Hollinger Corp. 
 pH8.5 
 
GERMANY'S 
 HOLY WAR 
 
 AND OTHER ARTICLES 
 
 BY 
 
 ALBERT SAUVEUR 
 
 CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 
 1915 
 

3^ ^ 
 
 GERMANY'S HOLY WAR.* 
 
 Germany's bid for America's sympathy on the ground that she 
 is conducting a holy war to protect herself and the rest of Europe 
 from falling under Muscovite domination will not appeal to the 
 intelligent, clear-minded American. 
 
 It would be a calamity indeed for the whole world if Europe 
 were to be ruled by the Slav, but it would likewise be a calamity 
 should the Teuton become her master. The imminent danger to- 
 day is not the rule of the Romanoffs, but that of the Hohenzollerns. 
 The present war is not, as the German Chancellor would have 
 it thought, a " life-and-death struggle between Germany and the 
 Muscovite races of Russia," but obviously a life-and-death struggle 
 between democracy and German militarism. This is why the 
 sympathy of the majority of the American people must necessarily 
 be with Germany's opponents. The present coalition is not directed 
 against the German people and German civilization — no more than 
 the coalition that put an end to the power of Napoleon the First 
 was directed against the French people and French civilization; 
 it is directed against the rule of might represented by German 
 militarism. 
 
 It is obvious that Germany's supreme desire in the present 
 struggle is not the warding off of Slavic rule, — that is only incidental, 
 — but the bringing of Europe under her own rule. Hence the 
 present alignment of Powers against her. Her eagerness to crush 
 France is not stimulated by her desire to save the latter country 
 from Muscovite domination, but rather by her wish to increase her 
 own power at the expense of her neighbors. Her evident intention 
 to annex Belgium, should she be victorious, is not directed against 
 the Slavs, but aims solely at her own aggrandizement. 
 
 The world also realizes that Germany has played the part of 
 a bully among European nations, — a part which is never popu- 
 lar, and not without danger, for the hour of reckoning generally 
 comes, and when it does come, the bully is likely to find himself 
 without friends. The invasion of Belgium was a brutal mani- 
 festation of Germany's belief that might makes right. And when 
 thus breaking her pledge guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium, 
 
 *A letter published in The Nation, September 3, 1914. 
 
 3 
 
she asked the EngHsh nation to take her word that after the war 
 she would restore the independence of that country. The perjurer 
 in the act of perjuring asking to be trusted ! It is Uttle wonder that 
 the statement was received with merriment by the English Parlia- 
 ment. 
 
 It remains to be seen how far the German nation will be willing 
 to go with the sacrifice of her children in order, not to save the 
 fatherland, but the Hohenzollern dynasty. There is nothing 
 fantastic in the thought that before the end of the war the German 
 monarchy may tumble down. 
 
 A German victory in the present struggle would mean primarily 
 a tremendous setback to democratic principles and the triumph of 
 militarism; it would imply the crushing of France and of French 
 civilization and the weakening of the power of England, if not the 
 reduction of that country to the rank of a second-rate nation. The 
 victory of the Allies, on the contrary, would probably be a death- 
 blow to militarism and all the evils it implies, and might mark the 
 dawn of the era of peace and good-will among nations for which 
 the world has so long waited, and towards which bleeding humanity 
 is stretching imploring arms. 
 
 Bailey Island, Me., August 22. 
 
 REPLY TO PROFESSOR FRANCKE.* 
 
 In your issue of August 23, 1914, you publish an article by 
 Prof. Kuno Francke in which he discusses " the underlying causes 
 that forced the hand of the Kaiser." I hope you will permit me to 
 reply briefly through your columns to some of his contentions. 
 
 Professor Francke writes that it is easy to see why American 
 public opinion should have condemned by an overwhelming ma- 
 jority the diplomats of Austria and Germany, but that he believes 
 that on looking beyond the immediate occasion of the world's 
 conflict the thoughtful observer will find that fundamental justice 
 is on the German side. 
 
 Such statement should not be allowed to pass unchallenged. 
 In defense of his contention Professor Francke claims that Germany 
 was forced into this war (i) because of France's desire to recover 
 the provinces she lost in 1870, (2) because of England's jealousy of 
 
 * A letter published in the Boston Herald, August 27, 1914. 
 
Germany's commercial and industrial prosperity, and (3) because 
 of Russia's hatred of Germany. 
 
 What is the validity of these claims? It is undoubtedly true 
 that France has never ceased to mourn the loss of a part of her 
 territory and to hope for the day when it might be restored to her. 
 Does not so natural a feeling entitle her to the respect rather than 
 to the blame of any man, regardless of his nationality, who is a 
 lover of his country? In spite of the existence of that most excusable 
 sentiment, it must be obvious to the unbiased and intelligent 
 observer that she did not want war with Germany, that for many 
 years she has done her utmost to preserve the peace of Europe, 
 at times accepting humiliation in order to avoid a conflict with 
 Germany. 
 
 Professor Francke writes: "Germany's policy toward France 
 during these forty-three years has been one of utmost restraint 
 and forbearance and has been dictated by the one desire of making 
 her forget the loss of the two provinces." One is tempted to ask 
 whether Professor Francke intended to be facetious when he made 
 such statement. Every Franco-German incident which has occurred 
 since the war of 1870 is a refutation of Professor Francke's claim 
 of German friendly attitude. That Germany has ever been ready, 
 on the contrary, to stab France whenever possible to do so with 
 reasonable safety and without arousing the indignation of civilized 
 nations must be obvious to the student of history. As a matter of 
 fact, has not Germany played toward France the part of a bully? 
 
 The Franco-German relations since the war of 1870 have been 
 so accurately and clearly outlined in the Springfield Republican 
 for August 22 that I cannot help wishing that that editorial might 
 be reproduced in your columns, as therein will be found a convincing 
 answer to Professor Francke's contention of Germany's friendly 
 attitude. As pointed out in that editorial, Bismarck's first concern 
 after the Franco-Prussian war was to keep France weak and isolated. 
 In 1875 he was planning to attack her again on the ground that she 
 had not been sufficiently demolished four years before, intending this 
 time to " bleed France white," to use his own brutal words. And 
 it was chiefly through the intervention of Russia that France 
 escaped this appalling calamity. 
 
 Russia and England were now alarmed, and their fears paved 
 the way first for the Franco- Russian alliance and later for the Triple 
 Entente, essentially defensive agreements intended for mutual 
 protection against the growing and despotic ambition of Germany. 
 The Morocco incident in 1905, which led to the humiliation of 
 
France through her dismissal of Delcasse, at the time her Minister 
 of Foreign Affairs, at the dictate of Germany, is an edifying instance 
 of Germany's good- will and proves France's earnest desire to main- 
 tain peace. Again in 191 1, when Germany, taking advantage of an 
 apparent weakness in the Triple Entente, sent a warship to Agadir, 
 war was only avoided through the firmness of England's attitude. 
 Who is there that would doubt that notwithstanding the generous 
 feelings of Germany towards France now claimed by Professor 
 Francke to have existed for the last forty- three years, France as a 
 world's power would have ceased to exist long ago if Germany could 
 have had her own way? 
 
