^73 I E 413 .772 .U6 CopV IN THE MATTER OF FiTZ-JoHN Porter BRIEF SUMMARY m REPORT 01" THE II BOARD OF OFFICERS. Allen, Lane & Scott, Printers, 233 South Fifth Street, Philadelphia. 6154* t f\ I BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ACCUSATIONS AGAINST GENERAL FITZ-JOHN PORTER, OF WHICH HE WAS FOUND GUILTY BY THE COURT-MARTIAL IN JANU- ARY, 1863, WITH THE ANSWERS THERETO AND REFERENCE TO EVIDENCE ON BOTH SIDES. I. That General Porter did not march, as ordered to do, at 1 A. M. of the 3Slh of August, 1862, from Warrenton Junction for Bristoe Station, but delayed moving for two hours, or until 3 A. M. It was claimed on the trial before the court-martial that this charge was sustained by the evidence of — Captain Duryea O. R., page 115 Major Barstow O. R., page 111 Lieutenant-Colonel Myers O. R., page 107 General Reynolds O. R., page 169 General Heintzelman O. R., page 82 General Pope O. R., page 12 Drake De Kay O. R., page 42 The answer to this is that the night was so dark, the road was crossed by several small streams, the road was in places a newly-made army road with stumps in it, and so blocked by wagons in places as to have rendered it impossible to march at 1 A. M., and in fact when he did start at 3 A. M., his troops did not get out of camp even until daylight. The above facts, and the impossibility of marching, were sustained by the facts as sworn to by — Captain Duryea O. R., page 115 Lieutenant-Colonel Myers O. R., page 109 General Reynolds O. R., page 171 General Heintzelman • O. R., page 80 Colonel Locke O. R., page 134 Colonel Martin O. R., page 140 General Morell O. R., page 146 General Sykes O. R., page 176 General Bntterfield O. R., page 185 General Griffin O. R., page 161 Captain Nifield O. R., page 122 Captain Monteith O. R., page 126 Lieutenant Wild O. R., page 129 Colonel Brinton , O. R., page 204 Colonel Clary O. R., page 121 Note. — The accusations have been put into this simple form instead of the more elaborate one contained in the charges and specifications, as being more readily understood. They contain the sulistance of all that was charged against him, and of which he was found guilty. They are printed in italics. Note. — All the witnesses who gave evidence on one side or the other may not be referred to. No one can properly understand the full import of the testimony without reading it all through. But these references may assist in so doing. Note.— The capitals " O. R." indicate the court-martial record ; " N. R." the record of the board of officers who recently heard the case. 2 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN POETER. On the recent hearing before the board of officers who met at West Point in 1878, new evidence was given on this point against Porter by — Colonel J. S. Buchanan N. R., page 602 Major Duval N. R., page 860 Corporal Solomon Thomas N. R., page 840 Brevet Major W. Bullard N. R., page 730 Lieutenant Charles Dwiglit N. R., page 722 Private Murray N. R., page 587 Dr. W. L. Faxon N. R., page 889 Major Rufus R. Dawes N. R., page 834 On the hearing before the board, new evidence was given in favor of Porter by — General Warren N. R., page 15 General Ruggles N. R., page 271 General R. C. Buchanan N. R., page 214 General Patrick N. R., page 181 General Ruggles N. R., page 271 Captain Randal N. R., page I submit, upon examination of all this testimony, any fair-minded man "T"st conclude the darkness of the night and tlie obstructions were such as fully justified Porter in delaying from one to three o'clock. II. That he did not obey the joint order of the morning of August S9th, 1863, to General 3Ic]JoweU. and himself, to move toward Gainesville. The witnesses against Porter on this point were — General McDowell O. R., page 82 General Pope O. R., page 11 General Roberts O. R., page 47 Colonel Smith O. R., page 68 Captain Smith : O. R., page 112 The answer to this charge is that Porter met the forces of Longstreet when he reached Dawkins' branch and could not go further. That Mc- Dowell took the command as senior in rank, and told Porter he was too far out ; that was no place to fight a battle ; that he (McDowell) then took Ricketts' and King's divisions off and moved up the Sudley road, and thus deprived Porter of the force necessary to carry out the order any further, and l)y his course destroyed the binding effect of that or- der ; that Porter being too weak in force to attack Longstreet's force of 25,000 men with the 8000 or 10,000 men left him by McDowell, did all he could do, viz., he held Longstreet in check and kept himself in read- iness to fall back behind Bull Run, that night, as oi-dered by the joint order. In this he was sustained by the evidence of — General Morell O. R., page 146 General Griffin O. R., page 160 ~1 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 3 General Sykes O. R., page 176 General Butterfield O. R., page 185 Colonel Locke O. R., page 133 Captain Martin O. R., page 140 Lieutenant Weld O. R., page 129 Colonel E. G. Marshall O. R., page 189 The new evidence against Poi'ter on this point was given by — General McDowell N. R., page 742 Colonel Sciiriner N. R., page 832 General Bouton N. R., page 332 Captain Geeke N. R., page 678 Captain Runnell N. R., page 677 Dr.Faxon N. R., page 890 Private Brahn N. R., page 936 Robbing N. R., page 845 Captain Hatch N. R., page 600 General Sturgis N. R., page 711 Thomas N. R., page 840 The new evidence on this point in Porter's favor was given by — General B. H. Robertson N. R., page 173 Colonel Davis N. R., page 389 Major Earle N. R., page 408 General Morel) N. R., page 419 Colonel Locke N. R., page 298 General Longstreet N. R., page 57 General Warren N. R., page 15 Colonel Charles Marshall N. R., page 157 General Patrick. N. R., page 185 The most conclusive evidence tiiat Porter was justified in the course he took is that General McDowell, when in command of a total force of from 25,000 to 27,000 men (half of Pope's army), decided not to at- tempt to execute the joint order by marching further in the direction of Gainesville, and took King's and Ricketts' divisions of 16,000 to 17,000 oif up the Sudley road and away from the road to Gainesville. This was the abandonment of tlie order, and left Porter no option except to remain where he was and do the best he could. III. Thai on the 29th of August, 1862, being with his army corps, be- tween 3Ianassas Station and the field of battle then pending, and loithin sound of the guns and in the presence of the enemy, and knowing that a severe action, of great consequence, icas being fought, and that the aid of his corps iras greatly needed, he did fail all day to bring it on the field, and did shamefully fall back and retreat from the advance of the enemy, without any attempt to give them battle, and without knoicing the forces from which he shamefully rdreated. 4 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. The evidence on this point as relied upon by Judge-Advocate Holt, was given by — General McDowell O. R., page 82 General Pope O. E,., page 11 General Roberts O. R., page 47 Colonel Smith O. R., page 68 And especially the despatch of Porter to McDowell and King O. R., page 31 The answer to this cliarge is : 1st. That Porter was not between Manassas Station and the field of" battle, but was on Dawkins' branch, which was to the left and south of the line referred to. 2d. That no such severe action was being fought there as is involved in this charge. 3d. That he did not fail to bring his corps on the field as alleged, but held it in a position to keep Longstreet's force of 25,000 to 27,000 men in check all day ; that he did not retreat, but held the most advanced position he had reached that day, without yielding or losing any ground whatever. In this he is sustained by the evidence of General McDowell's conduct as given by General McDowell, O. R., page , General Pope (that he stopped all fighting when he came on the ground at 12 M.) C. M. B. 14. General Morell O. R., page 146 Colonel Locke O. R., page 133 Colonel Marshall O. R., page 189 General Griffin O. R., page 160 Captain Martin O. R., page 140 The new evidence on these points against Porter before the board was given by General J. C. Robinson N. R., page 833 General Rosser N. R., page 1152 Captain McEldowney N. R., page 950 General Early N. R., page 848 Captain Benjamin N. R., page 612 Captain Blackford N. R., page 692 H. Bouton N. R., page 935 A. Doubleday (General) N. R., page 688 Major Troebel N. R,, page 708 The new evidence given in favor of Porter on these points was by General Pope's Official Record of September 3d, 1862, and Janu- ary 29th, 1863. General Morell N. R., page 968 General Sykes N. R., page 440 General Sturgis N. R., page 711 Colonel Davis N. R., page 389 Major Earle N. R., page 408 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 5 Colonel Randal N. R., page 89 General Warren N. R., page 15 General Tower N. R., page 445 General Mindill N. R, page 845 General R. C. Buchanan N. R., page 214 General McKeever N. R., page It was proved conclusively that the action during the 29th consisted of skirmish fighting, some of it quite heavy during the morning, between Sigel's and Reynolds' troops and the enemy, in the neighborhood of Groveton, of artillery firing (some of that quite heavy), that at 12 M., according to General Pope, he came on to the field and ordered all efforts to cease for the time; thai after or about three an attack was made by General Grover witli about two thousand men, and that there were^frpm. that time on some three or four attacks with not more than three thousand to four thousand men at any one time. That these attacks were about an hour apart each, and were unsupported by any other simultaneous or combined iin)vcment ; that towards sundown General King's division, under McDowell, made an attack up the Warrenton Pike near Grove- ton ; that no musketry firing was heard by Porter or any one in his corps, until this last attack ; that he did not know that Pope was on the field until he received the 4.80 desi)atch about sundown, and had no reason to sui)iwse Pope needed liis assistance or had any thought of fighting a general battle ; on the contrary, from what McDowell had told him iu'^the morning — from McDowell's saving he was too for out— this is no place to fight a battle ; from McDowell's taking Ricketts and King away from\im, and from the tenor of the joint order directing them to keep in such a position as to be able to fall back of Bull Run that night, he had every reason to believe that there was no general battle benig fought, and none was expected or wished for by Pope. ^s to retreating.— The new evidence offered by Porter utterly destroys the foundation of this charge. ^ ^ From the time Porter put out his skirmish line beyond Dawkins branch on arriving there, it was not withdrawn until 3 A. M. of the next day. His artillery maintained its position, and there was no change in that of the other troops, except such marching and counter-marching as was described in the evidence, caused only by orders for position or when movements were made so as to meet movements, or supposed move- ments of the enemy. They remained on Dawkins' branch, and stretch- ing back to Bethlehem Church until they moved at 3 A. M. of the Sdth under positive orders from Pope. IV. That while a severe action teas being fov.ght on the 29th of August, lS6S,'by General Pope, and beliering the troops of General Pope were sustaining defeat and retiring from the field, he did fail to go to the aid of General Pope, and retreated away and fell back with his army, and left In the disasters of a presumed defeat General Pope's army, and failed, Ini any attempt to attack the enemy, to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that woidd have endangered the safety of the capital of the country. The evidence and remarks given as to the third charge are applicable to this. 6 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. V. That he disobeyed the order of ^.SU F. 31., of Augxist 29th, 1862, to attach the enemy on hisflanh or rear. The evidence relied upon by the Judge-Advocate to sustain this charge was given by — Captain Douglas Pope O. R., page 57 Charles Durfee O. R., page 208 General McDowell O. R., page 85 General Pope O. R., page 35 General Roberts O. R., page 53 The answer of Porter to this charge is that he did not I'eceive it until about sundown, when it was too late to attack. The evidence offered by Porter to sustain this defense was by — General Sykes, (sunset) O. R., i)age 177 Colonel Locke, (between sundown and dusk) O. R., page 136 Monteith, (about sundown) O. R., page 127 Weld, (after sundown) O. R., pages 130, 132 Ingham, (after sundown) O. R., page 199 The new evidence offered against Porter on this ])oint was by — Archelaus Dyer N. R., page 1177 Duffee ". N. R., page 615 Captain Pope N. R., ])age 563 The three despatches brought by McDowell (N. R., page 810) were expected to prove that Porter received the order at an early hour ; but they ]iroved it could not have been in hand at 