THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF THE GREAT WAR. WILBUR E GORDY Class Book fopyrigtaN Y I CDEYRIGHT DEPOSIT. THIS BOOK IS ENDORSED BY THE CONNECTICUT COUN- CIL OF DEFENSE AFTER BEING READ AND APPROVED BY A COMMITTEE APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE. From a photograph copyright by Underwood and Underwood PRESIDENT WILSON THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF THE GREAT WAR BY WILBUR F. GORDY it AUTHOR OF "ABRAHAM LINCOLN," "AMERICAN LEADERS AND HEROES," " STORIES OF EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY," " STORIES OF LATER AMERICAN HISTORY," "AMERICAN BEGINNINGS IN EUROPE," " COLONIAL DAYS," " AMERICAN EXPLORERS." " ELEMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES," " A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES FOR SCHOOLS" CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS NEW YORK BOSTON CHICAGO ATLANTA SAN FRANCISCO N\ Copyright, 1919, by CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS SB* &ftft r ©CI.A536128 PREFACE The principal reason for the teaching of history is to explain the meaning of human life, and in this way to reveal to the learner his relations to the social and moral world of which he is a part. The understanding thus afforded is the best equipment possible for intelligent and useful service in the co- operative life and work of a democracy like ours. With this conception of the function and value of history and of the importance of making clear to American boys and girls our national ideals as well as our international relations and responsibilities, the author has prepared this book, upon request of the Connecticut State Council of Defense, for use in the upper grammar grades and the lower classes of high schools. Emphasis has been put upon the reasons why our country entered the conflict and the large part she played in winning victory for the cause of democracy and humanity. One of the author's aims has been to show how the new Germany, which came into being in 1871 as the outcome of three 'SUT#esSf©Twars, differed from the old, and how her wonderful material success led to an intense desire for world conquest and world domination. Furthermore, it has been his purpose to show that this great war, spreading far outside of the limits of vi PREFACE the countries in which it started, was the outward expression of a world revolution in men's thoughts — one that must profoundly influence not only the ideals and purposes of Europe, but those of America and the entire world. American boys and girls should understand what this revolution signifies to the United States, and also how it is likely to affect the relations of the United States with other nations. They should gain some conception of what we have come to be as a great free country. They should acquire some knowledge as to our duty to co-operate, in the spirit of friendship and good-will, with other countries for the social, moral, and political better- ment of humanity. If this book proves helpful to intelligent citizen- ship and patriotic service, the author's aim in writing it will be realized. In closing, I wish to acknowledge my deep obliga- tions to Miss Elizabeth P. Peck, of the Hartford Public High School, and to Mr. Forrest Morgan, of the Watkinson Library, Hartford, both of whom have read the manuscript and have offered many valuable suggestions; and especially to my wife, whose cordial co-operation and constructive criticism have done much to give the book whatever merit it may possess. Wilbur F. Gordy. Hartford, Connecticut, June 14, 1914. CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. Nationalism in the Nineteenth Century . . 1 II. Bismarck and the New Germany 10 III. William II and the Mad Ambition of Ger- many for World Domination 15 IV. Bitter Antagonism Between Germany and England 20 V. Pan-Germanism and Its Dazzling Vision . . 31 VI. How the Balkan Wars Menaced Pan-Ger- manism 43 VII. Why Germany and Austria-Hungary Wished to Crush Serbia 58 VIII. Why and How Germany and Austria Brought on the World War 63 IX. Some Striking Events of the War 72 X. Our Country Enters the War 92 XI. A New World 132 Principal Events of the War ....... 143 Index 153 ILLUSTRATIONS President Wilson Frontispiece PAGE Prince Bismarck 5 William II 17 The Market Square, Sparta . '.■ 47 Buffalo Teams, Sofia 55 Serbian Women 61 Foreign Secretary Balfour 69 The Ruins of Louvain 73 King Albert 75 Marshal Joffre 77 The Ruins of Verdun 83 Constantinople 85 Admiral Beatty 89 Admiral Jellicoe 91 Field-Marshal Lord Kitchener 95 Rheims Cathedral . . • 101 Food Administrator Hoover 105 Admiral Sims 107 Clearing for Action 109 An American Aviation Station Showing Fifteen Seaplanes Arriving and Departing 113 Ship-Building at Hog Island 115 General von Ludendorff 117 ix x ILLUSTRATIONS PAGE Tanks Passing Through a Wood on the British Front in France 119 Marshal Foch . 121 General Cadorna 123 General Diaz 127 General Pershing 129 Premier Lloyd George 133 Premier Clemenceau 137 MAPS PAGE Map Showing the Berlin to Bagdad Railroad 41 Balkan States, 1913 57 Routes of the German Armies through Belgium .... 74 Map Showing the Western Front . . 78 The Eastern Theatre of War 81 The Turkish Theatre of War 84 Map of Italian Campaign 124 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF THE GREAT WAR CHAPTER I NATIONALISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY i. The Causes of the Great War. — To find the The murder causes of the Great War beginning in 1914, and duke^f Aus- to explain its meaning, we must go back to the caused/the last century. For we should remember that the ultimatum . . sent to Ser- conflicting forces which manifest themselves in bia deadly struggles on land or sea have always their beginnings long before the outbreak of the war itself. The assassination of Ferdinand, Archduke of Austria, and his wife in Serajevo on June 28, 1914, was not the real cause of the ultimatum which Austria sent to Serbia forcing upon her national annihilation either by direct surrender of her independence or by a war against over- whelming odds. The murder of this Austrian prince furnished only the pretext which Austria had been seeking ever since the end of the Second Balkan War in 1913. There had been bitter and burning hatred between the two countries, and this had a definite relation to European rivalries, jealousies, and national ambitions, which cannot 1 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF National unity and national ex- pansion The com- plete union of all parts of Italy be understood without at least a brief reference to events occurring many years before the Great War began. 2. Two Movements which Altered the Balance of the European World. — After the overthrow of Na- poleon, in 1815, there were five great Powers in Europe — Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia. This situation remained without much change, though with some difference in rela- tive strength, for nearly sixty years. Then fol- lowed two world-wide movements which altered the entire balance of the Powers in Europe. The first of these movements was toward national unity and the second toward national expansion. As ex- amples of growth toward national unity, it will be sufficient for the purposes of this book to make brief mention of three countries — Italy, the United States, and Germany. 3. Growth Toward National Unity in Italy. — Italy had been for ages a mere " geographical expression." It was not a single state, like Spain or France, but was made up of several unconnected sovereignties, the rulers including an Italian king, a Spanish king, two Austrian archdukes, and the Roman pontiff, the richest provinces being directly ruled by Austria. For many years patriots had. striven to make of these several divisions a united Italy. In 1821, 1831, and 1848-1850, they had carried on armed and bitter contests for this ideal, and in 1859 they had enlisted France in their cause. The THE GREAT WAR 3 struggle ended in 1870 with the complete union of all parts of Italy into a single kingdom, a constitu- tion and a national parliament being established. The Italian Victor Emmanuel was made king. 4. Our Own Civil War a Struggle for National Our Civil Solidarity. — Within the period of this struggle in victoryfor" 1 Italy our own Civil War was fought. This war, as ^Jy nal you know, was the outward expression of two con- flicting political ideals — that of sectionalism and that of nationalism. The South stood for section- alism, based upon the principle of state sovereignty, while the other parts of the country stood for na- tionalism. The antagonism between these ideals had existed since the adoption of the Constitution, and found most ardent expression through our lead- ing statesmen. In the South Jefferson and Cal- houn had been the most conspicuous advocates of state sovereignty, while in the North, long before the Civil War took place, Jackson and Webster had openly proclaimed the preservation of the Union. After four years, 1861-1865, the war ended in victory for national unity, and there was no doubt that the sentiment of the American people overwhelming^ favored national solidarity. 5. Austria and Prussia Rivals for Leadership in The infa- Germany. — The next country to form a union of its S°" biood Cy many states was Germany. The most important andiron " of the German states at this time were Austria and Prussia, and they had long been rivals for leader- ship. Through skilful and unscrupulous methods, THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Bismarck's desire to ex- pel Austria from the German body Bismarck's guiding prin- ciple : " The end justifies the means " Prussia finally won in the struggle, her leadership being established by Otto von Bismarck and his infamous policy of " blood and iron." 6. Bismarck's Purpose the Consolidation of the German States Under the Leadership of Prussia. — When this powerful but unprincipled leader first came into prominence as the head of the Prussian ministry, under William I, in 1862, his purpose was the consolidation of the several German states into one mighty empire under the dominating leadership of Prussia. But as Austria was then the leading German Power, and too huge and conglomerate to make a subservient part of that empire, Bismarck's first step was to crush and expel her from the German body. 7. Bismarck's Brutal Policy of " Blood and Iron." — To carry out his purpose a powerful army, per- fectly disciplined and superbly equipped, was necessary, and to secure it the taxes were vastly increased. To this increase the Liberals in the Prussian Landtag strenuously objected. But he was not at all dismayed by the bitter and violent opposition he had to meet. They threat- ened to hang Bismarck. Although challenged again and again to the duel field he remained un- moved. Thrusting aside those who stood in his pathway, he silenced the press at will; he bullied the Landtag. He scornfully referred to his opponents as "mere pedants," and with brutal frankness exclaimed: "The making of Germany PRINCE BISMARCK 6 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Bismarck's open defi- ance of con- stitutional rights is a matter not of speechifying or parliamentary majorities; but of blood and iron." By this he of course meant that his aims were to be achieved not by argument or by moral suasion, but by the use of bayonets and bullets on the battle- field. The triumph of his master, the Prussian king ; and of his country, the Prussian state, was to be brought about by any methods he could devise, his guiding principle being: "The end justifies the means." For four years he took the money he needed, in utter disregard and in open defiance of constitu- tional rights. He could safely do this because the army, which was wholly at the king's disposal, protected him against a possible revolution on the part of the people. This same army, enlarged and improved, was his chief instrument in carry- ing out this policy of "blood and iron" outside the kingdom. 8. The War with Denmark (1864). — By able, crafty, and audacious diplomacy, in which he overmatched all the rulers and chancellors of rival states, he brought on, in rapid succession, three wars during a period of seven years. In the first of these (1864) Denmark was speedily overcome and the North Sea coast brought under control. Criticism at home of his unjust methods were stifled on ac- count of the spoils of war. 9. The War with Austria (1866). — Austria had joined Prussia in the war and shared in these spoils; THE GREAT WAR 7 but in the second war (1866) Prussia defeated Aus- Austria tria ; took back the share of Danish plunder which withdraw had been given her, and then forced many other fr r ° m ^ German states into a new North German Confed- German states eration with the King of Prussia at its head. There was formed a second confederation also, which included the four states in South Germany — Ba- varia; Wiirtemberg, Hesse-Darmstadt, and Baden. Compelled to withdraw from membership in the group of German states, Austria shortly afterward united with Hungary to form the Dual Empire of Austria-Hungary. The first part of Bismarck's great purpose had been achieved. Austria had been pushed out. Thus did Prussia suddenly rise to a leading posi- Prussia fills tion among the great Powers of Europe; and her position m people, in pride and self-confidence, were now Euro P e ready to grant their dictator all that he wished in planning still greater conquests. 10. The Franco-Prussian War (1870-1871). — One Bismarck, more war was fought not only for the purpose goads™ ' of defeating France, but for that of fusing the * r a a r nceint0 two German confederations into one consolidated union, with Prussia in the position of ruler. This was the Franco-Prussian War, begun in 1870, which Bismarck brought on, as he himself asserts, by deliberately falsifying the report of an interview between the Prussian king and the French am- bassador. Bismarck played this trick upon the French people to goad them into war, knowing 8 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF The Ger- mans con- quer France The Ger- mans force upon France a humiliat- ing treaty The plan to reduce France to a small state well that Prussia was thoroughly prepared to fight and that France was not. Like the conflict between Prussia and Austria, this war was brief; for within six weeks the French were disastrously defeated by the German armies. The Germans captured the French emperor, and at the end of seven months they were in possession of Paris and had conquered France. ii. The Germans Force Upon France a Humiliating Peace. — Then the Germans forced upon France a humiliating and, as they supposed, ruinous peace. She was compelled to pay 5,000,000,000 francs (a billion dollars) as a war indemnity; to give up Alsace and Lorraine, French provinces lying close to the German border, which were invaluable for their mines of coal, iron, and potash, and which included the old French district of Metz, the strongest fortress in western Europe. France was also compelled to make a commercial treaty with Germany, which for over forty years crippled French export trade and increased German im- ports. A condition of the treaty was that northern France was to be occupied by German troops until the indemnity was paid, and as Bismarck had fixed this indemnity at what he believed was an impos- sible sum for France to pay, he believed that the oc- cupied region would remain permanently a German possession. France would thus be reduced to a small state which could not stand in Germany's way. But France heroically bent every energy to pay- THE GREAT WAR 9 ing this indemnity quickly, and within two and a Effects of half years the vast sum had been raised; moreover, demSty up- through her titanic efforts to create new industries JJJJ/q^. 6 she rose to a great new prosperity. Germany, on many the other hand, suffered a temporary relaxation and decline as a result of the extravagance caused by this unearned wealth, and after long years her wrong-doing proved a bitter curse. 12. The Creation of a New Germanic Empire. — The most marked immediate result of the Franco- Prussian War was the new Germanic empire that was created. The King of Prussia was crowned German Emperor — not, as often styled, Emperor of Germany — as the head of all the German states and thus the second part of Bismarck's great purpose had been achieved. 13. " It Pays to Make War " Is the Foolish Con- Out of the elusion of the German People. — You may well note ^ts the 1 " the important fact that in all the wars just referred German to it was the almost perfect Prussian military ma- emerges chine, aided to some extent by troops from the other German states, that swept away with crush- ing force all opposition; and that out of the three conflicts emerged the German Empire, with Prussia dominant and Bismarck all - powerful. Having Bismarck a now became a popular idol, Bismarck by his policy popular ldo1 of "blood and iron," of treachery and fraud, ac- complished his great purpose. He had proven to the satisfaction of the German people that a well-trained," well-equipped army was a good in- 10 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF vestment for the country. It pays to make war was their foolish conclusion based upon the hazardous idea that they were sure always to win. CHAPTER II BISMARCK AND THE NEW GERMANY The new German Empire the greatest military Power in Europe Bismarck needs a period of peace Rapid growth in population 14. The Beginning of a New Epoch in European and in German History. — The victory over France was the beginning of a new epoch in Europe as well as in Germany, for the new German Empire, being the greatest military Power in Europe, had secured, under the leadership of Prussia, unrivalled military prestige on the Continent. It now be- came the leading aim of Bismarck to secure and maintain for Germany a dominating position in the field of European diplomacy. 15. Bismarck Changes His Methods to Meet New Conditions and New Problems. — To achieve this end, he changed his policy to one of peace. Ger- many needed a period of freedom from war, in order to develop her imperial political institutions, and also to foster and strengthen her economic life. New conditions had arisen, and new problems were to be met. One of these was the rapid growth in popula- tion. Germany's prosperity had been attended by a large increase in the birth-rate. When the THE GREAT WAR 11 Franco-Prussian War ended (1871), the population of the German Empire had been 41,000,000; by 1900 it had risen to 56,000,000; and in 1911 it had grown to about 65,000,000, or more than 50 per cent in forty years. Of course, this exceedingly rapid growth brought about the problem of feed- ing, clothing, and otherwise supporting the greatly enlarged nation. Another problem was the rise of the industrial The rise of class. Before 1871, Germany had been for the SaUiass" most part dominated by the agricultural interests. But after that year, through the mineral wealth she had acquired in Alsace-Lorraine, the number of those engaged in industry began to increase by leaps and bounds; and her industrial leaders de- manded a share in the political control of the em- pire. They attained their end, although they were forced to overcome the fierce resistance of the land- holders, or Junkers. Furthermore, there was a remarkable shifting of a remark- the population from rural sections to urban cen- *f foepopu- tres, as in many other countries at that time, and lation this trend of population cityward both increased the difficulty of providing the necessaries of life for the whole nation and also required that labor must be provided in the cities for the ever-growing army of workers. 16. The Marked and Even Revolutionary Results ^piSym- of the New Conditions. — The results — industrial, so- creases her material cial, and political — of these new conditions were wealth 12 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Germany's need of foreign markets Germany requires a correspond- ing expan- sion in her merchant marine Striking increase in German shipping marked and even revolutionary. Many new and varied industries were built up and organized as rapidly as possible; and by skilfully applying to these industries the principles of science and art Germany increased her material wealth with as- tounding rapidity. 17. Expansion of German Industries Involves the Development of an Extensive Commerce and a Cor- responding Expansion in the Merchant Marine. — Expansion of industries involved other activities. Industries demanded , raw materials, nearly all of which Germany had to get from outside her own boundaries; and when the raw materials were made into finished goods, these had to find markets, some at home, but most in foreign lands. With an extensive foreign commerce, which was the outgrowth of her industries, Germany required a corresponding expansion in her merchant marine; for she wished to control her own carrying trade. Here again her merchants and capitalists showed marked efficiency, and this was especially evident in the building of the Kiel Canal, connecting the North and the Baltic Seas. To control the site of such a canal was the chief object in making war on Denmark (1864) and in seizing the provinces of Schleswig-Holstein, through which the canal was cut. In 1871 nearly all German shipping had to clear from Baltic ports; by 1900 — striking increases having been made in the nineties — her vessels THE GREAT WAR 13 numbered more than 4,000, her merchant marine surpassing that of any nation in the world except Great Britain; and in 1905 over 7,000 vessels of all nations, but largely German, cleared from Kiel alone, a port which had grown from some 30,000 inhabitants in 1870 to 150,000 in 1905. 18. Germany Stupendously Increases Her Wealth Germany and Steadily Grows in Material Efficiency. — With this ^wealth rapid enlargement in economic life, Germany was a°d S stu- ly not only supporting her rapidly increasing popula- pendously tion — so that emigration had nearly ceased — but she was stupendously adding to her wealth. Her steady growth in material efficiency was due not only to great skill in applying scientific principles to agriculture and to production in her industries, but to the thoroughness with which she trained her workmen, her salesmen, men in every walk in life, with a view to making them more efficient in their assigned vocations. 19. The Idealism of the Old Germany Gives Place Materialism to Gross Materialism. — In the expansion of her eco- German nomic life, her wealth-producing power, Germany ^JJ^wl never lost sight of the material advancement of universities, . . and every her people. Her all-absorbing desire was for ma- field of na- terial wealth and the power that comes with such deavor wealth. Her aspiration for the finer things of the spirit was almost wholly giving way to gross ma- terialism, which dominated her schools, her uni- versities, and every field of national endeavor. Even humane sentiment, which has done so much 14 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Germany must be the overlord of the Conti- nent The Triple Alliance a great tri- umph of Bismarck's diplomacy for modern progress in many other lands, was openly derided in her Reichstag, her press, and also her pulpits, as either the cowardly self-interest of slavish weaklings or a hypocritical screen for ex- ploitation. The idealism of the old Germany of the days before Bismarck was fast disappearing. 