\ '^^P" /% \W^"' /\ '^™^' ^^'"'^<^ '^^ "-^^o^ f -f^Jrfe;* THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY. 1870-1914 BY CLARA EVE SCHIEBER A Summary of a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Clark University, Worcester, Mass., in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Accepted on the Recommendation of George H. Blakeslee Reprinted from The Journal of International Relations Vol. 12, No. 1, .July, 1921 THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY. 1870-1914 BT CLARA EVE SCHIEBER A Summary of a Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Clark University, Worcester, Mass., in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy and Accepted on the Recommendation of George H. Blakeslee Reprinted from The Journal of International Relations Vol. 12, No. 1, July, 1921 Reprinted from Journal op International Relations Vol. 12, No. 1, July, 1921 THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN SENTI- MENT TOWARDS GERMANY, 1870-19141 By Clara Eve Schieber, Ph.D., Professor of History, King- fisher College, Kingfisher, Oklahoma I. Introductory This article will attempt to give a concise account of the changes in the attitude of the United States towards Ger- many from 1870 to the outbreak of the world war. In 1870 the sympathies of the United States were unquestionably with Germany. During the half century which followed our sentiment had gradually changed, so that in 1914 the pre- vailing attitude in this country was anti-German. The alteration of our attitude came about as the result of a series of diplomatic and commercial incidents and certain definite tendencies in Germanic policy, culture and society which aroused the fears and suspicions of Americans. It will be the purpose of this article to describe briefly the nature of the changes in the American feeling towards Germany, to- gether with the causes for these transformations. II. American Opinion with Respect to the Franco- Prussian War of 1870-1871 1 . The background of American sympathy for Gerinany in 1 870 Much has been made in the last seven years of the "wrong done to France" by Germany in 1870, which President Wilson held must be righted as one of the results of the world war. On the contrary the American attitude in 1870 was that no wrong had been done to France by either the war or the taking of Alsace-Lorraine. Rather, the American public ^ This article is a condensation of a more elaborate study of the same title submitted as a Ph.D. dissertation at Clark University, 1920. 50 .-. : Gift AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 51 agreed with a recent expression of opinion by Clemenceau that the wrongs done in 1870 were those committed by the French." It is interesting to consider why we should have entertained this attitude a half century ago. The Germans in the United States in the thirties and for- ties had tended to be radicals and supporters of liberal policies in this country. The German element in the Free Soil Party was a large one. The United States sympathized with the aspirations of the German liberals in 1848, and this attitude was notably forwarded by the exiles from that group who took refuge here after the collapse of the liberal move- ment. Germany, along with Russia, had been the chief European sympathizer with the North in the Civil War The conspicuous fairness of the Prince Consort of England in the early part of the Civil War called attention to his German extraction. German universities were the center of the world's intellectual life at that time, and Americans recog- nized the German hegemony in scholarship and were be- ginning that notable academic hegira to Germany which lasted for a generation. Finally, the German aspiration for national unity naturally appealed to a nation which had just passed through a great conflict to achieve a similar aim. On the other hand there were equally obvious reasons why the United States was suspicious and fearful of France in 1870. The dupHcity and oppression of the first Napoleon between 1800 and 1815 had not been forgotton, and the ruler of France in 1870 was a Bonaparte. The policy of Napoleon III had been one of autocracy, mihtarism and im- perialism. It had come home to us in the invasion of Mexico in 1861 and the years immediately following. There was a very general feeling that the Franco-Prussian War was a product of his aggressive and domineering action and that his dynasty and supporters were in great need of such salu- tary disciphne as would be furnished by a stinging defeat at the hands of Prussia. We now know that they were wrong in attributing the French responsibility for the war to Napoleon rather than to Gramont and Eugenie.^ 2 Saturday Evening Post, March 12, 1921. 3 Gorce, Histoire du Second Empire, vols, vi-vii; Sorel, Histoire diplo- matique de la guerre jranco-allemandc. 52 CLAKA EVE SCHIEBER 2. American sympathy with Germany in 1870-71 George Bancroft, our minister to Germany in 1870, well expressed the current pro-German opinion in a letter written to Secretary of State Hamilton Fish : Our foreign political interests almost always run parallel with those of Germany, and are often in direct conflict with those of France. Bismarck and the King were true to our union during our Civil War — when France took sides against us, Germany respected the independence of Mexico; the French supported the Austrian adventurer Bismarck loves to give the United States prominence in the eyes of Europe as a balance to Great Britian. If we need the solid, trusty good will of any government in Europe, we can have it best with Germany; because German institutions and ours most nearly resemble each other, and because so many millions of Germans have become our countrymen. This war will leave Germany the most powerful state in Europe, and the most free; its friendship, is, therefore, most important to us ; and has its foundations in history and in nature. The more I learn of the present condition of France, the more deeply does the country seem to have been injured by the corrupting, wasteful and immoral government of Louis Napoleon.^ Our minister to France, Elihu B. Washburne, lays the blame for the Franco-Prussian war squarely upon France and claims that it was brought about to strengthen the dynastic future of the Bonaparte line." Charles Sumner, chairman of the conamittee on foreign relations of the senate of the United States, made a vigorous speech on "The Duel between France and Germany," in which he vigorously condemned the former: Considering the age, and the present demands of civiHzation such a war stands forth terrific in wrong, making the soul rise indignant against it It is a war of pretexts, the real object being the humihation and dismemberment of Germany, in the vain hope of exalting the French Empire and perpetrating a bauble crown on the head of a boy. By a military success and a peace dictated at BerHn, the Emperor trusted to find himseK in such condition, that, on return to Paris, he could overthrow parhamentary government so far as it existed there, and reestab- lish personal government, where all depended on himseK — thus making triumph over Germany the means of another triumph over the French people.