El 4/72 .17 UBRARY OF CONGRESS DDDESD^amD LIBRftRY OF CONGRESS 509 341 Cifiijiiients on 9lMjor-Cieu. Model- lan's account ol' his W(>t Vir- Toledo, Nov. 2d, 1864. To t/ie Hon. Wni. Dennmn, Late Governor of Ohio : SiK : My apology for presuming fo address yon, and for publishing this p;yjer before it i»ad been submitted to you, must be tound in the facts and circumstances herein referred to. I have the honor respectfully to call your attention to the U<.ct, that in the ^V inter of 18G1-2 the President was asked to appoint me a Brigadier General of Volunteer.«. • The appointnjent was not made. A long time af- terwards I was credibly informed tlmt the ob- stacle to my appointment lay in the opposi- tion covertly manifested by Maj. Gen. jMcClei- lan, then occu^.ying a high i)Gsiiiun in the army. You did me' the .horror to commission me a Brigadier in .June, 1861, and ordered me to Western Virginia, to comiuand a portion of the Ohio three months' troops, then serving under Maj. Gen. McClellan. I had sei ved un- der him about thirty days before he was or- dered to Washingtcjn, and up to the 14th of July, 1861, had received from him direct and strong commendation with every mark of contidence, If I did, or omitted, anything, to cause a forfeiture of that confidr^nce, it must have been that I did not intercept or captuie Garneti's Rebel army, after it had eluded and escaped from Generals McClellan and Morris. General McClellan passed through Grafton, Va., on his way to assume command of the Army of the Potomac, on the 33d or 24th of July. 1861. General Rosecrans accompjinied him to Grafton, and there I had an interview with both of them. I called their attention to the false stateraen's which bad appeared in the newspapers in relation to my efforts to intercept or capture Garnett's army; stated tl^t my report was not prepared, as reports frDm my subordinates were not in— but that it soon would \)e ready; and,, in view of the fact that everything had transpired whi'.eMaj. Gen. McClellan was in command, stated that I should expect and desire him to take every step necessary to vindicate himself and the service, and to enable him to do so (he more promptly and conveniently ; and at the same time to enable his successor, Gen. Rosecrans, *.o act, I asked permission of both them to make my report, in duplicate, addressing one «opy to Maj. Gen. McClellan and one copy to Brig. Gen. Rosecrans, and also asked prompt action by them upon anything found to be wrong. And I especially asked of Ms.j. Gen. McClellan that he would make an early inves- tigation of the case, so ftyi as there were facts that he might wisli to inquire into, and tliat h-e, would promptly give his conclusions to the public. This he promised to do so soon as he should re- mve my Report. Within ten days after that interview my Report was completed in dupli- •ate and one copy, with a map and the re- ports of my subordinates, addressed and forwarded to Major General McClellan and ihe other to Brigadier General Rosecrans. — From tliG circumstances of the case, it was understood and expected that G ne- ' eral Rosecrans would defer to Gen. McClel- lan. But on looking the case over he did not kesitate, in a con vernation with ray Cliief of Stair, now Brig. Gen. J. W. Fuilei, :„ .......;- ate me from all blame. I trusted to the promixe of Gen. McClellan to promptly exandne and viiulicate the truth, and knew, that in so doing, as a man of intel- ligence and honor, he could quire for «ny comment or report from Gener- al McClellan, touching my transactions in Virginia, but .got no intelligence of anything from him until ihe IGtli of last month, when I heard of the publication, by Sheldon i.c Co., of a book written by Misjor General McClel- lan, containing "An account of the campaign in Western Virfiuia." I obtained the book on the 17ih ultimo, and found in it a preface dated February 22d, 1864, in which the au- thor denominates his account of his Western Virginia Campaign a " Simple Narrative.'" It is in no sense an official report. So iar as it is intended to etlect me, it is a practical ad- mission by the author, after surveying the field of his necessities, for nearly three years, that he must have a scape-goat, or the miraculously inflated repulatifui which the newspripers made for him out of his Western Virginia campaign must collapse. I c cline the honor of serving as his scape-goat, and now, at the earliest moment which I could command for such a purpose, will show with how much regard for truth, and wiih how much freedom from a depraved ambi'ion, and a mean, sel- fish spirit, the writer of the narrative has sta- ted his facts and drawn his conclusions. He has been relieved from official duty ever since the 7ih of November, 