LC I0|i F5 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES FITZ-HUGH Class _LG_LDlU_ Book.. .F 5 Copyright^ COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES THOMAS FITZ-HUGH PROFESSOR OF LATIN IN THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS CHICAGO Ube Tantversitg of dbica^o press 1897 FEB a xm P TWO COPIES RECEIVED 2nd COPY, U*V\ ^ 1898. i'283 COPYRIGHT 1898 BY THOMAS F1TZ-HUGH THE EVOLUTION OF CLASSIC CULTURE AND ITS PEDAGOGIC TREATMENT AN INQUIRY INTO THE PHILO- SOPHIC BASIS OF THE HUMANITIES THIS LITTLE BOOK IS DEDICATED TO THE CAUSE OF HUMANISTIC STUDIES AND TO THEIR PHILOSOPHIC ORGAN- IZATION IN THE LONE STAR STATE CONTENTS. The Evolution of Culture. ii. The Pedagogic Aspect of Culture-Evolution: Organ- ization of the Latin Humanities in the College. 29 III. Organization of the Latin Humanities in Secondary Education. -------- 55 PREFACE. The three addresses contained in this volume were pre- pared on separate occasions and for totally different bodies : hence some little repetition and the air of individual isolation which characterizes them. They are reproduced here without alteration. THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE I. THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE. Delivered before the Texas Academy of Science in December of 1896. The normal evolution of Aryan culture presents to reflection five successive stages — the hunting and fishing, the nomadic or pastoral, the agricultural or political, which is the historical stage par excellence, the artistic or creative, and the philosophic or reflective stage. Our knowledge of the hunting and fishing and of the nomadic or pastoral period is derived from the fos- silized objects of prehistoric archaeology and the fossilized words and thoughts of comparative philology and comparative mythology, and confirmed by ordinary reason and by the obser- vation of primitive types of contemporary civilization. But with these aids we have reached the Ultima Thule of pure histor- ical insight : the sciences of man can carry us no farther back than the period of hunting and fishing. Primeval man and his relation to nature and through nature to God are questions left to natural science and religion. And yet, constituted as the cultured spirit under the law of spiritual survival has come to be, these questions as to the meaning for man of nature and God are the chief interests of humanity, and hence from our culture-historical standpoint we are justified in viewing science and religion as the mainstays of our hope for the future. To the first two of our culture-historical stages, therefore, the era of hunting and fishing, and the era of nomadic life, only the practical interest of the specialist or the ideal interest of the philosopher attaches. But with the last three, the social-politi- cal, the artistic, and the scientific era, cultured humanity identi- fies the supreme practical and ideal interests of the individual and the race. The social foundation with its organizing factors, religion and law, art with its creations of glad beauty, science with its system of ever-widening truth, constitute the basal inter - 9 io THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES ests of the cultured spirit, for they embody the whole content of man's spiritual evolution, and they present the successive phases of that content in their historical and organic relation ; they constitute, therefore, the true humanities, the story of the unfolding of individual as well as racial culture. Let us inquire now more closely into that unfolding: we shall find one supreme factor that is all-pervasive in civilization, and we shall determine the order and process of its operation in the evolution of culture. If we seek the ultimate answer to the question what seems to be the determining impulse in that evolution, it is found in the human will. The most momentous and epoch-making fact in modern philosophy is the union of history and biology, of the sciences, par excellence, of man and nature, on the common ground of a volitional psychology and a volitional metaphysics : the ultimate inner reality of man and nature, so far as it seems empirically presented to thought, is of a kind with the thing we call will, — it is will, will to survive, that is at the bottom of bio- logical as of historical evolution. If we seek, on the other hand, the particular culture-historical factor that exerts over all other stimuli of the human will the determining influence in civiliza- tion, it is found in religion, or whatever in any particular case takes its place as embodying the highest ideal of the will. For I use the term religion in its true Latin meaning, as that influ- ence which binds the strong springs of will by the power of the supreme ideal which it holds before the imagination ; the power of every religion is the power of its ideal, for that is what incites the will. Now it is not every religion that is a simple religion of the divine or supernatural : when the ideal changes from the elemen- tary form of a vague transcendental sanction to, let us say, the beautiful as in Greece, or the political as in Rome, the empirical power of these religions in the evolution of culture lies in the new and not the old ideals ; in the case of Greece, for example, we might speak of a religion of beauty, in the case of Rome, of a religion of patriotism. The original common mark of all THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 1 1 religion, however, is the element of the ultimate-ideal, or tran- scendental, and it is this element which the national will invari- ably appropriates when the particular content of the old religion has faded before the vital interests of the new ideal. The shell of the transcendental sanction accommodates continually a chang- ing content which each successive era naively reads into the tra- ditional religion. Thus religion, embodying everywhere the supreme ideal of the individual and the collective will, becomes inevitably the mainspring of the highest spiritual activity, which is culture itself : it will urge men to lay the social-political sub- structure in harmony with that ideal, it will inspire artistic genius to glorify its worth in song and shrine and statue, it will stimu- late and exercise the imagination and suggest the first bold sal- lies of discursive thought. If the religious ideal is thus regnant in the evolution of cul- ture, we shall not be surprised to find it fixing the character and standard of culture-attainment. The achievements of an individ- ual civilization, as the Greek or the Roman, or of a cycle of cul- ture like the Atlantic, can therefore nowhere transcend the level of the religious ideal : the arrow does not rise above the line of aim, nor has the individual or the collective will ever wrought higher than its ideal. The achievements of culture are threefold : social, artistic, and scientific. A nation the essence of whose religion is the ideal of state, or patriotism, like the Roman's, will achieve its best culture-historical results in the sphere of that ideal, or the social political sphere. A people the ideal of whose religion is the beautiful, like the Greek's, will realize in the sphere'of art its highest achievements. A culture-historical cycle like that of Atlantic civilization, whose religious ideal is spiritual perfection, will excel in all the fruits of spirit, but preeminently in the pur- est, which is truth or science. If we come now to consider more narrowly the nature and origin of this astonishing transcendental element in historical survival, the religious ideal, we are brought face to face with the most vital distinction involved in all inquiry into the unknown, the distinction between the empirical reason and the transcenden- 1 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES tal reason ; between the how and the what or why of things. As we have not attempted to answer the transcendental question why- life is, neither have we sought to explain why religion, with its suggestions of the' beyond, of the supernatural, of the transcen- dental, should appear everywhere in history to lie so near the springs of human motive and so arouse the hearts of men to toil by deed and thought towards the attainment of those ideals which, under their respective environments, have approved themselves in the battle of life as making for spiritual survival and highest efficiency, and which tend everywhere in the history of human life to become invested with the transcendental sanction of religion. We have only sought to find how the religious ideal operates in the evolution of culture, and we have found the empirical reason in the motive power of the ideal upon the will. Our laws of nature and history do not explain the causes, but only the process of phenomena. Newton's principle of uni- versal attraction does not explain why the cosmic system so moves, but only how it moves. Physics makes no claim to solving the problem why energy is and acts, but only how it acts. Biology does not concern itself with the question, why life is, but only how the phenomena of life succeed each other. Scien- tific thought restricts its responses within the limits of real or possible experience ; it would contradict its nature to dogmatize about the metempirical. Whence, then, comes the answer to the transcendental question, which is the characteristic and dis- tinguishing mark of the human spirit, the answer to which makes up the dynamic content of religion and determines its vital power for good or evil in culture ? In metempirical matters it is the function of the intellect |to answer how, of the will to answer why. Reason knows how the thing is, the will decrees why it is. Science furnishes the empirical cause, religion the transcendental. All that reason accepts beyond the limits of real or possible experience is inevitably a mere decree of the will, a choice of the heart ; and that decree, that choice, rises spontaneously out of the total experience of life like odor from a rose. Reason may point and suggest, but the heart must THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 13 decree and confirm. It was the heart of Anaxagoras that, thrilling with the beauty and order of the world, leapt beyond the data of science and found the transcendental answer in a world- ordering Mind. It was the heart of Lucretius that, stricken with the sorrows of men and the hideousness of their superstitions, " Dropped his plummet down the broad, Deep universe, and said, ' No God.' " It is the heart of cultured humanity that, following the evo- lution