20. Bismarck's Reason for Desiring a Period of Peace. — In order to accomplish the smooth work- ing of these colossal economic changes that were to create a new Germany, a period of peace, as we have already noted, was necessary. To secure it and also to maintain the commanding position of Germany on the Continent which her military victories over Austria and France had given her, Bismarck, as we have said, sought aid in diplomacy. For it was indispensable that Germany should maintain her prestige as the predominant power in Europe. She must be the overlord, the inter- national dictator, of the Continent. Bismarck's Great Triumph in Bringing About 21 the Triple Alliance. — With this great end in view, Bismarck made an alliance first with Austria- Hungary and then with Italy, forming what was known as the Triple Alliance. The Triple Alliance, signed in 1883, was perhaps the greatest triumph of Bismarck's astute diplomacy. For so long as he could rely on the friendly support, or even the neutrality and open markets, of Austria-Hungary and Italy, and at the same time keep up the rivalry and antagonism between England and France on THE GREAT WAR 15 the one hand and England and Russia on the other — a rivalry and antagonism which grew out of conflicts arising through colonial expansion — Germany's mastery in European political relations would be undisputed and irresistible, and the old balance of power in Europe could never be re- stored. This situation Bismarck was able to main- tain until the end of his career, and it continued for many years afterward. CHAPTER III WILLIAM II AND THE MAD AMBITION OF GER- MANY FOR WORLD DOMINATION 22. William II Dismisses Bismarck as Chancellor. The Kai- — TWerf ul though Bismarck was, and great as were tomie "* his achievements, he was at last obliged to give way to one whose authority was greater than his own. This was the new ruler of the Fatherland, William II, who was crowned King of Prussia and German Emperor in 1888. His more familiar title, is the Kaiser. Two years after ascending the throne he dismissed Bismarck, so as to become in reality his own foreign minister; and after that time the chancellor was expected to carry out the Kai- ser's bidding. In fact, the "will to rule" of William II was so overbearing that he would not tolerate a minister with any independence of thought or action. 16 THE CAUSES AND MEANING The Kai- ser's atti- tude toward the German army The Kai- ser's atti- tude toward the German people Obedience to the Kai- ser a relig- ious duty 23. The Autocratic Kaiser. — The Kaiser's power was practically absolute in Prussia, and over the whole of Germany his rule was autocratic. He was the head of the German army, which he re- garded as the instrument with which to carry out his will. Of this he left no doubt in the minds of his subjects. In 1891, in an address to a body of military recruits, he said: "You are my soldiers. You have given yourselves to me, body and soul. There is now but one enemy for you, and that is my enemy. In this time of Socialistic intrigue, it may happen that I may order you to fire on your brothers or fathers. God save us from it ! But in such a case you are bound to obey me without a murmur." His attitude toward the German people was tersely expressed in a sentence he inscribed in the visitors' book in the town hall in Munich: "The will of the King is the supreme law." On another occasion he said to the people: "Only one is master in this country; that is I. Who opposes me I will crush to pieces. All of you have only one will, and that is my will; there is one law, and that is my law." These utterances show that William II held him- self to be above the law and the people as having no rights except the one right of obeying him as their Kaiser, the one chosen of God, as he thought of himself, to think for them in matters of govern- ment and to rule them as he saw fit. He had un- WILLIAM II 18 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF " Germany a world em- pire," says the Kaiser limited confidence in his own wisdom, and treated the German people as if they were incapable of thinking and acting for themselves. The masses were taught that obedience to the Kaiser was a religious duty ; . and that loyalty to him was loyalty to the Fatherland. 24. Germany and World Empire. — The young emperor followed the policy of his great chancel- lor, Bismarck, in insisting that the prestige of Germany on the Continent should be maintained at all costs. He went even further. In one of his speeches he declared that Germany had become a world empire, and that she must shoulder the responsibilities of such an empire. 25. The Kaisers Policy of Exploiting Unclaimed Savage Lands as German Colonies. — To this end he embarked whole-heartedly upon a policy which Bis- marck had disapproved as fraught with certainty of immense cost and world war, as well as, with uncertainty of result and with no likelihood of a compensating profit. This policy was the ex- ploitation of unclaimed savage lands as Ger- man "colonies," the purpose being to control the raw materials of industry and use these lands as military and supply bases for German force. By this means Germany's industry, her foreign trade, and her merchant marine were constantly increasing her wealth and power, until by 1895 her commercial empire was world-wide. THE GREAT WAR 19 26. The Navy a Striking Part of the Kaiser's " Our future World Policy. — This expansion of commerce de- s || » pon the manded a powerful navy, and the Kaiser at once set out to establish a programme of naval con- struction, which by a rapid growth transformed what was an insignificant nav} r in 1895 to one of the great navies of the world. The navy, in fact, became a dominant part of the Kaiser's all-absorbing "Welt Politik," or world policy. "Our future lies upon the sea," he said. At another time he proclaimed: "As my grand- father worked for the reconstruction of this army, so will I work without allowing myself to be checked to reconstitute this navy." 27. The Relation between a Great Navy and In- An ambi- dustrial Expansion. — The relation between a great programme navy and a colonial empire built up by industrial expansion can be easily understood. Industries require markets, or foreign trade; extensive for- eign trade calls for a large merchant marine; and if the merchant marine is to be protected from unfriendly rivals, there must be a powerful navy. Yet while the argument that a powerful com- mercial nation must have a powerful fleet is readily admitted, at the heart of William's policy was some- thing far greater than commerce. It was the dream of colonial empire. By his programme, decided upon in 1898, and largely supplemented in 1900 and again in 1906, it became evident that by 1920 20 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Germany could venture to challenge; with good hope of success, even the long-standing naval suprem- acy of Great Britain. CHAPTER IV BITTER ANTAGONISM BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND The Kaiser's 28. The Kaiser's Inordinate Longing for Teutonic SereaSof World-Power.— The words of the Kaiser, "Our the Father- future lies upon the sea/' are significant and il- luminating. They reveal his inordinate longing for Teutonic world-power, which was the under- lying motive in his attempt to extend German boundaries, and was the most conspicuous feature of his reign. He dreamed of a political empire for Germany which should be co-extensive with her commercial empire, and to make real his dream he pur- posed to build a navy strong enough to match that of Great Britain. His idea was well expressed by one of his statesmen who said that without an irresistible navy Germany was "like an eagle with one wing." A few 29. The German Plan for Naval Expansion Re- derstandthe garded with Consternation by Far-Sighted Military ?h?Iate£n ger Men and Di P lomats in England.— This militant plan England for German naval expansion was regarded in Eng- land with regret, because it increased the burden THE GREAT WAR 21 of maintaining the superiority needful to safe- guard their ocean-sundered commonwealth spread over the entire globe; but it caused little uneasi- ness and no fear of its hostile intent, up to the very declaration of war, except among a few far-sighted military men and diplomats. These few men re- garded this naval rivalry with nothing short of consternation. They knew that a great nation would not pour out her wealth for long years to build up a huge war-machine without intending to use that machine. They saw, too, and tried vainly to make the nation see, that Germany's policy meant ultimately a life-and-death struggle for the independence not only of Great Britain but of the world. Their alarm can be easily understood. So long The reason n t_ j u i • v f° r alarm in as Germany had been supreme merely as a mill- England tary power, while England remained supreme as a naval power, there was no reason why British leaders should be greatly disturbed over the inter- national situation. But when Germany, whose whole nation was a trained and equipped army, ready for immediate action, and by far the strongest on the globe, began building an equally powerful navy, the situation changed. If she should be- come as strong on the sea as on the land, England had good reason to be deeply concerned. Since the establishment of the Triple Alliance in ^kabS" 8 " 1883, British diplomats were aware of the possi- warning of . . . . . coming dan- bility of a coalition of Continental Powers, which ger 22 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Britain's feuds with France and Germany The British Empire settles her differences with France and Ger- many The balance of power in Europe re- stored might try to break up the British Empire and con- quer England. Now they saw in this grandiose plan for the creation of a stupendous German navy an unmistakable warning. 30. British Statesmen Decide that the Days of Britain's " Splendid Isolation" Must End. — The days of Britain's " splendid isolation" were at an end. She closed her long feuds with France and with Russia, feuds brought about by conflicting interests in their commercial and colonial expan- sions. These had been a source of secret rejoicing to Bismarck, and after him the Kaiser, for they made it easier for Germany to retain her position as the dictator of European diplomacy. 31. The Formation of the Triple Entente. — That Germany encouraged these feuds English states- men and diplomats well knew; and when, in 1900, she adopted her ambitious naval programme, they recognized the grave peril. Accordingly, in 1904, the Entente Cordiale — or friendly understanding — between her and France was effected; and three 3 r ears later a similar entente was reached with Russia. As France and Russia had already en- tered upon a formal alliance (1893), the three Powers were now ready to work together in friendly accord. The diplomatic union thus formed was known as the Triple Entente. 32. The Triple Entente Restores the Balance of Power in Europe. — This group of states, which stood in hostile rivalry with the Triple Alliance — con- THE GREAT WAR 23 sisting, as you remember, of Germany, Austria, and Italy — restored the balance of power in Europe. It brought great relief to both England and France as well as to Russia, because it meant that each nation was assured of support against the aggressive attitude of Germany. 33. The Triple Entente Greatly Disturbs Germany. Germany — On the other hand, Germany was greatly dis- losjTofher turbed, because her relative strength was now less E^fl 6111 than it had been before the Triple Entente came into being. With a restoration of the balance of power in Europe, she feared, with good reason, that she might lose her prestige; and that was for her a serious matter, not only from the standpoint of her pride, but also from that of her commercial and political plans. She could not give up her claim to be the masterful overlord of the European Powers because she was maturing vast schemes to seize not only unoccupied savage lands, but richer lands already appropriated, the control of which other Powers would contest unless she cowed them in advance. 34. Germany Rapidly Develops into an Inter- The auto- national Bully. — She therefore became more aggres- serimpe^-" sive than ever before. She adopted a belligerent, SJJritof Ger- defiant, threatening tone, indicative of her unalter- man y able purpose to have her own way, however great might be the cost to herself and to the rest of Europe. She rapidly developed into an interna- tional bully, whose spirit was impersonated by the 24 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF England blocks Ger- many's path- way to world domination England must give place to a young and vigorous Power autocratic Kaiser, swaggering about in his " shining armor" and ever ready to " rattle his sabre" when it seemed wise to threaten Europe. At last he said explicitly that no European decision on foreign questions should be made unless Germany were consulted and should agree to it. 35. Treitschke's and Bernhardi's Bitter Dislike of England. — The attitude of Germany constantly grew more warlike, especially in its opposition to England. It was well impersonated for a genera- tion by Treitschke and in recent years by Bern- hardi — the first a brilliant professor of history in the University of Berlin, and the second a general in the German army. They bitterly disliked Eng- land because she was the principal obstacle block- ing Germany's pathway to world domination. According to their representation, she had been a robber-state, and by fraud and violence had seized one-fifth of the land on the globe, including nearly all that was fitted for civilized occupancy. She had no lawful claim to it, and was not worthy to own it, because she had not the power to use it in the best way. Her strength was only apparent, and she had the feebleness of senility tottering toward its grave. It was time for her to step aside and give place to a young and vigorous Power, whose people were superior in character, and whose civilization — or Kultur, as the Germans called it — was far better suited to developing and fostering the best interests of humanity. THE GREAT WAR 25 Continuing the argument against England, her England Teutonic enemies said in effect: " England, the ^^ a a _ n international burglar, has seized immense booty, tionaibur- and now she says : ' I want to live in ease and com- g ar fort without disturbance of any kind, but with ample police protection. Now that I have got all I want, let us have universal peace. Let us have national disarmament and settle all international disagreements by arbitration.'" " England's attitude toward war shows that she "England is at the end of her career," said Treitschke and ofher Cn Bernhardi, supplemented by a thousand other career" voices: "She dares not try to make her crazy structure an organic whole, firmly ruled from a centre. Her empire is kept working only by slack self-interest, without loyalty or sense of duty; and as soon as the outlying parts find the connection a burden they will break away. Hence if we attack her, we shall have only the central island to fight, for all the rest — Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa — will at once secede rather than spend blood or money for nothing. The first and last are only waiting the chance to do so, anyway, and will help assail their hated tyrant. "But Germany's brilliant world career has only Germany's just begun; her grandeur and glory are to be real- ^o^cl- ized in the future. She has within herself unlimited reer just power, and is entitled to 'her place in the sun'; egun and that place she will certainly win by war, since she cannot acquire it in any other way, as all the 26 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Germany's threatening attitude Germany's gains by war good districts are already pre-empted, and will not be given up without it." 36. Germany's Determination to Have Full World Control and to Get It by Force. — This was another way of saying that Germany had made up her mind to have full world control, and to get by force what she was unable to acquire by diplomacy. The fact was that she could have had a splendid colonial empire for the taking, with general good- will, if she had ceased to threaten or aim at the whole. For twenty years before the war it had been commonly assumed in English discussion that Mesopotamia and eastern Asia Minor at least — a veritable garden of the earth close to Europe and able to support many millions of colonists — was to be Germany's whenever she chose to eject the infamous Turkish Government. 37. The Belief in Prussianized Germany that " War Pays." — But Germany insisted upon her power to take what she wanted by force. She had learned from the great Prussian, Bismarck, from the successful war career of the house of Hohen- zollern, and from the remarkable history of the Prussian state, that "war pays." Long before this time a distinguished Frenchman, Mirabeau, had pithily and truly remarked: "War is the na- tional industry of Prussia," and under William II it had greatly increased its proportions. The argu- ment was advanced that Germany made a profit of 2,000 per cent by the Franco-Prussian War in 1871; THE GREAT WAR 27 and that she could make a profit of 20,000 per cent by the war which was to be brought on in the second decade of the twentieth century. It was to this end that she had developed the best trained and most powerful army in the world, and, as already observed, was rapidly building up a great navy. It was the spirit and method of Bismarck still alive and evolving its natural growth in the German na- tion, even though differing in detail and going be- yond what he thought advantageous. Germany had become Prussianized. 38. Germany Resolutely Opposes Disarmament. — Germany With this view-point of Germany before us, we need armament 8 " not be surprised that she resolutely opposed the dis- cussion of disarmament at the first international peace conference held at The Hague in 1899. Her delegates to that conference declared in boastful language that "armaments are not a burden but a privilege," and that Germany would increase her expenditures for that purpose. Andrew D. White, one of the American delegates German op- to the conference, when referring to the attitude Arbitration taken at that' time by the chairman of the German delegation, said: "Meeting Count Minister, who, after M. de Staal, is very generally considered the most important personage here, we discussed the subject of arbitration. To my regret, I found him entirely opposed to any well-developed plan. . . . He insisted that arbitration must be injurious to Germany; that Germany is prepared for war as no 28 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF The Kaiser against the discussion of disarma- ment Bethmann- Hollweg says Ger- many needs an increase of arma- ments other country can be; that she can mobilize her army in ten days; and that neither France, England, Russia, nor any other Power can do this. 'Arbitra- tion/ he said, 'would simply give rival Powers time to put themselves in readiness, and would therefore be a great disadvantage to Germany.'" On the near approach of the second international peace conference (1909), the Kaiser declared to King Edward of England, with emphasis: "I will go to war rather than allow the question of dis- armament to be discussed." Two years later — and only three years before the outbreak of the Great War — Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg spoke in the Reichstag as fol- lows: "Any agitation in Germany in favor of dis- armament is absolutely unpardonable. . . . Ger- many is, among all the Powers, the only one which possesses not only sufficient men, but sufficient gold, to increase armaments on land and sea to an extraor- dinary degree. Germany is at the same time the nation that needs this increase of armaments the most. We stand not at the end, but at the be- ginning of a great development." 39. Bernhardi's Belief that Arbitration Would not be a Good Thing for Germany. — Again, in 1911, Bernhardi, in his "Germany and the Next War," declared: "Arbitration may easily conflict with the actual turn of affairs, and may check the expan- sion of any young and vigorous state in favor of one which is sinking in the scale of civilization." It THE GREAT WAR 29 is very evident that he had in mind Germany, as the " young and vigorous state/' and either Eng- land or France, or very likely both, as " sinking in the scale of civilization." 40. To Secure Economic and Political Supremacy Germany Germany Prepares for War. — These several quota- ^ht^f tions from German leaders of thought and national might policy point to one important fact : That Germany was preparing for war in which she expected to secure the economic and political supremacy which, as she claimed, it was the right of might to make her own. As a further example of this belligerent attitude France to be toward her neighbors, here is another quotation crushed from Bernhardi's " Germany and the Next War": "We must square our account with France if we wish for a free hand in our international policy. This is the first and foremost condition of a sound German policy; and since the hostility of France cannot be removed by peaceful overtures, the mat- ter must be settled by force of arms. France must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path." 41. England the Most Formidable Enemy of Ger- England to many. — But while Germany hated France and was be destr °y ed determined in due time to " square her account" with that country, it was England that caused her most serious concern. For England, with her vast colonial empire, and her mighty fleet which gave her supremacy of the seas — England, with her 30 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF France in- dependent of Ger- many Change in the face of European politics commerce that embraced the world and her enor- mous wealth — was Germany's most formidable en- emy. Accordingly; England must be destroyed before Germany could realize her ambitious scheme of world domination. 