® * Howe, lAje and Letters of George Bancroft, pp. 246-7. ^ Washburne, Elihu B. Recollections, p. 33. * The Duel between France and Germaiiy, pp. 266-7. AMEKICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 53 The newspapers of the country were overwhelmingly in favor of Germany. Only the JSew York World and the Boston Post were consistently pro-French. Perhaps the most notably pro-German periodical in the country was Har- per's Weekly. The New York Times stated that The attempt of France to entice Prussia into war is a crime which has no counterpart since the partition of Poland. France seems doomed to defeat and she will have to thank the Emperor for the humiliation.'' The Boston Herald held that Napoleon was chagrined by the advance of Prussia to the head of European powers. He knew his dynasty was weak and hoped by a victory over Prussia to place himself more firmly in his seat. He seized the first pretext — a. flimsy affair — and went in.^ The New York Tribune contended that Napoleon threatens hostilities on perfectly insuflacient grounds . . . Neither abstract justice, nor present expediency, nor the historic policy of his own realm, justifies him in the course he now pursues.^ The Springfield Republican raised the query What is the war all about? The sad answer must be the old one: the ambitions of kings, the lust of conquest and the folly of the people The moral enormity of precipitating war at the present time is unspeakable, and the guilt of it will rest wholly with Louis Napoleon.^" The Chicago Daily Tribune maintained that France wars at a mere pretence Napoleon wanted war. The united sense of mankind is. that the ruler who precipi- tates war without a cause is the greatest of criminals and wholly unfit to preside over the destinies of any nation.^^ The Independent was particularly bitter in its indictment of Louis Napoleon: If there is one man in Europe who has outlived his day, who belongs not to the present but to the past, who is a charlatan ■> July 28, 1870. « November 3, 1870. 9 July 12, 1870. 10 July 12, 1870. " July 20, 1870. 54 CLAEA EVE SCHIEBER instead of a statesman, a usurper instead of a rightful prince, that man is Louis Napoleon. Every drop of blood now flowing in Europe adds a new stain to his name. He is responsible, and he alone, for this upheaval of the volcano of war. It was he, and he only, who made a causeless attack upon a great nation that would not draw a sword except in self-defence. God pity the French people, but overthrow the French Emperor.^^ When will Heaven rid the earth of the last vestige of the Bona- partes? If France suffers him, or any of his name, to remain on her soil after this last crowning crime, she will deserve no pity for all she has suffered or all that she may yet suffer at his hands. She will show herself fit only to be the slave of such a master.^^ The New York World, on the contrary, insisted that The government of Prussia has become the most autocratic in Europe The objection of the French Emperor to a Prussian prince on the throne of Spain is perfectly valid. . . France would need a large standing army if a Hohenzollern were on the throne of Spain. France would be between two Hohenzollerns.^* Likewise the Boston Post charged that The war is of Bismarck's making. . . . It is a war between Liberalism and despotism. , . Napoleon has kept France in the path of progress Prussia is a military govern- ment in the strictest sense. The king lays his iron hand on his people in their very cradles, and keeps it there with a tight grip till they go to their graves. . . The Prussian soldier fights for his king, not for his country.^^ The newspapers of the country were exultant over the crushing defeat of the French. They hailed it as a salu- tary lesson to any state which would ruthlessly and need- lessly break the peace of Europe. They criticized the aggressiveness and militarism that lay beneath it all. Yet sympathy was expressed for the French people, while Ger- man unity and the promise of French republicanism were extolled. There was practically no criticism of the indem- nity of five billion francs and but little critical comment on the taking of Alsace-Lorraine. Most papers regarded them as the legitimate spoils of war and some influential papers 12 August 18, 1870. " September 8, 1870. " July 16, 20, 1870. 15 July 13, 18, 1870. AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 55 claimed that they really belonged to Germany, from whom France wrested them by force. The Springfield Republican said that The provinces that France made the stepping stones to her assaults on Germany were once German and are in every sense stolen property. They ought to go for something in the settlement of the account The present sufferings of France are her best hopes for the future. She needs to feel through her humiliation her wrong-doing.^^ The Philadelphia Inquirer remarked that France must be prepared to suffer the loss of Alsace and Lor- raine. They seem naturally to belong to Germany rather than to France. They were formerly a part of Germany and speak a German dialect.^^ The majority of the press, thus, agreed with the majority of the statesmen in expressing their sympathy for Germany in the Franco-Prussian War because (1) German-Americans had rendered splendid service in the Union army during the Civil War; while France had aided the Confederacy and attempted intervention in Mexico; (2) Germany was be- lieved to have fought a defensive war, while France was the aggressor and brought Europe into a great war for a mere dynastic ambition and on a flimsy pretext; (3) the war was for German unity against French imperialism and militarism; (4) Germany had succeeded in overthrowing the feared and distrusted Napoleonic despotism and aided the French re- publicans. It will be the task of the remainder of this article to show how this evident cordial friendliness to Germany in 1870-71 turned to suspicion and fear, if not positive dishke. " October 24, 1870. " September 23, 1871. 