of culture through the ages until now, rises above the empirical and finds the sanction for the power of the ideal and the transcendental upon the human will in an Infinite Will, "in whom we live and move and have our being." It is the heart of the materialist that, withered by the cold indifference of nature's mechanism, declines to transgress the limits of possible experience and finds the mechanical reason in Nature. Out of the heart are the issues of life. Of critical moment in the evolution of culture is this answer of the heart to the what and why of things, for it involves the nature of the supreme ideal and the worth of religion. Even if the religion of matter were as mysterious and transcendental as the religion of spirit, there could not be serious dispute as to their relative motive force in the concerns of culture. The mys- tery of the one is clothed with sacredness and worth, the mystery of the other is wrapped in the ice of indifference. The very essence of the religion of spirit is the life of the ideal impulse, the very essence of the religion of matter is indifference to that ideal. History strongly suggests the inference that a moribund religion implies a moribund civilization ; the canker that destroyed the civilizations of Greece and Rome was in the heart of religion. It is but culture-historical justice that the world's best poetry and philosophy has reprobated the materialistic answer to the transcendental question as being unworthy of our race ; cf. also Wundt, System der Philosphie, pages 3-4. The flowers of spirit wither and die with the vine that gave them life. It is, there- fore, a profound instinct of spiritual selection which leads society 14 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES to shudder at the touch of atheism, as the quick shudders at touch of the dead. Out of the spiritual ideal are the issues of culture. It is clear, therefore, that the transcendental sanction which religion gives is the important and determining thing for cul- ture, and that it is not religion's function to give any other. And yet, in the nature of the case, every historical religion has more or less of the empirical blended with its structure. This unavoidable and necessary union of the historical with the super- natural has been the disturbing element in that structure, because of the tendency of the transcendental to invest the historical and empirical with its own sacredness and inviolability. But is not the ideal sanction the characteristic factor that concerns the evolution of culture and determines the worth of religion for humanity ? And must not the historical tradition, which is wholly empirical, be subject to the test of historical criticism in order that the precious ideal be saved from the polluting union with a lie ? Since religion is a blending of the empirical and the transcendental, let heart and head do each its perfect work, aiding but not dogmatizing to each other, and all heresy and schism and hate of humanity's best friend will cease. What right has the heart to dogmatize to the intellect about historical facts ? What right has the intellect to dogmatize to the heart about the love that moves them both to work their noblest works ? Surely, the health of religion lies in the full, free development of its rational and ideal elements in harmonious and spontaneous, not in hostile and forcible reaction. The degree of this harmony will ever be the measure of the power of religion in culture- progress. Having thus established the supreme importance of the religious ideal in the evolution of culture, we come now to consider the order and process of that evolution. When man has outlived the naturalistic stages of the hunting and fish- ing, and the nomadic life, and enters upon the proper task of culture, the problems that arise are the practical problems of adaptation to his geographical and spiritual environment, the THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 15 conquest of the soil and the organization of private and public life. The first stage of culture-historical life is, therefore, the social-political, on which, as a practical basis, the subsequent evolution goes forward. When economic advance has been suffi- cient to afford leisure and means for ideal pursuits, the human spirit begins at once to unfold itself in art, and the second stage in the history of culture, the era of the beautiful, is inaugurated. At length, when the typical forms of economic and artistic activ- ity have been achieved, the spirit of inquiry springs into new and sudden life, and the pure quest of truth begins, the final era in the unfolding of culture. Thus the order of all culture-evolu- tion is economic, artistic, scientific, as suggested in my opening sentence. And this, too, must needs be the order of individual evolution, since culture is the work of individuals. Furthermore, the characteristic activity of each stage does not cease with the inauguration of the subsequent stage, but continues for all time, achieving continually higher culture- historical results. Economic activity does not, of course, cease when artistic activity begins, and both of them flourish in the pure air of science. Hence the order of perfecting may even vary from the order of beginning : what our law affirms is the invariability of the order of first unfolding. Agamemnon, king of men, must live and work in order that Homer, the sweet singer, may "touch our eyelids with tears," and a Homer must stir the infinite depths of spirit before Thales of Miletus can inquire into the mystery of the universe. A Numa must inau- gurate his policies before Ennius can have leisure to sing, and Ennius, the poet, must precede Lucretius, the philosopher. Even in the chaotic beginnings of modern culture, a Charle- magne or a Friedrich Barbarossa will arise before a Dante, and a Dante before a Descartes. Our next inquiry which concerns the reason for this seeming fixity in the order of the phenomena of higher culture presents no difficulty for our first evolutionary stage, since we recognize in the agricultural, social, and political activities of that stage the necessary basis of civilization. Reason does not question 1 6 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES why the practical era of society-building normally precedes all other manifestations of culture. But when we ask why the crea- tion of the beautiful in art is characteristic of the second stage of spiritual evolution and the quest of truth in science of the third, the answer does not at once suggest itself, although the fact of this sequence seems apparent not only in the history of higher culture, but in the more rudimentary phenomena of child- development and in the trend of aboriginal and savage types of civilization. The psychological reason seems to lie in the dif- ference for the human spirit between the concrete and the abstract. When we observe that the whole process of human evolution presents itself to us both in history and biology as an unfolding from nature into spirit, from the sensuous into the rational, we are prepared to find the concrete ideal activity in art manifesting itself as a necessary preparatory stage to the abstract ideal activity in science. The era of art is the midway stage in the passage of the human spirit from concrete activity to abstract activity ; it exhibits the concrete element of the sensuous and the abstract element of the ideal. The harmoni- ous union of the two, of the concrete and the abstract, of nature and thought, is what we mean by art. The scientific era elimi- nates the sensuous as an integral constructive element in its characteristic activities, and thus implies a higher stage of thought evolution. Hence a people whose impelling interest is concrete, like the Romans, does not rise to the higher spiritual activity of the artistic stage, and still less to the non-sensuous standpoint of the scientific era, and a people whose impelling interest is the beautiful, like the Greeks, while achieving the results of the economic stage cannot realize, though they may approximate, the genuine results of the scientific, for their science will be inevitably contaminated with the imaginative and the aesthetic; cf, also Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, I, 154 ff. Let us now observe more in detail the operation of this psychological law, in accordance with which human culture manifests itself as a progress from concrete-activity through art- activity into scientific-activity. The characteristic problems of THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 17 the economic stage of culture are concrete problems clamoring for solution in order to the satisfaction of social and political wants. The power of disinterested abstract thought is not involved, since thought is here always stimulated by practical interest, but at the same time the foundation is being laid for the next higher function of spirit in art-creation where thought while cleaving to the sensuous has nevertheless emancipated itself from the fetters of self-interest. When the necessary conditions of social life have been ful- filled and a period of leisure and affluence ensues, the first advance of culture must needs be, as we have seen, into the artistic stage, whose products, moreover, by their sensuous beauty appeal more immediately to the fresh, youthful feelings of those who have emerged triumphantly from the difficulties of the economic era, and whose first higher spiritual impulse is to realize in art the ideals that have inspired them. The height- ened vigor which accrues to the imagination in the first flush of the artistic life of a people redounds on the one hand to the economic interest, inasmuch as it renders finer achievements possible in the further development and expansion of the social- political fabric, and on the other to the scientific interest, inas- much as the exercise of the sensuous imagination is the imme- diate and necessary preparation for the activity of the rational or abstract imagination, which is the essence of that spiritual activity we call scientific ; vid. Zeller, Pre-Socratie Philosophy •, I, 54. The moment imagination becomes sufficiently strong to subject its own content to critical analysis, the phenomenon of intellectual doubt arises, which is the necessary starting-point of scientific thought. The scientific or reflective era dawns when the intellectual presentation begins to supplement the moral or volitional presentation in the systematic interpretation of things; cf. also Wundt, System, der Philosophic, p. 3. Having