Glass JR&&2QA* Book j_J_Z1 CICERO CICERO ./^ 1111. / / IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL QT AESTIONUM TUSCULANARUM LIBER WITH NOTES AM) AN APPENDIX. BY M. STUART. Professor of Sac. Literature in the Theol. Sem. at An,! ANDOVEK \ FLAGG, GOULD, & NEWMAN. 1833. <$>* >?-\ t^«\ $* Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1833, by .VlAgG, GOULD, AND NEWMAN, in the die fit's office of the District Court of Massachusetts. 'J PREFACE. The occasion and design of publishing the little volumes entitled Select Classics, may be stated in a few words. It is customary with me, always to recommend to my pupils in sacred philology, the daily reading of some portion of a good Latin or Greek classical writer. This I do, in order that they may increase their know- ledge of the ancient languages, and be able to judge of the difference between classical idioms and those of the Scriptures. But ihis is not my only motive. Believing that the study of the best Latin and Greek authors is very important to the cultivation of an improved taste in literature, and to the acquisition of tact and ability in criticism and in writing, I feel it to be a matter of serious consequence, that every theological student should devote some portion of his time to this employ- ment. But what shall he read ? Merely to repeat the read- ing of college books, would be unattractive to most students. And if they are to extend it beyond these limits, what shall be selected ? A question of more difficulty to the young student, (whose circle of ac- quaintance with the classics is generally somewhat narrow), than every one will be apt to imagine. And even after he has made his choice, how shall he obtain the pieces which he desires? They appear, more usu- ally, only in the large collections; which he cannot afford to purchase. Or if separately printed, they are not published, perhaps, in our country; or if they are> most of them are merely copies of European editions, which (the school-books excepted) are principally char- acterized by notes on the various readings of the text; in which lie, who studies for profit and pleasure, can feel but little if any interest. Grammarians and crit- ical editors alone can profit much by these. But the IV PREFACE. great mass of readers belong to neither of these classes. Consequently, they need an exegetical commentary. They are, and ought to be, much more interested to know what the text in general means, than to know how a solitary word or phrase, which now and then occurs, is to be read. The Select Classics which I now publish, are intend- ed wholly for this latter class of readers. In particular are the} 7 designed for young readers in our country, who need to be allured and guided and encouraged, with respect to classical study. The plan which I have adopted, supersedes the ne- cessity of printing a continuous translation. Every passage, in which I have supposed that there could be any difficulty, the student will find translated or ex- plained in the notes ; and some perhaps will even won- der, that I have done so much in this way, rather than so little. None, I would hope, will have reason to complain, that the meaning of the author is not made sufficiently evident; so far, at least, as I am able to understand and explain it. That I have always under- stood it rightly, I would not venture to assert. I can only say, that I have devoted to the study of it, as much time as I could possibly spare from my other duties and studies ; and that I indulge the hope, that I shall not often mislead the student. If it should be asked, why I have been so liberal in my biographical and historical notes and explanations ; my answer is, that I have adopted this course for sev- eral reasons. Most readers have not the sources at hand, from which I have drawn more or less of them. Many of these sources are in languages, which the stu- dents in general of our country do not understand. And even in cases where the reader may have access to these sources, and be able to draw from them, it is not often the case, when he sits down to spend a few leisure moments in reading a classic, that he feels inclined to load his table with biographical, geographical, chrono- logical, and historical works, (not to mention many other helps), in order that he may proceed with a due understanding of his author. It falls, moreover, within the special design of the PREFACE. V present publication, to render classical reading easy, and attractive, and profitable. Whatever may bo said as to the expediency of this, with reference to students who are pursuing classical studies as a daily business, and whose strength may sometimes be put to the trial by the reading of text without note or comment; such a principle is not applicable to the present case. I pub- lish these volumes for the aid of those, who wish to re- new their acquaintance with the classics, or to increase their knowledge of them, with as little expense of time and money as possible. To purchase all the helps, which I have made use of for their benefit, would be expensive ; to study them, would require time and pains which many will hardly deem themselves able to spare. It has been my endeavour, in the notes and appendix to this work, to point out in what manner we should read the Greek and Roman writers in order truly to profit by them. If I have succeeded in the attempt, it may encourage others to rise up as editors among us, in the like way. In the text of the present volume, I have not impli- citly followed any one edition. I have had before me the editions of Ernesti, of Rath, of Nobbe,and of Carey; all recent editors; the three last, I believe, still living. In doubtful cases I have selected that which seemed to me the most probable reading ; and in this, I have some- times agreed with one, and sometimes another, of these editors. As we have no manuscripts in this country from which a new edition of the text could be formed, I have done all in respect to it, that the nature of the case seemed to admit. From none of these editions have I derived any exegetical aid, which is worthy of being mentioned. Rath's book is a large one, and filled with notes ; but almost all of them are occupied with specu- lations concerning the state of the text. The punctuation, I may say, is wholly my own. I found none with which I was satisfied. Carey's I re- gard as the best; and Nobbe's stands next; while that of Ernesti often and almost of necessity obscures the meaning of the text; at least it does so for me. By careful and diligent attention to the punctuation, L VI PREFACE. would hope that I have made the sense more evident to the reader, in many passages, than it is in the com- mon editions. I was induced to engage in the present work, by the express wish of my pupils, during the past year. My earnest hope and desire are, that thej', and others asso- ciated with them, may be profited by the study of it; as it is specially designed fortheological students. I would indulge the hope, also, that others who pursue classical study, may take an interest in it ; for I can scarcely conceive of a topic more interesting, in a moral and religious point of view, than the knowledge of what the highest efforts of human reason could without revela- tion and of themselves do, in developing the doctrine of the soul's immortality. My present design is, to publish a second volume in connexion with this, which is to consist of Plato's Fhaedo, i. e. his treatise on the immortality of the soul. The present volume is a specimen of the manner which I mean to pursue, in respect to commentary, and to the critical examination of the author's arguments. In the present volume, I have adapted the sections (marked §) to the purpose of discriminating the larger transitions of the author's discourse. I found these so discrepant from each other in my different editions, and oftentimes so much at variance with what seemed to me the most desirable division of the text, that, after consideration, I was induced to abandon the plan of fol- lowing any one of them, and to mark the sections anew. Another object obtained by marking them, is, to facili- tate references to the text, in the notes and elsewhere. I have also introduced breaks or paragraphs in many places of the text, where most editions make none. Ernesti has printed an almost unbroken text ; by which the reader is often perplexed, and always fatigued. I have also ventured to go a step further than any of I the editions which I have seen, viz., to print the colloquy [ in the manner of a dialogue. Every reader will, I trust, spontaneously give his assent to this. In those cases where I have supposed there could be I any doubt, in the mind of the reader, with regard to I the Ablative case of the first declension, as distinguish- PREFACE. Vli iominative, I have marked the Ablative in t!.i ty. Carey marks it always ; the German editors, never. It is unnecessary to mark it for the practised reader; but it is convenient for the unprac- one to have it marked in doubtful cases. I have marked such cases ; but I have come, in the course of printing, and when it was too late to retrace my steps, entire conviction, that the method of Carey is the best. Here and there I have printed a whole sentence in capitals. My object is, to render conspicuous to the eye, and easy to be found, such sentences as are extraordi- nary for the sentiment which they contain, or as will serve for significant mottos in writing, or maxims in conversation. I could never be induced, placed in such circum- stances as I am at present, to give my time and attention to the exegesis of any heathen author, were I not con- vinced that the study of such authors is important to the interpreter of the sacred writings. It is because of the bearing which such study has on the interpretation of the Scriptures, and because of the deeply interesting nature of the subjects discussed in the selection which I