Gass Book 1 ^ i THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 1870-1914 THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 1870-1914 BY CHARLES SEYMOUR, Ph.D. PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN YALE COLLEGE NEW HAVEN YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS LONDON • HUMPHREY MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS MDCCCCXVI h — The Central East— The Far East- Russia on the Pacific — Interests of Great Britain in China — The acquisition of Hong Kong — Effects of the rise of Japan — Russia, Germany, and France forbid Japanese acquisition of Port Arthur — The advance of Russia in Manchuria — British fears — Anglo- Japanese alliance — British hostility towards Russia during Manchurian war — Relations of Great Britain with Germany — Good feeling between the Governments preserved by Bismarck and Salis- bury — Colonial rivalry alleviated by compromises — Various treaties — Possibility of Anglo-German alliance — Sudden reversal of British policy . . 115 Chapter VII. The Diplomatic Revolution. Character of the diplomatic revolution — Change in French policy — Accession of Delcasse to power — Relations of France with Italy — Ameliorated by dismissal of Bismarck and fall of Crispi — Franco-Italian conventions — French Mediterranean policy — Mo- rocco — Delcasse 's attitude towards Great Britain — Accession of Edward VII — Commercial interests favor a Franco-British reconciliation — Efforts of Edward VII— The Convention of 1904— Effects— Settlement of African questions — Step towards the restoration of the balance of power — Tendency towards a British understanding with Russia — Is- sues between the two nations — Anglo-Russian Con- vention of 1907 — Its scope and effects — Its import- ance — Change in the international diplomatic sit- uation since 1898 — Restoration of the equilibrium 140 Chapter VIII. The Conflict op Alliances. Effect of the diplomatic revolution upon German policy — Germany convinced of necessity of maintaining diplomatic prestige of the Empire — Belief that Ger- many's position was threatened by new attitude of France — Necessity of reinforcing German pres- TABLE OF CONTENTS xiii PAGE tige after 1904 — The Moroccan affair— Disembark- ation of the Kaiser at Tangier — Veto placed upon French Moroccan policy — Resignation of Del- casse — Humiliation of France — The Conference of Algeciras — The Bosnian crisis — Relation to Young Turk Revolution — Austria annexes Bosnia and Herzegovina— Protests of Serbia and Russia- Overridden by Austria and Germany — Restoration of German prestige — French aggression in Mo- rocco — International conditions suitable for an- other blow on part of Germany — German gunboat Panther despatched to Agadir— German de- mands—Resisted by France who finds support in Great Britain — Circumstances in Germany not favorable for enforcing her demands — Compromise effected — Disappointment of Germany — Certainty of a renewal of the conflict .... 166 Chapter IX. The Near Eastern Question. Import- ance of the Near Eastern Question— Its character in general — Aspects of the problem in the nine- teenth century — Dismemberment of Turkey in Europe — Serbian and Grecian independence; — Later independence of Rumania and Bulgaria — Aspirations of the great Powers in the Near East- Russian interests— At first opposed by Great Brit- ain—At close of the century Anglo-Russian accord in Near East foreshadowed — Austrian interests in the Balkans — More vital in recent times — Austrian hostility towards Russia — Germany's interest in Near East resulted from world policy — Plans for development of Mesopotamia— Support given to Turkey and Austria— Importance of the Young Turk revolution— Its character— Its effects— An- nexation of Bosnia by Austria— Effect upon Serbia— Young Turk regime in Macedonia— Effect upon Bulgaria— Young Turk attitude towards xiv TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Crete — Venizelos — Policy of Greece — Young Turk opposition to Italian development in Tripoli — Italy declares war on Turkey ..... 194 Chapter X. The Balkan Wars. Significance of Italy's attack upon Turkey — Attitude of the Powers — The Italian army in Tripoli — The dead- lock — Treaty of Lausanne — Attitude of the Balkan States — Factors favorable to their union — The formation of the Balkan League — Hope of preserv- ing peace with Turkey — Beginning of first Balkan War — Bulgarian victories at Kirk Kilisse and Lule Burgas — Greek and Serbian successes — Peace negotiations — Renewal of the war — Turks yield — Treaty of London — Terms — Question of Albania — Effects of its settlement upon Serbian policy — Bulgarian desire for Macedonia — Attitude of Ger- many and Austria — Bulgaria attacks Serbia and Greece — Defeat of Bulgaria — Entrance of Ruma- nia — End of second Balkan War — Treaty of Bukarest — Attitude of great Powers — Especially of Austria and Germany — Teutonic Powers deter- mined to revise Balkan settlement — Necessity of a conflict with Serbia — Murder of the Archduke . 221 Chapter XI. The Crisis of 1914. Summary of inter- national conditions in 1914 — German anxiety aroused by the Triple Entente — And by the failure of German efforts to break it — Necessity of an alteration in the Balkan settlement — Circumstances favorable for action — Austrian assistance assured — Abstention of the other Powers probable — Weak- ness of Russia — Decadence of Franee — Great Brit- ain incapable of interfering on the Continent — Character of the stroke planned by Austria and Germany — In the Balkans — The Austrian note to Serbia — Character of the Austrian demands — The two impossible conditions — The Serbian reply — TABLE OF CONTENTS xv PAGE Pronounced unsatisfactory by Austria — War de- clared on Serbia — Attitude of Russia — Determined to protect Serbia — Attempts of Sir Edward Grey to find peaceable solution — International confer- ence suggested — Refused by Germany — Austria refuses to continue conversations with Russia — Austria's belief that Russia would stand aside — New formula suggested by Russia refused by Germany — Russian mobilization — Opposite effects upon Austria and Germany .... 245 Chapter XII. The Diplomatic Break. Effects of Russian mobilization — Austrian concessions — Re- sumption of conversations with Russia — Accepts principle of mediation — Contradictory attitude of Germany — The Kaiser's warning to Russia — The German ultimatum — Its character — Russia refuses to demobilize — German declaration of war on Russia — On France — Germany 's hope of peace with Great Britain — German offer of neutrality agree- ment — Refused by Great Britain — German convic- tion of British pacifism — The question of Belgian neutrality — British belief in the necessity of the independence of the Lowlands — Belgian neutrality guaranteed in 1839 — Construction of German stra- tegic lines on Belgian frontier — Germany 's demand to Belgium — Refused — Effect on British policy — German invasion of Belgium — Her justification — Great Britain enters the war — German invasion of Belgium forced by military necessity — German aggressive action in crisis of 1914 necessitated by principles of the policy adopted since 1871 . . 266 Bibliography 288 Index 295 THE DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR 1870-1914 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, was assassinated by a Serbian nationalist in the streets of the chief town of Bosnia. Doubtless not more than the merest handful of the millions who read the news on the following day, realized that the murder would carry in its train consequences of extraordinary moment. The popular mind had become accustomed to assassination of royalty. The Empress Elizabeth of Austria, King Humbert of Italy, King Carlos of Portugal, King George of Greece, had all experienced a similar fate and the international diplomatic situation had not been affected. Who could guess that this new crime would prove to be of greater significance! And yet within five weeks of the murder and apparently as a direct result, the five greatest Powers of Europe were battling in the most terrific war of history. It very soon became obvious that so great a catas- trophe could not have resulted solely from the assassination of a single man, even though he were archduke and future emperor. Other forces must have been at work, of wider scope and more vital significance. The murder was merely the occasion of the conflict, the spark igniting the magazine ; if it had not been for thirty years' accumulation of powder, there could have been no explosion. History shows 2 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR that great events find their genesis in influences which work for a long time separately and silently, bnt which when brought together by some comparatively minor factor, are powerful in their union to produce results of the utmost magnitude. So it was in the case of the war that broke out in 1914. And to comprehend, even in the most general fashion, the influences which by their combination resulted in the titanic conflict, a survey of the previous forty-five years of diplomacy is essential. Even the most superficial consideration of the generation that followed the Franco-Prussian War, leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the factor of vital significance during this period was the develop- ment of the new German Empire. It was Germany that forced the new conditions which contained the germs of the international struggle. Not that German policy was more aggressive or more nationally selfish than that of the other states ; but that simply by her entrance into the circle of great nations and by her extraordinary growth, new elements were introduced into the diplomatic situation, which were destined to result inevitably in conflict. The other states were simply passive, in the sense that they pursued their policy along much the same lines as those followed previous to 1871. Germany was the active agent. By defeating France and forcing upon her a humil- iating peace in 1871, Germany attained her political unity and at once secured a position of unquestioned weight in the councils of the great Powers. A decade later, she organized the Triple Alliance, which guar- anteed the support of Austria and Italy and soon assured to her a preponderant role in European diplomacy; by means of this coalition of the three INTRODUCTION 3 states of central Europe and despite the Dual Alliance of France and Russia which was formed in 1891, Germany practically controlled the Continent from 1882 to the end of the century. This position of primacy she utilized skillfully to secure a period of uninterrupted peace on the Conti- nent, which gave her the necessary opportunity for organizing her imperial political institutions and developing the industrial and commercial activities essential to the economic life of the nation. With increasing intensity, the Germans created new indus- tries, built up their mercantile marine, opened up new markets, laid down vessels of war, dreamed of colonies. And as a result partly of economic necessity and partly of a moral transformation that came over the Empire, German policy began to concern itself not merely with European matters, but with every- thing that went on over all the globe. It was the inauguration of Germany's ™ "World Policy." It was inevitable that the policy of the other states should be affected by the successful growth of Ger- many, and when they recognized its true significance, a new period opened in the history of European diplomacy. The more far-sighted in France and Great Britain perceived with inexorable lucidity that Germany's new policy must necessarily threaten the position of their own countries. In the face of the common danger they agreed to put an end to their traditional enmity and, together with Russia, to form a tentative combination, which was designed merely to preserve the balance of power threatened by the growth and ambitions of Germany. The latter Power, disquieted by this apparent barricade to the realiza- tion of her hopes and in order to reinforce her prestige, 4 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR adopted a policy of bluster, which was at times successful, but which culminated in welding the loose understanding between the three Powers into a comparatively solid force of opposition. Under such conditions there arose a diplomatic conflict scarcely less bitter than the war which was to succeed it. On the one side stood the Entente Powers, unalterably convinced that the development of the German world policy spelled their ultimate or their immediate ruin; on the other, Germany, equally determined in the belief that failure to win for herself a position in world affairs comparable to her influence in European matters, meant economic and national disaster. Between such opposite poles there could be no compromise. With each successive crisis the tension increased. Finally, in the summer of 1914, the strain suddenly exerted upon the thread of fate proved too severe and it snapped. If, as seems obvious, the development of Germany — military, naval, economic, national — was the essential leit-motif of the international drama which was to have such a tremendous denouement, we ought to remind ourselves briefly of the circumstances under which united Germany came into being. The founda- tion of the German Empire in 1871 was, perhaps, the greatest political fact of the nineteenth century. Both because of the immediate effects of the process of unification and because of the ultimate consequences, which were not at once revealed, any survey of recent diplomatic history must go back to the great triumph of Prussia and Bismarck in 1871. Previous to that date, Germany as a political state was non-existent. The hundred and more kingdoms, principalities, duchies and cities which were loosely INTRODUCTION 5 bound together in the German Federation, formed something more than a geographical expression, for they were sentimentally united by language and by pride in a common literature and music; but they formed nothing like a nation in the political sense. From disunion comes weakness, and all through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Germany was the prey of Europe. Although the two chief German states, Austria and Prussia, were reckoned as great Powers, their mutual jealousy had on more than one occasion left Germany impotent before the attack of a powerful foe on the east and on the west. For centuries the dream of a politically united nation had filled the minds of Germans. The dream went back to the days of Charlemagne and Frederick Barbarossa, the red-bearded emperor who, according to legend, was not dead but sleeping, and was destined to awake and reunite Teutonia and rule the world. From the time of Otto the Great, all through the Middle Ages down to the days of Wallenstein, the unity of Germany formed the subject of the most exalted plans. But whenever a definite attempt was made to transform the vision into fact, the mutual hatred of the warring German states proved disas- trous and the dream of union was never realized. The forces of disintegration always triumphed over those of consolidation. "With the fall of Napoleon, it seemed for a moment as though the hope of unification might be fulfilled. The burst of patriotism which informed the war of liberation against the French Emperor was enforced by the conviction that the national aspiration was about to be satisfied ; the youths who pressed on from Leipsic, driving the French across the Rhine, fought 6 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR the more fiercely in the belief that they were fighting for a united Fatherland. The stirring war songs of the period are all imbued with the idea that once Germany was freed from the foreign yoke, she would be united. But the hopes of the peoples were deceived by the princes. The popular enthusiasm for national unity based upon liberalism was not in accord with the designs of the diplomats and sovereigns who planned the map of Europe in 1815, and Germany was left disunited. A generation later, in 1848, the German Liberals made another effort to attain national unity. For the moment the reactionary Austrian Government was paralyzed by a revolution which spread through all the Hapsburg possessions; the King of Prussia was intimidated by the Berlin mob; and the Liberals, meeting at Frankfort, had free hand. But their attempt was again frustrated by the opposition of the princes. Austria, which soon recovered her control and stamped out revolution, refused to sanction a centralized Germany founded upon liberal principles. And the King of Prussia would not take the imperial crown from the hands of the people, " picked up out of the mud," as he said; he would reign as emperor only by the grace of God and at the invitation of his fellow princes. The failure of the German Liberals in 1848 was succeeded by the far different method of Bismarck, which ultimately proved successful, although the cost was great. The Liberals had hoped that unification might be accomplished peacefully through a national Parliament, representing the German people, and that the result would be a liberal confederation, not unlike the United States of America. In the mind of Bis- INTRODUCTION 7 marck, the sole means of union was to be found in the Prussian King and army. Austria, the great stumbling-block to unity, must be driven out of Germany by war; the other German states must be compelled by force to accept union under the Prussian domination. With the strongest army in Europe as his instrument, Bismarck carried this policy into effect by means of three wars : the war of 1864 with Denmark, of 1866 with Austria, and of 1870 with France. It was in 1862 that Bismarck was called to minis- terial power in Prussia, and he lost no time in developing his policy. Under William I, who had been a soldier from his youth and had made the campaigns against Napoleon, the Prussian army had been thor- oughly reorganized, and offered to the diplomacy of the new minister the material force necessary for the success of his plans. A quarrel that sprang up in 1863 between the King of Denmark and the German states, over the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein, presented the opportunity he desired. Persuading Austria to act with Prussia, Bismarck brought on a war with Denmark in 1864, in which the smaller Power was naturally overwhelmed. Denmark sur- rendered the two duchies to the rulers of Austria and Prussia. Realizing that so long as Austria remained a member of the German Confederation, Prussia could not hope to unify Germany under her own control, Bismarck did not seek to prevent the quarrel that soon developed over the disposition of Schleswig and Holstein. In both his military and diplomatic arrangements he was thoroughly prepared for the struggle with Austria that was to decide the hegemony of Germany. The Prussian army had been brought to the highest degree 8 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR of efficiency by the Minister of War, Roon, and was led by that master of strategy, Moltke. Bismarck had received from Napoleon III a guarantee of benevolent neutrality, in return for vague promises of compen- sation for France along the Rhine. He obtained the active assistance of Italy in his attack upon Austria by promising that Italy should win the province of Venetia. The war with Austria, which broke forth in 1866, was brief and decisive ; it completely fulfilled