1862, and if he had not time before, he certainly has bad time enough since, to \odk about and know whereof he affirms, before making disparaging allu- sions to another. He Jiud had my report and accompanying documents iwo years and half before his narrative was written, and now I propose to test his statements by known facts, and by the original papers, which I happen to have preserved, and still hold. He asserts in two places that "if the Rebel army were cut off from a retreat via Huttons- ville, their o?ily chance for ehcape would be via Leedsville, and St. George, or by forcing the passage of the Cheat River near Rowles- bure." Their retreat by way of Huttonsville was cut otf; and the Rebel army, in escipiug, did not follow the Cheat River" to St. George, nor go within five miles of that place, nor within twenty miles of Rowlesburg. I admit, that in taking the shortest and most direct route to the East, the Rebels were disrespect- ful to " the Commanding General of the Department of the Ohio ;" but they saved about thirty miles of travel by it, and with his plans, and mode and time of execution, they were saved the possibility of serious tnter- rnpMon in their escape. He put then, and still puts, great stress up- on Rowlesburg and the Cheat River line, not- withstanding the fact which I reported to him about »he Ist day of July, 1861, that the reconnoissance by Col. Whittlesey and^Jaji^r Frothingham, Engineers, showed fllat Oalv land should be Uie basr-t, and Chisholm's Mill two miles from i he Red-House, the position to be held ou the North- west turn- pike ; but he did not respond. He ^I5^|j|^directed me to hold myself in n-adiness tosfWigthen the Cheat River line. His instructions, commu- i nicafced by his Adjutant-General were as fbl- | lows: "The commanding General instructs i me to add, that he has entrusted to you the ■ most important duty next to his own in this | Teriitory, viz, that of securing the the ba^e of I 7m operationfi and line of , retreat. At any cost j — that of your last man — you will preserve the I Cheat River line, Grafton and the line thence j to WMeling. On this depends the entire sue- j ce?s of the plan of operations." Although repeatedly and continually stripped by Gen. I McClellau of disposable troops, I defy him to 1 show one minute of lime when I fiiiled to do the doty thus required of me. Pretending to show my^resources, he allea;es that he gave me, among other troops, the 15ih and 16th Ohio regiments and Dahn's [Daum's] battery, before he left Grafton, (June 28th); while the truth is, that before he as- signed me a command, he had detached three companies of the loth, and three or four com- panies cf the lij.h Ohio, and assigned them to Gen. Morris, who retained them through- out the campaign, and Daum's battery was not mastered — was not organized, nor iniised, and did not leave Wheeling until nearly two weeks later ;— and up to Uie escape of Gar- nett's army, July 14: h, with all the efforts that Captain Daum i-.nd I could make, not a horse, nor a harness could be obtained for that battery. It consit-ted of about one hun- dred good men, just recruited, and four guns, with limbers and caissons, in the hands of good otHcers; and that was all! It was for field service ! I had no other artillery. St. Ge'>rge, about eight miles below and South of Corrick's F"rd, (where Garnett's ar- my crossed the Cheat River,) was the farthest point from the railroad that Gi.-n. McCiellan at any time proposed to have my troops occu- py. In a letter, over his own signiture, dated July ;3d, 1861, he tells me to hold the 6th Ohio' to occupy that place, but I was not to move towards St. George without deiiuite in- structions. Sub«equenr!y,on the same day; he telegraph- ed me to send i.he 3th Ohio to Brig. Gen. Mor- ris at Phillippi, and conc.tudi-d, saying: "I shall hold myself ready to re-enforce you at all times, if necessary." I repeatedly asked for a disposable force so that I might extend my operatifms and be ready for emergencies, but to no avail. I was left as I had been, with scant garrisons for my two Railroads and oth- er lines, and not so much as one Regiiuent of disposable troops. In his dispatch to Col. E. D. Townsend, A. A. Gen., dated at Beverly, July 13ih, '61 (see 1. Rebellion Record, p. 284), Gen. McCiellan says, (alluding to me), "The General is con- centrating alibis troops at Rowlesburg, and he will cut off Garnett's retreat near West Un- ion, or, if possible, at St. George." Thus, by inference, he officially represented to the War Department, and to the whole Country, that he h d given me my orders and placed troops and means in my hands, so many days before, . that then, on the 12th of July, I was in the very path of the Rebels, and