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 SPEECHES 
 
 Ain> 
 
 FORENSIC ARGUMENTS 
 
 BY DAIVIEL WEBSTER. 
 
 VOL. II. 
 
 EIGHTH EDITION, 
 
 BOSTON: 
 
 PUBLISHED BY TAPPAN & DENNET. 
 
 1843. 
 
erszT 
 
 Entered according- to Act of Congress, in llie year 1335. 
 
 By Perkins, Marvin, and Company, 
 
 In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of Massachusetts. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 TO THE SECOND VOLUME. 
 
 It is now about five years, since the publishers of the present 
 collection presented their fellow-citizens with the former volume of 
 the Speeches and Forensic Arguments of Mr. Webster. It com- 
 manded the attention, which might have been anticipated from the 
 reputation of the author ; and the curiosity and interest thus ex- 
 cited were amply sustained, by the contents of the work. It is 
 believed, that no volume has ever issued from the American press, 
 better calculated to take a permanent hold of the public mind ; — 
 to be regarded as a choice specimen of excellence in the various 
 kinds of intellectual effort which it embraced ; — and to be consult- 
 ed as a standard authority, on the great Political and Constitutional 
 questions, which have agitated the public mind during the last twenty 
 years. The estimation in which it was held from its appearance, 
 may be safely inferred from the tenor of a very judicious and elo- 
 quent notice of it, in the eighteenth number of the American 
 Quarterly Review ; and the rapid sale of the edition has proved 
 that the judgment of the critic was sanctioned by the reading com- 
 munity at large, not merely in this country, but in Europe. The 
 critical journals of Great Britain have confirmed the estimate 
 formed by his countrymen of Mr. Webster's professional and par- 
 liamentary talent, and have quoted his works as containing some 
 of the best specimens of American forensic eloquence.* 
 
 The publishers now find themselves called upon for a second 
 volume of the speeches and occasional addresses of Mr. Webster 
 The five years since the appearance of the former volume have, as 
 
 • Quarterly Journal of Jurisprudence, for August, 1834. 
 
 
4 
 
 is known to every one, been passed by Mr. Webster on the same 
 elevated stage of public duty, on which he had before acquired a 
 most enviable reputation. A series of the most important discus- 
 sions in the Senate of the United States, in which he has borne a 
 highly conspicuous part, has attracted the attention of the people 
 throughout the Union. Those great Constitutional questions, which 
 formed the theme of the closing speeches in the first volume, 
 have been again the subject of strenuous contest, between the 
 master minds of the country. Not inferior in interest to these 
 are the speeches of Mr. Webster, contained in the present volume, 
 in the financial controversy which has lately agitated, and still 
 agitates, the country. Commencing with his argument in answer 
 to the President's veto of the Bank bill, in 1832, down to the over- 
 whelming refutation of the Protest, in 1834, they will all be found 
 in the present volume. It contains also several other speeches, on 
 subjects of less commanding interest, but characterized by the 
 same high qualities. In addition to these parliamentary efforts, the 
 publishers have introduced into the volume several occasional 
 speeches, such as that delivered at a public dinner in New York, 
 the address to the citizens of Pittsburgh, the eulogium on the 
 character of Washington, the speech before the Convention at 
 Worcester in 1832, with some others of a miscellaneous class. 
 
 The general aspect of the present collection will be found, in 
 some degree, different from the former, in the range of topics. It 
 was, at that time, the pleasing duty of the publishers, in preparing 
 the first collection which had been made of the works of Mr. 
 Webster, to introduce into it his admirable discourses at Plymouth, 
 and Bunker Hill, that delivered on occasion of the death of Adams 
 and Jefferson, and the law arguments which occupy a considerable 
 space in the volume. The complexion of the present series is 
 more uniform, as to topics and form of address, though infinitely 
 rich and various in illustration, and in application to the fortunes 
 of the Republic, of inappreciable interest. Every thing, or almost 
 every thing, contained in the present volume, has been delivered 
 by Mr. Webster, in the period which has elapsed since the former 
 volume was published. It accordingly exhibits to us the action of 
 his intellect, almost exclusively, on the great questions which have 
 convulsed the country, in this highly momentous period of time. 
 
It presents the operations of his mind, at the very meridian of its 
 vigor, trained in the most strenuous exercises of the bar and the 
 Senate-house, acting under the intensest excitement, and the re- 
 sponsibiHty of a commanding reputation ah-eady acquired, com- 
 pelled, at every moment, not merely to struggle with the ablest 
 competitors and opponents, but to equal himself, and sustaining at 
 times upon his shoulders the weight of the almost severed Union. 
 There is, perhaps, nothing, in the present volume, finished in a 
 style so highly academic as the orations at Plymouth and Bunker 
 Hill, unless we except the speech at the New York dinner, which 
 is surpassed by nothing of the kind which Mr. Webster has ever 
 produced. But the speech in reply to Mr. Calhoun, and the 
 speech on the Protest, are like leaves of the Constitution. They 
 are authorities rather than illustrations. While we are engaged 
 in perusing them, every thing like mere discourse, however inge- 
 nious, forcible, or ornate, seems comparatively insipid. 
 
 At no period, it is believed, since the adoption of the Consti- 
 tution, has either House of Congress contained a greater number 
 of very eminent men, than the Senate of the United States for the 
 last four years. At no period have questions so important been 
 discussed, or principles so fundamental to the Government been 
 maintained and contested. At no period has a succession so rapid 
 of the most powerful and animated harangues commanded the 
 attention of the people ; and the publishers think they may add, 
 without being deemed unjust to his eminent contemporaries, that, 
 among all the powerful voices with which the Senate-chamber 
 has resounded, none has been heard, with such effect, by the 
 great mass of the people throughout the country, as that of which 
 the record, inadequate at best, is now offered to the reading world, 
 in the following pages. That, in a country divided into parties, 
 which are brought in powerful collision with each other, and led 
 by the most accomplished and skilful champions, there should be 
 great diversity in the judgments formed of distinguished men, is a 
 matter of course. It is scarcely possible to form a perfectly can- 
 did estimate of the intellectual power, exerted in the defence of a 
 cause which we greatly disapprove, and in the support of principles 
 which we deem wholly false. There is, however, a meed of 
 applause which men of discrimination and liberality never withhold 
 
from a rival, and even an opponent. There is an impression pro- 
 duced by the exertions of commanding talent, even on the mind 
 least prepossessed in favor of the individual by whom it is manifest- 
 ed, which is not easily mistaken. We presume, if those who, from 
 every part of the country, have watched, with the greatest attention 
 and interest, the splendid displays of power, eloquence, and states- 
 manship, which have been made in the Senate, were called upon 
 to designate the acknowledged leaders, that, after each one, accord- 
 ing to his taste, opinions, and sectional prejudices, had named his 
 favorite, it would be found that the second place was accorded to 
 Mr. Webster, by all who did not claim for him the first ; which a 
 vast number, unquestionably, in every part of the country, would 
 be found to do. 
 
 The position which Mr. Webster fills in the eyes of the country, 
 by this general consent, is the more honorable to him, when it is 
 recollected that it is the victory gained by talent, wholly unaided 
 by those advantages of opportunity, which, to other men, have given 
 official standing, influence, and political power. Mr. Webster came 
 forward at a period when that ascendency, which New England 
 possessed from the early settlement of the colonies, and which was 
 strengthened by her agency in the great triumphs of the revolution, 
 had passed away. Other portions of the country had grown up ; 
 the West was settled ; the Virginian dynasty was in undisputed 
 possession of the public favor ; and new centres of political influ- 
 ence had been established, in which New England was allowed to 
 have no share. Had he been a foreigner, barely naturalized, he 
 would have come forward with less prejudice than as a New Eng- 
 lander of talent and promise. At the early age of thirty, and 
 without preliminary training in the state assemblies, he rose at once, 
 in the Congress of 1812, to an undisputed eminence; and it was 
 said of him, even then, by one of the very few who could have dis- 
 puted his rank, (Mr. Lowndes,) "that the North had not his equal, 
 nor the South his superior." What might not have been his career, 
 had he sprung from the other side of the Potomac ! He would 
 have succeeded Mr. Monroe, as inevitably as sunrise succeeds the 
 dawn, and would have been thought to sustain, with increased 
 lustre, the line of the great men of Virginia. 
 
 It is not merely that Mr. Webster has forced his way to the 
 
exalted position which he occupies in the pubUc mind, against the 
 whole force of this prejudice, (the operation of which is unques- 
 tionably a subject of just complaint,) but he has also reared the 
 fabric of his own reputadon, without the fair and natural advantage 
 of high official station. It is a somewhat singular fact, that, from the 
 time Mr. Webster first crossed the threshold of public life, to the 
 present hour, he has never owed any thing to execudve favor, nor 
 held of any body but the people. To many public men, Con- 
 gress is the most advantageous theatre. Its action and reac- 
 tion, its excitement, its collision, its public display, give the fullest 
 scope to talent of the most popular cast. But it may be safely said 
 of Mr. Webster,' that even in the Senate of the United States, his 
 powers are beyond his field. Brilliant as is his position, and unsur- 
 passed as is his power, in the senatorial arena, no man can witness, 
 and calmly analyze, the character of his efforts, without feeling that 
 his intellect is above the contentious sphere of the mere partisan 
 warfare, which is often waged, even there. It is impossible to re- 
 press the idea, that his largeness of view, his coolness, gravity, sa- 
 gacity, power of investigation, and his dignified eloquence, could 
 only act to their greatest advantage in a high executive sphere ; in 
 the conduct of arduous negotiations with foreign powers ; in dispos- 
 ing of great questions of public policy ; comprehending within one 
 grand survey the various interests of this mighty country ; infusing 
 a lofty patriotism into the people, by public addresses, conceived 
 and executed with real ability, essential force, and good sense, and 
 exhibiting to foreign nations a noble specimen of the sovereignty of 
 intellect. No person would hesitate to admit, that there is nothing 
 preserved in the archives of the Government, from the days of 
 Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Hamilton down, vv^hich is not equalled by 
 the reports of the committees of which Mr. Webster has acted as 
 chairman ; and that he would bring to any office known to the Con- 
 stitution, and to any of its duties, a power, to say the least, never 
 surpassed by any of the justly celebrated men who fill the highest 
 places in our political history, and owe their fame to the opportuni- 
 ties of public appearance afforded by their station. We think it 
 may be said, for instance, without injustice, of Mr. Jefferson, that, 
 unless early placed in eminent station, by executive appointment, 
 he would have filled a much narrower space in the public mind. 
 
8 
 
 Had he been in the minority, he would have been comparatively 
 undistinguished. 
 
 As Mr. Webster has enjoyed none of the advantages of execu- 
 tive station, so his system of political action, and his power and 
 influence as a public man, are free from that narrowness and spirit 
 of private arrangement, which grow out of long training in an 
 organized majority. Nothing so effectually breaks down the 
 elements of a public character, naturally promising, or so soon 
 matures the corruption of one naturally weak, as regular promo- 
 tion, through all the gradations of rank, in an organized and 
 dominant party. The sti'onger the party is, the more fatal its 
 influence on a true statesman-like generosity of character. The 
 only desire naturally felt by its members, is to keep in the ranks. 
 All generous ambition of personal excellence is subdued ; for per- 
 sonal excellence, too strongly marked, is embarrassing, invidious, 
 and dangerous. The successive posts of trust are attained by 
 favor ; are secured by the arts of private intercourse ; by dutiful 
 attendance on the head of the party ; laborious intercourse with 
 its prominent leaders ; and a spirit-crushing correspondence with 
 its infinity of village great men. There is no time, no courage, 
 no place, no call for efforts of independent power ; and a man 
 reaches, at last, the object, in the regular line of promotion, a 
 wonder to the community, and a still greater wonder to himself. 
 It is, indeed, a noble and heart-stirring spectacle, when a crisis 
 comes on, to see the long array of politicians of this description, 
 crowding together in trepidation, like a fleet of gun-boats, at the 
 sight of an enemy's frigate, waiting for some statesman of the true 
 stamp — self-formed, self-poised — the work and the man of the peo- 
 ple, — to bear down, in his pride and strength, to meet and van- 
 quish the foe. It is a singular and a most incontestable fact, that 
 the present Administration, but for the voice of Mr. Webster, and 
 those of his friends who rallied under him, would have been 
 left in a state of the most pitiable weakness, in the great war of 
 nullification. But for him, the powerful champions of that doc- 
 trine, in the Senate of the United States, would have trampled 
 the policy of the Administration, and with it the supremacy of the 
 Constitution, into dishonorable fragments. One cause of the pro- 
 digious power, with which popular revolutions in monarchical 
 
governments move forward, is, that they bring on, by the nature of 
 the case, an instant colhsion between the men of routine, the men 
 of place, the men raised by favor and trained in the bureaux, 
 with the men of self-formed characters, who come fresh to affairs, 
 urged forward by the noble impulses of duty and patriotism ; 
 speaking out of the fullness of generous hearts ; assuming the posts 
 of danger or of labor assigned them by the acclamations of the 
 people. Official experience and etiquette, habits of authority, 
 and all the curious network of personal intercourse and corre- 
 spondence, fly to pieces, before the breath of such men, like cob- 
 webs before a storm. What could the place-men and veteran 
 ministers of Charles I. effect against the great popular spirits of 
 the commonwealth ? In lieu of all other capacity, that of a 
 blind and melancholy firmness alone remained, — a principle, at best, 
 not of efficient action, but of heroic sacrifice. What could the 
 accomplished courtiers, who formed the cabinet of Louis XVI., 
 effect against the Mirabeaus and the Lafayettes? or how long 
 would the adroitest chancellor of either of the continental empires, 
 at the present day, stand in a strenuous contest with a powerful 
 mind, in a revolutionary chamber of deputies.'' The robes of 
 office, worn too long, give a mincing gait to the politician ; and it 
 is not the least of Mr. Webster's titles to the sympathy of the 
 people, that they have never, for a moment, impeded the bold 
 strides of his intellect. Nor has he been less a stranger to the 
 emoluments than the honors of executive station. More work 
 has been done by him for the public, since his first entrance upon 
 political life, than by any six official functionaries, of the ordinary 
 class, during the period of an administration ; but they have been 
 the voluntary services of a great parliamentary leader, unrewarded 
 with office, and unpaid by gold. Not a dollar has passed, by ex- 
 ecutive gift, from the treasury into his hands, or those of any 
 person, however remotely connected with him, or in whose interest 
 he might be supposed to be personally concerned. 
 
 This is not mentioned as if any discredit attached to the 
 enjoyment of the honors and emoluments of office, when office is 
 worthily obtained, and filled to the advantage of the country. 
 But there is a point on which we feel disposed, for a moment, to 
 dwell, as one of no little importance. We live under a Govern- 
 
 VOL. n. B 
 
10 
 
 ment, which, as every one, of course, knows and understands, is 
 popular, — organized by popular elections, recurring at short inter- 
 vals. But the spirit and genius of the Government are still more 
 popular than its form. There are parts of the Government, 
 designed to be removed, by one or two degrees, from immediate 
 popular interference. Such is the provision for the choice of the 
 President by electors ; such is the constitution of the Judiciary, 
 holding by a life-tenure ; such is the six years' term of the Senate. 
 But it is next to impossible to give to either of these Consti- 
 tutional provisions any efficacy beyond that which popular senti- 
 ment, at the time, accords to it. The intervention of the electoral 
 college is known to be purely nominal. It is profoundly observed, 
 by Mr. Webster, in his Worcester Speech — " We have been 
 accustomed to venerate the judiciary, and to repose hopes of 
 safety on that branch of the Government. But let us not deceive 
 ourselves. The judicial power cannot stand, for a long time, 
 against the executive power. The judges, it is true, hold their 
 places by an independent tenure ; but they are mortal. That 
 which is the common lot of humanity must make it necessary to 
 renew the benches of justice. And how will they be filled? 
 Doubtless, Sir, they will be filled with incumbents agreeing with 
 the President in his Constitutional opinions. If the court is felt as 
 an obstacle, doubtless the first opportunity, and every opportunity, 
 will be embraced, to give it less and less the character of an 
 obstacle. Without pursuing these suggestions, I only say, that the 
 country must prepare itself for any change in the judicial depart- 
 ment, such as it may deliberately sanction in other departments." 
 Nor is it only in this way, that the principle of popular control 
 over the judiciary is carried out. We have seen, within three 
 years, the mandate of the court rendered nugatory by the steady 
 refusal of the executive, strong in the support of a dominant party, 
 to carry it into effect. The senatorial term presents a barrier 
 somewhat more efficient against rapid fluctuations of what is called 
 the popular will, (that is, small changes of majorities at contested 
 elections,) but passing events teach us how seriously this is 
 menaced. 
 
 These reflections all establish our point, that the Government, 
 popular in its theory, popular in its conception, and in the rightful 
 
11 
 
 action of the system, is still more popular in its actual operation. 
 It is popular even in its frequent vergings toward a concentrated 
 executive despotism ; for it is only when the head of the Govern- 
 ment is also the head of an overwhelming party majority, that he 
 is strong enough to stretch beyond just limits the powers of his 
 office. This being the case, flattery of the people is not merely 
 the demagogue's accustomed theme, but the temptation to espouse 
 popular prejudices, to inveigh against even just exercises of con- 
 stituted power, to disparage institutions, and to court temporary 
 opinions, is too strong to be resisted, except by firmly-balanced 
 minds, warmed with a true patriotism. It will accordingly be 
 found, that this is the path to advancement most frequently pur- 
 sued. The people have been most flattered by those who have 
 most systematically and boldly assailed all those Constitutional 
 safeguards, originally devised to protect the people from the 
 abuses of executive power. So artfully contrived is this plan of 
 popularity, that the real friend of the people, the friend of the 
 Constitution and the laws, in which the safeguard of their liberties 
 exists, is apparently thrown upon unpopular ground, and compelled, 
 at times, to resist their own hasty cooperation in measures result- 
 ing in their own injury. 
 
 The discharge of this duty, in which the very heroism of politics 
 consists, is the touchstone of the statesman ; and in nothing do 
 Mr. Webster's public character and course of political conduct 
 appear in so noble and commanding a light. On all occasions, he 
 has been the great champion of the Constitution and laws ; the 
 supporter of the institutions of the country, and of its great funda- 
 mental interests ; and from his first appearance in public life, 
 to the present day, his writings may be searched in vain for a 
 single attempt to play the demagogue. And yet who could have 
 played it, we were about to say, with a better right ? Who could 
 have played it with a better pretence ? Born on the very 
 frontiers of civilization, the son of one of Stark's rangers, a 
 captain of the revolutionary war, a poor boy, with no other 
 education than that of the village schools of New England, — 
 struffdino; hard to obtain even the inconsiderable advantages for 
 
 ■bto 
 
 improvement which were within the reach of any one in his part of 
 the country, — owing nothing to position, nothing to opportunity, 
 
12 
 
 nothing to patronage, but every thing to Providence, to his own 
 strong mind and resolute purpose, — why should not such a man 
 enter the wide, the straight, the beaten, easy path which leads to 
 aggrandizement ? He is a republican of the purest school : the 
 true whig blood of the revolution flows in all his veins ; and he has 
 followed his father to the labors of the plain New England hus- 
 bandman. Why are not the catchwords of a false and party re- 
 publicanism forever on his lips? He was born and reared in 
 poverty ; never was, nor will be rich ; and owes the honorable 
 competence he enjoys to the strenuous efforts of a most laborious 
 profession. Why does he not join wealthy office-holders in be- 
 wailing the oppression of the people, and in raising that delusive 
 cry, " the hatred of the poor against the rich," which he denounced 
 in the Senate-chamber, in the hearing of some who had given 
 countenance to that detestable fraud .? Why does not he throw 
 himself into the circle of those who are stimulating and leading 
 on the people to a mad crusade against the people's Consthution 
 and laws ? Is he so blind as not to see that that way lies the 
 road to honor, office, and power? Is he so wanting in discern- 
 ment that he wanders from this path through ignorance? Are 
 there so few examples to guide his choice ? Not so. Mr. Web- 
 ster is a patriot. He would find no pleasure in influence and 
 place obtained by fomendng prejudices, by sowing alienation and 
 hatred among the members of the community, by exciting the peo- 
 ple to tear down the fabric of their own liberty, and by making the 
 institutions odious in which it is organized, and, so to say, enshrined. 
 It is not merely that his understanding is too just and manly to 
 adopt and repeat these odious sophistries, but his moral sense re- 
 volts from them, as mean and treacherous. 
 
 The people, we apprehend, do too little justice to such a 
 course, and do not sufficiently consider how much they owe to 
 such a man. Suppose the power, which Mr. Webster has em- 
 ployed to sustain and build up, had been exerted to subvert and 
 destroy ; suppose he, too, with all the resources of his understand- 
 ing, had endeavored to stimulate those less favored of Providence 
 against their fellow-citizens who have been successful in life ; sup- 
 pose he had endeavored to propagate discontent and disafi'ection, 
 elevating himself by persuading the people they are wretched, 
 
13 
 
 and making them so by making them feel so; suppose he 
 had contributed to embarrass every man's business, by empirical 
 attempts upon the currency, under the flimsy but popular 
 pretext of substituting gold for paper ; suppose he had lent his 
 aid to paralyze all the industrious interests of the country, and 
 arrest every measure for its internal improvement, by propagating 
 cheap metaphysical refinements on ConstituUonal powers ; suppose 
 he had raised his voice against the Judiciary and against the 
 Senate, and looked coldly on while the Union was assailed, an 
 ostentatious patron of the rights of the States, and lukewarm friend 
 of the rights of the United States ; suppose Mr. Webster had 
 done this, and thus deprived the people of a most efficient, real 
 friend, and the cause of the Constitution of its most powerful 
 advocacy ; — should we have stood where we now stand ? Would 
 not Nullification, struggling with the official power of the President, 
 adorned and recommended by its eloquent and ingenious cham- 
 pions, and unexposed in its true nature, have commanded more 
 of the sympathy of the people ? Would not regulated, Constitu- 
 tional liberty have passed under a cloud, in the loss of such a 
 friend, under the influence of such an opponent? Would not 
 every man, who has any property, have felt that it was shaken, 
 and every one, who relies upon the conservative principles of the 
 Constitution, have begun to despair of their efficacy? Unques- 
 tionably. And if the country still stands unshaken on its foun- 
 dations, the people should understand that they owe it partly to 
 the irresistible power of argument, the noonday light of illustra- 
 tion, which have been shed upon the great principles of the 
 Consdtution, in the late fearful crisis. That we yet have a country 
 to be the subject of these desolating experiments, is in no small 
 degree owing to the ability, with which they have been exposed 
 and counteracted. 
 
 In the variety of speeches and addresses contained in the present 
 volume, we may distinguish two or three classes. 
 
 The first are the Constitutional, unquestionably those in which 
 the feelings, as well as powers, of Mr. Webster have found their 
 most grateful exercise. Events seem, by a singular coincidence,. 
 to have prepared him, in a peculiar manner, for the noble province 
 of the champion of the Constitution. He had, at a very early 
 
14 
 
 period of his professional career, in the Dartmouth College case, 
 and subsequently in the great steam-boat cause, and in other cases 
 involving the leading principles of Constitutional law, been called to 
 explore its doctrines to their foundation. They are doctrines of a 
 nature which require the lawyer's precision and discrimination. 
 Loose and popular views cannot be relied upon, in drawing the 
 delicate line between the powers granted by the Federal Consti- 
 tution and the powers reserved to the States. They must be dis- 
 tinguished, compared, reconciled, and limited, by a severe profes- 
 sional logic. But logic alone is not enough. Constitutions are 
 historical documents : their formation and adoption are historical 
 facts ; and a judgment well disciplined in historical studies is as 
 necessary as the talent of perception or argument. Nor must a 
 sort of patriotic moral sense be wanting. The politician whose 
 soul is not warmed with an elevated and comprehensive patriotism, 
 knows nothing of the Constitution ; he does not feel the value of 
 the objects for which the Constitution was framed. The qualities 
 we have enumerated are found in the closest union in Mr. Web- 
 ster's Constitutional speeches — the sternest dialectics — a species 
 of historical tact, as well as an entire familiarity with historical 
 records, — and a love of the Union which takes the heart to the 
 work of its defence. The student of Constitutional law will ever 
 resort to the speeches of Mr. Webster, in this department, with 
 the same deference that he pays to the numbers of the Fed- 
 eralist and the opinions of Chief Justice Marshall. 
 
 The speeches on the financial policy of the Administration, and 
 the Bank question, are of a character somewhat different, although 
 the reply to the Protest is also a Constitutional argument. Mr. 
 Webster's knowledge of the whole question of finance is second 
 to that of no man in the country. He was a leader on this subject, 
 upon his first entrance into public life, in the debates on the charter 
 of a bank in 1814, and the years immediately following. For 
 unadorned and close reasoning, on a financial question, — for lumi- 
 nous exposition of a subject wrapped up in mystery, by the declama- 
 tions of the party press, — Mr. Webster's report, as chairman of 
 the committee of finance, at the last session of Congress, may be 
 quoted as a model. But even in the speeches of this class, it is 
 pleasing to see the strong patriotic and Constitutional bent of his 
 
15 
 
 mind. The Bank, in itself, is comparatively nothing. As an in- 
 strument of finance, it is convenient ; as the fiscal agent of the 
 Government, it is probably indispensable ; and these topics are 
 properly enforced. But it is the distress of the country, produced 
 by this unhappy tampering with the currency ; the loss of a twelve- 
 month's prosperity ; the ruin of thousands ; the embarrassment of 
 hundreds of thousands ;— these are the topics which perpetually 
 force themselves upon his mind. Nor these alone ; he beholds, in 
 the treatment of the stockholders and directors of the Bank, a vio- 
 lation of the law, a breach of the spirit of the Constitution, an absorp- 
 tion into executive discretion of powers, intended to be exercised 
 by other functionaries ; and these higher views give a peculiar 
 warmth and solemnity to his appeals. 
 
 The miscellaneous speeches present a great variety of the most 
 interesting subjects of discussion. In this class we include his 
 addresses at the great public festivals, offered by his admiring 
 fellow-citizens, as expressions of their gratitude for his defence of 
 their Constitutional liberties. It will be recollected, that, at the 
 close of the session of 1831, Mr. Webster was invited by a large 
 number of the most respectable citizens of New York and its vi- 
 cinity, including among them distinguished gentlemen of both 
 political parties, to meet them at a festival prepared as an expres- 
 sion of their satisfaction, at the part which he had taken in the 
 great Constitutional struggle, that had occurred in the Senate of 
 the United States. There were persons uniting in this tribute 
 of respect and gratitude to Mr. Webster, who had perhaps never 
 acted together before, in any matter connected with party politics. 
 The principle and the feeling, which had brought them together 
 for the purpose named, are emphatically stated in the address 
 made to Mr. Webster, by the president of the day, (Chancellor 
 Kent,) and which we have prefixed, as the proper introduction, to 
 the report of Mr. Webster's speech, at the commencement of the 
 present volume. It was a principle of attachment to the Union, 
 and a feeling that the maxims of Constitutional law, on which the 
 stability of the Union rests, had, " by the discussions in the Senate, 
 and the master genius that guided them, been rescued from the 
 archives of tribunals, and the libraries of lawyers, and placed 
 under the eye, and submitted to the judgment, of the American 
 
16 
 
 people. Their verdict is with us, and from it their lies no appeal^ 
 The speech of Mr. Webster, which we have ah-eady ventured to 
 name as one of the very happiest of his efforts, is conceived in the 
 spirit of the occasion. It is the outpouring of a full heart, the 
 breathing of a pure patriotism, kindling with the sentiment of the 
 worth of the Union, as illustrated in the history, the growth, and the 
 prosperity, of the great metropolis in which he spoke, and in the 
 lives and services of the patriot statesmen, who, in all the States, 
 contributed to establish the Independence and frame the Constitution 
 of the United States. What citizen of New York but must have 
 glowed with honest pride, as Mr, Webster unrolled, on this occa- 
 sion, the long record of her illustrious men ! What lover of the 
 Union but must have caught new views of its inestimable value, as 
 its connection with the prosperity, the industry, and the whole 
 social system of the country was pointed out with the eloquence 
 of a master ! Not less significant, appropriate, and instructive, is 
 the delineation of the character of Washington, delivered on the 
 22d of February, 1832, before a company assembled to commem- 
 orate the birthday of tlie father of his country. The character 
 of Washington is there lifted up from common-places ; its strong 
 points cleared away from the mere generalities of eulogy; the dis- 
 tinctive features which marked him pointed out ; and that beau ideal 
 of the perfect patriot, which exists under his name, in every Ameri- 
 can imagination, shown to have its original, in the life and conduct 
 of our Washington. 
 
 It is not our province to enter into any criticism on the style 
 of Mr. Webster's addresses. He is himself, in several instances, 
 in no degree responsible for their style, in the common acceptation 
 of the term. Not one of the speeches contained in this volume 
 is of a character to admit of being written beforehand. They 
 are taken by the publishers as found in the reports of the day, in 
 the contemporaneous newspaper and pamphlet form. In some 
 cases, the publishers presume, of course, that the speeches, as 
 printed, were written out by Mr. Webster, from his own brief 
 notes and the minutes of the stenographer ; in others, it is probable 
 that the speech written out by the reporter may have passed under 
 Mr. Webster's revision ; but not seldom, as the publishers have 
 reason to know, they have been obliged to content themselves with 
 
17 
 
 the contemporaneous newspaper report, without the advantage of 
 the shghtest revision. There is, however, one feature, not so much 
 of style as of manner, to which the publishers feel warranted in 
 adverting ; it is the dignified absence of personality in the speeches 
 of Mr. Webster. His career has fallen on times of warm party 
 collision ; he has himself shared the inevitable fate of eminent 
 talent, in being the object of hostility and attack. When called 
 upon, in self-defence, to wield the weapons of sarcasm, he has 
 shown that he can do it with terrific effect ; but the entire series of 
 his speeches does not present an instance of a voluntary personality. 
 We do not commend this, however, as a great merit on the part 
 of Mr. Webster, so much as we would notice the bad taste and 
 the mistaken policy of the opposite course. It requires power~> 
 to bend the bow, and skill to point the shaft, but the meanest ./ 
 malice can dip it in poison. And, when the passions of the day 
 are passed, personal abuse is forgotten, or remembered only to the 
 discredit of those who deal in it ; but argument never loses its 
 force ; eloquence never ceases to charm ; and truth is eternal. 
 
 We close these introductory remarks, by commending the vol- 
 umes of the Speeches of Mr. Webster to the affections of the Amer- 
 ican people, and particularly of the Young Men of the country, 
 for their strong practical and patriotic tendency. They deal not 
 in metaphysical abstractions, nor in popular generalities; they 
 speak to the common sense, to the sound judgment, the patriotic 
 feeling, of all good citizens. The future incidents of his public 
 course are in the disposal of Providence, to be decided by second 
 causes, which no one can foresee. But of his station before the 
 American people ; of the relation in which he has placed himself 
 to the Constitution ; of his connection with the truths and the prin- 
 ciples on which the Union rests, — there is no question ; and over 
 these, time, and events, and men, have no control. It may please 
 the people to honor talents such as Heaven has intrusted to his 
 stewardship, to reward services such as he has performed, — as the 
 people only can honor and reward them ; or others may attain the 
 high honors of that Constitution which he has so nobly vindicated, 
 and done so much to uphold. The alternative is certainly no 
 mean one, in the common estimation formed of human things ; but 
 to no man in the United States can it be personally so indiffer- 
 
 VOL. II. C 
 
18 
 
 ent as to a man like Mr. Webster. The service has been ren- 
 dered ; the good has been performed ; the tribute of gratitude has 
 flowed from milhons of patriotic hearts ; and the time will never 
 come when it will be forgotten, either in the United States, or 
 wheresoever, in the whole world and in all time, the English lan- 
 guage shall be understood, and the history of this generation shall 
 be read. The party triumphs of the day may be, and sometimes 
 are, decided by influences with which worth and merit are of little 
 account ; but thanks to the press, the great suffrage of an ap- 
 proving age cannot be diverted from its rightful object. 
 
 Let it not be thought, however, by this reflection, that we are 
 unobservant spectators of the signs of the times. We rejoice in 
 the strong and encouraging indications, that the contemporaries of 
 Mr. Webster are gratefully sensible of his merits, and in the ear- 
 nest and extensive conviction, which is daily manifesting itself, of 
 the expediency of calling his great powers of usefulness into their 
 appropriate sphere of activity. Proofs are rapidly multiplying, 
 that the people are disposed to do their duty to themselves and 
 the great interests of the country ; that they are inclined to take away 
 from mere politicians the decision of the question, — To whom shall 
 the momentous trust of the chief administration of the Government 
 be confided ? Let this become the general feeling of the country, 
 and we regard it as the inevitable result, that "the Highest 
 Honors of the Constitution will be bestowed on its 
 ABLEST Defender." 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 I Speech delivered in the City of New York, March 10, 1831 17 
 
 Speech at the Dinner in Honor of the Centennial Birth-day of Washington 36 
 
 Remarks in Secret Session of the Senate of the United States, on the Nom- 
 ination of Mr. Van Buren as Minister to Great Britain, January 24, 
 1832 49 
 
 Report on the Apportionment of Representation 60 
 
 / Speech in the Senate of the United States, on the Bill for renewing the 
 
 Charter of the Bank of the United States, May 25, 1832 78 
 
 Speech in the Senate of the United States, on the President's Veto of the 
 Bank BiU, July 11, 1832 98 
 
 Speech at the National Republican Convention in Worcester, Mass., Oc- 
 tober 12, 1832 125 
 
 Speech in the Senate of the United States, in Reply to Mr. Calhoun's 
 Speech, on the Bill " further to provide for the Collection of Du- 
 ties on Imports," February 16, 1833 160 
 
 / Remarks made to the Citizens of Buffalo, June, 1833 209 
 
 Address to the Citizens of Pittsburgh, July 9, 1833 213 
 
 Speech on moving for Leave to introduce a Bill to continue the Bank of 
 the United States for six Years, delivered in the Senate of the United 
 States, March 18, 1834 229 
 
 Speech on the President's Protest, delivered in the Senate of the United 
 States, May 7, 1834 , 248 
 
20 
 
 Remarks, on different Occasions, on the Removal of the Deposits, and on 
 the Subject of a National Bank, delivered in the Senate of the United 
 States, January and February, 1834 286 
 
 Report on the Removal of the Deposits, made by Mr. Webster, from the 
 Committee on Finance of the Senate of the United States, on the Fifth 
 of February, 1834 366 
 
 Remarks in the Senate of the United States, on the Affairs of the General 
 
 Post-Office, June 27, 1834 393 
 
 Remarks in the Senate of the United States, in Relation to Steam-Boats, 
 
 December 19, 1833. 397 
 
 Speech delivered at a Public Dinner in Salem, Mass., August 7, 1834. . . . 401 
 
 Speech at Concord, New Hampshire, September 30, 1834 ^. . . . 412 
 
 ; Argument in the Goodridge Case 423 
 
 Speech in the Senate of the United States, January 12, 1835, on the Bill 
 granting Indemnity to Citizens of the United States for French Spo- 
 liations on American Commerce prior to 1800 438 
 
 Speech on the Appointing and Removing Power, delivered in the Senate 
 of the United States, on the 16th of February, 1835, on the Passage 
 of the Bill entitled " An Act to repeal the first and second Sections 
 of the Act to limit the Term of Service of certain Officers therein 
 named." 461 
 
 Remarks in the Senate of the United States, February 26, 1835, on the 
 Bill to regulate the Deposits of the Pubhc Money 479 
 
SPEECH 
 
 DELIVERED IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK, MARCH 10, 1831. 
 
 In February, 1831, several distinguished gentlemen of the City of New York, 
 in behalf of themselves, and a large number of other citizens, invited Mr. 
 Webster to a public dinner, as a mark of their respect for the value and suc- 
 cess of his efforts, in the preceding session of Congress, in defence of the Con- 
 stitution of the United States. His speech in reply to Mr. Hayne (published in 
 the former volume), which^ by that time, had been circulated and read through 
 the country to a greater extent than any speech ever before delivered in Con- 
 gress, was the particular effort, doubtless, which procured the honor of this in- 
 vitation. 
 
 The dinner took place, at the City Hotel, on the 10th of March, and was 
 attended by a very large assembly. 
 
 Chancellor Kent presided, and, in proposing to the gentlemen the health of 
 their guest, made the following remarks : — 
 
 New England had been long fruitful in great men, the necessary con- 
 sequence of the admirable discipline of her institutions ; and we were 
 this day honored with the presence of one of those cherished objects of her 
 attachment and pride, who has an undoubted and peculiar title to our re- 
 gard. It is a plain truth that he who defends the Constitution of his coun- 
 try by his wisdom in council, is entitled to share her gratitude with those 
 •who protect it by valor in the field. Peace has its victories as well as 
 war. We all recollect a late memorable occasion, Avhen the exalted 
 talents and enlightened patriotism of the gentleman to whom he had al 
 luded, were exerted in the support of our national Union, and the sound in 
 terpretation of its Charter. If there be any one political precept, pre- 
 eminent above all others, and acknowledged by all, it is that which dic- 
 tates the absolute necessity of a union of the States under one govern- 
 ment, and tliat government clothed with those attributes and powers with 
 which the existing Constitution has invested it. We were indebted, under 
 Providence, to the operation and influence of the powers of that Consti- 
 tution, for our national honor abroad, and for unexampled prosperity at 
 home. Its future stability depended upon the firm support and due exer- 
 cise of its legitimate powers in all their branches. A tendency to dis- 
 union—to anarchy among the members rather than to tyranny in the head 
 — had been heretofore the melancholy fate of all the federal governments 
 of ancient and modern Europe. ' Our Union and National Constitution 
 were formed, as we have hitherto been led to believe, under better au- 
 spices and with improved wisdom. But there was a deadly principle of 
 disease inherent in the system. The assumption by any member of the 
 VOL. II. 3 
 
18 
 
 Union, of the rig-ht to question and resist, or annul, as its own judgment 
 should dictate, either the laws of Congress, or the treaties, or the decisions 
 of the Federal Courts, or the mandates of the executive power, duly made 
 and promulgated as the Constitution prescribes, was a most dangerous as- 
 sumption of power, leading to collision and the destruction of the system. 
 And if, contrary to all our expectations, we should liereafter fail in the 
 grand experiment of a confederate government, extending over some of 
 the fairest portions of this continent, and destined to act, at the same time, 
 with efficiency and harmony, we should most grievously disappoint the 
 hopes of mankind, and blast forever the fruits of the revolution. 
 
 But, happily for us, the refutation of such dangerous pretensions, on 
 the occasion referred to, was signal and complete. The false images and 
 delusive theories wJiich had perplexed the tlioughts and disturbed the 
 judgments of men, were then dissipated in like manner as spectres dis- 
 appear at the rising of the sun. The inestimable value of the Union, and 
 the true principles of the Constitution, were explained by clear and ac- 
 curate reasonings, and enforced by pathetic and eloquent illustrations. 
 The result was the more auspicious, as the heretical doctrines, which 
 were then fairly reasoned down, had been advanced by a very respectable 
 portion of the Union, and urged on the floor of the Senate by the polished 
 mind, manly zeal, and honored name of a distinguished member from the 
 South. 
 
 The consequences of that discussion have been extremely beneficial. 
 It turned the attention of the public to the great doctrines of national 
 rights and national union. Constitutional law ceased to remain wrapped 
 up in the breasts, and taught only by the responses, of the living oracles 
 of the law. Socrates was said to have drawn down philosophy from the 
 skies, and scattered it among the schools. It may with equal truth be said 
 that constitutional law, by means of those senatorial discussions, and the 
 master genius that guided them, was rescued from the archives of our 
 tribunals and the libraries of lawyers, and placed under the eye, and sub- 
 mitted to the judgment, of the American people. Their verdict is with us, 
 and from it their lies no appeal. 
 
 As soon as the immense cheering and acclamations, with which this address 
 and toast were received, had subsided, JNIr. Webster rose and spoke as 
 follows : — 
 
 I OWE the honor of this occasion, gentlemen, to your patriotic 
 and affectionate attachment to the Constitution of our country. 
 For an effort, well intended, however otherwise of unpretending 
 character, made in the discharge of public duty, and designed to 
 maintain the Constitution, and vindicate its just powers, you have 
 been pleased to tender me this token of your respect. It would 
 be idle affectation to deny, that it gives me singular gratification. 
 Every public man must naturally desire the approbation of his fel- 
 low-citizens ; and though it may be supposed that I should be anxious, 
 in the first place, not to disappoint the expectations of those whose 
 immediate representative I am, it is not possible, that I should 
 not feel, nevertheless, the high value of such a mark of esteem as 
 is here offered. But, gentlemen, I am conscious that the main 
 purpose of this occasion is higher than mere manifestation of per- 
 
19 
 
 sonal reo^ard. It is to evince your devotion to the Constitution, 
 your sense of its transcendent value, and your just alarm at whatever 
 threatens to weaken its proper authority, or endanger its existence. 
 Gentlemen, this could hardly be otherwise. It would be strange, 
 indeed, if the members of this vast commercial community should 
 not be first and foremost to rally for the Constitution, whenever 
 opinions and doctrines are advanced hostile to its principles. 
 Where, sooner than here, where, louder than here, may we expect 
 a patriotic voice to be raised, when the Union of the States is 
 threatened ? In this great Emporium, at this central point of the 
 united commerce of the United States, of all places, we may ex- 
 pect the warmest, the most determined and universal, feeling of at- 
 tachment to the National Government. Gentlemen, no one can es- 
 timate more highly than I do the natural advantages of your City. 
 No one entertains a higher opinion than myself, also, of that spirit 
 of wise and liberal policy, which has actuated the government of 
 your own great State in the accomplishment of high objects, 
 important to the growth and prosperity both of the State and 
 the City. But all these local advantages, and all this enlightened 
 state policy, could never have made your City what it now is, with- 
 out the aid and protection of a General Government, extending 
 over all the States, and establishing, for all, a common and uni- 
 form system of commercial regulation. Without national charac- 
 ter, without public credit, without systematic finance, without uni- 
 formity of commercial laws, all other advantages possessed by this 
 City, would have decayed and perished, like unripe fruit. A Gen- 
 eral Government was, for years before it was instituted, the great 
 object of desire to the inhabitants of this City. New York, at a very 
 early day, was conscious of her local advantages for commerce — she 
 saw her destiny, and was eager to embrace it ; but nothing else than 
 a General Government could make free her path before her, and set 
 her forward on her brilliant career. She early saw all this, and to the 
 accomplishment of this great and indispensable object, she bent up 
 every faculty, and exerted every effort. She was not mistaken. She 
 formed no false judgment. At the moment of the adoption of the 
 Constitution, New York was the capital of one State, and con- 
 tained thirty-two or three thousand people. It now contains more 
 than two hundred thousand people, and is justly regarded as the 
 Comrnercial Capital, not only of all the United States, but of the 
 whole Continent also, from the Pole to the South Sea. Every 
 page of her history, for the last forty years, bears high and irresist- 
 ible testimony to the benefits and blessings of the General Govern- 
 ment. Her astonishing growth is referred to, and quoted, all the 
 world over, as one of the most striking proofs of the effects of our 
 Federal Union. To suppose her now to be easy and indifferent, 
 when notions are advanced tending to its dissolution, would be to 
 
20 
 
 suppose her equally forgetful of the past, and blind to the present, 
 alike ignorant of her own history, and her own interest, metamor- 
 phosed, from all that she has been, into a being, tired of its pros- 
 perity, sick of its own growth and greatness, and infatuated for its 
 own destruction. Every blow aimed at the Union of the States 
 strikes on the tenderest nerve of her interest and her happiness. 
 To bring the Union into debate, is to bring her own futuie pros- 
 perity into debate also. To speak of arresting the laws of the 
 Union, of interposing State power in matters of Commerce and 
 Revenue, of weakening the full and just authority of the General 
 Government, would be, in regard to this City, but another mode 
 of speaking of commercial ruin, of abandoned wharves, of vacated 
 houses, of diminished and dispersing population, of bankrupt mer- 
 chants, of mechanics without employment, and laborers without 
 bread. The growth of this City, and the Constitution of the 
 United States, are coevals and cotemporaries. They began to- 
 gether, they have flourished together, and if rashness and folly de- 
 stroy one, the other will follow it to the tomb. 
 
 Gentlemen, it is true, indeed, that the growth of this City is 
 extraordinary, and almost unexampled. It is now% I believe, six- 
 teen or seventeen years since I first saw it. Within that compar- 
 atively short period, it has added to its number three times the 
 whole amount of its population when the Constitution was adopted. 
 Of all things having power to check this prosperity ; of all things 
 potent to blight and blast it ; of all things capable of compelling 
 this City to recede as fasi as she has advanced, — a disturbed 
 government, an enfeebled public authority, a broken or a weakened 
 Union of the States, — w^ould be most sovereign. This would be 
 cause efficient enough. Every thing else, in the common fortune of 
 communities, she may hope to resist or to prevent. But this would 
 be fatal as the arrow of death. 
 
 Gendemen, you have personal recollections and associations, 
 connected whh the establishment and adoption of the Constitution, 
 which are necessarily called up on an occasion like this. It is im- 
 possible to forget the prominent agency which eminent citizens of 
 your own fulfilled, in regard to that great measure. Those great 
 men are now recorded among the illustrious dead ; but they have left 
 names never to be forgotten, and never to be remembered without re- 
 spect and veneration. Least of all, can they be forgotten by you, 
 when assembled here for the purpose of signifying your attachment to 
 the Constitufion, and your sense of its inestimable importance to 
 the happiness of the people. 
 
 1 should do violence to my own feelings, gentlemen — I think I 
 should offend yours — if I omitted respectful mention of distinguish- 
 ed names, yet fresh in your recollections. How can I stand here, to 
 speak of the Constitution of the United States, of the wisdom of its 
 
21 
 
 provisions, of the difficulties attending its adoption, of the evils from 
 which it rescued the country, and of the prosperity and power 
 to which it has raised it, and yet pay no tribute to those who were 
 highly instrumental in accomplishing the work? While we are 
 here, to rejoice that it yet stands firm and strong ; while we con- 
 gratulate one another that we live under its benign influence, and 
 cherish hopes of its long duration, — we cannot forget who tliey were 
 that, in the day of our national infancy, in the times of despondency 
 and despair, mainly assisted to work out our deliverance. I should 
 feel that I disregarded the strong recollections which the occasion 
 presses upon us, that I was not true to gratitude, not true to patri- 
 otism, not true to the living or the dead, not true to your feelings 
 or my own, if I should forbear to make mention of Alexander 
 Hamilton. 
 
 Coming from the military service of the country, yet a youth, 
 but W'ith knowledge and maturity, even in civil affairs, far beyond 
 his years, he made this City the place of his adoption ; and he gave 
 the whole powers of his mind to the contemplation of the weak 
 and distracted condition of the country. Daily increasing in ac- 
 quaintance and confidence with the people of this City, he saw, 
 what they also saw, the absolute necessity of some closer bond of 
 union for the States. This was the great object of desire. He 
 never appears to have lost sight of it, but w'as found in the lead, 
 whenever any thing was to be attempted for its accomplishment. 
 One experiment after another, as is well known, was tried, and all 
 failed. The States were urgently called on to confer such further 
 powers on the old Congress as would enable it to redeem the pub- 
 lic faith, or to adopt, themselves, some general and common princi- 
 ple of commercial regulation. But the States had not agreed, and 
 were not likely to agree. In this posture of affairs, so full of public 
 difficulty, and public distress, Commissioners from five or six of the 
 States met, on the request of Virginia, at Annapolis, in Sept., 1786. 
 The precise object of their appointment was, to take into consider- 
 ation the trade of the United States ; to examine the relative sit- 
 uations and trade, of the ^veral States ; and to consider how far a 
 uniform system of commercial regulations was necessary to their 
 common interest and permanent harmony. Mr. Hamilton was 
 one of these Commissioners ; and I have understood, though I 
 cannot assert the fact, that their Report was drawn by him. His 
 associate from this State was the venerable Judge Benson, who 
 has lived long, and still lives, to see the happy results of the counsels 
 which originated in this meeting. Of its members, he and Mr. Mad- 
 ison are, I believe, now the only survivors. These Commissioners 
 recommended, what took place the next year, a General Conven- 
 tion of all the States, to take into serious deliberation the condifion 
 of the country, and devise such provisions as should render the 
 
22 
 
 Constitution of the Federal Government adequate to the exigencies 
 of the Union. I need not remind you, that of this Convention 
 Mr. Hamilton was an active and efficient member. The Consti- 
 tution was framed, and submitted to the country. And then 
 another great work was to be undertaken. The Constitution 
 would naturally find, and did find, enemies and opposers. Objec- 
 tions to it were numerous, and powerful, and spirited. They were 
 to be answered ; and tliey were, effectually, answered. The 
 writers of the numbers of the Federalist, Mr. Hamilton, Mr. ]\Iadi- 
 son, and Mr. Jay, so greatly distinguished themselves in their dis- 
 cussions of the Constitution, that those numbers are generally re- 
 ceived as important commentaries on the text, and accurate expo- 
 sitions, in general, of its objects and purposes. Those papers 
 were all written and published in this City. Mr. Hamilton was 
 elected one of the distinguished delegation from the City, into the 
 State Convention at Poughkeepsie, called to ratify the new Con- 
 stitution. Its debates are published. Mr. Hamilton appears to 
 have exerted, on this occasion, to the utmost, every power and 
 faculty of his mind. 
 
 The whole question was likely to depend on the decision of 
 New York. He felt the full importance of the crisis ; and the 
 reports of his speeches, imperfect as they probably are, are yet 
 lasting monuments to his genius and patriotism. He saw at last 
 his hopes fulfilled ; he saw the Constitution adopted, and the gov- 
 ernment under it established and organized. The discerning eye 
 of Washington immediately called him to that post, which was in- 
 finitely the most important in the administration of the new system. 
 He was made Secretary of the Treasury ; and how he fulfilled the 
 duties of such a place, at such a time, the whole country perceived 
 with delight, and the whole world saw with admiration. He smote the 
 rock of the national resources, and abundant streams of revenue 
 gushed forth. He touched the dead corpse of the Public Credit, 
 and it sprung upon its feet. The fabled birth of Minerva, from 
 the brain of Jove, was hardly more sudden, or more perfect, than 
 the financial system of the United StateSj^Jjurst forth from the con- 
 ceptions of Alexander Hamilton. 
 
 Your recollections, gentlemen, your respect, and your affections, 
 all conspire to bring before you, at such a time as this, another 
 great man, now, too, numbered with the dead. I mean the pure, 
 the disinterested, the patriotic John Jay. His character is a bril- 
 liant jewel in the sacred treasures of national reputation. Leaving 
 his profession at an early period, yet not before he had singularly 
 distinguished himself in it, from the commencement of the revolu- 
 tion, his whole life, until his final retirement, was a life of public 
 service. A member of the first Congress, he was the author of 
 that political paper which is generally acknowledged to stand first 
 
23 
 
 among the incomparable productions of that body ; productions which 
 called forth that decisive strain of commendation from the great 
 Lord Chadiam, in which he pronounced them not inferior to the 
 finest productions of the master States of the world. Mr. Jay had 
 been abroad, and he had also been long intrusted with the diffi- 
 cult duties of our foreign correspondence at home. He had seen 
 and felt, in the fullest measure, and to the greatest possible ex- 
 tent, the difficulty of conducting our foreign affi\irs honorably 
 and usefully, without a stronger and more perfect domestic union. 
 Though not a member of the Convention which framed the Con- 
 stitution, he was yet present while it was in session, and looked 
 anxiously for its result. By the choice of this City, he had a seat 
 in the State Convention, and took an active and zealous part for 
 the adoption of the Constitution. On the organization of the new 
 Government, he was selected by Washington to be the first Chief 
 Justice of the United States ; and surely the high and most respon- 
 sible dudes of that station could not have been trusted to abler or 
 safer hands. It is the duty, one of equal importance and delicacy, of 
 that tribunal, to decide constitudonal questions, arising occasionally 
 on State laws. The general learning and ability, and especially the 
 prudence, the mildness, and the firmness of his character, eminenUy 
 fitted Mr. Jay to be the head of such a court. When the spotless 
 ei-mine of the judicial robe fell on John Jay, it touched nothing 
 not as spotless as itself. 
 
 These eminent men, gentlemen, the cotemporaries of some of you, 
 known to most, and revered by all, were so conspicuous in the 
 framing and adopting of the Constitution, and called so early to im- 
 portant stations under it, that a tribute, better, indeed, than I have 
 given, or am able to give, seemed due to them from us. > 
 
 There was yet another, of whom mention is to be made. In the 
 revolutionary history of the country, the name of Chancellor Living- 
 ston became early prominent. He was a member of that Congress 
 which declared Independence ; and a member, too, of the Com- 
 mittee which drew and reported the immortal Declaration. At 
 the period of the adoption of the Constitution, he was its firm 
 friend and able advocate. He was a member of the State Con- 
 vention, being one of that list of distinguished and gifted men, who 
 represented this city in that body ; and he threw the whole weight of 
 his talents and influence into the doubtful scale of the Constitufion. 
 
 Gendemen, as connected with the Constitution, you have also 
 local recollections which must bind it still closer to your attach- 
 ment and affection. It commenced its being, and its blessings, 
 here. It was in this City, in the midst of friends, anxious, hopeful, 
 and devoted, that the new Government started in its course. To 
 us, gentlemen, who are younger, it has come down by tradition ; 
 but some around me are old enough to have witnessed, and did 
 ^vitness, the interesting scene of the first inauguration. They re- 
 
24 
 
 r 
 
 member what voices of gratified patriotism, what shouts of enthu- 
 siastic hope, what acclamations, rent the air — how many eyes were 
 sufilised with tears of joy — how cordially each man pressed the 
 hand of him who was next to him, when, standing in the open air, 
 in the centre of the City, in the view of assembled thousands, the 
 first President was heard solemnly to pronounce the words of his 
 official oath, repeating them from the lipsof Chancellor Livingston. 
 You then thought, gentlemen, that the great work of the revolution 
 was accomplished. You then felt that you had a Government — 
 that the United States were then, indeed, united. Every benig- 
 nant star seemed to shed its selectest influence on that auspicious 
 hour. Here were heroes of the Revolution ; here were sages of 
 the Convention ; here were minds, disciplined and schooled in all 
 the various fortunes of the country, acting now in several relations, 
 but all co-operating to the same great end, the successful admin- 
 istration of the new and untried Constitution. And he — how shall 
 I speak of him ? — he was at the head, who was already first in 
 war, — who was already first in the hearts of his countrymen, — and 
 who was now shown also, by the unanimous suffrage of the coun- 
 try, to be first in peace. 
 
 Gendemen, how gloriously have the hopes, then indulged, been 
 fulfilled ! Whose expectation was then so sanguine — I may almost 
 ask, whose imagination then so extravagant — as to run forward and 
 contemplate as probable, the one half of what has been accom- 
 plished in forty years? Who among you can go back to 1789, 
 and see what this City, and this country too, then were — and then, 
 beholding what they now are, can be ready to consent that the 
 Constitution of the United States shall be weakened, nuUiJied, 
 or dishonored ? 
 
 Gentlemen, before I leave these pleasant recollections, I feel it 
 an irresistible impulse of duty to pay a tribute of respect to another 
 distinguished person, not, indeed, a fellow-citizen of your own, but 
 associated with those I have already mentioned, in important la- 
 bors, and an early and indefatigable friend and advocate in the great 
 cause of the Constitution. Gendemen, I refer to Mr. Madison. I 
 am aware, gentlemen, that a tribute of regard from me to him is 
 of little importance ; but if it shall receive your approbation and 
 sanction, it will become of value. Mr. Madison, thanks to a kind 
 Providence, is yet among the living, and there is certainly no other 
 individual living, to whom the country is so much indebted for the 
 blessings of the Constitution. He was one of the Commissioners 
 at Annapolis, in 1786, at the meeting of which I have already 
 spoken ; a meeting which, to the great credit of Virginia, had its 
 origin in a proceeding of that State. He was a member of the 
 Convention of 1789, and of that of Virginia the following year. 
 He was thus intimately acquainted with the whole progress of the 
 
25 
 
 formation of the Constitution, from its very first step to its final 
 adoption. If ever man had the means of understanding a written 
 instrument, Mr. Madison has tl)e means of understanding the Con- 
 stitution. If it be possible to know what was designed by it, he 
 can tell us. It was in this City, that, in conjunction with Mr. 
 Hamilton and Mr. Jay, he wrote the numbers of the Federalist ; 
 and it was in this City that he commenced his brilliant career, 
 under the new Constitution, having been elected into the House 
 of Representatives of the first Congress. The recorded votes and 
 debates of those times show his active and efficient agency in 
 every important measure of that Congress. The necessary or- 
 ganization of the Government, the arrangement of the Depart- 
 ments, and especially the paramount subject of revenue, engaged 
 his attention, and shared his labors. 
 
 The legislative history of the first two or three years of the Gov- 
 ernment is full of instruction. It presents, in striking light, the evils 
 intended to be remedied by the Constitution, and the provisions 
 which were deemed essential to the remedy of those evils. It ex- 
 hibits the Country, in the moment of its change, from a weak and 
 ill-defined confederacy of States, into a general, efficient, but still 
 restrained and limited government. It shows the first working of 
 our peculiar system, moved, as it then was, by master hands. 
 
 Gentlemen, for one, I confess, I like to dwell on this part of our 
 history. It is good for us to be here. It is good for us to study 
 the situation of the country at this period, to survey its difficulty, 
 to look at the conduct of its public men, to see how they struggle 
 %vith obstacles, real and formidable, and how gloriously they 
 brought the country out of its state of depression and distress. 
 Truly, Gentlemen, these founders and fathers of the Constitution 
 were great men, and thoroughly furnished for every good work. 
 All that reading and learning could do ; all that talent and intel- 
 ligence could do ; and — what perhaps is still more — all that long 
 experience, in difficult and troubled times, and a deep and inti- 
 mate practical knowledge of the condition of the country, could do, 
 — conspired to fit them for the great business of forming a general, 
 but limited government, embracing common objects, extending 
 over all the States, and yet touching the power of the States no 
 further than those common objects require. I confess, I love to linger 
 around these original fountains, and to drink deep of their waters. 
 I love to imbibe, in as full measure as I may, the spirit of those 
 who laid the foundations of the Government, and so wisely and 
 skilfully balanced and adjusted its bearings and proportions. 
 
 Having been afterwards, for eight years, Secretary of State, 
 and as long President, Mr. Madison has had an experience in the 
 affairs of the Constitution, certainly second to no man. More 
 than any other man living, and perhaps more than any other who 
 
 VOL. 11. 4 
 
26 
 
 has lived, his whole public life has been incorporated, as it were, 
 into the Constitution ; in the original conception and project 
 of attempting to form it, in its actual framing, in explaining and 
 recommending it, by speaking and writing, in assisting at the first 
 organization of the Government under it, and in a long adminis- 
 tration of its executive powers, — in those various ways he has lived 
 near the Constitution, and with the power of imbibing its true 
 spirit, and inhaling its very breath, from its first pulsation of life. 
 Again, therefore, 1 ask. If he cannot tell us what the Constitution 
 is, and what it means, who can ? He had retired with the respect 
 and regard of the community, and might naturally be supposed not 
 willing to interfere again in matters of political concern. He has, 
 nevertheless, not withholden his opinions on the vital question 
 discussed on that occasion, which has caused this meeting. He 
 has stated, with an accuracy almost peculiar to himself, and so 
 stated, as, in my opinion, to place almost beyond further contro- 
 versy, the true doctrines of the Constitution. He has stated, not 
 notions too loose and irregular to be called even a theory — not 
 ideas struck out by the feeling of present inconvenience or sup- 
 posed mal-administration — not suggestions of expediency, or eva- 
 sions of fair and straight-forward construction, — but elementary 
 principles, clear and sound distinctions, and indispensable truths. 
 I am sure, Gendemen, that I speak your sentiments, as well as 
 my own, when I say, that, for making public so clearly and dis- 
 tinctly as he has done, his own opinions on these vital questions 
 of Constitutional law, Mr. Madison has founded a new and strong 
 claim on the gratitude of a grateful country. You will think, with 
 me, that, at his advanced age, and in the enjoyment of general 
 respect and approbation, for a long career of public services, it 
 was an act of distinguished patriotism, when he saw notions pro- 
 mulgated and maintained, which he deemed unsound and danger- 
 ous, not to hesitate to come forward, and to place the weight of 
 his own opinion in what he deemed the right scale, come what, 
 come might. I am sure, Gendemen, it cannot be doubted, — the 
 manifestation is clear, — that the country feels deeply the force of 
 this new obligation. 
 
 Gentlemen, what I have said of the benefits of the Constitution 
 to your City, might be said, with little change, in respect to every 
 other part of the country. Its benefits are not exclusive. What has 
 it left undone, which any government could do, for the whole country ? 
 In what condition has it placed us ? Where do we now stand ? 
 Are we elevated, or degraded, by its operation } What is our con- 
 dition under its influence, at the very moment when some talk of 
 arresting its power and breaking its unitv ? Do we not feel our- 
 selves on an eminence ? Do we not challenge the respect of the 
 whole world? What has placed us thus high ? What has given 
 
27 
 
 us this just pride ? What else is it, but the unrestrained and free 
 operation of that same Federal Constitution, which it has been pro- 
 posed now to hamper, and manacle, and nullity ? Who is there 
 among us, that, should he find himself on any spot of the earth, where 
 human beings exist, and where the existence of other nations is 
 known, would not be proud to say, I am an American ? I am a 
 countryman of Washington ? I am a citizen of that Republic, which, 
 ahhough it has suddenly sprung up, yet there are none on the globe 
 who have ears to hear, and have not lieard of it — ^who have eyes 
 to see, and have not read of it — who know any thing, and yet do 
 not know of its existence and its glory ? — And, Gentlemen, let me 
 now reverse the picture. Let me ask, who there is among us, if he 
 were to be found to-morrow in one of the civilized countries of Eu- 
 rope, and were there to learn that this goodly form of Government 
 had been overthrown — that the United States were no longer united 
 — that a death-blow had been struck upon their bond of Union — 
 that they themselves had destroyed their chief good and their chief 
 honor, — who is there whose heart would not sink within him? Who 
 is there, who would not cover his face for very shame ? 
 
 At this very moment, Gentlemen, our country is a general 
 refuge for the distressed and the persecuted of other nations. 
 Whoever is in affliction from political occurrences in his own 
 country, looks here for shelter. Whether he be republican, flying 
 from the oppression of thrones — or whether he be monarch or 
 monarchist, flying from thrones that crumble and fall under or 
 around him, — he feels equal assurance, that, if he get foot-hold on 
 our soil, his person is safe, and his rights will be respected. 
 
 And who will venture to say, that in any government, now 
 existing in the world, there is greater security for persons or prop- 
 erty than in that of the United States ? We have tried these popular 
 institutions in times of great excitement and commotion ; and they 
 have stood substantially firm and steady, while the fountains of 
 the great political deep have been elsewhere broken up ; while 
 thrones, resting on ages of prescription, have tottered and fallen ; 
 and while, in other countries, the earthquake of unrestrained pop- 
 ular commotion has swallowed up all law, and all liberty, and all 
 right together. Our Government has been tried in peace, and it 
 has been tried in war ; and has proved itself fit for both. It has 
 been assailed from without, and it has successfully resisted the shock ; 
 it has been disturbed within, and it has effectually quieted the dis- 
 turbance. It can stand trial — it can stand assault — it can stand adver- 
 sity, — it can stand every thing, but the marring of its own beauty, 
 and the weakening of its own strength. It can stand every 
 thing, but the effects of our own rashness, and our own folly. 
 It can stand every thing, but disorganization, disunion, and nul- 
 lification. 
 
28 
 
 It Is a striking fact, and as true as it is striking, that at this very 
 moment, among all the principal civilized states of the world, thai 
 Government is most secure against the danger of popular commo- 
 tion, which is itself entirely popular. It seems, indeed, that the 
 submission of every thing to the public will, under Constitutional 
 restraints, imposed by the people themselves, furnishes, itself, 
 security that that will will desire nothing wrong. 
 
 Certain it is, that popular Constitutional liberty, as we enjoy it, 
 appears, in the present state of the world, as sure and stable a 
 basis for government to rest upon, as any government of enlight- 
 ened states can find, or does find. Certain it is, that, in these 
 times of so much popular knowledge, and so much popular activ- 
 ity, those governments which do not admit the people to partake 
 in their administration, but keep them under and beneath, sit on 
 materials for an explosion, which may take place at any moment, 
 and blow them into a thousand atoms. 
 
 Gentlemen, let any man who would degrade and enfeeble the 
 National Constitution — let any man who would nullify its laws, 
 stand forth and tell us w'hat he would wish. What does he pro- 
 pose.'* Whatever he may be, and whatever substitute he may 
 hold forth, I am sure the people of this country will decline his 
 kind interference, and hold on by the Constitution which they 
 possess. Any one who would willingly destroy it, I rejoice to 
 know, would be looked upon with abhorrence. It is deeply en- 
 trenched in the regards of the people. Doubtless, it may be un- 
 dermined by artful and long-continued hostility ; it may be imper- 
 ceptibly weakened by secret attack ; it may be insidiously shorn 
 of its powers by slow degrees ; the public vigilance may be lulled, 
 and when it awakes, it may find the Constitution frittered away. 
 In these modes, or some of them, it is possible that the Union of 
 the States may be dissolved. 
 
 But if the general attention of the people be kept alive — if 
 they see the intended mischief before it is effected — they will 
 prevent it by their own sovereign power. They will interpose 
 themselves between the meditated blow and the object of their 
 regard and attachment. Gentlemen, next to the controlling au- 
 thority of the people themselves, the preservation of the Govern- 
 ment is mainly committed to those who administer it. If conduct- 
 ed in wisdom, it cannot but stand strong. Its genuine original 
 spirit is a patriotic, liberal, and generous spirit; a spirit of con- 
 ciliation, of moderation, of candor, and charity ; a spirit of friend- 
 ship, and not a spirit of hostility, with the States ; a spirit, careful 
 not to exceed, and equally careful not to relinquish, its just 
 powers. While no interest can or ought to feel itself shut out 
 from the benefits of the Constitution, none should consider those 
 benefits as exclusively its own. The interests of all must be con- 
 
29 
 
 suited, and reconciled, and provided for, as far as possible, that 
 all may perceive the benefits of a united government. 
 
 Among other things, we are to remember, that, since the adop- 
 tion of the Constitution, new States have arisen, possessing already 
 an immense population, spreading and thickening over vast regions, 
 which were a wilderness when the Constitution was adopted. 
 Those States are not like New York, directly connected with 
 maritime commerce. They are entirely agricultural, and need mar- 
 kets for consumption, and they need, too, access to those markets. 
 It is the duty of the Government to bring the interests of these new 
 States into the Union, and incorporate them closely in the family com- 
 pact. Gentlemen, it is not impracticable to reconcile these various 
 interests, and so to administer the Government as to make it useful 
 to all. It was never easier to administer the Government than it is 
 now. We are beset with none, or with few, of its original diffi- 
 culties; and it is a time of great general prosperity and happiness. 
 Shall we admit ourselves incompetent to carry on the Government, 
 so as to be satisfactory to the whole country ? Shall we admit 
 that there has so little descended to us of the wisdom and pru- 
 dence of our fathers ? If the Government could be administered in 
 Washington's time, when it was yet new, when the country was 
 heavily in debt, when foreign relations were threatening, and when 
 Indian wars pressed on the frontiers, can it not be administered 
 now ? Let us not acknowledge ourselves so unequal to our duties. 
 
 Gentlemen, on the occasion referred to, it became necessary to 
 consider the judicial power, and its proper functions under the 
 Constitution. In every free and balanced government, this is a 
 most essential and important power. Indeed, I think it is a re- 
 mark of Mr. Hume, that the administration of justice seems to be 
 the leading object of institutions of government ; that Legislatures 
 assemble, that armies are imbodied, that both war and peace are 
 made, with a sort of ultimate reference to the proper administra- 
 tion of laws, and the judicial protection of private rights. — The ju- 
 dicial power comes home to every man. If the Legislature passes 
 incorrect or unjust general laws, its members bear the evil as well 
 as others. But judicature acts on individuals. It touches every 
 private right, every private interest, and almost every private feel- 
 ing. What we possess is hardly fit to be called our own, unless we 
 feel secure in its possession ; and this security, this feeling of per- 
 fect safety, cannot exist under a wicked, or even under a weak and 
 ignorant administration of the laws. There is no happiness, there 
 is no liberty, there is no enjoyment of life, unless a man can say, 
 when he rises in the morning, I shall be subject to the decision of 
 no unjust judge to-day. 
 
 But, Gentlemen, the judicial department, under the Constitu- 
 tion of the United States, possesses still higher duties. It is true 
 
30 
 
 that it may be called on, and is occasionally called on, to decide 
 questions, which ai-e, in one sense, of a political nature. The 
 General and State Governments, both established by the people, 
 are established for different purposes, and with diflerent powers. 
 Between those powers, questions may arise ; and who shall decide 
 them ? Some provision for this end is absolutely necessary. 
 What shall it be ? This was the question before the Convention ; 
 and various schemes were suggested. It was foreseen, that the 
 States might inadvertently pass laws inconsistent with the Consti- 
 tution of the United States, or with acts of Congress. At least, 
 laws might be passed, which would be charged with such incon- 
 sistency. How should these questions be disposed of? Where^ 
 shall the power of judging, in cases of alleged interference, be 
 lodged? One suggestion, in the Convention, was, to make it an 
 executive power, and to lodge it in the hands of the President, by 
 requiring all State laws to be submitted to him, that he might neg- 
 ative such as he thought appeared repugnant to the general Con- 
 stitution. This idea, perhaps, may have been borrowed from 
 the power exercised by the crown over the laws of the colonies. 
 It would evidently have been not only an inconvenient and trou- 
 blesome proceeding, but dangerous, also, to the powers of the 
 States. It was not pressed. It was thought wiser and safer, on 
 the whole, to require State Legislatures and State Judges to take 
 an oath to support the Constitution of the United States, and then 
 leave the States at liberty to pass whatever laws they pleased, and 
 if interference, in points of fact, should arise, to refer the question to 
 judicial decision. To this end, the judicial power, under the Con- 
 stitution of the Unhed States, was made co-extensive with the legis- 
 lative power. It was extended to all cases arising under the Con- 
 stitution and the laws of Congress. The judiciary became thus 
 possessed of the authority of deciding, in the last resort, in all cases 
 of alleged interference, between State law"s and the Constitution,, 
 and laws of Congress. 
 
 Gentlemen, this is the actual Constitution — this is the law 
 of the land. There may be those who think it unnecessary, or 
 who would prefer a diflerent mode of deciding such questions. 
 But this is the established mode, and, till it be altered, the courts 
 can no more decline their duty, on these occasions, than on other 
 occasions. But, Gentlemen, can any reasonable man doubt the 
 expediency of this provision, or suggest a better? Is it not abso- 
 lutely essential to the peace of the country, that this power should 
 exist somewhere ? Where can it exist, better than where it now 
 does exist ? The national judiciary is the common tribunal of the 
 whole country. It is organized by the common authority, and 
 its places filled by the common agent. This is a plain and prac- 
 tical provision. It was framed by no bunglers, nor by any wild 
 
31 
 
 theorists. And who can say that it has failed ? Who can find 
 substantial fault with its operation or its results? The great 
 question is, whether we shall provide for the peaceable decision 
 of cases of collision. Shall they be decided by law, or by force? 
 Shall the decisions be decisions of peace, or decisions of war? 
 
 On the occasion which has given rise to this meeting, the propo- 
 sition contended for, was, that every State, under certain supposed 
 exigencies, and in certain supposed cases, might decide for itself, 
 and act for itself, and oppose its own force to the execution of the 
 laws. By what argument, do you imagine, Gendemen, it was, that 
 such a proposition was maintained ? I should call it metaphysical, 
 and subtle ; but these terms would imply at least ingenuity, and some 
 degree of plausibility ; whereas the argument appears to me plain 
 assumption, mere perverse construction of plain language, in the body 
 of the Constitution itself. As I understand it, when put forth in its 
 revised and most authentic shape, it is this : that the Constitution 
 provides that any amendments may be made to it, which shall be 
 agreed to by three fourths of the States : there is, therefore, to be 
 nothing in the Constitution to which three fourths of the States 
 have not agreed. All this is true ; but then comes this inference, 
 viz. that when one State denies the constitutionality of any law of 
 Congress, she may arrest its execution as to herself, and keep it 
 arrested, till the States can all be consulted, by their Conventions, 
 and three fourths of them shall have decided that the law is Con- 
 stitutional. Indeed, the inference is still stranger than this ; for 
 State Conventions have no authority to construe the Constitution, 
 though they have authority to amend it ; therefore the argument 
 must prove, if it prove any thing, that when any one State denies 
 that any particular power is included in the Constitution, It is to 
 be considered as not included, and cannot be found there, till three 
 fourths of the States agree to insert it. In short, die result of the 
 whole is, that, though it requires three fourths of the States to in- 
 sert any thing into the Constitution, yet any one State can strike 
 any thing out of it. For the power to strike out, and the power 
 of deciding, without appeal, upon the construction of what is al- 
 ready in, are substantially and pracdcally the same. 
 
 And, Gentlemen, what a spectacle should we have exhibited 
 under the actual operation of notions like these ! At the very 
 moment when our Government was quoted, praised, and com- 
 mended all over the world ; when the friends of Republican Lib- 
 erty, every where, were gazing at it with delight, and were in 
 perfect admiration at the harmony of its movements, one State 
 steps forth, and, by the power of nullification, breaks up the whole 
 system, and scatters the bright chain of the Union into as many 
 sundered links as there are separate States ! 
 
 Seeing the true grounds of the Constitution thus attacked, I 
 
32 
 
 raised my voice in its favor, I must confess, with no preparation, 
 or previous intention. I can hardly say that I embarked in the 
 contest from a sense of duty. It was an instantaneous impulse of 
 inclination, not acting against duty, I trust, but hardly waiting for 
 its suggestions. I felt it to be a contest for the integrity of the 
 Constitution ; and I was ready to enter into it, not thinking, or 
 caring, personally, how I might come out. 
 
 Gentlemen, I have true pleasure in saying that I trust the crisis 
 has, in some measure, passed by. The doctrines of nullification have 
 received a severe and stern rebuke from public opinion. The 
 general reprobation of the country has been cast upon them. 
 Recent expressions of the most numerous branch of the National 
 Legislature are decisive and imposing. Every where, the general 
 tone of public feeling is for the Constitution. While much will be 
 yielded — every thing, almost, but the integrity of the Constitution, 
 and the essential interests of the country — to the cause of mutual 
 harmony, and mutual conciliation, no ground can be granted, not 
 an inch, to menace, and bluster. Indeed, menace and bluster, and the 
 putting forth of daring unconstitutional doctrines, are, at this very mo- 
 ment, the chief obstacles to mutual harmony, and satisfactory accom- 
 ■ modation. Men cannot well reason, and confer, and take counsel to- 
 gether, about the discreet exercise of a power, with those who deny 
 that any such power rightfully exists, and who threaten to blow up 
 the whole Constitudon, if they cannot otherwise get rid of its op- 
 eration. It is matter of sincere gratification, Gendemen, that the 
 voice of this great State has been so clear and strong, and her vote 
 all but unanimous, on the most interesting of these occasions, in 
 the House of Representatives. Certainly such respect to the 
 Union becomes New York. It is consistent with her interests 
 and her character. That singularly-prosperous State — which now 
 is, and is likely to condnue to be, the greatest link in the chain of 
 the Union — will ever be, it is to be hoped, the strongest link 
 also. The great States which lie in her neighborhood agreed widi 
 her fully in this matter. Pennsylvania, I believe, was loyal to the 
 Union, to a man; and Ohio raises her voice, like that of a lion, 
 against whatsoever threatens disunion and dismemberment. This 
 harmony of sentiment is truly gratifying. It is not to be gainsaid 
 that the union of opinion, in this great central mass of our popu- 
 lation, on this momentous point of the Constitution, augurs well for 
 our future prosperity and security. 
 
 I have said, Gentlemen, what I verily believe to be true — that 
 there is no danger to the Union, from open and avowed attacks 
 on its essential principles. Nothing is to be feared from those who 
 will march up boldly to their own propositions, and tell us that 
 they mean to annihilate powers exercised by Congress. But, cer- 
 tainly, there ai-e dangers to the Constitution, and we ought not to 
 
33 
 
 shut our eyes to them. We know the importance of a firm and 
 intelligent judiciary ; but fiow shall we secure the continuance of 
 a firm and intelligent judiciary ? Gentlemen, the judiciary is in 
 the appointment of the executive power. It cannot continue or 
 renew itself. Its vacancies are to be filled in the ordinary modes 
 of executive appointment. If the time shall ever come (which \ 
 Heaven avert), when men shall be placed in the supreme tribunal \ 
 of the country, who entertain opinions hostile to the just powers of t 
 the Constitution, we shall then be visited by an evil defying all 
 remedy. Our case will be " past surgery." From that moment 
 the Constitution is at an end. If they who are appointed to de- 
 fend the castle shall betray it, wo betide those within ! If I live 
 to see that day come, I shall despair of the country. I shall be 
 prepared to give it back to all its former afflictions, in the days of 
 the confederation. I know no security. Gentlemen, against the 
 possibility of this evil, but an awakened public vigilance. I know | 
 no safety, but in that state of public opinion, which shall lead it to 
 rebuke and put down every attempt, either to gratify party, by j 
 judicial appointments, or to dilute the Constitution by creating a I 
 court which shall construe away its provisions. If members of 
 Congress betray their trust, the people will find it out, before they 
 are ruined. If the President should, at any time, violate his duty, 
 his term of office is short, and popular elections may supply a 
 seasonable remedy. But the judges of the Supreme Court pos- 
 sess, for very good reasons, an independent tenure of office. No 
 election reaches them. If, with this tenure, they betray their trusts. 
 Heaven save us ! Let us hope for better results. The past, cer- ' 
 tainly, may encourage us. Let us hope that we shall never see 
 the time when there shall exist such an awkward posture of af- ; 
 fairs, as that the Government shall be found in opposition to the / 
 Constitution, and when the guardians of the Union shall become 
 its betrayers. 
 
 Gentlemen, our country stands, at the present time, on com- 
 manding ground. Older nations, with different systems of gov- 
 ernment, may be somewhat slow to acknowledge all that justly 
 belongs to us. But we may feel, without vanity, that America is 
 doing her part in the great work of improving human affairs. 
 There are two principles. Gentlemen, strictly and purely American, 
 which are now likely to overrun the civilized world. Indeed, they 
 seem the necessaiy result of the progress of civilization and knowl- 
 edge. These are, first, popular governments, restrained by writ- 
 ten constitutions; and, secondly, universal education. Popular 
 governments and general education, acting and re-acting, mutually 
 producing and reproducing each other, are the mighty agencies 
 which, in our days, appear to be exciting, stimulating, and chang- 
 ing civilized societies. Man, every where, is now found demand- 
 
 VOL. II. 5 
 
34 
 
 ing a participation in government — and he >vill not be refused ; 
 and he demands knowledge as necessary to sell-government. On 
 the basis of these two principles, liberty and knowledge, our own 
 American systems rest. Thus far, we have not been disappointed 
 in their results. Our existing institutions, raised on these founda- 
 tions, have conferred on us almost unmixed happiness. Do we 
 hope to better our condition by change ? When we shall have 
 nullified the present Constitution, what are we to receive in its 
 place .'* As fathers, do we wish for our children better govern- 
 ment, or better laws ? As members of society, as lovers of our 
 country, is there any thing we can desire for it better than diat, as 
 ages and centuries roll over it, it may possess the same invaluable 
 institutions which it now enjoys ? For my part. Gentlemen, I 
 can only say, that I desire to thank the beneficent Author of all 
 good, for being born ichcre I was born, and ivhcn I was born ; 
 that the portion of human existence, allotted to me, has been 
 meted out to me in this goodly land, and at this interesdng period. 
 I rejoice that I have lived to see so much developement of truth — • 
 so much progress of liberty — so much diffusion of virtue and happi- 
 ness. And, through good report and evil report, it will be my conso- 
 lation to be a citizen of a republic unequalled in the annals of the 
 world, for the freedom of its instituuons, its high prosperity, and 
 the prospects of good which yet lie before it. Our course. Gentle- 
 men, is onward, straight onward, and forward. Let us not turn to 
 the right hand, nor to the left. Our path is marked out for us, 
 clear, plain, bright, distinctly defined, like the milky way across 
 the heavens. If we are true to our country, in our day and gen- 
 eration, and those who come after us shall be true to it also, as- 
 suredly, assuredly, we shall elevate her to a pitch of prosperity 
 and happiness, of honor and power, never yet reached by any na- 
 tion beneath the sun. 
 
 Gentlemen, before I resume my seat, a highly gratifying duty 
 remains to be performed. In signifying your sentiments of regard, 
 you have kindly chosen to select, as your organ for expressing 
 them, the eminent person* near whom I stand. I feel, I cannot 
 well say how sensibly, the manner in which he has seen fit to speak, 
 on this occasion. Gendemen, if I may be supposed to have made 
 any attainment in the knowledge of constitutional law, he is among 
 the masters in whose schools I have been taught. You see near 
 him a distinguished magistrate,! long associated with him in judi- 
 cial labors, which have conferred lasting benefits, and lasting char- 
 acter, not only on the State, but on the whole country. Gende- 
 men, I acknowledge myself much their debtor. While yet a 
 youth, unknown, and with litde expectation of becoming known, 
 
 * Chancellor Kent, the presiding officer. t Judge Spencer. 
 
35 
 
 beyond a very limited circle, I have passed days and nights, not o( 
 tedious, but of happy and gratified labor, in the study of the judi- 
 cature of the State of New York. I am most happy to have this 
 opportunity of publicly acknowledging the obligation, and of re- 
 paying it, so far as it can be repaid, by the poor tribute of my 
 profound regard, and most sincere good wishes. 
 
 Gentlemen, I will no longer detain you than to propose a toast. 
 
 " The City op New York ; herself the noblest eulogy on 
 THE Union of the States." 
 
SPEECH 
 
 AT THE DINNER IN HONOR OF THE CENTENNIAL BIRTH-DAY OF 
 
 WASHINGTON. 
 
 On the 22d day of February, 1832, being the Centennial Birth-Day of 
 George Washington, a number of Gentlemen, from different parts of the 
 United States, honored the occasion by a Public Dinner, at Barnard's Hotel, 
 in the City of Washington. 
 
 The arrangements for the Dinner were made under the direction of a Com 
 mittee, consisting of Mr. Chambers, of Maryland ; Mr. Waggaraan, of 
 Louisiana; Mr. Letcher, of Kentucky; Mr. Bates, of Massachusetts; Mr 
 Peters, of Pennsylvania. 
 
 According to the arrangements by this Committee, Mr. Webster, Senator 
 of the United States, from the State of Massachusetts, presided ; and Gen. 
 Charles Fenton Mercer, a Representative from Virginia, Gen. Walter Jones, 
 of the District of Columbia, and Gen. Joseph Vance, a Representative from 
 Ohio, vrere selected to act as Vice-Presidents. 
 
 After the Dinner was removed, information was given by the Chairman of the 
 Committee of Arrangements, that the President of the Day would announce 
 the Toasts prepared for the occasion. 
 
 Mr. Webster, the President of the Day, then rose, and addressed the 
 Company to the following effect : — 
 
 I RISE, Gentlemen, to propose to you the name of that great 
 man, in commemoration of whose birth, and in honor of whose 
 character and services, we have here assembled. 
 
 I am sure that I express a sentiment common to every one 
 present when I say, that there is something more than ordinarily 
 solemn and affecting in this occasion. 
 
 We are met to testify our regard for him whose name is inti- 
 mately blended with whatever belongs most essentially to the 
 prosperity, the liberty, the free institutions, and the renown of 
 our country. That name was of power to rally a nation, in the 
 hour of thick-thronging public disasters and calamities ; that name 
 shone, amid the storm of war, a beacon light, to cheer and guide 
 the country's friends ; it flamed, too, like a meteor, to repel her 
 foes. That name, in the days of peace, was a loadstone, attract- 
 ing to itself a whole people's confidence, a whole people's love, 
 
37 
 
 and the whole world's respect ; that name, descending with all time, 
 spreading over the whole earth, and uttered in all the languages 
 belonging to the tribes and races of men, will forever be pro- 
 nounced with atFectionate gratitude by every one, in whose breast 
 there shall arise an aspiration for human rights and human liberty. 
 
 We perform this grateful duty, Gentlemen, at the expiradon of a 
 hundred years from his birth, near the place so cherished and be- 
 loved by him, where his dust now reposes, and in the capital 
 whicli bears his own immortal name. 
 
 All experience evinces, that human sentiments are strongly in- 
 fluenced by associations. The recurrence of anniversaries, or of 
 longer periods of time, naturally freshens the recollection, and 
 deepens the impression, of events witJi which they are historically 
 connected. Renowned places, also, have a power to awaken 
 feeling, which all acknowledge. No American can pass by the 
 fields of Bunker Hill, Monmouth, or Camden, as if they were or- 
 dinary spots on the earth's surface. Whoever visits them feels 
 the sentiment of love of country kindling anew, as if the spirit 
 that belonged to the transactions which have rendered these places 
 distinguished, still hovered round, with power to move and excite 
 all who in future time may approach them. 
 
 But neither of these sources of emotion equals the power with 
 which great moral examples affect the mind. When sublime 
 virtues cease to be abstractions, when they become imbodied in 
 human character, and exemplified in human conduct, we should 
 be false to our own nature, if we did not indulge in the sponta- 
 neous effusions of our gratitude and our admiration. A true lover 
 of the virtue of patriotism delights to contemplate its purest mod- 
 els ; and that love of country may be well suspected, which affects 
 to soar so high into the regions of sentiment as to be lost and ab- 
 sorbed in the abstract feeling, and becomes too elevated, or too 
 refined, to glow with fervor in the commendation or the love of 
 individual benefactors. All this is unnatural. It is as if one 
 should be so enthusiastic a lover of poetry as to care nothing for 
 Homer or Milton ; so passionately attached to eloquence as to be 
 indifferent to TuUy and Chatham ; or such a devotee to the arts, 
 in such an ecstasy with the elements of beauty, proportion, and 
 expression, as to regard the master-pieces of Raphael and Michael 
 Angelo with coldness or contempt. We may be assured. Gentle- 
 men, that he who really loves the thing itself, loves its finest exhi- 
 bitions. A true friend of his country loves her friends and bene- 
 factors, and thinks it no degradation to commend and commemo- 
 rate them. The voluntary outpouring of the public feeling, made 
 to-day, from the north to the south, and from the east to the west, 
 proves this sentiment to be both just and natural. In the cities 
 and in the villages, in the public temples and in the family circles. 
 
38 
 
 among all ages and sexes, gladdened voices, to-day, bespeak grate- 
 ful hearts and a freshened recollection of the virtues of the Father 
 of his Country. And it will be so, in all time to come, so long as 
 public virtue is itself an object of regard. The ingenuous youth 
 of America will hold up to themselves the bright model of Wash- 
 ington's example, and study to be what they behold ; they will 
 contemplate his character till all its virtues spread out and display 
 themselves to their delighted vision ; as the earliest astronomers, 
 the shepherds on the plains of Babylon, gazed at the stars till they 
 saw them form into clusters and constellations, overpowering at 
 length the eyes of the beholders with the united blaze of a thou- 
 sand lights. 
 
 Gentlemen, we are at the* point of a century from the birth of 
 Washington ; and what a century it has been ! During its course, 
 the human mind has seemed to proceed with a sort of geometric 
 velocity, accomplishing, for human intelligence and human free- 
 dom, more than had been done in fives or tens of centuries pre- 
 ceding. Washington stands at the commencement of a new era, 
 as well as at the head of the new world. A century from the birth 
 of Washington has changed the world. The country of Washing- 
 ton has been the theatre on which a great part of that change has 
 been wrought ; and Washington himself a principal agent by which 
 it has been accomplished. His age and his country are equally 
 full of wonders ; and of both he is the chief. 
 
 If the prediction of the poet, uttered a few years before his birth, 
 be true ; if indeed it be designed by Providence that the grandest 
 exhibition of human character and human affairs shall be made on 
 this theatre of the western world ; if it be true that, 
 
 " The four first acts already past, 
 A fifth shall close the drama with the day ; 
 Time's noblest offspring is the last ;" 
 
 how could this imposing, swelling, final scene, be appropriately 
 opened, how could its intense interest be adequately sustained, but 
 by the introduction of just such a character as our Washington .? 
 
 Washington had attained his manhood when that spark of lib- 
 erty was struck out in his own country, which has since kindled 
 into a flame, and shot its beams over the earth. In the flow of a 
 century from his birth, the world has changed in science, in arts, 
 in the extent of commerce, in the improvement of navigation, and 
 in all that relates to the civilization of man. But it is the spirit 
 of human freedom, the new elevation of individual man, in his 
 moral, social, and political character, leading the whole long train 
 of other improvements, which has most remarkably disdnguished 
 the era. Society, in this century, has not made its progress, like 
 Chinese skill, by a greater acuteness of ingenuity in trifles ; k has 
 not merely lashed itself to an increased speed round the old circles 
 
39 
 
 of thought and action ; but it has assumed a new character ; it has 
 raised itself from beneath governments to a partici))ation in gov- 
 ernments ; it has mixed moral and political objects with the daily 
 pursuits of individual men ; and, with a freedom and strength 
 before altogether unknown, it has apjjlied to these objects the 
 whole power of the human understanding. It has been the era, 
 in short, when the social principle has triumphed over the feudal 
 principle ; when society has maintained its rights against military 
 power, and established, on foundations never hereafter to be shaken, 
 its competency to govern itself 
 
 It was the extraordinary fortune of Washington, that, having 
 been intrusted, in revolutionary times, with the supreme military 
 command, and having fulfilled that trust with equal renown for 
 wisdom and for valor, he should be placed at the head of the first 
 government in which an attempt was to be made, on a large scale, 
 to rear the fabric of social order on the basis of a written consti- 
 tudon, and of a pure representative principle. A government 
 was to be established, without a throne, without an aristocracy, 
 without castes, orders, or privileges ; and this government, in- 
 stead of being a democracy, existing and acting within the walls 
 of a single city, was to be extended over a vast country, of differ- 
 ent climates, interests, and habits, and of various sects and senti- 
 ments of the Christian religion. The experiment certainly was 
 endrely new. A popular government, of this extent, it was evi- 
 dent, could be framed only by carrying into full effect the princi- 
 ple of representation, or of delegated power ; and the world was 
 to see whether society could, by the strength of this principle, 
 maintain its own peace and good government, carry forward its 
 own great interests, and conduct itself to political renown and 
 glory. By the benignity of Providence, this experiment, so full of 
 interest to us and to our posterity forever, so full of interest, indeed, 
 to the world, in its present generation, and in all its generations to 
 come, was suffered to commence under the guidance of Washing- 
 ton. Destined for this high career, he vi^as fitted for it by wisdom, 
 by virtue, by patriotism, by discretion, by whatever can inspire 
 confidence in man toward man. In entering on the untried scenes, 
 early disappointment, and the premature extincUon of all hope of 
 success, would have been certain, had it not been that there did 
 exist throughout the country, in a most extraordinary degree, an 
 unwavering trust in Him whose hand held the helm of affairs. 
 
 I remarked. Gentlemen, that the whole world was and is inter- 
 ested in the result of this experiment. And is it not so .'' Do we 
 deceive ourselves, or is it true, that at this moment the career 
 which this Government is running is among the most attractive 
 objects to the civilized world ? Do we deceive ourselves, or is it 
 true, that at this moment that love of liberty, and that understand- 
 
40 
 
 ing of its true principles, which are flying over the whole earth, 
 as on the wings of all the winds, are really and truly of American 
 origin ? 
 
 At the period of the birth of Washington, there existed in Europe 
 no political liberty, in large communities, except the Provinces of 
 Holland, and except that England herself had set a great example, 
 so far as it went, by her glorious revolution of 1688. Every 
 where else, despotic power was predominant, and the feudal or 
 military principle held the mass of mankind in hopeless bondage. 
 One half of Europe was crushed beneath the Bourbon sceptre, 
 and no conception of political liberty, no hope even ot religious 
 toleration, existed among that nation which was America's first 
 ally. The King was the State, the King was the Country, the 
 King was all. There was one King, with power not derived from 
 his People, and too high to be questioned ; and the rest were all 
 subjects, with no political right but obedience. All above was in- 
 tangible power, all below quiet subjection. A recent occurrence 
 in the French Chambers shows us how human sentiments on these 
 subjects have changed. A minister had spoken of the " King's 
 subjects." "There are no subjects," exclaimed hundreds of 
 voices at once, "in a country where the People make the King !" 
 
 Gentlemen, the spirit of human liberty and of free government, 
 nurtured and grown into strength and beauty in America, has 
 stretched its course into the midst of the nations. Like an ema- 
 nation from heaven, it has gone forth, and it will not return void. 
 It must change, it is fast changing, the face of the earth. Our 
 great, our high duty, is to show, in our own example, that this spirit 
 is a spirit of health as well as a spirit of power ; that its benignity 
 is as great as its strength ; that its efficiency to secure individual 
 rights, social relations, and moral order, is equal to the irresistible 
 force with which it prostrates principalities and powers. The 
 world, at this moment, is regarding us with a willing, but some- 
 thing of a fearful admiration. Its deep and awful anxiety is to 
 learn, whether free states may be stable as well as free ; whether 
 popular power may be trusted as well as feared ; in short, whether 
 wise, regular, and virtuous self-government is a vision, for the 
 contemptation of theorists, or a truth, established, illustrated, and 
 brought into practice, in the country of Washington. 
 
 Gentlemen, for the earth which we inhabit, and the whole circle 
 of the sun, for all the unborn races of mankind, we seem to hold 
 in our hands, for their weal or wo, the fate of this experiment. 
 If we fail, who shall venture the repetition ? If our example 
 shall prove to be one, not of encouragement, but of terror — not fit 
 to be imitated, but fit only to be shunned — where else shall the 
 world look for free models ? If this great Western Sun be struck 
 out of the firmament, at what other fountain shall the lamp of 
 
41 
 
 Liberty hereafter be lighted ? What other orb shall emit a ray to 
 glimmer, even, on the darkness of the world ? 
 
 Gentlemen, there is no danger of our overrating, or overstating, 
 the important part which we are now acting in human affairs. It 
 should not flatter our personal self-respect, but it should reanimate 
 our patriotic virtues, and inspire us with a deeper and more sol- 
 emn sense, both of our privileges and of our duties. We cannot 
 wish better for our country, nor for the world, than that the same 
 spirit which influenced Washington, may influence all who suc- 
 ceed him ; and that that same blessing from above, which attended 
 his efforts, may also attend theirs. 
 
 The princi])les of Washington's administration are not left 
 doubtful. They are to be found in the Constitution itself, in "the 
 great measures recommended and approved by him, in his speeches 
 to Congress, and in that most interesting paper, his Farewell Ad- 
 dress to the people of the United States. The success of the Gov- 
 ernment under his administration is the highest proof of the sound- 
 ness of these principles. And, after an experience of thirty-five 
 years, what is there which an enemy could condemn — what is 
 there which either his friends, or the friends of the country, could 
 wish to have been otherwise ? I speak, of course, of great meas- 
 ures and leading principles. 
 
 In the first place, all his measures were right in intent. He 
 stated the whole basis of his own great character, when he told the 
 country, in the homely phrase of the proverb, that honesty is the 
 best policy. One of the most striking things ever said of him is, 
 ^' that he changed mankind's ideas (^ political greatness.''^ To 
 commanding talent, and to success, the common elements of such 
 greatness, he added a disregard of self, a spotlessness of motive, a 
 steady submission to every public and private duty, which threw 
 far into the shade the whole crowd of vulgar great. The object 
 of his regard was the whole country. No part of it was enough to 
 fill his enlarged patriotism. His love of glory, so far as that may 
 be supposed to have influenced him at all, spurned every thino- 
 short of general approbation. It would have been nothing to him, 
 that his partisans or his favorites outnumbered, or outvoted, or 
 outmanaged, or outclamored, those of other leaders. He had no 
 favorites — liejieiectejijll partisan ship ; and, acting honestly for the 
 universal good7nedeserved^'""'wHat he has so richly enjoyed, the 
 universal love. 
 
 His principle it was to act right, and to trust the people for 
 support ; his principle it was not to follovi? the lead of sinister and 
 selfish ends, and to rely on the litfle arts of party delusion to ob- 
 tain public sanction for such a course. Born for his country, and 
 for the world, he did' not give up to party what was meant for 
 mankind. The consequence is, that his fame is as durable as his 
 
 VOL. II. 6 
 
42 
 
 principles, as lasting as truth and virtue themselves. While the 
 hundreds whom party excitement, and temporary circumstances, 
 and casual combinations, have raised into transient notoriety, sink 
 again, like thin bubbles, bursting and dissolving into the great ocean, 
 Washington's fame is like the rock, which bounds that ocean, and 
 at whose feet its billows are destined to break harmlessly forever. 
 
 The maxims upon which Washington conducted our foreign re- 
 lations were few and simple. The first was an entire and indis- 
 putable impartiality towards foreign states. He adhered to this 
 rule of public conduct, against very strong inducements to depart 
 from it, and when the popularity of the moment seemed to favor 
 such a departure. In the next place, he maintained true dignity, 
 and unsullied honor, in all communications with foreign states. It 
 was among the high duties, devolved upon him, to introduce our 
 new Government into the circle of civilized states and powerful 
 nations. Not arrogant or assuming, with no unbecoming or super- 
 cilious bearing, he yet exacted for it, from all others, entire and 
 punctilious respect. He demanded, and he obtained at once, a 
 standing of perfect equality for his country, in the society of na- 
 tions ; nor was there a prince or potentate of his day, whose per- 
 sonal character carried with it, into the intercourse with other 
 states, a greater degree of respect and veneration. 
 
 He regarded other nations only as they stood in political rela- 
 tions to us. With their internal affairs, their political parties and 
 dissensions, he scrupulously abstained from all interference ; and, 
 on the other hand, he spiritedly repelled all such interference by 
 others with us or our concerns. His sternest rebuke — the most 
 hidignant measure of his whole administration — was aimed against 
 such an attempted interference. He felt it as an attempt to wound 
 the national honor, and resented it accordingly. 
 
 The reiterated admonitions, in his Farewell Address, show his 
 deep fears, that foreign influence would insinuate itself into our 
 councils, through the channels of domestic dissensions, and obtain 
 a sympathy with our own temporary parties. Against all such 
 dangers, he most earnestly entreats the country to guard itself. 
 He appeals to its patriotism, to its self-respect, to its own honor, to 
 every consideration connected with its welfare and happiness, to 
 resist, at the very beginning, all tendencies towards such connec- 
 tion of foreign interests with our own affairs. With a tone of 
 earnestness no where else found, even in his last affectionate fare- 
 well advice to his countrymen, he says — " Against the insidious 
 wiles of foreign influence, (I conjure you to believe me, fellow- 
 cidzens,) the jealousy of a free people ought to be constantJy 
 awake ; since history and experience prove, that foreign influence 
 is one of the most baneful foes of republican government." 
 
 Lastly, on the subject of foreign relations, Washington never 
 
43 
 
 forgot that we had interests pecuhar to ourselves. The primary- 
 political concerns of Europe, he saw, did not affect us. We had 
 nothing to do with her balance of power, her family compacts, or 
 her successions to thrones. We were placed in a condition favor- 
 able to neutrality, during European wai's, and to the enjoyment of 
 all the great advantages of that relation. "Why, then," he asks 
 us, " why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation ? Why- 
 quit our own to stand upon foreign ground ? Why, by interweav- 
 ing our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace 
 and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, 
 humor, or caprice ? " 
 
 Indeed, Gentlemen, Washington's Farewell Address is fujl of 
 truths important at all times, and particularly^ deserving considera- 
 tion^at""tlie~~present". ~'T\^ith a sagacitv which brought the future 
 before him, and made it like the present, he saw and pointed out 
 the dangers that even at this moment most imminently threaten us. 
 f\ hardly know how a greater service of that kind could now be\ 
 I done to the community than by a renewed and wide diffusion of \ 
 I that admirable paper, and an earnest invitation to every man in I 
 \ the country to reperuse and consider it. Its political maxims are 
 invaluable ; its exhortation to love of country and to brotherly af- 
 fection among citizens, touching; and the solemnity with which it 
 , urges the observance of moral duties, and impresses the power of 
 I religious obligation, gives to it the highest character of truly disin- 
 ' terested, sincere, parental advice. 
 
 The domestic policy of Washington found its pole-star in the 
 avowed objects of the Constitution itself He sought so to admin- 
 ister that Constitution, as to form a more perfect union, establish 
 justice, ensure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common de- 
 
 fence, promote the general welfare, and secure the 
 
 blessings of 
 
 liberty. These were objects interesting, in the highest degree, to 
 the whole country, and his policy embraced the whole country. 
 
 Among his earliest and most important duties, was the organi- 
 zation of the Government itself, the choice of his confidential ad- 
 visers, and the various appointments to office. This duty, so im- 
 portant and delicate, when a whole government was to be organ- 
 ized, and all its offices for the first time filled, was yet not difficult 
 to him ; for he had no sinister ends to accomplish, no clamorous 
 partisans to gratify, no pledges to redeem, no object to be regarded, 
 but simply the public good. It was a plain, straight-forward mat- 
 ter — a mere honest choice of good men for die public service. 
 
 His own singleness of purpose, his disinterested patriotism, were 
 evinced by the selection of his first Cabinet, and by the manner in 
 which he filled the Courts of Justice, and other places of high trust. 
 He sought for men fit for offices ; not for offices which might 
 suit men. Above personal considerations, above local considera- 
 
44 
 
 tions, above party considerations, he felt that he could only dis- 
 charge the sacred trust which the country had placed in his hands, 
 by a diligent inquiry after real merit, and a conscientious prefer- 
 ence of virtue and talent. The whole country was the field of 
 his selection. He explored that whole field, looking only for w'hat- 
 ever it contained most worthy and distinguished. He was, indeed, 
 most successful, and he deserved success for the purity of his mo- 
 tives, the liberality of his sentiments, and his enlarged and manly 
 policy. 
 
 Washington's administration established the national credit, 
 made provision for the public debt, and for that patriotic army 
 whose interests and welfare were always so dear to him ; and, by 
 laws wisely framed, and of admirable effect, raised the commerce 
 and navigation of the country, almost at once, from depression and 
 ruin, to a state of prosperity. Nor were his eyes open to these in- 
 terests alone. He viewed with equal concern its agriculture and 
 manufactures, and so far as they came within the regular exercise 
 of the powers of this Government, they experienced regard and 
 favor. 
 
 It should not be omitted, Gentlemen, even in this slight refer- 
 ence to the general measures and general principles of the first 
 President, that he saw and felt the full value and importance of 
 the Judicial Department of the Government. An upright and able 
 administration of the laws he held to be alike indispensable to pri- 
 vate happiness and public Hberty. The temple. of justice, in his 
 judgment, was a sacred place, and he would profane and pollute it, 
 who should assign any to minister in it, not spodess in character, 
 not incorruptible in integrity, not competent by talent and learning, 
 not a fit object of unhesitating trust. 
 
 Among other admonifions, Washington has left us, in his last 
 communication to his country, an exhortation against the excesses 
 of party spirit. A fire not to be quenched, he yet conjures us not 
 to fan and feed the flame. Undoubtedly, Gentlemen, it is the 
 greatest danger of our system, and of our time. Undoubtedly, if 
 that system should be overthrown, it will be the work of excessive 
 party spirit, acting on the Government, wdiich is dangerous enough, 
 or acting in the Government, which is a thousand times more dan- 
 gerous ; for Government then becomes nothing but organized party, 
 and, in the strange vicissitudes of human affairs, it may come at last, 
 perhaps, to exhibit the singular paradox of Government itself being 
 in opposiuon to its own powers, at war with the very elements of 
 its own existence. Such cases are hopeless. As men may be 
 protected against murder, but cannot be guarded against suicide, 
 so Government may be shielded from the assaults of external foes, 
 but nothing can save it when it chooses to lay violent hands on 
 itself. 
 
45 
 
 Finally, Gentlemen, there was in the breast of Washington one 
 sentiment so deeply feh, so constantly uppermost, that no proper 
 occasion escaped without its utterance. From the letter which he 
 sio-ned, in behalf of the Convention, when the Constitution was 
 sent out to the people, to the moment when he put his hand to that 
 last paper, in which he addressed his countrymen, the Union — the 
 Union, was the great object of his thoughts. In that first letter, he 
 tells them, that to him, and his brethren of the Convention, Union 
 appears to be the greatest interest of every true American ; and in 
 that last paper, he conjures them to regard that Unity of Govern- 
 ment, which constitutes them one people, as the very palladium 
 of their prosperity and safety, and the security of liberty itself He 
 regarded the Union of these States, not so much as one of our bless- 
 ings, as the great treasure-house which contained them all. Here, 
 in his judgment, was the great magazine of all our means of pros- 
 perity ; here, as he thought, and as every American still thinks, are 
 deposited all our animating prospects, all our solid hopes for future 
 greatness. He has taught us to maintain this Union, not by seek- 
 ing to enlarge the powers of the Government, on the one hand, nor 
 by surrendering them, on the other; but by an administration oi 
 them, at once firm and moderate, adopted for objects truly national, 
 and carried on in a spirit of justice and equity. 
 
 The extreme solicitude for the preservation of the Union, at all 
 times manifested by him, shows, not only the opinion he entertained 
 of its importance, but his clear perception of those causes which 
 were likely to spring up to endanger it, and which, if once they 
 should overthrow the present system, would leave little hope of 
 any future beneficial re-union. Of all the presumptions indulged 
 by presumptuous man, that is one of the rashest, which looks for 
 repeated and favorable opportunities for the deliberate establish- 
 ment of a united government over distinct and widely-extended , 
 communities. Such a thing has happened once, in human affairs, 
 and but once : the event stands out, as a prominent exception to 
 all ordinary history ; and unless we suppose ourselves running into 
 an age of miracles, we may not expect its repetition. 
 
 Washington, therefore, could regard, and did regard, nothing as 
 of paramount political interest, but the integrity of the Union itself. 
 With a united government, well administered, he saw we had 
 nothing to fear ; and without it, nothing to hope. The sentiment 
 is just, and its momentous truth should solemnly impress the 
 whole country. If we might regard our country as personated in 
 the spirit of Washington, if we might consider him as representing 
 her, in her past renown, her present prosperity, and her future 
 career, and as in that character demanding of us all, to account for 
 our conduct, as political men, or as private citizens — how should he 
 answer him, who has ventured to talk of disunion and dismem- 
 
 / 
 
46 
 
 berment? Or, how should he answer him, who dwells perpetually 
 on local hiterests, and fans every kindling flame of local prejudice ? 
 How should he answer him, who would array State against State, 
 interest against interest, and party against party, careless of the 
 continuance of that unity of government which constitutes us one 
 people ? 
 
 Gendemen, the political prosperity which this country has at- 
 tained, and which it now enjoys, it has acquired mainly through the 
 instrumentality of the present Government. While this agent con- 
 tinues, the capacity of attaining to still higher degrees of prosper- 
 ity exists also. We have, while this lasts, a political life, capable 
 of beneficial exertion, with power to resistor overcome misfor- 
 tunes, to sustain us against the ordinary accidents of human affairs, 
 and to promote, by active efforts, every public interest. But dis- 
 memberment strikes at the very being which preserves these fac- 
 ulties. It would lay its rude and ruthless hand on this great agent 
 itself It would sweep away, not only what we possess, but all 
 power of regaining lost, or acquiring new, possessions. It would 
 leave the country, not only bereft of its prosperity and happiness, 
 but without limbs, or organs, or faculties, by which to exert itself, 
 hereafter, in the pursuit of that prosperity and happiness. 
 
 Other misfortunes may be borne, or their effects overcome. If 
 disastrous war should sweep our commerce from the ocean, another 
 generation may renew it ; if it exhaust our treasury, future indus- 
 try may replenish it ; if it desolate and lay waste our fields, still, 
 under a new cultivation, they will grow green again, and ripen to 
 future harvests. It were but a trifle, even if the walls of yonder 
 Capitol were to crumble, if its lofty pillars should fall, and its gor- 
 geous decorations be all covered by the dust of the valley. All 
 these might be rebuilt. But who shall re-construct the fabric of 
 demolished government? Who shall rear again the well-propor- 
 tioned columns of Constitutional liberty ? Who shall frame together 
 the skilful architecture which unites national sovereignty with State 
 rights, individual security, and public prosperity ? No, Gentle- 
 men, if these columns fall, they will be raised not again. Like the 
 Coliseum and the Parthenon, they will be destined to a mournful, a 
 melancholy immortality. Bitterer tears, howevei-, will flow over 
 them, than were ever shed over the monuments of Roman or Gre- 
 cian art ; for they will be the remnants of a more glorious edifice 
 than Greece or Rome ever saw — the edifice of ConstituUonal Amer- 
 ican liberty. 
 
 But, Gentlemen, let us hope for better things. Let us trust in 
 that gracious Being who has hitherto held our country as in the 
 hollow of his hand. Let us trust to the virtue and the intelligence 
 of the people, and to the efficacy of religious obligation. Let us 
 trust to the influence of Washington's example. Let us hope that 
 
47 
 
 that fear of Heaven, which expels all other fear, and that regard to 
 duty, which transcends all other regard, may influence public men 
 and private citizens, and lead our country still onward in her hap- 
 py career. Full of these gratifying anticipations and hopes, let 
 us look forward to the end of that century which is now com- 
 menced. A hundred years hence, other disciples of Washington 
 will celebrate his birth with no less of sincere admiration than we 
 now commemorate it. When they shall meet, as we now meet, 
 to do themselves and him that honor, so surely as they shall see 
 the blue summits of his native mountains rise in the horizon, so 
 surely as they shall behold the river on whose banks he lived, and 
 on whose banks he rests, still flowing on toward the sea, — so surely 
 may they see, as we now see, the flag of the Union floating on the 
 top of the Capitol ; and then, as now, may the sun, in his course, 
 visit no land more free, more happy, more lovely, than this our 
 own country ! Gentlemen, I propose — 
 
 (( 
 
 m)t pernors of ^eorrjc 21311 a.sljinrjton.'* 
 
 From the excellent Speeches, delivered by gentlemen on this interesting oc- 
 casion, we cannot refrain from selecting for this publication, thougli a little out 
 of place, the appropriate, just, and classic remarks of Mr. Robbins, of Pdrode 
 Island. 
 
 Mr. Webster having retired, Mr. Chambers, being in the chair, called upon 
 Mr. Robbins, of Rhode Island ; when Mr. Senator Robbins, of Rhode Island, 
 addressed the company as follows : — 
 
 Gentlei\ie:s — I beg leave to offer a sentiment ; but first, with your in- 
 dulgence, will offer a few remarks, not inappropriate, I hope, to the oc- 
 casion. 
 
 It is the peculiar good fortune of this country to have given birth to a 
 citizen, whose name every where produces a sentiment of regard for his 
 country itself. In other countries, whenever or wherever this is spoken 
 of to be praised, and with the highest praise, it is called the country of 
 Washington. I believe there is no people, civilized or savage, in any 
 place, however remote, where the name of Washington has not been 
 heard, and Avhere it is not repeated with the fondest admiration. We 
 are told, that the Arab of the desert talks of Washington in his tent, and 
 that liis name is familiar to the wandering Scythian. He seems, indeed, 
 to be the delight of human kind, as their beau ideal of Imman nature. 
 "Nil oriturum alias, nil ortum tale fatentes." 
 
 No American, in no part of the world, but has found the regard for 
 himself increased by his connection with Washington, as his fellow-coun- 
 tryman ; and who has not felt a pride, and had occasion to exult, in the 
 fortunate connection ? 
 
 Half a century and more has now passed away since he came upon 
 the stage, and his fame first broke upon the world ; for it broke like the 
 blaze of day from the rising sun — almost as sudden, and seemingly as 
 
48 
 
 universal. The eventful period, since that era, has teemed with great 
 men, who have crossed the scene and passed off. Some of them have 
 arrested great attention — very great: still Washington retains his pre- 
 eminent place in the minds of men — still his peerless name is cherished 
 by them in the same ft-eshness of delight as in the morn of its glory. 
 
 History will keep lier record of his iame ; but history is not necessary 
 to perpetuate it. In regions where history is not read, where letters 
 are unknown, it lives, and will go down from age to age, in all future 
 time, in their traditionary lore. 
 
 Who would exchange this fame, the common inheritance of our coun- 
 try, for the fame of any individual, which any country of any time can 
 boast ? — I would not ; with my sentiments, I could not. 
 
 I recollect the first time I ever saw Washington : indeed, it is im- 
 possible I should forget it, or recollect it without the liveliest emotion. 
 I was then a child at school : the school was dismissed, and we were told, 
 that General Washington \vas expected in town that day, on his way to 
 Cambridge, to take command of the American army. We, the children, 
 were permitted to mingle with the people, who had assembled in mass to 
 see him. I did see liim ; I riveted my eyes upon him ; I could now, 
 were I master of the pencil, delineate with exact truth his form and fea- 
 tures, and every particular of his costume : so vivid are my recollections. 
 I never can forget the feelings his sublime presence inspired. How 
 often, afterwards, when I came, in my studies, to learn them, have I re- 
 peated and applied, as expressive of that feeling, these lines — 
 
 " Quern sese ore ferens, quam forti peclore et armis 
 Credo equidem, nee vana fides, genus esse Deorum." 
 
 He did seem to me more than mortal. It is true this was young and ig- 
 norant enthusiasm ; but, though young and ignorant, it was not false ; it 
 was enthusiasm, which my riper judgment has always recognized as just 
 ■ — it was but the anticipated sentiment of the whole human kind. 
 I now beg leave to offer this sentiment : 
 
 " The written Legacy of Washington to his countrymen — a code 
 OF politics, by which, and by which alone, as he believed, their 
 
 UNION AND their LIBERTIES CAN BE MADE IMMORTAL." 
 
REMARKS 
 
 IN SECRET SESSION OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 ON THE NOMINATION OF MR. VAN BUREN AS MINISTER TO 
 GREAT BRITAIN, JANUARY 24, 1832. 
 
 Mr. President : As it is highly probable that our proceedings 
 on this nomination will be published, I deem it proper to state 
 shortly the considerations which influenced my opinion, and will 
 decide my vote. 
 
 I regard this as a very important and delicate question. It is 
 full of responsibility ; and I feel the whole force of all that re- 
 sponsibility. While I have been in the Senate, I have opposed 
 no nomination of the President, except for cause ; and I have at 
 all times thought that such cause should be plain and sufficient ; 
 that it should be real and substantial, not unfounded or fanciful. 
 
 I have never desired, and do not now desire, to encroach, in 
 the slightest degree, on the Constitutional powers of the Chief 
 Magistrate of the Nation. I have heretofore gone far, very far, 
 in assenting to nominations which have been submitted to us. I 
 voted for the appointment of all the gendemen who composed 
 the first Cabinet ; I have opposed no nomination of a foreign 
 Minister ; and I have not opposed the nominations recently 
 before us, for the re-organization of the administration. I have 
 always been especially anxious, that, in all matters relating to our 
 intercourse with other nations, the utmost harmony, the greatest 
 unity of purpose, should exist between the President and the 
 Senate. I know how much of usefulness such harmony and union 
 are calculated to produce. 
 
 I am now fully aware. Sir, that it is a serious, a very serious 
 matter, to vote against the confirmation of a Minister to a Foreign 
 Court, who has already gone abroad, and has been received and 
 accredited by the Government to which he is sent. I am aware, 
 that the rejection of this nomination, and the necessary recall of 
 the Minister, will be regarded by foreign States, at the first blush, 
 as not in the highest degree favorable to the character of our 
 Government. I know, moreover, to what injurious reflections 
 one may subject himself, especially in times of party excitement, 
 
 VOL. II. 7 
 
50 
 
 by giving a negative vote on such a nomination. But, after all, 
 I am placed here to discharge a duty. I am not to go through 
 a formality ; I am to perform a substantial and responsible duty. 
 I am to advise the President in matters of appointnient. This 
 is my Constitutional obligation ; and I shall perform it conscien- 
 tiously and fearlessly. I am bound to say, then, Sir, that, for 
 one, I do not advise nor consent to this nomination. I do not 
 think it a tit and proper nomination ; and my reasons are found 
 in the letter of instructions, written by Mr. Van Buren, on the 
 20th of July, 1829, to Mr. McLane, then going to the Court of 
 England, as American Minister. I think these instructions derog- 
 atory, in a high degree, to the character and honor of the coun- 
 try. I think they show a manifest disposition, in the writer of 
 them, to establish a distinction between his country and his par- 
 ty ; to place that party above the country ; to make interest, at a 
 foreign Court, for that party, rather than for the country ; to 
 persuade the English IMinistry, and the English Monarch, that 
 they had an interest in maintaining, in the United Slates, the as- 
 cendency of the party to which the writer belonged. Thinking 
 thus of the purpose and object of these instructions, I cannot be of 
 opinion that their author is a proper Representative of the United 
 States at that Court. Therefore it is, that I propose to vote 
 against his nomination. It is the first time, I believe,_ in modern 
 diplomacy, it is certainly the first time in our history, in which a 
 Minister to a foreign Court has sought to make favor for one party 
 at home, against another ; or has stooped, from being the Represen- 
 tative of the whole country, to be the Representative of a party. And 
 as this is the first instance in our history of any such transaction, 
 so I intend to do all in my power to make it the last. For one, I 
 set my mark of disapprobation upon it ; I contribute my voice and 
 my vote to make it a negative example, to be shunned and avoid- 
 ed by all future Ministers of the United States. If,i in a deliber- 
 ate and formal letter of instructions, admonitions and directions 
 are given to a Minister, and repeated, once and again, to urge 
 these mere party considerations on the foreign Government, to 
 \vhat extent, is it probable, the writer himself will be disposed 
 to urge them, in his one thousand opportunities of informal inter- 
 course with the agents of that Government ? 
 
 1 propose, Sir, to refer to some particular parts of these in- 
 structions ; but before I do that, allow me to state, very generally, 
 the posture of that subject to which those particulars relate. 
 That subject was the state of our trade with the British West In- 
 dia Colonies. 1 do not deem it necessary now to go minutely 
 into all the history of that trade. The occasion does not call for 
 it. All know, that, by the Convention of 1815, a reciprocity of 
 intercourse was established between us and Great Britain. The 
 
61 
 
 ships of both countries were allowed to pass, to and from each 
 other respectively, with the same cargoes, and subject to the 
 same duties. But this arrangement did not extend to the Britisli 
 West Indies. There our intercourse was cut off. Various dis- 
 criminating and retaliatory acts were passed by England and by 
 the United States. Eventually, in tbe summer of 1825, tlie 
 English Parliament passed an act, offering reciprocity, so far as 
 the mere carrying trade was concerned, to all nations, who might 
 choose, within one year, to accept that offer. 
 
 Mr. Adams's administration did not accept that offer ; first, 
 because it was never officially communicated to it ; secondly, 
 because, only a few months before, a negotiation on the very 
 same subject had been suspended, with an understanding that it 
 might be resumed ; and, thirdly, because it was very desirable 
 to arrange the whole matter, if possible, by treaty, in order to 
 secure, if we could, the admission of our products into the Brit- 
 ish Islands for consumption, as well as the admission of our ves- 
 sels. This object had been earnestly pursued ever since the 
 peace of 1815. It was insisted on, as ev'ery body knows, 
 through the whole of Mr. Monroe's administration. He would 
 not treat at all, without treating of this object. He thought the 
 existing state of things better than any arrangement, which, while it 
 admitted our vessels into West India ports, still left our produc' 
 tions subject to such duties there, that they could not be carried. 
 
 Now, Sir, Mr. Adams's administradon was not the first to take 
 this ground. It only occupied the same position which its pred- 
 ecessor had taken. It saw no important objects to be gained 
 by changing the state of things, unless that change was to admit 
 our products into the British West Indies, direcdy from our ports, 
 and not burdened with excessive duties. The direct trade, by 
 English enactments and American enactments, had become 
 closed. No British ship came here from the British West In- 
 dies. No American ship went from us to those places. A cir- 
 cuitous trade took place, through the Islands of third Powers ; 
 and that circuitous trade was, in many respects, not disadvanta- 
 geous to us. 
 
 In this state of things, Sir, Mr. INIcLane was sent to England ; 
 and he received his instructions from the Secretary of State. In 
 these instructions, and in relation to this subject of the colonial 
 trade, are found the sentiments of which I complain. What are 
 they ? Let us examine, and see. 
 
 Mr. Van Buren tells INIr. McLane — " The opportunities which 
 you have derived from a participation in our public councils, as 
 well as other sources of information, will enable you to speak 
 with confidence (as far as you may deem it proper and useful so 
 to do) of the respective parts taken by those to whom the ad- 
 
62 
 
 ministration of this Government is now committed, in relation to 
 the course heretofore pursued upon the subject of the colonial 
 trade." 
 
 Now, this is neither more nor less than saying, " You will be 
 able to tell the British Minister, whenever you think proper, that 
 you, and I, and the leading persons in this administration, have 
 opposed the course heretolbre pursued by the Government, and 
 the country, on the subject of the colonial trade. Be sure to let 
 him know, that, on that subject, tve have held with England, 
 and not with our own Govermnent.'^ Now, 1 ask you, Sir, if this 
 be dignified diplomacy ? Is this statesmanshij) ? Is it patriotism, 
 or is it mere party ? Is it a proof of a high regard to the honor 
 and renown of the whole country, or is it evidence of a disposi- 
 tion to make a merit of belonging to one of its political divisions ? 
 
 The Secretary proceeds : " Their views (that is, the views 
 of the present administration) upon that point have been submit- 
 ted to the people of the United States ; and the counsels by 
 which your conduct is now directed, are the result of the judg- 
 ment expressed by the only earthly tribunal to which the late ad- 
 ministration was amenable for its acts." 
 
 Now, Sir, in the first place, there is very little reason to sup- 
 pose diat the Jirst part of this paragraph is true, in point of fact. 
 I mean that part which intimates that the change of administration 
 was brought about by public disapprobation of Mr. Adams's con- 
 duct, respecting the subject of the colonial trade. Possibly, so 
 much was then said, on a subject which so kw understood, some 
 degree of impression may have been produced by it. But be 
 assured, Sir, another cause will be found, by future historians, for 
 this change ; and that cause will be the popularity of a successful 
 soldier, united with a feeling, made to be considerably extensive, 
 that the preferences of the people in his behalf had not been justly 
 regarded, on a previous occasion. There is, Sir, very litde ground 
 to say that " the only tribunal to which the late administration 
 was amenable " has pronounced any judgment against it for its 
 conduct on the whole subject of the colonial trade. 
 
 But, however this may be, the other assertion in the paragraph 
 is manifestly quite wide of the facts. Mr. Adams's administration 
 did not bring forward this claim. I have stated, already, that it 
 bad been a subject, both of negotiation and legislation, through 
 the whole eight years of Mr. Monroe's administration. This the 
 Secretary knew, or was bound to know. Why, then, does he 
 speak of it as set up by the late administration, and afterwards 
 abandoned by them, and not now revived.'' 
 
 But the most humiliating part of the whole follows : — " To set 
 up the acts of the late administration as the cause of forfeiture 
 of privilege, which would otherwise be extended to the people 
 
53 
 
 of the United States, would, under existing circumstances, be un- 
 just in itself, and could not fail to excite their deepest sensibility." 
 
 So, then, Mr. President, we are reduced, are we, to the poor 
 condition, that we see a Minister of this great Republic instructed 
 to argue, or to intercede, with the British Minister, lest he should 
 find us to have forfeited our privileges ; and lest these privileges 
 should no longer be extended to us! And we have forfeited 
 those privileges, by our misbehavior in choosing rulers, ivlio thoiight 
 better of our own claim than of the British ! Why, Sir, this is 
 patiently submitting to the domineering tone of the British Min- 
 ister, I believe Mr."Huskinson — [Mr. "Clay said, " No, Mr. Can- 
 ning."] — Mr. Canning, then. Sir, who told us that all our trade 
 with the West Indies was a boon, granted to us by the indulgence 
 of England. The British Minister calls it a boon, nnd our Min- 
 ister admits it as a privihge, and hopes that his Royal Majesty 
 will be too gracious to decide that we have forfeited this privilege, 
 by our misbehavior in the choice of our rulers ! Sir, for one, 
 I reject all idea of holding any right of trade, or any other rights, 
 as a. privilege or a boon, from the British Government, or any other 
 Government. 
 
 At the conclusion of the paragraph, the Secretary says — "You 
 cannot press this view of the subject too earnestly upon the con- 
 sideration of the British Ministry. It has bearings and relations 
 that reach beyond the immediate question under discussion." 
 
 And adverting, again, to the same subject towards the close 
 of the despatch," he says, " I will add nothing as to tlie impro- 
 priety of suffering any feelings that find their origin in the past 
 pretensions of this Government, to have an adverse influence upon 
 die present conduct of Great Britain." 
 
 I a-sk again, Mr. President, if this be statesmanship ? if this be 
 dignity ? if this be elevated regard for country ? Can any man 
 read this whole despatch, with candor, and not admit, that it is 
 plainly and manifestly the writer's intention to promote the in- 
 terests of his party at the expense of those of the country ? 
 
 Lest I should do die Secretary injustice, I will read all that I 
 find, in this letter, upon this obnoxious point. These are the 
 paragraphs : — 
 
 "Such is the present state of our commercial relations with 
 the British Colonies ; and such the steps by which we have ar- 
 rived at it. In reviewing the events which have preceded, and 
 more or less contributed to, a result so much to be regretted, there 
 will be found three groimds upon which we are most assailable. 
 1st, in our too long and too tenaciously resisting the right of Great 
 Britain to impose protecting duties in her colonies ;" 2nd, &ic. _ 
 
 " The opportunities which you have derived from a participa- 
 tion in our public councils, as well as other sources of information, 
 
54 
 
 will enable you to speak with confidence (as far as you may deem 
 it proper and useful so to do) of the respective parts taken by 
 those to whom the administration of this Government is now 
 committed, in relation to the course heretofore pursued upon the 
 subject of the colonial trade. Their views upon that point have 
 been submitted to the people of the United States ; and the coun- 
 sels by which your conduct is now directed are the result of the 
 judgment expressed by the only earthly tribunal to which the late 
 administration was amenable for its acts. It should be sufficient 
 that the claims set up by them, and which caused the interruption 
 of the trade in question, have been explicitly abandoned by those 
 who first asserted them, and are not revived by their successors. 
 If Great Britain deems it adverse to her interests to allow us to 
 participate in the trade with her colonies, and finds nothing in the 
 extension of it to others to induce her to apply the same rule to 
 us, she will, we hope, be sensible of the propriety of placing her 
 refusal on those grounds. To set up the acts of the late admin- 
 istration as the cause of forfeiture of privileges w' hich would other- 
 wise be extended to the people of the United States, would, un- 
 der existing circumstances, be unjust in itself, and could not fail to 
 excite their deepest sensibility. The tone of feeling which a 
 course so unwise and untenable is calculated to produce, would 
 doubtless be greatly aggravated by the consciousness that Great 
 Britain has, by order in council, opened her colonial ports to Rus- 
 sia and France, notwithstanding a similar omission on their part 
 to accept the terms offered by the act of July, 1825. You cannot 
 press this view of the subject too earnestly upon the consideration 
 of the British ministry. It has bearings and i-elations that reach 
 beyond the immediate question under discussion." 
 
 "I will add nothing as to tl)e impropriety of suffering any feel- 
 ings that find their origin in the past pretensions of this Govern- 
 ment to have an adverse influence upon the present conduct of 
 Great Britain." 
 
 Sir, I submit to you, and to the candor of all just men, if I am 
 not right in saying, that the pervading topic, through the whole, 
 is not American rights, not American interests, not American 
 defence, but denunciation of past pretensions of our own country, 
 reflections on the past administration, and exultation, and a loud 
 claim of merit for the administration now in power. Sir, I would 
 forgive mistakes ; I would pardon the want of information ; I would 
 pardon almost any thing, where I saw true patriotism and sound 
 American feeling ; but I cannot forgive the sacrifice of this feeling 
 to mere party. I cannot concur in sending abroad a public agent, 
 who has not conceptions so large and liberal, as to feel, that, in the 
 presence of foreign Courts, amidst the monarchies of Europe, he is 
 to stand up for his country, and his whole country ; that no jot nor 
 
55 
 
 tittle of her honor is to come to harm in his hands ; that he is not 
 to suffer others to reproach either his Government or his countiy, 
 and far less is he himself to reproach either ; that he is to have no 
 objects in his eye but American objects, and no heart in his bosom 
 but an American heart ; and that he is to forget self, to forget party, to 
 forget every sinister and narrow feeling, in his proud and lofty 
 attachment to the Republic whose commission he bears. 
 
 Mr. President, I liave discharged an exceedingly unpleasant 
 duty, the most unpleasant of my public life. But I have looked 
 upon it as a duty, and it was not to be shunned. And, Sir, how- 
 ever unimportant may be the opinion of so humble an individual 
 as myself, I now only wish that I might be heard by every Inde- 
 pendent Freeman in the United States, by the British Minister, 
 and the British King, and by every Minister and every crowned 
 head in Europe, while, standing here in my place, I pronounce 
 my rebuke, as solemnly and as decisively as I can, upon this first 
 instance, in which an American Minister has been sent abroad, 
 as the Representative of his party, and not as the Representative 
 of his country. 
 
 SECOND DAY. JAN. 2fi. 
 
 Mr. Webster said, in reply to some remarks of Mr. Forsyth, 
 that it was, in his judgment, a great mistake, to suppose that 
 what was now called the American ^'pretension,'" originated 
 with Mr. Adams, either as President or Secretary of State. By 
 the way, it is singular enough that the American side of this ques- 
 tion is called, in the instructions before us, a pretension too long 
 persisted in ; but the British side of it is called a right, too long 
 and too tenaciously resisted by us. This courteous mode of speak- 
 ing of the claims of a foreign Government, and this reproachful 
 mode of speaking of the claims of our own, is certainly somewhat 
 novel in diplomacy. But, whether it be called, respectfully, a claim, 
 or, reproachfully, ^pretension, it did not originate with Mr. Adams. 
 It had a much earlier origin. This '^pretension," now abandoned, 
 with so much scorn, or this claim, said, reproachfully, to have been 
 first set up by the late administration, originated with George Wash- 
 ington. He put his own hand to it. He insisted on it ; and he would 
 not treat with England, on the subject of the colonial trade, without 
 considering it. 
 
 In his instructions to Mr. Morris, under his own hand, in Octo- 
 ber, 1789, President Washington says — 
 
 " Let it be strongly impressed on your mind, that the privilege 
 of carrying our productions, in our vessels, to their islands, and 
 bringing in return the productions of those islands to our own 
 ports and markets, is regarded here as of the highest importance ; 
 and you will be careful not to countenance any idea of our dispens- 
 
56 
 
 ing with it in a treaty. Ascertain, if possible, their vietvs on 
 this subject ; for it would not be expedient to commence 
 
 NEGOTIATIONS WITHOUT PREVIOUSLY HAVING GOOD REASONS TO 
 EXPECT A SATISFACTORY TERMINATION OF THEM." 
 
 Observe, Sir, that President Washington, in these instructions, 
 is not speaking of the empty and futile riglit of sending our own 
 vessels, without cargoes, to the British West Indies ; but he is 
 speaking of the substantial right of carrying our own products to 
 the islands, for sale and consumption there. And whether these 
 products were shut out by a positive act of Parliament, or by a 
 tariff of duties, absolutely and necessarily prohibitory, could make 
 no difference. The object was to provide, by treaty, if it could 
 be done, that our products should find their way, effectually and 
 profitably, into the markets of the British West Indies. This was 
 Genei-al Washington's object. This was the ^'pretension " which 
 he set up. 
 
 It is well known. Sir, that no satisfactory arrangement was 
 made, in General Washington's time, respecting our trade with the 
 British West Indies. But the breaking out of the French Revo- 
 lution, and the wars which it occasioned, were causes, which, of 
 themselves, opened the ports of the West Indies. During the long 
 continuance of those wars, our vessels, with cargoes of our own 
 products, found their way into the British West India Islands un- 
 der a practical relaxation of the British Colonial System. While 
 this condition of things lasted, we did very well without a particu- 
 lar treaty. But when the European wars, and our war, all ceased, 
 then Great Britain returned to her former system ; then the islands 
 became shut against us ; and then it became necessary to treat on 
 the subject. And, Sir, we proposed to treat ; our Ministers were, 
 successively, instructed to treat, from that time forward. And, 
 Sir, I undertake to say, that neither Mr. Madison, who was then 
 President, nor his successor, Mr. Monroe, gave any authority or 
 permission to any American Minister to abandon this pretension, 
 and give it up, or even to waive it, or postpone it, and make a 
 treaty without providing for it. No such thing. On the contrary, 
 It will appear, I tliink, if we look through papers which have been 
 sent to the Senate, that, under Mr. Madison's administration, our 
 Minister in England was fully instructed on this subject, and ex- 
 pected to press it. And as to Mr. Monroe, I have means of being 
 informed, in a manner not liable to mistake, that he was, on this 
 subject, always immovable. He would not negotiate without 
 treating on this branch of the trade ; nor did I ever understand, 
 that, in regard to this matter, there was any difference of opinion 
 whatever, among the gentlemen who composed Mr. Monroe's 
 Cabinet. Mr. Adams, as Secretary of State, wrote the despatches 
 and the instructions ; but the policy was the policy of the whole 
 
57 
 
 administration, as far as I ever understood. Certain it is, it was 
 the settled and determined policy of Mr. Monroe himself. Indeed, 
 Sir, so far is it from being true, that ih\s pretension originated with 
 Mr. Adams, that it was in his administration that, for the first time, 
 permission was given, under very peculiar circumstances, and with 
 instructions to negotiate a treaty, waiving this part of the question. 
 This has been already alluded to, and fully explained, by the hon- 
 orable member from Kentucky. 
 
 So, then, Sir, this pretension, asserted in the instructions to have 
 been first set up by the late administration, is shown to have had 
 President Washington for its author, and to have received the 
 countenance of every President who had occasion to act on the 
 subject, from 1789 down to the time of the present administra- 
 tion. 
 
 But this is not all. Congress itself has sanctioned the same 
 "pretension." The act of the 1st of March, 1823, makes it an 
 express condition, upon which, and upon which alone, our ports 
 shall be opened to British vessels and cargoes from the West In- 
 dies, on the same duties as our vessels and cargoes — that our prod- 
 ucts should be admitted into those islands, without paying any 
 other or higher duties than shall be paid on similar productions 
 coming from elseivhere. All this will be seen by reference to 
 the third section of that act. Now, remember, Sir, that this act 
 of Congress passed in March, 1823, two years before the com- 
 mencement of Mr. Adams's administration. The act originated in 
 the Senate. The honorable Senator from Maryland, who has 
 spoken on this subject to-day (Mr. Smith), was then a member of 
 the Senate, and took part in the discussion of this very bill ; and 
 he supported it, and voted for it. It passed both Houses, without 
 material opposition in either. Now, Sir, how is it possible, after 
 referring to this law of 1823, to find any apology for the assertion 
 contained in these instructions, that this claim is a pretension first 
 set up by Mr. Adams's administration? How is it possible that this 
 law could have been overlooked, or not remembered ? In short. Sir, 
 with any tolerable acquaintance with the history of the negotiations 
 of the United States or their legislation, how are we to account for 
 it that such an assertion as these instructions contain, should have 
 found its way into them ? 
 
 But the honorable member from Georgia asks, why we lay all 
 this to the charge of the Secretary, and not to the charge of the 
 President. The answer is, the President's conduct is not before us. 
 We are not, and cannot become, his accusers, even if we thought 
 there were any thing in his conduct which gave cause for accusa- 
 tion. But the Secretary is before us. Not brought before us by 
 any act of ours ; he is placed before us by the President's nomi- 
 nation. On that nomination we cannot dechne to act. We must 
 
 VOL. II. 8 
 
58 
 
 either confirm or reject it. As to the notion that the Secretary of 
 State was but the instrument of the President, and so not respon- 
 sible for these instructions, I reject, at once, all such defence, ex- 
 cuse or apology, or whatever else it may be called. If there be 
 any thing in a public despatch derogatory to the honor of the 
 country, as I think there is in this, it is enough for me, that I see 
 whose hand is to it. If it be said, that the signer was only an in- 
 strument in the hands of others, 1 reply, that I cannot concur in 
 conferring a high public diplomatic trust on any one who has con- 
 sented, under any circumstances, to be an instrument in such a 
 case. 
 
 The honorable member from Georgia asks, also, why we have 
 slept on this subject, and why, at this late day, we bring forward 
 complaints. Sir, nobody has slept upon it. Since these instruc- 
 tions have been made public, there has been no previous op- 
 portunity to discuss them. The honorable member will recollect, 
 that the whole arrangement with England was done and completed 
 before ever these instructions saw the light. The President opened 
 the trade by his proclamation, in October, 1830 ; but these in- 
 structions were not publicly sent to Congress till afterwards, that 
 is, till January, 1831. And they were not then sent with any 
 view, that either House should act upon the subject, for the whole 
 business was already settled. For one, I never saw the instruc- 
 tions, nor heard them read, till January, 1831 ; nor did I ever hear 
 them spoken of as containing these obnoxious passages. This, 
 then, is the first opportunity for considering these instructions. 
 
 That they have been subjects of complaint out doors since they 
 were made public, and of much severe animadversion, is certainly 
 true. But, until now, there never has been an opportunity natu- 
 rally calling for their discussion here. The honorable gentleman 
 may be assured that if such occasion had presented itself, it would 
 have been embraced. 
 
 I entirely forbear, Mr. President, from going into the merits of 
 the late arrangement with England, as a measure of commercial 
 policy. Another time will come, I trust, more suitable for that 
 discussion. For the present, I confine myself strictly to such parts 
 of the instructions as I think plainly objectionable, and reprehen- 
 sive, whatever may be the character of the agreement between us 
 and England, as matter of policy. And I repeat, Sir, that I place 
 the justification of my vote on the party tone and pm'ty character 
 of these instructions. Let us ask, If such considerations as these 
 are to be addressed to a foreign Government, what is that foreign 
 Government to expect in return ? The Ministers of foreign Courts 
 will not bestow gratuitous favors, nor even gratuitous smiles, on 
 American parties. JJ^iat, then, I repeat, is to he the return ^I — 
 What \s parti/ to do here, for that foreign Government, which has 
 
59 
 
 done, Is expected to do, or is asked to do, something for party 
 here ? What is to be the consideration paid for this foreign favor ? 
 Sir, must not every man see, that any mixture of such causes 
 or motives in our foreign intercourse, is as full of danger as it is of 
 dishonor ? 
 
 I will not pursue the subject. I am anxious only to make my 
 own ground fully and clearly understood ; and willingly leave 
 every other gentleman to his own opinions. And I cheerfully 
 submit my own vote to the opinions of the country. I willingly 
 leave it to the people of the United States to say, whether I am 
 acting a factious and unworthy part, or the part of a true-hearted 
 American, in withholding my approbation from the nomination of 
 a gentleman as minister to England, who has, already, as it ap- 
 pears to me, instructed his predecessor at the same Court, to carry 
 party considerations, to argue party merits, and solicit party favors, 
 at the foot of the British throne. 
 
 J^otc. The circumstance did not occur to Mr. Webster's recollection at the 
 moment he was speaking, but the truth is, that Mr. Van Buren was himself a 
 member of the Senate, at the very time of the passing of this law, and Mr. 
 McLane was, at the same time, a member of the House of Representatives. 
 So that Mr. Van Buren did himself certainly concur in " setting up this pre- 
 tension," two years before Mr. Adams became President. 
 
REPORT 
 
 ON THE APPORTIONMENT OF REPRESENTATION. 
 
 In the Senate of the United States, April 5, 1832, Mr. Webster made the 
 following Report : — 
 
 The Select Committee, to whom was referred, on the 27th of March, 
 the bill from the House of Representatives, entitled "An Act for 
 the Apportionment of Representatives among the several States 
 according to the Fifth Census," have had the subject under consid- 
 eration, and now ask leave to report: — 
 
 This bill, like all laws on the same subject, must be regarded 
 as of an interesting and delicate nature. It respects the distribu- 
 tion of political power among the States of the Union. It is to 
 determine the number of voices which, for ten years to come, 
 each State is to possess in the popular branch of the Legislature. 
 In the opinion of the committee, there can be few or no questions 
 which it is more desirable should be settled on just, fair and satis- 
 factory principles, than this ; and, availing themselves of the ben- 
 efit of the discussion which the bill has already undergone in the 
 Senate, they have given to it a renewed and anxious consideration. 
 The result is, that, in their opinion, the bill ought to be amended. 
 Seeing the difficulties which belong to the whole subject, they are 
 fully convinced that the bill has been framed and passed in the 
 other House, with the sincerest desire to overcome these difficul- 
 ties, and to enact a law which should do as much justice as possi- 
 ble to all the States. But the committee are constrained to say, 
 that this object appears to them not to have been obtained. The 
 unequal operation of the bill on some of the States, should it be- 
 come a law, seems to the committee most manifest ; and they 
 cannot but express a doubt whether its actual apportionment of 
 the representative power among the several States, can be con- 
 sidered as conformable to the spirit of the Constitution. The 
 bill provides, that, from and after the third of March, 1833, 
 the House of Representatives shall be composed of members 
 elected agreeably to a ratio of one representative for every forty- 
 
61 
 
 seven thousand and seven hundred persons in each State, com- 
 puted according to the rule prescribed by the Constitution. The 
 addition of die seven hundred to the forty-seven thousand, in the 
 composition of this ratio, produces no efTect whatever in regard to 
 the constitudon of die House. It neidier adds to nor takes from 
 the number of members assigned to any State. Its only effect is, 
 a reduction of the apparent amount of the fractions, as they are 
 usually called, or residuary numbers, after the application of the 
 ratio. For all other purposes, the result is precisely the same as 
 if the ratio had been 47,000. 
 
 As it seems generally admitted, that inequalities do exist in this 
 bill, and that injurious consequences will arise from its operation, 
 which it would be desirable to avert, if any proper means of 
 averting them, without producing others equally injurious, could 
 be found, the committee do not think it necessary to go into 
 a full and particular statement of these consequences. They will 
 content themselves with presenting a few examples only of these 
 results, and such as they find it most difficult to reconcile with 
 justice, and the spirit of the Constitution. 
 
 In exhibiting these examples, the committee must necessarily 
 speak of particular States; but it is hardly necessary to say, that 
 they speak of them as examples only, and with the most perfect 
 respect, not only for the States themselves, but for all those who 
 represent them here. 
 
 Although the bill does not commence by fixing the whole num- 
 ber of the proposed House of Representafives, yet the process 
 adopted by it brings out the number of two hundred and forty 
 members. Of these two hundred and forty members, forty are 
 assigned to the State of New York; that is to say, precisely one 
 sixth part of the whole. This assignment would seem to require 
 that New York should contain one sixth part of the whole popu- 
 lation of the United States, and would be bound to pay one sixth 
 part of all her direct taxes. Yet neither of these is the case. 
 The whole representative population of the United States is 
 11,929,005 ; that of New York is 1,918,623, which is less than 
 one sixth of the whole, by nearly 70,000. Of a direct tax of two 
 hundred and forty thousand dollars. New York would pay only 
 38.59. But if, instead of comparing the numbers assigned to. 
 New York with the whole numbers of the House, we compare 
 her with other States, the inequaUty is still more evident and 
 striking. 
 
 To the State of Vermont the bill assigns five members. It 
 gives, therefore, eight times as many Representatives to New 
 York as to Vermont : but the population of New York is not equal 
 to eight times the population of Vermont by more than three hun- 
 dred thousand. Vermont has five members only for 280,657 
 
62 
 
 persons. If the same proportion were to be applied to New 
 York, it would reduce the number of her members from forty to 
 thirty-four — making a difference more than equal to the whole 
 representation of Vermont, and more than sufficient to overcome 
 her whole power in the House of Representatives. 
 
 A disproportion almost equally striking is manifested, if we 
 compare New York to Alabama. The population of Alabama is 
 262,203 ; for this she is allowed five members. The rule of pro- 
 portion, which gives to her but five members for her number, 
 would give to New York but thirty-six for her number. Yet 
 New York receives forty. As compared with Alabama, then. 
 New York has an excess of representation equal to four fifths of 
 the whole representation of Alabama ; and this excess, itself, will 
 give her, of course, as much weight in the House as the whole 
 delegation of Alabama, widiin a single vote. Can it be said, then, 
 that Representatives are apportioned to these States according to 
 their respective numbers ? 
 
