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M G CLELLAFS CAMPAIGN. 
 
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 sprint** it am Cj?* Wotlb 
 
 Of August 7, 1862. 
 
 THERE IS JUSTICE IN HISTORY.' 
 
 NEW YORK: 
 ANSON D. F. RANDOLPH, 
 
 683 BROADWAY 
 1862. 
 

McCLELLAN'S CAMPAIGN 
 
 The time has come to vindicate General McClellan and his campaign 
 from the misrepresentations of political antagonists and the aspersions of 
 ignorant critics. His enemies have concealed nothing which, by publicity 
 or obliquity of statement could at any time do him damage, whatever 
 was made known to the enemy that should have been secret. With pro- 
 per self-poise, and the instinct and etiquette of a soldier, General McClel- 
 lan has remained silent, nor furnished the facts or inspired the logic of his 
 defence. He does well to do so. He can afford to be silent. 
 
 Our position as public journalists has kept us informed of many circum- 
 stances in the history of the campaign which are not generally known — 
 many facts which, to have made public earlier, would have given valuable 
 information to the enemy. The situation has now so completely changed, 
 however, that further silence will aid the good cause less than the out- 
 spoken truth. A Michigan senator, moreover, whose personal weight or 
 political character are not such as of themselves to give to his opinions or 
 his statements authority, has yet, by the fact that they were uttered upon 
 the floor of the Senate and are still assiduously circulated and endorsed 
 by radical presses, been able to confuse the public mind, and create a dis- 
 trust of its formerly favorite General. And this, too, though the Presi- 
 dent still retains him in his high command, though the best and most 
 skillful Generals— the fighting not less than the counseling Generals — ex- 
 press unabated confidence in his capacity and his past management ; this, 
 too, though General Halleck whom all praise, once paralleled Manassas 
 with Corinth, and though he, too, has the highest confidence in General 
 McClellan ; this, too, though President Lincoln now frankly acknowledges, 
 in words, the responsibility of our failure on the peninsula, as he had pre- 
 viously acknowledged that of the Shenandoah valley disaster, and in acts, 
 by retiring from the conduct of the campaign and giving the reins to the 
 able and trained hands of the present General-in-Chief. 
 
 It is the duty, then, of those who can better inform the public judg- 
 ment no longer to delay doing so. It is the duty of those whom hasty 
 opinions have led astray to restore their confidence to General McClellan, 
 if it shall appear that their confidence is deserved. None of us invariably 
 succeed in the light affairs of human life, or the weighty. We have no 
 right to demand it in detail and at all times of any General. Invariable 
 success can be compassed by no infinite intellect, though assisted by 
 every advantage of weapons and means. We have a right, such is our 
 preponderance of power, to expect it of Generals in the long run, and of 
 the Administration as the final result. But as to a movement, or a cam- 
 paign, the American people have no right to demand of a General more 
 than this : " With all the means at your command, do the very best you 
 can." That General McClellan has done thus much his worst traducers do 
 not deny. That no General living, in his place, could have done more or 
 better we are firmly persuaded. And we ask attention to the facts which 
 induce our belief. 
 
 It is needless to recite here the brilliant services and successes of the 
 
young officer in Mexico, or to allude to his dashing campaign in Western 
 Virginia, where the stake was small and bold risks wise. It is from the 
 time that he was called to command the Army of the Potomac that his 
 career is without a parallel in military history. We had no army ; he 
 was asked to create one. The rebels threatened the capital ; he was 
 asked to defend it. We had suffered defeat ; he was asked to retrieve it 
 by victories. Thousands upon thousands of unarmed men poured into 
 Washington from the populous and aroused North — some unarmed, 
 others half armed, some with officers, some without, and these nearly all 
 as ignorant as their men. Arms, equipments, ammunition, clothing, 
 shoes, food, all were lacking. The country over, foundries and furnaces 
 were set agoing to cast cannon and shot; the powder factories were 
 worked to their utmost capacity ; every carriage factory was set to turn- 
 ing out artillery carriages, baggage trains, ambulance wagons ; saddle and 
 harness shops were all in requisition ; and, in fine, the whole industrial 
 force of the country was put at work to complete in the shortest time 
 possible the vast material without which our great armies would have 
 been helpless mobs. To the practical direction of these preparations for 
 weeks General McClellan gave long days and sleepless nights. Was it well 
 done? Let competent judges answer. Even his detractors speak of 
 " the finest army of the world," forgetful who it was that made it. 
 