42. England, in Giving up Her Policy of " Splendid Isolation," Boldly Opposes the Teutonic Avalanche. — But when England departed from her policy of "splendid isolation" by forming alliances with France and Russia, it became clear to the Kaiser and his officials at Berlin that a diplomatic revolution had been brought about in Europe, and the government at Berlin well knew, though the English populace still did not, that she was taking a bold stand in opposition to Germany. For protected by the powerful support of England, France ceased longer to yield to the open or covert dictation of Berlin, and assumed a position of independence in her policy of expansion, espe- cially in relation to Morocco and the western Medi- terranean. With this group of powerful states ready to work in cordial co-operation to foil Germany's ag- gressive schemes of expansion and Pan-Germanism, the face of European politics had again changed. Germany saw that her days of preponderant in- fluence were coming to an end, and that she should soon have to fight for what she should get in place of merely threatening to fight. THE GREAT WAR 31 43. The Antagonism of Germany to England Grows into Bitter Hatred. — But hoping to keep her prestige unchallenged a little longer, she be^ came more and more overbearing and domineering. Her antagonism to England grew into a hatred, ever deepening in acrimony, until she gripped her foe in deadly combat on the battle-field and on the sea, and forced her to defend herself from extinction. But until the war was raging in long-forgotten savagery and bestiality at their very gates, Eng- land's best classes would not accept the truth. CHAPTER V PAN-GERMANISM AND ITS DAZZLING VISION 44. Bismarck and William I Indifferent About a Work Navy and the Acquisition of Colonies.— Under Wil- enough for J _ # Germany at liam II the policy for world empire made great home and strides. Both Bismarck and his master ; William I, in Eur °P e as already mentioned; were indifferent about a navy and the acquisition of colonies. They thought there was work enough for Germany to do in solv- ing her internal problems and in holding diplomatic sway on the Continent. To them it seemed im- portant not to arouse the suspicion and jealousy of Great Britain by inaugurating a far-reaching policy of appropriating territory. Not long after the formation of the German Empire, Bismarck had 32 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF German possessions outside of Europe declared — with sincerity, no doubt — that the whole of the Balkans was not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier. 45. Germany Competes with Other European Coun- tries in a Wild Scramble for Territory in Foreign Lands. — It was during the eighties that Germany was seized by the consuming desire for colonial posses- sions which was then sweeping over Europe. She began to compete, with other European Powers, in a wild scramble for territory in foreign lands, in the great movement of expansion. Nationalism was developing into imperialism. Even as late as 1884 she had no possessions outside of Europe; but before the outbreak of the Great War, in 1914, she owned in Africa an immense area of nearly a million square miles, mainly on the Guinea coast and in the south- east and southwest. However, it was without much economic value, and was unsuitable for plant- ing colonies of German people. More valuable were several groups of islands she possessed in the western Pacific, and a " sphere of influence," or region of control, she had obtained at Kiauchau in China. 46. The Colonial Possessions of Germany not of High Value. — These possessions had been acquired mostly by diplomatic methods made effective by the possibility of war; but except Kiauchau, they were not on the whole of high value, because most of the land best suited for Germany's purposes was already under the control of other Powers, who THE GREAT WAR 33 had ventured into the field of territorial expansion a long time in advance of her. 47. War, According to Bernhardi, an Economic Germany and Political Necessity for Germany. — The problem ^f^ " became all-absorbing. The point of view of many the coming German leaders at that time was no secret. It was genera 10ns openly expressed by Bernhardi in his "Germany and the Next War/' where he defends Germany's policy by amplifying her needs: "No remunerative occupation will ever be found within the borders of the existing German Empire for the whole population however favorable our international relations. We shall soon, therefore, be faced by the question whether we wish to sur- render the coming generations to foreign countries, as formerly in the hour of our decline, or whether we wish to take steps to find them a home in our Ger- man colonies, and so retain them for the Father- land. There is no possible doubt how this question must be answered. " Since almost every part of the globe is inhabited, The right new territory must, as a rule, be obtained at the ° conquest cost of its possessors — that is, by conquest — which thus becomes the law of necessity. The right of conquest is universally acknowledged. "It may be that a growing people cannot win Territory colonies from uncivilized races, and yet the state ^^ired wishes to retain the surplus population which the by war mother country cannot feed. Thus the only course left is to acquire territory by war" [with other 34 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF What the future of Germany depends upon German emigration civilized powers]. " Thus the interest of self-preser- vation leads inevitably to war and the conquest of foreign soil." 48. Bernhardi Declares War to be a Moral Ne- cessity also. — According to this representative of mediaeval militarism; war is seen to be an economic and a political necessity. Bernhardi then goes on: "War is also a moral necessity; if waged to pro- tect the highest and most valuable interests of a nation. As human life is now constituted; it is political idealism which calls for war." 49. BernhardPs Belief in the Great Value of Colonies to Germany. — Having thus demonstrated Germany's need of colonies and justified the method of securing them by force, he goes on to discuss the future importance of colonies to Germany. The facts upon which his arguments are based are easily followed. Elsewhere he says: "We have long underestimated the value of colonies. In the future the importance of Germany depends upon two points: (1) How many millions of men in the world speak German; and (2) how many of them are politically members of the German Empire." How did Bernhardi's argument tally with the facts? In the early part of this century, the Ger- man population was increasing with startling ra- pidity; about a million souls a year. By the enor- mous extension of her economic power, Germany had not only been feeding and otherwise supporting THE GREAT WAR 35 her population ; but she had cut down to a minimum the number of her emigrants to foreign lands. In 1885 it had been reduced to about 171,000, while in 1898 it was only about 23,000. She had been following this policy of restricting emigration, be- cause she could provide means to support her population at home. But for many years before she became an in- dustrial country — that is, before 1871 — she had lost millions of her people, among whom were the most energetic and valuable of her citizenship. They had gone to the United States, Canada, South America, and other lands, where they were not only lost to the Fatherland, but added to the economic and military power of their adopted coun- try. And although emigration dwindled in the later years of the last century, with the enormous yearly increase of the people in the early years of the present century, it was evident that the loss by emigration must soon begin again on a large scale. To this transfer of economic and military strength from herself to what might prove to be deadly enemies, Germany strenuously objected. How could she put a stop to this loss of power? In two ways only: The first was by acquiring possession of colonies; the second, by establishing " spheres of influence," or regions of control in weaker countries. But in view of the pre-emption by other nations of most of the best land for such purposes, the first method could be carried out in 36 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF " England effete and decadent " " The whole world will be Ger- many," said Heine just one way, and that was by the use of military and naval power. As we might expect; therefore, early in the twentieth century, there was a growing demand on the part of many influential Germans — a point of view soon to be taken by a large majority of people in Prussianized Germany — that the desired colonies should be secured by war, if they could be secured in no other way. 50. Reason for the Bitter Hostility of the German People to England. — In carrying out this purpose Germany knew that the greatest obstacle she would have to meet was the British Empire. Hence the bitter hostility of the German people to Eng- land. They verily believed, as did Treitschke and Bernhardi, that England had grown effete and de- cadent; and that her glory had departed, while the virile young Germany was confidently looking forward to a splendid and glorious future. The conclusion was irresistible: England must give place to a nation admirably qualified to guide the world into a higher and better civilization than humanity had ever known. Germany's God-given mission was to extend her Kultur throughout the world. 51. Teutonic Belief in Germany's Divine Mission. —For a full century this belief in Germany's divine mission had been growing stronger in the Teutonic mind. "Not merely Alsace and Lorraine," the poet Heine had written before the middle of the THE GREAT WAR 37 nineteenth century, with all the weight his prestige could give his significant words ; "not merely Alsace and Lorraine, but all France, Europe, and the whole world will be ours. Yes, the whole world will be Germany." Only ten years or so before the outbreak of the Great War, Emperor William himself had declared at Bremen: "God has called us to civilize the world; we are mission- aries of progress." The pulpits teemed with such sayings, and some far more extravagant than these, comparing the Germans to the ancient Israelites, and all other nations to the Canaanites, whom the chosen of God were to enslave or slaughter at will. . 52. Bulk of Educated Germans in 1914 Regard the The one Rest of the World with Contempt.— In fact, it is ^°f essive not too much to say that the bulk of educated Germans in 1914 regarded the rest of the world with arrogant contempt, and scoffed at any moral obligation to refrain from war whenever the time was opportune. They listened admiringly to preachers and other speakers by the thousand, who told them it was God's will that the backward races like the English and the French, the Italians and the Russians, should give place to the one pro- gressive race. With such lofty conception of their own superior The Ger- worth, and with absolute confidence in the unlimited ™ a ^navy 7 strength of their Fatherland, many leaders of Ger- man thought, in the early part of the twentieth century, urged that the most important task of 38 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Germany steeped in crass ma- terialism The Kaiser visits the Sultan the Imperial Government was to make the army and the navy so powerful that Germany could win certain victory at any time that might seem most opportune for beginning an international struggle. 53. Pan- Germanism a System of International Robbery. — Many of the war-mad militarists were enthusiastic adherents of Pan-Germanism , the unblushing and shameful purpose of which was to annex to the empire by force of arms whatever re- gions might seem useful for increasing the power of the Hohenzollerns. As some one has rightly said, Pan-Germanism was nothing less than a system of international robbery. The Pan-Germanists were economic brigands. 54. Pan-Germanism Labors Earnestly to Bring About War. — By 1908 Pan-Germanism had a wide influence in the Fatherland; and by 1911 its momen- tum had become tremendous. It made a strong appeal to Germany, now steeped in crass material- ism; and its watchword, which continued to grow in vehemence year by year, was: "Let us have not merely a greater Germany, but a world-ruling Germany, as the one means of establishing a nation which other peoples will steadily enrich." For this end, Pan-Germanism labored earnestly to bring about war. 55. The Kaiser's Strong Desire for the Friendship and Favor of the Sultan. — Turning now to Ger- many's second method of finding support for her teeming population — that of commercial penetra- • THE GREAT WAR 39 tion — we find that Emperor William, early in his reign , turned his covetous eyes toward the Turkish Empire. In 1889, the second year of his reign, he went to Constantinople; and again he paid a more friendly and formal visit to the Sultan in the Turk- ish capital in 1898, his strong desire being to secure the friendship and favor of the Sultan, for reasons which can be stated in a few words. Germany, as you know, was in search of markets Markets for in which to buy the raw materials needed by ^eTSsh her industries and in which to sell her finished Empire goods, and those of the Turkish Empire seemed to be admirably suited to her purposes. The wide valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates, in Meso- potamia, had a very fertile soil, and could be made highly productive by irrigation, for which there was an abundant water-supply. Two of the prod- ucts of that region — rice and cotton — were greatly needed in Germany. Asia Minor, too, was rich in mineral resources, and could be made to yield largely in cereals, including wheat. As both Asia Minor and Mesopotamia were inhabited mostly by uncivilized people, these regions were undevel- oped and their resources were largely untouched. Here were lands which Germany's commercial rivals had not yet penetrated; and if Germany could secure economic control of them, they would in the course of time furnish reservoirs for millions of her surplus population, as well as markets for large supplies of her raw materials and her finished 40 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF A rich field for Ger- many's economic enterprise A strong strategic position goods. Here indeed was a rich field for Germany's economic enterprise; a wonderful opportunity for inaugurating and working out the ambitious schemes of the Pan-German propagandists. 56. The " Berlin to Bagdad " Railroad. — As a first step toward the economic control of Mesopotamia and a German protectorate over Turkey, the Bag- dad Railroad concession was secured by German capitalists early in the twentieth century. By way of Vienna, Sofia, the Balkan countries, and Constantinople, the road would connect Berlin and Bagdad, and was therefore called the " Berlin to Bagdad" Railroad. The extension of the line to Hamburg on the north and to the Persian Gulf on the south would complete what is known as the " Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" scheme. 57. How Political Control of Turkey by Germany Would Threaten the British Empire. — This railroad has well been called the backbone of the Pan-Ger- man plan to secure economic, and later, political, control of the Turkish Empire. Should the plan succeed, Germany would be in a very strong strategic position; for she could attack England at a most vital point of her empire, the Suez Canal and Egypt. She could also, choosing her own time, make an attack upon India; and when she should extend the railway line to the Persian Gulf, as planned, she could establish a naval base there, and support an invasion of India by attacks upon the English fleet and transports that would be going to its defense or supply. THE GREAT WAR 41 58. The Kaiser's Deep-Seated Desire to Win the The Kaiser Favor of the Moslem Population. — It was at Damas- Moslems cus, in November, 1898, that the Kaiser revealed JairoW k Cana k \ MAP SHOWING THE BERLIN TO BAGDAD RAILROAD his deep-seated desire to win the favor of the Mos- lems, wherever they might dwell. "May his Majesty the Sultan," he said, "as well as the three hundred millions of Moslems who venerate him as their khalifa, rest assured that the German 42 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF emperor is their friend forever." These famous words indicate clearly enough now, in the light of what we have learned about Pan-German plans, that William II hoped to reinforce Germany's mili- tary power by making use of the three hundred million Mohammedans as a menace to her enemies. 59. Relation Between the Two Railroads and the Ambition of Germany to Control the World. —For economic, political, and strategic reasons, there- fore, the success of the "Berlin to Bagdad" scheme and the larger " Hamburg to the Persian Gulf" scheme were of vital importance to Germany, be- cause they furnished the means by which she hoped to control the Balkan region and the Turkish Em- pire, and later to dominate and enslave the world. " World It was this dazzling vision which urged the dowSaii" Kaiser and his satellites to commit themselves to the policy of "world power or downfall." As we know now, the fates had decreed that it should be downfall, for in the titanic struggle which the Im- perial German Government was resolved to pre- cipitate in order to realize its greedy ambition, Kaiserism and Pan-Germanism received their death- blow at the hands of an indignant and outraged civilization, which was determined "to make the world safe for democracy." THE GREAT WAR 43 CHAPTER VI HOW THE BALKAN WARS MENACED PAN- GERMANISM 60. German Control of the " Berlin to Bagdad " Railway Entire Imperative. — The Pan-German scheme of obtaining economic control of Mesopo- tamia and Asia Minor could not be carried out suc- cessfully unless the " Berlin to Bagdad" Railway entire were administered by Germany ; any broken connection would imperil the whole line. Accord- ingly, it was imperative that Germany should secure and maintain not only economic but also political dominance over those Balkan countries through which the railroad ran. 61. The Balkan Peninsula a Storm Centre. — This The control fact alone made the Balkan situation one of the tlf^S™ Kan region first magnitude; and its control by the two Teutonic of the first Powers became a cardinal principle in their policies impor ance of commercial and political expansion. The situa- tion reveals one of several reasons why the Balkan Peninsula became a storm centre for European rival- ries; ambitions, and deep-seated enmities of long standing; other reasons will be made clear as our story develops. 62. Morocco a Distinctive Menace to the Peace of The size Europe. — A less serious but yet a distinctive menace JJ£ j^^, to the peace of Europe was bound up in Morocco. The situation here could not be ignored. Close to 44 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Europe, it had almost exactly the area of France, with a thousand miles of seacoast extending along the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. It was rich in minerals and in possible tropical products, and had long attracted the eyes of Europe; for its wild peoples and futile Moslem government made an independent future for it impossible, at least for centuries. It was proper that some civilized Christian state should train its people and develop its resources. On racial, historic, and geographic grounds Spain should have undertaken this re- sponsibility, but she was too poor and not strong enough as a political Power to become its ruler. Border 63. To France Falls the Task of Modernizing Morocco. — France had remade its eastern neighbor, Algeria, where the native tribes were the same as in Morocco. The friction occasioned by the contact of these tribes with each other brought about con- stant border troubles for France. To her, there- fore, by the course of events, fell the task of modern- izing Morocco. And when in 1905 anarchy among the tribes forced France to interfere, Germany, who had almost no trade there, and openly admitted the fact, conceded the French claim of paramount interests in the land. 64. A Menacing Crisis in Morocco in 191 1. — But the Pan-Germans bitterly opposed this view, for in their colonial dream they had greedily appro- priated Morocco as their own. It is not surpris- ing, therefore, that when opportunity offered in troubles in Morocco THE GREAT WAR 45 1911, they brought on so menacing a crisis in Mo- rocco that all Europe, with the exception of the British people, believed that war was near. But the Kaiser, not yet insistent to the point of war, gave way and thus lost prestige in the diplo- matic struggle. 65. Two Serious Crises in the Balkans. — More serious than these two crises in Morocco were two others in the Balkans. They grew out of the resolve of Austria-Hungary, backed by Germany, to have absolute control of the Balkan Peninsula, as a vital link of the great Eastern railroad scheme, and the equally stubborn resolve of Russia that they should not have such control, since it would cut her off from her water route to the Mediterranean. The first of these crises was in 1908, the second in 1914. 66. Germany the Central Figure in All Four of the Germany Crises. — In all four of the crises which we have ^^^ supremacy mentioned — and these came at three-year intervals, in 1905, 1908, 1911, and 1914— Germany was the dominating figure, inexorably determined to assert her supremacy in the diplomatic field. And this was not mere idle arrogance, for, inflated by her great victories, and convinced of her cultural superiority, she believed that by this means she might gain her colonial and political ends without actual warfare. 67. The Balkan Countries. — Turning our atten- Turkey's tion to the Balkan region, where Germany could not ^reSive allow her ally, Austria, to yield a foot without giv- rule ing up her whole scheme, let us examine briefly 46 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Bosnia and Herzegovina under rule of Austria- Hungary Austria- Hungary desires po- litical con- trol of Serbia the local conditions. The principal Balkan coun- tries were Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Ru- mania, all Christian countries which, by the early- years of the twentieth century, had become inde- pendent of Turkey, under whose cruel and op- pressive rule they had suffered for centuries. Other countries — not yet independent — were Bosnia-Her- zegovina, inhabited by Serbians; Albania, by Al- banians; and Macedonia, by Serbians, Greeks, and Bulgarians, partly in separate districts and partly mixed. 68. The People in Bosnia and Herzegovina Desire Union with their Brethren in Serbia. — Since the Berlin Congress in 1878, following the war between Turkey and Russia, Bosnia and Herzegovina had been part of the Turkish Empire only in name. They were actually ruled by Austria-Hungary, but they hated their rulers as foreigners and drillmasters and desired union with the people of their own language and customs in Serbia. And the dream of the Serbs for centuries had been to revive a Greater Serbia. 