I VIV 
 
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 THE CONFLICT 
 
 
 OF THE EAST AND WEST 
 
 IN 
 
 H 
 
 GYPT 
 
 "DISSERT A. TIOK IN PART FULFILLMENT OF THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY 
 
 FOE THE ATTAINMENT OF THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY," IN 
 
 THE SCHOOL OF POLiTICAL SCIENCE, 
 
 COLUMBIA COLLEGE. 
 
 — BY 
 
 JOHN ELIOT BOWEN, B. A., Ph. B. 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 THE INDEPENDENT PRESS, 21 & 23 ROSE STREET. 
 
 1S3S. 
 
 W\ 
 
09 
 
 •p. 
 
 4> p5 Ov^i^v-c^n^xr'^-'t: 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 ^r/ 
 
 •Chapter. 
 
 I. Feobi Mehemet Ali to Ismail, 
 
 Page. 
 1 
 
 II. Ismail's Ambitious Designs, . . . . 15 
 
 III. The Eoad to Kuin, 23 
 
 IV. Mehemet Tewtik, Khedive, ..... 42 
 V. Egypt fok the Egyptians, ...... 54 
 
 VI. AsABi's Eebellion, and the Eefobms that Followed, 65 
 
 VII. The Sudan and the Mahdi, ..... 77 
 
 VIII. The Mission of Gordon. Operations in the Eastern 
 
 Sudan, ......... 86 
 
 IX. Gordon at Khartum and the Government in London, 91 
 
 X. "Wolseley's Expedition. Conclusion, .... 99 
 
THE 
 
 CONFLICT OF THE EAST AND WEST 
 
 IN 
 
 EGYPT. 
 
 CHAPTEE I. 
 
 From Mehemet Ali to Ismail. 
 
 It was not until tlie purchase of the Suez Canal shares by 
 Great Britain, in 1875, that the conflict to be described was waged 
 "with spirit. The influences and interests of the East and West, 
 however, had clashed for many years. Long before the dawn of 
 the nineteenth century the attention of England had been directed 
 through Egypt to the far-away Indian Empire, that El-Dorado 
 that lured the British merchantmen to brave the storms of the 
 southern seas. But the voyage 'round the Horn was a hazardous 
 one and a long one ; and the growth of commerce demanded that 
 the Eastern Empire should be made more accessible. England 
 knew, and the world knew, that the du'ect route to India lay 
 through the land of the ancient Pharaohs. England thought 
 the way through Egypt should be overland ; but France thought 
 it should be by a canal that would one day connect the Medi- 
 terranean and the Red Seas. 
 
 France was interested in the valley of the Nile. She had 
 put her foot there before England. The great Napoleon knew 
 the value of Egypt. " By seizing and holding Egypt," he said, 
 "I retain and command the destinies of the civilized world." 
 And so, in 1798, he seized Egypt ; but he did not hold it. The 
 English, under Abercrombie, compelled the French to retire by 
 the Battle of Alexandria, in 1801. And now, for a short time, the 
 
— 6 — 
 
 influence of England was felt in Egypt. But it did not last long ; 
 for, after the accession of Mehemet Ali, in 1805, Egypt was able 
 to stand by herself. This event marks the starting-point, from 
 which it will be necessary to trace in brief the history and de- 
 velopment of Egypt in order to appreciate the government and 
 condition of the country a decade ago, when England purchased 
 the canal shares. ■ 
 
 When the firman of the Sublime Porte made Mehemet Ali the 
 Governor of Egypt, in 1805, the country was in a state of feudal- 
 ism. The pacha appointed by the Porte had been only the nomi- 
 nal ruler, the real government of the country being in the hands 
 of the petty lords, or beys, known as the Memluks. They had 
 deference neither for pasha nor for Sultan. It is true that a 
 small tribute was promised the Porte every time a new pacha was 
 appointed; but it was almost never paid. The governors had been 
 m.any since the beginning of the century. "Indeed," says Mr. 
 Patton, in his history of the Egyptian Revolution, "all the pachas 
 that intervene between the French rule and that of Mehemet Ali 
 are a will-o'-the-wisp to the historian. A pacha of some sort 
 flies before the eyes ; but when we attempt to grasp him he is 
 gone. . . . Thus successively rose and fell Mehemet Khusuff 
 Pasha, Tahir Pasha, Ali Pasha Gezairli, and Khurshid Pasha. 
 Mehemet Ali alone stands out the distinct historical figure in the 
 foreground." * 
 
 The obscure Albanian owed his elevation to the pashalic to 
 his success, while a Turkish commander, in quelling the dissen- 
 sions among the Mamluk beys. Once at the head of the govern- 
 ment he set to work in earnest to deprive them of their power, 
 Isnowing full well that his position as the Sultan's pasha would be 
 at best both insignificant and insecure, so long as these feudal 
 lords played fast and loose with the resources of the land. Until 
 1811, therefore, Mehemet Ali devoted himself to the suj)pression 
 of the Memluks. Against this grasping for power England en- 
 tered a feeble protest ; not indeed because she sympathized with 
 Egyptian feudalism, but because she happened, at that time, to 
 fall out with the Porte, and desired, therefore, to help the Sultan's 
 enemies. She even sent troops to Egypt and took possession of 
 Alexandria. But the occupation was brief ; for Mehemet Ali de- 
 
 * Vol. II, p. 14. 
 
— 7 — 
 
 scended from Upper Egypt, where he had been administering 
 such correction to the Memluks as few absokite monarchs ever 
 dared employ, and, proclaiming himself the champion of Islamism, 
 he forced the infidels to retire to Sicily. It now remained for 
 the vigorous pasha to perform the two acts that consolidated his 
 power throughout the valley of the Nile : the first was the revo- 
 lutionary transfer to his own possession of the landed property of 
 the entire country, and the second was the total extinction of the 
 Memluks by massacre in the Citadel of Cairo. The period of 
 destruction was succeeded by one of development. The absolute 
 ruler introduced modern mihtary tactics and established a naval 
 -arsenal in Alexandria ; he built canals ; he introduced the culture 
 of cotton, a product that was destined one day to become the 
 source of enormous revenues; he imported, also, indigo, forest 
 trees, fruits, spices, etc., for reproduction; he founded medical 
 and educational institutions ; he improved the police and rendered 
 travel safe, so that now, for the first time, passengers and letters 
 bound for India were conveyed with perfect safety through Egypt 
 overland to Suez. 
 
 But Mehemet Ali was not content with these undertakings and 
 improvements, important and difficult as they were ; he longed 
 for greater power. He made war against the Wahabees of Arabia 
 and he conquered the peoples of the Sudan. And all the time he 
 chafed under his subjection to the Porte. Finally he sent his 
 warlike son, Ibrahim, to pick a quarrel in Syria; and Ibrahim 
 captured Aci'e and was soon fighting against the troops of his 
 father's suzerain and carrying all before him. It seemed as if 
 Mehemet AK was about to become the Sultan of Egypt and Syria. 
 
 This was in 1832, a time when England was keeping a very 
 watchful and a very jealous eye on Russia, ready at any moment 
 to claim a foothold in Turkey. England thought that Egypt, 
 being against Turkey, must be for Russia. From self-interest 
 England could not allow her " ancient ally " to remain be- 
 tween two such fires; this Syrian flame must be quenched. 
 England hesitated, however, to act, and in 1833 the Porte 
 recognized the feudal sovereignty of Mehemet Ali over Egypt, 
 Crete, Syria, and Adana, exacting only a small tribute. The 
 peace did not last long, and in 1839 the Turks were again flee- 
 ing before the victorious Ibrahim. It seemed as if Asia Minor 
 
— 8 — 
 
 and Constantinople must soon succumb to him. But now England 
 intervened with an energy that was wanting in 1832. Her fleet 
 joined those of Turkey and Austria off the coast of Syria, and with 
 British commanders on land and sea the troops of Ibrahim were 
 forced to yield. The hopes of Mehemet Ali were blasted. His 
 son had been overcome by England and he had been duped by 
 France. Thiers promised an assistance that was never rendered. 
 
 The war at an end, the Powers endeavored to negotiate a 
 treaty. After the usual diplomatic formalities and delays it was 
 finally agreed that Mehemet Ali should evacviate Syria, Arabia, 
 and Candia, and shotdd receive the hereditary government of 
 Egypt, acknowledging the Sultan as his suzerain. The terms of 
 this agreement were embodied in a firman issued by the Sublime 
 Porte in 1841. 
 
 Mehemet Ali was now an old man, and during the remainder of 
 his life the influences of his youth and early manhood, as is 
 usually the case with those who have witnessed and participated 
 in great governmental and social revolutions, predominated over 
 the progressive spirit of his most vigorous and potent years. He 
 became more of a despot than ever ; and his severity had few of its 
 former excuses. He did, however, permit an association of British 
 merchants to organize a transportation service to India, through 
 Egypt via Cairo and Suez, by means of which communication with 
 India was made in weeks instead of months.* 
 
 In 1847 Mehemfet All's intellect began to weaken, and within a 
 year his dotage had so increased that his son Ibrahim was installed 
 Pasha of Egypt in his place. But Ibrahim's rule was cut short by 
 death two months later, and in December of 1848 Abbas was in- 
 vested with the pashalic. In the summer of 1849 Mehemet Ali 
 died, spent in mind and body. A good idea of the character and 
 work of this " Napoleon of Egypt," as he has so often been called, 
 may be gathered from the following quotation from Mr. Patton's 
 history : 
 
 " Ttere is mucli to be said in abatement of his merits. Although superior to a thirst 
 for blood, from mere vengeance and resentment, and an easy pardoner of those who were 
 no longer able to injure him, no compunction ever deterred him from removing the 
 obstacles to his lawless ambition by fraud or force— most frequently by a compound of 
 both. Nor was he able, with all his perseverance, to conquer his aboriginal want 
 
 *"The Modern History and Condition of Egypt, from 1801 to 1846," by Wm. Holt 
 Yates, M.D. 
 
— 9 — 
 
 of education. Anxious to introduce European civilization into Egypt, he remained 
 to the end of his life in utter ignorance of the economical principles upon which 
 the prosperity of a state reposes. Greedy of the praise of Europeans, and, in the latter 
 part of his career, anxious to count for something in the balance of military pow- 
 er, his allusions on this head showed to himself and to others the wide interval that 
 separates the scientific organization of European military and political establishments 
 from the Egyptian imitations which cost him efforts so lengthened and persevering. But 
 altbiough unable to resist the dictation of any European power, he was— within Egypt— all- 
 potent in establishing an order that had never existed before, so as to afford those facili- 
 ties that have proved so valuable to the Indian transit. He found Egypt in anarchy ; 
 and long before he had terminated his career the journey from the Mediterranean to Nubia 
 was as secure as that from London to Liverpool. He learned to read, and attempted to 
 write, after he had attained his fortieth year ; and when we add that the practical result 
 of his efforts was to leave his family in the hereditary government of Egypt, Mehemet Ali 
 must be admitted to have been, without exception, the most remarkable character in the 
 modern history of the Ottoman Empire."* 
 
 Abbas Pasha succeeded Mehemet Ali. He preceded his uncle 
 Said; for, by the then existing law of succession, the reins of 
 government fell to the " eldest male of the blood of Mehemet Ali." 
 Abbas possessed neither the warlike impetuosity of his father 
 Ibrahim, nor the ambition of his grandfather Mehemet Ali. He 
 did not look beyond the bounds of Egypt for territory to acquire 
 or for customs to imitate. It was enough for him that he was a 
 good Mohammedan ; that the wheat and millet fields throughout 
 the valley of the Nile yielded their yearly increase ; that the fella- 
 hin prospered and paid their taxes without the application of 
 kurbash and bastinado, and that there was peace among the people 
 who acknowledged him their master. Though he did not court 
 the favor of foreigners, he allowed an English company to begin 
 the construction of a railway from Alexandria to Cairo, which was 
 to be continued across the desert to Suez. But he himself under- 
 took no great works, built no new canals, and did not even carry 
 out the schemes and plans of his predecessors. Abbas has been 
 called a bigot and a miser. He certainly was neither liberal in 
 mind nor lavish with money.f It is not surprising, therefore, that 
 
 *"A History of the Egyptian Revolution to the Death of Mehemet Ali," by A. A. 
 Patton, P. R. G. S., Vol. II., pp. IT and 18. 
 
 t Abbas has had few defenders. Henry C. Kay, in The Contemporary Review for March 
 1883, says of him : " It is not my purpose to attempt the impossible task of justifying every 
 act of his government. But, as a matter of justice and a fact of history, it ought to be 
 stated that he was probably, though without the advantage of European education, the 
 most aWe and the most eflScient administrator the country has seen since the death of 
 Mehemet Ali. He has met with the misfortune of having his reputation sacrificed for 
 political reasons. French mfluence was supreme and practically unchallenged throughout 
 the reign of Mehemet Ali. Abbas Pasha, on his accession, manifested a disposition to seek 
 some measure of support from England. He added an Englishman to the French officials 
 
— 10 — 
 
 at Ms death lie left a large sum of ready money in the Egyptian 
 treasury. Perhaps this was known by those who are said to have 
 strangled him. At all events the money and the Government 
 passed to Said in 1854. 
 
 Said Pasha was a very different man from his nephew Abbas. 
 Their tastes, their habits, their dispositions, their lives, and, con- 
 sequently, their governments were diametrically opposite. In fact 
 Said was everything that his predecessor was not. Sociable, witty, 
 extravagant, sensual, and fond of all the delights of life, he seemed 
 rather the gay French courtier than the imperturbable Moslem 
 ruler. He set up a coiu:t not unlike that of Louis XIY. He wel- 
 comed foreigners and entertained most lavishly. He forgot the 
 sobriety enjoined by the Prophet, so that his dinners and his 
 wines became famed for their richness and excellence. He accepted 
 the suggestions of his foreign parasites and hastened to adopt this 
 scheme or that scheme, according as the whim of the hour or the 
 persuasive agreeableness of the schemer might move him. 
 
 Among the foreigners attracted to Egypt at the beginning of 
 Said's reign was a man of larger and nobler purpose than these 
 grasping tricksters knew. Ferdinand de Lesseps had formed an 
 early friendship with Said while acting as diplomatic attache in 
 Egypt years before. At that time, also, he had conceived a plan 
 destined to revolutionize the commerce of the world. It was not 
 a new plan, however. The scheme of constructing a waterway 
 between the Mediterranean and Red Seas had been suggested to 
 all the great rulers of Egypt, the Pharaohs, the Persian, Greek, and 
 Eoman conquerors, and the Arab Caliphs. Also, according to re- 
 cent discoveries in the archives of Venice, it seems that the project 
 of cutting the Isthmus was considered by the mariners of the 
 fifteenth centviry.* A canal between the two seas via the river 
 Nile actually existed for an unknown period in the dynasties of 
 
 employed at his Foreign Office. He set about the construction, under the superintendence 
 of English engineers, of a railway destined to connect Alexandria with Suez, an undertak- 
 ing until then successfully opposed by France. He, moreover, placed his son under the 
 care of an English tutor. The consequences may easily be understood. But the curious 
 part of the matter is, that English writers, bj constant repetition, one after ttie other, have 
 done more to propagate erroneous views of Abbas Pasha's reign than those of any other 
 nation, the French probably included. It is not my object to defend Abbas Pasha's private 
 character, further than by adding that the generality of the stories told about him rest 
 upon no better foundation than the merest gossip." 
 
 * '» Discoveries and Inventions of the Nineteenth Century," p. 163, by Robert Eout- 
 ledge. 
 
— li- 
 the Pharaolis, and again for a period of more than four hundred 
 years under the Eomans, and lastly for a period of more than a 
 century after the Arab conquest. But Mehemet Ali, though he 
 had considered, had not favored the great canal scheme, and Fer- 
 dinand de Lesseps was obliged, therefore, to await a more oppor- 
 tune time for broaching his plan. He brooded over his idea of a 
 waterway while England secui'ed the construction of a railway. 
 
 With the accession, now, of his old friend Said, the cherished 
 hopes of de Lesseps were kindled to expectation. Nor was he 
 deceived in believing that the opportune time had arrived. He 
 went at once to Egypt and laid his plan before the Viceroy. It 
 was accepted by him on the fifteenth of November, 1854, with 
 these words : " I am convinced. I accept your plan. We will talk 
 about the means of its execution during the rest of the journey. 
 [They were taking a Nile trip together.] Consider the matter set- 
 tled. You may rely on me." * 
 
 The concession had no sooner been announced than English 
 influence was brought to bear against the canal scheme. Mr, 
 Bruce, the English Consul in Egypt, told the Viceroy that he was 
 acting too hastily in the matter. At Constantinople, Lord Strat- 
 ford de Redcliffe tlirew obstacles in the way of the scheme, while 
 in England the general attitude toward the canal was unfavorable, 
 and even hostile. In January, 1855, the London Times declared 
 against the proposed canal as an absolute impossibility. Lord 
 Palmerston opposed the scheme from first to last. He held that 
 the Porte must give its consent before the Viceroy could allow the 
 canal, forgetting that the English Government had told a former 
 Viceroy that he might construct a railway from Alexandria to 
 Suez without the consent of his suzerain. 
 
 In February the Sultan's Council was on the point of granting 
 the necessary permission, when Lord Stratford interposed his 
 influence to produce delay. His lordship urged that the railway 
 ought to be enough without any canal. He hinted to the Porte 
 that a canal might so increase the importance of Egypt that the 
 child would break with its parental authority. An influence, also, 
 was brought to bear upon the Viceroy, but probably not of so 
 intense a kind as de Lesseps imagined ; for he wrote at the time : 
 " He [the Viceroy] is even threatened with the displeasure of Eng- 
 
 . * " The Suez Canal," p. 13, by Ferdinand de Lesseps. 
 
— 12 — 
 
 land, whose fleets might attack him when the business on the 
 Black Sea is ended." 
 
 The whole matter had by this time assumed an international 
 importance, with France at the head of the nations who favored 
 the canal, and with England leading the opposition. Lord Clar- 
 endon, in communication with the French Government, said that 
 her Majesty foresaw inconvenience in leaving the matter to be 
 decided between the Sultan and his Viceroy. He submitted the 
 following objections to the scheme: 1st, the canal is physically 
 impossible ; 2d, the project would require a long time for com- 
 pletion; it would therefore retard the projected railway and in- 
 jure Indian interests ; 3d, her Majesty's Ministers consider the 
 scheme to be founded on an antagonistical policy on the part of 
 France toward Egypt. The same objections and arguments were 
 repeated by Lord Palmerston.* 
 
 All this time Said Pasha was harassed by doubts and fears ; 
 but at length, without receiving the authority of the Porte, and 
 disregarding the attitude of England, he signed the final con- 
 cession for the canal on January 5th, 1856. It is said that he 
 was influenced by the assurance that the canal would redound to 
 his immortal honor and glory. Be that as it may, it is, in a meas- 
 ure, a monument to the generosity of the good-natured Viceroy, 
 whose name, at least, is perpetuated by the port at the Mediter- 
 ranean terminus. 
 
 In 1858 de Lesseps launched his Cotnpagnie TTniverselle du 
 Canal Maritime de Suez, with a capital of £8,000,000. More 
 than half of this amotmt was subscribed for — the greater part 
 
 * The whole policy of opposition, as manifested by England, is thus humorously, but 
 faithfully summed up by Mr. D. Mackenzie Wallace, in his "Egypt and the Egyptian 
 Question": " The consular representative of England does not approve the scheme, and 
 warns his Highness against the insidious counsels of the plausible Frenchman. The cut- 
 ting of a canal maybe advantageous for humanity, or rather for that portion of humanity 
 which happens to have a commercial fleet and seaports on the northern shores of the 
 Mediterranean ; but it wouW be ruinous for Egypt, because it would entirely destroy th^ 
 lucrative transit trade, which might, on the contrary, be increased by continuing to Suez 
 the Alexandria-Cairo railway. Then his Highness must remember that Lord Palmerston 
 —terrible name in those days !— is opposed to the scheme, not from selfish motives, but be- 
 cause he fears that it is merely a first step to a French occupation, by which, of course, 
 his Highness would be the principal loser. Lastly, there is the little matter of physical 
 impossibility. The most competent English engineers— and his Highness is too well-in- 
 formed a man not to Ijnow that English engineers are much more practical and trustwor- 
 thy than French ones— have declared with one accord that the proposed canal, if ever 
 made, will remain merely a dry ditch." (p. 308.) 
 
— 13 — 
 
 "being taken in France — and in 1860 Said took up the remainder, 
 amounting to £3,500,000. De Lesseps began tlie work in the 
 spring of 1859, although the consent of the Porte was not given 
 until 1866. 
 
 The attitude (jf England toward the canal remained unfriendly. 
 When the engineering question had been settled, and the feasi- 
 bility of constructing the canal proved, the English began to 
 assert that it could not be made to pay. The policy of opposition 
 bas been kept up even to the present day. As the question of the 
 canal is to be dismissed now and to be taken up again only inci- 
 dentally, as in its financial bearings upon the relation of England 
 to Egypt, it may be well to notice how England has persisted in 
 what appears a jealous opposition toward the Compagnie JJniver- 
 selle. A single quotation will show how the London papers sought 
 to bring the canal into discredit at a time when its success was still 
 a matter of doubt: "The Peninsular and Oriental Company's 
 steamer 'Poonah,' with the Indian and China mails, which arrived 
 at Southampton yesterday, experienced, while in the Suez Canal, a 
 severe sandstorm, which commenced at sunrise and continued, 
 more or less furious, until Jive in the afternoon. During the 
 storm she laid [!] right across the canal powerless. Tons of sand 
 were thrown on the deck, and the masts and gear were covered 
 with a thick coating." * 
 
 Of late years the British ship owners have come to wish for a 
 canal of their own, and they are inclined to dispute the claim of 
 the Compagnie Universelle that it has the sole right to control 
 the canal question until the ninety-nine years of the concession 
 are up. The British Government, however, advised by the Lord 
 Chancellor and the Law Officers of the Crown, has been forced to 
 declare that the Company's claim is well grounded. It is to 
 England's credit that the opinions of such men as E.. T. 
 Reid, Q. C, M. P., prevailed. This honorable gentleman said: 
 " The claim of M. de Lesseps and his Company to equitable treat- 
 ment is well known, and is more creditable to him than to the 
 intelligence of our past rulers. The Suez Canal is the work of his 
 lifetime. He undertook it under circumstances of great discour- 
 agement. He completed it in spite of the disapproval of the 
 
 * Quoted from tlie London papers of May 1st, 1876, by Edward De Leon, in his "The 
 Kh6dive's Egypt," p. 36. 
 
— 14 — 
 
 British Government. And when it has proved an immense suc- 
 cess, and the navies of the vs^orld are reaping the benefit of his 
 speculation, we are invited to find a flaw in his title, to chop logic 
 as to the meaning of his concession, and to creep out of a difficulty 
 which is a mere matter of pounds, shillings, and pence, by refining 
 upon words in defiance of the intention. Such conduct would be 
 unworthy of the British Government. . . . The canal is of 
 enormous value to oiu- shipping interests. It has saved us mil- 
 lions upon millions of pounds by halving or nearly halving the 
 route to India, and greatly reducing the distance by water between 
 us and our entire Eastern dominions. It is admittedly of the 
 utmost political advantage to us with reference to India. This 
 vast profit, infinitely exceeding anything gained by the Canal Com- 
 pany, has been acquired without risk of any kind to the British 
 Government, and, indeed, has been forced upon us against our 
 will by the enterprise of M. de Lesseps. "When the Company who 
 bore the brunt of the outlay ask for an infinitesimal part of the 
 profit conferred upon England, and ask it in the form of dues 
 stipulated before the outlay was incurred, we are invited to beat 
 them down by the threat of a rival canal. This would not be 
 creditable in an individual. It would be wholly unworthy of a 
 great nation." * And so the great nation decided. 
 
 But to return to Said Pasha. Having described his relations 
 to the Suez Canal, it only remains to record that he died in 1863. 
 But, in passing, it must be noticed that a financial cloud, that was 
 destined to blacken the Egyptian sky, and to let loose its 
 bolts of distress and bankruptcy on the land of the Nile, was already 
 discernible on the horizon. Said had exhausted the surplus accu- 
 mulated by Abbas, and had left a debt of more than three millions 
 sterling. How this was doubled, quadrupled, and doubled again 
 under his successor the sequel will show. 
 
 * The Contemporary Review, August, 1883. 
 
— 15 — 
 
 CHAPTER II. 
 
 Ismail's Ambitious Designs. 
 
 Ismail, the son of Ibrahim, the son of Mehemet Ali, succeeded 
 Said. It is said that Abbas, long before, had been very jealous of 
 him. He must, at least, have disliked him heartily ; for the two 
 men had nothing in common, and everything that the one shunned 
 the other courted. While Abbas was ruling Egypt with a rigorous 
 economy, Ismail sought the more congenial atmosphere of Paris. 
 He obtained, in one capital and another, an intimate acquaintance 
 with the civilization of the "West, and stored his mind with all 
 those pictures of European development that, though the result 
 of centuries in Europe, he thought might be reproduced in Egypt 
 within his lifetime. Having secured thus " a European education,' ' 
 Ismail returned to Egypt, after the accession of Said, and received 
 from him a governmental portfolio. He seems to have had the 
 entire confidence of the Viceroy, for twice he acted as regent. He 
 commanded, also, the year before Said's death, an expedition to 
 the Sudan. On his accession in 1863, therefore, Ismail was a man 
 of experience — such experience as should have given him excep" 
 tional qualification for a ruler. But greater than all the wisdom 
 was the ambition that his observation had begotten. 
 
 It seemed as if Ismail's dreams of wealth and power were to be 
 realized immediately upon his accession. Our Civil War was to 
 furnish the means to this end. Europe had depended upon our 
 Southern States for her cotton, and when, by the war, the supply 
 was cut off, there followed throughout Europe what has been called 
 " a cotton famine." Especially in England the want threatened 
 to become & great distress. The factories were closing, and legis- 
 lators and economists were puzzled to find a way out of the danger. 
 The shrewd Ismai], at this juncture, was not slow to perceive that 
 the seed introduced into Egypt by his grandfather might bring 
 him the coveted wealth, and he bent his entire energies to the 
 production of cotton, borrowing money to buy the implements and 
 tools, to secure the proper irrigation, and planning for work on 
 a grander scale than the fellah at his chaduf had ever dreamed of. 
 Ismail's success was greater than he could have expected in his 
 most visionary moments. The soil of the Nile valley seemed ad- 
 
— 16 — 
 
 mirably suited to the new industry, and every yield was enormous. 
 The fellahin, the most conservative people under the sun, for- 
 sook their lentils, their millet, and their wheat, and hastened, in 
 their humble way, to acquire wealth after the manner of their lord 
 and ruler. And they prospered as their race never has been 
 known to prosper from the time when their remote ancestors were the 
 pyramid-builders of the Pharaohs down to the present day. It was 
 the Golden Age of modern Egypt. In three years the exports rose 
 from four and a half millions to more than thirteen millions ster- 
 ling. As is usually the case with those who enjoy unaccustomed 
 and unexpected affluence, neither the Viceroy, nor the great 
 pashas, nor the lowly fellahin, made wise use of their prosperity. 
 Their extraTagances increased with their wealth. The Viceroy 
 thought that the influx of gold would be permanent, and he spent 
 and wasted accordingly ; the pashas believed that the vast estates 
 that favoritism had bestowed upon them would continue to pro- 
 duce in luxuriance the white flower that was so easily convertible 
 into yellow gold, and they lived their voluptuous life of Parisian 
 and Oriental excess in their Daira palaces ; and the fellahin 
 thought not and cared not, so long as their burdens were light 
 and they could enjoy the sensual life that tiie Prophet Moham- 
 med allowed them. 
 
 They had all counted in vain. Our Civil War had come to an 
 end, and the Southern States were again supplying the markets of 
 Europe ; the nliturally fertile valley of the Nile, denied the neces- 
 sary rotation of crops or the chemical fertilizers that the agri- 
 cultural science of to-day substitutes, had been ruinously ex- 
 hausted ; and as a double consequence the Golden Age was ended. 
 All the extravagances reacted upon the fellahin. The Viceroy 
 could not or would not contract his expenses, and, of necessity, 
 he turned to the money-lenders and the task-masters. The latter 
 ground down the fellahin to a life that was nothing more than 
 existence. Exorbitant taxes were forced from them with the aid 
 of the kurbash, and their condition was more miserable than be- 
 fore their recent prosperity. At this time the cattle murrain made 
 its appearance in the Nile valley, and the loss was overwhelming, 
 and, of itself, sufficient to impoverish the people for a time. The 
 Egyptian Government, slow usually to give such assistance, was 
 obliged to expend five million pounds to aid the suffering fella- 
 
— 17 — 
 
 hin. But, to offset the gift and in lieu of unpaid taxes, the land 
 of the unfortunates was appropriated, not by the Government, 
 but by the Viceroy himself. In the years that followed he became 
 master, in this fraudulent manner, of one-fifth of the cultivable 
 land of Egypt. 
 
 As the condition of the fellahin grew worse, the extravagances 
 of Ismail seemed to increase. In 1866, at a time when he should 
 have economized to the last degree, not only to relieve his coun- 
 try but to pay his own debts, which were already of a threatening 
 size, Ismail, yielding, as ever, to his inordinate ambition, purchased 
 the title and rank of Khediv-el-misr (King of Egypt) from his 
 Sultan. The firman that granted these honors and raised the 
 limit of the Egyptian army from eighteen thousand to thirty thou- 
 sand men, cost Egypt the increase from three hundred and seven- 
 ty-six thousand to six hundred and seventy-five thousand pouilds 
 of yearly tribute to the Porte. From this time on the Khedive 
 Ismail, through the most prodigal use of money-bribes and pres- 
 ents, seciired a succession of firmans from the Porte. A firman of 
 1867 empowered him "to make laws for the internal government 
 of Egypt, and to conclude conventions with foreign Powers as to 
 customs duties and the police, postal and transit services. A fir- 
 man of 1872 conceded to the Khedive the power of contracting 
 loans without the Sultan's authorization " * — a power how used 
 and abused ! — and established the law of primogeniture in his 
 family. I A firman of 1873, "which Ismail obtained by bribery 
 
 * "England's Duty in Egypt." Rj Join Westlake, Q,C,, LL.D. The Contemporary 
 Review, December, 18S2. 
 
 t This part of ttie firman, as it reads, " establishes the line of succession by order of 
 primogeniture in Ismail's family— his eldest living brother, or this brother's eldest soli, 
 succeeding in case of failure of direct male issue, to the exclusion always of the female 
 line. In the case of the heir being a minor (i. e., under eighteen) on the Khedive's death, 
 he is at once to assume the vice-regal title under a council of regency. If, in his will, the 
 late Khedive have not nominated this council, the Ministers of the Interior, of War, of 
 Foreign Affairs, of Justice, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, the Inspector-General 
 of the Provinces, in power at his death, will form the council of regency, and will elect a 
 regent from theii- body. Should the votes be equally divided in favor of two names, the 
 regency falls to the minister holding the more important department, who will govern 
 with the council of his colleagues, when their powers have been confirmed at Constanti- 
 nople by an Imperial firman. The regent and the council of regency are immovable be- 
 fore the legal expiration of their powers, i. e., before the majority of the Khedive. Should 
 one of the council die, the survivors have power to elect a successor. Should the regent 
 die, the council will elect another from their body and a successor to the place he will 
 leave vacant in the council." (" Egypt Under Ismail Pasha," pp. 71, 72.) This law reads 
 well, and remains unchanged to-day. It did not provide, however, for such a forced abdi- 
 cation as occurred in 1879. 
 
— 18 — 
 
 at Constantinople on a more than ordinary scale, removed all limit 
 from the numbers of his army, and empowered him to conclude 
 conventions with foreign States concerning all internal and other 
 affairs of Egypt in which foreigners might be concerned."* So 
 much for Ismail's expensive relations with his suzerain. They 
 had brought him, it is true, a power such as Mehemet Ali had 
 dreamed of after the fall of Acre, but they had helped drag him 
 deeper into the meshes of a financial snare, from which he was 
 destined to escape, only with the loss of ail the powers he had in- 
 herited or so dearly purchased. 
 
 Ismail's extravagances at home were equally enormous. When 
 cotton was no longer recognized as king in the Nile valley, the 
 Khedive quickly proposed to substitute the culture of sugar. Not 
 only did he proceed to cultivate the cane, but he planned to man- 
 ufacture the sugar. For this purpose he built nineteen factories 
 and refineries, and imported the best of machinery from Europe. 
 This attempt to convert agricultural Egypt into a manufacturing 
 country must always be regarded as the crowning farce of Ismail's 
 reign. The country may be said to be absolutely v/ithout fuel ; 
 there are no coal mines, and the tax-paying trees are too few and 
 far too valuable to serve as fire-wood. With all his advanced 
 ideas, the Khedive seems not to have learned the first principles of 
 political economy. Besides the building of the factories, a rail- 
 road was required to make them accessible. This was constructed 
 from Cairo to Assiut at vast expense. Canals, also, were needed 
 for the proper irrigation; and they, of course, involved another 
 great outlay. But there was never any hesitancy on account of 
 expense ; and, the money being borrowed, the works were pushed 
 ahead. 
 
 It would not be right, however, to attribute all the debts of 
 Egypt, incurred during Ismail's reign, to his inordinate extrava- 
 gance. The cattle murrain, for example, cost the Government 
 and people dear, as has been seen, but not through any fault of 
 Ismail. In another matter the Khedive laid a heavy burden on 
 the Government, but at the same time he won, and deservedly, the 
 gratitude of his people and the applause of civilized nations. Said 
 Pasha had promised to furnish the Suez Canal Company with a 
 
 * "England's Duty in Egypt." By John Westlate, Q.C., LL.D. The Contemporary 
 Review, December, 1882. 
 