 Professor Francke speaks of the benevolent rule of Germany in 
 Alsace-Lorraine. Again it is difficult to believe that he is serious. 
 The Zabern incident to which he refers is a good instance of the 
 benevolence of the German domination in Alsace-Lorraine. We 
 are told that these two French provinces had been German until 
 the seventeenth century, but is not the essential point the fact that 
 when torn away from France they were inhabited by Frenchmen 
 whose patriotism and love for France was not excelled by the 
 feelings of the inhabitants of any other portion of the French 
 republic, and that after forty-three years of Germanic rule their 
 supreme desire is to become once more French citizens? 
 
 Professor Francke refers to the recent military law requiring 
 every Frenchman to serve three years instead of two in the active 
 army, and considers it as equivalent to mobilization, and as an 
 evident indication that France was getting ready to strike at 
 Germany. That view is certainly extraordinary when one realizes 
 that even after this tremendous sacrifice on the part of France her 
 army still remained numerically inferior to that of Germany; that 
 the sacrifice was imposed upon her because of the ever-increasing 
 size of the German army, due primarily to Germany's increasing 
 population, while her own remained nearly stationary. Professor 
 Francke might as well contend that France's maintenance of any 
 army at all was a proof of evil intentions against Germany. 
 
 We are told that the war was further forced upon Germany 
 because of England's jealousy of the commercial growth and pros- 
 perity of Germany. Commercial rivalry between nations is not to 
 be denied, nor is it to be found fault with. That England should like 
 a larger share of the world's commerce, even at the expense of 
 Germany's share, can readily be conceded. But it does not follow 
 that England was ready to plunge Europe into this terrible war in 
 order to satisfy her commercial cravings. Indeed, her conduct, as 
 
well as that of France, since the Triple Entente came into existence, 
 has clearly demonstrated that, like France, she was most anxious 
 to preserve peace. 
 
 When everything has been said and discounted I believe that 
 American sympathy will remain with Germany's opponents because 
 of the following basic considerations : 
 
 (i) When Austria sent an ultimatum to Servia it was so 
 worded that she knew it could not be complied with. 
 
 (2) Even after Servia had accepted Austria's ultimatum 
 with the single exception of the most offensive clause, which she 
 proposed to submit to arbitration, Austria proclaimed herself 
 unsatisfied and immediately declared war on Servia. 
 
 (3) Austria in her diplomatic moves with Servia undoubtedly 
 had the support of Germany. 
 
 (4) Germany and Austria knew that a war with Servia meant 
 a war with Russia. 
 
 (5) Germany and Austria knew that a war with Russia 
 meant a general European conflagration. 
 
 (6) In spite of Professor Francke's contention that the 
 violation of Belgium's neutrality was a necessity, the world will 
 continue to regard it as a brutal manifestation of Germany's belief 
 that might makes right. 
 
 (7) The present struggle is not, as the German Chancellor 
 would have it, "a life-and-death struggle between Germany and the 
 Muscovite races of Russia," but obviously a life-and-death struggle 
 between militarism and its evils as represented by the Hohenzollern 
 dynasty and democracy as represented by England and France. 
 
 Cambridge, August 25. 
 
 GERMANY'S CLAIMS VERSUS HER AIMS.* 
 
 German professors and editors and other German sympathizers 
 in the present struggle of nations have attempted the difficult task 
 of convincing the American public, first, that Germany was not 
 the aggressor, and, second, that she is conducting a war of civiliza- 
 tion directed primarily against Russia that Europe may not fall 
 under Muscovite domination. The German Chancellor has made 
 similar claims, while in the German " White Paper," published in 
 full in the New York Times for August 24, it is likewise attempted 
 to fasten the responsibility for this war on Germany's opponents. 
 
 *A letter published in the New York Times, September 5, 1914. 
 
 7 
 
A close and impartial study of both the English and German 
 " White Papers " must suffice to convince the reader that Germany 
 clearly was the aggressor and that England made every possible 
 effort first to prevent a war between Austria and Servia and later 
 to localize the conflict. Germany, on the contrary, by insisting from 
 the start that there should be no intervention in the settlement of 
 the dispute between Servia and her ally, Austria, made a European 
 war inevitable. The sophistry, inaccuracies, and unwarranted 
 conclusions of the German professors and editors have not helped 
 their cause. The irrefutable facts remain, first, that Austria with 
 the knowledge and approval of Germany presented to Servia an 
 ultimatum so worded that she knew that the conditions imposed 
 could not be complied with by any nation retaining a spark of self- 
 respect; second, that after Servia had accepted Austria's ultimatum 
 with the single exception of the most offensive clause, which she 
 proposed to submit to arbitration, Austria, with Germany's consent, 
 proclaimed herself unsatisfied and immediately declared war on 
 Servia; third, that Germany and Austria knew that a war with 
 Servia meant a war with Russia, and that a war with Russia meant 
 a general European conflagration; fourth, that Germany declared war 
 on Russia, started the invasion of France before declaring war, and 
 by refusing to respect the neutrality of Belgium, to which she was 
 solemnly pledged, forced both Belgium and England into the war. 
 In the face of so flagrant a violation of all sentiments making for 
 peace, no sophistry will avail in attempting to protect Germany 
 from the odium of being responsible for the greatest calamity the 
 civilized world has ever seen. 
 
 We are told that Germany is conducting this war in the interest 
 of civilization, — that her chief purpose is to protect Europe from 
 the domination of the Slav. And to ward off this Muscovite danger 
 Germany is at present making desperate efforts to crush England 
 and France, the standard-bearers of democracy in Europe! In her 
 war for civilization she is employing the methods of barbarian 
 tribes, methods condemned by civilized nations and which have 
 already horrified the world. It is hardly conceivable that Russia, 
 which the German Chancellor describes as a semi-Asiatic, slightly 
 cultured barbaric nation, could have committed in Belgium the 
 atrocities imputed to the Germans had she conquered that country 
 in similar circumstances. 
 
 It is manifest that Germany's supreme desire is to fasten 
 Teutonic rule on Europe, to crush Russia, to be sure, but also 
 to crush France and French civilization and to reduce England to 
 
 8 
 
the rank of a second-class nation. It is obvious that this is a struggle 
 between militarism and its evils as represented by the Hohenzollern 
 dynasty and democracy as represented by England and France. 
 
 Cambridge, Mass., September 5, 1914. 
 
 GERMANY'S DOINGS.* 
 
 In the November issue of the Harvard Monthly several pages 
 were devoted to an exposition of " Germany's hope." I may, I 
 think, be permitted to express the belief that the world is not at the 
 present time greatly interested in Germany's hope; it is with her 
 doings that it is chiefly concerned. 
 