69. The Extension of the Organization and Power of Serbia very Distasteful to Austria-Hungary. — Such an extension of the national organization and power of Serbia was very distasteful to Austria-Hungary, for it seriously interfered with the ambitious plans of Austro-Hungarian diplomats and statesmen. They wished for such political control of Serbia as the Dual Monarchy had exercised from 1878 to 1903. During that period the Serbian ruler, King from a photograph, copyright by Underwood and Underwood THE MARKET SQUARE, SPARTA 48 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Alexander, had been pro-Austrian in sympathies; but at the end of the period he was murdered and in his place a pro-Russian ruler ascended the Serbian throne. Russia de- 70. Russia Supports Serbia for Racial and Eco- sires a nomic Reasons. — From that time Serbia was a pro- trade out- . x let to the sea tege of Russia, the great Slavic Power to whom this smaller Slavic state looked for backing and protection. Such support Russia was more than willing to give not only for racial but also for eco- nomic reasons. She had no satisfactory trade out- let to the sea, and as most of her exports reached foreign lands by going through the Dardanelles, she had long desired to get control of Constan- tinople, which commanded these famous straits. Failing in this, she might well desire, through Serbia, to extend her influence over the Balkan Peninsula as far as some seaport on the iEgean Sea or the Adriatic. Austrian /i. Why Austria-Hungary Formally Annexed Bos- fears of nia an( j Herzegovina. — It was fear of the Slavic rivalry influence of Serbia, and far more of Serbia's pow- erful protector, Russia, which had led to Austria- Hungary 's desire for the administrative control of Bosnia and Herzegovina which she exercised after 1878. Up to 1908 she had been content with such control, but as international rivalries increased in the early years of the twentieth century, and as in Austria fears of Slavic rivalry in the Balkan Peninsula became more intense, that country THE GREAT WAR 49 resolved to tighten her grasp. Therefore, in that year ; in flagrant defiance of the international agree- ment reached by the European Powers at the Berlin Congress in 1878, and without warning to the other nations, she took complete control of Bosnia and Herzegovina by formally annexing them. This was a serious blow to Russian ambition. A serious That country had failed through her defeat bv £ low . to J m ° J Russian Japan in her ambitious scheme to establish ambition her empire on the Pacific. She had turned then, as we have noted, to find an outlet for her trade through Constantinople, or else on the iEgean or the Adriatic. But if Austria-Hungary should dominate the Balkan Peninsula, the desires of Rus- sia in that field could never be realized. 72. Russia Makes a Vigorous Protest. — Russia therefore made a vigorous protest against the an- nexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria- Hungary. She called for another European con- gress, similar to that held in Berlin in 1878, to go over the whole complex situation in the Balkan Peninsula. But Austria-Hungary refused to meet with such a congress, and Germany stood by her. 73. Edward VII Indignant at the Outrageous Austria- Conduct of Austria-Hungary.— The English king, £™g^ n Edward VII, and the British Government were in- intema- dignant because of the outrageous conduct of Aus- ag^ement tria-Hungary in coolly breaking an international agreement. It made clear the fact that the Teu- tonic Powers had definitely resolved on force to ac- 50 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Dramatic words of the Kaiser A triumph for Austro- Hungarian and German prestige Two objects of the Balkan alliance complish their Eastern plans; but English public opinion would not support a war upon an issue having no immediate bearing upon British interests. 74. Germany Gives Strong Support to Her Ally. — The ruling classes in Russia were deeply sympa- thetic with the Serbian people and the Russian Government gave signs of encouraging Serbia to go to war. Then the Kaiser, in a highly dramatic fash- ion, exclaimed that if his august ally Austria were compelled to draw the sword, "a Knight in shining armor " — that is, armed Germany — would be found at her side. As Russia was not ready for war, she had to yield to German bluff and retire in deep humiliation. Serbia, inflamed with anger and indignation, was eager for war. But it would of course have been foolhardy for her to engage in deadly combat with a military power of many times her own strength. 75. Direct Bearing of the Annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina upon the Great War. — The out- come of the crisis was a triumph for Austro-Hun- garian and German prestige, and the Teutonic Powers were content. But the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in defiance of honor and right and justice, had a direct bearing upon a con- flict far more destructive and disastrous than Eu- rope had ever known, as the future was to reveal. 76. Macedonia Another Trouble-Breeder. — An- other trouble-breeder was Macedonia. In this Turkish province were people of three nationalities, THE GREAT WAR 51 Serbians ; Greeks, and Bulgarians, all of whom suffered from the harsh misrule of the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish Government forced upon them unjust laws and exacted from them extortion- ate and sometimes ruinous taxes. At last the Turkish yoke became so intolerable that Serbia, Montenegro, Greece, and Bulgaria formed an alli- ance with two objects in view: (1) To free the Christians in Macedonia from Turkey and take them under their own rule; and (2) to drive the Turks out of Europe. 77. The First Balkan War (1912). — They chose Why the 1912 for the attack, partly because the Turkish ^^" I2 army was being reorganized by German officers and was still in a somewhat chaotic state, and partly because Turkey was distracted by the Turco- Italian War in which she was embroiled. But despite Turkey's weakness at that time, the Confidence Teutonic Powers, supported by the advice of their ^^Powers military experts, confidently believed that the in the Turk- Turkish armies, under a single command, led by 1S anmes German officers, and equipped from the Krupp factories with the latest German guns, would crush the petty Balkan armies, under four separate com- mands, each dreading another's success almost more than their joint failure. But in this Germany and Austria-Hungary were grievously mistaken; for the allied countries were at all points so sur- prisingly successful that within the brief space of a single month they had practically demolished the 52 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Austria- Hungary supported by Germany and Italy Turkish Empire in Europe so that Turkey was al- most driven out of that continent. 78. Why the Teutonic Powers Oppose a Federation of Balkan States. — If the Balkan states had been able to work together in as much harmony after the fighting ended as during the struggle itself, they might have formed a strong federation of states, as many liberal statesmen in Europe hoped they would do. But such a federation would have been fatal to the extension of Austro-Hungarian influence in the Balkan Peninsula and to the working out of the Pan-German plan in Mesopotamia and Asia Minor. Therefore, the Teutonic Powers opposed it, and Austria encouraged the bitter dissension that had sprung up among the allies about the division of the spoils of war. 79. Austria-Hungary Succeeds in Her Plan of Having Albania Made an Independent State. — Aus- tria was very astute and effective in her methods of procedure. She knew that one of the strongest reasons why Serbia had taken up arms was to secure territory in Albania with a seaport on the Adriatic, and that, the Serbian armies having won this greatly coveted territory, that country was about to secure the great prize for which she longed. But Austria-Hungary insisted that Albania must be made an independent state, and, mobilizing her armies, ordered the withdrawal of Serbian troops from that region. In so doing, she was again THE GREAT WAR 53 backed by Germany. She had the support of Italy, also, for Albania guarded the approach by sea to the Adriatic and therefore possessed great strategic value to both nations. Either of them, therefore, would profit greatly by securing its control, and the ambitions of both would be seriously balked if Serbia should add it to her territory. Austria- Hungary had her way. Albania was allowed to set up a government of her own. 80. Bitter Trouble Among the Balkan States. — Claims of A self-governing Albania meant not only a disas- Q^ece and trous defeat to Serbia in realizing her cherished Bulgaria dream, but it was also the cause of bitter trouble among the allies — Serbia, Greece, and Bulgaria. For in the various treaties which they had made with one another in the spring and summer of 1912, before joining in an attack upon Turkish armies and Turkish territory, they had agreed to make allot- ments of conquered territory at the end of the struggle in the event of their being victorious. According to these pacts, Serbia was to get as her share much of the territory of Albania; Greece was to have part of southern Albania, including a commercial outlet on the Adriatic Sea; and Bul- garia was to have as her share the largest part of Macedonia, with a seaport on the ^Egean. Serbia, seeing her share snatched from her and Serbia's bitterly disappointed that she could not have her appomtment Adriatic port, demanded that Bulgaria give her part of Macedonia to make up for her loss. Greece 54 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Bulgaria strongly op- poses Ser- bia and Greece The Teu- tonic Powers encourage Bulgaria to fight Bulgaria hopelessly beaten backed her, and also put in a claim of her own for Macedonian territory. Bulgaria strongly opposed both countries, de- claring that she must have for herself what her armies had conquered, and asserting with much emphasis that the main reason why the Bulgarians had rushed to arms was that they might rescue from Turkish misrule the lands of her "unredeemed " people and bring them under her flag. She did not wish now to give up to any other nation part of the fruits of her victory. 81. The Second Balkan War (1913). — Here again was a fine opportunity for mischief-making on the part of the Teutonic Powers. They not only wished for serious trouble among the Balkan coun- tries, but they also felt confident that their friend, Bulgaria, would be a sure winner if war should come. So they encouraged Bulgaria to fight. Her generals and officers were more than willing to listen to such appeals, for they felt confident of success. Believing in their unquestioned superior- ity to the Serbian and Greek armies, they would neither debate the situation nor wait, and were either insolent or condescending, according to their mood, toward their former allies. The war began on the night of June 29, 1913, when the Bulgarian army made a treacherous at- tack along the whole line of the Serbian and Greek armies, with the hope of crushing them by one terrific, sudden blow. But in this they totally 56 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Losses and gains of the warring countries failed. At the end of a month, Bulgaria was hope- lessly beaten and was at the mercy of her enemies, to the list of which had been added Rumania and Turkey; for, taking advantage of Bulgaria's dis- traction, Rumania had attacked her from the north on account of conflicting claims of territory, and Turkey, with a reorganized army, had recap- tured Adrianople, a city which the Bulgarians had taken in the First Balkan War. 82. Striking Results of the Two Balkan Wars. — The results of the two Balkan Wars were far-reach- ing. Turkey lost most of her European territory, which had been reduced from 65,300 square miles with 6,130,000 people, to 10,880 square miles with about 1,900,000 people. Rumania had forced Bul- garia to yield to her 2,687 square miles with 286,000 people. Serbia had added to her territory some 15,000 square miles with about 1,700,000 inhabitants, and thereby almost doubled her area. Greece had gained nearly 18,000 square miles of territory — including Crete and many other islands — in all about three-fourths of her original area with about 1,700,000 people. Bulgaria, humiliated and crestfallen, had been driven out of much of Macedonia, and although she had made a net gain of 9,660 square miles of territory, with 125,500 people, it was of little value. 83. The Balkan Wars Bring Keen Disappointment to Germany and Austria-Hungary. — These two Bal- kan wars brought keen disappointment to Germany THE GREAT WAR 57 and Austria-Hungary. Germany had lost in mili- tary prestige, because the Turkish armies, after BALKAN STATES 1913 & • tfazaaV S E A being trained by German officers, had suffered grievous defeat wherever they fought. Both Ger- many and Austria had lost in diplomatic prestige because they had incited Bulgaria to war and that 58 THE" CAUSES AND MEANING OF Attitude of Bulgaria and Turkey toward Ger- many and Austria- Hungary country had been ignominiously defeated on the* battle-field. 84. The Outcome of the Balkan Wars a Distinct Threat to Pan-Germanism. — But even worse than the defeat of Turkey and Bulgaria, in affecting the ambitious schemes of Austria-Hungary and Pan- Germanism, was the change of attitude on the part of these nations toward Germany. Bulgaria was bitter over the results of the war and sullen toward Germany and Germany's ally, Austria-Hungary, because both of them had advised her to enter upon the Second Balkan War; while Turkey, having fought her losing battles without support from her Teu- tonic friends, was openly turning a cold shoulder to Germany and Austria-Hungary, and leaning more and more to the Entente Powers. CHAPTER VII WHY GERMANY AND AUSTRIA-HUNGARY WISHED TO CRUSH SERBIA Serbian longings for a Greater Serbia 85. Serbia at the End of the Balkan Wars much more Powerful than Before. — The blow, struck in the Balkans, which fell so heavily upon Pan-Germanism, brought a menace that was greatly disturbing to William II and his advisers at Berlin, for not only had Bulgaria been .defeated, but Serbia was much more powerful than ever before. She THE GREAT WAR 59 had increased her military prestige, had added a vast extent of territory in Macedonia and thereby had gained larger influence over her kinsmen, the Jugo- slavs in Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, and even in Austria-Hungary. Moreover, this great accretion of power intensified the Serbian longings for a Greater Serbia, which should extend her na- tional organization so as to include under one flag millions of the Jugo-Slav race, with Serbia as a centre. It was a worthy aspiration for a brave and heroic people. 86. The Jugo-Slavs in Austria-Hungary. — In 1913 Serbia's in- the situation in the Balkans, therefore, had be- JJJjJ^ ™~ eT come far more delicate and perilous in its rela- thejugo- tion to the plans of Germany than it had been in tria-Hungary 1908, for Serbia's increased power and influence, as noted above, was seriously affecting not only the Jugo-Slavs in the Balkan Peninsula, but also those in Austria-Hungary. That was especially alarming to the Teutonic Powers, for the Jugo-Slavs in Aus- tria numbered 24,000,000, while there were only 12,000,000 Germans and 10,000,000 Magyars in the Dual Monarchy. In spite of their smaller numbers, however, jugo-siavs for a long time the Germans and the Magyars, Hungary*" by uniting for their mutual profit, had prevented restive and the Jugo-Slavs from having their just rights in 1 n en ec the management of the affairs of the empire. But this could not continue, for the Jugo-Slavs were growing stronger by reason of their closer racial 60 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Serbia's success threatens the Austro- Hungarian Empire The Jugo- slavs in the Austro- Hungarian Empire organization; and were increasing more rapidly in numbers because of their higher birth-rate. They became restive and discontented, claim- ing for themselves the political rights and powers proportionate to the greater number of their people in the empire. 87. Both Austria and Germany Disturbed over the Power and Influence of Serbia. — The Austrian Gov- ernment, therefore, had reason to be greatly dis- turbed on its own account over the power and in- fluence of Serbia in the Balkan Peninsula; for if Serbia should expand to include Bosnia and Herze- govina, this might lead to a revolt of the disaffected Jugo-Slavs in Austria-Hungary, and even to their withdrawal from that empire. In other words, the success of Serbia threatened to break up Austria- Hungary. Furthermore, even though the Jugo-Slavs should remain in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, they might, under the influence of the Jugo-Slavs in Serbia, insist upon their rights to the point of de- manding federation. If this should be done, there might be not only Austria and Hungary but also a third division in the empire made up of Jugo- Slavs. In such a federated empire the Jugo-Slavs, far outnumbering the Germans and the Magyars, could control the foreign relations of the empire. In that case, inasmuch as they bitterly hated Prus- sianism, they would upset the plans of German domination of Austria, and without such domina- SERBIAN WOMEN 62 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF A large in- crease in the German army Germany becomes more and more asser- tive and insolent tion the " Berlin to Bagdad" scheme and the much more ambitious Pan-German scheme of dominating the Balkan Peninsula and the Ottoman Empire would come to naught. 88. Germany and Austria Resolve that Serbia must be Crushed. — Therefore, at the close of the Second Balkan War, when the peace was signed on August 10 ; 1913, both Germany and Austria re- solved that Serbia must be crushed. It was only a matter of time when the deed was to be done. They both stood expectant, eagerly waiting for the opportune moment when they could spring upon their despised victim and crush out her life. 89. Germany is Set upon Triumphing over the Jugo-Slavs in Serbia even though It Means War with Russia and France. — Meantime, Germany, knowing that Turkey and Bulgaria, upon whom she had been depending for military support, were weakened by their overwhelming defeats in 1912 and 1913, at once set about making a large increase in the German army. A great European crisis was rapidly approaching, for Germany was de- termined to triumph over the Jugo-Slavs in Serbia, even if it meant war with Russia and France. She had become more and more assertive, insolent, and bellicose, striving to maintain her prestige unim- paired even at the cost of an awful cataclysm in- volving the whole of Europe. Though we did not know it then as we do now, Germany's inordinate hunger for wealth and her insane ambition for The great war 63 glory had grown so enormously that " world domin- ion or downfall!" had become the familiar watch- word of militarists and Pan-Germanistsy of the Junkers and the Prussian war-lords. In November, 1913, less than three months "Warwitfr after the signing of the Treaty of Bucharest, which F ^|f .^7 brought to a close the Second Balkan War, William says the II of Germany gave the word to King Albert of Kaiser Belgium, who was visiting him at Potsdam: "War with France is inevitable and is near." That war with France might mean war with many other na- tions William II must have known, but his war- mad military leaders had weighed the chances and believed that Germany stood ready to win. CHAPTER VIII WHY AND HOW GERMANY AND AUSTRIA BROUGHT ON THE WORLD WAR 90. Political Agitation in Favor of a Greater Ser- The very ex- bia Threatens Austria-Hungary. — Political agitation ^ e a ° f among the Jugo-Slavs constantly grew in intensity threatened and effectiveness, and much of it had its origin in Serbia. Serbian newspapers, as well as a secret political organization, worked continuously in the interests of a Greater Serbia, spreading abroad propaganda which seriously threatened the power and in fact the very existence of Austria. The agitators declared that Austria, in annexing Bosnia 64 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF How Ger- many and Austria re- gard the shocking deed The Pots- dam Con- ference and Herzegovina ; had robbed Serbia of what was rightly her own; that Austria was Serbia's most bitter enemy and desired to crush her. They even went so far as to say that Serbia's interests would be advanced by Austria's destruction. 91. The Assassination of the Archduke Ferdi- nand (June 28, 19 14). — Thoroughly awake to the possibilities; Germany and Austria were firmly re- solved to put an end to Slavic influence in the Balkan Peninsula. They awaited only a favorable opportunity. The pretext for which they were seeking came in the assassination; on June 28, 1914; of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Crown Prince of the Austrian imperial throne, and his wife. They were murdered by a Jugo-Slav in the streets of the little city of Serajevo, the capital of Bosnia. This shocking deed was rightly regarded by Ger- many and Austria as a political protest against Aus- tria's attitude toward Jugo-Slavic aspirations. The Austrian Government charged that the murder was committed not only with the knowledge and ap- proval of the Serbian Government; but that it was part and parcel of the Serbian conspiracy against the Dual Monarchy. 92. A Humiliating Ultimatum to Serbia. — A week after the assassination a conference of German and Austrian leaders was held at Potsdam, at which it was decided to use the murder as a pretext for carry- ing out the plan to crush Serbia. Accordingly; on July 23; the first step was taken by sending Serbia THE GREAT WAR 65 a diplomatic note in the form of a humiliating ulti- matum , involving not only her honor but her very existence as an independent state. She was granted but forty-eight hours in which to give an answer of complete submission or go to war — although several of the demands involved a total change in her con- stitution, which could not be made except by calling together her Parliament and getting a vote of approval. The terms dictated to her in this outrageous state An out- paper were extremely drastic. "I have never g^fte*"^ er seen/' said Sir Edward Grey, the British foreign secretary , "one nation address to another a docu- ment of so formidable a character." Said the German Socialist newspaper, Vorwdrts: "The de- mands of that government" — referring to Austria — "are more brutal than any ever made upon a civilized state in the history of the world, and they can be regarded as only intended to provoke war." If, in a word, Serbia had complied with the condi- tions demanded in the ultimatum, she would have become to all intents and purposes a vassal state to Austria. And yet, strange to say, the one fear that found Fear in expression throughout Germany was that Serbia J^there might accept the terms in their entirety, leaving might not no excuse for Austria to make war upon her. This would have been a great disappointment, for such a miraculous chance might never come again, providing at once for barbaric Teuton revenge 66 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Russia's weakness Serbia swallows the bitter dose and the achievement of the great Pan-German dream. 