 When Congress adjourned in the summer it left Washington at the 
 mercy of a force fully adequate to capture it and rout the armed rabble 
 which panic-struck, had fled from the Stone Bridge and was then roaming 
 through its streets and suburbs. When Congress met in December the 
 city was safe against five times any force that could be brought against it, 
 order had been restored, they were soldiers who were across the Potomac, 
 and the equipment of the army was proceeding as rapidly as energy and 
 skill could make it. 
 
 The " On to Richmond" hullabalooers — who had forced the President 
 to his first and most fatal error, who had compelled General Scott to a 
 movement which his judgment did not approve, and hounded the army of 
 the Potomac on to its terrible disaster — recovering from the silence which 
 the peril and the aroused wrath of the nation forced upon them, now began 
 again their devilish work, and this time McClellan was the point of attack. 
 
 It is scarcely worth while to discuss all the causes of General McClellan's 
 delay in taking the field. It is enough to say, setting aside the army's 
 lack at that time of the thorough discipline and instruction to which it 
 now owes its very existence ; it was not, even when it left Washington, pro- 
 perly equipped ; it was forced into the field a full month too soon — a month 
 before it had been or possibly could be supplied with its proper material. 
 All that depended on the General he had done ; that which depended on 
 physical laws and conditions none could control. The shops, the fur- 
 naces, the factories, had not completed their work ; it was simply a phy- 
 sical impossibility for them to do so by the 10th, or even by the last of 
 March. As material of different kinds was prepared, it was assigned where 
 first needed, and the equipment of the western and southern expeditionary 
 armies took precedence of that of his own. The demands of the whole 
 army were large ; the supply, within a limited time, wholly inadequate ; 
 and neither money, energy, nor the vollej^s of abuse from the Tribune 
 
could remedy the matter. Time alone could supply the deficiencies, and 
 until that time had elapsed, and the supplies were completed and delivered, 
 the army could not be ready. An army and all its material — its instru- 
 ments and equipments, not less than its skill — had to be created. One 
 merely as good as the rebel army would not answer. It had to be larger 
 and better, or its first campaign would have been its last. Thank God, the 
 seven days' battles proved that we had an army. 
 
 As to the size, past and present, of that army, the figures and facts given 
 by Senator Chandler were given not only to the country but to the enemy, 
 who now lias a solid base on which to act. His vague idea of our army 
 of 200,000 to 250,000 men has been of great advantage to us ; but that 
 idea is now corrected, and the Senators speech has deprived us of the ad- 
 vantage of concealing our numbers, or the possibility of misleading and 
 deceiving him. Had any member of the Army of the Potomac divulged 
 so much to the enemy as Senator Chandler has done, he would, on con- 
 viction, have been hung as a traitor and a spy, promptly and justly. It 
 is lawful and expedient now, at any rate, to break the full effect of his in- 
 discretion, by placing the facts he has presented in their natural order 
 and connection, so that they may convey truth instead of falsehood. The 
 consequences must fall where they belong. 
 
 General McOlellan never underrated the rebellion, nor the power that 
 must be put forth to suppress it. He knew well the strength and resour- 
 ces of the South, and the desperate character of its able leaders. He was 
 never deluded by the foolish theories about a starved-out population, nor 
 by the rosy but crack-brain visions of the Tribune, and other negrophi- 
 list organs, about an enthusiastic rising of u mean whites and negroes." 
 He did not need to be persuaded that the army which won the field at 
 Manassas, doubled in numbers and perfect in discipline, would not run 
 away from their works at the charge of a regiment of Yankee horse, even 
 if preceded by a thundering speech from an emancipation Senator, a dia- 
 tribe from Wendell Phillips, and a first-rate editorial from Field-Marshal 
 Greeley. He knew that he was to engage a powerful army of brave men, 
 of the same race and blood as ourselves, ably commanded, gallantly led, 
 and thoroughly and fanatically in earnest; men who knew they were 
 fighting for a cause — not a faction — and that cause their independence ; 
 that these men, mistaken as they were, would fight as well as men ever 
 fought ; and that the conflict would be desperate and blood}'-, yet that it 
 might be, could be, and he was determined should be short, sharp and de- 
 cisive. His public enunciations were all to this effect, and his prepara- 
 tions were made accordingly. 
 