 Germany stands before the neutral nations soaked in the 
 blood of an innocent and peaceful people, and, so long as that is her 
 garb, it is incongruous for her to appear as a suppliant for a hearing 
 that she may explain to her less cultured sisters some of her philo- 
 sophical systems. Many pertinent questions must be answered 
 before the world, and especially the people of the United States, will 
 be in a mood to listen to her, and in answering them sophistry 
 will not be tolerated. Her answers must not be such as to be 
 intelligible only to those who have been trained in German kultur. 
 One of these questions is so vital that it seems futile to proceed 
 with Germany's case until it has been satisfactorily answered. If 
 it cannot be done, the prosecution may rest and the verdict must 
 necessarily be one of Guilty. It is to that one " incident " only, and 
 closely related ones, that I desire to allude. What is Germany doing 
 in Belgium? Why did she ever invade that country? Why did she 
 conduct a war of atrocities with the evident intention of terrorizing 
 the inhabitants of that unfortunate land? Why did she destroy 
 her cities and works of art? Why did she drop bombs among non- 
 combatants? Why did she levy enormous war taxes? Why did she 
 take possession of the food supply? Why, having devastated the 
 country and reduced the inhabitants to famine, does she refuse to 
 feed them notwithstanding her claim that they are now German 
 subjects? 
 
 If we turn to the mass of writing that the defenders of Ger- 
 many's conduct have contributed to the daily press, and to the 
 counters of booksellers, we discover that they would justify Ger- 
 many's invasion of Belgium on the ground of military necessity, 
 
 ♦Not previously published. 
 
 9 
 
made all the more imperious because of the intention of the French, 
 known to Germany, of violating Belgium's neutrality. The theory 
 that to deal a more direct and quicker blow to your enemy you are 
 justified in knocking down and trampling upon any innocent by- 
 stander happening to be in your way is so odious as to call for 
 universal condemnation, and it has been universally condemned. 
 Germany's conduct has been that of a bully brutally assaulting 
 a child whom he had sworn to protect. As for France's alleged 
 intention of invading Belgium in spite of having given her word to 
 England that she would respect the neutrality of that country, as a 
 mere expression of opinion from German advocates it carries ab- 
 solutely no weight. If Germany could prove that if she had not 
 •committed the crime of which she is convicted, France would have 
 committed it, it would not exonerate her, but it certainly would 
 be an attenuating circumstance. The only possible construction, 
 however, that can be placed on Germany's failure to prove her 
 contention is that proofs, or even circumstantial evidences, do not 
 exist. 
 
 Germany's guilt has been correctly stated in the Providence 
 Journal for October 14, 1914, the concluding paragraph of which 
 reads as follows: 
 
 "All the tramping of Germany's legions, all the thunder of 
 her bombs and batteries, cannot drown out the cry of one little 
 Belgian child." 
 
 Has not the time arrived when the neutral nations should unite 
 in the name of humanity to rescue an innocent people from the 
 clutch of the vulture holding it? 
 
 Cambridge, Mass., November 25, 1914. 
 
 THE EUROPEAN WAR.* 
 
 If this assembly were a court of justice seated to hear Germany's 
 case and I the prosecuting attorney, I should rest; I should not 
 consider an argument necessary, feeling certain that the verdict 
 must be one of Guilty, so satisfactorily has the defense done the 
 work of the prosecution. Every word uttered by German sym- 
 pathizers, every line written by them in support of their cause, 
 has strengthened the belief of an outraged world in Germany's 
 
 *An address before the Massachusetts Schoolmaster's Club, Hotel Bellevue, Boston, 
 December 12, 1914. 
 
 10 
 
culpability. If her apologists had remained silent, her position 
 would be to-day less hopeless than it is. Their defense of the 
 Fatherland has been based on conclusions drawn from false premises, 
 on historical and other inaccuracies, but above all on sophistry. 
 Theirs has been the attitude of pedagogues instructing mentally 
 deficient children; in addressing the American public they have 
 assumed that their audiences were lacking in intelligence and ig- 
 norant of the basic facts and incidents that led to the war. And it 
 would seem as if those who should be best qualified by education 
 and training to defend their country have been the chief offenders 
 against accuracy, logic, and tact. 
 
 A few weeks ago a letter I had sent to the editor of a well- 
 known New England magazine was returned to me with the state- 
 ment that the American public was not interested in a defense of 
 the Ten Commandments. That, gentlemen, expresses, I believe, 
 the view of a great majority of the American people. The cause 
 of the Allies is so obviously a just one that it needs no defense. 
 A simple consideration of the events that immediately preceded 
 the war and the information contained in the " White Papers " 
 suffices to carry conviction. 
 
 When an horrified world, fully realizing the magnitude of the 
 catastrophe, heard that a European war had started, its first in- 
 quiry was as to the nation or nations responsible for the con- 
 flagration. It soon became apparent that Germany, standing 
 back of Austria, had committed the infamous deed. The " White 
 Papers " uncovered her in the very act of cold-bloodedly lighting 
 the blaze — actually hastening to war lest the other nations should 
 find a way to prevent it. 
 
 At first there was an attempt on Germany's part to shift the 
 blame on her enemies, claiming that they, and not she, had actually 
 started the war. That was her first line of defense. How can 
 any one believe, asked Dr. Bernhard Dernburg, that Germany 
 could be so mad as to plunge into a war against Russia, France, 
 England, and Belgium and in face of the moral hostility of the rest 
 of the world? Our answer is that we do not believe anything of 
 the kind. We believe Germany to be war mad, but not so com- 
 pletely as to wilfully enter into such a desperate venture. We 
 believe that she started the war because she counted upon the 
 moral support, at least, of her ally, Italy; because she expected 
 England to remain neutral and Belgium to permit the passage of 
 her armies. It was to be a struggle of the triple alliance, or, at 
 least, of Germany and Austria against Russia and France. We 
 
 II 
 
believe that had she known what the attitude ot Italy, Belgium, 
 and England would be she would have postponed her aggression. 
 Her hatred of England, so loudly proclaimed, is obviously due 
 to the part taken by that country in causing Germany's plans 
 to miscarry. 
 
 That France did not want war is now conceded by the Germans 
 themselves, while we have conclusive evidences that Russia ap- 
 proved every move suggested for the maintenance of peace and 
 joined with her allies in their strenuous efforts to that end. 
 
 As to the claim that England started the war, it is not to be 
 seriously entertained. The attention of England was at that time 
 chiefly concerned with sports and with brewing Irish troubles, and 
 her hopeless lack of preparations for war is the best proof riot only 
 that she had no aggressive intentions, but that she did not expect 
 to be drawn into any war. In the face of that unpreparedness, 
 scorned at by the Germans themselves, and for which England is 
 now paying such heavy penalty, it is inconceivable that German 
 sympathizers should have carried mental stupidity to the point 
 of claiming that England was the aggressor. But if England had 
 failed to take arms against Germany after her violation of Belgium, 
 and if Germany had succeeded in defeating both Russia and France, 
 as she felt confident she could do, the sequence of Germany's game 
 was easy to foretell. With France and Russia crushed, Belgium 
 and the French colonies annexed, Germany's mastery of Europe 
 would have been such that England undoubtedly would have been 
 the monster's next victim. At last " Der Tag "! And who will 
 doubt that in due time. South America, the Monroe doctrine, and 
 the United States would have received Germany's attention. 
 
