jLB 475 
 
 .L6 H7 
 
 ICopy 1 
 
 JOHN LOCKE 
 
 AND 
 
 FORMAL DISCIPLINE 
 
 A THESIS 
 
 Presented to the General Faculty of the 
 University of Virginia 
 
 IN Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 BY 
 
 Frederick Arthur Hodge 
 
 professor of 
 Psychology and Education 
 
 WiNTHROP Normal and Industrial College 
 Rock Hill. South Carolina 
 
JOHN LOCKE 
 
 AND 
 
 FORMAL DISCIPLINE 
 
 A THESIS 
 
 Presented to the General Faculty of the 
 University of Virginia 
 
 IN Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
 BY 
 
 Frederick Arthur Hodge 
 
 professor of 
 Psychology and Education 
 
 WiNTHROP Normal and Industrial College 
 Rock Hill, South Carolina 
 
 LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA : 
 J. P. Bell Company, Inc., Printers and Binders 
 1911 
 
L3A^^, 
 
 ,\_fc 
 
 ^1 
 
 TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 PAGE 
 
 I. Pkeliminary Statement 3 
 
 II. Locke's Histoeical and Philosophical Backgeound 6 
 
 III. Soueces for Locke's Educational Docteines 12 
 
 IV. The Essay and Foemal Discipline 14 
 
 V. Logic and Mathematics as a Discipline of Reason. . 20 
 
 YI. Ee-Interpeetation of Locke's Views 27 
 
 Bibliography 31 
 
I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
 
 Modern education is no exception to that law of development by 
 which the new must be entered through the medium of the old. 
 Classicism had to yield to naturalism and realism, as scholasticism 
 had given way to the renaissance. But progress ever comes through 
 readjustment, and- it was in the effort to readjust classical training 
 to the demands of the renaissance, that the doctrine of formal disci- 
 pline was brought forth. This doctrine, in its broader form, held 
 that mental activity leads to mental power, and power so gained 
 may be used on any kind of subject-matter with equal facility. 
 The aim of education, therefore, should be the learning process, 
 not the thing learned.^ 
 
 It is not the purpose of the present paper to engage in polemics 
 over this already much belabored dogma, but rather to attempt a 
 re-interpretation of the views of one, who, although he prepared 
 the way for the overthrow of formal discipline, has notwithstand- 
 ing, often been classed by educational writers as a leading pro- 
 mulgator of it. There are, in fact, but few men who have been 
 used as the scapegoat for so many varying theories as John Locke. 
 In the words of Professor Adams :^ "Almost every philosopher who 
 writes a book feels compelled to dispose of Locke first: . . . 
 Though they spend all their introductory chapters in showing how 
 Locke went wrong, philosophers do not seem to be able to get 
 along without him." 
 
 It has thus come to pass that Locke stands identified with many 
 opinions which are contrary to the whole tenor of his thinking. 
 It also frequently occurs that what was intended by him merely 
 as a side-light, or as illustrative material, has been used as his 
 central thought. A few of the many interpretations of Locke by 
 leading educational writers will serve to show the difference in 
 opinion concerning his classification. 
 
 ^Monroe's "Text-Book in the Hist, of Ed.," p. 596. 
 "'Herbartian Psychology Applied to Education," p. 32. 
 
Oscar Browning^ divides educators into three schools : humanists, 
 realists and naturalists, and puts Locke in the last class. 
 
 Quick- notes two classes, utilitarians and mental trainers. He 
 places Locke with the latter, inasmuch as he is not so much con- 
 cerned with results in a practical way, as with discipline. 
 
 Compayre^ finds the opposing classes in realists and formalists, 
 and places Locke with the former class. 
 
 Paul Monroe* sees in Locke traces of the realist and the natural- 
 ist, but, above all, he uses him as the chief representative of tlie 
 disciplinary conception in education. 
 
 Williams^ finds in him a "pronounced utilitarian;'' and S. S. 
 Laurie*' an incomplete humanivst. 
 
 Amid these varying estimates there seems to run but one common 
 thought — the disciplinary character of education, according to 
 Locke. Compayre is, apparently, the only exception. He, however, 
 makes no attempt to free Locke from the dogma attributed to him 
 by the others, but, stressing a slightly different phase of Locke's 
 work, classes him with the realists instead of the formalists. 
 
 The question of correctly interpreting Locke does not differ 
 much from the same problem with relation to any other writer, 
 except in degree. With him, individual statements mean possibly 
 less, and the entire system more, than with most writers. This has 
 been clearly expressed by Lewes.'' 
 
 '"There is no excuse for not understanding Locke. If his 
 language be occasionally loose and wavering, his meaning is 
 always to be gathered from the context. He had not the lucidity 
 of Descartes or Hobbes; but he was most anxious to make himself 
 intelligible, and to this end he varied his expressions, and stated 
 his meaning in a variety of forms. He must not be taken literally. 
 Xo single passage is to be relied on, unless it be also borne out by 
 
 ^"Educational Theories," pp. 85 ft". 
 
 ^''Educational Reformers," pp. 234 ff. 
 
 '"'Hist, of Pedagogy;" Tr. by W. H. Payne, §210. 
 
 ^"Text-Book in the Hist, of Ed.," pp. 505 flf. 
 
 '"Hist, of Modern Ed.," pp. 193 ff. 
 
 ""Educational Opinion from the Renaissance," p. 233. 
 
 ^"Biographical Hist, of Phil.," vol. 2, p. 534. 
 
the whole tenor of his speculations. Any person merely 'dipping 
 into' the Essay will find passages which seem very contradictory: 
 any person carefully reading it through will find all clear and 
 coherent." 
 
 It will be the aim of this paper to interpret Locke's educational 
 views in harmony with his philosophy. Indeed, I am convinced 
 that only by so doing can his real meaning be made manifest. 
 He was primarily a philosopher, and his greatest work, "The 
 Essay Concerning Human Understanding," is a statement of his 
 philosophical views. Of the three works written by him, with 
 which we shall be principally concerned, the "Essay" is the only 
 one that may be called a finished product. His "Thoughts Con- 
 cerning Education," was written to a friend concerning the educa- 
 tion of his son. The "Conduct of the Understanding," from which 
 most of Locke's formal discipline is culled, was an afterthought 
 which Locke intended for an additional chapter to the "Essay." 
 It was never put in final form by him, and was first published in 
 a volume of posthumous works. 
 
 Professor Paul Monroe says of "Thoughts Concerning Educa- 
 tion:"^ "It is entirely one-sided to formulate Locke's educational 
 ideas from this one treatise, the more so since it contains advice 
 written to a friend concerning the education of his own sons and 
 it is specifically stated by Locke that much of it has only this 
 special application." Again he says;- "Though it is impossible to 
 enter into details here, it must be borne in mind that Locke's 
 philosophical and psychological views do not always accord with 
 his views on education." 
 
 It is but just to any writer, that his views be harmoniously 
 interpreted when possible. The task before us is limited to the 
 re-interpretation of that part of Locke's system which, in the eyes 
 of educators, seems to sanction the dogma of formal discipline. If 
 it shall be found that the discrepancy between his philosophy and 
 education, pointed out by Professor Monroe, appears in connection 
 with this dog-ma, a re-interpretation may serve at once to remove 
 Locke from the ranks of the disciplinarians and to harmonize his 
 entire system of the origin and development of knowledge. 
 
 "'Text-Book in the Hist, of Ed.," p. 513. 
 =Ibid. 
 
