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 1^ 
 
GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM, 
 
 THE 
 
 COMMANDER AT BUNKER HILL. 
 
 By SAMUEL ADAMS DRAKE. 
 
 L To accompany Drake's " Bunker Hill."^ 
 
 A3^ 
 
 Nichols & Hall, Boston. \, J.''' 
 
 1S75. 
 
GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM, 
 
 COMMANDER AT BUNKER HILL, 
 
 [To accompany Drake's " Bunker Hill."] 
 
 'T^HE writer did not purpose to renew the old controversy as 
 -*- to the officer entitled to be considered first in command 
 at the battle of Bunker Hill ; at the same time, he did not 
 mean to be silent, if the subject should again become one of 
 discussion. In the brief sketch which precedes the narra- 
 tives of British officers present at the battle, he felt that he 
 could not appropriately enter upon the question of command, 
 for the reason assigned, and because a simple declaration, if 
 unsupported by argument or authority, would count for noth- 
 ing more than an expression of opinion. 
 
 The subject having been revived in the interest of Colonel 
 Prescott as the commander in the battle, and the writer hav- 
 ing seen that after this long silence the claim of Colonel 
 Prescott was urged as if there were really no longer any ques- 
 tion of his title,' nor a claimant who might successfully dispute 
 it, he now feels the time to have arrived to enter his emphatic 
 protest against both assumptions. 
 
 There is a wide difference between the command of a partic- 
 ular post on a battle-field, to which an officer is assigned by the 
 order of a superior, and the command of a field of battle which 
 embraces other positions of perhaps equal importance. Author- 
 ities are found, some of them being nearly contemporaneous with 
 the event, — the foundation of those that have since appeared, — 
 which simply assign to Colonel Prescott the command at the re- 
 
 1 
 
2 GENERAL ISRAi:L PUTNAM, 
 
 doubt. This specific statement has been understood by many to 
 imply the chief command of the field of battle ; and though the 
 distinction may be one well understood by all who have carefully 
 studied the operations at Bunker Hill, it is one. to which the 
 writer believes it necessary at the outset to call attention. 
 
 The question who is entitled to be considered as command- 
 ing in the battle of Bunker Hill is a strictly military one. No 
 written orders concerning the events of the day are in exist- 
 ence. There is no proof that any ever did exist. It becomes 
 necessary, therefore, to apply well-known principles of military 
 law to the acts of the leaders themselves. 
 
 According to the usage of armies engaged in active 0{x;r- 
 ations, an officer detached upon a service which is likely to 
 bring on an engagement would only be entitled to command 
 in a resulting battle under certain circumstances, every one of 
 which is to be kept in view. If he remained within the active 
 supervision and control of the commander-in-chief of the army 
 to which he belonged, the conditions under which he found 
 himself temporarily commanding might be wholly changed, 
 and demand entirely different dispositions. For example, if 
 the officer commanding the detachment was in danger of being 
 overpowered, and was obliged to solicit reinforcements, he 
 must submit himself to the altered state of affairs, and take 
 the risk of becoming subordinate to a superior officer, should 
 such an officer arrive on the field with the knowledge and 
 approval of the gcneral-in-chief. This was precisely the con- 
 dition of affairs at Bunker Hill. 
 
 On the other hand, as long as the officer commanding the 
 detachment is able to maintain himself in his- original status, 
 and does not call for aid, it is inconsistent with military cour- 
 tesy for an officer of superior rank to supersede him. A 
 colonel commanding a detachment on a special service might 
 be attacked by a superior force, and a general of his own army 
 might come to his aid with reinforcements. The general 
 might assume command ; but would do so upon his own respon- 
 sii)ility, and would be answerable to their common superior for 
 any complications that might arise from his act. In other 
 words, military rank does not always entitle an officer to com- 
 
THE COMMANDER AT BUNKEK HILL. 6 
 
 mand. If this were otherwise, it would subject an officer 
 engaged in a special service, for which he had heen duly 
 selected, to the interference of a superior, who might wish to 
 reap the glory belonging to the inferior. There is no nicer 
 point in military etiquette than this ; but, in deciding it, all the 
 peculiar circumstances of a battle, which are usually beyond 
 human power to foresee, must be taken into account ; and each 
 officer must bear the responsibility which belongs to him, — 
 the superior of giving orders, the inferior of resisting them. 
 
 Mr. Frothingham says, on this point, when speaking of 
 General Putnam : ^ " In a regularly organized army, his appear- 
 ance on the field, by virtue of his rank, would have given him 
 the command." It will be seen that the writer differs with 
 this author in stating what is military usage. But he here 
 distinctly refuses to allow General Putnam the command, 
 because of the disorganized condition of the provincial army, 
 which he names an " army of allies, whose jealousies had not 
 yielded to the vital principle of subordination." That is to 
 say, the troops of each colony considered themselves inde- 
 pendent of the orders of an oificer of a different colony. What 
 has this insubordination or jealousy to do with the troops who 
 at Bunker Hill proved subordinate and amenable to orders : 
 those who, in fact, fought the battle ? Were these objectious 
 sound, would they not be necessarily fatal to the claim of 
 Colonel Prescott, who, if he is to be proved the rightful 
 commander at Bunker Hill, must be shown to have commanded 
 troops of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire, 
 having officers who ranked him ? But the allegation is not 
 true, and the conflict of authority arising from ignorance, 
 insubordination, or cowardice has been left out of view. It 
 is a sufficient answer to this argument that the troops all 
 repaired to the field by the order of General Ward, a Massa- 
 chusetts officer, or of General Putnam, a Connecticut officer ; 
 that those of Connecticut obeyed the orders of Colonel Prescott, 
 and those of New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Massachusetts, 
 the orders of General Putnam. 
 
 1 " Siege of Boston," p. 1G8. 
 
4 GENERAL ISRAEL PUTXAM, 
 
 The provincial army was inchoate, it is true, but it em- 
 bodied all the essential features of a mobilized force, having 
 regiments and battalions formed on a recognized system, and 
 commanded by proper officers. It liad infantry and artillery. 
 It had an acknowledged head. General Ward, whose orders 
 were respected. To say that no officer could be considered as 
 commanding, because of the lack of discipline and morale in 
 the troops, and the want of experience in the officers of inferior 
 grade, is to allege that General McDowell did not command at 
 Bull Run, because his army was precisely in this condition. 
 To assert that no officer could command, because forces of the 
 different colonies, now for the first time acting together, did 
 not cordially co-operate, is to deny that Wellington commanded 
 the Spanish armies in the Peninsular War, because they were 
 notoriously insubordinate. 
 