 We do not purpose here to discuss other plans which General McClellan 
 may have submitted, or their fate. We simply take Mr. Chandler's state- 
 ment that when the march to Manassas was executed, which, as the Sena- 
 tor truly says, was not opposed by McClellan and his Generals, and which 
 turned out to be rather an absurdity, the General returned to Alexandria, 
 and after some delay (necessar}^, among other things, to complete the 
 equipment of his army) embarked for Fortress Monroe. But here the 
 Senator gets into a mass of confusion. He tells us that the Army of the 
 Potomac, on the 10th of March, numbered 230,000 men ; that it was de- 
 cided that 45,000 should be left for the defence of Washington ; that the 
 
6 
 
 General "divided his army," and was then "permitted" to embark with 
 120,000. Then the Senator produces the sworn testimony of General 
 Wadsworth that he had under his command for the defence of Washington 
 less than 20,000 men. All this is extraordinary arithmetic. 
 
 The Army of the Potomac is 230,000 strong. General McClellan takes 
 120,000 with him, and there are less than 20,000 left, although^ had been 
 decided to retain 45,000. Now the difference between 230,000 and 120,000 
 is 110,000 ; what had become of all these? It simply needs to state all 
 the facts, which Mr. Chandler everywhere fails to do. His success, in 
 every important statement, in always concealing an essential fact, is ex- 
 traordinary. General McClellan's comprehension of his task was clear, 
 as we have said. His intent was to move when he got quite ready, and 
 to be, before moving, so thoroughly prepared that once in motion, there 
 should be no delay from any contingency whatever, against which labor 
 and forethought could provide. Having determined on his plan he resolved 
 to execute it, and reap surely and swiftly its results, without giving his 
 enemy time to guard against them. What plan he preferred, it is useless to 
 state. Events may yet take such a turn as to make silence even now prudent. 
 
 The advance by way of the peninsula was determined on. The plan 
 was thoroughly digested and arranged, subject only to such minor varia- 
 tions as circumstances might render necessary. The execution of the plan 
 was based on the employment of a force of 160,000 men, leaving 70,000 
 for the defence of Washington. A portion of these were ordered from 
 the Shenandoah to Manassas to replace Sumner's corps; nearly 20,000 
 men — some of them excellent artillerists, under the command of General 
 Wadsworth — garrisoned the forts which guarded all the approaches to the 
 city, and the remainder were within easy call. Here was the most ample 
 protection against a much larger army than "the 40,000 rebels supplied 
 with wooden guns," about which the Senator makes merry ; and even 
 these rebels had left the country, and were known to be beyond the Rappa- 
 hannock. Where they would go, when the rebel leaders found 150,000 men 
 advancing from Yorktown on their capital, it needed no wizard to guess. 
 
 Having thus amply provided for the safety of Washington, General 
 McClellan left Alexandria with a well organized army of over 150,000 
 men under his command. He witnessed the embarkation of the larger 
 portion of them, and then he hurried to Fortress Monroe. His inten- 
 tion was to advance with this body on Yorktown. The troops which 
 were to follow — (McDowell's corps, 45,000 strong, reinforced, if neces- 
 sary, by 60,000 from Sumner's corps) — were to land above Old Point, 
 and, after certain operations were effected, to cross the Pamunkey near 
 West Point, interpose between Richmond and the rebel army at York- 
 town, and so cut off the latter, and shut them up in the peninsula, 
 without the possibility of escape. In pursuance of this plan, the army 
 left Fortress Monroe for Yorktown. Mr. Chandler states that there 
 were not 10,000 rebels there; but the works were found, on actual ex- 
 amination, which led to a sharp action, to be strong, and the enemy 
 present in large force. In this fact was seen the promise of the certain 
 success of the plan, and the rapid conclusion of a campaign which 
 would utterly destroy the enemy's main army, and give us his capital. 
 
 " Does any man doubt," triumphantly asks the Senator (speaking of 
 
an army of 158,000 men, which at this moment General McClellan be- 
 lieved to be under his command), " that this army, ably handled, was 
 sufficiently strong to have captured Richmond, and crushed the rebel 
 army ? 1 think not, if promptly led against the enemy ; but, instead of 
 that, it sat down in malarious swamps, and awaited the drafting, arming, 
 drilling, and making soldiers of an army to fight it, and in the mean- 
 time our own army was rapidly wasting away." General McClellan, for 
 one, did not doubt for an instant, the absolute certainty of first "crush- 
 ing' 1 the enemy's army, and then occupying his capital speedily, and 
 with little loss. # His confidence could be seen in every movement by 
 those near him, by all who were in the secrets of the campaign, and 
 this feeling was shared by all around him. 
 