II. LOCKE'S HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
 BACKGROUND 
 
 The educational doctrine wliich based the curriculum on the 
 supposed values of studies, was, in its earlier days, part of the 
 educational system known as Humanism. During it's first period, 
 from the middle of the fourteenth to the middle of the fifteenth 
 centuries. Humanism represented a real revival of learning. "It 
 was, however, inevitable," says Laurie,^ "that in seeking for an 
 expression of Life and Art, the more active minds should be drawn 
 to what was ready-made, but had been forgotten. Latin literature, 
 and, subsequently, the study of Greek, accordingly, were the two 
 great occupations of the Humanists. From the ancient classics 
 they sought to revivify the Socratic teaching that 'knowledge is 
 virtue.' " 
 
 Petrus Vergerius (1349 — ), a thorough Humanist, in writing of 
 liberal studies, says;- "We call those studies liberal which are 
 worthy of a free man ; those studies by which we attain and practice 
 virtue and wisdom; that education which calls forth, trains and 
 develops those highest gifts of body and of mind which ennoble 
 men." 
 
 Between these views and those of the later Humanists there is a 
 very decided difference. The first century of Humanism had 
 breadth of view and the spirit of real scholarship. They turned 
 to the classics because these had meaning for life : they refused 
 to be bound by scholasticism with its vapid show of reason, its 
 acceptance and confirmation of received doctrines, and its perfect 
 contentment with its own educational status. "In this difference," 
 says Woodward,'^ "is implied a constant process in which the ideal 
 of the greater Humanists was slowly narrowed and hardened till 
 it reaches the pedantry which rouses the scorn of Montaigne. It 
 
 '"Ed. Opinion from the Renaissance," p. 0. 
 
 ""De Ingenxiis Moribus," Tr. by Woodward in '"Vittorino Da Feltre and 
 Other Humanist Educators," p. 102. 
 
 ^"Vittorino Da Feltre and Other Humanist Educators," Intro, p. viii. 
 
is not merely that the Latinity of Vergerius or Giiarino was freer 
 and less artificial, nor that with them literature was something 
 more than a sequence of model passages: the scholars of the first 
 half of the Quattrocento had a far broader grasp of the true content 
 of education, and with it a more sincere conception of the relation 
 between the antique and the modern world." 
 
 "The narrowing of the educational aim and the return to mere 
 verbalism was, in truth, not long of coming. If it be the essence 
 of Humanism in its larger meaning, that it was the opening of 
 men's eyes afresh to nature and life, the exhaustion of the new 
 movement can be easily understood. For it is given to few men, 
 and those chiefly of poetic temperament, to keep their eyes open 
 for long. There is an instinctive craving for dogma and form; 
 for without these there is no intellectual repose."^ 
 
 By the sixteenth century this tendency toward intellectual repose 
 and dogmatism had obscured the early Humanistic aims: "that 
 which was at first merely a means came to be considered as an end 
 in itself. The term Humanities came to indicate the language and 
 literature of the ancients. Consequently, the aim of education was 
 thought of in terms of language and literature instead of in terms 
 of life: the educational effort was directed toward the mastery 
 of this literature. That portion of these literatures which was 
 superior from the formal standpoint became the center of educa- 
 tional effort. Consequently the formal, instead of the content or 
 literary side of these writings, was considered to be of the greater 
 importance. This change, though a gradual one, resulted in the 
 formulation of a type of education distinct from and inferior to 
 the liberal education out of which it grew."^ Educational thought 
 became centered in the triviuni and quadrivium of Scholasticism, 
 and, even the studies included in these were taught for their 
 value as mental disciplines rather than for anything contained in 
 them. 
 
 During the Middle Ages and the early period of Humanism, 
 Latin had not been studied for its cultural value alone. It had 
 also a practical, utilitarian value.^ It was the key that unlocked 
 
 "'Ed. Opinion from the Renaissance," p. 28. 
 
 ^Monroe's "Brief Course in the Hist, of Ed.," p. 170. 
 
 ^Cf. Jos. Payne's "Lectures on the Hist, of Ed.," vol. 2. p. 35. 
 
every door. It was the language of all education. Woodward 
 emphasizes this fact in the following passage.^ 
 
 "But apart from the broader effects of classical culture it was 
 held that on nearly every side of practical life the best guidance 
 attainable was to be derived from the study of ancient books. 
 Aristotle's Politics is the soundest manual of statecraft : Vegetius 
 and Caesar are the best guides to the Art of War; Virgil, to agri- 
 culture. In ruling a household, Cicero, Plutarch, Upon Education, 
 and Francesco Barbaro, whose work De Re Uxoria was regarded 
 as worthy of a place in the noble company, could be safely relied 
 upon. In all departments of government, in war, justice, council, 
 and domestic policy. Literature is the one sure course of practical 
 wisdom." 
 
 At this early day there was no distinction between the elements 
 that made for culture and those that made for utility. But when 
 the scientific awakening of Bruno and Bacon, of Copernicus and 
 Galileo usliered in a thousand insistent demands for practical 
 scientific training, the whole system of educational values was 
 changed. The classics could not longer fulfill the demand for 
 practical values and the Humanists began to urge their cultural 
 values. 
 
 The claim of the classics to cultural values was not founded 
 upon demonstration, but upon authority. Studies which had 
 produced such civilizations could not be called in question. Even 
 if they were inadequate in content no exception could be taken to 
 them as mental trainers. Therefore, if a man would excell in 
 science, let him first develop Ms power of judgment through the 
 classics, and in this way he will best prepare himself for any field 
 of investigation. 
 
 Hegius, who presided over the College of Deventer in Holland, 
 the first school in the North to adopt the study of Greek after the 
 capture of Constantinople, said :- 
 
 "If any one wishes to understand grammar, rhetoric, mathematics, 
 history or Holy Scripture, let him learn Greek. We owe everything 
 to the Greeks." This idea rapidly became the dominant one, and 
 formal discipline intrenched itself in authority. 
 
 ^"Vittorino Da Feltre and Other Humanist Educators," p. 184. 
 ^Jos. Payne's "Lectures on the Hist, of Ed.," vol. 2, p. 37. 
 
But the sixteenth century saw this dependence upon authority 
 assailed on every hand. "The movement away from authority and 
 toward freedom, which found expression in the experimental science 
 of Bacon and the pedagogy of Comenius, made itself felt in all the 
 departments of human life, especially in religion and politics. 
 In religion, it produced the Eef ormation ; in politics, that persistent 
 tendency to ignore the divine right of kings, and to place the seat 
 of authority in the people."^ Finally through the brilliant work 
 of Rene Descartes (1606-1659) and John Locke (1632-1704), 
 philosophy threw off its yoke. These two men, although so much 
 opposed in the general character of their philosophy, have, never- 
 theless, as Davidson points out,- one view in common. They both 
 refuse to be bound by authority. Descartes makes truth to rest 
 upon clearness and distinctness of ideas, while Locke bases it upon 
 experience; both deny authority as a valid test. The two types of 
 philosophy thus promulgated — rationalism and empiricism — were 
 respectively continued; on the continent by the mathematical 
 rationalists Spinoza and Leibniz; and in England by B^'keley 
 and Hume. In Locke, however, are to be found elements which 
 point forward to the final reconciliation in Kant. 
 
 Having rested its claims upon authority, the advocates of formal 
 discipline have consistently eschewed all metaphysical alliances. 
 But, while belonging to no particular system of philosophy, there 
 are some systems better adapted to its claims than others. Thus, 
 the faculty psychology of Aristotle formed a very convenient psy- 
 chological background for it. For, if the value of the classics lay 
 in their disciplinary powers, power gained in the exercise of any 
 particular faculty would be beneficial in all other exercises of the 
 same faculty. In fastening upon Locke as an exponent of this 
 dogma, however, modern writers have failed to take into considera- 
 tion the question of its adaptability to liis philosophy. 
 