discussed the fundamental laws regulating the evo- lution of culture, let us now trace more explicitly its empirical process. When we cast our glance backward to the farthest limits of historical tradition, two factors present themselves as 1 8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES of prime significance in the life and progress of civilization, the one an outer, the other an inner influence. These factors are geography and religion, the one involving the physical, the other the spiritual, environment of the community. The geo- graphical factor furnishes the physical basis of the individual and collective life, and in so doing exerts a powerful reflex influence upon the spiritual trend of that life. When we come to inquire into the fundamental traits of the social organism, both on its domestic and on its political side, we are at once brought face to face with the radical influence of the religious ideal. It appears first as the source of all reverence for the institution of the family, and finally as the guarantee of the sacredness of the state. A factor that thus enters with determining power into the foundations of the social order must needs ramify the whole practical life and history of the race : it is preeminently the key to that life and history ; cf. also Hegel, Philosophy of History, p. 53. To sum up our results for the first historical period of culture — the agricultural-political or the historical period proper — geog- raphy and religion are the fundamental factors, the one deter- mining the physical basis of society, the other evolving from itself all the sanctities of private and public life, of the family and the state, as we find them set forth in the private and public antiquities of every historical people. The stage of state-building through the establishing of cus- toms unwritten and written is fairly inaugurated and the second era of culture dawns in the lives of some individuals ; I say, of some individuals, because the advance from one stage of culture to another is in the last analysis a fact of the individual experi- ence, and will occur sooner or later with the various members of the social order as the life of the individual has been richer or poorer in the highest experiences of the race. It is the period of the love of the beautiful and of the creation of its noblest manifestations ; a period of spiritual freedom, which follows upon the organization of the state and the supplying of the immediate demands of the social order, and which implies, therefore, in certain individuals in the community a condition of leisure and THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 19 independence of fortune. Here, too, when we inquire into the historical beginnings of the various spheres of art, the same Ariadne thread of the religious ideal unites the maze of culture's pathway. As handmaidens of religion, the two highest arts, poetry and song, hand in hand usher in the glad morning of the beautiful. And when religion has uttered her ideals in poetry and song, she strikes another chord in the diapason of beauty — the temple rises on some heaven-kissing hill as a worthy house for deity : the majestic beauty of architecture is born. Then sculp- ture seeks to realize man's thoughts of God and bodies forth the marble form of deity, and painting touches shrine and statue with the charm of color. Thus art everywhere enters history as the fair vestal at religion's altar. The economic and creative eras have unfolded their charac- teristic products, and the spirit of man is ripe for the era of science, which appears in the evolution of culture as rising on the basis of the political and artistic stages and as having its roots like them in the soil of religion. The activity of the scientific era has as its necessary starting-point the data of the religious imagination, which therefore determines the direction and powerfully influences the results of the earliest scientific inquiry. The religious presentation is the source of the first scientific presentation, for the religious consciousness involves the notion of a power behind the phenomenal world, and so suggests to reason the reign of law ; cf. Zeller, Pre-Socratic Philosophy, I, 51 f. Thus science becomes aware of her whole problem — to find the law in things. Morever, the nature of the religious presentation is found to determine the nature of the suggestion to reason. A religion of nature and beauty like the Greek's will suggest a naturalistic philosophy constructed on aesthetic rather than scientific principles ; a religion of utility like the Roman's, a utilitarian philosophy, which is all ethics ; a religion of spirit, a philosophy of spirit, as in Christendom. And, finally, just as the artistic era opens with the most spiritual form of art — poetry and song — as the most perfect expression of its impelling ideals, so the era of science is ushered in by the 20 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES queen of sciences, philosophy, out of whose broad lap the sep- arate sciences gradually unfold themselves, leaving to the mother the queenly task of maintaining the unity and concord of the household, and of finding a supreme truth that shall harmonize the ideals of religion with the data of science. Surveying now the course of culture-evolution as empirically presented in the history of our race, it is impossible to ignore the operation and development of what may be termed the tran- scendental sanction as a vital and characteristic element in the process of spiritual selection and survival. We can no more ignore the determining power of this element in the struggle and rivalry of spiritual evolution than we can any other principle of organic or social adaption in lower stages of evolution. At every stage of culture-evolution we find this metempirical sanc- tion attaching itself with greater or less precision to every element of culture that seems to make for spiritual survival and efficiency, and converting such element into an ideal of tremen- dous power. With the birth of science the relation of the transcendental sanction which religion exploits in the evolution of culture is naturally at first disturbed. There are two ultimate cravings of the human spirit. The dominant one is to find worth in things, the secondary to find truth in things. Religion is the product of the longings of the heart, science of the longings of the intel- lect. But until the rise of science religion had to discharge the twofold function of satisfying heart and head, and only after a struggle, the din of whose Armageddon still echoes along the paths of culture, has she renounced this twofold relation, leaving to science the theoretic, and restricting herself to the practical, function in civilization. But her supremacy still asserts itself in unmistakable character in the demand which culture makes of science in the person of philosophy that religion and science be harmonized in a contradictionless unity. In conclusion, I wish to emphasize an empirical law of supreme practical importance in culture, and I can devise no more satisfactory term for it than the law of habit. I mean by THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 21 the law of habit a tendency to organization as against disorgan- ization, to cosmos as against chaos, under the higher law of life, progress by spiritual selection and survival. The question I now propose is again the how, the law, not the why, the cause, of this tendency in the spiritual world. The subject of culture-historical inquiry is the spirit of man. By spirit I mean always the whole willing, feeling, and thinking being. Culture is the work of that spirit under the impulse of stimuli of the will. These stimuli of the will are what we mean by ideals. What the human spirit most wants or wills becomes by definition the ideal of the will. Now just here our empirical question arises : how does the individual and the community come to want or will any particular ideal of culture ? We answer at once, through the sum total of experience, hereditary and personal, physical and spiritual. But how does experience go about creating these wants, these longings, these ideals of the will ? I find only one answer : by the most vital empirical law in the world of life, by the law of habit, which I have tried to define more exactly as a tendency to organization as against disorganization, to cosmos as against chaos. What gravity is in the so-called inanimate cosmos, habit is in the animate world. Just as the nebular tends to cosmic organization by the way of gravity, so the animate tends to biologic organization by the way of habit. I repeat, I raise no transcendental issue. The ques- tion, what is the reason for the biological law of habit is tanta- mount to the question, what is the reason for the physical law of gravity ? The question why nebular matter develops a ten- dency to organization or cosmos is tantamount to the question why the human spirit develops a tendency to culture. Science has never yet successfully answered these questions. Their answer has thus far been ever a fiat of the human, will, a revela- tion of the human heart. I mean only to emphasize the empir- ical fact that the universe of matter and mind does actually develop this tendency to beauty, on the one hand by the way of gravity, on the other by the way of habit. Gravitation, then, in matter and habitual experience, or habit through experience, in 2 2 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES life are God's modes of astronomic and biological evolution. Gravitation develops astronomical cosmos, and habit biological cosmos. Gravity is the law of astronomical organization, and habit the law of biological organization. The sum-total of our experience, then, under the law of habit, or tendency to organization, conditions all our concrete willing and feeling and thinking; in other words, all spiritual activity and hence all culture is the result of this tendency of spirit under the law of progress, which seems to hold in history as in biology, to convert disorganization into organization, chaos into cosmos, by the way of habit. The power of experience expresses itself in its tendency to habituate. Experience, become habitual, tends more and more to become a law. Habitual experience of climate becomes a climatic need. Habitual experience of social and political conditions converts those conditions into laws of life for individual and community. Habitual experience of the beautiful makes art a second nature. Habitual experience of science becomes a permanent motive of