was sure to cut them off, when he well knew that I had neither re- ceived orders or troops for that movement. — He putni&ly represented me as doing what I was not doing, and what I had not means or authoiity to do. The assurances in his dis- patch were not, and could not be fulfilled. — The War Department and the Public were disappointed. The tault was his, but by long silence, when he ought to have spoktn, and misrepreseiitation in much that he has spoken, he has used his high posiuon to cast the blame upon me. Thanks that he has at last written his '"narrative" at^d taken a tangible position. On page 33 of the "narrative" its author sayf — " During the evening of the 12lh I in- formed Gen. Hiil * * * that Oarnett was moviiug towards Eastern Yirginin, * * * and directed him to take the field at once," '-Ti!9"» with only four coiipiiuits of infantry, (aU that I could get ready) follovied that evening with only very iuconsicjeiuble supports, very slowly arriving. Onlj- iwo light trains, including my own, had reached Oakland when I Itrt there at 9 A. M., on the 14th, bringing in all, probably not over 700 men. My troops were scattered along nearly two hundred miles of rail-road, wett of Grafton, and wire to be picked up, a few men in a place, with the necessary supplies. It und< r such circumstances, getting .my orders only at II A. M. that day, on the same day, I gathered up and started off with 2,500 men, and so pro- vided that considerable supports ^cere rapidly arrivirig hy rail, then I obeyed orders more promptly and moreefflciently than the author of this "narrative" ever did, and he ought to liave resigned in my favor. I confess to hav- ing exerted myself to the utmost, from the beginning to the erd, but I accomplished no such thing as he alleges. This same author is full of apologies and sweet excuses for Gen. Morris, who had been out in front of the enemy at Laurel Hill for some two weeks, with his troops well in hand, watching for a chance at the Rebels. He says of Gen. Morris' purbuit : "The usual difficulty and delay in getting new troops started on the march, &c., gave the enemy still further ad- vantages," «fec. Were not my troops just as new And far less used to preparations for, and the making of actual movements ? And the "rapidly arriving by rail !"' Why, it was uni- versally notorious that by the management and bad faith of many of the employees on that Railroad, in that very movement, trains were unaccountably delayed. Appreciating the importance of the greatest possible dis- patch, I had placed two members of my Staff at Grafton to hurry forward the trains with troops and supplies. And after I reachea Oakland where I could do most to facilitate organization and movements, I telegraphed repeatedly to Col. Fuller (now Brig. Gen.) at Grafton, inquiring about trains, and com- plaing of delays. In one of his replies, allud- ing to the delays, he says: "There is some- thing wrong in this road, you may depend. If you say the word I'll arrest a few of the managers and run the road myself." Three companies only of the first two trains were able to leave Oakland before I did, and I left there at 9 A. M. on the 14th. I stopped at the Red House, a few minutes, to make in- quiries and necessary dispositions, and then hastened on to*the point where I overtook our infantry, who, under command of Colonel Irvine, 16th Ohio, with about 1,200 men (in- cluding the three companies sent over from Oakland the night before,) had made a forced march of fourteen miles, from West Union, (all without breakfast, and several companies without having had any supper the night before,) in pursuit of the Rebel army. I had traveled, after leaving Oakland, all of six- teen miles, and it must have been full 11 A. M. when I overtook our infantry. They were resting, and practically the pursuit was ended before I came up. A conference was at once held to gather facts as to the condition of the command. Mounted officers and detachment of cavalry, sent out by Col. Irvine, returned from a reconnoissance to the front and report- ed to him. His report and those of Col. De Puy, Capt. Keyes and Adj't Marshall are all published with my report, and show that our infantry could not at any time have been nearer than 8 miles of the Rebel army. They started one hour behind in time aiA S miles behind in distance, and being ai.out as hungry as the rebels were at the worst, did well to gain three miles in fourteen. The author of the '^ narrntive did know why the pur&uit was abandoned. ily report and the accompanying documents show the facts and corclusious. There was not a Cap- tain, or any officer of higher grade who thought further pursuit practicable. The men could get no food in that countiy in