 Of the two great philosophical systems of Locke's time, viz : 
 empiricism and rationalism, the latter affords the better basis for 
 the dogma of formal discipline. The whole tendency of empiricism 
 is against it, and furnishes the principles for its overthrow. In 
 
 ^Davidson's "A History of Education," p. 196. 
 =^Ibid, p. 197. 
 
 9 
 
opposition to the dogma of formal discipline, empiricism sets up 
 the doctrine of specific experiences. On the other hand there is a 
 presupposition of mental discipline in the fundamental doctrines 
 of the mathematical rationalists. They held mathematics to be 
 the most perfect and, therefore, the pattern science, and all others 
 should be cast in the same mould. Spinoza wrote his Ethics under 
 the title, Ethica more geometrica demonstrata. Each book begins 
 with definitions and axioms; propositions and proofs follow. 
 According to this type of philosophy, mathematics furnished the 
 discipline required for ethics and, in fact, for all other sciences. 
 
 Paulsen has shown^ that '^even the cogito ergo sum of Descartes 
 together with the deduction therefrom of the existence of God, 
 which, in turn, is to form the basis or the certainty of all scientific 
 knowledge, is an afterthought' deduced from certain generaliza- 
 tions on mathematics as a perfect and, therefore, a pattern science. 
 It was probably due only to his craving for mathematics that Des- 
 cartes substituted mathematical for classical discipline. The differ- 
 ence is in content and not in form or method. 
 
 To what extent Locke was influenced by the Humanism that 
 pervaded Oxford while he was a student there, it is impossible to 
 say. There is some evidence that he revolted at the narrowness 
 and dogmatism of the curriculum. "I have often heard him say," 
 Lady Masham reports, "that he had small satisfaction in his Oxford 
 studies, as finding very little light brought thereby to his under- 
 standing; that he became discontented with his manner of life, 
 and wished that his father had rather designed him for anything 
 else than what he was destined to."- Again she writes: "The 
 first books, as Mr. Locke has told me, which gave him a relish 
 of philosophical things were those of Descartes. He was rejoiced 
 in reading these, because, though he very often differed in opinion 
 from this writer, yet he found that what he said was very intelligi- 
 ble; from whence he was encouraged to think that his not having 
 understood others had possibly not proceeded from a defect in his 
 understanding."^ 
 
 "'Intro, to Phil.," Tr. by Frank Thilly, Book II., note p. 38.3. 
 ''Fraser's Ed. of Locke's "Essay Concerning Human Understanding," 
 Prolegomena, p. xix. 
 Tbid, p. XX. 
 
 10 
 
It may well have been that the center of attraction for Locke, in 
 the writings of Descartes, was that freedom from authority which 
 has already been mentioned as characteristic of both these men. 
 It is certain that Locke found the menu provided by Humanism, 
 unappetizing. In his "Thoughts Concerning Education," he 
 says :^ 
 
 "But under whose Care soever a Child is put to be taught during 
 the tender and flexible years of his Life, this is certain, it should 
 be one who thinks Latin and Language the least Part of Educa- 
 tion;" and again: 2 "When I consider what ado is made about a 
 little Latin and Greek, how many Years are spent at it, and what 
 a Noise and Business it makes to no Purpose, I can hardly for- 
 bear thinking that the Parents of Children still live in fear of the 
 school-masters Rod, which they look on as the only Instrument of 
 Education; as a language or two to be its whole Business." 
 
 Locke did not advocate the abolition of the classics from the 
 schools. He thought they were necessary for a gentleman's son, 
 but that altogether too much attention was paid to this limited 
 sphere. 
 
 These quotations in connection with the testimony of Lady 
 Masham, indicate that Locke's free spirit revolted at the dogmatism 
 of Humanism, and led him to break with this traditional authority 
 in formulating his educational system. Wliether he broke with 
 Humanism in toto, or only so far as the classics were concerned, 
 will be considered later. Before entering upon a discussion of his 
 system we shall briefly notice our sources. 
 
 >§177. 
 ^§147. 
 
 11 
 
III. SOURCES FOR LOCKE'S EDUCATIONAL 
 DOCTRINES 
 
 The sources for the study of Locke's educational views are the 
 "Essay Concerning Human Understanding;" "Thoughts Concern- 
 ing Education;" "Conduct of the Understanding;" and a short 
 essay "Of Study." 
 
 The "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" was the great- 
 est and most careful piece of work of his life. In an introductory 
 chapter he details the events that started him upon this inquiry. 
 A few friends having met in Locke's chamber, probably during 
 the winter of 1670-1671 became involved in a discussion Avhich 
 could only be settled by a criticism of the knowing faculties. Locke 
 set liimself to this task and after eighteen years of labor he pub- 
 lished the first edition in March, 1690. This was followed by 
 other editions, the second in 1694, and the third and fourth in 
 1695 and 1700 respectively. Important changes were made and 
 new chapters added in both the second and fourth editions. 
 
 "Thoughts Concerning Education" was first published anony- 
 mously, in 1693. It was translated into French by Pierre Coste, 
 who supplied the name of the author. In later editions, Locke 
 signed his own name to the dedicatory letter. S. S. Laurie says;^ 
 "I would apologize for the large space I have given to Locke did I 
 not think that his Thoughts read along with his Conduct of the 
 Understanding is, in spite of some obvious faults the best treatise 
 on education which has ever appeared, with the (doubtful) excep- 
 tion of Quintillian." 
 
 Quick gives the following account of Locke's purpose in writing 
 Thoughts.- "One of Locke's friends in England, Mr. Edward 
 Clarke of Chipley, near Taunton, was anxious for advice about the 
 bringing up of his son, and, as this problem had been much in 
 Locke's thoughts, the philosopher wrote from Holland a series of 
 letters on the subject, which, four years after his return to England, 
 
 ^"Educational Opinion from the Renaissance," Prefatory note, p. vi. 
 ^"Loeke on Ed.," Intro, p. xxsvi. 
 
 12 
 
he was induced to publish as 'Thoughts Concerning Education.' 
 No doubt the letters were more elaborate than they would have 
 been but for a notion in the writer's mind that they might some 
 day be used as material for a treatise. . . . As he afterwards 
 found no time to work up these letters into a regular dissertation, 
 he was content to publish them as thoughts." 
 
 The "Conduct of the Understanding" was originally designed 
 as an additional chapter of the Essay. It, however, failed to appear 
 in the fourth edition, although previous to the publication of this 
 edition, the author had written his intention of including the Con- 
 dud, to William Molyn^ux. In fact, this treatise was never 
 published nor even revised by Locke, but first appeared in the 
 "Posthumous Works of Mr. John Locke," edited anonomously, 
 though probably by Peter King, and published in 1706. Of this 
 collection the editor says in general that, "for the most part they 
 received not the author's last hand, being in a great measure little 
 more than sudden views, intended to be afterwards revised and 
 farther looked into, but by sickness, intervention of business, 
 or preferable enquiries happened to be thrust aside and so lay 
 neglected."^ 
 
 The essay "Of Study" was likewise a posthumous publication, 
 but is without value for the present inquiiy. 
 
 ^Fowler's "Locke's Conduct of the Understanding," Intro, p. xxii. 
 