 And we now come to Germany's second line of defense. Forced 
 to admit that she had started the conflagration, she attempted to 
 justify her conduct: (i) because Russia was unwilling to permit 
 Austria to deal with Servia as she pleased; (2) because of France's 
 unwilHngness to desert her ally, Russia, in case the latter was 
 attacked by Germany and Austria; (3) because of England's 
 refusing to overlook Germany's criminal invasion of Belgium and 
 her obvious evil intentions after the crushing of France and Russia ; 
 and (4) because of Belgium's unwise course in opposing the viola- 
 tion of her territory. In short, if Russia, France, and England 
 had been willing to surrender in abject submission to Germany's 
 dictates there would have been no war. As for Germany's reason- 
 ing in regard to Belgium, it is as if a man having burned another 
 man's house attempted to throw the blame upon him on the ground 
 
 12 
 
that had he surrendered his house, there would have been no need 
 of burning it. 
 
 Germany's third line of defense is found in the claims that 
 she started the conflagration in August, 1914, because of her con- 
 viction that her enemies of the Triple Entente intended to attack 
 her a little later, — " in possibly a year," we are told by Professor 
 Muensterberg, — at a time when they would have been in a better 
 position to defeat her. She had to ward off their blow by striking 
 first. Mere assertion on the part of German advocates of the 
 existence of such plot carries with it little weight. The world 
 wants proofs or at least strong circumstantial evidences in support 
 of the contention. But neither proofs nor evidences can be given, 
 because they are non-existent. The world does not believe that 
 the members of the Triple Alliance either separately or collectively 
 had any desire of precipitating a war with Germany, their conduct 
 having always been consistent with a desire for peace, as proven 
 by so many historical incidents of the last twenty years. And 
 here again England's utter unpreparedness for war is conclusive 
 proof that she had no intention of attacking Germany in a year 
 or in ten. 
 
 Having failed in her various attempts at placing on the 
 shoulders of her enemies the responsibility for the war, Germany 
 endeavors to enlist the sympathy of neutral nations, and especially 
 of the United States, on the ground that she is fighting for civiliza- 
 tion and to ward off Muscovite domination, — as colossal a piece 
 of impudence or of stupidity as the world has ever known; an 
 insult, in fact, to the intelligence of those she would like to convince. 
 Behold Germany, her satellite, Austria, and her new ally, Turkey, 
 fighting for civilization against England and France, the standard 
 bearers in Europe of democracy and personal liberty! Behold 
 also the methods used by the German armies in their defense of 
 civilization ! 
 
 Finally we are told that the world should condone Germany's 
 conduct because of her proficiency in governmental and municipal 
 administration, because of the excellence of her schools and uni- 
 versities, because of her ability to manufacture more cheaply than 
 other nations certain useful chemical products, because, also, 
 Beethoven, Goethe, and even Dante, it seems, were Germans. It 
 is as if a criminal was pleading not only for acquittal, but also for 
 the indictment of the prosecution, on the ground that he had a 
 well-ordered house, that he was a skilled artisan, and that some of 
 his ancestors had distinguished themselves. 
 
 13 
 
With her flimsy defense shattered, and having failed in her 
 plea for sympathy, Germany stands before the world convicted of 
 having committed with malice aforethought one of the greatest 
 crimes recorded in the history of civilized nations, actuated by her 
 lust of empire, by her odious theory that might makes right, and 
 by an insane belief that she is a superior race entrusted with the 
 mission of conquering the world and of forcibly feeding German 
 kultur to every nation on Christendom. At first it would seem 
 as if but one man, or at least a small group of men, could be the 
 victim oi such obsession, but it is now apparent that the whole 
 German nation is infected. 
 
 Although acknowledging that the invasion of Belgium was a 
 criminal deed, the German chancellor attempted to justify it on the 
 ground of military necessity. As this did not appeal to the neutral 
 nations, it was then claimed that the Germans were forced to invade 
 the country because of their knowledge that England and France 
 intended a similar invasion, a statement so obviously contrary to 
 facts that it was nowhere seriously entertained. It was then 
 contended that documents had been discovered (after the com- 
 mission of the crime, however) proving that an understanding 
 existed between Belgium and England by which the latter country 
 was to be permitted to land troops in Belgium. The documents as a 
 matter of fact and of history related only to unofiticial exchanges 
 of view in regard to the military assistance that England could 
 render in case Germany invaded Belgium. After the untold suffer- 
 ings inflicted upon innocent and heroic Belgium by the German 
 armies, this attempt at robbing her of her last asset, namely, her 
 honor, has been universally condemned. Remember, Belgium will 
 long remain the watchword of the nations in their dealings with 
 Germany. 
 
 France, we are told, is responsible for the war because she allied 
 herself with Russia and because of her desire to recover her lost^ 
 provinces, Alsace and Lorraine. The alliance with Russia was, of 
 course, essential to the very existence of France. Had it not been 
 consummated, France as one of the great powers would have 
 ceased to exist long ago ; Germany would have completed her work 
 of 1870; France would have been " bled white, " to use Bismarck's 
 gentle words. As for France's longing for the return of her lost 
 territory, although the Germans generally describe it as a mad 
 thirst for revenge, the sentiment is excusable, to say the least. The 
 world, moreover, knows that in spite of its existence, France did 
 not intend to provoke a war with Germany; indeed, she has given 
 
 14 
 
in the last twenty years many proofs of her intense desire to live in 
 peace with Germany, and that, in the face of distressing Teutonic 
 provocations. 
 
 For France this war is like fighting a pestilence, the Huns of the 
 twentieth century, who, like birds of prey, have alighted on her 
 beautiful and sacred soil. Against that danger she has risen like 
 one man, conscious of the justice of her cause, conscious of her 
 mission and of her duty to mankind; once again she is unselfishly 
 shedding her blood that the cause of personal liberty may triumph. 
 For forty years France has lived in the shadow of the lifted club — 
 the odious Teutonic menace — with full realization that the blow 
 was likely to fall at any moment. And still she lived in that shadow, 
 serene, dignified, uncomplaining, outwardly smiling, determined 
 that, true to her traditions and ideals, if the blow was to crush her, 
 her last gesture would not be a repulsive one. Forty years of de- 
 cadence, we are told by the Germans, and well they might have 
 been had not France been the possessor of a noble and immortal 
 soul. Forty years of decadence, during which France recovered so 
 quickly from the disasters of 1870 that Germany, becoming alarmed, 
 was anxious five years later to stab her anew, the intervention of 
 Russia only preventing her. Forty years of decadence, during 
 which France paid promptly the enormous war indemnity demanded 
 by Germany and became one of the rich nations of Europe, the 
 banker of other nations. Forty years of decadence, during which 
 she reconstructed her army with so much success that millions of 
 decadent French soldiers drove back from the very walls of Paris 
 an equal or greater number of Germans, the pick of the German 
 army, and have more than held them ever since. Forty years of 
 decadence, during which France gave the world Pasteur, the greatest 
 of scientists and public benefactors: Rodin, the greatest living 
 sculptor; Rostand, the immortal poet; Berthelot, the great chemist; 
 Bergson, the philosopher; Joffre, the invincible. Even in music the 
 French school of to-day is conspicuously in the lead. It may be 
 assumed that the Nobel prizes are awarded with the strictest 
 impartiality by a competent body of men and that the awards 
 may, therefore, be regarded as a fair test of the productions of the 
 various nations in the fields they cover. Since their creation 
 eighteen prizes have been given to " kultured " Germans and eighteen 
 to decadent Frenchmen. In other words, decadent France, with a 
 population but a little more than one half that of " kultured " Ger- 
 many, has received the same number of awards. France is still the 
 arbiter of good taste in matters of decoration, personal, municipal, 
 