intellectual activity. The permanence of culture, then, in obedience to the law of habit, depends upon habitual experience of its ideals. So long as those ideals are becoming spiritual habits through systematic cultivation at the hands of the individual, the family, and the community, so long will the true, beautiful, and good be ruling impulses in life. When that sacred cult falls into partial or total desuetude, culture by the divinely imposed law of habit is par- tially or wholly dead. What a responsibility then is ours, who, as truth-seekers, are protagonists in the vanguard of civilization ! If noble, social ideals are to rule, must we not toil to habituate our fellowmen, and especially the young, to the experience of them ? If a government worthy of spiritual freemen is to sur- vive, must not its vital interests and aims be made familiar and habitual to our children and our neighbors ? If the joy of art is to live, must we not, by habitual contact, drink in its pure inspiration ? If the truth of science is to wax, must we not make it the habitual goal of our thinking ? My theory of culture-evolution is completely, though of THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 23 necessity briefly, stated. I desire to append to it two philo- sophic inferences which it seems to involve. The first concerns the empirical biologic basis of science, the second the metempir- ical basis of religion. The evolution of culture stands, of course, in immediate connection with universal evolution. Culture-evo- lution, viewed empirically, is merely the third step in universal evolution. Science recognizes, first, an astronomic evolution, next, a biologic evolution, and lastly, a culture evolution. Cul- ture evolution is simply the crown of the biological process ; the highest form of life is the cultured spirit. The empirical fact that unites all forms of biological evolution is the fact of a tendency to organization, a conception arising in the biological sphere, and applied figuratively or interpretatively to the astro- nomical process. I say figuratively or interpretatively, for sci- ence cannot, without an assumption, speak of a tendency to organ- ization as an empirical fact, except for the world of life, because consciousness alone can cognize that fact of itself ; conscious life cognizes its own tendency to organization as an empirical fact. Science can go no farther than to posit this tendency as probably inherent likewise in all extra-conscious phenomena of life, being compelled, even here, to ignore the factor of conscious- ness, although it is in conscious life alone that we have imme- diate experience of the tendency. Apart, therefore, from the problem of astronomical evolution, let us consider the biological significance of the empirical fact of this conscious tendency to organization. That significance will be found to consist in the determination of the ultimate scientific basis, or the empirical starting-point, of biological evolution, as a cosmic and not an acosmic condition. In any ultimate empirical basis of biological evolution science must pre- suppose the tendency to organization because the present known biological world exhibits at least in conscious spirit a certain degree of this tendency. Furthermore, science must admit as a possible element in that ultimate empirical basis a non-tendency to organization because in our present known biological status this non-tendency exists at least in conscious spirit as the empir- 24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES ical correlate of the conscious tendency. We cannot assume this non-tendency at any particular point of previous biological evolution, because such elements may be rationally viewed as a sort of dead-waste of organization and therefore as an integral part of organization, though set off in consciousness as non- organization because not empirically participant in organization. But neither can we disprove and repudiate this non-tendency as an element in our possible biological basis, because on empirical grounds it may have as good right to be as the tendency to organization. Furthermore, thought must assert the primacy of the element of organization in the sense that the non-tendency must be viewed as incidental to the tendency, and not the ten- dency to organization as incidental to inertia or chaos. Thought cannot view organization as the dead-waste of non-organization, cosmos as a side issue to chaos, just as it cannot think purpose a function of indifference, order a function of confusion, life a function of death. On the contrary, experience of thought and life seems to justify the position that the tendency to biological organization which we call life has this advantage over non- tendency, that it waxes in power and tends to invade the realm of non-tendency and win it over to organization in cell and plant and animal. But an acosmic empirical basis of life that must develop into a cosmic one is an impossible conception for science. Therefore, in view of this empirical fact of the divine tendency to biological organization, as cognized in consciousness, science must posit as its ultimate biological basis a cosmos in ovo, and it must repudiate as unscientfk all conceptions of a chaotic or "chance" biological condition. I shall not raise the analogous question with reference to the astronomical world, because our whole inquiry is confined to phenomena of life. Although science assumes the biological world as arising on the basis of the astronomical, she has not yet succeeded in showing either life to be an astronomical, or motion to be a biological, phenomenon. Until this is achieved the relation of thought to the astronomical process will continue fundamentally different from its relation to the biological process. THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 25 Thought contemplates the biological process from within, because it is itself a function of that process, but thought's relation to non-life remains persistently an outer relation, in accordance with which thought can only interpret non-life in terms of life, and must therefore waive the scientific cogency of all conclusions about non-life and even of extra-conscious life that are based upon life's experience of itself. Hence, while the analogy between biological evolution and astronomical evolution is very near, we could not make it more than an analogy without assuming, in the first place, the existence of a tendency in non-life, which we know only for life, and, in the second place, even admitting a tendency to cosmos in non-life, that the empirical biological fact of consciousness that organizing tendencies prevail against non- organizing tendencies is likewise an empirical astronomical fact, — which we cannot assert. In a word, to make our argument for a cosmic biologic basis cogent for a cosmic astronomical basis we must practically assume what we posit as non-life to be one with life. Thought will continue to interpret the phenomena of astronomical evolution in terms of those of biological evolution, but science will deny anything but the analogy until thought itself is shown to be a mode of motion, or energy a mode of life. But not only does the fact of this biological tendency to cosmos determine for science the empirical basis of life ; it determines and explains for religion the metempirical ideal. The ideal of human faith while beyond empirical thought may not clash with empirical thought, for both religion and science are phenomena of one life. The same law of that life in accord with which science posits a cosmic empirical basis for that life will determine for faith a cosmic metempirical basis of the nature of organizing spirit, for organizing spirit is the noblest manifestation of that life. While reason cannot arrive at a first cause, because the rational quest of a first cause involves reason in the hopeless regress of antecedents, yet the history of humanity and the experience of the individual show that reason rests naively in a first cause of the nature of spirit. The explanation is that such an ideal, though unattainable by empirical thought, is sympathetic 26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES with empirical thought, while the non-spiritual principle, even though like the atoms of Democritus, simple and satisfactory as a process, falls as a first cause under the ban of reason and the infinite regress, because thought refuses to rest naively in a first cause that ignores life and its highest manifestation, human spirit. Hence it is that as culture advances to the reflective stage the transcendental sanction tends more and more to express itself in a religion of Organizing Spirit, in which the cultured mind realizes the maximum reconciliation between knowledge and faith. Let us now sum up our results. From the general interpre- tative standpoint of a volitional metaphysics, the evolution of culture has been presented as an invariable series of phenomena evolving, in obedience to psychological law, under the impulse of physical and spiritual stimuli, which find their most typical conceptual expression in the terms geography and religion. Under the primitive indirect influence of physical environment and the subsequent direct influence of spiritual aspiration after worth in life and truth in things, the three successive stages of culture-achievement, the social-political, the artistic or imagi- native, and the philosophic or reflective stage, unfold themselves in the order of psychological process. The tendency to spiritual organization effectuates itself empirically by the way of habit, which is the empirical mode of the operation of experience. The consciousness of this tendency, which is given in thought, involves for thought the scientific repudiation of a "chance" or acosmic biological standpoint or starting-point, whether empir- ical as in science or metempirical as in religion. THE PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE-EVOLUTION II. THE PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE-EVOLUTION ORGANIZATION OF THE LATIN HUMANITIES IN THE COLLEGE. Delivered before the University of Texas in February of 1897. When thought addresses itself either to the world of life or to the astronomical-physical world, the thing that appears con- spicuously as a common trait of both is a principle of organiza- tion, which manifests itself in the highest form of reality, the human spirit, as a natural tendency to culture, — that is, to economic, artistic, and scientific organization. Consciousness recognizes the will as the motive power behind