 13 
 
IV. THE ESSAY AND FORMAL DISCIPLINE 
 
 In his introduction to the "Essay,"^ Locke states that his purpose 
 is to ''inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human 
 knowledge." In so far as he finds the "original" of knowledge in 
 ideas which are obtained either through sensation or reflection, his 
 problem is a psychological one. But in so far as it has to do with 
 the validity of knowledge and its extent, the problem is epistemo- 
 logical. 
 
 I have already endeavored to show that such a doctrine as that 
 of formal discipline could be more readily adapted to some philo- 
 sophical systems than to others. It remains to be shown whether 
 the epistemology and psychology of Locke furnish us with any 
 Grundlehre for such a doctrine. If so, the alleged inconsistency 
 between his philosophy and educational theory vanishes. If, on 
 the other hand, his philosophical principles offer no foundation 
 for formal discipline, we may well look for some other interpre- 
 tation of those passages in his other writings wherein, it is claimed, 
 the dogma is promulgated. 
 
 In the First Book of the Essay, Locke's purpose is a negative 
 one; i. e., to show by reason and a fund of observed facts, that 
 none of our ideas may be called innate when such term would 
 indicate their origin in the mind apart from experience. He holds 
 this as evident because they must either be in the mind at birth, 
 or dawn upon it later. That the former is not true is evident, 
 because, "to be in the mind" must obviously imply consciousness 
 of them, and we know that children are not conscious of many of 
 the so-called innate truths, such as mathematical axioms, the law 
 of identity, etc. But, if, on the other hand, there is merely a 
 capacity for these truths and they themselves dawn later, then, 
 not only a part of the things we come to know are innate, but all 
 are, and the term, as applied to a restricted class of ideas, loses 
 its distinction. 
 
 Wliile the limits of this investigation do not include the primary 
 question at issue in the First Book of the Essay, yet there are in 
 
 14 
 
this discussion epistemological implications that have direct bear- 
 ing on our problem. 
 
 Friedrich Paulsen says:^ "Epistemological inquiries culminate 
 in two questions: What is the essence, and What is the origin of 
 knowledge? What is hnoivledge, and How is l-nowledge acquired f 
 In the First Book of the Essay, Locke is concerned with the ques- 
 tion of the origin of knowledge. 
 
 Granting, for the moment, the existence of innate ideas, such 
 ideas would necessarily be both general and abstract. This would 
 posit the existence of general truths in the mind prior to particular 
 facts. Locke's basal contention contradicts this. For him "the 
 ideas first known are not general axioms and abstract concepts, 
 but particular impressions of the senses."^ "The senses at first 
 let in particular ideas and furnish the yet empty cabinet, and the 
 mind by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are 
 lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards, the 
 mind proceeding further, abstracts them, and by degrees karns 
 the use of general names."^ This makes all general truths arise 
 from particular experiences by means of abstraction. 
 
 It will be, furthermore, apparent that under the system of innate 
 ideas, the original endowment of ideas will form both the basis for 
 the aquisition of specific experiences, and the interpreting medium 
 of them. Truth and certainty will be attained by reference of 
 each experience to some one of these innate truths. But the 
 number of these innate ideas must necessarily remain limited. 
 Martinean and others have tried to catalog them. If, then, the 
 number of experiences may be indefinitely increased while the 
 number of general ideas to which they are referred, remains static, 
 there will be, of necessity, an extension of the general truths over 
 the varied matters of experience. Such an extension of the appli- 
 cation of general truths is formal discipline, and this dogma is, 
 therefore, a corollary of the doctrine of innate ideas. Moreover, 
 in using the relation of particular and general ideas as the basis 
 of his attack on innate ideas Locke is forced at the same time to 
 strike at the foundation of its corollary, formal discipline. 
 
 ^"Intro. to Phil.," Tr. by F. Thilly, Book II., p. 341. 
 ^Falckenberg's "Hist, of Modern Phil.," Tr. by A. C. Armsti'ong, Jr., 
 p. 156. 
 
 ^Essaij, Book I., Cliapter 1, §15. 
 
 15 
 
While it is true that Locke has not criticised innate ideas because 
 of the disciplinary concej)tion involved in their application to 
 particular facts of experience, he has done that which is of equal 
 importance for the purposes of this investigation in taking away 
 the ground on which the system rests. He holds that the mind 
 is at first a blank. There is no knowledge prior to experience. 
 The normal order is from particular to general. Such is the 
 system of specific experience that he sets up against or in place 
 of that of innate ideas. This doctrine of specific experience as the 
 basis of knowledge, does away with both the need for, and the 
 possibility of formal discipline. 
 
 The difi^erence in theory between Locke and the advocates of 
 innate ideas, however, is more than merely a question of the order 
 in which general and particular ^notions are acquired. It is a 
 fundamental difl:erence in the conception of the nature of knowl- 
 edge. The theory of innate ideas, as also the faculty psychology, 
 conceived of the elements of knowledge as static and fixed. Locke 
 conceives of them as dynamic. This difi:erence in the nature of 
 knowledge as embodied in the rival systems is clearly pointed out 
 by AVeber. He says :^ 
 
 "The fact is if truth is native to the mind, it is useless to search 
 for it outside by observation and experimentation. Then we may, 
 l)y means of a priori speculation, meditation, and reasoning, evolve 
 it from our own inner consciousness, as the spider spins its web 
 out of itself. This hypothesis Descartes consistently carries out 
 when he 'closes his eyes and stops his ears,' and abstracts from 
 everything acquired by the senses; but he ceases to be consistent 
 when he assiduously devotes himself to the study of anatomy and 
 physiology. Indeed, the favorite method of the metaphysics of 
 the monasteries and universities was to close one's eyes, to stop 
 one's ears, and to ignore the real world. This method prevailed 
 as long as the conviction existed that our ideas have their source 
 within us. Hence, it was necessary, in order to make the philoso- 
 phers 'open their eyes to the real world,' to prove to them that 
 all our ideas come to us from without, through the medium of 
 sensation: it was necessary to demonstrate that our ideas are not 
 innate but acquired." 
 
 ^Weber's "Hist, of Phil.," Tr. by Frank Thilly, p. 371. 
 
 16 
 
Having found nothing in Locke's epistemology that warrants the 
 attribution to him of the doctrine of formal discipline we will now 
 proceed to examine his psychology. The theory of an original 
 mental endowment in ideas differs but little, in Locke's point of 
 view, from the theory of an original endowment of mental faculties. 
 In fact the two theories go hand in hand, the first, however, being 
 more of an epistemology by nature, and the latter, a psychology. 
 The doctrine of innate ideas involves a discipline of material 
 elements, while the faculty psychology involves a discipline of 
 formal elements. The former makes necessary the extension of 
 the application of general truths, the latter extends the application 
 of mental powers. A criticism of innate ideas, therefore, from the 
 standpoint of their disciplinary application as general truths is 
 likewise a criticism of the faculty psychology from the same stand- 
 point. Locke, however, is commonly taken as an advocate of the 
 faculty psychology, either because he is commonly accepted as an 
 advocate of formal discipline, and the one implies the other; or 
 because of his frequent use of the terminology current among 
 the faculty psychologists. 
 