 15 
 
and national. French culture stands for intellectual attainments 
 and a discriminating appreciation of the beautiful in its various 
 manifestations. German kultur deals largely with the material 
 sides of life. The French mind is still the temple of reason and of 
 clear thinking and the French language still the admirable and 
 unequaled means of expressing with lucidity the most delicate 
 thoughts of the human mind. French playwrights more than those 
 of any other nation still supply the needs of the theater, while in 
 foreign countries the demand for French literature is greater than 
 that for any other literature. Inspired by the basic work of the 
 Wright brothers, has not France done more for aviation than any 
 other country? Has she not been a leader also in the successful 
 development of the automobile? Even in the manufacture of 
 Germany's own specialties, namely, appliances for the destruction 
 of human life, France has been a successful competitor, as the Ger- 
 mans have now learned from the performance of her seventy-five 
 millimeter guns. France is to-day as much as it ever was the Mecca 
 of lovers of the beautiful. French thought means as much to the 
 world as it ever did. The saying is as true to-day as it ever was that 
 every man has two countries, his own and France. 
 
 I believe that the world has for France an affection in which 
 tenderness is uppermost, an affection not unlike that of a lover, 
 because France is the most human of nations. More than others 
 it personifies humanity — with its weaknesses and many failings, 
 but also with its noblest impulses and noblest deeds; with its 
 sufferings and purest joys. 
 
 AN OFFICIAL PROTEST 
 Urged against German Acts in Belgium.* 
 
 In " A Word with Our English Friends " you contend that the 
 English should be satisfied with an expression of sympathy for 
 their cause on the part of the American people; that it is unreason- 
 able to expect more ; that for the American government to protest 
 against the criminal deeds of Germany would do more harm than 
 good; that The Hague conventions, because they were not ratified 
 by all the belligerent nations, impose upon our government no 
 obligation to make protest. 
 
 I do not think, sir, that your arguments, and the precedents 
 
 * A letter published in the New York Times, February i7, ipiS. 
 
 I6 
 
cited by you to justify the failure of our country to protest ofificially 
 against revolting deeds, carry conviction. 
 
 Granting that the United States has no legal obligation to 
 protest against Germany's violation of Belgium and other crimes 
 against the rights of humanity committed by her, are you not 
 begging the question? Does not the world expect from this country 
 something more than a purely correct legal attitude? Are we 
 going to ignore our moral obligations as champions of democracy? 
 Most of us believe that the Allies are fighting for the cause of 
 personal liberty throughout the world, and that this country is 
 vitally interested in the outcome. Most of us believe that, should 
 Prussian militarism triumph, this fearful struggle would have to 
 be begun all over again, sooner or later, in which case it is very 
 improbable that the United States could avoid taking an active 
 part in it. 
 
 The American nation is practically unanimous in condemning 
 Prussian militarism and its methods, and through its magnificent 
 generosity it has expressed warm sympathy for its victims; but 
 ofificially America has not spoken a word. On the contrary, a con- 
 gratulatory birthday message was sent " in the name of the Amer- 
 ican people " by the President of the United States to the German 
 Emperor. At the first indication, however, that England might be 
 exceeding her rights in the handling of ships carrying American 
 cargoes and involving, therefore, monetary consideration, official 
 protest was quickly formulated, an action calculated to cause se- 
 rious embarrassment to the Allies and to render their titanic task 
 still more difficult. 
 
 No one in his senses can believe for a moment that England 
 intends to interfere with the commerce and other interests of this 
 country. The good-will of the United States is of much importance 
 to her in the present crisis, and she is undoubtedly anxious to gain 
 and retain it. If there are some who believe that her desire for our 
 sympathy is not prompted by genuine friendship for the people 
 of the United States, let them ascribe it to some other motives, but 
 let them also realize the utter foolishness of assuming the existence 
 of any unfriendly intention oil the part of England toward this 
 country. 
 
 Will it be contended that the maintenance of an attitude 
 of strict neutrality by this nation prohibits the placing on record 
 of her abhorrence of acts violating sacred rights of nations and of 
 humanity? And, after all, this punctilious neutrality has been of no 
 avail. The German sympathizers in this country are still dis- 
 
 17 
 
satisfied. Indeed, they are in an ugly mood and threaten to take 
 the nation by the throat and teach her a lesson. 
 
 Although deeply appreciative of the moral support of the 
 American people, is it surprising that our English friends should 
 experience that tightening of the heart which comes from the 
 hesitating attitude of a friend at a crucial moment in one's existence? 
 
 Cambridge, Mass., February 15, 1915. 
 
 A VIEW OF THE OUTCOME.* 
 
 In your issue of February 25 you ask editorially, " Is Germany 
 Winning? " the question being prompted by some remarks of Rear- 
 Admiral Francis T. Bowles recently printed in the newspapers. 
 Admiral Bowles's views do not appear to constitute a safe founda- 
 tion upon which to rest the belief that the Germans will be victori- 
 ous when it is considered that they are opposed by the opinion 
 of the great majority of intelligent and neutral observers. Nor 
 are such views supported by what the Germans have so far ac- 
 complished, and still less by what the conditions are likely to be as 
 time passes. 
 
 Granting Germany's marvelous military organization and her 
 vast supplies of men and ammunitions, is it not obvious that the 
 Allies' resources are still greater and that they are increasing at a 
 pace that Germany cannot possibly follow? As for Germany's 
 successes to date, they point to ultimate defeat rather than to 
 victory. In the West she has utterly failed to accomplish what was 
 so essential to her final success. Her quick advance toward Paris 
 at the beginning of the war was made possible primarily because 
 of the inability of the French to mobilize as fast as their enemy and 
 because, despite many warnings, the French doubted that Germany 
 would commit so great an international crime as the violation 
 of Belgium and, in consequence, massed their troops at their eastern 
 frontier. As soon, however, as sufificient forces could be brought 
 together, and with the assistance of a handful of English troops, the 
 advance was turned into a disastrous retreat. 
 