6 P. M. The new evidence in favor of Porter on this point was given by — Colonel Randal, (between (J and 7, growing dark)...N. R., page 93 Three desi)atches N. R., page 810 Dyer, Duffee and Pope, were contradicted by Wheeler N. R., page 980 Leachman N. R., page 119 It was shown on behalf of Porter that since the original trial Douglas Pope had stated to several persons that he was lost while on his way ; that he came near running into the rebels; that he was two hours on the road, and it was nearly dark when he delivered it to Porter. The testi- mony of the other witnesses was entirely overthrown on this point, and they were proved unworthy of credit. They all said they went along the Sudley road, and yet did not see a soldier marching there, when it is an undisputed fact that Ricketts' and King's divisions of sixteen or seventeen tiiousand men were then moving on that road. But the most conclusive evidence, at last, is the despatch fi-om Porter to McDowell and King, dated six P. M., N. R., page 810, which bears CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 7 intrinsic evidence he had not then received the 4.30 order. This was produced by McDowell on the late hearing, and is the best evidence that can be iiad on this point, supplemented, as it is, by tiie evidence of s :h men as Sykes, Locke, Monteith, Weld, and Ingram, and recently by Randol. But the fiict that the 4.30 order was given under an absolute mistake as to Porter's location and his ability to attack the flank and rear of the enemy, and also as to the presence of Longstreet's forces, would have fully justified him in not carrying out the order. VI. That he disobeyed the order of 4-oO P. 31. to attack the enemy, and retreated from advancing forces of the enemy without any attempt to engage them, or to aid the troops who were a/ready fighting greatly sujie- rior numbers, and were relying on the flank attack he tvas ordered to make to secure a decisive victory, and to capture the enemy's army ; results which must have folloived from said flank attack had it been made by General Porter in compiliance with the said order. This charge is substantially the same as the last, and the evidence re- ferred to and the remarks under it are appropriate to this. Errors of the Court Martial. 1. As to Portcr\ location. — They thought he was at least one mile beyond Dawkin.s' branch. This would have brought him within the enemy's lines. He was not beyond Dawkins' branch, except with his skirmish line. 2. As to the character of the battle. — There was no general battle on that day. The position, as clearly proven, has been stated, and as every position and movement of every corps, every division, every brigade and regi- ment, were established by evidence and laid down on the maps before the board, the nature of each engagement and its extent was found by them to prove that there was no such battle as was described in the charges and found by the court-martial. 3. As to Longstreet's presence. — The court-martial did not believe he was present. That he was there with twenty-five thousand to twenty- seven thousand men is now shown beyond a doubt, by Longstreet, Wilcox, Robertson, Early, Marshall, Blackford, and other witnes.ses. 4. As to PoHer's retreat. — In this the court were clearly wrong. It is shown by evidence that can not be disputed that Porter did not retreat. 5. As to delivery of 4-30 order. — It is now clear it was not delivered until about 6.30 or sundown, and Porter could not have attacked. Whereas, the court-martial found it was delivered as early as 5 to 5.30. All these mistakes except the last were based upon General McDowell's evidence. His evidence before the board shows how utterly he fails to sustain the inferences drawn from his former testimony, and in fact, that 8 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. by his conduct as he explains it, and by his evidence as wrung out of him in cross-examination, he disproves wiiat he was relied upon to establish in the former trial. Bv the new evidence these errors can be corrected, and without any reflection upon the court-martial, the report of the board can be sustained by relying ujion the new evidence and the maps which are now correct. The map before the court was grossly defective, and the marks upon it show how entirely wrong they were in the views they adopted in the ])articulars referred to. The court suppo.sed Porter was a mile in advance of his real position, that he was near the Warrenton Pike — tiiat lie was so far advanced he could readily have fallen upon Jackson's flank and rear — that Long- street's force was not on the fiekl — that there was no difficulty in Porter's falling upon Jackson's flank and rear at any time during the afternoon, and he was especially culpable in not having done so after the receipt of the 4.30 order. The board in their report have corrected these errors, as will be seen by reference to their report. REPO RT OF BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED AT WEST POINT, IN JUNE, 1878. New York City, March 19th, 1879. To the Honofdhk the Secretary/ of War, Washinr/ton , D. C, Sir : — We, the Board of Officers appointed by order of the President to examine the evidence in the case of Fitz-John Porter, late Major- General of Volunteers, and to report, with the reasons for our conclu- sions, what action (if any), in our o]nnion, justice requires should be taken by the President on the application for relief in that case, have the honor to make the following report. The Recorder lias been directed to for- ward to the Adjutant-General of the Army the printed record of our proceeding, including all the evidence examined and the arguments of counsel on either side. We have made a very thorough examination of all the evidence pre- sented and bearing in any manner uj)on the merits of the case. The Thorough Eecorder has, under instructions from the Board, sought with great iioni.f;.ii diligence for evidence in addition to that presented by the petitioner, j^^^^"" especially such as might appear to have a bearing adverse to the claims urged by him. Due care has been exercised not to inquire into the military operations pare not to of the Army of Virginia, or the conduct of officers thereof, any fur- wi?"t was" " ther than has seemed necessary to a full and fair elucidation of the sub- "^" y"'^'^"' jeet submitted to us for investigation. On the other hand, we have not hesitated to examine fully into all the facts, accurate knowledge of which seemed to us to be necessary to the formation of a correct judgment upon the merits of the case, and to the determination of the action which jus- tice requires should be taken by the President on the petitioner's appli- cation for relief. Note. — The side notes are not in tlie report as made by the Board, Inil liave been added in this printed copy to call attention more readily to the siilyects treated of, and the italics have also been introduced to show portions of the report upon which special emphasis should be placed. (9) 10 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. Benefit of We liave had the benefit of the testimony of a large number of officers dencritiKi of t'lB late Confederate army, a kind of testimony which was not avail- accurate ^\^\q ^f ([jg time of Gcncral Porter's trial by court-martial. We have also availed ourselves of the testimony of many officers and soldiers of the Union forces who were present on the battle-field, and of much docu- mentary evidence, to throw additional light upon points not made per- fectly clear in the record of evidence taken before the court-martial ; and we have had the use of accurate maps of the battle-field of Manassas, constructed from recent actual surveys made, under the direction of the Chief of Engineers, by a distinguished officer of that corps, who was himself a partici])ant in that battle. Without Without such a map neither the testinumy upon which General Porter evMence'"' was couvictcd uor the additional testimony submitted to this Board could understood.' have bceu correctly understood. The evidence which we have thus been able to examine, in addition to that which was before the court-martial, has placed beyond question many important facts which were before the subjects of dispute, and in respect to some of which radically erroneous opinions were entertained by General Porter's accusers, and doubtless by the court-martial that pronounced him guilty. E-sentiai The rcsult has been, as we believe, to establish beyond reasonable iished"be- doubt all the facts essential to the formation of a correct judgment upon JonaiJe"" the mcrits of the case of Fitz-John Porter. We are thus enabled to re- •loubt. port, with entire unanimity, and without doubt in our own minds, with the reasons for our conclusions, what action, in our opinion, justice re- quired should be taken by the President on the petitioner's application for relief Several The evidence ]>rescnts itself under several distinct heads, viz. : — w'h^h'evt" First. — The im])erfect, and in some respects, erroneous statements of ''.^n'ls^usei'f ''acts, duc to the jiartial and incorrect knowledge in possession of wit- nesses at the time of the court-martial, and the extremely inaccurate maps and erroneous locations of troops thereon, by which erroneous state- ments were made to convey still more erroneous impressions. Second. — The opinions and inferences of prominent officers based upon this imperfect knowledge. Third. — Tlie far more complete and accurate statements of facts now made by a large number of eye-witnesses from both the contending forces. Fourth. — The accurate maps of the field of operations and the exact positions of troops thereon at different periods of time, by which state- ments otherwise contradictory or irreconcilable are shown to be harmo- nious, and opposing o]iinions are shown to have been based upon different views of the same military situation ; and, Finally. — The conflicting testimony relative to plans of operations, in- terpretation of onlers, motives of action, and relative degrees of respon- sibility for unfortunate results. Several A carcfiil consideration of all the material facts now fully established, views. in combination with the conflicting or inconclusive testimony last above referred to, gives rise to several diverse theories respecting the whole subject with which General Porter's ease is inseparably connected. These diverse views of the subject necessarily involve, in a greater or less CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 11 degree, the acts, motives, and responsibilities of others as well as those of the petitioner. We have considered witli great care and labor, and with our best ability, each and all of these phases in which the subject can be*" P'"^'''* and has been presented, and we find that all these possible views of the™""""'"*' subject, when examined in the light of the fiicts which are fully estab- lished by undisputed testimony, lead inevitably to one and tlie same conclusion in respect to the guilt or innocence of Fitz-John Porter of the specific charges upon which he was tried and pronounced guilty by the court-martial. Therefore, while exposing General Porter's conduct to the test of the highest degree of responsibility which recognized military principles attached to the command he held under the circumstances in which he was placed, and the orders which he had received, we are able to take that view of the whole subject which seems to involve in the least possi- ble degree any question as to the acts, motives, or responsibility of others. We will now proceed to give, as concisely as we are able to do, a nar- rative of the events which gave rise to the charges against Major Gen. Fitz-John Porter, omitting the multitude of interesting but unessential details and all facts having no necessary bearing upon his case, and limit- ing ourselves to a plain statement of the essential facts of the case which have been established, as we believe, by positive proof While the Army of the Potomac was withdrawing from its position on the James river in August, 1862, the Army of Virginia, under Major- Line of Ar- General Pope, was ordered to hold the line'of the Rappahannock, and Smf in"' to stand on the defensive until all the forces could be united behind that ■^"^" '*''^- river. General Pope was given to understand that, when this concentra- tion was effected, Major-General Halleck, the General-in Chief, was to take the field in command cf the combined armies. On the other hand, it appears that Major-General McClellan, then commanding the Array of the Potomac, was given to understand that he was to direct the opera'- tions of all the forces in Virginia as soon as they should be united. It appears that General Pope was notified on the 25tli of August that Gen'i Pope an active campaign was soon to be commenced, without waiting for a Aug^asii,, union of all the forces, and under some commander other than eiihev oQl^^'^"^ those before named. But this information appears to have been of ^^ '"""P"^"' secret character, afterwards suppressed, and not made known to General McClellan and his subordinates until five davs later, when the order appeared from the War Department, depriving McClellan of the com- mand of all his troops then between the Potomac and the Rappanannoek, although leaving him in nominal command of the Army of the Potomac. Thus General Porter, who joined General Pope's armv about that Auhatiime time, was left under the impression, which all had previously shared, pos'edope't that the operations ot the army were to continue of a defensive charac- of defeDsWe ter until all the forces should be united and proper preparations made '=''•■"■="''*'''■ for the commencement of an offensive campaign under a general desig- nated by the President to command the combined armies. But just then the Confederate General, Jackson, witii three divisions of infantry, one of cavalry, and some artillery, commenced his movement to turn the Union right through Thoroughfare Gap, wiiich gap he passed on the 26th, and that night struck the rear of the Union army at Bristoe and 12 CASE OF riTZ-JOHN POETER. Manassas Junction. The next morning, August 27tii, tlie Union Army changed front to the rear, antl was oidered to move on Gainesville, Greenwich, and Warrenton Junction. Aiig.27tii, General Porter, with his two divisions of the Fifth Corps, arrived at portMito Warrenton Junction on the 27th, and there reported in person to Gen- Pope. gj-ai Pope. That afternoon Hooker's division was engaged with the enemy at Bristoe Station ; McDowell and Sigel were moving on Gaines- ville, and Heintzelman and Reno on Greenwich. Banks was covering the rear below Warrenton Junction, and guarding the trains in their Engage- movement toward ]\Iaiiassas Junction. Porter was at first ordered to Bristoe' move toward Greenwich upon the arrival of Banks at Warrenton Junc- tion, but after Hooker's engagement at Bristoe the following order was sent him, and he received it at 9.50 P. M. Headquarters Army of Virginia, Bristoe Station, August 27th, 1862—6.30 P. M. Major-General F. J. Porter, Warrenton Junction, Order to General: The ruajor-general commanding directs that you start at 1 o'ldock to-night march at 1 and come forward with your wliole corps, or such part of it as is with you, so as to l)e here A'tf' ^"^ by daylight to-morrow morning. Hool^er has had a very severe action witli the enemy, with a loss of about 300 killed and wounded. The enemy has been driven back, l>ut is retiring along the railroad. We must drive him from Manassas, and clear the country between that place and Gainesville, where McDowell is. If Morell has not joined you, send him word to push forward immediately ; also send word to Banks to hurry forwanl witli all sjjeed to take your jdaee at Warrenton Junction. It is necessary on all accounts that you should be here- by daylight. I send an officer with this despatch who will conduct you to this place. Be sure to send word to Banks, who is on the road from Fayetteville, probably in the direction of Be.aleton. Say to Banks, also, that he had best run back the railroad trains to this side of Cedar run. If he is not with you, write him to that eflect. By command of General Pope. GEORGE D. RUGGLES, Colonel and Chief of Staff. P. S. — If Banks is not at Warrenton Junction, leave a regiment of infantry and two pieces of artillery as a guard till he comes up, with instructions to follow you immediately upon his doing so. If Banks is not at the junction, instruct Colonel Clary to run the trains back to this side of Cedar Run, and post a regiment and a section of artillery with it. By command of Cieueral Pope. GEORGE D. RUGGLES, Colonel and Chief of Staff. Ordershows This order ])lainly contemplated an aggressive movement against the movemeDts encmy early on the 28th, and retiuired the presence of General Porter's intended. ^Qj-pg^ at BHstoe Station as early as possible in the morning, to take part in the pursuit of and attack upon the enemy. The order did not indicate any anticipation of defensive action at Bristoe, but, on the contrary, it indicated continuous, active, and aggres- sive operations during the entire day of the 28th, to drive the enemy from Manasses and clear the country. Hence the troops must arrive at Bristoe in condition for such service. Porter The evidence clearly shows that General Porter evinced an earnest earne^stde- desire to Comply literally with the terras of the order, and that he held siretocom-a eousultation with his division commanders, some of his brigade com- ply. . » . . manders, and his staff officers on the subject. One of his divi.sions had arrived in camp late in the evening, after a long march, and was much fatigued. CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 13 If the troops marched at 1 o'clock, none of them could have much sleep before starting, and, even if they could arrive at Bristoe by or soon after daylight, they must be in poor condition for a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, who was already some distance beyond Bristoe, But this was not regarded by General Porter as sufficient reason for hesitating to make the attempt to com])ly literally witii the order. He still urged, against the advice of his division commanders, the necessity of imj)Iicit obedience. Then, further consideration of the subject disclosed the fact that the road was filled with army trains, which had been pressing in tliat direction all day and as late at night as they could move, until the way had become completely blocked with wagons. The trains of the army moving back from tiie line of the Kapjiahannock had been ordered to take that road to the number of " two or three thousand." In the language of one of the most intelligent witnesses, the mass of wagons blocked together at places in the road was "like a lot of ice that jams in on the shore." The night had become very dark, or, as testified by most of the witnesses, excessively dark. It would have been difficult to march troops u)wn a plain and unobstructed road. It was a manifest Manifest }>iiysical impossil)ility to march over tiiat road tiiat night, or to remove Pjjy^.'^t^^l,"."- the obstructions in the darkness of the night. When this situation was to maich'.Tt made evident. General Porter reluctantly consented to delay the move-'^'*'' ment two hours, or until .3 o'clock. At that hour tiie march was com- menced, but it was found that no appreciable proi::ress could be made before daylight. Nothing was gained, or could have been gained, by the attempt to move before the dawn of day. It would have been wiser wiser to to have delayed the attempt to move until 4 o'clock. ed''u'ntiu''' A vigorous and persistent effort to make that march, commencing at "'^'o'''- 1 o'clock, could only have resulted in greatly fatiguing the troops and throwing them into disorder, from whicli they could not have been extri- cated until long after daylight, without making any material progress, and would thus have caused the corps to.arrive at Bristoe at a later hour and in a miserable condition. Abundant experience in situations similar to that above described porter exer- leaves no room for doubt what General Porter's duty was. He exercised oi^Junary' only the very ordinary discretion of a corps commander, which it was ap strike Jackson a decisive blow on the morn- son mo^'n-'^ '"g of the 29th, before reinforcements could reach him. In the mean ing of 29ih. time the Confederate general had taken up a favorable position a little to the north and west of Groveton and Sudley to await attack. Under tiiese conditions General l^ortcr, who was still at Bristoe Station, received, at (> A. M., the following order from General Pope: — Headquarters Army of Virginia, „ , Near Bull Run, August 29th, 1862—3 A. M. Porter or- > o i dered to Genkral: — McDowell lias intercepted the retreat of Jackson. Sigel is imiueiliately on move to jj,g right of McDowell. Kearney and Hooker march to attack the enemy's rear at early en rev} . j].^,^^ Majcir-General Pope directs you to move upon Centreville, at the fiV.st dawn of day, with your whole command, leaving your trains to follow. It is very important that you should be here at a very early hour in the morning. A severe eugagemeut is likely to take place, and your presence is necessary. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEORGE D. RUGGLES, Colonel mid Chief of Staff. Major-General Porter. Porter Under this order. General Porter marched promptly with his corjis moves. toward Centreville. He had passed Manassas Junction with the head of his column, when he was halted by counter orders, issued in consequence of a grave change which had occurred in the situation since the night before. Change in King had withdrawn from his position near Jackson's right, on the order. Warrenton turnpike, and had fallen back to INIanassas Junction. Rick- etts had fallen back in the night from Thoroughfare Gap to Gainesville, and thence, in con.sequence of the movement of King, had retired to Bristoe Station. Wayopened Thus the way had been left open for the retreat of Jackson to Tiiorough- son'sTetreat fei'e Gap, or for the advance of Longstreet from that point, and ample st'^icetTo" ^''^'^ ^^^'-^ elapsed for them to effect a junction, either at the Gap or near join Jack- Groveton, before a force could again be interposed to prevent it. The op]iortunity to attack Jackson's detached force with superior numbers had passed beyond the possibility of recall. CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 15 As soon as the withdrawal of King became known to General Pope, he hastily sent a verbal message to General Porter to retrace his steps and move towards Gainesville, and soon followed this\~'°*sage with the following order, which was received by General Porter aK d.20 A. M. : Headquarters Army of Virginia, Centreville, August 29th, 1SG2. Push forward with your corps and King's division, which you will take with you, upon 0'^" '■> Gainesville. I am following the enemy down the Warreuton turnpike. Be e.xpeditious or Q^j^Q^pgyiuc we will lose much. JOHN POPE, Major-General Commanding. Under these orders General Porter advanced promptly with his corps, Po^er followed b_v King's division, on the direct road from Manassas Junction toward toward Gainesville, having knowledge of the military situation as above *''"'"^^'""°' described. General Porter had met General McDowell near Manassas Junction p^^t^ and tiiey had conversed with each other relative to this order, placing ™<^<^'«*i'=- King's division under Porter's command. McDowell claims that it was conceded that he might go forw'ard and command the whole force, under the 62d Article of War, but he desired to reunite all the divisions of his corps on that part of the field where Reynolds then was. Hence he wrote to Pope on this subject, awaited his orders, and did not exercise any command over Porter's corps until after the receipt of further orders from Pope. When about 11.30 o'clock, the head of Porter's column arrived at Arrives at Dawkiiis' Branch, about three and a half miles from Gainesville and g^^'Jj^jj''*' nine and a half miles from Thoroughfare Gap, he met the enemy's cav- alry advance, and captured some of Longstreet's scouts. The clouds of dust in his front and to his right, and extending back toward Thorough- J^e"!!'"''* fare Gap, showed the enemy coming in force, and already arriving on the field in his front. Morell's division was at once deployed ; Sykes clo.sed up in support, p^rce de- King's division following. A regiment was sent forward across the creek, p'oyed. as skirmishers, and Butterfiekl's brigade was started across the creek to the front, and somewhat to the right, with orders to seize, in advance of the enemy, if po,ssible, the commanding ground on the opposite ridge, about a mile distant. Morell's division, with Sykes in support, was ready to advance at once to the support of Butterfield. At this stage of Porter's operations, sometime between 11.30 and I2j^^j)„„^ii o'clock, McDowell, in person, arrived on the field and arrested the move- f"',™^"-^'' ment Porter was making, saying to him in the hearing of several offi- cers, " Porter, you are too far out. This is no place to fight a battle," or words to that effect. McDowell had received, a few minutes before, a despatch from Buford, Buford's informing him that seventeen regiments of infantry, a battery, and some ^''^'^ " cavalry had passed through Gainesville at 8.45 o'clock, and moved down the Centreville road toward Groveton, and hence must have been on the field in front of Sigel and Reynolds at least two hours. The dust in Porter's immediate front and extending across toward Dust Groveton, as well as back toward Gainesville, showed that large forces urge'''* of the enemy, in addition to those reported by Buford, were already on en^y'^in front. 