 Mr. Adams, while paying the highest tributes to Locke, voices 
 the commonly accepted view of his psychology. He says:^ 
 
 "The English philosopher got rid of innate ideas, but he could 
 not free himself from innate faculties. What Locke did for innate 
 ideas Herbart did for innate faculties. Burdened by his assump- 
 tion of successive states, Locke could not get his ideas to work 
 upon each other in order to produce complex actions and reactions. 
 He was therefore driven to invent or assume certain powers of 
 the mind which he called faculties, and which were credited with 
 all the work that went on within the mind. When a certain pro- 
 cess was discovered, by the act of introspection to take place in the 
 mind, Locke and his followers gave this process a name, and then 
 assumed a faculty corresponding to that name. A certain process 
 called abstraction is discovered to go on within the mind. This 
 gives the introspectionist no trouble. It is only a matter of baptiz- 
 ing another faculty, and we have the 'faculty of abstraction.' 
 Against this short and easy method Herbart made a vigorous pro- 
 test and swept away forever from his Philosophy the whole brood 
 of faculties." 
 
 '"Heibartian Psy. Applied to Ed.," p. 47. 
 
 17 
 
On tliis point Locke displays his usual good sense, and one can- 
 not but feel that, not only did he see the difficulty clearly, but his 
 treatment of it, avoiding as it does all metaphysical speculation, 
 is greatly preferable to that of Herbart. To say the least, Locke, 
 more than a century before the German psychologist, did free him- 
 self from what Mr. Adams above terms "innate faculties," and in 
 so doing opened a path for the rest of the thinking world. 
 
 We will let Locke argue his own case. He says :^ 
 
 "For, if it be reasonable to suppose and talk of faculties as 
 distinct beings that can act (as we do, when we say the will orders, 
 and the will is free), it is fit that we should make a speaking 
 faculty, and a walking faculty, and a dancing faculty, by which 
 these actions are produced. . . . And we may as properly 
 say that it is the singing faculty sings, and the dancing faculty 
 dances, as that the will chooses, or that the understanding con- 
 ceives; or, as is usual, that the will directs the understanding, or 
 the understanding obeys or obeys not the will: it being altogether 
 as proper and intelligible to say that the power of speaking directs 
 the power of singing, or the power of singing obeys or disobeys the 
 power of speaking. 
 
 "This way of talking, nevertheless, has prevailed, and, as I guess, 
 produced great confusion. For these being all different powers 
 in the mind, or in the man, to do several actions, he exerts them 
 as he thinks fit; but the power to do one action is not operated 
 on by the power of doing another action. 
 
 "The attributing to faculties that which belonged not to them, 
 has given occasion to this way of talking; but the introducing into 
 discourses concerning the mind, with the name of faculties, a 
 notion of their operating, has, I suppose, as little advanced our 
 knowledge in that part of ourselves, as the great use and mention 
 of the like invention of faculties, in the operations of the body, 
 has helped us in the knowledge of physic. Not that I deny there 
 are faculties, both in the body and mind : they both of them have 
 their powers of operating, else neither the one nor the other could 
 operate. For nothing can operate that is not able to operate; and 
 that is not al)le to operate that has no power to operate. Nor do I 
 deny that those words, and the like, are to have their place in the 
 
 'Essay, Book II., Chapter xxi, §17-20. 
 
 18 
 
common use of languages that have made them current. It looks 
 like too much affectation wholly to lay them by; and philosophy 
 itself, though it likes not a gaudy dress, yet, when it appears in 
 public, must have so much complacency as to be clothed in the 
 ordinary fashion and language of the country, so far as it can 
 consist with truth and perspicuity. But the fault has been, that 
 faculties have been spoken of and represented as so many distinct 
 agents. For it being asked, what it was that digested the meat in 
 our stomachs? It was a ready and very satisfactory answer to 
 say that it was the digestive faculty. What it was that made any- 
 thing come out of the body? the expulsive faculty. Wliat moved? 
 the motive faculty. And so in the mind, the intellectual faculty, 
 or the understanding, understood; and the elective faculty, or 
 the will, willed or commanded. This is, in short, to say, that the 
 ability to digest, digested; and the ability to move, moved; and 
 the ability to understand, understood. For faculty, ability, and 
 power, I think, are but different names of the same things; which 
 ways of speaking, when put into more intelligible words, will, I 
 think, amount to thus much; — That digestion is performed by 
 something that is able to digest, motion by something able to move, 
 and understanding by something able to understand. And, in 
 truth, it would be very strange if it should be otherwise ; as strange 
 as it would be for a man to be free without being able to be free." 
 
 It would be difficult to conceive of a more complete refutation 
 of the old faculty psychology than the above. It is the thought 
 of the philosopher put into the language of the plain man, and 
 there is no occasion for stumbling. He is willing to hold to the 
 term faculty, meaning by it any ahility to do anything, but rejects 
 it in the more distinctive humanistic sense. Instead of restricting 
 these so-called faculties to a limited number he makes their num- 
 ber as unlimited as actions are varied. In calling Locke's faculties, 
 innate, Adams would have to call all action innate, and would 
 commit the same fallacy as Locke himself criticized in the advocates 
 of innate ideas; viz., that to make them all innate destroys the 
 notion of them as a separate class. This, then, is Locke's solution 
 of the problem. By making faculty, the power to act, he destroys 
 faculties as a limited class, and, as has been already noted under 
 general notions, the extension of a limited power to act through 
 formal discipline is made unnecessary. In so far, then, as formal 
 discipline rests on the faculty psychology, the empirical psychology 
 of Locke offers it no support. 
 
 19 
 
V. LOGIC AND MATHEMATICS AS A DISCIPLINE OF 
 
 REASON 
 
 We are now ready for a re-interpretation of some of the passages, 
 especially from the "Conduct of the Understanding," which have 
 been most frequently quoted as evidence of Locke's disciplinary 
 view of education. It is generally thought that Locke merely sub- 
 stituted mathematics for the classics as a means of discipline. 
 Under the faculty psychology, the reasoning faculty lield highest 
 place, and the study of logic and mathematics was considered the 
 best means of training it. Locke's position on the disciplinary value 
 of these subjects should, therefore, be decisive as to Ms doctrine, and 
 especially so in as much as the passages most often quoted to show 
 his disciplinary conception, are on the subject of mathematics. 
 
 The Schoolmen were strong advocates of Logic as a means of 
 training the reason. It had held honored place in the trivium. 
 We will, therefore, let Locke's estimate of logical values speak for 
 itself. In the introduction to the Conduct, he says:^ 
 
 "The logic now in use has so long possessed the chair, as the only 
 art taught in the schools for the direction of the mind in the study 
 of the arts and sciences, that it would perhaps be thought an affecta- 
 tion of novelty to suspect that rules that have served the learned 
 world these two or three thousand years, and which, without any 
 complaint of defects, the learned have rested in, are not sufficient 
 to guide the understanding." Here he quotes from Lord Verulam, 
 who says : 
 
 "They who attributed so much to logic perceived very well and 
 truly that it was not safe to trust the understanding to itself, with- 
 out the guard of any rules. But the remedy reached not the evil; 
 but became a part of it ; for the logic which took place, though it 
 might be well enough in civil affairs and the arts which consisted 
 in talk and opinion, yet comes very far short of subtil ity in the real 
 performances of nature, and, catching at what it can not reach, 
 has served to confirm and establish errors, rather than to open a 
 way to truth." 
 
 ^Fowler's Ed. "Conduct of the Understanding," p. 4. 
 
 20 
 
In the Tourth Book of the Essay, under the chapter on Eeason, 
 the anthor enters into an elaborate discussion of the syllogism. 
 He here sets forth that any one, in reasoning on every-day matters, 
 does not put his reasoning in syllogistic form. He does not deny 
 that the "syllogism is made use of, on occasion, to discover a 
 fallacy hid in a rhetorical flourish, or cunningly wrapt up in a 
 smooth period ; and stripping an absurdity of the cover of wit and 
 good language, show it in its naked deformity."^ 
 
 But the fallacy, in this case, 'is apparent only to those who have 
 thoroughly studied mode and figure, owing to the artificial form 
 into which it must be put.' 
 