 The Germans were then numerically superior to the French, 
 and better supplied with artillery. Is it reasonable to suppose that 
 what the Germans were unable to perform under such favorable 
 conditions can be done now when the numerical superiority of the 
 
 * A letter published in the Boston Herald, March r, igiS- 
 
Allies is every day increasing? Is it conceivable that they will do 
 in the spring with 1,000,000 English soldiers facing them what they 
 could not do last August when England had less than 100,000 men 
 at the firing line? For the last five months the Germans have 
 lost ground in the West, slowly but steadily, and the reasonable 
 assumption is that they will be unable to resist a pressure which is 
 becoming every day more severe, and which must lead eventually to 
 the evacuation of France and Belgium. In the East, Germany has 
 won several victories over the Russians, but has not Russia twice 
 invaded East Prussia? Have they not inflicted enormous losses on 
 the Germans and severe defeats on the Austrian armies and on the 
 Turks? Are they not occupying a large territory in Austria-Hun- 
 gary? Has not Germany repeatedly failed in her attempts to reach 
 Warsaw? Assuming, to favor the German side, that two Russians 
 have been disabled to one German, this would entail a relatively 
 much greater loss to the Germans, for at that rate their armies must 
 in time be completely annihilated, while Russia would still have 
 millions of men in the field. It is not to be believed that, with one 
 half of her army detained in the West, Germany can possibly defeat 
 Russia on Russian territory. 
 
 As to shortage of food, ammunition, and money, is it not certain 
 that the Allies can stand the strain longer than Germany? Unless 
 Admiral Bowles has reason to suspect that Germany is now capable 
 of developing means of attack which she has not so far been able to 
 bring into play, his statements, which are apparently based on the 
 industrial and military conditions he observed in Germany, do not 
 carry conviction. Had he traveled likewise in France and England, 
 his faith in the eventual success of Germany might have been 
 shaken. 
 
 If the above considerations, however, fail to convince one that 
 the Allies will triumph over their foes, let it be remembered that this 
 struggle is no longer between a dual or triple alliance on one side 
 and a triple entente on the other; it is a struggle between the 
 civilized world and Prussian militarism, which, through its violation 
 of Belgium and its barbarous methods of warfare, is every day 
 becoming more odious. Should the Allies be really in danger of 
 being crushed, some of the neutral nations, at least, would come to 
 their assistance. If they remain neutral now, it is because of their 
 conviction that the Allies can deal successfully with the situation. 
 That the world would tolerate a victory of Prussian militarism is 
 unthinkable, and that Prussian militarism and its allies can defeat 
 the whole world is also unthinkable. 
 
 19 
 
As for Admiral Bowles's statement that the AUies, including 
 England, " are ready to quit," who will believe him? 
 
 Cambridge, February 26. 
 
 AMERICA AND THE WAR. 
 Arguments For and Against Intervention.* 
 
 With remarkable unanimity the peoples of the neutral nations 
 have expressed their horror at the violation of Belgium and at the 
 barbarous methods of warfare of the German armies. When it 
 comes to their respective governments making any official protest, 
 however, or taking any part in the struggle, the pubUc opinion in 
 those countries appears to be sharply divided. It cannot be argued 
 that one side is more patriotic than the other; on the contrary, it 
 must be assumed that both have the welfare and honor of their 
 country equally at heart. Why, then, these opposite views? 
 
 Obviously because of a different understanding as to the merits 
 and meaning of the war and of the conditions likely to prevail in 
 the world at its conclusion according as to whether one side or the 
 other is victorious. 
 
 Those who urge their government to take no official action 
 whatsoever unless the interests of the nation are directly challenged 
 contend that the quarrel between the belligerents does not concern 
 their country; that they are not called upon to play the part of 
 policemen among warring nations; that as bystanders they may 
 witness the perpetration of a crime without any obligation on their 
 part to interfere; that any interference might draw upon them the 
 wrath of the villain and thus endanger their own peace ; that a purely 
 sentimental protest on humanitarian grounds would be foolish and 
 would do more harm than good ; that, while wishing for the success 
 of the Allies, their country should not, officially, give them any 
 assistance, even of a purely moral character, as, for instance, by 
 protesting against Germany's deeds; that it would be better for 
 them to permit a victory of Prussian militarism than to become 
 involved in the war. Theirs is obviously the " safety first " point 
 of view, but it may be asked pertinently whether the course they 
 advocate is in reality the safest one to follow, even when all moral 
 considerations are ignored and attention is given solely to the 
 peace of the nation and its commercial welfare. 
 
 * A letter published in the New York Times, April 4. ipiS- 
 20 
 
The advocates of official intervention, if only of a sentimental 
 kind, base their view on their conviction that a victory of Prussian 
 militarism would be the greatest calamity that could befall western 
 civilization, and that, should it come to pass, their country would 
 suffer greatly; that they should enter the arena rather than to 
 permit it; they contend that it is cowardly, and in the present 
 instance shortsighted, to remain outwardly indifferent onlookers to 
 a great tragedy by which an innocent nation is violated and tortured ; 
 shortsighted because, if the ruffian is permitted to complete his 
 task, the bystanders themselves may be his next victims; they 
 believe that moral obligations cannot be utterly disregarded and 
 a nation's conduct influenced only by selfish or pusillanimous 
 considerations; that their country, on the contrary, should be 
 willing to suffer pecuniary losses and other inconveniences as a 
 very small contribution to the struggle for liberty and democracy 
 throughout the world; that the Allies are at least entitled to an 
 official assurance of sympathy for the justice of their cause; that 
 moral support at least should be extended to them freely and un- 
 grudgingly; that their task should not be made more difficult by 
 official fault-finding with relatively unimportant incidents; they 
 do not believe that the neutrality of their country should be carried 
 to the point of abstaining, in face of revolting deeds, from any 
 official word or act which might be construed by Germany as 
 indicative of disapproval of her conduct, of sympathy for the cause 
 of their opponents, or even of pity for their victims; against that 
 kind of neutrality they rebel. 
 
 As representative an exponent of civic virtues as Dr. Charles 
 W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard University, is one of 
 those who hold that a Prussian victory should not be tolerated by 
 the neutral nations. Referring to President Eliot's views. Professor 
 Kuno Francke writes in an article contributed to The Fatherland : 
 
 " Many of the sympathizers with Great Britain have gone so far 
 in their blind partisanship as to become un-American. When a 
 man like President Eliot openly declares that the United States 
 could not allow Germany to vanquish the Allies, when the whole 
 drift of his utterances proves that he considers loyalty to German 
 ideals and sympathy with the German cause as incompatible with 
 loyalty to America, this fact alone is sufficient to show that partisan- 
 ship for the Allies tempts even recognized leaders of American public 
 opinion into views contrary to American interests and American 
 ideals." 
 
 A newspaper expressing approval of Professor Francke's 
 
 21 
 
views writes: "Turning reason's searchlight on the too English 
 sympathies of many of our citizens, he shows them in their essence 
 un-American." 
 