 The ratio assumed by the bill, it will be perceived, leaves large 
 fractions, so called, or residuary numbers, in several of the small 
 States, to the manifest loss of a great part of their just proportion 
 of representative power. Such is the operation of the ratio, in 
 this respect, that New York, with a population less than that of 
 New England by thirty or thirty-five thousand, has yet two more 
 members than all the New England States ; and there are seven 
 States in the Union, whose members amount to the number one 
 hundred and twenty-three, being a clear majority of the whole 
 House, whose aggregate fractions, all together, amount only to fifty- 
 three thousand ; while Vermont and New Jersey, having together 
 but eleven members, have a joint fraction of seventy-five thousand. 
 
 Pennsylvania, by the bill, will have, as it happens, just as many 
 members as Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New 
 Jersey ; but her population is not equal to theirs by a hundred and 
 thirty thousand : and the reason of this advantage, derived to her 
 from the provision of the bill, is, that her fraction, or residuum, is 
 twelve thousand only, while theirs is a hundred and forty-four. 
 
 But the subject is capable of being presented in a more exact 
 and mathematical form. The House is to consist of two hundred 
 and forty members. Now, the precise portion of power, out of 
 the whole mass presented by the number two hundred and forty, 
 which New York would be entitled to according to her popula- 
 tion, is 38.59 ; that is to say, she would be entiUed to thirty-eight 
 members, and would have a residuum or fraction ; and even if a 
 member were given her for that fraction, she w^ould still have but 
 thirty-nine ; but the bill gives her forty. 
 
 These are a part, and but a part, of those results, produced by the 
 bill in its present form, which the committee cannot bring them- 
 
63 
 
 selves to approve. While it is not to be denied that, under any 
 rule of apportionment, some degree of relative inequality must 
 always exist, the committee cannot believe that the Senate will 
 sanction inequality and injusuce to the extent in which they exist 
 in this bill, if they can be "avoided. But, recollecting the opinions 
 which had been expressed in the discussions of the Senate, the 
 committee have diligently sought to learn, whether there was not 
 some other number which might be taken for a ratio, the applica- 
 tion of which would work out more justice and equality. In this 
 pursuit, the committee have not been successful. There are, it 
 is true, other numbers, the adoption of which would relieve many 
 of the States which suffer under the present ; but this relief would 
 be obtained only by shifting the pressure on to other States, thus 
 creating new grounds of complaint in other quarters. The number 
 forty-four thousand has been generally spoken of as the most ac- 
 ceptable substitute for 47,708 ; but should this be adopted, great 
 relative inequality would fall on several States, and, among them, 
 on some of the new and growing States, whose relative dispropor- 
 tion, thus already great, would be constandy increasing. 
 
 The committee, therefore, are of opinion, that the bill should 
 be altered in the mode of apportionment. They think that the 
 process which begins by assuming a ratio should be abandoned, 
 and that the bill ought to be framed on the principle of the 
 amendment which has been the main subject of discussion before 
 the Senate. The fairness of the principle of this amendment, 
 and the general equity of its results, compared with those which 
 flow from the other process, seem plain and undeniable. The 
 main question has been, whether the principle itself be Constitu- 
 tional ; and this question the committee proceed to examine, 
 respectfully asking of those who have doubted its Constitutional 
 propriety to deem the question of so much importance as to jus- 
 tify a second reflection. 
 
 The words of the Constitution are, " Representatives and direct 
 taxes shall be apportioned among the several States, which may 
 be included within this Union, according to their respective num- 
 bers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number 
 of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of 
 years, and excluding Indians, three fifths of all other persons. 
 The actual enumeratTon shall be made within three years after 
 the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within 
 every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall 
 by law direct. The number of Representatives shall not exceed 
 one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least 
 one Representative." 
 
 There would seem to be litde difficulty in understanding these 
 provisions. The terms used are designed, doubtless, to be re- 
 
 \ 
 
64 
 
 ceived in no peculiar or technical sense, but according to their 
 common and popular acceptation. To (qijmrtion is to distribute 
 by right measure ; to set oft' in just parts ; to assign in due and 
 proper proportion. These clauses of the Constitution respect not 
 only the portions of power, but the portions of the public burden, 
 also, which should fall to the several States ; and the same lan- 
 guage is applied to both. Representatives are to be apportioned 
 among the States according to their respective numbers, and 
 direct taxes are to be apportioned by the same rule. The end 
 aimed at, is, that representation and taxation should go hand in 
 hand ; that each state should be represented in the same extent 
 to which it is made subject to the public charges by direct taxa- 
 tion. But, between the apportionment of Representatives and 
 the apportionment of taxes, there necessarily exists one essential 
 difference. Representation founded on numbers must have some 
 limit, and being, from its nature, a thing not capable of indefinite 
 subdivision, it cannot be made precisely equal. A tax, indeed, 
 cannot always, or often, be apportioned with perfect exactness ; 
 as in other matters of account, there will be fractional parts of 
 the smallest coins, and the smallest denomination of money of 
 account ; yet, by the usual subdivisions of the coin, and of the de- 
 nomination of money, the apportionment of taxes is capable of 
 being made so exact, that the inequality becomes minute and in- 
 visible. But representation cannot be thus divided. Of represen- 
 tation, there can be nothing less than one Representative ; nor, by 
 our Constitudon, more Representatives than one for every thirty 
 thousand. It is quite obvious, therefore, that the apportionment 
 of representative power can never be precise and perfect. There 
 must always exist some degree of inequality. Those who framed 
 and those who adopted the Constitution, were, of course, fully ac- 
 quainted with this necessary operation of the provision. In the 
 Senate, the States are entitled to a fixed number of Senators ; 
 and therefore, in regard to their representation, in that body, there 
 is no consequential or incidental inequality arising. But, being 
 represented in the House of Representatives according to their 
 respecuve numbers of people, it is unavoidable that, in assigning 
 to each State its number of members, the exact proportion oif 
 each, out of a given number, cannot always or often be expressed 
 in whole numbers ; that is to say, it will not often be found that 
 there belongs to a State exactly one tenth, or one twentieth, or 
 one thirtieth of the whole House ; and, therefore, no number of 
 Representatives will exactly correspond with the right of such 
 State, or the precise share of representation which belongs to it, 
 according to its population. 
 
 The Constitudon, therefore, must be understood not as enjoin- 
 ing an absolute reladve equality — because that would be demand- 
 
65 
 
 in°- an impossibility — ^but as requiring of Congress to make the 
 apportionment of Representatives among tlie several States, accord- 
 ino- to their respective numbers, as near as may he. That which 
 cannot be done perfectly, must be done in a manner as near 
 perfection as can be. If exactness cannot, from tlie nature of 
 things, be attained, then the greatest practicable approach to ex- 
 actness ought to be made. 
 
 Congress is not absolved from all rule, merely because the rule 
 of perfect justice cannot be applied. In such a case, approxima- 
 tion becomes a rule ; it takes the place of that other rule, which 
 would be preferable, but which is found inapplicable, and becomes, 
 itself, an obligation of binding force. The nearest approximation 
 to exact truth, or exact right, when that exact truth, or that exact 
 right, cannot itself be reached, prevails in other cases, not as matter 
 of discretion, but as an intelligible and definite rule dictated by 
 justice, and conforming to the common sense of mankind ; a rule 
 of no less binding force in cases to whicli it is applicable, and no 
 more to be departed from than any other rule or obligation. 
 
 The committee understand the Constitution, as they would 
 have understood it, if it had said, in so many words, that Repre- 
 sentatives should be apportioned among the States, according to 
 their respective numbers, as near as may be. If this be not its 
 true meaning, then it has either given, on this most delicate and 
 important subject, a rule which is always impracticable, or else it 
 has given no rule at all ; because, if the rule be that Representa- 
 tives shall be apportioned exactly according to numbers, it is im- 
 practicable in every case ; and if, for this reason, that cannot be 
 the rule, then there is no rule whatever, unless the rule be that 
 they shall be apportioned as near as may be. 
 
 This construction, indeed, which the committee adopt, has not, 
 to their knowledge, been denied ; and they proceed in the discus- 
 sion of the question before the Senate, taking for granted that such 
 is the true and undeniable meaning of the Constitution. 
 
 The next thing to be observed is, that the Constitution prescribes 
 no particular process by which this apportionment is to be wrought 
 out. It has plainly described the end to be accomplished, viz. 
 the nearest approach to relative equality of representation among 
 the States; and whatever accomplishes this end, and nothing else, 
 is the true process. In truth, if, without any process whatever, 
 whether elaborate or easy. Congress could perceive the exact 
 proportion of representative power rightfully belonging to each 
 State, it would perfectly fulfil its duty by conferring that portion 
 on each, without reference to any process whatever. It would 
 be enough that the proper end had been obtained. And it is to 
 be remarked, further, that, whether this end be attained best by 
 one process or by another, becomes, when each process has been 
 
 VOL. II. 9 
 
66 
 
 carried through, not matter of opinion, but matter of mathematical 
 certainty. If the whole population of the United States, the pop- 
 ulation of each State, and the proposed number of the House of 
 Representatives, be all given, then, between two bills apportion- 
 ing the members among the several States, it can be told, with 
 absolute certainty, which bill assigns to any and every State the 
 number nearest to the exact proportion of that State ; in other 
 words, which of the two bills, if either, apportions the Represen- 
 tatives according to the numbers in the States, respectively, as near 
 as may be. If, therefore, a particular process of apportionment 
 be adopted, and objection be made to the injustice or inequality 
 of its result, it is, surely, no answer to such objection to say, that 
 the inequality necessarily results from the nature of the process. 
 Before such answer could avail, it would be necessary to show, 
 either that the Constitution prescribes such process, and makes it 
 necessary, or that there is no other mode of proceeding which 
 would produce less inequality and less injustice. If inequality, 
 which might have otherwise been avoided, be produced by a given 
 process, then that process is a wrong one. It is not suited to the 
 case, and should be rejected. 
 
 Nor do the committee perceive how it can be matter of Con- 
 stitutional propriety or validity, or in any way a Constitutional 
 question, whether the process which may be applied to the case 
 be simple or compound, one process or many processes ; since, 
 in the end, it may always be seen whether the result be that which 
 has been aimed at, namely, the nearest practicable approach to 
 precise justice and relative equality. The committee, indeed, are 
 of opinion, in this case, that the simplest and most obvious way 
 of proceeding is also the true and Constitutional way. To them 
 it appears that, in carrying into effect this part of the Constitution, 
 the first thing naturally to be done, is, to decide on tlie whole 
 number of which the House is to be composed ; as when, under 
 the same clause of the Constitution, a tax is to be apportioned 
 among the States, the amount of the whole tax is, in the first 
 place, to be settled. 
 
 When the whole number of the proposed House is thus ascer- 
 tained and fixed, it becomes the entire representative power of all 
 the people in the Union. It is then a very simple matter to as- 
 certain how much of this representative power each State is enti- 
 tled to by its numbers. If, for example, the House is to contain 
 240 members, then the number 240 expresses the representative 
 power of all the States ; and a plain calculation readily shows how 
 much of this power belongs to each State. This portion, it is 
 true, will not always, nor often, be expressed in whole numbers, 
 but it may always be precisely exhibited by a decimal form of 
 expression. If the portion of any State be seldom, or never, 
 
67 
 
 one exact tenth, one exact fifteenth, or one exact twentieth, it 
 will still always be capable of precise decimal expression, as one 
 tenth and two hundredths, one twelfth and four hundredths, one 
 fifteenth and six hundredths, and so on. And the exact portion 
 of the State, being thus decimally expressed, will always show, 
 to mathematical certainty, what integral number comes nearest to 
 such exact portion. For example, in a House consisting of 240 
 members, the exact mathematical proportion to which her num- 
 bers entitle the State of New York, is 38.59: it is certain, there- 
 fore, that 39 is the integral or whole number nearest to her exact 
 proportion of the representative power of the Union. Why, then, 
 should she not have thirty-nine ? and why should she have forty.? 
 She is not quite entitled to thirty-nine ; that number is something 
 more than her right. But, allowing her thirty-nine, from the 
 necessity of giving her whole numbers, and because that is the 
 nearest whole number, is not the Constitution fully obeyed when 
 she has received the thirty-ninth member? Is not her proper 
 number of Representatives then apportioned to her, as near as may 
 be ? And is not the Constitution disregarded, when the bill goes 
 further, and gives her a fortieth member? For what is such a 
 fortieth member given ? Not for her absolute numbers ; for her 
 absolute numbers do not entitle her to thirty-nine. Not for the 
 sake of apportioning her members to her numbers as near as may 
 be; because thirty-nine is a nearer apportionment of members 
 to numbers than forty. But it is given, say the advocates of the 
 bill, because the process which has been adopted gives it. The 
 answer is. No such process is enjoined by the Constitution. 
 
 The case of New York may be compared, or contrasted, with 
 that of Missouri. The exact proportion of Missouri, in a general 
 representation of 240, is two and six tenths ; that is to say, it 
 comes nearer to three members than to two, yet it is confined to 
 two. But why is not Missouri entitled to that number of Repre- 
 sentatives which comes nearest to her exact proportion ? Is the 
 Constitution fulfilled as to her, while that number is withheld, 
 and while, at the same time, in another State, not only is that 
 nearest number given, but an additional member given, also ? Is 
 it an answer with which the people of Missouri ought to be satis- 
 fied, when it is said that this obvious injustice is the necessary 
 result of the process adopted by the bill ? May they not say, 
 with propriety, that, since three is the nearest whole number to 
 their exact right, to that number they are entitled, and the process 
 which deprives them of it, must be a wrong process ? A similar 
 comparison might be made between New York and Vermont. 
 The exact proportion to which Vermont is entitled, in a repre- 
 sentation of 240, is 5.G45. Her nearest whole number, there- 
 fore, would be six. Now, two things are undeniably true : first, 
 
68 
 
 that to take away the fortieth member from New York, would 
 bring her rcpreseiuation nearer to her exact proportion than it 
 stands by leaving her that foriicih member: second, that giv- 
 ing the member, thus taken from New York, to Vermont, would 
 bring her representation nearer to her exact right than it is by the 
 bill. And both these propositions are equally true of a transfer 
 of the twenty-eighth member assigned by the bill to Pennsylvania, 
 to Delaware, and of the thirteenth member assigned to Kentucky, 
 to Missouri : in other words, Vermont has, by her numbers, 
 more right to six members than New York has to forty ; Dela- 
 ware, by her numbers, has more right to two members than 
 Pennsylvania has .to twenty-eight; and Missouri, by her numbers, 
 has more right to three members than Kentucky has to thirteen. 
 Without disturbing the proposed number of the House, the mere 
 chansins; of these three members from and to the six States re- 
 spectively, would bring the representation ot each ot the whole 
 six nearer to their due proportion, according to their respective 
 numbers, than the bill, in its present form, makes it. In the face 
 of this indisputable truth, how can it be said that the bill appor- 
 tions these members among those States according to their re- 
 spective numbers, as near as may he ? 
 
 The principle on which the proposed amendment is founded, 
 is an effectual corrective for these and all other equally great 
 inequalities. It may be applied at all times, and in all cases, 
 and its result will always be the nearest approach to perfect jus- 
 lice. It is equally simple and impartial. As a rule of apportion- 
 ment, it is little other than a transcript of the words of the Con- 
 stitution, and its results are mathematically certain. The Con- 
 stitution, as the committee understand it, says, Representatives 
 shall be apportioned among the States according to their respec- 
 tive numbers of people, as near as may be. The rule adopted 
 by the committee, says, out of the whole number of the House, 
 that number shall be apportioned to each State which comes 
 nearest to its exact right according to its number of people. 
 
 Where is the repugnancy between the Constitution and the 
 rule? The arguments against the rule "Seem to assume, that there 
 is a necessity of instituting some process, adopting some number 
 as the ratio, or as that number of people which each member 
 shall be understood to represent ; but the committee see no occa- 
 sion for any other process whatever, than simply the ascertain- 
 ment of that quantum, out of the whole mass of the representadve 
 power, which each State may claim. 
 
 But it is said that, although a State may receive a number of 
 Representatives which is something less than its exact proportion 
 of representation, yet that it can, in no case, Constitutionally re- 
 ceive more. How is this proposition proved ? — How is it shown 
 
69 
 
 that the Constitution is less perfectly fulfilled by allowing a State 
 a small excess, than by subjecting her to a large deficiency ? 
 What the Constitution requires is tlie nearest practicable approach 
 to precise justice. The rule is approximation ; and we ought to 
 ap|:)roach, therefore, on whichever side we can approach nearest. 
 
 But there is still a more conclusive answer to be given to tliis 
 suggestion. The whole number of representatives, of which the 
 House is to be composed, is, of necessity, limited. This number, 
 whatever it is, is that which is to be apportioned, and notliing 
 else can be apportioned. This is the whole sum to be distributed. 
 If, therefore, in making the apportionment, some States receive 
 less than their just share, it must necessarily follow that some 
 other States have received more than their just share. If there 
 be one State in the Union with less than its right, some other 
 State has more than its right ; so diat the argument, whatever be 
 its force, applies to the bill in its present form, as strongly as it 
 can ever apply to any bill. 
 
 But the objection most usually argued against the principle of 
 the proposed amendment, is, that it provides for the representa- 
 tion of fractions. Let this objection be examined and considered. 
 Let it be ascertained, in the first place, what these fractions, or 
 fractional numbers, or residuary numbers, i-eally are, which it is 
 said will be represented, should the amendment prevail. 
 
 A fraction is the broken part of some integral number. It is, 
 therefore, a relative or derivative idea. It implies the previous 
 existence of some fixed number, of which it is but a part or re- 
 mainder. If there be no necessity for fixing or establishing such 
 previous number, then the fraction resulting from it is itself not 
 matter of necessity, but matter of choice or accident. Now, the 
 argument which considers the plan proposed in the amendment 
 as a representation of fractions, and therefore unconstitutional, 
 assumes as its basis, that, according to the Constitution, every 
 member of the House of Representatives represents, or ought to 
 represent, the same, or nearly the same, number of constituents ; 
 that this number is to be regarded as an integer ; and any thing 
 less than this is therefore called a fraction, or a residuum, and can- 
 not be entitled to a Representative. But all this is not the pro- 
 vision of the Constitution of the United States. That Constitu- 
 tion contemplates no integer, or any common number for the con- 
 stituents of a nmember of the House of Representatives. It goes 
 not at all into these subdivisions of the population of a State. It 
 provides for the apportionment of Representatives, among the sev- 
 eral States, according to their respective numbers, and stops there. 
 It makes no provision for the representation of districts of States, 
 or for the representation of any portion of the people of a State 
 less than the whole. It says nothing of ratios or of constituent 
 
70 
 
 numbers. All these things it leaves to State legislation. The 
 right which each State possesses to its own due portion of the 
 representative power, is a State right, strictly : it belongs to the 
 State, as a State ; and it is to be used and exercised as the State 
 may see fit, subject only to the Constitutional qualifications of 
 electors. In fact, the States do make, and always have made, 
 different provisions for the exercise of this power. In some, a 
 single member is chosen for a certain defined district ; in others, 
 two or three members are chosen for the same district; and, in 
 some again, as New Hampshire, Rhode Island j Connecticut, 
 New Jersey, and Georgia, the whole representation of the State 
 is exerted as a joint, undivided representation. In these last-men- 
 tioned States, every member of the House of Representatives 
 has for his constituents all the people of the State ; and all the 
 people of those States are consequently represented in that branch 
 of Congress. 
 
 If the bill before the Senate should pass into a law, in its pres- 
 ent form, whatever injustice it might do to any of those States, 
 it would not be correct to say of them, nevertheless, that any por- 
 tion of their people was unrepresented. The well-founded ob- 
 jection would be, as to some of them at least, that they were not 
 adequately, competently, fairly represented; that they had not as 
 many voices and as many votes in the House of Representatives 
 as they were entided to. This would be the objection. There 
 would be no unrepresented fractions ; but the State, as a State, 
 as a whole, would be deprived of some part of its just rights. 
 
 On the other hand, if the bill should pass as it is now proposed 
 lo be amended, there would be no representation of fractions in 
 any State ; for a fraction supposes a division and a remainder. 
 All that could justly be said, would be, that some of these States, 
 as States, possessed a portion of legislative power a little larger 
 than their exact right ; as it must be admitted, that, should the 
 bill pass unamended, they would possess of that power much less 
 than that exact right. The same remarks are substantially true, 
 if applied to those States which adopt the district system, as most 
 of them do. In Missouri, for example, there will be no fraction 
 unrepresented, should the bill become a law in its present form; 
 nor any member for a fraction, should the amendment prevail. 
 Because the mode of apportionment which is nearest to its exact 
 right, applies no assumed ratios, makes no subdivisions, and, of 
 course, produces no fractions. In the one case, or in the other, 
 the State, as a State, will have something more, or something 
 less, than its exact proportion of representative power ; but she 
 will part out this power among her own people, in either case, 
 in such mode as she may choose, or exercise it altogether as an 
 entire representation of the people of the State. 
 
71 
 
 Whether the subdivision of the representative power within any 
 State, if there be a subdivision, be equal or unequal, or lliirly or 
 unfairly made. Congress cannot know, and has no authority to in- 
 quire. It is enough that the State presents her own representa- 
 tion on the floor of Congress in the mode she chooses to present it. 
 If a State were to give to one portion of her territory a Representa- 
 tive for every twenty-five thousand persons, and to the rest a Rep- 
 resentative only for every fifty thousand, it would be an act of un- 
 just legislation, doubtless, but it would be wholly beyond redress, 
 by any power in Congress ; because the Constitution has left all 
 this to the State itself. 
 
 These considerations, it is thought, may show that the Constitu- 
 tion has not, by any implication, or necessary construction, enjoin- 
 ed that which it certainly has not ordained in terms, viz. that 
 every member of the House shall be supposed to represent the 
 same number of constituents ; and, therefore, that the assumption 
 of a ratio, as representing the common number of constituents, is 
 not called for by the Constitution. All that Congress is at liberty 
 to do, as it would seem, is to divide the whole representative pow- 
 er of the Union into twenty-four parts, assigning one part to each 
 State, as near as practicable, according to its right, and leaving^ all 
 subsequent arrangement, and all subdivisions, to the State itself ^ 
 
 If the view thus taken of the rights of the States, and the duties 
 of Congress, he the correct view, then the plan proposed in the 
 amendment is, in no just sense, a representation of fractions. But 
 suppose it was otherwise; suppose a direct provision were made 
 for allowing a Representative to every State in whose population, it 
 being first divided by a common ratio, there should be found a 
 fraction exceeding half the amount of that ratio, what Constitution- 
 al objection could be fairly urged against such a provision ? Let it 
 always be remembered, that the case here supposed provides only 
 for a fraction exceeding the moiety of the ratio ; for the committee 
 admit, at once, that the representation of fractions less than a 
 moiety is unconstitutional ; because, should a member be allowed 
 to a State for such a fraction, it would be certain, that her represen- 
 tation would not be so near her exact right as it was before. But 
 the allowance of a member for a major fraction is a direct approxi- 
 mation towards justice and equality. There appears to the com- 
 mittee to be nothing, either in the letter or the spirh of the Consti- 
 tution, opposed to such a mode of apportionment. On the contra- 
 ry, it seems entirely consistent with the very object which the Con- 
 stitution contemplated, and well calculated to accomplish it. The 
 argument commonly urged against it, is, that it is necessary to ap- 
 ply some one common divisor, and to abide by its results. 
 
 If by this it be meant, that there must be some conmion rule, 
 or common measure, applicable, and applied impartially to all the 
 
72 
 
 States, it is quite true. But, if that which is intended be, that 
 the population of each State must be divided by a fixed ratio, and 
 all resulting fractions, great or small, disregarded, this is but to 
 take for granted the ver)^ thing in controversy. The question is, 
 whether it be unconstitutional to make approximation to equality, 
 by allowing Representatives for major fractions ? The affirmative 
 of this question is, indeed, denied, but it is not disproved, by say- 
 ing, that we must abide by the operation of division, by an as- 
 sumed ratio, and disregard fractions. The question still remains 
 as it was before, and it is still to be shown what there is in the Con- 
 stitution which rejects approximation as the rule of apportionment. 
 
 But suppose it to be necessary to find a divisor, and to abide its 
 results. What is a divisor.^ Not necessarily a simple number. 
 It may be composed of a whole number and a fraction ; it may it- 
 self be the result of a previous process ; it may be any thing, in 
 short, which produces accurate and uniform division : whatever 
 does this, is a common rule, a common standard, or, if the word 
 be important, a common divisor. The committee refer, on this 
 part of the case, to some observations by Professor Dean, with a 
 table, both of which accompany this Report. 
 
 As it is not improbable that opinion has been a good deal influ- 
 enced on this subject by what took place on the passing of the 
 first act making an apportionment of Representatives among the 
 States, the committee have examined and considered that prece- 
 dent. If it be in point to the present case, it is certainly entitled 
 to very great weight ; but if it be of questionable application, the 
 text of the Constitution, even if it were doubtful, could not be ex- 
 plained by a doubtful commentary. In the opinion of the commit- 
 tee, it is only necessary that what was said on that occasion should be 
 understood in connection with the subject-matter then under con- 
 sideratson ; and, in order to see what that subject-matter really 
 was, the committee think it necessary to state, shortly, the case. 
 
 The two Houses of Congress passed a bill, after the first enu- 
 meration of the people, providing for a House of Representatives 
 which should consist of 120 members. The bill expressed no 
 rule or principle by which these members were assigned to the 
 several States. It merely said that New Hampshire should have 
 five members, Massachusetts ten, and so on ; going through all 
 the States, and assigning the whole number of one hundred and 
 twenty. Now, by "the .census then recently taken, it appeared 
 that the whole representative population of the United States was 
 3,615,920; and it was evidently the wish of Congress to make 
 the House as numerous as the Constitution would allow. But 
 the Constitution has said that there should not be more than one 
 member for every thirty thousand persons. 
 
 This prohibition was, of course, to be obeyed ; but did the Con- 
 
73 
 
 stitution mean that no State should have more than one member 
 for every tliirty thousand persons ? Or did it only mean that the 
 whole House, as compared with the whole population of the 
 United States, should not contain more than one member for 
 every thirty thousand persons ? If this last were the true con- 
 struction, then the bill, in that particular, was right ; if the first 
 were the true construction, then it was wrong ; because so many 
 members could not be assigned to the States, without giving to 
 some of them more members than one for every thirty thousand. 
 In fact, the bill did propose to do this in regard to several States. 
 
 President Washington adopted that construction of the Consti- 
 tution which applied its prohibition to each State individually. 
 He thought that no State could. Constitutionally, receive more 
 than one member for every thirty thousand of her own population. 
 On this, therefore, his main objection to the bill was founded. 
 That objection he states in these words : — 
 
 " The Consthution has also provided that the number of Repre- 
 sentatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand ; which 
 restriction is, by the context, and by fair and obvious construction, 
 to be applied to the separate and respective numbers of the States ; 
 and the bill has allotted to eight of the States more than one for 
 every thirty thousand." 
 
 It is now necessary to see what there was further objectionable 
 in this bill. The number of one hundred and twelve members 
 was all that could be divided among the States, without giving to 
 some of them more than one member for thirty thousand inhab- 
 itants. Therefore, having allotted these one hundred and twelve, 
 there still remained eigiit of the one hundred and twenty to be 
 assigned ; and these eight the bill assigned to the States having 
 the largest fractions. Some of these fractions were large, and 
 some were small. No regard was paid to fractions over a moiety 
 of the ratio, any more than to fractions under it. There was no 
 rule laid down, stating what fractions should entitle the States to 
 whom they might happen to fall, or in whose population they 
 might happen to be found, to a Representative therefor. The 
 assignment was not made on the principle that each State should 
 have a member for a fraction greater than half the ratio ; or that 
 all the States should have a member for a fraction, in all cases 
 where the allowance of such member would bring her repre- 
 sentation nearer to its exact proportion than its disallowance. 
 There was no common measure, or common rule, adopted, but the 
 assignment was matter of arbitrary discretion. A member was 
 allowed to New Hampshire, for example, for a fraction of less 
 than one half the ratio ; thus placing her representation farther 
 from her exact proportion than it was without such additional 
 member ; while a member was refused to Georgia, whose case 
 
 VOL. II. 10 
 
74 
 
 closely resembled that of New Hampshire, both having what were 
 thought large fractions, but both still under a moiety of the ratio, 
 and distinguished from each other only by a very slight difference 
 of absolute numbers. The committee have already fully ex- 
 pressed their opinion on such a mode of apportionment. 
 
 In regard to this character of the bill, President Washington said, 
 " The Constitution has prescribed that Representatives shall be 
 appoitioned among the several States according to their respective 
 numbers ; and there is no one proportion or divisor, which, applied 
 to the respective numbers of the States, will yield the number 
 and allotment of Representatives proposed by the bill." 
 
 This was all undoubtedly true, and was, in the judgment of the 
 committee, a decisive objecdon against the bill. It is, nevertheless, 
 to be observed, that the other objection completely covered the 
 whole ground. There could, in that hill, be no allowance for a 
 fraction great or small ; because Congress had taken for the ratio 
 the lowest number allowed by the Constitution, viz. thirty thou- 
 sand. Whatever fraction a State might have less than that ratio, 
 no member could be allowed for it. It is scarcely necessary to 
 observe, that no such objection applies to the amendment now pro- 
 posed. No State, should the amendment prevail, will have a greater 
 number of members than one for every thirty thousand ; nor is it 
 likely that the objection will ever again occur. The whole force of 
 the precedent, whatever it be, in its application to the present case, 
 is drawn from the other objection. And what is the true import 
 of that objection ? Does it mean any thing more than that the 
 apportionment was not made on a common rule or principle, ap- 
 plicable, and applied alike to all the States? 
 
 President Washington's words are, "■ There is no one proportion 
 or divisor, which, applied to die respective numbers of the States, 
 will yield the number and allotment of the Representatives pro- 
 posed by the bill." 
 
 If, then, he could have found a common proportion, it would 
 have removed this objection. He required a proportion or divisor. 
 These words he evidently uses as explanatory of each other. He 
 meant by divisor, therefore, no more than by -proportion. What 
 he sought was, some common and equal rule, by which the allot- 
 ment had been made among the several States ; he did not find 
 such common rule ; and, on that ground, he thought the bill 
 objectionable. 
 
 In the opinion of the committee, no such objecdon applies to 
 the amendment recommended by them. That amendment gives 
 a rule, plain, simple, just, uniform, and of universal application. 
 The rule has been frequently stated. It may be clearly expressed 
 in either of two ways. Let the rule be, that the whole number of 
 the proposed House shall be apportioned among the several States 
 
75 
 
 according to their respective numbers, giving to each State that 
 number of members which comes nearest to her exact mathematical 
 part or proportion ; or let the rule be, that the population of each 
 State shall be divided by a common divisor, and that, in addition 
 to the number of members resulting from such division, a member 
 shall be allovjed to each State whose fraction exceeds a moiety of 
 the divisor. 
 
 Either of these is, it seems to the committee, a fair and just 
 rule, capable of uniform application, and operating with entire im- 
 partiality. There is no want of a common ])roportion, or a com- 
 mon divisor ; there is nothing left to arbitrary discretion. If the 
 rule, in either of these forms, be adopted, it can never be doubt- 
 ful how every member of any proposed number for a House of 
 Representatives, oitght to be assigned. Nothing will be left in the 
 discretion of Congress ; the right of each State will be a mathe- 
 matical right, easily ascertained, about which there can be neither 
 doubt nor difficulty ; and, in the application of the rule, there will 
 be no room for preference, partiality or injustice. In any case, in 
 all time to come, it will do all that human means can do, to allot 
 to every State in the Union its proper and just proportion of rep- 
 resentative power. And it is because of this, its capability of con- 
 stant application, as well as because of its impartiality and jusuce, 
 that the committee are earnest in recommending its adoption to 
 Congress. If it shall be adopted, they believe it will remove a 
 cause of uneasiness and dissatisfaction, recurring, or liable to recur, 
 with every new census, and place the rights of the States, in this 
 respect, on a fixed basis, of which none can with reason complain. 
 It is true, that there maybe some numbers assumed for the compo- 
 sition of the House of Representatives, to which, if the rule weie 
 applied, the result might give a member to the House more than 
 was proposed. But it will be always easy to correct this by al- 
 tering the proposed number by adding one to it, or taking one from 
 it; so that this can be considered no objection to the rule. 
 
 The committee, in conclusion, cannot admit that it is sufficient 
 reason for rejecting this mode of apportionment, that a different 
 process has heretofore prevailed. The truth is, the errors and 
 inequalities of that process were at first not obvious and startling. 
 But they have gone on increasing ; they are greatly augmented 
 and accumulated every new census ; and it is of the very nature 
 of the process itself, that its unjust results must grow greater and 
 greater in proportion as the population of the country enlarges. 
 What was objectionable, though tolerable, yesterday, becomes in- 
 tolerable to-morrow. A change, the committee are persuaded, 
 must come, or the whole just balance and proportion of represen- 
 tative power among the States will be disturbed and broken up. 
 
 \ 
 
76 
 
 [Among the papers appended to this Report is the following.] 
 
 Extract of a Letter from Professor James Dean. 
 
 "I cannot express my rule so densely and perspicuously as I could 
 wish ; but its meaning is, that each State shall have such a number of Rep- 
 resentatives, that the population for each shall be the nearest possible, 
 whether over or under, to [ ]. The number for each State may be as- 
 certained thus : Divide the representative number by the number assumed 
 to fill the blank, disregarding the remainder ; the quotient, or the next 
 greater number, will be the number of Representatives. In order to deter- 
 mine which is the proper one, divide the representative number of the 
 State by the two numbers separately, then subtract the least quotient 
 from the assumed number, and the assumed number from the other quo- 
 tient ; and that from which results the least remainder, is the number of 
 Representatives for the State." , 
 
 The foregoing rule is illustrated thus: The population of Maine, for in- 
 stance, which is 399,435, being divided by 47,700, the ratio assumed in 
 the bill from the House of Representatives, gives a quotient of 8 ; the 
 population being then divided by 8, the quotient is 49,929 ; divide by 9, 
 the next high number, the quotient is 44,381. The following table ex- 
 hibits the results in the several States, according to this process. 
 
 States. 
 
 Maine, 
 
 New Hampshire,. 
 Massachusetts,. . . 
 Rhode Island, . . . 
 Connecticut, . . . . 
 
 Vermont, 
 
 New York, 
 
 New Jersey, 
 
 Pennsylvania, . . . 
 
 Delaware, 
 
 Maryland, 
 
 Virginia, 
 
 North Carolina,. . 
 South Carolina,. . 
 
 Georgia, 
 
 Kentucky, 
 
 Tennessee, 
 
 Ohio, , 
 
 Indiana, , 
 
 Mississippi, , 
 
 Illinois , 
 
 Louisiana, , 
 
 Missouri, 
 
 Alabama, , 
 
 Totals, 11,928,054 
 
 c 
 
 .£ m 
 
 •SB 
 
 c . 
 
 6h 
 
 399,435 
 269.326 
 610,407 
 
 97,194 
 297,665 
 280,657 
 ,918,553 
 319,922 
 ,348,072 
 
 75,432 
 405,843 
 ,023,503 
 639,747 
 455,025 
 429,811 
 621,832 
 625,263 
 935,882 
 343,030 
 110,358 
 157,147 
 171,904 
 130,419 
 262,508 
 
 a. 
 
 8 
 6 
 
 13 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 6 
 
 40 
 
 7 
 
 28 
 
 2 
 
 9 
 
 21 
 
 13 
 
 10 
 
 9 
 
 13 
 
 13 
 
 20 
 
 7 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 6 
 
 251 
 
 no r-T 
 
 49,929 
 44,887 
 46,954 
 48,599 
 49.610 
 48,776 
 47,964 
 45,970 
 46,145 
 37,716 
 45,049 
 48,738 
 49,211 
 45,.502 
 47,746 
 47,833 
 48;097 
 46,794 
 49,004 
 55,129 
 52,362 
 42,927 
 43,473 
 43,751 
 
 
 9 
 5 
 
 12 
 
 3 
 
 7 
 
 5 
 
 41 
 
 6 
 
 29 
 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 22 
 
 14 
 
 9 
 
 10 
 
 14 
 
 14 
 
 19 
 
 8 
 
 3 
 
 4 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 5 
 
 253 
 
 ir 2 
 
 S 
 3 
 
 44,381 
 53,805 
 50,867 
 32,333 
 42,523 
 56,132 
 46.794 
 33,320 
 46,485 
 75,432 
 50,435 
 45,613 
 45,669 
 50,558 
 42,981 
 44,416 
 44,061 
 49,251 
 42,878 
 36,766 
 39,283 
 57,301 
 65,209 
 52,501 
 
 5 
 12 
 
 2 
 
 6 
 
 5 
 
 40 
 
 6 
 
 28 
 
 1 
 
 8 
 
 21 
 
 13 
 
 9 
 
 9 
 
 13 
 
 13 
 
 19 
 
 7 
 
 2 
 
 3 
 
 3 
 
 2 
 
 240 
 
77 
 
 Note. — The principle laid down by Professor Dean appears to be this : 
 Each State should have that share of representation which bears the near- 
 est possible proportion to the ratio assumed. 
 
 Thus Massachusetts, with 610,000 people, if the ratio be 47,700, should 
 have 13 Representatives, because 13 bears the nearest possible propor- 
 tion to 47,700. 
 
 As 13 is to 1, so is GIO.OOO to 46,923. 
 As 12 is to 1, so is 610,000 to 50,833. 
 
 The first result, or 46,923, is nearer to 47,700, the assumed ratio, than 
 the last result, or 50,833. The number 13, therefore, is more nearly ap- 
 portioned to the assumed ratio than 12 ; and further trial of numbers will 
 prove it to bear the nearest possible proportion to 47,700. 
 
 Mr. Dean considers that, the ratio being assumed, the number of the 
 House, and of each State's share of representation, should be apportioned 
 to the ratio. The error of the bill is thus shown : its ratio bears no pro- 
 portion, either to the whole number of the House, or to the respective 
 quotas of representation of the several States. Its ratio is arbitrary, and 
 its proposed number of the House is arbitrary ; that is, the number is not 
 to be found by any process : the necessary consequence is, that no State's 
 share of the House is found by any rule of proportion. 
 
 The number of the House being fixed, the ratio should bo found by 
 proportion. As 241, e. g. : 1 : : 11,988,731 : 49,496. 
 
 Thus, for a House of 241, the true ratio is found to be 49,496 ; then, by 
 the rule of Professor Dean, each State is entitled to that number of Rep- 
 resentatives which, when divided into its whole federative population, 
 produces a quotient or ratio approximating nearest to the true ratio, 
 49,496 ; in other words, each State is entitled to that number of Repre- 
 sentatives which bears the nearest possible proportion to the true ratio. 
 
SPEECH 
 
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE BILL FOR 
 RENEWING THE CHARTER OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED 
 STATES, MAY 25, 1832. 
 
 Mb.. Webster said, that, though he was entirely satisfied vvith 
 the general view taken by the chairman of the committee (Mr. 
 Dallas), and with his explanation of the details of the bill, yet 
 there were a few topics, upon which he desired to offer some re- 
 marks ; and if no other gentleman wished, at present, to address 
 the Senate, he would avail himself of this opportunity. 
 
 A considerable portion of the active part of life has elapsed, said 
 Mr. W., since you and 1, Mr. President, and three or four other 
 gentlemen, now in the Senate, acted our respective parts in the 
 passas^e of the bill creating the present Bank of the Lmted States. 
 We have lived to little purpose, as public men, if the experience 
 of this period has not enli-htened our judgments, and enabled us 
 to revise our opinions ; and to correct any errors into which vve 
 may have fallen, if such errors there were, either in regard to the 
 general utility of a National Bank, or the details of its constitution. 
 1 trust it will not be unbecoming the occasion, if I allude to your 
 own important agency in that transaction. The bill incorporating 
 the Bank, and giving it a constitution, proceeded from a Commit- 
 tee in the House of Representatives of which you were Chairman, 
 and was conducted through that House under your distinguished 
 lead. Having recently looked back to the proceedings ol that day, 
 I must be permitted to say, that I have perused the speech by 
 which the subject was introduced to the consideration ot the 
 House, with a revival of the feeling of approbation and pleasure 
 with which I heard it ; and 1 will add, that it would not, perhaps 
 now be easy to find a better brief synopsis of those principles ol 
 currency and of banking, which, since they spring from the nature 
 of money and of commerce, must be essentially the same, at all 
 times, in all commercial communities, than that speech contains. 
 The other gendemen now with us in the Senate, all of them, 1 be- 
 lieve, concurred with the Chairman of the Committee, and voted 
 for the bill. My own vote was against it. This is a matter ol lit- 
 
79 
 
 tie importance ; but it is connected with other circumstances, to 
 which I will, for a moment, advert. The gentlemen wiih whom I 
 acted, on that occasion, had no doubts of the Constitutional power 
 of Congress to establish a National Bank ; nor had we any doubts 
 of the general utility of an institution of that kind. We had, in- 
 deed, most of us, voted for a Bank, at a preceding session. But 
 the object of our regard was not whatever might be called a Bank. 
 We required that it should be established on certain principles, 
 which alone we deemed safe and useful, made subject to certain 
 fixed liabilities, and so guarded, that it could neither move volunta- 
 rily, nor be moved by others, out of its proper sphere of action. 
 The bill, when first introduced, contained features to which we 
 should never have assented, and we set ourselves accordingly to 
 work with a good deal of zeal, in order to effect sundry amend- 
 ments. In some of these proposed amendments, the Chairman, 
 and those who acted with him, finally concurred. Others they op- 
 posed. The result was, that several most important amendments, 
 as I thought, prevailed. But there still remained, in my opinion, 
 objections to the bill, which justified a persevering opposition, till 
 they should be removed. 
 
 The first objection was to the magnitude of the capital. In its 
 original form, the bill provided for a capital of thirty-five millions, 
 with a power in Congress to increase it to fifty millions. This lat- 
 ter provision was struck out on the motion of a very intelligent 
 gentleman from New York (Mr. Cady), and, I believe, Sir, with 
 your assent. But I was of opinion that a capital of thirty-five 
 millions was more than was called for by the circumstances of 
 the country. The capital of the first Bank was but ten millions ; 
 and it had not been shown to be too small ; and there certainly was 
 no good ground to say, that the business or the wants of the coun- 
 try had grown, in the mean time, in the proportion of thirty-five to 
 ten. But the state of things has now become changed. A great- 
 ly-increased population, and a greatly-extended commercial activi- 
 ty, especially in the West and South-west, evidently require an en- 
 larged capacity in the National Bank. The capital, therefore, is 
 less disproportionate to the occasion than it was sixteen years ago ; 
 and whatever of disproporfion may be thought still to exist, will be 
 constantly decreasing. The augmentation of Banking capital in 
 State insutufions is by no means a reason for reducing the capital 
 of this Bank. At first view, there might appear to be some reason 
 in such a suggesUon ; but I think further reflection on the duties ex- 
 pected to be performed by the Bank, in relation to the general cur- 
 rency of the country, will reject it. On the whole, I am disposed 
 to continue the capital as it is. 
 
 There was another objection. The bill had divided the stock 
 into shares of one hundred dollars each, not of four hundred dol- 
 
80 
 
 lars each, as in the first Bank; and it had established such a scale 
 of voting by the stockholders, as showed it to be quite practicable 
 for a minority in interest to control all elections, and to seize on 
 the entire direction of the Bank. It was on this very ground, it 
 was under the apprehension of this very evil, that the last attempt 
 to amend the bill, made by me, proceeded. That attempt was, a 
 motion to diminish the number of shares by raising the amount of 
 each from one hundred dollars to four hundred. 
 
 There was yet one other provision of the bill, which was re- 
 garded as unnecessary and objectionable. That was, the power 
 reserved to the Government of appointing five of the directors. 
 We had no experience of our own of the effect of such Govern- 
 ment interference in the direction of the Bank ; and in other coun- 
 tries it had been found that such connection between Government 
 and Banking institutions, produced nothing but evil. The credit 
 of Banks has generally been very much in proportion to their inde- 
 pendence of Government control. While acting on true commer- 
 cial principles, they are useful both to Government and people; 
 but the history of the principal moneyed institutions of Europe has 
 demonstrated, that their efiiciency and stability consist very much in 
 their freedom from all subjection to State interests and State neces- 
 sities. The real safety to the public lies in the restraints and liabili- 
 ties imposed by law, and in the interest which the proprietors 
 themselves have in a judicious management of the affairs of the 
 corporation. I will only say, on this part of the subject, that it is 
 unquestionably true, that the successful career of this institution 
 then commenced, when its stock, leaving the hands of speculation, 
 came to be owned, for the common purposes of investment, by 
 such as desired to make investments, and when the proprietors ex- 
 ercised their proper discretion in constituting their part of the di- 
 rection, with a single view of giving to the Bank a safe and compe- 
 tent administration. 
 
 The question now is. Sir, whether this institution shall be con- 
 tinued. We ought to treat it as a great public subject ; to consider 
 it, like statesmen, as it regards the great interests of the country, 
 and with as little mixture as possible of all minor motives. 
 
 The influence of the Bank, Mr. President, on the interests of 
 the Government, and the interests of the people, may be consider- 
 ed in several points of view. It may be regarded as it affects the 
 currency of the country ; as it affects the collection and disburse- 
 ment of the public revenue ; as it respects foreign exchanges ; as 
 it respects domestic exchanges ; and as it affects, either generally 
 or locally, the agriculture, commerce, and manufactures of the 
 Union. 
 
 First, as to the currency of the country. This is, at all times, a 
 most important political object. A sound currency is an essential 
 
81 
 
 and indispensable security for the fruits of industry and honest en- 
 terprise. Every man of property or industry, every man who de- 
 sires to preserve wliat he honestly possesses, or to obtain what he 
 can honestly earn, has a direct interest in maintaining a safe circu- 
 lating medium ; such a medium as shall be a real and substantial 
 representative of property, not liable to vibrate with opinions, not 
 subject to be blown up or blown down by the breath of specula- 
 tion, but made stable and secure by its immediate relation to 
 that which the whole world regards as of a permanent value. A.. 
 disordered currency is one of the greatest of political evils. It un-1 
 derniines the virtues necessary for the support of the social system, \ 
 and encourages propensities destructive of its happiness. It wars \ 
 against industry, frugality and economy ; and It fosters the evil spir- ' 
 its of extravagance and speculadon. Of all the contrivances for 
 cheating the laboring classes of mankind, none has been more ef- 
 fectual than that which deludes them with paper money. This is 
 the most effectual of inventions to fertilize the rich man's field by 
 the sweat of the poor man's brow. Ordinary tyranny, oppression, 
 excessive taxation, these bear lightly on the happiness of the mass 
 of the community, compared with fraudulent currencies, and the 
 robberies committed by depreciated paper. Our own history has 
 recorded for our instruction enough, and more than enough, of the 
 demoralizing tendency, the injustice, and the intolerable oppres- 
 sion, on die virtuous and well disposed, of a degraded paper curren- 
 cy, authorized by law, or in any way countenanced by Government. 
 We all know, Sir, that the establishment of a sound and uniform 
 currency was one of the great ends contemplated in the adoption 
 of the present Constitution. If we could now fully explore all the 
 motives of those who framed, and those who supported that Con- 
 stitution, perhaps we should hardly find a more powerful one than 
 this. The object, indeed, is sufficiently promineiTt on the face of 
 the Consdtution itself. It cannot well be questioned, that it was in- 
 tended by that Constitution to submit the whole subject of the curren- 
 cy of the country, all that regards the actual medium of payment 
 and exchange, whatever that should be, to die control and legisla- 
 tion of Congress. Congress can alone coin money; Congress can 
 alone fix the value of foreign coins. No State can coin money ; 
 no State can fix the value of foreign coins ; no State (nor even 
 Congress itself) can make any thing a tender but gold and silver, 
 in the payment of debts ; no State can emit bills of credit. — The' 
 exclusive power of regulating the metallic currency of the country 
 would seem necessarily to imply, or, more properly, to include, as 
 part of itself, a power to decide how far that currency should be 
 exclusive, how far any substitute should interfere with it, and what 
 that substitute should be. The generality and extent of the power 
 granted to Congress, and the clear and well-defined prohibitions 
 
 VOL. II. 11 
 
82 
 
 on the States, leave little doubt of an intent to rescue the whole 
 subject of currency from the hands of local legislation, and to con- 
 fer it on the General Government. But, notwilhstanding this appar- 
 ent purpose in the Constitution, the truth is, that the currency of 
 the country is now, to a very great extent, practically and effectual- 
 ly under the control of the several State Governments ; if it be not 
 more correct to say, that it is under the control of the Banking in- 
 stitutions, created by the States ; for the States seem first to have 
 taken possession of the power, and then to have delegated it. 
 
 Whether the States can Constitutionally exercise this power, or 
 delegate it to others, is a question which I do not intend, at present, 
 either to concede or to argue. It is much to be hoped, that no con- 
 troversy on the point may ever become necessary. But it is 
 matter highly deserving of consideration, that, although clothed by 
 the Constitution with exclusive power over the metallic currency, 
 Congress, unless through the agency of a Bank established by its 
 authority, has no control whatever over that which, in the charac- 
 ter of a mere representative of the metallic currency, fills up al- 
 most all the channels of pecuniary circulation. 
 
 In the absence of a Bank of the United States, the State Banks 
 become effectually the regulators of the public currency. Their 
 numbers, their capital, and the interests connected with them, give 
 them, in that state of things, a power which nothing is competent 
 to control. We saw, therefore, w^hen the late war broke out, and 
 when there was no National Bank in being, that the State institu- 
 tions, of their own authority, and by an understanding among 
 themselves, under the gentle phrase of suspending specie pay- 
 ments, every w^here south of New England, refused payment of 
 their notes, and thus filled the whole country with irredeemable 
 and degraded paper. They were not called to answer for this vio- 
 lation of their charters, as far as I remember, in any one State. 
 They pleaded the urgency of the occasion, and the public distress- 
 es ; and in this apology the State Governments acquiesced. Con- 
 gress, at the same time, found itself in an awkward predicament. 
 It held the whole power over coins. No State, or State institu- 
 tion, could give circulation to an ounce of gold or of silver, not 
 sanctioned by Congress. Yet all the States, and a hundred State 
 institutions, claimed and exercised the right of driving coin out of cir- 
 culation by the introduction of their own paper ; and then of depre- 
 ciadng and degrading that paper, by refusing to redeem it. As they 
 were not institutions created by this Government, they were not an- 
 swerable to it. Congress could not call then:i to account, and, if it 
 could, Congress had no Bank of its own, whose circulation could 
 supply the wants of the community. Coin, the substantial constit- 
 uent, was, and was admitted to be, subject only to the control of Con- 
 gress ; but paper, assuming to be a representative of this constituent, 
 
83 
 
 was taking great liberties with it, at the same time that it was no way- 
 amenable to its Constitutional guardian. — This suspension of specie 
 payments was of course immediately followed by great deprecia- 
 tion of the paper. It shortly fell so low, that a bill on Boston 
 could not be purchased at Washington under an advance of from 
 20 to 25 per cent. I do not mean to reflect on the proceedings 
 of the State Banks. Perhaps their best justification is to be found 
 in the readiness with which Government itself borrowed of them 
 their paper, depreciated as it was ; but it certainly becomes us to 
 regard, attentively, this part of our experience, and to guard, as far 
 as we can, against similar occurrences. 
 
 I am of opinion. Sir, that a well-conducted National Bank has 
 an exceedingly useful and effective operation on the general paper 
 circulation of' the country. I think its tendency is manifestly to 
 restrain, within some bounds, the paper issues of other institutions. 
 If it be said, on the other hand, that these institutions, in turn, 
 hold in check the issues of the National Bank, so much the bet- 
 ter. Let that check go to its full extent. An over-issue, even 
 by the Bank itself, no one can desire. But it is plain, that by 
 holding State institutions, which come into immediate ^ contact 
 with itself and its Branches, to an accountability for their issues, 
 not yearly or quarterly, but daily and hourly, an important re- 
 straint is exercised. Be it remembered always, that what it is to 
 expect from others, it is to perform itself; and that its own paper 
 is at all times to turn into coin by the first touch of its own 
 counter. 
 
 But, Mr. President, so important is this object, that I think, 
 that, lar from diminishing, we ought rather to increase and mul- 
 ti])ly our securities ; and I am not prepared to say that, even 
 with the continuance of the Bank charter, and under its wisest 
 administration, I regard the state of our currency as entirely safe. 
 It is evident to me that the general paper circulation has been ex- 
 tended too far for the specie basis on which it rests. Our 
 system, as a system, dispenses too far, in my judgment, with the 
 use of gold and silver. Having learned the use of paper, as a 
 substitute for specie, we use the substitute, I fear, too freely. It 
 is true, that our circulating paper is all redeemable in gold and 
 silver. Legally speaking, it is all convertible into specie at the 
 will of the holder. But a mere legal convertibility is not suffi- 
 cient. There must be an actual, practical, never-ceasing convert- 
 ibility. This, I think, is not at present sufficiently secured ; and, 
 as it is a matter of high interest, it well deserves the serious con- 
 sideration of the Senate. The paper circulation of the country 
 is at this time probably seventy-five or eighty millions of dollars. 
 Of specie, we may have twenty or twenty-two millions ; and this 
 principally in masses, in the vaults of the banks. Now, Sir, this 
 
84 
 
 is a state of things, which, in my judgment, leads constantly to 
 over-trading, and to the consequent excesses and revulsions which 
 so often disturb the regular course of commercial affairs. A cir- 
 culation consisting in so great a degree of paper, is easily expand- 
 ed, to furnish temporary capital to such as wish to adventure on 
 new enterprises in trade; and the collection in the Banks of most 
 of what specie there is in the country affords all possible facility 
 for its exportation. Hence, over-trading does frequently occur, 
 and is always followed by an inconvenient, sometimes by a dan- 
 gerous, reduction of specie. It is in vain that we look to the 
 prudence of the Banks for an effectual security against over-trading. 
 The directors of such institutions will generally go to the length 
 of their means in cashing good notes, and leave the borrower to 
 judge for himself of the useful employment of his money. Nor 
 would a competent security against over-trading be always ob- 
 tained, if the Banks were to confine their discounts, strictly, to 
 business paper, so denominated ; that is, to notes and bills wliich 
 represent real transactions, having been given and received on 
 the actual purchase and sale of merchandise ; because these trans- 
 actions themselves may be too far extended. In other words, 
 more may be bought than the wants of the community require, 
 on a speculative calculation of future prices. Men naturally have 
 a good opinion of their own sagacity. He who believes merchan- 
 dise is about to rise in price, will buy merchandise, if he possesses 
 money, or can obtain credit. The fact of actual purchase, there- 
 fore, is not proof of a really subsisting want ; and of course the 
 amount of all purchases does not correspond always with the 
 entire wants or necessities of the community. Too frequendy it 
 very much exceeds that measure. If, then, the discretion of the 
 Banks, exercised in deciding the amount of their discounts, is not 
 a proper security against over-trading — if facility in obtaining Bank 
 credits naturally fosters that spirit — if the desire of gain and love 
 of enterprise constantly cherish it — and if it finds specie collected 
 in the Banks inciting exportation, what is the remedy suited and 
 adequate to the case ? Now, I think. Sir, that a closer inquiry 
 into the direct source of the evil will suggest the remedy. Why 
 have we so small an amount of specie in circulation ? Certainly 
 the only reason is, because we do not require more. We have 
 hat to ask its presence, and it would return. But we voluntarily 
 banish it by the great amount of small bank notes. In most of 
 the States, the Banks issue notes of all low denominations, down 
 even to a single dollar. How is it possible, under such circum- 
 stances, to retain specie in circulation? All experience shows 
 it to be impossible. The paper will take the place of the gold 
 and silver. When IMr. Pitt, in the year 1797, proposed in Par- 
 liament to authorize the Bank of England to issue one pound 
 
85 
 
 notes, Mr. Burke lay sick at Bath of an illness from which he 
 never recovered ; and he is said to have written to the late Mr. 
 Canning, "Tell Mr. Pitt that, if he consents to the issuing of one 
 pound notes, he must never expect to see a guinea again." 
 
 The one pound notes were issued, and the guineas disappeared. 
 A similar cause is producing now a precisely similar effect with 
 us. Small notes have expelled dollars and half dollars from cir- 
 culation in all the States in which such notes are issued. On 
 the other hand, dollars and half dollars abound in those States 
 which have adopted a wiser and safer policy. Virginia, Penn- 
 sylvania, Maryland, Louisiana, and some other States, I think 
 seven in all, do not allow their Banks to issue notes under five 
 dollars. Every traveller notices the difference, when he passes 
 from one of these States into those where small notes are allowed. 
 The evil, then, is the issuing of small notes by State Banks. Of 
 these notes, that is to say, of notes under five dollars, the amount 
 now in circulation is doubdess eight or ten millions of dollars. 
 Can these notes be withdrawn? If they can, their place will be 
 immediately supplied by a specie circulation of equal amount. 
 The object is a great one, as it is connected with the safety and 
 stability of the currency, and may well justify a serious reflection 
 on the means of accomplishing it. May not Congress and the 
 State Governments, acting, not unitedly, but severally, to the same 
 end, easily and quietly attain it? I think they may. It is but for 
 other States to follow the good example of those which I have 
 mentioned, and the work is done. As an inducement to the 
 States to do this, 1 propose, in the present bill, to reserve to Con- 
 gress a power of withdrawing from circulation a pretty large part 
 of the issues of the Bank of the United States. I propose this, 
 so that the State Banks may withdraw their small notes, and find 
 their compensation in a larger circulation of those of a higher de- 
 nomination. — My proposition will be, that, at any time after the 
 expiration of the existing charter of the Bank, that is, after 1836, 
 Congress may, if it see fit, restrain the Bank from issuing for cir- 
 culation notes or bills under a given sum — say, ten or twenty 
 dollars. This will diminish the circulation, and consequently the 
 profits, of the Bank ; but it is of less importance to make the 
 Bank a highly-profitable institution to the stockholders, than that 
 it should be safe and useful to the community. It ought not, cer- 
 tainly, to be restrained from the enjoyment of all the fair advan- 
 tages to be derived from the discreet use of its capital in banking 
 IransacUons ; but the leading object, after all, in its confinuance, is, 
 and ought to be, not private emolument, but public benefit. 
 
 It may, perhaps, strike some gentlemen, that the circulation 
 of small notes might be effectually discouraged, by refusing to 
 receive not only all such small notes, but all notes of such Banks 
 
86 
 
 as issued them, at the custom-houses, land-offices, post-offices, 
 and other places of public receipt, and by causing them to be 
 refused also, either in payment or deposit, at the Bank of the 
 United Slates. But the effect of such refusal may he doubtful. 
 It would certainly, in some degree, discredit such notes ; hut prob- 
 ably it would not drive them out of circulation altogether ; and 
 il it should not do this, it might very probably increase their cir- 
 culation. If in some degree they become discredited, to that de- 
 gree they would become cheaper than oiher notes ; and universal 
 experience proves, that of two things which may be current, the 
 cheaper will always expel the other. Thus, silver itself, because 
 it is proportionally cheaper with us than gold, has driven the gold 
 out of the country ; that is to say, we can pay a debt of one hun- 
 dred dollars, by tendering that number of Spanish or American 
 dollars. But we cannot go into the market, and buy ten American 
 eagles for these hundred silver dollars. They would cost us a 
 hundred and four. Thus, as we can pay our debts cheaper in 
 silver than in gold, we use nothing but silver, and the gold goes 
 where it is more highly valued. The same thing always happens 
 between two sorts of paper, which are found at the same time in 
 circulation. That which is cheapest, or of less value than the other, 
 always drives its more respectable associate out of its company. 
 
 Measures, therefore, such as I have alluded to, would be likely, 
 I fear, rather to aggravate, than to remedy, die evil. We must 
 hope that all notes under five dollars may be entirely withdrawn 
 from circulation, by the consent of the States and the State 
 Banks ; and when that shall be done, their place will be imme- 
 diately supplied with specie. We should then receive an acces- 
 sion of ten millions of dollars, at least, to our specie circulation ; 
 and these ten millions will find their place, not in the Banks, not 
 collected any where in large masses, but in constant use, among 
 all classes, and in hourly transfer from hand to hand. It cannot 
 be denied that such an addiuon would give great strength to our 
 pecuniary system, discourage excessive exportation of specie, and 
 tend to restrain and correct the evils of over-trading. England has 
 applied the like remedy to a similar evil, though she has carried 
 the restriction much higher, and allowed die circulation of no 
 notes for less sums than five pounds sterling. 
 
 I have thought this subject, Mr. President, of so much impor- 
 tance, as that it was fit to present it, at this time, to the consider- 
 ation of the Senate. I propose to do no more at present than to 
 insert such a provision as I have described in this bill. In the 
 mean time, I hope the matter may attract the attention of those 
 whose agency will be desired to accomplish the general object. 
 
 The next point on which I will offer a few remarks, is the 
 great advantage of the Bank in the operations of the Treasury ; 
 
87 
 
 first, in the collection, next, in the disbursement, of the revenue. 
 How is the revenue to be collected through all the custom-houses, 
 the land-offices, and the post-offices, without some such means 
 as the Bank affords ? Where are payments made at the custom- 
 houses to be deposited ? In whose hands are these large sums to 
 be trusted? And how are they to be remitted to Washington, or 
 wherever else they may be wanted ? I dare say, Sir, that the 
 operations of Government might be carried on in some way with- 
 out the agency of a Bank ; but the question is, whether they 
 could be carried on safely, without loss and without charge. Look 
 to the disbursement of the revenue. At present, the Bank is 
 bound to transmit Government funds in one place to any other 
 place, without expense. A dollar at St. Louis or Nashville be- 
 comes a dollar in New Hampshire or Maine, if the Treasury so 
 choose. This certainly is very useful and convenient. If there 
 were no Bank of the United States, at New Orleans for example, 
 duties to the Government at that place must be received either 
 in specie or in bills of local Banks. If in the former, the funds 
 could not be remitted where they might be required, without con- 
 siderable expense ; if in the latter, they could not be renntted at 
 all, until first converted into specie. If bills of exchange were 
 resorted to, they would be often not to be had without a premium, 
 and always attended with more or less risk. In short, the utility 
 of the Bank, in collecting and disbursing the revenue, is too obvious 
 to be argued, and too great not io strike any one, conversant with 
 such subjects, without the aid of comment. 
 
 I have alluded to its dealings in foreign exchanges as one of the 
 most important powers of the corporation. Tiiere are those who 
 think this power ought to be withheld. It is, I think, one of the 
 most common objections to the Bank in the large cities ; but I do 
 not think it well founded. It is said that the 'trade in exchange 
 ought to be left free, like other traffic. Be it so ; but then why 
 not leave it as free to the Bank as to others? The Bank enjoys 
 no monopoly. If it be true, that, by the magnitude of its capital, 
 and the distribution of its several offices, it acts upon the rates of 
 exchange, not locally but generally, and thus occasionally restrains 
 the profit of dealing in one place, by bringing the general rates 
 through the whole country nearer to a uniformity, the occasional 
 profits of individuals may be lessened, but the general effect is 
 beneficial to the public. If, at the same fime that it keeps the 
 domestic exchanges of the country at low rates, it keeps the rates 
 of foreign exchanges nearly uniform and level, I hardly know how 
 it could do greater service to the commercial community. In the 
 business of foreign exchange, the Bank has, and always will have, 
 powerful rivals. It is natural that these rivals should desire that, 
 in this particular, the Bank should retire from business. But are 
 
88 
 
 its dealings in exchange found prejudicial by those who deal in it 
 themselves no further than to buy for their own remittances in the 
 ordinary way of business ? Tn things of this kind, we may most 
 safely guide ourselves by the light of experience ; and, taking it for 
 granted that the general interest of the trading community is in- 
 jured by sudden fluctuations in exchange, and benefited by keep- 
 ing it as steady as the commerce of the country will allow, — in 
 other words, by keeping the price of bills so as that it corresponds 
 with the real state of the exchange, and not raised or lowered for 
 ends of speculation, — I have inquired of those who could inform me, 
 whether, for ten or twelve years past, the rates of exchange have, 
 or have not, been as steady and unvarying as may ever be expected ; 
 and the information I have received has satisfied me that the 
 power of the Bank of dealing in foreign exchange has been far 
 from prejudicial to the commercial world. While there is a dealer 
 with competent funds and credit, always willing to sell foreign bills 
 at moderate rates, and always ready to buy them, also, the very 
 nature of the case furnishes a considerable degree of security 
 against those fluctuations whidi arise from speculation, although it 
 leaves private dealings entirely free. 
 
 If that power should be now taken away from the Bank, I think 
 I can perceive that consequences of some magnitude would follow, 
 in particular parts of the country. At present, the producer, or 
 the shipper of produce, at New Orleans, Savannah, or Charleston, 
 in making shipment for Europe, can, on the spot, cash his bill, 
 drawn against such shipment, without charge for brokerage, guar- 
 antee, or commission. If the planter has sold to the sljipper, the 
 latter has his bill discounted, and pays the planter, who thus re- 
 ceives the price for his crop, without delay, and without danger of 
 loss. Suppose the Bank were denied the power of purchasing 
 foreign bills, what '^ould be the necessary operation ? The pro- 
 ducer or shipper might send the cotton or the sugar to the North, 
 and in that case the Bank could cash his draft. But if he sent it 
 abroad, his bill must be sent to his agent, in the bill market of the 
 northern cities, for sale ; and if he wishes to realize the amount, 
 he will draw on his agent, and sell such draft. This evidently 
 subjects him to a double operation, and to the expenses of com- 
 mission, guarantee, &ic. 
 
 It is plain, I think, that, in the present state of things, the shipper 
 of soudiern and western produce enjoys the benefit of both the 
 foreign and the northern market more perfectly than he would if 
 this state of things were to be so changed, that he could not draw 
 on his consignee in the foreign market as advantageously as he can 
 now do it. 
 
 But, if there be a question about the utility of the operations of 
 the Bank, in foreign exchange, there can be none, I suppose, as 
 
89 
 
 to its influence on that which is internal, or domestic. I speak 
 now of internal exchange, as exchange merely ; without consid- 
 ering it connected, as it usually is, with advance, or discount, in 
 anticipation of the maturity of bills. In regard to mere exchange, 
 the operations of the Bank appear to have produced the most ben- 
 eficial effect. I doubt whether, in any extensive country, the 
 rates of internal exchange ever averaged so low. Before the Bank 
 went into operation, three, four, or five per cent, was not uncom- 
 mon as the difference of exchange between one extremity of the 
 country and the other. It has at times, indeed, as I am informed, 
 been as high as six per cent, between New Orleans and Balti- 
 more ; and, indeed, between other places in this country much 
 higher. The vast amounts bought and sold by the Bank, in all 
 parts of the country, average, perhaps, less than one half of one per 
 cent. I doubt whether this exceeds the rates between compara- 
 tively neighboring parts of Great Britain, or of the continent of 
 Europe — although much of it consists in exchange between the 
 extreme south and the northern and eastern parts of the Union. 
 With respect to the effect and operation of the Bank upon the 
 general interests of agriculture, commerce, and manufactures, there 
 will be found a great difference as we look at different parts of the 
 country. Every where, I think, they have been salutary ; but they 
 have been important in very different degrees in different quar- 
 ters. The influence of the Bank on the general currency of the 
 country, and its operations in exchanges, are benefits of a general 
 nature. These are felt all over the country. But in loans and 
 discounts — in the distribution and actual application of its capital — 
 different portions of the country have partaken, and are partaking, 
 in very different degrees. The West is a new and fast-growing 
 country, with vast extents of rich land, inviting settlement and 
 cultivation. Enterprise and labor are thronging to this scene of 
 useful exertion, and necessarily create an urgent demand for cap- 
 ital. This demand the Bank meets to a very considerable degree. 
 The reports of the Bank show the existing extent of its accom- 
 modation to this part of the country. In the whole Southern and 
 Western States, that is to say, south and west of Philadelphia, 
 the amount exceeds forty-three miUions of dollars. In the States 
 lying on the Mississippi and its waters, it exceeds thirty millions of 
 dollars. Of these thirty millions, nineteen or twenty are dis- 
 counts of notes, and the residue of acceptances of bills drawn on 
 other parts of the country. This last amount is not strictly a loan ; 
 it is an advance in anticipation of a debt ; but other advances are 
 needed, quite as fast as this is paid off, as every successive crop 
 creates a new occasion, and a new desire to sell bills. I leave it 
 to western gentlemen to judge how far this state of things goes 
 to show that the continuance of the Bank is injportant to the agri- 
 
 VOL. II. 12 
 
90 
 
 culture and commerce of the West. I leave it to them to con- 
 template the consequences of withdrawing this amount of capital 
 from their country. 1 pray them also to inquire what is to be 
 their circulating medium, when the notes of the Bank are called 
 in ? Do they see before them neither difficulty, nor danger, in 
 this part of the case? Are they quite confident, that, in the ab- 
 sence of the bills and notes of the Bank of the United States, they 
 need have no fears of a bad currency, depreciated paper, arid the 
 long train of ills that follow, according to all human experience, 
 those inauspicious leaders ? I ask them, also, to judge how far it 
 is wise to settle this question now, so as to give time for making 
 this vast change, if it is to be made at all. The present charter 
 is to continue but four years. If it be not renewed, this debt 
 must be called in within that period. Not a new note can be 
 taken to the Bank for a dollar of it, after that time. The whole 
 circulation of bank notes, too, must be withdrawn. Is it not plain, 
 then, that it is high time to know how this important matter is to 
 be adjusted ? The country could not stand a sudden recall of all 
 this capital, and an abrupt withdrawal of this circulation. How, 
 indeed, the West could stand the change, even if it were begun 
 now, and conducted as gradually and as gendy as possible, I con- 
 fess, I can hardly see. The very commencement of the process 
 of recall, hovA^ever slight, would be felt in the prices of the very 
 first crop, partly from the immediatj3 effect of withdrawing even a 
 small part of the capital, and partly from the certainty of future 
 pressure from withdrawing the rest. Indeed, gendemen must 
 prepare themselves, I think, for some effect on prices of lands and 
 commodities by the postponement of this question, should it take 
 place, as well as for embarrassments in other respects. That 
 postponement will, at best, not diminish the uncertainty which 
 hangs over the fate of the measure. Seeing the hostility which 
 exists to renewing the charter, and the extent of that hostility, if 
 the measure cannot now be carried, not only a prudent regard to 
 its own interests, but the highest duty to the country, ought to 
 lead the Bank to prepare for the termination of its career. It has 
 not before it one day too many to enable it to wind up, without 
 distressing the public, such vast concerns. If it were certain, that 
 the charter was to be renewed, a postponement v/ould be of htde 
 importance. But this is uncertain, and a postponement would 
 render it more uncertain. A motion to postpone, should such be 
 made, will be mainly supported by those, who, either on Constitu- 
 tional grounds, or some other grounds, are and always will be 
 against the renewal. A postponement, under such circumstances, 
 and such auspices, cannot but create far stronger doubts than now 
 exist of the final renewal of the charter. It is now two years and 
 a half since the President invited the attention of Congress to 
 
91 
 
 this subject. That invitation has been more than once repeated. 
 Every where, the subject has been considered ; every where, it 
 has been discussed. The public interest now requires our decision 
 upon it, and the public voice demands that decision. I trust, Sir, 
 we shall make it, and make it wisely. 
 
 Mr. President, the motives which prescribe my own line of 
 conduct, on this occasion, are not drawn from any local consider- 
 ations. The State in whose representation I bear a part, has as 
 little interest peculiar to itself, in the continuance of this corpora- 
 tion, as any State in the Union. She does not need the aid of its 
 capital, because the state of her commerce and manufactures does 
 not call for the employment of more capital than she possesses. 
 She does not need it, in a peculiar degree, certainly, as any re- 
 straint or corrective on her own paper currency. Her Banks are 
 as well conducted as those of other States. But she has a com- 
 mon interest in the continuance of a useful institution. She has 
 an interest in the wise and successful administration of the Gov- 
 ernment, in all its departments. She is interested that the general 
 currency of the country should be maintained in a safe and 
 healthy state. She derives a benefit with others (I believe it a 
 great benefit) from the facility of exchanges in internal commerce, 
 which the Bank affords. This is the sum of her motives. For 
 these reasons, she is willing that the Bank should be continued. 
 But if the matter should be otherwise determined, however much 
 she might regret it on general and public grounds, she certainly 
 does not apprehend, from such a result, ijpconveniences to her own 
 citizens, such as may and must fall, so far as I can see, on some 
 others. 
 
 Mr. President, I will take leave of the subject for the present, with 
 a remark which I think is due from me. For some years past, I 
 have not been inattentive to the general operations of the Bank, or 
 to their influence on the public interests and the convenient adminis- 
 tration of the Government; and I take the occasion to say, with 
 sincerity and cheerfulness, that, during that period, its affairs have 
 been conducted, in my opinion, with fidelity, as well towards the 
 Government, as towards its own stockholders ; and that it has sought 
 the accomplishment of the public purposes designed by its in- 
 stitution with distinguished ability and distinguished success. 
 
 MAY 28, 1832. 
 
 The question being on the amendment offered by Mr. Moore, of Alabama, 
 proposing, '•' First, That the Bank shall not establish or continue any Office of 
 Discount or Deposit, or Branch Bank, in any State, without the consent and ap- 
 probation of the State — Second, That all such Offices and Branches shall be 
 
92 
 
 subject to taxation, according to the amount of their loans and issues, in like 
 manner as other Banks or other property shall be liable to taxation" — 
 
 Mr. Webster said, he trusted the Senate would not act on 
 these propositions, without fully understanding their bearing and 
 extent. For my own part, said he, I look upon the tw^o parts of 
 the amendment as substantially of the same character. Each, in 
 my opinion, confers a power in the States to expel the Bank at 
 their pleasure ; in other words, entirely to defeat the operations, 
 and destroy the capacity for usefulness, of the whole Bank. The 
 simple question is. Shall we, by our own act, in the charter it- 
 self, give this States' permission to expel the Bank and all its 
 Branches from their limits, at their own pleasure. The first part 
 of the amendment gives this permission in express terms ; and the 
 latter part gives it in effect, by authorizing the States to tax the 
 loans and issues of the Bank, with no effectual limitation. It ap- 
 pears to me idle to say, that this power may be safely given, be- 
 cause it will not be exercised. It is to be given, I presume, on 
 the supposition that probably some of the States will choose to 
 exercise it ; else why is it given at all ? And will they not so 
 choose? We have already heard, in the course of this debate, of 
 two cases in which States attempted to exercise a power of this 
 kind, when they did not Constitutionally possess it. Two States 
 have taxed the Branches, for the avowed purpose of driving them 
 out of their limits, and were prevented from accomplishing this 
 object merely by force of judicial decisions against their right. If, 
 then, these attempts have been made to exercise this power, when 
 it was not legally possessed, and against the will of Congress, is 
 there any doubt that it will be exercised when its exercise shall be 
 permitted and invited by the proposed amendment ? No doubt, 
 in my mind, the power, if granted, wall be exercised, and the 
 main object of continuing the Bank thus defeated. 
 
 I have already said, that the second branch of the amendment is as 
 objectionable and as destructive as the first. I think it so. It 
 appears to me to give ample power, by means of taxation, to ex- 
 pel the Bank from any State which may choose to expel it. It gives 
 a power of taxation, without fixed limits, or any reasonable guards. 
 And a power of taxation, without fixed limits, and without guards, is 
 a power to embarrass, a power to oppress, a power to expel, a power to 
 destroy. The States are to be allowed to tax the Branches accord- 
 ing to the amount of their loans and discounts, in like manner as 
 other Banks, or other property in the State, shall be liable to taxation. 
 
 Now, Sir, some of the States have no Banks. Of course they 
 tax no Banks. In other States, the Banks pay the State a bonus, 
 on their creation, and are not otherwise taxed. In other cases, 
 the State, in effect, itself owns the Bank, and a tax on it, therefore, 
 
93 
 
 would be merely nominal. Besides, no State is to be bound to 
 lay this tax, as it taxes its own Banks. It has an option to tax it 
 in that manner, or as other property is taxed. What other prop- 
 erty ? It may be as lottery tickets, gaming tables, or other things, 
 which may be deemed fit to be discouraged or suppressed, are 
 taxed. The Bank may be classed with other nuisances, and 
 driven out or put down by taxation. All this is perfectly within 
 the scope of the amendment. The license is broad enough to 
 authorize any thing which may be designed or wished. 
 
 Now, Sir, in the first place, I doubt exceedingly our power to 
 adopt this amendment, and I pray the deliberate consideration of 
 the Senate, in regard to this point. In the first place, let me ask, 
 What is the Constitutional ground on which Congress created this 
 corporation, and on which we now propose to continue it ? There 
 is no express authority to create a Bank, or any other corporation, 
 given to us by the Constitution. The power is derived by im- 
 plication. It has been exercised, and can be exercised, only on 
 the ground of a just necessity. It is to be maintained, if at all, on 
 the allegation, that the establishment of a National Bank is a just 
 and necessary means of carrying on the Government, and of exe- 
 cuting the powers conferred on Congress by the Constitution. On 
 this ground Congress has established this Bank, and on this it is 
 now proposed to be continued. And it has already been judi- 
 cially decided, that. Congress having established a Bank for these 
 purposes, the Constitution of the United States prohibits the 
 States from taxing it. Observe, Sir, it is the Constitution, not the 
 Laiv^ which lays this prohibition on the States. The charter of 
 the Bank does not declare that the States shall not tax it. It says 
 not one word on that subject. The restraint is imposed, not by 
 Congress, but by a higher authority, the Constitution. Now, Sir, 
 I ask how we can relieve the States from this Constitutional pro- 
 hibition. It is true, that this prohibition is not imposed in express 
 terms ; but it results from the general provisions of the Constitu- 
 tion, and has been judicially decided to exist in full force. This 
 is a protection, then, which the Constitution of the United States, 
 by its ouai force, holds over this instrument, which Congress has 
 deemed necessary to be created, in order to carry on the Govern- 
 ment, so soon as Congress, exercising its own judgment, has chosen 
 to create it. Can we throw off from this Government this Con- 
 stitutional protection ? I think it clear we cannot. We cannot 
 repeal the Consdtution. We cannot say that every power, every 
 branch, every institution, and every law of this Government, shall 
 not have all the force, all the sanction, and all the protection, 
 which the Constitution gives it. By the Constitution every law 
 of Congress is finally to be considered, and its construction ulti- 
 mately settled by the Supreme Court of the United States. These 
 
94 
 
 very acts, before referred to, taxing the Banks, were held valid by 
 more or fewer of the States' Judicatures, but were finally pronounced 
 unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States ; and 
 this, not by force of any words in the charter, but by force of the 
 Constitution itself I ask, whether it is competent for us to re- 
 verse this provision of the Constitution, and to say that the laws of 
 Congress shall receive their ultimate construction from the State 
 Courts ? Again : the Constitution gives Congress a right to lay 
 duties of impost, and it prohibits the exercise of any such power 
 by the States. Now, it so happens, that the national treasury is 
 full, and the State treasuries are far less so. It might be thought 
 very convenient that a part of the receipts at the custom-houses 
 should be received by the States. But will any man say, that 
 Congress could now authorize the States to lay and collect im- 
 posts under any restrictions or limitations whatever ? No one will 
 pretend it. That would be to make a new partition of power be- 
 tween this Government and the State Governments. Mr. Madi- 
 son has very correctly observed, that the assent of the States can- 
 not confer a new power on Congress, except in those cases espe- 
 cially provided in the Constitution. This is very true, and it is 
 equally true that the States cannot obtain a new power, by the 
 consent of Congress, against the prohibition of the Constitution, 
 except in those cases which are expressly so provided for, in the 
 Constitution itself. 
 
 These reasons. Sir, lead me to think that, if, for purposes con- 
 nected with the beneficial administration of the Government, we 
 deem it necessary to continue this corporation, we are not at liberty 
 to repeal any protection, or any immunity, with which the Con- 
 stitution surrounds it. We cannot give to a law of the United 
 States less than its Constitutional effect. The Constitution says, 
 that every such law, passed in pursuance of the Consthution, shall 
 be paramount to any State law. We cannot enact that it shall not 
 be so ; for that would be to repeal, so far, the Constitution. 
 
 Allow me now, Mr. President, to inquire on what ground it is 
 that the States claim this power of taxation. They do not claim 
 it as a power to tax all property of their own citizens. This they 
 possess, without denial or doubt. Every stockholder in the Bank 
 is liable to be taxed for his property therein, by the State of which 
 be is a citizen. This right is exercised, I believe, by all the States 
 which lay taxes on money at interest, income, and other subjects 
 of that kind. It is, then, not that they may be authorized to tax 
 the property of their own citizens. Nor is it because any State 
 does not participate in the advantage of the premium, or bonus, 
 paid by the Bank to Government for the charter. That sum goes 
 into the treasury for the general good of all. 
 
 Nor can the claim be sustained, nor, indeed, is it asserted, on the 
 
95 
 
 strenf^th of the mere circumstance that a Branch, or an Office, is 
 estabUshed in a State. Such Office, or Branch, is but an agency. 
 It is no body politic or corporate. It has no legal existence of 
 itself. It is but an agent of the general corporation. That these 
 ao-ents have their residence, or place of business, in a particular 
 State, is not of itself the foundation of any claim. But, according 
 to the language of the amendment, the ground of this claim to tax 
 is evidently the loans and issues; and these loans and issues, 
 properly speaking, are the loans and discounts of the Bank. The 
 Office, as an agent, conducts the arrangements, it is true ; but the 
 notes which are issued are notes of the Bank, and the debts created 
 are debts due to the Bank. The circulation is the circulation of 
 the BanJc. Now, the truth is, what the States claim, or what this 
 amendment proposes to give them, is a right to tax the circulation 
 of the Bank. It is on this right that the argument rests. The 
 common way of stating it is, that since State Banks pay a tax to 
 the State, these Branch Banks, coming among them, ought to pay a 
 similar tax. But the State Banks pay the tax to the State /or the 
 privilege of circulation ; and the proposition is, therefore, neither 
 more nor less than that the United States' Bank shall pay the States 
 for the same privilege. The circulation of the bills is the sub- 
 stance. The locality of the Office is but an incident. An Office 
 is created, for example, on Connecticut River, either in Massa- 
 chusetts, Vermont, Connecticut, or New Hampshire. The notes 
 of the Bank are loaned at this Office, and put into circulation in 
 all these States. Now, no one will say that the State where the 
 Office happens to be placed should have a right to lay this tax, and 
 the other States have no such right. This would be a merely ar- 
 bitrary distinction. It would be founded on no real or substantial 
 difference ; and no man could seriously contend for it, as it seems 
 to me. Under this very amendment, Pennsylvania would be au- 
 thorized to collect a large tax, and New Jersey no tax at all, al- 
 though the State circulation of New Jersey is as much infringed 
 and diminished as that of Pennsylvania by the circulation of the 
 Bank of the United States. The States which have the benefit of 
 Branches (if it be a benefit) are to have the further advantage of 
 taxation ; while other States are to have neither the one nor the 
 other. Founding the claim on the State right to derive benefit 
 from the paper circulation which exists within it, the advocates of 
 the claim are clearly not consistent with themselves, when they 
 maintain a measure which professes to protect that right in some 
 States, and to leave it unprotected in others. 
 
 But the inequality of the operation of this amendment is not 
 the only, nor the main, objection to it. It proceeds on a principle 
 not to be admitted. It asserts, or it takes for granted, that the 
 power of authorizing and regulating the paper currency of the 
 
96 
 
 country, is an exclusive State right. The ground assumed can 
 be no less broad than this ; because, the Bank of the United States 
 having the grant of a power from Congress to issue notes for circu- 
 lation, its right is perfect, if Congress could make such grant. It 
 owes nothing to the States, if Congress could give what it has un- 
 dertaken to give ; that is to say, if Congress, of its own authority, 
 may confer a right to issue paper for circulation. Now, Sir, who- 
 soever denies this right, in Congress, denies, of course, its power 
 to create such a Bank as now exists ; at least, so it strikes me. 
 The Bank of the United States is quite unconstitutional, if the 
 whole paper circulation belongs to the States ; because the Bank 
 of the United States is a Bank of circulation, and was so intended 
 to be by Congress, which expressly authorized the circulation of 
 notes and bills. The power of issuing notes for circulation is not 
 an indispensable ingredient in the constitution of a Bank, merely as 
 a Bank. The earlier Banks did not possess it, and many good ones 
 have existed without it. A Bank with no such power might yet 
 very well collect the public revenue (provided there was a proper 
 medium in which it could be paid), could tolerably well remit the 
 revenue to the treasury, and could deal usefully, to some extent, 
 in the business of exchange. 
 
 On what ground is it, then, that Congress possesses the power, 
 not only to create a Bank, but a Bank of circulation ? Simply, 
 as I suppose, because Congress possesses a Constitutional control 
 over the currency of the country, and has power to provide a safe 
 medium of circulation, as well for other purposes as for the col- 
 lection of its own debts and revenue. The Bank, therefore, al- 
 ready possesses unconstitutional power, if the paper circulation be 
 the subject, exclusively, of State right or State regulation. Indeed, 
 Sir, it is not a little startling that such exclusive right should now 
 be asserted. I observed, the other day, that, in my opinion, it 
 was very difficult to maintain, on the face of the Constitution itself, 
 and independent of long-continued practice, the doctrine that the 
 States could authorize the circulation of Bank paper at all. They 
 cannot coin money ; can they, then, coin that which becomes the 
 actual and almost the universal substitute for money? Is not the 
 right of issuing paper, intended for circulation, in the place and as 
 the representative of metallic currency, derived merely from the 
 power of coining and regulating that metallic currency ? As 
 bringing this matter to a just test, let me ask whether Congress, if 
 it had not the power of coining money, and of regulating the value 
 of foreign coins, could create a Bank, with the power to circulate 
 bills. For one, I think it would be difficult to make that out. 
 Where, then, do the States, to whom all control over the metallic 
 currency is altogether prohibited, get this power? It is true that, 
 in other countries, private bankers, having no legal authority over 
 
97 
 
 the coin, issue notes for circulation. But this they do always 
 with the consent of Government, express or implied ; and Gov- 
 ernment restrains and regulates all their operations at its pleasure. 
 It would be a startling proposition, in any other part of the world, 
 that the prerogative of coining money, held by Government, was 
 liable to be defeated, counteracted, or impeded, by another pre- 
 rogative, held in other hands, of "authorizing a paper circulation. 
 It is further to be observed, that the States cannot issue bills of 
 credit ; not that they cannot make them a legal tender, but that 
 they cannot issue them at all. Is not this a clear indication of the 
 intent of the Constitution to restrain the States, as well from estab- 
 lishing a paper circulation, as from interfering with the metallic 
 circulation ? Banks have been created by States with no capital 
 whatever ; their notes being put into circulation simply on the 
 credit of the State, or the State law. What are the issues of such 
 Banks but bills of credit, issued by the State ? 
 
 I confess, Mr. President, that, the more I reflect on this subject, 
 the more clearly does my mind approach the conclusion, that the 
 creation of State Banks, for the purpose and with the power of circu- 
 lating paper, is not consistent with the grants and prohibitions of 
 the Constitution. But, Sir, this is not now the question. The 
 question is, not whether the States have the exclusive power ; it is, 
 whether they alone have the power. May they rightfully exclude 
 the United States from all interference with the paper currency } 
 Are we interlopers, when we create a Bank of circulation ? Do 
 we owe them a seignorage for the circulation of bills, by a corpo- 
 ration created by Congress ? Up to the present time, the States 
 have been content with a concurrent power. They have, indeed, 
 controlled vastly the larger portion of the circulation; but they 
 have not claimed exclusive authority over the whole. They have 
 demanded no tax or tribute from a Bank issuing paper under the 
 authority of Congress. Nor do I know that any State or States 
 now insist upon it. It may be, that individual States have put 
 forth such claims, in their legislative capacity ; but, at present, I 
 recollect no instance. The amendment, however, which is now 
 proposed, asserts the claim, and I cannot consent to yield to it. 
 We seem to be making the last struggle for the authority of Con- 
 gress to interfere at all with the actual currency of the country. 
 1 shall never agree to surrender that authority ; I would as soon 
 yield the coinage power itself; nor do I think there would be much 
 greater danger, nor a much clearer departure from Constitutional 
 principle, in a consenting to such surrender, than in acquiescing in 
 what is now proposed. 
 
 VOL. II. 13 
 
SPEECH 
 
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE PRESmENT'S 
 VETO OF THE BANK BILL, JULY 11, 1832. 
 
 Mr. President : No one will deny the high importance of 
 the subject now before us. Congress, after full deliberation and 
 discussion, has passed a bill for extending the duration of the 
 Bank of the United States, by decisive majorities, in both Houses. 
 It has adopted this measure not until its attention had been called 
 to the subject, in three successive annual messages of the Presi- 
 dent. The bill having been thus passed by both Houses, and 
 having been duly presented to the President, instead of signing 
 and approving it, he has returned it wnth objections. These ob- 
 jections go against the whole substance of the law originally 
 creating the Bank. They deny, in effect, that the Bank is Con- 
 stitutional ; they deny that it is expedient ; they deny that it is 
 necessary for the public service. 
 
 It is not to be doubted, that the Constitution gives the Presi- 
 dent the power wdiich he has now exercised ; but while the pow- 
 er is admitted, the grounds upon which it has been exerted be- 
 come fit subjects of examination. The Constitution makes it the 
 duty of Congress, in cases like this, to reconsider the measure 
 which they have passed, to weigh the force of the President's 
 objections to that measure, and to take a new vote upon the 
 question. 
 
 Before the Senate proceeds to this second vote, I propose to 
 make some remarks upon those objections. And, in the first 
 place, it is to be observed, that they are such as to extinguish all 
 hope, that the present Bank, or any Bank at all resembling it, 
 or resembling any known similar institution, can ever receive his 
 approbation. He states no terms, no qualifications, no conditions, 
 no modifications, which can reconcile him to the essential provis- 
 ions of the existing charter. He is against the Bank, and against 
 any Bank constituted in a manner known either to this or any 
 other country. One advantage, therefore, is certainly obtained, 
 by presenting him the bill. It has caused his sentiments to be 
 made known. There is no longer any mystery, ao longer a con- 
 
99 
 
 test between hope and fear, or between those prophets who pre- 
 dicted a veto, and those who foretold an approvaL The bill 
 is negatired ; the President has assumed the responsibility of put- 
 ting an end to the Banks ; and the country must prepare itself 
 to meet that change in its concerns which the expiration of the 
 charter will produce, Mr. President, I will not conceal my opin- 
 ion, that the affairs of this country are approaching an important 
 and dangerous crisis. At the very moment of almost unparalleled 
 general prosperity, there appears an unaccountable disposition to 
 destroy the most useful and most approved institutions of the 
 Government. Indeed, it seems to be in the midst of all this na- 
 tional happiness, that some are found openly to question the ad- 
 vantages of the Constitution itself; and many more ready to em- 
 barrass the exercise of its just power, weaken its authority, and 
 undermine its foundations. How far these notions may be car- 
 ried, it is impossible yet to say. We have before us the prac- 
 tical result of one of them. The Bank has fallen, or is to fall. 
 
 It is now certain, that, without a change in our public councils, 
 this Bank will not be continued, nor will any other be established, 
 which, according to the general sense and language of mankind, 
 can be entitled to the name. Within three years and nine 
 montlis from the present moment, the charter of the Bank ex- 
 pires ; within that period, therefore, it must wind up its concerns. 
 It must call in its debts, withdraw its bills from circulation, and 
 cease from all its ordinary operations. All this is to be done in 
 three years and nine months ; because, although there is a pro- 
 vision in the charter, rendering it lawful t6 use the corporate name 
 for two years after the expiration of tlie charter, yet this is allow- 
 ed only for the purpose of suits, and for the sale of the estate be- 
 longing to the Bank, and for no other purpose whatever. The 
 whole active business of the Bank, its custody of public deposits, 
 its transfers of public moneys, its dealing in exchange, all its loans 
 and discounts, and all its issues of bills for circulation, must cease 
 and determine on or before the third day of March, 1836; and 
 within the same period, its debts must be collected, as no new 
 contract can be made with it, as a corporation, for the renewal 
 of loans, or discount of notes or bills, after that time. 
 
 The President is of opinion, that this time is long enough to 
 close the concerns of the institution without inconvenience. His 
 language is, " The time allowed the Bank to close its concerns 
 is ample, and if it has been well managed, hs pressure will be 
 light, and heavy only in case its management has been bad. If, 
 therefore, it shall produce distress, the fault will be its own." 
 Sir, this is all no more than general statement, without fact or 
 argument to support it. We know what the management of the 
 
100 
 
 Bank has been, and we know the present state of its affairs. We 
 can judge, therefore, whether it be probable, that its capital can 
 be all called in, and the circulation of its bills withdrawn, in three 
 years and nine months, by any discretion or prudence in manage- 
 ment, without producing distress. The Bank has discounted 
 liberally, in compliance with the wants of the community. The 
 amount due to it, on loans and discounts, in certain large divisions 
 of the country, is great; so great, that I do not perceive how any 
 man can believe, that it can be paid, within the time now limited, 
 without distress. Let us look at known facts. Thirty millions 
 of the capital of the Bank are now out, on loans and discounts in 
 the States on the Mississippi and its waters ; ten of these millions 
 on the discount of bills of exchange, foreign and domestic, and 
 twenty millions loaned on promissory notes. Now, Sir, how is 
 it possible, that this vast amount can be collected in so short a 
 period, without suffering, by any management whatever? We 
 are to remember, that, vvhen the collection of this debt begins, at 
 that same time, the existing medium of payment, that is, the cir- 
 culation of the bills of the Bank, will begin also to be restrained 
 and withdrawn ; and thus the means of payment must be limited, 
 just when the necessity of making payment becomes pressing. 
 The whole debt is to be paid, and within the same time the whole 
 circulation withdrawn. 
 
 The local Banks, where there are such, will be able to afford 
 little assistance ; because they themselves will feel a full share of 
 the pressure. They will not be in a condition to extend their 
 discounts, but, in all probability, obliged to curtail them. Whence, 
 then, are the means to come for paying this debt ? and in what 
 medium is payment to be made ? If all this may be done with 
 but slight pressure on the community, what course of conduct 
 is to accomplish it? How is it to be done ? What other thirty 
 millions are to supply the place of these thirty millions now to be 
 called in ? What other circulation, or medium of payment, is to 
 be adopted, in the place of the bills of the Bank ? The message, 
 following a singular strain of argument, which had been used in 
 this House, has a loud lamentation upon the suffering of the West- 
 ern States, on account of their being obliged to pay even interest 
 on this debt. This payment of interest is itself represented as 
 exhausting their means, and ruinous to their prosperity. But if the 
 interest cannot be paid without pressure, can both interest and prin- 
 cipal be paid in four years without pressure ? The truth is, the inter- 
 est has been paid, is paid, and may continue to be paid, without any 
 pressure at all ; because the money borrowed is profitably employed 
 by those who borrow it, and the rate of interest, which they pay, is 
 at least two per cent, lower than the actual value of money in that 
 
101 
 
 part of the country. But to pay the whole principal in less than 
 four years, losing, at the same time, the existing and accustomed 
 means and facilities of payment created by the Bank itself, and to 
 do this without extreme embarrassment, without absolute distress, 
 is, in my judgment, impossible. I hesitate not to say, that, as this 
 veto travels to the West, it will depreciate the value of every man's 
 property from the Atlantic States to the capital of Missouri. Its 
 effects will be felt in the price of lands, the great and leading 
 article of western property, in the price of crops, in the products 
 of labor, in the repression of enterprise, and in embarrassment to 
 every kind of business and occupation. I state this opinion 
 strongly, because I have no doubt of its truth, and am willing its 
 correctness should be judged by the event. Without personal 
 acquaintance with the Western States, I know enough of their 
 condition to be satisfied, that what I have predicted must happen. 
 The people of the West are rich, but their riches consist in their 
 immense quantities of excellent land, in the products of these 
 lands, and in their spirit of enterprise. The actual value of 
 money, or rate of interest, with them, is high, because their pecu- 
 niary capital bears litUe proportion to their landed interest. At 
 an average rate, money is not worth less than eight per cent, per 
 annum, throughout the whole western country ; notwithstanding 
 that it has now a loan, or an advance, from the Bank, of thirty 
 millions, at six per cent. To call in this loan, at the rate of eight 
 millions a year, in addition to the interest on the whole, and to 
 take away, at the same time, that circulation which constitutes so 
 great a portion of the medium of payment throughout that whole 
 region, is an operation which, however wisely conducted, cannot 
 but inflict a blow on the community of tremendous force and 
 frightful consequences. The thing cannot be done without dis- 
 tress, bankruptcy, and ruin, to many. If the President had seen 
 any pracdcal manner in which this change might be effected with- 
 out producing these consequences, he would have rendered in- 
 finite service to the community by pointing it out. But he has 
 pointed out nothing, he has suggested nothing ; he contents him- 
 self with saying, without giving any reason, that, if the pressure be 
 heavy, the fault will be the Bank's. I hope this is not merely an 
 attempt to forestall opinion, and to throw on the Bank the respon- 
 sibility of those evils wliich threaten the country, for the sake of 
 removing it from himself. 
 
 The responsibility justly lies with him, and there it ought to 
 remain. A great majority of the people is satisfied with the 
 Bank as it is, and desirous that it should be continued. They 
 wished no change. Tlie strength of this public sentiment has 
 carried the bill through Congress, against all the influence of the 
 administration, and all the power of organized party. But the 
 
102 
 
 President has undertaken, on his own responsibility, to arrest the 
 measure, by refusing his assent to the bill. He is answerable for 
 the consequences, therefore, which necessarily follow the change 
 which the expiration of the Bank charter may produce ; and if 
 these consequences shall prove disastrous, they can fairly be as- 
 cribed to his policy, only, and the policy of his administration. 
 
 Although, Sir, I have spoken of the effects of this veto in the 
 Western Country, h has not been because I considered that part 
 of the United States exclusively affected by it. 
 
 Some of the Atlantic States may feel its consequences, perhaps, 
 as sensibly as those of the West, though not for the same reasons. 
 The concern manifested by Pennsylvania, for the renewal of the 
 charter, shows her sense of the importance of the Bank to her 
 own interest, and that of the nation. That great and enterprising 
 State has entered into an extensive system of internal improve- 
 ments, which necessarily makes heavy demands on her credit and 
 her resources ; and by the sound and acceptable currency which 
 the Bank affords, by the stability which it gives to private credit, 
 and by occasional advances, made in anticipation of her revenues, 
 and in aid of her great objects, she has found herself benefited, 
 doubdess, in no inconsiderable degree. Her legislature has in- 
 structed her Senators here to advocate the renewal of the charter, 
 at this session. They have obeyed her voice, and yet they have 
 the misfortune to find that, in the judgment of the President, the 
 measure is unconstitutional, unnecessary, dangerous to liberty, 
 and is, moreover, ill tihed. But, Mr. President, it is not the local 
 interest of the West, nor the pardcular interest of Pennsylvania, 
 or any other State, which has influenced Congress in passing 
 this bill. 
 
 It has been governed by a wise foresight, and by a desire to 
 avoid embarrassment, in the pecuniary concerns of the country, to 
 secure the safe collection and convenient transmission of public 
 moneys, to maintain the circulation of the country, sound and safe 
 as it now happily is, against the possible effects of a wild spirit of 
 speculation. Finding the Bank highly useful, Congress has thought 
 fit to provide for its continuance. 
 
 As to the time of passing this bill, it would seem to be the last 
 thing to be thought of, as a ground of objection, by the President ; 
 since, from the date of his first message to the present time, he 
 has never failed to call our attenUon to the subject with all possible 
 apparent earnestness. So early as December, 1829, in his mes- 
 sage to the two Houses, he declares, that he " cannot, in justice to 
 the parties interested, too soon present the subject to the deliber- 
 ate consideration of the Legislature, in order to avoid the evils re- 
 sulting from precipitancy, in a measure involving such important 
 principles and such deep pecuniary interests." Aware of this 
 
103 
 
 early Invitation given to Congress, to take up the subject, by the 
 President himself, the writer of the message seems to vary the 
 ground of objection, and instead of complaining that the time of bring- 
 ing forward this measure was premature, to insist, rather, that, after 
 the report of the committee of the other House, the Bank should 
 have withdrawn its application for the present ! But that report 
 offers no just ground, surely, for such withdrawal. The subject 
 was before Congress ; it was for Congress to decide upon it, with 
 all the light shed by the report; and the question of postponement, 
 having been made in both Houses, was lost, by clear majorities, in 
 each. Under such circumstances, it would have been somewhat 
 singular, to say the least, if the Bank itself had withdrawn its ap- 
 plication. It is indeed known to every body, that the report of 
 the committee, or any thing contained in that report, was very little 
 relied on by the opposers of the renewal. If it has been discov- 
 ered elsewliere, that that report contained matter important in it- 
 self, or which should have led to further inquiry, this may be proof 
 of superior sagacity ; for certainly no such thing was discerned by 
 either House of Congress. 
 
 But, Sir, do we not now see, that it was time, and high time, 
 to press this bill, and to send it to the President ? Does not the 
 event teach us, that the measure was not brought forward one 
 moment too early ? The time had come when the people wished 
 to know the decision of the Administration on the question of the 
 Bank. Why conceal it, or postpone its declaration ? Why, as in 
 regard to the Tariff, give out one set of opinions for the North, 
 and another for the South ? 
 
 An important election is at hand, and the renewal of the Bank 
 charter is a pending object of great interest, and some excitement. 
 Should not the opinions of men high in office, and candidates for 
 reelection, be known, on this as on other important public ques- 
 tions? Certainly, it is to be hoped that the people of the United 
 States are not yet mere man-worshippers, that they do not choose 
 their rulers without some regard to their political principles, or 
 political opinions. Were they to do this, it would be to subject 
 themselves voluntarily to the evils which the hereditary transmis- 
 sion of power, independent of all personal qualifications, inflicts on 
 other nations. They will judge their public servants by their 
 acts, and continue or withhold their confidence, as they shall think 
 it merited, or as they shall think it forfeited. In every point of 
 view, therefore, the moment had arrived, when it became the duty 
 of Congress to come to a result, in regard to this highly-important 
 measure. The interests of the Government, the interests of the 
 people, the clear and indisputable voice of public opinion, all 
 called upon Congress to act without further loss of time. It has 
 acted, and its act has been negatived by the President ; and this 
 
104 
 
 result of the proceedings here, places the question, with all its 
 connections and all its incidents, fully before the people. 
 
 Before proceeding to the Constitutional question, there are some 
 other topics, treated in the message, which ought to be noticed. 
 It commences by an inflamed statement of what it calls the " favor " 
 bestowed upon the original Bank, by the Government, or, indeed, 
 as it is phrased, the " monopoly of its favor and support ;" and 
 through the whole message all possible changes are rung on the 
 "gratuity," the " exclusive privileges," and "monopoly," of the 
 Bank charter. Now, Sir, the truth is, that the powers conferred 
 on the Bank are such, and no others, as are usually conferred on 
 similar institutions. They constitute no monopoly, although some 
 of them are of necessity and with propriety exclusive privileges. 
 " The original act," says the message, " operated as a gratuity of 
 many millions to the stockholders." What fair foundation is there 
 for this remark ? The stockholders received their charter not 
 gratuitously, but for a valuable consideration in money, prescribed 
 by Congress, and actually paid. At some times the stock has 
 been above par, at other times below par, according to prudence 
 in management, or according to commercial occurrences. But 
 if, by a judicious administration of its affairs, it had kept its stock 
 always above par, what pretence would there be, nevertheless, for 
 saying that such augmentation of its value was a ''gratuity'^ 
 from Government? The message proceeds to declare, that the 
 present act proposes another donation, another gratuity, to the 
 same men, of at least seven millions more. It seems to me that 
 this is an extraordinary statement, and an extraordinary style of 
 argument, for such a subject and on such an occasion. In the first 
 place, the facts are all assumed ; they are taken for true without ev- 
 idence. There are no proofs that any benefit to that amount will 
 accrue to the stockholders ; nor any experience to justify the expec- 
 tation of it. It rests on random estimates, or mere conjecture. 
 But suppose the continuance of the charter should prove beneficial 
 to the stockholders ; do they not pay for it ? They give twice as 
 much for a charter of fifteen years as was given before for one of 
 twenty. And if the proposed bonus, or premium, be not, in the 
 President's judgment, large enough, would he, nevertheless, on 
 such a mere matter of opinion as that, negative the whole biU? 
 May not Congress be trusted to decide, even on such a subject 
 as the amount of the money premium to be received by Govern- 
 ment for a charter of this kind.'' 
 
 But, Sir, there is a larger and a much more just view of this subject. 
 The bill was not passed for the purpose of benefiting the present 
 stockholders. Their benefit, if any, is incidental and collateral. 
 Nor was it passed on any idea that they had a right to a renewed 
 charter ; although the message argues against such right, as if it 
 
105 
 
 had been somewhere set up and asserted. No such right has 
 been asserted by any body. Congress passed the bill, not as a 
 bounty or a favor to the present stockholders, nor to comply with 
 any demand of right, on their part ; but to promote great public 
 interests, for great public objects. Every Bank must have some 
 stockholders, unless it be such a Bank as the President has rec- 
 ommended, and in regard to which he seems not likely to find 
 much concurrence of other men's opinions ; and if the stockholders, 
 whoever they may be, conduct the affairs of the Bank prudently, 
 the expectation is always, of course, that they will make it profit- 
 able to themselves, as well as useful to the public. If a Bank 
 charter is not to be granted, because it may be profitable, either in 
 a small or great degree, to the stockholders, no charter can be 
 granted. The objection lies against all Banks. 
 
 Sir, the object aimed at by such institutions is to connect the 
 public safety and convenience with private interests. It has 
 been found by experience, that Banks are safest under private 
 management, and that Government Banks are among the most 
 dangerous of all inventions. Now, Sir, the whole drift of the mes- 
 sage is to reverse the settled judgment of all the civilized world, 
 and to set up Government Banks, independent of private interest 
 or private control. For this purpose the message labors, even be 
 yond the measure of all its other labors, to create jealousies and 
 prejudices, on the ground of the alleged benefit which individuals 
 will derive from the renewal of diis charter. Much less effort is 
 made to show, that Government, or the public, will be injured by 
 the bill, than that individuals v/ill profit by it. Following up the 
 impulses of the same spirit, the message goes on gravely to allege, 
 that the act, as passed by Congress, proposes to make a present of 
 some millions of dollars to foreigners, because a portion of the 
 stock is holden by foreigners. Sir, how would this sort of argu- 
 ment apply to other cases ? The President has shown himself 
 not only willing, but anxious, to pay off the three per cent, stock 
 of the United States at par, notwithstanding that it is notorious 
 that foreigners are owners of the greater part of it. Why should 
 he not call that a donation to foreigners of many millions ? 
 
 I will not dwell particularly on this part of the message. Its 
 tone and its arguments are all in the same strain. It speaks of 
 the certain gain of the present stockholders, of the vahie of the 
 monopoly : it says that all monopolies are granted at the expense 
 of the public ; that the many millions which this bill bestows on 
 the stockholders, come out of the earnings of the people ; that if 
 Government sells monopolies, it ought to sell them in open market ; 
 that it is an erroneous idea, that the present stockholders have a 
 prescriptive right either to the favor or the bounty of Government ; 
 that the stock is in the hands of a few, and that the whole Anier- 
 
 VOL. II. 14 
 
106 
 
 ican people are excluded from competition in the purchase of the 
 monopoly. To all this I say, a§ain, that much of it is assumption 
 without proof; much of it is an argument against that which nobody 
 has maintained or asserted ; and the rest of it would be equally 
 strong against any charter, at any time. These objections existed 
 in their full strength, whatever that was, against the first Bank. 
 They existed, in like manner, against the present Bank at its 
 creation, and will always exist against all Banks. Indeed, as to the 
 bill now before us,- all the fault found with that is, that it proposes to 
 continue the Bank substantially as it now exists. " All the ob- 
 jectionable principles of the existing corporation," says the mes- 
 sage, " and most of its odious features, are retained without alle- 
 viation ;" so that the message is aimed against the Bank, as it has 
 existed from the first, and against any and all others resembling it 
 in its general features. 
 
 Allow me, now. Sir, to take notice of an argument founded on 
 the practical opeiation of the Bank. That argument is this. Little 
 of the stock of the Bank is held in the West, the capital being 
 chiefly owned by citizens of the Southern and Eastern States, and 
 by foreigners. But die Western and South-western States owe 
 the Bank a heavy debt, so heavy that the interest amounts to a 
 million six hundred thousand a year. This interest is carried to 
 the Eastern States, or to Europe, annually, and its payment is a 
 burden on the people of the West, and a drain of their currency, 
 ivhich no country can bear without inconvenience and disti-ess. 
 The true character and the whole value of this argument are 
 manifest by the mere statement of it. The people of the West 
 are, from their situation, necessarily large borrowers. They need 
 money, — capital, — and they borrow it, because they can derive a 
 benefit from its use, much beyond the interest which they pay. 
 They borrow at six per cent, of the Bank, although the value of 
 money, with them, is at least as high as eight. Nevertheless, al- 
 though they borrowed at this low rate of interest, and although they 
 use all they borrow thus profitably, yet they cannot pay the inter- 
 est without '^inconvenience and distress;" and then. Sir, follows 
 the logical conclusion, that, although they cannot pay even the in- 
 terest tvithoiit inconvenience and distress, yet less than four years 
 is ample time for the BanTc to call in the whole, both principal 
 and interest, without causing more than a light pressure. This is 
 the argument. 
 
 Then follows another, which may he thus stated. It is com- 
 petent to the States to tax the property of their citizens, vested in 
 the stock of this Bank ; but the power is denied of taxing the stock 
 of foreigners : therefore the stock will be worth ten or fifteen per 
 cent, more to foreigners than to residents, and will of course in- 
 evitably leave the country, and make the American people debtors 
 
107 
 
 to aliens in nearly the whole amount due the Bank, and send 
 across the Atlantic from two to five millions of specie every year, 
 to pay the Bank dividends. Mr. President, arguments like these 
 mio-ht be more readily disposed of, w^ere it not that the high and 
 official source from which they proceed, imposes the necessity of 
 treating them with respect. In the first place, it may safely be 
 denied, that the stock of the Bank is any more valuable to for- 
 eigners than our own citizens, or an object of greater desire to them, 
 except in so far as capital may be more abundant in the foreign 
 country, and therefore its owners more in want of opportunity of 
 investment. The foreign stockholder enjoys no exemption from 
 taxation. He is, of course, taxed by his own government for his 
 incomes, derived from this as well as other property ; and this is a 
 k\\\ answer to the whole statement. But it may be added, in the 
 second place, that it is not the practice of civilized states to tax 
 the property of foreigners under such circumstances. Do we tax, 
 or did we ever tax, the foreign holders of our public debt ? Does 
 Pennsylvania, New York, or Ohio, tax the foreign holders of stock 
 in the loans contracted by either of these States ? Certainly not. 
 Sir, I must confess, I had little expected to see, on such an occa- 
 sion as the present, a labored and repeated attempt to produce an 
 impression on the public opinion, unfavorable to the Bank, from 
 the circumstance that foreigners are among its stockholders. I 
 have no hesitation in saying that I deem such a strain of remark 
 as the message contains, on this point, coming, from the President 
 of the United States, to be injurious to the credit and character of 
 the country abroad ; because it manifests a jealousy, a lurking dis- 
 position not to respect the property of foreigners, invited hither 
 lay our own laws. And, Sir, what is its tendency but to excite this 
 jealousy, and create groundless prejudices .'' 
 
 From the commencement of the Government, it has been thought 
 desirable to invite, rather than to repel, the introduction of foreign 
 capital. Our stocks have all been open to foreign subscriptions ; 
 and the State Banks, in like manner, are free to foreign ownership. 
 Whatever State has created a debt, has been w'illing that foreign- 
 ers should become purchasers, and desirous of it. How long is 
 it, Sir, since Congress itself passed a law vesting new powers in the 
 President of the United States over the cities in this district, for 
 the very purpose of increasing their credit abroad, the better to enable 
 them to borrow money to pay their subscriptions to the Chesa- 
 peake and Ohio Canal ? It is easy to say that there is danger to 
 liberty, danger to independence, in a Bank open to foreign stock- 
 holders — because it is easy to say any thing. But neither reason 
 nor experience proves any such danger. The foreign stockholder 
 cannot be a director. He has no voice even in the choice of di- 
 rectors. His money is placed entirely in the management of the 
 directors appointed by the President and Senate and by the 
 
108 
 
 American stockholders. So far as there is dependence, or influ- 
 ence, either way, it is to the disadvantage of the foreign stockholder. 
 He has parted with the control over his own propeity, instead of 
 exercising control over the property or over the actions of others. 
 And, Sir, let it now be added, in further answer to this whole class 
 of objections, that experience has abundantly confuted them all. 
 This Government has existed forty-three years, and has maintained, 
 in full being and operation, a Bank, such as is now proposed to 
 be renewed, for thirty-six years out of the forty-three. We have 
 never for a moment had a Bank not subject to every one of these 
 objections. Always, foreigners might be stockholders ; always, 
 foreign stock has been exempt from State taxation, as much as at 
 present ; always, the same power and privileges ; always, all that 
 which is now called a " monopoly," a " gratuity," a " present," 
 has been possessed by the Bank. And yet there has been found 
 no danger to liberty, no introduction of foreign influence, and no 
 accumulation of irresponsible power in a few hands. I cannot but 
 hope, therefore, that the people of the United States will not now 
 yield up their judgment to those notions, which would reverse all 
 our best experience, and persuade us to discontinue a useful insti- 
 tution, from the influence of vague and unfounded declamation 
 against its danger to the public liberties. Our liberties, indeed, 
 must stand upon very frail foundations, if the Government cannot, 
 without endangering them, avail itself of those common facili- 
 ties, in the collection of its revenues, and the management of its 
 finances, which all other Governments, in commercial countries, 
 find useful and necessary. 
 
 In order to justify its alarm for the security of our independence, 
 the message supposes a case. It supposes that the Bank should 
 pass principally into the hands of the subjects of a foreign country, 
 and that we should be involved in war with that country, and 
 then it exclaims, " What would be our condition ? " Why, Sir, 
 it is plain that all the advantages would be on our side. The 
 Bank would still be our institution, subject to our own laws, and 
 all its directors elected by ourselves ; and our means would be 
 enhanced, not by the confiscation and plunder, but by the proper 
 use of the foreign capital in our hands. And, Sir, it is singular 
 enough, that this very state of war, from which this argument 
 against a Bank is drawn, is the very thing which, more than all 
 others, convinced the country and the Government of the neces- 
 sity of a National Bank. So much was the want of such an in- 
 stitution felt, in the late war, that the subject engaged the atten- 
 tion of Congress, constantly, from the declaration of that war 
 down to the time when the existing Bank was actually established ; 
 so that, in this respect, as well as in others, the argument of the 
 message is directly opposed to the whole experience of the Gov- 
 
109 
 
 ernmentj and to the general and long-settled convictions of the 
 country. 
 
 I now proceed, Sir, to a few remarks upon the President's Con- 
 stitutional objections to the Bank ; and I cannot forbear to say, 
 in regard to them, that he appears to me to have assumed very 
 extraordinary grounds of reasoning. He denies that the Con- 
 stitutionality of the Bank is a settled question. If it be not, will 
 it ever become so, or what disputed question ever can be setded ? 
 I have already observed, that for thirty-six years, out of the forty- 
 three, during which the Government has been in being, a Bank 
 has existed, such as is now proposed to be continued. 
 
 As early as 1791, after great deliberation, the first Bank char- 
 ter was passed by Congress, and approved by President Washing- 
 ton. It established an institution, resembling, in all things now 
 objected to, the present Bank. That Bank, like this, could take 
 lands in payment of its debts ; that charter, like the present, gave 
 the States no power of taxation ; it allowed foreigners to hold 
 stock ; it restrained Congress from creating other Banks. It gave 
 also exclusive privileges, and in all particulars it was, according to 
 the doctrine of the message, as objectionable as that now existing. 
 That Bank continued twenty years. In 1816, the present insti- 
 tution was established, and has been, ever since, in full operation. 
 Now, Sir, the question of the power of Congress to create such 
 institutions, has been contested in every manner known to our 
 Constitution and laws. The forms of the Government furnish no 
 new mode, in which to try this question. It has been discussed 
 over and over again, in Congress ; it has been argued and solemnly 
 adjudged in the Supreme Court ; every President, except the 
 present, has considered it a settled question ; many of the State 
 Legislatures have instructed their Senators to vote for the Bank ; 
 the tribunals of the States, in every instance, have supported its 
 Constitutionality ; and, beyond all doubt and dispute, the general 
 public opinion of the country has at all times given, and does 
 now give, its full sanction and approbation to the exercise of this 
 power, as being a Constitutional power. There has been no 
 opinion, questioning the power, expressed or intimated, at any 
 time, by either House of Congress, by any President, or by any 
 respectable judicial tribunal. Now, Sir, if this practice of near 
 forty years ; if these repeated exercises of the power ; if this solemn 
 adjudication of the Supreme Court, with the- concurrence and 
 approbation of public opinion, — do not settle the question, how is 
 any question ever to be setded, about which any one may choose 
 to raise a doubt? The argument of the message, upon the Con- 
 gressional y)recedents, is either Ti bold and gross fallacy, or else it 
 is an assertion without proofs, and against known facts. The 
 message admits, that, in 1791, Congress decided in favor of a 
 
no 
 
 Bank ; but it adds that another Congress, in 1811, decided against 
 it. Now, if it be meant that, in 1811, Congress decided against 
 the Bank 07i Constitutional ground, then the assertion is whoUy 
 incorrect, and against notorious fact. It is perfectly well known, 
 that many members, in both Houses, voted against the Bank, in 
 1811, who had no doubt at all of the Constitutional power of 
 Congress. They were entirely governed by other reasons given 
 at the time. I appeal, Sir, to the honorable member from Maryland 
 (Gen. Smith), who was then a member of the Senate, and voted 
 against the Bank, whether he, and others, who were on the same 
 side, did not give those votes on other well-known grounds, and 
 not at all on the Constitutional ground ? 
 
 [Gen. Smith here rose, and said, that he voted against the Bank in 1811, but 
 not at all on Constitutional grounds, and had no doubt such was the case with 
 other members.] 
 
 We all know. Sir (continued Mr. Webster), the fact to be as 
 the gentleman from Maryland has stated it. Every man who re- 
 collects, or who has read, the political occurrences of that day, 
 knows it. Therefore, if the message intends to say that, in 1811, 
 Congress denied the existence of any such Constitutional power, 
 the declaration is unwarranted — is altogether at variance with the 
 facts. If, on the other hand, it only intends to say, that Congress 
 decided against the proposition then before it, on some other 
 grounds, then it alleges that which is nothing at all to the purpose. 
 The argument, then, either assumes for truth that which is not 
 true, or else the whole statement is immaterial and futile. But 
 whatever value others may attach to this argument, the message 
 thinks so highly of it, that it proceeds to repeat it. " One Con- 
 gress," it says, " in 1815, decided against a Bank ; another, in 1816, 
 decided in its favor. There is nothing in precedent, therefore, 
 which, if its authority were admitted, ought to weigh in favor of the 
 act before me." Now, Sir, since it is known to the whole coun- 
 try, one cannot but wonder how it should remain unknown to the 
 President, that Congress did not decide against a Bank in 1815. 
 On the contrary, that very Congress passed a bill for erecting a 
 Bank, by very large majorities. In one form, it is true, the bill 
 failed in the House of Representatives ; but the vote was recon- 
 sidered, the bill recommitted, and finally passed by a vote of one 
 hundred and tiventij to thirty-nine. There is, therefore, not only 
 no solid ground, but not even any plausible pretence, for the as- 
 sertion that Congress, in 1815, decided against the Bank. That 
 very Congress passed a bill to create a Bank, and its decision, 
 therefore, is precisely the other way, and is a direct practical pre- 
 cedent in favor of the Constitutional power. What are we to think 
 of a Constitutional argument which deals, in this way, with his- 
 
Ill 
 
 torical facts ? When the message declares, as It does -declare, 
 that there is nothing in precedent which ought to weigh in favor 
 of the power, it sets at nought repeated acts of Congress affirming 
 the power, and it also states other acts, which weie in fact, and 
 which are well known to have been, directly the reverse of what 
 the message represents them. There is not. Sir, the slightest 
 reason to think that any Senate or any House of Representatives, 
 ever assembled under the Constitution, contained a majority that 
 doubted the Constitutional existence of the power of Congress to 
 establish a Bank. Whenever the question has arisen, and has 
 been decided, it has been always decided one way. The legis- 
 lative precedents all assert and maintain the power ; and these le- 
 gislative precedents have been the law of the land for almost forty 
 years. They settle the construction of the Constitution, and 
 sanction the exercise of the power in question so far as these ends 
 can ever be accomplished by any legislative precedents whatever. 
 But the President does not admit the authority of precedent. 
 Sir, I have always found, that those who habitually deny most 
 vehemently the general force of precedent, and assert most strong- 
 ly the supremacy of private opinion, are yet, of all men, most te- 
 nacious of that very authority of precedent, whenever it happens 
 to be in their favor. I beg leave to ask, Sir, upon what ground, 
 except that of precedent, and precedent alone, the President's 
 friends have placed his power of removal from office. No such 
 power is given by the Constitution, in terms, nor any where inti- 
 mated, throughout the whole of it ; no paragraph or clause of that 
 instrument recognizes such a power. To say the least, it is as 
 questionable, and has been as often questioned, as the power of 
 Congress to create a Bank ; and, enlightened by what has passed 
 under our own observation, we now see that it is of all powers 
 the most capable of flagrant abuse. Now, Sir, I ask again. What 
 becomes of this power, if the authority of precedent be taken 
 away ? It has all along been denied to exist ; it is no where found 
 in the Constitution ; and its recent exercise, or — to call things by 
 their right names — its recent abuse, has, more than any other single 
 cause, rendered good men either cool in their affections toward 
 the Government of their country, or doubtful of its long continu- 
 ance. Yet this power has precedent, and the President exercises 
 it. We know. Sir, that, without the aid of that precedent, his acts 
 could never have received the sanction of this body, even at a 
 time when his voice was somewhat more potential here than it 
 now is, or, as I trust, ever again will be. Does the President, 
 then, reject the authority of all precedent except what it is suitable 
 to his own purposes to use .'' And does he use, without stint or 
 measure, all precedents which may augment his own power, or 
 gratify his own wishes } 
 
112 
 
 But, if the President thinks lightly of the authority of Congress, 
 in construing the Constitution, he thinks still more lightly of the 
 authority of the Supreme Court. He asserts a right of individual 
 judgment, on Constitutional questions, which is totally inconsistent 
 with any proper administration of the Government, or any regular 
 execution of the laws. Social disorder, entire uncertainty in re- 
 gard to individual rights and individual duties, the cessation of 
 legal authority, confusion, the dissolution of free government 1 — 
 all these are the inevitable consequences of the principles adopted 
 by the message, whenever they shall be carried to their full 
 extent. Hitherto, it has been thought that the final decision of 
 Constitutional questions belonged to the supreme judicial tribunal. 
 The very nature of free government, it has been supposed, enjoins 
 this; and our Constitution, moreover, has been understood so to 
 provide, clearly and expressly. It is true, that each branch of 
 the Legislature has an undoubted right, in the exercise of its func- 
 tions, to consider the Constitutionality of a law proposed to be 
 passed. This is naturally a part of its duty ; and neither branch 
 can be compelled to pass any law, or do any other act, which it 
 deems to be beyond the reach of its Constitutional power. The 
 President has the same right, when a bill is presented for his ap- 
 proval ; for he is, doubtless, bound to consider, in all cases, 
 whether such bill be compatible with the Constitution, and whether 
 he can approve it consistently with his oath of office. But when 
 a law has been passed by Congress, and approved by the Presi- 
 dent, it is now no longer in the power, either of the same Pres- 
 ident, or his successors, to say whether the law is Constitutional 
 or not. He is not at liberty to disregard it ; he is not at liberty 
 to feel or to affect " Constitutional scruples," and to sit in judg- 
 ment himself on the validity of a statute of the Government, and 
 to nullify it, if he so chooses. After a law has passed through 
 all the requisite forms; after it has received the requisite legisla- 
 tive sanction and the executive approval, the question of its Con- 
 stitutionality then becomes a judicial question, and a judicial ques- 
 tion alone. In the courts that question may be raised, argued, 
 and adjudged ; it can be adjudged no where else. 
 
 The President is as much bound by the law as any private cit- 
 izen, and can no more contest its validity than any private citizen. 
 He may refuse to obey the law, and so may a private citizen ; 
 but both do it at their own peril, and neither of them can settle 
 the question of its validity. The President may say a law is un- 
 constitutional, but he is not the judge. Who is to decide that 
 question ? The judiciary, alone, possess this unquestionable and 
 hitherto unquestioned right. The judiciary is the Constitutional 
 tribunal of appeal, for the citizens, against both Congress and the 
 Executive, in regard to the Constitutionality of laws. It has this 
 
113 
 
 jurisdiction expressly conferred upon it, and when it lias decided 
 the question, its judgment must, from the very nature of all judg- 
 ments that are final, and from which there is no appeal, be conclu- 
 sive. Hitherto, this opinion, and a correspondent practice, have 
 prevailed, in America, with all wise and considerate men. If it 
 were otherwise, there would be no government of laws ; but we 
 should all live under the government, the rule, the caprices, of in- 
 dividuals. If we depart from the observance of these salutary 
 principles, the executive power becomes at once purely despotic ; 
 for the President, if the principle and the reasoning of the mes- 
 sage be sound, may either execute, or not execute, the laws of the 
 land, according to his sovereign pleasure. He may refuse to put 
 into execution one law, pronounced valid by all branches of the 
 Government, and yet execute another, which may have been by 
 CbnsUtutional authority pronounced void. On the argument of 
 the message, the President of the United States holds, under a new 
 pretence, and a new name, a dispensing ■power over the laws, as 
 absolute as was claimed by James the Second of England, a month 
 before he was compelled to fly the kingdom. That which is now- 
 claimed for the President, is, in truth, nothing less, and nothing 
 else, than the old dispensing power asserted by the kings of Eng- 
 land in the worst of times — the very climax, indeed, of all the 
 preposterous pretensions of the Tudor and the Stuart races. Ac- 
 cording to the doctrines put forth by the President, although Con- 
 gress may have passed a law, and although the Supreme Court 
 may have pronounced it Constitutional, yet it is, nevertheless, no 
 law at all, if he, in his good pleasure, sees fit to deny it effect ; in 
 other words, to repeal and annul it. Sir, no President, and no 
 public man, ever before advanced such doctrines in the face of the 
 nation. There never before was a moment in which any President 
 would have been tolerated in asserting such a claim to despotic 
 power. After Congress has passed the law, and after the Su- 
 preme Court has pronounced its judgment, on the very point in 
 controversy, the President has set up his own private judgment 
 against its Constitutional interpretation. It is to be remembered, 
 Sir, that it is the present law, it is the act of 1816, it is the present 
 charter of the Bank, which the President pronounces to be un- 
 constitutional. It is no Bank to be created, it is no law proposed 
 to be passed, which he denounces ; it is the latv now existing, 
 passed by Congress, approved by President Madison, and sanc- 
 tioned by a solemn judgment of the Supreme Court, which he 
 now declares unconstitutional, and which, of course, so far as it 
 may depend on him, cannot be executed. If these opinions of 
 the President's be maintained, there is an end of all law and all ju- 
 dicial authority. Statutes are but recommendations, judgments no 
 'more than opinions. Both are equally destitute of binding force. 
 VOL. II. 15 
 
114 
 
 Such an universal power as is now claimed for him, a power of 
 judging over the laws, and over the decisions of the tribunal, is 
 nothing else than pure despotism. If conceded to him, it makes 
 him, at once, what Louis the Fourteenth proclaimed himself to be, 
 when he said, " I am the State." 
 
 The Supreme Court has unanimously declared and adjudged 
 that the existing Bank is created by a Constitutional law of Con- 
 gress. As has been before observed, this Bank, so far as the 
 present question is concerned, is like that which was established 
 in 1791, by Washington, and sanctioned by the great men of that 
 day. In every form, therefore, in which the question can be 
 raised, it has been raised, and has been settled. Every process 
 and every mode of trial, known to the Constitution and laws, has 
 been exhausted ; and always, and without exception, the decision 
 has been in favor of the validity of the law. But all ihis practice, 
 all diis precedent, all this public approbation, all this solemn adju- 
 dication directly on the point, is to be disregarded, and rejected, 
 and the Constitutional power flatly denied. And, Sir, if we are 
 startled at this conclusion, our surprise will not be lessened when 
 we examine the argument by which it is maintained. 
 
 By the Constitution, Congress is authorized to pass all laws 
 "necessary and proper" for carrying its own legislative powers 
 into effect. Congress has deemed a Bank to be "necessary and 
 proper" for these purposes, and it has therefore established a 
 Bank. But, although the law has been passed, and the Bank estab- 
 hshed, and the Constitutional validity of its charter solemnly ad- 
 judged, yet the President pronounces it unconstitutional, be- 
 cause some of the powers bestowed on the Bank are, in his opin- 
 ion, not necessary or proper. It would appear, that powers, 
 which, in 1791 and in 1816, in the time of Washington and in 
 the time of Madison, were deemed "necessary and proper," are 
 no longer to be so regarded, and therefore the Bank is unconsti- 
 tutional. It has really come to this, (hat the Constitutionality of a 
 Bank is to depend upon the opinion which one particular man 
 may form of the utility or necessity of some of the clauses in its 
 charter ! If that individual chooses to think that a particular 
 power contained in the charter is not necessary to the proper con- 
 stitution of the Bank, then the act is unconstitutional ! 
 
 Hitherto it has always been supposed, that the question was of 
 a very different nature. It has been thought, that the policy of 
 granting a particular charter may be materially dependent on the 
 structure, and organization, and powers of the proposed institution. 
 But its general Constitutionality has never before been understood 
 to turn on such points. This would be making its Constitutionality 
 depend on subordinate questions, on questions of expediency, and 
 questions of detail ; upon that which one man may think necessary, 
 
115 
 
 and another inay not. If the Constitutional question were made to 
 hin2;e on matters of this kind, how could it ever be decided ? All 
 would depend on conjecture, on the complexional feeling, on the 
 prejudices, on the passions of individuals ; on more or less practi- 
 cal skill, or correct judgment, in regard to Banking operations, 
 among those who should be the judges ; on the impulse of 
 momentary interests, party objects, or personal purposes. Put 
 the question, in this manner, to a court of seven judges, to decide 
 wiietlier a particular Bank was Constitutional, and it might be doubt- 
 ful whether they could come to any result, as they might well hold 
 very various opinions on the practical utility of many clauses of the 
 charter. 
 
 The question, in that case, would be, not whether the Bank, in 
 its general frame, character and objects, was a proper instrument 
 to carry into effect die powers of the Government ; but whether the 
 particular powers, direct or incidental, conferred on a particular 
 Bank, were better calculated than all others to give success to its 
 operations. For if not, then the charter would be unwarranted, 
 according to this sort of reasoning, by the Constitution. This mode 
 of construing the Constitution is certainly a novel discovery. Its 
 merits belong entirely to the President and his advisers. Accord- 
 ing to this rule of interpretation, if the President should be of 
 opinion, that the capital of the Bank was larger, by a thousand 
 dollars, than it ought to be ; or that the time for the continuance 
 of the charter was a year too long ; or that it was unnecessary to 
 require it, under penalty, to pay specie ; or needless to provide 
 for punishing, as forgery, the counterfeiting of its bills, — either of 
 these reasons would be sufficient to render the charter, in his opin- 
 ion, unconstitutional, invalid, and nugatory. This is a legitimate 
 conclusion from the argument. Such a view of the subject has 
 certainly never before been taken. This strain of reasoning has 
 hitlierto not been heard, within the halls of Congress, nor has any 
 one ventured upon it before the tribunals of justice. The first ex- 
 hibition, its first appearance, as an argument, is in a message of the 
 President of the "United States. 
 
 According to that mode of construing the Constitution, which 
 was adopted by Congress in 1791, and approved by Washington, 
 and which has been sanctioned by the judgment of the Supreme 
 Court, and affirmed by the practice of nearly forty years, the 
 question upon the Constitutionality of the Bank involves two in- 
 quiries : first, whether a Bank, in its general character, and with re- 
 gard to the general objects with which Banks are usually connected, 
 be, in itself, a fit means, a suitable instrument, to carry into efiect the 
 powers granted to the Government. If it be so, then the second, 
 and the only other question is, whether the powers given in a par- 
 ticular charter are appropriate for a Bank. If they are powers 
 
116 
 
 which are appropriate for a Bank — powers which Congress may 
 fairly consider to be useful to the Bank or the country — then Con- 
 gress may confer these powers ; because the discretion to be ex- 
 ercised in framing the constitution of the Bank belongs to Congress. 
 One man may think the granted powers not indispensable to the 
 particular Bank ; another may suppose them injudicious, or injuri- 
 ous ; a third may imagine that other powers, if granted in their 
 stead, would be more beneficial ; but all these are matters of expe- 
 diency, about which men may differ ; and the power of deciding 
 upon them belongs to Congress. 
 
 I again repeat, Sir, that if, for reasons of this kind, the President 
 sees fit to negative a bill, on the ground of its being inexpedient or 
 impolitic, he has a right to do so. But remember, Sir, that we are 
 now on the Constitutional question ; remember, that the argu- 
 ment of the President is, that, because powers were given to the 
 Bank by the charter of 1816, which he thinks not necessary, that 
 charter is unconstitutional. Now, Sir, it will hardly be denied, or 
 rather it was not denied or doubted before this message came to 
 us, that, if there was to be a Bank, the powers and duties of that 
 Bank must be prescribed in the law creating it. Nobody but 
 Congress, it has been thought, could grant these powers and priv- 
 ileges, or prescribe their limitations. It is true, indeed, that the 
 message pretty plainly intimates, that the President should have 
 heen first consulted, and that he should have had the framing of 
 the bill ; but we are not yet accustomed to that order of things in 
 enacting laws, nor do I know a parallel to this claim, "thus now 
 brought forward, except that, in some peculiar cases in England, 
 highly affecting the royal prerogatives, the assent of the monarch 
 is necessary, before either the house of peers, or his majesty's 
 faithful commons, are permitted to act upon the subject, or to en- 
 tertain its consideration. But supposing, Sir, that our accustomed 
 forms and our republican principles are still to be followed, and 
 that a law creating a Bank is, like all other laws, to originate with 
 Congress, and that the President has nothing to do with it, till it 
 is presented for his approval, — then it is clear that the powers and 
 duties of a proposed Bank, and all the terms and conditions an- 
 nexed to it, must, in the first place, be settled by Congress. 
 
 This power, if Constitutional at all, is only Constitutional in the 
 hands of Congress. Any where else, its exercise would be plain 
 usurpation. If, then, the authorhy to decide what powers ought to 
 be granted to a Bank, belong to Congress, and Congress shall have 
 exercised that power, it would seem litde better than absurd to 
 say, that its act, nevertheless, would be unconstitutional and invalid, 
 if, in the opinion of a diird party, it had misjudged, on a question 
 of expediency, in the arrangement of details. According to such 
 a mode of reasoning, a mistake in the exercise of jurisdiotion takes 
 
117 
 
 away the jurisdiction. If Congress decide right, its decision may- 
 stand ; if it decide wrong, its decision is nugatory ; and whether its 
 decision be right or wrong, another is to judge, although the origi- 
 nal power of making the decision mast be aUoxved to be exclu- 
 sively in Congress. This is the end to which the argument of the 
 message will conduct its followers. 
 
 Sir, in considering the authority of Congress to invest the Bank 
 with the particular powers granted to it, the inquiry is not, and 
 cannot be, how appropriate these powers are, but whether they be 
 at all appropriate ; whether they come within the range of a just and 
 honest discretion; whether Congress may fairly esteem them to be 
 necessary. The question is not. Are they the fittest means, the 
 best means, or whetlier the Bank might not be established without 
 them ? But the question is. Are they such as Congress, bona fide, 
 may have regarded as appropriate to the end ? If any other rule 
 were to be adopted, nothing could ever be setded. A law would 
 be constitutional to-day and unconstitutional to-morrow. Its con- 
 stitutionality would altogether depend upon individual opinion, on 
 a matter of mere expediency. Indeed, such a case as that is now 
 actually before us. Mr. Madison deemed the powers given to the 
 Bank, in its present charter, proper and necessary. He held the 
 Bank, therefore, to be Constitutional. But the present President, 
 not acknowledging that the power of deciding on these points rests 
 with Congress, nor with Congress and the then President, but 
 setting up his own opinions as the standard, declares the law, now 
 in being, unconstitutional, because the powers granted by it are, in 
 his estimation, not necessary and proper. I pray to be informed, 
 Sir, whether, upon similar grounds of reasoning, the President's 
 own scheme for a Bank, if Congress should do so unlikely a thing 
 as to adopt it, would not become unconstitutional also, if it should 
 so happen that his successor should hold Ats Bank in as light esteem 
 as he holds those established under the auspices of Washington and 
 Madison ? 
 
 If the reasoning of the message be well founded, it is clear that 
 the charter of the existing Bank is not a law. The Bank has no 
 legal existence ; it is not responsible to Government ; it has no 
 authority to act ; it is incapable of being an agent ; the President 
 may treat it as a nullity, to-morrow ; withdraw from it all the pub- 
 lic deposits, and set afloat all the existing national arrangements 
 of revenue and finance. It is enough to state these monstrous 
 consequences, to show that the doctrine, principles, and pretensions 
 of the message, are entirely inconsistent with a government of laws. 
 If that which Congress has enacted, and the Supreme Court has 
 sanctioned, be not the law of the land, then the reign of law has 
 ceased, and the reign of individual opinion has already begun. 
 
 The President, in his commentary on the details of the existing 
 
118 
 
 Bank charter, undertakes to prove that one provision, and another 
 provision, is not necessary and proper ; because, as he thinks, the 
 same objects, proposed to be accompHshed by them, might have 
 been better attained in another mode ; and therefore such provis- 
 ions are not necessary, and so not warranted by the Constitution. 
 Does not this show, that, according to his own mode of reasoning, 
 his own scheme would not be Constitutional, since another scheme, 
 which probably most people would think a better one, might be 
 substituted for it ? Perhaps, in any Bank charter, there may be no 
 provisions which may be justly regarded as absolutely indispen- 
 sable ; since it is probable, that for any of them some others 
 might be substituted. No Bank, therefore, ever could be estab- 
 lished ; because there never has been, and never could be, any 
 charter, of which every provision should appear to be indispensable, 
 or necessary and proper, in the judgment of every individual. 
 To admit, therefore, that there may be a Constitutional Bank, and 
 yet to contend for such a mode of judging of its provisions and 
 details as the message adopts, involves an absurdity. Any charter 
 which may be framed, may be taken up, and each power con- 
 ferred by it successively denied, on the ground, that, in regard to 
 each, either no such power is " necessary or proper " in a Bank, or, 
 which is the same thing in effect, some other power might be 
 substituted for it, and supply its place. That can never be neces- 
 sary, in the sense in which the message understands that term, 
 which 7nay be dispensed with; and it cannot be said that any 
 power may not be dispensed with, if there be some others, which 
 might be substituted for it, and which would accomplish the same 
 end. Therefore, no Bank could ever be Constitutional ; because 
 none could be established which should not contain some provis- 
 ions which might have been omitted, and their place supplied by 
 others. 
 
 Mr. President, I have understood the true and well-established 
 doctrine to be, that, after it has been decided that it is competent 
 for Congress to establish a Bank, then it follows, that it may create 
 such a Bank as it judges, in its discretion, to be best, and invest it 
 with all such power as it may deem fit and suitable ; witli this 
 hmitation, always, that all is to be done in the bona fide execution of 
 the power to create a Bank. If the granted powers are appropri- 
 ate to the professed end, so that the granting of them cannot be 
 regarded as usurpation of authority by Congress, or an evasion of 
 Constitutional restrictions under color of establishing a Bank, then 
 the charter is Constitutional, whether these powers be thought in- 
 dispensable by others or not, or whether even Congress itself deemed 
 them absolutely indispensable, or only thought them fit and suitable ; 
 or whether they are rtwre or less appropriate to their end. It 
 is enough that they are appropriate ; it is enough that they are 
 
119 
 
 suited to produce the effects designed ; and no comparison Is to be 
 instituted, in order to try their Constitutionality, between them and 
 others which may be suggested. A case, analogous to the present, 
 is found in the Constitutional power of Congress over the mail. 
 The Constitution says no more than that " Congress shall have 
 power to establish post-offices and post-roads ;" and, in the general 
 clause, "all powers necessary and proper" to give effect to this. 
 In the execution of this power. Congress has protected the mail, 
 by providing that robbery of it shall be punished with death. Is 
 this infliction of capital punishment Constitutional ? Certainly it is 
 not, unless it be both " proper and necessary." The President 
 may not think it necessary or proper; the law, then, according to 
 the system of reasoning enforced in the message, is of no binding 
 force, and the President may disobey it, and refuse to see it exe- 
 cuted. 
 
 The truth is, Mr. President, that if the general object, the sub- 
 ject-matter, properly belong to Congress, all its incidents belong to 
 Congress also. If Congress is to establish post-offices and post- 
 roads, it may, for that end, adopt one set of regulations or another; 
 and either would be Constitutional. So the details of one Bank 
 are as Constitutional as those of another, if they are confined, fairly 
 and honesdy, to the purpose of organizing the institution, and ren- 
 dering it useful. One Bank is as Constitutional as another Bank. 
 If Congress possess the power to make a Bank, it possesses the power 
 to make it efficient, and competent to produce the good expected 
 from it. It may clothe it with all such power and privileges, not 
 otherwise inconsistent with the Constitution, as may be necessary, 
 in its own judgment, to make it what Government deems it should 
 be. It may confer on it such immunities as may induce individ- 
 uals to become stockholders, and to furnish the capital ; and since 
 the extent of these immunities and privileges is matter of discretion, 
 and matter of opinion, Congress only can decide it, because Con- 
 gress alone can frame or grant the charter. A charter, thus granted 
 to individuals, becomes a contract with them, upon their compli- 
 ance with its terms. The Bank becomes an agent, bound to per- 
 form certain duties, and entitled to certain stipulated rights and 
 privileges, in compensation for the proper discharge of these duties ; 
 and all these stipulations, so long as they are appropriate to the 
 object professed, and not repugnant to any other Constitutional in- 
 junction, are entirely within the competency of Congress. And 
 yet, Sir, the message of the President toils through all the com- 
 mon-place topics of monopoly, the right of taxation, the suffering 
 of the poor, and the arrogance of the rich, with as much painful 
 effort, as if one, or another, or all of them, had something to do 
 with the Constitutional quesdon. 
 
 What is called the " monopoly " is made the subject of repeat- 
 
120 
 
 ed rehearsal, in terms of special complaint. By this " monopoly," 
 I suppose, is understood die restriction contained in the charter, 
 that Congress shall not, during the twenty years, create another 
 Bank. Now, Sir, let me ask, VVho would think of creating a Bank, 
 inviting stockholders into it, with large investments, imposing upon 
 it heavy duties, as connected with the Government, receiving some 
 millions of dollars as a bonus, or premium, and yet retaining the 
 power of granting, the next day, another charter, which would de- 
 stroy the whole value of the first ? — If this be an unconstitutional 
 restraint on Congress, the Constitution must be strangely at vari- 
 ance with the dictates both of good sense and sound morals. Did 
 not the first Bank of the United States contain a similar restriction ? 
 And have not the States granted Bank charters, with a condition, 
 that if the charter should be accepted, they would not grant others ? 
 States have certainly done so ; and, in some instances, where no 
 bonus, or premium, was paid at all ; but from the mere desire to give 
 effect to the charter, by inducing individuals to accept it and organ- 
 ize the institution. The President declares that this restriction is 
 not necessary to the efficiency of the Bank ; but that is the very 
 thing which Congress and his predecessor in office were called on 
 to decide, and which they did decide, when the one passed and 
 the other approved the act. And he has now no. more authority 
 to pronounce his judgment on that act than any other individual in 
 society. It is not his province to decide on the Constitutionality of 
 statutes which Congress has passed, and his predecessors approved 
 There is another sentiment, in this part of the message, which 
 we should hardly have expected to find in a paper which is sup- 
 posed, whoever may have drawn it up, to have passed under the 
 review of professional characters. The message declares that this 
 limitation to create no other Bank is unconstitudonal, because, al- 
 though Congress may use the discretion vested in them, " they 
 may not limit the discretion of their successors." This reason is 
 almost too supei-ficial to require an answer. Every one, at all ac- 
 customed to the consideration of such subjects, knows that every 
 Congress can bind its successors to the same extent that it can 
 bind itself: the power of Congress is always the same ; the author- 
 ity of law always the same. It is true, we speak of the twentieth 
 Congress, and the twenty-first Congress ; but this is only to denote 
 the period of time, or to mark the successive organizations of the 
 House of Representatives under the successive periodical elec- 
 tions of its members. As a politic body, as the legislative power 
 of the Government, Congress is always continuous, always identi- 
 cal. A particular Congress, as we speak of it, — for instance, 
 the present Congress, — can no farther restrain itself from doing 
 what it may choose to do at the next session, than it can re- 
 strain any succeeding Congress from doing what it may choose. 
 