— 19 — 
 
 large amount of labor each year for the construction of the canal, 
 and this labor was to be provided by the corvee, a system of forced 
 service, in use as far back certainly as the age of the pyramid- 
 builders. It was almost disastrous to the agriculture of the 
 coimtry to have twenty thousand of the fellahin torn from their 
 homes each month and forced to work on the canal. Ismail recoar- 
 nized this fact and abolished the corvee. It is generally admitted, 
 also, that he was influenced by humanitarian motives. And well 
 he might have been! Oar own most dreadful tales of slavery 
 <}ould be paralleled with the sufferings and tortures of those 
 miserable mortals who were wrested from what little they had to 
 make them happy in the fertile valley to endure the privations 
 and almost certain death of that desert highway. Whatever the 
 motive here, Ismail must always be credited with having per- 
 formed a noble action. The Canal Company, deprived of the 
 promised assistance, naturally demurred. This and a few other 
 ■disputed questions were finally referred to the Emperor Napoleon 
 for arbitration, and he awarded the Company the somewhat exorbi- 
 tant indemnity of three million, three hundred and sixty thousand 
 pounds. This was in 1864. In 1866 Egypt re-purchased for the 
 «»um of four hundred thousand pounds a domain that had been 
 sold to the Canal Company five years before for seventy-four 
 thousand pounds. It was a modest advance ! Of course such 
 extraordinary expenses as these necessitated new loans. All the 
 loans that Ismail raised are themselves so extraordinary that their 
 details must be noticed as well as the methods that the Khedive 
 employed in his endeavors to bear the burden of his obliga 
 tions. 
 
 Before proceeding to the loans it will be well to form an idea 
 of the revenue of Egypt under Ismail. To do this it will be 
 necessary to consider the taxes somewhat in detail, although it is 
 impossible, as Mr. Cave and Goschen and Joubert found, to get 
 perfectly accurate and trustworthy statistics on the subject, owing 
 to the unsystematic and dishonest methods of a treasury system 
 that was nothing more nor less than a hierarchy of swindlers, in 
 which each officer got as much from the one belov^ him and gave 
 as little to the one above as was possible. What the amount of 
 the taxes was before Ismail's time, one can only guess ; but we 
 may be sure that they never varied much from the utmost that 
 
— 20 — 
 
 kurbash and extortion could raise.* The land-tax, immediately- 
 after his accession, was increased by twenty-five per cent. This 
 tax was again and again increased, until, in 1871, the famous 
 Mukabala f was invented. This was a voluntary additional tax of 
 fifty per cent, for six years, which, being paid, would free the land 
 of the one assuming the self-imposed obligation from half the 
 grain tax in perpetuity. The Mukabala was found to yield so 
 readily to the demands of the moment — and Ismail lived in the 
 present, borrowing no trouble from the thought of obligations to be 
 met in the future — that it was enforced in 1876, and the period, 
 at the end of which exemption should take place, was increased to 
 twelve years. No tax ever met with such bitter denunciation as 
 Mukabala did from its inception to the day of its abolition. It 
 was bad for the payer and bad for the payee. "A ruinous finan- 
 cial device," says Blanchard Jerrold, "seeing that for a sum of in 
 all less than twenty-seven million pounds, spread over a dozen 
 years, is thence afterward surrendered for all time nearly two 
 million five hundred thousand pounds of its [Egypt's] surest and 
 most easily collected revenue." % 
 
 In order to form an idea of what the yearly revenue of Egypt 
 was from 1870 to 1875, it is necessary to consult the reports that 
 were made after that time; for up to 1875 there had been no at- 
 tempt to estimate the revenue in detail. As the agricultui-al con- 
 ditions did not vary much from year to year, the revenue during 
 1877, for example, would be approximately equal to the revenue 
 during 1872 or 1873. This analogical reasoning is allowable, but 
 not very satisfactory ; for, unfortunately, even the official esti- 
 mates of Europeans appointed for the purpose are found to vary 
 greatly. The official estimate of Mr. Goschen, made in December, 
 
 * That the condition of the tax-payer had not changed much in three thousand years 
 may be gathered from a papyrus in the British Museum, contaming a par t of the correspond- 
 ence between Ameneman, the chief librarian of Rameses the Great, and the poet Pentaur. 
 Ameneman writes : " Have you ever represented to yourself, in imagination, the estate of 
 the rustic who tills the ground ? Before he has put the sickle to his crop, the locusts have 
 blasted part thereof; then come the rats and birds. If he is slack in housing his crops, the 
 thieves are on him. The horse dies of weariness as it drags the wain. The tax-collector 
 arrives ; his agents are armed with clubs ; he has Negroes with him who carry whips of 
 palm-branches. They all cry : ' Give us your grain ! ' and he has no way of avoiding their 
 extortionate demands. Kext, the wretch is caught, bound, and sent off to work, without 
 wage, at the canals ; his wife is taken and chained, his children are stripped and plun- 
 dered."— Quoted by Blanchard Jerrold, in " Egypt Under Ismail Pasha," p. 164. 
 
 t M'&kahala = compensation. 
 
 X " Egypt Under Ismail Pasha." 
 
— 21 — 
 
 1876, placed the year's revenue at £10,804,300. Mr. Cave's esti- 
 mate for the same year was a little over ten and a half millions. 
 Mr. Romaine gives the official revenue, month by month, for 1877, 
 reaching a total of £9,350,274 for the year. The Cairene Com- 
 mittee, in 1878, placed the total income of the Khedive's Govern- 
 ment at about eleven and a half millions ; but they considered this 
 estimate low, and thought that, if it had been possible to count all 
 revenues, the sum total would not have been less than thirteen 
 millions sterling. This may readily be believed, if we may trust, 
 approximately, the statement of Ismail Sadyk, the Miiffetish, or 
 " Lord High Treasurer" of the Khedive, and one of the most no- 
 torious rascals that ever plundered a state and people, that he had 
 raised by taxation in one year the sum of fifteen million pounds. 
 But some estimates varied as widely in the other direction, and 
 placed the revenue even as low as seven and a half millions. The 
 extremes are far apart. 
 
 It will be interesting to dissolve one of the total estimates into 
 its constituent parts ; and for this purpose we may take the report 
 of the Cairene Committee- They placed 
 
 The land tax at £7,346,219 
 
 Date palm tax 211,046 
 
 House, shop, and mill tax .... 28,195 
 
 Poll tax* . . . . . . . 630,204 
 
 Licenses and patents! . .... 793,253 
 
 Miscellaneous Taxes. 
 
 (1) Succession or transfer duties on legacies, 
 
 mortgages, etc 103,685 
 
 (2) Stamp tax (no statistics). 
 
 (3) Salt tax t 400,000 
 
 (4) Octroi and road duties on produce, fod- 
 
 der, and building materials § . . 328,872 
 
 * This tax was divided into three classes, viz.: 40, 30, and 15 piasters. The collectors, 
 however, were instructed to produce aa average of 30 piasters ($1.50) a head. 
 
 t These were imposed on all servants, operatives, tradesmen, and merchants. 
 
 t Nine piasters imposed on every man, woman, and child over seven years of age. 
 
 § This figure the committee considered small, since irregular Governmental expenses 
 were taken out of the octroi receipts, as, for example, the salaries of a corps de ballet ! 
 When, later, Egypt came under European control, the Comptroller General encountered 
 much opposition by his refusal to pay such salaries from such a fund. 
 
 2 
 
— 22 — 
 
 (5) Customs .... 
 
 
 639,000 
 
 (6) Navigation dues 
 
 . 
 
 110,185 
 
 (7) Duties on fisheries 
 
 . 
 
 83,548 
 
 (8) Law taxes 
 
 . 
 
 44,392 
 
 (9) Tobacco tax 
 
 . 
 
 106,777 
 
 (10) Tax on cattle sales. 
 
 . 
 
 45,402 
 
 (11) Sheep slaughtered for food. 
 
 . 
 
 14,769 
 
 (12) Animal tax 
 
 . 
 
 8,479 
 
 (13) Stamp tax on manufactured 
 
 goods. 
 
 18,000 
 
 (14) Payments of railways into Public Debt 
 
 Department 
 
 • 
 
 602,990 
 
 Total 
 
 . £11,470,016 * 
 
 From the foregoing notes and figures it will be seen that it is 
 almost impossible to exaggerate the extortionate character of tax- 
 ation in Egypt a decade ago. But it should be noticed in passing 
 that the land of the natives only was taxed ; by a monstrous in- 
 justice — an injustice that continues to the present day, though 
 there is just now a prospect of its being remedied! — ttie Euro- 
 pean property-holders have never paid so much as a brass far- 
 thing into the state treasury on the land they have held. 
 
 Whether, now, we place the yearly revenue at the lowest esti- 
 mate, seven millions sterling, or at the highest, thirteen millions, 
 or midway between the two, the fact always remains the same — 
 that Ismail was unable to live within his income. With the same 
 revenue Mehemet Ali would have made Egypt independent of 
 Tui'key, and himself the champion of all Islam. Even the gay Said 
 would have been at a loss for ways to squander such undreamed- 
 of means. Bat with Ismail it was different. As we have seen, he 
 could not forget the splendors of European Courts, or cease to 
 envy the civilization of western countries ; nor could he contract 
 the extravagances he had learned in the days when " cotton was 
 . king " in Egypt. If he could not live and flourish and build and 
 spend on the strength of his internal resources, he knew that 
 there were bankers and money lenders iu Europe who would con- 
 
 * Otliei' taxes, as on Are engiaes, ferries, jewelry, burials, marriages, tolls on bridges, 
 and exemption from military service, were not counted, owing to absence of trustworthy 
 statistics. 
 
 t Vide seq. 
 
— 23 — 
 
 sider the yearly overflow of the Nile the best of security. The 
 story of his transactions with these unbelievers forms the most 
 important chapter in the modern history of Egjpt ; but the story 
 is devoid of romance ; it is as bold and bald and true as the 
 working of a natural law. For the state, as for the individual, 
 when debts are contracted to pay other debts, when further sums 
 are borrowed to pay those, and when this system of discharging 
 obligations is continued, the end is ruin. In the case of Egypt, 
 the ever impending ruin has been long averted, owing as much — or 
 more — to the political importance of the country as to its inherent 
 wealth; but the burning question of that land to-day is the ques- 
 tion of finance ; for the debts that are due to the follies of Ismail 
 still stand, an unmanageable burden. And this is how the first 
 Khedive brought about the financial disastei*, and his own downfall. 
 
 CHAPTEE III. 
 
 The Road to Ruin. 
 
 It will be remembered that Said had left a debt of about three 
 millions sterling. To be exact, he had effected in 1862 a seven per 
 cent, loan in the European market of £3,292,800.* Of course he 
 
 * For facts and figures I depend chiefly upon J. C. McOoan's "Egypt As It Is,' 
 upon Mr. Cave's Report of 1S76, from which the follovv'ing concise table is taken : 
 
 and 
 
 LOAN OF 
 
 1862 
 1864 
 1866 
 
 1868 
 1873 
 
 Daira taken 
 over by the 
 State. 
 
 1866 
 1867 
 
 Daira Loan 
 of Ismail. 
 
 1870 
 
 1892 
 1879 
 1874 
 
 1898 
 190B 
 
 1881 
 1881 
 
 Nominal 
 amount of 
 Loan, but 
 Keal Debt 
 
 of State. 
 
 £, 
 
 3,292,800 
 5,704,200 
 3,000,000 
 
 11,890,000 
 32,000,000 
 
 55,887,000 
 
 3,000,000 
 2,080,000 
 
 7)142,860 
 
 Charge on 
 Nomn'l Am't, 
 
 pr c 
 
 7 
 7 
 7 
 
 Snk 
 Fnd 
 
 pre 
 
 1 
 8.87 
 
 3.27 
 3.4 
 
 7 2.35 9.35 
 
 Tot'l 
 
 perc 
 
 8 
 10.87 
 
 12.27 
 12.4 
 
 Amount 
 Realized, 
 
 4,864,063 
 2,640,000 
 
 7,193,334 
 
 20,740,077 
 
 35,437,474 
 
 3,000,000 
 
 2,080,000 
 
 5,080,000 
 
 5,000,000 
 
 KealCharges on 
 Am't Realized. 
 
 Int. 
 
 perc 
 
 8.2 
 
 11.56 
 10.8 
 
 Sink ,, 
 Fund 
 
 per c 
 
 4.5 
 
 18.9 
 
 1.6S 
 1.56 
 
 Total 
 
 perc 
 
 12.7 
 26.9 
 
 13.24 
 12.36 
 
 12.27 
 17.04 
 
 Remarks. 
 
 No particulars of 
 amount realized. 
 
 Railway Loan re- 
 paid by six annual 
 payments of £500,- 
 000, equivalent to a 
 Sinking F'nd of 18.9 
 per cent. 
 
 No particulars of 
 amounts realized, 
 but probably the 
 whole. 
 
— 24 — 
 
 did not receive this amount entire, for tlie commission rate of is- 
 sue, etc., reduced tlie sum paid into tlie Egyptian Treasury to 
 £2,500,000. But this loan did not prevent Said from leaving a 
 further legacy of liabilities, which necessitated a second loan 
 vs^ithin a year after his death. The amount of this one, which was 
 raised in England, was £5,704,200. It yielded to the Treasury 
 only £4,864,063. And still the indebtedness was not covered. Up 
 to this time the financial troubles had come through no fault of 
 Ismail's. But in 1866 he had begun to push the sugar industry; 
 •and, not having laid by any of the enormous revenues from cot- 
 ton, he was forced, in order to carry out his raih'oad scheme, to 
 contract a seven per cent, loan of £3,000,000, which netted him 
 £2,640,000. The cattle murrain, the abolition of the corvee, and 
 his extravagances called for another loan only two years later. 
 The nominal amount of this loan was £11,890,000; but heavier 
 terms had to be made ; for, though a seven per cent, stock, it was 
 issued at 75, and yielded, after the usual deductions, only £7,193,- 
 834. In other words, the total annual cost of this loan was more 
 than thirteen per cent. "The Khedive, by this time," as Mr. 
 McCoan remarks,* "was fairly on the road to ruin." But the na- 
 tional credit was still good, since the floating debt had been cov- 
 ered by this last loan. 
 
 Ismail seems not to have suspected the perils ahead. It was 
 his aim to make a civilized country even out of uncivilized mate- 
 rials, and to develop trade even where natural resoui'ces were 
 wanting, let the cost be what it might. It certainly was great ; 
 it was enormous. The outlay, even if the revenue of the coun- 
 try had permitted it, would have been foolish extravagance; but, 
 in view of Egypt's financial condition, it was nothing less than 
 reckless robbery. The fellahin — the people of EgyjDt — were the 
 sufferers. The kurbash exacted more extortionate payments than 
 ever ; bvit all to no purpose. By 1873 the floating liabilities, pay- 
 ing nearly fourteen per cent, interest, amounted to about £26,- 
 000,000. The Messrs. Oppenheim, who had secured the loan of 
 1868, now proposed to fund the entii'e mass of debts in a seven 
 per cent, loan of £32,000,000. This offer, disastrous in its results, 
 was accepted. The Egyptian Government received in cash only 
 £11,740,077, the remainder of the amount realized, £9,000,000, 
 
 *" Egypt As It Is," p. 142. 
 
— 25 — 
 
 "being paid in bonds of tlie floating debt, wliicli the contractors 
 bought up at a heavy discount and gave over to the Egyptian 
 Government at 93. There was, to say the least, a good deal of 
 Shylockism shown by the money-lenders of the "West in their 
 financial relations with Egypt. But if they were knavish, Ismail 
 was not altogether simple. Looking at the figures that tell the 
 story of "this wicked waste of a country's resources," as Mr. 
 McCoan calls it, we see that from loans amounting to £58,887,000, 
 the Egyptian Government received only £35,437,474. At the end 
 of 1875 the treasury had repaid £29,570,995 in interest and in 
 sinking fund. Was so mach money ever paid for so little gain "? 
 
 There were other loans than those above mentioned. The 
 Dau^a, the immense personal estate of the Khedive, afforded ex- 
 cellent security for supplementary loans. The first of these was 
 negotiated in 1866, its amount being £3,887,000. The follow- 
 ing year the Khedive compelled his uncle Halim to sell to him 
 his inherited estate ; and to pay for the property obtained by this 
 enforced sale, the so-called "Mustapha Pasha Loan'' of £2,080,- 
 000 was negotiated. Still another Daira loan of more than seven 
 millions sterling was raised in 1870 at seven per cent., the stock 
 being issued at 75. Only five million pounds was handed over to 
 the borrower. Thus the same story is told with the private as 
 with the public loans. 
 
 The question now was. How long could the ruinous rate of 
 interest be paid on these enormous debts'? Up to 1875 it was 
 regularly paid, and the credit of Egypt was good. But the crisis 
 was now near at hand. The stock of the great loan of 1873 was 
 quoted at 53 in the London market, and the Cairene Treasury 
 was almost empty. Even Ismail Sadyk, the Muffetish, with all 
 his tortures and threats, could not get piasters enough from the 
 fellaheen to meet the demands that were measured by hundreds 
 of thousands of pounds. And yet he was ordered to find money 
 to pay the December dividend. At this juncture the Khedive 
 appealed to England to rescue Egypt from ruin ; and produced, 
 as his last card, the 176,000 Suez Canal Shares, held by his Gov- 
 ernment. The Mviftetish was offering the same securities in 
 negotiations with the bankers of Paris and Alexandria, and with 
 the Credit Fonder of Prance, in his attempt to force upon them 
 new Treasury bonds for £16,000,000 at fifteen per cent, interest. 
 
— 26 — 
 
 After a series of advances and retreats on the part of tlie English 
 and the French Governments, Disraeli's Government finally tele- 
 graphed to the Khedive, in December, 1875, that England would 
 give four millions sterling for the shares in drafts on Rothschild. 
 The offer was eagerly accepted, and the crisis was tided over. 
 The shares of the '73 loan in London rose twenty points at a 
 jump, but after a few days they were quoted at 61, midway 
 between the points of utmost depression and inflation. England 
 was now given a more vital interest in the affairs of Egypt than 
 she had before possessed. She had gone thither, in the first 
 place, to further the demands of her commerce; she had then 
 maneuvered for the protection of the interests of the British 
 bondholders ; and now, in addition to these undertakings, she was 
 to guard the rights that this purchase gave her, and increase the 
 obligations that it heaped upon Egypt. 
 
 Four million pounds, as Ismail soon found, could not stem the 
 tide of disaster for long. Everything worth it had been mortgaged, 
 and the Muffetish was offering treasury bonds to the extent of 
 two hundred thousand and three hundred thousand and even four 
 hundred thousand pounds in return for cash advances of one hun- 
 dred thousand at twenty per cent. A few were taken, and with 
 heavy sales of Daira sugar and corn the demands were satisfied 
 for a time. The Khedive now invited England to investigate the 
 financial condition of his country, and Mr. Stephen Cave, M.P., 
 was sent out for this purpose. Nubar Pasha, the foremost of 
 Egyptian statesmen, was called to the Cabinet, and at the begin- 
 ning of 1876 everything had a reassuring aspect. But within 
 three months Nubar had resigned, and Disraeli, to the consterna- 
 tion of bondholders, had announced in Parliament that the Khe- 
 dive requested that Mr. Cave's report be not published for fear of 
 its effect upon Egyptian finances. But this request was disre- 
 garded. The effect of the report, however, was more favorable to 
 the Khedive than he expected, owing to the somewhat rose-colored 
 view Mr. Cave took of the financial outlook. " Egypt," he wrote, 
 " may be said to be in a transition state, and she suffers from the 
 defects of the system out of which she is passing as well as from 
 those of the system into which she is attempting to enter. She 
 suffers from the ignorance, dishonesty, waste, and extravagance of 
 he East, such as have brought her suzerain to the verge of rmn, 
 
— 27 — 
 
 and at the same time from the vast expense caused by hasty and 
 inconsiderate endeavor to adopt the civilization of the West." He 
 read the causes of Egyptian difficulty aright. But he was wrong 
 in estimating that the yearly revenue from 1876 to 1885 would be 
 more than double the cost of the administration. To meet the 
 necessities of the Government he proposed another unification of 
 all debts, exclusive of three of the earliest and smallest loans which 
 were to be paid off by the operation of the Mukabala. The con- 
 solidated debt, amounting to £75,000,000, was to bear interest at 
 seven per cent., and to be redeemable in 1926. The project, how- 
 ever, was not carried out. 
 
 The Khedive Ismail, in the meantime, had succeeded in getting 
 the greater part of his floating debt taken up in France. That the 
 holders had been duped was evident before the end of March 
 (1876), for there was no money in the Egyptian treasury to meet 
 the April dividends, and the Khedive was appealing for aid to the 
 English and French Governments. His overtures were flatly 
 refused by England ; but when France realized that the Credit 
 Fonder, the second flnancial institution of the land, was in a strait 
 in consequence of its relations with Egypt, a Cabinet Council was 
 summoned in Paris, and on the 31st of March the April dividend 
 was disjDatched to London. And again the impending disaster 
 was averted. 
 
 Mr. Cave's scheme for the unification of the debt fell through, 
 as above noticed, although coupled with certain measures of re- 
 form, which provided for a regular control of the revenue under 
 the administration of Europeans and natives, and for the establish- 
 mesnt of debt and audit officers. The cause of failure was that 
 nominations were left in the hands of the Khedive, who was him- 
 self controlled by the corrupt Muffetish, Ismail Sadyk. France 
 now proposed a financial scheme ; but this also failed of adoj)tion. 
 In November of '76, however, the English and the French bond- 
 holders united in sending to Egypt a joint commission, consisting 
 of Ml'. Goschen, M.P., and M. Joubert, to solve the financial prob- 
 lem. Theii' labor resulted in the Khedive's issuing a decree, Novem- 
 ber 18th, 1876, that remodeled the debt on the following basis : * 
 
 Title. Amount. Interest, etc. Security. 
 
 Dnified £59,000,000 £4,130,000 General Revenues. 
 
 Preference 17,000,000 886,000 Hallways, etc. 
 
 Daira 8,825,000 450,000 Khedive's Estates. 
 
 £84,825,000 £5,466,000 
 
 * The Contemporary Review, Oct., 18S2, " Egyptian Finance," by M. G. Mulliall. 
 
— 28 — 
 
 Tlie reforms of November 18tli secured a substantial power ta 
 European comptrollers, and the downfall of Ismail Sadyk, wbo 
 now disappeared from tbe face of the earth in the mysterious way 
 common to the Orient. He left an immense property, which in- 
 cluded three hundred women in his harem, two hundred and fifty 
 men-servants, £600,000 in money, and 30,000 feddansf of land. 
 The Mukabala, which would have been abolished if the unification 
 proposed in May had been accepted, was retained by the Messrs. 
 Goschen and Joubert in a slightly modified form. 
 
 Those who fancied that plain sailing was now in store for the 
 Khedive and the bond-holders were again doomed to disappoint- 
 ment. Within a few months it was apparent that the financial 
 state of afiairs was as bad as ever. The ordinary expenses were 
 augmented by a special tax of two shillings an acre to assist 
 Turkey in the war against Russia. Egypt, backed by England 
 and France, whose interest it was to have all revenues applied to 
 the public debt, for a time resisted the pecuniary demands of the 
 Porte, though she told the Turkish envoj'-s that she would forward 
 troops to the seat of war if the Porte would bear the expenses of 
 transport and maintenance. The new Egyptian Parliament, how- 
 ever, at last voted the special war tax and ten thousand troops 
 were sent at the expense of Egypt. 
 
 During 1877 the interest on the loans was raised by collecting- 
 the taxes with ail the old-time cruelty (Mr. Mulhall says " the 
 fellahin were basti«nadoed even more than before"; but that was 
 not possible) and as much as nine months in advance. This ruin- 
 ous system, of course, brought greater difficulties with each pay- 
 day ; and at the beginning of 1878 the outlook, to say the least, 
 was most doleful. It was at this time that the exiled Prince 
 Halim, the uncle of Ismail and the most enlightened, perhaps, of 
 the descent of Mehemet Ali, wrote a letter of advice to Ismail 
 from Constantinople. The letter, which bears the date of March 
 4th, 1878, is worth quoting, at least in part. He wrote : 
 
 "1. Place the financial administration of the country in the hands of Europeans 
 chosen by the interested Powers; such administration alone having the power to appoini 
 and dismiss all officials connected with the finance of the country. 
 
 " 2. Trie financial administration thus constituted, and all its dealings being carried 
 on in broad daylight, you must appoint a Special Inquiry Commission, chosen by the high 
 officials, to establish an equitable repartition of taxes, which are now arbitrarily distrib- 
 uted and levied. 
 
 t A feddan is about equal to an acre. 
 
— 29 — 
 
 " 3. All property belonging to tlie princes and princesses shall be made over to tie 
 State, so as to be used in payment of all debts. 
 
 " 4. The revenue of all the Dalras, the Khedive's and his family's, being thus devoted to 
 the paying off of public and private debts, the Civil List, the amount of which shall be 
 agreed upon by the interested Powers, will suppjrt the Khedive and his family. 
 
 "5. The reform tribunals, having over them a sovereign free from all personal inter- 
 ests, and by whose care all the judgments which they pronounce shall be carried out, will 
 be empowered, over and above their present jurisdiction, to try causes between natives, if 
 the latter shall so choose it." 
 
 These five articles, says Mr. Jerrold,* "became the ba- 
 sis on which the discussion of Egyptian affairs turned." 
 The first article of reform had already met with Ismail's appar- 
 ent approval, the state revenues having been placed in the hands 
 of two " Comptrollers- General", one English, and the other French. 
 They were appointed for five years, with almost unlimited powers 
 in the domain of finance. But the step was taken reluctantly ; 
 for the Khedive realized that, to quote the words of Mr. Justin 
 McCarthy,! " when a country has once accepted an investigation 
 of its finances by foreign powers, and given the practical control 
 of its treasury into the hands of foreign representatives, its claim 
 to independence can hardly fail to be regarded as signally dimin- 
 ished." Still more reluctantly, we may well believe, did the Khe- 
 dive yield to the demand of the commission to hand over his vast 
 private estates to meet the Daira coupons. But he had been 
 forced into both of these actions by the troubles of 1877. Early 
 in 1878, the Khedive made a bold effort to secure foreign favor, 
 and quiet the discontent among the money-lenders of Alexandria. 
 The Egyptian Government had announced, in 1877, that it could 
 not pay the existing high rate of interest on the public debt : but 
 before the bond-holders would consent to any reduction, they de- 
 manded the appointment of a Commission to examine into the re- 
 ceipts and expenses of the Government. The Khedive, in Janu- 
 ary, 1878, allowed an investigation of receipts ; but would permit 
 no examination of expenditures. Two months later, however, he 
 issued the following decree : 
 
 " We, Khedive of Egypt— with respect to our decree of the 27th cf January, 18Y8, in- 
 stituting a superior Commission of Inquiry, considering that it is the duty of that Commis- 
 sion to prepare and submit for our sanction regulations to secure the regular working of 
 the public services, and to give a just satisfaction to the interests of the country, and to the 
 public creditors— have decreed and do decree : 
 
 * " Egypt Under Ismail Pacha," p. 256. 
 
 t " England Under Gladstone," Chap. XIII. 
 
— 30 — 
 
 " Article 1. The widest powers are given to the Commission we establish. 
 
 "Art. 2. The investigation of the Commission of Inquiry will embrace all the ele- 
 ments of the financial situation, always respecting the legitimate rights of the Government. 
 
 " Art. 3. The ministers and officials of our Government will be bound to furnish di- 
 rectly to the Commission, at its request and without delay, all information required from 
 them. 
 
 "Art. 4. There are named as members of the superior Commission of Inquiry: 
 Pi'esident, M. Ferdinand de Lesseps; Vice-President, Mr. Rivers Wilson ; Vice-President, 
 his Excellency, Riaz Pasha ; M. Baravelli ; Mr. Baring ; M. de Blignieres ; M. de Kremer. 
 
 "Art. 5. A credit necessary for the expenses of the Commission will be opened on 
 the budget of 1878, in accordance with the report which the President will present us. 
 
 " Cairo, March 30th, 18T8. Ismail." 
 
 On the 20tli of August, Mr. Elvers Wilson presented the re- 
 port of the Commission of Inquiry. The report considered first 
 the system of accounts employed by the Egyptian Government. 
 It then explained the system of taxation, and discussed the corvee. 
 the military conscription, and the water laws. The second part 
 of the report was taken up with the estimate of the non- con- 
 solidated liabilities. The amount of floating debt to be settled 
 was found to be £6,276,000. The gross expenditure for 1878 was 
 estimated at £10,405,665, and the gross receipts at £7,819,000. 
 Adding the difference between receipts and expenditures, £2.586,- 
 665, to the amount of floating debt, the total deficit for 1878 
 would appear to be £8,862,665 ; but this sum was reduced to a 
 little more than six millions sterling by deductions for security 
 against partially guaranteed debts, and for amounts nominally due 
 to the Dairas, but before that time surrendered. There was im- 
 mediate need, th^erefore, for about six millions. The report closed 
 with the following suggestions of reform : 
 
 " That no taxes shall be imposed or gathered without a law, authoriz-ng them, being 
 promulgated ; that future legislation may extend the taxation to foreigners ; that there 
 shall be an efficient control over tax-collectors ; that there shall be a reserve fund to pro- 
 vide against the contingency of a bad rising of the Nile ; that there shall be a special juris- 
 diction for complamts on the subject of the collection and assessment of taxes for the 
 special protection of the natives ; that existing vexatious taxes shall be aboJished except 
 for works of public utility ; that the obligation to military service shall be placed under re- 
 strictions ; and that all the immovable property of the different Dairas shall toe independ- 
 ently managed by a special administration for the benefit of the creditors both of the state 
 and the Dairas." 
 
 These were excellent recommendations, though there was some- 
 thing very naive in the suggestion that " there shall be a reserve 
 fund to provide against the contingency of a bad rising of the 
 Nile." It would have been as easy to resolve that, if the river 
 failed to rise, copious rains should fall; for reserve funds are as 
 rare in Egypt as rain-storms in the desert. Not the least good of 
 
— 31 — 
 
 the recommendations was that providmg that foreigners should 
 be taxed; a measure that the "Westerners have always been shame- 
 fully slow to encourage. The reforms contained also a plan for 
 the cadastral survey of Egypt, which was recognized in England, 
 in France, and in Egypt, as just to the fellahiu and as the 
 treasury's only safeguard against fraud and corruption. The 
 Khedive accepted the report on August 23d in a speech express- 
 ing entire approval of the work of the Commission, appreciation 
 of their services, and determination to carry out the reforms. To 
 show how thoroughly in earnest he was, so he said, he had recalled 
 Nubar Pasha from exile and would entrust him with the formation 
 of a new ministry. The new ministry was composed of the fol- 
 lowing persons : Nubar Pasha, President of the Council, Minister 
 •of Foreign Affairs and of Justice ; Riaz Pasha, Minister of Interi- 
 or ; Ratif Pasha, Minister of War ; Ali Mubarek Pasha, Minister of 
 Public Instruction, Agriculture and Pablic Works. The portfolio 
 of Finance was left vacant, but it was soon offered to Mr. Rivers 
 Wilson, who accepted the ofS.ce with the consent of the British 
 Government. This excited the jealousy of France, to appease 
 which the comparatively unimportant office of Public Works was 
 offered to M. de Blignieres. Italy thea put in the claim that she 
 should be consulted in Egyptian affairs; but her voice was ig- 
 nored. 
 
 Before any active steps had been taken toward inaugurating 
 the proposed reforms, Mr. Wilson urged the necessity of another 
 loan to meet immediate demands, and this, although the total 
 debt already amounted to ninety-two millions sterling. But he 
 had no choice in the matter; the loan was imperative. The only 
 unmortgaged property on which a loan could be raised consisted 
 of the Daira estates belonging to the Khedive's family. These, 
 now, with a rent-roll of £430,000 a year, were handed over to the 
 State, in consequence, not of ttie advice of Prince Halim, but of 
 the utter necessity of the time. The loan was concluded with the 
 Messrs. Rothschild, of Paris, in November, 1878, at the rate of 73. 
 The nominal amount of the loan was £8,500,000, but with the dis- 
 count of twenty- seven per cent, and the commission of two and a 
 half per cent., the net product was only £5,992,000. Thinking 
 that financial affairs could rest for the moment, Mr. Wilson now 
 made a tour of inspection tHrough Lower Egypt. The people met 
 
— 32 — 
 
 him with petitions which he received with promises of redress. 
 He beheved and they had every reason to believe the words he 
 uttered in a speech at Tanta. "A new era," he said, "has begun 
 for Egypt. Reforms are ah^eady initiated, and if you will only 
 have patience you can count on their completion. If you have 
 grievances, make them known to us, and you shall be righted. 
 We wish to establish equality and legality in the country, and the 
 law shall no longer be for the rich alone ; it shall work for rich 
 and poor alike." The fellahin might well have been happy; 
 they had never in their ages of oppression received such assur- 
 ances before. 
 