 Another paper, in commending some remarks of Lord Bryce 
 on the neutrality of the United States, expresses itself as follows: 
 
 " Lord Bryce's statement in the London Chronicle on the posi- 
 tion of the United States in reference to the war should put to shame 
 those Americans who have been clamoring that we should ' do 
 something ' about the violation of Belgium's neutrality and 
 flagrant breaches of recognized rules of war." 
 
 Such assertions should be vigorously challenged. By what 
 perverted mental process can it be argued that in being guided by 
 considerations of a high moral order and by unselfish and devoted 
 love for one's country in making up one's mind on a question of 
 supreme importance, and then to express one's views fearlessly, is 
 un-American and shameful? Is it not, on the contrary, in keeping 
 with the dictates of true Americanism? These men believe, with 
 the rest of mankind, exclusive of Germany and her allies, that the 
 crucifixion of Belgium is a blot on the history of Germany that 
 time even will not efface; but they believe also that the attitude 
 of the neutral nations which, like Pontius Pilate, wash their hands 
 of the criminal deed, is a blot on civilization itself. 
 
 Cambridge, March ii, 191 5. 
 
 THE ISSUE OF THE WAR.* 
 
 While the great majority of neutral observers of the present war 
 believe that the Allies will eventually win, many statements have 
 recently appeared in the newspapers pointing to a German victory. 
 We are told that Germany still possesses great aggressive power and 
 large stores of food and ammunition ; that she is building hundreds of 
 submarines and hundreds of Zeppelins to be used in the conquest 
 of England; that millions of men are still to be sent to the front; 
 that Russia will soon be beaten, or that she will betray her allies and 
 conclude a separate peace; that the defeat of France will promptly 
 follow, and that England, deprived of the assistance of her allies, 
 will in turn succumb. 
 
 A little reflection suffices to show the unsoundness of these 
 
 * A letter published in the New York Sun, April 13, 19 1 5- 
 22 
 
arguments and, in some instances, their fantastic character. That 
 the resources of the AlHes in money, food, and ammunition are 
 vastly superior to those of Germany, Austria, and Turkey is a fact 
 that cannot be reasonably refuted. As for men, it has been declared 
 that Germany could still send 14,000,000 against her enemies. Let 
 us assume, for the sake of argument, that it is a possible thing for a 
 country to prepare for actual warfare twenty per cent, of its entire 
 population. Germany, Austria, and Turkey have a total population 
 of some 139,000,000, while England, France, Russia, and Servia have 
 a combined population of 248,000,000. If Germany can send to the 
 battlefield twenty per cent, of her population, so can the other 
 nations. It is not to be argued that France, England, and Russia 
 are not ready to make as great sacrifices as their enemies, or that 
 they lack the will or means to mobilize as large a proportion of their 
 population. They may not be able to do it as quickly, but that they 
 could eventually do it is not to be doubted. There would, then, be 
 27,000,000 men on the Teutonic side against 49,000,000 on the side 
 of the Allies. Of course, these figures are absurd ; they are given here 
 solely to show that there is little comfort for German sympathizers 
 in this kind of talk. 
 
 And so it is with the hundreds of Zeppelins and of submarines 
 said to be in process of construction. Leaving the realms of fancy, 
 it will be realized that the best Germany will probably be able to do 
 will be to manufacture these implements fast enough to replace 
 those destroyed. Nor is there any reason to anticipate that her 
 warfare in this direction will be in the future more effective than 
 it has been in the past. If Germany had it in her power to use her 
 Zeppelins and submarines so as to strike telling blows at her enemies, 
 who would believe for an instant that she would have been con- 
 tented these eight months with the sinking of a few merchant ships 
 and the killing of a few women and children? Ships will continue to 
 be torpedoed from time to time, but the British fleet will not be 
 destroyed; more women and children will undoubtedly be murdered, 
 but neither England nor France will be laid bare by the bombs 
 of the German Zeppelins. 
 
 In regard to Russia's early defeat, the assertion is absolutely 
 without support, while the contention that she is to prove traitor 
 and abandon her allies is so obviously part of the German propa- 
 ganda intended to create distrust and discord among the Allies as 
 hardly to deserve consideration. 
 
 The facts are that Germany probably has in the East some 
 2,000,000 men facing three or four million Russians, and that 
 
 23 
 
in the West she has likewise some 2,000,000 soldiers opposed by 
 3,000,000 Frenchmen and 1,000,000 Belgians and British, the latter 
 soon to be strongly reenforced. It may be reasonably assumed that 
 all belligerent countries will be able for some time to come to fill the 
 gaps in their armies as fast as they occur, but in time the supply 
 must become exhausted, when, assuming equal losses on both sides, 
 the German armies must of necessity be annihilated, while millions 
 of Allies would still remain in the field ; and it seems inevitable that 
 the supply of new recruits must give out in Germany before the 
 Allies have exhausted theirs. 
 
 No mention is here made of the armies of Austria and of Turkey 
 because additional available millions of Russian troops will un- 
 doubtedly be able to complete the defeat of these half -beaten armies. 
 
 Those to whom these facts are unwelcome will find little comfort 
 in the hope that the Germans will achieve victory in the face of these 
 great odds because of greater strategic skill, greater bravery, or 
 what not, seeing that such hope would have no foundation. The 
 days of a possible theatrical drive to Paris, followed by a rush to 
 Petrograd, have passed. The German forces are divided between 
 the East and the West, and divided they must remain to the end of 
 the war. Admitting that the combined forces of Germany and 
 Austria could crush Russia on the one hand, or England and 
 France on the other, divided the task is beyond their power. 
 
 As for the neutral nations, if some of them cease to be neutral , 
 as some probably will, it is almost certain that they will join the 
 ranks of the Allies. 
 
 It may appear presumptuous for one who is not a military 
 expert to venture a prediction as to the outcome of the European 
 struggle, but the statements of military specialists have been so wild 
 or so absolutely non-committal as to be of little assistance to laymen, 
 and it seems permissible to express an opinion based on common 
 sense and on the rational belief that a coalition of 248,000,000 people 
 with greater resources, the command of the sea, equal strategic 
 skills equal courage, and equal determination cannot be defeated 
 by a coalition of 139,000,000 people. 
 
 It should also be borne in mind that the Allies have the hearty 
 moral support of practically all the neutral nations, and the great 
 importance of that " asset " is not to be overlooked. The soldiers of 
 the Allies are inspired by the knowledge that their victory will be 
 acclaimed with rejoicing by the neutral nations and that they will be 
 hailed as the liberators of the world from the odious Teutonic 
 menace. The German soldiers, on the contrary, must fight with 
 
 24 
 
the courage of desperation while conscious that if they win they will 
 have to live surrounded by nations in which their conduct has 
 inspired horror, and which by brute force only can be prevented from 
 rising against them, a vision of victory hardly less disheartening 
 than that of defeat. 
 