121 
 
 Any Congress may repeal the act or law of its predecessor, if in 
 its nature it be repealable, just as it may repeal its own act ; and if 
 a law, or an act, be irrepealable in its nature, it can no more be re- 
 pealed by a subsequent Congress than by that which passed it. 
 All this is famihar to every body. And Congress, like every oth- 
 er Legislature, often passes acts which, being in the nature of grants, 
 or contracts, are irrepealable ever afterwards. The message, in a 
 strain of argument which it is difficult to treat with ordinary re- 
 spect, declares that this restriction on the power of Congress, as to 
 the establishment of other Banks, is a palpable attempt to amend 
 the Constitution by an act of legislation. The reason on which 
 this observation purports to be founded, is, that Congress, by the 
 Constitution, is to have exclusive legislation over the District of 
 Columbia ; and when the Bank charter declares that Congress 
 will create no new Bank within the district, it annuls this power of 
 exclusive legislation ! I must say, that this reasoning hardly rises 
 high enough to entitle it to a passing notice. It would be doing it 
 too much credit to call it plausible. No one needs to be informed 
 that exclusive power of legislation is not unlimited power of legisla- 
 tion ; and if it were, how can that legislative power be unlimited 
 that cannot restrain itself; that cannot bind itself by contract? 
 Whether as a government, or as an individual, that being is fetter- 
 ed and restrained, which is not capable of binding itself by ordinary 
 obligation. Every Legislature binds itself, whenever it makes a 
 grant, enters into a contract, bestows an office, or does any other 
 act or thing which is in its nature irrepealable. And this, instead 
 of detracting from its legislative power, is one of the modes of ex- 
 ercising that power. And the legislative power of Congress over 
 the District of Columbia would not be full and complete, if it 
 might not make just such a stipulation as the Bank charter con- 
 tains. 
 
 As to the taxing power of the States, about which the message 
 says so much, the proper answer to all it says, is, that the States 
 possess no power to tax any instrument of the Government of the 
 United States. It was no part of their power before the Constitution, 
 and they derive no such power from any of its provisions. It is 
 nowhere given to them. Could a State tax the coin of the 
 United States, at the mint ? Could a State lay a stamp tax on 
 the process of the courts of the United States, and on custom- 
 house papers ? Could it tax the transportation of the mail, or the 
 ships of war, or the ordnance, or the muniments of war, of the 
 United States? The reason that these cannot be taxed, by a 
 State, is, that they are means and instruments of the Government 
 of the United States. The establishment of a Bank, exempt from 
 State taxation, takes away no existing right in a State. It leaves 
 it all it ever possessed. But the complaint is, that the Bank char- 
 
 VOL. II. 16 
 
122 
 
 ter does not confer the power of taxation. This, certainly, though 
 not new (for the same argument was urged here), appears to me 
 to be a strange mode of asserting and maintaining Slate rights. 
 The power of taxation is a sovereign power ; and the President, 
 and those who think with him, are of opinion, in a given case, that 
 this sovereign power should be conferred on the States, by an act 
 of Congress. There is, if I mistake not, Sir, as little compliment to 
 State sovereignty, in this idea, as there is of sound Constitutional 
 doctrine. Sovereign rights, held under the grant of an act of Con- 
 gress, present a proposition quite new in Constitutional law. 
 
 The President himself even admits, that an instrument of the 
 Government of the United States ought not, as such, to be taxed 
 by the States ; yet he contends for such a power of taxing proper- 
 ty connected with this instrument, and essential to its very being, 
 as places its whole existence in the pleasure of the States. It is not 
 enough that the States may tax all the property of all their own 
 citizens, wherever invested, or however employed. The com- 
 plaint is, that the power of State taxation does reach so far as to 
 take cognizance over persons out of the State, and to tax them for 
 a franchise, lawfully exercised under the authority of the United 
 States. Sir, when did the power of the States, or indeed of any 
 Government, go to such an extent as that? Clearly never. The 
 taxing power of all communities is necessarily and justly limited to 
 the property of its own citizens, and to the property of others, hav- 
 ing a distinct local existence, as property, within its jurisdiction ; it 
 does not extend to rights, and franchises, rightly exercised, under 
 the authority of other governments, nor to persons beyond its ju- 
 risdiction. As the Constitution has left the taxing power of the 
 States, so the Bank charter leaves it. Congress has not under- 
 taken either to take away, or to confer, a taxing power ; nor to 
 enlarge, or to restrain it ; if it were to do either, I hardly know 
 which of the two would be the least excusable. 
 
 I beg leave to repeat, Mr. President, that what I have now 
 been considering are the President's objections, not to the policy 
 or expediency, but to the Constitutionality of the Bank ; and not to 
 the Constitutionality of any new,ov proposed Bank, but of the Bank, 
 as it now is, and as it has long existed. If the President had de- 
 clined to approve this bill, because he thought the original charter 
 unwisely granted, and the Bank, in point of policy and expedien- 
 cy, objectionable or mischievous, and in that view only had suggest- 
 ed the reasons now urged by him, his argument, however incon- 
 clusive, would have been intelligible, and not, in its whole frame 
 and scope, inconsistent with all well-established first principles. 
 His rejection of the bill, in that case, would have been, no doubt, 
 an extraordinary exercise of power ; but it would have been, nev- 
 ertheless, the exercise of a power belonging to his office, and trust- 
 
123 
 
 ed by the Constitution to his discretion. But when he puts forth 
 an array of arguments, such as the message employs, not against 
 the expediency of the Bank, but against its Constitutional exist- 
 ence, he confounds all distinctions, mixes questions of policy and 
 questions of right together, and turns all Constitutional restraints 
 into mere matters of opinion. As far as its power extends, either 
 in its direct effects, or as a precedent, the message not only unset- 
 des every thing which has been setded, under the Constitution, 
 but would show, also, that the Constitution itself is utterly incapa- 
 ble of any fixed construction or definite interpretation, and that 
 there is no possibility of establishing, by its authority, any practical 
 limitations on the powers of the respective branches of the Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 When the message denies, as it does, the authority of the Su- 
 preme Court to decide on Constitudonal quesdons, it effects, so far 
 as the opinion of the President and his authority can effect, a com- 
 plete change in our Government. It does two things ; first, it con- 
 verts Constitutional limitations of power into mere matters of opinion, 
 and then it strikes the judicial department, as an efficient department, 
 out of our system. But the message by no means stops even at 
 this point. Having denied to Congress the authority of judging 
 what powers may be Constitutionally conferred on a Bank, and 
 having erected the judgment of the President himself into a stand- 
 ard, by which to try the Constitutional character of such powers, 
 and having denounced the authority of the Supreme Court, to de- 
 cide finally on Constitutional questions, the message proceeds to 
 claim for the President, not the power of approval, but the prima- 
 ry power, the power of originating laws. The President informs 
 Congress, diat he would have sent them such a charter, if it had 
 been properly asked for, as they ought to possess. He very plain- 
 ly indmates, that, in his opinion, the establishment of all laws, of 
 this nature at least, belongs to the functions of the Executive Gov- 
 ernment ; and that Congress ought to have waited for the manifes- 
 tation of the Executive will, before it presumed to touch the sub- 
 ject. Such, Mr. President, stripped of their disguises, are the real 
 pretences set up in behalf of the Executive power in this most ex- 
 traordinary paper. 
 
 Mr. President, we have arrived at a new epoch. We are en- 
 tering on experiments, with the Government and the Constitudon 
 of the country, hitherto untried, and of fearful and appalling aspect. 
 This message calls us to die contempladon of a future, which little 
 resembles the past. Its principles are at war with all that public 
 opinion has sustained, and all which the experience of the Govern- 
 ment has sanctioned. It denies first principles ; it contradicts 
 truths, heretofore received as indisputable. It denies to the judi- 
 ciary the interpretation of law, and demands to divide, with Con- 
 
124 
 
 gress, the origination of statutes. It extends the grasp of Execu- 
 tive pretension over every power of the Government. But this is 
 not all. It presents the Chief Magistrate of the Union in the attitude 
 of arguing aivay the powers of that Government over which he has 
 been chosen to preside ; and adopting, for this purpose, modes of 
 reasoning which, even under the influence of all proper feeling 
 towards high official station, it is difficult to regard as respectable. 
 It appeals to every prejudice which may betray men into a mistaken 
 view of their own interests; and to every passion, which may lead 
 them to disobey the impulses of their understanding. It urges all the 
 specious topics of State rights, and national encroachment, against 
 that which a great majority of the States have affirmed to be rightful, 
 and in which all of them have acquiesced. It sows, in an unspar- 
 ing manner, the seeds of jealousy and ill will against that Govern- 
 ment of which its author is the official head. It raises a cry, that 
 liberty is in danger, at the very moment when it puts forth claims 
 to powers heretofore unknown and unheard of It affects alarm 
 for the 'public freedom, when nothing endangers that freedom so 
 much as its own unparalleled pretences. This, even, is not all. 
 It manifestly seeks to inflame the poor against the rich ; it wanton- 
 ly attacks whole classes of the people, for the purpose of turning 
 against them the prejudices and the resentments of other classes. 
 It is a state paper which finds no topic too exciting for its use, 
 no passion too inflammable for its address and its solicitation. 
 Such is this message. It remains, now, for the people of the 
 United States to choose between the principles here avowed and 
 their Government. These cannot subsist together. The one or 
 the other must be rejected. If the sentiments of the message 
 shall receive general approbation, the Constitution will have perish- 
 ed even earlier than the moment which its enemies originally al- 
 lowed for the termination of its existence. It will not have sur- 
 vived to its fiftieth year. 
 
SPEECH 
 
 AT THE NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONVENTION IN WORCESTER, 
 
 MASS., OCTOBER 12, 1832. 
 
 Mr. President : I offer no apology for addressing the meet- 
 ing. Holding, by the favor of the people of this Commonwealth, 
 an important public situation, I deem it no less than a part of my 
 duty, at this interesting moment, to make my own opinions on the 
 state of public affairs known ; and, however I may have per- 
 formed other duties, this, at least, it is my purpose, on the present 
 occasion, fully to discharge. Not intending to comment, at length, 
 on all the subjects which now attract public attention, nor to 
 discuss any thing, in detail, I wish, nevertheless, before an 
 assembly so large and respectable as the present, and through 
 them to the whole people of the State, to lay open, without 
 reserve, my own sentiments, hopes, and fears, respecting the state, 
 and the fate, of our common country. 
 
 The Resolutions which have been read from the Chair express 
 the opinion that the public good requires an effectual change, in 
 the administration of the General Government, both of measures 
 and of men. In this opinion I heartily concur. 
 
 i\Ir. President, there is no citizen of the State, who, in prin- 
 ciple and by habitual sentiment, is less disposed than myself to 
 general opposition to Government, or less desirous of frequent 
 changes in its administration. I entertain this feeling strongly, 
 and at all times, towards the Government of the United States ; 
 because I have ever regarded the Federal Constitution as a frame 
 of Government so peculiar, and so delicate in its relations to the 
 State Governments, that it might be in danger of overthrow, as 
 well from an indiscriminate and wanton opposition, as from a weak 
 or a wicked administration. But a case may ?rise, in which the 
 Government is no longer safe in the hands to which it has been 
 intrusted. It may come to be a question, not so much in what 
 particular manner, or according to what particular political opin- 
 ions, the Government shall be administered, as whether the Con- 
 stitution itself shall be preserved and maintained. Now, Sir, in my 
 judgment, just such a case, and just such a question, are at this 
 
126 
 
 moment before the American people. Entertaining this senti- 
 ment, and thoroughly and entirely convinced of its truth, I wish, 
 as far as my humble power extends, to awaken the people 
 to a more earnest attention to their public concerns. With the 
 people, and the people alone, lies any remedy for the past, and 
 any security for the future. No delegated power is equal to the 
 exigency of the present crisis. No public servants, however able 
 or faithful, have ability to check or to stop the fearful tendency of 
 things. It is a case for sovereign interposiuon. The rescue, if it 
 come at all, must come from that power which no other on earth 
 can resist. I earnestly wish, therefore, unimportant as my own 
 opinions may be, and entitled, as I know they are, to no con- 
 siderable regard, yet, since they are honest and sincere, and since 
 they respect nothing less than dangers which appear to me to 
 threaten the Government and Constitution of the country, I fer- 
 vently wish, that I could now make them known, not only to this 
 meeting, and to this State, but to every man in the Union. I 
 take the hazard of the reputation of an alamiist ; I cheerfully 
 submit to the imputation of over-excited apprehension ; I discard 
 all fear of the cry of false prophecy, and I declare, that, in my 
 judgment, not only the great interests of the country, but the 
 Constitution itself, is in imminent peril, and that nothing can save; 
 either the one or the other, but that voice w^hich has authority to 
 say to the evils of misrule and misgovernment, Hitherto shall ye 
 come, but no farther. 
 
 It is true. Sir, that it is the natural effect of a good Constitution 
 to protect the people. But who shall protect the ConsUtution? 
 Who shall guard the guardian .'' What arm but the mighty arm 
 of the people itself, is able, in a popular government, to uphold 
 public institutions } The Constitution itself is but the creature of 
 the public will ; and in every crisis which threatens it, it must owe 
 hs security to the same power to which it owes its origin. 
 
 The appeal, therefore, is to the people ; not to party, nor to 
 partisans ; not to professed politicians ; not to those who have an 
 interest in office and place, greater than their stake in the country ; 
 but to the people, and the whole people ; to those, who, in regard 
 to political affairs, have no wish but for a good government, and 
 who have power to accomplish their own wishes. 
 
 Mr. President : Are the principles and leading measures of the 
 Administration hostile to the great interests of the country ? 
 
 Are they dangerous to the ConsUtution, and to the Union of 
 the States.'' 
 
 Is there any prospect of a beneficial change of principles and 
 measures, without a change of men ? 
 
 Is there reasonable ground to hope for such a change of men ? 
 
127 
 
 On these several questions, I desire to state my own convictions, 
 fully, though as briefly as possible. 
 
 As government is intended to be a practical institution, if it be 
 wisely formed, the first and most natural test of its administration 
 is the effect produced by it. Let us look, then, to the actual 
 state of our affairs. Is it such as should follow a good administra- 
 tion of a good Constitution ? 
 
 Sir, we see one State openly threatening to arrest the execution 
 of the revenue laws of the Union, by acts of her own. This pro- 
 ceeding is threatened, not by irresponsible persons, but by those 
 who fill her chief places of power and trust. 
 
 In another State, free citizens of the country are imprisoned, 
 and held in prison, in defiance of a judgment of the Supreme 
 Court, pronounced for their deliverance. Immured in a dungeon, 
 marked and patched as subjects of penitentiary punishment, these 
 free citizens pass their days in counting the slow-revolving hours 
 of their miserable captivity, and their nights in feverish and 
 delusive dreams of their own homes and their own families ; while 
 the Constitution stands adjudged to be violated, a law of Congress 
 is effectually repealed by the act of a State, and a judgment of 
 deliverance, by the Supreme Court, is set at nought and con- 
 temned. 
 
 Treaties, importing the most solemn and sacred obligations, are 
 denied to have binding force. 
 
 A feeling, that there is great insecurity for property, and the 
 stability of the means of living, extensively prevails. 
 
 The whole subject of the tariff, acted on for the moment, is, at 
 the same moment, declared not to be at rest, but liable to be 
 again moved, and with greater effect, just so soon as power for that 
 purpose shall be obtained. 
 
 The currency of the country, hitherto safe, sound, and univer- 
 sally satisfactory, is threatened with a violent change ; and an 
 embari-assment in pecuniary affairs, equally distressing and unne- 
 cessary, hangs over all the trading and active classes of society. 
 
 A long-used and long-approved legislative instrument for the 
 collection of revenue, well secured against abuse, and always 
 responsible to Congress and to the laws, is denied further exist- 
 ence ; and its place is proposed to be supplied by a new branch 
 of the Executive Department, with a money power, controlled 
 and conducted solely by Executive agency. 
 
 The power of the Veto is exercised, not as an extraordinary, 
 but as an ordinary power ; as a common mode of defeating acts 
 of Congress not acceptable to the Executive. We hear, one day, 
 that the President needs the advice of no cabinet ; that a kw 
 secretaries, or clerks, are enough for him. The next, we are 
 informed, that the Supreme Court is but an obstacle to the popular 
 
128 
 
 will, and the whole Judicial Department but an encumbrance to 
 Government. And while, on one side, the judicial power is thus 
 derided and denounced, on the other arises the cry, " Cut down 
 the Senate ! " and over the whole, at the same time, prevails the 
 loud avowal, shouted with all the lungs of conscious party strength 
 and party triumph, that the spoils of the enemy belong to the vic- 
 tors. This condition of things. Sir, this general and obvious aspect 
 of affairs, is the result of three years' administration, such as the 
 country has experienced. 
 
 But, not resting on this general view of results, let me inquire 
 what the principles and policy of the Administration are, on the 
 leading interests of the country, subordinate to the Constitution 
 itself And, first, what are its principles, and what its policy, 
 respecting the tariff? Is this great question settled, or unsetded? 
 And is the present Administration for, or against, the tariff? 
 
 Sir, the question is wholly unsettled, and the principles of the 
 Administration, according to its most recent avowal of those princi- 
 ples, are adverse to the protecting policy, decidedly hostile to the 
 whole system, root and branch ; and this on permanent and alleged 
 Constitutional grounds. 
 
 In the first place, nothing has been done to settle the tariff 
 question. The anti-tariff gentlemen who voted for the late law 
 have, none of them, said they would adhere to it. On the contrary, 
 they supported it, because, as far as it went, it v^^as reduction, and 
 that was what they wished ; and if they obtained this degree of 
 reduction now, it would be easier to obtain a greater degree hereafter ; 
 and they frankly declared that their intent and purpose was to 
 insist on reduction, and to pursue reduction, unremittingly, till all 
 duties on imports should be brought down to one general and equal 
 per centage, and that regulated by the mere wants of the revenue ; 
 or that, if different rates of duty should remain on different articles, 
 still, that the whole should be laid for revenue, and revenue only ; 
 and that they would, to the utmost of their power, push this 
 course, till protection, by duties, as a special object of national 
 policy, should be abandoned, altogether, in the national councils. 
 It is a delusion, therefore. Sir, to imagine that the present tariff 
 stands, safely, on conceded ground. It covers not an inch, that 
 has not been fought for, and must not be again fought for. It stands, 
 while its friends can protect it, and not an hour longer. 
 
 In the next place, in that compend of Executive opinions in the 
 Veto Message, the whole principle of the protecting policy is 
 plainly and pointedly denounced. 
 
 Having gone through its argument against the Bank charter, as 
 it now exists, and as it has existed, either under the present or a 
 former law, for near forty years, and having added to the well- 
 doubted logic of that argument the still more doubtful aid of a 
 
129 
 
 large array of opprobrious epithets, the message, in unveiled 
 allusion to the protecting policy of the country, holds this lan- 
 guage :— 
 
 " Most of the difficulties our Government now encounters, and 
 most of the dangers which impend over our Union, have sprung 
 from an abandonment of the legitimate objects of government 
 by our National Legislation, and the adoption of such principles 
 as are imbodied in this act. Many of our rich men have not 
 been content with equal protection and equal benefits, but have 
 besought us to make them richer by act of Congress. By at- 
 tempting to gratify their desires, we have, in the results of our 
 legislation, (arrayed section against section, interest against in- 
 terest, and man against man. In a fearful commotion which 
 threatens to shake the foundations of our Union.^ It is time to 
 pause in our career, to review our principles, and, if possible, re- 
 vive that devoted patriotism and spirit of compromise which dis- 
 tinguished the sages of the revolution, and the fathers of our 
 Union. If we cannot at once, in justice to interests vested under 
 improvident legislation, make our Government what it ought to 
 be, we can at least take a stand against all new grants of monopo- 
 lies and exclusive privileges, against any prostitution of our Govern- 
 ment to the advancement of the few at the expense of the many, 
 and in favor of compromise and gradual reform in our code of 
 laws and system of political economy." 
 
 Here, then, we have the whole creed. Our National Legisla- 
 ture has abandoned the legitimate objects of government. It has 
 adopted such principles as are imbodied in the Bank charter ; 
 and these principles are elsewhere called objectionable, odious, 
 and unconstitutional. And all this has been done, because rich 
 men have besought the Government to render them richer by acts 
 of Congress. It is time to pause in our career. It is time to 
 review these principles. And, if we cannot, at once, make our 
 Government what it ought to be, we can, at least, take a 
 stand against new grants of power and privilege. 
 
 The plain meaning of all this is, that our protecting laws are 
 founded in an abandonment of the legitimate objects of govern- 
 ment ; that this is the great source of our difficulties ; that it Is 
 time to stop in our career, to review the principles of these laws, 
 and, as soon as we can, make our Government what it ought 
 to be. 
 
 No one can question, Mr. President, that these paragraphs, from 
 
 the last official publication of the President, show, that, in his 
 
 opinion, the tariff, as a system designed for protection, is not 
 
 only impolitic, hut unconstitutional also. They are quite incapa- 
 
 VOL. II. 17 
 
130 
 
 ble of any other version or interpretation. They defy all explana- 
 tion, and all glosses. 
 
 Sir, however we may differ fiom the principles or the policy of 
 the Administration, it would, nevertheless, somewhat satisfy our 
 pride of country, if w^e could ascribe to it the character of con- 
 sistency. It would be grateful if w^e could contemplate the 
 President of the United States as an identical idea. But even 
 this secondary pleasure is denied to us. In looking to the pub- 
 lished records of Executive opinions, sentiments favorable to 
 protection, and sentiments against protection, eidier come con- 
 fusedly before us, at the same moment, or else follow each other 
 in rapid succession, like the shadows of a phantasmagoria. 
 
 Having read an extract from the veto message, containing the 
 statement of present opinions, allow me to read another extract 
 from the annual message of 1830. It will be perceived, that, in 
 that message, both the clear Constitutionality of the tariff laws, 
 and their indispensable policy, are maintained in the fullest and 
 strongest manner. The argument, on the Constitutional point, is 
 stated with more than common ability ; and the policy of the laws 
 is affirmed in terms importing the deepest and most setded con- 
 viction. We hear in this message nothing of improvident legisla- 
 tion ; nothing of the abandonment of the legitimate objects of 
 government ; nothing of the necessity of pausing in our career, and 
 reviewing our principles ; nothing of the necessity of changing our 
 Government, till it shall he made what it ought to be : — But let 
 the message speak for itself: — 
 
 " The power to impose duties on imports originally belonged to 
 the several States. The right to adjust those duties with a view 
 to the encouragement of domestic branches of industry, is so com- 
 pletely incidental to that power, that it is difficult to suppose the 
 existence of the one without the other. Tlie States have dele- 
 gated their whole authority over imports to the General Govern- 
 ment, without limitation or restriction, saving the very inconsider- 
 able reservation relating to their inspection laws. This authority 
 having thus entirely passed from the States, the right to exercise 
 it for "the purpose of protection does not exist in them ; and, con- 
 sequently, if it be not possessed by the General Government, it 
 must be extinct. Our political system would thus present the 
 anomaly of a people stripped of the right to foster their own in- 
 dustry, and to counteract the most selfish and destructive policy 
 which might be adopted by foreign nations. This surely cannot 
 be the case : this indispensable power, thus surrendered by the 
 States, must be within the scope of the authority on the subject 
 expressly delegated to Congress. 
 
 " In this coaclusion I am confirmed, as well by the opinions 
 
131 
 
 of Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, who 
 have each repeatedly recommended the exercise of this right 
 under the Constitution, as by the uniform practice of Congress, 
 tlie continued acquiescence of the States, and the general under- 
 standing of the people." 
 
 " I am well aware that this is a subject of so much delicacy, on 
 account of the extended interests it Involves, as to require that it 
 should be touched with the utmost caution ; and that, while an 
 abandonment of the policy in which it originated— a policy coeval 
 with our Government, pursued through successive ad^ninistrations — 
 is neither to be expected or desired, the people have a right to 
 demand, and have demanded, that it be so modified as to correct 
 abuses and obviate injustice." 
 
 Mr. President, no one needs to point out inconsistencies, plain 
 and striking like these. The messnge of 1830 is a well-written 
 paper ; it proceeded, probably, from the Cabinet proper. Whence 
 the veto message of 1832 proceeded, I know not; perhaps 
 from the Cabinet improper. 
 
 But, Sir, there is an important record of an earlier date than 
 1830. If. as the President avers, we have been guilty of im- 
 provident legislation, what act of Congress is the most striking 
 instance of that improvidence? Certainly it is the act of 1824. 
 The principle of protection, repeatedly recognized before that 
 time, was, by that act, carried to a new and great extent ; so new, 
 and so great, that the act was considered as the foundation of the 
 system. That law it was, which conferred on the distinguished 
 citizen, whose nomination for President this meeting has received 
 with so much enthusiasm, the appellation of" Author of the Amer- 
 ican System." Accordingly, the act of 1824 has been the par- 
 ticular object of attack, in all the warfare waged against the pro- 
 tective policy. If Congress ever abandoned legitimate objects of 
 legislation, in favor of protection, it did so by that law. If any 
 laws, now on the statute book, or which ever were there, show, 
 by their character, as laws of protection, that our Government is 
 not what it ought to be, and that it ought to be altered, and, in the 
 language of the veto message, made what it ought to be, the 
 law of 1824 is the very law, which, more than any, and more 
 than all others, makes good that assertion. And yet. Sir, the 
 , President of the United States, then a Senator in Congress, voted 
 for that law ! And, though I have not recurred to the journal, my 
 recollection is, that, as to some of its provisions, his support was 
 essential to their success. It will be found, I think, that some of 
 its enactments, and those now most loudly complained of, would 
 have failed, but for his own personal support of them, by his 
 own vote. 
 
132 
 
 After all this, it might have been hoped, that there would be, 
 in 1832, some tolerance of opinion toward those who cannot 
 think, that improvidence, abandonment of all the legitimate objects 
 of legislation, a desire to gratify the rich, who have besought Con- 
 gress to make them still richer, and the adoption of principles 
 unequal, oppressive, and odious, are the true characteristics to be 
 ascribed to the system of protection. 
 
 But, Sir, it is but a small part of my object to show inconsis- 
 tencies in Executive opinions. My main purpose is different, 
 and tends to more practical ends. It is, to call the attention of 
 the meeting, and of the people, to the principles, avowed in the 
 late message, as being the President's present opinions, and proofs 
 o{ his 2Jresent purposes, and to the consequences, if they shall be 
 maintained by die country. These principles are there expressed 
 in language which needs no commentary. They go, with a point 
 blank aim, against the fundamental stone of the Protecting Sys- 
 tem ; that is to say, against the Constitutional power of Congress 
 to establish and maintain that system, in whole or in part. The 
 question, therefore, of the tarift^ — the question of every tariff — 
 the question between maintaining our agricultural and manufac- 
 turing interests where they now are, and breaking up the entire 
 system, and erasing every vestige of it from the statute book, is 
 a question materially to be affected by the pending election. 
 
 The President has exercised his negative power on the law 
 for continuing the Bank charter. Here, too, he denies both the 
 Constitutionality and the policy of an existing law of Congress. 
 It is true, that the law, or a similar one, has been in operation 
 near forty years. Previous Presidents and previous Congresses 
 have, all along, sanctioned and upheld it. The highest courts, 
 and, indeed, all the courts, have pronounced it Constitutional. 
 A majority of the people, greater than exists on almost any other 
 question, agrees with all the Presidents, all the Congresses, and 
 all the courts of law. Yet, against all this weight of authority, 
 the President puts forth his own individual opinion, and has nega- 
 tived the bill ibr continuing the law. Which of the members of 
 his Administration, or whether any one of them, concurs in his 
 sentiments, we know not. Some of them, we know, have re- 
 cently advanced precisely the opposite opinions, and in the strong- 
 est manner recommended to Congress the continuation of the 
 Bank charter. Having himself, urgently and repeatedly, called 
 the attention of Congress to the subject, and his Secretary of the 
 Treasury, wno, and "all the other Secretaries, as the President's 
 friends say, are but so many pens in his hand, having, at the very 
 session, insisted, in his communication to Congress, both on the 
 Constitutionality and necessity of the Bank, the President, never- 
 theless, $avv fit to negative the bill, passed, as it had been, by 
 
133 
 
 strong majorities in both Houses, and passed, without doubt or 
 question, in comphance with the wishes of a vast majority of the 
 American people. 
 
 The question respecting the Constitutional power of Congress 
 to establish a Bank, I shall not here discuss. On that, as well as 
 on the general expediency of renewing the charter, my senti- 
 ments have been elsewhere expressed. They are before the pub- 
 lic ; and the experience of every day confirms me in their truth. 
 All that has been said of the embarrassment and distress, which 
 will be felt from discontinuing the Bank, falls far short of an ade- 
 quate representation. What was prophecy only two months ago, 
 is already history. 
 
 In this part of the country, indeed, we experience this distress 
 and embarrassment only in a mitigated degree. The loans of the 
 Bank are not so highly important, or at least not so absolutely 
 necessary, to the present operations of our commerce ; yet we 
 ourselves have a deep interest in the subject, as it is connected 
 with the general currency of the country, and with the cheapness 
 and facility of exchange. 
 
 The country, generally speaking, was well satisfied with the 
 Bank. Why not let it alone ? No evil had been felt from it in 
 thirty-six years. Why conjure up a troop of fancied mischiefs, 
 as a pretence to put it down ? The message struggles to excite 
 prejudices, from the circumstance that foreigners are stockholders ; 
 and on this ground it raises a loud cry against a moneyed aristoc- 
 racy. Can any thing. Sir, be conceived more inconsistent than 
 this ? any thing more remote from sound policy and good states- 
 manship? In the United States, the rate of interest is high, 
 compared with the rates abroad. In Holland and England, the 
 actual value of money is no more than three, or perhaps three 
 and a half, per cent. In our Atlantic States, it is as high as five 
 or six, taking the whole length of the sea-board ; in the North- 
 western States, it is eight or ten, and in the South-western ten or 
 twelve. If the introduction, then, of foreign capital be discoun- 
 tenanced and discouraged, the American money-lender may fix 
 his own rate, any where from five to twelve per cent, per annum. 
 On the other hand, if the introduction of foreign capital be coun- 
 tenanced and encouraged, its effect is to keep down the rate of 
 interest, and to bring the value of money in the United States 
 so much the nearer to its value in older and richer countries. 
 Every dollar brought from abroad, and put into the mass of active 
 capital at home, by so much diminishes the rate of interest ; and 
 by so much, therefore, benefits all the active and trading classes 
 of society, at the expense of the American capitalist. Yet the 
 President's invention — for such it deserves to be called, — that 
 which is to secure us against the possibility of being oppressed by 
 
134 
 
 a moneyed aristocracy — is to shut the door and bar it safely against 
 all introduction of foreign capital ! 
 
 Mr. President, what is it that has made England a sort of 
 general banker for the civilized world ? Why is it that capital, 
 from all quarters of the globe, accumulates at the centre of her 
 empire, and is thence again distributed ? Doubtless, Sir, it is be- 
 cause she invites it, and solicits it. She sees the advantage of this ; 
 and no British minister ever yet did a thing so rash, so inconsid- 
 erate, so startling, as to exhibit a groundless feelhig of dissatisfac- 
 tion at the introduction or employment of foreign capital. 
 
 Sir, of all the classes of society, the larger stockholders of the 
 Bank are among those least likely to suffer from its discontinuance. 
 There are, indeed, on the list of stockholders, many charitable in- 
 stitutions, many widows and orphans, holding small amounts. To 
 these, and other proprietors of a like character, the breaking up of 
 the Bank will, no doubt, be seriously inconvenient. But the cap- 
 italist — he who has invested money in the Bank merely for the 
 sake of the security and the interest — has nothing to fear. The 
 refusal to renew the charter will, it is true, diminish the value of 
 the stock ; but, then, the same refusal will create a scarcity for 
 money ; and this will reduce the price of all other stocks ; so that 
 the stockholders in the Bank, receiving, on its dissolution, their por- 
 tion respectively of its capital, will have opportunities of new and 
 cheap investment. 
 
 The truth is, Sir, the great loss, the sore embarrassment, the 
 severe distress, arising from this Veto, will fall on the public, and 
 especially on the more active and industrious portion of the public. 
 It will inevitably create a scarcity of money ; in the Western 
 States, it will most materially depress the value of property ; it will 
 greatly enhance, every where, the price of domestic exchange ; 
 it threatens, every where, fluctuations of the currency ; and it 
 drives all our well-settled and safe operations of revenue and 
 finance out of their accustomed channels. And all this is to be suf- 
 fered on the pretended ground of a Constitutional scruple, which 
 no respect for the opinion of others, no deference to legisla- 
 tive precedent, no decent regard to judicial decision, no homage to 
 public opinion, expressed and maintained for forty years, have 
 power to overcome. An idle apprehension of danger is set up 
 against the experience of almost half a century ; loose and flimsy 
 theories are asserted, against facts of general notoriety ; and argu- 
 ments are urged against continuing the charter, so superficial and 
 frivolous, and yet so evidently addressed to those of the commu- 
 nity who have never had occasion to be conversant with subjects 
 of this sort, — that an intelligent reader, who wishes to avoid im- 
 ])uting obliquity of motive, is obliged to content himself with as- 
 cribing to the origin of the message — whatever and wherever that 
 
135 
 
 origin may have been — no very distinguished share of the endow- 
 ments of intellect. 
 
 Mr. President, as early as December, 1829, the President 
 called the attention of Congress to the subject of the Bank, in the 
 most earnest manner. Look to his annual message of that date, 
 li^ou will find that he then felt constrained, by an irresistible sense 
 ofdutytothe various interests concerned, not to delay, beyond 
 that moment, hia, urgent invitation to Congress to take up the sub- 
 ject. He brought forward the same topic again, in all his subse- 
 quent annual messages ; yet when Congress did act upon it, and, 
 on the fourth of July, eighteen hundred and thirty-two, did 
 send him a bill, he returned it with his objections ; and among these 
 objections, be not only complained that the Executive was not 
 consulted on the propriety of present action, but affirmed also, 
 in so many words, that present action was deemed premature by 
 the Executive Department. 
 
 Let me ask, Mr. President, if it be possible that the same Pres- 
 ident, the same Chief Magistrate, the same mind, could have 
 composed these two messages ? Certainly they much more re- 
 semble the production of two minds, holding, on this point, pre- 
 cisely opposite opinions. The message of December, 1829, asserts 
 that the time had then come for Congress to consider the Bank 
 subject; the message of 1832 declares, that, even then, the ac- 
 tion of Congress on the same subject was premature ; and both 
 these messages were sent to Congress by the President of the 
 United States. Sir, I leave these two messages to be compared 
 and considered by the people. 
 
 Mr. President, I will here take notice of but one other sug- 
 gestion of the President, relative to the time and manner of passing 
 the late bill. A decent respect for the Legislature of the country 
 has hitherto been observed by all who have had occasion to hold 
 official intercourse with it, and especially by all other branches of 
 the Government. The purity of the motives of Congress, in re- 
 gard to any measure, has never been assailed from any respecta- 
 ble quarter. But in the veto message there is one expression, 
 which, as it seems to me, no American can read without some 
 feeling. There is an expression, evidently not casual or accidental, 
 but inserted with design, and composed with care, which does 
 carry a direct imputation of the possibility of the effect of private 
 interest and private influence on the deliberations of the two 
 Houses of Congress. I quote the passage, and shall leave it, with- 
 out a single remark : " Whatever interest or influence, whether 
 public or private, has given birth to this act, it cannot be found 
 either in the wishes or necessities of the Executive Department, 
 by which present action is deemed premature." 
 
 Among the great interests of the country, Mr. President, there 
 
186 
 
 is one, which appears to me not to have attracted, from the people 
 of this Commonvveakh, a degree of attention ahogether equal to 
 its magnitude. 
 
 I mean the pubhc lands. If we run our eye over the map of 
 the country, and view the regions, almost boundless, which now 
 constitute the public domain, and over which an active jiopulation 
 is rapidly spreading itself, and if we recollect the amount of annual 
 revenue derived from this source, we shall hardly fail to be con- 
 vinced that few branches of national interest are of more extensive 
 and lasting importance. So large a territory, belonging to the 
 public, forms a subject of national concern of a very delicate na- 
 ture, especially in popular governments. We know, in the history 
 of other countries, with what views designing men have granted 
 the public lands. 
 
 Either in the form of gifts and largesses, or in that of reduction 
 of prices to amounts merely nominal, or as compensation for ser- 
 vices, real or imagined, the public domain, in other countries and 
 other times, has not only been diverted from its just use and des- 
 tination, but has been the occasion, also, of introducing into the 
 state, and into the public councils, no small portion, both of dis- 
 traction and corruption. Happily, our own system of administer- 
 ing this great interest has hitherto been both safe and successful. 
 Nothing under the Government has been better devised than our 
 land system ; and nothing, tlius far, more beneficially conducted. 
 But the time seems to have arrived, in the progress of our growth 
 and prosperity, when it has become necessary to reflect, not on 
 any new mode of sale, — for that can hardly be improved, — but on 
 some disposition of the proceeds, such as shall be just and equal 
 to the whole country, and shall ensure also a constant and vigilant 
 attention to this important subject from the people of all the States. 
 It is not to be denied or disguised, that sentiments have recently 
 sprung up, in some places, of a very extraordinary character, re- 
 specting the ownership, the just proprietary interest, in these lands. 
 The lands are well known to have been obtained by the United 
 States, either by grants from individual States, or by treaties with 
 foreign powers. In both cases, and in all cases, the grants and 
 cessions were to the United States, for the interest of the whole 
 Union ; and the grants from individual States contain express 
 limitations and conditions, binding up the whole property to the 
 common use of all the States forever. Yet, of late years, an idea 
 has been suggested, indeed seriously advanced, that these lands, of 
 right, belong to the States respectively, in which they happen to 
 lie. This doctrine. Sir, which, I perceive, strikes this assembly as 
 being somewhat extravagant, is founded on an argument derived, 
 as is supposed, from the nature of State sovereignty. It has been 
 openly espoused, by candidates for office, in some of the new 
 
137 
 
 States, and, indeed, has been announced in the Senate. To the 
 credit of the country, it should be stated, that, up to the present 
 moment, these notions have not spread widely ; and they will be 
 dispersed, undoubtedly, by the power of general opinion, so soon 
 as that opinion shall be awakened and expressed. But there is 
 another tendency, more likely, perhaps, to run to injurious excess ; 
 and that is, a constant effort to reduce the price of land to sums 
 almost nominal, on the ground of facilitating settlement. The 
 sound policy of the Government has been, uniformly, to keep the 
 prices of the public lands low ; so low, that every actual settler 
 might easily obtain a farm ; but yet not so low as to tempt in- 
 dividual capitalists to buy up large quantities, to hold for specula- 
 tion. The object has been to meet, at all times, the whole actual 
 demand, at a cheap rate ; and this object has been obtained. And 
 it is obviously of the greatest importance to keep the prices of the 
 public lands from all influences, except the single one of the desire 
 of supplying the whole actual demand, at a cheap rate. The present 
 minimum price is one dollar and a quarter per acre ; and millions 
 of acres, much of it of an excellent quality, are now in the market 
 at this rate. Yet, every year, there are propositions to reduce the 
 price, and propositions to graduate the price ; that is to say, to 
 provide that all lands, having been offered for sale, for a certain 
 length of time, at the established rate, if not then sold, shall be 
 offered at a less rate ; and again reduced, if not sold, to one still 
 less. I have myself thought, that, in some of the oldest districts, 
 some mode might usefully be adopted of disposing of the remain- 
 der of the unsold lands, and closing the offices; but a universal 
 system of graduation, lowering prices at short intervals, and by- 
 large degrees, could have no other effect than a general de- 
 pression of price in regard to the whole mass, and would evidently 
 be great mismanagement of the public property. The meeting, 
 Sir, will think it singular enough, that a reduction of prices of the 
 public lands should have been demanded, on the ground that other 
 impositions for revenue, such as the duty on tea and coffee, have 
 been removed; thus considering and treating the sums received 
 for lands sold, as a tax, a burden, an imposition, and a great d7-ai7i 
 on the means and the industry of the new States. A man goes 
 from New England to one of the Western States, buys a hundred 
 acres of the best land in the world for one hundred and twenty- 
 five dollars, pays his money, and receives an indisputable title ; and 
 immediately, some one stands up in Congress to call this operation 
 the laying of a tax, the imposition of a burden ; and the whole of 
 these purchases and payments, taken together, are represented as 
 an intolerable drain on the money and the industry of the new 
 States. I know not. Sir, which deserves to pass for the original, 
 and which for the copy ; but this reasoning is not unlike that 
 
 VOL. II. 18 
 
138 
 
 which maintains that the trading connmunity of the West will be 
 exhausted and ruined, by the privilege of borrowing money of the 
 Bank of the United States at six per cent, interest ; this interest 
 being, as is said in the veto message, a burden upon their indus- 
 try, and a drain of their currency, which no country can bear 
 without inconvenience and distress ! 
 
 It was in a forced connection with the reduction of duties of 
 impost, that the subject of the public lands was referred to the 
 Committee of Manufactures in the Senate, at the late session of 
 Congress. This was a legislative movement, calculated to throw 
 on Mr. Clay, who was acting a leading part on the subject of the 
 tariff, and the reduction of duties, a new and delicate responsi- 
 bility. From this responsibility, however, Mr. Clay did not 
 shrink. He took up the subject, and his report upon it, and his 
 speech delivered afterwards, in defence of the report, are, in my 
 opinion, among the very ablest of the efforts which have distin- 
 guished his long public life. I desire to commend their perusal 
 to every citizen of Massachusetts. They will show him the deep 
 interest of all the States, his own among the rest, in the security, 
 and proper management, and disposal, of the public domain. 
 Founded on the report of the committee, Mr. Clay introduced 
 a bill, providing for the distribution, among all the States, accord- 
 ing to numbers, of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands 
 for five years ; first making a deduction of a considerable per cen- 
 tage in favor of the new States ; the sums thus received by the 
 States to be disposed of by them in favor of education, internal 
 improvement, or colonization, as each State might choose for 
 itself This bill passed the Senate. It was vigorously opposed 
 in the House of Representatives, by the main body of the friends 
 of the Administration, and finally lost by a small majority. By 
 the provisions of the bill, Massachusetts would have received, as 
 her dividend, one hundred and thirty-seven thousand dollars 
 a year. 
 
 I am free to confess. Sir, that I had hoped to see some unob- 
 jectionable way of disposing of this subject, with the observance 
 of justice towards all the States, by the Government of the United 
 States itself, without a distribution, through the intervention of the 
 State Governments. Such way, however, I have not discovered. 
 1 therefore voted for the bill of the last session. 
 
 Mr. President, let me remind the meeting of the great extent 
 of this public properly. 
 
 Only twenty millions of acres have been, as yet, sold, from the 
 commencement of the Government. One hundred and twenty 
 millions, or about that quantity, are now cleared from the Indian 
 title, all surveyed into townships, ranges, and sections, and now 
 in the market for sale. I think, Sir, the whole surface of Mas- 
 
139 
 
 sachusetts embraces about six millions of acres ; so that the United 
 States have a body of land, now surveyed, and in market, equal 
 to twenty States, each of the size of Massachusetts. But this is 
 but a very small portion of the whole domain ; much the greater 
 part being yet unsurveyed, and much, too, subject to the original 
 Indian tide. The income to the revenue from the sales of land, 
 is estimated at three millions of dollars a year. The meeting will 
 thus see. Sir, how important a subject this is, and how highly it 
 becomes the country to guard this vast property against perver- 
 sion and bad management. 
 
 Mr. President, among the bills which failed, at the last ses- 
 sion, for want of the President's approval, was one in which this 
 State had a great pecuniary interest. It was the bill for the pay- 
 ment of interest to the States, on the funds advanced by them 
 during the war, the principal of which had been paid, or assumed, 
 by the Government of the United States. Some sessions ago, a 
 bill was introduced into the Senate, by my worthy colleague, and 
 passed into a law, for paying a large part of the principal sum, ad- 
 vanced by Massachusetts, for militia expenses, for defence of the 
 country. This has been paid. The residue of the claim is in 
 the proper course of examination ; and such parts of it as ought to 
 be allowed will doubdess be paid hereafter, vetos being out of the 
 way, be it always understood. In the late bill, it was proposed 
 that interest should be paid to the States, on these advances, in 
 cases where it had not been already paid. It passed both Houses. 
 I recollect no opposition to it in the Senate, nor do I remember 
 to have heard of any considerable objection in the House of Rep- 
 resentatives. The argument for it lay in its own obvious jus- 
 tice ; a justice too apparent, as it seems to me, to be denied by 
 any one. I left Congress, Sir, a day or two before its adjourn- 
 ment, and, meeting some friends, in this village, on my way home, 
 we exchanged congratulations on this additional act of justice, thus 
 rendered to Massachusetts, as well as other States. But I had 
 hardly reached Framingham, before I learned that our congratu- 
 lations were premature. The President's signature had been re- 
 fused, and the bill was not a law ! The only reason which I 
 have ever heard for this refusal, is, that Congress had not been 
 in the practice of allowing interest on claims. This is not true 
 as a universal rule ; but if it were, might not Congress be trusted 
 with the maintenance of its own rules } Might it not make ex- 
 ceptions to them for good cause ? There is no doubt that, in 
 regard to old and long-neglected claims, it has been customary 
 not to allow interest ; but the Massachusetts claim was not of diis 
 character, nor were the claims of other States. None of them 
 had remained unpaid for want of presentment. The Executive 
 and Legislature of this Commonwealth had never omitted to press 
 
140 
 
 her demand for justice, and her Delegates in Congress have en- 
 deavored to discharge their duty by supporting that den)and. It 
 has been ah-eady decided, in repeated instances, as well in regard 
 to States as to individuals, that when money has been actually 
 borrowed, for objects for which the General Government ought 
 to provide, interest paid on such horroived money shall be re- 
 funded by the United States. Now, Sir, would it not be a dis- 
 tinction without a difference to allow interest in such a case, and 
 yet refuse it in another, in which the State had not borrowed the 
 money, and paid interest for it, but had raised it by taxation, or, 
 as I believe was the case with Massachusetts, by the sale of val- 
 uable stocks, bearing interest 1 Is it not apparent, that, in her 
 case, as clearly as in that of a borrowing State, she has actually 
 lost the interest? Can any man maintain that, between these 
 two cases, there is any sound distinction, in law, in equity, or in 
 morals ? The refusal to sign this bill has deprived Massachusetts 
 and Maine of a very large sum of money, justly due to them. It 
 is now fifteen or sixteen years since the money was advanced ; 
 and it was advanced for the most necessary and praiseworthy 
 public purposes. The interest on the sum already refunded, and 
 on that which may reasonably be expected to be hereafter re- 
 funded, is not less than Jive hundred thousand dollars. But for 
 the President's refusal, in this unusual mode, to give his appro- 
 bation to a bill which had passed Congress almost unanimously, 
 these two States would already have been in the receipt of a very 
 considerable portion of this money, and made sure of the residue 
 in due season. 
 
 Mr. President, I do not desire to raise mere pecuniary inter- 
 ests to an undue importance, in political matters. I admit there 
 are principles and objects of paramount obligation and importance. 
 I would not oppose the President merely because he has refused 
 to the State what I thought her entitled to, in a matter of money, 
 provided he had made known his reasons, and they had appeared 
 to be such as might fairly influence an intelligent and honest mind. 
 But where a State has so direct and so heavy an interest ; where 
 the justice of the case is so plain, that men agree in it who agree 
 in hardly any thing else ; where her claim has passed Congress 
 without considerable opposition in either House — a refusal to ap- 
 prove the bill without giving the slightest reason, the taking ad- 
 vantage of the rising of Congress to give it a silent go-by, is an 
 act that may well awaken the attention of the people in the States 
 concerned. It is an act requiring close examination. It is an 
 act which calls loudly for justification by its author. And now, 
 Sir, I will close what 1 have to say on this particular subject, by 
 stafing, that, on the 22d of March, 1832, the President did ac- 
 tually approve and sign a bill, in favor of South Carolina, by 
 
141 
 
 which it was enacted that her claim for interest upon money ac- 
 tually expended by her for mihtary stores, during the late war, 
 should be settled and paid ; the money so expended having been 
 drawn by the State from a fund upon xvhich she ivas receiving 
 interest. Now, this. Sir, was precisely the case of Massa- 
 chusetts. 
 
 Mr. President, I now approach an inquiry of a far more deep 
 and affecting interest. Are the principles and measures of the 
 Administration dangerous to the Constitution, and to the Union of 
 the States ? Sir, I believe them to be so ; and I shall state the 
 grounds of that belief. 
 
 In the first place, any administration is dangerous to the Consti- 
 tution, and to the Union of the States, which denies the essential 
 powers of the Constitution, and thus strips it of the capacity to do 
 the good intended by it. 
 
 The principles embraced by the Administration, and expressed 
 in die veto message, are evidently hostile to the whole system 
 of protection, by duties of impost, on Constitutional grounds. 
 Here, then, is one great power struck at once out of the Constitu- 
 tion ; and one great end of its adoption defeated. And while this 
 power is thus struck out of the Constitution, it is clear that it exists 
 nowhere else ; since the Constitution expressly takes it away from 
 all the States. 
 
 The veto message denies the Constitutional power of creating 
 or continuing such an insdtution as our whole experience has 
 approved, for maintaining a sound, uniform, national currency, and 
 for the safe collection of revenue. Here is another power, long 
 used, but now lopped oflT. And this power, too, thus lopped off 
 from the Constitution, is evidently not within the power of any of 
 the individual States. No State can maintain a national currency; 
 no State institution can render to the revenue the services per- 
 formed by a National institution. 
 
 The principles of tlie Administration are hostile to internal 
 improvements. Here is another power, heretofore exercised in 
 many instances, now denied. The Administration denies the 
 power, except widi qualifications, which cast an air of ridicule 
 over the whole subject ; being founded on such distinctions as 
 between salt water and fresh water, places above custom-houses 
 and places below ; and others equally extraordinary. 
 
 Now, Sir, in all these respects, as well as in others, I think the 
 principles of the Administration are at war with the true principles 
 of the Constitution ; and that by the zeal and industry which it 
 exerts to support its own principles, it does daily 'weaken the 
 Constitution, and does put in doubt its long continuance. The 
 inroad of to-day opens the way for an easier inroad to-morrow. 
 When any one essential part is rent away, or, what is nearer the 
 
142 
 
 truth, when many essential parts are rent away, who is there to tell 
 us how long any other part is to remain ? 
 
 Sir, our condition is singularly paradoxical. We have an 
 Administration opposed to the Constitution ; we have an Opposi- 
 tion which is the main support of the Government and the laws. 
 We have an Administration which denies, to the very Govern- 
 ment which it administers, powers which it has exercised for forty 
 years ; it denies the protecting power, the bank power, and the 
 power of internal improvement. The great and leading measures 
 of the National Legislature are all resisted by it. These, strange as 
 it may seem, depend on the Opposition for support. We have, 
 in truth, an Opposition without which it would be difficult for the 
 Government to get along at all. I appeal to every member of 
 Congress present (and I am happy to see many here) to say, what 
 would now become of the Government, if all the members of the 
 Opposition were withdrawn from Congress. For myself, I declare* 
 my own conviction that its continuance might probably be very 
 short. Take away the Opposition from Congress, and let us see 
 what would probably be done the first session. The tariff 
 would be entirely repealed. Every enactment having protection 
 by duties as its main object would be struck from the statute book. 
 This would be the first thing done. Every work of internal 
 improvement would be stopped. This would follow, as matter 
 of course. The Bank would go down, and a treasury money 
 agency would take its place. The Judiciary act of 1789 would 
 be repealed, so that the Supreme Court should exercise no power 
 of revision over State decisions. And who would resist the doc- 
 trines of Nullification ? Look, Sir, to the votes of Congress 
 for the last three years, and you will see that each of these things 
 would, in all human probability, take place at the next session, if 
 the Opposition were to be withdrawn. The Constitution is threat- 
 ened, therefore, imminently threatened, by the very fact that 
 those are intrusted with its administration who are hostile to its 
 essential powers. 
 
 But, Sir, in my opinion, a yet greater danger threatens the 
 Constitution and the Government ; and that is from the attempt 
 to extend the power of the Executive at the expense of all the 
 other branches of the Government, and of the people themselves. 
 Whatever accustomed power is denied to the Constitution, whatever 
 accustomed power is denied to Congress, or to the Judiciary, none is 
 denied to the Executive. Here, there is no retrenchment ; here, no 
 apprehension is felt for the liberties of the people ; here, it is not 
 thought necessary to erect barriers against corruption. 
 
 I begin, Sir, with the subject of removals from office for 
 opinion's sake, — as, I think, one of the most signal instances of the 
 attempt to extend Executive power. This has been a leading 
 
143 
 
 measure, a cardinal point, in the course of the Administration. It 
 has proceeded, from the first, on a settled system of proscription 
 for political opinions; and this system it has carried into operation 
 to the full extent of its ability. The President has not only filled 
 all vacancies with his own friends, generally those most dis- 
 tinguished as personal partisans, but he has turned out political 
 opponents, and thus created vacancies, in order that he might fill 
 them with his own friends. I think the number of removals and 
 appointments is said to be two thousand. While the Administra- 
 tion and its friends have been attempting to circumscribe, and to 
 decry, the powers belonging to other branches, it has thus seized 
 into its own hands a patronage most pernicious and corrupting, an 
 authority over men's means of living most tyrannical and odious, 
 and a power to punish free men for political opinions altogether 
 intolerable. 
 
 - You will remember. Sir, that the Constitution says not one 
 word about the President's power of removal from office. It is a 
 power raised entirely by construction. It is a constructive power, 
 introduced, at first, to meet cases of extreme public necessity. It 
 has now become coextensive whh the Executive will, calling for 
 no necessity, requiring no exigency, for its exercise ; but to be 
 exercised at all times, without control, without question, without 
 responsibility. When the question of the President's power of 
 removal was debated in the first Congress, those who argued for 
 it limited it to extreme cases. Cases, they said, might arise, in 
 which it would be absolutely necessary to remove an officer, before 
 the Senate could be assembled. An officer might become in- 
 sane ; he might abscond ; and from these, and other supposable 
 cases, it was said, the public service might materially suffer, if the 
 President could not remove the incumbent. And it was further said, 
 that there was little or no danger of the power's being abused for 
 party or personal objects. No President, it was thought, would 
 ever commit such an outrage on public opinion. Mr. Madison^ 
 who thought the power ought to exist, and to be exercised in} 
 cases of high necessity, declared, nevertheless, that if a President 
 should exercise the power, when not called for by any public 
 exigency, and merely for personal objects, he ivould deserve to be 
 impeached. By a very small majority, — I think, in the Senate, by 
 the casting vote of the Vice-President,— Congress decided in favor 
 of the existence of the power, upon the grounds which I have 
 mentioned ; granting the power, in a case of clear and absolute 
 necessity, and denying its existence every where else. 
 
 ^ Mr. President, we sl]ould recollect that this question was 
 discussed, and thus decided, when Washington was in the Execu- 
 tive chair. Men knew, that, in his hands, the power would not 
 be abused ; nor did they conceive it possible that any of his 
 
144 
 
 successors could so far depart from his great and bright example, 
 as, by abuse of'the power, and by carrying that abuse to its utmost 
 extent, to change the essential character of the Executive from 
 that of an impartial guardian and executor of the laws, into that of 
 the chief dispenser of party rewards. Three or four instances of 
 removal occurred in the first twelve years of the Government. 
 At the commencement of Mr. Jefferson's Administration, he made 
 several others, not without producing much dissatisfaction ; so 
 much so, that he thought it expedient to give reasons to the 
 people, in a public paper, for even the limited extent to which he 
 had exercised the power. He placed his justification on particu- 
 lar circumstances and peculiar grounds ; which, whether sub- 
 stantial or not, showed, at least, that he did not regard the power 
 of removal as an ordinary power, still less as a mere arbitrary 
 one, to be used as he pleased, for whatever ends he pleased, and 
 without responsibility. As far as I remember, Sir, after the 
 early part of Mr. Jefferson's Administration, hardly an instance 
 occurred for near thirty years. If there were any instances, they 
 were few. But at the commencement of the present Administra- 
 tion, the precedent of these previous cases was seized on, and a 
 system, a regular plan of government, a well-considered scheme 
 for the maintenance of party power, by the patronage of office, 
 and this patronage to be created by general removal, was adopted, 
 and has been carried into full operation. Indeed, before Gen. 
 Jackson's inauguration, the party put the system into practice. 
 In the last session of Mr. Adams's Administration, the friends of 
 Gen. Jackson constituted a majority in the Senate ; and nomina- 
 tions, made by him to fill vacancies, which had occurred in the 
 ordinary way, were postponed, by this majority, beyond the third 
 of March, for the purpose, openly avoived, of giving the nomina- 
 tions to Gen. Jackson. A nomination for a Judge of the Su- 
 preme Court, and many others of less magnitude, were thus dis- 
 posed of 
 
 And what did we witness. Sir, when the Administration actually 
 commenced, in the full exercise of its authority? One universal 
 sweep, one undistinguishing blow, levelled against all who were 
 not of the successful party. No worth, public or private, no ser- 
 vice, civil or military, was of power to resist the relendess greedi- 
 ness of proscription. Soldiers of the late war, soldiers of the rev- 
 olutionary war, the very contemporaries of the liberties of the 
 country, all lost their situations. No office was too high,_and none 
 too low ; for office was the spoil, — and all the spoils, it is said, 
 belong to the victors! If a man, holding an office, necessary for 
 his daily support, had presented himself covered vyith the scars of 
 wounds received in every battle, from Bunker Hill to Yorktown, 
 these would not have protected him against this reckless rapacity. 
 
145 
 
 1 
 Nay, Sir, if Warren himself had been among the living, and had / 
 possessed any office under Government, high or low, he would not / 
 have been suffered to hold it a single hour, unless he could show 
 that he had strictly complied with the party statutes, and had put 
 a well-marked party collar round his own neck. Look, Sir, to 
 the case of the late venerable Major Melvill. He was a spirit 
 of 1776, one of the very first to venture in the cause of liberty. 
 He was of the Tea Party ; one of the very first to expose himself 
 to British power. And his whole life was consonant with this, its 
 beginning. Always ardent in the cause of liberty ; always a zeal- 
 ous friend to his country ; always acting with the party which he ,' 
 supposed cherished the genuine republican spirit most fervent- / 
 ly ; always estimable and respectable in private life, — he seemed i 
 armed against this miserable petty tyranny of party, as far as man / 
 could be. But he felt its blow, and he fell. He held an office / 
 in the custom-house, and had holden it for a long course of years; 
 and he was deprived of it, as if unworthy to serve the country which 
 he loved, and for whose liberties, in the vigor of his early manhood, he 
 had thrust himself into the very jaws of its enemies. There was 
 no mistake in the matter. His character, his standing, his revolu- 
 tionary services, were all well known ; but they were known to no 
 purpose ; they weighed not one feat'her against party pretensions. 
 It cost no pains to remove him ; it cost no compunction to wring 
 his aged heart with this retribution fi'om his country for his services, 
 his zeal, and his fidelity. Sir, you will bear witness, that, when 
 his successor was nominated to the Senate, and the Senate was 
 told who it was that had been removed to make way for that nomi- 
 nation, members were struck with horror. They had not con- 
 ceived the Administration to be capable of such a thing ; and yet, 
 they said, What can ive do.'' The man is removed; ive cannot 
 recall him ; we can only act upon the nomination before us .'' Sir, — 
 you and I thought otherwise ; and I rejoice that we did think 
 otherwise. We thought it our duty to resist the nomination 
 to a vacancy thus created. We thought it our duty to oppose this 
 proscription when, and where, and as, we Constitutionally could. 
 We besought the Senate to go with us, and to take a stand before 
 the country on this great question. We invoked them to try the 
 deliberate sense of the people ; to trust themselves before the 
 tribunal of public opinion; to resist at first, to resist at last, to resist 
 always, the introduction of this unsocial, this mischievous, this dan- 
 gerous, this belligerent principle, into the practice of the Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 Mr. President, as far as I know, there is no civilized country\ 
 on earth, in which, on a change of rulers, there is such an inquisi'J 
 tionfor spoil, as we have witnessed in this free republic. The 
 Inaugural Address of 1829 spoke of a searching ojjeration of Gov- 
 vol. II. 19 
 
/ 
 
 146 
 
 ernment. The most searching operation, Sir, of the present Ad- 
 ministration, has been its search for office and place. Whenever, 
 Sir, did any English minister, whig or tory, take such an inquest? 
 When did he ever go down to low-water mark, to make an ousting 
 ) of tide-waiters ? When did he ever take away the daily bread of 
 weighers, and gangers, and measurers ? Or when did he go into the 
 villages, to disturb the litile post-offices, the mail contracts, and 
 any thing else, in the remotest degree connected with Government ? 
 Sir, a British minister, who should do this, and should afterwards 
 show his head in a British House of Commons, would be received 
 by a universal hiss. 
 
 I have little to say of the selections made to fill vacancies thus 
 created. It is true, however, — and it is a natural consequence of 
 the system which has been acted on, — that, within the last three 
 years, more nominations, have been rejected, on the ground of un- 
 fitness, than in all the preceding forty years of the Government. 
 And these nominations, you know, Sir, could not have been reject- 
 ed, but by votes of the President's own friends. The cases were 
 too strong to be resisted. Even party attachment could not stand 
 them. In some, not a third of the Senate, in others not ten votes, 
 and in others not a single vote, could be obtained ; and this for no 
 particular reason known only to the Senate ; but on general grounds 
 of the want of character and qualifications ; on grounds known to 
 every body else, as well as to the Senate. All this, Sir, is per- 
 fectly natural and consistent. The same party selfishness which 
 drives good men out of office, will push bad men in. Political 
 proscription leads necessarily to the filling of offices with incompe- 
 tent persons, and to a consequent mal-execution of official duties. 
 In my opinion, Sir, it will effectually change the character of our 
 Government, this acting upon the avowed principle of claiming 
 office by right of conquest, unless the public shall rebuke and re- 
 strain it. It elevates party above country ; it forgets the common 
 weal in the pursuit of personal emolument ; it tends to form, it 
 does form, we see that it has formed, political combinations, held 
 together by no common principles or opinions among its members, 
 either upon the powers of the Government, or the true policy of 
 the country ; but held together simply as an association, under the 
 charm of a popular head, seeking to maintain possession of the 
 Government by a vigorous exercise of its patronage ; and for this 
 purpose agitafing, and alarming, and distressing social life by the 
 exercise of a Tyrannical party proscription. Sir, if this course of 
 /things cannot be checked, good men will grow tired of the exer- 
 ^ cise of political privileges. They will have nothing to do with pop- 
 ular elections. They will see that such elections are but a mere 
 selfish contest for office ; and they will abandon the Government 
 I to the scramble of the bold, the daring, and the desperate. 
 
147 
 
 It seems, Mr. President, to be a peculiar and singular charac- 
 teristic of the present Administration, that it came into power on a 
 cry against abuses, which did not exist, and then, as soon as it was 
 in, as if in mockery of the perception and intelligence of the people, 
 it created those very abuses, and carried them to a great length. 
 Thus the Chief Magistrate himself, before he came into the chair, 
 in a formal public paper, denounced the practice of appointing 
 members of Congress to office. He said, that if that practice con- 
 tinued, corruption would become the order of the day ; and, as if 
 to fasten and nail down his own consistency to that point, he de- 
 clared that it was ^^ due to himself to practise what he recommended 
 to others.'' Yet, Sir, as soon as he was in power, these fastenings 
 gave way, the nails all flew, and the promised consistency remains, 
 a striking proof of the manner in which political assurances are 
 sometimes fulfilled. For, Sir, he has already appointed more 
 members of Congress to office than any of his predecessors, in the 
 longest period of administration. Before his time, there was no 
 reason to complain of these appointments. They had not been 
 numerous under any administration. Under this, they have been 
 numerous, and some of them such as may well justify complaint. 
 
 Another striking instance of the exhibition of the same character- 
 istics, may be found in the sentiments of the Inaugural Address, 
 and in the subsequent practice, on the subject of interfering ivith 
 the freedom of elections. The Inaugural Address declares, that it 
 is necessary to reform abuses which have brought the patronage 
 of the Government into conflict ivith the freedom of elections. 
 And what has been the subsequent practice.'' Look to the news- 
 papers ; — look to the published letters of officers of the Government, 
 advising, exhorting, soliciting, friends and partisans to greater ex- 
 ertions in the cause of the party ; — see all done, every where, 
 which patronage and power can do, to affect not only elections in 
 the General Government, but also in every State Government — 
 and then say, how well this promise of reforming abuses has been 
 kept. At what former period, under what former administration, 
 did public officers of the United States thus interfere in elections? 
 Certainly, Sir, never. In this respect, then, as well as in others, 
 that which was not true, as a charge against previous administra- 
 tions, would have been true, if it had assumed the form of a proph- 
 ecy respecting the acts of the present. 
 
 But there is another attempt to grasp, and to wield a power 
 over public opinion, of a still more daring character, and far more 
 dangerous effects. 
 
 In all popular governments, a Free Press is the most impor- 
 tant of all agents and instruments. It not only expresses public 
 opinion, but, to a very great degree, it contributes to form that 
 opinion. It is an engine, for good or for evil, as it may be directed ; 
 
148 
 
 but an engine of which nothing can resist the force. The con- 
 /"ductors of the press, in popular governments, occupy a place, in 
 fithe social and political system, of the very highest consequence. 
 They wear the character of public instructers. Their daily labors 
 bear directly on the intelligence, the morals, the taste and the 
 public spirit of the country. Not only are they journalists, record- 
 ing political occurrences, but they discuss principles, they com- 
 ment on measures, they canvass characters ; they hold a power 
 over the reputation, the feelings, the happiness of individuals. The 
 pubUc ear is always open to their addresses, the public sympathy 
 easily made responsive to their sentiments. It is, indeed, Sir, a 
 distinction of high honor, that theirs is the only profession ex 
 pressly protected and guarded by Constitutional enactments. Their 
 employment soars so high, in its general consequences, it is so in- 
 timately connected with the public happiness, that its security is 
 provided for by the fundamental law. While it acts in a manner 
 worthy of this distinction, the press is a fountain of light, and a 
 source of gladdening warmth. It instructs the public mind, and 
 animates the spirit of patriotism. Its loud voice suppresses every 
 
 V thing which would raise itself against the public liberty ; and its 
 blasting rebuke causes incipient despotism to perish in the bud. 
 
 But remember. Sir, that these are the attributes of a Free 
 Press only. And is a press that is purchased or pensioned more 
 free than a press that is fettered ? Can the people look for truths 
 to partial sources, whether rendered partial through fear or through 
 favor? Why shall not a manacled press be trusted, with the main- 
 tenance and defence of popular rights ? Because it is supposed to 
 be under the influence of a power which may prove greater than 
 the love of truth. Such a press may screen abuses in Government, 
 or be silent. It may fear to speak. And may it not fear to speak, 
 too, when its conductors, if they speak in any but one way, may 
 lose their means of livelihood ? Is dependence on Government for 
 bread no temptation to screen its abuses ? Will the press always 
 speak the truth, though the truth, If spoken, may be the means of 
 silencing it for the future ? Is the truth in no danger — is the watch- 
 N man under no temptation — when he can neither proclaim the ap 
 yproach of national evils, nor seem to descry them, without the loss 
 of his place ? 
 
 Mr. President, an open attempt to secure the aid and friend- 
 ship of the public press, by bestowing the emoluments of office 
 on its active conductors, seems to me, of every thing we have 
 witnessed, to be the most reprehensible. It degrades both the 
 Government and the press. As far as its natural effect extends, it 
 turns the palladium of liberty into an engine of party. It brings 
 the agency, activity, energy and patronage of Government, all to 
 bear, with united force, on the means of general intelligence, and 
 
 r 
 
149 
 
 on the adoption or rejection of political opinions. It so completely 
 perverts the true object of Government — it so entirely revolutionizes 
 our whole system — that the chief business of those in power is di- 
 rected rather to the propagation of opinions favorable to them- 
 selves, than to the execution of the laws. This propagation of 
 opinions, through the press, becomes the main administrative duty. 
 Some fifty or sixty editors of leading journals have been appointed 
 to office by the present Executive. A stand has been made 
 against this proceeding, in the Senate, with partial success ; but, 
 by means of appointments which do not come before the Senate, 
 or other means, the number has been carried to the extent I have 
 mentioned. Certainly, Sir, the editors of the public journals are 
 not to be disfranchised. Certainly, they are fair candidates either 
 for popular elections, or a just participation in office. Certainly, 
 they reckon, in their number, some of the first geniuses, the best 
 scholars, and the most honest and well-principled men, in the coun- 
 try. But the complaint is against the system, against the practice, 
 against the undisguised attempt to secure the favor of the press, by 
 means addressed to its pecuniary interest, and these means, too, 
 drawn from the public treasury, Ijeing no other than the appointed 
 compensaUons for the performance of official duties. Sir, the press 
 itself should resent this. Its own character for purity and inde- 
 pendence is at stake. It should resist a connection rendering it 
 obnoxious to so mmiy imputations. It should point to its honor- 
 able denomination, in our Constitutions of Government, and it 
 should maintain the character, there ascribed to it, of a Free 
 Press. 
 
 There can. Sir, be no objection to the appointment of an editor 
 to office, if he is the fittest man. There can be no objection to 
 considering the services, which, in that, or in any other capacity, 
 he may have rendered his country. He may have done much to 
 maintain her rights against foreign aggression, and her character 
 against insult. He may have honored, as well as defended her ; 
 and may, therefore, be justly regarded and selected, in the choice 
 of faitliful public agents. But the ground of complaint is, that the 
 aiding, bij the press, of the election of an individual, is rewarded, 
 by that same individual, ivith the gift of moneyed offices. Men are 
 turned out of office, and others put in, and receive salaries from 
 the public treasury, on the ground, either openly avowed, or 
 falsely denied, that they had rendered service in the election of 
 the very individual who makes this removal, and makes this ap- 
 pointment. Every man. Sir, must see that this is a vital stab at 
 the purity of the press. It not only assails the independence of 
 the press, by addressing sinister motives, but it furnishes the means 
 of exciting these motives from the public treasury. It extends 
 the Executive power over the press in a most daring manner. It 
 
150 
 
 operates to give a direction to opinion, not favorable to the Gov- 
 ernment, in the aggregate ; not favorable to the Constitution and 
 laws ; not favorable to the Legislature ; but favorable to the Execu- 
 tive alone. The consequence often is, just what might be looked 
 for, that the portion of the press, thus made fast to the Executive 
 interest, denounces Congress, denounces the Judiciary, complains 
 of the laws, and quarrels with the Constitution. This exercise of 
 the right of appointment, to this end, is an augmentation, and a 
 vast one, of the Executive power, singly and alone. It uses that 
 power strongly against all other branches of the Government, and 
 it uses it strongly, too, for any struggle which it may be called on 
 to make with general public opinion. Mr. President, I will quit 
 this topic. There is much in it, in my judgment, affecting, not 
 only the purity and independence of the press, but also the char- 
 acter and honor, the peace and security, of the Government. 1 
 leave it, in all its bearings, to the consideration of the people. 
 
 Mr. President, among the novelties introduced into the Gov- 
 ernment by the present Administration, is the frequent use of the 
 President's negative on acts of Congress. Under former Presi- 
 dents, this power has been deemed an extraordinary one, to be 
 exercised only in peculiar and marked cases. It was vested in 
 the President, doubtless, as a guard against hasty or inconsider- 
 ate legislation, and against any act, inadvertently passed, which 
 might seem to encroach on the just authority of other branches of 
 the Government. I do not recollect that, by all General Jackson's 
 predecessors, this power was exercised more than four or five 
 times. Not having recurred to the journals, I cannot, of course, 
 be sure that I am numerically accurate in this particular ; but such 
 is my belief. I recollect no instance in the time of Mr. John 
 Adams, Mr. Jefferson, or Mr. John Quincy Adams. The only 
 cases which occur to me are, two in General Washington's admin- 
 istration, two in Mr. Madison's, and one in Mr. Monroe's. There 
 may be some others ; but we all know that it is a power which 
 has been very sparingly and reluctantly used, from the beginning of 
 the Government. The cases, Sir, to which I have now referred, 
 were cases in which the President returned the bill loith objec- 
 tions. The silent veto is, I believe, the exclusive adoption of the 
 present Administration. I think, indeed, that, some years ago, a 
 bill, by inadvertence or accident, failed to receive the President's 
 signature, and so did not become a law. But I am not aware of any 
 instance, before the present Administration, in which the President 
 has, by design, omitted to sign a bill, and yet has not returned it 
 to Congress. But since the present Administration came into 
 power, the veto, in both kinds, has been repeatedly applied. In the 
 case of the Maysville Road, the Montgomery Road, and the Bank, 
 we have had the veto, with reasons. In an internal improvement 
 
151 
 
 bill of a former session, in a similar bill at the late session, and in 
 the State interest bill, we have had the silent veto, or refusal 
 without reasons. 
 
 Now, Sir, it is to be considered, that the President has the 
 power of recommending measures to Congress. Through his 
 friends, he may and does oppose, also, any legislative movement, 
 which he does not approve. If, in addition to this, he may exer- 
 cise a silent veto, at his pleasure, on all the bills presented to him 
 during the last ten days of the session ; if he may refuse assent to 
 them all, without being called upon to assign any reasons what- 
 ever, — it W'ill certainly be a great practical augmentation of his 
 power. Any one, who looks at a volume of the statutes, will see 
 that a great portion of all the laws are actually passed within the 
 last ten days of each session. If the President is at liberty to 
 negative any, or all, of these laws, at pleasure, or, rather, to refuse 
 to render the bills laws, by approving them, and still may neglect 
 to return them to Congress for renewed action, he will hold a 
 very important control over the legislation of this country. The 
 day of adjournment is usually fixed some weeks in advance. This 
 being fixed, a litUe activity and perseverance may easily, in most 
 cases, and perhaps in all, where no alarm has been excited, post- 
 pone important pending measures to a period within ten days 
 of the close of the session; and this operation leaves all such 
 measures at the pleasure of the President to sign the bills or not, 
 without being obliged to state his reasons publicly. 
 
 A silent veto on the Bank bill would have been the inevi- 
 table (ate of that bill, if its friends had not refused to fix on any 
 term for adjournment before the President should have had the 
 bill so long as to be required, by Constitutional provisions, to sign 
 it, or to send it back with his reasons for not signing it. The two 
 Houses did not agree, and would not agree, to fix a day for ad- 
 journment, until the bill was sent to the President, and then care 
 was taken to fix on such a day as should allow him the whole 
 Constitutional period. This seasonable presentment rescued the 
 bill from the power of the silent negative. 
 
 This practical innovation on the mode of administering the 
 Government, so much at variance with its general principles, and 
 so capable of defeatmg the most useful acts, deserves public con- 
 sideration. Its tendency is, to disturb the harmony, which ought 
 always to exist between Congress and the Executive, and to turn 
 that which the Constitution intended only as an extraordinary 
 remedy for extraordinary cases, into a common means of making 
 Executive discretion paramount to the discretion of Congress, in 
 the enactment of laws. 
 
 Mr. President, the Executive has not only used these unac- 
 customed means to prevent the passage of laws, but it has also 
 
152 
 
 refused to enforce the execution of laws actually passed. An em- 
 inent instance of this is found in the course adopted relative to 
 the Indian intercourse law of 1802. Upon being applied to, in 
 behalf of the Missionaries, to execute that law, for their relief 
 and protection, the President replied, that, the State of Georgia 
 having extended her laws over the Indian territory, the laws of 
 Congress had thereby been superseded. This is the substance of 
 his answer, as communicated through the Secretary of War. He 
 holds, then, that the law of the State is paramount to the law of 
 Congress. The Supreme Court has adjudged this act of Georgia 
 to be void, as being repugnant to a Constitutional law of the Uni- 
 ted States. But the President pays no more regard to this de- 
 cision than to the act of Congress itself The Missionaries 
 remain in prison, held there by a condemnation, under a law of a 
 State, which the Supreme Judicial Tribunal has pronounced to 
 be null and void. The Supreme Court have decided that the act 
 of Congress is Constitutional ; that it is a binding statute ; that it 
 has the same force as other laws, and is as much entitled to be 
 obeyed and executed as other laws. The President, on the con- 
 trary, declares that the law of Congress has been superseded by 
 the 'law of the State, and therefore he will not carry its provisions 
 into effect. Now we know, Sir, that the Constitution of the 
 United States declares, that that Constitution, and all acts of 
 Congress passed in pursuance of it, shall be the supreme law of 
 the land, any thing in any State law to the contrary notwith- 
 standing. This would seem to be a plain case, then, in which 
 the law should be executed. It has been solemnly decided to be 
 in actual force, by the highest judicial authority ; its execution is 
 demanded for the relief of free citizens, now suffering the pains 
 of unjust and unlawful imprisonment ; yet the President refuses to 
 execute it. 
 
 In the case of the Chicago Road, some sessions ago, the Pres- 
 ident approved the bill, but accompanied his approval by a mes- 
 sage, saying how far he deemed it a proper law, and how far, 
 therefore, it ought to be carried into execution. 
 
 In the case of the Harbor bill of the late session, being applied 
 to, by a member of Congress, for directions for carrying parts of 
 the law into effect, he declined giving them, and made a distinction 
 between such parts of the laiv as he should cause to be executed, 
 and such as he should not; and his right to make this distinction 
 has been openly maintained, by those who habitually defend his 
 measures. Indeed, Sir, these, and other instances of liberties 
 taken with plain statute laws, flow, naturally, from the principles 
 expressly avowed by the President, under his own hand. In that 
 important document, Sir, upon which it seems to be his fate to 
 stand, or to fall, before the American people, the veto message, 
 
153 
 
 he holds the following language : — " Each public officer, who 
 takes an oath to support the Constitution, swears that he will 
 support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by 
 others^ Mr. President, the general adoption of the sentiments 
 expressed in this sentence would dissolve our Government. It 
 would raise every man's private opinions into a standard for his 
 own conduct ; and there certainly is, there can be, no government, 
 where every man is to judge, for himself, of his own rights, and 
 his own obligations. Where every one is his own arbiter, force, 
 and not law, is the governing power. He who may judge for 
 himself, and decide for himself, must execute his own decisions ; 
 and this is the law of force. I confess. Sir, it strikes me with as- 
 tonishment, that so wild, so disorganizing a sentiment, should be 
 uttered by a President of the United States. I should think it 
 must have escaped from its author through want of reflection, or 
 from the habit of little reflection, on such subjects, if I could sup- 
 pose it possible, diat, on a question excidng so much public at- 
 tention, and of so much national importance, any such extraordi- 
 nary doctrine could find its way, through inadvertence, into a for- 
 mal and solemn public act. Standing as it does, it affirms a prop- 
 osition which would effectually repeal all Constitutional and all 
 legal obligations. The Constitution declares, that every public 
 officer, in the State Governments, as well as in the General Gov- 
 ernment, shall take an oath to support the Constitution of the 
 United States. This is all. Would it not have cast an air of 
 ridicule on the whole provision, if the Constitution had gone on to 
 add the words " as he understands it ? " What could come 
 nearer to a solemn farce, than to bind a man by oath, and still 
 leave him to be his own interpreter of his own obligation ? Sir, 
 those who are to execute the laws have no more a license to con- 
 strue them for themselves than those whose only duty is to obey 
 them. Public officers are bound to support the Constitution ; 
 private citizens are bound to obey it ; and there is no more indul- 
 gence granted to the public officer, to support the Constitution 
 only as he understands it, than to a private citizen to obey it only 
 as he understands it; and what is true of the Constitution, in this 
 respect, is equally true of any law. Laws are to be executed, 
 and to be obeyed, not as individuals may interpret them, but ac- 
 cording to public, authoritative interpretation and adjudication. 
 The sentiment of the message would abrogate the obligation of the 
 whole criminal code. If every man is to judge of the Constitution 
 and the laws for himself; if he is to obey, and support them, only 
 as he may say he understands them, — a revolution, I think, would 
 take place in the administration of justice ; and discussions about 
 the law of treason, murder, and arson, should be addressed, not 
 to the judicial bench, but to those who might stand charged with 
 VOL. II. 20 
 
154 
 
 such offences. The object of discussion should be, if we run out 
 this notion to its natural extent, to convince the culprit himself how 
 he ought to understand the law. 
 
 Mr. President, how is it possible, that a sentiment so wild, 
 and so dangerous, so encouraging to all who feel a desire to op- 
 pose the laws, and to impair the Constitution, should have been 
 uttered by the President of the United States, at this eventful and 
 critical moment ? Are we not threatened with dissolution of the 
 Union? Are we not told that the laws of the Government shall 
 be openly and directly resisted ? Is not the whole country look- 
 ing, with the utmost anxiety, to what may be the result of these 
 threatened courses ? And, at this very moment, so full of peril 
 to the State, the Chief Magistrate puts forth opinions and senti- 
 ments as truly subversive of all government, as absolutely in con- 
 flict with the authority of the Constitution, as the wildest theories 
 of Nullification. Mr. President, I have very little regard for the 
 law, or the logic, of Nulhfication. But there is not an individual 
 in its ranks, capable of putting two ideas together, who, if you 
 will grant him the principles of the veto message, cannot defend 
 all that Nullification has ever threatened. To make this assertion 
 good, Sir, let us see how the case stands. The Legislature of 
 South Carolina, it Is said, will nullify the late revenue or tariff 
 law, because, they say, it is not warranted by the Constitution 
 of the United States, as they U7iderstand the Constitution. They, 
 as well as the President of the United States, have sworn to sup- 
 port the Constitution. Both he and they have taken the same 
 oath, in the same words. 
 
 Now, Sir, since he claims the right to interpret the Constitution 
 as he pleases, how can he deny the same right to them ? _ Is his 
 oath less stringent than theirs ? Has he a prerogative of dispensa- 
 tion which they do not possess? How can he answer them, 
 when they tell him, that the revenue laws are unconstitutional, as 
 they understand the Constitution, and that, therefore, they will 
 nullify them ? Will he reply to them, according to the doctrines 
 of his annual message in 1830, ih^^i precedent has settled the ques- 
 tion, if it was ever doubtful? They will answer him in his own 
 words, in the veto message, that, in such a case, precedent is not 
 binding. Will he say to them, that the revenue law is a law of 
 Congress, which must be executed, until it shall be declared void ? 
 They will answer him, that, in other cases, he has himself refused 
 to execute laws of Congress which had not been declared void, 
 but which had been, on the contrary, declared valid. Will he 
 urge the force of judicial decisions? They will answer, that he 
 himself does not admit the binding obligation of such decisions. 
 Sir, the President of the United States is of opinion, that an indi- 
 vidual, called on to execute a law, may himself judge of its Con- 
 
155 
 
 stitutional validity. Has Nullification any thing more revolutiona- 
 ry than that ? The President is of opinion that judicial interpreta- 
 tions of the Constitution and the laws do not bind the consciences, 
 and ought not to bind the conduct, of men. Has Nullification any 
 thing more disorganizing than that? The President is of opinion, 
 that every officer is bound to support the Constitution only accord- 
 ing to what ought to be, in his private opinion, its construction. 
 Has Nullification, in its widest flight, ever reached to an extrava- 
 gance like that ? No, Sir, never. The doctrine of Nullification, 
 in my judgment a most false, dangerous, and revolutionary doc- /] 
 trine, is this ; that the State, or a State, may declare the extent 
 of the obligations which its citizens are under to the United States; 
 in other words, that a State, by State laws, and State judicatures, 
 may conclusively construe the Constitudon for its own citizens. / 1 . 
 But that every individual may construe it for himself, is a refine- [ } 
 ment on the theory of resistance to Constitutional power, a sublima- 
 tion of the right of being disloyal to the Union, a free charter for 
 the elevation of private opinion above the authority of the funda- 
 mental law of the State, such as was never presented to the public 
 view, and the public astonishment, even by Nullification itself. Its 
 first appearance is in the veto message. Melancholy, lamenta- 
 ble, indeed. Sir, is our condifion, when, at a moment of serious 
 danger and wide-spread alarm, such sentiments are found to pro- 
 ceed from the Chief Magistrate of the Government. Sir, I cannot 
 feel that the Constitution is safe in such hands. I cannot feel that 
 the present Administration is its fit and proper guardian. 
 
 But let me ask. Sir, what evidence there is, that the President 
 is himself opposed to the doctrines of Nullification. — I do not say 
 to the political party which now pushes these doctrines, but to 
 the doctrines themselves. Has he any where rebuked them ? 
 Has he any where discouraged them ? Has his influence been ex- 
 erted to inspire respect for the Constitution, and to produce obedi- 
 ence to the laws ? Has he followed the bright example of his pred- 
 ecessors ? Has he held fast by the institutions of the country ? Has 
 he summoned the good and the wise around him ? Has he admon- 
 ished the country that the Union is in danger, and called on all 
 the patriotic to come out in its support ? Alas ! Sir, we have seen 
 nothing, nothing of all this. 
 
 Mr. President, I shall not discuss the doctrine of Nullification. 
 I am sure it can have no friends here. Gloss it and disguise it as 
 we may, it is a pretence incompatible with the authority of the 
 Constitufion. If direct separation be not its only mode of operation, 
 separation Is, nevertheless, its direct consequence. That a State may 
 nullify a law of the Union, and still remain in the Union ; that she 
 may have Senators and Representatives in the Government, and yet 
 be at liberty to disobey and resist that Government ; that she may 
 
156 
 
 partake in the common councils, and yet not be bound by their re- 
 suhs ; that she may control a law of Congress, so that it shall be 
 one thing with her, while it is another thing with the rest of the 
 States; — all these propositions seem to be so absolutely at war with 
 common sense and reason, that I do not understand how any 
 intelligent person can yield the slightest assent to them. _ Nullifica- 
 tion, it is in vain to attempt to conceal it, is dissolution ; it is dismem- 
 berment ; it is the breaking up of the Union. If it shall practically 
 succeed in any one State, from that moment there are twenty-four 
 States in the Union no longer. Now, Sir, I think it exceedingly 
 probable that the President may come to an open rupture with 
 that portion of his original party which now constitutes what is called 
 the Nullification party. I think it likely he will oppose the proceed- 
 ings of that party, if they shall adopt measures coming directly in 
 conflict with the laws of the United States. But how will he op- 
 pose } J'VJiat loill he his course of remedy ? Sir, J wish to call 
 the attention of the meeting, and of the people, earnestly to this 
 question, — How will the President attempt to put dotvn JYuUiJica- 
 tion, if he shall atteinpt it at all? 
 
 Sir, for one, I protest in advance against such remedies as I 
 have heard hinted. I'he Administration itself keeps a profound 
 silence, but its friends have spoken for it. We are told, Sir, that 
 the President tvill immediately employ the military force, and at 
 once blockade Charleston ! A military remedy, a remedy by di- 
 rect belligerent operation, has been thus suggested, and iiothing 
 else has been suggested, as the intended means of preserving the 
 Union. Sir, there is no little reason to think, that this suggestion 
 is true. We cannot be altogether unmindful of the past ; and 
 therefore we cannot be altogether unapprehensive for the future. 
 For one. Sir, I raise my voice beforehand against the unauthorized 
 employment of military power, and against superseding the author- 
 ity of the laws, by an armed force, under pretence of putting down 
 Nullification. The President has no authority to blockade 
 L Charleston; the President has no authority to employ military 
 ' force, till he shall be duly required so to do, by law, and by the 
 civil authorities. His duty is to cause the laws to be executed. 
 His duty is to support the civil authority. His duty is, if the laws 
 be resisted, to employ the mihtary force of the country, if necessa- 
 ry, for their support and execution ; biitjp do all this in compli- 
 ance only with h.w, and with decisions of the tribunals.; r If, by any 
 ingenious devices, those who resist the laws escape from the reach 
 of judicial autiiority, as it is now provided to be exercised, it is en- 
 tirely competent to Congress to make such new provisions as the 
 exigency of the case may demand. These provisions undoubtedly 
 would be made. With a Constitutional and efficient head of the 
 Government, with an Administration really and truly in favor of 
 
157 
 
 the Constitution, the country can grapple with NuUification. By 
 the force of reason ; by the progress of enHghtened opinion ; by the 
 natural, genuine patriotism of the country, and by the steady and 
 well-sustained operations of law, — the progress of disorganization 
 may be successfully checked, and the LFnion maintained. Let it 
 be remembered, that, where Nullification is most powerful, it is 
 not unopposed. Let it be remembered, that they who would 
 break up the Union by force, have to inarch toward that object 
 through thick ranks of as brave and good men as the country 
 can show ; men, strong in character, strong in intelligence, strong 
 in the purity of their own motives ; and ready, always ready, to 
 sacrifice their fortunes and their lives to the preservation of the 
 Constitutional Union of the States. If we can relieve the country 
 from an Administration which denies to the Constitution those 
 powers which are the breath of its life ; if we can place the Gov- 
 ernment in the hands of its friends ; if we can secure it against the 
 dangers of irregular and unlawful military force ; if it can be under 
 the lead of an Administration whose moderation, firmness and 
 wisdom shall inspire confidence and command respect, — we may 
 yet surmount the dangers, numerous and formidable as they are, 
 which surround us. 
 
 And, Sir, I see little prospect of overcoming these dangers, with- 
 out a change of men. After all that has passed, the reelection 
 of the present Executive will give the national sanction to senti- 
 ments, and to measures, which will effectually change the Govern- 
 ment; which, in short, must destroy the Government. If the 
 President be reelected, with concurrent and cooperating majori- 
 ties in both Houses of Congress, I do not see, that, in four years 
 more, all the power which is suffered to remain in the Government 
 will not be holden by the Executive hand. Nullification will pro- 
 ceed, or will be put down by a power as unconstitutional as itself 
 The revenues will be managed by a Treasury Bank. The use of 
 the veto will be considered as sanctioned by the public voice. 
 The Senate, if not " cut down," will be bound down ; and the 
 President, commanding the army and the navy, and holding all 
 places of trust to be party property, what will then be left, Sir, for 
 Constitutional reliance ? 
 
 Sir, we have been accustomed to venerate the Judiciary, and to 
 repose hopes of safety on that branch of the Government. But 
 let us not deceive ourselves. The Judicial power cannot stand, 
 for a long time, against the Executive power. The Judges, it is 
 true, hold their places by an independent tenure ; but they are 
 mortal. That which is the common lot of humanity must make 
 it necessary to renew the benches of justice. And how will they 
 be filled ? Doubtless, Sir, they will be filled by incumbents, agree- 
 ing with the President in his Constitutional opinions. If the Court 
 
158 
 
 is felt as an obstacle, doubtless the first opportunity, and every 
 opportunity, will be embraced, to give it less and less the charac- 
 ter of an obstacle. Sir, without pursuing these suggestions, I only 
 say that the country must prepare itself for any change in the 
 Judicial Department, such as it shall deliberately sanction in other 
 departments. 
 
 But, Sir, what is the prospect of change ? Is there any hope, 
 that the national sentiment will recover its accustomed tone, and 
 restore to the Government a just and efficient administration ? 
 
 Sir, if there be something of doubt on this point, there is also 
 something, perhaps much, of hope. The popularity of the pres- 
 ent Chief Magistrate, springing from causes not connected with his 
 administration of the Government, has been great. Public grati- 
 tude for military service has remained fast to him, in defiance of 
 many things, in his civil administration, calculated to weaken its 
 hold. At length, there are indications, not to be denied, of new 
 sentiments and new impressions. At length, a conviction of dan- 
 ger to important interests, and to the security of the Government, 
 has made its lodgment in the public mind. At length, public sen- 
 timent begins to have its free course, and to produce its just effects. 
 I fully believe. Sir, that a great majority of the nation desire a 
 change in the Administration ; and that it will be difficult for party 
 organization, or party denunciation, to suppress the effective utter- 
 ance of that general wish. There are unhappy differences, it is 
 true, about the fit person to be successor to the present incumbent, 
 in tile Chief Magistracy ; and it is possible, that this disunion 
 may, in the end, defeat the will of the majority. But, so far as we 
 agree together, let us act together. Wherever our sentiments con- 
 cur, let our hands cooperate. If we cannot, at present, agree 
 who should be President, we are at least agreed who ought not to 
 be. I fully believe, Sir, that gratifying intelligence is already on 
 the wing. While we are yet deliberating in Massachusetts, Penn- 
 sylvania is voting. This week, she elects her members to the 
 next Congress. I doubt not the result of that election will show 
 an important change in public sentiment in that State ; nor can I 
 doubt that the great States adjoining her, holding .similar Constitu- 
 tional principles, and having similar interests, will feel the impulse 
 of the same causes which affect her. The people of the United 
 States, by a vast and countless majoritj^, are attached to the Con- 
 stitution. If they shall be convinced that it is in danger, they will 
 come to its rescue, and will save it. It cannot be destroyed, even 
 now, if THEY will undertake its guardianship and protection. 
 
 But suppose. Sir, there was less hope than there is, would that 
 consideration weaken the force of our obligations ? Are we at a 
 post which we are at liberty to desert when it becomes difficult 
 to hold it ? May we fly at the approach of danger ? Does our 
 
159 
 
 fidelity to the Constitution require no more of us than to enjoy its 
 blessings, to bask in the prosperity which it has shed around us 
 and our fathers ? and are we at liberty to abandon it in the hour of 
 its peril, or to make for it but a faint and heartless struggle, for the 
 want of encouragement, and the want of hope ? Sir, if no Stale 
 come to our succor — if every where else the contest should be 
 given up — here let it be protracted to the last moment. Here, 
 where the first blood of the revolution was shed, let the last ef- 
 fort for that which is the greatest blessing obtaired by the revolu- 
 tion — a free and united government — be made. Sir, in our endeav- 
 ors to maintain our existing forms of government, we are acting 
 not for ourselves alone, but for the great cause of Constitutional 
 liberty all over the globe. We are trustees, holding a sacred treas- 
 ure, in which all the lovers of freedom have a stake. Not only 
 in revolutionized France, where there are no longer subjects, 
 where the monarch can no longer say, he is the State; not only in 
 reformed England, where our principles, our institutions, our prac- 
 tice of free government, are now daily quoted and commended ; 
 but in the depths of Germany, also, and among the desolated fields 
 and the still smoking ashes of Poland, prayers are uttered for the 
 preservation of our Union and happiness. We are surrounded, 
 Sir, by a cloud of witnesses. The gaze of the sons of Liberty, 
 every where, is upon us, anxiously, intently, upon us. They may 
 see us fall in the struggle for our Constitution and Government, 
 but Heaven forbid that they should see us recreant. 
 
 At least. Sir, let the star of Massachusetts be the last which 
 shall be seen to fall from heaven, and to plunge into the utter dark- 
 ness of disunion. Let her shrink back, let her hold othei-s back, 
 if she can ; at any rate, let her keep herself back, from this gulf, 
 full, at once, of fire and of blackness ; yes, Sir, as far as human 
 foresight can scan, or human imagination fathom, full of the fire, 
 and the blood, of civil war, and of the thick darkness of general 
 political disgrace, ignominy, and ruin. Though the worst may 
 happen that can happen, and though she may not be able to pre- 
 vent the catastrophe, yet let her maintain her own integrity, her 
 own high honor, her own unwavering fidelity, so that, with respect 
 and decency, though with a broken and a bleeding heart, she may 
 pay the last tribute to a glorious, departed, free Constitution. 
 
SPEECH 
 
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN REPLY TO MR. 
 CALHOUN'S SPEECH, ON THE BILL "FURTHER TO PROVIDE 
 FOR THE COLLECTION OF DUTIES ON BIPORTS," FEBRUARY 
 
 16; 1833. 
 
 On the 21st of January, 1833, Mr. Wilkins, Chairman of the Judiciary 
 Committee, introduced the bill further to provide for the collection of duties. 
 
 On the 22d day of the same month, Mr. Calhoun submitted the following 
 resolutions : — 
 
 " Resolved, That the people of the several States composing these United 
 States are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to which the 
 people of each State acceded as a separate sovereign community, each 
 binding itself by its own particular ratification ; and that the union, of 
 which the said compact is the bond, is a union between the States ratifying 
 the same. 
 
 " Resolved, That the people of the several States, thus united by the con- 
 stitutional compact, in forming that instrument, and in creatmg a General 
 Government, to carry into effect the objects for which they were formed, 
 delegated to that Government, for that purpose, certain definite powers, 
 to be exercised jointly, reserving, at the same time, each State to itself, 
 the residuary mass of powers, to be exercised by its own separate Gov- 
 ernment ; and that whenever the General Government assumes the exer- 
 cise of powers not delegated by the compact, its acts are unauthorized, 
 and are of no effect ; and that the same Government is not made tlie final 
 judge of the powers delegated to it, since that would make its discretion, 
 and not the Constitution, the measure of its powers ; but that, as in all 
 other cases of compact among sovereign parties, without any common 
 judge, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infraction 
 as of the mode and measure of redress. 
 
 " Resolved, That the assertions that the people of these United States, 
 taken collectively as individuals, are now, or ever have been, united on 
 the principle of the social compact, and, as such, are now formed into one 
 nation or people, or that they have ever been so united in any one stage 
 of their political existence ; that the people of the several States com- 
 posing the Union have not, as members thereof, retained their sovereign- 
 ty ; that the allegiance of their citizens has been transferred to the Gen- 
 eral Government ; that they have parted with the right of punishing treason 
 through their respective State Governments ; and that they have not the 
 right of judging in the last resort as to the extent of the powers reserved, 
 and of consequence of those delegated ; — are not only without foundation 
 in truth, but are contrary to the most certain and plain historical facts, 
 and the clearest deductions of reason ; and that all exercise of power on 
 the part of the General Government, or any of its departments, claiming 
 
161 
 
 authority from such erroneous assumptions, must of necessity be unconsti- 
 tutional — must tend, directly and inevitably, to subvert the sovereignty of 
 the States, to destroy the federal character of the Union, and to rear on 
 its ruins a consolidated Government, without Constitutional check or limi- 
 tation, and which must necessarily terminate in the loss of liberty itself." 
 
 On Saturday, the 16th of February, Mr. Calhoun spoke in opposition to 
 the bill. 
 Mr. Webster followed him. 
 
 Mr. President : The gentleman from South Carolina has 
 admonished us to be mindful of the opinions of those who shall 
 come after us. We must take our chance, Sir, as to the light in 
 which posterity will regard us. 1 do not decline its judgment, nor 
 withhold myself from its scrutiny. Feeling that I am performing 
 my public duty with singleness of heart, and to the best of my 
 ability, I fearlessly trust myself to the country, now and hereafter, 
 and leave both my motives and my character to its decision. 
 
 The gentleman has terminated his speech in a tone of threat 
 and defiance towards this bill, even should it become a law of the 
 land, altogether unusual in the halls of Congress. But I shall 
 not suffer myself to be excited into warmth by his denunciation 
 of the measure which I support. Among the feelings which at 
 this moment fill my breast, not the least is that of regret at the 
 position in which the gentleman has placed himself Sir, he does 
 himself no justice. The cause which he has espoused finds no 
 basis in the Constitution, no succor from public sympathy, no 
 cheering from a patriotic community. He has no foothold on 
 which to stand, while he might display the powers of his 
 acknowledged talents. Every thing beneath his feet is hollow 
 and treacherous. He is like a strong man struggling in a morass : 
 every effort to extricate himself only sinks him deeper and 
 deeper. And I fear the resemblance may be carried still farther ; 
 I fear that no friend can safely come to his relief, that no one can 
 approach near enough to hold out a helping hand, without danger 
 of going down himself, also, into the bottomless depths of this 
 Serbonian bog. 
 
 The honorable gentleman has declared that on the decision of 
 the question now in debate, may depend the cause of liberty 
 itself I am of the same opinion ; but tlien, Sir, the liberty which 
 I think is staked on the contest, is not political liberty, in any 
 general and undefined character, but our own, well-understood, 
 and long-enjoyed American liberty. 
 
 Sir, I love Liberty no less ardently than the gentleman, in 
 whatever form she may have appeared in the progress of human 
 history. As exhibited in the master states of antiquity, as 
 breaking out again from amidst the darkness of the middle ages, 
 
 VOL. II. 21 
 
162 
 
 and beaming on the formation of new communities in modern 
 Europe, she has, ahvays and every where, charms for me. Yet, 
 Sir, it is our own liberty, guarded by constitutions and secured by 
 union ; it is that liberty which is our paternal inheritance, it is our 
 established, dear-bought, peculiar American Uberty, to which I am 
 chiefly devoted, and the cause of which I now mean, to the ut- 
 most of my power, to maintain and defend. 
 
 Mr. President, if I considered the Constitutional question now 
 before us as doubtful as it is important, and if I supposed that its 
 decision, either in the Senate or by the country, was likely to be 
 in any degree influenced by the manner in which I might now 
 discuss it, this would be to me a moment of deep solicitude. 
 Such a moment has once existed. There has been a time, when, 
 rising in this place, on the same question, I felt, I must confess, 
 that something for good or evil to the Constitution of the country 
 might depend on an effort of mine. But circumstances are 
 changed. Since that day. Sir, the public opinion has become 
 awakened to this great question : it has grasped it ; it has reasoned 
 upon it, as becomes an intelligent and patriotic community, and 
 has settled it, or now seems in the progress of settling it, by an 
 authority which none can disobey — the authority of the people 
 themselves. 
 
 I shall not, Mr. President, follow the gentleman, step by step, 
 through the course of his speech. Much of what he has -said he 
 has deemed necessary to the just explanation and defence of his 
 own political character and conduct. On this I shall offer no 
 comment. Much, too, has consisted of philosophical remark 
 upon the general nature of political liberty, and the history of free 
 institutions ; and of other topics, so general, in their nature, as to 
 possess, in my opinion, only a remote bearing on the immediate 
 subject of this debate. 
 
 But the gentleman's speech, made some days ago, upon intro- 
 ducing his resolutions, those resolutions themselves, and parts of 
 the speech now just concluded, may probably be justly regarded 
 as containing the whole South Carolina doctrine. That doctiine 
 it is my purpose now to examine, and to compare it with the 
 Constitution of the United States. I shall not consent, Sir, to 
 make any new constitution, or to establish anodier form of 
 government. I will not undertake to say what a constitution for 
 these United States ought to be. That question the people have 
 decided for themselves ; and I shall take the instrument as they 
 have established it, and shall endeavor to maintain it, in its plain 
 sense and meaning, against opinions and notions which, in my 
 judgment, threaten its subversion. 
 
 The resolutions introduced by the gentleman were apparently- 
 drawn up with care, and brought forward upon deliberation. I 
 
163 
 
 shall not be in danger, therefore, of misunderstanding him, or those 
 who agree with him, if I proceed at once to these resolutions, and 
 consider them as an authentic statement of those opinions, upon 
 the great Constitutional question, by which the recent proceedings 
 in South Carolina are attempted to be justified. 
 
 These resolutions are three in number. 
 
 The third seems intended to enumerate, and to deny, the 
 several opinions expressed in the President's proclamation, 
 respecting the nature and powers of this Government. Of this 
 third resolution, I purpose, at present, to take no particular no- 
 tice. 
 
 The two first resolutions of the honorable member affirm these 
 propositions, viz. 
 
 1. That the political system, under which we five, and under 
 which Congress is now assembled, is a compact, to which the 
 people of the several States, as separate and sovereign communi- 
 ties, are the parties. 
 
 2. That these sovereign parties have a right to judge, each for 
 itself, of any alleged violation of the Constitution by Congress ; 
 and, in case of such violation, to choose, each for itself, its own 
 mode and measure of redress. 
 
 It is true, Sir, that the honorable member calls this a " constitu- 
 tional'''' compact; but still he affirms it to be a compact between 
 sovereign States. What precise meaning, then, does he attach to 
 the term constitutional 9 When applied to compacts between 
 sovereign States, the term constitutional affixes to that word 
 compact no definite idea. Were we to hear of a constitutional 
 league or treaty between England and France, or a constitutional 
 convention between Austria and Russia, we should not understand 
 what could be intended by such a league, such a treaty, or such a 
 convention. In these connections, the word is void of all mean- 
 ing ; and yet. Sir, it is easy, quite easy, to see why the honorable 
 gentleman has used it in these resolutions. He cannot open the 
 book, and look upon our written frame of government, without 
 seeing that it is called a constitution. This may well be appalling 
 to him. It threatens his whole doctrine of compact, and its dar- 
 ling derivatives, nullification and secession, with instant confuta- 
 tion. Because, if he admits our instrument of government to be 
 a constitution, then, for that very reason, it is not a compact 
 between sovereigns ; a constitution of government, and a compact 
 between sovereign powers, being things essentially unhke in their 
 very natures, and incapable of ever being the same. Yet the 
 word constitution is on the very front of the instrument. He 
 cannot overlook it. He seeks, therefore, to compromise the 
 matter, and to sink all the substantial sense of the word, while he 
 retains a resemblance of its sound. He introduces a new word 
 
164 
 
 of his own, viz. compact, as importing the principal idea, and 
 designed to play the principal part, and degrades constitution into 
 an insignificant, idle epithet, attached to compact. The whole 
 then stands as a " constitutional compact ! " And in this way he 
 hopes to pass off a plausible gloss, as satisfying the words of the 
 instrument ; but he will find himself disappointed. Sir, I must 
 say to the honorable gentleman, that, in our American political 
 grammar, constitution is a noun substantive ; it imports a 
 distinct and clear idea, of itself; and it is not to lose its impor- 
 tance and dignity, it is not to be turned into a poor, ambiguous, 
 senseless, unmeaning adjective, for the purpose of accommodating 
 any new set of political notions. Sir, we reject his new rules of 
 syntax altogether. We will not give up our forms of political 
 speech to the grammarians of the school of nullification. By the 
 Constitution, we mean not a " constitutional compact,^^ but, simply 
 and directly, the Constitution, the fundamental law ; and if there 
 be one word in the language, which the people of the United 
 States understand, this is that word. We know no more of a 
 constitutional compact between sovereign powers, than we know 
 of a constitutional indenture of copartnership, a constitutional 
 deed of conveyance, or a constitutional bill of exchange. But we 
 know what the Constitution is ; we know what the plainly-written, 
 fundamental law is ; we know what the bond of our Union and 
 the security of our liberties is ; and we mean to maintain and to 
 defend it, in its plain sense and unsophisticated meaning. 
 
 The sense of the gentleman's proposition, therefore, is not at 
 all affected, one way or the other, by the use of this word. That 
 proposition still is, that our system of government is but a compact 
 between the people of separate and sovereign States. 
 
 Was it Mirabeau, Mr. President, or what other master of the 
 human passions, who has told us that words are things .-' They 
 are indeed things, and things of mighty influence, not only in 
 addresses to the passions and high-wrought feelings of mankind, 
 but in the discussion of legal and political questions also ; because 
 a just conclusion is often avoided, or a false one reached, by the 
 adroit substitution of one phrase, or one word, for another. Of 
 this we have, I think, another example in the resolutions be- 
 fore us. 
 
 The first resolution declares that the people of the several 
 States " acceded " to the Constitution, or to the constitutional 
 compact, as it is called. This word " accede/^ not found either 
 in the Constitution itself, or in the ratification of it by any one of 
 the States, has been chosen for use here, doubtless, not without a 
 well-considered purpose. 
 
 The natural converse of accession is secession; and, therefore, 
 when it is stated that the people of the States acceded to the 
 
163 
 
 Union, It may be more plausibly argued that they may secede from 
 it. If, in adopting the Constitution, nothing was done but acceding 
 to a compact, nothing would seem necessary, in order to break 
 it up, but to secede from the same compact. But the term is 
 wholly out of place. Accession, as a word applied to political as- 
 sociations, implies coming into a league, treaty, or confederacy, by 
 one hitherto a stranger to it ; and secession implies departing from 
 such league or confederacy. The people of the United States 
 have used no such form of expression in establishing the present 
 Government. They do not say that they accede to a league, but 
 they declare that they ordain and establish a Constitution. Such 
 are the very words of the instrument itself; and in all the States, 
 without an exception, the language used by their conventions was, 
 that they ^'ratified the Constitution;^'' some of them employing 
 the additional words '' assented to" and "adopted," but all of 
 them " ratifying." There is more importance than may, at first 
 sight, appear, in the introduction of this new word by the hon- 
 orable mover of these resolutions. Its adoption and use are indis- 
 pensable to maintain those premises, from which his main conclu- 
 sion is to be afterwards drawn. But, before showing that, allow 
 me to remark, that this phraseology tends to keep out of sight the 
 just view of our previous political history, as well as to suggest 
 wrong ideas as to what was actually done when the present Con- 
 stitution was agreed to. In 1789, and before this Constitution was 
 adopted, the United States had already been in a Union, more or 
 less close, for fifteen years. At least as far back as the meeting 
 of the first Congress, in 1774, they had been, in some measure, 
 and to some national purposes, united together. Before the Con- 
 federation of 1781, they had declared independence jointly, and 
 had carried on the war jointly, both by sea and land ; and this, 
 not as separate States, but as one people. When, therefore, they 
 formed that Confederation, and adopted its articles as articles of 
 perpetual union, they did not come together for the first time ; and, 
 therefore, they did not speak of the States as acceding to the Con- 
 federation, ahhough it was a league, and nothing but a league, and 
 rested on nothing but plighted faith for its performance. Yet, 
 even then, the States were not strangers to each other ; there was 
 a bond of union already subsisting between them; they were as- 
 sociated. United Stales ; and the object of the Confederation was 
 to make a stronger and better bond of union. Their representa- 
 tives deliberated together on these proposed Articles of Confedera- 
 tion, and, being authorized by their respective States, finally ^' rat- 
 ified and confirmed" them. Inasmuch as they were already in 
 union, they did not spe-dko^ acceding to the^new Articles of Con- 
 federation, but of ratifying and confirming them ; and this lan- 
 guage was not used inadvertently, because, in the same instru- 
 
166 
 
 ment, accession is used in its proper sense, when applied to Canada, 
 which was altogether a stranger to the existing Union. " Canada," 
 says the 11th article, '' acceding to this Confederation, and joining 
 in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into the 
 Union." 
 
 Having thus used the terms ratify and confirm, even in regard 
 to the old Confederation, it would have been strange, indeed, if the 
 people of the United States, after its formation, and when they came 
 to establish the present Constitution, had spoken of the States, or 
 the people of the States, as acceding to this Constitution. Such 
 language would have been ill suited to the occasion. It would 
 have implied an existing separation or disunion among the States, 
 such as never has existed since 1774. No such language, there- 
 fore, was used. The language actually employed is, adopt, ratify, 
 ordain, establish. 
 
 Therefore, Sir, since any State, before she can prove her right 
 to dissolve the Union, must show her authority to undo what has 
 been done, no State is at Hberty to secede, on the ground that she 
 and other States have done nothing but accede. She must show 
 that she has a right to reverse what has been ordained, to unsettle 
 and overthroio what has been established, to reject what the people 
 have adopted, and to break iLp what they have ratified; because 
 these are the terms which express the transactions which have ac- 
 tually taken place. In other words, she must show her right to 
 make a revolution. 
 
 If, Mr. President, in drawing these resolutions, the honorable 
 member had confined himself to the use of Constitutional language, 
 there would have been a wide and awful hiatus between his prem- 
 ises and his conclusion. Leaving out the two words compact and 
 accession, which are not Constitutional modes of expression, and 
 stating the matter precisely as the truth is, his first resolution would 
 have affirmed that the people of the several States ratified this Con- 
 stitution, or form of government. These are the very words of 
 South Carolina herself, in her own act of ratification. Let, then, 
 his first resolution tell the exact truth ; let it state the fact precisely 
 as it exists ; let it say that the people of the several States ratified 
 a Constitution, or form of government ; and then. Sir, what will 
 become of his inference in his second resolution, which is in these 
 words, viz. "that, as in all other cases of compact, among sovereign 
 'parties, each has an equal right to judge for itself, as ivell of the 
 infraction as of the mode and measure of redress "? It is obvi- 
 ous, is it not. Sir? that this conclusion requires for its support quite 
 other premises ; it requires premises which speak of accession and 
 of compact between sovereign powers; and, without such premises, 
 it is altogether unmeaning. 
 
 Mr. President, if the honorable member will truly state what 
 
167 
 
 the people did in forming this Constitution, and then state what 
 they must do if they would now undo what they then did, he will 
 unavoidably state a case of revolution. Let us see if it be not so. 
 He must state, in the first place, that the people of the several 
 States adopted and ratified this Constitution, or form of govern- 
 ment ; and, in the next place, he must state that they have a right to 
 undo this ; that is to say, that they have a right to discard the form of 
 government which they have adopted, and to break up the Con- 
 stitution which they have ratified. Now, Sir, this is neither more 
 nor less than saying that they have a right to make a revolution. 
 To reject an established government, to break up a political con- 
 stitution, is revolution. 
 
 I deny that any man can state, accurately, what was done by 
 the people, in establishing the present Constitution, and then state, 
 accurately, what the people, or any part of them, must now do to 
 get rid of its obligations, without stating an undeniable case of the 
 overthrow of Government. I admit, of course, that the people 
 may, if they choose, overthrow the Government. But, then, that 
 is revolution. The doctrine now contended for is, that, by nulli- 
 fication or secession, the obligations and authority of the Govern- 
 ment may be set aside or rejected, without revolution. But that 
 is what I deny ; and what I say is, that no man can state the case 
 with historical accuracy, and in Constitutional language, without 
 showing that the honorable gentleman's right, as asserted in hi.s 
 conclusion, is a revolutionary right merely; that it does not, and 
 cannot exist, under the Constitution, or agreeably to the Constitu- 
 tion, but can come into existence only when the Constitution is 
 overthrown. This is the reason, Sir, which makes it necessary to 
 abandon the use of Constitutional language for a new vocabulaiy, 
 and to substitute, in the place of plain historical facts, a series of 
 assumptions. This is the reason why it is necessary to give new 
 names to things, to speak of the Constitution, not as a constitution, 
 but as a compact, and of the ratifications, by the people, not as 
 ratifications, but as acts of accession. 
 
 Sir, I intend to hold the gentleman to the written record. In 
 the discussion of a Constitutional question, I intend to impose 
 upon iiim the restraints of Constitutional language. The people 
 have ordained a Constitution ; can they reject it without revolution? 
 They have established a form of government ; can they overthrow 
 it without revolution? These are the true questions. 
 
 Allow me now, Mr. President, to inquire further into the extent 
 of the propositions contained in the resolutions, and their necessary 
 consequences. 
 
 Where sovereign communities are parties, there is no essential 
 difference between a compact, a confederation, and a league. 
 They all equally rest on the plighted faith of the sovereign Dartv. 
 
168 
 
 A league, or confederacy, is but a subsisting or continuing 
 treaty. 
 
 The gentleman's resolutions, then, affirm, in effect, that these 
 twenty-four United States are held together only by a subsisting 
 treaty, resting for its fulfilment and continuance on no inherent 
 power of its own, but on the plighted faith of each State ; or, in 
 other words, that our Union is but a league ; and, as a consequence 
 from this proposition, they further affirm that, as sovereigns are 
 subject to no superior power, the States must decide, each for 
 itself, of any alleged violation of the league ; and if such violation 
 be supposed to have occurred, each may adopt any mode or 
 measure of redress which it shall think proper. 
 
 Other consequences naturally follow, too, from the main propo- 
 sition. If a league between sovereign powers have no limita- 
 tion as to the time of its duration, and contain nothing making it 
 perpetual, it subsists only during the good pleasure of the parties, 
 although no violation be complained of. If, in the opinion of either 
 party, it be violated, such party may say that he will no longer 
 fulfil its obligations on his part, but will consider the whole league 
 or compact at an end, although it might be one of its stipulations 
 that it should be perpetual. Upon this principle, the Congress 
 of the United States, in 1798, declared null and void the treaty 
 of alliance between the United States and France, though it pro- 
 fessed to be a perpetual alliance. 
 
 If the violation of the league be accompanied with serious injuries, 
 the suffering party, being sole judge of his own mode and measure 
 of redress, has a right to indemnify himself by reprisals on the 
 offending members of the league ; and reprisals, if the circumstances 
 of the case require it, may be followed by direct, avowed, and 
 public war. 
 
 The necessary import of the resolutions, therefore, is, that the 
 United States are connected only by a league ; that it is in the 
 good pleasure of every State to decide how long she will choose 
 to remain a member of this league ; that any State may determine 
 the extent of her own obligations under it, and accept or reject 
 what shall be decided by the whole ; that she may also determine 
 whether her rights have been violated, what is the extent of the 
 injury done her, and what mode and measure of redress her wrongs 
 may make it fit and expedient for her to adopt. The result of the 
 whole is, that any State may secede at pleasure ; that any State 
 may resist a law which she herself may choose to say exceeds the 
 power of Congress ; and that, as a sovereign power, she may re- 
 dress her own grievances, by her own arm, at her own discretion : 
 she may make reprisals ; she may cruise against the property of 
 other members of the league ; she may authorize captures, and 
 make open war. 
 
169 
 
 If, Sir, this be our political condition, it is time the people of 
 the United States understood it. Let us look for a moment to the 
 practical consequences of these opinions. One State, holding an 
 embargo law unconstitutional, may declare her opinion, and with- 
 draw from the Union. tS'Ae secedes. Another, forming and ex- 
 pressing the same judgment on a law lading duties on imports, 
 may withdraw also. She secedes. And as, in her opinion, money 
 has been taken out of the pockets of her citizens illegally, under 
 pretence of this law, and as she has power to redress their wrongs, 
 she may demand satisfaction ; and, if refused, she may take it with 
 a strong hand. The gentleman has himself pronounced the col- 
 lection of duties, under existing laws, to be nothing but robbery. 
 Robbers, of course, may be rightfully dispossessed of the fruits of 
 their flagitious crimes ; and, therefore, reprisals, impositions on the 
 commerce of other States, foreign alliances against them, or open 
 war, are all modes of redress justly open to the discretion and 
 choice of South Carolina ; for she is to judge of her own rights, 
 and to seek satisfaction for her own wrongs, in her own way. 
 
 But, Sir, a third State is of opinion, not only that these laws of 
 imposts are Constitutional, but that it is the absolute duty of Con- 
 gress to pass and to maintain such laws ; and that, by omitting to 
 pass and maintain them, its Constitutional obligations would be 
 grossly disregarded. She relinquished the power of protection, 
 she might allege, and allege truly, herself, and gave it up to Con- 
 gress, on the faith that Congress would exercise it. If Congress 
 now refuse to exercise it, Congress does, as she may insist, break 
 the condition of the grant, and thus manifestly violate the Consd- 
 tution ; and for this violation of the Constitution, she may threaten 
 to secede also. Virginia may secede, and hold the fortresses in 
 the Chesapeake. The Western States .may secede, and take to 
 their own use the public lands. Louisiana may secede, if she 
 choose, form a foreign alliance, and hold the mouth of the Mis- 
 sissippi. If one State may secede, ten may do so — twenty may 
 do so — twenty-three may do so. Sir, as these secessions go on, 
 one after another, what is to constitute the United States ? Whose 
 will be the army? Whose the navy? Who will pay the debts? 
 Who fulfil the public treaties? Who perform the Constitutional 
 guaranties ? Who govern this District and the Territories ? Who 
 retain the public property ? 
 
 Mr. President, every man must see that these are all questions 
 which can arise only after a revolution. They presuppose the 
 breaking up of the Government. While the Constitution lasts, they 
 are repressed ; they spring up to annoy and startle us only from its 
 grave. 
 
 Ti)e Constitution does not provide for events which must be pre- 
 ceded by its own destruction. Secession, therefore, since it must 
 VOL. II. 22 
 
170 
 
 bring these consequences with it, is revolutionary. And nulli- 
 fication is equally revolutionary. What is revolution .-' Why, 
 Sir, that is revolution, which overturns, or controls, or successfully 
 resists, the existing public authority ; that which arrests the exer- 
 cise of the supreme power; that which introduces a new paramount 
 authority into the rule of the State. Now, Sir, this is the precise 
 object of nullification. It attempts to supersede the supreme legis- 
 lative authority. It arrests the arm of the Executive Magistrate. 
 It interrupts the exercise of the accustomed judicial power. Under 
 the name of an ordinance, it declares null and void, within the 
 State, aU the revenue laws of the United States. Is not this rev- 
 olutionary .'' Sir, so soon as this ordinance shall be carried into 
 effect, a re-yoZw^iow will have commenced in South Carolina. She 
 will have thrown off the authority to which her citizens have 
 heretofore been subject. She will have declared her own opinions 
 and her own will to be above the laws and above the power of those 
 who are intrusted with their administration. If she makes good these 
 declarations, she is revolutionized. As to her, it is as distinctly a 
 change of the supreme power, as the American revolution of 1776. 
 That revolution did not subvert government in all its forms. It did 
 not subvert local laws and municipal administrations. It only threw 
 off the dominion of a power claiming to be superior, and to have a 
 right, in many important respects, to exercise legislative authority. 
 Thinking this authority to have been usurped or abused, the Amer- 
 ican colonies, now the United States, bade it defiance, and freed 
 themselves from it by means of a revolution. But that revolution 
 left them with their own municipal laws still, and the forms of 
 local government. If Carolina now shall effectually resist the 
 laws of Congress ; if she shall be her own judge, take her remedy 
 into her own hands, obey the laws of the Union when she pleases, 
 and disobey them when she pleases, — she will relieve herself from a 
 paramount power as distinctly as the American colonies did the 
 same thing in 1776. In other words, she will achieve, as to her- 
 self, a revolution. 
 
 But, Sir, while practical nullification in South Carolina would 
 be, as to herself, actual and distinct revolution, its necessary ten- 
 dency must also be to spread revolution, and to break up the Con- 
 stitution, as to all the other States. It strikes a deadly blow at the 
 vital principle of the whole Union. To allow State resistance to 
 the laws of Congress to be rightful and proper, to admit nullifica- 
 tion in some States, and yet not expect to see a dismemberment 
 of the entire Government, appears to me the wildest illusion, and 
 the most extravagant folly. The gentleman seems not conscious 
 of the direction or the rapidity of his own course. The current 
 of his opinions sweeps him along, he knows not whither. To 
 begin with nullification, with the avowed intent, nevertheless, not 
 
171 
 
 to proceed to secession, dismemberment, and general revolution, 
 is as if one were to take the plunge of Niagara, and cry out that 
 he would stop half way down. In the one case, as in the other, 
 the rash adventurer must go to the bottom of the dark abyss below, 
 were it not that that abyss has no discovered bottom. 
 
 Nullification, if successful, arrests the power of the law, absolves 
 citizens from their duty, subverts the foundation both of protec- 
 tion and obedience, dispenses with oaths and obligations of alle- 
 giance, and elerates another authority to supreme command. Is 
 not this revolution ? And it raises to supreme command foiu--and- 
 twenty distinct powers, each professing to be under a General 
 Government, and yet each setting its laws at defiance at pleasure. 
 Is not this anarchy, as well as revolution? Sir, the Constitution 
 of the United States was received as a whole, and for the whole 
 country. If it cannot stand altogether, it cannot stand in parts ; 
 and if the laws cannot be executed every where, they cannot 
 long be executed any where. The gentleman very well knows 
 that all duties and imposts must be uniform throughout the countr}-. 
 He knows that we cannot have one rule or one law for South 
 Carolina, and another for other States. He must see, therefore, 
 and docs see, — every man sees, — that the only alternative is a repeal 
 of the laws throughout the whole Union, or their execution in 
 Carolina as well as elsewhere. And this repeal is demanded be- 
 cause a single State interposes her veto, and threatens resistance ! 
 The result of the gentleman's opinions, or rather the very text of 
 his doctrine, is, that no act of Congress can bind all the States, 
 the Constitutionality of which is not admitted by all ; or, in other 
 words, that no single State is bound, against its own dissent, by a 
 law of imposts. This is precisely the evil experienced under the 
 old Confederation, and for remedy of which this Constitution was 
 adopted. The leading object in establishing this Government — an 
 object forced on the country by the condition of the times, and 
 the absolute necessity of the law — was to give to Congress power 
 to lay and collect imposts without the consent of particular States. 
 The revolutionary debt remained unpaid ; the national treasury 
 was bankrupt; the country was destitute of credit; Congress 
 issued its requisitions on the States, and the States neglected 
 tliem ; there was no power of coercion but war ; Congress could 
 not lay imposts, or other taxes, by its own authority ; the whole 
 General Government, therefore, was little more than a name. 
 The Articles of Confederation, as to purposes of revenue and finance, 
 were nearly a dead letter. The country sought to escape from 
 this condition, at once feeble and disgraceful, by constituting a 
 Government which should have power, of itself, to lay duties and 
 taxes, and to pay the public debt, and provide for tlie general 
 welfare ; and to lay these duties and taxes in all the Slates, with- 
 
172 
 
 out asking the consent of the State Governments. This was the 
 very power on which the new Constitution was to depend for all 
 its ability to do good ; and, without it, it can be no government, 
 now or at any time. Yet, Sir, it is precisely against this power, 
 so absolutely indispensable to the very being of the Government, 
 that South Carolina directs her ordinance. She attacks the Gov- 
 ernment in its authority to raise revenue — the very main spring of 
 the whole system; and, if she succeed, every movement of that 
 system must inevitably cease. It is of no avail that she declares 
 that she does not resist the law as a revenue law, but as a law for 
 protecting manufactures. It is a revenue law ; it is the very law 
 by force of which the revenue is collected ; if it be arrested in any 
 State, the revenue ceases in that State; it is, in a word, the sole 
 reliance of the Government for the means of maintaining itself and 
 performing its duties. 
 
 Mv. President, the alleged right of a State to decide Constitu- 
 tional questions for herself, necessarily leads to force, because 
 other States must have the same right, and because different 
 States will decide differently ; and when these questions arise 
 between States, if there be no superior power, they can be decided 
 only by the law of force. On entering into the Union, the people 
 of each State gave up a part of theii" own power to make laws for 
 themselves, in consideration that, as to common objects, they 
 should have a part in making laws for other States. In other 
 words, the people of all the States agreed to create a conjmon 
 Government, to be conducted by common councils. Pennsylva- 
 nia, for example, yielded the right of laying imposts in her own 
 ports, in consideration that the new Government, in which she was 
 to have a share, should possess the power of laying imposts in all 
 the States. If South Carolina now refuses to submit to this 
 power, she breaks the condition on which other States entered 
 into the Union. She partakes of the common councils, and there- 
 in assists to bind others, while she refuses to be bound herself. 
 It makes no difference in the case, whether she does all this with- 
 out reason or pretext, or whether she sets up as a reason that, in 
 her judgment, the acts complained of are unconstitutional. In the 
 judgment of other States, they are not so. It is nothing to them 
 that she offers some reason or some apology for her conduct, if it 
 be one which they do not admit. It is not to be expected that 
 any State will violate her duty without some plausible pretext. 
 That would be too rash a defiance of the opinion of mankind. 
 But if it be a pretext which lies in her own breast ; if it be no 
 more than an opinion which she says she has formed, how can 
 other States be satisfied with this? How can they allow her to 
 be judge of her own obligations? Or, if she may judge of her ob- 
 ligations, may they not judge of their rights also r May not the 
 
173 
 
 twenty-three entertain an opinion as well as the twenty-fourth? 
 And, if it be their right, in their own opinion, as expressed in the 
 common council, to enforce the law against her, how is she to say 
 that her right and her opinion are to be every thing, and their 
 right and their opinion nothing? 
 
 Mr. President, if we are to receive the Constitution as the text, 
 and then to lay down, in its margin, the contradictory commenta- 
 ries which have been, and which may be, made by different 
 States, the whole page would be a polyglot indeed. It would 
 speak with as many tongues as the builders of Babel, and in dia- 
 lects as much confused, and mutually as unintelligible. The very 
 instance now before us presents a practical illustration. The law 
 of the last session is declared Unconstitutional in South Carolina, 
 and obedience to it is refused. In other States, it is admitted to 
 be strictly Constitutional. You walk over the limit of its author- 
 ity, therefore, when you pass a State line. On one side, it is 
 law ; on the other side, a nullity ; and yet it is passed by a com- 
 mon Government, having the same authority in all the States. 
 
 Such, Sir, are the inevitable results of this doctrine. Beginning 
 with the original error, that the Constitution of tlie United States 
 is nothing but a compact between sovereign States; asserting, 
 in the next step, that each State has a right to be its own sole 
 judge of the extent of its own obligations, and consequently of the 
 Constitutionality of laws of Congress ; and, in the next, that it 
 may oppose whatever it sees fit to declare unconstitutional, and 
 that it decides for itself on the mode and measure of redress, — the 
 argument arrives at once at the conclusion, that what a State dis- 
 sents from, it may nullify ; what it opposes, it may oppose by 
 force ; what it decides for itself, it may execute by its own power ; 
 and that, in short, it is, itself, supreme over the legislation of Con- 
 gress, and supreme over the decisions of the National Judicature ; 
 supreme over the Constitution of the country, supreme over the 
 supreme law of the land. However it seeks to protect itself 
 against these plain inferences, by saying that an unconstitutional 
 law is no law, and that it only opposes such laws as are unconsti- 
 tutional, yet this does not, in the slightest degree, vary the result; 
 since it insists on deciding this question for itself; and, in oppo- 
 sition to reason and argument, in opposition to practice and expe- 
 rience, in opposition to the judgment of others, having an equal 
 right to judge, it says, only, " Such is my opinion, and my opin- 
 ion shall be my law, and I will support it by my own strong hand. 
 I denounce the law ; I declare it unconstitutional ; that is enough ; 
 it shall^ not be executed. Men in arms are ready to resist its 
 execution. An attempt to enforce it shall cover the land with 
 blood. Elsewhere, it may be binding ; but here, it is trampled 
 under foot." 
 
174 
 
 This, Sir, IS practical nullification. 
 
 And now, Sir, against all these theories and opinions, I main- 
 tain — 
 
 1. That the Constitution of the United States is not a league, 
 confederacy, or compact, between the people of the several States 
 in their sovereign capacities ; but a government proper, founded 
 on the adoption of the people, and creating direct relations between 
 itself and individuals. 
 
 2. That no State authority has power to dissolve these rela- 
 tions ; that nothing can dissolve them but revolution ; and that, 
 consequently, there can be no such thing as secession without rev- 
 olution. 
 
 3. That there is a supreme law, consisting of the Constitution 
 of the United States, acts of Congress passed in pursuance of it, 
 and treaties ; and that, in cases not capable of assuming the char-^ 
 acter of a suit in law or equity, Congress must judge of, and finally ' 
 interpret, this supreme law, so often as it has occasion to pass acts; 
 of legislation ; and, in cases capable of assuming, and actually as- 
 suming, the character of a suit, the Supreme Court of the United 
 States is the final interpreter. 
 
 4. That an attempt by a State to abrogate, annul, or nullify, an 
 act of Congress, or to arrest its operation within her limits, on the 
 ground that, in her opinion, such law is unconstitutional, is a direct 
 usurpation on the just powers of the General Government, and 
 on the equal rights of other States ; a plain violation of the Con- 
 stitution, and a proceeding essentially revolutionary in its charac- 
 ter and tendency. 
 
 Whether the Constitution be a compact between States in their 
 sovereign capacities, is a question which must be mainly argued 
 from what is contained in the instrument itself We all agree 
 that it is an instrument which has been, in some way, clothed with 
 power. We all admit that it speaks with authority. The first 
 question, then, is. What does it say of itself.' What does it purport 
 to be.' Does it style itself a league, confederacy, or compact, 
 between sovereign States ? It is to be remembered. Sir, that the 
 Constitution began to speak only after its adoption. Until it was 
 ratified by nine States, it was but a proposal, the mere draught of 
 an instrument. It was like a deed drawn, but not executed. 
 The Convendon had framed it ; sent it to Congress, then sitting 
 under the Confederation ; Congress had transmitted it to the State 
 Legislatures ; and by these last it was laid before conventions of 
 the people In the several States. All this while it was inoperative 
 paper. It had received no stamp of authority, no sanction ; it 
 spoke no language. But when ratified by the people in their re- 
 spective conventions, then it had a voice, and spoke authentically. 
 Every word in it had then received the sanction of the popular 
 
175 
 
 will, and was to be received as the expression of that will. What 
 the Constitution says of itself, therefore, is as conclusive as what 
 it says on any other point. Does it call itself a " compact" ? Cer- 
 tainly not. It uses the word comyact but once, and that is when 
 it declares that the States shall enter into no compact. Does it call 
 itself a *' lea£;ue," a " confederacy," a " subsisting treaty between the 
 States " ? Certainly not. There is not a particle of such language 
 in all its pages. But it declares itself a constitution. What is 
 a constitution ? Certainly not a league, compact, or confederacy, 
 but a fundamental law. That fundamental regulation which de- 
 termines the manner in which tlie public authority is to be exe- 
 cuted, is what forms the constitution of a State. Those primary 
 rules which concern the body itself, and the very being of the po- 
 litical society, the form of government, and the manner in which 
 power is to be exercised — all, in a word, which form together the 
 constitution of a State, — these are the fundamental laws. This, 
 Sir, is the language of the public writers. But do we need to be 
 informed, in this country, what a constitution is.'' Is it not an 
 idea perfectly familiar, definite, and well settled ? We are at no 
 loss to understand what is meant by the constitution of one of the 
 States ; and the Constitution of the United States speaks of itself 
 as being an instrument of the same nature. It says, this Consti- 
 tution shall be the law of the land, any thing in any State consti- 
 tution to the contrary notwithstanding. And it speaks of itself, 
 too, in plain contradistinction from a confederation ; for it says 
 that all debts contracted, and all engagements entered into by the 
 United States, shall be as valid under this Constitution, as under 
 the Confederation. It does not say, as valid under this compact, 
 or this league, or tins confederation, as under the former confede- 
 ration, but as valid under this Constitution. 
 
 Tliis, tlien. Sir, is declared to be a constitution. A constitution 
 is the fundamental law of the state ; and this is expressly declared 
 to be the supreme law. It is as if the people had said, " we pre- 
 scribe this fundamental law," or " this supreme law," for they 
 do say that they establish this Constitution, and that it shall be the 
 supreme law. They say that they ordain and establish it. Now, 
 Sir, what is the common application of these words ? We do not 
 speak of ordaining leagues and compacts. If this was intended to 
 be a compact or league, and the States to be parties to it, why was 
 it not so said ? Why is there found no one expression in the whole 
 instrument indicating such intent? The old Confederation was 
 expressly called a league ; and into this league it was declared 
 that the States, as States, severally entered. Why was not sim- 
 ilar language used in the Constitution, if a similar intention had 
 existed ? Why was it not said, " the States enter into this new 
 league," " the States form this new confederation," or " the 
 
176 
 
 States agree to Uiis new compact" ? Or why was it not said, in 
 the language of the gentleman's resolution, that the people of 
 the several States acceded to this compact in their sovereign ca- 
 pacities ? What reason is there for supposing that the framers of 
 the Constitution rejected expressions appropriate to their own 
 meaning, and adopted others wholly at war with that meaning ? 
 
 Again, Sir, the Constitution speaks of that political system which 
 it established as " the Government of the Lhiited States.''^ Is it 
 not doing strange violence to language to call a league or a com- 
 pact between sovereign powers a government? The government 
 of a State is that organization in which the political power resides. 
 It is the political being created by the constitution or fundamental 
 law. The broad and clear difference between a government and 
 a league, or compact, is, that a government is a body politic ; it 
 has a will of its own ; and it possesses powers and faculties to ex- 
 ecute its own purposes. Every compact looks to some power to 
 enforce its stipulations. Even in a compact between sovereign 
 communities, there always exists this ultimate reference to a power 
 to ensure its execution ; although, in such case, this power is but 
 the force of one party against the force of another ; that is to sa}', 
 the power of war. But a government executes its decisions by its 
 own supreme authority. Its use offeree in compelling obedience to 
 its own enactments, is not war. It contemplates no opposing party 
 having a right of resistance. It rests on its own power to enforce 
 its own will ; and, when it ceases to possess this power, it is no 
 longer a government. 
 
 Mr. President, I concur so generally in the very able speech of 
 the gentleman from Virginia, near me [Mr. Rives], that it is not 
 without diffidence and regret that I venture to differ with him on 
 any point. His opinions. Sir, are redolent of the doctrines of a 
 very distinguished school, for which I have the highest regard, of 
 whose doctrines I can say, what I also can say of the gentleman's 
 speech, that, while I concur in the results, I must be permitted to 
 hesitate about some of the premises. I do not agree that the 
 Constitution is a compact between States in their sovereign capaci- 
 ties. 1 do not agree that, in strictness of language, it is a compact 
 at all. But I do agree, that it is founded on consent, or agree- 
 ment, or 071 compact, if die gentleman prefers that word, and 
 means no more by it than voluntary consent or agreement. The 
 Constitution, Sir, is not a contract, but the result of a contract ; 
 meaning, by contract, no more than assent. Founded on consent, 
 it is a government proper. Adopted by the agreen:)ent of the 
 people of the United States, when adopted, it has become a Con- 
 stitution. The people have agreed to make a Constitution ; but 
 when made, that Constitution becomes what its name imports. It 
 is no longer a mere agreement. Our laws, Sir, have their founda- 
 
177 
 
 tion in the agreement or consent of the two Houses of Congress. 
 We say, habitually, that one House proposes a bill, and the other 
 agrees to it ; but the result of this agreement is not a compact, 
 but a law. The law, the statute, is not the agreement, but some- 
 thing created by the agreement ; and something which, when 
 created, has a new character, and acts by its own authority. So 
 the Constitution of the United States, founded in or on the con- 
 sent of the people, may be said to rest on compact, or consent ; 
 but it is itself not the compact, but its result. When a people agree 
 to erect a government, and actually erect it, the thing is done, and 
 the agreement is at an end. The compact is executed, and the 
 end designed by it attained. Henceforth, the fruit of the agree- 
 ment exists, but the agreement itself is merged in its own accom- 
 plishment ; since there can be no longer a subsisting agreement, or 
 compact, to form a constitution or government, after that constitu- 
 tion or government has been actually formed and established. 
 
 It appears to me, Mr. President, that the plainest account of 
 the establishment of this Government presents the most just and 
 philosophical view of its foundation. The people of the sev- 
 eral States had their separate State Governments ; and between 
 the States there also existed a Confederation. With this condition 
 of things the people were not satisfied, as the Confederation had 
 been found not to fulfil its intended objects. It was proposed, 
 therefore, to erect a new. Common Government, which should pos- 
 sess certain definite powers, such as regarded the prosperity of the 
 people of all the States, and to be formed upon the general model 
 of American constitutions. This proposal was assented to, and 
 an instrument was presented to the people of the several States 
 for their consideration. They approved it, and agreed to adopt 
 it, as a ConsUtution. They executed that agreement ; they adopted 
 the Constitution as a Constitution, and henceforth it must stand as 
 a Constitution until it shall be altogether destroyed. Now, Sir, is 
 not this the truth of the whole matter ? And is not all that we 
 have heard of compact between sovereign States, the mere effect of 
 a theoretical and artificial mode of reasoning upon the subject ^ 
 a mode of reasoning which disregards plain facts, for the sake of 
 hypothesis ? 
 
 Mr. President, the nature of sovereignty, or sovereign power, 
 has been extensively discussed by gentlemen on this occasion, as 
 it generally is, when the origin of our Government is debated. But 
 I confess myself not entirely satisfied with arguments and illustra- 
 tions drawn from that topic. The sovereignty of government is 
 an idea belonging to the other side of the Atlantic. No such 
 thing is known in North America. Our governments are all lim- 
 ited. In Europe, sovereignty is of feodal origin, and imports no 
 more than the state of the sovereign. It comprises his rights, du- 
 voL. 11. 23 
 
178 
 
 ties, exemptions, prerogatives and powers. But, with us, all power 
 is with the people. They, alone, are sovereign ; and they erect 
 what governments they please, and confer on them such powers as 
 they please. None of these governments is sovereign, in the 
 European sense of the word, all being restrained by written con- 
 stitutions. It seems to me, therefore, that we only perplex our- 
 selves when we attempt to explain the relations existing between 
 the General Government and the several State Governments, ac- 
 cording to those ideas of sovereignty which prevail under sys- 
 tems essentially different from our own. 
 
 But, Sir, to return to the Constitution itself; let me inquire what 
 it relies upon for its own continuance and support. 1 hear it often 
 suggested, that the States, by refusing to appoint Senators and 
 Electors, might bring this Government to an end. Perhaps that is 
 true ; but the same may be said of the State Governments them- 
 selves. Suppose the Legislature of a State, having the power to 
 appoint the governor and the judges, should omit that duty, would 
 not the State Government remain unorganized ? No doubt, all 
 elective governments may be broken up, by a general aban- 
 donment, on the part of those intrusted with political powers, of 
 their appropriate duties. But one popular government has, in this 
 respect, as much security as another. The maintenance of this 
 Constitution does not depend on the plighted faith of the States, as 
 States, to support it ; and this again shows that it is not a league. 
 It relies on individual duty and obligation. 
 
 The Constitudon of the United States creates direct relations 
 between this Government and individuals. This Government may 
 punish individuals for treason, and all other crimes in the code, 
 when committed against the United States. It has power, also, to 
 tax individuals, in any mode, and to any extent ; and it possesses 
 the further power of demanding from individuals military service. 
 Nothing, certainly, can more clearly distinguish a government from 
 a confederation of states, than the possession of these powers. 
 No closer relations can exist between individuals and any govern- 
 ment. 
 
 On the other hand, the Government owes high and solemn du- 
 ties to every cidzen of the country. It is bound to protect him 
 in his most important rights and interests. It makes war for his 
 protection, and no other government in the country can make war. 
 It makes peace for his protection, and no other government can 
 make peace. I? maintains armies and navies for his defence and 
 security, and no other government is allowed to maintain them. 
 He goes abroad beneath its flag, and carries over all the earth a 
 national character imparted to him by this Government, and which 
 no other government can impart. In whatever relates to war, to 
 . peace, to commerce, he knows no other goveinmeut. All these, 
 
179 
 
 Sir, are connections as dear and as sacred as can bind individuals 
 to any government on earth. It is not, therefore, a compact be- 
 tween States, but a government projier, operating directly upon 
 individuals, yielding to them protection on die one hand, and de- 
 manding from them obedience on the other. 
 
 There is no language in the whole Constitution applicable to a 
 confederation of States. If the States be parties, as States, what 
 are their rights, and what their respective covenants, and stipula- 
 tions? And where are their rights, covenants, and stipulations 
 expressed ? The States engage for nothing, they promise nothing. 
 In the Articles of Confederation, they did make promises, and did 
 enter into engagements, and did plight the faith of each State for 
 their fulfilment; but, in the Constitution, there is nothing of that 
 kind. The reason is, that, in the Constitution, it is the people 
 who speak, and not the States. The people ordain the Constitu- 
 tion, and therein address themselves to the States, and to the Legis- 
 latures of States, in the language of injunction and prohibition. The 
 Constitution utters its behests in the name and by authority of the 
 people, and it exacts not from States any plighted public faith to 
 maintain it. On the contrary, it makes its own preservation de- 
 pend on individual duty and individual obligation. Sir, the States 
 cannot omit to appoint Senators and Electors. It is not a matter 
 resting in State discretion or State pleasure. The Constitution has 
 taken better care of its own preservation. It lays its hand on in- 
 dividual conscience and individual duty. It incapacitates any 
 man to sit in the Legislature of a State, who shall not first have 
 taken his solemn oath to support the Constitution of the United 
 States. From the obligation of this oath, no Stale power can 
 discharge him. All the members of all the State Legislatures are as 
 religiously bound to support the Constitution of the United States 
 as they are to support their own State constitution. Nay, Sir, 
 they are as solemnly sworn to support it as we ourselves are, 
 who are members of Congress. 
 
 No member of a State Legislature can refuse to proceed, at the 
 proper time, to elect Senators to Congress, or to provide for the 
 choice of Electors of President and Vice-President, any more than 
 the members of this Senate can refuse, when the appointed day 
 arrives, to meet the members of the other House, to count the 
 votes for those officers, and ascertain who are chosen. In both 
 cases, the duty binds, and with equal strength, the conscience of 
 the individual member, and it is imposed on all by an oath in 
 the same words. Let it, then, never be said. Sir, that it is a 
 matter of discretion with the States, whether they will continue 
 the Government, or break it up by refusing to appoint Senators and 
 to elect Electors. They have no discretion in the matter. The 
 members of their Legislatures cannot avoid doing eidier, so often as 
 
tt' 
 
 180 
 
 the time arrives, without a direct violation of their duty and their .^ 
 
 oaths; such a violation as would break up any other government. 
 
 Looking still further to the provisions of the Constitution itself, 
 in order to learn its true character, we find its great apparent pur- « 
 
 pose to be, to unite the people of all the States under one General 
 Government, for certain definite objects, and, to the extent of this 
 union, to restrain the separate authority of the States. Congress 
 only can declare war ; therefore, when one State is at war with a 
 foreign nation, all must be at war. The President and the Senate 
 only can make peace ; when peace is made for one State, there- 
 fore, it must be made for all. 
 