have made, that I feel myself to be within the proper sphere of my duty, while engaged in this work. My reason for publishing my notes and strictures in English, is the same which induces almost all the lexi- cographers of Greek and Latin, at the present day, to publish their explanations in their own vernacular language. He who expects to aid the young reader, must make it not only possible for him to understand his explanations, but a matter of course that they should be understood without much effort or study. Where is to be the end of interpretation, if each writer who at- tempts to explain, is as difficult to be understood, as the original on which he comments? My object would be entirely defeated, by pursuing such a course. Should this work meet with a favourable reception, I would hope to see some other individual proceed farther in the execution of the plan now commenced. With the little volume from Plato, should my life be spared to finish it, I must bid adieu to this kind of labour. VU PREFACE. My present duties and station call for all my attention in another way; and the guardians and friends of the Seminary with which I am connected, expect, and have a right to expect, that I should obey the call. Most cheerfully shall 1 do it, if it may please a kind Provi- dence to give me ability. Thus far, all the attention I have bestowed on the little volumes of Select Classics, has been of direct and immediate advantage to my exe- getical studies. I cannot, therefore, but think the time well spent; and especially so, if the undertaking should meet the public approbation so as to excite some of the scholars in our country to publish such editions of the classics, as may be the real means of literary and moral improvement. We have been, long enough, shut up to the European method. More pieces which are entire^ (only such should be published for the purposes of read- ing), from Plato, Xenophon, and other Greek writers, of a moral and highly interesting nature ; and also like pieces from the Latin ones; might easily be selected. To all these I could wish to see added, Selections from the Latin and Greek Christian Fathers ; writers now un- known, except by name, to most of our students ; but deserving of more attention than our country has yet given them. How can a system of education be truly Christian and liberal, which entirely excludes them ? How soon the volume containing the Phaedo will follow, I cannot definitely state at present. I find the editing of it to be a serious business indeed, as it ren- ders a knowledge of the Platonic system absolutely ne- cessary, in order to give the requisite explanations. No one of all Plato's writings, partakes more of his ideal philosophy than this. The public will not therefore expect that this volume should be hastily published, when they consider what an undertaking it is, and also that I can give but a very small portion of my time to the work, as my other duties must not in any wise be neglected. Still, I have advanced nearly through the commentary on the Phae- do, and would hope to conclude the work, during the winter or in the spring. Moses Stuart Andover, Jan. 1833. M. TULLII CICERONI8 TUSCULANARUM QUAESTIONUM AD M. BRUTUM LIBER PRIMUS. DE CONTEMNENDA MORTE. §1. Cum defensionum laboribus senatoriisque mu- neribus, aut omnino, aut magna ex parte, essem aliquando liberatus, retuli me, Brute, te hortante maxime, ad ea studia, quae retenta animo, re- missa temporibus, longo intervallo intermissa re- vocavi. Et cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina stu- dio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, con- tineretur; hoc mihi Latinis litteris illustrandum putavi. Non quia philosophia Graecis et litteris 10 et doctoribus percipi non posset : sed meum sem- per judicium fuit, omnia nostros aut invenisse per se sapientius quam Graecos ; aut accepta ab illis fecisse meliora, quae quidem digna statuis- sent in quibus elaborarent. Nam mores et in- stituta vitae, resque domesticas ac familiares, nos profecto et melius tuemur et lautius ; rem vero publicam nostri majores certe melioribus tem- peraverunt et institutis et legibus. Quid loquar de re militari ? in qua cum virtute nostri mul 20 turn valuerunt, turn plus etiam disciplina. Jam ilia quae natura non litteris assecuti sunt, neque cum Graecia neque ulla cum gente sunt confe- renda. Quae enim tanta gravitas, quae tanta constantia, magnitudo animi, probitas, fides, 2 14 TDSC. QUAESTIONfES I §§ 1,2* quae tam excellens in omni genere virtus in ullis fuk^ ut sit cum majoribus nostris comparanda ? Doctrina Graecia nos et omni litterarum gen- ere superabat; in quo erat faciJe vincere non repugnantes. Nam cum apud Graecos antiquis- simum sit e doctis genus poetarum, siquidem Homerus fuit et Hesiodus ante Romam condi- tam, Archilochus regnante Romulo; serius po- eticam nos accepimus. Annis enim fere dx to post Roimam conditam, Livius fabulam dedit (C. Claudio Caeci fllio, M. Tuditano, consulibus) anno ante natum Ennium, qui fuit major natu -quarn Plautus ; et Naevius. Sero igitur a nostris poetae vel cogniti vel re- cepti. Q-uamquam est in Originibus, solitos es- se in epulis canere eonvivas ad tibicinem de «clarorum hominum virtutibus, nonorem tamen huic generi non fuisse, dedarat oratio Catonis, in qua objecit ut probrum M. NobHiori, quod is 20 in provioeiam poetas duxisset ; duxerat autem consul ille in Aetoliam, ut scimus, Ennium. Quo minus igitur honoris erat poetis, eo minora stu- *dia fuerunt ; nee tamen sic qui magnis ingeniis mi eo genere exstiterunt, non satis Graecorum gloriae responderunt. An censemus, si Fabio nobilissimo homini laudi datum esset quod pingeret, non naultos etiam apud nos futuros Polycletos et Parrhasios fuisse 1 HONOS AlAT ARTES, OMNESQUE INCENDUNTUR AD ^SSTODIA GLORIA'; JACENTQUE EA SEMPER, QUAE AP.UB QU©mUE IMPJ&ORANTUR. TUSC. QUAESTiONES 1 §§ 3, 4. 1 5 §3. Summam eruditionem Graeci sitam censebant in nervorum vocumque cantibus. Igitur et Epaminondas (princeps, meo judicio, Graeciae) fidibus praeclare cecinisse dicitur. Themisto- clesque, aliquot ante annos cum in epulis recu- sasset lyram, habitus est indoctior. Ergo in Graecia musici floruerunt, discebantque id om- nes ; nee qui nesciebat satis excultus doctrina putabatur. In summo apud illos honore geometria fuit ; 10 itaque nihil mathematicis illustrius. At nos metiendi ratiocinandique utilitate hujus artis ter- minavimus modum. At contra, oratorem celer- iter complexi sumus ; nee eum primo eruditum, aptum tamen ad dicendum ; post autem erudi- tum. Nam Galbam, Africanum, Laelium, doc- tos fuisse traditum est ; studiosum autem eum, qui iis aetate anteibat, Catonem ; post vero, Le- pidum, Carbonem, Gracchos^ deinde ita mag- nos, nostram ad aetatem, ut non multum aut ni-20 hil omnino Graecis cederetur. §4. Philosophia jacuk usque ad hanc aetatem, nee ullum habuit lumen litterarum Latinarum ; quae illustranda, et excitanda nobis est, ut, si occupa- ti profuimus aliquid civibus nostris, prosimus etiam, si possumus, otiosi. In quo eo magis no- bis est elaborandum, quod multi jam esse Latini J-ibri dicuntur scripti inconsiderate, -ab optimis illis quidem viris, sed non satis eruditis. Fieri autem potest, ut recte quis sentiat, 3$ it id quod sentit polite eloqui non po^sit^' 16 TUSC. quaestiones : §§4, 5. sed mandare quemquam litteris cogitationes su- as, qui eas nee disponere nee illustrare possit, nee delectatione aliqua allicere lectorem, homi- nis est intemperanter abutentis et otio et litteris. Itaque suos libros ipsi legunt cum suis ; nee quis- quam attingit, praeter eos qui eandera licen- tiam scribendi sibi permitti volunt. Quare si aliquid oratoriaelaudi nostra attulimusindustria, multo studiosius philosophiae fontes aperiemus, 10 e quibus etiam ilia manabant. §5. Sed ut Aristoteles, vir suramo ingenio, scien- tiae copia, cum motus esset Isocratis rhetoris gloria, docere etiam coepit adolescentes dicere, et prudentiam cum eloquentia jungere ; sic no- bis placet, nee pristinum dicendi studium depo- nere, et in hac majore et uberiore arte versari. Hanc enim perfectam philosophiam semper judicavi, quae de maximis qijaestionibus copiose posset ornateque dicere ; in quam 20 exercitationem ita nos studiose operam dedimus, ut jam etiam scholas, Graecorum more, habere auderemus ; ut nuper, tuum post discessum, in Tusculano, cum essent plures mecum familiares, tentavi quid in eo genere possem. Ut enim an- tea declamitabam causas, quod nemo me diutius fecit ; sic haec nunc mihi senilis est declamatio. Ponere jubebam de quo quisaudire vellet; ad id, aut sedens aut ambulans, disputabam. Ita- que dierum quinque scholas, ut Graeci appel- 30 lant, in totidem libros contuli. Fiebat autem ita, ut cum is qui audire vellet dixisset quid sibi vi- deretur, turn ego contra dicerem. Haec est enim, TUSC. quaestioxes : §§ 5,6. 17 ut scis, vetus et Socratica ratio contra alte- rius opinionem disserendi ; nam ita facillime, quid verisi mtllimum esset, inveniri posse Socra- tes arbitrabatur. Sed quo commodius disputa- tiones nostrae expiicentur, sic eas exponam quasi agatur res, non quasi narretur. Ergo ita nascetur exordium. §6. A. Malum mihi videtur esse mors. 31. Iisne qui mortui sunt, an iis quibus mo- riendum est ? 10 A. Utrisque. 3T. Est miserum, igitur, quoniam malum. A. Certe. 31. Ergo et ii quibus even it jam ut more- rentur, et ii quibus eventurum est, miseri. A. Mihi ita videtur. 31. Nemo ergo non miser. A. Prorsus nemo. 31. Et quidem, si tibi constare vis, omnes quicunque nati sunt eruntve, non solum miseri, 20 sed etiam semper miseri. Nam si solos eos di- ceres miseros quibus moriendum esset, neminem tu quidem eorum qui viverent, exciperes ; mo- rienchm est enim omnibus : esset tamen mise- riae finis in morte. Quoniam autem etiam mor- tui miseri sunt, in miseriam nascimur sempiter- nam. Necesse est enim miseros esse eos, qui centum millibus annorum ante occiderunt, vel potius omnes quicumque nati sunt. A. Ita prorsus existimo. 