the hopes of Bismarck. Austria, defeated in a seven weeks' campaign and with her main army crushed at Sadowa, agreed to withdraw from the German Confederation, and allow Prussia to organize a centralized union of the North German states under Prussian domination. Hannover and some five smaller states were annexed to Prussia outright, despite their protests. It was the first step towards national unity ; the new North German Federation was solidly constituted and led by Prussia formed a powerful political entity. But it was incomplete. There still remained the states of South Germany, Baden, Bavaria, and Wurtemberg, who were jealous of Prussia, resentful of the position of mastery that she was securing, and who appeared determined on remaining aloof. Bismarck perceived that to bring them into the union a third war would be necessary, preferably directed against France, the national enemy of Germany ; a war in which the states of both North and South Germany should fight together side by side. By a series of diplomatic manoeuvres, which force our admiration if not our approval, and favored by the rash and bellicose attitude of the French Govern- ment, Bismarck precipitated the Franco-German War INTRODUCTION 9 in 1870. With equal skill he saw to it that the struggle was regarded as a national and not merely a Prussian quarrel, and that South Germany stood by the North German Federation. The entire country was a unit, and the sentiment of national consciousness aroused by battling against a common foe was enforced by the common victory. The brave, but ill-equipped and miserably officered French armies proved totally incapable of coping with the Germans, who were splendidly organized and directed by the genius of Moltke. Overwhelmed at Sedan in September, 1870, the French Emperor surrendered; four months later Paris capitulated, and the Provisional Government of France accepted the German terms. In order that France might be stripped of future powers of offence and defence, Alsace-Lorraine was taken from her, and she was forced to pay an indemnity of five billion francs (Treaty of Frankfort). Through this national victory over France, Bis- marck's hope of persuading the South German states to enter the union was realized. While the German guns were still thundering outside the walls of Paris, at Versailles, in the Hall of Mirrors, painted with all the scenes of the triumphs of Louis XIV, the King of Prussia was proclaimed German Emperor and accepted by the rulers of all the German states. A consolidated unified Germany, in which the principle of centralization triumphed over all factors of dis- union, became a definite fact. Thus was born in Europe a new political state, whose entrance upon the international stage was destined to have the most far-reaching consequences. The whole set of international conditions which rested upon the division of Germany disappeared. France was humil- 10 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR iated and her material power broken, at least for the moment. The creation of united Germany brought with it the completion of Italian unity, for upon the withdrawal of the French troops, which had been stationed at Rome to protect the Pope, Victor Emmanuel was able to make of Eome the capital of his kingdom. German unification also reopened the Near Eastern Question, for Bismarck, in order to win the benevolent neutrality of Russia in 1870, had agreed to her violation of the neutrality of the Black Sea, which had been guaranteed by the Treaty of Paris in 1856; Russia could once more send her warships down to the Bosphorus and again threaten Constantinople. More important than the immediate political results were the moral effects of the methods employed by Bismarck in the unification of Germany. Instead of coming through the application of liberal and nationalistic principles, as the idealists of 1815 and 1848 had hoped, it was consummated in direct contra- vention to those principles. It was the product of force not unadulterated with trickery. The theory of brute strength, of "blood and iron," had triumphed. By the incorporation of a Danish duchy, by the forcible annexation of Hannover to Prussia, by taking Alsace- Lorraine without the consent of its inhabitants, Bis- marck had frankly given effect to the doctrine that might is right. The generous nationalistic theories of the French Revolution were crushed under the fist of military armaments, and for them was substituted the good old plan, That he should take who has the power, And he should keep who can. INTRODUCTION 11 The effect upon Germany was inevitable. Having witnessed the failure of the liberal and the success of the Bismarckian method, the German people "con- ceived thereby a faith in force, a veneration of power and might that has directed in large part the subse- quent course of German life and history." 1 The material prosperity that followed upon the military and political success of Bismarck only enhanced their belief that "iron is gold." The world did not realize at once the full significance of the Prussian victory and the acceptance of Prussian methods by Germany; and the ultimate consequences of Prussian domination in Germany were not com- pletely manifested until the twentieth century. For, after securing the unification of Germany, Bismarck was careful to allay the fears caused by his methods and extraordinary success. During the twenty years that followed the birth of the German Empire, he made use of quite different weapons than those by which he had carried out his earlier policy. War and brute force had served their turn ; what he desired after the war with France was a period of uninterrupted peace in which he might consolidate the Empire and foster its economic development. Above all he was anxious to preserve the new diplomatic prestige that Germany had won on the Continent of Europe. The study of how he worked towards these ends is essential to an understanding of contemporary international relations. i Priest, Germany since 174.0, 123. CHAPTER II BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE With the successful termination of the last of the three wars that led to German unity, Bismarck com- pleted the task which so many had attempted and which he alone had been able to carry through. But his diplomatic labors were not finished, for the prob- lem which confronted him after 1871 was one of hardly less difficulty and demanded, perhaps, the exercise of even greater adroitness than all his diplomatic and military victories of the earlier period. The success of his policy in the political organization of the new Empire and the preservation of the European peace after the close of the war with France, was no less than that which he achieved in the unification of Ger- many, and it certainly affected the recent history of Europe to an equal degree. His first problem was obviously the actual consoli- dation of the new federated Germany : the translation of the forms that had been fixed in 1871 into fact. 1 The task was one of herculean character. As we observed, the states of southern Germany had always looked to Vienna for guidance and been jealous of Berlin; the victory of Prussia over Austria in 1866 had been regarded by them in the light of a national disaster. With their racial dislike and their political fear of Prussia, they were none too enthusiastic in their i Hanotaux, Histoire de la France Contemporaine, ii, 368 ; Von Poschinger, Life of the Emperor Frederick, 359. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 13 acceptance of the new Germanic constitution, which gave practical hegemony to the Hohenzollerns. 2 Bis- marck had also to face the protests of Poles, Danes, and Alsatians, who had been included in the Empire against their will and in defiance of the rights of nationality. In the North, Hanoverians complained of their annexation to Prussia ; in the South, intriguing prelates fostered the particularist elements, hoping thus to weaken the power of the State and increase that of the Church. 8 "With such factors of disruption constantly working against him, Bismarck found his policy of centraliza- tion to be one that called for all his administrative skill. He finally succeeded, and Germany became a political unit, thanks in large measure to the national victory over the traditional enemy across the Rhine, to the self-abnegation of the German princes, and to the almost universal consciousness that national strength could come only from union. But in order to succeed, peace with foreign countries was necessary and a period of international calm must be ensured. In Bismarck's opinion, Germany was ''satiated" and her interests demanded only the opportunity to absorb what she had secured. As war during the preceding period had been the essential condition of German unification, so, after 1871, the preservation of the status quo offered the only assurance of German development. 4 2 Bismarck, Eeflections and Beminiscences (ed. Butler), ii, 128; Hano- taux, op. cit., ii, 372-373; Oncken, "The German Empire," in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 137; Bourgeois, Politique Etrangere, iii, 763, 766; cf. the remark of the Wittelsbach monarch: "Ich unterwerfe mich keinem Hohenzollern, " White, Seven Great Statesmen, 463. s Bismarck, Eeflections, ii, 189, 249; Hanotaux, op. cit., ii, 369. * Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 763. 14 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR The difficulty of ensuring the preservation of the status quo, however, was not small. Notwithstanding the constant expressions emanating from the German Chancellor to the effect that the new Empire enter- tained no further military ambitions, the other states found real cause for anxiety in the rapid success of Germany, and their attitude was inevitably one of agitated watchfulness. The smaller states, having witnessed the extent and variety of Prussian annexa- tions, were not entirely reassured as to their own fate. Prussia had rendered military force the order of the day, and an atmosphere of febrile anxiety resulted, especially in the countries that were impotent to defend themselves. " There is no longer any protec- tion," said one statesman, "for the small and the weak." The larger states also felt that they must be on their guard. They found a centralized political entity, based on the strongest army in the world, far less to their taste than the "impotent galaxy of squabbling states, chiefly notable for literature, art, and music, ' ' which had been the Germany of the earlier period. Such distrust was an obstacle to the fulfilment of Bismarck's sincerely pacific policy. Moreover, he had to face the special danger of disturbance which might arise from the French desire for revenge. The humiliation of defeat was not soon forgotten in France, and all chance of closing up the wound was prevented by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, which kept it an open sore. As a German historian has said, the new structure of the German Empire was burdened at the very outset by a French mortgage, as it were, since in the future every foreign foe of Germany could BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 15 reckon unconditionally upon French support. 5 It was the price paid for Alsace-Lorraine. Of this the Germans were not unaware, and the most harmless words and actions of the French filled them with the certain belief that the war of revenge would burst forth on the day when the German armies left the French soil ; nor was their conviction lessened by the speed with which the war indemnity was paid. Bis- marck realized acutely the danger that threatened, and always stood in deadly fear of the coalition of some state with France, designed to break down the new position of Germany. 6 As the best means of preventing such an anti- German coalition and of assuring a continuance of the status quo, he sought to create a diplomatic com- bination of his own. He realized the hazards of Germany's position, which was unprotected by natural frontiers of defence, and set down between three Powers with two of whom she had recently been at war ; and he considered that it was of vital importance to Germany to become one of a political alliance which would lessen the chances of an anti-Teutonic combi- nation, and which would, by intimidation, forestall any possible attempt at revenge on the part of France. During the decade that followed the unification of Germany the foreign policy of Bismarck was chiefly directed towards the creation of such an alliance. His first attempts to bring Russia and Austria into a political coalition with Germany were frustrated, largely because of the jealousy of the two first-named Powers in the Near East. Austria, however, joined b Oncken, in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 136. • Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 252. 16 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR with Germany, and in 1882 the place originally designed for Russia was taken by Italy. As early as 1870 and before the end of the war with France, Bismarck had determined that a permanent understanding, and if possible an alliance, between the three imperial Powers, Germany, Austria, and Russia, should be the keystone of his foreign policy. 7 Friendly relations with Russia were, in his opinion, natural and desirable for both Germany and Russia. They were traditional for each nation and royal family; with the exception of a brief period during the wars of Frederick the Great and the factitious alliance of Prussia with Napoleon in 1812, the Hohen- zollerns and Romanoffs had invariably recognized their mutual interests and remained on terms of close friendship. Bismarck himself had done much to bring the two states together during his stay as Ambassador in St. Petersburg, and in 1863 he had further won the good-will of the Tsar by refusing to take advantage of a Polish revolt or to aid the rebels. 8 During the war of 1870, the understanding had not been broken, for Bismarck persuaded Russia to adopt an attitude of friendly neutrality by acceding to her demand that the Treaty of Paris be abrogated so as to allow Russia to send her warships out on the Black Sea. Russia did nothing to hinder the creation of a new and powerful German state, inasmuch as her position in the Near East found compensation ; hence- forth she could again bear aid to her kinsmen in the Balkans, and find a new opportunity of menacing i Bismarck, Beflections, ii, 248, 249. 8 Benedetti, Studies in Diplomacy, 77-80; Lowe, Bismarck, i, 241- 245, 302-304. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 17 Turkey. 9 The political bonds which thus united Ger- many and Russia were drawn closer by the deep personal affection that existed between the Kaiser William and his nephew, the Tsar Alexander II. 10 To come to an understanding with Austria was, in Bismarck's opinion, no less desirable for Germany; but it proved at the outset more difficult. Two cen- turies of mutual jealousy and hostility had left traces which were not to be eradicated in a moment. The conquest of Silesia by Frederick the Great was not entirely forgotten or forgiven by Austria. The defeat of 1866 and what amounted to Austria's expulsion from Germany still rankled. And the Austrian Chancellor, Beust, had always been the bitterest foe both of Prussia and of Bismarck. The restraint displayed by Bismarck in his treat- ment of Austria after her defeat by Prussia had done much to smooth matters between the two states. 11 Austria, on her side, had raised no objections to the union of Germany under Prussian hegemony, although it was contrary to the Treaty of Prague, and Francis Joseph saluted the transformation of Germany with at least outward cordiality. 12 Bismarck's readiness to pass over the Austrian negotiations with France immediately before the Franco-German War, had also gone far to facilitate an understanding. The real obstacle to the union of Austria and Germany was to be found in the policy of Beust, who retained his o Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 785. io Schneider, L'Empereur Guillaume, iii, 312; Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 268. ii Andrews, The Historical Development of Modern Europe, ii, 251. Although defeated by Prussia, Austria had suffered no loss of territory except the surrender of Venetia to Italy. 12 Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 768. 18 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR ancient hatred of Prussia and could be bribed by no offer to enter into treaty arrangements. Bismarck determined to get rid of Beust. 13 He found his opportunity in the domestic jealousy that existed in the Austro -Hungarian Monarchy. It must not be forgotten that the Hapsburg Empire was a heterogeneous compilation of mutually hostile nationalities, of which there are three main divisions : the German, the Hungarian or Magyar, and the Slav. By a compromise reached in 1867, the German and Magyar elements divided the power to the exclusion of the Slav; but their mutual jealousy still persisted. 14 When Beust, who represented the German element and was in difficulties owing to trouble with the Slavs, refused to accept the advances of Bismarck, the latter turned to the Magyars. The Magyar party, led by Count Andrassy, saw in the German alliance an opportunity for making them- selves supreme in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They were little affected by the Prussian victory of 1866 and felt no disappointment at the exclusion of Austria from Germany. Their ambitions were directed rather to the Southeast. They were desirous first of maintaining Magyar supremacy over the Slav races in the Austrian Empire, and then of extending the hegemony of their race over the Slavs of the Balkans. An understanding with Germany would undoubtedly facilitate the success of their policy; they would agree to accept Bismarck's offers on condition that he would permit them to exploit the rich field of the Balkans. A bargain, based on such is Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 787. i* Beavan, Austrian Policy since 1867, 7 ; Steed, The Hapsburg Monarchy, passim. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 19 terms, was struck with Germany. Bismarck, who had come into contact with Andrassy through the naive mediation of Beust himself, planned with the former the overthrow of the latter. The plot succeeded, Beust was dismissed in 1871, and his place was filled by Andrassy. It meant that the new Austrian Govern- ment would renounce all claim to its German heritage, would seek compensations in the Balkans, and would enter into terms of close friendship with Germany. 15 Andrassy was the more ready to enter into Bis- marck's scheme of a triple understanding between the imperial Powers, since he sincerely desired to strike a bargain with Eussia. The chief obstruction to his policy of extending the sway of the Magyar race over the Slavs of the Danube and Balkans, was the assist- ance which they were likely to receive from Eussia. But Eussia also had her fear of difficulties with the Poles of Galicia, who were supported by Austria. Andrassy agreed to withdraw the support that the Poles had found at Vienna, on condition that Eussia would deliver the Slavs of the Danube and Balkans over to the Magyars. 