 The execution of the plan of General McClellan had now been fairly 
 commenced, and it was too late to revise it. The first action had been 
 fought, and the main body of the army stood ready and anxious bo 
 execute their part. Yet that very evening, within one hour after the 
 last gun had ieen fired, without any previous notice whatever, General 
 McClellan received oy telegraph the astounding intelligence that Hc- 
 DowelVs corps, nearly one-third of his army — the troops on which the 
 vital operation of the campaign depended — had teen detached from his 
 army, and were no longer under his command ! The execution of his 
 plans was thus very effectually thwarted ; yet, as if still further to em- 
 barrass him, General Wool, with his command, including Fortress Mon- 
 roe and the country up to Hampton Creek, was also withdraw r from his 
 control. Can it be wondered at, that, in the words of the Senator, 
 •' instantly General McClellan began to telegraph for reinforcements, and 
 continued to telegraph up to the day wiien he was attacked by the 
 rebels ?" What else could he do but this, unless it were to resign ; and 
 would the country have forgiven him for that? Yet this is the man 
 whose patriotism has been called in question ; who, without one word 
 of public or private complaint, has still stuck to his post, and labored 
 as untiringly as at the beginning, when nothing was plainer than that, 
 when that order came, either his patriotism or his pride and r^ .itation 
 must pass under a cloud. Was his choice a noble one? 
 
 The army was now in a false position ; the plans and objects of the 
 General were, by the nature of the case and the delay, made manifest to 
 the enemy, in the very act which deprived him of the means of 
 executing them. The works were closely examined. It was found the 
 success of a general assault would be doubtful, the sacrifice of life so 
 enormous, as to cripple his reduced army for further operations, even if 
 it should succeed, and the flank movement, which would have made 
 the position untenable, was now impossible. 
 
 Two courses only remained to him : to abandon the peninsula or to 
 besiege the works. Of the two evils the latter was the less, and was 
 adopted, and hence the necessity for that unfortunate "ditching,' 1 over 
 which the Senator groans. It was the first fruit of the panic, real or 
 simulated, which was raised in Washington as soon as General Mc- 
 Clellan left, and made the pretext for depriving him of one-third of his 
 army, rendering the result doubtful, and entailing, under any circum- 
 stances, an enormous mortality either by disease or the sword. 
 
8 
 
 But the "incessant telegraphing" produced some effect ! Yes ; one of 
 McDowell's divisions — that of Franklin — was sent down to him, but it 
 was unnecessary for siege purposes and too feeble to do the work of the 
 whole corps ; so it was useless, as all half measures are — except, perhaps, 
 to replace the number of men sacrificed in the siege. 
 
 About the same time, perhaps, by the way of filling General McClel- 
 lan's telegraphic demands, or perhaps further to secure Washington, orders 
 were issued stopping recruiting ; and suggestions were even made that a 
 part of the army might be disbanded as unnecessary ! Senator Wilson 
 has denied his complicity with this scheme, but the Congressional Olooe 
 and the telegrams at the time from our own reporter prove his denial a 
 falsehood. The siege was prosecuted to a successful termination, and on 
 the 4th day of May the enemy did that which, had sixty thousand men 
 appeared at West Point, he would have done by the 15th of April in a 
 desperate attempt to save himself — he abandoned his works. But he had 
 delayed us a month, discovered our plans, collected his forces, and forti- 
 fied his capital ; and on the 5th (by which time, had the original plan not 
 been interfered with, Virginia would have been cleared of the rebel troops 
 and our army in possession of Richmond and even Raleigh) the battle of 
 Williamsburg was fought. 
 
 As soon as the works were abandoned, General McClellan started his 
 troops in pursuit — not a moment was lost, and he brought the enemy to 
 bay at Williamsburg and defeated him. He sent a dispatch to the Secre- 
 tary of War that night, stating that he had already arranged for move- 
 ments up the York River ; that Johnson was in front of him in strong 
 force, probably greater than his own ; but " I will at least run the risk of 
 holding them in check here while I resume the original plan ;" and concludes, 
 " I will do all I can with the force at my disposal." Mr. Chandler, after 
 quoting this dispatch, indulges in one of the absurdities that men gene- 
 rally commit when discussing matters they do not understand, and breaks 
 out with, " He would try to hold them in check ! He could not hold 
 them. He could not stop his eager troops from chasing them." The 
 honorable Senator does not seem to be aware that to hold a flying enemy 
 in check he must be followed closely, and attacked fiercely, as the Con- 
 federates were followed and attacked on this occasion. In the meantime, 
 Franklin was sent up the river to West Point, to intercept them, " in 
 pursuance of the original plan." A bloody battle took place, but we were 
 too feeble here, as at all other points. It was a desperate and gallant at- 
 tempt to accomplish the " original plan " with an inadequate force. It 
 resulted in still further weakening the army. Still he continued to tele- 
 graph, and, as ever, a deaf ear was turned to his demands. 
 