the track of the rebel army. They had no transportation, and food could not be bn^ught to them, and they must go back where sup- plies could be reached, or they too, would be "starved, exhausted and disorganized." All of the fine rhetoric of this pathetic "«/z»*- ratite" about the remnants of Garnett's army " who, starved, exhausted and disorganized, were seeking a little rest " &c., is the work of a convenient, and very willing invagina- tion. That same army only stopped for din- ner after crossing the n^rth branch of the Po- tomac, Difficult Creek and tStony River, and then went on and encamped on the night of that same 14th of July, beyond the Gap »t Greenland, more than 30 miles beyond the point where our infantry halted and turned back, and within that space this same Rebel army, that day, burned two important bridges. It may be useful to stop right here and in- quire about the strength, discipline, and effi- ciency of this Rebel army. In his dispatch to Col. E. '.Townsenrl, A. A. General, dated July 12th, '61, and already referred to, the au- thor of the " narrative " puts the strength of Garnett's army at 10,000 men, and two days later he tells that officer—" The troops that Garnett had under his command were said to be the crack regiments of Eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Tennesseeans, and North Carolinians. " On page 34 of the " narrative " the writer assumes that the Rebel killed, wounded and prisoners, during the campaign amounted to 1,000, and on the same page, that their available strength was 8,000. Now what became of the other 7,000 or 9,000, who were not killed, w^ounded or made prisoners ? There were enough of them in their rear guard, and m sufficient condition to shake off the army of Gen. Morris at Corrick's Fora. at which point his pursuit ended. In going to intercept those 9,000 or 7,000 "crack troops" who had eluded and escaped Generals ISIcClellan and Morris, I was order- ed to take 6,000 men and the same four guns, (without a horse, or a harness.) I was about as bad off for wagon transportation as for artillery horses and harnes-s. Just eighteen hours and»«(? ?nore, elapsed between the time ot mv receiving Gen. McClellan's order to gather up my Railroad Guards and the march- ing of the rear guard of the reliel army past the Red House, 21 miles march from Rowles- burtr. What it was possible for me to do in tha^ period of 18 hours, was done, and I defy any o^.e to show that more could have been done under the circumstances. The motive and purpose of the "narrative" will be easily gathered by putting a few of its facts together. The author, with three Brig- ades, including the 8th, 10th, 13th, 14th and 15th Indiana, and 3d, 4th, 7th, 9th and 10th Regiments of Ohio Infantry and eight com- panies additional, including Cavalry, Artillery and Riflemen, held the lelt flank and rear of 4 ) Garuett's army. . The Cheat SWil||||^s shut then\ in on their right flanV;, and G^^llorris aciing under the direct command of Geu. Mc- Clellan lay in front of the rebels with the 6ih and 14th Ohio, and the 0th, 7th and 9th Indi- ana Regiments and 11 additional companies. Here was a force equal to 18 or 19 regiments ; and regiments in those days were generally maximum. Nearly two weeks were spent in taking positions, and after all from 7,000 to 9,000 of the rebels escaped from " the Major- Qeneral comniandiug," notwithstanding his force was nearly or quite double the rebels in number. Of course the rebels must have been very choice troojis to escape ?m grasp ! Surely they were "crack regimenU!" until their rear guard bade good bye to Gen. Morris at Cor- rick's Ford ! The author of the "narrative" miast shirk the responsibility of this escape. — Pie had failed to give me troops, or time to place '.hem in position, and so he kindly and thoroughly compensates for the whole. He turns magician, and with his pen for a wand, at once, somewhere bttweeu Corrick's Ford and the Red House, reduces that fine army of rebels to a few " ■?w«;ianfe," ^'v^ho, starved, ex- hausted and disorganized, were seeking a little r&st ! " &c. Thus four important objects were accomplished : 1st. The rebels were well punished for presuming to escape. 