30 31. Die, quaeso, num te ilia terrent, triceps apud inferos Cerberus, Cocyti fremitus, trans- 18 TIXSC. QUAESTTONES : § 6v vectio Acherontis, mento summam aquam attin* gens siti enectus Tantalus? Num illud, quod Sisyphus versat Saxum sudans nitendo, ncque proficit hilum >. Fortasse etiam inexorabiles judices, Minos et Rhadamanthus? Apud quos nee te L. Crassus defendet, nee M. Antonius ; nee, quoniam apud Graecos judices res agetur, poteris adhibere De- mosthenem ; tibi ipsi pro te erit maxima corona i° causa dicenda. Haec fortasse metuis y et idcirco mortem censes esse sempiternum malum. A. Adeone me delirare censes,, ut ista esse credam ? M. An tu haec non credis I A. Minime vero. M. Male hercule narras. A. Cur ? quaeso. M. duia disertus esse possem, si contra ista dicerem. 20 A. Quis enim non in ejusmodi causa? Aut quid negotii est, haec poetarum et pictorum por- tenta convincere 1 31. Atqui pleni sunt libri contra ista ipsa philosophorum disserentium. A. Inepte sane; quis est eairn tarn excors y quern ista moveant ? M. Si ergo apud inferos miseri non sunt, ne sunt quidem apud inferos ufli. A. Ita prorsus existimo. 30 M. Ubi ergo sunt ii quos miseros dicis, aut quern locum incolunt 1 Si enim sunt, nusquam esse non possunt. A. Ego vero nusquam esse illos puto* M. Igitur ne esse quidem. TtXSC. quaestiones : § 6r 10 A. Prarsus isto modo ; et tamen miseros ob id ipsum quidem, quia nulli sunt. M. Jam mallem Ccrberum metueres, quarr* ista tarn inconsiderate diceres. A. Quid tandem ? M. Quern esse negas, eundem esse dicis ; ubi est acumen tuum ? Cum enim miserum esse di- cis, turn eum qui non sit dicis esse. A. Non sum ita hebes, ut istuc dicamv M. Quid dicis igitur I 10 A. Miserum esse (verbi causa) Marc. Cras- sum, qui illas fortunas morte dimiserit ; miserum Cn. Pompeium, qui tanta gloria sit orbatus ; om~ r>es denique miseros, qui hac luce careant. M. Revolveris eodem ; sint enim oportet, si miseri sunt ; tu autem modo negabas eos esse, qui mortui essent. Si igitur non sunt, nihil pos- sant esse; ita ne miseri quidem sunt. A. Non dico fortasse etiam quod sentio ; nam istuc ipsum, non esse cum fueris, miserrimum 20 puto. 31. Quid ? miserius quam omnino numquarri fuisse ? Ita qui nondum nati sunt, miseri jam sunt quia non sunt ; et nos ipsi, si post mortem miseri futuri sumus, miseri fuimus antequam na- ti. Ego autem non commemini, antequam sum natus me miserum. Tu, si meliore memoria es, velim scire ecquid de te recordere. A. Ita jocaris quasi ego dicam, eos miseros qui nati non sunt, et non eos qui mortui sunt. ^ M. Esse ergo eos dicis. A. Immo, quia non sunt cum fuerint, eo mis- eros esse. 20 TUSC. QJTAESTIONES : § 6. M. Pugnantia te loqui non vides 1 Quid enim tarn pugnat, quam non modo miserum, sed om- nino quidquam esse, qui non sit? An tu, egres- sus porta Capena, cum Calatini, Scipionum, Serviliorum, Metellorum, sepulcra vides, miseros putas illos ? A. Quoniam me verbo premis, posthac non ita dicam miseros esse, sed tantum mise?*os, ob id ipsum quia non sunt. io M. Non dicis, igitur, miser est M. Crassus ; sed tantum, miser M. Crassus. A. Ita plane. M. Quasi non necesse sit, quidquid isto modo pronunties, id aut esse, aut non esse. An tu di- alecticis ne imbutus quidem es ? In primis enim hoc traditur : Omne pronuntiatum, (sic enim mihi in praesentiaoccurrit ut appellarem d^icofia, utar post alio si invenero melius), id ergo est pronuntiatum, quod est verum aut falsum. Cum qo dicis igitur, miser M. Crassus, aut hoc dicis, miser est M. Crassus, ut possit judicari verum id falsumne sit ; aut nihil dicis omnino. A. Age, jam concedo non esse miseros qui mortui sunt ; quoniam extorsisti ut faterer, qui omnino non essent, eos ne miseros quidem esse posse. Quid ? Qui vivimus, cum moriendum sit, nonne miseri sumus? Quae enim potest in vita esse jucunditas, cum dies et noctes cogi- tandum sit, jam jamque esse moriendum ? 30 M. Ecqui ergo intelligis, quantum mali de humana conditione dejeceris 1 A. Quonam modo ? M. Quia, si mori etiam mortuis miserum es- set, infinitum quoddam et sempiternum malum TUSC. QUAESTIONES : § 6. tj haberemus in vita. Nunc video calcem ; ad quam cum sit decursum, nihil sit praeterea extimescendum. Sed tn mihi videris Ephichar- mi, acuti nee insulsi homiuis, ut Siculi, senter> tiam sequi. A. Quam ? non enim novi. 31. Dicam, si potero, Latine ; scis enim me Graece loqui in Latino sermone non plus solere, quam in Graeco Latine. A. Et recte quidem ; sed quae tandem est 10 Epicharmi ista sententia ? 31. Emori nolo; sed me esse mortuum nihil aestimo. A. Jam agnosco Graecum ; et quoniam coe* gisti ut concederem, qui mortui essent eos mise>- ros non esse, perfice, si potes, ut ne morienduna quiderfi esse, miserum puXem. 31. Jam istuc quidem nihil negotii est; sed etiam majora molior. A. Quo modo hoc nihil negotii est ? Aut a? quae sunt tandem ista majora ? 31. Quia, quoniam si post mortem nihil est mali, ne mors quidem est malum ; cui proximum tempus est post mortem, in quo mali nihil esse concedis. Ita ne moriendum quidem esse, ma- lum est ; id est enim, perveniundum esse ad id, quod non esse malum confitemur. A. Uberius ista, quaeso ; haecenim spinosiora prius (ut confitear) me cogunt, quam ut assentiar. Sed quae sunt ea, quae dicis te majora moliri ? 3$ 31. Ut doceam, si possim, non modo malum non esse, sed bonum etiam esse mortem. A. Non postulo id quidem ; aveo tamen aiu . Senilis est declamatio, is the dec- lanudion of my old age ; which shews that the Tuscu- lan Questions were written In the latter part of Cic- ero's lilc. Indeed) ho scums to have betaken himself to the study of philosophy, on account of the exigen- cies of the times ; which, during the wane of his life, left little hope for a busy and ambitious politician, who was attached to the popular form of govern- ment. The whole of the introduction to the Tufi- culan Questions, is in fact, as has been above re- marked, an apology for the stiuty of philosophy, and an effort to render that an object of particular admiration and attention, which up to the period when he was writing, had not been generally in good repute among the Romans. — Declamatio and declamito designate the usage of extempore speaking and discussion on any subject proposed, for the sake of practice and improvement. As Cicero had done this to a great extent, when young ; so he apologizes as it were for himself, in respect to his resuming the practice when he is old. His mean- ing is, that in what he is about to say, he resumes the practice of his youth, in descanting upon vari- ous topics. (19) P. 16. 1.27. Ponere jubebam, I required [some one] to propose something ; i. e. some subject on which he would wish me to speak. — Disputabam here means to discuss in the manner of a disputation, viz. by question and answer, the proposing of objections and answering them, etc. — Itaque, and then, or and in this way. — Scholas plainly means here the discussions held during the five days mentioned, 5* 94 NOTES ON §§ 5, 6. So the Greek word axolrj is often employed. — Fie- bat autem ita, the matter moreover teas so managed, — Sic eas . . . narretur, I shall so represent them, as if the thing were acted out, and not merely narrated; he means, that he shall represent them in the way of dialogue, so that the speakers or actors may in propria persona (so to express it) present them- selves before the readers. — Exordium here means, the commencement of the discussion which follows. §6. This section is a true specimen of the Socratic method of reasoning ; in which Cicero makes the young man, (who had set out with the position, that death is an evil, and yet held that there is no existence after death), to contradict himself, or to maintain what is plainly absurd. The sum of the argument which Cicero employs, is, that if we are annihilated at death, it follows of course, that we cannot be miserable after this period ; because mis- ery denotes the existence of feeling and suffering ; and these necessarily imply the actual existence of a sentient being. On the weight and force of this argument, I shall not make any remarks here ; nor in other cases of the like nature ; so as to intermingle them with the Notes. I purposely reserve, for the most part, remarks of this nature, for insertion in the Appendix ; in which I intend to examine, at large, the arguments of Cicero respecting the immortality of the soul, and also to suggest some considera- tions, relative to the arguments usually employed, in modern times, in discussing this subject. Enough, for the present, that Cicero has here applied his NOTES ON § 6- 9") dialectical skill in such a way, as absolutely to hedge op the path, in which his Collocutor was beginning to proceed. (50) P. 17. /. 8. — 1. Two questions may be asked in respect to this letter; first, What is the meaning of it ? Secondly, is it a manu auctoris °) As to the first question ; the meaning of A. seems to be explained in Tusc. Quaest. Lib. II. 11 ; where Cicero, ad- dressing his Collocutor, says : " At tu, adolescens" etc. A. then means adolescens, young man. But this should not be understood of a mere youth, as Mated by us at the present time. Among the Romans, as among the Hebrews, a person was called young, until he was some thirty years of age. Now as Socrates was usually surrounded by disciples in younger life ; so Cicero represents himself, in the present case, as entering into dis- cussion with a friend of the like age, i. e. adoles- cens. Indeed, the congruity of the whole thing requires this. Cicero is the master ; they who question him, are his disciples or pupils. But the ordinary solution of A. , is by Auditor. So Carey and others. — As to the other question, the manu- scripts exhibit the initial letters A, and also M, which follow ; and there can scarcely be a doubt that they are a prima manu. It will of course be understood, after what has been said, that M. stands for Marcus Tullius Cicero. (21) P. 17. 1. 