 Can any thing be conceived more preposterous than that any 
 State should have power to nullify the proceedings of the General 
 Government respecting peace and war ? When war is declared by 
 a law of Congress, can a single State nullify that law, and remain 
 at peace ? And yet she may nullify that law, as well as any other. 
 If the President and Senate make peace, may one State, neverthe- 
 less, continue the war ? And yet, if she can nullify a law, she 
 may quite as well nullify a treaty. 
 
 The truth is, Mr. President, — and no ingenuity of argument, no 
 subtlety of distinction, can evade it, — that, as to certain purposes, the 
 people of the United States ai'e one people. They are one in 
 making war, and one in making peace ; they are one in regulating 
 commerce, and one in laying duties of imposts. The very end 
 and purpose of the Constitution was, to make them one people in 
 these particulars ; and it has effectually accomplished its objects. 
 All this is apparent on the face of the Constitution itself. I 
 have already said. Sir, that to obtain a power of direct legisla- 
 tion over the people, especially in regard to imposts, was always 
 prominent as a reason for getting rid of the Confederation, and 
 forming a new Constitution. Among innumerable proofs of this, 
 before the assembling of the Convention, allow me to refer only to 
 the report of the committee of the old Congress, July, 1785. 
 
 But, Sir, let us go to the actual formation of the Constitution ; 
 let us open the journal of the Convention itself, and we shall see 
 that the very first resolution which the Convention adopted, was, 
 
 "that A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO BE ESTABLISHED, 
 CONSISTING OF A SUPREME LEGISLATURE, JUDICIARY, AND EX- 
 ECUTIVE." 
 
 This itself completely negatives all idea of league, and compact, 
 and confederation. Terms could not be chosen more fit to ex- 
 press an intention to establish a National Government, and to ban- 
 ish forever all notion of a compact between sovereign States. 
 
 This resolution was adopted on the 30th of May. Afterwards, 
 the style was altered, and, instead of being called a National Gov- 
 ernment, it was called the Government of the United States; but 
 
181 
 
 the substance of this resolution was retained, and was at the head 
 of that list of resolutions which was afterwards sent to the com- 
 mittee who were to frame the instrument. 
 
 It is true, there were gentlemen in the Convention, who were 
 for retaining the Confederation, and amending its Articles ; but the 
 majority was against this, and was for a National Government. INIr. 
 Patterson's propositions, which were for continuing the Articles of 
 Confederation with additional powers, were submitted to the Con- 
 vention on the 15th of June, and referred to the committee of the 
 whole. And the resolutions forming the basis of a National Gov- 
 ernment, which had once been agreed to in the committee of the 
 whole, and reported, were recommitted to the same committee, on 
 the same day. The Convention, then, in committee of the whole, 
 on the 19th of June, had both these plans before them ; that is to 
 say, the plan of a confederacy, or compact, between States, and 
 the plan of a National Government. Both these plans were con- 
 sidered and debated, and the committee reported, " That they do 
 not agree to the propositions offered by the honorable Mr. Patter- 
 son, hut that they again submit the resolutions formerly reported.'^ 
 If, Sir, any historical fact in the world be plain and undeniable, it is 
 that the Convention deliberated on the expediency of continuing 
 the Confederation, with some amendments, and rejected that 
 scheme, and adopted the plan of a National Government, with a 
 Legislature, an Executive, and a Judiciary of its own. They were 
 asked to preserve the league ; they rejected the proposition. They 
 were asked to continue the existing compact between States ; 
 they rejected it. They rejected compact, league, and confedera- 
 tion, and set themselves about framing the Constitution of a 
 National Government ; and they accomplished what they under- 
 took. 
 
 If men will open their eyes fairly to the lights of history, it is 
 impossible to be deceived on this point. The great object was to 
 supersede the Confederation, by a regular government ; because, 
 under the Confederation, Congress had power only to make requi- 
 sidons on States ; and if States declined compliance, as they did, 
 there was no remedy but war against such delinquent States. It 
 would seem, from Mr. Jefferson's correspondence, in 1786 and 
 1787, that he was of opinion that even this remedy ought to be 
 tried. "There will be no money in the treasury," said he, " till 
 the confederacy shows its teeth ; " and he suggests that a single 
 frigate would soon levy, on the commerce of a delinquent State, 
 the deficiency of its contribution. But this would be war ; and it 
 was evident that a confederacy could not long hold together, which 
 should be at war with its members. The Constitution was adopt- 
 ed to avoid this necessity. It was adopted that there might be a 
 Government which should act directly on individuals, without bor- 
 
182 
 
 rowing aid from the State Governments. This is clear as light it- 
 self on the very face of the provisions of the Constitution, and its 
 whole history tends to the same conclusion. Its framers gave this 
 very reason for their work in the most distinct terms. Allow me 
 to quote but one or two proofs, out of hundreds. That State, so 
 small in territory, but so distinguished for learning and talent, — Con- 
 necticut, — had sent to the General Convention, among other mem- 
 bers, Samuel Johnston and Oliver Ellsworth. The Constitution 
 having been framed, it was submitted to a convention of the people 
 of Connecticut for ratification on the part of that State ; and Mr. 
 Johnston and Mr. Ellsworth were also members of this convention. 
 On the first day of the debates, being called on to explain the rea- 
 sons which led the Convention at Philadelphia to recommend such 
 a Constitution, after showing the insufliciency of the existing con- 
 fedei-acy, inasmuch as it applied to States, as States, Mr. Johnston 
 proceeded to say — 
 
 " The Convention saw this imperfection in attempting to legis- 
 late for States in their political capacity — that the coercion of law 
 can be exercised by nothing but a military force. They have, 
 therefore, gone upon entirely new ground. They have formed one 
 new nation out of the individual States. The Constitution vests in the 
 General Legislature a power to make laws in matters of national 
 concern ; to appoint judges to decide upon these laws ; and to 
 appoint officers to carry them into execution. This excludes the 
 idea of an armed force. The power which is to enforce these 
 laws, is to be a legal power, vested in proper magistrates. The 
 force which is to be employed, is the energy of law; and this 
 force is to operate only upon individuals who fail in their duty to 
 their country. This is the peculiar glory of the Constitution — that 
 it depends upon the mild and equal energy of the magistracy for 
 the execution of the laws." 
 
 In the further course of the debate, INIr. Ellsworth said — 
 
 " In republics, it is a fundamental principle, that the majority 
 govern, and that the minority comply with the general voice. How 
 contrary, then, to republican principles, how humiliating, is our 
 present situation ! A single State can rise up, and put a veto upon 
 the most important public measures. We have seen this actually 
 take place : a single State has controlled the general voice of the 
 Union ; a minority, a very small minority, has governed us. So 
 far is this from being consistent with republican principles, that it 
 is, in effect, the worst species of monarchy. 
 
 " Hence we see how necessarv for the Union is a coercive 
 
 ■ 
 
183 
 
 principle. No man pretends the contrary. We all see and feel 
 this necessity. The only question is, Shall it be a coercion of 
 law, or a coercion of arms ? There is no other possible alternative. 
 Where will those who oppose a coercion of law come out ? Where 
 will they end ? A necessary consequence of their principles is a 
 war of the States one against another. I am for coercion by 
 la^v ; that coercion which acts only upon delinquent individuals. 
 This Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies, 
 States, in their political capacity. No coercion is applicable to 
 such bodies, but that of an armed force. If we should attempt to 
 execute the laws of the Union, by sending an armed force against 
 a delinquent State, it would involve the good and bad, the inno- 
 cent and guilty, in the same calamity. But this legal coercion 
 singles out the guilty individual, and punishes him for breaking the 
 laws of the Union." 
 
 Indeed, Sir, if we look to all cotemporary history, to the writings 
 of the Federalist, to the debates in the conventions, to the publi- 
 cations of friends and foes, they all agree, that a change had been 
 made from a confederacy of States to a different system ; they all 
 agree, that the Convention had formed a Constitution for a National 
 Government. With this result some were satisfied, and some 
 were dissatisfied ; but all admitted that the thing had been done. 
 In none of these various productions and publications did any 
 one intimate that the new Constitution was but another compact 
 between States in their sovereign capacities. I do not find such 
 an opinion advanced in a single instance. Every where, the people 
 were told that the old Confederation was to be abandoned, and a 
 new system to be tried ; that a proper government was proposed, 
 to be founded in the name of the people, and to have a regular 
 organization of its own. Every where, the people were told that 
 it was to be a government with direct powers to make laws over 
 individuals, and to lay taxes and imposts without the consent of the 
 States. Every where, it was understood to be a popular Constitu- 
 tion. It came to the people for their adoption, and was to rest on 
 the same deep foundation as the State constitutions themselves. 
 Its most distinguished advocates, who had been themselves mem- 
 bers of the Convention, declared that the very object of submitting 
 the Constitution to the people was, to preclude the possibility of 
 its being regarded as a mere compact. " However gross a heresy," 
 say the writers of the Federalist, "it may be to maintain that a 
 party to a compact has a right to revoke that compact, the doctrine 
 itself has had respectable advocates. The possibility of a ques- 
 tion of this nature prov^es the necessity of laying the foundations 
 of our National Government deeper than in the mere sanction of 
 
184 
 
 
 delegated authority. The fabric of American empire ought to 
 rest on the sohd basis of the consent of the people." 
 
 Such is the language, Sir, addressed to the people, while they | 
 
 yet had the Constitution under consideradon. The powers con- '^ 
 
 ferred on the new Government were perfectly well understood to 
 be conferred, not by any State, or the people of any State, but by 
 the people of the United States. Virginia is more explicit, perhaps, 
 in this particular, than any other State. Her convention, assembled 
 to ratify the Constitution, " in the name and behalf of the people of 
 Virginia, declare and make known, that the powers granted under 
 the Constitution, being derived from thepeople of the United States, 
 may be resumed by them whenever the same shall be perverted 
 to their injury or oppression." 
 
 Is this language which describes the formation of a compact 
 between States? or language describing the grant of powers to a 
 new government, by the whole people of the United States ? 
 
 Among all the other ratifications, there is not one which speaks 
 of the Constitution as a compact between States. Those of 
 Massachusetts and New Hampshire express the transaction, in 
 my opinion, with sufficient accuracy. They recognize tlie divine 
 goodness " in affording the people of the United States 
 an opportunity of entering into an explicit and solemn compact 
 with each other, by assenting to and ratifying a new Constitu- 
 tion." You will observe, Sir, that it is the people, and not the 
 States, who have entered into this compact ; and it is the people 
 of all the United States. These conventions, by this form of 
 expression, meant merely to say, that the people of the United 
 States had, by the blessing of Providence, enjoyed the oppor- 
 tunity of establishing a new Constitution, /oMnrfc<^ in the consent of 
 the people. This consent of the people has been called, by 
 European writers, the social compact ; and, in conformity to this 
 common mode of expression, these conventions speak of that 
 assent, on which the new Constitution was to rest, as an explicit 
 and solemn compact, not which the Stales had entered into 
 with each other, but which the people of the United States had 
 entered into. 
 
 Finally, Sir, how can any man get over the words of the 
 Constitution itself? — "We, the people of the United States, 
 
 DO ORDAIN AND ESTABLISH THIS CONSTITUTION." ThcSC WOl'ds 
 
 must cease to be a part of the Constitution, they must be 
 obliterated from the parchment on which they are written, 
 before any human ingenuity or human argument can remove 
 the popular basis on which that Constitution rests, and turn the 
 instrument into a mere compact between sovereign States. 
 
 The second proposition. Sir, which I propose to maintain, is, 
 
185 
 
 that no State authority can dissolve the relations subsistin"- be- 
 tween the Government of the United States and individuals ; that 
 nothing can dissolve these relations but revolution ; and that 
 therefore, there can be no such thing as secession without 
 revolution. All this follows, as it seems to me, as a just conse- 
 quence, if it be first proved that the Constitution of the United 
 States is a government proper, owing protection to individuals, 
 and entitled to their obedience. 
 
 The people, Sir, in every State, live under two governments. 
 They owe obedience to both. These governments, though dis- 
 tinct, are not adverse. Each has its separate sphere, and its 
 peculiar powers and duties. It is not a contest between two 
 sovereigns for the same power, like the wars of the rival houses 
 in England ; nor is it a dispute between a government de facto 
 and a government de jure. It is the case of a division of powers, 
 between two governments, made by the people, to which both are 
 responsible. Neither can dispense with the duty which individ- 
 uals owe to the other ; neither can call itself master of the other : 
 the people are masters of both. This division of power, it is true, 
 is in a great measure unknown in Europe. It is the peculiar 
 system of America ; and, though new and singular, it is not in- 
 comprehensible. The State constitutions are established by the 
 people of die States. This Constitution is established by the 
 people of all the States. How, then, can a State secede? How 
 can a State undo what the whole people have done ? How can 
 she absolve her citizens from their obedience to the laws of the 
 United States .? How can she annul their obligations and oaths ? 
 How can the members of her Legislature renounce their own 
 oaths ? Sir, secession, as a revolutionary right, is intelligible ; as 
 a right to be proclaimed in the midst of civil commotions, and 
 asserted at the head of armies, I can understand it. But, as a 
 practical right, existing under the Constitution, and in conformity 
 with its provisions, it seems to me to be nothing but a plain 
 absurdity ; for it supposes resistance to Government, under the 
 authority of Government itself ; it supposes dismemberment, with- 
 out violating the principles of union ; it supposes opposition to 
 law, without crime ; it supposes the violation of oaths, without 
 responsibility; it supposes the total overthrow of Government, 
 without revolution. 
 
 The Constitution, Sir, regards itself as perpetual and immortal. 
 It seeks to establish a union among the people of the States, 
 which shall last through all time. Or, if the common fate of 
 things human must be expected, at some period, to happen to it, 
 yet that catastrophe is not anticipated. 
 
 The instrument contains ample provisions for its amendment, 
 at all times ; none for its abandonment, at any time. It declares 
 VOL. II. 24 
 
186 
 
 that new States may come into the Union, but it does not declare 
 that old States may go out. The Union is not a temporary 
 partnership of States. It is the association o( the people, under a 
 Constitution of Government, uniting their power, joining together 
 their highest interests, cementing their present enjoyments, and 
 blending, in one indivisible mass, all their hopes for the future. 
 Whatsoever is steadfast in just, political principles ; whatsoever is 
 permanent in the structure of human society ; whatsoever there is 
 which can derive an enduring character from being founded on 
 deep-laid principles of Constitutional liberty, and on the broad 
 foundations of the public will, — all these unite to entide this in- 
 strument to be regarded as a permanent Constitution of Govern- 
 ment. 
 
 In the next place, Mr. President, I contend that there is a su- 
 preme law of the land, consisting of the Constitution, acts of Con- 
 gress passed in pursuance of it, and the public treaties. This 
 will not be denied, because such are the very words of the Con- 
 stitution. But I contend, further, that it rightfully belongs to 
 Congress, and to the courts of the United States, to settle the 
 construction of this supreme law, in doubtful cases. This is 
 denied ; and here arises the great practical question, Who is to 
 construe finally the Constitution of the United States ? We 
 all agree that the Constitution is the supreme law ; but who 
 shall interpret that law ? In our system of the division of powers 
 between different governments, controversies will necessarily 
 sometimes arise, respecting the extent of the powers of each. 
 Who shall decide these controversies? Does it rest with the 
 General Government, in all or any of its departments, to exercise 
 the office of final interpreter ? Or may each of the States, as 
 well as the General Government, claim this right of ultimate 
 decision ? The practical result of this whole debate turns on this 
 point. The gentleman contends that each State may judge for 
 itself of any alleged violation of the Constitution, and may finally 
 decide for itself, and may execute its own decisions by its own 
 power. All the recent proceedings in Soudi Carolina are founded 
 on this claim of right. Her convention has pronounced the rev- 
 enue laws of the United States unconstitutional ; and this decision 
 she does not allow any authority of the United States to overrule 
 or reverse. Of course she rejects the authority of Congress, 
 because the very object of the ordinance is to reverse the decision 
 of Congress ; and she rejects, too, the authority of the courts of 
 the United States, because she expressly prohibits all appeal to 
 those courts. It is in order to sustain this asserted right of being 
 her own judge, that she pronounces the Constitution of the 
 United States to be but a compact, to which she is a party, and a 
 sovereign pally. If this be established, then the inference is sup- 
 
 
 
187 
 
 posed to follow, that, being sovereign, there is no power to control 
 her decision ; and her own judgment on her own compact is and 
 must be conclusive. 
 
 I have already endeavored, Sir, to point out the practical conse- 
 quences of this doctrine, and to show how utterly inconsistent it is 
 with all ideas of regular government, and how soon its adoption 
 would involve the whole country in revolution and absolute 
 anarchy. I hope it is easy now to show, Sir, that a doctrine, 
 bringing such consequences with it, is not well founded ; that it 
 has nothing to stand on but theory and assumption ; and that it is 
 refuted by plain and express Constitutional provisions. I think 
 the government of the United States does possess, in its appro- 
 priate departments, the authority of final decision on questions of 
 disputed power. I think it possesses this authority, both by 
 necessary implication, and by express grant. 
 
 It will not be denied, Sir, that this authority naturally belongs 
 to all governments. They all exercise it from necessity, and as 
 a consequence of the exercise of other powers. The State Gov- 
 ernments themselves possess it, except in that class of questions 
 vi'hich may arise between them and the General Government, and 
 in regard to which they have surrendered it, as well by the nature 
 of the case, as by clear Constitutional provisions. In other and 
 ordinary cases, whether a particular law be in conformity to the 
 Constitution of the State, is a question which the State Legislature 
 or the State Judiciary must determine. We ah know that these 
 questions arise daily in the State Governments, and are decided 
 by those Governments ; and I know no government which does 
 not exercise a similar power. 
 
 Upon general principles, then, the Government of the United 
 States possesses this authority : and this would hardly be denied, 
 were it not that there are other governments. But since there 
 are State Governments, and since these, like other governments, 
 ordinarily construe their own powers, if the Government of the 
 United States construes its own powers also, which construction is 
 to prevail, in the case of opposite constructions? And again, as 
 in the case now actually before us, the State Governments may 
 undertake, not only to construe their own powers, but to decide 
 directly on the extent of the powers of Congress. Congress has 
 passed a law as being widiin its just powers ; South Carolina 
 denies that this law is within its just powers, and insists that she 
 has the right so to decide this point, and that her decision is final. 
 How are these questions to be settled ? 
 
 In my opinion, Sir, even if the Constitution of the United States 
 had made no express provision for such cases, it would yet be diffi- 
 cult to maintain that, in a Constitution existing over four-and-twenty 
 States, with equal authority over all, one could claim a right of 
 
I 
 
 188 
 
 construing it for the whole. This would seem a manifest impro- 
 priety — indeed, an ahsurdlty. If the Constitution is a government 
 existing over all the States, though with limited powers, it necessa- 
 rily follows that, to the extent of those powers, it must be supreme. 
 If it be not superior to the authority of a particular State, it is not 
 a national government. But as it is a Government, as it has a 
 legislative power of its own, and a judicial power coextensive with 
 the legislative, the inference is irresistible, that this Government, 
 thus created hy the whole, and for the whole, must have an au- 
 thority superior to that of the particular government of any one 
 part. Congress is the Legislature of all the people of the United 
 States ; the Judiciary of the General Government is the Judiciary 
 of all the people of the United States. To hold, therefore, that 
 this Legislature and this Judiciary are subordinate in authority to 
 the Legislature and Judiciary of a single State, is doing violence 
 to all common sense, and overturning all established principles. 
 Congress must judge of the extent of its own powers so often as 
 it is called on to exercise them, or it cannot act at all ; and it must 
 also act Independent of State control, or it cannot act at all. 
 
 The right of State interposition strikes at the very foundation of 
 the legislative power of Congress. It possesses no effective legis- 
 lative power, if such right of State interposition exists ; because it 
 can pass no law not subject to abrogation. It cannot make laws 
 for the Union, if any part of the Union may pronounce its enact- 
 ments void and of no effect. Its forms of legislation would be an 
 idle ceremony, if, after all, any one of four-and-twenty States might 
 bid defiance to its authority. Without express provision in the 
 Constitution, therefore. Sir, this whole question is necessarily de- 
 cided by those provisions which create a legislative power and a 
 judicial power. If these exist in a government intended for the 
 whole, the inevitable consequence is, that the laws of this legis- 
 lative power, and the decisions of this judicial power, must be bind- 
 ing on and over the whole. No man can form the conception of 
 a government existing over four-and-twenty States, with a regular 
 legislative and judicial power, and of the existence, at the same 
 time, of an authority, residing elsewhere, to resist, at pleasure or 
 discretion, the enactments and the decisions of such a government. 
 I maintain, therefore, Sir, that, from the nature of the case, and 
 as an inference wholly unavoidable, the acts of Congress, and the 
 decisions of the National Courts, must be of higher authority than 
 State laws and State decisions. If this be not so, there is, there 
 can be, no general government. 
 
 But, Mr. President, the Constitution has not left this cardinal 
 point without full and explicit provisions. First, as to the audiority 
 of Con2;ress. Having enumerated the specific powers conferred 
 on Congress, the Constitution adds, as a distinct and substantive 
 
189 
 
 clause, the following, viz. " To make all laws lohich shall he ne- 
 cessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing 
 powers, and all other poioers vested by this Constitution in the 
 Government of the United States, or in any department or officer 
 thereof If this means any thing, it means that Congress may 
 judge of the true extent and just interpretation of the specific 
 powers granted to it, and may judge also of what is necessary and 
 proper for executing those powers. If Congress is to judge of 
 what is necessary for the execution of its powers, it must, of ne- 
 cessity, judge of the extent and interpretation of those powers. 
 
 And in regard, Sir, to the Judiciary, the Constitution is still more 
 express and emphatic. It declares that the judicial power shall 
 extend to all cases inlaw or equity arising under the Constitution, 
 laws of the United States, and treaties ; that there shall be one 
 Supreme Court, and that this Supreme Court shall have appellate 
 jurisdiction of all these cases, subject to such exceptions as Con- 
 gress may make. It is impossible to escape from the generality 
 of these words. If a case arises under the Constitution, — that is, if 
 a case arises depending on the construction of the Constitution, — the 
 judicial po\^r of the United States extends to it. It reaches the 
 case, the question ; it attaches the power of the national judicature 
 to the case itself, in whatever court it may arise or exist ; and in 
 this case the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over all 
 courts whatever. No language could provide with more effect and 
 precision, than is here done, for subjecting Constitutional questions 
 to the ultimate decision of the Supreme Court. And, Sir, this is 
 exactly what the Convention found it necessary to provide for, and 
 intended to provide for. It is, too, exactly what the people were 
 universally told was done when they adopted the Constitution. 
 One of the first resolutions, adopted by the Convention, was in these 
 words, viz. "that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall 
 extend to cases which respect the collection of the national revenue, 
 and questions which involve the national peace and harmony." 
 Now, Sir, this either had no sensible meaning at all, or else it 
 meant that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary should extend 
 to these questions, ivith a paramount authority. It is not to be 
 supposed that the Convention intended that the power of the na- 
 tional judiciary should extend to these questions, and that the 
 judicatures of the States should also extend to them, with equal 
 power of final decision. This would be to defeat the whole 
 object of the provision. There were thirteen judicatures already 
 in existence. The evil complained of, or the danger to be guarded 
 against, was contradiction and repugnance in the decisions of these 
 judicatures. If the framers of the Constitution meant to create a 
 fourteenth, and yet not to give it power to revise and control the de- 
 cisions of the existing thirteen, then they only intended to augment 
 
190 
 
 the existing evil, and the apprehended danger, by increasing, still fur- 
 ther, the chances of discordant judgments. Why, Sir, has it become 
 a setded axiom in politics, that every government must have a judi- 
 cial power coextensive with its legislative power ? Certainly, there 
 is only this reason, viz. that the laws may receive a uniform inter- 
 pretation , and a uniform execution. This object can be no otherwise 
 attained. A statute is what it is judicially interpreted to be ; and if it 
 be construed one way in New Hampshire, and another way in Geor- 
 gia, there is no uniform law. One supreme court, with appellate and 
 final jurisdiction, is the natural and only adequate means, in any 
 government, to secure this uniformity. The Convention saw all 
 this clearly ; and the resolution which I have quoted, never after- 
 wards rescinded, passed through various modifications, till it finally 
 received the form which the article now wears in the Constitution. 
 It is undeniably true, then, that the framers of the Constitution 
 intended to create a national judicial power, which should be para- 
 mount on national subjects. And after the Consutution was framed, 
 and while the whole country was engaged in discussing its merits, 
 one of its most distinguished advocates (Mr. Madison) told the 
 people, that it ivas true that, in controversies relatingto the boun- 
 dary hetween the two jurisdictions, the tribunal whicli is ultimately 
 to decide is to be established under the General Government. Mr. 
 Martin, who had been a member of the Convention, asserted the 
 same thing to the Legislature of Maryland, and urged it as a reason 
 for rejecting the Constitution. Mr. Pinckney, himself also a leading 
 member of the Convention, declared it to the people of South 
 Carolina. Every where, it was admitted, by friends and foes, that 
 this power v^^as in the Constitution. By some it was thought dan- 
 gerous ; by most it was thought necessary ; but, by all, it was agreed 
 to be a power actually contained in the instrument. The Conven- 
 tion saw the absolute necessity of some control in the National 
 Government over State laws. Different modes of establishing this 
 control were suggested and considered. At one time, it was pro- 
 posed that the laws of the States should, from time to time, be 
 laid before Congress, and that Congress should possess a negative 
 over them. But this was thought inexpedient and inadmissible ; 
 and in its place, and expressly as a substitute for it, the existing 
 provision was introduced ; that is to say, a provision by which the 
 federal courts should have authority to overrule such State la\vs as 
 might be in manifest contravention of the Constitution. The writers 
 of the Federalist, in explaining the Constitution, while it was yet 
 pending before the people, and still unadopted, give this account of 
 the matter in terms, and assign this reason for the article as it now 
 stands. By this provision Congress escaped from the necessity of 
 any revision of Stale laws, left the whole sphere of State legislation 
 quite untouched, and yet obtained a security against any infringe- 
 
191 
 
 ment of the Constitutional power of the General Government, 
 Indeed, Sir, allow me to ask again, if the national judiciary was 
 not to exercise a power of revision, on Constitutional questions, over 
 the judicatures of the States, why was any national judicature 
 erected at all ? Can any man give a sensible reason for having a 
 judicial power in this Government, unless it be for the sake of 
 maintaining a uniformity of decision, on questions arising under the 
 Constitution and laws of Congress, and ensuring its execution ? 
 And does not this very idea of uniformity necessarily imply that 
 the construction given by the national courts is to be the prevailing 
 construction ? How else, Sir, is it possible that uniformity can be 
 preserved ? 
 
 Gentlemen appear to me, Sir, to look at but one side of the ques- 
 tion. They regard only the supposed danger of trusting a govern- 
 ment with the interpretation of its own powers. But w^ill they view 
 the question in its other aspect ? Will they show us how it is possible 
 for a government to get along with four-and-twenty interpreters of 
 its laws and powers ? Gentlemen argue, too, as if, in these cases, 
 the State would be always right, and the General Government 
 always wrong. But suppose the reverse ; suppose the State wrong ; 
 (and, since they differ, some of them must be wrong ;) are the most 
 important and essential operations of the Government to be embar- 
 rassed and arrested, because one State holds a contrary opinion ? 
 Mr. President, every argument which refers theConstitutionality of 
 acts of Congress to State decision appeals from the majority to 
 the minority ; it appeals from the common interest to a particular 
 interest ; from the councils of all to the council of one ; and en- 
 deavors to supersede the judgment of the whole by the judgment 
 of a part. 
 
 I think it is clear. Sir, that the Constitution, by express provision, 
 by definite and unequivocal words, as well as by necessary impli- 
 cation, has constituted the Supreme Court of the United States the 
 appellate tribunal in all cases of a Constitutional nature which as- 
 sume the shape of a suit, in law or equity. And I think I cannot 
 do better than to leave this part of the subject by reading the 
 remarks made upon it by Mr. Ellsworth, in the Convention of 
 Connecticut ; — a gendeman. Sir, who has left behind him, on the 
 records of the Government of his country, proofs of the clearest 
 intelligence and of the deepest sagacity, as well as of the utmost 
 purity and integrity of character. " This Constitution," says he, 
 " defines the extent of the powers of the General Government. 
 If the General Legislature should, at any time, overleap their limits, 
 the judicial department is a Constitutional check. If the United 
 States go beyond their powers; if they make a law which the 
 Constitution does not authorize, it is void ; and the judiciary power, 
 the national judges, who, to secure their impartiality, are to be made 
 

 192 
 
 independent, will declare it to be void. On the other hand, if the 
 States go beyond their limits ; if they make a law which is a usur- 
 pation upon the General Government, the law is void ; and upright, 
 independent judges will declare it to be so." 
 
 And let me now only add, Sir, that, in the very first session of 
 the first Congress, with all these well-known objects, both of the 
 Convention and the people, full and fresh in his mind, Mr. Ells- 
 worth reported the bill, as is generally understood, for the organ- 
 ization of the judicial department, and, in that bill, made provision 
 for the exercise of this appellate power of the Supreme Court, in 
 all the proper cases, in whatsoever court arising ; and that Uiis ap- 
 pellate power has now been exercised for more than forty years, 
 without interruption, and without doubt. 
 
 As to the cases. Sir, which do not come before the Courts — those 
 political questions which terminate with the enactments of Congress — 
 it is of necessity that these should be ultimately decided by Con- 
 gress itself Like other legislatures, it must be trusted with this 
 power. The members of Congress are chosen by the people, and 
 they are answerable to the people : like other public agents, they 
 are bound by oath to support the Constitution. These are tlie 
 securities that they will not violate their duty, nor transcend their 
 powers. They are the same securities as prevail in other popular 
 governments ; nor is it easy to see how grants of power can be 
 more safely guarded, without rendering them nugatory. If the 
 case cannot come before the courts, and if Congress be not trusted 
 with its decision, who shall decide it ? The gentleman says, each 
 State is to decide it for herself. If so, then, as I have already 
 urged, what is law in one State is not law in another. Or, if the 
 resistance of one State compels an entire repeal of the law, then 
 a minority, and that a small one, governs the whole country. 
 
 Sir, those who espouse the doctrines of nullification, reject, as it 
 seems to me, the first great principle of all republican liberty ; 
 that is, that the majority must govern. In matters of common con- 
 cern, the judgment of a majority must stand as the judgment of 
 the whole. This is a law imposed on us by the absolute necessity 
 of the case ; and if we do not act upon it, there is no possibility of 
 maintaining any government but despotism. We hear loud and 
 repeated denunciations against what is called majority government. 
 It is declared, with much warmth, that a majority government 
 cannot be maintained in the United States. What, then, do gen- 
 tlemen wish ? Do they wish to establish a minority government ? 
 Do they wish to subject the will of the many to the will of the 
 few ? The honorable gentleman from South Carolina'has spoken 
 of absolute majorities and majorities concurrent ; language wholly 
 unknown to our Constitution, and to which it is not easy to affix 
 definite ideas. As far as I understand it, it would teach us that the 
 
193 
 
 absolute majority may be found in Congress, but the majority coU' 
 current must be looked for in the States ; diat is to say, Sir, 
 stripping the matter of this novelty of phrase, that the dissent of 
 one or more States, as States, renders void the decision of a majority 
 of Congress, so far as that State is concerned. And so this doc- 
 trine, running but a short career, like other dogmas of the day, 
 terminates in nullification. 
 
 If this vehement invective against majorities meant no more 
 than diat, in the construction of Government, it is wise to provide 
 checks and balances, so that there should be various limitadons on 
 the power of the mere majority, it would only mean what the Con- 
 stitution of the United States has already abundantly provided. 
 It is full of such checks and balances. In its very organization, it 
 adopts a broad and most effectual principle in restraint of the power 
 of mere majorities. A majority of the people elects the House of 
 Representatives, but it does not elect the Senate. The Senate is 
 elected by the States, each State having, in this respect, an equal 
 power. No law, therefore, can pass, without the assent of a ma- 
 jority of the Representatives of the people, and a majority of the 
 Representatives of the States also. A majority of the Representa- 
 tives of the people must concur, and a majority of the States must 
 concur, in every act of Congress ; and the President is elected on 
 a plan compounded of both these principles. But, having com- 
 posed one House of Representatives chosen by the people in 
 each State, according to its numbers, and the other, of an equal 
 number of members from every State, whether larger or smaller, 
 the Constitution gives to majorities in these Houses, thus consti- 
 tuted, the full and entire power of passing laws, subject always to 
 the Constitudonal restrictions, and to the approval of the Pi'esident. 
 To subject them to any other power, is clear usurpation. The 
 majority of one House may be controlled by the majority of die 
 other ; and both may be restrained by the President's negative. 
 These are checks and balances provided by the Constitution, ex- 
 isting in the Government itself, and wisely intended to secure de- 
 liberation and caution in legislative proceedings. But to resist the 
 will of the majority in both Houses, thus Constitutionally exercised ; 
 to insist on the lawfulness of interposition by an extraneous power ; 
 to claim the right of defeating the will of Congress, by setting up 
 against it the will of a single State, — is neither more nor less, as it 
 strikes me, than a plain attempt to overthrow the Government. 
 The constituted authorities of the United States are no longer a 
 government, if they be not masters of their own will ; they are no 
 longer a government, if an external power may arrest their pro- 
 ceedings ; they are no longer a government, if acts passed by both 
 Houses, and approved by the President, may be nullified by State 
 vetoes or State ordinances. Does any one suppose it could make any 
 VOL. II. 25 
 
194 
 
 difference, as to the binding authority of an act of Congress, and 
 of the duty of a State to respect it, whether it passed by a mere 
 majority of both Houses, or by three fourths of each, or the unan- 
 imous vote of each ? Within the hmits and restrictions of the Con- 
 stitution, the Government of the United States, hke all other pop- 
 ular governments, acts by majorities. It can act no otherwise. 
 Whoever, therefore, denounces the government of majorities, de- 
 nounces the government of his own country, and denounces all 
 free governments. And whoever would restrain these majorities, 
 while acting within their Constitutional limits, by an external pow- 
 er, whatever he may intend, asserts principles which, if adopted, 
 can lead to nothing else than the destruction of the Government 
 itself. 
 
 Does not the gentleman perceive. Sir, how his argument against 
 majorities might here be. retorted upon him? Does he not see 
 how cogently he might be asked, whether it be the character of 
 nullification to practise what it preaches ? Look to South Caro- 
 lina, at the present moment. How far are the rights of minorities 
 there respected ? I confess, Sir, 1 have not known, in peaceable 
 times, the power of the majority carried with a higher hand, or 
 upheld whh more relentless disregard of the rights, feelings and 
 principles of the minority — a minority embracing, as the gentle- 
 man himself will admit, a large portion of the worth and respecta- 
 bility of the State ; a minority comprehending, in its numbers, 
 men who have been associated with him, and with us, in these 
 halls of legislation ; men who have served their country at home 
 and honored it abroad ; men who would cheerfully lay down their 
 lives for their native State, in any cause which they could regard 
 as the cause of honor and duty ; men above fear, and above re- 
 proach ; whose deepest grief and distress spring from the convic- 
 tion, that the present proceedings of the State must ultimately re- 
 flect discredit upon her. How is this minority, how are these men, 
 regarded ? They are enthralled and disfranchised by ordinances 
 and acts of legislation ; subjected to tests and oaths, incompatible, 
 as they conscientiously think, with oaths already taken, and obli- 
 gations already assumed ; they are proscribed and denounced, 
 as recreants to duty and patriotism, and slaves to a foreign power. 
 Both the spirit which pursues them, and the positive measures 
 which emanate from that spirit, are harsh and prescriptive, beyond 
 all precedent within my knowledge, except in periods of professed 
 revolution. 
 
 It is not, Sir, one would think, for those who approve these 
 proceedings to complain of die power of majorities. 
 
 Mr. President, all popular governments rest on two principles, 
 or two assumptions : 
 
 First, That there is so far a common interest, among those over 
 
195 
 
 whom the government extends, as that it may provide for the de- 
 fence, protection, and good government of the whole, without in- 
 justice or oppression to parts. 
 
 Second, That the representatives of the people, and especially 
 the people themselves, are secure against general corruption, and 
 may be trusted, therefore, with the exercise of power. 
 
 Whoever argues against these principles, argues against the 
 practicability of all free governments. And whoever admits these, 
 must admit, or cannot deny, that power is as safe in the hands 
 of Congress as In those of other representative bodies. Congress 
 is not irresponsible. Its members are agents of the people, elected 
 by them, answerable to them, and liable to be displaced or super- 
 seded at their pleasure ; and they possess as fair a claim to the 
 confidence of the people, while they continue to deserve it, as any 
 other public political agents. 
 
 If, then. Sir, the manifest intention of the Convention, and the 
 cotemporary admission of both friends and foes, prove any thing; if 
 the plain text of the instrument itself, as well as the necessary im- 
 plication from other provisions, prove any thing ; if the early legis- 
 lation of Congress, the course of judicial decisions, acquiesced in 
 by all the States for forty years, prove any thing — then it is proved 
 that there is a supreme law, and a final interpreter. 
 
 My fourth and last proposition, Mr. President, was, that any 
 attempt by a State to abrogate or nullify acts of Congress, is a 
 usurpation on the powers of the General Government, and on the 
 equal rights of other States, a violation of the Constitution, and a 
 proceeding essentially revolutionary. This is undoubtedly true, if 
 the preceding propositions be regarded as proved. If the Govern- 
 ment of the United States be trusted with the duty, in any depart- 
 ment, of declaring the extent of its own powers, then a State ordi- 
 nance, or act of legislation, authorizing resistance to an act of Con- 
 gress, on the alleged ground of its unconstitutionality, is manifestly 
 a usurpation upon its powers. 
 
 If the States have equal rights in matters concerning the whole, 
 then for one State to set up her judgment against the judgment of 
 the rest, and to insist on executing that judgment by force, is also 
 a manifest usurpation on the rights of other States. 
 
 If the Constitution of the United States be a government proper, 
 with authority to pass laws, and to give them a uniform interpreta- 
 tion and execution, then the interposition of a State, to enforce her 
 own construction, and to resist, as to herself, that law which binds 
 the other States, is a violation of the Constitution. 
 
 And if that be revolutionary which arrests the legislative, exec- 
 utive, and judicial power of Government, dispenses with existing 
 oaths and obligations of obedience, and elevates another power to 
 supreme dominion, then nullification is revolutionary. Or if that 
 
196 
 
 be revolutionary, the natural tendency and practical effect of which 
 is to break the Union into fragments, to sever all connection among 
 the people of the respective States, and to prostrate this General 
 Government in the dust, then nuUification is revolutionary. 
 
 Nullification, Sir, is as distinctly revolutionary as secession ; but 
 I cannot say that the revolution which it seeks is one of so re- 
 spectable a character. Secession would, it is true, abandon the 
 Constitution altogether ; but, then, it would profess to abandon it. 
 Whatever other inconsistencies it might run into, one, at least, it 
 would avoid. It would not belong to a government, while it re- 
 jected its authority. It would not repel the burden, and continue 
 to enjoy the benefits. It would not aid in passing laws which 
 others are to obey, and yet reject their authority, as to itself. 
 It would not undertake to reconcile obedience to public authority, 
 with an asserted right of command over that same authority. It 
 would not be in the Government, and above the Government, at 
 the same time. But, however more respectable a mode secession 
 may be, it is not more truly revolutionary than the actual exe- 
 cution of the doctrines of nullification. Both, and each, resist tlie 
 Constitutional authorities ; both, and each, would sever the Union, 
 and subvert the Government. 
 
 Mr. President, having detained the Senate so long already, I 
 will not now examine, at length, the ordinance and laws of South 
 Carolina. These papers are well drawn for their purpose. Their 
 authors understood their own objects. They are called a peaceable 
 remedy, and we have been told that South Carolina, after all, 
 intends nothing but a lawsuit. A very few words, Sir, will show 
 the nature of this peaceable remedy, and of the lawsuit which 
 South Carolina contemplates. 
 
 In the first place, the ordinance declares the law of last July, 
 and all other laws of the United States, laying duties, to be ab- 
 solutely null and void, and makes it unlawful for the constituted 
 authorities of the United States to enforce the payment of such 
 duties. It is, therefore, Sir, an indictable offence, at this moment, 
 in South Carolina, for any person to be concerned in collecting 
 revenue, under the laws of the United States. It being declared 
 unlawful to collect these duties by what is considered a funda- 
 mental law of the State, an indictment Hes, of course, against any 
 one concerned in such collection ; and he is, on general principles, 
 liable to be punished by fine and imprisonment. The terms, it is 
 true, are, that it is unlawful " to enforce the payment of duties ; " but 
 every custom-house officer enforces payment while he detains the 
 goods, in order to obtain such payment. The ordinance, dierefore, 
 reaches every body concerned in the collection of the duties. 
 
 This is the first step in the prosecution of the peaceable remedy. 
 The second is more decisive. By the act, conmionly called the 
 
197 
 
 replevin law, any person, whose goods are seized or detained by 
 the collector for the payment of duties, may sue out a writ of re- 
 plevin, and, by virtue of that writ, the goods are to be restored to 
 him. A writ of replevin is a writ which the sheriff is bound to 
 execute, and for the execution of which he is bound to employ 
 force, if necessary. He may call out the posse, and must do so, 
 if resistance be made. This posse may be armed or unarmed. 
 It may come forth with military array, and under the lead of mil- 
 itary men. Whatever number of troops may be assembled in 
 Charleston, they may be summoned, with the governor, or com- 
 mander-in-chief, at their head, to come in aid of the sIierifF. It is 
 evident, then. Sir, that the whole military power of the State is to 
 be employed, whenever necessary, in dispossessing the custom- 
 house officers, and in seizing and holding the goods, without paying 
 the duties. This is the second step in the peaceable remedy. 
 
 Sir, whatever pretences may be set up to the contrary, this is die 
 direct applicadon of force, and of military force. It is unlawful, 
 in itself, to replevy goods in the custody of the collectors. But 
 this unlawful act is to be done, and it is to be done by power. 
 Here is a plain interposition, by physical force, to resist the laws 
 of the Union. The legal mode of collecting duties is to detain the 
 goods till such duties are paid or secured. But force comes, and 
 overpowers the collector, and his assistants, and takes away the 
 goods, leaving the duties unpaid. There cannot be a clearer case 
 of forcible resistance to law. And it is provided that the goods 
 thus seized shall be held against any attempt to retake them, by the 
 same force which seized them. 
 
 Having thus dispossessed the officers of the Government of the 
 goods, without payment of duties, and seized and secured them by 
 the strong arm of the State, only one thing more remained to be 
 done, and that is, to cut off all possibility of legal redress ; and 
 that, too, is accomplished, or thought to be accomplished. The 
 ordinance declares, that all judicial proceedings, founded on the 
 revenue laws (including, of course, proceedings in the courts of 
 the United States), shall be null and void. This nullifies the ju- 
 dicial power of the United States. Then comes the test-oath act. 
 This requires all State judges and jurors in the State courts, to 
 swear that they will execute the ordinance, and all acts of the 
 Legislature passed in pursuance thereof The ordinance declares, 
 that no appeal shall be allowed from the decision of die State courts 
 to the Supreme Court of the United States ; and the replevin act 
 makes it an indictable offence for any clerk to furnish a copy of 
 the record, for the purpose of such appeal. 
 
 The two principal provisions on which South Carolina relies, to 
 resist the laws of the United States, and nullify the authority of 
 this Government, are, therefore, these : — 
 
198 
 
 1. A forcible seizure of goods, before duties are paid or secured 
 by the power of the State, civil and military. 
 
 2. The taking away, by the most effectual means in her power, 
 of all legal redress in the courts of the United States ; the confining 
 all judicial proceedings to her own State tribunals ; and the com- J 
 pelling of her judges and jurors of these, her own courts, to take 
 an oath, beforehand, that they will decide all cases according to the 
 ordinance, and the acts passed under it ; that is, that they will de- 
 cide the cause one way. They do not swear to try it, on its own 
 merits ; they only swear to decide it as nullification requires. 
 
 The character. Sir, of these provisions, defies comment. Their 
 object is as plain as their means are extraordinary. They propose 
 direct resistance, by the whole power of the State, to laws of Con- 
 gress, and cut ofi', by methods deemed adequate, any redress by 
 legal and judicial authority. They arrest legislation, defy the 
 executive, and banish the judicial power of this Government. 
 They authorize and command acts to be done, and done by force, 
 both of numbers and of arms, which, if done, and done by force, 
 are clearly acts of rebellion and U'eason. 
 
 Such, Sir, are the laws of South Carolina; such, Sir, is the 
 peaceable remedy of nullification. Has not nullification reached, 
 Sir, even thus early, that point of direct and forcible resistance to 
 law, to which I intimated, three years ago, it plainly tended ^ 
 
 And now, Mr. President, what is the reason for passing laws like 
 these? What are the oppressions experienced, under the Union, 
 calling for measures which thus threaten to sever and destroy it ? 
 What invasions of public liberty, what ruin to private happiness, 
 what long list of rights violated, or wrongs unredressed, is to justify 
 to tlie country, to posterity, and to the world, this assault upon the 
 free Constitution of the United States, this great and glorious work 
 of our fathers ? At this very moment. Sir, the whole land smiles in 
 peace, and rejoices in plenty. A general and a high prosperity 
 pervades the country ; and, judging by the common standard, by 
 increase of population and wealth, or judging by the opinions of ll 
 
 that portion of her people not embarked in those dangerous and des- ' 
 
 perate measures, this prosperity overspreads South Carolina herself. 
 
 Thus happy at home, our country, at the same time, holds high 
 the character of her institutions, her power, her rapid growth, and 
 her future destiny, in the eyes of all foreign states. One danger, 
 only, creates hesitation; one doubt only exists, to darken the 
 otherwise unclouded brightness of that aspect, which she exhibits 
 to the view, and to the admiration, of the world. Need I say, that 
 that doubt respects the permanency of our Union ? and need I say, 
 that that doubt is now caused, more than by any thing else, by 
 these very proceedings of South Carolina ? Sir, all Europe is, at 
 this moment, beholding us, and looking for the issue of this con- 
 
 , 
 
199 
 
 troversy ; those who hate free institutions, with maHgnant hope ; 
 those who love them, with deep anxiety and shivering fear. 
 
 The cause, then. Sir, the cause ! Let the world know the cause, 
 which has thus induced one State of the Union to bid defiance to 
 the power of the whole, and openly to talk of secession. 
 
 Sir, the world will scarcely believe that this whole controversy, 
 and all the desperate measures which its support requires, have 
 no other foundation than a difterence of opinion, upon a provision 
 of the Constitution, between a majority of the people of South 
 Carolina, on one side, and a vast majority of the whole people of 
 the United States, on the other. It will not credit the fact, it will 
 not admit the possibility, that, in an enlightened age, in a free, 
 popular republic, under a Government where the people govern, 
 as they must always govern, under such systems, by majorities, at 
 a time of unprecedented happiness, without practical oppression, 
 without evils, such as may not only be pretended, but felt and ex- 
 perienced — evils, not slight or temporary, but deep, permanent, 
 and intolerable — a single State should rush into conflict with all the 
 rest, attempt to put down the power of the Union by her own laws, 
 and to support those laws by her military power, and thus break 
 up and destroy Uie world's last hope. And well the world may be 
 incredulous. We, who see and hear it, can ourselves hardly yet 
 believe it. Even after all that had preceded it, this ordinance 
 struck the country with amazement. It was incredible and incon- 
 ceivable, that South Carolina should thus plunge headlong into 
 resistance to the laws on a matter of opinion, and on a question in 
 which the preponderance of opinion, both of the present day and 
 of all past time, was so overwhelmingly against her. The ordi- 
 nance declares that Congress has exceeded its just power, by 
 laying duties on imports intended for the protection of manufac- 
 tures. This is the opinion of South Carolina ; and on the strength 
 of that opinion she nullifies the laws. Yet has the rest of the 
 country no right to its opinion also.'' Is one State to sit sole arbi- 
 tress ? She maintains that those laws are plain, deliberate, and 
 palpable violations of the Constitution ; that she has a sovereign 
 right to decide this matter ; and that, having so decided, she is 
 authorized to resist their execution, by her own sovereign power ; 
 and she declares that she will resist it, though such resistance 
 should shatter the Union into atoms. 
 
 Mr. President, I do not intend to discuss the propriety of these 
 laws at large ; but I will ask. How are they shown to be thus 
 plainly and palpably unconstitutional ? Have they no countenance 
 at all in the Constitution itself? Are they quite new in the history 
 of the Government ? Are they a sudden and violent usurpation on 
 the rights of the States ? Sir, what will the civilized world say, 
 what will posterity say, when they learn that similar laws have 
 
200 
 
 existed from the very foundation of the Government ; that for 
 thirty years the power was never questioned ; and that no State in 
 the Union has more freely and unequivocally admitted it than South 
 Carolina herself? 
 
 To lay and collect duties and imposts, is an express power, 
 granted by the Constitution to Congress. It is, also, an exclusive 
 power ; for the Constitution as expressly prohibits all the States 
 from exercising it themselves. This express and exclusive power is 
 unlimited in the terms of the grant, but is attended with two spe- 
 cific restrictions ; first, that all duties and imposts shall be equal in 
 all the States ; second, that no duties shall be laid on exports. 
 The power, then, being granted, and being attended with these 
 two restrictions, and no more, who is to impose a third restriction 
 on the general words of the grant? If the power to lay duties, as 
 known among all other nations, and as known in all our history, and 
 as it was perfectly understood when the Constitution was adopted, 
 includes a right of discriminating, while exercising the power, and 
 of laying some duties heavier, and some lighter, for the sake of 
 encouraging our own domestic products, — what authority is there 
 for giving to the words used in the Constitution a new, narrow, and 
 unusual meaning ? All the limitations which the Constitution in- 
 tended, it has expressed ; and what it has left unrestricted, is as 
 much a part of its will, as the restraints which it has imposed. 
 
 But these laws, it is said, are unconstitutional on account of the 
 motive. How, Sir, can a law be examined on any such ground ? 
 How is the motive to be ascertained? One House, or one member, 
 may have one motive ; the other House, or another member, 
 another. One motive may operate to-day, and another to-morrow. 
 Upon any such mode of reasoning as this, one law might be Un- 
 constitutional now, and another law, in exacdy the same words, 
 perfectly Constitutional next year. Besides, articles may not only 
 be taxed for the purpose of protecting home products, but other 
 articles may be left free, for the same purpose, and with the same 
 modve. A law, therefore, would become unconstitutional from 
 what it omitted, as well as what it contained. Mr. President, it is 
 a settled principle, acknowledged in all legislative halls, recognized 
 before all tribunals, sanctioned by the general sense and under- 
 standing of mankind, that there can be no inquiry into the modves 
 of those who pass laws, for the purpose of determining on their 
 validity. If the law be within the fair meaning of the words in the 
 grant of the power, its authority must be admitted until it is re- 
 pealed. This rule, every where acknowledged, every where ad- 
 mitted, is so universal, and so completely without exception, as that 
 even an allegation of fraud, in the majority of a Legislature, is not 
 allowed as a ground to set aside a law. 
 
 But, Sir, is it true, that the motive for these laws is such as is 
 
 r 
 
 i 
 
 i 
 
201 
 
 stated ? I think not. The great object of all these laws is, un- 
 questionably, REVENUE. If there were no occasion for i-evenue, 
 the laws would not have been passed ; and it is notorious that 
 almost the entire revenue of the country is derived from them. 
 And, as yet, we have collected none too much revenue. The 
 treasury has not been more exhausted for many years than at the 
 present moment. All that South Carolina can say, is, that, in passing 
 the laws which she now undertakes to nullify, particular articles 
 were, taxed, from a regard to the 'protection of domestic articles, 
 higher than they tvould have been had no such regard been enter- 
 tained. And she insists that, according to the Constitution, no such 
 discrimination can be allowed ; that duties should be laid for revenue, 
 and revenue only ; and that it is unlawful to have reference, in any 
 case, to protection. In other words, she denies the power of dis- 
 crimination. She does not, and cannot, complain of excessive 
 taxation ; on the contrary, she professes to be willing to pay any 
 amount for revenue, merely as revenue ; and up to the present 
 moment there is no surplus of revenue. Her grievance, then, that 
 plain and palpable violation of the Constitution which she insists 
 has taken place, is simply the exercise of the power of discrim- 
 ination. Now, Sir, is the exercise of this power of discrim- 
 ination plainly and palpably unconstitutional ? 
 
 I have already said, the power to lay duties is given by the 
 Constitution in broad and general terms. There is also conferred 
 on Congress the whole power of regulating commerce, in another 
 distinct provision. Is it clear and palpable. Sir — can any man say 
 it is a case beyond doubt — that, under these two powers, Congress 
 may not justly discriminate, in laying duties, for the purpose of 
 countervailing the policy of foreign nations, or of favoring our 
 own home productions ? Sir, what ought to conclude this question 
 forever, as it would seem to me, is, that the regulation of commerce, 
 and the imposition of duties, are, in all commercial nations, powers 
 avowedly and constantly exercised for this very end. That un- 
 deniable truth ought to settle the question ; because the Constitu- 
 tion ought to be considered, when it uses well-known language, as 
 using it in its well-known sense. But it is equally undeniable, that 
 it has been, from the very first, fully believed that this power of 
 discrimination was conferred on Congress ; and the Constitution was 
 itself recommended, urged upon the people, and enthusiastically 
 insisted on, in some of the States, for that very reason. Not that, 
 at that time, the country was extensively engaged in manufactures, 
 especially of those kinds now existing. But the trades and crafts 
 of the seaport towns, the business of the artisans, and manual 
 laborers ; those employments, the work in which supplies so great a 
 portion of the daily wants of all classes, — all these looked to the new 
 Constitution as a source of relief from the severe distress which 
 VOL. II. 26 
 
202 
 
 followed the war. It would, Sir, be unpardonable, at so late an 
 hour, to go into details on this point ; but the truth is as I have 
 stated. The papers of the day, the resolutions of public meetings, 
 the debates in the Conventions, all that we open our eyes upon, in 
 the history of the times, prove it. 
 
 The honorable gendeman. Sir, from South Carolina, has referred 
 to two incidents connected with the proceedings of the Convention 
 at Philadelphia, which he thinks are evidence to show that the 
 power of protecting manufactures, by laying duties, and by com- 
 mercial regulations, was not intended to be given to Congress. 
 The first is, as he says, that a power to protect manufactures was 
 expressly proposed, but not granted. I think. Sir, the gentleman 
 is quite mistaken in relation to this part of the proceedings of the 
 Convention. The whole history of the occurrence to which he al- 
 ludes is simply this : Towards the conclusion of the Convention, 
 after the provisions of the Constitution had been mainly agreed 
 upon, after the power to lay duties and the power to regulate com- 
 merce had both been granted, a long list of propositions was made, 
 and referred to the committee, containing various miscellaneous 
 powers, some or all of which it was thought might be properly 
 vested in Congress. Among these was a power to establish a 
 university ; to grant charters of incorporation ; to regulate stage- 
 coaches on the post-roads ; and also the power to which the gen- 
 tleman refers, and which is expressed in these words : " To estab- 
 lish public institutions, rewards, and immunities, for the promotion 
 of agriculture, commerce, trades, and manufactures." The com- 
 mittee made no report on this or various other propositions in the 
 same list. But die only inference from this omission is, that nei- 
 ther the committee nor the Convention thought it proper to author- 
 ize Congress " to establish public institutions, reivards and immu- 
 nities,'' for the promotion of manufactures, and other interests. 
 The Convention supposed it had done enough — at any rate, it had 
 done all it intended — when it had given to Congress, in general 
 terms, die power to lay imposts and the power to regulate trade. 
 It is not to be argued, from its omission to give more, that it meant 
 to take back what it had already given. It had given the impost 
 power ; it had given the regulation of trade ; and it did not deem it 
 necessary to give the further and distinct power of establishing 
 public institutions. 
 
 The other fact, Sir, on which the gentleman relies, is the decla- 
 ration of Mr. Mardn to the Legislature of Maryland. The gentle- 
 man supposes Mr. Martin to have urged, against the Constitution, 
 that it did not contain the power of protection. But, if the gende- 
 man will look again at what Mr. Martin said, he will find, I diink, that 
 what Mr. Martin complained of was, that the ConsUtudon, by its 
 prohibitions on the States, had taken away from the States them- 
 
 ! 
 
 i 
 
20P 
 
 o 
 
 selves the power of protecting their own manufactures by duties 
 on imports. This is undoubtedly true ; but I find no expression 
 of Mr. Martin intimating that the Constitution had not conferred 
 on Congress the same power which it had thus taken from the 
 States. 
 
 But, Sir, let us go to the first Congress ; let us look in upon this 
 and the other House, at the first session of their organization. 
 
 We see, in both Houses, men distinguished among the framers, 
 friends and advocates of the Constitution. We see in both, those 
 who had drawn, discussed and matured the instrument in the 
 Convention, explained and defended it before the people, and 
 were now elected members of Congress, to put the new Govern- 
 ment into motion, and to carry the powers of the Constitution into 
 beneficial execution. 
 
 At the head of the Government was Washington himself, who 
 had been President of the Convention ; and in his cabinet were oth- 
 ers most thoroughly acquainted with the history of the Constitu- 
 tion, and distinguished for the part taken in its discussion. 
 
 If these persons were not acquainted with the meaning of the 
 Constitution, if they did not understand the work of their own 
 hands, who can understand it, or who shall now interpret it to us ? 
 
 Sir, the volume which records the proceedings and debates of 
 the first session of the House of Representatives lies before me. 
 I open it, and I find that, having provided for the administration of 
 the necessary oaths, the very first measure proposed for considera- 
 tion is, the laying of imposts ; and in the very first committee of 
 the whole into which the House of Representatives ever resolved 
 itself, on this its earliest subject, and in this its very first debate, 
 the duty of so laying the imposts as to encourage manufactures, 
 was advanced, and enlarged upon, by almost every speaker, and 
 doubted or denied by none. The first gentleman who suggests 
 this as the clear duty of Congress, and as an object necessary to 
 be attended to, is Mr. Fitzsimons, of Pennsylvania ; the second, 
 Mr. White, of Virginia; the third, Mr. Tucker, of South 
 Carolina. 
 
 But the great leader. Sir, on this occasion, was Mr. Madison. 
 Was he likely to know the intentions of the Convention and the 
 people ? Was he likely to understand the Constitution .'' 
 
 At the second sitting of the committee, Mr. Madison explained 
 his own opinions of the duty of Congress, fully and explicitly. I 
 must not detain you. Sir, with more than a few short extracts from 
 these opinions, but they are such as are clear, intelligible, and 
 decisive. 
 
 " The States," says he, " that are most advanced in population, 
 and ripe for manufactures, ought to have their particular interest at- 
 tended to, in some degree. While these States retained the pow- 
 
I 
 
 204 
 
 er of making regulations of trade, they had the power to cherish 
 such institutions. By adopting the present Constitution, they 
 have thrown the exercise of this power into other hands ; tliey 
 must have done this with an expectation that those interests would 
 not be neglected here." 
 
 In another report of the same speech, Mr. Madison is represent- 
 ed as using still stronger language ; as saying, that the Constitu- 
 tion, having taken this power away from the States, and conferred 
 it on Congress, it would be a fraud on the States and on the peo- 
 ple were Congress to refuse to exercise it. 
 
 Mr. Madison argues, Sir, on this early and interesting occasion, 
 very justly and liberally, in favor of the general principles of unre- 
 stricted commerce. But he argues, also, with equal force and 
 clearness, for certain important exceptions to these general 
 principles. 
 
 The first. Sir, respects those manufactures which had been 
 brought forward under encouragement by the State Governments. 
 " It would be cruel," says Mr. Madison, " to neglect them, and to 
 divert their industry into other channels ; for it is not possible for 
 the hand of man to shift from one employment to another without 
 being injured by the change." Again : " There may be some 
 manufactures which, being once formed, can advance towards per- 
 fection without any adventitious aid ; while others, for want of the 
 fostering hand of Government, will be unable to go on at all. 
 Legislative provision, therefore, will be necessary to collect the 
 proper objects for this purpose ; and this will form another ex- 
 ception to my general principle." And again : " The next ex- 
 ception that occurs is one on which great stress is laid by some 
 well-informed . men, and this with great plausibility ; that each 
 nation should have, within itself, the means of defence, independ- 
 ent of foreign supplies ; that, in whatever relates to the opera- 
 tions of war, no State ought to depend upon a precarious supply 
 from any part of the world. There may be some truth in 
 this remark ; and therefore it is pi'oper for legislative atten- 
 tion." 
 
 In the same debate, Sir, Mr. Burk, from South Carolina, 
 supported a duty on hemp, for the express purpose of encouraging 
 its growth on the strong lands of South Carolina. " Cotton," he 
 said, " was also in contemplation among them, and, if good seed 
 could be procured, he hoped might succeed." Afterwards, Sir, 
 the cotton seed was obtained, its culture was protected, and it did 
 succeed. Mr. Smith, a very distinguished member from the 
 SAME State, observed : " It has been said, and justly, that the 
 States which adopted this Constitution expected its administration 
 would be conducted with a favorable hand. The manufacturing 
 States wished the encouragement of manufactures ; the maritime 
 
205 
 
 States the encouragement of ship-building ; and the agricultural 
 Slates the encouragement of agriculture." 
 
 Sir, I will detain the Senate by reading no more extracts from 
 these debates. I have already shown a majority of the members 
 of South Carolina, in this very first session, acknowledging this 
 power of protection, voting for its exercise, and proposing its 
 extension to their own products. Similar propositions came from 
 Virginia ; and, indeed. Sir, in the whole debate, at whatever 
 page you open the volume, you find the power admitted, and you 
 find it applied to the protection of particular articles, or not 
 applied, according to the discretion of Congress. No man denied 
 the power — no man doubted it ; the only questions were, in 
 regard to the several articles proposed to be taxed, whether they 
 were fit subjects for protection, and what the amount of that 
 protection ought to be. Will gentlemen, Sir, now answer the 
 argument drawn from these proceedings of the first Congress ? 
 Will they undertake to deny that that Congress did act on the 
 avowed principle of pi'otection ? Or, if they admit it, will they 
 tell us how those who framed the Constitution fell, thus early, 
 into this great mistake about its meaning ? Will they tell us how 
 it should happen that they had so soon forgotten their own senti- 
 ments, and their own purposes ? I confess I have seen no 
 answer to this argument, nor any respectable attempt to answer 
 it. And, Sir, how did this debate terminate? What law was 
 passed .'' There it stands, Sir, among the statutes, the second law 
 in the book. It has a preamble, and that preamble expressly 
 recites, that the duties which it imposes are laid " for the support 
 of Government, for the discharge of the debts of the United 
 States, and the encouragement and protection of manufactures.^'' 
 Until, Sir, this early legislation, thus coeval with the Constitution 
 itself, thus full and explicit, can be explained away, no man can 
 doubt of the meaning of that instrument. 
 
 Mr. President, this power of discrimination, thus admitted, 
 avowed, and practised upon, in the first revenue act, has never 
 been denied or doubted, until within a few years past. It was 
 not at all doubted in 1816, when it became necessary to adjust 
 the revenue to a state of peace. On the contrary, the power was 
 then exercised, not without opposition as to its expediency, but, 
 as far as I remember, or have understood, without the slightest 
 opposition founded on any supposed want of Constitutional 
 authority. Certainly, South Carolina did not doubt it. The 
 tariff" of 1816 was introduced, carried through, and established, 
 under the lead of South Carolina. Even the minimum policy is 
 of South Carolina origin. The honorable gentleman himself sup- 
 ported, and ably supported, the tariff of 1816. He has informed 
 us, Sir, that his speech on that occasion was sudden and ofi:-hand, 
 
206 
 
 he being called up by the request of a friend. I am sure the gen- 
 tleman so remembers it, and that it was so ; but there is, never- 
 theless, much method, arrangement, and clear exposition, in that 
 extempore speech. It is very able, very, very much to the point, 
 and very decisive. And in another speech, delivered two months 
 earlier, on the proposition to repeal the internal taxes, the honora- 
 ble gentleman had touched the same subject, and had declared, 
 " thai a certain encouragement ought to be extended, at least to 
 our woollen and cotton manufactures^ I do not quote these 
 speeches. Sir, for the purpose of showing that the honorable 
 gentleman has changed his opinion : my object is other, and 
 higher. I do it for the sake of saying, that that cannot be so 
 plainly and palpably unconstitutional as to warrant resistance to 
 law, nullification, and revolution, which the honorable gentleman 
 and his friends have heretofore agreed to, and acted upon, without 
 doubt, and without hesitation. Sir, it is no answer to say, that 
 the tariff of 1816 was a revenue bill. So are they all revenue 
 bills. The point is, and the truth is, that the tariff of 1816, like 
 the rest, did discriminate: it did distinguish one article from 
 another : it did lay duties for protection. Look to the case of 
 coarse cottons, under the minimum calculation : the duty on these 
 was sixty to eighty per cent. Something beside revenue, cer- 
 tainly, was intended in this ; and, in fact, the law cut up our 
 whole commerce with India in that article. 
 
 It is, Sir, only within a few years that Carolina has denied the 
 Constitutionality of these protective laws. The gendeman himself 
 has narrated to us the true history of her proceedings on this 
 point. He says that, after the passing of the law of 1828, de- 
 spairing then of being able to abolish the system of protection, 
 political men went forth among the people, and set up the doc- 
 trine that the system was unconstitutional. '■^ And the people,''^ 
 says the honorable gentleman, ^'received the doctrine." This, I 
 believe, is true. Sir. The people did then receive the doctrine : 
 they had never entertained it before. Down to that period, the 
 ConstituUonality of these laws had been no more doubted in South 
 Carolina than elsewhere. And I suspect it is true, Sir, and I 
 deem it a great misfortune, that, to the present moment, a great 
 portion of the people of the State have never yet seen more than 
 one side of the argument. I believe that thousands of honest 
 men are involved in scenes now passing, led away by one-sided 
 views of the question, and following their leaders by the impulses 
 of an unlimited confidence. Depend upon it. Sir, if we can avoid 
 the shock of arms, a day for reconsideration and reflection will 
 come ; truth and reason will act with their accustomed force, and 
 the public opinion of South Carolina will be restored to its usual 
 Constitutional and patriotic tone. 
 
 i. 
 
207 
 
 But, Sir, I hold South Carohna to her ancient, her cool, her 
 uninfluenced, her deliberate opinions. I hold her to her own ad- 
 missions, nay, to her own claims and pretensions, in 1789, in the 
 first Congress, and to her acknowledgments and avowed senti- 
 ments through a long series of succeeding years. I hold her to 
 the principles on which she led Congress to act in 1816 ; or, if she 
 have changed her own opinions, I claim some respect for those 
 who still retain the same opinions. I say she is precluded from 
 asserting that doctrines, which she has herself so long and so ably 
 sustained, are plain, palpable, and dangerous violations of the Con- 
 stitution. 
 
 Mr. President, if the friends of nullification should be able to 
 propagate their opinions, and give them practical effect, they 
 would, in my judgment, prove themselves the most skilful " archi- 
 tects of ruin," the most effectual extinguishers of high-raised ex- 
 pectation, the greatest blasters of human hopes, which any age has 
 produced. They would stand up to proclaim, in tones which 
 would pierce the ears of half the human race, that the last great 
 experiment of representative government had failed. They would 
 send forth sounds, at the hearing of which the doctrine of the 
 divine right of kings would feel, even in its grave, a returning 
 sensation of vitality and resuscitation. Millions of eyes, of those 
 who now feed their inherent love of liberty on the success of the 
 American example, would turn away from beholding our dismem- 
 berment, and find no place on earth whereon to rest their gratified 
 sight. Amidst the incantations and orgies of nullification, seces- 
 sion, disunion, and revolution, would be celebrated the funeral 
 rites of Constitutional and republican liberty. 
 
 But, Sir, if the Government do its duty, if it act with firmness 
 and with moderation, these opinions cannot prevail. Be assured, 
 Sir, be assured, that, among the political sentiments of this people, 
 the love of union is still uppermost. They will stand fast by the 
 Constitution, and by those who defend it. I rely on no temporary 
 expedients, on no political combination; but I rely on the true 
 American feeling, the genuine patriotism of the people, and the 
 imperative decision of the public voice. Disorder and confusion, 
 indeed, may arise ; scenes of commotion and contest are threat- 
 ened, and perhaps may come. With my whole heart, I pray for 
 the continuance of the domestic peace and quiet of the country. 
 I desire, most ardently, the restoration of affection and harmony to 
 all its parts. I desire that every citizen of the whole country may 
 look to this Government with no other sentiments but those of 
 grateful respect and attachment. But I cannot yield, even to 
 kind feelings, the cause of the Constitution, the true glory of the 
 country, and the great trust which we hold in our hands for suc- 
 ceeding ages. If the Constitution cannot be maintained without 
 
208 
 
 meeting these scenes of commotion and contest, however unwel- 
 come, they must come. We cannot, we must not, we dare not, 
 omit to do that which, in our judgment, the safety of the Union 
 requires. Not regardless of consequences, we must yet meet 
 consequences; seeing the hazards which surround the discharge 
 of pubhc duty, it must yet be discharged. For myself, Sir, 1 shun 
 no responsibility justly devolving on me, here or elsewhere, in 
 attempting to maintain the cause. I am tied to it by indissoluble 
 bands of affection and duty, and I shall cheerfully partake in its 
 fortunes and its fate. I am ready to perform my own appropriate 
 part, whenever and wherever the occasion may call on me, and to 
 take my chance among those upon whom blows may fall first and 
 fall thickest. I shall exert every faculty I possess in aiding to 
 prevent the Constitution from being nuUified, destroyed, or im- 
 paired ; and even should I see it fall, I will still, with a voice, 
 feeble, perhaps, but earnest as ever issued from human lips, and 
 with fidelity and zeal which nothing shall extinguish, call on the 
 PEOPLE to come to its rescue. 
 
 t 
 
REMARKS 
 
 MADE TO THE CITIZENS OF BUFFALO, JUNE, 1833. 
 
 In the summer of 1833, Mr. Webster made a visit to Ohio. On his way 
 thither, while at Buffalo, New York, he was invited by the citizens of that place 
 to attend a public dinner, which his engagements, and the necessity of an early 
 departure, compelled him to decline. He accepted, however, an invitation to 
 be present at the launching of a steam-boat, to which the proprietors had given 
 the name of Daniel Webster, and, in replj'^ to an address of one of them, 
 made the following remarks : — 
 
 I AVAIL myself gladly of this opportunity of paying my acknowl- 
 edgments to the piroprietors of this vessel, for the honor con- 
 ferred upon me by allowing her to bear my name. Such a 
 token of regard, had it proceeded from my immediate friends and 
 neighbors, could not but have excited feelings of grateful respect ; 
 and it is more calculated to waken these sentiments, when coming 
 from gentlemen of character and worth, with whom I have not had 
 the pleasure of personal acquaintance, and whose motive, I may 
 flatter myself, is to be found in an indulgent opinion towards well- 
 intentioned services in a public situation. 
 
 It gives me great pleasure, also, on the occasion of so large an 
 assembly of the city of Buffalo, to express to them my thanks for 
 the kindness and hospitality with which I have been received in 
 this young, but growing and interesting city. The launching of 
 another vessel on these inland seas, is but a fresh occasion of con- 
 gratulation on the rapid growth, the great active prosperity, and 
 the exciting future prospects of this city. Eight years ago, fel- 
 low-citizens, I enjoyed the pleasure of a short visit to this place. 
 There was then but one steam-boat on Lake Erie : it made its pas- 
 sage once in ten or fifteen days only ; and I remember that persons 
 in my own vicinity, intending to travel to the far West by that con- 
 veyance, wrote to friends to learn the day of the commencement 
 of the contemplated voyage. I understand that there are now 
 eighteen steam-boats plying on the lake, all finding full employ- 
 ment ; and that a boat leaves Buffalo twice every day for Detroit, 
 and the ports in Ohio. The population of Buffalo, now four 
 times as large as it was then, has kept pace with the augmenta- 
 voL. II. 27 
 
210 
 
 tion of its commercial business. This fast progress is a sample, 
 but certainly is not to be regarded as the measure, of the future 
 advancement of the city. So many circumstances incline to 
 fiivor that advancement, that it is difficult to estimate the rate by 
 which it may hereafter proceed. It will probably not be long 
 before the products of the fisheries of the East, the importations of 
 the Atlantic frontier, the productions, mineral and vegetable, of 
 all the Noi-th-western States, and the sugars of Louisiana, will find 
 their way hither by inland water communication. Much of this, 
 indeed, has already taken place, and is of daily occurrence. 
 Many, who remember the competition between Buffalo and Black 
 Rock, for the site of the city, will doubtless live to see the city 
 spread over both. This singular prosperity, Fellow-citizens, so 
 gratifying for the present, and accompanied with such high hopes 
 lor the future, you owe to your own industry and enterprise, your 
 favored position, and to the flourishing condition of the internal 
 commerce of the country ; and the blessings and the riches of 
 that internal commerce, be it ever remembered, are the fruits 
 of a united government, and one general common commercial 
 system. 
 
 It is not only the trade of New York, of Ohio, of New Eng- 
 land, of Indiana, or Michigan, but it is a part of the great aggre- 
 gate of the trade of all the States, in which you so largely and so 
 successfully partake. Who does not see that the advantages here 
 enjoyed spring from a General Government and a uniform code ? 
 Who does not see, that, if these States had remained severed, and 
 each had existed with a system of imposts and commercial regu- 
 lations of its own, all excluding and repelling, rather than inviting 
 the intercourse of the rest, the place could hardly hope to have 
 been more than a respectable frontier post ? Or can any man 
 look to the one and to the other side of this beautiful lake and 
 river, and not see, in their different conditions, the plain and man- 
 ifest results of different political institutions and commercial regu- 
 lations ? 
 
 It would be pleasant, Fellow-citizens, to dwell on these topics, 
 so worthy at all times of regard and reflection ; and especially so 
 fit to engage attention at the present moment ; but this is not the 
 proper moment to pursue them ; and, tendering to you once more 
 my thanks and good wishes, I take my leave of you by expressing 
 my hope for the continued success of that great interest, so essen- 
 tial to your hnppiness — the commerce of the lakes, a new- 
 
 DISCOVERED SOURCE OF NATIONAL PROSPERITY, AND A NEW 
 BOND OF NATIONAL UNION. 
 
 I 
 
211 
 
 An address was also made to Mr. Webster in behalf of tlie mechanics ami 
 manufacturers of Buffalo, to which he returned the following reply : 
 
 I NEED hardly say, Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, that it gives 
 me much satisfaction to receive this mark of approbation of my 
 public conduct, from the Manufacturers and Mechanics of Buffalo. 
 Those who are the most immediately affected by any measures of 
 the Government, are naturally the earliest to perceive their opera- 
 tion, and to foresee their final results. Allow me to say, Gentle- 
 men, that the confidence you express in my continuance in the 
 general course which I have pursued, must rest, and may rest 
 safely, I trust, on the history of the past. Desiring always to 
 avoid extremes, and to observe a prudent moderation in regard to 
 the protective system, I yet hold steadiness and perseverance, in 
 maintaining what has been established, to be essential to the public 
 prosperity. Nodiing can be worse than that what concerns the 
 daily labor and the daily bread of whole classes of the people, 
 should be subject to frequent and violent changes. It were 
 far better not to move at all than to move forward and then fall 
 back again. 
 
 My sentiments. Gentlemen, on the tariff question, are generally 
 known. In my opinion, a just and a leading object in the whole 
 system is the encouragement and protection of American manual 
 labor. I confess, that every day's experience convinces me more 
 and more of the high propriety of regarding this object. Our 
 Government is made for all, not for a few. Its object is to pro- 
 mote the greatest good of the whole ; and this ought to be kept 
 constantly in view in its administration. The far greater number 
 of those who maintain the Government belong to what may be 
 called the industrious or productive classes of the community. 
 With us labor is not depressed, ignorant and unintelligent. On 
 the contrary, it is active, spirited, enterprising, seeking its own 
 rewards, and laying up for its own competence and its own sup- 
 port. The motive to labor is the great stimulus to our whole 
 society ; and no system is wise or just which does not afford this 
 stimulus, as far as it may. The protection of American labor 
 against the injurious competition of foreign labor, so far, at least, as 
 respects general handicraft productions, is known historically to 
 have been one end designed to be obtained by establishing the 
 Constitution ; and this object, and the Constitutional power to ac- 
 complish it, ought never to be surrendered or compromised in any 
 degree. 
 
 Our political institutions, Gentlemen, place power in the hands 
 of all the people ; and, to make the exercise of this power, in such 
 hands, salutary, it is indispensable that all the people should 
 enjoy, first, the means of education, and, second, the reasonable 
 
212 
 
 certainty of procuring a competent livelihood by industry and 
 labor. These institutions are neither designed for, nor suited to, a 
 nation of ignorant paupers. To disseminate knowledge, then, 
 universally, and to secure to labor and industry their just rewards, 
 is the duty both of the General and State Governments, each in i 
 
 the exercise of its appropriate powers. To be free, the people 
 must be intelligently free ; to be substantially independent, they 
 must be able to secure themselves against want, by sobriety and 
 industry ; to be safe depositories of political power, they must be 
 able to comprehend and understand the general interests of the 
 community, and must have a stake, themselves, in the welfare of 
 that community. The interest of labor, therefore, has an impor- 
 tance, in our system, beyond what belongs to it as a mere question 
 of political economy. It is connected with our forms of govern- 
 ment, and our whole social system. The activity and prosperity 
 which at present prevail among us, as every one must notice, are 
 produced by the excitement of compensating prices to labor ; and 
 it is fervently to be hoped that no unpropitious circumstances, and 
 no unwise policy, may counteract this efficient cause of general 
 competency and public happiness. 
 
 I pray you, Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen, to receive person 
 ally my thanks for the manner in which you have communicated 
 the sentiments of the meeting which you represent. 
 
ADDRESS 
 
 TO THE CITIZENS OF PITTSBURGH, JULY 9, 1833, 
 
 Mr. Webster arrived at Pittsburgh on the evening of the fourth of July, 
 accompanied by a numerous cavalcade of citizens. He was immediately waited 
 on by a committee, with the following 
 
 LETTER. 
 
 To THE Hon. Daniel Webster. 
 
 Pittshurgh, July 4, 1833. 
 
 Sir: At a meeting of the citizens of Pittshuro'h, the undersigned were 
 appointed a committee to convey to you a cordial welcome and an assur- 
 ance of the exalted sense which is entertained of your character and 
 public services. 
 
 The feeling is one which pervades our whole community, scorning any 
 narrower discrimination than that of lovers of our sacred Union, and ad- 
 mirers of the highest moral and intellectual qualities, steadily and trium- 
 phantly devoted to the noblest purposes. 
 
 The resolutions, under which the committee act, indicate no particular 
 form of tribute, but contain only an earnest injunction to seek the best 
 mode by which to manifest the universal recognition of your claim to the 
 admiration and gratitude of every American citizen. It will be deeply 
 mortifying to us, if our execution of this trust shall fail adequately to 
 represent the enthusiastic feeling in which it had its origin. 
 
 The committee will have the honor of waiting on you in person at 
 such an hour as you may please to designate, with a view to ascertain 
 how they can best fulfil the purposes of their appointment. It will be 
 very gratifying if your convenience will permit you to partake of a Pub- 
 lic Dinner at any period during your stay. 
 
 We have the honor to be, with the highest respect, 
 
 JAMES ROSS, 
 BENJAMIN BAKEWELL, 
 CHARLES AVERY, 
 WILLIAM M^ADE, 
 SAMUEL PETTIGREW, 
 GEORGE MILTENBERGER, 
 ISAAC LIGHTNER, 
 SYLVANUS LATHROP, 
 JOHN ARTIIURS, 
 ALEX. BRACKENRIDGE, 
 WILLIAM ROBINSON, Juw. 
 GEORGE A. COOK, 
 W. W. FETTERMAN, 
 SAMUEL ROSEBURGH, 
 WILLIAM MACKEY, 
 JAMES JOHNSTON, 
 
 RICHARD BIDDLE, 
 SAMUEL P. DARLINGTON, 
 MICHAEL TIERNAN, 
 SAMUEL FAHNESTOCK, 
 THOMAS BAKEWELL, 
 WALTER H. LOWRIE, 
 WILLIAM W. IRWIN, 
 ROBERT S. CASSAT, 
 CORNELIUS DARRAGH, 
 BENJAMIN DARLINGTON, 
 NEVILLE B. CRAIG, 
 WILSON McCANDLES, 
 OWEN ASHTON, 
 CHARLES SHALER, 
 THOMAS SCOTT, 
 CHARLES H. ISRAEL. 
 
214 
 
 REPLY. 
 
 Pittshurgh, July 5th, 1833. 
 
 Gentlemen : I hardly know how to express my thanks for the hos- 
 pitable and cordial welcome with which the citizens of Pittsburgh are 
 disposed to receive me on this my first visit to their city. The terms 
 in which you express their sentiments, in your letter of yesterday, far 
 transcend all merits of mine, and can have their origin only in spontane- 
 ous kindness and good feeling. I tender to you, Gentlemen, and to the 
 meeting which you represent, my warmest acknowledgments. I rejoice 
 sincerely to find the health of the city so satisfactory ; and I reciprocate 
 with all the people of Pittsburgh the most sincere and hearty good 
 ■wishes for their prosperity and happiness. Long may it continue what it 
 now is — an abode of comfort and hospitality, a refuge for the well-deserv- 
 ing from all nations, a model of industry, and an honor to the country. 
 
 It is my purpose, Gentlemen, to stay a day or two among you, to see 
 such of your manufactories and public institutions, as it may be in my 
 power to visit. I most respectfully pray leave to decline a public dinner, 
 but shall have great pleasure in meeting such of your fellow-citizens as 
 may desire it, in the most friendly and unceremonious manner. 
 
 I am, Gentlemen, with very true regard, yours, 
 
 DANIEL WEBSTER. 
 
 To Hon. JAMES ROSS and others, 
 Gentlemen of the Committee. 
 
 In deference to Mr. Webster's wishes, the idea of a formal dinner was aban- 
 doned ; but, as there was a general desire for some collective expression of pub- 
 lic esteem, it was decided to invite him to meet the citizens at a spacious grove, 
 at 4 o'clock, on the afternoon of the eighth. Refreshments of a plain kind 
 were spread around, under the charge of the committee ; but the tables could 
 serve only as a nucleus to the multitude. His honor, the Mayor, called the 
 company to order, and addressed them as follows : — 
 
 I HAVE to ask. Gentlemen, your attention for a few moments. 
 
 We are met here to mark our sense of the extraordinary merits of a 
 distinguished statesman and public benefactor. At his particular request, 
 every thing like parade or ceremonial has been waived ; and, in conse- 
 quence, he has been the better enabled to receive, and to reciprocate, the 
 hearty and spontaneous expression of your good will. I am now desired 
 to attempt, in your name, to give utterance to the universal feeling 
 around me. 
 
 Gentlemen, we are this day citizens of the United States. The Union 
 is safe. Not a star has fallen from that proud banner around which our 
 affections have so long rallied. And when, with this delightful assurance, 
 we cast our eyes back upon the eventful history of the last year, — when 
 we recall the gloomy apprehensions, and perhaps hopeless despondency, 
 which came over us, — who, Gentlemen, can learn, without a glow of en- 
 thusiasm, that the great champion of the Constitution — that Daniel 
 Webster — is now in the midst of us. To his mighty intellect, the nation, 
 with one voice, confided its cause — of life or death. Shall there be with- 
 held from the triumpliant advocate of the nation a nation's gratitude ? 
 
215 
 
 Ours, Gentlemen, is a government not of force, but of opinion. The rea- 
 son of the people must be satisfied before a call to anas. The mass of 
 our peaceful and conscientious citizens cannot, and ought not, — except in 
 a clear case, — to be urged to abandon the implements of industry for the 
 sword and the bayonet. This consideration it is that imparts to intel- 
 lectual preeminence in the service of trutli, its incalculable value. And 
 hence the preciousness of that admirable and unanswerable exposition, 
 which has put down, once and forever, the artful sophisms of nullification. 
 
 If, Gentlemen, we turn to other portions of the public history of our 
 distinguished guest, it will be found, that his claims to grateful acknowl- 
 edgment are not less imposing. The cause of Domestic Industry, of 
 Internal Improvement, of Education, of whatever, in short, is calculated 
 to render us a prosperous, united, and happy people, has found in him a 
 watcliful and efficient advocate. Nor is it the least of his merits, that, to 
 our gallant JVavy, Mr. Webster has been an early, far-sighted, and per- 
 severing friend. Our interior position cannot render us cold and unob- 
 servant on this point, whilst the victory of Perry yet supplies to us a 
 proud and inspiring anniversary. And such is the wonderful chain of 
 mutual dependence which binds our Union, that, in the remotest corner 
 of the West, the exchangeable value of every product must depend on 
 the security with which the ocean can be traversed. 
 
 Gentlemen, I have detained you too long; yet I will add one word. I 
 do but echo the language of the throngs that have crowded round Mr. 
 Webster, in declaring, that the frank and manly simplicity of his charac- 
 ter and manners has created a feeling of personal regard which no mere 
 intellectual ascendancy could have secured. We approached him with 
 admiration for the achievements of his public career — never supposing, 
 for a moment, that our hearts could have aught to do in the matter ; we 
 shall part as from a valued friend, the recollections of whose virtues can- 
 not pass away. 
 
 Mr. Webster then addressed the assembly as follows : — 
 
 Mr. Mayor and Gentlemen : I rise, Fellow-citizens, with 
 unaffected sensibility, to give you my thanks foi- the hospitable 
 manner in which you have been kind enough to receive me, on 
 this my first visit to Pittsburgh, and to make all due acknowledg- 
 ments to your worthy Mayor, for the sentiments which he has 
 now seen fit to express. 
 
 Although, Gentlemen, it has been my fortune to be personally 
 acquainted with very few of you, I feel, at this moment, that we 
 are not strangers. We are fellow-countrymen, fellow-citizens, 
 bound together by a thousand ties of interest, of sympathy, of 
 duty ; united, I hope I may add, by bonds of mutual regard. 
 We are bound together, for good or for evil, in our great polidcal 
 interests. I know that I am addressing Americans, every one of 
 whom has a true American heart in his bosom ; and I feel diat I 
 have also an American heart in my bosom. I address you, then, 
 Gentlemen, with the same fervent good wishes for your happiness, 
 the same brotherly affection, and the same tokens of regard 
 and esteem, as if, instead of being upon the borders of the Ohio, 
 
216 
 
 I stood by the Connecticut or the Merrimac. As citizens, 
 countrymen, and neighbors, I give you my hearty good wishes, 
 and thank you, over and over again, for your abundant hospi- 
 tahty. 
 
 Gentlemen, the Mayor has been pleased to advert, in terms 
 beyond all expectation or merit of my own, to my services in 
 defence of the glorious Constitution under which we live, and 
 which makes you and me all that we are, and all that we desire 
 to be. He has done much more than justice to my efforts ; but 
 he has not overstated the importance of that occasion in which 
 those efforts were made. 
 
 Gentlemen, it is but a few short months since dark and por- 
 'tentous clouds did hang over our heavens, and did shut out, as it 
 were, the sun in his glory. A new and perilous crisis was upon 
 us. Dangers, novel in their character, and fearful in their as- 
 pect, menaced both the peace of the country and the integrity of 
 the Constitution. For forty years our Government had gone on, 
 I need hardly say how prosperously and gloriously, meeting, it is 
 true, with occasional dissatisfaction, and, in one or two instances, 
 with ill-concerted resistance to law. Through all these trials it 
 had successfully passed. But now a time had come when the 
 authority of law was opposed by authority of law, — when the 
 power of the General Government was resisted by the arms of 
 State Government, — and when organized military force, under all 
 the sanctions of State Conventions, and State laws, was ready to 
 resist the collection of the public revenues, and hurl defiance at 
 the statutes of Congress. 
 
 Gendemen, this was an alarming moment. In common with 
 all good citizens, I felt it to be such. A general anxiety pervaded 
 the breasts of all, who were at home, partaking in the prosperity, 
 honor and happiness which the country had enjoyed. And how 
 was it abroad ? Why, Gendemen, every intelligent friend of 
 human liberty, throughout the world, looked, with amazement, at 
 the spectacle which we exhibited. In a day of unparalleled 
 prosperity, after a half century's most happy experience of the 
 blessings of our Union, — when we had already become the 
 wonder of all the liberal part of the world, and the envy of the 
 illiberal, — when the Constitution had so amply falsified the pre- 
 dictions of its enemies, and more than fulfilled all the hopes of its 
 friends, — in a time of peace, with an overflowing treasury, — when 
 both the population and the improvement of the country had out- 
 run the most sanguine anticipations ; — it was at this moment, that 
 we showed ourselves to the whole civilized world, as being, 
 apparendy, on the eve of disunion and anarchy, — at the very 
 point of dissolving, once and forever, that Union which had made 
 us so prosperous and so great. It was at that moment that those 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
217 
 
 appeared among us who seemed ready to break up the National 
 Constitution, and to scatter the twenty-four States into twenty-four 
 unconnected communities. 
 
 Gentlemen, tlie President of the United States was, as it 
 seemed to me, at this eventful crisis, true to his duty. He com- 
 prehended and understood the case, and met it as it was proper 
 to meet it. While I am as willing as others to admit that the 
 President has, on other occasions, rendered important services to 
 the country, and especially on that occasion which has given him 
 so much military renown, I yet think the ability and decision with 
 which he resisted the disorganizing doctrines of nullification, 
 create a claim, than which he has none higher, to the gratitude of 
 the country, and the respect of posterity. The issuing of the 
 Proclamation of the 10th December inspired me, I confess, with 
 new hopes for the duration of the republic. I regarded it as 
 just, patriotic, able, and imperiously demanded by the condition 
 of the country. I would not be understood to speak of particular 
 clauses and phrases in the Proclamation ; but its great and leading 
 doctrines I regard as the true and only true doctrines of the 
 Constitution. They constitute the sole ground on which dis- 
 memberment can be resisted. Nothing else, in my opinion, can 
 hold us together. While diese opinions are maintained, the 
 Union will last ; when they shall be generally rejected and 
 abandoned, that Union will be at the mercy of a temporary ma- 
 jority in any one of the States. 
 
 I speak. Gentlemen, on this subject, without reserve. I have 
 not intended heretofore, and elsewhere, and do not now intend 
 here, to stint my commendation of the conduct of the President, in 
 regard to the Proclamation, and the subsequent measures. I 
 have ditFored with the President, as all know, who know any 
 thing of so humble an individual as myself, on many questions of 
 great general interest and importance. I difler with him in re- 
 spect to the Constitutional power of internal improvements ; I 
 differ with him in respect to the re-chartering of the Bank, and I 
 dissent, especially, from the grounds and reasons on which he 
 refused his assent to the bill passed by Congress for that pur- 
 pose ; I differ with him, also, probably, in the degree of protec- 
 tion which ought to be afforded to our agriculture and manufac- 
 tures, and in the manner in which it may be proper to dispose of 
 the public lands. But all these differences afforded, in my judg- 
 ment, not the sligbtest reason for opposing him, in a measure of 
 paramount importance, and at a moment of great pubhc exigency. 
 I sought to take counsel of nothing but patriotism, to feel no im- 
 pulse but that of duty, and to yield not a lame and hesitating, but 
 a vigorous and cordial support to measures which, in my con- 
 science, 1 believed essential to the preservation of the Constitu- 
 voL. II. 28 
 
218 
 
 tion. It is true, doubtless, that if myself and others had surren- 
 dered ourselves to a spirit of opposition, we might have embar- 
 rassed, and, probably, defeated the measures of the Administra- 
 tion. But, in so doing, we should, in my opinion, have been 
 false to our own characters, false to our duty, and false to our 
 country. It gives me the highest satisfaction to know, that, in 
 regard to this subject, the general voice of the country does not 
 disapprove my conduct. 
 
 I ought to add. Gentlemen, that, in whatever I may have done, 
 or attempted, in this respect, I only share a common merit. A 
 vast majority of both Houses of Congress cordially concurred in 
 the measures. Your own great State was seen in her just posi- 
 tion on that occasion, and your own immediate Representatives 
 were found among the most zealous and efficient friends of the 
 Union. 
 
 Gendemen, I hope that the result of that experiment may 
 prove salutary, in its consequences, to our Government, and to 
 the interests of the community. I hope that the signal and 
 decisive manifestation of public opinion, which has, for the time 
 at least, put down the despotism of nullification, may produce 
 permanent good effects. I know full well that popular topics may 
 be urged against the Proclamation. I know it may be said, in 
 regard to the laws of the last session, that if such laws are to be 
 maintained. Congress may pass what laws they please, and en- 
 force them. But may it not be said, on the other side, that, if a 
 State may nullify one law, she may nullify any other law also . 
 and, therefore, that the principle strikes at the whole power of 
 Congress ? And when it is said, that, if the power of State inter- 
 position be denied, Congress may pass and enforce what laws it 
 pleases, is it meant to be contended or insisted, that the Constitu- 
 tion has placed Congress under the guardianship and control of 
 the State Legislatures .'' Those who argue against the power of 
 Congress, from the possibility of its abuse, entirely forget, that, if 
 the power of State interposition be allowed, that power may be 
 abused also ; but, what is more material, they forget the will of 
 the people, as they have plainly expressed it in the Constitution ; 
 they forget that the people have chosen to give Congress a power 
 of legislation, independent of State control ; they forget that the 
 Confederation has ceased, and that a Constitution — a Government 
 — has taken its place ; they forget that this Government is a pop- 
 ular Government, — that members of Congress are but agents and 
 servants of the people, chosen for short periods, periodically 
 removable by the people, as much subservient, as much de- 
 pendent, as willingly obedient, as any other of their agents and 
 servants. This dependence on the people is the security that 
 they will not act wrong. This is the security which the people 
 
219 
 
 themselves have chosen to rely on, in addition to the guards con- 
 tained in the Constitution itself. 
 
 I am quite aware, Gentlemen, that it is easy for those who 
 oppose measures deemed necessary for the execution of the laws, 
 to raise the cry oi consolidaiion. It is easy to make charges, and 
 to bring general accusations. It is easy to call names. For one, 
 •I repel all such imputations. I am no consolidationist. I dis- 
 claim the character, altogether, and, instead of repeating this gen- 
 eral and vague charge, will be obliged to any one to show how the 
 Proclamation, or the late law of Congress, or, indeed, any meas- 
 ure to which I ever gave my support, tends, in the slightest 
 degree, to consolidation. By consolidation is understood a grasp- 
 ing at power not Constitutionally conferred. But the Proclama- 
 tion asserted no new power. It only asserted the right, in the 
 Government, to carry into effect, in the form of law, power which 
 it had exercised for forty years. I should oppose any grasping at 
 new powers, by Congress, as zealously as the most zealous. I 
 wish to preserve the Constitution as it is, without addition, and 
 without diminution, by one jot or tittle. For the same reason that 
 I would not grasp at powers not given, I would not surrender 
 nor abandon powers which are given. Those who have placed 
 me in a public station, placed me there, not to alter the Consti- 
 tution, but to administer it. The power of change the people 
 have retained to themselves. They can alter, they can modify, 
 they can change the Constitution entirely, if they see fit. They 
 can tread it under foot, and make another, or make no other ; but 
 while it remains unaltered by the authority of the people, it is our 
 power of attorney — our letter of credit — our credentials ; and we 
 are to follow it, and obey its injunctions, and maintain its just 
 powers, to the best of our abilities. I repeat, that, for one, I seek 
 to preserve to the Constitution those precise powers with which 
 the people have clothed it. While no encroachment is to be 
 made on the reserved rights of the people or of the States, while 
 nothing is to be usurped, it is equally clear that we are not at 
 liberty to surrender, cither in fact or form, any power or principle 
 which the Constitution does actually contain. 
 
 And what is the ground for this cry of consolidation ? I main- 
 tain that the measures recommended by the President, and 
 adopted by Congress, were measures of self-defence. Is it con- 
 solidation to execute laws? Is it consolidation to resist the force 
 that is threatening to upturn our Government ? Is it consolidation to 
 protect officers, in the discharge of their duty, from courts and 
 juries previously sworn to decide against them ? 
 
 Gendemen, I take occasion to remark, that, after much reflec- 
 tion upon the subject, and after all that has been said about the 
 encroachment of our General Government upon the rights of tiie 
 
220 
 
 States, I know of no one power, exercised by the General Govern- 
 ment, which was not admitted by the innuediate friends and foes 
 of the Constitution to have been conferred upon it by tlie people 
 when that instrument v^as adopted. I know of no one power, now 
 claimed or exercised, which every body did not agree, in 1789, was 
 conferred on the General Government. On the contrary, there are 
 several powers, and those, too, among the most important for the 
 mterests of the people, which were then universally allowed to be 
 conferred by the Constitution of the United States, but which are 
 now ingeniously doubted, or clamorously denied. 
 
 Gentlemen, upon this point I shall detain you with no further 
 remarks. It does, however, give me the most sincere pleasure to 
 say, that, in a long visit through the State west of you, and in the 
 great State north of you, as well as in a tour of some days' duration 
 in the respectable State to which you belong, 1 find but one senti- 
 ment, in regard to the conduct of the Government, upon this sub- 
 ject, I know that those who have seen fit to intrust to me, in part, 
 their interests in Congress, approve of the measures recommended 
 by the President. We see that he has taken occasion, during the 
 recess of Congress, to visit that part of the country ; and we know 
 how he has been received. No where have hands been extended 
 with more sincerity of friendship ; and for one, Gentlemen, I take 
 occasion to say, that, having heard of his return to the seat of gov- 
 ernment, with health rather debilitated, it is among my most earnest 
 prayers that Providence may spare his life, and that he may go 
 through with his administration, and come out with as much success 
 and glory as any of his predecessors. 
 
 Your worthy Chief Magistrate has been kind enough, Gentlemen, 
 to express sentiments favorable to myself, as a friend of domestic in- 
 dustry. Domestic industry ! How much of national power and opu- 
 lence, how much of individual comfort and respectability, that phrase 
 implies ! And w'ith what force does it strike us, as we are here, at 
 the confluence of the two rivers whose united currents constitute the 
 Ohio, and in the midst of ope of the most flourishing and distinguish- 
 ed manufacturing cities in the Union ! Many thousand miles of in- 
 land navigation, running through a new and rapidly-improving coun- 
 try, stretch away below us. Internal communications, completed 
 or in progress, connect the city with the Atlantic and the lakes. A 
 hundred steam-engines are in daily operation, and nature has sup- 
 plied the fuel which feeds their incessant flames, on the spot itself, 
 , in exhaustless abundance. Standing here. Gentlemen, in the midst 
 of such a population, and with such a scene around us, how great 
 is the import of these words, " domestic industry " ! 
 
 Next to the preservation of the Government itself, there can 
 hardly be a more vital question, to such a community as this, than 
 that which regards their own employments, and the preservation 
 
 s 
 

 of that policy, which the Government has adopted and cherished, 
 for the encouragement and protection of those employments. This 
 is not, in a society like this, a matter which affects the interest of 
 a particular class, but one which affects the interest of all classes 
 It runs through the whole chain of human occupation and em 
 ployment, and touches the means of living and the comfort of all. 
 
 Gentlemen, those of you who may have turned your attention 
 to the subject know, that, in the quarter of the country with which 
 I am more immediately connected, the people were not early or 
 eager to urge the Government to carry the protecting policy to the 
 height which it has reached. Candor obliges me to remind you, 
 that, when the act of 1824 was passed, neither he who now ad- 
 dresses you, nor those with whom he usually acted on such sub- 
 jects, were ready or willing to take the step which that act proposed. 
 They doubted its expediency. It passed, however, by the great 
 and overwhelming influence of the central states, New York, Penn- 
 sylvania, and Ohio. New England acquiesced in it. She con- 
 formed to it, as the settled policy of the country, and gave to her 
 capital and her labor a corresponding direction. She has now be- 
 come vitally interested in the preservation of the system. Her 
 prosperity is identified, not perhaps with any particular degree of 
 protection, but with the preservation of the principle ; and she is not 
 likely to consent to yield the principle, under any circumstances 
 whatever. And who would dare to yield it ? Who, standing 
 here, and looking round on this community and its interests, would 
 be bold enough to touch the spring, which moves so much industry, 
 and produces so much happiness .-* Who would shut up the mouths 
 of these vast coal pits } Who stay the cargoes of manufactured 
 goods, now floating down a river, one of the noblest in the world, 
 and stretching through territories almost boundless in extent, and 
 unequalled in fertility ? Who would quench the fires of so many 
 steam-engines, or stay the operations of so much well-employed 
 labor? Gentlemen, I cannot conceive how any subversion of that 
 policy, which has hitherto been pursued, can take place, without 
 great public embarrassment, and great private distress. 
 
 I have said, that I am in favor of protecting American manual 
 labor; and, after the best reflection I can give the subject, and 
 from the lights which lean derive from the experience of ourselves 
 and others, I have come to the conclusion that such protection is 
 just and proper ; and that to leave American labor to sustain a 
 competition with that of the over-peopled countries of Europe, 
 would lead to a state of things to which the people could never 
 submit. This is the great reason why I am for maintaining 
 what has been established. I see at home, I see here, I see 
 wherever I go, that the stimulus, which has excited the existing 
 activity, and is producing the existing prosperity of the country, is 
 
nothing else than the stimulus held out to labor by compensating 
 prices. I think this effect is visible every where, from Penobscot 
 to New Orleans, and manifest in the condition and circumstances 
 of the great body of the people ; for nine tenths of the whole 
 people belong to the laborious, industrious, and productive classes ; 
 and on these classes the stimulus acts. We perceive that the price 
 of labor is high, and we know that the means of living are low ; 
 and these two truths speak volumes in favor of the general pros- 
 perity of the country. I am avs^are, as has been said already, that 
 this high price of labor results partly from the favorable condition 
 of the country. Labor was high, comparatively speaking, before 
 the act of 1824 passed; but that fact afibrds no reason, in my 
 judgment, for endangering its security and sacrificing its hopes, by 
 overthrowing what has since been established for its protection. 
 
 Let us look, Gentlemen, to the condition of other countries, and 
 inquire a little into the causes, which, in some of them, produce 
 poverty and distress, the lamentations of which reach our own 
 shores,' I see around me many whom I know to be emigrants 
 from other countries. Why are they here ? Why is the native of 
 L-eland among us ? Why has he abandoned scenes as dear to him 
 as these hills and these rivers are to you ? Is there any other cause 
 than this, that the burden of taxation on the one hand, and the low 
 reward of labor on the other, left him without the means of a 
 comfortable subsistence, or the power of providing for those who 
 were dependent upon him ? Was it not on this account that he left 
 his own land, and sought an asylum in a country of free laws, of 
 comparative exemption from taxation, of boundless extent, and in 
 which the means of living are cheap, and the prices of labor just 
 and adequate ? And do not these remarks apply, with more or less 
 accuracy, to every other part of Europe ? Is it not true, that 
 sobriety, and industry, and good character, can do more for a 
 man here than in any other part of the world ? And is not this 
 truth, which is so obvious that none can deny it, founded in this 
 plain reason, that labor, in this country, earns a better reward than 
 any where else, and so gives more comfort, more individual inde- 
 pendence, and more elevation of character? Whatever else may 
 benefit particular portions of society ; whatever else may assist 
 capital ; whatever else may favor sharp-sighted commercial enter- 
 prise, professional skill, or extraordinary individual sagacity or good 
 fortune, — be assured. Gentlemen, that nothing can advance the mass 
 of society, in prosperity and happiness, nothing can uphold the 
 substantial interest, and steadily improve the general condition and 
 character of the whole, but this one thing, compensating rewards 
 to labor The fortunate situation of our country tends strongly, 
 of itself, to produce this result ; the Government has adopted the 
 policy of cooperating with this natural tendency of things : it has 
 
223 
 
 encouraged and fostered labor and industry, by a system of dis- 
 criminating duties ; and the result of these combined causes may 
 be seen in the present circumstances of the country. 
 
 Gentlemen, there are important considerations of another kind, 
 connected with this subject. Our Government is popular ; popular 
 in its foundation, and popular in its exercise. The actual character 
 of the Government can never be better than the general moral and 
 intellectual character of the community. It would be the wildest 
 of human imaginations, to expect a poor, vicious and ignorant 
 people to maintain a good popular government. Education and 
 knowledge, which, as is obvious, can be generally attained by the 
 people, only where there are adequate rewards to labor and indus- 
 try, and some share in the public interest, some stake in commu- 
 nity, would seem indispensably necessary in those w4io have the 
 power of appointing all public agents, passing all laws, and even 
 of making and unmaking constitutions at their pleasure. Hence 
 die truth of the trite maxim, that knowledge and virtue are the 
 only foundation of republics ; but it is to be added, and to "be 
 always remembered, that there never was, and never can be, an 
 intelligent and virtuous people, who, at the same time, are a poor 
 and idle people, badly employed and badly paid. Who would 
 be safe, in any community, where political power is in the hands 
 of the many, and property in the hands of the few ? Indeed, such 
 an unnatural state of things could no where long exist. 
 
 It certainly appears to me, Gendemen, to be quite evident, at 
 this time, and in the present condition of the world, that it is 
 necessary to protect the industry of this country against the pauper 
 labor of England, and other parts of Europe. An American 
 citizen, who has children to maintain, and children to educate, has 
 an unequal chance against the pauper of England, whose children 
 are not to be educated, and are probably already on the parish ; 
 and who himself is half fed and clothed by his own labor, and half 
 from the poor-rates, and very badly fed and clothed after all. As 
 I have already said, the condition of our country, of itself, without 
 the aid of Government, does much to favor American manual 
 labor ; and it is a question of policy and justice, at all times, what 
 and how much Government shall do in aid of natural advantages. 
 In regard to some branches of industry, the natural advantages are 
 less considerable than in regard to others ; and those, therefore, 
 more imperiously demand the regard of Government. Such are 
 the occupations, generally speaking, of the numerous classes of 
 citizens in cities and large towns ; the workers in leather, brass, 
 tin, iron, &,c.; and such, too, under most circumstances, are the 
 employments connected with ship-building. Our own experience 
 has been a powerful, and ought to be a convincing and long-re- 
 membered preacher, on this point. From the close of the war of 
 
224 
 
 the revolution, there came on a period of depression and distress, 
 on the Atlantic coast, such as the people had hardly felt during the 
 sharpest crisis of the war itself Ship-owners, ship-builders, me- 
 chanics, artisans, all were destitute of employment, and some of 
 them destitute of bread. British ships came freely, and British 
 goods came plentifully ; while, to American ships, and American 
 products, there was neither protection on the one side, nor the 
 equivalent of reciprocal free trade on the other. The cheaper 
 labor of England supplied the inhabitants of the Atlantic shores 
 with every Uiing. Ready-made clothes, among the rest, from the 
 crown of the head to the soles of the feet, were for sale in every 
 city. All these things came free from any general system of im- 
 posts. Some of the States attempted to establish their own partial 
 systems, but they failed. Voluntary association was resorted to, 
 but that failed also. A memorable instance of diis mode of at- 
 tempting protection occurred in Boston. The ship-owners, seeing 
 that Brttish vessels came and went freely, while their own ships 
 were rotting at the wharves, raised a committee to address the 
 people, recommending to them, in the strongest manner, not to 
 buy or use any articles imported in British ships. The chairman 
 of this committee was no less disdnguished a character than the 
 immortal John Hancock. The committee performed its duty 
 powerfully and eloquendy. It set forth strong and persuasive 
 reasons, why the people should not buy or use Bridsh goods, im- 
 ported in British ships. The ship-owners and merchants having 
 thus proceeded, the mechanics of Boston took up the subject also. * 
 
 They answered the merchants' committee. They agreed with ™ 
 
 them, cordially, that Bridsh goods, imported in Bridsh vessels, 
 ought not to be bought, or consumed ; but then they took the lib- 
 erty of going a step farther, and of insisting, that such goods 
 ovs:ht not to be bought or consumed at all. (Great applause.) 
 " For," said they, " Mr. Hancock, what difierence does it make to 
 us, whether hats, shoes, boots, shirts, handkerchiefs, tin-ware, 
 brass-ware, cudery, and every other article, come in British ships, 
 or come in your ships ; since, in whatever ships they come, they 
 take away our means of living.'"' 
 
 Gendemen, it is a historical truth, manifested in a thousand 
 ways by the public proceedings and public meetings of the times, 
 that the necessity of a general and uniform impost system, which, 
 while it should provide revenue to pay the public debt, and foster 
 the commerce of the country, should also encourage and sustain 
 domestic manufactures, was the leading cause in producing the 
 present national Constitution. No class of persons was more 
 zealous for the new Consdtution, than the handicraftsmen, artisans, 
 and manufacturers. There were then, it is true, no large manu- 
 facturing establishments. There were no manufactories in the in- 
 
225 
 
 terior, for there were no inhabitants. Here was Fort Pitt — it had 
 a place on the map — but here were no people, or only a very few. 
 But in the cities and towns on the Atlantic, the full importance, 
 indeed the absolute necessity, of a new form of government, and 
 a general system of imposts, was deeply felt. 
 
 It so happened. Gentlemen, that, at that time, much was thought 
 to depend on Massachusetts ; several States had already agreed to 
 the Constitution : if her Convention adopted it, it was likely to go 
 into operation. This gave to the proceedings of that Convention 
 an intense interest, and the country looked, with trembling anxiety, 
 for the result. That result was for a long time doubtful. The 
 Convention was known to be nearly equally divided ; and down 
 to the very day and hour of the final vote, no one could predict, 
 with any certainty, which side would preponderate. It was under 
 these circumstances, Gendemen, and at this crisis, that the trades- 
 men of the town of Boston, in January, 17S8, assembled at the 
 Green Dragon, the place where the whigs of the revolution, in its 
 ancient stages, had been accustomed to assemble. They resolved, 
 that, in their opinion, if the Constitution should be adopted, " trade 
 and navigation looidd revive and increase, and employ and sub- 
 sistence afforded to many of their townsmen, then suffering for the 
 want of the 7iecessaries of life f^ and that, on the other hand, 
 should it be rejected, " the small remains of commerce yet left 
 woxdd he annihilated ; the various trades and handicrafts depend- 
 ent thereon decay ; the poor be increased, and many worthy and 
 shilful mechanics compelled to seek employ and subsistence in 
 strange lands ^ These resolutions were carried to the Boston 
 delegates in the Convention, and presented to the hand of Sam- 
 uel Adams. That great and distinguished friend of American 
 hberty, it was feared, might have doubts about the new Consti- 
 tudon. Naturally cautious, and sagacious, it was apprehended he 
 might fear the practicability,* or the safety, of a General Govern- 
 ment. He received the resolutions from the hands of Paul Revere, 
 a brass-founder by occupation, a man of sense and character, and of 
 high public spirit, whom the mechanics of Boston ought never to 
 forget. " How many mechanics," said Mr. Adams, " were at the 
 Green Dragon when these resolutions were passed ? " " More, 
 sir," was the reply, "than the Green Dragon could hold." 
 "And where were the rest, Mr. Revere?" "In the streets, sir." 
 " And how many were in the streets ? " " More, sir, than 
 there are stars in the sky." This is an instance, only, among many, 
 to prove, what is indisputably true, that the tradesmen and mechan- 
 ics of the country did look to the new Constitution for encourage- 
 ment and protection in their respective occupations. Under these 
 circumstances, it is not to be expected that they will abandon the 
 principle, in its application to their own employments, any more than 
 VOL. II. 29 
 
226 
 
 in its application to the commercial and shipping interests. They 
 believe the power is in the Constitution ; and doubtless they mean, 
 so far as depends on them, to keep it there. Desirous of no ex- 
 travagant measure of protection ; desirous of oppressin-g or burden- 
 ing nobody, seeking nothing as a substitute for honest industry and 
 hard work ; as a part of the American family, having the same in- 
 terests as other parts, — they will continue their attachment to the 
 Union and the Constitution, and to all the great and leading inter- 
 ests of the country. 
 
 Gentlemen, your worthy mayor has alluded to the subject of in- 
 ternal improvements. Having no doubt of the power of the Gen- 
 eral Government over various objects comprised in that denomi- 
 nation, I confess I have felt great pleasure in forwarding them, to 
 the extent of my ability, by means of reasonable Government 
 aid. It has seemed strange to me, that, in the progress of human 
 knowledge and human virtue (for I have no doubt that both are 
 making progress), the objects of Government should so long have 
 been principally confined to external aflairs, and to the enactment 
 of the general laws, without considering how much may be done 
 by Government, which cannot be done widiout it, for the improve- 
 ment of the condition of the people. There are many objects, 
 of great value to man, which cannot be attained, by unconnected 
 individuals, but must be attained, if attained at all, by association. For 
 many of them, Government seems the most natural and the most 
 efficient association. Voluntary association has done much, but 
 it cannot do all. To the great honor and advantage of your own 
 State, she has been forward in applying the agency of Government 
 to great objects of internal utility. But even States cannot do 
 every diing. There are some things which belong to all the States ; 
 and, if done at all, must be done by all the States. At the con- 
 clusion of the late war, it appeared to me that the time had corne 
 for die Government to turn its attentibn inward ; to survey the con- 
 dition of the country, and particularly the vast Western Country ; 
 to take a comprehensive view of the whole ; and to adopt a liberal 
 system of internal improvements. There are objects not naturally 
 within the sphere of any one State, which yet seemed of great im- 
 portance, as calculated to unite the different parts of the country, 
 to open a better and shorter way between the producer and con- 
 sumer, to be also of the highest advantage to Government itself, in 
 any exigency. It is true. Gentlemen, that the local theatre for 
 such improvement is not mainly in the East. The East is old, 
 pretty fully peopled, and small. The West is new, vast, and 
 thinly peopled. Our rivers can be measured — yours cannot. We 
 are bounded — you are boundless. The West was, therefore, most 
 deeply interested in this system, though, certainly, not alone in- 
 terested, even in such works as had a western locality. To clear 
 
097 
 
 her rivers was to clear them for the commerce of the whole country ; 
 to construct harbors, and clear entrances to existing harbors, 
 whether on the Gulf of Mexico or on the lakes, was for the ad- 
 vantage of that whole commerce. And if this were not so, he is 
 but a poor public man, whose patriotism is governed by the car- 
 dinal points ; who is for or against a proposed measure, according 
 to its indication by compass, or as it may happen to tend farther 
 from, or come nearer to, his own immediate connections. And 
 look at the West — look at these rivers — look at the lakes — look 
 especially at Lake Erie, and see what a moderate expenditure has 
 done for the safety of human life, and the preservation of property, 
 in the navigation of that lake; and done, let me add, in the face 
 of a fixed and ardent opposition. 
 
 I rejoice, sincerely. Gentlemen, in the general progress of inter- 
 nal improvement, and in the completion of so many objects near 
 you, and connected with your prosperity. Your own canal and 
 rail-road unite you with the Atlantic. Near you is the Ohio Canal, 
 which does so much credit to a younger state, and with which your 
 city will doubtless one day have a direct connection. On the south 
 and east approaches the Baltimore and Ohio Rail-road, a great 
 and spirited enterprise, which 1 always thought entitled to the aid 
 of Government, and a branch of which, it may be hoped, will yet 
 reach the head of the Ohio. 
 
 I will only add, Gentlemen, that for what I have done, in the 
 cause of internal improvement, I claim no particular merit, having 
 only acted with others, and discharged, conscientiously and fairly, 
 what I regarded as my duty to the whole country. 
 
 Gentlemen, the Mayor has spoken of the importance and neces- 
 sity of education. And can any one doubt, that to man — as a social 
 and an immortal being, as interested in the world that is, and vastly 
 more concerned for that which is to be — education, that is to say, 
 the culture of the mind and the heart, is an object of infinite im- 
 portance ? So far as we can discern the designs of Providence, the 
 formation of the mind and character, by instruction in knowledge, 
 and instruction in righteousness, is a main end of human being. 
 Among the new impulses which society has received, none is more 
 gratifying than the awakened attention to public education. That 
 object begins to exhibit itself to the minds of men, in its just mag- 
 nitude, and to possess its due share of regard. It is but in a 
 limited degree, and indirectly only, that the powers of the General 
 Government have been exercised in the promotion of this object. 
 So far as these powers extend, I have concurred in their exercise 
 with great pleasure. The Western States, from their recency of 
 setdement, from the great proportion of their population which are 
 children, and from other circumstances, v/hich must, in all new 
 countries, more or less, curtail individual means, have appeai-ed to 
 
228 1 
 
 me to have peculiar claims to regard ; and in all cases, where I 
 have thought the power clear, I have most heartily concurred in | 
 
 measures designed for their benefit, in this respect. And, amidst j 
 
 all our efforts for education, literary, moral, or religious, be it al- 
 ways remembered, that we leave opinion and conscience free. 
 And Heaven grant, that it may be the glory of the United States, 
 to have established two great truths, of the highest importance to 
 the whole human race ; — first, that an enlightened community is 
 capable of self-government ; and, second, that the toleration of all 
 sects does not necessarily produce indifference to religion. 
 
 But I have already detained you too long. My Friends, Fellow- 
 citizens, and Countrymen, I take a respectful leave of you. The 
 time I have passed on this side the Alleghany has been a succession 
 of happy days. I have seen much to instruct and much to delight 
 me. I return you, agam and again, my unfeigned thanks for the 
 frankness and hospitality with which you have made me welcome ; 
 and, wherever I may go, or wherever I may be, 1 pray you to 
 believe I shall not lose the recollection of your kindness. 
 
SPEECH 
 
 ON MOVING FOR LEAVE TO INTRODUCE A BILL TO CONTINUE 
 THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES FOR SIX YEARS, DE- 
 LIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, MARCH 
 
 18, 1834. 
 
 Mr. President : I rise, Sir, pursuant to notice, to ask leave 
 to bring in a bill to continue, for six years, the act incorporating the 
 subscribers to the Bank of the United States ; and shall hope for 
 that indulgence of the Senate which is usually granted on such 
 occasions, if I accompany its introduc-tion with some remarks on 
 the general state of the country, as well as on tlie nature of the 
 measure proposed. If leave be granted, it is my purpose to move 
 to refer the bill to the Committee on Finance, that it may take the 
 usual course, and come up for the consideration of the Senate in 
 due season. 
 
 Mr. President, in the midst of ample means of national and 
 individual happiness, we have, unexpectedly, fallen into severe 
 distress. Our course has been suddenly arrested. The general 
 pulse of life stands still, and the activity and industry of the 
 country feel a pause. A vastly extended and beneficent commerce 
 is checked ; manufactures suspended, with incalculable injury to 
 those concerned in them ; and the labors of agriculture threatened 
 with the loss of their usual reward. Our resources are, never- 
 theless, at the same time, abundant, and all external circumstances 
 highly favorable and advantageous ; such as fairly promised us, 
 not only a continuance of that degree of prosperity which we have 
 actually enjoyed, but its rapid advancement, also, to still higher 
 stages. 
 
 The condition of the country is, indeed, singular. It is like that 
 of a strong man chained. In full heakh, with strength unabated, 
 and all its faculties unimpaired, it is yet incapable of performing its 
 accustomed action. Fetters and manacles are on all its limbs. If 
 we could but unbind it ; if we could break these iron chains ; if we 
 coijld once more set it free, — it would, in a moment, resume its ac- 
 tivity, and go on again in its rapid career. It is our duty. Sir, to 
 relieve this restraint, to unshackle the industry of the people, and 
 give play, once more, to their common action and their common 
 
230 
 
 energies. The evils, all the evils, which we now feel, and feel so 
 acutely, result from political measures ; and by political measures, 
 and political measures alone, can they be redressed. They have 
 their origin in acts of Government, and they must find their cure 
 in other acts of Government. 
 
 Only six months ago, Sir, the country presented an aspect, in 
 regard to all its great interests, exceedingly satisfactory and grat- 
 ifying. Our commerce was highly prosperous, and our manufac- 
 tures, for the present at least, flourishing. Agricultural products 
 commanded fair prices, and the general appearance of things ex- 
 hibited more than a usual degree of activity. The year elapsing 
 between the autumn of 1832 and that of 1833, was a year of 
 great prosperity. In the activity of commerce, it is possible enough 
 that some degree of overtrading had taken place ; but there is 
 nothing to show that great excess had been committed in that 
 particular. In general, the state of things was sound, as well as 
 prosperous. The commerce of the country had reached, I think, 
 to a greater extent than in any former year ; the amount of exports 
 for 1833 being, according to the treasury estimate, no less than 
 ninety millions of dollars, and that of the imports no less than one 
 hundred and nine millions. The internal and coasting trade was 
 in a still more flourishing condition. This branch of the national 
 industry has grown into the very highest importance, affording a 
 vast field for active usefulness, enriching all parts of the country 
 by its mutual exchanges of commodities, and furnishing profitable 
 employment to great numbers of the people. It was carried on 
 last year, both by sea and land, with great vigor ; and the situation 
 of the currency of the country gave it facilities such as never 
 existed elsewhere over so broad an extent. The money circulation 
 was free, and the banks in good credit. They were, doubtless, 
 somewhat too economical in the use of specie, and sustained 
 their credit on a basis not sufiicienUy broad to be quite secure. 
 But no great degree of danger to the circulation was felt, or gen- 
 erally feared. 
 
 Such was our condition in September last ; and the change which 
 has since taken place must strike all minds. How do we stand 
 now, in respect to these great interests ? Let us look to our com- 
 merce, the main source of our revenue, as well as a source of wealth, 
 and let us see how that is affected, or likely to be affected, by recent 
 occurrences. I have stated the amount of exports and imports 
 for the last year ; those for the present cannot, of course, be yet 
 estimated with accuracy ; but we are not without some means of 
 forming opinions upon this interesting point. I think it is evident 
 that there must be a falling off" in the imports, and consequently a 
 falling off" in the revenue. I shall be very glad to find myself 
 mistaken in this opinion ; but it appears to me there is much reason 
 to entertain it. As one of the Committee on Finance, I have felt 
 
 ^ 
 
231 
 
 It my duty, of course, to look to the state of the treasury, and to 
 form some opinion, if I could, of what may be its future condition. 
 Its present state, as we learn from the Secretary's report, with his 
 estimate of the receipts and expenditures of the year, is substan- 
 tially as follows : 
 
 Estimated balance in the treasury, January 1, 1834, . . $7,983,790 
 But from this deduct the amount of appropriations already* 
 made, and which remain unsatisfied, wliich amount, the 
 Secretary supposes, may yet be required for the objects for 
 whicli it was appropriated, 5,190,287 
 
 Balance remaining in the treasury, unappropriated, . . $2,793,503 
 
 Estimated amount of receipts for 1834 : 
 
 Customs, $15,000,000 . 
 
 Land, 3,000,000 
 
 Bank dividends and miscellaneous, . . 500,000 
 
 18,500,000 
 
 Total ofmeans for the use of 1834, $21,293,503 
 
 Estimated expenditures for 1834, 23,501,994 
 
 This statement would seem to exhibit a deficit of more than two 
 millions ; and this would doubtless be the result, should die appro- 
 priations of the year all be called for within the year ; but expe- 
 rience shows that this is not to be expected. What amount of 
 appropriations may remain uncalled for, however, is necessarily 
 uncertain. 
 
 Among the expenditures, it is to be observed, is included the 
 sum of five millions, within a fraction, for the payment of the 
 balance of the public debt, which becomes " reimbursable at the 
 commencement of next year." 
 
 The Secretary supposes, even without making any allowance 
 for the effect of recent measures, that the receipts for 1835 will be 
 still less than those for 1834; and diat, unless the revenue should 
 be more productive than is anticipated, it will be necessary, in two 
 years from this time, to retrace our steps, and to impose duties on 
 articles which are now free, in order to meet the current expenses 
 of the Government. 
 
 If such were the prospects of the country in regard to revenue, 
 before the late measures had so much disturbed its commerce, it 
 cannot but be expected that, under the influence of that cause, 
 there may be a very considerable deficiency, especially should the 
 cause continue. 
 
 It is not very easy to ascertain to what extent the importations 
 of the year may fall short of previous importations, in consequence 
 of the disturbed state of things ; but I know an opinion is enter- 
 tained among those who have the best means of forming a correct 
 judgment, that there may be a falling off in the receipts of the 
 
232 
 
 customs from a quarter to a third of the amount anticipated. 
 Siiould this prove to be true, which there is certainly too much 
 reason to fear, Congress may be called on, much earlier than within 
 two years, to furnish additional means of revenue. 
 
 The diminution will be mainly felt in the last half of the year, 
 it being generally understood that orders for fall importations have 
 been count(?i-manded to a great extent. It is not thought improb- 
 able, that the receipts of the year from customs, estimated at fifteen 
 millions, will fall down to twelve. This, should it happen, would 
 no otherwise disturb the intended course of things, than as it would 
 postpone the payment of the balance of the public debt ; but this 
 effect it is not unlikely to produce. On such subjects, however, 
 no very sure anticipations can be founded, and therefore I speak 
 with no posidveness. But it is my expectation that the receipts of 
 the year will fall below the estimate, and probably to the extent I 
 have mentioned ; and that this effect will be produced by no other 
 cause than the deranged state of things, occasioned by the removal 
 of the public moneys. 
 
 If such be the consequences of the measure on our foreign com- 
 merce, and on the revenue, its effect on the internal trade of the 
 country is a thousand times more disastrous. Here it produces 
 not only diminution, but stagnation ; and such a stagnation as has 
 caused a cessation of production. The industry of the country is 
 arrested, and its useful labor suspended. Great activity prevailed 
 in the manufactiu'ing districts, under a sanguine expectation that 
 the law of the last session would, for a time at least, ensure success 
 to that great interest. But this new measure has struck that in- 
 terest with a sudden and deadly blow. It is now but little more 
 than twelve months since the manufacturing portion of the com- 
 munity was deeply alarmed by the pendency of a measure in the 
 other House, known usually as Mr. Verplanck's bill. Throughout 
 the Middle and the Northern States, and wherever that interest 
 existed, the apprehension of change in the policy of the country 
 diminished the value of property, embarrassed all calculations for 
 the future, and disturbed and deranged the course of private occu- 
 pation and industry. But how small was all that evil, compared 
 with the effects produced by the Secretary, when he interfered 
 with the public revenues ! 
 
 I will not go over the long list of cases, in which prosperous 
 manufacturing establishments have been compelled to discontinue 
 dieir operation:,, under the pressure of the times. I will only advert 
 to an instance or two, taken, without selection, from papers and 
 letters before me. Let Paterson, in New Jersey, be one of these 
 instances ; the state of which interesting and afflicted town has 
 been, indeed, repeatedly presented to the Senate by the members 
 from that State. The population of Paterson, I believe, is about 
 
233 
 
 ten thousand ; and it is known to be a population almost exclu- 
 sively engaged in manufactures. In September last, 43,500 spin- 
 dles were in operation in it. Of these, 24,500 have stopped, and 
 6,000 others are expected to stop as soon as stock on hand is 
 worked up. I am informed that the manufacturers at Paterson 
 cannot prevail on their consignees in Pliiladelphia and New York 
 to come under responsibilities for them, even to the amount of 
 one third the cost of producing the article. The means, therefore, 
 of paying labor, and purchasing new stock, are completely cut off'. 
 We may see another instance, sufficiently appalling, in the 
 manufactories in New Hampshire. I understand a cotton mill at 
 Dover, of six thousand spindles, has ceased operation, and another 
 was to cease the 15th of this month ; a mill with four thousand 
 spindles, at Newmarket, and another at Nashua, of five thousand, 
 have ceased also ; and a large woollen mill, at a place called the 
 Great Falls, employing two or three hundred hands, has stopped 
 with the rest. These, Sir, are instances of the effect of the ex- 
 periment upon our manufacturing interests. Accounts similar to 
 these have reached us fi-om New York, Connecticut, Maine, Ver- 
 mont, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania. I need not enter into the 
 particulars of these accounts. Their general character is like that of 
 those which I mentioned from New Jersey and New Hampshire. 
 It is often inquired, how this enormous amount of evil could 
 spring from a cause so apparently inadequate to produce it ? Can 
 it be possible, it is asked, that the Secretary has brought about all 
 this distress, simply by removing a few millions of dollars from one 
 bank into other banks ? Sir, nothing is more true, and nothing more 
 easily accounted for. 
 
 Every commercial country has one great representative, con- 
 stantly passing and acting between all its "citizens. This universal 
 representative is money, or credit, in some form, as its substitute. 
 Without tliis agency nothing can be bought, and nothing can be 
 sold : capital has no income, and labor no reward. It is no more 
 possible to maintain the ordinary business and intercourse between 
 man and man without money and credit, than to maintain an inter- 
 course between nations without ministers or public ao-ents, or to 
 maintain punctual correspondence by letter without the mail. 
 And all the distress which the country now suffers arises solely 
 from acts which have deranged the currency of the country, and 
 the credit of the commercial community. The country is as rich, 
 in its general appearance, as it was before the experiment was 
 begun ; that is to say, men have the same houses, lands, ships, and 
 merchandise. But the value of these has fallen ; or, to speak 
 more correctly, they have lost the power of being exchanged ; 
 and they have lost this power because of the embarrassment which 
 has befallen the general medium of exchange. 
 VOL. 11. 30 
 
234 
 
 Six months ago, a state of things existed highly prosperous and 
 advantageous to the country, buthable to be injuriously affected by 
 precisely such a cause as has now been put into operation upon it. 
 Business was active, and carried to a great extent. Commercial 
 credit was expanded, and the circulation of money was large. 
 This circulation, being of paper, of course rested on credit ; and 
 this credit was founded on banking capital, and bank deposits. 
 The public revenues, from the time of their collection to the time 
 of their disbursement, were in the Bank and its Branches, and, 
 like other deposits, contributed to the means of discount. Between 
 the Bank of die United States and the State banks, there was a 
 degree of watchfulness, perhaps of rivalry ; but there was no 
 enmity, no hostility. All moved in their own proper spheres, 
 harmoniously and in order. 
 
 The Secretary disturbed this state of peace. He broke up all 
 the harmony of the system. By suddenly withdrawing all the 
 public moneys from the Bank of the United States, he forced that 
 Bank to an immediate correspondent curtailment of its loans and 
 discounts. It was obliged to strengthen itself; and the State 
 Banks, taking the alarm, were obliged to strengthen themselves also 
 by similar measures ; so that the amount of credit actually exist- 
 ing, and on which men were doing business, was suddenly greatly 
 diminished. Bank accommodations were withdrawn ; men could 
 no longer fulfil their engagements by the customary means ; prop- 
 erty fell in value ; thousands failed ; many thousands more main- 
 tained their individual credit by enormous sacrifices ; and all, being 
 alarmed for the future, as well as distressed for the present, forbore 
 from new transactions and new engagements. Finding enough to do 
 to stand still, they do not attempt to go forward. This deprives 
 the industrious and laboring classes of their occupations, and brings 
 want and misery to their doors. This, Sir, is a short recital of 
 cause and effect. This is the history of the first six months of the 
 " experiment." 
 
 Mr. President, the recent measures of the Secretary, and the 
 opinions which are said to be avowed by those who approve and 
 support them, threaten a wild and ruthless attack on the commer- 
 cial credit of the country, on that most delicate and at the same 
 time most important agent in producing general prosperity. Com- 
 mercial credit is the creation of modern times, and belongs, in its 
 highest perfection, only to the most enlightened and best-governed 
 nations. In the primitive ages of commerce, article is exchanged 
 for article, without the use of money or credit. This is simple 
 barter. But, in its progress, a symbol of property, a common 
 measure of value, is introduced, to facilitate the exchanges of 
 property ; and this may be iron, or any other article fixed by law 
 or by consent, but has generally been gold and silver. This, cer- 
 
 , 
 
235 
 
 tainly, is a great advance beyond simple barter, but no greater than 
 has been gained, in modern times, by proceeding from the mere 
 use of money to the use of credit. Credit is the vital air of the 
 system of modern commerce. It has done more, a thousand times, 
 to enrich nations, than all the mines of all the world. It has ex- 
 cited labor, stimulated manufactures, pushed commerce over every 
 sea, and brought every nation, every kingdom, and every small 
 tribe, among the races of men, to be known to all the rest. It has 
 raised armies, equipped navies, and, triumphing over the gross 
 power of mere numbers, it has established national superiority on 
 the foundation of intelligence, wealth, and well-directed industry. 
 Credit is to money what money is to articles of merchandise. As 
 hard money represents property, so credit represents hard money ; 
 and it is capable of supplying the place of money so completely, 
 that there are writers of distinction, especially of the Scotch school, 
 who insist that no hard money is necessary for the interests of 
 commerce. I am not of that opinion. I do not think any Gov- 
 ernment can maintain an exclusive paper system, without running 
 to excess, and thereby causing depreciation. 
 
 I hold the immediate convertibility of bank notes into specie to 
 be an indispensable security to their retaining their value ; but, 
 consistently with this security, and, indeed, founded upon it, credit 
 becomes the great agent of exchange. It is allowed that it in- 
 creases consumption, by anticipating products ; and that it supplies 
 present wants out of future means. And as it circulates commod- 
 ities without the actual use of gold and silver, it not only saves 
 much by doing away with the constant transportation of the pre- 
 cious metals from place to place, but accomplishes exchanges with 
 a degree of despatch and punctuahty not otherwise to be attained. 
 All bills of exchange, all notes running upon time, as well as the 
 paper circulation of the banks, belong to the system of commercial 
 credit. They are parts of one great whole. And, Sir, unless we 
 are to reject the lights of experience, and to repudiate the benefits 
 which other nations enjoy, and which we ourselves have hitherto 
 enjoyed, we should protect this system with unceasing watchful- 
 ness, taking care, on the one hand, to give it full and fair play, and, 
 on the other, to guard it against dangerous excess. We shall show 
 ourselves unskilful and unfaithful statesmen, if we do not keep clear 
 of extremes on both sides. 
 
 It is very true that commercial credit, and the system of banking, 
 as a part of it, does furnish a substitute for capital. It is very true 
 that this system enables men to do business, to some extent, on 
 borrowed capital ; and those who wish to destroy all such, act 
 wisely to that end by decrying it. 
 
 This commercial credit. Sir, depends on wise laws, steadily ad- 
 ministered. Indeed, the best-governed countries are always the 
 
236 
 
 richest. With good pohtical systems, natural disadvantages, conn- 
 petition, and the world, may all be defied. Without such systems, 
 climate, soil, position, and every thing else, may favor the prog- 
 ress of wealth, and yet nations be poor. What but bad laws and 
 bad government has retarded the progress of commerce, credit, and 
 wealth, in the peninsula of Spain and Portugal, a part of Europe 
 distinguished for its natural advantages, and especially suited, by its 
 position, for an extensive commerce, with the sea on three sides of 
 it, and as many good harbors as all the rest of Europe ? The 
 whole history of commerce shows that it flourishes or fades, just in 
 proportion as property, credit, and the fruits of labor; are protected by 
 free and just political systems. Credit cannot exist under arbitrary 
 and rapacious governments, and commerce cannot exist without 
 credit. Tripoli, and Tunis, and Algiers, are countries, above all 
 others, in which hard money is indispensable ; because, under such 
 governments, nothing is valuable which cannot be secreted and 
 hoarded. And as government rises, in the scale of intelligence 
 and liberty, from these barbarous despotisms, to the highest rank 
 of free states, its progress is marked, at every step, by a higher 
 degree of security and of credit. And this undeniable truth should 
 make well-informed men ashamed to cry out against banks and 
 banking, as being aristocratical, oppressive to the poor, or partaking 
 of the character of dangerous monopoly. Banks are a part of the 
 great system of commercial credit, and have done much, under the 
 influence of good government, to aid and elevate that credit. 
 What is their history ? Where do we first find them ? Do they 
 make their first appearance in despotic governments, and show 
 themselves as inventions of power to oppress the people? The 
 first bank was that of Venice ; the second that of Genoa. From 
 the example of these republics, they were next established in 
 Holland, and the free city of Hamburgh. England followed these 
 examples, but not until she had been delivered from the tyranny 
 of the Stuarts, by the revolution of 1688. It was William the 
 Deliverer, and not William the Conqueror, that established the 
 Bank of England. Who supposes that a Bank of England could 
 have existed in the times of Empson and Dudley ? Who supposes 
 that it could have lived under those ministers of Charles II. who 
 shut up the exchequer ; or that its vaults could have been secure 
 against the arbitrary power of the brother and successor of that 
 monarch ? 
 
 The history of banks belongs to the history of commerce and 
 the general history of liberty. It belongs to the history of those 
 causes which, in a long course of years, raised the middle and 
 lower orders of society to a state of intelligence and property, in 
 spite of the iron sway of the feudal system. In what instance 
 have they endangered liberty, or overcome the laws ? Their very 
 
237 
 
 existence, on the contrary, depends on the security and tlie rule 
 both of liberty and law. Why, Sir, have we not been taught, in 
 our earliest reading, that, to the birth of a commercial spirit, to 
 associations for trade, to the guilds and companies formed in the 
 towns, we are to look for the first appearance of liberty, from the 
 darkness of the middle ages ; for the first faint blush of that morn- 
 ing, which has grown brighter and brighter till the perfect day has 
 come ? And it is just as reasonable to say that bills of exchange 
 are dangerous to liberty, that promissory notes are dangerous to 
 liberty, that the power of regulating the coin is dangerous to liberty, 
 as that credit, and banking, as a part of credit, are dangerous to 
 liberty. 
 
 Sir, I hardly know a writer on these subjects who has not se- 
 lected the United States as an eminent and striking instance, to 
 show the advantages of well-established credit, and the benefit of 
 its expansion, to a degree not incompatible with safety, by a paper 
 circulation. Or, if they do not mention the United States, they 
 describe just such a country ; that is to say, a new and fast-growing 
 country. Hitherto, it must be confessed, our success has been 
 great. With some breaks and intervals, our progress has been 
 rapid, because our system has been good. We have preserved 
 and fostered credit, till all have become interested in its further 
 continuance and preservation. It has run deep and wide into our 
 whole system of social life. Every man feels the vibration, when 
 a blow is struck upon it. And this is the reason why nobody has 
 escaped the influence of the Secretary's recent measure. While 
 credit is delicate, sensitive, easily wounded, and more easily alarmed, 
 it is also infinitely ramified, diversified, extending every where, and 
 touching every thing. 
 
 There never was a moment in which so many individuals felt 
 their own private interest to be directly affected by what has been 
 done, and what is to be done. There never was a moment, there- 
 fore, in which so many straining eyes were turned towards Con- 
 gress. It is felt, by every one, that this is a case in which the acts 
 of the Government come directly home to him, and produce either 
 good or evil, every hour, upon his personal and private condition. 
 And how is the public expectation met ? How is this intense, this 
 agonized expectation answered ? I am grieved to say, I am ashamed 
 to say, it is answered by declamation against the Bank, as a mon- 
 ster, by loud cries against moneyed aristocracy, by pretended zeal 
 for a hard-money system, and by professions of favor and regard 
 to the poor. 
 
 The poor ! We are waging war for the benefit of the poor. 
 We slay that monster, the Bank, that we may defeat the unjust 
 purposes of the rich, and elevate and protect the poor ! And what 
 is the effect of all this ? What happens to the poor, and all the 
 
238 
 
 middling classes, In consequence of diis warfare ? Where are they ? 
 Are they well fed, well clothed, well employed, independent, 
 happy, and grateful ? They are all at the feet of the capitalists ; 
 they are in the jaws of usury. If there be hearts of stone in 
 human bosoms, they are at the mercy of those who have such 
 hearts in their breasts. Look to the rates of interest, mounting to 
 twenty, thirty, fifty per cent. Sir, this measure of Government has 
 transferred millions upon millions of hard-earned property, in the 
 form of extra interest, from the industrious classes, to the capitalists, 
 from the poor to the rich. And this is called putting down a mon- 
 eyed aristocracy ! Sir, there are thousands of families who have 
 diminished, not their luxuries, not their amusements, but their 
 meat and their bread, that they might be able to save their credit, 
 by paying enormous interest. And there are other thousands, who, 
 having lost their employment, have lost every thing, and who yet 
 hear, amidst the bitterness of their anguish, that the great motive 
 of Government is kindness to the poor ! 
 
 It is difficult, Sir, to restrain one's indignation, when, to so much 
 keen distress, there is added so much which has the appearance 
 of mere mockery. Sir, let the system of the Administration go on, 
 and we shall soon not know our country. We shall see a new 
 America. On the map, where these United States have stood, we 
 shall behold a country that will be strange to us. We shall see a 
 class of idle rich, and a class of idle poor ; the former a handful, 
 the latter a host. We shall no longer behold a community of men, 
 with spirits all active and stirring, contributing, all of them, to the 
 public welfare, while they partake in it, pushing on their fortunes, 
 and bettering their own condition, and helping to swell, at the same 
 time, the cup of the general prosperity to overflowing. We shall 
 see no more of that credit which reaches out its hand to honest 
 enterprise ; of that certainty of reward, which cheers on labor to 
 the utmost stretch of its sinews ; of that personal and individual 
 independence, which enables every man to say that no man is his 
 master. Sir, I will not look on the picture. I w^ill not imagine 
 what spectacle shall be exhibited, when this country not only halts 
 in her onward march, but recedes ; when she tracks back in the 
 long and rapid strides of her forward movement ; when she sets 
 herself to undo all that she has done ; when she renounces the 
 good she has attained ; when she obstructs credit, destroys enter- 
 prise, arrests commerce, and smothers manufactures. 
 
 Mr. President, I confess I find it difficult to respect the intelli- 
 gence, and at the same time the motives, of those, who alarm the 
 people with the cry of danger to their liberties from the Bank. 
 Do they see the same danger from other banks ? I think not. 
 With them, bank capital and bank credit is dangerous or harmless, 
 according to circumstances. It is a lion, whose conduct and char- 
 
239 
 
 acter appear to depend on his keeper. Under the control of this 
 Government, it is fearful and dangerous ; but under State authority, 
 it '' roars as gently as a sucking dove ; it roars as it were any 
 nightingale." 
 
 Both the members from New York have labored to persuade us 
 that the pubhc hberties of this whole country are in imminent 
 danger from a bank with thirty-five millions. And yet, Sir, they 
 feel no fears for the liberty of the people of their own State, with 
 a banking capital of twenty-three millions, and a proposed addition 
 of ten millions, all lodged in banks associated under the Safety 
 Fund system, and all under the supervision of a political board, 
 appointed by the Government. In all this they see no danger to 
 liberty ; but their anxiety is intense, lest a bank of thirty-five 
 millions should enslave all the people of the twenty-four States ! 
 
 Again, Sir, from the time of the veto message to the present 
 moment, the country has been assailed with the cry of danger, 
 from the small portion of foreign capital which is in the stock of the 
 Bank. Republicanism, it is said, cannot exist in a country where 
 there is a bank with dukes and marquisses, and lords, among its 
 stockholders. And yet. Sir, have we not seen the Executive 
 approving of an enormous loan by the cities of this District from 
 Dutch capitalists, and sanctioning a law binding down all their 
 citizens, and all their property, to pay the interest of this foreign 
 debt, by provisions vasdy more strict and severe than those which 
 compel the payment of taxes to their own Government ? And is 
 not Pennsylvania now deliberating whether she will not send an 
 agent to Europe to borrow money to meet that very exigency 
 which the present state of things creates ? And is not the new bank, 
 too, proposed to be established in New York, to be created oa 
 foreign capital? 
 
 Sir, are arguments of this nature altogether creditable to the 
 country ? Do they exhibit us in a respectable light abroad .'' 
 Do intelligent observers, elsewhere, behold our public men 
 addressing themselves to the people in fair discussion on the real 
 merits of public questions ; or may they not think, rather, that 
 they see them attempting to carry favorite measures of party, by 
 false cries of danger to liberty ? 
 
 The truth is, that banks, every where, and especially with us, 
 are made for the borrowers. They are made for the good of the 
 many, and not the good of the kw. Even their ownership, to a 
 very great extent, is in the hands of men of moderate property. 
 I have read a very able speech, by Mr. Gushing, in the Legisla- 
 ture of Massachusetts, in which he states that he has taken pains 
 to examine the list of stockholders, in several banks in his neigh- 
 borhood, and he finds a majority of the stock (I think more than 
 two thirds) in the hands of charitable societies, guardians, widows^ 
 
240 
 
 and traders with small capital. And, Sir, at this moment, the 
 stockholders of the Bank of the United States have infinitely less 
 interest in the questions which we are discussing, as stockholders, 
 than they have as citizens of the country. The stock is con- 
 standy in the market, and daily changing hands ; and any one 
 who wishes for it may always buy it. It is not permanently 
 vested in any hands ; and this of itself shows that the corporation 
 is, in its nature, incapable of prosecuting any purpose hostile to 
 the public liberties. Indeed, Sir, I think it time, high time, that 
 there should be a pause in this outcry against the Bank, as dan- 
 gerous from its political power, or as favoring wealth in its masses 
 rather than in its distribution. Sir, prejudice, excited against the 
 Bank is a much more powerful engine for political purposes than 
 the Bank itself It is more than a match for ten banks. Not 
 long ago, a member, not now with us, declared on this floor, that, 
 in the course of his political struggles, some years ago, he felt 
 sure of triumph, the moment an impression was made that the 
 Bank had taken part against him ; and that, if he were again to be 
 a candidate, he should wish for no surer pledge of success. His 
 own experience, thus candidly stated, seems not to have been lost 
 on others. I full well know. Sir, the power of such prejudices. 
 I know how easily they may be excited, and how potent is their 
 agency. Efforts to excite Uiem, and calculations on their eiEcacy, 
 when excited, have sometimes succeeded, and must be expected 
 sometimes to succeed, in popular governments. They are among 
 the means by which little men occasionally become great. But 
 they are not among the means by which lasting character is to be 
 attained, any more than they are among the means by which 
 substantial and important public service is to be rendered to the 
 country. 
 