 "All," he continues,- "who have so far considered syllogism, as 
 to see the reason why in three propositions laid together in one 
 form, the conclusion will be certainly right, but in another not 
 certainly so, I grant are certain of the conclusion they draw from 
 the premises in the allowed modes and figures. But they who 
 have not so far looked into those forms, are not sure by virtue of 
 syllogism, that the conclusion certainly follows from the premises; 
 they only take it to be so by an implicit faith in their teachers 
 and a confidence in those forms of argumentation; but this is 
 still but believing, not being certain. Now, if, of all mankind 
 those who can maJie syllogisms are extremely few in comparison 
 of those who cannot ; and if, of those few who have been taught 
 logic, there is but a very small number who do any more than 
 believe that syllogisms, in the allowed modes and figures do con- 
 clude right, without knowing certainly that they do so; if syl- 
 logisms must be taken for the only proper instrument of reason 
 and means of knowledge, it will follow, that, before Aristotle, 
 there was not one man that did or could know anything by reason; 
 and that, since the invention of syllogisms there is not one of ten 
 thousand that doth. 
 
 "But God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely 
 two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational ; 
 i. e., those few of them that he could get so to examine the grounds 
 
 ^Essay, Book IV., Chapter xvii, §4. 
 =Ibia. 
 
 21 
 
of syllogisms, as to see that, in above three-score ways that three 
 propositions may be laid together, there are but about fourteen 
 wherein one may be sure that the conclusion is right; and upon 
 what grounds it is, that, in these few, the conclusion is certain, 
 and in the other not. God has been more bountiful to mankind than 
 so. He has given them a mind that can reason, without being 
 instructed in methods of syllogizing; the understanding is not 
 taught to reason by these rules; it has a native faculty to perceive 
 the coherence or incoherence of its ideas, and can range them right, 
 without any such perplexing repetitions. I say not this any way 
 to lessen Aristotle, whom I look on as one of the greatest men 
 amongst the ancients." 
 
 He next shows that the syllogism is based on an act of the 
 mind which we term inference, but inference really precedes the 
 making of the syllogism; for it is evident that the logician sees the 
 "connexion of each intermediate idea with those it stands between 
 (on which the force of the inference depends), as well before as 
 after the syllogism is made, or else they do not see it at all. For 
 a syllogism neither shows nor strengthens the connexions of any 
 two ideas immediately put together, but only by the connexion seen 
 in them shows what connexion the extremes have one with another. 
 But what connexion the intermediate has with either of the 
 extremes in the syllogism, that no syllogism does nor can show."^ 
 
 He, therefore, shows that before the logician can put propositions 
 into syllogistic form he must first have seen the connection between 
 the middle term and the other two terms, and, when this is seen, 
 the reasoning is passed upon as either good or bad, so the syllogism 
 comes too late to settle the matter. 
 
 It is right at this stage that Locke reveals the presence of a 
 power which he has previously called by the name, Sagacity. The 
 same word is used in the same connection by William James in his 
 justly celebrated chapter on Reasoning.- Locke defines it as a 
 "quickness of the mind to find out and apply intermediate ideas ;"^ 
 and again as the "faculty which finds out while inference sets in 
 
 ^Ibid. 
 
 ^"Psychology," vol. 2, p. 331. 
 
 'Essay, Book IV., Chapter ii, §3. 
 
 22 
 
order the intermediate ideas in the chain of truth."^ Logical acu- 
 men, therefore, for Locke, depends upon the sagacity of the logician 
 in seeing the connection between his terms, before putting them to- 
 gether. James has the same thought in making sagacity in the 
 selection of premises, the chief thing in reasoning. But neither 
 hold sagacity to be a subject of logical discipline. It is first of 
 all a natural endo'WTnent, but capable of development in a manner 
 which will soon be demonstrated. 
 
 If, then, the perception of logical relations depends on sagacity, 
 and is not to be had from practice in the construction of logical 
 syllogisms, 'of what use are syllogisms ?' Locke answers :- "Their 
 chief and main use is in the Schools, where men are allowed with- 
 out shame to deny the agreement of ideas that do manifestly 
 agree ; or out of the Schools, to those who from thence have learned 
 without shame to deny the connexion of ideas, which even to 
 themselves is visible." 
 
 Notwithstanding this severe arraignment of the syllogism, in 
 his "Second Vindication of the Eeasonableness of Christianity," 
 published in 1697, Locke says that, "If he (Mr. Edwards) can 
 but find arguments to prove his propositions that will bear the 
 test of setting down in form, and will so publish them, I will allow 
 myself to be mistaken. Nay, which is more, if he or anybody, 
 in the 113 pages of his Socinianism Unmasl'ed, can find but ten 
 arguments that will bear the test of syllogism — the true touchstone 
 of right arguing — I will grant that that treatise deserves all those 
 recommendations he has bestowed upon it."^ 
 
 This makes it evident that Locke did not discredit the syllo- 
 gistic logic per se, but, as indicated above, it was its use in the 
 Schools coupled with the extravagant claims made for it as a mental 
 discipline that led to his attack. He saw clearly the artificiality 
 of the system and the need for a more vital training in reasoning 
 than that offered by the Schoolmen. Their logic was a mere thing 
 of rules, of figure and mode; it was abstract, and neither sought 
 nor found living relationship with concrete existence. He showed 
 the necessity for such a relation. The logic that lacked concrete- 
 
 ^Essay, Book IV., Chapter xvii, §3. 
 
 ^Ibid., Chapter xvii, §4. 
 
 ^Vide C. Eraser's Ed. Essay, vol. 2, note p. 307. 
 
 23 
 
ness was worthless, simply a mental gymnastic. It was to overcome 
 this defect that Locke used mathematics as a concrete embodiment 
 of logical principles. 
 
 That Locke was a believer in education by concrete experiences 
 rather than by abstract laws, is evidenced by the following passage 
 from "Thoughts Concerning Education :"^ 
 
 "I have seldom or never observed any one to get the Skill of 
 Reasoning well, or Speaking handsomely, by studying those Rules 
 which pretend to teach it: And therefore I would have a young 
 Gentleman take a view of them in the shortest Systems could be 
 found, without dwelling long on the Contemplation and Study of 
 those Formalities. Right Reasoning is founded on something 
 else than the Predicaments and Predicables, and does not consist 
 in talking in Mode and Figure itself. But 'tis beside my present 
 Business to enlarge upon this Speculation. To come therefore 
 to what we have in hand : if you would have your Son reason well, 
 let him read Chillingtvorth ; and if you would have his speak well, 
 let him be conversant in Tully, to give him the true Idea of Elo- 
 quence ; and let him read those Things that are well writ in 
 English, to perfect his Style in the Purity of our Language." 
 
 Just as Locke would use Chilling worth for examples of reason- 
 ing in the concrete, so he would use mathematics. He says in the 
 "Conduct of the Understanding:"^ 
 
 ''Would you have a man reason well, you must use him to it 
 betimes, exercise his mind in observing the connection of ideas 
 and following them in train. Nothing does this better than 
 mathematics, which, therefore, I think should be taught all those 
 who have the time and opportunity, not so much to make them 
 mathematicians as to make them reasonable creatures; for though 
 we all call ourselves so, because we are born to it if we please, yet 
 we may truly say nature gives us but the seeds of it; we are born 
 to be, if we please, rational creatures, but it is use and exercise 
 only that makes us so, and we are indeed so no farther than in- 
 dustry and application has carried us. And, therefore, in ways 
 of reasoning which men have not been used to, he that will observe 
 the conclusions they take up must be satisfied they are not at all 
 rational." 
 