 It is claimed for Colonel Prescott that he was the proper 
 commanding officer at the battle of Bunker Hill, because he 
 was sent with the original detachment of a thousand men to 
 erect intrenchments. General Ward commanded the whole 
 army, with hcad-cjuarters at Cambridge, three miles distant from 
 the battle-field. He had a number of general officers subject 
 to his orders, and a considerable body of troops. It is admitted 
 that after the discovery of Prescott's works by the enemy, and 
 when all indications pointed to an immediate engagement, 
 reinforcements were urgently solicited of General Ward by 
 General Putnam in person, and by Colonel Prescott through 
 John Brooks ; and that they were despatched from time to 
 time in consequence of these solicitations. 
 
 If not already advised of General Putnam's active partici- 
 pation in the operations on the field, General Ward, beyond a 
 question, thus became aware of the fact. He must have known 
 that Putnam, after visiting him from the front, had immedi- 
 ately returned there. The conclusion, therefore, is unavoid- 
 able, that Putnam's participation was with the full knowledge 
 and approval of General ^Vard. If that officer had meant that 
 Colonel Prescott should retain the command under any and all 
 circumstances that might arise, it was his plain duty to have 
 prevented the interference of another officer who outranked 
 
THE COMMANDER AT BUNKER HILL. O 
 
 him. The knowledge of the fact was liis approval. It was 
 not enough to have ignored it : he should have forbade it imper- 
 atively. By not doing so, he became as much responsible as 
 if he had ordered it. 
 
 The question of precedence of rank was one well understood 
 by such men as Ward, Putnam, and Prescott, who had all 
 served under the old monarchical system, where the rule of 
 subordination was inflexible, and blind, unreasoning obedience 
 to a superior the fundamental law of armies. Upon this sys- 
 tem the provincial and continental armies were formed. Where 
 an officer is now required to obey only the lawful orders of a 
 superior, it would then have been considered equivalent to 
 insubordination to question them. There was no greater 
 stickler for the deference due to rank than General Ward. 
 
 It is just to conclude, inasmuch as the operations of the 
 day of battle depended wholly upon what the enemy might 
 do, — with what force he might attack, and at what point, — 
 that the counter-movements Originating at the American head- 
 quarters developed themselves accordingly ; and that what was 
 originally a proper operation for a colonel's command now 
 called for a larger view, more troops, and an officer or officers 
 of higher rank. Especially is this judgment of the case con- 
 firmed when it is considered that the British commander-in- 
 chief sent a force not much in excess of two thousand men 
 under the command of a major-general (Howe), with a subor- 
 dinate brigadier-general (Pigot), and that a third (Clinton) 
 was on the field before the close of the battle. 
 
 General Ward despatched from first to last not fewer than 
 four thousand men to Bunker Hill ; not all reached there, but 
 they were put in motion. If, when having general officers of 
 experience at hand, he had omitted to put them on duty, he 
 would either have been criminally culpable or have exliibited 
 remarkable incapacity. In either case he would justly have 
 incurred the responsibility of defeat, to say nothing of the 
 proper resentment of every general officer subject to his orders. 
 But he had, in fact, recognized General Putnam as in com- 
 mand. 
 
 Generals Warren and Pomeroy were also upon the battle- 
 
G GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAJI, 
 
 field, but both preferred to act as volunteers. General Heath, 
 the contemporary of the principal actors at Bunker Hill, relates, 
 more than twenty years after the battle, in his " Memoirs," 
 the following incident : ^ — 
 
 " In the time of action. Colonel Prescott observing that the 
 brave General Warren was near the works, he immediately 
 stopped up to him, and asked him if he had any orders to give 
 him. The General replied that he had none, that he exercised 
 no command there, — 'the command,' said the General, 'is 
 yours.' " General Heath makes this statement clear when he 
 also says that Colonel Prescott " was the proper commanding 
 officer at the redoubt, and nobly acted his part as such during 
 the whole action." There is now no one to dispute that 
 Colonel Prescott commanded at the redoubt, as Colonel Stark 
 commanded at the rail-fence, — a post fully as important, con- 
 sidering that one could not have been held without the other. 
 As a matter of courtesy, Prescott offered the command of the 
 redoubt to Warren, nothing more. 
 
 Eliot, the biographer, says on this point : " Colonel Prescott 
 commanded the party within the lines, and Colonel Stark the 
 men who were without behind a rail-fence, and did such amaz- 
 ing execution by a well-directed fire." ^ " Within the lines "" is 
 supposed to mean within the redoubt, as the defences were 
 confined to the redoubt, the redan, or breastwork, and the rail- 
 fence. Mr. Frothingham does not quote this authority. 
 
 Mr. Frothingham concludes that Putnam " was present 
 rather as the patriotic volunteer than as the authorized 
 commander ; " ^ and in the same paragraph he asserts that 
 " Putnam was applied to for orders by the reinforcements that 
 reached the field, and he gave orders without being applied 
 to." He thus consigns Putnam to the same passive condition 
 with Warren, whom he believes to have distinctly refused the 
 command ; and with Pomeroy, in whose behalf no claim is 
 ])ut forward. By what process of reasoning Putnam is set 
 
 1 Heath's " Memoirs," p. 20. 
 
 2 Eliot's "Biographical Dictionary." Boston, 1809. John Eliot, D.D., was 
 pastor of the New Nortli Church, Boston. 
 
 8 " Siege of Boston," p. IC8. 
 
THE COMMANDER AT BUNKER HILL. 7 
 
 down a volunteer, while exercising command, is not ex- 
 plained. 
 