this tendency to spiritual organization, and thought, interpreting the outer world of life and non-life in terms of the Ego, points the way to a volitional metaphysics. For to some first principle we must come, since that primal will within us demands and ultimately decrees it and thought continually approaches it. Nothing is truer than that the heart and mind thirst to rest in God. And herein we recognize the ultimate mystery in higher culture, — this spiritual longing for the good, the beautiful, and the true; and herein the ultimate power of the cultured will, — to tran- scend experience in the construction of its own ideals and so to anticipate in thought the haven where it would be. These basal longings of the human heart, the strange children of the strug- gles and rivalries of existence with its divinely imposed law of survival by progress and selection, or by whatever other empir- ical process science may interpret to itself the course of spiritual evolution, take shape in religion, by which we mean the con- straining power of these ideals of the will upon the work and thought of men. Religion we find everywhere answering the highest cravings of the human spirit, those that condition and determine all others, the craving for ultimate, unconditioned 29 30 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES worth, and the craving for ultimate, unconditioned truth, the supreme wants of heart and head. Its ideal is therefore supreme in culture because as the ultimate sanction it gives value and significance to all the higher aspirations and activities of life. These ideal interests and aspirations of the individual and the collective will become instinctively incorporated with the super- natural in religion, in which, therefore, the process of culture from the period of social-political organization throughout each subsequent stage of its evolution, its era of artistic activity and its era of philosophic activity, is strongly rooted. Hence it is that as the religious ideal becomes purer and higher it imparts a like character to the ideals of culture, and as it declines under the influence of satiety, excessive luxury, or other cause of spiritual stagnation, then government, art, and science decline with it ; for that from which the ultimate sanction springs for the worth of the state, of art, and of science, that whence comes all worth to life, must needs involve life and culture in its own decay. It is important at the outset to emphasize the purely empir- ical meaning and verifiability of these and all similar statements about religion, and furthermore to remind the reader that refer- ence is only intended to that segment of culture-evolution which is already achieved. Our gaze is directed upon man in history, not upon the possible future of culture ; and our inquiry is purely empirical, not even speculative and in no sense idealizing. In every essential statement appeal is made to the world of experience. The earliest twilight dawn of culture in the prehistoric period of the cave-dwellers shows the birth of art under the inspiration of the sense of the supernatural. The lancehead carved with the mammoth, the harpoon-fang ornamented with a fish, seem to have become supernatural weapons in the thought of these people of the old stone age; cf. Keary, Dawn of History, p. 20. If the stimulus of these dim, transcendental notions that do not rise above the dignity of fetichism was so effective in the life of the cave-man as to produce a style of art-carving that excites the wonder of archaeologists, we are' prepared to find in the neolithic PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE EVOLUTION 31 era, where a nobler view of life and the other world expresses itself in grander types of art, the mighty tumuli of their heroes and the stately cromlechs of their gods. These vast structures belong to the first era of consecutive human tradition, the neolithic age, for the men of the old stone age are cut off from us by a period of unknown duration and voiceless silence. But here when the race reappears we trace over the entire globe what seems to be the indestructible relics of its tendency and power to revere, and thus at this prehistoric period the religious and transcendental ideal is the inspiration of all that has perpetu- ated the memory of these remarkable Turanian forerunners of Mediterranean culture. We are not suprised, therefore, that as we enter upon the pathway of literary tradition we find ourselves everywhere ushered through the sacred portals of religion into the very heart of the social and political economy, the art, and the science of mankind. Everywhere it is this power of the soul to revere that lifts humanity into the godlike way of culture, where springs into being all that ennobles life, and suggests the divinity of our race ; and everywhere in history it is with this key that we open the door to a knowledge of the inner processes of culture in society, in art, and in scientific activity. The earliest historical art on the walls of Egyptian tombs, like the art of the cave-man, seems to have been inspired by a faith in the supernatural meaning and efficacy of such imitative portrayals, for thus the double of the dead man enjoyed in the tomb the doubles of his earthly possessions and experiences. And again in her monumental forms aged Egypt takes up the thread of prehistoric art and shows us the simple grave-mound and dolmen-circles of the mighty Turanian brotherhood devel- oped now under the same spiritual influence into the Egyptian pyramid and temple; cf. Keary, Dawn of History, p. 53. But here in Egypt we emerge from the twilight of unrecorded history and for the first time are enabled to survey the entire scope of the religious ideal in human life, for only implements of handiwork and products of formative art are independent of 32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES literary tradition. On the other hand, customs and laws, music and song, philosophy and science, must be caught up for us in the written symbol, or they are forever lost to history along with all knowledge of the influences that fostered them. With the Egyptian civilization dawns the continuous life of Mediterranean culture. Theodore Mommsen begins his great history of Rome with these words: "The Mediterranean Sea with its various branches, penetrating far into the great continent, forms the largest gulf of the ocean, and alternately narrowed by islands or projections of the land and expanding to considerable breadth, at once separates and connects the three divisions of the Old World. The shores of this inland sea were in ancient times peopled by various nations belonging from an ethnographical and philological point of view to different races, but constituting in their historical aspect one whole. This historic whole has been usually, but not very appropriately, entitled the history of the ancient world. It is in reality the history of civilization among the Mediterranean nations ; and, as it passes before us in its successive stages, it presents four great phases of develop- ment, — the history of the Coptic or Egyptian stock dwelling on the southern shore, the history of the Aramaean or Syrian nation which occupied the east coast and extended into the interior of Asia as far as the Euphrates and Tigris, and the his- tories of the twin-peoples, the Hellenes and Italians, who received as their heritage the countries on the European shore. Each of these histories was in its earlier stages connected with other regions and with other cycles of historical evolution ; but each soon entered on its own distinctive career. The surrounding nations of alien or even of kindred extraction — the Berbers and Negroes of Africa, the Arabs, Persians, and Indians of Asia, the Celts and Germans of Europe — came into manifold contact with the peoples inhabiting the borders of the Mediterranean, but they neither imparted unto them nor received from them any influ- ences exercising decisive effect on their respective destinies. So far, therefore, as cycles of culture admit of demarcation at all, the cycle which has its culminating points denoted by the names, PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE EVOLUTION 33 Thebes, Carthage, Athens, and Rome, may be regarded as an unity. The four nations represented by these names, after each of them had attained in a path of its own a peculiar and noble civiliza- tion, mingled with one another in the most varied relations of reciprocal intercourse, and skillfully elaborated, and richly developed all the elements of human nature. At length their cycle was accomplished. New peoples, who hitherto had only laved the territories of the states of the Mediterranean as waves lave the beach, overflowed both its shores, severed the history of its south coast from that of the north and transferred the center of civilization from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean. The distinction between ancient and modern history, therefore, is no mere accident, nor yet a mere matter of chron- ological convenience. What is called modern history is in reality the formation of a new cycle of culture, connected in several stages of its development with the perishing or perished civilization of the Mediterranean states, as this was connected with the primitive civilization of the Indo-Germanic stock, but destined, like the earlier cycle, to traverse an orbit of its own. It, too, is destined to experience in full measure the vicissitudes of national weal and woe, the periods of growth, of maturity, and of age, the blessedness of creative effort in religion, polity, and art, the comfort of enjoying the material and intellectual acquisitions which it has won, perhaps also, some day, the decay of productive power in the satiety of contentment with the goal attained. And yet this goal will only be temporary : the grand- est system of civilization has its orbit and may complete its course ; but not so the human race, to which, just when it seems to have reached its goal, the old task is ever set anew with a wider range and with a deeper meaning." The old task of which Mommsen speaks is the task of higher culture. The three successive stages in its fulfillment are society, art, and science, and its regnant inspiration has ever been the idealizing human will, with its God-given reverence for what it believed to be the good, the beautiful, and the true. This is everywhere the lesson of history. Examine the significance of 34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES Osiris and Isis in Coptic civilization, and