12. Est miserum . . . malum, it is a misery, then, since it is an evil. — Nemo . . . miser, all then are wretched, or there is no one who is not misera- ble. — Si tibi constare vis, if you ivill be consistent with yourself, you must grant, etc. — Nam si solos etc. ; the sentiment which follows is this : ' If you should 96 NOTES ON § 6. affirm merely that all are miserable who have yet to die, then indeed, you would represent all the living as miserable, inasmuch as they must all die ; but still, should you go no further than this, death would at least be the end of our woes ;' nevertheless there would be an end of misery, in death. ' But since you represent the dead also as miserable, you make us all subject to endless misery. On this ground we must necessarily admit, that those who died one hundred thousand years ago, or rather, that all who have been born, are miserable.' (22) P. 17. 1. 32. Coeytus fremitus, the groanings of Coeytus. Coeytus, according to mythology, was a river in Hades, flowing from the Styx, and named by the Greeks, Kawviog, from vmivo}, to howl, to shriek ; i.e. Coeytus means, shriek-river. — Transvectio Ache- rontis, the passage over Acheron; which was another river in Hades, into which (according to Homer in Odyss. x. 513) Periphlegethon and Coeytus emptied themselves. The Greek ° Ax&qwv seems to be equiv- alent to 6 aym qzwv, i. e. ivhichjlows ivith griefs, or the river of sorroivs. Tantalus, well known in mythology, was a king of Lydia, the middle province on the western shore of Asia Minor, and son of Jupiter and the nymph Pluto ; also the father of Niobe, Pelops, etc., all famous in fable. He is represented as plunged up to the chin into a pool of water in Hades, and as tormented with an insatiable thirst; but the mo- ment he attempts to catch at the water, it recedes from him. Some add to this, that a bough of de- licious fruit hangs above his head, which, forced by raging hunger, he attempts to seize, but which is instantly removed beyond his reach by a blast of NOTES ON § G. 97 wind. Others represent him as sitting under ;i «e that is suspended over his head, whieh every moment threatens to fall. This dreadful punishment was inflicted, because he served up his son Pelope for a supper made to regale 'the gods; which he did in consequence of doubts as to their real divinity, and in order to put their knowledge to the test. So Pindar ; but others say, it was be- cause he stole nectar and ambrosia from the table of the gods, and gave them to men ; and others assign still different causes. — Siti enectus means, dying with thirst, tortured to death with thirst. Sisyphus' story may be found in all the books of mythology. lie is represented as the son of Aeo- lus and Enaretta, and the founder of Eph} r re, af- terwards called Corinth ; also as the most crafty and subtle prince of all the heroic ages. His pun- ishment in Hades is represented, as a continual effort to roll a huge stone up a steep hill, which no sooner reaches near the top, than it is precipi- tated back to the bottom, and he commences his work anew. The cause of this punishment is usu- ally represented, to be a trick which Sisyphus played upon Pluto. At his death, he commanded his wife to leave his body unburied. When he came to Hades, he begged indulgence of Pluto, to go back and punish the seeming negligence of his wife, in leaving his body unburied ; and having obtained his request, he declined returning to the infernal regions. Pluto then sent Mars after him ; and when he was brought back by force, Pluto con- demned him to the punishment above stated. Oth- ii different causes. — Sudans nitendo, sweat- ing: because of strenuous exertion. — Hilum, in the least, in any degree. 98 NOTES ON § 6. (23) P. 18. I. 5. Minos et Rhadamanthus, both (ac- cording to mythology) sons of Jupiter and Europa, and born in Crete. For their distinguished justice while kings on earth, the Greeks represented them as severe and impartial judges in Hades. Minos hears the causes of the dead, and shakes the fatal urn by which their destiny is determined ; and Rhada- manthus obliges them to confess their crimes, and punishes them for their offences. Cicero has here omitted Aeacus, son of Jupiter and Aegina, and king of Oenopia, who is often associated with Minos and Rhadamanthus. — L. Crassus . . . M. Antonius ; the former a celebrated orator cotemporary with Cicero ; the latter, Cicero's teacher in rhetoric, at Rome, otherwise called Marcus Antonius Gnipho. (24) P. 18. I. 7. Quoniam, whilst ; the sense seems to require quamquam, as Ernesti remarks ; but quoniam is admissible in the sense now given to it. — Graecos judices, i. e. Minos and Rhadamanthus, as stated above. — Tibi ipsi . . . dicenda, [but] the cause must be pleaded for yourself, the crown being of the highest value. The recent translation of Cicero's Tusculan Questions, by W. H. Main (Lond. 1824), renders maxima corona, before a very great assembly. The Latin is, no doubt, capable of this ; because co- rona sometimes means the crowd which surrounds or encircles any one. But I apprehend the true force and point of the expression here would be lost by such a version. I understand Cicero, who had just named Demosthenes, as alluding here to the last and highest effort of this masterly orator, viz., the celebrated oration tizqI crjeqpdvov, i. e. pro corona. Demosthenes, in the course of his life, had been twice crowned on the public stage at Athens ; once NOTES ON §6. 99 for his services in expelling the Macedonian garri- son from the island of Enboeu: and the second time, after the 1p;ii: ; ;<* made With the Thebans. In 334 J). C, Ins friend Ctesiphon proposed in the Senate, that Demosthenes should be again crowned for his many public, patriotic, and disinterested services. Aeschines, the rival of Demosthenes, took otfence at this, and accused Ctesiphon of acting unlawfully and precipitately in this matter, and demanded that he should be fined fifty talents of gold. From various causes, the matter did not come to trial until eight years afterwards ; when Demosthenes undertook the defence of Ctesiphon ; and through him, the vindication of his own claims, which was the real basis of the dispute. As this was the last, so it was the most perfect of all the public speeches of Demosthenes ; and indeed, it is the unquestionable master-piece of ancient ages. An allusion to these well-known facts I suppose Cicero to make, in the phrase maxima corona ; which, on the ground that I take, means as much as to say : ' The crown for which you will plead, will be one of the highest possible value ;' i. e. it amounts to the question of eternal happiness or misery. The idea of a great assembly before which individuals are to plead their cause at the bar of the judges in Hades, is, as it seems to me, foreign to the classical circle of thought ; although it is fa- miliar to us, because we insensibly transfer the scriptural account of the judgment day, to the hea- then judgment day. It comes, therefore, from the Scriptures, rather than from the Greek or Roman views of our final trial. P. 18. /. 16. Male, Hercule, narras, by Hercules, you 100 NOTES ON § 6. speak unluckily. The reason follows : Quia . . . dice- rem, i. e. * I might exhibit some eloquence in des- canting against such things,' viz. if he had not been prevented by his Collocutor's disclaiming any be- lief in them. — Quis enirn non etc., who now could not [be eloquent] in a matter of this kind? Con- vincere, refute. (25) P. 18. I. 31. Nusquam . . . possunt, literally they cannot be nowhere, i. e. they must be somewhere. —Quid tandem, literally why at last ? Tandem, in such a case, is expressive of surprise or strong feel- ing ; just as we should say, in English : ' Why, in all the world ? Why, for heaven's sake ?' — Istuc, that ; put for isthoc. — Illas fortunas, those [splendid] pos- sessions, viz. such as the persons present were well acquainted with. — M. Crassus, i. e. Marcus Licinius Crassus, one of the triumvirate with Caesar and Pompey, who was exceedingly rich, and met with a violent death, B. C. 53. — Cneium Pompeium, Pompey the Great, as he has been called, one of the same triumvirate, who also came to a violent end. — Qui . . . careant, i. e. who die. (26) P. 19. 1. 15. Revolveris eodem, you move in a circle, i. e. you argue in one. — Etiam quod sen- tio, the very thing which, or exactly what, I think. — Esse . . . dicis, then you affirm that they [who are dead] do still exist. — Porta Capena, a gate of Rome so named, because it led towards Capena. — Calati- ni, etc., heroes and patriots of former days. The Greek al'impa means, in logic, whatever is so said, in a perfect sentence, that it must he either true or false. Prormnciatum, then, is a proposition, declaration, something declared. — Id ergo . . . falsum, is not exactly fitted to the previous omne pronuntia- NOTES ON § G. 101 turn. The feet is, that the construction of the sen- tence is broken off by the parenthesis, and begun anew or resumed at id etc. -, that then is an ajjinua- tion, whidi it true or false. (27) P. 20. /. 