 I now proceed, Mr. President, to the state of opinion existing, 
 both in and out of Congress, as to the remedy proper for the pres- 
 ent condition of things. 
 
 There are three classes of persons, holding on this subject dif- 
 ferent opinions — 
 
 1. Those who believe a bank to be Constitutional and necessary, 
 and, seeing no danger from the present institution, would prefer, 
 if they could follow their own choice, to recharter the Bank, for 
 the usual period, with the usual powers ; modified, however, 
 in any manner that the experience of the past may suggest. 
 
 2. There are those who think a bank useful, but who do not 
 believe Congress has the power to incorporate a bank, under any 
 form. 
 
 3. There are those who admit the power of Congress to make 
 a bank, and are in favor of some bank, but oppose the continuance 
 of the present. 
 
 ,1 
 
241 
 
 It is obvious, Sir, tliat, if any relief come to the country, it must 
 proceed from some degree of union between these classes, or some 
 of them. 
 
 And the question is, Is there any common ground on which 
 these can meet? Is there any expedient which tiiey will consent 
 to lay hold on to save the country ? Or will they leave it a prey 
 to their differences of opinion? 
 
 Now, Sir, among those who oppose tliose measures of Govern- 
 ment which have brought the jiresent distress on the country, a 
 great majority would prefer a continuance of the charter of the 
 present Bank for the usual term. This would be their wish, and 
 I am one of them. We passed a bill for such a recharter, through 
 both Houses, two years ago, but it was negatived by the Presi- 
 dent. I would prefer a bank of fifteen or twenty years' duration ; 
 either this or a new one ; for I do not act from a regard to the 
 pecuniary interest of the stockholders in the present Bank, 
 although I would not consent to do them any injustice. 
 
 But, Sir, I see no chance of renewing this charter, at present, 
 for a long period. It appears to me that the minds of members 
 of Congress are in a state to render this hopeless. I give up, 
 therefore, my own preference ; I sacrifice my opinions to that 
 necessity which I feel to be imposed upon me by the condition 
 of the country. I go for relief, for efficient relief, and for imme- 
 diate relief. I feel this to be demanded of me, by every dictate 
 of duty and patriotism, and by the loud voice of the country. I 
 obey that voice, and cheerfully yield every thing to the accom- 
 plishment of the object. When I ask others to make sacrifices, I 
 begin with making them myself 
 
 Preferring a permanent measure, I yet agree to a temporary 
 measure. Desirous of setding the question for a length of years, 
 I yet consent to leave it open, in the hope of obtaining present 
 relief and security ; and I earnestly entreat all those with whom I 
 have generally concurred in opinion, to concur in a temporary 
 measure. If we cannot do all we would, let us do what we can. 
 Let us make a proposition ivhich no reasonable man, ivho really 
 desires to relieve the country, can object to. That is my object, 
 and with that single object have I prepared this bill. 
 
 And now. Sir, I will say a word to the gentlemen who have 
 Constitutional scruples about all banks. They find a Bank 
 actually existing. They find that this Bank, or another like it, 
 has existed through more than three fourths of the whole period 
 of our Government. They find Congress to have asserted the 
 Constitutional power to establish a bank, over and over again ; 
 they find all the judicial tribunals to have sanctioned the power, 
 and four fifths of the State Legislatures, and as great a proportion 
 of the people, to have confirmed it. Now, Sir, as sensible and 
 
 VOL. II. 31 
 
242 
 
 candid men, they cannot say that it is a clear case against the 
 power. They must admit there is some reason for supposing the 
 power to exist. The most they can say is, that the Bank stands 
 on a doubtful authority. Now, suppose that to be true. Let it 
 be admitted that the Bank stands on a doubtful title. Does it 
 follow that they must suddenly destroy it ? Will not they give it 
 time to wind up its affairs, without producing excessive injury to 
 the people ? Shall it be brought to a sudden termination, at 
 whatever cost, at whatever ruin to the public happiness ? 
 
 Besides, Sir, if the Bank be unconstitutional, what is that 
 state of things into which the country must fall, ivhen the Bank 
 charter expires ? Can arly thing be more unconstitutional than 
 that state of things ? 
 
 Again, Sir, I must say, that some of those States, now most 
 opposed to the Bank on Constitutional ground, helped to make it. 
 Look to New York ; look even to Virginia : these States had 
 much more hand in creating this Bank than Massachusetts. In 
 1816, there was no majority in the two Houses of Congress of the 
 members from Virginia opposed to the Bank on Constitutional 
 grounds. Virginia actually gave much more support to it than 
 Massachusetts, and a Virginia President approved the bill. May 
 not a degree of forbearance, then, be justly expected, even though 
 the opinion should now be, that the Bank stands on a doubtful 
 right ? Sir, it is enough to state these suggestions, without arguing 
 them at length, to candid and honorable men. 
 
 I do not, on this occasion, argue the question of the power of 
 Congress to make a bank, but I cannot but recur to the strong 
 view presented of the question the other day by the honorable 
 member from Vermont near me [Mr. Prentiss]. Congress, 
 said he, having, by express grant, the power to regulate commerce 
 between the several States, if money, if currency, silver or paper, 
 be a thing essential to commerce, how can they regulate the com- 
 merce without regulating the currency of the country ? And if 
 the Constitution of the United States does allow the States to 
 create banks, with power to issue paper, and Congress still may 
 not control or regulate that paper, either by a bank of its own, or 
 any other just means, how can it be said that Congress has power 
 to regulate commerce between the States ? These are questions, 
 Sir, which 1 cannot answer. 
 
 In the next place, Sir, as I have said, there are those who are 
 for a new bank. 
 
 Sir, gentlemen may well be for a new bank ; but they cannot 
 be for that and for nothing else, if they really intend to relieve the 
 country. JYo new bank can be established before 1836. This 
 we all know. And what are we to do in the mean time .'' I am 
 not against a new bank, when the proper time comes to make it, 
 
243 
 
 if that shall be the general voice of the country ; but it is idle to 
 talk of a new bank now. Those cannot feel the exigency of the 
 moment, they do not realize the pressure of the times, who talk 
 of a new bank, and nothing but a new bank. Let them bring 
 forward a project for a new bank whenever they please ; but let 
 us, in the mean time, not suffer the present distress of the country 
 to go on, and to increase, for the want of a more immediate 
 measure. I do not object to take the question of a new bank 
 into consideration at any time, either in this Congress or the next ; 
 but I do object to holding out any hope to the country of immedi- 
 ate relief from such a measure, because we know it cannot afford 
 such relief We are in an emergency. Great interests are in 
 danger of being overwhelmed ; we need some plank, something to 
 lay hold on, to buoy us up, and keep our heads above water, 
 until more effectual and permanent provision for our safety can 
 be made. 
 
 I will now, Sir, state the general substance of the bill, which I 
 ask leave to introduce. 
 
 The first section proposes to continue the present Bank for six 
 years, but with this provision, viz. that so much of the present 
 charter as gives the Bank an exclusive right, shall not be contin- 
 ued, but that Congress may make any other bank, if it see fit, to 
 come into existence at any time after 1836. 
 
 This is the great feature of the bill. It continues the Bank for 
 a short period, and takes away the exclusive right. Congress is 
 thus left at perfect liberty to make another bank whenever it 
 chooses. When the present agitation shall have subsided, when a 
 day of calm consideration comes, and the people have had time 
 for deliberation, then Congress may make a permanent provision, 
 satisfactory to itself and to the country. Can any thing be more 
 reasonable than this } Can the bitterest enemy of the present 
 Bank refuse to give it time to wind up its affairs without distress 
 to the people ? Can the most ardent advocate of a new bank 
 refuse, meantime, to allow the country to relieve itself, by the use 
 of the present, until a new one shall be established } 
 
 Sir, I am not dealing in plausibilities only. I mean to leave 
 the whole question, between this Bank and a new one, fairly open. 
 I mean to give to neither any manner of advantage. If Congress 
 establish a new bank, it may easily go into operation while the 
 present is gradually retiring from operation, and the business of the 
 country will feel no violent shock. 
 
 I mean to give the present Bank no claim to a renewal ; but, on 
 the contrary, the only new power conferred on it by this bill is a 
 power to enable it to wind up its concerns. 
 
 As to the time, I think six years not too long. If we were now- 
 certain that a new bank would come into existence in 1836, I 
 
244 
 
 think It would be convenient, for all parties, that this Bank should 
 have six years to run. The new bank would hardly get into full 
 operation under a year or two, and time is absolutely necessary to 
 enable this Bank gradually to collect its debts. A hastened 
 collection must distress the people. With an existing debt of 
 fifty-five millions, and pressed and solicited, on all sides, still fur- 
 ther to extend its loans, in order to relieve the country, all must 
 see that the affairs of the Bank cannot be closed without intolera- 
 ble pressure on the community, unless time be given for that pur- 
 pose. But, if six years be thought too long, I will consent to five, 
 or to four. My own opinion is, that six years is not too long. 
 
 The second section provides, that the public moneys, becoming 
 due after the 1st of July, shall be deposited in the Bank and its 
 Branches as heretofore, subject, however, at any time after this 
 act shall be accepted, to be removed by order of Congress. If 
 Congress shall establish a new bank, they will of course remove 
 the deposits into it. The effect of this provision will be to give 
 to Congress, at all times, what rightfully belongs to them — a full 
 control over the public purse. It separates that purse from the 
 sword, and reestablishes the just authority of the Legislature. 
 
 Then comes the section by which the Bank is to pay ^200,000 
 a year, for each of the six years, as compensation for the benefits 
 of this continuance of its charter. This provision is adopted from 
 the bill of 1832. For one, I should have been willing that a 
 fixed per centage should have been paid, instead of this bonus, 
 to be divided among the States, according to numbers ; but 
 others objected to this, and I have sought to avoid all new causes 
 of difference. 
 
 The next section authorizes Congress to restrain the Bank 
 from issuing notes of less denomination than twenty dollars, if it 
 shall see fit so to do, any time after March, 1836. This, too, is 
 borrowed from the bill of 1832, and its object was fully discussed 
 on that occasion. That object is to get rid of the circulation of 
 all notes under five dollars, and, by so doing, to extend the specie 
 basis of our circulation. When the States shall direct their own 
 banks to issue no notes less than five dollars, then it is proposed 
 that Congress shall direct the bank of the United States to issue 
 no notesbelow twenty dollars. The state of our currency will 
 then be, as I explained the other day, that, up to five dollars, the 
 currency will be silver and gold ; above five dollars, it may be 
 silver, and gold, and notes of State banks ; and above twenty 
 dollars, silver, and gold, and notes of State banks, and notes of the 
 Bank of the United States. This greater use of silver and gold, 
 for common purposes, and small payments, I have thought to be a 
 desirable object, as I have often before said. 
 
 The next section looks to the winding up of the affairs of the 
 
245 
 
 Bank ; and it provides that, at any time within the last three 
 years of its continuance, its directors may divide, among the stock- 
 holders, any portion of the capital which they may have with- 
 drawn from active operation. The remaining sections are only 
 such as are formal and necessary : one continues the acts of Con- 
 gress connected with the Bank, such as those providing for forging 
 its notes ; and the other requires the acceptance of this bill by the 
 Bank, in order to give it vaUdity and effect. 
 
 Such, Mr. President, are the provisions of this bill. They are 
 few and simple. 
 
 1 . The Bank is to be continued for six years. 
 
 2. The deposits are to be restored after the 1st of July. 
 
 3. Congress is to be at perfect liberty to create any new bank, 
 at any time after March, 1836. 
 
 4. The directors, in order to wind up their concerns, may, three 
 years before the six years expire, begin to divide the capital among 
 the stockholders. 
 
 Mr. President, this is the measure which I propose ; and it is 
 my settled belief that, if we cannot carry this, we can carry nothing. 
 
 I have thus, Sir, stated my opinions, and discharged my duty. 
 I see the country laboring, and struggling, and panting under an 
 enormous political evil. I propose a remedy which I am sure will 
 produce relief, if it be adopted, and which seems to me most likely 
 to obtain support. And now, Sir, I put it to every member of 
 Congress, how he can resist this measure, unless by proposing 
 another and a better. Who, among the agents and servants of 
 the people assembled in these Houses, is prepared, in the present 
 distressed state of the country, to say, that he will oppose 
 every thing, and propose nothing ? For one, Sir, I can only say, 
 that I have been driven to this proposition by an irresistible im- 
 pulse of obligation to the country. If I had been suddenly called 
 to my great reckoning in another world, I should have felt that 
 one duty was left unattempted, if I had had no measure to recom- 
 mend, no expedient to propose, no hope to hold out, to this suffering 
 community. 
 
 As to the success of this bill, Sir, or any other, I have only to 
 repeat what I have so often said, that every thing rests with the 
 people themselves. In the distracted state of the public councils, 
 any measure of relief can only be obtained by the decisive demand 
 of the public will. 
 
 By an exercise of Executive power, which I believe to be illegal, 
 and which all must see to have been injurious, — by an unrelenting 
 adherence to the measure which has thus been adopted, in spite 
 of all consequences, and by the force of those motives which 
 influence men to support the measure, though they entirely disap- 
 prove it; — the country is brought to a condition such as it never 
 
246 
 
 before witnessed, and which it cannot long bear. But it is not a 
 condition for despair. Nothing will ruin the country, if the people 
 themselves will undertake its safety ; and nothing can save it, if 
 they leave that safety in any hands but their own. 
 
 Would to God, Sir, that I could draw around me all these twelve 
 millions of people ; would to God, that I could speak audibly to 
 every independent elector in the whole land. I would not say to 
 them, vainly and arrogantly, that their safety and happiness re- 
 quired the adoption of any measure recommended by me. But I 
 would say to them, with the sincerest conviction that ever animated 
 man's heart, that their safety and happiness do require their own 
 prompt and patriotic attention to die public concerns, their own honest 
 devotion to the welfare of the State. I would say to them, that 
 neither this measure, nor any measure, can be adopted, except by 
 the cogent and persisting action of popular opinion. I would say 
 to them, that the public revenues cannot be restored to their ac- 
 customed custody ; that they cannot be again placed under the 
 control of Congress ; that the violation of law cannot be redressed, 
 but by manifestations, not to be mistaken, of public sentiment. I 
 would say to them, that the Constitution and the law's, their own 
 rights and their own happiness, all depend on themselves ; and if 
 they esteem these of any value ; if they were not too dearly bought 
 by the blood of their fathers ; if they be an inheritance, fit to be 
 transmitted to their posterity, — I would beseech them — I would 
 beseech them, to come now to their salvation. 
 
 [The following is the bill which Mr. Webster asked leave to introduce.'} 
 
 A Bill to continue, for the term of six years, the act entitled " An Act to 
 incorporate the Subscribers to the Bank of the United States." 
 
 Be it enacted, <^-c. That the act entitled " An Act to incorporate the Subscri- 
 bers to the Bank of the United States," approved on the tenth day of April, in 
 the year one thousand eight hundred and sixteen, shall continue in full force 
 and effect for the term of six years, from and after the period therein limited 
 for its expiration, to wit, the third day of March, in the year one thousand eight 
 hundred and thirty-six ; and that all the rights, interests, properties, powers, 
 and privileges, secured by the same act, with all the rules, conditions, restrictions, 
 and duties, therein prescribed and imposed, be and remain after the said third 
 day of March, in the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, during 
 the said six years, as if the said limitation in the said act had not been made : 
 Provided, nevertheless, That so much of the said act as declares that no other 
 bank shall be established by any future law of the United States, during the 
 continuance of the corporation thereby created, shall not be continued by this 
 act ; but that it shall be lawful for Congress, whenever it shall see fit, to es- 
 tablish any other bank, to come into existence and operation at any time, on or 
 after the fourth day of March, one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six. 
 
 Sec. 2. £nd be it further enacted. That all public moneys accruing to the 
 United States, and becoming payable from and after the passage of this act, in 
 places where the said Bank or any of its Offices is established, shall be deposited in 
 the Bank of the United States and its Offices as heretofore : Provided, That, at 
 any time after this act shall have been accepted, Congress may, by law or joint 
 
247 ; 
 
 resolution, cause such moneys to be withdrawn and removed to any other I 
 
 custody or place of deposit. 
 
 Sec. 3. Jlnd be it further enacted, That, in consideration of the benefits and 
 privileges conferred by this act, the said Bank shall pay to the United States J 
 
 the annuity or yearly sum of two hundred thousand dollars ; which said sura j 
 
 shall be paid, by the said Bank, on the fourth day of March, in each and every ,J| 
 
 year, during the said term of six years. 'j 
 
 Sec. 4. Jliid he it further enacted, That Congress may provide, by law, that ' 
 
 the said Bank shall be restrained, at any time after the third day of March, in 
 the year one thousand eight hundred and thirty-six, from making, issuing, or i 
 
 keeping in circulation, any notes or bills of said Bank, or any of its Offices, of ] 
 
 a less sum or denomination then twenty dollars. < 
 
 Sec. 5. ^nd be it further enacted. That, at any time or times within the last 1 
 
 three years of the existence of said corporation, as continued by this act, it shall 
 be lawful for the president and directors to divide among the several stock- \ 
 
 holders thereof such portions of the capital stock of said corporation as they 
 may have withdrawn from active use, and may judge proper so to divide. 
 
 Sec. 6. ^nd be it further enacted, That so much of any act or acts of Con- 
 gress, heretofore passed and now in force, supplementary to, or in any wise 
 connected with, the said original act of incorporation, approved on the tenth 
 day of April, in the year one thousand eight hundred and sixteen, as is not 
 inconsistent with this act, shall be continued in full force and effect during the 
 said six years, after the third day of March, in the year one thousand eight 
 hundred and thirty-six. ■ 
 
 Sec. 7. J3nd be it further enacted, That it shall be the duty of the president " 
 
 and directors of the said Bank, on or before the first day of the next session 
 of Congress, to signify to the President of the United States their acceptance, 1 
 
 on behalf of the Bank of the United States, of the terms and conditions in 
 this act contained ; and if they shall fail to do so on or before the day above 
 mentioned, then this act shall cease to be in force. 
 
^"^ 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 ON THE PRESIDENT'S PROTEST, DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF 
 THE UNITED STATES, MAY 7, 1834. 
 
 Mr. President : I feel, Sir, the magnitude of this question. 
 We are coming to a vote which cannot fail to produce important 
 effects on the character of the Senate and the character of the 
 Government. 
 
 Unhappily, Sir, the Senate finds itself involved in a controversy 
 with the President of the United States ; a man who has rendered 
 most distinguished services to his country, has hitherto possessed 
 a degree of popular favor perhaps never excelled, and whose 
 honesty of motive, and integrity of purpose, are still maintained 
 by those who admit that his administration has fallen into lamenta- 
 ble errors. 
 
 On some of the interestmg questions, in regard to which the 
 President and Senate hold opposite opinions, the more popular 
 branch of the Legislature concurs with the Executive. It is not 
 to be concealed that the Senate is engaged against imposing odds. 
 It can sustain itself only by its own prudence and the justice of its 
 cause. It has no patronage by which to secure friends ; it can 
 raise up no advocates through the dispensation of favors, for it has 
 no favors to dispense. Its very constitution, as a body whose 
 members are elected for a long term, is capable of being rendered 
 obnoxious, and is daily made the subject of opprobrious remark. 
 It is already denounced as independent of the people, and aristo- 
 cratic. Nor is it, like the other House, powerful in its numbers ; 
 not being, like that, so large as that its members come constantly 
 in direct and sympathetic contact with the whole people. Under 
 these disadvantages, Sir, which, we inay be assured, will be 
 pressed and urged to the utmost length, there is but one course 
 for us. The Senate must stand on its rendered reasons. It must 
 put forth the grounds of its proceedings, and it must then rely on 
 the intelligence and patriotism of the people to carry it through the 
 contest. 
 
 As an individual member of the Senate, it gives me great pain 
 to be engaged in such a conflict with the Executive Government. 
 The occurrences of the last session are fresh in all our recollec- 
 tions ; and, having felt it to be my duty, at that time, to give my 
 
249 
 
 cordial support to highly-important measures of the Administration, 
 1 ardently hoped that nothing might occur to place me, afterwards, 
 in an attitude of opposition. In all respects, and in every way, 
 it would have been far more agreeable to me to have found 
 nothing in the measures of the Executive Government which I 
 could not cheerfully support. The present occasion of difference 
 has not been sought or made by me. It is thrust upon me, in 
 opposition to strong opinions and wishes, on my part not con- 
 cealed. The interference with the pubhc deposits dispelled all 
 hope of continued concurrence with the Administration, and was 
 a measure so uncalled for, so unnecessary, and, in my judgment, 
 so illegal and indefensible, that, with whatever reluctance it might 
 be opposed, opposition was unavoidable. 
 
 The paper before us has grown out of the consequences of this 
 interference. It is a paper which cannot be treated with indiffer- 
 ence. The doctrines which it advances, the circumstances wlricli 
 have attended its transmission to the Senate, and the manner in 
 which the Senate may now dispose of it, will form a memorable 
 era in the history of the Government. We are either to enter it 
 on our journals, assent to its sentiments, and submit to its rebuke, 
 or we must answer it, with the respect due to the Chief 
 Magistrate, but with such animadversion on its doctrines as 
 they deserve, and with the firmness imposed upon us by our 
 public duties. 
 
 I shall proceed, then. Sir, to consider the circumstances which 
 gave rise to this Protest ; to examine the principles which it at- 
 tempts to establish ; and to compare those principles with the 
 Constitution and the laws. 
 
 On the 28th day of March, the Senate adopted a resolution 
 declaring that, " in the late Executive proceedings in relation to the 
 public revenue, the President had assumed a poiver not conferred 
 by the Constitution and laws, but in derogation of both." In 
 that resolution I concurred. 
 
 It is not a direct question, now again before us, whether the 
 President really had assumed such illegal power : that point is 
 decided, so far as the Senate ever can decide it. But the Protest 
 denies that, supposing the President to have assumed such illegal 
 power, the Senate could properly pass die resolution ; or, what is 
 the same thing, it denies that the Senate could, in this way, ex- 
 press any opinion about it. It denies that the Senate has any 
 right, by resolution, in this or any other case, to express disappro- 
 bation of the President's conduct, let that conduct be what it may ; 
 and this, one of the leading doctrines of the Protest, I propose to 
 consider. But, as I concurred in the resolution of the 28th of 
 March, and did not trouble the Senate, at that time, with any 
 VOL. II. 32 
 
230 l; 
 
 (I 
 
 statement of ray own reasons, I will avail myself of this opporta 
 nity to explain, shortly, what those reasons were. 
 
 In the first place, then, I have to say, that I did not vote for the 
 resolution on the mere ground of the removal of Mr. Duane from 
 the office of Secretary of the Treasury. Although 1 disapprove 
 of the removal altogether, yet the power of removal does exist in 
 the President, according to the established construction of the 
 Constitution ; and there fore, although, in a particular case, it may 
 be abused, and, in my opinion, was abused in this case, yet its i 
 
 exercise cannot be justly said to be an assumption or usurpation. 
 We must all agree that Mr. Duane is out of office. He has, | 
 
 therefore, been removed by a power Constitutionally competent to 
 remove him, whatever may be thought of the exercise of that 
 power, under the circumstances of the case. 
 
 If, then, the act of removing the Secretary be not the assump- 
 tion of power which the resolution declares, in what is that as- 
 sumption found ? Before giving a precise answer to this inquiry, 
 allow me to recur to some of the principal previous events. 
 
 At the end of the last session of Congress, the public moneys 
 of the United States were still in their proper place. That place 
 was fixed by the law of the land, and no power of change was 
 conferred on any other human being than the Secretary of the 
 Treasury. On him the power of change was conferred, to be 
 exercised by himself, if emergency should arise, and to be exer- 
 cised for reasons which he was bound to lay before Congress. 
 No other officer of the Government had the slightest pretence of 
 authority to lay his hand on these moneys for the purpose of 
 changing the place of their custody. All the other heads of de- 
 partments together could not touch them. The President could 
 not touch them. The power of change was a trust confided to 
 the discretion of the Secretary, and to his discretion alone. The 
 President had no more authority to take upon himself this duty, 
 thus assigned expressly by law to the Secretary, than he had to 
 make the annual report to Congress, or the annual commercial 
 statements, or to perform any other service which the law 
 specially requires of the Secretary. He might just as well sign 
 the warrants for moneys, in the ordinary daily disbursements of Gov- 
 ernment, instead of the Secretaiy. The statute had assigned the 
 especial duly of removing the deposits, if removed at all, to the 
 Secretary of the Treasury, and to him alone. The consideration 
 of the propriety, or necessity of removal, must be the consideration 
 of the Secretary ; the decision to remove, his decision ; and the 
 act of removal, his act. 
 
 Now, Sir, on the 18th day of September last, a resolution was 
 taken to remove these deposits from their legislative (that is to 
 
251 
 
 say, their legal) custody. Whose resolution was this ? On the 
 1st day of October, they were removed. And by whose j^ower 
 was this done ? The papers necessary to accomplish the re- 
 moval (that is, the orders and drafts) are, it is true, signed by the 
 Secretary. The President's name does not appear to them ; nor 
 does the Secretary, in any of them, recite or declare that he does 
 the act by direction of the President, or on the President's respon- 
 sibility. In form, the whole proceeding is the proceeding of the 
 Secretary, and, as such, had the legal effect. The deposits were 
 removed. But whose act was it, in truth and reality ? Whose 
 will accomplished it ? On whose responsibility luas it adopted ? 
 
 Those questions are all explicitly answered by the President 
 himself, in the paper, under his own hand, read to the Cabinet on 
 the 18th of September, and published by his authority. In this 
 paper the President declares, in so many words, that he begs his 
 Cabinet to consider the proposed measure as his own; that its re- 
 sponsibility has been assumed by him; and that he names the first 
 day of October as a period proper for its execution. 
 
 Now, Sir, it is precisely this which I deem an assumption of 
 power not conferred by the Constitution and laws. I think the 
 law did not give this authority to the President, nor impose on 
 him the responsibility of its exercise. It is evident that, in this re- 
 moval, the Secretary was in reality nothing but the scribe : he was 
 the pen in the President's hand, and no more. Nothing depended 
 on his discretion, his judgment, or his responsibility. The removal, 
 indeed, has been admitted and defended in the Senate, as the 
 direct act of the President himself This, Sir, is what I call 
 assumption of power. If the President had issued an order for 
 the removal of the deposits in his own name, and under his own 
 hand, it would have been an illegal order, and the Bank would 
 not have been at liberty to obey it. For the same reason, if the 
 Secretary's order had recited that it was issued by the President's 
 direction, and on the President's authority, it would have shown, 
 on its face, that it was illegal and invalid. No one can doubt that. 
 The act of removal, to be lawful, must be the bona fide act of the 
 Secretary ; his judgment, the result oi his deliberations, the volition 
 of his mind. All are able to see the difference between the 
 power to remove the Secretary from office, and the power to 
 control him, in all or any of his duties, while in office. The 
 law charges the officer, whoever he may be, with the perform- 
 ance of certain duties. The President, with the consent of the 
 Senate, appoints an individual to be such officer ; and this individ- 
 ual he may remove, if he so please ; but, until removed, he is the 
 officer, and remains charged with the duties of his station — duties 
 which nobody else can perform, and for the neglect or violation of 
 which he is liable to be impeached. 
 
i! 
 
 252 
 
 The distinction is visible and broad between the power of 
 removal and the power to control an officer not removed. The 
 President, it is true, may terminate his political life ; but he cannot 
 control his powers and functions, and act upon him as a mere 
 machine, while he is allowed to live. This power of control and 
 direction, no where given, certainly, by any express provision of 
 the Constitution or laws, is derived, by those who maintain it, 
 from the right of removal ; that is to say, it is a constructive 
 power. But the right of removal itself is but a constructive 
 power : it has no express warrant in the Constitution. A very- 
 important power, then, is raised by construction, in the first place ; 
 and, being thus raised, it becomes a fountain, out of which other 
 important powers, raised also by construction, are to be supplied. 
 There is no little danger that such a mode of reasoning may be 
 carried too far. It cannot be maintained that the power of direct 
 control necessarily flows from the power of removal. Suppose it 
 had been decided in 1789, when the question was debated, that 
 the President does not possess the power of removal ; will it be 
 contended, that, in that case, his right of interference with the acts 
 and duties of executive officers would be less than it now is? 
 The reason of the thing would seem to be the other way. If the 
 President may remove an incumbent when he becomes satisfied 
 of his unfaithfulness and incapacity, there would appear to be less 
 necessity to give him also a right of control, than there would be if 
 he could not remove him. 
 
 We may try this question by supposing it to arise in a judicial 
 proceeding. If the Secretary of the Treasury were impeached 
 for removing the deposits, could he justify himself by saying that 
 he did it by the President's direction ? If he could, then no ex- 
 ecutive officer could ever be impeached, who obeys the President ; 
 and the whole notion of making such officers impeachable at all 
 would be farcical. If he could not so justify himself (and all will 
 allow he could not), the reason can only be that the act of removal 
 is his own act ; the power, a power confided to him, for the just 
 exercise of which the law looks to his discretion, his honesty, and 
 his direct responsibility. 
 
 Now, Sir, the President wishes the world to understand that he 
 himself decided on the question of the removal of the deposits ; 
 that he took the whole responsibility of the measure upon him- 
 self; that he wished it to be considered his oum act; that 
 he not only himself decided that the thing should be done, but 
 that he regulated its details also, and named the day for carrying it 
 into eifect. 
 
 I have always entertained a very erroneous view of the par- 
 tition of powers, and of the true nature of official responsibility 
 
 I 
 
 I 
 
253 
 
 under our Constitution, if this be not a plain case of the assump- 
 tion of power. 
 
 The Legislature had fixed a place, by law, for the keeping of 
 the public money. They had, at the same time, and by the same 
 law, created and conferred a power of removal, to be exercised 
 contingently. This power they had vested in the Secretary, by 
 express words. The law did not say that the deposits should be 
 made in the Bank, unless the President should order otherwise ; 
 but it did say that they should be made there, unless the Sec- 
 retary of the Treasury should order otherwise. 1 put it to the 
 plain sense and common candor of all men, whether the discretion 
 which was thus to be exercised over the subject was not the Sec- 
 retary's own personal discretion ; and whether, therefore, the 
 interposition of the authority of another, acting directly and con- 
 clusively on the subject, deciding the whole question, even in its 
 particulars and details, be not an assumption of power ? 
 
 The Senate regarded this interposition as an encroachment, by 
 the Executive, on other branches of the Government ; as an inter- 
 ference with the legislative disposition of the public treasure. It 
 was strongly and forcibly urged, yesterday, by the honorable 
 member from South Carolina, that the true and only mode of 
 preserving any balance of power, in mixed governments, is to 
 keep an exact balance. This is very true, and to this end en- 
 croachment must be resisted at the first step. The question is, 
 therefore, whether, upon the true principles of the Constitution, 
 this exercise of power by the President can be justified. Whether 
 the consequences be prejudicial or not, if there be an iUegal 
 exercise of power, it is to be resisted in the proper manner. 
 Even if no harm or inconvenience result from transgressing the 
 boundary, the intrusion is not to be suffered to pass unnoticed. 
 Every encroachment, great or small, is important enough to 
 awaken the attention of those who are intrusted with the preserva- 
 tion of a Constitutional government. We are not to wait till great 
 public mischiefs come, till the Government is overthrown, or 
 liberty itself put in extreme jeopardy. We should not be worthy 
 sons of our fathers, were we so to regard great questions affecting 
 the general freedom. Those fathers accomplished the revolution 
 on a strict question of principle. The Parliament of Great Britain 
 asserted a right to tax the colonies in all cases whatsoever ; and it 
 was precisely on this question that they made the revolution turn. 
 The amount of taxation was trifling, but the claim itself was 
 inconsistent with liberty ; and that was, in their eyes, enough. It 
 was against the recital of an act of Parliament, rather than against 
 any suffering under its enactments, that they took up arms. 
 They went to war against a preamble. They fought seven years 
 against a declaration. They poured out their ti"easures and their 
 
254 
 
 blood like water, in a contest in opposition to an assertion which 
 those less sagacious, and not so well schooled in the principles of 
 civil liberty, would have regarded as barren phraseology, or mere 
 parade of words. They saw in the claim of the British Parlia- 
 ment, a seminal principle of mischief, the germ of unjust power; 
 they detected it, dragged it forth from underneath its plausible dis- 
 guises, struck at it ; nor did it elude either their steady eye, or 
 their well-directed blow, till they had extirpated and destroyed it, 
 to the smallest fibre. On this question of principle, while actual 
 suffering was yet afar off, they raised their flag against a power, to 
 which, for purposes of foreign conquest and subjugation, Rome, 
 in the height of her gloiy, is not to be compared — a power 
 which has dotted over the surface of the whole globe with her 
 possessions and military posts, whose morning drum-beat, follow- 
 ing the sun, and keeping company with the hours, circles the 
 earth daily with one continuous and unbroken strain of the martial 
 airs of England. 
 
 The necessity of holding strictly lo the principle upon which 
 free governments are constructed, and to the precise lines which 
 fix the partitions of power between different branches, is as plain, 
 if not as cogent, as that of resisting, as our fathers did, the strides 
 of the parent country upon the rights of the colonies ; because, 
 whether the power which exceeds its just limits be foreign or 
 domestic, whether it be the encroachment of all branches on the 
 rights of the people, or that of one branch on the rights of others, 
 in either case the balanced and well-adjusted machinery of free 
 government is disturbed, and, if the derangement go on, the whole 
 system must fall. 
 
 But the case before us is not a case of merely theoretic infringe- 
 ment ; nor is it one of trifling importance. Far otherwise. It 
 respects one of the highest and most important of all the powers 
 of Government; that is to say, the custody and control of the 
 public money. The act of removing the deposits, which I now 
 consider as the President's act, and which his friends on this floor 
 defend as his act, took the national purse from beneath the security 
 and guardianship of the law, and disposed of its contents, in par- 
 cels, in such places of deposit as he chose to select. . At this 
 very moment, every dollar of the public treasure is subject, so far 
 as respects its custody and safe keeping, to his unlimited control. 
 We know not where it is to-day ; still less do we know where it 
 may be to-morrow. 
 
 But, Mr. President, this is not all. There is another part of the 
 case, which has not been so much discussed, but which appears to 
 me to be still more indefensible in its character. It is something 
 which may well teach us the tendency of power to move forward, 
 with accelerated pace, if it be allowed to take the first step. The 
 
 I" 
 
255 
 
 Bank of the United States, in addition to the services rendered to 
 the treasury, gave for its charter, and for the use of the public 
 deposits, a bo7ius, or outright sum of one milhon and a half of 
 dollars. This sum was paid by the Bank into the treasury, soon 
 after the commencement of its charter. In the act which passed 
 both Houses for renewing the charter, in 1832, it was provided 
 that the Bank, for the same consideration, should pay two hundred 
 thousand dollars a year, during the period for which it was proposed 
 to renew it. A similar provision is in the bill which I asked leave 
 to introduce some weeks ago. Now, Sir, this shows that the 
 custody of the deposits is a benefit, for which a bank may well 
 afford to pay a large annual sum. The banks which now hold the 
 deposits pay nothing to the public ; they give no bonus, they pay 
 no annuity. But this loss of so much money is not the worst part 
 of the case, nor that which ought most to alarm us. Although • 
 they pay nothing to the public, they do pay, nevertheless, such 
 sums, and for such uses, as may be agreed upon betiveen themselves 
 and the Executive Government. We are officially informed that 
 an officer is appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury to inspect 
 or superintend these selected banks ; and this officer is compensated 
 by a salary fixed by the Executive, agreed to by the banks, and 
 paid by them. I ask. Sir, if there can be a more irregular, or a 
 more illegal transaction than this ? Whose money is it, out of which 
 this salary is paid ? Is it n(ft money justly due to the United 
 States, and paid, because it is so due, for the advantage of holding 
 the deposits ? If a dollar is received on that account, is not its 
 only true destination into the general treasury of the Government ? 
 And who has authority, without law, to create an office, to fix a 
 salary, and to pay that salary out of this money? Here is an 
 inspector, or supervisor of the deposit banks. But what law has 
 provided for such an officer? What commission has he received? 
 Who concurred in his appointment ? What oath does he take ? 
 How is he to be punished, or impeached, if he colludes with any 
 of these banks to embezzle the public money, or defraud the 
 Government ? The value of the use of this public money to the 
 deposit banks is probably two hundred thousand dollars a year ; 
 or, if less than that, it is yet, certainly, a very great sum. May 
 the President appoint whatever officers he pleases, with whatever 
 duties he pleases, and pay them as much as he pleases out of these 
 moneys thus paid by the banks, for the salce of having the deposits 7 
 Mr. President, the Executive claim of power is exactly this, that 
 the President may keep the money of the public in whatever 
 banks he chooses, on whatever terms he chooses, and to apply the 
 sums which these banks are willing to pay for its use to whatever 
 purposes he chooses. These sums are not to come into the general 
 treasury. They are to be appropriated before they get there ; 
 
256 
 
 they are never to be brought under the control of Congress ; they 
 are to be paid to officers and agents not known to the law, not 
 nominated to the Senate, and responsible to nobody but the Ex- 
 ecutive itself. I ask gentlemen if all this be lawful ? Are they 
 prepared to defend it? Will they stand up and justify it ? In my 
 opinion, Sir, it is a clear and a most dangerous assumption of 
 power. It is the creation of office widiout law ; the appointment 
 to office without consulting the Senate ; the establishment of a 
 salary without law ; and the payment of that salary out of a fund 
 which itself is derived from the use of the public treasures. This, 
 Sir, is my other reason for concurring in the vote of the 28th of 
 March ; and on these grounds I leave the propriety of that vote, 
 so fir as I am concerned with it, to be judged of by the country. 
 
 But, Sir, the President denies the power of the Senate to pass 
 any such resolution, on any ground whatever. Suppose the 
 declaration contained in the resolution to be true ; suppose the 
 President had, in fact, assumed powers not granted to him ; does 
 the Senate possess the right to declare its opinion, affirming this 
 fact, or does it not ? I maintain the Senate does possess such a 
 power : the President denies it. 
 
 Mr. President, we need not look far, nor search deep, for the 
 foundation of this right in the Senate. It is clearly visible, and 
 close at hand. In the first place, it is the right of self-defence. 
 In the second place, it is a right f»unded on the duty of repre- 
 sentative bodies, in a free government, to defend the public liberty 
 against encroachment. We must presume that the Senate honestly 
 entertained the opinion expressed in the resolution of the 28th of 
 March ; and, entertaining that opinion, its right to express it is but 
 the necessary consequence of its right to defend its own Constitu- 
 tional authority, as one branch of the Government. This is its 
 clear right, and this, too, is its imperative duty. 
 
 If one, or both, the other branches of the Government happen 
 to do that which appears to us inconsistent widi the Constitutional 
 rights of the Senate, will any one say that the Senate is yet bound 
 to be passive, and to be silent ? to do nothing, and to say nothing ? 
 Or, if one branch appears to encroach on the rights of the other 
 two, have these two no power of remonstrance, complaint, or 
 resistance ? Sir, the question may be put in a still more striking 
 form. Has the Senate a right to have an opinion in a case 
 of this kind ? If it may have an opinion, how is that opinion 
 to be ascertained but by resolution and vote? The objection 
 must go the whole length ; it must maintain that the Sen- 
 ate has not only no right to express opinions, but no right to 
 form opinions, on the conduct of the Executive Government, 
 though in matters intimately affecting the powers and duties of the 
 Senate itself. It is not possible. Sir, that such a doctrine can be 
 
237 
 
 maintained for a single moment. All political bodies resist what 
 they deem encroachments', by resolutions expressive of their sen- 
 timents, and their purpose to resist such encroachments. When 
 such a resolution is presented for its consideration, the question is, 
 whether it be true ; not whether the body has authority to pass it, 
 admitting it to be true. The Senate, like other public bodies, is 
 perfectly justifiable in defending, in this mode, either its legislative 
 or executive authority. The usages of Parliament, the practice 
 in our State Legislatures and Assemblies, both before and since the 
 revolution, and precedents in the Senate itself, fully maintain this 
 right. The case of the Panama mission is in point. In that case, 
 Mr. Branch, from North Carolina, introduced a resolution, which, 
 after reciting that the President, in his annual message, and in his 
 communication to the Senate, had asserted that he possessed an 
 authority to make certain appointments, althoxigh the appointments 
 had not been made, went on to declare that " a silent acquiescence, 
 on the part of this body, may, at some future time, be drawn into 
 dangerous precedent ; " and to resolve, therefore, that the President 
 does not possess the right or power said to be claimed by him. 
 This resolution was discussed, and finally laid on the table. But 
 the question discussed was, whether the resolution was correct, in 
 fact and principle ; not whether the Senate had any right to pass 
 such resolution. So far as I remember, no one pretended that, if 
 the President had exceeded his authority, the Senate might not 
 so declare by resolution. No one ventured to contend that, 
 whether the rights of the Senate were invaded or not, the Senate 
 must hold its peace. 
 
 The Protest labors strenuously to show that the Senate adopted 
 the resolution of the 28th of March, under its judicial authority. 
 The reason of this attempt is obvious enough. If the Senate, in 
 its judicial character, has been trying the President, then he has 
 not had a regular and formal trial ; and, on that ground, it is hoped 
 the public sympathy may be moved. But the Senate has acted 
 not in its judicial, but in its legislative capacity. As a legislative 
 body. It has defended its own just authority, and the authority of 
 the other branch of the Legislature. Whatever attacks our own 
 rights and privileges, or whatever encroaches on the power of both 
 Houses, we may oppose and resist, by declaration, resolution, or 
 other similar proceedings. If we look to the books of precedents, 
 if we examine the journals of legislative bodies, we find every 
 where instances of such proceedings. 
 
 It is to be observed. Sir, that the protest imposes silence on the 
 House of Representatives as well as on the Senate. It declares 
 that no power is conferred on either branch of the Legislature, to 
 consider or decide upon official acts of the Executive, for the 
 purpose of censure, and without a view to legislation or impeach- 
 voL. n. 33 
 
258 
 
 \i 
 
 ment. This, I think, Sir, is pretty high-toned pretension. Ac- 
 cording to this doctrine, neither House»can assert its own rights, 
 however the Executive might assail them ; neither House could 
 point out the danger to the people, however fast Executive en- 
 croachment might be extending itself, or whatever danger it might 
 threaten to the public liberties. If the two Houses of Congress 
 may not express an opinion of Executive conduct by resolution, 
 there is the same reason why they should not express it in any 
 other form, or by any other mode of proceeding. Indeed, the 
 Protest limits both Houses, expressly, to the case of impeachment. 
 If the House of Representatives are not about to impeach the fl 
 
 President, they have nothing to say of his measures or of his 
 conduct ; and unless the Senate are engaged in trying an impeach- 
 ment, their mouths, too, are stopped. , It is the practice of the 
 Executive to send us an annual message, in which he rehearses the 
 general proceedings of the Executive for the past year. This 
 message we refer to our committees for consideration. But, 
 according to the doctrine of the Protest, they can express no 
 opinion upon any Executive proceeding, upon which it gives infor- 
 mation. Suppose the President had told us, in his last annual 
 message, what he had previously told us in his Cabinet paper, that 
 the removal of the deposits was his act, done on his responsibility ; 
 and that the Secretary of the Treasury had exercised no discretion, 
 formed no judgment, presumed to have no opinion whatever, on 
 the subject. This part of the message would have been referred 
 to the Committee on Finance ; but what could they say ? They 
 think it shows a plani violation of the Constitution and the laws ; 
 but the President is not impeached ; therefore they can express 
 no censure. They think it a direct invasion of legislative power, 
 but they must not say so. They may, indeed, commend, if they 
 can. The grateful business of praise is lawful to them ; but if, 
 instead of commendation and applause, they find cause for disap- 
 probation, censure, or alarm, the Protest enjoins upon them abso- 
 lute silence. 
 
 Formerly, Sir, it was a practice for the President to meet both 
 Houses, at the opening of the session, and deliver a speech, as is 
 still the usage of some of the State Legislatures. To this speech 
 there was an answer from each House, and those answers expressed, 
 freely, the sentiments of the House upon all the merits and faults 
 of the Administration. The discussion of the topics contained in 
 the speech, and the debate on the answers, usually drew out the 
 whole force of parties, and lasted sometimes a week. President 
 Washington's conduct, in every year of his administration, was 
 thus freely and publicly canvassed. He did not complain of it ; 
 he did not doubt that both Houses had a perfect right to comment, 
 with the utmost latitude, consistent with decorum, upon all his 
 
259 
 
 measures. Answers, or amendments to answers, were not uu- 
 frequently proposed, very hostile to his own course of public policy, 
 if not sometimes bordering on disrespect. And when they did 
 express respect and regard, there were votes ready to be recorded 
 against the expression of those sentiments. To all this President 
 Washington look no exception ; for he well knew that these, and 
 similar proceedings, belonged to the power of popular bodies. 
 But if the President were now to meet us with a speech, and 
 should inform us of measures, adopted by himself in the recess, 
 which should appear to us the most plain, palpable, and dangerous 
 violations of the Constitution, we must, nevertheless, either keep 
 respectful silence, or fill our answer merely with courdy phrases 
 of approbation. 
 
 Mr. President, I know not who wrote this Protest, but I confess 
 I am astonished, truly astonished, as well at the want of knowledge 
 which it displays of Constitutional law, as at the high and dangerous 
 pretensions which it puts forth. Neither branch of the Legisla- 
 ture can express censure upon the President's conduct ! Suppose, 
 Sir, that we should see him enlisting troops, and raising an army, 
 can we say nothing, and do nothing? Suppose he were to declare 
 war against a foreign power, and put the army and the fleet in 
 action ; are we still to be silent ? Suppose we should see him 
 borroiving money on the credit of the United States ; are we yet 
 to wait for impeachment .'' Indeed, Sir, in regard to this borrowing 
 money on the credit of the United States, I wish to call the atten- 
 tion of the Senate not only to what might happen, but to what has 
 actually happened. We are informed that the Post-Office De- 
 partment, a department over which the President claims the same 
 control as over the rest, has actually borrotved near half a million 
 of money on the credit of the United States. 
 
 IVIr. President, the first power granted to Congress by the Con- 
 stitution is the power to lay taxes ; the second, the power to borrow 
 money on the credit of the United States. Now, Sir, where does 
 the Executive find its authority, in oj:* through any department, to 
 borrow money without authority of Congress ? This proceeding 
 appears to me wholly illegal, and reprehensible in a very high 
 degree. It may be said that it is not true that this money is bor- 
 rowed on the credit of die United States, but that it is borrowed 
 on the credit of the Post-Office Department. But that would be 
 mere evasion. The department is but a name. It is an office, 
 and nothing more. The banks have not lent this money to any 
 officer. If Congress should abolish the whole department to- 
 morrow, would the banks not expect the United States to replace 
 this borrowed money ? The money, then, is borrowed on the 
 credit of the United States — an act which Congress alone is com- 
 petent to authorize. If the Post-Office Department may borrow 
 
260 
 
 money, so may the War Department, and the Navy Department. 
 If half a million may be borrowed, ten millions may be borrowed. 
 What, then, if this transaction shall be justified, is to hinder the 
 Executive from borrowing money, to maintain fleets and armies, or 
 for any other purpose, at his pleasure, without any authority of faw? 
 Yet, even this, according to the doctrine of the Protest, we have 
 no right to complain of We have no right to declare that an 
 executive department has violated the Constitution and broken 
 the law, by borrowing money on tlie credit of the United States. 
 Nor could we make a similar declaration, if we were to see the 
 Executive, by means of this borrowed money, enlisting armies and 
 equipping fleets. And yet, Sir, the President has found no diffi- 
 culty, heretofore, in expressing his opinions, in a paper, not called 
 for by the exercise of any official duty, upon the conduct and 
 proceedings of the two Houses of Congress. At the commence- 
 ment of this session, he sent us a message, commenting on the land 
 bill, which the two Houses passed at the end of the last session. 
 That bill he had not approved, nor had he returned it with ob- 
 jections. Congress was dissolved ; and the bill, therefore, was 
 completely dead, and could not be revived. No communication 
 from him could have the least possible effect as an official act. 
 Yet he saw fit to send a message on the subject, and in that mes- 
 sage he very freely declares his opinion that the bill which had 
 passed both Houses began iviih an entire subversion of every one 
 of the compacts by ichich the United States became possessed of 
 their western domain; that one of its provisions was in direct and 
 undisguised violation of the pledge given by Congress to the 
 States; that the Constitution provides that these compacts shall be 
 untouched by the legislative power, which can only make needful 
 rules and regulations ; and that all beyond that is an assumption 
 of undelegated power. 
 
 These are the terms In which the President speaks of an act of 
 the two Houses ; in no official paper, in no communication which 
 it was necessary for him to make to them.; but in a message, 
 adopted only as a mode through which to make public these opin- 
 ions. After this, it would seem too late to enjoin on the Houses 
 of Congress a total forbearance from all comment on the measures 
 of the Executive. 
 
 Not only is it the right of both Houses, or of either, to resist, 
 by vote, declaration, or resolution, whatever it may deem an en- 
 croachment of Executive power, but it is also undoubtedly the right 
 of either House to oppose, in like manner, any encroachment by 
 the other. The two Houses have each hs ow-n appropriate powers 
 and authorities, which it is bound to preserve. They have, too, 
 difierent constituents. The members of the Senate are repre- 
 sentatives of States ; and it is in the Senate alone that the four- 
 
261 
 
 and-twenty States, as political bodies, have a direct influence in the 
 legislative and executive powers of this Government. He is a 
 strange advocate of State rights, who maintains that this body, 
 thus representing the States, and thus being the strictly federal 
 branch of the Legislature, may not assert and maintain all and 
 singular its own powers and privileges, against either or both of 
 the other branches. 
 
 If any thing be done or threatened derogatory to the rights of 
 the States, as secured by the organization of the Senate, may we 
 not lift up our voices against it ? Suppose the House of Repre- 
 sentatives should vote that the Senate ought not to propose amend- 
 ments to revenue bills ; would it be the duty of the Senate to 
 take no notice of such proceeding? Or, if we were to see the 
 President issuing commissions to office to persons who had never 
 been nominated to the Senate, are we not to remonstrate ? 
 
 Sir, there is no end of cases, no end of illustrations. The 
 doctrines of the Protest, in tliis respect, cannot stand the slightest 
 scrutiny ; they are blown away by the first breath of discussion. 
 
 And yet, Sir, it is easy to perceive why this right of declaring 
 its sentiments, respecting the conduct of the Executive, is denied 
 to either House, in its legislative capacity. It is merely that the 
 Senate might be presented in the odious light of trying the Pres- 
 ident, judicially, without regular accusation or hearing. The 
 Protest declares that the President is charsred ivith a crime, and, 
 without hearing or trial, found guilty and condemned. This is 
 evidently an attempt to appeal to popular feeling, and to represent 
 the President as unjustly treated and unfairly tried. Sir, it is a 
 false appeal. The President has not been tried at all ; he has not 
 been accused ; he has not been charged with crime ; he has not 
 been condemned. Accusation, trial and sentence are terms be- 
 longing to judicial proceedings. But the Senate has been engaged 
 in no such proceeding. The resolution of the 2Sth of March 
 was not an exercise of judicial power, either in form, in substance, 
 or in intent. Every body knows that the Senate can exercise no 
 judicial power until articles of impeachment are brought before it. 
 It is then to proceed, by accusation and answer, hearing, trial, and 
 judgment. But there has been no impeachment, no answer, no 
 hearing, no judgment. AH that the Senate did was to pass a 
 resolution, in legislative form, declaring its opinion of certain acts 
 of the Executive. This resolution imputed no crime ; it charged 
 no corrupt motive ; it proposed no punishment. It was directed, 
 not against the President, personally, but against the act ; and that 
 act it declared to be, in its judgment, an assumption of authority 
 not warranted by the Constitution. 
 
 It is in vain that the Protest attempts to shift the resolution on 
 to the judicial character of the Senate. The case is too plain for 
 
262 
 
 such an argument to be plausible. But, in order to lay some 
 foundation for it, the Protest, as I have already said, contends that 
 neither the Senate, nor the House of Representatives, can express 
 its opinions on the conduct of the President, except in some form 
 connected with impeachment ; so that if the power of impeach- 
 ment did not exist, these two Houses, though they be represent- 
 ative bodies ; though one of them be filled by the immediate 
 representatives of the people ; though they be constituted like other 
 popular and representative bodies, — could not utter a syllable, 
 although tney saw the Executive either trampling on their own 
 rights and privileges, or grasping at absolute authority and dominion 
 over the liberties of the country ! Sir, I hardly know how to 
 speak of such claims of impunity for Executive encroachment. 
 I am amazed that any American citizen should draw up a paper 
 containing such lofty pretensions — pretensions which would have 
 been met with scorn, in England, at any time since the revolution 
 of 1688. A man who should stand up, in either House of the 
 British Parliament, to maintain that the House could not, by vote 
 or resolution, maintain its own rights and privileges, would make 
 even the tory benches hang their heads for very shame. There 
 was, indeed, a time when such proceedings were not allowed. 
 Some of the kings of the Stuart race would not tolerate them. 
 A signal instance of royal displeasure with the proceedings of 
 Parliament occurred in the latter part of the reign of James the 
 First, The House of Commons had spoken, on some occasion, 
 "0/ its oivn undoubted rights and privileges." The king 
 thereupon sent them a letter, declaring that he ivould not allow 
 that they had any undoubted rights ; but that what they enjoyed 
 they might still hold by his own royal grace and permission. Sir 
 Edward Coke and Mr. Granville were not satisfied with this title 
 to their privileges ; and, under their lead, the House entered on 
 its journals a resolution, asserting its privileges, as its oivn un- 
 doubted right, and manifesting a determination to maintain them as 
 such. This, says the historian, so enraged his majesty, that he 
 sent for the journal, had it brought into the council, and there, in 
 the presence of his lords and great officers of state, tore out the 
 offensive resolution with his own royal hand. He then dissolved 
 Parliament, and sent its most refractory members to the Tower. 
 I have no fear, certainly, Sir, that this English example will be 
 followed, on this occasion, to its full extent ; nor would I insinuate 
 that any thing outrageous has been thought of, or intended, except 
 outrageous pretensions ; but such pretensions I must impute to the 
 author of this Protest, whoever that author be. 
 
 When this and the other House shall lose the freedom of speech 
 tind debate ; when they shall surrender the rights of publicly and 
 freely canvassing all important measures of the Executive ; when 
 
263 
 
 they shall not be allowed to maintain their own authority and their 
 own privileges by vote, declaration, or resolution, — they will then 
 be no longer free representatives of a free people, but slaves 
 themselves, and fit instruments to make slaves of others. 
 
 The Protest, Mr. President, concedes what it doubtless regards 
 as a liberal right of discussion to the people themselves. But its 
 language, even in acknowledging this right of the pcop/c to discuss 
 the conduct of their servants, is qualified and peculiar. The free 
 people of the United States, it declares, have an undoubted right 
 to discuss the official conduct of the President, in such language 
 and form as they may think proper, '' subject only to the restraints 
 of truth and justice.''' But, then, who is to be judge of this truth 
 and justice .'' Are the people to judge for themselves, or are others 
 to judge for them ? The Protest is here speaking of political 
 rights, and not moral rights ; and if restraints are imposed on po- 
 litical rights, it must follow, of course, that others are to decide, 
 whenever the case arises whether these restraints have been 
 violated. It is strange that the writer of the Protest did not 
 perceive that, by using this language, he was pushing the Pres- 
 ident into a direct avowal of the doctrines of 1798.'' The text of 
 the Protest and the text of the obnoxious act of that year are 
 nearly identical. 
 
 But, Sir, if the people have a right to discuss the official conduct 
 of the Executive, so have their representatives. , We have been ] 
 ■ taught to regard a representative of the people as a sentinel on the « 
 watch-tower of liberty. Is he to be blind, though visible danger 
 approaches? Is he to be deaf, though sounds of peril fill the air.'^f 
 ■ Is he to be dumb, while a thousand duties impel him to raise the ] 
 cry of alarm .'' Is he not, rather, to catch the lowest whisper ' 
 which breathes intention or purpose of encroachment on the 
 public liberties, and to give his voice breath and utterance at the 
 .^fii^t^p.pearance of dang_er?f Is not his eye to traverse the whole 
 horizon with the l^een and eager vision of an unhooded hawk, 
 detecting, through all disguises, every enemy advancing, in any 
 form, towards the citadel which he guards? Sir, this watchfulness 
 for public liberty ; this duty of foreseeing danger and proclaiming 
 it ; this promptitude and boldness in resisting attacks on the Con- 
 stitution from any quarter ; this defence of established landmarks ; 
 this fearless resistance of whatever would transcend or remove 
 them, — all belong to the representative character, are interwoven 
 with its very nature, and of which it cannot be deprived, without 
 converting an active, intelligent, faithful agent of the people into 
 an unresisting and passive instrument of power. A representative 
 body, which gives up these rights and duties, gives itself up. It is 
 a representative body no longer. It has broken the tie between 
 itself and its constituents, and henceforth is fit only to be regarded 
 
264 
 
 as an inert, self-sacrificed mass, from which all appropriate prin- 
 ciple of vitality has departed forever. 
 
 I have thus endeavored to vindicate the right of the Senate to 
 pass the resolution of the 28th of March, notwithstanding the denial 
 of that right in the Protest. i 
 
 But there are. other sentiments and opinions expressed in the 
 Protest, of the very highest importance, and which demand nothing 
 less than our utmost attention. 
 
 The first object of a free people is the preservation of their hb-y • 
 erty ; and liberty is only to be preserved by maintaining constitu-' 
 jional restraints and just divisions of political power. Nothing is 
 more deceptive or more dangerous than the pretence of a desire to 
 simplify government. The simplest governments are despotisms ; 
 the next simplest, limited monarchies ; but all republics, all govern- 
 ments of law, must impose numerous limitations and qualifications 
 of authority, and give many positive and many qualified rights. In 
 other words, diey must be subject to rule and regulation. This is 
 the very essence of free political institutions. The spirit of liberty 
 is, indeed, a bold and fearless spirit ; but it is also a sharp-sighted 
 spirit ; it is a cautious, sagacious, discriminating, far-seeing intelli- 
 gence ; it is jealous of encroachment, jealous of power, jealous of 
 man. It demands checks ; it seeks for guards ; it insists on se- 
 curities ; it entrenches itself behind strong defences, and forfifies, 
 with all possible care, against the assaults of ambition and passion. 
 It does not trust the amiable weaknesses of human nature, and 
 therefore it will not permit power to overstep its prescribed limits, 
 though benevolence, good intent, and patriotic purpose, come along 
 with it. Neither does it satisfy itself with flashy and temporary 
 resistance to illegal authority. Far otherwise. It seeks for dura- 
 tion and permanence. It looks before and after ; and, building on 
 the experience of ages which are past, it labors diligently for the 
 benefit of ages to come. This is the nature of constitutional lib- 
 erty ; and this is our liberty, if we will rightly understand and pre- 
 serve it. Every free government is necessarily complicated, be- 
 cause all such governments establish restraints, as well on the 
 power of government itself, as on that of individuals. If we will 
 abolish the distinction of branches, and have but one branch ; if 
 we will abolish jury trials, and leave all to the judge ; if we will 
 then ordain that the legislator shall himself be that judge ; and 
 if we will place the executive power in the same hands, — we may 
 readily simplify government. We may easily bring it to the sim- 
 plest of all possible forms — a pure despofism. But a separafion of 
 departments, so far as practicable, and the preservation of clear 
 lines of division between them, is the fundamental idea in the creation 
 of all our constitutions ; and, doubdess, the continuance of regula- 
 ted liberty depends on maintaining these boundaries. 
 
265 
 
 In the progress, Sir, of the Government of the United States, we 
 seem exposed to two classes of dangers or disturbances ; one exter- 
 nal, the other internal. It may happen that collisions arise be- 
 tween this Government and the governments of the States. That 
 case belongs to the first class. A memorable instance of this kind 
 existed last year. It was my conscientious opinion, on that occa- 
 sion, that the authority claimed by an individual State was subver- 
 sive of the just powers of this Government, and, indeed, incompat- 
 ible with its existence. I gave a hearty cooperation, therefore, to 
 measures which the crisis seemed to require. We have now be- 
 fore us what appears, to my judgment, to be an instance of the 
 latter kind. A contest has arisen between difterent branches of 
 the same Government, interrupting their harmony, and threatening 
 to disturb their balance. It is of the highest importance, therefore, 
 to examine the question carefully, and to decide it justly. 
 
 The separation of the powers of government into three depart- 
 ments, though all our constitutions profess to be founded on it, has, 
 nevertheless, never been perfectly established in any government 
 of the world, and, perhaps, never can be. The general principle 
 is of inestimable value, and the leading hnes of distinction suffi- 
 ciently plain ; yet there are powers of so undecided a chai*acter, 
 that they do not seem necessarily to range themselves under either 
 head. And most of our constitutions, too, having laid down the 
 general principle, immediately create exceptions. There do not 
 exist in the general science of government, or the received maxims 
 of political law, such precise definitions as enable us always to say 
 of a given power whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial. 
 And this is one reason, doubtless, why the Constitution, in confer- 
 ring power on all the departments, proceeds not by general defini- 
 tion, but by specific enumeration. And, again, it grants a power 
 in general terms, but yet, in the same, or some other article or 
 section, imposes a limitation or qualificadon on the grant ; and the 
 grant and the limitation must, of course, be construed together. Thus 
 the Constitution says that all legislative power, therein granted, 
 shall be vested in Congress, which Congress shall consist of a 
 Senate and House of Representatives ; and yet, in another article, 
 it gives to the President a qualified negative over all acts of Con- 
 gress. So the Constitution declares that the judicial power shall 
 be vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior courts as Con- 
 gress may establish. It gives, nevertheless, in another provision, 
 judicial power to the Senate ; and, in like manner, though it de- 
 clares that the executive power shall be vested in the President, 
 using, in the immediate context, no words of limitation, yet it else- 
 where subjects the treaty-making power, and the appointing power, 
 to the concurrence of the Senate. The irresistible inference, 
 from these considerations, is, that the mere nomination of a depart- 
 voL. II. 34 
 
266 
 
 ment, as one of the three great and commonly-acknowledged de- 
 partments of Government, does not confer on that department any 
 power at all. Notwithstanding the departments are called the 
 legislative, the executive, and the judicial, we must yet look into 
 the provisions of the Constitution itself, in order to learn, first, what 
 powers the Constitution regards as legislative, executive, and ju- 
 dicial ; and, in the next place, what portions or quantities of these 
 powers are conferred on the respective departments ; because no 
 one will contend that all legislative power belongs to Congress, all 
 executive power to the President, or all judicial power to the 
 courts of the United States. 
 
 The three first articles of the Constitution, as all know, are em- 
 ployed in prescribing the organization, and enumerating the 
 powers, of the three departments. The first article treats of the 
 Legislature, and its first section is — " All legislative power, herein 
 granted, shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which 
 shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." 
 
 The second article treats of the executive power, and its first 
 section declares that " the executive power shall be vested in a 
 President of the United States of America." 
 
 The third article treats of the judicial power, and its first section 
 declares that " the judicial power of the United States shall be 
 vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the 
 Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish." 
 
 It is too plain to be doubted, I think. Sir, that these descriptions 
 of the persons or officers, in whom the executive and the judicial 
 powers are to be vested, no more define the extent of the grant of 
 those powers, than the words quoted from the first article describe 
 the extent of the legislative grant to Congress. All these several 
 titles, heads of articles, or introductory clauses, with the general 
 declarations which they contain, serve to designate the departments, 
 and to mark the general distribution of powers ; but in all the de- 
 partments, in the executive and judicial as well as in the legislative, 
 it would be unsafe to contend for any specific power under such 
 clauses. 
 
 If we look into the State constitutions, we shall find the line of 
 distinction between the departments still less perfectly drawn, al- 
 though the general principle of the distinction is laid down in most 
 of them, and, in some of them, in very positive and emphatic terms. 
 Li some of these States, notwithstanding the principle of distribu- 
 tion is adopted and sanctioned, the Legislature appoints the 
 judges ; and in others it appoints both the governor and the judges ; 
 and in others, again, it appoints not only the judges, but all other 
 officers. 
 
 The inferences which, I think, follow from these views of the 
 subject, are two : First, that the denomination of a department 
 
267 
 
 does not fix the limits of the powers conferred on it, nor even their 
 exact nature ; and, second (which, indeed, follows from the first), 
 that, in our American governments, the chief executive magistrate 
 does not necessarily, and by force of his general character of su- 
 preme executive, possess the appointing power. He may have 
 it, or he may not, according to the particular provisions applicable 
 to each case, in the respective constitutions. 
 
 The President appears to have taken a different view of this 
 subject. He seems to regard the appoindng power as originally 
 and inherently in the Execudve, and as remaining absolute in 
 his hands, except so far as the Constitution restrains it. This I 
 do not agree to, and shall have occasion hereafter to examine the 
 question further. I have intended, thus far, only to insist on the 
 high and indispensable duty of maintaining the division of power, 
 as the Constitution has marked that division out, and to oppose 
 claims of authority not founded on express grants or necessary im- 
 plication, but sustained merely by argument, or inference, from 
 names or denominations given to departments. 
 
 Mr. President, the resolutions now before us declare, that the 
 Protest asserts powers as belonging to the President, inconsistent 
 with the authority of the two Houses of Congress, and inconsistent 
 with the Constitution ; and that the Protest itself is a breach of 
 privilege. I believe all this to be true. 
 
 The doctrines of the Protest are inconsistent with the authority 
 of the two Houses, because, in my judgment, they deny the just 
 extent of the law-making power. I take the Protest as it was sent 
 to us, without inquiring how far tlie subsequent message has mod- 
 ified or explained it. It is singular, indeed, that a paper, so long in 
 preparation, so elaborate in composition, and which is put forth for 
 so high a purpose as the Protest avows, should not be able to 
 stand an hour's discussion, before it became evident that it was in- 
 dispensably necessary to alter or explain its contents. Explained 
 or unexplained, however, the paper contains sentiments which 
 justify us, as I think, in adopting these resolutions. 
 
 In the first place,! think the Protest a clear breach of privilege. 
 It is a reproof, or rebuke, of the Senate, in language hardly 
 respectful, for the exercise of a power clearly belonging to it as a 
 legislative body. It entirely misrepresents the proceedings of the 
 Senate. I find this paragraph in it, among others of a similar 
 tone and character — " A majority of the Senate, whose inter- 
 ference with the preliminary question has, for the best of all rea- 
 sons, been studiously excluded, anticipate the action of the House 
 of Representatives, assume not only the function which belongs, 
 exclusively, to that body, but convert themselves into accusers, 
 witnesses, counsel and judges, and prejudge the whole case ; 
 thus presenting the appalling spectacle, in a free State, of 
 
268 
 
 'judges going through a labored preparation for an impartial hear- 
 ing and decision, by a previous ex parte investigation and sentence 
 against the supposed offender." 
 
 Now, Sir, this paragraph, I am bound to say, is a total misrep- 
 resentation of the proceedings of the Senate. A majority of the 
 Senate have not anticipated the House of Representatives ; they 
 have not assumed the functions of that body ; they have not con- 
 verted themselves into accusers, witnesses, counsel, or judges ; 
 they have made no ex parte investigation ; they have given no 
 sentence. This paragraph is an elaborate perversion of the whole 
 design and the whole proceedings of the Senate. A Protest, sent 
 to us by the President, against votes which the Senate has an un- 
 questionable right to pass, and containing, too, such a misrepre- 
 sentation of these votes as this paragraph manifests, is a breach of 
 privilege. 
 
 But there is another breach of privilege. The President inter- 
 feres between the members of the Senate and their constituents, 
 and charges them with acting contrary to the will of those consdt- 
 uents. He says it is his right and duty to look to the journals of 
 the Senate, to ascertain who voted for the resolution of the 28th 
 of March, and then to show that individual Senators have, by their 
 votes on that resolution, disobeyed the instructions, or violated the 
 known wiU of the Legislatures who appointed them. All this he 
 claims as his right and his duty. And where does he find any 
 such right, or any such duty ? What right has he to send a mes- 
 sage to either House of Congress, telling its members that they 
 disobey the will of their constituents ? Has any English sovereign, 
 since Cromwell's time, dared to send such a message to Parlia- 
 ment .'' Sir, if he can tell us that some of us disobey our constitu- 
 ents, he can tell us that all do so ; and if we consent to receive 
 this language from him, there is but one remaining step ; and that 
 is, that, since we thus disobey the will of our constituents, he 
 should disperse us, and send us home. In my opinion, the first 
 step in this process is as distinct a breach of privilege as the last. 
 If Cromwell's examples shall be followed out, it will not be more 
 clear dien than it is now, that the privileges of the Senate have 
 been violated. There is yet something, Sir, which surpasses all 
 this ; and that is, that, after this direct interference, after pointing 
 out those Senators whom he would represent as having disobeyed 
 the known will of their constituents, he disclaims all design of in- 
 terfering at all! Sir, who could be the writer of a message, 
 which, in the first place, makes the President assert such mon- 
 strous pretensions, and, in the next line, affront the understanding 
 of the Senate by disavowing all right to do that very thing which 
 he is doing ? If there be any thing, Sir, in this message, more 
 likely than the rest of it to move one from his equanimity, it is this 
 
269 
 
 disclaimer of all design to interfere with the responsibility of mem- 
 oers of the Senate to their constituents, after such interference had 
 already been made, in the same paper, in the most objectionable 
 and offensive form. If it were not for the purpose of telling these 
 Senators that they disobeyed the will of the Legislatures of the 
 States they represent, /or what purpose was it that the Protest has 
 pointed out the four Senators, and paraded against them the sen- 
 timents of their Legislatures ? There can be no other purpose. 
 The Protest says, indeed, that " these facts belong to the history 
 of these proceedings!" To the history of what proceedings.^ 
 To any proceeding to which the President was party ? To any 
 proceeding to which the Senate was party ? Have they any thing 
 to do with the resolution of the 28th of March? But it adds, that 
 these facts are important to the just dev elopement of the principles 
 and interests involved in the proceedings. All this might be said 
 of any other facts. It is mere words. To what principles, to 
 what interests, are. these facts important ? They cannot be im- 
 portant but in one point of view ; and that is as proof, or evidence, 
 that the Senators have disobeyed instructions, or acted against the 
 known will of their constituents, in disapproving the President's 
 conduct. They have not the slightest bearing in any other way. 
 They do not make the resolution of the Senate more or less true, 
 nor its right to pass it more or less clear. Sir, these proceedings 
 of the Legislatures were introduced into this Protest for the very 
 purpose, and no other, of showing that members of the Senate 
 have acted contrary to the will of their constituents. Every 
 man sees and knows this to have been the sole design ; and any 
 other pretence is a mockery to our understandings. And this 
 purpose is, in my opinion, an unlawful purpose ; it is an unjus- 
 tifiable intervention between us and our constituents ; and is, there- 
 fore, a manifest and flagrant breach of privilege. 
 
 In the next place, the assertions of the Protest are inconsistent 
 with the just authority of Congress, because they claim for the 
 President a power, independent of Congress, to possess the 
 custody and control of the public treasures. Let this point be 
 accurately examined ; and, in order to avoid mistake, I will read 
 the precise words of the Protest. 
 
 '■« The custody of the public property, under such regulations 
 as may be prescribed by legislative authority, has always been 
 considered an appropriate function of the executive department in 
 this and all other governments. In accordance with this principle, 
 every species of property belonging to the United States (except- 
 ing that which is in the use of the several coordinate departments 
 of the Government, as means to aid them in performing their 
 appropriate functions) is in charge of officers appointed by the 
 President, whether it be lands, or buildings, or merchandise, or 
 
270 
 
 provisions, or clothing, or arms and munitions of war. The 
 superintendents and keepers of the whole are appointed by the 
 President, and removable at his will. 
 
 " Public money is but a species of public property. It cannot 
 be raised by taxation or customs, nor brought into the treasury in 
 any other way except by law ; but whenever or howsoever 
 obtained, its custody always has been, and always must be, unless 
 the Constitution be changed, intrusted to the Executive Depart- 
 ment. No officer can be created by Congress, for the purpose 
 of taking charge of it, whose appointment would not, by the Con- 
 stitution, at once devolve on the President, and who would 
 not be responsible to him for the faithful performance of his 
 duties." 
 
 And, in another place, it declares that "Congress cannot, 
 therefore, take out of the hands of the Executive Department the 
 custody of the public property or money, without an assumption 
 of executive power, and a subversion of the first principles of the 
 Constitution." These, Sir, are propositions which cannot receive 
 too much attention. They affirm, that the custody of the public 
 money Constitutionally and necessarily belongs to the Executive ; 
 and that, until the Constitution is changed. Congress cannot take 
 it out of his hands, nor make any provision for its custody, except 
 by such superintendents and keepers as are appointed by the 
 President, and removable at his will. If these assertions be cor- 
 rect, we have, indeed, a singular Constitution for a republican 
 government ; for we give the Executive the control, the custody, 
 and the possession of the public treasury, by original Constitutional 
 provision ; and when Congress appropriates, it appropriates only 
 what is already in the President's hands. 
 
 Sir, I hold these propositions to be sound in neither branch. I 
 maintain that the custody of the public money does not, necessa- 
 rily, belong to the Executive, under this Government ; and I hold 
 that Congress may so dispose of it, that it shall be under the 
 superintendence of keepers not appointed by the President, nor 
 removable at his will. I think it competent for Congress to 
 declare, as Congress did declare in the Bank charter, that the 
 public deposits should be made in the Bank. When in the 
 Bank, they were not kept by persons appointed by the President, 
 or removable at his will. He could not change that custody ; nor 
 could it be changed at all, but according to provisions made in the 
 law itself. There was, indeed, a provision in the law authorizing 
 the Secretary to change the custody. But suppose there had 
 been no such provision ; suppose the contingent power had not 
 been given to the Secretary ; would it not hav^e been a lawful 
 enactment.'' Might not the law have provided that the public 
 moneys should remain in the Bank, until Congress itself should 
 
271 
 
 otherwise order, leaving no power of removal any where else ? 
 And if such provision had been made, what power, or custody, or 
 control, would the President have possessed over them ? Clearly, 
 none at all. The act of May, ISOO, directed custom-house bonds, 
 ill places where the Bank, which was then in existence, was situ- 
 ated, or in which it had Branches, to be deposited in the Bank or 
 its Bi'anches for collection, without the reservation of any poiver 
 of removal to the Secretary or any body else. Now, Sir, this was 
 an unconstitutional law, if the Protest, in the part now under con- 
 sideration, be correct ; because it placed the public money in a 
 custody beyond the control of the President, and in hands of 
 keepers not appointed by him, nor removable at his pleasure. 
 One may readily discern. Sir, the process of reasoning by which 
 the author of the Protest brought himself to the conclusion that 
 Congress could not place the public moneys beyond the Presi- 
 dent's control. It is all founded on the power of appointment, 
 and the power of removal. These powers, it is supposed, must 
 give the President complete control and authority over those who 
 actually hold the money, and, therefore, must necessarily subject 
 its custody, at all times, to his own individual will. This is the 
 argument. 
 
 It is true, that the appointment of all public officers, with some 
 exceptions, is, by the Constitution, given to the President, with 
 the consent of the Senate; and as, in most cases, public property 
 must be held by some officer, its keepers will generally be persons 
 so appointed. But this is only the common, not a necessary con- 
 sequence, of giving the appointing power to the President and 
 Senate. _ Congress may still, if it shall so see fit, place the public 
 treasure in the hand of no officer appointed by the President, or 
 removable by him, but in hands quite beyond his control. Sub- 
 ject to one contingency only, it did this very thing by the charter 
 of the present Bank ; and it did the same thing absolutely, and 
 subject to no contingency, by the law of 1800. The Protest, in 
 the first place, seizes on the fact that all officers must be ap- 
 pointed by the President, or on his nomination ; it then assumes 
 the next step, that all officers are, and 7nust be, removable at his 
 pleasure ; and then, insisting that public money, like other public 
 property, niust be kept by some public officer, it thus arrives at 
 the conclusion that it must always be in the hands of those who 
 are appointed by the President, and who are removable at his 
 pleasure. And it is very clear that the Protest means to maintain 
 that the tenure of office cannot be so regulated by law, as that 
 public offiicers shall not be removable at the pleasure of the Pres- 
 ident. 
 
 ^ The President considers the right of removal as a fixed, vested, 
 Constitutional right, which Congress cannot limit, control, or quali- 
 
272 
 
 fy, until the Constitution shall be altered. This, Sir, is doctrine 
 which I am not prepared to admit. I shall not now discuss the 
 question, whether the law may not place the tenure of office be- 
 yond the reacli of executive pleasure ; but 1 wish merely to draw 
 the attention of the Senate to the fact, that any such power in 
 Congress is denied by the principles and by the words of the Prot- 
 est. According to that paper, we live under a Constitution, by 
 the provisions of which the public treasures are, necessarily and 
 unavoidably, always under executive control ; and as the Execu- 
 tive may remove all officers, and appoint others, at least tempora- 
 rily, without the concurrence of the Senate, he may hold those 
 treasures, in the hands of persons appointed by himself alone, in 
 defiance of any law which Congress has passed or can pass. It is 
 to be seen, Sir, how far such claims of power will receive the 
 approbation of the country. It is to be seen whether a con- 
 struction will be readily adopted which thus places the public 
 purse out of the guardianship of the immediate representatives of 
 the people. 
 
 But, Sir, there is, in this paper, something even yet more 
 strange than these extraordinary claims of power. There is, Sir, 
 a strong disposition, running through the whole Protest, to repre- 
 sent the Executive Department of this Government as the peculiar 
 protector of the public liberty, the chief security on which the 
 people are to rely against the encroachment of other branches of 
 the Government. ' Nothing can be more manifest than this pur- 
 pose. To this end, the Protest spreads out the President's 
 official oath, reciting all its words in a formal quotation ; and yet 
 the oath of members of Congress is exactly equivalent. The 
 President is to swear that he will " preserve, protect, and defend, 
 the Constitution ; " and members of Congress are to swear that 
 they will " support the Constitution." There are more words in 
 one oath than the other, but the sense is precisely the same. 
 Why, then, this reference to his official oath, and this ostentatious 
 quotation of it ? Would the writer of the Protest argue that the 
 oath itself is any grant of power ; or that, because the President 
 is to " preserve, protect, and defend, the Constitution," he is, 
 therefore, to use what means he pleases, or any means, for such 
 preservation, protection, and defence, except those which the 
 Constitution and laws have specifically given him ? Such an 
 argument would be preposterous ; but if the oath be not cited for 
 this preposterous purpose, with what design is it thus displayed on 
 the face of the Protest, unless it be to support the general idea that 
 the maintenance of the Constitution, and the preservation of the 
 public liberties, are especially confided to the safe discretion, the 
 sure moderation, the paternal guardianship, of executive power ? 
 The oath of the President contains three words, all of equal 
 
273 
 
 import; that is, that he will preserve, protect, and defend, the 
 Constitution. The oath of members of Congress is expressed in 
 shorter phrase : it is, that they Avill support the Constitution. If 
 there be any difference in the meaning of the two oaths, I cannot 
 discern it ; and yet the Protest solemnly and formally argues thus : 
 " The duty of defending, so far as in him lies, the integrity of the 
 Constitution, would, indeed, have resulted from the very nature of 
 his office ; but, by thus expressing it in the official oath or affirma- 
 tion, which, in this respect, differs from that of every other func- 
 tionary, the founders of our republic have attested their sense 
 of its importance, and have given to it a peculiar solemnity and 
 force." 
 
 Sir, I deny the proposition, and I dispute the proof. I deny 
 that the duty of defending the integrity of the Constitution is, in 
 any peculiar sense, confided to the President ; and I deny that 
 the words of his oath furnish any argument to make good that 
 proposition. Be pleased, Sir, to remember against whom it is 
 that the President holds it his peculiar duty to defend the integrity 
 of the Constitution. It is not against external force ; it is not 
 against a foreign foe ; no such thing ; but it is against the repre- 
 sentatives of the yeople and the representatives of the States ! It 
 is against these, that the founders of our republic have imposed 
 on him the duty of defending the integrity of the Constitution — a 
 duty, he says, of the importance of which they have attested their 
 sense, and to which they have given peculiar solemnity and force, 
 by expressing it in his official oath ! 
 
 Let us pause, Sir, and consider this most strange proposidon. 
 The President is the chief Executive Magistrate. He is com- 
 mander-in-chief of the army and navy ; nominates all persons to 
 office ; claims a right to remov^e all at will, and to control all, while 
 yet in office ; dispenses all favors ; and wields the whole patronage 
 of the Government. And the proposition is, that the duty of 
 defending the integrity of the Constitution against the representa- 
 tives of the States, and against the representatives of die people, 
 results to him from the very nature of his office ; and that the 
 founders of our republic have given to this duty, thus confided to 
 him, peculiar solemnity and force ! 
 
 Mr. President, the contest, for ages, has been to rescue Liberty i 
 from the grasp of executive power. Whoever has engaged in 
 her sacred cause, from the days of the downfall of diose great 
 aristocracies, which had stood between the king and the people, 
 to the time of our own independence, has struggled for the accom- 
 plishment of that single object. On the long list of the champions 
 of human freedom, there is not one name dimmed by the reproach 
 of advocating the extension of executive authority : on the con- 
 trary, the uniform and steady purpose of all such champions has 
 VOL. ir. 35 
 
274 
 
 been to limit and restrain it. To this end the spirit of liberty, 
 growing more and more enlightened, and more and more vigorous 
 from age to age, has been battering, for centuries, against the soHd 
 butments of the feudal system. To this end, all that could be 
 gained from the imprudence, snatched from the weakness, or 
 wrung from the necessities, of crowned heads, has been carefully 
 gathered up, secured, and hoarded, as the rich treasures, the very 
 jewels of liberty. To this end, popular and representative right 
 has kept up its warfare against prerogative, with various success ; 
 sometimes writing the history of a whole age in blood ; sometimes 
 witnessing the martyrdom of Sidneys and Russells, often baffled and 
 repulsed, but still gaining, on the whole, and holding what it gained 
 with a grasp which nothing but the complete extinction of its own 
 being could compel it to reHnquish. At length, the great conquest 
 over executive power, in the leading western states of Europe, has 
 been accomplished. The feudal system, like other stupendous 
 fabrics of past ages, is known only by the rubbish which it has left 
 behind it. Crowned heads have been compelled to submit to the 
 restraints of law, and the people, with that intelligence and that 
 spirit which make their voice resistless, have been able to say to 
 prerogative, "Thus far shalt thou come, and no farther." I need 
 hardly say. Sir, that, into the full enjoyment of all which Europe 
 has reached only through such slow and painful steps, we sprang 
 at once, by the declaration of independence, and by the establish- 
 ment of free representative governments; governments borrowing 
 more or less from the models of other free states, but strengthened, 
 secured, improved in their symmetry, and deepened in their foun- 
 dation, by those great men of our own country whose names will 
 be as familiar to future times as if they were written on the arch 
 of the sky. 
 
 Through all this history of the contest for liberty, executive 
 power has been regarded as a lion which must be caged. So far 
 from being the object of enlightened popular trust ; so far from 
 being considered the natural protector of popular right, — it has 
 been dreaded, uniformly, always dreaded, as the great source of 
 its danger. 
 
 And now, Sir, who is he, so ignorant of the history of liberty, 
 at home and abroad ; who is he, yet dwelling, in his contem- 
 plations, among the principles and dogmas of the middle ages ; 
 who is he, from whose bosom all original infusion of American 
 spirit has become so entirely evaporated and exhaled, as that he 
 shall put into the mouth of the President of the United States the 
 doctrine that the defence of liberty naturalJy results to executive 
 power, and is its peculiar duty ? Who is he, that, generous and 
 confiding towards power where it is most dangerous, and jealous 
 only of those who can restrain it ; who is he, that, reversing the 
 
275 
 
 order of tlie state, and up-heaving the base, would poise the 
 pyramid of the political system upon its apex ; who is he, that, 
 overlooking with contempt the guardianship of the representatives 
 of the people, and, with equal contempt, the higher guardianship 
 of the people themselves ; — who is he, that declares to us, through 
 the President's lips, that the security for freedom rests in executive 
 authority ? Who is he that belies the blood and libels the fame 
 of his own ancestors, by declaring that they, with solemnity of 
 form, and force of manner, have invoked the executive power to 
 come to the protection of liberty ? Who is he that thus charges' 
 them with the insanity, or the recklessness, of putting the lamb , 
 beneath the lion's paw ? No, Sir. No, Sir. Our security is in '' 
 our watchfulness of executive power. It was the constitution of 
 this department, which was infinitely the most difficult part in the 
 great work of creating our present Government. To give to the 
 Executive Department such power as should make it useful, and 
 yet not such as should render it dangerous ; to make it efficient, 
 independent, and strong, and yet to prevent it from sweeping away 
 every thing by its union of military and civil authority, by the 
 influence of patronage, and office, and favor ; — this, indeed, was 
 difficult. They who had the work to do, saw the difficulty, and 
 we see it ; and if we would maintain our system, we shall act 
 wisely to that end, by preserving every restraint and every guard 
 which the Constitution has provided. And when we, and those 
 who come after us, have done all that we can do, and all that 
 they can do, it will be well for us and for them, if some popular 
 Executive, by the power of patronage and party, and the power, 
 too, of that very popularity, shall not hereafter prove an over- 
 inatch for all other branches of the Government. 
 
 I do not wish. Sir, to impair the power of the President, as it 
 stands written down in the Constitution, and as great and good men 
 have hitherto exercised it. In this, as in other respects, I am for 
 the Constitution as it is. But I will not acquiesce in the reversal 
 of all just ideas of government ; I will not degrade the character 
 of popular representation ; I will not blindly confide, where all 
 experience admonishes me to be jealous ; I will not trust executive 
 power, vested in the hands of a single magistrate, to keep the 
 vigils of liberty. - ^ 
 
 Having claimed for the Executive the especial guardianship of 
 the Constitution, the Protest proceeds to present a summary view 
 of the powers which are supposed to be conferred on the Executive 
 by that instrument. And it is to this part of the message. Sir, 
 that I would, more than to all otliers, call the particular attention 
 of the Senate. I confess, that it was only upon careful rcpcrusal 
 of the paper, that I perceived the extent to which its assertions of 
 power reach. I do not speak, now, of the President's claims of 
 
276 
 
 power as opposed to legislative authority, but of his opinions as 
 to his own authority, duty, and responsibility, as connected with 
 all other officers under the Government. He is of opinion that 
 the whole executive power is vested in him, and that he is re- 
 sponsible for its entire exercise ; that, among the duties imposed 
 on him, is that of " taking care that the laws be faithfully exe- 
 cuted ;" and that, " being thus made responsible for the entire action 
 of the Executive Department, it was but reasonable that the power 
 of appointing, overseeing, and controlling, those who execute the 
 laws — a power in its nature executive — should remain in his hands. 
 It is, therefore, not only his right, but the Constitution makes it his 
 duty, to ' nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of 
 the Senate, appoint,' all ' officers of the United States whose 
 appointments are not in the Constitution otherwise provided 
 for,' with a proviso that the appointment of inferior officers may 
 be vested in the President alone, in the courts of justice, or in 
 the heads of departments." 
 
 The first proposition, then, which the Protest asserts, in regard 
 to the President's powers, as Executive Magistrate, is, that, the 
 general duty being imposed on him by the Constitution, of taking 
 care that the laws be faithfully executed, he thereby becomes himself 
 ^sponsible for the conduct of every person employed in the Gov- 
 ernment ; " for the entire acfion," as the paper expresses it, "of 
 the Executive Department." This, Sir, is very dangerous logic. 
 I reject the inference altogether. No such responsibility, nor any 
 thing like it, foUovi^s from the general provision of the Constitution, 
 making it his duty to see the laws executed. If it did, we should 
 have, in fact, but one officer in the whole Government. The 
 President would be every body. And the Protest assumes to 
 the President this whole responsibility for every other officer, for 
 the very purpose of making the President every body, of anni- 
 hilating every thing like independence, responsibility, or character, 
 in all other public agents. The whole responsibility is assumed, 
 in order that it may be more plausibly argued, that all officers of 
 Government are, not agents of the law, but the President's agents, 
 and, therefore, responsible to him alone. If he be responsible for 
 the conduct of all officers, and they be responsible to him only, 
 then it may be maintained that such officers are but his own 
 agents, his substitutes, his deputies. The first thing to be done, 
 therefore, is to assume the responsibility for all ; and this, you will 
 perceive, Sir, is done, in the fullest manner, in the passages which 
 1 have read. Having thus assumed for the President the entire 
 responsibility of the whole Government, the Protest advances 
 boldly to its conclusion, and claims, at once, absolute power over 
 all individuals in office, as being merely the President's agents. 
 This is the language : — ■' The whole executive power being vested 
 
277 
 
 in the President, who is responsible for its exercise, it is a neces- 
 sary consequence that he should have a right to employ agents 
 of his own choice, to aid him in the performance of his duties, 
 and to discharge them when he is no longer willing to be respon- 
 sible for their acts." 
 
 This, Sir, completes the work. This handsomely rounds off 
 the whole executive system of executive authority. First, the 
 President has the whole responsibility; and then, being thus 
 responsible for all, he has, and ought to have, the whole power. 
 We have heard of political units, and our American Executive, 
 as here represented, is, indeed, a unit. We have a charmingly 
 simple government ! Instead of many officers, in different de- 
 partments, each having appropriate duties, and each responsible 
 for his own duties, we are so fortunate as to have to deal with but 
 one officer. The President carries on the Government ; all the 
 rest are but sub-contractors. Sir, whatever 7iame we give him, 
 we have but one executive officer. A Briareus sits in the 
 centre of our system, and with his hundred hands touches every 
 thing, moves everything, controls every thing. I ask, Sir, Is this 
 republicanism? Is this a government of laws? Is this legal 
 responsibility ? 
 
 According to the Protest, the very duties which every officer 
 under the Government performs, are the duties of the President 
 himself It says that the President has a right to employ agents 
 of his own choice, to aid him in the performance of his duties. 
 
 Mr. President, if these doctrines be true, it is idle for us any 
 longer to talk about any such thing as a government of laws. We 
 have no government of laws, not even the semblance or shadow 
 of it : we have no legal responsibility. We have an Executive, 
 consisting of one person, wielding all official power, and which is, 
 to every effectual purpose, completely irresponsible. The Pres- 
 ident declares that he is '' responsible for the entire action of the 
 Executive Department." Responsible ? What does he mean by 
 being " responsible ? " Does he mean legal responsibility ? Cer- 
 tainly not. No such thing. Legal responsibility signifies liability 
 to punishment for misconduct or mal-achninistration. But the 
 Protest does not mean that the President is liable to be impeached 
 and punished, if a secretary of state should commit treason, if a 
 collector of the customs should be guilty of bribery, or if a treas- 
 urer should embezzle the public money. It does not mean, and 
 cannot mean, that he should be answerable for any such crime, 
 or such delinquency. What, then, is its notion of that respon- 
 sibility, which it says the President is under for all officers, and 
 which authorizes him to consider all officers as his own personal 
 agents? Sir, it is merely responsibility to public opinion. It is a 
 hability to be blamed ; it is the chance of becoming unpopular, 
 
278 
 
 the danger of losing a reelection. Nothing else is meant in the 
 world. It is the hazard of failing in any attempt or enterprise of 
 ambition. This is all the responsibility to which the doctrines of 
 the Protest hold the President subject. 
 
 It is precisely the responsibility under which Cromwell acted, 
 when he dispersed Parliament, telling its members, not in so many 
 words, indeed, that they disobeyed the will of their constituents, 
 but telling them that the people were sick of them, and that he 
 drove them out " for the glory of God, and the good of the 
 nation." It is precisely the responsibility upon which Bonaparte 
 broke up the popular assembly of France. I do not mean, Sir, 
 certainly, by these illustrations, to insinuate designs of violent 
 usurpations against the President ; far from it ; but I do mean to 
 maintain that such responsibility as that with which the Protest 
 clothes him, is no legal responsibility, no Constitutional respon- 
 sibility, no republican responsibility ; but a mere liability to loss of 
 office, loss of character, and loss of fame, if he shall choose to 
 violate the laws and overturn the liberties of the country. It is 
 such a responsibility as leaves every thing in his discretion, and 
 his pleasure. 
 
 Sir, it exceeds human belief, that any man should put senti- 
 ments such as this paper contains into a public communication 
 from the President to the Senate. They are sentiments which 
 give us all one master. The Protest asserts an absolute right to 
 remove all persons from office at pleasure ; and for what reason ? 
 Because they are incompetent.'' Because they are incapable? 
 Because they are remiss, negligent, or inattentive ? No, Sir ; these 
 are not the reasons. But he may discharge them, one and all, 
 simply because " he is no longer willing to be responsible for their 
 acts ! " It insists on an absolute right in the President to direct 
 and control every act of every officer of the Government, except 
 the judges. It asserts this right of direct control, over and over 
 again. The President may go into the treasury, among the au- 
 ditors and controllers, and direct them how to settle every man's 
 account ; what abatements to make from one, what additions to 
 another. He may go into the custom-house, among collectors 
 and appraisers, and may control estimates, reductions, and ap- 
 praisements. It is true, that these officers are sworn to discharge 
 the duties of their respective offices honestly and fairly, according 
 to their oivn best abilities ; it is true, that many of them are liable 
 to indictment for official misconduct, and others responsible, in 
 suits of individuals, for damages and penalties, if such official mis- 
 conduct be proved ; but, notwithstanding all this, the Protest avers 
 that all these officers are but the Presidenfs agents ; that they are 
 but aiding him in the discharge of his duties ; that he is responsible 
 for their conduct, and that they are removable at his will and 
 
279 
 
 pleasure. And it is under this view of his own authority, that the 
 President calls the Secretaries his Secretaries, not once only, but 
 repeatedly. After half a century's administration of this Govern- 
 ment, Sir ; after we have endeavored, by statute upon statute, and 
 by provision following provision, to define and limit oflicial au- 
 thority ; to assign particular duties to particular public servants ; to 
 define those duties ; to create penalties for their violation ; to adjust, 
 accurately, the responsibility of each agent, with his own powers 
 and his own duties ; to establish the prevalence of equal rule ; to 
 make the law, as far as possible, every thing, and individual will, 
 as far as possible, nothing ; — after all this, the astounding assertion 
 rings in our ears, that, throughout the whole range of official agency, 
 in its smallest ramifications, as well as in its larger masses, there is 
 
 but ONE RESPONSIBILITY, ONE DISCRETION, ONE WILL ! TrUO 
 
 indeed is it, Sir, if these sentiments be maintained, true indeed 
 is it, that a President of the United States may well repeat, 
 from Napoleon, what he repeated from Louis XIV, " I am the 
 State ! " 
 
 The argument by which the writer of the Protest endeavors to 
 establish the President's claim to this vast mass of accumulated 
 authority, is founded on the provision of the Constitution, that the 
 executive power shall be vested in the President. No doubt the 
 executive power is vested in the President ; but what, and how 
 much executive power, and how limited? To this question I 
 should answer, " Look to the Constitution, and see ; examine the 
 particulars of the grant, and learn what that executive power is, 
 which is given to the President, either by express words or by 
 necessary implication." But so the writer of this Protest does 
 not reason. He takes these words of \he Constitution as beings 
 of themselves, a general original grant of all executive power to 
 the President, subject only to such express limitations as the Con- 
 stitution prescribes. This is clearly the writer's view of the subject, 
 unless, indeed, he goes behind the Constitution altogether, as some 
 expressions would intimate, to search, elsewhere, for sources of 
 execudve power. Thus the Protest says, that it is not only the 
 right of the President, but that the Constitution makes it his duty, 
 to appoint persons to office ; as if the right existed before the 
 Constitution had created the diitij. It speaks, too, of the power 
 of removal, not as a powev granted by the Constitution, but ex- 
 pressly as " an original executive power, left unchecked by the 
 Constitution. " How original ? Coming from what source higher 
 than the Constitution ? I should be glad to know how the Pres- 
 ident gets possession of any power by a title earlier, or more 
 original, than the grant of the Constitution ; or what is meant by 
 an original power, which the President possesses, and which the 
 Constitution has left, unchecked, in his hands. The truth is. Sir, 
 
280 
 
 most assuredly, that the writer of the Protest, in these passages, 
 was reasoning upon the British Constitution, and not upon the 
 Constitution of the United States. Indeed, he professes to found 
 himself on authority drawn from the constitution of England. I 
 will read, Sir, the whole passage. It is this : — 
 
 " In strict accordance with this principle, the power of removal, 
 which, like that of appointment, is an original executive power, is 
 left unchecked by the Constitution in relation to all executive 
 officers, for whose conduct the President is responsible ; while it is 
 taken from him in relation to judicial officers, for whose acts he is 
 not responsible. In the government from ivhich many of the fun- 
 damental principles of our system are derived, the head of the ex- 
 ecutive department originally had power to appoint and remove at 
 ivill all officers, executive and judicial. It was to take the judges 
 out of this general power of removal, and thus make them inde- 
 pendent of the Executive, that the tenure of their offices was 
 changed to good behavior. Nor is it conceivable why they are 
 placed, in our Constitution, upon a tenure different from that of 
 all other officers appointed by the Executive, unless it be for the 
 same purpose." 
 
 Mr. President, I do most solemnly protest (if I, too, may be 
 permitted to make a protest) against this mode of reasoning. The 
 analogy between the British constitution and ours, in this respect, 
 is not close enough to guide us safely ; it can only mislead us. It 
 has entirely misled the writer of the Protest. The President is 
 made to argue, upon this subject, as if he had some right anterior 
 to the Constitution, which right is, by that instrument, checked, in 
 some respects, and in other respects is left unchecked ; but which, 
 nevertheless, still derives its being from another source ; just as the 
 British king had, in the early ages of the monarchy, an uncon- 
 trolled right of appointing and removing all officers at pleasure ; 
 but which right, so far as it respects the judges, has since been 
 checked and controlled by act of Parliament ; the right being origin- 
 al and inherent, the checl<: only imposed by law. Sir, I distrust 
 altogether British precedents, authorities, and analogies, on such 
 questions as this. We are not inquiring how far our Constitution 
 has imposed checks on a preexisting authority. We are inquiring 
 what extent of power that Constitution has granted. The grant of 
 power, the whole source of power, as well as the restrictions and 
 limitations which are imposed on it, is made in and by the Consti- 
 tution. It has no other origin. And it is this, Sir, which distin- 
 guishes our system so very widely and materially from the systems 
 of Europe. Our governments are limited governments ; limited 
 in their origin, in their very creation ; limited, because none but 
 
281 
 
 specific powers were ever granted either to any department of 
 government, or to the whole : theirs are limited, whenever lim- 
 ited at all, by reason of restraints, imposed at different times, on 
 governments originally unlimited and despotic. Our American 
 questions, therefore, must be discussed, reasoned on, decided, and 
 settled, on the appropriate principles of our own constitutions, and 
 not by inapplicable precedents, and loose analogies, drawn from 
 foreign states. 
 
 IMr. President, in one of the French comedies, as you know, in 
 which the dullness and prolixity of legal argument is intended to 
 be severely satirized, while the advocate is tediously groping 
 among ancient lore having nothing to do with his case, the judge 
 grows impatient, and at last cries out to him to come doivn to the 
 flood! I really wish, Sir, that the writer of this Protest, since he 
 was discussing matters of the highest importance to us as Amer- 
 icans, and which arise out of our own peculiar Constitution, had 
 kept himself, not only on this side the general deluge, but also on 
 this side the Atlantic. I desire that all the broad waves of that 
 wide sea should continue to roll between us and the influence of 
 those foreign principles and foreign precedents, which he so 
 eagerly adopts. 
 
 In asserting power for an American President, I prefer he should 
 attempt to maintain his assertions on American reasons. I know 
 not, Sir, who the writer was (I wish I did), but, whoever he was, 
 it is manifest that he argues this part of his case, throughout, on 
 the principles of the constitution of England. It is true, that, in 
 England, the king is regarded as the original fountain of all honor 
 and all office; and that anciently, indeed, he possessed all political 
 power of every kind. It is true that this mass of authority, in the 
 history of that government, has been diminished, restrained, and 
 controlled, by charters, by immunities, by grants, and by various 
 modifications, which the friends of liberty have, at different periods, 
 been able to obtain or to impose. All liberty, as we know, all pop- 
 ular privileges, as indeed the word itself imports, were formerly 
 considered as favors and concessions from the monarch. But 
 whenever and wherever civil freedom could get a foothold, and 
 could maintain itself, these favors were turned into rights. Before 
 and during the reigns of the princes of the Stuart family, they 
 were acknowledged only as favors or privileges graciously allowed, 
 although, even then, whenever opportunity offered, as in the in- 
 stance to which I alluded just now, they were contended for as 
 rights ; and by the revolution of 1688, they were acknowledged as 
 rights in England, by the prince who then ascended the throne, 
 and as the condition on which he was allowed to sit upon it. But, 
 with us, there never was a time when we acknowledged original, 
 unrestrained, sovereign power over us. Our constitutions are not 
 VOL. II. 36 
 
282 
 
 made to limit and restrain preexisting authority. They are the 
 instruments by which the people confer power on their own ser- 
 vants If I may use a legal phrase, the people are grantors, not 
 crantees They give to the Government, and to each branch ot 
 it, all the power it possesses, or can possess ; and what is not given 
 they retain. In England, before her revolution and in the rest of 
 Europe since, if we would know the extent of liberty or popular 
 ri-ht we must go to grants, to charters, to allowances, and indul- 
 e;?nces. But with us, we go to grants and to constitutions to learn 
 fhe extent of the powers of Government. No political power is 
 more ori-inal than the Constitution ; none is possessed which is not 
 there granted ; and the grant, and the limitations in the grant, are 
 
 in the same instrument. , , r r< 
 
 The powers, therefore, belonging to any branch of our Govern- 
 ment, are to be construed and settled, not by remote analogies, 
 drawn from other governments, but from the words of the grant 
 itself, in their plain sense and necessary unport, and according to 
 an interpretation consistent with our own history and the spirit ot 
 our own institutions. And I will never agree that a Pi^sident of 
 the United States holds the whole undivided power of office m his 
 own hands, upon the theory that he is responsible for the entire 
 action of the whole body of those engaged in carrying on the Gov- 
 ernment and executing the laws. Such a responsibility is purely 
 ideal, delusive, and vain. There is, there can be, no substantial 
 responsibility, any further than every indlvidualis answerable not 
 merely in his reputation, not merely in the opinion ot mankind, 
 but xothe law, for the f\uthful discharge of his own appropriate 
 duties. Again and again we hear it said that the President is re- 
 sponsible to the American people ! that he is responsible to the bar 
 of public opinion! For whatever he does, he assumes account- 
 ability to the American people ! For whatever he omits he ex- 
 pects to be brought to the high bar of public opinion ! And tins 
 is thoudit enough for a limited, restrained, republican govern- 
 ment! an undefined, undefinable, ideal responsibility to the public 
 iuda-ment ! Sir, if all this mean any thing, if it be not empty sound, 
 it ineans no less than that the President may do any thmg and every 
 thing which he may expect to be tolerated in doing. He may go 
 lUst so far as he thinks it safe to go; and Cromwell and Bonaparte 
 went no farther. I ask again, Sir, Is this legal responsibility? Is 
 this the true nature of a government with written laws and limited 
 powers ? And allow me. Sir, to ask, too, if an executive magistrate, 
 while professing to act under the Constitution, is restrained only 
 by this responsibility to public opinion, what prevents him, on the 
 same responsibility, from proposing a change in that Constitution? 
 Why may he not say, "I am about to introduce new forms, new 
 principles, and with a new spirit; 1 am about to try a political 
 
283 
 
 experiment, on a great scale ; and when I get through with it, I 
 shall be responsible to the American people, 1 shall be answerable 
 to the bar of public opinion ?" 
 
 Connected, Sir, with the idea of this airy and unreal responsi- 
 bility to the public, is another sentiment, which, of late, we hear 
 frequently expressed ; and that is, that the President is the direct 
 representative of the American people. This is declared, in the 
 Protest, in so many words : " The President," says the Protest, 
 " is the direct representative of the American peojyJe.^' Now, 
 Sir, this is not the language of the Constitution. The Constitution 
 nowhere calls him the representative of the American people; still 
 less their direct representative. It could not do so with the least 
 propriety. He is not chosen directly by the people, but by a body 
 of electors, some of whom are chosen by the people, and some of 
 whom are appointed by the State Legislatures. Where, then, is 
 the authority for saying that the President is the direct representa- 
 tive of the people ? The Constitution calls the members of the 
 other House, Representatives, and declares that they shall be 
 chosen by the people ; and there are no other direct or immediate 
 representatives of the people in this Government. The Constitu- 
 tion denominates the President simply the President of the United 
 States ; it points out the complex mode of electing him, defines 
 his powers and duties, and imposes limits and restraints on his au- 
 thority. With these powers and duties, and under these restraints, 
 he becomes, when chosen, President of the United States. That 
 is his character, and the denomination of his office. How is it, 
 then, that, on this official character, thus cautiously created, hmited, 
 and defined, he is to engraft another, and a very imposing charac- 
 ter, viz. the character of the direct representative of the Ameri- 
 can people'} I hold this, Sir, to be mere assumption, and dan- 
 gerous assumption. If he is the representative of cdl the American 
 people, he is the only representative which they all have. No- 
 body else presumes to represent all the people. And if he may be 
 allowed to consider himself as the sole representative of 
 ALL THE American people, and is to act under no other re- 
 sponsibility than such as I have already described, then I say, Sir, 
 that the Government (I will not say the people) has already a 
 master. I deny the sentiment, therefore, and I protest against the 
 language ; neither the sentiment nor the language is to be found in 
 the Coasfitution of the country ; and whosoever is not satisfied to 
 describe the powers of the President in the language of the Con- 
 stitution, may be justly suspected of being as litde satisfied with 
 the powers themselves. The President is President. His office 
 and his name of office are known, and both are fixed and describ- 
 ed by law. Being commander of the army and navy, holding the 
 power of nominadng to office and removing from office, and being, 
 
284 
 
 by these powers, the fountain of all patronage and all favor, what 
 does he not become if he be allowed to superadd to all this the 
 character of single representative of the American people ? Sir, 
 he becomes, what America has not been accustomed to see, 
 what this Constitution has never created, and what I cannot con- 
 template, but with profound alarm. He who may call himself the 
 single representative of a nation, may speak in the name of the 
 nation ; may undertake to wield the power of the nation ; and who 
 shall gainsay him, in whatsoever he chooses to pronounce as the 
 nation's will? 
 
 I will now. Sir, ask leave to recapitulate the general doctrines 
 of this Protest, and to present them together. They are — 
 
 That neither branch of the Legislature can take up, or con- 
 sider, for the purpose of censure, any official act of the President, 
 without some view to legislation or impeachment ; 
 
 That not only the passage, but the discussion of the resolution 
 of the Senate of the 28th of March, was unauthorized by the Con- 
 stitution, and repugnant to its provisions ; 
 
 That the custody of the public treasury always must be intrust- 
 ed to the Executive ; that Congress cannot take it out of his hands, 
 nor place it any wliere, except with such superintendents and 
 keepers as are appointed by him, responsible to him, and remov- 
 able at his will ; 
 
 That tlie whole executive power is in the President, and that, 
 therefore, the duty of defending the integrity of the Constitution 
 results to Mm from the very nature oi his office; and that the 
 founders of our republic have attested their sense of the importance 
 of this duty, and, by expressing it in his official oath, have given to 
 it peculiar solemnity and force ; 
 
 That, as he is to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, 
 he is thereby made responsible for the entire action of the Execu- 
 tive Department, with power of appointing, overseeing, and control- 
 ling, those who execute the laws ; 
 
 That the power of removal from office, like that of appointment, 
 is an original executive power, and is left in his hands, tmchecked 
 by the Constitution, except in the case of judges ; that, being re- 
 sponsible for the exercise of the whole executive power, he has a 
 right to employ agents of his own choice to assist him in the per- 
 formance of his duties, and to discharge them when he is no longer 
 willing to be responsible for their acts ; 
 
 That the Secretaries are his Secretaries, and all persons appoint- 
 ed to offices created by law, except the judges, his agents, respon- 
 sible to him, and removable at his pleasure ; 
 
 And, finally, diat he is the direct representative of the American 
 people. 
 
 These, Sir, are some of the leading propositions, contained in 
 
285 
 
 the Protest ; and If they be true, then the Government under which 
 we hve is an elective monarchy. It is not yet absolute ; there are 
 yet some checks and limitations in the Constitution and laws ; but, 
 in its essential and prevailing character, it is an elective monarchy. 
 Mr. President, I have spoken freely of this Protest, and of the 
 doctrines which it advances ; but I have said nothing which I do 
 not believe. On these high questions of Constitutional law, re- 
 spect for my own character, as well as a solemn and profound 
 sense of duty, restrains me from giving utterance to a single sen- 
 timent which does not flow from entire conviction. I feel that I 
 am not wrong. I feel that an inborn and inbred love of Constitu- 
 tional liberty, and some study of our political institutions, have not 
 on this occasion misled me. But I have desired to say nothing 
 that should give pain to the Chief Magistrate, personally. I have 
 not sought to fix arrows in his breast ; but I believe him mistaken, 
 altogether mistaken, in the sentiments which he has expressed ; 
 and I must concur with others in placing on the records of the 
 Senate my disapprobation of those sentiments. On a vote, which 
 is to remain so long as any proceeding of the Senate shall last, and 
 on a question which can never cease to be important while the 
 Constitution of the country endures, I have desired to make pub- 
 lic my reasons. They will now be known, and I submit them to 
 the judgment of the present and of after times. Sir, the occasion 
 is full of interest. It cannot pass off without leaving strong im- 
 pressions on the character of public men. A collision has taken 
 place, which I could have niost anxiously wished to avoid ; but it 
 was not to be shunned. We have not sought this controversy ; it 
 has met us, and been forced upon us. In my judgment, the law 
 has been disregarded, and the Constitution ti'ansgressed ; the for- 
 tress of liberty has been assaulted, and circumstances have placed 
 the Senate in the breach; and, although we may perish in it, I 
 know we shall not fly from it. But I am fearless of consequences. 
 We shall hold on. Sir, and hold out, till the people themselves 
 come to its defence. We shall raise the alarm, and maintain the 
 post, till they, whose right it is, shall decide whether the Senate 
 be a faction, wantonly resisting lawful power, or whether it be op- 
 posing, with firmness and patriotism, violations of liberty and in- 
 roads upon the Constitution. 
 
REMARKS, 
 
 ON DIFFERENT OCCASIONS, ON THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITS, 
 AND ON THE SUBJECT OF A NATIONAL BANK, DELIVERED IN 
 THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY AND FEB- 
 RUARY, 1834 
 
 On the 20th of January, Mr. Webster presented the following resolutions 
 passed at a meeting in Boston : — 
 
 1. Resolved, as the sense of this meeting, That the business commu- 
 nity of this city, vicinity, and commonwealth, are in a high state of 
 prosperity, independently of those embarrassments in the money market, 
 consequent upon the deranged state of the financial and banking opera- 
 tions of the country. 
 
 2. Resolved, That all the great branches of industry throughout the 
 Union have, for three years past, been in a highly-prosperous condition, 
 till within the period of a few months. 
 
 3. Resolved, That the products of agriculture have been unusually 
 abundant the past year ; that prices at home and abroad are higher than 
 usual, and likely to be maintained under the ordinary circumstances of 
 the money market. 
 
 4. Resolved, That the currency, issued by the banks of this State, 
 inasmuch as their notes in circulation are not more than one fourth of 
 their capitals, and the securities for their loans being deemed good, is in 
 a sound condition. 
 
 5. Resolved, That the currency of the Union at large is also in a safe 
 and sound state, and that any sudden and undue contraction of bank 
 issues, which may have been lately made, has principally arisen, not 
 from over-issues of paper, but from the disturbed state of our financial 
 and money concerns, incident to the altered condition of the National 
 Bank. 
 
 6. Resolved, That there is the usual quantity of specie in the country, 
 and that, foreign exchanges being greatly in our favor, there is no reason 
 to apprehend any drain of the precious metals ; but, on the contrary, we 
 may naturally look for an influx of them. 
 
 7. Resolved, That the local banks now employed by Government, 
 however well disposed to accommodate the public, cannot, with their 
 small capitals, limited credit, and scattered resources, and, above all, 
 their entire want of concert and unity of action, afford tliat aid to the 
 agricultural classes, in the transmission of their products, from the places 
 of growth to the places of export and distribution, which they have here- 
 tofore received from the National Bank, but which is now, in part, neces- 
 sarily withdrawn from them by that institution, in consequence of its 
 -change of position in regard to the Government. 
 
287 
 
 8. Resolved, That the evils arising from the scarcity and high price of 
 money fall with most severity on the industrious and middling classes of 
 society, who are compelled to make sacrifices of property to provide 
 for their daily payments, while the retired capitalists are not oidy 
 exempt from such a loss, but derive a benefit from the increased value 
 of money. 
 
 9. Resolved, That a continuance of the existing" embarrassments in 
 business, arising from the deranged state of our money concerns, will not 
 only check the future operations of the farmer, merchant, manufacturer, 
 and mechanic, and consequently lessen the employment and wages of 
 the laborer, but will also prove extremely injurious to those great and 
 useful internal improvements, which must soon be arrested in their prog- 
 ress, if the pressure on the money market is not relieved ; and that all 
 property noAv in existence will become depreciated to a degree that may 
 prove utterly ruinous to a portion of the most enterprising and useful 
 members of the community. 
 
 10. Resolved, That the amount of currency necessary to effect the 
 ordinary payments in business, though utterly insignificant compared 
 with the wealth of the nation, yet, when viewed as the measure of value 
 of every species of property, as the basis of all contracts, and the medium 
 by which the constant interchanges of property are made, must be con- 
 sidered of immense importance ; and that any sudden and undue expan- 
 sion or contraction of the amount required for the ordinary wants of the 
 country, from whatever causes it may proceed, will necessarily tend to 
 the most calamitous results. 
 
 11. Resolved, That the existing embarrassments and panic among all 
 classes of the business community, and which threaten, if not soon 
 remedied, the most serious evils, may be attributed, first, to a spirit of 
 speculation and over-trading — the usual effects of long-continued pros- 
 perity ; and, secondly, to the transferring tlie collection of the national 
 revenue from the National Bank to the State banks, and thereby paraly- 
 zing, in some degree, tlie action of that institution, by whose large cap- 
 ital, solid credit, and extensive resources, the business operations of the 
 whole country have been sustained and promoted. 
 
 12. Resolved, That, in the opinion of this meeting, a restoration of the 
 National Bank to the relation in which it stood to the Government prior 
 to the removal of the deposits, and allowing the public moneys already 
 in possession of the local banks to remain there, till required by the Gov- 
 ernment, would, in a great measure, relieve the country from the embar- 
 rassments arising from a scarcity and derangement of currency, and, 
 above all, allay that distrust, agitation, and alarm, which is more difficult 
 to overcome, and more dangerous in its tendencies if not overcome, than 
 tlie actual inconveniences and losses usually incident to an insufficient 
 or deranged currency. 
 
 13. Resolved, That, whatever course may be adopted by Congress, in 
 relation to matters now m dispute between the Government and the Na- 
 tional Bank, it is of vital importance to the great interests of the nation 
 that there should be a prompt decision, so necessary for the refistablish- 
 ment of that confidence throughout the whole country, which has been 
 greatly impaired by the uncertain and unsettled state of our financial and 
 money concerns. 
 
 14. Resolved, That the foregoing resolutions have no relation to any 
 party or political purposes, beyond the direct object manifest on the face 
 of them ; that the meeting comprises persons of all classes and profes- 
 sions, entertaining various and opposite opinions upon the question of 
 
288 
 
 rechartering the existing National Bank, or of chartering a new one in 
 lieu of it ; that few of them have any pecuniary interest involved in tlic 
 fate of that institution ; that they have met together, on this occasion, as 
 citizens, having one common end in view, and with no other purpose or 
 desire tlian to aid in the reestablishment of that credit and contidence, 
 among all classes, so essential to our present safety and our future pros- 
 perity. 
 
 15. Resolved, That a copy of the foregoing resolutions be transmitted, 
 by the Chairman of this meeting, to each of the Senators and Repre- 
 sentatives of this State in Congress, as expressive of the opinions and feel- 
 ing of a portion of their constituents upon tlie important matters therein 
 referred to, and earnestly requesting them to use their best exertions 
 to eftect the objects which this meeting lias in view ; and that they also 
 be i-equested to lay a copy of the same before both branches of our Na- 
 tional Legislature. 
 
 16. Resolved, That a committee, consisting of Henry Lee, George 
 Bond, Jonas B. Brown, Henry F. Baker, James T. Austin, George Dar- 
 racott, and Charles Wells, be appointed to take such other measures, in 
 furtherance of the object of this meeting, as they shall deem proper and 
 expedient. 
 
 CHARLES WELLS, Chairman. 
 Henry F. Baker, } c, . • 
 
 TJx-^,T.,,T.r T" Tf^J^^ } /secretaries. 
 JjENJAMiN 1 . Reed, ^ 
 
 The resolutions having been read by the Secretary of the Senate, — 
 
 Mr, Webster said, he wished to bear unequivocal and de- 
 cided testimony to the respectabihty, intelligence, and disinterest- 
 edness, of the long list of gentlemen at whose instance this meeting 
 was assembled. The meeting. Sir, was connected with no party 
 purpose whatever. It had an object more sober, more cogent, 
 more interesting to the whole community, than mere party ques- 
 tions. The Senate will perceive, in the tone of these resolutions, 
 no intent to exaggerate or inflame ; no disposition to get up ex- 
 citement or to spread alarm. I hope the restrained and serious 
 manner, the moderation of temper, and the exemplary candor of 
 these resolutions, in connection with the plain truths which they 
 contain, will give them just weight with the Senate. I assure you, 
 Sir, the members composing this meeting were neither capitalists, 
 nor speculators, nor alarmists. They are merchants, traders, me- 
 chanics, artisans, and others engaged in the active business of life. 
 They are of the muscular portion of society ; and they desire to 
 lay before Congress an evil, which they feel to press sorely on 
 their occupations, their earnings, their labor, and their property ; 
 and to express their conscientious conviction of the causes of that 
 evil. If intelligence ; if pure intention ; if deep and wide-spread 
 connection with business in its various branches ,• if thorough practi- 
 cal knowledge and experience ; if inseparable union between their 
 own prosperity and the prosperity of the whole country, — authorize 
 men to speak, and give them a right to be heard, the sentiments of 
 
289 
 
 this meeting ought to make an impression. For one, Sir, I entirely 
 concur in all their opinions. I adopt their first fourteen resolutions, 
 without alteration or qualification, as setting forth truly the present 
 state of things, stating ti'uly its causes, and pointing to the true 
 remedy. 
 
 Mr. President, now that I am speaking, I will use the opportu- 
 nity to say a few words, which I intended to say in the course of the 
 morning, on the coming up of the resolution which now lies on the 
 table ; but which are as applicable to this occasion as to that. 
 
 An opportunity may, perhaps, be hereafter afforded me of dis- 
 cussing the reasons given by the Secretary for the very important 
 measure adopted by him in removing the deposits. But as I 
 know not how near that time may be, I desire, in the mean while, 
 to make my opinions known, without reserve, on the present state 
 of the country. Without intending to discuss any thing at present, 
 I feel it my duty, nevertheless, to let my sentiments and my con- 
 victions be understood. In the first place, then, Sir, I agree with 
 those who think that there is a severe pressure in the money mar- 
 ket, and very serious embarrassment felt in all branches of the na- 
 tional industry. I think this is not local, but general — general, at 
 least, over every part of the country where the cause has yet begun 
 to operate, and sure to become not only general, but universal, as 
 the operation of the cause shall spread. If evidence be wanted, in 
 addition to all that is told us by those who know, the high rate of 
 interest, — now at twelve per cent, or higher, where it was hardly six 
 last September, — the depression of all stocks, some ten, some twenty, 
 some thirty per cent., and the low prices of commodities, are proofs 
 abundantly sufticient to show the existence of the pressure. But, 
 Sir, labor, that most extensive of all interests, — American manual 
 labor, — feels, or will feel, the shock more sensibly, far more sensibly, 
 than capital, or property of any kind. Public works have stopped, or 
 must stop ; great private undertakings, employing many hands, have 
 ceased, and others must cease. A great lowering of the rates of wages, 
 as well as a depreciation of property, is the inevitable consequence 
 of causes now in full operation. Serious embarrassments in all 
 branches of business do certainly exist. 
 
 I am of opinion, therefore, that there is, undoubtedly, a very 
 severe pressure on the community, which Congress ought to re- 
 lieve, if it can ; and that this pressure is not an instance of the ordi- 
 nary reaction, or the ebbing and flowing of commercial affairs, 
 but is an extraordinary case, produced by an extraordinary cause. 
 
 In the next place, Sir, I agree entirely with the 11th Boston 
 resolution, as to the causes of this embarrassment. We were in a 
 state of high prosperity, commercial and agricultural. Every branch 
 of busmess was pushed far, and the credit as well as the capital of 
 the country employed to near its utmost limits. In this state of 
 VOL. 11. 37 
 
290 
 
 things, some degree of overtrading doubtless took place, which, 
 however, if nothing else had occurred, would have been seasonably 
 corrected by the ordinary and necessary operation of things. But 
 on this palmy state of things the late measure of the Secretary fell, 
 and has acted on it with powerful and lamentable effect. 
 
 And I think, Sir, that such a cause is entirely adequate to pro- 
 duce the effect, that it is wholly natural, and that it ought to have 
 been foreseen that it would produce exactly such consequences. 
 Those must have looked at the surface of things only, as it seems 
 to me, who thought otherwise, and who expected that such an 
 operation could be gone through with without producing a very 
 serious shock. 
 
 The Treasury, in a very short time, has withdrawn from the 
 Bank 8,000,000 dollars, within a fraction. This call, of course, 
 the Bank has been obliged to provide for, and could not provide 
 for without more or less inconvenience to the public. The mere 
 withdrawing of so large a sum from hands actually holding and 
 using it, and the transferring of it, through the Bank collecting, and 
 through another bank loaning it, if it can loan it, into other hands, 
 is itself an operation which, if conducted suddenly, must produce 
 considerable inconvenience. And this is all that the Secretary 
 seems to have anticipated. But this is not the one hundredth part 
 of the whole evil. The great evil arises from the new attitude in 
 which the Government places itself towards the Bank. Every 
 thing is now in a false position. The Government, the Bank of 
 the United States, the State banks, are all out of place. They 
 are deranged and separated, and jostling against each other. In- 
 stead of amity, rehance, and mutual succor, relations of jealousy, 
 of distrust, of hostihty even, are springing up between these parties. 
 All act on the defensive : each looks out for itself; and the public 
 interest is crushed between the upper and the nether millstone. 
 All this should have been foreseen. It is idle to say that these 
 evils might have been prevented by the Bank, if it had exerted 
 itself to prevent them. That is a mere matter of opinion : it may 
 be true, or it may not ; but it was the business of those who pro- 
 posed the removal of the deposits to ask themselves how it was 
 probable the Bank would act, when they should attack it, assail 
 its credit, and allege the violation by it of its charter ; and thus 
 compel it to take an attitude, at least, of stern defence. The com- 
 munity have certainly a right to hold those answerable who have 
 unnecessarily got into this quarrel with the Bank, and thereby oc- 
 casioned the evil, let the conduct of the Bank, in the course of the 
 controversy, be what it may. 
 
 In my opinion, Sir, the great source of the evil is the shock 
 which the measure has given to confidence in the commercial world. 
 The credit of the whole system of the currency of the country 
 
291 
 
 seems shaken. The State banks have lost credit, and lost confi- 
 dence. They have suffered vastly more than the Bank of the 
 United States itself, at which the blow was aimed. 
 
 The derangement of internal exchanges is one of the most dis- 
 astrous consequences of the measure. By the origin of its charter, 
 by its unquestioned solidity, by the fact that it was at home every 
 U'here, and in perfect credit every w4iere, the Bank of the United 
 States accomplished the internal exchanges of the country with 
 vast facility, and at an unprecedented cheap rate. The State banks 
 can never perform this equally well ; for the reason given in the 
 Boston resolutions, they cannot act with the same concert, the 
 same identity of purpose. Look at the prices current, and see 
 the change in the value of the notes of distant banks in the great 
 cities. Look at the depression of the stocks of the State banks, 
 deposit banks and all. Look at what must happen the mo- 
 ment the Bank of the United States, in its process of winding up, 
 or to meet any other crisis, shall cease to buy domesuc bills, espe- 
 cially in the southern, south-western, and western markets. Can 
 any man doubt what will be the state of exchange when that takes 
 place .'' Or can any one doubt its necessary effect upon the price 
 of produce ? The Bank has purchased bills to the amount of sixty 
 millions a year, as appears by documents heretofore laid before the 
 Senate. A great portion of these, no doubt, was purchased in the 
 South and West, against shipments of the great staples of those 
 quarters of the country. Such is the course of trade. The prod- 
 uce of the South-west and the South is shipped to the North and 
 the East for sale, and those who ship it draw bills on those to whom 
 it is shipped ; and these bills are bought and discounted, or cashed 
 by the Bank. When the Bank shall cease to buy, as it must 
 cease, consequences cannot but be felt much severer even than 
 those now experienced. This is inevitable. But, Sir, 1 go no 
 farther into particular statements. My opinion, I repeat, is, that 
 the present distress is immediately occasioned, beyond all doubt, 
 by the removal of the deposits ; and that just such consequences 
 might have been, and ought to have been, foreseen from that meas- 
 ure, as we do now perceive and feel around us. 
 
 Sir, I do not believe, nevertheless, that these consequences were 
 foreseen. With such foresight, the deposits, I think, would not 
 have been touched. The measure has operated more deeply and 
 more widely than was expected. We all may find proof of diis in 
 the conversafions of every hour. No one, who seeks to acquaint 
 himself with the opinions of men, in and out of Congress, can doubt 
 that, if the act were now to be done, it would receive very litde 
 encouragement or support. 
 
 Being of opinion that the removal of the deposits has produced 
 the pressure, as its immediate effect, not so much by withdrawing 
 
292 
 
 a large sum of money from circulation, as by alarming the confi- 
 dence of the community, by breaking in on the well-adjusted rela- 
 tions of the Government and the Bank, I agree again with the 
 Boston resolutions, that the natural remedy is a restoration of the 
 relation in which the Bank has heretofore stood to Government. 
 
 I agree, Sir, that this question ought to be settled, and to be settled 
 soon. And yet, if it be decided that the present state of things 
 shall exist — if it be the determination of Congress to do nothing in 
 order to put an end to tlie unnatural, distrustful, half-belfigerent, 
 present condition of the Government and the Bank — I do not look 
 for any great relief to the community, or any early quieting of the 
 public agitation. On the contrary, I expect increased difficulty 
 and increased disquiet. 
 
 The public moneys are now out of the Bank of the United 
 States. There is no law regulating their custody, or fixing their 
 place. They are at the disposal of the Secretary of the Treasury, 
 to be kept where he pleases, as he pleases, and the places of their 
 custody to be changed as often as he pleases. 
 
 Now, Sir, I do not think this is a state of things in which the 
 country is likely to acquiesce. 
 
 Mr. President, the restoration of the deposits is a question dis- 
 tinct and by itself. It does not necessarily involve any other 
 question. It stands clear of all controversy and all opinion about 
 rechartering the Bank, or creating any new bank. 
 
 But I wish, nevertheless. Sir, to say a few words of a bearing 
 somewhat beyond that question. Being of opinion that the country 
 is not likely to be satisfied with the present state of things, I have 
 looked earnestly for the suggestion of some prospective measure — 
 some system to be adopted as the future policy of the country. 
 Where are the public moneys hereafter to be kept ? In what cur- 
 rency is the revenue hereafter to be collected ? What is to take the 
 place of the Bank in our general system ? How are we to preserve 
 a uniform currency, a uniform measure of the value of property 
 and the value of labor, a uniform medium of exchange and of pay- 
 ments ? How are we to exercise that salutary control over the 
 national currency, which it was the unquestionable purpose of the 
 Constitution to devolve on Congress ? 
 
 These, Sir, appear to me to be the momentous questions before 
 us, and which we cannot long keep out of view. In these ques- 
 tions every man in the community, who either has a dollar, or ex- 
 pects to earn one, has a direct interest. 
 
 Now, Sir, I have heard but four suggestions, or opinions, as to 
 what may hereafter be expected or attempted. 
 
 The first is, that things will remain as they are — the Bank be 
 suffered to expire, no new bank created, and the whole subject 
 left under the control of the Executive Department. 
 
293 
 
 I have already said that I do not beheve the country will ever 
 acquiesce in this. 
 
 The second suggestion is that which was made by the honorable 
 member from Virginia [iNIr. Rives]. That honorable member 
 pledges himself to bring forward a proposition, having for its object 
 to do away with the paper system altogether, and to return to an 
 entire metallic currency. 
 
 I do not expect, Sir, that the honorable member will find much 
 support in such an undertaking. A mere gold and silver cur- 
 rency, and the entire abolition of paper, is not suited to the times. 
 The idea has something a little too antique, too Spartan, in ft ; we 
 might as well think of going to iron at once. If such a result as 
 the gentleman hopes for were even desirable, I regard its attain- 
 ment as utterly impracticable and hopeless. I lay that scheme, 
 therefore, out of my contemplation. 
 
 There is, then, Sir, the rechaitering of the present Bank ; and, 
 lasdy, there is the establishment of a new bank. The first of these 
 received the sanction of the last Congress, but the measure was 
 negatived by the President. The other, the creation of a new bank, 
 has not been brought forward in Congress, but it has excited attention 
 out of doors, and has been proposed in some of the State Legisla- 
 tures. I observe, Sir, that a proposition has been submitted for 
 consideration, by a very intelligent gentleman in the Legislature of 
 Massachusetts, recommending the establishment of a new bank, 
 with the following provisions : — 
 
 " L The capital stock to be fifty millions of dollars. 
 
 " 2. The stockholders of the present United States Bank to be 
 permitted to subscribe an amount equal to the stock they now hold. 
 
 " 3. The United States to be stockholders to the same extent they 
 now are, and to appoint the same number of directors. 
 
 "4. The subscription to the remaining fifteen millions to be dis- 
 tributed to the several States in proportion to federal numbers, or 
 in some other just and equal ratio ; the instalments payable either in 
 cash or in funded stock of the State, bearing interest at five per cent. 
 
 "5. No branch of the bank to be established in any State, unless 
 by permission of its Legislature. 
 
 " 6. The branches of the bank established in the several States 
 to be liable to taxation by those States, respectively, in the same 
 manner and to the same extent only with their own banks. 
 
 " 7. Such States as may become subscribers to the stock to have 
 the right of appointing a certain number, not exceeding one third, 
 of the directors in the branch of their own State. 
 
 " 8. Stock not subscribed for under the foregoing provisions to 
 be open to subscription by individual citizens." 
 
 A project not altogether dissimilar has been started in the Le- 
 gislature of Pennsylvania. These proceedings show, at least, a 
 
294 
 
 conviction of the necessity of some bank created by Congress. Mr. 
 President, on this subject I have no doubt whatever. I think a 
 national bank proper and necessary. I believe it to be the only 
 practicable remedy for the evils we feel, and the only effectual 
 security against the greater evils which we fear. Not, Sir, that 
 there is any magic in the name of a bank ; nor that a national 
 bank works by any miracle or mystery. But, looking to the state 
 of things actually existing around us — looking to the great number 
 of State banks already created, not less than three hundred and 
 fifty, or four hundred — looking to the vast amount of paper issued 
 by "those banks, and considering that, in the very nature of things, 
 this paper must be limited and local in its credit and in its circula- 
 tion — I confess I see nothing but a well-conducted national institu- 
 tion which is likely to afford any guard against excessive paper 
 issues, or which can furnish a sound and uniform cui'rency to eveiy 
 part of the United States. This, Sir, is not only a question of 
 finance, it not only respects the operations of the Treasury, but it 
 rises to the character of a high political question. It respects the 
 currency, the actual money, the measure of value of all property 
 and all labor in the United States. If we needed not a dollar of 
 money in the Treasury, it would still be our solemn and bounden 
 duty to protect this great interest. It respects the exercise of one 
 of the greatest powers, beyond all doubt, conferred on Congress by 
 the Constitution. And I hardly know any thing less consistent 
 with our public duty, and our high trust, nor any thing more likely 
 to disturb the harmonious relations of the States, in all affairs of 
 business and life, than for Congress to abandon all care and control 
 over the currency, and to throw the whole money system of the 
 country into the hands of four-and-twenty State Legislatures. 
 
 I am, then. Sir, for a bank ; and am fully persuaded that to that 
 measure the country must come at last. 
 
 The quesdon, then, is between the creadon of a new bank, and 
 the rechartering of the present Bank, ivith modifications. I have 
 already referred to the scheme for a new bank, proposed to the 
 Legislature of Massachusetts by Mr. White. Between such a new 
 bank as his propositions would create, and a rechartering of the 
 present Bank, with modifications, there is no very wide, certainly 
 no irreconcilable difference. We cannot, however, create another 
 bank before March, 183G. This is one reason ibr preferring a 
 continuance of the present. And, treaung the subject as a prac- 
 tical question, and looking to the state of opinion, and to the prob- 
 ability of success, in either attempt,! incline to the opinion that 
 the true course of policy is to propose a recharter of the present 
 Bank, ivith modifications. 
 
 As to what these modifications should be, I would only now 
 observe, that, while it may well be inferred, from my known senti- 
 ments, that I should not myself deem any alterations in the char- 
 
295 
 
 ter, beyond those proposed by the bill of 1832, highly essential, 
 yet it is a case in which, I am aware, nothing can be effected for 
 the good of the country, without making some approaches to unity 
 of opinion. I think, therefore, that, in the hope of accomplishing 
 an object of so much importance, liberal concessions should be 
 made. I lay out of the case all consideration of any especial 
 claim, or any legal right, of the present stockholders to a renewal 
 of their charter. No such right can be pretended ; doubtless none 
 such is pretended. The stockholders must stand like other indi- 
 viduals, and their interest regarded so far, and so far only, as may 
 be judged for the public good. Modifications of the present char 
 ter should, I think, be proposed, such as may remove all reasona 
 ble grounds of jealousy, in all quarters, whether in States, in othei 
 institutions, or in individuals ; such, too, as may tend to reconcile 
 the interests of the great city where the Bank is, with those 
 of another great city ; and, in short, the question should be 
 met with a sincere disposition to accomplish, by united and 
 friendly counsels, a measure which shall allay fears and promote 
 confidence, at the same time that it secures to the country a 
 sound, creditable, uniform currency, and to the Government a safe 
 deposit for the public treasure, and an important auxiliary in its 
 financial operations. 
 
 I repeat, then, Sir, that I am in favor of renewing the charter 
 of the present Bank, with such alterations as may be expected to 
 meet the general sense of the country. 
 
 And now, Mr. President, to avoid all unfounded inferences, I 
 wish to say, that these suggestions are to be regarded as wholly 
 my own. They are made without the knowledge of the Bank, 
 and with no understanding or concert with any of its friends. I 
 have not understood, indeed, that the Bank itself proposes to ap- 
 ply, at present, for a renewal of its charter. Whether it does so 
 or not, my suggestions are connected with no such or any other 
 purpose of the Bank. I take up the subject on public grounds, 
 purely and exclusively. 
 
 And, Sir, in order to repel all inferences of another sort, I wish 
 to state, with equal distinctness, that I do not undertake to speak 
 the sentiments of any individual heretofore opposed to the Bank, or 
 belonging to that class of public men who have generally opposed it. 
 I state my own opinions : if others should concur in them, it will 
 be only because they approve them, and will not be the result of 
 any previous concert or understanding whatever. 
 
 Finally, Mr. President, having stated my own opinions, I re- 
 spectfully ask those who propose to continue the discussion now 
 going on, relative to the deposits, to let the country see their plan 
 for the final settlement of the present difficulties. If they are 
 against the Bank, and against all banks, what do they propose 7 
 
296 
 
 That the countiy will not be satisfied with the present state of 
 things, seems to be certain. What state of things is to succeed it ? 
 To these questions I desire to call, earnestly, the attention of the 
 Senate and of the country. The occasion is critical, the interests 
 at stake momentous, and, in my judgment. Congress ought not to 
 adjourn till it shall have passed some law suitable to the exigency, 
 and satisfactory to the country. 
 
 On the 30th day of January, Mr. Wright, of New York, presented to the 
 Senate sundry resolutions, passed by the Legislature of New York, approving 
 the removal of the deposits, and disapproving of any bank of the United States. 
 
 In presenting these resolutions, Mr. Wright, among other observations, ex- 
 pressed his decided hostility to the renewal of the charter of the present Bank, 
 or the creation of any other ; that he would oppose this Bank upon the ground 
 of its flagrant violations of the high trusts confided to it, but that his objections 
 were of a still deeper and graver character ; that he went against this Bank, 
 and against any and every bank to be incorporated by Congress, to be located 
 any where within the twenty-four States. He expressed a strong opinion, too, 
 that the existing distress arose from the conduct of the Bank in curtailing its 
 loans ; and that this curtailment had been made with a view to extort a renewal 
 of its charter from the fears of the people. 
 
 As to ichat teas to be done, under present circumstances, in order to relieve the 
 public pressure, Mr. Wright said, that, speaking for himself only, he would 
 sustain the executive branch of the Government, by all the legal means in his 
 power, in the effort now making to substitute the State banks, instead of the 
 Bank of the United States, as the fiscal agent of the Government. 
 
 When Mr. Weight had concluded his remarks, 
 
 Mr. Webster said : I cannot consent to let the opportunity 
 pass, without a few observations upon what we have now heard. 
 Sir, the remarks of the honorable member from New York are 
 full of the most portentous import. They are words, not of cheer- 
 ing or consolation, but of ill-boding signification ; and, as they 
 spread far and wide, in their progress from the capital through the 
 country, they will carry with them, if I mistake not, gloom, appre- 
 hension, and dismay. I consider the declarations which the hon- 
 orable member has now made, as expressing the settled purpose of 
 the Administration on the great question which so much agitates the 
 country. 
 
 [Here Mr. Wright rose, and said that he had given his opinion as an indi- 
 vidual, and that he had no authority to speak for the Administration.] 
 
 Mr. Webster continued. I perfectly well understand, Sir, all 
 the gentleman's disclaimers and demurrers. He speaks, to be 
 
297 
 
 sure, in his own name only ; but, from his political connections, his 
 station, and his relations, 1 know full well that he has not, on this 
 occasion, spoken one word which has not been deliberately weighed 
 and considered by others as well as himself. 
 
 He has announced, therefore, to the countiy, two things clearly 
 and intelligibly : 
 
 First, that the present system (if system it is to be called) is to 
 remain unaltered. The public moneys are to remain, as they now 
 are, in the State banks, and the whole public revenue is hereafter 
 to be collected through the agency of such banks. This is the 
 first point. The gentleman has declared his full and fixed inten- 
 tion to support the Administration in this course, and therefore it 
 cannot be doubted that this course has been determined on by the 
 Administration. No plan is to be laid before Congress ; no system 
 is to be adopted by authority of law. The effect of a law would 
 be to place the public deposits beyond the power of daily change, 
 and beyond the absolute control of the Executive. But no such 
 fixed arrangement is to take place. The whole is to be left com- 
 pletely at the pleasure of the Secretary of the Treasury, who may 
 change the public moneys from place to place, and from bank to 
 bank, as often as he pleases. 
 
 The second thing now clearly made known, and of which, in- 
 deed, there have been many previous intimations, is, Sir, that a 
 great effort is to be made, or rather an effort already made is to 
 be vigorously renewed and continued, to turn the public com- 
 plaints against the Bank instead of the Government, and to per- 
 suade the people that all their sufferings arise, not from the act of 
 the Administration in interfering with the public deposits, but from 
 the conduct of the Bank since that was done. It is to be asserted 
 here, and will be the topic of declamation every where, that, not- 
 withstanding the removal of the deposits, if the Bank had not acted 
 wrong, there would have been no pressure or distress on the 
 country. The object, it is evident, will now be to divert public 
 attention from the conduct of the Secretary, and fix it on that of 
 the Bank. This is the second thing which is to be learned from 
 the speech of the member from New York. 
 
 The honorable member has said that new honors are to be 
 gained by the President, from the act which he is about to accom- 
 plish ; that he is to bring back legislation to its original limits, and 
 to establish the great truth that Congress has no power to create 
 a national bank. 
 
 I shall not stop to argue whether Congress can charter a bank 
 in this little District, which shall operate every where du'oughout 
 the Union, and yet cannot establish one in any of the States. 
 The gentleman seemed to leave that point, as if Congress had 
 such a power. But all must see that, if Congress cannot establish 
 VOL. II. 38 
 
298 
 
 a bank in one of the States, with branches in the rest, it would be 
 mere evasion to say that it might establish a bank here, with 
 branches in the several States. 
 
 Congress, it is alleged, has not the Constitutional power to 
 create a bank ! Sir, on what does this power rest, in the opinion 
 of those of us who maintain it ? Simply on this ; that it is a 
 power which is necessary and proper for the purpose of carrying 
 other powers into efiect. A fiscal agent — an auxiliary to the 
 Treasury — a machine — a something, is necessary for the purposes 
 of the Government ; and Congress, under the general authority 
 conferred upon it, can create that fiscal agent — that machine — 
 that something — and call it a bank. This is what I contend for ; 
 but this the gentleman denies, and says that it is not competent 
 to Congress to create a fiscal agent for itself, but that it may employ, 
 as such agents, institutions not created by itself, but by others, and 
 which are beyond the control of Congress. It is admitted that 
 the agent is necessary, and that Congress has the power to employ 
 it ; but it is insisted, nevertheless, that Congress cannot create it, 
 but must take such as is or may be already created. I do not 
 agree to the soundness of this reasoning. Suppose there were no 
 State banks: in that case, as the gentleman admits the necessity 
 of a bank, how can he hold such discordant opinions as to assert 
 that Congress could not, in that case, create one .'' The agency of 
 a bank is necessary ; and, because it is necessary, we may use it, 
 provided others will make a bank for us ; but, if they will not, we 
 cannot make one for ourselves, however necessary ! This is the 
 proposition. 
 
 For myself, I must confess that I am too obtuse to see the dis- 
 tinction between the power of creating a bank for the use of the 
 Government, and the power of taking into its use banks already 
 created. To make and to use, or to make and to hire, must 
 require the same power, in this case, and be either both Constitu- 
 tional or both equally Unconstitutional ; except that every consid- 
 eration of propriety, and expediency, and convenience, requires 
 that Congress should make a bank which will suit its own pur- 
 poses, answer its own ends, and be subject to its own control, 
 rather than use other banks, which were not created for any 
 such purpose, are not suited to it, and over which Congress can 
 exercise no supervision. 
 
 On one or two other points. Sir, I wish to say a word. The 
 gentleman differs from me as to the degree of pressure on the 
 country. He admits that, in some parts, there is some degree of 
 pressure ; in large cities, he supposes there may be distress ; but 
 asserts that every where else the pressure is limited ; that every 
 where it is greatly exaggerated ; and that it will soon be over. 
 This is mere matter of opinion. It Is capable of no precise 
 
299 
 
 and absolute proof or disproof. Tlie avenues of knowlcd2;e are 
 equally open to all. But I can truly say that I differ from the 
 gendeman on this point most materially and most widely. From 
 the information I have received during the last few weeks, I have 
 every reason to believe that the pressure is very severe, has 
 become very general, and is fast increasing ; and I see no chance 
 of its diminution, unless measures of relief shall be adopted by the 
 Government. 
 
 But the gendeman has discovered, or thinks he has discovered, 
 motives for the complaints which arise on all sides. It is all but 
 an attempt to bring the Administration into disfavor. This alone 
 is the cause that the removal of the deposits is so strongly cen- 
 sured ! Sir, the gendeman is mistaken. He does not — at least 
 I think he does not — rightly interpret the signs of the times. 
 The cause of complaint is much deeper and stronger than any 
 mere desire to produce political effect. The gentleman must be 
 aware that, notwithstanding the great vote by which the New 
 York resolutions were carried, and the support given by other 
 proceedings to the removal of the deposits, there are many as 
 ardent friends of the President as are to be found any where, who 
 exceedingly regret and deplore the measure. Sir, on this floor 
 there has been going on, for many weeks, as interesdng a debate 
 as has been witnessed for twenty years ; and yet I have not heard, 
 among all who have supported the Administradon, a single Senator 
 say that he approved the removal of the deposits, or was glad it 
 had taken place, until the gentleman from New York spoke. I 
 saw the gentleman from Georgia approach that point ; but he 
 shunned direct contact. He complained much of the Bank ; he 
 insisted, too, on the power of removal ; but I did not hear him 
 say he thought it a wise act. The gendeman from Virginia [IMr. 
 Rives], not now in his seat, also defended the power, and has 
 arraigned the Bank ; but has he said that he approved the measure 
 of removal ? I have not met with twenty individuals, in or out of 
 Congress, who have expressed an approval of it, among the many 
 hundreds whose opinions I have heard — not twenty who have 
 maintained that it was a wise proceeding ; but I have heard indi- 
 viduals of ample fortune declare, nevertheless, that, since it was 
 done, they would sacrifice all they possessed rather than not sup- 
 port it, although they wholly disapproved of it. Such is the warmth 
 of party zeal. 
 
 Sir, it is 3. mistake to suppose that the present agitation of the 
 country springs from mere party motives. It is a great mistake. 
 Every body is not a politician. The mind of every man in the 
 country is not occupied with the project of subverting one ad- 
 ministration, and setting up another. The gendeman "has done 
 great injustice to the people. I know, Sir, that great injustice has 
 
300 
 
 been done to the memorialists from Boston, whose resolutions 1 
 presented some days since, some of whom are very ardent friends 
 of the President, and can have been influenced by no such motive 
 as has been attributed to them. 
 
 But, Mr. President, I think I heard yesterday something from 
 the gendeman from Pennsylvania indicative of an intention to 
 direct die hostility of the country against the Bank, and to ascribe 
 to the Bank, and the Bank alone, the public distress. It was 
 the duty of the Government to have foreseen the consequences 
 of the removal of the deposits ; and gentlemen have no right 
 first to attack the Bank, charge it with great offences, and thus 
 attempt to shake its credit, and then complain when the Bank 
 undertakes to defend itself, and to avoid the great risk which 
 must threaten it from the hostility of the Government to its 
 property and character. The Government has placed itself in 
 an extraordinary position, both to the Bank and to the country, 
 by the removal of the deposits ; and also to the currency of the 
 country. The bills of the Bank are lawful currency in all pay- 
 ments to Government ; yet we see the Executive warring on the 
 credit of this national currency. We have seen the institution 
 assailed, which, by law, was provided to supply the revenue. Is 
 not this a new course } Does the recollection of the gentleman 
 furnish any such instance ? What other institution could stand 
 against such hostility ? The Bank of England could not stand 
 against it a single hour. The Bank of France would perish at the 
 first breath of such hostility. But the Bank of the United States 
 has sustained its credit under every disadvantage, and has ample 
 means to sustain it to the end. Its credit is in no degree shaken, 
 though its operations are necessarily curtailed. What has the 
 Bank done ? The gendeman from New York and the gentleman 
 from Pennsylvania have alleged that it is not because of the 
 removal of the deposits that there is pressure in the country, but 
 because of the conduct of the Bank. The latter gendeman, es- 
 pecially, alleges that the Bank began to curtail its discounts before 
 the removal of the deposits, and at a time when it was only ex- 
 pected that they would be removed. Indeed! and did not the 
 Bank, by taking this course, prove that it foresaw correctly what 
 was to take place? and, because it adopted a course of prepa- 
 ration, in order to break the blow which was about to fall upon it, 
 this also is to be added to the grave catalogue of its ofiences. 
 The Bank, it seems, has curtailed to the amount of nine millions. 
 Has she, indeed ? And is not that exacdy the amount of deposits 
 which the Government has withdrawn? The Bank, then, has 
 curtailed precisely so much as the Government has drawn away 
 from it. No other bank in the world could have gone on with so 
 small a curtailment. While public confidence was diminishing all 
 
301 
 
 around the Bank, it only curtailed just as much as it lost by the act 
 of the Government. The Bank would be justified, even whhout 
 the withdrawal of the deposits, in curtailing its discounts gradually, 
 and continuing to do so to the end of its charter, considering the 
 hostility manifested to its further continuance. The Government 
 has refused to recharter it. Its term of existence is approaching: 
 one of the duties which it has to perform is to make its collections ; 
 and the process of collection, since it must be slow, ought to be 
 commenced in season. It is, therefore, its duty to begin its cur- 
 tailments, so as that the process may be gradual. 
 
 I hope that I have not been misunderstood in my remarks the 
 other morning. The gentleman from New York has represented 
 me as saying that it is not die removal of the deposits wdiich has 
 caused the public distress. What I said was, that, if the Govern- 
 ment had required twice nine millions for its service, the with- 
 drawal of that amount from the Bank, without any interruption of 
 the good understanding between the Government and the Bank, 
 would not have caused this pressure and distrust. EVery thing 
 turns on the circumstances under which the withdrawal is made. 
 If public confidence is not shaken, all is well ; but, if it is, all — 
 all is difficulty and distress. And this confidence is shaken. 
 
 It has been said by the gentleman from New York, that Gov- 
 ernment has no design against the Bank ; diat it only desires to 
 withdraw the public deposits. Yet, in the very paper submitted 
 to Congress by the Executive Department, the Bank is arraigned 
 as unconstitutional in its very origin, and also as having broken its 
 charter, and violated its obligations — and its very existence is said 
 to be dangerous to the country ! Is not all this calculated to 
 injure the character of the Bank, and to shake confidence ? The 
 Bank has its foreign connections, and is much engaged in the busi- 
 ness of foreign exchanges ; and what will be thought at Paris and 
 London, when the community there shall see all these charges 
 made by the Government against a bank in which they have 
 always reposed the highest trust? Does not this injure its repu- 
 tation } Does it not compel it to take a defensive attitude ? The 
 gentleman from New York spoke of the power in the country to 
 put down the Bank, and of doing as our fathers did in the time of 
 the revolution, and has called on the people to rise and put down 
 this money power, as our ancestors put down the oppressive rule 
 of Great Britain ! All this is well calculated to produce the effect 
 which is intended ; and all diis, too, helps further to shake confi- 
 dence — it all injures the Bank — it all compels it to curtail more 
 and more. 
 
 Sir, I venture to predict that the longer gentlemen pursue the 
 experiment which they have devised, of collecting the public 
 revenue by State banks, the more perfectly will they" be satisfied 
 
, 
 
 302 
 
 that It cannot succeed. The gentleman has suffered himself to be 
 led away by false analogies. He says, that when the present Bank 
 expires, there will be the same laws as existed when the old bank 
 expired. Now, would it not be the inference of every wise man, 
 that there will also be the same inconveniences as were then felt ? 
 It would be useful to remember the state of things which existed 
 when the first bank was created, in 1791 ; and that a high degree ,3^ 
 
 of convenience, which amounted to political necessity, compelled M 
 
 Congress thus early to create a national bank. Its charter expired 
 in 1811, and the war came on the next year. The State banks 
 immediately stopped payment; and, before the war had continued 
 twelve months, there was a proposition for another United States 
 bank ; and this proposal was renewed from year to year, and 
 from session to session. Who supported this proposition ? The 
 very individuals who had opposed the former bank, and who had 
 now become convinced of the indispensable necessity of such an 
 institution. It has been verified, by experience, that the Bank is 
 as necessary in time of peace as in time of war ; and perhaps 
 more necessary, for the purpose of facilitating the commercial 
 operations of the country, and collecting the revenue, and sus- 
 taining the currency. It has been alleged, that we are to be left 
 in the same condition as when the old bank expired, and, of 
 course, we are to be subjected to the same inconveniences. Sir, 
 why should we thus suffer all experience to be lost upon us ? For 
 the convenience of the Government and of the country, there must 
 be some bank (at least I think so); and I should wish to hear the 
 views of the Administration as to this point. 
 
 The notes and bills of the Bank of the United States have 
 heretofore been circulated every where — they meet the wants of 
 every one — they have furnished a safe and most convenient 
 currency. It is impossible for Congress to enact a certain value 
 on the paper of the State banks. They may say that these banks 
 are entitled to credit ; but they cannot legislate them into the 
 good opinion and faith of the public. Credit is a thing which 
 must take its own course. It can never happen that the New 
 York notes will be at par value in Louisiana, or that the notes of 
 the Louisiana banks will be at par value in New York. In the 
 notes of the United States Bank we have a currency of equal 
 value every where ; and I say that there is not to be found, in the 
 whole world, another institution whose notes spread so far and 
 wide, with perfect credit in all places. There is no instance of 
 a bank whose paper is spread over so vast a surface of country, 
 and is every where of such equal value. How can it be, that a 
 number of State banks, scattered over two thousand -miles of 
 country, subject to twenty-four different State Legislatures and 
 State tribunals, without the possibility of any general concert of 
 
 I 
 
303 
 
 action, can supply the place of one general bank? It cannot be. 
 I see, Sir, in the doctrines which have been advanced to-day, only 
 new distress and disaster, new insecurity, and more danger to 
 property than the country has experienced for many years ; be- 
 cause it is in vain to attempt to uphold the occupations of industry, 
 unless property is made secure ; or of the value of labor, unless 
 its recompense is safe. But an opportunity will occur for re- 
 suming this subject hereaftei'. I forbear from it for the present. 
 
 A word or two on one other point. It was said by me, on a 
 former day, that this immediate question of the deposits does not 
 necessarily draw after it the question of rechartering the Bank of 
 the United States. It leaves that question for future adjusUnent. 
 But the present question involves high political considerations, 
 which I am not now about to discuss. If the question of the 
 removal of the deposits be not now taken into view, genUemen 
 will be bound to vote on the resolutions of the Senator from Ken- 
 tucky, as to the power which has been claimed and exercised. 
 The question, then, is not as to the renewing of the charter of the 
 Bank. But I repeat, that, however gendemen may flatter them- 
 selves, if it be not settled that the deposits are to be restored, 
 nothing will be settled; negative resolutions will not tranquillize 
 the countiy and give it repose. The question is before the coun- 
 try — all agree that it must be settled by that country. I very 
 much regret that topics are mixed up with the question which 
 may prevent it from being submitted to the calm judgment of the 
 people. Yet I have not lost faith in public sentiment. Events 
 are occurring, daily, which will make the people think for thenr- 
 selves. The industrious, the enterprising, will see the danger 
 which surrounds them, and will awake. If the majority of the 
 people shall then say there is no necessity for a continuance of 
 this sound and universal currency, I will acquiesce in their judg- 
 ment, because I can do no otherwise than to acquiesce. If the 
 gentleman from New York is right in his reading of the prog- 
 nostics, and public opinion shall settle down in the way which he 
 desires ; and if it be determined here that the public money is to 
 be placed at the disposal of the Executive, with absolute power 
 over the whole subject of its custody and guardianship ; and that 
 the general currency is to be left to the control of banks created 
 by twenty-four States ; — then, I say, that, in my judgment, one 
 strong bond of our social and political Union is severed, and one 
 great pillar of our prosperity is broken and prostrate. 
 
 [Mr. Tallmadge, of New York, spoke in reply to Mr. Webster, and de- 
 nied the Constitutional power of Congress to create a bank, although he main- 
 tained the power of the Secretary to make use of the State banks.] 
 
304 
 
 The subject being resumed the next day, January 31, 
 
 Mr. Webster said : It is not to be denied, Sir, that the finan- 
 cial affairs of the country have come, at last, to such a state, that 
 every man can see plainly the question which is presented for the 
 decision of Congress. We have, unquestionably, before us, now, 
 the views of the Executive, as to the nature and extent of the 
 evils alleged to exist ; and its notions, also, as to the proper rem- 
 edy for such evils. That remedy is short. It is, simply, tlie 
 system of administration already adopted by the Secretary of the 
 Treasury, and which is nodiing but this — that, whenever he shall 
 think pro[>er to remove the public moneys from the Bank of the 
 United States, and place them wherever else he pleases, this act 
 shall stand as the settled policy and system of the country ; and 
 this system shall rest upon the authority of the Executive alone. 
 This is now to be our future policy, as I understand the grave, 
 significant import of the remarks made yesterday by the gentleman 
 from New York, and as I perceive they are generally understood, 
 and as they are evidently understood by the gentleman from 
 Mississippi [Mr. Poind exter], who has alluded to them on pre- 
 senting his resolutions this morning. I wish, Sir, to take this, the 
 earliest opportunity, of stating my opinions upon this subject; and 
 that opinion is, that the remedy proposed by the Administration 
 for the evils under which the country is at this time suffering, 
 cannot bring relief, will not give satisfacdon, and cannot be acqui- 
 esced in. I think the country, on the other hand, will show much 
 dissatisfaction ; and that from no motive of hostility to the Gov- 
 ernment, from no disposition to make the currency of the country 
 turn upon political events, or to make political events turn upon 
 the question of the currency ; but simply because, in my judg- 
 ment, the system is radically defective — totally insufficient — car- 
 rying with it little confidence of the public, and none at all more 
 than it acquires merely by the influence of the name which 
 recommends it. 
 
 I do not intend now, Mr. President, to go into a regular and formal 
 argument to prove the Consfitutional power of Congress to estab- 
 lish a national bank. That question has been argued a hundred 
 times, and always settled the same way. The whole history of 
 the country, for almost forty years, proves that such a power has 
 been believed to exist. All previous Congresses, or nearly all, 
 have admitted or sanctioned it ; the judicial tribunals, Federal and 
 State, have sanctioned it. The Supreme Court of the United 
 States has declared the Constitutionality of the present Bank, after 
 the most solemn argument, without a dissenting voice on the 
 bench. 
 
305 
 
 Every successive President has, tacitly or expressly, admitted 
 the power. The present President has done this : he has informed 
 Congress that he could furnish the plan of a bank which should 
 conform to the Constitution. In objecting to the recharter of the 
 present Bank, he objected for particular reasons : and he has said 
 that a bank of the United States would be useful and convenient 
 for the people. 
 
 All this authority, I think, ought to settle the question. Both 
 the members from New York, however, are still unsatisfied : they 
 both deny the power of Congress to establish a bank. Now, Sir, 
 I shall not argue the question at this time ; but I will repeat what 
 I said yesterday. It does appear to me, that the late measures of 
 the Administration prove incontestably, and by a very short course 
 of reasoning, the Constitutionality of a bank. What I said yester- 
 day, and what I say to-day, is, that, since the Secretary, and all 
 who agree with the Secretary, admit the necessity of the agency 
 of some bank to carry on the affairs of Government, I was at a loss 
 to see where they could find power to use a State bank, and yet 
 find no power to create a bank of the United States. The gen- 
 tleman's perception may be sharp enough to see a distinction be- 
 tween these two cases ; but it is too minute for my grasp. It is 
 not said, in terms, in the Constitution, that Congress may create 
 a bank; nor is it said, in terms, that Congress may use a bank 
 created by a State. How, then, does it get authority to do either? 
 No otherwise, certainly, than that it possesses power to pass all laws 
 necessary and proper for carrying its enumerated powers into effect. 
 If a law were now before us for confirming the arrangement of the 
 Secretary, and adopting twenty State banks into the service of the 
 United States, as fiscal agents of the Government, where would 
 the honorable gentleman find authority for passing such a law ? 
 No where but in that clause of the Constitution to which I have 
 referred ; that is to say, the clause which authorizes congress to 
 pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying its granted powers 
 Into eftect. If such a law were before us, and die honorable 
 member proposed to vote for it, he would be obliged to pi'ove that 
 the agency of a bank is a thing both necessary and proper for 
 carrying on the Government. If he could not make this out, the 
 law would be unconstitutional. We see the Secretary admits die 
 necessity of this bank agency : the gendeman himself admits it, 
 nay, contends for it. A bank agency is his main reliance. All 
 the hopes expressed by himself or his colleague, of being able to 
 get on with the present state of things, rest on the expected effi- 
 ciency of a bank agency. 
 
 A bank, then, or some bank, being admitted to be both neces- 
 sary and proper for carrying on the Government, and the Secretary 
 proposing, on that very ground, and no other, to employ the State 
 VOL. II. 39 
 
306 
 
 banks, how does he make out a distinction between passing a law 
 for using a necessary agent, already created, and a law for creating 
 a similar agent, to be used, when created, for the same purpose ? 
 If there be any distinction, as it seems to me, it is rather in favor 
 of creating a bank by the authority of Congress, with such powers, 
 and no others, as the service expected from it requires, answerable 
 to Congress, and always under the control of Congress, than of 
 employing, as our agents, banks created by other governments, for 
 other purposes, and over which this Government has no control. 
 
 But, Sir, whichever power is exercised, both spring from the 
 same source ; and the power to establish a bank, on the ground 
 that its agency is necessary and proper for the ends and uses of 
 Government, is at least as plainly Constitutional as the power to 
 adopt banks, for the same uses and objects, which are already made 
 by other governments. Indeed, the legal act is, in both cases, 
 the same. When Congress makes a bank, it creates an agency ; 
 when it adopts a State bank, it creates an agency. If there be 
 power for one, therefore, there is power for the other. No power 
 to create a corporation is expressly given to Congress ; nor is 
 Congress any where forbidden to create a corporation. The crea- 
 tion of a corporation is an act of law, and, when it passes, the only 
 question is, whether it be a necessary and proper law for carrying 
 on the Government advantageously. And the case will be pre- 
 cisely the same when we shall be asked to pass a law for confirm- 
 ing the Secretary's arrangement with State banks. Each is Consti- 
 tutional, if Congress may fairly regard it as a necessary measure. 
 
 The honorable member. Sir, quoted me as having said that I 
 regarded the Bank as one of the greatest bonds of the union of the 
 States. That is not exactly what I said. What I did say was, 
 that the Constitutional power vested in Congress over the legal 
 currency of the country was one of its very highest powers, and 
 that the exercise of this high power was one of the strongest 
 bonds of the union of the States. And this I say sdll. Sir, the 
 gentleman did not go to the Constitution. He did not tell us how 
 he understands it, or how he proposes to execute the great trust 
 which it devolves on Congress, in respect to the circulating medium. 
 I can only say, Sir, how I understand it. 
 
 The Constitution declares that Congress shall have power " to 
 coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign coin." And 
 it also declares that " no State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, 
 or make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment 
 of debts." Congress, then, and Congress only, can coin money, 
 and regulate the value thereof. Now, Sir, I take it to be a truth, 
 which has grown into an admitted maxim with all the best writers, 
 and the best-informed public men, that those whose duty it is to 
 protect the community against the evils of a debased coin, are 
 
307 
 
 bound also to protect it against the still greater evils of excessive 
 issues of paper. • 
 
 If the public require protection, says Mr. Ricardo, against bad 
 money, which might be imposed on them by an undue mixau'e of 
 alloy, how much more necessary is such protection, when paper 
 money forms almost the whole of the circulating medium of the 
 country ! 
 
 It is not to be doubted, Sir, that the Constitution intended that 
 Congress should exercise a regulating power — a power both neces- 
 sary and salutary, over that which should constitute the actual 
 money of the country, whether that money were coin, or the rep- 
 resentative of coin. So it has always been considered : so Mr. 
 Madison considered it, as may be seen in his message, December, 
 181G. He there says : 
 
 " Upon this general view of the subject, it is obvious that there 
 is only wanting to the fiscal prosperity of the Government the res- 
 toration of a uniform medium of exchange. The resources and 
 the faith of the nation, displayed in the system which Congress has 
 established, ensure respect and confidence both at home and 
 abroad. The local accumulations of the revenue have already 
 enabled the Treasury to meet the public engagements in the local 
 currency of most of the States ; and it is expected that the same 
 cause will produce the same effect throughout the Union. But 
 for the interests of the community at large, as well as for the pur- 
 poses of the Treasury, it is essential that the nation should possess 
 a currency of equal value, credit, and use, wherever it may circidate. 
 The Constitution has intrusted Congress exclusively with the 
 power of creating and regulating a currency of that description ; 
 and the measures which ivere taken during the last session, in exe- 
 cution of the jmwer, give every promise of success. The Bank 
 of the United States has been organized under auspices the most 
 favorable, and cannot fail to be an important auxiliary to those 
 
 measures^ 
 
 The State banks put forth paper as representing coin. As such 
 representative, it obtains circulation ; it becomes the money of the 
 country ; but its amount depends on the will of four hundred differ- 
 ent State banks, each acting on its own discretion ; and in the ab- 
 sence of every thing preventive or corrective, on the part of the 
 United States, what security is there against excessive issues, and, 
 consequently, against depreciation ? The public feels that there is 
 no security against these evils ; it has learned this from experience ; 
 and this very feeling, this distrust of the paper of State banks, is 
 the very evil which they themselves have to encounter ; and it is 
 a very serious evil. They know that confidence in them is far 
 
308 
 
 greater when there exists a power ebewhere to prevent excess and 
 depreciation. Such a power, therefore, is friendly to their best 
 interests. It gives confidence and credit to them, one and all. 
 Hence a vast majority of the State banks — nearly all, perhaps, ex- 
 cept those who expect to be objects of particular favor — desire the 
 continuance of a national bank, as an institution highly useful to 
 themselves. 
 
 The mode in which the operations of a national institution afford 
 security against excessive issues by local banks, is not violent, 
 coercive, or injurious. On the contrarA'. it is gende, salutarv', and 
 friendly. The resuh is brought about by the natural and easy 
 operation of things. The money of the Bank of the United States, 
 ha\-in? a more wide-spread credit and character, is constantly 
 wanted for purposes of remittance. It is purchased, therefore, for 
 tliis purpose, and paid for in the bills of local banks : and h may be 
 purchased, of course, at par, or near it, if these local bills are 
 offered in the neighborhood of their own banks, and these banks 
 are in good credit. These local bills then return to the bank that 
 issued them. The result is, that, while the local bills will or may 
 supply, in great part, the local circulation (not being capable, for 
 want of more extended credit, of being remitted to great distances), 
 their amount is thus limited to the purposes of local circulation ; 
 and anv considerable excess, bevond this, finds, in due season, a 
 salutar}' corrective. 
 
 This is one of the known benefits of the Bank. Everv' man of 
 business understands it, and the whole countiy has realized the se- 
 curity which this course of things has produced. 
 
 But, Sir, as to the question of the deposits, the honorable 
 gentleman thinks he sees, at last, tlie curtain raised ; he sees the 
 object of the whole debate. He insists that the question of the 
 restoration of the deposits, and \he question of rechartering the 
 Bank, are tlie same question. It strikes me, Sir, as being strange, 
 that the gentleman did not draw an exactly opposite inference 
 fi-om his own premises. He says he sees the northern friends of 
 the Bank, and the southern opposers of the Bank, agreeing for 
 the restoration of the deposits. This is tme : and does not this 
 prove that the question is a separate one r On the one question, 
 the North and the South are together ; on the other, they sepa- 
 rate : either their apprehensions are obtuse, or else this very state- 
 ment shows the questions to be distinct. 
 
 Sir, since the gentieman has referred to the Xorth and the 
 South, I will venture to ask him if he sees nothing imponant in the 
 aspect which the South presents? On this question of the de- 
 posits, does he not behold almost an entire unanimity in the South ? 
 How many from the Potomac to the Gulf of ^lexico defend the 
 removal r For myself, I declare that I have not heai-d a member 
 
309 
 
 of Congress from beyond the Potomac say, either in or out of his 
 seat, that he approved the measure. Can the gentleman see 
 nothing in this but proof that the deposit question and the ques- 
 tion of recharter are the same? Sir, gentlemen must judge for 
 themselves ; but it appears plain enough to me, that the President 
 has lost more friends at the South by this interference with the 
 public deposits than by any or all other measures. 
 
 I must be allowed now, Sir, to advert to a remark in the speech 
 of the honorable member from New York on the left of the Chair, 
 [Mr. Wright,] as I find it in a morning paper. It is this : — 
 
 " Be assured. Sir, whatever nice distinctions may be drawn here 
 as to the show of influence which expressions of the popular will 
 upon such a subject are entitled to from us, it is possible for that 
 will to assume a Constitutional shape, which the Senate cannot 
 misunderstand, and, understanding, will not unwisely resist." 
 
 [Mr. Wright said, it should have been share of influence.] 
 
 Mr. Webster continued. That does not alter the sense. Mr. 
 President, I wish to keep the avenues of public opinion, from the 
 whole country to the capitol, all open, broad and wide. I desire 
 always to know the state of that opinion on great and important 
 subjects. From me, that opinion always has received, and always 
 will receive, the most respectful attention and consideration. And 
 whether it be expressed by State Legislatures, or by public meet- 
 ings, or be collected from individual expressions, in whatever form 
 it comes, it is always welcome. But, Sir, the legislation for the 
 United States must be conducted here. The law of Congress 
 must be the will of Congress, and the proceedings of Congress its 
 own proceedings. 
 
 I hope nothing intimidating was intended by this expression. 
 [Mr. Wright intimated it was not.] Then, Sir, I forbear fur- 
 ther remark. 
 
 Sir, there is one other subject on which I wish to raise my 
 voice. There is a topic which I perceive is to become the gene- 
 ral war-cry of party, on which I take the liberty to warn the country 
 against delusion. Sir, the cry is to be raised, that this is a ques- 
 tion between the poor and the rich. I know. Sir, it has been pro- 
 claimed, that one thing was certain — that there was always a hatred 
 from the poor to the rich ; and that this hatred would support' the 
 late measures, and the putting down of the Bank. Sir, I will not 
 be silent at the threatening of such a detestable fraud on public opin- 
 ion. If but one man, or ten men, in the nation, will hear my 
 voice, I will still warn them against this attempted imposition. 
 
 Mr. President, this is an eventful moment. On the great ques- 
 tions which occupy us, we all look for some decisive movement of 
 
310 
 
 public opinion. As I wish that movement to be free, Intelligent, 
 and unbiased, the true manifestation of the public will, I desire 
 to prepare the country for another assault, which I perceive is about 
 to be made on popular prejudice, another attempt to obscure all 
 distinct views of the public good, to overwhelm all patriotism, and 
 all enlightened self-interest, by loud cries against false danger, and 
 by exciting the passions of one class against another. I am not 
 mistaken in the omen ; I see the magazine whence the weapons 
 of this warfare are to be drawn. I already hear the din of the 
 hammering of arms, preparatory to the combat. They may be 
 such arms, perhaps, as reason, and justice, and honest patriotism, 
 cannot resist. Every efibrt at resistance, it is possible, may be 
 feeble and powerless ; but, for one, I shall make an efibrt — an 
 effort to be begun now, and to be carried on and continued, with 
 untiring zeal, till the end of the contest comes. 
 
 Sir, I see, in those vehicles which carry to the people sentiments 
 from high places, plain declarations that the present controversy is 
 but a strife between one part of the community and another. I 
 hear.it boasted as the unfailing security, the solid ground, never to 
 be shaken, on which recent measures rest, that the poor naturally 
 hate the rich. I know, that, under the shade of the roofs of the 
 capitol, within the last twenty-four hours, among men sent here to 
 devise means for the public safety and the public good, it has been 
 vaunted forth, as matter of boast and triumph, that one cause ex- 
 isted, powerful enough to support every thing, and to defend every 
 thing ; and that was — the natural hatred of the poor to the rich. 
 
 Sir, I pronounce the author of such sentiments to be guilty of 
 attempting a detestable fraud on the community ; a double fraud ; 
 a fraud which is to cheat men out of their property, and out of 
 the earnings of their labor, by first cheating them out of their un- 
 derstandings. 
 
 " The natural hatred of the poor to the rich ! " Sir, it shall not 
 be till the last moment of my existence ; it shall be only when I 
 am drawn to the verge of oblivion ; when I shall cease to have re- 
 spect or affisction for any thing on earth, — that I will believe the 
 people of the United States capable of being effectually deluded, 
 cajoled, and driven about in herds, by such abominable frauds as 
 this. If they shall sink to that point ; if they so far cease to be 
 men, thinking men, intelligent men, as to yield to such pretences 
 and such clamor, — they will be slaves already ; slaves to their own 
 passions — slaves to the fraud and knavery of pretended friends. 
 They will deserve to be blotted out of all the records of freedom ; 
 they ought not to dishonor the cause of self-government, by at- 
 tempting any longer to exercise it ; they ought to keep their un- 
 worthy hands entirely oft' from the cause of republican liberty, if 
 they are capable of being the victims of artifices so shallow, of 
 
311 
 
 tricks so stale, so threadbare, so often practised, so much worn out, 
 on serfs and slaves. 
 
 " The natural hatred of the poor against the rich ! " " The 
 danger of a moneyed aristocracy ! " " A power as great and 
 dangerous as that resisted by the revolution ! " "A call to a new 
 declaration of independence ! " 
 
 Sir, I admonish the people against the objects of outcries like 
 these, I admonish every industrious laborer in the country to be 
 on his guard against such delusion. I tell him the attempt is to 
 play off his passions against his interests, and to prevail on him, in 
 the name of liberty, to destroy all the fruits of liberty ; in the name 
 of patriotism, to injure and afflict his country ; and, in the name of 
 his own independence, to destroy that very independence, and make 
 him a beggar and a slave. Has he a dollar ? He is advised to do 
 that which will destroy half its value. Has he hands to labor ? 
 Let him rather fold them, and sit still, than be pushed on, by fraud 
 and artifice, to support measures which will render his labor useless 
 and hopeless. 
 
 Sir, the very man, of all others, who has the deepest interest in 
 a sound currency, and who suffers most by mischievous legis- 
 lation in money matters, is the man who earns his daily bread 
 by his daily toil. A depreciated currency, sudden changes of 
 prices, paper money, falling between morning and noon, and falling 
 still lower between noon and night, — these things constitute the very 
 harvest-time of speculators, and of the whole race of those who 
 are at once idle and crafty ; and of that other race, too, the Cata- 
 lines of all times, marked, so as to be known forever by one stroke 
 of the historian's pen, men greedy of other men's property and 
 prodigal of their own. Capitalists, too, may outlive such times. 
 They may either prey on the earnings of labor, by their cent, per 
 cent., or they may hoard. But the laboring man — what can he 
 hoard ? Preying on nobody, he becomes the prey of all. His 
 property is in his hands. His reliance, his fund, his productive 
 freehold, his all, is his labor. Whether he work on his own small 
 capital, or on another's, his living is still earned by his industry ; 
 and when the money of the country becomes depreciated and de- 
 based, whether it be adulterated coin or paper without credit, that 
 industry is robbed of its reward. He then labors for a country 
 whose laws cheat him out of his bread. I would say to every 
 owner of every quarter section of land in the West — I would say 
 to every man in the East, who follows his own plough — and to every 
 mechanic, artisan, and laborer, in every city in the country — I 
 would say to every man, every where, who wishes, by honest 
 means, to gain an honest living, " Beware of wolves in sheep's 
 clothing. Whoever attempts, under whatever popular cry, to shake 
 the stability of the public currency, bring on distress in money 
 
. 312 
 
 matters, and drive the country into paper money, stabs your inter- 
 est and your happiness to the heart." 
 
 The herd of hungry wolves, who hve on other men's earnings, 
 will rejoice in such a state of things. A system which absorbs into 
 their pockets the fruits of other men's industry, is the very system 
 for them. A government that produces or countenances uncer- 
 tainty, fluctuations, violent risings and fallings in prices, and, finally, 
 paper money, is a government exactly after their own heart. 
 Hence these men are always for change. They will never let 
 well enough alone. A condition of public affairs in which prop- 
 erty is safe, industry certain of its reward, and every man secure 
 in his own hard-earned gains, is no paradise for them. Give them 
 just the reverse of this state of things ; bring on change, and change 
 after change ; let it not be known to-day what will be the value 
 of property to-morrow; let no man be able to say wdiether the 
 money in his pockets at night will be money or worthless rags in 
 the morning ; and depress labor till double work shall earn but half 
 a living — give them this state of things, and you give them the con- 
 summation of their earthly bliss. 
 
 Sir, the great interest of this great country, the producing cause 
 of all its prosperity, is labor ! labor ! labor ! We are a laboring 
 conmiunity. A vast majority of us all live by industry and actual 
 occupation in some of their forms. 
 
 The Constitution was made to protect this industry, to give it 
 bodi encouragement and security ; but, above all, security. To 
 that very end, with that precise oljject in view, power was given 
 to Congress over the currency, and over the money system of the 
 country. In forty years' experience, we have found nothing at all 
 adequate to the beneficial execution of this trust but a well-con- 
 ducted national bank. That has been tried, returned to, tried again, 
 and always found successful. If it be not the proper thing for us, 
 let it be soberly argued against ; let something better be proposed ; 
 let the country examine the matter coolly, and decide for itself. 
 But whoever shall attempt to carry a question of this kind by 
 clamor, and violence, and prejudice ; whoever would rouse the 
 people by appeals, false and fraudulent appeals, to their love of 
 independence, to resist the establishment of a useful institution, 
 because it is a bank, and deals in money ; and who artfully urges 
 these appeals wherever he thinks there is more of honest feeling 
 than of enlightened judgment, means nothing but deception. And 
 whoever has the wickedness to conceive, and the hardihood to 
 avow, a purpose to break down what has been found, in forty 
 years' experience, essential to the protection of all interests, by 
 arraying one class against another, and by acting on such a prin- 
 ciple as that the poor always hate the rich, shows himself the reck- 
 less enemy of all. An enemy to his whole country, to all classes, 
 
Q 
 
 13 
 
 and to every man in it, he deserves to be marked especially as the 
 poor man's curse ! 
 
 Mr. President, I feel that it becomes me to bring to the present 
 crisis all of intellect, all of diligence, all of devotion to the public 
 good, that I possess. I act, Sir, in opposition to nobody. I desire 
 rather to follow the Administration, in a proper remedy for the present 
 distress, than to lead. I have felt so from the beginning, and I have 
 felt so until the declaration of yesterday made it certain that there is 
 no further measure to be proposed. The expectation is, that the 
 country will get on under the present state of things. Being my- 
 self entirely of a different opinion, and looking ibr no effectual 
 relief until some other measure is adopted, I shall, nevertheless, be 
 most happy to be disappointed. But if I shall not be mistaken, if 
 the pressure shall continue, and if the indications of general public 
 sentiment shall point in that direction, 1 shall feel it my duty, let 
 the consequences be what they may, to propose a law for altering 
 and continuing the charter of the Bank of the United States. 
 
 On Saturday, the 22d of February, in a debate on presenting a memorial from 
 Maine, Mr. Forsvth having, on the day before, described wliat he understood 
 to be the experiment which the Executive Government was trying, in regard 
 to tlie public deposits — 
 
 Mr. Webster rose, and addressed the Senate as follows : — 
 
 Mr. President : The honorable member from Georgia stated 
 yesterday, more distinctly than I have before learned it, what that 
 experiment is, which the Government is now trying on the rev- 
 enues and the currency, and, I may add, on the commerce, man- 
 ufactures, and agriculture, of this country. If I rightly apprehend 
 him, this experiment is an attempt to return to an exclusive specie 
 currency, first by being able, through the agency of the State 
 banks, to dispense with any bank of the United States ; and then 
 to supersede the use of the State banks themselves. 
 
 This, Sir, is the experiment. I thank the gentleman for thus 
 stating its character. He has done his duty, and dealt fairly with 
 the people, by this exhibition of what the views of the Executive 
 Government are, at this interesting moment. It is certainly most 
 proper that the people should see distinctly to what end or for 
 what object it is that so much suffering is already upon them, and 
 so much more already in visible and near prospect. 
 
 And now, Sir, is it possible ? — is it possible that twelve millions 
 of intelligent people can be expected voluntarily to subject them- 
 selves to severe distress, of unknown duration, for the purpose of 
 making trial of an experiment Uke this ? Will a nation that is in- 
 voL. II. 40 
 
314 
 
 telligent, well-informed of its own interest, enlightened, and capable 
 of self-government, submit to suffer embarrassment in all its pur- 
 suits, loss of capital, loss of employment, and a sudden and dead 
 stop in its onward movement in the path of prosperity and wealth, 
 until it shall be ascertained whether this new-hatched theory shall 
 answer the hopes of those who have devised it ? Is the country 
 to be persuaded to bear every thing, and bear patiendy, until the 
 operation of such an experiment, adopted for such an avowed 
 object, and adopted, too, without the cooperation or consent of 
 Congress, and by the Executive power alone, shall exhibit its 
 results ? 
 
 In the name of the hundreds of thousands of our suffering fellow- 
 citizens, I ask, for what reasonable end is this experiment to be 
 tried ? What great and good object, worth so much cost, is it to 
 accomplish ? What enormous evil is to be remedied by all this 
 inconvenience and all this suffering ? What great calamity is to 
 be averted? Have the people thronged our doors, and loaded 
 our tables with petitions for relief against the pressure of some 
 political mischief, some notorious misrule, which this experiment 
 is to redress ? Has it been resorted to in an hour of misfortune, 
 calamity, or peril, to save the State ? Is it a measure of remedy, 
 yielded to the importunate cries of an agitated and distressed na- 
 tion ? Far, Sir, very far from all this. There was no calamity, 
 there was no suffering, there was no peril, when these measures 
 began. At the moment when this experiment was entered upon, 
 these twelve millions of people were prosperous and happy, not 
 only beyond the example of all others, but even beyond their own 
 example in times past. 
 
 There was no pressure of public or private distress throughout 
 the whole land. All business was prosperous, all industry was 
 rewarded, and cheerfulness and content universally prevailed. 
 Yet, in the midst of all this enjoyment, with so much to heighten, 
 and so litde to mar it, this experiment comes upon us, to harass 
 and oppress us at present, and to affright us for the future. Sir, 
 it is incredible ; the world abroad will not believe it ; it is difficult 
 even for us to credit it, who see it with our own eyes, that the 
 country, at such a moment, should put itself upon an experiment 
 fraught with such immediate and overwhelming evils, and threat- 
 ening the property and the employments of the people, and all 
 their social and political blessings, with severe and long-enduring 
 future inflictions. 
 
 And this experiment, with all its cost, is to be tried, for what? 
 Why, simply, Sir, to enable us to try another " experiment ; " 
 and that other experiment is, to see whether an exclusive specie 
 currency may not be better than a currency partly specie and 
 partly bank paper ! The object to which, it is hoped, we may 
 
 ' 
 
315 
 
 arrive, by patiently treading this path of endurance, is to banish 
 from the country all bank paper, of all kinds, and to have coined 
 money, and coined money only, as the actual currency of the 
 
 country ! 
 
 Now, Sir, I altogether deny that such an object is at all desira- 
 ble, even if it could be obtained. I know, indeed, that all paper 
 ought to circulate on a specie basis ; that all bank notes, to be 
 safe, must be convertible into gold and silver at the will of the 
 holder ; and I admit, too, that the issuing of very small notes, by 
 many of the State banks, has too much reduced the amount of 
 specie actually circulating through the pockets of the people. It 
 may be remembered that I called the attention of Congress to this 
 subject in 1832, and that the bill which then passed both Houses, 
 for renewmg the Bank charter, contained a provision designed to 
 produce some restraint on the circulation of very small notes. ^ I 
 admit there are conveniences in making small payments in specie ; 
 and I have always not only admitted, but contended, that, if all 
 issues of bank notes under five dollars were discontinued, much 
 more specie would be retained in the country, and in the circu- 
 lation ; and that great security would be derived from this. But 
 we are now debating about an exclusive specie currency ; and I 
 deny that an exclusive specie currency is the best currency for 
 any highly commercial country ; and I deny, especially, that such 
 a currency would be best suited to the condition and circumstances 
 of the United States. With the enlightened writers and practical 
 statesmen of all commercial communities, in modern times, I have 
 supposed it to be admitted, that a well-regulated, properly- 
 restrained, safely-limited paper currency, circulating on an ad- 
 equate specie basis, was a thing to be desired — a political public 
 advantage, to be obtained, if it may be obtained ; and, more 
 especially, I have supposed that, in a new country, with resources 
 not yet half developed, with a rapidly-increasing population, and a 
 constant demand for more and more capital ; that is to say, in just 
 such a country as the United States are, I have supposed a safe 
 and well-regulated paper currency to be allowed to produce par- 
 ticular and extraordinary advantages ; because, in such a country, 
 well-regulated bank paper not only suppHes a convenient medium 
 of payments and of exchange, but also, by the expansion of that 
 medium in a reasonable and safe degree, the amount of circulation 
 is kept more nearly commensurate with the constantly-increasing 
 amount of property ; and an extended capital, in the shape of credit, 
 comes to the aid of the enterprising and the industrious. It is pre- 
 cisely on this credit, created by reasonable expansion of the cur- 
 rency in a new country, that men of small capital carry on their 
 business. It is exacdy by means of this, that industry and enter- 
 prise are stimulated. If we were driven back to an entire gold 
 
o 
 
 16 
 
 and silver currency, the necessary and inevitable consequence 
 would be, that all trade must (all into the hands of large capital- 
 ists. This is so plain, that no man of reflection can doubt it ; I know 
 not, therefore, in what words to express my astonishment, when I 
 hear it said that the present measures of Government are intended 
 for the good of the many instead of the few — for the benefit of 
 the poor, and against the rich ; and when I hear it proposed, at 
 the same moment, to do away the whole system of credit, and 
 place all trade and commerce, therefore, in the hands of those who 
 have competent capital to carry them on, without the use of any 
 credit at all. This, Sir, would be dividing society, by a precise, 
 disdnct, and well-defined line, into two classes ; first, the small class, 
 who have competent capital for trade, when credit is out of the 
 question ; and, secondly, the vastly-numerous class of those whose 
 living must become, in such a state of things, a mere manual 
 occupation, without the use of capital, or of any substitute for 
 capital. 
 
 Now, Sir, it is the effect of a well-understood system of paper 
 credit to break in upon this line, thus dividing die many from the 
 few, and to enable more or less of the more numerous class to 
 pass over it, and to participate in the profits of capital, by means 
 of a safe and convenient substitute for capital ; and thus to diffuse, 
 vastly more widely, the general earnings, and therefore the gen- 
 eral prosperity and happiness, of society. Every man of observa- 
 tion must have witnessed, in this country, that men of heavy cap- 
 ital have constantly complained of bank circulation, and a conse- 
 quent credit system, as injurious to the rights of capital. They 
 undoubtedly feel its effects. All that is gained by the use of 
 credit is just so much subtracted from the amount of their own 
 accumulations, and so much the more has gone to the benefit of 
 those who bestow their own labor and industry on capital in small 
 portions. To the great majority this has been of incalculable 
 benefit in the United States ; and, therefore, Sir, whoever attempts 
 the entire overthrow of the system of bank credit, aims a deadly 
 blow at the interest of that great and industrious class, who, having 
 some capital, cannot, nevertheless, transact business without some 
 credit ; and can mean nothing else, if it have any intelligible 
 meaning at all, than to turn all such persons over to the long list 
 of mere manual laborers. What else can they do, with not 
 enough of absolute capital, and with no credit ? This, Sir, this is 
 the true tendency and the unavoidable result of these measures, 
 which have been undertaken with the patriotic object of assisting 
 the poor against die rich ! 
 
 Sir, I am well aware that bank credit may be abused. I know 
 that there is another extreme, exactly the opposite of that of which 
 1 have now been speaking, and no less sedulously to be avoided. 
 
317 
 
 I know that bank paper may become excessive ; that depreciation 
 will then follow ; and that the evils, the losses, and the frauds, 
 consequent on a disordered currency, fall on the rich and the poor 
 t02;ether, but with especial weight of ruin on the poor. I know that 
 the system of bank credit must always rest on a specie basis, and 
 that it constantly needs to be strictly guarded and properly re- 
 strained ; and it may be so guarded and restrained. We need 
 not give up the good which belongs to it, through fear of the evils 
 which may follow from its abuse. We have the power to take 
 security against these evils. It is our business, as statesmen, to 
 adopt that security ; it is our business not to prostrate, or attempt 
 to prostrate, the system ; but to use those means of precaution, 
 restraint, and correction, which experience has sanctioned, and 
 which are ready at our hands. 
 
 It would be to our everlasting reproach, it would be placing us 
 below the general level of the intelligence of civilized states, to 
 admit that we cannot contrive means to enjoy the benefits of bank 
 circulation, and of avoiding, at the same time, its dangers. Indeed, 
 Sir, no contrivance is necessary. It is contrivance, and the love 
 of contrivance, that spoils all. We are destroying ourselves by a 
 remedy which no evil called for. We are ruining perfect health 
 by nostrums and quackery. We have lived, hitherto, under a 
 well-constructed, practical and beneficial system; a system not 
 surpassed by any in the world ; and it seems to me to be pre- 
 suming largely, largely indeed, on the credulity and self-denial of 
 the people, to rush, with such sudden and impetuous haste, into 
 new schemes and new theories, to overturn and annihilate all that 
 we have so long found useful. 
 
 Our system has, hitherto, been one in which paper has been 
 circulating on the strength of a specie basis ; that is to say, when 
 every bank note was convertible into specie at the will of the 
 holder. This has been our guard against excess. While banks 
 are bound to redeem their bills, by paying gold and silver on de- 
 mand, and are at all times able to do this, the currency is safe and 
 convenient. Such a currency is not paper money, in the odious 
 sense. It is not like the continental paper of revolutionary times ; 
 it is not like the worthless bills of banks which have suspended 
 specie payments. On the contrary, it is the representative of 
 gold and silver, and convertible into gold and silver on demand, 
 and, therefore, answers the purposes of gold and silver ; and so 
 long as its credit is in this way sustained, it is the cheapest, the best, 
 and the most convenient circolating medium. I have already 
 endeavored to warn the country against irredeemable paper ; 
 against bank paper, when banks do not pay specie for their own 
 notes ; against that miserable, abominable and fraudulent policy, 
 which attempts to give value to any paper, of any bank, one single 
 
318 
 
 moment longer than such paper is redeemable on demand in gold 
 and silver. And I wish most solemnly and earnestly to repeat 
 that warning. I see danger of that state of things ahead. I see 
 imminent danger that more or fewer of the State banks will stop 
 specie payments. The late measure of the Secretary, and the in- 
 fatuation with which it seems to be supported, tend directly and 
 strongly to that result. Under pretence, then, of a design to 
 return to a currency which shall be all specie, we are likely to 
 have a currency in which there shall be no specie at all. We are 
 in danger of being overwhelmed with irredeemable paper — mere 
 paper, representing not gold, nor silver ; no, Sir, representing 
 nothing but broken promises, bad faith, bankrupt corporations, 
 cheated creditors, and a ruined people. This, I fear, Sir, may be 
 the consequence, already alarmingly near, of this attempt — unwise, 
 if it be real, and grossly fraudulent, if it be only pretended — of es- 
 tablishing an exclusive hard-money currency ! 
 
 But, Sir, if this shock could be avoided, and if we could reach 
 the object of an exclusive metallic circulation, we should find in 
 that very success serious and insurmountable inconveniences. 
 We require neither irredeemable paper, nor yet exclusive hard 
 money. We require a mixed system. We require specie, and 
 we require, too, good bank paper, founded on specie, representing 
 specie, and convertible into specie on demand. W^e require, in 
 short, just such a currency as we have long enjoyed, and the ad- 
 vantages of which we seem now, with unaccountable rashness, 
 about to throw away. 
 
 I avow myself, therefore, decidedly against the object of a 
 return to an exclusive specie currency. I find great difficulty, I 
 confess, in believing any man serious in avowing such an object. 
 It seems to me rather a subject for ridicule, at this age of the 
 world, than for sober argument. But if it be true that any are 
 serious for the return of the gold and silver age, I am seriously 
 against it. 
 
 Let us, Sir, anticipate, in imagination, the accomplishment of 
 this grand experiment. Let us suppose that, at this moment, all 
 bank paper was out of existence, and the country full of specie. 
 Where, Sir, should we put it, and what should we do w'ith it ? 
 Should we ship it, by cargoes, every day, from New York to New 
 Orleans, and from New Orleans back to J^ew York ? Should we 
 encumber the turnpikes, the rail-roads and the steam-boats with it, 
 whenever purchases and sales were to be made in one place of 
 articles to be transported to another ? The carriage of the money 
 would, in some cases, cost half as much as the carriage of the 
 goods. Sir, the very first day, under such a state of things, 
 we should set ourselves to the creation of banks. This would 
 become immediately necessary and unavoidable. We may assure 
 
319 
 
 ourselves, therefore, without danger of mistake, that the idea of an 
 exclusive metallic currency is totally incompatible, in the existing 
 state of the world, with an active and extensive commerce. It is 
 inconsistent, too, with the greatest good of the greatest number ; 
 and therefore I oppose it. 
 
 But, Sir, how are we to get through the first experiment, so as 
 to be able to try that which is to be final and ultimate — that is to 
 say, how are we to get rid of the State banks ? How is this to be 
 accomplished ? Of the Bank of the United States, indeed, we 
 may free ourselves readily ; but how are we to aimihilate the 
 State banks ? We did not speak them into being ; we cannot 
 speak them out of being. They did not originate in any exercise 
 of our power; nor do they owe their conUnuance to our indul- 
 gence. They are responsible to the States ; to us they are irre- 
 sponsible. We cannot act upon diem; we can only act with 
 tliem ; and the expectation, as it would appear, is, that, by zeal- 
 ously cooperating with the Government in carrying into operation 
 its new theory, they may disprove the necessity of their own 
 existence, and fairly work themselves out of the world ! Sir, I 
 ask once more. Is a great and intelligent community to endure 
 patiendy all sorts of suffering for phantasies like these ? How 
 charmingly practicable, how delightfully probable, all this looks ! 
 
 I find it impossible, Mr. President, to believe that the removal 
 of the deposits arose in any such purpose as is now avowed. I 
 believe all this to be an after-thought. The removal was resolved 
 on, as a strong measure against the Bank ; and now that it has 
 been attended with consequences not at all apprehended from it, 
 instead of being promptly retracted, as it should have been, it is 
 to be justified on the ground of a grand experiment, above the 
 reach of common sagacity, and dropped down, as it were, from 
 the clouds, "to witch the world with noble policy." It is not 
 credible, — not possible. Sir, — that, six months ago, the Administra- 
 tion suddenly started off to astonish mankind with their new inven- 
 fions in politics, and that it then began its magnificent project by 
 removing the deposits as its first operation. No, Sir, no such 
 thing. The removal of the deposits was a blow at the Bank, and 
 nothing more ; and if it had succeeded, we should have heard 
 nothing of any project for the final putting down of all State 
 banks. No, Sir, not one word. We should have heard, on the 
 contrary, only of their usefulness, their excellence, and their exact 
 adaptation to the uses and necessifies of this Government. But 
 the experiment of making successful use of State banks having 
 failed, completely failed, in this the very first endeavor ; the State 
 banks having already proved themselves not able to fill the place 
 and perform the duties of a national bank, although highly useful 
 in their appropriate sphere ; and the disastrous consequences of 
 
320 
 
 the measures of Government coming thick and fast upon us — the 
 professed object of the whole movement is at once changed, and 
 the cry now is, Down with aU the State banks ! down with all the 
 Slate banks ! and let us return to our embraces of solid gold and 
 solid silver! 
 
 Sir, I have no doubt that, if there are any persons in the coun 
 try, who have seriously wished for such an event as the extinction 
 of all banks, they have not, nevertheless, looked for the absence 
 of all paper circulation. They have only looked for issues of pa- 
 per from another quarter. 
 
 We have already had distinct intimations that paper might be 
 issued on the foundation of the revenue. The Treasury of the 
 United States is intended to become the bank of the United 
 States, and the Secretary of the Treasury is meant to be the great 
 national banker. Sir, to say nothing of the crudity of such a no- 
 tion, I may be allowed to make one observation upon it. We 
 have heretofore heard much of the danger of consolidation, and 
 of the great and well-grounded fear of the union of all powers in 
 this Government. Now, Sir, when we shall be brought to the state 
 of things in which all the circulating paper of the country shall be 
 issued direcUy by the Treasury Department, under the immediate 
 control of the Executive, we shall have consolidation with a 
 witness ! 
 
 Mr. President, this experiment will not amuse the people of this 
 country. They are quite too serious to be amused. Their suf- 
 fering is too intense to be sported with. 
 
 Assuredly, Sir, they wih not be patient as bleeding lambs 
 under the deprivation of great present good, and the menace of un- 
 bearable future evils. They are not so unthinking — so stupid, I 
 may almost say — as to forego the rich blessings now in their actual 
 enjoyment, and trust the future to the contingencies and the 
 chances which may betide an unnecessary and a wild experiment. 
 They will not expose themselves at once to injury and to ridicule. 
 They will not buy reproach and scorn at so dear a rate. They 
 will not purchase the pleasure of being laughed at by all mankind 
 at a price quite so enormous. 
 
 Mr. President, the objects avowed, in this most extraordinary 
 measure, are altogether undesirable. The end, if it could be 
 obtained, is an end fit to be strenuously avoided ; and the process 
 adopted to carry on the experiment, and to reach that end (which 
 it can never attain, and which, in that respect, wholly fails), does 
 not fail, meantime, to spread far and wide a deep and general 
 distress, and to agitate the country beyond any thing which has 
 heretofore happened to us in a time of peace. 
 
 Sir, the people, in my opinion, will not support this experiment. 
 They feel it to be afflictive, and they see it to be ridiculous ; and 
 
321 
 
 ere long, I verily believe, they will sweep it away with the resist- 
 less breath of their own voice, and bury it up with the great mass 
 of the detected delusions and rejected follies of other times. I 
 seek. Sir, to shun all exaggeration. I avoid studiously all inflam- 
 mation and all embjazoning. But I beseech gentlemen to open 
 their eyes and their ears to what is passing in the country, and not 
 to deceive themselves with the hope that things can long remain 
 as they are, or that any beneficial change will come until the 
 present policy shall be totally abandoned. I attempted, Sir, the 
 other day, to describe shortly the progress of the public distress. 
 Its first symptom was spasm, contraction, agony. It seizes first 
 the commercial and trading classes. Some suivive it, and some 
 do not. But those who, with whatever loss, effort, and sacrifice, 
 get through the crisis without absolute bankruptcy, take good care 
 to make no new ensfa^ements till there shall be a change of times. 
 They abstain from all further undertakings ; and this brings the 
 pressure immediately home to those who live by their employments. 
 That great class now begin to feel the distress. Houses, warehouses, 
 and sliips, are not now, as usual, put under contract in the cities. 
 ^Manufacturers are besiinnina; to dismiss their hands on the sea-coast 
 and in the interior; and our artisans and mechanics, acting for 
 themselves only, are likely soon to feel a severe want of employ- 
 ment in their several occupations. 
 
 This, Sir, is the real state of things. It is a state of things 
 which is daily growing worse and worse. It calls loudly for rem- 
 edy ; the people demand remedy, and they are likely to persist in 
 that demand till remedy shall come. 
 
 For one, Sir, I have no new remedy to propose. My sentiments 
 are known. I am for rechartering the Bank, for a longer or a 
 shorter time, and with more or less of modification. I am for trying 
 no new experiments on the property, the employments and the 
 happiness of the whole people. 
 
 Our proper course appears to me to be as plain and direct as 
 the Pennsylvania Avenue. The evil which the country endures, 
 although entirely new in its extent, its depth, and its severity, is 
 not new in its class. Other such like evils, but of much milder 
 form, we have felt in former times. In former times, we have 
 been obliged to encounter the ills of disordered currency, of a 
 general want of confidence, and of depreciated State bank paper. 
 To these evils we have applied the remedy of a weU-constituted 
 national bank, and have found it effectual. I am for trying it again. 
 Approved by forty years' experience, sancfioned by all successive 
 administradons, and by Congress at all times, and called for, as I 
 verily believe, at this very moment, by a vast majority of the 
 people, on what ground do we resist the remedy of a national 
 bank.'' It is painful, Sir, most painful, to allude to the extraor- 
 
 VOL. II. 41 
 
322 
 
 dlnary position of the different branches of the Government ; but 
 it is necessary to allude to it. This House has once passed a bill 
 for rechartering the present Bank. The other House has also 
 passed it, but it has been negatived by the President ; and it is 
 understood that strong objections exist with the Executive to any 
 bank incorporated, or to be incorporated, by Congress. 
 
 Sir, I think the country calls, and has a right to call, on the 
 Executive to reconsider these objections, if they do exist. Per- 
 emptory objections to all banks created by Congress have not yet 
 been formally announced. I hope they will not be. I think the 
 country demands a revision of any opinions which may have been 
 formed on this matter, and demands, in its own name, and for the 
 sake of the suffering people, that one man's opinion, however 
 elevated, may not oppose the general judgment. No man in this 
 country should say, in relation to a subject of such immense in- 
 terest, that my single will shall be the law. 
 
 Tt does not become any man, in a government like this, to 
 stand proudly on his own opinion, against the whole country. I 
 shall not believe, until it shall be so proved, that the Executive 
 will so stand. He has, himself, more than once, recommended 
 the subject to the consideration of the people, as a subject to be 
 discussed, reasoned on, and decided. And if the public will, man- 
 ifested through its regular organs, the Houses of Congress, shall 
 demand a recharter for a longer or a shorter time, with modifi- 
 cations to remove reasonable and even plausible objections, I am 
 not prepared to believe that the decision of the two Houses, thus 
 acting in conformity to the known will of the people, will meet a 
 flat negative. I shall not credit that, till I see it. I certainly shall 
 propose, ere long, if no change or no other acceptable proposition, 
 be made, to make the trial. As I see no other practical mode of 
 relief, I am for putting this to the test. The first thing to be done 
 is to approve or disapprove the Secretary's reasons. Let us come 
 to the vote, and dispose of those reasons. In the mean time, 
 public opinion is manifesting itself It appears to me to grow daily 
 stronger and stronger. The moment must shortly come when it 
 will be no longer doubtful whether the general public opinion does 
 call for a recharter of the Bank. When that moment comes, I 
 am for passing the measure, and shall propose it. I believe it will 
 pass this House ; I believe it cannot be, and will not be, defeated 
 in the other, unless relief appears in some other form. 
 
 Public opinion will have its way in the houses of legislation 
 and elsewhere : the people are sovereign ; and whatever they de- 
 termine to obtain must be yielded to them. This is my belief, 
 and this is my hope. I am for a bank as a measure of expe- 
 diency, and, under our present circumstances, a measure of neces- 
 sity. I yield to no new-fangled opinions, to no fantastical experi- 
 
323 
 
 ments. I stand by the tried policy of the country. I go for the 
 safety of property, for the protection of industry, for the security 
 of the currency. And, for the preservation of all these great ends, 
 I am for a bank ; and, as the measure most likely to succeed, I 
 am for continuing this Bank, with modifications, for a longer or a 
 shorter period. This is the measure which I shall propose, and, 
 on this question, I refer myself, widiout hesitation, to the decision 
 of the country. 
 
 At a subsequent period of the same debate, in answer to observations of Mr. 
 Forsyth 
 
 Mr. Webster said : The gentleman asks. What could be done 
 if this House should pass a bill renewing the Bank charter, and 
 the other House should reject it } Sir, all I can say to this is, that 
 the question would then be one between that other House and the 
 people. I speak, Sir, of that honorable House with the same 
 respect as of this. Neither is likely to be found acting, for a long 
 time, on such a question as this, against the clear and well-ascer- 
 tained sense of the country. Depend upon it, Sir, depend upon 
 it, this " experiment " cannot succeed. It will fail — it has failed — 
 it is a complete failure already 
 
 Something, then, is to be done', and what is it ? Congress 
 cannot adjourn, leaving the country in its present condition. This 
 is certain. Each House, then, as I think, will be obliged to pro- 
 pose something, or to concur in something. Public opinion will 
 require it. Sir, negative votes settle nothing. If either House 
 should vote against a bank to-day, nothing would be determined 
 by it, except for the moment. The proposition would be renewed, 
 or something else proposed. The great error lies in imagining 
 that the country will be quieted and settled, if one House, or 
 even both, should pass votes approving the conduct of the Secre- 
 tary in removing the public deposits. This is a grand mistake. 
 The disturbing and exciting causes exist, not in men's opinions, 
 but in men's affairs. It is not a question of theoretic right or 
 wrong, but a question of deep suffering, and of necessary relief. 
 No votes, no decisions, still less any debates, in Congress, will 
 restore the country to its former condition without the interposition 
 and aid of some positive measure of relief. Such a measure will 
 be proposed : it will, I trust, pass this House. Should it be re- 
 jected elsewhere, consequences will not lie at our door. But I 
 have the most entire belief, that, from absolute necessity, and from 
 the imperative dictate of the public will, a proper measure must 
 pass, and will pass, into the form of law. 
 
 The honorable gentleman, like others, always takes it for 
 
324 
 
 granted, as a settled point, that the people of the United States 
 have decided that the present Bank shall not he renewed. I he- 
 lieve no such thing. I see no evidence of any such decision. It 
 is easy to assume all this. The Secretary assumed it, and gen- 
 tlemen follow his example, and assume it themselves. Sir, I think 
 the lapse of a iew months will correct the mistake, both of the 
 Secretary and of the gendemen. 
 
 The honorable member has suggested another idea, calculated, 
 perhaps, to produce a momentary impression. It has been urged 
 in other quarters ; and it is, that, if the Bank charter be renewed 
 now, it will necessarily become perpetual. Sir, if the gentleman 
 only means that, if we now admit the necessity or utility of a 
 national bank, we must always, for similar reasons, have one here- 
 after, I say, with frankness, that, in my opinion, unul some great 
 change of circumstances shall take place, a national institution of 
 that kind will always be found useful. But if he desires to pro- 
 duce a belief that a renewal of its charter now would make this 
 Bank perpetual, under its present form, or under any form, I do 
 not at all concur in his opinion. Sir, nobody proposes to renew 
 the Bank, except for a limited period. At the expiration of that 
 period, it will be in the power of Congress, just as fully as it is 
 now, to continue its charter still further, or to amend it, or let it 
 altogether expire. And what harm or danger is there in this? 
 The charter of the Bank of England, always granted for limited 
 periods, has been often renewed, with various conditions and 
 alterations, and has now existed, I think, under these renewals, 
 nearly one hundred and fifty years. Its last term of years was 
 about expiring recently, and the Reform Parliament have seen no 
 wiser way of proceeding than to incorporate into it such amend- 
 ments as experience had shown necessary, and to give it a new 
 lease. And this, as it appears to me, is precisely the course which 
 the interest of the people of the United States requires in regard 
 to our own Bank. The danger of perpetuity is wholly unfounded, 
 and all alarm on that score is but false alarm. The Bank, if re- 
 newed, will be as much subject to the will and pleasure of Con- 
 gress, as a new bank with a similar charter, and will possess no 
 more claim than a new one for further continuance hereafter. 
 
 The honorable gentleman quotes me, Mr. President, as having 
 said, on a former occasion, that, if Congress shall refuse to re- 
 charter the Bank, the country will yet live through the difficulty. 
 Why, certainly, Sir, I trust it will live through it. I believe the 
 country capable of self-government, and that they will remedy not 
 only such evils as they cannot live through, but other evils also, 
 which they could live through, and which they would bear, if 
 necessary, but which, nevertheless, being great evils, and wholly 
 unnecessary, they are not disposed to endure. Is the gentleman 
 
325 
 
 entirely satisfied, if be can only persuade himself that the country 
 can live under the evils inflicted on it by these measures of the 
 Executive Government ? Sir, I doubt not the people will live 
 through their difficulties ; and one way of living through them is 
 to put a speedy close to them. The people have only to will it, 
 and all their present sufferings are at an end. These suflerings flow 
 from no natural cause. They come not from famine or pestilence, 
 nor from invasion or war, or any external public calamity. They 
 spring directly and exclusively from the unwise and unjustifiable 
 interference of the Secretary of the Treasury with the public 
 moneys. By this single act, he has disordered the revenue, de- 
 ranged the currency, "broken up commercial confidence, created 
 already a thousand bankruptcies, and brought the whole business 
 of the country into a state of confusion and dismay. This is a 
 political evil, and a political evil only. It arises from misman- 
 agement entirely and exclusively. This mismanagement, this sole 
 cause of the whole distress, the people can correct. They have 
 but to speak the word, and it is done. They have but to say so, 
 and the public treasure will return to its proper place, and die 
 public prosperity resume its accustomed course. 
 
 They have but to utter this supreme conunand, these words of 
 high behest ; they have but to give to the public voice that im 
 perative unity which all must hear, and aU must obey ; and the 
 reign of misrule and the prevalence of disaster will expire together. 
 Public sufferings will then be removed by removing their cause. 
 Political mischiefs will be repaired by political redress. That 
 which has been unwisely done will be wisely undone; and this is 
 the way, Sir, in which an enlightened and independent people live 
 through their difficulties. And, Sir, I look to no other source for 
 relief; but I look confidenfly to this. I dare not, indeed, under 
 present appearances, predict an immediate termination of present 
 trouble : that would be rash. It may take time for the people to 
 understand one another in different parts of the country, and to 
 unite in their objects and in their means. Circumstances may 
 delay fliis union of purpose and union of effort. I knoW there 
 are powerful causes, now in full activity, which may not only 
 prolong, but increase, the commotion of the political elements. I 
 see indications that a storm is on the wing. I am not ignorant of 
 the probable approach of a crisis in which contending parties, and 
 contending passions, are to be intensely excited; in which the 
 great interests of the country are all to be deeply convulsed ; and 
 which, in its consequences, may even touch the action of the 
 Government itself. In preparing to meet such a crisis, should it 
 come, I found myself on those great truths, which our own expe- 
 rience and the experience of all other nations have established. 
 
326 
 
 I yield to no new-fangled theories, to no wild and rash experi- 
 ments. I stand, too, upon those high duties which the Constitution 
 of the country has devolved upon us; and, thus holding on, and 
 holding fast, by acknowledged truth and manifest duty, I shall 
 take events as they come; and although these black and por- 
 tentous clouds may break on our heads, and the tempest over- 
 power us for a while, still that can never be forever overwhelmed, 
 that can never go finally to the bottom, which truth and duty 
 bear up. 
 
 On Friday, March 7, in presenting a memorial from the Building Mechanics 
 of the City and County of Philadelphia, Mr. Webster addressed the Senate 
 as follows : — 
 
 I RISE, Sir, to perform a pleasing duty. It is to lay before the 
 Senate the proceedings of a meeting of the building mechanics of 
 the City and County of Philadelphia, convened for the purpose of 
 expressing their opinions on the present state of the country, on the 
 24th of February. This meeting consisted of three thousand 
 jpersons, and was composed of carpenters, masons, brickmakers, 
 bricklayers, painters and glaziers, lime-burners, plasterers, lumber 
 merchants, and others, whose occupations are connected with the 
 building of houses. I am proud. Sir, that so respectable, so 
 important, and so substantial a class of mechanics have intrusted 
 me with the presentment of their opinions and feelings, respecting 
 the present distress o,f the country, to the Senate. I am happy if 
 they have seen, in the course pursued by me here, a policy favor- 
 able to the protection of their interest, and the prosperity of their 
 families. These intelligent and sensible men — these highly-useful 
 citizens — have witnessed the effect of the late measures of Govern- 
 ment upon their own concerns ; and the resolutions which I have 
 now to present, fully express their convictions on the subject. 
 They propose not to reason, but to testify ; they speak what they 
 do know. 
 
 Mr. President, the members of this meeting have not transmitted 
 their proceedings by mail ; nor have they rested satisfied with 
 merely causing them, in any way, to reach the two Houses of 
 Congress, and to be read and disposed of in the ordinary manner. 
 They have forwarded them by a committee of thirty persons of 
 their own body ; and those thirty persons are now within the walls 
 of the Senate. I wish. Sir, that honorable Senators would con- 
 verse with these gentlemen ; I wish they would use the oppor- 
 tunity of satisfying themselves of their intelligence, their fairness, 
 their freedom from the influence of all oblique or improper mo- 
 tives, and the unquestionable truth of the existence of that distress 
 
327 
 
 which they come here to represent. Such a communication 
 would convince honorable members, that there is no pretence, no 
 fiction, no exaggeration, in the whole matter; but that all their 
 words are words of truth and soberness. 
 
 Mr. President, Congress has now been a good while in session. 
 When we left our respective homes, the pressure had not come 
 on ; and we left our friends and neighbors prosperous and happy. 
 We have been here three months, without intercourse with our 
 constituents and our neighbors. In the meantime, the whole con- 
 dition of things is changed, fearfully changed ; and, I verily be- 
 lieve, we do not fully know or feel the full extent of this change, 
 and all the difficulty and distress which now pervade the people. 
 If we were at home ; if we were each in our own respective circles, 
 amidst the men of business, and mingling with all classes ; and if 
 we were hearing, as in that case we should hear, every hour, of 
 more and more trouble, of new individual disasters, and of still 
 increasing fear and alarm ; and if we could witness, as we then 
 should witness, the despondency of those heads of families whose 
 occupations and means of living have been thus suddenly cut off, 
 we should be convinced that it is the imperative and solemn duty 
 of Congress to relieve the country without a moment's delay. 
 Sir, if half the time and the study, which are now devoted to the 
 finding out of plausible arguments to justify the Secretary, were 
 given to an honest and thorough inquiry into the real state of the 
 country, I fully believe all would see the absolute necessity of im- 
 mediate redress. Sir, while we sit here, in long debates, the 
 country is plunging deeper and deeper in distress. We must not 
 turn away from this. Sir, let us keep our eyes earnestly on the 
 country ; for, be assured, the eyes of the country are kept earnesdy 
 on us. And let us. Sir, take this occasion to look into facts, and 
 examine particulars. Let us see whether there be any thing, and, 
 if so, what it is, of which these, our fellow-citizens, complain. 
 Do they only join in a general cry raised by others ? Do they 
 deal in unmeaning generalities, and set up an undefined and invisi- 
 ble cause of distress .'' Sir, listen to the statement ; hear the facts. 
 The committee state. Sir, that eight thousand persons are 
 ordinarily employed in building houses, in the city and county of 
 Philadelphia — a number which, with their families, would make 
 quite a considerable town. They further state, that the average 
 number of houses, which this body of mechanics has built, for the 
 last five years, is twelve hundred houses a year. The average 
 cost of these houses is computed at two thousand, dollars each. 
 Here is a business, then. Sir, of tivo millions four hundred thou- 
 sand dollars a year. Such has been the average of the last five 
 years. And what is it now ? Sir, the committee state that the 
 business has fallen off seventy-five per cent, at least ; that is to 
 
^ 
 
 328 
 
 say, that, at most, only one quarter part of their usual employment 
 now remains. This is the season of the year in which building 
 contracts are made. It is now known what is to be the business 
 of the year. Many of these persons, who have heretofore had, 
 every year, contracts for several houses on hand, have this year no 
 contract at all. They have been obliged to dismiss their hands, to 
 turn them over to any scraps of employment they could find, or to 
 leave them in idleness, for want of any employment. But, Sir, 
 let us look into the particulars of this case still a httle further. ^ It 
 is well for us to dwell on them. As we have facts before 
 us useful for us to know, let us not hasten away from them. 
 
 Sir, how has this building business been usually carried on ? 
 Has it been by employing these mechanics as mere day-laborers ^ 
 No, Sir; that, probably, would be generally the case in other 
 countries ; but in this, hitherto, and especially of late years, some- 
 thing better has been done by the building mechanics. Many of 
 our young beginners, say the committee, buy a lot, partly for cash, 
 and perhaps mostly on credit. They go to work, and build a 
 house upon it ; those who furnish bricks and lumber having a lien 
 on the land for their security. They thus unite capital, or its sub- 
 stitute, credit, with their labor ; and by prudent management, in 
 prosperous times, they are able to sell their houses, when thus 
 built and completed, at prices handsomely remunerating them. 
 They are thus proprietors and owners, as well as laborers ; and 
 this practical ownership of property, this substantial interest in the 
 community, is one of the causes which give independence and 
 respectability to the mechanics in the cities of the United States, 
 far beyond the general experience of other countries. But see, 
 Sir, how the Secretary's " experiment " has affected the interest 
 of these persons. On the one hand, they can now obtain no new 
 credits, they can commence no new operations on their own ac- 
 count, and other and richer persons will not build houses in the 
 present state of things ; so that these mechanics are out of employ- 
 ment ; and, on the other hand, nobody buys, at fair and usual 
 prices, the houses which they have already built ; but they are 
 obliged to sell them to capitalists, or others, at great loss. At 
 the same time, therefore, that they are deprived of employment 
 for the present, and the hope of it for the future, they are sub- 
 jected, also, to great sacrifices in the earnings of former years. 
 
 These, Sir, are plain matters of fact ; and they are manifestly 
 the results of the measures of Government : and have not these 
 mechanics, then, a right to complain? Ought they to hold their 
 tongues, and starve, in order to enable the Secretary to try his 
 experiment ? Are they to be the willing victims of such fantasti- 
 cal and arrogant schemes? No, Sir; that is not their notion of 
 patriotism and duty. They think the Government was established 
 
329 
 
 for them, and the rest of the people of the United States, for their 
 protection, security, and happiness. They think it not a subject 
 for the practice of every raw conceit, every presumptuous theory, 
 every impulse of arrogant and self-sufficient love of change. Sir, 
 they are not the dupes of the Secretary's experiment; and, if they 
 can help it, they do not intend to be its victims. They know full 
 well in what purpose these measures originated, which have since 
 obtained the name of the "experiment." They think they have 
 a right to demand of Congress not to sanction such purposes, to 
 their ruin. As American citizens, they demand the shelter of the 
 laws ; as tax-payers to Government, they demand the protection 
 of Government ; as industrious citizens, they demand security for 
 their industry ; and they protest, solemnly protest — in their name, 
 Sir, in their behalf, in their presence, I now enter their protest — 
 against these unnecessary and wanton measures, which destroy 
 their property, break up their employments, and reduce them and 
 their children to want and beggary ! 
 
 Mr. President, the Senate will perceive, that, in one of the reso- 
 lutions, this meeting of mechanics expressed their hope that the 
 governor of Pennsylvania would adhere to his former opinions, 
 and lend his countenance and support to the restoration of the cur- 
 rency, by rechartering the Bank. In this hope they have been 
 disappointed. They feel it to be a great misfortune, certainly, that 
 they do not come here, sustained by the government of the State 
 at home. No doubt, Sir, it is a great misfortune ; at least, I agree 
 with them in thinking it such. They most assuredly had expected 
 a different result to the governor's deliberations. In addition to 
 their intense individual interest in this great question, they feel an 
 interest, also, in the public works of the State, which have come, 
 or may come, to a stop, in consequence of the pressure of the 
 times ; although it is true, perhaps, that they have not so direct an 
 interest as their fellow-citizens of Lancaster county, whose me- 
 morial has just been presented, since the great western railway is 
 to penetrate that important county from end to end. I refer to 
 the proceedings of Governor Wolf, Sir, with entire respect, personal 
 and public ; but I cannot help expressing my deep regret at the 
 views which he seems to have adoj)ted. I would even hope that 
 the subject has not yet passed beyond his reconsideration, because 
 I am fully aware of the weight and influence of Pennsylvania on 
 this great question. Yet, Sir, I see nothing in this proceeding to 
 alter my own view in the slightest degree. The state of things is 
 not changed. The promulgation of such opinions by the chief 
 magistrate of Pennsylvania, is, in my judgment, unfortunate, be- 
 cause its only effect is to prolong the sufferings of the country, by- 
 postponing the only adequate remedy. 
 
 Sir, the agitations of the country are not to be hushed by au- 
 voL. II. 42 
 
n 
 
 330 
 
 tliority. Opinions, from however high quarters, will not quitrt 
 them. The condition of the nation calls for action, for measures, 
 for the prompt interposition of Congress ; and, until Congress shall 
 act, be it sooner or be it later, there will be no content, no repose, 
 no restoration of former prosperity. Whoever supposes, Sir, that 
 he, or that any man, can quiet the discontents, or hush the com- 
 plaints of the people, by merely saying, " Peace, be still ! " mis- 
 takes, shockingly mistakes, the real condition of things. It is an 
 agitation of interests, not of opinions ; a severe pressure on men's 
 property and their means of living, not a barren contest about 
 abstract sentiments. Even, Sir, the voice of party, often so sove- 
 reign, is not of power to subdue discontents and stifle complaints. 
 The people. Sir, feel great interests to be at stake ; and they are 
 rousing themselves to protect those interests. They consider the 
 question to be, whether the government is made for the people, or 
 the people for the government. They hold tlie former of these 
 two propositions, and they mean to prove it. 
 
 Mr. President, this measure of the Secretary has produced a 
 degree of evil that cannot be borne. Talk about it as we 
 will, it cannot be borne. A tottering state of credit ; cramped 
 means; loss of property, and loss of employment ; doubts of 
 the condition of others ; doubts of their own condition ; constant 
 fear of failures and new explosions ; an awful dread of the future, — 
 Sir, vi^hen a consciousness of all these things accompanies a man, 
 at his breakfast, his dinner, and his supper ; when it attends him 
 through his hours both of labor and rest ; when it even disturbs 
 and haunts his dreams ; and when he feels, too, that that which is 
 thus gnawing upon him is the pure result of foolish and rash 
 measures of Government, — depend upon it, he will not bear it. A 
 deranged and disordered currency ; the ruin of occupation ; distress 
 for present means ; the prostration of credit and confidence ; and all 
 this without hope of improvement or change, — is a state of things 
 which no intelligent people can long endure. 
 
 On Tuesday, March 18th, Mr. Webster presented a Memorial from 
 citizens of Boston, with the following remarks : — 
 
 Mr. Webster said, that it would be perceived by the 
 Senate, that he had a roll before him of no ordinary dimensions. 
 It was a protest, respectfully addressed to both Houses of Con- 
 gress, against the recent proceedings of the Executive Government 
 in regard to the public moneys of the United States, and urgently 
 requesting Congress, by the interposition of its own just authority. 
 
331 
 
 to restore the Constitution and laws to that free and proper action 
 which the public interest and prosperity demanded. This paper, 
 Sir, said Mr. W., proceeded from a place not altogether obscure — 
 not altogether unknown in the history of the United States. It 
 came from the people of Boston, assembled in Faneuil Hall : it 
 came from those walls in which the earliest accents of independence 
 rang — from under that roof beneath which olir young American 
 Libm-ty shook her wings, ere she went forth, for the first time, to fly 
 over a thousand hills, and to proclaim independence to three mil- 
 lions of souls. It was sent by those, and the sons of those, who, 
 in the same place, in '74, '75, and '76, had heard the voices of 
 Otis, of Warren, and of Hancock, and who gave to those distin- 
 guished speakers as much patriotic impulse as they received from 
 them. 
 
 This paper, Mr. W. said, was signed by 6841 independent 
 voters, tax-payers, and men of property of the city of Boston. 
 Here were no men of straw. This paper presented the names of 
 men of different habits and occupations, electors of that city ; and, 
 so far as he knew, of a greater number of persons than any excited 
 election had ever called together before. The names were here 
 for the inspection of the Senate ; and his colleague, who was well 
 acquainted with many of them, could vouch for their high standing 
 and respectability. Whatever character the memorial might bear 
 elsewhere, it here challenged investigation. The sentiments of the 
 meeting at which the memorial was agreed upon approached nearer 
 to a feeling of unanimity than was usual on such occasions ; and the 
 strictest examination would be unable to detect in it any fault, even 
 if accidental error could be discovered. This memorial had no 
 secret communication with the Government, or any department of 
 it. He had heard, it was true, of attempts which had been made 
 to influence some departments of the Government by communi- 
 cations not destined to see the light, or to reach the public ear. 
 He would not say, that by such communications the President had 
 been deceived, but he would say, that, if he listened to them, there 
 was great danger of his being deceived ; and he hoped he would 
 look with great caution at any paper which came to him without 
 his possessing a full knowledge of those who framed it. 
 
 An honorable Senator from Tennessee, early in the session, ex- 
 pressed an opinion, with regard to these representations to Congress, 
 equally sound and liberal. He said he looked with distrust on any 
 proceedings which had been got up by those who had any interest 
 in the ofhces of the Government. No such interest influenced 
 tliose whose memorial he (Mr. Webster) now presented : they 
 had no party feelings which would induce them to uphold the evils 
 produced by the measures of those who administered the Govern- 
 ment ; and they had no motives to make them causeless fault- 
 
332 
 
 finders with the Chief Magistrate. He (the Chief Magistrate) 
 has been recently with them, and they had received him with 
 hospitality and cordiality. They had not all of them, though 
 many had, preferred him for the distinguished station to which he 
 had been elevated ; but all saw that a majority so large as to com- 
 mand respect, had placed him at the head of the government, and 
 they cheerfully acquiesced. They wished nothing else but that he 
 should complete the second term of his presidency, with as much 
 honor as had distinguished any of his illustrious predecessors. 
 They were not eager complainants against the measures of the 
 Administration ; they were not swift witnesses in the cause in 
 which they were engaged ; they had not rushed forward to make 
 known their sense of their own grievances at an early hour ; they 
 had not raised the cry of distress, whether distress existed or not ; 
 they came to speak their sentiments with moderation and firmness ; 
 they came to speak of their sufferings, and to describe a state of 
 things they knew to exist. 
 
 This paper has been brought here by a committee of gentlemen, 
 who, as they were his neighbors and friends, he could hardly speak 
 of them with delicacy ; and especially as some of them were as 
 well known to Congress as to himself, and needed no recommen- 
 dation from him. They were gentlemen of different relations in 
 life, social and political. They came here to testify to what they 
 knew ; to present a state of things, which they believed the ma- 
 jority of Congress could not realize, and which they believed they 
 could not, without actual and personal participation, understand. 
 Their mission was to Congress — they had no order to go elsewhere 
 for relief — had no message for any other department of the Gov- 
 ernment ; and, believing that the evils of which they complain 
 admitted only of legislative remedy, they came to the Legislature. 
 Believing the law to have been violated, they came to Congress ; 
 believing that distress exists to a calamitous extent, and believing 
 that no other power on earth can relieve it, their commission is to the 
 Senate and House of Representatives of the United States ex- 
 clusively. Their protest was on such a subject, that no consid- 
 eration on earth could have induced them to sign such a paper, 
 had it not been for that alarming, shocking state of things, so 
 deeply affecting the public interests. Had not all incredulity on 
 the subject become satisfied ? Had not the whole of the popu- 
 lation, from Maine to New Orleans, been satisfied? Had not all 
 their doubts been silenced ? If there be on the vast surface of 
 this happy country, on the sides of its fertile hills, and in the soil 
 of its rich valleys — if there be any spot so favored, that distress 
 has not reached it — let the inhabitants of that spot rejoice ; but let 
 them rejoice with fear and with trembling ; for so sure as the light 
 of the sun — if he might compare what was beneficent in action 
 
333 
 
 with that which was deleterious — so sure as the rays of the sun 
 would, in due time, penetrate the deepest shades of the forest — so 
 sure was it that the distress which now affected the industry and 
 prosperity of a great part of the country, must act every where 
 and be felt every where. In the opinion of these memorialists, the 
 act of the Secretary of the Treasury in removing the public de- 
 posits from the Bank of the United States, plainly violated the char- 
 tered rights of that corporation. And was it not so ? The act 
 was unrepealed. The benefit that was intended to be conferred 
 on the Bank for the services it was to render the Government, was 
 not at present enjoyed by it. It had been deprived, then, of one 
 part, and that the principal part, of the consideration which formed 
 the ground of the contract which had been entered into with the 
 Government. How had it been deprived ? The courts were open 
 — had it been summoned into them .'' The law was in operation — 
 had it been made to act on the Bank as a delinquent corporation ? 
 No. No one arraigned it before a tribunal. Nobody brought it 
 to trial for a violation of law. It existed, had its functions, as a 
 corporation ; but it was deprived of one of the principal advantages 
 secured to it by its charter, and deprived for such reasons as were 
 before the Senate and before the country. 
 
 The memorialists were not unaware, that, if rights were attacked, 
 attempts would be made to render those whose rights were violated, 
 odious. Power always sought such subjects upon which to try its ex- 
 periments. The individuals to whom he had reference, protested 
 against the Executive denunciation of the Bank. They protested 
 against the Executive Chief Magistrate raising, waging, and carry- 
 ing on war against that corporation. They thought they saw the 
 cause that had produced their present distress in the relations that 
 had existed between the Government and the Bank. Might not 
 we distinctly see the origin of that controversy which had so much 
 agitated, and still did agitate, the country, and which carried so much 
 distress to every family ? Was it not assumed from the beginning, 
 and did it not still assume the character of a warfare between the 
 President of the United States and the government of the Bank of the 
 United States ? It had not only been said in the common vehicles 
 of party exultation and commendation, but it had been said within 
 the walls of Congress, that in triumphing over that insthution — in con- 
 quering it — in bringing it to the feet of the President — he would 
 earn for himself a more flourishing garland, a more glorious victory, 
 than he won by the battle of New Orleans. The sentiment in 
 which that mode of commendation sprung was easy to be seen. 
 He feared there was a love of conquest — a thirst for victorious strug- 
 gles — a delight in triumphing, which had brought on the conflict 
 between the Administration and the Bank, while the interests of the 
 people were crushed between active and defensive operations. 
 
334 
 
 The memorialists thought that such a controversy was out of 
 place between the President and the Bank — that the origin of his 
 action should be far above it — that neither the Bank nor any other 
 corporation should entitle itself to any share of his personal hostil- 
 ity. They therefore protested against the continuance of that war 
 between the Executive on the one hand and the Bank on the other, 
 as it was destructive to them, injurious to the whole country, and 
 was not a little discreditable to its character in the eyes of the 
 world. They protested against the act of the Executive, in regard 
 to the public treasure, as tending to bring about that state of things 
 which the gentleman from Kentucky had so often presented to the 
 Senate — the union of the purse and the sword. They recognized 
 the Chief Magistrate as the commander-in-chief of the army 
 and navy of the United States ; they recognized in Congress the 
 power and duty to guard the national resources ; and they thought 
 that the withdrawing of the public revenue, from a place fixed by 
 law, settled by the charter of the Bank, for reasons connected in 
 no way with the safe-keeping of the moneys, but on account of 
 opinion's sake, was an unauthorized act. After reasoning, and after 
 inquiry upon the subject, the moneys were acknowledged to be 
 safe. Congress having recently acted on the subject, and having 
 seen no reason for the change, they were of opinion, that the rea- 
 sons given for the removal of the public treasure, were altogether 
 indefensible. 
 
 They thought that the effect of the measure was to augment the 
 rapidity of certain tendencies which they believed had attended 
 the Government for some years past ; and that was the tendency 
 to increase power and influence in the Executive hands. They 
 were of opinion, that the subtraction of the public revenue from a 
 custody where it was under the eye of Congress, to a custody 
 where it was only under the eye of the Secretary of the Treasur)^, 
 was one great proof of the existence of the tendency to increase 
 Executive power. Were they not right .'' Where were the public 
 treasures of the United States } No man in that Senate knew ; no 
 man in the other House knew. The last time that the Senate 
 had heard of them, they were deposited in certain banks not 
 created or fixed by the will of Congress. They might be changed, 
 for aught the Senate knew, within the last half hour, to some 
 other place which it knew not. What was (said Mr. W.) the 
 condition of the treasure six months ago ? Was it situated as it is 
 now ? Did not every member know where the money was then ? 
 — and had not Congress an account of it, and could see that it 
 was all there ? Had Congress any such right now ? Had that 
 House, or the other, the power to go to the Bank of the Metrop- 
 olis, or to the Manhattan Bank, in order to see that the money 
 deposited in those places was safe? The Executive had now 
 
335 
 
 the preservation of the public treasure, and Congress had no 
 control over it. 
 
 It was a fact not to be denied, that every dollar of the public 
 money — ordinarily eight to ten millions — between the moment of 
 its receipt at the custom-house and the land-offices — to the mo- 
 ment of its appropriation under the authority of law, was under 
 the entire, exclusive government of the Secretary of the Treasury — 
 Congress knew not where — Congj-ess declared not how. 
 
 The memorialists thought that this withdrawing of the public 
 money from the inspection of Congress, from the guardianship of 
 Congress, and placing it where it was subject to the guardianship 
 and control of the officers of the Executive Government, was an 
 encroachment upon the just rights of both houses of Congress. 
 They protested against that violation of the spirit of the Constitu- 
 tion. They professed themselves to be in favor of a nadonal 
 bank ; but that was a matter which they would leave most cheer- 
 fully to the wisdom of Congress. They did not insist upon a 
 national bank ; that might be a measure of expediency or inex- 
 pediency ; but they did insist that the law should be upheld, that 
 the power of Congress should continue to be exercised in regard 
 to the disposal of the public revenue, and that the public treasure 
 should be under the authority of those who had a right to the 
 control of it, according to law. They declared that, in the present 
 state of the country, looking to the effect of those measures, and 
 the extent of the evil, they saw no remedy but in Congress ; they 
 saw no remedy till Congress should take up the subject, and deter- 
 mine to act by its authority, and establish such measures of relief 
 as its wisdom should dictate. 
 
 He entirely agreed with them — he agreed with them altogether, 
 that relief must come from Congress, or through Congress. But 
 he wished to say tliat relief, though it come through the instru- 
 mentality of Congress, must have a higher origin. It could not 
 come from the Executive Department in the first place : the case 
 was past the surgery of all such practidoners. No state doctors, be- 
 ginning where they might, or ending where they might, had power 
 over the present affliction of the community. Not one of them 
 could pluck up this deep-rooted sorrow. It was a case in which the 
 patient must minister to himself. The people must take the 
 remedy into their own hands : they must act, indeed, on the case 
 through Congress, but they must act by their own will, and their 
 own power. 
 
 The spirit, and the only spirit, that could move over the face 
 of these waters, with power to reduce chaos to order ; the only 
 spirit that could cause that elemental strife to subside, and the sun 
 again to appear in the east, — was the intelligent, manly, free spirit 
 of the American people — summoned by the state of the country, 
 
336 
 
 and by tlie state of their own interests, to come and put a check to 
 such usurpations of power, and to apply that remedy which they, 
 and they alone, could apply. 
 
 On Friday, March 28th, on presenting a memorial from citizens of Albany, 
 Mr. Webster said — 
 
 Mr, President : I have the honor to present to the Senate a 
 memorial from the city of Albany. 
 
 New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston, have already 
 laid before Congress the opinions entertained in those cities by 
 men in all classes of society, and of all occupations and condiuons 
 in life, respecting the conduct of the Administration in removing 
 the pubhc deposits. To these Albany now joins her voice — a 
 voice not less clear, not less strong, not less unanimous, than that 
 of her sister cities. 
 
 It is well known to you. Sir, and to gentlemen on the floor of 
 the Senate, that Albany, for its size, is an extremely commercial 
 city. Connected with the sea by one of the noblest rivers on 
 earth, it is placed, also, at the point at or near which many hun- 
 dred miles of inland navigation, from the West and from the North, 
 accumulate the products of a vast and fertile interior, and deliver 
 them, for further transport, into receptacles proper to be borne on 
 tide waters, or to be impelled by steam. In return for these 
 riches of inland industry, thus abundantly poured forth to the sea, 
 Albany receives, of course, large amounts of foreign merchandise, 
 to be forwarded inward, and to be distributed for consumption in 
 the western district of the State, along the shores of the lakes, and 
 even to the banks of the Mississippi itself It is necessarily, there- 
 fore, a place of vast exchanges of property ; in other words, a 
 place of great trade. 
 
 Albany, I believe, Sir, has a population of twenty-eight or thirty 
 thousand people. It has given, I learn, on interesting occasions, 
 nearly, but not quite, thirty-eight hundred votes. The paper. Sir, 
 whose folds I am now unrolling, and which I have risen to present 
 to the Chair, bears twenty-eight hundred names, all believed to be 
 qualified electors. Great pains have been taken to be accurate in 
 this particular ; and if there be a single name to this paper not 
 belonging to a qualihed voter, it is not only here by mistake, but 
 here after careful scrutiny has been had, for the purpose of avoid- 
 ing such mistakes. 
 
 Every man. Sir, whose name is here, is believed to have a right 
 to say, " I am an American citizen ; I possess the elective fran- 
 chise ; I hold the right of suffrage ; I possess and I exercise an 
 
337 
 
 Individual share in the sovereign power of the State ; 1 am one of 
 those principals, whose agent Government is ; and I expect from 
 Government a proper regard to my interests.' 
 
 It will thus be seen, Sn*, that this paper expresses the sentiments 
 of three fourths of as many citizens of Albany as have ever been 
 collected, on any occasion, at the polls of the city. What these 
 sentiments are, the Senate will be at no loss to understand, when 
 the paper shall be read. Its signers possess the faculty of making 
 themselves fully understood. 
 
 This memorial. Sir, is brought hither for the purpose of being 
 laid before Congress, by a committee of eighteen persons. Some 
 of these gendemen are well known within the walls of the capitol, 
 and none of them altogether unknown to members of this or the 
 other House. They come, Sir, to vouch for the general respect- 
 ability of the signers to the memorial. They come to answer for 
 them, as persons capable of perceiving, not only the general fact, 
 that recent measures of Government have deranged the business 
 of society, but of seeing also precisely how those measures have 
 operated on their own business, their own employments, and their 
 own prosperity. 
 
 Unpromising, Sir, as the task is — ungrateful, nay, almost hope- 
 less as it is — this committee has not declined the wish of their iel- 
 low-citizens, that they would bring this solenm appeal to the notice 
 of the two Houses of Congress. They have come to vouch -for 
 the general respectability of the signers of the memorial ; for the 
 fact that they number among them individuals of every class, oc- 
 cupation, employment, profession, and trade, m society. And 
 they come to make good. Sir, the declarations of the memorial as 
 to the state of things actually existing at Albany. 
 
 Albany, Sir, has been flourishing and prosperous, and seemed 
 rapidly rising to greater and greater heights of commercial impor- 
 tance. There are circumstances which would appear to have 
 favored Albany, and to have enabled her to stand the shock better 
 than her neighbors. In addition to her capital, it has been under- 
 stood that she was 'benefited in her money operations, to a consid- 
 erable extent, by the use or the custody of State funds. 
 
 But the Senate will not be surprised to learn, notwithstanding 
 all her advantages, that she has not escaped the general disaster. 
 Whatever else is to be said against the Secretary's measures, they 
 cannot be charged with being partial in their operation. They 
 have the merit of impartiality, inasmuch as they produce universal 
 distress. 
 
 Sir, our condition is peculiar. One hardly knows how to 
 
 describe it. In the midst of all the bounties of Providence, and 
 
 in a time of profound peace, we are poor. Our Secretary of the 
 
 Treasury, Sir, is not Midas. His touch does not turn every thing 
 
 VOL. II. 43 
 
338 
 
 !o gold. It seems rather to turn every thing into stone. It stops 
 the functions, and tlie action, of organized social life, and congeals 
 the whole body politic. It produces a kind of instantaneous petri- 
 faction. We see still the form of our once active social system, 
 but it is vi^ithout life ; we can trace the veins along its cold sur- 
 face, but they are bloodless ; we see the muscles, but they are 
 motionless ; the external form is yet fair and goodly, but there is a 
 cessation of the principle of life within. 
 
 Sir, if one could look at the state of the country, at this moment, 
 who had never heard what that " Experiment " is, which the Sec- 
 retary is trying, he would naturally suppose him to be some nec- 
 romancer, some Prospero, who had power over the principle of 
 action, in the whole nation, and who was amusing himself, by the 
 exercise of that power, in seeing what sort of a spectacle a great, 
 busy, stirring community would exhibit, when his wand should 
 bring all its members to a sudden pause, check them in a moment 
 of great activity, and hold every one in the precise attitude in which 
 he should be found, when the charm begins ; as painters, thougli 
 they cannot represent progressive action on the canvass, can yet rep- 
 resent action suddenly arrested ; or as the interior of the mountains 
 discloses animals caught in full life and vigor, and embedded forever 
 in the subsiding elements of the general deluge. 
 
 Or perhaps, Sir, such a spectator might suppose that our Sec- 
 retary had been imitating infantile curiosity, which thrusts its busy 
 fingers into the opened watch, for the sake of seeing how pretty its 
 little wheels will look when they all stand still. 
 
 But whatever a disinterested beholder might think of the man- 
 ner in which the Secretary is amusing himself with " experiments " 
 upon the nation, the people of Albany have had quite enough of 
 experiment. They find it efficient for every thing but good. 
 There are some things, they admit, which it has fully proved. 
 It has proved the rashness, the delusion, and almost the insanity, of 
 those who undertook it. 
 
 One of the most visible effects of this measure, to the people 
 of Albany, is its check to the growth of the city. It has been fast 
 increasing in houses and in the number of its inhabitants. But 
 here are persons well acquainted with the facts and circumstances, 
 who declare that the houses in building, this year, are not one 
 twentieth the number of the last year. What is to be said in an- 
 swer to that fact ? The caqoenter and the mason are standing still, 
 with the rule and the trowel in their hands, to see when the Sec- 
 retary shall have done with his experiment. 
 
 Albany is a great lumber market. The very large sum of two 
 millions of dollars is usually paid annually for this article, in that 
 city. But there is now no demand for it. The same causes op- 
 
339 
 
 irating elsewhere which operate in Albany, the timber is not wanted, 
 cannot be used, and cannot be paid for. 
 
 A great coasting trade is, also, in ordinary times, carried on from 
 Albany. Lumber and other articles, brought down the canals, 
 are taken down the river, and scattered all along the shore, almost 
 to the eastern extremity of the Union. And we all know what 
 numbers of sloops and steam-boats usually cover the surface of the 
 Hudson, from its mouth to Troy. Last year, as I learn, from 
 thirty to thirty-five steam tow-boats found employment between 
 Troy and Albany and New York. 
 
 This great extent of navigation gave wages, of course, to multi- 
 tudes of industrious men, w^iose present power of finding employ- 
 ment may be judged of lay the fact that six or eight of these boats 
 are at this time adequate to the calls of commerce. The whole 
 business, it is said, has fallen off at least two hundred per cent. 
 
 It is natural to ask. Sir, how the times have affected the useful- 
 ness of the great canal, the true glory of New York, that imper- 
 ishable monument of the fame of a great man — a man of concep- 
 tions large enough to embrace a high and noble purpose, and who 
 had steadiness to pursue that purpose through evil report and good 
 report, let the strife of temporary party do its best, and its worst, 
 until he had accomplished it. lam told. Sir, that along the line of 
 this great work, the quantity of flour now ready to be embarked, 
 when the season of business commences, is not more than equal to 
 one tenth of the amount last year. The wheat is in the country, 
 but there is no demand for it in the city. The farmers and the 
 millers are obliged to keep it on hand. At the commencement of 
 the harvest last year, wheat was worth a dollar a bushel, in the 
 western part of New York, and where, as I am now informed, it 
 goes off heavily at 68 and 70 cents. There are cases in which the 
 article has been carried to the usual place of sale, and carried back 
 again for want of buyers. Indeed, an instance is mentioned of a ves- 
 sel which proceeded, from one of the towns on the river, to New 
 York, lay at the wharf a week, without being able to sell a dollar's 
 worth of her cargo, and then returned back with it to her place of 
 departure. 
 
 It will be at once seen, that those measures of Government, of 
 which the memorialists complain, neutralize the benefits of the 
 canal. They lower the price of wheat, in the western part of 
 the State, as much as the opening of the canal raised it. The 
 cause of all this loss is obvious. There is no market ; and there is 
 no market because there is no money ; and there is no money be- 
 cause the measures of Government have deranged the currency, 
 checked circulation, and shaken credit. 
 
 One of the gentlemen now here is extensively concerned in the 
 
340 
 
 business of transportation on the western and northern canals. 
 He is connected witii lines which owil, together, two hundred canal- 
 boats, and usually employ fourteen or fifteen hundred men, and as 
 many horses. An immediate loss of employment, for at least half 
 of this capital, and of these hands, is already among the conse- 
 quences of the Secretary's experiment. This shows, Sir, how the 
 measures of Government affect wages — ay. Sir, wages — the only 
 source of the poor man's income. Be it remembered, that the 
 Administration is waging war for the benefit of the poor. It has 
 attacked the Bank, laid hold of the public treasures, disregarded the 
 votes of Congress, and thrown the whole country into a state of 
 violent excitement, out of pure sympathy for the poor, and to pro- 
 tect them against the grinding power of moneyed corporations ! 
 Well, Sir, are the poor better off? Are wages higher? Is em- 
 ployment more easily obtained ? Is labor more richly rewarded ? 
 Let the Senate judge of this matter, when I state, as I am author- 
 ized to do, that men in Albany, who, three months ago, were earn- 
 ing and receiving a dollar and a quarter a day, six days in the 
 week, are now soliciting employment, for two days in the week only, 
 and for sixty-two cents a day ! And other industrious men, who 
 were receiving a dollar a day, are now content to work for their 
 board only. 
 
 There is in the city a large manufacture of iron castings for 
 stoves, hollow ware, machinery, Stc. Since December, it is said, 
 this manufacture has fallen off one half, and that a hundred hands 
 have been discharged in a day, most of them heads of families. If 
 this be so, Sir, and the case be but a common one, a fearful account 
 must be running up against those who have heedlessly brought such 
 calamities on the laboring classes. There is also, I hear, a very 
 extensive fur business done in the place ; a single establishment 
 employing no less than five hundred men and women, in the man- 
 ufacture of caps, of which article no less a number than two thou- 
 sand is manufactured daily, in the season of work, if any one can 
 conceive where they find heads for so many. From causes like 
 those which affect other manufactures, this, I hear, is also unfavora- 
 bly affected, as regards the great number of persons to whom it 
 gives employment. 
 
 It would be easy. Sir, to run into other details and other partic- 
 ulars. It would be easy to follow the effects of this derangement 
 of the currency, not only into all classes, but until we find it affect- 
 ing the concerns of all individuals, and touching the home comforts 
 of every family. But such detail would be only repetition. All 
 evidence and all argument must be lost on those who do not 
 already, from what the country exhibits on all sides, see, and feel, 
 and acknowledge, that the distress of the times is universal and 
 unparalleled. 
 
341 
 
 If, indeed, these memorialists, or other petitioners from the same 
 State, needed confirmation in their representation of tlie present 
 state of things, it might be abundantly found in the late communi- 
 cation from the executive of New York to the Legislature. Distress 
 is no fiction, when the extraordinary measure of a State loan is 
 resorted to, to sustain the common operations of business, and to 
 give new credit, or at least new power of accommodation, to the 
 banks. It is no trifle, certainly, when such a measure is proposed, 
 and when it is recommended, not indeed by the executive himself, 
 but by diose who support and justify it, by reference to precedents 
 in revolutionary times, and in the days of State bills of credit. It 
 is no merely pretended state of alarm, when the banks find two 
 millions of their own paper returning upon them, while they curtail 
 their loans but 000,000 dollars. This message, Sir, admits a 
 state of things, and argues upon a state of things, the existence of 
 which has hitherto been loudly denied by nearly all the friends of 
 the Administration. As to the measure proposed by the execu- 
 tive of New York, it becomes me, of course, to say little of it, and, 
 indeed, to say nothing, except so far as not only New York, but the 
 whole country, may have an interest in it. I abstain from any 
 thing of a local nature, or belonging exclusively to State polidcs 
 and State concerns. But, Mr. President, I may be permitted, I 
 hope, to say, that it fills me with deep and unfeigned regret, for the 
 present, and with sad, sad forebodings for the future, to see the 
 great State of New York, instead of concurring in experienced and 
 well-approved national measures, to promote a national object, in 
 tent only on applying local means for local relief. 
 
 Instead of giving a lead, in the national councils, to measures 
 of a general character, such as embrace the whole country, and 
 such as she herself has heretofore repeatedly supported, it is pain- 
 ful to see her denying to this Government powers so long acknowl- 
 edged by herself rightfully to belong to it, and to find her driven to 
 measures of at least a novel and questionable nature, to uphold 
 those interests, which she, and a majority of all the other States, 
 have heretofore not only admitted, but strenuously contended, 
 were confided to the just guardianship of the General Government. 
 
 I observed the other day. Sir, — and I said it neither for the sake of 
 sounding an alarm, nor of turning a sentence, — that if this experiment 
 of the Execufive Government is suffered to go on, it will bring us 
 to consequences nearly touching the powers and the continued 
 action of this Government. I verily think so. As surely, Sir, as 
 you sit in that chair, or as I stand on this floor, our tendencies, at 
 the present moment, are strong towards disorganization, to the times 
 of State securities, bills of credit, separate State currencies, and 
 paper money; and, if those tendencies be not seasonably arrested, 
 they will make shipwreck of our highest interests. The chain of 
 
342 
 
 a common currency, a common standard of value, a common me- 
 dium of exchange, is in imminent danger of being broken. In- 
 duced by our relinquishment of our own just rights, and the aban- 
 donment of our own proper powers and duties, individual States, 
 under an alleged necessity, march on, but without concert or co* 
 operation, to greater and greater control over the currency of the 
 country. 
 
 Whatever gentlemen may say of the limitation of the power of 
 Congress to the exclusive regulation of coin merely, I cannot but 
 be persuaded, that that authority, which is to regulate, by para- 
 mount laws, the commerce between the States, must of course 
 regulate that, whatever it may be, which is to perfoi-m the office of 
 money in carrying on this commerce. Can any man maintain, that 
 the sovereign power over commercial regulation rests in Congress, 
 but that the power, nevertheless, of regulating the great agent of 
 that commerce, — money, — is vested in twenty-four different States ? 
 Is our system thus disjointed and deformed ? I repeat. Sir, what 
 I have so often said, and what I believe with the utmost sincerity 
 of conviction to be true, — that, unless by wise legislative provisbns, 
 enacted by the authority of Congress, we secure the safety of the 
 currency, we are not only in great peril of a paper money system, 
 but we omit to maintain that which is one of the best, the easiest, 
 the most grateful, and the strongest ties of our national Union. 
 
 When it had become doubtful whether the present Bank of the 
 United States would be continued, and especially after it was sup- 
 posed probable that no Bank would hereafter exist, under the au- 
 thority of Congress, we know what followed. Gigantic projects of 
 State banks sprang up every where. We hear of propositions for 
 new banks with very large capitals, in Kentucky, Tennessee, 
 Ohio, and Louisiana. And now, Sir, we see amotion in the Legis- 
 lature of New York for a new bank of ten millions, only giving 
 way to a proposal for a State loan of four millions (it may probably 
 be much larger) ; and we see, at the same time, in Pennsylvania, 
 an application for a bank with ten millions capital, and a power to 
 have branches in other States. 
 
 Mr. President, we are thus breaking off from our accustomed 
 course of public policy on this great question of the currency. We 
 are throwing its disposition into other hands ; and we are doing this, 
 because the Constitutional power of Congress to establish a bank is 
 denied ; denied in quarters where it has heretofore been most zeal- 
 ously asserted. The respectable gendemen who represent the 
 State of New York, in the Senate, both of them stand up now, in 
 the forty-fifth year of the Government, and declare, as representa- 
 tives of the State of New York, that Congress transcends its 
 power when it establishes a bank ! This, Sir, is not a little ex- 
 traordinary, nor a little portentous. 
 
343 
 
 Mr. President, I have faith, stronger than that of most others, 
 I believe, in the duration of this Government ; and I mean, if pos- 
 sible, to die believing ; but, I confess, I sometimes feel misgivings, 
 \vh(!n I see powers of Government, of the very highest importance, 
 held to be Constitutional or Unconstitutional, according to the pre- 
 vailing party politics of the moment ; powers found in the Consti- 
 tution to-day at the first glance, but not to be found in it to-morrow 
 by the most searching construction ; powers, to-day, safe, necessa- 
 ry, and useful ; to-morrow, unsafe, unnecessary, and destructive of 
 liberty. Sir, when these respectable gentlemen were in their 
 cradles, or in the schools, the delegation from New York, in both 
 Houses of Congress, gave their unanimous support to the bill in- 
 corporating the fi)st Bank of the United States. They went, to 
 a man, withGeneial Washington, affirmingtheConstitutionality of the 
 Bank, owning its expediency, and actually creating and establish- 
 ing it. This was the Constitutional opinion of New York in 1791. 
 In her delegation, in both Houses, were gentlemen who had been 
 active and leading members in the Convention which formed the 
 Constitution, and had just come fresh from that great work into 
 Congress. Having helped to frame it, having argued it before the 
 people, they came now to administer it. With the Constitution 
 before them, the work of their own hands — with a perfect knowl- 
 edge of their own purposes, and the purposes of others, in framing 
 it — they voted to establish a bank. We know that, of all the 
 members of the first Congress who had been members of the Con- 
 vention, very few voted against the bank, on any ground whatever. 
 A great majority — I believe three or four to one — were in favor of 
 it on all grounds. New York, at least, was unanimous : with her 
 there was no doubt nor hesitation. 
 
 In 1811, the charter of this first bank expired. It was a day 
 of great party excitement, and party did unquestionably mingle it- 
 self with the proposition for the renewal of the charter. The Con- 
 stitutional question was then raised, and the bill for continuing the 
 bank was rejected, if I remember, by the majority of a single vote 
 in one House, and by the casting vote of the presiding officer in 
 the other. Of those voting against the renewal, some proceeded 
 on grounds of Constitutional objection, and others on other grounds, 
 as was recited to us, fully and particularly, some sessions ago, by 
 an honorable gentleman, then a member of the Senate from Ma- 
 ryland. 
 
 But those who, at that time, voted against continuing the first 
 bank, found, by even a short experience, that they had taken an 
 erroneous view of the subject. Within three years, they became 
 themselves strenuous advocates for a bank ; and, when the bills 
 of 1814 and 1815 were before Congress, the New York members, 
 generally speaking, were among their most zealous advocates ; or, 
 
344 
 
 if any of them were opposed, such opposition did not rest at 
 all on any Constitutional objections. Bills, Sir, which 1 thought 
 were unconstitutional — bills which I could not vote for — bills which 
 I thought contained such provisions as transcended the power of 
 Congress; such, for example, as that exempting the proposed 
 bank from specie payment — found zealous and able supporters 
 among the members from New York ; none more able, none more 
 zealous. And, Sir, when the present Bank itself was established, 
 in 181G, how was it then? Was the great State of New York 
 then found standing on Constitutional objections ? Was she found 
 opposing the Bank, as a great moneyed power, dangerous to liberty, 
 establishing an aristocracy, and without an inch of ground to stand 
 on, in the Constitutional power of Congress } Was judicial author- 
 ity then rejected, all precedents resisted, and the acquiescence of 
 the people" and of the States set at nought and derided ? Was 
 there even the slightest doubt expressed of the power of Congress 
 to make a bank ? Far from it. Of the twenty-seven members from 
 New York, then in the other House, only seven voted against the 
 bill ; and most of those seven are known to have so voted, not on Con- 
 stitutional grounds, but on particular objections to some parts of the 
 bill. Indeed, most or all the seven had not long before voted for 
 a bank, with provisions somewhat different, and such as suited them 
 better. Constitutional scruples, therefore, there were none. One 
 of the votes of the Senate, it is possible, — though I know not the 
 fact, — may have been given on such scruples ; but it is safe to say, 
 that at least nine tenths of the delegation of New York, in both 
 Houses of Congress, either actively supported the establishment 
 of the present Bank, or fully and expressly admitted the power pf 
 Congress to create it. It was created ; they helped to create it ; 
 without them it could not have been created. It is the creature of 
 New York opinions and New York power. And in all this, Sir, the 
 Legislature acquiesced, and the people acquiesced. 
 
 Now, Sir, when this plain and incontestable history of the past 
 is contrasted with the solemn declarations, the labored arguments, 
 and the patriotic invocations to liberty, which we have heard ut- 
 tered on this floor against all national banks, and all power of 
 Congress to establish such banks, is it without reason that I consider 
 such changes of opinion and conduct as things not auspicious to the 
 future progress of our Government ? Is it mere faint-heartedness, 
 which brings on these forebodings, when I thus see that opinions, 
 on great questions, of the power of Congress, change their hues, 
 and run through all the colors of the prism, according to the shift- 
 ing attitudes and varying positions of temporary political parties ? 
 
 But, Mr. President, if I may be allowed — since it affects ques- 
 tions of great common concern — to speak of opinions existing in 
 States to which I do not belong, I fully believe, notwithstanding all 
 
345 
 
 appearances to the contrary, that three fourths of the people of the 
 State of New York always have been, and now are, clearly of 
 opinion that a bank of the United States is a Constitutional, a use- 
 ful, and a necessary institution of this Government. I speak. Sir, 
 of the spontaneous sentiments of the people, and not of such prin- 
 ciples of action as, being recommended by organized bodies, a ma- 
 jority of the people may be induced to adopt as the basis of politi- 
 cal and party associations, and act upon accordingly ; and I enter- 
 tain not a particle of doubt, that, if the question could be put to- 
 day to the whole people of New York, unaffected by collateral 
 matters, three fourths of the whole would be in favor of a bank. 
 Nor would it be at all difficult to give reasons for this opinion, not- 
 withstanding any inference to the contrary from occurrences here. 
 
 But, Sir, I am pursuing these reflections farther than the occa- 
 sion will justify. I may not. Sir, presume to address myself to the 
 people of the State of New York ; I may not take upon myself 
 the character of an adviser to them ; but since the good citizens of 
 Albany, through their committee, have done me the honor to make 
 me their organ on this occasion, I hope they will forgive me if I 
 say to them, that, for the evils which they suffer, they themselves 
 must assist to furnish the remedy. A gentleman, on the other 
 side of the Senate, has said, and said truly, that these great ques- 
 tions must be settled at the polls. To die polls, then, let them be 
 brought. If the right of suffrage be not an idle form ; if self-gov- 
 ernment be not a delusion ; if there be any thing true in the idea of 
 popular intelligence, — then polhical mismanagement must be cor- 
 rected by political elections. I have said it so often, that it must 
 fatigue the ear to hear it again, that redress can come only from the 
 jjeople themselves. 1 beseech the good citizens of Albany to lay 
 this truth to heart. 
 
 If they are in earnest — if they really feel the evils of misrule — 
 let them touch the right spring to restore proper action to the ma- 
 chinery of Government ; let them take hold of the right lever. 
 They complain of violation of law : let them seek to obtain the 
 passage of other laws which shall redress such violation. They 
 complain of Executive encroachment : as far as depends on them, 
 let there be a Legislature which shall allow no such encroachment. 
 Some of them, with other citizens of the State, have lately acted 
 on the principles of a motto, taken from the words of a great and 
 good man, now removed from this scene of things. I would be- 
 seech those who have adopted that sentiment for one occasion to 
 apply it to another of still broader interest. It is a sentiment fit for 
 any crisis, and especially suited to the present. It is a sentiment 
 becoming republicans. It is a sentiment fundamental to all free 
 governments. I cherish it, not only as it is expressed in the words 
 of a valued friend not now among the living, but for its plain truth, 
 VOL. II. 44 
 
346 
 
 and its mighty importance. I beseech all who value the blessings 
 of free government, and of civil liberty, to embrace it, and act upon 
 it. I pray them to give it scope and energy, such as the present 
 exigency of the country requires. Let it have power to overcome 
 minor differences ; let its conciliating influence unite the heart of 
 man to man ; let it melt all smaller objects into one great purpose 
 of honest and resolute patriotism; and let all, who mean to die as 
 they live, citizens of a free country, stand together for the suprem- 
 acy OF THE LAWS. 
 
 On Tuesday, April 25th, Mr. Webster presented a memorial from three 
 thousand citizens of Ontario county, New York, against the removal of the 
 deposits, with the following remarks : — ■ 
 
 These memorialists (said Mr. W.) are farmers, mechanics, mer- 
 chants, and other cidzens. They represent that they inhabit a 
 portion of Western New York, essentially agricultural, and second 
 to none in fertility of soil, and other natural advantages. This will 
 be readily admitted by all acquainted with the county. It is in 
 the beautiful Lake country, is large, constituting a congressional 
 district by itself, and is doubtless in the very first class of agri- 
 cultural counties. Its great products are wheat and catde, and its 
 principal manufacture that of flour ; although there are, in the 
 county, manufactories both of wool and cotton. Ontario, in its 
 leading character, is a county of intelligent farmers. It belongs to 
 that interest which is at once the most general in the United States, 
 and is also the basis of other pursuits. Its rich lands, and other 
 local advantages, have invited into it, as the memorialists state, 
 considerable capital, and stimulated strongly the industry of the 
 people. The growth of the county is good proof of this. This 
 growth resembles the vigor with which population has spread forth, 
 and penetrated the wildernesses, in regions beyond the Alleghany. 
 I am old enough to remember when he who had seen the Seneca 
 Lake, had performed a journey from the Atlantic coast fit to be 
 spoken of; and I see it stated, indeed, in some interesting recent 
 account of the settlement of this part of New York, that, when the 
 county of Ontario was established, it contained only a thousand in- 
 habitants, though it extended from the Seneca Lake to Lake Erie, 
 carrying the whole breadth of the State between Canada and 
 Pennsylvania — an extent of country now embracing thirteen or four- 
 teen counties, with a population of near four hundred thousand. 
 A country so rapidly growing, with so much necessity of sale, pur- 
 chase, and exchange, of course requires credit, and confidence, 
 
347 
 
 and a stable currency, to conduct its business beneficially. The 
 memorialists declare that the effect of recent measures of Govern- 
 ment has been most disastrous on all their great interests. The 
 farmer, the merchant, the mechanic — all feel alike the pressure of 
 the times. Produce has fallen in price from twenty-five to thirty- 
 three per cent, since the interference of the Executive with the 
 public revenue ; and land, land itself, the great capital of the county, 
 the form in which the vast proportion of its property consists, has 
 fallen, within the same time, to the same extent. I receive thir 
 information from the best sources, and to which I give entire credit. 
 Here, then, is a reduction of the whole property of the people, 
 twenty-five or thirty-three per cent. — a striking off, at a blow, one 
 quarter or one third of the whole value of what they possess ! 
 Sir, is this tolerable ? All this, too, done under pretence of an 
 exrperiment, but really and truly out of hostility to a banking cor- 
 poration ; out of hostility to an institution which has existed with 
 great usefulness to the country, which is now approaching a time 
 when it might be modified, altered, and accommodated to any new 
 state of things, or so as to accord with the lights of past experience, 
 and be continued, with every prospect of advantage to the country. 
 How can conscientious men feel themselves justified in pushing, 
 with such ruinous effects on the people, a quarrel of this kind to 
 this extent ? How do they find within their own bosoms a monitor 
 to tell them that all this is right ? If the Bank was not to be re- 
 newed, why not let it quietly expire ? and why not leave the pub- 
 lic moneys in it till it should expire ? A measure so causeless, so 
 uncalled-for, so destitute of all reasonable object, and all just pur- 
 pose, and so disastrous in its effects on the whole body of the 
 people, is, so far as I know, no where else to be heard of This 
 changing the custody of the public money, without authority of 
 Congress, is. as a measure of policy, wholly without justification, 
 and, as a blow on the prosperity of the country, wholly without 
 exanqale. The people ought not to submit to it. Their respect, 
 their attachment for any individual, however strong that respect and 
 attachment may be, ought not to make them willing to submit lu 
 such an extension of Executive power, and to the consequences 
 which flow from it. And I am sure they will not submit. The 
 country is effectually roused. The people feel a spirit stirring 
 within them, which they know is the spirit which has come down 
 to them with the blood which fills their veins. It is the spirit of 
 their fathers, who did not wait till unjust power had crushed them, 
 but who saw its approach in the lowering storm, snuffed it in the 
 tainted gale, and met it, and resisted it, and repelled it. It is the 
 most alarming circumstance in our whole condition, that, in order 
 to justify the- removal of the deposits, principles are advanced by 
 the Executive which threaten a change in the substantial char. 
 
348 
 
 acter of our Government. The argument, which Is to justify the 
 Executive in this instance, seems to me to leave little or no power 
 to Congress over the public treasure. We thus see a constant 
 advance in the claims of power. Tiiose who defended the letter 
 read to the cabinet, probably never expected to be called on to 
 support such reasons as were afterwards given by the Secretary ; 
 and those who made up their minds to stand by the Secretary's 
 Report, could not have foreseen, that, ere long, they must prepare 
 themselves for the doctrine of the Protest. And what is next to 
 be put forth, time only can show. 
 
 Sir, a month or two ago, an honorable member of New York, 
 spoke with pleasure of the unanimity of feeling which prevailed in 
 New York, and of the quieting, in some measure, of what he 
 thought an unhappy controversy, which had existed, heretofore, in 
 the western parts of that State particularly. I think, too, Sir, there 
 are signs of union, and much stronger signs than there were when 
 the gentleman alluded to the subject. Sir, the letter addressed to 
 the honorable member from Kentucky and myself, committing this 
 memorial to our care, is signed by names many of them not un- 
 known here. They are, Nathaniel W. Howell, John C. Spencer, 
 Mark H. Sibley, James D. Bemis, Z. Barton Stout, John Dixson, 
 Phindres Prouty, H. R. Schermerhorn, Robert Carey Nicholas, 
 Abraham C. Post, Samuel Rawson, Stephen Bates, and Moses 
 Fairchild. 
 
 Those who know these gentlemen will recognize among them 
 persons whose political opinions have not been the same on all 
 subjects, nor their political objects always identical. Yet they are 
 united. They are united, as in a common cause, and seeking to 
 remove a common evil. They come with one voice to Congress ; 
 they speak with one voice to the people ; and I trust they will act 
 with one heart and one mind in the present exigency of public 
 affairs. It is to this union, to these united counsels, and united 
 efforts, to this sense of common danger, and this common sacrifice 
 of minor differences to iiigh patriotic duties, that I look, and look 
 confidendy, for the salvation of the country. Every day accumu- 
 lates new proofs of this growing harmony of public sentiment. Far 
 and near, there is a rallying for the Consdtution and the laws. 
 Three days ago, we heard of the clamorous and factious shouts 
 of the citizens of Baltimore. Another peal now reaches us from 
 the multitudes assembled in those same streets ; and in this peal 
 mingle many new voices, of powerful tone. Sir, the American 
 people are so well schooled in the great doctrines of free gov- 
 ernment, that they are competent to teach first principles, even to 
 their rulers, if unhappily such teaching should become necessary. 
 They will teach them that public complaint, for maladministration 
 of government, is not clamor ; that indignation for unnecessary and 
 
349 
 
 severe national suffering, is not treason, either legal or moral ; that 
 to resist the encroachments of power, is not to cabal against Gov- 
 ernment ; and that the people themselves are not a faction. 
 
 On Tuesday, May 20th, Mr. Webster presented to the Senate a memorial 
 from citizens of Columbia, Lancaster county, Pennsylvania, remonstrating 
 against the measures of the Executive, in relation to the Bank of the United 
 States, and the Executive Protest against the proceedings of the Senate. 
 
 Mr. Webster said he was more fortunate than the gentle- 
 man near him, the member from Pennsylvania, as he was about 
 to present to the Senate a paper, in the sentiments of which he heart- 
 ily concurred. It was a paper which recorded the proceedings 
 of a Whig meeting in the town of Columbia, Lancaster county, 
 Pennsylvania. Columbia was a handsome town, as most of the 
 Senate knew, on the Susquehannah, containing two or three thou- 
 sand inhabitants, and, by its position, much connected with the in- 
 land trade, in lumber, and articles of agricultural product, as in the 
 great hne of communication between Pittsburg and Philadelphia 
 by tliose noble canals and rail-roads, by which the enterprise 
 of Pennsylvania has connected those two important points. The 
 memorialists partake in the evil of the times. They have not es- 
 caped that impartial and undistinguishing scourge — the experiment. 
 They feel its heavy hand upon them, in the stagnation of trade, 
 the want of employment, the disappearance of credit, and the 
 flight of commercial confidence. Sentiments like theirs, strongly 
 and ably expressed, have just been heard, in the memorial of the 
 antimasons of Alleghany county. Like the antimasons of Alle- 
 ghany county, these Lancaster Whigs are satisfied with their ex- 
 perience of the experiment ; and, like them, they protest against 
 the Protest. 
 
 The Alleghany memorialists declare their opinion, that the re- 
 moval of the deposits was made without just cause, and that 
 therefore it violates the word of honor of this Government. And 
 among the resolutions adopted by the Whig meeting at Columbia, 
 I find the following : — 
 
 " Resolved, That the Bank of the United States has acted the 
 part of an useful and faithful public servant ; that the war now be- 
 ing waged against it is foolish, wicked, unjust, and calculated to 
 injure the best interests of the country ; and that the charter of 
 that institution ought to be renewed, with such restrictions and mod- 
 ifications as the public good may require and tlie judgment of 
 Congress ordain." 
 
 1 believe this resolution is entirely true. The present state of 
 
350 
 
 things, in my judgment, exhibits the laws transgressed, the chartered 
 rights of a corporate institution violated, the word of honor of the 
 Government broken. I think the withholding the deposits from 
 the Bank is a daily wrong, a continued infringement of its legal 
 rights, inasmuch as it stipulated for the custody of these deposits, 
 paid its money, under that stipulation, and had done no act what- 
 ever contrary to its contract. I believe the suffering of the com- 
 munity is brought upon it by an act not only unwise, but unjust ; 
 not only an act of folly, as it affects ourselves, but an act of posi- 
 tive wrong to others. 
 
 Mr. President, this is perhaps as fit an occasion as may occur, 
 to say something upon the motion which I made to the Senate, the 
 latter part of March, for leave to bring in a bill to continue, for six 
 years, the charter of the Bank of the United States, with certain 
 modifications. At that time, Sir, the country had been trying this 
 notable experiment, or rather its own patience and forbearance 
 had been on trial under its operation, almost six months. All 
 men of the least pretension to sense and candor, had become satis- 
 fied that very great distress existed in the country. The time for 
 doubt and denial had gone by. The sneers which had previously 
 been manifested in the Senate, whenever the pressure on the coun- 
 try was alluded to, had ceased. However men might dispute about 
 the cause of the distress, the fact of its existence was too plain to 
 be gainsaid. The merchants, the farmers, the manufacturers, 
 and the mechanics, had loaded our tables with their remonstrances 
 and memorials, and filled our halls with their committees. No 
 measure of relief, meantime, was suggested by gentlemen con- 
 nected with the Administration. Their only remedy was, as it 
 now IS, endurance. If we spoke of distress, they bade us hold our 
 tongues, and bear it. The sum and substance of their political 
 philosophy was, " We must stand by the President : we must hold 
 on upon the experiment." 
 
 In this state of things. Sir, I felt it my duty to prepare, for the 
 consideration of Congress and the country, some measure of imme- 
 diate and efficient relief It might be rejected ; but then an offer 
 would have been made. The devotees to the experiment might 
 cling to it, extol its wisdom, and predict its success ; but the country 
 would have an option. The condition of the country was such as 
 was not to be trifled with ; and therefore I sought for a measure 
 that, if adopted, could not fail to be effectual. Against rash ex- 
 periment, I prepared well-tried experience ; in opposition to rash 
 and speculative theory, I offered what forty years had proved to 
 be safe, practical, and beneficial. Allow me to advert to the main 
 provisions of the bill which I recommended, as I desire its char- 
 acter should be kept, to the eye of the public, in a clear and dis- 
 tinct light. 
 
351 
 
 What the bill proposed was, 
 
 A short continuance of the present charter, with an addition of 
 its exclusive right ; so tliat, while this Bank still continued, Con- 
 gress, at its leisure, might provide another, if it chose, and bring it 
 into existence, to take the place of this, at the end of six years ; 
 
 A restoration of the deposits ; 
 
 And a provision for enlarging the specie circulation, so as to 
 increase, in fact, to a great extent, the hard money of the country, 
 and to discountenance the circulation of small notes. 
 
 This is the substance of the measure. 
 
 Now, Sir, if this measure shall be adopted, the country will be 
 relieved ; 
 
 The Bank will have time to collect its debts, and wind up its 
 concerns ; 
 
 Congress will be at liberty, also, to adopt any system for the fu- 
 ture, which its wisdom shall approve: it may recharter this Bank ; 
 it may create a new bank ; it may decide it will have no bank. 
 Meantime, and until its final decision shall be made, business will 
 resume its wonted course, employment will revive, labor will be 
 again in demand, commerce will open its sails, and revenue begin 
 again to flow into the treasury. If there be one intelligent indi- 
 vidual who denies that all these consequences would immediately 
 follow the passage of this bill, that individual I have not met with. 
 What is said is, not that this measure would not produce these ben- 
 eficial effects, but that we can get along without it ; that the ex- 
 periment will yet succeed ; and that, at any rate, the President and 
 the party will put down the Bank. If;, Sir, this bill had passed 
 within a fortnight from the time of its introduction, the country, at 
 this hour, would have begun to resume its accustomed prosperity, 
 activity, and cheerfulness : we should have despatched the business 
 of the country, and been ready to go home by the first day of 
 June, to receive the cordial welcome of our constituents. 
 
 If we could pass it now, although the case has been growing 
 constantly worse, yet, even now, it would in ten days give an en- 
 tire change to the face of things — in a month, put the cotton-mills 
 again in motion, bring up the prices of lumber, wheat, and other pro- 
 ducts of the farm, reanimate internal trade, put life into all the manu- 
 factories, and the mechanic pursuits, in wliichlife is now suspended, 
 gladden labor with the certainty of fair wages, restore confidence, 
 bring back credit, and make the country, once more, what it was 
 twelve months ago. All this good is in our reach, if we will 
 abandon theories, when they are proved and demonstrated to be 
 fallacious ; give up follies, now that they stand as exposed and ac- 
 knowledged follies ; and restore the reign of the law, of justice, of 
 good sense, and of experience. 
 
 When I last addressed the Senate on this subject, the latter part 
 
352 
 
 of March, I manifested my Intention to call it up again the 21st of 
 April. The opinion of the Senate, both on the causes of the public 
 distress, and on the proper remedy, were very well known. A 
 majority, it was not doubted, disapproved the whole Executive 
 proceeding, in removing the public moneys from the Bank, and 
 would regard their return as the first step in I'eestablishing a 
 proper state of things. And a continuance of the present Bank, 
 with modifications, was supposed also to be the measure which a 
 majority was most likely to concur in, asthe remedy best suited to 
 the occasion. The House of Representatives had done nothing 
 to commit itself, one way or the other. Whatever might be con- 
 jectured of its course, it had come to no decision. 
 
 But before the 21st of April came, that honorable body had 
 expressed its opinion. It had decided, by a very large majority, 
 and in the most general terms, that the Bank should not be re- 
 chartered. While this purpose remains, it is obvious that any 
 proceeding of the Senate on the subject must be nugatory. The 
 Senate cannot recharter the Bank. The Senate, of itself, has no 
 power to pass measures for the public relief. It can, indeed, check 
 the measures of other branches: it can resist what it deems to be 
 wrong, and it may show itself ready to concur in wise and proper 
 measures of relief; but it can do no more. It would seem, there- 
 fore, to be hardly worth while to occupy the aUention of the Sen- 
 ate with propositions for relief, to which the other House has, be- 
 forehand, manifested its determined opposition. Until there is 
 some intimation of a change of opinion in that House, it is useless 
 to press the measure which I proposed. For the present, there- 
 fore, I shall suffer the subject to remain where it is. When I shall 
 next call it up. will, of course, depend on circumstances. Of the 
 measure itself I retain the same opinion as I expressed on its in- 
 troduction. It is a prompt measure ; it is an efficient measure ; it is 
 a conciliatory measure ; audit is the only measure which promises 
 relief to the country. These are my opinions ; and those who 
 oppose this measure, and have nothing to propose but a 
 confirmation of the present state of things, act on their own 
 responsibility. 
 
 Sir, the question is before the country. Shall the Bank be re- 
 chartered, for a short period, until it can collect its debts, and wind 
 up its concerns, without distressing the people? or shall it be left to 
 collect its debts, in the short period of its charter which yet remains, 
 whatever may be the consequences to the public ? 
 
 Mr. President, if Congress see fit to embrace the latter branch 
 of the alternative ; if it will not recharter the Bank, even for a 
 day, or under any modification ; if it will make no new bank ; if 
 it will leave the country, in its present condition, to struggle with 
 its difficulties and its distresses as it can ; — it will be recollected, at 
 
353 
 
 least, that all tliis is not the result of necessity. It will be recol- 
 lected that a different policy was proposed ; that a fair and concil- 
 iatory measure was offered, was earnestly pressed on the attention 
 of Congress, and was rejected. 
 
 Let genfiemen, then. Sir, take the consequences upon them- 
 selves. If the summer shall prove to be one of great embarrass- 
 ment ; if business shall be suspended ; if trade shall stagnate ; if 
 employment for labor shall not be found; if the revenue shall fall 
 off one half; — let it be remembered, that these consequences, one 
 and all, migiit have been, this day, easily prevented ; that plain, . 
 easy and adequate means of prevention were proposed, but diat" 
 gentlemen chose to adhere to their theories, their experiments, 
 and their predetermined course of policy, against all remonstrances, 
 as well within the walls of Congress as without. 
 
 Mv. President, while, like others, I am engaged here every 
 morning in presenting to the Senate the proceedings of public 
 meetings and the memorials of individuals, supplicating Congress to 
 restore the public prosperity, and to reestablish the authority of the 
 laws, I think it due to those who thus do me the honor to make me 
 the organ of their sentiments and their wishes, and indeed to the 
 whole country, that I should express my own opinions upon the 
 present state of things, and upon the prospects before us. 
 
 In the first place, then, Sir, I wish to express my belief that 
 nearly all practical men and men of business in the country, friends 
 or foes of the Administration, have become satisfied that the "ex- 
 periment " is a complete failure. Whatever some may, at one 
 time, have believed, and whatever others have hoped, eight months' 
 experience has settled the question. Yes, Sir, I believe that 
 friends as well as foes now see that the attempt to sustain the cur- 
 rency, and maintain commercial credit, by the aid of State banks, 
 has hopelessly failed. With all the aid of Government, with all 
 that party zeal could do for them, these banks have not been able 
 to relieve the community ; they have not been able to restore con- 
 fidence. Confidence is a thing not to be produced by compulsion. 
 Men cannot be forced into trust. Good credit, within local limits, 
 these banks, or some of them, possessed ; but there it naturally 
 stopped, and cannot be forced farther. 
 
 As far as I understand, at least in this part of the country, the 
 usual occurrences are these : If a man has the notes of State 
 banks to any amount, he goes to the banks, and gets specie for 
 them. Having obtained his specie, he very often goes to the 
 Bank of the United States, and exchanges it for bills. The returns 
 made to Congress from the deposit banks, and all our informa- 
 tion, official and unofficial, clearly show that they are not compe- 
 tent to relieve the country. The experiment, I repeat. Sir, has 
 already failed. Men feel that it has failed. The friends of the 
 VOL. II. 45 
 
«?f;^i 
 
 54 
 
 Administration feel that it has failed. I speak confidently, and 
 am willing it should be remembered that I have so spoken; 
 and I say that, at this very hour, in my opinion, the conviction is 
 general that the measures adopted by Government have not pro- 
 duced, and cannot produce, the expected beneficial eflfect. 
 
 As to what is before us. Sir, my opinion is, we are to look forward 
 to a summer and autumn of very great difficuUy. There may be oc- 
 casional and temporary relaxations of suffering, but there can be no 
 permanent relief Men of capital will be alarmed ; active men of 
 business will be timid ; those who have any thing will rather seek 
 to secure it, than to hazard it in the attempt to make more. Em- 
 ployment will be scarce, wages low, and, above all, or rather, per- 
 haps, as the cause of all, a want of confidence, an uncertainty 
 about the future, a distrust in the currency, and a distrust in Gov- 
 ernment, will continue to paralyze the whole community. 
 
 If we break up here, having done nothing, we shall go home to 
 meet nothing but complaints and trouble. Can any of these advo- 
 cates of " experiments" tell me how the condition of the country is 
 to be changed for the better, before the next meeting of Congress ? 
 How is business to revive ? How is occupation for the laboring 
 classes to be obtained ? How is commerce to be extended ? How 
 is internal trade, especially, to regain its facilities and advantages? 
 How are exchanges to be reestabhslied ? And what is to become 
 of the revenue ? Will gentlemen longer sleep over this last sub- 
 ject ? Do they now not see, that the Secretary's estimates cannot 
 be realized ? Sir, the honorable member from Kentucky has 
 called for an account of the receipts at the treasury for the year, 
 thus far. When those accounts come, they will open gentlemen's 
 eyes ; they will show sad disappointment. I cannot speak with 
 precision, as to the extent of defalcation, but I do not speak alto- 
 gether at random, when I give my opinion on this subject. From 
 the best lights I can obtain, there will be a deficiency in the re- 
 ceipts of the customs of at least one third the whole expected 
 amount ; perhaps nearer to a moiety than to a third. Such is the 
 direct effect of the experiment upon the finances of the country. 
 Having, Sir, expressed these opinions, there are others, also, which 
 I thinly, it right to state. 
 
 With all respect, Sir, to both Houses of Congress, and notwith- 
 standing all that we hear, in one or the other, against the power 
 to create a bank, I am fully of opinion, nevertheless, that two 
 thirds of each House are convinced of these two propositions : 
 First, that a national bank is Constitutional ; second, that a na- 
 tional bank, in the present state of things, is indispensable. This 
 may appear inconsistent with what has taken place, but I fully 
 beheve it is all true. This paradox, if it appear to be one, is 
 easily explained by considering the circumstances which may, 
 
355 
 
 and which do, control men's opinions. One question gets mixed 
 with another ; opinions give way to notions of present expediency ; 
 and the consequences of appearing to give way and abandon a 
 favorite course of policy, are more feared than all other consequences. 
 Sir, if the Executive would but signify his assent to such a pro- 
 ceeding, we should recharter the Bank of the United States, at 
 least for a short time, restore the deposits, and go home to the 
 people in three weeks. 
 
 We hear, sometimes, intimations thrown out, that the Adminis- 
 tration may itself yet propose a bank ; some sort of a bank ; a 
 bank not on the usual principles, but on some new principles. 
 *' New principles," it is frequently said, are to be applied to the 
 case. I am not aware, Sir, from my own reading or observation, 
 that any nciv principles in banking have been discovered, at home 
 or abroad, for the last quarter or half a century, unless it be that 
 certain notions which have been suggested among us, some time 
 since, and recently, but never adopted, may be called new princi- 
 ples. I will advert to some of them. 
 
 One is, that we may create a bank, with a large capital, and 
 establish it in this district ; not for the convenience of the people here, 
 but for the benefit of the whole United States. Now, Sir, he 
 must have singular ideas of Constitutional law, who denies that 
 Congress can make a bank at Philadelphia, with branches in other 
 States, and yet contends that it may establish a bank here, which 
 may send its branches into all the States. And as to a bank with 
 a large capital here, where there is so little commerce, with no 
 branches in the large cities, where commerce does exist, the no- 
 tion is too preposterous to need refutation. This " new principle," 
 then, Sir, be assured, will not be carried into operation. 
 
 There is another " new principle ; " and that is, to establish a 
 bank on the funds in the treasury. It is hardly necessary to say, 
 that the time for this, if there ever was a time favorable to so crude 
 and so dangerous a project, has quite gone by. 
 
 We have had, too. Sir, at different periods in our history, 
 suggestions favorable to the exemption of banks from liability to 
 pay their notes in specie ; in other words, favorable to a sheer, 
 confessed paper money system. These suggestions, it may be, 
 have become part of the " new principles," which it is intended 
 shortly to exemplify. The country, 1 trust, will not run into any 
 such folly. 
 
 Again ; I have heard it said, that, although there maybe a bank 
 hereafter, yet it must be a bank in which the Government, 
 that is, the Executive, shall have direct participation and control. 
 I need hardly say, that, for one, I shall not consent to any such 
 project forextending Executive influence. I shall not agree to make 
 a very bad bank, for the sake of making a very dangerous govern- 
 
S5G 
 
 ment. In short, Sir, I reject and repudiate all these new principles. 
 I shall set my face against all banks but a specie-paying bank, a 
 hard-money bank, a well-regulated and well-constituted bank, es- 
 tablished on principles safe to the Government and safe to the 
 people. If we cannot have such a bank, the next best thing will 
 be to have none. Gentlemen may set their hearts at rest, Sir, 
 about all these new projects. The country is too wise, it has al- 
 ready had too much taste of experiments, to countenance any one 
 of them. If there be not a sound bank, a safe bank, a bank in- 
 dependent of Executive control, there will, for the present at 
 least, be no bank at all. 
 
 I have only a few words more to say, Sir. We are already far 
 advanced in the session. The heats of summer are approaching ; 
 and what is to be done ? Is the Administration prepared to see 
 the session break up, and members go home, leaving these things 
 as they are ? Is such the intention of the Executive ? Is such 
 the intention of members who support the Executive ? I still re- 
 main of the opinion formerly expressed, that it is our absolute duty 
 to adopt some measure of relief, before we leave our seats. But 
 the responsibility is not on us. The Senate can do nothing. 
 We are not responsible either for the present or for future 
 difficulties. 
 
 We have not brought about this state of things ; we have not re- 
 moved the deposits ; we have not broken the plighted faith of 
 Government ; we have not deranged the currency ; we have not 
 shaken credit and confidence ; we have not brought on failures, 
 bankruptcies, and ruin ; we have not obstructed trade ; we have 
 not checked manufactures ; we have not starved labor ; we have 
 not impoverished the treasury. It is for those ivJio have changed 
 the state of things — it is for those whose political acts have placed 
 the country in the condition it noiv is in — to take and to bear the 
 responsibility. When we foretold this, we were derided as pro- 
 phets false or prophets ignorant ; complaints of distress have here- 
 tofore only produced sneers, sarcasms, and attempts, poor attempts 
 indeed, at ridicule. But the evil has come in a shape too for- 
 midable to be disregarded. Here it is ; and how do its authors in- 
 tend to deal with it ? Sir, I am as anxious as any member can be 
 to go home. I stay here at great inconvenience and sacrifice ; 
 but I am willing to stay till the last hope of doing any thing 
 useful has faded away. I will stay till the dog-days come, 
 if it promise the benefit. If the Administration has any thing 
 to propose, I will stay and hear it. If it meditates any meas- 
 ure of relief, I am willing to wait the result of its meditation. I 
 hope, therefore, gentlemen will tell us, — I call on them to tell us, — 
 whether the Executive has any thing further to propose. Does it 
 desire the prolongation of the session .'' Has it any thing, or does 
 
357 
 
 it expect to have any thing, to submit to us ? The friends of the 
 Executive have the power. They have, too, the responsibihty. 
 They reject every thing which we think useful ; and they propose 
 no change from our present condition. They can reheve the 
 country at once, if they choose. If they will but sacrifice their 
 own prejudices, their stiff adherence to their own opinions and pur- 
 poses, on the altar of the public good, they could relieve the 
 country in three weeks. It is for them to decide whether this 
 sacrifice shall be made. And I now repeat, Sir, — and it is the last 
 remark with which I shall trouble you, — that, unless some efficient 
 measure be adopted before we separate, w^e have a summer and 
 fall before us such as this country has not experienced. 
 
 In the Senate, on Tuesday, June 3d, Mr. M'Kean presented the memorial 
 of the Pennsylvania State Convention, assembled at Harrisburg, May 27th, 
 1834, introducing it with appropriate remarks. The memorial having been 
 read, Mr. Webster arose and addressed the Senate. 
 
 '■> 
 
 Mr. President : Is this. Sir, the voice of Pennsylvania? That 
 is a question of very great interest at the present moment. The 
 whole country has a concern in it. Is this the voice of Pennsyl- 
 vania ? If this be her voice, then we may hope that the day of relief 
 and of safety is approaching. If this be her voice, it is a voice of 
 health and of rescue. The work of relief will prosper, it will pro- 
 ceed, if her heart be in it, and her strong hand be put to it. Pennsyl- 
 vania is one of those great central States, on whose determination, 
 and on whose conduct, every thing in regard to the future condition 
 of the country seems to hang. If this centre moves with intelli- 
 gence, union, and patriotism, nothing can resist its force. For one, 
 I believe that the sentiments expressed in this memorial, are, to a 
 very great extent, the sentiments of Pennsylvania. I believe this 
 is HER VOICE. The proofs, I think, are satisfactory. They come 
 in numerous expressions of opinion, in a thousand forms, from all 
 parts of the State itself; and they may be gathered from the work- 
 ings of public opinion, in other portions of the country. In this 
 hall, and the other, I see evidence, if I mistake not, that those 
 who know Pennsylvania best, believe her to entertain the opinions 
 expressed in the paper w'hich has now been read, and believe, also, 
 that she will soon show herself in earnest in maintaining them. 
 She has been an ardent friend and a steacfy supporter of the present 
 Chief Magistrate. Among the very first to espouse his cause, 
 from warm grafitude for his great services, a strong conviction of 
 his honesty and patriotism, and a confiding trust in his ability to 
 administer the Government, she has adhered faithfully to her attach- 
 
358 
 
 ment. Three times she has given him her vote for the presidency, 
 and she has not fahered in her support, heretofore, aUhough there 
 have been measures, touching her vital interests, in which nearly 
 every one of her delegation here, and a vast majority of her own 
 Legislature, have been constrained to differ from the President. 
 She has seen and regretted what she thought errors ; but she has 
 remembered great services and great exploits, and has gone on 
 with her characteristic steadiness. It is not wonderful that she 
 should be slow and reluctant in withdrawing confidence where she 
 had bestowed it in such bountiful measure. I would not suggest, 
 that, even now, Pennsylvania abates her personal kindness and 
 regard for the Chief Magistrate, who has been so often the man of 
 her choice. No doubt she would desire to see him go through his 
 career with success and honor ; but I believe. Sir, that her citizens 
 perceive the true character, and feel the disastrous effects, of those 
 measures which the Administration has been recently led to adopt, 
 and that they are convinced that it is their duty to oppose those 
 measures, by every thing which belongs to their interest, and to 
 their character, as Pennsylvanians. In all this, it is possible I may 
 be deceived. The sentiment of Pennsylvania may be fixed the 
 other way. My hopes, my earnest wishes, may mislead me ; but 
 1 shall not give up these hopes while it is possible to retain them, 
 because they are intimately connected with all the expectation 
 which I cherish for a return of the prosperity of the country. 
 