of the entire trans- cendental hierarchy in Aramaean culture, and the religious ideal will be found basal to the institutions, the art, and the science of Egypt and Western Asia. Notably in the rounded civilization of Greece is the religious ideal conspicuous and the three culture forms in which it successively realizes itself apparent. Olympian Zeus and Delphic Apollo are the soul of all that is characteristic of Greek culture. They rule in the institutions of private and public life, their spirit lives in the poetry of Homer and the art of Pheidias, and utters itself in the philosophy of a Socrates, a Plato, and an Aristotle. The evolution of ancient culture pre- sents itself to us everywhere in three successive steps, economic, artistic, and reflective, and each successive stage of that culture- historical cycle exhibits the power of the religious ideal, first in the organization of society, next in the forms of art, and lastly in the trend of philosophy and science. Such is the lesson of Egyptian, Aramaean, Greek, and Roman civilization alike. It is left to those conversant with the trend of the indi- vidual national cultures of the Atlantic cycle to observe the applicability of this law in detail to the more complex phe- nomena of modern history. And yet striking analogies present themselves immediately even to the lay-student of European civilization subsequent to the fall of the ancient regime, when practically the world begins anew the old task of culture. Here our fundamental factor is the religion of Christ. The first stage is the building of the social and political fabric. In the con- struction of the new social regime the religious point of view is dominant, in the construction of the political regime the key- note is the doctrine of Christ, "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's," which is realized in the blending of Roman jurisprudence with the hitherto unwritten laws of Germanic Christendom. The social and political foundation under the auspices of Christianity being thus laid, what is the next supreme phenomena in the evolution of modern culture ? The Homer of Christendom, Dante and the Divina Commedia — with the religion of Christ as the inspiration. Then follow PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE EVOLUTION 35 in rapid unfolding the creations of Michael Angelo and Raphael in cathedral architecture, sculpture, and painting — all under the same mighty impulse of religion and reproducing in striking counterpart for Atlantic culture the age of Pheidias and Poly- gnotus in Mediterranean art. The era of the beautiful is inaug- urated and achieved, and we look expectantly for the birth of modern science and philosophy. Descartes, the Aristotle of the modern world, inaugurates the philosophic era with his system of Christian monism, and one by one the separate sciences of nature and man detach themselves and follow their respective pathways, once more leaving to philosophy its ancient moral function as critic and purifier of religion along with its new scientific function as harmonizer and unifier of the spiritual cosmos. This theory of the law and process of culture-evolution, which places the human will at the basis of all human achieve- ment and holds religion to be the mighty mainspring of that will in the history of culture, the crucial spiritual differentiation that has made for culture historical survival, and which on this foundation goes on to construe the inner process of that history as a succession of phenomena, characterizable as social-political, artistic, and scientific, has been more fully stated in a previous paper on "the Evolution of Culture." Having outlined the successive phases of spiritual activity as they rise into being in the course of culture-evolution under the promptings of those eternal longings which make up the basal essence of human life as we find it in higher culture, and which express themselves in maximum potency in the typical form of religion, we now approach the subject of this inquiry, the peda- gogic application of the theory. The peril of applying a false view of life to the organization of studies bids us pause at this point and reenvisage our practi- cal, efficient data in clear, cold reason, and thus fix the possible limit of error in the theory and so of evil in its application. The difficulty of all spiritual inquiry appears at once when we con- trast it, on the one hand, with mathematical processes and, on 36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES the other, with natural inquiry. Mathematics has only to do ultimately with the formal arrangement, never with the con- tent of phenomena ; cf. Wundt, System der Philosophie , p. 26. Its only link with experience exhibits itself in the form of a few colorless postulates : it is of all sciences the farthest removed from empirical reality. Its mode of procedure is purely logical and therefore independent of the whole content of experience. Its conclusions are thus deductive and therefore independent of all verification by observation and experiment. It is therefore out of all touch with the difficulties and uncertainties of induc- tion. Herein we find apparently the psychological reason why mathematics aud its immediate applications in mechanics and astronomy should have so early attained independent develop- ment. We recognize at once the increased difficulty of inquiry when we pass from the merely formal or mathematical sciences to the sciences of natural, biological, and spiritual reality. Here the objective world is ever standing over against thought and enforcing conformity between the results of induction and its own inner content. The mathematics and the logic of the chemist, the physicist, the economist, and the psychologist may be ever so faultless, but unless the data of experience have been so full as to suppress no significant natural, biological, or spiritual factor, the result, though perfect mathematically and logically, will be repudiated as unreal by the voice of reality. Herein we find the psychological reason why physics and chemistry should not have attained independent development so early as mathe- matical science with its simple empirical data. But even within these more contentful and real sciences of objective empirical experience there stands out one group of supreme experimental difficulty ; this is the group of spiritual sciences, as contrasted with the material, or chemical-physical sciences, and even as contrasted with kindred biological sciences in their restricted sense. The sciences of spirit depend for their data upon the observation of spiritual facts ; but spiritual facts, supremely real and supremely precious as they are, do not stand PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE EVOLUTION 37 before us objectified in a world of sense, nor can they be repro- duced at will in the spiritual laboratory of the sociologist and the psychologist. Herein we find the psychological reason why politics and psychology were relatively late in becoming scien- tifically organized. Striving to steer clear of the Charybdis of false induction, we have made in our theory of culture-evolution only those wide generalizations from spiritual phenomena which seem to be psychologically justified and necessitated. The ultimate and irreducible phenomenon in all life is an impulse, a striving, a want. Rational process as such is but an acquired means of demonstrably late origin, applied by living spirit to the attain- ment of its ends. Here let us shun for our lives the maze of metaphysical dialectics and use terms only as symbols of empiri- cal facts. Let the psychical anatomist abstract if he please his concepts of thought and feeling and will from the empirical reality with which we are dealing, but let us not invest these fictions of abstracting analysis with anything further than abstract reality and involve ourselves in idle ratiocinations as to whether either of two inseparable phases of one reality consti- tutes the starting point of culture-evolution. When I use the term will as the mainspring of culture, I do not mean to exclude thinking or any necessary element of spiritual activity : I mean simply the total spiritual reality, symbolized from the point of view of its active, impelling quality. Phenomena of evolution present themselves empirically from no other side. The fact that I find empirically in plant and animal life an irreducible impulse to organization, or the fact that I find empirically in human life an irreducible impulse to culture-unfolding is wholly indifferent to any subsequent and purely logical analysis of that impelling reality into biological or psychological abstractions. Let us waive then these distinctions of thought, and stick to objective reality as empirically presented to consciousness. There never was a thought-act that was not at the same moment a will-act, there never was a will-act that was not a thought-act ; and the subjectivity of feeling is incident to both. 3 8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES Granting then the empirical fact that the wants of man are basal to his attainments, what do we find those wants to be in every historical civilization and in every individual life ? They are first material wants and then spiritual wants. The satisfac- tion of his material wants is the condition of the existence of society and the cause of its formation. His spiritual wants, as we find them in history and personal experience, are longings to find worth and longings to find truth, in life and things. Everywhere in history the ideals of religion furnish the prime satisfaction of these longings of head and heart. Religion is clearly the creation of these longings, as the practical institu- tions of private and public life are the creations of his material wants. Then follow in simple obedience to psychological law the art-activity and the philosophic activity, the one satisfying his longing to objectify his spiritual interests in imperishable forms of beauty, the other satisfying the exacter claims of reason, no longer content with the naive data of the religious presenta- tion in matters susceptible of natural explanation. Approaching now our pedagogical problem, we observe between these three successive stages of culture-evolution, society, art and science, a most important psychological relation. Psy- chologically viewed, the first or social-political stage is one of immediate, presentative spiritual activity ; the second or artistic stage is one of imaginative spiritual activity ; and the third, or philosophic stage, is