16 The policy of Andrassy and Bismarck thus coincided and there resulted what historians have called the League of the Three Emperors. Bismarck counselled his Emperor to make a visit to Francis Joseph at Ischl, in August, 1871, which was returned by the latter at Salzburg. Andrassy sent the Archduke William to the Eussian manoeuvres in the summer of 1872, with the result that the Tsar consented to meet Francis Joseph and the Kaiser William at Berlin 15 White, Seven Great Statesmen, 471. See also, Thiers, Notes et Souvenirs, 92. ie Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 787-789. 20 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR in September of the same year. Other interviews followed in 1873 and the two following years, appar- ently demonstrating the permanence of the entente. 17 But the League of the Three Emperors was in no sense an alliance and hardly a league, and Bismarck found it impossible to give to it anything of real solidity. Nor could he use it as a weapon of intimi- dation against France; the French conviction that in the interviews of the Emperors were to be found a series of plots formed against them under the malign genius of Bismarck, was wholly at fault. Andrassy favored the combination solely in order to preserve the status quo in Central Europe, so that he might carry out his plan of subjugating the Slavs. He entered into the triple understanding, not to assist any movement directed against France, but simply to come to a compromise with Russia. 18 And the Tsar was by no means willing to act as Bismarck's tool in keeping France entirely disarmed and at the mercy of Germany. At the very moment of the interview at Berlin, in September, 1872, Alexander sent word to the French President, Thiers, that he had nothing to fear from what might transpire there ; and Gortcha- koff, the Russian Chancellor, said to the French Ambassador at Berlin: "We are not indifferent to your army or to your reorganization. On this point Germany has not the right to address any criticism to you. I have said, and I repeat with pleasure, that we need a strong France. ,n9 1 7 Hanotaux, France Contemporaine, i, 498 ; Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 249; Seignobos, I'Europe Contemporaine, 780. is Hanotaux, op. cit., i, 500. is Broglie, La Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron d Berlin, 47. See also, Thiers, Notes et Souvenirs, 333 ; Gavard, Le Proems d 'Arnim, 59. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 21 Bismarck's hope of definitely transforming the League of the Three Emperors into a solid alliance and guaranteeing the status quo against any disturb- ance on the part of France was thus not realized. Even the understanding that existed between the three Empires was soon destroyed by the strain of two crises. The first of these occurred in 1875, when it seemed as if war might again break out between France and Germany. The moral assistance brought by Russia to France on this occasion was such as to separate Russia and Germany. The second crisis took place in 1878 as a result of the Near Eastern situation, and brought Austria and Russia face to face in the Balkans. The hostility between the two Powers made a continuance of their understanding impossible, and forced Bismarck to recognize that his scheme of a triple imperial alliance was impracticable. The crisis of 1875 was the culmination of the policy of intimidation adopted by Bismarck with regard to France. From the moment when he opened negotia- tions in 1871, he was determined that France should be so crushed that she would be unable to lift her head against Germany for a generation. It was for this reason that he imposed a war indemnity so heavy that she was allowed four years in which to pay it, and which he later regretted as being too small. 20 It was to prevent any counter attack on the part of France that Germany took Alsace-Lorraine, which shifted the frontier from the Rhine to the Vosges and protected the states of South Germany from a sudden French invasion. The same fear of the recrudescence of France accounts for the successful demand of the 2°Gabriac, Souvenirs diplomatique* de Bussie et de I'Allemagne, 155. 22 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR German army staff that the fortress of Metz, in the midst of a district linguistically French, should be taken from her. 21 "This treaty," said Thiers of the Treaty of Frankfort, "is impregnated with the fear that France inspires in our foe. ' ' 22 Both Thiers and Bismarck ardently desired the continuance of peace, but everything that they did to ensure peace awoke mutual suspicion. To reorganize France and safeguard her national existence was the only care of the French leaders, but in the efforts made by Thiers and Gambetta to reorganize their nation, Bismarck saw preparations for an immediate war of revenge. 23 On the other hand, the French did not understand the mystery of the interviews of the three Emperors, and saw in them and in Germany's construction of forts and strategic lines, the active and brutal hand of Bismarck always threatening them. 24 As time went on, the mutual suspicion in- creased. The success of the French monarchists in ousting Thiers in 1873, seemed to the Germans to presage a crusade for the restoration of the Pope's temporal power at the very moment when Bismarck was fighting the Papacy in the Kulturkampf. Finally in 1875 the suspicion reached its culmination in a serious crisis. It was the year of the proclamation of the French Republic, and the Germans saw in this and in a vote 2i Oncken, in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 136 ; Busch, BismarcTc in the Franco-German War, ii, 341 ; Blowitz, Memoirs, 161. 22 Bourgeois, Politique Etrangere, iii, 757. 23 Von Poschinger, Life of the Emperor Frederick, 360; Gavard, Le Proces d'Arnim, 94; Hanotaux, op. cit., i, 338, 494; ii, 370; Gabriac, Souvenirs diplomatiques, 141. 24 Thiers, Liberation du Territoire, ii, 182-192. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 23 passed by the French Legislative Chambers, which increased the army of France, the clearest indication that the conflicting parties in that country were coming to an understanding in preparation for a war of revenge. In answer, Bismarck let drop a disquieting phrase to the effect that he would not wait until France was ready for war, and that he knew that she would be ready in two years. 25 In April, 1875, there was a general rustle of arms and the German Crown Prince did not conceal the fact that Berlin was filled with warlike tendencies. So far as Bismarck's intentions went, it is probable that he merely hoped to frighten France by his sabre-rattling and that he found a "pledge of peace in not allowing France the certainty of not being attacked, no matter what she did." Doubtless he hoped to warn her that any resumption of an aggressive policy on her part would not be tolerated by Germany. 26 But it is possible that the German army party, led by Moltke, were more serious in their intentions and were determined to finish once and for all with France. They doubtless believed that an eventual war was a certainty and that in eighteen months France would be able to wage it on nearly equal terms. According to one of the articles published at the time, Germany could not believe that Europe would be tranquil so long as a struggle were possible and France remained in a position to survive and recommence the duel. "Germany was troubled by the consciousness of having 25 Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 777 ; Hanotaux, op. cit., ii, 410 ; Broglie, La Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron d Berlin, 166, 182. 28 Chicken, in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 141 ; Hippeau, Eistoire diplomatique de la troisieme Republique, 84, 109. 24 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR only half crushed her enemy and of being able to defend herself only by sleeping with one eye open." 27 Whether or not the German military party were really determined to crush France at this opportunity has never been definitely established. At any rate their sentiments were thus described by Blowitz in a sensational article in the Times, which helped to wake Europe to the danger of the situation. 28 The French Foreign Minister telegraphed the fears of France to London and St. Petersburg, with the result that France was saved from the peril of a German attack, if peril there was, by the protests of England and especially of Eussia. Lord Derby instructed the British Ambas- sador at Berlin to exert his influence to calm the manifestations of war-fever in Berlin, and Queen Victoria expressed her desire that Europe should be spared serious trouble. 29 At St. Petersburg, the Tsar assured the French Ambassador that he would prevent any such attack as France feared on the part of Ger- many, and he immediately took steps to let the German Government know his sentiments. 30 Berlin at once became pacific, and the danger of war between France and Germany passed. But the crisis was* of the utmost importance, since it proved definitely that the understanding built up between the three Emperors could not be utilized for the purpose of intimidating France. And inevitably it opened a rift 27 Blowitz, Memoirs, 102, 111; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 124; Morier, Memoirs, ii, 333-345. 28 Blowitz, Memoirs, 103. 29 Hanotaux, op. cit., ii, 407; Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 775, 780; Gavard, TJn Diplomat a Londres, 242-243. so Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 188, 236 ; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 126; Hanotaux, France Contemporaine, iii, chap, iv; Daudet, Histoire diplomatique de I' Alliance Franco-Russe, 78-112. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 25 between Germany and Russia. It became clear that Germany had need of a weak France, Russia of a strong France ; so long as the degradation of France remained the keystone of Bismarck's policy, an alliance between Slav and Teuton was out of the question. This rift was widened by the ever-increasing personal animosity that existed between Bismarck and the Russian Chancellor, Gortchakoff. 81 With the Near Eastern crisis of 1878 it became a gulf. Both Austria and Russia had vital interests in the Near East and it was almost inevitable that sooner or later those interests would conflict. Russia, search- ing for an ice-free port and coveting control of the Dardanelles, looked upon Constantinople as her natural heritage. She was, moreover, the natural protector of her Slav kinsmen in the Balkans. By sentiment and policy she was impelled toward aggressive action in the Near East. Austro-Hungary, especially after her expulsion from Germany, also looked to the South- east as a field for expansion, actuated by economic as well as by political motives. When the clash with Russia came, the understanding entered into by the Tsar and Andrassy under Bismarckian auspices, was doomed. The temporary rapprochement of the two Powers in 1872 resulted from the desire of each to have a free hand with which to deal with internal difficulties. The domestic problems of each Empire demanded a more prompt solution than the questions of foreign policy which sometime must separate Russia and Austria. For the moment the maintenance of the status quo in the Orient was as desirable as in the Occident, and like Bismarck, Andrassy sought it in 81 Bismarck, Beflections, ii, 114; Hanotaux, op. cit., 497. 26 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR the Russian understanding. 32 But although the chances of conflict between Austria and Russia were thus laid aside, they were not destroyed, and in 1878 the clash of their Near Eastern ambitions took place, and definitely terminated Bismarck's hope of a triple imperial alliance. For many years the decadence of the Turkish Empire had presented the most difficult problem con- fronting Europe ; Ottoman weakness was a temptation to the greed of the great Powers, and Turkey's treat- ment of her Christian subjects a constant provocation. In fear of the results, should its Empire go to pieces, Great Britain and France had saved it from Russia in 1855, and the Treaty of Paris had proclaimed the sacredness of its integrity. Turkish decadence, how- ever, could not be remedied. The finances of the Porte were chaotic, sustained only by paper currency and foreign loans ; its administration was weak and at the same time tyrannical. Finally in 1875, a revolt began in Bosnia, which had its origin in the misery dealt out by the Turkish governors and in the hope offered by Turkish weakness. For two years the Powers of Europe sought vainly to arrange matters between the Sultan and his Chris- tian subjects ; the rebellion could not be checked, and spread until it included most of the Balkan provinces. Finally, in 1877, after receiving repeated appeals for assistance from her Slavic kinsmen, Russia declared war on Turkey, in order to bring them aid. 83 The 32 Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 790; Hanotaux, op. cit., 380. 33 Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, iv, passim; Phillips, Modern Europe, 494-505; Bourgeois, op. cit., 793-799; for the causes of the war, Songeon, Histoire de la Bulgarie, 332 sq. ; for its course, Kiistow, Der Krieg in der Turtcei. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 27 campaign was long and bloody. At first the Russians were unable to make headway against the valiant and intelligent resistance of the Turks, but in the spring of 1878 they broke down their obstinate defence by force of numbers. They advanced to within cannon- shot of Constantinople, and there dictated the terms of the peace (San Stefano). 34 According to the treaty, Turkey in Europe was dismembered. She retained only a narrow and broken strip of territory from the Bosphorus to the Adriatic, and was forced to see the rest of the Balkan Peninsula divided up on paper between Bulgaria, Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro, the first-named receiving Rumelia to the south and most of Macedonia. But Russia had counted without the other Powers, and her partition of the Balkans was not allowed to go into effect. Great Britain was absolutely opposed to the division of the Turkish Empire among the Balkan states, and especially disliked the enormous accession of territory provided for Bulgaria; the Balkan Principalities would be, in her opinion, simply clients of the Tsar who had freed them ; the more their power was increased, the greater would be the influence of Russia in the Near East. 35 Nor was Austria inclined to allow her pathway to the iEgean and lower Adriatic to be barred and her influence in the Balkans nullified by the threatened protectorate of Russia over the Slavic states. Realizing the determination of the two Powers, s^Seignobos, L'Europe Contemporaine, 602, 782-784; Phillips, op. cit., 514-515; Hippeau, Histoire diplomatique de la troisidme Republique, 181-197. 35 Circular despatch of Lord Salisbury, April 1, 1878, published in Anmial Begister, 1878, Appendix; Hippeau, op. cit., 176. 28 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OP THE WAR Russia did not insist upon the acceptance of her scheme and agreed that the Treaty of San Stefano should be discussed and revised at an international congress. A few months later she saw her plan torn to pieces by the Congress of Berlin, which settled the matter in July, 1878. 36 Turkey retained the larger part of her former European possessions, and although Rumania was granted absolute independence and Bulgaria became an autonomous tributary princi- pality, the latter did not receive Macedonia nor even Eastern Rumelia. The power of Russia's proteges was thus not increased as she had hoped, and she was at the same time forced to witness the development of Austrian plans for control in the Balkans, since Austria received permission to occupy and administer the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 37 Once more, as in the time of the Crimean War, Russian schemes for predominant influence in the peninsula were blocked. After this diplomatic conflict of Austria and Russia, a continuance of the understanding between the three Empires was extremely difficult, and its development into an alliance impossible. The irreconcilable inter- ests of Austria and Russia in the Near East were laid bare and any compromise between the two Powers was obviously out of the question. The relations between Russia and Germany were also embittered. 38 Russia, in her vexation at the result of the Berlin Congress, saw the explanation of her diplomatic 38 Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 233-236; Andrews, op. tit., ii, 321-323; Cahuet, La Question d'Orient, 399 sq. 37 The text of the treaty is printed in Annual Register, 1878, Appen- dix; cf. Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de I'Europe, ii, 515? 38 Oncken, in Cambridge Modem History, xii, 143. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 29 defeat in what she believed to be the underhand intrigues of Germany. The ill-feeling that already- existed between Bismarck and Gortchakoff was heightened; the Eussian Chancellor called the Con- gress the " darkest episode in his career," and laid the blame entirely upon Bismarck. 39 Russian feeling was not entirely justified by the actual facts. It does not appear that Bismarck took sides against Russia in the Congress, and he was apparently sincere when he professed his absolute indifference to the Eastern Question, saying that "it was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier." Furthermore, it was certainly in consonance with his general policy not to offend Russia; so that we may believe that he really did his utmost at Berlin to play the role of "the honest broker," as he professed. 40 But it was impossible to convince Russia that Ger- many had not acted as agent for Austrian ambitions in the Near East. The Russian press covered Bis- marck with invective and frankly called him a traitor ; members of the Russian royal family passing through Berlin refused to meet him, the Tsar protested to the Kaiser that Bismarck was an ingrate. Russian tariffs on German goods were raised, and Russian armies on the German frontier were increased. 41 Notwithstanding the wave of anti-German feeling that swept through Russia at this time, Bismarck was by no means inclined to break with a Power whose friendliness he believed to be essential for Germany; 39 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 127. 40 Von Poschinger, Life of the Emperor Frederick, 381 ; Bismarck, "Reflections, ii, 288. 4i White, Seven Great Statesmen, 476; Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 234- 236; Hohenlohe, Memoirs, ii, 427. 30 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR convinced that the display of Russian ill-humor was merely temporary and resulted from emotion, he still hoped to preserve good relations with the Slav state. But he could not fail to realize that the break between Eussia and Austria was definite, for it rested upon the conflict of interests and not upon sentimental grounds. And he saw plainly that Germany must choose between Russia and Austria, for she could not be the ally of both. 42 Not without difficulty he decided at last that the Austrian alliance would be more useful to Germany than the Russian. Despite the protests of the old Kaiser William, who could not but feel that alliance with Austria meant an ultimate break with Russia, and was only persuaded by Bismarck's threat of resignation, the German Chancellor *at once made advances to Andrassy. They were acceptable to the Austro-Hungarian Government, and in October, 1879, a defensive alliance was signed between the two Powers. 