56 CLARA EVE SCHIEBER III. The Progress of Anti-German Sentiment in the United States Since 1871 1. The historical background of German-American Relor- lions, 1870-1914- In produciDg the growing ill-feeling between Germany and the United States since 1870 several factors stand out most prominently. First, Germany went rapidly through a great industrial revolution which created a need for more markets and helped to stimulate the movement towards colonization and Weltpolitik. Then Bismarck succeeded in Prussianizing the empire and welding it into an autocratic and militaristic unity. These developments might not have been as noticeable or as potent in leading to foreign suspi- cion had the policy remained under the control of Bismarck until 1914. It was Germany's misfortune to be ruled after 1888 by an emperor who took things into his own hands and became the publicity agent of the new Germanic tendencies. By his ill-considered and hasty utterances he served to make Germany's aggressiveness seem worse than it really was and to arouse suspicions that otherwise would have remained dormant. In short, the kaiser, the industrial revolution, and the resulting nationalism and imperiahsm served to create the pattern of German behavior and international reputation which lost for her the good-will of the United States. Finally, it must not be forgotten that after 1890 we also entered fairly enthusiastically into the fasionable expansionist policy and naturally came into conflict with German counter ambitions. ^^ 2. The Samoan controversy There is no more telUng indictment of war than the proof that a great conflict may be generated by a most petty dis- pute. It is little known that a war was imminent between 18 W. H. Dawson, The Evolution of Modern Germany; and The German Empire, vol. ii; A. Zimmermann, Geschichte der deutschen Kolonialpolitik; C. Gauss, The German Emperor as shown in his Public Utterances; W. Weyl, American World Policies. AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 57 Great Britain, Germany and the United States in 1889 over the insignificant Samoan islands and was averted only through a storm which destroyed the rival warships. In 1872 the Samoan islanders petitioned the United States for annexation. This was rejected, but by a treaty of 1878 the United States, in return for a Samoan port, a coaling station, and a naval base, agreed to mediate between the Samoans and other countries. Germany and Great Britain soon obtained similar concessions and these led to conflicting claims and pretensions, which were intensified by the acts and statements of indiscreet and often unwise consuls. A conference held in June- July, 1887, failed because Ger- many insisted on ascendency in the Samoan islands. She then proceeded to violate existing agreements and to advance her interests by force. War seemed imminent. Secretary of State Bayard informed our minister at Berlin that ^'the course taken by Germany in respect to Samoa cannot be regarded as having been marked by that just considera- tion which the ancient friendship between the United States and Germany entitled this government to expect, "i® The Pacific Coast papers vigorously attacked the German action in Samoa, declaring that Germany was a plain highwayman and that her treatment of the natives was atrocious.2o When it seemed as though hostilities could not be averted a tjrphoon destroyed the warships of the contending powers in the Samoan islands on March 16-17, 1889. Bismarck took advantage of the enforced lull in active operations in this region to call a conference of the powers concerned, which met in Berlin in April, 1889. A treaty which satisfied the United States was signed on June 14, 1889. During the next decade there was much friction and Germany was accused of failing to abide by her agreements, but the matter was finally adjusted by the treaty of December 2, 1899. The American press was nearly unanimous in condemning the attitude and activities of Germany in the Samoan " Foreign Relations of the United States, 1888, Part I, p. 607. 2" San Francisco Chronicle, November 26, 1888; San Francisco Examiner, November 27. 1888. 58 CLARA EVE SCHIEBER islands, though some Republican papers attempted to make political capital out of the situation by attributing the trouble to Democratic bungling in diplomacy. The opinion of the Boston Transcript is typical of this criticism and distrust of Germany: It will be difficult for Germany to disprove the suspicion that all this trouble in Samoa has been worked in Samoa on plans mapped out in Berlin. Unless the consul has gone mad, it is impossible to believe that his high-handed proceedings were undertaken without some foreknowledge or secret approval by his government.21 The New York Evening Post, with its strong anti-imperial- istic trend, criticised the United States for interfering in Samoa and recommended American withdrawal from all parts of Samoa except the port of Pago Pago: The Americans have one more evidence of what "empire building" means. It means shelling defenceless native villages, making our flag the symbol of high-handed interference, and converting us into the oppressor of all nations, instead of the refuge of the oppressed. ^^ While the Samoan crisis passed without any serious results, it is significant as marking the first definite friction with Germany and the earliest appearance of any gen- eral American sentiment of distrust and suspicion against Germany. 3. The German participation in the partition of China In November, 1897, the exasperated Chinese killed two German Catholic missionaries in the Shantung peninsula. Though the kaiser was not noted for his love of the German Catholics at home, he quickly beheld in these two slain missionaries his "dear brothers in Christ" and made use of this incident to obtain one of the most enviable of the modem concessions in China. Without waiting for China to be persuaded to make this grant, the Germans forced her to concede a ninety-nine year lease of the port of Kiao-Chau and the economic exploitation of the rich and populous " April 20, 1889. " April 6, 1889. AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 59 Shantung peninsula. The Chinese were extremely bitter over the extortion but could do nothing until the Boxer Uprising in 1900, when they murdered the German minister at Pekin. Germany retaliated in a savage manner. In despatching troops to the Orient the kaiser made his famous speech directing them to emulate the Huns and "give no quarter, spare nobody, make no prisoners. Use your wea- pons so that for a thousand years hence no Chinaman will dare to look askance at any German. Open the way for civilization once for all." The German aggressiveness in leading the allied forces of reprisal and their large indemnity further served to bring them into disrepute with the more moderately minded Americans. The American press was suspicious of the German inter- vention in Shantung and clearly recognized the impulse of Weltpolitik in the Kaiser's solicitude for his slain Cathohc brethren. 