 It is claimed also for Prescott that because he commanded 
 at the redoubt he commanded the whole field. Mr. Frothing- 
 ham, who is understood to take this view, observes, in regard 
 to Colonel Prescott : ^ " Nor is there any proof that he gave an 
 order at the rail-fence, or on Bunker Hill. But he remained 
 in the redoubt, and there fought the battle with such coolness, 
 bravery, and discretion, as to win the unbounded applause of 
 his countrymen." The battle-field properly embraced the 
 heights of Bunker Hill and Breed's Hill, covered by an 
 extended line from the Charles River to the Mystic. This line 
 consisted of a redoubt, in which fewer than five hundred men 
 could be advantageously posted ; an embankment, without a 
 ditch on its left flank ; and a long line of fence, extemporized 
 into a breastwork by the troops of Knowlton, Stark, &c. The 
 redoul)t was on the right, the other defences prolonging the 
 line to the Mystic. The redoubt was not the key to this posi- 
 tion, because the moment the rail-fence was forced it became 
 untenable. The weight of the first and second attacks was 
 borne by the defenders of the rail-fence, where General Howe 
 in person attacked, with the very flower of his army, sup- 
 ported by artillery. The selection of the best troops — all his 
 light-infantry and grenadiers — for this attack, together with 
 his personal superintendence of it, fixes this point decisively. 
 Howe meant to break the American left and take the works in 
 reverse. He persisted in this plan until the troops which he 
 led were virtually annihilated. Of two companies each, the 
 King's Own lost four officers and forty-three men, the Welsh 
 Pusileers, four officers and fifty-three men ; and the whole of 
 the grenadier company of the 52d regiment were either killed 
 or wounded. This was the proportion of casualties on this 
 side, occasioned by a fire so murderous that even Howe, fire- 
 eater that he was, shrank from a third attack. 
 
 Mr. Frothingham again says : " The brow of Bunker Hill 
 was a place of great slaughter. General Putnam here rode to 
 the rear of the retreating troops, and, regardless of the balls 
 
 ^ " Siege of Boston," p. 166. 
 
8 GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM, 
 
 flying about him, with his sword drawn, and still undaunted in 
 his bearing, urged them to renew the fight in the unfinisiiod 
 works. ' Make a stand here ! ' he exclaimed. ' We can stop 
 them yet ! ' " Here, then, was the crisis of the battle come to 
 the very {)oint which Putnam had from first to last endeav- 
 ored with such unflagging perseverance to render defensible. 
 There can be little doubt that a second line of works here 
 would have stopped the British advance, and perhaps have 
 retrieved the day ; for at this moment large reinforcements 
 were either arriving on, or were within reach of, the ground. 
 Who believes that, with the terrible lesson he had received on 
 Breed's Hill, Howe would not have taken time to reflect l)efore 
 storming a second line of intrenchments, defended by a larger 
 force than had yet confronted him ? 
 
 It is true that Putnam, supposing him to have remained the 
 victor in an attack on this new position of Bunker Hill, would 
 have been inexcusable not to have withdrawn his troops from 
 the peninsula in the night. Yet this has nothing to do with tlie 
 importance whicli that hill obtained from its commanding tlie 
 whole peninsula. Breed's Hill included, or which it acquired 
 after that position had been evacuated. 
 
 It is agreed that on the night of the sixteenth of June, 
 1775, a detachment of a thousand men were sent under the 
 orders of Colonel Prescott to seize and fortify Bunker Hill.^ 
 This was a specific order, and went no further than the lan- 
 guage imports. To defend the works, either before or after 
 their completion, until relieved by competent authority, was 
 his duty as a soldier, and did not require an order. Colonel 
 Prescott therefore marched to the point indicated with his 
 thousand men, — a colonel's command, — and began to in- 
 trench. He had the honor of being singled out of the whole 
 army for this delicate and dangerous enterprise. This is the 
 
 1 Prescott's letter to Jolin Adams is accepted as evidence of the order. It, 
 however, says Breed's Hill was the one to which he was ordered. As in all tie 
 preliminary steps taken by the Committee of Safety I'unker Hill was proposed 
 for fortification, I conclude the recollection of Prescott to have been faulty on 
 this point. Moreover, the account of the Committee, as in its records, states 
 that " by some mistake " Breed's Hill was selected. There is confusion in the 
 different statements, which it is not essential to my argument to discuss. 
 
THE COMMANDEE AT BUNKER HILL. 9 
 
 order that is relied upon to establish Colonel Prescott as 
 commanding-in-chief during the battle of the seventeenth 
 of June. 
 
 Although in command of a force detached for a specific 
 object, it appears that Prescott's operations were supervised 
 from the beginning by higher authority. On arriving on the 
 ground indicated, a discussion arose whether Bunker Hill or 
 Breed's Hill should be selected for laying out the works. In 
 the consultation that ensued, two general officers, one of whom 
 was Putnam, took part. The other general is believed to have 
 been Pomeroy. " On the pressing importunity of one of the 
 generals," says Gray's letter,^ " it was concluded to proceed to 
 Breed's Hill." " Putnam, as we know from his son and Stephen 
 Codman, Esq., and Gridley, as we know from Colonel Hen- 
 shaw, liad previously reconnoitred the ground." ^ Two gen- 
 eral officers, then, were present before ground was broken, and 
 relieved Prescott from the responsibility of a decision between 
 Bunker and Breed's Hills. General Putnam, who either 
 marched with the detachment or joined it on the route, appears 
 thus early in the active movements preceding the battle, exert- 
 ing an important, if not a commanding, influence in deciding 
 the proper site for tlie intrenchments. 
 
 " At the same time," says Swett, " it was determined that a 
 work should be erected on Bunker Hill as a new post and 
 rallying point to resort to, should the enemy drive them from 
 the first, and for the protection of the rear." ^ This was 
 doubtless Putnam's project, as he appears on the day of battle 
 never to have lost sight of it, — striving with the utmost solic- 
 
 ^ " Siege of Boston," Appendix. 
 
 2 Colonel Sanidel Swett (p. 20, " Bunker Hill Battle"), whose account, pub- 
 lished in 1826, is the basis of subsequent ones. 
 
 Judge Grosvenor, in his letter to Daniel Putnam, " Pomfret, April 20th, 1818," 
 published in the "Analectic Magazine " of the same year, asserts tiiat the detach- 
 ment was ordered " to march to Breed's Hill, where, under tlie immediate super- 
 intendence of General Putnam, ground was broken and a redoubt formed." 
 Judge Grosvenor, was with the Connecticut troops who marched with Prescott, 
 and was wounded in the ensuing battle. 
 