 ^§188. 
 
 ^Fowler's "Locke's Conduct of the Understanding," p. 20. 
 
 24 
 
In connection with this last sentence he proceeds in the next 
 paragraph to say : that men who are reasonable in some things are 
 frequently not at all so in others; and, moreover, 'men who may 
 reason well in one sort of matters to-day, may not do so at all a 
 year hence.' This recognizes that the power to reason is specific 
 and not generalized. 
 
 In the following section he continues the same general subject, 
 and referring to the above quotation, continues :^ 
 
 I have mentioned mathematics as a way to settle in the mind a 
 habit of reasoning closely and in train ; not that I think it necessary 
 that all men should be deep mathematicians, but tliat having got 
 the way of reasoning, which that study necessarily brings the mind 
 to, they might be able to transfer it to other parts of knowledge as 
 they shall have occasion. For, in all sorts of reasoning, every single 
 argument should be managed as a mathematical demonstration, 
 the connection and dependence of ideas should be followed till 
 the mind is brought to the source on which it bottoms and observes 
 the coherence all along." 
 
 On the surface this reads very much like the dogma of formal 
 discipline, but such an interpretation would be out of harmony 
 with the tenor of Locke's entire system, as has been shown. To 
 interpret this passage in sympathy with the whole trend of Locke's 
 teaching, it is only necessary to point out that he would have 
 all men study mathematics because of a certain method used therein. 
 This method, he claims, is indispensable to all correct reasoning 
 in that it exhibits the connection and dependence of ideas. 
 
 In this same connection he goes on to elaborate the benefits to 
 be derived from the study of mathematics: "The study of mathe- 
 matics would show them the necessity there is, in reasoning, to 
 separate all the distinct ideas, and see the habitudes that all those 
 concerned in the present inquiry have to one another, and to lay 
 by those which relate not to the proposition in hand and wholly 
 to leave them out of the reckoning. This is that which in other 
 subjects, besides quantit}', is what is absolutely requisite to just 
 reasoning, though in them it is not so easily observed nor so care- 
 fully practiced. In those parts of knowledge where it is thought 
 
 »Ibid, p. 23. 
 
 25 
 
demonstration has nothing to do, men reason as it were in the 
 lump ; and, if, upon a summary and confused view or upon a par- 
 tial consideration, they can raise the appearance of a probability, 
 they usually rest content." 
 
 Turning now to the Essay we tind in the chapter on Reason, 
 already referred to, the very core of Locke's preference for mathe- 
 matics over logic as a developer of the reason. He says -} 
 
 "We may in reason consider these four degrees; the first and 
 highest is the discovering and finding out of truths; the second, 
 the regular and methodical disposition of them, and laying them 
 in a clear and fit order, to make their connexion and force be 
 plainly and easily perceived; the third is the perceiving their con- 
 nexion; and the fourth, a making a right conclusion. These 
 several degrees may be observed in any mathematical demonstra- 
 tion ; it being one thing to perceive the connexion of each part, as 
 the demonstration is made by another; another to perceive the 
 dependence of the conclusion on all the parts; a third, to make 
 out a demonstration clearly and neatly one's self; and something 
 different from all these, to have first found out these intermediate 
 ideas or proofs by which it is made." 
 
 He then proceeds to show that 'syllogism serves our reason in 
 only one of the four degrees mentioned; i. e., by showing the con- 
 nexion of proofs in any one instance, but in no more.'- 
 
 Locke's preference for mathematics as a mental trainer, may be 
 summed up in the following points: (1.) It separates the ideas 
 to be reasoned about, thus avoiding confusion: (2.) It arranges 
 the truths to be used, in order, so that their connection may be 
 readily seen: (3.) It exhibits the relations of the conclusion to 
 all the parts: and (-i.) It furnishes concrete demonstrations of 
 logical inference. So far, then, as mathematics supplies a method 
 of reasoning, which may be used in reasoning upon other things, 
 it is not at all necessary that its value be construed as disciplinary. 
 
 ^Essay, Book IV., Chapter xvii, §3. 
 ^Ibid, §4. 
 
 2% 
 
VI. RE-INTERPRETATION OF LOCKE'S VIEWS 
 
 Practically all the modern writers against the theory of formal 
 discipline admit, in one form or another, that while in education 
 the emphasis must be placed on the specific character of mental 
 training, yet, there are some generalized benefits to be derived. 
 In a recent work, in which the views on this subject are sum- 
 marized, Professor Heck gives the views of a number of leading 
 educational writers as to the character and extent of such general 
 benefits, as follows :^ 
 
 "Bagley says through 'a general ideal of work;' Bennett, 
 through "knowledge or ideal consciously generalized;' Lewis, 
 through 'educating the will by inculcating some general principle 
 or motive of conduct'; Home, through 'ideas and principles of 
 action;' Thorndike, through 'identity of procedure;' Ruediger, 
 through 'identity of aim.' " 
 
 Heck sums up these general benefits under the term, "Concepts 
 of Method." Of them he says :- 
 
 "A general benefit can be derived from specific training in so far 
 as the person trained has consciously wrought out, in connection 
 with the specific training, a general concept of method, based upon 
 the specific methods used in that training. The building of such 
 a concept follows the same laws as does the building of other con- 
 cepts. The common elements in a number of specific methods are 
 abstracted and bound together in a general concept of method, a 
 general rule or principle of how to do, how to act, in situations of 
 a certain general type. These concepts may be held in the mind 
 in one or more sentences, in a single phrase or a single word, in 
 a m.etaphor or a line of poetry or some traditional maxim, in a 
 formula of mathematics or chemistry or engineering. In all cases 
 the symbol stands for a method of activity, be it in the realms of 
 pure or applied natural science, of social science or practical civics, 
 of business or professional life, of personal manner or social 
 
 '"Mental Discipline and Educational Values," p. 80. 
 %id, p. 94. 
 
 27 
 
relations. The mind stores up by means of this symbol the rules 
 and directions to guide its activity in adjustment to those phases 
 of the environment to which such an activity seems applicable." 
 
 Under such a concept of method we have placed Locke's treat- 
 ment of mathematics. There seems, however, at first glance, to 
 be but little difference between the older dogma of formal dis- 
 cipline and these newer theories of educational values. The dif- 
 ferences might be summed up as follows: (1.) The older theory 
 attributed disciplinary values to mental activity on abstract data; 
 The new insists that such values are only to be had in concrete 
 exercises. (2.) The old theory was that of a general discipline 
 of the faculties; i. e., an act of judgment increased the power of 
 judgment. The new makes discipline specific ; there is a discipline 
 of closely related judgments hut not of the judgment. (3.) There 
 is a difference in practical application. The old theory limited the 
 subject-matter of mental discipline to a few studies; paramount 
 among which were the classics. The new theory, because of its 
 ideal of specific disciplines, insists on training in a -wide variety 
 of subject-matter. As the discipline has narrowed the subject- 
 matter has been broadened. 
 