93. Why Russia Advises Serbia to Submit. — Out- rageous as were the terms ; the prospect of war with the powerful German organization; backed by unfailing supplies, was so dreadful that even Russia advised Serbia to submit. For if Serbia stood out, and the war came, Russia must in honor take her side. She could not again yield after protest as in 1908 on the Bosnia-Herzegovina question without becoming thereafter despised by all as a "bluffer." Yet she well knew that she was in no condition fco undertake war. Her armies were being remade, her finances were low and her supplies scanty, and her always sparse and defective transportation was half paralyzed by labor troubles. She therefore made every effort to avert a crisis; and Serbia, too weak to fight alone and with no friend back of her, swallowed this bitter dose and accepted all the terms save two, which took away her sover- eignty as a state. Even these she agreed to sub- mit to The Hague or to the great Powers of Europe. 94. Austria Wants War, and Germany Gives Her Ally Unstinted Support. — But Austria did not want acceptance; she had purposely made the terms so harsh that they could not be accepted by any self-respecting state. She wanted war, and de- clared the answer equivalent to a rejection. Ger- many gave her ally unstinted support. She felt confident that Russia would not take a firm stand; THE GREAT WAR 67 and that if Russia did not intervene, the situation was safe, for Serbia would soon be overwhelmed, since it was almost certain that neither France nor England was prepared for war. 95. France not Ready for War. — The French people were most pacific; French armies were not only inferior in numbers, but below the best mark in equipment. Besides, the French system of trans- portation was lacking in order and in rapidity. There was no doubt, in Teutonic military circles, that if France should go to war in 1914, the mobili- zation of her armies would break down in utter confusion. 96. England, According to German Secret-Service The situa- Agents, almost Sure not to Intervene. — England England likewise, according to reports from German secret- service agents there, was almost sure not to inter- vene. She had less than 200,000 soldiers in service, three-fourths of them being in the East, against the German millions, all at home; and she could not add a thousand to them except through a tedious parliamentary debate and estimates. The Home Rule troubles, threatening imminent civil war, were believed to presage disruption even of Great Britain, and, at best, would tie her hands; the discontented classes in India would produce an- other mutiny if Britain got into war; the great col- onies would not stand by her and spend blood and money for a war in which they had no interest. More than all, the English people cared only for 68 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Opening of the Kiel Canal Germany declares war upon Russia and France trade — so the Germans believed — and not for na- tional honor or pride, and did not consider the Balkan affairs their concern. Such was the report of German secret-service agents. 97. Whatever Happens, Germany and Austria Are Ready for War. — But even if all of the Entente Powers should unite in war against Germany and Austria, it was wiser to enter into conflict with them in 1914, according to Teutonic military ex- perts, than to wait until a later time; for Germany was then relatively stronger than she would be a few years later, when the other nations would be better prepared for war. Only a few days before the Potsdam Conference, the enlarged Kiel Canal had been officially opened. It could let in or out the entire German navy in sixteen hours; and that navy, on which vast sums had been lavished for many years, was believed to be able to neutralize, and perhaps even overcome, the English navy. 98. The Rapid Movement of Events. — Events moved with startling rapidity, Germany all the while forcing a situation which would result either in abject humiliation to both Serbia and her protector Russia, or war. On July 28, Austria declared war upon Serbia. On July 29, Russia be- gan to mobilize her armies. Two days later, Ger- many sent an ultimatum to Russia in which she demanded that mobilization in that country should at once cease. Receiving no reply, she declared war upon Russia on August 1; and on getting an FOREIGN SECRETARY BALFOUR 70 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF unsatisfactory answer to an ultimatum to France, she declared war upon that country on August 3. 99. William II and German Military Leaders well Satisfied. — William II and the German mili- tary leaders were thus far well satisfied with the way events were moving. With England neutral, it would be a comparatively easy task to crush France by making a rapid attack, and then to turn upon Russia and overwhelm her. For, owing to long distances as well as to insufficient and in- effective railroads, it was thought that Russia's mobilization would be very slow. Germany's ioo. Germany Commits a Great Diplomatic Blunder BdtaS a b y violatin g the Neutrality of Belgium.— It was Ger- high out- many's plan to seize Paris at once. But in her at- rage tempt to make a speedy advance upon that city, she committed her first great diplomatic blunder of the war. She invaded Belgium, whose neu- trality she had guaranteed by treaty; and although that same treaty made Belgium liable to punish- ment if she allowed German forces or those of any other Power to pass through her territory, Ger- many demanded a free passage. This was a high outrage. As to the excuse later sown broadcast that France would have invaded Belgium if Ger- many had not done so, it was false; for France had already solemnly assured Belgium, and the assur- ance had been transmitted to Germany, that she would not enter Belgian territory. The German chancellor, von Bethmann-Holl- THE GREAT WAR 71 weg, made no such pretense at the time, but England's merely pleaded military necessity; and in urging g t ^° e rat Mr. Goschen, the British ambassador to Germany, to overlook the breach of this treaty, referred to it as a scrap of paper. But it was far more than that to England, for she had pledged her word to respect and preserve the neutrality of Belgium. Therefore, her honor was at stake, and that she would protect even at the cost of a long and terrible war. 101. England's Safety Involved. — Moreover, her safety also was involved. As a matter of fact, the neutrality of Belgium, as a cardinal principle of English foreign policy, stood on an almost equal footing with the necessity of her naval supremacy. If a great Power like Germany should get control of the Belgian coast and establish strong naval bases there, England's danger in war would be greatly increased. For it would be easy for such a Power to launch attacks against English shipping in the North Sea, and against the great seaports on the south coast of England. The mouth of the Thames also would be a most vulnerable point on the eastern coast, its control rendering the invasion of that country comparatively easy. 102. Germany Confident of Triumphant Victory. — Germany was well aware of these conditions, but, as we have seen, she believed that England would not go to war at that time; and even if she should, Germany believed herself all-sufficient for the task 72 THE CAUSES AND MEANING she had deliberately taken up. The hour of her destiny had struck. Victory, she believed, was certain. World dominion, the glorious dream of the Kaiser and the Prussian war-lords, was await- ing only her triumphant grasp. German barbarities in Belgium Sixteen priceless days CHAPTER IX SOME STRIKING EVENTS OF THE WAR 103. The Brave Little Belgian Army Holds Back the German Host. — The German military machine moved with scientific precision and marvellous rapidity; but in Belgium, through which it had hoped to march at full speed without serious opposi- tion, it met with a stubborn resistance that cost it the war in the end. At the outset the brave little Belgian army held back the German host three days at Liege, and then several days more at the now famous university city of Lou vain. In revenge for this, and to terrify other places so as to prevent resistance, the furious invaders visited several towns with wholesale massacre of innocent citizens of all ages and both sexes, and burned a part of Louvain to the ground, including its irreplaceable old library. On August 20, the German armies entered Brus- sels without opposition. Sixteen days — priceless days to their enemies — they had spent in Belgian 74 THE CAUSES AND MEANING territory; priceless for two reasons: flrst ; because they gave time for the French to mobilize their troops and mass them in northeastern France to op- Versaill ROUTES OF THE GERMAN ARMIES THROUGH BELGIUM pose the German onrush; second, because they per- mitted Britain to send across the Channel an advance force of 100,000, nearly all the few reg- ulars kept at home and a few reserves hurriedly collected— the "contemptible little English army/ 7 the Kaiser called it, but composed of the same kind of heroes as those who held the hedge before Waterloo. From a photograph by the Belgian Official Pictorial Service. KING ALBERT 76 THE CAUSES AND MEANING The Ger- mans sweep forward with ever- increasing power Retreat of the French and the English General Jofifre bides his time 104. The Allied Troops Retreat Without Confusion Before the Resistless Human Tide. — The French and the British troops now joined the Belgians. But, all told, the three allied armies for weeks were so inferior in numbers that they could hope to do nothing more than delay for a little the resistless hordes of Germans that swept forward with ever- increasing power and confidence. Fortresses among the strongest in Europe for an age, and until within a few years impregnable, crumbled like sand before the enormous new German artillery. At Namur and at Mons, on August 22 and 23, the invading army, under the command of Gen- eral von Kluck, defeated the Allies and then pressed on with the full expectation of captur- ing Paris at an early day. Over a two-hundred- mile front tens of miles slipped behind them, while the French and the English continued to retreat, yet without confusion. At one time the Germans were only fifteen miles from the French capital. 105. The Famous Battle of the Marne (Sept. 6-10, 1914). — But something akin to a miracle — as it seemed then — was the barring of the triumphant progress of the Germans. General Joffre,the French commander, had been biding his time. With a stoical judgment he sacrificed temporary possession of France to its ultimate recovery, showing a restraint which was only less marvellous than that the French should allow him to do it without taking away his MARSHAL JOFFRE 78 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF command. Instead of rushing his entire army to the German front, and having nothing with which to hold the enemy if his forces were overborne, he transferred an important force under Maunoury to — Battle Line of Sept. 6, 1914 Battle Line of July 15. 1918 -■• Battle Line of Nov. 11, 1918 MAP SHOWING THE WESTERN FRONT The Ger- mans hur- riedly re- treat some seventy miles his left flank, wholly unsuspected by the German high command. Then at the right moment, when the Germans had flung two great wings north and south to encircle Paris, he hurled one of his corps against the juncture of one wing with the main body, while General Foch assailed the other wing near the centre. The Germans had been allowed to cross the Marne River, where from September 6 to September 10 the two armies fought furiously. Then the THE GREAT WAR 79 invaders, menaced with the possibility of having their advance lines cut off from the main army and forced to surrender, hurriedly retreated some seventy miles toward Germany. Paris was saved, and so, as it turned out, was France and the cause of the Allies. 1 06. The Germans, Outfought and Outgeneralled, Russia as- Are Forced to Retreat. — The battle of the Marne ^worid proved not merely that the German army, after by her forty years of the most scientific preparation and spee with limitless equipment, was not invincible, but that the vaunted, unerring German strategy was not inspired. The Germans had been both out- fought and outgeneralled. They retreated as far as the Aisne River, where they took shelter in trenches which had been made ready for them. 107. The Splendid Service of Russia and Belgium. — In the meantime, Russia had bitterly surprised the German military leaders and astonished the world by the speed with which she had mobilized her armies. She had invaded Germany in East Prussia and Austria in Galicia, in each case advanc- ing far beyond her frontier. Although badly de- feated at Tannenberg, in East Prussia, on August 29, she had compelled the Germans to send a large army to meet her forces there; and thus, by re- ducing the number of Germans that could be utilized against France, had made it easier for the Allies to stay the onward rush of the foe on the western front. 80 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF How Ger- If Belgium had not delayed the German army for many's plan marl y days, a nd if Russia had not been so rapid in feated her mobilization, there is little doubt that Paris would have been captured and the French over- whelmed in six or seven weeks after the war began, according to the plan of the German high command. Germany's Germany's hope of success lay in rapid conquest, hope of rapid anc [ ^ mvas i n of Belgium was prompted by that conquest ° r- r- j expectation. She depended upon crushing France before Russia was ready, after which she could mass her troops upon the eastern frontier and over- whelm the Russian army. Nothing would then stand in the way of her concentrating her forces upon England, and having conquered her, she could unite the vanquished British fleet with her own and in due time she might cross the Atlantic for the conquest of the United States. 1 08. The Disappointment and Chagrin of the Kaiser and His Prussian War-Lords. — It is easy to imagine the disappointment and chagrin of the German Kaiser and his Prussian war-lords when they found their machine overmatched in about five weeks from the day their great armies had crossed the frontiers of brave little Belgium. Russian 1 09. The Russian Defeat at the Battle of the Gaiick m Dunajec. — There was some terrible fighting on the western front in the months following the battle of the Marne. But for more than a year the eastern front was the main centre of interest; for the Russians were so successful in Galicia that THE GREAT WAR 81 they threatened to break down the whole military machine of Austria. To prevent this and to- try <* e'^jF.^} ^v " -w^ 'Murmans A N ^Stockholm/ 1^8 &%*>>** ^J»&®„ . j a? is ? Sevastopolt^^ @ Buclferftt gL ^ eg SEA THE EASTERN THEATRE OF WAR to crush Russia, a huge German army was sent into Galicia, where, on the 1st of May, 1915, began the battle of the Dunajec, in which the Russian army, 82 THE CAUSES AND MEANING The Ger- mans ad- vance far into Russia What the German military leaders hoped to ac- complish " They shall not pass " betrayed by its largely German civil administra- tion, and fighting without arms, since its supply system was a wreck, was well-nigh destroyed. The Germans then continued to press eastward until they had advanced far into Russian territory, and for a time almost completely broke down Russian military power. no. The Great Battle for the Possession of Ver- dun (beginning in February, 191 5). — It was not until early in 1916, however, that the German high command dared release enough troops from the east to make another attempt to win a decisive victory on the western front, capture Paris, and conquer France. They believed that there was still time to do this before England could organize, train, and send across the Channel an army suf- ficiently powerful to save France from overwhelm- ing defeat. Accordingly, in February, 1916, they massed a large army for an attack upon Verdun, a French city surrounded by hills overlooking the valley of the Meuse River, and every one strongly fortified. It was a strategic centre, because it threatened Lorraine, the principal iron region of Germany, and it had long been considered one of the most formidable positions in Europe. Month in and month out the great battle raged for the posses- sion of Verdun, the two armies sacrificing half a million men in their determination to win victory at any cost. The French, pushed back to within 84 THE CAUSES AND MEANING two or three miles of the city but making every rod cost the Germans thousands of lives, heroi- cally held their position, inspired by the watch- THE TURKISH THEATRE OF WAR Why Tur- key joins Germany word, "They shall not pass." At the end of six months the Germans drew off, with another baffling defeat to their record. in. Turkey Enters the War on the Side of Ger- many. — Turning to the east again, we find that vitally important events were occurring there also. Turkey had joined Germany by secret treaty just before the war began, though not actively en- 86 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF The Allies desire to influence Bulgaria and Greece gaged in the war for some months. The alliance seemed to Turkey wise, for not only was she the natural ally of Germany as the key to her east- ern plan, but Germany in turn was Turkey 's only defense against Russia. Germany, she expected, would devour her ultimately, but without Ger- many the Allies were certain to dismember her at once. 112. Turkey's Accession Adds Two Formidable Dangers to the Allied List. — Turkey's accession added two formidable dangers to the allied list. One, an attack on the Suez Canal to cut off England from the short route to India, was attempted at once; the other, a land invasion of India through Persia, soon followed. Even though unsuccessful, these attempts forced England to fit out and sup- port two more long-distance armaments to meet the new dangers. 113. The Allies Attempt to Capture Constanti- nople (1915). — The Allies planned to attack Con- stantinople and cut the Turco-German communica- tions with Asia. This campaign, if successful, would accomplish two other purposes of command- ing importance. It would let Russian grain ships down through the Bosporus and Dardanelles with food for the western allies, and would let military supplies up through to sustain Russia. There was even a faint hope of its demonstrating to Bulgaria, whose king was a German princelet, and to Greece, whose queen was sister of the Kaiser, that the THE GREAT WAR 87 chances of war were going against Germany, and so of inducing them, if not to join the Allies, at least to allow the allied armies to pass through their territory in order to attack Austria in the rear. In making the attempt to capture Constantinople, a serious a large allied fleet of English and French war- set-back for ° the allied vessels advanced to the narrowest part of the Dar- cause danelles, where each bank was commanded by formidable defenses. There was a furious battle in which the English and French lost several large vessels. Then they withdrew to a point where they could land their forces on the Gallipoli Pen- insula, which is on the European shore of the Dar- danelles; but here they found the Turkish position almost impregnable, and after a heavy loss of men they abandoned the enterprise in December, 1915. It was a serious set-back for the allied cause. 114. Serbia is Practically Annihilated (1915). — Bulgaria The expedition against Constantinople was only ^f^the one unfortunate event -for the Allies in that region. s ide of Germany Serbia, almost at the beginning of the war, had been invaded by Austria; but she had stood up so bravely against the attack that by De- cember the invaders were driven out of her ter- ritory. In the autumn of 1915, however, she was confronted by her old enemy, Bulgaria. That country, with the hope of getting back the terri- tory which she had lost in the Second Balkan War (1913) had made a defensive treaty with Turkey and in October, 1915, declared war upon Serbia. THE CAUSES AND MEANING Rumania joins the Allies Blockade of the German coast By the end of that year, Serbia was practically annihilated. Her whole army was destroyed ex- cept a small remnant which escaped across Albania to the Adriatic Sea. Germany and Austria had achieved their pur- pose of conquering all enemy territory that lay be- tween them and the Turkish Empire. The coveted path was open from Berlin to Constantinople. 115. Rumania Meets with Disaster (1916). — Another old-time enemy of Bulgaria, Rumania, met with disaster, although not so ruinous as that meted out to Serbia. It had long been her desire to incorporate in her territory the more than two million Rumanians dwelling across the Carpathian Mountains in Transylvania, which was a part of Austria-Hungary. The Allies knew this and, wish- ing to gain her help, promised the aid of a Russian army if she would invade Transylvania. She did so, but the treacherous pro-German controllers of Russia, having encouraged her to start, sent no troops. Her army was overwhelmed by German and Austrian troops greatly outnumbering her own and her country was entirely overrun. She experi- enced the usual suffering which accompanied Ger- man victories — pillage and massacre and being stripped of food to supply her conquerors while her own people starved. 