopted to induce the king to take up again 
 this higher mission; it is impossible on looking honestly 
 below the surface into the connection between the older 
 events and the new, to deny the fact, that the idea, of 
 which Count Bismarck undertook the realisation, is the 
 outgrowth of the national mind and not of a narrow dy- 
 nastic egotism. 
 
 If we have dwelt upon this consideration, it has been 
 because it must be of material influence on our judgment 
 of the man who has become the victorious personification 
 of this idea. The Bismarck who devoted himself to the 
 task of continuing and conducting to a successful issue, the 
 work of Frederick the Great, — the freethinker and sworn 
 enemy of the House ofHapsburg, — and of continuing the 
 patriotic tradition of 1806, 1813, and 1848, cannot be the 
 same man, who from 1847 to 1851 was the champion of 
 the wildest feudalism, and the traducer of the great 
 national movement. Many changes must have taken place 
 in his views and opinions since then; and it is these 
 changes, concealed and distorted as they may often have 
 been by the repellant exterior habitual with Prussian 
 officials and Junkers ; it is these internal but unmistake- 
 able changes, which serve to explain the attractive 
 power exercised by the creator of the new order of things 
 on public opinion. Let those who pride themselves on 
 
— 33 — 
 
 their constancy and integrity say what they may, public 
 opinion is not so foolish and thoughtless as they are plea- 
 sed to represent it. It has by no means taken a violent, 
 blind, and allconfiding love for Count Bismarck. It sees 
 in him nothing more than what he is, a man gifted in 
 a high degree with that quality so rare in history and 
 especially in German history: the will and the power to 
 give a strong impulsion to a great national cause. It 
 knows his faults; indeed if it were tempted to ignore 
 them, it could not succeed; he takes too good care to 
 display them and remind people of them on every occasion. 
 He once characterised himself by the confession, which 
 though perhaps too sweeping and general is not without 
 interest, that he did not feel he had any aptitude for 
 internal affairs; a confession which must be taken as 
 meaning that his reckless and impatient spirit could not 
 adapt itself to the requirements of the law and to a 
 respect for individual interests, which is necessary in even 
 the most despotically governed of our communities with their 
 civilisation many hundred years old, it being impossible for 
 any one long to pursue an object in the midst of our thickly 
 grown civil institutions without turning to right or left; 
 whilst a temperament like his feels more at ease in a 
 foreign policy with the prospect of a not distant war. 
 This confession, and the explanation we have suggested, 
 form the key to the altercations in which Bismarck was 
 
~ 34 - 
 
 continually involved, both before and after the crisis of 
 1866, in working with the representatives of the law. 
 He belongs to those of whom it has been said: u To do 
 great things you must have the Devil in you." But even 
 if indispensable, this condition does not suffice. Great 
 things are only such as are durable; they are durable 
 only if they correspond to a generally felt want; and herein 
 lies the difference between the statesman and the adventurer. 
 The one is guided in his undertakings by the great march 
 of ideas and events, the other makes capital out of a mo- 
 mentary situation; the one takes counsel by the law of per- 
 petual development, the other by the favour of the hour. 
 Whatever may have been his errors and his faults, Count 
 Bismarck has in this sense unquestionably a right to be 
 called a statesman. Hardly a year has passed since 
 Germany, thanks to his initiative, entered on a new 
 phase, and already there is no longer a question of whether 
 it depends for stability on the life or death of its ini- 
 tiator. 
 
 
Chapter III. 
 
 Bismarck's conservative and Austrian sympathies. — Eight years as 
 ambassador to the Bund. — Change of views. — Demand for a re- 
 formed Zollverein. — Vacillating conduct of Prussia during the 
 Italian war. — Bismarck ambassador at St. Petersburg. — A Prussian 
 Germany or a German Prussia? — Meeting between the sovereigns 
 of Austria and Prussia at Teplitz. — Bismarck's interview with the 
 King at Baden-Baden and its results. 
 
 When Count Bismarck became Prime Minister in 
 1862, the world saw in him simply a man of reckless 
 daring, who had set himself the task of introducing a 
 reign of reaction. After a somewhat stormy youth, in 
 which he had thrown himself into the pleasures of life, 
 with the impetuosity that might naturally have beer 
 expected from one of his temperament, and had indul- 
 ged, it is said, after the manner of his German ancestors 
 in deep potations , he had entered the political arena a 
 perfect Hotspur. An impartial or, rather, a friendly wri- 
 ter says of him: "It is well known that during the time 
 of his parliamentary activity from 1847 to 1851, in spite 
 
— 36 — 
 
 of his great and rare powers, Bismarck was the leader 
 of the conservative party in its narrowest and most bi- 
 goted sense, the chief of the extreme right, the advocate 
 of patrimonial jurisdiction and trade guilds, the most ob- 
 stinate adversary of democracy and parliamentary go- 
 vernment, and the most zealous worshipper of solidarity 
 between the autonomy of the sovereign and the privi- 
 leges of the aristocracy." * 
 
 In a speech made in 1850, he openly avowed that 
 in his opinion, the mission of Prussia lay in subordina- 
 ting herself to Austria and fighting at her side against 
 the German democracy. In the same speech, he insisted 
 on the necessity of terminating the then existing occu- 
 pation of Schleswig - Holstein , which he designated as a 
 "stupid undertaking" into which the unfortunate policy 
 of 1848 had drawn Prussia. And to crown all, he ended 
 in these words : "Owing to some singular modesty, people 
 refrain from calling Austria a German power, because she 
 has the good fortune to exercise dominion over other 
 peoples. For my part, I cannot admit that, because 
 Slaves and Euthenians are subject to Austria, it is they 
 who principally represent that state, leaving the German 
 element only a subordinate part to play. On the con- 
 trary, I respect in Austria the representative of an an- 
 
 Adolf Schmidt. 
 
 
— 37 — 
 
 cient German power." Thus. spoke the man, who ten 
 years later was to give the cabinet of Vienna to under- 
 stand, that nothing remained for the Emperor but to aban- 
 don his position in Germany, and seek his welfare by 
 transporting his centre of gravity to Ofen (the capital of 
 Hungary). Thus spoke the man, who later on had no 
 peace nor rest until the Emperor had solemnly renoun- 
 ced all interference in German affairs. In the question 
 of the Duchies, in questions of policy affecting trade and 
 commerce, not to mention universal suffrage, he was de- 
 stined to experience the same entire reversal of his opi- 
 nions. 
 
 The events which had furnished him with the oc- 
 casion for thus pronouncing himself for Austria and against 
 the Duchies, were the last throes of the revolutionary 
 epoch of 1848. During the revolutionary interregnum, 
 Count Bismarck had retired from parliamentary life ; but, 
 in 1849, he once more reappeared to take his part in crushing 
 the last, desperate efforts which were being made by the na- 
 tional party, who, although in the final agonies, were never 
 weary of placing their hopes in the Prussian crown. That 
 crown had just attempted one of those half measures for 
 which it is famous, in order to secure, by means of dy- 
 nastic treaties, the Prussian supremacy, which it had not 
 ventured to accept at the hands of parliament. 
 
 Negotiations were entered into, just as in 1806, with 
 
— 38 — 
 
 the courts of Saxony and Hanover, which, now as then, 
 cared for nothing so much as that the negotiations 
 should end in smoke. Austria was at hand ready to 
 reinstate the ancient Diet at Frankfort. Saxony and 
 Hanover, whilst affixing their signatures to the alliance 
 with Prussia (called the alliance of the Three Kings) 
 sided in their hearts with Austria , just as Saxony 
 and Hesse in 1806, whilst signing the treaty of alliance 
 with Frederick William the Third, had been at the beck 
 of the Emperor Napoleon. 
 
 The conflict which had begun between Electoral 
 Hesse and its Prince, a perfect type of the petty Ger- 
 man despot, presented an opportunity, which was eagerly 
 seized, for putting an end to all doubt, and for extin- 
 guishing the last flickering light of the liberal aspira- 
 tions. It had always been the practice of the ancient 
 Diet to declare the Princes to be right and the states 
 to be wrong. This sacred tradition it was necessary to 
 re-consecrate. For this purpose, the Austrian army ad- 
 vanced to take possession of the Electorate, and to lend 
 a helping hand to the constitution-violator. For the 
 space of several hours, Prussia vacillated, and it seemed 
 as if she would come to the rescue of the down-trodden 
 national rights. Her army was put in motion. The two 
 powers met, and the result was the celebrated battle of 
 Bronzell, which cost the life of one Austrian white horse , 
 
— 39 — 
 
 immortal as a martyr to the devotion of the King 
 of Prussia to a national cause. After this propitiatory 
 sacrifice, the two rulers thought the moment had come 
 for the bloodshed to cease, and threw themselves into 
 each other's arms. 
 
 Baron Manteuffel the Prussian Prime Minister, set 
 out for Olmtitz, and there acting on what Count Bismarck 
 had declared to be the height of a good policy, he signed 
 Prussia's submission to the pleasure of the Emperor. The 
 Diet was reopened under the presidency of Austria. Ger- 
 man history had to record one more example, and this 
 perhaps the most lamentable of all, of the vanity of 
 placing hopes in Prussian royalty. 
 
 Count Bismarck naturally recommended himself to a 
 government which had so literally followed his programme ; 
 the more so as he had distinguished himself, not only 
 by the vehemence of his convictions but also by his 
 promptitude and vigour of mind. Count Bismarck is cer- 
 tainly no orator in the usual sense of the word, yet in 
 spite of many defects in his delivery, he commands 
 the attention of his audience by the evident force with 
 which his thoughts work within him. It seems, besides, 
 as if the habit of speaking in public , and especially the 
 certainty, which is so requisite, and which he now pos- 
 sesses, of obtaining the ear of his audience, had materially 
 contributed of late years to the development of his par- 
 
— 40 — 
 
 liamentary faculty. Yet in the year 1866, one of his ad- 
 mirers who had attended a sitting of the Eeichstag drew 
 his portrait in the following terms: "No oratorical or- 
 namentation, no choice of words , nothing which carries 
 the audience away. His voice, although clear and audible, 
 is dry and unsympathetic, the tone monotonous ; he inter- 
 rupts himself and stops frequently; sometimes even he 
 stutters, as if his recalcitrant tongue refused obedience, 
 and as if he had difficulty in finding words in which to 
 express his thoughts. His uneasy movements , somewhat 
 lolling and negligent, in no wise aid the effect of his 
 delivery. Still, the longer he speaks, the more he over- 
 comes these defects; he attains more precision of ex- 
 pression, and often ends with a well-delivered, vigorous, 
 sometimes , as every one is aware, too vigorous, perora- 
 tion." Any one hearing him now for the first time w r ould 
 not consider this description altogether just. It is true 
 that his words still come slowly, by starts and with hesi- 
 tation; but, except for those who regard a melodious 
 uninterrupted flow of language as the only true form of 
 oratory, his mode of speech is not without charm, for it 
 allows the listener to assist at the working out of the 
 speaker's thought, and thereby chains his attention much 
 more forcibly than many a smooth sounding or even 
 finely rolling diction which has no internal difficulties 
 to contend with. Often he succeeds in presenting his 
 
— 41 — 
 
 subject in sharp, happy touches, pressing into his service 
 similes from real life with wonderful audacity, and in a 
 cool unprejudiced kind of way overthrowing tenderly re- 
 vered traditions by a reference to stern realities. It should 
 be added that his style, although unstudied, is often not 
 wanting in imagery. His bright and clear intellect does 
 not despise colouring any more than his strong constitu- 
 tion is free from nervous irritability. 
 
 Baron Manteuffel had, then, every reason to avail 
 himself of the powers of such an able and thorough going 
 partisan. In May 1851, he sent him to the restored Diet 
 at Frankfort as first secretary of legation, and, three 
 months later, promoted him to the rank of ambassador 
 in the place of Herr von Rochow. Count Bismarck occu- 
 pied this post for eight years, till the spring of 1859, 
 and during this period his opinions underwent that pro- 
 cess of metamorphosis the surprising effects of which the 
 world has since witnessed. How did this transformation 
 take place; and by what influences was it brought about? 
 Can we trace the path by which his mind gradually ad- 
 vanced to this point? It is only latterly that attention 
 has been drawn to these questions. Before the great 
 crisis of 1866, neither the public nor Count Bismarck 
 had felt any necessity for explanation on this part of the 
 subject. Vague rumours were indeed afloat as to the 
 unfriendly relations existing between the representatives 
 
— 42 — 
 
 of the two great German powers at Frankfort. Political 
 gossip related all kinds of wonderful things as to the 
 contentions between the two diplomatists, and even hint- 
 ed that there had once been more than a figurative col- 
 lision. The same two men, who then, in their characters 
 of representatives of their respective courts at the Diet, 
 so violently opposed one another, were afterwards as prime 
 ministers to be opposed to one another in the decisive 
 struggle, to which their former skirmishes had been the 
 prelude. The name of Count Bismarck's colleague was 
 Herr von Eechberg. It is only since the events of 1866 
 have revealed the whole bearing of the plans prepared 
 so long beforehand, that attention has been awakened to 
 the psychological problem underlying those events; and 
 though, no complete investigation of that problem is yet 
 possible, still there are materials at hand of undoubted 
 interest and well worth being consulted, — with proper 
 caution. 
 
 In a conversation of tolerably recent date, which 
 for this reason we shall not give now, but in the sequel, 
 Count Bismarck laid great stress on the fact that when 
 he arrived at Frankfort, his Austrian sympathies were in 
 their full youthful bloom. He had paid a visit to the High- 
 priest of conservative nihilism, Prince Metternich, at his 
 country seat at Johannisberg, near Frankfort; and there, 
 on the shores of the classic stream , which washes the 
 
 
— 43 — 
 
 foot of the vineclad hills so dear to German poets, the 
 cordial alliance between the two monarchies, established 
 for the annihilation of the German people, had celebrated 
 its last idyll. Count Bismarck and his apologists are 
 fond of representing, that it was in consequence of the 
 opportunity, which he now had for the first time of ob- 
 serving Austria's system more nearly, tiiat he came to 
 see through her objectionable and dangerous policy; in 
 short, that the conversion of the politician was princi- 
 pally the result of the moral indignation of the man. 
 We already know enough of the personage we are studying 
 to be careful how we accept explanations which savour 
 rather strongly of idealism. 
 
 Properly understood, the statement amounts, without 
 however thereby losing its value, simply to this, that the 
 new ambassador with the energy and faculties we know him 
 to have possessed was urged, from the very beginning of 
 his career, by the irresistible impulse to be something, to 
 do something in the world. Far less vigour and fire than 
 he possessed would have been quite enough to provoke a 
 collision with the Austrian stubbornness; more especially 
 as this stubbornness, which generally proceeded from 
 sheer force of inertia, was to be found in the present 
 instance in men who were not deficient in aggressive- 
 ness. It did not suit the nature either of the prime 
 minister, Prince Schwarzenberg, or of his representative, 
 
— 44 — 
 
 Herr von Rechberg, to assume an air of goodnatured 
 stupidity and pretended cordiality, the mask under which, 
 formerly, the Emperor Francis had concealed from the 
 world the cunning and malicious character of his diplo- 
 macy. The too easy victory of Olmütz was followed by 
 one of those strange moments of illusion at Vienna, in 
 which the Austrians — drunk with the recollection of their 
 proverbial good fortune — give themselves up to a fit of 
 that irrepressible bragging, of which the orders of the 
 day of General Benedek have since furnished so wonder- 
 ful a specimen. In the drawing-rooms of the imperial 
 palace, Prince Schwarzenberg had thrown out the phrase : 
 "II faut avilir la Prusse d'abord pour ensuite la demolir" 
 (Prussia must first be humbled, that she may be then 
 destroyed). Things of this kind were snapped up by the 
 lesser German Princes, who vied with each other in the 
 amusement of letting fly the shafts of their humour 
 against this Prussia, — the smallest of the Great Powers 
 as it was the fashion to call her, — who had taken it into 
 her head to attempt to play a part in Germany. 
 
 Imagine a man of the temperament of Count Bismarck, 
 reduced to the position of a jeered-at Masetto in the illus- 
 trious Frankfort Diet , and it will be readily understood 
 that this was sufficient to incense him beyond bounds, 
 and to open his eyes to the abject character of the policy 
 he represented. J It had been said that Count Branden- 
 
 
— 45 — 
 
 burg, a natural son of Frederick William the Second, 
 the general under whose ministry the coup d'etat against 
 the Berlin national assembly took place at the end of 
 1848, had died of grief at the humiliation suffered by 
 Prussia at Olmütz. Upon Count Bismarck it had precise- 
 ly the opposite effect: it was the starting point of a 
 new policy, which was to be crowned with success. In 
 a letter, written in the year 1856, from Kheinfelden in 
 Pomerania, we find him already standing up boldly 
 against Austria, and full of sympathy for the Duchies. 
 In a second letter, dated Frankfort the 2 nd of April 1858, 
 he plunges deep into the main question. It is the Zollverein 
 that more than anything else reveals to him the utter 
 want of proper organisation in Germany. His views as 
 enunciated in this document are as follows: 
 
 " Our position in the Zollverein is altogether a bungle. I am 
 convinced that we shall be obliged to terminate the treaty, as soon 
 as the period arrives for doing so. . To continue it, is absolutely im- 
 possible so long as, in addition to twentyeight governments ,] some 
 fifty independent corporations governed by private interests exercise 
 a liberum veto. The equality -frenzy of the German governments 
 drives them to use this as a means for making themselves important. 
 In order to avoid these rocks, I think that in a reformed Zollverein, 
 after 1865, we must, for the exercise of the right of consent which 
 the corporations possess in Zollverein matters, borrow an idea from 
 the unionist projects of 1848 , and establish a kind of customs par- 
 liament. The governments would be strongly averse to this, 
 
 but with boldness and persistence we might effect much. The 
 Chambers and the press might be of the utmost assistance to our 
 foreign policy; they would have to discuss the organisation of the 
 
— 46 — 
 
 German customhouse from the Prussian point of view, broadly and 
 without reserve. Then the attention of Germany, now nagging, 
 would once more revive, and our Chambers would become a power 
 in Germany". 
 
 Observe, this was written in a private letter a whole 
 year before the outbreak of the Italian war, the signal 
 that awoke the continental nations from the torpor in 
 which they had lain since 1849. Is it sufficient, in the 
 face of such testimony, to explain so striking a change 
 of opinion by some fit of spleen at the proceedings of 
 the Austrian diplomatists? Is it not evident, that Count 
 Bismarck was feeling all the effects of a transplantation 
 into the open air, after the atmosphere of the narrow, 
 formal Potsdam world? Do we not see distinctly, in the 
 ideas here presented by him on paper, the result of the 
 thought which has been working within him, and which 
 is unavoidably forcing him to the recognition: that the 
 celestial dew of Divine right does not of itself suffice to 
 regenerate a dynasty; that to grow, it must assimilate 
 the living forces of the soil in which it has its roots? 
 His starting point was beyond a doubt dynastic inter- 
 ests. From his royalist education, it was natural that 
 the greatness of the Fatherland should be to him synonymous 
 with the greatness of the monarchy. As his views widened, he 
 proceeded by the inductive path of experience , and finally 
 arrived at those first principles, which we, ordinary mortals, 
 unhampered by traditionary prejudices, reach by a direct 
 
— 47 — 
 
 road. And there can be no doubt that, in the depths of 
 his heart, he has remained what he was. There will al- 
 ways be something of his old self about him, which 
 will recall his early opinions, and the experimental, in- 
 ductive road by which they have reached their present 
 stage. He is an empiric in matters of the public weal; 
 but precisely that higher instinct which makes the great 
 empiric, has led him to the discovery of the laws which 
 political science evolves by the reverse process (syn- 
 thesis). 
 
 The national party had long since come to the con- 
 clusion that the Prussian monarchy would serve admi- 
 rably as a lever to their views. A man now came upon 
 the scene who saw that, for the extension of the mon- 
 archy, it was necessary to have recourse to the prin- 
 ciple of nationality and all which that principle invol- 
 ves. The events of 1866 followed as the natural con- 
 sequence of the meeting of these two views. 
 
 That he should have taken up questions of political 
 economy, with such vigour and comprehension, alone suf- 
 fices to show how far behind him Count Bismarck had already 
 left the petty spirit of his ancient party, which had al- 
 ways looked upon the progress of industry as upon the 
 approach of a deadly enemy. In the preceding reign, 
 for instance, the President of the Pihenish provinces, Herr 
 von Kleist-Retzow, one of the leaders and at the same 
 
— 48 — 
 
 time one of the best types of the members of the upper 
 house, had allowed no opportunity to pass without 
 giving vent to his holy horror at the flourishing state of 
 those intelligent and industrious provinces. He did not 
 conceal, that, when making his periodical rounds, the 
 noise of the forges, the sight of the high chimneys, 
 which he averred to be the work of the devil, caused 
 him the deepest pain. Soldiers and peasants — what 
 more was wanted for happiness? As to whether peasants 
 alone were able to maintain soldiers he did not trouble 
 himself to inquire. 
 
 Can it now be denied that a man bred in such a 
 school must have advanced far beyond his colleagues to 
 render it possible that he should make the administra- 
 tion of the customs a subject of earnest study and sol- 
 licitude, and that he should cry with a loud voice for a 
 reform assisted by Chambers and Press? 
 
 The Italian war found him engrossed in such 
 thoughts, and it will be readily divined what course he 
 would have wished his government to pursue. Germany 
 was then on the eve of making a serious and irretriev- 
 able mistake. For a short time, a false sentimentality 
 and an artificial patriotism, excited in favour of Austria, 
 especially in the South, threatened to drag Germany 
 into a war for that power. The court of Berlin had 
 not remained unaffected by this movement. It had va- 
 
— 49 — 
 
 ciliated during the whole war between its rational inter- 
 ests, which were against, and its legitimist instincts, 
 which were for Austria. As the nation came round to 
 the right view and took the side of Italy, the Prussian 
 crown inclined towards Austria, whose cause was upheld 
 by influential personages at the palace of Potsdam. 
 The defeat of Magenta came most opportunely to the 
 aid of these machinations, to show the Prince Re- 
 gent (the present King) that the revolutionary principle 
 was threatening the whole of Europe. Prussia despatched 
 a circular to the German courts, announcing her inten- 
 tion of intervening in favour of Austria, in order 
 to maintain that power in her territorial statu quo. To 
 support these demonstrations six corps d'armee (250,000 
 men) were mobilized. At the same time, Prussia pro- 
 posed that the Diet should put two other German corps 
 d'armee on a war footing, and place them under her 
 command. Fortunately, these measures which would 
 have drawn Germany much too far into the quarrel, 
 were not sanctioned by Austria. Prince Windischgrätz 
 was sent to Berlin with the information that, so far 
 as Prussia was concerned, there was no question either 
 of intervention or of supreme command; that on the 
 contrary her duty was to take the field at Austria's 
 side; and that Austria would not think of giving up a 
 single Lombard village. 
 
 Count Bismarck. Q 
 
— 50 — 
 
 These cross and counter movements, which pressed one 
 upon another with the rapidity of the events, were still 
 going on when the battle of Solferino took place; and 
 at the actual moment when the Austrian negotiator was 
 urging Prussia to hasten her declaration of war with 
 France, and was telegraphing to Verona that the alliance 
 was certain, and that peace should not be concluded, be- 
 hold the Emperor Francis Joseph had already thrown himself 
 into the arms of Napoleon and signed the peace of Villafranca. 
 
 The apprehension that Prussia might not be disposed 
 to act as her vassal, and the fear, quite pardonable in 
 the face of the vacillating, overcautious policy of the 
 court of Berlin, that she might herself get placed between 
 hammer and anvil, if she allied herself with Prussia in a war 
 against France, had induced Austria to effect a speedy recon- 
 ciliation with the latter; preferring to receive peace from Na 
 poleon, as she lately preferred to place Venice in his hands. 
 
 She now turned her wrath upon Prussia. A manifesto 
 dated from the palace of Luxembourg, 25th of July 1859, 
 accused the Prussian court in the bitterest terms of 
 having been the sole cause of the defeat by leaving its 
 old ally in the lurch. An Austrian journal added the 
 naive confession, that Austria would rather have lost 
 three Lombardies than afford Prussia an opportunity of 
 extending her position in Germany.* 
 
 * Die neue Aera. Sondershausen 1862. 
 
— 51 — 
 
 This violent outbreak of the old spirit of rivalry 
 found Count Bismarck no longer in his seat at the Diet. 
 At the beginning of the war, Prussia, in the course of 
 her traditional vacillating policy, had thought it bet- 
 ter to remove so redoubtable a personage from the 
 immediate vicinity of events, and had appointed him 
 ambassador at the court of St. Petersburg, which was 
 quite disposed to agree with him in his sympathy 
 for Italy. 
 
 He entered on his new office in April 1859. No 
 sooner was he installed than (on the 12th of May, a fort- 
 night after the passage of the Ticino by the Austrian 
 troops), he addressed to Herr von Schleinitz, the minister 
 for Foreign Affairs at Berlin, a letter, which is one of 
 the most remarkable of the documents throwing a retro- 
 spective light upon the plans, that, after ripening long 
 and patiently in silence, were to take the world so vio- 
 lently by surprise. In this letter, which deserves to be 
 called historical, Count Bismarck begins by explaining 
 that the experience gained by him during the eight 
 years he sat in the Diet of Frankfort might be summed 
 up in a few words : In all questions great or small, home 
 or foreign, the wishes or wants of Prussia are stifled by 
 the majority, which Austria, thanks to her solidarity with 
 the other Princes, entirely commands : 
 
 "In the Eastern question," he says, "the Princes declared from 
 
 3* 
 
— 52 — 
 
 the outset that they would side with Austria, although this was un- 
 questionably an overstepping and violation of the federal law. Did 
 they ever do the like for Prussia? Certainly not, for it is their 
 interest to oppose every development on the part of Prussia; and 
 we shall never be in a position to conquer this resistance, unless 
 we emancipate ourselves from the situation made for us by the 
 existing treaties." And after further developing this idea he 
 adds: "The opportunity of casting off these fetters will not soon 
 come again, if we neglect to reap advantage from the present situa- 
 tion; and we shall be forced to resign ourselves in the future, as we 
 have done in the past, to the conviction that in ordinary times 
 there is no possibility of introducing reforms. If the South German 
 statesmen wish to draw us into a war (with France), it is perhaps 
 not without the comfortable reflection that it is easy for a small 
 state to wheel round according to the turn taken by events." In 
 the following sentence we have a clear foreshadowing of the pro- 
 gramme of 1866 : "I think we should hasten to take up the gaunt- 
 let, and I should regard it as no misfortune, but rather as a salu- 
 tary crisis and a means of progress, if the majority at Frankfort 
 were to pass some resolution, in which we could discover an attack 
 on the principle of the confederation, an abuse of power, and a 
 violation of the treaties." 
 
 This was, word for word, the argument invoked seven 
 
 i 
 
 years later to set the army in motion for Bohemia, after 
 the Diet had voted the mobilisation of three corps d'armee. 
 
 "The clearer the violation," pursues the writer, "the better for 
 us. Neither Austria, nor France, nor Russia, will readily present 
 us with so favourable an opportunity for improving our position in 
 Germany, and our allies are on the high road to offer us most 
 righteous motives, without our being under the necessity of stimu- 
 lating them to further excesses. Even the Kreuzzeitung is beginning 
 to grow angry with their proceedings." 
 
 And in his further remarks on this newspaper, he 
 
— 53 — 
 
 unhesitatingly classes it in the ranks of his adversaries 
 — Austria's partisans. He bitterly denounces the atti- 
 tude of the papers subsidized, he says, by Austria, and 
 complains of the timidity of others, which only venture 
 to defend Prussia's cause by concealing Prussian, under 
 the guise of German, sympathies. What is wanted is the 
 courage to plant openly the flag of a Prussian policy; 
 and this policy should be supported by military measures. 
 The letter ends with the following curious passage: 
 
 "As regards the use of the word German in the place of 
 Prussian, I should desire to see the former on our flag only when 
 we have become united to our German fellow countrymen in a 
 closer and more effectual bond; it loses its charm if, from the be- 
 ginning, it is misused by being applied to the state of things re- 
 presented by the Diet. I fear that your Excellency will interrupt 
 me in this digression into the domain of my former activity with 
 the cry: Ne sutor ultra crepidam. And I had no intention of 
 making an official report, but simply wished to give an expert's opi- 
 nion concerning the Diet. I perceive something defective in our 
 position in the Bund, which sooner or later we shall be obliged 
 to repair ferro et igne , unless we submit it in time and at a 
 favourable opportunity to serious treatment. I believe that, if the 
 Confederation were put an end to this very day, and were even 
 not replaced by anything else, this negative result alone would 
 suffice, in a short time, to establish better and more natural rela- 
 tions between Prussia and her German neighbours. 1 ' 
 
 Here, in the spring of 1859, we have the literal 
 programme of 1866. Nothing is wanting, not even the 
 phrase which was destined, when repeated subsequently 
 before a committee of the Prussian Chambers, to call forh 
 
— 54 - 
 
 general indignation against its author — the since famous 
 phrase of "Blood and Iron". But the most interesting 
 point is where the writer touches on the vital question: 
 the absorption of Prussia by Germany or the absorption 
 of Germany by Prussia? What were Count Bismarck's 
 real sentiments at that time? In hinting that, later on, 
 the word "Germany" would have to take the place of 
 "Prussia", had he recourse to that eternal stratagem of 
 governments, which expect the heaviest sacrifices from 
 their subjects, consoling them with prospective advantages 
 to be reaped at some indefinite future? Did he imagine 
 in offering this solution, that he should flatter the 
 liberal tendencies of the chief, to whom the letter was 
 addressed, Count Schleinitz, Prime Minister during that 
 time of modest illusions which has been called "the new 
 era"? Or was he really in earnest? — We will con- 
 tent ourselves for the present with putting this question. 
 The answer we shall endeavour to give in the sequel. 
 
 We have seen that Prussia had allowed the inter- 
 lude of the Italian war to come to an end without bene- 
 fiting by Bismarck's counsels. Counsels had also not 
 been wanting from the liberal side. 
 
 All the spleen and wrath, which the Vienna cabinet 
 had vented upon that of Berlin , had intimidated rather 
 than roused it. The court -spirit and the influences 
 already referred to, were at work to bring about a 
 
— 55 — 
 
 reconciliation, by borrowing from German patriotism some 
 specious reasonings, which had made a deep impression 
 on public opinion during the war. The Southern Alpine 
 passes, it was said, were an indispensable bulwark to 
 Germany ; and to let Austria be weakened, it was added, 
 would be like cutting off one arm, with the certainty of 
 losing the other in the unequal conflict which France 
 would not hesitate to provoke at an early date. 
 
 Put thus, the argument had the greater chance of 
 success that, then as since, France was not wanting in 
 fatal counsellors, who lost no opportunity of bringing 
 forward the question of the Rhine frontiers. Towards 
 the end of July 1860, the interview at Teplitz between 
 the Austrian and Prussian sovereigns had given rise to 
 numerous comments on certain secret conventions, the object 
 of which was said to be to guarantee the possession of 
 Venetia to the house of Hapsburg. 
 