 It is significant that in each specification, Locke stood on the 
 ground now occupied by modern educators in opposition to formal 
 discipline. His theory of specific concrete experiences as the source 
 of all I'noivledge was the real renaissance in educational theory. If 
 Locke's insistence on the study of mathematics is sufficient to 
 classify him as an advocate of formal discipline, where must we 
 place Herbart, in view of such a passage as the following : 
 
 "As to the middle portion of education, everything might be 
 repeated that has ever been said concerning the usefulness of 
 mathematics for the cultivation of the mind. Being a gymnastics 
 of the thinking powers, iieedful, even in the earlier years of child- 
 hood, shall we be able to dispense with it later on? The mind as 
 well as the body must from time to time return to its gymnasia in 
 order to test its muscles and to renew their perfect elasticity."^ 
 
 Fortunately, the ultimate interpretation of any man's views 
 does not depend upon any one or two passages. Herbart's use 
 
 ^Herbart's "A. B. C. of Sense Perception," Tr. by William J. Eekoff, p. 150. 
 
 28 
 
of mathematics as a gymnastics of the thinking powers savors as 
 strongly of disciplinary education as does Locke's view of mathe- 
 matics as the typical method -of rational procedure. 
 
 Nothing has yet been said concerning Locke's idea of disciplin- 
 ing the memory. So far as I have been able to note, those who con- 
 sider him as an advocate of formal discipline make no charge of 
 it in connection with this faculty. Yet the Humanists looked upon 
 the memory as one of the principal subjects of formal discipline. 
 Upon this subject, however, Locke has so clearly expressed himself 
 as to leave no shadow of doubt concerning his view of it. He says :^ 
 "But the learning Pages of Lati7i by Heart, no more fits the 
 Memory for Eetention of anything else, than the graving of one 
 Sentence in Lead makes it the more capable of retaining firmly 
 any other Characters. If such a sort of Exercise of the Memory 
 were able to give it Strength, and improve our Parts, Players of all 
 other People must needs have the best Memories and be the best 
 Company." 
 
 One further passage sometimes quoted from the Conduct- 
 demands attention. 
 
 "The business of education, as I have already observed, is not, 
 as I think, to make them perfect in any one of the- sciences, but 
 so to open and dispose their minds as may best make them capable 
 of any, when they shall apply themselves to it. If men are for a 
 long time accustomed only to one sort or method of thoughts, 
 their minds grow stiff in it, and do not readily turn to another. 
 It is, therefore, to give them this freedom, that I think they should 
 be made to look into all sorts of knowledge, and exercise their 
 understandings is so wide a variety and stock of knowledge. But 
 I do not propose it as a variety and stock of knowledge, but a 
 variety and freedom of thinking, as an increase of the powers and 
 activity of the mind, not as an enlargement of its possessions." 
 
 This is entirely in harmony with the dynamic view of the mind 
 already attributed to Locke : That is, to increase the possessions 
 of the mind without increasing its ability to react on the data 
 it receives would be of no value. He rightly urges that mental 
 
 ^Thoughts, §176. 
 ^Conduct, p. 44. 
 
 29 
 
ability is to be tested by the power of the mind to grasp new 
 situations. But here is where his method of attaining this power 
 is seen to differ most radically from the older conception of dis- 
 cipline. The old view said : Increase your powers by a few chosen 
 studies, and depend upon their general disciplinary powers to 
 enable you to grasp new situations of any kind whatsoever. Locke 
 says : Increase your powers by a 'variety and freedom of thinking.' 
 This can best be attained, not by endeavoring to attain perfection in 
 one of the sciences, but by the exercise of the mind in a large 
 variety of subject-matter, so that no matter what new experience 
 comes knocking at the door, there will be in the mind already 
 somewhat to which it can be related. 
 
 This investigation of Locke's attitude toward formal discipline 
 will, I believe, justify the following summary, viz. : That the 
 evidence adduced tends to show: First, that Locke's philosophy 
 and psychology furnish no basis for the dogma in question. 
 Second, that he sought to set aside the limited curriculum based 
 upon the disciplinary conception of his time, and substitute for it 
 a broader curriculum. Third, that he urged the abolition of 
 abstract rules and generalizations in favor of concrete specific 
 experiences. Fourth, that Locke's various references to education 
 as a discipline may best be interpreted in the light of specific dis- 
 ciplines and concepts of method, and such interpretation is con> 
 sistent with his philosophy. 
 
 From all these conclusions it appears that we are indebted to 
 Locke for the grounds upon which the refutation of this dogma has 
 been prosecuted. And I, am furthermore convinced that his writ- 
 ings contain the fundamentals of the best reform movements in 
 education, while his philosophy is set forth in the plain, clear 
 language of sound common sense which none can fail to appreciate. 
 
 30 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. 
 (a). John Locke. 
 BouBNE, H. R. Fox: "The Life of John Locke. 2 vols. London, 1876. 
 Fowler, Thomas: Locke. (Morley's English Men of Letters). New 
 
 York, 1880. 
 Fowler, Thomas: Locke's Conduct of the Understanding. Oxford, 1892. 
 Feaseb, a. Campbell: Locke. (Blackwood's Philosophical Classics). 
 
 Edinburg, 1890. 
 Eraser, A. Campbell: Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
 
 2 vols. Oxford, 1894. 
 King, Lord: The Life and Letters of John Locke. London, 1884. 
 Laurie, S. S. : Educational Opinion from the Renaissance. Cambridge, 1903. 
 Lewes, G. H. : Biographical History of Philosophy. Vol. 2. New York, 1893. 
 Quick, Robert H.: Educational Reformers. New York, 1890. 
 Quick, Robert H.: Locke on Education. Cambridge, 1895. 
 
 (b). Philosophy. 
 Falckenberg, Richard: History of Modern Philosophy. Tr. by A. C. 
 
 Armstrong, Jr., New York, 1893. 
 Fischer, Kuno: Descartes and His School. Tr. by J. P. Gordy, New 
 
 ,York, 1887. 
 Forsyth, Thomas M: English Philosophy. London, 1910. 
 Green, T. H. : Introduction to Hume's Treatise on Human Nature. Vol. 1. 
 
 London, 1874. 
 James, William: Psychology. 2 vols. New York, 1890. 
 Paulsen, Friedrich: Introduction to Philosophy. Tr. by Frank Thilly, 
 
 New York, 1895. 
 Rogers, Arthur K: A Student's History of Philosophy. New York, 1901. 
 Weber, Alfred: History of Philosophy. Tr. by Frank Thilly, New York, 
 
 1896. 
 ( c ) . Education. 
 
 Adams, John: The Herbartian Psvchology Applied to Education. New 
 
 York, 1897. 
 Bagley, William Chandler: The Educative Process. New York, 1905. 
 Browning, Oscar: History of Educational Theories. New York, 1895. 
 CosiPAYRE, Gabriel: History of Pedagogy. Tr. by W. H. Payne, Boston, 
 
 1886. 
 Davidson, Thomas: A History of Education. New York, 1900. 
 Heck, W. H. : Mental Discipline and Educational Values. New York, 1909. 
 Herbart, John Frederick: The A. B. C. of Sense Perception. Tr. by 
 
 Wm. J. Eckoff, New York, 1896. 
 Monroe, Paul: Text-Book in the History of Education. New York, 1905. 
 Monroe, Paul: A Brief Course in the History of Education. New York, 
 
 1907. 
 Munroe, James P: The Educational Ideal. Boston, 1895. 
 O'Shea, M. v.: Education as Adjustment. New York, 1903. 
 Payne, Joseph: Lectures. on the History of Education. London, 1892. 
 Williams, Samuel S.: History of Modern Education. Syracuse. 1892. 
 Woodward, William Harrison: Vittorino Da Feltre and Other Humanist 
 
 Educators. Cambridge, 1897. 
 
 31 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 020 949 945 9