 Gray says (Appendix, " Siege of Boston," p. 394), " The engineer and two 
 generals went on the hill at night and reconnoitred the ground." 
 
 3 Swett, p. 21, " Bunker Hill Battle." 
 
 2 
 
.10 GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM, 
 
 itude, and using every means in his power to carry it into 
 effect. It is necessary not to forget this circumstance : it liad 
 an important bearing on the subsequent fortunes of the day. 
 
 Leaving Colonel Prescott to finish his works, Putnam re- 
 turned to his camp, according to Swett, to prepare for the antic- 
 ipated crisis, by bringing on reinforcements and securing a fresh 
 liorse. At dayl)reak lie was again in the saddle. Hearing the 
 cannonade opened by the enemy, he abandoned the idea of 
 conducting the reinforcements himself, but reminded General 
 Ward " that the fate of the expedition depended on his being 
 reinforced immediately, according to the preconcerted plan, 
 and flew to join his men on the hill." ' At nine o'clock, Put- 
 nam, by the same authority, was again at head-quarters, urging 
 reinforcements. Frothingham says : " General Ward, early in 
 the morning, had been urged by General Putnam to send rein- 
 forcements to Colonel Prescott." ^ By this testimony. General 
 AVard was fully aware of Putnam's presence on the field. On 
 his way back to the heights, after his second application to 
 General Ward, Putnam was met by John Brooks, who was 
 proceeding to Cambridge on foot, and by Prescott's order, to 
 represent the necessity of a reinforcement.^ Putnam and 
 Prescott were both agreed on this important question. 
 
 The result of the application of one or both was that an 
 order was sent to Colonel Stark at Medford to send two hun- 
 dred men to reinforce the lines at Breed's Hill, which was 
 promptly answered by despatching the men under Lieutenant- 
 colonel Wyman. At two o'clock, says Stark, in his letter to 
 Matthew Thornton, " an express arrived for my whole regiment 
 to proceed to Charlestown." * 
 
 Having now reached that point where the question of com- 
 mand becomes properly a matter for discussion, where the 
 
 ' Swett, pp. 21, 24. 
 
 2 " Siege of Boston," p. 128. 
 
 3 On tlie (lay of the battle, says General linrbcck, who was then with the 
 army, " General Putnam rode between Ciiarlestown and Cambridge witliont a 
 coat, in liis shirt-sleeves, and an oiil felt hat on, to report to General Ward, and 
 to consult on further operations." Swett, on the " Commander at Bunker 
 Hill," p. 30. 
 
 * Frothingham says the order was despatched " about eleven o'clock." 
 
THE COMMANDEli AT BUNKER HILL. 11 
 
 situation of Colonel Prcscott undergoes a complete change, 
 and where, from being a principal, he became a subordinate, 
 the acts of General Putnam and of Colonel Prescott will show 
 who exercised the functions of commanding officer over the 
 whole field of battle. 
 
 COLONELS STARK AND REED. 
 
 Who gave orders to Colonels Stark and Reed, and posted 
 their regiments when they came on the field ? Not Prescott, 
 for he is always at his post in the redoubt. Even Mr. Froth- 
 ingham admits that there is no proof that Prescott gave Stark 
 an order during the day. Swett says positively,^ in regard to 
 the New Hampshire troops, that " Putnam reserved a part of 
 this force to throw up the work on Bunker Hill, and ordered 
 the remainder to press on to the lines as quick as possilde, and 
 join the Connecticut troops at the rail-fence. Stark encour- 
 aged them by a short, spirited address, ordered three cheers to 
 animate them, and they moved on rapidly to the line." Ed- 
 ward Everett says, in his biography of Stark: ^ " A portion of 
 them (the New Hampshire troops) were detached by General 
 Putnam to work upon the intrenchments of Bunker Hill, prop- 
 erly so called. The residue, under their colonels, Stark and 
 Reed, were ordered to take post at Captain Knowlton's position 
 just described. On receiving this order, Colonel Stark made a 
 brief and animated address to his men, and marched them off 
 to the station designated." Who gave Colonels Stark and 
 Reed these orders ? Not Colonel Prescott ; he was in the 
 redoubt at the front line, and this incident took place on Bun- 
 ker Hill. Mr. Frothingham says, " General Putnam ordered 
 part of these troops to labor on the works begun on Bunker 
 Hill," &c. There is, then, no disagreement that Colonels Stark 
 and Reed received and obeyed the orders of General Putnam, 
 detaching their troops ; and as it is not pretended that any 
 other general officer was at this point, the inference is a proper 
 
 1 " Bunker Hill Battle," p. 28. 
 
 2 Spark's "American Biography," vol. i. p. 60. 
 
12 GENERAL ISRAEL rUTJTAM, 
 
 one, — that it was also Putnam who posted these commands in 
 the line. 
 
 This was the most important reinforcement that arrived on 
 the field. It was ordered there ))y General Ward, reported to, 
 or was halted by General Putnam on Bunker Hill, and was 
 posted by him where it fought. Stark intrenched in his front, 
 as Prescott had done, and like him became another integral 
 part of the American line, — neither applying to Prescott for 
 orders nor receiving any from him. It is evident that General 
 Ward did not direct Stark to report to Colonel Prescott as the 
 commander of the field ; and yet, if he had been the proper 
 commander, Stark should have reported to him, and to no 
 other. Swett states that, on the British advance towards the 
 American lines, Putnam led the troops he had detained on 
 Bunker Hill into action. 
 
 What does Colonel Prescott say of this large reinforcement, 
 in number at least equal to the original detachment ? " There 
 was a party of Hampshire, in conjunction with some other 
 forces, lined a fence at the distance of threescore rods back of 
 the fort, partly to the north." In his letter to John Adams, 
 from which this fragment is extracted, Prescott always says, 
 " I commanded," or " I ordered," where he had done cither. 
 Prescott here virtually acknowledges that after these reinforce- 
 ments, which he had urgently solicited, were sent to him, and 
 came npon the field, he neither sent them orders nor was 
 applied to for any ; yet, if he were the proper commanding 
 ofhcer of the whole field, it was his duty to have posted these 
 troops. It is nowhere shown that he made any attempt to 
 control them in any way. This circumstance alone narrows 
 Prescott's command to his own part of the field. 
 
 PUTNAM AT THE REDOUBT. 
 