43 According to the terms of the treaty, which were secret, if either Austria or Germany were attacked by Russia they were bound to lend each other recip- rocal aid with the whole of their forces, and not to conclude peace, except jointly and in agreement. If one of them were attacked by another Power, the Ally was to observe an attitude of benevolent neutrality; and if the attacking Power were supported by Russia, the obligation of reciprocal help would come into force 42 Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 255-257; Buseh, Diary, ii, 223; Hanotaux, op. cit., i, 498. 43 Correspondence of William I and Bismarck (ed. Ford), ii, 200-202; Busch, Diary, ii, 475-489; Bismarck, "Reflections, ii, 266, 268; Oncken, in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 144. The text of the treaty is printed in Price, Diplomatic History of the War, 273-274. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 31 and the war would be waged jointly until the joint conclusion of peace. " By the conclusion of the alliance with Austria, Bismarck received the guarantee that he had been seeking against an attempt at revenge on the part of France. Should France dare to attack Germany, he was assured of Austrian neutrality, and if France secured the assistance of Russia against Germany, he was certain of Austrian assistance. The position that Germany had won by the Peace of Frankfort was thus stamped with the character of stability and perma- nence. Bismarck, however, was not satisfied with the new combination and sought to render it stronger by the inclusion of a third Power. As he could not make assurance doubly sure by the inclusion of Russia he turned to the south and determined that the place that Russia was to have occupied, should be taken by Italy. The adhesion of Italy to the Austro-German pact would set up in Central Europe a solid block of Powers, sufficient to maintain the status quo against any opposing group that could be marshalled against them. That Italy should have consented to enter the Teutonic alliance seems at first glance anomalous. A Latin Power, her racial sympathies were naturally with France; moreover she owed to France her first advance towards national unity, since it was Napoleon who had driven the Austrians out of Lombardy in 1796 and later brought the whole peninsula under his suzerainty; to his genius Italy owed her civil and economic organization. Napoleon III had enabled Italy again to free herself from Austrian misrule in 1859, and establish her independence under Victor Emmanuel. It is true that the relations of Italy with Prussia 32 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR had been close in 1866 and that it was only .through Prussian assistance that Italy had finally won Venetia. 44 But Italian gratitude was largely de- stroyed when Prussia imposed a peace that left the Trentino and Trieste in the hands of Austria. Italy had always regarded Austria as the traditional and national foe, and the fact that the Hapsburg still held territory which was claimed as Italian, did not lessen the bitterness that informed the relations of the two states. In Italy, a party that made up by zeal for its paucity of numbers, demanded loudly and constantly that the unredeemed provinces be reclaimed by force. In Austria, on the other hand, the anti-Papal policy of the Italian Government gave offence to the powerful Catholic party. Furthermore, the economic and mari- time interests of the two countries clashed in the Adriatic and on the Albanian coast, and the rivalry in this quarter seemed so keen as to render an alliance a practical impossibility. But circumstances played into Bismarck's hands. Italian gratitude to France for the assistance of Napoleon III was almost obliterated by the subsequent policy of the Emperor, which the Italians considered to be calculated perfidy. After promising that Italy should be freed from the Alps to the Adriatic, he had made a treacherous peace with Francis Joseph, in 1859, leaving Venetia in Austrian hands. He had, moreover, maintained the Pope in Rome for ten years, so that it was not until the defeat of France in 1870 that the King of Italy was able to make Rome his capital. 4* Italy had entered the war of 1866 against Austria with Prussia, and although defeated on the field of battle, received Venetia as the price of her cooperation and as the result of Prussia's victory. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 33 Even after the establishment of the Third Republic, French policy continued to be ultramontane and consequently anti-Italian. At the moment when Bis- marck was winning Italian sympathies by his struggle against the Papacy, the French royalists were making noisy manifestations in favor of the reestablishment of the temporal power. The ministers who showed themselves hostile to ultramontane demonstrations were forced to resign: first Jules Favre in 1871, and then Thiers in 1873. "Our chief enemy," said the leading Italian paper, "is the Papacy, and with the Papacy, France ; that is to say the implacable enemies of Germany." 45 The identity of adversaries and consequently of interests thus pushed Italy in the direction of an understanding with Germany, and Italy began to consider the possibility of an alliance. In 1872 Prince Humbert went to Berlin, where he was received with enthusiasm by the Prussian Government and people, and in the following year Victor Emmanuel visited the capitals of Austria and Germany. In 1875, at the beginning of the war scare and while Italy was arming, Francis Joseph came to Venice, where he met the King of Italy, and thus publicly affirmed the reconciliation of the two countries. 46 Austria had done much to render a friendly understanding possible by her moderate attitude: Francis Joseph, head of the most Catholic of states, accepted the Italian occu- pation of Rome, and thus gave to the Italian ministers a guarantee that their most precious victory would ^s Feiling, Italian Policy since 1870, 4-5; Bourgeois, op. cit., iii, 770; Seignobos, op. cit., 780; King and Okey, Italy Today, 288. "Hanotaux. oq. cit., iu. 378-383. 34 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR not be contested at Vienna. 47 The Italian Govern- ment, on its side, exerted efforts to stem the tide of irredentism. Something more, however, was necessary if Italy were to overcome completely her traditional hostility towards Austria and enter into the Austro-German combination. That additional factor was furnished in 1881, largely under Bismarckian auspices. Young Italy was indulging in dreams of grandeur and it was in the Mediterranean that she hoped to realize them. Especially did she consider control of part of the North African seaboard to be essential to her strategic security as well as to her commercial development. As early as 1838 Mazzini had declared that " Northern Africa is Italy's inheritance. " 48 It was therefore with a jealous eye that she regarded the French colonial empire in Algeria, and with no secrecy that she looked forward to gaining compensation in Tunis. That province is geographically the continuation of Sicily and it adjoins Tripoli, which it was understood might be taken by Italy whenever she dared. It might have been expected that Bismarck, seeking for the friendship of Italy, would have assisted her in the conquest of the African province. But the methods of the German Chancellor were less direct, and he liked to kill two birds with one stone. He knew that the French minister, Jules Ferry, was anxious to develop the colonial policy of France and that at the Congress of Berlin the French were receiving encouragement from Great Britain to extend their African empire by the addition of Tunis. To this proposal Bismarck made no objection, and is said 47 Memorial diplomatique, October 4, 1873, 626. 4 8 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 83. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 35 to have volunteered bis cordial assent. The colonial policy of France would help to make the French forget the "gap in the Vosges," and when they were busy in Tunis they would cease to think of the Rhine frontier. At the same time the acquisition of Tunis by France would arouse such bitterness in Italy that Bismarck could undoubtedly secure the consent of the Italian Government to an alliance with Austria and.. Germany. Encouraged by Great Britain and Ger- many, Ferry sent an expedition to Tunis in 1881, and transformed it into a French protectorate. 49 Bismarck's calculations were justified by the results. At the moment when the Italian Government was over- whelmed with rage and disgust at the march stolen on them by France, Bismarck had no difficulty in persuading Italy that her interests lay in an alliance with the Teutonic Powers. The ancient enmity to Austria was forgotten in the desire for revenge on France ; impelled by pique, Italy threw herself into the compact of Germany with Austria, and in 1882 the Triple Alliance was thus formed. 50 The completion of this alliance gave to Bismarck that solid bulwark for which he had been seeking ever since the war with France. It guaranteed the diplo- matic position that Germany had won in 1871 and it strengthened it. It assured the status quo and gave to Germany free hand for the solution of her internal 4 9 Busch, Diary, ii, 475; Crispi, Memoirs, ii, 97-104; Hanotaux, op. eit., iv, 387; Despagnet, La troisieme Eepuolique et le Droit des Gens, 234; Adam, Apres I' Abandon de la Revanche, 174, sq. ; Pincm, France et Allemagne, 55; Eambaud, Le France Coloniale, 140 sq. ; Picquet, Cam- pagnes d'Afrique, 141 sq. ; White, Seven Great Statesmen, 477; Hippeau, Eistoire diplomatique de la troisieme Republique, 383-406. bo Crispi, Politica Estera, 44-47 ; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 126, 130-132; Eeventlow, Dentschlands auswartige Folitik, 8-11. 36 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE "WAR problems. A single-handed attack on Germany by- France would be the wildest chauvinistic madness; an attack in conjunction with Russia would find Germany supported by both Austria and Italy. The alliance was purely defensive, but under the circum- stances that was all that Bismarck desired; as far as foreign relations were concerned, Germany's strength was in sitting still. By means of the alliance Bismarck began to exercise what was virtually a diplomatic mastery over Europe. Both French and German historians have agreed that with it the hegemony of Germany began ; 51 the military primacy secured by the war with France, now became a political primacy. The friendliness of Spain was assured. The German tendencies of Lord Salisbury made certain the cooperation of Great Britain, which was furthermore guaranteed by the understanding between Italy and Great Britain. And even the new- born colonial aspirations of Germany did not seriously disturb the cordiality of Anglo-German relations. France was isolated and involved in bitter quarrels with Italy and Great Britain; her attention was thus distracted from the continental situation, and Bis- marck received a double assurance that he had nothing to fear from that side of the Rhine. The single cloud on the horizon was the possibility of a diplomatic combination between France and Russia. But Bismarck had perfect confidence in his ability to prevent this contingency, and he never neglected an opportunity of cultivating good feeling with Russia in order to obviate the chance of her casting in her lot with France. Although he preferred oi Oneken, in Cambridge Modern History, xii, 159 ; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 132. Cf. also, White, Seven Great Statesmen, 478. BISMARCK AND THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 37 Austria, when forced to choose between that Power and Russia, he always held to his conviction that the interests of Germany and Russia were closely allied, and that a definite breach could always be avoided. With the fall of Gortchakoff the relations of the two countries began to improve, and Bismarck was soon able, in spite of his alliance with Austria, to create what almost amounted to an understanding with the Government of the Tsar. In 1884 and 1887 he con- cluded treaties with Russia, stipulating mutual neu- trality if either Russia or Germany should be attacked by a third Power. 62 Bismarck thus reinsured the German position of preponderance against any attack by a hostile coali- tion. If France should threaten, he had a promise from Russia that she would remain neutral. So long as Germany abstained from aggressive action, there was no need to fear any assault. Secure from all danger, Germany could turn her whole energy into the organization and consolidation of her domestic political system and the development of her latent economic forces. 52 Bismarck, Reflections, ii, 271, 273; Annual Register, 1884, 300; Headlam, Bismarck, 442, 443; Keventlow, Deutschlands auswdrtige Politik, 3, 5, 18-23. CHAPTER III THE DUAL ALLIANCE The success of Bismarck's diplomacy after 1871, which isolated France and led to German primacy on the Continent through the creation of the Triple Alliance, forms, perhaps, his chief title to greatness. It is at any rate a manifestation of diplomatic skill hardly less to be admired than his earlier policy which resulted in the unification of Germany. Disappointed in his plan of an alliance of the three Empires, he had nevertheless succeeded in building up a solid coalition of the chief states of central Europe, preserved friend- ship with Russia, maintained cordial relations with Great Britain, and, by encouraging the colonial aspira- tions of France, fostered quarrels which incapacitated her for action on the Continent. The peace of Europe was secured, Germany's political supremacy was recognized, and Bismarck could proceed with his plans of internal consolidation and industrial development. But the maintenance of Germany's position was a task of extreme difficulty. Bismarckian diplomacy had succeeded, but it had sown seeds of future develop- ments that were likely to disturb the conditions upon which German primacy rested. One of the most important of these conditions was the separation of France and Russia; and the process of creating the international greatness of Germany had brought factors into play which made a diplomatic union THE DUAL ALLIANCE 39 between France and Russia a probability if not a certainty. Each Power was isolated to a greater or less extent by the conclusion of the Triple Alliance, and naturally began to look to the other for support. Each Power, furthermore, felt itself the victim of some stroke of Bismarckian diplomacy: France had been humiliated and dismembered by the Treaty of Frankfort, and although she smothered outward manifestations of the spirit of revenge, could not but regard Germany as the national enemy; Russia considered that Germany had been largely responsible for the Treaty of Berlin, which shattered her dream of control in the Near East, and on that account bore her ill-feeling. Neither Power was content to accept the verdict of these treaties as final, and sooner or later each was bound to come to the realization that the continental equilibrium could be reestablished only by a rapproche- ment. The Balkans and the spire of Strasburg cathedral were destined to dominate European politics. A glance at the map will suffice to indicate that from geographical necessity France and Russia are natural allies. The former Power, protected on the north, west and south by the sea, on the southwest by the Pyrenees, on the southeast by the Alps, finds her eastern frontier open at many points to the attack of a hostile nation. To distract the attention of an enemy advancing from that side, she has need of a friend in the East. The value and necessity of such a friendship has constantly been recognized by the rulers of France and demonstrated by the course of her international relations. 1 In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when the iDaudet, Eistoire Diplomatique de V Alliance Franco-Busse, 2-35. 40 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR national foe on her eastern frontier was Austria, France sought alliance in turn with Turkey, with Sweden, and with Brandenburg. In the eighteenth century, during the wars of Frederick the Great of Prussia, an alliance with Austria was consummated. Half a century later, Napoleon signed treaties of alliance with Russia on two separate occasions, believing that the friendship of the Power farthest east was the surest guarantee of the security of France's position and the success of her development. Similarly under the Restoration that followed the fall of Napoleon, an understanding with the Tsar helped France to regain her international prestige and embark on the enterprise that was destined to found her colonial empire in North Africa. Russia on her side had often sought alliance or friendship with France. Peter the Great realized keenly the value of French support at the time when he was endeavoring to make a modern European state out of the half -barbarous Moscovy, and many of his successors, notably Catherine II, recognized the truth of the principle that Russia had need of a strong and friendly France. The Empire of the Tsars, a half Asiatic Power, must have the assistance of a western Power if it was to play a role of importance in Euro- pean affairs. France was the nation to which it looked for assistance, for with the vast frontiers of Russia largely open to the attack of Austria and Prussia, it naturally sought support from the nation in their rear, in order to neutralize the danger. History shows that adjacent and contiguous coun- tries are often, by the fact of their geographical location, hostile to each other; those separated often have allied interests. So it was in the case of Russia THE DUAL ALLIANCE 41 and France. It is an example of what may be termed checkerboard diplomacy: all the red squares have a natural tendency to join in alliance against the black squares. Although nature and history thus presented a Franco-Russian alliance as a development to be expected and desired by both nations, there existed many obstacles to its consummation, even after Bis- marck had formed the Triple Alliance. Memories of the past hindered a cordial rapprochement. Napo- leon's capture of holy Moscow in 1812, his nephew's attack upon the Crimea in 1855, Russia's indifference to the plight of France in 1870, left vestiges of mutual bitterness in both countries. Russia remembered that Napoleon III, to avenge a fancied slight and to gain the prestige of an alliance with Great Britain, had helped to block the Slav advance towards Constanti- nople. France could not forget that her call for help in 1870 had been silenced by Bismarck's bribe of acquiescence in the tearing up of the Treaty of Paris, and that Russia for the sake of sending warships on the Black Sea, had left her to her fate. The two countries were also separated by the differ- ence in their domestic political regimes, and their Governments sometimes found it difficult to under- stand each other: France was a democratic republic, and Russia an autocratic monarchy. The radical tendencies of the French people and ministers fright- ened the Tsar and his advisers, who feared lest their holy empire might be contaminated by contact with the nation of revolutions. France on the other hand, had no sympathy with Russian political methods : the efforts of the Poles to win their freedom met with the sentimental approval, if not the material support of 42 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE "WAR Frenchmen; and Russian revolutionaries in exile not infrequently found a kindly haven of refuge in Paris. 