16 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. tlie field. The latest information from the Confederate army showed the whole force of the enemy within reach of Gainesville by noon on the Longstra-t 29th. McDowcU's troops (Ricketts' division and some cavalry) had de- to mass h'i.r lay ed Longstreet's advance at Thoronghfiire Gap from abont noon nntil Ga'p''and7 tlark on the previous day, 28th. Hence, Lee's column had had eighteen houis to hours by the mornina: of tiie 29th to close up in mass near the Gap, and march 8 , *' , "^ . . i • i i • i -i i c i ■ miles and sevcu hours that morning m which to march eiglit miles and lorm line battle.'"'* " on the field of battle. Jackson, who had been supposed anxious to retreat, and for whom the way had been left open, had not retreated, but was still holding his posi- tion of the previous evening, as if confident of adequate reinforcements. Sigel's pursuit had been checked where it started that morning, at Groveton. Head of It was Certain that the head of column of Lee's main army had arrived re'ac'iifl™d2 0n the field in front of Groveton at least two hours in advance of thear- hoursbe- j.jyjj] gf ^i,g ]^gj^(| ^f columu of Porter's and McDowell's corps, at Daw- fore Porter. .,„ ,. ., , -ii/'t? kins Branch, and it was so nearly certain that the main body oi Lee s army was already on the field and in line of battle as to alxsolutely require corresponding action. This was Porter's impression at the time, and he conveyed it to McDowell by words and gesture that left no doubt in the mind of the latter that he (Porter) believed the enemy was in force in his immediate front. Only For- In contrast to this cridmt preparation of the enemy for battle, only Por- lo'fion^n^ ter's nine or ten thousand men were ready for action, of the thirty-jive tliou- ?ead°/for°^""''' '"-^'^ '''"'" coiiijMsing the left wing of the Union army. action. Banks' corps, ten thousand, was still at Bristoe without orders to move beyond that point. Ricketts' division, eight thousand, was near Bristoe, under orders to move to the front, but his men were so worn out by con- stant marching, night and day, tiiat they could not possibly be got to the field even tor defensive action that day. King's division, seven thou- sand, was just in rear of Porter, but was so fatigued as to be unfit for offensive action, and hardly able to march. Thus this long column, stretching back from Dawkins' Branch by way of Manassas Junction to and even beyond Bristoe, had struck the right wing of the Confederate army in line of battle, while a gap of nearly two miles remained in the Union line between Porter and Reynolds, who was on the left of Sigel near Groveton. Map No. I. The accompanying map, marked Board Map, No. 1, illustrates the positions of the Union troops at noon of August 29th, and the probable positions of the Confederate troops" at the same time, as indicated by the information then in possession of the Union generals. This ma|) is not intended to show the actual positions of the troops at that time, but to correctly interpret the information upon which the Union generals then acted. Situation This was the military situation on the Union left and Confederate right Dowei?'ar- of t'le field wheu McDowell arrested Porter's advance, and Porter's rested For- operations under the direct orders from Poijc heretofore mentioned ter's move- 1 . -it-..! ii-, ment. ceased, and, uniler new orders just received. Porter became subordinate to McDowell. Failure to Not Only had the effort to destroy Jackson before he could be rein- jack"on. forced totally failed, but the Confederate army was on the field and in line, CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 17 while the Union army was not. The time to resume defensive action, Defensive awaiting tile concentration of the army, liad not onlv arrived, but h&dt^'^Zh.ye been too long postponeil. been take" On his way to tlie front McDowell had received the following order from General Pope, addressed jointly to him and Porter, and Porter had received a copy of the same order a moment before McDowell's arrival : [General Order No. 5.] Headquarters Army of Virginia, r, , », r, „ , r, Centrbville, August 29tli, 1862. Generals MeDowell and Porter, You wUl please move forward with your joint commands towards Gainesville. I sent Joiot order General Porter written orders to tliat eflect an hour and a half ai;o. Heintzelman Sigel and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now he not far from Gaiues- viUe I desire that as soon as communication is established between tliis force and your own the whole command shall halt. It may be nece.ssarv to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville, to-night. I presume it will be so on account of our supplies. I have sent 'no orders of any description to Ricketts, and none to interfere in any way with the movements ot McDowell s tnjops, except what I sent by his aide-de-camp last night, which were to hold his position on the Warrenton pike until the troops from here should fall upon the enemy's flank and rear. I do not even know Ricketts' po.sition, as I have not lieen able to find out where General McDowell was until a late hour this morning. General McDowell will take immediate steps to communicate with General Ricketts, and instruct him to rejoin the other divisions of his corps as soon as practicable. If anv considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out. One thin" must be had in view that the troojjs mast occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-mght or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a jiacc that will bring them here bv to-morrow night or next dav Mv own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzelman's corps or at this place. JOHN POPE, Major- General Commanding. This order and the 62d Article of War made it the duty of McDowell j,,n„^ to command the combined corps, so long as they should continue to act'^^ coS- together, and General Pope should be absent from the field. In this in-""'"^- terpretation of tiie law Generals McDowell and I'orter agreed, and upon It they acted at the time. Upon McDowell devolved the responsibility of modifying the joint order as its terms authorized, and as the militarv situation .seemed imperatively to require. The terms of tiie order contemplating tiiat communication should be established with the troops on the other road, or, as General McDowell ordeT "' interpreted it, that line should be formed in connection with those troops, that the whole command should then halt, and that the troops must not go beyond a point from which they could reach Bull Run by that night or the next morning, and the military situation as it then appeared^'to them, was briefly discussed by the two generals. The situation was exceedingly critictil If the enemy should attack ,.. .• as he seemed about ready to do, Porter's two divisions, about nine thou-"*"^^'-" sand men, were all the force then ready to stand between Lee's main array, just arrived on the field, and McDowell's long and weary column, or the left flank of Pope's army near Groveton. McDowell was " exces- sively anxious" to get King's division over on the lefl of Reynolds, who then occupied with his small division that exposed flank; and he quickly decided that "considerable advantages" were "to be gained" by depart- ing from the terms of the joint order, so far as to make no attempt to <.-o further toward Gainesville, and to at once form line with the troops then engaged near Groveton ; and this departure from the strict letter of the Departure joint order was evidently required l)y the military situation as it thenfusMef' appeared and as it did actually exist. 18 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. After this brief consultation, the two generals rode together through the woods to the right, about tliree-quarters of a mile toward Groveton, and made a personal examination of the ground. As soon as this was McDowell done, McDowell decided not to take the troops through these woods, but tose'parate', to Separate his own corps from Porter's, take King's division (Ricketts Kin' M^d following) around the woods by the Sudley Springs road, and thus put Ritketts up them in beyond the woods and on the left of Reynolds. eyroa . McDowell then left Porter very hurriedly, announcing his decision, as he testified, by the words, "You put your force in here, and I will take mine up the Sudley Springs road on the left of the troops engaged at that ])oint against the enemy," or words to that effect. Even the.se few words, we are satisfied. Porter did not hear, or did not understand, for he called, as McDowell rode away, "What shall I do?" and Mc- Dowell gave no audible answer, but only a wave of the hand. In this state of uncertainty, according to the testimony of one of General Por- Porterto ter's Staff officcrs. Porter sent a message to King's division to ascertain whJre'he positively if tiiat division was ordered away by McDowell, and, if not, was. iQ give proper orders for its action with his corps, and a reply was re- turned by McDowell himself that he was going to the right and should take that division with him; that Porter iiad better stay where he was, and if necessary to fall back, ho could do so on McDowell's left. This testimony has given rise to much controversy ; but, in our opinion, the question whether that message was or was not sent is unim- portant. If it was sent, it did not differ in substance from the instruc- tions which Geneial McDowell testifies he had previously given to General Porter, " You put your force in here," &c. Neither could be construed as directing what Porter's action should be, but only as de- ciding that he should continue on that line while McDowell would take his own troops to another part of the field. There appears to liave been an understanding, derived either from pre- vious conversation or from the terms of the joint order, that when Mc- Dowell did get King's division on the other side of the woods, Morell's division on the right of Porter's corps should make such connection or establish such communication with that of King as might be practicable through the woods. None of them then knew how wide was that belt of woods, nor what was its character beyond where they had reconnoitered, nor whether the ground beyond was in possession of the enemy. Movement^ When the two generals had started to take that ride to the right, Morell's right. troops had been ordered to follow them, and Griffin's brigade had led off after its pickets had been called in. After McDowell took his departure this movement was continued for sometime and until Griffin had crossed the railroad and reached a point near half way across the belt of woods and where the forest became dense. There the movement was arrested. This movement might have meant an attempt to stretch out Morell's line through the woods, so as to connect with King's on the right, or a com- pletion of the deployment for an attack upon the enemy in front. Gene- ral Porter explained it as intended for an inunediateattack upon the enemy if he found he could keep King in support, and that he only desisted upon being informed that King was going away. But the attack would have been a rash one under the circumstances, even with King's support. Soon CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 19 after this, scouts were sent on through the woods to look for King, Reynolds, Sigel, or some body of Union troops in tiie direction wiiere ar- tillery firing was heard. Presently Griffin was withdrawn to the south side of the railroad. The enemy's artillery opened on his troops during this latter movement, and was replied to by one of Morell's batteries, but few shots being fired on either side. Then Morell's division was put in defensive order to hold Moreii the ground then occupied and undercover from the enemv's artillery. "'V"*''.^"° ml I 1 I 1 y ' aud put in 1 he scouts sent through the woods ran uj)on the enemy s pickets, and were '•etensite driven back. This effort to get scouts through the woods was repeated'""''""'' from time to time until late in the afternoon, but every effort failed. The scouts were all driven back or captured. As it turned out, this resulted from the fact that King's division did not get up on the right of the woods at all. That division reached a point some distance in rear of its po- sition in the lino about 4.30 P. M., and then, after some marching and countermarching, was sent northward to tiie Warrenton pike. Thus the gap in the line which McDowell's troops were to occupy remained open all the afternoon, and the margin of the timber remained in possession of the enemy's pickets. These failures to connect or to communicate directly along the front Porter re- were reported by Porter to McDowell by way of the Sudley Springs road, fo connect'!'