 It has been broadly asserted that Putnam did not give Pres- 
 cott an order on the field of battle. The evidence to the con- 
 trary rests partly upon the hearsay testimony before alluded to 
 of General Heath. Although I should have preferred to intro- 
 
THE COMMANDER AT BUNKER HILL. 13 
 
 (luce only the written declarations of actors in the battle, those 
 writers who have attached full credit to the relation of General 
 Heath cannot object to its appearance in opposition to their 
 conclusions. 
 
 " Just before the action began, General Putnam came to the 
 redoubt and told Colonel Prescott that the intrenching tools 
 must be sent off, or they would be all lost ; the Colonel replied 
 that if he sent any of the men away with the tools, not one of 
 them would return. To this the General answered, They shall 
 every man return. A large party was then sent off with the 
 tools, and not one of them returned : in this the Colonel was 
 the best judge of human nature." ^ 
 
 The language here is that General Putnam " told Colonel 
 Prescott that the intrenching tools must he sent off^ I do not 
 know what the generally received opinion may be as to the 
 usual language of an order ; but the sole object being to secure 
 obedience, the only thing material is that it should be obeyed 
 and respected, in whatever language it may be couched. " Colo- 
 nel Prescott, the intrenching tools must be sent off, or they will 
 be lost," is certainly emphatic enough to cover the case in ques- 
 tion. The Colonel remonstrated, according to General Heath ; 
 yet, considering that he had been told he "must "send the 
 tools, he did not refuse obedience, but sent them, — a very pro- 
 per act for a subordinate ; a very singular one in a commander 
 of the field, especially when in violation of his own judgment. 
 But General Putnam left him no alternative, and he sent a 
 detachment with the tools, as directed. 
 
 Mr. Frothingham asserts ^ of the redoubt: " Ge-neral officers 
 came to this position, but they did not give him (Prescott) an 
 order, nor interfere with his dispositions." If General Putnam 
 did not " give him an order," nor " interfere with his disposi- 
 tions," in this instance, I am at a loss how to characterize his 
 appearance at the redoubt, his language in regard to the in- 
 trenching tools, and his overbearing Prescott in so unofficerlike 
 a manner. He was certainly the most disorderly " volunteer " 
 that has ever come under my observation. 
 
 1 Heath's " Memoirs." Boston, 1798, pp. 19, 20. 
 
 2 " Siege of Boston," p. 166. 
 
14 GENERAL ISRAEL PUTXAM, 
 
 I think military men Avill agree that the language of an 
 order comes within the discretion of the officer who gives it. 
 The only vital thing about it is, that it should clearly express 
 the thing to be done, be properly addressed, and signed by the 
 superior, with his title. These acts are performed when the 
 superior elects to carry his own order. I do not believe an 
 inferior would escape responsibility for disobeying a request 
 of his commander, if the above conditions were complied with. 
 It is true that General Putnam did not mount the parapet of 
 the redoubt, flourish his drawn sword above Prescott's liead, 
 and say: "I command you to send away the tools!" But 
 his language had all the meaning, and, as we have seen, the 
 full effect, of such an order. 
 
 THE TESTIMONY OF AN ENEMY. 
 
 Something further about the redoubt. In 1818, when Gen- 
 eral Dearborn made an unprovoked attack upon the memory of 
 General Putnam, the painter Trumbull — whose " Bunker Hill " 
 is, more than any other, familiar to all classes — noticed its ap- 
 pearance in a letter to the General's son, Daniel Putnam, in which 
 he expressed his unmeasured indignation.^ After some pre- 
 liminary remarks, which I have not the space to give. Colonel 
 Trumbull observes : " In all cases like this, perhaps the most 
 unquestionable testimony is that which is given by an enemy." 
 
 " In the summer of 1786 I became acquainted in London 
 with Colonel John Small, of the Britisii army, who had served 
 in America many years, and had known General Putnam inti- 
 mately during the war of Canada, from 1756 to 1763. From 
 him I had the following anecdote respecting the battle of Bun- 
 ker Hill. I shall nearly repeat his words. Looking at the 
 picture which 1 had then almost completed, he said : ' I don't 
 like the situation in which you have placed my of d friend Put- 
 nam ; you have not done him justice. I wish you would alter 
 that part of your picture, and introduce a circumstance which 
 
 1 Trumbull was in the camp at Roxbury at the time of the battle. lie has 
 painted Colonel Small in the foreground of his picture. 
 
THE COMMANDER AT BUNKER HILL. 15 
 
 actually happened, and wliicli I can never forget. When the 
 British troops advanced the second time to the attack of the 
 redoubt, I, with the other officers, was in the front of the line to 
 encourage the men. We had advanced very near the works un- 
 disturbed, when an irregular fire, like iife.u de joie, was poured 
 in upon us. It was cruelly fatal. The troops fell back ; and, 
 when I looked to the right and left, I saw not one officer stand- 
 ing. I glanced my eye to the enemy, and saw several young 
 men levelling their pieces at me. I knew their excellence as 
 marksmen, and considered myself gone. At that moment my 
 old friend Putnam rushed forward, and, striking up the muzzles 
 of their pieces with his sword, cried out, " For God's sake, my 
 lads, don't fire at that man ; I love him as I do my brother." 
 We were so near each other, tiiat I heard his words distinctly. 
 He was obeyed ; I bowed, thanked him, and walked away un- 
 molested.' " ^ 
 
 Colonel Small asserted positively — and he was not likely to 
 be mistaken in a matter of life or death to him — that Putnam 
 was at the redoubt, gave a command not to fire, and was 
 obeyed. Mr. Frothingham says Putnam did not give an order 
 there. Great confidence is felt in the statement of Colonel 
 Small. He was so near General Putnam that he recognized 
 him, and heard his voice distinctly. The physiognomy of Put- 
 nam was little likely to have been mistaken for another by an 
 old comrade of nearly twenty years' standing.^ 
 
 LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ABERCROMBIE. 
 
 This distinguished officer, another old companion-in-arms of 
 Putnam, seems also to have recognized him in the front of bat- 
 tle. He was shot down while leading his men to the assault. 
 " He was a brave and noble-hearted soldier ; and when the men 
 were bearing him from the field, he begged them to spare his 
 
 ^ Mr. Frothingham mentions, page 148, the arrival on the field of the second 
 reinforcement of marines, under Major Small. It is well known that these 
 troops attacked the redoubt. 
 