 But tranquility was not yet. A number of creditors at Alex- 
 andria had put an end to the financial negotiations in a most un- 
 expected manner. These creditors had been watching their oppor- 
 tunity. They had tried some months before to seize the furniture 
 of the Palace at Ramleh, but had been foiled by the bailiffs. They 
 had succeeded, however, in obtaining a lien on the very estates 
 that were offered as security on the new loan. It was not sur- 
 prising, therefore, that Baron Rothschild withheld the amount of 
 the loan. To add to the Khedive's troubles, the unpaid officers of 
 the army in Cairo were urging their claims. The delay of Baron 
 Rothschild precipitated matters, and on February 18th, 1879, a 
 military uprising occurred in Cairo, which nearly cost Mr. Rivers 
 Wilson and Nubar Pasha their lives. While driving from a Coun- 
 cil of Ministers their carriage was beset by a throng of officers, esti- 
 mated at from four to twelve hundred; their driver was wounded, 
 and they were insulted and forced back into the court-yard 
 of the palace. The Khedive attempted to pacify the mob, but 
 they were only dispersed by the force of arms. Nubar Pasha, the 
 next day, offered his resignation. It was at once accepted by the 
 Khedive, and again the foremost statesman of Egypt, and the only 
 one worthy the name from the western conception of the term, 
 went into exile. It was immediately claimed in England and 
 Erance that Ismail had sought to bring about this result by insti- 
 gating or conniving at the insurrection among the officers. It 
 was generg-Uy known that Ismail had a pet aversion to Nubar. 
 They were as different as an honest man and a cunning diplomat 
 could well be, and it is certain that the Khedive would not have 
 entrusted Nubar with the new Ministry if the influence of England 
 
— 33 — 
 
 and France had not seemed to demand it. Confidence having 
 been secured, Ismail was ready, and probably only too glad, to 
 break with his Prime Minister. Nubar appreciated the desperate 
 state of affairs that prevailed in Egypt. He had written to a 
 friend on January 20th: "The everlasting political comedy or 
 tragedy is being played on the little stage here, just as it is every- 
 where else: a lost power sought to be regained, persons interested 
 in not letting it be regained, who yet aid it for personal motives, 
 or to give themselves importance — and not a sou in the Treasury 
 withal. What a situation for the country, for the interested coun- 
 tries, and for your friend ! "* 
 
 England and France were naturally displeased with the dis- 
 missal — for such it was — of Nubar Pasha; and while the Com- 
 mander-in-Chief of the Egyptian army was apologizing to Mr. 
 Rivers Wilson for the insult he had received at the hands of the 
 officers, the two Powers were preparing a protest to submit to the 
 Khedive. Notwithstanding their demand Nubar was not re-in- 
 stated ; but some of- the conditions they imposed upon the Khe- 
 dive were followed in his attitude toward the new Cabinet. Is- 
 mail's eldest son. Prince Tewfik, had been appointed President of 
 the Council, Zulfikar Pasha Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. 
 Wilson and M. de Blignieres had retained their former offices. 
 The important condition that was imposed upon Ismail was em- 
 braced by him in a letter to Tewfik, in which he said : " As the 
 native Ministers now form a majority in the Cabinet, it is right, 
 in order to restore the balance of power and lend to the interven- 
 tion of our European Ministers all the usefulness possible, that 
 they should be entitled to a veto on all measures they agree in 
 disapproving." This sop thrown to the great Powers was soon 
 counteracted. Egyptian and European influence clashed on the 
 financial question, and Egypt came out first best. It was in this 
 wise: Mr. Wilson, M. de Blignieres, Mr. Baring, and the Debt 
 Commissioners submitted a plan for the equitable reduction of 
 the claims of all ci'editors. The Khedive opposed this with an- 
 other plan, giving the bond-holders better terms; and he was 
 supported by the native Parliament, the pashas, the ulemas, and 
 all the high dignitaries of the land. The counter projects were 
 
 * Quoted from Appleton's AnnualCyclopcedia, 1879. 
 
— 34 — 
 
 pushed so hard that, on April 7th, Prince Tewfik resigned the 
 presidency of the Council, and the Khedive dismissed Mr. Wilson 
 and M. de Blignieres. 
 
 If, now, there was even a ship of state that sailed between 
 Scylla and Charybdis, it was the unsteady craft that Ismail was 
 trying to guide. If he avoided the rocks on one side, it was only 
 to meet destruction on the other. The wrath of the Egyptians 
 had been averted by the dismissal of the foreigners, and by the 
 same act the wrath of the great Powers had been incurred. The 
 French Government was in high dudgeon at the offense, and 
 threatened to reinstate her representative by the force of arms, 
 and asked England to join her. Bat England would not agree to 
 any such decisive step. Even had she cared to, she would have 
 found it difficult to spare more troops than were needed at chat 
 time to oppose the Boers in South Africa. She preferred, there- 
 fore, while waiting for the blood of France to cool, to send dis- 
 patches to the Khedive demanding a reconsideracion of his hasty 
 and unwarranted action. But the Khedive was now running 
 things with a high hand. If England would not allow France to 
 send an armed force to Egypt and did not do so herself, he could 
 laugh at the demands and threats of dispatches. His people said 
 that the unbelievers had brought all the trouble and the ruin 
 upon the fair valley of the Nile, and he decided to cut loose from 
 the Western influence and defy its power. He virtually repudi- 
 ated the debts ahd responsibilities of his country in a way that 
 would put our own Virginia to the shame, by issuing a decree, 
 April 22d, in which he declared that, for the future, he would 
 himself control the finances and regulate the discharge of liabili- 
 ties. He seemed to be riding on the wave of triumph. The peo- 
 ple thought that the day of Mehemet Ali was come again. 
 
 But at this moment an unexpected voice of authority was 
 heard. England and France were passing the time in an unavail- 
 ing effort like that of two horses who cannot pull their load be- 
 cause the one holds back while the other starts, when, suddenly, 
 the German Chancellor made a protest that cost Ismail his throne. 
 The German Consul at Cairo, on the 17th of May, simply informed 
 the Khedive that the interests of German subjects must be pro- 
 tected, let come what might, and that any arbitrary change of sys- 
 tem at that time would be considered prejudicial to their inter- 
 
— 35 — 
 
 ests. "What led the astute Bismarck to step into the leader's 
 place at this juncture is, and must remain, an enigma.* Doubt- 
 less he wished France still to be occupied with foreign affairs so 
 that her internal development might not be commensurate with 
 Germany's ; for at that day, more than now, there seemed a plaus- 
 ible possibility that the grievances and hatred that did not die 
 with Napoleon Third, might seek again a settlement by the sword. 
 Certain it is that the very reasons that have led England to op- 
 pose Frencli aggrandizement abroad have led Germany to favor 
 the same, or, at least, to view with satisfaction the foreign com- 
 plications that require the exportation of troops and treasure. 
 Against France England has only had to protect her interests 
 abroad, and Germany her interests at home. This may or may 
 not account for the Chancellor's unexpected though timely inter- 
 ference ; but the fact remains the same that his voice settled the 
 Khedive's fate. England, France, Austria, Russia and Italy fol- 
 lowed the lead of Germany, and protested against ajiy interfer- 
 ence with the Commission of Control and the non- execution of the 
 tribunal judgments. At this juncture the proposal to depose the 
 Khedive, which the Porte had made to England and France in 
 April, was reneAved. This time it was accepted. In place, how- 
 ever, of the Sultan's nominee for the succession. Prince Halim, 
 the uncle of Ismail, England and France insisted upon raising 
 
 * Of this action and its consequences, Mr. Edward Dicey, writing in The Nineteenth 
 Century of February, 1880, says: "How ttiis action came about lias never, so far as I 
 know, been clearly ascertained. Germany liad a comparatively insignificant interest in 
 the affairs of Egypt. A very small portion of the floating debt was due to German cred- 
 itors. It is not easy to believe that Germany ever really contemplated any intervention in 
 Egypt, and it is still less easy to understand how she could practically have intervened 
 even if she had been so minded. But the prestige of Germany— her repute of strength, 
 which is to a nation what credit is to an individual — stood her in good stead. The mere 
 fact that Prmce Bismarck had declared the KhOdive could not be allowed to play fast and 
 loose with the interests of German subjects produced more effect than all the dispatches 
 indited Jrom London and Paris ; and from the day when Germany pronounced against the 
 Khedive it was obvious that the end had come. Meanwhile, the initiative taken by Ger- 
 many had a result which might easily have been foreseen, and which doubtless was fore- 
 seen by those, whoever they may have been, who suggested to Prince Bismarck the ad- 
 visability of his coming forward as the champion of the Egyptian creditors. It was felt at 
 once in Paris that the time for vacillation had passed. The Republic could not allow it to 
 be said that France was unable or unwilling to protect the interests of her subjects in 
 Egypt, while the insignificant interests of the German creditors were safeguarded by the 
 mere expression of Prince Bismarck's will; and the English Government recognized, on 
 the one hand, that Prance could not be held back any longer, and, on the other, that we 
 could not allow Germany to take into her own hands the forcible solution of the Egyp- 
 tian question." 
 
— 36 — 
 
 Prince Tewfik, the son of Ismail, to the tbrone. The diplomatic 
 correspondence in discussion of this difference consumed a week 
 or more in June; but on the 26th of that month the Sultan at last 
 yielded and signed the firman deposing Ismail in favor of Prince 
 Mehemet Tewfik. Four days afterward the ex-Khedive left the 
 shores and troubles of Egypt behind him for an Italian life of 
 luxury. If he had been a Pasha in the feudal days of Egypt, 
 he would have forfeited his treasure and his life. As it was, 
 he escaped with the latter, and was given an annual allowance of 
 £50,000. 
 
 The character of Ismail Pasha has been variously depicted. 
 He has been painted with all the virtues, on the one hand, and 
 all the vices, on the other, that a monarch can be heir to. Of 
 course neither extreme gives the true picture ; and yet there is so 
 much ground for each conception that one inclines, at first 
 thought, to declare that Ismail was both the blessing and the 
 curse of his country. We think of the development of Egypt 
 during the sixteen years of his reign, of the public works, schools, 
 railways, telegraphs, founded and fostered, and we bless his 
 name ; but then we think of the cost, and the curse follows. 
 We cannot sympathize with those who would shield Ismail by re- 
 garding him as the dupe of his wicked Muffetish. He may have 
 been deceived and cheated by the latter, but he could not have 
 bee a altogether ignorant of the financial schemes of his treasurer. 
 They worked in the same groove and to the same end. They 
 were both ambitious, biit were not equally extravagant ; for the 
 Muffetish grew rich correspondingly as the Khedive grew poor, 
 although the money poured into the hands of the two alike. The 
 Muffetish hoarded while the Khedive wasted; but the desire of 
 the miser was no greater than that of the spendthrift, and he 
 must not bear the blame for both. For the financial woes of 
 Egypt under Ismail, some blame, undoubtedly, attaches to the 
 European money-lenders, whose bargains were so disastrous to 
 the Khedive. Their rates were often merciless. To prove that 
 all the blame is theirs, Mr. Keay tells "A Tale of Shame "* from 
 the British Blue Books, in which he supports his arguments with- 
 many italics, small capitals, and exclamation points. But they 
 
 *" Spoiling tlie Egyptians; A Tale of Shame." Told from the Blue Books. By J. 
 Seymour Keay. 
 
— 37 — 
 
 are not conclusive. They do not obliterats the fact of Ismail's 
 extravagance. 
 
 If we could wholly lose sight of the different acts of the finan- 
 cial tragedy, the glory of Ismail's reign would still be marred by 
 the means and measures he employed in carrying out his de- 
 signs of development. No obstacle could turn him from his 
 plan, and the teaching of economic science was ignored or misun- 
 derstood. We have seen how he bent his energies upon the 
 senseless attempt to refine sugar, when his country furnished no 
 fuel to run his dearly bought machines. Western civilization was 
 Ismail's model in all things. It was his ambition, from the start, 
 to implant in Egypt European arts and ideas. He thought he 
 could declare into existence what had been the slow development 
 of centuries in more enlightened lands. Even when he must 
 have known that his country was on the verge of ruin, he boasted 
 that Egypt was no longer a part of Africa, but of Europe.* 
 Nothing could be more ridiculous than the story of Ismail's at- 
 tempt to give his people governmental representation. He did 
 not propose to establish even a paper constitution ; and he had 
 no idea of giving up any of his prerogatives when, in 1866, he. 
 summoned the first Egyptian Parliament that had assembled 
 since the day of Mehemet Ali.f The members of the new Par- 
 liament had not the faintest idea of their duties and powers. 
 When the first bill was submitted to them by the Khedive, and 
 they were asked to signify their approval or disapproval, there 
 was not a dissenting vote against the measure. For, they said, 
 his Highness is the representative of Allah ; and his will, like that 
 of Allah and the Prophet, is our law. But this political simplicity 
 vanished before the end of Ismail's reign, though the voice of the 
 Parliament was still recognized as the Khedive's voice. 
 
 * In an interview witli Mr. Rivers Wilson, August 23cl, 187T, Ismail said : "My country 
 is no longer African ; we now form part of Europe." From Annual Cyclopcedia for 1877. 
 
 t Mr. McCoan, in " Egypt As It Is," page 117, thus describes the functions of the As- 
 sembly: "In 1866 the Khedive revived the defunct Assembly of Delegates, one of the 
 inchoate reforms projected by Mehemet All, but which had not met since his death. This 
 germ ot an Egyptian Parliament consists of village sheikhs and other provincial notables, 
 elected by the communes, and assembles once a year to receive from the Privy Council a 
 report on the administration during the twelvemonth. Its function is also to consider 
 and advise on all proposed fiscal changes, new public works, and other matters of national 
 concern that may be laid before it. It has, of course, no legislative power; but in prac- 
 tice its recommendations are received not merely with respect, but are often acted on by 
 the Government." 
 
 3 
 
— 38 — 
 
 It is only fair to Ismail that a somewhat detailed statement 
 should be made of the amounts expended by him in public works ; 
 for, having seen how one loan after another was received, the 
 question naturally arises, Where did the money go? There 
 was a considerable sum that the greed of money-lenders did not 
 absorb in commissions and interest, and a large part of this went 
 into public works. Mr. Mulhall gives the following table of 
 works established between 1863 and 1879, in his article on 
 "Egyptian Finance :"* 
 
 " Work. Amount. Observation. 
 
 Suez Canal £6,TTO,000 After deducting value of sHares sold. 
 
 Nile Canals 12,600,000 Made 8,400 miles at ^1,500 per mile. 
 
 Bridges 2,150,000 Built 430 at £5,000 per bridge. 
 
 Sugar-mills 6,100,000 Built 64, witt macliinery, etc. 
 
 Harbor Alexandria.... 2,542,000 Greenfield and Elliott Contract. 
 
 Suez docks 1,400,000 Dussand Bros. 
 
 Alex, water-works 300,000 Price agreed by Paris Syndicate. 
 
 Railways 13,861,000 Length 910 miles, new. 
 
 Telegrapns 853,000 Length 5,200 miles, new. 
 
 Light-houses 188,000 Built 15 on Red Sea and Mediterranean." 
 
 £46,264,000 
 
 We see thus that Ismail expended on works of public utility 
 not less than forty-six millions sterling. Now, as the loans con- 
 tracted by him netted only about forty-five millions, his admirers 
 and defenders say at once that he did not squander, but that he 
 spent all for the public weal. But there is the item of revenue, 
 which these writers do not consider, and which yielded the Gov- 
 ernment, in the sixteen years of Ismail's reign, not far from one 
 hundred and fifty millions. How large a part of this was wasted 
 by Ismail we can only guess ; but we may be sure that all those 
 millions did not go toward defraying necessary Governmental 
 expenses. The canals, railways, bridges, docks, etc., were the 
 best work of Ismail's reign if the financial side of the question be 
 left out of consideration. They brought in, it is true, a certain 
 revenue, but this was by no means equal to the interest on the 
 debts incurred to make the improvements. Where national de- 
 velopment is only secured by contracting with each change a 
 counterbalancing debt, it is doubtful if the changes can be con- 
 sidered beneficial. There were, however, certain other outlays by 
 Ismail that were of unquestionable advantage to the land, even 
 though they produced no revenue. He established 4,632 public 
 
 ''Contemporary Review, October, 1882. 
 
— 39 — 
 
 scliools, with 5,850 teachers, drawing salaries that ranged from 
 £24 to £84 a year, and expended in the sixteen years of his reign 
 no less than £3,600,000 for this purpose. He organized village 
 banks — we will say with philanthropic intent to protect the fella- 
 hin from the money-lenders — and lost £900,000 by the experi- 
 ment. And he lost largely on the shares he took in the Nile Steam 
 Navigation Company. On the other hand, just at the time of 
 the financial difficulties of 1873, he embarked upon a war with 
 Abyssinia which despoiled the Egyptian treasury of not less 
 than £3,000,000. He squandered a vast sum in building palaces 
 and theaters and in the entertainment of distinguished foreigners. 
 His expenditures at the time of the opening of the Suez Canal 
 were simply enormous. He gave bribes and presents at all times 
 with true Oriental prodigality. Even if he could have afforded 
 these outlays they would have been foolish ; as it was, they were 
 wicked. And yet, as Mr. Mulhall says, " whatever the faults, he 
 raised Egypt in the scale of nations" ; for there was an actual 
 progress between the death of Said and the accession of Tewfik. 
 It may be measured in the following table, prepared by IMr. Mul- 
 hall:* 
 
 "PEOGEESS or EGYPT IN SEVENTEEN YEAES. 
 
 iasf Tear of Last Year of 
 
 Said Pasha. Ismail Pasha. 
 
 1S62. 1879. 
 
 Acres tilled 4,052,000 5,425,000 
 
 Value of imports £1 ,991,000 ^15.410,000 
 
 Value of exports ^4,454,000 £13,810,000 
 
 Revenue .' £4,937,000 £8,562,000 
 
 Public debt £3,300,000 £98,540,000 
 
 No. of public schools 185 4,817 
 
 Railways — miles 275 1,185 
 
 Telegraphs " 630 5,820 
 
 Canals " 44,000 52,400 
 
 Population 4,883,000 5,518,000 " 
 
 If from this table could be excluded that decidedly negative 
 item of progress denoted by the Public Debt in 1879, there would 
 remain a good showing for Ismail ; but that one item cancels all 
 the others, even as it was the primal cause of Ismail's overthrow- 
 There was another reform, which has not yet been noticed be- 
 cause bearing no direct relation to finances, that was accomplished 
 during Ismail's reign, and for which he must, at least indirectly, 
 
 * The Contemporary Revieiv, October, 1882. 
 
— 40 — 
 
 be credited — the reform in judicial procedure. There had come to 
 be a very pernicious increase of consular jurisdiction in Egypt 
 after the death of Mehemet Ali. The native had to bring a suit 
 against a foreigner in the foreigner's consulate, where he was al- 
 most sure to be denied justice. With as little chance of justice, 
 also, the foreign plaintiff had to sue the foreign debtor in the 
 latter's consulate. Some consuls even claimed the right to sit in 
 judgment of cases in which the natives were defendants. The 
 Government suffered too. It was estimated, says Mr. McCoan,* 
 that, in the four years preceding 1868, consular influence extorted 
 from the Government £2,880,000 in satisfaction of claims, with- 
 out judicial sanction of any kind. " The whole system," he goes 
 on to say, "was, in fact, a scandal and a denial of justice all 
 around." It was, if anything, worse in criminal than in civil mat- 
 ters. The abuses were so flagrant that Nubar Pasha, in 1867, 
 proposed a scheme of reform to the Khedive. It was submitted to 
 France, but was unfavorably received. England, however, when 
 approached on the subject, promised to give the reform her hearty 
 support, provided the other Powers would concur. They did so 
 in the Fall of 1869. Negotiations, however, were interrupted for 
 a time by the war between France and Germany ; and when they 
 were renewed, in 1871, the Sultan entered his veto against the 
 scheme, though he afterward withdrew it at the demand of Eng- 
 land and Russia. France now offered objections once more, and 
 the negotiations dragged. Some of her amendments were ac- 
 cepted ; but it was not until December, 1875, that the scheme was 
 finally agreed to. 
 
 The reform was inaugurated in February, 1876, to continue in 
 force for five years. It is thus described by Mr. McCoan : | "As 
 now constituted the new system includes three tribunals of first 
 instance — one at Alexandria, a second at Cairo, and a third . . . 
 at Zagazig — and a Court of Appeal, which also sits at Alexandria. 
 Of the inferior courts, that at Alexandria — divided into two cham- 
 bers, with equal jurisdiction — consists of fourteen judges, of 
 whom six are natives and eight Europeans ; that at Cau-o, of three 
 natives and five foreigners ; and that at Zagazig, of three natives 
 and four foreigners. The nominal chiefs of all three are natives, 
 
 " Egypt as It Is," by J. C. McCoan, p. 270. 
 
 flUd, page 280 
 
— 4:1 — 
 
 but foreign vice-presidents actually direct their proceedings. In 
 the Court of Appeal the alien element is still more preponderant, 
 the bench of eleven judges there consisting of seven foreigners 
 and only four natives The judicial and other person- 
 nel is thus complete, and the jurisdiction exercised includes all 
 civil disputes between the Government and natives on the one 
 hand, and foreigners on the other, as also those between foreigners 
 of different nationalities ; and all suits and registrations of sale 
 and mortgage whatsoever of real property." Such was the reform 
 inaugurated; and a most excellent one it was. Not forgetting 
 that Nubar was its author, we give the credit of it to Ismail's 
 reign, just as we lay the blame of the Muffetish's villainy at his 
 door. If all his changes had been as wisely carried out, his ambi- 
 tious designs of raising Egypt to the plane of European civilization 
 would not have failed so utterly of reaUzation. In this connection 
 we must refer to Ismail's appointment, first of Sir Samuel Baker 
 and then of Colonel Gordon, as Governors-General of the Sudan 
 and of his apparently earnest attempts to suppress the slave trade. 
 He gave Gordon carte blanche power to "punish, change, and dis- 
 miss" officials, and assured him that Egypt would loyally support 
 England in this "measure of humanity and civilization." "We shall 
 see later how Baker and Gordon succeeded in their missions. 
 
 Long before his collapse the shrewd Ismail must have known 
 that his reign was doomed ; but he kept on his high-handed course 
 to the end. The discharge of the European administrators and 
 the virtual repudiation of debts were his last acts of bravado. 
 Powerless and empty-handed, he made no protest against the fir- 
 man of deposition. But "it would be a mistake," writes Mr. Edward 
 Dicey * "to attribute Ismail Pasha's collapse to lack of personal 
 courage. I should doubt his possessing any exceptional physical 
 bravery; but he had to a remarkable degree the gambler's instinct 
 and the gambler's boldness. He was not the man to forfeit his 
 stakes while there was a chance, however remote, of holding on to 
 his winnings. He threw up the game simply "and solely because he 
 knew better than any one else that he had absolutely no cards in 
 his hand." His people suffered him to depart into exUe without a 
 protest or a murmur. It is true that "the resident European com- 
 munity" — to quote Mr. Dicey's words once more — "to whom he had 
 
 * The Nineteenth Century, February, 1880. 
 
— 42 — 
 
 always been friendly, and who liad partaken freely of liis lavish, 
 hospitality, stood by him in his disgrace, and his departure into 
 exile was accompanied by sincere expressions of regret on the part 
 of the Court circle and the European embassy, but without one 
 solitary manifestation of sympathy on the part of the Egyptian 
 population." 
 
 CHAPTER IV. 
 
 Mehemet Tewjfik, Khedive. 
 
 Prince Mehemet Tewfik was not yet twenty-seven years old 
 when he ascended the vice-royal throne of Egypt. He was a very 
 different man from his father. He had not his inordinate ambi- 
 tion, and lacked, consequently, some of the energy as well as the 
 crafty diplomacy of Ismail. He had not, like his father, served an 
 apprenticeship of experience in the gay capitals of Europe ; but 
 he was not without the culture that European masters can inspire. 
 He had a good knowledge of French and English, speaking both 
 languages fluently. It may be doubted if he was as enlightened 
 a Prince as his great uncle. Prince Halim, the exile of Constanti- 
 nople, who was the choice of the Sultan for successor to Ismail ; 
 but under the law of succession in Egypt, established by the firman 
 of 1866, England could not well have supported Halim, even if 
 she had preferred him, which she did not. The Porte had to yield 
 Its eagerness to depose Ismail is not to be attributed to any over- 
 sensitiveness at the scandal of his financial follies, but rather to 
 the fact — which the Sultan foresaw — that if the Porte did not 
 depose the Khedive, England and France would. Making thus, a 
 concession to the inevitable, the Sultan would have still main- 
 tained the semblance of his suzerain authority if he could have 
 named the successor. But this was not permitted by England and 
 France, who, by their dictation at this time, showed that they pos- 
 sessed the virtual control of affairs in Egypt. 
 
 And jet, after the deposition, England, at least, was loth to 
 put her power further to the test. The opposition at home was 
 to be feared and a definite policy was not outlined ; and the new 
 Khedive was left to follow his own whim largely in the formation 
 
— 43 — 
 
 of his Government. France did not relish this inaction on the 
 part of England, and, for herself, insisted that M. de Blignieres 
 should continue to act as representative. Germany and the other 
 Powers having- retired from participation in the discussion of 
 Egyptian affairs, England and France at last came to a compro- 
 mise. They agreed not to insist upon the reinstatement of their 
 representatives in the Khedive's Cabinet, but, instead, upon the 
 appointment by the Khedive of two Comptrollers, one of whom 
 should be nominated by France and the other by England. 
 France named M. de Blignieres, who was accepted by Tewfik with 
 much dissatisfaction. England did not insist upon the appoint- 
 ment of Mr. Rivers Wilson, though losing thereby some prestige, 
 but named Major Baring instead. Their powers were not defined; 
 but it was understood that they would be as unlimited as France 
 and England might choose to make them. 
 
 In the meaatime there had been several ministerial changes since 
 Tewfik's accession. He had placed the ministry under the lead- 
 ership of Sherif Pasha. None but natives received portfolios. 
 The ministry thus formed indicated a reactionary spirit and 
 was totally out of sympathy with the reform movements instigated 
 by Nubar Pasha. Tewfik feared to depart at once from the ways 
 of Ismail ;. for he regarded his position as somewhat insecure so 
 long as Ismail's covert overtures to the Porte were received. The 
 Ex-Khedive sought to obtain permission of the Sultan to live in 
 Cairo. This could not have been allowed without prejudicing the 
 stability of the Egyptian Government ; but all fear of the possi- 
 bility was ended when, on the 14th of August, the firman of inves- 
 titure was presented to Tewfik. Four days after the Sherif Min- 
 istry was dismissed and a new one formed, of which the Khedive 
 himself assumed the presidency. But this was short-lived ; for, on 
 September 21st, Tewfik gave up his position of Minister, and ap- 
 pointed Eiaz Pasha to the presidency in his place. Riaz had been 
 Minister of the Interior under Nubar, with whom he was in complete 
 sympathy. It would seem, however, as if the Ministry should have 
 been intrusted to Nubar, the most enlightened man of Egypt ; but 
 Riaz was preferred by France and England because, in case of 
 differences arising, he would hardly have the courage or strength 
 to oppose the Dual Control, which was a consideration of some 
 moment now that the Powers had no representatives in the Cabinet. 
 
^ _ 44 — 
 
 Then, too, Nubar was not popular among the natives, being an 
 Armenian and a Christian. At the same time that the Khedive's 
 government was placed upon an apparently stable footing, the 
 burdens of the f ellahin were materially lightened by unusually 
 abundant crops. They were also less harassed than formerly by 
 the tax-gatherers, who no longer forced money from them a year 
 or more before it was due, but were content merely to collect 
 arrearages. There seemed thus to be a brighter sky above Egypt 
 than in the days of Ismail Pasha. 
 
 But there was the great question of finance still remaining to 
 be solved. To this the Comptrollers had turned their first atten- 
 tion. The difficulty that met them at the outset was of an inter- 
 national character. It will be remembered that Baron Roths- 
 child had withheld a part of his loan at the beginning of the year, 
 because individual creditors had obtained liens against the Daira 
 domains, which Ismail and his family had ceded to the State. 
 The domains could not be mortgaged to the Rothschilds until the 
 liens had been satisfied ; for their legality had been upheld by the 
 International Courts, whose law was that of a code based upon 
 French law. This code, now, could not be deviated from or mod- 
 ified in the least degree, except with the consent of all the Ppwers 
 represented in the International Courts. But it was evidently a 
 matter of right and necessity that funds borrowed to lighten cer- 
 tain burdens of the State should be expended to that end, and not 
 in the payment of the claims of individuals. An independent 
 Power would have so decided at once ; but Egypt had to abide 
 by the code, while the Comptrollers proceeded to try to secure the 
 consent of the Powers concerned. This was a difficult task. 
 Some of the lesser Powers were jealous of the Anglo-French con- 
 trol, and had no desire to act upon its bidding. Italy and Aus- 
 tria declined to sanction any change in the International code. 
 Major Baring and M, de Blignieres themselves went to Vienna to 
 expostulate, and with the strong influence of the nations they rep- 
 resented, they were at last able, in November, to effect a compro- 
 mise, by which all the liens on the domains, obtained before their 
 mortgage to the Rothschilds, on February 3d, 1879, were to be 
 satisfied from the unpaid balance of the loan ; while, with respect 
 to all other debts, the Rothschilds were to have the first mort- 
 gage on the lands. This was accomplished only by tedious nego- 
 
— 45 — 
 
 tiations. In the month of November, also, the Khedive issued 
 the following decree concerning the powers of the Comptrollers- 
 General : 
 
 " Art. 1.— The Comptrollers-General shall have in financial matters the most complete 
 powers of investigation into all the public services, including those whose receipts have a 
 special destination by virtue of decrees and contracts. Ministers and functionaries of 
 every ranK shall be bound to give every information and to furnish every document re- 
 quired by the Comptrollers and their agents. The Minister of Finance especially shall 
 furnish the Control every week with a detailed statement of all receipts and expenditures 
 at his Ministry. Every other Administration shall every month furnish a similar state- 
 ment of receipts and expenditures. 
 
 "Art. 2.— The Comptrollers shall agree upon the public services over which they 
 shall exercise the rights of supervision and control conferred by this decree. 
 
 "Art. 3.— The Governments of France and Great Britain having consented, for the 
 moment, that the Comptrollers shall take no part in the management of the Administra- 
 tion and financial services, the Comptrollers shall for the present confine themselves to the 
 communicationtousor to our Ministers of such observations as their investigations give 
 rise to. They shall also communicate to the Commission of the Debt all facts of a nature 
 to interest the creditors of the consolidated Debt. They may also, on account of such 
 facts, convene the Commissioners of Public Debt to examine such questions as the Comp- 
 trollers or the Commissioners of Public Debt may think advisable to discuss in common. 
 
 "Art. 4.— The Comptrollers shall have the rank of Ministers at the Council (of Minis- 
 ters), and shall have a seat and a consultative voice there. 
 
 " Art. 5.— At the end of each year, and more frequently if necessary, the Comptrollers 
 shall commniiicate to us their work in a report, which shall be published by them and in- 
 serted in the Moniteur Egyptien. 
 
 "Art. 6. — The Comptrollers can only be removed from their posts with the consent of 
 their respective Governments. They shall name their own officials and fix their salaries. 
 
 "Art. T.— The expenses of the department of the Control shall be fixed by the Comp- 
 trollers and approved by the Ministers. 
 
 " Art. 8.— The amount required by them shall be paid to them monthly. 
 
 "Art, 9.— Our Ministers are charged with the execution of this decree. 
 
 " (Signed) Mehemet Tewfik, 
 
 "November 15th, 1879. Riaz Pasha." 
 
 The remainder of the year 1879 was consumed by the Comp- 
 trollers in drafting a plan for the settlement of the financial ques- 
 tion. Their report was presented to the Khedive in January, 
 1880. Its most important suggestion was that a hne of demarka- 
 tion should be drawn at December 31st, 1879 ; and that all debts 
 contracted before that date should be settled by a law of liquida- 
 tion, which should protect the Egyptian Government from all 
 suits based on claims of earlier date than 1880. It had been un- 
 derstood when the Comptrollers were appointed the previous 
 summer, that a Commission of Liquidation should be instituted 
 to draft such a law as the Comptrollers now suggested ; and, fur- 
 ther, to devise some such scheme for the final settlement of finan- 
 cial difficulties as was outlined in the report of the Comptrollers. 
 The Commission was now appointed with the approval of Eng- 
 
— 46 — 
 
 land, France, Italy, Austria, Germany, and Egypt, and Sir Eivers 
 Wilson was chosen its president. The Khedive, in a decree issued 
 in March, outlined the duties of the Commission. It was to in- 
 vestigate thoroughly the finances of the country, to draw up a, 
 law of liquidation between Egypt and her creditors which should 
 be binding on all concerned, and to make general provision ta 
 ease Egypt of her burdens. The Governments represented in 
 the Commission agreed to accept its decisions as binding on the 
 International Courts, and to request jointly, after having given 
 their own approval, that the other Powers represented in the In- 
 ternational Courts should also consent to the new law. 
 