23 We had ourselves now begun an active expan- sionist policy and had acquired interests in the Orient — the Philippine Islands. Our press was beginning to take the cue from the commercial and expansionist interests. The Cleve- land Plain Dealer warned us that It is of considerable matter to the United States what becomes of China and how the old empire is parcelled out, because the present volume of the trade of the United States with China represents more than one-seventh of the trade of the empire. ^^ The Chicago Tribune expresses an opinion which was typical of the tenor of the American press : German}' was simply awaiting a pretext to occupy a portion of territory belonging to the Celestial Empire. Germany has always been anxious to obtain territory in the Far East. Her citizens were especially anxious that the black, white and red flag should wave over a section of China, and their Government seeing an opportunity growing out of the murder of the two missionaries promptly seized it It will require a more adroit player than the German kaiser to "conceal his hand. "25 The deep personal interest the Kaiser professes in the fate of the missionaries whose murder furnishes the occasion for the " See notes 25 and 26 below. " May 24, 1898. " November 26. 1897. 60 CLAKA EVE SCHIEBER display of arbitrary power against a foreign nation will be widely regarded as a transparent "fake."^^ The fiery utterances of the kaiser called down upon him the condemnation of the American press for his anachronistic brutahty of expression. The Boston Transcript declared that The contrast between the utterances of the German Emperor, breathing forth threatening and slaughter, and the calm, courteous, moderate temper shown by the Administration at Washington is strongly marked. While the United States is exerting every effort to prevent war, Emperor William is using his opportunities to foment a war spirit. The fact is not to be blinked at that Ger- many is bent upon waging a war of reprisal in China. . . . Her undisguised purpose in sending troops to China is to wreak vengeance upon the Chinese.^^ The high indemnity stirred both press and publicists. Our minister to China, Mr. Rockhill, condemned Germany in the following manner: Germany is insisting on her pound of flesh. She has announced her purpose to require the payment of every ounce she has deman- ded If Germany stands by her declaration to retain her troops in China until the indemnity is paid, the authorities say that this will mean that she will remain permanently .^^ The Americans were thus unmistakably opposed to the manner in which Germany Srst entered China and the con- tinuation of her initial aggressive pohcy toward the Chinese was a source of a growing suspicion of German methods wherever exercised. Americans were willing to allow for the serious offence against international law and comity in the murder of the German minister, Baron Von Ketteler, at the hands of the Chinese. But the demands of the kaiser were in excess of any reason in the matter. There were many columns in the daily press and long articles in magazines besides the utterances of public men that show that Americans looked with the greatest disfavor and dis- trust upon the policy that the German emperor was following in China. His instructions to his soldiers departing for the East were especially out of harmony with the ideals of " Ibid., December 3, 1897. " July 28, 1900. " New York Herald, April 12. 1901. AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 61 Americans and the practices of modern warfare. These very words excited a bitter feeling in the United States and did much to keep Americans on the alert as to what was actually being done in China. The fact that the American press applied the name "Hun" to the Germans at this time is especially significant. Public sentiment in this country was unanimous and loud in its protest against Germany throughout the entire Chinese trouble. The taking of Kiao-Chau is always spoken of as "piratical;" the mili- tary methods of the German troops as far more severe than the situation demanded; and the indemnity greatly in ex- cess of actual loss — in fact, from the very beginning Ameri- cans were united in condemning the Germans in China. 4. Admiral Dewey and the Germans in the Philippines We now have first-hand evidence as to the causes of German activity in the Philippines in the spring of 1898. German officials have admitted that Germany was at this time hopeful of building up a great Pacific empire and seemed to have excellent prospects of realizing this aspiration until the United States and Japan appeared in the field as con- tenders. Germany was determined to be on the alert to obtain control of the Philippines if it was possible to do so without getting into war with the United States. She was also possibly encouraged by a casual remark of Ambassador White that the United States did not desire the Philippines. A feeling of suspicion towards German aggression in the Shantung peninsula in 1897 had been generated in the American mind and had been shared by naval authorities and officers. In addition to the general setting of distrust there was a special cause of ill-feeling. At a banquet given by Prince Henry of Prussia in March, 1898, to officers of the foreign war vessels at Hong Kong, Dewey felt that the American officers had been slighted. After Dewey had begun his operation in the PhiUppines, and contrary to his express warning, the German admiral, Von Diederichs, ignored the American blockade and proceeded to carry on intercourse with the Spaniards, and even to provision them. 62 CLAEA EVE SCHIEBER Dewey promptly ordered the Germans to obey inter- national law and an open clash might have come had not the British commander in these waters, Captain Chichester, informed Diederichs that he regarded Dewey as wholly in the right. Another irritating incident in the Philippines was that at Subig Bay, where the German cruiser Irene was surprised in the act of aiding Spain. The Germans denied but did not disprove guilt. The attitude towards the United States in the German press was extremely critical, though probably not as scurillous as that of the French and Italian papers. In fact, it is known that France, Germany and Austria tried to organize a European coalition to prevent the United States from intervening in Cuba. Of course, it must be remembered that the