 ^ Several depositions assert Putnam was at the redoubt. 
 
16 GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM, 
 
 old friend Putnam." " If you take General Putnam alive," lie 
 said, "don't hang liim ; for he's a brave man."^ He died on 
 the 24th of June. 
 
 CAPTAIN KNOWLTON AND THE RAIL-FENCE. 
 
 Captain Thomas Knowlton commanded tlie detachment of 
 Connecticut troops that marched witli Colonel Prcscott on tlie 
 evening of the sixteenth. Although he left the redoubt by order 
 of Colonel Prescott, he did not, as Mr. Frothingham states he 
 did, begin the construction of the rail-fence by Prescott's direc- 
 tion. Colonel Prescott tells what was done by this detachment. 
 He says : " About two o'clock in the afternoon, on the seven- 
 teenth, the enemy began to land a north-easterly point from the 
 fort, and I ordered the train, with two field-pieces, to go and 
 oppose them, and the Connecticut forces to support them ; but 
 the train marched a different course, and, I believe, those sent 
 to their support followed, — I suppose, to Bunker Hill." 
 Colonel Prescott thus admits a want of knowledge as to the 
 movement of the guns and of Knowlton, with the supports, 
 after they left the redoubt. They, at any rate, marched " a 
 different course" from that indicated by him. His "belief" 
 was that they went to Bunker Hill. Now, as Knowlton was 
 the first to n)an the rail-fence, near the base of Bunker Hill, 
 it is evident that Prescott not only did not order this line to 
 be occupied, but his language justifies the opinion that he con- 
 sidered it a disobedience of his commands. 
 
 The authority of three persons is given, one of whom, Grosvc- 
 nor, says Putnam ordered Knowlton to this position ; Judge 
 Winthrop saw Putnam here just previous to the first attack ; 
 and Simeon Noyes declares that Putnam rode up to the com- 
 pany he was in, and said : " Draw off your troops here," point- 
 ing to the rail-fence, " and man the rail-fence ; for the enemy's 
 flanking us fast." ^ Swett says unqualifiedly that it was Put- 
 nam, who ordered Knowlton here.^ 
 
 1 " Siege of Boston," p. 195. 
 
 2 Ibid. p. 134. 
 
 8 Swett, " Bunker Iliil," p. 2G. 
 
THE COMMANDER AT BUNKEE HILL. 17 
 
 WHO POSTED THE ARTILLERY 1 
 
 Prescott, it has been seen, ordered the guns that were witli 
 him at the redoubt to a position they did not take, but moved 
 off to the rear. They are stated to liave fired a few rounds 
 from the interval between the earth breastwork and rail-fence, 
 and to have then limbered up and retired. Captain Callender 
 took his two pieces over Bunker Hill, apparently with the in- 
 tention of leaving the ground. While retreating, Callender, a 
 Massachusetts officer, was met by Putnam, who has fortunately 
 left a record in this case of what then occurred. 
 
 Gridley and Callender were tried by court-martial and dis- 
 missed the service.^ A committee of the Massachusetts Con- 
 gress applied to General Putnam " and other officers who were- 
 in the heat of the engagement for further intelligence." General 
 Putnam informed tliem that, " in the late action, as he was rid- 
 ing up Bunker Hill, he met an officer in the train drawing his 
 cannon down in great haste ; he ordered the officer to stop and 
 go back ; he replied he liad no cartridges ; the General dis- 
 mounted and examined his boxes, and found a considerable 
 number of cartridges, upon which he ordered him back ; he re- 
 fused, until the General threatened him with immediate death ; 
 upon which he returned up the hill again, but soon deserted 
 his post, and left the cannon." ^ 
 
 This is emphatic : while Prescott saw the artillery retreat, 
 and in disobedience to his orders, without any endeavor to re- 
 call it, Putnam compelled an officer to return with it, and to 
 take the post he directed, on pain of death. 
 
 These two guns were served by Putnam himself after they 
 had been abandoned.^ Mr. Frothingham, referring to the final 
 abandonment by Callender of his guns, tells us that " about 
 this time Captain Ford's company, of Bridge's regiment, came 
 on to the field, and, at the pressing request of General Putnam, 
 drew the deserted pieces to the rail-fence." A deposition of 
 
 1 The latter afterwards nobly wiped away the disgrace. 
 '-^ See note, p. 581, "Journals of Provincial Congress." 
 
 ^ See letter of Adjutant Waller, p. 23, " Bunker Hill : " "In these breast- 
 works they had artillery, which did so much mischief." 
 
18 GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM, 
 
 one of Ford's men states that Putnam ordered Ford to do this. 
 Here is another Massachusetts officer obeying the orders of 
 General Putnam. 
 
 GENERAL WARREN. 
 
 General Warren reached the field before the first attack. I 
 now quote from Frothingham, his biographer, who has rescued 
 every fragment relative to this distinguished and ill-fated per- 
 sonage. " A short time before the action commenced, he was 
 seen in conversation with General Putnam, at the rail-fence, 
 who offered to receive his orders. General Warren declined to 
 give any, but asked where he could be most useful. Putnam 
 directed him to the redoubt, remarking that ' there he would 
 be covered.' ' Don't think,' said Warren, ' I came to seek a 
 place of safety ; but tell me where the onset will be most 
 furious.' Putnam still pointed to the redoubt." ^ 
 
 Here is a distinct tender of the command, and as distinct 
 a declination. General Putnam chose to recognize Warren as 
 his superior, as Prescott afterwards did. The language used is 
 strictly that of an inferior offering the command to a superior. 
 In a volunteer, this would have been a gratuitous assumj)tion. 
 It carries conviction that Putnam considered himself in com- 
 mand. If Putnam were^but a volunteer what command should 
 he have tendered to Warren ? 
 
 General Warren's application to General Putnam shows at 
 least that the former recognized him as the proper person to 
 give him the best information about what was passing on the 
 field of battle. These two men knew precisely what had 
 transpired in the Council of War, of which both were mem- 
 bers. 
 
 COLONEL GARDNER. 
 
 Colonel Thomas Gardner, of Middlesex, Massachusetts, led 
 his regiment to the battle-field. Mr. Frothingham continues to 
 supply evidences of General Putnam's authority. " On arriv- 
 ing at Bunker Hill, General Putnam ordered part of it " (the 
 
 1 "Siege of Boston," p. 170. 
 