 The work of the Commission was completed by the middle of 
 July, and the Khedive at once signed the law of liquidation. It. 
 provided for the payment of the floating debt by giving thirty per 
 cent, cash and seventy per. cent in the bonds of a new preference 
 debt. The national debt was converted into unified and preference 
 stock, the former bearing interest at four per cent, and the latter 
 at five per cent. The unified stock, amounting to $57,776,340, 
 was secured by the land tax, and the preference stock, amounting 
 to £22,587,800, was secured by the railways, telegraphs, etc. The 
 Daira debt of £9,512,870, and the Domain debt of £8,499.620 were 
 secured respectively by the Khedive's estates and his family's es- 
 tates. The Mukabala amounted to £7,500,000. The entire in- 
 debtedness was thus placed at over one hundred and five millions 
 sterling. The* Mukabala tax was abolished, and a source of 
 revenue cut off; but it was thought that the Daira, being freed 
 now from debt, could be made to yield a revenue enough larger to 
 counterbalance the loss of the Mukabala tax. The Khedive had 
 previously signed decrees abolishing this tax and certain others 
 that had been declared by the Commissioners of Inquiry to be an- 
 noying to the tax-payer and of little profit to the State. The 
 relief to Egypt by the new law was to be found in the reduction of 
 the interest on the unified debt to four per cent. That would at. 
 once bring the expenses of the Government below the sum of the 
 revenues, and furnish a surplus that could be applied to the serv- 
 ice of the debt. The practical working of the law secured this 
 very result. In 1881, after the discharge of all obligations, there 
 remained a surplus of £321,265, which enabled the Government to 
 cancel nearly half a million of the funded debt. " The Liquida- 
 
— 47 — 
 
 tion Law of 1880," says Mr. Mulhall,* "first put the finances on 
 a sound footing and ... its effects have been just and 
 beneficial." 
 
 Other causes, also, worked to secure the prosperity of 
 1880. There was an abundant harvest, and trade was vastly im- 
 proved by the readjustment of the land tax, and by the abolition 
 of taxes in kind. In short, the condition of the fellah was sub- 
 stantially bettered ; and when the fellah is happy, Egypt prospers. 
 The improvement in the national credit was the cause of a great 
 influx of foreign capital, chiefly from France, which was directed 
 toward the development of the agricultural resources of the land 
 and toward the erection of buildings, and the improvement of 
 mechanical appliances. Money was loaned at a lower rate of in- 
 terest than formerly, and as a consequence the price of land rose 
 rapidly. At the same time attention was aroused to secure the 
 advancement of the people by giving them better facilities for edu- 
 cation. The great Moslem university of Cairo instructed twelve 
 thousand students in the philososhy of the Koran, but gave them 
 no broader education than the word of the Prophet required. This 
 was not enough for a country that was no longer isolated from the 
 laws and learning of unbelievers as it had been for the centuries 
 preceding. The actual contact with European nations now made 
 it necessary to cultivate the learning of the West. A Commission 
 was appointed to secure this end. 
 
 But the reform and the prosperity were not to be without 
 their hindrances. The Egyptians had had little thought for them- 
 selves while their condition seemed hopeless. Suffering, they 
 were content to exist. But now their prosperity seemed to arouse 
 the prejudices of race and religion, and stirred the people to com- 
 plain of the foreign influence and interference in Egypt. And 
 though the prosperity was, as we have seen, in large part due to 
 the foreign direction, there was some natural ground for complaint. 
 The people could not look without envy and jealousy on the 
 foreigners who were drawing immense salaries from the Egyptian 
 treasiuy. Fifty thousand pounds a year was paid to European 
 officials in the National Debt Office alone. f There might not have 
 
 * The Contemp.rary Review, October, 1S82. 
 
 tThe following salaries paid to foreign officials in the different departments were re- 
 ported by Sir Edward Mallet to his government on May ISth, 1882 : Cabinet of the Khedive 
 £3,000 (Egyptian pounds, £1 being about equal to $5) ; Maieh Sanieh, £676 ; Presidency of 
 
been complaint if salaries had gone solely to comptrollers, commis- 
 sioners, and judges ; but there were, besides, French or English 
 officials to direct the customs, the railways, the telegraphs, the 
 harbors of Alexandria, of Port Said, and of Suez, the coast-guard, 
 the light-houses, the post-office, the finance department of the 
 Government, the public works, and the administration of the 
 Domain and Daira lands. In all these offices, furthermore, the 
 subordinate positions were divided almost equally between French- 
 men and natives. Major Baring had been replaced by Mr. Colvin 
 as English Comptroller, and M. de Blignieres had assumed the lead 
 in control in consequence of his seniority and greater experience 
 in Egyptian affairs. In every way France had been more aggres- 
 sive than her ally, and hers was now the leading influence in 
 Egypt. It was even whispered that the prophecy that the Medi- 
 terranean would one day be " a French lake" was destined to ful- 
 fillment. French accessions in northern Africa encouraged this 
 kind of talk. But it mattered not to the Egyptians whether r- 
 French or English controlled : they were all alike foreigners, 
 and on that account hated. Both were bad, and either was as bad 
 as the other. That they were apparently robbing the natives of 
 the salaries that seemed rightfully theirs was enough to make the 
 inborn hatred intense. 
 
 The Khedive, however, had more tolerance for the foreigners, 
 and more sympathy with the reforms they suggested. He be- 
 lieved that the Comptrollers had the welfare of Egypt at heart, 
 and he was ready to show his confidence by awaiting the develop- 
 ment of the plans undertaken. This attitude, of course, tended 
 
 tte Council of Ministers, £452 ; Teft of Gizeli and Gizereli, £436 ; Ministry of B'oreign 
 Affairs, £2,088 ; Ministry of Finance, £1T,200; General Control, £14,101 ; Direction of the 
 Cadastral Survey, £26,T8T ; General Inspection of tHe Octrois, £2,TT0 ; LigM-house Service, 
 £10,239 ; Mint, £144 ; Ministry of War, £8,351 ; Ministry of Marine, £2,691 ; Ministry of 
 Public Instruction, £T,905 ; Administration of the Wakflj, £2,034; Ministry of the Interior, 
 £3,9T8 ; Government of Alexandria, £780 ; of Port Said, £8T0 ; of Suez, £163 ; of El Arish, 
 £84 ; Municipality of Alexandria, £540 ; Cairo Police, £1,567 ; Alexandria Police, £2,793 ; 
 Suppression of the Slave Trade, £2,052 ; Marine Sanitary Council and Quarantine, £5,290 ; 
 Council of Public Health, £6,084 ; Ministry of Justice, £6,848 ; Ministry of Public Works, 
 £26,216 ; Railroad Administration, £29,761 ; Telegraph Administration, £6,193 ; Port of 
 Alexandria, £3,681 ; Administration of Customs, £16,647 ; Administration of the Port, 
 £19,509; Postal steamer, £16,941 ; Salines, £162 ; Administration of the Public Domain, 
 £25,042; Daira Sanieh, £19,672; Public Debt, £16,227; Parquet Administration, £3,083; 
 Court of Appeals, £14,971 ; Alexandria Court of the First Instance, £22,344 ; Court of the 
 First Instance at Cairo, £14,212 ; Court of the First Instance at Mansiirah, £8'859. Total, 
 £373, 491. 
 
— 49 — 
 
 to alienate the Khedive from his people. Among them a national 
 feeling had been aroused. During 1881 this feeling was crystal- 
 lized into a recognized national movement, which was to culminate, 
 in 1882, in the cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians." There was 
 only one place where this movement could take form, and that 
 was in the army. Up to 1881 this was still composed almost 
 entirely of Egyptians ; but with the accession of Tewfik in 1879, 
 the army's grievances had begun. The Sultan, notwithstanding 
 the firman that Ismail had so dearly purchased, insisted upon en- 
 forcing military restrictions. The limit of enlistment was placed 
 at 18,000 men. Next to the interference of France or England, 
 that of the Porte was most unpopular among Egyptians. The 
 curtailment of the army, however, might have been endured ; but 
 the innovations that were begun with 1881 were unbearable. 
 The special grievance was the replacement of native officers by 
 Turks. The leading spirit among the disaffected troops was 
 Ahmed Arabi Bey. He had always been the friend of the fella- 
 hin, from whom he had sprung ; and it had been the work of his 
 life to secure their rights. Even under Ismail he had contem- 
 plated inciting a national movement ; but the time did not seem 
 ripe for it, and so he waited. Ismail had unjustly deprived Arabi 
 of his army rank, though he was afterward restored. But the 
 experience gave Arabi a sympathy for those officers, who, at the 
 beginning of 1881, were removed without cause, that Circassians 
 and Turks might be given places ; and he now became the cham- 
 pion of those who had been thus wronged. In February Arabi 
 and the other colonels demanded the dismissal of the Minister of 
 War, a Circassian who favored the Turks and hated the Arabs. 
 As soon as the Minister heard of the demand, he had Arabi and 
 two colleagues arrested ; but they were rescued from prison by 
 Arabi's regiment and borne off in triumph. The Circassian Os- 
 man was removed, and Mahmud Sami was appointed to his place. 
 For some months now the distrust existing between the military 
 party and the Khedive increased. The colonels feared assassina- 
 tion, and the Khedive a revolution. The rupture came on the 9th 
 of September, in the so-called "Insurrection of the Colonels." 
 On the morning of that day Arabi submitted a document to the 
 Khedive, calling for the dismissal of the entire ministry, for the 
 drafting of a constitution, and for the increase of the army to its 
 
— 50 — 
 
 limit, 18,000 men. On the afternoon of tlie same day, with 4,000 
 troops and eighteen cannon, the champion of the army marched 
 to the palace to get the Khedive's answer. Arabi intimated that, 
 if the demands were not met, Tewfik's successor would be forth- 
 coming. And still the Khedive demurred ; but only for a time. 
 He at length named a ministry ; which, however, was unsatisfac- 
 tory to Axabi. The latter demanded that the formation of the 
 Cabinet be left to Sherif Pasha. Sherif was second only to 
 Nubar among Egyptian statesmen ; but he utterly lacked the lat- 
 ter's firmness of character. This was to Arabi's liking; for he 
 wanted not a master, but a slave. Sherif was, moreover, a good 
 Mohamedan; and he was, therefore, better liked by the people 
 than Nubar, the Armenian. The Khedive gave way to the inevit- 
 able, and on the 14th of September Sherif formed a new ministry. 
 The foreign Powers now awoke to the apparent danger of a 
 still more formidable insurrection. As Mr. McCarthy rhetorically 
 stated it, * "a wondering world began to ask whether Arabi Bey 
 was the Cromwell of a great movement against an Egyptian 
 Charles ; the Garibaldi of a struggle for national liberty against a 
 foreign rule ; a scheming political adventurer, fighting for his own 
 hand like Hal of the Wynd, or only a puppet, whose actions were 
 guided by mysterious unseen strings." England was somewhat 
 alarmed, but not to the extent of wishing to intervene herself. 
 She wanted Turkey to send troops to Egypt to overawe the spirit 
 of insurrection. , But France would not consent to any kind of 
 Turkish intervention. The Sultan, however, was not to be baffled. 
 The wiley Abdul Hamid did not propose to let Egypt drift away 
 from his suzerainty again to the length that it had under Ismail. 
 He may not have had any determined policy. If he had we are 
 certainly ignorant of it. We simply know that he kept a jealous 
 guard of his authority. From this time on there were intimations 
 of mysterious signs of secret correspondence, first between 
 the Sultan and the Khedive, and afterward between the 
 Sultan and Arabi; but the signs were almost never sup- 
 plemented with proofs. Abdul Hamid, did, however, take 
 some steps openly that indicated a considerable degree of inde- 
 pendence. He announced on September 20th that he had 
 decided to send an emissary to Cairo. Both France and 
 
 * " England Under Gladstone," by Justin McCartliy, M. P., Chapter XIII. 
 
— 51 — 
 
 England protested, but notwithstanding this, he dispatched two 
 emissaries on October 3d. Two days after this Lord Granville, 
 the English Minister of Foreign Affairs, proposed to M. St. Hilaire, 
 who held the same portfolio for France, that the Khedive be, 
 advised to receive the envoys, but "firmly to oppose any interference 
 on their part in the internal administration of Egypt." * A joint 
 note to this effect was sent to the Khedive. 
 
 No sooner had the envoys arrived in Egypt than the feeling 
 against the unbelievers began to show itself more openly. It is 
 thought that the Sultan sent secret messages to encourage a show 
 of bitterness on the part of the students of the University of 
 Cairo, f The foreign population became alarmed at the evidences 
 of hatred and hostility. To reassure them, and to protect them- 
 if necessary, an English and a French vessel were sent at once to 
 Alexandria. This move naturally excited the disapproval of the 
 Sultan, but Lord Granville said through the English Ambassador 
 at Constantinople, that the war-ships must remain at Alexandria 
 so long as the envoys remained in Egypt. The Sultan hastily 
 decided, therefore, to recall the envoys, and they left Egypt on the 
 19th of October. Though their stay had been short, they had 
 succeeded in fomenting the ill-feeling against England. 
 
 It was known that France was occupied with the new acquisi- 
 tion of Tunis, and all attention was turned to England with fear 
 that she was bent on annexation. To allay this fear it became 
 necessary for the British Government, in November, to instruct 
 Sir Edward Mallet, her consular representative in Egypt, to assure 
 the Khedive's Government that the British policy was opposed to 
 intervention and foreign aggrandizement and would not favor the 
 separation of Egypt from Turkey, nor contend for more than the 
 fulfillment of the Sultan's firmans as already promulgated. It was 
 declared, however, that this policy would not be maintained if 
 disorders became prevalent. This was a firm note for Mr. Glad- 
 
 * Quoted from " Shall We Annex Egypt?" by William Stone, M.A. 
 
 t This great university has always been the hot-bed of Moslem fanaticism. When I 
 arrived in Egjpt, two months after the emissaries had been recalled, it was considered al- 
 most dangerous for foreigners to visit the university. A party of us went, however, and 
 suffered no other indignity than hisses from the students whenever our faces were turned 
 away. Some friends of mine were less fortunate in their visit a few weeks later. Not 
 only were they hissed, but missiles were thrown at them, and they were actually set upon 
 and driven from the place. The insult was prompted by the feeling that found vent a few 
 months later in the Massacre of Alexandria. 
 
— 52 — 
 
 stone's Government, whicli had not souglit a control in tlie affairs 
 
 of Egypt, but had been compelled, rather, by the circumstance of 
 
 governmental inheritance to accept what Disraeli bequeathed. 
 
 The note had the eftect of averting for a time the dread of British 
 
 occupation. The feeling of security was still further increased by 
 
 a joint letter addressed to the Khedive by Lord Granville and M. 
 
 Leon Gambetta, who has been called to the presidency of the French 
 
 Cabinet on the 14th of November. Its purpose was less to calm 
 
 the nationalists than to strengthen the Khedive's Government 
 
 against the military party. The letter declared that England and 
 
 France considered the maintenance of the Khedive's power the 
 
 sole guaranty of the present and future welfare of Egypt. 
 
 Soon after this, when all was apparently quiet in Egypt, 
 
 I visited that country. I speak of this in order to quote from 
 
 an article I wrote * describing an interview I was privileged to 
 
 have with the Khedive on the 2d of January, 1882, in which he 
 
 dwelt at some length upon the reforms he was endeavoring to 
 
 introduce. The following quotation will indicate, to a certain 
 
 extent, the Khedive's progressive ideas which we know to-day 
 
 were vainly uttered : 
 
 '• The Khedive desires and is aiming for three great reforms, religions, political and 
 educational. On the last he rightly laid the greatest stress. 'For,' said he, 'while the 
 people remain ignorant, reform in any direction is impossible ; but let learning be spread 
 among the people and throughout the land, and political and religious reform will follow 
 as a natural consequence in the path of educational advancement. For this reason,' said 
 he, » I am devoting my greatest energies to the spread of learning. The people must 
 know more than the Koran ;. they must know geography, and arithmetic, and algebra, and 
 the sciences, and the modern languages. All these pursuits and studies are now being 
 advanced; schools are being founded in all the large towns of Egypt, both Upper and 
 Lower, and now the numbers have increased from the tea or fifteen thousand I found on 
 my accession to between eighty and ninety thousand students. My own boys attend the 
 common schools; and, though princes to the world, they are there boys with the other 
 boys, and stand upon no different footing. Out of my own purse I have given fifteen 
 thousand pounds a year to the schools since I came to the throne. Often, too,' he said, 'I 
 go to the schools myself, and, if I say anything, I point to the United States for an exam- 
 ple. I say that its greatness is due to the education of the people, to their enterprise, to 
 their liberty of speech and freedom of thought; and I urge my people to become likewise 
 educated, free and great. Another reform that I am about to introduce is the education 
 of women. Heretofore they have always been ignorant, more like slaves and animals 
 than free women ; but now they, too, shall have their schools, and, being educated, they 
 can be better mothers to their sons, the coming children of a new Egypt. Soon, now, one 
 of these schools will be opened in Cairo, and I shall send there my own little daughter and 
 the daughters of the nobility of Egypt, and then the others will come. The women of 
 enlightened countries are on an equal footing with the men, and they must be here also ; 
 and, therefore, they must be educated. 
 
 * The Independent, February 2d, 1S82. 
 
53 
 
 "When travelers come here I do not wish them to look upon us as barbarians, but as 
 the most enlightened country of the Orient. We have been barbarous in some things; 
 but of these I wish to remove the last vestige, and I have already abolished some of the 
 moat atrocious practices of our religion. Last year I put an end to that barbarous cere- 
 mony of the Dosseh. Before then it was the custom, when the yearly pilgrims had re- 
 turned from Mecca, bearing the holy carpet, to have a great ceremony, most revolting 
 and barbarous. One hundred men would lie prostrate at the door of the mosque, with 
 head toward Mecca, and over their bodies would ride upon a horse the sheikh of the 
 mosque. Always from eighteen to twenty of this hundred were killed under the feet of 
 the horse. Europeans used to go in crowds to see this spectacle, and then call it barbar- 
 ous. It is true, it was barbarous, and was without authority from the Bible, the Koran, 
 or the Prophet ; and so I abolished it. People said a revolution would follow ; but we are 
 toetter for the change. 
 
 " Another change that I am working for is to make my people content with one wife. 
 I have but one myself, while my predecessor (my father) had many. I set the example I 
 wish my people to follow ; for, thank God, I make my own personal desire second to the 
 welfare of Egypt and my people. When the people tell me the Koran says a man may 
 have four wives, I tell them to read further on in the same book, where it says that the 
 man who is content with one wife wUl lead a better, purer, and happier life. As it is now, 
 family happiness is impossible. The children of one mother are jealous of those of another, 
 and the man cannot be the same husband to four wives that he would be to one. The man 
 and woman must be equal, and live their lives for each other and their chUdren. And this, 
 I say, is not inconsistent with, but the better interpretation of, our religion. 
 
 " Further, I desire to make my people liberal in regard to religious beliefs and respect- 
 ful toward Christians, Jews, and Mussulmans alike. They must not call the Christian the 
 Devil, as they have heretofore ; but must respect, if they do not believe. I myself am a 
 Mussiriman. I go to the mosque once a week; for, though;my father did not do so before 
 me, I, nevertheless, said when I came into power, that I would respect my religion and 
 live up to its teachings. But I encourage all religions. Here, in Cairo, I gave land on 
 which to build a Protestant mission, where the young might be instructed; also other 
 land on which to build a hospital, open to people of all religions ; and just within a few 
 days I have given land in Upper Egypt for the erection of another Protestant mission. All 
 this I do without changing my own religion or asking others to change theii-s. In fact, 
 when a person wrote me the other day that he would like to change his religion for mine, 
 I replied : Follow the teachings of your own religion and you will be good without any 
 change. It is difficult,' the Khodive went on, with a perceptible sadness in his voice, 
 < for me to do all that I would like to, or give my people all that I desire while other 
 Powers have their hands in my pockets. Still, I have decreased the royal expenses greatly 
 since I ascended the throne. My allowance is half a million dollars, and even out of this 
 I give considerable. My father before me spent between ten and fifteen millions yearly 
 In supportmg his five or six hundred women and a palace and household tdat rivaled the 
 Vatican for size. But I have great hopes for Egypt,' he concluded, ' and shall live and 
 work for her prosperity.' " 
 
 It will be admitted that these are views of an enlightened 
 ruler, even though subsequent events may have proved him a 
 weak one. The Khedive's Prime Minister, Sherif Pasha, said at 
 the same time : " Give us time for our reforms ; let us have ten 
 years of peaceful toiling, and Europe will be astonished at the 
 vitality of a long-suffering nation, at the prosperity and wealth, 
 the progress and rapid development of a country so long misgov- 
 erned and for ages kept in ignorance and in the bondage of servi- 
 3 
 
- 54 — 
 
 "tude."* But there were so many disturbing elements in the condi- 
 tion of affairs in Egypt that the dream of ''years of peaceful toil- 
 ing" was as vain as it was impossible of realization. 
 
 CHAPTER V. 
 
 Egypt for the Egyptians. 
 
 On the 4:th of January, 1882, Arabi Bey was taken into the 
 Cabinet as Assistant Minister of War. ' Just before this the 
 Chamber of Notables, strongly representative of the national 
 party, had convened on the summons of Sherif Pasha. Sherif at 
 once proposed a Parliamentary reorganization, wishing to intro- 
 duce the principle of ministerial responsibility and give the Nota- 
 bles full constitutional prerogatives. They were to be no longer 
 the mere consultative body that Ismail organized with his false 
 show of reform. The Notables had outgrown their former pious 
 regard for the will of the Khedive, and were not only willing to 
 accept all that Sherif offered, but demanded in addition that the 
 budget be submitted to them. This met with a quick opposition 
 on the part of the Comptrollers-General. The two Powers vetoed, 
 on the 7th of January, the demand for constitutional government. 
 Arabi and the Nationalists were incensed. They longed for con- 
 stitutional liberty, and knew not that it appears only as the result 
 of a slow internal growth, of which the germ had as yet barely 
 taken root in Egypt. Outside of the Copts, the Christian Syrians, 
 and the merchants of Cairo and Alexandria, there were few men 
 in Egypt who had the faintest conception of what was meant by 
 constitutional liberty. The Porte, however, not to neglect an op- 
 portunity to show its suzerainty, protested against the veto and 
 appealed to the other Powers. Gambetta was eager to make the 
 most of the complications, and proposed to England that they 
 should dispatch a joint expedition to Egypt to re-establish order. 
 England refused, and Gambetta's aggressiveness was cut short by 
 
 * Quoted from " The Belgium of the East." p. 138. 
 
— 55 — 
 
 the defeat of his Ministry. He was succeeded by De Freycinet, 
 whose policy was diametrically opposed to Gambetta's. The 
 new minister was for non-interference. He replaced the zealous 
 De Blignieres by M. Bredif, thus giving England the predomi- 
 nance in the control that goes with seniority. 
 
 While now the "Western Powers were occupied with diplomatic 
 negotiations with the Porte, the Chamber of Notables submitted 
 an alternative to Sharif Pasha : either he must accept their con- 
 stitutional demands or resign from the Ministry. He resigned, 
 and Mahmud Barudi formed a new cabinet with Arabi Bey as 
 Minister of War and Marine. The military party now took the 
 lead. Arabi and six other colonels were promoted to the rank of 
 ^general, with the title of Pasha. Some five hundred promotions 
 were made during three months. At the same time many Euro- 
 pean clerks were dismissed from their offices. Arabi's popularity, 
 meanwhile, was steadily increasing. In April he claimed to have 
 discovered a plot to assassinate himself and other generals. Some 
 £fty officers, many of them the still unpopular Circassians, and all 
 of them believed to be loyal to the Khedive, were arrested and 
 iried by court martial, and forty were sentenced to be banished 
 ior life to the White Nile — a sentence considered equivalent to 
 <3eath. This produced an agitation. The foreign consuls pro- 
 tested; the Sultan was fui'ious that the Circassians whom he had 
 himself decorated with favors should be thus dishonored ; and 
 the Khedive refused to give the sentence his signature. Finally, 
 Tiowever, he commuted the sentence to exile from Egypt. But 
 this displeased his Nationalist Ministry, who, on the 14th of May. 
 convoked the Chamber of Notable^ without the consent of the 
 Khedive. The Notables, however, refused to sit. At this juncture 
 England and France, who had reconciled their differences, gave 
 notice to the Powers that they were about to send a joint fleet to 
 Alexandria to uphold the authority of the Khedive and preserve 
 the status quo. And the Sultan, who slyly sought to ride on the 
 crest of every wave, sent a note to the Egyptian Ministry, chiding 
 them for summoning the Chamber unconstitutionally and rebuk- 
 ing them for their threat to oppose with force the landing of 
 Turkish troops in Egypt. This was considered by the Powers an 
 irregular communication on the part of the Porte. But the wily 
 Sultan was to be charged with more irregular notes than that. 
 
— 56 — 
 
 His alleged secret correspondence from this time on is believed to 
 have concealed many plots and intrigues. 
 
 On the 20th of May the united English and French squadrons 
 appeared in the harbor of Alexandria. Five days later the English 
 and French consuls demanded the dismissal of the Ministry and 
 the expatriation of Arabi. The ministers forthwith handed in. 
 their resignations ; but Arabi declared that he would remain at 
 the head of the army. In the meantime the fortifications about 
 Alexandria were increased and the harbor was put in a state of 
 defense. The guards at Cairo swore to oppose with force any 
 foreign intervention ; and the sheikhs and Bedawin of the desert 
 promised their support against European, but not against Turkish, 
 intervention. Lord Dufferin, the English Ambassador at Con- 
 stantinople, naively informed the Sultan that, as the Porte's au- 
 thority had never been called into question, it would not be nec- 
 essary for Turkish troops to co-operate to quell the fractious 
 spirit ; England and France would be quite equal to the task. The 
 poor Khedive, from the day he dismissed the Ministry, was beset 
 with trials and torments. He could not form a new Ministry, and 
 the utmost influence was brought to force him to reinstate Arabi 
 as Minister of War. The commanders of the Alexandria fortifica- 
 tion said they would obey the orders of no one but Arabi. Nota- 
 bles, sheikhs, ulemas, officers, urged and even demanded the rein- 
 statement. At Jength Tewfik was forced to give way. The Sul- 
 tan telegraphed that he would send a commissioner to Egypt to 
 investigate the troubles. France objected strenuously to his com- 
 ing, but England and the other Powers thought that he might 
 avert the impending danger. England, however, continued to op- 
 pose any military expedition from Turkey. De Freycinet felt that 
 France had been left in the liu'ch and proposed that a conference 
 of all the Powers be held at Constantinople to settle the Egyptian 
 question definitely. But in the meantime the Sultan had dis- 
 patched Dervish Pasha to Egypt to lend support, as he announced, 
 to the Khedive. 
 
 The commissioner arrived on the 8th of June. His presence 
 had no quieting effect. Arabi was the only Minister who had 
 been appointed ; and he was, in fact, the hero and the autocrat of 
 the hour. But, through the influence of Dervish, a ministry was 
 formed favorable to the Khedive, with Ragheb as President. It 
 
— 57 — 
 
 was, l^wever, powerless to still the tumult of passion that had 
 been aroused in Egypt during the past few months. Hatred of 
 the Christians was shouted through the streets.* The people 
 who had cowered before the kurbash during all the woes of Is- 
 mail's reign, who had seen the wealth of the Nile valley melt away 
 before their eyes year after year, who had abjectly begged for 
 baclcsheesh from every stranger in their land, now sprung to a po- 
 sition of independence and defiance. Fanaticism was burning 
 to its utmost intensity. It became a flame of fury on the llth of 
 June, in the massacre at Alexandria. 
 
 Just what the immediate cause of that outbreak was, is a dis- 
 puted point. It is claimed, on the one hand, that it began by a 
 Maltese stabbing an Arab ; and, on the other, that the massacre 
 was preconcerted, being countenanced by Arabi himself. Colonel 
 Long, who was in Cairo at the time, saysf that a secret council 
 was held in that city on the evening before the massacre, which 
 Arabi and several of the notables attended. One of the number, 
 who had openly preached the duty of massacre in the raosques of 
 Alexandria, arrived in that city before the hour of the slaughter. 
 The troops at Alexandria, who had proclaimed that they would 
 obey the orders of no one but Arabi, turned their bayonets against 
 the Europeans and aided the Arabs in the massacre. The police 
 joined the same mad throng. These facts would seem to point to- 
 ward complicity on the part of Arabi. The massacre was as horrible in 
 its way as the massacre of the Memluks in 1811, or the Syrian 
 massacre of 1860. The Oriental is frenzied at the sight of blood, 
 and impelled to the most atrocious crimes. His fury does not 
 spend itself ; it is only checked when the opportunity of blood- 
 shed is exhausted or some force interposed. The Maltese, the 
 Greeks, and other Europeans banded together, and offered, at 
 last, an effectual resistance ; but not before about a hundred of 
 their number had been butchered, and some five hundred Arabs 
 had been killed. 
 
 Abuse was heaped upon the English and French Admirals, who 
 had offered no assistance to the Europeans of Alexandria, although 
 they had witnessed the outrages and had sufficient force on the 
 ships, within sight, to quell the disturbance. Their boats were 
 
 '"The Three Prophets." By Col. C. Chaille Long. Page 119. 
 nbU. Page 120. 
 
— 58 — 
 
 ready to land tlie marines, but the Admirals could not act with- 
 out orders from their Governments. So they said, at least ; but 
 they might as well have claimed that they should not take in sail 
 at the approach of a hurricane except by governmental sanction. 
 As Colonel Long says :* " It is difficult to understand the hesitan- 
 cy of an officer to assume responsibility, however great, in the 
 presence of a great crime like this committed against humanity." 
 
 The massacre created, naturally, a panic among the Europeans 
 in Egypt. They fled from Cairo to Alexandria, and from Alexan- 
 dria they took passage in any craft that would bear them from the 
 scene of crime and the seat of danger. It was a stampede for 
 life, with no thought of the property forsaken. The Khedive, on 
 the 13th of June, accompanied by Dervish Pasha, went to Alexan- 
 dria to endeavor to restore quiet by his presence. He formed a 
 new Ministry at the dictation of the German and Austrian Con- 
 suls on the 16th, giving Arabi his old place as Minister of War, 
 and retaining Ragheb as President of the Council. But England 
 and France refused to recognize the Ministry. The Khedive was 
 in despair. His departure from Cairo had left Arabi the virtual 
 ruler there. The latter was at the high tide of his power. The 
 Sultan, immediately after the massacre, had conferred a great 
 honor upon him by investing him with the order of the Medjidieh. 
 Dervish Pasha, the Sultan's representative, was believed to be 
 working in his behalf, and to be fomenting rebellion. Arabi said 
 himself when, nJonths later, his power was gone : " The Sultan, 
 the real sovereign of this country, also sided with us, and loaded 
 us with marks of his approbation. His representative concurred 
 in our resistance, and his trusted officers exhorted us to defend 
 the country from what they termed the rapacity of England. 
 The opening acts of the war were carried on in his name."! So 
 far back as February the Chaplain to the Sultan had written to 
 Arabi : "In a special and secret manner I may tell you that the 
 
 Sultan has no confidence in Ismail, Halim, or Tewfik 
 
 His Majesty has expressed his full confidence in you.":}: During 
 the flight of Europeans, Arabi was sounding his cry of " Egypt 
 
 *" The Three Prophets." Page 129. 
 
 t" Instructions to My Counsel." The Nineteenth Century. December, 1S82. By Ahmed 
 Arabi. 
 
 JQuoted from Arabi's papers in Broadley's "How We Defended Arabi." Pages 169 
 and 170. 
 
— 59 — 
 
 for the Egyptians," and was exercising the utmost activity possi- 
 ble in military preparations. The warlike spirit had spread 
 throughout the country, and recruits and money were pouring in. 
 Work on the fortifications at Alexandria was pushed with renewed 
 vigor. 
 
 Meanwhile the Conference of Powers had met at Constantino- 
 ple on June 23d; but nothing had been accomplished. The 
 Porte would not commit itself to policy or to action. It is proba- 
 ble, however, that it contemplated the restoration of all its old power 
 in Egypt. England, at all events, feared this. The possibility of 
 such a thing was a menace to the Indian Empire. While, therefore, 
 the Conference was slowly seeking a solution of difficulties, Eng- 
 land resolved to take decisive action ; not so much, as has been 
 held by some, to mete out punishment for the Alexandrian massa- 
 cre as to protect her interests in Egypt and the farther East. 
 But, whatever her motives, she acted in the service of the world's 
 civilization when she set her face against the Sultan's restoration 
 of power in Egypt. 
 
 On the 6th of July, Sir Beauchamp Seymour, the Admiral of 
 the British fleet, at Alexandria, protested against the continued 
 work on the fortifications about the harbor, and announced to the 
 military governor, Tulba, that, unless the work ceased, he would 
 open fire upon the fortresses. Tulba replied that the Admij;al's 
 assertions as to the work of fortifying were unfounded. But elec- 
 tric lights from the British vessels discovered the Egyptian sol- 
 diers hard at work by night. On the 10th, Admiral Seymour sent 
 a second message : "I shall carry out the intention expressed to 
 you in my letter of the 6th inst., at sunrise to-morrow, the 11th 
 inst., unless, previous to that hour, you shall have^temporarily sur- 
 rendered to me, for the pvirpose of disarming the batteries on the 
 isthmus of Ras-el-Tin and the southern shore of the harbor of 
 Alexandria." The Khedive's Prime Minister replied to this, re- 
 fusing to comply with the Admiral's demands, whereupon the lat- 
 ter sent a brief message containing the implication that his threat 
 would be carried out. These messages had not been exchanged 
 without creating great alarm among the Exiropeans who still 
 remained in Egypt. The Consuls appealed to the Admiral for 
 delay and sought to mediate, and the Porte, through its London 
 Ambassador, demanded that the bombardment be interdicted ; 
 
— 60 — 
 
 but the Admiral's determination remained unaltered. Endeavors 
 were now made to put all remaining foreigners on shipboard. 
 Many had lingered in Cairo, loth to leave their posts or their 
 property. The notice given them was short — so short that 
 Admiral Seymour has been bitterly blamed for his haste.* 
 The impending bombardment, it was known, would be avenged on 
 any unfortunate foreigners who might thereafter fall into Arab 
 hands. 
 