30. Ecqui, sign of interrogation merely, like the word nuni ; do you see then, etc.? — Dejeceris, you have removed or abstracted, viz., by granting that men are not miserable after death, the sum of their misery is of course greatly diminish- ed ; as the sequel shews. — Haberemus in vita, i. e. we should, while living, have continually before us endless misery. — Calcem, literally the heel ; but here figuratively, the extremity. Epicharmus (fl. 440 B. C.) was a poet and Pytha- gorean philosopher, who introduced comedy at Syracuse, under king Hiero. He was imitated by the Roman Plautus. He is reported to have made a metrical version of the maxims of Pythagoras, and so to have divulged the secrets of the School. Aristotle and Pliny make him the inventor of the Greek letters % and &. — The phrase, acuti nee in- sulsi hominis, corresponds pretty exactly to our vulgar English expression, a shrewd sort of a man, and no fool of a fellow. At least, this gives the sense of the original, better than a more stately ex- pression. Ut Sic ul i, inasmuch as he is a Sicilian ; for Si- cilians were deemed, by the ancients, to be men of acute minds. — Quam, i. e. quam sententiam. — Me Graece . . . Latin e, that I am not any more wont to introduce Greek when speaking Latin, than I am to introduce the Latin while speaking Greek. — Jam ag- nosco Graecum, / readily discern the Greek ; but does he mean the Greek man, or the Greek Ian- 102 NOTES ON § 6. guage that corresponded with what Cicero had uttered ? The latter, Mr. Main says ; and perhaps correctly ; for a reference to what precedes the quotation, would incline one so to think. Still it is possible, that the speaker means to say : " I dis- cern in this sentiment the shrewd Greek philoso- pher ;" but, on the whole, I cannot think this to be the probable interpretation. He seems to design to say, that although Cicero had not expressed the Greek, he could discern what it must be, or recal it to mind. The verse of Epicharmus, ' Ano&dvsw i) TE&vavaiy ov poi diacpsgsi, which Sextus Empiri- cus (ad vers. Mathemat.) has preserved, does not appear to contain the sentiment which Cicero has here expressed in Latin. — Perfice, accomplish or complete your undertaking, viz., to shew, that / should regard the not being obliged to die, as mise- rable. (28) P. 21. I. 18. Jam . . . est, that now is indeed no difficult task. — Cui proximum etc., near to which [death], is the time after death, etc. — Id est enim etc., for that [viz. dying] is coming to that etc. — Uberius is- ta, [speak] more at large upon these things. — Haec . . . assentiar, these thorny matters (as I confess) compel me before lean yield my assent to them. — Ut enim non effi- cias etc., although you may not effect, etc. ; tamen etc., yet you may succeed in shaving, etc. — Continentem orationem, continuous or uninterrupted speech. — Su- perbum . . . esset, that would be acting haughtily or arrogantly ; for esset Ernesti reads est, but (with Rath) I prefer esset. — Geram tibi morem, I yield to thee, or I grant your request ; mos sometimes signi- fies one's own will or opinion ; and gero, to manage, direct, etc. Hence gero tibi morem, literally / di~ NOTES ON §§ 6, 7. 103 red my will for you, til>i being in the Dativus corn- modi, as irrammarians Bay. — Homunculus unus, lit- erally one little man, a man of an inferior cast, out of the many such who may be found ; Spoken in the way of modesty, so as not to protend to too much. — IVobabilia coujeeturA sequens, seeking af- ter what is probable by supposition, i. e. what We may suppose to he probable. — Tu, ut videtur, you may go on as you please ; we put ourselves in the attitude of listeners. §§ 7-9. In this discussion, (as should be done in all others which are properly conducted), the writer aims first at the definition of t he main word or topic : What is death 7 On the part of some, the an- swer to this is, that it is the separation of the soul and body, or the departure of the former from the latter. But others think that the soul perishes with the body. What then is the soul 1 A fundamen- tal question, of course, in the whole discussion. In the investigation of this topic, Cicero adduces (in § 7. § 8) all the various theories respecting the soul, which had been proposed by different philosophers ; and on some of these he makes remarks, in $9. Of course, all those theories respecting the soul, which make it a part, or the whole, of the body, e. g. the heart, the brain, the blood, or that harmony which is the result of all the parts of the body being united, are considered as affording no ground of hope for immortality ; because, if either of these theories be true, the soul must be dissolved with the body. Other theories, e. g. such as rep- resent the soul to be air or ether, fire or caloric, the perennial prin- ciple or cause of motion and life, etc., Cicero considers as affording some room for hope, that the soul, when it leaves the body, may find a permanent place of abode in the celestial regions. §7. (29) P. 22. L 17. Mors, etc., our first business, then, shall be, to inquire what death itself is, which seems to be something familiarly known. Animi, of the mind or soul, vovg, i.e. the intelligent and rational part of man, in distinction from his physical or bodily part. So 104 NOTES ON § 7. evidently animus is used here. But this is not its only meaning, in the Latin language. (1) Sometimes it is equivalent to anima, i. e. the animating living principle of our nature, as contained in the breath ; and this seems to be the original sense of the word, inasmuch as it plainly comes from the Greek live* fxog, wind, breath, (2) Animus sometimes desig- nates also the faculty of thinking and desiring, in distinction from the material nature of the body, which of itself cannot do this. (3) Animus denotes, also, the faculty of perception and feeling, in distinc- tion from the material nature of the body ; and in this last sense, as well as in its second one, it be- comes equivalent to mind, as designating our intel- lectual and rational part. Like our English word mind, also, animus designates the various affections and exercises of the soul ; e. g. will, desire, courage, satisfaction, dissatisfaction, hope, manner of think- ing, opinion, thought, etc. That Cicero uses ani- mus, in his present book, for mind (in a generic sense), i. e. for soul, in distinction from, or in oppo- sition to, the body as material and mortal, is plain from the very nature of the case. Of course, our English word soul or mind, is a correct translation of it. (30) P. 22. I. 21. Occidere, to fall or to perish.— Alii statim, i. e. alii censent statim ; and so in the fol- lowing cases of the word alii.— Semper, i. e. semper permanere. The reader will note these three classes of opinion, respecting the duration of the soul. Next follows a recension of the different opinions respecting the nature itself of the soul. — Nasica . . . Corculum, ATasica (i. e. Scipio Nasica), that shrewd man, tioice made consul, [was surnamed, dicebatur implied] corculum, i. e. little heart. NOTES ON § 7. 105 (31 ) 1'. 22. L 30. Empcdoclvs think*, that the soul is the blood suffused around the heart. Empedocles, who flourished about 444 B.C., was a native of Agrigen- turn, a town on the south- western shore of Sicily, a philosopher and poet, and one of the most distin- guished men in his country. He wrote a poem, in three hooks, on the Nature of Things ; which Lu- cretius had before him, when lie wrote his poem of the like kind ; but which, with all the other works of Empedocles, has perished, excepting only a few fragments. The story of Empedocles plunging himself into the crater of mount Etna, is probably a fiction. The sentence of Empedocles to which Cicero here alludes, is this: Ai t ua yag av&Qwnoig TieoLxagdiov £cttl voi]uu, for the blood around the heart of man is his mind; found in Stobaeus, Eclog. Pliys. p. 131. — Animi principatum tenere, to contain the principal portion, or the predominating portion of the soul. (32) P. 23. 1. 4. Declarat nomen, (Ernesti and Nob- be : declarant nomen), I understand as an elliptical expression, equivalent to hoc declaret nomen, this the name declares, i. e. the very name which we give to the soul, declares that it has been deemed the same thing as anima, the breath or vital principle. The sequel shews that such was the intention of the writer. — Agere animam means, the panting of a dying person, to pant for breath. — Animam ef- flare is to breath out one's breath, to expire. — Et an- imosos, i. e. et dicimus animosos, i. e. we speak of animosos, animatos, and also say, et animi sententid. — Bentley suspected the genuineness of the words, nam et . . . sententia ; Rath has so marked them in his edition ; but I prefer, with Nobbe, to mark 106 NOTES ON §§ 7, 8. only, et animosos . . . sententia ; which I have in- cluded in brackets, in order to denote the probabil- ity that it is not genuine ; at least, it does not seem to be to the purpose of the author, and I can make no tolerable reasoning out of it. (33) P. 23. 1.8. Zenoni Stoico, a celebrated philos- opher, and founder of the sect of the Stoics, was born at Citium in the island of Cyprus, and died B. C. 264, at the age of 96 years. He spent his literary life at Athens ; where he lectured on philosophy, in the portico called gtocc. Hence the name Stoic, given to him and his followers. Temperance, regularity of life, indifference to bodily appetites, and universal sobriety of demeanour, were virtues insisted on by the Stoics ; and which these philos- ophers, at least many of them, seem to have car- ried higher than any other sect of ancient Greece. (34) P. 23. 1. 9. Sed haec . . . vulgo, but that these things which Ihave mentioned, the heart, the brain, the breath, fire, [are the soul], is commonly [said] ; that is, these opinions are common. — Reliqua fere sin- guli, other things, for the most part, only particular persons [affirm]. — Ut multi ante etc. ; with Bentley and Rath, I begin a new sentence here. Ernesti puts only a comma after singuli ; but the nature of the sentence which follows, with the correlates ante . . . proxiine, shews that a different division should be made. — Ante, anciently, viz. before the time of Aristoxenus. Proxime, in later times. (35) P. 23 .1. 11. Aristoxenus, a celebrated musician, was born at Tarentnm of Calabria in Italy. He wrote 453 treatises on philosophy, history, etc. He was a NOTES ON § 8. 107 disciple of Aristotle ; and three books of his on mu- sic, are still extant, being the most ancient that we have respecting this science. He flourished about 340 B. C. (36) P. 23. /. 