2 The personalities and opinions of their statesmen also tended to keep the two nations apart. President Grevy, who was elected to the supreme office of France in 1879, was firmly opposed to any alliance with Russia. He argued the necessity of a period of quiet during which France might recuperate, and he feared that negotiations with Russia would alarm Germany and lead to a resumption of her menaces and possibly something worse ; nor did he believe that negotiations would result in any sort of a definite understanding. In his opinion, complete isolation was the wisest policy for France and afforded the only assurance of her peaceful renaissance. 3 On the other hand, French statesmen and diplomats were unable to secure the personal approval of the Tsar and his ministers. It did not smooth the path to friendship that a man who had publicly insulted Alexander in 1867 should become Prime Minister of France hardly more than a decade later. 4 And the representatives of France at St. Petersburg were very frequently in diplomatic hot water; more than one French Ambassador lost the favor of the Russian court by his faux pas, which created the worst impression in a circle where etiquette was of the utmost importance. 5 2 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 4. 3 Daudet, Histoire Diplomatique, 125. * M. Floquet, who had become Prime Minister, had in 1867, met the Tsar on his visit to Paris with the cry, "Vive la Pologne, " Annual Begister, 1888, 243. s Admiral Jaures, who represented France, remarked, when he was shown the portraits of the ancient Tsars, "Who are those hideous fellows?" Again in discussing Nihilism with the Minister of the Interior, he said, "You can only get out of this fix by becoming a Republic," t>audet, Histoire Diplomatique, 155. THE DUAL ALLIANCE 43 Thus, notwithstanding Bismarck's belief, which he expressed as early as 1856, that a Franco-Russian alliance was in the nature of things, the two countries remained isolated. And the elements of hostility were not unskillfully exploited by Bismarck, whose entire policy was affected by his dread of a coalition. Nevertheless, the general tendency of the two nations to come together was discernible, despite incidental factors of separation. And the same events that weakened the understanding between Germany and Russia assisted the tendency. It will not be forgotten that the understanding of the three Emperors first threatened dissolution as a result of the war scare of 1875. As we saw, the policy of intimidation employed by Bismarck towards France resulted in an atmosphere of mutual suspicion and a fear of the reopening of the Franco-German duel. In 1875 there appeared the bellicose articles in the German papers which, coupled with the increase of German armaments, seemed to presage an immediate attack upon France. The French ministers, sincerely terrified, sought the assistance of the other Powers, and particularly that of Russia. Largely because of the firm tone adopted by the Tsar on this occasion, the warlike schemes of Germany, if they existed, were not prosecuted. All through the crisis Russia encour- aged France to have no fear and to trust in Russian friendship. The Tsar, in a personal interview with the French Ambassador, told him that Russia would stand by France, that the two countries had interests in common, and that he hoped that their relations would become more and more cordial. And the Russian Chancellor, Gortchakoff, announced the assur- 44 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR ance of peace in such a way as to imply that Russia was responsible for the salvation of France. 6 The attitude assumed by Russia at this time neces- sarily threw a cloud over the German-Russian entente and increased very obviously the cordiality of Franco- Russian relations. The gratitude of the whole French nation rose to the Tsar. All the French papers expatiated upon the service done to the Republic by her friend in the East, and the President expressed the warmth of French feeling in a personal letter to the Tsar. 7 Thus the ill-considered brutality of German threats brought the Franco-Russian rapprochement into the light of possibility. The next step in the coming together of the two nations was the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Russia saw her plan of control in the Balkans torn up and notwithstanding the protestations of honesty that Bismarck uttered, she more than half suspected that Germany had been guilty of double dealing in favor of Russia's rival, Austria. At all events the crisis, which humiliated Russia in her prestige at the same time that it affected adversely her material interests, severed temporarily the bonds of German-Russian intimacy. It was a case of the farther is from Ger- many the nearer is to France, and the Russian news- papers began to advocate the French alliance with warm enthusiasm. 8 The following year saw the conclusion of the Austro-German alliance, and Russia realized plainly that Germany, having to choose between Russia and Austria, had deliberately elected « Hanotaux, Eistoire de la France Contemporaine, iii, 277; Daudet, Histoire Diplomatique, 84. 7 Hanotaux, Histoire de la France Contemporaine, iii, 285. 8 Hanotaux, Eistoire de la France Contemporaine, iv, 427. THE DUAL ALLIANCE 45 the latter Power. When in 1882 Italy signified her adhesion to the Teutonic combination, the Russian position, if not quite comparable to the isolation of France, was at any rate that of an outsider. For another decade the diplomatic skill of Bismarck was sufficient to keep Russia and France apart, and had he remained in office their ultimate rapprochement might have been postponed still longer. Notwith- standing the hostility of the journals of Russia to Germany and the uncompromising antipathy of the "Slavist" party, and despite fiscal and commercial quarrels, Bismarck managed, after 1884, to bring about a resumption of cordial relations with Russia. With tact and adroitness he showed the new Tsar, Alexander III, that monarchical Germany was likely to be a far better friend than revolutionary France. He commanded the German press to flatter and conciliate Russia on every occasion. The royal families of each nation exchanged visits, and Russian favor was secured by expelling from Berlin all persons suspected of hostility to the Government of the Tsar. 9 More significant still, Bismarck brought about a meeting of the three Emperors in 1884 at Skiernevice, which sealed the compact of reinsurance drawn up by Bismarck six months previously, and which stipulated for a benevolent neutrality in case either Germany or Russia were attacked by another Power. In 1887 this reinsurance treaty was renewed. 10 But presages of the coming revolution in diplomacy began to appear with increasing frequency. In the West, France was meditating a reinvigo ration of her s Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 134-137. loReventlow, Deutschlands auswdrtige Politih, 18-23; Daudet, His- toire Diplomatique, 169-170. 46 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR continental policy, and for this, an understanding with Russia was necessary. With the fall of Jules Ferry from power in 1885, the Government of France lost much of its ardor for colonial expansion and again took thought of the possibility of revenge on the Rhine and of reinforcing the position of France in Europe. The Radical party, which was constantly increasing in numbers, demanded a reversal of policy, leading to the renunciation of distant conquests and an alliance with some foreign Power against Germany, as the sole possible guarantee of the existence of France as a great nation. 11 Bismarck's attempt to intimidate France in 1887, by the arrest of a French commissioner of police, Schnoebele, and the passing of a law which increased the German army, only tended to augment the rising feeling against Germany and the sentiment that favored a close understanding with Russia. 12 In the following year Germany practically closed Alsace-Lorraine to French citizens and even to persons coming from France; relations between the two countries became consequently still more embittered. The spirit of nationalism which made possible the rise and popularity of Boulanger, captured the mass of the French nation, seemed likely to result in a conflict with Germany, and made an understanding with Russia still more popular. Furthermore, the retirement of President Grevy, who was always the obstinate ii Eckhardt, Berlin, Wien, 'Rom, 15 ; Due de Broglie, Discours, iii, 14, 23; Pinon, France et Allemagne, 70 sq.; Albin, Le Coup d'Agadir, 61; Eose, The Origins of the War, 100. 12 Annual Register, 1887, 213; 1888, 243; Tardieu, "La Politique Exterieure de 1 'Allemagne, " in Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangere, 1911, 73; Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 3. THE DUAL ALLIANCE 47 advocate of a policy of isolation, tended to render negotiations with Russia possible. In the latter country, notwithstanding the rein- surance treaties, friendly relations with Germany appeared less stable. A Near Eastern crisis had again separated the two nations, and the cordial support manifested by France on this occasion strengthened the idea of a Franco-Russian alliance. 13 Still greater was the effect of Bismarck's publication of the text of the Triple Alliance in 1888 ; Russia was wounded and alarmed when she discovered the extent of the preparations made against her by Austria and Germany. The new tone of intimidation adopted at this time by Bismarck, not merely towards France but towards all Europe, aroused Russian fears. Only a few days after publishing the text of the Triple Alliance, the German Chancellor, in an acrid speech, asserted the necessity of maintaining Germany's position on the Continent; his terms were so unmeasured that it seemed as though he were attempting to overawe all the PoAvers, and Russia in particular: "The fears that have arisen in the course of the present year have been caused by Russia more even than by France, chiefly through an exchange of provocations, threats, insults, and reciprocal investigations, which have occurred during the past summer in the Russian and French press. . . . God has given us on our flank the French, who are the most warlike and turbulent nation that exists, and He has permitted the development in Russia of warlike propensities which, until lately, did not manifest themselves to the same extent. . . . By means of courtesy and kind methods we may be is Annual Register, 1887, 263. 48 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR easily — too easily perhaps — influenced, but by means of threats, never. We Germans fear God and nothing else in the world. ' m In such terms Bismarck warned France and Russia to keep apart and practically asserted the mastery of Germany in Europe. Germany desired that the peace should be kept, but it must be the Pax Germanica. Whether or not the harsh and domineering attitude assumed by Bismarck would have succeeded in its purpose and frightened Russia into an avoidance of an understanding with France, cannot be deter- mined. Bismarck was sure of his ground and certain of his ability to keep the two nations permanently separated. What is certain is that at the moment when Russia was in doubt as to whether she should accept Germany's warning and shun an understanding with France, or whether she should accept the chal- lenge, the two personalities which more than anything else held Russia to Germany were removed in quick succession, the one by death, the other by disgrace. In 1888 the aged Kaiser William I died, and in March, 1890, Bismarck was dismissed. is The old Kaiser had always looked upon Russia and Prussia as natural friends, and it was largely through his influence that the two nations had not become frankly hostile after the Congress of Berlin. He had opposed the alliance with Austria because he feared that it would give umbrage to Russia, and to his last day he had worked for a close understanding with his beloved great-nephew, the Tsar. 15 To the Russophile Emperor there succeeded, after the brief hundred-day i* Annual Register, 1888, 267-269; Singer, GeschicMe des Dreibundes, 89-91 ; Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 144-145. is Schneider, L 'Emvereur Guillaume I, passim. THE DUAL ALLIANCE 49 reign of Frederick III, the youthful prince, William II, whose desires and policy were unknown quantities; Europe waited in anxiety, wondering whether he would use the enormous power bequeathed to him for peace or for war. Almost his first words seemed a threat. His acces- sion was signalized by an address to the army first of all: "I swear to remember that the eyes of my ancestors look down on me from the other world and that I shall one day have to render account to them for the glory and honor of the army." On the same day he expressed similar sentiments to the navy. It was not until three days later that he issued a proclamation to his people. ' ' Men everywhere remem- bered that his father had first addressed his people, and then his army and navy. The inference was unavoidable that the young Kaiser meant to be a Frederick the Great rather than a citizen emperor as his father had longed to be known. ' no To France and Russia, who were already agitated by the fear of a resumption of aggressive policy on the part of Germany, this army order, coming as it did, seemed to proclaim the advent of a Hohenzollern possessing all the martial traits of his forefathers and all the imprudence and recklessness of youth. Their alarm brought them closer together. At such a moment when they were anxiously awaiting some fresh manifestation of the Kaiser's intentions, arrived the news of Bismarck's dismissal (March 8, 1890). The one man who possessed the power to separate France and Russia thus disappeared. In Russia, the disgrace of Bismarck aroused not merely surprise but 18 The proclamations are printed in Elkind, The German Emperor 's Speeches, 4-7. 50 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR dismay. For despite the brutality with which the old Chancellor had fulminated against Russia in 1888, he was recognized as a force making for peace; and notwithstanding his unpopularity with the Slavist party, he was always regarded by the Tsar as a friend of Russia. With his removal from the political stage it seemed as though the ties of friendship that bound Russia and Germany were completely loosened. 17 The French were not slow to seize their opportunity and give to their relations with Russia the character they desired. In one respect these relations had been ameliorated in striking fashion even before the dismissal of Bismarck, for Russia was exceedingly grateful for the financial assistance that was given by France at the moment when Russia was seeking capital to be used in her industrial and commercial development. The aid brought by France to the Russian economic policy established a broad material basis for the political alliance that France was seeking. Previous to 1888 Russian loans had generally been floated by a small group of Berlin bankers, who remained masters of the market value of loans on Exchange. Russia was thus largely dependent upon a coterie of Prussian financiers. But in 1888 the initiative of a number of French bankers led to a change in Russian financial methods. They suggested 17 Hohenlohe (Memoirs, ii, 412, 413) says that the Grand Duke of Baden believed that the chief cause of Bismarck's disgrace was that he desired a close understanding with Eussia, even if it meant a split in the Triple Alliance. Eelations with Eussia were cool after Bismarck's fall, Ibid., ii, 428. Eambaud, on the other hand, believes (Histoire de la Russie, 825) that the retirement of Bismarck did not hasten the Dual Alliance, that it had already been forced by his brutality; in support of this thesis he quotes Caprivi, ' ' The interview of Kronstadt has simply made visible to the eyes what has long existed. ' ' THE DUAL ALLIANCE 51 that the Russian loans be floated on the French market and subscribed for by the French people. The sug- gestion was accepted by the Russian Minister of Finance, and in the same year a loan of five hundred million francs was thus floated. In the two following years other loans, amounting to more than a billion and a half, were similarly floated and were subscribed for by more than a hundred thousand persons. 18 Instead of seeing her commerce and industrial enter- prises controlled by a group of bankers, Russia became debtor to the French people. Since the number of subscribers was so large, it was impossible to manipu- late the market value of the loans to Russia's disad- vantage. To France, who was anxious to lend the money and desired the favor of Russia, and to Russia, who needed the capital and liked the terms, the arrangement was mutually satisfactory. Taking advantage of the friendliness created by the success of the loans, and the anxiety caused in Russia by the accession of "William II and the dismissal of Bismarck, the French Ministers lost no time in further improving relations with the Slav Government. In 1890 the French Minister of War placed at the disposal of Russia the great arms factory at Chatellerault. At the same time the Minister of the Interior arrested a band of Nihilists engaged in making bombs to be used against the Tsar ; nothing could have been found that would more certainly secure the gratitude of the Russian Government. The French Foreign Minister, Ribot, and the Ambassador at St. Petersburg, de Laboulaye, worked constantly for the development of the friendly feeling with Russia into an actual alliance. isDaudet, Histoire Diplomatique, 246-279, 282-297; Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 3-5; Annual Begister, 1888, 243. 52 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR "Every day the atmosphere grew more favorable. With statesmanlike perspicacity M. de Laboulaye saw that the time had come for action, and that only the approval of the people was required to bring to a successful issue these combinations, previously con- ceived in the secret councils of the two Chancelleries." 19 To win the expression of popular approval which was deemed necessary, it was essential to stage an act which would publicly make manifest the rapproche- ment of the two nations. This was effected in the summer of 1891, when the French fleet sailed to Russian waters under the command of Admiral Gervais, and on July 25, anchored off Kronstadt. The French received an enthusiastic welcome and there followed a fraternization of the sailors and officers of the two fleets which was warmly applauded both in France and in Russia. 20 The Tsar visited the French flagship and listened with uncovered head to the French band playing the national airs of the two countries : the revolutionary Marseillaise received the homage of the autocrat of the East, and the con- cord of the two countries hitherto isolated was thus symbolized. The warmth of approval which this demonstration evoked in both nations made the determination of some sort of pact inevitable. Although the existence of the alliance was not officially stated until 1896, the treaty was signed in August, 1891, nor was it then denied that the relations of France and Russia had entered upon a new phase. 