 Late on the afternoon of July 10th, all the vessels in the Alex- 
 andrian harbor, except the British fleet, weighed anchor, and 
 passed out to sea, their decks swarming with refugees of many 
 nationalities. The French fleet was among the departing ships. 
 If a Gambetta had been Premier of the French Government, 
 Admiral Conrad would have remained. He would have insisted 
 upon joint action or joint inaction. But De Freycinet was weak. 
 After seeing the disfavor with which France had suflered interven- 
 tion in Tunis, he feared to sanction intervention in Egypt. And 
 so Admiral Conrad and his fleet sailed avs^ay; and France, as the 
 sequel has shown, passed from a controlling power in Egypt. 
 
 The story, from a military point of view, of the bombardment 
 of Alexandria, is best told from the official reportsf of Admiral 
 Seymour. He wrote the following from his flagship Tnvincihle, 
 on the 20th of July: 
 
 " At 7 A.M., on the llth, I signaled from tie Invincible to the Alexandria to fire a shell 
 into the recently armed earthworks, termed the Hospital Battery, and followed this by a 
 general signal to the fleet, 'Attack the enemy's batteries ! ' when immediate action ensued 
 between all the ships in the positions assigned to them, and the whole of the forts com- 
 manding the entrance to the harbor of Alexandria. A steady flre was maintained on all 
 sides until 10:30 a.m., when the Sultan, Superb, and Alexandria, which had been hitherto 
 under way, anchored off the Light-House Port, and by their well-directed fire, assisted by 
 that of the Inflexible, which weighed and joined them at 12:30 p.m., succeeded in silencing 
 most of the guns in the forts on Eas-el-Tin ; still some heavy guns in Port Ada kept up a 
 desultory flre. About 1:30 p.m., a shell from the Superb, whose practice in the afternoon 
 was very good, blew up the magazine, and caused the retreat of the remaining garrison. 
 These ships then directed their attention to Port Pharos, which was silenced with the as- 
 sistance of the Temeraire, which joined them at 2:30 p.m., when a shot from the Inflexible 
 dismounted one of the heavy guns. The Hospital Battery was well fought throughout ; and, 
 although silenced for a time by a shell from the Inflexible, it was not until 5 p.m. that the 
 
 * Vide Introduction to " Panny Stone's Diary," by Stone Pasha, in The Century Maga- 
 zine for June, 1884. 
 
 t These official reports, as well as detailed descriptions of the defenses of Alexandria 
 and of the attacking fleet, and statements of the effect of the flght upon ships and fortifica- 
 tions, are given by Lieut.-Commander Casper P. Goodrich, of the U. S. Navy, in his 
 " Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt." 
 
— 61 — 
 
 artillerymen were compelled to retire from their guns by the Are of the off-shore squadron 
 and the Inflexible. The Invincible, with my flag, supported by the Penelope, both ships be- 
 ing at anchor, the latter on one occasion shifting berth, and assisted by the Jl/onarc/t, under 
 way inside the reefs, as well as by the Inflexible and Temeraire in the Boghaz and Corvette 
 Channels, succeeded, after an engagement of some hours, in silencing and partially 
 destroying the batteries and lines of Mex. Fort Marsa-el-Khanat was destroyed by the ex- 
 plosion of the magazine after half an hour's action with the Monarch. 
 
 " About 2 P.M., seeing that the gunners of the western lower battery of Mex had aban- 
 doned their guns, and that the supports had probably retired to the citadel, I called in the 
 gun-vessels and gnn-bcats, and under cover of their Are landed a party of twelve volun- 
 teers, under the command of Lieut. B. E. Bradford, of the Invincible, accompanidd by 
 Lieut. Richard Poore, of that ship, . . . [and three others] . . . who got on shore 
 through the surf, and destroyed, with charges of gun-cotton, two 10-inch M. L. E. guns, 
 and spiked six smooth-bore guns in the right-hand water battery at Mex, and returned 
 without a casualty beyond the loss of one of their boats {Bittern's diugy) on the roots. 
 This was a hazardous operation very well carried out. Previous to this, after the action 
 Tiad become general. Commander Lord Charles Beresf ord, of the Condor, stationed as re- 
 peatmg ship, seeing the accuracy with which two 10-inch rifled guns in Fort Marabout 
 were playing upon the ships engaged off Fort Mex, steamed up to within range of his 7-inch 
 90 cwt. gun, and by his excellent practice soon drew off the fire. I then ordered him to be 
 supported by the Beacon, Bittern, Cygnet, and Decoy, the Cygnet having been engaged with 
 the Eas-el-Tin forts during the early part of the day. I am happy to say, during the action, 
 no casualties happened to those vessels, owing, in a great measure, to the able manner in 
 which they were maneuvered, and their light draught enabling them to take up their posi- 
 tions on the weakest point of the batteries. The action generally terminated successfully 
 at 5:30 P.M., when the ships anchored for the night. 
 
 " The force opposed to us would have been more formidable had every gun mounted 
 on the line of works been brought into action ; but in the Eas-el-Tin batteries, few of the 
 large smooth-bores, and fewer still of the French 36-pounders, bought in the time of Mehemet 
 Ali, were manned, the Egyptians preferring to use the English 10-inch, 9-inch, S-inch, and 
 smaller muzzle-loading rifled guns. These guns are precisely the same as those which her 
 Majesty's ships carry, and no better muzzle-loading guns can be found. They were 
 abundantly, even lavishly, supplied with projectiles of the latest description, chilled shot, 
 and the sighting of the guns was excellent. The same may be said of the guns in the Mex 
 Lines, excepting that in them the 36-pounders were more used, and that one, if not two, 
 15-inch smooth-bores were brought into action, in addition to the 10- inch, 9- inch, and 
 smaller M. L. E. guns fired. Fort Jlarabout brought two 10-inch M. L. E. guns into action 
 at long range, shell after shell of which came up toward the in-shore squadron in an ex- 
 cellent line, falling from ten to thirty yards short. Not one shell from the guns in the 
 southern batteries burst on board her Majesty's ships during the day." 
 
 Though the Arabs' shells failed, their other shot took effect. 
 The Alexandra was struck twenty-five times, and the Invincible 
 was pierced by six shots. The shells from the ships burst, maiiy 
 of them, over or in the city, destroying much property. The Eng- 
 lish loss for the day was six killed and twenty.seven wounded. 
 The Arab loss was much greater. At least one hundred and fifty 
 men in the forts were killed ; but trustworthy information as to 
 their casualties is wanting. The Arabs stood by their guns with 
 an undreamed-of courage ; for the forts were not silenced till 
 the gunners had been killed. On the 12th of July the firing was 
 resumed. Admiral Seymour said, in his dispatch : 
 
— 62 — 
 
 " On the morning of the 12tli 1 ordered the Temeraire and Inflexible to engage Fort 
 Pharos, and after two or three shots had been flred a flag of truce was hoisted on Fort 
 Kas-el-Tin, and I then sent my flag lieutenant, the Honorable Hedworth Lambton, in to 
 discover the reason, and, from his report, there is no doubt it was simply a ruse to gain 
 time ; and, as negotiations failed, my demand being to surrender the batteries command- 
 ing the Boghaz Channel, one shot was flred into the Mex Barracks Battery earthwork, 
 when a flag of truce was again hoisted. I then sent Lieutenant and Commander Morri- 
 son into the harbor, in the Helicon, and on his going on board the Kh6dive's yacht, the 
 Itahrussa, he found she had been deserted, and he reported, on his return after dark, his. 
 belief that the town had been evacuated." 
 
 Such, indeed, was the fact. Arabi had gone, but the Khedive 
 had remained. The Khedive had presided at a Cabinet Council, held 
 at Ras-el-Tin, on the morning of the 10th, and had given his sanc- 
 tion to the proposed defense of the city. That evening, accom- 
 panied by Dervish Pasha, and his immediate household, he retired 
 to the palace of Ramleb, where he remained during the bombard- 
 ment. On the afternoon of the 12th he sent to Admiral Seymoui', 
 imploring his protection. Arabi claimed that by this act the Khe- 
 dive basely deserted his people. But Tewfik feared for his life. A 
 band of soldiers had sought entrance to the palace, asserting that 
 they had Arabi's instructions to murder the Khedive. Arabi is 
 said to have countermanded this order, and to have stationed a. 
 guard about the palace, when he determined to evacuate the city. 
 Another story states that Tewfik bought his life with bribes and 
 orders of distinction. At all events the trembling Tewfik re- 
 mained at Ramleh while Arabi withdrew his forces and his follow- 
 * 
 
 ers along the Mahmudieh Canal. 
 
 And now the fair city of Alexandria became such a scene of 
 pillage, massacre, and wanton destruction as to make the world 
 shudder. It was the old tale of horrors. Houses were plun- 
 dered and burned; the European quarter, including the state- 
 ly buildings surrounding the Great Square of Mehemet 
 Ali, was sacked, and left a heap of smoldering ruins ; and 
 more than two thousand Europeans, for the most part 
 Levantines, were massacred with all the cruelty of oriental 
 fanaticism. This was on the afternoon of the 12th. It was 
 the second massacre that had occurred under the very eyes of 
 the British fleet. The Admiral's failure to prevent it has been 
 called unfortunate by some, and criminal by others. It seems 
 to have been wholly without excuse. The most plausible pallia- 
 
— 63 — 
 
 tion of the neglect is found in Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich's 
 " Keport," but even that carries its blame. He sajs :* 
 
 " A few hundred men comld have seized and held the place on July 12th, so great was 
 the fear on the part of the Egyptians, both soldiers and citizens, caused by the bombard- 
 ment—a fear not known, at the time, to the British Commander-in-chief. In consequence 
 of the lack of information, this memorable battle was followed by one of the most shock- 
 ing, wanton, and deplorable catastrophes of the century," 
 
 The blue-jackets were landed on the 13 bh, and cleared the way 
 before them with a Gatling gun. The next day, more ships having 
 arrived, a sufficient force was landed to take possession of the en- 
 tii-e city. The Khedive was escorted back to Ras-el-Tin from 
 Ramleh, and given a strong guard. Summary justice was dealt 
 out to all hostile Arabs who had been captared in the city. In 
 short, English intervention was followed by English occupation. 
 
 The bombardment of Alexandria had defined clearly the re- 
 spective positions of Arabi and the Khedive toward Egypt and the 
 Egyptian people. The soldiers and the sympathy of the land were 
 with Arabi. His cry was, " Egypt for the Egyptians," and these 
 words embodied everything that was held dear and sacred by the 
 people. The Khedive was not only weak in the eyes of his people, 
 but he was regarded as the tool of England. He had deserted his 
 soldiers and fallen on his knees to beg the protection of unbe- 
 liever s. From the moment the first shot was fired upon Alexan- 
 dria Arabi was the real raler of the people. But England could 
 never suffer Egypt to exist solely " for the Egyptians." With 
 France she had placed Tewfik on the throne to protect the inter- 
 ests of her bondholders, and to secure her power in and over the 
 country along side of which flowed the chiefest artery of her com- 
 mercial life. Her duty and her interest compelled the re-estab- 
 lishment of Tewfik's power. He was the nominal ruler, and must 
 onee more be made so in fact. If Arabi refused to end his prepa- 
 rations for war at the bidding of the Khedive, and persisted in op- 
 posing the defenders of the Khedive, then he was a rebel and the 
 leader of rebellion, and he must be compelled by force to submit. 
 Such was the reasoning that led England to play the role of the 
 Khedive's defender, and to prepare for a war in Egypt. 
 
 The Conference at Constantinople was stirred by the news of 
 
 • Page 75. 
 
— 64 
 
 the bombardment of Alexandria. It presented a note to tlie Porte, 
 on the 15th of July, requesting the dispatch of Turkish troops to 
 restore the status quo in Egypt. But the Sultan had no idea of 
 taking the part of the Christian in what all Islam regarded as a 
 contest between the Moslem and the unbeliever. Arabi had called 
 himself the defender of the faith. He and his followers were the 
 soldiers of the Prophet. The ulemas and dignitaries of the mosques 
 of Stambul advised the Sultan not to risk his Caliphate by oppos- 
 ing the heroes of the Mohammedan faith. And so Abdul-Hamid 
 deliberated and delayed. France was uneasy at the prospect of 
 war, and Gambetta, now the leader of the opposition, was furious 
 at the prospect of being out of the row. He appealed to the 
 Prench Chamber to insist upon dual intervention, but in vain- 
 Eve a the timid De Preycinet went farther than the Chamber would 
 sanction. He proposed to confine operations to the protection of 
 the Saez Canal, and applied for a supplementary credit in order 
 to undertake the necessary military preparations. But the credit 
 was denied, and he resigned on the 24th of July. A ministry with 
 a policy of positive inactivity was formed by M. Duclerc. Con- 
 trasted to the strange inertness of Prance was the attempt at in- 
 terference on the part of Russia, Austria, and Italy. Eussia would 
 have given Egypt to England if she could have won the Bosphorus 
 as an offset ; but Prince Bismarck did not approve the contem- 
 plated annexation by Russia, and his power over Austria and Italy 
 was such as to «nable him to frustrate the plan. The Sultan ap- 
 pealed to Bismarck to support the Porte against England as well ; 
 but this the German chancellor declined to do, telling the Sultan 
 that he must yield to the inevitable in Egypt. And thus the 
 diplomatic contest was left to the chief combatants, England and 
 Turkey. 
 
 In Egypt, the Khedive had been prevailed upon, after some 
 demur, to proclaim Arabi a rebel and discharge him from his 
 Cabinet. Arabi had issued a counter-proclamation, on the same 
 day, declaring Tewfik a traitor to his people and his religion. 
 Having received the news of the Khedive's proclamation, Lord 
 Dufferin, the British ambassador at Constantinople, announced to 
 the Conference that England wa^ about to send an expedition to 
 Egypt to suppress the rebellion and to restore the authority of the 
 Khedive. Thereupon the Sultan declared that he had decided to 
 
— 65 — 
 
 send a Turkish expedition. Lord Dufierin feigned to accept the 
 Sultan's co-operation, but demanded that the Porte, as a pre- 
 liminary step, should declare Arabi a rebel. Again the Sultan was 
 confronted with the danger of incurring the wrath of the Moslem 
 world. He could not declare Arabi a rebel. He was manifestly 
 in an uncomfortable position. His sympathies were with Arabi. 
 But if he fought he must fight against him ; for he could not op- 
 pose England ; and if he kept out of the fray he must suffer the 
 humiliation of seeing a foreign force settle the affairs of his suze- 
 rainty. He was between two fires. In his desperation he sent a 
 force of three thousand men to Suda Bay with orders to hold them- 
 selves in readiness to enter Egypt at a moment's notice. Lord 
 Dufferin now submitted a proposal for co-operation, naming the 
 following conditions : 
 
 " 1. Ttat the Turkish contingent sliould be restricted to 5,000 men. 2. That it should 
 land at Abukir, Damietta, or Rosetta. 3. That its movements and operations should be 
 regulated by a previous agreement between the English and Turkish commanders. 4. 
 That a Turkish military commissioner should be attached to the English headquarters 
 and an English commissioner to the Turkish headquarters ; and, 5. That the English and 
 Turkish troops should evacuate Egypt simultaneously."* 
 
 The representatives of the Porte in the Conference would not 
 accept these conditions, wishing any Turkish expedition to act in- 
 dependently of England. In the meantime, however, the English 
 expedition had arrived in Egypt, and was proceeding to crush the 
 rebellion, regardless of the diplomatic delays and bickerings at 
 Constantinople . 
 
 CHAPTER VI. 
 
 Arabi's Rebellion, and the Reforms that Followed. 
 
 For a month after the bombardment, the British army at 
 Alexandria was satisfied simply to hold its position. Lieutenant- 
 Commander Goodrich describes the role it played during this 
 time as " of a negative character, in the main consisting in an 
 efficient if passive defense of the city against the Egyptians en- 
 camped and intrenched at King Osman and Kafr Dowar."t Several 
 
 * Quoted from Appleton's Annual Cyclopcedia, for 1882, p. 250. 
 t" Report," p. 8T. 
 
— 66 — 
 
 sorties, however, were made on the armed railway trains ; but 
 there was scarcely an engagement worthy the name. On the 21st 
 of July an army corps, under the command of General Sir Garnet 
 Wolseley, had been ordered to Egypt, and pending his arrival the 
 army of occupation preserved, for the most j)art, an attitude of 
 defense, though making an occasional reconnoissance. On the 28th 
 of July the British Parliament formally recognized the prepara- 
 tions for war by a vote of two million three hundred thousand 
 pounds for the expense of the expedition. It was not until the 
 15th of August that Sir Garnet Wolseley arrived with his force* 
 in Egypt. The English at that time held only two points, Alex- 
 andria and Suez, while the entire Egyptian interior, as well as 
 Port Said and Ismailia, were held by Arabi, whose force, it was 
 estimated, now amounted to about 70,000 men, of whom at least 
 50,000 were regulars. 
 
 The objective point of General Wolseley's expedition to crush 
 Arabi, was, of course, the city of Cairo. There were two ways of 
 approaching that city, one from Alexandria, through the Delta, 
 and the other from the Suez Canal. There were many objections 
 to the former route. The Delta was intersected by a net-work of 
 canals, dikes, ditches, and railways, all of which were in Arabi's 
 hands, and made the region easily defensible. la fact, the banks 
 of the canals and dikes were natural fortifications as they stood. 
 On the other hand, the way from Ismailia, the central station of 
 the Suez Cana?, to Cairo, was along an unobstructed and single 
 railway route. Then, too, the desert by the latter route was com- 
 paratively free from the pestilential^diseases of the Delta. Owing 
 to the Sweet Water Canal, the question of water presented no 
 difficulties. There was, however, an obstacle to the choice of 
 Ismailia as a base of operations ; but it was a piu*ely moral one, 
 and was easily overcome, or, rather, disregarded. The Suez Canal 
 was supposed to be neutral water. Count Ferdinand De Lesseps, 
 the President of the Suez Canal Company, assiu'ed Arabi, whom 
 he met at Ismailia, after the opening of hostilities, that England 
 would so regard it, and thus prevented Arabi from establishing 
 
 * Lieutenant-Commander Goodricli (" Report," p. 104) gives the following totals of tlie 
 principal corps under General Wolseley's command: Infantry, 15,642 (officers and men) ; 
 cavalry, 2,304; artillery, including siege trains, 2,435; engineers, 1,161; commissariat 
 and transport coii)S, 1,298 ; army hospital corps, 313 ; army medical department, 429. The 
 Indian contingent brought the total number of men up to about 35,000. 
 
— 67 — 
 
 Egyptian fortifications along the canal. But England felt no 
 obligation to recognize any neutrality. De Freycinet's scheme to 
 enforce the neutrality had cost him his premiership, and there was 
 little force in the orders and threats of the President of the Canal 
 Company. England, therefore, consulted simply her own inter- 
 ests, acting upon the principle, which is doubtless sound, and will 
 b)e so long as might makes right, that "the neutrality of any canal 
 joining the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans will be main- 
 tained, if at all, by the nation which can place and keep the strong- 
 est ships at each extremity."* In other words. General Wolseley de- 
 cided to enter Cairo by way of the Suez Canal and IsmaUia. 
 
 But he kept his plan a profound secret. Admiral Seymour 
 alone knew his purpose. On the 18th of August, all the orders for 
 an attack on Abukir, where Arabi's force was concentrated, were 
 issued, and concerning this plan rumors were purposely allowed 
 to reach the newspaper correspondents. On the 19th, the tran- 
 sports moved eastward from Alexandria, >as if to attack Abukir : 
 but under the cover of darkness that night, they were escorted on 
 to Port Said, where they learned that the entire canal, owing to 
 the preconcerted action of Admiral Seymour, was in the hands of 
 the British. On the 21st, the troops met Sir Henry McPherson's 
 Indian contingent at Ismailia. Two days were now consumed in 
 rest and jJi^eparation. The Egyptians had cut off the water sujd- 
 ply, which came from the delta by the Sweet "Water Canal, by dam- 
 ming the canal. A sortie to secure possession of the dam was 
 therefore deemed necessary, and was successfully made on the 
 24th. Fiu'ther advances were made, and on the 26th, Hassassin, 
 a station of some importance on the canal and railway, was occu- 
 pied. Here the British force was obliged to delay for two weeks, 
 while organizing a hospital and a transport service. This gave 
 Aiabi opportunity to concentrate his forces at Zagazig and 
 Tel-el-Kebir. But he knew that it was for his interest to strike at 
 once before the British transports could come up with the advance. 
 He, therefore, made two attempts, one on August 28th, and the 
 other, on September 9th, to regain the position lost at Hassassin. 
 But he failed! in both, though inflicting some loss upon his oppo- 
 nents. 
 
 *Stated thus in Goodrich's " Report," p. 125. 
 
 tArabi could not recognize defeat. His dispatches to the Ministry of War at Cairo 
 concerning the engagement of September 9th, are, to say the least, amusing. In one he 
 
— 68 — 
 
 On tlie 12tli of September preparations were made by General 
 Wolseley for a decisive battle. He had become convinced* from 
 daily reconnoissance and from the view obtained in the engage- 
 ment of September 9th, that the fortifications at Tel-el-Kebir 
 were both extensive and formidable. Against an enemy so strong- 
 ly intrenched, and whose force consisted of about 38,000 men and 
 fifty-nine siege-guns, it would have been folly to advance across 
 an open desert ; and it was therefore decided to make the approach 
 under cover of darkness. All possible precautions were taken to 
 guard against alarm. Bugle calls and fires were prohibited after 
 nightfall, and strict silence was enjoined. The camp was struck 
 as noiselessly as possible, and at 1:30 on the morning of the 13th 
 General Wolseley gave the order for the advance, his force con- 
 sisting of about 11,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalrymen, and sixty field 
 guns. They had only the stars to guide them ; but, so accurately 
 v/as the movement conducted, that the leading brigades of each 
 division reached the enemy's outposts within two minutes of each 
 other. " The enemy," says General Wolseley,! " were completely 
 surprised, and it was not until one or two of their advanced sen- 
 tries fired their rifles that they realized our close proximity to 
 their works. These were, however, very quickly lined with infan- 
 
 said (wide Goodricti's "Report," p. 144): "At sunrise the enemy came out with infantry, 
 cavalry, and artillery, and firing began, and continued on both sides for about an hour. 
 Then the Arabs charged like lions, displaying a courage and bravery which enabled them 
 to drive back the inemy, who were much more numerous than ourselves. Then they 
 followed the enemy, driving them until they had killed about 100 of them [the British 
 offlcialreport says two], and dispersed the rest, driving them back into their tents. The 
 Arabs captured their oxen, about 500 meters of torpedo- wire, and other military stores, and 
 then returned to their posts victorious. This engagement, including the attack and the 
 pursuit, lasted about six hours. , . . Thanks be to God, not one of the Arabs nor of the 
 soldiers was wounded. Give this news to those under your administrat'on." Three days- 
 after, he sent another dispatch, with a different statement as to casualties : " I give you 
 good news, which will cause you joy, and will delight each individual of the people — 
 namely, that the engagement of Saturday (9th of September) was the most serious battle 
 that has yet taken place between us and the English ; for the force of both armies was very 
 great, and the fighting lasted for twelve hours, with impetuosity and daring, while the 
 cannonade and the discharge of musketry were unceasing, poiuring down like rain on the 
 field of battle. Still, we lost only thirty-one men, martyrized, and 150 were slightly, not 
 dangerously, wounded, according to the ofllcial returns presented by the various regiments,, 
 witn gi-eat exactness and precision. It had been thought that our casualties would have 
 been double that number, owing to the seriousness of the engagement and its long dura- 
 tion. Moreover, from true observation, it has been proved to us that the number of the 
 enemy killed and remaining on the field of battle is about 2,500, and their carts were in- 
 sufficient for carrying off the wounded," etc. 
 
 * Vide his official report of the battle of Tel-el-Kebir, dated Cairo, September 16th, 18S2. 
 
 t/6id. 
 
— 69 — 
 
 try, who opened a deafening musketry fire, and tlieir guns came 
 into action immediately. Our troops advanced steadily without 
 firing a shot, in obedience to the orders they had received ; and, 
 when close to the works, went straight for them, charging with a 
 ringing cheer." The intrenchents were not carried without a se- 
 vere struggle. The Egyptians fought with a desperate coirrage, 
 and hundreds of them were bayoneted at their posts. " More in- 
 telligence," declares Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich,* " and less 
 downright cowardice in the upper grades might have converted 
 these men into a formidable army." But what could the rank and 
 file accomplish when " each officer knew that he would run, but 
 hoped his neighbor would stay."t At the first shot Arabi and his 
 second in command took horse and galloped to Belbeis, where 
 they caught a train for Cairo. Most of the other officers, as the 
 reports of killed and wounded show, did the same. 
 
 The Egyptians fired their first shot at 4:55 A. m., and at 6:45 
 the English had possession of Arabi's headquarters and the canal 
 bridge. The British loss was fifty-seven killed, 380 wounded, and 
 twenty-two missing. The Egyptian army left about 2,000 of their 
 number dead in the fortifications. There is no report of the 
 wounded ; but they probably were not proportionate to the num- 
 ber killed ; for, if rumor is to be trusted, the wounded were not 
 spared by the British saber and bayonet. There was, however, 
 some excuse for the alleged cruelty on the part of the attacking 
 troojjs. An Egyptian, like the wild beast of the jungle, gets an 
 added ferocity and desperation with each wound. " So many 
 cases are authenticated," says Lieutenant-Commander Goodrich,:}: 
 of the virulence displayed by the Egyptian wounded, that it is 
 demonstrated, beyond question, that many of these fellows not 
 only shot at the stretchermen engaged in carrying off the injured, 
 but, in some cases, actually killed the very Englishmen who had 
 stopped to give them water or to bind their wounds." The same 
 author makes the following observations upon the battle from a 
 military point of view:§ 
 
 " In view of the decisiveness of tbe victory, comment appears unnecessary. It may be 
 alleged that the mode of attack adopted was hazardous to the degree of imprudence ; that 
 
 *Keport. Page 15T. 
 
 ■\ldem. 
 
 tldcm, 
 
 iTdem. Page 158. 
 
— 70 — 
 
 no commander would dare to employ sucli tactics on European territory; that a niglit 
 marcli of nine miles could only be followed by a properly disposed and immediate assault 
 under circumstances so exceptional as to be providential. It must, however, be remem- 
 bered that General Wnlseley understood his enemy, knew his military habits and numbers, 
 as well as the ground intervening ; had a fairly good idea of his intrenchments, a just 
 appreciation of his morale, a strong conviction as to the proper manner of engaging him, 
 anfi confidence in the officers and men of his own command. What he would have done 
 had the enemy been of a different character, is another question, whose consideration does 
 not come within the province of this report. It seems a sufficient answer to such criticisms 
 as are briefly referreci to above, to remark that the means were adjusted to the end to be 
 reached, and that the justification (if any be needed) of the risks incurred lies in the suc- 
 cess which attended them — a success as rare as it was complete." 
 
 A proof of the completeness of the success was the entire dissipa- 
 tion of Arabi's army. Groups of soldiers, it is true, were scattered 
 to different parts of Egypt ; but the army organization was com- 
 pletely broken up with the battle of Tel-el- Kebir. 
 
 The movements that followed the decisive victory were promptly 
 begun and most effectively executed. The best account is given 
 in the words of General Wolaeley's dispatch of September 16th : 
 
 " The enemy were pursued to Zagazig, twenty-five miles from our camp at Hassassin 
 by the Indian Contingent, the leading detachment of which reached that place, under 
 Major-General Sir H. Macpherson, V. C, a little after 4 p.m., and by the cavalry division, 
 under General Lowe, to Belbeis, which was occupied in the evening. Major-General Lowe 
 was ordered to push on with all possible speed to Cairo, as I was most anxious to save 
 that city from the fate which befell Alexandria in July last. 
 
 " These orders were ably carried out, General Lowe reaching the great barracks of 
 Abbassieh, just outside of Cairo, at 4:45 P.M., on the 14th instant. The cavalry marched 
 sixty-five miles in these two days. The garrison of about 10,000 men, summoned by 
 Lieutenant-Colonel H, Stewart, assistant adjutant-general to the cavalry division, to sur- 
 render, laid down their arms, and our troops took possession of the citadel. A message 
 was sent to Arabi Pasha through the prefect of the city, calling upon him to surrender 
 forthwith, which he«did unconditionally. He was accompanied by Tulba Pasha, who was 
 also one of the leading rebels in arms against the Khedive. 
 
 " The Guards, under Ms Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, reached Cairo early 
 on the 15th instant." 
 
 "With an energy, as remarkable as it was praiseworthy, General 
 Wolseley prevented the war ending with horrors * like those with 
 which it began. Axabi's revenge was forestalled by that rapid 
 desert journey. Before leaving England, Wolseley had predicted 
 that he would enter Cairo on the 16th of September ; but with 
 
 * The death of the eminent Oriental scholar. Professor Palmer, which occurred on 
 August 12th, 1882, was one of the horrible tragedies for which the Egyptian war was 
 responsible. Justin McCarthy (in " England under Gladstone," Chap. XIII.) makes the 
 following reference to the loss the world sustained in his death. "Professor Edward 
 Palmer was one of those rare men who possess what appears to be an almost incredible 
 facility for learning languages. He was well-nigh the ideal scholar, devoted to learning 
 lor learning's sake, yet never tainted by the faintest tinge of pedantry, pride, or afl'ecta- 
 tion. The story of his life has been told by his close friend, attached admirer, and liter- 
 ary colleague, the well-known novelist, Mr. Walter Besant. It is a touching and a thrill- 
 ing record of marvelous accomplishments, of brilliant performance, of patient, determined 
 
— 71 — 
 
 still a day to spare the feat was accomplislied, and Arabi's Rebel- 
 lion was completely crushed. 
 
 England now stood alone. The victory had been won without 
 the aid of France or the intervention of Turkey. In Constantino- 
 ple negotiations regarding Turkish expeditions were still pending 
 when Lord Dufierin received the news of AVolseley's success, and 
 announced to the Porte that there was now no^^need of a Turkish 
 force in Egypt, as the war was ended. France at once prepared 
 to resume her share in the control ; but England, having borne the 
 sole responsibility of the war, did not propose now to share the 
 influence her success had given her. And it was for the interest of 
 Egypt that she should not. As in the campaign just ended, 
 England had been able to achieve a quicker and more effectual 
 success alone than would have been possible with a joint com- 
 mand of jealous powers, so now, peace having been restored, a 
 single supervision and direction promised a steadfastness to the 
 Government that could not have been effected under a re-establish- 
 ment of the joint control. AVhile there was a general agreement in 
 England as to what other powers should not do, there was a wide 
 difference of opinion as to the individual course to be pursued by 
 the British Government. Lord Derby, who became Colonial Sec- 
 retary soon after the end of the war, was in favor of withdrawing 
 from Egypt altogether, and leaving the country to "stew in her 
 own juice" ; but the judgment that declared that anarchy in Egypt 
 would mean injury to the world, prevailed. Egypt could not 
 stand alone ; and Anglo-Saxon support, with its civilizing influ- 
 ences, was the best to be found. 
 
 struggle toward success, of success achieved, of honors won, of flim friendship, and a 
 peaceful, happy home — and all ended by a sudden, terrible death in the Wady Sudr. In 
 the summer of 1SS2, Professor Palmer agreed to go out for the Government to Egypt to 
 prevent any alliance between Arabi and the Bedawin tribes of the desert. It seems 
 strange that so precious a life should have been risked on such an errand, though Profes- 
 sor Palmer's knowledge of the languages of the East was proverbial. It is not very sur- 
 prising that, when he and his party were captured by hostile Arabs, their doom should be 
 death. It is certain that short work would have been made of any emissary from Arabi 
 who was caught attempting to interfere with the relations existing between some Eng- 
 lish General and, say, an Indian regiment. We shall, perhaps, never exactly know the 
 story of the tragedy near Nakl. It is certain, however, that Palmer and his companions, 
 were caaptured through the treachery of the Sheikh Meter Sofieh, who was their guide, and 
 that Palmer, Captain Gill, and Lieutenant Charrington were shot. Some thii'teen of the 
 Arabs of the tribe that killed Palmer and his companions were afterward captured, brought 
 to trial, and Ave of them were hanged at Zagazig on February 28tti, 18S3. The remains of 
 Palmer, Gill, and Charrington were recovered, carried to England, and interred in St. 
 Paul's Church." 
 
— 72 — 
 
 England's first duty, after quiet was assured, was to send away 
 all the Britisli troops, except a force of about 11,000 men, wliicli 
 it was deemed advisable to retain in Egypt until the Khedive's 
 authority was placed on a safe footing throughout the land. At 
 the same time it was decided to reorganize the military establish- 
 ment of Egypt, and Baker Pasha, an Englishman in the service of 
 the Sultan, was invited to superintend this work. The Khedive 
 summoned a new cabinet, giving the leadership to Sherif Pasha, as 
 Minister of Poreign Affairs. 
 