13. Intontionem quandam, i. e. many of the ancients, and in later times, Aristoxcnus, [have said that the soul is] a kind of straining up or tuning of the body itself — Velut etc., as in singing and instrumental music, ivhat is called harmony, [arises from such a tuning] ; so from the nature and conformation of the whole body, its various mo- tions arise, like the sounds in music. — Hie, viz. Aristoxeuus. — Artificio suo, his art as a musician. — Et tamen . . . Platone, and yet he said something which, whatever it might be, was long before both said and explained by Plato. (37) P. 23. 1. 19. Xenocrates, born at Chalcedon in Bythinia, a town opposite Byzantium; a pupil of Plato, who succeeded Speusippus in the school of Plato ; and who was much respected and admired for his virtues. He died B. C. 314, at the age of 82. (38) P. 23. 1. 21. Pythagoras, a native of Samos one of the Grecian islands ; a disciple of Pherecydes of Syros ; a famous moral and political reformer, at Metapontum and Crotona, cities on the Tarentine bay, at the south-east part of the Italian peninsula, usually called Magna Graecia. His doctrine of metempsychosis and the harmony of the spheres, are well known. He applied the doctrine of even and odd, in numbers, to the system of the Universe ; and he drew from this application, the conclusion that this system is a system of relations, i. e. of numerical proportion ; and so, a living harmony of numbers. (See in Rixner's Geschichte der Philos. 108 NOTES ON § 8. Vol. I., a detailed account of the music of the Spheres, in the Appendix.) (39) P. 23. Z. 20. Numerum seems to mean, har- monical conformity. If we ask for definite ideas, in respect to such philosophy as that of Pythagoras and his followers, with regard to this point, we may ask in vain. The general idea of this numerical conformi- ty seems to have been, a kind of harmonizing anima mundi, diffused through all its parts ; and of course existing in human beings. To explain it, Pytha- goras compared it to music, and to the harmony (as he named it) of even numbers. (40) P. 23. Z. 22. Ejus doctor, i. e. the teacher of Xenocrates.— Cujus ... in arce, ivhose ruling part, i. e. reason he placed in the head, as in a kind of citadel. — Et duas partes . . . locavit, and two parts he made sub" ordinate, viz. irascibility and desire, which he located in their appropriate places, irascibility in the breast, and desire under the region of the heart. For suis, Ernesti and others read disclusit ; with Rath and some of the Mss., I prefer suis. (41) P.23.Z. 28. Dicaearchus, of Messene in the province of Messenia, belonging to the south-west- ern part of the Peloponnesus, was famous for his knowledge of philosophy, history, and mathematics. There are no remains of his works, at present. — Quern . . . exponit, which, being pronounced at Cor- inth, he has published in three books. — Duobus, in the other two books. — Disserentem, who maintains. — Frustra que .... appellari, and that without any rea- son, animals are also called animated beings. — -Ne- que, i. e. he also maintains, that neither etc. — Animum vel animam, i. e. neither a rational soul, nor an ani- mating principle. — Quippe . . . quidquam, because NOTES ON §§8, 9. 109 there is no such [anima], nor any thing whatever, unless etc. — Ita tiguratum, etC.,W formed, that by the tempering of mxturt it lives and thinks. (4*2) P. 24. /. 13. Quatuor ilia genera principiortita, those four kinds of dements, i. e. the well known four, viz. water, earth, fire, and air. — Cum complex- us, ichen . ... he had comprised or represented. — Et tain multa alia, and also jnany other things, viz., meminisse, etc. — ' ErdsXi^ttar, (so, on the whole, I think, with Rath, it should be written, and not as Ernesti writes it, ivihUyjia), means perennity, continued existence in the same state. EvTili'/ua means activity, action itself, or actual being. Nei- ther the one nor the other of these Greek words seem fully to correspond with Cicero's explana- tion. On the whole, however, his emphasis seems to lie upon continuatam and perennem, rather than on motionem; which w r ould favour the reading ivdeXs/sioiv. §9. (43) P. 24. 1. 24. Nisi sententiae, unless, per- chance, some have escaped me, these are nearly the [various] opinions inspecting the soul. After fere, the common editions insert omnium ; but the lead- ing Mss. omit it ; and so Rath. (44) P. 24. 1. 25. Democritus, of Abdera in Thrace, at the head of the Aegean Sea ; a disciple of Leucip- pus of the same place ; born B. C. 500 ; called ZZ&h Tad-log, because of his skill in logic, physics, ethics, mathematics, and music. The atomic philosophy seems Xo have taken its rise from him. Cicero seems hardly to represent his principles w r ith fair- ness here ; for he did not maintain the fortuitous concourse of atoms, but that their movements were 6 110 NOTES ON §9. necessary, and yet that they were directed by the laws of the highest reason. See Rixner, Geseh. der Philos. I. p. 128. (45) P. 24. I. 26. Levibus . . . corpusculis, smooth and round particles or atoms. — Apud istos, i. e. among philosophers of that class. — Confundere, to mix them together, to unite them. — Ut . . . disserantur, although those matters, viz. respecting the constituent ele- ments of the soul, be not discussed. — Nisi hac . . . hoc, unless this question [respecting the essence] of the soul be solved, now, if you think proper, [we will discuss] this. — Illud alias, otherwise [we will dis- cuss] that. — Efficiet enim ratio,/or reason will make it out. (46) P. 25. 1. 15. Si anima est, if it is air, breath. — His sententiis omnibus, according to all these opinions. — Sensus, sensation. — Non sentientis . . . intersit, but to one destitute of all sensation, there is nothing which can be of any consequence. (47) P. 25. 1 31. Num etc., i. e. can we defend the immortality of the soul more eloquently than Pla- to has done ? Sed nescio quo modo, etc. ; a remarkable and very affecting concession of an anxious and inquir- ing mind. All the arguments which a Plato and a Socrates had produced, could operate, as it would seem, with only a momentary and imperfect force upon it. With Plato's Phaedo in his hand, the inquiring youth could not, for the time being, gain- say his reasoning ; but so little of deep impression did it make, so little of solid satisfaction did it give, that at the moment when direct attention to the sub- ject ceased, then conviction and satisfaction began to diminish and to vanish away. Cicero does not, NOTES ON §§9, 10. Ill indeed, say this in his own person ; but can there be any good ground off doubt, that be drew the sentiment from his own leelinirsr 1 apprehend it inns: have been nearly or altogether so, with a ' pari of the few aiDODg the heathen, who pro- id to believe in the real immateriality and im- ality of the soul. They saw through a glass darkly. They were groping their way by dim twilight. The gospel, and that only, has " brought and immortality to light," in a manner that ad- mits no doubt nor fears as to the doctrine of a fu- ture a) Dasne, do you not concede, either that the soul endures etc., or etc. — Do vero i. e. I grant ihat the one or the other of these must be true. § 10. The first argument which Cicero employs to show that the soul survives the body, is an argumentum ad hominem ; i. e. it avails only for those who hold, as did the Greeks and Romans, that the gods now existing and immortal, were once human heings. For all such, Cicero says, the funereal rites and ceremonies that are prac- tised, will exhibit sufficient proof, that renowned men and women are regarded, end have from time immemorial been regarded, as surviving the destruction of the body. Thus it is in respect to Romulus, Castor and Pollux, fno, and others. Nay, even the Dii JIajores are all of the like class ; as their sepulchres in Greece, and their mysteries, clearly shew. We may add to these considerations, the general persuasion respecting the appearance of ghosts or spirits. (48) P. 26. 1. 23. Auctoribus. . . possumus, we can adduce the best authorities in respect to that sentiment which you wish should be established. — Et primum . . . antiquitate, and especially [we can ad- duce] all antiquity. — Ortu, its first origin. (49) P. 2G. 1. 30. Iusitum, implanted by na- ture. — Cascos, the same in meaning as antiquos ; 112 NOTES ON § 10. but the word cascos is antiquated or obsolete, be- ing probably a Sabine word. — Esse in morte sen- sum, that there is sensation in a state of death, i. e. after death. — Turn . . . sepulcrorum, both from the ordinances of the priests and the ceremonies at graves, — Nee violatas . . . sanxissent, nor, when [these ceremonies] are violated, would they have punished with a scrupulosity which could not he ap- peased, Religio, conscientiousness, scrupulosity ; sancio sometimes means to apply the penalty of a law, i. e. to punish ; and this seems to make the best sense here. — Mortem non . . . delentem, that death is not such a destruction as removes and makes an entire end of every thing. — In ceteris . . . tamen, in regard to others, [this soul] is retained in the ground, but still continues to exist, (50) P. 27. I, 11. Ex hoc . . . opinione, accord- ing to this, and in the opinion of our countrymen, — Ennius, see Note 9. — Indeque . . . Hercules, and from thence Hercules, penetrating to us, and even to the ocean, i. e. the Atlantic. — He probably refers here to Gades (now Cadiz), situated anciently on an island in the Atlantic, some distance north of the straits of Gibralter ; where Hercules was wor- shipped, and where he probably once came. The pillars of Hercules are usually supposed to have been at Calpe (Gibralter) on the Spanish coast, and Abyla, opposite to it on the African side ; and it is said that these were erected, as the limits of the western world. But Silius Italicus calls Gades the cognata limina [mundi], Lib. III. 3 ; and Isidorus says ; iC Hercules, cum Gadibus pervenisset, columnas ibi posuit, sperans illic esse orbis terrarum finis, Orig. Lib. XIII. c. 15, Add NOTES ON § 10. 