21 In the following year the alliance was supplemented by a military arrangement of a is Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 11. 2°Daudet, Histoire Diplomatique, 299-314; Annual Register, 1891, 262. 2i Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 12-13. THE DUAL ALLIANCE 53 defensive character, which undoubtedly stipulated for mutual defence in case either Power should be attacked. The coming together of France and Eussia in a defensive coalition, apparently ended the diplomatic hegemony of Germany and restored the equilibrium that had been destroyed by the German victories of 1870 and the creation of the Triple Alliance. Diplo- mats in both France and Germany believed that the balance of power was recovered, and in the latter country not a few agreed with Bismarck that German supremacy would end with the rise of the opposing combination. The dismissed Chancellor from his retreat covered with bitter sarcasms the policy of the young Kaiser, who had been impotent to prevent what Bismarck had so long staved off. It is true that at first the new alliance seemed destined to have an enormous moral effect. It was not formed to satisfy the French ambition for revenge, nor could it be counted upon for the winning back of Alsace-Lorraine; in no sense could it be regarded as an offensive league against Germany. But it apparently announced to the world that the two nations were determined that their independence of action should not be shackled by German domination. 1 'It insured us in Europe a moral authority which, *\ since our defeats, had been wanting to us. It aug- mented our diplomatic value. It opened to us the field of political combinations, from which our isolation had excluded us. From mere observation, we could pass to action, thanks to the recovered balance of power." 22 22 Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 14 ; cf . Eeventlow, Deutschlands auswartige PolitiJc, 31. 54 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR But the effects of the alliance were more apparent than real, and although the two nations may have acquired a new moral authority, their combination did not affect the practical control of Germany as much as had been expected. For some years, the Allies, as Tardieu says, were too exclusively absorbed in contemplating the fact of their union, and too desirous of multiplying outward manifestations that might convince the world at large of its reality. There were without question endless official visits made and returned, and a constant interchange of congratulatory addresses; that the practical value of the alliance was enhanced by such demonstrations is by no means certain. It is undeniable that both nations played into the hands of Germany: France by allowing her foreign policy to be paralyzed by domestic dissensions ; Russia by directing her activities from Europe to Asia. It resulted that the mastery of Germany, which Europe had experienced during the latter years of the Bismarck regime, was indeed less ostentatious under William II, but it was in reality no less effective. For another decade, following the Franco-Russian alliance, Germany exercised a very actual hegemony on the Continent. The explanation for this fact, which has not always been clearly recognized, is to be sought in two directions: partly in the failure of the French and Russian diplomats clearly to define and coordinate the interests of their countries; partly in the skill with which the young German Kaiser handled the situation. To meet the new Franco-Russian combination Ger- many had an untried emperor and was deprived of THE DUAL ALLIANCE 55 the services of the veteran Bismarck, whose genius had first won for the Empire its position of supremacy, and then successfully maintained it so long as he was in office. In this difficult situation, the new sovereign, whose chief characteristic in popular judgment was an opinionated conceit combined with the ability to make bellicose speeches, displayed at once the enigma of his character and the brilliance of his diplomacy. William II was then thirty-two years of age. In him there was to be found a melange of the salient traits of his various ancestors. Born and brought up in the midst of a militaristic circle and influenced by the ancient militarist traditions of his race, he never- theless was to keep the peace for quarter of a century ; the ambition and aggressiveness of Frederick the Great was in him balanced by the caution of Frederick William I. The flighty brilliance and impetuosity of his great uncle, Frederick William IV, was offset by the power of application and laborious drudgery, characteristic of the Great Elector. Bound by the traditions of the Hohenzollerns to the Junkers and imbued with a thoroughly mediaeval spirit, he was at the same time essentially modern in his tastes and delighted in the society of bourgeois manufacturers and Hebraic capitalists. One characteristic of his family was dominant in his nature : the will to rule. The power that God had bestowed upon the monarch was not, in his opinion, to be shared. Frederick William IV had written to Bunsen: "You all have good motives in your advice to me and you are good in the execution of orders, but there are things which are revealed only to one who is king, things which as Crown Prince were withheld from me and which I have only learned 56 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR by becoming king." Such were the feelings of William II. His personal will must guide the fortunes of Germany, within the Empire and without: "He who stands in my path, him will I shatter (den zerschmettere ec/i)." It is therefore necessary to regard Germany's policy as, to a large extent, the Kaiser's policy. The influence of capitalists and Junkers, of commercials and militarists must be taken into consideration; but in the last instance it was the Kaiser who decided. To him, accordingly, must go the credit for the success of Germany's policy during the years that followed 1891, a policy marked by a subtlety, a diplomatic cleverness worthy of the founder of the Empire. For ten years he played the most delicate game, working for friendly relations with each of the new allies, diverting their attention from European matters which might give them an opportunity for working together against Germany, encouraging their feuds with other countries. The sovereign who was univer- sally regarded as the man of war thus maintained the peace so essential to German commercial development, and at the same time preserved the dominating influence of the nation, the bequest of Bismarck. 23 Instead of losing his temper over the Franco- Russian alliance, the Kaiser at once set to work to 23 Berard, La France et Guillaume II, 19-21. Dr. Sarolea {The Anglo-German Problem, 327) criticises the Kaiser for having no guiding principles in foreign policy, for being in turn Anglophile, Francophile, and Bussophile, and imparting to German diplomacy an incoherence which has been its chief weakness. But in this the Kaiser has simply followed the very traditions of his race and practised Eealpolitik. He has changed friends, but according as circumstances changed; they were merely the means to his end, and that end, German continental hegemony, he has unwaveringly pursued. THE DUAL ALLIANCE 57 rob it of its force. This could only be accomplished by maintaining friendly relations with both France and Russia and controlling them through moral suasion; he constantly exerted himself to show a studied amiability towards each Power. At the same time he drew them both into extra-European adven- tures, often in company with Germany. France was encouraged to develop her colonial policy in Africa, which since the occupation of Tunis in 1881 had embroiled her with Italy, and since the affair of Egypt in 1882, with Great Britain. Russia was supported in her penetration of Manchuria, which embittered her relations with Great Britain and was to lead to the war with Japan. With their energies thus occupied, France and Russia had no opportunity for disputing with Germany her position of supremacy upon the Continent of Europe. Both French and Russian diplomats allowed them- selves to fall in with German plans. In 1894 Gabriel Hanotaux became Foreign Minister in France, and except for a period of a few months, remained at the Quai d'Orsay until June, 1898. Brought up in the school of Ferry he was an ardent advocate of colonial expansion, considered Great Britain as the inevitable enemy of France, and turned to Germany for support. 24 The Kaiser was not slow to respond and expressed on more than one occasion his desire for an under- standing with France. In 1895 the common action taken in the Far East by Germany, France, and Russia 24 See the debates in the French Chamber of Deputies, May 31 and June 10, 1895; also cf. an obviously inspired article in Le Temps, June 19, 1895; Pinon, France et Allemagne, 90 sq.; Elkind, The German Emperor's Speeches, 48; Despagnet, La Diplomatic de la Troisieme Bepublique- et le Droit des Gens, 765. 58 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE "WAR seemed almost like the proof of a triple understanding between the Powers of the Dual Alliance and Ger- many. 25 At the same time the participation of the Russian and French fleets at the opening of the Kiel Canal emphasized the rapprochement of the two nations with Germany. In 1897 steps were taken towards a general settlement of African colonial questions; Togoland was delimited, and France and Germany seemed almost ready to develop their colonial accord into a general entente. 28 Russia and Germany, in the meantime, were going hand in hand in the establishment of their position in the Far East. 27 This political understanding so anxiously sought by Hanotaux and the colonial party in France, and approved by the pacific Tsar of Russia, was strength- ened by the tact and cordiality displayed by the Kaiser towards the defeated of 1870. On every possible occasion he assured the French of his sym- pathy and admiration; paid homage to their courage when he celebrated the anniversary of the victories over France ; expressed his grief at the death of such opponents of Germany as MacMahon, Canrobert, and Jules Simon. He visited French training ships and telegraphed his congratulations "as sailor and com- rade ' ' to France ; saw that the German exhibit at the Paris exposition was as brilliant as possible, invited French generals to visit him at the time of the German 25 Pinon, La Lutte pour la Pacifique, 76, 79 ; Reventlowj Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 82-86. 26 Albin, Le Coup d'Agadir, 82-83; for the attempt of Germany to arrange a definite entente with France in 1898 immediately before Hanotaux' resignation, see Fullerton, Problems of Power, 53. 27 Hohenlohe, Memoirs, ii, 463 ; Reventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Politik, 103. THE DUAL ALLIANCE 59 manoeuvres, and made of the French Ambassador at Berlin one of his closest intimates. 28 The result of the political and sentimental rap- prochement which the Kaiser maintained with France and Russia was to give to Germany a position of continental control. The practical effect of the Dual Alliance was destroyed by the willingness of France and Russia to follow the lines that Germany desired them to take. In France, at the inspiration of Hano- taux, the spirit of revenge was entirely forgotten in the ardor for colonies; and the development of this colonial policy seemed to demand an understanding with Germany. 29 Russia's attention was entirely directed towards the Far East. So far as its operation in Europe went, the Dual Alliance was a weapon without edge. Hence, the Kaiser might fairly claim that the diplomatic burden that had fallen from the shoulders of Bismarck had been honorably and successfully 28 Tardieu, "La Politique Exterieure de 1 'Allemagne, ' ' in Questions Actuelles de Politique Etrangere, 1911, 76-79; Pinon, France et Alle- magne, 86-90; Elkind, The German Emperor's Speeches, 50-51. Imme- diately after visiting the French training ship, Iphigenie, the Kaiser ■wired to President Loubet: "I have had the pleasure of seeing young French sailors on board the training ship Iphigenie. Their military and sympathetic conduct, worthy of their noble country, has made a deep impression on me. My heart as a sailor and comrade rejoices at the kind reception which was accorded me . . . and I congratulate myself on the fortunate circumstance which has allowed me to meet the Iphigenie and your amiable countrymen." 29 Pinon, France et Allemagne, 97; Fullerton, Problems of Power, 28-29; General Dubarail, ex-Minister of War, wrote, "The peaceful intentions which the Emperor William has manifested since his acces- sion to the throne make it our duty to take part in the celebrations at the opening of the Kiel Canal. ' ' And see also an article by Jules Simon filled with pacific spirit towards Germany, Elkind, The German Emperor's Speeches, 49. 60 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR carried. His methods and his attitude towards France were different from those of the great Chancellor, but they were no less effective. Bismarck had forced and maintained the isolation of France and Russia; the supremacy of Germany that was built up on their isolation he had made manifest constantly and at times with brutal frankness. After the fall of Bis- marck, the young Kaiser had been powerless to prevent the alliance of Eussia and France, but his tact and skill were sufficient to render it innocuous, and the new opposing combination forgot to oppose. From 1891 to the end of the century the hegemony of Germany was concealed, but it was none the less real, and German influence was still as fully in control of continental diplomacy as when Bismarck was the recognized dictator of Europe. The significance of the position occupied by Ger- many during this period is realized when we come to consider the use that she made of it. Largely because of her diplomatic control of the Continent and the peace which she had assured under conditions most favorable to her growth, Germany was enabled to pass through an extraordinary material and moral transformation. From this transformation there resulted a change in international relations which led directly to the diplomatic crises that marked the first decade of the century and finally to the general war. CHAPTER IV GERMAN WORLD POLICY: ECONOMIC FACTORS The significance of the period during which Ger- many occupied a position of virtual mastery in Europe can hardly be overestimated. It was the time when the young empire, having secured its military pre- dominance by the defeat of Austria and France and won political primacy through the creation of the Triple Alliance, began to forge ahead as a great industrial and commercial Power and even to threaten the supremacy so long held by Great Britain. Bis- marck never failed to recognize the necessity of economic prosperity to a great state, and his desire to preserve the peace after 1871 was actuated in no small degree by his ambitions for the growth of German industry and commerce. Largely for the same reason, the Kaiser William II believed it necessary to keep the destinies of Europe under German control. Their hopes were fulfilled. During the period of almost unruffled calm that followed the Treaty of Berlin in 1878, Germany passed through an economic transformation which, in conjunction with an equally significant moral transformation, was destined to exercise the most important effect upon the inter- national diplomatic situation. The almost unparalleled growth of Germany's industries, the extension of her commerce, her skill and success in competing for 62 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR markets, could not be disregarded by the nations which had hitherto held economic control in the world at large. The demand for a strong navy, for the acquisition of colonies, and for political influence outside of Europe followed inevitably in Germany and did not allay the fears of Germany's neighbors. The jealousy of German economic success and the disquiet inspired by her ambitions played no small part in determining the diplomatic revolution which occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century, and which aimed at a restoration of the political balance of power in Europe. The economic transformation of Germany which took place during the generation that followed the war with Prance surpassed in rapidity and extent any similar phenomenon that Europe had ever seen. In Japan and in certain districts of America changes as vast and as speedy were characteristic of the nineteenth century; but in the old world nothing comparable to the alteration of Germany had been experienced, not even when the loom of Arkwright and the steam engine of Watts had made of agricul- tural England the first of industrial communities. This transformation was effected in an infinity of ways; its most salient features, perhaps, were the growth of population and its shifting from the rural districts to the urban centres, the development of industry based upon applied science, the extension of foreign trade, and the creation of a gigantic mercantile marine. The most obvious, and possibly the basic fact of significance in the economic development of Germany was the enormous growth of population. The number of inhabitants dwelling in the German Empire in 1871 GERMAN WORLD POLICY 63 was approximately forty-one million. 1 Because of the new advantages that resulted from national unity, this population could be supported by the natural resources of the country with greater ease and in a higher degree of comfort than before the war with France. The benefits of more uniform legislation, the improvement in the means of communication and transportation, the security afforded by a strong national government, tended to lighten the economic burden that rested upon the working people. But these very factors combined to facilitate a rapid increase of population. The birth rate was higher in 1876 than ever before, and although the ratio of births has slowly descended since that year, the loss has been more than counteracted by the continual decrease In the death rate. Germany's population has thus grown with startling rapidity. By the end of the century,, the Empire numbered more than fifty-six million souls, and after forty years of existence it had advanced to sixty-five million, thus increasing by more than half. Obviously, the problem that the Government was forced to meet r was how to find means of support for this human increment ; sixty million persons could not live upon the same resources that had been sufficient for forty millions. 2 One obvious solution to this problem was the develop- ment of intensive agriculture; by subjecting the soil, which was often of a sterile and arid nature, to scientific treatment, it might be possible to increase vastly the agricultural output of Germany. Nor was i Statesman's Year Book, 3873, 104-106. 2 Statesman's Year Book, 1898, 1905, 1913; Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 13; 61st Congress, 2d Session, Senate Documents, no. 578, "Statistics for Great Britain, Germany, and France, 1867-1909," 151. 