Catholic countries were fully aware of the pope's intervention in behalf of peace and of the American duplicity in keeping secret the Spanish assent to our ultimatum." But however righteous may have been the German criticism of our entry into the war with Spain, it is true that the German press bitterly criticised the course of this country and this helped to increase the ill-feeling produced between the two countries by events in the Orient. The following excerpts well illustrate the attitude of the American press with respect to German activities in the Philippines. The Chicago Tribune contended that There is a strong suspicion that the kaiser has been casting a covetous eye towards the Philippines and would be glad for any pretext that would furnish him with an excuse for getting a finger in our quarrel with Spain But if the kaiser is really seeking a pretext to make another land-grab as he did at Kiao- Chau a few months ago, he will find quite another element to deal with than he did in that case.^° The INew York Times expressed a doubt that the German naval force in the Philippines was there solely to protect German subjects and interests in that region: The apparatus she has provided is quite out of proportion to the object to be attained. There may be forty or fifty German 2^ Nation, Vol. Ixxiii, p. 4. 30 June 15, 1898. AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 63 subjects doing business in Manila. ... A single man-of-war could accommodate the entire German population of Manila. Yet the provision that Germany has made is a squadron composed, at last accounts, of five vessels, and superior to the American squadron which destroyed the Spanish fleet and which now holds Manila under its guns We should be very simple to believe that this force has been assembled merely to rescue German inhabitants from the fury of Auguinaldo There can be no doubt of the unofficial American view of the assemblage of a German squadron in Manila Bay. It is that that assemblage is unmannerly and provocative, and that it is meant not to protect existing German interests but to find new interests to protect. ^^ The Springfield Republican thought that The presence of five German warships at Manila, with two more near at hand, seems so utterly disproportionate to the German interests requiring protection at that port as to arouse suspicion in the minds of the American people concerning Ger- many's intention in the Philippines. It is nonsense to suppose that seven or five warships are necessary to protect the lives and the property of the few German residents in Manila. . . , . The size of the Kaiser's fleet at Manila can be safely attributed to that monarch's irrepressible desire to cut a large figure in the world He is always eager to impress foreign parts with the glory and power of the Hohenzollerns.'^ The Boston Herald held that the trouble came from the kaiser's vanity and ambition: After all, WiUiam of Germany may mean no harm by his irritating meddlesomeness in and about the Phihppines. Perhaps he does not really know that it is irritating. He is probably troubled by the thought that he may be forgotten if he does not thrust himself into prominence and keep there; that something of great political moment may be carried to a successful end without taking him into consideration as an indispensable factor; and he yearns to be in evidence, even if he should accomphsh nothing more than adding to the amusement that his bluster and strut have provided ever since he assumed the crown whose weight has caused his head to enlarge. He is constantly prone to bellow, "Boo!" and to look for the result with the air of saying "Aren't you frightened? "^'^ It is scarcely necessary to point out the fact that this attitude on the part of the press reflected and conformed to 31 June 30, 1898. 32 July 2, 1898. « July 17, 1898. 64 CLARA EVE SCHTEBER the opinions of the American leaders in private and pubhc life. It helped to create that distrust of German diplomacy and world politics which had been engendered at Samoa and was further stimulated by Germany 's actions and utterances in China in the two or three years following. 5. Germamj in the Caribbean and Latin America Germany's ambitions in Weltpolitik were not limited to the eastern hemisphere. She early attempted to get a foothold in the Caribbean. This was especially irritating to the United States because of our preponderant economic interests in this region and the fact that foreign intrusion in this district was a challenge to the most sacred section of our foreign poUcy — the Monroe Doctrine. In fact, the Germans after 1870 became rather imaptient over the Monroe Doctrine. Bismarck on various occasions re- ferred to it a "a species of arrogance peculiarly American and inexcusable," ''an insolent dogma" and "an interna- tional impertinence." And yet Bismarck was, among the German statesmen of his day, one of the least enthusiastic for German overseas expansion. The German press even exulted over German intrusion in the Caribbean as a final assault upon and triumph over the Monroe Doctrine. The following brief outline of German activities in Latin America will serve as the background against which to inter- pret the attitude of the United States. In November of 1897 Germany attempted to intervene in Haiti and aroused an American protest. In 1901 Germany was observed making surveys of the Santa Margarita Islands off the coast of Venezuela. Admiral Dewey was despatched with a powerful fleet to watch developments here. In 1902 minor difficulties arose in Guatemala relative to the collec- tion of debts due European states. The forcible and vigorous methods used shortly afterwards by Germany to coUect debts due her from Venezuela constituted the most sensa- tional phase of German activities in Latin America. Ger- many bombarded Venezuelan ports and warships to intimi- date Venezuela and force payment. President Roosevelt, AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 65 by a threat of war, forced the kaiser to arbitrate. Germany showed particularly bad taste and judgment by again bom- barding forts during the progress of arbitration. In 1902 Germany was able to put pressure on Denmark and block our negotiations for the purchase of the Danish West Indies. Finally, the development of a German sphere of interest in Brazil and the progress of German interests in Argentine and Chile alarmed many Americans. The American press doubted the good faith of the Germans in Latin America. The Outlook held that It is certainly difficult to apply any other name than war to the bombardment, day after day, of Fort San Carlos, by three German warships, with its active and continued defense, the destruction of a fishing village, and the enforcement of a blockade so closely maintained that it is reported that twelve fishermen on a little island were cut off from their supplies and starved to death The prestige of Germany, so the German Chancellor declared, required these things. . . But public opinion in America does not consider that prestige is greatly enhanced by acts of force towards a weak nation, acts, certainly not absolutely necessary, even if technically justified, and espe- cially to be regretted because they occurred precisely when the prospects of an amicable arbitration are most satisfactory.