THE COMMANDER AT BUNKER HILL. 19 
 
 regiment) " to assist in throwing up defences commenced at 
 this place." Colonel Gardner was mortally wounded during 
 the battle, and carried off the field. Another Massachusetts 
 officer who obeyed Putnam's orders.^ 
 
 CAPTAIN CHESTER. 
 
 Captain Chester's company was quartered in the Episcopal 
 Church at Cambridge, within pistol-shot of General Ward's 
 head-quarters. The statement is positively made by Chester 
 that he was ordered to the battle-ground by General Putnam, 
 and none other. He arrived there during the last attack,'and 
 was engaged at the rail-fence. This determines conclusively 
 who gave orders to this detachment of Connecticut troops.2 
 Frothingham says (p. 132): "Putnam ordered on the re- 
 mainder of the Connecticut troops." I have now mentioned 
 those troops most prominently identified with the battle. 
 
 COLONEL SCAMMANS. 
 
 Colonel James Scammans was from Maine. He was ordered, 
 presumably by Ward, to go where the fighting was, and moved 
 his command as far as Cobble Hill, — the old name for the 
 eminence on which the McLean Asylum for the Insane now 
 stands. At this point he halted, and, as Mr. Frothingham 
 says, " sent a messenger to General Putnam to inquire whether 
 he was wanted." ^ Colonel Scammans, though he did not come 
 on the field, reported to General Putnam. 
 
 COLONEL PRESCOTT'S INFLUENCE. 
 
 It is difficult to explain the following statement, which Mr. 
 Frothingham gives in support of Prescott's claim to the chief 
 command. " During the battle," he says, " the influence of 
 Colonel Prescott over his men preserved order at his position ; 
 but in other parts of the field the troops fought rather in pla- 
 
 1 " Siege of Boston," p. 179. 
 
 2 See Captain Chester's letter in Frothingham 's Appendix. 
 
 3 Ibid. p. 146. 
 
20 GENERAL ISRAEL TUTNAM, 
 
 toons, or individually, — companies entirely losing their order, 
 
 — than under regular commands." As Mr. Frothingham states 
 that Prescott remained within the redoubt, and there fought 
 the battle, the inference is that disorder existed at the rail-fence, 
 or earthen breastwork, the only other points of defence. In 
 other words, that the defence where Putnam in person com- 
 manded, and where Stark, Reed, and Knowlton fought, was 
 disorderly by comparison with that at the redoubt, where Pres- 
 cott held command. 
 
 Tlie defence of the rail-fence should be a sufficient answer 
 to this statement. There the defenders from behind their 
 rampart of hay — so unsubstantial that the bullets of the 
 enemy came through — twice repulsed the choicest troops on 
 the field, and victoriously held their line until the solid earthen 
 embankments of the redoubt were evacuated. The adjoining 
 breastwork was cleared by the enemy's artillery before the third 
 and last attack. The author quoted says, in another place, that 
 the Americans at the rail-fence " maintained their ground with 
 great firmness and intrepidity, and successfully resisted every 
 attempt to turn their flank. This line, indeed, was nobly de- 
 feuded. The force here did a great service, for it saved the 
 main body, who were retreating in disorder from the redoubt, 
 from being cut off by the enemy. When it was perceived at 
 the rail-fence that the force under Colonel Prescott had left the 
 hill, these brave men ' gave ground, but with more regularity 
 than could have been expected of troops who had been no 
 longer under discipline, and many of whom never before saw 
 an cngagcmcift.' " Thus it appears that the rail-fence was the 
 last post held, and that the retreat was comparatively orderly, 
 while that from the redoubt was disorderly. 
 
 To confirm the idea of Prescott's holding the chief command, 
 it is alleged that he posted guards, called councils of war, &c. 
 These acts were all performed, and properly, with the means 
 originally confided to him. He called councils of his own 
 subordinates, — not being competent to summon his superiors, 
 
 — and posted guards from his own command. Every com- 
 mander of troops exposed to danger docs all this, though the 
 posting of a picket docs not imply the command of an army. 
 
THE COmiANDER AT BUNKER HILL. 21 
 
 WHAT PRESCOTT SAYS. 
 
 Prescott's letter to John Adams, dated a little more than two 
 months after the battle, gives something tangible as to his own 
 acts. It is brief, and, as he himself characterizes it, " imper- 
 fect and too general." He states little or nothing of what 
 occurred except at his own post, which he styles " the fort ; " 
 and that little has been given in connection with the troops or 
 movements to which it relates. ^ 
 
 " On the 16th June, in the evening, I received orders to 
 march to Breed's Hill in Charlestown, with a party of about one 
 thousand men, consisting of three hundred of my own regiment. 
 Colonel Bridge and Lieutenant Brickett, with a detachment of 
 theirs, and two hundred Connecticut forces, commanded by 
 Captain Knowlton. We arrived on tlie spot ; tlie lines were 
 drawn by the engineer ; and we began the intrcnchment about 
 twelve o'clock. . . . Having thrown up a small redoubt, found 
 it necessary to draw a line al)Out twenty rods in length from 
 the fort northerly, under a very warm fire from the enemy's 
 artillery. About this time the above field-officers, being indis- 
 posed, could render me but little service, and the most of the 
 men under their command deserted the party. . . . About an 
 hour after tlie enemy landed, they began to march to the attack 
 in three columns. I commanded my Lieutenant-colonel Robin- 
 son and Major Woods, each with a detachment, to flank the 
 enemy, who, I have reason to believe, behaved with prudence 
 and courage. I was now left with perhaps one hundred and 
 fifty men within the fort." 
 
 Including the extracts heretofore quoted, this constitutes by 
 his own account, all the movements made, or orders given, 
 up to the moment of retreat, by Colonel Prescott. The im- 
 pression the letter made upon John Adams, to whom it was 
 written, is described in his statement written long after, " that 
 he always understood that General Pomeroy was the first officer 
 of Massachusetts on Bunker or Breed's Hill."^ This does 
 
 1 The movements of Stark, Knowlton, and the artillery. 
 
 2 Letter dated June 19, 1818, in " Columbian Centinel." 
 
22 GENERAL ISRAEL PUTNAM, 
 
 not affect General Putnam, who was not a Massacliusetts offi- 
 cer ; though it certainly does affect Colonel Prescott. 
 