one of rationalizing spiritual activity. These are no speculative catch-words. It is not meant that any presentative activity does not connote both imaginative and rationalizing activities, nor that any imaginative activity does not connote reflective activity. We have to do with empirical phenomena, not logical abstractions. All that is insisted upon is that in the presentative activity which society evidences in its practical-political stage of state building no art activity and no reflective activity is as yet consciously emphasized, and in the idealizing creations of art as they first appear in the evolution of any individual civilization pure rationalizing spiritual activity is wholly subconscious and unevolved. PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE EVOLUTION 39 But this formula of folk-psychology, presentation, imagina- tion, and reflection, is at once a formula of individual psychol- ogy, and our theory of the evolution of culture is verified in consciousness and becomes a pedagogic law for all humanistic instruction. The psychological order of the evolution of col- lective culture is the psychological order of the evolution of individual culture. The evolution of culture is the evolution of the individual spirit written large. Having found then our process of culture-evolution in history to correspond to and objectify the process of psychological unfolding in the individual, we have a twofold reason for the thoroughgoing application of the theory to all instruction in the history of culture ; our theory presents the grand and salient phenomena of civilization, economic-social, creative-artistic, and scientific-reflective, in their chronological sequence, the only possible order for the study of processes of life, and, further- more, since these phenomena prove to stand in a natural psy- chological sequence, the mind of the pupil, approaching them not merely in the order of their unfolding, but actually in the order of its own unfolding, is thus stimulated to full, healthy development in sympathy with the total life of cultured human- ity- Thus we shall have the true humanities, philosophically organized and invested with supreme pedagogic efficiency in all directions. The gain will be infinite, whereas the loss will be nil. In place of the old chaos we shall have a cosmos, whose fair order and noble worth will silence forever the ignoramus and the bigot, and all their brayings against Greek. The study of one rounded civilization will bring the student in touch with the active forces of all, and with the heart-beat of culture-his- tory. He will learn the power of an ideal in human life, and observe the influences of natural environment. He will be present at the organization of society, and watch the growth of institutions. He will behold the birth of art and realize its function in culture. He will understand the beginnings of philoso- phy and see the separate sciences leap Minerva-like from its 40 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES brow. He will incarnate the pure spirit of humanity in the highest sense of the " Homo sum, humani nil a me alienum puto! " Our law is discovered, our task done. When science dis- covers a law, its application becomes immediate and mechanical. But the glory of a physical law is one, and the glory of a spiritual law is another ; the one is a principle of divine mechanism, the other of divine life. The application of a physical law can effect the higher life of humanity only indirectly, the application of a spiritual law reaches the heart of humanity and determines the issues of life. Let us briefly test its application to the most difficult case in history, the civilization of the Latins. I say, the most difficult civilization for the fair test of our pedagogic scheme, because Roman civilization never evolved with native, indigenous life beyond the first stage of culture-evolution : its supreme achievements were social-political ; its art and science were abortive graftings from the eternal flower of Greece. The ultimate aim of all humanistic instruction is to humanize. To humanize is to enrich the heart and mind of the student by leading him to live over in thought and feeling the complete spiritual unfolding of a great people by repeating in imagination the experience of their sensuous environment, of their religious sanctions, their social and political life, their poetry and forma- tive art, their philosophy and science. If such knowledge of man is the beau ideal of humanistic study, our theory of the evolution of culture furnishes a clear-cut rationale for the work of preparatory and collegiate instruction. The spirit and ideal of both is the same. The stress of pre- paratory instruction, however, must lie in preparation, since the four years of high-school work are too short for the full realiza- tion of the humanistic ideal. That ideal, however, should, in all historical instruction, be constantly held before the mind of the high-school pupil, and even in the Latin reading of the pre- paratory years the way should be laid for the comprehensive grasp of the phenomena of culture as more elaboratory unfolded PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE EVOLUTION 41 in the college courses. Simple historical reading, with appro- priate suggestions and illustrations as to the geographical envi- ronment, religious beliefs, customs and institutions of the people, followed by similar readings in poetry, illustrative of the power of the national ideals in art creation, and accompanied by simple objective instruction in the inspiring beauties of plastic and architectural art, will represent the culture-historical side of high-school Latin. In the meantime, grammatical and linguistic studies will fall into line in their true perspective, and will pro- ceed under the fine impulse of an irresistible human interest in the highest achievements of the race. Should the hard injustice of fate cut short the education of the individual at the close of the high-school stage, he will nevertheless have won both in general history proper and in the special discipline of the classics a living principle of thought and study that will give him a power and a grasp over the processes of all higher national life, and best equip him for usefulness in the state. Should fortune, on the other hand, smile upon his destiny, he will enter college equipped, among other things, with that practical mastery of the language in prose and verse which will enable him, in the main, to take up the literature in the order suggested both by the his- tory of culture and by the process of psychological activity, that is, the practical, historical literature first, the imaginative and poetic next, and the philosophic or reflective last. It is obvious that in the first, or, as I may term it for the sake of brevity, the historical course proper, the order in which the authors should be taken up would be determined by the order of the historical periods of which they treated, for all process, spiritual and physical, must be studied chronologi- cally. The process of their narrative is by definition the process of the social and political unfolding. Hence the most diffi- cult author in any given cycle of culture might be the first to be attacked because of the primal position of his subject- matter in the historical unfolding. The difficulty that would confront inadequate or faulty preparation, however, would be serious only at the beginning of the college course. If the first 42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES over-difficult author were successfully accomplished, the chance of a like encounter would be ipso facto greatly diminished, for one tolerably difficult historian would probably smooth the way for all that followed. The culture-historical foundation being laid in the first course, the art and philosophy will follow in easy and natural sequence, while the question of the relative diffi- culty of authors within the succeeding courses will have lost its seriousness after the experience gained in connection with the first. Again, when we come to the second and third series of phe- nomena, the art-activity, and the philosophic-scientific thought of the people, a different principle of arrangement must clearly prevail ; for while, in the first series, our chronology is that of the subject-matter, since that furnishes the order of culture- evolution, in the artistic and philosophic stages our chronology is that of the authors, because their successive appearance marks the process of unfolding of art and science, whereas the chro- nology of their subject-matter is indifferent. Here, therefore, the most antique and possibly difficult poet or philosopher would be taken up first, and the brunt of difficulty would again be encountered at the beginning, instead of at the end, of the poetic and philosophic courses respectively. This difficulty, however, will be continually minimized by the grammatical-linguistic studies incidental to the reading of the authors, for these studies will continue to go hand-in-hand with the culture-historical series in the college until the theory of the language has been thoroughly mastered, and the foundation laid for specialistic linguistics in the university. But since the humanistic aim is paramount for the highest ends of life, the linguistic interest will be best sub- served by subordinating it to that aim throughout the high school and college humanities. Assuming now that our four years' course of high-school Latin has duly accomplished its task of preparation for the col- lege humanities as above characterized, it remains for us to out- line the pedagogic process of the humanistic side of college Latin. We are first concerned with the foundations of Roman PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE EVOLUTION 43 civilization or the historical side proper. The historical authors in the chronological sequence of subject matter become the appropriate Latin reading, for, besides presenting the Roman view of the historic unfolding of the nation from its origin to its climax, they furnish the true context for the study of the essen- tial factors of the first stage of all civilization, the physical environment or Classical Geography, the religious ideals or Classical Mythology, and the social and political institutions or the Private and Public Antiquities of the nation. Livy, Sallust, Cicero, and Tacitus, furnish abundant reading for the longest possible course in Roman historical writing, while Nepos, Pliny the Younger, and Suetonius, furnish available parallel