^ on which McDowell had gone. The reports were made in at least four different written despatches, which have been preserved. The hour was named in only one, apparently the latest, sent at 6 o'clock in the evening. Two reports — one about 4 o'clock and the other about 6.30 P. M. — were sent to General Pope direct. Both of these were received by him, but have not been preserved. About the time General McDowell arrived on the field at Porter's po- Artillery sition, and for an hour or two thereafter, a heavy artillery combat was ji^'d„" e™ going on between the Union batteries near Groveton, and the Confederate^""^'"'"! artillery. During this artillery combat, and until 5 o'clock, P. M., there "("''fen'ry was no infantry engagement, except skirmishing and some short and uni'iiT'"" sharp contests between small portions of the opposing forces, and until "^''^.'^'s^et''- 6.30 P. M., no musketry was audible to any one in Porter's corps. h'^^dh* On the Confederate side, as it now appears, Porter's display of troops PorLr /ntn — tiiree brigades in line — in the early part of the afternoon, had given ^^"^ rise to the expectation of an attack on their right. This having been reported to General Longstreet, that commander sent his reserve division (Wilcox's) from his extreme left, just north of the Warrenton turnpike, to his extreme right on the Manassas and Gainesville road. Wilcox reached this latter position about 4 o'clock P. M., and Porter having be- fore that time withdrawn his troops under cover, some troops from the Confederate right (D. R. Jones') were pushed to the front in the woods occupied by Porter's skirmishers, apparently to i-econnoitre. This move- ment gave rise to the impression among Porter's officers (Morell's divi- sion) that the enemy was about to attack about 5 P. M. General Pope having arrived some time after noon, on the field in thepopear- rear of Groveton, and General McDowell's column approaching that part 3'^^'^°^,^ of the field by the Manassas and Sudley road, an attack was ordered '■'"« '>«««■ upon the enemy's extreme left near Sudley, and a written order was sent, '""'°' dated 4.30 P. M., to Porter to attack the enemy's right, and, if possible, 20 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. McDowell liis rear. After some time had elapsed, General Pope ordered McDowell, atfack!' '° with King's division and otiier troops, to pursue np the Warrenton turn- pike tlie enemy, wiio, thus to be assailed upon both flanks, would be compelled to retreat. Kearney's The attack Oil Jackson's left was begun by Kearney about 5 P. M. ; jlX™'" but the order to Porter was not delivered in time. The messenger did ^''f^^^Jj^*'- not find General Porter until sunset. Thus, at 5 o'clock, nothing notdeiiv- having occurred to suggest to General Porter any change in the ])lan teriD"time. indicated in the joint order to retire behind Bull Run instead of giving battle that day, the sound of artillery near Sudley, so much apparently to the rear of iGrrovetoii, suggested to Porter, who was then at Bethlehem Church, that Sigel was retiring or perhaps being driven back, and that his artillery was then in a new jjosition near the Sudley Springs road. If it was true that Sigel was being driven back, the military situation was extremelv perilous, and Porter must instantly do what he could to avert disaster. His order to Morell, which must have been issued at that instant, shows what he proposed to do. It is as follow.s, viz. : Order to GENERAL MoKELl. :— Push orer to the aid of Sigel and strike in his rear. If you reach Morell. a road up which King is moving,-" and he has got ahead of you, let him pass; but see if you can not give help to Sigel. If you find liim retiring, move back toward Manassas, and, should necessity require it, and you do not hear from me, push to Centreville. If you find the direct road filled, take the oiie via Union Mills, which is to the right as you return. F. J.' PORTER, Major- Geyural, Look to the i>oints of the compass for Manassas. F. J. PORTER. Purpose to This movement would have left Porter with Sykes alone to hold the ultllT Manassas road and cover the retreat of Ricketts' worn-out troops, who d_ . "We can not retire while McDowell holds on." holds on. Notwithstanding contradictory testimony, we believe it was at this time that Porter ordered Piatt's brigade, of Sturgis' command, about eight hundred men, to move back to Manasses Junction and take up a defensive position to cover the expected retreat. * The Sudley road. CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 21 General Porter reported to General McDowell his views and intentions in the following despatches : — Generals McDowell and King : — I found it impossible to communicate by cross- Porter says ing tlie woods to Groveton. Tlie enemy are in great force on tliis road, and as tliey appear he will re- to have driven our forces back, the fire of the enemy having advanced, and ours retired, I treat, have determined to withdraw to Manassas. I have attempted to communicate with Mc- Dowell and Sigel, but my messengers have run into the enemy. They have gathered artil- lery and cavalry and infantry, and the advancing masses of dust show the enemy coming in force. I am now going to the head of the column to see what is passing and how aft'airs are going, and I will communicate with you. Had you not better send your train back ? r. J. PORTER, Major-General. General McDowell ok King :— I have been wandering over the woods and failed to get a communication to you. Tell iiow matters go with you. The enemy is in strong force in front of me, and I wisli to know your designs for to-night. If left to me I shall have to retire for food and water, which I can not get here. How goes the battle ? It seems to go to our rear. The enemy are getting to our left. F. J. PORTER, Major- General Volunteers. General McDowell : — The firing on my riglit has so far retired that, as I can not ad- vance and have failed to get over to you, except by the route taken by King, I shall with- draw to Manassas. If you have anything to communicate, please do .so. I have sent many messengers to you and General Sigel and get nothing. F. J. PORTER, Mitjor-General. An artillery duel is going on now ; been skirmishing for a long time. F. J. P. General JIcDowell : — Failed in getting Morell over to you. After wandering about Despatch G the woods for a time I withdrew him, and wliile doing .so artillery opened upon us. My P. M. pre scouts could not get through. Each one found the enemy between us, and I believe some duced be- have been captured. Infantry are also in front. I am trying to get a battery, but have not '"'^ Board, succeeded as yet. From the masses of dust on our left, and from reports of scouts, think the enemy are moving largely in that way. Please communicate the way this messenger came. 1 have no cavalry or messengers now. Please let me know your designs, whether you retire or not. I can not get water, and am out of provisions. Have lost a few men from infantry firing. F. J. PORTER, Major- General Volunteers. Aug. 29th— 3 P. M. But Porter soon found the sounds of artillery had deceived him. The Poiter de- renewal of the firing toward Groveton showed that Pope's troops were n'ot"to°re. still there. Piatt's brigade was then recalled, and no iurtherpreiiarations"'^''' for retreat were made. Next came to Porter about 5.30 o'clock a report from the right that the enemy was in full retreat, and heavy sounds of musketry soon after showed that serious work had commenced near Groveton. Porter ordered oraer to Morell to make a strong reconnoissauce to learn the truth. Morell, know- n5°^^'l.e"o„. ing the report must be false, at least as to the enemy in his front, prepared noissance at to support this reconnoi.ssance with his whole division. While this prepa- ration was being made came the long-delayed order, dated 4.30 P. M., to attack the enemy in tlank or rear : — Headquarters in the Field, August 29th— 4.30 P. M. Major-General Porter: — Your line ot march brings you in on the enemy's right 4 30 order, flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possi- ble, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy 22 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing. JOHN POPE, Major-General Commanding. Notre- Thi.s Order, thougli dated at 4.30 P. M., was not received by Porter at ponfrbi Bethlehem Church, before 6.30 P. M. fore 6.30. -pjjg evidence before the court-martial tending to show that Porter received the " 4.30 " order in time to e.\ecute it is found in the testimony of the officer who carried the order, and of one of the orderlies who accompanied him. Neither of these two witnesses appears to have carried a watch, and their several statements of the time when the order was delivered were based on estimates of the time occu- pied by them in riding from General Pope's headquarters to the place where they found General Porter. One of them at least knew from an inspection of the order that it was dated at 4.30 ; he, and probably both of them, therefore assumed that it was then that they started to deliver it, and adding to that hour the estimated time occupied by them, they severally fi.xed the hour of delivery. It is now proved by the testimony of the officer who wrote the despatch that " 4.30 " wa.s not the hour when the messenger started, but was the hour when he began to write the despatch, and con.sequently that it was after that hour that the officer started to deliver it. It is also shown that these messengers did not and could not, if other parts of their own testimony are true, have traveled over the route which Witnesses they supposcd they had taken. Moreover, it was proved by unquestion-' tlro°nth""able testimony that since the court-martial trial one of these witnes.ses had tr^adict™' iM^ide statements and admissions inconsistent with and contradictory of themselves, ^jg former testimony, and the other witness con{e.ssed before us that recently he had deliberately made false statements in regard to the route taken while carrying the despatch. We have therefore felt compelled to Their evi- lay thc testimony of these witnesses out of the case. An attempt was ken^doJn" made to siqiport these witnesses by the testimony of another person, who, as it was alleged, also accompanied as an orderly the officer charged with the despatch, but his testimony was so completely broken down by cross- examination that we regard it as entitled to no weight whatever. Proved to On the other hand, the testimony of General Sykes, Lieutenant-Colonel sun'do''wn or Lockc, Captain Monteith, Lieutenant Ingham, and Lieutenant Weld before by'syki'!' tl^^ court-martial, that the order in question was not delivered until about Locke,Mmi-gmniown, either a little before or a little after that hour, has now been ham,' Weld, supported bv a new and entirely independent witness. Captain Randol, EaDd° b' ''^ and has been singularly confirmed by the production, for the first time, byMcDo'w- of the despatch from Porter to McDowell, dated 6 P. M„ the terms of el' di^spatch ^vhich Utterly forbid the supposition that at that time Porter had 6 r. M., ■ 1 1 '' 1 now pro- received the order. duced. rpj^g moment this order was received Porter sent his chief of staff, Col- onel Locke, to General Morell with orders to make the attack at once. He then wrote and sent a repty to Pope, and immediately rode to the front. On his arrival there Morell had about completed his preparations for the attack under the previous order to make a reconnoissance, but CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 23 darkness had already come on. It was evidently impossible to accora- Porter on plisli any good that night, for, even if Morell migiitluive begun the attack over's' before dark, kSykcs could not have been got into line after the order was ^"JJ;^(^°'' received. The contest at Groveton had already so far spent its force as Pope to derive no possible aid from Morell's attack. The order was based upon conditions manifestly erroneous, and directed what was impossible to be done. To push Morell's division against the enemy in the dark would liave been in no sense obedience to that order. Porter wisely too late to ordered the preparations to cease, and the troops were put into position " to pass the night, picketing in all directions, for Porter had but a few mounted men and the enemy had two thousand five hundred cavalry near his flank. About this time, when darkness had come on, the rear of McDowell'sstniMe- column of weary troops were passing l)y the rear of Porter's column, si ill J^","fy''^ several miles from their destined place on the field. The Union Army \^°°v^ i"^^?