 On the 22nd August , Count Bismarck wrote a letter 
 from St. Petersburg, in which he expressed the appre- 
 hensions which those reports had awakened in him. 
 He says: 
 
 "I am quite out of the way of home politics, for the news- 
 papers give me hardly anything but official reports, which fur- 
 nish only a bare and general outline. According to them , we have 
 promised nothing definite at Teplitz, but made our assistance of 
 Austria dependent , on her first giving us a practical proof of her 
 friendly disposition towards us in German politics; after she has 
 
— 56 — 
 
 done this, she will be able to reckon on our gratitude. With this, 
 I should be quite satisfied; one hand washes the other, and if we 
 have once seen the lather of the Austrian soap, we will willingly 
 return the service. Indirect accounts, however, which arrive here from 
 other Courts speak differently. If they are correct, we have not in- 
 deed concluded any guarantee-treaty, but we have bound ourselves 
 verbally to stand by Austria, under all cireum stances in which she 
 may be attacked by France in Italy. If Austria sees herself com- 
 pelled to act on the offensive, our consent is necessary, if she is to 
 expect our assistance. This version sounds more innocent than, in 
 reality, it would be. If Austria has the certainty of our standing 
 by her in the Venetian question, she will manage matters so 
 as to provoke France to attack her in Italy; and, indeed, it is al- 
 ready asserted that, since Teplitz, her conduct in Italy has been 
 bold and defiant. A well-informed, but rather Bonapartist, corre- 
 spondent writes to me from Berlin: 'we were nicely taken in at Tep- 
 litz by the Austrian blandishments; we sold our rights for nothings 
 not even for a mess of potage. . . . What would the Prussian Cham- 
 bers say to Teplitz, and what to the reorganisation of the Army?* 
 In the latter question, all rational people will side with the govern- 
 ment; but the impression on foreign policy will first be appreciable 
 when it is more accurately known what is the meaning of Teplitz." 
 
 He takes the opportunity of this mention of the 
 "rather Bonapartist correspondent" to complain in the 
 most lively terms, that the liberal press carry on "a sys- 
 tematic campaign of calumny" against him. "He has 
 openly favoured Russo-French intentions upon the Rhine 
 frontier on the understanding of a compensating increase 
 of territory nearer home". 
 
 "I will give," he cries "a thousand Friedrichsd'or to any one, 
 who can prove that any such Eusso-French propositions have ever 
 been made to me. Never have I suggested anything else than our 
 
— 57 — 
 
 depending upon our own strength, and in case of war, upon an appeal 
 to the national forces. Those silly geese in the German press do not 
 in the least see that they are defeating whatever is best in their own 
 efforts in attacking me." Then turning to the feudal party, he says : 
 4 If I were an Austrian statesman, or a German Prince and Austrian 
 reactionist, like the Duke of Meiningen, our Kreuzzeitung would have 
 taken me unaer its wing as it has done him. The mendacity of those 
 suspicions is well known to all our political friends, but as I am only an 
 old member of their party, who has in addition the misfortune of having 
 peculiar views on many points , they allow people to slander me to 
 their hearts' content. The inquisitor is most stern to those on his 
 own side; and friends who have long drunk from the same cup, 
 are more unjust than enemies." 
 
 Thus, then, Herr von Bismarck although banished to 
 the rear of German politics , had not only not ceased to 
 busy himself about them, but had even succeeded in 
 drawing general attention to the active part he was 
 taking in them. 
 
 The ferment, which the peace of Villafranca had left 
 behind it, did not allow the Court of Berlin to sink 
 back into its inanity. The Venetian question was ar 
 open wound, and every new effort to heal it could not 
 but bring into the foreground the embarrassing alterna- 
 tive : either of assisting Austria against France and Italy, 
 or of profiting by the complications, to advance a step 
 towards securing that German supremacy, which was so 
 ardently desired by a part of the nation. 
 
 A year after the date of the letter just quoted, Bis- 
 marck had an interview with the King at Baden-Baden, 
 
 3*' 
 
- 58 — 
 
 when he explained his views, not without making some 
 impression. (The Baths have the peculiar property of 
 acting as a stimulant on the political mind.) Everyone 
 who has had an opportunity of talking to Count Bismarck 
 in private, recognises in him that power which is to be 
 found in superior men, and especially statesmen, of lay- 
 ing the listener under a spell by their intellectual ascen- 
 dancy and winning manner. Imagine a man of Bismarck's 
 position and ability, overflowing with ideas w T hich had long 
 been working in his mind, in the presence of the monarch 
 whose co-operation it was most essential to obtain! The 
 King neither remained quite deaf nor allowed himself to 
 be carried away. At the beginning of his regency he 
 had enjoyed a cheaply bought popularity and like every- 
 one else had found a charm in it. The Queen, whilst 
 she was still only Princess of Prussia, had always made 
 visible efforts to win the sympathies of the people 
 by those slight attentions which so richly repay the 
 great. 
 
 Perhaps, too, we ought to reckon amongst the pe- 
 culiar circumstances of the situation, the attempt on the 
 life of King William at Baden-Baden. Oscar Becker 
 thought he was doing something meritorious in trying 
 to send out of the world a Prince , who was inaccessible 
 to the wishes of the nation. Who knows, whether this des- 
 perate attempt may not have excited some reflections in 
 
— 59 — 
 
 the young fanatic's intended victim? Such a thing would 
 not be altogether unknown in modern history. 
 
 Finally, even the air of the country in which the 
 King and the minister met, was favourable to liberal ideas. 
 The inhabitants of the Grand Duchy have been in the 
 enjoyment of political liberty longer than those of most 
 German states. The Grand Duke, the King's son-in-law, 
 who had begun his reign at the time of greatest reac- 
 tion, and was at first completely in its favour, had sud- 
 denly, as if inspired by an inner light, become a liberal, 
 and had, from that time, been the most beloved, we 
 might say the most advanced man of his country, en- 
 joying the meed of a well-earned popularity. 
 
 Thus, everything combined to open the mind of the 
 King to the plans of future grandeur, which the Minister 
 unrolled before his eyes. Still, "he hastened but slowly" 
 to enter into them. Of an unpliant mind, brought up 
 under the severest military discipline, perpetually haunt- 
 ed by the spectre of the Revolution , which had risen 
 up before him in 1848, he felt little inclination to em- 
 bark for unknown shores, where he had forebodings 
 that he should find too much that was new. Finally, 
 he desired Count Bismarck to put the substance of their 
 conversation on paper in the form of a memorandum. 
 
 On the 15th of September, 1861, Count Bismarck 
 sent a short abstract of this conversation to a friend, 
 
— 60 — 
 
 dated from Stolpemünde, in Pomerania, and accompanied 
 by a letter no less interesting than those already given. 
 In it, he lays especial stress on the inopportuneness of 
 a purely conservative programme which would sacrifice 
 Prussia's future position in Germany to the intractable 
 love of sovereignty and the vanity of the petty princes. 
 He would have preferred to find the reactionist journals, 
 instead of launching invectives against the German 
 republic, making definite proposals for a suitable reform 
 of the national organisation: 
 
 "We need, as much as our daily bread, a firmer consolidation 
 of our powers of defence; we need a new and pliant system of 
 customs, and numerous institutions in common to protect Germany's 
 material interests from the disadvantages resulting from her un- 
 natural configuration. We ought to clear away every species of 
 doubt as to the sincerity and earnestness of our intention to forward 
 these objects. — Moreover, I do not see why we should start back 
 so coyly at the idea of a representation of the people, — be it in 
 the Diet, be it in a customs -parliament. An institution which is 
 legally established in every German state, and which we conser- 
 vatives would not wish to do without in Prussia, can hardly be 
 attacked as revolutionary. In national matters very moderate con- 
 cessions have hitherto always been recognised as valuable. We 
 might create a thoroughly conservative national representation, and 
 yet earn thanks from the liberals. The sounds of preparation for 
 my departure prevent my continuing. In case you should have the 
 opportunity of explaining my views on these subjects to our friends, 
 I forward with this letter the sketch I read to you, but I beg you 
 not to divulge its contents, as I do not know whether it would be 
 agreeable to the King that this account of the conversation which 
 I had with him, and which I have put on paper at his command, 
 
— 61 — 
 
 should become known, especially after its having, as I hear, fur- 
 nished the subject of certain discussions". 
 
 A fortnight later he informs the same friend, in a 
 letter dated from Berlin, the 2nd of October 1861, that he 
 had been to Coblentz, where his Majesty was then staying, 
 and that his visit had not been altogether without 
 result as regarded German politics; that the King had 
 commanded him to elaborate and complete the sketch 
 which he had presented to him at Baden-Baden. 
 
 On the 15th of the same month, he had to attend 
 the coronation, and it was there probably that he placed 
 in the King's hands his exposition of the necessity for a 
 thorough reform in German affairs. It is to be sup- 
 posed that, in this exposition, he endeavoured as far as 
 possible to conform his ideas to those of a sovereign, 
 who, that same day, astonished the modern world by the 
 formula he used in placing the crown on his head: U I 
 take it," he said '-from the table of the Lord", meaning 
 thereby that he was superior to every human authority, 
 and thus implying also that he was above all responsi- 
 bility. 
 
 Such was the monarch whom it was necessary to 
 bring to the point of placing himself at the head of a 
 national, united, progressive movement; a movement 
 which should be based on the broad foundation of uni- 
 versal suffrage, and on a right conception of economical 
 
— 62 — 
 
 interests. The antagonistic elements with which he had 
 to deal, are not sufficient to justify Count Bismarck's 
 proceedings, but they perhaps explain, why only a man 
 of his stamp had any chance of impressing the mind of 
 the King, with the necessity of combating the doctrine 
 of Divine Right by the side of Garibaldi and Kossuth. 
 
 
Chapter IV. 
 
 Constitutional government in Germany. — Army reorganisation 
 scheme. — Bismarck ambassador at Paris; interviews with Napoleon. 
 — Conduct towards the Chamber as Minister President; acts of his 
 administration. — Preparations for rupture with Austria. — Austria's 
 "delegate scheme"; its failure; reproduction of scheme at the 
 Congress of Princes. — Prussia's refusal of adherence. — Her 
 threats of war. — Incredulity of the Public. — Death of the 
 King of Denmark. 
 
 Constitutional government has hitherto been little 
 more than a name in Germany. The ministers have, 
 practically, never obeyed the will of the majority how- 
 ever clearly expressed. In the forty years during which 
 the States have possessed representative chambers, the 
 event of a ministry resigning after a parliamentary de- 
 feat has not occurred more than once or twice, in all the 
 states put together great and small. The views of the 
 reigning families on this subject are firmly fixed, once 
 for all. It seems to them nothing short of monstrous to 
 think of setting up the will of the subject in place of 
 
— 64 — 
 
 the sovereign decision of the ruler. In Berlin, particularly, 
 royalty has always regarded it as a ridiculous assumption 
 that a Prussian sovereign should submit to have ministers 
 forced upon him by the representatives of the people. 
 
 In what sense, then, did King William, in spite of 
 this absolute conviction, declare in his speeches — in 
 very vague terms, it is true — that he would faithfully 
 observe the constitution? What was his idea of a con- 
 stitution, which allowed him for four years to dispose of 
 the taxes without the sanction of the Chambers? Ever 
 since the existence of a constitution on paper, the libe- 
 ral party had lived in the hope of seeing the rulers 
 gradually adopt constitutional practices. But the tren- 
 chant tone, taken by the King at his coronation roughly 
 dispelled all such illusions. It was unmistakeably a procla- 
 mation of personal and absolute government. Thence- 
 forward , to introduce a legislative measure as the per- 
 sonal work of the sovereign, was to insure its meeting 
 with opposition from the whole country ; whilst the king 
 naively thought, that he must necessarily silence all 
 opposition by announcing any innovation as due to his 
 initiative and suggestion. 
 
 Here we have the key to the history of that famous 
 project of military re-organisation, which formed the cen- 
 tral point of the violent conflict between the Prussian 
 people and its government; a conflict which rose to such a 
 
— 65 — 
 
 degree of bitterness and obstinacy that, for a long time, 
 the war of 1866 was generally regarded as merely an 
 expedient for diverting public attention from the question 
 at stake , so as to obtain the consent of the country to 
 internal changes by the help of foreign complications. 
 A serious mistake indeed, but solely to be ascribed 
 to the attitude which the King and his ministry had 
 adopted, from the time of the coronation till the events 
 of the year before last. As to whether this project of 
 reorganisation, to the authorship of which King William 
 laid claim , would answer its purpose of improving the 
 country's means of defence, public opinion would not con- 
 descend seriously to inquire. The increase of the regi- 
 ments of the line, and of the length of service , was looked 
 upon simply as a measure, the secret object of which 
 was the suppression of the Landwehr, an institution sprung 
 from the popular movement of the year 1813. It seemed 
 a mere question of sacrificing the civil to the military 
 element ; and of multiplying the number of military posts 
 w r hich by traditional right belonged to the sons of the 
 nobility. No one saw in it any warlike intention. 
 
 The Chambers rejected the budget, which provided 
 the necessary means for carrying out the measure. There- 
 upon followed, on the 6th of March 1862, one of those 
 dissolutions which have often since been repeated, and 
 always with the same result. At the same time the mi- 
 
— 66 — 
 
 nisters who represented the last faint vestiges of the 
 liberal tendencies of the regency, were replaced by a ca- 
 binet firmly resolved to assist the royal prerogative, as it 
 was called in court language, to gain the victory. 
 
 The King, remembering the ability and energy which 
 he had had the opportunity of observing in Count Bismarck, 
 recalled him from St. Petersburg, and invited him to 
 enter the ministry. For the time being he declined the 
 honour. His motive, some say, was that he did not wish 
 to be subordinate to Herr von der Heydt, an influential 
 man who had steered through the last crisis. Others 
 say, and according to all appearance with more reason, 
 that this farsighted calculator felt the necessity, before 
 undertaking the realisation of his great schemes, of exa- 
 mining from near at hand the sentiments of the Court 
 of the Tuileries, and securing its eventual cooperation. 
 At the time of his embassy in Russia, he had already 
 made a short sojourn in Paris, and had shown a great 
 desire to enter into intimate relations with France. But 
 the Schleinitz Ministry feeling little inclination to be 
 dragged into a more active policy, and mistrusting the 
 adventurous character of the man, had given him to under- 
 stand in so many words, that he must moderate his zeal 
 and return to his post in Russia. 
 
 This time, however, it cost him no trouble to pro- 
 cure a hearing for his proposals. He was appointed am- 
 
— 67 — 
 
 bassador at Paris ; or rather he appointed himself, for 
 from this time forth he was virtually at the head of the 
 Government, and it only depended on him to choose the 
 moment for assuming the presidency of the cabinet. 
 
 Once in Paris, he lost no time. A single summer 
 sufficed for him to secure the secret understanding which 
 subsequently created such grave embarrassment to France. 
 Numerous conjectures have been hazarded as to the se- 
 cret interviews which marked Count Bismarck's stay in 
 Paris, and, even more, his stay at Biarritz. As however 
 we pretend to chronicle only that which may reasonably be 
 known, we will not seek to penetrate the privacy of those 
 conferences. That the intimacy was great, and the nego- 
 tiations earnest, may be gathered from the one signifi- 
 cant fact that, in the autumn of the same year, when 
 Count Bismarck was called to Berlin to take definiti- 
 vely the head of the ministry , he would not forego the 
 honour of returning for a short time to his post of am- 
 bassador, that he might take leave in due form, and 
 doubtless also make a final statement as to his views. 
 
 We should risk wearying the reader, if we were to 
 require him to follow us through all the mazes of this 
 long painful struggle, which, for three years and a half, 
 roused the indignation of the civilised world against Count 
 Bismarck. Now that we have seen the fifth act of this 
 drama, and know the mainsprings of the chief actions, 
 
— 68 — 
 
 we are perhaps inclined to judge the enormities into which 
 the Prime Minister allowed himself to be betrayed, a little 
 less harshly. It must be admitted that he was playing 
 a very difficult game, being forced to hide his hand not 
 only from his chief adversary but also from his natural 
 allies. Perhaps, even, we ought to make allowance for 
 him on the ground , that animated by his governing idea, 
 and convinced of its final justifiableness, he lost all pa- 
 tience — wrongly indeed, but still in good faith, — at a 
 resistance which to him seemed blindness. 
 
 But, however this may be, history will never grant him 
 the bill of indemnity which he obtained from the represen- 
 tatives of the nation. They had to yield to necessity 
 and accomplished facts ; their vote was but a compromise 
 between the mistakes of yesterday and the interests of 
 the morrow. But history has other duties. Like a court of 
 Justice , its province is to deliver judgments, and not to 
 render services. And, however much we might be dis- 
 posed to take the outward circumstances into conside- 
 ration, — even admitting up to a certain point the neces- 
 sity which Count Bismarck was under of concealing 
 his schemes by an unpleasant exterior, yet the ques- 
 tion remains: Whether the aristocratic sentiments and 
 the contempt for law, which lie at the root of his con- 
 duct, are not too intrinsically a part of his nature to 
 allow of his throwing the responsibility on circumstances? 
 
— 69 — 
 
 He has displayed too much natural inclination for an 
 odious part, and betrayed too much talent in playing 
 with public morality, to make us believe that his nature 
 had nothing to do with these excesses, and that they 
 were forced upon him entirely by the situation. 
 
 Since public attention has been turned to the exa- 
 mination of his past acts, it has been asserted by himself 
 and his apologists , that when he took the head of the 
 ministry, on the 24th of September 1862, he seriously 
 entertained the belief that he should succeed in bringing 
 the liberal party over to his side, and that he should 
 be able to work in harmony with it. Those who main- 
 tain this assertion, add even, that in refusing office 
 the first time, he acted under the impression that the 
 conflict, which had arisen out of the army - organisa- 
 tion question, would not be lasting, and that it would 
 be better in the interests of his great plans to enter the 
 cabinet after the solution of this difficulty, with the 
 prospect of obtaining the good-will of the Chamber. In 
 nowise did the attitude of the progress-party justify this 
 hope. To imagine that they would consent to the idea 
 of a propaganda backed by military measures, argued a 
 singular misapprehension of their character. It could not 
 even be said that they rejected the idea with horror : no , so 
 far from rejecting it were they, that they had not even con- 
 ceived the possibility of anyone earnestly entertaining such 
 
— 70 — 
 
 an idea, so monstrous and impossible did it seem to them. 
 They still held to the doctrine of moral conquests — a 
 doctrine dating from the time of the regency. They had 
 the firm conviction that, if Prussia were to mount the 
 liberal colours, she would be irresistible, and that Au- 
 stria and the lesser Princes would then lay down their 
 arms at her feet without firing a single shot. They 
 fondly clung to the belief that the head of the Hohen- 
 zollerns would consciously and openly embrace the cause 
 of the German people. On all these points, Count Bismarck 
 was of precisely the opposite opinion, and it is not impos- 
 sible that, in spite of his clearsightedness he may have 
 deceived himself with the illusion that he should be 
 able to convert his opponents. For he, too, is not exempt 
 from that law of nature, which permits the most striking 
 contradictions to exist side by side in one and the 
 same individual. He has astonished the world no less 
 by his openness than by his astuteness; we have seen 
 him at one time preparing for events with the utmost 
 circumspection, at another braving them with boundless 
 levity. Moreover, it is in the nature of enterprising 
 characters to place their goal at a great distance , and 
 to rely on their talent of improvisation for overcoming 
 any obstacles which may start up in their path. To 
 Count Bismarck the difficulties he might meet with in 
 Parliament, in the constitution, in public opinion, appear- 
 
— 71 — 
 
 ed in the light of incidents, mere details, questions of 
 home affairs, for which , from want of natural inclination 
 as we know, he cared but little, and whose importance 
 he was therefore exposed to the danger of miscon- 
 ceiving. 
 
 Nor did he reflect that the circumstances under 
 which he had taken the helm, and the reputation 
 which preceded him, were of a kind to alarm public 
 opinion, and that instead of making sure of a favourable 
 welcome, he should have done all in his power to inspire 
 confidence. The intimate relations which had existed 
 latterly between him and the court of the Tuileries, had 
 put the finishing stroke to hiß already great unpopularity. 
 He was openly accused of having cemented more firmly 
 the union between feudal Royalism and modern Caesar- 
 ism. Certain allusions which had fallen from him, and 
 had been immediately circulated, made him appear not 
 only as the author of a sinister plot against all ideas of 
 progress, but also as an apt pupil in the art of making 
 false use of democratic principles. There was nothing, 
 down to universal suffrage, which he was not thought 
 capable of employing as an engine for suppressing liberty. 
 
 Instead of seeing that there was some justice in 
 these suspicions, Count Bismarck lost patience at the first 
 opposition he encountered. He instinctively felt that 
 tact and delicacy were requisite towards the King, but 
 
— 72 — 
 
 he condescended to take no precautionary measures for 
 securing public approbation. He threw himself into the 
 arms of the Junker party, although in lucid moments he 
 had entirely recognised their nullity. Nothing, of course, 
 could be more welcome to that party than the possession 
 once more of their old favourite. 
 
 The parliamentary strife almost always turned upon 
 the army question. The Chambers were twice dissolved; 
 a third time the deputies were simply sent home, with 
 the information that their services could be dispensed 
 with in settling the budget. Defiance and insult of 
 every kind were heaped on the people. Count Bismarck 
 and his chief colleague, Herr von Boon, the minister for 
 war, had at times fits of audacious cynicism. One day, 
 a speaker having raised grave complaints against the 
 ministers, and Herr Virchow having desired that they 
 should attend the sittings, in order that they might be 
 able to answer, Count Bismarck coolly stepped forth from 
 an adjoining room, and stated in a contemptuous way, 
 that it would be superfluous to recommence the discussion, 
 inasmuch as what was going on amongst the gentlemen 
 could be heard well enough in the room where he had 
 been. Another time, in a public sitting of the House he 
 told the deputies to their face : "If we think it necessary 
 to make war, we shall do so with, or without, your 
 consent." 
 
— 73 — 
 
 The Minister of War, on being called "to order on 
 one occasion by the President of the House, replied that 
 the President had no right to interrupt him, that a mi- 
 nister was not amenable to the regulations of the House, 
 and that he was superior to the President, A long con- 
 test ensued, which ended in an open violation of the 
 Constitution: the King sent a message to the House 
 without any ministerial counter-signature. The Chambers 
 were at the same time dismissed (27th of May 1863). 
 A few days later, appeared the ordinances on the press. 
 A system of cautions and confiscations, manifestly borrow- 
 ed from abroad, was brought into operation against the 
 newspapers. Violent pressure was put upon all officials, 
 without any attempt at concealment, Whoever had the 
 courage to resist was persecuted to the utmost, was 
 placed under strict surveillance, or transferred to some 
 remote corner of the country. 
 
 A cry of indignation arose on all sides, so loud that 
 even the Crown Prince could not stand aloof from the 
 general agitation. At a public meeting in Dantzig, lie 
 declared that the ordinances on the press had been issued 
 without his knowledge, and that he entirely disapproved 
 of them. He even wrote to the King, his father, to 
 protest against a government, which, he said, endangered 
 his rights to the crown. The only result of his letter was 
 that for some time he was obliged to remain away from Court. 
 
 Count Bismarck. 4 
 
— 74 — 
 
 The famous sentence of the Berlin supreme tribunal 
 
 — a tribunal constituted expressly for the occasion in 
 imitation of the packed juries of the time of James the 
 Second— at last filled the measure to overflowing. The 
 verdicts of acquittal, which had been pronounced at the 
 first and second trials of the deputies, prosecuted for 
 having attacked the ministers in their speeches, were 
 reversed ; liberty of speech in Parliament, which had been 
 expressly guaranteed by one of the articles of the con- 
 stitution , was suppressed by penal enactment. The 
 Judges whose incorruptibility had become proverbial, 
 
 — although perhaps on too easy terms, — the government 
 employes who, if stiff and pedantic, had nevertheless, 
 with all their servility , retained a sort of rugged honesty, 
 
 — in a word, everyone who had any connection, inti- 
 mate or remote, with the official world, was exposed to 
 a treatment of systematic demoralisation. The traffic in 
 consciences came into full play; a new word was coined 
 for the young officials, who rose rapidly with no other 
 merit than that of being ready to do anything for a 
 little promotion. They were called the "aspirers" (die 
 Streber). The moment seemed to have come when the 
 predictions of the pessimists were about to be fulfilled. 
 The world was to see all the evils of the ancient regime, 
 coupled with all the wiles of modern despotism ; the 
 prejudices of a narrow orthodoxy in league with the lax 
 
— 75 — 
 
 views of an unprincipled realism: "One such open vio- 
 lation of the Constitution as was perpetrated at that 
 time", it is thus that a writer of the most moderate 
 opinions* expresses himself, "would have been enough 
 to kindle a revolution in a less cold-blooded people." 
 
 If all these measures were not the personal work of 
 Count Bismarck, — even if the most obnoxious of them were 
 the entire work of his colleague, the Minister of Justice, 
 a feudalist of the purest water and a favourite with the 
 King, — still, in the eyes of the world, he, as Minister Pre- 
 sident was responsible for them ; and, considering his re- 
 cognised superiority, this was no more than just : if he 
 did not do the things himself, he at any rate allowed 
 them to be done. His attention was entirely absorbed 
 in watching the course of external events ; he sought for 
 the long desired pretext to proclaim a violation of the fe- 
 deral law, which might be used as a handle for a rup- 
 ture with Austria. 
 
 To obtain this, he first had recourse to a method 
 peculiarly his own, consisting in extreme frankness. 
 In December 1862 , two months after he had become 
 Premier, he exchanged explanations with Count Karolyi, 
 the Austrian ambassador at Berlin, accounts of which we 
 possess from each of the two diplomatists. These accounts 
 agree in the main and are highly instructive. 
 
 * Adolph Schmidt. 
 
 4* 
 
— 76 — 
 
 In a circular note addressed to the German Courts, 
 on the 24th of January 1863, Count Bismarck says that he 
 has intimated to Count Karolyi his opinion, that the rela- 
 tions between the two powers cannot continue on their 
 present footing ; that they must change either for the better 
 or the worse. That it is the honest desire of the King's 
 government that they should change for the better, but 
 that if the necessary advances are not made by the 
 Imperial Cabinet, it will be requisite for Prussia to look 
 the other alternative in the face, and to make her pre- 
 parations accordingly. That he has reminded Count Ka- 
 rolyi that, in the period before 1848 a tacit agreement 
 existed between the two monarchies , in virtue of which 
 Austria was secure of Prussia's support in European ques- 
 tions, whilst Prussia had a free field left to her in Ger- 
 man politics, as evidenced in the formation of the Zoll- 
 verein. 
 
 "I have left untouched", he proceeds, "the question as to 
 whose fault it was that analogous relations were not again estab- 
 lished after the reconstitution of the Diet, because my desire was 
 not to enter into recriminations for the past, but to shape out some 
 practical course for the present; in which present we feel an an- 
 tagonistic Austrian influence at work in precisely those states on 
 whose friendship, owing to their geographical position , Prussia must 
 set an especial value. I begged Count Karolyi to reflect, that 
 Austria by this course would perhaps win the sympathies of the 
 governments of the states in question, but would alienate the sym- 
 pathies of Prussia, to the prejudice of the common interests of the 
 Bund. The Imperial Cabinet consoled itself with the idea, that in 
 
any war which threatened to be dangerous to Austria, the two 
 powers would nevertheless be found acting together as allies. 
 
 In this assumption there lies to my thinking a grave error, 
 which may perhaps not become apparent until the final moment, 
 but will then come out with fatal clearness; and I earnestly be- 
 sought Count Karolyi to use all his influence at Vienna to con- 
 tradict it. I pointed out that even in the last war, the alliance 
 had not been so serviceable to Austria as might have been the case, 
 if the two powers had not, during the preceding eight years, fought 
 one another on the field of German politics in a manner which 
 could only in the end be of advantage to others, and had un- 
 dermined all mutual confidence. Nevertheless, in the fact that 
 Prussia had not turned Austria's difficulties in 1859 to her own 
 advantage, but on the contrary had armed in order to assist Au- 
 stria, the results of the former intimate relations are clearly dis- 
 cernible. Should those relations however not be renewed and revi- 
 vified, Prussia would, under similar circumstances, be as little de- 
 barred from forming an alliance with an adversary of Austria, as, 
 in the opposite case, from forming a firm and faithful alliance with 
 Austria against a common enemy. I, at any rate, as I scrupled 
 not to tell Count Karolyi, should never be able to bring myself 
 under such circumstances to counsel my royal master to neutrality. 
 It rests with Austria to choose whether she will continue her pre- 
 sent anti-prussian policy of securing a coalition of the lesser states, 
 or seek an honest union with Prussia. That she should choose the 
 latter, is my most sincere desire. But this can be obtained only 
 by her giving up her inimical policy at the German Courts. 
 
 Count Karolyi replied, that it was not practicable for the im- 
 perial house to give up its traditional influence oa the German 
 governments. I contradicted the existence of any such tradition, 
 by pointing to the fact that Hanover and Hesse had for a hundred 
 years, — from the commencement of the Seven Years War, — been led 
 principally by Prussian influence, and that, in Prince Metternich's 
 time, the said states were guided by Vienna in a direction consonant 
 with the union between Prussia and Austria; so that the supposed 
 
— 78 — 
 
 tradition of the Austrian Imperial house dates only from the time 
 of Prince Schwarzenberg; and the system of which it is a part has 
 not hitherto proved conducive to the consolidation of the German 
 confederacy. 
 
 I stated that I had hoped on my arrival at Frankfort in the 
 year 1851, after the conversations I had previously had with Prince 
 Metternich, who was then living at his seat on the Johannisberg, 
 that Austria would herself recognise the policy of creating a posi- 
 tion for us in the German confederation, which might make it worth 
 Prussia's while to exert her whole power for joint purposes. Instead 
 of that, Austria has endeavoured, and with success, to embitter 
 and render difficult our position in the German Confederation, and 
 to force us in fact to seek other allies. The whole treatment of 
 Prussia by the Vienna Cabinet seems founded on the supposition 
 that we, more than any other State, are exposed to attack from 
 without, against which we need foreign help, and that we must, on 
 that account, put up with contemptuous treatment at the hands of 
 those states from which we expect that help. The task of a Prus- 
 sian government , having at heart the interests of the royal house 
 as well as those of the country at large, would therefore be to 
 prove, by deeds, the erroneousness of this supposition, if no heed 
 were paid to its words and wishes. 
 
 Our dissatisfaction with the state of affairs in the Bund has 
 received fresh stimulant, during the last few months, from the de- 
 termination with which the German governments more intimately 
 linked with Austria, have offensively stood out against Prussia in the 
 delegate question. Before 1848 it was unheard of, that questions 
 of any great importance should be brought before the Bund, unless 
 the concurrence of the great powers had been previously secured. 
 Even in cases, in which the opposition came from the less powerful 
 states, as in the matter of the South German fortresses, it had 
 been considered preferable to let objects of this importance and 
 urgency remain unaccomplished for years rather than enforce sub- 
 mission by the dictates of a majority. Nowadays, however, the 
 opposition offered by Prussia to a proposal, not merely on the 
 
— 79 — 
 
 ground of its demerits, but on the ground even of its illegality, 
 is treated as an incident unworthy of notice, by which no one should 
 be deterred from deliberately pursuing the chosen path. I begged 
 Count Karolyi to communicate the substance of the foregoing con- 
 versation to Count Rechberg, as accurately as possible, but confi- 
 dentially, and to express at the same time my conviction that the 
 wounds which our mutual relations have sustained can be healed 
 only by unreserved frankness." 
 
 Some days later, on the 13th of December, Count 
 Bismarck had a second interview with the same diplo- 
 matist. In examining what passed on this occasion, we 
 cannot help observing that, as early as the beginning 
 of 1863, Germany was, quite unconsciously, standing 
 within a hair's breadth of the final catastrophe, which 
 was at that time delayed solely by the death of the 
 King of Denmark and the Schleswig-Holstein war. Count 
 Bismarck sought Count Karolyi, and pointed out to him, 
 that it appeared from the dispatches received from the 
 Prussian ambassador at Frankfort, that matters were 
 taking a very serious turn at the Diet. 
 