116. The Great Efficiency of the British Navy. — From the land operations we turn to the exploits of the British navy, which from the beginning of the From a photograph, copyright by Underwood and Underwood ADMIRAL BEATTY 90 THE CAUSES AND MEANING The English navy's remarkable achieve- ments war, showed far greater efficiency on the sea than did the German army on the land. It swept Ger- man commerce from the ocean ; drove the German navy to Kiel Harbor for shelter, and established a blockade over German ports which proved disastrous to the German cause, by shutting out food and military supplies. While holding off the enemy's commerce the Eng- lish navy was equally effective in protecting the transportation of food and other supplies between the allied countries. It made the Channel, forty miles in breadth, a ferry across which day and night were conveyed troops and supplies to France, without the loss from enemy attacks of a man, a vessel, or a pound of food or munitions in over four years. In fact, perhaps it is not too much to say that the greatest force in bringing about fail- ure of the Teutonic Powers was the British navy. The greatest 1 1 7. The Naval Battle of Jutland Ends in Victory of all history f° r tne British Grand Fleet (May 31, 19 16). — It was nearly two years before the German navy ven- tured out of Kiel Harbor for battle. When finally it did appear on May 31, 1916, from the standpoint of tonnage and armament the greatest naval bat- tle of all history was fought. The action took place off the coast of Jutland, the peninsula of Den- mark. Taking advantage of a fog, Admiral von Scheer, who was in command of the German high- seas fleet, slipped out of Kiel Harbor on that day, and was met by the English battle-cruiser ADMIRAL JELLICOE 92 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF squadron, under the command of Admiral Beatty, who was reinforced later by the British grand fleet, under the command of Admiral Jellicoe. The The Germans claimed victory, but they suffered fleeTruns defeat, for their fleet withdrew under cover of the away darkness to its hiding-place, and left the British supremacy of the seas unbroken. Never again dur- ing the remaining years of the Great War did the German high-seas fleet venture out into the open sea to engage the British grand fleet. CHAPTER X OUR COUNTRY ENTERS THE WAR The reason n8. President Wilson's Proclamation of Neutral- wnson's ent ity- — Shortly after the outbreak of the great conflict proclamation j n -j-,h e summ er of 1914, President Wilson issued a proclamation in which he advised all American citi- zens to "act and speak in the true spirit of im- partiality and friendliness to all concerned." This position he took because the United States had al- ways tried to avoid taking part in quarrels arising between European countries. American 1 19. The American People at First Surprised and followed by tnen Indignant at Germany's Lawless and Cruel indignation Conduct. — But the course of events brought about a change in the attitude of the American people. When Germany, in order to gain an easier and THE GREAT WAR 93 shorter route to Paris, broke the treaty by which she promised to observe the neutrality of Belgium, Americans were surprised. When after invading that peaceful and innocent country, she devastated its fields, confiscated its treasure, and slew its men, women, and children with a cruelty incredible in a civilized world, surprise was followed by in- dignation. 120. The Conviction Grows Among many Ameri- The con- cans that the United States Will Be Forced into the S^£ods of War. — Our people then began to awaken to the the German character of the evil spirit which controlled Ger- leaders many's ambitious and war -mad policy; and gradually, in the progress of the war, the convic- tion grew among many Americans that in spite of our strong desire to keep out of the conflict, the arro- gant and conscienceless methods of the German military leaders were certain, sooner or later, to force the United States to take up arms against Germany. They saw, also, with increasing clear- ness that domination of Europe and Asia and the seas by Germany meant domination of America; and that if we allowed the Allies to be crushed, we should have no power to resist the new mistress of the world, flushed with arrogance, exultation, and revenge. 121. Germany's Piratical and Inhuman Submarine Why we Policy. — But the immediate and by far the most w*a r ere important cause of our entering the war was Ger- many's piratical and inhuman submarine policy. 94 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Our extensive commerce and industry German authorities assume control of food-supplies It will be of interest for us to consider why the Ger- man military authorities thought it wise to adopt this policy; and how it made such serious friction between the two countries that our national self- respect; and our sense of right and justice , finally compelled us to become a belligerent nation. 122. The Conflict Puts a Political Strain upon Neutral Nations. — The conflict, which involved all the great European Powers, put a political strain on the neutral nations who wished to maintain their friendship with all the warring countries. This was especially true of the United States on account of our extensive commerce and industry, which were greatly affected by the war. 123. Each Belligerent Power Tries to Destroy the Enemy's Commerce. — To prevent all supplies from reaching the enemy was of vital importance to both sides. The Allies, at the outset, were success- ful in completely destroying the direct ocean com- merce with Germany except through the Baltic Sea; while the harm that Germany could inflict upon British commerce by the few submarines and roving cruisers which she then had was small. Up to the opening of this war, food intended for civilians had never been considered as contraband, and hence could not be lawfully seized at sea when it was on the way to a belligerent port. But changed conditions brought about new methods. Some time after the war began, German authori- ties, including those of cities as well as those FIELD-MARSHAL LORD KITCHENER 96 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF England establishes a war zone and Germany retaliates A note of warning Germany's reply evasive and un- satisfactory of the imperial government, assumed control of food-supplies in Germany. This caused Great Britain to declare, on February 2, 1915, that all food imported into Germany was contraband. The truth is that under a system of universal military service the whole nation is practically an army ; and all its supplies are military supplies. Moreover, Germany had placed mines in the North Sea for the defense of her coasts, and these were frequently found in the open sea far away from the shore, in violation of interna- tional law. To offset this, England established a "war zone" in the North Sea, with only a single lane for neutral vessels. On February 4, 1915, Germany retaliated by declaring a war zone which included all the waters around Great Britain, and asserted that in this zone she would destroy all enemy vessels. She said it might not be possible to save crews and passengers, and, moreover, that neutral vessels sailing in this zone would be in danger. Without delay, our government sent to Germany a note of warning, declaring in vigorous language that it would hold that country " strictly account- able" if any American vessels should be destroyed or any American lives lost. Germany's reply was evasive and unsatisfactory. It was, in effect, as follows: "Inasmuch as Great Britain has put an end to our trade by blockading our coasts, we are simply acting in self-defense." THE GREAT WAR 97 124. The Germans Torpedo and Sink the " Lusi- Many tania" (May 7, 1915). — During the next three Xnidre/are months, Germany repeatedly insulted our nation Victims 1 * by attacking and sinking American vessels and destroying American lives. But the crowning outrage — which horrified the whole country — was the sinking of the Lusitania, an English passenger vessel of the Cunard line, on May 7, 1915, near the coast of Ireland, while she was on her way from New York to Liverpool. She was attacked with- out a moment's warning and sent to the bottom by a torpedo. Of the 1,154 lives lost, 114 were Americans, among the innocent victims being many women and children. It is significant of the German method that Count von Bernstorff, the German ambassador at Washington, advertised in the New York city daily newspapers a warning in which he advised against sailing on the Lusitania. Americans re- fused to believe that this advertisement of calcu- lated and wholesale homicide was official, and sailed on the fated ship. President Wilson again sent a vigorous note of A hideous protest against this hideous and barbaric deed; deed * for, according to a law of long standing among the nations, no merchant or passenger vessel could be sunk at sea without warning and without providing for the safety of crew and passengers. 125. Germany Continues the Torpedoing of Mer- chant Vessels Without Warning. — But Germany's THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Germany's contempt for the American people Germany's empty promise answer was far from satisfactory. In fact, she showed no concern over the bitterness and indigna- tion she had aroused in America. Her contempt for the American people appeared in her authoriz- ing her submarine commanders to continue the torpedoing of merchant and passenger vessels, without warning and without giving crews and passengers a fair chance to save their lives. Within three months after the Lusitania incident, our government sent to Germany three notes of indignant protest and emphatic warning. Ger- many sent no answer but she torpedoed another vessel, the Arabic, on August 19, 1915, with the loss of two American lives. 126. Germany Promises to Sink no more Liners Without Warning. — Again our government protested with vigor. In replying, Germany expressed re- gret at the sinking of the Arabic, and declared her willingness to pay indemnities for destroying Amer- ican lives. She went still further by declaring that orders had been sent out to her submarine commanders forbidding them in future to make attacks upon neutral merchantmen which put in peril the lives of crews and passengers. She added that she would sink no more liners; that is, passenger vessels — without giving a warning before the attack, unless, of course, they resisted or tried to escape. This fair promise made a good impression upon many American people. However, it was empty, and ended where it began, for Germany's future THE GREAT WAR 99 acts showed that she did not intend to keep her word when the promise was given, and official utterances since published confirm this. 127. Germany Secretly Acts as Our Enemy in Basely many Ways. — Neglecting no opportunity, she was pi^against secretly acting as our enemy in many ways. She !^£f encan had hatched many plots against the peace, safety, and industry of the American people at home. These plots were the more basely criminal because they were largely planned and directed by the German embassy and other German officials at Washington, whose immunity from our laws and taxes and whose protection under our laws were based, like that of all other foreign representatives, on their good faith in not perpetrating offenses against the government to which they were ac- credited. Agitators were employed to foment strikes in The killing important American industries. Men who were °f innocent 8 ready for any criminal violence were engaged to ™ndcMdrln' place bombs in the holds of vessels bound for Eng- land or France, and to blow up munition factories, thus killing hundreds of innocent men, women, and children. Strong attempts were made, over and over again, to bring about serious trouble be- tween Japan and the United States. 128. The Climax of German Treachery and In- Germany trigue. — But the climax of German treachery and amancewltn intrigue against the American Government and MexlC0 the American people took place in January, 1917. 100 THE CAUSES AND MEANING German faithlessness and treachery German barbarity In a note which the German foreign minister sent to the German minister in Mexico, he proposed "an alliance on the following basis: That we shall make war together and together make peace. We shall give general financial support, and it is understood that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona." This base act, when brought to light by our State Department, aroused profound indignation throughout the United States. Many Americans who before this time had not been inclined to be- lieve in the faithlessness and treachery of Germany, now saw her in her true colors, ready to stoop to any crime, however dastardly it might be, to carry out her own selfish plots and schemes. Success being her chief aim, any method that she might employ, no matter how unscrupulous, brutal, or criminal it might appear to other nations, she considered justifiable. Her point of view was that the state — the German state, of course — could do no wrong. 129. " Frightfulness." — In fact, by her method of " frightfulness," Germany set out to make war terrible, in order to weaken her enemies through fear. It was in carrying out this policy that entire villages and towns were burned to ashes, merely because, as the Germans claimed, their soldiers were being shot down by snipers; and that hun- dreds and thousands of innocent civilians, includ- ing helpless women and children, were brutally RHEIMS CATHEDRAL .101 102 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF German submarines destroy 226 American lives Germany defies the UnitedStates and the World murdered. As we shall see, these outrages, instead of intimidating their enemies, fired them with a righteous zeal to fight for their rights. 130. Destructive Results of Germany's Submarine Policy. — Many more examples of Germany's bru- tality might easily be given, for they have become common knowledge. But it was her operations at sea that more directly affected the United States. In carrying out her submarine policy up to April 2, 1917, Germany attacked 17 American merchantmen and 23 foreign vessels which had on board American citizens, thus causing the loss of 226 American lives. 131. Germany Adopts an Unrestricted Policy of Submarine Warfare (February 1, 19 17). — Despite the repeated and earnest protests of our govern- ment regarding submarine warfare, Germany only bided her time. At last, when it seemed to her that the day of her certain victory was not far away, she became so insolent that she dared openly to defy the United States and the rest of the world. In a proclamation issued January 31, 1917, she de- clared that beginning on the following day she would adopt an unrestricted policy of submarine warfare, by sinking at sight, and without any attempt to safeguard crews and passengers, all vessels she might find in extensive areas named by her, north and west of northern Europe and in the Mediterranean Sea. Confirming this declaration the German chan- THE GREAT WAR 103 cellor announced; in an important speech, that Ger- The German many was planning to pursue her ruthless sub- shameless S marine policy with greater vigor than ever before, announce- shamelessly explaining that she had been waiting only until she should have enough submarines to make her attacks upon the enemy's commerce and the world's shipping effective. This was a revela- tion that her promise to us had been a mere sub- terfuge; it had been made with no intention of keeping it. But the last straw, which would have shamed a The last country of weaklings into war, was a note granting s raw "permission" to this great and proud nation to send one vessel weekly from New York to London, if marked in a certain way that Germany desig- nated. Humiliation could not reach a lower depth unless we were a subject province. 132. President Wilson Breaks off Diplomatic Re- lations with Germany (February 3, 19 17). — President Wilson responded to this note by at once (February 3) recalling our American ambassador at Berlin and by dismissing the German ambassador at Washington, which meant that the United States had ceased to have diplomatic relations with Ger- many. 133. The United States Enters the War (April The sinking 6, 19 1 7). — Even after taking this serious step, vessels our government was loath to go to war if it could be avoided without the loss of our honor and our self-respect. But Germany persisted in sending to 104 THE CAUSES AND MEANING "We will not choose the path of submission" Germany drives us into war the bottom ship after ship (between February 2 and April 2, 1917, eight American vessels were sunk by German submarines), thus brutally mur- dering American citizens, until at last President Wilson, in a memorable address to Congress on April 2, 1917, said: "The present submarine warfare against com- merce is a warfare against mankind. "There is one choice we cannot make. . . . We will not choose the path of submission, and suffer the most sacred rights of our people to be ignored or violated. . . . "With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking, . . . I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the imperial German Government to be, in fact, nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States." These words had only one meaning, and that was that the American people had no other choice but to take up arms in defense of their just rights as a free people. Germany had driven us into war, for she had made war upon us. She had not only injured our commerce; she had also violated sacred human rights of American citizens, which we, as a free nation, are bound to cherish and defend. Congress, therefore, on April 6, 1917, declared that a condition of war existed between the United States and Germany. The promptness and zeal with which the Ameri- From a photograph, copyright by Brown Brothers FOOD ADMINISTRATOR HOOVER 106 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Four pressing problems What our navy could do can people responded to the action of the govern- ment was a signal proof of their loyalty and pa- triotism. 134. Certain Definite Things We Could Do. — Although at that time our army was too small to be of service on European battle-fields, there were certain definite things outside the military sphere in which we could give immediate service: (1) We could loan the Allies money, so that they could buy here or elsewhere what they needed. (2) We could supply them with munitions for their armies, raw materials for their civilian workers, and food for both. (3) We could build merchant ships of suf- ficient tonnage to help carry these supplies across the ocean. (4) With our navy we could assist in fighting the submarine menace. Of all these pressing problems, that of supplying sufficient ship tonnage to insure transportation across the sea was the most important, for without its solution the other problems could not be solved. 135. The Huge Task of Providing an Adequate Army and Navy. — An increase in the supply of food, ships, munitions, and other material needs was an immediate result of our entering upon the war. The huge task, of providing an adequate army and navy required more time. 136. Pressing Need of a Large Navy; Its Rapid Increase. — Even before the declaration of war, President Wilson had ordered the navy to be in- creased as rapidly as possible to the full war strength From a photograph, copyright by Western Newspaper Union ADMIRAL SIMS 108 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Germany scornfully laughs at American preparations of 93,000. Now that we were a belligerent nation, a powerful navy was an absolute necessity, for it was our first line of defense. It was far more. It was required, as already seen, to help in destroy- ing the German submarines; also to assist in fight- ing the German high-seas fleet, if it should steam out from its hiding-place; and to act as convoys in guarding ships which transported American soldiers across the Atlantic. By midsummer of 1918, the number of men in our navy was more than three times as great as it had been when we entered the war, and the number of vessels in the American naval service had increased fourfold. 137. " Is It too Late for Our Country to Render Efficient Service on the Far- A way Battle Front? " — The most important question of all, however, when we entered the war in April, 1917, was this: Has our country made its great decision to organize for war too late to render effective service on the battle front 3,000 miles away ? Germany pre- tended to believe so, and laughed scornfully at the American preparations. She had crushed Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania, and had so badly defeated Russia that in her political and military weakness and confusion she was no longer to be counted as a factor in the conflict. Large numbers of Ger- man troops in Russia were set free for service on the western front. Confident of victory, the German high command was planning to bring the war to a close before CLEARING FOR ACTION THE FORECASTLE OF THE BATTLESHIP " MICHIGAN 1 no THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF "Too late, America!" say the Germans Two huge blunders America could organize, train, and transport over- seas armies large enough to have any effective weight upon the military decision. They said: "The American people are engrossed in material things; they are a conglomeration of many races and there- fore lacking in unity of purpose; they are pacifists and therefore will not respond to the call for military service." "But if America should raise and train her armies/ ' they continued, "the German submarine has been so destructive of shipping that these cannot be transported across the Atlantic. If, however, in some miraculous way, they could reach the battle front, such ama- teur fighters could not stand up against our Ger- man veterans." "Too late, America!" they said, in jeering tones. "You may know how to make money, but as a fighting power, you are not worthy of serious consideration." 138. Germany's Second Irreparable Blunder. — This attitude strongly reminds us of the Kaiser's remark at the beginning of the conflict, when he referred to the "contemptible little British army." Inside of eighteen months, the Kaiser and his war- lords were again to learn to their chagrin and humil- iation, as at the Marne, the error of their calcu- lation, and to be made aware that with the weight of America added to the allied cause, the hour of doom for Hohenzollern autocracy and Prussian militarism had struck. Germany made an irreparable blunder when she decided THE GREAT WAR 111 upon her unrestricted submarine policy and forced the United States into the war. It was her second huge blunder in the diplomacy of war. The viola- tion of Belgian neutrality had caused Great Britain to take up arms. The submarine warfare brought America into the war. And yet Germany was in- sane enough to be contemptuous toward the armies of both nations. 139. The American Nation Ready to Put Forth Her Congress Giant Strength. — Our people were now aroused, sefective The fire of patriotism was burning in the heart of semce law America. The nation was ready to put forth her giant strength. Germany and the world were astonished to see Congress, at the end of six weeks after our declaration of war, pass a selective ser- vice law (May 18), which was the first step toward calling to the national colors a mighty host of the young men of the country. All sections — North, South, East, and West — responded with enthusiasm by giving their loyal and earnest support to the cause which they looked upon as sacred. 140. A Stupendous Achievement. — Less than A wonderful three weeks after the passage of the Army Draft ^ s orma " Bill, nearly 10,000,000 young men of draft age, which included all who were twenty-one but not yet thirty-one, were registered (June 5, 1917).