 In view of the above considerations, it is difficult to escape the 
 conclusion that, barring dissensions among the Allies, or a premature 
 peace caused by weariness of war, if the Allies decide to play the 
 terrible game to its bitter end their eventual and complete victory 
 is practically a mathematical certainty. 
 
 Cambridge, Mass., April ii. 
 
 ITALY'S DUTY.* 
 
 In a recently published letter, Prof. John W. Burgess proves 
 his proficiency in German kultur and his ability to use the methods 
 peculiar to German mentality, but, like other German apologists, he 
 utterly fails to prove his contentions. 
 
 Professor Burgess claims that the dictates of honor compel 
 Italy to take sides in this war with her former allies, Germany and 
 Austria; that to cast her lot with Great Britain, France, and Russia 
 " would be a deed of dishonor so deep and damning," he writes, that 
 he will never be able to persuade himself that she will do it until 
 it is actually done. For her to join the Allies, we are further told, 
 would be " infamy." 
 
 All this is obviously German " mentalism " pure and simple, if 
 I may be permitted to coin the word. What are the facts? For 
 many years an alliance has existed between Germany, Austria, and 
 Italy by which Italy was bound to come to the assistance of her 
 allies in the event of the latter being attacked. In the summer 
 of 1914 Germany and Austria, without consulting Italy, forced upon 
 the world the most aggressive, brutal, and unjust of wars. Italy 
 did not deviate from the " path of honor," nor did she commit an 
 infamy in refusing to help Germany and Austria in their odious 
 designs. Since then Prussian militarism has been stripped of all 
 vestiges of disguise and now stands before the world in its hideous 
 nakedness, an object of universal horror. In refusing to reconsider 
 her decision Italy is not deviating from the path of honor, nor would 
 she commit an infamy should she join the Allies. Indeed, a few 
 
 * Not previously published. 
 25 
 
more incidents like the sinking of the Falaha and it will be un- 
 justifiable for any nation not to help bringing the guilty ones to 
 terms. 
 
 When our associates become outlaws, it is not following the 
 path of honor to remain in their company, nor is it infamy to help 
 others in putting an end to their criminal deeds. 
 
 Passing to purely selfish considerations, by which, according 
 to Professor Burgess, Italy should also be guided, we are told that 
 her interests clearly demand that she should join her old allies. 
 Even the unkuUured may see that in the event of a German 
 victory Italy might gain by being on her side, but what if the Allies 
 should win? And it is quite possible that Italy believes with others 
 that victory for the Allies will be the probable outcome of the 
 struggle. 
 
 Professor Burgess ventures the opinion that if a Cavour were 
 guiding the destinies of Italy that country would cast her fortunes 
 with the Teutonic peoples. Few students of Italy, and especially 
 of the life of her great statesman, will, I believe, share Professor 
 Burgess' view. 
 Cambridge, Mass., April 12, 1915. 
 
 PRUSSIAN MILITARISM AND BRITISH NAVALISM.* 
 
 In a widely published letter to Ernest Ludwig, Consul for 
 Austria-Hungary, Count Albert Apponyi, at one time Hungarian 
 Minister of Education, joins the ranks of the German apologists 
 in an attempt to convince the American people that they misplaced 
 their sympathy in taking sides with the Allies. The Count confesses 
 " that a feeling of irritation against the Great Republic spreads both 
 in Austria as well as Germany," and he fears that the United States 
 has " irretrievably lost the confidence of one belligerent party." 
 " What sort of spell," he asks, " has been cast upon the American 
 mind that it should fail to perceive matters so obvious, so clear? " 
 The war has been forced upon Germany and her allies " by the 
 sacred duty of self-defense against wanton aggression." 
 
 As was the case with other champions of the German cause, 
 Count Apponyi's plea will serve only to strengthen the belief of the 
 American people that they were right in their condemnation of 
 Germany's aims and methods. When will the apologists for in- 
 
 * A letter published in The Nation, April 29, 1915. 
 26 
 
famous deeds realize that Prussian militarism has been stripped of 
 every vestige of disguise it ever wore, and that most of the stripping 
 has been done by its very defenders; that it now stands before the 
 world in its hideous nakedness, and that any attempt at robing it 
 again in its tattered clothes will be futile? 
 
 Count Apponyi would have the world believe that it stands in 
 greater danger from what he chooses to call " English navalism " 
 than from Prussian militarism. Unfortunately for the Count's 
 appeal, the world knows what Prussian militarism stands for, 
 what it is capable of doing, and what it would undoubtedly do 
 should it be victorious in the war. As for England's great strength 
 on the sea, which is so essential to her very existence, the world may 
 thank the gods for it, since it would otherwise be at the mercy of 
 German Kultur. 
 
 Between English navalism and German militarism, the world 
 does not hesitate. It knows the latter to be malignant, while be- 
 lieving the danger of the former to exist only in Teutonic minds. 
 
 Cambridge, Mass., April i6. 
 
 27 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 GERMANY AND THE EUROPL^f, "^Z. ^^?^^ * 
 
 By Albert Sauveur. 
 
 A brief consideration of Germany's claims under the following 
 captions: Claim I, Germany was not the aggressor; Claim II, 
 French aggression; Claim III, English aggression; Claim IV, 
 Russian aggression; Claim V, Germany is fighting to protect 
 Europe from Slavic domination; Claim VI, Germany is fighting 
 for civilization; Claim VII, The invasion of Belgium by Germany 
 was justifiable; Claim VIII, The methods used by the Germans 
 in conducting the war are justifiable. 
 
 The proceeds from the sale of this pamphlet are contributed to 
 the funds being raised for the Belgium refugees. 
 
 Copies may be obtained from the author, Cambridge, Mass., or 
 from the Harvard Co-operative Society, Harvard Square, Cam- 
 bridge, Mass. Price, 35 cents. 
 
 Extract from a letter of the Belgian minister at Washington, 
 dated January 27, 1915 (reproduced by permission of M. Havenith) : 
 
 " I have read with the greatest interest your publication on 
 ' Germany and the European War ' which you forwarded to me 
 with your letter of the twenty-fourth of this month. 
 
 " Permit me to offer you my sincere congratulations on this 
 clear, precise, and keen exposition of German diplomacy. 
 
 " I should be happy to help distribute it. I believe that this 
 pamphlet should not only be sold for charitable purposes, but ought 
 to be sent free, in large quantities, all over the United States. I 
 am quite ready to send it, with my recommendation, to all the 
 Belgian consuls, to professors, colleges, clubs, and the clergy, and, 
 in short, to give it a wide circulation." 
 
 (Signed) The Belgian Minister. 
 (E. Havenith.) 
 
 This pamphlet has been translated into French and published 
 with an introduction by Henri Le Chatelier, member of the 
 Academie des Sciences. Copies of the French translation may be 
 obtained from Bloud et Gay, 7 Place Saint-Sulpice, Paris. Price, 
 15 cents. 
 
 28 
 
 SAMUEL USHER 
 BOSTON