3d. A patriotic ■^'ork was done for the coun- try. 3d. It was made practicable forme, without reference to time, space, or circumstances, to intercept, pursue and capture the rebels with i 'its one re|^*iment, provided always that or- ders were given in French just as ihey would have been by the Great Napoleon ; and 4t.hly, And most important of all, no re- sponsibility would remain on the shoulders of "the Major-General commanding." On the 33d page of the "narrative" it is said, in giving the results of the affiiir at Corrick's Ford, that all. of the enemy's guns were cap- tured, or soon abandoned. Such is not the fact. I had it directly from citizens who saw the rehel array pass the Red House and on the road beyond there, that theie were from three to five pieces of Artillery in the column, and the tracks in the road showed conclusively that the rear of the column was coveied by Artillery until they crossed the north biauch of the Potomac. On the 34th page of the " Narrative " my eipadiiion from Oakland, on the 15t.h, after my troops and supplies had mostly come up, is censured, because, as the "narrative" says, it was "not within the spirit of my instruc- tions, which were to cut off the enemy's re- treiit," and so he ordered me to return. I will neither consume time, or space with repeat- ing the facts 1 had gathered, or niy plan of 'jperations, but reter to my report for both ; ])nt I have something to say about the order. Mark the date. It was July 14t,h. It was from Huttonsviile. It did not leach me at Oakland until noon, or after, of the 15th, and it could not have been expected to reach me earlier than that. It says: "I charge you to complete your operations by the capture of the remamder of his [Garnett's] force. If you have but one regiment attack and check them until the others arrive. You may never havet? such another opportunity again. Do. not throw it away. Conduct the movement in person and follow them ! a Vouirance!''' (io tJie uttermost.) I was obeying this order before I knew of its existence, and had only to go on just as I was inteiii cling to do. And with this order in my hands, its author pre- sumes to censure me for my march of 35^^ miles, over all the ranges of the Alleghenies, in twenty four hours, in pursuit of the rebel army. The notice of the approach of Col. Mor- ton's codnimn from New Creek, carried to the rebel army from the top of New Creek Moun- taiufi, induced them to move from Greeidand in the afternoon of the 16th. Otherwise we must have met them that night or the next morning. 1 beg to correct another error in fact. He says in his telegram to me, dated the 13th, at Beveil\', and the 13th, at Roaring Run, al- ready referred to. "Two Pennsylvania regi- ments at Cumberla,nd have been directed to proceed forthwith to Rowlesburg by special trains and report to you." It was not true. The telegrapiiic order for those regiments was dated the 13th, one day. after the date of my order in which the "have bren" occurred, and I am confident it was not transmitted over the wires until after I had left Grafton at 4 P. M., of the 13lh. During the period in question there were large numbers of rebels and rebel sympathiz- ers in most parts of Westrcn Virginia, and it is absurd to suppose that they did not keep Gen. Garnettand his successor advised of the state of our railroad lines and of the condition and strength of the garrisons on and near them. As should have been anticipated, Gar- nett knew that I had no adequate disposable force to meet him. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad between Rowlesburg and Cumber- land was not garrisoned, or protected. Gen. McClellan had it in contemplation to re-in- force me from Cumberland. He was antici- pated by the rebels, who, on the 18th of July, just in the nick of time, destroyed railroad and telegraphic communication between my Dis- trict and Cumberjand. And thus, as in other cases, the plans of the Major General, which might have worked well enough, if sequred in their details and put in operation at the pro- per time, and with sufficient vigor, were bar- ren of good results. The same characteristic deficiency was manifested in delay mg my or- ders so that they were impossible of execution, and fur all this, the writer of the "narrative" is alone at fault. A few words about the length of this paper. I am sufficiently .sensibie of the difference in recent and present position between Gen. Mc- Clellan and myself. Having paved the way by directly or indirectly countenancing and giving color to false newspaper reports, which originated chiefly at his headquarters, at the end of two years and a half he takes to book-making for his own purposes, and pub- licly becomes my accuser. Not, as an hon- orable man, or officer of high rank, of abun- dant leisure, and enjoying large compensaiion from the Government, should have done, by bringing the case before a proper tribunal for inv"Stigation; but in a manner at once ir- regular, unofflcer like, and disreputable to the service. He could trust to his position to give weight to his statements. My denial must be accompanied with proofs, and I now submit them to the consideration of any can- did reader. CiTAS. W. Hill. LIBRARY OF CONGI QDD550T341 Pe LIBRARY OF CONGRESS ODoaso^ama