* Shortly after the selective service law was passed, * By amending the Army Draft Bill in August, 1918, and ex- tending the draft age so as to include all men from eighteen to forty-five, Congress made available for war service 13,000,000 more. 112 THE CAUSES AND MEANING 2,000,000 American troops in France Enormous destruction of allied and neutral the government began the important work of choosing and training those who were to take their places in the ranks of the army. The wonderful transformation of the manly , vigorous, and loyal young men of America into fighting forces is the great outstanding fact of the first year of the war. Never was the American genius for or- ganization more effectively shown than in the stupendous achievement of building up, training, and transporting her huge armies to the fighting line in France, 3 ; 000 miles away. When, early in April, 1917, we went to war with Germany, our army numbered only 9,500 officers and 202,600 men. A year later, the number had increased to nearly 124,000 officers and 1,529,000 men. Early in July, 1918, there were 1,019,115 overseas or on their way over. Late in the sum- mer means of transportation for 250,000 per month were provided; and before the signing of the armis- tice on November 11, 1918, there were on Euro- pean soil 2,000,000 American troops. Had the war lasted until the summer of 1919, this number would probably have risen to nearly 4,000,000. But we are ahead of our story, for in the spring of 1918 the number of American troops that had reached France was small. We had barely four divisions ready to go into battle. 141. German Military Leaders Still Hope that American Troops Will Reach France too Late. — The German military leaders still hoped — and with 114 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Our ship- building army 550,000 strong good reason, as they believed — that American troops could not reach France in time to play an effective part in determining the military decision. According to their theory, the submarines had been so destructive and would continue to be such a menace that the transportation problem could not be solved. They knew what the world learned from an official British statement made on March 21, 1918, namely, that from August, 1914, to January, 1918, 11,800,000 gross tons of allied and neutral shipping had been sunk, and that only about 6,600,000 tons had been built to take the place of the loss. They knew also that the Allies had a pressing need for every vessel that could be brought into service to transport food and other supplies for their soldiers and civil- ians. 142. Wonderful Success of Our Emergency Fleet Corporation. — But again the German high com- mand made a serious mistake in its reckoning. For our Emergency Fleet Corporation, spurred by Germany's brutal submarine policy, had organized a colossal building programme, so that by the sum- mer of 1918 there were in the United States 151 ship-building plants, with a ship-building army 550,- 000 strong. This programme was carried out with such wonderful success that by the end of July, 1918, 1,719,536 tons of shipping had been built, over 631,000 tons of which were produced in July alone. 116 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Ludendorff confident of success The routing of a British corps 143. Ludendorff's Plan for a Grand Offensive in the Spring of 19 18. — The speed of the Americans hastened the German military leaders. They planned; under the leadership of Ludendorff, who was in direct command of the German armies, a grand offensive in the spring of 1918 in order to bring about a military decision before large armies could be brought overseas from America. The break-up in Russia, as a result of the revolu- tion there, had released so many German troops that Ludendorff's armies now outnumbered those of the Allies by more than forty divisions, prob- ably not far from 600,000 men. He was there- fore confident of success'. His great offensive, stretching over a period of nearly four months, consisted of five Titanic "drives," or assaults, with the purpose of breaking through the allied line, separating the British and French armies, and capturing the Channel ports in the North, or Paris in the South. 144. The First of the German " Drives " Launched on March 21. — The first of these "drives" was launched on March 21, when Ludendorff sent 1,700,000 men in a giant assault upon the British army at the point where it touched the French lines. One of the British corps, being greatly out- numbered, was routed; and but for the unrivalled valor and self-sacrificing devotion of a small num- ber of neighboring troops, with a host of civilian engineers, transport, and ambulance men, and the GENERAL VON LUDENDORFF 118 THE CAUSES AND MEANING General Foch in supreme command N like, who rushed into the gap between the two armies of the Allies and stayed the on-rushing Germans until reserve forces could save the situ- ation, the Allies might have met with supreme disaster. For if LudendorfFs men had separated the French from the English, he might perhaps have crushed each army in turn, captured Paris, and most likely one or more of the Channel ports. With the military mastery of the Continent, he could then have devoted his entire attention to England. 145. Darkest Days of the War; Two Results of the Bitter Experience. — The days following this first German " drive" of 1918 were the darkest of the war for the Allies. But the bitter experience had two re- sults, which conjointly were destined to beat Ger- many to her knees. The first was the putting of a single head — it was General Foch, the brilliant French leader — in supreme command of the allied armies. The second was the marvellous rapidity with which American troops were transported across the Atlantic to the western front. For this colossal achievement, which astounded Germany, and, in fact, the whole world, great credit is due to British shipping, which carried over more than half of the troops. 146. American Soldiers Halt the German Advance at Chateau-Thierry. — In the third German drive, be- ginning May 27, which aimed to capture Paris, the American troops played a conspicuous part in 120 THE CAUSES AND MEANING blocking the progress of the German army at Chateau-Thierry, a town which stands at a bend of the Marne River. It was on this battle-field that American soldiers not only halted the advance of the picked German troops, who, flushed with recent victory, were sweeping forward toward Paris, but forced them to give ground. Heroism To the American marines and the American Americans troops fell the honor of holding back the German drive at the point where the assault was the fiercest. And they did it with a heroism which has never been surpassed in the annals of warfare. Their valor was as memorable as that of Leonidas and his Spartan band at Thermopylae many cen- turies ago. The The American marines — who met the enemy in \f mTrlnes fight Belleau Wood in this battle of Chateau-Thierry— a°fms? y began the deadly struggle on June 2, a struggle superior which caused the loss, either in killed or seriously wounded, of more than half their entire force of 8,000 men. For almost an entire month they fought, every man a hero. For days at a time they went without rest except when they were so ex- hausted that they fell asleep at their posts. Often, also, they went for days without hot rations, some- times with no food at all for a whole day and some- times for long periods without water. But out- numbered though they were — three, four, and even five to one — they fought doggedly on, week after week, until they had cleared Belleau Wood of From a photograph copyright by Brown Brotners MARSHAL FOCH enters the war 122 THE CAUSES AND MEANING every German soldier. This was about the end of June. 147. The American Soldiers at Chateau-Thierry Truly Represent the Fighting Qualities of the Entire American Army. — In this heroic struggle at Chateau- Thierry, the marines and the other American sol- diers truly represented the fighting qualities of the entire American army; and their remarkable achievement had unmeasured value, for the battle of Chateau-Thierry has been called the turning- point of the war. Why Italy 148. Italy Enters the War. — During this Titanic struggle on the western front, the Austrians, in the summer of 1918, made a great assault upon the Italian armies stretching along the Piave River in northern Italy. Italy had entered the conflict on the side of the Allies by declaring war upon Austria, in May, 1915, and in the summer of 1916 upon Germany also. Her direct object was to annex certain neigh- boring territory. She had two reasons for this and both were patriotic. One was to reclaim territory to the north of the Alps called Italia Irredenta and thereby to include in her nation a large number of Italians who were unhappy under Austrian rule. The other was to strengthen her boundaries against Austrian attack, which from now on meant German attack also, for Austria had become virtually a German vassal. Austria, in granting northern Italy a grudging GENERAL CADORNA 124 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF independence years before, had purposely fixed the boundaries so that she could at any time overrun Italy, while Italy could not harm her; and her Adriatic coast stretched opposite a large part of MAP OF ITALIAN CAMPAIGN The Italians advance into Austrian territory but are driven back Italy, with strong naval bases from which raids could easily be made upon the Italian coast. By entering the war Italy hoped not only to get rid of these dangers but also to give substantial aid to the other Allies by keeping great Austrian armies from re- inforcing Germany on the western front. 149. The Italian Army Advances into Austrian Terri- tory; It Is Driven Back in the Autumn of 19 17. — In the early stages of their fighting the Italian armies under General Cadorna, though they had to force THE GREAT WAR 125 a passage over high steep mountains, or along the slippery surfaces of massive glaciers, slowly and with remarkable skill fought their way a consider- able distance into Austrian territory; and later threatened to pierce to the heart of Croatia, which hated its Hungarian rulers, rouse it to revolt, and so lay open the Hungarian plain to attack, taking Austria in the rear. But in. the autumn of 1917, a huge army of Austrians and Germans caught Cador- na's left wing unguarded in the Alps, and drove them in terrible rout into the Italian plain above Venice, capturing enormous masses of men, food, guns, and munitions. They were only stayed at the Piave River near Venice by the aid of British and French reinforcements that were hurried thither. 150. The Austrian Army Meets with Supreme The Italians Disaster; Austria Surrenders. — Here in the summer Austrians of 1918 the Teuton Powers launched a last des- perate offensive to complete their work. They hoped to force Italy to abandon the war and pay them an immense indemnity, or at the least to weaken the Allies in France by making them send a large force to Italy to avert the disaster. This time the Italians under their general, Diaz, with their allied companions from the western front, routed the Austrians as thoroughly as they them- selves had been routed the year before, and seri- ously menaced with capture the entire Austrian army penned against the Alps, when Austria sur- rendered. 126 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Marshal Foch launches an irresistible counter- offensive Marshal Foch honors the American troops y — "4 151. The Allies Win a Decisive Victory at the Second Battle of the Marne. — Meanwhile, the furi- ous struggle continued on the western front. On July 15 Ludendorff began his last assault, but it was halted in three days. For on July 18 Marshal Foch launched an irresistible counter-offensive, which was not to end until the Germans capitu- lated on November 11. Again, as in September, 1914, the Marne was the scene of a decisive Ger- man defeat. Here, for a second time, heavy masses of reserve troops about which the Ger- mans had no knowledge — made possible this time by the American help — were hurled with terrific force against the German army. Disorganized and thrown into confusion, it was forced to re- treat across the Marne with heavy losses of men and guns. This second battle of the Marne was quite as decisive as the first. 152. Marshal Foch, in His Wonderful Counter- Offensive, Keeps up a Ceaseless Hammering Cam- paign. — From that day forward, for the next three or four months, Marshal Foch kept up a ceaseless hammering against the German line, striking first at one point and then at another, all the way from the Channel on the north to St. Mihiel on the south, the allied armies making a constant advance. By the last of September, the German armies were in full retreat toward their own frontiers. 153. The Americans Advance with Resistless Might as They Fight Their Way to Victory Through the Argonne Forest. — As at Chateau-Thierry, Mar- GENERAL DIAZ 128 THE CAUSES AND MEANING Two gate- ways of escape for the Germans The Americans cut the enemy's main line of communica- tion shal Foch honored the American troops by intrust- ing to them a task of supreme difficulty and of the gravest importance. They were to fight their way through the Argonne Forest, which, because of its ravines, hills, and elaborate defenses hidden from view by dense thickets, had been regarded by the Germans as impregnable, and then cut the German main line of communication in the rear. The success of this venture would bring catastrophe upon the German armies in France and in Belgium, for there were only two gateways of escape for the vast enemy hordes with the countless tons of guns and military supplies which they had been accu- mulating for more than four years. One of these gateways was at Liege, in the north, and that was too narrow. The other was at Sedan, behind the Argonne and it was the closing of this wide outlet of escape that was assigned to the Amer- icans. tt On November 2," said General Pershing, who was in command of all the American forces in France, "the advance movement became an onslaught which could not be stayed. On the 6th, a division of the First Corps reached a point on the Meuse opposite Sedan, twenty-five miles from our line of departure. The strategical goal which was our highest hope was gained. We had cut the enemy's main line of communication, and nothing but surrender or an armistice could save the army from complete disaster. v Ludendorff chose an ar- GENERAL PERSHING 130' THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF Bulgaria's armies crumple up like paper mistice, which was in fact, as it turned out, an unconditional surrender. 154. America Not too Late in Reaching the Battle Front in France. — During this great counter-attack, the Americans had thirty divisions on the battle front in the onrush for Sedan, and ten more ready to fill up the ranks, although when LudendorfT began his grand offensive in March, we had, as you will recall, but four divisions ready to go into battle. America was not too late in reaching the battle front in France. 155. Bulgaria's Surrender and Its Disastrous Effect upon the German Plans. — The supreme disaster which crushed the hopes of Germany was made plain to all by the signing of the armistice on November 11. This world event had been hast- ened by the collapse of each of her allies on other battle fronts. In September the great force of the Allies so long lying inactive at Saloniki, with their Greek and Serbian allies to the west, had suddenly moved forward in one great surge, the Allies having private advices that the Bulgarian people were sick of the war, and would not support their German king in carrying it on longer. Bul- garia's armies had crumpled up like paper; her fortresses and all her southern border had been rapidly occupied; and with the capture of all her forces but a few days off, she accepted terms of unconditional surrender, including the right of the Allies to send their armies through Bulgarian terri- tory to take Austria in the rear. THE GREAT WAR 131 Bulgaria's collapse entirely severed the commu- The end of nications between Germany and Turkey. Worse m ^encein still, it put an end to all Teutonic influence in p^J^^ 11 the Balkan Peninsula, for Serbia's small remain- ing army, already half-way toward reconquering their homeland, at once reoccupied it all; and the patriot Greeks, led by Venizelos, had already driven out their treacherous Hohenzollern queen and her pro-Hohenzollern husband. 156. The Unconditional Surrender of Turkey. — a great Moreover, the success of the British in the East SeEnjKh had driven the last nail in the coffin of German schemes in Asia. Late in September, 1918, the British army under General Allenby had in a few days, with one tremendous strategic blow, com- pletely overwhelmed the Turkish force in Syria and Palestine, capturing over 70,000 troops with the entire Turkish artillery in that region. This loss could only be replaced from Germany, as Turkey had no artillery of her own, and of course artillery could not be spared or conveyed from Germany. This made the Mesopotamian Turkish army, now cut off from all supplies, so helpless that it very shortly surrendered. The Turkish Government therefore followed its Bulgarian ally in unconditional surrender. 157. Germany, in Signing the Armistice, Makes an Germany Unconditional Surrender.— Four days later (No vem- [e^ro^hi ber 4), with her provinces in revolt and her emperor the fi fjd and on the point of flight, Austria agreed to an armistice home 132 THE CAUSES AND MEANING which was in effect unconditional surrender also. Just one week later, Germany, facing hopeless rout in the field and anarchy at home, signed a similar armistice to save her lands and cities from the horrors and atrocities which, she expected, would be visited on her in retaliation for her own de- testable deeds. At the same time, with her ac- customed hypocrisy, she boasted that her armies were unbeaten and that Germany's soil had never submitted to an invader. The Great War, so far as campaigns and battles were concerned, was at an end. CHAPTER XI A NEW WORLD Germany's 158. Bismarck and the Monroe Doctrine. — After sSemeT the war had ended in the defeat of Germany there were many revelations of facts that were previously only guessed at, and it became an easy matter to convict Germany out of her own mouth of the responsibility of bringing on the war. Long before this war broke out, Bismarck had re- ferred to the Monroe Doctrine as an " international impertinence"; and as late as 1913, one of Ger- many's most conservative writers on international problems wrote: "Considered in all its phases, the Monroe Doctrine is in the end seen to be a question of might only and not of right." This undoubtedly '£^^*pv§&&'' v I i 1 P* ^i I 1 f *v * ' '% '-Hi " " » ii ■ill 4mk "r^^B ^ — "** *4|Kg.v ; 31 3BBI BBSS ■^^■■ ; ?--'-' : - ! - t '-. J '-:*t,-,;-; ! --,- ■BBBglBiS^ . ■-■■" ■';';' .' : W '/; , ■ L * I - HH Fro?n a photograph, copyright by Underwood and Underwood PREMIER LLOYD GEORGE 134 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF meant that when Germany should become powerful enough, she would carry out her ambitious schemes in America, in defiance of the Monroe Doctrine or any other form of protest from the United States. German 159. Attitude of Germany toward the United attacking States. — Still more significant is the following America statement, made by a German diplomat to an American army officer, in the years immediately following the Spanish-American War: " About fifteen years from now my country will start her great war. She will be in Paris in about two months after the commencement of hostilities. Her move on Paris will be but a step toward her real object — the crushing of England. Everything will work like clockwork. We shall be prepared and others will not be prepared. Some months after we finish our work in Europe, we shall take New York and probably Washington, and hold them for some time. We will put your country in its place with reference to Germany. We do not purpose to take any of your territory, but we do intend to take a billion or more dollars from New York and other places." The Kaiser's One more quotation may be made here to in- toward 6 dicate the attitude of Prussianized Germany toward America the United States. "The Emperor was standing," says James W. Gerard, our ambassador to Berlin, when writing of an interview he had on October 22, 1915, "so naturally I stood also; and according to his habit ... he stood very close to me, and THE GREAT WAR 135 talked very earnestly. ... He showed, however, great bitterness toward the United States, and re- peatedly said: 'America had better look out after this war'; and 'I shall stand no nonsense from America after the war. ' " 160. Grand Scheme of German War-Lords for World-Domination. — None of these statements need surprise us. It is now certain that the German war-lords had planned, as a first step in their grand scheme of world-domination, to conquer France and Russia. Then, as they believed, Germany would become so powerful that she would be able to break up the British Empire, annex the English colonies, and force England to give up all her war- vessels. With these accretions to her strength, she would find it comparatively easy to bring under her sway the United States and all of the American Continent. It was therefore quite evident that our country what we was fighting for something more than her rights fou s htfor upon the seas. She was fighting for her rights as a free people. She was fighting to prevent Germany from making her a dependency. 161. The German Point of View. — In carrying out this ambitious scheme, the war-mad Kaiser and his followers, goaded on by the predatory in- stinct, were acting in defiance of law and of human rights. Prussia had grown in power by robbing her neighbors. The German Empire was following her example. 136 THE CAUSES AND MEANING The words of 162. The American Point of View. — The Ameri- wiison* can view-point was absolutely different. In the words of President Wilson, words that truly voice the sentiments of his countrymen, from the Atlantic to the Pacific: "What we [Americans] seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of man- kind." and Abraham This noble sentiment strongly reminds us of that expressed by Abraham Lincoln in his Gettysburg speech when he said that "government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth." The words of Contrast this American ideal of government with the Kaiser ^^ p resen t ec [ ^y William jj a ft e r he had been crowned as German Emperor: "Considering my- self as the instrument of the Lord, I go on my way . . . and so I am indifferent to the views and the opinions of the moment." Freedom or 163. Contrast Between the Ideal of Autocracy and IsTpeopie 118 that of Democracy.