- 1 • J I "^ i"g rear ot loas not even yet ready for battle. Porter, and The accompanying maps, marked Board Maps Nos. 2 and 3, exhibit army not respectively substantially the military situation at the time the 4.30 P. M. foi'^j^fi^ order was i.ssued and that which was then uiiderstocid b_v General Pope to exist, as ex[)lained to tiie court-martial upon the trial of General Porter. We believe this plain and simple narrative of tlie events of the 29th Nothing in i o r t G r s of August clearly shows the true character of General Porter's conduct conduct to during that time. We are unahle to find in that conduct anything sm6- m,',ch It'ss jcct to criticism, much /ess deserving of censure or condemnation. condemn'"" Porter's duty that afternoon was too plain and simple to admit of dis-p„rt5j..j cussion. It was to hold his position and cover the deployment of Mc-''"'5'- Dowell's troops until the latter, or some of them, should get into line ; then to connect with them as far as might be necessary and practicable, and then, in the absence of further f)rders, to act in concert with those troops and others to the right. If King's division had come up on the right, as was expected, and had advanced to attack, Porter would have known it instantly, and tlius could have joined in the movement. If the main army retired, as indicated in the joint order, it was Por- ter's duty to retire also, afler having held his ground long enough to protect its left flank and to cover the retreat of Ricketts' troojis. Porter did for a moment entertain the purpose of trying to give aid to Sigel, who was supposed to be retiring before McDowell had got King's division up to his support. That was the nearest to making a mistake that Porter came that afternoon. But it soon enough became evident that such a |)urpose must be abandoned ; Porter had quite his full share of responsibility where he was. The preparations made for retreat were the ordinary soldierly disposi- prepara- tions to enable him to do promptly what he had good reason to expect hejj.°° might be required to do at any moment and must do at nightfall. soldierly He made frequent reports to his superiors, stating what he had donetions. and what he had been unable to do; what his situation was in respect to the enemy in his front and the strength of the enemy there; what his impressions were from the sourids of action toward his right ; how he had failed thus far to get any communications from any commander in the tioos for re- reat were 24 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. main army, or any orders from General Pope, asking McDowell, who was nearest to iiim, for sueli information and his (jMcDowell's) designs for the nir/lit ; sending an aide-de-camp to General Pojie for orders and receiving no rejjly, not even information that the 4 30 order liad been sent to him, and, finally, informing hissnperior's that if left to himself, without orders, he would have to retire at night for food and water, which he coidd not get where he was. These reports were sent not only frequently, but early enough to insure the receipt of ordei'S from Po])e or correct information from McDowell, if they had any to send him, before it would be time for him to withdraw. All these despatches were sent in the latter part of the afternoon. They all indicated a purpose to retire only after being assured that the main army was retiring, and tiien to cover the retreat of the army as far as possible, or to withdraw after nightfall, as the joint order had indicated, if no further orders or information of General Pope's ]>lans could be obtained. There is no indication in any of those despatches, when fairly con- strned, nor in anything which Porter did or said, of any intention to withdraw until after dark, unless comi)elled to do so by the retreat of the main army ; and even then lie was compelled to hold on until jMc- DowcH's troops could get out of the way, and that was not until after dark, for Ricketts' division was on the road in Porter's rear all the after- noon. No ihui.giit It is perfectly clear that Porter liad no thought whatever of retreating 'in^f mm the from file enemy, or of withdrawing because of the enemy in his front; enemy. ^^^^.^ whcu the cuemy was reported advancing as if to attack, his orders If the enemv is comiuir hold to hi'" " " He only iu- tenditl to 7-etire on as- surance that main army was rt^tiring, and then to cover re- retreat of the army. were : Assumed that some order to attaclt or battle — all reverse of truth. le enemy is coming hold to him." " Post your troops to repulse liim." " We can not retire wliilo McDowell holds on." (It appears to have been assumed in the condemnation of General Porter's conduct that he liad some order to attack or some information of aggressive plans on the part of General Pope, or some intimation, suggestion, or direction to that effect from General McDowell, or tiiat there was such a battle going on within his hearing, or something else in the military situation that required him to attack the enemy without orders before receiving the 4.30 P. M. order at sun.set. All this was the exact reverse of the truth. General Pope's hist order, General Mc- Dowell's directions while he was with General Porter, the military situ- ation as then known to botii Porter and McDowell, and the movement McDowell had decided to make to get his own troops into lino of battle, and the state of the action on the riglit of the field, all combined to ab- solutely forbid any attack by Porter during that entire afternoon until he received Pope's order at sunset, and even that order could not possi- bly have been given if the situation had been correctly understood. An attack by liim would have been a violation of the spirit of his orders, and a ci-iminal blunder leading to inevitable disaster. In short, he had no choice as a faithful soldier but to do substantially what he did do.) Tlie range of our investigation has not enabled us to ascertain the ll?nyai™f ""^soiirce of tlic great error wiiich was committed in the testimony before Longstreet. Qe„p,.^i Porter's court-martial respecting the time of arrival of the main body of Lee's army on the field of Manas.sas. But the information which was in possession of the Union officers at noon of the 29th of Au- gust, and afterwards published in their official reports, together with the Great error CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 25 testimony before the court-martial, affords clear, explicit, and convincing proof tliat the main body of that army must have been there on the field at that time. The recent testimony of Confederate officers hardly adds anything to the conclusiveness of that proof, but rather diminishes its force by show- ing that one division (Anderson's) did not arrive until the next morning ; while the information in their possession at that time required the Union officers to assume that that division as well as the others had arrived on the 29th. Yet General Porter's conduct was adjudged upon the assump- tion that not more than one division under Longstreet had arrived on the field, and that Porter had no considerable force in liis front. (The flict is that Longstreet, witii four divisions of full 25,000 men, Longstreet was there on the field before Porter arrived with his two divisions of frontwuh 9000 men ; that the Confederate general-in-chief was there in person at '^^'^^p^f^"' least two or three hours before the commander of the Army of Virg-iniaHsi""'^ , *^ . ^ 9000. himself arrived on the field, and that Porter, with his two divisions, saved the Army of Virginia that day from the disaster naturally due to the enemy's earlier preparation tor battle.) if4 30or(ier If the 4.30 order had been promptly delivered, a very grave responsi- promptly bility would have devolved upon General Porter. The order was based grave re-' upon conditions which were essentially erroneous, and upon expectations on™ori'e"'' which could not possibly be realized. on''mistake. It required an attack upon the enemy's flank or rear, which could not^tt.,ct on be made, and that the attackina; force keep closed on Reynolds, who was "-■'"'' i^""* far to the right and beyond reach. Yet it would have been too late to my impossi- correct the error and have the order modified. That order appeared to be part of a general plan. It must be executed promptly or not at all. If Porter had made not the impossible attack which was ordered, but a di- rect attack upon the enemy's right wing, would he have been blameless for the fruitless sacrifice of his troops? We believe not. It is a toell- estabUsheiJ military vm.vim that a coij^s commander «.s- 7)ot justifiable in making «n apparently hopeless attach in obedience to an order from a superior who is not on the spot, and who is evidently in error in respect to the essential conditions upon which the order is based. The duty of the corps commander in such a case is to make not a real attack, but a strong demonstration, so as to prevent the enemy in his front from send- ing reinforcements to other parts of his line. This is all that Porter would have been justifiable in doing, even if he had received the 4.30 order at 5 o'clock ; and such a demonstration, or even a real attack made after 5 o'clock by Porter alone, could have had no beneficial efl^et whatever upon the general result. It would not have diminished in the least the resistance offered to the attacks made at other points that afternoon. The display of troops made by Porter earlier in the afternoon had all the desired and all possible beneficial effect. It caused Long,street's reserve division to be sent to his extreme right in front of Porter's position. There that division remained until about 6 o'clock — too late for it to take any effective part in the operations at other points of the line. (A powerful and well-sustained attack by the combined forces of Por- ter's corps and King's division upon the enemy's right wing, if it had been commenced early in the afternoon, might have drawn to that part of the 26 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. Attack by field SO large a part of Loiigstreet's force as to have giveu Pope some deru[e"dr- cliaiice of success against Jackson ; but an attack by Porter alone could cumstivnces ijoyc been but an ineffective blow, destructive onlv to the force that made would Jiave -, ^ ,i 11 it * 1 tt • a 1 been not it, and, followed l)y a counter-attack, disastrous totlic Union army, buc/i bhlnde?!'^"' an attack, under such circmmtances, would have been not only a great crimef^'"'" blunder, but, on the part of an intelligent officer, it would hare been a greed crime.) court.mar- (What General Porter actually did do, althougli his situation was by notS'e* no means free from embarrassment and anxiety at the time, now seems condemned (;q l-^^yQ been ouly tiic simple, necessary action which an intelligent soldier conduct if , , , . / It.'*. •! t ,i 1 1 !• 1 understood, had HO choice but to take. It is not possible that any court-martial obedient, could have condemned such conduct if it had been correctly understood. Unim army On the Contrary, that conduct was obedient, subordinate, faithful, and from disas- judicious. It savcd the Union army from disaster on the 29th of August.) ter, August ■',_,. , , . "','^. ■ , i ,1 , '..*,., 29th. This ends the tran.sactions upon whicli were based tliecnarges ot wnicn General Porter was pronounced guilty ; but some account of the part taken by him and his corps in the events of tiie following day, August 30th, which gave rise to a charge which was withdrawn, is necessary to a full understanding of the merits of the case. At 'i A. M. of the 30th, General Porter received the following order, and in compliance with it promptly witiidrew from his position in pres- ence of the enemy, and marched rapidly by the Sndley road to the centre of the battle-field, where he reported to General Pope for orders : — Headquarters Army of Virginia, In the Field near Bull Run, August 2'Jth, 1862—8.50 P. M. Order to GENERAL i—ImiuediateJy upon receipt of this order, the precise hour of receiving march to whicli you will acknowledge, you will march your comuiaud to the field of hattle of to-day, fleldof bat- and report to iiie in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to "^- comply strictly with tliis order, and to be pi-esent on the field within three hours after its reception ov after daybreak to-morrow morning. JOHN POPE, Major-Geiicrtf/ Commanding, Majok-General F. J. Porter. [Received August ;fflth— 3.30 A. M.] sigli ful At first sight it would appear that in this prompt and unhesitating .