 The army then concentrated at the White House, advanced to the 
 Chickahominy, and a portion of it was boldly thrown across the stream 
 on the line of the railroad, the bridges of which had to be repaired to be 
 made available ; and now the awkwardness and danger of our position, due 
 solely to the cause we have named, were made manifest. 
 
 The telegraphic dispatches, which he continued to send " up to the day 
 he was attacked by the rebels," were still unheeded, and our army found 
 itself in presence of one of equal or superior force, strongly intrenched, 
 backed by a city which relieved it of all its sick and wounded, their at- 
 
9 
 
 tendants and guards, and having perfect freedom of movement ; while we 
 were surrounded by traitors and spies, who could and did keep the enemy 
 informed of all our movements. It was absolutely necessary, in order to 
 hold our position, to keep a large portion of our force north of the Chick- 
 ahominy, thus extending and weakening our lines. The difficulties of an 
 attack were much the same as at Yorktown, with the certainty of being 
 outnumbered at any given point, from the shorter interior lines of the 
 enemy, his greater facilities of communication and consequent power of 
 concentration. But we were favored in our defensive position by the en- 
 emy's exaggerated idea of our numbers. With no strong position, and 
 no organized force to fall back upon, it was certain that without a larger 
 army a general assault would be ruinous, unless completely successful. 
 Under these circumstances, to attack, with all the chances against us, 
 would have been criminal in the highest degree ; an act of folly and of mad- 
 ness for which, had the issue been unfortunate, no atonement could have 
 been made. With the ruin of the army, the cause itself would have been 
 greatly endangered, if not lost. It then became necessary, indispensa- 
 ble, to the safety of the army to form an intrenched camp, which, in case 
 of a reverse, would serve as a refuge and rallying point. This is the recog- 
 nized and only course, that an army, deficient in numbers, can pursue 
 under such circumstances. Hence, as a hard alternative, not from choice, 
 " digging ditches" was again resorted to by General McOlellan. It was 
 an unavoidable consequence of taking away his troops in the first place, 
 and the continued refusal to comply promptly with the demands of his 
 telegraphic dispatches. 
 
 In the meantime all that could be done was effected, and the brilliant 
 affair of Hanover Court House, and the destruction of the enemy's com- 
 munications on the Central Railroad, was undertaken and effected by the 
 troops on the north of the Chickahominy, led by the gallant General Fitz 
 John Porter. This rendered an advance toward Washington by way of 
 Fredericksburg impossible to the rebel army, and removed the last shadow 
 of excuse for still withholding General McDowell's army from General 
 McClellan. It is said that his advanced guard w r as within " the sound of 
 the enemy's cannon " at Hanover. Had he advanced, or been under 
 McClellan's orders, we might possibly have entered Richmond then, but 
 special measures had been taken to prevent McDowell, under any circum- 
 stances, from being subject to McClellan's orders : — and still reinforce- 
 ments were withheld. 
 
 On the last day of May, taking advantage of a rise in the Chickahominy, 
 which cut off the communication between its banks, the enemy threw his 
 whole force on our left wing at Fair Oaks. Our works were as yet im- 
 perfect, but the advantage of the defensive over the offensive where the 
 lines of attack are few and difficult was here, as in the subsequent bat- 
 tles, made evident. The event showed what would have been the result 
 of a headlong attack by our army on the enemy's stronger and better 
 manned positions, and made obvious to all but the wilfully blind the 
 wisdom of McClellan's course. The attack was repulsed, and the Con- 
 federates beaten back with enormous loss. Our force also suffered terribly, 
 and was too small to follow up the success. Had we done so and attacked 
 him in his chosen positions, the tables would have been turned upon us. 
 