 What should be done with Arabi was the question of para- 
 mount interest, when once the Khedive's authority was re-es- 
 tablished and recognized. Tewfik and his Ministers, if left to 
 themselves, would unquestionably have taken his life ; for in the 
 Orient an unsuccessful revolutionist knows but one fate. But 
 England was determined that Arabi should have a fair trial. To 
 secure this, an irresistible pressure had been brought to bear upon 
 Mr. Gladstone's Government by the English press. It was decided 
 that the rebel leaders should appear before a military tribunal, 
 and they were given English counsel to plead their cause. 
 The preliminary negotiations occupied several months, during 
 which time Mr. Broadley and Mr. Napier, Arabi's counsel, became 
 acquainted with the peculiarities of Egyptian legal procedure,* 
 and Arabi wrote out his story of the rebellion.! The general 
 tenor of his tale was to prove himself innocent of the charge of 
 rebellion. He declared that Tewfik was the traitor; for the Sultan,, 
 the real sovereign of Egypt, encouraged the resistance against 
 England that the Khedive did not dare show. If Arabi obeyed his 
 sovereign, how could he be a rebel? He vauntingly wrote : 
 
 " But the truth is, I am no ' rebel.' I led the nation in seeking the liberty of our coun- 
 try, and employed all honorable means to this end, respecting the laws, not thinking of 
 self, as others say, but of the welfare of Egypt. I became commander of the troops ap- 
 pointed to defend the country in a lawful manner, and by the order of the Sultan, the Khe- 
 dive, the Chamber, and with the sanction of the nation. As regards accusations of 
 massacre and incendiarism, I laugh them to scorn." 
 
 Such were the words that Arabi wrote in October, when lying in 
 
 prison in Cairo. If he had stood by them, he would have had the 
 
 respect of all who had heard the cry of "Egypt for the Egyptians," 
 
 *"How We Defended Arabi and His Friend;*. A Story of Egypt and the Egyptians." 
 By A. M. Broadley. 
 
 t" Instructions to My Consul. " In The Nineteenth Century of October, 1882. By Ahmed 
 ArabL 
 
— 73 — 
 
 and to many lie would liave posed as a hero and a martyr ; but 
 witMn , two months he had acknowledged himself guilty of 
 rebellion, and was cringing at the feet of England and all English- 
 men. 
 
 The trial was a farce. Everything was "cut and dried" before- 
 hand. It was arranged that Arabi was to plead guilty to rebel- 
 lion, that he was forthwith to be condemned to death by the 
 court, and that the Khedive was immediately to commute the 
 sentence to perpetual exile. In fact, the necessary papers were 
 drawn up and signed before the court met for Arabi's trial on 
 December 3d. First, the following charge was read :* 
 
 " Ahmed Arabi Pasha, you are charged before us, on the report of the Commission of 
 Inquiry, with the offense of rebellion against his Highness the Khedive, and of thereby 
 committing offenses against Article 96t of the Ottoman Military and Article 59t of the Otto- 
 man Penal Code. Are you guilty or not guilty 7" 
 
 Upon Arabi's saying that his counsel would answer for him, Mr. 
 Broadley read the following : 
 
 " Of my own free will, and by the advice of my counsel, I plead guilty to the charges 
 now read over to me." 
 
 An adjournment of several hours was then taken, as a matter 
 of form, we must believe," for the deliberations were all held in 
 advance. Upon reassembling the clerk of the court read the fol- 
 lowing sentence : 
 
 " Whereas Ahmed Arabi Pasha has admitted having committed the crime of rebellion 
 in contravention of Article 96 of the Ottoman Military Code and Article 59 of the Ottoman 
 Penal Code ; and whereas, in face of this ad mission, the court has only to apply the articles 
 already cited, which punish the crime of rebellion by the penalty of death ; for these mo- 
 tives the court unanimously condemns Ahmed Arabi Pasha to death for the crime of 
 rebellion against his Highness the Khedive by application of the said articles and orders. 
 That the said judgment be submitted for the consideration of his Highness the Khedive." 
 
 But the judgment had already been submitted, so that the 
 clerk was able to read the following decree from the Khedive at 
 once: 
 
 * The documents and articles here given are quoted from Mr. Broadley's " How We 
 Defended Arabi," pp. 326, 332, 336, and 341. 
 
 t Art. 96.— All persons who to the number of eight or more revolt, using their arms, 
 and refuse to disperse, or do not cease the revolt on receiving the orders of a superior au- 
 thority, may be punished with death. 
 
 t Art. 59.— Whoever, without an order from the Government, or without a legal mo- 
 tive, shall assume the command of a division, a fortified place, or city, etc., and any com- 
 mander who, without a legitimate motive, shall persist in keeping his troops under arms 
 after their disbandmeut has been ordered by the Government, may be punished with 
 death. 
 
— 74 — 
 
 " We, Mehemet Tewflk, Khedive of Egypt : Wbereas Ahmed Arabi Pasha has been 
 condemned to death by judgment of Court Martial of this day's date, by application o^ 
 Articles 96 of the Military Code and 69 of the Penal Code, and whereas we desire, for rea- 
 sons of our own, to exercise in reference to the said Ahmed Arabi Pasha the right of par- 
 don which appertains to us exclusively, we have decreed and do decree as follows : The 
 penalty of death pronounced against Ahmed Arabi is commuted to perpetual exile from 
 Egypt and its dependencies. This pardon will be of no effect, and the said Ahmed Arabi 
 will be liable to the penalty of death if he enters Egypt or its dependencies. Our Minis- 
 ters of the Interior, War, and Marine, are charged with the execution of this decree. 
 
 " (Signed) MEHEMET TEWFIK." 
 
 Arabi was glad to escape with liis life, if we may judge from 
 his profuse thanks. He thanked Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, 
 Lord Dufierin, Sir Edward Malet, Mr. Blunt, Mr. Broadley, Mr. 
 Napier, the English people, the English press, and others to whom 
 he felt specially grateful. It is not reported that the Khedive was 
 among the number. On the 26th of December Arabi and his six 
 companions, Mahmud Sami, Yacub Sami, Mahmud Fehmy, Tuiba 
 Osmat, Ali Fehmy, and Abd-el-Al Hilmy, upon whom the same 
 sentence had been passed, left Cairo for the Island of Ceylon, 
 there to spend their life of perpetual exile. 
 
 All this while France had been chafing under the prospect of 
 the abolition of the Dual Control. England had proposed in its 
 stead a Public Debt Commission, of which she offered the presi- 
 dency to France, by way of a sop to appease any anger ; but Pre- 
 mier Duclerc rejected the proposal. It therefore became necessa- 
 ry for Lord Granville to define the position of England in Egypt. 
 This he did on January 25th, 1883, in an identical note to the 
 Powers. He reeited that the Anglo-French control had not been 
 the result of international agreement, but of tripartite understand- 
 ing between England, France, and Egypt ; and that, France hav- 
 ing withdrawn from Egypt at the beginning of the war, England 
 had to suppress the rebellion without assistance. She now pur- 
 posed to keep an army of occupation in Egypt only so long as to 
 secure the permanency of the re-established Government. Lord 
 Granville announced, further, that England would favor new reg- 
 ulations to provide for the future neutrality and inviolability of 
 the Suez Canal. He was careful to insert in his note that the 
 protection of Egypt would be considered the only justification 
 for the military occupation of the canal. He begged that the 
 Powers would alter the Capitulations so that foreigners in Egypt 
 might be taxed, a plan, as we have seen, that is contemplated 
 in every scheme of reform, but never carried out. He also 
 
— 75 — 
 
 suggested tlie prolongation of the mixed tribunals for another 
 year.* 
 
 With regard to internal matters in Egypt, Lord Granville an- 
 nounced that certain reforms in the army, in the police, and in 
 political institutions had been undertaken. 
 
 Reference has already been made to the appointment of Baker 
 Pasha to supervise the reorganization of the Egyptian army. At 
 the beginning of 1883 he was superseded by Sir Evelyn Wood, 
 who undertook to introduce, so far as practicable, a discipline and 
 treatment similar to those employed in the British army. Re- 
 lieved from the supervision of the army Baker organized a police 
 force of 4,000 men, which was divided into urban and rural con- 
 stabulary and officered by Englishmen. The reform in political 
 institutions was the work, largely, of Lord Dufferin. He had been 
 sent from Constantinople to Cairo, early in November, with the 
 special mission of bringing order out of governmental chaos. In 
 two months he had prepared a scheme of legislative reorganiza- 
 tion. This was, however, somewhat altered ; so that it was not 
 until May, 1883, that the plan in its improved form was accepted 
 by the decree of the Khedive. 
 
 The new constitution provided for three classes of Assemblies : 
 the "Legislative Council," the "General Assembly," and the '-Pro- 
 vincial Councils," of which there were to be fourteen, one for each 
 province. The Legislative Council was to consist of thirty mem- 
 bers, fourteen of whom were to be nominated by the Khedive, 
 and sixteen of whom were to be elective. Of the latter, one would 
 represent Cairo, another the towns of Alexandria, Damietta, 
 Rosetta, Suez, Port Said, Ismailia, and El-Azich, and the remain- 
 ing fourteen would represent each one a province. The elective 
 members were to be chosen for terms of six years, and might be 
 indefinitely re-elected. The Council were to meet as often as once 
 in two months. Its influence on legislation was to be so great, 
 says Mr. Amos,t that" it is hardly conceivable that a law could be 
 persisted in, in the face of a determined remonstrance of the Leg- 
 islative Council." No law or decree of a legislative character 
 could be promulgated unless the Government had obtained the 
 
 *Their expiration had been flxecl for 1831, but two yearly prolongations had already 
 been added to the original term of five years. 
 
 t"The New Egyptian Constitution." By Sheldon Amos. The Contemporary Review, 
 June, 1883, 
 
— 76 — 
 
 opinion of the Council. If it should dissent from that opinion, 
 the Government must give its reasons. A special article provided 
 that the Budget must be submitted and that the Council might 
 express its opinion and wishes on each section thereof. The rea- 
 sons for dissent must be given as in other cases. The Legislative 
 Council was to have further, the right to discuss freely the con- 
 dition of the country and to consider any needful legislative reforms, 
 and to call for the drafting of measures, to be submitted to itself, 
 which should serve as the basis of legislation. 
 
 The General Assembly was to consist of eighty-four members : 
 the eight Ministers of State, the thirty members of the Legislative 
 Council, and forty-six elected members. The latter were to be 
 elected for terms of six years, and, as with the members of the 
 Legislative Council, might be indefinitely re-elected. The Assembly 
 must meet as often as once in two years, and its functions wereto be 
 largely of a financial character. No new tax could be levied un- 
 less it should receive the vote of the Assembly, and no public loan 
 could be contracted unless the Assembly should be consulted. The 
 reasons of dissent on the part of the Government must be given 
 to the Assembly, as to the Legislative Council. 
 
 The fourteen Provincial Councils were to consist each one of 
 from four to eight members, and were to divide between them the 
 representation of the six thousand villages in Egypt. Consider- 
 able legislative power in local government was to be given them, 
 such as the voting of extraordinary taxes for local improvement, 
 which were to take effect merely upon the sanction of the Gov- 
 ernment. Every Egyptian man, over twenty years of age, was to 
 vote (by ballot) for an "elector- delegate" from the village in the 
 neighborhood of which he lived, and the "electors- delegate" from 
 all the villages in a province, were to form the constituency that 
 should elect the Provincial Council. The term and re-eligibility 
 of the members of the Provincial Council were to be the same as 
 with members of the other two bodies, except that at the end of 
 three years one-half of the Provincial Council was to be renewed 
 by lot. The "electors- delegate" were also to elect directly the 
 forty-six elective members of the General Assembly; but they 
 were to have no share in the elections of members of the Legisla- 
 tive Council. Each Provincial Council was to elect from its own 
 number one member of the Legislative Council. 
 
- 77 — 
 
 Sach, in brief, was the scheme that Lord Daiferin proposed 
 and the Khedive sanctioned. It was well received* by many who 
 thought that it promised a brilliant future for Egypt. The idea, 
 however, of looking to the fellahin of Egypt for the exercise of 
 <;onstitutional rights and duties, strikes any one who is acquainted 
 with their abject condition and disposition as almost absurd. 
 It is well enough for the Westerner to import the ideas that 
 have been the slow growth of centuries in the most highly civil- 
 ized lands; they will have their inflaence; and yet it must always 
 be borne in mind that the political idea is the fruit only of inter- 
 nal growth. Lord Dufferin framed the Constitution ; but he knew 
 that the chiefest truth among his recommendations lay in the 
 following paragraph : 
 
 " The chief requirement of Egypt is justice. A pure, cheap, and simple system of jus- 
 tice will prove more beneficial to the country than the largest constitutional privileges. 
 The structure of society in the East is so simple that, providecl the taxes are righteously 
 assessed, it does not require much law-making to make the people happy. "t 
 
 The scheme of reorganization was carried forward to the ex- 
 tent of electing the "■ electors-delegate" in September ; but by that 
 time Egypt was again in a state of such disquietude that the Brit- 
 ish advisers of the Khedive considered it unwise to put the new 
 institutions into operation. In place of Legislative Council and 
 Oeneral Assembly, the Khedive appointed a Council of State, con- 
 sisting ■ of eleven Egyptians, two Armenians, and ten Europeans. 
 The reforms were set aside for the time being in view of impend- 
 ing troubles and dangers in the Sudan. 
 
 CHAPTER VII. 
 
 The Sudan and the Mahdi. 
 
 The Siidan comprises the vast region lying between the Equator 
 and the southern boundary of Egypt at the first cataract of the 
 Nile, and extending from the Red Sea and Abyssinia on the east 
 
 *Vide The Contemporary Review for June, 1883, where Mr. Amos says: "Certainly 
 bad government will henceforth be rendered difficult in Egypt, and the worst government 
 Impossible. 'The Legislative Council' may one day expand into as true a legislature as 
 the 'House of Commons.' " 
 
 tLord Dufferin's Scheme for ttie Reorganization of Egypt, Feb. 6th, 1883. 
 
— 78 — 
 
 to a western indefiniteness — to tlie point, one might say, from 
 which a slave could be carried to the Nile with some chance of 
 profit for the slave-hunter. Since the day of Mehemet Ali, the 
 country had been to Egypt very much what Egypt was to Turkey 
 before the day of the great Pasha. Mehemet Ali appropriated the 
 Sudan to himself with that free-handed robbery that was charac- 
 teristic of power in the time of feudalism, and his successors, ex- 
 cepting perhaps Said, did all they could to keep up the system of 
 robbery and spoliation that he had begun; and, on the other 
 hand, the chiefs of the native tribes did all they could to resist 
 the power of Egypt, often even to the point of bloodshed and 
 murder, or paid their enforced tributes unwillingly and only after 
 these had been diminished by all possible peculations. There was 
 an extensive inland commerce in the Sudan that made it a valuable 
 province. The yield of ivory, ostrich feathers, grains, and tropi- 
 cal fruits was very large ; but the traffic in slaves was the great 
 industry of the country. The Sudan supplied the slave markets 
 of the Eastern world. It was this feature of commerce that first 
 attracted the attention of the West to the Sudan. It was the 
 motive of mercy that encouraged the interference of civilized 
 people. 
 
 Ismail, with all the ambition of Mehemet Ali, was ready ta 
 listen to any plans for increasing his authority, especially if they 
 were suggested by Europeans. He had long entertained a scheme 
 of aggrandizemejit in the Sudan, and he fancied that expeditions 
 to suppress the slave-trade, if organized in his name, would some- 
 how secure the extension of his power. It may be doubted if 
 he appreciated the humanitarian motives that suggested to Eng- 
 lishmen the necessity of such an expedition as Sir Samuel W. 
 Baker was deputed to lead in 1869 ; but he gave Sir Samuel his 
 hearty co-operation, and appointed him Governor-General of the 
 entire region south of Gondokoro. Several years before that time 
 Ismail had reasserted Egypt's authority, which had been suffered 
 to lapse through the inactivity of Said and the opposition of the 
 Sudanese, by an extension of his dominion to the west in 
 the conquest of Darfur, and now he was glad to have his Governor- 
 General push on to the south. The story of Sir Samuel's attempt to 
 reach his province, and of his success in abolishing the slave-traffic 
 only for the time that the slave-posts were under his eye is told in 
 
— 79 — 
 
 his own book, " Ismailia." It is enough to state here that, despite 
 his strenuous and most worthy efiorts, he made no permanent im- 
 pression upon the trade he sought to wipe out ; on the contrary, 
 by his opposition to the most influential men of the Sudan, the 
 slave-traders, he brought Egypt into greater odium than before, 
 and increased the hatred that had always been felt for Egyp- 
 tian rule. 
 
 The successor of Sir Samuel Baker was Colonel Charles George 
 Gordon, familiarly known as " Chinese Gordon " from his remark- 
 able career in the suppression of the Tai-ping rebellion in China. 
 He was, perhaps, the most humane man in England ; but his char- 
 acter was as firm as it was sweet, and his courage was as great as 
 his pity. Of the man whose name has been for years a household 
 word among the civilized and the heathen, whose feats have won 
 the admiration of the world, and whose charities have been the in- 
 spiration of the rich and the comfort of the poor, it is unnec- 
 essary to write. Suffice it to say that Gordon had the quali- 
 ties that fitted him pre-eminently for the work he under- 
 took when, in 1874, he started upon his mission to the 
 Sudan. He did not give Ismail credit for much philanthro- 
 py; for, before he left Cairo for Khartum, he wrote to Eng- 
 land:* "I think I can see the true motive of the expedition, and 
 believe it to be a sham to catch the attention of the English peo- 
 ple ; and feel like a Gordon who has been humbugged." Going 
 to the Equatorial Province, however, solely on the authority of 
 Ismail, he did not question the latter's motives too closely, but ap- 
 plied himself to the work of the expedition. He was to establish 
 a series of posts between Khartum and Gondokoro and to sup- 
 press the slave-trade. In eighteen months Gordon retiu^ned to 
 Cairo and resigned his commission under the Khedive. This is 
 what he had done at that time rf 
 
 "He had mapped the White Nile from Khartum to within a short distance of the Vic- 
 toria Nyanza. He had given to the slave trade on the White Nile a deadly blow. He had 
 restored confidence and peace among the tribes of the Nile valley, so that they now freely 
 brought into the stations their beef, corn, and ivory for sale. He had opened up the water 
 communication between Gondokoro and the Lakes. He had established satisfactory rela- 
 tions with King M'tesa. He had formed Government districts, and established secure 
 posts with safe communication between them. He had contributed a revenue to the Khe- 
 divial exchequer, and this without oppression. The Tai-ping Kebellion established Gor- 
 
 * " Chinese Gordon." By Archibald Forbes. Page 125. 
 t Ibid, p. 157. 
 
— 80 — 
 
 doQ's genius as a military commander ; tlie Equatorial Provinces, -when he left them, tes- 
 tiflednot less to his genius as a philanthropic and practical administrator." 
 
 Gordon resigned because Ismail Tacub, the Governor-General 
 of the Sudan, threw so many stumbling blocks in his way. While 
 he -^as doing «».]lhe could to suppress the slave-trade, Ismail Yacub 
 was doing all he could to foster it. At the beginning of 1877 the 
 Khedive removed the latter, and wrote the following to Gordon on 
 February 17th : " Setting a just value on your honorable char- 
 acter, on your zeal, and on the great services you have already 
 done me, I have resolved to bring the Sudan, Darfur, and the prov- 
 inces of the Equator, into one vast province, and place it under 
 you as Governor- General."* Gordon accepted the larger responsi- 
 bilities and duties of the office bestowed upon him. For two years 
 and more he worked with indomitable energy in crushing the 
 slave-traffic, in putting down insurrection, and in establishing his 
 authority throughout the vast provinces nominally under his con- 
 trol. In spite of almost insuperable difficulties in the way of inad- 
 equate resources, both military! and financial, he accomplished 
 wonders. If he had been content to remain at Khartum after the 
 fall of Ismail, the fame and fear of the False Prophet might never 
 have been known in Egypt ; but he was disgusted with the abdi- 
 cation, and insisted upon resigning, to the no small relief, proba- 
 bly, of the new Khedive and his Ministers, who were glad to be rid 
 of all the servants of Ismail. 
 
 After Gordon, left the Sudan, in 1879, an Egyptian Pasha was 
 appointed Governor-General, and the country relapsed into its 
 former feeling of bitterness toward Egyptian rule. It was not 
 long before the disaffection found its leader. He was no less a 
 person than the Mahdi, whose coming had been foretold by the 
 prophet Mohammed. He chose an opportune moment to act as the 
 champion of his people. They had been incensed at the suppres- 
 sion of the slave trade, they hated the Egyptian rule, and they be- 
 lieved that the fourteenth century of the Hegira, which was close 
 at hand, would, in accordance with prophecy, usher in an era of 
 unexampled prosperity and happiness. 
 
 Mehemet Ahmed, who called himself the Mahdi, was an ob- 
 
 *Quotedfrom " Chinese Gordon," p. 159. 
 
 t" The Sudan had been well-nigh drained of troops for the support of the Sultan in 
 his war with Russia."—" Chinese Gordon," page 162. 
 
— 81 — 
 
 scure carpenter's sou, who had studied religious creeds with one 
 sect of dervishes in Khartum, and with another sect in Berber' 
 until 1870, when he became o^fahir, or dervish-chief, himself. He 
 then retired to the island of Abba, on the White Nile, where he 
 became famed for his piety. He lived in a cave, and gave himself 
 up to prayers, fastings, and mortifications of the flesh. He won a 
 wide notoriety, and made many disciples. Eich gifts were be- 
 stowed upon him, and the neighboring sheikhs gladly gave him 
 their daughters in marriage. His brotherhood in Khartum heard 
 of his devotion, wealth, and influence, and sent to him, early in 
 1881, a messenger to bid him arise, in answer to the call of God, 
 and lead a great army. Mehemet Ahmed took up the sword at 
 once, and in May declared to the fakirs of the faith of the Shiites 
 that he was the Imam Mahdi, the new Messiah who had come to 
 lead new believers into the fold of Islam, and to annihilate all the 
 infidels on the face of the earth. His declaration met with no de- 
 nial among the Shiites, whose religious order was confined almost 
 wholly to the Sudan ; but at Cairo, Constantinople, and Mecca, 
 the report of a Mahdi was scoffed at. Where were the signs* and 
 portents that should herald his coming ? 
 
 But the Mahdi set about the establishment of " a universal 
 equality, a universal law, a universal religion, and a community of 
 goods,"* and swore that he would visit with death all who did not 
 believe in and follow him. In August Eauf Pasha, the Governor- 
 General of the Sudan, became alarmed at the growing power of the 
 False Prophet, for such he had been declared by the ulemas of 
 
 *"The greater signs, among wMch the coming of the Mahdi is reckoned, are seven- 
 teen in all, and it must be coiifessed that some at least among these seem unlikeiy to be, 
 for the present, literally fulfilled. The sun must rise in the West ; the beast must emerge 
 from the earth near Mecca; the walls of Stambul must fall by miracle before an invading 
 foe; the Messlh ed Dejal, or 'Lying Anointed One,' marked K F E on his forehead, one- 
 eyed, and riding from Irak on an ass, must lay waste the earth. The true Messiah (our 
 Lord Jesus) must appear on the minaret at Damascus, must reign in Jerusalem, and de- 
 feat Gog and Magog), and slay ed Dejal at the gate of Lydda. A massacre of the Jews, 
 and invasion of Syria by the great giants (Gog and Magog), who are to drink diy the Sea 
 of Galilee, a smoke which shall fill the world, a relapse of Arabia into paganism, the dis- 
 covery of hid treasures in the Euphrates, the destruction of the Kaaba by Negroes, beasts 
 and stones speaking with human voices, a fire of Yemen, a man of the sons of Kahtan 
 wielding a rod, and an icy wind from Damascus which shall sweep away the souls of all 
 who have faith as a grain of mustard-seed, and blow to heaven the Koran itself ; these are 
 the wonders which, together with the coming of the Mahdi, will prepare the way for the 
 tremendous Y6ssr ed Din, or final day of judgment."—" The Guide of Islam." By C. R. 
 Conder, The Fortnightly Review. 
 
 t" The Story of Chinese Gordon." A. Egmont Hake. Vol. II., p. 24. 
 
— 82 — 
 
 Constantinople and Cairo and the Grand Sherif of Mecca, the 
 highest priest of Islam ; and he sent an army to crush him. But 
 the Mahdi easily repulsed the Egyptian * force, as he did also a 
 stronger force sent against him at the end of 1881. In June, 1882, 
 he fought his first great battle, and won a brilliant victory. Abdel 
 Kadir, who had succeeded Raut' Pasha as Governor- General, sent 
 out the strongest force he could muster; but it was overwhelmingly 
 defeated by the Mahdi's fanatical followers. Not a commander 
 escaped with his life, and nearly every Egyptian soldier perished. 
 And now for a time the False Propnet had things pretty much his 
 own way. Arabi's Rebellion not only diverted attention from the 
 Sudan, but it drew largely upon the Sudanese garrisons for troops 
 to support the nationalist cause. The Mahdi became more and 
 more aggressive, and his ranks and his coffers were continually 
 filling. Bat, in attacking El Obeid, he was repulsed with heavy 
 loss. He was beaten off only temporarily, however ; for he soon 
 returned and laid siege to the garrison, which was finally com- 
 pelled to yield, on the 15th of January, 1883. The commander of 
 the garrison and many of his subordinates saved their lives by 
 taking service under the Mahdi's standard. 
 
 The news of the fall of Obeid reached Egypt about the begin- 
 ning of February. The serious insurrection demanded the atten- 
 tion of the Khedive. Lord Dufferin, however, advised letting the 
 Mahdi alone so long as he remained in Kordofan. But the Egyp- 
 tian Governmeat determined upon an expedition, and entrusted its 
 command to Colonel Hicks, a retired English officer. It was im- 
 possible, so soon after Arabfs Rebellion, to send as strong a force 
 as was desirable; but it consisted of eight English officers, 6,000 
 infantry, 1,000 irregulars, 500 cavalry and a small force of artillery. 
 The English Government in no way sanctioned the expedition. 
 Lord Granville gave Sir Edward Malet, the British consul at Cairo, 
 positive orders not to offer any advice on the question. After the 
 first engagement between Hicks and the rebels, on April 9th, in 
 which the former achieved a brilliant success. Hicks made many 
 appeals to Malet for reinforcements ; but the latter merely passed 
 them on to the Egyptian Government without comment. "In 
 
 *The government forces in tlie Sudan were in large part made up of Egyptian sol- 
 diers, the Sudanese soldiers being sent to Egypt in at least equal numbers. This exchange 
 of military was held one of the chief grievances agamst Egyptian rule. 
 
— 83 — 
 
 other words," says Mr. McCarthy,* " though England had interfered 
 in Egypt by force of arms to keep the Khedive on his throne, 
 though Cairo was occupied by English soldiers, though it was 
 clearly in England's power, and in her right, to counsel the Egyp- 
 tian Ministry as to the course they should pursue in the most 
 difficult of all Egyptian questions, the Ministry still affected to 
 keep up the absurd pretense of exercising no influence upon the 
 ■councils of Egypt." England could not shirk her responsibility 
 by keeping silent. She was bound in all honor to give her advice 
 3,t least; and refusing, she failed of her just duty and obliga- 
 tions.! 
 
 The summer and rainy season of 1883 were passed by Hicks 
 Pasha in Khartum ; but on the 9th of September he set out for 
 El Obeid, the stronghold of the Mahdi. The story of his march 
 and the details of the final tragedy will probably never be authen- 
 tically told. The last bits of news were in the letters of Edmund 
 O'Donovan to a London newspaper. He seems to have appreciated 
 the dangers of the expedition. On September 23d he wrote to a 
 iriend : " It would be odd if the next intelligence from this part of 
 the world told that I, too, had gone the way of all flesh. How- 
 ever, to die even out here, with a lance-head as big as a shovel 
 through me, will meet my views better than the slow, gradual 
 sinking into the grave which is the lot of so many. . , . You 
 know I am by this time, after an experience of many years, pretty 
 well accustomed to dangers of most kinds, even some extra. Yet 
 I assure you I feel it terrible to face deadly peril far away from 
 civilized ideas, and where no mercy is to be met with, in company 
 with cravens that you expect to see run at every moment, and who 
 will leave you behind to face the worst." When this friend next 
 heard of U'Donovan, he had "gone the way of all flesh." 
 
 The accepted account of the slaughter of Hicks Pasha's army 
 of 11,000 men is that, having been treacherously led into an am- 
 buscade on the 1st or 2d of November, they fought for three days 
 vnth the courage and hopelessness of that smaller band at Ther- 
 
 *'«Bagland Under Gladstone." By Justin McCarthy, M.P. Chapter XV. 
 
 fMliy, then, it may be asked, did not the Liberal Government use its influence to 
 prohibit General Hicks's useless expedition? The question very plausibly suggests Eng- 
 lish responsibility for the expedition, and the consequences, or supposed consequences of 
 its failure." — " English Policy in the Sudan." British Quarterly Review, July, 1SS4. 
 
mopylse under Leonidas of old ; then, overcome with heat, thirsty 
 and fatigue, their ammunition gone, they fell where they had 
 fought, before the fury of the Mahdi's hordes. All the Egyptians, 
 were massacred, and only one European is known to have escaped. 
 
 It was more than two weeks before the terrible news reached 
 Khartum and was telegraphed to Cairo. It would be difficult to 
 say whether the panic was greater in Egypt or in the Sudan. Lx 
 the Sudan, governors of provinces, at the report of the Mahdi's 
 victory, declared their allegiance to the holy cause, and flocked ta 
 his capital with troops and treasure. Nothing succeeds like 
 success. The vast region from Kordofan to the Equator was 
 kindled to a fanatical zeal. The route from Khartum to Suakim,, 
 on the Red Sea, was intercepted by a lieutenant of the Mahdi's. 
 The grasp of the Mahdi seemed to be closing about Kliartum, 
 Colonel de Coetlogen, with his slender garrison of 4,000, could 
 not hold that city before the sweep of the rebel forces. In Cairo 
 the consternation was no greater over the defeat than over Eng- 
 land's opposition to an expedition to crush the Mahdi. Lord 
 Granville telegraphed to Sir Evelyn Baring, who was now the 
 British representative in Egypt, that the Government would lend 
 neither English nor Indian troops to assist an expedition. He 
 advised the abandonment of the Sudan. But the Khedive's min- 
 isters said that they could not give up the territory that belong ed 
 to ■ the Sultan, and of which Egypt was simply the guardian. 
 While negotiations between England and Egypt were pending,, 
 the IQiedive's Government decided to send a force to Suakim to 
 relieve the beleaguered Egyptian garrisons at Sinkat and Toker,. 
 and open the route from the Red Sea to Berber so as to allow the 
 Egyptians in Khartum a way of escape. The expedition was 
 placed under the command of Baker Pasha. 
 
 But now, January 4th, 1884, Mr. Gladstone's Government ex- 
 pressed its advice more forcibly than a month before. "It is in 
 dispensable," wrote Lord Granville, "that her Majesty's Govern- 
 ment should, as long as the provisional occupation of the country 
 by English troops continues, be assured that the advice which, 
 after full consideration of the Egyptian Government, they may 
 feel it their duty to tender to the Khedive should be followed. 
 It should be made clear to the Egyptian ministers and governors 
 of the provinces that the responsibility which, for the time rests 
 
— 85 — 
 
 on England, obliges her Majesty's Government to insist on the 
 adoption of the policy which they recommend ; and that it will be 
 necessary that those ministers and governors who do not follow 
 this course should cease to hold their offices." This was what 
 Mr. McCarthy calls "interference with a vengeance."* It was the 
 decisive, if tardy, assertion of authority. The note was equiva- 
 lent to saying that, in future, England's will was to be the law of 
 Egypt. From Downing Street the order was issued that the Su- 
 dan must be abandoned, whereupon Sherif's Ministry resigned. 
 Nubar Pasha was called to his place ; and he telegraphed at once, 
 of course at England's dictation, to Baker at Suakim that he must 
 prepare for evacuation. 
 
 But the question that now presented itself was, How should the 
 evacuation be effected? The answer was furnished by the Pall 
 Mall Gazette^ of London. Its issue of January 9th contained the 
 following words : 
 
 " At present it is obviously out of the question to send an army of relief to Colonel 
 Coetlogen. Baker Pasha's force seems inadequate even to relieve Smkat. In common 
 with the ex-Khedive, of whom he speaks with remarkable cordiality, General Gordon 
 deprecates the dispatch of either Indian or English troops to the Sudan. But if we have 
 not an Egyptian army to employ in the service, and if we must not send an English force, 
 what are we to do? There is only one thing that we can do. We cannot send a regiment 
 to Khartum, but we can send a man who, on more than one occasion, has proved himself 
 more valuable in similar circumstances than an entire army. Why not send Chinese Gor- 
 don with full powers to Khartum, to assume absolute control of the territory, to treat with 
 the Mahdi, to relieve the garrisons, and do what can be done to save what can be saved 
 from ttie wreck in the Sudan? ... No one can deny the urgent need in the midst of 
 that hideoufe welter of confusion for the presence of such a man, with a born genius for 
 command, an unexampled capacity in orgaiiizmg ' ever-victorious armies,' and a perfect 
 knowledge of the Sudan and its people. Wny not send him out with carte ilanche to do the 
 best that can be done ? He may not be able single-handed to reduce that raging chaos to 
 order, but the attempt is worth making, and if it is to be made it will have to be made at 
 once." 
 
 Immediately the popular feeling was found to be heartily 
 in accord with this suggestion, and a clamor was raised on all 
 sides for the dispatch of Gordon to the Sudan. The British Gov- 
 •ernment, some weeks before, had offered to appoint an English 
 officer to go to Khartum and organize the evacuation ; but the 
 Egyptian Ministry had not taken up the offer. Now, however, 
 Nubar informed Sir Evelyn Baring that such an appointment 
 would be accepted. The British Govei'nment, therefore, at once 
 communicated with Gordon, recalling him from Brussels on the 
 
 *" England Under Gladstone." Chapter XV. 
 