„. if he"^''" movement, under this order. General Porter committed a grave fault. He should have ^as already on the field of battle, confronting the enemy in force, and without ex- holding a position of vital importance to the security of Po|)e's army; sitllation. while the latter appeared, from the order, to be wholly in the dark re- specting these all-important facts. It is true the order was most positive, imperative, and also distrustful in its terms. But those very terms served to show only the more forcibly that the order was based upon a total misai)prehension of the essential facts, without which mi.sapi>rehension it would not seem poFsiblethat such an urder could have been i.ssued. The well-established military rule is that such an order must never be obeyed until the commander who gave it has been informed of iiis error and given an opportunity to correct it; but, Mpo?t close e.vandnation, the ojjposite view of Porter's conduct under this order appears to be the just one. But reasons Porter had re]5eatedly reported to McDowell the presence of the enemy jusUfledT in large force in his front. Presumably tli&se reports had gone to Pope, obejmgaa ^ ^^g ^£ ^^em had in fact. Porter had also sent an aide-de-camp with a CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 27 written message to Pope about 4 P. M., and had sent a written reply to tiie 4.30 P. M. order, after 6.30 P. M. Tiiese last two despatches have not been i)reserved by General Pope, and hence their contents are not known to us ; l)ut we are bound to presume that they reported the situa- tion as Porter then knew it, and as he had frequently reported it to Mc- Dowell, and the last of these despatches, in reply to the 4.30 P. M. order, was later than the latest of those in which Porter had spoken of any in- tention to fall back. Hence, Porter had already given to his superior all the information which it was possible for him to give, and nothing re-p^^j^j.,^ mained for him but to obey the order. This movement of Porter's corps ^^rpsp''"- on the morning of the 30th was the beginning of the unfoi'tunate opera- Pope's'ieft tion of that day. This corps, iBhieh had been protecling the left flank o/dr"wn^"'' Pope's army, was witlidrawn from its important position, leaving the left wing and flank exposed to attack by greatly superior force of the enemy, brought to the centre of the field and then ordered " in pursuit of the enemy." SPECIAL ORDER NO. — . HeadiU'arters near Gkoveton, August 30th, 1862, 12 M. The following forc-es will be; imraediate'y thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy and P'^u^jo'm^'" press him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to the ^'f 3q,],^^ command of the pursuit ; Major-General Porter's corps will push forward on the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals King and Reynolds. The divis- ion of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Hay Market road, followed by the corps of Major-General Jleintzelraan. The necessary cavalry will be assigned to these columns by Major-General McDowell, to wnoni regulara'nd frequent reports will be made. The gen- eral headquarters will be somewhere on the Warrenton turnjiike. By command of Major.General Pope : GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel and Chief of Staff. Headquarters Third Corps, Army of Virginia, August 30th, 1862. Major-General McDowell being charged with the advanced forces ordered to pursue the enemy, directs me to inform you that your corps will be followed immediately by King's division, supported l)y Reynolds. Heintzelman with his corps, preceded by Ricketts' divis- ion, will move on your right, on the road from Sudley Springs to Hay Market. He is in- structed to throw out skirmishers to the left, which is desirable you should join with your right. General McDowell's headquarters will be at the head of Reynolds' division, on the Warrenton road. Organize a strong advance to precede your command, and push on rap- idly in pursuit of tlie enemy until you come in contact with him. Report frequently. Bayard's brigade will be ordered to rejiort to you ; push it well to the left as you advance. Verv respectfully your obedient servant, ED. SCHPJVER, Colonel and Chief of Staff. Major-Generai, Porter, Commanding, &c., These orders led to an attack upon the Confederate left wing, Jack- son's command, made mainly by Butterfield's and Barnes' brigades, of Morell's division, and by Sykes' division, which is described as follows by the Confederate generals : — [Extract from General Lee's report of operations of the Army of Northern Virginia, bat- tle of Manassas.] Hdqrs. Army of Northern Virginia, March 6th, 1863. Sir: — -'' ^' About 3 P. M. the enemy, having massed his troops in front of Gen- Lee'^s report eral Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line jiushed forward un- of this at- til engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was checked, and a fierce '•'•t^'' 28 CASE OF FITZ-JOHX POSTER.^ and Woody ftnjgjrle ensued. A second and third line, of great strengih, moved up to support the first, but in doing so c-ame within easy ran^e of a position a little in advance of Long- street's left. He immediately ordered up rvro liatteries, and two others being thrown for- ward about the same time by Col. S. D. iree, under their well-directed and destructive fire the supporting lines were broken and fell hack in confusion. Their repeated efforts t^ rally were unavailing, and .Jackson's troojis being tins relieved from the pressure of overwhelm- ing numbers. bey a position from which they can reach Bull Eun to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or the ne.xt day. My own headquarters will for the present be with Heintzelman's corps, or at this place. (Signed) 'JOHN POPE, Mcjor- General Command ing. ' Generals McDowell and Porter.' Which order the said Maior-General Porter did then and there disobey. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862." Specification 3d. — " In this : that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, having been in front of the enemy during the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th of August, 1862, did on that day receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order, in the following letters and figures, to wit: — ' Headquarters in the Field, ' August 29th, 1862—4.30 P. M. ' Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to push for- ward into action at once on the enemy's flank, antl, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Eeynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves, and u.se your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall liack, do so to your right and rear, so as to keeji yon in close communication with tlie right wing. (Signed) 'JOHN POPE, Major-Gcncral Commanding. ' Ma,ior-General Porter.' Which said order tlie said Major-General Porter did then and there disoliey, and did fail to push forward liis forces into action either on the enemy's flank or rear, and in all other re- spects did fail to obev said order. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of Aiigust, 1862." Specification 4th. — " In that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being at or near Manassas Junction on the night of 29th .\ugust, 1SH2, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order in figures and words as follows, to wit : — 'Headquarters Army Virginia, In the Field neak Bull Eun, August 29th, 1862— S.50 P. M. General : — Immediately ujion receipt of this order, the ]>i'ecise hour of receiving which you will acknowledge, you will march your command to the field of battle of to-day, and report to nie in person for orders. You are to understand that you are expected to comply strictly with this order, and to be present on the field within three hours after its reception, or after daybreak to-morrow mornmg. (Signed) 'JOHN POPE, ' Major-General Commanding. Major-General F. J. Porter.' And the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter did then and there disobey the said order, and did permit one of the brigades of his command to march to Centreville — out of the way of the field of battle — and there to remain durins- the entire day of Saturday, the 30th of August. This at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th and 30th days of Augu.st, 1862." Specification 5th.— "In this: that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the night of the 29th August, 1862, and having received from his superior commanding officer, Major-General John Pope, the CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 31 lawful order set forth in specification fourth to tliis charge, (lid then and there disoliey the same, and did permit one other lirigade attached to his command — being tlie brigade com- manded liy Brigadier-General A. S. Piatt — to march to Ceutreville, and did thereby greatly delay the arrival of the said General Piatt's brigade on the field of the battle of Manassas, on Saturday tlie 30th August, 1862. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th day of August, 18G2." Charge II.—" Violation of the 52d Article of War." Specification 1st.—'- In this : that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, during the battle of Manassas, on Friday, the 29th August, 1862, and while within sight of the field and in full hearing of its artillery, did receive from Major-General John Pope, his superior and commanding officer, a lawful order to attacli the enemy, in the following figures and letters, to wit : — ' Headquarters in the Field, 'August 29, 1862—4.30 P. M. ' Your line of march brings you in on the enemy's right flank. I desire you to jiush for- ward into action at once on the enemy's flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can Ijc shelled out as soon as you engage then- tlank. Keep heavy reserves, and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing. "(Signed) ' JOHN POPE, ' Miijor-Generiil Commanding. Major-Genekal Porter.' Which said order the said Major-General Porter did then and there shamefully disobey, and did retreat from advancing forces of the enemy witliout any attempt to engage them, or to aid the troops wlio were already fighting greatly superior numbers, and were relying on the flank attack he was thus ordered to make to secure a decisive victory and to capture the enemy's army, a result which must have followed fnmi said flank attack had it been made by the said General Porter in compliance with the said oi-der which he so shamefully dis- obeved. This at or near Manassas, in the State of Virginia, on or about the 29th of August, 1862." Specification 2ii.--" n this : that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, being with his army corps on Friday, the 29th August, 1862, between Manassas Station and the field of battle then jiending between the forces of the United States and those of the rebels, and within sound of the guns and in the presence of the enemy, and knowing that a .severe ac- tion of great consequence was l>eing fought, and that the aid of his corps was greatly needed, did fail all day to bring it on to tlie field, and did shamefully fall liack and retreat from the advance of the enemy without any attempt to give them battle, and without knowiug the forces from which he shamefully retreated. This near Manassas Station, in the State of Virginia, on the 29th of August, 1862." Specification 3i>. — "In that the said Majoi--General Fitz-John Porter, being with his army corps near the field of i.nittle of Manassas on the 29th of August, 1862, while a severe action was being fought by the troojis of Major-tjeneral Pope's command, and being in the belief that the troops of the said General Pojje were sustaining defeat and retiring from the field, did shamefully fail to go to the aid of tiie said troojis and general, and did sbamefully retreat away, and did foil back with liis army to the Manassas Junction, and leave to the disasters of a jiresumed defeat the said army ; and did fail, liy any attemjit to attack the enemy, to aid in averting the misfortunes of a disaster that would have endangered the safety of the capital of the country. This at or near Manassas Station, in the State of Vir- ginia, on the 29th day of August, 1862." Specification 4th.—" In this : that the said Major-General Fitz-John Porter, on the field of battle of Manassas, on Saturday, the 30th August, 1S62, having received a lawful order from his superior oflicer and commanding general, Major-General John Pope, to engage the enemy's lines, and to carry a position near their centre, and to take an annoying battery there posted, did proceed in the execution of that order with unnecessary slowness, and by delays give the enemy opportunities to watch and kiK)W his movements, ami to prepare to meet his attack ; and did finally so feclily fall upon the enemy's lines as to make little or no impression on the same, and did fall back and draw away his forces unnecessarily, and without making any of the great i)ersonal eflbrts to rally his troops or to keep their lines, or to inspire his troojjs to meet the sacrifices and to make the resistance demanded by the importance of his jwsition and the momentous consequences and disasters of a retreat at so critical a juncture of the day." 32 CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. To which cliarges and specifications tlie accuscj, Major-General Fitz-John Porter States Volunteers, jileaded as follows : — United To specification 1st, " Not guilty.' To specification 2d, " Not guilty." To specification 3d, " Not guilty." To specification 4th, " Not guilty." To specification 5th, " Not guilty." And to the charge, " Not guilty." Charge I. To specification 1st, " Not guilty." To specification I'd, " Not guilty." To specification .'id, " Not guilty." And to the charge, " Not guilty." Charge II. FINDING. The court, having maturely con.sidered the evidence adduced, find the accused, Major- Geueral Fitz-Jolin Porter, of United States Volunteers, as follows : — Of the 1st specification, Of the 2d specification. Of tile .id specification. Of tile 4th specification, „ _, . Of tile 5th specification, "Not guilty. Of the charge, " Guilty " Charge I. '' Guiltv." 