 "I did not conceal from Count Karolyi", he says in the cir- 
 cular of the 24th of January 1863 already referred to, "that the 
 continuance of the majority in a course pronounced by us to be 
 contrary to federal law, would place us in a very disagreeable po- 
 sition; that we foresaw as a consequence the rupture of the Bund; 
 that Herr von Usedom had left Herr von Kübeck and Baron von 
 der Pfordten in hardly any doubt as to our view of the matter, 
 but had received answers to his intimation which showed no desire 
 for compromise, inasmuch as Baron von der Pfordten pressed for 
 the delivery of our minority-vote. 
 
— 80 — 
 
 I remarked on this point that, under such circumstances, our 
 dignity would not permit us any longer to evade the conflict pro- 
 voked by the other side, and that I had therefore telegraphed to- 
 our ambassador to give in his vote. I intimated that we should 
 regard the overstepping of the legitimate powers of the Diet, by 
 decrees of a majority, as a breach of the federal treaties, and that 
 we should act accordingly by recalling the Prussian representative 
 at the Diet. I pointed out the practical consequences which in a 
 very short time must naturally ensue from such a situation, namely 
 that we should cease to recognise the legality as regards all federal 
 power, of an assembly from which we had withdrawn on lawful 
 grounds. Nor should we any longer be able to subordinate the 
 Prussian garrisons in the federal fortresses to the decrees of the 
 Diet. It is untrue that I spoke of the withdrawal of the garrisons 
 in such a case. On the contrary, I called attention to the conflict, 
 which might arise from their remaining, after their commanders had 
 ceased to recognise the authority of the Diet." 
 
 The despatch concludes by stating, that all Prussia 
 could do, in the face of this attempt to carry measures 
 by means of new and forced interpretations of the federal 
 treaties, was to leave to those governments which by 
 their aggressive proceedings had compromised the internal 
 harmony of the Bund, the task of settling the difficulties, 
 or, failing that, the responsibility for all the consequences 
 of the conflict which they themselves had evoked. 
 
 Here we have the identical formula used by Prussia 
 three years later in preparing her casus belli, and in 
 the presence of this striking analogy, no doubt can exist 
 that from thenceforth the intention to drive things to 
 extremities was firmly fixed in the mind of the Minister 
 
— 81 — 
 
 President. The intervention of unforeseen events alone 
 made him give up his intended plan of campaign, 
 but it was only the better to attain the accomplish- 
 ment of his object by new and much more circuitous 
 paths. 
 
 The report made by Count Karolyi to Count 
 Rechberg (dated 18 th February 1863) a month after the 
 despatch of Bismarck's circular, completes the account 
 by giving us the Austrian point of view in this question 
 of rivalry. Count Karolyi is of opinion \ that Prussia's 
 pretensions to a preponderating influence in the internal 
 affairs of Germany have no lawful basis; that Prussia in 
 wishing to obtain this, at the cost of Austria, demands 
 the sacrifice of a position which belongs to her, — by right 
 of a tradition a century old, by right of treaties, and 
 by right of the greatness of her dynasty. 
 
 "Finally", adds the ambassador, and the saying has 
 now become historical, ''finally, Bismarck placed before us in 
 so many words the alternative of withdrawing from Ger- 
 many and transporting our centre of gravity to Ofen, er 
 of seeing Prussia in the ranks of our enemies on the 
 occasion of the first European war." The report ends 
 with the following words: "It behoves us to unmask in 
 time the pretext of which Prussia would wish to avail 
 herself for the achievement of her ends." 
 
 Austria , it must be admitted , had herself under- 
 
— 82 — 
 
 taken to furnish this pretext by making the "delegate 
 scheme" her own. This scheme had been elaborated by 
 the leaders of the lesser States with a view to organise 
 a species of diplomatic guerilla to thwart Bismarck's 
 unionist tendencies. The absence of all serious purpose 
 in this would-be reform was so manifest, that no one 
 was caught in the net, — except perhaps the originators. 
 It amounted practically to nothing more than a proposal 
 to convoke, by way of experiment, an assembly composed 
 of delegates from the Chambers of the various states, 
 which should discuss subjects of civil legislation, but 
 should have deliberative powers only. 
 
 This was tantamount to playing into Bismarck's 
 hands, and he immediately took the opportunity offered 
 him of overthrowing his enemies. A vote being called 
 for on the subject, on the 28th of January 1863, his 
 ambassador at the Diet insisted on earnest reforms, 
 particularly on the convocation of a real German par- 
 liament. Under these conditions he promised Prussia's 
 support. But, if the majority attempted to impose half 
 measures upon him, he should cease to recognise the 
 authority of the Diet. 
 
 These threats made the majority vacillate. The 
 German governments, always glad to sink back into their 
 comfortable state of traditional inaction, sacrificed their 
 desires for reform, without much regret, on the altar of 
 
- 83 — 
 
 peace. According to custom, Hanover and Hesse were 
 the first to give the signal for a general stampede. 
 
 But Austria did not consider herself beaten. Now 
 that she had lost Lombardy and found herself threatened 
 in Venetia, the idea had become more than ever fixed in 
 her head that her welfare depended on her supremacy 
 in Germany. When she perceived that the delegate 
 scheme had foundered from its insufficiency, she thought 
 she would astonish Germany with something grand and 
 unheard-of. If her powers had been equal to her inten- 
 tions, she might easily have seized this moment to play 
 the leading part. For no one had seriously believed 
 Count Bismarck's threats. The cry about nationality and 
 a representation of the people, coming from a minister, 
 who treated his country with unparalleled arrogance, was 
 looked upon as bitter mockery. An Austria, courage- 
 ously taking up the tradition of 1849, straightway con- 
 voking a parliament on the basis of the constitution, 
 which had been given by the Frankfort parliament, and 
 forcing the Princes to hold themselves subordinate to 
 the national authority, would at least have had some 
 chance of success. 
 
 Instead of doing this, Austria imagined that the de- 
 legate comedy had been a failure only in consequence of 
 not being brilliantly enough placed on the stage. To in- 
 crease the splendour of the show, seemed to her all that 
 
- 84 - 
 
 was required. She thought it was a stroke of genius 
 to assemble a congress of Princes at Frankfort , at 
 which all the crowned heads of Germany were to 
 appear in person to play the part of fathers of their 
 countiy ; and that the public would certainly not be able 
 to resist such a sensational effect. She found favourable 
 adherents to this scheme, not only in the little Princes, 
 always ready to parade themselves and while away the 
 time, but also in a class of politicians, who, thanks to 
 the influence of Austria, and to their affinities with her 
 leaders, had attained the post of prime-ministers, and, — 
 it is difficult to say how, — the fame of statesmen, at 
 some of the small courts. 
 
 All these people, who thought themselves so wonderfully 
 wise and clever, had thus agreed to produce at Frankfort 
 during August 1863 a master-piece of festive solemnity, 
 dazzling and imposing. Frankfort was one scene of 
 solemn entries, grand processions, orations, uniforms, car- 
 riages, majesties, highnesses, excellencies, the whole ar- 
 ranged so as to call up as vividly as possible the me- 
 mory of the Imperial coronations of the good old 
 times. To the honour of the public be it said, the 
 spectators' gallery remained in a state of magnificent in- 
 difference. The sight of all these great people, with 
 their suites of gilt lacqueys, made the citizens think of 
 their sad past; and in spite of the antipathy felt to 
 
— 85 — 
 
 Prussia, no one was duped by the hollow demonstrations 
 organised by Prussia's adversaries. 
 
 The reorganisation plan submitted to the congress 
 was, in its main features, nothing less than the old de- 
 legate scheme painted afresh and regilt. The most pa- 
 tent embellishment consisted in the appointment of 
 Austria as president, who was to be supported by several 
 directors chosen from among the other sovereigns. 
 
 The King of Prussia had been invited the last to 
 this assembly , four days after the other princes. Count 
 Bismarck replied that propositions of this kind required 
 consideration, and that Prussia would come to a confe- 
 rence in the month of October; that, in this way, the 
 King would have time to discuss the various articles of 
 the scheme with his ministers. But the congress went 
 forward, and, after a short deliberation, the Austrian 
 project was accepted as it stood. A note was sent to Prussia 
 leaving her the option of agreeing to the scheme or of 
 seeing herself excluded from the new organisation. On the 
 1 5th of September Prussia answered by a refusal, grounded 
 on the inadequacy of the proposed changes ; repeating at 
 the same time her chief conditions : namely, German supre- 
 macy to be shared between Prussia and Austria on a footing 
 of complete equality, and a real parliament with legislative 
 power. Austria and the other states rejoined in identical 
 notes, that these conditions could not be accepted. 
 
— 86 — 
 
 At last, after a series of demonstrations on both 
 sides, each more violent than the last, the diplomatists 
 of the confederated states met together in Nuremberg to 
 consider what preventive measures should be taken against 
 Prussia, who had talked of a casus belli. 
 
 When we look back on these events, it seems 
 strange that the public did not, at that time, ma- 
 nifest more attention and alarm. In the whole of Ger- 
 many — at the seat of the Diet, as well as at Vienna 
 and Berlin, — newspaper readers treated both the ac- 
 counts of the mutual recriminations between Austria and 
 Prussia, and the accounts of the busy doings of the Small- 
 states' Conference, with no more interest or attention than 
 if they had concerned a squabble between Turkey and 
 Servia. This indifference to menaces, the full gravity of 
 which we are now able to appreciate, is explained by the 
 scepticism with which the German people had been ac- 
 customed, for half a century, to look on at the skirmish- 
 ing between its two great powers. Each time that one 
 of them asked for assistance against the other, people 
 shrugged their shoulders as a matter of course. "Hawks 
 don't pick out hawks' eyes," they said. In spite of all 
 the hard words that had passed, the country thought? 
 with Austria, that, at the decisive moment, the solidarity 
 of reactionary tendencies would prevail , and that there 
 would be a reconciliation. To believe in political earnest- 
 
— 87 — 
 
 ness in the head of the Prussian government, except 
 where internal reaction was concerned, never once oc- 
 curred to friend or foe. 
 
 But things would unquestionably have taken a se- 
 rious turn at that time, and have brought the German 
 people to a sense of their mistake, if the course of events 
 had not been interrupted in an unforeseen manner. 
 
 During the night between the 14th and the 15th of 
 November Frederick VII, King of Denmark, died at 
 Copenhagen. This event was destined by circumstances 
 to be of the gravest importance. 
 
1 
 
 Chapter V. 
 
 Policy pursued by Bismarck in the Schleswig-Holstein question, more 
 particularly towards Austria and the Bund, with its results. 
 
 The episode of the Schleswig-Holstein war, looked 
 at as a whole, so completely exhibits the character of a 
 dramatic intrigue, — the cleverest and most successful 
 ever seen on the political stage, — that friends and enemies 
 have long agreed in regarding it as Bismarck's master- 
 piece. If it be true that the series of incidents which 
 followed in succession after the sudden death of the King 
 of Denmark up to the Bohemian campaign, were the re- 
 sult of a pre-conceived plan, it must be admitted that 
 Machiavellism, in its boldest flights, has never produced 
 anything parallel to it. 
 
 To have found Austria on the high road to popula- 
 rity, supported by the German princes with complete de- 
 votion, firmly ensconced in the Diet at which she presi- 
 ded; to have found Austria the representative of legiti- 
 
— 89 — 
 
 macy, the ancient friend and ally of the Great European 
 Powers, and at the end of two years to have isolated her 
 from everybody; to have lowered her in the eyes of the 
 masses, to have brought her into deadly antagonism with 
 the Princes and the Bund; to have made her disown 
 the principle of legitimacy and federal authority, and led 
 her into a course directly opposed, not only to France 
 and England, but also to her own former policy ; to have 
 thus taken her in tow, and led her on from one folly 
 to another, in order finally to turn against her and 
 ride over her when she was robbed of all internal sup- 
 port, and had no longer friends, allies, system, nor aim; 
 to have done all this, must certainly be reckoned the 
 highest perfection of that art of duping, which was for- 
 merly held to be the quintessence of diplomatic skill. 
 
 We must, how r ever, resist the temptation to drama- 
 tise, into which we may too readily be led. Life, cer- 
 tainly, often produces combinations much more wonderful 
 than have ever come out of poet's brain; but this very 
 richness of incident in life should put us on our guard 
 against the tendencies of our imagination, which delights 
 in seeing in every coincidence of events the work of some 
 human hand. In the sixteenth century, everyone would 
 have agreed that Count Bismarck had poisoned the King 
 of Denmark , because he knew how to turn this sudden 
 death to such great account in the realisation of 
 
— 90 — 
 
 his plans. If, however, we examine more narrowly the 
 various phases of this period, we shall rather come to 
 the conviction that the Prussian Premier evinced neither 
 that unity of method nor that diabolical premeditation, 
 which those who love to find a romance in all history- 
 would fain see in this tangled web of circumstances. 
 
 During the course of events, the diplomatic current 
 impelled him into such direct opposition to himself, that 
 he might be accused of having too lightly counted on 
 the resources of his talent for improvisation. His mode 
 of profiting by circumstances often reminds one of that 
 novelist, who to characterise his inventive talent said: 
 "When I make some one knock at the door of my hero's 
 room, I don't myself know who will come in." 
 
 The question of the succession to the Duchies affor- 
 ded an opportunity, which Count Bismarck hastened to 
 seize , of killing two birds with one stone : namely of 
 provoking a conflict with the Diet, and of, at the same 
 time, acquiring a valuable piece of territory. 
 
 Austria had two possible paths open before her : either 
 she could firmly adhere to the treaties concluded 
 under her auspices in London in 1852, and recognise the 
 dynastic rights of the King of Denmark; or she could 
 place herself at the head of the national German move- 
 ment in favour of the independence of the Duchies. 
 Count Bismarck, whose interests were precisely the re- 
 
— 91 — 
 
 verse, who wanted neither to leave the Duchies to Denmark 
 nor to put them under federal jurisdiction, — a sure way to se- 
 cure their being refused to Prussia, manoeuvered so well that, 
 through all the tortuous paths into which he successively 
 struck in order to achieve his object, Austria followed him. 
 The affair of the Duchies was one which had always 
 provided the small Princes of the confederation with a 
 means of displaying patriotism at little cost. It was a 
 safe outlet for the national effervescence, and an ever 
 welcome pretext for playing at soldiers. In the present 
 case, there came, in addition to these two motives, a 
 third of special attraction. The w T idest-spread and most 
 popular view T s favoured the pretensions of the Duke of 
 Augustenburg to the Duchies. This w T as at once a recog- 
 nition of the principle of legitimacy, and of that of the 
 small sovereignties, the number of which w^ould have been 
 augmented by the addition of this new state. The Diet 
 had caused the Duchies to be occupied by a federal 
 corps d'armee consisting of Saxons and Hanoverians. Count 
 Bismarck, above all imbued with the supreme importance of 
 an accomplished fact, lost not a moment, but sent his 
 Prussians under some pretence or other into Schleswig to 
 take up their post beside the federal troops. Austria in 
 her turn, seeing Prussia march, declared that she could 
 not remain an indifferent spectator, and determined to 
 march into Schleswig also. 
 
-*- 92 — 
 
 In this position of affairs , Count Bismarck offered 
 to forget all quarrels, and to come to an agreement to 
 act in common, throwing out a bait which the Vienna 
 cabinet could not resist. Alleging that the Princes of 
 the confederation, by making common cause with the 
 clamorous demands of the masses, were dragging the 
 Diet into the revolutionary whirlpool of national preten- 
 sions, he pointed out to Herr von Rechberg, what fearful 
 consequences monarchy would expose itself to, by the 
 recognition of this subversive principle. He made him 
 feel how much wiser and more dignified it would be to 
 keep on the ground of high diplomacy, to repulse the tur- 
 bulent intervention of the Diet, which obeyed the pres- 
 sure of public opinion, and so to enter into intimate rela- 
 tions with the great European powers, not in the cha- 
 racter of representatives of the German confederation, 
 but in virtue of being independent German powers. 
 
 A reconciliation with Prussia on this reactionary 
 basis seemed to Herr von Rechberg to offer a double 
 advantage, and straightway he fell into the trap. Eagerly 
 embracing the part, which Count Bismarck had assigned 
 to him, he commissioned his representative at the Diet to 
 submit to the latter a proposition, according to which 
 the Prince of Augustenburg should be ordered to quit 
 the Duchies, and all public demonstrations in his favour 
 in the states ot the confederation should be suppressed. 
 
— 93 — 
 
 The Diet refused. Then Austria and Prussia combined 
 in a demand that the Diet should at least authorise their 
 occupation of Schleswig in their quality of Great Powers. 
 Fresh refusal on the part of the Diet. After this double 
 check, sustained in January 1864, the two governments 
 determined to set themselves in direct opposition to the 
 Diet and to march into Schleswig in spite of it. 
 
 Thus then, Austria, who for half a century had based 
 her whole system on the solidarity with the sovereigns 
 of the second and third class, and on the institution of 
 the Diet, had allowed herself to be seduced into break- 
 ing this bond, and making common cause with Prussia, 
 who was guided by altogether opposite interests. 
 
 By the time the two armies set out on their march, 
 the conflict had arrived at such a point that Saxony, 
 destined two years later to be crushed by Austria's side 
 at Sadowa, refused a passage to the Imperial army, which 
 was therefore obliged to make a detour through Prussia. 
 To crown all, one of the secretaries of state (Herr von 
 Biegeleben) formally declared in the name of the Govern- 
 ment in the Austrian Lower House, that Austria under- 
 took this campaign against the movement set on foot 
 in Germany, solely because she never would recognise the 
 principle of nationalities. 
 
 Having thus practically suppressed the Diet, and in- 
 duced Austria to disown its authority, Count Bismarck 
 
— 94 — 
 
 saw himself, nolens volens, under the necessity of throw- 
 ing overboard the Treaty of London, which was as 
 great an obstacle as the federal law to the annexation 
 of the Duchies by Prussia. Like a skilful general, he 
 had at first occupied himself exclusively with one of his 
 adversaries, and now that this one lay at his mercy, he 
 turned against the other. He had more than once re- 
 cognised the validity of the above-mentioned treaty. 
 This however did not deter him, when the time came, 
 from absolving himself from its obligations. On the 15th 
 of May, 1864, he announced that he should no longer 
 regard himself as bound towards Denmark by the treaty 
 of 1852, because that power had itself broken the treaty, 
 and could not therefore claim its advantages. The day 
 after this official announcement, that is on the 16th of 
 May, 1864, he confessed in a letter to a friend that the 
 legal difficulties in regard to the succession, were merely 
 a pretext for achieving by hook or by crook the annexa- 
 tion of the Duchies. This friend, who belonged to the 
 conservative party, had been alarmed in reading the 
 draft of the address of the Prussian Chamber, which 
 expressed itself very strongly against Denmark. Count 
 Bismarck answers him: 
 
 "I understand your objection to the address which nevertheless 
 is, in my opinion, calculated to render us a service by putting a 
 certain pressure on the progress of the diplomatic negotiations. I 
 
— 95 — 
 
 may of course be deceived, for the longer I occupy myself with po- 
 litics the weaker becomes my belief in human calculations 
 
 But the present situation is of such a nature, that it seems advi- 
 sable to me to let loose upon the Danophilists at the Conference 
 all the dogs who want to bark (excuse this hunter's simile); the 
 barking of the whole pack in chorus is likely to produce a 
 good effect on foreign nations, making the subjection of the Duchies 
 
 to Denmark impossible in their eyes The Duchies have 
 
 hitherto been treated like spoilt children, and have been accustomed 
 to think that we would willingly sacrifice ourselves on the altar of 
 their private interests, and that Prussia's existence is to be hazard- 
 ed for every individual German in the North of Schleswig. The 
 address will serve as a useful, counteracting influence on this wild 
 
 notion I do not fear that the address will have so 
 
 great an effect as to cause us embarrassment. I should by no 
 means complain if the nation were to be so seized with Prussian 
 ambition as to require that the government, instead of stimulating, 
 should be obliged to moderate, the general ardour. 
 
 You see from this how I look at the matter according to 
 human lights. For the rest, the feeling of gratitude to God for 
 His support hitherto, raises in me the confidence that the Lord 
 knows how to turn even our faults to our advantage; this I learn 
 daily to mj^ salutary humbling. 
 
 Finally, I may observe that annexation is not the chief and 
 necessary aim of my efforts, although it may be their most pleasant 
 result." 
 
 And at the same time that he thus spoke out his 
 real thoughts, he was not satisfied with disguising them in 
 discussing a very doubtful point of law with Denmark, 
 but played, as it were for his amusement, a third game 
 with England. To Lord Wodehouse, who had been 
 sent from London to make a last attempt at reconcilia- 
 tion, he replied that Prussia could never come to an 
 
— 96 — 
 
 understanding with Denmark so long as the latter main- 
 tained a democratic government; that a coup d'etat at 
 Copenhagen was the sole means of preventing war! 
 
 All these prevarications at length opened Austria's 
 eyes, and thenceforth she began definitively to lean to 
 the Pretender's side. Count Bismarck for his part, not 
 feeling that the situation was yet sufficiently prepared to 
 show his hand, thought he could not do better than add 
 a little to the general confusion. Following Austria on 
 her own ground, he pretended to take the rights of the 
 Prince of Augustenburg into consideration, whereas all 
 he sought was to gain time in order to profit by any 
 new incidents which might arise. At length, after 
 having made use of the Treaty of London at Copenha- 
 gen, the democracy of Copenhagen in London and the 
 Prince of Augustenburg at Vienna, the time arrived when 
 he could give up this triple subterfuge. 
 
 The war with Denmark which had been interrupted 
 by the London conference, had recommenced, the term 
 fixed for diplomatic negotiations having expired without 
 result. The second campaign, with its decisive success 
 and the invasion of Jutland, led to the peace of Vienna, 
 which, on the 30th of October, 1864, placed the Duchies 
 at the absolute disposal of the allied Great Powers. 
 Thereupon Prussia laid hold of this new point of law, 
 raised solely by the accomplished fact, to set aside all 
 
— 97 — 
 
 parchment questions, and to take possession in virtue 
 alone of the right of conquest. Once more Austria, to 
 whom this opposing of brute force to principles offered 
 too pleasant a temptation to be resisted, adopted Prussia's 
 views. Under the title of co-possessors, Austria and Prussia 
 installed themselves in the Duchies, intimating to the Diet 
 that the matter concerned it no further. From that date, 
 the hostilities between the two rivals necessarily began, 
 Austria seeking to re-establish her connection with the 
 Diet, which more than ever supported the Pretender, 
 aud Count Bismarck interposing all kinds of difficulties 
 to the admission of his claims. Matters soon went so 
 far that, for three months, all negotiations were 
 broken off between the courts of Vienna and Berlin. 
 Resumed once more in June, 1865, they ended a second 
 time on the 22nd of July, in a Prussian ultimatum. 
 
 On the 15th of that month, Count Bismarck had 
 said to the Duke of Grammont at Karlsbad, that war 
 between Prussia and Austria had become inevitable ; that 
 he wished to come to blows as quickly as possible; and 
 that it was the mission of Prussia to take the destinies of 
 Germany into her hands. He was not however allowed this 
 time to invoke the decision of arms. The two reigning fa- 
 milies notwtihstanding all their irritation against one 
 another, felt an extreme repugnance to draw the sword. 
 Though they cherish a strong love for military govern- 
 
 Count Bismarck, 5 
 
— 98 — 
 
 ment, they are not, at bottom, of a warlike nature. The 
 thought of breaking the bond of the sacred alliance, and 
 of spilling German blood, filled them with horror. These 
 hesitations at the last moment brought about a final at- 
 tempt at a compromise. 
 
 On the 17th of August, the Gastein convention cre- 
 ated an interim, which was intended to put an end to 
 the condominium. Austria obtained provisionally the 
 exclusive possession of Holstein, Prussia that of Schleswig 
 which was less advantageous, inasmuch as Schleswig is cut 
 off by Holstein from all direct communication with Germany. 
 
 But the man who had piled all these complications 
 one upon another in order to effect a rupture, could not let a 
 situation which he had brought with such pains to this point 
 of maturity slip through his hands unused. The Italian 
 war and the Congress of Princes had been allowed to 
 pass by without any advance towards a decisive solution 
 having been made. Not to have seized this third oppor- 
 tunity, would have been flying in the face of fortune. The 
 acquisition of two new provinces was , beyond a doubt, 
 much more calculated to please the King than any na- 
 tional sentiment, and the prospect of this acquisition, 
 joined to the late military successes, must have made it 
 possible to Count Bismarck to obtain at last the consent 
 of the King, who till then had always shrunk back from 
 every extreme measure. 
 
— 99 — 
 
 Thenceforward it became merely a question of "How?" 
 The Prussian cabinet not only renewed its demands that 
 certain conditions should be imposed on the future sove- 
 reign of the Duchies, but also had a case prepared by 
 the crown lawyers resolutely contesting the rights of the 
 Pretender. And in order to advance with all its means 
 of attack simultaneously, it repeated the proposal to con- 
 voke a German parliament, accompanying this proposal 
 with a diplomatic circular note, in which it called on 
 Germany, in the most solemn terms, to flock round the 
 standard of unity, if she did not wish to suffer a fate 
 similar to that of Poland (24th of March 1866). Even then, 
 the public remained unmoved. In consequence of his con- 
 duct towards the Chambers, Count Bismarck had forfeited 
 every shadow of confidence amongst thinking people. If 
 he had wished to obtain the slightest credence for his as- 
 sertions, he should have refrained from the audacious ac- 
 cusation against Austria that she cherished warlike designs 
 against Prussia, swearing, by all the gods, that as to 
 himself no idea of aggression had ever entered his head. 
 It was asking too much of the credulity of even the 
 simplest minds. 
 
 It is true that Austria had at that period addressed 
 a confidential note to its most faithful adherents inviting 
 them to arm (16th of March 1866); but we need scarcely add 
 that never was such a precaution less superfluous. The 
 
— 100 — 
 
 alliance between Prussia and Italy, traces of which are to 
 be found as far back as the year 1863, was already in 
 such an advanced stage that, three weeks after the date 
 of the above mentioned Prussian circular note, the formal 
 treaty between Victor Emmanuel and King William was 
 signed at Berlin (8th of April). Austria had long groaned at 
 the recollection of the immense mistake she had made in 
 letting herself be separated from her old allies. She had 
 at last done penance in order to be again taken into 
 favour by the Diet. As long ago as the beginning of 
 1865, Herr von Schmerling, the Minister of State, had 
 formally avowed that Austria had completely gone astray 
 in her policy in the Schleswig Holstein question. As it 
 now suited her to substitute the principle of the autonomy 
 of the provinces for the rude rights of conquest, Austria 
 convoked the states of the Duchies to consult them as to 
 their wishes. At the same time, she appeared in sackcloth 
 and ashes at the Diet, and laid at the feet of the so 
 longdisowned federal jurisdiction the right of deciding on 
 this immortal question. This was on the 1st of June, 1866. 
 Thus had it come to pass, that Prussia and the Diet 
 stood in a position of direct antagonism to each other. 
 In accordance with an Austrian proposal, the Diet voted 
 the mobilisation of three corps d'armee as a demonstra- 
 tion against Prussia's threats ; and this vote gave Prussia 
 the signal which she had awaited for years, to declare the 
 
— 101 — 
 
 treaty of the confederation violated by the Diet itself 
 (14th of June). 
 
 And so, at last, the decisive moment had arrived for 
 Count Bismarck to settle with "blood and iron" the ques- 
 tion of the German hegemony. 
 
 Not quite a year before, on the 23rd of July 1865, he 
 had said in an interview with the Bavarian Minister Herr 
 von der Pfordten, at Salzburg, that the inevitable duel 
 between Prussia and Austria could not be postponed much 
 longer, but that it would be quickly finished: "One single 
 encounter, one decisive battle, and Prussia will have it 
 in her power to dictate the conditions." Never has pro- 
 gramme been more distinctly announced; never more 
 literally carried out. 
 
Chapter Tl. 
 
 Attitude of the nation at the outbreak of the war. — Bismarck's 
 negotiations with the opposition. — The King's absolutist principles. 
 Eelations of the Cabinet Ministers in Prussia to the King. — Cha- 
 racteristics of Bismarck. — His interview with M. Vilbort. — His 
 views on the German character. — Progress of Germany in the 
 last eighty years. — Education of the sovereign by the people. — 
 Bismarck the embodiment of two contradictory principles. 
 
 If we were to judge by the attitude of the German 
 people towards Count Bismarck, at the outbreak of the 
 war of 1866, we should not only be inclined to deny him 
 all mental superiority, but we should be forced to admit 
 that, after four years passed in preparing the ground for 
 the struggle, he had achieved a result exactly opposite 
 to his intention. For he had himself destroyed his last 
 chance of obtaining that moral support which the sym- 
 pathy of the country would have given him. But we 
 should never get to a comprehension of the true motives 
 of those arduous labours, of those endless moves on the 
 political chess-board, were we to content ourselves with 
 
— 103 — 
 
 explaining them as strenuous endeavours by which Count 
 Bismarck sought to conciliate public opinion. His mind 
 was bent on very different things. His practical way of 
 handling great questions led him to look for support else- 
 where than in the theoretic concurrence of the masses; 
 and whenever we see him in the act of some apparent con- 
 tradiction we must expect that he will appeal to certain 
 mysterious difficulties, which may be said to lie in 
 a choice between two evils, — the less being always in 
 his eyes that requiring the sacrifice of the moral co-ope- 
 ration of the country to the practical co-operation of the 
 powers that be. 
 
 So much is certain, that at the decisive moment he 
 obtained no moral support from the nation. Of what 
 use had it been to him that he had led astray and com- 
 promised Austria, by setting the Diet and public opinion 
 in hostility to her? On the day on which he accused the 
 Court of Vienna of wishing for war, and of arming with 
 that purpose, the cruel irony, the utter defiance of com- 
 mon sense, forced every impartial mind to defend Austria 
 against the insinuation which would have been odious if 
 it had not been absurd. When Prussia first marched 
 against Austria, the German people, always ready to take 
 political matters on their sentimental side, looked upon 
 the struggle as that of an innocent victim with a wicked 
 aggressor. The mass of the nation had steadily repelled 
 
— 104 — 
 
 the idea of this war as something morally impossible. The 
 consequence was that, in the presence of the actual accom- 
 plishment of the fact, public opinion stood confounded. 
 
 There were people so wedded to their conviction that, 
 even after Prussia had fought several battles, they still 
 persisted that she would never venture on such a war. 
 Public opinion was, therefore, placed under the necessity 
 of performing one of the most difficult strategic move- 
 ments, namely a change of front on the field of battle. 
 
 The first to make up their minds to this were those 
 who regarded the question as altogether simplified by the 
 fact that war had broken out. From that moment, they 
 no longer asked who was the aggressor, nor who had 
 most offended the liberal party. They saw in Prussia and 
 Austria simply the embodiments of two principles; and 
 decided for Prussia. In the second rank came those to 
 whom the question of existence, which was being fought 
 out between the two governments, was not a determining 
 motive. They had first to have their eyes opened, to 
 see that all the intelligence and power were on one side, 
 and all the incapability on the other, before they could 
 understand which of the two promised political life and 
 future. The adhesion of these came with victory. The 
 last to be convinced were those who required the physical 
 assurance of a new order of things — thrones overturned, 
 North Germany endowed with a constitution, the South 
 
— 105 — 
 
 summoned to an early reunion — to confess that a great 
 step had been made in advance, and that arresting Germany 
 in its onward course towards true and perfect unity was a 
 thing no longer to be thought of. The number of these 
 last is not yet exhausted. It augments from day to day. 
 