— This statement of the Kaiser represented the ideal of autocracy; the words of Abraham Lincoln and Woodrow Wilson express the ideal of democracy. The conflict between these two opposing ideals of government — gov- ernment of all by one and the rule of all by the people themselves — had its outward expression in the Titanic war in which more than 10,000,000 lives were blotted out, and many million more were mutilated or diseased for life. It was a war be- From a photograph copyright by Brown Brothers PREMIER CLEMENCEAU 138 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF The struggle was for the rights of all nations An enduring peace tween democracy and autocracy. It was a war whose issue was to determine whether the world should be free or should be enslaved by Germany — the last great embodiment of the barbarian prin- ciple of autocratic rule, which is an anachronism in a world where the rights of the people are respected. President Wilson declared that America was fighting to make the world safe for democracy; and Lloyd George declared : " Our real enemy is the war spirit fostered in Prussia. There will be no peace in the world until the shrine of the war spirit in Potsdam is shattered, and its priesthood is dis- persed and discredited forever." 164. The Great War a Deadly Struggle Between Civilization and Scientific Barbarism. — These two men meant practically the same thing. The world could not be made safe for democracy except by crushing Prussian militarism. It was for civiliza- tion — in its deadly struggle with scientific barbar- ism — that England; France, the United States, and the other allied Powers were fighting. It was for the rights of all nations, large or small, powerful or weak. It was for the principle that " right makes might/' against the mediaeval conception of international relations that " might makes right." 165. The Results of the Operation of Right and Justice in World Relationships. — When right and jus- tice prevail in world relationships, when small and THE GREAT WAR 139 weak nations are allowed to govern themselves, and work out their own destiny in their own way so long as they are fair to other nations, we shall have a new world. We shall not have a peace which is merely a truce between one war and another; we shall have an enduring peace, because it will be founded not only upon right and justice, law and reason, but upon friendship and good-will. Great armies and navies will then be unneces- sary, because international fears and suspicions and hatreds will be superseded by mutual trust and help- fulness and the spirit of co-operation in carrying forward the work of civilization. In our own Federal Union, the small state of safety for Rhode Island or Delaware is just as safe, politically ^weakest and economically, as great New York or Texas. P e °P les The same should be true of the smallest and weak- est peoples in the great family of nations; and such will be true, when law and reason and right and justice play the same part in international relations as they do in the relations between individual men and women in a highly civilized country like Eng- land or France or the United States. 166. Our People Willing to Make any Sacrifice Our people Because Inspired with the Sense of the Sacredness of make S any Their Cause. — Believing that the world should be sacrifice "made safe for democracy" — in Serbia, Poland, and Belgium, as well as in England, France, and the United States — our people were willing to make any sacrifice, even to the extent of billions of their 140 THE CAUSES AND MEANING OF treasure and millions of their young men, to crush the power of Prussian militarism and Hohenzollern autocracy. They believed that until this was ac- complished there could be no enduring peace. We sought no territory and no material gain of any We were kind. We were fighting, from April 6, 1917, until holy cause* 1 November 11, 1918, in a holy cause. Alive to the danger that threatened America and the world, we fought with patience and courage and stern determination until the hour of victory. Never did soldiers go to battle in a more heroic spirit. Inspired with a sense of the sacredness of their cause, the American boys were more than a match — man for man — for the finest picked troops that the German high command could lead against them. We were "all 167. Never Were We as a People so Firmly United. comrades" — Tlais same f ee j m g expressed itself in the loyal service of those at home in their encouragement and support of the American boys on battleships, on submarine destroyers, and in the trenches. Never were we as a people so firmly united. Con- fident that our cause was righteous, that we bat- tled for justice and for freedom, we were "all comrades" in a mighty struggle, shoulder to shoul- der, to win victory for our own country and for the freedom of the world. The new 168. America's Moral Leadership Among the Na- tions. — The Great War was a turning-point in history. The day of mediaeval militarism is ended, THE GREAT WAR 141 and we are entering upon a new epoch. Let us be proud and thankful that America did her share in making the New World, and that she now occupies a position of moral leadership among the nations. PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 1914 June 28 — Assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian throne, and his wife, at Serajevo, Bosnia. July 23 — Ultimatum of Austria-Hungary to Serbia. July 28 — Declaration of war on Serbia by Austria-Hungary. July 31 — Mobilization of Russian troops. Aug. 1 — Declaration of war on Russia by Germany. Aug. 2 — Declaration of war on France by Germany. Aug. 4 — Declaration of war on Germany by Great Britain, be- cause Germany refused to recognize the neutrality of Belgium. Aug. 4-26 — Invasion of Belgium by Germany. The country overrun. Aug. 6 — Declaration of war on Russia by Austria-Hungary. Aug. 10 — Declaration of war on Austria-Hungary by France. Aug. 12 — Declaration of war on Austria-Hungary by Great Bri- tain. Aug. 16 — Arrival of British Expeditionary Force in France. Aug. 21-23 — Battle of Mons-Charleroi, Belgium. Dogged retreat of French and British into France. Aug. 26 — Severe setback of Russians at Tannenberg. Aug. 26 — Conquest of Togoland, Africa, by the British and French. Aug. 28 — First big naval battle of the war at Helgoland, won by British. Sept. 5 — Treaty signed by Great Britain, France, and Rtnssia, agreeing not to make a separate peace. 143 144 PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR Sept. 6-10 — Battle of the Marne. Germans stopped in their advance toward Paris by the French, and driven back from the Marne to the Aisne River, where the battle-line remained stationary for three years. Sept. 22 — Sinking of three British armored cruisers by a German submarine. Oct. 9 — Occupation of Antwerp by Germans. Oct. 16-28 — Battle of the Yser. Germans stopped in their ad- vance by Belgians and French. Oct. 17-Nov. 17 — First battle of Ypres. Germans repulsed in their drive for the Channel ports by Belgians, French, and British. Nov. 5 — Declaration of war on Turkey by France, Great Britain, and Russia. Nov. 7 — Capture of Tsingtau by the Japanese. Nov. 10-Dec. 14 — Invasion of Serbia by Austria. Dec. 16 — Bombardment of the unfortified British towns of West Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby by German warships. Defenseless non-combatants killed. Dec. 24 — First German air-raid on England. Aug. 4-Dec. 31 — German shipping practically driven from the seas. 1915 Jan. 24 — British naval victory in the North Sea off Dogger Bank. Jan. 28 — Sinking of an American merchantman, William P. Frye, by a German cruiser, although Germany was not at war with the United States. Violation of inter- national law. Feb. 4 — Proclamation by Germany of "war zone" around the British Isles after Feb. 18. Commerce of neutrals restricted. Feb. 18 — Beginning of submarine campaign of "piracy and pil- lage" by Germany. PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 145 Feb. 19- Jan. 8, 1916 — Allied attack on the Dardanelles. Troops landed at Gallipoli finally withdrawn. Mar. 1 — Announcement of British blockade of Germany. Mar. 17 — Capture of Przemysl by Russians, strengthening their hold on Galicia. Mar. 28 — Sinking of the British steamship Falaba. Ill lives lost. First American killed by a German submarine. Apr. 17-May 17 — Second battle of Ypres. Asphyxiating gas used by Germans in violation of international law. Germans again failed to break through to the Chan- nel ports. Apr. 28 — Attack on American steamship Cushing by a German airplane. May 1 — Attack on American steamship Gulflight by German submarine. Two Americans killed. May 2 — Battle of the Dunajec. Russians compelled to retire from Galicia. May 7 — Sinking of the Cunard liner Lusitania by German sub- marine. 1,154 lives lost, including 114 Americans. Women and children killed. May 23 — Declaration of war on Austria by Italy. June 3 — Recapture of Przemysl by Austrians and Germans. July 12-Sept. 18 — Conquest of Russian Poland by the Germans. July 15 — Conquest of German Southwest Africa by the British. Aug. 4 — Capture of Warsaw by the Germans. Aug. 19 — Sinking of the White Star liner Arabic. 44 lives lost, including two Americans. Aug. 20 — Declaration of war on Turkey by Italy. Sept. 8 — Recall of Austrian ambassador demanded by United States on proof of German intrigue in the United States. Sept. 18 — Fall of Vilna. End of Russian retreat. Sept. 26-Oct. 2 — French offensive in Champagne. Oct. 6-Dec. 2 — Conquest of Serbia by Austrians, Germans, and Bulgarians. 146 PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR Dec. 10 — Dismissal by the United States of German naval and military attaches on proof of further German intrigue in the United States. 1916 Feb. 16 — Capture of Kamerun, German West Africa. Feb. 21-Nov. 3 — Siege of Verdun. Verdun, a fortified city in France, is a "military key" to the Western Front. Violent assaults were made upon it by the Germans with terrific losses of men and two of its forts were captured. Later the French regained practically all they had lost. Mar. 8 — Declaration of war on Portugal by Germany. Mar. 24 — Sinking of the cross-Channel steamer Sussex. 80 killed or wounded, including two Americans. Apr. 17 — Capture of Trebizond by Russians. Apr. 18 — Ultimatum of United States to Germany, stating that unless Germany abandoned her methods of subma- rine warfare the United States would sever diplo- matic relations. May 16- June 3 — Attack on Italians by Austrians through the Trentino, a part of "Italia Irredenta." May 31 — Naval battle off Jutland, won by British. July 1-Nov. 26 — Battle of the Somme. Failure of the Allies to drive Germans from strong positions in northern France. July 9 — Arrival of a German commercial submarine at Balti- more, in attempt to break the Allied blockade. Aug. 9 — Capture by Italians of Gorizia, an important city en route to Trieste. Aug. 27 — Declaration of war on Germany by Italy. Aug. 27 — Entrance of Rumania into the war on the side of the Allies. PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 147 Oct. 11-Jan. 15, 1917 — Invasion of Rumania by the Teutons. Dee. 12 — German peace offer. Rejected by the Allies as "empty and insincere." 1917 Jan. 10 — Statement of peace terms by Allies, demanding "resto- ration, reparations, indemnities." Jan. 31 — Announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare by Germany in violation of international law. Feb. 3 — Severance of diplomatic relations between the United States and Germany, and dismissal of the German ambassador. Feb. 24 — Reoccupation of Kut-el-Amara by the British. Feb. 28 — Publication of a note from Germany to Mexico, reveal- ing Germany's plan for an alliance with Mexico and a Mexican invasion of the United States. The Presi- dent of Mexico was to secure Japan's consent to these plans and mediate for a peace between Germany and Japan. Japan at once denied any connection with these schemes. Mar. 11 — Capture of Bagdad by British. Mar. 11-15 — Revolution in Russia. Czar forced to abdicate. Mar. 12 — Announcement of "armed neutrality" by the United States. American merchantmen armed for defense only. Mar. 17-19 — Retirement of Germans on the West Front to the "Hindenburg Line," a stronger line of defense. Apr. 6 — Declaration of war on Germany by the United States. Apr. 9-May 14 — Battle of Arras. British pursued retreating Germans and captured Vimy Ridge, threatening Lens. Apr. 16-May 6 — Battle of the Aisne. French dislodged Germans from strong positions held by them since the Battle of the Marne. May 4 — Great Italian offensive on Carso plateau. 148 PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR May 15-Sept. 15 — Arrival of American destroyers in the "war zone." Co-operation with Allied navies. May 18 — Enactment of the Selective Draft Law in the United States. June 15— First Liberty Loan. $2,000,000,000 offered. $3,035,- 226,850 subscribed. June 26 — Arrival of first American Expeditionary Force in France. General Pershing in command. July 31 — Beginning of great British and French offensive in Flanders. Aug. 19 — New Italian drive on Carso plateau. Aug. 27 — President's reply to Papal peace overtures, stating aims of United States in the war — necessity of ending Ger- man militarism to insure permanent peace. Reply endorsed by Allies. Sept. 13 — Capture of Riga, Russia, by Germans. Oct. 26-Dec. 30 — Great German-Austrian counter-attack on Italians on Carso plateau, driving them back into Italy. Venice saved by Italian defense holding the enemy at the Piave River. Oct. 26 — Declaration of war on Germany by Brazil. Oct. 27— Second Liberty Loan. $3,000,000,000 offered. $4,617,- 532,300 subscribed. Nov. 7 — Overthrow of Kerensky and the Provisional Govern- ment of Russia by the Bolsheviki. Nov. 22-Dec. 13 — Battle of Cambrai. Initial British gains some- what cancelled by later successful German counter- attacks. Dec. 7 — Declaration of war on Austria-Hungary by United States. Dec. 9 — Capture of Jerusalem by the British. Dec. 10 — Conquest of German East Africa by the British. Dec. 23 — Peace negotiations between Germany and Russia. Armistice signed between Germany and the- Bolshe- viki. PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 149 Dec. 26 — Management of the railroads in the United States taken over by the United States Government. 1918 Jan. 31 — United States troops in first-line trenches in France. Feb. 5 — Sinking of British steamer Tuscania, a transport for United States troops. 212 Americans lost. Feb. 9 — Treaty of peace, Germany and Ukraine. Feb. 10 — Withdrawal of Russia from the war. Feb. 11 — Demobilization of Russian troops. Feb. 17 — Renewal of Italian campaign against Austrian invaders. Mar. 3 — Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Germany and Russia. Mar. 5 — Treaty of Bucharest, Germany and Rumania. Mar. 21 — Beginning of new German offensive on West Front for distance of 150 miles. Battle of Picardy. Bom- bardment of Paris by German long-range guns. Mar. 28 — Appointment of General Ferdinand Foch as Generalis- simo of all the Allied forces on the West Front. Mar. 29 — Brigading of Americans with French and British troops on West Front. Apr. 6— Third Liberty Loan. $3,000,000,000 offered. $4,170,- 019,650 subscribed. Apr. 11 — Control of principal coastwise steamship lines taken over by LTnited States Government. Apr. 19 — Arrival of Italian troops on the West Front. Apr. 23 — Successful raid on German submarine bases at Ostend and Zeebrugge by British and French. Both har- bors blocked. Apr. 29 — Section of French line on West Front taken over by United States troops. May 25 — Beginning of German submarine raids on shipping in waters off the eastern coast of the United States. May 27 — Resumption of German offensive on West Front. 150 PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR May 28 — Capture of Cantigny by United States troops. June 5 — Advance of Germans toward Paris again stopped at the Marne. June 15 — Austrian offensive against Italians for distance of 97 miles from Asiago to the sea. June 23 — Withdrawal of Austrian troops across the Piave. Fail- ure of offensive. July 9-11 — Successful Allied advance in Albania. July 15 — German offensive on 60-mile front from Chateau-Thierry nearly to the Argonne. July 15 — Occupation of Murman coast by British and American troops. July 18-Aug. 15 — Counter-offensive by French and Americans from the Aisne to the Marne. Capture of Chateau- Thierry. Elimination of Marne salient. Aug. 1 — Control of all telegraph and telephone systems taken over by United States Government. Aug. 8-Sept. 18 — Elimination of salients pointing toward Amiens, Compiegne, and Ypres by Allies. Retreat of Germans to, and, in some places, beyond the Hin- denburg line. Aug. 15 — Landing of American troops at Vladivostok. Sept. 3 — Recognition by the United States of Czecho-Slovaks as a belligerent nation. Sept. 6 — Retreat of Germans on 90-mile front from the Aisne to Cambrai. Sept. 11 — Landing of American troops at Archangel. Sept. 12 — Registration for war service of men from 18 to 45 years of age not previously registered, throughout the United States. Sept. 12-14 — First independent American offensive. St. Mihiel salient, held by the Germans for four years, wiped out. Front in Lorraine established and Metz threat- ened by Americans and French. PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR 151 Sept. 14 — British advance toward Cambrai and St. Quentin. Sept. 18 — Allied advance in Macedonia against Bulgarians. Sept. 19-27 — British and French forces in Palestine, assisted by Arabs, destroy Turkish army. Sept. 21 — British break the Hindenburg line. Sept. 26 — Americans attack between the Meuse and the Aisne Rivers on 20-mile front and break through Hinden- burg line for several miles. Sept. 27 — Bulgaria asks for an armistice. Sept. 28 — Belgians begin attack in Flanders. French, English, and Americans press their attacks along whole front with success. Sept. 28— Fourth Liberty Loan. $6,000,000,000 offered. $6,989,- 047,000 subscribed. Sept. 29 — Armistice is signed with Bulgaria. Oct. 1 — Damascus is occupied by British and Arabs. Oct. 2 — Germans begin extensive retirement from • Northern France. Oct. 2 — Bulgarians evacuate Serbia. Oct. 3 — Austrians withdraw from Albania. Oct. 4 — King Ferdinand of Bulgaria abdicates. Oct. 5 — Austria-Hungary appeals to President Wilson accept- ing his peace principles and proposing armistice and peace parley. Oct. 8 — President Wilson replies, asking if his terms are fully accepted and if the chancellor speaks for the people. Oct. 8 — Turkey asks for peace. Oct. 17 — Hungarian Parliament declares independence of Hun- gary. Oct. 24 — Allied forces begin great offensive between the Brenta and Piave Rivers in Italy. Oct. 29 — Formation of a Czecho-Slovak Republic is announced. Oct. 30 — Insurrection in Budapest. People and troops proclaim Hungarian Republic. 152 PRINCIPAL EVENTS OF THE WAR Oct. 31 — Turkey signs armistice. Oct. 31 — Austria asks for armistice. Oct. 31 — Kingdom of Great Serbia, including Bosnia and Herzo- govina, proclaimed. Nov. 1 — Americans attack on wide front north of Verdun. Nov. 2 — King Boris of Bulgaria abdicates and Peasant Govern- ment is formed. Nov. 3 — Formation of Jugoslav Republic is announced. Nov. 3 — Austria signs armistice. Nov. 5 — American Government notifies German Government that Allies are willing to arrange armistice on Presi- dent Wilson's principles. Nov. 7 — Americans take Sedan, breaking main supply line of German Army. Nov. 9 — Kaiser and Crown Prince abdicate. Nov. 11 — Germany signs armistice. 1919 June 28 — -Germany signs Treaty of Peace. INDEX Adrianople, 56 Adriatic, 88 Albania, 46, 52, 53 Albert, King, 63, 76 Allenby, General, 131 Alsace-Lorraine, 8, 11 Arabic, the, 98 Arbitration, 28 Argonne Forest, 128 Asia Minor, 39, 52 Austria, 3, 4, 6, 60, 66, 67, 87; see Austria-Hungary Austria-Hungary, 14, 45, 49, 52, 57-60, 62, 63, 88 Balfour, Foreign Secretary, 69 Balkan Peninsula, 48, 49, 60 Balkan States, 43, 45, 46, 49, 53 Balkan Wars, 51-59 Beatty, Admiral, 89, 92 Belgium, 70, 72, 79, 80, 93 Berlin, 88 Berlin to Bagdad Railway, 40, 42, 43, 60 Bernhardi, 24, 25, 28, 29, 33 Bernstorff, German ambassador, 97 Bethmann-Hollweg, von, Chan- cellor, 28, 70, 71 Bismarck, Otto von, 4, 5, 9, 10, 14, 15, 18, 22, 27, 31, 32, 132 Bosnia, 46, 48, 49, 50, 59, 66 Bosporus, 86, 87 British navy, 88 Brussels, 72 Bulgaria, 6, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58, 86, 88, 130, 131 Cadorna, General, 123, 124 Carpathian Mountains, 88 Cathedral, Rheims, 101 Chateau-Thierry, battle of, 118- 120 Clemenceau, Premier, 137 Colonies, German, 32-36 Constantinople, 48, 49, 85, 88 Dardanelles, 48, 86, 87 Denmark, war with, 5 Diaz, General, 125, 127 - Divine Mission, Germany's, 36, 37 Draft, Army, Bill, 111 Dunajec, battle of the, 81, 82 Edward, King, 28, 49 England, 20-31, 36, 40, 67, 71, 86 Expansion, movement of, 32 Fleet, Emergency, Corpora- tion, 114 Foch, Marshal, 118, 121, 126, 128 France, 7, 8, 22, 23, 67, 70, 82 Francis Ferdinand, assassinated, 64 Franco-Prussian War, 7, 8, 26 "Frightf ulness," German, 100 Galicia, 79, 80 Gallipoli, 87 George, Lloyd, 133, 138 Gerard, Ambassador, 134 German Emperor, 9, 15 German Empire, 10-15 Germany, 3, 5, 10, 13, 18, 20-31, 56, 57, 60, 62, 69, 86, 88, 96-104 Great Britain, 20, 96, 111 Greece, 51, 53, 56, 86 Greeks, 46 Grey, Sir Edward, 65 Hague, The, 27 Hamburg to the Persian Gulf scheme, 40, 42 Heine, the poet, 36 Herzegovina, 46, 48, 49, 50, 59 Hoover, Food Administrator, 105 India, 86 "Influence, sphere of," 32, 35 Italy, 2, 14, 122-125 Jellicoe, Admiral, 91 Joffre, General, 76-77 153 154 INDEX Jugo-Slavs, 59, 60, 62, 63 Tnnkprs 1 Jutland,' battle of, 90, 91 Kaiser, 15-20, 22, 24, 30, 41, 50, 74, 80, 134 Kiauchau, 32 Kiel Canal, 12, 68, 89 Kiel Harbor, 89 Kitchener, Lord, 95 Kluck, von, General, 76 Kultur, 24 Liege, 72, 128 Lincoln, Abraham, 136 Lorraine, 8 Louvain, 72, 73 Ludendorff, General, 116, 117, 128 Lusitania, sunk, 97 Macedonia, 50, 58 Magyars, 59, 60 Maps : Snowing Berlin to Bagdad Railroad, 41; showing Balkan States, 57; route of the Ger- man armies through Belgium, 74; showing western front, 78; the Eastern theatre of the war, 81; the Turkish theatre of the war, 84; map of Italian cam- paign, 124 Marne, battle of the, 76, 77, 126 Maunoury, General, 78 Mesopotamia, 26, 39, 52 Militarism, 50 Monroe Doctrine, 132 Mons, 76 Montenegro, 57, 59 Morocco, 43, 44 Moslems, 41 Munster, Count, 27 Namur, 76 National unity, 2, 3 Neutral trade, 94, 96 Pan-Germanism, 38, 40, 42, 44, 52, 58, 61 Paris, 8 Pershing, General, 128, 129 Persia, 86 Piave River, 122, 125 Potsdam Conference, 64 Powers, the five great, 2 Prussia, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 135 Rumania, 56, 88 Russia, 22, 23, 46, 48, 49, 66, 67, 68, 79, 86 Saloniki, 130 Scheer, von Admiral, 90 Schleswig-Holstein, 12 "Scrap of paper," 71 Sedan, 128 Selective Service law, 111 Serajevo, assassination at, 64 Serbia, 41, 48, 51, 52, 53, 58-60, 62, 64-66, 87, 88 Serbians, 46, 51 Ship-building in the United States, 114 Sims, Admiral, 167 Submarine warfare, 97-104, 114 Suez Canal, 86 Sultan, the, 41 Tannenberg, battle of, 79 Teutonic Powers, 52 Transylvania, 88 Treitschke, 24, 25 Triple Alliance, 14, 22 Triple Entente, 22, 23 Turkey, 51, 58, 84, 85, 131 Turkish Empire, 39, 40, 88 Turks, 51, 62 United States, 92, 93, 94, 99, 100, 103, 104, 134, 135 Verdun, battle of, 82-84 Victor Emmanuel, 3 Wars: with Denmark, 6; with Austria, 6; Franco-Prussian War, 7 White, Andrew D., 27 William I, 4 William II, 15-17, 39, 58, 63, 70, 136 Wilson, President, 92, 104, 106, 136, 138