'Guilty." ' Guiltv." Not guilty." Charge II. — Of the 1st specification, "Guilty, except so much of the specification as implies that he, the accused, ' did retreat from advancing forces of tlie enemy,' after the reeeiiit of the order .set forth in .said .specification." Of the 2d specification, " Guilty." Of the 3d sjiecification, " Guiltv, e.Kcept the words ' to the Manassas Junction.' " Of the charge, "Guilty." SENTENCE. And the court does therefore sentence him, Major-Geueral Fitz-John Porter, of the United States Volunteers, "to be cashiered, and lo be forever ilisqaalified from holdiivj any office of trust or profit under the Government of the United States." II. In compliance with the 65th of the Rules and Articles of War, the whole proceedings of the general court-martial in the foregoing case have been transmitted to the Secretary of War, and by him laid before the President of the United States. The following are the orders of the President : — " The foregoing proceedings, findings, and sentence in the foregoing case of Major-General Fitz-John Porter are approved and con- firmed ; and it is ordered that the said Fitz-John Porter be, and hereby is, cashiered and dismissed from the service of the United States as a major-general of volunteers, and as colonel and brevet brigailier-general in the regular service of the United States, and forever disqualified from holding any office of trust or jirofit under the Government of the United States. "Jmuary 21st, l.si;3." ABRAHAM LINCOLN. III. The general court-martial, of which Major-General Hunter is president, is hereby dissolved. . Bv order of the Secretary of War. L. THOMAS, A dju tant- General. Oflicial : Assistant AdjiUant-Ge neraJ , Charges and .specinca- tioDS bear no resem- bldnce to (These charges and specifications certainly bear no discernible resem- blance to tlie facts of the ca.se as now established. Yet it has been our duty to carefully compare with the.se facts the views entertained by the as shown n the findings and in the review of the case facts as es- court-martia tabished. ^y|^jg]^ ^^,^g prepared for the information of the President by the Judge- Advocate-General who had conducted the prosecution, and thus to clearly CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 33: perceive every error into which the court-martial was led. We trust it is not necessary for us to submit in detail the results of this compari- son, and that it will be sufficient for us to point out the fundamental errors, and to say that all the essential facts in every instance stand out in clear and absolute contrast to those supposed facts upon which General Porter teas adjudged guilty. The fundamental errors upon which the conviction of General Porter Errors upon depended may be summed up in few words. It was maintained, and "cUon™e- apparently established to the satisfaction of the court-martial, that only ^'^"'J.'^pjj.'' about one-half of the Confederate army was on the field of Manassas on5«"'^«"f , the 29th of August, while General Lee, with the other half, was still be- As to ciiar- yond the Bull-Run Mountains; that General Pope's army, exclusive ofbattwod Porter's corps, was engaged in a severe and nearly equal contest with A^n'iJ'a't^ the enemy, and only needed the aid of a flank attack which Porter was'"'^''. 3- ^^ to Dnint expected to make to insure the defeat and destruction or capture of the McDowell Confederate force in their front under General Jackson ; that McDowell had reach- and Porter, with their joint forces. Porter's leading, had advanced to- jf^jjo^^}]*' ward Gainesville until the head of their column had reached a point near J,'''''''''^'' 1 TTT- -i I 1 p 1 I'*' c* ^ n 1 Porter 10 the Warrenton turnpike, where they found a division of Confederate attack, s. troops, "seventeen regiments," whicii Buford had counted as they retreated '^'^ passed through Gainesville, marching along the road across Porter's jj^as'las. front, and going toward the field of battle at Groveton ; that j\IcDowell '' Tiiat Por- ordered Porter to at once attack that column thus moving to join Jack-niainea son, or the flank and rear of the line if they had formed in line, while 'idie^con- he would take his own troops by the Sudley Springs road and throw JiSt^of"^ them upon the enemy's centre near Groveton ; that Porter, McDowell S'";vm|1'^\ having then separated from him, disobeyed that order to attack, allowed disobedi- that division of the enemy's troops to pass him unmolested, and then order"' s'" fell back and retreated toward Manassas Junction; that Porter then J^Jf^f gQj,, remained in the rear all the afternoon, listeniner to the sounds of battle "■^'"''^"'t ol PortCi 3 and coolly contemplating a presumed defeat of his comrades on the cen- disibedi- tre and right of the field ; that this division of the enemy having passed '"'°''' Porter's column and formed on the right of Jackson's line, near Grove- ton, an order was sent to Porter to attack the right flank or i-ear of the enemy's line, upon which his own line of march must bring him, but that he had willfully disobeyed, and made no attempt to execute that order ; that in this way was lost the opportunity to destroy Jackson's detached force before the other wing of General Lee's army could join it, and that this junction having been effected during the night of tiie 29th, the de- feat of General Pope's army on the 30th, thus resulted from General Porter's neglect and disobedience. Now, in contrast to these fundamental errors, the following all-impor- tant facts are fully established : — As Porter was advancing toward Gainesville, and while yet nearly xue Board four miles from that place and more than two miles from the nearest ^,'J"^j^*|]'^'^^^ point of the Warrenton turnpike, he met the right wing of the Confed- errors, and erate array, twenty -five thousand strong, which had arrived on the field Lcts^s ** that morning and was already in line of battle. Not being at that mo- were.'^'^''"' ment quite fully informed of the enemy's movements, and being then under orders from Pope to push rapidly toward Gainesville, Porter was pressing forward to attack the enemy in his front, when McDowell 34 - CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. arrived on the field witli later information of the enemy, and later and very different orders from Pope, assumed the command, and arrested Porter's advance. Tiiis later information left no room for doubt that the main body of Lee's army was already on the field and far in advance of Pope's army in preparation for battle. General McDowell promptly decided not to attempt to go further to the front, but to deploy his col- umn so as to form line in connection with (xeneral Pope's right wing, which M'as then engaged with Jackson. To do this General McDowell separated his corps entirely from General Porter's, and thus relinquished the command and all right to the command of Porter's corps. Mc- Dowell did not give Porter any order to attack, nor did he give him any order whatever to govern his action after their se))aration. It does not appear from the testimony that he conveyed to Gen- eral Porter in any way the erroneous view of the military situation which was afterward maintained before the court-martial, nor that he suggested to General Porter any expectation that he would make an at- tack. On the contrary, the testimony of all the witnes.ses as to what was actually said and done; the information which McDowell and Por- ter then had respecting tiie enemy, and ilie movement which McDowell decided to make, and did make, with his own troops, prove conclusively that there was left no room for doubt in Porter's mind that his duty was to stand on the defensive and hold his position until McDowell's move- ment could be completed. It would have indicated a great error of mil- itary judgment to have done or ordered the contrary, in the situation as then fully known to both McDowell and Porter.) Popewhoiiy General I'ojie appears from his orders and from his testimony to have thrsitua-"*^ been at that time wholly ignorant of the true situation. He had disap- tioD. proved of the sending of Ricketts to Thoroughfare Gap to meet Long- street on the 2Sth, believing that tiie main body of Lee's army could not reach the field of Manassas before the night of the 30th. Hence, he sent tlie order to Porter dated 4.30 P. M. to attack .Jackson's right flank or rear. Fortunately that order did not reach Porter until about sun- set — too late for any attack to be made. Any attack which Porter could have made at any time that afternoon must necessarily have been fruit- less of any good result. Porter's faithful, subordinate, and inteJIigent conduct that afternoon saved the Union army from the defeat which would othcnoise hare resulted that day from the enemy's more speedy concentra- tion. The only .seriously critical period of that campaign, viz., be- tween 11 A. M. and sunset of August 29th, was thus safely passed. Por- ter had understood and appreciated the military situation, and, so far as he had acted upon his own judgment, his action had been wise and judi- cious. For the disaster of the succeeding day he was in no degree re- sj)onsil)le. Whoever else may have been responsible, it did not flow from any action or inaction of his. Judgment (The judgment of the court-martial upon General Porter's conduct was manTai'" evidently based upon greatly erroneous impressions, not only respecting based oner- what that Conduct reallv was and the orders under which he was actine, rors, * ^ ^ but also respecting all the circumstances under which he acted. Espe- characterofcially was this ti'ue in respect to the character of the battle of the 29th 29th. of August. That battle consisted of a number of sharp and gallant combats between small portions of the opposing forces. Those combats N CASE OF FITZ-JOHN PORTER. 35 were of short duration and were separated by long intervals of simple skirmishing and artillery duels. Until after 6 o'clock only a small part of the troops on cither side were engaged at any time during the after- noon. Then, about sunset, one additional division on each side was en- gaged near Groveton. The musketry of that last contest and the yells of the Confederate troops about dark were distinctly heard by the offi- cers of Porter's corps ; but at no other time during all that afternoon was the volume of musketry such that it could be heard at the posilion of Porter's troops. No sound but that of artillery was heard by them during all those hours when Porter was understood" by the court-martial to have been listening to the sounds of a furious battle raging immedi- ately to his right. And those sounds of artillery were bv no means such as to indicate a general battle. The reports of the 29th and those of the 30th of August have some- confusion how been strangely confounded with each other. Even the Confederate "JloT"" reports have, since the termination of the war, been similarly miscon- 29'h "nd "' strued. Those of the 30th have been misquoted as referring to the 29th, tat str?g^ thus to prove that a furious battle was going on while Porter was com- S's 'Jps" paratively inactive on the 29th. The fierce and gallant struogle of his°"="'"' own troops on the 30th has thus been used to sustain the on'oinal error "ondemn under which he was condemned. General Porter was, in effect, con- oneof aif demned for not having taken any part in his own battle. Such was theJngor™"" error upon whicii General Porter was pronounced guilty of the luostl™"^"'"' shameful crime known among soldiers. We believe not one among all the '"' gallant soldiers on that bloody field teas less deserving of such condemnaUon than he.) The evidence of bad animus in Porter's case ceases to be material in Porter's aa- view of the evidence of his soldierly and faithful conduct. But it is our'T^''"^^^^ duty to say that the indiscreet and unkind terms in which General '"• But"" Porter expressed his distrust of the capacity of his superior commander s'lonsTto" can not be defended. And to that indiscretion was due, in very great S,aodeTin measure, the misinterpretation of both his motives and his conduct' and *'\f'^r his consequent condemnation. ftnded ' Havingthus given the reasons for our conclusions, we have the honor Justice re- _to report, in accordance with the President's order, that, in our opinion, ^nce't'obe"'' ju.stice requires at his hands such action as may be nece.ssary to annul ""?""''* and set aside the findings and sentence of the court-martial in the case ""stored as of Major-General Fitz-John Porter, and to restore him to the positions SLmtsaf. ot which that sentence deprived him— such restoration to take effect from the date of his dismissal from the .service. Very respectfully, your obedient servants, J. M. SCHOFIELD, Major- Genercd U. S. Army. ALFRED H. TEREY, Brigadier- General U. S. Army. GEO. W. GETTY, Brevet Major-General U. 8. Army, Colonel 3d Artillery. / \s LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 013 706 674 9