 Although Count Bismarck was far from representing 
 the national cause in all its purity, we must at least 
 recognise the fact that he had developed wonderfully since 
 the commencement of his political career, and had climbed 
 to a much higher point of view. The man, who dictated 
 the peace of Nicolsburg, and almost on the battlefield 
 proclaimed the necessity of new railways, of fresh channels 
 for commerce , of free trade , was evidently not the same, 
 man who, on the 15th October 1849, in a discussion on the 
 freedom of trades, demanded that the number of appren- 
 tices in each trade should be limited, and that the 
 guilds should have the power of regulating qualities and 
 prices. And he was certainly, after the alliance with 
 Victor Emmanuel, no longer an adherent of his old party, 
 which had presented a golden shield to the King of Naples. 
 In 1849, he had shown himself the most resolute opponent 
 of an amnesty; in 1866 he wrested from the King, on the 
 night before the entry of the troops into Berlin, the decree 
 granting a free pardon to all political offenders. 
 
 The admission that he has a flexible mind, accessible 
 to ideas of progress, is all the more important, since we 
 
— 106 — 
 
 cannot well deny to a man of his penetration the ability 
 to foresee the consequences of his own actions. It must 
 have been clear to him — of this no doubt can exist — 
 that to free Venice was to attack Rome; that to defeat 
 Austria was to undermine the Concordat and raise Hungary; 
 that to unite Germany was to break with legitimacy. 
 
 If he, however, was determined not to shrink from 
 the consequences of his undertaking, those with whom 
 he had first to deal were animated by a very different 
 spirit. 
 
 We meet with no allusion to this state of things in 
 the earlier confessions of Count Bismarck, made previously 
 to his entering the Ministry, but after that time we find 
 them occurring, and ever increasingly dwelt on as his 
 policy advances towards its final consummation. 
 
 The moment had come for him to count upon the 
 effective strength of the nation ; to assure himself of the 
 co-operation of the advanced patriots and of the enthusiasm 
 of the liberal party. For it was necessary to take into 
 consideration the possibility of a defeat. He had had no 
 personal relations with the opposition during the conflict 
 which arose out of the army and budget questions. But 
 in the beginning of June 1866, when war had become 
 inevitable, he endeavoured to enter into negotiations with 
 the most influential and intelligent of his opponents. 
 He invited them to private confidential interviews, 
 
— 107 — 
 
 in which he asked them, whether they would vote the 
 necessary supplies for the war, and whether they would 
 support him in the event of a reverse. He besought them 
 to abandon their hostile attitude for a season, and to 
 think only of Germany. They pointed out to him that it 
 was he himself, who had opened an abyss between the 
 people and the King by the insensate way in which he 
 had persistently defied public opinion, and had rendered 
 all confidence in the Government impossible. Count 
 Bismarck did not dispute the justice of these complaints, 
 but he intrenched himself behind the inextricable diffi- 
 culties of his position, with a royal master opposed to all 
 modern ideas, surrounded by ultra-aristocratic influences, 
 and, at his advanced age, little inclined to change his 
 opinions. He conjured them for the time being to think 
 only of the State and of their common country; and 
 explained that, without indulging in vain illusions, they 
 might hope better things from the future. He did not 
 disguise that some of his colleagues in the Cabinet deserved 
 dismissal, and that the government had done wrong not 
 to show more consideration for the wishes of the Chamber 
 on the army question; that he, for his own part, would 
 have wished to attain both these objects, but that his 
 influence was over-rated ; he had to contend with insu- 
 perable difficulties. The King, he said, would hear nothing 
 of any step towards reconciliation which would have neces- 
 
— 108 — 
 
 sitated any reduction whatever in the army; and it 
 would have been mere waste of time to ask him to alter 
 the composition of the Cabinet. 
 
 Under these circumstances, the minister said, he had 
 been obliged to sacrifice everything to the great object 
 which he had been pursuing for eight years. This object 
 was the expulsion of Austria from Germany, the primary 
 condition of German unity. To have assisted Austria in 
 the Italian war would have been suicidal, and it was by 
 saying this to the King, in so many words, that he had 
 dissuaded him from that course, which for a short time 
 had seemed likely to be adopted. "My greatest triumph", 
 he exclaimed several times in the course of these inter- 
 views, "is to have obtained from the King of Prussia the 
 declaration of war against Austria, and the permission 
 to convoke a German parliament. Leave the rest to the 
 future, and do not ask me why I could not achieve this, 
 my highest aim, without turning the Chamber and the 
 Press against me. There are great things which no dis- 
 cussions or votes can give us. To obtain them, we must 
 have five hundred thousand bayonets." 
 
 It was not difficult to Count Bismarck to convince 
 those to whom he unbosomed himself in these most inter- 
 esting avowals, that his resignation could be ill afforded 
 at this critical juncture; as for himself, he added, he could 
 not increase the difficulties of his position by adopting 
 
— 109 — 
 
 a policy radically different from that of the last four years. 
 "1 can resign," he said, "but I cannot expose myself to 
 the appearance of changing from one day to another like 
 a weathercock, especially since it would let loose upon 
 me all those who are hostile to my foreign policy." 
 
 Explanations of this kind ? given in a tone of winning 
 frankness, paved the way to an understanding between 
 the Minister-President and an influential part of the 
 opposition, which decided to support him, not after the 
 victory had been won, but long before even the thunder 
 of the cannon at Sadowa had come to the assistance of 
 his arguments. 
 
 If any one were to collect the explanations, given by 
 Bismarck in diplomatic notes and official speeches since 
 he has been in power , he w r ould find in all of them the 
 substance of the conversation just described — the same 
 train of ideas closely linked together : the will to regene- 
 rate the political body of the state, subordinated to the 
 necessity of having great material power at disposal, in 
 order to drive Austria from the field; and at the same time, 
 parallel with this main principle, the unexpressed thought 
 always recurring, that the greatest difficulty lay in winning 
 over the King to his side. The problem was the more 
 delicate that the King, honest in his way, always thought 
 he was within the bounds of the constitution even when 
 he was most egregiously violating it. He thought it 
 
— 110 — 
 
 monstrous that the Opposition should presume to interfere 
 in the choice of his ministers and to watch over the 
 expenditure incurred in supporting the army, though this 
 did not in the least prevent him from protesting his ■ 
 unshakeable fidelity to the constitution. Up to 1848, he had 
 seen but two things in the State, — the Crown and the Army; 
 and his opinions were considered to be so imbued with 
 absolutism that, at the time of the revolution, the Court 
 itself had begged him to withdraw out of the reach of 
 public resentment. For a long while, the words "National 
 Property" were to be seen inscribed on his palace in 
 large letters. He was at that time only heir presumptive 
 to the throne. The bitter memory of those days made 
 him the natural chief of the counter-revolution (reaction). 
 He commanded the campaign against the Baden in- 
 surrection in 1849, and with his own hand signed the 
 numerous death-warrants which threw such dark shadows 
 over that event, — not allowing himself to be softened 
 either by the celebrity of the leaders, or by the integrity 
 of the citizens, or by the tender age of the youths whose 
 blood the military tribunals demanded. Since that period, 
 whenever, as has happened from time to time, the mur- 
 murs of the Berlin populace have reached the doors of 
 the Royal Palace, the Prussian sovereigns have been wont 
 to say they were well aware that the revolutionists 
 menaced them with the fate of Louis XVI. 
 
— Ill — 
 
 Does any one imagine that it was an easy task to 
 erect, on such a foundation, an alliance with Italy and 
 Hungary against the Hapsburgs and the Guelphs? The 
 King, besides being under the dominion of doubts created 
 by his legitimist sentiments, was also influenced by that 
 horror of war which filled the liberal party. The 
 Queen, a grand -daughter of the Maecenas - like Prince 
 of Weimar, more accessible than the King to modern 
 ideas, shared the feeling of the liberals on the question 
 of war. Count Bismarck, therefore, saw the necessity 
 imposed upon himself of overcoming, not only the King's 
 own sentiments, but also those inspired by his immediate 
 and most intimate surroundings. Even after war had 
 been declared, the Court still continued to negotiate with 
 Austria, behind the back of the Prime Minister, but with 
 the cognisance of the King. Bound to face all the diffi- 
 culties of this position, Bismarck was undoubtedly always 
 readier to sacrifice the claims of the country than those 
 of the crown; still he never remained quite deaf to the 
 objections urged on the opposite side. U I pass my life", 
 he used to say, "in acting as a buffer between the King 
 and the liberals". 
 
 This dualism was not apparent only in the difference 
 of view existing between the King and his Prime Minister, 
 but also in the perhaps still greater divergence between 
 the latter and his chief colleagues, who were conservatives 
 
— 112 — 
 
 to the backbone. This difference of opinions in the midst 
 of the same government, which elsewhere would be quite 
 inadmissible, has nothing in it that clashes with the 
 traditions of the Court of Berlin. The Prussian state is, 
 above all, the personal work of Frederick -William the 
 First and his son, Frederick the Great. The whole system 
 bears to this day the impress of those two powerful 
 minds. Both were sole and absolute masters of the 
 Kingdom, keeping in their own hands the general super- 
 vision of affairs, and jealously guarding against the 
 ministers extending their acquaintance with affairs beyond 
 their own departments. * 
 
 On the death of Frederick the Great, the administration 
 of finance was found to be dispersed over so many dif- 
 ferent offices, that no general survey was possible; and 
 the absurd report got spread about, that the King had 
 destroyed the accounts on purpose to embarrass his suc- 
 cessor. His father had never permitted the foreign am- 
 bassadors to see a minister ; and Frederick followed this 
 example. Nor did the ministers ever meet together in 
 council, or consult one another; often for long periods 
 together, they did not even see the King ; they communi- 
 cated with him simply in writing, and that only on 
 matters of secondary importance. It is reported of Fre- 
 
 * Twesten, der Preussische Beamten staat. 
 
— 113 — 
 
 derick- William the Third who died in 1840, that he let 
 ten years pass without once receiving his enlightened 
 minister Herr von Altenstein. Under his successor, the 
 last King, it was not uncommon to hear a minister com- 
 plaining that he could not obtain audience of his so- 
 vereign to report some matter to him. Under Frederick 
 William the Second the contemporary of the French Revo- 
 lution, the numerous favourites, composed of adventurers 
 of all kinds, looked down on the ministers with utter 
 contempt; and even during the present reign, the after 
 effects of these anomalies have only lately begun to 
 disappear. It is not more than two years since a 
 number of officers of high rank, who composed the so- 
 called military cabinet, a cabinet existing — quite contrary 
 to the constitution — independently of the ministry, alto- 
 cethe lamed the power of the latter. It was in this military 
 cabinet that all great questions were discussed and decided. 
 And one understands how this dualism accorded with 
 the tradition preserved in the family of the Hohenzollerns, 
 that the state consists of soldiers and that the soldiers 
 are the King's. Even at the present day, it sometimes 
 happens that the King interrupts his work with his 
 ministers on a colonel being announced. 
 
 With these views and customs, it can be imagined 
 what a constitutional government was, as interpreted by 
 a King of Prussia, and it will be readily believed that 
 
— 114 — 
 
 the sovereign looked upon his ministers as his personal 
 servants, and did not admit that he had to consult any- 
 thing but his own taste in selecting and dismissing them. 
 If it was pointed out to him that this or that minister 
 exasperated the nation without benefiting the Crown; 
 that he was not only a scourge to the country but in- 
 dolent and incapable, the King rejoined that the man's 
 manners did not displease him, and that he had got 
 accustomed to working with him. If the answer was 
 not accepted as conclusive, the King complained that 
 they wanted to take away a faithful servant from him 
 — from him an old man of seventy; and if this con- 
 sideration was also unavailing, he got angry and turned 
 on his heel. 
 
 In the year 1866, the ministry was composed of 
 three different elements. Count Bismarck and Herr von 
 Roon represented the enlightened, active aristocracy, com- 
 paratively accessible to the ideas of the time and of pro- 
 gress. Beside them was Herr von der Heydt, the minister 
 of finance, a man of great ability in his special line, 
 who had survived all governments , professing liberal or 
 reactionary views according as circumstances served. 
 Finally, there was the pure feudal system, represented 
 by the Minister of the Interior, Count Eulenburg, and 
 the Minister of Justice, Count zur Lippe, both in 
 great favour at Court. The Ministers of Public Wor- 
 
— 115 — 
 
 ship, of Trade and of Agriculture played but a sub- 
 ordinate part. 
 
 Those who refuse to recognise in Count Bismarck 
 even after 1866, anything more than the chief of the 
 European counter-revolution have always endeavoured 
 to deny the secret conflict which he has for a long time 
 past sustained with the more conservative of his colleagues. 
 In especial, they have always maintained that the hostility 
 shown by the Minister President to Count zur Lippe, the 
 Minister of Justice, was a mere piece of acting, and have 
 made it a butt for their wit.* But events have com- 
 pletely contradicted this opinion. For the keeper of the 
 Seals, after having been attacked, blamed, and abused 
 by the Minister-President, in a public sitting of Parliament, 
 on the 10th of October 1867, was at last dismissed, prin- 
 cipally no doubt in order to put a stop to the insensate 
 prosecutions against the freedom of debate in Parliament. 
 Since then a fresh incident has brought the conflict 
 between Bismarck and Count Eulenburg to a crisis. The 
 question of the Hanoverian provincial funds undoubtedly 
 seemed for an instant to have shaken the position of 
 the Minister of the Interior, and on the same occasion 
 the rupture between Count Bismarck and the whole of 
 
 * Apropos of this the word "Zwei-Seelen-Ministerium" (Ministry 
 with two souls) was invented, in parody of a verse well known in 
 Germany. 
 
— 116 — 
 
 the ultra -conservative party became clearly manifest. 
 In addition to these facts, we could adduce many others, 
 of less weight but equally significant, to show that the 
 embarrassments created by the reactionary tendencies of 
 the court, were no mere chimeras of Bismarck's, and 
 that there was considerable truth in the assurance, made 
 by him over and over again in private conversations, that 
 his power in home matters bore no proportion to the 
 part he played in foreign politics. 
 
 Is it to be understood by this, that in the midst of a 
 reactionary court and under a more or less despotic govern- 
 ment, Count Bismarck represented justice and liberty? 
 After all that has been said, we could hardly be suspected 
 of defending such a paradox. Moreover, in history, as 
 in a novel, it is better to represent the characters in 
 action than to describe them. We need only cast a strong 
 light upon them from all sides, and they will save us the 
 trouble of analysing them. Count Bismarck lends himself 
 to this mode of treatment all the more readily that there 
 is nothing of the actor about him, as is so often the case 
 with eminent politicians. Not, however, that blind con- 
 fidence is to be placed in the frankness with which he 
 is accustomed to startle the world. All who have had 
 dealings with him, thoroughly well know how much faith 
 they may put in those surprisingly confidential revelations, 
 which are calculated to bewilder, now by an excess of 
 
— 117 — 
 
 sincerity, now by an excess in the opposite direction, according 
 as circumstances dictate. When he dissembles, he exag- 
 gerates so much that he overshoots his mark; and it may 
 be safely said, that he has oftener deceived his opponents 
 by speaking the truth than by denying it. Did he succeed 
 in duping any one, either when, in his diplomatic circulars 
 of April and May 1866, he bewailed the warlike prepa- 
 rations of bellicose Austria, who had made up her mind 
 to fall upon inoffensive Prussia at all costs? Or when 
 he affirmed before the Chambers that in governing without 
 a budget he considered himself acting strictly within the 
 pale of the constitution, — he who afterwards demanded 
 the bill of indemnity? He may deny without much scruple, 
 but he denies also without much art. In spite of his 
 boldness of assertion, we feel that he is laughing in his 
 sleeve. To an opponent he can be provoking, malicious, 
 even malignant; but he is not treacherous; he offends 
 against morality and justice, but against good taste, by 
 pathetic appeals, never. He is not of the tribe of para- 
 graph-writers, who imagine that the world is governed 
 by fine phrases, and that public evils are to be mastered 
 by wrapping them up in pompous commonplaces. On the 
 contrary, he is one of those who delight in heightening 
 a contrast by exaggeration, and who thus overshoot their 
 mark. What induced him to confess his principle of Blood 
 and Iron at that Committee meeting? Those who really 
 
— 118 — 
 
 act upon such principles do not boast of them, but rather 
 are full of professions of benignity and human kindness. 
 His contempt for appearances extends even to a 
 defective state of hat and necktie. Something about him 
 reminds one of that mixture of insolence and good humour, 
 the German student, with his bumptious, pugnacious, jovial, 
 and yet, in the inmost recesses of the soul, some what sen- 
 timental nature. He told a friend after Sadowa that the 
 sight of the ghastly battle-field had robbed him for some 
 days of all enjoyment in his triumph. A shade of melan- 
 choly occasionally appears in his letters. At the end of 
 the letter from St. Petersburg which has been quoted, 
 he says, in complaining of the suspicions of the Kreuz- 
 Zeitung party: "The inquisitor is most stern to those 
 on his own side, and friends who have long drunk 
 from the same cup are more unjust than enemies. I 
 am content it should be so; we are not intended to 
 depend on others, and I am grateful for everything that 
 drives me back on myself." The following sounds almost 
 Ossianic : "I yearn for my home on the Quai Anglais (in 
 St. Petersburg) with its quieting outlook on the ice of 
 the Neva." The joke has often been told of the olive- 
 leaf, which he one day drew from his cigar-case, saying 
 to a member of the liberal party that he had picked it 
 at Avignon to offer to the opposition, but that the moment 
 was not yet come, and that he kept it for a future time. 
 
— 119 — 
 
 He is a great smoker, and this habit contributes to the 
 recklessness of his appearance. Whilst he was ambassador 
 at Frankfort, his particular enemy, Herr von Rechberg, 
 called a council of the members of the Diet at his house, 
 and received them in his dressing-gown. Count Bismarck, 
 to pay him in his own coin, immediately drew his cigar- 
 case out of his pocket, took a cigar, offered a second to 
 his neighbour, and said, whilst lighting his own, and 
 without waiting for an answer, "You have no objection, 
 dear Count"? This levity which is apt sometimes to give 
 offence is connected with the activity and restlessness of 
 his mind, which desires to do, to see, and to know everything 
 for itself. He tormented the very life out of the Chambers 
 and the press. But as soon as he thought he could win 
 over a deputy or a journalist by a confidence or an ex- 
 planation, he took pains to attract him, and on such occa- 
 sions he not seldom entered in the easiest way, and often 
 without the slightest reserve, into conversations concerning 
 the machinery of the State. In 1849, he sent a challenge 
 to the editor of the Kladderadatsch (the Berlin Punch). 
 Later on, during his ambassadorship at the Diet, the 
 public strongly suspected that he wrote secretly for that 
 paper, particularly whenever a specially good skit ap- 
 peared on an Austrian diplomatist. 
 
 But it was in committees of the House, that he liked 
 best to let himself go just as the humour, now reckless and 
 
— 120 — 
 
 defiant, now winning and genial might seize him. The 
 unconstrained talk which he could indulge in with closed 
 doors suited his disposition much better than public oratory. 
 "At such times", reports a witness to these discussions, 
 "everything passed before our eyes in kaleidoscopic con- 
 fusion, and with such rapidity that it was impossible to 
 follow. There was a strange contrast between the grave 
 and matter of fact talk of the commissioners and the 
 brilliant rattle of the Minister with its strong sprinkling 
 of foreign words." 
 
 To complete the picture, we must supplement the 
 testimony given by facts and lookers-on by the document 
 in which the Prime -Minister himself undertook one day 
 to give the public, and more particularly the French 
 public, an account of himself. The confession is not one 
 which can be unreservedly accepted; but although we must 
 not forget that he is a witness in his own cause, we cannot, 
 if we are to form an opinion of Count Bismarck, alto- 
 gether refuse to hear him when he wishes to explain himself. 
 He is of course not on oath, and we shall reserve to 
 ourselves the liberty of accepting his statement with 
 caution. 
 
 A French journalist, M. Vilbort, who had accom- 
 panied the Prussian army during the campaign, begged 
 to be allowed to have an audience of the Prime-Minister 
 before his return to France, and an account of this in- 
 
— 121 — 
 
 terview appeared in the "Siecle" for the 10th of June 
 1866. However much the writer may have endeavoured 
 to preserve his independence of mind, both during and 
 after this visit, still we must presuppose that he would 
 not have taken the step of publishing the conversation 
 without assuring himself of the concurrence of the Minister. 
 We are therefore safe in saying that in the following pages 
 it is Count Bismarck himself who speaks to the reader. But 
 the air of lofty patronage with which the French journalist 
 makes known his approbation of the German people is of course 
 entirely the journalists. M. Vilbort's report runs as follows: 
 
 "On my arrival in Berlin, M. de Bismarck was described to 
 me as quite inaccessible. People said to me : "Do not attempt to 
 see him, you will be merely throwing away your time. He sees 
 no one, but lives retired in the recesses of his study, shut in with 
 doubly locked doors. He leaves it only to go to the King, and it 
 is with the greatest difficulty that his most intimate friends can 
 get access to him." 
 
 Nevertheless, I ventured to ask for an audience of the 
 Prime Minister of the King of Prussia. M. de Bismarck immediato- 
 ly sent word that he would receive me that evening. 
 
 On entering that study, where the peace of Europe hangs as 
 it were by a thread , but which I found was guarded by no bolt, 
 I saw before me a man of high stature and with a strongly marked 
 face; on his broad, high, and full forehead, I perceived, with some 
 surprise, the presence of much benevolence blended with obstinacy. 
 Monsieur de Bismarck is fair, somewhat bald, wears a military mous- 
 tache, and has in his speech more of the bluntness of the soldier than the 
 caution of the diplomatist. He has the air of a nobleman and a courtier, 
 and the chainn given by the most finished politeness. He came towards 
 me, took me by the hand, led me to an armchair and offered me a cigar. 
 
 Count Bismarck. 5 
 
— 122 — 
 
 "Monsieur le ministre 3 ', I said to him after a little preliminary 
 conversation, "I, like many of my countrymen, am most anxious 
 to enlighten myself, as thoroughly as possible, on the true interests 
 of Germany. Allow me , therefore , to speak to you with perfect 
 frankness. I willingly grant that, in her foreign policy, Prussia 
 seems to he pursuing ends with which the French nation eminently 
 sympathises, namely the complete emancipation of Italy from the 
 Austrian yoke, and the establishment of a united Germany, based 
 on the principle of universal suffrage. But between your foreign 
 policy and your home policy, is there not a flagrant contradiction? 
 You declare a national parliament to be the only means by which 
 Germany can be regenerated, — the only form of government by 
 which she can work out her future destiny, — whilst, at the same 
 time , you treat the second Chamber at Berlin in the same fashion 
 as Louis XIV, when he entered the Houses of Parliament whip 
 in hand. In France, we do not admit the possibility of any intimate 
 union between absolutism and democracy. And to speak the whole 
 truth, I may tell you that in Paris your plan of a national parliament 
 has not been taken seriously. It is generally regarded simply as 
 a cleverly-devised engine of war, and it is commonly thought that, 
 when it has served your purpose, you will yourself get rid of it, and 
 that too the moment it becomes inconvenient or useless." 
 
 "A la bonne lieure , you go at once to the root of things", 
 replied M. de Bismarck. "In France, I know, I am as unpopular as 
 in Germany. Everywhere I am considered responsible for a state 
 of things that I have not created, but which has been forced upon 
 me, as upon every one else. I am the scapegoat of public opinion ; 
 but that does not much trouble me. I pursue the course which 
 I believe to be beneficial to my country, and to Germany, with a. 
 perfectly easy conscience. As to the means, I have used those 
 which were within my reach in default of better. Much might be 
 said as to the internal condition of Prussia. In order to judge of 
 it impartially it is necessary to study thoroughly, and to know to 
 the very bottom, the peculiar character of the people of this coun- 
 try. Whilst France and Italy are compact wholes, each animated 
 
# — 123 — 
 
 by one spirit and one sentiment, Germany is given up to the spirit 
 of individualism. Here everyone lives apart in his own little corner; 
 with his own opinion; with his wife and children round him; always 
 in a state of antagonism to the government as well as to his 
 neighbour; judging everything from his own point of view and never 
 from that of other. The sentiment of individualism and the 
 necessity for contradiction are developed to an inconceivable degree 
 in the German. Show him an open door and, rather than go 
 through it, he will obstinately determine to force a passage through 
 the wall at its side. No government, whatever it may do, will 
 ever be popular in Prussia. The majority in the country will always 
 be opposed to it. Simply in virtue of being the government, and 
 of holding authority over the individual, it is doomed to be con- 
 stantly opposed by the moderates, and decried and despised by the 
 ultras. This has been the common fate of all successive govern- 
 ments since the beginning of the present dynasty. Neither liberal 
 ministries, nor reactionary ministries, have found favour with our 
 politicians." 
 
 And , passing in review the various reigns and governments 
 which have existed since the foundation of the monarchy, M. de 
 Bismarck applied himself to the task of proving to me, in brilliant, 
 graphic language, sparkling with wit, that the Auerswalds and the 
 Manteuffels had shared the same fate as himself, and that Frederick- 
 William III., surnamed the Just, no less than Frederick -William 
 IV., had wasted his pains in trying to satisfy the Prussian nation. 
 
 "They shouted", he added, "at the victories of Frederick the 
 Great, but they rubbed their hands together at the thought of being 
 delivered from their tyrant. Nevertheless, with this antagonism 
 there co-exists a deep attachment to the royal house. No sovereign- 
 no minister, no government can win the favour of Prussian in 
 dividualism. Yet all cry, from the depths of their hearts, — God 
 save the King! And they obey when the King commands." 
 
 "Yet some say , M. le Ministre, that this discontent is capable 
 of growing into rebellion." 
 
 „The government does not believe that this is to be feared, 
 
 6* 
 
— 124 — 
 
 and does not fear it. Our revolutionists are not formidable. Their 
 hostility exhausts itself in invectives against the Prime Minister, but 
 they respect the King. It is I who have done all the evil, and it 
 is to me alone that they wish evil. Perhaps they might see, if they 
 were only a little more impartial, that I have not acted otherwise, 
 simply because I could not. In Prussia's present position in Germany, 
 and with Austria opposed to her, an army is imperatively necessary. 
 In Prussia it is the only force capable of discipline. A Prussian who 
 got his arm broken on a barricade, would go home crestfallen, and 
 his wife would look upon him as a madman. But in the army, he 
 is an admirable soldier, and fights like a lion for the honour of 
 his country. A carping policy has not chosen to recognise the necessity 
 imposed on us by circumstances of maintaining a large armed force — 
 evident as that necessity is. As to my own course, I could not hesitate ; 
 all the influences of birth and education led me to the side of the King. 
 The King however clung to the idea of military organisation as firmly 
 as to his crown, because he was convinced heart and soul of its in- 
 dispensable necessity. No one could make him yield or vacillate on that 
 point. At his age — he is seventy — and with his traditions, people 
 persist in an idea; above all if they feel it to be good. Besides on 
 the subject of the army, I entirely agree with his views. 
 
 "Sixteen years ago, I was living as a country gentleman, when 
 the King appointed me the envoy of Prussia at the Frankfort Diet. 
 I had been brought up to admire, I might almost say to worship, 
 Austrian policy. Much time however was not needed to dispel my 
 youthful illusions with regard to Austria, and I became her declared 
 opponent. The humiliation of my country; Germany sacrificed to 
 the interests of a foreign nation ; a crafty and perfidious line of 
 policy; — these were not things calculated to give me satisfaction. 
 I did not know that the future would call upon me to take any 
 important part in public events, but from that period I conceived 
 the idea, which at the present day I am still working out — the 
 idea of withdrawing Germany from Austrian pressure; at any rate 
 that part of Germany whose tone of thought , religion, manners, and 
 interests, identify her destinies with those of Prussia — I speak of 
 
— 125 — 
 
 Northern Germany. In the plan which I brought forward, there has 
 been no question of overthrowing thrones, of taking a duchy from 
 one ruler, or some petty domain from another. The King, moreover, 
 would lend no hand to such schemes. And then there are all the 
 interests of relationships, cousinships, a host of antagonistic in- 
 fluences against which I have had to sustain a daily and hourly 
 warfare. 
 
 "But neither all this, nor the opposition which I have had to 
 struggle against in Prussia, could prevent my devoting myself, heart 
 and soul, to the idea of a Northern Germany, constituted in her 
 logical and natural form under the aegis of Prussia. To attain this 
 end, I would brave all dangers, exile — the scaffold itself. I said 
 to the Crown Prince, whose education and natural tendencies incline 
 him rather to the side of parliamentary government: what matter 
 if they hang me, provided the rope by which I am hung bind this 
 new Germany firmly to your throne!" 
 
 "May I also ask, M. le ministre, how you reconcile the principle 
 of freedom, which is embodied in the existence of a national parliament, 
 with the despotic treatment to which the Berlin Chamber has had 
 to submit? How, above all, have you been able to induce the King, 
 the representative of the principle of divine right, to accept universal 
 suffrage which is par excellence the principle of democracy." 
 
 M. de Bismarck answered with animation: 
 
 "That is a victory achieved after four years of struggle. When 
 the King sent for me, four years ago, the situation of affairs was 
 most critical. His Majesty laid before me a long list of liberal con- 
 cessions, but none of them touched upon the military question. I said 
 to the King: 'I accept; and the more liberal the government can 
 prove itself the stronger it will be.' The Chamber has been obdurate 
 on one side and the Crown on the other. In the conflict, I have 
 remained by the King. My veneration for him,* all my antecedents, 
 all the traditions of my family made that course my duty. But that 
 I am, either by nature or from principle, an adversary of national 
 representation, a born enemy of parliamentary government, is a 
 perfectly gratuitous supposition. During those discussions when the 
 
— 126 — 
 
 Chamber of Berlin set itself in opposition to a line of policy, which 
 circumstances had imposed on Prussia as a necessity of the most 
 pressing kind, I did not choose to separate myself from the King. 
 But no one has a right to insult me by the supposition that I am 
 only mystifying Germany, in bringing forward my project of a parlia- 
 ment. Should the day come, when my task being accomplished, 
 I find it impossible to reconcile my duties to my King with my 
 duties to my country, I shall know how to blot myself out of poli- 
 tical existence without denying the work I have done." 
 
 "Such are, substantially," says M. Vilbort in conclusion, "the 
 political views which M. de Bismarck expressed to me. His thought, 
 as conveyed by my pen, may be somewhat weakened or somewhat 
 unduly emphasized, but I have endeavoured to render it as faith- 
 fully as possible.". 
 
 In this sprightly dialogue, Count Bismarck advanced 
 theories on the nature of the German character, which in 
 more than one point cannot be accepted without reser- 
 vation. At the same time, we must admit that amongst the 
 traits on which he lays stress, there is one of which he, 
 more than any other man, is qualified to judge; and he 
 rightly assumed that the mind of his French hearer 
 would be specially open to its consideration. This is the 
 question, how much weight is to be attached in the 
 progress of German development to the intervention of 
 the revolutionary element. 
 
