E. HSQ ■UiSf LIBRARY OF CONGRESS iMiiiiiiiiiiiiiiilil mil II iiil 011 932 717 9 p6i2nulipe» pH8.5 E 456 .M439 Copy 1 j^x^rv^r^ Md^ c^^ ;%1^' MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. Remarks upon the Memorial Address of Charles Francis Adams on the latb V AYiLLiAM II. Seward. THIRD PAPER DIFFERENCES existed in the Cabinet and the country in 1861 on some of the measures and tlie course of policy which the Government should pursue to- ward the secessionists. The questions presented were in some respects novel and without precedent, as was the insurrec- tion itself. Hostilities were precipitated within forty days uf the inauguration, be- fore the Aduiinistration was fully estab- lished in place, or had time to develop its policy. The assault on the flag at Charleston compelled immediate action. The proclamation promptly issued for seventy-five thousand volunteers also de- clared a blockade of the Southern ports. There was entire unanimity in the Cabi- net on all points in the proclamation ex- cept that of a blockade, which was ques- tioaed as a doubtful and irregular pro- ceeding; for the conflict, whether an insurrection or rebellion, was purely domestic — a civil war and not a foi-eign war; and it was thought the internal dis- sensions in our own territory should be confined within our own borders. A majority of the Cabinet, therefore, pre- ferred an embargo or suspension of inter- course with that part of the country to a blockade, and maintained it to be tiie true policy of the Government to close the ports and interdict commerce witii the insurgents until the rebellion was sup- pressed. It was claimed that a blockade was not a domestic but an internaticmal question — legitimate and proper as be- tween two distinct nations, but that we could not proi)erly blockade our own ports, though we miglit shut tliera up, prohil)it traffic from abroad hy law, and make its violation a criminal offence ; that the very fact of a blockade of the whole rebel territory would raise them to the level of belligerents — a concession to the Confederate organization virtually ad- mitting it to be a quasi government — giving that organization a position among nations that we would not and could not recognize or sanction, and which would inevitably lead to embari'assments. But the subject was in some of its aspects novel, and tlie Secretary of State, though sometimes rash, had not the bold and vigorous mind to assert and maintain a right princi])le if fraught with doubt and difficulty, provided tliere was an easier path. The blockade, he thought, opened up a way. The questions of blockade wei-e well settled and clearly defined, the authority and precedents explicit ; and he therefore preferred to adopt that course, shelter himself under those precedents, and apply international law to a strictly national and domestic controversy, rather tiian assert a measure and vindicate an important principle afi'ecting national rigiits. Less was said in the confusion and proceeding? which came like an avalanche at tliat critical moment upon the Administrati(m, than at a later pe- riod. Two members of the Cabinet said they had bestowed vei'y slight examina- tion upon the subject, and as it related to foreign intercjjurse they deferred to the Secretary of State, who had given it spe- cial attention, and also cited authorities justifying an exclusion of commerce from national ports in the equitable farm of blockade. President Lincoln inclined to that view, and when Mr. Seward asserted that one great object of the blockade in- stead of a closure of the ports was to avoid complications which would be likely to involve us in a foreign war, the question was decided. The President said we could not afford to have two wars on our hands at once, and a blockade was ordered. The authority and the rigiit of tiie na- tional Government to close ports witliin its jurisdiction was controverted by no one, though a blockade was. Mr. Seward himself, in his despatch of the 8th of June to Mr. Adams, said : " We claim to have a right to close the ports which have been seized by insui'rectionists for the purpose of suppressing the attempted revi)lution, and no one could justly complain if we had done so decisively and peremptorily." 794 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. [Dec. But tlie English Government, as soon as iufurmation was obtained of diU'erences in the Anieri(3an Cabinet, made haste to force us to adhere to the blocl^ade, whicli would be aa acknowledgment of bellig- erent rights to the rebels, by indirectly admonishing us of its views and inten- tions in a debate promptly got up in Parliament for the purpose on the 27th of June, immediately on thereceipt of Mr. Seward's despatch. Lord John Russell in that debate announced the interpola- tion of a new doctrine b^^ the British (Jov- ernment into international law, by declar- ing to the feeble government of New Granada, " It is not competent for its government to close its ports that are de facto in possession of the insurgents." The debate, ostensibly on the aflairs of New Granada, was evidently and unmis- takably intended as an admonition and menace to the United States, then en- gaged in suppressing insurrection. In a despatch of the 28th of June from our Minister in London, just twenty days after Mr. Seward's despatch of the 8th of June claiming our right to close the ports, jMr. Adams wrote the Secre- tary of State that in an interview with Lord John Russell, " His Lordship tlien said something about difficulties in New Granada, and the intelligence that the insurgents had undertaken to close sev- eral of their ports. But the law officers here told him that this could not be done as against foreign nations, excepting l)y the regular form of blockade. lie did not know what we thought about it, but he had observed that some such plan was likely to be adopted at the coming ses- sion of Congress in regard to the ports of those whom we considered as insurgents." llis lordship also on the 27th of June an- nounced in Parliament that '' the opinion of Iler Majesty's Government after taking legal advice is, that it is perfectly compe- tent for the government of a c(nintry in a state of tranquillity to say which ports shall be open to trade and which shall be closed ; but in the event of insurrection or civil war in that country, it is not com- petent for its government to close its ports that are de facto in the hands of the in- surgents, as that would be an invasion of international law with regard to block- ade." Congress when it convened in spe- cial session in July, a few days after this English menace, totally unmindful of " the opinion of Her Majesty's Government after taking legal advice," imt under the counsel and deliberate conclusion of our wisest and ablest legislators and statesmen, and in total disregard of the policy of our own Secretary of State as well as of Her Ma- jesty's Government, declined to commit itself to the blockade, and in explicit and emphatic language authorized, Ijy the act of the 13th of July, a