10 
 
 Now at last some attention was paid to the telegraphic dispatches, and 
 General Wool's command was placed under McClellan's orders. It fur- 
 nished some 6,000 men — not enough to repair our losses at Fair Oaks. At 
 a later period another of McDowell's divisions, that of McCall, numbering 
 some 8,000 or 10,000 men, was also sent; it scarcely made good the 
 " sacrifice of men in the swamps of the Chickahominy." Had these forces 
 been sent in time they might have made the victory at Hanover decisive, 
 or enabled us to follow up the success at Fair Oaks ; but they had been 
 withheld too long, and they came too late. 
 
 Jackson's raid into the valley of the Shenandoah followed. Its object — 
 palpable to the whole army, and stated explicitly in his instructions — was 
 to prevent McCIellan being reinforced. "This will be greatest service 
 you can render to your country," were the emphatic words used by the 
 Confederate commander, icho was simply dent upon securing a continuance 
 of the policy already adopted at Washington toward McCIellan. 
 
 The effects of this expedition are too well known and too discreditable 
 to be dwelt upon. The raid itself would never have taken place if McClel- 
 lan's demands had been complied with ; the Confederates would not have 
 dared to detach him t nor would there have been any object to gain by doing 
 so. The true position for the defence of Washington and of Northern Vir- 
 ginia was in the immediate front of Richmond, and this raid was another 
 of the consequences of weakening McClellan's army The fright it occa- 
 sioned caused a levy en masse in some of the Northern States, and troops 
 began to pour into Washington. Now at least large reinforcements could 
 have been promptly sent. Jackson on the retreat, all the force on the 
 Potomac might be relieved and their places filled by the new levies. But. 
 alas ! the panic over, the orders for new troops were countermanded, and 
 McDowell — who, we are credibly informed, had been at last promised, 
 instead of being sent toward Richmond, which would have enabled him 
 surely and certainly to intercept Jackson, form a junction with McCIellan, 
 and destroy the enemy's army in detail — was sent off in the opposite di- 
 rection to unite with the four other Major-Gen erals, who, at the heads of 
 their respective armies, were engaged in writing accounts of their latest 
 victories, or dreaming of future ones, while Jackson was hurrying down 
 to join the already superior forces of Lee in a combined and overpowering 
 attack on McCIellan. 
 
 Then followed events of which McCIellan and his army may be justly 
 proud. The enemy had rendered the approaches to Richmond from the 
 north and east by our small force almost impossible. There remained 
 no chances for attacking him on any terms that could give hope of suc- 
 cess except by the northeast. The road passed through a country 
 which the Confederates considered impassable for cannon, and upon 
 which but few works had been erected. The result would depend in a 
 great degree upon the rapidity with which the enemy could mass his 
 forces in" that direction. General McClellan's attention had been ear- 
 nestly directed to this route, private letters told us that the ground had 
 beenreconnoitered, and dispatches to the press said that the recent dry 
 weather had done much toward making the country passable. Mea- 
 sures had been taken for a sudden moving of our base to the James River, 
 should it become necessary ; but the lingering hope of being reinforced 
 
11 
 
 probably detained General McClellan till the last moment on the Chick 
 ahominy. On the 26th of June the Confederates made an unsuccessfu 
 attack on Mechanicsville. Alter repulsing them at this point, the known 
 approach of Jackson caused all our disposable force to be assembled at 
 Gaine's Mill to give him battle. For five long hours twenty -five thousand 
 men, all that could be spared from the lines, resisted the onset of fifty 
 thousand Confederates with success ; but toward night a great accession 
 of force swelled their numbers to seventy thousand, and it required all 
 the reinforcements that could possibly be spared from other points to 
 hold our ground. During the night the whole army was quietly with- 
 drawn, crossed the river, and destroyed the bridges behind them. The 
 enemy, thrown off the trail, moved down the river, and until afternoon 
 dense masses could be seen crossing the river above to join in the pur- 
 suit to the White House. 
 
 The enemy was out-generaled, and that night our troops were with- 
 drawn from their works, and took the road to James River, turning 
 fiercely on their foes (" who endeavored to hold them in check ") at 
 every favorable position, and so covered the movement of our enormous 
 trains and stores. Battles succeeded battles, and in the intervals of 
 conflict our troops, successful in every engagement, pursued their march 
 until the " week of battles " was crowned by the victory of Malvern 
 Hills, and the army saved. The whole series of operations was con- 
 ducted with masterly skill, and nothing could be more admirable than 
 the behavior of the troops. In the steadiness, accuracy, and prompt- 
 itude with which great masses were handled and manoeuvred, could be 
 traced the direct effects of the "idle reviews" to which, day by day, 
 the different corps had been accustomed in "Washington. 
 