reading in touch with the spirit of the course. The remaining culture-historical topics, which may be called collateral studies as accompanying the formal reading of the lit- erature, may all be compassed in a single course and in sub- stantial and suggestive outline through excellent manuals of elementary or of advanced character, according to the needs of the individual or the class. Such manuals have been prepared in Classical Geography, in Classical Mythology, and in the Religious and Secular Institutions of the Romans, while the entire treasury of modern historical commentary upon Roman History, Religion, and Antiquities completes our possible col- lateral apparatus. Indeed this blending of the modern point of view, as presented by the great authorities of the nineteenth century, with the antique, as presented in the classic authors, is the saving clause in the theory of the Latin humanities ; thus do we wed the past and the present, and the torch of culture beams with added lustre over the union. Nor should it be feared that the volume of the work tran- scends the possibilities of even the shortest college year ; it is not details of knowledge, but living principles of spiritual evolu- tion, that constitute the goal of humanistic studies. The point of view is all. A few winged words here and there from the lips of a teacher who has stood face to face with these phenom- ena, who has felt the mighty heart-beat of historic life, will 44 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES suffice to open up the vista down which a single glance is worth an encyclopaedia of dead facts. The important pedagogical point is not at all the matter, but the spirit of the teaching. Let the teacher guard the spirit, and it will follow as the night the day that the matter will take care of itself. The simplest and briefest course of historical reading will furnish abundant occa- sion to show in unmistakable light the operation of these laws of culture, and that, too, without compromising the regular sub- ject-matter of instruction ; on the contrary, that subject-matter will assume a deeper significance under the transfiguring light of these higher truths. To recognize the significance of environ- ment, of the physical basis, in man's life, to see the necessity and the power of the religious ideal in culture-evolution, to watch the simple unfoldings of customs and laws and of the individual and national character which they express, are things to which every page of Latin history lends pointed and precious occasion. And such is the high spiritual function of the first course in the Latin humanities. Having caught the spirit of the social-political epoch in Roman civilization, we are prepared to observe the next phe- nomenon, which follows with unerring precision, — the artistic life of the people. Religious poetry and song, temple architec- ture, with its handmaidens, sculpture, and painting, repeat the old story of man's spiritual life in the native art-activity of the Romans. But before Roman art had developed beyond the rudest beginnings, two disturbing factors are introduced into the course of evolution, — the decay of religion and slavery to Greek genius. In place of an ideal religion of gods and heroes we have a practical religion of state ; patriotism monopolizes the reli- gious sanction. A naive patriotism is practical and not ideal ; it grasps after the ripened fruit wherewith to crown its idol. At the very dawn of Roman indigenous art-life, Greek Poetry, Greek Architecture, Greek Sculpture and Painting, became one vast plunder pile for this patriotic vandal, and we are left with the barren waste of Roman Art. The beauty we find there is primarily Greek, the waste is Roman. Hence, in this stage of PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE EVOLUTION 45 Roman culture, as indeed throughout its entire subsequent his- tory, the fruitful humanistic point of view will be dominantly the religious, ethical, and political aspect of Roman civilization, and only subordinately the purely artistic or scientific interest. Plau- tus and Terence, Catullus and Horace, Vergil and the Elegiac Poets, along with the study of Roman Metric Art will constitute our literary canon, and Roman Formative Art will round the sec- ond course in the Latin humanities. In this latter connection a new principle of pedagogic treatment rises into such importance as to demand special comment, — this is the principle of object- lessons. Plastic Art, including Architecture, is objective, and therefore demands for its proper study concrete illustrations. This need will already have been felt in connection with the religion and the social life of the people, but here the ordinary illustrations afforded by the dictionary of antiquities or by diagrams and wall-plates answer all practical purposes, since the aesthetic sense is not primarily involved in the consideration of the religious and social phenomena of culture-history. But in the study of the art-life of a nation it is a prime necessity that their creations of beauty be realized by the student either through the aid of reproductions or of exact photographs. Plaster casts of typical sculpture, and models of characteristic architectural details, open up a new world to the pupil whose experience has hitherto been limited to the text-book. Roman music falls outside our pedagogic province because the musical note dies with the vibration that produced it. Painting, too, is of little pedagogic importance because the colors fade with the lapse of ages, and only some rare catastrophe, like the volcanic burial of Pompeii, preserves to us the relics of antique painting. A museum of Archaeology and Art is thus an invaluable aid to the humanistic studies of the first and second courses. But with a people whose civilization, like ours, corresponds for the most part with the first, or social-political stage, such ideal needs are the last to be supplied, and the student is fortunate who has access to a good collection of photographs, or better still, to a few well-selected plaster-casts. In Architecture the 46 THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE HUMANITIES capitals and entablatures of the Greek orders and of their Roman modifications, in Sculpture a grand type from each successive period of art from the Lion Gate of Mycenae to the last dying smile of beauty on the Triumphal Arch of the Romans, would make a little humanistic series worth its weight in gold for the high ends of culture. The state being founded and beautified, there is nothing now left for the restless spirit of man but to philosophize, to inquire. With this third and highest stage of historic life we enter into the inner loom of the culture-evolution of humanity, for the philosopher of one era must start out from the theories of his teachers, however radically he may subsequently diverge from their standpoints. Hence it is that the history of philosophic and scientific thought presents itself as a continuous stream into which all cultures, individual and national, converge at their high- est stage, and no portion of which can be understood apart from the current of which it is a segment. The silver cord of rational continuity articulates all philosophic systems in the same cul- ture-historical cycle. The history of philosophy, therefore, marks in a peculiar sense the high-water line of culture along the continuous pathway of humanity's spiritual unfolding. When we survey the Roman spiritual world at its entrance upon the reflective stage of culture, we note the striking fact that the Romans have lapsed into the same religious and moral" slough of despond as the Greeks subsequent to Alexander. The religion of the gods had failed them and now the religion of patriotism was well nigh starved out. Philosophy, therefore, in the form of a consolatory ethics, attempts to substitute the religion it has helped to undermine, and, like Greek art in the previous stage, Greek Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Skepticism were received with open arms into the Roman thought-world. Our pedagogical task is thus clearly defined for the reflective period of the Latin humanities: Roman Ethical Philosophy in Lucretius, Cicero, and Seneca, with collateral reading in the History of Philosophy, will constitute the gist of the work, — and our pedagogical scheme for the undergraduate humanities is completely unfolded. PEDAGOGIC ASPECT OF CULTURE EVOLUTION 47 Departments of literary activity subordinate to the typical forms utilized in the curriculum but yet involving authors of importance will fall into line without difficulty as collateral or supplementary courses under their appropriate culture-historical periods. Thus Roman Biography, as represented by Nepos, Tacitus, and Suetonius, would associate itself with the historical authors ; Roman Rhetoric and Oratory, as discussed by Cicero and Quintilian, with the artistic period ; and Roman Satire, as it appears in Horace, Juvenal, and Persius, with the philosophic or reflective era. Our theory of the evolution of culture, therefore, when applied to the special civilization before us, reduces the chaos of culture- historical phenomena to the organic unity of a biological process, unfolding itself, as above exhibited, in the consecutive phases of Roman culture. But on the basis of this organic unity we are led to an organized view of universal history. The reflective period of Roman thought is the one supreme crisis in the evolu- tion of culture, the dividing line that marks the death of Medi- terranean, and the birth of Atlantic, ideals. Here the powers that sway the destiny of spirit are in council and the issue trembles in the balance. Over the drooping spirit of humanity the genius of Reason and Despair is in deadly struggle with the nascent genius of Faith and Hope, the Philosophy and Religion of Rome with the Religion of Christ. The old order dies, but, phoenix-like, out of its ashes, emerges the spirit of our race. Of him who, having eyes to see, has occupied this point of culture- historical vantage, it may be said as of the Homeric seer, : °C * : Cc-<\" z c CC > ^& 5T • «c fc -4T ■.' C '<3iC vCCC > c <-- «:• «i l.- 7 C C-c^f-^cg _ C C >«s . C C «®Cf fee .ccc c c - ,. ^^SL 0' ' o c?F ^ CC^CC c" .^ ^- ccccc c c^ -c,c C C cc c <_3P . - CCC C <£C ■ (« - ^C C c c CLC v : «^i re c ^cc _. c c mfc <■ *cc^ c c c - IC-Cc- . c c= >^ ^: 4 ^C c C • C >, c C«i " sVc\ C c C ,^ ^^cW;V^^3 C cc cc- . CC «CG C^C CiCC*. ' CC « C® c-C . <^ < m cc . c"«Cv irc;cf cr.,> cCcrc ■'*■;« ^'«?jCCC cC Pf CCCC cc - 1 ;-^cc cc ^ J?^jcc: