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FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 
 
 SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. JOHN A. LOGAN, 
 
 OF ILLINOIS, 
 
 SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
 
 Thursday, March 13, 1884. 
 
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 WASHINGTON. 
 
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SPEECH 
 
 OF 
 
 HON. JOHN A. LOGAN 
 
 The Seaate, as in Committee of the Whole, having under consideration the 
 bill (H. II. 1015) for the relief of Fitz-John Porter- 
 Mr. LOGAN said: 
 
 Mr. President : In 1865, when war had ceased, when our citizens 
 were no longer aroused by the distant rumbling of artillery, when blood 
 had ceased to flow, and the good women of our country, as ministering 
 angels, had ceased to smooth the brow of the weary and wounded sol- 
 dier, when all breathed freely once more, we then had reason to sup- 
 pose that all things necessarily connected with the prosecution of .the 
 war against rebellion would remain undisturbed; and that all proceed- 
 ings on the part of those in charge of national affairs which had been 
 conducted in accordance with the laws and the Constitution were set- 
 tled forever upon principles of equit}^ and justice. 
 
 In the prosecution of the war against treason they believed they were 
 preserving to future generations a great government, and that all nations 
 of the earth might receive benehcial lessons from the course pursued 
 by those who had maintained the national unity and supremacy. We 
 did not believe that the history as it was then honestly made would be 
 reversed, that the judgment of courts fairly, legally, and honestly 
 entered would in after years find a Congress that would set them aside 
 and rewrite the history of the trial; not only rewrite it, but write 
 it down against those who preserved the Government and in favor of 
 those who failed at a perilous moment, that, too, at a time when all the 
 power and the patriotism should have been combined for the purpose 
 of producing one grand result for the benefit of mankind. 
 
 TRIED BY A LEGALLY CONSTITUTED COOET. 
 
 Turning back the wheel of time to 186^ we find the trial of Fitz-John 
 Porter by a legally constituted court for the disobedience of orders law- 
 fully issued to him by his superior and commanding officer. In that 
 trial forty-live days were consumed and many witnesses were heard. 
 The court determined the case against him and dismissed hiin from the 
 service of the United States. That court Avas composed of nine officers, 
 a part of whom were learned in the law, and a majority of them learned 
 in military science. That sentence was approved by the then President 
 of the United States. 
 
 But, sir, what is the scene presented to the American people to-day? 
 It is not the trial of an officer for failing to perform his duty during a 
 battle or lor failing to observe an order issued by a superior officer. No, 
 sir; but it is the trial before the Congress of the United States in 1884 
 of the court that condemned this man; it is the trial of the President 
 who signed the verdict, it is a trial of the living and the dead who per- 
 formed their duties on that occasion. 
 
POETEB APPEARS AS A PEOSECUTOE AGAINST THE COUBT. 
 
 Talk about this being a trial of Fitz-John Porter. Sir, lie has been 
 tried and convicted and twenty years have passed, but to-day he appears 
 as a prosecutor before the Congi-ess of the United States, against a court 
 legally authorized, and against the martyred President of that time. It 
 is the trial of those who are living; it is the trial of the graves of those 
 who are dead with a charge that they dealt unjustly by him; that they 
 dealt with prejudice agaiust him; that they violated the laws in their 
 verdict; that they misconstrued the evidence ; that they rendered an un- 
 jiist and an unjustihable decision against him. These are the questions 
 that we are called upon to-day to determine. 
 
 In deciding a question like this it would seem at least that it should 
 be examined fairly, impartially, and be understood according to the 
 facts and the evidence on that trial, without either prejudice against 
 those who tried or prejudice in fovor of the man who was tried. 
 
 We find, however, on one side of the Chamber a solid vote in favor 
 of this bill. Without desiring to criticise the vote of any one, I hope I 
 may be, pardoned, however for making one remark. It is perfectly nat- 
 ural that when those who engaged ia rebellion agaiust a great Govern- 
 ment like this failed of success and had themselves been pardoned by 
 the Government should, without any examination of the evidence in the 
 case whatever, feel a sympathy for those who had been during the war 
 dismissed the service of the United States. Why ? Because they would 
 naturally sympathise with them and say, ' ' I have been forgiven, there- 
 fore I forgive everybody else for any dereliction during the war, no 
 matter whether tihey were criminally guilty or not, especially when 
 they were convicted for not marching or fighting agaiust us." 
 
 I can understand the sympathy that exists on that side of the Cham- 
 ber for this man, but let me say that sympathy ought not to go to the 
 violation of a great principle that underlies the very structure of our 
 Government, and the regulating of the armies of the United States, 
 their discipline and organization. 
 
 APPLY THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 I desire, however, to discuss this question first from a legal stand- 
 point, applying the evidence thereto, and then ask the question whether 
 any Senator in this Chamber, taldng the whole case as it stands to-day, 
 can lay his hand upon his heart and conscientiously say, ' ' I am acting 
 according to the law and according to the facts of the case " in voting 
 to restore Porter ? 
 
 First, what is the law in reference to the obedience of orders ? A 
 portion of it was read by my friend from Nebraska []\Ir. Manderson] 
 but I will read the law as it has been laid down in works that are re- 
 ceived as authority both in England and America, in fact all over the 
 civilized world, for the same principles apply eveiy where so far as this 
 question is concerned. You will find in the authority quoted by the 
 Senator from Nebraska known as De Hart the same language that he 
 read, which I quote. De Hart says this as a rule laid down in military 
 law: 
 
 Hesitancy in the execution of a military order is clearly, under most circum- 
 stances, a serious offense, and would subject one to severe penalties ; but actual 
 disobedience is a crime which the law has stigmatized as of the highest degree, 
 and against which is denounced the extreme punishment of death. (De Hart, 
 p. 165.) 
 
 The same author says further : 
 
 "In every case, then, in which an order is not clearly in derogation of some right 
 or obligation created by law, the command of a superior must meet with unhes- 
 itating and instant obedience." So vital to the military system is this subordi- 
 
nation of will and action deemed, that it is secured by the most solemn of human 
 sanctions. Each officer and soldier, before entering the service, swears that he 
 will observe and obey the orders of the officers appointed over him." 
 
 Penclergrast lays down the law relating to officers of the army in his 
 revised edition in the following language: 
 
 The duty of military obedience to the commands of superior officers is most 
 fully recognized by courts of law ; and it has been held that disobedience never 
 admits ol justification ; thatnoUiing but the physical impossibility of obeyin"-an 
 order can excuse the non-performance of it ; and that when such Impossibility is 
 proved, the charge of disobedience falls tothe ground. Thelearningon thissub- 
 
 5?'^i?"£.'' ^P'^ disobedience to orders in the actfon wit'i the French squadron under 
 M. SuCfrein in Ponto Praya Bay, in the year 1782 ; and there the two chief-jus- 
 tices, Lord Mansheld and Lord Loughborough, laid down the law in the follow- 
 ing terms: 
 
 "A subordinate officer must not judge of the danger, propriety, expediency or 
 consequence of the order he receives; he must obey; nothing can excuse him 
 but a physical impossibility. A forlorn hope is devoted ; many gallant officers 
 liave been devoted ; fleets have been saved and victories obtained by orderinir 
 particular ships upon desperate services, with almost a certainty of death or 
 capture. 
 
 Mr. Pendei-grast, in his citation, makes the reservation, always under- 
 stood, that the order given is not manifestly and clearly illegal. 
 
 The General of the American Army (Sherman), in referring to this 
 principle of obedience to orders in action (•34th February, 1870), re- 
 onuuciated the rule laid down by the two eminent lord chief-justices, 
 lie says: 
 
 The stronger the force of the enemy present at the time the officer received 
 the orders, the greater the necessity for him and his troops to pitch in, even if 
 roughly handled, to relieve, pro tanto, the other forces engaged. 
 
 That being the law I defy any one to show that this has not been the 
 rule since armies have been organized and since battles have been 
 iought. It being the law that an order must be obeyed unless there 
 is a physical impossibility to obey, the question before the court-martial 
 was, what is the statute law of the United States in reference to punish- 
 ment for disobedience of orders ? You find that article 9 of the Articles 
 of War as read yesterday afternoon by my friend from Iowa [Mr. Wil- 
 son] is in the following language: 
 
 Any officer or soldier who shall strike his superior officer, or draw or lift up a 
 weapon, or offer any violence against him, being in the execution of his office 
 on any pretense whatsoever, or shall disobey any lawful command of his supe- 
 rior officer, shall suffer death, or such other punishment as shall, according to 
 the nature of his off^ense, be inflicted upon him by the sentence of a court-mar- 
 
 The court-martial in examining the case find, first, what is the gen- 
 eral law regulating armies; in other words, what is the common law 
 governing the case ? In the second place, what is the statute law of the 
 United States in reference to the obedience of orders? It is that a law- 
 ful order from a superior officer must be obeyed. Its disobedience car- 
 ries with it the penalty of death. 
 
 THE QtrESTION BEFOKE THE COUET-5I.A.RTIAL. 
 
 What had the court-martial that tried Fitz-John Porter to examine? 
 V\ hat question was before them at the time they were organized for his 
 trial ? It was this: Did Fitz-John Porter receive a lawful order? No 
 one has ever questioned that proposition. If he received a lawful order 
 was it a physical impossibility for him to obey that order ? If it wjis 
 demonstrated that it was an impossibility for it to be obeyed, then as 
 a matter of course, they had no right to convict him. It was his duty 
 to show that impossibility. Did he do it ? Does the evidence disclose 
 
any such state of facts ? If so, I ask any Senator on this floor to point 
 out to me wherein it was impossible for this order to have been obeyed. 
 A question has been suggested in the argument here that he did not 
 know the necessity for obeying the order strictly. I suppose that no 
 Senator who has read the testimony will state that as a fact. Did not 
 General Pope send him two orders prior to the G.30 order of the 2~th 
 of August notifying him that the enemy was in a certain position and 
 that he must be there as speedily as possible ? He had received two 
 orders prior to that giving him notice of the position of the enemy and 
 requiring him to move as rapidly as possible. 
 
 WHY GENERAL, POPE ISSUED THE OEDEE. 
 
 The first proposition is to examine this case foirly, so that no one shall 
 be deceived in reference to it, and to understand that General Pope issued 
 not only a proper order but one based upon good reasons at the time. It 
 has been said that Pope managed the campaign badly ; that the order 
 was issued without good reasons; that there was no necessity for this 
 man Porter being there the next morning; that the necessity disappeared 
 when he arrived. For the purpose of understanding properly this ques- 
 tion as we go along let us examine the reasons that prompted General 
 Pope to issue the order. You will find on page 13 of the sworn testi- 
 mony before the court-martial this statement by Pope: 
 
 General Hooker's division had had a severe fight along the railroad, com- 
 mencing some four miles ^vest of Bristoe .Station, and had succeeded in driving 
 the division of General Ewell back along the road, but without putting it to rout ; 
 so that at dark Ewell's forces still confronted Hooker's division along the banks 
 of a small stream at Bristoe Station. Just at dark Hooker sent me word, and 
 General Heintzelman also reported to me, that he. Hooker, was almost entirely 
 out of ammunition, having but tlve rounds toa man left,and that if any action 
 took place in the morning, he would, in consequence, be ■without the means of 
 making any considerable defense. 
 
 Without taking up the time of the Senate to read the evidence which 
 has been given to the Senate time and again, I will briefly restate the 
 situation as shown by the testimony. Jackson was at Centreville with 
 his corps; Hooker's division was at Bristoe Station engaged in a battle 
 with Ewell's division; Fitz-Johu Porter was ten miles away that night 
 with his corps; Hooker's division was out of ammunition, there be- 
 ing but five cartridges to the man. Why was this order issued? Is 
 there a man on either side of the Chamber who understands anything 
 about military operations who does not know that it is a part of the 
 science of war for every good general to tiike advantage of such a posi- 
 tion and try to strike the enemy in detail? It was perfectly natural 
 for Pope to expect that his division would be attacked at daylight next 
 morning by Jackson, who was only a few miles away at Centreville, 
 before the support would come from the rear. 
 
 POPE DID INFOEM PORTEE OP THE NECESSITY OP A NIGHT MAECH. 
 
 But it is said that he. Porter, was not sufficiently advised by Pope, 
 and did not see the necessity of a night march. This is not true; he 
 was notified both on the 26th of August and on the 27th, prior to the 
 6.30 order, so that he was to be ready to move and act quickly. To 
 show this I will merely give the two orders mentioned, which are as fol- 
 lows. They tell their own story: 
 
 Headquaetees Aemy of Virginia, 
 Warrenton Junction, August 26, 1862 — 7 o'clock p. m. 
 
 General : Please move forward with Sykes's division to-morrow morning 
 through Fayetteville to a point two and a half miles of the town of Warrenton, 
 and take position where you can easily move to the front, with your right rest- 
 ing on the railroad. Call up Morell to join you as speedily as possible, leaving 
 only small cavalry forces to watch the fords. If there are any troops below, 
 coming up, they should come up rapidly, leaving only small rear guard at Rap- 
 pahannock Station. You will fmd General Banks at Fayetteville. I append be- 
 
low the position of our forces, as also those of the enemy. I do not see how a 
 general eng'agement can be postponed more than a day or two. 
 
 McDowell, with his ottd corps, Sigel's, and three brig'ades of Reynolds's men, 
 being about thirty-four thousand, are at and immediately in front of Warren- 
 ton ; Reno joins him on his right and rear with eight thousand men at an early 
 ■^hour to-morrow; Cox, with seven thousand men, will move forward to join 
 him in the afternoon of to-morrow ; Banks, ^'ith six thousand men, is at Fay- 
 etteville; Stui-gis, about eight thousand strong, •will move forward by day after 
 to-morrow ; Franklin, I hope, with his corps, will by day after to-morrow night 
 occupy the point ^vhere the Manassas Gap Railroad intersects the turnpike from 
 Wai-renton to Washington city; Heintzelman's corps will be held in reserve 
 here at Warrenton Junction until it is ascertained that the enemy has begun to 
 cross Hedgeman's River. You will understand how necessary it is for our troops 
 to be in ijosition as soon as possible. The enemy's line extends from a point a 
 little east of Warrenton Sulphur Springs around to a point a few miles north of 
 the turnpike from Sperryvillo to Warrenton, with his front presented to the 
 east, and liis trains thrown around well behind him in the direction of Little 
 Washington and Sperryville. Make your men cook three days' rations and 
 keep at least two days' cooked rations constantly on hand. Hun-y up Morell as 
 rapidly as possible, as also the troops coming up in his rear. The enemy has a 
 strong column still further to his left toward Manassas Gap Railroad, in the di- 
 rection of Salem. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-Oeneral Commanding. 
 
 Maj. Gen. Fitz-John Porter, 
 
 Conimanding Fifth Army Corps. 
 
 This order of Pope on the 26tli shows that Porter was thus early 
 notified of what was expected. Also the following: 
 
 Headquarters Army of Virginia, 
 Warrenton Junction, August 27, 1SC2 — i o'clock a. m. 
 General: Your note of 11 p. m. yesterday is received. Major-General Pope 
 directs me to say that under the circumst.inces stated by you in relation to your 
 command he desires you to march direct to this place as rapidly as possible. 
 The troops behind you at Barnett's Ford will be directed by you to march at 
 once direct to this place or Weaverville, without going to Rappahannock Sta- 
 tion. Forage is hard to get, and you must graze your animals as far as you can 
 do so. The enemy's cavalry has intercepted our railway comminiicatiun near 
 Manassas, and he seems to be advancing with a heavj' force along the Manassas 
 Gap Railroad. We will probably move to attack him to-morrow in tlie neigh- 
 borhood of Gainesville, which may bring our line further back toward Wash- 
 ington. Of this 1 will endeavor to notify you in time. You should get here aa 
 early in the day to-morrow as possible in order to render assistance should it be 
 needed. 
 
 I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 GEO. D. RUGGLES, 
 
 Colonel and Chief of Staff. 
 Maj. Gen. F. J. Porter, 
 
 Commanding Fifth Army Corps. 
 
 Any discreet officer would have expected exactly what Pope did. So 
 he says to Porter, ' ' You must come and be here by daylight. ' ' He is- 
 sued this order and demand that Porter should come by daylight. Here 
 is the order: 
 
 Headquarters Army op Virginia, 
 Bristoe Station, August 27, 1862 — 6.30 p. m. 
 Gknekal: The major-general commanding directs that you start at 1 o'clock 
 to-night and come forward w^ith your w^hole corps, or such part of it as is with 
 you, so as to be here by daylight to-morrow morning. Hooker has had a very 
 severe action with the enemy, with a loss of about three hundred killed and 
 wounded. The enemy has been driven back, but is retiring along the railroad. 
 We must drive him from Manassas and clear the country between that place and 
 Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you send word to him 
 to push forward immediately ; also send word to Banks to hurry forward with all 
 speed to take yourplaceat Warrenton Junction. It is necessary, on all accounts, 
 that you should be here by daylight. I send an officer with this dispatch, who 
 ■will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the 
 road from Fayetteville, probably in the direction of Bealeton. Say to Banks, also, 
 that he had best run back the railroad train to this side of Cedar Run. If he Is 
 not with you, w^rite him to that effect. 
 By command of Major-Qeneral Pope. 
 
 GEO. D. RUGGLES, 
 
 Colonel and Chief of Staff, 
 Maj. Gen. F. J. Porter, Wcnrenton Junction. 
 
8 
 
 p. S.— If Banks is not at "Wfirrenton Junction leave a regiment of infantry and 
 two pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow 
 you iumicdiately. If Banks is not at the junction instruct Colonel Clary to run 
 ■the trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and section of 
 artillery with it. 
 By command of Major-General Pope. 
 
 GEO. D. RUGGLES, 
 
 Colonel and Chi^f of Staff. 
 
 So it will be seen that two orders prior to that time had been issued 
 notifying him of the fact that the enemy was in his front, and that 
 he must hurry without any delay, and yet it is said that Porter did not 
 know this. He did know it, but if he did not it is not for the subor- 
 dinate oflicer to know, it is for the officer who issues the order to have 
 reason for issuing such an order, and if it is a lawful order it is the duty 
 of the subordinate to obey. Oh, but, says the Senator from New Jer- 
 sey, Porter's officers told him that there was no necessity for obeying 
 this order, that they could get there in the morning early enough. As we 
 go along I propose to show that Fitz- John Porter did not intend to obey 
 the order. He did not notify his generals commanding his divisions of 
 the necessity of this order being olicyed. General Sykes, who was the 
 oflicer that commanded the regulars under Fitz-John Porter, in his evi- 
 dence before the court-martial testifies as follows: 
 
 Q. Do you remember whether you were made acquainted with the urgent 
 language of the order — 
 
 Speaking of the 6.30 order of the 27th of August, 1862— 
 
 stating that by all means General Porter must be at Bristoe Station by day- 
 ight tile next morning? 
 
 Now mark what General Sykcs says: 
 
 A. No, sir, I think not; for I am satisfied that if that urgency had been made 
 known to us we would have moved at the hour prescribed. 
 
 Showing that this man did not even let the officers commanding his 
 divisions know the urgency of his being there the next morning. Gen- 
 eral Sykes had agreed with him that night to postpone his march in 
 obedience to that order, but when he comes to testify he says that if he 
 had known the urgency of that order, he would have been in favor of 
 obeying it and moving at the time. 
 
 THE SUREOUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES. 
 
 Now let us examine for a moment another proposition. When a man 
 is tried for an offense there is always something in connection with the 
 circumstances surrounding the case that gives an idea to a jury or to a 
 court of his intention. In order, then, to ascertain the intention of this 
 man Porter, to show that he did not intend to obey the orders, I call 
 the attention of Senators to the letters referred to by the Senator from 
 Nebraska [Mr. Mandeeson], that he wrote to General Burnside be- 
 fore receiving these orders, and afterward too, showing that at the time 
 he had contempt for Poj)e, and if he obeyed Pope it would l)e because 
 he was compelled to do so. No man can infer anything from these let- 
 ters, other than that he did not intend to support Pope. 
 
 •DETERMINATION THAT POPE SHOULD NOT SUCCEED. 
 
 Then, Jlr. President, there is a long history in connection with the 
 conduct of Porter, but I will not take the time of the Senate to read it, 
 though I have order after order issued by General Halleck to General 
 McClellan, just across the Potomac, to send Franklin and his command 
 to the support of Pope. When he was ordered to send them, when there 
 was a necessity for it, he sent back for the reasons, but was compelled 
 to send the troops, but when sent they did not arrive, showing-t hat there 
 was a combination and determination that this man Pope should not 
 succeed. 
 
9 
 
 Take the conduct of Fitz- Jolin Porter iu fi out of Wiucliester at the 
 heginning of the war, when General Patterson was ordered to move 
 and attack General Joe Johnston — just before the first battle of Bull 
 Kun was fought and when he had nineteen thousand troops and Gen- 
 eral Joe Johuston of the confederate side had but nine thousand. He 
 was within ten miles, and when he was ordered to attack Joe Johnston 
 to prevent him from joining the rebels at Manassas Junction, Fitz- 
 John Porter x^ersuaded Patterson, as the records, sworn to, show, to move 
 twenty miles to the right under pretense that it was the best move to 
 make. So by this move Johnston was let loose and made his move on 
 to Manassas and turned the battle against McDowell. So I charge 
 here, and I defy contradiction, that Fitz-John Porter was the cause of 
 the loss of the first battle of Bull Eun and refused to fight in the second. 
 [Applause in the galleries. ] 
 
 The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Fkye in the chair). No applause 
 can be allowed in the galleries, and the Sergeant-at-Arms will be in- 
 structed to arrest any person in the galleries who hereafter indulges 
 in it. 
 
 WAS IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBEY THE OEDEK ? 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. Now, Mr. President, let me call the attention of the 
 Senate for one moment to the e\ddence and see whether or not it was 
 an impossibility for this order, known as the 6. 30 order, to be obeyed. 
 The order was issued at 6.30 in the afternoon of August 27, 1862, when 
 Porter was nine miles away. The order was delivered by Capt. Drake 
 De Kay, one of the staff officers of General Pope, at 9.30 p. m. That 
 order directed him to start at 1 o'clock precisely and be at Bristoe Sta- 
 tion at daylight, which was about 4 o'clock. 
 
 I ask what is the necessity for Senators here to say that darkness, 
 trees, bridges, or anything else was in the way of Fitz-John Porter ? 
 Fitz-John Porter did not examine the roads, and there is no evidence 
 to show that he did. Fitz-John Porter did not try to clear the roads, 
 and there is no evidence to show that he did. He sent two officers to 
 Pope and asked Pope to clear the road for him. Sir, it will not do to 
 say that a man is excusable for disobeying an order when he does not 
 try to obey it. He gave no orders to his commanding officers to move 
 at 1 o'clock, he gave no orders for them to be ready to move at 1 o'clock, 
 he gave no orders to them to be ready to move prior to 3 o'clock in the 
 morning. The evidence of Drake De Kay shows that there were four 
 miles of that road from Porter's camp to where the teams were being 
 parked, with no obstruction in the way. He did not attempt to move 
 that four miles. The evidence of Frederick Myers, the quartermaster 
 in charge, shows that the wagons were all parked out of the way by 2 
 ■o'clock, and the road was clear, and Porter still did not move; in fact 
 he did not move until after sunrise the next morning. The head of 
 his column touched the road at 4 o'clock, right at his camp, and the 
 evidence of one of the officers who was near Porter at that time shows 
 that Porter was in his tent, and the sun was uj) before he mounted his 
 horse; and yet Senators say that because he could not obey the order 
 was the reason he did not do it. 
 
 Why do not Senators say that he tried to obey the order, as an ex- 
 cuse ? But they can not say this. He did not, and the evidence shows 
 that he did not. If he did not try to obey the order, he certainly dis- 
 obeyed it. No obedience is disobedience. If there was disobedience 
 of the order, I ask any Senator here to-day, no matter on which side he 
 may have plumed himself, to tell me what a court-martial could do on 
 a trial of a man for disobedience of orders if the evidence disclosed the 
 fact that he did not try to obey the order? "UTiat kind of a verdict 
 
10 
 
 would they find ? I ask what kind of a verdict could a .jury or a court- 
 martial find ? They miist find, according to their oaths, that he did 
 not obey the order. If he did not obey the order, then, as a justifica- 
 tion for not obeying it, was there an impossibility ? The evidence does 
 not show that fact. That being true, then I ask any man how he can 
 vote to condemn that court-martial, the President who approved its 
 judgment, and the whole country who approved it at that time, merely 
 out of sympathy for this man because it is said he has been punished 
 sufiiciently ? 
 
 THK EVIDENCK AS TO THE CONDITION OF THE ROAD PBEPAEED FOK POUTER. 
 
 Why, sir, I will give the evidence of twenty-one witnesses swearing 
 to different points showing this state of facts to be true: that the road 
 was open at 2 o'clock in the morning; that four miles of the road was 
 open from his camp that night when he received the order; that he did 
 not move until five hours after the order directed him to move; that he 
 moved at a time when the wagons were coming out of park, which was 
 off the road, into the road; that the road became obstructed not while 
 he could have moved, but after the time had expired when he was to 
 have been at Bristoe Station. 
 
 General Pope swore the road was in good condition, &c. 
 
 Drake De Kay delivered the order at 9. 30. 
 
 OTHER WITNESSES. 
 
 Chauncey McKeever, known as General McKeever, a man well known 
 here by nearly everybody, testifies that there was nothing to prevent 
 the troops being put in motion on that night of the 27th of August. 
 
 Col. Robert C. Cleary, who was sent by Porter to move the trains 
 forward beyond Cedar Run, testifies that a proper force had been sent 
 forward to clear the road; that there was nothing to prevent the troops 
 from moving that night if a force had been sent to clear the road; that 
 when he passed over it there was only a small portion of the road ob- 
 structed. 
 
 Solomon Thomas testifies that he moved out on the road in the morn- 
 ing; that they lay thereuntil 9 o'clock on the morning of the 28th be- 
 fore they were moved forward ; that the roads were in good condition 
 and when they moved out there was no obstruction. He was j)art of 
 this command. 
 
 General Butterfield testifies that General Porter sent two aids to 
 Pope that night, to ask Pope to clear the road for him (Porter) ; that 
 he did not know the urgency of the order; nor did he know whether 
 any attempt had been made to clear the road. 
 
 Captain Duryea testifies that he marched from Warrenton that night 
 up to 12 o'clock, and experienced no difiiculty whatever in marching. 
 
 Capt. William W. Macy testifies that he marched that night until 10 
 o'clock, and experienced no difiiculty, and had marched many times 
 on darker nights. 
 
 Lieutenant Brooks testifies that he traveled that night from beyond 
 Warrenton to Warrenton Junction, from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe 
 Station, and from Bristoe Station along to Greenwich; that he had no 
 difiiculty in finding the road, and that the roads were good. 
 
 General Thomas McCoy testifies that he marched all the night of the 
 27th and until 1 o'clock in the morning with his command, and they 
 experienced no difiiculty in marching. 
 
 Colonel Buchanan testifies that he was at Porter's headquarters at 3 
 o'clock in the morning; that there was no stirring in the camp; that he 
 waited until after sun-up before he could see General Porter; that after 
 
11 
 
 that time Porter asked him to send a detachment of his cavalry forward 
 to clear the road, so that he could march his troops, which was done. 
 
 William E. Murray testifies that he marched with his command that 
 night until 10 o'clock; that the roads were dry and in good condition. 
 
 William M. Campbell testifies that he marched that night, finding 
 no difficulty in the roads or darkness of the night. 
 
 Maj . William Birney testifies that he marched with his command in 
 the direction of Bristoe Station on the night of the 27th; also marched 
 again before daylight; that he experienced no difficulty on account of 
 the character of the night, or the roads; and that his entire brigade ac- 
 companied him. 
 
 J. H. Stine testifies that he marched with the whole brigade to which 
 he belonged until after 9 o'clock at night, and found no difficulty either 
 in the roads or in the darkness of the night. 
 
 Capt. John P. Taylor testifies that he is well acquainted with that 
 country; that be was over the road from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe 
 Station frequently; that wagons could go on either side of the road; 
 that it was an open country, so that troops could move either on or at 
 the side of the roads without difficulty. 
 
 The triith is, the evidence does show that there were but two little 
 strips of wood from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe Station. It was all 
 open field, and the fences had been burned. There was no trouble what- 
 ever in troops marchmg either on the road or outside of the road. 
 
 Samuel G . Hill, of Gibbon's brigade, testifies that his brigade marched 
 that night until 10 o'clock ; that he was up until 3 o'clock in the morn- 
 ing, and that the night was clear. 
 
 MajorDuvall testifies that he rode from Warrenton to Catlett Station, 
 from Catlett Station to Bristoe Station; thence to Manassas Junction; 
 that there were wagons in the road, but no particular obstruction; that 
 he traveled from eighteen to twenty miles that night. 
 
 James Haddow testifies that he marched with his command after sun- 
 down from Catlett Station to Bristoe Station ; that the next morning 
 (the 28th) he went from Bristoe Station back to Catlett Station; thence 
 to Warrenton with three ambulances, and that they had no material 
 difficulty in passing; that they met Porter's troops on the way. 
 
 Lieutenant Tifiany and N. P. Beach accompanied Haddow and testi- 
 fied to the same. 
 
 General Jubal Early testifies that he marched on the night of the 27th 
 without experiencing any difficulty on account of the night. 
 
 Henry Kidd Douglass, adjutant-general of Jackson, of the confederate 
 army, testifies that Jackson's whole command moved away from Cen- 
 trevUle up to near Grovetou with all their brigade trains during the 
 night of the 27th. 
 
 General Myers, quartermaster who had charge of the trains, testifies 
 that the road was good from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe Station ; 
 that he parked the trains and kept them going into park, reducing the 
 number all the time in the road ; that there was a road on either side 
 of the railroad; that there was nothing to prevent troops from moving 
 that night; that he brought the head of the wagon trains into the road 
 at daylight on the morning of the 28th. 
 
 I follow this with the more extended testimony of these witnesses on 
 these points. 
 
 The evidence shows not only that ample provision had been made for 
 the movement of Porter's troops, but it also shows that the road was a 
 good one, that troops passed over it that day, wagon trains passed over 
 it that day; that the railroad had been repaired; that trains were run 
 out all the way. The evidence shows that there was a road on either 
 
12 
 
 side of the railroad. The evidence shows that these roads were open. 
 The evidence shows that it was an open country all the way, except 
 one or two little strips of woods that came down beyond his camp, and 
 one near Kettle Run, so that the troops could march outside of the road, 
 and did so during that day. 
 
 EXCUSES GIVEN. 
 
 Mr. President, what is the excuse given by his friends ? It is that 
 it was a dark night. I will not take up time in discussing the ques- 
 tion as to the darkness of the night, except to say that the evidence 
 contradicts that statement. Suppose it was a dark night ; does that 
 make it impossible for men to march? I appeal to every Senator on 
 this side of the Chamber who was in the Union Army, I appeal to every 
 Senator on that side of the Chamber who was in the confederate army 
 if they would make such a statement— I would appeal to my friend from 
 Kentucky [Mr. Williams] . No matter how he may vote out of sym- 
 pathy, he knows that the cry that a man can not move on account of a 
 dark night when there was a road to eo on is utterb^ false. 
 
 SOME NIGHT MOVEMENTS THAT WEKE MADE. 
 
 I have never desired to give my experience or say what 1 have done, 
 but I will say now to the Senator from New Jersey, when he defends 
 Fitz-John Porter for not moving nine miles at night so that he might 
 fight a battle the next morning, that the records of our war show that 
 I moved ten thousand men one night in a rain where we had to feel our 
 way, ay, crossed the Mississippi River at daylight, and marched fourteen 
 miles and came onto the battlefield in the midst of a heavy engage- 
 ment, went into action at once with my men tired — but no matter, the 
 soldiers went in with a will and turned the tide and the day was won. 
 
 Tell me that you can not move at night ! Why, sir, moving around 
 Vicksburg we marched night and day. After the battle of Jonesbor- 
 ough — I think my friend who spoke last [Mr. M ANDERSON] was there — 
 we moved to Lovejoy Station. In moving back, when the rain was pour- 
 ing in torrents, I covered the rear of the Union Army when I could 
 see neither road nor path. 
 
 Take the marches at the winding up of the rebellion; take the 
 marches in Virginia at the time Richmond was evacuated; take the 
 marches of Sheridan and of CrOok; take the marchesof the Filth Corps — 
 this same Fifth Corps that Fitz-John Porter commanded and did not com- 
 mand to fight at the second battle of Bull Run, after he was relieved 
 from its command, however, it marched night after night. The history 
 of the rebellion shows that the Fifth Corps marched for five days and 
 nights, almost incessantly, helping to fight battles, under a different 
 commander. And yet Senators make an excuse for this man that he 
 could not attempt even to march that corps, he would not even try to 
 obey an order to march, because it was dark ! 
 
 LITTLE SCRAPS OF HISTORY. 
 
 Sir, it might not be amiss right here to call the attention of Senators 
 to some little scraps of history. We may go far back in the history of 
 wars, we may travel back as long as battles have been ibught of which 
 history gives an account, and we find nigh t marches. Take, for instance, 
 the battle of Arbela, fought by Alexander the Great against Darius. The 
 nightbutonebeforethat battle Alexander made the march in the dark 
 to get on the battlefield by daylight. So you may take many others. 
 Take the battle fought by Demosthenes at Syracuse. His assault was 
 made in the dead of night by climbing around the crags on a pathway to 
 the enemy. So, too, you may take the marches of Caius Claudius Nero 
 flrhen he escaped from the front of Hannibal and marched by night and 
 
13 
 
 day without ceasing to Metaurus, and there the battle was fought. His 
 troops were hidden in the camp of Livius until the battle commenced; 
 they won'the battle after night and day marches, and the first that was 
 known by Hannibal that Nero had escaped him was when he threw 
 Hasdrubel's head into his — Hannibal's — camp. 
 
 Sir, the battle of Waterloo is recognized as a great battle, one of the 
 fifteen great battles of the world. The battle of Waterloo was com- 
 menced in early day, and fought far into the night. The charge that 
 was made by Napoleon with his reserve guard on the Iron Duke was 
 made after 8 o'clock, and at 9 o'clock Wellington moved with his whole 
 Ihie and dispersed and drove the French army from his front. Do you 
 tell me that you can not move troops by night? History is full of it. 
 Battles in history show that great victories have been won in the night 
 and that great marches have been made in the darkness and gloom of 
 the night. 
 
 For the pui-pose of calling my friend's attention to the diflt'erence be- 
 tween an oflScer ia 1862 and one in 1572 I should like to have read for 
 his benefit a little scrap of history found in the second volume of Mot- 
 ley's Dutch Republic, on page 414: 
 
 The Secretary read as follows: 
 
 The Scheld, flowing past the city of Antwerp and separating the provinces of 
 Flanders and Brabant, opens wide its two arms in nearly opposite directions be- 
 fore it joins the sea. Between these two arms lie the isles of Zealand, half floating 
 upon, half submerged by the waves. The town of Tergoes was the chief city 
 of South Beveland,the most important part of this archipelago, but South Beve- 
 land had not always been an island. Fifty years before, a tempest, one of 
 the most violent recorded in the stormy annals of that exposed country, had 
 overthrown all barriers, the waters of the German ocean, lashed by a succes- 
 sion of north winds, having been driven upon the low coast of Zealand more 
 rapidly than they could be carried ofl" tlirough the narrow straits of Dover. The 
 dykes of the island had burst, the ocean had swept over the land, hundreds of 
 villages had been overwhelmed, and a tract of country torn from the province 
 and buried forever beneath the sea. This " Drowned Land," as it is called, now 
 separated the island from the main. At low tide it was, however, possible for 
 experienced pilots to ford the estuary, which had usurped the place of the land. 
 The average depth was between four and five feet at low water, while the tide 
 ' rose and fell at least ten feet ; the bottom ^ras muddy and treacherous, and it 
 was moreover traversed by three living streams or channels, always much too- 
 deep to be fordable. 
 
 Captain Plomaert, a Fleming of great experience and bra very, warmly attached 
 to the King's cause, conceived the plan of sending reinforcements across this 
 drowned district to the city of Tergoes. Accompanied by two peasants of the 
 country well acquainted w^ith the track, he twice accomplished the dangerous 
 and difficult passage, which, from dry land to dry land, was nearly ten English 
 miles in length. Having thus satisfied himself as to the possibility of the enter- 
 prise, he laid his plan before the Spanish colonel, Mondragon. 
 
 Thatcourageous veteran eagerly embraced the proposal, examined the ground, 
 and after consultation with Sancho d'Avila, resolved in person to lead an expe- 
 dition along the patli suggested by Plomaert. Three tliousand picked men, a 
 thousand from each nation, Spaniards, Walloons, and Germans, were speedily 
 and secretly assembled at Bergen op Zoom, from the neighborhood of which ci)y, 
 at a place called Aggier, it was necessary that the expedition should set forth. 
 A quantity of sacks were provided, in which a supply of biscuit and of powder 
 was placed, one to be carried by each soldier upon his head. Although it w^as 
 already late in the autumn the weather was propitious; the troops, not yet in- 
 formed as to the secret enterprise for ^vhich they had been selected, were already 
 assembled at the edge of the water, and Mondragon, who, notwithstanding liia 
 age, had resolved upon heading the hazardous expedition, now briefly, on the 
 evening of the 20th October, explained to them the nature of the service. Hi» 
 statement of the dangers which they were about to encounter rather inflamed 
 than diminished their ardor. Their enthusiasm became unbounded as he de- 
 scribed the importance of the city which they were about to save and alluded 
 to the glory whitth would be won by those who th\is courageously came forward 
 to its rescue. The time of about half ebb-tide having arrived, the veteran, pre- 
 ceded only by the guides and Plomaert, plunged gaily into the waves, followed 
 by his army, almost in single file. The water was never lower than the breast, 
 often higher than the shoulder. The distance to the island, three and a half 
 leagues at least, was to be accomplished within at most six hours or the rising 
 tide would overwhelm them forever. And thus, across the quaking and uncer- 
 
14 
 
 tain (ilime, which often refused them a footing, that adventurous band five hours 
 long pursued their midnight march, sometimes swimming for their lives, and 
 always struggling with the waves, which every instant threatened lo engulph 
 them. 
 
 Before the tide had risen lo more than half-flood, before the day had dawned, 
 the army set foot on dry land again at the village at Irseken. Of the whole three 
 thousand only mne unlucky individuals had been drowned; so much had cour- 
 age and discipline availed in that dark and perilous passage through the very 
 bottom of the sea. The Duke of Alva might well pronounce it one of the most 
 brilliant and original achievements in the annals of war. The beacon fires were 
 immediately liglited upon the shore, as agreed upon, to inform Sancho d'Avila, 
 who was anxiously awaiting the result at Bergen op Zoom, of the safe arrival of 
 the troops. A brief repose was then allowed. At the approach of daylight, they 
 set forth from Irseken, which lay about four leagues from Tergoes. The news 
 that a Spanish army had thus arisen from the depths of the sea flew before 
 them as they marched. The besieging force commanded the water with their 
 fleet, the land with tlieir army; yet had these indomitable Spaniards found a 
 path which was neither land nor water, and had thus stolen upon them in the 
 silence of night. A panic preceded them as they fell upon a foe much superior 
 in number to their own force. It was impossible for 't Zeraerts to induce his 
 soldiers to offer resistance. The patriot army fled precipitately and ignomini- 
 ously to their ships, hotly pursued bj' the Spaniards, who overtook and de- 
 stroyed the whole of their rear-guard before they could embark. This done, 
 the gallant little garrison which had so successful ly held the city was re-enforced 
 with the courageous veterans who had come to their relief. Hisaudacious proj- 
 ect thus brilliantly accomplished, the "good old Mondragon," as his soldiers 
 called him, returned to the province of Brabant. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. Here is an instance in 1572 where tiiree thousand 
 soldiers marched three leiigues and a half, a distance of over nine miles, 
 through an arm of the sea that came up to their chins, during the time 
 when the tide was coming in, and they had to make the march by a certain 
 time in order to reach the land. They did it, carrying their ammunition 
 on their heads and saved the garrison. Yet you tell me that Fitz-John 
 Porter with a corps refused to march nine miles at night when there was 
 no sea there to overflow him, but because of the darkness of the night, upon 
 a steady, lirm road, and that it was a physical impossibility for him to 
 march. Will an American soldier say that he can not do that which a 
 Spanish, Walloon, or German soldier could do? Will an American, 
 soldier say he can not march where a foreigner might march? Will an 
 American soldier say he can not march on dry land nine miles when a 
 foreigner marched three thousand men not on dry land but on a slip- 
 pery bottom where theocean's waves came up to the chins of the soldiers, 
 and lie made that march in the dead of night when darkness was upon 
 his army and saved the troops that he went to succor ? In the name of 
 all that is under and above the earth will Americans claim that they 
 can not perform that which other men can do ? 
 
 Suppose Fitz-Johu Porter had been ordered to march through water 
 four feet deep nine miles that night, he would have said it was a phys- 
 ical impossibility, and you gentlemen who are voting to relieve him 
 would have agreed with him; but here is a man who tells you that it 
 was not a physical impossibility, for he did it, says this history. If an 
 American Senator can excuse an American officer from marching nine 
 miles in the night on a good road, where there are two roads, after hav- 
 ing read this history it ought to bring a blush to the cheek of every 
 American. 
 
 No, sir, it is not because he was convicted in violation of law, it is not 
 beciiu-se he was unjustly condemned. That is not it. The court has 
 all passed away except three, 1 believe. Lincoln was assassinated ; Gar- 
 field was assassinated. It is easy to denounce the action of the dead, for 
 they can speak not; but it is not always well in a country like this to 
 denounce the conduct of good and true men in the performance of their 
 duty for the benefit of men who failed to perform their duty. 
 
15 
 
 SOME RECENT HISTORY. 
 
 I have a little history here to which I wish to call the attention of the 
 Senate. Some who were major-generals of the Army have a history 
 themselves. I discover some gentlemen who are very anxious to insist 
 in word, speech and vote that this man Porter was improperly condemned 
 should look well to their own record. I have the proceedings of fifty- 
 one dismissals of officers from the Army copied f'-om records of the War 
 Department. I will read some of them. They were poor volunteer offi- 
 cers, that is true: 
 
 Lieut. Henry C. Smith, "for insubordination, disrespect to his com- 
 manding officer, and disobedience of orders." He was dismiseed. 
 
 Lieut. James Walton, ' ' absent without leave, and disobedience of 
 orders. ' ' 
 
 Capt. Henry D. Wishart, of Pennsylvania, dismissed for deserting 
 his company during action. "The general commanding regrets that 
 he has not the authority to inflict the sentence of death. ' ' 
 
 Senators are putting this on the ground of excuses for people. Here 
 is a poor fellow who could not sttmd the racket and he dodged a little ; 
 he was dismissed and the general says he regrets he has not the power 
 to inflict the sentence of death. 
 
 Seth L. Woodworth, of Illinois, was dismissed for skulking. 
 
 Captain Paul us was dismissed for absence without leave. 
 
 Eeuben Piatt, lieutenant, was dismissed for ' ' misdemeanor when the 
 regiment was marching against the enemy. ' ' 
 
 I will not read them all at this time, but will ask to give them with 
 my remarks. There are fifty-one cases, all dismissed, and I wish to call 
 the attention of both sides of the Chamber to the fact that these fiftj'- 
 one officers were dismissed by a commanding general without even giv- 
 ing one of them a trial. Not one ever had a trial by court-martial, but 
 were dismissed peremptorily by order of the general commanding, some 
 for skulking, some for absence, some for disobedience of orders, and one 
 for disrespect to his commanding officer. That general is a tender- 
 hearted man, I presume. Would the Senator from New Jersey like to 
 know who the general is that dismissed those fifty-one officers without 
 giving them even the right to a court-martial. His name is signed to 
 this order, and I will read it: 
 
 By order of Major-General Eosecrans. 
 
 General Orders, No. 30. 
 
 Headquarters Department op the Cumberland, 
 
 Murfreesborough, Tenn., February 2A,186S. 
 
 By virtue of the authority delegated to themajor-greneral commanding by the 
 Secretary of War, the following-named oflicers are dismissed the service of the 
 United States from the dates set opposite their respective names : 
 
 Maj.H. C.Rogers, Fourth Ohio Cavalry, from December 25, 1862, for absence 
 without leave. 
 
 Lieut. James Ritt, Fourth Ohio Cavalry, from April 1, 1862, for absence without 
 leave. 
 
 Lieut. "Wellington B. Straight, Fourth Ohio Cavalry, from September 12, 1862, 
 for absence without leave. 
 
 Lieut. John Shade, Fourth Ohio Cavalry, from December 26, 1862, for absence 
 without leave. 
 
 Lieut. Adam Kunk, Fourth Ohio Cavah-y, from September 6, 1862, for absence 
 without leave. 
 
 Lieut. Tliorcas D. Burdsal, Fourth Ohio Cavalry, from September 6, 1862, for 
 absence without leave. 
 
 Capt. J. W. Marvin, Third Ohio Cavalry, from January 21, 1863, for absence 
 ■without leave, breaking his arrest, and drunkenness. 
 
 Capt. John Fenfrock, Sixty-fourth Ohio Volunteers, from November 5, 1862, 
 for deserting his command while on the march. 
 
 Second Lieut. James H. Baty, Fifth Kentucky Volunteers, from January 22, 
 1863, for absence without leave. 
 
16 
 
 Second Lieut. L. H. Albert, Thirty-ninth Indiana Volunteers, from January 
 22, 18C3, for desertion. 
 
 First Lieut. John W. Scott, Company G, Forty-second Illinois Volunteers, from 
 January 11, 1S63, for alxscnting himself without leave and for disabling himself 
 by contracting a disease which unfits him for military duty. 
 
 Lieut. Henry C. Smith, Eightieth Illinois Volunteers, from January 22, 1863, 
 for insubordination, disrespect to his commanding officer and disobedience of 
 orders. 
 
 Second Lieut. James Walton, Ninety-fourth Ohio Volunteers, from January 
 22, 1863, for absence without leave and disobedience of orders. 
 
 Lieut. A. C. Brown, Tenth Wisconsin Volunteers, from January 23, 1863, for 
 repeated nii.sbehavior and absenting himself without leave -when his regiment 
 was marching to meet the enemy. 
 
 First Lieut. G. W. Riley, Fifteenth Indiana Volunteers, from January 29,1863, 
 for having disabled himself by contracting a disease which disqualifies him for 
 military service. 
 
 Second Lieut. E. Bierce, Thirtieth Indiana Volunteers, from January 29, 1863> 
 for straggling and permitting himself to be captured. 
 
 Capt. B. W. Caulield, One hundred and fifth Ohio Volunteers, from January 
 29, 1803, for disobedience of orders and gross neglect of duty in allowing his 
 train, consisting of thirty-four wagons and one hundred and eighty-four animals, 
 under charge of one hundred and sixty -four men, to be surprised and captured 
 by scarcelysuperiorforceoftheenemy, without any resistance on his part. The 
 commanding general regrets his inability to inflict the extreme penalty of the 
 law upon one so deserving au ignominious death. 
 
 Surg. n. M. Grouse, Fifty-seventh Indiana Volunteers, from November 9, 1862, 
 for absence without leave. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Jacob Ruckstuhl, Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, from January 5,1863, 
 for absence without leave. 
 
 Capt. Henry ShaiTer, Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, from January 5, 1863, for re- 
 peated absence without leave. 
 
 Capt. Patrick McGowan, Fourth Kentucky Cavalry, from January 5, 1863, for 
 repeated absence without leave. 
 
 Maj. W. J. Clil't, First Middle Tennessee Cavalry, from January 10, 1863, for 
 absence without leave whUe his regiment was engaged with the enemy at the 
 battle of Stone River. 
 
 First Lieut. R. H. Shively, First Middle Tennessee Cavalry, from January 10, 
 1863, for absence without leave while his regiment was engaged with the enemy 
 at the battle of Stone River. 
 
 Second-Lieut. II. N. S. Shipp, First Middle Tennessee Cavalry, from January 
 10, 1863, for absence without leave while his regiment was engaged with the 
 enemy at the battle of Stone River. 
 
 First Lieut. S. L. Gregg, Nineteenth Indiana Battery, from October 27, 1862, for 
 absence without leave. 
 
 Col. O. S. Hamilton, Eighty-sixth Indiana Volunteers, from January 13, 1863, 
 for incompetency. 
 
 Capt. John Burton, Fourth Indiana Volunteers, from January 13, 1863, for in- 
 temperance. 
 
 First Lieut. Henry Week, Seventy-ninth Illinois Volunteers, from January 13» 
 1863, for cowardice in the face of the enemy at the battle of Stone River. 
 
 Second Lieut. William C. Willard, Seventy-ninth Illinois Volunteers, from Jan- 
 uary 13, 18G3, for cowardice in the face of the enemy at the battle of Stone River. 
 
 Capt. David Jamison, Twenty-ninth Indiana Volunteers, from January 13, 1863,, 
 for cowardice and deserting his command in the midst of the battle of Stone 
 River. 
 
 Capt. W. W. Schuyler, Twenty-ninth Indiana Volunteers, from January 13, 
 1863, for cowardice and deserting liis commajid in the midst of the battle of' 
 Stone River. 
 
 Capt. S. H. Williams, One hundred and fifth Ohio Volunteers, from January 13, 
 1863, for drunkenness while on duty. 
 
 Lieut. John Mangold, Ninth Ohio Volunteers, from January 15, 1863, for absence- 
 without leave. 
 
 First Lieut. Joseph J. Armatage, Eighty-sixth Indiana Volunteers, from Jan- 
 uary ].5,18G3,for abandoning his company in the presence of the enemy at the 
 battle of Stone River. 
 
 Captain Klein, Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, from January 15, 1863, 
 for absence without leave. 
 
 First Lieut. E. H. Benediet,"Seventy-ninth In'diana Volunteers, from January 
 15,1863, for cowardice and misbehavior on the battlefield. 
 
 Capt. Duncan C. -Reed, Twenty-fourth Wisconsin Volunteers, from January 27, 
 1863, for deserting his command while engaged with the enemy, on the pretext 
 of sickness. 
 
 Second Lieut. Alljert B. Forbes, Eighty-eighth Indiana Volunteers, from Jan- 
 uary 17, 1863, for drunkenness on the field of battle. 
 
 Second Lieut. Jesse Ball, Eighty-eighth Indiana Volunteers, from January 17,. 
 
17 
 
 1863, for tendering his resignation, assigning as a reason that he was tired of the 
 eervice and opposed to the President's proclamation. 
 
 Col. W. B. Casselly, Sixty-ninth Ohio Volunteers, from December 31,1862, for 
 drunkenness on the morning of the 31st December, at the most critical moment 
 of the battle of Stone River, rendering him incapable of receiving or giving 
 commands, thereby imperiling the safety of his entire regiment. . 
 
 Capt. John Watts, Seventy-second Indiana Volunteers, from January 19, 1863, 
 for disobedience of orders, gross carelessness, and neglect of duty while on 
 picket. 
 
 Capt. M. Noble, One hundred and first Ohio Volunteers, from January 21, 1863, 
 for absence without leave. 
 
 Second Lieut. O. L. Peck, One hundred and first Ohio Volunteers, from Jan- 
 uary 21, 1863, for absence without leave. 
 
 Lieut. S. G. Wright, acting assistant quartermaster, Thirty-sixth Brigade, from 
 November 21, 1862, for signing a false voucher. 
 
 Surg. W. H. Myers, Thirtieth Indiana Volunteers, from November 26, 1862, for 
 stealing horses, abandoning his post when regiment was marching in the face 
 of the enemy, he being the only medical oflicer on duty, and absence without 
 leave. 
 
 Lieut. G. P. Stiles, Thirty-first Ohio Volunteers, from February 2, 1863, for ab- 
 sence without leave for more than sixty days. 
 
 Lieut. S. B. Conn, Sixty-fourth Ohio Volunteers, from February2, 1863, for ab- 
 sence without leave for more than sixty days. 
 
 Second Lieut. Arthur Bennett, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, 
 from February 2, 1863, for absence without leave. 
 
 Capt. Henry D. Wishart, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania Volunteers, from Feb- 
 ruary 2, 1863, for cowardly conduct in the face of the enemy and deserting his 
 company during the action of December 31, 1862, at Stone River, under the dis- 
 graceful pretext of sickness. The general commanding regrets that he has not 
 the authority to inflict the sentence of death. 
 
 Lieut. Seth L. Woodworth, Company B, Seventy-ninth Illinois Volunteers, 
 from February 2, 1863, for skulking in the rear at the beginning of the battle, dis- 
 obedience of orders, and pretending lameness. 
 
 Capt. M. L. Paulus, Ninety-third Ohio Volunteers, from February 5, 1863, for 
 being absent without leave and without sufficient cause from December 31, 1862, 
 to January 3, 1863. 
 
 Lieut. Reuben Piatt, Ninth Indiana Volunteers, from February 9, 1863, for re- 
 peated insubordination , absence without leave, and misdemeanor when the regi- 
 ment ■was marching against the enemy. 
 
 By command of Major-General Rosecrans. 
 
 C. GODDARD, 
 Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff. 
 
 Without speaking of any member of the House of Eepresentatives, I 
 can speak of the General. When he appeals to this country to reinstate 
 Fitz- John Porter, who was tried by a court-martial, who was convicted 
 by a court-martial lawfully organized, and the sentence approved by the 
 President of tlie United States. I ask him who appeals for the restora- 
 tion of those fifty-one poor volunteer officers who were disnii.ssed by a 
 stroke of his pen without anything on the records as to what they were 
 accused of except his own statement ? I should like to see the tender 
 heart turned toward the poor unfortunate volunteer as well as toward 
 the man who happened to have been educated at the expense of the 
 Government. Who pleads for those men ? Who introduces bills to re- 
 store those men ? No Senator, no Member of Congress, nobody pleads 
 for them. Nobody asks that the tender heart shall turn toward them, 
 dismissed without a court, without a trial, by merely the vnll of the 
 commanding officer. Yet we are told that this is all right. They were 
 mere volunteer officers. 
 
 HOW to-day's rbcobd stands. 
 
 But, sir, that is about the way matters are moving in this country 
 now. There is a class that must feed on the bounty of the Govern- 
 ment; kicked out of the Army or not, it makes no diiference, they must 
 be put back and they must be supported by the Government. They 
 are asking reinstatement by Congress every day. Why? Because at 
 some time they performed service. Theyhave been dismissed very true 
 (dishonorably), but no difference. 
 
 Sir, there were two millions of men who performed service in this 
 Lo 2 
 
18 
 
 country, volunteer soldiers, privates and officers, and no bill has ever 
 passed the Senate to put one of them on the retired-list; and not a vol- 
 unteer officer has ever been placed there ; no matter how badly wounded 
 or shattered or torn, it makes no difterence. A man has to go through 
 the portals of the regular Army to receive the bounty of this Govern- 
 ment on the retired-list. Whether he be armless, without legs or eyes, 
 it makes no difference. If he was a poor volunteer, kick him out of 
 the service by an order, not by a trial, and it is all right; but if a man 
 who happened once to belong to the regular Army fails in his duty, dis- 
 obeys orders, shows his disobedience and his contempt for his superior 
 officer, all that side of the Chamber come up in solid phalanx for him, 
 and they generally obtain a few allies from oar side for the purpose of 
 helping them along to reverse history. Men who attempted to destroy 
 the Government, when forgiven (and I say this with all due respect — 
 they will not complain, for they did try to destroy the Government), 
 come to you, and undertake to reverse history on your side of the case, 
 and you rush forward to assist them in doing it, and expect to gain the 
 plaudits of the people of this country for so reversing history against the 
 Union people of this Government; it is done on the ground of charity. 
 Charity for what ? Charity for your country ? Charity for truthful his- 
 tory ? Charity for a person. Therefore reverse the history of the case, 
 tui'n the wheel backward, cast a stigma upon two dead Presidents, upon 
 an honorable court-martial, for the benefit of a man who failed in the 
 hour of trial to perform his duty toward his country. If that is the 
 course that is going to be pursued it will not be long until all the his- 
 tory of the war will in a certain sense be reversed. 
 
 I for one, no matter what men may say, will follow my convictions 
 of right. I am charged with following this man unnecessarily. I fol- 
 low no man. I have my honest convictions and by my convictions I 
 will stand. If I were the only man in this country who would stand 
 in the Senate Chamber and defend the name and fame of Lincoln, Gar- 
 field, and the men who condemned this man, I would say, solitary and 
 alone, ' ' I will stand here in defense of right against a man who tries to 
 tear down the reputation of those men in order to build up one for him- 
 seK which he does not deserve. ' ' 
 
 THE SECOND BBANCH OP THE CASE. 
 
 Mr. President, I now desire to call the attention of the Senate to the 
 second branch of this case, which is in reference to the 29th of August, 
 1362, and the orders on that day. I will not go over the testimony in 
 full, for I propose by leave of the Senate to file the evidence in the case 
 with my argument to sustain every proposition that I make. I have 
 it compiled from the records as sworn to. 
 
 What is the case of the 29th of August ? The Senator from New 
 Jersey [Mr. Sewell] commenced his speech by having a letter read 
 fi-om General U. S. Grant. If there is any one in this country who 
 has a higher admiration for the military genius of General Grant than 
 I have, I do not know him. I served under General Grant for three 
 years. I went into the Army almost at the same time he did. I have 
 known him for a great many years. I would not say one word that 
 would deprive him of the great reputation that he has justly won be- 
 fore the American people. I will take his letter as read by the Senar 
 tor on yesterday, and I propose to examine the paragraph for myself 
 upon which he laid so much stress and see what I can make of it. 
 
 THE BATTLE ON THE 29TH OP AUGUST. 
 
 The controversy in this case on the 29th is about three orders. The 
 first order was issued about 6 o'clock in the morning; the second was 
 
19 
 
 the joint order ; and the third was the 4.30 order, which it is said he did 
 not obey, nor, strictly, any of them. On that point the Senator from New 
 Jersey makes the same mistake that all persons have made who defend 
 Fitz- John Porter for the disobedience of that order. They insist that 
 there was no battle on the 29th. If there had been a battle on the 29th, 
 then Fitz- John Porter was guilty ; but inasmuch as there was no battle 
 on the 29th, he could not be guilty of violating sm order to fight when 
 there was no fighting to be done. That is the reasoning 
 
 The proposition is this : If there was a battle on the 29th, and Fitz- 
 John Porter failed to fight when he was ordered to fight, then he is 
 guilty; if there was no battle, he is not guilty, as there was no fighting 
 to do. Is not that it? 
 
 Now, let us see if General Grant does not fall into the very same error. 
 What does he say ? 
 
 Until in 1881— 
 
 Mark the language, and I call the Senator's attention especially to it: 
 
 Until in 1881, when I re-examined for myself, my belief ■was that on the 29th 
 of August, 1862, a great battle was fought between General Pope, commanding 
 the Union forces, and General Jackson, commanding the confederate forces ; 
 that you, with a corps of twelve or more thousand men, stood in a position across 
 the right flank of Jackson and where you could easily get into his rear ; that you 
 received an order to do so about 5 or 5.30 o'clock, which you refused to obey be- 
 cause of clouds of dust in your front, which you contended indicated an enemy 
 in superior force to you ; that you allowed Pope to get beaten while you stood 
 idly looking on, without saising an arm to help him. With this understand- 
 ing— 
 
 Now mark the language — 
 and without a doubt as to the correctness of it, I condemned you. 
 
 What does he mean by this statement ? He means that if there was a 
 battle on the 29th and Porter stood there with twelve thousand men and 
 did not fight, and did notattempt to fight, he was guilty and Grant con- 
 demned him ; but since he ascertained that there was no battle on the 
 29th he has changed his opinion. That is the whole case as General 
 Grant puts it. I will agree with Grant on that proposition. I agree 
 right here that if the evidence does not show that there was a battle 
 fought on the 29th that I may be wrong so far as the order to attack is 
 concerned, and if I cannot show by confederate and Union testimony 
 that there was a battle fought on the 29th, and not only that, but by 
 the report of the Senator himself, who sayg in his report that he had 
 to change one battalion of his regiment to the position of the other on 
 account of exhausting his ammunition — that is substantially the lan- 
 guage of the Senator's own report — on the 29th, the battle was raging 
 so furiously; in this I am not mistaken. 
 
 CONFEDERATE TESTIMOSfY. 
 
 Now let us see whether I am correct. These gentlemen do not like 
 the evidence that was taken before the court-martial. It does not seem 
 to agree with their case. They want confederate testimony. Inasmuch as 
 they want coofederate testimony let me give them a little of it. I bring 
 General Lee now to prove my side of the case as I state it. General 
 Lee says — I read from his ofiicial report: 
 Generals Jones aiid Wilcox bivouacked that night east of the mountain — 
 That is the night of the 28th ; I do not want to consume time in 
 reading the whole report — 
 
 and on the morning of the 29th the whole command resumed the march, the 
 sound of cannon at Manassas announcing that Jackson was already engaged. 
 
 That was at 9 o'clock in the morning. 
 Lpngstreet entered the turnpike near Gainesville, and moving down toward 
 
20 
 
 Groveton, the head of his column came upon the field in rear of the enemy's 
 left— 
 
 That is in the rear of Pope's left — 
 
 which had already opened with artillery upon Jackson's right, as previously 
 described. He immediately placed some of his batteries in position, but before 
 he could complete his dispositions to attack, the enemy withdrew, not, however, 
 ■without loss from our artillery. Longstreet took possession (position?) on the 
 right of Jackson, Hood's two brigades, supported by Evans, being deployed 
 across the turnpike and at right angles to it. 
 
 Now he goes on and gives the description, and winds up with saying: 
 While this demonstration was being made on our right a large foi-ce advanced 
 to assail the left of General Jackson's position, occupied by the division of Gen- 
 eral A. P. Hill. The attack was received by his troops with their accustomed 
 steadiness, and the battle raged with great fury. 
 
 THE TESTIMONY OP UNION OFFICERS. 
 
 That is the language of Lee. The battle raged with great fury on the 
 29th. Now, I can prove it by every report made by Union officers, and 
 I have the names of the different ones making the reports, and I will 
 give them 
 
 Mr. ED MUNDS. Ho w far was Porter from that battle at that time ? 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. About two miles to the left. 
 
 Mr. EDMUNDS. Then he could have heard the cannon. 
 
 Mr. LOG-AN. The evidence all shows that his troops heard the ar- 
 tillery all day. 
 
 Now let me show yon the number of reports of Union officers, and I 
 especially call the attention of the Senate to them. They are as follows : 
 General Pope, General McDowell, General Reynolds, General Schenck, 
 General Robinson, General Grover, General Kearney, GeneralSigel, Gen- 
 eral Milroy, General Stahel, Lieutenant Haskins, General Carl Schurz, 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Muhleck, Colonel Kryzanowski, and divers other 
 Union officers' reports, and each and every one of them not only show a 
 battle but heavy loss on the 29th, and not only that, but I assert the fact 
 and will put it in evidence that the battle was desperate and bloody. 
 The fight was so severe that the confederate reports show that all the 
 field officers of one whole command were lost save two. 
 
 And yet with all these facts before the country and before this body, 
 Senators will say there was no battle on the 29th. 
 
 I will now give the names of the confederate officers who made re- 
 ports of that battle. Here js the report of the Senator from New Jersey. 
 He was in the battle — I have qiioted it — he says he was out of ammu- 
 nition and changed one-half his command around in order to let the 
 others have a chance, his ammunition being exhausted. The Senator 
 knows this to be his report. That was on the 29th. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. Will the Senator allow me to interrupt him? 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. Certainly. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. There is no question of the fact that there was severe 
 fighting on that day. It was by isolated brigades, though; it was not 
 a general battle. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. "Isolated brigades." Yes, I should say there was 
 one isolated command that did not fight at all. [Great laughter. ] But 
 you may call it what you please. Sir, you know if you are a military 
 man — and I do not doubt the proposition; you served honorably during 
 the war — there never was a battle fought yet when aU the troops on 
 both sides were engaged at the same time, unless it was a mere small 
 detachment. There is no man certainly who was in the Army but 
 knows that battles were all fough* by brigades and divisions, one fight- 
 ing now and another again, and so on as different movements were made. 
 There is my friend who has an honorable record as an army officer [Mr. 
 
21 
 
 Miller, of California] ; he knows that what I say is true. Every man 
 who has served in the Federal or confederate army knows the same 
 thing. On the 29th every man you had under Pope except Porter was 
 engaged in battle that day, and yet you say it was not a battle, and on 
 that ground General Grant says because there was no battle on the 29th 
 Porter ought to be excused, but if there was any battle on the 29th h© 
 ' ' con'demned him. ' ' 
 
 WHAT GENERAL GRANT'S LETTER PROVES. 
 
 Now, what does Grant's letter prove ? It proves exactly what you do 
 not want proven. It proves that if there was a battle on the 29th Por- 
 ter was properly condemned. You agree there was. Therefore he was 
 properly condemned. There is the kind of argument that you have 
 used in this case from the time it was first before Congress, denying 
 that there was a battle on the 29th when Lee, Longstreet, Hood, Jones, 
 Ewell, and Jackson and the whole confederate forces recognize the fact 
 and report that there was a severe battle, a severe struggle on that day, 
 which is corroborated by your own officers, and the excuse made is that 
 there was no fight on the 29th, therefore Porter is not culpable because 
 he did not fight, for there was no battle going on. 
 
 If there was a battle on the 29th, Porter was guilty. I said I would 
 stake the whole case on that j)roposition and take General Grant's letter 
 to support my statement; and the very evidence that the Senator from 
 New Jersey introduces to support his side of the case when the facts 
 are brought to light condemn his friend. 
 
 ORDERS TO POPE. 
 
 On the morning of the 29th, General Porter was lying near Manassas 
 Junction; he received a verbal order. Without referring to the date I 
 will try to give it correctly, for I do not want to detain the Senate by 
 reading it, but I will put these orders in my remarks. I can state them. 
 As I said, on the morning of the 29th General Pope sent a verbal order to 
 General Porter ordering him to push as rapidly as possible towards 
 Gainesville, that if he did not move expeditiously we would lose much. 
 General Porter refused to obey that order because it was not in wi'iting. 
 I have a letter from the man that carried that order to General Porter. 
 Porter admits in his own statement that he received that order but he 
 wanted it in writing. Then General Pope had to give him an order 
 in writing. This is the order: 
 
 Headquarters Army op Virginia. 
 Centreville, August 29, 1862. 
 Push forward with your corps and King's division, w^hich you will take with 
 you, upon Gainesville. I am following the enenay down the Warrenton turn- 
 pike. Be expeditious, or we will lose much. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-General Commanding. 
 
 The object of this order was to enable General Porter with a large 
 force to intervene near Gainesville, on the Warrenton pike, between 
 Jackson and Longstreet, and thus regain the advantages lost by the re- 
 treat of King and Ricketts early that morning. After that order was 
 given in vsTiting Pope issued what is called the joint order — the Mc- 
 Dowell and Porter order. That order directed McDowell and Porter 
 to march in the direction of Gainesville until they moved far enough to 
 throw the right down on to the left of the army of Pope and to be in 
 position that night, so that if they had to faU back to fall behind Bull 
 Eun. 
 
 Headquarters Army of Virginia, Centreville, Arigust 29, 1862. 
 
 Generals McDovTELL AND Porter : You will please move forward with your 
 joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to 
 that eflect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are mov- 
 
22 
 
 tag on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I 
 desire that as soon as communication is established between this force and your 
 own the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind 
 Bull Run, at Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our 
 supplies. I have sent no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to in- 
 terfere in any way -with the movements of McDowell's troops, excei)t what I 
 sent by his aid-de-camp last night, which ^vere to hold his position on the War- 
 renton pike until the troops from here should fall on the enemy's flank and 
 rear. I do not even know^ Ricketts's position, as I have not been able to find out 
 where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General Mc- 
 Do"well ■will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts and 
 instruct him to join the other division of his corps as soon as practicable. If any 
 considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order, it will 
 not be carried out. One thing must be held in view — that the troops must oc- 
 cupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. 
 The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direc- 
 tion at a pace that will bring them here to-morrow night or the next day. My 
 own headquarters will, for the present, be with Heintzelnaan's corps or at this 
 place. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-General, Commanding. 
 
 AN EXPLANATION OF THE JOINT ORDEE. 
 
 There ought to be an explanation of this order. It is not very en- 
 tertaining to the Senate to deal with maps, but I used to have a good 
 deal to do with them when I had charge of a corps and also of an army, 
 and therefore I naturally take to them. Why was the order given in 
 that way ? It is very simple when understood, as it may be if any one 
 will look at the military situation, and I will explain it in a moment. 
 
 Jackson had moved around from Centreville by Sudley Springs, behind 
 what is called the Independent Railroad, which was a cut, and formed 
 his line in rear of the railroad cut, letting his rigbt run up in the direc- 
 tion of the road that ran from Gainesville to Centreville. Bull Run Creek 
 runs down in this direction [indicating] . They were to move from Daw- 
 kin's Branch up to Gainesville, striking this turnpike road. The inten- 
 tion was to strike the turnpike, and the fact that Porter was told to be in 
 a condition to fall back behind Bull Run shows that to be true, because 
 on the road that he was then marching he could not fall behind Bull Run 
 without traveling clear around to Centreville, but by passing through 
 and letting his right svping over to this road he would be on the turn- 
 pike road which passed down across Bull Run to Centreville on this 
 turnpike. That was the situation, and that is what Pope intended. 
 After Porter had gone as far as Dawkin's Branch, five miles away from 
 Gainesville, he says that, seeing dust, &c. , he concluded to stop there. 
 I do not give his language, but that is the substance. He did stop 
 there ; he staid there the whole day ; that is, the head of his column did. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. Will the Senator allow me a word ? 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. Certainly. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. The evidence of General Butterfield goes to show 
 that he threw a brigade across Dawkin's Branch, his line deployed, 
 and he rode in advance of his brigade to look at the gi-ouud, when sud- 
 denly his brigade was withdrawn, and he found McDowell and Porter 
 together. It was on McDowell's order that it was withdrawn, and he 
 says, " Put your troops in here to the right; you are too far out." 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. If the Senator had just waited a moment he would 
 have gotten all the facts and more than he has given. I was stating 
 that at Dawkin's Branch he stopped. That is true, is it not? Mc- 
 Dowell came up with him at Dawkin's Branch. They had some con- 
 versation. He says that McDowell told him to put his troops in here. 
 McDowell, he states, said this is no place to fight a battle. JMcDowell 
 declares he did not say so; but that is immaterial. 
 
 Porter said, " If I put my troops in I will get into a fight. ' ' McDow- 
 ell replied, " That is what we came here for." 
 
23 
 
 General Butterfield, of whom you speak, did not take his brigade, but 
 he took part of it, went across the branch into open ground, and he 
 says that he expected that an attack would be made, that he looked 
 around and his whole regiment was gone, and he was left there by him- 
 self. He says he does not know how his regiment got away. He does 
 not know who ordered it away, and does not know anything about it 
 except that he was left there with one staff officer. 
 ■ Mr. SEWELL. Give the rest of it. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. I will give the whole of it as I go along. General 
 Porter went back to Bethel chapel, two miles and a half, or three, to the 
 rearof Dawkin's Branch, at the junction of the roads. There he staid 
 the whole day; his corps was lying along that road with their arms 
 stacked, and he never moved them one inch. Morell's brigade was up 
 to the front, and he put skirmishers out, and the only order that Porter 
 gave to Morell during that day was to deploy a regiment, which he did. 
 The next order he gave was to hide them in the woods, which he did 
 all except one battery, that Morell says he could not get in — Hazlett's 
 battery; he could not get it into the woods under cover. That was the 
 only order he got until late in the afternoon, after 6 o'clock in the even- 
 ing, and Porter says that from the dust in the road he imagined or 
 thought that a great force was marching down upon him, and therefore 
 he hid his men m the woods. 
 
 I want to take the argument the Senator made yesterday. He said 
 the judicious and soldierly conduct of Porter saved that army from de- 
 struction; that holding his troops in front of Longstreet kept Long- 
 street from moving off against Pope and destroying Pope ; holding them 
 there so long as he could have them in view. He did not have them 
 in view, because he hid his men in the woods so that Longstreet could 
 not see them. He says so and the Senator knows it. Instead of holdr 
 ing them in ^dew to deter Longstreet from moving on Pope, he hid them 
 in the woods so that they could not be seen, and so let Longstreet move 
 on Pope. Not only that, sir, but before I get through, instead of your 
 twenty-five thousand troops in front of Fitz- John Porter, I can demon- 
 strate from the evidence that Longstreet had but six thousand that he 
 could have used against Porter. He ( Longstreet) never had twenty-five 
 thousand troops under him present on that day, and I will prove that 
 by Longstreeb's own statement. 
 
 Mr. Porter, he says, obeyed the joint order. He was to go to Gaines- 
 ville. Porter says, or the Senator says for him, that Porter could not 
 fall over to the right; he could not move to the right so as to join Pope 
 on the left. Why does he say that ? Capt. James Stevenson, who is 
 well known to many Senators here — he is connected with the Geologi- 
 cal Survey — was a captain in a New York regiment. He was sent to 
 Porter's corps for the mail, and he crossed from Pope's left through 
 these very woods on horseback with the mail. During that very time 
 that Porter says Longstreet had twenty-five thousand troops right in his 
 front this man Stevenson rode by himself on horseback and carried the 
 mail over to Porter's corps. One man on horseback could pass through 
 these woods unmolested, and Porter was afraid to go in there for fear 
 he would be destroyed with his twelve thousand men. 
 
 THE NUMBER OF TEOOPS ENGAGED. 
 
 Let us see for a moment how many troops were there. This map 
 shows that Longstreet first formed his men on Pageland Lane. Here 
 [indicating] was Jackson's right. Longstreet formed, throwing his left 
 around on Jackson ' s right. Here was Pope throwing his left up this road, 
 the turnpike road [indicating]. Porter, then, by moving here, would 
 
24 
 
 have struck Longstreet ou the right flank ; and according to all the testi- 
 mony and the maps that your own friends have made for you, if he had 
 moved forward on that road he would have struck Longstreet on the 
 right flank. There is Longstreet's right flank, and there is the road 
 passing up to the right of Longstreet. He could not have moved with- 
 out strilving him on the right flank. If Longstreet had met him he 
 must have thrown his left around here [indicating] to face Porter in- 
 stead of already facing him,. as he is said to have been. This statement 
 about its being impossible for Porter to pass on to the right of the enemy 
 is sheer nonsense. 
 
 Now, let us see if we can find about how many troops were in Por- 
 ter's front. I take General Longstreet's report, General Lee's report, 
 General Wilcox's, General Hood's, General Anderson's, and see what 
 they state. Longstreet on the 29th had (General Wilcox's brigade, 
 Feathertone's brigade, General Pryor's brigade) six thousand three hun- 
 dred men; General Hood (Texas brigade. Law's brigade, Evans's bri- 
 gade) six thousand three hundred men — they average up very nicely 
 according to their statements; I do not know how they got them so 
 evenly — General Kemper (Kemper's brigade, Pickett's brigade, and 
 Jenkins's brigade) six thousand one hundred men; and General Jones 
 (Drayton's brigade and Toombs's brigade) six thousand three hundred 
 men, making in all twenty-five thousand men. That is the number 
 that General Longstreet gives. 
 
 Now, let us examine the testimony for a moment. General Lee says 
 in his report that General Anderson's division came up in the evening 
 of the 30th. General Anderson's division was seven thousand men, ac- 
 cording to the testimony. They came up in the evening of the 30th, 
 and not on the 29th. Now, subtract that from your twenty-five thousand 
 and how many have you? Take a pencil and make your figures. The 
 Senator says there were twenty-five thousand iti front of Porter; we 
 have got them down to eighteen thousand. 
 
 Now let us see what General Lee says and what General Longstreet 
 says. They say that Wilcox's division, Kemper's brigade, Jenkins's 
 brigade, and Evans's brigade, Hunton'sand Hood's divisions went into 
 action at Groveton at 4 o'clock, in all making over twelve thousand 
 men taken from the eighteen thousand men, that went into action at 
 Groveton at 4 o'clock. ' Lee had sent Wilcox's division, he says in his 
 report, over to support Jones. Jones's brigade was over on the rail- 
 road, near the Cole house, watching Porter, when he saw some move- 
 ment made, and that was the same time Porter hid his men in 
 the brush. Wilcox's division was sent to support Jones; but Lee 
 says, and so does Longstreet, that the column disappeared imme- 
 diately. They do not say where, but Porter explains that they disap- 
 peared in the woods. Then he says he withdrew Wilcox's Division 
 and threw it down to Groveton. There are twelve thousand men with- 
 drawn from that eighteen thousand and sent to Groveton in action against 
 Pope's left; and Longstreet and Lee both say that they remained there 
 until 11 o'clock at night before they withdrew from Groveton. Now 
 how many have you left in front of Porter ? Six thousand men, and 
 that was Jones's command, and his support — but six thousand men. 
 The evidence shows that Longstreet did not have another man there 
 anywhere near Porter, and they were not in his front; they were over 
 by the railroad, and that is the only command that Longstreet had any- 
 where near Porter at 4 o'clock, and during the whole time from 4 o'clock 
 untU 11 o'clock at night, and at 11 o'clock at night he says they with- 
 drew to their line, which was at Pageland lane, and not in front of 
 Porter, so that Mr. Porter, when he received the order, instead of having 
 
25 
 
 twenty-five thousand men in his front had but six thousand men, not in 
 his front either, but in a position where they could have probably been 
 employed against an assault. 
 
 The truth is, Stuart's report shows, and so does Porter's report, that 
 the dust was thick ; and Stuart says the dust was made by drawing brush 
 along the road. I have repeated this before, and I do not wish to refer 
 to it again, but that is the evidence in this case, and the evidence is 
 what we must be guided by. 
 
 WHAT PORTER SAID BEFORE THE COURT-MARTIAL AS TO THE FORCES IN HIS 
 
 FRONT. 
 
 In order to sustain what I say about that, suppose we take what Mr. 
 Porter says. I want to call the attention of the Senate to this fact. Mr. 
 Porter and his friends insist that there were twenty-five thousand men 
 in his front and that he knew it, and Pope did not. I believe that is 
 the statement. Fitz- John Porter stated to the contrary before the court- 
 martial that there must have been fi-om ten thousand to fifteen thousand 
 men in his front. Now he says there were twenty-five thousand ; the 
 Senator says so, and he knew it then, he says; but yet in his statement 
 before the court-martial Porter said there must have been from ten to fif- 
 teen thousand men. How is it that he did not know then that there 
 were twenty-five thousand, when he now claims that he did know 
 it? If ten thousand, he (Porter) had more men than they had, for his 
 morning report showed that he had thirteen thousand men for duty on 
 the 29th. Twelve thousand five hundred is the estimate that is given 
 by the witnesses. When he believed there were not more than ten or 
 fifteen thousand he would not attack. Now, the Senators who try to 
 excuse him say there were twenty-five thousand. When did they make 
 this grand discovery ? When you come to examine the reports of the 
 confederates showing the number of men that they had in battle that 
 day at Groveton, it turns out that Longstreet had but six thousand 
 men anywhere near where Porter could have got at them at all. All 
 the reports agree in this. Wilcox, who was here on duty in the Senate, 
 makes the same statement as to the number moved to Groveton at 4 
 o'clock. In all the letters that they have written they do not pretend — 
 that is dodged artfully — to state where their troops were that day. 
 
 Six thousand men ! He did not even know that. How could he 
 know anything about it? He was back at Bethel chapel the whole day, 
 five miles away from the enemy. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. Does the Senator want me to answer that question? 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. Certainly. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. You have a recollection of the Buford dispatch? 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. I have. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. That covers the ground. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. Covers what ground? 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. That the troops were there. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. Where? 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. That they passed through Gainesville. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. Does that prove that they were in Porter's front? 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. Certainly. It was the only way they could get 
 there. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. The Senator is an artful man and I like these dodges. 
 Now let me show the Senator the map. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. I know it. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. Yes, you know it; but I will explain it to others who 
 do not know it. There is the road [indicating] . Buford says they 
 were marching on down there. Here was Porter over here [indicating] . 
 
26 
 
 Seventeen regiments of infantry niarclied through Gainesville at 9 
 o'clock, says Buford's dispatch, but he never said they were marching 
 in the direction of Dawkin's Branch. He said they vrere marching 
 on the pike, and that is the pike down to Groveton ; and General Lee 
 in his report says that they marched down the pike to Groveton and 
 went into battle against Pope's left; but the Senator will insist on say- 
 ing they were in front of Porter, while he can not find a scintilla of 
 testimony that supports him in such a statement. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. You will find it in General Longstreet's report and 
 his evidence. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. You do not find General Longstreet saying any such 
 thing. General Longstreet says his corps amounted to twenty-five 
 thousand men, and I do not doubt that; but in his report he tells us 
 that all his corps were in the fight at Groveton except one division. I 
 know what Longstreet says. He says that he had twenty -five thou- 
 sand men in his command, and if this man had attacked him any time 
 after 12 o'clock he would have been terribly abused, but does not say 
 his men were on the ground. I have his evidence, and here is his report 
 made as soon after as possible, which says that D. H. Anderson came 
 up on the 30th late in the day. 
 
 I ask the Senator whether he takes the report of a man made imme- 
 diately after a battle ? Mr. Longstreet and several other gentlemen 
 who belonged to the confederate army have tried to make this matter 
 as easy as possible for Fitz-John Porter; nobody doubts that. But I 
 am taking their reports as they made them, the report of Lee, of Long- 
 street, of Jackson, and the whole of them, and they aU agree that these 
 troops were in the battle at Groveton on the 29th and not in front of 
 Porter. And will any Senator tell me that the reports of Jackson, of 
 Longstreet, of Lee, of Wilcox, of Hood, of Evans, and of all these men 
 who were under Longstreet and engaged in battle that day, made vnth- 
 in the next few days, are not true, and that Longstreet after loss of 
 memory in twenty years shall contradict the whole thing; which, how- 
 ever, he does not do? No, sir; I defy any man to take the reports of 
 the confederates themselves and disprove the statement I have made; 
 they prove it, sustain it in every particular. And nowhere in the evi- 
 dence of any of them do they contradict the fact that the troops I men- 
 tion were engaged at Groveton on the 29th. 
 
 THE 4.30 OEDER. 
 
 Now let us examine the 4.30 order, which was as follows: 
 
 Headquabters in the Field, August 29 — i.30 p. m. 
 Majge-General, Poeter : Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's 
 right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's 
 flank, and if possible on his rear, keeping your right in communication with 
 General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but c;in 
 be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use 
 your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are 
 obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close com- 
 munication with the right wing. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-General, Commanding. 
 
 General Pope was near the right of his line. General Ricketts was 
 with him, and kept note of the movement of troops on that day. Gen- 
 eral McDowell withdrew from Porter at about 12 o'clock with his di- 
 vision, and he went from Bethel chapel up the Sudley Springs road 
 until he struck the pike rurming to Groveton ; he took that, and arrived 
 there and put his division in battle on the left center. At the time 
 he was going into battle, when he reported to Pope, he (Pope) had con- 
 cluded to make a movement along the whole line and to assault the 
 
27 
 
 enemy at every point. So he sent an order to Porter then to assault 
 and strike the enemy on his right flank or in tlie rear; that he must do it 
 at once, and the men under McDowell moved forward; his whole army 
 moved forward. It was about 6 o'clock, when it moved forward, and 
 he expected Porter to do the same thing. Instead of that, he (Pope) had 
 Longstreet's whole corps, except Jones's division, in his front at Groveton, 
 and Porter, lying with his arms stacked for three miles along the road, 
 never moved nor did he fire a shot. Was there any excuse for that? 
 They say he did not receive the order in time. When did he receive 
 the order ? He says at 6. 30. The Senator said yesterday at 6. 30. The 
 evidence, however, does not bear him out in that statement. 
 
 I know the fact that when a Senator makes a statement it is some- 
 times taken against the sworn testimony of the witnesses if it serves 
 the purpose, but it does not serve mine so well. The evidence of 
 Pope's aid who delivered that order, the evidence of the orderly who 
 went with him, is that it could not have been later than half after 
 5 o'clock when that order was delivered. The sun on the 29th day 
 of August, 1862, set at 6.36, and he received the order at half past 5. 
 But suppose he did not receive it until 6.30. Take that for granted for 
 the sake of the argument. He had then nearly two hours of daylight 
 in which to have made his assault; and will any man tell me that 
 Longstreet was right in his front ? If Longstreet was immediately in 
 front Porter did not have far to go to strike the enemy, and why did he 
 not do it ? Why did not that soldier — whom Senators speak of as being 
 a grand soldier — strike the enemy ? It may be very well for Senators to 
 say that he was a man of great experience ; he was a man of great gen- 
 ius; he knew more than Pope. That is the argument. Pope was an 
 ignoramus and tliis man was a wise man ; and therefore, being a wise 
 man, he knew better than to fight when he was ordered to fight, because 
 the man that ordered him did not know as much as he did ! 
 
 Fitz-John Porter is a man of great imagination, and a man who thinks 
 he can overturn the history of the country, and that he does find help 
 to do it I agree He finds help on this side that he ought not to find ; 
 he finds men helping him who ought not to assist, but still they are 
 found. 
 
 WHAT PREVENTED THE ASSAULT? 
 
 Now let US see for a moment whether he could have assaulted or not. 
 I repeated a moment ago from history the fact that at the great battle 
 of Waterloo the last assault made by Napoleon's guards on the guards of 
 the Iron Duke (Wellington), was made after 8 o'clock on the 18th day 
 of June, 1815, and there tl^e order was given by Wellington that has 
 gone down into history, ' ' Up, guards, and at them ! ' ' And at 9 o'clock 
 Wellington formed his line and moved forward and broke the French 
 army into pieces; and yet Fitz-John Porter could not move at 6.30, 
 when the Senator says that he had his troops up at Dawkin's Branch 
 deployed ready to attack ! Why did he not do it? 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. Will the Senator allow me to interrupt him? 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. Certainly. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. The head of his column was deployed ready for an 
 attaek, but his whole troops were not in line, the joint order did not 
 contemplate the fighting of a battle at that place, but it contemplated 
 going to Bull Run. He was in a position to hold himself to protect his 
 own column on the road and to hold Longstreet there. 
 
 Another item I would call the Senator's attention to: the twilight 
 at Brussels is entirely different from the twilight at Bull Run; it lasts 
 about two hours later. 
 
28 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. If the gentleman would take two hours off, we should 
 have it exactly, and in doing that Wellington's attack would, accord- 
 ing to the Senator, be an hour after dark. So that does not help the 
 Senator's case. 
 
 I wish to answer the Senator in the .same way he tries to answer me. 
 He says the reason was that the joint order did not contemplate an at- 
 tack. That was the order issued in the morning. I am talking about 
 the order of 4.30, which directed him to attack at once; but the Senator 
 says because the previous order did not contemplate an attack, therefore 
 he had no right to obey the 4. 30 order. In other words, to illustrate: if 
 the rebellion is going on and I am ordered to move on Jackson, Miss. , 
 from Vicksburg and to be there at a certain time, because the troops at 
 Jackson were going to attack, and I meet some troops on the road, I say, 
 "Well, I will not fight these fellows, because lam ordered to go to 
 Jackson before I fight. " [Laughter.] That is the reasoning of the 
 Senator. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. The Senator drew a comparison between Wellington 
 at Waterloo and Porter on Dawkin's Branch. He is perfectly right 
 about the time at Waterloo, but there had been a fight going on there 
 all day in open sight, open view. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. So there had been at Bull Eun since 9 o'clock. 
 
 Mr. SEWELL. There I differ with the Senator in opinion, and I say 
 there the Guard were in line and they could not help it. 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. The difference is this: Napoleon's Guard had not been 
 in the battle at all at Waterloo, and they never engaged until 8 o'clock, 
 when they were ordered to assault the guards of Wellington. That is 
 just the position this man Fitz-John Porter was in. They were the 
 reserve of Napoleon's army and had not been engaged in battle, but 
 they assaulted at 8 o'clock and Wellington assaulted at 9. The battle 
 had been going on the major part of the day, and so had the battle of 
 Bull Eun from 9 o'clock in the morning until 9 o'clock at night, and 
 yet your friend did not assault ! No time in the day was proper for 
 him to assault and no part of his column was in action. 
 
 Mr. EDMUNDS. You mean that the cannon were still firing at half 
 past 8? 
 
 Mr. LOGAN. I mean the battle was still going on at 9 o'clock and 
 did not cease until that time. I mean that McDowell's corps com- 
 menced its battleat 6 o'clock and continued to 9 o'clock, as the reports 
 on both sides show. Assault after assault was made, and yet Porter's 
 Army Corps coidd not assault but the confederates could. Longstreet's 
 corps could assault at Groveton at 8 o'clock at night, moving down at 4 
 o'clock to do it, but we could not do it. Oh, sir, it is a bandbox sol- 
 dier that must only fight by sunlight. When did Sheridan ever ask 
 for daylight, if necessary to save a battle ? 
 
 A FEW COMPARISONS. 
 
 I should like to give a little experience here just for the benefit of the 
 Senator. I do not know whether any of my friends on the other side 
 were there or not. If they were, they left early; they will remember 
 that. At the battle of Eesaca General Thomas E. Woods, the brother 
 of Judge Woods, of the Supreme Bench, commanded a division, and Judge 
 Woods commanded one of his brigades. They were in my command. 
 At 9 o'clock at night at Eesaca, under my orders, General Woods as- 
 saulted the line of works of the rebels, a curtain running from the fort 
 down to the river, and took it when it was so dark that you could not 
 see where the line of works was. I sat on my horse and could only 
 tell the position of either side by the flash of the guns. 
 
29 
 
 Talk about being destroyed ! I will give you an instance of one bri- 
 gade at the battle of Baker's Creek, where thirty thousand of the enemy 
 were opposed to two divisions of our troops. One brigade, a small 
 brigade at that, under my orders marched two miles down a ravine and 
 moved into the rear of those thirty thousand men and opened on them, 
 scattered and dispersed them, and we captured much of their artillery 
 and nearly as many men as the brigade itself had. Qf cotirse it took 
 its chances; but it did it. If Fitz-John Porter had performed his duty 
 as well as that little brigade did the Army of Virginia would not have 
 been depleted as it was on that day. 
 
 THE POSITION PORTER OCCUPIED THAT DAY. 
 
 Having disposed, as I believe at least, of the question of the number 
 of troops in front of Fitz-John Porter at that time, let us come back to 
 the proposition for a moment and see the position he occupied during 
 that day, to show whether he intended to engage in the contest. As I 
 said, his troops were lying on the road from three to four miles, with 
 arms stacked, during the day. He had but two regiments deployed at 
 any time during the whole day, and then he withdrew them and put 
 them in the brush. Further than that, when he received that order, 
 will the Senator insist that he ever told one of his officers, staff officers 
 or anybody else, that he had received an order to attack ? The evidence 
 shows that when that order was delivered to him he was lying down 
 undera tree resting. The order was handed to him; he read it, folded 
 it up, and put it in his vest pocket. General Sykes, who was sitting by 
 his side, testifies that Porter never told him what the order was ; that 
 he never knew that Porter had received an order to attack. Morell says 
 the same. Every commander that he had who has given testimony at 
 all testifies that he did not give them any information that he was di- 
 rected to attack at any time or any place. So when he sent word to 
 Morell to put his command in line, Morell says that he was deploying 
 his regiment, and while he was deploying it he got an order to with- 
 draw it and go into camp for the night. 
 
 Fitz-John Porter was charged with having allowed some of his officers 
 to retreat during the day. That has been persistently denied. The 
 evidence does show that when General Sturgis reported to him with his 
 brigade and informed him that there was a battery being established in 
 his front and called his attention especially to it, he said no, and gave 
 Sturgis an order not to move forward and assault the enemy. But what 
 was the order? To move back to Manassas and go into a defensive 
 position. That was the order that Sturgis received, and the only one 
 received that day from Fitz-John Porter. Sturgis went into the bat- 
 tle, but he did not go in by the order of Porter. He himself moved his 
 troops to the front and engaged with the enemy on the next morning. 
 
 When Porter was ordered to bring his whole command on the battle- 
 field, Griffith's brigade, a part of Porter's command, retired to Centre- 
 ville, and remained at Centreville during the whole battle. It came 
 there on the night of the 29th and remained there, and never fired a 
 gun. Piatt commanded a brigade, and he makes the statement and pub- 
 lishes it to the world that he received no orders at all. He reported 
 that day, and the only way he got into the battle was by going on his 
 own motion and engaging in the battle on the 30th. He received no 
 orders whatever from Porter. In all the evidence an order can not be 
 found that Porter ever gave to a solitary regiment, brigade, or division 
 to engage in the battle, or even in a skirmish, with the enemy at any 
 time during that day. 
 
 Porter received the order I will say at 5. 30 o'clock. The Senator says 
 at 6.30 o'clock. What was the order ? To move at once, and attack 
 
30 
 
 the enemy on the right flank and in rear, if possible, keeping his right 
 well refused, so as to strike back on the left of Pope's line, using his 
 artillery freely. That was the order given to Porter. Will you tell me 
 why he did not attempt to obey that order ? There has not been an order 
 given to Porter up to the present time that he obeyed, except to move 
 forward, which he did to Dawkin's Branch, and there stopped. Then, 
 instead of starting at 6 o'clock in the morning when he was ordered, he 
 did not start until 9 o'clock. In all this case I defy any friend of Fitz- 
 .Tohn Porter to put his finger on one order requiring immediate action 
 which he obeyed. He utterly refused to obey any order given to him 
 either to move or to fight. 
 
 ONE OP poeter's excuses for refusing to fight. 
 
 Suppose we take it for granted that Longstreet had twenty-five thou- 
 sand men drawn up in line right in Porter's front, what of it? Does 
 a man always expect to fight inferior forces ? Many times during the 
 late war the confederates fought us with one-half the number we had. 
 We fought them sometimes with one-half the number they had. The 
 only rule of warfare that I know is to strike the enemy where you find 
 him, if your army is engaged. To say that a man shall not fight because 
 he expects to be whipped is something new in military science. It is some- 
 thing that I have never been taught before. Since I came to the Senate 
 I have learned that this is the idea of some gentlemen, but never dur- 
 ing my little experience in the Army did I so understand it. 
 
 Speaking of small armies assaulting great ones, the world's history 
 is full of such cases. At the battle of Marathon the Athenians, a handful 
 almost, in the afternoon assaulted the Persian hordes and drove them 
 from the land, slaying six thousand of the Persians, when only about 
 two hundred of the Athenians were slaughtered, owing to the impetu- 
 osity of the assault. 
 
 Now let me contrast this man's conduct on the 29th of August with 
 the conduct of an officer at the battle of Marengo. There, when the 
 battle was lost, when the troops were leaving the field, when Dessaix 
 said the sun was receding and the enemy advancing, that great sol- 
 dier, who fell in that conflict, with six thousand men moved forward 
 without orders, assaulted the enemy, and turned defeat into victory. 
 So, too, this man could have done if he had obeyed his orders; but he 
 failed to do it, failed in every instance. 
 
 I could name quite a number of victories won by an army inferior in 
 numbers in our war. When Vicksburg was flrst surrounded with thirty 
 thousand men inside its walls we had only twenty -seven thousand men 
 to impale them there, and miles of our line were only held by a skirmish 
 line. The enemy did not know it, however. It was a mere picket line, 
 that' they could have gone through any day or night. They supposed 
 of course that there was a column of troops behind, but it was not true. 
 In many instances throughout the late war cases of the kind occurred. 
 Yet, forsooth, to-day a man with twelve thousand five hundred troops 
 fails to assault an enemy for fear that he will be whipped. A man is a 
 good commander who can possibly command more than that number of 
 troops in a battle. He may command a corps with his division com- 
 manders having their orders to manage their divisions; he may com- 
 mand an army with his corps commanders having their orders, but the 
 immediate control of twelve thousand troops in a battle will be satis- 
 factory to the genius of almost any man in military affairs. 
 
 THE real, question IN THE CASE. 
 
 There is but one more point in this case that I desire to discuss. The 
 Senator from New Jersey has said that Fitz- John Porter was a good 
 
31 
 
 soldier prior to this time. I do not dispute it. He says he did well 
 the next day. I do not dispute that. It was absolutely necessary for 
 him to do something on the next day. After our army was broken to 
 pieces perhaps he had to help. Nobody questions that. The question 
 before the Senate is not whether a man has been a good soldier or a poor 
 soldier. The question before the court-martial was: Did he disobey his 
 orders; were they lawful; could they have been obeyed? 
 
 THE LAST ORDER ISStJED BY POPE TO PORTER ON THE 29TH. 
 
 General Pope, finding that it was impossible to have Porter obey any 
 of his orders, finally issued the following order, directing him to march 
 on the battlefield and report to him, with his command, in person, also 
 to note the time of the receipt of the order, for the reason that Porter 
 had avoided noting the time of the sending or receiving of any orders 
 or dispatches during that day: 
 
 Headquarters Army op Virginia, 
 J»i the Field, near Bull Run, August 29, 1862—8.50 p. m. 
 General : Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiv- 
 ing which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of 
 battle of to-day, and report to me in person for orders. You are to understand 
 that you are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on 
 the field within three hours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow 
 morning. 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Major-General, Commanding. 
 Maj. Gen. F. J. Porter. 
 
 The very issuing of the above is proof that Pope could not get Porter 
 to obey any of his orders, and in fact this order was not literally obeyed, 
 as Porter did not bring his whole command on the field of battle on the 
 30th. 
 
 With all these facts before us who can say that he was unjustly found 
 guilty ? 
 
 The maxim of Napoleon, "to always march to the sound of the ene- 
 my's guns," was totally unheeded by Porter. 
 
 To sum up his condupt on the 29th in brief: The battle began at 
 Groveton at 9 o'clock the 29th; hewasatDawkin'sBranchat 12o'clock, 
 on a plain road to Gainesville, within two miles of Pope's left, where the 
 battle was raging; he had his troops stack arms along the road from 
 Bethel chapel to Dawkin's Branch, a distance of three miles ; his troops 
 did not move from their position of resting during the whole day. The 
 sound of battle was heard by his command during the entire day until 
 9 o'clock at night; he was ordered to move to Gainesville in the morn- 
 ing — to push forward. He was ordered to join his right on Pope's 
 left ; he was ordered to attack the enemy. He did not obey these orders ; 
 he did not try to obey any or either of them. He heard the shock of 
 battle, the shouts of triumph and despair, but he moved not while 
 the red-throated cannon belched forth missiles of death ; while mus- 
 ketry rattled as the long-roll on a thousand drums; while infantry as- 
 saulted and cavalry charged ; while men fell in death's embrace and the 
 wounded cried for.help; while the blood of his comrades flowed like 
 water. While his commanding officer and his fellow-soldiers anxiously 
 listened for the sound of his guns, he lay beneath the shade of a tree, 
 putting his orders in his pocket, without informing his officers what they 
 directed him to do. Sir, does history record such action in any soldier 
 prior to this time ? Where is the man other than Porter that ever lay 
 with twelve thousand men who were panting to move to the aid ot 
 comrades within two miles of a battle for nine weary hours without 
 firing a gun or even trying to ascertain if he could be of any assistance ? 
 
 Sir, no such case can be found; and we are asked to condemn the 
 court-martial that convicted him for his disobedience of orders. Was 
 
32 
 
 ever such request made by such a man ? The only information sent by 
 him during the day to his superiors was that he was going to retire or 
 retreat to Manassas, and this was received just as the battle was hottest. 
 Dust, sir, dust, was his only excuse. Men in buckram haunted him all 
 the day. Let the many widows and orphans made that day and the 
 many graves of brave men who fell on that field, bear testimony against 
 him in all time to come. 
 
 This thing of sympathy for a man because he has been punished for 
 disobedience of orders is one thing, but the law and the just verdict of 
 a court is another. You are not asked to sympathize with this man. 
 You are asked to overturn the verdict of a court. You are asked to de- 
 clare the law contrary to what the law was as expounded by that court. 
 You are asked to reverse the verdict of a lawfully constituted tribunal. 
 You are asked to reverse the record made by the President of the United 
 States. I ask you whether you can do it as a legal proposition ? You 
 may do it in violation of the law, you may do it in violation of right and 
 justice in reference to military conduct, but when you do that, do not 
 place it upon the ground that you sympathize with this man, and are 
 justified in youi action. 
 
 Our sympathy goes out to all humanity. The poor down-trodden man 
 in Europe has our sympathy. The poor man in this country has our 
 sympathy. The man who has to labor night and day should have our 
 sympathy ; the sick, the sore, and distressed should have our sympathy ; 
 and our sympathy should lead us to do what? To extend to them food 
 or raiment, to give them employment or aid them in all proper ways, 
 but not to do that which overrides law. It is not that which will 
 override justice; it is not that which will override the principles which 
 underlie this Government, and destroy the morale of our grand little 
 Army, that can be justified on the ground of sympathy. 
 
 THIS BII^L ESTABLISHES A DANGEROUS AND BAD PRECEDENT. 
 
 Mr. President, when every day poor, unfortu^nate, crippled officers are 
 having their bills to put them on the retired-list referred to the Mili- 
 tary Committee reported against, and why ? Because they were dis- 
 missed from the service or because they resigned from the service, and 
 therefore are not in law entitled to be put back. That has been the 
 rule in the Congress of the United States, and the exception to the 
 rule is made in favor of a man who was dismissed from the service for 
 wanton disobedience of orders in the time of a great battle. And this 
 is to be made the exception. Why? Will some Senator tell me? 
 Why are these appeals made? I ask when the soldier who sleeps in 
 the far-ofi" grave is forgotten, when only his name is known by the 
 monument that is above him, saying that he fought for his country, and 
 that is all ; when he is remembered by a poor little pension to his heirs, 
 a man who stood with his musket in time of battle with courage against 
 the enemy, this pittance is allowed to his heirs; for what? For his loy- 
 alty, for being true to his Government, for obeying orders even to the 
 loss of life. But here comes a man who failed his superior officers, who 
 was dismissed from service, and asks to be reinstated — reinstated for 
 what? For disobedience of orders; for failing when failure was dis- 
 aster. He asks you to put him back in the Army, to be supported 
 with a $3,000 salary as long as he may live. For what? Sir, if this 
 man is to be restored, where is the Union officer that was wounded in 
 battle, where is the crippled officer to-day, whether he belonged to the 
 regular Army or to the volunteers, who would not be entitled to the 
 same consideration? Yet the Senate would not vote for it. I tell you, 
 Mr. President, make not these distinctions; make not this record. 
 It is not one of honor, nor do I believe the country will so regard it. 
 
33 
 
 EQUALITY AND JUSTICE TO THE PEOPLE. 
 
 I have tried to hurry through and not detain the Senate too long. I 
 say, in conclusion, that the war for the Union was fought to preserve a 
 great Government, to preserve the rights of citizens, to give them pro- 
 tection under the law, and to secure equality of rights and justice be- 
 fore the law. If this act of wrong, as I deem it, shall be perpetrated 
 by the Congress of the United States, it will be declaring that those who 
 failed in the hour of trial are those who shall be honored in the hour of 
 triumph ; it will be declaring to the world that the record of those in the 
 Army who failed at the important time is as good as that of those who 
 sustained the Government; that the honor and glory of the whole Army 
 ■of the United States shall not be maintained alone by the honors it 
 won, but shall be maintained by the honors lost by its unworthy mem- 
 bers. When we returned to our homes and our peaceful pursuits, when 
 the armies of a million of men melted away into the paths of peace, we 
 then expected, and ought to expect now, that nothing would be done by 
 Congress at least that would mar that thought that should be in every 
 man's mind, that equality and justice should be done to all according 
 to the laws and Constitution of our land, that justice should be done 
 the living and that justice also should be meted out to the reputation 
 of the dead. 
 
 So then for the honor of this nation let not its representatives mar 
 the record that loyalty made in behalf of this great Government and 
 for the benefit of this people. 
 
 I have deemed it to be my duty as a member of this body to oppose 
 at all times a proposition of this character, because I believe it to be 
 wrong in theory and certainly wrong in ijractice. I believe it will de- 
 moralize the Army and have a demoralizing effect upon the country. 
 
 DANGER OP THE FIRST STEP. 
 
 I say in all kindness to the other side of this Chamber (it will perhaps 
 have no effect), your course, assisted by a few of our side in this case, 
 will prevent the people of this country as long as you shall proceed in 
 this way from having confidence that you intend to administer the af- 
 fairs of the Government fairly. The opening of the doors for Fitz- John 
 Porter does not mean Fitz-John Porter. It means breaking down the 
 barrier, the wall between the good and the bad and those who failed in 
 time of trial and those who did their duty. It means opening the door 
 on the retired-list to Porter and to other men who failed us in our trials 
 who shall follow in his wake. It means more. I do not care what a 
 few gentlemen who were in the Union Army may say. I do not care 
 Avhat a few gentlemen who were not in the Union Army may say ; but 
 the great body of the American people do not believe in breaking down 
 the barriers between the men who tailed in time of need and the men 
 who stood at their posts. 
 
 When I say that, I am speaking of our loyal people. I mean that the 
 people do not believe in your coming here to regulate courts-martial for 
 us, that we settled during the war. They do not believe it is just; 
 they do not believe it is right. I am speaking the truth to you, and the 
 people will emphasize it hereafter. Let your confederacy regulate its 
 own courts-martial while it existed in opposition to this Union, but do 
 not come here from under that flag with numbers sufficient to put dis- 
 graced men back in the Army, to cast slurs upon our men who did 
 their duty, to trample in the dust the authority that suppressed your 
 confederacy. Let not your feelings go that far. If they do, I tell you 
 that more years than you think will pass over your heads before you 
 will have the confidence of the American people. 
 Lo 3 
 
34 
 
 There are some Mends on this side of the Chamber who join with th<* 
 other side. They are entitled to their views. I say to them, you will 
 open the doors to danger in this country when you do this act. It is 
 not an act of kindness to this man ; it is an act of isijustice to the Army; 
 it is an act of injustice to the loyal people of this country; it is an act of 
 injustice to the memory of Lincoln and those who were associated with 
 him at the time; it is trampling under foot the law and the facts. You 
 who were the friends in the hour of trial, you who stood by then, should 
 not falter now. You are to-day doing that which you would not have 
 done ten years ago. But to-day the consciences of some people are getting 
 so easy that we must do everything that is asked for men who failed 
 us in the hour of our greatest danger, ibr men who are entitled to noth- 
 ing except what they received. We are asked in charity which is no 
 charity to violate the law, to violate the proper rules of civil conduct, 
 to violate the judgment of a court, to violate the order of a President 
 made according to law and in justice, as shown at that time and now. 
 I hope at least that men who have stood by the country in the hour of 
 trial will not weaken in the hour of triumph in the interest of those 
 whose triumph would have proved disastrous to the country. 
 
 The conscientious feeling that I have performed my duty according 
 to my honest convictions to my country, to the honor of our now 
 faithful little Army, to my comrades in arms during the war, to the 
 living and the dead that took part in the judgment of the court, to the 
 loyal people that loved this country and helped to save it, shall be in 
 my own breast through life my reward for my action in this case. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 EVIDENCE, REPORTS, AND ORDERS IN THE FITZ-JOHN PORTER CASE. 
 
 Badeau on the subject of marches, says: 
 
 It was late in the evening before Grant reached Burkeville, ■where he found 
 that Orel had moved to Rice's Station and intrenched in front of Lee. The g:en- 
 eral-in-chief at once reported the situation to the Government. 
 
 And here is his dispatch : 
 
 The troops are pushing now, though it is after night, and they have had no- 
 rest for more than one week. 
 
 That was the way General Grant moved armies. 
 
 Now let me show what General Grant uuderetauds by an imperative 
 order, by an order that means to be obeyed. Here is his language on 
 page 586 of the third volume of the Military History of U. S. Grant, by 
 Badeau: 
 
 I am moving the cavalry column on Appomattox depot. There are eight 
 trains of cars at that point to supply Lee's army. Everything is being run out 
 of Lyncliburg toward Danville. Our troops are reported at Liberty. This must 
 be Stoiieman. 
 
 When Croolc received his orders to rejoin Sheridan he was very unwilling ta 
 obey, and went in person to Grant to complain. 
 
 Crook did not disobey Sheridan's order, but he went to Grant. He 
 was ordered by Grant to report to Sheridan, but was unwilling to obey, 
 and he went to Grant; for what? To be excused from obeying the 
 order. What did he say ? 
 
 His troops — 
 
 Crook said — 
 were tired and worn ; they had marched all day, forded the river, and fought a 
 battle, in which they had been repelled. Not a thousand men were fit to move. 
 
 What did Grant say ? 
 
 But Grant was peremptory ; the emergency was immediate ; Sheridan had 
 asked, and Crook was obliged to conform. Accordingly, the cavalry crossect 
 the stream again in the night and set out to rejoin Sheridan. 
 
35 
 
 Now let me read again about marches day and night. On page 596 
 of the same volume you will find this: 
 
 Ord marched his men from daylight on the 8th until daylight on the 9th of 
 April, halting only three hours on the road — a terrible march ; but the men un- 
 derstood that they were conquering theiff enemy as effectually by marching as 
 by fighting, and did not murmur. Griffin did as well as Ord. His troops marched 
 twenty-nine miles and bivouacked at 2 a. m. on the 9th; then moved again at 4, 
 and reached Sheridan's position at 6, just as Lee was approaching in heavy force 
 to batter his way through the cavalry. 
 
 Again — 
 
 Crook was soon hotly engaged. He ran his guns to the front and held his 
 ground in spite of a heavy onset of the enemy, for the rebels must make their 
 way through now orall ^vas lost. Lee's force was infantry and greatly outnum- 
 bered Sheridan, and the cavalry leader soon sent back, urging Ord to hasten for- 
 ward ; at the same time he directed Crook to fall back slowly and sacrifice no 
 more men in trying to check this heavy force. Gibbon, Griffin, and a division 
 of colored troops were ensconced in the woods waiting for orders to advance. It 
 looked as if Sheridan was deserting the field and meant to allow the rebel army 
 to pass. Lee's men gave once more the battle-yell and quickened their pace and 
 doubled their fire, when suddenly, the cavalry having all retired, the infantry 
 line emerged from the woods, and the rebellion was over. 
 
 Now, let us go further, to show some of these marches: 
 
 All night the Army of the Potomac marched, though it had been allowed no 
 rest for live full days and nearly as many nights; marched without food ; as its 
 commander said, "As ready to die from fatigue and starvation as from the bul- 
 lets of the enemy." 
 
 On page 622 of Badeau's Military History of U. S. Grant I find: 
 
 The marvelous marching, not only of Sheridan but of the men of the Fifth 
 and Twenty-fourth Corps, was doing as much as a battle to bring the rebellion 
 to a close. Twenty -eight, thirty-two, thirty-five miles a day in succession these 
 infantry soldiers marched — all day and all night. From daylight till daylight 
 again, after more than a week of labor and fatigues almost une.tampled, they 
 pushed on to intercept their ancient adversary, whiletheremainder ofthe Army 
 of the Potomac was at his heels. 
 
 grant's opinion op the porter case in 1874. 
 
 Washington, April 18, 1874. 
 
 Mr. President : It is no doubt known to you that General Fitz-John Porter 
 claims to have procured evidence since his trial, not attainable at the time, which 
 ■would either acquit him of the crime of which he stands convicted or greatly 
 modify the findings and sentence ofthe court-martial before which he was tried, 
 and that he has embodied in a printed pamphlet the kind and character of this 
 evidence and what he expects to establish by it, together with an appeal for a 
 rehearing of his case. 
 
 It is widely asserted by those who sympathize with him. and probably believed 
 by many who have no personal interestin his case, that influences hostile to him 
 have restrained you from examining this statement of his case, and have thus 
 worked great injustice by preventing the Executive from considering state- 
 ments or evidence ^vhich might vindicate his character. 
 
 It is needless to say to you that I have never used any influence with you, per- 
 sonal or other, to prevent the investigation of his statements, nor even intimated 
 to you in any maitner that I objected to any action you might think proper to 
 take in the matter. 
 
 Nevertheless, as I do not wish even to seem to consent to any additional mis- 
 conceptions concerning me or my action in this case, I beg (if you have not al- 
 ready done so) that you will yourself, Blr. President, examine "as fully into the 
 question as you think justice or mercy demands; orthatyou^vill ordera board 
 of competent officers of high rank, unconnected with the armies or transact ions 
 involved, to investigate fully the statements of this new evidence made by Gen- 
 eral Porter, and report to you what, if any, bearing it would have upon the find- 
 ings and sentence of his court-martial, even if it could be fully estaljlished. 
 I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
 
 JOHN POPE, 
 Brigadier-General, U. S. A. 
 
 General U. S. Grant, 
 
 President of the United States. 
 
 Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C, May 9, 1874. 
 My Dear General : Your letter of the 18th of April, in regard to your position 
 in the matter of a rehearing ofthe Fitz-John Porter court-martial, was duly re- 
 ceived. You are under the apprehension that I had not fully examined the case. 
 
36 
 
 or rather that the public so thought, and that you had used means to prevent 
 me from giving the subject fair consideration. 
 
 In reply, I will make two emphatic statements: First, to the best of my recol- 
 leciion I have never had but one letter from you on this subject prior to the one 
 I am now answering, and that simply contained the request that if I contemplated 
 reopening the case that I examine both sides. I read during the trial the evi- 
 dence and the final findings of the court, looking upon the whole trial as one of 
 great importance, and particularly so to the Army and Navy. When General 
 Porter's subsequent defense was published, I received a copy of it and read it 
 with care and attention, determined if he had been wronged and I could right 
 him I would do so. My conclusion was, that no new facts were developed that 
 could be fairly considered, and that it was of doubtful legality whether by the 
 mere authority of the Executive a rehearing could be given. 
 Yours, truly, 
 
 U. S. GRANT. 
 General John Pope, U. S. A. 
 True copies : 
 
 C. S. ILSLEY, 
 Captain and Aid-de-Camp. 
 
 porter's animus toward pope. 
 
 Porter received liis order from Pope at about 9.30 at night. Prior 
 to that time he wrote a letter to General Ambrose E. Burnside, of this 
 character: 
 
 Waerknton, 27— p. ra. 
 To General Burnside : 
 
 Morell left his medicine, ammunition, and baggage at Kelly's Ford. Can you 
 have it hauled to Fredericksburg and stored ? His wagons were all sent to you 
 for grain and ammunition. I have sent back to you every man of the First and 
 Sixth New York Cavalry except what has been sent to Gainesville. I will get 
 them to you after awhile. Everything here is at sixes and sevens, and I find I 
 am to take care of myself in every respect. Our line of communication has 
 taken care of itself, in compliance with orders. The army has not three days' 
 provision. The enemy captured all Pope's and other clothing; and from Mc- 
 Dowell the same, including liquors. No guards accompanying the trains, and 
 small ones guard bridges. The ^vagons are rolling on, and I shall be here to- 
 morrow. Good night ! 
 
 F. J. PORTER, Major-Oeneral. 
 
 Porter was not satisfied with bis first letter. At about 4 o'clock, 
 August 27, 1863, the same day, he wrote another letter, as follows: 
 
 W.'^rrenton Junction, August 27, 1862 — i p. m. 
 General Burnside, Falmouth : 
 
 I send you the last order from General Pope, which indicates the future as 
 well as the present. Wagons are rolling along rapidly to the rear as if a mighty 
 power was propelling them. I see no cause for alarm, though I think this order 
 may cause it. McDowell moves on Gainesville, where Sigel now is. The latter 
 got to Buckland Bridge in time to put out the fire and kick the enemy, who is 
 pursuing his route unmolested to the Shenandoah or Loudoun County. The 
 forces are Longstreet's, A. P. Hill's, Jackson's, Whiting's, Ewell's, and Ander- 
 son's (late Huger's) divisions. Longstreet is said by a deserter to be very strong. 
 They have much artillery and long v.'agon trains. 
 
 The raid on the railroad was near Cedar Run, and made by a regiment of in- 
 fantry, two squadrons of cavalry, and a section of artillery. The place was 
 guarded by nearly three regiments of infantry and some cavatey. They routed 
 the guard, captured a train and many men, destroyed, the bridge, and retired 
 leisurely down the road toward Manassas. It can be easily repaired. No troops 
 are coming up, except new troops, that I can hear of. Sturgis is here with two 
 regiments. Four were cut off by the raid. The positions of the troops are given 
 in the order. No enemy in our original front. A letter of General Lee, seized 
 when Stuart's assistant adjutant-general was taken, directs Stuart to leave a 
 squadron only to watch in front of Hanover Junction, &c. Everything has 
 moved up north. I find a vast difference between these troops and ours. But I 
 suppose they were new, as they to-day burnt their clothes, &c., when there was 
 not the least cause. 
 
 I hear that they are much disorganized, and needed some good troops to give 
 them heart, and I think head. We are working now to get behind Bull Run, 
 and, I presume, will be there in a few days, if strategy don't use us up. The 
 strategy is magnificent, andtacticsinthe inverse proportion. I would like some 
 of my ambulances. 1 w^ould like, also, to be ordered to return to Fredericks- 
 burg and to push toward Hanover, or, with alarge force to strike at Orange Court 
 House. I wish Sumner was at Washington, and up near the Monocacy with 
 good batteries. I do not doubt the enemy have large amounts of supplies pro- 
 vided for them, and I believe thej- have a contempt for this Army of Virginia. I 
 
37 
 
 wish myself away from it, with all our old Army of the Potomac, and so do our 
 companions. 
 
 I was informed to-day by the best authority that, in opposition to General Pope's 
 views, this army was pushed out to save the Army of the Potomac, an army that 
 could take the best care of itself. Pope says he long since wanted to go behind 
 the Occoquan. I am in great need of ambulances, and the officers need medi- 
 cines, which, for want of transportation, were left behind. I hear many of the 
 sick of my corps are in houses on the road very sick. I thinjc there is no fear of 
 the enemy crossing the Rappahannock. The cavalry are all in the advance of 
 the rebel army. At Kelly's and Barnelt's fords much property was left, in con- 
 sequence of the wagons going down for grain, <fcc. If you can pushup the grain 
 to-night please do so, direct to this place. There is no grain here to-day, or any- 
 where, and this army is wretchedly supplied in that line. Pope says "he never 
 could get enough. Most of this is private. 
 
 F. J. PORTER. 
 
 But if you can get me away, please do so. Make what use of this you choose, 
 so it does good. 
 
 F. J. P. 
 
 GENERAL POPE'S TESTIMONY RELATING TO MOVEMENTS AUGUST 27, 28, AND 29. 
 
 General Pope, the commander of that army, testified as follows: 
 
 Maj. Gen. John Pope was called by the Government, sworn and examined, as 
 follows : 
 
 By the Judge-Advocate : 
 
 Q. Will you state to the court what position you occupy in the military serv- 
 ice of the United States ? 
 
 A. I hold a commission as brigadier-general in the regular Army, and as major- 
 general of volunteers. 
 
 Q. What was your position and command, and what the field of your opera- 
 tions on the 27th of August last ? 
 
 A. Do you mean my military position as commander? 
 
 Q. Yes, sir. 
 
 A. I commanded the Army of Virginia, which, as originally constituted, con- 
 sisted of the army corps of McDowell, Banks, and Fremont. These, by the 27th 
 of August, had been re-enforeed by a portion of General Burnside's command, 
 by General Heintzelman's corps, and on the morning of the 27th by a part of 
 General Porter's corps. A portion of my command also consisted of the troops 
 under General Sturgis, which had begun to come up to Warrenton Jimction. I 
 was myself, on the morning of the 27th, at ^Varrenton Junction. The field of 
 operations of the army at that time covered the region of country between the 
 Warrenton turnpike and the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. 
 
 Q. At what time on the 27th did you leave Warrenton Junction, and in what 
 direction did you march? 
 
 A. I left Warrenton .Junction before midday, I think, though the precise hour 
 I do not remember, and moved east along the railroad, following the movements 
 of Hooker's division, toward Manassas Junction. 
 
 Q. At what time did General Porter arrive with his command, or the portion 
 of his command of which you speak, at Warrenton Junction? 
 
 A. I think between the hours of 7 and 10 o'clock in the morning of the 27th of 
 August. 
 
 Q. How many troops had he then with him ? 
 
 A. He reported to me that he had brought up Sykes's division of regulars, 
 numbering forty-five hundred men. 
 
 Q. Did you see his troops : and, if so, what was their condition ? 
 
 A. I only saw them at a distance as they passed along; not sufficiently near 
 to ascertain anything about that. 
 
 Q. Did you, or not, after you left Warrenton Junction and proceeded along 
 the road east, issue to Major-General Porter an order in reference to the move- 
 ments of his troops ; and, if so, what was the character of that order ? 
 
 A. I issued an order to General Porter late in the afternoon of the 27th, direct- 
 ing him to move with his command at 1 o'clock that night to the position I then 
 occupied at Kettle Run; that if General Morell, with his other division, was not 
 up to Warrenton Junction when he received that order, to send back and hurry 
 him up, and to come forward himself with the troops which he had. That is * 
 my remembrance of the order. I gave him some further directions concerning 
 General Banks's movement, the substance of which I remember very well, but 
 not the precise ^\-ords. 
 
 Q. Will you look at this orcier, which is dated " Headquarters Army of Vir- 
 ginia, August 27, 1862, 6.30 p. m., Bristoe Station. To Major-General F. J. Por- 
 ter, Warrenton Junction," and state whether or not that is the order to which 
 you refer in your answer ? 
 
 A. That is the order I issued. 
 
 (The accused admitted that the order shown to witness is the order, a copy of 
 ■which is set forth in the first specification of the first charge.) 
 
38 
 
 Q. Will you explain to the court the reasons for the urgency of the order, aa 
 indicated by the following: words of the order : " It is necessary on all accounts 
 that you should be here bj^ daylight. I send an officer with this dispatch, who 
 will conduct you to this place? " 
 
 A. General Hooker's division had had a severe fight along the railroad, com- 
 mencing some four miles west of Bristoe Station, and had succeeded in driving 
 the division of General Ewell back along the road, but without putting it to rout; 
 so that at dark Ewell's forces still confronted Hooker's division along the banks 
 of a small stream at Bristoe Station. Just at dark Hooker sent me word, and 
 General Heintzelman also reported to me, that he, Hooker, was almost entirely 
 out of ammunition, having but five rounds to a man left, and that if any action 
 took place in the morning, he would, in consequence, be without the means of 
 making any considerable defense. As it was known that Jackson, with his own 
 and the division of A. P.Hill, was at or in the vicinity of Manassas Junction, and 
 near enough to advance to the support of Ewell, it was altogether probable that 
 if he should learn the weakness of our forces there he would unite and make an 
 attack in the morning. It was for that purpose that I was so anxious that Gen- 
 eral Porter's corps should be present by daylight, the earliest moment at which 
 it was likely the attack would be made. 
 
 Q. What distance would General Porter have had to march to have o)>eycd 
 your orders ? 
 
 A. About nine miles. 
 
 Q. And within what time ; from 1 o'clock until when ? 
 
 A. He would have had until daylight. I do not remember exactly what time 
 daylight was ; perhaps 4 o'clock, perhaps a little earlier. I directed him to move 
 at 1 o'clock, in order to give his command as much time to remain in their beds 
 at nightas possible ; supposing that it would occupy him perhaps three hours to 
 get upon the ground. I had expected him there certainly by 4 o'clock. 
 
 Q. You had just passed over the road along which he was required by this order 
 to march ; will you state its condition ? 
 
 A. The road was in good condition everywhere. At most places along the road 
 it was a double road on each side of the railroad track. I am not sure it was a 
 double road all the way ; a part of the way I know it was. 
 
 Q. Did General Porter obey that order? 
 
 A. He did not. 
 
 Q. At what time on the 28th did he arrive at Bristoe Station, the point indicated 
 in your order? 
 
 A. As the head of his column came to Bristoe Station I took out my watch ; it 
 was twenty minutes past 10 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Q. Did he at that time, or at any time before his arrival, explain to you the rea- 
 son why he did not obey the order? 
 
 A. He wrote me a note, which I received, I think, in the morning of the 28th ; 
 very early in the morning, perhaps a little before daylight. I am not quite sure 
 about the time. The note I have mislaid. I can give the substance of it. I re- 
 member the reasons given by General Porter. If it is necessary to state them I 
 can do so. 
 
 The accused asked if the witness had looked for the note. 
 
 The Witness. I looked for it, but have not been able to find it. 
 
 The Judge-Advocate. I will not press the question. 
 
 The Accused. I do not object to it. The witness says he has looked for the note 
 and can not find it. I only want to know when and where he has searched for it. 
 
 By the Judge- Advocate : 
 
 Q. What was the character of the night ; was it starlight ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir ; as I remember, it was a clear night ; that is my recollection. 
 
 Q. If there were any obstacles in the way of such a march as your order con- 
 templated, either growing out of the night or the character of the road, will you 
 please state them? 
 
 A. There was no difficulty in marching, so far as the night was concerned. I 
 have several times made marches with a larger force than General Porter had 
 during the night. There was some obstruction on the road in a wagon train that 
 was stretched along the road, marching toward the Manassas Junction, in rear 
 of Hooker's division ; not sufficient, in my judgment, to have delayed foracon- 
 siderable length of time the passage of artillery. But even had the roads been 
 entirely blocked up, the railroad track was clear, and along that track had passed 
 .the larger portion of General Hooker's infantry. There was no obstruction to 
 the advance of infantry. 
 
 Q. Whatever obstacle, in point of fact, may have existed to the execution of 
 this order, I ask you, as a military man, was it, or not, the duty of General Porter, 
 receiving this command from you as his superior officer, to have made efforts, 
 and earnest efforts, to obey ? 
 
 A. Undoubtedly it was his duty. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Q. You mentioned that in going from Warrenton Junction toward BristoeSta- 
 tion, on the morning of the 27th of August, you saw many stragglers of Hooker't 
 
39 
 
 command on the railroad ; were they, or not, in sufficient nu mbers to have im- 
 peded the march of infantry along the track ? 
 
 A. Shortly after I started east from Warrenton Junction we came upon the 
 railroad again just east of Cedar Run, and from that time until we reached Bris- 
 toe Station the road was lined with stragglers from Hooker's division Those 
 stragglers commenced singly, then two or three together, then half a dozen un- 
 til we had got three or four or five miles from Warrenton Junction toward the 
 east, when they began to be in bodies of forty or fifty or one hundred together 
 marchmg along the railroad going eastward, between Warrenton Junction and 
 Bristoe Station. I think the most of them had gotten up to their command at 
 Bristoe Station during the night, though I continued to see small bodies of them 
 commg along the railroad track on the morning of the 28th of August They 
 occupied the whole track during the day of the 27th as we were going eastward 
 but all of them, or the larger portion of them, got to Bristoe Station during the 
 night of the 27th of August. 
 
 Q. Were there, to your knowledge, any openings in the track, such as to have 
 made it dangerous for infantry to march along said track at night? 
 
 A. Along the road between Warrenton Junction to Kettle Run, which is per- 
 haps three miles west from Bristoe Station, the track had been torn up in places • 
 but during the day of the 27th of August I directed Captain Morrell, of the en- 
 gineers, with a considerable force, to repair the track up to the bridge over Ket- 
 tle Run, which had been burned. He reported to me, on the night of the 27th 
 that he had done so ; so that from Warrenton Junction to the bridge over Kettle 
 Run there was no obstruction on the railroad of any description. The bridge at 
 Kettle Run had been burned ; but a hundred yards above the bridge the road 
 crossed the creek by a ford, and from there toward Bristoe the most of the coun- 
 try — in fact, nearly the whole of it — was open country. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF CAPT. DEAKE DE KAY— OPER.4TIONS ON AUGUST 27, 28, AND 29. 
 
 I now give the testimony of Captain De Kay, on page 43 of the gen- 
 eral court-martial record: 
 
 Capt. Drake De Kay was then called by the Government, sworn, and exam- 
 ined as follows : 
 
 By the Judge-Advocate : 
 
 Q. Will you state what position you hold in the military service " 
 
 A. First lieutenant, of the Fourteenth Infantry. 
 
 Q. What position did you hold during the campaign of the Army of Virginia 
 under the command of General Pope? 
 
 A. Aid-de-camp to General Pope. 
 
 Q. Did you, or not, on the 27th of August last, bear a written order from Major- 
 General Pope to Major-General Porter, who was then, I believe, at Warrenton 
 Junction? 
 
 A. I did. 
 
 Q. Do you remember distinctly the character of that order, and would you be 
 able to recognize it again upon having it read to y.ou? 
 
 A. I did not read it. 
 
 Q. Did you, or not, after its delivery to General Porter, learn from him its 
 character ? 
 
 A. I was aware of its character by word of mouth, either from General Pone 
 or from his chief of staff. * 
 
 Q. Will you state its character as you understood it? 
 
 A. That he was to proceed at 1 o'clock that night to move up to Bristoe Station 
 with his command. 
 
 Q. Do you mean at 1 o'clock on the morning of the 28th of August '' 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. At what hour of the 27th of August did you deliver this order to General 
 
 A. Between 9 o'clock and half-past 9 p. m.; I think about half-past 9; I could 
 not say within half an hour. 
 
 Q. Had you any conversation with General Porter at the time in relation to 
 the order or the execution of the order by him ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir; some conversation. 
 
 Q. Will you please state it, as far as you can recall it ? 
 
 A. I arrived, as I have said, about half-past 9 o'clock, at his tent, and found 
 Oreneral Porter and two or three generals there— General Sykes and General 
 Morell, and I think, General Butterfleld.thoughlamnot sure whether he came 
 in afterward or not. I handed General Porter the order, which he read and then 
 handed to one of the generals, .saying as he did so, "Gentlemen, there is some- 
 thing for you to sleep upon." I then said that the last thing that General Pope 
 said to me on leaving Bristoe Station was that I should remain with General 
 Porter and guide the column to Bristoe Station, leaving at 1 o'clock, and that 
 General Pope expected him certainly to be there by daylight, or relied upon his 
 bemg there by daylight ; something of that nature ; those mav not be the exact 
 words; I only give to the best of my recollection, of course." General Porter 
 
40 
 
 then asked me how the road was. I told him that the road was good, though I 
 had had difficulty in getting down on horseback, owing to the number of wagons 
 in the road ; but I told him I had passed the last wagon a little beyond Catlett's 
 Station from this direction. I told him that as they were moving slowly he 
 ■would probably be up with them by daylight. I also stated to him that his in- 
 fantry could take the railroad track, as many small squads of men had gone up 
 that way. These small squads, I would state here, though I did not state that 
 to General Porter, were stragglers from Hooker's corps ; I should think some 
 six or eight hundred of them, which we passed in going down to Bristoe Sta- 
 tion ; they all took the railroad track as the shortest and easiest road. 
 
 Q. Whatremark,if any, did General Porter make, either to you or to the gen- 
 erals with him, in reply to your statement in reference to the road and the expec- 
 tation of General Pope? 
 
 A. He stated— I do not think to me ; he spoke generally to all who were in the 
 tent— that his troops had just got into camp; that they had been marched hard 
 that day ; that they would be good for nothing if they were started at that time 
 of night ; that if their rest was broken they would be good for nothing in the 
 morning on coming up with the enemy. 
 
 Q. Did you, or not, make known to him that you were there for the purpose of 
 conducting him under the order of General Pope? 
 A. I did. 
 
 Q. Did he, or not, at the moment, announce any purpose either to obey the 
 order or not to do so ? 
 A. I do not recollect precisely. 
 
 Q. From the remarks made by Greneral Porter in your hearing, in reply to 
 these statements of yours, was or was not the impression made upon your mind 
 that it was not his purpose to march in obedience to his order? 
 (Question objected to bj' the accused. 
 
 The j udge-advocate stated that he merely wished to arrive at the fact whether 
 there was any determination made known to the witness in regard to this order 
 in any way; he was not particular as to the form of the question to be asked. 
 The accused withdrew his objection.) 
 
 A. There was no order issued to my knowledge, of course, one way or the 
 other. That would have been done through General Porter's assistant adj utant- 
 xeneral. I can only say that I was aware of the determination not to start until 
 daylight, inasmuch as I laid down and went to sleep. 
 
 Q. Do I or do I not understand you, then, to say that there was an evident 
 determination on the part of General Porter not to march until daylight ? 
 A. There was. 
 
 Q. Have you any knowledge as to the time at which his troops had arrived at 
 Warrenton Junction ? 
 
 A. Only the fact that the regulars— Sykes's division— were in camp at "Warren- 
 ton Junction at about 10 o'clock in the morning of that day, which fact I am 
 aware of from having visited several officers of my regiment in their camp. 
 
 Q. These regulars were a portion of General Porter's command, were they 
 not? 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Have you any knowle'dge how far the troops under General Porter had 
 marched on that day ? 
 A. I have not. 
 
 Q. What was the character of the night of the 27th of August? 
 A. To the best of my recollection, it was a cloudy night, but not rainy. 
 Q. What was about the distance between Warrenton Junction and Bristoe Sta- 
 tion? 
 A. I supposed it to be ten miles; they say nine miles. 
 
 Q. What was the distance from Bristoe Station to Catlett's Station, where you 
 passed the last of the wagons? 
 A. I can not tell you exactly; six miles, I should think. 
 Q. At what hour did you pass the last of those wagons? 
 A. Half past 8 p. m., I should think. 
 
 Q. Did you remain over night and wait until the march of General Porter's 
 command the next dav ? 
 A. I did. 
 
 Q. At what hour, in point of fact, did he move from Warrenton Junction? 
 A. I should think the head of the column left about 4 o'clock in the morning; 
 I am not positive about the hour. 
 Q. At what rate did the command march after it left Warrenton Junction? 
 A. I could not say at what rate. We started at or about 4 o'clock in the morn- 
 ing, and marched along quietly, without any apparent haste, meeting with no 
 obstruction or detention, except that arising from the wagons we found in the 
 road. The liead of the column arrived at Bristoe Station about 10 o'clock, 1 
 should judge. 
 
 Q. At what point did you overtake the wagons, and how many of them do you 
 suppose there were ? 
 
 A. I do not recollect. There was a large park of wagons near Warrenton Junc- 
 tion—about half way between Catlett's Station and Warrenton Junction— which 
 
41 
 
 left for Bristoe Station at daylight. We overtook those wagons. They were in 
 park when I passed down to Warrenton Junction the previous evening; there- 
 fore I can not tell when we overtook the end of the train which I had passed near 
 Catlett's station the evening before. 
 
 Q. What is the meaning of the term " in park ? " 
 
 A. In camp. . 
 
 Q. Had General Porter's command marched atl o'clock in the morning would 
 he or would he not have passed those wagons in camp ? 
 
 A. He would have passed them in camp, probably. 
 
 Q. Was or was not the march throughout at the usual rate at which troops 
 move, or was it slower? 
 
 A. It was at the rate at which troops would move if there was no necessity for 
 rapid movement. 
 
 TESTIMONY OP COL. FREDERIC MYERS, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Col. Frederic Myers, of the Quartermaster's Department, who is now 
 dead, testifies (general court-martial record, page 106) : 
 
 Lieut. Col. Frederic Myers was then called by the Government and sworn, 
 and examined as follows : 
 
 By the Judge- Advocate : 
 
 Q. Will you state to the court in what capacity you served in the Army of Vir- 
 ginia, under Msyor-General Pope, during his lat« campaign, in July and August 
 last? 
 
 A. I was chief quartermaster to General McDowell. 
 
 Q. Where were you on the night of the 27th of August last? 
 
 A. I was with the trains of the army, about a mile and a half from where Gen- 
 eral Hooker had his battle on the 27th. 
 
 He was with the trains about a mile and a half from where General 
 Hooker had the battle of the 27th. General Hooker's battle on the 27th 
 was at Bristoe Station, where these troops were to be marched that night. 
 
 Q. Did you, or not, receive any instruction from General Pope on that day re- 
 lating to your train along the road from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe Station ? 
 If so, state what they were. 
 
 A. I was ordered to move the trains in rear of General Hooker. Just before 
 dark General Pope with his staff rode up, and I reported to him that General 
 Hooker was in action ahead of me, and asked him if I should go into park with 
 my trains. He replied that I could do so, or go on, ag I thought best. 
 
 Q. What did you do ; did you go into park, or did you continue on ? 
 
 A. I went into park, and gave directions to all the quartermasters to go into 
 park. 
 
 Q. At what hour on the following morning were those trains upon that road 
 put in motion ? 
 
 A. The head of the train commenced moving just at daylight. 
 
 Q. What was the condition of the road between Warrenton Junction and Bris- 
 toe Station at that time, so far as regards the passage of wagons, artillery, &c. ? 
 
 A. It was in excellent condition at that time. 
 
 Q. Do you remember the character of that nights — the night of the 27th of Au- 
 g^ust ? If so, will you please state it ? 
 
 A. I was up nearly all that night. It was quite dark ; there was no moon. 
 
 Q. Did the night change in its character toward the morning, or was it the 
 same throughout? 
 
 A. It was a dark night. I could not state about it toward morning particularly. 
 
 Q. In view of the condition of the road as you have described it, and also the 
 character of the night, was or was not the movement of troops along that road 
 practicable that night? 
 
 A. I do not know of anything to hinder troops moving along the railroad there. 
 There was a road running each side of the railroad. I should think it would have 
 been easy for troops to move along there, although I may be mistaken in that. 
 
 FRANCIS S. E.\RL,'S testimony AS ASSISTANT .4DJUTANT-GENERAL, AUGUST 27-28. 
 
 Francis S. Earl, the assistant adjutant-general of General Morell, 
 swears as follows (board record, pages 408-413): 
 
 Q. When did you, as acting assistant adjutant-general for Major-General 
 Morell, on the 27th of August, first receive intimation that you were to move 
 the next morning ? 
 
 A. That was the day we moved to Warrenton Junction ; I knew nothing of 
 it until the next morning. 
 
 Q. About daybreak ? 
 
 A. The order came to General Morell that we were to inove in the morning; 
 that was all I knew — that we were to move in the morning. 
 
 Q. When did you receive the first intimation that you were to move on th« 
 morning of the 28th? 
 
42 
 
 A. I could not say whether it waa the night before or whether it was during 
 the night. I think it must have been before, because I knew we were to move 
 at 3 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Q. Were you up at 3 o'clock? 
 
 A. Yes; 1 was up at that time, and before, probably. 
 
 Q. You are quite positive you were? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Have a distinct recollection of it ? 
 
 Q. Yes; I recollect being up at that time. 
 
 Q. At what time did you arrive at Bristoe Station? 
 
 A. I should judge somewhere about 10 o'clock, between 9 and 10. 
 
 Q. Do you know of any orders having been given the night before, or any efifod 
 made to clear that road from V/arrenton Junction to Bristoe, Station? 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 Q. From your position, would you have been likely to hav^e known? 
 
 A. If I had really been acting as assistant adjutant-general of division, or 
 feeling that I was in that position, I probably may have known of it. 
 
 Q. You considered you were acting in that capacity ? 
 
 A. I considered myself more acting as an aid to General Morell, because I bad 
 not been announced as assistant adjutant-general. 
 
 Q. Who was acting as assistant adjutantrgeneral? 
 
 A. Nobody but myself; he so considered me, though I had not been announced. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF GENERAL CHAUNCEY M'KEEVER, AUGUST 27-28. 
 
 General Chauncey McKeever, chief of staff of General Heintzelman, 
 on page 151 of the board record, as it is called. 
 
 General McKeever says : 
 
 Q. If a peremptory order had been received at Warrenton Junction to move 
 from that place to Bristoe at 1 a. m. on the night of the 27th and 2Sth of August, 
 is it your opinion, as a military man, that the troops at Warrenton could have 
 been put in motion on the road to Bristoe in order to comply with such a com- 
 mand? 
 
 A. They could have been put in motion, I presume. I know nothing to pre- 
 vent their being put in motion. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect about what time it was daylight on the 28th of August? 
 
 A. I should think about 4 o'clock; maybe a little later — not much. 
 
 COL. ROBERT E. CLARY TESTIFIES, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Col. Eobert E. Clary, called by accused, swears that he received a 
 note from Porter about 10 o'clock to run the railroad trains east beyond 
 Cedar Run; and in answer to question says, page 119, G. C. M. (court- 
 martial record, page 118) : 
 
 Q. You speak of pushing forward the trains. Do you mean the trains upon 
 the railroad, or ordinary wagon trains? 
 
 A. I mean railroad trains loaded with our own stores, and I think some sick 
 and ■wounded. 
 
 Q. In your opinion, could or could not General Porter, after the receipt of his 
 order to move, which receipt was at 9.30 p. m. of the 27th of August, have cleared 
 the road entirely of wagons by 1 or 2 o'clock that night, so that his march would 
 not have been much impeded ? 
 
 A. I think the troops could have passed over during the night, had a sufficient 
 force been sent in advance to have cleared the road of its obstructions, which, 
 at the time I passed over it, extended only three miles, I think. When I passed 
 over the road it was between 2 and 3 o'clock in the morning; what the obstruc- 
 tions had been previously to that time I am unable to say. 
 
 The examination by the judge-advocate here closed. 
 Examination by the Court : 
 
 Q. Will you state whether at 1 o'clock the character of the night and the state 
 of the road were such as, in your judgment, to render practicable the march of 
 General Porter's troops to Bristoe Station to arrive at or about daylight ? 
 
 A. Not without the preliminary steps which I have previously stated ought to 
 have been taken. 
 
 Q. Were or were not the first three or four miles of the road from Warrenton 
 unobstructed ? 
 
 A. They were, as I passed over it. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF SOLOMON THOMAS, AUGUST 27-28. 
 
 Solomon Thomas, of the Eighteenth Massachusetts Regiment, Mar- 
 tiadale's brigade, being a part of Morell's division, swears, on page 841 
 of the board record, as follows: 
 
 Q. On the 27th of August where were you? 
 
 A. We were moving on the Warrenton road toward Bristoe Station. I should 
 
43 
 
 think that we were encamped on that night some six to eight miles from Bris- 
 toe Station. We went in before sundown ; probably the sun was an hour or an 
 hour and a half high when we halted there. 
 
 Q. When did you move from there? 
 
 A. I was corporal of the guard that night, and was ordered to wake the men 
 at 1 o'clock, which I did; and we were formed and moved out from our camp 
 immediately after 1 o'clock. 
 
 Q. At what time did you start on your march ? 
 
 A. We then started immediately from that, and marched a mile probably, 
 when we were halted. 
 
 Q. How long did you remain there before you proceeded on your journey ? 
 
 A. I know at 9 o'clock we were still there. We had halted in the first place 
 expecting to stop for a moment, and halted in position. Tiien we were ordered 
 to rest at will, and did so, and then were ordered to lie down, and then we lay 
 down. 
 
 Q. That was the morning of the 2Sth ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir; andlayin that position, as we felt disposed, until, I should think — 
 according to the best of my judgment it was 10 o'clock before we were called to 
 company. Then we started and marched for Bristoe Station. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect what the character of that night was, the 27th, and morn- 
 ing of the 28th of August ? 
 
 A. I do. I recollect the roads were in good condition and that as we moved 
 out there was no obstruction whatever in our way. 
 
 Q. You were wounded on the 30th ? 
 
 A. On the 31st. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF GENERAL, BUTTEEFIELD, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Extract from General Butterfield's testimony (court-martial record, 
 page 179) : 
 
 General Porter called two aids, and sent them off to investigate the condition 
 of the road, and to ask General Pope to have the road cleared so that we could 
 come up. 
 
 POETER ASKS POPE TO HAVE THE EOAD CLEARED. 
 
 Q. Did you see the order of the 27th from General Pope, or know anything 
 about the urgency of its terms ? 
 
 A. I did not read it. 
 
 Q. Did you learn of Capt. Drake De Kay that General Pope had taken meas- 
 ures to have the road cleared ? 
 
 A. I did not. 
 
 Q. Can you state that, in point of fact, the road had not been cleared by Gen- 
 eral Pope's orders, or that at 1 o'clock at night and until later in the morning 
 the road was all cleared ; and can you state that the wagons that obstructed the 
 road when you passed had not moved on to the road after daylight? 
 
 A. I cannot; I have no knowledge upon that subject. 
 
 STATEMENT OP CAPT. W. B. C. DUEYEA, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Capt. W. B. C. Duryea, called by the Government, and sworn and 
 examined, as foUoves (court-martial record, page 113) : 
 By the Judge- Advocate : 
 
 Q. What is your position in the military service ? 
 
 A. 'I am assistant adjutant-general to General Duryea. 
 
 Q. Where were you and in what position on the 27th August last ? 
 
 A. We were on the march from Warrenton, and on the night of the 27th of 
 August we halted, I should think, some three or four miles this side of Warrenton. 
 
 Q. At what hour of the night did you halt ? 
 
 A. About midnight. 
 
 Q. In your march up to that hour did you experience any unusual difficulties 
 growing out of the character of the nifiht? 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF WILLIAM W. MACY, AUGUST 27. 
 
 In the board record, page 583, will be found the e\'idence of William 
 W. Macy: 
 
 William W. Macy, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, testified as fot 
 lows : 
 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Q. Where do you reside? 
 
 A. Winchester, Ind. 
 
 Q. Wereyouinthemilitaryser^-iceof the United States in August, 1802; it so, 
 In what capacity ? 
 
 A. I was in the military service at that time ; a sergeant, I believe. 
 
 Q. What regiment ? 
 
 A. Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers, Gibbon's brigade. King's division. 
 
44 
 
 Q. When you finally left the service, what rank did you hold ? 
 
 A. I held the rank of captain, A Company, Twentieth Indiana, ouir regiment 
 having become consolidated. 
 
 Q. Where were you on the 27th of August, 1862' 
 
 A. With Gibbon's brigade, on the march most of the day from Sulphur Springs 
 toward the old Bull Run battle-ground. 
 
 Q. How long did your brigade continue its march that day ? 
 
 A. About 10 o'clock, I think, or half past 10 that night. 
 
 Q. You then arrived at what place, as near as you can recollect? 
 
 A. I think it was called New Baltimore. We laid near a little town. 
 
 Q. What was the character of that night — the night of the 27th and 28th of 
 August ? 
 
 A. Rather a dark night ; starlight dark night. 
 
 Q. Do you know what the character of that night was toward morning ? 
 
 A. I am a little indistinct as to just the time. I was up at some time in the 
 after part of the night. 
 
 Q. Once, or more than once ? 
 
 A. Once that I recollect very distinctly, and I think only once. 
 
 Q. What was the character of the night then, so far as distinguishing objects ? 
 
 A. I could see how to get a little way from the camp. I could see where the 
 men laid as I went past the line where.the soldiers were lying without running 
 over them. 
 
 Q. How far could you see ? 
 
 A. I do not know that I could state how far I could see to distinguish things. 
 I could see when I passed the wagon trains enough to stay away from the horses' 
 heels. I could see that the wagon teams were hitched up. 
 
 Q. In marching that night up to 10 o'clock, what difficulty, if any, did you ex- 
 perience on account of the character of the darkness of the night? 
 
 A. Most too dark to march pleasantly. We marched many nights as dark, 
 though ; some nights that were a good deal darker than it was that night we 
 were on the march ; but of course it is unpleasant marching after night. 
 
 Q. Your regiment, in the march — how ■was it as to keeping its formation ? 
 
 A. Could keep the ranks, as far as that was concerned. 
 
 Q. What was the character of the roads, as to whether muddy or the reverse, 
 on the night of the 27th of August ? 
 
 A. They were not muddy unless we ran into a branch. 
 
 LIEUT. EDWARD BROOKS TESTIFIES, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Lieut. Edward Brooks called by the Government, and sworn and ex- 
 amined, as follows (general court-martial record, page 112): 
 By the Judge-Advocatb: 
 
 Q. What is your position in the military service ? 
 
 A. I am a first lieutenant of volunteers in the Sixth Wisconsin Regiment. 
 
 Q. State to the court, if you please, whether or not you ■were serving with the 
 Army of Virginia on or alDOut the 27th of August last. 
 
 A. I was. 
 
 Q. In what place occupied by that army were you on the night of the 27th of 
 August ? 
 
 A. I was at Bristoe Station and at Greenwich. 
 
 Q. Do you remember the character of the night; if so, will you state whether 
 it ■was of usual or unusual darkness? 
 
 A. It was not very dark — not so dark but what I could find my way through 
 the woods. 
 
 Q. Was or was not the night of such a character as to offer any unusual difficu 1- 
 ties to the march of troops ? ' 
 
 A. It was not. 
 
 Q. What was the general condition of the road from Warrenton Junction in 
 the direction of Manassas Junction ? 
 
 A. It was very good. 
 
 Q. Did you have full opportunities of ascertaining the condition of that road on 
 the night of the 27th of August? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. What opportunities did you have? 
 
 A. I traveled from beyond Warrenton to AVarrenton Junction, from Warrenton 
 Junction to Bristoe Station ; and after arriving at Bristoe Station I went across 
 the country to Greenwich. 
 
 Q. Have you, or not, frequently passed over the road? 
 
 A. Very often. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF COL. THOMAS F. M'COY, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Board record, page 640: 
 
 Col. Thomas F. McCoy, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, was exam- 
 ined and testified as follows : 
 
45 
 
 <J. Whose brigade and whose division ? 
 A. Duryea's brigade, Ricketts's division, McDowell's corps. 
 Q. What rank did you leave Ihe service with? 
 A. Colonel. 
 
 Q. Were you brevet brigadier-general? 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Where were you on the afternoon of Augjust 25, 1862? 
 A. A little southwest of Warrenton. 
 ^. How late did you march that day and evening ? 
 A. The 25th? 
 Q. Ves. 
 
 A. I don't think we marched on the 25th. We marched on the 23d. 
 Q. Until how late? 
 A. About 10 or 11 o'clock. 
 
 Q. On the 27th of August were you on the march late in the day? 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Until how late did you then march? 
 A. All night, until 1 o'clock. 
 
 Q. What difficulty, if any, was experienced in marching that night? 
 A. We didn't have any difficulty in marching that night. There was a good 
 deal of straggling among the soldiers. 
 
 STATEMENT OF COLONEL BUCHANAN, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Colonel Buchanan, of the Third Indiana Cavalry, on page 603 of the 
 board record, in reference to Porter's movement from Warrenton Junc- 
 tion to Bristoe, testifies as follows: 
 
 Q. What conversation had you with General Porter before he started oif to 
 Bristoe Station ? 
 
 A. On the evening before he started somebody gave me an order to be in readi- 
 ness to move at 3 o'clock in the morning. I was in front of General Porter's 
 headquarters at 3 o'clock in the morning, but I saw no one until after the break 
 of day. Then some one came to me and told me to let the men get their break- 
 fasts and let their horses be fed. That was done, and I immediately went back 
 to the place I occupied. Some time afterward, after sunrise, I saw General 
 Porter. I wanted to go back to Fredericksburg to my regiment. I only had 
 about ninety men with me, and I expected to go back the day before. I rode out 
 with him in the woods, where he was in camp, until we got into an open field. 
 He asked me to send a detachment of the command I had forward to clear the 
 road toward Bristoe Station, two or three miles. This was done. I waited some 
 httle time, and the infantry began to move. About that time he handed me a 
 letter, and directed me to give it to General Burnside, and told me I could go. 
 I started toward Fredericksburg ; he sent an aid after me and brought me back, 
 and told me he was apprehensive that I might be captured. He told me to say 
 to General Burnside — I can not get his language — but the idea was that there 
 was no disaster that was verj' threatening as yet, and he hoped for the best. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF WILLIAM E'. MURRAY, AUGUST 27-28. 
 
 Board record, page 586: 
 
 William E. Murray, called by the recoider, being duly sworn, testified as fol- 
 lows: 
 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Q. Where do you reside ? 
 
 A. Winchester, Ind. 
 
 Q. Were you in the military service of the United States in the month of Au- 
 gust, 1862; if so, in what capacity? 
 
 A. Yes; I was a member of Company C, Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers. 
 
 Q. In whose brigade and division? 
 
 A. Gibbon's brigade, King's division. 
 
 Q. Where were you on the night of August 27, 1862? 
 
 A. The night of the 27th our regiment was encamped near New Baltimore ; a 
 little to the north, I think, of New Baltimore ; that is, we stopped there about 
 10 o'clock, perhaps. 
 
 Q. How long had vou been marching before you made that halt on that day 
 of the27lh? 
 
 A. We had been marching, I think, most of the day ; not continuously, but 
 back and forth. 
 
 Q. From sunset, how much of that time had you been marching up to 10 
 o'clock? 
 
 A. I am unable to state the distance. 
 
 Q. Were you marching during that time? 
 
 A. We were moving most of the time. 
 
 Q. Did you keep to the road, or in the fields, or both? 
 
 A. Generally to the road, except where we would meet obstructions in tho 
 way of cavalry or artillery; kept mainly in the roads. 
 
46 
 
 Q. How was it after dark ? . 
 
 A. Much the same. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect the character of the roads at that time, as to whether they 
 were dry or muddy ? 
 
 A. I don't remember any mud ; I think they were generally dry. 
 
 Q. Do you recall what the character of the night of the 27th of August was? 
 
 A. There was no moon, according to my recollection, but it was clear ; w© 
 could see objects plain enough. 
 
 Q. At a great distance? 
 
 A. A rod or so. 
 
 Q. How much of that night were you up after coming to a halt at 10 o'clock? 
 
 A. I should think that I did not lie down till near midnight. 
 
 Q. Up to that time, do j'ou recollect what the character of the night was, as 
 far as distinguishing objects was concerned? 
 
 A. My recollection is that it was the usual starlight night. 
 
 Q. Up to that time, during that night, what difficulty, if any, did you experi- 
 ence in marching ? 
 
 A. No particular difficulty. 
 
 Q. How was the regiment, so far as its formation was concerned, on that march 
 after sunset. 
 
 A. I think they kept their formation about as well as usual. 
 
 WILLIAM M. CAMPBELL TESTIFIES, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Board record, page 591: 
 
 William M. Campbell, called by the recorder, was sworn and examined, as 
 follows : 
 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Q. State your residence. 
 
 A. I reside in Randolph County, Indiana. 
 
 Q. During the month of August, 1862, were you in the military service ? If ao, 
 in what capacity ? 
 
 A. I was in the military service, and in the Nineteenth Regiment of Indiaaa 
 Volunteers, Gibbon's brigade. King's division. 
 
 Q. Where were you on the evening of August 27,1862? 
 
 A. We were marching from the direction of Warrenton to Centreville, on a 
 road that led in that direction, as far as I knew. 
 
 Q. On what is called the Warrenton, Gainesville and Centreville pike? 
 
 A. I think that was it; that is my recollection of it. 
 
 Q. How late did you march ? 
 
 A. We marched until after night. I could not state how late it was, because I 
 did not have any timepiece. It was after night when we stopped. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Q. What was the character of the night ? 
 
 A. It was an ordinary night, without moonlight ; that is my recollection about 
 it ; nothing extraordinary in any way, only an ordinary night, such as we had a 
 good many of in Virginia about those times. 
 
 Q. How far could you distinguish objects? 
 
 A. We marched our regiments in companies, and got along without any diffi- 
 culty that I recollect of. How far we could see I could not say. 
 
 J. H. STINE EXAMINED, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Board record, page 597: 
 
 J. H. Stine, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, testifies as follows : 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Q. Where do you reside? 
 
 A. I reside at Winchester, Randolph County, Indiana. 
 
 Q. During the month of August, 1862, were you in the military service of the 
 United States? If so, in what regiment? 
 
 A. I was in Company C, Nineteenth Indiana Volunteers. 
 
 Q. Where were you on the afternoon, evening, and night of the 27th of Au- 
 gust, 1862? 
 
 A. We started from Sulphur Springs near noon and marched north through 
 Warrenton, going through there about 3 or 4 o'clock, and on north toward the 
 Bull Run battle-ground. 
 
 Q. At what time did your regiment halt? 
 
 A. We marched quite a time after 9. 
 
 Q. Where was the rest of the brigade? 
 
 A. The whole brigade was together. 
 
 Q. Where was the rest of the division ? 
 
 A. I took a great interest in the history of the movement oi troops, and that 
 day we were understood to be going into battle ; I don't positively recollect 
 whether the whole of the division went into camp or not; I know the next day 
 we were not together all the time. 
 
47 
 
 Q. In marching during that evening, what difficulty, if any, did you expe- 
 rience in getting along ? 
 
 A. None, particularly. 
 
 Q. Did you keep to the road? 
 
 A. Mainly we did, though sometimes we didn't. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect what the character of the night was on the 27th of August, 
 1862. 
 
 A. My recollection is thatfrom,say, 8tol0 o'clock, it was may be toward from 
 8 to 11, it was not so light as afterward. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM BIKNEY, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Board record, page 683: 
 
 William Birney, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, testified as follows: 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Q. Where do you reside? 
 
 A. Washington city. 
 
 Q. In the month of August, 1862, what rank did you hold in the service of the 
 United States? 
 
 A. I was major of the Fourth New Jersey Regiment ; I commanded the Fifty- 
 seventh Pennsylvania. 
 
 Q. You finally left the service with what rank? 
 
 A. Brevet major-general. 
 
 Q. Early that month I believe you were taken prisoner? 
 
 A. No, sir; I was taken prisoner at Gaines' Mill. 
 
 Q. When did you assume command of the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania? 
 
 A. Immediately after my exchange. If my memory serves me, I was ex- 
 changed on the 13th of August and took command about the 15th. 
 
 Q. In whose division were you then? 
 
 A. Commanding the Fifty-seventh ; I was in Kearney's, Heintzelman's corps. 
 
 Q. Where were you on the night of August 27, 1862, and the morning of the 
 28th? 
 
 A. I was in camp, a little north of the Alexandria railroad. 
 
 Q. Did you march any that night; if so, when, and for what length of time? 
 
 A. We marched that night, but the exacth our of starting I can not recollect. 
 We marched some time before daybreak and in the direction of Bristoe Station. 
 
 Q. How^ many hours is it your recollection, about, that you marched? 
 
 A. I can not now say. I recollect marching sonie distance. 
 
 Q. What difficulty, if any, did you experience in marching that night, from 
 the character of tlie night or the character of the roads? 
 
 A. I recollect no jjarticular difficulty about the road. 
 
 Q. Were you then in command of the Fifty-seventh Pennsylvania? 
 
 A. I ■was. 
 
 Q. Did the entire brigade march with you ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect about what time you came to a halt ? 
 
 A. I can not remember whether we halted before we got to Bristoe Station or 
 not. We got to Bristoe Station at a very early hour. 
 
 EVIDENCE OF JOHN P. TAYLOR, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Board record, page 861: 
 John P. Taylor, called by the recorder, having affirmed, testified as follows: 
 
 Direct examination: 
 Q. Where do you live? 
 A. Reedsville, Pa. 
 
 Q. Were you in the military service of the United States in the month ol 
 August, 1862 1 if so, in what capacity ? 
 A. I was captain of the First Pennsylvania Cavalry at that time. 
 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 Q. Have you ever been over the road from Warrenton Junction to Bristoe 
 Station? 
 
 A. Yes; quite frequently. 
 
 Q. What was the character of that road from Warrenton Junction to Catlett's 
 in 1862? 
 
 A. It is on the left side of the road from Warrenton Junction to Catlett's. There 
 is a stream that passes between Warrenton Junction and Catlett's, I think at a dis- 
 tance not to exceed a mile. 
 
 Mr. Bullitt. Had the witness been over this road frequently before that? 
 
 A. Yes ; I encamped at Catlett's in the spring of 1862 for some three weeks 
 immediately after the enemy vacated Manassas. We were there three weeks 
 before the advance moved to Fredericksburg. 
 
 Q. Go on and describe the character of the road as it then was from Warren- 
 ton Junction to Catlett's Station. 
 
 A. There is a stream passes down between Warrenton Junction and Catlett's 
 and a railroad bridge crosses there, and some trestle-work, but above the bridge 
 
48 
 
 It is almost level country for some miles west. At that time there was a strip of 
 woods that came down near Catlett's — a narrow strip of woods. We had moved 
 all over that ground for a mile west of the railroad. 
 
 Q. Then coming from Catlett's to Bristoe, what was the character of the road? 
 
 A. That is nearly a vast plain most of the way. There are vtwo streams, I 
 think — small ravines — but the country is a vast plain. General Gregg moved 
 his division of cavalry a mile to the north of the railroad, in the night, from 
 Bealeton to Auburn, about two or three miles north of Catlett's. 
 
 Q. Across the country ? 
 
 A. Yes ; across the country about a, mile, where there was no road. 
 
 Q. At that time, could wagons go on each side of the road? 
 
 A. There were roads some distance there on each side of the railroad, and 
 wagons and troops moved frequently in column. 
 
 Q. More than one road ? 
 
 A. Oh, yes; the troops had made roads. Sometimes one road would get bad, 
 and they would go off and make another road. The country was such they 
 could have one almost any place. 
 By Mr. Bullitt : 
 
 Q. Were there any woods along the line of that road from Warrenton Junc- 
 tion to Bristoe Station ? 
 
 A. There is a strip of woods that comes dow^n at Catlett's or near Catlett's. 
 
 Q. Is that the only one ? 
 
 A, There may have been others. 
 
 Q. I ask you, from your recollection, whether you know there were no others, 
 or that there were others ? 
 
 A. I don't recollect any woods, that is to any distance ; I know there was on 
 the right. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect whether there were any roads at that time that had been 
 made by the army cutting through the woods and leaving stumps in the road ? 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect an>-thing of that sort? 
 
 A. There were roads there in the spring of 1862 that the enemy had used dur- 
 ing the winter of 1861-'62; fencing and everything was gone; it was an open 
 country from Manassas to Warrenton Junction. 
 
 Q. Then it was an open country all the way from Manassas to Bristoe, was it? 
 
 A. Very nearly. 
 
 Board record, page 589: 
 
 STATEMENT OF SAMUEL G. HILL, AUGUST 27-28. 
 
 Samuel G. Hill, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, testified as follows: 
 
 Direct examination : 
 Q. Where do you reside ? 
 A. Arbor, Ind. 
 
 Q. Were you in the military service of the United States during the month of 
 August, 1862? 
 A. Yes; I was a private in the Nineteenth Indiana, Company C. 
 Q. Gibbon's brigade. King's division? 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Where were you on the afternoon of August 27, 1862? 
 A. On the road from Warrenton to Gainesville. 
 ^. How late were you marching? 
 A. We were marching until 10 o'clock at night. 
 Q. Do you recollect what the character of the night was? 
 A. It ^vaa a clear night. 
 
 Q. How^ much of that night did you have an opportunity of noticing? 
 A. Until probably 3 o'clock of the morning of the 2Sth. 
 
 SOLOMOX THOMAS TESTIFIES, AUGUST 27-28. 
 
 ^ Board record, page 803: 
 
 Solomon Thomas, of Morell's division, Porter's corps, called by the recorder, 
 being duly sworn, testified as follows : 
 
 * * * « « ,1; :f: 
 
 Q. On the 27tli of August where were you? 
 
 A. We were moving along the Warrenton road toward Bristoe Station. I 
 should think that we were encamped on that night some six to eight miles from 
 Bristoe Station. We ■went in before sundown ; x>robably the sun was an hour or 
 an hour and a half high when we halted there. 
 
 Q. When did you move from there ? 
 
 A. I was corporal of the guard that night, and was ordered to wake the men 
 at 1 o'clock, which I did, and we were formed and moved out from our camp im- 
 mediately after 1 o'clock. 
 
 Q. At what time did you start on your march? 
 
 A. We then started immediately from that and marched a mile, probably, when 
 we were halted. 
 
49 
 
 Q. How long did you remain there before you proceeded on your journey? 
 
 A. I know at 9 o'clock we were still there. We had ha'ted in the first i>lace 
 expecting to stop for a moment, and halted in position. Then we were ordered 
 to rest at will, and did so, and then were ordered to lie down, and then we lay 
 down. 
 
 Q. That was the morning of the 28th ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir; andlay in that position, as wefeltdisposed, until, Ishould think — 
 according to the best of my judgment it was 10 o'clock before we were called 
 to company. Then we started and marched for Bristoe Station. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect what the character of that night was, the 27th, and morn- 
 ing of the 2Sth of August? 
 
 A. I do. I recollect the roads were in good condition, and that as we moved 
 out there ^vas no obstruction whatever in our way. 
 
 Q. You ■were wounded on the 30th? 
 
 A. On the 31st. 
 
 TESTIMONY OP E. D. ROATH, AUGUST 27. 
 
 E. D. Roath, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, testified as follows: 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Q. Where do you reside? 
 
 A. Marietta, Lancaster County, Pennsylvania. 
 
 Q. Were you in the military service of the United States in August, 1862 7 If 
 so, in what capacity? 
 
 A. I was in the military service of the United States in 1862, as captain of Com- 
 pany E, One hundred and seventh Regiment Pennsylvania Volunteers, Dur- 
 yea's brigade, Ricketts's division. 
 
 Q. You finally left the service with what rank? 
 
 A. Captain, and w^as brevetted. 
 
 Q. On the night of August 27, 1862, where were you ? 
 
 A. We were somewhere.Ithink, between WarrentonandaplacecalledWater- 
 loo; somewhere in the neighborhood of Warrenton. 
 
 Q. Did you make a night march that night? 
 
 A. We marched some ; we were going from toward the Rappahannock across 
 there. 
 
 Q. How^ late did you march? 
 
 A. I can not tell exactly what time we bivouacked. I know that we were all 
 tired. 
 
 Q. Have you any reeollection with reference to midnight »s to what time yon 
 came into camp ? 
 
 A. I could not tell, but I think it was somewhere near midnight ; might have 
 been 11 o'clock. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect whether you experienced any difficulty in marching? 
 
 A. No, sir ; we did not. 
 
 Q. What was the character of the night as to darkness? 
 
 A. There was no moon ; it was starlight ; a little hazy toward morning, I think. 
 
 GENERAL JUBAL EARLY TESTIFIES, AUGUST 27. 
 
 GeneralJubal Early, confederate, testifies (board record, page 812) that 
 he marched, on the night of the 27th, betvreen 10 and 12 o'clock, in the 
 direction of Manassas, by way of Blackburn's Ford, and he experienced 
 no difficulty whatever in marching. 
 
 Board record, pages 702, 705, 707, 708. 
 
 STATEMENT OF HENRY KYD DOUGLAS, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Henry Kyd Douglas, staff officer to General Jackson, testifies (on 
 page 685, board record) that General Jackson's whole command moved 
 away from Centreville on the night of the 27th, with all their trappings, 
 up to the position, or near it, that they occupied on the day of the battle 
 of the 29th. 
 
 I. H. DUVAL TESTIFIES, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Board record, page 820: 
 
 I. H. Duval, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, testified as follows : 
 
 Q. Where do you reside? 
 
 A. Wellsborough, W. Va. 
 
 Q. Were you in the military service of the United States in the month of August, 
 1862; if so, in what capacity? 
 
 A. I was major of volunteers. First West Virginia Regiment. 
 
 Q. Whose brigade and division ? 
 
 A. I was in the fourth brigade, Ricketts's division. 
 
 Q. Where were you on the evening of August 27, 1862, and what did you do ? 
 
 A. On the evening of August 27 1 was with my brigade. We were about four 
 miles, I think, northwest of Warrenton at that time — north or northwest — ^and I 
 LO 4 
 
50 
 
 ■was directed by my colonol to carry a letter that he handed me from Q«neral 
 Rieketts to General Pope. 
 
 Q. To what point? 
 
 A. It was supposed to be somewhere near Centreville. That was my order. 
 
 Q. What did you then do? 
 
 A. I started and made the trip and delivered the letter. 
 
 Q. You left the camp about what time ? 
 
 A. Nearly dark; It was after sundown. 
 
 Q. What road did you take ? 
 
 A. I came back to Warrenton, and 1 followed then the road running from 
 Warrenton in the direction ot Catlett Station. I was directed to go that way and 
 keep out of the way of the enemy. 
 
 Q. Did you pass through Warrenton Junction? 
 
 A. No, sir ; I struck the road at Catlett's. 
 
 Q. What direction did you then take? 
 
 A. I took the road leading from Catlett Station to Manasses Junction, by the 
 way of Bristoe. 
 
 Q. Where did you find General Pope? 
 
 A. I found General Pope near Manasses Junction. 
 
 Q. What was the character of that night? 
 
 A. I don't know that I recollect distinctly in regard to that. I rode all night, 
 though, until about3 o'clock in the morning, when I took a little rest. I had no 
 particular difficulty in finding the way. 
 
 Q. From Catlett Station to Bristoe did you meet with any obstruction to your 
 movements? 
 
 A. There were a great many w^agons along the line ; there were some troops ; 
 but I went along without any particular obstruction. There were no obstacles 
 that kept me from going. 
 
 Q. Did you have any escort with you ? 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF MAJOR DUVALL, AUGUST 27. 
 
 Major Duvall also testifies that he traveled eighteen or twenty miles 
 that night. 
 
 Board record, page 832, paragraph 875: 
 
 JAMES HADDOW TESTIFIES, AUGUST 27. 
 
 James Haddow, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, testified aa follows: 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Q. Where do you reside? 
 
 A. Barlow, Ohio. 
 
 Q. Were you in the military service of the United States on the 27th of Aujjnat, 
 1862; if so, in what capacity? 
 
 A. I was in the military service as orderly sergeant of Company F, Thirty- 
 sixth Ohio Infantry.' 
 
 Q. When you finally left the service what rank did you hold? 
 
 i.. Captain. I was transferred to Company E. 
 
 Q. Where were you at sunset on the 27th of August, 1862 — about that tlmeT 
 
 A. We were on the road between Catlett Station and Bristoe. 
 
 Q. Did you after that go toward Catlett Station ; if so, at what time and under 
 what circumstances? 
 
 A. We marched that night to Bristoe, arriving at BrLstoe Station after dark 
 some time ; we remained there that night ; on the following niorning the regi- 
 ment went on in the direction of Manassas ; the company of which I was a mem- 
 ber was detached and put in charge of a major of the medical department to go 
 back in the direction of Warrenton with ambulances and obtain medical supplies; 
 we returned to somewhere near Warrenton, passing Catlett Station at some dis- 
 tance on the morning of the 28th ; we returned to Bristoe on the evening of the 
 28th. 
 
 Q. At what time did you set out from Bristoe Station to go in the direction of 
 Catlett Station? 
 
 A. I could not give the hour, but pretty early in the morning — aa soon as we 
 got up and got breakfast. 
 
 Q. Did you during that day see General Porter's corps ? 
 
 A. We met troops (it was a frequent habit to ask soldiers what troops they 
 were), and they said they were General Porter's troops. Porter's troops lay at 
 Warrenton Junction on the afternoon of the 27th, when we left there. 
 
 Q. What difliculty, if any, did you experience on the morning of the 28th In 
 taking this ambulance train from Bristoe Station to Catlett Station ? 
 
 A. I don't think we had any material difficulty in getting through ; we must 
 have had at least three ambulances ; we passed through trains and passed troops : 
 we must undoubtedly have made a march that day of sixteen miles; we could 
 not have met with serious obstructions. 
 
 Q. Do you know what troops yeu met? 
 
 A. They said they were General Porter's; we inquired frequently; of course 
 
51 
 
 I was not acquainted -with General Porter's corps ; we had just reached the East 
 from the West, and all troops were strange to me. 
 
 Q. On the morning of the 29th where were you? 
 
 A. Alter taking supper on the evening of the 28th, at Bristoe Station, some 
 time after dark, we cotuinenoed marchingagain andmarchedto Manassas Junc- 
 tion, reaching there some time during the night; I don't kno'w ■n'hat hour; so 
 early in the night that we lay down and slept, however, and on the morning of 
 the 29th we were at Manassas Junction. 
 
 Board record, page 834, paragraph 878: 
 
 STATEMENT OP LIEUT. A. F. TIPPANY. 
 
 Lieut. A. P. Tiffany, called b> the recorder, being duly sworn, testified aa 
 follows : 
 
 * * * ***!)! 
 
 Q. What difficulty, if any, did you experience in getting along in your march 
 from Bristoe toward Warrenton ? 
 
 A. Nothing more than that ■which is common where there is a good many 
 trains passing ; sometimes the road would be full; sometimes we would pass 
 around, then we would be on the road again; nothing so very unusual in the 
 way of traveling. 
 
 EVIDENCB IN RBFEEENCB TO THE OKDEBS OP THE 29TH AUGU T, 1862 — REPORTS 
 OP UNION OFFICERS. 
 
 In giving the following reports of Union officers I have been compelled 
 in many cases to use extracts, for the reason that in cutting from the 
 reports I could not take the pages, it being printed on both sides. The 
 same is also the case vsdth the confederate reports. But all material 
 points are included, and these extracts apply solely to the 29th of Au- 
 gust, 1862: 
 
 Report of Brig. Gen. John P. Reynolds, division attached to McDowell's corps. 
 
 Headquarters Reynolds's Division, 
 Camp near Munson's Hill, Virginia, September 5, 1862. 
 
 •V 41 ^ s^ ^ ^ ifi 
 
 General McDowell Joined tBe oommand at daylight, and directed my co-oper- 
 ation with General Sigel. 
 
 The right of the enemy's position could be discerned upon the heights above 
 Groveton, on the right of the pike. The division advanced over the ground to 
 the heights above Groveton, crossed the pike, and Cooper's battery came gal- 
 lantly into action on the same ridge on which the enemy's right was. supported 
 by Meade's brigade. While pressing forward our extreme left across the pike, 
 re-enforcements were sent for by General Sigel for the right of his line under 
 General Milroy, now hardly pressed by the enemy, and a brigade was taken 
 from Schenck's command on my right. The whole fire of the enemy was now 
 concentrated on the extreme right of my division, and, unsupported there, the 
 battery was obliged to retire with considerable loss, in both men and horses, and 
 the division fell back to connect with Schenek. 
 
 Later in the day General Pope, arriving on the right from Centreville, renewed 
 the attack on the enemy and drove him some distance. My di\ision was directed 
 to threaten the enemy's right and rear, which it proceeded to do under a heavy 
 fire of artillery from the ridge to the left of the pike. Generals Seymour and 
 Jackson led their brigades in advance; but, notwithstanding all the steadiness 
 and courage shown by the men, they were compelled to fall back before the 
 heavy fire of artillery and musketry which met them both on the front and left 
 flank, and the division resumed its original position. King's division engaged 
 the enemy along the pike on our right, and the action was continued with it 
 until dark by Meade's brigade. 
 
 Report of Brig. Gen. John C. Robinson, of Kearney's division, Heintzelman'e 
 
 corps. 
 Headquarters Robinson's Brigade, 
 
 Centreville, Va., August 31, 1862. 
 « • « « * « « 
 
 On Friday morning I was ordered to "support Colonel Poe's brigade and to 
 develop his line of battle to the right." After crossing Bull Run I moved for- 
 ward in two lines, the first composed of the Sixty-third Pennsylvania and five 
 companies of the Thirtieth Ohio, which were temporarily attached to my com- 
 mand. Arriving on the ground assigned me, I remained for a considerable time 
 exposed to a heavy artillery fire, after which I tooli up nay position on high 
 ground farther to the right. I was soon after directed by INIajor-General Kear- 
 ney, commanding division, to move to the support of Poe's left, when I formed 
 the Sixty-third and One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania in line of battle on the 
 
52 
 
 Leesburg road, holding the Twentieth Indiana and Ohio battalion in reserve. 
 At this time there was a heavy musketry lire to our left and front, and I was 
 directed to move forward through the woods to turn the enemy and cut off his 
 retreat through the railroad cut. 
 
 On arriving on the ground witli the Sixty-third and One hundred and fifth 
 Pennsylvania, Twentieth I>idiana, and Third Michigan, I found the railroad al- 
 ready occupied by our own troops and the cornfield in front filled with the enemy, 
 I then deployed the Sixty-third and One hundred and fifth Pennsylvania along 
 the railroad to the right of the troops in position, directing the Third Michigan 
 to protect my right flank, placing the Twentieth Indiana in reserve, and throw- 
 ing skirmishers to the front. Soon after taking this position the regiments on 
 my left gave way and passed rapidly to the rear out of the woods, leaving my 
 left flank entirely exposed. 
 
 As rapidly as possible I moved my command to the left to occupy the deserted 
 ground, but before my troops could get fairly into position I was fiercely attacked 
 by a superior force that had succeeded in crossing the road. I then threw for- 
 ward my right wing, forming my line of battle at right angles to the original po- 
 sition, and checked the progress of the enemy. At this time General Birney 
 brought up and turned over to me his Fourth Maine. He afterward sent me his 
 First, Fortieth, and One hundred and first New York Regiments. These troops 
 were deployed to the right and left of the railroad, and pushed forward to the 
 support of my regiments in front, which were suflering severely from a terrific 
 fire of musketry and the enemy's artillery posted on a hill to our right and rear. 
 Our men now gained steadily on the enemy, and were driving him before them 
 until he brought up fresh masses of troops (supposed to be two brigades), when, 
 with ammunition nearly expended, we withdrew to our second position. 
 
 Report of Brig. Gen. C. Grover, of Heintzelman's corps. 
 
 Headquarters First Brigade, Hooker's Division, 
 
 September 26, 1862. 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 On the following day we continued our march for the plains of Manassas by 
 the way of Centreville", and arrived upon the battlefield about 9 a. m. The bat- 
 tle had already commenced, and as my column moved to the front the shells 
 fell with remarkable precision along the line of the road, but fortunately did no 
 damage. 
 
 My brigade was temporarily placed under the orders of Major-General Sigel, 
 whose troops were then engaging the enemy in the center. Under instructions 
 received from him, I threw forward the First Massachusetts Volunteers to sup- 
 port his line, while my remaining four regiments were drawn up in two lines, 
 sheltered from the enemy's fire by a roll of the field in front. This position was 
 occupied until about 2.30 p. m. 
 
 In the mean time I rode over the field in front as far as the position of the enemy 
 would admit. After rising the hill under which my command lay an open field 
 was entered, and from one edge of it gradually fell oft" in a slope to a valley, 
 through which ran a railroad embankment. Beyond this embankment the forest 
 continued, and the corresponding heights beyond were held by the enemy in 
 force, supported by artillery. 
 
 At 3 p. m. I received an order to advance in line of battle over this ground, pass 
 the embankment, enter the edge of the woods beyond, and hold it. Dispositions 
 for carrying out such orders were immediately made ; pieces were loaded, bayo- 
 nets fixed, and instructions given for the line to move slowly upon the enemy 
 until it felt its fire, then close upon him rapidly, fire one well-directed volley, and 
 rely upon the bayonet to secure the position on the other side. 
 
 We rapidly and firmly pressed upon the embankment, and here occurred a 
 short, sharp, and obstinate hand-to-hand conflict with bayonets and clubbed 
 muskets. 
 
 Report of General P. Kearney (by General Birney), of Heintzelman's corps. 
 
 Centreville, Va., August 31, 1862. 
 ******* 
 
 On the 29th, on my arrival, I was assigned to the holding of the right wing, my 
 left on Leesburg road. I posted Colonel Poe, with Berry's brigade, in first line ; 
 General Robinson, First Brigade, on his right, partly in line and partly in sup- 
 port; and kept Birney's most disciplined regiments reserved and ready for 
 euAergeiicics. 
 
 Toward noon I was obliged to occupy a quarter of a mile additional on left of 
 said road, from Schurz's troops being taken elsewhere. 
 
 During the first hours of combat General Birney, on tired regiments in the 
 center falling back, of his own accord rapidly pushed across to give them a hand 
 to raise themselves to a renewed fight. 
 
 I II early afternoon General Pope's order to General Roberts was to send a pretty 
 Btrong foVce diagonally to the front to relieve the center in woods from pressure. 
 Aceordiiiglv 1 detached on that purpose General Robinson, with his brigade, the 
 Six*,-u thirfrPennsylvauia Volunteers, Colonel Hays, the One hundred and fltth 
 
53 
 
 Pennsylvania Volunteers, Captain Craig, the Twentieth Indiana, Colonel Brown, 
 and, additionally, the Third Michigan Marksmen, under Colonel Champlin 
 General Robinson drove forward for several hundred yards, but the center of 
 the main battle being shortly after driven back and out of the woods, my detach- 
 ment thus exposed so considerably in front of all others, both flanks in air 
 ******* 
 That I might drive the enemy, by an unexpected attack, through the woods I 
 brought up additionally tlie most ofBiriiey'sregiments.the Fourth Maine.Colonel 
 Walker and Lieutenant-Colonel Carver, the Fortieth New York; Colonel Egan 
 First New York, Major Kurt, and One hundred and first New York Lieutenant^ 
 Colonel Gesner, and changed front to the left, to sweep with a rush the first line 
 of the enemy. This was mosl successful. The enemy rolled up on his own right 
 It presaged avictory for usall; still our force was toolight. The enemy brought 
 up rapidly heavy reserves, so that our further progress was impeded. General 
 Stevens came up gallantly in action to support us, but did not have the numbers. 
 
 Report of Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel. 
 
 Near Fort Db Kalb, Virginia, September 16 1862 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 1J-— Battle of Oroveton, near Bull Run, on Friday, August 29, 1862. 
 
 On Thursday night, August 28, when the First Corps was encamped on the 
 heights south ot Young's Branch, near Bull Run, I received orders from General 
 Pope to " attack the enemy vigorously " the next morning. I accordingly made 
 the necessary preparations at night and formed in order of battle at daybreak 
 having ascertained that the enemy was in considerable force beyond Young's 
 Branch, in sight of the hills we occupied. His left wing rested on Catharpin 
 Creek, front toward CentieviUe; with his center he occupied a long stretch of 
 woods parallel with the Sudley Springs (New Market) road, and his right was 
 posted on the hills on both sides of the Centreville-Gainesville road. I therefore 
 directed General Schurz to deploy his division on the right of the Gainesville 
 road, and, by a change of direction to the left, to come into position parallel with 
 the Sudley Springs road. General Milroy, with his brigade and one battery was 
 directed to form the center, and to take possession of an elevation in front of the 
 so-called "stone house," at the junction of the Gainesville and Sudley Springs 
 roads. General Schenck, with his division, forming our left, was ordered to ad- 
 vance quickly to an adjoining range of hills, and to plant his batteries on these 
 niUs at an excellent range from the enemy's position. 
 
 In this order our whole line advanced from point to point, taking advantage 
 of the ground before us, until our whole line was involved in a most vehement 
 artillery and infantry contest. In the course of about four hours, from half past 
 6 to half past 10 o'clock in the morning, our whole infantry force and nearly 
 all our batteries were engaged with the enemy. Generals Milroy and Schurz ad- 
 vancing one mile and General Schenck two miles from their original positions 
 At this time (10.30 o'clock) the enemy threw forward large masses of infantry 
 against our right, but was resisted firmly and driven back three times by the 
 troops of Generals Milroy and Schurz. To assist those troops so hard pressed 
 by overpowering numbers, exhausted by fatigue, and weakened by losses I or- 
 dered one battery of reserve to take position on their left, and poste'd two pieces 
 of artillery, under Lieutenant Blum, of Schirmer's battery, supported by the 
 Fortj'^first New York Volunteer Infantry, beyond their line and opposite the 
 right flank of the enemy, who was advancing in the woods 
 
 «=****** 
 
 At 2 o'clock in the afternoon General Hooker's troops arrived on the field of 
 kiittle and were immediately ordered forward by their noble commander to par- 
 ticipate in the battle. One brigade, under Colonel Carr, received orders by my 
 request, torehevethe regiments of General Schurz's division, which had main- 
 tained their ground against repeated attacks, but were now worn out and nearly 
 without ammunition. Other regiments were sent forward to relieve Brigadier- 
 General Milroy, whose brigade had valiantly disputed the ground against greatly 
 superior numbers for eight hours. 
 
 To check the enemy if he should attempt to advance, or for the purpose of 
 preparing and supporting an attack from our side, I placed four batteries of 
 different commands, on a range of hills on our center and behind the woods 
 which had been the most hotly contested part of the battlefield during the day' 
 I had previously received a letter from Major-General Pope, saying that Fit& 
 John Porter's corps and Brigadier-General King's division, num'bering twenty 
 thousand men, would come in on our left. I did, therefore, not think it prudent 
 to give the enemy time to make new arrangements, and ordered all the batteries 
 to continue their fire, and to direct it principally against the enemy's position 
 in the woods before our front. Some of our troops placed in front were retiring 
 from the woods, but as the enemy, held in check by the artillery in the center 
 ^d not venture to follow, and as at this moment new regiments of General 
 Hooker's command arrived and were ordered forward, we maintained our posi- 
 tion which Generals Milroy and Schurz had occupied in the morning. 
 
 During two hours, from 4 to 6 o'clock p. m., strong cannonading and musketry 
 
54 
 
 continued on our center and right, where General Kearney made a successlul 
 effort against the extreme left of the enemy's lines. 
 
 Beport of Brig. Gen. B. H. Milroy. 
 
 BLeadquaetbrs Independent Brigade, 
 
 Nhae Fokt Ethan Allen, Va., 
 September 12, 1862. 
 
 « * 4: Up * * * 
 
 On the following morning (the 29th) at daylight I was ordered to proceed in 
 search of the rebels, and had not proceeded more than five hundred yards when 
 we were greeted by a few straggling shots from the woods in front. We were 
 now at the creek, and I had just sent forward my skirmishers, when I received 
 orders to halt and let my men have breakfast. While they were cooking, my- 
 self, accompanied by General Schenck, rode up to the top of an eminence some 
 five' hundred yards to the front to reconnoiter. We had no sooner reached the 
 top than we were greeted by a shower of musket-balls from the woods on our 
 right. I immediately ordered up my battery and gave the bushwhackers a few 
 Bhotand shell, which soon cleared the woods. Soon after I discovered the enemy 
 in great force about three-quarters of a mile in front of us, upon our right of the 
 pike leading from Gainesville to Alexandria. I brought up my two batteries and 
 opened upon them, causing them to fall back. I then moved forward my brigade, 
 with skirmishers deployed, and continued to advance my regiments, the enemy 
 falling back. 
 
 General Schenck's division was off to my left, and that of General Schurz to 
 my right. After passing a piece of woods I turned to the right, where the rebels 
 had a battery that gave us a good deal of trouble. I brought forward one of my 
 batteries to reply to it, and soon after heard a tremendous fire of small-arms, and 
 knew that General Schurz was hotly engaged to my right in an extensive forest. 
 1 sent two of my regiments, the Eighty-second Ohio, Colonel Oantwell, and the 
 Fifth Virginia, Colonel Ziegler, to General Schurz's assistance. They were to at^ 
 ta«k the enemy's right flank, and I held my other two regiments in reserve for a 
 time. The two regiments sent to Schurz were soon hotly engaged, the enemy 
 being behind a railroad embankment, which afforded them an excellent breastn 
 work. 
 
 Report of Brigadier-General Stahl. 
 
 Ckntreville, September 1, 1862. 
 ******* 
 With break of day on the 29th I followed the second brigade, first division, 
 marching to Dogan's farm, and took position behind the farm. I remained here 
 but a short time. * * * Here I found a number of dead and wounded. Hav- 
 ing remained here a half an hour, a heavy skirmish occurred at this point. 
 
 Beport of Lieut. George B. Haskins, First Ohio Artillery, McLean's brigade, 
 Schenck's division, Sigel's corps. 
 
 Headquarters Battery K, 
 Buffalo Fort, Va., September 17, 1862. 
 ******* 
 Fighting resumed next morning, August 29, and engaged the enemy until 
 about Ha. m., when we ran out of ammunition, and, not being able to get more, 
 were ordered to the rear, where we remained that and the following day, August 
 SO, until about 5 p. m. 
 
 Beport of Colonel Krzyzanowski, commanding second brigade, Schurz's divis- 
 ion, Sigel's corps. 
 Near Arlington Heights, September 3, 1862. 
 
 At about half past 5 o'clock a. m. on the 29th of August I received orders from 
 General Schurz to advance with my brigade. It was done in the following or- 
 der: Two regiments in company column, left in front, and one regiment, the 
 Fifty-fourth New York Volunteers, as reserve. On the right of me was Colonel 
 Schimelpfennig with his brigade, and on the left General Milroy's brigade. A 
 line of skirmishers having been established, we advanced toward the woods 
 through which the Manassas Gap Railroad runs. As soon as we entered the 
 woods I dispatched my adjutant to ascertain whether the line of skirmishers was 
 kept up on lioth wings, and finding such was not the case and that I had ad- 
 vanced a little faster than General Milroy's and Colonel Schimelpfennig's col- 
 umn, I halted my skirmishers to wait until the line was re-established. How- 
 ever, being informed that General Milroy v.-as advancing, I sent the Fifty-fourth 
 Eegiment to take position on my right wing and try to find the lines of Colonel 
 Schimelpfennig's skirmishers, and then I advanced together with the former. 
 
 Scarcely had the skirmishers passed over two hundred yards when they be- 
 came engaged with the enemy. For some time the firing was kept up ; but our 
 
55 
 
 skirmishers had to yield at last to the enemy's aavancing column. At this time 
 I ordered my regiments up, and a general engagement ensued. However, I 
 Boon noticed that the Fifty-fourth and Fifty-eighth Regiments had to fall back, 
 owing to the furious fire of the enemy, who had evidently thrown his forces ex- 
 clusively upon those two regiments. The Seventy-fifth Regiment Pennsylvania 
 Volunteers, which up to this time liad not taken part in this engagement, was (at 
 the time the Fifty-eighth and Fifty-fourth retired) now nobly led on by Lieuten- 
 ant-Colonel Mahler upon the right flank of the enemy, and kept him busy until I 
 had brought the Fifty -eighth at a double-quick up to its previous position, when 
 those two regiments successfully drove the enemy before them, thereby gaining 
 the position of the Manassas Gap Railroad. 
 
 The Fifty-fourth had meanwhile been ordered by General Sehurz to take po- 
 sition with the Twenty-ninth Regiment New York State Volunteers in the inter- 
 val of my brigade and that of Colonel Schimelpfennig. 
 
 At this time I observed on my right the brigade of General Roberts, to whom 
 I explained my position, after which we advanced together a short distance; 
 but he soon withdrew bis forces, ascertaining that he got his brigade in between 
 the columns of bur division. We had occupied the above-named position only a 
 short time when the enemy again tried to force us back, but the noble conduct 
 of my troops did not allow him to carry out his design, and he did not gain one 
 inch of ground. We were thus enabled to secure our wounded and some of our 
 dead, and also some of the enemy's wounded, belonging to the Tenth South Caro- 
 lina Regiment. We held this position until 2 p. ni., when we were relieved by 
 tL brigade of General Kearney's division, and i-etired about one-fourth of a mile 
 toward our rear, where we also encamped for the night. 
 
 Keport of Col. Joseph B. Carr, commanding brigade of Brig. Gen. Joseph Hook- 
 er's division, Heintzelman's corps. 
 Headquarters Third Brigade, Hooker's Division, 
 
 Camp near Fort Lyon, Va., September 6, 1862. 
 
 ******* 
 
 At 2 o'clock Friday morning, August 29, I received orders to march at 3 a. m. 
 and support General Kearney, who was in pursuit of the enemy. A march of ten 
 miles brought us to the Bull Run battlefield. About 11 a. m. was ordered in posi- 
 tion to support a battery in front of the woods, where the enemy with General 
 Sigel's troops was engaged. Remaining about one hour in that position, was 
 ordered to send into the woods and relieve two regiments of General Sigel's 
 corps. 1 sent in the Sixth and Seventh New Jersey Volunteers. Afterward re- 
 ceived orders to take the balance of the brigade in the woods, which I did at 
 about 2 p. m. Here I at once engaged the enemy, and fought him for a space of 
 two hours, holding my position until ourammunition was all expended. About 
 i o'clock wo were relieved by General Reno and Colonel Taylor, but did not 
 reach the skirt of the woods before a retreat was made and the woods occupied 
 by the enemy. When I arrived out of the woods I was ordered to march about 
 half a mile to the rear and bivouac for the night. 
 
 Report of Col. J. W. Revere, Seventh New Jersey Volunteers, Carr's brigade, 
 Hooker's division, Heintzelman's corps. 
 In the Field, near Centreville, Va., August 30, 1862. 
 
 Sir : I have the honor to report that this regiment, being ordered into the 
 ■Woods with the Sixth New Jersey Volunteers, proceeding [proceeded] to occupy 
 them, relieving a New York regiment of General Steinwehr's division on the 
 29th instant at 11 a. m. on the extreme right of the position of our part of the 
 army. 
 
 Advancing about fifty yards, we encountered the enemy's pickets, and a spir- 
 ited engagement ensued, with varying success; and having been relieved by the 
 timely advance of the Sixth Regiment New Jersey Volunteers, we drove the 
 enemy from his position, but having been strongly re-enforced, he regained it 
 ab»ut 1 p. m. 
 
 Report of Maj. F. Blessing, commanding Seventy-fourth Pennsylvania Volun 
 teers, of first brigade, Schurz's division, Sigel's corps. 
 ******* 
 At 5 o'clock a. m., August 29, we left this place, meeting our brig^ade, com- 
 manded by Col. A. Schimelpfennig, at 6 o'clock. After a rest of about fifteen 
 minutes the regiment was ordered to take its position on the extreme right of 
 the army corps then advancing. Under cover of skirmishers in the front and 
 right flank, we advanced in quick time over an open field until we arrived at the 
 center of the woods, where in an opening we halted. The skirmishers met the 
 skirmish line of the enemy, opened fire, and drove them into the woods. Forced 
 by the heavy artillery fire of the enemy, we changed several times our positions. 
 PVom the right flank came the report that a strong column was advancing, but 
 that it was impossible to recognize whether friend or foe. It was afterward as- 
 certained to be General Kearney's corps for our relief. The regiment was then 
 
56 
 
 ordered to the left, -where it took its position in the general battle-line after ad- 
 rancing about four hundred yards under the heavy fire of the enemy driving 
 the latter back and out of his positions, but by the withdrawing of a regiment 
 stationed on the left of the Seventy-fourth, the enemy took advantage, and, 
 outflanking us, we were forced back about one hundred yards. 
 
 Forming again in column for attack, the regiment advanced in quick time to- 
 ward the enemy, who gave way until he arrived at the other side of the railroad 
 dam. Here, again flanked by the enemy and under a galling Are of grape-shot 
 and canister, the regiment had to leave its position, which it did by making a 
 flank movement to the left, forcing the enemy to withdraw from the woods. 
 We advanced over our former position, capturing an ambulance with two 
 wounded officers, to the seam of the woods. At this point a heavy shower of 
 grape-shot and canister pouring into us, we withdrew to the raih'oad danj. After 
 resting here for about thirty minutes, we were ordered by General Schurz to sup- 
 port a battery on the extreme right, keeping in tliat position till the battery left. 
 We then again joined our brigade. Wearied and exhausted we camped for the 
 night on the same ground the enemy held the night previous. 
 
 Report of Maj. Steven Kovacs, Fifty-fourth New York Volunteers, Second Bri- 
 gade, Schurz's divi.sion, Sigel's corps. 
 
 Camp near Arlington Heights, September 12, 1862. 
 Sir : I have the honor to report that on the 29th of August, 1862, the Fifty-fourth 
 Regiment New York State Volunteers was drawn up in line of battle at 6 o'clock 
 a. m., at Manassas, and ordered for reserve by General Schurz ; at 8 o'clock, by 
 his orders, was sent to the woods to drive out the enemy, and found them in large 
 force. The regiment instantly became engaged, and it held the woods in spite 
 of the superior numbers until 1 o'clock, when it ^vas relieved by another regi- 
 ment. In this engagement the officers and men behaved themselves bravely, 
 especially the second color-bearer, William Rauschmiiller, who, seeing his com- 
 rade (the first color-bearer) fall, instantly seized the flag, and at the same time he 
 cared for his wounded comrade, took him to the rear, and immediately returned 
 again to his proper place. After this the regiment was ordered to fall back to 
 another wood about half a mile distant, with the order to be in column by divis- 
 ion, to be ready for any emergency, and the regiment remained under arms all 
 night. 
 
 Report of Capt. F. Braum, commanding Fifty-eighth New York Volunteers, 
 Second Brigade, .Schurz's division, Sigel's corps. 
 
 Camp near Arlington Heights, September VI, 1862. 
 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 The 29th instant the regiment was ordered into action, and marching over a 
 plain ground soon was engaged with the enemy, which had taken position in 
 the woods. The regiment held the enemy in check from 8 o'clock in the morn- 
 ing till 12 o'clock p. m., when the regiment was relieved. The loss of the regi- 
 ment was twenty-nine killed, wounded, and missing. 
 
 Report of Col. William Blaisdell, Eleventh Massachusetts Volunteers, Grover'a 
 Brigade, Hooker's division, Heintzehnan's corps. 
 
 Camp near Alexandria, Va., September 14, 1862. 
 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 After supporting several batteries the regiment was ordered to move forward 
 and engage the enemy. At about 3 p. m., advancing about one mile to the edge 
 of a heavy wood, then deploying and moving forward in line of battle until 
 w^ithin range of the enemy's pickets, the line was halted, bayonets fixed. Again 
 moving forward, driving the enemy's pickets before it, the regiment came upon 
 and engaged a heavy line of the enemy's infantry, which was driven l)ack and 
 over a line of railroad, where the road-bed was ten feet high, behind which was 
 posted another heavy line of infantry, which opened a terrific fire tipon the regi- 
 ment as it emerged from the woods. 'The Eleventh Regiment being the liuttalion 
 of direction, was the first to reach the railroad, and of course received the heaviest 
 of the fire. This staggered the men a little, but recovering in an instant, they 
 gave a wild hurrah and over they went, mounting the embankment, driving 
 everything before them at the point of the bayonet. 
 
 Here, for two or more minutes, the struggle was very severe, the combatants 
 exchanging shots, their muskets almost muzzle to muzzle, and engaging hand 
 to hand in deadly encounter. Private .Tohn.Sawler, of Company D, stove in the 
 skull of one rebel with the butt of his musket and killed another with his bayo- 
 net. The enemy broke in confusion and ran, numbers throwing ilown their 
 muskets, sotne fully cocked, and the owners too much frightened to fire them, 
 the regiment pursuing them some eighty yards into the woods, where it was 
 met by an overwhelming force in front, at the same time receiving an artillery 
 fire, which enfiladed our left and forced it to retire, leaving the dead and many 
 of the woMiidcd where thev fell. 
 
67 
 
 It was near the railroad embankment that the brave Tileston, Stone, and Por- 
 ter, and other gallant men, received their mortal wounds. Being thus overpow- 
 ered by numerical odds, after breaking through and scattering two lines of the 
 enemy, and compelled to evacuate the woods and enter into the open fields be- 
 yond, the enemy pursuing us hotly to the edge of the woods, I was greatly 
 amazed to find that the regiment had been sent to engage a force of more than 
 five times its numbers, strongly posted in thick woodsand behind heavy embank- 
 ments, and not a soldier to support it in case of disaster. After collecting the 
 regiment together and moving back to our original position we encamped for the 
 night. The officers and men of the regiment fought with the most desperate 
 bravery ; not a man flinched, and the losses were proportionately severe. Out 
 of two hundred and eighty-three officers and men who participated in the fight, 
 three officers and seven enlisted men were killed, three officers and seventy-four 
 enlisted men were wounded, and twenty-five missing, making an aggregate of 
 ten killed, seventy-seven wounded, and twenty-five missing, all in the space of 
 fifteen or twenty minutes. The regiment bivouacked on the field. 
 
 General R. C. Schenck's report, by Colonel Cheesborough. 
 
 Washington, D. C, Septeniber 17, 1862. 
 ******* 
 
 On Thursd.<vy, 29th ultimo, we left Buckland's Mills, passing through Gaines- 
 ville, and proceeded on the Manassas Junction pike to within some four miles of 
 that place, and then turned eastwardly, marching toward Bull Run. The scouts 
 in advance reported a force of the enemy, consisting of infantry and cavalry in 
 front. We were hurried forward and formed line of battle with our right toward 
 Centreville. Some few shells were thrown into a clump of woods in front where 
 the enemy were last seen, but without eliciting any response. Some two hours 
 elapsed when heavy firing was heard on our left, which we concluded was from 
 McDowell's corps, and the enemy who had worked around from our front in 
 that direction. We were immediately put in motion, and marched on the War- 
 renton road and took position for the night on a hill east of the "stone house," 
 our right resting on the pike. 
 
 On Friday morning early the engagement was commenced by General Milroy 
 on our right, in which we soon alter took part, and a rapid artillery fire ensued 
 from both sides. For some time heavy columns of the enemy could be seen fil- 
 ing out of a wood in front and gradually falling back. They ■were within range 
 of our guns, which were turned on them and must have done some execution. 
 An hour after ■we received the order to move one brigade by the flank to the left 
 and advance, which was done. We here obtained a good position for artillery, 
 and stationed De Beck's First Ohio Battery, which did excellent service, dis- 
 mounting one of the enemy's guns, blowing up a caisson aud silencing the bat- 
 tery. Unfortunately, however, they were poorly supplied with ammunition, 
 and soon compelled to withdraw. 
 
 Our two brigades were now put in motion. General Stahel, commanding first 
 brigade, marching around the right of the hill to a hollo^v in front, was ordered 
 to draw up in line of battle and halt. Colonel McLean advanced around the left 
 of the hill under cover of the woods, pressing gradually forward until he struck 
 the turnpike at a white house about one-half mile in advance of the stone house. 
 General Milroy's brigade arrived about the same time. We were halted, and 
 sent back for General Stahel, who took the pike and soon joined us. We then 
 formed our line of battle in the woods to the leftof the pike, our right resting on 
 the road, and then pushed on slow-ly. Milroy, in the mean while, had deployed 
 to the right of the road, and soon became engaged with the enemy. Our divis- 
 ion was advanced until we reached the edge of the woods and halted. 
 
 In front of us was an open space (which also extended to the right of the road 
 and to our right), beyond which ^vas another wood. We remained here nearly 
 an hour, the firing in the mean while becoming heavy on the right. The enemy 
 had a battery very advantageously placed on a high ridge behind the woods in 
 front of Milroy, on the right of the road. It was admirably served and entirely 
 concealed. Our position becoming known their fire was dii'ected toward us. 
 The Generaldetermined, therefore, to advance, and so pushed on across the open 
 space in front and took position in the woods beyond. We here discovered that 
 ■we ■were on the battle-ground of the night before, and found the hospital of Gib- 
 bon's brigade, who had engaged the enemy. Thebattery of the enemy still con- 
 tinued. We had no artillery. De Beck's" and Sehirmer's ammunition having 
 given out, and Buell's battery which had reported, after a hot contest with the 
 enemy (who had every advantage in position and range), ■was compelled to re- 
 tire. It was now determined to flank the battery and capture it, and for this 
 purpose General Schenck ordered one of his aids to reconnoiter the position. 
 Before he returned, how^ever, ■we veere requested by General Milroy to assist 
 him, as he was very heavily pressed. General Stahel was immediately ordered 
 to proceed with his brigade to Milroy's support. 
 
 It was about this time, 1 or 2 o'clock, that aline of skirmishers were observed 
 approaching us from the rear ; they proved to be of General Reynolds. We com- 
 municated with General Reynolds at once, who took his position on our left, and 
 
58 
 
 at General Schenck's suggestion he sent a battery to our right in the woods for 
 the purpose of flanking the enemy. They secured a position and were engaged 
 with him about an hour, but with what result we were not informed. General 
 Reynolds now sent us ^vord that he had discovered the enemy bearing down 
 upon his left in heavj' columns, and that he intended to fall back to the first 
 woods behind the cleared space, and had already put his troops in motion. 
 We therefore accommodated ourselves to his movement. It ■was about this time 
 that your order came to press toward the right. We returned answer that the 
 enemy were in force in front of us, and that ■we could not do so without leaving 
 the left much exposed. General Schenck again asked for some artillery. 
 
 General Stahel's brigade that had been sent to General Milroy's assistance 
 ha\nng accomplished its object under a .severe fire had returned, and soon after 
 General Stevens reported ^vith two regiments of infantry and a battery of four 
 20-pound Parrot guns. With these re-enforcements we determined to advance 
 again and reocc\ii)y the ■woods in front of the cleared space, and communicated 
 this intention to General Reynolds. He, however, had fallen back on our left 
 some distance to the rear; he was therefore requested to make his connection 
 with our left. The Parrots in the mean while were placed in i-)osition, and under 
 the adra irable management of Lieutenant Benjamin did splendidly. Two mount- 
 ain howitzers also reported, and were placed on our right in the edge of the 
 woods near the road and commenced shelling the woods in front of the open 
 space, which were now occupied by the enemy, our skirmishers having pre- 
 viously fallen back. 
 
 The artillery fire now^ became very severe, and Genei'alSchenck was convinced 
 that it w^as very essential that he should have another battery, and so sent me to 
 you to get one. I arrived to find one. Captain Romer's, just starting. You also 
 directed me to order General Schenck to fall gradually back, as he was too far 
 forward. General Stahel on the left of the pike and Colonel McLean to the left 
 of Stahel. I here state in my report that General Schenck, on receiving these 
 re-enforcements, determined to advance again, and communicated his intention 
 to General Reynolds. I carried this message myself, and, after some difficulty, 
 found General Reynolds and requested him to halt and form on the left of Mc- 
 Lean. He had fallen back, however, some distance to the rear of McLean's line 
 of battle, so much so that the enemy's skirmishers had actually flanked us, and 
 in returning to the division I had a narrow escape from being captured. 
 
 I also asked General Reynolds to ride forward to meet General Schenck, who 
 had directed me to say that he would be at the extreme left of our line for that 
 purpose. General Reynolds neither gave me any positive answer as to whether 
 he would meet General Schenck or any information as to w^hat he intended to 
 do. I do not know if he complied with the request to make his connection on 
 our left, as, on my return to General Schenck, I was immediately sent to Gen- 
 eral Sigel to represent our position ; and when returning again with the order 
 to General Schenck to retire slowly, I met the command executing the move- 
 ment. 
 
 My report was intended merely as a sketch of our movements for General 
 Slgel's information, and I endeavored throughout to be as concise as possible 
 and confine myself solely to the operations and movements of our division. I 
 now submit the above statement, trusting that the explanations will be satisfac- 
 tory to General Reynolds. 
 
 Report of Maj. Gen. S. P. Heintzelman. 
 
 Arlington, Va., October 21, 1862. 
 
 ******* 
 
 At 10 a. m. I reached the field of battle, a mile from Stone Bridge, on the War- 
 renton turnpike. General Kearney's division had proceeded to the right and 
 front. I learned that General Sigel was in command of the troops then engaged. 
 
 At 11 a.m. the head of Hooker's division arrived; General Reno an hour later. 
 At the request of General Sigel I ordered General Hooker to place one of his 
 brigades at General Sigel's disposal, to re-enforce aportionof his line then hard 
 pressed. General Grover reported, and l)efore long became engaged, and was 
 afterward supported by the whole division. General Pope arrived between 1 
 and 2 p. m. The enemy were driven back a short di.stance toward Sudley's 
 church, where they made another stand and again pressed a portion of our line 
 back. All this time General Kearney's division held its position on our extreme 
 right. Several orders were sent to him to advance, but he did not move till after 
 the troops on his left had been forced back, which was near 6 p. m. He now 
 advanced and reported that he was driving the enemy. This was not, however, 
 until after the renewed heavy musketry fire on our center had driven General 
 Hooker's troops and those he was sent to support back. They were greatly out- 
 numbered and behaved with exceeding gallantry. 
 
 It was on this occasion that General Grover's brigade made the most gallant 
 and determined bayonet charge of the war. He broke two of the enemy's lines, 
 but was finally repulsed by the overwhelming numbers in the rebel third line. 
 It was a hand-to-hand conflict, using the bayonet and the butt of the musket. 
 In this fierce encounter of not over twenty minutes' duration the Second New 
 
59 
 
 Hampshire, Colonel Marston, suffered the most. The First, Eleventh, and Six- 
 teenth Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania were engaged. The loss 
 of this brigade, numbering less than 2,0UO, was a total of 484, nearly all kiUed and 
 wounded. I refer you to General Grover's accompanying report. 
 
 Had General Kearney pushed the enemy earlier it might have enabled us to 
 have held our center and have saved some of this heavy loss. Kearney on the 
 right with General Stevens and our artillery, drove the enemy out of Uie woods 
 they had temp'.rarily occupied. The firing continued some time afterdark, and 
 when it ceased we remained in possession of the battlefield. 
 
 THIS DAY MUST NOT BE CONFUSED. 
 
 These all speak of the 29th, not confused with the 30th, for the 30th 
 is in a separate part of the reports. 
 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Sewell, commander Fifth New Jersey, reports that 
 "on the 29th of August — 
 
 I was soon obliged to relieve my right wing with my left, the former having 
 emptied their cartridge-boxes. 
 
 His command had emptied their cartridge-boxes and one wing had to 
 be relieved by the other for that reason. 
 
 Captain Weidrick, commanding Battery I, New York Artillery, re- 
 ports in action from 10 o'clock, 29th, until 3 o'clock, when they had to 
 retire on account of loss of ammunition. 
 
 Captain Dilger, commanding battery, reports his battery engaged until 
 his ammunition was expended and his battery relieved by another. 
 
 Colonel Thompson, One hundred and fifteenth Pennsylvania, reports 
 continuous fighting until his command was relieved by fresh troops, sus- 
 taining heavy loss. 
 
 Col. G. C. Burling, Sixth New Jersey, was engaged until relieved by 
 fresh troops. His loss was severe. 
 
 NEW EVIDENCE FURNISHED BY CONFEDERATE OFFICERS. 
 
 Fitz-John Porter says he found new evidence. What new evidence? 
 The new evidence is produced by statements from oflficers of the con- 
 federate army for the purpose of showing that on that day he was not 
 required to fight because there was no battle. 
 
 REPORTS OF CONFEDERATE OFFICERS. 
 
 General T. J. Jackson, who commanded the rebel forces on that day, 
 in making his report April 27, 1863, or rather made, from the records 
 he left, by his adjutant-general, says: 
 
 My troops on this day (29th) were distributed along and in the vicinity of the 
 cut of an unfinished railroad (intended as a part of the track to connect the Ma- 
 nassas road directly with Alexandria) stretching from the Warrenton turnpike 
 in the direction of Sudley Mill. It was mainly along the excavation of this un- 
 finished road that my line of battle was formed on the 29th [August] 
 
 Assault after assault was made on the left, exhibiting on the part of the enemy 
 great pertinacity and determination, but every advance was most successfully 
 and gallantly driven back. General Hill reports that six separate and distinct 
 assaults were thus met and repulsed by his division, assisted by Hays's brigade, 
 Colonel Forno commanding. By this time the brigade of General Gregg, which, 
 from its position on the extreme left, was most exposed to the enemy s attack, 
 had nearly expended its ammunition. It had suffered severely in its men, and 
 all its field officers except two were killed or wounded. 
 
 About 4 o'clock it had been assisted by Hays's brigade (Colonel Forno). It 
 was now retired to the rear to take some repose after seven hours of severe service. 
 
 After seven hours of severe contest it was relieved because the men 
 were exhausted. 
 
 And General Early's brigade, of Ewell's division, with the Eighth Louisiana 
 Regiment, took its place. ,. j ..^ » j 
 
 On reaching his position, General Early found that the enemy had obtained 
 possession of the raih-oad and a piece of wood in front, there being at this point 
 a deep cut which furnished a sU-ong defense. Moving through a field he ad- 
 vanced upon the enemy, drove them from the wood and railroad cut with great 
 slaughter, and followed in pursuit some two hundred yards. 
 They were driven back with great slaughter. 
 
 Early kept his position there until the following morning. 
 
60 
 
 Now, to show that this was on the 29th let us see what he says in 
 the conclusion of this report: 
 
 At a later period Major Patrick, of the cavalry, who was by General Stuart in- 
 trusted with guarding the train, was attacked, and, although it was promptly 
 and effectually repulsed, it was not without the loss of that intrepid officer, who 
 fell in the attack while setting an example of gallantry to his men well worthy 
 of imitation. During the day the commanding general arrived, and also Gren- 
 eral Longstreet with his command. 
 
 EEPORT OF GENEBAL, A. P. HILl.. 
 
 Let me call attention to the report of General A. P. Hill, who was 
 in that battle on the day of the 29th: 
 
 The evident intention of the enemy this day was to turn our left and overwhelm 
 Jackson's corps before Longstreet came up. 
 
 The evident intention of the enemy, speaking of Pope's forces, was to 
 torn Jackson's left and overwhelm him before Longstreet could arrive. 
 
 And to accomplish this, the most persistent and furious onsets were made by 
 column after column of infantry, accompanied by numerous batteries of artil- 
 lery. 
 
 The enemy prepared for a last and determined attempt. Their serried masses, 
 over^vhelming superiority of numbers, and bold bearing made the chance of 
 victory to tremble in the balance ; my own division exhausted — 
 
 A. P. HUl's division exhausted — 
 by seven hours' unremitted fighting, hardly one round per man remaining, and 
 weakened in all things save its unconquerable spirit. Casting about for help, 
 fortunately it was here reported to me that the brigades of Generals Lawton and 
 Early were near by, and sending for them they promptly moved to my front at 
 the most opportune moment, and this last charge met the same disastrous fate 
 that had befallen those preceding. Having received an order from General Jack- 
 eon to endeavor to avoid a general engagement, my commanders of brigades 
 contented themselves ^th repulsing the enemy and following them up but a 
 few hundred yards 
 
 MOST r0KIOUS ONSLAUGHTS ON HIS COMMAND. 
 
 General Early reports the same thing in his report on the 29th of 
 August, the time that he took his position, the time he was engaged, 
 and reports it as a severe battle. So Talliaferro and so General Hood. 
 Hood's force was a part of Longstreet's command. Now, what does 
 Hood say ? Speaking of the battle of the 29th, he says: 
 
 About 4 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy made a fierce attack upon General 
 Jackson, his noble troops holding their ground with their usual gallantry. 
 
 At sunset an order came to me from the commanding general to move for^vard 
 and attack the enemy. Before, however, this division could come to attention 
 they were attacked, and I instantly ordered the two brigades to move forward 
 and charge tlie enemy, which they did most gallantly, driving them in confusion 
 in front of them. Colonel Law's brigade, being engaged with avery heavy force 
 of the enemy, captured one piece of artillery, three stand of colors, and one hun- 
 dred prisoners, and the Texas brigade three stand of colors. It soon became so 
 very dark that it was impossible to pursue the enemy any farther. At 12 o'clock 
 at night orders came to retake our position on the right of General Jackson^ 
 
 There was one of the divisions that General Longstreet had General 
 Wilcox to support in the attack at Groveton. And yet he says at 12 
 o'clock at night he was ordered to retake his former position. He staid 
 there by Groveton. 
 
 WHAT GENERAL WILCOX SAID. 
 
 General C. M. Wilcox, of General Longstreet's command, said: 
 Pursuing our line of march, together with the division, we passed by Gaines- 
 ville, and advancing some three miles beyond, my three brigades were formed 
 In line of battle on the left and at right angles to the turnpike. Having advanced 
 near three-quarters of a mile, ■we were then halted. The enemy was in our front 
 and not far distant. Several of our batteries were jilaced in position on a com- 
 manding eminence to the left of the turnpike. A cannonading ensued and con- 
 tinued for an hour or tw^o, to which the enemy's artillery replied. 
 
 At half past 4 or 5 p. m. the three brigades were moved across to the right of 
 the turnpike, a mile or more, to the Manassas Gap Railroad. While here mus- 
 ketry was heard to our left, on the turnpike. This firing continued, with more 
 or less vivacity, until sundown. Now the command was ordi^red back to the 
 
61 
 
 turnpike, and forward on this to the support of General Hood, who had become 
 engaged with the enemy, and had driven him back some distance, inflietingse- 
 vere loss upon him, beinjj clieoked in his successes by the darkness of the night. 
 After reaching General Hood's position but little musketry was heard. All 
 soon became quiet. Our pickets were thrown out to the front. The enemy's 
 camp-fires soon became visible, extending far off to our left, front, and right. 
 Remaining in this position until 12 o'clock at night, the troops were withdrawn 
 three-quarters of a mile to the rear and bivouacked, pickets being left to guard 
 our front. 
 
 So that by 4 o'clock all the troops that were on the right of Long- 
 street were turned back on to Groveton and engaged there at Groveton, 
 and staid there until 11 or 12 o'clock at night, leaving nothing but 
 Jones's brigade in the direction of Porter. 
 
 EEPOETS OP LONGSTREET'S OFFICERS AND OTHERS. 
 
 Report of Col. Edward L. Thomas, commanding second brigade, A. P. Hill's 
 division, Jackson's command. 
 Headquarters Third Brigade, Light Division, 
 
 October 26, 1862. 
 
 On Thursday, August 28, near Sudley Ford, this brigade was held in reserve 
 by order of General Hill ; was under fire, but took no active part, and after the 
 enemy gave way, moved forward and bivouacked for the night on the field. 
 Early on Friday, August 29, the march was resumed, with directions to be pre- 
 pared for an attack near the railroad. General Gregg's brigade meeting the 
 enemy there, this brigade advanced to his right, the regiments being thrown in 
 successively until all became engaged. The enemy were in strong position on 
 the railroad. 
 
 We at once advanced and drove them from it. This position we were ordered 
 to hold, and, if possible, avoid bringing on a general engagement, and held it 
 against several attacks of the enemy in strong force during the day. In the af- 
 ternoon an overwhelming force attacked us, now almost without ammunition, 
 in front and on the left flanks, and forced us back a short distance, w^hen Gen- 
 eral Pender's brigade advanced promptly and in fine order to the assistance of 
 the third, most of which joined General Pender, and together they drove back 
 the enemy some distance beyond our previous position, which was held until 
 night, the brigade bivouacking on the field. 
 
 Report of Brig. Gen. S. McGowan. 
 
 Headquarters Second Brigade, 
 A. P. Hull's Light Division, Second Army Corps, 
 
 Camp Gregg, Va., February 9, 1863. 
 
 * * * * * :if * 
 
 Friday, the 29th, was the glorious but bloody day for the brigade. It may be 
 allowed for us to claim that by holding the left steady on Friday we contributed 
 to the success of the great battle on Saturday. The distinguished brigadier-gen- 
 eral who commanded, and was present everywhere during the day and exerting 
 himself to the utmost, was himself spared, only to fall upon another victorious 
 field (Fredericksburg), but many of our noblest and best officers and men fell 
 there. The ag<jregate of the killed and wounded of the brigade in this battle 
 was six hundred and thirteen (613). 
 
 Report of Brig. Gen. N. Q. Evans, Longstreet's command. 
 
 Headquarters Evans's Brigade, 
 Near Winchester, Va., October 13, 1862. 
 
 * * * * 4: * * 
 
 On the evening of the 29th of August the brigade engaged the skirmishers of 
 the enemy in considerable force on the south side of the road near Groveton, 
 and rendered efficient co-operation to the commands of General Wilcox on the 
 left and General Hood on the right in driving the enemy from his position. The 
 enemy falling back, and the darkness of the night concealing his movements, 
 I formed my brigade in the camp of the enemy, until ordered to fall back by 
 the major-general commanding. Leaving a strong picket in my front, I with- 
 drew about a mile to the rear. 
 
 Report of Lieut. Col. R. L. Walker. 
 
 Headquarters Aetillery Battalion, March 1, 1863. 
 ******* 
 On Friday, the 29th of August, the batteries were placed in position on the 
 ridge in rear and to the left of General A. P. Hill's di\-ision. Captain Brax- 
 ton's battery was engaged early in the forenoon on the extreme left, with the 
 
62 ; 
 
 loss of some of his horses. Upon the cessation of the enemy's fire ours ceased 
 also. In the afternoon a section of Captain Pegram's battery hotly engaged 
 theenemyon the right. Hisposition was in rear of General Field's and Gregg's 
 brigades. The loss of this section was very heavy, and, the fire continuing with 
 unremitted severity, it was withdrawn. Captain Braxton -was then ordered to 
 the position, and, with five guns, held it, with loss, under a terrible fire, until 
 night closed in upon the field. Captain Crenshaw's battery was also engaged 
 during the day from a point in rear of General Pender's brigade. 
 
 Report of Col. J. B. Walton, of Longst reefs command, of second battle of Ma- 
 nassas. 
 Hbadqdabteks Battalion Washington Abtilleey, 
 
 November 30, 1862. 
 
 • ««***« 
 
 On the 29th August, 1862, the four batteries composing the battalion were as- 
 signed and served as follows: The fourth company, consisting of two six-pound 
 bronze guns and two twelve-pound howitzers, under Capt. D. F. Eshleman, 
 Lieutenants Norcom, Battles, and Apps, with Pickett's brigade ; the second com- 
 pany, with two six-pouud bronze guns and two twelve-pound howitzers, under 
 Captain Richardson, Lieutenants Hawes, De Russey, and Britton, with Toombs's 
 brigade ; the first company, with three three-inchrifle-guns, under Capt. C. W. 
 Squiers, Lieutenants E. Owens, Galbraith, and Brown, and the third company, 
 vrith four light twelve-pound guns (Napoleon), under Capt. M. B. Miller, Lieuten- 
 ants McElroy and Hero, in reserve. 
 
 About noon on the 29th, the two batteries in reserve having halted near the 
 village of Gainesville, on the Warrenton and Centreville turnpike, were ordered 
 forward by General Longstreet, to engage the enemy then in our front, and near 
 the village of Groveton. Captains Miller and Squiers at once proceeded to the 
 position indicated by the general and opened fire upon the enemy's batteries. 
 Immediately in Captain Miller's front he discovered a battery of the enemy, 
 distant about 1,200 yards. Beyond this battery, and on a more elevated position, 
 were posted the enemy's rifle batteries. He opened upon the battery nearest 
 him, and, after a spirited engagement of three-quarters of an hour, completely 
 silenced it and compelled it to leave the field. He then turned his attention to 
 the enemy's rifle batteries^ and engaged them until, having exhausted his ammu- 
 nition, he retired from the field. 
 
 Captain Squiers, on reaching his position on the left of Captain Miller's battery, 
 at once opened, with his usual accuracy, upon the enemy's batteries. Unfortu- 
 nately, after the first fire, one of his guns, having become disabled by the blowing 
 out of the bushing of the vent, was sent from the field. Captain Squiers then 
 placed the remaining section of his battery undercommand of Lieutenant Owen, 
 and rode to the left to place additional guns (that had been sent forward to his 
 assistance) in position. At this time the enemy's infantry were engaged with the 
 forces on the left of the position occupied by our batteries, and while the enemy 
 retreated in confusion before the charge of our veterans the section under Lieu- 
 tenant Owen poured a destructive fire into their affrighted ranks. Scores were 
 seen to fall. 
 
 Report of Maj. B. W. Frobell, chief of artillery of Hood's division, Longstreet's 
 command, of second battle of Manassas. 
 
 Camp near Febdeeick, Md., September 9, 1862. 
 
 At 11 a. m. on Friday I was ordered by General Hood to proceed to the right of 
 the turnpike road and report to General Stuart. This I did, with Captain Bach- 
 man's battery, Reilly being already in position on the left, and Garden having 
 no long-range pieces. General Stuart had selected a position near tlie Orange 
 and Alexandria Railroad. The battery was brought up and immediately opened 
 with marked effect on a column of the enemy moving to the right, which at 
 once changed direction, moving rapidly to the left. Fifteen rounds were fired, 
 when the distance being greatly increased, I ordered Captain Bachman to cease 
 firing. At 1 o'clock p. m. Captain Reilly was ordered to the left of the turnpike 
 and to take position with other batteries on a hill commanding the hills near 
 Groveton House. 
 
 Report of Col. E. M. Law, of Hood's division, Longstreet's command, of second 
 battle of Manassas. 
 Headquartebs Third Brigade, September 10, 1862. 
 
 * « * * * * 4: 
 
 Leaving Thoroughfare Gap at sunrise on the 29th the brigade marched in the 
 direction of Manassas Junction. At Gainesville, on the Warrenton turnpike, the 
 line of march changed abruptly to the left along the turnpike in the direction of 
 Centreville. On arrivingabout midway between Gainesville and the stone house, 
 which is situated at the junction of the turnpike and the Sudley Ford road, I was 
 ordered by Brigadier-General Hood, commanding the division, to form the bri- 
 l^ade in line of battle to the left of the turnpike and almost at right angles with 
 
63 
 
 It, the right resting on the road and the left connecting with Gteneral Jaokaou'a 
 
 line. 
 
 * • * « « • • 
 
 The opposing force of the enemy, as I learned from captured officers, consisted 
 of General King's division of four brigades and a battery of ho witzers. One piece 
 was captured and about a hundred prisoners. Among the prisoners were Captain 
 judson, assistant adjutant-general to General Hatch, and Captain Garish, of the 
 battery. 
 
 During the night of the 29th, under orders from General Hood, I resumed the 
 position to the rear of Groveton which I had occupied in the morning. 
 
 Report of Brig. Gen. J. B. Hood of operations of his division, Longstreet's com- 
 mand, from Freeman's Ford. 
 
 Division Hkaquabtees, September 27, 1862. 
 ******** 
 
 On arriving at Thoroughfare Gap, the enemy were drawn up in line to dispute 
 our passage. After a spirited little engagement with them by Gen. D. B.Jones's 
 troops, on the evening of the 28th instant, our forces were able to bivouac for the 
 night beyond the gpxp. The next morning, at daylight, the march was again re- 
 sumed, with this division in the advance, Lieutenant-Colonel Upton, of the 
 Fifth Texas, in command of a party of select Texas riflemen, constituting the 
 advance guard. 
 
 Coming up with the rear-guard of the enemy before sunrise, this gallant and 
 distinguished officer drove them before him so rapidly that halts would have to 
 be made for the troops in rear to rest. Early in the day we came up with the 
 main body of the enemy on the plains oiManassas, engaging General Jackson's 
 forces. Disposition of the troops being made, the Texas brigade advanced in 
 line of battle down and on the immediate right of the pike leading to the stone 
 bridge, and Colonel Law's brigade on the left. Arriving on a line with the lino 
 of battle established by General Jackson, the division was halted by order of 
 the general commanding. 
 
 About 4 o'clock in the afternoon the enemy made a fierce attack upon General 
 Jackson, his noble troops holding their ground with their usual gallantry. 
 
 At sunset an order came to me from the commanding general to move forward 
 and attack the enemy. Before, however, this division could come to attention 
 they were attacked, and I instantly ordered the two brigades to move forward 
 and charge the enemy, which they did most gallantly, driving them in confu- 
 sion in front of them. Colonel Law's brigade, being engaged with a very heavy 
 force of the enemy, captured one piece of artillery, three stand of colors, and 
 one hundred prisoners, and the Texas brigade three stand of colors. It soon 
 became so very dark that it was impossible to pursue the enemy any further. 
 At 12 o'clock at night orders came to retake our position on the right of General 
 Jackson. 
 
 Bei>ort of Major-General Stuart of operations immediately preceding and includ- 
 ing the battle of Groveton. 
 
 Headquakters Stuakt's Cavalry DrvisioN, 
 
 Army of Northern Virginia, 
 
 February 28, 1863. 
 « * « * ' * « * 
 
 The next morning, 29th, In pursuance of General Jackson's wishes, I set out 
 again to endeavor to establish communication with Longstreet, from whom he 
 had received a favorable report the night before. Just after leaving the Sudley 
 road my party was fired on from the wood bordering the road, which was in 
 rear of Jackson's lines, and which the enemy had penetrated with a small force, 
 it was afterwards ascertained, and captured some stragglers. They were be- 
 t^veen General Jackson and his baggage at Sudley. 
 
 I immediately sent to Major Patrick, whose six companies of cavalry were 
 near Sudley, to interpose in defense of the baggage, and use all the means at 
 hand for its protection, and order the baggage at once to start for Aldie. Gen- 
 eral Jackson, also being notified of this movement in his rear, sent back infantry 
 to close the woods. Captain Pelham, always at the right place at the right tirne, 
 unlimbered his battery, and soon dispersed that portion in the woods. Majot 
 Patrick was attacked later, but he repulsed the enemy with considerable loss, 
 though not without loss to us, for the gallant Major himself, setting the example 
 to his men, svna mortally wounded. He lived long enough to ■witness the tri- 
 umph of our arms, and expired thus in the arms of victory. The sacrifice waa 
 noble, but the loss to us irreparable. 
 
 I met tvith the head of General Longstreet's column between Haymarketand 
 Gainesville, and there communicated to the commanding general General Jack- 
 son's position and the enemy's. I then passed the cavalry through the column, 
 so as to place it on Longstreet's right flank, and advanced directly toward Ma- 
 nassas, while the column kept directly down the pike to join General Jackson's 
 light. I selected a fine position for a battery on the right, and one having been 
 
64 
 
 sent to me, I fired a few shots at the enemy's supposed position, which Induced 
 him to shift liis position. General Robertson, who with his command was sent 
 to reconnoiter farther down tlie road toward Manassas, reported the enemy in 
 his front. Upon repairing to that front, I found tliat Rosser's regiment was en- 
 gaged with the enemy to the left of the road, and Robertson's videttes had found 
 the enemy approaching from the direction of Bristoe Station toward Sudley. 
 
 The prolongation of his line of march would have passed through :iiy position, 
 which was a very fine one for artillery as well as observation, and struck Long- 
 street in flank. I ^vaited his approach long enough to ascertain that there was 
 at least an army corps, at the same time keeping detatchments of cavalry drag- 
 ging brush down the road from the direction of Gainesville, so as to deceive the 
 enemy (a ruse which Porter's report shows was successful), and notified the 
 commanding general, then opposite me on the turnpike, thatLongstreet's flank 
 and rear were seriou.sly threatened and of the importance to us of the ridge I 
 then held. Immediately upon the receipt of that intelligence Jenkins's, Kemp- 
 er's, and D. R. Jones's brigades and several pieces of artillery were ordered to 
 me by General Longstreet, and, being placed in position fronting Bristoe, 
 aw^aited the enemy's advance. 
 
 After exchanging a few shots with rifle pieces, this corps withdrew toward 
 Manassas, leaving artillery and supports to hold the position till night. Briga- 
 dier-General Fitz Lee returned to the vicinity of Sudley, after a successful expe- 
 dition, of which his official report has not been received, and was instructed to 
 co-operate with Jackson's left. Late in the afternoon the artillery on this com.- 
 manding ridge was, to an important degree, auxiliary to the attack upon the 
 enemy, and Jenkins's brigade repulsed the enemy in handsome style at one vol- 
 ley as they advanced across the cornfield. Thus the day ended, our lines hav- 
 ing considerably advanced. 
 
 General Longstreet, in his report, says: 
 
 Headquarters near Winchester, Va., October 10, 1862. 
 
 :)fi iti ii^ * * * * 
 
 Early on the 29th (August) the columns were united, and the advance to join 
 General Jackson was resumed. The noise of battle was heard before we reached 
 Gainesville. The march was quickened to the extent of our capacity. The ex- 
 citement of battle seemed to give new life and strength to our jaded men, and 
 the head of my column soon reached a position in rear of the enemy's left flank 
 and within easy cannon-shot. 
 
 On approaching the field some of Brigadier-General Hood's batteries Tvere or- 
 dered into position, and his division was deployed on the right and left of the 
 turnpike, at right angles with it, and supported by Brigadier-General Evans's 
 brigade. Before these batteries could open the enemy discovered our move- 
 ments and withdrew his left. Another battery (Captain Stribling's) was placed 
 upon a commanding position to my right, which played upon the rear of the 
 enemy's left and drove him entirely from that part of the field. He changed his 
 front rapidly, so as to meet the advance of Hood and Evans. 
 
 Three brigades, under General Wilcox, were thrown forward to the support 
 of the left, and three others, under General Kemper, to the support of the right 
 of these commands. General D. R. Jones's division was plaeed upon the Manas- 
 sas Gap Railroad — 
 
 ONLY CAVALRY, BRUSH, AND DUST. 
 
 Not on this road [indicating] that Porter was on. 
 
 upon the Manassas Gap Railroad, to the right and in echelon with regard to the 
 three last brigades. Colonel Walton placed his batteries in a commanding posi- 
 tion between my line and that of General Jackson, and engaged the enemy for 
 several hours in a severe and successful artillery duel. At a late hour in the day 
 Major-General Stuart reported the approach of the enemy in heavy columns 
 against my extreme right. I withdrevv General Wilcox with his three brigades 
 from the left, and placed his command in position to support Jones in ca.se of an 
 attack against my right. After some few shots the enemy withdrew his forces, 
 moving them around toward his front, and about 4 o'clock in the afternoon began 
 to press forward against General Jackson"s position. Wilcox's brigades were 
 moved back to their former position, and Hood's two brigades, .supported by 
 Evans, were quickly pressed forward to the attack. At the same time Wilcox's 
 three brigades made a like advance, as also Hunton's brigade of Kemper's com- 
 mand. 
 
 These movements were executed w^ith commendable zeal and ability. Hood, 
 supported by Evans, made a gallant attack, driving the enemy back till 9 o'clock 
 at night. One piece of artillery, several regimental standards, and a number of 
 prisoner.-, were taken. The enemy's entire force was found to be massed directly 
 in my front , and in so strong a position that it was not deemed advisable to move 
 on against his immediate front; so the troops were quietly withdrawn at 1 
 o'clock the following morning. The wheels of the captured piece were cut down, 
 and it was left on the ground. The enemy seized that opportunity to claim a 
 victory, and the Federal commander was so impudent as to dispatch his GoV' 
 
G5 
 
 ernm 3nt by telegraph t idings to that effect. After withdrawing from the attack 
 my troops were placed in the line tirst occupied and in the original order. 
 
 I now desire to call attention to the report of General Robert E. Lee 
 of the first day, second Bull Run, August 29, 1862. It is as follows: 
 
 The next morning, the 29th, the enemy had taken a position to interpose his 
 army between GeneralJackson and Alexandria, and about 10 a. m. opened with 
 artillery upon the right of Jackson's line. The troops of the latter were dis- 
 posed in rear of Groveton, along the line of the unfinished branch of the Manas- 
 sas Gap Railroad, and extended from a point a short distance ■west of the turn- 
 pike toward Sudley Mill, Jackson's division, under Brigadier-General Starke, 
 being on the right; Ewell's, under General Lawton, in the center, aud A. P. Hill 
 on the left. The Federal Army was evidently concentrating upon Jackson, with 
 the design of overwhelming him before the arrival of Longstreet. The latter 
 officer left hi , position, opposite Warrenton Springs, on the 26th, being relieved 
 by General R. H. Anderson'sdivision,andmarched to join Jackson. He crossed 
 at Kinson's (Hinson's) Mill in the afternoon and encamped near Orlean that 
 night. The next day he reached the White Plains, his march being retarded by 
 the want of cavalry to ascertain themeaningof certainmovementsof theenemy 
 from the direction of Warrenton, who seemed to menace the right of his column. 
 
 On the 2Sth, arriving at Thoroughfare Gap, he found the enemy prepared to 
 dispute his progress. General D. R. Jones's division being ordered to force the 
 passage of the mountain, quickly dislodged the enemy's sharpshooters from the 
 trees and rocks and advanced into the gorge. The enemy held the eastern ex- 
 tremity of the pass in large force, and directed a heavy fire of artillery upon the 
 road leading through it and upon the sides of the mountain. The ground occu- 
 pied by Jones afforded no opportunity for the employment of artillery. Hood, 
 with two brigades, and Wilcox, with three, were ordered to turn the enemy's 
 right — the former moving over the mountain by a narrow path to the left of the 
 pass, and the latter fartht-r to the north, by Hopewell Pass. 
 
 Before these troops reached their destination the enemy advanced and attacked 
 Jones's left, under Brig. Gen. G. T. Anderson. Being vigorously repulsed he 
 withdrew^ to his position at the eastern end of the gap, from which he kept up an 
 active fire of artillery until dark, and then retreated. Generals Jones and Wil- 
 cox bivouacked that night east of the mountain, and on the morning of the 29th 
 the whole command resumed the march, the sound of cannon at Manassas an- 
 nouncing that Jackson was already engaged. Longstreet entered the turnpike 
 near Gainesville, and moving down toward Groveton the head of his column 
 came upon the field in rear of the enemy's left, which had already opened ^vith 
 artillery upon Jackson's right, as previously described. He immediately placed 
 some of his batteries in position, but before he could complete his dispositions 
 to attack, theenemy withdrew, not, however, without loss from our artillery. 
 
 Longstreet took possession (position?) on tlie right of Jackson, Hood's two bri- 
 gades, supported by Evans, being deployed across the turnpike and at right 
 angles to it. These troops were supported on the left by three brigarles under 
 General Wilcox, and by a like force on the right under General Kemper. D. 
 R. Jones's division formed the extreme right of the line, resting on the Slanassas 
 Gap Railroad. The cavalry guarded our right and left flanks, that on the right 
 lacing under General Stuart in person. After the arrival of Longstreet, the enemy 
 changed his position, and began to concentrate opposite Jackson's left, opening 
 a brisk artillery fire, which was responded to with efl'ect by some of General A. 
 P. Hill's batteries. 
 
 Colonel Walton placed a part of his artillery upon a commanding position be- 
 tween Generals Jackson and Longstreet, by order of the laKer, and engaged 
 the enemy vigorously for several hours. Soon afterward General Stuart re- 
 ported the approach of a large force from the direction of Bristoc Station, threat- 
 ening Longstreet's right. The brigades under General Wilcox were sent to re- 
 enforce General Jones, but no serious attack \%'as made, and after firing a few 
 shots the enemy withdrew. While this demonstr.ation was being made on our 
 right a large force advanced to assail the lett of General Jackson's position, oc- 
 cupied by the division of General A. P. Hill. The attack was received by his 
 troops with their accustomed steadiness, and the battle raged with great fury. 
 
 The enemy was repeatedly repulsed, but again pressed on the attack with 
 fresh troops. Once he succeeded in penetrating an interval between General 
 Gregg's brigade, on the extreme left, and that of General Thomas, but was 
 c[uickly driven backwith greatslaughterby the FourteenthSouth Carolina Reg- 
 iment, then in reserve, and the Forty-ninth Georgia, of Thomas's brigade. The 
 contest w^as clase and obstinate ; the combatants sometimes delivered their flre 
 at ten paces. General Gregg, who was most exposed, was re-enforced by Hays's 
 brigade, under General Forno, and successfully and gallantly resisted the attack 
 of the enemy until the ammunition of his brigade being exhausted and all its field 
 officers but two killed or wounded, it was relieved, after several hours of severe 
 fighting, by Early's brigade aud the Eighth Louisiana Regiment. 
 
 General Early drove the enemy back with heavy loss, and pursiHd about two 
 liundred yards beyond the line of battle, when he was recalled to the position on 
 LO 5 
 
66 
 
 the railroad, where Thomas, Bender, and Archer had firmly held their ground 
 against every attack. While the battle was raging on Jackson's left General 
 Longstreet ordered Hood and Evans to advance, but before the order could be 
 obeyed Hood was himself attacked, and his command became at once warmly 
 engaged. General Wilcox was recalled from the right and ordered to advance 
 on Hood's left, and one of Kemper's brigades, under Colonel Hunton, moved 
 forward on his right. The enemy was repulsed by Hood after a severe contest, 
 and fell back, closely followed by our troops. The battle continued until 9 p. m., 
 the enemy retreating until he had reached a strong position, wliich he held with 
 a large force. The darkness of the night put a stop to the engagement, and our 
 troops remained in their advanced position until early next morning, when they 
 were withdrawn to their first line. One piece of artillery, several stands of col- 
 ors, and a number of prisoners were captured. Our loss was severe in this en- 
 gagement. Brigadier-Generals Field and Trimble and Colonel Forno, com- 
 manding Hays's brigade, were severely wounded, and several other valuable 
 officers killed or disabled, whose names are mentioned in the accompanying 
 reports. 
 
 FITZ-JOHN porter's TESTIMONY. 
 
 Fitz- John Porter himself gave testimony before the court of inquiry 
 on General McDowell in Washington city. He appeared before that 
 board and gave testimony as follows (page 1010. board record): 
 By General McDowell : 
 
 Q. Under what relations as to command did you and General McDowell move 
 from Manassas and continue prior to the receipt of General Pope's joint order? 
 
 A. I did not know that General McDowell was going from Manassas, and I 
 have no recollection of any relations whatever, nor of any understanding. 
 
 Q. Was there nothing said about General McDowell being the senior, and of 
 his commanding the whole by virtue of his rank ? 
 
 A. Nothing that I know of. 
 
 Q. What time did you take up your line of march from Manassas Junction for 
 Gainesville? 
 
 A. The hour the head of the column left, I presume, was about 10 o'clock ; it 
 may have been earlier. Ammunition had been distributed to the men, or ^vas 
 directed to be distributed, and the command to be put in motion immediately. 
 
 Q. When you received the joint order, where were you personally and where 
 was your comnaand ? 
 
 A. I was at the head of my column, and a portion of the command or the head 
 of the column was then forming line in front. One regiment as skirmishers was 
 in advance, and also a small party of cavalry which I had as escort. The remain- 
 der of the corps was on the road. The head of my column was on the Manassas 
 road to Gainesville at the first stream, as previously described by me. 
 
 Q. Please state the order of your divisions, &c., in the column at that time. 
 
 A. First, Morell's; next, Sykes's; the other brigade, Sturgis's or Piatt's, I know 
 nothing of, having left it, in compliance with orders from General Pope, atWar- 
 renton Junction, with orders to rejoin as soon as possible. 
 
 Q. Where was King's division? 
 
 A. I left King's division getting provisions and ammunition near Manassas 
 Junction. I gave, personally, direction to General Hatch, in command, to move 
 up as quickly as possible. I did not see General King at all. 
 
 Q. The witness says he received an order from General McDowell, or what 
 he considered an order, ^vhen General McDowell first joined him, which order 
 he did not obey — will witness state why he disobeyed what he considered an 
 order? 
 
 A. The order I have said I considered an order in connection with his conver- 
 sation, and his taking King's division from nie. I therefore did obey it. 
 
 Q. What did you understand to be the elfect of General IMcDowell's conver- 
 sation? Was it that you were to go no further in the direction of Gainesville 
 than you then were ? 
 
 A. The conversation was in connection with moving over to the right, which 
 necessarily would prevent an advance. 
 
 Q. You state you did not think General McDowell's order (if it was one) a 
 projier one, and that for that reason you continued your movement as if you 
 had not seen the joint order. Is the witness to be understood that this was in 
 obedience of what he has stated to be General McDowell's order? 
 
 A. I did not consider that an order at that time, and have tried to convey that 
 impression, but it was an expression of opinion which I might have construed 
 as an order; but when General McDowell left me he gave no reply to my ques- 
 tion ; and seeing the enemy in my front, I considered myself free to act accord- 
 ing to my own judgment until I received notice of the withdrawal of King. 
 
 GENERAL POPE'S TE.STIMONY REG.^RDING THE ORDER, 
 
 GeneraKPope testifies in reference to this order on page 14: 
 Q. Will you state what orders, if any, you gave to General Porter, on the 29tb 
 
67 
 
 of August, in reference to the movements of himself and his men, and the griound* 
 upon which those orders were based ? 
 
 A. In answer to that question, it will perhaps be necessary for me to state, at 
 least partially, the condition of things on the afternoon of the 28th, and during 
 the night of the 28th and 29th of August, for the reason that the information from 
 the front, upon which the dispositions of the army ^vere made, varied at different 
 periods of the day and night. And it was not until toward daylight in the morn- 
 ing of the 29th thati became thoroughly satisfied of the position of the enemy, 
 and of the necessary movements of the troops to be made in consequence. The 
 orders that I gave to General Porter on the 29th of August, as I remember them, 
 were four. One of them was dated in the night I think ; I do not remember the 
 time. 
 
 That order I think required him, in consequence of information we had re- 
 ceived of the enemy's forces beyond Centreville, to move upon Centreville. 
 But about daylight in the morning I sent General Porter an order to take his 
 own army corps, which was then at Manassas Junction; and which by my order 
 had been re-enforced by the brigade of General Piatt, which had come up there 
 in the command of General Sturgis, and King's division of McDowell's corps, 
 which had ^vithdrawn to Manassas Junction, or to that vicinity, during the 
 night of the 28th, and move forward in the direction of Gainesville. 
 
 An hour and a half later I received a note from General McDowell, whom I 
 had not been able to find until that hour in themorning, requesting that King's 
 division of his corps be not turned over to General Porter, but that he be allowed 
 to conduct it himself. I then sent ajoint order to Generals Porter and McDowell, 
 directed to them at Manassas Junction, specifying in detail the movement that 
 I wished to be made by the troops under their command — the withdrawal of 
 King's division of McDowell's corps, which during the greater part of the night 
 I had understood to be on theWarrentonturnpike, and westof the troops under 
 Jackson. Their withdrawal to Manassas .Junction, I feared, had left open Jack- 
 son's retreat in the direction of Thoroughfare Gap, to which point the main por- 
 tion of the army of Lee was then tending to re-enforce him. I did not desire to 
 pursue Jackson beyond the town of Gainesville, as ■we could not have done so 
 on account of the want of supplies — rations for the men and forage for the horses. 
 
 My order to Generals Porter and McDowell is, therefore, w^orded that they 
 shall pursue the route to Gainesville until they effect a junction with the forces 
 that are marching upon Gainesville to Centreville — the forces under Heintzel- 
 man, Sigel, and Reno; and that when that junction was formed (as I expected 
 it would have been very near to Gainesville) the whole command should halt, 
 it being, as I stated before, not feasible with my command in the condition it 
 was in, on account of supplies, to pursue Jackson's forces further. During the 
 whole morning the forces under Sigel and Heintzelman had kept up a skirmish- 
 ing with the rear of Jackson's forces, they retiring in the direction of Gaines- 
 ville. They were brought to a stand at the little town of Groveton, about eight 
 miles, I think, from Centreville, and perhaps five or six miles from Gainesville. 
 When I rode on to the field of battle, ■which was about noon (having been de- 
 layed at Centreville), I found that the troops had been sharply engaged, and 
 were still confronting each other. 
 
 General Sigel reported tome that he needed re-enforcements in the front; that 
 his line wai3 weak, and that his troops required to be withdrawn from the ac- 
 tion. I told him (as I did General Heintzelman, who was present on the ground) 
 that I only wished them to maintain their positions, as the corps of McDowell 
 and Porter were then on the march from Manassas Junction toward the enemy's 
 right flank and ought in a very short time to be in such position as to fall upon 
 that portion of his line. I desired them, therefore, only to maintain the positions 
 they occupied. We waited for the arrival of Generals McDowell and Porter. At 
 4 o'clock, or some little after that time (perhaps at half past 4 in the afternoon), 
 finding that neither McDowell nor Porter had made their appearance on the 
 field, I sent an order to General Porter informing him generally of the condition 
 of things on the field, and stating to him that I desired him to push forward and 
 attack the enemy in flank, and, if possible, in rear, ■n-ithout any delay. This or- 
 der was sent to Cieneral Porter about half past 4 in the afternoon. 
 
 Finding that General Porter did not comply with this order, and receiving a 
 dispatch which he sent to Generals JMcDowell and King, stating to them that he 
 was about to fall back or was falling back to Manassas Junction, and that he 
 did so because he saw clouds of dust, showing that, in his judgment, the enemy 
 was advancing on the road he was occupying, and stating that it appeared to him 
 from the lire of the battle that he had been listening to that our forces ■were re- 
 treating and the enemy .advancing, and he had determined to fall back to Ma- 
 nassas .Junction, and recommended Generals McDowell and Iving to send back 
 their trains also — receiving this note, purporting to be from General Porter to 
 Generals McDowell and King, I sent an order to General Porter directing liim, 
 immediately upon the receipt of the order, to march his whole command to the 
 field of battle, and to report to me in person for orders, stating to him that I ex- 
 pected him to comply strictly with that order. ? . 
 
 I put it in such form (perhaps not entirely courteous) because I had understood 
 General Porter, upon two several occasions, to have disobeyed the orders that I 
 
68 
 
 had sent him. These are all the orders that I issued on that day and night to 
 General Porter. I will state in addition to what I have already said, that the 
 first of these orders to which I have referred, being subsequently superseded, ia 
 not perhaps referred to here. I will also state that the corps of Sigel, Heintzel- 
 man, and Reno were formed in line of battle across the Warrenton turnpike, 
 facing to the west, and near the little town of Groveton, or at it, almost at the 
 point where the road from Manassas Junction to Sudley Spring — the Sudley 
 Spring road I think it is called — crosses Warrenton turnpike a little in advance 
 of that road. 
 
 (The judge-advocate stated that the first order, referred to by the witness in 
 his answer to the last interrogatory, is not referred to in the specifications, being 
 superseded by a subsequent order.) 
 
 Q. Excluding from view the first order given on the morning of the 29th of 
 August, and which directed General Porter to fall back upon Centreville, and 
 which, you say, was superseded by a subsequent order, are or are not the other 
 three orders whicli you have enumerated in your last answer, given to General 
 Porter on that day, the same which are set forth in the second, third, and fourth 
 specifications of the first charge preferred against him ? [Handing witness the 
 charges and specifications.] 
 
 A. (After examining them.) They are the same orders. 
 
 Q. Do you mean to say that the order set forth in the second specification, ad- 
 dressed to Generals McDowell and Porter, is the one that superseded that fli-st 
 order ? 
 
 A. No, sir. There was one sent to General Porter previous to that time, giv- 
 ing nearly the same directions, and which is referred to in that joint order as 
 having been given an hour and a half before. I repeated that order in detail, 
 because I was not sure that General Porter had received the order referred to 
 there as having been sent to him an hour and a half before. 
 
 Q. At what hour in the morning was this order issued, addressed to Generals 
 McDowell and Porter, and set forth in the second specification of the first charge ? 
 
 A. I do not remember distinctly. I think it was somewhere between 8 and 9 
 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Q. Was there any engagement then pending ? 
 
 A. Fighting was then going on along the turnpike that led from Centreville 
 to Warrenton — fighting was going on quite sharply. 
 
 Q. Did the march of General Porter's command, as indicated in that order, 
 lead him tow^ard that battle ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir ; it led him toward the flank of the enemy. 
 
 Q. What forces had he under his command that morning when that order was 
 Issued ? 
 
 A. He had, or should have had, at Manassas Junction the whole of his own 
 corps, which, from his report to me at Warrenton Junction, I understood to be 
 between 8,500 and 9,000 men. I had added to his command the troops forming 
 the brigade commanded by General Piatt; they were to belong to the division 
 of General Sturgis, and I think they numbered about 3,500 men. Their exact 
 strength I do not know. That was the impression I got from General Sturg^is. 
 
 Q. What was his entire command ? 
 
 A. That was his entire command. I understood him to have had from 12,000 
 to 12,500 men at Manassas Junction. 
 
 Q. What was the distance between Manassas Junction and the scene of this 
 engagement of which you speak ? 
 
 A. Between five and six miles, I think, though I had not been myself over the 
 road. 
 
 Q. Do you know the character of the road? Had you passed over it? 
 
 A. I had not passed over it. 
 
 Q. Did General Porter obey the order addressed to him and General Mc- 
 Dowell? 
 
 A. I do not know whether he obeyed it ; he did not obey it fully ; how far he 
 obeyed it I am not able to say ; he certainly did not obey the order fully. 
 
 Q. If he had obeyed it, would it not have brought him up with the enemy be- 
 fore half past 4 in the evening ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. On your arriving on the battlefield, where w^as he reported to you to be ? 
 
 A. I arrived on the battlefield at 12 o'clock, about noon. At 4.30 p. m. nobody 
 on the field knew where General Porter was at all. 
 
 Q. Did or did not General Porter obey the second order to which you refer, is- 
 sued at four and a half o'clock on the 29th of August, directing him to engage 
 the enemy in flank, and, if possible, in rear? 
 
 A. He did not, so far as my knowledge of the fact goes. 
 
 Q. You have no knowledge of his having made any attack then? 
 
 A. I should have known it if he had attacked. 
 
 Q. Will you state to the court and describe the condition of the battlefield at 
 that hour and the importance of his obedience of that order to the success of your 
 troops? 
 
 A. Late in the afternoon of the 29th, perhaps toward half past 5 or 6 o'clock— 
 ftbout the time that I hoped that General Porter would be in his position and be 
 
69 
 
 assaulting the enemy on the flank, and when General McDowell had himself ar- 
 rived with his corps on the field of battle— I directed an attack to be made on the 
 left of the enemy's line, which was handsomely done by Heintzelman's corps 
 and Reno's corps. The enemy was driven back in all directions and left a large 
 part of the ground with his dead and wounded upon it in our possession. Had 
 General Porter fallen upon the flank of the enemy, as it was hoped, at any time 
 up to 8 o'clock that night, it is my firm conviction that we should have destroyed 
 the army of Jackson. 
 
 Q. You have stated that General McDowell obeyed that order so far as to ap- 
 pear upon the battlefield with his command? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. He arrived on the battlefield, I think, about 5 o'clock, and im- 
 mediately pushed forward his corps to the,front ; the division of General King 
 having a very sharp engagement with the enemy along the Warrenton turnpike, 
 in advance of the position that we had occupied during the day. 
 
 Q. To reach the battlefield, had or liad not General McDowell as great a dis- 
 tance to march as General Poftcr? 
 
 A. Yes, sir ; I should think fully as great. 
 
 Q. I believe you have stated the distance from Manassas Junction to the bat- 
 tlefield as about four or five miles? 
 
 A. Five or six miles ; I am not quite sure ; that is my impression. 
 
 Q. Is or is not that about the distance which the command of General Porter 
 would have had to have marched to have obeyed your order? 
 
 A. It would have had to march less than that. You refer, I suppose, to the 
 order I issued about half past 4 in the afternoon. 
 
 Q. Yes, sir. 
 
 A. General Porter was reported to me by the aid-de-camp who delivered him 
 that order to be two miles or more from Manassas Junction, in the direction of 
 the field of battle. 
 
 Q. In point of fact, did or did not General McDowell, in obeying that order, 
 pass General Porter and his command on the way? 
 
 A. I so understood. General McDowell can tell that better than I can myself. 
 
 Q. I will ask you now in regard to the last order, that which purports to be 
 dated on the 29th of August, at 8.50 p. m., and is set forth in the fourth specifica- 
 tion of the first charge. I will ask you if General Porter obeyed that order or 
 not? 
 
 A. General Porter appeared himself on the field the next morning with a por- 
 tion of his Command. Two brigades, however, were not present with him, but 
 were reported by aid-de-cajnp to me as being at Centreville. 
 
 Q. Do you or not know at what point those brigades were separated from his 
 command? 
 
 A. I do not. 
 
 Q. What brigades were they? 
 
 A. One was General Griffin's brigade; the other was General Piatt's brigade. 
 I would say, however, of the latter brigade that when they reached Centreville 
 and found there was a battle going on in the advance they marched forward to 
 the field and made their appearance on the ground and took part in the action 
 late in the afternoon of the 30th of August. That is, the brigade of General 
 Piatt. They did so without orders to that effect from anybody. 
 
 Q. Do you know what became of General Griffin's brigade, or where it was 
 during the battle of the 30th of August? 
 
 A. Of my own knowledge I do not know, except what was reported to me by 
 aid-de-camp fi'om Centreville, that the brigade was there. 
 
 Q. It took no part in the action? 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 Q. Will you state what effect, if any, was produced, or was liable to be pro- 
 duced on the fortunes of that battle by the absence of that force ? 
 
 A. A very great effect. I do not kno^v the strength of General Griffin's bri- 
 gade; but a brigade of four regiments and abatteryof artillery, as I understand 
 it. That was utterly withdrawn from the field ; took no part in the action. 
 General Piatt's command got up very late ; too late to do anything, except, in- 
 deed, to contribute to enable us to maintain our ground until the darkness closed 
 the fight. The presence of the other brigade would undoubtedly have been of 
 immense benefit. 
 
 Q. Did or did you not regard the withdrawal of these brigades from General 
 Porter's command, under the circumstances, a clear violation of the order issued 
 to him to report with his command on the battlefield? 
 
 (Question objected to by a member of the court.) 
 
 The i-oom was cleared, and the court proceeded to deliberate with closed doors. 
 After some time the doors were reopened. Whereupon — 
 
 The judge-advocate stated the decision of the court to be that the question 
 should be propounded to the witness. 
 
 Q. (Repeated.) Did or did you not regard the withdrawal of those brigades 
 from General Porter's command, under the circumstances, a clear violation of 
 the order issued to him to report witli his command on the battlefield ? 
 
 A. Undoubtedly. 
 
 Q. Will you state to the court whether or not vou had made known to Gen- 
 
70 
 
 eral Porter the position of tlie enemy's forces, and your plans and intentions so 
 far and so fully that he knew the critical condition of your army, and the im- 
 .portance of rapid movements and prompt and energetic action to secure your 
 supplies and to guarantee success? 
 
 A. It has been my habit to talk very freely with all officers having large com- 
 mands in the army which I commanded. How far I informed General Porter 
 I am not now able to say. But I should presume, from my habitual practice, 
 and from conversations that I had with him, that he understood pretty fully the 
 condition of the army and the position of the various corps of the army. What 
 I regarded as a necessity it is altogether possible he might have had a diflerent 
 opinion about. Therefore I can not say that he understood the necessity which 
 I understood. 
 Major-General Portek : 
 
 General: Immediately upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of which 
 you will acknowledge, you will mar •h your comnoand to the field of battle of to- 
 day, and report to me in person for orders. You are to understand that you are 
 expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within 
 three hours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow morning. 
 
 GENERAL M' DO WELL TESTIFIES. 
 
 General McDowell, in speaking of the order, says (court-martial 
 record, pages 82, 83, and 84} : 
 
 That was the only order I received from General Pope thaf day. 
 
 Q. How did you regard that order; asplacingGeneral Porter in subordination 
 to you, or as indicating that you were both to act independently of each other 
 and each of you in subordination to General Pope? 
 
 A. I can not say that at that time the order occupied my mind in connection 
 with the question of subordination or otherwise. In starting out on this road, 
 as I mentioned before. General Porter had started out ahead of me under the 
 order he had himself received from General Pope to move with his corps and one 
 of my divisions on a certain road, and 1 think for a certain purpose, though I am 
 not certain as to that. At that time I conceived General Porter to be under me. 
 When the joint order reached us we were doing what that joint order directed 
 us to do. That joint order found the troops in the position in which it directed 
 them to be. That joint order gave a discretion to the eftect that if any consider- 
 able advantages were to be gained by departing from that order it was not to be 
 strictly construed. 
 
 I decided that considerable advantages were to be gained by departing from 
 that order, and I did not construe it or strictly carry it out. That order contem- 
 plated a line being formed which was to be joined on to a line that was to come 
 up from the east to the west, and have troops on the Gainesville road to attack 
 the flank and rear of the enemy, as I understood it, in moving along on the 
 Gainesville road. This long line of troops — those who were ahead of me, Gen- 
 eral Porter's corps— coming to a halt, I moved along and rode by his corps to the 
 head of the column. On the way up to the head of the column I reaei ved a note 
 from General Buford, addressed to General Ricketts, andtobe forwarded tome. 
 This note was addressed primarily to General Kicketts, and then to my.-ielf, for 
 I do not think General Buford knew of General Porter's being there at the time 
 he wrote it. I will read the note : 
 
 Headquarters Cavalry Brigade— 9.30 a. m. 
 
 General Rickktts: Seventeen regiments, one battery, five hundred cavalry 
 passed through Gainesville three-quarters of an hour ago on the Centreville 
 road. I think this division should join our forces now engaged at once. 
 
 Please forward this. 
 
 JOHN BUFORD, Brigadier-General. 
 
 This was addressed to General Ricketts, who commanded a division. I do 
 not know whether it went to General Ricketts direct or came to me direct, or 
 came to me from General Ricketts. I infer it had reference to that division. 
 General Buford belonged to General Banks's corjis, but had been temporarily 
 under my orders the day before, and had gone up to Thoroughfare Gap with 
 Ricketts's division at the time I expected a force of the enemy to come through 
 that gap; and he had fallen back with Ricketts, and at that time, as I under- 
 stood, occupied a position to our left and front. 
 
 Q. Did you or not communicate to General Porter the contents of the note 
 from General Buford, which you have read ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir ; I did communicate it to him. 
 
 Q. Where w^as General Porter's command at that time? 
 
 A. On this road leading from Manassas Junction, by way of Bethlehem chapel 
 or church, toward Gainesville. The rear of his column had passed by Bethlehem 
 ohapel, which is at the junction of the Sudley Spring road with the road from 
 Manassas Junction to Gainesville. 
 
 Q. Bethlehem church enables you to identify that position ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. It is at the junction, or the crossing rather, a little beyond the 
 
71 
 
 crossing of the Sudley Spring, or Gun Spring, or old Carolina road, with the road 
 from Manassas Junction to Gainesville. The rear of General Porter's command 
 was beyond that road, the head of it stretching out here in this direction [indi- 
 cating on the map]. 
 
 Q. Can you speak with any confidence as to the hour of the day at which you 
 communicated to General Porter the contents of this note from General Buford ? 
 
 A. It was somewhere before noon, I think. It is impossible for me to keep the 
 hours of the day in my mind on such occasions. I have tried it several times but 
 have never succeeded except some important things, such as dayHght and dark- 
 ness. It was communicated a short time after it was received. 
 
 Q. Did you or not, upon communicating this note, confer with General Porter 
 in reference to his movements and your own? 
 
 A. I did. 
 
 Q. Will you state fully what occurred in that conference? 
 
 A. On passing the head of General Porter's column, which was on the road I 
 have before mentioned, General Porter was in advance of the head of his column, 
 I think, on a slight eminence or knoll or rise of ground, with some of his staff 
 near him. 
 
 I rode up to him [Porter] ; I saw that he had the same order as myself in the 
 joint order. 
 
 Soon after my attention was directed to some skirmishing, I think some drop- 
 ping shots in front of us. The country in front of the position where General 
 Porter was when I joined him was open for several hundred yards, and near, 
 as I suppose, by seeing the dust coming up above the trees, the Warrenton turn- 
 pike, which was clK'ered from view by the woods. How deep those ■woods were 
 1 do not know. It did not seem at that time to be a great distance to that road — 
 the Warrenton turnpike. I had an impression at the time that those skirmish- 
 ers where engaged with some of the enemy near that road. I rode with General 
 Porter from the position he occupied, eastward, to the right — that is, the column 
 being somewhat west of north, and I going east, made an angle with the line of 
 troops on the road. 
 
 The joint order of General Pope was discussed between us — the point to be 
 held in view, of not going so far that w^e should not be alile to get beyond Bull 
 Run that night ; that was one point, the road being blocked with General Por- 
 ter's troops, from where the head of his column Avasback to Bethlehem church- 
 the sound of battle, which seemed to be at its heighten our right toward Grove 
 ton ; the note of General Buford, indicating the force that had passed through 
 Gainesville, and, as he said, was moving toward Grovcton, where the battle was 
 going on, the dust ascending above the trees, seeming to indicate that force to 
 be not agreat distance from the head of General Porter's column. 
 
 I am speaking now of that force of the enemy referred to by General Buford 
 as passing down the Warrenton turnpike toward Groveton. I understand this 
 note of General Buford to refer to a force of the enemy. The question with me 
 was how soonest within the limit fixed by General Pope this force of ours could 
 be applied against the enemy. General Porter made a remark to me which 
 showed me that he had no question but that the enemy was in his immediate 
 front. I said to him : " You put your force in here, and I will take mine up the 
 Sudley Spring road on the left of the troops engaged at that point with the en- 
 emy," or words to that effect. I left General Porter with the belief and under- 
 standing that he would put his force in at that point. 
 
 I moved back by the shortest road I could find to the head of my o^vn troops, 
 who Tvere near Bethlehem church, and immediately turned them up north on 
 the Sudley Spring road to join General Reynolds's division, which belonged to 
 my command, and which I had directed to co-operate with General Sigel in the 
 movements he (General Sigel) was making at the time I left him in the morn- 
 ing. After seeing the larger part of my troops on the Sudley Spring road I rode 
 forward to the head of the column. I met a messenger from General Pope. I 
 stopped him and saw that he had an order addressed to General Porter alone. 
 I do not recollect more than the general purport or tenor of that order. It was 
 to the effect that he should throw his corps upon the right flank or rear of the 
 enemy from the position he then occupied. When I say right flank, I do so 
 merely because of my knowledge of the position of the forces, not from any 
 recollection of what that order contained on that point. 
 
 Q. Was or was not the messenger to whom you refer who bore that order a 
 staff officer, Capt. Douglas Pope ? 
 
 A. I do not recollect; I do not think it was. 
 
 Q. You did not meet on the way, or take from the hands of any other staff 
 officer on that day, an order from General Pope to General Porter except this 
 one, did you? 
 
 A. No, sir ; and I did not take this from his hands in one sense. I examined 
 it, gave it back to him, and he went on his way. 
 
 Q. Is Captain Pope personally knowii to you ? 
 
 A. Yes sir; he is. My impression is that it was not Captain Pope, but I will 
 not be confident. I do not remember who it was. 
 
 Q. I will read you an order which is set forth in specification 1 of charge 2. 
 
72 
 
 (The order was read accordingly.) Do you or not recogrnize that as the ordex 
 which you saw and read ? 
 
 A. I caa only say that the order that I saw in passing was of that same import. 
 Whether that was' the order or not I can not say. 
 
 Q. You have said that the accused made an observation to you which showed 
 that he was satisfied that the enemy was in his immediate front ; will you state 
 what that observation was ? 
 
 A. I do not know that I can repeat it exactly, and I do not know that the ac- 
 cused meant exactly what the remark might seem to imply. The observation 
 was to the eflfect — putting his hand in the direction of the dust rising above the 
 tops of the trees — " We can not go in there anywhere without getting into a 
 fight." 
 
 Q. What reply did you make to that remark ? 
 
 A. I think to this effect : "That is what we came here for." 
 
 Q. Were there any obstacles in the way of the advance on the part of General 
 Porter's command upon the flank of the enemy? 
 
 A. That depends upon what you would call obstacles. A wood is an obstacle. 
 
 Q. I mean insuperable obstacles, in a military sense. 
 
 A. I do not think we so regarded it at that time. I did not. 
 
 Q. Wag or not the battle raging at that time ? 
 
 A. The battle was raging on our right ; that is, if you regard the line of the 
 road from Bethlehem church to Gainesville to be substantially northwest, the 
 battle was raging to the right and east of that line at Groveton. 
 
 Q. At what hour did you arrive upon the battlefield with your command and 
 take part in the engagement ? » 
 
 A. I can not say as to hours. 
 
 Q. As nearly as you can ? 
 
 A. It was in the afternoon. I do not know at what time the sun set. I should 
 not be able to fix the hour. It may have been 4 o'clock or 5 o'clock. One of my 
 divisions, which had been the day before up to Thoroughfare, and the day be- 
 fore that on a long march, extending to late in the night, and which had started 
 that day, Friday, and had marched since 1 o'clock in the morning, had its rear 
 g:uard some distance behind, and that rear guard did not get up to Manassas 
 until the next morning, though it got within a couple of miles of that place. 
 That was the rear guard of the corps, in that instance a brigade. 
 
 Q. Did you or not afterward see General Porter during that engagement of the 
 29th. 
 
 A. No, sir; I did not. 
 
 Q. Did he or not, with his command, take any part in that battle ? 
 
 A. I do not know, of my own knowledge. 
 
 Q. What would probably have been the effect upon the fortunes of that battle 
 if, between 5 and 6 o'clockin the afternoon, General Porter, with his whole force 
 had thrown himself upon the right wing of the enemy, as directed in this order 
 of 4:31) p. m. of the 29th of August, which has been read to you ? 
 
 A. It is a mere opinion that you ask ? 
 
 Q. YeSj sir. 
 
 A. I thmk it would have been decisive in our favor. 
 
 Q. Did any considerable portion of the confederate forces attack General Pope's 
 left on Saturday, passing over the ground that General Porter would have passed 
 over had he attacked the enemy's right on Friday? 
 
 A. I can not say. They may have done so. I do not know. 
 
 Q. All the localities of which you have spoken in your testimony are in the 
 State of Virginia, are they not ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Examination by the judge-advocate here closed. 
 
 Examination by the Accused : • 
 
 Q. Will you say whether you found General Porter's corps in the position 
 where you expected to find it when you joined him the first time you saw htm 
 on the 29th of August? 
 
 A. I did not think anything about it ; it was not a question with me. 
 
 Q. State if, when you found him at the place where the joint order required 
 him to be, you stated to him, or thought, that you found in his front a different 
 state of affairs than you had expected to find. 
 
 A. I do not recollect of such a statement. 
 
 Q. Try to recollect if, upon that occasion, you did not say to him, in substance, 
 that he was too far in the front, and that the position in which he was was not a 
 position in which to fight a battle, or anything to that effect? 
 
 A. I do not recollect. 
 
 Q. Are you sure you did not ? 
 
 A. I have no recollection of any question about that place not being the one 
 to fight a battle. Something may have been said about not going further to- 
 ward Gainesville, with reference to falling behind Bull Run that night. 
 
 Q. If anything was said in relation to the facility of getting back to Bull Run 
 that night, do you remember whether it was that the accused was too far in the 
 front, or would be too far in the front if he moved farther on ? 
 
73 
 
 A. It was hardly a question of going further on. It was more a question of 
 turning to the right and going against the enemy than passing down the "War- 
 renton turnpike. 
 
 Q. You say that something might have been said by the accused about getting 
 back to Bull Run ; are you to be understood as saying from recollection that he 
 was told to keep in view his ability to get back to Bull Run? 
 
 A. That was the expression in the joint order. 
 
 Q. Was it used by you ? 
 
 A. We referred to that point. 
 
 Q. When did you first see the order of which you have spoken in your testi- 
 mony in chief, that of 4:30 p. m. of the 29th of August, which directed the accused 
 to turn the right flank and attack the enemj' in the rear? You have been un- 
 derstood as saying that that was the effect of the joint order. That is not your 
 meaning, is it ? 
 
 A. It was the effect of the joint order as modified by me, when I left General 
 Porter, so far as I had the power to modify that order, and so far as the under- 
 standing with which I left him at the time. 
 
 Q. Are you to be understood as saying that before you saw the order to General 
 Porter of"4:30 p. m. of the 29th of August, you, under the discretion you sup- 
 posed was reposed in you by the joint order to yourself and General Porter, had 
 directed him to attack the enemy's right flank and rear? 
 
 A. To that effect, yes, sir ; I knew I had that discretion ; I did not suppose it. 
 This is the clause under which I supposed, if you prefer that term, I had that 
 discretion : " If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from 
 this order, it will not be strictly carried out." That joint order contemplated 
 General Porter's corps and my own to be employed differently from the way I 
 had arranged when I left General Porter, which arrangement was to separate 
 them, leaving him alone on the Gainesville road, while I went up the Studley 
 Spring road. , 
 
 Q. Did you under that joint order suppose that you were authorized to take 
 any part of General Porter's command and place it in such a position that it 
 would not have been in the power of his command to reach Bull Run that night 
 or the following morning ? 
 
 A. That question, if I understand it, did not come up in my mind. The order 
 itself stated that one thing was to be held in view. I will read that part of the 
 order. " One thing must be held in view, that the troops must occupy a posi- 
 tion from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning." 
 
 Q. Was it your understanding of that joint order of the 29th of August that 
 you could, under that order, direct General Porter to take his command into a 
 position from which that "one thing" could not be accomplished? 
 
 A. Certainly not. The order does not say that I should disobey the order, and 
 that is what the question amounts to. 
 
 Q. Have you any recollection that after you left the accused on the 29th, and 
 took with you King's division, the accused sent a message to you requesting that 
 that division should be permitted to stay with his command ? 
 
 A. I received no such message. 
 
 Q. Will you say whether, in consequence of a message or otherwise, you sent 
 a message to the "accused with your compliment9,telling him thatyou were going 
 to the right and should take King with you, and that he, the accused, should re- 
 main where he was for the present, and if he had to fall back to do so on your 
 left? 
 
 A. I do not recollect. 
 
 Q. Are you able to say that you are certain that you did not send such a mes- 
 sage? 
 
 Q. That is my impression, that I did not. 
 
 Q. What distance did you march with that portion of your command which 
 you took to the battlefield from the point where you left the accused to the point 
 upon the battlefield that you reached with that portion of your command ? 
 
 A. Somewhere about four miles. 
 
 <1. What road did you travel, or did you travel any route known as a road? 
 
 A. The troops went by the Sudley Springs road from Bethlehem church. 
 
 Q. When you left the accused where you found him on the 29th of August, 
 were you at "that time advised that Longstreet's corps or any other corps of the 
 confederate army was marching on to unite with the right of Jackson ? 
 
 A. I did not know anything about Longstreet's corps or Jackson's corps. I 
 have mentioned before that I received a note from General Buford that seven- 
 teen regiments, a battery, and five hundred cavalry were marchingfrom Gaines- 
 ville upon Groveton. To whom tliey belonged or to whom they weregoingwas 
 not a matter of which I was informed. 
 
 Q. Do you know now whether the information given by General Buford In 
 the note to which you have just referred was correct? 
 
 A. I know nothing more now than I knewthen; I believed it then to be correct. 
 
 Q. Will you state, if the force to which General Buford referred in his note 
 actually passed through Gainesville at thirty minutes past 9 o'clock on the 29tb 
 of August, how long you suppose it would have taken to have joined the forco 
 in front, which, as we have supposed, was commanded by Jackson? 
 
74 
 
 A. It would depeud upon how fast they marched. 
 
 Q. I know that. 
 
 A. I do not know how fast they marched, so I can not tell. 
 
 Q. How long would it have taken them if they had marched as fast as you 
 think tliey could have marched ? 
 
 A. I have formed no estimate as to how fast those troops can march. 
 
 Q. If those troops, in fact, marched as fast as you have marched your own 
 troops upon any occasion, how long would it have taken them? 
 
 A. To go from Gaiusville? 
 
 Q. Yes, sir. 
 
 A. Without stops, without obstacles, formations, or checks of any kind, simply 
 marching along the road ? 
 
 Q. The question has reference to the country as it is, a distance of, as you say, 
 about four miles. 
 
 A. It was somewhere between four and six miles. Troops march readily 
 from two miles to two miles and a half an hour, if there is nothing to prevent 
 them, if they are not disturbed by stopping up the roads with wagons, getting 
 breakfast, or something of that kind. 
 
 Q. From your knowledge of the actual condition of the country over which 
 that force was supposed to be passing, can you tell whether there were any ob- 
 stacles to their march, and, if there ^vere any, what were they ? 
 
 A. Not having gone over the road, I do not know anything about the obsta- 
 cles, one way or the other. 
 
 Q. Do you know what was the average number of the regiments of the con- 
 federates — each regiment, I mean ? 
 
 A. Do you mean the strength of each regiment ? 
 
 Q. Yes, sir. ■* 
 
 A. They consisted of all the way from two hundred, or even as low as one 
 hundred and fifty, up to one thousand or even twelve hundred. I have taken a 
 great deal of pains at different times in examining deserters, scouts, spies, ne- 
 groes, and prisoners to ascertain that matter, and I find that nothing varies so 
 much as the strength of the regiments on the other side. I have the impression 
 that they were not very strong; that their average was certainly notgreater than 
 our own, if it was as great; but that it varies at different times. Before they had 
 their conscription it was very low; after the conscription their regiments were 
 quite full. I have no personal knowledge of the matter at all. I give the sources 
 from which I obtained this estimate. 
 
 Q. Have you a knowledge now of what was the actual force of the enemy un- 
 der the command of Jackson, or did you know that Jackson ■was in command 
 of the enemy? 
 
 A. I did not know that Jackson was there; I have been told that he was there. 
 I do not know what his force was. 
 
 Q. And do you know or not what was the amount of the confederate force 
 that was coming up? 
 
 A. Coming up when and where? 
 
 Q. As stated in the note from General Buford ? 
 
 A. Nothing more than he told me in that note. 
 
 Q. How long had you left the accused on the 29th of August when you saw the 
 order dated at 4.30 p.m. of that day, which was handed you by some officer? 
 
 A. I can not tell ; I do not recollect. I I'ode from the head of his column back 
 to the head of my own column, and as rapidly as I could get my troops into po- 
 sition on the other road, and waited until the larger part of them had entered 
 upon that road. Then, on riding by them to go to the head of my column on 
 the Sudley Springs road, I met this messenger. I can not tell how long all this 
 took. I can not fix the time when I left General Porter, and, of course, can not 
 fix the time when I saw this messenger. 
 
 Q. How often during this campaign of General Pope in Virginia, of whom you 
 have spoken, had you seen the accused before you saw him on the 28th of August ? 
 
 A. I had not seen him during that campaign before I saw him on the 29th of 
 August. 
 
 Q. How long were you together during that interview of the 29th of August ? 
 
 A. I can not fix the exact time. We rode together some distance ; perhaps a 
 mile ; perhaps it may have been more ; I do not recollect now. 
 
 Q. Was it five, ten, fifteen, or twenty minutes? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Which? 
 
 A. You may put it at fifteen minutes, or at twenty minutes. 
 
 Q. During that conversation, that interview, did the accused say anything or 
 do anythin.g from whicli you inferred disloyalty upon his part, or unwillingness 
 to perform his duty under the command of General Pope? 
 
 A. No, sir; ■what he said was the reverse He professed to have but one feel- 
 ing, which was th.at for the success of his country. This was said, I think, in 
 reference to the embarrassment which I have before alluded to, about General 
 King's division going under him, General Porter. It ^vas not a question with 
 me about loyalty or disloyalty ; I never think of such things ; what I mean is 
 this ; I assume everybody to be loyal : my suspicions do not run that way. The 
 
75 
 
 suspicion that persons who hold commissions as general officers in the Arm j' are 
 disloyal does not occur to me. 
 
 Q. It is not recollected what you said in relation to the embarrassment you 
 apeak of growing out of King's division being under General Porter's command. 
 Will you state what it was that you understood him to refer to? 
 
 A. The embarrassment was rather on my side than on his; the embarrassment 
 I refer to was this : I came down to take King's division and bring it up along 
 with my other division, that is, with Reynolds's division, then engaged at 
 Groveton. I found it with an order to go under General Porter in another 
 direction ; that was what produced the embarrassment. General Porter had 
 nothing to do with that embarrassment ; I may say that we were both embar- 
 rassed, I at finding one of my divisions under his command, and he at finding 
 himself under my command. I do not knoTV that "embarrassment" is the 
 proper word to use ; what I meant was that I found things difl'erent from what 
 I expected to find. 
 
 When I spoke of one of my divisions going under him, he suggested that I was 
 the senior officer, as between himself and myself, and that I could take the com- 
 mand of the whole force — his corps and my own force— and we went forward at 
 first in that way before the joint order reached us. I did not go to that place ex- 
 pecting to find General Porter ; I went there to find my own division and I found 
 General Porter there with an order to take one of my divisions under his com- 
 mand. That was not foreseen by the general-in-chief of that army, who was 
 absent, and the naatter was solved in the way 1 have stated, I commanding Gen- 
 eral P(?rter's corps and my o'wn division. We then received the joint order, 
 which directed the very things which we had ourselves done. The order was 
 sent by General Pope upon the receipt of a note from me, in reference to this 
 matter of my division. 
 
 Q. Do you know from w^hat point King's division had marched on that day, 
 or the day before, in order to get to the point where you found it on the 29th of 
 August ? 
 
 A. It had marched from some point or some place on the Warrenton turnpike, 
 between Gainesville and Grove ton, where it had an engagement with the ene- 
 my, back to Manassas Junction, having left, as I was informed by General Rey- 
 nolds, about 1 o'clock on the morning of Friday the 29th of August. It had 
 been ordered the day before to march from Buekland Mills, which is beyond 
 Gainesville, to Manassas Junction. Before it had reached Bethlehem church 
 it was ordered to move on to Centreville, in compliance with orders from Gen- 
 eral Pope, and had been sent from the road— or I do not know that it was on 
 any road, but from the position where the order reached it —north to the War- 
 renton turnpike, and thence to move along that pike to Centreville. It had 
 become engaged with the enemy in the evening, and then, as I have before 
 stated, fell back the next morning, starting at 1 o'clock, as I iniderstood from 
 General Reynolds. These facts I learned on the morning of Friday the 29th, 
 from General Reynolds, who had been personally with King's division ; had 
 ridden over to it the night before. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect whether you informed the accused at that interview that 
 General Ricketts had been driven from Thoroughfare Gap, and that General 
 King had been driven from Gainesville by the enemy ? 
 
 A. I do not recollect having used such expressions. I recollect having in- 
 formed him of the fact that General King's division, as I had learned from Gen- 
 eral Reynolds, had fallen back that morning, itnd also that General Rieketts's 
 division had fallen back from Thoroughfare Gap. At the time I saw General 
 Porter I had not got up with either of these divisions. I found them after my 
 interview ■with him. 
 
 Q. Did you then know that Generals Ricketts and King had met with the 
 enemy, the one at Thoroughfare Gap and the other at or near Gainesville, and 
 that they were then falling back in consequence of the enemy? 
 
 A. I knew they had met the enemy the night before, but at the time I met 
 General Porter I knew nothing of the details of the engagements which they 
 had had with the enemy, nor do I recollect having said to General Porter, or 
 having known, anything about the motives for General King's falling back 
 to Manassas from this position on the road between Gainesville and Groveton ; 
 I have an idea that there was a question of supplies connected with the falling 
 back from that point. General Reynolds had told me that he had told General 
 King that he would be alongside of him in the morning. At the time I saw Gen- 
 eral Porter the ■whole subject of the engagements of the evening before, except 
 the mere fact there had been engagements, was unknown to me ; I mean the 
 details in regard to those engagements. 
 
 Q. You have stated, or have been understood to have stated, that when you 
 were with the accused, on the 29th of August, the battle was going on, and you 
 could hear it. Will you stateif you heardany other firingthanthatof artillery? 
 
 A. I do not recollect about that now. The noise was very decided, and dis- 
 tant from where we were, I should suppose, about four miles. 
 
 Q. Do you know when the infantry firing on that day commenced ; was it, or 
 not, about 4 o'clock? 
 
 A. I think it was much earlier than that ; I have only one thing to guide nae. 
 
76 
 
 and that is General Reynold's report ; I can refer to that and find out more par- 
 ticularly if it is desired. 
 
 The examination by the accused was here closed. 
 
 Thereupon the court adjourned to 11 a. m. to-morrow. 
 
 The examination of Maj. Gen. Irvin McDowell was then resumed, as follows : 
 Examination by the Court : 
 
 Q. Did or did not General Porter put his troops in action at the point indicated 
 by you, at the time he said he could not go in anywhere there without getting 
 into a iight ? 
 
 A. Of my own knowledge I know nothing of what General Porter did after 
 I left him. 
 
 Q. In departing from a strict obedience to the joint order of the 29th of August, 
 did you or not extend that departure beyond your own immediate command; 
 that is, did you change the order with respect to General Porter's corps? 
 
 A. General Porter and I started out from Manassas with the understanding that 
 under the articles of war applicable to such cases I had the command of the 
 whole force — his own and my own. We each of us received a joint order from 
 General Pope, our then commander-in-chief, which order, while it did not at the 
 time change the relations between General Porter and myself, seemed to imply 
 that those relations were not to be constant, were not to continue. 
 
 I decided, under the latitude allowed in that order, that General Porter should 
 post his troops in to the right of where the head of his column then lay, and 
 that I would take mine away from the road on which our two commands then 
 lay up the Sudley Springs road into the battle, in this way dissolving the joint 
 operations of our two corps, and from the moment I left General Porter I con- 
 sidered he was no longer under my immediate control, or under my immediate 
 command, or my direct orders, but that he came under those of our common 
 commander-in-chief, we not then being on the same immediate ground. The 
 article to which I refer is the sixty-second article of war, which directs that 
 when troops happen to meet, the senior officer commands the whole. I con- 
 sidered that article of warto apply up to the time that I left General Porter and 
 broke my command away from his, after wliich I conceived that his relations 
 were direct to the commander-in-chief; therefore, in answer to the question, to 
 that extent I did interfere with his corps, by separating mine from it, and also 
 by indicating where I thought his corps ought to be applied against the enemy. 
 
 "Q. Did you report to General Pope any change you had made in the opera- 
 tions of that joint order? 
 
 A. No f urtlier than by bringing my troops up, reporting to him that they were 
 there, and receiving his orders. His order to General Porter direct met me on 
 my way to join the main army. I did not know at that time that General Pope 
 was at that particular place. 
 
 Q. When you saw the order from General Pope to General Porter, the one sub- 
 sequent to tile joint order, did you give or had you given any order to General 
 Porter which would interfere with his obedience to it? 
 
 A. None. 
 
 Q. The orders you had given to General Porter were not in opposition, or at 
 least not of a different character from the one that came to him from General 
 Pope? . 
 
 A. They concurred. The arrangements that I supposed to exist when I left 
 General Porter concurred with the order which I afterward saw from General 
 Pope to General Porter. They were to the same effect, except as to details, which 
 General Pope may have given. I gave no details. 
 
 Q. Would or would not the presence of General Pope, an officer superior in 
 command to both yourself and General Porter, render inoperative or inapplica- 
 ble the article of war to which you have referred ? 
 
 A. It would depend upon his presence, whether it was immediate or not. 
 
 Q. We speak of such presence as existed then. 
 
 A. We did not so consider it. General Pope, according to the note we received, 
 was at Centreville, which I suppose was some six miles off, and we were going 
 away from him. I will mention further that the day before nearly a similar case 
 happened, when General Sigel and myself were together at Buckland Mills, and 
 I commanded General Sigel. That was done by a direct order from General 
 Pope, before given. Still, it would have been the same if he had not given that 
 order. 
 
 Q. Could the accused have engaged in the battle according to your order and 
 according to the subsequent order of General Pope and still have fallen back to 
 Bull Run within the time named in the joint order to yourself and the accused? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. From your knowledge of the nature of the country between General Por- 
 ter's column and the forces engaged on the 29th of August, was there anything 
 to have prevented the accused from making an attack upon the enemy's right or 
 rear, as directed by General Pope ? If so, state wliat it Tvas. 
 
 A. My knowledge of the country is derived principally, first, from having gone 
 
77 
 
 over the railroad from Manassas to Gainesville in a car or in a locomotive, which 
 gave me but little idea of it, as I was engaged while going over with matters 
 which prevented my paying attention to the country; nest, in marching from 
 Buckland Mills to Gainesville, and from Gainesville east along the Warrenton 
 turnpike for a mile or two — I do not remember the exact distance — then turning 
 off to the right and south, and going across the country to Bethlehem Church, 
 and thence to Manassas; then from the fact that General Keynolds's division, 
 which hadtheleadon the occasion that I refer to, going from tiainesville toward 
 Oroveton, had gone further on that road than I went myself, had turned to the 
 right and gone toward Bethlehem Church ; and from the fact that General King's 
 division, which had gone on that same road toward Groveton from Gainesville, 
 and had turned down south of that road, had again gone north on to that road, 
 had engaged the enemy at a certain place, had fallen back to JManassas from 
 that place, which place I learned was nearly reached, if not quite, on Friday, the 
 day of the battle, by the troops moving from Cxrovcton west; and from the fact 
 that the enemy's force had moved to the south on Saturday, and turned our left 
 on that day. These movements by two divisions of my corps, my own move- 
 ments, and the movements of the enemy gave me the belief that troops could 
 move through the country comprised between the Warrenton turnpike and the 
 Sudley Springs road and the road from Bethlehem church to Gainesville. I will 
 mention further that that country is a mixture of woods, clear ground, and hills, 
 and that it is easy for troops to march without being seen or seeing the enemy. 
 
 Q. Does the country which you have just described include that over which 
 General Porter was required to march in obeying the order of 4.30 p. m. from Gen- 
 eral Pope to attack the enem j' ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. I would say that I do not know that order by that hour. 
 
 Q. Please state the ground on whichyou formed the opinion that if the accused 
 had attacked the right wing of the rebels, as he was ordered, the battle would 
 have been decisive in our favor. 
 
 A. Because on the evening of that day I thought the result was decidedly in 
 our favor, as it was. But, admitting that it was merely equally balanced, I think, 
 and thought, that if the corps of General Porter, reputed one of the best, if not 
 the best, in the service, consisting of between twenty and thirty regiments and 
 some eight batteries, had been added to the eflbrts made by the others, the re- 
 sult would have been in our favor very decidedly. 
 
 Q. Was there anything besides mere advantage in numbers from which that 
 result would have followed? 
 
 A. And position. 
 
 Q. What particular advantage in position was there ? 
 
 A. Ihe position in which that force would have been applied, ■while the main 
 body was so hotly engaged in front, would have been an additional powerful 
 reason for so supposing. 
 
 Q. When the accused .said to you that he could not go anywhere there with- 
 out getting into a fight, did he or not appear to be averse to engaging the enemy ? 
 
 A. I can not say that it made that impression on me, though in giving my an- 
 swer I took the view that he did so imply and made the remark ; but 1 did not 
 think he was averse to engaging the enemy. I mean by that that that was not 
 seriously a question with me, for when I left him I thought he was going to 
 «ngage and would engage the enemy. 
 
 Q. Had General Porter taken part in the action of August 29 would you not 
 have been likely to have known it? 
 
 A. I heard that he did fire some artillery, and I did not hear his fire ; so that 
 he might have gone into action without my knowing it at that time, because 
 where I was there was a great deal of noise ; and the noise that his engagement 
 might have made might have been in a direction which would have confounded 
 it with other noise. 
 
 Q. Up to what hour did the battle continue on that day, and how long was j'our 
 command engaged in it. 
 
 A. It continued until after dark, or continued to such an hour in the evening 
 ■when you could see the flash rather than the smoke. Of my command part of 
 King's division was actively engaged to the front for, I should think, something 
 like an hour, it may have been more, before the battle terminated. I speak of 
 the active collision. 
 
 GENERAL B. S. ROBERTS'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 ThLs is the testimony of General B. S. Roberts (court-martial record, 
 page 50) : 
 
 Q. 'Nyhat do you know, if anything, in regard to the order issued by General 
 Pope to General Porter, set forth in the third specification of the fu-st charge, 
 bearing date 4.30 p. m. of the 29th August? 
 
 A. About 4. .30 p. ni. of the 29th of August it was supposed by General Pope that 
 General Porter ■^vas near the field of battle. The direction in which the first 
 order required him to move would have brought him, as was supposed, near 
 the field of battle before that hour; and I had noticed, in the direction where 1 
 knew General Porter was expected, the flash and the smoke from some pieces 
 
78 
 
 of artillery, and I inferred it to be artillery from General Porter, -who waa ex- 
 pected to attack there about that time. But it very soon cep.s€ J, and General 
 Pope then wrote another order to General Porter, which, according to my recol- 
 lection, stated that the direction of his movements would bring him on the ene- 
 my's right flank or rear, and that he wished him to press forward and attack 
 immediately. ' 
 
 Q. Is or is not the order to which you now refer the one set forth in the third 
 specification of the first charge? 
 
 A. That is the order to which I refer. 
 
 Q. Will you state what you know, if anything, in regard to General Porter's 
 having either obeyed or disobeyed those orders? 
 
 A. I know that General Porter did not attack as he was directed to attack in 
 that order. I wason that part of the field several times, and was expecting every 
 moment that the attack would be made, and was watching for it with a great 
 deal of anxiety, but it was not made. 
 
 Q. Did you continue upon the field until the engagement closed? 
 
 A. I was on the field ail day, and remained on the field all that night. 
 
 Q. What were the results of the battle when the night closed in? 
 
 A. General Pope's troops, when night closed in, occupied quite a portion of 
 the field from which the enemy had been driven, and in my opinion, although 
 the battle was not a decisive one, the advantages of the day were in favor of 
 General Pope's army. 
 
 Q. In view of what the army had accomplished during the battle of the day 
 in the absence of General Porter's command, what do you suppose ^\-ould have 
 been the result upon the fortunes of the battle if General Porter had attacked, 
 as ordered by the order of 4.30 p. m. , either on the right flank of or the rear of the 
 enemy? 
 
 (The accused objected to the question. 
 
 The court was thereupon cleared. 
 
 Some time after the court was reopened the judge-advocate announced that 
 the court determined that the question shall be answered. 
 
 The question was again propounded to the witness, as follows :) 
 
 Q. In view of what the army had accomplished during the battle of the day in 
 the absence of General Porter's command, what do you suppose would have 
 been the results upon the fortunes of the battle if General Porter had attacked, 
 as ordered by the order of 4.30 p. m., either on the right flank or the rear of the 
 enemy? 
 
 A. I do not doubt at all that it would have resulted in the defeat, if not in the 
 capture, of the main army of the confederates that were on the field at that time. 
 
 GENERAL DANIEL BUTTERPIELD'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 General Daniel Butterfield, one of Ms own commanders, testifies as 
 follows: 
 
 Q. state whether the point at which you were directed was on the same side 
 of the Manassas Railroad or on the other side from the one upon which you 
 were at the time. 
 
 A. The point at which I was directed was across the railroad. 
 
 Q. Which direction from the point from which you were moving? 
 
 A. To the right, between Grovetcn and Gainesville; I understood it to strike 
 between Groveton and Gainesville, keeping the movement toward Gainesville, 
 covering this road that led up to Gainesville, a dirt road ; and the leaning, if 
 anything, was to be to the right rather than to the left (road marked on the map). 
 And in pursuance of that order I put my brigade in motion, saw that it started 
 out, and then proceeded in advance myself with my staff to make a personal re- 
 connaissance, to look up a position and see whatever difficulties might be in the 
 way. 1 understood myself not at liberty to bring on this engagenaent until (he 
 division could be deployed behind, unless I could gain a position, findingafiairs 
 that I could handle in front of me. 
 
 I went out personally with my staff after seeing the head of my column in mo- 
 tion, leaving it in charge of the senior colonel, Lansing, of the Seventeenth New 
 York. I proceeded until I came up in close proximity to the enemy's skirmishers, 
 ■vvhen one of my staff officers asked me if I proposed to tackle the enemy alone. 
 I said no; I had troops behind ; I tm-ned around, and, to my astonishment, sa'w 
 that my brigade that I had put in motion, and seen well out over toward this dry 
 branch, were not there — had returned and were out of sight. I returned with 
 great rapidity and considerable temper. I did not understand why my command 
 had left me ; I came back and found that my brigade had moved off to the right 
 in these woods; which -were very thick. There was a little road running along 
 here, and they were out in'front of this and had come to a halt. That is, they 
 were back of Dawkin's Branch, back on the high land, on this side of the rail- 
 road — south side of the railroad — in the woods. I asked my senior otHcer Avhat 
 it meant — his returning without any order from me; he said he had received 
 orders directly to return, and not to make the advance. 
 
 I was in no very pleasant humor about that method of proceeding. He of- 
 fered as his excuse that the orders had come direct from a staff officer 6f Gen- 
 
79 
 
 eral Porter, or from General Porter himself. I asked where General Porter was. 
 He said he had gone in this direction, in the woods, with General McDowell. I 
 met one of General Porter's staff' officers and entered a complaint against his 
 order withdrawing my troops withont the order coming from me^ien I was in 
 front. I received answer that it was a sndden movement in consequence of 
 something that had occurred between General Porter and General McDowell. 
 
 Q. You were informed by the statf officer that that was the reason it was 
 given ? 
 
 A. That that was the reason the order was given. We then were moved a lit- 
 tle farther to the right, then returned to the left; then we went up and took po- 
 sition again inider same order over on the same ground, and were withdrawn 
 again. These ditlerent movements occupied until dark. Then we went into 
 camp rather with the expectation, as I judged from what came to me from Gen- 
 eral Morell,of an attack from the enemy upon us. 
 
 COL. B. F. SMITH'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 Col. B. F. Smith testifies: 
 By the Judge-Advocate : 
 
 Q. Will you state your position in the military service of the United States? 
 
 A. I am a captain of the Sixth Regular Infantry and colonel of the One hun- 
 dred and twenty-sixth Regiment of Ohio VoUinteers. 
 
 Q. Will you state to the court whether you were serving with any part of the 
 Army of Virginia, commanded by Major-General Pope, on the days of the 27th, 
 28th, 29th, and 3()th of August last ; and, if so, in what brigade and division ? 
 
 A. I was serving in Colonel Chapman's brigade of General Sykes's division. 
 
 Q. In what direction did that brigade march on Friday, the 29th of August 
 last? 
 
 A. We had marched from Fredericksburg by way of Warrenton Junction, and 
 arrived at Manassas Junction, I think, on the 29th of August, the day before the 
 battle of Bull Run. We arrived exactly at the place where the railroad had been 
 destroyed ; the wreck of the train was there, and there we lialted. Late in the 
 day, in the morning, we retraced our steps to the branch railroad running, I 
 think, toward Gainesville or Manas.sas Gap, and followed the direction of that 
 road some few miles. We then halted on some rising ground, where we could 
 see the country beyond, over the M'oods, the tops of the trees. It was a wooded 
 country. While we were lialted there a battery of the rebels opened ujjon us, 
 but fired some three or four .shells only, I think; there may have been a half a 
 dozen. Our brigade then marched into a field and the regiments were placed in 
 order of battle. I recollect that General Morell's division was in our advance, 
 on the lower ground. 
 
 Some of our pieces replied to this rebel battery. I received permission from 
 theeommandingofficerof my regiment to go to a more elevated piece of ground, 
 a few rods distant, and while there I sa'w our batteries reply. A short time after- 
 ward, probably a half an hour, we received orders to retrace our steps and march 
 back in the direAion we had come. We then marched back to near Manassas 
 Junction, and camped in the woods alongside this liranch railroad I have men- 
 tioned. That night I was placed on duty as tlie Held officer of the pickets of 
 Sykes's division. About daybreak the jjickets were called in, and we marched 
 toward the battlefield of Bull Run, and were engaged in that battle. 
 
 Q. What was the efleet of the reply of vour guns to this attack of the rebel bat- 
 tery? 
 
 A. It seemed to silence that battery, and it withdrew. At least that was the 
 Impression I had at the time. 
 
 Q. What amount of infantry force, if any, did there seem to be sujjporting this 
 rebel battery ? 
 
 A. I tid not see them. 
 
 Q. Before you received orders to fall back and retrace your .steps along this 
 road, had or had not this rebel battery been completely silenced ? 
 
 A. I think it had been. 
 
 Q. Were there not at that time clouds of dust in view showing an advance of 
 the enemy ? 
 
 A. Cloiids of dust were distinctly visible farther over beyond the trees. Whether 
 there were troops advancingor whether tliey were moving in another direction 
 I could not tell. I could see distinctly the clouds of dust, as if there was a large 
 body of troops moving. 
 
 Q. Did you or not see the accused. General Porter, at the head of the column 
 on tliat day ? 
 
 A. No, sir ; I do not recollect of seeing General Porter at all that day. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF SOLOMON THOMAS. 
 
 Solomon Thomas, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, testified 
 as follows: 
 
 Direct examination : 
 Q. Where were you on August 29,1862? 
 
80 
 
 A. With General Fitz-John Porter's corps, Eighteenth Massachusetts, Martin- 
 dale's brigade, Morell's division. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect being at Manassas Junction on that day ? 
 
 A. I do. 
 
 Q. Did you move off on the Gainesville road ? 
 
 A. We moved up on the line of the railroad. We moved more in a direct line 
 infront, though we ^vere intending to move to the right. 
 
 Q. How far upon that road did your regiment go? 
 
 A. We went upon that road nearly to a small creek, or what had been origi- 
 nally a small creek ; it w^as dry, or nearly so, at that Vime. 
 
 Q. What did you do there? 
 
 A. We then halted, and the Thirteenth New Yoi<k, or a part of it, which was 
 thrown out as skirmishers — a battery was planted in our front a little to our 
 rightr— in the fields, and as the skirmishers of the Thirteenth advanced we were 
 deployed to the right, into the woods ; our right rested in the woods. We halted 
 and lay down. This was probably 10 o'clock in the morning I should say ; 
 might have been a little later. 
 
 Q. How long did you remain there? 
 
 A. We remained in that position — I should say it was half past 4 when we were 
 called to attention and right-about-face, and moved out from that position, left in 
 front, upon the same road that we moved down on in the morning. I don't know 
 the distance, but we had been marching some time. 
 
 Q. Back toward Manassas Junction ? 
 
 A. Yes ; toward Manassas Junction — when an officer came riding from the 
 Manassas Junction way, having a dispatch, and rode up to General Porter, and 
 handed him the dispatch. Then we were commanded to halt; we did. General 
 Porter dismounted, and sat down by the side of the road and leaned his back 
 against a tree — quite a large tree — and read the dispatch, and went up and re- 
 mounted and called us to attention and right-about-face. We marched back upon 
 the same road we had come on, moving then right in front, until we came near 
 the position of the road where we had moved into the woods on the right in the 
 morning. We then moved out to the left, into an open field. The artillery was 
 brought into the field, and parked in our front. We were formed in line, and 
 ordered to stack arms ; we did so. Orders were received that there should be 
 no fires made to make any coffee ; that we were to remain perfectly quiet. The 
 adjutant received orders that if there were any orders received during the night 
 he should deliver those orders to the commander of each regiment in person, so 
 there should be no loud words spoken ; and we w^ere to remain. Me and some 
 of my comrades spread our blankets and were preparing to lie down for the 
 night. As we sat down, before ^ve got ready to lie down, we heard upon our 
 right a shout which we knew was a charge — from the shout ; then we heard mus- 
 ketry discharges. 
 
 Q. What did yon tmderstand at that time ? 
 
 A. I felt at that time that we were exj^ected to charge on the rear and flank in con- 
 junction with what was going on infront. ^ 
 
 Q. About what time of the day, in reference to sunset, wa"t that you were 
 halted on your way back to Manassas Junction, and that an officer came up with 
 a dispatch ? 
 
 A. I should judge from the position of the sun it must have been somewhere 
 from 5 to half past 5 o'clock. 
 
 Q. During the day did yon hear any indications of a battle going on ; if so, what 
 were they, and where were they? 
 
 A. In our immediate front t/je heard an occasional discharge of musketry, and, in 
 fact, there were pieces of railroad iron fired from a rebel battery right over our 
 right, and two pieces lodged in the rear of where I lay, probably forty feet in our 
 rear. Some Oi thehoys went and dug themup, and one of tliem waa eighteen hiclies in 
 length, the other tvas about fifteen. Wethouglit of bringing them hoine,butmey were 
 rather heavy, so we left them on the field. Then, while we were laying there, 
 beside that we heard, upon our riglit, distant firing all day, but not continuous ; 
 there were intervals that we could hear artillery distinctly. 
 
 Q. On the 27th of August where were you? 
 
 A. We were moving on tlie Warrenton road toward Bristoe Station. I should 
 think that we were encamped on that night some six to eight miles from Bristoe 
 Station. AVe went in before sundown ; probably the sun was an hour or an hour 
 and a half high -when we halted there. 
 
 Q. When did you move from there ? 
 
 A. I was corporal of the guard that night, and was ordered to wake the men at 
 1 o'clock, which I did, and we were formed and moved out from our camp imme- 
 diately after 1 o'clock. 
 
 TESTIMONY OP LEWIS B. CAERICO. 
 
 Lewis B. Carrico, who resides on the battle-ground, called by Gov- 
 ernment, testified as follows (board's record, page 982): 
 
 Q. Wliere do you reside? 
 
 A. Prince William County, Virginia. 
 
81 
 
 Q. ^V^^e^e did you reside on the 29th of August, 1862 ? 
 
 A. Wliere I now reside, very near the Manassas Gap Railroad. 
 
 Q. Were you there on that day ? 
 
 A. I was. 
 
 Q. Up to what hour in the day did you remain there ? 
 
 A. I was there until very late Friday evening. 
 
 Q. During tliat day did you see any confederate forces ? If so, where ? 
 
 A. I saw some cavalry scouts during that day, and in tiie evening there was » 
 battery tiring some seventy-hve or eighty yards back of my house, just west of 
 my iiouse, and an ofiicer came there and told me I was in danger, and to take 
 my family and go back of the line. 
 
 Q. Where did you go then? 
 
 A. I went up the road about a mile, to a farm owned now by Major Nutt 
 
 Q. Towards Gainesville? 
 
 A. Between there and Gainesville. 
 
 Q. Did you meet any confederate force on that trip? If so, about where? 
 
 A. I saw them a little beyond Hampton Cole's, a very small number. Tho> 
 w^ere sitting down on the side of the railroad, and their battery, that was planted 
 at the back of my house; that opened upon the Federal troops directly after I 
 passed it ; and when I got up there against them, they got up and took sheltei 
 on the embankment of the railroad. 
 
 Q. Did you at that time see any troops to the south of the railroad? 
 
 A. None at all, except a little picket force that was a little to the south of ttn? 
 railroad, just above there ; a small picket force. 
 
 Q. Did any confederate force pass to the east of your house during the day ? 
 If so, in what direction did they go? 
 
 A. I saw none jiass to the eastward. I saw some shelling from the back of what 
 is called the Britt farm, and a disabled Federal wagon at the mouth of a lane 
 called Compton's lane. 
 
 Q. About what time in the day w^as that? 
 
 A. I could hardly say ; 12 or 1 o'clock. 
 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 Q. What do you mean by the expression "evening?" 
 A. I mean something like 3 or 4 o'clock; somew^here thereabouts. 
 Q. How do you fix the time? 
 
 A. I fix the time by having to leave home, and having to go the small distauuv 
 I did go. 
 
 *^* * * * * * 
 
 Q. What room did you stay in ? 
 
 A. I was all over the house; very often upstairs, looking out of the winauw 
 Q. Which way? 
 A Toward Dawkin's Branch. 
 Q. What time was the cannon posted there ? 
 A. Possibly 4 o'clock. 
 Q. You are positive about that? 
 
 A. I am not positive ; but according to the best of my judgment it was piuuu> 
 bly as late as 4. 
 Q. Was it earlier or later than 4? 
 
 A. It was not earlier, I do not think ; not earlier than 3, lam very sure. 
 ***** * * 
 
 Q. Were there any soldiers of any description about your house, except t/u« 
 battery ? 
 
 A. On Friday there was a Federal force in Mr. Lewis's field, to the east of my 
 house. 
 
 Q. Where ^vas Lewis's field ? 
 
 A. Within three hundred or four hundred yards to the east of my house. 
 
 Q. Were there any about your house? 
 
 A. Yes ; there were some of the Federal forces ; two men that I had had som^ 
 acquaintance with, who were in my house when this wagon w^as disabled at the 
 end ot Compton's lane. 
 
 ***** * * 
 
 Q. About where is the place where you carried your famUy? 
 
 A. Immediately at the Manassas Railroad, one mile past Hampton Cole's. 
 
 Q. You say you did not meet any considerable body of the confederate force 
 on your way there' 
 
 A. Yes, I do say it; and I saw no considerable body there, as I stated to you 
 and General Porter, if he ■was with you, until I got home next morning, about 
 8un-up. They came there to my house and destroyed a great deal. 
 B. s. white's testimony. 
 B. S. White, on August 27, 1862, held the position of major in the 
 assistant inspector-general's department of the confederate Maj. Gen. 
 J. E. B. Stuart's staff (board's record, page 983) : 
 
 Q. That morning, after Major Patrick had those orders to charge, what did 
 you do? 
 
 Lo 6 
 
82 
 
 A. The enemy were driven away. 
 
 Q. Then what was the next event that transpired? 
 
 A. We moved o£F across tlie country to find out what had become of Long- 
 street's corps. We moved off in this way toward Thorouglifare Gap. 
 
 Q. Did you find General Longstreet's column or corps advancing? 
 
 A. We did, between Haymarket and Gainesville. 
 
 Q. What did General Stuart then do ? 
 
 A. General Stuart then threw his command on Longstreet's right and moved 
 down with his right flank in the direction of Bristoe to Manassas Junction. 
 
 Q. What did you then observe? 
 
 A. We took the road leading directly down the Manassas Gap Railroad ; there 
 is a road running parallel with it. 
 
 Q. How far down did you go? 
 
 A. General Stuart threw his command on the right of Longstreet, and passer! 
 down the Manassas Gap Railroad to about that point [west of Hampton Cole's; 
 point marked " W "]. 
 
 Q. Then what did you do? 
 
 A. We discovered a column in our front — discovered a force in our front com- 
 ing from the direction of Manassas Junction to Bristoe. 
 
 Q. AVhat sort of a point was that where you discovered this column coming, 
 so far as observation is concerned? 
 
 A. It was a good point for observation ; a high position, elevated ground. We 
 could see Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville and all the sorrounding country. 
 * * ***** 
 
 Q. When you got back to General Stuart, where was he ? 
 
 A. Where I left him, on that hill. 
 
 Q. At that time where was General Longstreet's command? 
 
 A. They had come down and were forming here. [Witness indicates a point 
 back westerly of Pageland lane.] 
 
 Q. About what time of day was it that this affair occured at Sudley Springs ; 
 before you and General Stuart started to cross the country toward Thoroughfare 
 Gap? 
 
 A. Early in the morning. 
 
 Q. At what would you fix the time? 
 
 A. I suppose 8 or 9 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Q. Did you remain at this point with General Stuart after you got back on thi.s 
 hill? 
 
 A. I did. 
 
 Q. What became of this column of troops that you saw advancing? 
 
 A. I don't know what became of them ; they disappeared from our front. 
 
 Q. Do you know of any other position being taken up by General Longstreet's 
 command during the day in advance of the position that you have indicated ? If 
 so, when and where ? You indicated a position back of Pageland lane. 
 
 A. I do not. 
 
 Q. How long were you down in the neighborhood of this hill which you have 
 marked with a cross during that day ; up to what time ? 
 
 A. We were down there the greater part of the day ; we were on the extreme 
 right all the time afterward. The cavalry remained on the extreme right until 
 the morning of the 30th. 
 
 Q. What time do you think you met General Longstreet between Haymarket 
 and Gainesville? 
 
 A. It was about 11 o'clock. 
 
 Q. Was General Longstreet at the head of his column ? 
 
 A. He was near the head of the column. 
 
 Q. Were there many troops in front of his command? 
 
 A. Not many. 
 
 Q. Were they advancing ? 
 
 A. They were. 
 
 Q. Rapidly? 
 
 A. They were marching at an ordinary pace. 
 
 Q. State the style of march ; how many front ? 
 
 A. They were marching in column. 
 
 Q. How many frant ? 
 
 A. Marching in column of regiments, perhaps four abreast. 
 
 Q. Were they in close order ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Would you swear it was 11 o'clock ? 
 
 A. It was about 11 o'clock. 
 
 Q. You are confident that none of Longstreet's forces had passed through 
 Gainesville before 11 o'clock? 
 
 A. I don't think they had. 
 
 Q. How did they appear to you; to be on top of a hill, or in a depression, or in 
 woods, or by woods, or in an open field ? 
 
 A. The position -we occupied was a commanding one, of course. They were in 
 a depressed situation from the position we occupied. We were on this hill and 
 there were here. [Witness indicates.! 
 
83 
 
 Q. In column, marching along the Manassas Gap Railroad? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Did you see the Manassas Gap Railroad right in their vicinity ? 
 
 A. The road they were marching on was parallel to the Manassas Gap Railroad . 
 
 Q. When you came back to that position did you see any Federal troops any- 
 where ? 
 
 A. Yes. There were Federal troops off here. [Indicatingthelinesof the regi- 
 ments.] 
 
 Q. When you came back did you see Longstreet's command? 
 
 A. I saw Longstreet's command on my way back from General Stuart; they 
 came and formed in here. [Pageland lane.] 
 
 Q. Did you remain in that position all day? 
 
 A. We were there most all day. Do you mean me individually? 
 
 Q. Yes. 
 
 A. No. Iwasbackwardandforwardseveraltimesduringtheday. Iwentwith 
 messages from Stuart to Lee and Longstreet and to^ackson. 
 
 Q. Then during that whole day you were in the vicinity of Longstreet's 
 troops and knew of their position? 
 
 A. Yes ; we were on his right. 
 
 Q. What time do you put it that you came back from General Jackson after 
 being sent over by General Stuart ? 
 
 A. Half past 2 or 3 o'clock. 
 
 Q. Do you know of any action that occurred along the Warrenton pike — in- 
 fantry ? 
 
 A. I heard firing. 
 
 Q. What time was that? 
 
 A. In the evening. 
 
 Q. About what time? 
 
 A. General Jackson's command was engaged all the time. 
 
 Q. Was Hood's command engaged at all? 
 
 A. That evening they were. 
 
 Q. What time that evening ? 
 
 A. I suppose about3 o'clock in the evening they were engaged; 2k to 3 o'clock, 
 
 Q. Were they engaged vigorously ? 
 
 A. Quite a severe fight. 
 
 Q. Describe the action so far as you observed it ? 
 
 A. I was not present. I didn't see it. I heard the fii'ing; it lasted, I suppose, 
 half to three-quarters of an hour. 
 
 Q. Was it very vigorous? 
 
 A. It was a very sharp fight. 
 
 Q. Was that the only occasion in which Hood's command was engaged that 
 day to your knowledge? 
 
 A. To my knowledge that is the only one until next morning. 
 
 Q. You say it was 3 o'clock? 
 
 A. Between 2 and 3 o'clock. It may have been after 3. It ■was after he had got 
 in position. 
 
 Q. How long after he got in position ? 
 
 A. He got in position, I suppose, about 12orl o'clock. This engagement took 
 place about 2^, or mav be 3 or 3j. 
 
 Q. Was it as late as 5? 
 
 A. I can't recollect. I don't think it was. 
 
 Q. What is your recollection about the time that that engagement took place 
 upon the Warrenton turnpike by Hood's troops? 
 
 A. I was away on the right. Of course there was fighting on the line. I don't 
 know what troops were engaged, but I know that Hood's troops had a fight there 
 that evening. Idon'tknow^iether itwas3or3i; it may have been 5 o'clock. I 
 know they had a sharp fight there, and I heard it. 
 
 Q. Assuming Hood's division to be in the place you have indicated by W^, and 
 suppose there had been a battery placed on this rise of ground marked C, would 
 that have fulfilled what you understood was the position of a battery firing off in 
 the direction of " W"? " 
 
 A. Yes. Just beyond a small branch there was a hill, a very fine position for 
 artillery, and it ^svas firing off in the direction of '" W^." The highest ground of 
 that hill is where that battery -was placed, orrathera park of artillery; nineteen 
 or twenty of our guns werein that position. 
 
 Q. Suppose that the column of troops that you saw on that morning, or on the 
 noon of Friday, August 29, had been coming up the dirt road from Manassas 
 Junction to Gainesville and was in the neighborhood of Dawkin's Run, would 
 that have been the position of the column that you saw according to the map ? 
 
 (Objected to as leading.) 
 
 A. The troops we saw approaching came more from the direction of Bristoe 
 than from INIanassas. 
 
 Q. Therefore, what road indicated on this map best fulfiiUs the direction from 
 which you saw those troops coming? 
 
 (Objected to as leading.) 
 
84 
 
 A. They were approaching more in the direction from Bristoe than from Ma- 
 nassas. 
 
 Q. Therefore, what road best of the roads you see on this map shows the direc- 
 tion from which you saw those troops coming? [Map explained to the witness.] 
 Kow, where were the Federal troops? 
 
 A. I remarked a while ago that the column that was advancing advanced more 
 from the direction of Bristoe tlian Manassas. 
 
 Q. Here is Bristoe and there is Manassas. Now, where do you put it, what di- 
 rection? Make a line indicating the direction. 
 
 A. They must have come in here or in here. 
 
 Q. Then you are not positive that you saw them on the Manassas Gap Rail- 
 road ? 
 
 A. I never said I saw the Manassas Gap Railroad. I said I .saw them on the 
 roa<i running parallel with the Manassas Gap Railroad. They were not march- 
 ing on the railroad. They were marching on a road that I supposed, from the 
 position I occupied, was a line parallel with the Manassas Gap Railroad; they 
 may have been on this road [from Gainesville to Stuart's Hill] and took position 
 there [at -p.] From that position we saw the columns coming up, but they were 
 not on the railroad. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Q. Did yo\i see the railroad in conjunction with seeing them, or at the same 
 time in connection with seeing them ? 
 
 A. I could not say. I was not looking for railroads. I was looking for troops. 
 I don't recollect now whether I saw the railroad or not. because mv attention 
 was directed to more important matters. 
 
 Q. Would you swear that those troops, Bristoe being here and Manassas there— 
 that those troops were not on this road to Millbrd? 
 
 A. No; they were not in that direction at all. They were off here [witness in- 
 dicates in the direction of the Manassas and Gainesville dirt road]. 
 
 Q. Had you been to Bristoe that day? 
 
 A. N'o, .sir ; we had been there the day before. 
 
 Q. How do you know where Bristoe was? 
 
 A. Because \ have been there a thousand times since. 
 
 Q. (Jonld you see it from that positioi*? 
 
 A. I tlon't know that you could .see the station, but I knew the general direction 
 and liad been all over that country time and again. 
 
 Q. Did you -see any of the shot tired fall near that column? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. What did the column do? 
 
 A. The column seemed to retire. 
 
 Q. Did you see them retire ? 
 
 A. Yes ; I saw them give back. 
 
 Q. How did they retire ? 
 
 A. You know how troops retire. They gave back into a piece of woods ; and 
 just at that time I went off with a message, as I stated before — went off v.'ith a 
 message to General Jackson from General Stuart. 
 
 By Mr. Maltby : 
 
 Q. You say that the artillery were stationed on the right of Jackson at the 
 highest point on the ridge. Now, did Longstreet's line bend back from the line 
 of Jackson, or did they make an angle more nearly approaching right angles? 
 
 A. I had nothing to do with Longstreet's position. 
 
 Q. But you saw it? 
 
 A. I passed in his rear several times. 
 
 Q. Take a pencil and mark Longstreet's line. 
 
 A. There was an angle formed between Jackson and Longstreet's line; Jack ^ 
 son's line ran along here. [Witness indicates.] 
 
 Q. Draw it in pencil. There is the Independent line of the Manassas Gap Rail- 
 road. [Indicated to the witness.] 
 
 A. Jackson's artillery was posted on this stony ridge. 
 
 Q. Draw a line where the nineteen or twenty guns were posted. 
 
 A. I had no connection with Longstreet's command or Jackson's. I passed in 
 the rear of both lines several times with messages. I did not inspect their lines. 
 I just speak from general recollection of their lines. 
 
 Q. Then you do not recollect pi-ecisely where any one line was? 
 
 A. 1 do; "yes. I have indicated there is Jackson'sline; hisartillerywasposted 
 on this range of hills; General Longstreet formed here. [Witness indicates the 
 different positions.] Their lines did not join; there was an angle there, an 
 opening, and there is where the battery of artillery was. 
 
 Q. Draw Jackson's line and the cannon of Long.street. 
 
 A. I have indicated it. [Witness indicates the line of the Independent line of 
 the Manassas Gap Railroad.] His line did not go down that far [indicating Sud- 
 ley church] ; it went to about there. , 
 
 Q. Where do vou run Jackson's line? 
 
 A. Jackson's iine ran about in this direction. [Marked with a pencil.] That 
 is about the direction of Jackson's line. 
 
8.". 
 