closure of the ports. ^Ir. Seward was constrained, under these circumstances and under the direction of President Lincoln, on the 2Ist of July, to tell Mr. Adams that " Since your con- versation with Lord John Russell, the Congress of the United States has by law asserted the right of this Government to close the ports of this country which have been seized by the insurgents. The connecting by Lord John Russell of that measure when it Avas in prospect with what had taken place in regard to a law of New Granada, gives to the ren)arks which he made to you a significance that requires no especial illustration. The President fully agrees with Congress in the principle of the law which authorizes him to close the ports which have been seized by the insurgents, and lie will put into execution and maintain it with all the means at his command, at the hazard of whatever consequences, whenever it shall appear that the safety of the nation requires it." It is not expedient, perhaps, to follow up in its details a subject not particular- ly ci'editable to our diplomacy and to the maintenance of our national rights, further than to allude briefly to the historic facts. The brave words of the Secretary of State, uttered on the 2Ist of July, were not en- forced. Mr. Adam,^, in a despatch of the 16th of August, says he took occasion to intimate to Lord John Russell that " he must not infer from my not having enter- ed into discussion of the merits of the question, that I gave any assent to the \>o- sition taken by him about the right of a government to close its own ports, when held by forcible possession of persons re- sisting its authority. On the contrary, 1 desired to reserve for my government the treatment of it as an open question when- ever it should take any practical shape. In the mean time I had every reason to be- lieve that it was the design of the Presi- dent to persevere in the blockade," etc. His lordship declared in Parliament, how- ever, that he considered the law of Con- 1873.] MR. LINCOLX AND MR. SEWARD. 795 gress " as merely giving a discretionary power. But if carried into practice, lie construed it as putting an end to tlie blockade." Under these threats our (Jov- ernnient tamely submitted. The law of Congress was not carried into effect, our diplomacy was meek and yielding, and under British menace the blockade of our own ports, by our own shii)s, was contin- ued . On the 2d of September the Secretary of .State, with some trepidation, informed the Minister that "no change of i)olicy in regard to the blockade has been ad()i)t- ed " — a timid intimation of acquiescence in an insult and injury, to appease British arrogance ; her ministry believing and as- serting that an effective blockade of our extensive coast was impo.ssible, but in no other way could commerce be interdicted. Our Government did not close the ports, but under the hint given by the English dictum to New Granada, it abstained from exercising the national authority, and was passive and submissive. In all this time, while treating the Confederates as bel- ligerents, and their organization as a quasi government, the Secretary of State, with strange inconsistency, denounced their cruisers as pirate-s. Not until the 9th of April, 1865, after Richmond had fallen, and only three days before the assassination of President Lin- coln, was a proclamation issued, in pursu- ance of the act of Congress of the 13th of July, 1861, to close the ports of the South- ern States. Until the war had virtually ceased, tiie law of Congress was not en- forced. The British mandate to New Gra- nada was tamely acquiesced in and ob- .sequiously observed by the United States. Our ports were not closed, but block- aded, which eventuated, as was intended, in establishing throughout the war the Engli.sh ports of Nassau, Bermuda, and Halifax as entrepots for illicit traffic with the rebels and resorts for rebel crui.sers, to harass and destroy our counnerce. It 0])ened the English ports throughout tlie world to the Alabania, and rovers of her class, Avhich swept our merchant ships from the ocean for the benefit of England. On the subject of a blockade of our own ports by our own vessels, Mr. Seward had undoubtedly, for good or for evil, influ- ence Avith the President which outweigh- ed a majoritj' of the Cabinet and Con- gress. The suliject was new to him when hl^ decision was given, and the blockade being made eflective by the navy, lie did not care to reopen a disturbing question, though his views became modified, and ultimately the ports were closed, notwith- standing the Enijlish dictum to New Gra- nada. Tlie management of our foreign affairs, and the maintenance of our rights against the jiretensioiis and menaces of the arro- gant ministry of England, thus com- menced, was continued, until intelligent Englishmen themselves were surprised if not disgusted with our subserviency- After the shameful renunciation of our right to send into the courts mails from cajitured vessels — a right recognized and established by the usage of nations, and made a duty by our own statutes — an eminent English publicist, Sir Vernon Ilawksworth, amazed at our submissive and pusillanimous diplomacy, Marned liis government against proceeding too fiir in its demands, " for," said he, '■'what we have Jiiost to fear is not that Americaiis will yield too little, but that we shall accept too much.'''' A humiliating commentary on our dii)l()macy, by an English writer of no mean aliility. The relation of the circumstances at- tending the capture and release of the rebel emissaries. Mason and Slidell, is pregnant with error. The excitement which accompanied the intelligence of the capture of these mischievous men was great, and had at one time a threatening aspect. The final disposition of the ques- ticm, with the restoration of the prisoners to British authority, might well be men- tioned as displaying the marked and in some respects perhaps happy trait of Mr. Seward in adapting himself to circum- stances which he could not control. But Mr. Adams fails to bring out that shrewd diplomatic quality of Mr. Seward's mind, and strives to inculcate an impression that tlie Secretary of State stood alone ; was wise, sagacious, reserved, and pro- found, when others were blind, precip- itate, and weak ; took upon himself" the whole weight of popular indigiration," and, " like the Roman Curtius, who leap- ed into the abyss which could have been closed in no other way," he offered him- self a sacrifice to secure the safiity of the State. Mr. Seward should receive credit for the dexterous and skilful despatch which he jH-epared on hJ.s own change of position. It exhibits his readiness and peculiar tact and ability to extricate liim 796 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. [Dec, self from and to pass over difficulties. But in point of fact no man was more elated or jubilant over the capture of the emissaries than Mr. Seward, who fur a time made no attempt to conceal his grat- ification and approval of • the- act of Wilkes. But while he and most