113 to this, that. Oadcs is on the Atlantic ocean, in ac- cordance with the expression of Cicero, usque ad Oeeanum ; while Caipe (Gibralter) and Abyla are within the Mediterranean Sea. Gades, therefore, was naturally the extreme boundary of the west- ern world, as known to the ancients. — Tyndaridae fratres, the brothers, sons of Tyndar, i.e. Castor and Pollux, reckoned as tutelar Genii by the Roman people. The particular story to which Cicero seems here to refer, is, that Castor and Pollux were present, in the Macedonian war, at the battle in which Perses the king of Macedonia was con- quered, near Pydna, B. C. 168 ; that they not only assisted the Romans to obtain this victory, but appeared immediately after it at Rome, washing off from themselves the blood and dust of battle in the river Tiber, and announcing victory to the imperial city. The like phenomena, however, the mythology of the Romans often ascribed to the sons of Tyndar. (51) P. 27. Z. 20. Ino, Cadmi filia, etc.; the mythology is complex, and very absurd. ^ Athe- mas, king of Thebes in Boeotia, married first Themisto, by whom he had Phryxus and Helle. Pretending that Themisto was subject to fits of insanity, he afterwads married Ino, by whom he had Melarchus and Melicerta. Ino, becoming jealous of the first children of her husband, sought in various ways to destroy them. Juno, in re- venge for this, sent one of the Furies to the house of Athamas ; who taking possession of him, in a fit of madness he killed Melarchus the son of Ino, and pursued her, in his rage, in order to destroy her. She, flying with Melicerta in her arms, 114 NOTES ON § 10. plunged into the sea ; upon which she was changed into a sea-goddess, whom the Greeks called A^vaod-m, and the Romans Matuia. Only free born, married women were permitted to enter her temple. The meaning of the name Matuia, seems to be morning-goddess, i. q. Aurora ; and so the Greek name would not unnaturally import. (52) P. 27. I. 22. Quid ? What more shall I say ? — Ne plures persequar, not to particularize any more individuals. — Caelum, commonly writ- ten coelum = ndlXog, hollow, concave, the welkin. — Ipsi illi . . . reperientur, those very individuals, viho are reputed as gods of a higher kind, will he found to have gone from us to heaven. This is a very strik- ing passage ; and it casts great light over the whole field of heathen mythology. All the objects of Greek and Roman worship were then, after all, mere men who had undergone ano&eocriq. " Cease ye from man," one might well say, with the sublime prophet of the Hebrews, to all the worshippers of such gods. But the purpose for which Cicero here makes such an appeal, is one of great inter- «, est. He is labouring to shew that the soul is im- mortal. How can this be done ? ' All antiquity,' says he, ' believed it. All that is done for the dead, shews that we consider them as still having a regard to their fame and honour. The fact, that even the gods themselves (to whom we pray and look for help, and whom we all believe to be immortal) were once men, shews that the souls of men are immortal ; yea, these gods, even of the highest order, we acknowledge, were once mere men.' The argument is certainly ingenious ; and to a popular believer in the Roman gods, was an NOTES ON § 10. 115 argumentum ad hominem which was invincible. For u*, such an argument has no further weight, than as it goes to shew, how deeply seated in the human breast is the desire or expectation of an immortal existence. I) P. 27. /. 2(>. Majoruni gentium Dii, are Ju- piter, Neptune, Apollo, Mars, Vulcan, Mercury; Juno, Minerva, Ceres, Venus, Diana, Vesta; six male, and six female ones. So Ennius the poet reckons them by name. — Quere . . . Graecia, ask tcliose sepulchres are shewn in Greece ; i. e. in so doing you will find what I have said to be true. — Initiatus, i. e. initiated into the mysteries of the heathen mythology, become a (ivarriQ. — Mysteriis, the secret rites and doctrines of the heathen my- thology or theology, not disclosed to the world. These rites, no doubt, were symbols of things which the reputed gods had done and said ; and among these, was what had been done by them before their transmigration to heaven. On this account, Cicero appeals to the mysteries as a proof that what he had been saying with respect to the gods having 'once been men, was true. — Turn . . . intelliges, then surely will you understand, hoio widely this extends ; viz. how widely the declara- tion that he had made, may be extended, how generally true it is. Denique is sometimes em- ployed, as here, as an adverb of intensity, i. e. serving to strengthen the affirmation. (54) P. 27. /. 32. Physica, natural philosophy, physics. — Tantum . . . cognoverant, persuaded them- selves of only so much as they understood from the instructions of nature, i. e. their own internal na- ture. — Maxime uoctumis; night being the time, 116 NOTES ON §§ 10, 11. when spectres have always and every where been supposed usually to make their appearance. — Ut . . . vivere, so that those seemed to live, mho had departed from life. § 11. The second argument is, that as universal belief in the existence of the gods seems to be a good reason for admitting the truth of this ; therefore the general laws of our nature, that we should be- lieve in the doctrine of a future state, is a good reason for believing it. It is in reference to this, also that we grieve over our departed friends ; not because of disadvantages to which we are subjected, on account of their death, but because we think them deprived of the pleasures of life. Again; that all men have an instinctive apprehension or expecta- tion of a continued existence, is testified by all our arrangements for the future; by sepulchres, eulogies of the dead, heroic deeds, de- votedness to one's country, etc. Poets, artificers, philosophers, all develope the same trait of character, as to their expectations con- cerning the future. Especially is this trait discernible, in all those, vtrho attain to superior excellence in any way. It is therefore a law of our nature ,* and as such, its testimony must be regarded as true. This placed on its proper basis, is a fundamental argument in favour of a future state; as we shall see hereafter. The develop- ment of it, however, may be made, I think, in a more convincing way than is here done. But even here, are sparks of celestial fire, shewing that heathenism itself could not wholly deface the image of God, which he has given to our immortal part; at least, that it could not do this as to the mind of a reflecting man, such as Cicero was. (55) P. 28. I. 5. Ut . . . videtur, moreover, this seems to be adduced as a very solid reason. Ut is frequently used with the superlative of adjectives, in this way. Ernesti suspects the genuineness of it here, and thinks we should read at ; but this seems to be occasioned by overlooking the idiom. — Deorum opinio means, a belief that gods exist ; opin- io est means, one believes. — Collocutio hominum means, men's conferring together, i. e. in the way of conversation and discussion. Cicero means to say. NOTES ON § 1 I. 117 that no conferences with each other, no natural agreement in consequence of such conferences, no ordinances, no laws, have occasioned men thus to harmonize in their opinions about the immortal gods; in other words, it all results from the teach- ing of nature merely; and so it results, of course, from a law of our nature. — Suo incommodo, on account of his own [personal] inconvenience or suffering. — Dolent, i. e. [some] grieve, etc. — Fletus- que maerens, and weeping occasioned by grief. — Idque sentire, and that he is sensible of this, viz. of being deprived, etc. — Nulla ratione . . . doctrina, independently of any reasoning or instruction, i. e. simply as guided by nature. (5(3) P. 28. I. 25. Tacitam, silently, i. e. without any teaching or leading, as above said. — Quod . . . sint, that all are solicitous, and peculiarly so, about those thi7igs which are to happen after they are dead. He means by this, to shew that a longing after im- mortality is a part of our very nature ; which no doubt is a real, as it is a most important truth. (57) P. 28. I. 28. Statius (Caecilius), a comic poet, cotemporary with Ennius, a native of Gaul, and originally a slave. He acquired great reputa- tion by his comedies, although his Latin was not pure. — Synephebis, a play so called, from crvi'sys- fioi, young persons of the same age. — Quid . . . perti- nere ? To ivhat does he look, unless that even after ages concern himself "? — Ergo . . . non seret, shall the indus- trious husbandman, then, plant trees, the fruit (or bemj) of which he will never see ; and shall not a great man establish laws, institutes, the republic ? — Nisi nos . . . cogitare, unless we have respect also to the future. — Illud ... natura, can you doubt it, that a 6* 118 NOTES ON §§ 11, 12. specimen of what is really natural, should be selected from that nature what is hest in its kindt — Carey and some others read thus: Quid illud ? num etc. with Rath I prefer, Quid ? Illud num etc. , as this construction of quid then accords with that in the preceding sentences. — Quam eorum,i.e.quam natu- ra.eorum, etc. — Munivisset, had prepared by his fa- mous deeds, etc. — Et religione . . . consecrata, and rendered sacred by the religious feeling of all men. §12. (58) P. 29. I. 16. lisdem ne . . . terminaretur ? Shall we say that their fame is terminated by the same hounds as their life ? — Licuit . . . Themistocli, The- mistocles might have enjoyed his ease ; where the con- struction is, licuit Themistocli esse otioso, esse tak- ing the same case after it as before it. — Ne et. . . quaeram, not to mention things ancient and foreign, — Quo dempto, which [expectation of the future] being taken away. — De principibus ; concerning leading men or rulers. — Funera fletu faxet, nor perform my funeral rites with weeping ; faxet (by syncope) forfecerit, — Vivu', i. e. vivus, the s being dropped by apocope. (59) P. 30. I. 3. Sed quid poetas? But why [should I speak of] the poets ^ — Ophices, artists. Phidias, a celebrated statuary of Athens, who died B. C. 432. By request of Pericles, he made a stat- ue of Minerva, and on her shield, he carved his own likeness, and also that of Pericles. For this he was banished from Athens; and he took his revenge afterwards, by making a statue of Jupiter Olympius, which eclipsed the glory of his Minerva, and which was kept by the people of Elis. — Et si CONTENTS OF §§ 13 IS. 1 19 . . . maxime, and if we think those whose minds excel either in genius or virtue, to be pcculiartjj adapted to discern the power of nature, because they possess a nature best in iis kind. §§ 13—18.