 And it is in 'this question that we must seek for a 
 practical explanation of all that has happened during the 
 last two years. The first ground for consideration in judging 
 between the Prussian Minister and the nation must be 
 
— 127 — 
 
 supposed stated somewhat as follows : "Whereas, whether 
 from natural inclination or from habit, whether for their 
 happiness or their misfortune, the German people have 
 hitherto in no w r ay given proof of a vocation for revolu- 
 tions " Count Bismarck himself was particularly 
 
 well able to discover the want of this natural inclination, for 
 he unquestionably possessed the revolutionary element, so 
 wanting in the masses with whom he had to cope. It cannot 
 be doubted for a moment that he is a born revolutionist. 
 For a man is born a revolutionist, as he is born a 
 legitimist, by the conformation of the brain, though 
 chance alone determines the exact direction which the 
 revolutionary tendencies shall take. When we hear this 
 aristocrat proclaiming at every opportunity the value of 
 an accomplished fact, — the remedy of Blood, Iron, and 
 Fire, — are we not forcibly reminded of those famous 
 thunderers of a former epoch, who used to say that revolu- 
 tions were not made with rose-water; that bread and 
 steel would carry you to the end of the world? The 
 revolutionist is he who believes himself to be in 
 possession of a heroic remedy for the attainment of 
 the highest good. 
 
 This conviction was one day expressed by Count 
 Bismarck to Herr Virchow in the words: u You perhaps 
 imagine that you understand the national policy better than 
 I do; but I know that I understand better than you or 
 
— 128 — 
 
 the Chamber what I call political policy (die politische 
 Politik)." 
 
 And the further he advanced, the more this feeling 
 of assurance gained upon him. His mode of proceeding 
 might be compared with that of engineers, when they 
 build a railway-bridge over a river. Before they trust 
 the fate of travellers to it, they load it with a weight 
 greater than any which it will ever be called upon to 
 bear, and then they observe how many millimetres the 
 supports have sunk. In the same way, Count Bismarck 
 had burdened the country with an immense weight of 
 arbitrary rules, and the country had indicated the 
 pressure only by a movement of the slightest possible 
 dimensions, which statics would take no note of. The 
 trial was made, and the train could now securely carry 
 over the King and his soldiers, with their bag and 
 baggage. From this moment, the choice was made of 
 the means by which the problem of German unity was 
 to be solved. 
 
 That which Count Bismarck said to the French jour- 
 nalist in the confidence of a tete-ä-tete, was one day 
 flung in the face of the Chamber by his colleague, Herr 
 von Boon. A deputy was alluding to the possibility of 
 a general insurrection when the Minister of War, turn- 
 ing to the majority on the opposition benches, cried: 
 "I see here many earnest and honest faces, but not one 
 
- 129 — 
 
 which could inspire me with fear of such a thing." — 
 And Count Bismarck seldom let an opportunity pass 
 without showing how the democrats had been defeated in 
 1848, owing to their want of energy and practical ability, 
 as well as to their childlike trust in a theoretic propa- 
 ganda. 
 
 It would, nevertheless, be a grave error were we to 
 judge of the degree of development of the German nation 
 exclusively from the point of view just enunciated. A 
 personal and monarchical government on the one side and 
 obedience on the other, exist (in Prussia, as well as, 
 though less apparently, in the smaller states) side by 
 side with an intellectual development, and a general 
 moral sense, surpassed by no country in the world. 
 The statesman whose successes have jeopardised the 
 people's good name is certainly least inclined to dispute 
 this intellectual and moral worth. He once alluded to it 
 in his sarcastic way, when he put forward in a parlia- 
 mentary committee the assertion that Germany was 
 perhaps too advanced to bear a constitution. But what 
 he, with his impatient desire for action, and his practi- 
 cal nature, had his eye mainly fixed upon, was the then 
 existing status quo. 
 
 This great, perhaps exaggerated, estimate of the im- 
 portance of a status quo as a basis for operations, formed 
 a striking constrast to the views of an essentially idealistic 
 
— 130 — 
 
 Opposition. The more a nation devotes itself to intellectual 
 work, the greater becomes its danger of underrating both 
 the strength of existing ties, which bind it to its past, 
 and the power exercised by tradition. The advanced part 
 of the nation , a very considerable part, with that craving 
 for knowledge , and those cosmopolitan sympathies, which 
 characterise it, has lived not only its own life, but, in 
 thought, that of all other civilised nations. 
 
 After having sympathetically taken part in all the 
 great reform movements, Germany thought she could 
 take up the broken thread of general liberation at the 
 point where other nations had dropped it. But the axiom 
 of political economy, that capital is nothing more than 
 accumulated labour , applies equally to the law of human 
 development. The more or less fruitful result of re- 
 volutionary undertakings depends, above all, on the 
 inner work from which they have been evolved. The 
 notion that one may profit by a simple appropriation 
 of the ideas of a neighbour, is founded on a radical 
 error. But Germany has never gone through a revolution 
 of her own. She has the fame of having established 
 Protestantism and developed philosophical freedom; but, 
 as regards political liberty, she has never created anything 
 original, independent, or permanent. She cannot in this 
 respect compare with England, nor with America, France, 
 Switzerland, Holland or Belgium. She is the youngest 
 
 
- 131 — 
 
 of political nations; and the year 1866 brought her for 
 the first time a great organic change without any impulse 
 from without. It is true this impulse came from above 
 and not from beloio , from the people; but still it came 
 at least from within. Nations are in the lowest stage 
 of progress when they are driven forward only by the 
 blows of fate. Thus Russia after the fall of Sebastopol 
 abandoned serfdom; and France after Leipzig and Wa- 
 terloo, and Austria each time after the defeats of 1859 
 and 1866, returned to constitutional government. 
 
 The same rule applied formerly to Germany. The 
 hostile invasion under the first Republic awoke her out 
 of her sleep. Buonaparte performed an incalculable ser- 
 vice to Germany when he swept away her three hundred 
 rulers, leaving only thirty in their place. Since that 
 time, it has only been on occasions when, as in 1830 
 and 1848, the echo of the Parisian revolutions frightened 
 her Princes, that Germany has found strength within 
 herself for united opposition. 
 
 The struggle of constitutionalism carried on in 
 Prussia from 1859 to 1866 by the Chambers and the 
 country against the principle of an absolute monarchy, 
 presents for the first time the spectacle of a great, in- 
 dependent, and enduring endeavour, eminently calculated 
 to forward the political education of the people. The 
 fruits of this struggle, in spite of Count Bismarck's final 
 
— 132 — 
 
 triumph, have not been lost. The liberal party can fairly 
 take credit for a large share of the progress made in 
 Germany, which has been brought about by the man who 
 had so harshly abused them. 
 
 But the more palpable are the results obtained by 
 the assiduous labours of these last years, the more 
 chimerical were the results upon which the radicals based 
 their hopes of continuing the revolutionary rising of 1848. 
 In spite of all intellectual progress, personal government 
 did still practically prevail above, and blunt insensibility 
 below. In this state of things, Count Bismarck did not 
 long hesitate, but ventured his whole stake on personal 
 government. 
 
 Does this justify the conclusion that his victory was 
 but the victory of military despotism? This is precisely 
 the mistake made by those who take account only of the 
 external train of events, and discern no difference between 
 the end and the means. We will not here discuss the 
 famous thesis that the end justifies the means, which 
 the Jesuits are reproached with, and everybody acts 
 upon; nor the question, whether the fruits of a victory, 
 which has been gained by doubtful means, will not for 
 a long time to come bear traces of their origin. It was 
 not, from the first, our intention to show the advantages 
 or disadvantages of the great changes which have recently 
 taken place in Germany, the subject since then of such 
 
— 133 — 
 
 numerous and lively discussions, but simply to get at 
 the ideas, both individual and national, which formed 
 the moving principle of those changes. Although the 
 greatness of the result cannot fail to enlarge the horizon 
 of those who are the first to derive profit and honour 
 from it, yet it cannot be urged too often upon the nation 
 that it should grant them only a limited confidence and 
 should take the management of its affairs into its own 
 hands as soon as possible. 
 
 Above all, let us not confound just apprehensions 
 with that blind fear, by means of which certain radicals 
 are seeking to set the French liberals against the work 
 of German unity. "Take care", they say, "a military 
 Prussia at the head of a new Germany means an approaching 
 reactionary campaign against revolutionary France". Sin- 
 gular! Those who hold this language to France are the 
 very same who declare that, if Germany had waited but 
 a quarter of an hour longer, she would certainly have 
 attained unity through a general rising of the people; 
 and they reproach those who have given in their adhesion 
 to the new order of things, with having too readily 
 despaired of the revolutionary power of their country. 
 
 We must admire the naivete that can so beautifully 
 reconcile the most glaring contradictions ! These highly 
 maginative politicians get up in the morning with the 
 hope of seeing Germany at once enter upon the road 
 
— 134 — 
 
 followed by the National Convention of 1793; they go 
 to bed in the evening in the firm conviction that the 
 same Germany will carry out the decrees of the Congress 
 of Pillnitz. Thus it happens — always according to the 
 theories of this profound science — that the same- 
 people perform, on the same day, things of the most 
 opposite nature, just as chance may ordain. Had they 
 been allowed to do as they pleased, Germany would have 
 struck up the Marseillaise; unfortunately Count Bismarck 
 was allowed to have his way, and immediately these 
 same good people place their bayonets at the service of 
 the Brunswick manifesto. If those who talk thus call 
 themselves the friends of the people, it must be confessed 
 that their friendship is not founded on respect. Such 
 self-contradiction would be incredible, did we not know 
 the extravagancies of which party spirit, with its in- 
 fatuation for itself and its formulas, is capable in a 
 moment of anger. In the eyes of all orthodoxies, by 
 nature indolent and narrow, there is but one choice, and 
 that lies between two extremes which are eternally the 
 same : between the Council of Trent and heresy, between 
 Danton and Coburg. 
 
 Those , however, who see the world as it is, recog- 
 nise, though they may not be able to shut their eyes 
 to the lingering existence in Germany of powers now 
 obsolete, the results of eighty years' progress. Eighty 
 
— 135 — 
 
 years! It is a long time. And there are people who 
 would incite the French by telling them that the Germany 
 of the present day, is the Germany of the Congress of 
 Pillnitz, and that the two countries, now as then, represent 
 the two opposite poles, the modern spirit and the ancient 
 spirit ! 
 
 Is then France still, in her own eyes and in the 
 eyes of the world, as she was eighty years ago, the em- 
 bodiment of freedom; the only nation which has thought 
 on social problems and has worked at their solution? 
 Has not the German nation long since shared the light 
 of modern civilisation? Does it not work earnestly at 
 its political advancement? Is it an inert and unintelligent 
 mass, which any knight errant of legitimacy could some 
 fine morning let loose upon a France engaged on the 
 work of regeneration? 
 
 The Coalition itself was beaten, as it deserved to 
 be, and at that time there was no question either of 
 a German or of a Prussian nation. And the Prussian 
 monarchy defeated France only when the modern genius 
 of Frederick the Great stood opposed to the disgraceful 
 government of Louis XV, and when the nation rose 
 against the insatiable Caesarism of Napoleon L If ever 
 again a King of Prussia should be so misguided as to 
 undertake a crusade against a France raising the standard 
 of liberty, he would be left destitute of everything which 
 
— 136 — 
 
 could give him the victory. He would be beaten, as he 
 would deserve to be; as his predecessor was before him, 
 and even more ignominiously than his predecessor. The 
 progress of freedom in France has always been fraught 
 with good to the liberal parties in Germany. Does any one 
 imagine that, in the future, a Germany breathing the 
 purer air of its new life, will let itself be drawn into a 
 legitimist crusade? 
 
 In the eternal conflict of nations with their rulers, 
 there are properly but two courses open to the people; 
 either to overthrow the sovereign or to endeavour to educate 
 him. Experience has proved that there is little practical 
 value in the middle course — that of limiting the power 
 of the sovereign by coercive measures, by charters and 
 constitutional restrictions. Wherever the spirit of a 
 government is in a state of more or less open revolt 
 against the authority of public opinion, wherever the 
 rulers consider themselves unjustly restrained by the 
 limits of a constitution, the concentrated power at the 
 head of the state will always have a chance of prevailing 
 against the diffused power of the many. The real triumph 
 of civilisation in monarchical states consists in raising 
 the hereditary mind of the reigning families to a height 
 where a conflict with the public opinion of their country 
 seems to them a moral impossibility; an enormity which 
 could not enter the mind of a rational human creature. 
 
— 137 — 
 
 The German people, after suffering shipwreck in 
 their feeble attempt at revolution, themselves perceived, 
 that the past had not sufficiently developed the elemen- 
 tary powers, which are absolutely necessary for the 
 complete success of a great national rising. They were 
 forced, therefore, to content themselves with that other 
 alternative of educating the existing rulers. It was 
 hopeless to attempt this task with thirty ruling houses. 
 A probability of success with one would be much. 
 History and circumstances had for a century pointed to 
 Prussia. 
 
 For half a century the Prussian monarchy had by 
 its complete nullity reduced its adherents to despair. At 
 last, in the year 1866, it gave evidences of powers of 
 perception, of vigour, and of wholesome ambition. For 
 all those who had the least comprehension of their 
 country's policy, this was the moment to rally round, 
 and support, the chief author of this memorable under- 
 taking in his difficult, and — let us openly confess — 
 venturesome task of infusing something of the modern 
 spirit into the heart of an ancient military dynasty. 
 
 Is it not now apparent, that he who would attempt such 
 a task with any prospect of success must combine in his 
 own person the two elements which it was necessary to 
 unite ? He could not be other than a man of aristocratic 
 descent and feelings and a man of powerful and flexible 
 
— 138 — 
 
 mind , forced by the law of its own development to serve 
 the cause of modern progress. 
 
 Clearly a wonderful apparition, this alliance of junker- 
 dorn with a national idea; of aristocracy with universal 
 suffrage; of cavalier with roundhead. But, in fact, it 
 was nothing more than the incarnation of the two con- 
 tradictory principles, which it was necessary to reconcile, 
 if the Prussian Monarchy was to be forced to enter on 
 a new life. 
 
 Up to what point will this man be permitted to 
 develop, in his own mind and in the Cabinet, which he 
 governs by the weight of his personal influence, the 
 germs of progress? Nothing leads us to infer that he 
 has ceased to advance. More than once during the last 
 two years he has given proof that he feels the necessity 
 of following a policy of progress , so as to make head 
 against the reaction which is on the watch for the mo- 
 ment to displace him. On the other hand , he has 
 demanded considerable sacrifices from the liberal 
 party to disarm the opposing influences which surround 
 the throne. To maintain this equilibrium, he makes a 
 too unsparing use of his weapon for frightening the li- 
 berals, — the threat of resignation. At the least con- 
 tradiction — this is his old fault — he loses patience 
 and levels a pistol at their breast, making their surrender 
 a cabinet question. And then the opposition knowing 
 
— 139 — 
 
 the secret weakness of its very difficult situation, shrinks 
 from the responsibility of shaking the position of a man 
 who forms the hyphen as it were between the past and the 
 future. 
 
 All is compromise in this Janus-headed policy — all 
 — its ruling mind included. Count Bismarck, in spite 
 of the elasticity of his mind, will always be a fertile 
 source of embarrassment to those who flatter themselves 
 that they can perceive in him anything more than an 
 aristocrat, who makes use of progress, not from the love 
 of liberty, but for the purposes of policy. 
 
Supplementary Chapters. 
 
 I. 
 
 The foregoing work, written in the Autumn of 1867, 
 first appeared in Paris in the Revue Moderne in February, 
 1868. It was published in a separate form in the fol- 
 lowing June and has now been translated into German, 
 without the Author having felt called upon to make more 
 than a few slight alterations in the text when revising 
 the translation. Whether the fact that he has found 
 nothing to improve, implies excellence in the original 
 conception, or a present want of critical judgment, he 
 must leave to the reader to decide. He feels, however, 
 that the lapse of a year, important and eventful from 
 many points of view, has furnished additional material 
 which will be useful, if not for the correction of previous 
 views, at any rate for their completion. 
 
 Three circumstances have beyond all others contri- 
 buted to this result. The writer had the opportunity of 
 
— 141 — 
 
 seeing events from a nearer point of view; events ex- 
 plained themselves as they proceeded; and the prime 
 movers in the events gave explanations which served to 
 place these in their true light. Let us see what additional 
 insight each of these three circumstances will afford us. 
 The personal question is soon disposed of. For the 
 first time, after a long involuntary absence, the writer 
 was enabled to pass the summer of 1866 in Germany, 
 and thenceforward kept himself in close sympathy with 
 the re-awakened life of political opinion. Materials for 
 more exact judgment of events, past and present, were 
 furnished by his own observation, by a study of all at- 
 tainable sources of information, and by personal inter- 
 course with many men who, through their position in the 
 van of German political life, had gained extensive know- 
 ledge of men and things. In this way, he was able to 
 form a conscientious opinion without any assistance from 
 specially confidential communications; and while saved 
 from the temptation of revealing secrets, he could rejoice 
 in the privilege of speaking his mind freely, without the 
 restraint of any personal obligation. Now, although the 
 fact of becoming a member of the Customs-Parliament, 
 cannot be regarded as opening a sanctuary closed to 
 ordinary mortals, yet the various relations of the position 
 would naturally entail revelations, of which it would be 
 very unsuitable to make any public use. This con- 
 
— 142 — 
 
 sicleration had a large share in inducing the writer to 
 leave his work in the form originally given to it in the 
 Autumn of 1867, on the coast of Normandy, when he 
 was far from the seat of the events, and had never seen 
 the chief characters in his story. 
 
 If we now proceed to the explanations given by the 
 events, we shall find that they have very distinctly shown 
 the correctness of the fundamental ideas of our sketch. 
 
 One chief reason for attempting this work, was the 
 feeling that it cannot be a matter of indifference with 
 what eyes France and Germany regard each other. Now, 
 experience has shown that the questions immediately 
 affecting German development, are visibly influenced by 
 French politics , and that therefore nothing is at the 
 moment of such vital importance to us, as the attitude 
 of France towards us. It is true, that official France, 
 with which we have practically to deal, is not the same 
 as the French public to which a theoretic study like the 
 present appeals, but still no one will maintain that the 
 foreign policy of France, especially in our case, is entirely 
 uninfluenced by public opinion. On the contrary, it daily 
 becomes more dependent on public opinion, and shows its 
 dependence, not by doing the will of the nation, but by 
 its attempts to escape down by-paths; and these by-paths, 
 as is well known, lead at the first turning to the Ehine. 
 
 Even, if it be true that a ruler who wishes to bring 
 
— 143 — 
 
 about a war, is never at a loss for an excuse, the 
 government of Napoleon no longer stands firmly enough, 
 either at home or abroad, for any mere pretext to suffice, 
 for undertaking the responsibility of a struggle the cost of 
 which cannot be estimated. There always exists, there- 
 fore, a strong tie of connection between the attitude of 
 public opinion in France towards us, and our internal 
 affairs. 
 
 If it were possible (unfortunately it is not so) to 
 gain over this opinion entirely to our side, we should 
 not require to give any heed to the intentions of the 
 French Cabinet; just as, on the other hand, the whole 
 South -German agitation of people, priest, and prince, 
 would have died away without result, had it not been 
 upheld by the universal excitement of the French people. 
 
 It may, to return to the testimony of later events, 
 be regarded as a notorious fact, that the debate on the 
 Address in the Customs -Parliament would not have led 
 to an anti- national result under the influence of the 
 Prussian ministerial party, had it not been for this regard 
 to the opinion of France; and it may be affirmed with 
 equal truth, that the egregious folly of a half North- 
 German half South- German Kingdom of Hesse is to be 
 ascribed, not to the line of the Main, but to the point 
 of the French sword. 
 
 Further, the facts have given plenty of fresh proofs, 
 
— 144 — 
 
 that the key to our internal events is to be found in 
 the relative strength of the ruling political opinions in 
 Germany. The result of our whole investigation might 
 be summed up thus: that the urgent problem of uniting 
 Germany was to be solved either by conservative or by 
 revolutionary methods, and that the method actually 
 employed , was precisely the one which met the demands 
 of the majority of the nation. The elections for the 
 Reichstag and the Customs -Parliament were, notwith- 
 standing the few exceptions, which may be said to prove 
 the rule , as free from Government influence and bribery 
 (the influence of the Priests is an element of the people's 
 thought) as those of any country, whether on this side 
 or on the other side of the Altantic; and yet the various 
 conservative elements displayed so great and even, as it 
 appears, so increasing a preponderance, that we must be 
 struck with party-blindness to attribute this melancholy 
 result to the conservatism at the summit, instead of to 
 the conservatism at the base of the social scale. 
 
 The majority of the German nation, which is so much 
 abused by the high and mighty chiefs of the popular party, 
 might reply to them as the dyer about to take an oath did to 
 the Judge. "Witness", said the Judge, "take off your gloves." 
 — "Judge", rejoined the dyer, "put on your spectacles". We 
 cannot free ourselves from the reaction by the use of hasty 
 and superficial remedies ; we must slowly change the nation's 
 
— 145 — 
 
 vital fluids. We are suffering the evil consequences of 
 the disorganised state of Germany, in the fact that the 
 regeneration of the country has commenced under the 
 auspices of personal Monarchy and that it could not even 
 be begun without taking into account the influence of 
 France, an influence which during the internal dissensions 
 of the last two centuries, has become as it were naturalised 
 in Germany. It is a terrible commentary on the state of 
 our affairs, that a Minister who only considered himself 
 fitted for foreign politics, should have felt himself called 
 to the creation of our inner unity; and though it is very 
 true, that he need have been less anxiously observant 
 of external relations, if he had been endowed with greater 
 gifts for the internal development of justice and freedom, 
 his defenders will always have a last impregnable po- 
 sition in the fact, that a man with a higher feeling for 
 justice and freedom, would never have attained such a 
 position in the existing Prussian Monarchy (itself a part 
 of the common German responsibility) as to enable him 
 to break the wretched spell of German small stateism. 
 This consideration naturally leads us to the question, 
 whether the experience of a year may not have thrown 
 some light upon a delicate point. Can the spirit of pro- 
 gress adduce any new proof for the assertion that it can 
 call even the smallest corner of Bismarck's heart its 
 own? or again, is there any ground for affirming more 
 
 Count Bismarck. 7 
 
— 146 — 
 
 strongly that the throne and its surroundings, so con- 
 stantly put forward by him as a protection against the 
 urgency of the Liberals, is anything more than a clever 
 cover for his own reactionary designs? As is well known, 
 opinions are still divided on this point. 
 
 For our own part, having deduced from the broad 
 features of the great events what seemed to us the im- 
 partial truth, we remain firm to our first opinion, — the 
 after-effects of the great volcanic action leaving us un- 
 moved. We continue to see the same Pilot steering, now 
 to the left, now as much or even more to the right, as 
 winds and waves or even his own fancy may direct. 
 Perhaps the current itself tends towards the quiet side 
 of the stream, in natural sympathy with the calmer state 
 of the weather, or perhaps the accusers, looking only 
 from their lofty heights at the most distant marks, are 
 unable to perceive the small advantages which the good 
 cause, steadily fighting for the daily bread of progress, 
 gains in a comparitively quiet time. The undecided state 
 of the contest is most distinctly shown in the fact, that 
 Count Bismarck's enemies sometimes rejoice that he is 
 not a whit better than the worst Eulenburgs and then 
 again that he has been worsted by the latter, and that 
 his reign is coming to an end. Here the domain of po- 
 litics ends and that of gossip begins. 
 
 The party which has adopted Count Bismarck's 
 
— 147 — x 
 
 creation and which considers it a gain to know that he is 
 at the helm, has in no way decreased the manifestation 
 of its doubts, cold reservations, and prudent sense of 
 duty. If it has altered its attitude at all, it has been 
 to withdraw slightly from him, on the ground that the 
 impatience of contradiction, and disregard for legality in 
 the Minister make him unable to preserve inward and 
 hardly outward respect for Parliament, which , if only in 
 consistency to his own creation, is due from him. If 
 the North German navy had not been as shadowy and 
 unformidable an existence as the North German Reichs- 
 tag, it might have been a crime to throw back its for- 
 mation by years, to set it formally aside, in a fit of ill 
 humour, simply in order to embarrass an opposition, wich 
 was discharging its legislative duty. 
 
 In a country with a full-grown constitution, and a 
 full-grown Navy, a Minister who gave such an order (if 
 indeed such a thing were conceivable) w r ould have risked 
 his life; and when the leader of a great state takes such 
 means to punish his opponents, and through them the 
 country, for what seems to him party narrowness or 
 party ambition, there can be no doubt which of the 
 two sides has lost sight of the standard of dignified 
 behaviour. 
 
 At a time when parliamentary government is on its 
 final trial for an indefinite time to come, and is being 
 
f — 148 — 
 
 attacked from above and from below, it is possibly no 
 misfortune that the union into which Count Bismarck 
 has entered with the Reichstag and Customs -Parliament 
 is more a marriage of head than of heart; for this origin 
 promises under the circumstances greater stability. But 
 granting that the victory-laden leader imagines himself 
 in this union to have espoused his maid, who is to 
 humbly wait upon him at home, so that he may carry 
 on his conquests abroad, he should not forget that in 
 such cases a man, for his own sake, vows equality to 
 his low-born wife, and that if the mother is not honoured 
 in the house, the children can only be neglected and 
 disowned. The Parliamentary opposition wisely held in 
 this instance to the maxim, that he who wishes to be 
 respected by others must first respect himself. 
 
 In the contest on the subject of the pecuniary lia- 
 bilities of the Bund, and more especially on the right of 
 control over the money matters of the Empire, the oppo- 
 sition were the more determined not to give way, as this 
 was not a case in which Count Bismarck could take re- 
 fuge in his favourite excuse. This resistance to all legal 
 control in small matters could not be laid by him upon 
 his royal master's shoulders, for it is as repugnant to the 
 royal ideas, as it is natural to those of the Minister. His 
 antipathy to anything that looks like pedantic interference 
 with the judicial power, has been greatly strengthiened 
 
— 149 — 
 
 by the impunity with which in his character of re- 
 volutionist at a great crisis, he set himself above all 
 considerations of law; and he thus exposed himself to 
 the same danger as is incurred by his extreme opponents, 
 that of keeping up revolution as a permanent institution 
 and as a good in itself. 
 
 The idea that the final motive of every retrograde 
 movement might be traced to higher and occult influences, 
 at work behind Count Bismarck's back as it were, 
 had gradually somewhat lost its force with those who 
 for a long time had set down a good deal to his credit 
 on this score. Before the great turning point of events, 
 the plea of want of power, put forward to excuse his at 
 the best but indifferent attitude in regard to "home af- 
 fairs/' might perhaps be allowed to pass; but the notion 
 that a man in his position, who had performed such 
 services and given such proofs of ability, should still 
 have so little authority, one might even add, conscious- 
 ness of his own importance, was incredible to all think- 
 ing minds. He had on several occasions proved plainly 
 enough that, when he was in earnest, he could, either in 
 legal or judicial matters, carry his point in spite of re- 
 actionary colleagues; and he is certainly not too scrupulous 
 to make use of so very convenient a means of escape from 
 an embarrassing position, as that of throwing the respon- 
 sibility of unpalateable actions on irresponsible shoulders. 
 
— 150 — 
 
 One circumstance especially attracted the attention 
 of those who were making it their aim to clear up these 
 doubts. The uncertain and incomplete condition, in 
 which South Germany had been left by the peace of 
 Prague, and the increasing desire on the part of France 
 to interfere, gradually led people's minds back to the 
 consideration of the first issue. Every day afresh the 
 thought came up: was the creation of such an unbearable 
 state of things really an unavoidable necessity? Was it 
 not too feeble a result of so great a success, that Ger- 
 many should have prepared such a rod for her own back, 
 at a moment when the whole of Europe, stunned by the 
 thunder of victory , and dazzled by the resistless force 
 of Prussian arms, stood wondering and unprepared for any 
 emphatic word of interference? These questions were 
 asked, not merely by those who, proud of the newly ac- 
 quired fame, believed that they should be more than a 
 match for any opponent, but also by the peace-loving 
 working classes who became aware that, although it was 
 a treaty of peace which had been signed at Prague, it 
 was no peace. 
 
 These ideas had been very much brought into the 
 foreground by the debates arising on the question of the 
 military organisation of France. Both the Imperial Go- 
 vernment, which could only base its proposals on the 
 ground of present military inefficiency, and the opposition 
 
— 151 — 
 
 which found it convenient to reproach the government, 
 with neglecting the country's defences and with weakness 
 of action, felt it their interest to declare that Prussia in 
 1866 was more ready for war than France. And as it 
 gradually grew clearer to the German mind, that the 
 line of the Main had been entirely created by the in- 
 fluence of French diplomacy, the opinion gained ground 
 that, when the Prussian army stood before Vienna, bolder 
 measures should have been taken to give to German 
 unity at any rate its external, if not its internal form, 
 regardless of the risk of a quarrel with France. 
 
 At this decisive moment, was Count Bismarck held 
 back by the restraining influence of France from fol- 
 lowing his own naturally bold inspirations ? Such was the 
 question asked by all reflecting minds. The answer given 
 by all that we know of the history of the Peace of 
 Nikolsburg, much of which is necessarily secret, is de- 
 cidedly in the negative. All impartial testimony on the 
 inner history of this event, points to the conclusion that 
 the Minister had no desire to take bold and decisive 
 steps in advance. 
 
 This view, indeed, coincides with what we know of 
 human nature. It is a law of hesitating temperaments 
 that, having once come to a great resolution, they cling to 
 it almost with desperation, and once in movement will 
 not stop, until the result of the struggle answers to the 
 
— 152 — 
 
 previous effort. All that is known of the history of the 
 critical moment in the Luxembourg question confirms the 
 idea that Count Bismarck took the side of moderation 
 and pacification ; and a story which has since been told 
 of him, strengthens this view of his conduct at Prague. 
 Being interrogated one day by a friend, he said — "You 
 see, our white waistcoat was still quite spotless after 
 Königgrätz. Why run the risk of uselessly soiling it?" 
 This simile is so much in his well known figurative, 
 joking, and perhaps slightly frivolous vein, that we are 
 inclined to believe in the authenticity of the story. And 
 since experience has shown that a study of the Imperial 
 policy was not without its influence on the course of the 
 Prussian Minister, it may reasonably be argued that in 
 concluding the peace of Nikolsburg, the remembrance of 
 the French policy at Villafranca influenced him to some 
 extent. Louis Napoleon, too, had been influenced among 
 other considerations by that of the "white waistcoat"; 
 though the half -settled questions in Italy did not present 
 their dark sides to him so plainly as the provisional 
 state of Germany must have done to the conqueror of 
 Sadowa. 
 