of the Cabinet and country were hilarious, the President had doubts, misgivings, and re- grets, which were increased after an in- terview with Senator Sumner, with whom he often— sometimes to the disgust and annoyance of Mr. Seward — advised on controverted or disputed international questions, and especially when there were differences between himself and the Sec- retary of State. On the question of giving up the emis- saries, Mr. Adams says: "When the time came for the assembly of the Cabi- net, not a sign had been given by the President, or any of the members, favora- ble to concession. Mr. Seward, who had been charged with the official duty of fur- nishing tlie expected answer, assumed the responsibility of preparing his able argu- ment, upon which a decision was made to surrender the men. Upon him would have rested the whole weight of popular indignation had it proved formidable. If I have I)een rightly informed, when read it met with few comments and less appro- bation. On the other hand, there was no resistance. Silence gave consent. It was the act of Mr. Seward, and his name was to be associated with it, whether for good or for evil." The truth is, not only had the Presi- dent expressed his doubts of the legality of the capture, and had them increased, while ]\Ir. Seward was rejoicing over and approving of the proceeding, but Mr. Bhiir from the first had denounced the act as unauthorized, irregular, and ille- gal. Not being a special admirer of Wilkes, Mr. Blair recommended that Wilkes should be ordered to take the Iro- quois and go with Mason and Slidell to England, and deliver them to the British government ; for Palmerston and Russell would, he said, seiz;e the occasion to make war, Tlie prompt and voluntary disa- vowal of the act of Wilkes, and delivering over the prisoners, would have evinced our confidence in our own power, and been a manifestation of our indifference and contempt for the emissaries, and a rebuke to the alleged intrigues between the reb- els and the English Cabinet. Mr. Sew- ard took a totally different view ; scouted the idea of letting the prisoners go ; said the British did not want them, and we could not think of delivering them up. While Mr. Blair did not go about at the time proclaiuiing his opinions on a sub- ject which was under consideration, liLs dissent from the original views of the Sec- retary of State, and condemnation of the act of Wilkes, are notorious among those who were intimate with the transactions of the Government. The time for further withholding the facts, and permitting men like Mr. Adams to be misled, has gone by. The truth in relation to these and other matters, so long perverted and suppress- ed, should be known, and history set right. Nearly every member of the Adminis- tration, like Mr. Seward, rejoiced in the capture of these mischievous men. No one coincided with Mr. Blair in his sug- gestion to compel Wilkes to return them to the custody of Great Britain, however wise it may have been in view of subse- quent events. But the irregular action of Wilkes in this case was in various ways the cause of serious embarrassment. If the proceedings could not be fully justified, neither could they, in the then condition of affairs, and the excited state of pul)lic feeling, be censured and condemned. But the Secretary of the Navy, before hearing from Great Britain, before even the Administration had passed upon the subject, was compelled to recognize and approve or disapprove the act, and com- municate the, transaction in his annual navy report, just then to be submitted to the President and Congress. In that re- port, and in a congratulatory letter of the 30th of November, allusion is made to the irregularity of Wilkes, which, it is sug- gested, might be excu.sed in view of the patriotic motives ; " but it must by no means be permitted to constitute a prece- dent hereafter for the treatment of any similar infraction of neutral obligations by foreign vessels engaged in commerce or the carrying trade," This report, though bearing date of the 2d of Decem- ber, the day on which Congress convened, was, as is usual with annual reports, de- livered complete to the President at the last regular Cabinet meeting preceding the session, which was on Friday, the 29th of November, 1861, to be transmitteof with the message. Of course the naval report was seen ou that day by Mr. Sew- 1873.] MR. LTXCOLX AND i\IR. SEWARD. 797 ard, who until then had taken no excep- tion to the capture ; but on tlie succeeding day, the 30th of Noveuiber, tlie date of the congratulatory letter to Wilkes, lie wrote to Mr. Adams what the latter gen- tleman calls the " preliminary despatch that saved the dignity of" the country." These matters, it will l)e borne in mind, were weeks before hearing from England, and before ]\Ir. Seward's elaborate answer of the 2Gth of December to the demand of the British government for the surren- der of the emissaries. When Mr. Adams declares tiiat " not a sign had been given l)y the President or any member of the Cabinet favorable to concession," at the time that answer was prepared, he com- mits an egregious mistake. The Presi- dent was from tiie first willing to make concession. Mr. Blair advocated it. JNIr. Seward was at the beginning opposed to any idea of concession which involved giving up the emissaries, but yielded at once, and with dexterity, to the peremp- tory demand of Great Britain. Let him have all the applause which belongs to him for the facility and diplomatic skill which hedisplaj'ed in that change, but in doing so it is unjust to the President and others to misrepresent them, or to mis- take or jiervert the facts in regard to them or Mr. Seward. The incidents selected from among many indicate something of the man- aging expediency, fertility of resources, and administrative manner of Mr. Sew- ard, and illustrate the "superior intel- lectual power " and " force of moral dis- cii)line " which the" Memorial Address " undertakes to say enabled liira to " di- rect affairs for the benefit of the naticm, through the name of another." Acting at times from impulse, often without sufficient forethought of consequences — • fond of displaying power — frequently ex- ercising questionable authority — prompt- ed in some degree by Jol)bing and lobby surroundings which, fostered at Albany and defeated at Ciiicago, followed him to AVashington, where not a few of those fol- lowers contrived to grow rich as tlie coun- try grew poor, Mr. Seward attempted and did many things which could scarcely be justified, but forwhich tiie Administration was responsible. It would be unjust to tJirow his eccentricities and errors upon others, and award to him the honors and credit of successful measures of adminis- tration which he did not originate. The President, never unreasonably ob- stinate or wilful, was ever lenient and forbearing, even when his intentions were defeated, and sometimes yielded to pro- ceedings that his judgment did not fully approve. In the generosity of his nature he was tolerant of acts where a more