^* The ISJew York Sun expressed itself frankly upon the sub- ject of the Monroe Doctrine and its economic and stragetic foundations : As for our actual and prospective traffic with Latin America, experience should have taught us that from all parts of it which should fall into German, French or Italian hands our manu- facturers and merchants would be debarred. Then again, for strategic reasons too obvious to need emphasis, we, as owners of the Panama Canal, could not permit a European Power to occupy any part of the coasts of Central America, or of Colombia, Vene- zuela, and Ecuador The Monroe Doctrine was formulated not for a day but for all time. The American people will never renounce it. Never will they suffer the New World to be made the victim of partition. ^^ The Boston Herald inquired "What has the kaiser up his Venezuelan sleeve? Have we no pact to denounce the " Vol. 73, p. 229. « April 28, 1904. THE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, VOL. 12, NO. I, 1921 66 CLAKA EVE SCHIEBER G oth and the shameless Hun ? " ^6 To one not familiar with the situation it is surprising to discover with what vital interest the American press kept in touch with the whole situation from the sending of the Promemoria to the final adjust- ment of all claims at The Hague. PubUc sentiment was unanimous in condemning the "browbeating" of Venezuela by Germany and looked upon the methods of the Teutons as wholly unjust and ''unnecessarily severe." While ac- knowledging that creditors had a perfect right of insisting upon payment, the feeling of the United States was that the demands and the policy of action were not consistent with the dignity of a great nation. The Boston Herald was especially strong in soliciting pity for Venzuela in the face of German severity. Not one organ but called upon Germany to beware in extending her debt-collecting pro- pensities to the permanent occupation of Venzuelan terri- tory. Here we find expressed much the same feeling against German war aims and methods which existed dur- ing the recent war. Germany was called the ''shameless Hun " and there are many references to the manner in which helpless women and children and feeble old people were treated by the kaiser's troops. With but one single excep- tion all the newspapers agreed that the primary object of Germany was to test the real strength of our Monroe Doctrine. Even former Ambassador White, although he saw no real danger to the Monroe Doctrine, does state that the kaiser was apparently responsible for the sending of "German ships of war and the handling of sundry Venezuelans with decided roughness." There was cer- tainly sufficient evidence against Germany greatly to arouse American fears. Why did German sailors and German soldiers act as they did in Venezuela when the whole world knows that the entire German war machine was under the direct and personal control of the kaiser? If his subordinates disobeyed, why were they not punished, and if they were merely fulfiUing orders — -"for no German official acts without instructions" — why did the Berlin 36 January 21, 1903. AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 67 foreign office continue to send to the Washington state department a series of notes whose purport was to assure the United States of the friendly spirit of Germany for us and of her respect for the fundamental principles of our foreign policy? Blowing forts to pieces and kilhng defence- less women and children are ways of expressing international amity generally unknown to America. A careful study of American sentiment as expressed in the various public utterances shows that the United States was constantly growing in her distrust of German ambitions. In spite of all the German official protestations of friendship for America a feeling of suspicion continued to grow. Ger- many had made too many blunders before in her deahngs with America to be trusted now in her activities in the Western hemisphere Her manner was too haughty, and bumptious, and autocratic. It did not harmonize with our ideals or with those of the Latin-American republics. So these states likewise questioned Germany's motives and turned to the United States for support and protec- tion. If the actions of Germany had been in accord with the status of the weak republics which she attacked there would have been no need of American interference. But the very austerity of Teutonic manners compelled the general public in the United States to think that what Germany really wanted was not the settlement of old debts but the perma- nent occupation of the territory attacked. This long series of German threats in the Caribbean and in South America did much to arouse in the people of the United States a definite fear of German miUtarism and German imperialism. Americans generally came to realize that German aggression was bound to lead to very serious consequences. 6. General phases of German history 1870-1914 engendering suspicion on the part of the United States In addition to these specific instances of conflict between the United States and Germany there were certain larger phases of German development after 1870 which served to 68 CLARA EVE SCHIEBEE make the United States fearful and suspicious of Germanic tendencies. First and foremost, probably, were the utter- ances and conduct of the kaiser, who afforded a striking symbol of German aggression, autocracy, mihtarism, and Weltpolitik. In particular, his statements dealing with divine-right, militarism and expansion incurred the derision or sarcastic criticism of the American press. There can be httle doubt that the kaiser was the heaviest liability which Germany carried in her foreign policy from 1888 to 1918. The Prussianization of the empire by Bismarck, with the accompanying growth of autocracy and militarism, served to cool the ardor of Americans for the results of German unity. The treatment of German liberals and radicals from 1878 to 1890 and the oppression involved in the denationalization of Alsace-Lorraine operated to