 We may add that the critics of the Peace of Prague 
 have this advantage, that the justice of their views can 
 no longer be put to the test of facts. We see distinctly 
 in present events the evils which arose from the moderation 
 
— 153 — 
 
 of the victor ; but who will venture to guess the calamities 
 which would have been the result of greater daring? 
 Did it not at [the time seem incredible, that Count 
 Bismarck should have come to terms with France, without 
 ceding a foot of German ground? Did not everything 
 look as if, in the absence of any express agreement, he 
 had at any rate tacitly bound himself to purchase the 
 neutrality of France with a few sundries ? Do not the 
 still resounding echoes in France prove that the Treaty of 
 Prague was regarded by the majority of the French nation 
 as an unspoken defeat ? Finally, was not Count Bismarck 
 under a certain obligation, which worldly prudence might 
 alone have dictated, not to run counter to, aud provoke, 
 the Court of the Tuileries, which — be the motive what 
 it might — had made the rise and fulfilment of the im- 
 portant undertaking possible by its neutrality. If it be 
 true (and nothing justifies us in contradicting it) that the 
 horrors of a battle, seen then for the first time, made 
 a deep impression on Count Bismarck ; and if it be true 
 that he regarded a war between France and Germany 
 as being, quite independently of its issue, a misfortune 
 to be avoided by the most strenuous efforts, we may 
 regard his anxiety about the "white waistcoat" as an 
 evidence of his desire, not hastily to grasp a personal triumph, 
 but to reap a bountiful harvest with wisdom and mode- 
 ration. Louis Napoleon at Villafranca carried out a 
 
— 154 
 
 personal policy, fitted to a dynasty the chief aim and end 
 of which must of necessity be to implant in the people 
 a faith in itself and in its race. To return a conqueror 
 from Magenta and Solferino was the highest of all com- 
 mands to Napoleon; especially as Savoy and Nice had been 
 promised and the unity of Italy was in reality of no 
 very vital consequence to him. Count Bismarck's 
 bitterest opponents have not hitherto been able to reproach 
 him with pursuing a personal policy, with allowing self- 
 love, in its various manifestations to be the main-spring of 
 his actions. Self-sufficiency, boastfulness and dissimulation 
 are foreign to his nature. His impatience of contradiction 
 arises more from irritability of temperament than from a 
 desire to satisfy unbounded ambition, which would be 
 natural to his consciously strong nature. His opponents 
 have attacked him only for the views by which he is 
 guided in action, and for the principles which, as they 
 suppose, he desires to see in the ascendant. We must 
 therefore also take for granted that, if the moderation 
 after victory was due to him, it was dictated by the con- 
 viction that the securing of his great aims absolutely 
 required it. He desired, not to drain with impatient hand 
 the full goblet of success, but to practise self-restraint 
 in presence of the many temptations on the path to 
 greater splendours. Perhaps too, having succeeded in 
 the most difficult part of the work, he expected, as so 
 
— 155 — 
 
 many people do, that things would progress of their own 
 accord; but the experience of two years has not to any 
 extent justified this expectation. 
 
 Little accustomed to take the requirements of the 
 masses into his calculations, he had perhaps studied 
 the Imperial policy too exclusively on its personal side, 
 and had quieted himself with the idea that in its present 
 condition it was not to be feared as an aggressive power ; 
 but he had neglected to reflect that the French policy was 
 not entirely independent of the will of the nation. His 
 own expeiience in the Luxembourg question must have 
 taught him that the German nation would not easily 
 brook anything, which might look like loss of power or 
 humiliation in the eyes of foreign countries, — although 
 the Prussians are far from being as sensitive as the 
 French where their honour is concerned, and the in- 
 dignation of the masses would not be nearly so serious to 
 a Prussian king as to the French Emperor. It is this 
 sensitiveness of the French in matters of foreign policy, 
 and its reflected action in the Imperial Cabinet, which 
 have for two years retarded the natural development of 
 the German state; and it was perhaps want of sufficient 
 foresight as to the effect of this obstacle, that confirmed 
 Count Bismarck in his idea that the German cause, now 
 that the greatest difficulties had been overcome, would by a 
 natural law continue to develop in the direction it had taken. 
 
— 156 — 
 
 For we can now no longer doubt that, from the first, 
 he looked forward to something more than making a 
 larger Prussia out of the North -German Bund, and 
 throwing -over the states south of the Main. Even his 
 greatest enemies have been obliged to acknowledge that 
 Prussia did not hold back from the Southern States for 
 fear of the preponderance of the democratic element in 
 the masses. The elections to the Customs -Parliament 
 showed as strong a conservative majority in the south 
 as in the north *; and the charge, that Prussia wished to 
 divide, not to unite Germany, has been changed for the 
 opposite one, that she craves for territory. 
 
 There is something strange about this notion, that 
 ' 'things will go of themselves". It cannot possibly have 
 taken such a hold of men's minds without any practical 
 foundation, and we cannot say of it, as of so many kindred 
 expressions, that it has arisen simply from the need 
 of rest in the human mind, or from philosophical views 
 of doubtful correctness. The belief that a thought which 
 has once been recognised by universal consent as com- 
 plete and practical, must finally be practically carried out, 
 rests upon a mathematically correct foundation, and is at 
 the bottom nothing more than the reverse of the proverb 
 
 * A careful estimate gives, out of 86 members chosen in the 
 south, 38 liberals of all shades, and 48 conservatives. 
 
— 157 — 
 
 that the pitcher which goes often to the well at last 
 comes broken home. A time can be fixed with tolerable 
 certainty, beyond which a thing of fragile nature is not 
 likely to exist; while it can be maintained with equal 
 truth, that a life-containing germ will assuredly one day 
 find its way into the light of reality. 
 
 And yet nothing is so true as that things will not 
 "go of themselves". No one has experienced and proved 
 this so much as the man who opened a way for German 
 unity on the very side where a way could least have 
 been expected; a way for that German unity which had 
 so long, so loudly, and so vainly been expected to accom- 
 plish itself from within. Now, would it not be eminently 
 remarkable if, as there is every appearance of being the 
 case, even this thorough -going realist should have 
 been led away to act upon a pure abstraction, which 
 made him believe that things would develop themselves 
 to a far greater extent than they actually appear to 
 have done? 
 
 It is the natural tendency of our time, in political as 
 well as industrial matters, to look with great favour on 
 the collective. Such great things have been done by 
 gathering in towards the centre of thought and practice 
 all the wide developments of extended circles, that 
 the value of individual powers has been greatly 
 overlooked. Yet experience, art, and science are always 
 
— 158 — 
 
 leading us back to what is individual. The history of 
 modern industry, whenever written, will have to record 
 a fearful waste of material as a counterbalance to the 
 most admirable results of the principle of association. 
 The true root of strength lies where labour and reward 
 are one ; and what the Poet has said of country is true, 
 simply because a country is individual in relation to 
 universal humanity. 
 
 These reflections though apparently losing themselves 
 in the domain of philosophy may find a very practical 
 justification for appearing in this place; for our special 
 aim is to throw light upon events by the study of a 
 personality and at the same time to throw light upon that 
 personality by a study of the events. 
 
 This makes it very important for us to remember, 
 firstly, how much the secret of life lies in individual 
 power, and secondly, what overwhelming power is put 
 into the hand of the individual by the conjunction of 
 extraordinary circumstances and extraordinary men. Let 
 no democracy repudiate this truth; for if it do, it will 
 incur the danger of being obliged to declare, either nature 
 undemocratic, or democracy unnatural. What, for example, 
 can be freer and more open to all, than the beautiful in 
 art and literature ? Yet who would deny the sovereignty 
 of Genius? Shall we assert that Shakespeare, Lessing, 
 and Goethe did immense service to their contemporaries 
 
— 159 — 
 
 and to posterity not by their innate superiority but by 
 co-operation? And what is incontestably true in the 
 domain of thought, is still more true in the domain of 
 action, where an achieved position lends additional weight 
 to superior mental powers. The effect of what is said 
 depends, it is well known, upon who says it. Cavour, if 
 for the happiness of Italy he had lived, might often 
 perhaps have given no better advice than Ricasoli or 
 others; but how much more irresistibly would a word 
 from him have conducted into one stream, the whole 
 strength and devotion of Italy, and thus have given the 
 first pledge of success! 
 
 The application of what we have just said is plain. 
 The ideas, to which Cavour and Bismarck first gave 
 form, will be carried out. This is no longer a personal 
 question : but the how and the when, so important to us 
 poor mortals, is inseparable from the question of per- 
 sonality. Nothing so much hinders things from moving on 
 of themselves as to imagine that they will do so ; and 
 the old saying — "Providence helps those who help 
 themselves" — should be the Alpha and Omega of 
 German aspirations. 
 
II. 
 
 Up to this point, we have endeavoured to follow 
 the commentaries on the events, which the events them- 
 selves have furnished in the course of the past year. It 
 now only remains for us to answer the third question 
 raised at the beginning of this supplement : namely, what 
 explanations the chief actors in the events have since 
 thought it well to lay before their contemporaries. Now, 
 it happens that a revelation has quite recently been made 
 of incomparable value in the solution of this question. 
 In the August of this year (1868), the note addressed 
 by Prussia to the Italian cabinet in June 1866, relative 
 to the most advantageous manner of conducting the war 
 which v^as then about to commence , was made public. 
 This note is in itself so remarkable a document, that in 
 any work, devoted to a consideration of the leading 
 ideas of the period, it would claim a place. And it 
 
— 161 — 
 
 must be the less neglected here, because it confirms, 
 beyond every expectation, the views which formed the 
 basis of the present work. 
 
 The note was addressed by the Prussian ambassador, 
 Count Usedom, some days before the outbreak of the 
 war, to General La Marmora, Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
 President of the Council, and afterwards Commander-in- 
 Chief of the Italian army, and runs as follows: 
 
 "To his Excellency General La Marmora , President of the 
 "Council, Florence. 
 
 "The undersigned, ambassador extraordinary from his Majesty 
 "the King of Prussia, has the honour to submit the following con- 
 siderations to General La Marmora, President of the Council, and 
 "Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
 
 "In a few days , Prussia and Italy will appeal to arms to 
 "settle their common dispute with Austria. The government of the 
 "King, my royal master, thinks that from this moment there should 
 "be complete agreement and energetic co-operation in the military 
 "movements of the two powers. United action in the field, which is 
 "prevented by distance, must be compensated for by simultaneous- 
 "ness of attack. The resisting power of Austria will thus be 
 "divided; she will be unable to turn her whole strength against 
 "either one of her opponents. Our blows will in this way make 
 "themselves felt at a distance, as well as on the field of battle. 
 
 "In the first place, the government of the King is convinced 
 "that the opening of hostilities in Germany should be immediately 
 "followed by Italy's declaration of war. We know the good faith 
 "which animates the government of King Victor Emmanuel too well 
 "to doubt that this will be the case. But the Prussian government 
 "is of opinion that this solidarity of feeling and simultaneousness 
 "of action should equally characterise every stage of the campaign; 
 "and that each power should give constant and equal attention to 
 
— 162 — 
 
 "the military movements of its ally, to whom it is bound by the 
 "most intimate ties. The Prussian government anticipates that this 
 "sentiment will be approved and shared by Italy. The plan 
 "on which Prussia proposes that the ensuing campaign should be 
 "conducted is that of a war to the death (guerre ä fond). Should 
 "the decision of arms be favourable to us in the beginning of the 
 "campaign, we will not be arrested by the obstacles which lie in 
 "the way, but will drive our opponent to his last defences and his 
 "last resources. 
 
 "We will not content ourselves after a victory with only 
 "occupying such territory as an advantageous peace may allow us 
 "to retain. On the contrary, we will endeavour to make our victoiy 
 "complete and decisive, without reference to any future territorial 
 "arrangements A complete defeat of this kind would exercise a 
 . "most sensible influence on the enemy's powers of resistance; and 
 "greater even than the physical consequences will be the political 
 "and moral effects of such a defeat. Prussia will therefore dis- 
 regard all obstacles which nature or art may put in her path 
 "from Linz to Cracow , and will press forward in her victorious 
 "career to the gates of Vienna. 
 
 "As regards the analogous operations of the Italian forces, it 
 "would not be advisable that they should lay siege to the fortresses 
 "of the Quadrilateral; they should rather pass between or round 
 "them, in order to defeat the enemy in the open field. There can 
 "scarcely be a doubt, when we take the numerical force of the 
 "opposing parties into consideration, that the Italian army will very 
 "shortly be in possession of the whole of Venetia, with the exception 
 "of Venice, Verona and Mantua, whose garrisons would of course 
 "have to be held in check by strong corps of observation. 
 
 "The Italian generals will no doubt be best able to judge of 
 "the operations to be carried out: but Italy, if she is to act in 
 "accord with Prussia, must not limit herself to pushing on to the 
 "northern frontier of Venetia. She must strike out for herself a 
 "road to the Danube, so as to combine forces with Prussia in the 
 "very centre of the Empire ; in a word, she must march on Vienna. 
 
— 163 — 
 
 "To secure Italy's lasting hold on Venetia, Austria must be struck 
 "at the very heart. 
 
 "What would be the consequences if Italy were to confine 
 "her military action to Udine or Belluno, in order to occupy herself 
 "afterwards with the siege of the Quadrilateral? It would ine- 
 vitably retard the war. For it would enable the Austrian forces 
 "quietly to withdraw northwards, and strengthen the Imperial army 
 "against Prussia. With the assistance possibly of Bavaria, Austria's 
 "united forces might then be able to compel Prussia to give up 
 "the offensive and assume the defensive. Thus deprived of the 
 "advantages of previous success, we should perhaps conclude a 
 "peace, which would answer neither to the original ideas entertained 
 "by Prussia and Italy, nor to the immense sacrifices that the two 
 "countries would have imposed upon themselves. In order to avoid 
 "so unfortunate a result, which would force the allies sooner or 
 "later to begin their work afresh, Prussia believes she cannot in- 
 "sist too strongly on the necessity of maintaining the offensive on 
 "both sides to the utmost, that is, up to the walls of Vienna. 
 
 "If we accept for a moment the opposite possibility, and con- 
 sider specially the position of Prussia, it will be seen that in such 
 "a case the co-operation of Italy would have been more injurious 
 "than its absolute neutrality. Neutrality would, at least, have had 
 "the advantage of keeping a whole Austrian army in the Quadri- 
 lateral, and paralysing it with regard to Prussia; while victorious, 
 "but ill-organised, and half carried out co-operation would leave this 
 "same army at liberty to turn against Prussia, which would thus 
 "have a fairer chance without than with an Italian alliance. 
 
 "But the government of the King, my royal master, cherishes 
 "the most perfect confidence in the loyalty of its ally, and feels 
 "sure that any such possibility will be carefully avoided. 
 
 "From a strategic point of view the march upon Vienna may 
 "perhaps appear dangerous; the scale of operations too large, and 
 "the resources too distant. But in proportion as the distance from 
 "the Prussian army diminishes, the danger will diminish, and the 
 "final victory become more and more probable. 
 
— 164 — 
 
 "Moreover, there is an infallible means of securing to both 
 "armies the most effective cooperation upon a common territory: 
 "this territory is Hungary. 
 
 "The Prussian government has of late carefully studied the 
 "Hungarian question, and has arrived at the conviction that Hungary, 
 "supported equally by Italy and Prussia, will on its side be willing 
 "to serve them as a rallying point and strategic fulcrum. 
 
 "Supposing, for example, that a strong expedition were sent 
 "to the eastern coast of the Adriatic, an arrangement which would 
 "in no way weaken the main army, since the expeditionary force 
 "would be formed chiefly of volunteers to be placed under the 
 "command of General Garibaldi. The Prussian government has 
 "every reason to believe, from information received, that such a 
 "force would find a hearty welcome among the Slave and Hungarian 
 "populations. It would cover the main army in its advance upon 
 "Vienna, and secure for it the goodwill and the resources of this 
 "wide territory. On the other hand, the Croatian and Hungarian 
 "regiments would soon refuse to fight against troops, which had 
 "been received as friends in their own countries. Again, a body 
 "of light troops, composed as much as possible of national elements, 
 "might break into Hungary from the north and from the frontiers 
 "of Prussian Silesia, and come to the aid of the Italian troops and 
 "of the national volunteer forces which would have been rapidly 
 "organized. Austria would thus lose in proportion as we gained, 
 "and the blows delivered by us would strike, not her circumference 
 "but her very centre. 
 
 "It is on all these grounds, that the Prussian government at- 
 taches so much value to the Hungarian question, and to combined 
 "action with its Italian ally in Hungary, it proposes to the 
 "Florentine cabinet that the two governments should provide jointly 
 "for the expenses necessary in preparing for the reception of the 
 "expeditions, and in securing the co-operation of the countries 
 "mentioned. 
 
 "Such is the outline of the plan of campaign which the under- 
 signed has the honour, in accordance with the instructions of his 
 
— 165 — 
 
 "government, to submit to the Italian cabinet. Inasmuch as it 
 "is qualified to serve the general interests; inasmuch as it ensures 
 "the combined action of the allied forces, the Prussian government 
 "flatters itself that the proposed plan will be heartily received by 
 "the Italian cabinet, and will contribute largely to the success of 
 "this great undertaking. 
 
 "The undersigned requests General La Marmora to honour 
 "Mm with a reply as soon as possible, and begs him to accept the 
 "renewed assurance of his highest consideration. 
 
 (signed) Usedom. 
 
 Our especial task does not require us to enter into 
 the controversies which have arisen on the subject of the 
 publication of this note, nor to discuss the disputed 
 question, in what degree the Prussian ambassador was 
 personally responsible for the drawing up and communi- 
 cation of this important document. Historical inquiry, 
 untouched by the subordinate motives and transient 
 necessities of daily policy, will reckon this note one of 
 the most valuable contributions to a correct understanding 
 of the leading ideas of the war, and will not trouble 
 itself to consider whether it was hastily concocted in the 
 brain of a subordinate, and handed in by him at a 
 venture. Impartial history, and above all German history, 
 will never require a justification from the originators of 
 these great events, for it will count them to their greatest 
 honour ; and in the same proportion as it considers each 
 individual to have taken part in the conception and exe- 
 cution of the whole, it will claim for him credit in the 
 
— 166 — 
 
 drawing out of this plan. History will hardly be mistaken 
 if it recognizes in the tone of the document — bold, con- 
 fident, and prepared for the utmost consequences — 
 the hand of the men who held an overwhelming sway in 
 the cabinet as in the field. This programme requires no 
 great explanation. Its own words give the most energetic 
 expression to the ideas which our preceding study had 
 more doubtfully arrived at. Although some of these 
 heroic measures may be attributed to mere expediency, 
 there remains much in them that is instructive. 
 
 It would be folly to assert that Bismarck, Moltke 
 and Roon were inspired in drawing out this programme 
 by enthusiasm for the unity of Italy or the freedom of 
 Hungary; but it would be equally absurd, in presence of such 
 a grand revolutionizing plan, to say that they had no 
 thought but that of carrying out a traditional and stiff- 
 necked Junker- policy: that they boldly gave the rein to 
 principles of progress, and sought to stir Europe to its 
 depths — simply to increase the number of lesser royal- 
 ties. No, those who were at that time the guides of the 
 Prussian monarchy, had at least raised it to the highest 
 point which could be expected by the German people, so 
 long as the people did not feel in themselves the power to put 
 something better in the place of this same monarchy. 
 If the path indicated in this plan had been strictly fol- 
 lowed, Germany and Italy would no longer be tormented, 
 
— 167 — 
 
 the one with the problem of the line of the Main, the 
 other with the problem of the Papacy. But this was not 
 to be. An important part of the programme was not 
 carried out; the Italian arms not only failed to defeat 
 the common enemy, but even to fulfil the lesser, but very 
 important, duty of keeping him long occupied. The peace 
 of Prague was an act of moderation necessitated by the 
 entire failure of the Italian co-operation, and the line of the 
 Main, accepted in that peace, only a resource which had 
 been kept for an evil day, not the true aim of the original 
 undertaking. 
 
 It is necessary to keep this point in view, when we 
 endeavour to balance the merits and demerits of the 
 peace of Prague, and complete what has already been 
 said on this subject. The conclusion of this peace certainly 
 indicates a great yielding to French pressure; but this 
 pressure drew all its force from the weakness shown by 
 Italy. If we imagine the Prusso -Italian programme strictly 
 carried out, south as well as north of the Alps, we 
 shall at once see that such energetic movements would 
 have overborne all opposition. Napoleon would then have 
 found far less support at home, because the open frater- 
 nizing with the liberal element in Hungary and Eome, 
 and the calling of Garibaldi to an important part in the 
 campaign, would have stamped the German cause with 
 the impress of universal freedom, instead of with that 
 
— 168 — 
 
 of the one - sided military absolutism, of which its enemies 
 have made so much capital. 
 
 It would lead us too far from our subject to enter 
 here upon the interesting question, whether political as 
 well as military sins do not lie at the door of the Italian 
 general. Though it is certain that he did not wish to 
 be beaten at Custozza, and probable that, after Custozza, 
 he would rather have repaired his fault, and used his 
 army to some purpose, than have lain in a state of 
 complete helplessness; yet, on the other hand, there are 
 two points of undoubted authenticity which give rise to 
 a suspicion of a want of steady good -will on his part. 
 For in the first place it is proved, that General La 
 Marmora, at that time President of the Council and shortly 
 afterwards Commander-in-Chief, put Count Usedom's 
 project into his pocket, without submitting it to a single 
 one of his colleagues, and that for more than two years 
 (till the end of July, 1868) not a soul in Italy had any 
 idea of its existence. In the second place, it is proved 
 that on the 5th of July, Venice was assured to him 
 without another blow. 
 
 The Italians attribute the failure on their side en- 
 tirely to the military incapacity of La Marmora. They 
 appeal for proof to the facts, that after Custozza he, as 
 well as the other leaders of the army, entirely lost their 
 heads ; that a fruitless interchange of despatches between 
 
— 169 — 
 
 La Marmora and Cialdini filled up the time; that the 
 ministry constantly insisted on renewed action, and Ricasoli, 
 La Marmora's successor, was several times in the camp; 
 that it is well known the unfortunate battle of Lissa 
 was the result of this desire for action; and finally, they 
 appeal to the acknowledged fact, that Austria (true to 
 its old traditions in preferring to yield to Italy rather 
 than to Prussia) had before the outbreak of hostilities 
 offered Venice to Italy, which had, however, chosen to 
 remain true to its ally and invoke the decision of arms, 
 and that Italy's consent to the preliminaries of Nikols- 
 burg was given with great repugnance and only at the 
 last moment, the nation being deeply wounded at the 
 manner in which Venice returned to it, as a united 
 present from France Austria and. 
 
 So much is certain, — and it is all that now concerns 
 us, — that it was not the fundamental idea of the Prus- 
 sian campaign to stop short in Germany at the Main, 
 but that the difficulties on the line of the Mincio were 
 the cause of the difficulties on the line of the Main. 
 
 This view is confirmed by another important docu- 
 ment which must be spoken of here. It is known that 
 the whole revelation on the subject of Count Usedom's 
 note was brought about by circumstances in the Floren- 
 tine Chamber. A very minute and interesting account of 
 the campaign of 1866 had been published by the War-his- 
 
 Count Bismarck. ft 
 
— 170 — 
 
 tory Division of the Prussian staff. This work dealt 
 chiefly with questions of strategy, but touched on the 
 domain of political thought in a way more attractive 
 than could have been strictly required of a semi-military, 
 semi-official work. It also touched on the conduct of the 
 war south of the Alps; and thus gave rise to interpel- 
 lations in the Chamber which induced General La Mar- 
 mora to publish the hitherto secret note. 
 
 If the object of the present study were to chronicle 
 the collective events of 1866, we should feel induty 
 bound to follow the official account step by step through 
 its scattered political reflections. Instead of this, we 
 must confine ourselves to a cursory glance at the more 
 prominent points tending to elucidate our subject. 
 
 In regard to the Italian question, the official work 
 adopts the view just mentioned, as to the difficulties on 
 the line of the Mincio having caused those on the line 
 of the Main, — expressing itself indeed in the veiled 
 and considerate language due to an allied government 
 and a friendly and noble nation, but yet so clearly that 
 its meaning cannot escape the attentive reader ; so much 
 so that the chief offender felt himself wounded to the 
 quick. It throws no new light on the earliest stages of 
 the alliance; but starting from the period shortly before 
 the outbreak of hostilities, it holds to the dogma, set 
 up once for all, by the highest authorities, that Prussia 
 
— 171 — 
 
 had not made up her mind to war, and could not, there- 
 fore , till within a very few months of the actual out- 
 break, undertake the responsibility of inducing Italy to 
 arm; and fixes the time, at which both states pledged 
 their word to one another to make every sacrifice in 
 preparation for war, between the 26th and 30th of April, 
 1866, after Count Mensdorff had offered to disarm with 
 regard to Prussia, but had expressly refused to do so 
 with regard to Italy. 
 
 It must remain for later times to bring to light the 
 secret and no doubt interesting revelations of the earlier 
 negotiations between Florence and Berlin. These are 
 said by some to go back as far as the year 1863. At 
 any rate, however, by the month of August or September 
 1865, they had assumed a tangible form, although it is 
 to the present day a matter of dispute from which side 
 the first proposal came.* 
 
 Much more detailed is the Prussian account of the 
 relations with France, though not even here is mention 
 made of the secret conferences before the outbreak of the 
 war. Nevertheless we meet (page 14**) with this impor- 
 
 * The information contained in a recent publication: Les pre- 
 liminaires de Sadowa: Julian Klaczko, Revue des deux Mondes, 
 \bth Sept. 1868, cannot be accepted without certain reservations. 
 
 ** Der Feldzug von 1866 in Deutschland. Redigirt von der 
 kriegsgeschichtl. Abtheil, des grossen Generalstabs. Berlin. 1867. 
 
— 172 — 
 
 tant statement: "From France we might at any rate 
 expect friendly neutrality." If this expectation is founded 
 on the argument, that France had reason to wish for a 
 Prussia strengthened so as to be independent of Russia 
 and Austria, and for a German fleet which might ev- 
 entually be used in an alliance against England, the Prus- 
 sian staff would hardly have written this book, if they 
 had thought they should find only readers of such intel- 
 ligence that they would accept these considerations as suffi- 
 cient to warrant an exposure of the western frontier of the 
 empire. If, too, Prussian diplomacy had ever thought it 
 well to drop hints to France of this kind, there ought 
 now to be something better to rely upon than such da- 
 ring arithmetical problems; and this something will one 
 day come to light, not through the archives, which know 
 little on this point, but through personal memoirs, when 
 the time has come to give to the world the secrets of 
 the conferences of Plombieres and Biarritz. 
 
 A very frank and circumstantial account is given in 
 this work of the vigorous and decisive intervention of France, 
 when officially called in by Austria after the battle of 
 Königgrätz. It shows that France performed the chief 
 part of the work of reconciliation ; and that her attitude 
 was so serious that an ambassador of high rank, Prince 
 Reuss, was sent from the Prussian head-quarters at 
 Brunn to Paris with the documents of a previous nego- 
 
— 173 — 
 
 tiation which had come to nothing, as a certain justifi- 
 cation for the rejection of the Austrian proposals of the 
 14th of July. The reader must be referred for further 
 details to the work itself; its whole tone distinctly shows 
 that the Prussian government did not act hastily in ne- 
 gotiating at Nikolsburg and Prague ; but that it was to- 
 lerably well aware of the evils of the peace, and only 
 yielded at last from a desire to avoid war with France, 
 which the turn taken by the negotiations under Napo- 
 leon's auspices after the 4th of July, had rendered im- 
 minent. 
 
 On this point the "Campaign of 1866" expresses it- 
 self as follows: 
 
 "Thus the first preliminaries were accomplished. 
 
 "It was a serious and important decision which rested with 
 "his Majesty the King, — as grave as the decision of the war 
 "itself. 
 
 "Should the war be continued in the hope of still greater 
 "results? The army stood before Vienna. Presburg had very nearly 
 "been in the hands of the Prussian forces. The result of a second 
 "battle , if one were needed , might be looked forward to without 
 "anxiety, and Vienna might be entered without any very heavy 
 "sacrifice. The military conditions were, therefore, favourable at the 
 "moment, and from this point of view it was natural to wish to 
 "prosecute the war to the utmost, and to give full scope to the 
 "proved strength of the Prussian army. The enemy's capital — 
 "always the great aim of the first Napoleon — lay in tempting 
 "proximity; its towers were visible to our outposts. 
 
 "But there were several weighty considerations on the other 
 "side. Austria herself would not be forced to make peace after the 
 
— 174 — 
 
 "loss of Vienna; she might withdraw her forces to Hungary, and 
 "there await the result of the complications of European politics. 
 "Should no peace be founded on the basis proposed by the Emperor 
 "Napoleon, the interests, as well as the dignity, of France would 
 "be compromised. A great result was achieved. Would it be well, 
 "on the chance of gaining a greater result, to impose fresh sacri- 
 "fices and extreme exertions on the Prussian people, and perhaps 
 "endanger what had already been won? A wise policy makes what 
 "is necessary, not what is desirable, the standard of its aims. The 
 "development of German nationality, under the leadership of Prussia, 
 "was secured by the offered peace; and extended projects of con- 
 quest, such as are often ascribed to Prussia, were no part of the 
 "intentions of her government." 
 
 An impartial view would, however, be incomplete 
 without a mention in this place of the fact, that the line 
 of the Main, though not the ultimate aim of Prussia in 
 case of complete success, had very early been viewed by 
 her as a possible eventuality, and had for years frequently 
 appeared on the political horizon. Thus, while the first 
 dispositions for the advance upon Vienna date from the 
 19th of July, 1866, we find, as early as the 11th, a 
 plain indication that the line of the Main had already 
 become a very steady landmark to the victorious party. 
 On that day, Count Bismarck telegraphed from the head- 
 quarters of the great army of Bohemia to general Vogel 
 von Falckenstein , who at that time still held chief 
 command of the army in South -Western Germany, as 
 follows : 
 
 "Strategic occupation of the countries north of the 
 
— 175 - 
 
 'Main is now politically important with reference to future 
 "negotiations on the status quo."* 
 
 We may, therefore, look upon it as certain that as 
 early as the first stage of the negotiations with France 
 and Austria, Prussian diplomacy had viewed very favour- 
 ably the idea of stopping short at the Main. On the 
 other hand the question, whether the right of conquest 
 should be thoroughly carried out in the case of all the 
 states north of the Main, which had turned their arms 
 against Prussia, had not at that time been maturely 
 considered. On this question depended whether not only 
 the whole of Hanover but the whole of Saxony should 
 be incorporated in the Prussian monarchy. To judge by 
 all indications, it was the intention of the Prussian Ca- 
 binet to incorporate Saxony as well as Hanover, and a 
 great step would undoubtedly have been thereby made 
 towards the entire fusion of Germany into one state. 
 But such an increase of power to Prussia was calculated 
 to excite the most vigorous opposition of France; which 
 accordingly supported Austria on this point with readiness 
 and emphasis. 
 
 Although the King of Hanover had not failed in 
 good faith nor in sacrifices for the Austrian cause, yet 
 a number of reasons political, dynastic , and strategic, 
 weighed so strongly with the French and Austrian ne- 
 
 * "Campaign of 1866", page 614. 
 
— 176 — 
 
 gotiators in favour of Saxony, that Prussia was forced 
 to give up even the proposal to incorporate merely a 
 part of Saxony in exchange for a part of Hanover. North 
 of the Main, therefore, the right of conquest could only 
 be applied to Hanover, Electoral Hesse, and Nassau. 
 (The peculiar case of Frankfort which, strictly speaking, 
 had not joined in the war, is passed over in silence , no 
 doubt on account of inconvenient recollections as to the 
 conduct of General Manteuffel and his officers.) If this 
 was really the ground, on which the resolution to sup- 
 press these three sovereignties was based, Germany may 
 congratulate itself that the Duke, the Elector, and the 
 King, rejected the proposals of neutrality made at the 
 last moment by Prussia ; and so sealed their fate. It is, 
 of course, not to be expected that a more or less official 
 work like this "History of the Campaign of 1866", should 
 cut away the ground of legal theory, upon which the 
 Prussian Government had taken its stand before the war, 
 and should show that the events owed their origin to 
 national claims and desires. Yet here, as in all great 
 public statements put forward since the war, there was 
 felt to be an imperative necessity to seek for some justi- 
 fication in the eyes of Prussia, of Germany , and of the 
 world, which should be both higher and more decisive 
 than the pedantic and dubious exposition of written and 
 unwritten laws and traditions. 
 
— 177 — 
 
 And so, even in this book, the living truth comes 
 to its rights in the appeal to principles, which recognise 
 the claim of the German nation to freedom. It is true 
 that owing to this double attitude of mind towards the 
 spirit of the past , it frequently happens that the sounds do 
 not harmonise, and that the ear is tortured by harsh 
 discords. The very first page opens with a false harmony : 
 
 "The whole nation was, indeed, filled with an earnest longing 
 "after unity; but for this unity, neither would the princes sacrifice 
 "their rights, nor would the peoples, with their inborn separatism, 
 "sacrifice their peculiar institutions. Fifty years' experience had 
 "shown that unity would never be achieved merely by moral con- 
 quest. Force was needed, and that on the part of a German power." 
 