ar- bitrary and imperious mind would have been implacable and unforgiving. There were occasi(ms, however, when, relying on his own convictions, and the exi- gency being great, he exercised the ex- ecutive will — the one-man power — with intelligent determination and effect. His promjjtness and energy in an emergency were displayed on one memorable occasion, when danger was imminent and innuedi- ate decision necessary. It may be men- tioned as illustrative of his executive abil- ity, promptness, and self-reliance ; for it was in the absence of Mr. Seward, and when those on Avhom he had a right to rely failed him and were despondent. Gloom and national disaster were upon the country, but the President met the crisis with firntness, rose with the exi- gency, and, independent of his Caliinet and against the general sentiment of tiie peo- ple, and by a sacrifice of personal feeling, adopted a course which results justified, and proved his ability as chief. In the early period of the war the pro- ceedings and operations of the military commanders were unsatisfactory, and no- where equalled the general expectation. Too much was doubtless expected and too little accomplished. None were more dis- appointed or depressed by the slow pro- gress made than the President himself. For a period he had hopes fromMcClellan, Avhose talents at organization were dis- played to advantage when, in the summer of 1861, he took command at Washington, established order, and enforced good mili- tary administration. In some respect the President esteemed him to be superior to any of the generals with whom he had come in contact ; but tlie afltumn wore away in dilatory parades. With the change in the War Department in Janu- ary, 18G2, came the hostility of Secretary Stanton to jNIcClellan, then General-in- Chief. The hesitating movements of that officer weakened tli« confidence of the President in his energy and military power. He still believed, however, that the Genei-al had superior military capa- city and intelligence, but that he was in-" ert, infirm of purpose ; not quite realy to "98 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. [Dec do all that lieliad the ability to accomplish. lie rcixiiired pushing, and the President therefore took upon himself to order a for- ward movement of both the army and navy. But JMcClellan continued tardy, and the winter and spring delays, follow- ed by the sluggish movements on the York peninsula and the reverses before Rich- mond, discouraged and greatly dishearten- ed not only the President but the whole country. At this juncture, when, with large armies under him, he had more than he C(nild perform in the line of his profes- sion, McClellan in July wrote from his headquarters a very injudicious, not to say impertinent letter to the President in relation to the civil administration and the political conduct of affairs. This un- wise letter, ami the reverses of the army, with the active hostility of Stanton, brought Halleck,a vastly inferior man, to Washington. General Pope had preced- ed him, and, l)y an executive order creat- ing the army of Virginia, had been placed in command of that army, then in front of Washington, to the infinite disgust of some of tlie older generals. This disgust was increased by his public gasconading pro- clamation reflecting on the proceedings of his seniors — on their" lines of retreat and bases of supplies," which must, he said, thenceforward be discarded. These bla- tant bulletins, instead of inspiriting the men, caused ridicule in the ranks. The soldiers were attached to their old officers, particularly to McClellan, and to a great extent sympathized with him and other generals in their dislike, almost contempt, of this junior commander. Pope had been brouglit from the West directly after Halleck reported he had accomplished ex- traordinary achievements — reporis gross- ly untrue, and which Pope himself after- ward refuted. On coming to Washing- t(|fi. Pope, who was ardent, and I think courageous, though not always discreet, very naturally fell into the views of Sec- retary Stanton, who improved every op- portunity to denounce McClellan and his hesitating policy. Pope also reciprocat- ed the C(jminendations bestowed on him by Halleck, by uniting Avitli Stanton and General Scott in advising that McClellan should be superseded, and Halleck placed in charge of military affairs at Washing- ton. This, combined with the movements and the disasters before Ricinnond, en- abled Stanton to get rid of McClellan at headquarters. One of the lirst orders of Halleck on reaching Washington aftei superseding McClellan, was for the with, drawal of the army of the Potomac from the vicinity of Richmond. This brought McClellan and his generals with their commands to the assistance of Pope, for whom they not only entertained no special regard, but some of them absolute hate. The orders to reinforce and assist Pope were consequently not obeyed with alac- rity. There is no denying the fact that professional pride was allowed to encroach on patriotic duty in that momentous pe- riod. The selection of Pope to command that army may have been injudicious ; he may not have been the man to take in hand and wield the immense force which met Lee and Jackson at the front ; there may have been error on the part of Stanton and Halleck as well as Pope in slighting some of the older generals ; the enmity of the Secretary of War toward McClellan may not witiiout reason have been felt by him and his favorites as unjust; yet the Avellare of the republic should not have been put in jeopardy to gratify personal, official, or professional resentments. The general in counnand, whether j^oung or old, should at such a crisis have been ear- nestly and in good faith sustained. Had that been the case, the results of the second battle at Manassas or Bull Run might have been different. But Pope was defeated, and the army, sadly demoralized, came retreat- ing to the Potomac. The War Depart- ment, and especially Stanton and Ualleck, became greatly alarmed. On the 30th of August, in the midst of these disasters and before the result had reached us, though most damaging information in re- gard to McClellan, who lingered at Alex- andria, was current, the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Chase, called upon me with a protest, signed by himself ami Stanton, denouncing the conduct of McClellan and demanding his immediate dismissal. Two other members were ready to append their names after mine. I declined to sign the paper, which was in the handwriting of Stanton, not that I did not disapprove of the course of the General, but because the combination was improper and disrespect- ful to the President, who had selected his Cabinet to consult and advise with, not to conspire against him ; besides, some of the charges or allusions in the paper I knew nothing of, and I had doubted the Avisdoin of recalling the army of the Po- tomac from Richmond, therein differing 1873.] MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. iOO from Chase and Stanton. The