64 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR this line of development neglected, and the improve- ment of German agricultural methods has formed not the least of the Empire's economic triumphs. 3 But this solution was not wholly adequate, for the problem of an increased population was further complicated by the rapid shifting of population, the continual emigration from the rural districts to the towns and industrial centres. In 1871 less than a quarter of the German people resided in the towns; at the end of the century, the town population comprised nearly half of the whole. The country districts declined relatively in all parts of Germany, and in some quar- ters there was an absolute decrease of the rural population. 4 In this shifting of the centre of gravity from country to town there is to be found partly cause and partly effect of Germany's economic transfor- mation; the problem of supporting the new town population led to the growth of new activities, which in their turn tended continually to increase the influx. The rise of such new activities resulted inevitably from the growth of population. The surplus popu- lation might have sought a new home in colonies overseas, but when Germany looked abroad for spots suitable for the life of Europeans, she found that they had already been seized upon by older nations; nor was she in a position to demand that land should be granted to her for the use of her surplus population. Emigration to foreign countries or alien colonies was distasteful to Germany for sentimental and practical reasons. Germans could not endure that the Father- land should suffer the loss of vigor and vitality that comes to an emigrating nation ; they believed that the 3 Dawson, Evolution of Modern Germany, 228-237. 4 Dawson, Evolution of Modern Germany, 39, 41-43. GERMAN WORLD POLICY 65 increase in their numbers was essential to the preser- vation of their military strength; and they could not bear that foreign countries should profit by the surplus energy that Germany herself was unable to support. Emigration, accordingly, was not encouraged and after 1870 the annual loss from this cause became contin- ually less. In 1885 about 171,000 persons emigrated from Germany, but in 1898 there were only some 23,000. s Under these circumstances there remained for Ger- many but one satisfactory means of supporting her increasing population, namely, the creation of new industries and the concurrent development of foreign commerce. The growth of such new industries, both causing and resulting from the opening of foreign markets, provided employment and support for millions who otherwise would have been forced to leave Germany. The increase in number and size of new industrial enterprises was thus the essential condition of Germany's ability to offer a living to her children; in the minds of Germans, the sine qua non of German national existence. 8 Previous to the war with France and the conse- quent unification of Germany, her characteristics were without question agricultural. The establish- ment of the customs union and its inclusion of the chief German states between 1819 and 1842, proved a strong stimulus to industrial enterprise; but both political and financial conditions were unsuitable sRohrbach, German World Policies (trans. Von Mach), 16-17; Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 13; Tonnelat, L'Expansion allemande hors d'Europe, passim. e Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 14; Speech of Ambassador von Bernstorff, November 6, 1909 (published under title of The Develop- ment of Germany as a World Power). 66 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR for the encouragement of capital. So long as Ger- many remained divided and the jealousy of Austria and Prussia seemed to preclude any solid political settlement, it was hopeless to attempt the development of manufactures upon a large scale; nor were there any large banking institutions capable of standing behind industrial enterprises. Most of the manu- factured articles which we now associate with the inscription, "Made in Germany," were then imported from England and France. 7 But the national victory over France in 1871 affected the commercial no less than the political life of Germany. It led to the breaking down of the barriers that had hindered the exercise of that busi- ness initiative, acumen, and pertinacity characteristic of the German middle class. "For the first time the Germans as a nation became conscious of collective power and of the great possibilities which this power placed within their reach. A new youth — that un- speakable gift which the gods so rarely bestow upon mortals — was given to them, and with all youth's energy and ardor and audacity they plunged at once into a bold competition with neighbors of whom they had hitherto stood in a certain awe, and who in truth for their part had barely taken the young rival seriously. ' ' 8 A clear index of the growth of German industry is to be found in the activities of the banks during the years that succeeded the war. The Deutsche Bank, which was a private institution unaided by the state, i Sehierbrand, Germany : The Welding of a World Power, 98 ; States- man's Year Booh, 1850-1870, passim. s Dawson, Modern Germany, 37; Andrillon, L' Expansion de I'Alle- magne, 117. GERMAN WORLD POLICY 67 more than quadrupled its capital in a decade, advanc- ing from three millions of capital in 1870 to thirteen millions in 1880. In the former year it carried on a business that amounted to sixty millions; ten years later it had developed its business to 2500 millions and doubled its dividends ; in 1890 it did a business of 7000 millions. The state banks were equally successful, and by the increase in their capital and by its productive employment not merely gave proof of the success of German industry, but made possible its further development. 9 The astonishing growth of the mineral and metal industries is equally significant, for coal and iron are used in the other industries and the increase in the output of both is at once a cause and result of the great industrial development. The product of Germany's coal mines for the year following the war was tripled thirty years later and quadrupled in 1906 ; in Prussia this industry was sextupled between 1871 and 1905. 10 The production of iron ore showed a still more notable development, and the creation of the smelting indus- tries was rapid and successful. The amount of pig- iron produced in 1871 was less than a fifth of that put forth in 1901. Forty years ago Germany's steel output was barely half a million tons annually; in 1895 it approximated three millions, in 1902 it had advanced to seven millions, and in 1907 to twelve millions. 11 The significance of this increase is easily appreciated, for the steel trade is the industrial » Schierbrand, Germany, 100-101; Statistics for Great Britain, Ger- many, and France, 173 sq. io Statesman's Year Book, 1873, 128; 1898, 552; 1907, 1000; Statis- tics for Great Britain, Germany, and France, 156, 157. ii Statesman's Year Book, 1873, 129; 1898, 552-553; 1907, 1001. 68 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR barometer. Other indications of the economic develop- ment of Germany may be discovered in the statistics of population. It is estimated that 61 per cent of the earning population in 1843 were engaged in agricul- ture, forestry, gardening, fishing, etc. In 1882 the percentage of persons dependent upon agriculture, etc., for their livelihood had decreased to 42 per cent, and in 1895 it had further declined to 35 per cent. Not- withstanding the growth of population, the absolute number of persons engaged in agriculture was barely maintained, and practically all the increment went into the new industries. 12 This transformation is realized in more impressive fashion the more we study the growth of other economic activities, especially the electrical, textile, chemical, and toy industries. Nor can we over- emphasize the fact that it was regarded by Germans as an essential element in the existence of the Father- land as a great state. These industries, gigantic in size and infinite in number, were believed to be the sole means by which the nation could support her vastly increased population, which otherwise must perforce emigrate or starve. Germany must become a manufacturing state if she was to maintain herself upon an equality with the other Powers of Europe. Just as the German people believed themselves to be thus dependent upon their industries, so in turn did they believe that those industries were dependent upon the extension of foreign trade. The complete success of German industrial energy could never be attained nor ensured, unless it were certain of a permanent position in the markets of the world; for Germany's industries were in many cases absolutely 12 Dawson, Modern Germany, 44-46. GERMAN WORLD POLICY 69 dependent upon the raw materials supplied by other countries, and free access to oversea markets was essential to the sale of her goods. The extraordinary success of Germans in selling their goods has been no less marked than their success in producing them in the first instance. Although they came into the commercial race late and the established position of their competitors laid heavy handicaps upon them, they succeeded in outrivalling most of their economic opponents, and finally even threatened the commercial position of Great Britain. Their success has been ascribed by an authoritative writer as due in the main to one or all of three factors : the cheaper price of German goods; their superior or at least their more serviceable character ; the more efficient arrangements which the German makes for reaching and attracting purchasers. 18 All of these factors result in large measure from the fact that the German has made of his industry and commerce a science. The nations who entered the field first were not forced by competition to the development of scientific methods of production and distribution; their way being clear they proceeded in hit-or-miss fashion, and although they lost many opportunities of cheapening their goods without lessening their value, and neglected many prospective customers whom they might have secured, they still made their necessary profits. And as time went on, even with the advent of new trade rivals, they clung to their old-fashioned methods. But the Germans, if they were to overcome the start that had been gained by the older nations, were absolutely forced to the use of scientific methods both in the making of the 13 Dawson, Modern Germany, 79. 70 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR goods and in selling them. This they realized defi- nitely, with the result that the processes of manu- facturing and selling developed by the Germans, have become models for the world. That which of late years has been so characteristic of German Kultur in general — "the application of a trained intelli- gence to the practical affairs of life" — has been preeminently true of their industrial and commercial methods. Science in method has been, perhaps, the greatest reason for Germany's ability to produce goods more cheaply than her rivals. The development of mechani- cal labor-saving devices progressed further there than in any other country; and the Germans' skill in the coordination of the various processes of pro- duction has also enabled them to cut their costs. 14 Their application of the natural sciences, especially chemistry, was another factor making for economy in manufacturing methods. Every new discovery was at once investigated by the German manufacturers in the hope that it would lead to some improvement in the technical details of production and thus allow I* A correspondent wrote to the Times, April 7, 1906: "Among the chief reasons for the decrease in the British iron industry must be placed the tendency to adhere to antiquated methods of production among English manufacturers. As opposed to this the German iron- masters have known how to avail themselves fully of modern improve- ments in the technical details of the metallurgy of iron and in the practical operation of the blast furnace. In fact, though during 1905 there were fifty fewer blast furnaces in Germany than in Great Britain, the former country was able to produce no less than two million tons more of pig-iron than its rival, even with this great disadvantage in point of plant." Dawson shows (Modern Germany, 81) that in 1886 the average production of a blast furnace in Germany was 16,500 tons, but by the building of larger furnaces and improved methods the pro- duction in 1908 reached 40,000 tons. GERMAN WORLD POLICY 71 them to undersell their competitors. 16 Moreover, they were assisted by the fact that in general they could pay lower wages to their laborers and lower industrial salaries to the officers of their companies. And in the last instance they were apt to be satisfied with smaller profits ; their scale of living was lower in general than that of the French manufacturers, and almost inva- riably than that of the British manufacturers of their own station. The amount that in other countries would be spent upon luxuries was deducted from the price by the German manufacturers. 16 Besides producing cheaper articles the German learned how to make them more to the taste of his possible purchasers. He watched the effect of foreign- made articles upon purchasers, and then either imi- tated them or improved them in the details in which they did not exactly meet the desires of the customers. It has been said with insight that the German is not an inventive genius but "he excells in adaptation, which under ordinary circumstances is a gift of even greater practical value than inventiveness. The great inventors have seldom become rich men; the prizes have generally fallen to the men who have had just enough originality to recognize a good idea when they saw it, to adapt and develop it, and to turn it to immediate success." 17 It is Lavoisier, Berthallet, and Berthelot who created organic chemistry, but Germany has exploited their discoveries and made the profits. 18 In this respect the German manufacturer has been is Stiegel, Die chemische Industrie, 8. i« Schierbrand, Germany, 106. it Dawson, Modern Germany, 85. is Andrillon, L'Expansion de I'Allemagne, 120. Cf. Haller in Bevue generate des Sciences, November 30, December 15, 30, 1912. 72 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR unrivalled. He has been kept in touch with the desires of his customers by his travelling agents, and accord- ing to their instructions has modelled his goods. His own tastes have been completely sunk in those of the persons to whom he wishes to sell. He has made it his business to discover the predilections of his prospective customers and to conform to them in the manufacture of the articles designed for that particular quarter. He realized, as some of his com- petitors did not, that the secret of industrial success lay not in forcing the purchaser to buy goods with which he was not satisfied, but rather in recognizing that the purchaser had the right to know what he wanted and making it his own business to supply it. 19 Because of their adaptability the Germans had an enormous advantage over their British competitors, who were apt to refuse to change their models to suit the taste of the persons for whom they were designed. The attitude of the British was often that their articles had been made in such a style for a long time, and were not going to be changed ; if the customer did not like them, he might leave them and look for what he wanted somewhere else. Especially in South American countries and in the Par East, the Germans secured many markets simply by ornamenting their goods in a certain style, or packing them in attractive boxes which pleased the purchasers. The British failed to understand that even though their own article might be superior, other factors might be of importance. In Europe itself and in quarters where the British had the advantage of long established trade, the Germans often ousted them by their appre- ciation of the tastes of the purchasers. "Our market,' ' is Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 50, 51. GERMAN WORLD POLICY 73 the British Consul at Cherbourg wrote in 1897, "is overrun with German hardware and toys. The region lives mainly by its trade with England; and yet the shopkeepers buy nothing in England. At the big bazaar, where I asked the reason of this, the manager handed me articles in wood and fayence made in Germany from models he had given, and in sizes suited to the taste of the population, with views of Cherbourg and scenes from Norman history." 20 Even if the Germans had not possessed the com- mercial advantages resulting from cheaper goods and articles better suited to the tastes of their customers, they would have proved dangerous competitors because of their more expert salesmen. In the training of their commercial representatives, as in other respects, they took more pains and consequently achieved better results. The Government founded technical schools and mercantile colleges for the special purpose of equipping the young men with the qualities necessary for successful salesmanship. A thorough knowledge of foreign languages and a study of foreign charac- teristics and methods enabled them to enter their business career with a far better business education than that ordinarily given to young men of other countries. Upon leaving the mercantile college they were generally sent by the exporting house with which they were to be connected, on a trip around the world, or to remain for a term of years in some foreign commercial field in order to study the requirements of the country in which they were placed. 21 In this way the German commercial houses secured a trained corps of salesmen of excellent technical 20 Cited by Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 53. 2i Schierbrand, op. cit., 108; Dawson, op. cit., 92-94. 74 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR education and well acquainted with the customs and needs of the foreign market. They kept the home firm in close connection with its customers and made it their task to persuade the manufacturers to satisfy the desires of the purchasers. We need not wonder that the Germans were successful in their competition when they met the traders who still held to the antiquated method of forcing the goods of the houses they represented upon the market, regardless of the tastes of their customers. The German exporter also accommodated himself to the modes of payment habitual in foreign countries, differing from the British trader, who was apt to demand immediate settlement and through a British financial house. The German granted long credits and easy payments. Everything that could be done to win the favor of his customers was done. The British Consul at Havre wrote home : "The Germans have secured the contract for supplying the industrial school at Elbeuf with all its material. They have laid down all the machinery at a merely nominal price. . . . What was paid was for the sake of form only. . . . They have thus gained the town's good graces. And this gift will be amply requited by their obtaining the future custom of all the pupils leaving this school, who will have been accustomed to the articles, methods, tools, and skill of the Germans." 