 The Prussian staff have published in a separate 
 volume the "Ordres de bataille" and the disposition of 
 the forces; but they have omitted to give a list of the 
 attempts at " moral conquest". It is quite allowable to 
 entertain the opinion (which we, however, think false), 
 that an attempt to achieve the end in view by means 
 of moral conquest, even if carried on steadily for fifty 
 years, would have failed (what becomes of the offer of 
 the Imperial crown in 1849?); but to appeal to a fifty 
 years' "experience" of such attempts, is an easier mode 
 of conducting an argument in non- military matters, than 
 can be permitted even to Staff Officers; and political 
 history is forced to enter a solemn protest against it. 
 
 The attempt at maintaining the two attitudes of 
 

 — 178 
 
 mind at the same time, has a peculiarly unfortunate effect 
 in the discussion of the Schleswig -Holstein question. 
 Whilst, on the one hand, we meet with the bold and 
 dignified admission, that it would have been pure folly, 
 when once this country had fallen to Germany, to have 
 given it back into the hands of a petty independent 
 prince, in order to sanctify the principle of small stateism, 
 and to declare the old husk of legitimacy more precious 
 than the possession and use of the important and long 
 desired German sea -board, by the only German State 
 worthy of the name; yet, on the other hand, pains are 
 taken to prove, that Prussia would not have moved 
 in the matter to the end of time, had it not been for 
 this or that insignificant violation by Austria of the 
 letter of the Treaty of Gastein. We can readily under- 
 stand that, so long as a game of political hide and seek 
 with Austria and the other powers was going on, 
 Prussian diplomacy should shelter itself behind succession- 
 parchments and the "putting down of demagogues"; but 
 it had only to look back to the time of the conflict and the 
 explanation given to the opposition, to see that it was erring 
 against its true interests in keeping up this tone longer than 
 was actually necessary. The partisanship for the Duke of 
 Augustenburg, on the plea of his divine right, or even on the 
 score of his pledges of a liberal policy, had always been a 
 very extraordinary line of conduct from a radical party. None 
 
— 179 — 
 
 but the federalist party, as it called itself, separatist in 
 tendency, and guiltless of statesmanship, which in 1859 
 had stupidly sided with Austria against Italy, could 
 seriously take up arms for the Duke against Germany. 
 To politicians of every other shade of opinion, the com- 
 plete incorporation of Schleswig -Holstein with Prussia 
 seemed, beyond question, the one thing possible. 
 
 The official account adopts this opinion; but imme- 
 diately spoils it by introducing the well known refrain 
 that the demagogue spirit in Schleswig -Holstein must 
 be put down; and finally adduces, as proof of the 
 violation of the Treaty by Austria the fact, that the 
 position of joint possessors was "deteriorated" by the 
 convening of the Estates of Holstein (11th of June, 1866). 
 
 But the spirit of any wide -spreading development 
 delights in such inconsistencies. To paradoxical prin- 
 ciples the Reformation owes its origin, England her free- 
 dom. Thus a vigorous and life-containing germ struggles 
 up through all the obstacles of the old and worn- 
 out world, and maintains through all its turnings a vic- 
 torious and upward direction. 
 
 In casting a glance over the men and the events 
 of recent history, we shall perceive that of the various 
 obstinate hindrances which modern development in Prus- 
 sia has to encounter, the military one is not the worst. 
 Quite independently of the principle of democracy and 
 

 — 180 — 
 
 citizenship, which to some extent lies at the very root 
 of an army, the spirit of war itself contains an element 
 of civilisation, as well as an element of barbarism, — espe- 
 cially since the discoveries of later times have made of 
 military tactics, partly a technical art, and partly a 
 physical science. An army grows stupid in a long peace, 
 as it grows brutal in a long war; whilst the necessarily 
 short wars of the present day avoid both dangers, and 
 are welcome to intelligence as demanding mechanical 
 ingenuity, and to public opinion as demanding men 
 and money. 
 
 Something of this kind is reflected in the "History 
 of the Campaign of 1866". The military spirit has this 
 time done the nation a service (whether the good on the 
 moral side might have been greater is another question); 
 and the more it boasts of it the better ; the more hope 
 is there that it will find in it a spur to future ennoble- 
 ment. But how different is the attitude of the priest- 
 hood towards progress ! Italies has nothing in common with 
 the culture of the time; no channel, through which it 
 might gain comprehension; no bond, which might give it 
 interest in the preservation of anything that belongs to 
 life. Here all is darkness and death. The deadliest 
 poison which still pervades the life-blood of the Prussian 
 State is priestly Lutheranism. The curse of the power, 
 which it exercises in the higher classes of society , may 
 
— 181 — 
 
 almost bear comparison with the curse of the dominion 
 of the Catholic priesthood, which weighs on the lower 
 classes in France. 
 
 It is at this point that all community ceases 
 between the great past and the present ; and those, who 
 now think themselves in some degree worthy and capable 
 of stepping into the inheritance of Frederick II, would 
 do well to remember that the Prussian monarchy at the 
 highest point of its power, made absolute freedom from 
 Protestant orthodoxy the very foundation-stone of its 
 throne. Here, if anywhere, we may recall the much- 
 used and much-abused maxim of Machiavelli, that prin- 
 cipalities and powers are maintained by the same means 
 that first brought them into existence. To accept the 
 military heritage of the great King, and to reject his 
 heritage of free thought, would be to prove ourselves blind 
 both to the past and the future, — would be to cling 
 to the form while we ignore the spirit of that monarchy 
 which was to inspire posterity. He who fights the 
 reign of soldierdom in Prussia may — especially in times 
 like these — often expose a weak side, for we are in no 
 position to defend ourselves with high-sounding maxims 
 against our opponents. But he who fights the reign of 
 Protestant priestdom has everything in his favour — no- 
 thing against him. It would not be worth the labour, 
 even if it were practicable, to elevate the nation to unity 
 
— 182 — 
 
 and strength, — to a higher form of external life, — at the 
 cost of taking away from it that aspiration after spiritual 
 freedom, to which it owes its best strength. 
 
 Nothing tends ^so greatly to divide Prussia and Ger- 
 many as the spirit of a haughty priesthood, which takes 
 no part in active life and progress. Were this priesthood 
 with all its accompaniments once banished from the coun- 
 cils and from the daily life and work of the community, 
 fresh streams of progress would come pouring through a 
 thousand new channels into the heart of the state. Hap- 
 pily in this case, the remedy and the evil lie close 
 together. For that which is most opposed to the in- 
 tellectual development of the age, is also that which 
 suffers daily the worst defeats at its hands. 
 
 The end. 
 
Germany, France, and the Revolution. 
 
 Germany shares the fate of Italy in being unable 
 either to consolidate her territory, or to develop her in- 
 ternal resources without violently offending against her 
 French neighbour's conditions of self-preservation — 
 conditions which may be real or fancied, but have 
 at any rate the sanction of tradition. The establishment 
 of the European balance of power was , as we have often 
 lately been reminded, essentially the work of France, and 
 the balance was so adjusted as to give her the pre- 
 ponderance. Every lessening of that preponderance there- 
 fore must, of course, seem to the French adherent of the 
 system like a threatened disturb ance of the equilibrium. 
 
 The idea, moreover, of regulating the progress of 
 the world, — and Europe at that time was the world — 
 as if it were a clock that could be made by means of 
 properly adjusted weights to go on for ever with one 
 even beat, entirely corresponds with the love of order 
 
— 184 — 
 
 and symmetry innate in the French. They value reason 
 and intellect so highly, that they imagine everything in 
 the world must be governed and arranged on some fixed 
 method. 
 
 In addition to this general habit of mind, we must 
 take into account the respect for established rights pe- 
 culiar to the French. There is, perhaps, no people in 
 the world, over whom established rights exercise such 
 authority as over this people, famed for their fickle, 
 changeable nature. This is most clearly seen in their 
 theory and practice of civil law. Whoever has grown 
 up with the principle, which we have adopted from the 
 Eoman law, that everyone may turn and move as he 
 pleases within the sphere of his own limbs , qui jure suo 
 utitur neminem Iceäit; whoever has once witnessed the 
 struggling and striving of any English or American society 
 full of self-reliance, finds it difficult, if indeed it be possible, 
 to submit to the restraints imposed in France on the 
 movements of the individual for the general protection, 
 — or, what is here equivalent, for the protection of in- 
 dividual established rights. 
 
 A comparison between the legislation of England, 
 Germany and France, in the matter of patents, would 
 throw considerable light on the varying degrees of boldness, 
 with which each of the three nations trusts its citizen 
 to the strength of his own muscles in the struggle for 
 
— 185 — 
 
 life. But the legislation of no country would have any- 
 thing to show so calculated to bring back the struggle 
 for life to Anti -Darwinian principles as the French law 
 on unfair rivalry (concurrence deloyale) dating from the 
 time of the July monarchy, and the jurisprudence which 
 has gradually in the course of years grown up on this 
 subject, through the decisions of the law courts. Cases 
 occur which make the hair of a foreigner stand on end. 
 A Paris baker had a woman in his service who 
 used to carry out the bread to his customers in the 
 mornings. After some years he discharged her, — no 
 matter for what reason, — and she went into the 
 service of another baker. In order to make herself use- 
 ful and valuable to the latter, she called upon those of 
 the former customers with whom she stood well, and 
 begged them for her sake to give their custom to her 
 new master, which many of them accordingly did. There- 
 upon, the first baker brought a suit against his rival, 
 on the ground that he had taken away customers who 
 had long dealt with him, and this, not because his bread 
 was less good than formerly, but because the bread 
 carrier had unduly influenced his clients. Observe, it 
 could not be asserted that the woman had left her patrons 
 in the dark about her change of place, otherwise she 
 would have made herself liable to punishment for fraud. 
 Nevertheless, the Court declared that the new baker had 
 
— 186 — 
 
 acted unfairly, and forbade him thenceforth to employ 
 his servant to serve the old customers of his rival. 
 
 With these views on matters of private as well as 
 public rights, — which however have their good and 
 useful side, — it was of course natural that an actual 
 alteration in the division of power on the continent should 
 be regarded by France as a violation of existing rights 
 and a serious threat to her own established possessions. 
 The strength displayed by Prussia, and yet more the 
 prospect of her future strength, had, in consequence of 
 the merely relative changes in the balance of power, 
 already filled the French with apprehension. How much 
 more exasperating, then, must have been the possibility 
 that the newly developed German monarchy might in 
 the end easily attain an unquestionable superiority. 
 Was not this precisely the moment to accuse Germany 
 of "disloyal competition" for the exercise of the decisive 
 influence on the continent? 
 
 And what French tribunal would not have considered 
 itself bound to pass sentence in conformity with the 
 enactment above referred to? 
 
 Had not the French Government, interpreting the law 
 of nations in a similar spirit, laid down the principle, 
 and carried it out sword in hand, that the rights of the 
 majority of the French people as Catholics gave them a 
 claim to dispose of the Roman territory? 
 
— 187 — 
 
 They were, therefore, not mere pretexts, which the 
 French brought forward, in support of their deeply rooted 
 idea of supremacy, but were honest reasons really believed 
 in, and intimately associated with all their notions of law, 
 even down to the civil law of meum and tuum. 
 
 The principle of nationality, which enjoys general 
 favour, ought certainly to have exercised a correcting 
 influence on this claim to interference. But from the 
 above -quoted example of the Roman question, it is plain 
 that the principle of nationality is thrust into the back- 
 ground, wherever it comes into collision with what the 
 French consider their established rights; and this would 
 be done more easily in our case, because of the com- 
 plication of our home affairs and the not unnatural 
 ignorance of foreign countries respecting them. 
 
 It is easy for us to talk contemptuously about the 
 ignorance of the French with regard to German politics ; 
 but how many Germans would stand an examination 
 in the parliamentary and municipal government of the 
 France of eighty years ago , or in the departments of 
 the modern empire? Are not the position and importance 
 of many French towns and districts, which in every 
 respect can claim precedence of a German residence or 
 German principality, unknown to the student at our uni- 
 versities? And if, further, we take into consideration 
 that we ourselves have not only long endured the humi- 
 
— 188 — 
 
 liating motley of distinctions between German and Ger- 
 man, but even still upon occasion willingly flaunt these 
 distinctions, we ought neither to be amused nor as- 
 tonished, if the great mass of the French people are 
 confured between Prussians and Germans, and Bavarians 
 and Austrians, and Hanoverians and Saxons, and asso- 
 ciate with these different names the idea of different 
 nationalities. When, moreover, these differences advance 
 their own cause, they will of course make the most of 
 them, availing themselves of German materials, of which 
 there are abundance at hand. 
 
 Accordingly, in the German question, it was much 
 easier to allay the scruples arising from the principle of 
 nationality, than it was in the Roman question. The 
 dynasties overthrown by Prussia might naturally be 
 regarded as European, and the attempts at union as 
 attempts at conquest. How can it excite surprise, that 
 the government and the great majority in France should 
 be inclined to push this view to its most extreme con- 
 sequences, when we know that they earnestly strove, as 
 they openly confessed, to get the Confederate States of 
 America recognised as independent belligerent powers; 
 and the Confederates could be far less justly regarded 
 as an independent nation than could the Southern Ger- 
 man States. (The French attitude towards the Slave 
 party affords one of the innumerable instances of ana- 
 
— 189 — 
 
 logy between the American and German struggle, an 
 analogy which extends even to the confusion of ideas 
 produced by the word "democratic"; and it thus helps 
 to complete the extremely curious freak of Nature, 
 in creating an inner affinity between two such out- 
 wardly distinct phenomena as American and German se- 
 paratism.) 
 
 If, therefore, the different names of the German 
 countries denoted different peoples, the Treaty of Prague 
 disturbed international relations, the maintenance of 
 which in their status quo France considered she had a 
 right to claim; and, as we know, the German opponents 
 of Prussia find it quite compatible with their logic to 
 lament to their fellow countrymen over the "Civil War", 
 while at the same time, they strengthen the impression 
 abroad, that Prussia is a foreign conqueror and an in- 
 truder in the eye of the European Areopagus. 
 
 It is almost hopeless to attempt to combat by means 
 of rational exposition, false doctrines fostering the vanity, 
 and intimately bound up with the real or imaginary in- 
 terests of the masses; but the attempt was made in the 
 preceding work in the hope of introducing, at any rate 
 into certain cultivated circles in France, a more unpre- 
 judiced judgment of the recent events in Germany. To 
 do this, it was necessary to correct the false impression 
 afloat, that the great event of 1866 was unlinked with 
 
— 190 — 
 
 any antecedents, and had started up suddenly in the 
 brain of an ambitious statesman. 
 
 But this was only one part, and the lesser part of 
 our task. He who would undertake to answer the ob- 
 jections urged on the French side must not overlook a 
 second point of view of quite a different nature to that 
 just mentioned, and in a certain sense more attractive 
 to the lovers of argument. In addition to the reasons, 
 derived from the law of nations, arguments founded on 
 the universal rights of man were vehemently and elo- 
 quently put forward , in the name of Freedom and Pro- 
 gress, against the new order of things in Germany. What 
 had just taken place, and, still more, what was con- 
 fidently expected to take place in the future, was to be 
 regarded not only as a transgression against the re- 
 cognised system of the States of Europe, but also as a 
 sin against the universal principles which govern the 
 upright and just of all nations, and — what was more 
 than all the rest together — a great danger for the pro- 
 gress of culture throughout Europe. 
 
 Now, that the present generation has eagerly ap- 
 plied itself to the science of history, and has gathered 
 thence a stock of illustrative ideas; now that there has 
 sprung up a philosophy and comparative physiology of 
 historical phenomena, which supply inexhaustible food for 
 speculative ingenuity, the theorists are in a position some- 
 
— 191 — 
 
 thing like that of medical students, who beginning to be 
 initiated in the terrible secrets of their art, imagine them- 
 selves going through in their own persons all the diseases 
 which they hear described from the professional chair. 
 We have our finger continually on the pulse of time, and 
 count the beats with wise, anxious looks to ascertain 
 whether there is not a dangerous fever there. At one 
 time, it is the decomposition of the blood in ancient 
 Greece, at another the congestion of the vital fluids in 
 Rome, at another the disorder of Poland, at another the 
 luxurious excess of the Directory, which is pronounced 
 to be the fatal seed of ruin to this and that people or 
 even to whole groups of races, and to have hurried them 
 irrevocably toward that vast grave in which past civili- 
 sations sleep the sleep of centuries. 
 
 A time ; which is continually tormenting itself with 
 such gloomy thoughts, could not want doctors who would 
 discover, in the stupendous events of 1866, new symptoms 
 of an alarming kind. Had not the French Emperor 
 himself undertaken the task of tracing the resemblance 
 between his own part, and that played by the Csesars, 
 thereby informing the world of his ominous mission ? for 
 the commencement of the decline of the Roman Empire 
 is generally dated from the fall of the Republic. And 
 now a catastrophe had occurred, the secret preparations 
 for which had undeniably a certain connection with the 
 
— 192 — 
 
 inner mysteries of the Cabinet of the Emperor, whilst 
 the sudden display of an irresistible military power 
 together with the simultaneous appeal to the necessity of 
 a decisive blow, seemed completely to justify those who 
 saw in Count Bismarck only a plagiarist of Buonapartism. 
 Prophets threatened us, and indeed still threaten us 
 with danger in its rudest form, in the shape of an inroad 
 on the part of the newly developed military power into 
 its neighbour's territory. The German war was alleged 
 to be , not so much the counter-part of the December 
 coup d'6tat, the triumph of internal reaction in favour of 
 personal despotism, as the reproduction of the 18th Bru- 
 maire, the imposition of a military yoke with the design 
 also of using the soldiery as an instrument to satisfy the 
 insatiable lust of conquest and of new territory. There 
 was no river, country or sea, the occupation of some 
 part of which was not represented as having already 
 entered into the adventurous plans of this newly revealed 
 and boundless ambition. Switzerland , because it was a 
 republic, and Holland, because of its seaboard, Alsace and 
 Lothringen, because they belonged to the ancient king- 
 dom, and Belgium of course, because it lay between the 
 others, had hardly time to make their wills; and to supply 
 the dramatic cravings of the great public, the theory 
 was elaborated, that two colossal states, armed to the 
 teeth as France and Germany were, could not by any 
 
— 193 — 
 
 possibility subsist in peace beside one another; that, 
 sotmer or later, in virtue of the decrees of an eternal 
 destiny, they must come into collision, and present to 
 the peoples of the earth the fearful spectacle of one of 
 those giant struggles for life or death, which it was for 
 a long time the custom gravely to prophecy as awaiting 
 Prussia and Great Britain on the plains of Asia: 
 
 "Now is the moment to unsheathe the sword: 
 Earth is not wide enough to hold us both!" 
 
 To would-be politicians, dreadful predictions of this 
 kind are always welcome. In the present instance, they 
 suited the feelings of innumerable Frenchmen all the 
 more, because their jealousy for their martial fame was 
 deeply wounded by Prussian successes, and, thanks to 
 their wonderful self-confidence, they were convinced that 
 the victors of Sadowa would not be able to resist those 
 of the Malakoff and of Solferino. All the essential ele- 
 ments of a duel were here present; and Frenchmen of 
 all classes to this moment pronounce as an axiom, that 
 the world will not obtain rest, until the question has 
 been decided by arms, which of the two nations is the 
 stronger. 
 
 Beside and above the strata of society which only 
 seek high - sounding formulas for their commonplace 
 feelings there exist the thinking minds who, though few 
 in number and small in immediate influence yet gradually 
 
 Count Bismarck. 9 
 
— 194 — 
 
 and imperceptibly change the current of public opinion. 
 Now, it was a considerable portion of this select culti- 
 vated class , which had fallen completely under the do- 
 minion of the idea, that it was the duty of everyone to 
 oppose to the utmost the turn things had taken in 
 Germany. Convinced for many years, that the restoration 
 of Napoleonism was leading their own country to de- 
 struction; and filled with ideas of ruin by the phenomena 
 passing before their eyes, they were of course fully pre- 
 pared to see in the occurrences on the other side of the 
 Ehine, the confirmation, extension, and continuation of 
 the deadly disease which had already attacked their 
 own countiy. They raised a warning voice, telling us to 
 turn away from brute force, — the delusion which had 
 been so fatal to their own people, — and not to let the 
 hitherto peace-loving Germany fall down before the blood- 
 reeking Moloch of war. In a mournful tone, they who, 
 in spite of their sense of superiority, had honestly 
 respected book -writing and music -loving Germany, sent 
 from the Seine across the Ehine their "Et tu Bnite". 
 
 This they could do with the more ease because they 
 had only to consider German affairs from a general point 
 of view, — only to regard them in their general human 
 relations. They neither knew nor cared to know what 
 particular kind of domestic evil we had to cure. Of 
 the phenemona presented by what was passing in Ger- 
 
— 195 — 
 
 many, they heeded only that side which interested them 
 by its likeness to their own ills, and were half -alarmed 
 and half-pleased at seeing us attacked by their own 
 disease , because of the necessity which it would entail 
 of our going onward with them towards a common death 
 or a common recovery. 
 
 The attacks from all sides therefore were concentrated 
 on this point; for this was especially neutral ground. 
 Here everyone was equally elevated above national pre- 
 judices: the Frenchman could not be suspected of jealousy, 
 nor the German of unpatriotic party feeling , when they 
 stood side by side against the innovators who were shaking 
 the sanctuary of Freedom and Culture to its very 
 foundations. Germany's literary opponents therefore, the 
 straightforward, the equivocal, the fanatical, the dis- 
 contented, — applied themselves with all the energy which 
 party — spirit could give to the task of spreading 
 simultaneously moral indignation and blind fear. Pro- 
 phecies of misfortune from the Seine were answered by 
 sounds of woe from the Neckar. Nothing was easier 
 than to produce historical analogies, the indispensable 
 aids to prognostications of ruin. Ever since human re- 
 collection the word " Revolution" had been used as a 
 symbol for all spontaneous movements on the Continent 
 of Europe; its use as a creed dates from the time of its 
 
 most powerful practical expression, that is from the 
 
 9* 
 
— 196 — 
 
 upheaval at the end of the last century. The theory 
 once started that Prussia had drawn the sword to put 
 down, first in Germany and then in the rest of Europe, 
 the principles and the heritage of the Revolution, it was 
 easy with a little imagination to carry out the idea in 
 all possible details. William the first was Frederick 
 William come to life again, surrounded by the resuscitated 
 ministers and generals of 1792. 
 
 It must be admitted that it was Count Bismarck 
 more than any one else who had given colour to this 
 theory. Not indeed because, twenty years before, when 
 in a subordinate position, he had preached a crusade against 
 the revolution, but because even quite recently he had 
 on many occasions not scrupled to adopt the language 
 used by the counter-revolutionary party. For although 
 he had long emancipated himself from this narrow 
 point of view, he had, in his reckless way often 
 chosen to use reactionary phrases when he anticipated 
 they would have a telling effect, or when he wished 
 to inspire confidence, and divert attention from his 
 real aims. 
 
 And there is abundant proof, that he was in bitter 
 earnest in these utterances. The long struggle from 
 1862 to 1866 had been everywhere understood only in 
 this sense; and with opinions already formed to accept 
 it, what could be more easily believed than the assertion 
 
— 197 — 
 
 that all had been clone with the single object in view 
 of strangling every effort at Freedom , and introducing a 
 system of military absolutism? Parenthetically this also 
 proved that the Prussian government could not regard 
 their work as more than half-done, nor secure, until the 
 last revolutionary forces in France had been extirpated 
 root and branch. It could not, indeed, well be suspected 
 that they regarded the Empire as a chief adversary, 
 as a government favourable to reform and even progress, 
 and therefore as a thorn in their side. But it is well 
 known that the revolutionists in France always feel them- 
 selves to be on the eve of a new outbreak. In this 
 certainty, upon which their whole life is based, it could 
 not but seem to them to be the first duty of self-preser- 
 vation to help betimes in suppressing the power, which 
 they were assured was continuing to arm only in order 
 that she might march in battle-array upon Paris, the 
 moment liberty was declared. 
 
 Finally, for those who were too far removed from the 
 influence of these arguments others were forthcoming. 
 They were shown (and the German allies of Revolutionary 
 Chauvinism with their turn for philosophy were specially 
 fitted for doing this) that even in the Empire there is 
 still enough left of the inheritance of the National Con- 
 vention, still enough of the democratic principle of equality 
 saved from the general bankruptcy of the "good" time 
 
— 198 — 
 
 to make out of even imperial France an object of abo- 
 mination to the overbearing and fanatical Junkers, into 
 whose hands modern Prussia had fallen. This array of 
 arguments, deduced from philosophy and history, succeeded 
 in drawing a great part of the liberal and influential voices 
 in France to join in the panic cry of, Hannibal ante portas ! 
 Of these voices none is so important and at- 
 tractive as that of Edgar Quinet who has long been 
 acquainted with the language, literature and life of 
 Germany. A decided liberal he has judged the French 
 Revolution from an entirely independent point of view. 
 In the same way, he has arrived at an independent 
 opinion on German events. Although his opposition 
 views lead him to insist on the dangerous results to 
 France of the German development of power, and at the 
 same time to drag the conservative element in the 
 German movement into the foreground — - a course which, 
 in his place, he is quite justified in adopting — yet, as 
 we shall see, he displays for what is real and vital in 
 the movement a largeness, justness, and appreciation such 
 as our German Catos have not an atom to boast of. He 
 published in the "Temps" in January 1867 two long 
 articles entitled " France and Germany" which deserve 
 to be preserved both for their attractiveness and for 
 the masterly way in which they treat the subject. 
 We can only quote here some of the more striking 
 
 t 
 
— ; 199 — 
 
 of the passages, which specially bear on the subject 
 in hand. 
 
 Quinet commences with a passage from a former 
 work, written in 1831, "Allemagne et Italie". His 
 prophetic words, pronounced thirty years before the 
 German war, deserve to be also prefixed here. They 
 are as follows: 
 
 "In Prussia, it happened that the former spirit of 
 indifference and political cosmopolitanism made way for 
 a sensitive and irascible spirit of nationality. Here the 
 national party first made its peace with the governing 
 powers. The Prussian Government indeed gives the 
 Germans that which at this day they most desire, 
 spontaneity, real life and a policy in which it takes the 
 initiative itself. It satisfies the desire for material power 
 and importance which has all at once laid hold of them. 
 
 The Prussian despotism is intelligent, active, enter- 
 prising; all it needs is a man who shall clearly see and 
 recognise that its star is in the ascendant. It is upheld 
 as much by knowledge as by ignorance. Between it and 
 the people there exists a tacit agreement to postpone 
 freedom, and unite in the common work of increasing 
 the inheritance of Frederick the Great. Moreover, the 
 Prussian despotism possesses an indisputable advantage 
 which would outweigh a thousand faults in having with 
 its own hands completed the humiliation of France and 
 
— 200 
 
 paid her back for the many years' disgrace of the Peace 
 of Westphalia; for it was Prussian despotism which at 
 Waterloo clipped the wings of the French eagle. 
 
 Unity ! That is the one deep pressing thought which 
 pervades this country in every direction. Religion, law, 
 commerce, liberty, despotism, everything that exists on 
 the other side of the Rhine is hurrying towards this 
 solution. 
 
 What is the ruling thought that at this moment 
 dwells under every roof? It is the idea of the unity of 
 the German Fatherland; the call for the abolition of the 
 artificial boundaries, which shut in people and pro- 
 duce, without any common bond, without any possible 
 trade. 
 
 This unity is not a sentimental feeling which any 
 day may destroy, but a necessary principle of development 
 in the civilisation of the North. 
 
 And we French who have such good ground for 
 knowing what power lies in ideas, have allowed ourselves to 
 fall asleep not imagining that these aspirations could ever 
 pass from a state of mere consciousness to volition, and from 
 volition to action, and would demand social and political 
 power. Now, however, these ideas instead of remaining 
 abstractions, rise up before our eyes like the genius of a 
 whole race ; and this race subordinates itself to a branch 
 of itself which is not more intelligent, but is more 
 
— 201 — 
 
 choleric, covetous, self-asserting and practical. It hands 
 over to this branch its ambition, its desires for reprisals 
 and extension of territory, its desires for skilful diplomacy, 
 for war, for fame and for power. Is it true then that 
 at this moment the North is about to forge itself an 
 implement out of Prussia? Yes, and if it were allowed 
 to have its own way, it would slowly and secretly drive 
 Prussia forward to a murderous attack upon the ancient 
 kingdom of the Franks. The German world now only 
 waits for an opportunity. And, once more, which is the 
 state that is appointed in the name of Germany to keep 
 a watch for this opportunity? It is the State which 
 carries the keys to our territory in its belt, and holds 
 the happiness of France chained in its dungeon". 
 
 Having with this quotation from the past proved 
 himself indisputably to be entitled to form a judgment 
 on present relations, Quinet proceeds: 
 
 "Relying on the same ideas, which everything has 
 confirmed, I am tempted to extend my speculations to 
 the present, and I ask first: what will this new power 
 grow to — a power which having sprung up but yester- 
 day already occupies all minds? In the first place, we 
 may consider it as certain that this German unity can 
 no longer be prevented by any power in the world. It 
 has taken its start with the force of a cannon ball. It 
 will not be held back either by newspaper articles or by 
 
— 202 — 
 
 diplomatic notes. It had wanted nothing but an oppor- 
 tunity to come into the world. The opportunity has been 
 given. For the future, the only question is as to its 
 growth, and this difficulty is as nothing compared to the 
 first. If any one asks why this tremendous unity, pre- 
 pared and preached so long in advance, needed so much 
 time to become realised, and what kept Prussia from 
 trying her fortune before, I should answer: that which 
 kept back the Prussian government so long, and took 
 away its inclination for a venture, which might have so 
 desirable an issue, was the apprehension lest it might 
 meet the Revolution somewhere on its path. One would 
 have thought that a weakening of the national conscience 
 could only be a cause of sadness to the philosopher. 
 But, in truth, this moral inanity was calculated, growing 
 as it did day by day, to pave the way for a great am- 
 bition. The Prussian government had the clear sense to 
 see that this moral weakness had caused a corresponding 
 mental weakness; that this was a priceless moment not 
 to be lost; that men's minds would belong to him who 
 first took possession of them; that the success of one 
 day would decide everything ; that the most hostile would 
 become the most servile as soon as they had felt cold 
 steel. Prussia marched and conquered. The public mind 
 immediately prostrated itself. The unity of Germany, 
 which could not be compassed by law and justice, was 
 
— 203 — 
 
 established by a war, which, at first detested, was, as 
 soon as it was successful, received with acclamations. 
 
 Be this as it may, the German 
 
 kingdom is founded. I can easily imagine that in some 
 respects, the result will be exactly opposed to that which 
 its founders had in view. They thought they were 
 serving the interests of a feudal aristocratic party. It will 
 not be a matter of surprise should the contrary prove to 
 be the case. No nationality has ever been developed 
 without a simultaneous development of industry ; and the 
 first consequences of the development of industry are to 
 repress and keep in check the aristocracy. Germany 
 will not be an exception to this hitherto universal rule. 
 The scattered parts of the Teutonic whole are approaching 
 and merging into one another; general wealth will in- 
 crease, the hereditary influence of the great families will 
 diminish. 
 