object in bringing that army back to W'asiiington in order to start anew, marcli overland, and regain the abandoned position, I did not mideiistand unless it was to get rid of" McCleUan ; and it' that was the object it ■would iiave been mucli better to phice an- other general at the liead of tlie army while it was yet on the James. But a majority of the Cabinet finally united in this proceeding, and on Monday, the 1st of September, the paper, somewhat mod- ified and signed by four of the Cabinet officers, was brought me. Mr. Seward was at the time absent from Wash- ington — I never doubted jturposely ab- sent — and not of the numljer. My re- fusal and perhaps my remarks prevented the matter from proceeding further. The indignation against McCleUan was at the time intense in Wasliington and the coun- try. The President never knew of this paper, l)ut was not unaware of the popu- lar feeling, in which he sympathized, and of the sentiments of tlie members of the Cabinet, aggravated by the hostility and strong if not exaggerated rumors sent out by the Secretary of War. Both Stanton and Halleck were, however, filled with apprehensions beyond others, as the army of stragglers and broken battalions on the last of August and first of September came rusliing toward Wasliington. At tlie stated Cabinet meeting on Tues- day, the 2d of September, while the whole community was stirred up and in confusion, and afi'airs were gloomy beyond anytliing tiiat had previously occurred, Stanton entered the council room a few moments in advance of Mr. Lincoln and said, with great excitement, he had just learned from General Halleck that the President had placed McCleUan in com- mand of the forces in Washington. The information was surprising, and, in view of the prevailing excitement against that officer, alarming. The President soon came in, and in answer to an inquiry from Mr. Chase, confirmed what Stanton had stated. General regret was expi'ess- ed, and Stanton witli some feeling re- marked that no order to that effect had issued from the War Department. The President, calml}' but with some emphasis, said the order was liis, and he would be responsible for it to tlie country. With a retreating and demoralized army tumbling in upon us, and alarm ami panic in the community, it was neces.sary,thePresident .said, that something should be done, but there seemed to be no one to do it. lie therefore had directed McCleUan, who knew this whole ground, who was the best organizer in the army, whose faculty was to organize and defend, and who would here act upon the defensive, to take this defeated and broken army and reorganize it. lie knew full well the in- firmities of McCleUan, who was not an af- firmative man ; was worth little tor an on- ward movement; but beyond any other of- ficer he had the confidence of the armj', and he could more efficiently and speed- ily reoi'ganize it and jiut it in eoiuli- tion than any other general. If the Sec- I'etary of War, or any member of the Cab- inet, would name a general that could do this as promjjtly and well, he would ap- point iiim. For an active fighting gen- eral he was sorry to say JMcClellan was a failure; he had" the slows " ; was never ready for battle, and probably never would be ; but for this exigency, when organiza- tion and defence were needed, he consid- ered him the best man for the service, and the country must have the benefits of his talents though he had behaved l3adl3\ The President said he iiad seen and given his opinion to General Halleck, w!io was still General-in-Chief; but Halleck had no plan or views of his own, proposed to do nothing himself, and fully approved his calling upon INIeClellan. In stating what he had done the Presi- dent was deliberate, but firm and decisive. His language and manner Avere kind and affectionate, especially toward two of the members, who were greatly disturbed ; but every person present felt that he was truly the chief, and everyone knew his decision was as fixed and unalterable as if given out with tiie imperious command and de- termined will of Andrew Jackson. A long discussion followed, closing with acquiescence in the decision of the Presi- dent, ))ut l)ef(n'e separating, the Secretary of the Treasury expressed his apprehen- sion that the reinstatement of McCleUan would prove a national calamity. In this instance the President, unaided by others, put forth with firmness and de- termination tlie executive will — the one- man power — against the temporary gen- eral sense of the community as well as of his Cabinet, two of whom it has been gen- erally supposed had with him an influ- ence almost as great as the Secretary of State. Tliey had been ready to make 800 MR. LIXCOLX AND MR. SEWARD. [Dec. issue and resign their places unless Mc- Cleilan was dismissed ; but knowing their opposition, and in spite of it and of the general dissatisfaction in the community, the President had in that perilous mo- ment exalted him to new and impm'tant trusts. In an interview with the Presi- dent on the succeeding Friday, when only he and myself were present, he un- burthened liis mind freely. Military mat- ters were still in confusion, without plan or purpose at headquarters. The Secre- tary of War, under Pope's defeat and jMc- Clellan's reinstatement, was not only dis- appointed, but dejected and dispirited. The President said most of our troubles grew out of military jealousies. Whether changing the plan of operations (dis- carding McClellan and placing Pope in command) was wise or not, was not now the matter in hand. These things, right or wrong, had been done. If the Admin- istration had erred, the country should not have been made to suffer and our brave men cut down and butchered. Pope should have been sustained, but he was not. These personal and professional quarrels came in. Whatever may have been said to the contrary, it could not be denied that the army was with JNIcClellan. He had so skilfully handled his troops in not getting to Richmond as to retain their confidence. The soldiers certainly had not transferred their confidence to Pope. He could, however, do no more good in this quarter. It was humiliating, after what had transpired and all we knew, to reward McClellan and those who failed to do their whole duty in the hour of trial, but so it was. Personal considerations must be sacrificed for the public good. He had kept aloof from the dissensions tliat prevailed, and intended to; " but," said he, " I must have McClellan to reorganize the army and bring it out of chaos. There has been a design, a purpose in breaking down Pope, without regard to the conse- quences to the country, that is atrocious. It is shocking to see and know this, but there is no remedy at present. McClellan . has the army with him." These were the views and this the course of the President when there was general dismay in the country and confusion in the army, the rebels near the intrenchments of Wash- ington, and some of the Cabinet alarmed and preparing to leave. The President was not insensible to the deficiencies or ignorant