 Notwithstanding the bitter disappointment of the Confederates, who, 
 in view of their enormous superiority of numbers and freedom of action 
 reasonably anticipated the total destruction of our army, they knew 
 how to do justice to their enemy, and while an American Senator ignor- 
 ant of war, was employed in villifying and traducing McClellan on the 
 floor of the Senate, the head of the rebel-government, himself a soldier, 
 in open admiration, declared that with the exception of the retreat of 
 Moreau through the Black Forest — a retreat upon which, more than 
 upon any of his victories, rests his great fame as a General — the opera- 
 tions of McClellan furnished the most magnificent example which mod- 
 ern history presents of the rescue of a great army from apparent ruin. 
 
 After reaching Harrison's Landing, and three days after the battle of 
 Malvern Hills was fought, Shields' division was sent to the peninsula, too 
 late again for any earthly use except to supply the places of those whom 
 their presence in proper time would have saved. These troops and all 
 the reinforcements previously received, formed part of the 158,000 men 
 whom Mr. Chandler would have us believe were always under General 
 McClellan's control, and for the misapplication of which he is so vio- 
 lently assailed. 
 
 Mr. Chandler further says that McDowell's troops, also, " were to 
 have been sent him." Why were they not sent ? and in time to save the 
 campaign, and the blood and treasure that must now be poured out like 
 water, because they were not sent ? 
 
Ill 
 
 12 LIBRARY Of 
 
 But that Wool's and McCall's, and Shields 
 Do well's " were to have been sent," is a com 
 policy that originally withdrew them from iBPipnjgm ,,B, g^jjjj" ^2 3^ 
 
 tained them so long against his earnest and ^Jfcu remonstrances- 
 
 Washington was as safe when they were withdrawn — apparently a 
 great deal safer than when they were retained. If they could be 
 spared at any time, they could have been spared in April. But they 
 were withdrawn when the act sacrificed the whole campaign, and were 
 restored when it was too'late to be of any use. 
 
 It will be seen by a consideration of the facts stated by Mr. Chandler, 
 and here presented in their true light and proper connection, that the 
 failure of this campaign, the profitless expenditure of hundreds of mil- 
 lions of treasure, and of tens of thousands of lives, were due, not to any 
 want of capacity, nor courage, nor energy, nor forethought of General 
 McClellan ; nor of discipline, nor labor, nor bravery, nor devotion on 
 the part of his troops ; but that they were the direct, natural and ne- 
 cessary result of the suicidal policy which deprived the General-in-Chief 
 of a part of his command, and transferred the control of our armies 
 and the conduct of the war to an irresponsible committee and an in- 
 competent civilian. 
 
 So long as our armies were under one military head, and those of the 
 rebels were directed by their War Office and its influences in Richmond, 
 we were favored with a continued and unbroken series of victories. 
 The rebels took warning, and established the office of Commander-in- 
 Chief. While they were doing this, a powerful faction was at work to 
 reverse the process with us. Our Commander-in-Chief was, amid the 
 triumphant rejoicings. of the Conspirators, deprived of his position, and 
 his dutie 5 were transferred to our War Office and its influences. The 
 results o this change of policy on both sides have shown themselves 
 all over 1 he country. 
 
 But wl latever have been the errors into which the President has suf- 
 fered those under him to be led, he has only* needed to see them plainly 
 to apply a remedy. His heart, at least, is in the right place. His worst 
 enemy h is not accused him of any controlling emotion save the purpose 
 to do all in his power for the good of the country. The failures have 
 taught h m the errors of the past twelve months. General Halleck has 
 assumed die military conduct of the war. The plans of the campaign 
 which are now determined upon, will not be botched by an incom- 
 petent Secretary or a meddling committee. General McClellan will 
 get strength instead of weakness through the wire which connects his 
 headquarters with the War Office, and we reveal no more than the 
 country has a right to know, when we say that combinations have been 
 formed, plans already set on foot and approaching their crisis, which 
 will vindicate the wisdom of President Lincoln in his last act, and the 
 masterly ability of General McClellan in his past campaign and in the 
 new one now begun. 
 
 Edward O. Jenkins, Printer, 20 North William Street, N. Y. 
 
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