 Mr. President, the immediate difficulty in our condition is to 
 convince the friends of the Administration here, and the President 
 himself, that the country is either dissatisfied or distressed. The per- 
 tinacity with which men here cling to this " experiment," exceeds 
 all former experience. They can see no proof of distress, they 
 can hear no sounds of just complaint. All the excitement which 
 exists in the country, they insist upon it, is produced by the Bank, 
 by jjanic-maJcers, by party politicians. All the memorials come, 
 they say, from the President's enemies. If we stand up here to 
 present the petitions of the people, and to press them on the 
 attention of the Senate, we are called panic-mahcrs ! If we speak 
 of the multitudes who flock together, at public meetings, to memo- 
 rialize Congress, we are told they are all Bank agents. Farmers, 
 mechanics, laborers, traders, manufacturers, and merchants, come 
 here, by hundreds of thousands ; but we are told they are all but a 
 few noisy political partisans. Sir, an end to this delusion must 
 some time come. It cannot last forever; and, if any thing short 
 of an overwhelming defeat at the ballot-boxes will ever convince 
 the supporters of the present measures that the people are against 
 them, they might be, in some degree, satisfied by the character of 
 this Convention at Harrisburg, the circumstances attending it, and 
 
359 
 
 the result of its proceedings. It was a Convention, consisting of 
 two hundred and fifty delegates, coming from forty-four counties, 
 out of fifty-two, which the State contains. These delegates assem- 
 bled. Sir, from places some of them three hundred miles apart, at 
 a very busy season of the year, in obedience to the will of their 
 constituents, for the pupose of consulting on the present state of 
 things, and uniting to pray relief from Congress. I have the honor 
 of knowing several of these gentlemen personally, and many others 
 by reputation. The Convention was not composed altogether of 
 delegates from any one political party. Various parties, various 
 descriptions of political men, united in its proceedings. 
 
 It is known, that there exists in Pennsylvania a large, active, and 
 zealous antimasonic party ; and I see, among the members of the 
 meeting, many distinguished names belonging to that party. These 
 gentlemen came to the Convention, not to lose their own distinct 
 character ; not to give up their own principles of association ; but 
 to signify, that, in this crisis, and on the great questions which now 
 agitate the whole country, they think as others think, and as Amer- 
 icans ought to think, and that they hold fast to the Constitution 
 and laws. 
 
 Sir, I am happy to say, that I know no party or body of citizens 
 in the country, whose principles and opinions, on all its leading 
 interests, are more thoroughly sound and patriotic than those of 
 the antimasons of Pennsylvania. I know no gentlemen more 
 worthy of trust, in every respect, than those who are placed in the 
 public councils here by their influence and their votes. It is true, 
 that the party has a distinct object of its own, which it keeps con- 
 stantly in sight, and which it pursues with steadiness and zeal ; but 
 it is equally true, that it shows itself, always, unwavering and stead- 
 fast in its attachment to die Constitution, in its maintenance of the 
 authority of law, in its love of liberty, and in its support of the 
 great interests and true policy of the country. 
 
 The Whigs, Sir, were also represented in this Convention, and 
 it will be seen, by its proceedings, that they have avowed senti- 
 ments and principles worthy of their name. Nor are these all. It 
 appears, also, from the memorial itself, that nearly one third of the 
 whole Convention was composed of friends and supporters of the 
 present Executive. Seventy-five Jackson men, as they have been 
 called, are on the roll of members. Will not this striking fact 
 produce its effect on gentlemen here ? Will it not cause them to 
 open their eyes to the progress of opinion, and their minds to the 
 force of truth ? You will observe. Sir, that this Convention did 
 not call itself a Whig Convention, a JVational Republican Con- 
 vention, nor an Antimasonic Convention ; but it called itself a 
 " Convention of delegates from the citizens of Pennsylvania op- 
 
360 
 
 posed to Executive usurpation and abuse." It adopted a name, or 
 used a description, broad enough to comprehend all those who, 
 however they might differ in other things, united in the objects of 
 this meeting. Now, Sir, how is it possible, that so numerous and 
 respectable a Convention, thus composed of gendemen belonging 
 to distinct parties, and to different political associations, could be 
 brought together, and be found adopting this memorial, with entire 
 unanimity, if there were not some strong conviction, common to 
 all. some general and concurring sense of public distress and public 
 danger ? 
 
 Sir, they have acted wisely and patriotically ; they have remem- 
 bered that they have a common country, a common liberty, and, in 
 times of danger, a common duty. They have felt, that, whatever 
 else they may be, they are yet all Americans, all Pennsylvanians, 
 all lovers of liberty and the Constitution. The Administration is 
 deceived, therefore, Sir, the President himself is deceived, greatly, 
 if he supposes this Convention to have been assembled by the 
 agency of the Bank, by any mere party operation, or by any desire 
 to create panic. Let us look to individuals, let us see who com- 
 posed the Convention, that we may judge the better of the weight 
 due both to its declarations and its opinions. 
 
 I perceive. Sir, that there was placed in its chair a Wash- 
 ington County" Farmer, Joseph Lawrence — ^a man. Sir, well 
 known in this capitol ; a man of the simplest republican habits, 
 and the sternest republican virtues ; a man who has served his 
 fellow-citizens in distinguished public stations with much credit, and 
 has gone back to the cultivation of his own farm with real Roman 
 simplicity. Sir, all the Banks in the world, and all the panic- 
 makers and political partisans in the world, could not bring him 
 over the Alleghany to Harrisburg, there to put his name to a paper 
 containing these sentiments and these statements, unless he fully 
 believed them all to be true. 
 
 In the preliminary arrangements of the meeting, and also in its 
 subsequent proceedings, I observe that General Frick, of Northum- 
 berland, acted a cons])icuous part. If I have been rightly informed, 
 this gentleman has been a distinguished friend of the present Chief 
 Magistrate, and has supported him and his measures, with ability, 
 both in and out of the Legislature of Pennsylvania. Is it panic, 
 is it party spleen, is it ill-will to the President, which brought this 
 highly-respectable gendeman, and others like him, to the Con- 
 vention ? Certainly it is not. Nobody can believe it is. 
 They were brought thither, and could only be brought thither, 
 by that sense of duty which is stronger than personal preference ; 
 by that true love of country which places principles above men. 
 Would they not stand by the President if they could } Popular 
 
361 
 
 as he still is, powerful as he is, would they not go on in their 
 support of his measures if insurmountable obstacles were not in 
 
 the way? 
 
 There is another circumstance, Sir, in the character of this 
 Convention, worthy of especial notice. Among its members were 
 several who belong to that highly respectable portion of our fellow- 
 citizens, the society of Friends. With one of them, a member 
 of the committee who brings this memorial to Congress, a most 
 worthy" and respectable gentleman, I have the pleasure of some 
 personal acquaintaixje. He is advancing far into age ; and yet, Sir, 
 he never attended a political meeting in his whole life, until he 
 went, with others of his society, last week, to Harrisburg ! When, 
 Sir, were the society of Friends found to be political agitators, 
 ambitious partisans, or panic-makers ? When have they disturbed 
 the community with false cries of public danger, or joined in any 
 clamor against just, and wise, and Constitutional government ? Sir, 
 if there be any political fault fairly imputable to the Friends, I 
 think it is, rather, if they will allow me to say so, that they are 
 sometimes a little too indifterent about the exercise of their polit- 
 ical rights ; a little too ready to leave all matters respecting Gov- 
 ernment in the hands of others. Not ambitious, usually, of honor 
 or office, but peaceable and industrious, they desire only the safety 
 of liberty, civil and religious, the security of property, and the pro- 
 tection of honest labor. All they ask of Government is, that it be 
 wisely and safely administered. They are not desirous to interfere 
 in its administration. Yet, Sir, a crisis can move them ; and they 
 think a crisis now exists. They bow down to nothing human which 
 raises its head higher than the Constitution, or above the laws._ 
 
 Such, Sir, is the character, the composition, of this Convention. 
 I beseech gentlemen not to deceive either themselves or others, by 
 referring all its proceedings to party influence and bank influence. 
 Depend on it, Sir, it had its origin, and owes its character, to a 
 deep feeling of dissatisfaction with measures of Government, a 
 conviction of much public distress, and an honest alarm at Execu- 
 tive claims of power. And depend on it. Sir, if these and other 
 admonitions are not taken in time, if nothing be done to quiet ap- 
 prehension, and to relieve the country, the sentiments of this Con- 
 vention will become, and must become, more and more general 
 among the people. 
 
 This memorial, Mr. President, declares that the cherished policy 
 of Pennsylvania, consisting of an encouragement of her manufac- 
 tures, has become impracticable and delusive ; that numerous es- 
 tablishments are closed, and others crippled ; that the loss of prop- 
 erty has been afflicting ; and that the suspension of business deprives 
 labor of wages, and of bread. Is this true ? Is this representation 
 VOL. II. 46 
 
362 
 
 fact, or fiction ? Have two hundred and fifty gentlemen been sent 
 to Harrisburg, by their fiiends and neighbors, that they may raise 
 a false cry, put statements upon paper wliich are not true, and 
 send thirty of their own number to Washington, to impose on 
 Congress with a pretended but false story of distress ? 
 
 The memorial speaks of Pittsburg. It is now within a few days 
 of twelve months, since, for the first time, I visited that city, so in- 
 teresting by its position, by its rapid growth, by the character of its 
 inhabitants, and by the history of early occurrences in its neighbor- 
 hood. It was then all animation, activity, and cheerfulness. If the 
 smoke of numerous manufactories and workshops somewhat dark- 
 ened the air and obscured the view of the charming scenery around, 
 it gave evidence, still, that occupations v^^ere prosperous, and that 
 labor was well paid, and happy in its daily toil. Of thirty thou- 
 sand inhabitants, it is said two thirds of them owe their means of 
 livelihood to manufactures ; and it may be asked, with emphasis, 
 and with alarm, unless activity be restored again to the loom and 
 the forge, what is to become of this mass of human strength and 
 industry, thus thrown out of employment ? The memorial goes 
 on to say, that the great staples of the State are without a market ; 
 that many of its min.es are more or less abandoned ; that the man- 
 ufactures of iron and cotton have fallen off one third ; and the 
 products of the field sell only at reduced prices, when they sell at 
 all. "Turn where we will," say the memorialists, "your memo- 
 rialists perceive one universal sense of present or impending ruin, 
 depressing the energies and darkening the prospects of the 
 ciuzen." 
 
 Now, Sir, if these statements, put deliberately on paper by this 
 Convenfion, and brought hither by its Committee, will not convince 
 the Administration and its friends of the fact of dissafisfaction and 
 distress among the people, all effort to produce conviction must 
 fail. We are, indeed, I fear, attempfing a hopeless task. All fact 
 and all reasoning seem to fall powerless on the unimpressible, im- 
 penetrable surface of party opinion. Every blow, however often 
 repeated, rebounds from it as from the face of an anvil. Men have 
 become so committed, they have so far stepped in already, all their 
 hopes are so entirely pledged and staked on the success of this 
 grand " experiment," that any change of purpose appears to be 
 out of the quesUon. 
 
 I can only repeat, therefore, Sir, what I have so often said, that 
 I entertain faint hopes of relief, till public opinion shall produce it, 
 by some change of public agents. The authors of this experi- 
 ment have made up their minds to share its fate, to float with it, 
 if they can keep it above water, and to sink with it, if it must go 
 down. They still cry out that all is well, all is safe, all is pros- 
 
nnry 
 70C 
 
 ODO 
 
 perous, all is glorious ; and argument, experience, the importunity, 
 even the supplications of the people, have no more influence than 
 the idle wind. 
 
 Sir, 1 am happy to believe, as I do believe, that the citizens of 
 the great State of Pennsylvania are awaking to a just sense of the 
 condition of the country. Since all our fortunes are so much con- 
 nected with her own ; since all diat she does, and all that she 
 omits to do, may affect the happiness of every man, not only 
 within her own limits, but in all the other States ; it is natural that 
 the whole country should regard her with interest. I doubt not, 
 Sir, she will examine the conduct of Government, and take coun- 
 sel with her own thoughts, about the security of the Constitution, 
 and the preservation of the authority of the laws. I doubt not 
 that she will well consider the present, and look to the future ; and 
 if she finds all well, and all safe, if she feels no evil, and perceives 
 no danger, she will repose in her accustomed tranquillity. But if 
 she feels that evil, and great evil, does exist, and if she sees that 
 danger is before the country, it is not to be doubted that she will 
 bring to the crisis her intelligence, her patriotism, and her power. 
 
 In acquiring the liberty which we enjoy, she had her full share, 
 both of the sacrifice and the glory ; and she knows that that rich 
 possession is holden only on the condition of watchfulness and 
 vigilance — God grants liberty only to those who love it, and are 
 always ready to guard and defend it. In establishing our admi- 
 rable Constitution, she bore a leading part, and contributed, to the 
 councils which framed it, the wisdom of Franklin, and Morris, and 
 Wilson. None can have a deeper stake in the preservation of this 
 Constitution than the citizens of Pennsylvania ; and 1 verily believe 
 that none are more truly attached to its true principles. It is natural, 
 therefore, that those who think that high principles, or great inter- 
 ests, are in danger, should look to her for succor. 
 
 If, as this memorial alleges, the manufacturing industry is de- 
 pressed and suffering, if it be discouraged, crippled, and threatened 
 with ruin, who shall save it, if Pennsylvania shall not aid in its 
 rescue ? Where will it find support, if she abandon it .-' We 
 have followed her lead, in fostering manufactures, and sustaining 
 domestic industry, believing this to be a part of her settled policy, 
 interwoven with her system, and that her purposes in regard to it 
 were fixed and settled. I still think so ; and, therefore, I cannot 
 readily believe that she will approve measures which undo all that 
 has been done, or counteract its good effect. 
 
 Above all. Sir, I cannot believe that the political doctrines of 
 the times can stand a chance for adoption in Pennsylvania. I 
 cannot believe that men who have been educated in that school, 
 which has been called emphatically the Democratic School, and 
 
564 
 
 who hold their political opinions in common with McKean, and 
 Snyder, and William Findlay, will have a relish for the sentiments 
 of the Protest. When they are asked, Who ought to hold the 
 public purse ? I think they will not agree with the Protest in their 
 answer. Nor has it ever been taught for doctrine, in the school 
 of which they are disciples, that the Executive power is the nat- 
 ural guardian of liberty, and that it is not for the representatives of 
 the people, or the representatives of the States, to question its acts, 
 or to proclaim its encroachments. Sir, Pennsylvania is deeply inter- 
 ested in that in which we are all interested — the welfare of the 
 WHOLE ; and if she be true to herself, as I trust she will be, she 
 cannot be false to the country. 
 
 Mr. President, we are approaching to the end of a long session, 
 and we are likely to leave off where we began. We have done 
 nothing, and I fear shall do nothing, for the relief of the people. 
 The Government has nothing to propose which even its own 
 friends will support. On what does it rely? A proposition is 
 before the other House, which has been represented as the only 
 scheme of the Administration. It is a law for keeping the public 
 treasures in the State banks. It was offered here, the other day, 
 as you remember, Sir, by way of amendment to a bill, and was 
 rejected by more than two thirds. It is put to rest here ; nor is its 
 sleep elsewhere likely to be disturbed. 
 
 The Administration will not consent that the deposits be restored ; 
 it will not consent to give the present Bank time to collect its debts 
 and wind up its affairs without distressing the people ; it will not 
 consent to prolong its existence a single day ; it will not consent 
 to any new bank ; it will not suffer the public money to depart, in 
 any way, from Executive control. It sees employment cut off, 
 but it does nothing to. restore it ; it sees confidence destroyed, but 
 it does nothing to revive it ; it sees the revenue diminished, and 
 dwindling, but it does nothing to improve it. And yet it would ap- 
 pear, that the Administration is now desirous that Congress should 
 adjourn and go home. For one, Sir, I feel that Congress has not 
 done its duty ; it has not fulfilled the objects of the session ; it has 
 done nothing to relieve the country. 
 
 The responsibility. Sir, must rest where it ought to rest ; and 
 we must prepare ourselves, as best we may, to account to the 
 people for the disappointment of their just hopes, and the disas- 
 trous consequences of rash, unlawful, ill-ad\ased measures of 
 Government. 
 
 ]VIr. President, I hardly intended, when I rose, to occupy more 
 than a moment of the time of the Senate. I know how many 
 important subjects are upon the table. But this one subject — the 
 general condition of the country — is so superior to all — ^it is of such 
 
365 
 
 overwhelming importance, that every thing else necessarily gives 
 way to it. It has been so through the session ; it will be so next 
 session ; and it will continue to be so, till the Constitution shall be 
 vindicated, the violated law redressed, the public treasures restored 
 to their proper custody, and general confidence reestablished. 
 How soon this may be done, it remains with the people themselves 
 to decide ; but until it is done, and all done, we shall look in vain, 
 either for an end to distraction in the public councils, or an end to 
 embarrassment and suffering among the people. 
 
REPORT 
 
 ON THE REMOVAL OF THE DEPOSITS, MADE BY MR. WEBSTER, 
 FROM THE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE OF THE SENATE OF THE 
 UNITED STATES, ON THE FIFTH OF FEBRUARY, 1834. 
 
 In Senate of the United States, February 5, 1834, Mr. Webster, from the 
 Committee on Finance, made the following Report : — 
 
 The Committee on Finance, to whom has been referred the report 
 of the Secretary of the Treasury of the 3d December, 1833, on 
 the removal of the public deposits from the Bank of the United 
 States, and a resolution, submitted to the Senate by an honorable 
 member from Kentucky, declaring that the reasons assigned by 
 the Secretary for the removal of the said deposits are unsatisfac- 
 tory and insufficient, have agreed on the following Report : — 
 
 The act incorporating the Bank of the United States, as is justly- 
 remarked by the Secretary, is a contract, containing stipulations on 
 the part of the Government, and on the part of the corporation, 
 entered into for full and adequate consideration. 
 
 The Government became party to this contract by granting the 
 charter, and the stockholders by accepting it. "In considera- 
 tion," says the charter, " of the exclusive privileges and benefits 
 conferred by this act on the said Bank, the president and directors 
 thereof shall pay to the United States, out of the corporate funds 
 thereof, one million and five hundred thousand dollars, in three 
 equal payments ; " and, in another section, it declares that, " during 
 the continuance of this act, and whenever required by the Secre- 
 tary of the Treasury, the said corporation shall give the necessary 
 facilities for transferring the public funds from place to place 
 within the United States, or the territories thereof, and for distrib- 
 uting the same in payment of the public creditors, without charging 
 commissions, or claiming allowance on account of difference of 
 exchange ; and shall do and perform the several and respective 
 duties of the commissioners of loans for the several States, or any 
 one or more of them, whenever required by law." 
 
 The section Immediately following this provision is in these 
 words : " And he, it further enacted, That the deposits of the 
 
367 
 
 money of the United States, in places in which the said Bank or 
 Branches thereof may be established, shall be made in said Bank 
 or Branches thereof, unless the Secretary of the Treasury shall at 
 any time odiervvise order and direct ; in which case the Secretary 
 of the Treasury shall immediately lay before Congress, if in ses- 
 sion, and, if not, immediately after the commencement of the next 
 session, the reasons for such order or direction." 
 
 It is not to be denied or doubted that this custody of the public 
 deposits was one of the " benefits " conferred on the Bank by the 
 charter, in consideration of the money paid, and the services 
 undertaken to be performed by the Bank to the Government ; 
 and to this custody the Bank has a just right, unless such causes 
 have arisen as may have justified the Secretary in giving an order 
 and direction for changing that custody. Any order or direction, 
 therefore, issued under the provisions of this law, necessarily 
 involves a considera'tion of the just extent of the Secretary's power, 
 and of the rights of the Bank. 
 
 But Congress, in making this provision, unquestionably had in 
 view the safety of the public funds, and certain important financial 
 objects, as well as the making of a just consideration to the Bank 
 for the sum paid and the services undertaken by it ; and with this 
 view, also, it has expressed its will that the deposits shall continue 
 to be made in the Bank until good cause shall arise for ordering 
 otherwise. Of this good cause, the Secretary of the Treasury, in 
 the first instance, and Congress ultimately and conclusively, is 
 constituted the judge. Every order, therefore, of the Secretary 
 for changing the deposits, presents for the examination of Congress 
 a question of general political propriety and expediency, as well as 
 a question of right and obligation to the Bank. 
 
 These questions may be considered together. They are inti- 
 mately connected ; because the right of the Bank to retain the 
 deposits, and to enjoy the advantages to be derived therefrom, 
 cannot be denied, unless a case is shown to have arisen within the 
 just power of removal vested in the Secretary, and which made it 
 his duty to exercise that power. The Secretary is only to 
 remove the deposits for reasons. Of these reasons he is to give 
 an account to Congress. If they be insufficient to justify the 
 removal, the Bank has a right to a return of the deposits, and the 
 country has a right also to expect that, in that case, the public 
 treasure will be restored to its former place of safety. 
 
 The Secretary having removed the deposits, and having re- 
 ported his reasons to both Houses, the whole subject is now 
 before Congress by way of appeal from his decision ; and the 
 question is, whether that decision ought to stand, or ought to be 
 reversed. 
 
 The power of the Secretary, under the law, is evidenUy but 
 
368 
 
 provisional. It is a power which he may exercise in the first 
 instance ; but the propriety of his conduct, in every instance of its 
 exercise, is ultimately referred to the wisdom of Congress, and by 
 Congress it must be judged. He is authorized to do the act, but 
 Congress is to examine it when done, and to confirm or reverse 
 it. The Secretary may change the deposits ; but, when changed, 
 Congress is to decide on the causes of such change, with authori- 
 ty either to sanction the removal, or to restore the deposits, 
 according to its own judgment of right and expediency. 
 
 In order to decide whether the act of the Secretary ought to be 
 confirmed, it is requisite, in the first place, to form a just opinion 
 of the true extent of his power under the law ; and, in the second 
 place, to consider the validity of the reasons which he has 
 specially assigned for the exercise of that power in the present case. 
 
 The opinion of the Secretary is, that his power over the depos- 
 its, so far as respects the rights of the Bank, is not limited to any 
 particular contingencies, but is absolute and unconditional. If it 
 be absolute and unconditional, so far as respects the rights of the 
 Bank, it must be absolute and unconditional in all other respects ; 
 because it is obvious, if there be any limitation, that limitation is 
 imposed as much for the benefit of the Bank as for the security of 
 the country. The Bank has contracted for the keeping of tlie 
 public moneys, and paid for it as for a privilege or benefit. It 
 has agreed, at the same time, that the Secretary shall possess the 
 power of removal ; but then it is also agreed, that, whenever this 
 power is exercised, the reasons therefor shall be reported to Con- 
 gress ; Congress being thus constituted the final judge as well of 
 the rights of the Bank, in this particular, as of the good of the 
 country. So that, if the Secretary's power be in truth absolute 
 and unconditional, it restrains Congress from judging whether the 
 public good is injured by the removal, just as much as it restrains 
 it from judging whether the rights of the Bank are injured by the 
 removal ; because the limitation, if any, is equally for the security 
 of the Bank and of the public. 
 
 If the Bank be interested in retaining the deposits, then it is 
 interested in the truth or falsity, in the sufficiency or insufficiency, 
 of the reasons given for their removal. Especially is it so inter- 
 ested, since these reasons are to be rendered to a tribunal which 
 is to judge over the Secretary, and may form a different opinion 
 on the validity of these reasons, and may reverse his decision. It 
 clearly has an interest in retaining the deposits, and therefore is as 
 clearly concerned in the reasons which the Secretary may give for 
 their removal. And as he is bound to give reasons, this very cir- 
 cumstance shows that his authority is not absolute and uncondi- 
 tional ; because, how can an appeal be given from the decision of 
 an .absolute power? and how can such a power be called on to 
 
369 
 
 give reasons for any instance of its exercise ? If it be absolute, its 
 only reason is a reference to its own will. 
 
 The committee think, therefore, that no absolute and uncon- 
 ditional power was conferred on the Secretary ; that no authority 
 was given him by which he could deprive the Bank of the cus- 
 tody of die public moneys, without reason ; and that, therefore, his 
 opinion is not to be admitted ; that in no event can any order for 
 removing the deposits impair the right secured to the Bank by the 
 charter. If removed without good cause, the committee think the 
 removal does impair the rights of the Bank. 
 
 But the opinion of the Secretary, as to his own powers, is 
 hardly more limited in respect to the Government and the country, 
 than in regard to the rights of the Bank. 
 
 His opinion is, that it is his duty, and within his authority, in 
 this view, also, to withdraw the deposits of the public money from 
 the Bank whenever such a change would, in any degree, promote 
 the public interest. " The safety of the deposits," he says, " the 
 abifity of the Bank to meet its engagements, its fidelity in the per- 
 formance of its obligations, are only a part of the considerations by 
 which his judgment must be guided. The general interest and 
 convenience of the people must regulate his conduct." 
 
 By the general interest and convenience of the people, the 
 Secretary can only mean his own sense of that interest and con- 
 venience, because they are no otherwise to be ascertained than by 
 his own judgment. 
 
 The Secretary's construction of the law is, therefore, that he 
 has power to remove the deposits whenever, for any reason, he 
 thinks the public good requires it. 
 
 In this interpretation of the design and object of the law, and 
 this broad construction of the Secretary's power, the comriiittee do 
 not concur. 
 
 Although the power of the Secretary is not resti'icted by any 
 express words or terms, nor by any particular occasions for its 
 exercise specifically and expressly designated or prescribed by the 
 law, yet it is not to be admitted, as the committee think, that this 
 power is to be exercised capriciously, or in an arbitrary manner, 
 or for loose or conjectural reasons, or on any idea of an unlimited 
 discretion vested in the Secretary to judge on the general question 
 of the public welfare ; or, indeed, on any other grounds than those 
 of necessity, or plain and manifest expediency, directly connected 
 with the subject over wdiich the power exists. 
 
 The keeping of tlie public money is not a matter which is left, 
 or was intended to be left, at the will of the Secretary, or any 
 other officer of the Government. This public money has a place 
 fixed by law, and setUed by contract ; and this place is the Bank 
 of tiie United States. In this place it is to remain until some 
 VOL. 11. 47 
 
370 
 
 event occur requiring its removal. To remove It, therefore, from 
 this place, without the occurrence of just cause, is to thwart the 
 end and design of the law, defeat the will of Congress, and violate 
 the contract into which the Government has solemnly entered. 
 
 It is fit to be observed, that no other law confers on the Secre- 
 tary such a wide discretion over the public interests in regard to 
 any subject, or gives him a -power to act on the rights of others, or 
 on the rights of the public, in any part of his official duties, with 
 so unlimited an authority as is here asserted. Every where' else 
 he appears in the character of a limited and restricted agent. He 
 is the financial officer of the Government ; he is the head of the 
 Department of the Treasury. His duty is, to report annually 
 to Congress the state of the finances, and to communicate to 
 either House, when requested, any information respecting the 
 Treasury ; and he is to superintend the collection of the revenue. 
 But he has no authority over the circulating medium of the coun- 
 try, either metallic or paper ; nor has he the control of the na- 
 tional currency. It is no part of his duty either to contract or ex- 
 pand the circulation of bank paper, nor in any other way to exer- 
 cise a general superintendence over the money system of the 
 country. These general interests of the Government and the peo- 
 ple are not confided to his hands by any of the laws which created 
 his office, and have prescribed his duties ; and the committee are 
 of opinion, that the charier of the Bank no more intended to give 
 such a wide scope to the Secretary in regard to the deposits, than 
 other laws intended to give him the same wide scope in respect to 
 other duties of his office. No intimation of such intention is found 
 either in the charter itself, or in any of the legislative debates 
 which took place in both Houses when the Bank was established, 
 or in the discussions which have been had on the various occasions 
 which have been more recently presented for calling forth the 
 sentiment of Congress. In none of these sources is there to be 
 found any proof that the Legislature has delegated, or intended to 
 delegate, this extraordinary power of judging of the general 
 interest of the people to the Secretary of the Treasury. Such a 
 power, did he possess it, would necessarily make him the general 
 superintendent of all the proceedings of the Bank ; because it 
 would enable him to compel the Bank to conform all its operations 
 to his pleasure, under penalty of suffering a removal of the public 
 moneys. This would be little less than placing all the substantial 
 power of managing the Bank in his hands. But he is not by law 
 its manager, nor one of its managers ; nor has he any right, in 
 any form, to interfere in its management. On the contrary, the 
 very language of the charter rejects all idea of such general super- 
 vision over its concerns by him, or any other officer of Govern- 
 ment. That language is, that, ''for the management of the affairs 
 
371 
 
 of the corporation, there shall be twenty-five directors annually 
 chosen ; " and, under the restrictions contained in the charter, 
 thsse directors are intrusted with the whole general business of the 
 Bank, subject, of course, to all the provisions of the charter and 
 the by-laws ; subject, too, always to the inspection and examina 
 tion of either House of Congress ; subject always to regular 
 inquiry and trial ; and bound always to communicate to the head 
 of the Treasury Department, on request, statements of its amount 
 of stock, debts due, moneys deposited, notes in circulation, and 
 specie on hand. 
 
 Under these restrictions, the establishment of its offices, and the 
 appointment of its officers ; the amount of its discounts, and every 
 thing respecting those discounts ; its purchases and sales of ex- 
 change, and all other concerns of the institution, are to be con- 
 ducted and managed by the directors. There is nothing in the 
 charter giving the slightest authority to the Secretary to decide, as 
 between the Bank on the one hand, and the Government or the 
 people on the other, whether the general management of the 
 directors is wise or unwise ; or whether, in regard to matters not 
 connected with the deposits, it has or has not violated the condi- 
 tions of its charter. The statement which the Bank is bound to 
 make to the Secretary the may lay before Congress ; and he is, 
 doubtless, bound by his official duty to communicate to Congress 
 any other information in his possession, tending, in his judgment, to 
 show that the Bank had disregarded its charter, or failed to fulfil 
 all or any of its duties ; but here his authority, so far as it regards 
 the general course and operation of the Bank, ends. It is then 
 for Congress to act, if it see occasion, and to adopt the regular 
 remedies for any evils which it may suppose to exist. But it 
 transcends the power of Congress itself to pronounce the charter 
 violated, without hearing — without trial — without judgment ; far 
 less is any such power of pronouncing final judgment confided to 
 the Secretary. His power simply is, that, in regard to the deposits 
 of the public money, he is to judge, in the first instance, whether 
 just cause has arisen for their removal. 
 
 The Secretary seems to suppose — indeed, the very basis of his 
 argument assumes — that the law has confided to him a general 
 guardianship over the public welfare, so far as that welfare is in 
 any way connected with the Bank, or liable to be affected by its 
 proceedings ; and that he holds the power of removing the de- 
 posits as the means or instrument by which he is to enforce his 
 own opinions respecting that welfare. The committee do not 
 adopt this opinion. They think that, if such had been the design 
 of the law, its provisions would have been very different from 
 those which it does actually contain. 
 
 If such general guardianship had been intended to be conferred 
 
372 
 
 on the Secretary, it is reasonable to believe that he would have 
 been vested with powers more suitable to such a high trust. If 
 he had been made, or intended to be made, general inspector or 
 superintendent, other authority than merely that of removing the 
 deposits would have been given him, for this plain reason — that 
 the Government and the country have interests of much magni- 
 tude connected with the Bank, besides the deposits of the public 
 moneys in its vaults ; and to which interests, if endangered, the 
 removal of the deposits would bring no security. 
 
 The Government is proprietor of seven millions of the stock of 
 the Bank ; and yet no authority is given to the Secretary to sell 
 this stock under any circumstances whatever, or in any other way 
 to interfere with it. 
 
 The bills and notes of the Bank, too, are made receivable in all 
 payments to the United States, until Congress shall otherwise 
 order ; and no power is given to the Secretary to prevent their 
 being so received, either during the session of Congress or in its 
 recess, however the credit of these bills and notes might become 
 depreciated. 
 
 How is it possible to conceive that, if Congress intended to give 
 to the Secretary a general right to judge of the operations and 
 proceedings of the Bank, — and a power, of course, to declare when 
 it had violated its duty, and was no longer trustworthy, — it should 
 yet leave him under an absolute obligation to receive its bills and 
 notes in all payments to the Treasury, though they might have lost 
 all credit, and place no means in his hands to execute his high 
 authority of superintendent, except the mere power of removal? 
 
 Wherever it is clear that Congress has given the Secretary a 
 power, it has given him the means of informing his judgment as 
 to the propriety of exercising that power. He has power to re- 
 move the deposits ; and ample means are afforded him by which 
 he may learn, from time to time, whether those deposits are safe. 
 For this purpose, it is expressly made the duty of the Bank to 
 furnish him, so often as he shall require, if not oftener than once 
 a week, with statements of the amount of the capital stock of the 
 corporation, of the debts due to it, of the moneys deposited in it, 
 of its notes in circulation, and specie on hand ; and he has a right 
 to inspect the general accounts in the books of the Bank relating 
 to this statement. This statement enables him to judge of the 
 solvency and stability of the Bank, and of the safety of the public 
 money deposited in it. Here, then, is a power, and all appro- 
 priate means given for the just and enlightened exei'cise of that 
 power. Confined to the deposits, the power is accompanied with 
 all rational auxiliaries and attendants. 
 
 But for the depreciation of the bills of the Bank, should that 
 happen, and for other cases of maladministration, Congress has 
 
373 
 
 provided just and appropriate reniedies, to be applied by itself or 
 others, in exclusion of the Secretary. For redress of diese evils 
 no ])ovver is given to him. 
 
 For the security of the public interest, the law reserves a right 
 to either House of Congress to inquire, at all times, into the pro- 
 ceedings of the Bank ; and if, on such inquiry, it appears in any 
 respect to have violated its charter. Congress may bring it to trial 
 and judgment. Power is given to the President, also, to institute 
 judicial proceedings, if he shall have reason to believe that any 
 such violation has taken place. But no such power is given to 
 the Secretary. 
 
 The proposiuon, then, cannot be maintained, that Congress has 
 relied, for the security of the public interests, and the preservation 
 of the general welfare, so far as it is connected with the Bank, on 
 a general discretion reposed in the Secretary, for two reasons — 
 first, because it has not given him the appropriate powers of 
 remedy in the most important instances ; and, secondly, because 
 it has, in those instances, either expressly reserved those powers 
 to itself, or expressly conferred them on the President. 
 
 If the Secretary cannot prevent the notes of the Bank from 
 being received at the custom-houses and the land-offices, even 
 after they should be discredited ; if he have no power to touch, 
 m any way, the seven millions of stock belonging to the Govern- 
 ment ; if the power of examination into the proceedings of the 
 Bank be given, not to him, but to either House of Congress ; if 
 he have no power, but Congress and the President each has 
 power, to direct a legal investigation into the conduct of the Bank, 
 — how can it possibly be maintained that a general inspection and 
 guardianship over the public welfare, so far as it is connected with 
 the Bank, is confided to him ; and that his authority to remove 
 the deposits was given, not to protect the deposits themselves, and 
 secure their proper use, but to enable him to enforce upon the 
 Bank, under penalty of their removal, such a course of manage- 
 ment as his sense of the public interest and of the convenience of 
 the people may require? Such a construction would give the law 
 a strange and an undeserved character. It would convert the 
 })ower of removal, intended for remedy and redress, into a mere 
 instrument of punishment ; and it would authorize the infliction 
 of that punishment, without hearing or trial, in the very cases in 
 which the law yet says that, if violation of duty be charged, the 
 charge shall be heard and tried before judgment is pronounced ; 
 and the duty of preferring this charge, and of prosecuting it to 
 judgment, is given, not to the Secretary, but to Congress and to 
 the President. 
 
 The contingent power given to the Secretary to remove the 
 deposits, evidently shows that Congress contemplated the possibility 
 
374 
 
 of the happening of some sudden evil, for which either no other 
 remedy was provided, or none which could be applied with suffi- 
 cient promptitude ; and for which evil, removal would be a just 
 and appropriate remedy. The remedy prescribed, then, teaches 
 us the nature of the evils which were apprehended. We can 
 readily understand that threatened danger to the funds was one, 
 and probably the chief of those evils ; because change into other 
 hands is the ready and appropriate measure which would ration- 
 ally suggest itself to all minds as the proper security against such 
 danger ; and change is the remedy actually prescribed. Neglect 
 to transfer the deposits from one place to another, as the exi- 
 gencies of Government might require, and thereby to furnish those 
 facilities of exchange which the charter demands of the Bank 
 without commission and without charge, is another evil, for which, 
 should it happen, the remedy would naturally be the withdrawing 
 of the funds, and the placing of them in their former custody, so 
 that they could be transferred or exchanged by the Treasury itself. 
 
 But who can see any connection or relation, such as ordinarily 
 exists between an evil apprehended and a remedy proposed — be- 
 tween such an evil as a supposed over-discount, for instance, by 
 the Bank at one time, or an under-discount at another, and the 
 abrupt removal of all the public deposits ? And if no one can 
 see the connection, how can it be supposed that, in giving the 
 power of removal as a remedy. Congress had in view any such evil .'' 
 
 A question may arise between the Government and the Bank 
 respecting the right of the parties to the sum of one hundred and 
 fifty thousand dollars, as in the case of the French bill. 
 
 It is a question on which different opinions may be entertained, 
 and which is, in its nature, fit for judicial decision. Does any man 
 imagine that such a case as this was in the eye of Congress when 
 they granted the power of withdrawing the whole public treasure 
 from the Bank? Can it be for one moment maintained, that 
 Congress intended that, in such a case, the Secretary should 
 compel the Bank to adopt his own opinion, by the exercise of a 
 power, the very exertion of which deranges the currency, inter- 
 feres with the industry of the people, and, under some circum- 
 stances, would hazard the safety of the whole revenue ? 
 
 The committee think it cannot admit of rational doubt that, if 
 Congress had intended to give to the Secretary any power what- 
 ever, not directly touching the deposits themselves, not only would 
 it have specially pointed out the cases, but it would also, most 
 assuredly, have provided a remedy more suitable for each case. 
 The nature of the remedy, therefore, which is prescribed, clearly 
 shows the evils intended to be provided against. 
 
 To admit that the Secretary's conduct is subject to no control 
 
375 
 
 but his own sense of the general interest and convenience of the 
 people, is to acknowledge the existence, in his hands, of a dis- 
 cretion so broad and unlimited, tliat its consequences can be no 
 less than to subject, not only all the operations of the Bank and 
 its offices, but its powers and capacities, perhaps its very existence, 
 to his individual will. He is of opinion that the law creating it is, 
 in many of its provisions, unconstitutional : he may not unnaturally, 
 therefore, esteem it to be his duty to restrain and obstruct, to the 
 utmost of his power, the operation of those provisions thus deemed 
 by him to be unconstitutional. He is of opinion that the exist- 
 ence of such a powerful moneyed monopoly is dangerous to the 
 liberties of the people. It would result from this, that, if, in the 
 discharge of his official duty, he is to follow no guide but his owui 
 sense of the interest of the people, he might feel bound to coun- 
 teract the operations of this dangerous monopoly, diminish its 
 circulation, curtail its means, and prejudice its credit. To accom- 
 plish these very purposes, and these alone, he might withdraw the 
 deposits. The power given him by Congress would thus be used 
 to defeat the will of Congress in one of its most important acts, by 
 discrediting, and otherwise injuriously affecting, an institution which 
 Congress has seen fit to establish, and which it has declared shall 
 continue, with all its powers, to the expiration of its charter. 
 
 The power conferred on the Secretary is a trust power, and, 
 like other trust powers, in the absence of express terms setting 
 forth the occasions for its exercise, it is to be construed according 
 to the subject and object of the trust. As in other cases of the 
 deposit of moneys in banks, the primary object sought to be 
 accomplished by Congress, by that provision of the charter now 
 under consideration, is the safe keeping of the money. The Sec- 
 retary's trust, therefore, primarily and principally respects this safe 
 keeping. But another object is distinctly disclosed in the charter, 
 which object is intimately connected with the fund ; and that is its 
 transfer and exchange from place to place, as the convenience of 
 Government might require. The Secretary's trust, therefore, re- 
 spects also this other object, thus connected witli the fund ; and 
 when either of these objects requires a removal, a removal becomes 
 a just exercise of his authority. To this extent none can doubt 
 the existence of his power. If, in truth, the money is believed to 
 be unsafe — if, in truth, the Bank will not grant the facilities which 
 it has promised, in consideration of receiving and holding the fund 
 — then, certainly, it ought to be removed. But here the power 
 must stop, or else it is altogether unbounded. Here is a just and 
 reasonable limit, consistent with the character of the power, con- 
 sistent with the general duties of the Secretary, and consistent with 
 the nature of the remedy provided. 
 
376 
 
 The cliarter of the Bank is the law — It is the expressed will of 
 the Legislature. That will is that the Bank shall exist, with all 
 its powers, to the end of its term. That will, too, as the com- 
 mittee think, is that the public deposits shall continue in the Bank 
 so long as they are safe, and so long as the Bank fulfils all its duty 
 in regard to them. The Secretary assumes a broader ground. 
 He claims a right to judge of the proceedings of the Bank on all 
 subjects. Admitting the fund to be safe, and admitting that the 
 Bank has performed all its duties in regard to it, he claims an 
 authority, nevertheless, to remove the deposits whenever he shall 
 form an opinion, founded on the conduct of the Bank in any par- 
 ticular whatever, and however unconnected with the public mon- 
 eys, that the general interest of the people requires such removal 
 If, in his opinion, it discounts too litde, or discounts too much — if 
 it expands or contracts its circulation too fast or too slow — if its 
 committees are not properly organized — if it claims damages on 
 protested bills, which it ought not to claim — if, in his opinion still, 
 it is guilty of a wrongful meddling in politics, or if it do any thing 
 else not consistent with his sense of the public interest — he has a 
 right to visit it with a withdrawal of the public money from its 
 custody. 
 
 If this claim of power be admitted, it would seem to the com- 
 mittee to be a fair result, that the Secretary has power to withdraw 
 the deposits for no other reason than that he ditFers with Congress 
 upon its Constitutional authority to create any bank, or upon the 
 Constitutionality of this particular Bank, or upon the utility of con- 
 tinuing it in the exercise of its chartered powers and privileges till 
 its term shall expire. 
 
 The committee, therefore, are of opinion that it was not the in- 
 tention of the Legislature to give to the Secretary of the Treasury 
 a general guardianship over the public interests in all matters con- 
 nected with the Bank ; but that his power is a limited one, and is 
 confined to the safety and the proper management of that portion 
 of the public interest to which it expressly relates ; that is to say, 
 to the public moneys in deposit in the Bank. 
 
 But the extent of the Secretary's discretion, as asserted by him- 
 self, reaches even farther than the wide range which the commit- 
 tee have here described. It is not confined to the protection of 
 all the various interests which the Government and the country 
 have in the Bank, or to a supervision and control over all the con- 
 duct of the Bank ; but it embraces all branches of the public inter- 
 est, and touches every thing which in any way respects the good 
 of the people. He supposes himself rightfully to possess the power 
 of removing the deposits, whenever any causes, springing up in 
 any part of the whole wide field of the general interest, may appear 
 to him to call for such removal. Notwithstanding he may suppose 
 
377 
 
 all the great interests confided to the Bank to be perfectly safe — 
 notwithstanding he may have no occasion to complain of any part 
 of its conduct — notwithstanding, even, it may so have demeaned 
 itself as to have become the object of his favor and regard— yet, 
 if his construction be admitted, he may remove the deposits simply 
 because he may be of opinion that he might place them, with a 
 prospect of still greater advantage, in other hands. If he be of 
 opinion that the commerce of the country, or its manufactures, 
 would be benefited by withdrawing the public money from one 
 bank and placing it in many, that would be an exercise of authority 
 entirely within the limits which he prescribes to himself It would 
 be a case in which he would only follow his own sense of what the 
 general interest and convenience of the people required. He might 
 think, too, that, by withdrawing all the public treasure from the 
 Bank of the United States, and {Joeing it in the hands of twenty 
 or thirty State banks, to remain there during his pleasure, and to 
 be drawn thence, again, at his will, he might be enabled effectually 
 to advance certain other objects, which, whatever others might 
 think of them, he might consider to be essential to the good of the 
 people. All this, if he be right, is within his just authority. A 
 power necessarily running to this extent is a power, in the opinion 
 of the committee, which can never be admitted. 
 
 Having thus expressed an opinion upon the general extent of 
 the power claimed by the Secretary, the committee proceed to 
 consider the reasons which he has reported to Congress as the 
 particular grounds on which the power has been exercised in the 
 present case. 
 
 The first reason assigned by the Secretary is the near approach 
 of the period when the Bank charter will expire. That period is the 
 4th of March, 1836, more than two years distant ; nearly two years 
 and a half at the lime of the removal. Three sessions of Congress 
 are, in the mean fime, to be holden ; and inasmuch as the Secre- 
 tary himself says that " the power qver the place of the deposits 
 for the public money would seem properly to belong to the legis- 
 lative department of Government," the committee think it might 
 reasonably have been expected by him that Congress would not 
 fail to make, in season, suitable regulations on a subject thus ad- 
 mitted to be within the just exercise of its authority, and properly 
 one of its duties. 
 
 Why, then, should he not have waited till Congress had seen fit 
 to act upon the subject, or had manifested a disposition not to act? 
 The matter of the deposits had been before Congress last session ; 
 and Congress had then thought no provision to be, as yet, neces- 
 sary. Its undoubted sense was, that the public moneys should 
 remain where they were. This was manifested by proofs too 
 clear to be questioned. Another session was fast approaching; 
 VOL. II. 48 
 
578 
 
 and why was not the whole subject left where Congress had 
 chosen to leave it at the end of its last session, to await the free 
 exercise of its legislative power at this session ? It might have 
 been fit for the Executive to call the attention of Congress, at this 
 lime, to the necessity of some legal provisions respecting the future 
 custody of the public moneys ; and it would, doubdess, have been 
 proper for Congress, without such call, to take up and consider 
 the subject at its own suggestion ; but the committee see no reason 
 whatever, in the approaching expiration of the charter, for a change 
 so sudden, and producing such important effects, made so long 
 before that expiration, at a time when Congress had recently had 
 the subject before it, and when, too, it was again about to assemble, 
 and would naturally have reasonable and full opportunity to adopt 
 any necessary legislative provisions. 
 
 The Secretary has stated no reason satisfactory to the commit- 
 tee for not deferring this important step until the meeting of Con- 
 gress. He sets forth no emergency, no sudden occasion, nothing 
 which, in their judgment, made immediate action by him necessary. 
 
 The Secretary supposes it to have been his duty to act on the 
 belief that the Bank charter would not be renewed ; and he refers 
 to recent popular elections in support of this opinion. The com- 
 mittee believe it altogether unusual for reasons of that kind to be 
 assigned for public and official acts. On such subjects, opinions 
 may be very various. Different and opposite conclusions may be 
 drawn from the same facts by different persons. One man may 
 think that a candidate has been elected on account of his opposition 
 to the Bank ; another may see only that he has been chosen, not- 
 withstanding such opposition. One may regard the opposition, or 
 the support, of any measure, by a particular candidate, as having 
 been itself a promoting cause of the success of his election ; 
 another may esteem it as a formidable objection, overcome, how- 
 ever, by more powerful reasons ; and others, again, may be of 
 opinion that it produced little or no effect on the one side or the 
 other. But if inferences less uncertain could be drawn from such 
 occurrences, the committee still think, that for a public officer to 
 presume what law the Legislature will or will not pass, respecting 
 matters of finance, from the elecdon of a particular person to be 
 Chief Magistrate, implies a consequence from such election which 
 the Constitutional independence and dignity of the Legislature do 
 not allow to be admitted. 
 
 But if, for this or other reasons, the Secretary had persuaded 
 himself that the charter of the Bank would not be renewed, still it 
 certainly did not follow that the deposits ought to be removed 
 before Congress had decided on the hands into which they should 
 be transferred, and had made suitable regulation respecting their 
 future custody. If there were good ground for thinking that Con- 
 
379 
 
 gress would not recliarter the Bank, for that very reason there was 
 equally good ground for supposing that it would make proper and 
 seasonable provision for the keeping of the public moneys else- 
 where. How could the Secretary doubt that Congress would 
 omit to do that which he avers to be one of its appropriate duties ? 
 The question is, not what measures Congress might be expected to 
 adopt — whether the rechartering of the Bank, or what other meas- 
 ures; but whether it ought not to have been presumed that it 
 would adopt some measure, and that a seasonable and proper one, 
 according to its power and its duties ; and whether, therefore, this 
 anticipation of the action of Congress, on the eve of its session, is 
 to be justified. 
 
 The Bank charter declares that the deposits of the public money 
 shall be made in the Bank and its offices, and that the Bank shall 
 continue till March, 1836. Where does the Secretary find his 
 power to decide that the deposits shall be so made but for seven- 
 teen years from the date of the charter, instead of twenty ? If he 
 may thus withdraw the deposits two or three years before the ex- 
 piration of the charter, what should restrain him from exercising 
 the same authority five years before its expiration, or ten years ? 
 A plain and cogent necessity, the existence of a case which admits 
 of no reasonable doubt, and which is too urgent for delay till Con- 
 gress can provide for it, can alone justify an interference with the 
 public moneys, lodged in the Bank by law, for the double purpose 
 of safe-keeping, and fulfilment of solemn contract. 
 
 But, supposing it not reasonable for the Secretary to have ex- 
 pected the interposition of Congress, and admitting that he might 
 consider the withdrawing of the deposits as an act which was to be 
 done, at some time, by himself, how can it, nevertheless, be argued, 
 that so early and so sudden a withdrawal was necessary ? The 
 committee can perceive no possible reason for this, in any state of 
 facts made known to them. 
 
 The withdrawal of the money, left on deposit, from a bank 
 whose charter is about to expire, is naturally one of the things 
 longest postponed. It is as safe the last day of the existence of 
 the Bank, in common cases, as at any previous period. The 
 Bank expects the recall of its deposits, near the period of its expi- 
 ration, and prepares itself accordingly. The operation, if made 
 gradually, produces, when thus conducted, the least possible dis- 
 tiu'bance in the business of the community. Former experience 
 would seem to have held out a salutary light for the guidance of 
 the Secretary in this part of his official duty. 
 
 At the time of the expiration of the charter of the former bank, 
 Mr. Gallatin was Secretary of the Treasury, and the public depos- 
 its were in the bank. The charter of the bank was to end on 
 tlie 4th of March, 1811 ; and it does not appear that Mr. Gallatin 
 
380 
 
 thought it necessary to make any provision whatever for removing 
 any part of the deposits, except by drawing on them for the com- 
 mon uses of Government, until kite in the very month preceding 
 the expiration of the charter. A large amount of those deposits 
 remained, indeed, in the vaults of the bank after the charter had ex- 
 pired, and until they were wanted in the general operations of the 
 Treasury. And why should it be otherwise ? Why should that be 
 done suddenly now, which the Secretary thinks could not be done 
 suddenly hereafter without great inconvenience ? Is it not the just 
 inference, from his own argument, that the thing should not have 
 been done suddenly at all? As to the idea that the credit of the 
 paper of the Bank will be depreciated near the time of the expi- 
 ration of its charter, or that it would be inconvenient for it, at that 
 time, to be called on for the deposits, the committee are utterly at 
 a loss to see the slightest foundation for such an opinion. Expe- 
 rience is against it; and all reason, as the committee think, is 
 against it also. There is nothing to render it in any degree 
 ' doubtful that the bills of the Bank will be in as good credit the 
 last day of its charter, and even after that time, if any shall be 
 outstanding, as they are now ; and there is as little to render it 
 doubtful' that then, as now, the Bank would be competent to an- 
 swer all demands upon it. In the opinion of the committee, the 
 withdrawal of the fund was both unnecessarily early and unneces- 
 sarily sudden. It might have been made gradual ; it might have 
 been deferred ; and it might have been, and ought to have been, 
 as the committee think, not ventured upon at all, until the attention 
 of Congress itself had been called to the subject. The committee, 
 therefore, entirely dissent from this first reason reported by the 
 Secretary. They see nothing which proves to them the existence 
 of the slightest occasion for taking this important step at the 
 moment it was taken. So far as it depends on this reason, the 
 committee think the removal was made without necessity, without 
 caution or preparation, with a suddenness naturally producing 
 mischievous consequences, and in unjustifiable anticipation of the 
 legislation of Congress. 
 
 But the Secretary thinks there are other reasons for the removal, 
 growing out of the manner in which the affairs of the Bank have 
 been managed, and its money applied, which would have made it 
 his duty to withdraw the deposits at any period of the charter. 
 
 Of these reasons, thus arising from the alleged misconduct of 
 the Bank, the first is, that many important money transactions of 
 the Bank are placed under the control of a committee of exchange, 
 of which committee, no one of the public directors, as they are 
 called, is allowed to be a member, instead of being transacted by a 
 board of seven directors. 
 
 This charge consists of two parts : — first, that the discounts of bills 
 
381 
 
 are made by a committee, and not by a quorum of the bonrd ; 
 second, that the pubUc directors are not allowed to be of this com- 
 mittee, r 1 -11 1 
 
 First. It is not alleged that, in the discounts ot bills by this 
 committee, any indiscretion has been committed, or any loss in- 
 curred, or that, in consequence thereof, any facility to the mercan- 
 tile community has been widiheld, or any duty of the Bank to the 
 Government violated. The objection is, simply, that bills are dis- 
 counted by a committee. Supposing this to be an irregularity, or 
 illegality, in the proceedings of the board, how is it to be corrected 
 by withdrawing the deposits ? What connection is there between 
 the two things ? It is not pretended that this mode of discounting 
 bills endangered the deposits ; it is not pretended that it made the 
 Bank either less able or less willing to perform every one of its 
 duties to Government. How should the withdrawal of the deposits, 
 then, be suggested by the discovery of such an irregularity, real or 
 supposed ? The committee are not able to perceive the least pro- 
 priety in applying the power of removal to a proceeding of this 
 kind, even if it were admitted to be irregular or illegal. But is the 
 practice illegal ? It is believed to be not at all unusual. It is be- 
 lieved to be quite common, in banks of large business, for bills of 
 exchange, which are presented every day, and almost every hour 
 in the day, to be discounted either by a committee of the directors, 
 or by the president, or even other officers, acting under such gen- 
 eral orders and instructions as the directors, at their stated meetings, 
 prescribe. A large board of directors cannot assemble every day 
 — perhaps not oftener than twice a week. If bills of exchange 
 could only be discounted at these periodical meetings, the business 
 of exchange could not go on with the promptitude and despatch so 
 important to commercial men in such transactions. 
 
 The committee suppose the truth of these remarks will be at 
 once admitted by all who have knowledge of business of this kind. 
 The general management and control, the authority of examining 
 and supervising, of contracting or enlarging the amount of daily 
 discounts, according to the state of the Bank, and of giving every 
 other order and direction on the- subject, still remains with the di- 
 rectors, and is constantly exercised by them. They still manage 
 the allairs of the Bank, in the language of the charter, although 
 they may depute to a committee the authority of inquiring and de- 
 ciding upon the credit of persons whose names are on bills of ex- 
 change offered for discount, and on the rate of exchange current 
 at the day. The legal question would be, whether the directors, 
 by rule or by law, may not authorize a small number of their own 
 board to discount bills. The Bank has been advised that it 
 might rightfully do this ; and if it be not clear that this opinion is 
 right, it is certainly far from clear that it is wrong ; and in this 
 
S82 
 
 state of the question, the general practice of other banks, under 
 similar provisions in their charters, may well relieve the directors 
 from the imputation of intentional mismanagement. 
 
 If, in all this, the Bank has violated its charter, what other 
 banks of extensive business have not done the same thing ? 
 
 But the other subject of complaint, and that which seems to be 
 regarded as the more offensive part of this regulation, is, that the 
 public directors, as they are calledj were not allowed to be on this 
 committee. 
 
 It may be observed, in the first place, that, if the discounting of 
 bills of exchange by a committee, instead of the whole board of 
 directors, be illegal, it would hardly be rendered legal by placing 
 any or all of these public directors on the committee as members. 
 But the Secretary seems to suppose that there was some particu- 
 lar object in this exclusion of these directors, as if there had been 
 something wrong to be done, and therefore secrets to be kept, by 
 this committee. It is not easy to see what foundation there can 
 be for this opinion. All those discounts are matter of record. 
 They appear every day in the books of the Bank. Every 
 director, on or off the committee, sees them, or may see them, at 
 pleasure. There is no secrecy, nor any motive for secrecy, so far 
 as this committee can perceive. Very proper causes may have 
 existed, for aught that can be known by the Senate, for the omis- 
 sion of these particular directors from this particular committee. 
 Their services misht have been deemed more useful in other 
 committees ; or, however respectable in general character, or how- 
 ever useful in other parts of the direction, they may have been 
 esteemed not so well acquainted as others with the business of 
 foreign or domestic exchange. And even if there were, or are, 
 other causes for the omission, such as tend less to prove the ex- 
 istence of that harmony and mutual respect which it is so desirable 
 should prevail in such a board, these causes cannot furnish any 
 just ground for asserting, either that the business of exchange 
 was illegally conducted, or that the constitution of the committee 
 was proof of the existence of any motive not fit to be avowed. 
 
 But the Secretary entertains an opinion respecting the character 
 and duties of the directors appointed by the President and Senate, 
 in which the committee do not concur. He denominates them 
 " public directors," " officers of the Government," &c. 
 
 By the charter of the Bank there are to be twenty-five directors. 
 Of these, twenty are to be chosen by the individual stockholders, 
 and five appointed by the President, with the advice and consent 
 of the Senate. As the Government owned one fifth of the stock 
 of the Bank, it was judged expedient to place in the hands of the 
 President and Senate the appointment of one fifth of all the 
 directors. But they are not called public directors, nor officers of 
 
383 
 
 the Government, nor public agents ; nor are they entitled, so far 
 as the committee can perceive, to either of these appellations, any 
 more than the other directors. The whole twenty-five directors 
 are joint managers of a joint fund, each possessing precisely the 
 same powers, and charged with the same duties as every other. 
 They derive their appointments, it is true, from different origins, 
 but, when appointed, their authority is the same. There is not 
 one word in the charter intimating, in the remotest manner, that 
 the five directors appointed by the President and Senate have any 
 particular <luty, or are the objects of any peculiar trust. The 
 charter calls them not Government directors, not public directors, 
 but simply the directors appointed by the President and Senate. 
 They ai-e placed in the direction to consult with the other directors 
 for the common good of the Bank, and to act with these others, 
 and vote with them on all questions. They are, what the law 
 calls them, directors of the Bank, not agents of the Government. 
 They* are joint trustees with others in a joint interest. If any 
 thing illegal or improper takes place in the board, they are bound 
 to resist it by the duty which they owe the individual stockholders, 
 as much as by the duty they owe the Government ; because they 
 are agents of the individual stockholders, and have the same au 
 thority to bind them, by their acts, as to bind the Government ; 
 and, in like manner, it is the duty of those directors who are 
 appointed by the individual stockholders, to give notice, as well to 
 Government as to the stockholders, if any thing illegal take place 
 or be threatened. All those directors act and vote together, on 
 tbe smallest as well as on the highest occasions, and, by their 
 joint votes, bind the corporation, and bind both the Government 
 and individual stockholders to the extent of their respective inter- 
 ests in the corporation. 
 
 If the directors appointed by the President and Senate had 
 been excluded by the charter from any part of the power exer- 
 cised by the others ; if it had been forbidden them to interfere, to 
 the same extent, and with the same eftect, as the rest, in the com- 
 mon business of the Bank, there might be some reason for sup- 
 posing that an uncommon character — a character not so much of 
 action as of supervision and inspection — was intended to be con- 
 ferred on them. But they do interfere, and justly, in all transac- 
 tions of the Bank. They do vote and act on all subjects like the 
 other directors. Being, then, possessed of this common character 
 of directors, and enjoying all its powers to the fullest extent, the 
 committee know no form of argument by which an uncommon 
 and extraordinary character is to be raised by construction, and 
 superadded to the common character of directors which thus 
 already belongs to them. 
 
 By granting the charter, and by accepting it, the Government 
 
384 
 
 on the one hand, and the individual stockholders on the other 
 have agreed, that, of the directors, as joint agents of all parties, 
 the stockholders shall appoint twenty, and the Government five. 
 The interest of all parties is confided to this joint agency ; and 
 any distinction in their powers, as arising from their different 
 modes of appointment, is, in the judgment of the committee, not 
 to be sustained. They regard such distinction as entirely incon- 
 sistent with the nature of the agency created, and as deriving not 
 the least countenance from any thing contained in the law. 
 
 The committee, nevertheless, to avoid misapprehension, wish 
 to repeat, that it is undoubtedly the duty of the directors appointed 
 by the President, and of all other directors, to give notice, both to 
 Government and the stockholders, of any violation of the charter 
 committed or threatened. 
 
 The Secretary of the Treasury has thought proper to observe 
 that the measures of the connnittee of exchange are, as it 
 appears, designedly, and by system, so arranged as to conceal from 
 the officers of the Government transactions in which the public 
 are deeply involved. This, it must be admitted, is a very serious 
 charge. It imputes a corrupt motive. The committee have 
 sought for the foundation, either in evidence or argument, on 
 which this charge rests. They have found neither. They find 
 only the charge, in the first place ; and tlien they find the charge 
 immediately stated as a fact, and relied on as the basis of other 
 charges. 
 
 The second reason specially reported by the Secretary as 
 arising from the conduct of the Bank, respects the bill of exchange 
 drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury on the government of 
 France, and purchased by the Bank. 
 
 The general facts connected with this case are these : — 
 
 By the late treaty of indemnity between the United States and 
 France, it was stipulated that the French government should pay 
 to that of the United States twenty-five millions of francs, to be 
 distributed among those American citizens who had claims against 
 France for the unlawful seizure, capture, and condemnation, of 
 their vessels and property ; the whole sum to be paid in annual 
 instalments of four millions one hundred and sixty-six thousand six 
 hundred and sixty-six francs each, into the hands of such persons 
 as shall be authorized by the Government of the United States 
 to receive it ; the first instalment to be paid at the expiration of 
 one year next following the exchange of the ratification. 
 
 On the expiration of the year, the Secretary drew a bill of 
 exchange, signed by himself as Secretary, on the French govern 
 ment, for the amount of this instalment, and sold it to the Bank, 
 like any other bill of exchange, and received the proceeds by 
 credit of the amount to the account of the Treasurer in the Bank. 
 
385 
 
 On the presentment of this bill at the French treaistiry, pay- 
 ment was refused ; the bill was accordingly duly protested, and it 
 was taken up by a third person for account of the Bank. The 
 damages accruing on this bill, according to law and constant usage 
 in such cases, are one hundred and fifty-eight thousand dollars. 
 
 If diis bill had been transferred by the Bank, as probably it 
 was, the Bank itself would have been answerable for damages, 
 even at a higher rate, if a third person had not taken up the bill 
 for the honor of the Bank. 
 
 On receiving information of the protest of the bill, the officers 
 of the Bank, as was their duty, gave immediate notice to the 
 Treasury Department, and accompanied that notice with the in- 
 formation, always given in such cases, that the drawers of the bill 
 would be held answerable for the damages. Such is the substance 
 of the facts in this case. 
 
 The Bank, it would appear, was willing to collect the bill on 
 account of Government, and to credit the Treasury with the pro- 
 ceeds when received — a course of proceeding which had this to 
 recommend it, that the money to be received on the bill was to be 
 received by the Government simply in trust for claimants under the 
 French treaty, and was not ultimately destined to the ordinary uses 
 of the Treasury. On the contrary, indeed, before the dishonor of 
 the bill was known, it had been made, already, the legal duty of 
 the Secretary to place the fund, so soon as received, at interest, 
 for the benefit of the claimants. 
 
 But it was thought best to sell the bill, and to realize at once 
 its amount into the Treasury ; and the bill was sold to the Bank, 
 in preference to others offering to purchase, for no reason, it is to 
 be presumed, except that the terms of the Bank were more satis- 
 factory. The bill was thus purchased by the Bank, and its pro- 
 ceeds credited to the Treasury. This was a mere transaction of 
 the purchase and sale of a bill of exchange. There was no trust 
 confided to the Bank, and no fiscal agency in the whole matter. 
 Indeed, the agency of the Bank had been declined, the Secretary 
 preferring to deal with it, not as an agent, but as a purchaser, pro- 
 posing to it not to collect the bill, but to buy it. On being re- 
 mitted to Europe, and presented for payment, the bill was pro- 
 tested. By the universal commercial law, the Government, on 
 the occurrence of this protest, became amenable to the Bank for 
 the amount of the bill, with damages. These damages may be 
 ultimately claimed, widi justice, from the French government, if 
 the bill was drawn upon sufficient grounds, and on proper author- 
 ity ; in other words, if the obligation of the French government 
 was such, that it was bound to accept and pay the bill ; but unless 
 there be something in the case to vary the general rule, which the 
 committee do not perceive, these damages were part of the debt 
 VOL. 11. 49 
 
386 
 
 which had become dne to the Bank, as much as the principal sum 
 of the bill. If this be so, how could tlie directors relinquish this 
 part of the debt, any more than the other ? They are agents for 
 the corporation ; they act as trustees, and have no authority, with- 
 out consideration, to release either to the GoveiTiment or to indi- 
 viduals debts due or properly belonging to the corporation. 
 
 It has been suggested, that the Bank should have taken up this 
 bill, when pi'otested, on Government account. Two answers may 
 be given to this suggestion : the first is, that the bill had been 
 taken up by a correspondent abroad for account of the Bank, be- 
 fore it was known in the United States that it had been protested. 
 The second is, that it would have been unlawful for the Bank to 
 have advanced such amount to the Government, or on account of 
 Government, for the purpose of taking up this bill, or for any other 
 purpose, without an act of Congress. The express words of the 
 charter forbid it. 
 
 But, as a reason for removing the deposits, it appears to the 
 committee quite immaterial whether the Bank be right or wrong 
 in claiming these damages. If wrong, it will not recover them. 
 It is not the judge of its own rights ; and if the appropriate tribu- 
 nals shall decide that the Bank was acting, on this occasion, or 
 ought to have acted, as the agent of Government, or that it was its 
 duty to take up the bill on account of Government, then the dam- 
 ages will not be awarded to it. And in the worst aspect of this 
 case, how can its conduct, in this respect, be any possible reason 
 to justify the removal of the deposits ? What connection has this 
 occurrence with the safe-keeping of the public treasures, or with 
 the remitting them from place to place, to meet the convenience 
 of Government, according to the duty of the Bank under the char- 
 ter ? The Bank thinks itself entitled to damages on a protested 
 bill purchased and held by itself, and drawn by Government. 
 The Secretary of the Treasury thinks otherwise. If there be no 
 reason to doubt the sincerity of the Secretary's conviction, there is 
 as little to doubt the sincerity of that entertained by the Bank ; 
 and it is quite inconceivable to the committee that the pendency 
 of such a difference of opinion, on such a question, should furnish 
 any reason whatever for withdrawing the deposits, unless it be at 
 once admitted that the Secretary holds the power of removal as a 
 perfectly arbitrary power, and may exercise it, by way of punish- 
 ment, whenever, in any particular, the conduct or the opinions of 
 the Bank do not conform to his pleasure. 
 
 The Secretary does not argue this matter. He offers no reason 
 in opposition to the legal right of the Bank to the damages claimed. 
 Indeed, he hardly denies the right. He commences his obser- 
 vations on the subject by saying that the ruling principle of the 
 Bank is its own interest ; and closes them with another declaration, 
 
387 
 
 that, as fiscal agent to the public, it availed itself of the disap- 
 pointment of its principal for the purpose of enlarging its own 
 profits. 
 
 Assertions like these, however else they may be disposed of, 
 cannot be made subjects of argument. 
 
 The last charge preferred against the Bank is, that it has used 
 its means with a view to obtain political power, and thereby secure 
 the renewal of its charter. 
 
 The very statement of such a charge, as a reason for removing 
 the deposits, is calculated to excite distrust in the wisdom and 
 propriety of that measure ; because the charge, too general to be 
 proved, is too general, also, to be disproved ; and since it must 
 always rest mainly on mere opinion, it might be made at any time, 
 by any Secretary, against any bank. It would be, therefore, 
 always a convenient cloak under which to disguise the true mo- 
 tives of official conduct. 
 
 If proof be made out that the funds of the Bank have been 
 applied to illegal objects, the proper mode of redress and punish- 
 ment should have been adopted ; but what has this to do with the 
 deposits? As in the case of the French bill, the Secretary 
 cannot justify the removal of the deposits on any such ground as 
 this, unless it be conceded that he may use the power of removal 
 as a punishment for any offence, of any kind, which the Bank, in 
 his opinion, may have committed. The committee have already 
 expressed the opinion that no such latitude of power belongs to 
 him ; and the assertion of sucli a power, for such a cause as is now 
 under consideration, shows that the power ought never to belong 
 to any Secretary ; because the offence on account of which it is 
 here proposed to be exercised is a political offence, incapable of 
 definition, depending merely on the Secretary's opinion, and 
 necessarily drawing into its consideration all the exciting contro- 
 verted topics of the day. The Bank, it is said, " has sought to 
 obtain political power." What is the definition of such an offence 
 as this ? What acts constitute it ? How is it to be tried ? Who 
 is to be the judge ? What punishment shall follow conviction ? 
 All must see that charges of this nature are but loose and vague 
 accusations, which may be made at any time, and can never be 
 either proved or disproved ; and to admit them as sufficient grounds 
 to justify the removal of the deposits, would be to concede to the 
 Secretary the possession of a power purely arbitrary. 
 
 The main fact relied on for this cause of removal shows how 
 extremely unsafe all proceedings on any such reasons must be. 
 That main fact is, that, between December, 1830, and December, 
 1831, the Bank extended its loans twenty milhons of dollars; 
 and it is further alleged that, as if to leave no doubt of the motive 
 of this extraordinary conduct, it continued to add rapidly to its 
 
388 
 
 loans, until, in May, 1832, while its petition for renewal was pend- 
 ing, those loans amounted to seventy millions. And the Secretary 
 declares that this extraordinary increase of loans, made in so short 
 a space of time, and on the eve of a contested election, in which 
 the Bank took an open and direct interest, demonstrates that it 
 was using its money to obtain a hold upon the people of the 
 country, to induce them, by the apprehension of ruin, to vote 
 against the candidate whom it desired to defeat. This is strong 
 assertion ; but, so far as the committee perceive, it is assertion 
 merely. It is but the Secretary's own inference from facts, from 
 which very facts his predecessors in office have drawn no such 
 conclusions. 
 
 This great extension of the loans, be it remembered, took place 
 in 1831. Why was it not then complained of? How should it 
 have escaped the vigilance of the Secretary of that day at the 
 time it took place ? And, if it did not escape his vigilance, why 
 did he not remove the deposits ? So, also, as to the amount of 
 loans in May, 1832. That amount was perfectly well known at 
 the time ; and if it proved any offence, why was not the punish- 
 ment inflicted then ? How should all other Secretaries have slept 
 over this creat mischief? 
 
 It might further be well asked, What evidence is there of the 
 existence of any such motive as is imputed to the Bank, in this 
 extension of its loans ? There is no evidence, but the mere fact 
 xtself of the extension ; and it cannot be denied, that other and 
 very different reasons for the extension may have existed ; so that 
 the charge is proved no otherwise than by inferring a bad motive, 
 from an act lawful in itself, and for which good reasons may have 
 existed. 
 
 Nor is it either acknowledged, nor, so far as the committee 
 know, proved, that the Bank took an open and direct interest, as 
 a corporation, in the election referred to. The Bank certainly 
 was much interested in certain accusations which had been brought 
 against it, and which became subjects of public discussion during 
 the pendency of that election. It had been charged with great 
 misconduct, and gross violation of its charter. These accusations 
 must undoubtedly have called on the directors for answer. If 
 made before Congress, they were to answer before Congress ; if 
 made judicially, they were to answer in the courts ; if made in an 
 official and formal manner, and in that manner submitted to the 
 judgment of the country, the directors were bound to meet them 
 before that country, by every fair use of fact and argument, not 
 only for the purpose of defending themselves as directors, but for 
 the higher purpose of maintaining the credit of the Bank, and pro- 
 tecting the property intrusted to their care. If, in thus defending 
 the Bank before the community, the directors carried their measures 
 
389 
 
 beyond this fair object of defence, or if they resorted to dishon- 
 orable or indecorous modes of discussion ; if they sought rather to 
 inflame than to reason ; if they substituted personal crimination for 
 argument ; if even they met invective and violence with corre- 
 sponding invective and violence, — they follovi^ed bad examples, and 
 are not to be justified. But on their right to defend themselves 
 before the public against grave charges brought against them, and 
 urged hefore the public, the committee entertain no doubt ; and 
 they are equally clear in opinion, that the Secretary of the Treas- 
 ury is not constituted the judge of the mode of exercising this 
 right, and cannot justly remove the deposits merely because the 
 conduct of die Bank, in this particular, has not happened to con- 
 form to his wishes. 
 
 The committee, therefore, consider this last reason of the Sec- 
 retary equally insufhcient with the rest ; and they regard it as the 
 most objectionable of all, in its principle, inasmuch as it proceeds 
 on grounds which, if admitted, would leave a very high official duty 
 to be exercised from considerations connected with the political 
 feelings and party contests of every day, with no guide but the 
 individual opinion of the officer who is to perform the act — an 
 opinion which, it is possible, may itself be no less tinctured with 
 political motive and feeling than the conduct which it would rep- 
 rehend. 
 
 If an unlimited power be conceded to the Secretary to inflict 
 penalties on the Bank for supposed political motives, in acts legal 
 in themselves, where is die security tl>at the judge may not be 
 found acting under the same impulses which he imputes to the 
 party accused ? 
 
 The committee entertain no doubt that the immediate cause of 
 the existing public distress is to be found in the removal of the 
 public deposits, and in the manner in which that removal has been 
 made. No other adequate cause has been suggested ; and those 
 who justify the removal do not so much deny this to have been the 
 cause, as insist that it was not necessary that any such effect should 
 have followed from it. In other words, they argue that, notwith- 
 standing the removal, the Bank still possessed the power, if it had 
 chosen to exercise it, of warding off" the blow which has fallen on 
 the country, or at least of mitigating its severity. 
 
 Nodiing could have been rationally expected but that the Bank, 
 deprived of the deposits, and denounced by the Executive Gov- 
 ernment, would feel itself called on to take just care of its own 
 interest and its own credit. Of the means necessary to the at- 
 tainment of these ends, the directors alone were judges, and the 
 committee have no evidence before them to show that they have 
 not exercised their judgment fairly, and with a real solicitude to 
 accommodate the commercial community, in the altered state of 
 
390 
 
 things, as far as has been practicable, consistently with the security 
 of the institution, which it is equally their duty to the public and 
 the stockholders to maintain. They are certainly under every 
 obligation of duty, in the present distressed state of the country, 
 to do every thing for the pubhc relief which is consistent with the 
 safety of the Bank, and with those considerations which the ap- 
 proaching expiration of its charter makes it important for the 
 directors to regard. 
 
 The removal itself, and the manner of effecting it, are causes 
 entirely sufficient, in the judgment of the committee, to produce 
 all the consequences which the country has experienced, and is 
 experiencing ; and these consequences, they think, are to be re- 
 ferred to those causes as their just origin. How could any other 
 result have been expected ? The amount of the deposits was nine 
 millions of dollars. On this amount in deposit there was sustained, 
 no doubt, a discount of far greater magnitude. The withdrawal 
 of this sum of nine millions from die Bank necessarily compelled 
 it to diminish its discounts to the full extent of all that part which 
 may be supposed to have been sustained by it. It is to be remem- 
 bered, too, that this was done at a moment when business of every 
 kind was pressed with great activity, and all the means of the 
 country fully employed. 
 
 The withdrawing of so large an amount, at such a time, from 
 hands actually holding and using it, could not but produce derange- 
 ment and pressure, even if it had been immediately placed in other 
 banks, and if no unfriendly feeling, and no want of confidence, had 
 attended the transaction. But it is quite obvious, that the operation 
 to which the Secretary has resorted has been attended with both 
 these additional and powerful causes of derangement. It has cre- 
 ated unfriendly feelings, and it has diminished confidence. This 
 change of the deposits is made on the strength of charges against 
 the Bank, of a very grave and aggravated nature ; such as, if true, 
 would most seriously affect its credit for solvency and stability. It 
 is proclaimed to the whole world as having converted itself into a 
 political partisan, misapplied its funds, neglected its highest duties, 
 and entered on a career of electioneering against the Government 
 of die country. 
 
 These serious charges necessarily put the Bank on Its defence ; 
 and the extraordinary spectacle is exhibited of a warfare by the 
 National Government on the National Bank, notwithstanding that 
 the Government is itself a great proprietor in the Bank, and not- 
 withstanding that the notes of the Bank are the currency in which 
 the revenues of the country are by law receivable. 
 
 The true and natural relation between the Government and the 
 Bank is altogether reversed. Instead of enjoying the confidence 
 of the Government, it is obliged to sustain its most serious official 
 
391 
 
 assaults, and to maintain itself against its denunciations. The banks 
 selected by Government as its agents are themselves thrown, per- 
 haps unwillingly, into an attitude of jealousy and suspicion with 
 the Bank of the United States. They become cautious and 
 fearful, therefore, in all their proceedings; and thus those who 
 should cooperate to relieve the public pressure are considering 
 mainly their own safety. Fearful of each other, and fearful of 
 the Government, they see the distress continue, with no power of 
 beneficial interposition. 
 
 It may be asked, Why are not these deposit banks able to main- 
 tain as large a circulation on the nine millions of deposits as the 
 Bank of the United States? And will they not be thus able 
 when the present panic shall have subsided? The committee 
 think both these questions easily answered. 
 
 The Bank of the United States has a credit more general, it 
 may be said more universal, than any State bank does possess. 
 The credit of the Bank of the United States is equally solid, its 
 bills and notes received with equal confidence, for the purpose of 
 circulation and remittance, in every quarter of the country. Ko 
 paper circulation, so far as the committee know, which ever ap- 
 peared in the world, has approached nearer to the value and uni- 
 formity of a specie currency than the notes and bills of the Bank 
 of the United States. To the State banks these notes and bills 
 have performed the office of specie. All the State banks have 
 discounted, upon the possession of them, with the same freedom 
 and boldness as they would have done on an equal amount of the 
 precious metals. The curtailment of their circulation, therefore, 
 is not merely a withdrawing of the amount curtailed from the 
 general mass of circulation — it is removing, rather, to the amount 
 curtailed, the basis of the general circulation ; and although the 
 actual amount of notes and bills has not been recently gready 
 diminished, there is reason to suppose that the amount held by 
 State banks has been greatly diminished. 
 
 The removal of the deposits has operated direcdy on the amount 
 of the circulating medium, at a moment when that amount could 
 not bear any considerable reduction, suddenly made, without pro- 
 ducing sensible effect. It has diminished prices, and, in some 
 instances, it has had this effect to a very material degree. It has 
 operated on the internal exchange, and has, most manifestly, been 
 attended with very serious and heavy inconveniences in that im- 
 portant branch of the national interest. More than all, it has 
 acted on opinion ; it has disturbed the general confidence ; it has 
 weakened the public faith in the soundness of the currency ; and it 
 has alarmed men for the security of property. As yet, we hardly 
 know Its effects on the credit of the country in Europe. Perhaps 
 it is not easy to anticipate those effects ; but if causes which 
 
392 
 
 operate here should be found to have been efficient there also, a 
 still greater degree of pressure and distress than has yet been felt 
 may be expected. 
 
 The committee, therefore, cannot but regard the removal of the 
 deposits, on the whole, as a measure highly inexpedient, and 
 altogether unjustifiable. The public moneys were safe in the 
 Bank. This is admitted. All the duties of the Bank connected 
 with these public moneys were faithfully discharged. This, too, 
 is admitted. The subject had been recently before the House of 
 Representatives, and that House had made its opinion against the 
 removal known by a very unequivocal vote. Another session of 
 Congress was close at hand, when the whole matter would again 
 come before it. Under these circumstances, to make the removal, 
 with the certainty of creating so much alarni, and of producing so 
 much positive evil and suffering, stich derangement of the cur- 
 rency, such pressure and distress in all the branches of the busi- 
 ness of private life, is an act which the committee think the Senate 
 is called on to disapprove. 
 
 The reasons which have thus been stated, apply to the whole 
 proceedings of the Secretary relating to the public deposits, and 
 make it unnecessary to consider whether there be any difference 
 between his power over moneys already in the Bank, and his 
 power to suspend future deposits. The committee forbear, also, 
 to consider the propriety of the measures adopted by the Secre- 
 tary for the safe keeping of the public moneys since their with- 
 drawal from the Bank. They forbear, too, from entering into any 
 discussion, at present, of the course of legislation proper to be 
 adopted by Congress under the existing state of things. In this 
 report, they have confined their consideration to the removal of 
 the deposits, the reasons assigned for it, and its immediate conse- 
 quences ; and on these points they have formed the opinions which 
 have now been expressed. 
 
 They recommend to the Senate the adoption of the resolution 
 which has been referred to them. 
 
REMARKS 
 
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE AFFAIRS OF 
 THE GENERAL POST-OFFICE, JUNE 27, 1834. 
 
 In the Senate, June 27th, 1834, the Report of the committee on the condi- 
 tion of the general post-.ofRce, and the resolutions with which the Report 
 concludes, having been taken up and debated by several gentlemen, Mr. Web- 
 ster, in conclusion, made the following remarks : — 
 
 Mr. Webster said that he thought great credit was due to the 
 committee for the labor, dihgence, and abihty, which its members 
 had bestowed on the subject referred to them. They have now 
 made a report of a very serious character, containing explicit 
 charges of maladministration, and accompanied by the evidence on 
 which those charges are founded. Two members of the committee 
 have made a report, or presented a paper, of their own, in which 
 they undertake in some instances to defend, and in others to ex- 
 cuse, the conduct of the Postmaster-General, and other persons 
 employed in the department. Now, Sir (said Mr. W.), in an 
 affair so complicated, where there are so many charges, and so 
 much evidence, the first question to be asked is. Are any of these 
 charges admitted to be true, by the friends of the Administration, 
 and, if any, which ? And, as to the rest of the charges, are they 
 all denied or contradicted, or are some of them, and, if any, which, 
 left without denial or contradiction .'' The honorable chairman of 
 the committee (Mr. Grundy), who does not agree in the report 
 of the committee, but who is one of the two members who signed 
 the other paper, called the report of the minority, has addressed 
 the Senate repeatedly, on the subject of these charges. Some of 
 them he has objected to ; others he has not attempted to rebut ; 
 and of others he has said nothing. The honorable gentleman is 
 friendly to the Administration, and to the head of the Post-Office 
 Department; and, therefore, perhaps, it was hardly to be expected 
 that he should show great zeal in the prosecution of this inquiry. 
 Yet I think. Sir, we had a right to expect from him not only his 
 opinion on all the charges, but also some degree of patriotic indig- 
 nation against lawless acts, which he admits to be lawless. Take, 
 VOL. II. 50 
 
394 
 
 for example, the first resolution of the committee, which declares 
 that the Postmaster-General has borrowed money on the credit of 
 the United States, without any authority of law. The honorable 
 chairman says, he admits the truth of this charge. Admits it? 
 But why does he content himself with admitting it ? Does he not 
 regard it as a gross violation of duty ? Does he not think it an 
 alarming thing, that the Postmaster-General should borrow half a 
 million of dollars, in order to cover up the deficiencies of the de- 
 partment, and that he should keep this loan concealed, for years, 
 from the knowledge of Congress ? As the head of a committee 
 charged to inquire into abuses, and this enormous abuse having 
 been discovered, can the honorable member justify himself by 
 simply saying he admits its existence ? Has he no reproof, no 
 word of censure for such a flagrant violation of law? Has he no 
 disapprobation to express, no complaint to enter, in such tones as 
 that the Administration shall hear them ? No man denies the fact, 
 and none undertakes to defend it. What then ? Is the depart- 
 ment still to go on in its career, and nothing done, any more than 
 if nothing had been discovered ? If there were nothing else in the 
 whole report — if that charge stood alone — I cannot conceive how 
 any man can doubt that the department ought to be immediately 
 and thoroughly reformed. The country, if I mistake not, will call 
 for such reformation. As to upholding the administration of the 
 department, with such charges against it proved and admitted, it is 
 more even than the spirit of party devotion can accomplish. 
 
 Again, Sir, the third resolution distinctly declares that a practice 
 prevails, in the post-office, of granting contracts on bids which vary 
 from the advertisements, and of altering contracts, after they are 
 made and accepted — a practice which destroys all competidon, 
 and enables the department to give all contracts to favorites. Is 
 this charge denied, or admitted ? I have not heard the honorable 
 member, the chairman, deny it. Does he acknowledge it to be 
 true ? If he does, why does he not tell us, in a plain and direct 
 manner, that this, too, is an enormous abuse, and ought to be 
 reformed ? Is such a practice to pass without reprehension ? 
 While its existence is detected, discovered, and acknowledged, is 
 there to be no rebuke of it ? 
 
 There is, then, the sixth resolution, which declares, that extra 
 allowances have been made to contractors, which are unreasonable 
 and extravagant, and out of all proportion with the increase of 
 service. Is this true ? 
 
 The eleventh resolution alleges, in general terms, that the depart- 
 ment is deeply in debt, and its affairs in disorder. I have heard no 
 man deny this. None can deny it. The department is deeply in 
 debt; its affairs are disordered, greatly disordered. These extra 
 allowances appear to have lost their original character. Instead of 
 
395 
 
 being extraordinary, they have become ordinary. Contractors 
 calculate upon them. The probability of an extra enters into their 
 motives, when they make bids. Indeed, it seems of very little 
 importance what bids they make. They are, in fact, paid just what 
 sums the Postmaster-General sees fit to pay ; and they are gener- 
 ally very well satisfied. From the frequency and the amount of 
 these extras, the constant changing of contracts, it is quite evident 
 that all fair competition among contractors is done away. 
 
 Mr. President, the country is awakened to these abuses in the 
 post-office, and it will not be, and ought not to be, satisfied without 
 a thorough examination, and an honest and real reform. I give 
 my hearty thanks to the committee for their zeal and industry. 
 They have had a laborious winter, and are likely to have a labo- 
 rious summer. Let them go on fearlessly, and the country will 
 appreciate their services. 
 
 Let them explore all the sources of corrupt patronage ; let them 
 bring all abuses into the broad light of day. Let them inquire into 
 the number of removals of postmasters, with the alleged causes 
 of such removals. Let them inquire at whose bidding honest and 
 faithful men have been removed, to make way for partisans. Let 
 them ascertain whether it be true that persons here may go into 
 the post-office, and require the removal of postmasters by dozens ; 
 and whether the Postmaster-General, as matter of course, com- 
 pHes with such requisitions. 
 
 Mr. President, it is due to the committee — it is due to the Sen- 
 ate itself — it is due to this highly important subject, that we should 
 express an opinion on some of the leading resolutions reported by 
 the committee. If some are more doubtful than the rest, or re- 
 quire further examination, let them remain for further consideration. 
 But on the plain, acknowledged, notorious cases, let us come to a 
 vote. Let us show the country that we are in earnest. Let us 
 begin with the first, with that which respects the borrowing of the 
 money from banks, without authority of law, or even the knowl- 
 edge of Congress ; and let us see whether any one individual 
 member of the Senate is prepared to withhold from that proceed- 
 ing his vote of censure. 
 
 [Mr. Benton thought the Senate ought to defer, for the present, taking a vote 
 on the resolutions. He said he had had no opportunity of carefully examining 
 the reports, and therefore knew but little of their contents. However, he must 
 say, that he had found things in them at which he had felt much mortified.] 
 
 Mr. Webster thought the best course, which was called for by 
 the importance of the subject, and what was due as well to the 
 committee as the Senate, was this — to take a vote on the first reso- 
 lution. He would then move to lay the others upon tlie table, 
 
396 
 
 until such time as gentlemen had an opportunity of examining them, 
 when he would move that they be taken up. 
 
 The question was then taken on agreeing to tlie first resolution reported by the post- 
 office committee, in the following words :— 
 
 " Resolved, That it is proved, and admitted, that large sums of money 
 have been borrowed at different banks by the Postmaster-General, in 
 order to make up the deficiency in the means of carrying on the business 
 of the Post-Office Department, witliout autliority given by any law of 
 Congress ; and that, as Congress alone possesses the power to borrow 
 money on the credit of the United States, all such contracts for loans by 
 the Postmaster-General are illegal and void." 
 
 ■'o^ 
 
 And the question on agreeing to this resolution was decided unanimously in 
 the affirmative. 
 
REMARKS 
 
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, IN RELATION TO 
 STEAM-BOATS, DECEMBER 19, 1833. 
 
 In the Senate, on Thursday, December 19th, 1833, the following resolution 
 relating to steam-boats, and other vessels propelled by steam, offered by Mr. 
 Webster, was taken up for consideration : — 
 
 " Resolved, That the Committee on Naval Affairs be instructed to inquire 
 into the expediency of passing a law for preventing, as far as may be, 
 accidents to vessels employed on the foreign or coastwise commerce of 
 tlie United States, from explosion by steam." 
 
 Mr. Webster addressed the Senate. It was, he believed, the 
 general expectation of the country, that Congress would take up 
 the subject to which this resolution referred. The history of the 
 last two or three years (said he) exhibits a vast amount of prop- 
 erty, and a startling list of human lives, lost by the explosion of 
 the boilers and flues of steam-boats. These frequent occurrences 
 have occasioned the existence of so much fear and terror, as to be 
 a serious diminution of the convenience and comfort of that mode of 
 conveyance. At present, the whole subject is without any regulation 
 whatever, by public authority ; and no authority but that of Congress 
 seems competent to establish proper regulations. Of the power of 
 Congress there can be no doubt. Steam-boats are, generally, li- 
 censed vessels, and they engage extensively in the coastwise com- 
 merce of the country. They may be registered vessels also, and may 
 engage in its foreign commerce. On the same ground that laws of 
 Congress regulate the number of passengers in merchant vessels, 
 and make it necessary that such vessels should have medicine- 
 chests, for the preservation of the lives and health of persons on 
 board, with divers other provisions, for the same or similar objects, it 
 is plainly in the power of Congress to adopt any regulations for 
 the government of steam-vessels, which security to life and prop- 
 erty may appear to require. It is with Congress to make these 
 regulations, or they cannot be effectually made at all. 
 
 It is the general opinion, I believe, not only of practical engi- 
 neers, but of the public also, that nearly all these accidents have 
 arisen from negligence ; and some of them from a very highly 
 
398 
 
 criminal degree of negligence. Indeed, it may be well doubted 
 whether a still more positive criminal offence has not, in some 
 instances, occasioned the disaster. Steam-boat racing, for example 
 — a practice by which the lives of hundreds of persons are put into 
 imminent danger, without the shghtest knowledge, on their part, of 
 the existence of any such cause of danger — is such a wanton, in- 
 tentional, and reckless exposure of human life, as that it may well 
 be regarded as a higher offence than even extreme negligence. 
 But negligence itself is criminal, highly criminal, where such effects 
 to life and property follow from it. Those who carry passengers 
 for hire, by means of such a mighty agent as steam — an agent so 
 useful and powerful, when kept under proper management, and 
 so destructive when it is allowed to overcome its just restraints- 
 are bound in duty, and should be bound by law, to apply to their 
 business the strictest attention and the utmost degree of diligence. 
 I am not prepared to say, definitely, what legal provisions it 
 may be proper to adopt. It will be the business of the committee 
 to consider and arrange such provisions. They will have the ben- 
 efit of the legislation of other countries on the same subject, and 
 may readily command the assistance of whatever skill and expe- 
 rience our own country affords, in aid of their labors. 
 
 Some general ideas upon the proper remedy, however, have 
 occurred to me, which I will suggest for consideration. 
 
 The law, as it seems to me, might be of a two-fold character. 
 It might prescribe certain regulations, the violation of which, 
 whether accidents happened in consequence or not, should incur a 
 penalty ; and it might further provide, that, in case of accident, 
 although all prescribed regulations should have been previously 
 complied with, yet, if the accident happened from culpable negli- 
 gence at the moment, that negligence should be severely punished. 
 As to previous and prescribed regulations, the first and most im- 
 portant, doubtless, should be, that every boiler, intended for a 
 steam-boat, should be tried and proved by some public authority, 
 and restrained, in its future use, to one third, or, at most, one half, 
 the degree of pressure or tension which it should have been proved 
 to be capable of bearing. A safety-valve, out of the reach of the 
 firemen, a proper apparatus to show at all times the level of the 
 water, and also the intensity or height of the steam, and this appa- 
 ratus so arranged as that its indications may be seen from without, 
 are among the preventive remedies to which the attention of the 
 committee will probably be called. 
 
 But I look with more confidence of beneficial results from 
 certain other provisions, which I trust will receive the consideration 
 of the committee. Fully believing that these accidents generally 
 result from negligence, at the time, by those who have the charge 
 of the engine, penalties, I think, ought to be enacted against such 
 
 a 
 
399 
 
 negligence, and legal means provided, by which, when lives are 
 lost by such occurrences, an immediate inquisition, investigation, 
 and trial, should be secured, and the cidpable negligence, if there 
 be such, adequately punished. And, hi the first place, I think the 
 boat itself should be made subject to forfeiture, whenever lives 
 are lost through the negligence of those conducting it. There is 
 nothing unreasonable in this; analogous provisions exist in other 
 cases. The master of a merchant ship, for instance, may forfeit 
 the ship by a violation of law, however innocent the owners may 
 be ; even though that law be only a common regulation of trade 
 and customs. There is, at least, quite as much reason for saying 
 that whoever builds or buys a steam-boat, and proposes to carry 
 passengers therein for hire, shall be answerable to the amount of 
 the value of the boat, for the sobriety, diligence, and attention, of 
 those whom he appoints his agents to navigate it, as there is, in 
 revenue cases, to impose such liability for smuggling, or illegal 
 landing of goods. To enforce this liability, I should propose, that 
 whenever an explosion takes place, causing the loss of the lives of 
 passengers, the boat should be immediately seized by the collector 
 of the district, and the persons navigating her detained for exam- 
 ination ; a trial should be had, and, unless it should appear, on 
 such trial, tliat all legal requirements had been previously complied 
 with, and were observed, at tlie time, and, further, that the accident 
 was one which no degree of attention could have foreseen or pre- 
 vented, the boat should be forfeited, and the persons having charge 
 at the time should be punished. It is no unreasonable hardship, in 
 such cases, to throw the burden of proof on those who are in- 
 trusted with the navigation and management of the boat. They 
 should be able to make out a clear case of actual attention, skill, 
 and vigilance, or else forfeiture ought to follow. It is a very high 
 trust to have charge of Uiat which is so potent to destroy life, and 
 which, when negligently treated, is so likely to destroy it. Of 
 course, all unnecessary delay, expense, or trouble, should be 
 avoided. The property seized might be restored, on bonds, as in 
 other cases of seizure, pending preparation and trial ; and every 
 indulgence allowed, in the forms and modes of proceeding, com- 
 patible with the great end of an immediate investigation and a 
 prompt decision. 
 
 It is evident, that, for many reasons, a judicial investigation will 
 seldom be had, in these cases, unless it be instituted by public 
 authority ; and I do not think any provisions will be adequate, 
 which do not secure such investigation, whenever the loss of life 
 happens. 
 
 As to steam-boat racing, it is an enormity that demands no tol- 
 erance. Doubtless, the committee will see the propriety of pro- 
 viding that all such racing, on an/ wager, or for any stakes, whether 
 
400 
 
 it be between boat and boat, both, or either, having passengers on 
 board, or whether the wager be on any boat, with passengers on 
 board, running against time, shall be punished with forfeiture of 
 the boat, and severe personal penalties on those concerned; 
 whether any accident happen from such racing or not. 
 
 This, Sir, is a rough sketch of those enactments, which, I think, 
 may deserve the consideration of the committee. Others, and 
 perhaps better than these, will doubtless occur to the members of 
 the committee. I have the fullest confidence that it is in the power 
 of Congress to put an end, in a very great degree, to these disas- 
 trous occurrences. I believe that a wise and efficient law, such as 
 may be easily framed and put in practice, would prevent three 
 fourths of them. At any rate, I trust vi^e shall meet the public 
 expectation, and try the experiment. 
 
 There are, Sir, one or two other subjects, belonging to the safe 
 navigation of steam-boats, though not immediately connected with 
 the explosion of steam, which the committee will probably think 
 worthy of attention. The first is, the collision of these vessels. 
 It has happened more than once, that steam-boats have run foul of 
 each other, not by means of darkness, or fog, but simply because 
 the one did not know on which side the other meant to pass. 
 Something like a law of the road, by which each should know on 
 which hand to keep her course, with the obligation of being well 
 lighted at night, would probably prevent some of these occurrences. 
 
 The other subject is the carrying gunpowder, in large quan- 
 tities, in boats l:jjiving passengers. As there are boats used exclu- 
 sively for freight, there can hardly be a necessity of transporting 
 gunpowder In passenger boats. This transportation In such boats 
 augments the danger, and, when known, still more augments the 
 terror of the passengers. And it Is probably In consequence of 
 this, and because some captains, on that account, are not willing to 
 receive gunpowder on board, that the article Is sometimes shipped 
 in disguise, the boxes being marked as containing other goods. 
 Tills highly objectionable and criminal practice ought to be se- 
 verely punished. 
 
 ( 
 
SPEECH 
 
 DELIVERED AT A PUBLIC DINNER IN SALEM, MASS., AUGUST 7, 1834. 
 
 The Whigs of Salem and its vicinity gave a public dinner, on Thursday, 
 August 7th, to the Hon. Daniel Webster, and the Hon. Nathaniel Silsbee, 
 the Senators in Congress from MassacJiusetts. The Hon. Judge White presided. 
 The table was graced with the presence of many of our most distinguished 
 citizens. When the toast complimentary to the Senate of the United States, 
 was announced, Mr. Webster rose and spoke as follows : — 
 
 Respected Fellow-Citizens : My honorable and worthy 
 colleague has preceded me, as was his right and place, in express- 
 ing to you his sense and my own of the great honor conferred 
 upon us by this assembly. It is not to be doubted, fellow-citizens, 
 as he has properly and truly stated, that next to the consciousness 
 of an honest endeavor to serve those whose servants we are, is the 
 high satisfaction of receiving at their hands proof that they think 
 our efforts have been well intended. Gentlemen, with a heart full 
 of grateful acknowledgments for all the kindness which has been 
 expressed towards us, permit me to say that I know you mean by 
 this meeting — by this congregation of citizens — to express your 
 approbation, not only of our endeavors, but also of those of the 
 patriotic citizens composing the majority of the Senate, with whom 
 we have acted. Those distinguished men, now gone to their 
 homes in every State of New England — in most of the Middle, 
 Southern, and Western States — will feel the same pleasure that we 
 feel, when they, too, shall hear that their efforts to stay the tide of 
 misgovernment have found support in the just, intelligent, and 
 patriotic population of the county of Essex. But, Gentlemen, in 
 all governments truly republican, men are nothing— -prmr?'/)/e is 
 every thing ; and I know that not men, but principle, not individ- 
 uals, but the great cause of civil liberty, has brought you here to- 
 day ; I know that the country, and not the servants of the country, 
 has drawn together the assembly by which I am surrounded. It is 
 with the cause to be pleaded, and not with its impotent pleaders, 
 that you have to do. 
 
 Fellow-citizens, you are assembled under a name that, for a cen- 
 tury and a half, has designated the lovers of civil liberty ; under a 
 
 VOL. II. 51 
 
402 
 
 name which, borne aloft, has carried terror and dismay to the 
 bosoms of despots, from the time of the Stuarts down to the pres- 
 ent period. And how is it — by what magic or miracle is it — that, 
 within the short space of three months, the appellation of Whig 
 has spread over onr country from the East to the West, and from 
 the North to the South, embracing in its denomination all lovers of 
 Constitutional liberty ? How is it to be accounted for, but by the 
 fact, that there is something in the state of the case — something 
 in the condition of the country, and in the purposes of the Govern- 
 ment on the one hand, and something in the determination and 
 spirit of the people on the other hand — that makes the name 
 " Whig " applicable ; that makes the name correctly characteristic 
 of things as they are, and that makes its opposite appropriate and 
 descriptive of men as they are ? Gentlemen, it is as certain that 
 the appellations of Whig and Tory do not circulate in the polit- 
 ical hemisphere without adequate cause, as that the lightning is not 
 found in the clouds without electricity. And, now, what is the 
 question which has given rise to the renewal of these distinctive 
 names? It can be no subordinate question; no temporary meas- 
 ure ; no question of mere political expediency, that has had this 
 effect : such questions arise ; men take different views of them, 
 express their sentiments ; a decision takes place, and the matter 
 passes away forever. It must be some question which takes hold 
 of the Constitution, which is dear to the hearts of the people ; some 
 question connected with that liberty which the people of tlie Uni- 
 ted States have intelligence enough to know is the source of all 
 the blessings they enjoy. What is the question, then? It is the 
 question of resistance or non-resistance to Executive power. The 
 iVIiigs go for resistance ; the Tories, following the principle of their 
 predecessors, go for non-resistance. And this is the distinction. 
 If, however, we may believe the oracles of the Tories, the whole 
 is a question of Bank ! — of the Bank ! — an institution of yes- 
 terday, and that expires to-morrow ! Why, Gentlemen, it would not 
 become me to tell you that this is not the question. You know it 
 is not. You know too well that the question lies deeper. 
 
 It has happened that the Bank has been the object upon which 
 Executive power has been attempted to be exercised ; and who 
 does not know that, in all cases in which similar attempts have been 
 made, an object has been invariably chosen which was odious, or 
 might be made odious, to the people. Despotism is sharp-sighted ; 
 and whenever it commences its career of usurpation, it makes 
 choice of something — its first transgression will be against some 
 institution which cannot command the sympathies of the people. 
 It is our duty, then, to watch the principle of the movement, and 
 not to look at the merit or demerit of the object against which 
 power is directed. Allow me to recur here to the rise of this great 
 
403 
 
 question. The Chief Magistrate was reelected under circum- 
 stances of a very imposing "character. Although it may be true 
 that he did not receive a majority of the votes of the whole people, 
 yet, considering the complex manner in which the votes were taken 
 — the great States voting by States, and the majority reckoned by 
 States — I repeat, that the majority he had was very imposing. It 
 seemed to say that it was the will of the people that this individual 
 should still continue to be President of the United States : al- 
 though some of us looked in a ditFerent direction, yet we felt 
 ourselves bound to submit to this decision of the people. We did 
 submit. And I can answer for myself and the other represen- 
 tatives of this State, that nothing was further from our wishes than 
 to be obliged to enter into a course of opposition. Events occurred 
 during the session before last — a great crisis arrived — in which we 
 thought it our duty to support the Executive, to maintain inviolate 
 the law, and to uphold the just power of the Government. We 
 did support him without hesitation, and by our numbers, if by 
 nothing else, we did so with some effect. Affairs, however, after- 
 wards took a different direction, and we also feh it to be our duty 
 subsequently to take a different course. This time twelve months 
 the country was in a high state of prosperity, and in this part of it 
 there was assuredly no desire unnecessarily to oppose the Admin- 
 istration. The President had just been among us : he had re- 
 ceived the strongest marks of regard, and had been treated as the 
 Chief Magistrate of the United States might expect to be treated^ 
 He went back, and, in September last, took the resolution to 
 interfere with the treasury of the country. Foreseeing this event, 
 from the tone of an official newspaper at the seat of Government, 
 I ventured, as an individual of the community, to utter my voice, 
 beforehand, against any such attempt upon the money of the people. 
 One of the last acts of the House of Representatives had been to 
 express their satisfaction and confidence in the Bank of the United 
 States — two thirds of the House had voted thus ; the sentiments 
 of the Senate were as well known upon the subject as if they had 
 been similarly expressed ; and yet, ten days after the rising of Con- 
 gress, intimation was given of the President's intention to remove 
 the deposits. At that dme, I was so connected with public men 
 and measures, that I did not deem it unfitdng for me to express 
 my sentiments in relation to this matter. I did so. In September 
 last, however, the act was done — the deed was consummated — 
 the President, by his own authority, by displacing a Constitutional 
 officer, who refused to do his bidding, and appointing another and 
 more pliant instrument — removed the public treasures from a place 
 assigned them by law, and placed them in the banks chosen by 
 himself, and completely under his own control. This is but one 
 out of a series of acts, which evince the disposition of the Exec- 
 
404 
 
 utive to encroach upon tlie Legislative Department of the Gov- 
 ernment. 
 
 It is now (continued Mr. Webster) two years since I have ad- 
 dressed any assembly of Massachusetts cit'zens upon political 
 subjects. The last occasion was at Worcester ; and I said then, 
 what I now repeat, viz. that the general course of the Executive 
 has been, 1st, to derogate from the powers of Congress and the 
 common Government ; and this on pretence of State right : 2dly, 
 in relation to the powers admitted to be in the Government, to 
 take to himself the lion's part. The early papers of the Adminis- 
 tration prove this to be the case : the veto messages, he. all go to 
 curtail the powers of Congress. In this latter particular, the Pres- 
 ident has pursued a course different from that of any of his prede- 
 cessors, from the time of Washington until the present moment. 
 The power of negativing the laws is a power which does exist in 
 the Executive, but which is only to be exercised on extraordinary 
 occasions. If we go back to the framers of the Constitution, we 
 shall find that the chief object of the veto was to secure the Ex- 
 ecutive from any encroachment on the part of the Legislative De- 
 partment of the Government : it was to protect the President and 
 his own rights ; but it was never intended that the veto should admit 
 the Executive to a full participation in the ordinary business of the 
 Legislature, and with power to put an end to the proceedings of 
 both Houses of Congress. This would be an absolute power ; for 
 what President, with a party at his heels, would be unable to obtain 
 one third of one of the legislative branches — and one third would 
 be sufficient for his purpose — to enable him to arrest the progress 
 of legislation. This veto power has been so frequently employed 
 of late as to exceed, in the occasions of its exercise, the whole pre- 
 vious history of the Government. [Mr. Webster here alluded to 
 the otlier (the negative) power of veto possessed by the Exec- 
 utive, in withholding the expression of his assent or dissent from 
 bills until the time for acting upon them had past.] There had 
 been but one instance (Mr. W. said) of this negative description 
 of veto during the last session, and that was in the case of the bills 
 for clearing the navigation of the Hudson and Wabash riveis : of 
 these two bills "one had been taken, and the other left;" but he 
 had never been able to ascertain the reason for the preference 
 evinced, excepting, indeed, that the waters of the Hudson were a 
 little salt, while those of the Wabash were entirely fresh. But the 
 most remarkable instance of actual Executive encroachment was 
 to be found in the power claimed by the President of removal 
 from office. The Constitution said nothing about removal from 
 office. It was true that, at an early period of the Government, it 
 had been decided that the President might make a vacancy, in 
 case of absolute necessity ; but so far was the Executive from 
 
405 
 
 having the power of dismissing an officer at his pleasure, that Mr. 
 Madison, one of the most able expounders of the Constitution, had 
 declared that any President who should remove a worthy man from 
 office upon mere party motives, would be liable to impeachment. 
 Necessity, absolute necessity alone (as in the case of insanity, Sic. 
 on the part of an incumbent), or at least some substantial and reason- 
 able ground of objection, could justify the exercise of the power 
 of removal on the part of the President of the United States. But 
 what did they now see ? An extraordinary power made an or- 
 dinary power. They saw the " extreme medicine of the Con- 
 stitution made its daily bread." Yes ! it did seem to be the " daily 
 bread" of the Administration to remove from office competent and 
 worthy men, and to fill the vacancies with friends and creatures of 
 their own. This system was commenced even before the present 
 individual who filled the Executive chair had taken the oath of 
 office. During the last year of the administration of Mr. Adams, 
 when offices became vacant, the friends of Andrew Jackson, consti- 
 tuting at that time a majority in the Senate, decided, by a vote, 
 that those offices should remain open until his election had taken 
 place, so that they could be filled by individuals of his nomination. 
 This was done, and thus judges of the Supreme and District 
 Courts, marshals, district attorneys, fee, were all left to the 
 choice of the new President, who possessed, in this way, not only 
 the patronage of the Government for his own term, but that of the 
 last year of his predecessor. It was this power of removal, without 
 any other pretext but that of party will and pleasure, that was 
 changing the whole character of our Government. There were 
 honest men in the Senate who said that the thing could not be 
 altered ; who asked, " What could they do ? " We told them that 
 we could reject nominations. We knew that we must make a 
 stand somewhere, and we made it here, and continue to occupy 
 the ground we then took till this day. The Senate was not, 
 however, strong enough at that time ; the President had come 
 into office backed with unexampled popularity, and we were borne 
 down, outvoted, and overwhelmed ; men who thought well at that 
 time, did not dare well. The power of removal, then, connected 
 with the exercise of the veto power, was the first step in the march 
 of Executive encroachment : next, in September last, came the still 
 more alarming (and more fortunate because more alarming) act of 
 the removal of the deposits. The law said that the public money 
 should be placed in the United States Bank, and gave to the Sec- 
 retary alone the power of removal, in cases and for reasons con- 
 nected with the public interest. The House of Representatives had 
 voted that the deposits were safe, that they should remain in the 
 Bank ; and there they did remain until the eve of the next session ; 
 when, by an act said to be his, boasted of as his, and declared by 
 
406 
 
 himself to be his, the public treasures were by the President taken 
 out of the custody of the law, and placed in banks chosen by him- 
 self and his Secretary. And now it is pretended that this is all a 
 question between the Bank and the Executive, between the Ex- 
 ecutive as the source of all good, and the Bank as the source of all 
 evil. The Bank happened to be the subject upon which Exec- 
 utive power was exercised ; it, therefore, necessarily came into the 
 argument ; but it was not the rights of the Bank, the interest of 
 the Bank, nor the liberty of the Bank, that constituted the main 
 question before the country : the real question at issue was the 
 liberties of the people. If the people, by the voice of their rep- 
 resentatives, could not say, v/here their money was safe and where 
 it should be kept, they had no control over it : if they could not 
 choose one place for it, they could not choose another. If the 
 people were to choose a place at all, he (Mr. Webster) supposed 
 they might choose their own place ; although it was certain that 
 the Bank, by paying a valuable consideration, had entitled itself to 
 hold the public money, and that any infringement on the rights 
 of the Bank in this particular would be a violation of contracts, 
 which ought not to be acquiesced in. That man, too, greatly 
 mistook the people of the United States and of Massachusetts, who 
 supposed that a question of right was to be decided by the degree 
 of tavor with which they regarded the party claiming that right. 
 They, of the Senate, had not connected favor of the Bank with 
 this question ; they did not defend the Bank ; the Bank might 
 have acted right, or it might have acted wrong : if the latter, how- 
 ever, there was the tribunal ; let it have its trial. But the question 
 was not one of Bank, and the attempt to hold up the Adminis- 
 tration as the fountain of light on the one hand, and to cry " Mon- 
 ster " against the Bank, on the other, would not succeed. The 
 Senate thought fit, for reasons which it has laid before the country, 
 to express its disapprobation of the removal of the public deposits, 
 to say that there was no cause for such removal, and that the Pres- 
 ident, in effecting a removal, had transcended his Constitutional 
 powers. This unwary, rash and improper conduct/)f the Senate 
 called down on the members of that body the — Protest ! ! — that 
 Protest, which was meant to teach them, not only the extent of 
 their past transgressions, but the extent of future obedience, by which 
 alone they could hope for forgiveness. It was a homily on the 
 extent of Executive power — a sort of creed. It appeared to tend 
 but to one result ; and that was, that all powers, which, in the 
 widest range of Executive definition, could be called Executive 
 powers, were to be placed in the hands of one man ; that all offi- 
 cers, whose duties were prescribed by the Constitution, and whom 
 the Constitution and laws made amenable to impeachment for mal- 
 administration, were but so many puppets to be moved by one 
 
407 
 
 supreme Executive head, and to perform those duties which the 
 Executive himself could not perform. He (Mr. W.) did say, as 
 a lawyer, that the whole theory of tlie Protest was huilt on this 
 foundation ; and that there was not one power helonging to the 
 customs, army, navy, treasury, &x., which was not, accordmg to 
 the Protest, an Executive power, and to be exercised according to 
 Executive will. He (ISIr. W.) had said that the one great elemen- 
 tary principle which characterized the present Administration was a 
 desire to extend Executive power. There was, however, another 
 principle connected with this first one, and which formed its chief 
 support: it was this— that all offices were the just revyards ot the 
 successful party, and that he who got office, got it for himself, to the 
 utter disregard of the people or the country. It was this principle of 
 reliance on party, that enabled the Administration to rear up paid 
 ti-oops — mercenaries — every man marked — some with a button, 
 but most with a collar — men upon whom they could reckon with 
 certainty ; and he (Mr. W.) believed that the expectations of those 
 who hoped to carry the President through were founded solely and 
 entirely on their confidence in the discipline, acfivity, the tactics, 
 and obedience, of this corps. He would ask if there was any thing 
 like argument on the other side. Did the advocates of the Admin- 
 istration come out into the field and meet discussion ?^ Were they 
 ever seen coming out to discuss their principles ? Were they not 
 found calculating upon the post-ofiice, the custom-house, and 
 the paid and disciplined troops that they had every where ? These 
 latter were the sort of persons who were to go to the polls and 
 vote down the arguments of the Whigs. It appeared to him that 
 the same thing was desired to be effected with the people and the 
 people's friends as was to be effected with the coin of the country : 
 that was, they were not to be loeighcd, but to go by tale. It was 
 desired to have the people stamped, so that, when a man showed 
 his forehead, he would also show Caesar's image and superscription. 
 It would be observed that this power of removal claimed by the 
 President, having a check in the Senate, an attempt had been 
 made against the Senate in that particular. It had been the cus- 
 tom of the Government, hitherto, in the event of any vacancies 
 occurring during the recess of Congress, and being filled by the 
 President, to submit such nominations for the approbation of the 
 Senate, at an early day after the commencement of the next ses- 
 sion. But what course had been pursued by the present Admin- 
 istration ? For more than twelve months, important offices had 
 been filled without the consent of the Senate. [Mr. Webster here 
 instanced die cases of Messrs. M'Lane, Duane, and Taney.] So 
 that here was the key of the treasury (he did not know whether 
 there was any thing in it) held for more than twelve months by an 
 officer whose nomination had not been confirmed by the Senate. 
 
408 
 
 The means of exercising that patronage of Gov^ernmenttovvhlchhe 
 (Mr. W.) had alluded — the power of the office-holders — much as 
 had been said upon the subject, were still, he conscientiously be- 
 lieved, greatly underrated. In times of prosperity — when every 
 member of the community was profitably employed in his own con- 
 cerns — men got into office who were wholly dependent on the in- 
 come of office ; and it was one of the great evils of the times, that, 
 whatever other manufactures were discouraged, the Government man- 
 ufactory of public opinion at Washington still went on. It was from 
 these causes — from the patronage of office — from a subsidized press, 
 and from the support thus procured from the people, that the great- 
 est danger to the institutions of the country was to be apprehended. 
 There was the custom-house — a great power, with the most ex- 
 tensive influence — and he was glad to say that the proscribed Sen- 
 ate had determined to look into that matter. His colleague stood 
 pledged to bring in a measure at the next Congress which should 
 restrain and limit this department, and take away all unjust profits, 
 from the collector down to the tide-waiter. In the post-office 
 they had but just raised the veil — nobody had as yet looked into 
 the dark recesses of the department ; but they had seen enough to 
 know that it ought to be inquired into. He did not wish to influ- 
 ence the minds of those who heard him, but he believed that the 
 extent to which money influence had been actually used in the 
 purchase of political partisans was yet but half exposed. 
 
 The same state of things prevailed in the Indian Department, 
 through the medium of agencies and reservations to favored indi- 
 viduals. This was a subject which was little known, however, to 
 the Northern and Middle States ; information respecting it being 
 confined to a few gentlemen of the South and West. The press, 
 too, — that great light of human liberty — that invaluable boon to 
 civilized man, — that, like every other dear and valued blessing, 
 might be, and had been corrupted. The Government had power 
 over the press, and it had used it without scruple. And what 
 would be the result of all this .'' Allowing the President his veto 
 power, the power of removal and appointment, the keeping of the 
 public treasures, from the time of their collection till the passing of 
 an appropriation bill by Congress, the administration of the post- 
 office ; add to all these means of influencing public opinion the 
 influence which he naturally possessed as the Chief Magistrate of 
 the country, and let him (Mr. W.) ask if there was not reason for 
 the Senate to raise an alarm that public liberty was in danger? 
 If they had raised a false cry, there was no harm done ; they had 
 risked their own honor, character, and reputation, in the course 
 they had adopted, and if, when they said there was danger there 
 was no danger, let the consequences fall on them. They were 
 individuals — public men to-day, and to-morrow mingling again in 
 
409 
 
 the ranks of their fellow-citizens ; if, therefore, he repeated, they 
 had spread a causeless alarm — be the result visited upon their 
 own heads. But if they saw, or thought they saw, Executive 
 power advancing with rapid strides to despotism — trampling upon 
 tlie laws and Constitution of the country, and threatening destruc- 
 tion to the dearly-bought freedom bequeathed to them by their 
 fathers — if they saw this, and had not cried aloud, what would 
 they have been but traitors — slaves themselves, and fit instruments 
 to make slaves of others ? It was with regret that he adverted to 
 another circumstance — to the extraordinary phenomenon of a pop- 
 ular branch of the Legislature, the immediate representatives of the 
 people, yielding to, nay, supporting, the encroachments of Exec- 
 utive ambition. What did not this prove in relation to the power of 
 party and the idolatry for man, with which human nature was some- 
 times afflicted ? No consciousness that they were disobeying their 
 constituents had been able to divert them from supporting Exec- 
 utive usurpation. Only on the ground of party was their conduct 
 attempted to be justified. One man had been seen receiving 
 directions from his constituents, and refusing to obey them, because 
 he did not find a majority of the names of those who had voted for 
 him at his election appended to the instructions which had been 
 sent to him. When his respectable constituents came to him by 
 thousands, his answer was, " I do not see a majority of the names 
 of my party." 
 
 It was cheering, though (continued Mr. W.), on an occasion like 
 this, to be able to hope that a period was coming when the people 
 would take the management of their affairs into their own hands. 
 Liberty was no longer in danger in this country when the danger 
 was perceived. He hoped the people would examine for them- 
 selves ; for one, he asked nothing else. He wished not to force 
 upon them any dogmas or catechism of his own, but he felt it his 
 duty to beseech those whose servant he was, to look into the con- 
 duct of Government and decide for themselves. He and his col- 
 leagues were transient, and would speedily pass away, leaving 
 nothing behind them but the remembrance of the good or evil 
 they had done. In a moment of danger, however, such as they 
 believed this to be, there was one course in which they could not 
 err ; and that was, in calling upon the people to arouse themselves 
 — to look around them, and if there was danger, to work 
 OUT THEIR OWN SALVATION. Hc need not tell them that, in his 
 judgment, the present was a time for reflection, for wise and firm 
 resolution, and determined action. They could not rescue the 
 country — could not raise it above party — could not raise up the 
 people's party — without vigorous action. He formed but a poor 
 conception of the present crisis who did not perceive the necessity 
 of union among those men who had the same purposes to accom- 
 
 VQL. II. 52 
 
410 
 
 plish. He (Mr. W.) knew that there were many subordinate 
 points to be considered ; but if those points did not concern and 
 touch the Constitution, let them remain for the present unheeded. 
 If they found the ship among the breakers, surrounded willi black 
 rocks which threatened her with ruin and destruction, was it not 
 their duty to forget for a time all minor matters and perform ship's 
 duty ? It was in vain to talk of a crisis, to enlarge upon the dan- 
 ger of the country, if they would not go, one and all, to the country's 
 deliverance. They were entirely in tlieir own power in this matter, 
 and he hoped that the necessary exertions would be used. 
 
 He wished to say a word to the young Whigs of Salem. There 
 were those in the present assembly who were Whigs in '75 ; who 
 were Whigs at Bunker's Hill on the glorious 17th of June; who 
 were called from their beds by the fire of the first platoon on the 
 19th of April, But they were few in number. There were those 
 present, too, who remembered the difficulties which were to be 
 contended with at the commencement of this Government. Those 
 also were few. Some there were, also, who had had something to 
 do with the Government of the present day. But these were all 
 passing to their forefatliers. It is to the youthful Whigs (said Mr. 
 Webster), the legitimate possessors of the fair and glorious inherit- 
 ance bequeathed to us by our ancestors — it is to them we look, to 
 maintain in its purity, and transmit, inviolate, that inheritance to 
 posterity. And what is it — this rich and glorious inheritance ? — 
 the purchase of so much toil and so much blood — that has come 
 down to us from the great men of past generations, and which I 
 now commend to the affectionate care and valiant defence of the 
 young men of our time? What is it? It is difilcult to compre- 
 hend the magnitude of its value, — or to state truly the political 
 blessings which it confers upon us. It is difficult to take a view of 
 the aspect which our country presents to the civilized world. The 
 Constitution of the United States — our free institutions — are these 
 things of course ? are these the common blessings of Providence 
 to all lands, and are they felt by all people ? No ! All that makes 
 us great, and happy, and renowned, is peculiar to us. 
 
 Where else will you look for regulated liberty ? where else see 
 the benefits enjoyed by us springing from a government composed 
 directly of the people, and proving, by the experience of half a 
 century, such a government to be practicable ? And this Consti- 
 tution — these instituUons — gazed at with admiration and delight by 
 every lover of liberty ; prayed for and held up as an exemplar — a 
 model — ^by every advocate of freedom throughout the civilized world 
 — are these treasures to be treated with indifference ? Founded 
 on the great principles of self-government; on the ground of the 
 ability of the people to govern themselves — by agents chosen im- 
 
411 
 
 mediately from themselves — raising the whole community, hut 
 raising none above the community — proving that the people caii 
 govern themselves, and not rendering it necessary for them to look 
 for angels to govern them — is this a system to be slighted, or to be 
 otherwise than zealously and carefully guarded ? 
 
 After a very few additional remarks, Mr. Webster concluded by 
 offering the following sentiment : — 
 
 " The Whigs of Salem and its vicinity — their cause is 
 
 THE cause of their COUNTRY J IF IT FAIL, THEY ARE NOT THE 
 ONL / SUFFERERS," 
 
SPEECH 
 
 AT CONCORD, NEW HAJMPSHIRE, SEPTEBIBER 30, 1834, 
 
 At a public dinner at Concord, New Hampshire, given to Hon. Samuel 
 Bell, a Senator in Congress from that State, Mr. Webster, with several dis- 
 tinguished gentlemen from other States, was present, by invitation. The health 
 of Mr. W. being proposed and drunk, he addressed the meeting as follows : — 
 
 Gentlemen : It becomes me at least to acknowledge the great 
 honor conferred on me by an invitation to be present upon this 
 occasion, and by the kind manner in which the sentiment just 
 given has been received. When I survey the individuals com- 
 posing this assembly, so many of whom I know; when I see 
 men of advanced life, whom from infancy I have been taught to 
 revere, who have filled the seats of justice, who have held the 
 high places in the State, and have acted with credit in the councils 
 of the Union ; when I see gentlemen from parts so remote, and 
 gentlemen of all pursuits and professions ; when I see so large an 
 assemblage of the substantial farmers of the State, — I cannot but think 
 that there is something connected with the occasion which proves 
 the existence of danger, and which creates apprehension for the 
 safety of our rights and laws. It is my first grateful duty, upon 
 this occasion, to join with you in the tribute of respect tendered to 
 your worthy Senator now present — my highly valued and cher- 
 ished friend. I cannot, like you, offer this tribute as one of his 
 constituents, but I come forward gladly in the character of a wit- 
 ness, to bear conscientious and ready testimony to the able manner 
 in which he has supported the interests and credit of his State. 
 His presence imposes on me forbearance, as to much that my 
 heart dictates ; but I will venture to say, that there is no candid 
 man in the State, who can surmise any motive by which he has 
 been governed, other than a desire Constitutionally to discharge 
 his duty, and to merit the approbation of his fellow-citizens. 
 Drawing towards the close of his second term of service in the 
 Senate, wdiat would have better suited him than to have floated 
 along the stream with power — to have gone with majorities — to 
 have found an easy and beaten turnpike road along which to 
 travel towards the close of his career ? What motive but a patriotic 
 
41 
 
 o 
 
 one (considering the state of feeling in his own State) could have 
 induced him to breast the current which beset him, and resolve to 
 stand or lldl with the ConsUtution — desiring, as he had lived under 
 its benefits, to partake its fate ? Having said thus much of another, 
 it becomes my next duty to thank you for the invitation to be 
 present with you here, and for the kind manner in which I have 
 been received. You do me honor in calling me a native of this 
 State. I feel the strength of that tie ; 1 feel that it connects me 
 with thousands of patriotic hearts within the limits of Nevy Hamp- 
 shire ; and if you do not discard this connection, permit me to 
 assure you, that I shall never do so until the day of my death. I 
 will presume to say a few words more in relation to myself. It is 
 now eighteen years since I left this State, to pursue the arduous 
 duties of my profession in the metropolis of the neighboring 
 commonwealth, with no expectation of being called again into the 
 public service of the country. [Mr. Webster here again apologized 
 for speaking of himself, and continued.] But I may take notice 
 of what must have been obvious to you all, viz. that it has been 
 my fortune, whether in public life or out of it, to be pursued by a 
 degree of reproach and accusation in my native State, such as, I 
 believe, has never before followed an individual so humble as my- 
 self Incessant pains have been taken to misrepresent my conduct 
 and principles, to render my character odious and repulsive, to 
 alienate from me the feelings of the citizens of New Hampshire, 
 and to hold me up as an object of jealousy and enmity. Certainly 
 I have felt the injustice of these calumnies — certainly 'I have 
 regretted them, because they have been long continued, and have 
 operated upon those who had no means of ascertaining their truth 
 or falsehood — upon a new generation, who, I have been well aware, 
 would grow up under the influence of a sentiment of enmity 
 towards me, produced by tliis continued course of wanton and 
 malicious abuse. 
 
 I should have been unworthy, however, of the esteem which 
 you manifest to-day, had I suffered this or any other injury to 
 weaken that feeling of affection which I cherish for my native 
 State, and which no wrong, no calumny, no holding me up to 
 odium and reproach, can ever eradicate from the fibres of my 
 heart. I have trusted to time — to the influence of truth — to 
 returning sense of justice — to the general intelligence and generous 
 feeling of my fellow-citizens, to do me right in the end. I shall 
 continue so to trust, and wait the result with perfect resignation. 
 But, in the existing state of the country, I repeat what I have said 
 elsewhere, that men are nothing — the country every diing. The 
 preservation of the Constitution and the laws — it is to that that I 
 would attract the attention of this and every other assembly. 
 What occasions this meeting — what has brought the Whigs of New 
 
414 
 
 Hampshire, from the East and the West, from the North and the 
 South, to take counsel together ? Is it a real or fictitious danger ? 
 Is it the result of political fanaticism — of a disposition to revolt 
 against the constituted authorities ? or is it because inen have come 
 to the conviction that circumstances and a time have arisen, show- 
 ing that some extraordinary efibrt of the people themselves, some 
 patriotic feeling of the old revolutionary spirit, is necessary for the 
 rescue of public liberty ? I believe the latter. I believe the 
 country is in danger. I believe the danger is real, urgent, press- 
 ing. I believe if the ancient revolutionary heroes of New Hamp- 
 shire — Langdon, Whipple, Bartlett, Oilman, Sullivan, Poor, Stark — 
 were now in the land of the living, every man of them would be 
 on our side. I rejoice to see so many descendants of those illus- 
 trious Whigs here present, resolving to transmit to posterity not 
 only their names and blood, but their principles also. From the 
 formation of the Constitution, there has existed in New Hampshire 
 much difference as to men and measures ; but this has ever been 
 accompanied by a general desire to maintain the Constitution, and 
 a just balance of power between the Executive and Legislative 
 Department ; and I sincerely believe that if the great men to whom 
 I have just alluded were still living, and in possession of their in- 
 tellect and facuhies, they would feel the great principles of the rev- 
 olution to be attacked, and would declare that it was time for the 
 people to rise for their own rescue. The time (said Mr. W.) will 
 not now serve for a detailed discussion of the great questions which 
 agitate the country. Whatever is minor in importance, or is mere 
 matter of expediency, ought to be dispensed with. But that which 
 assaults the principles of the revolution — that which lays hold of 
 the foundation of the State — is entitled at all times to considera- 
 tion. It is the temper of the times — it is the obvious and plain 
 course of a great party in the United States — to sink country in 
 party ; and it is this raising of party, and raising one man for the 
 benefit of party, that is leading us on to man-worship and to the 
 danger of despotism. This system began from litde, and has gone 
 on from stage to stage. When the present Administration came 
 into power, new and popular, it established the doctrine of universal 
 removal from office. There were those who protested, argued, 
 and voted, against such an abuse of power, year after year. But 
 it was but one stage. " What doth it matter .'' " said some ; " the 
 country is not in danger." But then came the next stage, at which it 
 was announced that he who held office, held it at the pleasure of the 
 powers thill be — at the pleasure of the person in whom the gift of 
 office lay. Then the third stage, when it was boldly and fearlessly 
 advanced, that any one who held office was not only subject to be 
 removed, but that ever_v officer was but a pen to record the de- 
 cision of the individual who appointed him ; thus leaving to the 
 
415 
 
 officer no responsibility of his own. The patronage, the power of 
 giving office, of granting conlracts and facilities, the extension of 
 pecuniary aid, are now the means of carrying on the Government; 
 and, to our shame be it spoken (said Mr. W.), I do not believe 
 there is a government on earth that executes its will so much by 
 pecuniary means as that of the United States. The Custom- 
 House, the Land-Office, the Indian, and the Post-Office Depart- 
 ments — 1 know not how many thousand persons are by these means 
 influenced. If official individuals were independent — if they were 
 sulTered to exercise the common rights of citizens — if they were 
 subject to no political servitude — if they wore no collar, paid no 
 rent-service for the tenure of office, the case would be different ; 
 but if they hold office entirely at the will of the giver, what can be 
 expected? Men subject to this influence are numerous, well paid, 
 and, acting on a community engaged, like honest men, in their own 
 concerns, are certain to effect their purpose in every part of the 
 country. 
 
 And how has it happened that any part of this system has been 
 developed — that any thing is known in relation to the post-office ? 
 Certainly not through the agency of the Government. At the 
 last session of Congress, a Senator, from whom a letter had just 
 been read (Mr. Sprague), proposed to the Senate to take the 
 appointment of committees into their own hands : heretofore they 
 had been appointed by an officer who was friendly to the Admin- 
 istration. The committees, thus differently appointed, went to 
 work, and, having had time to examine into but one department, 
 the country saw what they had already brought to light. Now, 
 can it be said that we have no cause of blame ? Look at the 
 resolution introduced into the Senate at the close of the session in 
 relation to the Post-Office Department. Not one man, thank God, 
 was found so completely lost as to vote against that resolution. 
 The Postmaster-General was charged with having violated the 
 Jaw ; with having run the United States in debt, and with having 
 kept the matter secret, session after session. The fact was 
 proved — admitted — no one was found hardy enough to deny it. 
 It is not to be said, then, that there is no foundation for alarm. It 
 is not, however, the loss of the money, of which the people of the 
 United States so much complain, but of the purposes for which it 
 was applied. It is not because money is property that they are 
 indignant at its loss ; but when the money was used to purchase 
 men, to buy the people, the people have certainly a right to com- 
 plain. An effort was made through the post-office to control the 
 press and govern the people by the use of their own dollars. 
 Again, we think that the negative power of the President over the 
 laws has been abused. We do not think that by the Constitution 
 the President is justified in rejecting laws at his pleasure. The 
 
416 
 
 power granted to the President in this respect was principally for 
 the maintenance of his own rights, and to prevent the passing of 
 any law which violated the Constitution. I do not recollect (said 
 Mr. Webster) under other Administrations hardly more than a 
 single instance in which this negative power has been exercised, 
 excepting on the ground of Constitutional or legal right ; under the 
 present Administration, it had been exercised, however, by the Presi- 
 dent in relation to the land bill — a measure which had passed both 
 Houses by strong majorities. The United States were proprietors 
 of a domain from which they derived a large revenue — .^'50,000 
 or .^G0,000 of which would have fallen to the share of this State 
 but for the interference of the Executive. There were two modes 
 of disposing of the public lands — one, to sell them, and divide such 
 part of the proceeds as was not wanted in the general treasury, 
 among the States, according to the census ; and the other, to give 
 them away to all who chose to occupy them. There was no 
 reason for the adoption of the latter course : the land was cheap, 
 ^1,25 per acre; settlements were not the least retarded by the 
 price, and were going on very rapidly. It seemed, then, to the 
 old States, that the revenue thus accruing might have been dis- 
 tributed among them, inasmuch as the custom-houses were en- 
 joyed by the General Government, and the States driven to direct 
 taxes and assizes ; they had no other means of raising money for 
 necessary uses. The exercise of this veto power was, then, 
 another Executive abuse ; but under this the Government might 
 have existed. Other assumptions, however, had been made 
 which struck at the very existence of our institutions. The chief 
 of these assumptions was the seizure of the public treasury — a 
 thing so abhorrent in principle, so obnoxious to every objection to 
 Executive encroachment, as justly to awaken the indignation of 
 every lover of the republic. The law had designated the place 
 for the keeping of the public money, and the law was not 
 repealed. Congress had been applied to, but had refused to 
 remove it, declaring it to be safe — ^liad decided that it should not 
 be removed. Yet the Executiv^e had seized upon it, and placed it 
 in banks of his own choosing. This was an act so hostile to every 
 principle of a popular government as to excite universal alarm. 
 They had always been taught to believe that the public money 
 was to be collected, kept and appropriated by Congress. But 
 this subject opened (Mr. Webster said) a field too wide to be 
 fully traversed. It would be easy, however, to show that the act 
 of the Executive had produced great distress and pressure — ■ 
 pressure which would be renewed and repeated until the cause 
 was removed ; for did any man suppose that the people could 
 acquiesce in the present state of things — could consent that the 
 flinds of the nation should be kept in a place unprovided by law, 
 
417 
 
 and liable to the perpetual interference of toe Administration ? 
 Eternal war against such a principle ! if it could not be overthrown 
 to-day, let it be attacked to-morrow, and year after year, until it 
 was overthrown. While this striiggle continued, however, confi- 
 dence was weakened, prices, particularly the prices of labor, were 
 depressed ; and now let any man who pretended to love his 
 country — for we were a nation of laborers, and the earnings of 
 capital were but as a drop in a bucket, to the ocean, compared 
 with those of labor — let any man say how this trifling with the 
 prosperity of the farmers and laborers was to be justified. No 
 sooner was the act done than the justifying reason was found in 
 the Bank ! The Bank was declared to be unconstitutional ! One 
 could not but inquire of those who raised such an outcry against 
 the Bank, at what period they became the enemies of that institu- 
 tion — at what time tliey discovered it to be a " monster." The 
 Bank, during Mr. Adams's Administration, was an independent in- 
 stitution. When the stru.2;gle on the succession of Mr. Adams 
 took place, I ask if any of the friends of General Jackson com- 
 plained of the Bank, or proposed its annihilation as a matter of 
 reform. Did they say there was any danger to be apprehended 
 from the Bank ? Not a syllable ! All that was said at that time 
 may be found and referred to in the newspapers of the day. It 
 never was asserted then that the Bank was unconstitutional — that 
 it was a " monster." And there was good reason for this silence. 
 The Bank had taken no part in politics ; no one had been wicked 
 enough to bring it into the political arena. It is as true as that 
 our fathers fell at Bunker's Hill, at Lexington, and at Monmouth, 
 that this outcry against the Bank was raised because the Bank 
 refused to be made a political agent ! It is true that the operation 
 commenced with the Branch Bank in this State. It was tried to 
 make that bank a political institution. Men here applied to the 
 President to make the bank at Portsmouth a political bank. They 
 wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury to do this. These are 
 facts — made known to the world — not disputed. And this appli- 
 cation to make the Portsmouth Branch Bank a political agent, was 
 referred to the directors at Philadelphia, who unanimously agreed 
 that it did not become them to meddle in politics. Their business 
 was to serve the country on the terms of their charter; and they 
 wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury that they would not change 
 their agents on political grounds, because their institution had 
 not been incorporated on political grounds. They said there was 
 no man in their service who had been appointed on political grounds, 
 and they would not discharge any man for his political opinions. 
 They sought for business men, and had nothing to do with political 
 motives. The moment that this letter got to Washington (said Mr. 
 Webster) it was discovered that the Bank was a " monster " with 
 VOL. II. 53 
 
418 
 
 10,000 claws, and ought to be instantly destroyed. No man hi 
 the community could doubt that if tlie Bank had yielded to the 
 demand of the Administration, had said, " O yes ! we will turn out 
 A., who is an enemy to the Government, and put in B., who is a 
 fiiend; we will lend money to C, who is a proper man, and not 
 to D., who is the reverse ; witness our hand, and seals, &c." — no 
 man can doubt that, if the Bank had done this, it would have 
 been not only not a " monster," but the most amiable, harmless, 
 useful creature that the law ever created ! But, again, if tiieBank 
 be unconstitutional, when did it become so ? In the first message 
 of the President, it was said that a national bank was perfectly 
 Constitutional, but that it should be differently constituted ; that it 
 should be founded on Government credit and Government revenue. 
 This (said Mr. Webster) would have been an Administration bank, 
 and, eventually, through the President's officer (the Secretary of 
 the Treasury), the President's bank. The veto message of 1832 
 said that the President, constrained as he was to negative the Bank 
 of the United States, would, had he been applied to, have given 
 the plan of one. Not knowing (said Mr. Webster) the kind inten- 
 tions of the President in this particular, we had not an opportunity 
 of sending to him the necessary application. And now let him 
 (Mr. Webster) ask, if, in this great controversy, all were to be 
 driven to the question of " Bank or no Bank." We supposed the 
 Bank to be convenient ; we knew it to be so. We know that over 
 the great number of State banks, having the power to issue money, 
 the United States Bank exercised a salutary control : the experi- 
 ence of forty years had convinced us that it was useful ; but beyond 
 this we have nothing to do with it. 
 
 But a panacea has been discovered. The pressure of last 
 winter had been removed, never more to return ; there was to be 
 no more fraudulent paper ; even the safety banks might cease their 
 operations ; the golden age had returned ; a new coin had come 
 forth, which, deprived of the cap of liberty and the old motto, 
 E pluribus unum, was in future to protect the country and restore 
 It to all its former prosperity. 
 
 One must think very lightly of the intelligence of the community 
 to believe that it could be thus deceived ; and when the people 
 heard of new eagles, clipped, it was true, of their wings, being 
 shown as a sign of new and better times, we could not help asking 
 if the people were so enslaved, so ignorant, as to be led astray by 
 such paltry devices. You know (continued Mr, Webster) that 
 most countries make but one of the precious metals the medium for 
 the payment of debt. In our country, from the time of Hamilton, 
 the standard has been twofold. We pay either in gold or silver. 
 The law regulating this matter made one ounce of gold worth fifteen 
 ounces of silver. This proportion has been found to be incorrect. 
 
419 
 
 gold being found to be worth more than fifteen for one, as com- 
 pared with silver. The consequence of this has been, that, as sil- 
 ver is a tender with us, and gold coin in England, our gold has 
 gone to England, while the silver has remained with us. This 
 being the case, and desiring to bring back gold again, the subjeci 
 was brought before Congress in petitions from the merchants of 
 Boston and New York : the latter accompanied their petition with 
 a bill drawn by Mr. Gallatin to restore a just proportion between 
 gold and silver. In the course of the last session (said Mr. 
 Webster), we took up the matter, and were prepared to report upon 
 the subject, but postponed our intention till the measure from the 
 House came before us. The measure of the House was not 
 accurate ; its rate of proportion was not entirely exact ; it went to 
 the extreme, giving too much value to gold and too little to silver ; 
 nevertheless, it pleased the southern members, at this time most 
 deeply interested in the gold question ; and the bill was therefore 
 passed. As far, then, as an influx of gold is concerned, that effect 
 will be necessarily followed by the disappearance of dollars. Gold, 
 having an undue value, will necessarily be kept in the country, 
 and dollars will be remitted to pay all balances in trade. Gold 
 will therefore be the only metallic medium, and that confined to 
 the banks. In one respect, this will be injurious, as it will cause 
 an increased circulation of one dollar bills, while, if silver had been 
 retained, the circulation of small notes would have been propor- 
 tionally arrested by the circulation of dollars. 
 
 (Apologizing to the meeting for this digression, Mr. Webster 
 continued.) But it is the principles and authority asserted in the 
 Protest which most truly alarm the people, — the right claimed by 
 the President to negative and construe the laws, and to reject the 
 construction of Congress and the courts, — the assumption that all 
 officers are his, and that every act of an officer is his (the Presi- 
 dent's) act. If this be so, what becomes of impeachment.? The 
 Constitution says that any officer shall be liable to impeachment 
 for malpractices. Impeach a man, however, under this doctrine, 
 and he says, "Behold the rescript of the Emperor!" Impeach- 
 ment in such a case would be idle. In short, though I do not 
 wish to make extravagant statements, I venture to say, that, if we 
 yield to the doctrines of the Protest, we shall live under an elective 
 monarchy ; elective as yet, but for information as to how long it 
 will remain so, let us consult the page of history. I know little 
 difference between the king of England and the President of the 
 United States, if the assumptions of the Protest be submitted to. 
 And how has this happened ? What has brought about this state 
 of things? What would have been done, if John Quincy Adams 
 had acted thus ? I put the question to you in regard to his prede- 
 cessors, not excepting even Washington. I do not believe that 
 
420 
 
 Washington, in the most palmy state of his administration, at the 
 moment of his greatest popularity, would have been able to have 
 maintained himself a single month, had he claimed the powers 
 claimed by the present President in the Protest. Why are they 
 then tolerated now even for a moment? There is but one reason; 
 it is this — that there are those in the present generation who are 
 interested to deceive, and those who, from culpable inattention to 
 the concerns of their country, suffer themselves to be deceived. 
 Power now maintains itself by the aid of the purchased, and the 
 apadiy of the deceived. 
 