 6 
 
- 86 — 
 
 17th of January, where he had just arrived to receive the last in- 
 structions of the King of Belgium, before proceeding on an anti- 
 slavery mission to the Congo. He returned to London that same 
 day, and on the morning of the 18th was closeted with memtjers 
 of the English Cabinet. On Saturday, the 19th, the London Times 
 startled the world with the following announcement : 
 
 "It will be a welcome surprise to the country to learn that General Gordon started 
 
 last night, not for the Congo, but for Egypt He takes with him as his Military 
 
 Secretary, Lieutenant- Colonel Stewart, who was on duty at Khartum so late as last year,, 
 and whose knowledge of the affairs of the Sudan is second only to that of General Gordon 
 himself. The immediate purpose of the General's mission is, we understand, to report on 
 the military situation m the Sudan, to provide in the best manner for the safety of the 
 European population of Khartum and of the Egyptian garrisons still in the country, as 
 well as for the evacaation of the Sudan with the exception of the seaboard. His appoint- 
 ment will be received by the country with a certain sense of relief, as showing that the 
 Government has been willing to seek the best advice and to select the most competent 
 agent for the development of its policy in the Sudan." 
 
 CHAPTER VIIL 
 
 The Mission of Gokdon. Opeeations in the Eastern Sudan. 
 
 England had now taken a firm stand. She largely increased 
 her responsibilities by entrusting Gordon with the Sudanese mis- 
 sion. She had been niggardly even with advice in the case of 
 Hicks, but she was ready to hazard all with Gordon. Her un- 
 questionable responsibility will be proved by the following docu- 
 ments. The day that Gordon left London, Lord Granville gave 
 him this note of instruction : 
 
 "FOEEiGN Office, Jan. I8th, 1884. 
 "Sir:— Her Majesty's Government a^'e desirous that you should proceed at once to 
 Egypt, to report to them on the military situation in the Sudan and on the measures which 
 it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons still holding posses- 
 sions in that country, and for the safety of the European population in Khartum. Tou are 
 also desired to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the 
 interior of the Sudan, and upon the manner in which the safety and the good administra- 
 tion by the Egyptian Government of the ports on the seacoast can best be secured. In 
 connection with this subject, you should pay especial consideration to the question of the 
 steps that may usefully be taken to counteract the stimulus which it is feared may possi- 
 bly be given to the slave trade by the present insurrectionary movement and by the with- 
 drawal of the Egyptian authority from the interior. You wi'l be under the instructions of 
 her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo, through whom your reports to her 
 Majesty's Government should be sent under flying seal. You will consider yourself author- 
 ized and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire 
 
— 87 — 
 
 to entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring. You will "^'^ 
 accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will assist you in the duties thus confided to you. 
 On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir E. Baring, who will arrange 
 to meet you, and will settle with you whether you should proceed direct to Suakim, or 
 should go yourself or dispatch Colonel Stewart to Khartum, via the Nile. 
 
 1 am, etc., (signed) Granville." 
 
 While Gordon was on his way to Egypt he wrote the following 
 notes, explanatory of the above instructions, and developed in ac- 
 cordance with the views expressed at the conference on January 
 *18th. These notes were forwarded from Cairo to the Foreign 
 Office at London : 
 
 " I understand that her Majesty's Government have come to tae irrevocable decision 
 not to incur the very onerous duty of securing to the peoples of the Sudan a just future 
 Government. That, as a consequence, her Majesty's Government have determined to re- 
 store to these peoples their independence, and will no longer suffer the Egyptian Govern- 
 ment to interfere with their affairs. 
 
 " 2. For this purpose her Majesty's Government have decided to send me to the Siidan 
 to arrange for the evacuation of these countries, and the safe removal of the Egyptian em- 
 ployes and troops. 
 
 " 3. Keeping paragraph No. 1 in view, viz., that the evacuation of the Sudan is irrevo- 
 cably decided on, it will depend on circumstances in what way this is to be accomplished. 
 My idea i3 that the restoration of the country should be made to the different petty Sultana 
 who existed at the time of Mehemet All's conquest, and whose families still exist ; that the 
 Mahdi should be left altogether out of the calculation as regards the handing over the 
 country; and that it should be optional with the Sultans to accept his supremacy or not. 
 As these Sultans would probably not be likely to gain by accepting the Mahdi as their sov- 
 ereign, it is probable that they will hold to their independent positions. Thus we should 
 have two factors to deal with ; namely, the petty Sultans asserting their several independ- 
 ence, and the Mahdi's party aiming at supremacy over them. To hand, therefore, over to 
 the Mahdi the arsenals, etc., would, I consider, be a mistake. They should be handed over 
 to the Sultans of the states in which they are placed. The most difficult question is how 
 and to whom to hand over the arsenals of Khartum, Dongola, and Kassala, which towns 
 have, so to say, no old standing families, Khartum and Kassala having sprung up since 
 Mehemet All's conquest. Probably it would be advisable to postpone any decision as to 
 these towns till such time as the inhabitants have made known theii- opinion. 
 
 " 4. I have, in paragraph 3, proposed the transfer of the lands to the local Sultans, and 
 stated my opinion that these will not accept the supremacy of the Mahdi. If this is agreed 
 to, and my supposition is correct as to their action, there can be but little doubt that, as far 
 as he is able, the Mahdi will endeavor to assert his rule over them, and will be opposed to 
 any evacuation of the Government employes and troops. My opinion of the Mahdi's force 
 is, that the bulk of those who were with him at Obeid will refuse to cross the NDe, and that 
 those who do so will not exceed 3,000 or 4,000 men ; and also, that these will be composed 
 principally of black troops who have deserted, and who, if offered fair terms, would come 
 over to the Government side. In such a case, viz., ' Sultans accepting transfer of territory 
 and refusing the supremacy of the Mahdi, and Mahdi's black troops coming over to the 
 Government,' resulting weakness of the Mahdi, what should be done should the Mahdi's 
 adherents attack the evacuating columns? It cannot be supposed that these are to offer 
 no resistance, and if in resisting they should obtain a success, it would be but reasonable to 
 allow them to follow up the Mahdi to such a position as would Insure their future safe 
 march. This is one of those difficult questions which our Government can hardly be ex- 
 pected to answer, but which may arise, and to which I would call attention. Paragraph 1 
 fixes irrevocably the decision of the Government, viz., to evacuate the territory, and, of 
 course, as far as possible, involves the avoidance of any fighting. I can therefore only 
 
say, that having in view paragraph 1, and seeing the difficulty of asking her Majesty's 
 Government to give a decision or direction as to what should be done in certain cases, that 
 I will carry out the evacuation as far as possible according to their wish to the best of my 
 ability, and with avoidance, as far as possible, of all fighting. I would, however, hope 
 that her Majesty's Government will give me their support and consideration, should I be 
 unable to fulfill all their expectations. 
 
 " 5. Though it is out of my province to give any opinion as to the action of her Majesty's 
 Government in leaving the Sudan, still, I must say it would be an iniquity to reconquer 
 these peoples, and then hand them back to the Egyptians without guarantees of future 
 good government. It is evident that this we cannct secure without an inordinate expendi- 
 ture of men and money. T'le Sudan is a useless possession, ever was so, and ever will be 
 so. Larger than Germany, France, and Spain together, and mostly barren, it cannot be 
 governed except by a Dictator, who may be good or bad. If bad, he will cause constant 
 revolts. No one who has ever lived in the Sudan can escape the reflection : ' What a use- 
 less possession is this land.' Few men can stand its fearful monotony and deadly climate 
 
 "6. Said Pasha, the Viceroy before Ismail, went up to the Sudan with Count F. de 
 Lesseps. He was so discouraged and horrified at the misery of the people that at Berber 
 Count de Lesseps saw him throw his guns into the river, declaring that he would be no 
 party to such oppression. It was only after the urgent solicitation of European consuls 
 that he reconsidered his decision. Therefore, I think her Majesty's Government are fully 
 justified in recommending the evacuation, inasmuch as tne sacrifices necessary toward se- 
 curing a good government would be far too onerous to admit of such an attempt being 
 made. Indeed, one may say it is impracticable at any cost. Her Majesty's Government 
 will now leave them as God has placed them ; they are not forced to fight among them- 
 selves, and they will no longer be oppressed by men coming from lands so remote as Cir- 
 cassia, Kurdistan, and Anatolia." 
 
 Colonel Stewart, also, while on the way to Cairo, addressed, some 
 observations to the Foreign Office, of which the following is of 
 some importance as showing Gordon's independence of Egypt and 
 direct dependence upon England as the authority of his actions : 
 
 " [, of course, understand that General Gordon Is going to the Sudan with full powers 
 to make all arrangements as to its evacuation, and that he is in no way to be interfered 
 with by the Cairo Ministers ; also, that any suggestions or remarks that the Cairo Govern- 
 ment would wish to make are to be made directly to him and her Majesty's Minister Plen- 
 ipotentiary, and that no intrigues are to be permitted against Ms authority. Any other 
 course would, I am persuaded, make his mission a failure." 
 
 While Gordon was in Cairo, Sir Evelyn Baring communicated 
 to him the following additional instructions : 
 
 " Lord Granville ' authorized and instructed you to perform such duties as the Egyp- 
 tian Government may desire to entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir 
 E. Baring.' I have now to indicate to you the views of the Egyptian Government on two 
 of the points to which your special attention was directed by Lord Granville. These are, 
 (1) the measure which it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garri- 
 sons still holding positions in the Sudan, and for the safety of the European population in 
 Khartam; (y) the best mode of efl'ectiTig the evacuation of the interior of the Sudan. 
 These two points are intimately connected, and may conveniently be considered together. 
 It is believed that the number of Europeans at Khartum is very small, but it has been esti- 
 mated by the local authorities that some 10,000 to 15,000 people will wish to move north- 
 ward from Khartum only when the Egyptian garrison is withdrawn. These people are 
 native Christians, Egyptian employes, their wives and children, etc. The Government of 
 his Highness the Khedive is earnestly solicitous that no effort should be spared to insure 
 (the retreat both of these people and of the Egyptian garrison without loss of life. As re- 
 
— 89 — 
 
 gards the most opportune time and tie best method for effecting the retreat, whether of 
 the garrison or of the civil populations, it is neither necessary nor desirable that you 
 should receive detailed instructions. A short time ago the local authorities pressed 
 strongly on the Egyptian Government the necessity for giving orders for an immediate 
 retreat. Orders were accordingly given to commence at once the withdrawal of the civil 
 population. No sooner, however, had these orders been issued than a telegram was 
 received from the Sudan, strongly urging that the orders for commencing the retreat 
 should be delayed. Under these circumstances, and in view of the fact that the position at 
 Khartum is now represented as being less critical for the moment than it was a short time 
 ago, it was thought desirable to modify the orders for the immediate retreat of the civil 
 population, and to await your arrival. You will bear in mind that the main end to be pur- 
 sued Is the evacuation of the Siidan. This policy was adopted, after very full discussion, 
 by the Egyptian Government, on the advice of her Majesty's Government. It meets with 
 the full approval of his Highness the Khedive, and of the present Egyptian Ministry. I 
 understand, also, that you entirely concur in the desirability of adopting this policy, and 
 that you think it should on no account be changed. You consider that it may take a few 
 months to carry it out with safety. You are further of opinion that ' the restoration of the 
 country should be made to the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet 
 All's conquest, and whose families still exist ' ; and that an endeavor should be made to 
 form a confederation of those Sultans. In this view the Egyptian Government entirely 
 concurs. It will, of course, be fully understood that the Egyptian troops are not to be 
 kept in the Sudan merely with the view to consolidating the power of the new rulers of 
 the country. But the Egyptian Government has the fullest confidence in your judgment, 
 your knowledge of the country, and of your comprehension of the general line of policy to 
 be pursued. "You are, therefore, given full discretionary power to retain the troops for 
 such reasonable period as you may think necessary, in order that the abandonment of the 
 country may be accomplished with the least possible risk of life and property. A credit 
 of £100,000 has been opened for you at the Finance Department, and further funds will be 
 supplied to you on your requisition when this sum is exhausted. In undertaking the dif- 
 ficult task which now lies before you, you may feel assured that no effort will be wanting 
 on the part of the Cairo authorities, whether English or Egyptians, to afford you all the 
 co-operation and support in their power." 
 
 On the 26tli of January General Gordon, Colonel Stewart, and 
 the newly-appointed Sultan of Darfur,* with no escort beyond 
 their personal attendants, left Cairo for Khartum, by way of Siut, 
 Assuan, Wady Haifa, Abu Hamed, and Berber. 
 
 While this daring party was hastening toward Khartixm as 
 swiftly as railway, steamer, and camel could carry them, events of 
 a portentous nature were occurring elsewhere. On the 5lh of 
 February the British Parliament was opened, and on the same day 
 the news was received in London that Baker Pasha had been de- 
 feated near Tokar, with a loss of 2,000 men, and had fallen back 
 with the remainder of his army — some 1,200 — on Trinkitat, himself 
 escaping death by a reckless dash through the Arab ranks. Os- 
 man Digna, the Mahdi's lieutenant, had carried all before him. 
 Trinkitat could not hold out against him, and fears were enter- 
 
 * The Khedive had reinstated the heir to the Sultanship, who was a captive in Cairo, 
 as the first step toward carrying out Gordon's policy. 
 
— 90 — 
 
 tained even for Suakim, although Admiral He wett had just landed 
 a force there. These were not favorable auspices for the opening 
 of Parliament. The customary placid language of the Queen's 
 Speech yf&s strangely at variance vrith the feelings of those who 
 listened to it. A vote of censure upon the Government was at 
 once moved, but it was rejected in the form offered, and the sub- 
 ject was postponed for a few days. In the meantime public opin- 
 ion on the necessity of active interference and responsibility had 
 strengthened to the point of insistance. The London Times 
 voiced the widespread sentiment in saying :* " This fatuous effort 
 to evade the grasp of facts must now be abandoned, and even with 
 respect to the past the world will be obstinately incredulous. Not 
 only in Europe, as may be seen from the strong language used by 
 the French Press, but among the Mahommedan populations of the 
 East, England is held to be responsible for the expeditions of 
 Hicks Pasha and Baker Pasha not less than for the mission of 
 General Gordon." 
 
 The excitement caused by the news of Baker's defeat was 
 further increased by the report of the slaughter of the Sinkat gar- 
 rison. Baker's expedition had utterly failed in the offensive. The 
 vote of censure came on the 12th. The identical motion was 
 offered in the upper House by Lord Salisbury, and in the lower 
 House by Sir Stafford Northcote, "that this House, having read 
 and considered the correspondence relating to Egypt laid on the 
 table by her Majesty's command, is of opinion that the recent 
 lamentable events in the Sudan are due, in a great measure, to 
 the vacillating and inconsistent policy pursued by her Majesty's 
 Government." The motion was carried against the Government 
 by one hundred majority in the House of Lords, but it was lost in 
 the House of Commons, where Mr. Gladstone made an ingenious 
 defense of his policy of non-intervention, and of his claim of ir- 
 responsibility for the slaughter of the Hicks and the defeat of the 
 Baker expedition. Relief had not been sent to Sinkat, because it 
 was believed that such a move would endanger the lives of Gordon 
 and those whom he had been sent to rescue, and the chief desire 
 of her Majesty's Government was to secure the evacuation, the 
 peaceful evacuation, of the interior of the Sudan. England was 
 the guardian of Egyptian interests and the welfare of the land de- 
 
 * February Tth, 1884. 
 
— 91 — 
 
 manded that Gordon's mission should be successfully executed. 
 " For," said Mr. Gladstone, " I look upon the possession of the 
 Sudan — I won't say as a crime — that would be going a great deal 
 too far — but I look upon it as the calamity of Egypt. It has been 
 a drain on her treasury, it has been a drain on her men." The 
 Government was saved in the Commons by a majority of forty- 
 nine. 
 
 In spite, now, of the reasons assigned for not having rescued 
 the garrison of Sinkat, the English Government authorized the 
 dispatch of General Graham for the relief of Tokar, Admiral 
 Hewitt having already, with English sanction, assumed the general 
 command of forces at Suakim. Before Graham had landed his 
 force at Trinkitat, however, Tokar had succumbed, the greater 
 ^art of the garrison joining the standard of Osman Digna. On 
 the last day of February Graham marched forth and met and 
 overcame the intrepid lieutenant of the Mahdi on the field where 
 Baker's force had been defeated. This success was followed up 
 by further advances, and on March 13th a decisive victory was 
 won. The backbone of the Mahdi's power in the eastern Sudan 
 seemed broken. But at this junction General Graham was or- 
 dered to embark his troops and leave the seat of war at once 
 This was a fatal order. Then was the time, Osman's forces having 
 been beaten and scattered, to open the route from Suakim to 
 JBerber and afford an egress for the garrisons of the interior. The 
 opportunity was missed and never was presented again. Osman 
 gathered together his forces, strengthened his power at his leisxu'e, 
 and held himself in readiness to carry out his old threat of 
 sweeping Suakim and every soul it contained into the Red Sea. 
 
 CHAPTER IX. 
 
 GoKDON AT Khartum, and the Government in London. 
 
 We left General Gordon on his way to Khartum. He arrived 
 there on February 18th. At Berber he had issued a proclamation 
 declaring the purpose and policy of his mission. He had come to 
 establish tranquility and prevent the shedding of Moslem blood ; 
 
— 92 — 
 
 to secure to tile inhaloitants their riglits of property, and put au 
 end to injustice and oppression. He reduced the taxes one-half 
 and wiped off all arrearages. He conferred upon the people the 
 right, of which they had been deprived at the expense of time, 
 treasure, and blood, to hold slaves as property, with full control 
 over their services. He guaranteed them the privileges they en- 
 joyed under Said Pasha and promised prosperity and happiness. 
 In consequence of this proclamation Gordon's journey from Berber 
 to Khartum was a triumphal march. The natives flocked to bless 
 him as their king and deliverer, and he was received at Khartum 
 with cries of rejoicing. His proclamation had a very different 
 effect in the outside world. European nations stood aghast. 
 Gordon, the arch enemy of the slave trade, declared himself its 
 friend ! England received the news with consternation and hor- 
 ror. Every Wilberforce of the nation raised his voice of protest. 
 The clamor precipitated a second vote of censure, which was offered 
 by M. Labouchere on March 15th, the ground of censure, how- 
 ever, being nominally the useless waste of life in the operations 
 about Suakim. The Government barely escaped defeat, the ma- 
 jority being only seventeen. The criticism on General Gordon for 
 his slave-trade proclamation was as blind as his policy was far- 
 sighted. He had been sent to secure the evacuation of the Sudan, 
 after which every sane man knew the country would return to its 
 old traffic ; for Gordon could scarcely be expected to say : "We are 
 to withdraw, bui^you are to frown upon the slave trade just as 
 though we were here to compel you. The peaceful evacuation, 
 Gordon well knew, could only be secured by conciliations, and the 
 best favors to grant were those the people were bound to gain. 
 The wisdom of his proclamation needed no further proof than the 
 excessive friendliness of the greetings along his march and of his 
 reception at Khartum. 
 
 Gordon devoted his first day in Khartum to acts of mercy. 
 He said to the people : "I come without soldiers, but with God on 
 my side, to redress the evils of this land. I will not fight with 
 any weapons but justice." He won the hearts of all at once by 
 burning the Government books and all instruments of torment 
 and torture, by releasing the unjustly imprisoned, and by devoting 
 himself personally to the sick and the wronged. That first day, also, 
 he sent a dispatch to Sir Evelyn Baring, saying that it would be 
 
— 93 — 
 
 folly to leave the Sudan unless some one were to take his place as 
 Governor-General. Anarchy and misery would surely ensue. He 
 named Zubair Pasha* as the one above all others to select for the 
 position. "He alone," he wrote, "has the ability to rule the Sudan, 
 and would be universally accepted by the Sudan." Sir Evelyn 
 Baring forwarded the suggestion the next day to Earl Granville, 
 and heartily urged its adoption, believing, as he said, that Zubair 
 was the only possible man. 
 
 It had been supposed, and, in fact, General Gordon himself 
 had so understood it, that he was to have the dictatorial power in 
 the Sudan that the crisis demanded. The English Government, 
 however, immediately repelled the notion of appointing old slave- 
 trading Zubair Governor- General. A long series of telegrams 
 passed between Gordon, Baring, and Granville on the subject. 
 Gordon besought and Baring expostulated ; but the Government 
 was blind to all reason — to everything but the fear of a renewal of 
 the slave-trade, which, in point of fact, was assured the day the 
 evacuation of the Sudan was decided upon. General Gordon 
 afterward reduced the Government's reasoning oa this point to 
 a simple form if "I will not send up A., because he will do this ; 
 but I will leave the country to B., who will do exactly the same." 
 Baring telegraphed to Granville (March 9th): "As regards slavery, 
 it may certainly receive a stimulus from the abandonment of the 
 Sudan by Egypt ; but the dispatch of Zubau' Pasha to Khartum 
 will not affect the question one way or the other. No middle 
 course is possible so far as the Sudan is concerned. We must 
 either virtually annex the country, which is out of the question, 
 or else we must accept the inevitable consequences of abandon- 
 ment." But the British Government wished to abandon, and yet 
 avoid the "inevitable consequences." Gordon maintained that 
 to prevent anarchy it was necessary to "smash up" the Mahdi, 
 and that Zubair was the only one who had enough influence and 
 prestige of family to do it. Gordon could not bear the thought 
 of leaving the Sudan to ruin. He sent a further argument,:]: that 
 
 • Zubair had had great power in the Sudan, where he was king of the slave-traders. 
 He was, at this time, confined in Cairo, his captivity being lightened by a liberal allowance. 
 Zubair was supposed to bear an undying grudge against Gordon, because he had killed 
 the former's son in the Sudan during a previous campaign. 
 
 f'General Gordon's Journal." Page 42. (Sept. 17th.) 
 
 tMarch 8th. 
 
— 94 — 
 
 should have had some weight with the Government: "If you do 
 not send Zubair you have no chance of getting the garrisons away; 
 this is a heavy argument in favor of sending him." 
 
 But it was no use. On March 28th, Earl Granville sent a long 
 note to Sir Evelyn Baring, in which he reviewed the discussion at 
 length, and even rehearsed the slavery antecedents of Zubair. It 
 is impossible after all the months that have intervened since that 
 note was written to read it dispassionately. Granville wrote: 
 "Her Majesty's Government, on the perusal of General Gordon's 
 advice, were under the impression that he gave undue weight to 
 the assumed necessity of an immediate evacuation of Khartum, 
 and they inquired whether it was urgent to make an arrangement 
 at once to provide for his successor, expressing a hope that Gen- 
 eral Gordon would remain for some time." In other words, her 
 Majesty's Government thought that the "necessity of an imme- 
 diate evacuation" could be more judiciously determined in Down- 
 ing Street than in Khartum. The question could be decided cer- 
 tainly more safely. It is not necessary to go through Lord Gran- 
 ville's note in detail. The vain desire is clearly manifest throughout 
 that Gordon should not abandon the Sudan in evacuating. Gordon 
 said that* he could pursue but one coiu'se ; Granville denied him 
 thatj but suggested no alternative. "Let Gordon stay a while : 
 the Government will deliberate. So far as is known he is not in 
 any immediate danger at Khartum. We will not let Zubair leave 
 Cairo." That was the gist of the note. A week later Mr. Glad- 
 stone naively remarked that General Gordon could leave Khartum 
 "at anytime if he felt so disposed." Little did he know the fiber 
 of the man's honor if he thought he could, under any conditions, 
 "feel disposed" to desert the garrisons he had been sent to rescue. 
 He felt that the lives of some 29,000 persons, composing the gar- 
 risons at Bahr Ghazelle, Sennar, Kassala, Khartum, Shendy, Ber- 
 ber, Abu Hamed, and Dongola were in his hands. He would not 
 be false to his trust. 
 
 The story of Gordon's government at Khartum, of his dealings 
 with the people, of his sorties against the threatening forces of 
 the Mahdi, and of his untiring zeal and dauntless personal cour- 
 age, is. told in his own journals* and dispatches to Sir Evelyn 
 
 *A large and very valuable part of Gordon's journals were lost wlien Colonel Stewart's 
 party was massacred, In September, 1884. Gordon Had entrusted them to tliat officer, be- 
 
95 - 
 
 JBaring, and in the letters of Mr. Power, the correspondent of the 
 London Times. Oui* concern is less with those details than with 
 the relations existing between Gordon and the British Govern- 
 jnent. The Egyptian Government quite drops out of notice, all 
 negotiations proceeding independently of the Khedive. 
 
 From first to last, so long as communication was kept up with 
 Gordon, the British Government pursued a policy of opposition 
 to his proposals. His long-continued and persistent calls for 
 Zubair were disregarded. He desired permission to proceed to 
 El Obeid for a peaceful negotiation with the Mahdi, whom he ap- 
 pointed Sultan* of Kordofan ; but he was told to remain at Khar- 
 ium. He said that Berber should be relieved, and that the route 
 from Suakim to Berber should be kept open ; instead of this, the 
 ^British troops were withdrawn from the Eed Sea littoral. He de- 
 .sired that Turkish troops should be sent there ; but this proposal 
 "was vetoed, presumably on diplomatic grounds. He wished to go 
 from Khartum to Bahr Ghazelle and the Equatorial Provinces ; 
 T3ut he was told again not to proceed beyond Khartum. He 
 begged that troops be sent to Wady Half a and Assuan; but the 
 request was refused. Later he urged the necessity of a British 
 diversion at Berber ; but his plea was not heeded. Was it not 
 strange that the English Government should have sent Gordon 
 \o the Sudan with the explicit understanding that his judgment 
 should determine the means and methods of evacuation, and then 
 jiever, in any essential particular, follow his advice ? The world 
 <3alled it almost a crime. Early in April Gordon sent an undated 
 message to Sir Evelyn Baring, containing the following words : 
 *'As far as I can understand, the situation is this : you state your 
 intention of not sending any relief up here or to Berber, and you 
 refuse me Zubair. I consider myself free to act according to cir- 
 cumstances. I shall hold on here as 1 ong as I can ; and if I can 
 suppress the rebellion, I shall do so. If I cannot, I shall retire to 
 Ihe Equator ; and leave you the indelible disgrace of abandoning 
 the garrisons of Sennar, Kassala, Berber, and Dongola, with the 
 •certainty that you will, eventually, be forced to smash up the 
 
 liCTlug that they would be safer thau if kept by himself, in Khartum. Stewart's Journals, 
 which Gordon considered very valuable, were lost at the same time. Viae seq. 
 
 *The appointment was scornfully rejected by the Mahdi, who sent dervishes to Gor- 
 •don, ordering him to embrace the Moslem faith. 
 
- 96 
 
 Mahdi under great difficulties, if you would retain peace in Egypt." 
 As Mr. Hake says :* " The breacli was complete. The great sol- 
 dier declined to serve as an instrument of dishonor." 
 
 In England the bitterest criticism was heaped upon Mr. Glad- 
 stone. The Liberals in Parliament became hostile to their own. 
 Government. On the 12th of May a third vote of censure was 
 jDroposed, in which the Government was charged with indifference- 
 to the success of Gordon's mission and the safety of his person. 
 Again the Government escaped, but with the small majority of 28 
 in 578 votes cast. The result would probably have been fatal to 
 Mr. Gladstone, if the vote had been postponed for a month. Then 
 his Government would have been held responsible for the fall of' 
 Berber and the terrible massacre that occurred there on June 2d. 
 A fourth vote might have been proposed, had not a different phase 
 of the Egyptian trouble been forced upon Parliament for consid- 
 eration before the news was received. 
 
 As always, the finances of Egypt were in a bad way. For 
 three years the deficits of the Treasury had been accumulating, 
 till they amounted to something over £8,000,000. The indemni- 
 ties for losses sustained in the bombardment, burning, and pillage 
 of Alexandria, made about half of this sum ; and the expenditures 
 for the military constituted the chief item in the remaining half. 
 The British Government desired to meet the deficit by a new 
 loan ; but, as this could not be done without conflicting with the 
 Law of Liquidation, it was decided to summon to a Conference 
 those Powers that had agreed to the establishment of the law. 
 Accordingly, on the 19th of April, Lord Granville sent an identi- 
 cal note to the great Powers, inviting them to a Conference in. 
 London, to consider whether a modification of the Laws of Liqui- 
 dation would not be for the financial interest of Egypt. Ger- 
 many, Austria, Kussia, and Italy accepted the invitation at once ; 
 but France, with something of her old-time jealousy, objected to< 
 a Conference that could not consider the political as well as the 
 financial question. Lord Granville, however, was firm in his in- 
 sistance upon the limitation so far as the Conference was con- 
 cerned ; but he entered into a diplomatic correspondence with M. 
 Waddington. The result of the exchange of views, or, as it was 
 
 *"Tlie story of Ctinese Gordon." Vol. II. Page 166. 
 
— 97 — 
 
 «alled, "the Anglo-French agreement," was submitted to Parlia- 
 ment by Mr. Gladstone before the Conference met. Trance re- 
 signed all claim of control in Egypt, and agreed never to land 
 troops in the Delta without the consent of England. On the other 
 hand, England agreed to withdraw her military forces from Egypt 
 before the 1st day of January, 1888, unless the Powers should re- 
 quest the contrary. In the meantime she was to prepare a scheme 
 for the neutralization of Egypt, which should be submitted to the 
 Powers. The Caisse de la Dette Puhlique, it was agreed, should 
 1)6 placed under the multiple direction of the Powers. But all 
 these arrangements, as Mr. Gladstone said, were dependent upon 
 the will of the Conference, which, in turn, should be binding upon 
 England according as Parliament, by its votes, determined. 
 
 England being thus carefully guarded behind two big ifs^ the 
 Conference met in London on June 28th. Its progress was slow, 
 and as it failed of its purpose ultimately its details need not be 
 given. The Powers were so hopelessly disagreed that the Con- 
 ference was dissolved on the 2d of August. France, the leader of 
 the opposition to England, could not secure the formulation of a 
 future policy. As a last straw she endeavored to obtain an ad- 
 journment of the Conference till October, but, instead, it was 
 adjourned sine die ; and thus, all participation in the affairs of 
 Egypt was lost to her. This was practically accomplished by her 
 -withdrawal from a joint supervision at the time of Arabi's Re- 
 bellion ; but now, for the first time, her position of looker-on was 
 determined. Germany seemed satisfied with having egged on 
 France to a point where the refusal of her demands would only in- 
 crease the growing coolness between the British and French Gov- 
 ernments. Turkey, of course, had found no following in urging 
 her rights and ability to control Egypt without the help of Eastern 
 Powers. Italy, the only pronounced ally of England in the Con- 
 ference, retired with the distinction that this alliance had brought 
 upon her, and accepted, as her share of the " spoils" the thanks 
 which Sir John Saville Lumley, British Minister to Italy, was in- 
 structed to bestow upon her for the support which she gave to the 
 British proposals in the Conference. 
 
 The glory of the collapse of the Conference, if there were any, 
 fell to England. It was demonstrated that the Powers could not 
 control Egypt in unison ; it was left to England to do the work 
 
— 98 — 
 
 alone and to earn the praise or the blame. The financial question', 
 remaining still unsettled, the Government commissioned Lord. 
 Northbrook to go to Egypt and investigate the " condition o£ 
 affairs so as to advise the English Government as to what counsel 
 should be given to the Egyptian Government in the present cir- 
 cumstances." Of course it was understood that the "counsel" 
 would be of a more peremptory character than advice usually is ; 
 for counsel and command to the Khedive have long been regarded 
 in England as one and the same thing. The High Commission 
 found the finances of Egypt in such a muddle that one of two 
 courses seemed inevitable ; to make a declaration of bankruptcy- 
 with a reduction of the coupons, or to turn the revenues tempo- 
 rarily from the sinking fund for the redemption of the certified- 
 debt into the Egyptian treasury. The latter alternative was- 
 chosen, and wisely, as it seems, although it was a breach of the 
 Law of Liquidation. Lord Northbrook held that, if the tribute ta 
 Turkey and the expenses of the Government could be met for a. 
 time, and if the revenues should afterward be reverted to the 
 sinking fund, the coupon holders would lose less than by a decla- 
 ration of bankruptcy. By the decree of the Khedive, September 
 18th, the Law of Liquidation was suspended for six weeks. This 
 called forth the united remonstrance of the Powers. The plan,, 
 however, was persisted in. 
 
 General Gordon, meanwhile, seemed to have dropped com- 
 pletely out of iftind. No word had been received from him since 
 May. By the fall of Berber telegraphic communications had been 
 cut off, and only the vaguest rumors from any point south of 
 Dongola made their way to Cairo. At the eleventh hour there had 
 been a pretense of opening the route from Suakim to Berber by 
 sending a railway plant to Suakim. Desultory dispatches of the 
 progress in its construction and of skirmishes with Osman Digna. 
 were received during the summer ; but no one was surprised that 
 the work was discontinued before autumn. This railway scheme- 
 was perhaps less of a farce than the Khedive Ismail's projected 
 railway from Wady Haifa south to Hanneck ; for Ismail left his 
 plant to be covered by the sweeping sands of the Nubian desert,. 
 Avhile the English carried theirs off to India. In order to divert 
 attention from the Berber massacre the success of Admiral 
 Hewett's mission to King John, of Abyssinia, the news of which 
 
— 99 — 
 
 liad been received at about tlie same time, had been somewhat 
 magnified. He secured by treaty access to a third route to Khar 
 tum from Massowah through Abyssinia. The sequel has shown how 
 valueless the concession was. But the attention of England had 
 been very generally diverted from Egypt altogether. The Fran- 
 chise Bill at home had been the absorbing topic during the early 
 summer. There had, however, been many rumors afloat of an ex- 
 pedition to be sent to the relief of General Gordon. But the 
 weeks had drifted by, and July, the month first named for the dis- 
 patch of the expedition, was past before any active preparations 
 were made. These were begun in August by the vote of a credit 
 of £300,000 to defray expenses. It seemed, finally, as if the con- 
 science of the Government were quickened. 
 