initiate that estimate of Germany as a curious political anachronism which was confirmed by the kaiser's gro- tesque allusions to the divine right of the Hohenzollern. Ger- man militarism appeared to be a special menace to the peace of the world. The miUtary flourish associated with all phases of German official policy, the ''armed peace" for which she stood, her opposition to disarmament at the Hague, the brutalities of army discipline, which were a pub- lic scandal even in Germany, the savagery of the custom of duelling, and the kaiser's absurd speeches concerning the primary loyalty of the German soldier to the kaiser which should go to the extent of shooting his own father and mother if so ordered for the amusement of the war-lord, all served to disgust the leaders of public opinion in the United States. Particularly was this the case between 1905 and 1914 when the United States was generally favorable to the pacifist and arbitration campaign. The Boston Transcript was almost alone in its praise of the moral training inculcated in the German army." The development of German Weltpolitik was a matter of concern to this country in cases other than those in which the United States came into direct conflict with it. The kaiser 's visits to the Near East " January 6, 1900. AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 69 in the interests of the Berhn-Bagdad project were the sub- ject of critical comment by the American papers, as well as the development of German control in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. Especially was the United States soHcitous of insuring that clashes over world pohtics should not bring about a world war. Mr. Bishop has now shown that President Roosevelt practically forced the kaiser to accept the Algeciras Congress where the possibility of a war over jNIorocco was averted. The great increases in the German protective tariffs 'from 1879 to 1905 aroused the jealousy of American economic interests, particularly the embargo on American meats. Then, there were diplomatic disputes over such matters as citizenship, and irritation caused by limitations placed on certain types of American business in Germany. Finally, the chief hold of Teutonism on Amer- ican thought — the American college professors of Germanic training — was gradully being loosened through the distinct falling off of the number of Americans who went to Germany for their graduate work. To those who will make a careful study of the many and varied activities of Germany since 1871 and to those who will follow American reactions as found in the pubhc press and in the sober judgement of its statesmen and its citizens in all walks of life — there must certainly come the reaUza- tion that at the beginning of the World's War the majority of the .American sentiment was opposed to Germany. This was but the natural and inevitable result of our growing suspicion of Germany in the fields of trade and colonization, in her general world poUcy, in her cold defiance of solemn treaties, and in our increasing fear of the possibilities of German miUtarism. In a word— the entire pohcy of the German Government was completely out of harmony with American institutions, and the majority of the people of the United States were opposed to German autocracy, in all its forms and modes of expression. 70 CLAJIA EVE SCHIEBER 7. Attitude of leading citizens of the United States towards Germany in 1914- While it is safe to hold that newspapers either reflect or shape prevaiUng pubhc opinion, it is not wholly safe to rely upon their attitude alone, and in the preceding generaliza- tions concerning the changing American attitude towards Germany reliance was not put merely upon newspaper opinion. A careful study of the opinion of leading states- men and publicists was also executed. ^^ In order to make this aspect of the investigation even more complete a ques- tionnaire was sent out to leading representative Americans in all fields of life making inquiry as to their conception of the relative attitude of the United States towards Germany in 1914. As this was sent out just at the close of the world war when passions were still warm and an expression of regard for Germany was viewed as savoring of treason there is httle doubt but that the replies were less objective than they would have been if made in May of 1914. Yet, after allowing for all probability of bias due to circum- stances, there seems to be no doubt from a reading of the one hundred and seventy rephes received, that these repre- sentative citizens from all professions beheved that in 1914 the United States was more suspicious of, and unfriendly towards, Germany than towards any other major European state. Judging from these replies the majority of prominent citizens from all parts of the country and representing all groups and interests were of the opinion that we were definitely suspicious and fearful of Germany in July, 1914, before the opening of the world war; that this feeling was not uniform throughout all elements of society but tended to be more favorable toward Germany in university groups; and that this feeling of fear and suspicion was largely due to the increasingly arrogant, saber-rattHng, swash-buckling attitude of German officials and the growing militaristic tendency of the German government. A majority of the statements in the replies to the questionnaire therefore agree 2* This is given in detail in the dissertation. AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 71 with the quotations gathered from the press, and expressions of public opinion that have been cited in former sections to the effect that from a friendly attitude towards Germany during the Franco-Prussian war, 1870-71, the United States, through a long series of incidents, came gradually to have a feeling of fear, suspicion, and distrust of Germany and her motives. IV. German Attempts to Counteract the Growth OF Anti-German Sentiment in the United States There is no doubt that the German government and the German emperor were well aware of this striking cooling of the traditional friendship of the United States for Germany. There is no less doubt that both sincerely desired the good willof this country. But it seems never to have occurred to them that American friendship could have been retained most effectively by that sort of conduct in domestic policy and foreign relations which could command the respect of civilized mankind. Rather, they prefered to proceed with their policies at home and abroad and rely upon ostenta- tious display of imperial pleasure and beneficence and upon propaganda to offset the progress of anti-German feeling. In 1902 the United States was honored by a visit from no less a personage than Prince Henry of Prussia, the brother of the kaiser. He came officially to participate in the cere- monies attending the launching of a private yacht which had been built for the kaiser in America. The visit was the occasion of many notable receptions by public officials and prominent citizens, the bestowing of gifts from the kaiser, and a formal display of strong German- American sentiment. The papers were in most cases cordial and respectful, though some openly described the trip as propaganda.