 Every thing (said Mr. Webster) now turns upon personal con- 
 fidence. If attempts be made to alarm the people, the reply 
 is, " The hero can do no wrong." Tell them the Constitution is in 
 danger, and his friends say, " It may be so, but he means no harm." 
 Speak to them of the seizure of the treasury, and they will tell 
 you " that if the President had not acted as he had done, the Bank 
 would have corrupted the whole Legislature before the next ses- 
 sion." He (Mr, Webster) thought this man-worship dangerous. 
 It was not what our forefathers had taught us. Jeiferson said he 
 did not fight for an elective monarchy. But this was not the worst. 
 Were we sure that these various usurpations of Executive power 
 originated with the "hero"? — sure that the main spring was held 
 by his hand — that he was the head of his own administration? 
 or were we realizing the fears of the Roman Coriolanus before 
 the gates of Antium ? Was it not possible that the blows which 
 they received proceeded " from boys with sticks and cooks from the 
 kitchen with spits and ladles" ? He (Mr. W.) would present the 
 subject in another light. The present Administration would expire 
 in three years. Let us suppose the accession of another military 
 man, with the same popularity, to follow up, step by step, the preten- 
 sions of his predecessor. What would be the state of the country 
 eight years hence ? Could they say then that they governed them- 
 selves — that they made their own laws ? He (Mr. Webster) put it to 
 every man to say what must ensue if the present system were followed 
 up. The country could bear every thing but the destruction of the 
 Government — pressure — any thing. If its money was needed, let 
 it flow like water for defence, but be frozen like ice if for tribute. 
 It is not because it is money (said Mr. Webster) that we refuse 
 to part with it, but because we know that if our opponents get our 
 money, they get every thing ; and if they do not get that, they get 
 nothing. Yes (continued Air. Webster), we can give up every 
 thing but our Constitution, which is the sun of our system. As 
 the natural sun dispels fogs, heats the air, and vivifies and illuminates 
 the world, even so does the Constitution, in days of adversity and 
 gloom, come out for our rescue and our enlightening. If the lu- 
 minary which now sheds its light upon us, and invigorates our 
 
421 
 
 sphere, should sink forever in his ocean bed, clouds, cold, and 
 perpetual death, would environ us : and if we suffer our other sun, the 
 Constitution, to be turned from us ; if we reject or disregard its bene- 
 fits ; [(its beams disappear but once in the west,— anarchy and chaos 
 will have come again, and we shall grope out in darkness and despair 
 the remainder of a miserable existence. I confess (said Mr. 
 Webster) that, when I speak of the Constitution, I feel a burmng 
 zeal wliich prompts me to pour out my whole heart. What is the 
 Constitution ? It is the band which binds together twelve millions of 
 brothers. What is its history ?— who made it ? Monarchs, crowned 
 heads, lords, or emperors ? No, it was none of these. The Con- 
 stitution of the United States, the nearest approach of mortal to 
 perfect political wisdom, was the work of men who purchased 
 liberty with their blood, but who found, that, whhout organization, 
 freedom was not a blessing. They framed it, and the people, in 
 their intelligence, adopted it. And what has been its history for 
 forty years? Has it trodden down any man's rights? Has it cir- 
 cumscribed the liberty of the press ? Has it stopped the mouth 
 of any man ? Has it held us up as objects of disgrace abroad ? 
 How much the reverse ! It has given us character abroad ; and 
 when, with Washington at its head, it went forth to the world, this 
 young country at once became the most interesting and imposing 
 in the circle of civilized nations. How is the Constitution of the 
 United States regarded abroad ? Why, as the last liope of liberty 
 among men ! Wherever you go, you find the United States held 
 up as an example by the advocates of freedom. The mariner no 
 more looks to his compass or takes his departure by the sun, than 
 does die lover of liberty abroad shape his course by reference to 
 the Constitution of the United States. 
 
 I feel that it is not for me, still less for those who are farther 
 advanced in life than I am, to come effectually to the rescue of 
 this Constitution : the young men of the country are at this mo- 
 ment its main hope. Youth is generous: its patriotism is free 
 from selfishness : it is full of just and ardent impulses : and these 
 are feelings that become it. Early manhood is sanguine : men at 
 this stage of existence have a long life before them, and they nat- 
 urally feel a deep interest in events which are to influence their 
 whole future career. May we, then, not flatter ourselves that these 
 young men will lay it at heart to preserve this great patrimony ? If 
 they are careless of their personal patrimony, we call them waste- 
 ful ; but what shall we call them if they throw from them this pearl 
 of great price — the Constitutional liberty of their country ? It is 
 for the young men, then, to direct their attention to the preservation 
 of that patrimony, the like of which no other young men can boast; 
 a patrimony which neither kings nor potentates can bequeath to 
 their offspring ; and which the present possessors have received at 
 
422 
 
 the price of their fathers' blood. If it be necessary to success 
 (continued Mr. Webster) , politics must be made the business of 
 our lives ; must be our daily occupation. Is a neighbor in error, 
 we must instruct and enlighten him. I will not attempt to conceal 
 from you that I feel a more than common interest — more than the 
 interest of a stranger — in the sentiments and course of the citizens 
 of this State. I cannot feel alien to it, or forget that it was amidst 
 the beautiful scenery of these hills that I first drew breath — that, 
 by the kindness of revered and excellent parents, I here received 
 my education — here entered upon the pursuits of manhood — and 
 that, by the kindness of my friends in this State, I was first intro- 
 duced into public life. I cannot, then, if I would, tear myself from 
 the sincerest wishes and regard for the happiness and welfare of the 
 citizens of this State. I may not again have an opportunity of 
 addressing so large an assembly of my friends in New Hampshire ; 
 and it is of litde importance whether or not I continue in political 
 life ; but permit me to assure you that, wherever I go, I shall con- 
 tinue to cherish a firm attachment to the State of my nativity, and 
 a grateful sense of the kindness now and heretofore bestowed 
 upon me. 
 
 Mr. Webster concluded by offering the following toast, and sat down amidst 
 loud and long-continued applause. 
 
 " Our native State, rich in revolutionary merit, she 
 will yet be focnd occupying her true place in support op 
 THE Constitution, Liberty, and the Laws." 
 
ARGUMENT 
 
 IN THE GOODRIDGE CASE. 
 
 This argument was addressed to a jury in April, 1817, on the occasion of 
 the trial of Levi and Laban Kenniston, in the Supreme Judicial Court of the 
 Commonwealth of Massachusetts, held at Ipswich, in the County of Essex, for 
 an alleged assault and robbery by said Levi and Laban, in company with one 
 Reuben Taber (who was tried separately), on the person of Major Elijah Putnam 
 Goodridge, of Bangor, in the District of Maine. The crime was alleged to 
 have been committed upon the evening of the 19th of December, 1816, when the 
 said Goodridge was travelling in Newbury ; and it was also charged in the in- 
 dictment that he was robbed, at that time, and by these men, of a large sum of 
 money in bank-bills and gold. It was stated by the solicitor-general (the 
 Hon. Daniel Davis), in opening the cause on the part of the Government, that 
 he expected to prove, in substantiating these charges, that the prisoners were, 
 during the afternoon previous to the robbery, at Newburyport, within a short 
 distance of the place where the robbery was alleged to have been committed ; that 
 they were seen that evening under very suspicious circumstances; and that, 
 since that time, on a thorough search in the dwelling-house of the Kennistons 
 (at Ipswich), there had been found papers, and bills, and gold coin, which 
 Goodridge could identify, and had identified, to be his, and which, it was said, 
 had been taken from him at the time of the robbery. To this would be added 
 their agitation, and partial confessions, when charged with the crime. It is 
 unnecessary to set forth the evidence introduced on either side, as it will suffi- 
 ciently appear from the following argument of the counsel. Mr. Webster 
 was connected, in the defence, with Samuel L. Knapp, Esq., of Boston, and 
 Stephen W. Marston, Esq., of Newburyport. 
 
 It was true (Mr. Webster said) that the oifence charged was not 
 capital ; but perhaps this could hardly be considered as favorable to 
 the defendants. To those who are guilty, and without hope of escape, 
 no doubt the lightness of the penalty of transgression gives conso- 
 lation. But if the defendants were innocent, it was more natural 
 for them to be thinking upon what they had lost, by that alteration 
 of the law which had left highway robbery no longer capital, than 
 upon what the guilty might gain by it. They had lost those great 
 privileges, in their trial, which the law allows, in capital cases, for 
 the protection of innocence against unfounded accusation. They 
 have lost the right of being previously furnished with a copy of 
 the indictment, and a list of the Government's witnesses. They 
 
424 
 
 have lost the right of peremptory challenge ; and, notwithstanding 
 the prejudices which they know have been excited against them, 
 they must show legal cause of challenge, in each individual call, 
 or else take the jury as they find it. They have lost the benefit 
 of the assignment of counsel by the court. They have lost the 
 benefit of the Commonwealth's process to bring in witnesses in 
 their behalf. When to these circumstances it was added that 
 they were strangers, in a great degree without friends, and without 
 the means for preparing their defence, it was evident they must 
 take their trial under great disadvantages. 
 
 Mr. Webster then called the attention of the jury to those cir- 
 cumstances which he thought could not but cast doubts on the 
 story of the prosecutor. 
 
 In the first place, it was impossible to believe a robbery of this 
 sort to have been committed by three or four men without previ- 
 ous arrangement and concert, and of course without the knowl- 
 edge of the fact, that Goodridge would be there, and that he had 
 money. They did not go on the highway, in such a place, in a 
 cold December's night, for the general purpose of attacking the 
 first passenger, running the chance of his being somebody who 
 had money. It was not easy to believe that a gang of robbers 
 existed, that they acted systematically, communicating intelligence 
 to one another, and meeting and dispersing as occasion required, 
 and that this gang had their head-quarters in such a place as 
 Nevvburyport : no town is more distinguished for the correctness 
 of the general habits of its citizens ; and it is of such a size that 
 every man in it may be known to all the rest. The pursuits, 
 occupations, and habits of every person within it are within the ob- 
 servation of his neighbors. A suspicious stranger would be instantly 
 observed, and all his movements could be easily traced. This is 
 not the place to be the general rendezvous of a gang of robbers. 
 Offenders of this sort hang on the skirts of great cities. From 
 the commission of their crimes they hasten into the crowd, and 
 hide themselves in the populousness of great cities. If it were 
 wholly improbable that a gang existed in such a place for the pur- 
 pose of general plunder, the next inquiry was, Was there any 
 reason to think that there had been a special or particular combi- 
 nation, for the single purpose of robbing the prosecutor ? Now, it 
 was material to observe, that not only was there no evidence of 
 any such combination, but also that circumstances did exist which 
 rendered it next to impossible that the defendants could have been 
 parties to such a combination, or even that they could have any 
 knowledge of the existence of any such man as Goodridge, or 
 that any person, with money, was expected to come from the 
 Eastward, and to be near Essex bridge, at or about 9 o'clock 
 that evening. 
 
425 
 
 One of the defendants had been for some weeks in Newbury- 
 port — the other passed the bridge from New Hampshire, at 12 
 o'clock, on the 19th. At this time, Goodridge had not )^et arrived 
 at Exeter, twelve or fourteen miles from the bridge. How, then, 
 could either of the defendants know that he was coming ? Be- 
 sides, he says that nobody knew, on the road, that he had money, 
 as far as he knows, and nothing happened till he reached Exeter, 
 according to his account, from which it might be conjectured that 
 he carried money. Here, as he relates it, it became known that 
 he had pistols ; and he must wish you to infer, that the plan to rob 
 him was laid here, at Exeter, by some of the persons who inferred 
 that he had money from his being armed. Who were these 
 persons ? Certainly not the defendants, or either of them. Cer- 
 tainly not Taber. Certainly not Jackman. Were they persons 
 of suspicious character? Was he in a house of a suspicious 
 character.'' On this point he gives us no information. He 
 has either not taken the pains to inquire, or he chooses not to 
 communicate the result of his inquiries. Yet nothing could be 
 more important, since he seems compelled to lay the scene of the 
 plot against him at Exeter, than to know who the persons were 
 that he saw, or that saw him, at that place. On the face of the 
 facts now proved, nothing could be more improbable than that the 
 plan of robbery was concerted at Exeter. If so, why should those 
 who concerted send forward to Newburyport to engage the de- 
 fendants, especially as they did not know that they were there ? 
 What should induce any persons so suddenly to apply to the de- 
 fendants to assist in a robbery ? There was nothing in their per- 
 sonal character or previous history that should induce this. 
 
 Nor was there time for all this. If the prosecutor had not 
 lingered on the road, for reasons not yet discovered, he must have 
 been in Newburyport long before the time at which he states the 
 robbery to have been committed. How, then, could any one ex- 
 pect to leave Exeter, come to Newburyport, fifteen miles, there 
 look out for and find out assistants for a highway robbery, and 
 get back two miles to a convenient place for the commission of 
 the crime ? That any body should have undertaken to act thus, 
 was wholly improbable ; and in point of fact there is not the least 
 proof of any body's travelling, diat afternoon, from Exeter to 
 Newburyport, or of any person who was at the tavern at Exeter 
 having left it that afternoon. In all probability, nothing of this 
 sort could have taken place without being capable of detection 
 and proof In eveiy particular die prosecutor has wholly failed 
 to show the least probability of a plan to rob him having been 
 laid at Exeter. 
 
 But how comes it, that Goodridge was near or quite four hours 
 and a half in travelling a distance which might have been travelled 
 VOL. II. 54 
 
426 
 
 » 
 
 m two hours or two hours and a half? He says he missed his 
 way, and went the Salisbury road. But some of the jury know, 
 that this could not have delayed him more than five or ten minutes. 
 It would be well to be able to give some better account of this 
 delay. 
 
 Failing, as he seems to do, to create any belief that a plan to 
 rob him was fixed at Exeter, the prosecutor goes back to Alfred, 
 and says he saw there a man whom Taber resembles. But Taber 
 is proved to have been at that time, and at the time of the rob- 
 bery, in Boston. This is proved beyond question. It is so certain, 
 that the solicitor has no7i pressed the indictment against him. 
 
 There is an end, then, of all pretence of the adoption of a 
 scheme of robbery at Alfred : this leaves the prosecutor alto- 
 gether unable to point out any manner in which it should become 
 known that he had money, or in which a design to rob him should 
 originate. 
 
 It was next to be considered whether the prosecutor's story 
 was either natural or consistent. But, in the threshold of the 
 inquiry, every one puts the question. What motive had the prose- 
 cutor to be guilty of the abominable conduct of feigning a robbery ? 
 It is difficult to assign motives. The jury did not know enough 
 of his character or circumstances. Such things had happened, 
 and might happen again. • Suppose he owed money in Boston, 
 and had it not to pay ? Who knows how high he might estimate 
 the value of a plausible apology ? Some men have also a whim- 
 sical ambition of distinction. There is no end to the variety of 
 modes in which human vanity exhibits itself. A story of this 
 nature excites the public sympathy. It attracts general attention. 
 It causes the name of the prosecutor to be celebrated as a man 
 who has been attacked, and, after a manly resistance, overcome by 
 robbers, and who has renewed his resistance, as soon as returning 
 life and sensation enabled him, and, after a second conflict, has 
 been quite subdued, beaten and bruised out of all sense and sen- 
 sation, and finally left for dead on the field. It is not easy to say 
 how far such motives, trifling and ridiculous as most men would 
 think them, might influence the prosecutor, when connected with 
 any expectation of favor or indulgence, if he wanted such, from 
 his creditors. It was to be remembered, that he probably did not 
 see all the consequences of his conduct, if his robbery be a pre- 
 tence. He might not intend to prosecute any body. But he 
 probably found, and indeed there is evidence to show, that it was 
 necessary for him to do something to find out the authors of the 
 alleged robbery. He manifested no particular zeal on this subject. 
 He was in no haste. He appears rather to have been pressed by 
 others to do that which we should suppose he would be most 
 earnest to do, the earliest moment. 
 
427 
 
 But could he so seriously wound himself? — could he or would 
 he shoot a pistol bullet through his hand, in order to render the 
 robbery probable, and to obtain belief in his story ? All exhibi- 
 tions are subject to accidents. Whetlier they are serious or far- 
 cical, they may, in some particulars, not proceed exactly as they 
 are designed to do. If we knew that diis shot through the hand, 
 if made by himself, must have been intentionally made by himself, 
 it would be a circumstance of greater weight. The bullet went 
 through the sleeve of his coat. He might intend it should have 
 gone through nothing else. It was quite certain he did not re- 
 ceive this wound in the way he described. He says he was pull- 
 ing or thrusting aside the robber's pistol, and while his hand was 
 on it, it was fired, and the contents passed through his hand. This 
 could not have been so, because no part of the contents went 
 through the hand, except the ball. There was powder on the 
 sleeve of his coat, and from the appearance one would think the 
 pistol to have been three or four feet from the hand when fired. 
 The fact of the pistol bullet being fired through the hand, is doubt- 
 less a circumstance of weight. It may not be easy to account for 
 it ; but it is to be weighed with other circumstances. 
 
 It was most extraordinary, that, in the whole case, the prosecutor 
 should prove hardly any fact in any way but by his own oath. 
 He chooses to trust every thing on his own credit with the jury. 
 Had he the money with him, which he mentions? If so, his 
 clerks or persons connected with him in business must have known 
 it ; yet no witness is produced. Nothing can be more important 
 than to prove that he had the money. Yet he does not prove it. 
 Why should he leave this essential fact without further support ? 
 He is not surprised with this defence — he knew what it would be. 
 He knew that nothing could be more important than to prove that 
 in truth he did possess the money which he says he lost ; yet he 
 does not prove it. All that he saw, and all that he did, and every 
 thing that occurred to him until after the alleged robbery, rests 
 solely on his own credit. He does not see fit to corroborate any 
 fact by the testimony of any witness. So he went to New York 
 to arrest Jackman. He did arrest him. He swears positively 
 that he found in his possession papers which he lost at the dme of 
 the robbery ; yet he neither produces the papers themselves, nor 
 the persons who assisted in the search. 
 
 In like manner he represents his intercourse with Taber at 
 Boston. Taber, he says, made certain confessions. They made 
 a bargain for a disclosure or confession on one side, and a reward 
 on the other. But no one heard these confessions except Good- 
 ridge himself. Taber now confronts him, and pronounces this 
 part of his story to be wholly false ; and there is nobody who can 
 support the prosecutor- 
 
428 
 
 A jury cannot too seriously reflect on this part of the case. 
 There are many most important allegations of fact, which, if true, 
 could easily be shown by other witnesses, and yet are not so shown. 
 
 How came Mr. Goodridge to set out from Bangor, armed in 
 this formal and formidable manner ? How came he to be so ap- 
 prehensive of a robbery ? The reason he gives is completely 
 ridiculous. As the foundation of his alarm, he tells a story of a 
 robbery which he had heard of, but which, as far as appears, no 
 one else ever heard of; and the story itself is so perfectly absurd, 
 it is difficult to resist the belief that it was the product of his im- 
 agination at the moment. He seems to have been a little too con- 
 fident that an attempt would be made to rob him. The manner 
 in which he carried his money, as he says, indicated a strong ex- 
 pectation of this sort. His gold he wrapped in a cambric cloth, 
 put it into a shot bag, and then into his portmanteau. One parcel 
 of bills, of a hundred dollars in amount, he put into his pocket- 
 book — another, of somewhat more than a thousand dollars, he 
 carried next his person, underneath all his clothes. Having dis- 
 posed of his money in this way, and armed himself with two good 
 pistols, he set out from Bangor. The jury would judge whether 
 this extraordinary care of his money, and this formal arming of 
 himself to defend it, did not appear a good deal suspicious. 
 
 He stated that he did not travel in the night ; that he would 
 not so much expose himself to robbers. He said that, when he 
 came near Alfred, he did not go into the village, but stopped a 
 few miles short, because night was coming on, and he would not 
 trust himself and his money out at night. He represents himself 
 to have observed this rule constantly and invariably until he got 
 to Exeter. Yet, when the time came for the robbery, he was 
 found out at night. He left Exeter about sunset, intending to go 
 to Newburyport, fifteen miles distant, that evening. When he 
 is asked how this should happen, he says he had no fear of rob- 
 bers after he left the District of Maine. He thought himself 
 quite safe when he arrived at Exeter. Yet he told the jury, that 
 at Exeter he thought it necessary to load his pistol afresh. He 
 asked for a private room at the inn. He told the persons in at- 
 tendance that he wished such a room for the purpose of changing 
 his clothes. He charged them not to suffer him to be interrupted. 
 But he says his object was not to change his dress, but to put new 
 loading into his pistol. What sort of a story was this ? 
 
 He says he now felt himself out of all danger from robbers, 
 and was therefore willing to travel at night. At the same time, 
 he thought himself in very great danger from robbers, and there- 
 fore took the utmost pains to keep his pistols well loaded and in 
 good order. To account for the pains he took about loading his 
 pistols at Exeter, he says it was his invariable practice, every 
 
 \ 
 
429 
 
 day after he left Bangor, to discharge and load again one or both 
 of his pistols ; that he never missed doing this ; that he avoided 
 doing it at the inns, lest he should create suspicion, but that he 
 did it, while alone, on the road, every day. 
 
 How far this was probable the jury would judge. It would be 
 observed that he gave up his habits of caution as he approached 
 the place of the robbery. He then loaded his pistols at the tav- 
 ern, where persons might and did see him ; and he then also trav- 
 elled in the night. He passed the bridge over Merrimack river 
 a few minutes before nine o'clock. He was now at a part of his 
 progress where he was within the observation of other witnesses, 
 and something could be known of him besides what he told of 
 himself. Immediately after him passed the two persons with their 
 wagons — Shaw and Keyser. Close upon them followed the mail 
 stage. Now, these wagons and the stage must have passed within 
 three rods, at most, of Goodridge, at the very time of the robbery. 
 They must have been very near the spot, the very moment of the 
 attack ; and if he was under the robbers' hands as long as he rep- 
 resents, or if they staid on the spot long enough to do half what 
 he says they did do, they must have been there when the wagons 
 and the stage passed. At any rate, it is next to inipossible, by any 
 computation of time, to put these carriages so far from the spot, as 
 that the drivers should not have heard the cry of murder, which 
 he says he raised, or the report of the two pistols, which he says 
 were discharged. In three quarters of an hour, or an hour, he 
 returned, and repassed the bridge. 
 
 The jury would next naturally look to the appearances exhib- 
 ited on the field, after the robbery. The portmanteau was there. 
 The witnesses say, that the straps which fastened it to the saddle 
 had been neither cut nor broken. They were carefully unbuckled. 
 This was very considerate for robbers. It had been opened, and 
 its contents were scattered about the field. The pocket-book, too, 
 had been opened, and many papers it contained found on the 
 ground. Nothing valuable was lost but money. The robbers did 
 not think it well to go off at once with the portmanteau and the 
 pocket-book. The place was so secure, so remote, so unfrequented 
 — they were so far from the highway — at least one full rod — there 
 were so few persons passing, probably not more than four or five 
 then in the road, within hearing of the pistols and the cries of 
 Goodridge — there being, too, not above five or six dwelling-houses, 
 full of people, within the hearing of the report of a pistol ; — these 
 circumstances were all so favorable to their safety, that the robbers 
 sat down to look over the prosecutor's papers, carefully examined 
 the contents of his pocket-book and portmanteau, and took only 
 the things which they needed ! There was money belonging to 
 other persons. The robbers did not take it. They found out i« 
 
430 
 
 was not the prosecutor's, and left it. It may be said to be favor- 
 able to the prosecutor's story, that the money which did not be- 
 long to him, and the plunder of which would seem to be the most 
 probable inducement he could have to feign a robbery, was not 
 taken. But the jury would consider whether this circumstance 
 did not bear quite as strong the other way, and whether they can 
 believe that robbers could have left this money either from acci- 
 dent or design. 
 
 The robbers, by Goodridge's account, were extremely careful 
 to search his person. Having found money in his portmanteau 
 and in his pocket-book, they still forthwith stripped him to the 
 skin, and searched until they found the sum which had been so 
 carefully deposited under his clothes. Was it likely, that, having 
 found money in the places where it is ordinarily carried, robbers 
 should proceed to search for more, where they had no reason to 
 suppose more would be found ? Goodridge says that no person 
 knew of his having put his bills in that situation. On the first 
 attack, however, they proceeded to open one garment after an- 
 other, until they penetrated to the treasure, which was beneath 
 them all. 
 
 The testimony of Mr. Howard was material. He examined 
 Goodridge's pistol, which was found on the spot, and thinks it had 
 not been fired at all. If this be so, it would follow that the wound 
 through the hand was not made by this pistol ; but, then, as the 
 pistol was then discharged, if it had not been fired, he is not cor- 
 rect in swearing that he fired it at the robbers, nor could it have 
 been loaded at Exeter, as he testified. 
 
 In the whole case, there was nothing perhaps more deserving 
 consideration, than the prosecutor's statement of the violence 
 which the robbers used towards him. He says he was struck 
 with a heavy club, on the back part of his head. He fell sense- 
 less to the ground. Three or four rough-handed ruffians then 
 dragged him to the fence, and through it or over it, with such 
 force as to break one of the boards. They then plundered his 
 money. Presently he came to his senses ; perceived his situation ; 
 saw one of the robbers sitting or standing near: he valiantly 
 sprung upon, and would have overcome him, but the ruffian called 
 out for his comrades, who returned, and all together they renewed 
 their attack upon, subdued him, and redoubled their violence. 
 They struck him heavy blows ; they threw him violently to the 
 ground ; they kicked him in the side ; they choked him ; one 
 of them, to use his own words, jumped upon his breast. They 
 left him only when they supposed they had killed him. He went 
 back to Pearson's, at the bridge, in a state of delirium, and it was 
 several hours before his recollection came to him. This is his 
 account. Now, in point of fact, it was certain that on no part of 
 
431 
 
 his person was there the least mark of this beating and wounding. 
 The blow on the head, which brought him senseless to the ground, 
 neither broke the skin, nor caused any tumor, nor left any mark 
 whatever. He fell from his horse on the frozen ground, without any 
 appearance of injury. He was drawn through or over the fence with 
 such force as to break the rail, but not at all to leave any wound or 
 scratch on him. A second time, he is knocked down, kicked, stamped 
 upon, choked, and in every way abused and beaten till sense had 
 departed, and the breath of life hardly remained ; and yet no 
 wound, bruise, discoloration, or mark of injury, was found to result 
 from all this. Except the wound in his hand, and a few sftght 
 punctures in his left arm, apparently made with his own penknife, 
 which was found open on the spot, there was no wound or mark 
 which the surgeons, upon repeated examinations, could any where 
 discover. This was a story not to be believed. No matter who 
 tells it, it is so impossible to be true, that all belief is set at defi- 
 ance. No man can believe it. All this tale of blows which left 
 no marks, and of wounds which could not be discovered, must be 
 the work of imagination. If the jury could believe that he was 
 robbed, it was impossible they should or could believe his account 
 of the manner of it. 
 
 With respect, next, to delirium. The jury had heard the phy- 
 sicians. Two of them had no doubt it was all feigned. Dr. 
 SpofFord had spoken in a more qualified manner, but it was very 
 evident his opinion agreed with theirs. In the height of his 
 raving, the physician who was present said to others, that he 
 could find nothing the matter of the man, and that his pulse was 
 perfectly regular. But consider the facts which Dr. Balch tes- 
 tifies. He suspected the whole of this illness and dehrium to be 
 feigned. He wished to ascertain the truth. While he or others 
 was present, Goodridge appeared to be in the greatest pains and 
 agony from his wounds. He could not turn himself in bed, nor 
 be turned by othefs, without infinite distress. His mind, too, was 
 as much disordered as his body. He was constantly raving about 
 robbery and murder. At length the physicians and others with- 
 drew, and left him alone in the room. Dr. Balch returned softly 
 to the door, which he had left partly open, and there he had a 
 full view of his patient, unobserved by him. Goodridge was 
 then very quiet. His incoherent exclamadons had ceased. Dr. 
 Balch saw him turn over in bed without inconvenience. Pretty 
 soon he sat up in bed, and adjusted his neckcloth and his hair. 
 Then, hearing footsteps on the staircase, he instandy sunk into 
 the bed again ; his pains all returned, and he cried out against 
 robbers and murderers as loud as ever. Now, these facts are all 
 sworn to by an intelligent witness, who cannot be mistaken in 
 them — a respectable physician, whose veracity or accuracy is ia 
 
432 
 
 no way impeached or questioned. After this, it was difficult to 
 retain any good opinion of the prosecutor. Robbed or not robbed, 
 this was his conduct ; and such conduct necessarily takes away 
 all claim to sympathy and respect. The jury would consider 
 whether it did not also take away all right to be believed in any 
 thing. For if they should be of opinion that in any one point he 
 had intentionally misrepresented facts, he could be believed in 
 nothing. No man was to be convicted on the testimony of a 
 witness whom the jury had found wilfully violating the truth in 
 any particular. 
 
 The next part of the case was, the conduct of the prosecutor, 
 in attempting to find out the robbers, after he had recovered from 
 his illness. He suspected Mr. Pearson, a very honest, respecta- 
 ble man, who keeps the tavern at the bridge. He searched his 
 house and premises. He sent for a conjurer to come, with his 
 metallic rods and witch-hazel, to find the stolen money. Good- 
 ridge says now, that he thought he should find it, if the conjurer's 
 instruments were properly prepared. He professes to have full 
 faith in the art. Was this folly, or fraud, or a strange mixture 
 of both ? Pretty soon after the last search, gold pieces were ac- 
 tually found near Mr. Pearson's house, in the manner stated by the 
 female witness. How came they there ? Did the robber deposit 
 them there ? That is not possible. Did he accidentally leave 
 them there ? Why should not a robber take as good care of his 
 money as others .-' It is certain, too, that the gold pieces were not 
 put there at the time of the robbery, because the ground was then 
 bare ; but when these pieces were found, there were several inches 
 of snow below them. When Goodridge searched here with 
 his conjurer, he was on this spot, alone and unobserved, as he 
 thought. Whether he did not, at that time, drop his gold into 
 the snow, the jury will judge. When he came to this search, he 
 proposed something very ridiculous. He proposed that all per- 
 sons about to assist in the search should be examined, to see that 
 they had nothing which they could put into Pearson's possession, 
 for the purpose of being found there. But how was this exami- 
 nation to be made ? Why, truly, Goodridge proposed that every 
 man should examine himself, and that, among others, he would 
 examine himself, till he was satisfied he had nothing in his pock- 
 ets, which he could leave at Pearson's, with the fraudulent design 
 of being afterwards found there, as evidence against Pearson. 
 What construction would be given to such conduct .-' 
 
 As to Jackman, Goodridge went to New York and arrested 
 him. In his room he says he found paper coverings of gold, with 
 his own figures on them, and pieces of an old and useless 
 receipt, which he can identify, and which he had in his posses- 
 sion at the time of the robbery. He found these things lying on 
 
433 
 
 the floor In Jackman's room. What should induce the robbers, 
 when they left all other papers, to take this receipt ? and what 
 should induce Jackman to carry it to New York, and keep it. 
 with the coverings of the gold, in a situation where it was likel) 
 to be found, and used as evidence against him ? 
 
 There was no end to the series of improbabilities growing out 
 of the prosecutor's story. 
 
 One thing especially deserves notice. Wherever Goodridge 
 searches, he always finds something ; and what he finds, he 
 always can identify and swear to, as being his. The thing found 
 has always some marks by which he knows it. Yet he never 
 finds much. He never finds the mass of his lost treasure. He 
 finds just enough to be evidence, and no more. 
 
 These were the circumstances which tended to raise doubts of 
 the truth of the prosecutor's relation. It was for the jury to say, 
 whether it would be safe to convict any man for this robbery, 
 until dieir doubts should be cleared up. No doubt they were to 
 judge him candidly ; but they were not to make every thing yield 
 to a regard to his reputation, or a desire to vindicate him from 
 the suspicion of a fraudulent prosecution. 
 
 He stood like other witnesses, except that he was a very inter- 
 ested witness ; and he must hope for credit, if at all, from the 
 consistency and general probability of the facts to which he tes- 
 tified. The jury would not convict the prisoners to save the 
 prosecutor from disgrace. He had had every opportunity of 
 making out his case. If any person in the State could have cor- 
 roborated any part of his story, that person he could have pro- 
 duced. He had had the benefit of full fime, and good counsel, 
 and of the Commonwealth's process to bring in his witnesses. 
 More than all, he had had an opportunity of telling his own 
 story, with the simplicity that belongs to truth, if it were true, 
 and the frankness and earnestness of an honest man, if he be 
 such. It was for the jury to say, under their oaths, how he had 
 acquitted himself in these particulars, and whether he had left 
 their minds free of doubt about the truth of his narration. 
 
 But if Goodridge were really robbed, vi^as there satisfactory 
 evidence that the defendants had a hand in the commission of this 
 offence ? The evidence relied on is the finding of the money in 
 their house. It appeared that these defendants lived together, 
 and, with a sister, constituted one family. Their father lived 
 in another part of the same house, and with his wife constituted 
 another and distinct family. In this house, some six weeks after 
 the robbery, the prosecutor made a search ; and the result has 
 been stated by the vi'itnesses. Now, if the money had been 
 passed, or used by the defendants, it might have been conclusive. 
 If found about their persons, it might have been very strong proof. 
 VOL. II. 55 
 
434 
 
 But, under the circumstances of this case, the mere finding of 
 money in their house, and that only in pkices vvliere the prosecutor 
 had previously been, was no evidence at all. With respect to the 
 gold pieces, it w^s certainly true, that they were found in Good- 
 ridge's track. They were found only where he had been, and 
 might have put them. 
 
 When the sheriff was in the house, and Goodridge in the cellar, 
 gold was found in the cellar. When the sheriff was up stairs, and 
 Goodridge in the rooms below, the sheriff was called down to look 
 for money where Goodridge directed, and there inoney was 
 found. As to the bill, the evidence is not quite so clear. Mr. 
 Leavitt says he found a bill, in a drawer, in a room in which 
 none of the party had before been ; that he thought it an un- 
 current or counterfeit bill, and not a part of Goodridge's money, 
 and left it where he found it, without further notice. An hour or 
 two afterward, Upton perceived a bill in the same drawer, — Good- 
 ridge being then with or near him, — and called to Leavitt. Leavitt 
 told him that he had discovered that bill before, but that it could 
 not be Goodridge's. The bill was then examined. Leavitt says 
 he looked at it, and saw writing on the back it. Upton says 
 he looked at it, and saw writing on the back of it. He says 
 also that it was shown to Goodridge, who examined it in the 
 same way that he and Leavitt examined it. None of the party 
 at this time suspected it to be Goodridge's. It was then put into 
 Leavitt's pocket-book, where it remained till evening, when it 
 was taken out at the tavern ; and then it turned out to be, plainly 
 and clearly, one of Goodridge's bills, and had the name of 
 " James Poor, Bangor," in Goodridge's own hand-writing on the 
 back of it. The first thing that strikes one, in this account, is. 
 Why was not this discovery made at the time ? Goodridge 
 was looking for bills, as well as gold. He was looking for Bos- 
 ton bills — for such he had lost. He was looking for ten dollar 
 bills — for such he had lost. He was looking for bills which he 
 could recognize and identify. He would, therefore, naturally be 
 particularly attentive to any writing or marks upon such as he 
 might find. Under these circumstances, a bill is found in the 
 house of the supposed robbers. It is a Boston bill — it is a ten 
 dollar bill — ^it has writing on the back of it — that writing is 
 the name of his town, and the name of one of his neighbors — ■ 
 more than all, that writing is his own hand-writing ! — notwith- 
 standing all this, neither Goodridge, nor Upton, nor the sheriff, 
 examined the bill, so as to see whether it was Goodridge's money. 
 NotwiUistanding it so fully resembled, in all points, the money 
 they were looking for, and notwithstanding they also saw writing 
 on the back of it, which, diey must know, if they read it, would 
 probably have shown where the bill came from, yet neither of 
 
456 
 
 them did so far examine it as to see any proof of its being Good- 
 ridge's. This was hardly to be beheved. It must be a pretty 
 strong faith in the prosecutor that could credit this story. la 
 every part of it, it was improbable and absurd. It was much 
 more easy to believe, that the bill was changed. There might 
 have been, and there probably was, an uncurrent or counterfeit 
 bill found in tiie drawer by Leavitt. He certainly did not at 
 the time think it to be Good ridge's, and he left it in the drawer 
 where he found it. Before he saw it again, the prosecutor had 
 been in that room, and was in or near it when the sheriff was 
 again called in, and asked to put that bill in his pocket-book. 
 How did the juiy know, that this was the same bill which Leav- 
 itt had before seen ? Or, suppose it was — Leavitt carried it to 
 Coffin's ; in the evening he produced it, and, after having been 
 handed about for some time among the company, it turned out to 
 be Goodridge's bill, and to have upon it infallible marks of 
 identity. How did the jury know, that a sleight of hand had not 
 changed the bill at Coffin's ? It is sufficient to say, the bill might 
 have been changed. It is not certain, that this is the bill which 
 Leavitt first found in the drawer — and this not being certain, it 
 is not proof against the defendants. 
 
 Was it not extremely improbable, if the defendants were guilty, 
 that they should deposit the money in die places where it was 
 found ? Why should they put it in small parcels in so many 
 places, for no end but to multiply the chances of detection ? Why, 
 especially, should they put a doubloon in their father's pocket- 
 book ? There is no evidence, nor any ground of suspicion, that the 
 father knew of the money being in his pocket-book. He swears 
 he did not know it. His general character is unimpeached, and 
 there is nothing against his credit. The inquiry at Stratham 
 was calculated to elicit the truth ; and, after all, there is not the 
 slightest reason to suspect that he knew that the doubloon was in 
 his pocket-book. What could possibly induce the defendants to 
 place it there ? No man can conjecture a reason. On the other 
 hand, if this were a fraudulent proceeding on the part of the 
 prosecutor, this circumstance could be explained. He did not 
 know that the pocket-book, and the garment in which it was 
 found, did not belong to one of the defendants. He was as like- 
 ly, therefore, to place it there as elsewhere. It was very mate- 
 rial to consider that nothing was found in that part of the house 
 which belonged to the defendants. Every thing was discovered 
 in the father's apartments. They were not found, therefore, in 
 the possession of the defendants, any more than if they had been 
 discovered in any other house in the neighborhood. The two 
 tenements, it was true, were under the same roof; but they were 
 not on that account the same tenements : they were as distinct as 
 
436 
 
 any other houses. Now, how should it happen that the several 
 parcels of money should all be found in the father's possession ? 
 He is not suspected — certainly there is no reason to suspect him 
 — of having had any hand either in the commission of the rob- 
 bery, or the concealing of the goods. He swears he had no knowl- 
 edge of any part of this money being in his house. It is not easy 
 to imagine how it came there, unless it be supposed to be put there 
 by some one who did not know what part of the house belonged 
 to the defendants, and what did not. 
 
 The witnesses on the part of the prosecution have testified 
 that the defendants, when arrested, manifested great agitation and 
 alarm ; paleness overspread their faces, and drops of sweat stood 
 on their temples. This satisfied the w^itnesses of the defendants' 
 guilt, and they now state the circumstance, as being indubitable 
 proof. This argument manifests, in those who use it, equal want 
 of sense and sensibility. It is precisely fitted to the feeling and 
 the intellect of a bum-bailiff In a court of justice it deserves 
 nothing but contempt. Is there nothing that can agitate the frame, 
 or excite the blood, but the consciousness of guilt ? If the defend- 
 ants were innocent, would they not feel indignation at this unjust 
 accusation ? If they saw an attempt to produce false evidence 
 against them, would they not be angry ? And, seeing the production 
 of such evidence, might they not feel fear and alarm ? And have 
 indignation, and anger, and terror, no power to affect the human 
 countenance, or the human frame ? 
 
 Miserable, miserable, indeed, is the reasoning which would in- 
 fer any man's guilt from his agitation, when he found himself ac- 
 cused of a heinous offence ; when he saw evidence, which he might 
 know to be false and fraudulent, brought against him ; when his 
 house was filled, from the garret to the cellar, by those whom he 
 might esteem as false witnesses ; and when he himself, instead of 
 being at liberty to observe their conduct and watch their motions, 
 was a prisoner in close custody in his own house, with the fists of a 
 catch-poll clenched upon his throat. 
 
 The defendants were at Newburyport the afternoon and evening 
 of the robbery. For the greater part of the time, they show where 
 they were and what they were doing. Their proof, it is true, 
 does not apply to every moment. But, when it is considered that, 
 from the moment of their arrest, they have been in close prison, 
 perhaps they have shown as much as could be expected. Few 
 men, when called on afterwards, can remember, and fewer, still, 
 can prove, how they have passed every half hour of an evening. 
 At a reasonable hour they both came to the house where Laban 
 had lodged the night before. Nothing suspicious was observed 
 in their manners or conversation. Is it probable they would 
 thus come unconcernedly into the company of others, from a field 
 
437 
 
 of robbery, and, as they must have supposed, of murder, before 
 they could have ascertained whether the stain of blood was not 
 on their garments? They remained in the place a part of the 
 next day. The town was alarmed ; a strict inquiry was made of 
 all strangers, and of the defendants among others. Nothing sus- 
 picious was discovered. They avoided no inquiry, nor left the 
 town in any haste. The jury had had an opportunity of seeing 
 the defendants. Did their general appearance indicate that har- 
 dihood which would enable them to act this cool, unconcerned 
 part ^ Was it not more likely they would have fled ? 
 
 From the time of the robbery to the arrest, five or six weeks, 
 the defendants had been engaged in their usual occupations. They 
 are not found to have passed a dollar of money to any body. They 
 continued their ordinary habits of labor. No man saw money 
 about them, nor any circumstance that might lead to a suspicion 
 that they had money. Nothing occurred tending in any degree 
 to excite suspicions against them. When arrested, and when all 
 tliis array of evidence was made against them, and when they 
 could hope in nothing but their innocence, immunity was ofiered 
 them again if they would confess. They were pressed, and urged, 
 and allured, by every motive which could be set before them, to 
 acknowledge their participation in the offence, and to bring out 
 their accomplices. They steadily protested that they could con- 
 fess nothing, because they knew nothing. In defiance of all the 
 discoveries made in their house, they have trusted to their inno- 
 cence. On that, and on the candor and discernment of an enlight- 
 ened jury, they still rehed. 
 
 If the jury were satisfied, that there was the highest improba- 
 bility that these persons could have had any previous knowledge 
 of Goodridge, or been concerned in any previous concert to 
 rob him ; if their conduct that evening and the next day 
 was marked by no circumstances of suspicion ; if, from that 
 moment until their arrest, nothing appeared against them ; if they 
 neither passed money, nor are found to have had money ; if the 
 manner of the search of their house, and the circumstances at- 
 tending it, excite strong suspicions of unfair and fraudulent prac- 
 tices ; if, in the hour of their utmost jjeril, no promises of safety 
 could draw from the defendants any confessions affecting them- 
 selves or others, — it would be for the jury to say whether they 
 could pronounce them guilty. 
 
SPEECH 
 
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 12, 1835, 
 ON THE BILL GRANTING INDEMNITY TO CITIZENS OF THE 
 UNITED STATES FOR FRENCH SPOLIATIONS ON AMERICAN 
 COMMERCE PRIOR TO 1800. 
 
 Mr. Webster said, that, before proceeding to the discussion of 
 the bill, he felt it to be his duty to take notice of an occurrence 
 such as did not ordinarily draw from him any remarks in his place 
 in the Senate. Some time last March, said Mr. Webster, there 
 appeared in a newspaper published at Albany, in the State of New 
 York, a letter purporting to have been written to the editor, from 
 Washington, in which the writer charged me with having a direct 
 personal interest in these claims. I am ashamed to say, that this 
 letter was written by a member of Congress. The assertion, like 
 many others which I have not felt it to be my duty to take any notice 
 of, was wholly and entirely false and malicious. I have not the 
 slightest interest in these claims, or any one of them. I have never 
 been conferred with or retained by any one, or spoken to as counsel 
 for any of them, in the course of my life. No member of the Senate 
 is more entirely free from any personal connection with the claims 
 than I am. It has been the pleasure of the Senate, on several oc- 
 casions, to place me on a committee to which these petitions have 
 been referred. I have, on those occasions, examined the subject, 
 with a desire to acquit myself conscientiously, by exercising my 
 best judgment upon the claims, as questions of mere right and 
 justice. 
 
 At the last session, an honorable member of the Senate, now in 
 a public capacity at St. Petersburg, introduced a bill for the relief 
 of the petitioners, and moved the appointment of a committee, de- 
 clining himself to be a member of that committee. Without any 
 wish of mine, and, indeed, without my knowledge, — for I was not 
 then in the city, — the Senate was pleased to place me at the head of 
 that committee. I thought it my duty, then, to introduce the bill 
 which is now again under consideration. 
 
 This, said Mr. Webster, is no party question : it involves no 
 party principles ; atlects no party interests ; seeks no party ends 
 or objects ; and as it is a question of private right and justice, it 
 would be flagrant w^rong and injustice to attempt to give to it, any 
 
439 
 
 where, tlie character of a party measure. The petitioners, the 
 sufferers under the French spoliations, belong to all parties. Gen- 
 tlemen of distinction, of all parties, have at different times main- 
 tained the justice of the claim. The present bill is intended for 
 the equal relief of all sufferers ; and if the measure shall become a 
 party measure, I, for one, shall not pursue it. It will be wiser to 
 leave it till better auspices shall appear. 
 
 The question, Sir, involved in this case, is essentially a judicial 
 question. It is not a question of public policy, but a question of 
 private right ; a question between the Government and the peti- 
 tioners ; and, as the Government is to be judge in its own case, it 
 would seem to be the duty of its members to examine the subject 
 with the most scrupulous good faith, and the most solicitous desire 
 to do justice. 
 
 There is a propriety in commencing the examination of these 
 claims in the Senate, because it was the Senate, which, by its 
 amendment of the treaty of 1800, and its subsequent ratification 
 of that treaty, and its recognition of the declaration of the French 
 Government, effectually released the claims as against France, and 
 forever cut off the petitioners from all hopes of redress from that 
 quarter. The claims, as claims against our own Government, have 
 their foundation in these acts of the Senate itself; and it may cer- 
 tainly be expected that the Senate will consider the effect of its 
 own proceedings on private right, and private interests, with that 
 candor and justice which belong to its high character. 
 
 It ought not to be objected to these petitioners, that their claim 
 is old, or that they are now reviving any thing which has heretofore 
 been abandoned. There has been no delay which is not reason- 
 ably accounted for. The treaty, by which the claimants say their 
 claims on France for these captures and confiscations were released, 
 was concluded in 1800. They immediately applied to Congress 
 for indemnity, as will be seen by the report made in 1802, in the 
 House of Representatives, by a committee, of which a distinguished 
 member from Virginia, not now living (Mr, Giles), was chair- 
 man. 
 
 In 1807, on the petition of sundry merchants and others, citizens 
 of Charleston, in South Carolina, a committee of the House of 
 Representatives, of which Mr. Marion, of that state, was chairman, 
 made a report, declaring that the committee was of opinion that the 
 Government of the United States was bound to indemnify the 
 claimants. But at this time our affairs with the European powers 
 at war had become exceedingly embarrassed ; our Government 
 had felt itself compelled to withdraw our commerce from the ocean ; 
 and it was not until after the conclusion of the war of 1812, and 
 after the general pacification of Europe, that a suitable opportunity 
 occurred of presenting the subject again to the serious consideration 
 
440 
 
 of Congress. From that time the petitioners have been constantly 
 before us, and the period has at length arrived proper for a final 
 decision of their case. 
 
 Another objection, Sir, has been urged against these claims, 
 well calculated to diminish the favor with which they might other- 
 wise be received, and which is without any substantial foundation 
 in fact. It is, that a great portion of them has been bought up, as 
 a matter of speculation ; and it is now holden by these purchasers. 
 It has even been said, I think, on the floor of the Senate, that nine 
 tenths, or ninety hundredths, of all the claims, are owned by 
 speculators. 
 
 Such unfounded statements are not only wholly unjust towards 
 these petitioners themselves, but they do great mischief to other inter- 
 ests. I have observed that a French gentleman of distinction, former- 
 ly a resident in this country, is represented in the public newspa- 
 pers as having declined the offer of a seat in the French administra- 
 tion, on the ground that he could not support the American treaty ; 
 and he could not support the treaty, because he had learned, or 
 heard, while in America, that the claims were no longer the prop- 
 erty of the original sufferers, but had passed into unworthy hands. 
 If any such thing has been learned in the United States, it has been 
 learned from sources entirely incorrect. The general fact is not so ; 
 and this prejudice, thus operating on a great national interest, — an 
 interest, in regard to which we are in danger of being seriously 
 embroiled with a foreign state, — was created, doubtless, by the same 
 incorrect and unfounded assertions which have been made relative 
 to this other class of claims. 
 
 In regard to both classes, and to all classes of claims of American 
 citizens on foreign governments, the statement is at variance with 
 the facts. Those who make it have no proof of it. On the con- 
 trary, incontrovertible evidence exists of the truth of the very re- 
 verse of this statement. The claims against France, since 1800, 
 are now in the course of adjudication. They are all, or very 
 nearly all, presented to the proper tribunal. Proofs accompany 
 them, and the rules of the tribunal require that, in each case, the 
 true ownership should be fully and exactly set out, on oath, and 
 be proved by the papers, vouchers, and other evidence. Now, 
 Sir, if any man is acquainted, or will make himself acquainted, 
 with the proceedings of this tribunal, so far as to see who are the 
 parties claiming the indemnity, he will see the absolute and enor- 
 mous error of those who represent these claims to be owned, in 
 great part, by speculators. 
 
 The truth is, Sir, that these claims, as vi^ell those since 1800 
 as before, are owned and possessed by the original sufferers, widi 
 such changes only as happen in regard to all other property. 
 The original owner of ship and cargo ; his representative, where 
 
441 
 
 such owner is dead ; underwriters, who have paid losses, on ac- 
 count of cajDtures and confiscations ; and creditors of insoh'ents and 
 bankrupts, who were interested in the claims, — these are the de- 
 scriptions of persons, who, in all these cases, own vastly the larger 
 portion of the claims. This is true of the claims on Spain, as is 
 most manifest from the proceedings of the commissioners under the 
 Spanish treaty. It is true of the claims on France arising since 
 1800, as is equally manifest by the proceedings of the commis- 
 sioners now sitting ; and it is equally true of the claims, which are 
 the subject of this discussion, and provided for in this bill. In 
 some instances, claims have been assigned, from one to another, in 
 the settlement of family affairs. They have been transferred, 
 in other instances, to secure or to pay debts; they have been 
 transferred, sometimes, in the setdement of insurance accounts ; 
 and it is probable there are a few cases in which the necessities 
 of the holders have compelled them to sell them. But nothing 
 can be further from the truth, than that they have been the general 
 subjects of purchase and sale, and that they are now holden mainly 
 by purchasers from the original owners. They have been com- 
 pared to the unfunded debt. But that consisted in scrip, of fixed 
 amount, and which passed from hand to hand by delivery. These 
 claims cannot so pass from hand to hand. In each case, not only 
 the value, but die amount, is uncertain. Whether there be any 
 claim, is, in each case, a matter for investigation and proof; and 
 so is the amount, when the justice of the claim itself is established. 
 These circumstances are of diemselves quite sufficient to prevent 
 the easy and frequent transfer of the claims from hand to hand. 
 They would lead us to expect that to happen which actually has 
 happened ; and that is, that the claims remain with their original 
 owners, and their legal heirs and representatives, with such excep- 
 tions as I have already mentioned. As to the portion of the claims 
 now owned by underwriters, it can hardly be necessary to say, 
 that they stand on the same equity and justice as if possessed and 
 presented by the owners of ships and goods. There is no more 
 universal maxim of law and justice, throughout the civilized and 
 commercial world, than that an underwriter, who has paid a loss on 
 ships or merchandise to the owner, is entitled to whatever may be 
 received from the property. His right accrues by the very act of 
 payment ; and if the property, or its proceeds, be afterwards recov- 
 ered, in whole or in part, whether the recovery be from the sea, 
 from captors, or from the justice of foreign states, such recovery is 
 for the benefit of the underwriter. Any attempt, therefore, to 
 prejudice these claims, on the ground that many of them belong to 
 insurance companies, or other underwriters, is at war with the first 
 principles of justice. 
 
 A short but accurate general view of the history and character 
 VOL. n. 56 
 
442 
 
 of these claims, is presented in the report of the Secretary of State, 
 on the 20th of May, 182G, in compHance with a resolution of the 
 Senate. Allow me, Sir, to read the paragraphs : — 
 
 " The Secretary can hardly suppose it to have been the inten- 
 tion of the resolution to require the expression of an argumenta- 
 tive opinion as to the degree of responsibility, to the American 
 sufferers from French spoliations, which the convention of 1800 
 extinguished, on the part of France, or devolved on the United 
 States, the Senate itself being most competent to decide that ques- 
 tion. Under this impression, he hopes that he will have sufficiently 
 conformed to the purposes of the Senate, by a brief statement, 
 prepared in a hurried moment, of what be understands to be the 
 question. 
 
 " The second article of the convention of 1800 was m the fol- 
 lowing words : — ' The ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties 
 not being able to agree at present, respecting the treaty of alliance 
 of 6th of February, 1778, the treaty of amity and commerce of 
 the same date, and the convention of the 14th November, 1788, 
 nor upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will 
 negotiate firther on these subjects at a convenient time ; and, until 
 they may have agreed upon these points, the said treaties and 
 convention shall have no operation, and the relations of the two 
 countries shall be regulated as follows.' 
 
 " When that convention was laid before the Senate, it gave its 
 consent and advice, that it should be ratified, provided that the 
 second article be expunged, and that the following article be added 
 or inserted : — * It is agreed that the present convention shall be in 
 force for the term of eight years, from the time of the exchange of 
 the ratifications ; ' and it was accordingly so ratified by the Presi- 
 dent of the United States, on the 18th day of February, 1801. On 
 the 31st of July of the same year, it was ratified by Bonaparte, 
 First Consul of the French Republic, who incorporated in the in- 
 strument of his ratification the following clause, as part of it : — ' The 
 Government of the United States having added to its ratification 
 that the convention should be in force for the space of eight years, 
 and having omitted the second article, the Government of the 
 French Republic consents to accept, ratify, and confirm, the above 
 convention, with the addition, importing that the convention shall 
 be in force for the space of eight years, and with the retrenchment 
 of the second article : Provided that, by this retrenchment, the tioo 
 states renounce the respective iiretensions which arc the object of 
 the said article.^ 
 
 " The French ratification, being thus conditional, was, neverthe- 
 less, exchanged against that of the United States, at Paris, on the 
 same 31st of July. The President of the United States, consid- 
 
443 
 
 ering it necessary again to submit tlie convention, in this state, to 
 the Senate, on the 19th day of December, 1801, it was resolved 
 by tlie Senate, that they considered the said convention as fully 
 ratified, and returned it to the President for the usual promulgation. 
 It was accordingly promulgated, and thereafter regarded as a valid 
 and binding compact. The two contracting parties thus agreed, 
 by the retrenchment of the second article, mutually to renounce 
 the respective pretensions which were the object of that article. 
 The pretensions of the United States, to which allusion is thus 
 made, arose out of the spoliations under color of French authority, 
 in contravention of law and existing treaties. Those of France 
 sprung from the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February, 1778, 
 the treaty of amity and commerce of the same date, and the con- 
 vention of the 14th November, 1788. Whatever obligations or in- 
 demnities, from these sources, either party had a right to demand, 
 were respectively waived and abandoned ; and the consideration 
 which induced one party to renounce his pretensions, was that of 
 renunciation by the other party of his pretensions. What was 
 the value of the obligations and indemnities so reciprocally re- 
 nounced, can only be matter of speculation. The amount of the 
 indemnities due to the citizens of the United States was very large ; 
 and, on the other hand, the obligation was great (to specify no other 
 French pretensions) under which the United States were placed in 
 the eleventh article of the treaty of alliance, of the 6tli February, 
 1778, by which they were bound, forever, to guaranty, from that 
 time, the then possessions of the crown of France in America, as 
 well as those which it might acquire by the future treaty of peace 
 with Great Britain ; all these possessions having been, it is be- 
 lieved, conquered at, or not long after, the exchange of the ratifi- 
 cations of the convention of September, 1800, by the arms of 
 Great Britain, from France. 
 
 " The fifth article of the amendments to the Constitution pro- 
 vides — ' nor shall private property be taken for public use without 
 just compensation.' If the indemnities to which citizens of the 
 United States were entitled for French spoliations, prior to the 30th 
 September, 1800, have been appropriated to absolve the United 
 States from the fulfilment of an obligation which they had con- 
 tracted, or from the payment of indemnities which they were bound 
 to make to France, the Senate is most competent to determine how 
 far such an appropriation is a public use of private property within the 
 spirit of the Constitution, and whether equitable considerations do 
 not require some compensation to be made to the claimants. The 
 Senate is also best able to estimate the probability which existed, 
 of an ultimate recovery from France of the amount due for those 
 indemnities, if they had not been renounced ; in making which es- 
 timate, it w^ill, no doubt, give just weight to the painful considera- 
 
444 
 
 tion, that repeated and urgent appeals have been in vain made to 
 the justice of France, for satisfaction of flagrant wrongs committed 
 upon property of other citizens of the United States, subsequent to 
 the period of 30ih September, 1800.", 
 
 Before the interference of our Government with these claims, 
 they constituted just demands against the Government of France. 
 They were not vague expectations of possible future indemnity for 
 injuries received, too uncertain to be regarded as valuable, or be 
 esteemed property. They were just demands, and, as such, they 
 were property. The courts of law took notice of them as prop- 
 erty. They were capable of being devised, of being distributed 
 among heirs and next of kin, and of being transferred and assigned, 
 like odier legal and just debts. A claim or demand for a ship un- 
 jusdy seized and confiscated, is property as clearly as the ship it- 
 self. It may not be so valuable, or so certain ; but it is as clear a 
 right, and has been uniformly so regarded by the courts of law. 
 The papers show American citizens had claims against the French 
 Government for six hundred and fifteen vessels, unlawfully seized 
 and confiscated. If this were so, it is difficult to see how the Gov- 
 ernment of the United States can release these claims for its own 
 benefit, with any more propriety than it could have applied the 
 money to its own use, if the French Government had been ready 
 to make compensation, in money, for the property thus illegally, 
 seized and confiscated ; or how the Government could appropriate 
 to itself the just claims which the owners of these six hundred and 
 fifteen vessels held against the wrong-doers, without making com- 
 pensation, any more than it could appropriate to itself, without 
 making compensation, six hundred and fifteen ships which had not 
 been seized. I do not mean to say that the rate of compensation 
 should be the same in both cases ; I do not mean to say that a 
 claim for a ship is of as much value as a ship ; but I mean to say 
 that both the one and the other are property, and that Govern- 
 ment cannot, with justice, deprive a man of either, for its own ben- 
 efit, without making a fair compensation. 
 
 It will be perceived at once. Sir, that these claims do not rest on 
 the ground of any neglect or omission, on the part of the Govern- 
 ment of the United States, in demanding satisfaction from France. 
 That is not the ground. The Government of the United States, in 
 that respect, performed its full duty. It remonstrated against these 
 illegal seizures ; it insisted on redress ; it sent two special missions 
 to France, charged expressly, among other duties, with the duty 
 of demanding indemnity. But France had her subjects of com- 
 plaint, also, against the Government of the United States, which 
 she pressed with equal earnestness and confidence, and which she 
 woidd neither postpone nor reluiquish, except on the condition 
 
445 
 
 that the United States would postpone or relinquish these claims. 
 And, to meet this condition, and to restore harmony between the 
 two nations, the United States did agree, first to postpone, and af- 
 terwards to relinquish, these claims of its own citizens. In other 
 words, the Government of the United States bought off the claims 
 of France against itself, by discharging claims of our own citizens 
 against France. 
 
 Tiiis, Sir, is the ground on which these citizens think they have 
 a claim for reasonable indemnity against their own Government. 
 And now. Sir, before proceeding to the disputed part of the case, 
 permit me to state what is admitted. 
 
 In the first place, then, it is universally admitted that these pe- 
 titioners once had just claims against the Government of France, on 
 account of these illegal captures and condemnations. 
 
 In the next place, it is admitted, that these claims no longer 
 exist agamst France ; that they have, in some way, been extin- 
 guished or released, as to her ; and that she is forever discharged 
 from all duty of paying or satisfying them, in whole or in part. 
 
 Tliese two points being admitted, it is then necessary, in order to 
 support the present bill, to maintain four propositions : — 
 
 1. That these claims subsisted against France up to the time 
 of the treaty of September, ISOO, between France and the United 
 States. 
 
 2. That they were released, surrendered, or extinguished, by 
 that treaty, its amendment in the Senate, and the manner of its final 
 ratification. 
 
 3. That they were thus released, surrendered, or extinguished, 
 for political and national considerations, for objects and purposes 
 deemed important to the United States, but in which these claimants 
 had no more interest than any other citizens. 
 
 4. That the amount or measure of indemnity, proposed by this 
 bill, is no more than a fair and reasonable compensation, so far as 
 we can judge by what has been done in similar cases. 
 
 1 . Were these subsisting claims against France, up to the time 
 of the treaty ? It is a conclusive answer to this question to say, 
 that the Government of the United States insisted that they did 
 exist, up to the time of the ti'eaty, and demanded indemnity for 
 them, and that the French Government fully admitted their exist- 
 ence, and acknowledged its obligation to make such indemnity. 
 
 The negotiation, which terminated in the treaty, was opened by 
 a direct proposition for indemnity, made by our ministers, the jus- 
 tice and propriety of which wa.s immediately acceded to by' the 
 ministers of France. 
 
 On die 7th of April, ISOO, in their first letter to the ministers of 
 Fi-ance, Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and IMurray, say — 
 
446 
 
 " Citizen Ministers : The undersigned, appreciating the value of 
 time, and wishing by frani<ness to evince their sincerity, enter di- 
 rectly upon the great object of their mission — an object which they 
 believe may be best obtained by avoiding to retrace minutely the 
 too well known, and too painful, incidents which have rendered a 
 negotiation necessary. 
 
 " To satisfy the demands of justice, and render a reconciliation 
 cordial and permanent, they propose an arrangement, such as shall 
 be compatible with national lionor and existing circumstances, to 
 ascertain and discharge the equitable claims of the citizens of either 
 nation upon the other, whether founded on contract, treaty, or the 
 law of nations. The way being thus prepared, the undersigned 
 will be at liberty to stipulate for that reciprocity and freedom of 
 commercial intercourse between the two countries, which must es- 
 sentially contribute to their mutual advantage. 
 
 " Should this general view of the subject be approved by the 
 ministers plenipotentiary to whom it is addressed, the details, it is 
 presumed, may be easily adjusted, and that confidence restored 
 which ought never to have been shaken." 
 
 To this letter the French ministers immediately returned the 
 following answer : — 
 
 "The ministers plenipotentiary of the French Republic have 
 read attentively the proposition for a plan of negotiation, which 
 was communicated to them by the envoys extraordinary and min- 
 isters plenipotentiary of the United States of America. 
 
 " They think that the first object of the negotiation ought to be 
 the determination of the regulations, and the steps to be followed 
 for the estimation and indemnification of injuries for which either 
 nation may make claim for itself, or for any of its citizens ; and 
 that the second object is, to assure the execution of treaties of 
 friendship and commerce made between the two nations, ana 
 the accomplishment of the views of reciprocal advantages which 
 suggested them." 
 
 It is certain, therefore, that the negotiation commenced in the 
 recognition, by both parties, of the existence of individual claims, 
 and of the justice of making satisfaction for them ; and it is equally 
 clear that, throughout the whole negotiation, neither party suggested 
 that these claims had already been either satisfied or extinguished ; 
 and it is indisputable that the treaty itself, in the second ardcle, ex- 
 pressly admitted their existence, and solemnly recognized the duty 
 of providing for them at some future period. 
 
 It will be observed, Sir, diat the French negotiators, in their 
 first letter, while they admit the justice of providing indemnity for 
 
447 
 
 individual claims, bring forward, also, claims arising under trea- 
 ties ; taking care, thus early, to advance the pretensions of France 
 on account'of alleged violations by the United States of the treaties 
 of 1778. On that part of the case, I shall say something here- 
 after ; but I use this first letter of the French ministers at present 
 only to show that, from the first, the French Government admit- 
 ted its oblisration to indemnify individuals who had suffered wrongs 
 and injuries. 
 
 The honorable member from New York (Mr. Wright) con- 
 tends. Sir, that, at the time of concluding the treaty, these claims 
 had ceased to exist. He says that a war had taken place between 
 the United States and France, and by the war the claims had be- 
 come extinguished. I differ from the honorable member, both as 
 to the fact of war, and as to the consequences to be deduced from 
 it, in this case, even if public war had existed. If we admit, for 
 argument sake, that war had existed, yet w^e find that, on the res- 
 toration of amity, both parties admit the justice of these claims, and 
 their continued existence ; and the party against which they are 
 preferred acknowledges her obligation, and expresses her willing- 
 ness, to pay them. The mere fact of war can never extinguish 
 any claim. If, indeed, claims for indemnity be the professed 
 ground of a war, and peace be afterwards concluded without ob- 
 taining any acknowledgment of the right, such a peace may be 
 construed to be a relinquishment of the right, on the ground that 
 the question has been put to the arbitration of the sword, and de- 
 cided. But, if a war be waged to enforce a disputed claim, and 
 it be carried on till the adverse party admit the claim,'and agree to 
 provide for its payment, it would be strange, indeed, to hold that 
 the claim itself was extinguished by the very war w^hich had com- 
 pelled its express recognition. Now, whatever we call that state 
 of things which existed between the United States and France, 
 from 1798 to 1800, it is evident that neither party contended or 
 supposed that it had been such a state of things as had extin- 
 guished individual claims for indemnity for illegal seizures and 
 confiscations. 
 
 The honorable member, Sir, to sustain his point, must prove 
 that the United States went to war to vindicate these claims ; that 
 they waged that war unsuccessfully ; and that they were therefore 
 glad to make peace, without obtaining payment of the claims, or 
 any admission of their justice. I am happy, Sir, to say, that, in 
 my opinion, facts do not authorize any such record to be made up 
 against the United States. I think it is clear, Sir, that, whatever 
 misunderstanding existed between the United States and France, 
 it did not amount, at any time, to open and public war. It is cer- 
 tain that the amicable relations of the two countries were much 
 disturbed ; it is certain that the United States authorized armed 
 
448 
 
 resistance to French captures, and tne captures of French vessels 
 of war found hovering on our coast ; but it is certain, also, not only 
 that there was no declaration of war, on either side, but diat the 
 United States, under all their provocations, did never authorize 
 general reprisals on French commerce. At the very moment 
 when the gentleman says war raged between the United States 
 and France, French citizens came into our courts, in their own 
 names, claimed resdtution for property seized by American cruis- 
 ers, and obtained decrees of restitution. They claimed as citizens 
 of France, and obtained restoration, in our courts, as citizens of 
 France. It must have been a singular war. Sir, in which such 
 proceedings could take place. Upon a fair view of the whole 
 matter, Mr. President, it will be found, I tbink, that every thing 
 done by the United States was defensive. No part of it was ever 
 retaliatory. The United States did not take justice into their 
 own hands. 
 
 The strongest measure, perhaps, adopted by Congress, was the 
 act of May 28, 1798. Tbe honorable member from New York 
 has referred to this act, and chiefly relies upon it, to prove the ex- 
 istence, or the commencement, of actual war. But does it prove 
 either the one or the other ? 
 
 It is not an act declaring war ; it is not an act authorizing re- 
 prisals ; it is not an act, which, in any way, acknowledges the ac- 
 tual existence of war. Its whole implication and import is the 
 other way. Its title is, " An act more effectually to protect the 
 commerce and coasts of the United States." 
 
 This is its preamble : — 
 
 " Whereas armed vessels, sailing under authority, or pretence 
 of authority, from the Republic of France, have committed depre- 
 dations on the commerce of the United States, and have recently 
 captured the vessels and property of citizens thereof, on and near 
 the coasts, in violation of the law of nations, and treaties between 
 the United States and the French nation ; therefore," — 
 
 And then follows its only section, in these words : — 
 
 " Sec. 1. Be it enacted, ^c. That it shall be lawful for the 
 President of the United States, and he is hereby authorized, to in- 
 struct and direct the commanders of the armed vessels belonging 
 to the United States, to seize, take, and bring into any port of the 
 United States, to be proceeded against according to the laws of 
 nations, any such armed vessel which shall have committed, or 
 which shall be found hovering on the coasts of the United States 
 for the purpose of committing, depredations on the vessels belonging 
 to citizens thereof; and also retake any ship or vessel, of any ciii- 
 
449 
 
 zen or citizens of the United States, which may have been captured 
 by any such armed vessel." 
 
 This act, it is true, authorized the use of force, under certain 
 circumstances, and for certain objects, against French vessels. 
 But there may be acts of authorized force ; there may be assaults ; 
 there may be battles ; there may be captures of ships, and im- 
 prisonment of persons, — and yet no general war. Cases of this 
 kind may occur under that practice of retortion which is justified, 
 when adopted for just cause, by the laws and usages of nations, and 
 which all the writers distinguish from general war. 
 
 The first provision in this law is purely preventive and defen- 
 sive ; and the other hardly goes beyond it. Armed vessels, hover- 
 ing on our coast, and capturing our vessels, under authority, or pre- 
 tence of authority, from a foreign state, might be captured and 
 brought in, and vessels already seized by them retaken. The act 
 is limited to armed vessels ; but why was this, if general war ex- 
 isted ? Why was not the naval power of the country let loose, at 
 once, if there were war, against the commerce of the enemy ? 
 The cruisers of France were preying on our commerce : if there 
 was war, why were we restrained from general reprisals on her 
 commerce ? This restraining of the o]Deration of our naval marine 
 to armed vessels of France, and to such of them only as should be 
 found hovering on our coast, for the purpose of committing depre- 
 dations on our commerce, instead of proving a state of war, proves, 
 I think, irresistibly, that a state of general war did not exist. But 
 even if this act of Congress left the matter doubtful, other acts, 
 passed at and near the same time, demonstrate the understanding 
 of Congress to have been, that, although the relations between the 
 two countries were greatly disturbed, yet that war did not exist. 
 On the same day (May 28, 1798) in which this act passed, on 
 which the member from New York lays so much stress, as proving 
 the actual existence of war with France, Congress passed another 
 act, entided "An act authorizing the President of the United 
 States to raise a provisional army ; " and the first section declared, 
 that the President should be audiorized, " in the event of a decla- 
 ration of tear against the United States, or of actual invasion 
 over their territorij, hy a foreign poiver, or of imminent dan- 
 ger of such invasion, to cause to be enlisted," &ic., ten thou- 
 sand men. 
 
 On the 16th of July following. Congress passed the law for 
 augmenting the army, the second section of which authorized the 
 President to raise twelve additional regiments of infantry, and six 
 troops of light dragoons, " to be enlisted for and dining the contin- 
 uance of the existing differences hetivecn the United States and 
 the French Republic, unless sooner discharged," Sic. 
 
 VOL. II. 57 
 
450 
 
 The following spring, by the act of the 2d March, 1799, entitled 
 " An act giving eventual authority to the President of the United 
 States to augment the army," Congress provided that it should be 
 lawful for the President of the United States, in case war should 
 break out heticecn the United States and a foreign European 
 power, &,c., to raise twenty -four regiments of infantry, he. And 
 in the act for better organizing the army, passed the next day, 
 Congress repeats the declaration contained in a former act, that 
 certain provisions shall not take effect unless war shall break out 
 between the United States and some European prince, potentate, 
 or state. 
 
 On the 20th of February, 1800, an act was passed to suspend 
 the act for augmenting the army, and this last act declared, that 
 further enlistments should be suspended until the further order of 
 Congress, unless, in the recess of Congress, and during the contin- 
 uance of the existing differences between the United States and 
 the French Republic, ivar should break out between the United 
 States and the French Republic, or imminent danger of invasion 
 of their territory by the said republic, should be discovered. 
 
 On the I4th of May, 1800, four months before the conclusion 
 of the treaty, Congress passed an act authorizing the suspension of 
 military appointments, and the discharge of troops raised under the 
 provisions of the previous laws. No commentary is necessary, Sir, 
 on the texts of these statutes, to show that Congress never recog- 
 nized the existence of war between the United States and France. 
 They apprehended war might break out; and they made suitable 
 provision for that exigency, should it occur ; but it is quite impos- 
 sible to reconcile the express and so often repeated declarations of 
 these statutes, commencing in 1798, running through 1799, and 
 ending in 1800, with the actual existence of war between the two 
 countiies, at any period within those years. 
 
 The honorable member's second principal source of argument, 
 to make out the fact of a state of war, is the several non-intercourse 
 acts. And here, again, it seems to me, an exactly opposite infer- 
 ence is the true one. In 1798, 1799, and 1800, acts of Congress 
 were passed, suspending the commercial intercourse between the 
 United States and France, each for one year. Did any govern- 
 ment ever pass a law of temporary non-intercourse with a pul^lic 
 enemy? Such a law would be little less than an absurdity. War itself 
 effectually creates non-intercourse. It renders all trade with the 
 enemy illegal, and of course subjects all vessels found so engaged, 
 with their cargoes, to capture and condemnation, as enemy's prop- 
 erty. The first of these law^s was passed June 13th, 1798; the 
 last, February 27, 1800. Will the honorable member from New 
 York tell us when the war commenced ? When did it break out ? 
 When did those " differences," of which the acts of Congress 
 
451 
 
 speak, assume a character of general hostility ? Was there a state 
 of war on the 13th of June, 1798, when Congress passed the first 
 non-intercourse act ? and did Congress, in a state of puhlic war, 
 limit non-intercourse with the enemy to one year ? Or was there 
 a state of peace, in June, 1798 ? And if so, I ask again, At what 
 time, after that period, and hefore September, 1800, did the war 
 break out ? Difficulties of no small magnitude surround the gen- 
 tleman, I think, whatever course he takes through these statutes, 
 while he attempts to prove from them a state of war. The truth 
 is, they prove, incontestably, a state of peace ; a state of endan- 
 gered, disturbed, agitated peace; but still a state of peace. Find- 
 ing themselves in a state of great misunderstanding and contention 
 with France, and seeing our commerce a daily prey to the rapacity 
 of her cruisers, the United States preferred non-intercourse to war. 
 This is the ground of the non-intercourse acts. Apprehending, 
 nevertheless, that war might break out. Congress made prudent 
 provision for it, by augmenting the military force of the country. 
 This is the ground of the laws for raising a provisional army. The 
 entire provisions of all these laws necessarily suppose an existing 
 state of peace ; but they imply also an apprehension that war 
 might commence. For a state of actual war they were all un- 
 suited ; and some of them would have been, in such a state, pre- 
 posterous and absurd. To a state of present peace, but disturbed, 
 interrupted, and likely to terminate in open hostilities, they were 
 all perfectly well adapted. And as many of these acts, in express 
 terms, speak of war as not actually existing, but as likely or 
 liable to break out, it is clear, beyond all reasonable question, 
 that Congress never, at any time, regarded the state of things 
 existing between the United States and France as being a state 
 of war. 
 
 As little did the Executive Government so regard it, as must 
 be apparent from the instructions given to our ministers, when the 
 mission was sent to France. Those instructions, having recurred 
 to the numerous acts of wrong committed on the commerce of the 
 United States, and the refusal of indemnity by the Government of 
 France, proceed to say — "This conduct of the French Republic 
 would well have justified an immediate declaration of wai* on the 
 part of the United States; but, desirous of maintaining peace, and 
 still ivilling to leave open the door of reconciliation with France, 
 the United States contented themselves wuh preparations for de- 
 fence, and measures calculated to protect their commerce." 
 
 It is equally clear, on the other hand, that neither the French 
 Government, nor the French ministers, acted on the supposition 
 that war had existed between the two nations. And it was for 
 this reason that they held the treaties of 1778 still binding. Within 
 a month or two of the signature of the treaty, the ministers plcni- 
 
452 
 
 potentlary of the French Repubh'c write thus to INIessrs. Ellsworth, 
 Davie, and Murray : " In the first place, they will insist upon the 
 principle already laid down in dieir former note, viz. that the 
 treaties which united France and the United States are not broken ; 
 that even war could not have broken diem ; but that the state of 
 misunderstanding which has existed for some time between France 
 and the United States, by the act of some agents, rather than by 
 the will of the respective Governments, has not been a state of 
 war, at least on the side of France." 
 
 Finally, Sir, the treaty itself — what is it ? It is not called a 
 treaty of peace ; it does not provide for putting an end to hostili- 
 ties. It says not one word of any preceding war ; but it does say 
 that " differences " have arisen between the two states, and that 
 they have therefore respecdvely appointed their plenipotentiaries, 
 and given them full powers to treat upon those "differences," and 
 to terminate the same. 
 
 But the second article of the treaty, as negotiated and agreed 
 on by the ministers of both Governments, is, of itself, a complete 
 refutation of the whole argument which is urged against this bill, 
 on the ground that the claims had been extinguished by war; 
 since that article distinctly and expressly acknowledges the exist- 
 ence of the claims, and contains a solemn pledge that the two 
 Governments, not being able to agree on them at present, will ne- 
 gotiate further on them, at convenient time thereafter. Whether 
 we look, then, to the decisions of the American courts, to the acts 
 of Congress, to the instructions of the American Executive Gov- 
 ernment, to the language of our ministers, to the declarations of 
 the French Government, and the French ministers, or to the un- 
 equivocal language of the treaty itself, as originally agreed to, we 
 meet irresistible proof of the truth of the declaration, that the state 
 of misunderstanding which had existed between the two countries 
 was not war. 
 
 If the treaty had remained as the ministers on both sides agreed 
 upon it, the claimants, though their indemnity was postponed, 
 would have had no just claim on their own Government. But 
 the treaty did not remain in -this state. This second article was 
 stricken out by the Senate ; and in order to see the obvious motive 
 of the Senate, in thus striking out the second article, allow me to 
 read the whole article. It is in these words : — 
 
 "The ministers plenipotentiary of the two parties, not being 
 able to agree, at present, respecting the treaty of alliance of the 
 Gth of February, 1778, the treaty of amity and commerce, of 
 the same date, and the convention of the 14th of November, 1788, 
 nor upon the indemnities mutually due or claimed, the parties will 
 negotiate further on these subjects at a convenient time ; and until 
 
453 
 
 they may have agreed upon these points, the said treaties and 
 convention shall have no operation, and the relations of the two 
 countries shall be regulated as Mows." 
 
 The article thus stipulating to make the claims of France, under 
 the old treaties, matter of further negotiation, in order to get rid 
 of such negotiation, and the whole subject, the Senate struck out 
 the entire article, and ratified the treaty in this corrected form. 
 France ratified the treaty, as thus amended, whh the further dec- 
 laration, that, by thus retrenching the second article, the two na- 
 tions renounce the rcsppctke pretensions ichich were the object of 
 the article. In this declaration of the French Government, the 
 Senate afterwards acquiesced ; so that the Government of France, 
 by this retrenchment, agreed to renounce her claims, under the 
 treaties of 1778, and the United States, in hke manner, renounced 
 the claims of their citizens, for indemnities due to them. 
 
 And this proves. Sir, the second proposition which I stated, at the 
 commencement of my remarks, viz. that these claims were re- 
 leased, relinquished, or extinguished by the amendment of the 
 treaty, and its ratification, as amended. It is only necessary to 
 add, on this point, that these claims for captures, before 1800, 
 would have been good claims under the late treaty with France, 
 and would have come in for a dividend in the fund provided by 
 that treaty, if they had not been released by the tJ-eaty of 1800. 
 And they are now excluded from all participation in the benefit 
 of the late treaty, because of such release or extinguishment by 
 that of 1800. 
 
 In the third place, Sir, it is to be proved, if it be not proved 
 already, that these claims were surrendered, or released, by the 
 Government of the United States, on national considerations, and 
 for objects in which these claimants had no more interest than any 
 other citizens. 
 
 Now, Sir, I do not feel called on to make out, that the claims 
 and complaints of France against the Government of the United 
 States were well founded. It is certain, that she put forth such 
 claims and complaints, and insisted on them to the end. It is cer- 
 tain, that, by the treaty of alliance of 1778, the United States did 
 guaranty to France her West India possessions. It is certain, that, 
 by the treaty of commerce of the same date, the United States 
 stipulated that French vessels of war might bring their prizes into 
 the ports of the United States, and that the enemies of France 
 should not enjoy that privilege ; and it is certain, that France con- 
 tended that the United States had plainly violated this article, as 
 well by their subsequent treaty with England as by other acts of 
 the Government. For the violation of these treaties, she claimed 
 indemnity from the Government of the United States. Without 
 
454 
 
 admitting the justice of these pretensions, tlie Government of the 
 United States found them extremely embarrassing, and they au- 
 thorized our ministers in France to huy them off by money. 
 
 For the purpose of showing the justice of the present bill, it is 
 not necessary to insist that France was right in these pretensions. 
 Right or wrong, the United States were anxious to get rid of the 
 embarrassments which they occasioned. They were willing to 
 compromise the matter. The existing state of things, then, was 
 exacdy this : — 
 
 France admitted that citizens of the United States had just 
 claims against her ; but she insisted that she, on the other hand, 
 had just claims against the Government of the United States. 
 
 She would not satisfy our citizens till our Government agreed 
 to satisfy her. Finally, a treaty is ratified, by which the claims on 
 both sides are renounced. 
 
 The only question is, whether the relinquishment of these indi- 
 vidual claims was the price which the United States paid for the 
 relinquishment, by France, of her claims against our Government. 
 And who can doubt it ? Look to the negotiation. The claims on 
 both sides were discussed together. Look to the second article of 
 the treaty, as originally agreed to. The claims on both sides are 
 there reserved together ; and look to the Senate's amendment, and 
 to the subsequent declaration of the French Government, acquiesced 
 In by the Senate ; and there the claims on both sides are renounced 
 together. What stronger proof could there be of mutuality of con- 
 sideration ? Sir, allow me to put this direct question to the honor- 
 able member from New York. If the United States did not agree 
 to renounce these claims, in consideration that France would re- 
 nounce hers, what ivas the reason why they surrendered thus the 
 claims of their own clnzens ? Did they do it without any con- 
 sideration at all ? Was the surrender wholly gratuitous .'' Did they 
 thus solemnly renounce claims for indemnity, so just, so long in- 
 sisted on by themselves, the object of two special missions, the 
 subjects of so much previous controversy, and at one time so near 
 being the cause of open war — did the Government surrender and 
 renounce them gratuitously, or for nothing ? Had it no reasonable 
 motive In the relinquishment.'' Sir, it is Impossible to maintain 
 any such ground. 
 
 And, on the other hand, let me ask. Was it for nothing that 
 France relinquished, what she had so long insisted on, the obliga- 
 tion of the United States to fulfil the treaties of 1778 } For the 
 extinguishment of this obligation we had already offered her a large 
 sum of money, which she had declined. Was she now willing to 
 give up, without any equivalent ? 
 
 Sir, the whole history of the negotiation is full of proof that the 
 
455 
 
 individual claims of our citizens, and the Government claims of 
 France against the United States, constituted the respective de- 
 mands of the two parties. They were brought forward together, 
 discussed together, insisted on together. The French ministers 
 would never consent to disconnect them. While they admitted, 
 in the fullest manner, the claims on our side, they maintained, with 
 persevering resolution, the claims on the side of France. It would 
 fatigue the Senate were I to go through the whole correspondence, 
 and show, as I could easily do, that, in every stage of the negotia- 
 tion, tliese two subjects were kept together. I will only refer to 
 some of the more prominent and decisive parts. 
 
 In the first place, the general instructions which our ministers 
 received from our own Government, when they undertook the 
 mission, directed them to insist on the claims of American citizens 
 against France — to propose a joint board of commissioners — to 
 state those claims — and to agree to refer the complaints of France, 
 for infringements of the treaty of commerce, to the same board. 
 I will read. Sir, so much of the instructions as comprehend 
 these points. 
 
 " First. At the opening of the negotiation, you will inform the 
 French ministers, that the United States expect from France, as 
 an indispensable condition of the treaty, a stipulation to make to 
 the citizens of the United States full compensation for all losses 
 and damages which they shall have sustained by reason of irregular 
 or illegal captures or condemnations of their vessels and other 
 property, under color of authority or commissions from the French 
 Republic or its agents. And all captures and condemnations are 
 deemed irregular or illegal, when contrary to the law of nations, 
 generally received and acknowledged in Europe, and to the stipula- 
 tions in the treaty of amity and commerce, of the sixth of Febru- 
 ary, 1778, fairly and ingenuously interpreted, while that treaty re- 
 mained in force. 
 
 " Second, If these preliminaries should be satisfactorily ar- 
 ranged, then, for the purpose of examining and adjusting all the 
 claims of our citizens, it will be necessary to provide for the ap- 
 pointment of a board of commissioners, similar to that described in 
 the sixth and seventh articles of the treaty of amity and commerce 
 between the United States and Great Britain. 
 
 " As the French Government have heretofore complained of 
 infringements of the treaty of amity and commerce by the United 
 States, or their citizens, all claims for injuries, thereby occasioned, 
 to France or its citizens, are to be submitted to the same board ; 
 and ivhatever damages they award, will be ,alloived by the United 
 States, and deducted from the sums awarded to be paid by 
 France.'' 
 
456 
 
 Now, Sir, suppose this board had been constituted, and suppose 
 that it had made awards against France, in behalf of citizens of the 
 United States, and had made awards also in favor of the Govern- 
 ment of France against the Government of the United States ; and 
 then these last awards had been deducted from the amount of the 
 former, and the property of citizens thus applied to discharge the 
 public obligations of the country, — would any body doubt that such 
 citizens would be entitled to indemnity ? And are they less en- 
 titled, because, instead of being first liquidated and ascertained, 
 and then set off, one against the other, they are finally agreed 
 to be set off against each other, and mutually relinquished in 
 the lump ? 
 
 Acting upon their instructions, it will be seen that the American 
 ministers made an actual offer to suspend the claim for indemni- 
 ties, till France should be satisfied as to her political rights under 
 the treaties. On the 15th of July, they made this proposition to 
 the French negotiators : — 
 
 " Indemnities to be ascertained, and secured, in the manner pro- 
 posed in our project of a treaty, but not to be paid until the United 
 States shall have offered to France an article stipulating free ad- 
 mission, in the ports of each, for the privateers and prizes of the 
 other, to the exclusion of their enemies." 
 
 This, it will be at once seen, was a direct offer to suspend the 
 claims of our own citizens, till our Government should be willing 
 to renew to France the obligation of the treaty of 1778. Was 
 not this an offer to make use of private property for public pur- 
 poses .'' 
 
 On the eleventh of August, the French plenipotentiaries thus 
 write to the ministers of the United States : — 
 
 " The propositions which the French ministers have the honor 
 to communicate to the ministers plenipotentiary of the United 
 States, are reduced to this simple alternative : — 
 
 " Either the ancient treaties, with the privileges resulting from 
 priority, and a stipulation of reciprocal indemnities ; 
 
 " Or a new treaty, assuring equality, without indemnity.^' 
 
 In other words, this offer is, "If you will acknowledge or renew 
 the obligation of the old treaties, which secure to us privileges in 
 your ports, which our enemies are not to enjoy, then we will make 
 indemnities for the losses of your citizens ; or, if you will give up 
 all claim for such indemnities, then we will relinquish our especial 
 privileges, under the former treaties, and agree to a new treaty, 
 
457 
 
 which shall only put us on a footing of equality with Great Britain, 
 our enemy." 
 
 On the 20th of August, our ministers propose, that the former 
 treaties, so far as they respect the rights of privateers, shall be re- 
 newed, but that it shall be optional whh the United States, by the 
 payment, widiin seven years, of three millions of francs, either in 
 money or in securities issued by the French Government for in- 
 demnities to our citizens, to buy off this obligation, or to buy off 
 all its polidcal obligations, under both the old treaties, by pay- 
 ments in like manner otfive millions of francs. 
 
 On the 4th of September, the French ministers submit these 
 propositions : — 
 
 " A commission shall regulate the indemnities, which either of 
 the two nations may owe to the citizens of the other. 
 
 " The indemnides which shall be due by France to the citizens 
 of the United States shall be paid for by the United States, (md in 
 return for which France yields the exclusive privilege resulting 
 from the 17th and 22d articles of the treaty of commerce, and 
 from the rights of guaranty of the Wth article of the treaty of 
 alliance.'''' 
 
 The American ministers considered these propositions as inad- 
 missible. They, however, on their part, made an approach to 
 them, by proposing in substance, that it should be left optional with 
 the United States, on the exchange of the ratification, to relinquish 
 the indemnides, and in that case, the old treaties not to be obliga- 
 tory on the United States, so far as they conferred exclusive priv- 
 ileges on France. This will be seen in the letter of the American 
 ministers of the 5th of September. 
 
 On the 18th of September, the American ministers say to those 
 of France — 
 
 " It remains only to consider the expediency of a temporary 
 arrangement. Should such an arrangement comport with the 
 views of France, the following principles are offered as the basis 
 of it : — 
 
 " 1st. The ministers plenipotentiary of the respective parties, 
 not being able at present to agree respecting the former treaties 
 and indemnities, the parties will, in due and convenient time, fur- 
 ther treat on those subjects ; and until tliey shall have agreed re- 
 specting the same, the said treaties shall have no operation." 
 
 This, the Senate will see, is substantially the proposition which 
 was ultimately accepted, and which formed the second article of 
 the treaty. By that article, these claims, on both sides, were post- 
 voL. II. 58 
 
458 
 
 poned for the present ; and afterwards, by other acts of the two 
 Governments, they were mutually and forever renounced and re- 
 linquished. 
 
 And now. Sir, if any gentleman can look to the treaty, look to 
 the instructions under which it was concluded, look to the corre- 
 spondence which preceded it, and look to the subsequent agreement 
 of the two Governments to renounce claims, on both sides, and not 
 admit that the property of these private citizens has been taken to 
 buy off embarrassing claims of France on the Government of tlie 
 United States, I know not what other or further evidence could 
 ever force that conviction on his mind. 
 
 I will conclude this part of the case, by showing you how this 
 matter was understood by the American Administration, which final- 
 ly accepted tlie treaty, with this i-enouncement of indemnities. 
 The treaty was negotiated in the administration of Mr. Adams. 
 It was amended in the Senate, as already stated, and ratified on 
 the third day of February, 1801, Mr. Adams being still in office. 
 Being thus ratified, with the amendment, it was sent back to France, 
 and on the 31st day of July, the First Consul ratified the treaty, as 
 amended, by striking out the second article, but accompanied the 
 ratification with this declaration — "Provided that by this re- 
 trenchment THE two states RENOUNCE THEIR RESPECTIVE 
 PRETENSIONS, WHICH ARE THE OBJECT OF THE SAID AR- 
 TICLE." 
 
 With diis declaration appended, the treaty came back to the 
 United States. Mr. Jefferson had now become President, and 
 Mr. Madison was Secretary of State. In consequence of the dec- 
 laration of the French Government, accompanying its ratification 
 of the treaty, and now attached to it, Mr. Jefferson again referred 
 the treaty to the Senate, and, on tlie 19th of December, 1801, 
 the Senate resolved that they considered the treaty as duly ratified. 
 Now, Sir, in order to show what Mr. Jefferson and his adminis- 
 tration thought of this treaty, and the effect of its ratification, in its 
 then existing form, 1 beg leave to read an extract of an official 
 letter from Mr. Madison to Mr. Pinkney, then our minister in 
 Spain. Mr. Pinkney was at that time negotiating for the adjust- 
 ment of our claims on Spain ; and, among others, for captures com- 
 mitted within the temtories of Spain, by French subjects. Spain 
 objected to these claims, on the ground that the United States had 
 claimed redress of such injuries from France. In writing to Mr. 
 Pinkney (under date of Feb. 6, 1804), and commenting on this 
 plea of Spain, Mr. JMadison says — " The ])\ea on which it seems 
 the Spanish Government now principally relies, is the erasure of 
 the second article from our late convention with France, by which 
 France was released from the indemnities due for spoliations com- 
 mitted under her immediate responsibility to the United States. 
 
459 
 
 This plea did not appear in tlie early objections of Spain to our 
 claims. It was an aCter-th.ougbt, resulting from the insufficiency 
 of every other plea, and is certainly as little valid as any other. 
 
 " The injuries for which indemnities are claimed from Spain, 
 though committed by Frenchmen, took place under Spanish au- 
 thority ; Spain therefore is answerable for them. To her we have 
 looked, and continue to look, for redress. If the injuries done to 
 us by her resulted in any manner from injuries done to her by 
 France, she may, if she pleases, resort to France as we resort to 
 her. But whether her resort to France would be just or unjust, is 
 a question between her and France ; not between either her and us, 
 or us and France. We claim against her, not against France. In 
 releasing France, therefore, we have not released her. The claims, 
 again, from which France was released, were admitted by France, 
 and the release was for a valuable consideration in a correspondent 
 release of the United States from certain claims on them. The 
 claims we make on Spain were never admitted by France, nor 
 made on France by the United States ; they made, therefore, no 
 part of the bargain with her, and could not be included in the re- 
 lease." 
 
 Certainly, Sir, words could not have been used which should 
 more clearly affirm that these individual claims, these private rights 
 of property, had been applied to public uses. Mr. Madison here 
 declares, unequivocally, that these claims had been admitted by 
 France ; that they were relinquished by the Government of the 
 United States ; that they were relinquished for a valuable consid- 
 eration ; diat that consideration was a correspondent release of the 
 United States from certain claims on them ; and that the whole 
 transaction was a bargain between the two Governments. This, 
 Sir, be it remembered, was little more than two years after the 
 final promulgation of the treaty ; it was by the Secretary of State, 
 under that administration which gave effect to the treaty in its 
 amended form ; and it proves beyond mistake, and beyond doubt, 
 the clear judgment which that administration had formed upon die 
 ti-ue nature and character of the whole transaction. 
 
 I have said nothing, Sir, of the Louisiana treaty, because neither 
 that treaty, nor any thing done under it, affects this question in the 
 slightest degree. Great mistakes, I am aware, have existed on 
 this point. The honorable member from New York (Mr. Wright) 
 candidly acknowledged that he himself had partaken in this misap- 
 prehension ; but as he, and others who have opposed the bill, ad- 
 mit that the Louisiana treaty is not connected with this subject at 
 all, I will not detain the Senate with remarks upon it. Suffice it 
 to say, that the demands, provided for by that treaty, were only 
 certain debts, arising in contract, or due for detention of vessels by 
 
460 
 
 embargo, and for certain vessels, not condemned at the date of the 
 treaty of 1800, and tliat none of them arose from illegal captures 
 and condemnations. And the Senate will see, that, to avoid all 
 ambiguity on that point, this bill expressly excludes from its pro- 
 visions all claims which were paid, in whole or in part, under that 
 treaty. 
 
 It only remains to show the reasonableness of the amount which 
 the bill proposes to distribute. And this, it must be admitted, can 
 only be fixed by estimate, and this estimate may be formed in va- 
 rious ways. So far as can be learned from official reports, there 
 are something more than six hundred vessels, with their cargoes, 
 which will be supposed to form claims under this bill. Some of 
 them, it is probable, may not be good claims ; but a very great ma- 
 jority of that number will be, no doubt, just and fair cases. 
 
 Then, the question is, What may be regarded as a just average 
 value of each vessel and cargo? And this question is answered, in 
 a manner as satisfactory as the nature of the case allows. By ascer- 
 taining the average value of vessels and cargoes, for which com- 
 pensation has been awarded under the treaty with Spain. That 
 average was 16,800 dollars for each vessel and cargo; and, taking 
 the cases coming under this bill to be of the same average value, 
 the whole amount of loss would exceed ten millions of dollars, 
 without interest. 
 
 On this estimate, it seems not unreasonable to allow the sum of 
 five millions, in full satisfaction for all claims. There is no ground 
 to suppose that the claimants will receive, out of this sum, a great- 
 er rate of indemnity than claimants have received who had claims 
 against Spain, or than other claimants against France, whose claims 
 have not been relinquished, because arising since 1800, will receive, 
 under the provisions of the late French treaty. 
 
 Mr. President, I have performed the duty of explaining this case 
 to the Senate, as I understand it. I believe the claims to be as 
 just as were ever presented to any government. I think they 
 constitute an honest and well-founded debt, due by the United 
 States to these claimants — a debt which, I am persuaded, the 
 justice of the Government, and the justice of the country, will, one 
 day, both acknowledge and honorably discharge. 
 
SPEECH 
 
 ON THE APPOINTING AND REMOVING POWER, DELIVERED IN THE 
 SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, ON THE IGTH OF FEBRUARY, 
 1833, ON THE PASSAGE OF THE BILL ENTITLED "AN ACT TO 
 REPEAL THE FIRST AND SECOND SECTIONS OF THE ACT TO 
 LBHT THE TERM OF SERVICE OF CERTAIN OFFICERS THEREIN 
 NA3IED." 
 
 Mr. Webster said, the professed object of this bill was the 
 reduction of executive influence and patronage. I concur (said 
 Mr. Webster) in the propriety of that object. Having no wish to 
 diminish or to control, in the slightest degree, the Constitutional and 
 legal authority of the presidential office, I yet think that the indi- 
 rect and vastly-increasing influence which it possesses, and which 
 arises from the power of bestowing office, and of taking it away 
 again at pleasure, and from the manner in which that power seems 
 now to be systematically exercised, is producdve of serious evils. 
 
 The extent of the patronage, springing from this power of ap- 
 pointment and removal, is so great, that it brings a dangerous 
 mass of private and personal interest into operation in all great 
 public elections and public questions. This is a mischief which 
 has reached, already, an alarming height. The principle of re- 
 publican governments, we are taught, is public virtue ; and whatever 
 tends either to corrupt this principle, to debase it, or to weaken its 
 force, tends, in the same degree, to the final overthrow of such 
 governments. Our representative systems suppose, that, in exer- 
 cising the high right of suffi-age, the greatest of all political rights, 
 and in forming opinions on great public measures, men will act 
 conscientiously, under the influence of public principle and patri- 
 otic duty ; and that, in supporting or opposing men or measures, 
 there will be a general prevalence of honest, intelligent judgment 
 and manly independence. These presumptions he at the founda- 
 tion of all hope of maintaining governments entirely popular. 
 Whenever personal, individual, or selfish motives influence the 
 conduct of individuals on public questions, they affect the safety of 
 the whole system. When these motives run deep and wide, and 
 come in serious conflict with higher, purer, and more patriotic pur- 
 poses, they greatly endanger that system ; and all will admit that, 
 if their extent become general and overwhelming, so that ail public 
 
 \ 
 
462 
 
 principle is lost sight of, and every election becomes a mere 
 scramble for office, the system inevitably must fall. Every wise 
 man, in and out of government, will endeavor, therefore, to promote 
 the ascendency of public virtue and public principle, and to re- 
 strain, as far as practicable, in the actual operation of our institutions, 
 the influence of selfish and private interests. 
 
 I concur with those who think, that, looking to the present, and 
 looking also to the future, and regarding all the probabiliues of 
 what is before us, as to the qualities which shall belong to those 
 who may fill the executive chair, it is important to the stability of 
 Government, and the welfare of the people, that there should be a 
 check to the progress of official influence and patronage. The 
 unlimited power to grant office, and to take it away, gives a com- 
 mand over the hopes and fears of a vast multitude of men. It is 
 generally true, that he who controls another man's means of living, 
 controls his will. Where there are favors to be granted, there are 
 usually enough to solicit for them ; and when favors, once granted, 
 may be withdrawn at pleasure, there is ordinarily little security for 
 personal independence of character. The power of giving office 
 thus affects the fears of all who are in, and the hopes of all who^ 
 are out. Those who are out endeavor to distinguish themselves 
 by active political friendship, by warm personal devotion, by clam- 
 orous support of men in whose hands is the power of reward ; 
 while those who are in ordinarily take care that others shall not 
 surpass them in such qualities, or such conduct, as is most likely 
 to secure favor. They resolve not to be outdone in any of the 
 works of partisanship. The consequence of all this is obvious. 
 A competition ensues — not of patriotic labors ; not of rough and 
 severe toils for the public good ; not of manliness, independence, 
 and public spirit — but of complaisance, of indiscriminate support 
 of executive measures, of pliant subserviency and gross adulation. 
 All throng and rush together to the altar of man-worship ; and 
 there they offer sacrifices, and pour out libations, till the thick fumes 
 of their incense turn their own heads, and turn, also, the head of 
 him who is the object of their idolatry. 
 
 The existence of parties in popular governments is not to be 
 avoided ; and if they are formed on Constitutional questions, or in 
 regard to great measures of public policy, and do not run to exces- 
 sive length, it may be admitted that, on the whole, they do no^ 
 great harm. But the patronage of office, the power of bestowing 
 place and emoluments, creates parties, not upon any principle, or 
 any measure, but upon the single ground of personal interest. 
 Under the direct influence of this motive, they form round a leader, 
 and they go for " the spoils of victory." And if the party chief- 
 tain becomes the national chieftain, he is still but too apt to con- 
 sider all who have opposed him as enemies to be punished, and 
 
463 
 
 all who have supported him as friends to be rewarded. Blind 
 devotion to party, and to the head of a party, thus takes place of 
 tlie sentiments of generous patriotism and a high and exalted sense^ 
 
 of public duty. 
 
 Let it not be said, Sir, that the danger from executive patronage 
 cannot be great, since the persons who hold office, or can hold 
 office, consdtute so small a portion of the whole people. 
 
 In the first place, it is to be remembered that patronage acts, 
 not only on those who actually possess office, but on those also 
 who expect it, or hope for it ; and in the next place, office-holders, 
 by their very situation, their public station, their connection with 
 the business of individuals, dieir activity, their ability to help or to 
 hurt according to their pleasure, their acquaintance with public 
 affairs, and their zeal and devotion, exercise a degree of influence 
 out of all proportion to their numbers. 
 
 Sir, we cannot disregard our own experience. We cannot shut 
 our eyes to what is around us and upon us. No candid man can 
 deny that a great, a very great change has taken place, within a 
 few years, in the practice of the executive government, which 
 has produced a corresponding change in our polidcal condition. 
 No one can deny that office, of every kind, is now sought with 
 extraordinary avidity, and that the condition, well understood to be 
 attached to every officer, high or low, is indiscriminate support pf 
 executive measures, and implicit obedience to executive will. 
 For these reasons. Sir, I am for arresfing the further progress of 
 this executive patronage, if we can arrest it. I am for staying the 
 further contagion of this plague. 
 
 The bill proposes two measures. One is to alter the duration 
 of certain offices, now limited absolutely to four years ; so that the 
 limitation shall be qualified or conditional. If the officer is in de- 
 fault ; if his accounts are not setded ; if he retains or misapplies the 
 public money, — information is to be given thereof, and thereupon 
 his commission is to cease. But if his accounts are all regularly 
 settled ; if he collects and disburses the public money faithfully, — 
 then he is to remain in office, unless, for some other cause, the 
 President sees fit to remove him. This is the provision of the bill. 
 It applies only to certain enumerated officers, who may be called 
 accounting officers ; that is to say, officers who receive and dis- 
 burse the public money. Formerly, all these officers held their 
 places at the pleasure of the President. If he saw no just cause 
 for removing them, they continued in their situations, no fixed 
 period being assigned for the expiration of their commissions. But 
 the act of 1820 limited the commissions of these officers to four 
 years. At the end of four years, they went out, without any 
 removal, however well they may have conducted, or however 
 useful to the public their furdier continuance in office might be. 
 
464 
 
 They might be nominated again, or might not ; but their commis- 
 sions expired. 
 
 Now, Sir, I freely admit that considerable benefit has arisen 
 from this law, I agree that it has, in some instances, secured 
 promptitude, diligence, and a sense of responsibility. These were 
 the benefits which those who passed the law expected from it ; 
 and these benefits have, in some measure, been realized. But I 
 think that this change in the tenure of office, together with some 
 good, has brought along a far more than equivalent amount of evil. 
 By the operation of this law, the President can deprive a man of 
 office without taking the responsibility of removbg him. The 
 law itself vacates the office, and gives the means of rewarding a 
 friend without the exercise of the power of removal at all. Here 
 is increased power, with diminished responsibility. Here is a still 
 greater dependence, for the means of living, on executive favor, 
 and of course a new dominion acquired over opinion and over con- 
 duct. The power of removal is, or at least formerly was, a sus- 
 pected and odious power. Public opinion would not always toler- 
 ate it ; and still less frequently did it approve it. Something of 
 character, something of the respect of the intelligent and patriotic 
 part of the community, was lost by every instance of its unnecessary 
 exercise. This was some restraint. But the law of 1820 took it all 
 away. It vacated offices periodically, by its own operation, and 
 thus added to the power of removal, which it left still existing in 
 full force, a new and extraordinary facility for the extension of pat- 
 ronage, influence, and favoridsm. 
 
 I would ask every member of the Senate, if he does not perceive, 
 daily, efi:ects which may be fairly traced to this cause. Does he 
 not see a union of purpose, a devotion to power, a cooperation 
 in action, among all who hold office, quite unknown in the earlier 
 periods of the Government .'' Does he not behold, every hour, a 
 stronger developement of the principle of personal attachment, and 
 a corresponding diminution of genuine and generous public feeling ? 
 Was indiscriminate support of measures, was unwavering fealty, 
 was regular suit and service ever before esteemed such important 
 and essential parts of official duty ? 
 
 Sir, the theory of our institutions is plain : it is, that Govern- 
 ment is an agency, created for the good of the people ; and that 
 every person in office is the agent and servant of the people. 
 Offices are created, not for the benefit of those who are to fill them, 
 but for the public convenience ; and they ought to be no more in 
 number, nor should higher salaries be attached to them, than the 
 public service requires. This is the theory. But the difficulty in 
 jractice is, to prevent a direct reversal of all this ; to prevent pub- 
 ic offices from being considered as intended for the use and emol- 
 ument of those V. ho can obtain them. There is a headlong ten- 
 
4.65 i 
 
 dency to this, and it is necessary to restrain it by wise and effec- ;; 
 live legislation. There is still another, and perhaps a greatly more , 
 mischievous result, from extensive patronage in the hands of a sin- 
 gle magistrate, and to which I 'have already incidentally alluded ; ] 
 and that is, that men in office have begun to think themselves ' i 
 mere agents and servants of the appointing power, and not agents ] 
 of the Government or the country. It is, in an especial manner, j 
 important, if it be practicable, to apply some corrective to this kind I 
 of feeling and opinion. It is necessary to bring back public officers \ j 
 /ito the conviction that they belong to the country, and not to anyy 
 *\ administration, nor to any one man. ^ j 
 
 The army is the army of the country ; the navy is the navy of y^y^nytxyf^, 
 
 the country ; neidier of them is either the mere instrument of the ' ■ 
 
 administi-ation for the time being, or of him who is at the head of j 
 it. The post-office, the land-office, the custom-house, are, in ; i 
 
 like manner, institutions of the country, established for the good j 
 
 of the people ; and it may well alarm the lovers of free institutions, ) 
 
 when all the offices in these several departments are spoken of, in | 
 
 high places, as being but " spoils of victory," to be enjoyed by ; 
 
 those who are successful in a contest, in which they profess this ' 
 grasping of the spoils to have been the object of their efforts. 
 
 This part of the bill, therefore, Sir, is a subject for fair compar- ■ 
 
 ison. We have gained something, doubtless, by limiting the com- '. 
 
 missions of these officers to four years. But have we gained as '. 
 
 much as we have lost.'' And may not the good be preserved, and ' 
 
 the evil still avoided.'' Is it not enough to say, that if, at the end ] 
 
 of four years, moneys are retained, accounts unsettled, or other ; 
 duties unperformed, the office shall be held to be vacated, without 
 
 any positive act of removal ? \ 
 
 For one, I think the balance of advantage is decidedly in favor 
 of the present bill. I think it will make men more dependent on i 
 their own good conduct, and less dependent on the will of others. * 
 I believe it will cause them to regard their country more, their own ■ 
 duty more, and the favor of individuals less. I think it will con- , 
 tribute to official respectability, to freedom of opinion, to independ- i 
 ence of character ; and I think it will tend, in no small degree, to | 
 prevent the mixture of selfish and personal motives with the ex- 
 ercise of high political duties. It will promote true and genuine ! 
 republicanism, by causing the opinion of the people, respecting the i 
 measures of Government, and the men in Government, to be ' 
 formed and expressed without fear or favor, and with a more en- . 
 tire regard to their true and real merits or demerits. It will be, ! 
 so far as its effects reach, an auxiliary to patriotism and public vir- 1 
 tue, in their warfare against selfishness and cupidity. I 
 
 The second check on executive patronage, contained in this ! 
 
 bill, is of still greater importance than the first. This provision is, j 
 VOL. II. 59 
 
466 
 
 that, whenever the President removes any of these officers from 
 office, he shall state to the Senate the reasons for such removal. 
 This part of the bill has been opposed, both on Constitutional 
 grounds and on grounds of expediency. 
 
 The bill, it is to be observed, expressly recognizes and admits 
 the actual existence of the power of removal. I do not mean to 
 deny, and the bill does not deny, that, at the present moment, the 
 President may remove these officers at will, because the early de- 
 cision adopted that construction, and the laws have since, uniformly, 
 sanctioned it. 
 
 The law of 1820, intended to be repealed by this bill, expressly 
 affirms the power. I consider it, therefore, a setded point ; set- 
 tled by construction, settled by precedent, setded by the practice 
 of the Government, and settled by statute. At the same time, I 
 am very willing to say, that, after considering the question again 
 and again, within the last six years, in my deliberate judgment, the 
 original decision was wrong. I cannot but think that those who 
 denied the power, in 1789, had the best of the argument; and yet 
 I will not say that I know myself so thoroughly as to affirm, that 
 this opinion may not have been produced, in some measure, by 
 that abuse of the power which has been passing before our eyes 
 for several years. It is possible, that this experience of the evil 
 may have affected my view of the Constitutional argument. It ap- 
 pears to me, however, after thorough, and repeated, and conscien- 
 tious examination, that an erroneous interpretation was given to the 
 Constitution, in this respect, by the decision of the first Congress; 
 and I will ask leave to state, shordy, the reasons for that opinion, 
 although there is nothing in this bill which proposes to disturb that 
 decision. 
 
 The Constitution no where says one word of the power of re- 
 moval from office, except in the case of conviction on impeachment. 
 Wherever the power exists, therefore, except in cases of impeach- 
 ment, it must exist as a constructive or incidental power. If it 
 exists in the President alone, it must exist in him because it is at- 
 tached to something else, or included in something else, or results 
 from something else, which is granted to the President. There is 
 certainly no specific grant: it is a power, therefore, the existence 
 of which, if proved at all, is to be proved by inference and 
 argument. 
 
 The only instance in which the Constitudon speaks of removal 
 from office, as I have already said, it speaks of it as the exercise 
 of judicial power; that is to say, it speaks of it as one part of the 
 judgment of the Senate, in cases of conviction on impeachment. 
 No other mention is made, in the whole instrument, of any power 
 of removal. Whence, then, is the power derived to the Pres- 
 ident .'' 
 
 ' 
 
4^7 
 
 It is usually said, l)y those who maintain its existence in the sin- 
 gle hands of the President, that the power is derived from that 
 clause of the Constitution which says, "The executive power shall 
 be vested in a President." The power of removal, they argue, 
 is, in its nature, an executive power ; and, as the executive 
 power is thus vested in the President, the power of removal is 
 necessarily included. 
 
 It is true, that the Constitution declares, that the executive 
 power shall he vested in die President ; but the first question which 
 then arises is, JVhat is executive poiver? What is the degree, 
 and what are the limitations 1 Executive power is not a thing so 
 well known, and so accurately defined, as that the written Consti- 
 tution of a limited government can be supposed to have conferred 
 it in the lump. What is executive power ? What are its boun- 
 daries ? What model, or example, had the framers of the Con- 
 stitution in their minds, when they spoke of "executive power?" 
 Did they mean executive power as known in England, or as 
 known in France, or as known in Russia ? Did they take it as 
 defined by Montesquieu, by Burlamaqui, or by De Lolme? All 
 these differ from one another as to the extent of the executive 
 power of Government. What, then, was intended by " the exec- 
 utive power ? " Now, Sir, I think it perfectly plain and manifest, 
 that, although the framers of the Constitution meant to confer ex- 
 ecutive power on the President, yet they meantf to define and limit 
 that power, and to confer no more than they did thus define and 
 limit. When they say it shall be vested in a President, they mean 
 that one magistrate, to be called a President, shall hold the exec- 
 utive authority; but they mean, further, that he shall hold this 
 authority according to the grants and limitations of the Consfitution 
 itself. 
 
 They did not intend, certainly, a sweeping gift of prerogative. 
 They did not intend to grant to the President, whatever might be 
 construed, or supposed, or imagined to bo executive power ; and 
 the proof that they meant no such thing, is, that, immediately after 
 using these general words, they proceed, specifically, to enumer- 
 ate his several distinct and particular authorities ; to fix and define 
 them ; to give the Senate an essential control over the exercise of 
 some of them, and to leave others uncontrolled. By the execu- 
 tive power conferred on the President, die Constitution means no 
 more than that portion which itself creates, and which it qualifies, 
 limits, and circumscribes. 
 
 A general survey of the frame of the Constitution will satisfy us 
 of this. That instrument goes all along upon the ideaof dividing the 
 powers of Government, so far as practicable, into three great depart- 
 ments. It describes the powers and duties of these departments in an 
 article allotted to each. As first in importance and dignity, it begins 
 
468 
 
 with the Legislative Department. The first article of tne Constitu- 
 tion, therefore, commences with the declaration, that" all legislative 
 power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United 
 States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representa- 
 tives." The article goes on to prescribe the manner in which 
 Congress is to be constituted and organized, and then proceeds to 
 enumerate, specifically, the jyoivers intended to he granted ; and 
 adds the general clause, conferring such authority as may be ne- 
 cessary to carry granted powers into effect. Now, Sir, no man 
 doubts that this is a limited legislature ; that it possesses no powers 
 but such as are granted by express words or necessary implication ; 
 and that it would be quite preposterous to insist that Congress pos- 
 sessed any particular power, merely because it is, in its nature, 
 a legislative body, if no grant can be found for it in the Constitu- 
 tion itself. 
 
 Then comes, Sir, the second article, creating an executive 
 power ; and it declares, that "the executive power shall be vested 
 in a President of the United States." After providing for the 
 mode of choosing him, it immediately proceeds to enumerate, 
 specifically, the powers which he shall possess and exercise, and 
 the duties which he shall perform. I consider the language of this 
 article, therefore, precisely equivalent to that in which the legisla- 
 ture is created ; that is to say, I understand the Constitution as 
 saying that " the executive power, herein granted, shall be vested 
 in a President of the United States." 
 
 In like manner, the third article, or that which is intended to ar- 
 range the judicial system, begins by declaring that "the judicial 
 power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, 
 and in such inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, 
 ordain and establish." But these general words do not show what 
 extent of judicial power is vested in the coiu'ts of the United States. 
 All that is left to be done, and is done, in the following sections, by 
 express and well-guarded provisions. 
 
 I think, therefore. Sir, that very great caution is to be used, and 
 the ground well considered, before we admit that the President 
 derives any distinct and specific power from those general words, 
 which vest the executive authority in him. The Constitution itself 
 does not rest satisfied with these general words. It immediately 
 goes into particulars, and carefully enumerates the several authori- 
 ties which the President shall possess. The very first of the 
 enumerated powers is the command of the army and navy. This, 
 most certainly, is an executive power. And why is it particularly 
 set down and expressed, if any power was intended to be granted 
 under the general words? This would pass, if any thing would 
 pass, under those words. But enumeration, specification, particu- 
 larization, was evidently the design of the framers of the Constitu- 
 
 I' 
 
469 
 
 tion, in this as in other parts of it. I do not, therefore, regard the 
 declaration that the executive power shall be vested in a President, 
 as being any grant at all ; any more than the declaration that the 
 legislative power shall be vested in Congress, consthutes, by itself, 
 a grant of such power. In the one case, as in the other, I think 
 the object was to desci-ibe and denominate the department, which 
 should hold, respectively, the legislative and the executive author- 
 ity ; very much as we see, in some of the State Constitutions, that 
 the several articles are headed with the titles "legislative power," 
 "executive power," "judicial power;" and this entithng of the 
 articles with the name of the power, has never been supposed, of 
 itself, to confer any authority whatever. It amounts to no moi'e 
 than naming the departments. 
 
 If, then, the power of removal be admitted to be an executive 
 power, still it must be sought for and found among the enumerated 
 executive powers, or fairly implied from some one or more of 
 them. It cannot be implied from the general words. The power 
 of appointment was not left to be so implied : why, then, should 
 the power of removal have been so left ? They are both closely 
 connected : one is indispensable to the other : why, then, was one 
 carefully expressed, defined, and limited, and not one word said 
 about the other? 
 
 Sir, I think the whole matter is sufficiently plain. Nothing is 
 said in the Constitution about the power of removal, because it is 
 not a separate and distinct power. It is part of the power of ap- 
 pointment, naturally going with it or necessarily resulting from it. 
 The Constitution or the laws may separate these powers, it is true, 
 in a particular case, as is done in respect to the judges, who, though 
 appointed by the President and Senate, cannot be removed at tlie 
 pleasure of either or of both. So a statute, in prescribing the 
 tenure of any other office, may place the officer beyond the reach 
 of the appointing power. But, where no other tenure is prescribed, 
 and officers hold their places at will, that will is necessarily the will 
 of the appointing power ; because the exercise of the power of ap- 
 pointment at once displaces such officers. The power of placing 
 one man in office, necessarily implies the power of turning another 
 out. If one man be Secretary of State, and another be appointed, 
 the first goes out by the mere force of the appointment of the 
 other, without any previous act of removal whatever. And this is 
 the practice of tlic Government, and has been, from the first. In 
 all the removals which have been made, they have generally been 
 effected simply by making other appointments. I cannot find a 
 case to the contrary. There is no such thing as any distinct official 
 act of removal. I have looked into the practice, and caused in- 
 quiries to be made in the departments, and I do not learn that any 
 
470 
 
 such proceeding is known as an entry or record of the removal of 
 an officer from office ; and the President could only act, in such 
 cases, by causing some proper record or entry to be made, as proof 
 of the fact of removal, I am aware that there have been some 
 cases, in which notice has been sent to persons in office that their 
 services are, or will be, after a given day, dispensed with. These 
 are usually cases in which the object is, not to inform the incum- 
 bent that he is removed, but to tell him that a successor either is, 
 or, by a day named, w'ill be appointed. If there be any instances, 
 in which such notice is given, without express reference to the ap- 
 pointment of a successor, they are few ; and even in these, such 
 reference must be implied ; because in no case is there any dis- 
 tinct official act of removal, as I can find, unconnected with the 
 act of appointment. At any rate, it is the usual practice, and has 
 been from the first, to consider the appointment as producing the 
 removal of the previous incumbent. When the President desires 
 to remove a person from office, he sends a message to the Senate, 
 nominating some other person. The message usually runs in this 
 form : " I nomi^iate A. B. to be collector of the customs, Sic. in 
 the place of C. D., removed." If the Senate advise and consent 
 to this nomination, C. D. is effectually out of office, and A. B. is 
 in, in his place. The same effect would be produced, if the mes- 
 sage should say nothing of any removal. Suppose A. B. to be 
 Secretary of State, and the President to send us a message, saying, 
 merely, " I nominate C. D. to be Secretary of State." If we 
 confirm this nomination, C. D. becomes Secretary of State, and 
 A. B. is necessarily removed. 
 
 I have gone into these details and particulars, Sir, for the pur- 
 pose of showing, that, not only in the nature of things, but also ac- 
 cording to the practice of the Government, the power of removal is 
 incident to the power of appointment. It belongs to it, is attached 
 to it, forms a part of it, or results from it. 
 
 If this be true, the inference is manifest. If the power of re- 
 moval, W'hen not otherwise regulated by Constitution or law, be part 
 and parcel of the power of appointment, or a necessary incident to 
 it, then whoever holds the power of appointment, holds also the 
 power of removal. But it is the President and the Senate, and 
 not the President alone, who hold the power of appointment ; and, 
 therefore, according to the true construction of the Constitution, it 
 should be the President and Senate, and not the President alone, 
 who hold the power of removal. 
 
 The decision of 1789 has been followed by a very strange and 
 indefensible anomaly, showing that It does not rest on any just 
 principle. The natural connection between the appointing power 
 and the removing power has, as I have already stated, always led 
 
471 
 
 the President tc bring about a removal by the process of a new 
 appointment. This is quite efficient for his purpose, when the 
 Senate confirms the new nomination. One man is tlien turned 
 out, and another put in. But the Senate sometimes rejects the 
 new nomination ; and what then becomes of the old incumbent ? 
 Is he out of office, or is he still in .'' He has not been turned out 
 by any exercise of the power of appointment, for no appointment 
 has been made. That power has not been exercised. He has 
 not been removed by any distinct and separate act of removal, for 
 no such act has been performed, or attempted. Is he still in, then, 
 or is he out .'' Where is he ? In this dilemma. Sir, those who 
 maintain the powder of removal, as existing in the President alone, 
 are driven to what seems to me very near absurdity. The incum- 
 bent has not been removed by the appointing power, since the 
 appointing power has not been exercised. He has not been re- 
 moved by any distinct and independent act of removal, since no 
 such act has been performed. 
 
 They are forced to the necessity, therefore, of contending that 
 the removal has been accomplished by the mere nomination of a 
 successor ; so that the removing power is made incident, not to the 
 appointing power, but to one part of it ; that is, to the nominating 
 power. The nominadon, not having been assented to by the 
 Senate, it is clear, has failed, as the first step in the process of ap- 
 pointment. But, though thus rendered null and void in its main 
 object, as the first process in making an appointment, it is held to 
 be good and valid, nevertheless, to bring alDout that which results 
 from an appointment ; that is, the removal of the person actually 
 in office. In other words, the nomination produces the conse- 
 quences of an appointment, or some of them, though it be itself no 
 appointment, and efi:ects no appointment. This, Sir, appears to 
 me to be any thing but sound reasoning and just construction. 
 
 But this is not all. The President has sometimes sent us a 
 nomination to an office already filled, and, before we have acted 
 upon it, has seen fit to withdraw it. What is the effect of such a 
 nomination ? — If a nomination, merely as such, turns out the 
 present incumbent, then he is out, let what will become afterwards 
 of the nomination. But I believe the President has acted upon 
 the idea that a nomination made, and at any time afterwards with- 
 drawn, does not remove the actual incumbent. 
 
 Sir, even this is not the end of the inconsistencies into which the 
 prevailing doctrine has led. There have been cases in which 
 nominations to offices already filled have come to the Senate, re- 
 mained here for weeks, or months, the incumbents all the while 
 continuing to discharge their official duties, and relinquishing their 
 offices only when the nominations of their successors have been 
 confirmed and commissions issued to them ; so that, if a nomina- 
 
472 
 
 tion be confirmed, the nomination itself makes no removal. The 
 removal, then, waits to be brought about by the appointment ; but 
 if the nomination be rejected, then the nomination itself, it is con- 
 tended, has efiected the removal. Who can defend opinions 
 which lead to such resuks ? 
 
 These reasons, Sir, incline me strongly to the opinion that, upon 
 a just construction of the Constitution, the power of removal is part 
 of, or a necessary result from, the power of appointment, and, 
 therefore, that it ought to have been exercised by the Senate con- 
 currently with the President. 
 
 The argument may be strengthened by various illustrations. 
 The Constitution declares that Congress may vest the appoint- 
 ment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts of 
 law, or in the heads of departments ; and Congress has passed 
 various acts, providing for appointments, according to this regula- 
 tion of the Constitution. Thus the Supreme Court, and other 
 courts of the United States, have authority to appoint their clerks ; 
 heads of departments also appoint dieir own clerks, according to 
 statute provisions ; and it has never been doubted that these courts, 
 and these heads of departments, may remove their clerks at pleas- 
 ure, although nothing is said in the laws respecting such power of 
 removal. Now, it is evident that neither the courts nor the heads 
 of departments acquire the right of removal under a general grant 
 of executive power, for none such is made to them ; nor upon 
 the ground of any general injunction to see the laws executed, for 
 no such general injunction is addressed to them. They, neverthe- 
 less, hold the power of removal, as all admit, and they must hold 
 it, therefore, simply, as incident to, or belonging to, the power of 
 appointment. There is no other clause under which they can 
 possibly claim it. 
 
 Again; let us suppose that the Constitution had given to the 
 President the power of appointment, without consulting the Senate. 
 Suppose it had said, "The President shall appoint ambassadors, 
 other public ministers, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other 
 officers of the United States." If the Constitution had stood thus, 
 the President would unquestionably have possessed the power of 
 removal, where the tenure of office was not fixed ; and no man, I 
 imagine, would, in that case, have looked for the removing power 
 either in that clause which says, the executive authority shall be 
 vested in the President, or in that other clause which makes it his 
 duty to see the laws faithfully executed. Every body would have 
 said, " The President possesses an uncontrolled power of appoint- 
 ment, and that necessarily carries with it an uncontrolled power 
 of removal, unless some permanent tenure be given to the office 
 by the Constitution, or by law." 
 
47 
 
 o 
 
 And now, Sir, let me state, and examine, the main argument, 
 on which the decision of 1789 appears to rest it. 
 
 The most plausible reasoning brought forward on that occasion 
 may be fairly stated thus : — ■" The executive power is vested in the 
 President : this is the general rule of the Constitution : the associa- 
 tion of the Senate with the President, in exercising a particular 
 funcdon belonging to the executive power, is an exception to this 
 general rule, and exceptions to general rules are to be taken strictly : 
 therefore, though the Senate partakes of the appointing power, by 
 express provision, yet, as nothing is said of its participation in the 
 removing power, such parUcipation is to be excluded." 
 
 The error of this ar?;ument, if I may venture to call it so, con- 
 sidering who used it, lies in this. It supposes the power of re- 
 moval to be holden l3y the President under the general grant tjf 
 executive power. Now, it is certain that the power of appoint- 
 ment is not holden under that general grant, because it is pardcu- 
 larly provided for, and is conferred, in express terms, on the Pres- 
 ident and Senate. If, therefore, the power of removal be a natural 
 appendage to the power of appointment, then it is not conferred by 
 the general words, granting executive power to the President, but 
 is conferred by the special clause which gives the appointing 
 power to the President and Senate. So that the spirit of the very 
 rule, on which the argument of 1789, as I have stated it, rehes, 
 appears to me to produce a directly opposite result ; for, if ex- 
 ceptions to a general rule are to be taken stricdy, when expressed, 
 it is still more clear that they are not to be implied, without evi- 
 dent and clear grounds when they are not expressed at all ; and as 
 the general power of appointment is confessedly given to the 
 President and Senate, no exception is to be implied in favor of 
 one part of that general power, viz. the removing part, unless for 
 some obvious and irresisdble reason. In other words, this argu- 
 ment, which I am answering, is not sound in its premises, and there- 
 fore not sound in its conclusion, if the grant of the power of ap- 
 pointment does naturally include also the power of removal, when 
 this last power is not otherwise expressly provided for ; because, 
 if the power of removal belongs to tlie power of appointment, or 
 necessarily follows it, then it has gone with it into the hands of the 
 President and Senate ; and the President does not hold it alone, as 
 an implication or inference, from the grant to him of general ex- 
 ecutive powers. 
 
 The true application of that rule of construction, thus relied on, 
 would present the argument, I think, in this form : — " The appoint- 
 ing power is vested in the President and Senate : this is the gen- 
 eral rule of the Constitudon : die removing power is part of the 
 appointing power : it cannot be separated from the rest, but by 
 supposing an exception was intended ; but all exceptions to gen- 
 voL. II. 60 
 
474 
 
 eral rules are to be taken strictly, even when expressed; and, for a 
 much stronger reason, they are not to be implied, when not ex- 
 pressed, unless inevitable necessity of construction requires it." 
 
 On the whole. Sir, with the diffidence which becomes one who 
 is reviewing the opinions of some of the ablest and wisest men of 
 the age, I must still express my own conviction, that the decision 
 of Congress in 1789, which separated the power of removal from the 
 power of appointment, was founded on an erroneous construction 
 of the Constitution, and that it has led to great inconsistencies as 
 v/ell as to great abuses, in the suhsequent, and especially in the 
 more recent, history of the Government. 
 
 Much has been said now, and much was said formerly, about 
 the inconvenience of denying this power to the President alone. I 
 agree, that an argument, drawn from this source, may have weight, 
 in a doubtful case ; but it is not to be permitted that we shall pre- 
 sume the existence of a power merely because we think it would 
 be convenient. Nor is there, I think, any such glaring, striking, 
 or certain inconvenience, as has been suggested. Sudden removals 
 from office are seldom necessary — we see how seldom, by 
 reference to the practice of the Government under all administra- 
 tions which preceded, the present. And if we look back over 
 the removals which have been made in the last six years, there is 
 no man who can maintain, that there is one case in a hundred, in 
 which the country would have suffered the least inconvenience, 
 if no removal had been made without the consent of the Senate. 
 Party might have felt the inconvenience, but the country never. 
 Many removals have been made (by new appointments) during the 
 sessions of the Senate ; and if there has occurred one single case in 
 the whole six years, in which the public convenience required the 
 removal of an officer in the recess, such case has escaped my rec- 
 ollection. Besides, it is worthy of being remembered, when we 
 are seeking for the true intent of the Constitution on this subject, 
 that there is reason to suppose that its framers expected the Sen- 
 ate would be in session a much larger part of the year than the 
 House of Representatives, so that its concurrence could generally 
 be had, at once, on any question of appointment or removal. 
 
 But tliis argument, drawn from the supposed inconvenience of 
 denying an absolute power of removal to the President, suggests 
 still another view of the question. The argument asserts that it 
 must have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution to 
 confer the power on the President, for the sake of convenience, 
 and as an absolutely necessary power in his hands. Why, then, 
 did they leave their intent doubtful? Why did they not confer 
 the potver in express terms 1 Why were they thus totally silent 
 on a point of so much importance ? 
 
 Seeing that the removing power naturally belongs to the appoint- 
 
475 
 
 ing power — seeing that, in other cases, in the same Constitution, 
 its framers have left the one with the consequence of drawing the 
 other after it — if, in this instance, they meant to do what was un- 
 common and extraordinary, that is to say, if they meant to sepa- 
 rate and divorce the two powers, why did they not say so ? Why 
 did they not express their meaning in plain words ? Why should 
 they take up the appointing power, and carefully define it, limit 
 it, and restrain it, and yet leave an equally important power, which 
 all must admit to be closely connected with it, if not a part of it, 
 to vague inference and loose construction ? If othei's can account 
 for all this silence respecting the removing power, upon any other 
 ground than that the framers of the Constitution regarded both 
 powers as one, and supposed they had provided for them together, 
 I confess I cannot. I have the clearest conviction, that they 
 looked to no other mode of displacing an officer than by impeach- 
 ment, or by the regular appointment of another person to the 
 same place. 
 
 But, Sir, whether the decision of 1789 were right or WTong, the 
 bill before us applies to the actually existing state of things. It 
 recognizes the President's power of removal, in express terms, as 
 it has been practically exercised, independently of the Senate. 
 The present bill does not disturb the power ; but I wish not to be 
 understood that the power is, even now, beyond the reach of legis- 
 lation. I believe it to be within the just power of Congress to re- 
 verse the decision of 1789, and I mean to hold myself at liberty to 
 act, hereafter, upon that question, as I shall think the safety of the 
 Government and of the Constitution may require. The present 
 bill, however, proceeds upon the admission that the power does at 
 present exist. Its words are, *-' " 
 
 " Sec. 3. And he it further enacted, That, in all nominations 
 made by the President to the Senate, to fill vacancies occasioned 
 by the exercise of the President's power to remove the said officers _ 
 mentioned in the second section of this act, the fact of the removal ' 
 shall be stated to the Senate, at the same time that the nomination 
 is made, with a statement of the reasons for which such officer may 
 have been removed." / t 
 
 In my opinion, this provision is entirely Constitutional, and highly / "cs^ 
 expedient. 
 
 The regulation of the tenure of office is a common exercise of 
 legislative authority, and the power of Congress, in this particular, 
 is not at all restrained or limited, by any thing contained in the 
 Constitution, except in regard to judicial officers. All the rest is 
 left to the ordinary discretion of the legislature. Congress may 
 give to offices which it creates (except those of judges) what du- 
 ration it pleases. When the office is created, and is to be filled, 
 
 A. 
 
476 
 
 the President is to nominate the candidate to fill it ; but, when he 
 comes into the office, lie comes into it upon the conditions and re- 
 strictions which the law may have attached to it. If Congress 
 were to declare by law that the Attorney-General, or the Secretary 
 of State, should hold his office during good behavior, I am not 
 aware of any ground on which such a law could be held unconsti- 
 tutional. A provision of that kind might be unwise, in regard to 
 such officers, but I do not perceive that it would transcend the 
 power of Congress. 
 
 If the Constitution had not prescribed the tenure of judicial 
 office. Congress might have thought it expedient to give the judges 
 just such a tenure as the Constitution has itself provided ; that is 
 to say, a right to hold during good behavior ; and I am of opinion, 
 that such a law would have been perfectly Constitutional. • It is by 
 law, in England, that the judges are made independent of the re- 
 moving power of the crown. I do not think that the Constitution, 
 by giving the power of appointment, or the power both of appoint- 
 ment and removal, to the President and Senate, intended to im- 
 pose any restraint on the legislature, in regard to its authority of 
 regulating the duties, powers, duration, or responsibility of office. 
 I agree, that Congress ought not to do any thing which shall essen- 
 tially impair that right of nomination and appointment of certain 
 officers, such as ministers, judges, &c., which the Constitution has 
 vested in the President and Senate. But while the power of nomi- 
 nation and appointment is left fairly where the Constitution has 
 placed it, I think the whole field of regulation is open to legislative 
 discretion. If a law were to pass, declaring that district attorneys, 
 or collectors of customs, should hold their offices four years, unless 
 removed on conviction for misbehavior, no one could doubt its 
 Constitutional validity ; because the legislature is naturally compe- 
 tent to prescribe the tenure of office. And is a reasonable check 
 on the power of removal any thing more than a qualification of 
 the tenure of office ? Let it be always remembered, that the 
 President's removing power, as now exercised, is claimed and held 
 under the general clause, vesting in him the executive authority. 
 It is implied, or inferred, from that clause alone. 
 
 Now, if it is properly derived from that source, since the Consti- 
 tution does not say how it shall be limited, how defined, or how 
 carried into effect, it seems especially proper for Congress, under 
 the general provision of the Constitution, which gives it authority 
 to pass all laws necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred 
 on any department, to regulate the subject of removal. And the 
 regulation here required is of the gentlest kind. It only provides 
 that the President shall make his reasons for removal of ofhcers of 
 this description known to the Senate, when he does see fit to re- 
 
 
t 
 
 "S. 
 
 477 
 
 move them. It might, I think, very justly go farther. It might, 
 and perhaps it ought, to prescribe the form of removal, and the 
 proof of the fact. It might, I think, too, declare, that the Presi- 
 dent should only suspend ofhcers, at pleasure, till the next meet- 
 ing of the Senate, according to the amendment suggested by the 
 honorable member from Kentucky ; and, if the present practice 
 cannot be otherwise checked, this provision, in my opinion, ought.,,^u>_ ,^ 
 hereafter to be adopted. .'\ But I am content with the slightest de- \r^-^ <) 
 gree of restraint which may be sufficient to arrest the totally un- | 
 necessary, unreasonable, and dangerous exercise of the power of \ 
 removal. I desire only, for the present at least, that, when the f 
 President turns a man out of office, he should give his reasons for \ 
 it, to the Senate, when he nominates another person to fill the 
 place. Let him give these reasons, and stand on them. If they 
 be fair and honest, he need have no fear in stating them. It is not 
 to invite any trial ; it is not to give the removed officer an oppor- . 
 tunity of defence ; it is not to excite controversy and debate ; it is, 
 simply, that the Senate, and ultimately the public, may know the 
 grounds of removal. I deem this degree of regulation, at least, 
 necessary ; unless we are willing to submit all these officers to an 
 absolute and a perfectly irresponsible removing power ; a power 
 which, as recently exercised, tends to turn the whole body of pub- 
 lic officers into partisans, dependants, favorites, sycophants, and 
 man-worshippers. 
 
 Mr. President, without pursuing the discussion further, I will 
 detain the Senate only while I recapitulate the opinions which 
 I have expressed ; because I am far less desirous of influencing 
 the judgment of others, than of making clear the grounds of my 
 own judgment. 
 
 I think, then. Sir, that the power of appointment naturally and 
 necessarily includes the power of removal, where no limitation is 
 expressed, nor any tenure but that at will declared. The power 
 of appointment being conferred on the President and Senate, I 
 think the power of removal went along with it, and should have 
 been regarded as a part of it, and exercised by the same hands. 
 I think, consequently, that the decision of 1789, which implied 
 a power of removal, separate from the appointing power, was 
 erroneous. 
 
 But I think the decision of 1789 has been established by prac- 
 tice, and recognized by subsequent laws, as the settled construction 
 of the Constitution ; and that it is our duty to act upon the case 
 accordingly, for the present ; without admitting that Congress may 
 not, hereafter, if necessity shall require it, reverse the decision 
 of 17S9. I think the legislature possesses the power of reg- 
 ulating the condition, duration, qualification, and tenure of office, 
 
478 
 
 in all cases where the Constitution has made no express provision 
 on the sul)ject. 
 
 I am, therefore, of opinion, that it is competent for Congress to 
 declare by law, as one qualification of the tenure of office, that 
 the incumbent shall remain in place till the President shall remove 
 him, for reasons to be stated to the Senate. And I am of opinion 
 that this qualification, mild and gentle as it is, will have some effect 
 in arresting the evils which beset the progress of the Government, I 
 
 and seriously threaten its future prosperity. j ^ 
 
 These are the reasons for which 1 give my support to this bill. 
 
REMARKS 
 
 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, FEBRUARY 26, 1835, ON 
 THE BILL TO REGULATE THE DEPOSITS OF THE PUBLIC 
 MONEY. 
 
 Amongst the amendments moved by Mr. Webster to the bill, and adopted, 
 was the following additional section, which was also adopted, viz. 
 
 " Section 9. That all the warrants or drafts of the Treasurer of the United 
 States, or such as shall be authorized by the Treasury Department, drawn on 
 any deposit bank, shall be payable in gold and silver, if the holder desire to 
 receive the same ; and no such warrant, or draft, nor any check, draft, or bill 
 of exchange, given or received in payment thereof, shall be expressed to be 
 payable in ' current bank bills,' or in any other medium than the lawful cur- 
 rency of the country." 
 
 On offering this amendment, 
 
 Mr. Webster said, that, in discussing the provisions and merits 
 of this bill, it was necessary so often to allude to the Bank of the 
 United States, and the withdrawal of the Government deposits 
 from that institution, that he would take occasion to say a few 
 words, and they should be very few, upon that subject. In the 
 first place, he wished to say, that he considered the question of re- 
 newing the Bank charter as entirely setded. It could not be re- 
 newed. Public opinion, he thought, very unfortunately for the 
 country, had decided against it ; and while there was a strong and 
 prevailing sentiment in the minds of the community against a meas- 
 ure, it was quite useless to move such measure. For himself, he 
 should take no part in any attempt to renew the charter of the 
 Bank. The people have decided against its continuance, and it 
 must expire. 
 
 Nor should he, if he remained in public life, join in any attempt, 
 at any time hereafter, to establish a new national bank, till expe- 
 rience of its want should have satisfied the country of its great util- 
 ity or indispensable necessity. That the time would come when 
 the country would feel the fullest conviction of this necessity, he did 
 not doubt ; but that conviction, he thought, was likely to be brought 
 about only by experience. If, while he remained here, there 
 should be a general call of the country for a new national institu- 
 tion, he should, of course, be ready to aid in its establishment, on 
 
480 
 
 principles which have been proved to be safe, and with any 
 amendments which experience may have suggested. But, for 
 himself, it was his stated purpose to do nothing more in relation to 
 a national bank, till a decisive lead should be given in that direc- 
 tion by the public opinion. 
 
 In the next place, he wished to say, that the " experiment," 
 upon the success of which gentlemen had felicitated themselves, 
 had not, in his opinion, undergone any trial at all. It had been put 
 to no test. 
 
 There are two public objects, both of great importance (said Mr. 
 Webster), in the accomplishment of which the Bank of the United 
 States, in my opinion, has been generally successful. I mean the 
 transmission of public funds, and other facilities to the operations of 
 the Treasury, as one of these objects ; and a safe, cheap, and ad- 
 mirable system of internal exchanges, as the other. These objects 
 were both attained, by the skilful administration of the Bank, to 
 such a degree as left little or nothing to be wished. By internal 
 exchanges, I intend the whole operation of internal bills of ex- 
 change, and the circulation, also, of a paper currency, always safe, 
 founded on solid capital, and every where, in every nook and cor- 
 ner of the country, as well as on the exchanges of the great cities, 
 always of the same value as gold and silver, except, indeed, where 
 the bills of the Bank have been preferred to gold and silver, as be- 
 ing better suited to the purposes of remittance. Now, Sir, it has 
 been predicted, that the Stale banks, selected as deposit banks, 
 could equally well accomplish all these objects; that they could as 
 readil}^, and as completely, facilitate the operations of the Treasu- 
 ry ; and that they could, and would also, furnish a general curren- 
 cy, as sound and as well accredited ; and that they could and 
 would be able to conduct the internal exchanges of commerce as 
 safely and as cheaply. Of all this I have doubted ; but the day of 
 argument is passed, and the system now awaits the unerring result 
 of experience. But the time for that experience has not yet ar- 
 rived. Up to the present moment, the country has enjoyed, and 
 does now enjoy, the benefit of the circulation of the bills of the 
 Bank of the United States. The amount of that circulation is now 
 eighteen or twenty millions, and it is diiFused over every part of the 
 country, and abounds, more especially, in those places where it is 
 more particularly needed, and, indeed, is kept there because it is 
 there most needed. Here is a medium of exchange, every where 
 to be had, and to be had without charge. A hundred dollars in 
 gold and silver buy a post-note of the Bank of the United States in 
 New Orleans, or Mobile, or St. Louis, and it is remitted to Phila- 
 delphia or New York without danger and without expense. The 
 whole mass of the circulation of the Bank of the United States, 
 therefore, is, at this moment, in active operation, in expediting and 
 
481 
 
 facilitating exchanges, and, indeed, in assisting the operations of the 
 Treasury, and the deposit banks themselves, by affording a me- 
 dium of universal credits. The present system, therefore, still 
 rests, substantially, on the Bank of the United States. 
 
 It is the credit and the circulation of the bills of that Bank, which 
 still sustain the accustomed operations of internal commerce ; and 
 the Bank still exercises all that wholesome control over the curren- 
 cy of the country, which it has heretofore done. But the Bank is 
 about to expire. These eighteen or twenty millions must be grad- 
 ually withdrawn from circulation, though they may come in very 
 slowly, and be drawn very reluctantly, from the hands which hold 
 them ; so that the circulation of the bills may more or less continue 
 for a considerable time after the charter shall expire. In this way 
 I have no doubt of its continuance to do good, for some time after 
 its legal existence shall have ceased. There will be no rush for 
 payment of its notes and bills, because there will be no doubt 
 about the sufficiency of the fund. There will be no haste to get 
 rid of them, because they will be better than any other paper, and 
 better than gold and silver. 
 
 But the Bank must wind up its affairs ; its debts must be col- 
 lected, and its circulation, after a while, entirely withdrawn. And 
 when this takes place, or begins to take place, then, and not till 
 then, the existing Government " experiment " will begin to be put 
 to the proof. At present, all is fair weather : the question is, How 
 will it be, when it becomes necessary to fill up the void occasioned 
 by withdrawing the bills of the Bank of the United States, by notes 
 of the deposit banks? When these banks shall be brought to 
 rely on their own means, their own credit, and their own facilities ; 
 when the substantial succor of a universally-accredited paper cur- 
 rency of twenty millions in amount shall be withdrawn, — then the 
 " experiment " will be put on trial. 
 
 It is known. Sir, that I am one of those who believe in the im- 
 practicability of an exclusive, or of a general metallic currency. 
 Such a currency is not suited to the age, nor to commercial con- 
 venience. The return of the golden age is a dream. There will 
 continue to be banks ; and the mass of circulation will be a paper 
 circulation of some kind ; and the question will be, whether State 
 institutions, associated together as deposit banks, can furnish a 
 sound and universally accredited circulation. 
 
 At present, they are not proved capable of any such thing. If a 
 gentleman here wishes to remit money to New England, or to the 
 Ohio river, he certainly does not send bills of the deposit bank of 
 this District. If a single individual has done that, by way of trying 
 the '•' experiment," he probably does not repeat the trial ; and, at 
 any rate, the example is not generally followed. The deposit 
 banks pay specie, which is, so far, very well ; and a person with 
 VOL. II. 61 
 
482 
 
 a check on one of those banks can obtain specie, and with that 
 specie he can obtain bills of the Bank of the United States ; and 
 this is the process he will go through, if he wishes to remit money, 
 in tlie shape of bank notes, to places at any considerable distance. 
 In fact, that is well known to be the only practice. How this is to 
 be effected, when there shall be no longer notes of the Bank of the 
 United States to be had, remains to be seen. 
 
 I have said. Sir, the day of trial has not come, and that all as 
 yet seems clear weather. But I have recendy learned some 
 symptoms of approaching squalls. Some little specks of clouds, at 
 least, make their appearance above the horizon. I learn, from au- 
 thority not to be questioned, that, within the last week or ten days, 
 a Treasury warrant was drawn on a deposit bank in one of the 
 cities, payable in another city. The bank on which the warrant 
 was drawn offered to pay in a check, on a bank in the city where 
 the warrant was payable ; and when the check was presented, it was 
 found to be made payable in current bank notes. Here, I think, 
 Sir, there is, as I have said, a small cloud darkening the early dawn of 
 the new golden day of our currency. Even so soon as the present 
 hour. Treasury drafts are thus offered to he paid in current bank 
 notes. I have very good reason to believe. Sir, that other deposit 
 banks draw their checks, in like manner, payable in current bank 
 notes. And I have called the attention of the Senate to these oc- 
 currences, not merely to expose the practice, but to correct it also. 
 I wish to stop it at the threshold, by declaring it illegal; and I have 
 prepared a section, which, I trust, the Senate will see the impor- 
 tance of inserting in this bill. 
 

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