of the faults of McClellan, nor yet blind to and stubborn as regarded his better qualities. In placing liiui at the head of the army he went counter to the wishes of his friends, and forgetful of all else he subdued every personal feeling, and in the spirit of unselfish patriot- ism resolved to do what was for the true interest of the country. Had the General followed up the battle of Antie- tam, which took place a fortnight later, he would have retrieved the misfortunes of the peninsula and given the President additional reason to congratulate himself on the reinstateu'ent ; but the old dilatory infirmity remained, which strengthened the influence that persistently o})posed him, and led to his being retired from the command of the army. The President was a much more shrewd and accurateobserver of the characteristics of men — better and more correctly formed an estimate of their power and capabili- ties — than the Secretary of State or most others. Those in the public service he closely scanned, but wasdeliberate in form- ing a conclusion adverse to any one he had appointed. In giving or withdrawing confidence he was discriminating and just in his final decision ; careful never to wound unnecessarily tlie sensibilities of any for their infirmities, always ready to praise, but nevertheless firm and reso- lute in discharging the to liim always pain fid duty of censure, reproof, or dis- missal. Du Pont he classed in the naval service with McClellan in the military. Both were intelligent, accomplished, and val- ual)le officers in tlieir way, but neither was the man for fierce encounter and des- perate fighting. Tlie two until tried had his support and all the confidence to which they wereentitled, or which either had reason to expect, If the results at Port Royal were not followed up with the energy and vigor anticipated, the fault was, he justly considered, as much with the military as with the navy. But in the autumn of 1862 and winter of 1863 extensive preparations were made for re- taking Fort Sumter and the capture of Charleston. Du Pont visited Washington in the autumn, and had consulted on the subject, but would listen to no sugges- tiim that any other officer should be de- tailed for that especial service, Avhich he claimed as a right and as within the limits of his blockade. Exti-aordinary ef- forts were accordingly mn,de by the Navy 1873.] MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. 801 Deiiartraent, which gave hi:ii a hirge portion of the best officers and vessels in the service that he might be successful. But time wore on, with no more effective demonstration than liad been made by the army of the Pi^tomac on the York penin- sula. Du Pont, like McClellan, was con- stantly asking for more reinforcements, and tlie Navy Department strained every nerve to aid him, and often answered liis requisitions at the expense of other squad- rons. The President, as well as the wliole countrj', felt greatly interested in this subject; not that (Jliarleston was of any great strategic importance, l)ut it was the liotbed of secession, and tliere the rebel- lion had its origin. It was winter or early spring, and nothing had been accomplish- ed, when the President one day said to me that he had but slight expectation that we should have any great success from Du Pont. " lie. as well as McClellan," said ^Ir. Lincoln, " hesitates — lias ' the slows.' McClellan always wanted more regiments ; Du Pont is everhistingly ask- ing for more gunboats — more ironclads. He will do nothing with any. He has in- telligence and system, and will maintain a good blockade. You did well in select- ing him for that command, but he will never take Sumter or get to Charleston. He is no Farragut, though unquestion- ably a good routine officer, who obeys orders and in a general way carries out his instructions." A few weeks served to verify all that the President had said on the subject. Du Pont died without plant- ing thefiag on Sumter or visiting Charles- ton. The distinctive measure of Mr. Lin- coln's administration, beyond all others that which makes it an era in our na- tional history, is tlie deci'ee of emancipa- tion. This movement, almost revolution- ary, was a step not anticipated by him when elected, and which neither he nor any of his Cabinet were prepared for or would have assented to when they enter- ed upon their duties. He and tliey had, regardless of party discipline, resisted the schemes for the extension of slavery into free territory under the sanction of fed- eral authority. All of them, though of different parties, were and ever had been opposed to slavery, but not one of them favored any interference with it by the national Government in the States where it was established or permitted. The as- sumption, after the acquisition of territory from ^Mexico, that slavery was a national and not a local institution, opened a new controversy in American politics, which contributed to tiie disintegration of old party organizations, each of which be- came in a measure sectional. Tlie dis- senting elements resisted the centralizing claim that slaver^' was national, not local ; and ultimately, after a struggle of sev- eral years, they threw off old i)arty alle- giance and combined under a new organi- zation, thenceforward known as Republi- can. In the first stages of this move- ment neither Mr. Lincoln nor Mr. Seward participated. Both of them had sympa- thized with what was known as the Free- soil party in 1818, but declined to become identified with it. They were politi- cians, and not then prepared to abandon the organization with which they had previously acted. Mr. Lincoln, with the free thought and independence of the men of the West, less trained and bound to party than the disciplined i)oliticians in the old States, holding no official posi- tion, a quiet but observing and reflect- ing citizen, truthful, honest, faithful to his convictions, and with the mental strength and courage to avow and main- tain them, early appreciated the import- ant principles involved in this rising ques- tion, and boldly cast off the shackles of party in defence of the right, and ear- nestly, irrespective of any and all par- ties, opposed the extension and aggres- sions of slavery. Mr. Seward was in those days in office, trammelled by jiarty followers and party surroundings. Train- ed during his whole public career in the severest discipline of party, indebted to it for his high position, alw^iys subservi- ent to its decrees and requirements, active and exacting in enforcing its obligations, he had not the independence and moral stamina to free himself from the restraints and despotism of party, whatever were his sympathies, until that organization dislianded. The people of the West, who knew Mr. Lincoln and ai)preciatcd his capabilities, trieil in 18.56 to place him on the ticket with Fremont as a candidate for Vice-President. Although but slight- ly known in the East, such was the zeal and enthusiasm in his favor of those who knew him, that nothing but tlie expedi- ency of selecting