^^ Even those which were inchned to be pleasant to the prince re- minded him of the pending difficulties in the Caribbean and of the high German tariff.^" Some papers bitterly attacked 39 The Chicago Tribune was the most enthusiastic in praise of the prince. The New York Herald perhaps the least cordial. " New York Evening Post, January 13, 1902. 72 CLARA EVE SCHIEBER the German autocracy and derided the whole notion that we were honored by the visit of a Hohenzollern Prince.*^ Congressman Wheeler of Kentucky bitterly assailed any notion of a cordial reception of the royal visitor/^ It is interesting to note that the papers most vigorously assailing the prince were often those of undisguised British sympa- thies. The New York Herald, upon Prince Henry's depar- ture from this country, published the following ironical hon voyage. Prince of Prussia; Grand Duke of Hock der kaiser; Baron Bingenon derrhine; Marquis of Johannesberg and Kirschwasser; Margrave of Katzenjammer; Lord Rathskeller von Pabst; Earl of Pretzel; hereditary ruler of Donner and Blitzen; Archduke Laubenheimer; Field Marshal Wasislosmith ; brother to the Emperor of Germany ; nephew to the King of England ; Uncle to the heir apparent to the throne of Prussia; cousin to the Prince of Wales; grand-son and grand-son-in-law of the late Queen of England. Born 1862. Made in Germany. General manager of the mailed fist in China, 1897. Head of the Imperial Bureau of International Amenities, Berlin, 1901. Discovered America, February 23, 1902 Descended upon Washington and received surrender of keys from Native Chiefs, February 27. Returned to New York Launched new German navy. Shooter's Island, February 28th. Proceeded to Chicago and quelled insurrection of malcontents in the German colony there located. Fell back on Waldorf-Astoria for supplies. Made second attack on Washington Penetrated wilds of Massachusetts. Sustained heavy assault of New England culi- nary forces, armed to the teeth with baked beans, brown bread and pumpkin pie. Wounded in the vicinity of the vermiform, returned to New York and evacuated the country in March. Returned to Berlin, having lost sixty-eight pounds in weight, but the gainer by a permanent case of dyspepsia and much useful knowl- edge of the new empire across the sea. Has advised Emperor to send his next fist across the sea by mail and not by special messenger. Was a welcome guest and deserved all his victories.** For a number of years the kaiser had been endeavoring to convince this country of his special friendliness through a presentation of a statue of Frederick the Great. For a time our officials were able to evade the reception of so un- " Harper's Weekhj, Vol. 47, p. 228. *- Congressional Record, vol. 25, pt. 2, pp. 1757-8. « March 9, 1902. AMERICAN SENTIMENT TOWARDS GERMANY 73 American a symbol, but in 1905 it was no longer possible to delay, and President Roosevelt accepted it as graciously as he could and had the statue placed before the War College in Washington. The unveiling was made a very formal and serious occasion. The American press was generally critical of the propriety of accepting this gift. The Washington Evening Star suggested that we reciprocate by sending the kaiser a statue of James Monroe. ^^ As the number of American students in German univer- sities was steadily falling off, due to the improvement of our own institutions of higher learning, the kaiser hit upon an expedient for maintaining at least some portion of the German ascendency in our university circles. For years Hugo Munsterberg had been making vigorous efforts to prevent the progress of German- American coolness. The kaiser decided to found a number of exchange professor- ships by arrangement with leading American universities. No thinking person can doubt the educational advantages of such procedure, but it also served to increase German influence in this country and especially to paralyze with Hohenzollern splendor the American professors who lec- tured in Germany. Further, the kaiser aided in the estab- lishment of a Deutsches Haus at Columbia University and made many valuable gifts to the Harvard Germanic Mu- seum. No small number of American university presidents and professors were also able to include in their academic biographies the "Order of the Red Eagle of Prussia." Finally, societies were formed for perpetuating the German nationality among German emigrants who went to other lands, and for carrying on German propaganda in foreign lands. Among these were the Alldeutscher Verhand, the Verein fur das Deutschtum im Ausland, the Gustav Adolf Verein, the Diaspora Verein, and the Deutscher Wehr verein. These societies did their best to keep aUve German sentiments among Germans dispersed in many diverse regions of the earth. "^ The propaganda carried " May 24, 1902. " E. E. Sperry, Tentacles of the German Octopus in America. 74 CLARA EVE SCHIEBER on by Dernberg and others from 1914-1917 in the United States in the hope of arousing sympathy for Germany is remembered by all. V. The Future The foregoing facts make it certain that the international feeling of one period is no safe or certain criterion of what the relations between the same states will become in another generation. The violent hatred of Germany, developed between 1870 and 1918, may, if circumstances are altered, be transformed into warm sympathy within ten years. The progress of liberalism in Germany may turn our sus- picions into confidence and respect, while autocratic and imperialistic policies on the part of our recent aUies may lead to a breach with them. Certainly our feelings towards France and Germany since 1870 have been completely re- versed in both cases. Already it is apparent that the French diplomacy since 1918 has begun to turn liberal American sentiment against her. The one redeeming fea- ture seems to be that, unless prevented by conflicting economic interests, our feelings are likely to be most cordial to that country which conducts itself most in harmony with the dictates of international decency and fair-dealing. 542 . • ^t^vVK^iv.'^ . o ^^'% 'i^^'?^ N MANCHESTER, i-^-* INDIANA