 CHAPTER X. 
 
 Wolseley's Expedition. Conclusion. 
 
 The command of the relief expedition was entrusted to Lord 
 "Wolseley, the Sir Garnet Wolseley who had suppressed Arabi's 
 Rebellion and thereby won for himself elevation to the peerage. 
 At first Lord "Wolseley had been asked simply to draw up the 
 plans of the expedition; but, as General Stephenson, the com- 
 mander of the forces in Egypt had not approved the scheme, 
 Wolseley was called upon to assume the command himself. At 
 his suggestion the Government had decided upon the Nile route 
 in opposition to the very generally expressed advice of the most 
 competent authorities, among whom was General Stephenson. The 
 latter favored the route from Suakim to Berber as the most direct 
 and the shortest. If an advance of only ten miles a day were 
 made, this journey could be accomplished within a month. The 
 objections to this route were the lack of water and the certainty 
 that Osman Digna would dispute every inch of the way. They 
 were formidable objections certainly, but not insuperable. The 
 route would have been far preferable to the one decided upon on 
 account of the great saving in time. 
 LofC. 
 
— 100 — 
 
 There was still anotlier route than the one chosen that seems 
 never to have been considered, although it has always been the 
 beaten way from Cairo to Khartum. It coincides with the route 
 Wolseley preferred, except that, instead of making the long jour- 
 ney through the horse-shoe bend of the Nile, south of Wady Haifa, 
 where the river is impassable to large craft on account of the cata- 
 racts, it strikes oif across the Nubiandesert from Korosko to Abu 
 Hamed, the points that represent the heel of the shoe. The desert 
 journey is accomplished in about six days, the distance being two 
 hundred and thirty miles, or somewhat less than the distance 
 from Suakim to Berber. The route is not altogether pleasant, as 
 the line of skeletons of men and beasts who have perished on the 
 way testifies; but there is a wellat the midway station, and a flying 
 column could have carried enough water along with it. In spite, 
 however, of the greater disadvantages of the circuitous route, 
 Wolseley decided to stick to the river. 
 
 The commander arrived in Egypt on the 8th of September, 
 and began to make elaborate and tedious preparations. His force 
 was to consist of 10,000 men. To transport them he had deter- 
 mined to employ Canadian boatmen, and to use small boats simi- 
 lar to those he had used in a Canadian expedition which he had 
 commanded on the Red River some years before. The boats and 
 boatmen were not ready before the end of September, when more 
 than a month of high water had already been lost. If the expedi- 
 tion had started! in July, as originally suggested, even steamers of 
 light draft might have been towed up the cataracts, which, it must 
 be remembered, are nothing more than long stretches of whirl- 
 pools and eddies that scarcely roar or rush as they wind in and out 
 and around the thousand and one rocky islets. After the middle 
 of August, when the Nile began to fall, every day passed was a 
 precious day lost. 
 
 An impulse was given to the work at the end of September. A 
 voice from the desert was heard that had been stilled for months. 
 It had all of its old ring. "lam awaiting the British forces," 
 wrote Gordon, "in order to evacuate the Egyptian garrisons.'" 
 His purpose had not changed since the day he started for the 
 Sudan. On the 29th of September, Mr. Power's journal of events 
 in Khartum, from the first of May to the end of July, was given in 
 the London Times. It was a thrilling story. The indignation 
 
— 101 — 
 
 that the following extract aroused was intense: "Since the dis- 
 patch which arrived the day before yesterday [July 29th], all hope 
 of relief by our Government is at an end; so when our provisions, 
 which we have at a stretch for two months, are oaten, we must fall; 
 nor is there any chance, with the soldiers we have, and the great 
 crowd of women, children, etc., of oiu' being able to cut our way 
 through the Arabs. We have not steamers for all, and it is only 
 from the steamers we can meet the rebels." The two months were 
 past : had the garrison already fallen ? Early in October further 
 news was received contained in a series of dispatches sent by Gen- 
 eral Gordon to Massowah. None of them, however, bore a later 
 date than Power's message to the Times. In one of them (July 
 31st) Gordon writes: " Reading over youi* telegram of the 5th 
 May, 1884, you ask me to state cause and intention in staying at 
 Khartum, knowing Government means to abandon Sudan, and in 
 answer I say, I stay at Khartum because Arabs have shut us up, 
 and will not let us out." Again and again Gordon referred in his 
 journal to the impertinence of the above request: State your rea- 
 sons 1 "The '■reasons' are those horribly plucky Arabs."* 
 
 The immediate result of these dispatches was that all eyes 
 were tiu'ned upon Lord Wolseley. The criticism of his move- 
 ments was less than the impatience at his delays. In the Gov- 
 ernment's letter of instructions, dated October 8th, he was in- 
 formed that the primary object of his expedition was the rescue 
 of General Gordonj and Colonel Stewart. He was not to go far- 
 ther south than Dongola, unless it became actually necessary ; 
 and, in no case, was he to proceed beyond Khartum, not even to 
 relieve the garrison at Sennar. Such instructions were scarcely 
 calculated to arouse Lord Wolseley to the activity that the pur- 
 pose of his expedition required. Gordon had said that he could 
 not leave Khartum, and yet the Government talked about rescu- 
 ing him at a point midway between that city and Wady Haifa. 
 The general who had stilled the cry of "Egypt for the Egyp- 
 
 *" Journal." Page 53 (Sept. 19tli). 
 
 tGordon's view of the relief expedition is interesting in ttis connection. He wrote in 
 Ms journals (Sept. 24) : " I altogether decline the imputation that the projected expedition 
 has come to relieve me. It has come to save our national HONOEi/i extricating the garrisons, 
 etc., from a position in ivhich our action in Egypt has placed these qarrisons. I loas relief ex- 
 pedition No. \. They are relief expedition No. "i,. ... I am not the resc ited tom&, and I 
 will not be." (The italics are his.) 
 
 7 
 
— 102 — 
 
 tians" with a skill and promptness tliat called forth the applause 
 of the world, seemed to have assumed now a character quite in 
 keeping with the desires of his Government. They had been slow 
 and irresolute in all their relations with the Sudan. Each step 
 was taken only when the irresistible force of public opinion com- 
 pelled. By keeping just behind the public demand and the ne- 
 cessities of the moment, the Government had acted always just 
 too late. General Gordon gives a good instance of this failing in 
 his Journals :* " Take the Tokar business : had Baker been sup- 
 ported, say, by 500 men, he would not have been defeated; yet, 
 after he was defeated, you go and send a force to relieve the 
 town. Had Baker been supported by these 500 men, he would, 
 in all probability, have been victorious, and would have pushed on 
 to Berber ; and, once there, Berber would not have fallen. "What 
 was right to do in March, was right to do in February. We sent 
 an expedition in March, so we ought to have sent it in February ; 
 and then, the worst of it was that Baker, having been defeated, 
 when you did send your expedition to Tokar, Baker's force no 
 longer existed, and his guns resist me at Berber. It is truly de- 
 plorable, the waste of men and money, on account of our inde- 
 cision." 
 
 The advance of the Nile force was lamentably slow. By the 
 20th of November there were only 3,000 troops out of some 16,- 
 000 in Egypt that had passed Wady Haifa. Within the next three 
 weeks, however the 10,000 troops composing the expeditionary 
 force were all south of Korosko. It seemed as though Lord 
 Wolseley were preparing to write a book on " My Winter on the 
 Nile." He would have had the advantage of the thousand and 
 one tourists who have written under the above title, in that he 
 pushed beyond the usual limit at the first cataract, and main- 
 tained a progress that all might envy, who have enjoyed the mo- 
 tionlessness of the dahabieh. A description of a Nile journey 
 is nothing unless it dwells upon the laziness, the idleness, the do- 
 nothingness of the life. 
 
 In the meantime the news of another horror had been received 
 from the Siidan. On the 10th of September General Gordon had 
 sent Colonel Stewart down the Nile in command of an expedition 
 against Berber. He considered it important that the rebel forti- 
 
 *Page 151 (Oct. 8th), 
 
— 103 — 
 
 fications there should be destroyed, thus enabling Stewart to open 
 communication with the expedition of relief, concerning whose 
 movements Gordon was very much in the dark. It is also hinted* 
 that Gordon wished, by this method, to save the life of his brave 
 lieutenant. Before the fall of Berber he had sent down into 
 Egypt more than 600 soldiers and 2,000 people ; but this was the 
 first attempt since then to add to the number. Stewart succeeded 
 in demolishing the Berber fortifications, and then, with Power, 
 the Times correspondent, and about forty others, he parted from 
 the main force, which returned to Khartum, and steamed on 
 toward Dongola. After passing Abu Hamed — where he might 
 have met a flying column from Korosko if that route had only 
 been selected — his steamer struck a rock and could not be shoved 
 ojBf. He and his companions were now induced by promises of peace 
 to accept the hospitality of Suleiman Wad Gamr, in whose country 
 they were. Unarmed, they met him at the house of a blind man 
 to negotiate for the purchase of camels to take them to Dongola; 
 but, while there, they were basely set upon and murdered. The 
 bodies of Stewart and Power, the only Englishmen besides Gor- 
 don south of Dongola, were thrown into the river as food for the 
 crocodiles. The valuable journals of Gordon and Stewart fell into 
 the hands of the rebels. Hussein, the stoker of the steamer, es- 
 caped death, and after a servitude of four months gave the first 
 authoritative report of the massacre. Undoubted rumors, how- 
 ever, had reached the force advancing up the Nile early in October. 
 The news added fresh fuel to the fire of English indignation. The 
 Government that had shielded itself from the responsibility of 
 Hicks's death could find no way of escape from the blame that now 
 attached to it. Stewart had been appointed Gordon's first lieu- 
 tenant, had been sent to the Sudan for a specific purpose, and had 
 then been abandoned to the fate that befell him. Those who had 
 been wondering if the last act of the play were to be comedy or 
 tragedy, questioned no longer. Alarming rumors were now cir- 
 culated regarding Gordon. It was said that he had been captured 
 by the Mahdi ; then that Khartum had fallen ; and again that the 
 mines had been exploded and had blown Gordon into the air. On 
 the 14th of November, however, Wolseley received from Gordon a 
 set of cipher dispatches, dated November 4th. Gordon lived ; 
 
 •" The Story of CMnese Gordon," by A. Egmont Hake, p. ISO. 
 
— 104 — 
 
 but lie was in imminent danger. The Mahdi was within eight 
 hours of Khartum, which had provisions for about forty days. 
 Five steamers had gone from Khartum to Metemneh to await 
 the expected relief. These facts were kept from the public, which 
 only knew that Gordon was alive. 
 
 The beginning of the new year found LordWolseley still work- 
 ing his tedious way up the Nile. The apathy that had followed 
 long-continued impatience in England was, however, dispelled, 
 early in January, by a very explicit telegram from Lord Wolseley 
 to the Prince of Wales. His lordship announced, with something 
 of a theatrical air, that he would enter Khartum on the 24th of 
 January. The public confidence in Wolseley's promises was 
 great ; for he had always had a way of announcing what he pro- 
 posed to accomplish on a certain day, and of proceeding forthwith 
 to carry out his undertaking to the letter. Since the battle of Tel 
 el Kebir, however, the public had been deluded by so many vain 
 plans, never carried to their execution, that almost any promise 
 must need go begging for confidence. Still the general public was 
 willing to trust for a last time, and the recent article in the Lon- 
 don Times* was forgotten, that called upon Mr. Gladstone to re- 
 sign " in order to enable a new ministry, not crippled by personal 
 engagements injurious to the true interests of England, to adopt 
 a vigorous policy in Egypt, the colonies, and foreign affairs gen- 
 erally." 
 
 While Wolaeley was hurrying his troops forward to Korti, 
 which he had determined to make his base of operations, there 
 were perplexing rumors afloat concerning the re-entrance of the 
 Sublime Porte as an active factor in the Egyptian question. The 
 announcement soon followed that the Sultan was preparing to 
 dispatch troops to Suakim in order to overcome Osman Digna, 
 who was still zealously serving the Mahdi in that locality. Her 
 Majesty's Government at once resolved that Turkish troops should 
 not be landed on the Ked Sea littoral. But on what ground could 
 England prevent it ? It had never claimed the power of a protec- 
 torate ; how, then, could it exercise such power? The answer 
 was easily found in the history of the preceding years. The Brit- 
 ish Government had never hesitated to act as the dominant power ; 
 it had only hesitated to assume the responsibility that must neces- 
 
 *Jaliuary 5tli, 1885. 
 
— 105 — 
 
 sarily be associated with that power. It seemed now as if England 
 would be forced finally to acknowledge herself the positive pro- 
 tector of Egypt, when suddenly the attention of the Government 
 and the people was diverted from diplomacy to the war operations 
 in the Sudan. 
 
 Having concentrated his forces at Korti, Lord Wolseley, on the 
 4th of January, had ordered General Earle, with a force of about 
 2,500 men, to proceed to Berber, by way of the long bend in the 
 Nile. He was to get possession of Abu Hamed and Berber, in order 
 that the desert routes from those points might be made use of in 
 case of evacuation. On the 8th of January, General Stewart, 
 with a picked force of about 1,500 men, was dispatched from 
 Korti straight across the desert to Metemneh, there to meet the 
 steamers that General Gordon had sent out from Khartum. This 
 desert route was only about thirty miles shorter than the one from 
 Korosko to Abu Hamed, which might have been taken in Septem- 
 ber. Four precious months would thus have been saved. All 
 went well with General Stewart's desert journey, till he neared 
 the wells of Abu Klea, less than twenty -five miles from Metemneh. 
 He encamped near them on the 16th of January, and on the 17th 
 his force was attacked by 10,000 rebels. His troops fought as 
 Englishmen always fight, and the rebels, with all their superiority 
 of numbers, were repulsed. The English loss was sixty-five killed 
 and nearly a hundred wounded. Among the former was the 
 famous Colonel Burnaby, who made the wonderful "Ride to Khiva." 
 He is said to have died "like a true British bull-dog, with his right 
 hand clenched in death about the throat of the Arab whose spear 
 was thrust through the Colonel's neck." On the 19th, a still more 
 formidable force was encountered ; but again the rebels were 
 repulsed. General Stewart had received a wound which he would 
 not admit was serious, but pushed on to Gubat on the Nile, not 
 attempting to force Metemneh, which was in the hands of the rebels. 
 At Gubat were Gordon's steamers and the inspiring message : 
 "All right at Khartum. Can hold out for years." It seemed as if 
 fortune served the will of England. The enthusiasm that greeted 
 the news of Stewart's victories, and of Gordon's message was 
 boundless. A confidence was begotten that made final success 
 seem already within England's grasp. The world did not know 
 then, as we do now, that the message was written for the enemy,* 
 
 *"Story of Chinese Gordon," p. 200. By A. Egmont Hake. 
 
— 106 — 
 
 and that Gordon had sent word to "Wolseley nearly two months 
 before that he had provisions enough for about forty days. The 
 Commander-in-Chief had received a later dispatch, dated December 
 14th, in which Gordon said : "Our troops in Khartum are suffering 
 from lack of provisions. . . . We want you to come quickly." 
 But Wolseley had kept Gordon's peril a secret, only using the 
 utmost haste — at the eleventh hour — to secure his release. The 
 world, therefore, rejoiced at the news. 
 
 Several days were now fatally misspent. It was not till the 
 24th of January that Sir Charles Wilson started on Gordon's 
 steamers for Khartiim. On the 28th, after having been assailed all 
 along his journey by armed Arabs on the banks of the river. Col- 
 onel Wilson appeared in sight of Khartum. Instead of the eager 
 welcome he expected, he was met with a furious fusilade from all 
 sides, and before him on the Government house floated the Mahdi's 
 colors. Khartum had fallen, and Gordon was captured or killed. 
 Assured of the terrible disaster, Wilson hastily beat a retreat. He 
 lost both his steamers at the Sixth cataract, and only reached 
 Gubat after a most perilous adventure, from which he was rescued 
 by Lord Charles Beresford. But on the way down he had learned 
 from the natives that Khartum had fallen on the 26th. Gordon 
 had been lost by two days. With fateful instinct he had written,* 
 October 13th : "It is, of course, on the cards that Khartum is taken 
 under the nose of the expeditionary force, vrhich will be just too 
 latey It probably never will be known just how he died; and it 
 matters little which story we believe. All agree that Faraz Pasha 
 treacherously betrayed the city, and that the martyr died like a 
 hero. 
 
 To the western world the news of the fall of Khartum was like 
 a thunderbolt from a clear sky. At the very moment of rejoicing, 
 fortune and faith were crushed. The calamity marked an epoch. 
 The press and the people demanded that from that day the great 
 statesman, whose policy had always been peace, should bear the 
 arms he^was loath to assume and slow to use in a strong and 
 swift campaign of revenge, or make way for a ministry of war. 
 The public patience and forbearance were strained beyond their 
 utmost tension. The final catastrophe was the natural outcome 
 of all the mistakes of England in Egypt. Since the suppression 
 
 ■"'Journals," Page 178. 
 
— 107 — 
 
 of Arabi's Kebellion there had been little to admire in the British 
 policy. Forced to remain and protect her own interests, and 
 guard with jealous care the water-way to India, England hesitated 
 to accept, and endeavored to shirk at every step, the responsibility 
 that her power and position had forced upon her. It may be true 
 that the British interference in Egypt was not of Mr. Gladstone's 
 choosing ; but, when he accepted the control of the Government, 
 he accepted the situation in Egypt as it was, and not as he might 
 wish it to be. Since his accession in 1880, it had never been possi- 
 ble or desu-able for England to withdraw her influence from 
 Egypt ; but Mr. Gladstone could not look that fact in the face. 
 After Arabi's downfall, in 1882, the British Parliament, press, and 
 public urged their Government to declare its policy or intentions 
 in Egypt ; but they iirged in vain. Nothing was ever decided till 
 the exigencies or the disasters of the moment rendered action ab- 
 solutely imperative. This halting policy had resulted in disaster, 
 slaughter, and the final tragedy. 
 
 Scarcely had the world recovered from the first great shock of 
 Gordon's death, when it was announced that General Earle had 
 been killed in an engagement with the rebels on February 9th, 
 while pressing toward Abu Hamed ; and then came the sad news 
 that General Stewart's wound had proved fatal on February 16th. 
 Perhaps Wolseley began to have some concern for his own life 
 At all events, he lost no time in gathering together the outlying 
 portions of his army. The perilous desert journey from Gubat to 
 Korti was safely made; and the river expedition that Genera 
 Earle had commanded, was recalled. With all possible expedition 
 the army retreated to Dongola, where it took up its quarters for 
 the summer. Such was the end of the lamentable failiire to res- 
 cue Gordon. 
 
 The cry for vengeance with which England was still ringing 
 had to be recognized in some way. To counteract the humiliation 
 of Wolseley's retreat, active operations had been undertaken on 
 the Red Sea littoral. Troops were personally reviewed by the 
 Queen, and then ordered to the seat of war in the eastern Sudan. 
 It was declared that the Government had determined to open the 
 route to Berber and then to "smash" the Mahdi. But the most 
 barren, desolate and difficult of desert routes was still guarded by 
 Osman Digna, the lieutenant of the Mahdi, whose forces had more 
 
— 108 — 
 
 than once carried destruction into the English camp. It was a 
 difficult task the Government set the English soldiers, to accom- 
 plish that journey of two hundred and fifty miles amid all the 
 natural perils of the desert and with hostile hordes ready to s wooip 
 dov/n upon them from every mountain along the way. But the 
 accomplishment was heyond the intention of the Government. A 
 show of activity was made at Suakim with soldiers and railway 
 plant until Mr. Gladstone had recovered from the effect of the vote 
 of censure that so nearly* cost him his government when Parlia- 
 ment reassembled at the end of February. The beleaguered 
 garrison of Kassala was sending piteous appeals for help that were 
 like the old cries from Khartum. But aside from this the call for 
 war was still inspired of vengeance only. Vengeance, however, is 
 a quality that Mr. Gladstone's character — to his honor be it said — 
 has never known. Supported by a narrow majority, he turned his 
 thoughts from the stinging failures of his policy abroad to the grand 
 purposes of his life-work at home. The cry for vengeance never 
 found an echo in the sand hills of the desert, while at home it had 
 dwindled, within two months, to the murmur of a jeering and de- 
 riding opposition. The epilogue of the tragedy, however, might 
 better have been spoken after a farce. All the irony of an eigh- 
 teenth century comedy was contained in Lord Wolseley's farewell 
 address, in which he announced the withdrawal of the British 
 troops from the Sudan and highly praised " the conduct of all the 
 departments of the service during the campaign." One asks to 
 whom and to what he issued the farewell. Was it to the shades of 
 Hicks Pasha, of the Stewarts, of Earle, of Gordon, and of the brave 
 British soldiers whose whitening bones would make the desert 
 paths plainer to the caravans of war or peace that should there- 
 after wind across the sands of the Sudan ? Or, was it to the rival 
 Mahdis — ^for since the death of Gordon the glory of Mehemet 
 Ahmed had been dimmed by the claims of a Falser Prophet than 
 himself— who were threatening a greater destruction among be- 
 lievers than had been accomplished by the trained troops of a 
 superior civilization '? Perhaps Osman Digna heard the address or, 
 from the hills about Suakim where he and his band had so success- 
 fully harassed and hindered the invaders, watched the withdrawal. 
 
 * The vote was carried in the Upper House by a large majority, but lost in the Lower 
 House by the narrow majority of fourteen. 
 
— 109 — 
 
 He must have smiled — for he was a European, and cannot be sup- 
 posed to have acquired the disposition of the Mussulmans with 
 their faith — as he looked down upon the few miles of the incom- 
 plete and deserted railway. 
 
 And yet the withdrawal from the Stidan in May, 1885, was the 
 wisest act of Mr. Gladstone's Sudanese policy. Gordon himself 
 had said :* " If Khartum falls, then go quietly back to Cairo, for you 
 will only lose men and spend money uselessly in carrying on the 
 campaign." The troops could not go as far as Cairo, however, for 
 the Egyptian boundary needed to be guarded. The frontier gar- 
 rison was placed at Wady Haifa. This was the proper limit ; 
 for it brought Korosko, the terminus of the desert route, under 
 the protection of the Nile patrol of steamers, while being itself 
 within easy reach of reinforcements from Assuan. The natural 
 barriers of protection, the long cataract south of Wady Haifa, and 
 the six days' desert guarding Korosko, make the present Egyptian 
 garrisons practically impregnable. And so the Sudan was left to 
 its inherent anarchy. But first England offered naively to let 
 Turkey set up a government there. Tiirkey declined with thanks. 
 The Sudan pays no tribute. The Porte cares little for the mere 
 honor of being acknowledged suzerain ; its solicitude is for some- 
 thing more tangible. So long as there is no interference with her 
 tribute prerogatives, Tiirkey will make no attempts to establish 
 her claim of authority, by sending troops or treasure to Egypt or 
 the Sudan. After Turkey refused to act the part of what seemed 
 cat's-paw to England, Italy became clamorous for the distinction. 
 But her ambition never has extended beyond the Red Sea littoral. 
 The Sudanese have thus been left practically to themselves since 
 May, 1885. They have begun to prepare their country for the 
 ultimate reception of civilization much more effectually than an 
 external force could have done. The Mahdi and Osman Digna are 
 dead. Intestine strifes among different factions have so wasted 
 the resources of the land that the misery of the people is as great, 
 probably, or greater than in the days when an Egyptian Pasha 
 was Governor-General. Perhaps the people already look back 
 upon the time when Gordon first ruled among them as the period 
 of their happiest prosperity. It is not an impossibility that the 
 dreams of Sir Samuel Baker may yet come true, in which he 
 
 * "Journals," page 1T9 (Oct. iStH). 
 
— 110 -^ 
 
 pictures to himself the upper Nile region as freed frora the curse 
 of the slave-traffic, as accessible to the outer world, and as bring- 
 ing forth the bounties of tropical increase. Before this Utopian 
 result is secured, however, the influence of the Anglo-Saxon will 
 again be needed. 
 
 We must now take a final look at Egypt proper. The Khe- 
 dive's Government played a small part in the game that cost Eng- 
 land so dearly. Their chief concern had been to keep their head 
 above the ever-flowing, never-ebbing tide of debts. It cannot be 
 said that they succeeded. It has been seen to what extremities 
 Lord Northbrook was obliged to go in order to relieve the finan- 
 cial embarrassments of 1884, and how the Powers were incensed 
 at his action. By way of conciliation a financial scheme was 
 drawn up, to which the Powers agreed, and which was presented 
 to Parliament in March, 1885. It has, however, not yet become a 
 law. The agreement guarantees a loan of £9,000,000, to be used 
 in lifting the Egyptian debt. The loan is to be liquidated by the 
 repayment of £325,000 annually ; and this sum is to be considered 
 the first charge against the Egyptian revenues until the entire 
 loan is lifted. The customary provision is included, which ex- 
 tends taxation to all foreigners resident in Egypt. This provision 
 has often enough been indorsed ; it should now be executed. The 
 Egyptians will then believe that the Giaours are not without a 
 sense of honor. The agreement further provides for reductions 
 in interest — ^wBich, though absolutely necessary, partake some- 
 what of the spirit of repudiation — and, as always, for an "exhaus- 
 tive investigation into the revenue earning capacity of Egypt." 
 The agreement seems to have been drawn up in the interest of 
 Egypt. This rare quality may have something to do with the de- 
 lay in its adoption. In the meantime, the discovery o'f petroleum 
 within the boundaries of Egypt suggests a possible solution of the 
 financial problem more satisfactory than the agreements and in- 
 vestigations of European Powers can ever secure. 
 
 There is one step remaining to be taken in Egypt that will do 
 more than anything else toward securing the final settlement of 
 the conflict between the East and West. England must assume 
 the burdens of her authority. She can never loose her hold of the 
 country that guards the water-way to India. She is jealous of her 
 power. When her attention was concentrated on the Afghan im- 
 
— Ill — 
 
 broglio last May, France thought it an opportune moment to re- 
 gain her lost prestige in Egypt. But if England's attention were 
 -diverted for the moment, her representatives were not without 
 power in Egypt. M. de Freycinet failed as utterly then as he had 
 ■in the day of Arabi. England has the single-handed control, and 
 she means to maintain it. The welfare of Egypt rests en this 
 resolution. Many people, who claim the divine right of judging 
 the motives of an action, and who fail to see so far as its results, 
 ^irge that England is actuated solely by selfishness and the greed 
 of power in asserting her control in Egypt, and that she is merely 
 fortifying herself against that certain day when some groping arm 
 of Russian territory shall reach a southern sea. They say she 
 makes the interest of Egypt secondary to her own ; therefore, the 
 power of England in Egypt must be resisted. Granting even that 
 these are England's motives, cannot the same wind blow good to 
 both countries ? Is it a sound principle that what benefits one 
 •country must injure another? The fact is, that the exten- 
 sion of the dominion of Great Britain, while bringing glory to 
 ihe nation itself, is for the interest of the civilized world. 
 The Anglo-Saxon influences of Christianity and civilization 
 are the best known. As opposed to Eassian influences they are 
 iconoclastic and creative. The Russian Empire extends its domin- 
 ion, and there appears no sign of assimilation ; the . subjugated 
 people pays its tribute and its homage, but retains its language, 
 its religion, and its customs. England, on the other hand, makes 
 ber furthermost territory British in reality as well as in name ; ig- 
 norance, superstition, and savagery melt away under contact with 
 the Anglo Saxon influence. That England, in spite of all her mis- 
 takes, has had a beneficent influence upon Egypt, no one can doubt 
 who compares the civilization under Mehemet Ali with that of to- 
 day. This would be the trite assertion of an accepted fact, were 
 it not for the stupendous financial follies of Ismail. The storm 
 raged in his day ; and the gloom still hangs over Egypt. It can 
 only be pierced by the protecting arm of England. She has 
 shrunk all along from the final step of annexation ; but she re- 
 mains the virtual suzerain of Egypt. A truly anomalous condition 
 of affairs is presented to view. England has the control ; Egypt 
 bears the burdens ; and Turkey reaps the profit. The role of 
 Turkey is quite superfluous. She has never yielded to Egjpt the 
 
— 112 — 
 
 sligMest return for the tribute she has regularly exacted and the 
 troops she has occasionally employed. It is true that she granted 
 Ismail the title of Khedive for an enormous consideration ; but if 
 Mehemet Ali had been supported in his just struggle for independ- 
 ence in 1842, the ruler in Egypt might call himself Khedive, Em- 
 peroi", or Mikado, without the expenditure of a single piaster. It 
 is not yet too late for severance. The vast sum of money paid by^ 
 way of tribute to the Porte, may be considered duly to have pur- 
 chased for Egypt her independence of Turkey. This violation of 
 contract could not be effected without a struggle. But with Eng- 
 land's support it could result only one way. Once accomplished, 
 Egypt might yet shake off the shackles of debt, and the relations 
 of the great Power of the West to Egypt in the East might b& 
 settled without conflict. 
 
 THE "END. 
 
BOOKS AND PERIODICALS CONSULTED 
 
 ^'Annual Cyclopaedia" — Appleton. . 
 
 ^'Belgium of the East, The." By the author of "Egypt Under Ismail 
 Pasha." Edited by Blanchard Jerrold. 
 
 ^'British JSTaval and Military Operations in Egypt, 1883, Report of The." 
 By Lieutenant-Commander Casper F. Goodrich, U. y. Navy. 
 
 ** British Quarterly Review, " Files of. 
 
 ■"Chinese Gordon. Succinct Record of His Life." By Archibald Forbes. 
 
 " Chinese Gordon, The Life of." By Charles H. Allen, F. R. G. S. 
 
 "" Chinese Gordon, The Story of." By A. Egmont Hake. 
 
 ■" Confederate Soldier in Egypt, A." By W. W. Loring. 
 
 ■" Contemporary Review," Files of. 
 
 "Diary of an American Girl in Cairo during the War of 1883." {Century, 
 June, 1884.) Fanny Stone. 
 
 ■"■ Edinburgh Review," Files of. 
 
 ■"England in Egypt." By George Makepeace Towle. 
 
 ■" England Under Gladstone, 1880—1885." By Justin H. McCarthy, M. P. 
 
 "'Egypt and the Egyptian Question." By D. Mackenzie Wallace. 
 
 "Egypt and the SCdan." Speech by W. E. Gladstone. 
 
 "' Egypt As It Is." By J. C. McCoan. 
 
 " Egypt For the Egyptians. A Retrospect and a Prospect." (Anonymous.) 
 
 "Egypt Under Ismail Pasha." Edited by Blanchard Jerrold. 
 
— 114 — 
 
 "Fellah, The." By Edmond About. 
 
 " Fortnightly Review," Files of. 
 
 " General Gordon's Journals at Khartum." 
 
 " History of the East India Company." By Robert Grant. 
 
 'History of the Egyptian Revolution to Death of Mehemet Ali, A." B^. 
 A. A. Patton, F. R. G. S. 
 
 " How We Defended Arabi." C. M. Broadley. 
 
 "Independent," Files of. 
 
 "Ismailia" By Sir Samuel W. Baker. 
 
 ' ' Khedive's Egypt, The. " By Edward De Leon. 
 
 " London Times," Files of. 
 
 "Modern History and Condition of Egypt, The. 1801 to 1843." By Wnt. 
 Holt Yates, M.D. 
 
 "Morning Land, The." By Edward Dicey. 
 
 ''Nineteenth Century," Files of. 
 
 "Plain Words on the Egyptian Question." (Anonymous.) 
 
 " Quarterly Review," Files of. 
 
 " Shall We Annex Egypt ?" By William Stone, M. A., F. L. S. 
 
 "Spoiling the Egyptians." A Tale of Shame Told from the British Blue- 
 Books. By J, Seymour Heay. 
 
 " Suez Canal, The." By J. H. Pepper. (In "Discoveries and Inventions, 
 of the Nineteenth Century," by Robt. Routledge.) 
 
 "Suez Canal, The." Letters and Documents Descriptive of its Rise and 
 Progress in 1854 — 1856. By Ferdinand De Lesseps. 
 
 "Three Prophets, The : Chinese Gordon, Mahemet Ahmed, Arabi Pasha." 
 By Colonel C. Chaille Long. 
 
 " Uganda and the Egyptian Sfidan." By C. T. Wilson and R. W. Felkin.- 
 
THE CONFLICT / 
 
 OF THE EAST AND WEST 
 
 IN 
 
 EGYPT, 
 
 '< DISSERTATION IN PAET FULFILLMENT OF THE CONDITIONS NECESSARY 
 
 FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF THE DEGREE OF 
 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHr," IN 
 
 THE SCHOOL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, 
 
 COLUMBIA COLLEGE. 
 
 — BY — 
 
 T JOHN ELIOT BOWEN, B. A., Ph. B. 
 78 ■>■ 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 THE INDEPBNDBNT PRESS, 21 & 23 ROSE STREET. 
 
 1886. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 029 958 379 A 
 
 :*■ ■ j-v 
 
 ■' I