an Eastern man to be associated with Fremont, who was from the West, prevented his nomination iu- 802 MR. LIXCOLX AND MR. SEWAIID. [Dec stead of Daj- ton. From the start he was that there was in the inensiire profound a prominent Republican champion and thought, statesmanship, courage, and far- leader, while JNIr. Seward, a partisan pol- seeing sagacity — consummate executive- itician, held off; was i-eluctant to leave and administrative ability, Avhich was, tlie party with which he had been asso- after some reverses, crowned with suc- ciated, lioping to make the new move- cess. The nation, emerging from gloom ment subservient to or a part of the Whig and disaster, and the whole civilized party. Mr. Lincoln had no such purpose ; world', united in awarding honor and grat- the principles involved were with him itude to the illustrious man who had the ab;)ve mere party. With no fortune, un- mind to conceive and the courage and aided by metropolitan funds or pecuniary firmness to decree the emancii)atii)n of a assistance from any quarter, he gave his race. Ten years after this event, when time and mind with unstinted devotion to the patriot and philanthropist who de- the cause of freedom, and in his memora- creed emancipation had been years in his ble campaign with Douglas, alone and grave, an attempt is made on a solemn unassisted, he, through the empire State occasion to award to one of his subordi- of the West, met the Senatorial giant* on nates the honor and credit which justly the questions of the extensi(m of slavery, belong to the great chief who decreed it. the rights of the States, the grants to and limitatioyi of the powers of the General Government, and displayed ability and power which won the applause of the country, and drew from Douglas himself expressions of profound respect. When the Republicans, in convention at Chicago, chose their standard-bearer, they wisely and properly selected as their rep- resentative the sincere and able man avIio had no great money power in his interest, no disciplined lobby, no host of party fol- lowers, but who, like David, confided in the justice of his cause, and with the sim- ple weapons of truth and right met the Goliath of slavery aggi-ession, before as- sembled multitudes, in many a Avell-con- tested debate. The popular voice was not The Albany "Memorial Address" dwells on public measures, particularly during the war, but makes no allusion to this great act of Lincoln, nor to his merits in the great cause of freedom, for which he la- bored and in which he died, but declares his Secretary of State, a lifelong partisan politician, was always opposed to slavery, and that he " directed affairs for the ben- efit of the nation, through the name of another." It is unnecessar3% after what has already been said, to comment on this assumed direction by a subordinate in- stead of the chief, or on the gross injus- tice to Mr. Lincoln ; but it should be known that the Secretary of State neither originated nor directed the affairs of the Government on the great measure of eman- in error, or its confidence misplaced, when cipation. Mr. Seward was undoubtedly it selected and elected liincoln. opposed to slavery, and so was every mem- After his election, and after the war ber of the Administration, but his opposi- commenced, events forced upon Mr.'l^in- tion never led him to propose any measure coin the emancipation of the slaves in the of relief to the country, or to take any rebellious States. It was his act, a bold steps against slavery which would be step, an executive measure originating likely to impair the Whig party or the with him, and was, asstated in the memor- Whig organization while it existe(L No able appeal at the close of the final procla- specific act of his — no measure or distinct mation, invoking for it the considerate proposition to emancipate the slaves — is judginentof mankind, warranted alone by mentioned, for there was none. In the military necessity. He and the Cabinet administration of the government he took wereaware that the measure involved high no advance step on the slavery question, and fearful responsibility, for it Avould Mr. Lincoln was the pioneer and respon- alarm the timid everywhere, and alienate, sible author, while the Secretary of State at least for a time, the bold in the border studiously avoided aqy expression of opin- States. The act itself could not have ion in regard to it. The Secretaries of been justified or excused, and would never War and Navy were compelled to act in have been attempted, had the country relation to fugitives from slavery who been at peace ; yet the movement seemed sought protection under the Union flag — aggravated and more hazardous from the an anomalous question — but they could fact that the Union was weakened and im- obtain no counsel or advice from the Sec- perilled by civil war. Results have proved retary of State how to act. He not only 187:3.] MR. LIXCOLX AND Mil. SEWARD. 803 avoidi'il giving an oiiiiiioii, but recoin- liiendod cliat the Adiuiui-itration siiuuld abstain from any decisive stand on tliat controverted and embarrassing sui)ject. Tiie President, wiio is rei)resented as iiK^ompetent for his position, and whose mind in 1861, it is said, " had not even opened to the crisis," was reluctant to maddle with this disturbing element. Yet earlier than others he rightly appreciated wliat the Government would have to en- counter, and was convinced it must be taken in hand and disposed of. The mag- nitude of the I'ebellion, and the nature of the contest, compelled him, after the civil war had been carried on lor twelve months, to grapple with this formidable subject. His first movement, in March, 1862, was cautious and deliberate, char- acterized by great prudence and fore- thought, and designed not to alarm the friends of the Union by any harsh or of- fensive proceeding. It was an ameliorat- ed plan fjr the gradual abolition of slav- ery by action of the States respectively, with cooperation and assistance of the General Government. This plan of volun- tary and compensated emancipation vras pressed upon Congress and tlie border slave States, with great earnestness, by the President. Mr. Blair and Mr. Bates, both residents of the border slave States, were the only members of the Cabinet who cordially seconded these first early measures in the cause of emancipation. Their associates cheerfully assented to and acquiesced in the proposition, but had neither faitii nor zeal in its success ; nor did Mr. Seward or any one of them suggest a different or more available plan for national relief. The subject was beset on every side with difficulty, requiring for its manipulation and disposition the highest order of administrative and exec- utive ability'. No one more than the President was impressed with the difficul- ties to be met, and at the same time with the imperative necessity of decisive ac- tion. The details of these proceedings, and tlie final determined stand taken by him — not by the Secretary of State or any of the Cabinet — to decree by an executive