22 By the exercise of trained intelligence and scientific methods in production and in salesmanship, the Germans thus won a secured position not merely in 22 Cited by Tardieu, France and the Alliances, 54. For the German organization for influencing the press and public opinion of foreign countries in favor of German goods, see British Parliamentary Payers, 1914, no. cd 7595, Despatches of Sir E. Goschen. GERMAN WORLD POLICY 75 the markets of South and Central America and the Far East, but in Europe itself and in the very homes of their competitors. We read in a book written by a man who cannot be suspected of favoring Germany : "In my home in Paris the elevator is German, elec- trical fixtures are German, the range in my kitchen is German, the best lamps for lighting are Ger- man. . . . My cutlery is German, the chairs in my dining room are German, the mirror in my bath room is German, some of my food products are German, and practically all the patented drugs, and some of the toilet preparations are German. . . . All these things have been purchased in the Paris markets, without the slightest leaning towards or preference for articles coming from the Fatherland. I was not aware of the fact that I was buying German things. They sold themselves — the old combination of appear- ance, convenience, and price, which will sell any- thing." 23 The success that attended Germany's efforts to win a place in foreign markets is realized without difficulty when we recall the totals of German trade statistics. In 1878 German imports and exports amounted to about six billion marks; by 1892 her commerce had advanced to seven billions, and in 1900 to ten and a half billions, while in 1906 the total sum of her imports and exports was not less than fifteen billions. 24 These 23 Gibbons, The New Map of Europe, 50. 24 From. 1870 to 1900 Germany rose from fourth to second place in international trade; a decade later she had nearly quintupled the amount of exports and imports of 1870, whereas Great Britain's foreign trade was only about two and half times as great in 1910 as in 1870, Eohrbach, German World Policies, 66-81; Andrillon, L'Expansion de I'Allemagne, 117; Statistisches Jahrbuch, passim; Statistics for Great Britain, Germany, and France, 153. 76 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR enormous figures, as von Biilow says, are lifeless, but they "assume a living interest when we consider how important they are for the welfare of the Germans, and that the work and very existence of millions of . . . citizens depends upon them." 23 Germany's vastly increased population found their means of support in her new gigantic industries, and those industries could never have been built up without the rapid and successful extension of Germany's commerce. Just as Germany's industries were dependent upon her foreign trade, so that trade was, to a large extent, dependent upon her mercantile marine. And the speedy growth of the German shipping industry has marched abreast of the expansion in industry and commerce. Our attention is called by one writer to the Latin device over the portal of the Navigation House in Bremen, "Navigare necesse est." 26 The vast majority of Germans have believed firmly since 1890 that navigation was an absolute necessity to the existence of the new industrial state. It was necessary for the feeding of her enormous population ; above all it was necessary for her trade, in order to ensure the importation of the raw materials which supplied the great industries, and to carry German manufactured products back to foreign markets. The growth of German shipping first became notable in the nineties. Before the war with France, Germany could in no respect claim to be a seafaring Power; the Hanseatic ports, which in mediaeval days were amongst the chief centres of European commerce, had languished ever since the Napoleonic blockade. 25 Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 14-15. 26 Schierbrand, Germany. 131. GERMAN WORLD POLICY 77 Hamburg, Germany's chief port, was in 1872 not so much a German as a British harbor : of the ships that put into that port the British vessels surpassed the German by two to one. But by 1887, the German ships entering Hamburg slightly surpassed the British in number and tonnage, and in 1900 the German shipping of Hamburg was more than double that of the British. A decade later the entire trading fleet of France was less than that of Hamburg alone. 27 The increase in German shipping in this single port was typical of the general growth of Germany's mercantile marine. In the year of unification, her shipping was almost entirely confined to the Baltic and consisted chiefly of sailing vessels. By the end of the century she had quintupled her mercantile tonnage and possessed thirteen hundred steamers plying the high seas and entering all the ports of the world. With more than four thousand sea-going vessels, her mercantile marine was surpassed by that of Great Britain alone. 28 The development of certain lines was especially notable. In 1855 the Hamburg- American line had but two steamers, one of them built in England ; at the beginning of the twentieth century this line was the largest in the world, no British or French company comparing with it either in size or in steamer connections. Besides its regular service to New York and other American, Mexican, Canadian, and South American ports, it had extended branch lines to Italy, the West Indies, around Africa, and to 27 Schierbrand, op. cit., 132-134; Clapp, The Port of Hamburg, passim; Statesman's Year Booh, 1873, 177; Statistics for Great Britain, Germany, and France, 166. 28 Dawson, Modem Germany, 70-71 ; Andrillon, L 'Expansion de I'Allemagne, 126-127; Statesman's Year Book, 1898, 555-558; 1907, 1007-1009. 78 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR the Far East. The North German Lloyd operated twenty-seven steamer lines to all continents, and possessed forty-six steamers engaged in Chino-Indian trade. 29 The natural corollary to the growth of Germany's mercantile marine was the creation of her navy. It was inconceivable that the Germans should be willing to trust the security of their ships to the chances of fortune and the generosity of rival Powers; for they believed that their commerce and industry depended absolutely on the preservation of their mercantile marine. On this point von Biilow expressed the conviction of the German people with unmistakable lucidity: "We have entrusted millions to the ocean, and with these millions the weal and woe of many of our countrymen. If we had not in good time provided protection for these valuable and indispensable pos- sessions, we should have been exposed to the danger of having one day to look on defencelessly while we were deprived of them. But we could not have returned then to the comfortable economic and political existence of a purely inland state. We should have been placed in the position of being unable to employ and support a considerable number of our millions of inhabitants at home. The result would have been an economic crisis which might easily attain the proportions of a national catastrophe. ' m 29 For German pride in these lines, see Rohrbach, German World Policies, 100-101. so Von Biilow, Imperial Germany, 17. Cf. also Professor Paulsen: "The German Empire has participated in the policy of expansion out of Europe — at first modestly, of late with growing decision. The enormous increase of its industrial production and its trade compelled it to take measures for the extension and the security of its overseas interests. In the course of a single generation Germany, as an indus- GERMAN WORLD POLICY 79 Convinced of the economic necessity of a formidable navy, Germany, although she entered the race late, proceded to make up for lost time. In 1888 the German naval estimates amounted only to some sixty- five million marks annually, and ten years later only to one hundred million; in the former year the navy was manned by fifteen thousand officers and sailors, in the latter the number was twenty-three thousand. In 1898 she possessed only nine armored ships of war. But in that year and two years later she adopted a far-sighted programme of naval development which, with the complementary law of 1906, promised her a fleet which would soon be of great defensive strength and by 1920 might hope to dispute even Great Britain's supremacy on the sea. By 1908 the annual naval estimates had risen from one hundred million marks to about four hundred twenty million. The number of officers and seamen in the navy had increased to over fifty thousand. The programme of 1900 was intended to bring the navy by the year 1920 to a strength of thirty-eight line ships and fourteen large cruisers. But the complementary laws of 1906 and 1908 gave notable increases so that Germany was promised at least eighty war ships of the latest type in 1920. 31 trial and mercantile State, has worked its way into the second position in Europe; today England alone is ahead of it, yet by no great distance, and the distance decreases every year. The necessity of protecting this position by a strong naval force has during recent decades become a dominant factor in the political thought of the nation," Internationale Wochenschrift fur Wissenschaft, Kunst, und TechniJc, October 26, 1907, p. 18. Cf. Usher, Pan-Germanism, 102. 3i Reventlow, Deutschlands auswartige Tolitik, 57-62; Dawson, Modern Germany, 351 ; the German Naval programmes are printed in Hurd and Castle, German Sea-Power, 328 sq. 80 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR The movement for a great fleet was supported by the enthusiasm of the people and above all by the determination of the Kaiser. "Our future lies upon the sea," said William II. And again, "As my grand- father worked for the reconstitution of this army, so I will work without allowing myself to be checked to reconstitute this navy." 32 The Naval League, organized to win popular support for Germany's new aspirations, soon included nine hundred thousand members and disposed of an annual budget of a million marks. 33 Aided by a wealth of human material, the great lack of which in Great Britain and France was undeniable, the new German navy rapidly ap- proached the position where it could assure the safety of German commerce and German control of markets. Correlative with the growth of the German navy was the hope of acquiring new colonies or at least spheres of influence in the undeveloped portions of the globe. Enthusiasm for colonies by no means equalled that for a great navy at the beginning of the century, but there were many who insisted upon the economic necessity of an active colonial policy. In their minds the acquisition of colonies which should furnish raw materials to German industries and in return purchase manufactured goods was an essential safeguard for the maintenance of the Empire's new industries. The German Empire had come into political exist- ence so late that the fairest portions of the globe had 32 Speeches at Stettin, September 23, 1898, and at Berlin, January 1, 1900. 33 By 1907, the Navy League 's organ, Die Flotte, had a circulation of 275,000 and during the course of the year 700 lectures on naval sub- jects were delivered under its auspices, Annual Begister, 1908, 293. GERMAN WORLD POLICY 81 already been taken by the older states. In the early seventies Germany might have secured valuable terri- tory in North and Central Africa had not Bismarck felt it necessary to restrict the scope of his policy to the European Continent. But both the Chancellor and William I were opposed to a policy of colonial aggrandizement; they considered that it would be a "political over-capitalizing" of the young Empire, and they feared the jealousy of Great Britain. 34 As Bismarck said, they valued British friendship more than the whole East Coast of Africa. We have also seen how Bismarck attempted to distract the attention of the French from the "gap in the Vosges" by encouraging Ferry in his colonial schemes, thereby foregoing any opportunity of winning territory for Germany on the North African Coast. 35 But in the eighties Germany was caught in the wave of enthusiasm for colonies that swept over Europe, and the initiative of her traders secured certain territories for her. In 1882 a bay on the west coast of Africa was seized by Herr von Liideritz, and two years later, as a result of a quarrel with the British at Cape Town, Bismarck declared the annexation of the West African coast and hinterland from the Orange River to Cape Frio. During the next two years Germany won territory in the Cameroons and Togoland, as well as on the East African coast. At the same time she secured various islands in the Pacific: Kaiser Wilhelmsland, Solomon Islands, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall Islands. In 1897 8* Bismarck believed that Germany already had "too much hay on the fork" to make any large scheme of colonization prudent, Sir Bartle Frere, How the Transvaal Trouble arose, 258. 85 Supra, chap. II. 82 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR the aggressive action of Germany in the Far East led to the acquisition of Kiau Chau, and in 1899 she secured the Caroline Islands and two of the Samoa group. 36 The German colonies, however, were not of great value to the mother country, with the exception of Kiau Chau, which offered a fortified naval base in the Far East and gave to Germany commercial control of the province of Shantung. The others, regarded either as commercial ventures or as coaling stations and strategic points for the exercise of German political influence, were failures. Serious trouble developed in Southwest Africa and its latent resources were not developed. Elsewhere the colonial methods of the German administrators proved to be ill-suited to the problems they had to meet. The strategic value of the Cameroons and Togoland was nullified by the position of the British and French. The Pacific Islands were leftovers. 37 We can therefore understand why, at the beginning of the twentieth century, German enthusiasm for colonies was not warm. They were regarded as a poor investment by the capitalists and the mass of the nation looked on them with indifference. But the rapid growth of the Pan-Germanist element tended to revive ambition for colonial success, and in 1907 the formation of a Colonial Office gave new impetus 36 Zimmerman, Geschichte der Deutschen KolonialpolitiTc, passim. For a discussion of German colonies, Keller, "Beginnings of German Colonisation and Colonial Policy," Yale Eeview, x, 30; xi, 390; xii, 57. See also Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft Jahresberichte and Deutsche Kolonialzeitung . 37 For the failure of German officials, see Kohrbach, German World Policies, 152-156. GERMAN WORLD POLICY 83 to the movement. The first Colonial Secretary, Dr. Dernburg, brought to his task abilities of the first order and the enthusiasm that proceeded from his conviction that the development of colonies was a " great imperial concern." In his opinion, they were chiefly important as capable of providing in future the raw products so necessary for German industries. He confined his colonial ambitions to the development of the territories that Germany already possessed into profitable plantation colonies. 38 Others, however, allowed their aspirations to soar higher, and began to insist that colonies suitable for emigrating Germans should be demanded from the older nations. "For centuries the overflow of the strength of the German nation has poured into foreign countries and been lost to our Fatherland and to our nationality; it is absorbed by foreign nations and steeped with foreign sentiments. Even today the German Empire possesses no colonial territories where its increasing population may find remunerative work and a German way of living. This is obviously not a condition which can satisfy a powerful nation, or which corresponds to the greatness of the German people and their intellectual importance." 39 Immediate aggression that would lead to the acquisi- tion of colonies suitable to the life of Europeans was not, however, favored by more than the smallest number of German chauvinists. Most of the influential classes resigned themselves to the alternative of opening and assuring new markets, sufficiently large to absorb the constantly increasing volume of German 38 Dernburg, Zeilpunkte des deutschen Kolonialismus (Berlin, 1907). 8» Bernhardt, Germany and the Next War, 76. 84 DIPLOMATIC BACKGROUND OF THE WAR exports, upon which the new increment of German population depended for its support. "We must resign ourselves in all clearness and calm," wrote Eohrbach, "to the fact that there is no possibility of acquiring colonies suitable for emigration. But if we cannot have such colonies it by no means follows that we cannot obtain the advantages if only to a limited extent, which make these colonies desirable. It is a mistake to regard the mere possession of exten- sive transoceanic territories, even when they are able to absorb a part of the national surplus of population, as necessarily a direct increase of power. Australia, Canada, and South Africa do not increase the power of the British Empire because they are British possessions, nor yet because a few million British emigrants with their descendants live in them, but because by the trade with them the wealth and with it the defensive strength of the mother country are increased. Colonies which do not produce that result have but little value ; and countries which possess this importance for a nation, even though they are not its colonies, are in this decisive point a substitute for colonial possessions in the ordinary sense." 40 The value of commercial penetration which gave to Germany a share in important markets, although it did not lead to the acquisition of colonies, had already been proved, and it was clear that rich districts were still open to German industrial enterprise. This was especially true of South America, the Far East, Africa, and the Central East, and in each district extensive commercial penetration was planned by German individuals and societies. <° Rohrbach, Deutschland unter den Weltvolkern, 159, 160. GERMAN WORLD POLICY 85 In Brazil, as early as 1849, Germans had begun to establish commercial houses, and a generation later serious plans were on foot for the acquisition of territory that might be developed into a sort of German colony. In 1908 it was said that there were no less than 400,000 Germans resident in Brazil. Commercial penetration, however, in this instance, could hardly lead to political control of any sort. The growth in power of Brazil itself blocked any such scheme, and behind Brazil stood the other South American States who showed clearly that they were not inclined to permit any European colonization. 41 The Monroe Doctrine, furthermore, could not easily be brushed aside. In the Far East the extension of German influence, which had been established by the acquisition of Kiau Chau in 1897, proceeded rapidly. The commercial penetration of the province of Shan- tung was developed, and the Pan-Germanists looked forward to winning political control of an enormous stretch of territory, of the utmost commercial and strategic value, should the break-up of the Chinese Empire not be arrested. 42 But the best opportunities seemed to lie in Morocco, Persia, and Mesopotamia. In South America and the Far East German traders were confronted with the competition of British and Americans, a competition which they often met successfully by the superiority of their commercial methods but which made impos- sible absolute control. In the Near and Central East