 The Junker party will have wounded itself with its 
 own weapons. Moreover, what can be the character of 
 a Prussian despotism imposed upon the German race? I 
 should be very much astonished if it succeeded in 
 uprooting the intellectual needs of this race, and prevented 
 
 them from thinking The Germans are not however 
 
 at the moment sacrificing freedom solely to temporal wel- 
 fare, or to gain, but to the idea of national greatness. Con- 
 vinced that the leadership of thought in Europe belongs 
 
— 204 — 
 
 to them, they consider it as long since proved that every- 
 thing intellectual emanates from them, science, art, poetry, 
 philosophy; that humanity is their pupil. What was 
 wanting to this intellectual sovereignty which they 
 imagined they possessed? Power. This they have now 
 achieved. In their eyes, it is not merely a question 
 of one kingdom more which has come into the world, 
 but a question of supplanting the Latin Catholic era by 
 a German era, the Latin races being henceforth thrust 
 
 into the background What changes will the creation 
 
 of a German Fatherland introduce into the world? It 
 will be difficult for the military spirit to absorb all power 
 to itself in Germany as it so easily does with Latin 
 races. The very suddenness of the victory of Sadowa 
 will prevent the growth of myths and legends in favour 
 of the conqueror. The blow was so like lightning in its 
 rapidity that it did not leave time for the heroes of the 
 war to impress themselves on the imagination of the 
 masses, and thus lay the foundation for their immortality. 
 Moreover, with the Germans, military fame does not 
 degenerate into superstition; for this reason, that it is 
 overshadowed by the fame of their reformers , poets, and 
 artists. Luther, Goethe, Schiller, Beethoven, will never 
 rank below Blücher. The brilliance of the uniform which 
 fascinates other people is on the German side of the 
 Rhine not the most alluring of attractions. I can there- 
 
— 205 — 
 
 fore well imagine a kingdom, which, although founded 
 by the needle gun, might yet not end in military despotism. 
 More difficult is the calculation as to what the over- 
 weening German pride will grow to, if nothing stands 
 in its way, and it conies to look down on the Latin 
 races from the heights of its newly -won victories, as 
 on so many dwarfs at the foot of a giant's castle. I 
 see then the danger of self-sufficiency for this giant. 
 Whither might it not lead him? When he touches the 
 Baltic and the Danube at the same time, what thoughts, 
 what ambition will not awake in him? Nor will he 
 escape delusion. So young and powerful, what a temp- 
 tation to measure himself against the would, and, stepping 
 forth from the land of dreams, to lay hands upon the 
 kingdoms lying within his reach ! With a belt of iron 
 extending from Holstein to the Tyrol, it would be difficult 
 to nourish only modest thoughts, and to renounce all 
 idea of stretching one's arm across the Rhine. Even if 
 moderation were to win the day, who would believe in 
 it? Will not France often and often awake from her 
 sleep, thinking she hears the step of her giant neighbour? 
 Or, supposing she were to fall asleep without taking pru- 
 dential measures, would not this be the sign of a deadly 
 relaxation? and what a temptation then for Germany to 
 take advantage of it! In all these cases, our danger 
 is equally great. Whether they exist only in the 
 
— 206 — 
 
 imagination, or in reality, matters little; the Present 
 seems to have bequeathed inevitable storms to the 
 Future". With these words, Quinet closes what he 
 calls the German point of view. He proceeds to look at 
 the subject from the French point of view. He describes 
 in his striking and yet gracefully flowing language, how 
 France allowed herself to be taken by surprise at the 
 great turn of Fate. He warns the reader against admitting 
 the idea that the new Germanic kingdom has stepped in 
 as a protection to the West against the East. Germany's 
 sympathies, he says, still incline towards Russia by 
 whose side she won at Leipzig; and she has not yet 
 lost her old enmity to France. No safety from the 
 danger with which this newly risen world threatens 
 France is conceivable, unless France recover her lost 
 freedom : 
 
 "Do you ask what the question turns on? That is 
 easily answered. The question turns on the advent of 
 a new world which is now revealing itself, and is deter- 
 mined to excel yon in all things. It is true the Prussian 
 liberals assure you to the contrary, and I am quite willing to 
 believe in their sincerity. They aver that these great masses 
 of men along the banks, and on the other side of the Rhine, 
 are set in motion only for your benefit, and that, merely 
 to watch over your slumbers, a million of German soldiers 
 stand ready for combat on your threshold, in a time of 
 
— 207 — 
 
 peace. These same liberals say you may sleep securely, 
 they will answer for the consequences — as if even the 
 present belonged to them! I would willingly accept 
 their warrant if they were masters at home. But are 
 they ? Have they created the situation ?.-.'.. Everything 
 has taken place without them, and in spite of them. 
 Who can say, that it will not be the same to-morrow 
 and the day after to-morrow ? They have been converted 
 to the party of the strongest, and they promise you the 
 favour of their influence with the destiny to which they 
 themselves submit. But if this same destiny should one 
 day require your fall, nothing would prevent their sub- 
 mitting to it with still more patience and philosophy". — 
 
 Any one who knows how firmly and with what strong 
 belief the French mind clings to maxims as soon as they 
 are accounted admirable and praiseworthy, and who knows 
 that this is the case with regard to the sacred traditions 
 of the Great Revolution will at once perceive that it 
 would be a grateful task to raise this cry of "Hannibal ante 
 portas". In their mode of thought and love of system, 
 the French of the present day show a decided resemblance 
 to their forefathers, whose Parliaments and learned 
 bodies punished with torture and the gallows the smallest 
 heresies, not only in religion but also in science. 
 
 At the time when the renaissance was at its height, 
 the learned printer Etienne Dolet was burnt on 
 
— 208 — 
 
 the Place Maubert, by order of the Paris parliament, 
 because he had translated five words of one of Plato's 
 Dialogues, — quite literally and correctly, it is true, 
 but not in the sense in which the theological faculty wished 
 them to be understood. And yet this, in itself incredible, 
 ground of condemnation was only a pretext to punish 
 the evil-doer for another crime, that of taking up a 
 position in the philological quarrel about the Ciceronian 
 literature (Scaliger, Erasmus etc.) opposed to the dominant 
 school. At the same time, the philosopher Pierre Ramus 
 was prosecuted on account of his assertion , that Aristotle 
 had not rightly defined logic; and a royal proclamation 
 was cried about the streets of Paris to the sound of a 
 drum, to the effect that said Ramus be declared, for 
 that statement, a daring, presumptuous, shameless, ignorant, 
 wicked and malicious liar. And the only fault which 
 was found with this sentence, was that it was too 
 lenient. A petition was presented to the King, Francis 
 the First begging that "with his approved love of the 
 sciences and his favourable dispositions towards its 
 teachers, he would have the grace to condemn this man 
 to the galleys". 
 
 It would seem as if something of the old jealous, 
 inflexible spirit, which in the Middle Ages gradually 
 evolved out of the newly discovered Aristotelian wisdom 
 the only saving scientific principles, especially in France, 
 
— 209 — 
 
 had attended the French Revolution in its political results. 
 The intellectual heritage of the great revolution had be- 
 come national property in France, and thereby sacred; 
 for "property is sacred". Accordingly, every deviation 
 that was introduced under the succeeding forms of 
 government, appeared to the faithful adherents of the 
 revolution like a step backward towards the pre-revolutionary 
 time, and only increased their fidelity and earnestness 
 of belief. 
 
 More recently, other causes had arisen to fan this 
 fiery conviction into flame. For years, people had been 
 in the habit of seeing the attacks upon the revolutionary 
 creed coming only from behind, i. e. from the side which 
 was more or less unfavourable to intellectual enlightenment 
 or political progress. Gradually, however, the enemy 
 had worked his way round to the front. A new school 
 had arisen in France, which, in the name of freedom, 
 severely criticised the authors of the reign of Terror 
 and their excesses; and not stopping there, had ventured 
 more or less to impugn the whole of the Revolution. The 
 ground taken by these critics was that, after the lapse 
 of eighty years, France found herself in the most mise- 
 rable situation, politically speaking, which the modern 
 world has ever witnessed, that therefore the event which 
 formed the turning-point of her recent history, could 
 have possessed no especial remedial power. Those who 
 
— 210 — 
 
 least opposed the reigning school of thought contented 
 themselves in their historical position with espousing 
 the side of the Girondists; showing in detail that the 
 unhappy course of the whole later development, from the 
 Directory to the Empire of to-day, was to be ascribed 
 solely to the defeat and extermination of the moderate 
 republicans. 
 
 In the ranks of the orthodox republicans who could 
 not possibly abandon so much of their cherished beliefs 
 and who — as is usually the way — take a kind of 
 pride in carrying their cause through thick and thin, such 
 reservation called forth great indignation. In a short 
 time, supported chiefly by the sympathies of the youth 
 of the universities, there grew r up a complete literature, 
 having for its object the glorification of sans-culottism 
 and its heroes. Thick volumes were written, one after 
 another, to glorify Klootz, St. Just, Robespierre, Marat, 
 and even Hebert; and Edgar Quinet's book against ter- 
 rorism (La Revolution) roused a storm of opposition. 
 
 Whilst the critics were disputing the merits of the 
 Revolution on its abstract side, the broader question in 
 dispute was agitating the general public ; and the already 
 inflamed minds became doubly inflamed at the idea that 
 the heritage of the revolution was threatened by the 
 resuscitated coalition. The opinions which here came into 
 play although not shared by those at the helm of the 
 
— 211 — 
 
 State are so widely spread, that even the highest au- 
 thorities cannot help paying at least outward homage to 
 them, and taking the opportunity of coquetting with them, 
 wherever, as in the domain of foreign politics, it can be 
 done without danger. 
 
 It was therefore an imperative duty , if the French 
 were to gain a clearer insight into German affairs, to 
 correct and modify the prejudiced, distrustful and hostile 
 conception abroad in France. This duty was doubly and 
 trebly imperative, because we had all more or less contri- 
 buted to create the impression which we now felt to be 
 offensive and hurtful to us; and because this impression 
 in the first instance had been energetically and eloquently 
 implanted in the French mind by the German opponents 
 of the modern Prussian policy. Where else had the 
 French got their notion of the exclusively anti-revolutionary 
 Junker tendencies of the Bismarck policy, if it was not 
 from Germany? Whether it was the fault of Count Bis- 
 marck himself, or the fault of an inevitable fate , that, 
 during a struggle of four years, Germany was unable to 
 see in his proceedings any object but that of helping on 
 the triumph of absolute monarchy and Junkerdom — no 
 matter what is the answer to this question, a question 
 we have endeavoured to solve in this work — so much 
 at any rate is certain: that for years the whole of 
 cultivated Germany had denounced the policy of Count 
 
— 212 — 
 
 Bismarck as thoroughly destructive, and had claimed the 
 moral support of the public opinion of Europe in com- 
 bating it. 
 
 The final outbreak of war with Austria, which for 
 Germany immediately became a turning-point for its 
 judgment on things past and present, seemed to the 
 foreign theorist precisely the most striking confirmation 
 of all the ill that had been told him of the Prussian 
 government. Now if ever, he thought, the moment had 
 come to fly to the help of the Germans; and it is well 
 known that invitations to do this were not wanting. 
 
 Under these circumstances , was it not a first duty 
 to make known our newly awakened doubts to those 
 countries, which we had misled, not only with our 
 suspicions, but even with our irrevocable sentence of 
 condemnation? Even those who might not love truth 
 enough to feel joy in confessing a long cherished error 
 could not but regard themselves as bound to work against 
 the wild propagation of views which were now exploded. 
 How much more then were they thus bound, when the 
 inflamed hate might become a devouring fire! 
 
 The solution of the question, whether the Prussian 
 undertaking was inspired by anything better than the 
 poor and evil desire to stifle freedom in Germany, and 
 in the rest of Europe was of no less importance to the 
 French than to us. For if Prussia was nothing — ab- 
 
— 213 — 
 
 solutely nothing — to the Germans, but the spirit of 
 darkness; to the French she was the personal enemy of 
 their revolution, whom to wage war with was a sa- 
 cred duty. 
 
 It was therefore incumbent on us, as soon as we 
 had ourselves arrived at this opinion, to prove to France 
 that the campaign of Prussia against Austria and her 
 allies was, neither in its deeper historical origin, nor in 
 its personal motives, a work of the Reaction — of the 
 Counter-Revolution, but that its visible consequences have 
 proved it to be precisely the reverse. This we could 
 prove to them only by explaining at the same time, how 
 it was that we had led them astray. 
 
 With the continual action and re-action going on 
 between French and German public opinion, a clear ex- 
 position of the subject is as necessary as it is useful 
 even to German minds. For, although French opinion of 
 Germany's attitude in this special case rests on German 
 authorities, these authorities in their turn obtained the 
 elements for their view from French sources. The an- 
 tithesis of revolution and counter-revolution had travelled 
 from France all round the world, and nothing of course 
 was so pre-eminently calculated to produce a vivid im- 
 pression on the French people as that which, having 
 originated with themselves, sounded as intelligible, as it 
 was agreeable to their ears. In like manner, it often 
 
— 214 — 
 
 happens that people in naive ignorance, imagine they 
 are understanding a foreign language, because the foreigner 
 speaks to them in their own language, only with a foreign 
 accent. — 
 
 If we look back a couple of generations we cannot 
 help a feeling of pity for the vegetating state of the 
 German Fatherland of that day. And yet, on closer exa- 
 mination, we shall find that half a century ago the active 
 minds of Germany imagined they were standing on the 
 eve of a general revolutionary rising. It is exactly fifty 
 years since Görres wrote his "Germany and the Revo- 
 lution", which concluded in a warning voice of thunder 
 to the Princes : Discite justitiam moniti, et non temnere 
 Divos! Nothing can be more instructive than a glance 
 at those pages, in which the coming of a merciless hurri- 
 cane is prophesied with the impetuous energy of a firm 
 conviction. 
 
 "The heart of the Nation" he says "has turned 
 "away from the Institution of the Diet which people 
 "used to look upon as only provisional*; nor has it the 
 "least desire for a mock Emperor without a Chamber . . 
 
 " What can all the diplomatic art in the 
 
 "world avail against the force of Nature which discloses 
 "itself in the peoples more and more every day? 
 
 This was in 1819! 
 
— 215 — 
 
 "Every thing is tending towards violence and a general 
 "overthrow. The cry resounds throughout the land : The 
 "sword of reason for all who dare to resist!"* 
 
 But this sentence of doom went forth upon a land 
 in a state of complete servitude ! Of the four and thirty 
 princes whom this voice of thunder marked out for con- 
 version or sacrifice, not a single one paid any heed; 
 every one of them descended in peace into the grave of 
 his fathers, mourned by his faithful subjects. Their sons 
 all sit tolerably secure still, and but little improved, on 
 their thrones and thronelets, — with the exception of 
 the few who have at last been swept from the face of 
 the German Earth, as some poor compensation for the 
 blood poured out on the fields of Bohemia. 
 
 And how often has not the day of vengeance been 
 announced since 1819 and those looked down upon with 
 angry contempt who would not believe in its dawning! 
 
 Between the time when the printer Dolet was burnt 
 on the Place Maubert, and the philosopher Ramus was 
 declared infamous — between the time of the St. Bar- 
 tholomew massacre and the dawn of the Revolution — 
 
 * It was the time of the murder of Kotzebue by Sand, and 
 of the attempt on the life of the Nassau minister of state, Ibell, by 
 another student, of the name of Löning. A mass of writings dis- 
 cussed the question of the threatened revolution. There even 
 appeared a pamphlet with the expressive title u Has Germany cause 
 to fear a Revolution" by J. Weitzel. Wiesbaden 1819. 
 
h 
 
 — 216 — 
 
 there are not more than two centuries. For the revo- 
 lution dates from the rising of the American colonies 
 against the mother country — the first time that a 
 great political rebellion was carried out, which, althoug 
 nominally based on a question of historical right, was 
 really based on a philosophical avowal of universal laws 
 of nature. But between this great turning point and the 
 present time there is another century. Truly, it is not 
 too much to suppose that the development of mankind 
 during this last period has gone on at double the rate 
 of the preceding period. Ought we not then to recognise 
 at last that the problems no longer stand on the same 
 ground, and are therefore no longer to be solved in the 
 same way as three generations back ? France has other 
 tasks before her than she had at the time when the 
 notables assembled ; and Germany has quite long enough 
 believed that she could rid herself of the middle -ages 
 as France got rid of the Bourbons. A thousand new 
 conditions and claims have since arisen to make the aim 
 of a revolution anything but simple — the first element 
 of success. Progress in Germany now depends upon the 
 rulers ceasing to regard the Revolution as a spectre which 
 threatens continually to rise from its grave, and the 
 ruled ceasing to regard it as a deliverer which any day 
 may give back to them. 
 
 As soon as Prussia had made up its mind to a 
 
— 217 — 
 
 policy which, be it from whatever motives, forced it to 
 sin against the literal letter of ancient rights and to 
 enter the free current of modern thought, it revealed 
 once more so much internal possibility of devoting 
 itself to higher tasks, that it became a duty to the 
 liberal party, seeing the utter wildness of German 
 as well as French attempts at remedy, to meet it 
 on their side with a corresponding absence of prejudice. 
 And if this attempt was justified for a moment, it is 
 more than ever necessary, now that the most difficult 
 part is accomplished, not to be led astray by those who 
 would willingly bring back everything into the track of 
 their favourite Routine, which pays so well and gives so 
 little trouble. 
 
 Even historical science has not remained free from 
 responsibility in the ruinous perpetuation of formulas 
 of strife. Under the pressure of momentary currents 
 of feeling, it threw itself with the injustice of hostile 
 bitterness into criticism of the Revolution. With the 
 philological critical talent for destruction with which 
 our German pundits are gifted, it was not difficult to 
 demolish, stone by stone, the whole temple erected to 
 the Revolution on German ground. The proceeding was 
 all the easier as it was simply necessary to destroy the 
 ideal views in general acceptation, by a resolution of 
 those views into their real elements. Each individual per- 
 
 Connt Bismarck. 10 
 
— 218 — 
 
 sonage, each individual motive was subjected to a mi- 
 croscopic inspection, was shown up in its poor and narrow 
 finiteness; and thus in the simplest and most perverted 
 way in the world, the meaning of a great event was 
 destroyed. 
 
 We have only to look at the criticism of the daily 
 press on the men of the present time and on passing 
 occurrences, to perceive how easy and at the same time 
 how false it is to apply this smallest of all measures 
 to great historical events. What, for example, is easier 
 than to represent the history of the German reformation 
 as the work of the lowest self interest on the part of a 
 Prince? But, in life, the whole is just as real as the 
 parts, the feelings as the intellect, the concrete as the 
 abstract; and no one will succeed in judging correctly 
 and justly of the things of this world, unless he is able 
 to take both sides into equal account. 
 
 The course taken by our young historical school of 
 renewing on paper the campaign of German legitimacy 
 against the French Eepubiic did not remain without re- 
 sult in France. Like causes produced like effects, and a 
 certain select circle in France, which derives its mental 
 nourishment from Germany, took a pleasure in carrying 
 the rejection of the Eevolution even further than had 
 been done in Germany. We meet, for example, with the 
 statement, that, looking at the question from the point 
 
— 219 — 
 
 of real progress, even the whole system of civil order 
 with its law of equal inheritance and free-trade is an 
 evil; that legitimate monarchy is the sole rational con- 
 stitution for a state; in short, that in order to advance 
 to true freedom, we must seek for the union of the fu- 
 ture with the past in the time before 1789.* 
 
 Just as the blind reactionary party had gone astray 
 with the idea that the whole revolution could and must 
 be destroyed root and branch, and the party of progress 
 with the idea that the whole Revolution must be repeated 
 literally, so the historical critics had allowed themselves 
 to be carried away by the example before them in the 
 field of practical politics. Fascinated by the grandeur of 
 the Titan-like vision, and transferring to the object looked 
 at, the fixity of their own gaze, they forgot that history 
 on which their eyes were dwelling , is not an unchanging 
 rock but an ever-flowing stream. It is therefore necessary 
 we should clearly comprehend that the great reform 
 which was made in human society in the last century is 
 neither to be utterly rejected nor to be repeated, but to 
 be carried on; that it continues to grow daily of itself; 
 that more or less every useful activity helps to advance 
 the Revolution, although in quite a different manner, and 
 
 * Vide Renairs Questions contemporaines and Philosophie de 
 l'histoire eontemporame. 
 
 10* 
 
— 220 — 
 
 with quite different results to what was expected by the 
 promulgators of the rights of man. 
 
 When we have once succeeded in distinguishing be- 
 tween the matter and the manner of the Eevolution , we 
 shall have effected a considerable step towards making 
 our course clear. But the tendency of the present training 
 of the world, which science is hardly able to counteract 
 is to convert every conviction into a dogma, from which 
 no iota may be taken away. Even the revolutionary ritual 
 is as firmly held to by the revolutionary priesthood as 
 the substance of their belief itself. Thus, it is reckoned 
 moral degeneracy to count upon reforming a given state 
 in a given position through any other means than the 
 rising of the masses. Woe to him who supposes that 
 he can accomplish his ends to-day by means of anything 
 that he once rejected ! This is as thorough dogmatism, 
 and that of the worst kind, as ever any Dominican was 
 guilty of. What would be thought of the opinion of a 
 man, who should make it a subject of moral reproach to 
 a physician, that he now treats with iodine and steel the 
 disease, which twenty years ago he endeavoured to cure 
 by bleeding, — and this too in the face of the fact that 
 not only the knowledge of diseases has advanced, not 
 only the character of the disease has become greatly 
 modified, but also that the patients died under the blood- 
 letting treatment of twenty years ago ! 
 
— 221 — 
 
 Principles are not invented but are deduced from the 
 needs and experiences of mankind. Nothing is therefore 
 so foolish as the warning not to undermine principles, not 
 to make known to the general mass the doubts which 
 rise in the minds of the few. Especially is it impossible 
 in a time like this, alive with movement, that new views 
 should be held only by an aristocratic few; every new 
 truth that assails an ancient tradition rapidly permeates 
 the whole of society. 
 
 Who, for example, will refuse to recognise that the 
 lessons of the year 1868 have had a revolutionizing 
 effect in Germany, on the generally received convictions 
 of the masses? At crises of this importance duty 
 to society consists in forwarding the evolution of prin- 
 ciples, and in hastening the transition from a state 
 of dim feeling and uneasy conscience to that of clear 
 knowledge. 
 
 This task rests with those who look below the sur- 
 face for what is vital and eternal, and seek to separate 
 it from what is accidental and perishable. These it is 
 who further progress, not those who pride themselves on 
 discovering what is fatal in events, and in placing mora- 
 lity and the popular conscience in contradiction to each 
 other. 
 
 It was with these views, that we undertook the pre- 
 ceding study, bearing specially in mind the French mode 
 
— 222 — 
 
 of thought. Circumstances offered extraordinary advan- 
 tages, both as regards the technical treatment and the 
 practical carrying-out of the subject. Instead of having 
 to depict events in their dry, impersonal character, the 
 author found himself in presence of a single, living, and 
 individual figure, which embodied the substance of the 
 events, and already represented them in the eyes of the 
 world. This figure was doubly alluring to one addressing 
 the French, a nation with a lively dramatic sense, that 
 has long been accustomed in memoir, romance, and play, 
 to take intense interest in psychological problems. 
 
 The surest way, then to ensure attention and 
 comprehension was, by combination and arrangement of 
 the personal materials, to succeed in finding the psycho- 
 logical key to an individuality which had exercised such 
 a predominant influence on events, that in the universal 
 judgment, it had stamped them with its personal character. 
 In the present case, public event and personal deed see- 
 med one, and the chief actor was so entirely a represen- 
 tative man in the fullest sense of the word, that the 
 altered world was regarded as entirely the work of the 
 man, while the man was not in any way considered as 
 the product of the altered world. 
 
 A critical study was therefore called upon to vindicate 
 the just share of power which circumstances had exercised 
 over the individual. 
 
— 223 — 
 
 The psychological problem could only be solved by 
 demonstrating that the individual had strength to move 
 the world, simply because he understood better than 
 others what lever to apply. And while this possibility 
 of personifying events afforded a most favourable oppor- 
 tunity, not on any account to be neglected, and was 
 especially adapted to French views, it happened that the 
 character of the individual seemed created to impress 
 this special nation. If, in history, the French chiefly care 
 for what is personal, in the personal, they care chiefly 
 for the diplomatic, that is, for the skilful, bold, and secret 
 management of state affairs. 
 
 Of all the refinements which had been imported 
 into the French court with the Italian culture of the 
 16th and 17th centuries, none had taken deeper root 
 than the love for the manipulation of home and foreign 
 politics. All the subtle poisons of the diplomatic art, 
 which dominion of priests, commercial spirit, gallantry, 
 and jealousy among the great, had distilled in the la- 
 boratories of Rome, Venice, Florence, and Genoa, were 
 re-brewed in the chambers of the Bourbons, and ex- 
 perimented with in all parts of the world, under the in- 
 fluence of a female dominion carried to the furthest 
 extreme. 
 
 * The character and language of modern European 
 policy may be considered as entirely of French origin. 
 
— 224 — 
 
 Talleyrand was in a certain sense a popular figure, for 
 a short time. The fascinating influence which Napoleon III. 
 exercised over the mass of the people till lately was to 
 be ascribed to the respect which they felt for his states- 
 manship and prudence. A political phenomenon like that 
 of Count Bismarck could not therefore but exercise an 
 ensnaring power over the French. Had he not won the 
 game, card by card, from their Emperor, who had long 
 been considered the cleverest player in the world? Not 
 even Cavour was so much admired in France as Bis- 
 marck. Cavour, though surpassed by no living man in 
 the refinements of statesmanship, yet worked with liberal 
 and national tools , which compelled him to a less zig- 
 zag course, and gave his policy a less markedly per- 
 sonal stamp. He could of course boast of larger sym- 
 pathy in France than the Prussian minister, but he never 
 attained the same degree of popularity; popularity, that 
 is, not in the sense of being a universal favourite, but 
 of perpetually rising to the surface in men's minds and 
 speech. The admiration, ironical and given under protest 
 though it be, with which the* name of^Bismarck is uttered 
 by great and small in France, is all the greater proof of 
 his popularity, because it bears the traces in itself of 
 their violent efforts not to give way to it. With all 
 their evident jealousy of our laurels, we may safely as- 
 sume that the political superiority of the diplomatist left 
 
— 225 — 
 
 a deeper impression on the French than all the victories 
 of the Prussian army. 
 
 At any rate, in both arts , that of war and that of 
 diplomacy, to which this people attaches such importance, 
 a master-piece had been accomplished before their eyes, 
 which extorted from them immense respect for their 
 German neighbours ; for these were departments in which 
 they had least expected rivalry. The French perceived 
 that they had to make our acquaintance in an entirely 
 new character; and nothing was more natural than that 
 they should feel called upon to point out the weak side 
 of the newly revealed qualities. 
 
 Their first discovery was, that in attaining these 
 worldly objects of ambition, we must have sacrificed 
 many of the ideal qualities for which we had once 
 been famous; — a necessary corollary to the as- 
 sertion that the German war of 1866 had been a large 
 nail driven into the coffin of European freedom and 
 culture. 
 
 Especially were we attacked about the loss of our 
 modesty; and those who for a hundred reasons of their 
 own wanted to bring about a war between the two na- 
 tions used denunciations of the contempt, with which the 
 Germans now looked down on the French, as a sharp 
 spur wherewith to prick their countrymen. To say pre- 
 cisely what esteem German nationality enjoys with the 
 
— 226 — 
 
 French is no easy matter. We were too long in their 
 eyes blockheads, tetes carrees, sauerkraut-eaters, the 
 regular butt in the farce , and the clown of the circus, 
 for this idea of us to be altogether swept away yet. The 
 class of Frenchmen who when travelling in Germany feel 
 half estranged, half angry, that every one does not under- 
 stand their language, and regard this as a sign of the 
 unpractical nature of the Germans, is not yet extinct; 
 but the increasing contact of the two nations on a thou- 
 sand points, and particularly on the field of science and 
 of literature, has greatly tended to alter this. The number 
 of those who consider us equals is proportionately smaller 
 than that of those who, roused to enthusiasm by German 
 learning and German industry, are ready, in a sort of ill- 
 will to their own nation, to give us the palm of superiority. 
 
 Since the French have become better acquainted with us, 
 they have begun to respect us more highly on many points ; 
 but at the same time they have begun to doubt those quiet 
 virtues which we had boasted of, and which they had accepted 
 on our word, — particularly our very equivocal modesty. 
 
 More than twenty years ago, a book appeared in 
 Paris, which was a good deal noticed at the time, entitled 
 — "Des Allemands, par un Frangais",* which showed 
 
 * Published by Amyot, 1846. M. du Fabry, the author, whose 
 name did not appear on the title-page, is now living, retired from 
 public life, in the country. 
 
— 227 — 
 
 a wonderfully exact acquaintance with our circumstances 
 and tendencies at that time, and was written by a French- 
 man who had evidently studied in Germany, and had 
 successfully striven to form an impartial opinion. In this 
 work, we meet frequently with the serions complaint that 
 the German looks down upon the Frenchman with con- 
 tempt; in the course of the last two years this view 
 has become very general with cultivated people. It is clear 
 from Quinet's article, already quoted, that since the time 
 of M. du Fabry's book, it has become quite a matter of 
 course to inveigh against German pride. In talking on 
 political matters with cultivated Frenchmen, a German 
 must be prepared for their revealing by their manner, 
 if not by their words , that they suspect him of looking 
 down upon them with a sort of silent compassion. 
 
 We have been so much accustomed to feel the reverse, 
 that the discovery that we are under the suspicion of 
 arrogance and injustice rather tickles our fancy. It seems 
 like compensation for long-endured ill-will, and it gives 
 us the impression, that we must have accomplished a 
 great deal before we could be represented, by those who 
 had despised us, for so many hundred years, as being 
 filled with a pride, not founded on the brilliance of our 
 success, but altogether vain and unwarranted. 
 
 The accusation is not wholly groundless ; and to give 
 apparent or real cause for it can only do harm to the 
 
— 228 — 
 
 German nation, both as regards its relations with its 
 neighbours and as regards itself. 
 
 A German writer* has well said: 
 
 "We may judge tolerably safely of any man's aesthetic, 
 "political, and, to a certain extent, even moral, cultivation 
 '•by the way in which he speaks about France. If his 
 "views are arrogant, unappreciative and contemptuous, 
 "he is at best coarse and ignorant; but if hate lurks in 
 "his speech, we shall do well to be on our guard 
 "against him". 
 
 If anything is capable of averting from us the 
 danger of a pernicious over-estimate of our strength and 
 our progress, it is the thought which is aroused by such 
 an attempt as the foregoing work. To give foreign nations 
 a just and clear understanding of the latest change in 
 German destinies, we must first make it evident that 
 this change is to be explained only by our hitherto in- 
 ordinately backward state. A comparison of what has 
 been accomplished with what has still to be accomplished 
 must convince us that many and difficult things still 
 remain to be done. Nor shall we be able to escape the 
 conviction that the end was attained by a road neither 
 known to, nor desired by, the majority and the better 
 part of the nation ; so that in most mouths any boast 
 
 * Karl Stahr. 
 
— 229 — 
 
 about the result would sound like "Priding one's self on 
 the heat of July" (Farsi bello del sole di Luglio) as the 
 Italian proverb says. 
 
 It is fortunate that the time has come, as come it 
 surely has, for us to apply to ourselves the warning ad- 
 vice addressed to our princes fifty years ago by old 
 Görres, in closing his book on Germany and the Re- 
 volution: "Learn justice, and fear of the Eternal Power, 
 "which chastises the haughty." 
 
 Wiesbaden, September 1868. 
 
Leipsic, printed by Hiithel & Legier. 
 
S a$" 
 
 
 
 
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