 (The lin,e indicated by tlie witness l)y nieiius of a pencil is followed in ink by 
 the recorder.) 
 
 Q. Where were these eighteen or twenty guns of Jackson's? 
 
 A. Thatdid nut have refcrenceto Jaclison'scommaiid ; Jackson's artillery was 
 posted on this range of hills back of his line of battle. This park of artillery is 
 wheie W-" is and W^. 
 
 Q. Vou still say that Hood occupied tliat position, and that his right was where 
 + and + + are? 
 
 A. Tliere is where Hood was ; right there. 
 
 REV. JOHN LANDSTREET'S EVIDENCE. 
 
 The evitlence of Rev. John Landstreet (l)oard'.s record, 996). He 
 was a minister, called in both armies a chajjluin; he was a chaplain in 
 the confederate service belonging to this cavalry command. His resi- 
 dence is in Baltimore County, Maryland: 
 
 Q. "What did you do or see there which has impressed itself upon your atten- 
 tion ? 
 
 A. There was considerable dust in this direction [witness indicates] indicat- 
 ing a body of troops ; there was considerable down in this direction some where. 
 At any rate, General Stuart ordered some of the Fifth Cavalry to go out and cut 
 brush and drag it along the road. 
 
 Q. (By Mr. Mai.tby.) Did you liearthe order? 
 
 A. Ye's ; to drag the brush along the Gainesville road, so as to serve as a feint 
 and to convey the impression that there was a force coming down the Gaines- 
 ville road. It was given, I distinctly recollect, to a member of the Fifth Vir- 
 ginia Cavalry. 
 
 Q. "Who was the colonel of that regiment? 
 
 A. T. L. Uosser. We frequently alter that conversed about it. 
 
 Q. Wliat was done after that while you were in the neighborhood of Hamp- 
 ton Cole's? 
 
 A. There was some firing from this ijosition [+-1, in the direction of this ap- 
 proaching force ; and froua my recollection of it the force was a considerable 
 distance down. If three inches indicate a mile here, and if it was a life and death 
 case. I would say that it was inside of a mile that they were off. 
 
 Q. You should say it was a distance of aboiit a mile? 
 
 A. I should say it was inside of a mile. It was not beyond a mile, certainly. 
 [Witness indicates from Hampton Cole's.] There were several shots tired from 
 this point in the direction down there. 
 
 Q. In what direction? 
 
 A. That depends entirely \ipon wh<'re the man wasHtanding at (he time, and 
 what he was looking at. I did not charge my mind niiich with this Manassas Gap 
 Railroad, though I knew it very well. But I would not say whether it was here 
 or there [whctiier right or left]. It was pretty much in line willi tliis railroad 
 [Manassas Gap Railroad]. 
 
 (i. What becameof this column of trooi)S upon those sliots being fircl ? 
 
 A. I <Iid not see them. 
 
 Q. They disappeared from your sight ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Did they remain in the position they were in wheii they w,'rf tired upon? 
 
 A. No, sir. When my attention wasdirectedto t!ieni tliey were wherel could 
 see the column, or a considerable jjortion of it ; and they were marching in good 
 order, close column. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect how many shots were fired at them ? 
 
 A. I do" not; but I am positive I didn't hear halfa dozen ; I know I did !iot. 
 
 Q. IIow long did you remain inthat position in the neighborliood of Hamj ton 
 Cole's that day? 
 
 A. 1 was sent oft' after that to hunt up the First Virginia ('avalry. not very far 
 from there at that time; and I paid very little attention, indeed, from that time. 
 When Longstreet caiue and formed there. General Jackson being in position, I 
 came out from the command, and I was not in any of tlie light at all cxcei^t in 
 the caviilry movcinents^-skirmishing. 
 
 Q. Where did General Longstreet form his command? 
 
 A. It seems to me I struck a portion of Mood's command on General Long- 
 street's left before I got anywhere in the direction of Lougstrecl's right. They 
 seemed to come in a good ways in the direction of General Longstreet's left, if 
 they were not immediately on his Hank. 
 
 Q^ About where would you put them, north of the pike, across the pike, or 
 south of the pike? 
 
 A. Which? 
 
 Q. Hood's division of that command? 
 
 A. From my recollection, there was a portion of Longstreet's command that 
 crossed the Manassas Gap Railroad [the witness marks a point witli a pen]: 
 crossed it, am sure, some distance, but how far I don't know. I do not think it 
 was far. It extended, I think, up in this way. Hood's was in front of it ; part 
 
86 
 
 of It in the body of the woods. My impression is that Hood came in a little in 
 advance of Longstreet's left. I am certain that I came to Hood before I came to 
 Longstreet's force in position. [Marked " Longstreet " and " Hood."] 
 
 Q. What time of day was that that they were all in position? * * * 
 
 A. It is my recollection that it was somewhere between 2 and 3 o'clock. 
 
 Q. Do you know whether or not either Hood or the remainder of Longstreet's 
 command were in advance to the east of Pageland lane at any time that day? 
 
 A. I do not. 
 
 Q. Was your position such that you could see the location of Hood and Long- 
 street during the afternoon? 
 
 A. Oh, yes ; I could go where I pleased. 
 
 Q. How long did this action of that day continue? 
 
 A. The firing, to my recollection, continued up to about dark. It was near 
 dusk. At times it was heavier than at others ; and at times severer than I ever 
 heard It in any engagement. 
 
 Q. What were your opportunities during that day of knowing the fact, pro- 
 vided General Hood had advanced east of Pageland lane? [Points of compass 
 upon tlie map explained to the witness.] 
 
 A. My answer is, that if I had a desire to know it, I could have known it very 
 easily ; but I didn't think about it at all. It was not in my mind. I was well 
 acquainted with Hood and his command, and that made the impression upon me 
 in coming to this point. I came from the direction where Jackson's command 
 was, and passed this heavy battery ai the time, though I think there were a few 
 more guns there than I have heard stated to-day. 
 
 Q. In which direction, as you stood at Hampton Cole's facing the enemy, was 
 Longstreet's command from you, with reference to your own person — to the left, 
 right, front, or rear? 
 
 A. Looking down in the direction from which the enemy were coming, a por- 
 tion of it was in my rear and a portion of it was not. 
 
 Q. At the time you arrived there at Hampton Cole's ? 
 
 A. No, sir. They did not get in this position at the time I arrived at Hampton 
 Cole's. I arrived at Hampton Cole's about 10 or 11 in the morning. 
 
 Q. Where were the guns .stationed in reference to Hampton Cole's? 
 
 A. The guns were pointed down a little to the left of the railroad. 
 
 Q. How near were you to the guns ? 
 
 A. Riglit up by them. 
 
 Q. How much of that column did you see? 
 
 A. I could not say how many regiments there were. The column indicated 
 that it was the head of a considerable body of men. 
 
 Q. What was that indication ? 
 
 A. They were marching in close column. 
 
 Q. Would not a regiment march in close column? 
 
 A. Might not in as close column as tliat, and in good order. My judgment in 
 the matter was that it was the advance of a large army. 
 
 Q. Did you see a quarter of a mile of that column? 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 Q. An eightli of a mile? 
 
 A. That is somewhere near it. 
 
 Q. Was it marching upon a plain? 
 
 A. I can not tell you tliat. It did not appear to me as if they were coming up 
 a hill, nor as if they were coming down a hill. 
 
 Q. As if they were marching upon a plain? 
 
 A. It looked pretty much as if they were on a level. 
 
 Q. Can you state whether any bushes were to their right or left, or trees? 
 
 A. No; I could not. ISIy impression is that the country was pretty well open 
 left and right of where I first saw them. 
 
 Q. Did you see them in rtank at all? 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 Q. I don't know whether it is a military expres.sion or not. 
 
 A. Do you mean did I see the rear of the enemy? 
 
 Q. No, sir; I mean the side of the column as it advanced. 
 
 A. No, sir; it was the shortest space of time before the firing commenced here 
 at Hampton Cole's before I saw them no more. 
 
 Q. Was this column to your right or left? 
 
 A. From the position I was in, it was almost directly in my front. I think if I 
 had advanced in a straight line I would have come up face to face with them. I 
 was a little to the right of Hampton Cole's and looking right straight down. 
 
 Q. Did you see troops in the neighborhood of the Lcachman house? 
 
 A. I knew there were troops there, but how I knew it I am not now prepared 
 to say. 
 
 Q. How did they appear? Did they march out of sight in the rear, or did they 
 retire in the bushes? 
 
 A. If you will let me u.se an illustration : It was a very common thing for a col- 
 umn of cavalry to advance, and one shot into a column of «avalry w^ould make 
 them disappear in the w^oods, and that was the end of it. I never saw a column 
 that got out of sight quicker than this column did. 
 
87 
 
 Q. How long did you remain at Hampton Cole's? 
 
 A. I suppose I staid there until— well, it was just after the brush expedition; 
 shortly after that ; and I went in the direction of Gainesville from there. I don't 
 know but what I went right across to Gainesville ; I think I did. 
 
 Q. How did you go? 
 
 A. 1 struck out on this Gainesville road that I had traveled hundreds of times 
 towards Gainesville ; pretty much along the line of the railroad. 
 
 Q. How long did you say that it was that you were at Hampton Cole's? 
 
 A. I said I was there until after 12 o'clock. 
 
 Q; Were you there about an hour in all? 
 
 A. I was there more than lui hour ; I was there fully an hour and a half. 
 
 Q. You passed along the Manassas Gap Railroad? 
 
 A. I passed along the Gainesville turnpike. 
 
 Q. What did you see on your route in the shape of troops? 
 
 A. I met some of, I think, Longstreet's forces on the Warrenton pike. 
 
 Q. Did you see any of Longstreet's troops? 
 
 A. I have no recollection of seeing them. 
 
 Q. Were there any troops marching on that turnpike? 
 
 A. There may have been. I did not pay any attention to it. 
 
 Q. How long* did you .stay away in the direction of Gainesville ? 
 
 A. I staid awav uiitil about 3 or half past 3 o'clock, 1 think. 
 
 Q. Then what "did you do? 
 
 A. TTien I returned to the First Regiment of Virginia Cavalry. 
 
 Q. Where was that? 
 
 A. If my recollection serves, it was between Hampton Cole's and Sudley. 
 
 Q. Was that the detachment that had beensentoff to drag brush there thatday ? 
 
 A. No, sir. That was the Fifth Virginia Cavalry, commanded by Colonel 
 Rosser. 
 
 Q. When did you first see the place where Longstreet's line was formed after 
 you went off towards Gainesville? 
 
 A. I saw it fur the first time a little after 3 o'clock. 
 
 Q. Was it then formed ? 
 
 A. Yes; it was then formed. in good order. 
 
 Q. All along the whole line? 
 
 A. Well, I did not ride along the whole line. 
 
 Q. Where were you? 
 
 A. I could not tell you how it was along the whole line. I rode in along /lereand 
 I passed on out here. 1 passed around on Longstreet's left, and 1 found Hood's 
 division in front of Longstreet, and rather extending beyond his left. [Witness 
 indicates near Pageland lane.] 
 
 Q. Then what did you strike? 
 
 A. I didn't know what the name of the road was. I made for Sudley neigh- 
 borhood, and there I met a portion of the First Virginia. 
 
 Q. On Hood's left or Longstreet's left did you find artillery? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Did Hood's line extend quite up to the artillery? 
 
 A. No, sir; it did not. There was a gap. 
 
 Q. HoAv much of a gap? 
 
 A. I don't recollect how much it was, but it was a considerable gap. 
 
 Q. Haifa mile? 
 
 A. I don't know whether it was thatmuch, but it was a considerable gap, a con- 
 siderable elevation. 
 
 Q. Do you know where thatartillery was in reference to the Browner or Doug- 
 las house ? 
 
 A. No, sir ; I know nothing about houses there. 
 
 Q. Were the batteries in advance of Hood's line? 
 
 A. Well, rather. ' 
 
 Q. Much? 
 
 A. No, sir; they were rather a little in advance of his left. 
 
 Q. Was the distance between Hood's left and the right of the artillery as great 
 as the gap ? 
 
 A. According to my recollection, the battery was pretty nearly in the center of 
 the gap. 
 
 Q. Did the line of the battery run in the same direction that Hood's line ran, or 
 did Hood's line form an angle with the battery? 
 
 A. It was at an angle. 
 
 Q. Was the right of the battery much in advance of Hood's left ? 
 
 A. No, sir; it was not much in advance, but still it was in ads-ance. 
 
 Q. Was it a half mile in advance ? 
 
 A. Oh, no. 
 
 Q. Was it a quarter of a mile? 
 
 A. No, sir ; I don't think it was that. 
 
 Q. Or an eighth ? 
 
 A. T don't think it was that. It was a verj' short distance in advance. Iwould 
 not say positively tluil it was in advance at all. 
 
Q. About what time of day did you first see Loiigstreet's troops in position 
 after that? 
 
 A. I saw them in position, I think, somewhere about 3 o'clock, or a little after 
 3, or a little before 3. 
 
 GENERAL, ROBERT C. SCHENCK'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 Robert C. Schenck, called by the recorder, and examined in the city 
 of Baltimore, October 22, 1878 (present, the recorder, and Mr. Maltby, 
 of counsel for the petitioner), being duly sworn, testified as follows: 
 
 Q. Where do you reside ? 
 
 A. Dayton, Ohio ; temporarily residing in Washington, D. C. 
 
 Q. What rank and command did you hold in the military service of the United 
 States on the 29th August, 1862? 
 
 A. Brigadier-general of volunteers, commanding the fii'St division, Sigel's 
 corps. 
 
 Q. Finally you left the service with what rank? 
 
 A. Major-general. I was proinoted to take effect August 30, 1862. 
 
 Q. In moving up to this position, did you have, in the morning of the 29th 
 August, any enemy in front of you ? 
 
 A. None that we felt. Throwing forward skirmishers and supposing the enemy 
 was present somewhere, pretty early in the day a force of the enemy was de- 
 veloped upon this ridge where there were a number of batteries placed to our 
 right ; that would be to the north of the turnpike road. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect passing that lane, Lewis lane No. 1? 
 
 A. I have a very indistinct impression of it. I have a remembrance floating 
 in my mind having crossed some road which was not the turnpike, but 1 don't 
 recall it distinctly. 
 
 Q. At what time of the day did you reach your farthest point in advance? 
 
 A. I think it must have been somewhere about the middle of the day ; perhaps 
 a little earlier than the middle of the day. 
 
 Q. Did you see General Reynolds's divisions during that day? 
 
 A. No; but I understood he was off on my left. 
 
 Q. Did you see General Reynolds himself during the morning or afternoon? 
 
 A. No; I think not. I don't recollect. 
 
 Q. How far did you get beyond the Gibbon wood, in which the wounded of 
 the night before were ? 
 
 A. I don't know that we got beyond the Gibbon wood. My remembrance is 
 that the farthest point we reached was somewhere about the west edge of the 
 Gibbon wood — that is, the wood in which Gibbon's troops were engaged the 
 night before. We found there his wounded and the evidence of the battle that 
 had taken place. 
 
 Q. Was anything done with these wounded that you found there? 
 
 A. I ordered all the men in that and the piece of woods this side of that, where 
 there were, I think, a few scattered, to be sent to the rear and taken care of. 1 
 don't know that that is the Gibbon wood ; I mean the wood farthest in advance 
 that I reached was the wood in which the engagement took place. My impres- 
 sion is we did not at any period go farther in that direction than to perhaps the 
 ■west edge of that wood. 
 
 Q. Look at the map. Which piece of timber is it that you consider to be the 
 Gibbon wood? * 
 
 A. r/iis I suppose to be the wood. [In which the word "Warrenton" ends; 
 marked " S " on the Landstreet map.] That, I suppose, is intended for the wood 
 in which Gibbon's engagement took place. 
 
 Q. How long did your division remain in that woods? 
 
 A. We must have been in that wood, altogether, two or three hours. 
 
 Q. Did you see any battery of the enemy while you wei'e in that position ? If 
 so, where was it? 
 
 A. There was a battery off" to our right somewhere which I recollect all the more 
 distinctly because it seemed to me to be detached from the general line of t he en- 
 emy, and I conceived the purpose of attempting to capture it, and sent one of my 
 staff over to reconnoiter with a view to see how it might be approached. But 
 about that time Milroy, who was engaged with the enemy off to my right, com- 
 municated with me, or General Sigel for him — I think the message came from 
 Milroy himself— begging assistance, and I detached Stahel's brigade to support 
 Milroy northeast of the pike, and then gave up the idea of attempting to capture 
 that battery. 
 Q. That battery was in the neighborhood of where? 
 
 A. It was on a hill on my right ; to the right of" the wood where Gibbon's fight 
 had taken place. It was upon elevated ground, and seemed to be the spur of a 
 hill. I thought we might by a sudden and decisive movement upon it capt ure it. 
 Q. Whil9 you were up in this position McLean's brigade, I understand, was on 
 the left. What was the position of Reynolds's division of Pennsylvania Reserves 
 as reported to you at that time in reference to your own position ? 
 A. I did not see them, but they were reported to me as being upon our left, and 
 
89 
 
 I may add that it was reported to me that they had stationed a battery somewhere 
 in advance of Gibbon's wood, I think Cooper's battery. 
 
 Q. In which direction was that battery operating ? 
 
 A. I did not see the battery. 
 
 Q. At what time did you quit with your division this Gibbon wood ? 
 
 A. I should think, to the best of ujy recollection, somewhere between 1 and 3 
 o'clock. I don't think I can be more positive tlian that. My recollection is that 
 it was some time after noon. 
 
 Q. To what point did you go then with your division? 
 
 A. In consequence of reports made to me in reference to the movements of 
 General Reynolds I thought it best for me to fall back, and I came into a strip 
 of woods which I supposed to be these [south of the syllable "ville" in "Gaines- 
 ville "]. I formed in line of battle near the west edge of that woods. There we 
 lay most of the afternoon. 
 
 Q. Up to what time ? 
 
 A. I can scarcely tell you. I should think at least until the middleof the after- 
 noon, perhaps later. I recollect withdrawingfrom thatpointfrom wood to wood 
 as we Iiad advanced. We found it quite late in tlie afternoon, or quite sunset, 
 by the time 1 reached my original position. The whole distance, 1 should think, 
 was about two miles from the point v^here westarted in the morning to the fur- 
 thest point to which we advanced. 
 
 Q. While you were in the Gibbon wood, what enemy, if any, did you see in 
 your immediate front? 
 
 A. I can not say that I saw any enemy in our immediate front. There were 
 skirmishers in that direction, and as my skirmishers were thrown forward we 
 would have an occasional shot, but there seemed to me at that time to be no 
 enemy in nay front, in my immediate front. The first intimation that I had that 
 the enemy in considerable force were upon our left was through Colonel Mc- 
 Lean, the commander of my second brigade, who told me that a messenger, or 
 staff ofhcer, or orderly, or some one from Reynolds, apparently with autliority, 
 had come to him, as he was in command of a brigade, and communicated the 
 fact thai the enemy M'ere upon our left, and I think was coupled with the in- 
 formation that Reynolds intended to fall back. I tried to communicate with 
 Reynolds again, but did not succeed, but I thought there was no occasion for im- 
 mediately falling back; but not finding any response from General Reynolds, I 
 concluded to withdraw slowly to at least a .short distance and then come across 
 an open space into the next wood (into a little strip marked S-), where I rested 
 the troops in line. 
 
 Q. While you were holding position in that little strip of woods do you know 
 whether or not the enemy obtained the possession of the Gibbon wood? 
 
 A. I am satisfied that they were not there in any force; they had their skir- 
 mishers thrown forward as I had men toward the Gibbon wood, and there were 
 occasional shots tired with or without good cause for them, but there was no 
 movement in force, nor ^vas there indicated to me any presence of an enemy 
 in force. 
 
 Q. Can you fix with any degree of relative certainty the time in th-e afternoon 
 when you quit the little fringe of woods marked "S-"; whether it was 2, or 3, 
 or 4, or 5, or 6 o'clock ? 
 
 A. The days in August are pretty long. I should say it w^as at least the mid- 
 dle of the afternoon, or probably later. I reached my conclusion from measur- 
 ing it by the movement forward and the gradual withdrawal of the troops. I 
 should think it was after the middle of the afternoon. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF GENERAL S. D. STURGIS. 
 
 General S. D. Sturgis te.stifies that he moved on the Gainesville road 
 August 29, 1862, with his commaoid. (Board record, page 711.) 
 
 Q. Yo>i say you went a mile and a half beyond Bethlehem Church toward 
 Gainesville? 
 
 A. That is my recollection. 
 
 Q. What did you then do? 
 
 A. I reported to General Porter. I rode in advance of my brigade. I foiind 
 troops occupying the road, and I got upas near as I could get and then halted my 
 command, and then rode forward to tell General Porter that they were there. 
 He said, " For the present let them lie there." 
 
 Q. What did you do then individually? 
 
 A. Well, I simply looked about to see what I could see. I was a stranger to 
 the lay of the land, and the troops, and all that ; so without getting off my horse 
 I rode about from place to place watching the skirmishers, and among other 
 things I took a glass and looked in the direction of the woods; about a mile be- 
 yond which seemed to be the object of attention— beyond the skirmishers; 
 there I saw a glint of light on a gun ; and I remarked to General Porter that I 
 thought they were probably putting a battery in position at that place, for I 
 thought 1 had seen a gun. 
 
 Q. State what the conversation was. 
 
 A. I reported this fact of what I had seen to the general ; he thought I was mis- 
 
90 
 
 taken about it, but I was not mistaken, because it opened in a moment — at least 
 a few shots were flred from tliat place — four, as I recollect. 
 
 Q. What force of the enemy did you see in that direction at that time? 
 
 A. I didn't see any of the enemy at all. 
 
 Q. Then what did you do? 
 
 A. Then when they had fired, as near as I can recollect, about four shots from 
 this piece. General Porter beckoned to nie ; I rode up to him and he directed me 
 to take my command to IManassas Junction, and take up a defensive position, 
 inasmuch as the firinj^ seemed to be receding on our right. 
 
 Q. What firing do you mean ? 
 
 A. 1 mean the cannonading that had been goingon forsome time on our right, 
 probably in the dh-ection of (iroveton. 
 
 Q. How long hud you heard that cannonading? 
 
 A. I don't recollect exactly where I heard it first. My impression has been 
 that 1 heard it all along the march from Manasses to General Porter's position. 
 I do not recollect distinctly that I did hear it, but I know I heard it all the time 
 after I arrived there until I left. 
 
 Q. What time of day was this that you j-eceived the order to niove back with 
 your comiuand to Manassas Jimotion? 
 
 A. 1 have no way of fixing the time of day. I have carried in my mind the 
 impression that it was more about the middle of the day — about 1 o'clock. 
 
 Q. What did you do when you received that order? 
 
 A. I sent word to General Piatt to move back to Manassas Junction, and that 
 I would join him there. 
 
 Q. Do you know whether your order was obeyed? 
 
 A. Yes; it was obeyed. 
 
 EVIDEN'CE OF MARK J. BUNNELL. 
 
 Mark J. Bunnell, on page 678 of the board record, says : 
 
 I called to an orderly and .stated to him what I wanted. He called Colonel 
 Marshall, and they came down within a few paces of where I was, and Colonel 
 Marshall then received his orders to deploy his regiment as skirmishers in front. 
 
 Q. Did you hear the order? 
 
 A. I stood right there so I could hear. 
 
 Q. What were the orders that General Porter gave Colonel Marshall. 
 
 A. I could not hear all the conversation, but to deploy his regiment as skir- 
 mishers, as we were about ready to move out ; not to bring on a general engage- 
 ment, but the idea was that we had to do duty only as skirmishers. 
 
 CAPT. A. P. martin's TESTIMONY. 
 
 Capt. A. P. Martin, commanding the artillery of Morell's division on 
 the 29th of August, swears as follows : 
 Examination by the Court : 
 
 Q; Do you know of any order having been given by General Porter to make 
 an attack upon the enemy during that day ? 
 
 A. I did not. 1 received orders from him to put the batteries in position. 
 
 Q. How long did the artillery firing continue? 
 
 A. The firing of the first section of the enemy's battery that opened from the 
 woods in front continued perhaps twenty minutes; they fired very slowly. An 
 hoiir later, perhaps, there was a battery opened further to our right, and they 
 were engaged by Ilazlett's battery of Morell's division. 
 
 Q. At what distance from each other were these batteries that were engaged? 
 
 A. I should think not over a thousand yards; it might have been a thousand 
 or one thousand two hundred yards. 
 
 Q. Do you know whether any effect was produced on either side by this artil- 
 lery fire? 
 
 A. They were in the ^voods, and we could not see, except that the first battery 
 that was opened was silenced, I should think, in about twenty minutes or half an 
 hour. 
 
 Q. Was there any loss on our side ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir; one man was killed by the first shot that the enemy fired. I saw 
 him fall. 
 
 Q. On which side of the Manassas Gap Railroad, north or south, were the ene- 
 my's l)atteries that you were then engaging? 
 
 A. They were on "the side toward us — the south side, I suppose. 
 
 The examination of this witness was here closed. 
 
 J. J. coppinger sworn. 
 J. J. Coppinger, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, testifies as 
 follows: 
 
 Direct examination : 
 Q. State your rank and station. 
 A. Captain Twenty-third Infantry, and brevet colonel. 
 
91 
 
 Q. What rank did you hold in the month of August, 1802 ? 
 
 A. Captain Fourteenth Infantry. 
 
 Q. In whose brigade, division, and corps were you during that month? 
 
 A. The first regular brigade, Sykes's division, Porter's corps. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect being at Fredericksburg in that month? 
 
 A. Yes; at or near Fredericksburg. 
 
 Q. Where did you move to from there? 
 
 A. We moved in a general direction toward Bealeton on the line of the rail- 
 road from Eappahaunock Junction to Alexandria. 
 
 Q. AVliat sort of a march did you make in going up there to that point? 
 
 A. The first afternoon we made a long march ; we made good time. I could 
 not give the distance in miles. Thenextmorning we marched early a few miles, 
 and to the best of my recollection countermarched, and were placed in line of 
 battle at a short distance from the camp which we had left. After that our 
 marches seemed rather spasmodic until we got to the railroad. 
 
 Q. Near what jjoint, or at what point? 
 
 A. Until we got near Bealeton, on the railroad. I do not recollect whether w^e 
 actually struck the track at Bealeton or Warrenton Junction, but we were near 
 the railroad at Bealeton, and on it to Warrenton Junction. 
 
 Q. Were you in Warreton Junction on the 27th of August, 1862? 
 
 A. On or about, but I can not swear to the date. 
 
 Q. Then you left there to go to what point? 
 
 A. March along the line of the railroad toward Manassas Junction. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect at what time of day you left Warrenton Junction to go in 
 the direction of Manassas Junction? 
 
 A. I cannot. My watch, I think, was broken, and I was very badly wounded 
 a few hours after ; so I do not recollect. I cannot give you the hours. 
 
 Q. You came to a halt for the night at what place? 
 
 A. Near Bristoe Station. 
 
 Q. At what time of day did you arrive at Bristoe Station ? 
 
 A. Early in the day ; I cannot give the hour. The reason I say early in the day 
 is that I recollect passing a good partof the evening •with Smead, of the artillery, 
 who was killed a few hours after. 
 
 Q. The next morning you marched for what place? 
 
 A. Manassas Junction. 
 
 Q. From there, what direction did you take? 
 
 A. Toward Gainesville. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect a place named Bethlehem church? 
 
 A. I have an indistinct recollection of a small church on the leftof the road. 
 
 Q. You went out on that road ; do you recall any incident connected with that 
 march out on the road toward Gainesville? 
 
 A. Do you mean the passage of other tryops? 
 
 Q. You went out on that road; when did you receive a command to halt? 
 
 A. When, I think, about two shots close to the edge of a wood^two shots, I 
 think, were lired ; just about that moment our command halted. 
 
 Q. From what direction? 
 
 A. Front and right. 
 
 Q. Then what did your regiment and brigade do? 
 
 A. Halted, and were ordered to face about. 
 
 Q. Then what? 
 
 A. We were marched to the rear in column of fours. 
 
 Q. To what point ? 
 
 A. I can not give you the point; but the next point I recollect is being on a side 
 road which leads o&" toward the battlefield of Bull Run. Perhaps it would be 
 better if I were to say that'my memory of that battlefield — I was left on the field 
 between the lines, senseless, until the next day, and my memory of both those 
 days is somewhat spasmodic. Some things I .see as clearly as anybody I see in 
 this room; and there are intervals of which I have a very poor recollection. 
 Now, between the time of our being marched liere and our being halted. I don't 
 recollect. [Witness indicates points on the map.] 
 
 Q. As to this point of fact — these shots being fired, and you countermarched to 
 the rear — how .soon after the shots were fired was the order for you to move to the 
 rear? 
 
 A. I think almost immediately. 
 
 Q. Do you recall with any certainty how long or how far you marched to the 
 rear? 
 
 A. We marched quite a distance to the rear, I think from one to two miles, if 
 not more ; but 1 am almost certain that the command was " Halt; about face," 
 and within three minutesi think, and perhaps a shorter time, we were in motion 
 to the rear. 
 
 Q. During that day did you move to the front again ; if so, when? 
 
 A. We were moved on a cross-road, which led us the next day to the battlefield. 
 [AVitncss indicates in the direction of the Sudley Springs road.] 
 
 Q. When did you say you made that move at the cross-road ? 
 
 A. I can not give the time. 
 
 Q. Some time that day'.' 
 
92 
 
 A. In the afternoon. 
 
 Q. Did you encamp there, or did you go back again? 
 
 A. We passed the night there ; stacked arms, and I think lay down by our 
 arms. 
 
 Cross-examination by Mr. Bullitt : 
 
 Q. You were then a captain ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Of what company ? 
 
 A. Company A, second battalion. Fourteenth Infantry. 
 
 Q. Who was the commander of your regiment? 
 
 A. General Stone was the colonel. Our battalion w^as that day commanded by 
 Captain McKibbon, who was wounded the next day. The senior officer on the 
 ground was Captain O'Connor, who was also wounded the next day. 
 
 Q. What brigade? 
 
 A. The first regular brigade, temporarily commanded by Colonel Buchanan. 
 
 The examination of this witness was here clo.sed. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF CAPTAIN GECKE. 
 
 Captain Gecke testified as follows (board's record, page 6683: 
 Right before me was a piece of wood and an open corn-field between me and 
 the woods. I remained and deployed my skirmish line outside of the ditch 
 there. At the same time when I came there I saw skirmishers, dismounted 
 cavalry, )narching before me in that corn-field. My men fired at them and they 
 fired over to us. Then they went back into the woods and I gave the command 
 to cease firing. Then the adjutant of the regiment came up between 4 and 5 
 o'clock with an order tothecommandingoflicerof theskirmish line. I stepped 
 up, and he said I should find out immediately what was going on in the corner 
 of the woods; so I took a sergeant and a file of men and went up there ; and 
 the sergeant went ahead and looked in that direction, and then Ave came down 
 and reported to the adjutant that the enemy has been marching out of the 
 woods, and that they were moving cannon and ammunition-wagons to form 
 their proper companies, and turning to tlie left. A little while after this I heard 
 a few shots fired over in that direction. 
 
 Q. When you went out with the skirmishers and deployed your men, what 
 orders did you have? 
 
 A, I had no special order except to see what was going on. I saw no line 
 formed on the left; no line formed on the right. 
 
 Q. When did you first observe the enemy coming down on your front? 
 
 A. That was about 4 o'clock. 
 
 Q. Up to that time what indications were there of an enemy in your front ? 
 
 A. I should say I saw a few of a skirmish line moving through the corn-field 
 into the other side of the wood. 
 
 Q. During that day did you see any artillery firing? 
 
 A. I heard artillery firing. 
 
 Q. In what direction did you hear it? 
 
 A. The fire of artillery that forenoon I heard on the front of us; in the after- 
 noon on our right. 
 
 Q. What was the character of that artillery firing that you heard ? 
 
 A. Itcommenced at 5 o'clock in the morning; then it was in the far distance. 
 Then about 11 or 12 o'clock we heard it better ; we heard heavier firing. Then 
 between land 2 o'clock there was no firing whatever. Then from about 3 o'clock 
 and afterward there was heavy artillery firing- and musket firing up to mo.st 9 
 o'clock at night and yelling by the enemy and cheering by the Union men. We 
 heard that off on om- right. 
 
 Q. Did you at any time during that afternoon undertake to feel the enemy 
 and find out what their strength was? 
 
 A. No; I only carried out the order I had. 
 
 Q. About what time in the day would j'ou say you moved across Dawkin's 
 Branch to go forward with your skirmishers? 
 
 A. About 3 o'clock. 
 
 Q. Did you know the position of the enemy after you got up on the skirmish 
 line? 
 
 A. No; I didn't see no other part of the troops except this dismounted cavalry. 
 ******* 
 
 Q. This yelling and cheering that you heard by the enemy and the Union 
 troops — was that before or after you moved your skirmish line across Dawkin's 
 Branch? 
 
 A. Afterward. 
 
 Q,. How long after? 
 
 A. That commenced about 5 o'clock or half past 5, and kept on until dark- 
 ness. 
 
 Q. The yelling and cheering that you heard was between 5 o'clock and sun- 
 down ? 
 
93 
 
 The coufederate Genenil R. E. Lee's official report of that aetion says 
 that the battle continued until 9 o'clock at night (board's record, page 
 
 520). 
 
 A. Up to U o'clock at night. 
 
 Q. Did you make any report of that to anybody? 
 
 A. No. 
 
 Q. Do yuii mean to say that you did not send any message to Colonel Marshall 
 at all that day ? 
 
 A. No ; except this one, because I was not so far ofl'from them. They could hear 
 all these things going on themselves. 
 
 Q. Then you could hear, and he could hear? 
 
 A. Heoouhl hearthe liring. It took me about ten minutes, more or less, to get 
 there from my position back. 
 
 SERGT. FERDINAND MOHLE'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 Sergt. Ferdinand Mohle, Thirteenth New York Volunteers (board's 
 record, page ()"()), a Government witness, has stated as follows as to his 
 position to the front: 
 
 A. I think we staid as skirmishers up toward night, and then we were w^ith- 
 drawn on to a hill. It is kind of rolling country here. I think it was hoUow^ 
 along that way and then it raised again. 
 
 Q. What did you see while you were on the skirmish line so far as the enemy 
 was concerned ? 
 
 A. Siiw a couple of rebel pickets in front of us. 
 
 Q. Infantry or cavalry ? 
 
 A. I could not say exactly ; I guess it was dismounted cavalry. 
 
 Q. What other indications of an enemy did you see during the day; what 
 enemy did you see in front of j'ou ? 
 
 A. 1 saw no enemy where I stood. I have just said it was a kind of hollow 
 place wliere we went through and we could not see many of the enemy except 
 a line of pickets; they were not very active. We exchanged a couple of shots, 
 and I recollect a couple of cannon shots flew right over our line and came, I 
 gues.s, fi-om our rear — our own men — two or three shots. 
 
 Q. Was there any cannonading going on then? 
 
 A. There was. 
 
 Q. Where was that? 
 
 A. That was to our right. 
 
 Q. What was the character of it? 
 
 A. It was heavier toward evening than the time we went up there. We heard 
 the noi.se more in the evening — the noise of artillery and cheering — than when 
 we lirst came up there. But still liring was going on. 
 
 Q. When did the enemy come down in force on your front that cPay where you 
 were ? 
 
 A. What do j'ou mean by- the enemy ; the line of pickets? 
 
 Q.. Yes, or heavy force ; did you see any heavier force in front of you ? 
 
 A. I could not see any heavy force; 1 could hear more. I could liear moving. 
 I did not know whether it was artillery or cavalry, but I heard some words, some 
 commands. 
 
 Q. How late in the day was that? 
 
 A. It was in the evening; toward night, I guess. 
 
 Q. When you went out there on that line did you hear tho.se commands and 
 movements? 
 
 A. I can not remember; I did not hear any command at that time; buttherewas 
 ac<.>u|)le of shots exchanged betweenthe pickets; and finally, I think, the rebel 
 pickets went back a little, and word was brought to cease liring. 
 
 Q. Could you hear any musketry firing in the afternoon where you were, and 
 infantry firing? 
 
 A. Yes, I could hear that. 
 
 Q. How long in the afternoon did you hear infantry firing. 
 
 A. ] can not tell exactly when it commenced, but I could hear cannon firing 
 when we were marching up there. 
 
 Q. A fter you got up there was there any cannon firing? 
 
 A. There was cannon firing at intervals; it ceased sometimes, and toward 
 niglit it went on pretty heavy. 
 
 Q. Any musketry firing in the afternooti to your front or right? 
 
 A. I think there was musketry firing, but we could not hear it so plain as in the 
 evening. 
 
 Q. About what time did you hear this cheering which you speak of? 
 
 A. About sunset. 
 
 CAPT. JOHN S. hatch's TESTIMONY. 
 
 Capt. John S. Hatch, First Michigan "Volunteers, Martindale's bri- 
 gade, Morell's division, a witness for the Government, testifies as fol- 
 
94 
 
 lows (board record, page 600) as to what transpired at the front, near 
 Dawkin's Branch, on the 29th August: 
 
 Q. Tell what you saw when yoii got there at that point. 
 
 A. When we turned off into the woods we were preparing to go into action, as 
 I supposed. I think the pieces were loaded. Caps were let ofi' the guns, and 
 cartridges examined and cartridge-boxes, and .some such things as that. We re- 
 mained in the woods a little time, and then we moved ofl" to an eminence where 
 wo couhl look oil' into tlie depression or ravine ; and then the Thirteenth New 
 York was thrown out as skirmishers. 
 
 Q. How long had this been after you had arrived at that pointbefore the Thir- 
 trcuth was thrown in? 
 
 A. It is my impression that we were loading piecesand preparing, as we sup- 
 ))Osed, to go into action. I recollect we were talking of it together ; that it was 
 about noon. I do not recollect looking at a watch. It was about 12 o'clock, I 
 should say ; not far from that any way. 
 
 Q. That the Thirteenth were thrown out? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. You remained there during the day? 
 
 A. Remained there all that day. 
 
 Q. After the Thirteenth were thrown out what did you see? 
 
 A. ^Ve came out of those wood, I guess, almost entirely, so that w^e could see 
 the Thirteenth New York maneuver, and see the ravine and woods on beyond. 
 I think our arms were stacked— our brigade. We lay there and .saw the Thir- 
 teenth New York moving ; they kept moving on until they met with some little 
 check on the other side; there were some shots fired; then, sometime after that, 
 a solid shot came over. General Porter was there with his staff. I do not know 
 whether there were any other generals there or not. There was a little scatter- 
 ing there and a little commotion all around, until pretty soon another one came 
 over, and there was a piece run out of the woods where the Thirteenth NewYork 
 had met with some opposition from the infantry; there was another shot tired 
 soon after that, and we suppose<lthe work was commencing. There were three 
 shots, I think, or four shots lired. We supposed that they were firing at General 
 Porter and his staff, because they were mounted and conspicuous. 
 
 Q. Then what was done? 
 
 A. There was nothing done by us during that afternoon. We were lying there 
 at ease until early in the evening, when our brigade, a portion of it — my regiment 
 at least^ — was thrown out. you might say, as skirmishers. We were thrown out 
 to guard against a surprise that night — thrown outtotherightof where the New 
 York Thirteenth went down. 
 
 Q. How long did you remain there? 
 
 A. Two hours ; about that. 
 
 Q. What indications, if any, did you observe of the presence of the enemy 
 din-ing the day? 
 
 A. We saw lighting going on on our right and front. 
 
 Q. What kind of a contest was it? 
 
 A. There was heavy artillery firing. 
 
 Q. How long did that continue? 
 
 A. From the time we came out on to that eminence, out of the woods; there 
 was firing all the afternoon, but not continuous; there was at times heavy firing, 
 rapid firing. 
 
 Q. From the character of the firing what were the indications? 
 
 A. It was heavy — artillery fire. 
 
 Q. I understand you to say that you could see the action going on? 
 
 A. I could not see the troops that I recollect. I do not think I could, but the 
 smoke and the bursting of the shells could be seen, and we could hear the sound 
 of the artillery and see the lines of smoke ; towards evening we heard mus- 
 ketry firing. 
 
 Q. How long was it after the Thirteenth New York went out before you saw 
 that gun run out that yon speak of? 
 
 A. They had time to get down three-quarters of a mile or more — perhaps half 
 an hovn-. 
 
 Q. During the day what enemy did you see in your front besides what you 
 have mentioned at that time? 
 
 A. Saw a line of dust on the left making toward Jackson, who we under- 
 stood was opposing our forces. 
 
 Q. At the time? 
 
 A. At the time. ^ 
 
 Q. Did you see any enemy directly in your front? 
 
 A. These woods were there ; nothing more than artillery. There were infan- 
 try oppo.sed to the Thirteentli New York. 
 
 "Q. How long did they remain there, artillery and infantry? 
 
 A. I do not know that; they did not remain all tlie afternoon. 
 
 Q. Had no more artillery firing from them ? 
 
 A. The artillery ; three or four shots was all that bothered us. 
 
95 
 
 Cross-examination by Mr. Btjllitt : 
 
 Q. What time was it, in the afternoon or toward evening, that you lieard that 
 musketry firing? 
 
 A. Tlie day was well advanced. 
 
 Q. Five or 6 o'clock in the evening? 
 
 A. I should judge so; before sundo'wn some timi'. 
 
 Q. Wliat you had heard, prior to that time, was ;ill artillery firing? 
 
 A. I do not recollect any musketry firing until toward sundown; perhaps the 
 sun was an hour or two high. 
 
 Q. What time was it that you were sent on that picket-line? 
 
 A. The Thirteenth New York was sent out, and 1 was in the same brigade with 
 them. As I say, we were preparing for action in the woods about 12 o'clock, I 
 should think. 
 
 MAJ. GEN. ROBERT C. BUCHANAN'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 The late Bvt. Maj . Gen. Robert C. Buislianan, United States Army, re- 
 tired, called by petitioner (board record, page 215), testifies as to the 
 movements of the brigade he commanded in Brigadier-General Sykes's 
 division after they left Manasses Junction, on the 29th, as follows: 
 
 Q. Which way did you move then? 
 
 A. We had been moving by the right flank ; we then moved by the left flank ; 
 we moved down by the road which takes us near a church, which I have since 
 heard called Bethlehem church, in the direction of Gainesville. 
 
 Q. Where did you halt then? 
 
 A. Near that church and in advance of it. 
 
 Q. In what position were your troops then ? 
 
 A. At that time directly on the road. 
 
 Q. How were you formed when you halted there? 
 
 A. We were formed in line of battle immediately after we halted. 
 
 Q. How long did you remain in tliat position ? 
 
 A. I can not tell you. 
 
 Q. During the balance of the day, I mean. 
 
 A. We did not leave that ground that day except under various instructions 
 that we got to countermarch ; from time to time we countermarched, of course 
 on the same ground. 
 
 Q. You did not leave that ground ? 
 
 A. No; except toward night we changed our direction, I think on to a little 
 road that led us off to the turnpike. 
 
 Q. Practically, you remained in that position during that day? 
 
 A. During that day. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect any stacking of arms ? 
 
 A. Yes; they stacked arms from time to time. 
 
 Q. When you did that what position was your line in — still in line of battle? 
 
 A. Always; always ready. 
 
 EDMUND SCHRIVER'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 Edmund Schriver, called by the recorder, being duly sworn, testi- 
 fied as follows: 
 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Q. State your rank in the Army. 
 
 A. Inspector-general and brevet major-general. 
 
 Q. What position did you hold on the 29th of August, 1862? 
 
 A. I was then on General McDowell's stafi", when he commanded the Third 
 Corps of the Army of Virginia. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect being with him on the 29th of August, at the head of Gen- 
 eral Porter's column in the neighborhood of Dawkin's Branch ? 
 
 A. I do. 
 
 Q. Where did you go then? 
 
 A. Went out to the right with the generals, -whose object was, I believe, to 
 make some observations, and then returned to the place whence we started. 
 
 Q. Where did General McDowell leave you, or did he not leave you? 
 
 A. He left somewhere to the east or to his right looking out toward the railroad, 
 my recollection is. 
 
 Q. Which direction did he take when he left? 
 
 A. I think he went in a southerly direction, off to where his divisions were. 
 
 Q. Did you go with him? 
 
 A. No. 
 
 Q. Which direction did you take? 
 
 A. I came a little to the left and went by General Porter's headquarters, and 
 then came down, if I recollect rightly, the road General McDowell went, through 
 the woods ; I did not go with him. 
 
 Q. You went down the Gainesville road then ? 
 
 A. Yes. sir. 
 
96 
 
 Q. Did you go back with General Porter, or did you follow him? 
 
 A. I really can not recollect that: I know we met again. 
 
 Q. What transpired at that time when you met him there? 
 
 A. I had a little conversation; I can not exactly recollect what it was, except 
 the general said or expressed the belief that he miglit become engaged with the 
 enemy, and that he had no cavalrymen ; he either tlien proiJt)sed, or I proposed, 
 or at any rate the arrangement was made, that he should have half of General 
 McDowell's escort that was with me; it was turned over, and I left. He wanted 
 them to send messages. 
 
 Q. At that time where were the enemy? 
 
 A. I am sure I do not know. 
 
 COL. JOHN S. MOSBY'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 John S. Mosby, formerly colonel of Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart's staff, 
 testified as follows (board record, page 887) : 
 
 Q. When did that battle begin on the 29th — what time of day ? 
 
 A. Pretty early on the morning of the 29th there was heavy fighting. 
 
 Q. How long did that continue? 
 
 A. My recollection is that there was heavy fighting during most of the day. 
 Early in the morning I suppose I was about the rear of the center of Jackson's 
 line, and I suppose about 8, or 9, or 10 o'clock there came a report that our left 
 flank had been turned, over in the direction of Sudley ; I went over there with 
 the First Virginia Cavalry, according to my recollection; for the purpose of 
 checking that, and we were there the whole of the day. 
 
 Q. What of the action could you see and hear? Describe all that you recall of 
 that action. 
 
 A. We could not see the fighting. I was with this cavalry, and I suppose we 
 were half a mile, or part of the time ^vithin a mile of it. in the morning this 
 regiment that I got with I suppose was not half a mile in the rear of Jack.son's 
 line; but when the report came that tlie Federal cavalry was over on Jackson's 
 left, and there was danger of their capturing his wagons and ambulances that 
 were in the rear of Sudley church, this cavalry was sent over there to protect 
 Jackson's left, and I went with it. 
 
 ***** * * 
 
 Q. Do you know what the losses of Jackson were in that action ? 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 Q. From 12 o'clock noon up to 3 o'clock in the afternoon, do you recollect the 
 character of the fighting as far as you could judge from the sound ■.' 
 
 A. My general recollection of it is that most of the day there was heavy fight- 
 ing. I cannot particularize. 
 
 Q. Musketry and artillery? 
 
 A. Musketry and artillery. 
 
 LIEUT. COL. THOMAS C. H. SMITH'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 Attention is also called to evidence of Lieut. Col. T. C. H. Smith, 
 afterward brigadier-general, as follows: 
 By the Judge- Advocate : 
 
 Q. Will you state in what capacity you were serving in the Army of Virginia 
 in its late campaign under General Pope in August last? 
 
 A. I was aid-de-camp on the staff of General Pope. 
 
 Q. Did you, or not, on the 28th or 29th of August, carry any ordersfrom Major- 
 CJeneral Pope to Major-General Porter whicli concerned hismovemenlson those 
 davs ? 
 
 A. I did not. 
 
 Q. Didyou,or not, see GeneralPorter during either of the days of the 27th, 28th, 
 and 29th of August? 
 
 A. I saw (ieneral Porter on the afternoon of the 2Sth. 
 
 Q. At what place and under what circumstances did you see him? 
 
 A. I had been sent backtotheammmution on the train at Bristoeand charged 
 with its distribution. General Porter wished over four hundred thousand 
 rounds; General Hooker something over ninety thousand rounds. About 2 or 
 3 o'clock I had sent forward to General Porter some three hundred and twenty 
 thousand rounds, and had seized wagons to forward the balance, and left Cap- 
 tain Piatt in charge. Tlie business being tlien sulliciently forward, I went on to 
 find General Pope. On getting to the point where I had left General Pope in 
 the morning, I found he had moved on, and, to inquire the road he had taken, 
 I went to General Porter's headquarters, near the Manassas water statit)n. I 
 found General Porter in his tent, and asked him which road General Pope had 
 taken, and he informed me. I had some ten minutes' conversation witii him. 
 One of his staff was present ; I forget his name. 
 
 Q. Will you state that conversation ? 
 
 A. After asking him about the road, I told General Porter the amount of am- 
 munition that I had sent forward to him, and also that the balance would come 
 
97 
 
 immediately forward. I asked him if he had received it, or made some remark ; 
 I can not remember the exact expression. General Porter said that he had not; 
 that was the substance of his reply— either that he had received hardly any of it, 
 or none of it, if I remember aright. I expressed some surprise, and said that it had 
 been sent forward to the front as ordered ; and , either in reply to some question of 
 mine or to some remark, or of himself , he said that he had no officers to take charge 
 of it and distribute it, or to look it up, or something of that kind. 1 remarked 
 that he could hardly expect us at headquarters to be able to send officers to distri- 
 bute it in his cori>s ; that it had been sent forward on the road in the direction 
 where his corps was. He replied that it was gone where it belonged ; that it 
 was on the road to Alexandria, where we were all going. I do not know as it 
 is evidence to give the spirit in which this was said— the way it impressed me. 
 Those remarks were made in a sneering manner, and appeared to me to express 
 a great indifference. There was then a pause for a moment. General Porter then 
 spoke in regard to the removal of the sick and wounded from the field of Kettle 
 Kun. He said it would hurt Pope, leaving the wounded behind. I told him that 
 they were not to be left behind ; that I knew that a positive order— an impera- 
 tive order— had been given to General Banks to bring all the wounded with hirii, 
 and for that purpose to throw property out of the wagons if necessary. To this 
 General Porter made no reply in words; but his manner to me expressed the 
 same feeling that I had noticed before. This conversation, from General Porter's 
 manner and look, made a strong impression on my mind. I left him, as I have 
 said, after an interview of about ten minutes, and rode on, arriving at our head- 
 quarters on Bull Run just as we entered them and pitched our tents for the night. 
 After my tent was pitched, and I had had something to eat, I went over to Gen- 
 eral Pope and reported to him briefly what I had done in regard to the ammu- 
 nition. I then said to him, "General, I saw General Porter on my way here." 
 Said he, "Well, sir?" I said, "General, he will fail you." " Fail me?" said he ; 
 " what do you mean? What did he say? " Said I, " It is not so much what he 
 said, though he said enough ; he is going to fail you." These exi^ressions I re- 
 peat. I think I remember them with exactness, for I was excited at the time 
 from the impression that had been made upon me. Said General Pope, " How 
 can he fail me? He will fight where I put him ; he will fight where I put him ;" 
 or, " He must fight where I put him ; he must fight where I put him " — one of 
 those expressions. This General Pope said with a great deal of feeling, and irn- 
 petuously, and perhaps overbearingly, and in an excited manner. I replied in 
 the same way, saying that I was certain that Fitz-John Porter was a traitor ; that 
 I would shoot him that night, so far as any crime before God was concerned, if 
 the law would allow me to do it. I speak of this to show the conviction that I 
 received from General Porter's manner and expressions in that interview. I 
 have only to add that my prepossessions of him were favorable, as it was at head- 
 quarters up to that time. I never had entertained any impressions against him 
 until that conversation. I knew nothing with regard to his orders to move up 
 to Kettle Run. I knew nothing of any failure on his part to comply with any 
 orders. 
 
 Q. State more distinctly the point where you saw General Porter on the 28th 
 of August? 
 
 A. He was encamped at the Manassas water station, between Bristoe and the 
 junction. The water station was a short distance from his headquarters. [The 
 witness indicated upon the map before the court where he thought the place to 
 be.] I do not think the water station is more than one-third the distance from 
 Bristoe to Manassas Junction. That is my impression ; I can not speak posi- 
 tively about it. 
 
 Q. In the conversation to which you refer, did or did not General Porter man- 
 ifest any anxiety to get possession of, and have distributed in his corps, the 
 ammunition of which you speak? 
 
 A. No, sir ; I thought he showed an utter indifference upon the subject ; showed 
 it very plainly. 
 
 Q. At what hour of the day did this conversation between you and General 
 Porter take place ? 
 
 A. I think it must have been about 4 o'clock in the afternoon ; half past 3 or 
 4 o'clock. 
 
 Q. In anything that was said in that conversation , or in the manner of General 
 Porter, wasthere evidenced any desire or any willingness on his part to support 
 General Pope in tlie military operations in which he was then engaged? 
 
 A. Quite the contrary to that. ^ 
 
 Q. Can you state whether the disinclination to support General Po^^ which 
 you thought he manifested, was the result of disgust with the imme(^Re serv- 
 ice in which he was then engaged, or of hostility to the commanding ^meral, or 
 upon what did it seem to rest? 
 