order the emancipntion of tlie slaves in the rebellious States, have been elsewhere related. It was after all effirts for vol- untary emancipation by the States inter- ested, with pecuniary aid from tlie nation- al treasury, had failed. To Mr. Seward and iiiysclC the President communicated his purpose, and asked our views, on the 13th of July, 1862. It was the day suc- ceeding his last unsuccessful and lio})eles3 conference with the representatives in Congress from the border slave States, at a gloomy {)eriod of our afi'iirs, just after the reverses of our armies under ^IcClcl- lan before Richmond. The time, he said, had arrived when we must determine whether the slave element should be for or against us. ^Ir. Seward, represented as a superior in " native intellectual pow- er," and as having forty years previously chosen his side, and as at that early period having claimed " aright in the government to emancipate slaves," was appalled and not prepared for this decisive step, when jNIr. Lincoln made known to us his inten- tion, by an executive order, to emancipate the slaves. Startled with so broad and radical a proposition, he informed the President that the consequences of such an act were so momentous that he was not prepared to advise on the subject without further reflection. While Mr. Seward hesitated, and had the subject under con- sideration, the President deliberately pre- pared his preliminary proclama tion, which met the approval, or at least the acqui- escence, of the whole Cabinet, though there were phases of opinion not entirely in accord with the proceeding. Mr. Blair, an original emancipationist, and committed to the principle, thought the time to issue the order in()i>portune, and Mr. Bates desired that the deportation of the colored race should be coincident with emancipation. Aware that there were shades ol'difference amcmg iiis counsellors, and hesitation and doubt with some in view of the vast responsibility and its cim- sequences, the President devised his own scheme, held himself alone accountable for the act, and, unaided and unassisted, prepared eacli of the proclamations of freedom. Mr. Seward in no way or form originated or was responsible for that important measure, did not in any way "direct affairs" in regard to it, was in no other way cognizant of it beyond his colleagues except as communicated to him and myself on tiie 13th of July, at its inception. Yetinthe" Memorial Address " Mr. Seward is represented as the lifelong leading opponent of slavery, beyond others tlie masterspirit in the Lincoln Adminis- tration. The President and tiiis great 804 MR. LINCOLN AND MR. SEWARD. [Dec. event are ignored, and the inference is intended to be conveyed that the Secreta- ry uf State, who " chose his side " in the morning of life adverse to slavery, is ea- t*tled to the credit ; for it is represented that the President was a mere secondary personage, and the Secretary of State di- rected affairs in tlie name of Mr. Lincoln, who was to " reap the honors due chiefly to Mr. Seward's labors." To unfold the leaves of suppressed his- tory, and correct the errors and perver- sions which interested — and many of them still living — persons have spread abroad and inculcated, is a thankless task, and will subject him who performs it to par- tisan abuse. It is scarcely to be expected that the present generation will know or be able to appreciate the labors and acts of those who, intrusted with the govern- ment in a trying period, took upon them- selves immense and unprecedented re- sponsibilities, or that a rightful discrim- ination will at this early day, if ever, be made as regards those who participated in the movements which eventuated in the salvation of the Union and the eman- cipation of a race. The late labored ef- fjrt of the distinguished gentleman of an historic family and name to depreciate the talents and services of Abraham Lin- coln, and to crown another with honors that justly belong to him, is a specimen of lamentable partisan prejudice and error. It is but one and perhaps the last of many attempts of a similar cliaracter, to take from the brow of Lincoln the wreath of merit that is justly his — to de- prive him of the reward due for his labor, and give to another credit for his acts. It is not the first time in our history when like injustice has been witnessed toward our Chief Magistrates. Volumes have been Avritten to prove that Hamilton controlled Washington and directed the affairs of the nation in tlie name of iiis chief. Van Buren, it was claimed, con- trolled the imperious will of Jackson and dictated his measures. Undoubtedly each had influence with his chief, perhaps more than he deserved. The same may be said of Mr. Seward, who had undeniably influ- ence with Mr. Lincoln, but who was no more the directing mind of the Adminis- tration of Lincoln, but really much less, than was Hamilton of Washington or Van Buren of Jackson. Both Hamilton and Seward are .charged with having given countenance to this false impres^ijn, which, however, redounds to llie credit of neitlier. In tliese papers, written to correct the misconceptions of Mr. Adams, and mi-;- representationsof the Albany " Memorial Address," incidents of what occurred would, I thought, better than merecontrar- dictory assertions, illustrate the acts, the executive management and administrative ability, as well as the capacity and men- tal energy, of the men whoso traits are in- . volved in the statements which have been made. Of the incidents that took place during the administration of Mr. Lincoln, some of which and the attending circumstances could not have been disclosed at the time of their occurrence, there are in most cases living witnesses. The transactions of an earlier date are of public notoriety and matters of record, commencing with the organized anti-masonic proscription, and embracing the rise and fall of that and subsequent parties, down to and in- cluding the much misrepresented pro- ceedings at the Chicago Convention in 1860. It has been no part of my purpose to magnify or overstate the qualities or to give undue credit to the labors and abilities of Mr. Lincoln, still less to do in- justice to ^Ir. Seward, who is represented in the " Memorial Address " as overshad- owing his chief. Mr. Lincoln was in many ■ respects a remarkable, though I do not mean to say an infallible man. No true delineation or photograph of his intellect- ual capacity and attributes has ever been given, nor shall I attempt it. His vigoi'- ous and rugged but comprehensive mind, his keen and shrewd sagacity, his intel- lectual strength and mental power, his genial, kindly temperament, with charity for all and malice toward none — his sin- cerity, unquestioned honesty, and homely suavity, made him popular as well as great. Had he survived to this day, the Albany" jNIemorial Address " would have been of a different character, and its pages not marred with paragraphs wliich retieet on his ability and do injustice to his mem- ory. 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