 To Colonel Prescott must be awarded the credit of having 
 executed the movement entrusted to him with intelligence, 
 and of having defended his post on the field with great intre- 
 pidity. The tax upon his physical endurance did not scom to 
 abate his energy or resolution. He was the right man in the 
 right place. But his was not the mind that controlled the ope- 
 rations of the day. 
 
 WHAT DID "OLD PUT" DO? 
 
 The following is Mr. Frothingham's resume of General Put- 
 nam's movements before and during the battle : ^ " On the 
 evening of June 16th he joined the detachment at Charlestown 
 Neck ; took part in the consultation as to the place to be forti- 
 fied ; returned in the night to Cambridge ; went to the heights 
 on the firing of the ' Lively,' but immediately returned to 
 Cambridge ; went again to the heights about ten o'clock ; was 
 in Cambridge after the British landed ; ordered on the Con- 
 necticut troops, and then went to the heights ; was at the rail- 
 fence at the time the action commenced ; was in the heat of 
 the battle, and during its contiimance made great efforts to 
 induce the reinforcements to advance to the lines ; urged labor 
 on works on Bunker Hill ; was on the brow of this hill when 
 the retreat took place ; retreated witli that part of the army 
 that went to Prospect Hill, and remained here during the 
 night." 
 
 This statement, in appearance eminently fair, is in reality 
 partial, as it neglects to mention facts that have the most im- 
 portant bearing on this very question of command ; namely, 
 the posting of troops on the field and the exercise of command 
 in all parts of it, — functions proper only to an officer com- 
 manding the whole field, or acting by his autliority. 
 
 To this resume, a few circumstances should be added. Putnam 
 was present at the Council of War that planned and ordered tlie 
 battle ; he is thus identified with it from its inception to its close. 
 
 1 " Siege of Boston," p. 1G9. 
 
THE COMMANDER AT BUNKER HILL. 23 
 
 He was at least twice at General Ward's head-quarters in con- 
 sultation with that officer ; not only exercised command, but, 
 in one instance, compelled obedience by threatening an officer 
 with death if he disobeyed ; was the only mounted officer on the 
 field ; visited all the posts, encouraging and, when necessary, 
 aiding, — pointing with his own hands the guns that did such 
 execution upon Howe's troops.^ In awarding to General Put- 
 nam his share of the honors, Mr. Frothingliam quotes from 
 Chester's letter the words, " He acts nobly in every thing; " 
 but, inadvertently no doubt, omits what is in fact the essence 
 of the quotation : " Lieutenant Webb says, for God's sake, to 
 urge General Lee and Colonel Washington to join ; head offi- 
 cers is what we stand greatly in need of ; -we have no acting 
 head here but Putnam : he acts nobly in every thing." 
 
 The reader must now decide whether Prescott, who held a 
 particular post, from which he never stirred until forced — 
 who never gave any orders except to his own detachment, — 
 or Putnam, who is shown to have assumed and exercised 
 supreme authority everywhere on the field, was the com- 
 mander at the battle of Bunker Hill. He was there with the 
 knowledge and approbation of General Ward ; was every- 
 where recognized and obeyed, as far as it was possible for 
 any officer to have been by such raw soldiery as was at his 
 disposal ; that he believed himself to have been the commander 
 is not doubted. I will only add the opinion of two of his con- 
 temporaries, then serving with the provincial army. 
 
 According to Swett, President Stiles, of Yale College, has 
 put in writing that William Ellery, one of the foremost Rhode 
 Island patriots, and a signer of the Declaration of Independence, 
 had just shown him a copy of a letter from General Greene at 
 Iloxbury,2 in which the former said : " General Putnam took 
 possession and intrenched on Bunker Hill, Friday night, IGtli 
 
 1 The earliest engraving of the hattle in the " Penn'a Magazine " for September, 
 1775, reproduced by Mr. Frothinghara, exhibits Putnam, mounted, as the con- 
 spicuous figure of the battle-ground. A large engraving of General Putnam, of 
 the same date, published in London, entitles him the commander at Bunker 
 Hill. 
 
 2 Greene, as is well known, was in the right wing of Ward's army. 
 
24 GENEKAL ISRiVEL PUTNAM. 
 
 inst." Another letter is cited from a committee of the Rhode 
 Island Chamber of Supplies, then in Cambridge, which states 
 that the " king's troops attacked General Putnam, who defended 
 himself with great bravery, till overpowered and obliged to 
 retreat." Judge Grosvenor, already quoted, in speaking of 
 General Putnam's activity, says, '' he directed principally the 
 operations." Tlie statement of General Greene is, of itself, 
 almost sufficient to carry conviction. 
 
 Any eulogium of General Putnam would be superfluous. 
 He was a veteran of many campaigns. Beyond question he 
 was the foremost man of that army in embryo which assem- 
 bled at Cambridge after the battle of Lexington. Not Ward, 
 or Thomas, or Pomeroy, or even the lamented Warren, pos- 
 sessed its confidence to the degree that Putnam did. Mr. 
 Frothingham truly says he " had the confidence of the whole 
 army.'' Nature formed him for a leader ; and men instinc- 
 tively felt it. This gallant old man, who at nearly threescore 
 put forth such superhuman exertions to achieve victory at 
 Bunker Hill, had a significant interview with his son on the 
 night before the battle, which foreshadows his determination 
 to share its fortunes. On the field he exercised the functions 
 of a general officer, his own colony having invested him, in 
 April, 1775, with the rank of brigadier-general. 
 
 He, alone, showed the genius and grasp of a commander there 
 in posting his troops, in liis orders during the action, and in 
 his fruitless endeavor to create a new position on Bunker Hill, 
 where the British had begun to intrench on the evening of 
 their retreat from Lexington. With a few brave spirits he 
 turned at bay within cannon-shot of the victorious enemy, 
 while others, stunned by defeat, continued to retire in disorder. 
 In estimathig the services of General Putnam and Colonel 
 Prescott, from a military view, the former must receive the 
 award as the commanding officer of the field. When will the 
 people of Massachusetts apjjropriatcly honor the memory of 
 her noble son ? 
 

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