 A. It seemed to me to rest on hostility. But I do not know that I could ana- 
 lyze the impression that was made upon me. I conveyed it to General Pope in 
 the words that I have stated. I had one of those clear convictions that a man 
 has a few times perhaps in his life as to the character and purposes of a person 
 whom he sees for the first time. No man can express altogether how such an 
 impression is gained from looks and manner, but it is clear. 
 Lo 7 
 
98 
 
 Q. Had you passed over the road between Bristoe Station and Warrenton 
 Junction on that day or on the previous day? 
 
 A. On the previous day, the 27th, I came over it after General Pope. 
 
 Q. At what hour of the day did you pass over it? 
 
 A. I should say that I left our headquarters, about a mile from Warreuton 
 Junction, about half past 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon. I should say it was 
 past the middle of the afternoon. 
 
 Q. What was the condition of the roads then ? 
 
 A. For the first mile and a half, until you got to Cedar Run, the road was bor- 
 dered on either side by open fields or open woods, over which troops could march 
 easily, in great part without going on the road. Indeed, I doubt whether there is 
 any regular road a good part of the way up. The troops marched through the 
 fields to Bristoe Station. 
 
 Q. Were you or not present at the battle of the 29th of August ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir ; I was present. 
 
 Q. Throughout the engagement? 
 
 A. I left with General Pope when he rode on to the field, but on the way out 
 he sent me with an order off the road, so that I did not get on the field for two 
 or three hours after that. 
 
 Q. At what time did you regard the battle as commencing ? 
 
 A. The smoke was rising over a considerable portion of ground, I should say a 
 mile, plainly in view, when we were at Centreville ; and there was some heavy 
 cannonading. I should say it was about 10 or 11 o'clock when I first came to 
 Centreville, and it was about 11 or 12 o'clock when I saw the appearance of which 
 I speak— the sign of a heavy action, from the smoke rising. Itwas very plainly 
 in view from Centreville; you looked riglit down upon it, and you could hear 
 thesoundof the guns. I did not ride up to the town at first, but finding thatGen- 
 eral Pope had not ridden on, as I had supposed,! rode back to Centreville, and 
 then it was I saw the appearance I speak of, about 11 or 12 o'clock. I should 
 mention, too, in order that it maybe clearly understood in regard to the action, 
 that at the time I was sent off from the road, while General Pope was riding on 
 the field there was a cessation of cannon-firing for a considerable time, I should 
 say for certainly a half an hour. 
 
 Q. Was or was not the battle raging at 5 p. m. on that day? 
 
 A. Yes, sir ; severely. 
 
 WILLIAM L. FAXON TESTIFIES. 
 
 William L. Faxon testifies as follows (board record, page 844): 
 
 Q. State vour occupation? 
 
 A. Superintendent National Sailors' Home, Quincy, Mass. 
 
 Q. Were you in the military service of the United States on the 29th of August, 
 18G2 ; if so, in what capacity ? 
 
 A. I was assistant surgeon of the Thirty-second Massachusetts from the 2d of 
 June, 1862, until along in August, 1863. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Q. Where were you on the night of the 27th? 
 
 A. In camp at Warrenton Junction. 
 
 Q. In whose brigade and division? 
 
 A. I was in the second brigade, first division. Fifth Corps, Morell commanding 
 division, and General Griffin commanding the brigade. 
 
 Q. At what time did you leave Warrenton Junction, and what direction did 
 your regiment take? 
 
 A. The bugle sounded for an early start, and it was quite dark. We got out 
 just before daylight, and my brigade lay outside of the wood in which we camped 
 until the sun was pretty high. 
 
 Q. What direction did you take from there? 
 
 A. We marched off a little to the left of the wood and crossed a little run, and 
 went up to Catlett's, and from there to Bristoe ; followed the general direction 
 of the Orange and Alexandria Railroad. 
 
 Q. At what time did you arrive at Bristoe Station with your regiment? 
 
 A. I judge about the middle of the afternoon. 
 
 Q. During that time did you see General Porter? 
 
 A. I saw General Porter only as I crossed the run at Bristoe. 
 
 Q. Where was he at that time? 
 
 A. He was at a little house on the left hand of where I crossed ; that is, on the 
 side toward Washington. He and his staff were at a little house ; I think it was 
 n kind of peach orchard ; I think most of them were sitting down. 
 
 Q. Describe what you saw and heard, so far as General Porter was concerned. 
 
 A. As I crossed the run I heard General Porter make this remark : " Go tell 
 Morell to halt his division;" and he added, " I don't care a damn if we don't get 
 there." I am very particular about those words, because I recollect them, and I 
 have spoken of them. 
 
 Q. On the next morning where were you ? 
 
 A. I marched with the regiment, and I think we went up about as far as Ma- 
 nassas Junction, where we halted a short time ; then the regiment turned off to 
 
99 
 
 the left, I believe, and crossed the road and came off on a road not exactly par- 
 allel, but curving off and following the general direction of the Manassas Gap 
 Railroad, I think. 
 
 Q. Do you know the place where you halted ? 
 
 A. We halted on a small knoll ; part of it overlooked quite a large valley ; 
 quite a large part of it was cleared, and on the right I saw the line of the Manas- 
 sas Gap Railroad. 
 
 Q. This point that I have indicated on the map as Dawkin's Branch? 
 
 A. I should take the branch to be a little farther away. I should take the 
 branch to be about a mile away from the place where we halted ; there might 
 have been a dry run at the foot of this knoll, but I think not. 
 
 Q. What did you do after you came to a halt there ? 
 
 A. I went down on the railroad. I went around generally in the woods and 
 looked at the situation generally ; saw firing was going on along the right of us, 
 over toward Thoroughfare Gap. 
 
 Q. Did you see any indications of an enemy immediately in your front? 
 
 A. I did not see any for a mile or more ; I looked along through the field close. 
 General Porter came up and borrowed a glass of me ; he asked me what I had 
 seen. I told him I thought there was a battery coming in about a mile from us 
 on the Washington side of the road. Not very far from it I think there was a 
 small house, and I saw something that led me to suppose that there were men 
 going in there. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect what reply he made? 
 
 A. I do not know that he made any reply to me. 
 
 Q. Did that battery open upon you ? 
 
 A. It opened shortly afterward ; of course I can not tell you how many min- 
 utes, because I did not keep any note of the time. I had no intention of making 
 any memorandum. It opened and fired before the troops were withdrawn ; I 
 think not exceeding three, might have been four, possibly but two, shots. 
 
 Q. Where did those shots strike ? 
 
 A. One of the shots struck a man in the front rank of the First Michigan In- 
 fantry, and passed through his abdomen, and struck the first man in the rear 
 rank in the thigh. 
 
 Q,. You were there at the time ? 
 
 A. I was at the place and saw the men. They ^vere sitting or lying just a little 
 lower down on the slope of the hill in front of me. 
 
 Q, Then what was done? 
 
 A. Shortly after that we withdrew. 
 
 Q. What indications, if any, did you see of an enemy in your front or to your 
 right and front, or to your right? 
 
 A. To the right and front. 
 
 Mr. Choatb. I do not know that an assistant surgeon is a military expert. 
 
 The Recorder. I asked him what he saw. 
 
 Mr. Choate. I have no objection to what he saw. 
 
 A. [Continued.] Beyond this general clearing to quite a large extent there was 
 a smaller clearing, only a part of which could be seen ; there was a small open- 
 ing in the ■woods; across that opening there came a small body of raen; they 
 halted in the opening, where there was evidently a depression, but their heads 
 and shoulders could be plainly seen. 
 
 Q. About how many men? 
 
 A. I should judge, not over twenty. 
 
 Q. What else did you see of an enemy in your front, orto your right and front, 
 or to your right? 
 
 A. Nothing. 
 
 Q. Could you see anything that would indicate the march of troops; if so, what? 
 
 A. I could see a large cloud of dust on the Warrenton turnpike, moving towards 
 Centreville. 
 
 Q. After that where did you go? 
 
 A. I went into camp with troops at night, after they withdrew. 
 
 Q. Did they remain in this advanced ijosition during the day ? 
 
 A. They were withdrawn in the afternoon ; the sun was declining in the heav- 
 ens. 
 
 Q. How far -were they withdrawn? > 
 
 A. I should judge inside of a mile. 
 
 Q. More than half a mile or less? 
 
 A. That I could not tell you ; I could go to the spot, to the place where they 
 came, beeause we withdrew on the same road, and then came back and went into 
 camp again after dusk. 
 
 CAPT. DOUGLAS POPE SWORN. 
 
 Capt. Douglas Pope was then called by the Government and sworn 
 and examined, as follows: 
 By the Judge- Advocate : 
 Q. Will you state what is your rank in the military service? 
 A. I am captain and additional aid-de-camp. 
 
100 
 
 Q,. Were you with the Army of Virginia in its late campaign under Major-Gen- 
 eral Pope ? 
 
 A. I was. 
 
 Q. In what capacity ? 
 
 A. As additional aid-de-camp to General Pope. 
 
 Q. Were you or not on the field of the l^attle of Manassas on Friday, the 29th 
 of August? 
 
 A. I was. 
 
 Q. Did you or not on that day bear any order from General Pope to General 
 Porter ; and, if so, what was its character, and at what hour did you bear and de- 
 liver it? 
 
 A. I received an order from General Pope, to be delivered to General Porter, 
 at half past 4 o'clock. The purport of the order I did not know at the time. I 
 went directly to General Porter with that order, and it reached him by 5 o'clock. 
 
 Q. Was or was not that the only order which on that day you had to General 
 Porter from General Pope ? 
 
 A. It was. 
 
 Q. Where did you find General Porter with his command ? 
 
 A. I found him at the forks of the road leading from Manassas to Gainesville 
 and Groveton, on the railroad. 
 
 Q. What distance was that from Manassas Junction ? 
 
 A. I do not know, of my own knowledge; but I have heard that it was between 
 two and three miles. 
 
 Q. What distance from the battlefield where the. engagement was then pend- 
 ing? 
 
 A. When I received the order I was to the right of the battlefield, and I sup- 
 pose it was a distance of about three miles from General Porter. 
 
 Porter was not with the head of his column, but back within two 
 miles of Manassas Junction. 
 
 Q. Did you or not, on delivering the order, learn its character? 
 
 A. I did not. 
 
 Q. What statements, if any, did General Porter make to you in regard to the 
 movements which the order coiitemi^lated he should make? 
 
 A. In a conversation which I had with General Porter, after his reading the 
 order, he explained to me on the map where the enemy had come down in force 
 to attack him and had established a battery. I understood him to say that the 
 enemy liad opened ui)on him ; but what he had done I do not now remember. 
 
 Q. How long did you remain with General Porter? 
 
 A. About fifteen minutes, I suppose. 
 
 Q. While you were there, or at any time before you left, did you observe any 
 orders given or any indication of preparation for a movement in the direction 
 of thebatttlefleld? 
 
 A. I did not. 
 
 Q. In what condition were the troops there at that time? 
 
 A. I saw only a portion of them; the portion that I saw I believed belonged 
 to General Sykes's division. They were on the road between the forks of the 
 road and Manassas — what small portion of the troops I saw that belonged to 
 General Porter's corps. It was my impression they were halted there; I saw the 
 arms of some of them stacked. 
 
 Q. They had their arms stacked? 
 
 A. Ves, .sir. 
 
 Q. Was not the .sound of the artillery of the battle then pending distinctly aud- 
 ible at that point? 
 
 A. It was. 
 
 Q. And was the .sound of the small-arm.s distinctly audible at that point? 
 
 A. In regard to the small-arms I do not remember; but I could hear the artil- 
 lery very plainly, very distinctly. 
 
 Q. Was it continuous, indicating a continued action? 
 
 A. It was. 
 
 Q. Did or did not General Porter make any Inquiry of you at all as to the con- 
 dition of the forces then engaged in battle ? 
 
 A. There were inquiries made of me by an oflicer — one of General Porter's 
 aids-de-camp, I think. I do not think that General Porter said anything to me 
 about it. 
 
 Page 58, G. C. M. : 
 
 Q. As you have passed over the road and know the distance, will you state 
 within what time General Porter and his command could have reached the bat^ 
 tlefleld after the delivery of that order? 
 
 A. To have reached where I had received the order would have taken him two 
 or three hours, I suppose— that is, to the extreme right of our army. 
 
 Q. Within what time would it4iave required him to reach the rlglit fiank of the 
 enemy? 
 
 A. I could not state, because I do not know where the right fiank of the enemy 
 
101 
 
 then was. My impression, though, from what General Porter said, was that the 
 enemy were nearly in his front. I supposed them about a mile from him. That 
 was merely my impression from the conversation I had with General Porter. 
 
 Q. Did you or not have another interview with General Porter after that time ? 
 
 A. I did not. After receiving a written reply to the order I had delivered to 
 General Porter, I started on my way back, and I suppose I had got a mile or a 
 mileandahalf from where General Porter was wlien I was overtaken by an or- 
 derly, who said General Porter wished to see me. I got part way back when I 
 met an otticer, I supposed an aid-de-camp of General Porter, who said that Gen- 
 eral Porter wished to see me. I went back, and this aid-de-camp told me 1 better 
 wait a few minutes. I did not see General Porter then. 
 
 Q. Had you, or not, seen this officer whom you supposed to be an aid-de-camp 
 during your first interview with General Porter? 
 
 A. I had, and had had a conversation with him. 
 
 Q. In the presence of General Porter? 
 
 A. While General Porter was writing the reply to the order I had delivered to 
 him. 
 
 Q. What seemed to be his rank ? 
 
 A. He was a first lieutenant, I think. 
 
 Q. Did he, or not, perform any act or make any remark in the presence of Gen- 
 eral Porterwhich induced you to believe that he wasan aid-de-camp? If so, state 
 what that remark and what that act was. 
 
 A. I do not remember his making any remark to General Porter, or General 
 Porter saying anything to him. My impression is that he told me that he was 
 an aid-de-camp. I firmly believed at the time that he was General Porter's ald- 
 de-camp. I did not see any act indicating that, excepting that he was associated 
 with General Porter ; he was very close to General Porter at the time I had 
 the conversation with him ; within hearing of General Porter if he had listened 
 to it. 
 
 Q. Do you, or not, suppose that his statement to you, that he was an aid-de- 
 camp of General Porter, could have been heard by General Porter if he had been 
 listening to your conversation? 
 
 A. It could. 
 
 Q. Do I not understand you, then, to say that that conversation occurred in 
 fact in the presence of General Porter? 
 
 A. In the presence of Genei-al Porter ; yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Were you not charged by that officer with a message to General Pope 
 that a scout had come in reporting that the enemy were retreating through 
 Thoroughfare Gap ? 
 
 A. I was. 
 
 Q. Did you regard that message as given to you seriously or jestingly ? 
 
 A. Seriously. 
 
 Q. How long a time had elapsed from the time of your interview with General 
 Porter until your return to General Porter's encampment? 
 
 A. About three-quarters of an hour, I suppose ; between that and an hour. 
 
 Q. On your return to his encampment, did you or not observe any preparation 
 
 on the part of his officers or of the troops for an advance upon the enemy 7 
 
 A. I did not. 
 
 * « * * * « * 
 
 Q. What was the dress of this officer whom you supposed to be an aid-de-cnmp ? 
 
 A. I do not remember. I do not know whether he had a staff officer's shoul- 
 der-straps on or a line officer's. I do not remember now which it was. He was 
 in uniform. 
 
 The examination by the judge-advocate here closed. 
 Examination by the accused : 
 
 Q. How does the witness fix the hour of the day when he left General Pope to 
 bear the order? 
 
 A. From the date of the order, which was dated at 4.30 p. m. 
 
 Q. Was the road which you took to bear the order from General Pope to Gen- 
 eral Porter direct or circuitous? 
 
 A. My impression is that it was a direct road. 
 
 Q. Did you pass through Manassas Junoiion ? 
 
 A. I did not, that is, in conveying the order to General Porter, I did not. 
 
 Q. Did you go up the railroad toward General Porter? 
 
 A. I did not ; I met him right on the railroad. 
 
 Q. You have stated how you fix the time when you received the order ; how 
 do you fix the time of its delivery ? 
 
 A. By the distance and the rate at which I carried the order. 
 
 Q. And so fixing it, you determine the order to have been delirered at 6 
 o'clock ? 
 
 A. Not precisely at 5 o'clock'; by 5 o'clock. 
 
 Q. You mean as early as 5 o'clock? 
 
 A. As early as 5 o'clock. It may have been three or four minutes after 5 o'clock. 
 
 Q. We understand you to say that youmakethis judgment as to the time from 
 the distance which you had to pass over and the rate you went? 
 
102 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. When you first started to go back from General Porter to General Pope, 
 did you t«ke the same road back by which you had come to General Porter? 
 A. I did. 
 
 TESTIMONY OF GENERAL GEORGE SYKES. 
 
 On the original trial Brig. Gen. George Sykes swore, after saying that 
 he was with the petitioner when an officer brought him the order from 
 General Pope, as follows (G. C. M. record, pages 177, 178) : 
 By Judge-Advocate : 
 
 Q. Did General Porter make known to you the character of that order? 
 
 A. He did not. 
 
 Q. Did he read it in your presence? 
 
 A. Not that I know of. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Q. How long did you remain with General Porter on that occasion, after the 
 receipt of this order ? 
 A. I continued with him from that time all night. 
 
 ******* 
 
 Q. You had then, as I understand you to say, no knowledge thata positive or- 
 der had been given by General Pope on that afternoon for General Porter to 
 attack the enemy on their right flank ? 
 
 A. I had no such knowledge. 
 
 The evidence of General Sykes leads directly to the conclusion that 
 the petitioner had no intention or desire to attack or he would have told 
 his division commander then and there. 
 
 Look at it in any light, there was no effort then, or at any time 
 afterward on that day, to put Sykes's division into position to support 
 or participate in an assault. 
 
 CAPT. GEORGE M. RANDALL'S TESTIMONY. 
 
 Capt. George M. Eandall, Twenty-third United States Infantry, a 
 Government witness (board record, page 725), testified as follows: 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Q. On the 29th of August, 1S62, where were you, and what rank did you hold 
 in the service? 
 
 A. Second lieutenant, Fourth Infantry, attached to Sykes's division. 
 
 Q. Where were you on that morning ? 
 
 A. We were at Bristoe Station. 
 
 Q. Moved up from there to Manassas Junction? 
 
 A. Yes, sir ; from Manassas Junction we took position on the Gainesville road 
 beyond Bethlehem church. 
 
 Q. When you were at Manassas Junction were there any indications of an ac- 
 tion? If so, what were they? 
 
 A. Yes, I think so ; I heard very distinctly heavy firing ; as near as I can recol- 
 lect, it was about half past 9 or 9 o'clock in the morning. 
 
 Q. How long did you continue to bear tliat? 
 
 A. I do not recollect; I heard artillery flring during the day several times, and 
 I think along about 3 or quarter to 4 o'clock in the afternoon I heard it again; 
 quite a brisk firing at that time. 
 
 Q. How far did you get upon the IManassas and Gainesville road ? 
 
 A. I think we moved about three miles, probably four miles, beyond the 
 church. 
 
 Q. Did you go up to the front ? 
 
 A. Very near it ; sufficiently far that I could see the opening between our lines 
 and where the rebels were supposed to be ; at that time wc were in a belt of tim- 
 ber ; the head of the column, as near as I can recollect, halted at the edge of it. 
 
 Q. What indications were there of an enemy in front of you ? 
 
 A. I heard several shots exchanged, and also some few shots from the skirmish 
 line. 
 
 Q. Anything more? 
 
 A. That is all. 
 
 Q. Did you see any enemy ? 
 
 A. I did not. 
 
 Q. What did your brigade then do? 
 
 A. I think some time in the afternoon we countermarched, probably about two 
 and a half miles, and then halted and bivouacked for the night. 
 Cross-examination by Mr. Bullitt : 
 
 Q. About what time did your company get up into the front? 
 
 A. I think about 11 o'clock. 
 
H)'6 
 
 Q. How near to the front were you? 
 
 A. I suppose we were three-quarters of a mile from the front ; suflBciently near 
 6o that we could see the open space. 
 
 * it * *: * * * 
 
 Q. Did you change your position that day at all to the right or left? 
 
 A. I think not. I think we moved to the rear. 
 
 Q. You have no recollection of being moved back into the woods? 
 
 A. I think we halted in the woods. 
 
 Q. The only move you made was to march back about two miles? 
 
 A. Yes; that is all I recollect. 
 
 Q. How far back in the woods were you? 
 
 A. We went back about two and a half miles or two miles, but the exact point 
 it is Impossible for me to mark ; we may have moved up here [in the woods] and 
 taken a zigzag. 
 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 Q. Then you took your position in the woods, and then you subsequently 
 countermarched toward Bethlehem church. Now, I want to know whether 
 you made any other movement after you had passed Bethlehem church and 
 got up toward Dawkin's Branch except first to march to the point where you 
 first halted; then you got into the woods, and afterward countermarched about 
 two miles back to Bethlehem church ; did you make any other movement dur- 
 ing that day ? 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 * * « ♦ « * * 
 
 Q. Will you explain what you mean by countermarching in that particular 
 instance ? 
 
 A. We marched to the front, and then faced the column about and went to the 
 rear. 
 
 Q. Did you countermarch by brigade ? 
 
 A. By regiments and brigades, as near as I can recollect. 
 
 Q. By which, regiments or brigades? 
 
 A. By brigades, I think. 
 
 Q. You were in the leading brigade as you went forward? 
 
 A. I ^vas in the leading brigade, Sykes's division. 
 
 Q. When you countermarched and marched to the rear where were the other 
 two brigades of the division ? 
 
 A. I think they were going to the rear. 
 
 Q. You did not pass them? 
 
 A. No, sir; I think not. 
 
 Q. Did you march in the road going back? 
 
 A. Yes, as near as I can recollect. 
 
 CHARLES DUFFEE SWOEN. 
 
 Charles Duffee (page 609, board record), called on behalf of the 
 Government, being duly sworn, testified as follows : 
 Direct examination by the Recobdeb : 
 
 Q. Where do you reside ? 
 
 A. Washington Court House, Ohio. 
 
 Q. On the original trial in 1863 of the petitioner here you were called as a wit- 
 ness for the Government, were you not ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. And testified as to the direction you took in delivering a certain order, 
 commonly known as the " 4.30 p. m. order?" 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Where were General Pope's headquarters on Friday afternoon, August 29, 
 1862, about 4 o'clock? 
 
 A. He ■was at the right-hand side of the stone house on the hill. 
 
 Q. Do you know wliat that liill is called? 
 
 A. I don't recollect now. I recollect the place very well. 
 
 Q. Where were you at the time that Captain Pope received the 4.30 order? 
 
 A. I was at General Pope's headquarters, not over three or four rods from his 
 headquarters, in the edge of the woods. 
 
 Q. What were you doing there? 
 
 A. Awaiting orders. 
 
 Q. What then transpired ? 
 
 A. Captain Pope called for his horse and mine and I fetched them up ; ]VIr. 
 Ruggles, I believe, gave him the order. He was giving him the directions of 
 Porter's headquarters when I came np. I spoke up and told him I knew the 
 road ; I had been through there before. 
 
 Q. How soon after that did you start ? 
 
 A. We immediately started. I think I was mounted when he was speaking 
 about the road, if I recollect right. 
 
104 
 
 Q. Have you since been over the route that you took at that time? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Recently? 
 
 A. Last Tuesday. 
 
 Q. Under my instructions? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. In this conversation with Mr. Collins, when you pointed out the route on 
 that map, did you not state that the route which you took was an old road, not 
 used by wagons, but w^agons could have traveled it? 
 
 A. Yes ; part of the road was. 
 
 Q. I asked you what you said to him. 
 
 A. I don't kno\v whether I told him the whole road was so or not. 
 
 Q. I only asked you what you told Collins. Did you tell him that it was aa 
 old road not used by wagons, but wagons could have traveled over it. 
 
 A. Do you mean to say the whole distance? 
 
 Q. I ask you what you said to him. 
 
 A. I didn't tell him the whole road ; a part of the road. 
 
 Q. You told him a part of the road ? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. ■ 
 
 Q. Diu you tell him that neither Captain Pope nor any other officer went with 
 you, but that five or seven men went with you ? 
 
 A. I did. Ididu'twanthim to know that Captain Pope was with me. I didn't 
 care much about answering his questions. I was not under oath. 
 
 Q. You ■were not under oath, and therefore you did not feel bound to tell him 
 the truth? 
 
 A. That is it exactly. I found out when he got to that point what he wanted,, 
 and I evaded the question. 
 
 Q. You did tell him Captain Pope was not with you ? 
 
 A. I did, as soon as I mistrusted what his object was. 
 
 Q. Did you tell him that you -(vere ordered to leave three of the men with you 
 at General Porter's if there were five, or four if there were seven with you ? 
 
 A. I don't recollect about the number. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect telling him that you were ordered to leave any men with 
 General Porter? 
 
 A. I told him that was the direction ; I don't know whether I told him I wa» 
 so directed. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect saying to him that you traveled slowly, for both you and 
 your horse were worn out, and besides that you did not know but you might 
 run into the enemy at any time? 
 
 A. Not going; coming back. 
 
 Q. I ask you what you said to him. Did you tell him that you traveled slowly 
 for both you and your horse were worn out? 
 
 A. I told him we traveled slowly coming back. 
 
 Q. Did you use the words, "We traveled slowly,for both I and my horse were 
 worn out? " 
 
 A. Coming back. 
 
 Q. Did you say coming back ? 
 
 A. Yes ; I did. 
 
 Q. And did you say to him, "and besides I did not know but what we might 
 run into the enemy at any time? " 
 
 A. Yes ; coming back. 
 
 Q. You said coming back? 
 
 A. Yes; that was the only time I suggested running into the enemy, coming 
 back? 
 
 Q. Did you say, " I walked my horse a good deal of the way ; after I got on the 
 main road at ' E,' I soon found it full of General Porter's troops, and they pre- 
 vented my getting along very fast?" 
 
 A, I supposed it was Porter's troops. [Witness looks at the map.] This is too 
 far down. I did not see any "E" on the map when I was talking to him. 
 
 Q. You did notsay to him, "After getting on the main road at'E' I soon found 
 It full of General Porter's troops?" 
 
 A. Not at " E." I supposed them to be Porter's troops ; but it was farther up 
 this way ; not as far down as that was. 
 
 Q. It was nearer to the railroad than the letter E on the Collins map? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Did you tell him it was about 6 p. m. when you delivered to General Porter 
 the order ? 
 
 A. No, sir. He wanted me to say so, but I wouldn't do it. Then he wanted 
 me to say it was half-past 6, and I ■wouldn't do it. 
 
 Q. You did not want to deceive him, then ? 
 
 A. I had an object in not letting him know about Captain Pope. I didn't want 
 to be summoned. 
 
 Q. Your object in not telling him that Pope was with you was in order not to 
 be summoned here? 
 
 A. No; I didn't want to be summoned. 
 
105 
 
 Q. That was the reason you deceived him in reference to Captain Pope being 
 with you 7 
 
 A. That was one reason. 
 
 Q. You did not say that it was not earlier than that, but may have been a little 
 later? 
 
 A. How is that? Earlier than what ? 
 
 Q. "I think it was about 6 p.m. when I delivered the order to General Porter. 
 It was not earlier than that, and may have been a little later." 
 
 A. No, sir ; I did not say that, because I kne'w it was not so. I knew it did not 
 take me any hour and a half to ride four and a half or five miles. 
 
 By the Recorder : 
 
 Q. Who commanded the battalion of your regiment at the headquarters of 
 General Pope ? 
 
 A. I don't know as I can tell. I was not with the company much ; I was at 
 headquarters all the time ; but I think Captain Jones, who was a lieutenant at 
 that time. 
 
 Q. Who was the lieutenant-colonel of your regiment ? 
 
 A. T. C. H. Smith, who was then at Pope's headquarters, and I believe Menken 
 had command of a squadron, but I don't recollect whether it was so or not. 
 
 Q. Where did you first see this map called the " Collins map? " 
 
 A. I do not know. I saw one map at Columbus. Whether that is the same 
 one or not I do not know. I have no marks by which I can tell. 
 
 Q. Who had it there? 
 
 A. Francis Collins. 
 
 Q. Have you seen him since that time ? 
 
 A. I saw him here in the court-room ; met him at the door on Friday. 
 
 Q. Did you make these marks on that map? [Red marks.] 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 Q. Are you familiar with maps of that kind? 
 
 A. No, sir. 
 
 Q. What is your occupation ? 
 
 A. I am now in the grocery business ; my regular business is boots and shoes. 
 
 Q. Were you acquainted with Mr. ColUns before this interview that you had 
 with him in Columbus ? 
 
 A. I saw him once before that, but I was never acquainted with him. 
 
 Q. Was that the first interview that you ever had with him in reference to this 
 case? 
 
 A. I had another interview with him, but he did not tell me at that first inter- 
 view what his object was, only that he ■wanted to see me. 
 
 Q. How long ago is that? 
 
 A. I do not know as I can recollect just what year it was in. It was about 
 eighteen months or maybe two years after the first trial. 
 
 Q. What was the occasion of your going to Columbus from your home at Wash- 
 ington Court House? 
 
 A. Do you mean the second time ? 
 
 Q. Yes. 
 
 A. I received a letter from Mr. Collins requesting me to come to Columbus — 
 that he wanted a private interview with me. He stated it would be at his ex- 
 pense if I came. I did not know what he wanted. I supposed it ■was the Por- 
 ter case, and I dropped him a few lines and told him if he would send me $10 I 
 would go, and gave him reference in Columbus that I would perform my part 
 of the contract. In a few days the $10 came, and I went. 
 
 Q. What did Mr. Collins say he wanted with you ? 
 
 A. He told me when I first went into his office that it was in regard to the 
 Porter trial. We talked a few minutes, and he then invited me over to his 
 house. 
 
 Q. What did he ask you ? 
 
 A. It was in regard to the time when we left General Pope's headquarters 
 with that 4.30 order, the road that we traveled, and the time that we got there. 
 
 Q. Go on and describe, as near as you can, what questions he asked you. 
 
 A. He asked me the road, asked me the point where General Porter's head- 
 quarter's were, and what time I thought it took me to travel the distance, what 
 time I started, and the time I got there ; says he, "Can you recollect whether it 
 was as late as half-past 6?" I told him no. Then he wanted to know if it was 
 as late as 6. I told him it was not. 
 
 WILLIAM B. LORD TESTIFIES. 
 
 "William B. Lord testifies as follows (board record, marginal page 
 969): 
 
 Q. Will you state substantially what that interview was, and what General 
 Porter said ? 
 
 A. I had been directed by the judge-advocate of the court to proceed to the 
 rooms of General Porter and to look for some telegrams that had been introduced 
 
106 
 
 In evidence that day, and that had been mislaid in some way. While there look- 
 ing oversome papers General Porter made the remark," I was not loyal to Pope ; 
 there is no denying that." 
 
 Q. Do you recall anything else that he said in that connection? 
 
 A. I can not say that I do, and I doubt if I should recall that now but for the 
 peculiarity of the circumstance, and the fact that I made a record of it myself a 
 few days afterward; otherwise I think likely I should have forgotten it. 
 
 Q. That was during the progress of his trial before a general court-martial? 
 
 A. It was. 
 
 The President of the Boaed. The decision is that the letter is admissible 
 for the purpose stated by counsel, namely, not to prove the fact, but to test the 
 credibility of the witness. 
 By the Recorder : 
 
 Q. You have stated in your cross-examination that the feelings which had act- 
 uated you you expressed at the time you wrote that letter to your wife. It was 
 not called for by the counsel for the petitioner ; I will call for it. Please let me 
 know what you stated on the subject, if you have that letter here. 
 
 A. [Witness produces a book.] Shall I read? 
 
 Q. Ju.st that part and no more. 
 
 The witness read as follows: 
 
 "I have been a little bothered about General Fitz-John Porter. I had to go 
 to his room on Monday to get sonae papers that belonged to the court that he 
 had had to copy. One of the reporters of the New York Times was along with 
 me. While in the room, after some conversation. General Porter made the re- 
 mark, ' Well, I wasn't loyal to Pope ; there is no denying that.' Now, that is 
 really the charge against him before the court-martial — that he did not do his 
 duty as an officer before the enemy, and that he did not act rightly toward 
 General Pope, his commanding officer. General Porter said what he did in the 
 privacy of his own room ; without thinking of the eflect of his words. After 
 thinking it over, I have concluded it better not to say anything about it now, 
 though I would not promise as much for that newspaper correspondent." 
 
 Q. That is your letter-press copy of your letter to your wife? 
 
 A. It is. 
 
 Q. Do you retain usually letter-press copies of your letters to your wife ? 
 
 A. All of my correspondence. 
 
 Q. Do you know whether or not some one may not have heard the same lan- 
 guage at some other time, or an affidavit made on the subject and communi- 
 cated to Senator Chandler ? 
 
 A. I know nothing about that. 
 
 WATERMAN L. ORMSBY CALLED. 
 
 Waterman L. Ormsby (board record, page 638), called by the re- 
 corder, being duly sworn, was examined, and testified as follows: 
 Direct examination : 
 
 Q. Where do you reside? 
 
 A. Two hundred and forty-seven Putnam avenue, Brooklyn. 
 
 Q. Do you know the petitioner ? 
 
 A. By reputation. 
 
 Q. I mean do you know him when you see him? 
 
 A. I should not have known him to-day if he had not been pointed out to me. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect having seen him at any time during the month of Decem- 
 ber, 1862? 
 
 A. I do. 
 
 Q. Where was it ? 
 
 A. In his room in the city of Washington, at his residence. 
 
 Q. About what time in the month was it ? 
 
 A. I can't recollect. 
 
 Q. In reference to the beginning or end of the month? 
 
 A. I have no recollection. 
 
 Q. At the time you saw him there were you accompanied by anybody? If so, 
 by whom ? 
 
 A. By Mr. Lord, the official stenographer of the court-martial. 
 
 Q. What is his first name ? 
 
 A. I think William Blair Lord is his name. 
 
 Q. Do you recall the purpose for which you went to General Porter's room ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Please state it. 
 
 A. I went in company with Mr. Lord for the purpose of procuring some docu- 
 ments which had been offered in evidence that day, and which Mr. Lord desired 
 for the official record, and which I desired to be used in my report for the New 
 York Times, which I then represented. 
 
 Q. At what time do I understand that General Porter's trial was in progress? 
 
 A. It w^as then in progress. 
 
 Q. Do you recollect the conversation ? 
 
107 
 
 A. Only a small partof it. 
 
 Q. Do yon recollect any remarks made by General Porter? 
 
 A. I do. One made a strong impression upon me at the time. 
 
 Q.-What had it relation to ? 
 
 A. It had relation to his feeling toward General Pope and General McClellan. 
 
 Q. What was the remark which he made ? 
 
 A. "I wasn't loyal Ut Pope; I was loyal to McClellan." 
 
 Q. What did you at the time understand that the remark had reference toT 
 
 Mr. Choate. That I object to. His understanding of the matter is unimpor- 
 tant. 
 
 The Recorder. On the contrary, if he knows what the conversation is about. 
 
 Mr. Choate. He should certainly be permitted to give all the conversation 
 that he recollects, but anything outside of that certainly cannot be drawn from 
 the witness. 
 
 The President of the Board. Perhaps the recorder can change the form of 
 the question so as to elicit the facts without its being subject to objection. 
 
 The Recorder. I will take the ruling of the board upon the question. 
 
 Mr. Choate. We suppose that it is the board's understanding of anything that 
 General Porter may have been proved to have said, and not the witness' under- 
 standing. 
 
 The President of the Board. I suggest to the recorder that it might be bet- 
 ter to ascertain what transpired to produce an understanding on the part of the 
 witness. 
 
 The Recorder. Then the question is overruled? 
 
 The President op the Board. For the present. 
 
 Q. When that remark was made what was the conversation ? 
 
 A. It would be impossible for me to state another word of that conversation 
 positively. My recollection is that it referred to the testimony which had beer 
 given that day, and concerning which General Porter seemed to be considera 
 excited. 
 
 evidence of general griffin. 
 
 Then take the evidence of General Griffin. General Griffin com- 
 manded one ol" the brigades of Morell's division. Griffin retired with 
 his brigade to Centre ville. He said: 
 
 In the evening, a little after dark, there were some very heavy volleys of mus- 
 ketry, the enemy evidently driving our troops right before them. That mus- 
 ketry was to our right and front, I should say two miles, maybe not so far ; 
 maybe further. I should have stated, when I stated that I heard no other firing 
 but artillery, that in marching ■vve had some skirmish firing. 
 
 Q: You spoke of having returned from the movement you made to the right 
 in consequence of obstacles that you encountered. What -was the character of 
 those obstacles, and what efforts did you make to overcome them? 
 
 A. I led off my column. We ran up into some little thick pine bushes. We 
 halted there. The next order I got was to move back again. Some one re- 
 ported that we could not get through. I made no reconnaissance whatever my- 
 self. 
 
 Q. You say that you had failed to get through to the right during the day of 
 the 29th of August. Will you state what efforts were made by you, or by Gen- 
 eral Porter, to get through on the right during that day? 
 
 A. I merely obeyed orders. 
 
 He does not say that he made any effort, but "I merely obeyed 
 orders." 
 
 My position was at the head of my brigade. What efforts General Porter 
 made I am not aware of. 
 
 general, morell's testimont. 
 
 General Morell, division commander of Porter, says: 
 
 Colonel Marshall reports that two batteries have come down in the woods on 
 our right, toward the railroad, and two regriments of infantry on the road. If 
 this be so, it will be hot here in the morning. 
 
 Q. Was that returned with this indorsement of General Porter : "Move the 
 infantry and everything behind the crest, and conceal the guns. We must hold 
 that place and make it too hot for them. Come the same game over them that 
 they do over us, and get your men out of sight? " 
 
 A. Yes, that -was the next one. 
 
 Q. When that was received by you, directing you to move your infantry and 
 everything behind the crest, and conceal the guns, where were your infantry and 
 the other troops? 
 
 A. At that time they were deployed in line, mostly two brigades, along the crest 
 that leads to the descent to'wards Da^wkin's Branch. 
 
 Q. It was from there that you were directed to move? 
 
 A. From there I was directed to put the men under cover. On this left-hand 
 
108 
 
 side of the road as we advanced it was all open ground; on the right-hand side 
 bushes. One of my batteries, supported by a brigade, was on the right-hand side 
 of the road, just on the crest of the ridge ; the other battery on this side. When 
 General Porter sent me that order I put them back into the fine b\ishes ; and the 
 other two batteries on this side of the road were on a slight depression; I supposed 
 the ridge in front would conceal them from the enemy. I had three batteries, and 
 one was in position all the time. 
 
 General Morell continues, on page 423, board record : 
 
 Q. Why is it that on No. 30, the communication from CJeneral Porter to your- 
 self, and on those that follow, there is no memorandum of the hour and minute 
 of the receipt ? 
 
 A. It was always my practice to note the hour of the receipt. Two days pre- 
 vious to that, on the march from Kelly's Ford to the Junction, I injured my 
 watch, and then I had to guess at the time. 
 
 Q. And you did not put on the guess? 
 
 A. I did not put on the guess. 
 
 Q. Will you state whether the indorsement of General Porter on No. 31 was 
 received by you as appears upon it? 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 Q. Your communication to him is this: 
 
 " General Porter : I can move everything out of sight except Hazlett's bat- 
 tery. Griflin is supporting it, and is on its right, principally in the pine bushes. 
 The other batteries are retired out of sight. Is this what you mean by every- 
 thing? 
 
 "GEO. W. MORELL, JI/aJor-Gfrterai." 
 
 A. Yes, sir. 
 
 The indorsement was read, as follows: 
 
 "I think you can move Hazlett's, or the most of it, and post him in the bushes 
 with the others, so as to deceive. I would get everything, if possible, in ambus- 
 cade. All goes well with the other troops. 
 
 "The Witness. Yes, everything was out of sight except Hazlett's battery. 
 That was exposed all day long." 
 
 Q. Then, on the receipt of No. 31 from General Porter, you did not succeed in 
 getting Hazlett's battery under cover? 
 
 A. No, I didn't attempt to. I wanted to keep one battery in position. That 
 was in front of the bushes, with a brigade immediately behind it. The other 
 two brigades were massed in the rear of that. 
 
 General Morell : Tell me what is passing, quickly. If the enemy is coming, 
 hold to him, and I will come up. Post your men to I'epulse him. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, Major-General. 
 
 Q. What next ? 
 
 A. Then, I think, 35; which is a note from me to General Porter : 
 
 "General Porter: Colonel Marshall reports a movement in frontofhis left. 
 I think we had better retire. No infantry in sight, and I am continuing the move- 
 ment. Stay where you are, to aid me if necessary. 
 
 "MORELL." 
 
 "Colonel Marshall reports a movement in front of his left. I think 
 we had better retire. ' ' 
 
 What does Porter say ? 
 
 General Morell : I have all within reach of you. I wish you to give the 
 enemy a good shelling without wasting ammunition, and push at the same time 
 a party over to see what is going on. We can not retire while McDowell holds 
 his own. 
 
 F. J. P. 
 
 I desire in this connection to call the attention of the Senate to the 
 following facts. General Morell, in his testimony, says: 
 
 Q. Did the putting of those that were foremost under cover cause any move- 
 m.ent of those behind them ? 
 
 A. I think not. I think those immediately behind Hazlett's battery remained 
 where they were, and the others went to the rear. 
 
 iti Up Up ^ ^ iii ^ 
 
 Q. Will you look at the communication from General Porter to Generals Mc- 
 Dowell and King, on that day, which is printed on page 243 of the original record ? 
 
 " Generals McDowell and King : I found it impossible to communicate by 
 crossing the woods to Groveton. The enemy are in great force on this road, and 
 as they appear to have driven our forces back, the force of the enemy having 
 advanced and ours retired, I have determined to withdraw to Manassas. I have 
 attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messengers have 
 run into the enemy." 
 
 Q. AVhat I want to ask is, whether you had any knowledge of that communica- 
 tion being made that day ? 
 
 A. I don't remember it. 
 
109 
 
 Q. Did you receive or k\iowo! any order indicating a withdrawal to Manassas 
 
 A. No, sir; notliing of the kind . 
 
 Q. Or any movement in that direction? 
 
 A. Nothing of the kind. 
 
 Q. "Will you look at a copy of a communication from General Warren to General 
 Sykes, dated 5.45 p. m., August 29,1862, which lia.s been putin evidence? [Paper 
 shown witness.] In this General Warren usesthese words. I will read the whole 
 of it : 
 
 " General Sykes: I received an order from Mr. Cutting to advance to the sup- 
 port of Morell ; I faced about and did so.' I soon met Griffin's brigade withdraw- 
 ing, by order of General Morell, -who was not pushed out, but retiring. I faced 
 about and marched back two hundred yards or so ; I met then an orderly from 
 General Porter to General Morell saying he mu.st push on and press the enemy ; 
 that all was going well for us and he was retiring. Griffin then faced about and 
 I am following him to sujiport General Morell, as ordered. None of the batteries 
 are closed up to me. 
 " liespectfully, 
 
 " G. K. WARREN." 
 
 Q. Do you know anything of that allusion to yourself in it? 
 
 A. No, sir; I iiever gave General Griffin any order of that kind. 
 
 Q. What kind? 
 
 A. That he should retire or retreat. There was no order to leave the front, 
 except to get under cover of those bushes. 
 
 Q. State whether during the whole of the 29th you had your vchole division 
 in command ready to meet any attack that might be made by the enemy. 
 
 A. Ye.c-; I did. 
 
 Q. Although they w^ere under cover, as you have described ? 
 
 A. Within reach at any rate of the batteries, just at the other side of the road — 
 within a fe^v minutes' call. 
 
 Q. Were your advanced regiments and sitirmishers in such position in the 
 neighborhood of Dawkin's Branch tliat if any movement toward attacking you 
 had been madeby the enemy you would have known it in time to receive it with 
 the whole of your divi.sion ? 
 
 A. I think so. 
 
 Q. Will you state what action you took in obedience to No. 37, which directed 
 you to pifsh >ip two regiments supported by two others preceded by skirmish- 
 ers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, and attacli the section of 
 artillery opposed to you — what you did with the four regiment.^ indicated, and 
 what you did with the rest of your division in connection with what you did 
 or what you ordered? 
 
 * * * * * * * 
 
 A. When I received that order — the latter part says " the battle works well on 
 our right" — 
 
 " the battle works well c>n our right ; the enemy said to be retiring up the pike " — 
 I said immediately to the person who lirought it tliat the order was given under 
 a misapprehen-sion. We knew the enemy were not retiring; and I believe I 
 sent tliat message to General Porter. I immediately gave orders to move the 
 whole of my division to the front to be in readiness to support the four regi- 
 ments. WTiilethat was going on I received a verbal order from Colonel Locke 
 to make an attack. When 1 received this order it was quite late in the after- 
 noon, just before sunset; the sun was almost touching tlie toi)S of the trees. 
 And soon after that an order in writing, which is No. 38, " to put the men in po- 
 sition and remain during the night." 
 
 General Morell 's attention was here called to Colonel Locke's state- 
 ment on court-martial trial, and then this follows: 
 
 "Ke (that is, the messenger from General Pope) handed tlie general a note, 
 w^hich I afterward ascertained was an order for him to attack the enemy at once, 
 lie very soon afterward ordered me to ride up to General Morell and direct him 
 to move forward and attack the enemy immediately, and to say that he would 
 be up himself right after me." 
 
 Then on page 223: 
 
 " Toward the close of the day, when I was sent V>y General Porter to General 
 Morell with the order for him to move forward his division and attack the enemy, 
 on my way up to General Morell I passed Colonel (now General) Warren." 
 
 Is that, as you nowunderstand it, the verbal orderwhich General Locke finally 
 brought to you to attack after you had received and were proceeding to execute 
 No. 37? 
 
 A. I think now that it is, from conversations that I had had with Major Earle, 
 At the time I knew nothing about this 4.30 order. 
 
 Q. You merely received this written and verbal order directing an attack in 
 succession ? 
 
 A. Yes ; and when Colonel Locke came to me with that order I was engaged 
 
110 
 
 in getting my men up to the front, and I supposed it was rather supplementary 
 to the written order, and perhaps to expedite the movement. After this inves- 
 tigation was begun I tried very hard to recollect who brought me that written 
 order to attacls with four regiments, and until I conversed with Major Earle and 
 saw the letter of his I could not fix it. But upon talking with him I am very 
 well satisfied now that he did bring the order, and that Colonel Locke's order 
 referred to the 4.30 p. m. order. 
 
 Q. Colonel Locke's order that he describes as being for you to attack with your 
 division ? 
 
 A. As Colonel Locke states in his testimony on page 223. I can not speak 
 positively, but, from conversation with Major Earle and my recollection, I have 
 no doubt that it is so. 
 
 There is the evidence of his own staff officer showing that he saw him 
 receive the order, and that he immediately sent an order to Morell to 
 attack, and so soon as he gave the order for Morell to attack then he 
 dispatched a written order to Morell directing him not to attack, but 
 to remain in statu quo all night. 
 
 Dispatches that passed between Porter and General Morell on the 
 29th of August, 1862, while Morell occupied the position mentioned 
 by him in his testimony, and while Porter was two and one-half miles 
 back at Bethlehem chapel: 
 
 dispatches between porter and morell. 
 
 August 29, 1862. 
 General Morell : Push over to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. If you 
 reach a road up which King is moving and hehasgotaheadof you,let him pass, 
 but see if you can not give help to Sigel. If you find him retiring, move back 
 toward Manassas, and should necessity require it, and you do not hear from me, 
 push to Centreville. If you find the direct road filled, take the one via Union 
 Mills, which is to the right as you return. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, Major-General. 
 
 Look to the points of the compass for Manassas. 
 
 General Moeell : Hold on, if you can, to your present place. What is pass- 
 ing? 
 
 F. J. PORTER. 
 
 General: Colonel Marshall reports that two batteries have come down in the 
 woods on our right toward the railroad, and two regiments of infantry on the 
 road. If this be so, it will be liot here in the morning. 
 
 GEO. W. MORELL, Major-Oeneral. 
 
 Indorsed as follows: 
 
 Move the infantry and e%'erything behind the crest, and conceal the guns. We 
 must hold that place and make it too hot for them. Come the same game over 
 them they do over us, and get your men out of sight. 
 
 F. J. PORTER. 
 
 General Porter : I can move everything out of sight except Hazlett's bat- 
 tery. Griflin is supporting it, and is on its right, principally in the pine bushes. 
 The other batteries and brigades are retired out of sight. Is this what you mean 
 by everything ? 
 
 GEO. W. MORELL, Major-General. 
 Indorsed as follows: 
 
 General Morell : I think you can move Hazlett's, or the most of it, and post 
 him in the bushes with the others so as to deceive. I would get everything if 
 possible in ambuscade. All goes well with the other troops. 
 
 F. J. P. 
 
 General Morell : Tell me what is passing, quickly. If the enemy la coming, 
 hold to him, and I will come up. Post your men to repulse him. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, Major-General. 
 
 General Porter: ColonelMarshallreportsamovementinfrontofhisleft. I 
 think we had better retire. No infantry in sight, and I am continuing the move- 
 ment. Stay where you are, to aid me if necessary. 
 
 MORELL, 
 
Ill 
 
 General Moeell : I have all within reach of you. I wish to give the enemy 
 a good shelling without wasting ammunition, and push at the same time a party 
 over to see what is going on. We can not retire while McDowell holds his own. 
 
 August 29. 
 General Morell : I wish you to push up two regiments supported by two 
 others, preceded by skirmishers, the regiments at intervals of two hundred yards, 
 and attack the section of artillery opposed to you. The battle works well on our 
 right, and the enemy are said to be retiring up the pike. Give the enemy agood 
 shelling as our troops advance. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 Major-Oeneral Commanding. 
 
 General Morell : Put your men in position to remain during the night, and 
 have out your pickets. Put them so that they will be in a position to resist any- 
 thing. I ana about a mile from you. McDowell says all goes well, and we are 
 getting the best of the fight. I wish you would send me a dozen men from the 
 cavalry. Keep me informed. Troops are passing up to Gainesville, pushing the 
 enemy. Ricketts has gone ; also King. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, Major-General. 
 
 warren's note to general sykes. 
 
 5 h. 45 m. p. M., Aug. 29, '62. 
 General Sykes: I received an order from Mr. Cutting to advance and sup- 
 port Morell. I faced about and did so. I soon met Griflin's brigade, withdraw- 
 ing, by order of General Morell, who was not pushed out, but returning. I faced 
 about and marched back two hundred yards or so. I met then an orderly from 
 General Porter to General Morell, saying he must push on and press the enemy; 
 that all was going well for us, and he was returning. GrifHn then faced about; 
 and I am following him to support General Morell, as ordered. None of the bat- 
 teries are closed up to me. 
 
 Respectfully, G. K. WARREN. 
 
 It was denied that General Sturgis was under Porter's orders ; here 
 is the evidence : 
 
 General Sturgis: Please put your command in motion to follow Sykes as 
 soon as he starts. If you know of any other troops who are to join me, I wish 
 you to send them notice to follow you. 
 
 We march as soon as we can see. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, Major-General. 
 
 porter's dispatches to m'dowell and king. 
 
 General McDowell or King : 
 
 I have been wandering over the woods, and failed to get a communication 
 to you. Tell how matters go with you. The enemy is in strong force in front 
 of me, and I wish to know your design for to-night. If leit to me, I shall have 
 to retire for food and water, which I can not get here. How goes the battle? 
 It seems to go to our rear. The enemy are getting to our left. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, 
 Major-General Volunteers. 
 
 General McDowell : Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering 
 about the woods for a time I withdrew him, and while doing so artillery opened 
 upon us. The fire of the enemy having advanced and ours retired, I have de- 
 termined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with 
 McDowell and Slgel, but my messengers have run into the enemy. They have 
 gathered artillery and cavalry and infantry and the advancing masses of dust 
 show the enemy coming in force. lam now going to the head of thecolumn to 
 see what is passing and how affairs are going, and I will communicate with you. 
 Had you not better send your train back ? 
 
 F. J. PORTER, Major-General. 
 
 August 29, 1862. 
 
 Gener.\ls McDowell and King: I found it impossible to communicate by 
 crossing the woods to Groveton. The enemy are in strong force on this road, 
 and as they appear to have driven our forces back, the firing of the enemy having 
 advanced and ours retired, I have determined tjo withdraw to Manassas. I have 
 attempted to communicate with McDowell and Sigel, but my messengers have 
 run into the enemy. They have gathered artillery and cavalry and infantry, 
 and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. 
 
 I am now going to the head of the column to see what is passing and how af- 
 
112 
 
 fairs are going. Had you not better send your train back ? I will communicate 
 with you. 
 
 F. J. PORTER, Major-General. 
 
 I desire to call attention to the fact thafnone of the communications 
 to Morell, McDowell, and King, or any other officer, by Porter, has the 
 time of sending or recei'sang the same marked on that day — a very un- 
 usual and unmilitary proceeding. 
 
 DISPATCH OF GENERAL, EUFORD TO GENERAL, RICKETTS. 
 
 Headquarters Cavalry Brigade — 9:30 a. m. 
 General, Rickbtts: Seventeen regiments, one battery, and five hundred cav- 
 alry passed through Gainesville three-quarters of an hour ago on the Centre- 
 ville road. I think this division should join our forces now engaged at once. 
 Please forward this. 
 
 JOHN BUFORD, Brigadier-General. 
 
 A