- But if the son I survives tho body, where and how docs it exist This question gives occasion tor a kind of episode here, on the met aphysical nature of the soul, and its linal place of residence ; which extends through VV) 13 — 18. Vulgar ignorance, says Cicero, has formed a multitude of superstitious notions on this subject ; because the uninformed minds of men were unable to contemplate any thing but sensible objects. Pherecydes first taught the proper eternity of the soul; which was received and supported by the disciples of Pythagoras ; from whom it passed to Plato. tematicians (natural philosophers) teach, that of the four elements, two, i. o. earth and water, sink downwards ; and two, i. e. fire and air, mount upwards. Now if the soul be igneous or ethe- rial ; and a fortiori if it be harmony, or that fifth something de- scribed by Aristotle; it will of course mount upwards on its depart- ure from the body, and ascend to a very great distance from the earth. But I do not see how harmony can arise from the disposition of members and the figure of the body destitute of a soul. It were better for Aristoxenus, who maintains this, to attend to his music, and leave reasoning on this subject to Aristotle his master. The fortuitous concourse of atoms, moreover as a cause of anima- ted being, we must at once reject. If then the soul consists of any of the four elements, it must necessarily be that of fire or air ; and of cour.se the soul, consisting of either of these, or of these com- bined, on quitting the body, must mount into the upper regions. And that the soul is of a warmer or more glowing nature than the concrete air, is clear from the warmth which it imparts to our bod- ies, that are formed from mere terrene materials. The soul, moreover, is capable of the highest celerity of move- ment ; by which it can easily permeate the clouds and vapours and obscurity which encompass the earth, and escape to that element in the upper regions, consisting of combined ether and solar warmth, which will be homogeneous with itself, and where it will find its own proper balance and resting place, and therefore ceaso to ascend. Here it will be nourished as the stars are, i.e. by the pure and glowing ether of those upper regions. Here, also, being freed from all bodily desires and lusts, and left to the full and free exercise of its own proper powers, it will gratify its insatiable thirst for knowledge; which, moreover, will ever be increased in proportion to its gratification and its opportunities. Even here, on earth, the beauty of the natural creation excites ar- dent desire for more extended knowledge. And if we now count it a great thing to visit the extreme western part of the Mediterra- 120 CONTENTS OF §§ 13 18. nean and to see the Euxine Sea on the east ; what will be our rap- ture, when we can see all the regions of the earth, with all their various forms and productions ! Besides all this, we may consider, that at present we do not real- ly see any thing, with our physical organs. These are the mere inlets to the soul, which alone has any proper sensation. When we come, then, to those upper regions, where we shall no longer be impeded by any of our physical organs, nothing will hinder our having the clearest, most extensive, and altogether satisfactory views of every thing that we desire to know. — Such therefore will be the state and condition of the soul. And such being the case, I wonder at the strange conduct of the Epicureans, who think it a great thing to have freed men from the fear of the future, by shewing that the soul is of a mortal na- ture, and expires with the body. To^me the sentiment of Pythago- ras and Plato is much more probable and welcome. The objection made by many, viz. that they cannot understand what the nature of the soul is, which is eternal, amounts to nothing ; for can they understand any better what the soul is, when in the body, than when out of the body ? To me it is much more difficult to see how the soul can dwell in a habitation so foreign to its true nature, and how it is to contemplate it as freed from such a habitation : un- less, indeed, we are to maintain the position, that we can understand nothinglvhich we do not sec with our eyes; and then we must dis- believe the existence of the gods. Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus, because they could not tell what the soul is, rejected the idea of its existence. But when the oracle of Apollo said: JTvojd't G&av- 7~OV, it meant, that we should become acquainted with our souls, which are our only proper selves. Thus it is evident that one main design of Cicero, in the whole of this apparent digression, is to remove objections against a future state, made from the nature and dwelling place of the soul. (60) P. 30. I. 26. Censebant, i. e. antiqui hom- ines censebant. — Frequens . . . theatri, the crowded assembly at the theatre. — Audiens . . . carmen, when hearing so pompous a strain. Adsum etc. , / am present, and I come from Acheron, ivith difficulty, through a deep and dangerous passage ; through caves formed by rough rocks, over-hanging, huge ; where the thick darkness of hell is immoveable ; rigi- da stat is a more probable reading than rigida constat ; the meaning of which former is stands stiff, i. e. immoveable. The quotation is from the Hecuba of Euripides, sub. init. — Valuit, did pre- vail— SublaXus, removed; the lexicons derive this NOTES ON § 13. 121 word from folio, its own proper root being out of use. (01) P. 31. /. 5. Amnios • . . complecti, they could not form any idea of minds living by themselves, i.e. existing independently of the body. — Aliquam, some kind of. — Tota v&cvict, all the vexvla of Homer ; rtxvia means sacrifices and rites instituted for the dead, in order to evoke the shades (umbrae) from the under-world or Hades. — IVr/.gouco'Tela, places where necromancy was practised. — Faciebat seems hardly to admit of a tolerable sense here. It may be ren- dered, p roc ured, made, constructed, and possibly made of, i. e. esteemed, valued, for this is one of the senses of facio, even when it governs the Accusative ; al- though it is seldom so used in such a connexion. (0*2) P. 31. I. 9. Averni lacus was near to Cu- mae in Campania ; hence in vicinia nostra. By this lake is the fabled entrance to the infernal re- gions, as described by Homer and Virgil. — Ostio . . . Acherontis, at the mouth of the deep Acheron ; which (Acheron) here means a river in lower Italy that must have been near the lake mentioned; see Scheller's Lat. Lex. (03,) P. 31. I. 11. Fcdso sanguine; so I find it, in my edition of Ernesti's Cicero ; but in Rath, Nobbe, and Carey, salso sanguine. What salt blood is, I am unable to imagine. False blood may very easily be attributed to the imagines mor- tuorum, i. e. mere umbrae or shadows of living be- ings ; so Main in his version : " No mortal blood." — Ad oculos . . . referebant, i. e. they made every thing to be visible to the eye, in whose existence they believed. — Et . . . abducere, and to withdraw our thoughts from objects with which we are familiar. 122 ' NOTES ON § 11. (64) P. 31. L 18. Itaque . . . dixit, therefore, (what in my opinion others had said for many ages, but, so far as we have it on record), Pherecydes of Syros first said, etc. Syrius (JZvqloq), belonging to Syros, one of the Grecian islands (Cyclades) , not far from Delos, and at the mouth of the Aegean Sea. The Syrius here has been mistaken by some for Syrus, a Syrian. Pherecydes was born about 595 B. C. and died about 535. He was the teacher of Pythagoras ; and with the disciples of Pythagoras, Plato was intimate ; so that the doctrine of the immortality of the soul seems to have come down from Pherecydes directly to Plato. — Antiquus sane ; for, as the above dates shew, Pherecydes was born almost 500 years be- fore Cicero. (65) P. 31. L 21. Meo regnante gentili, during the reign of my relative, (Main renders : my name- sake Tullus), i. e. during the reign of Servius Tul- lius, which was from 578 B. C. to 534 B. C. Serv. Tullius was the son of Ocrisia and Tullius, who belonged to Corniculum, a town of the Sabines, a little north of the river Anio, and but a short dis- tance from the city of Rome. In a war between the Sabines and Romans, Tullius the husband of Ocrisia was killed, and she came into the hands of Tarquin the Elder, king of Rome, as a slave. Tarquin presented her to his wife ; who brought up her son, Servius Tullius, in the palace. After- wards Tarquin gave to Tullius his daughter as a wife ; and upon the death of this king, S. Tullius, his son in law, was made king, and reigned 34 years. He was the last of the ancient Roman kings, save one, viz. Tarquin the Proud ; who is NOTES ON §§ 13, 14. 123 mentioned in the next sentence, and who married the daughter of S. Tullius, himself being Am grandson of Tarquin the Elder. Tarquin the Proud began to reign 534 & C, and 25 years af- terwards was expelled from the throne. Cicero retained the name of the family (Tallins), from which he was descended. (Go*) P. 31./. 23. Maxime confirmavit ; Pytha- goras and his disciples appear to have been much in earnest on the subject of the immortality of the soul. The so called Golden Verses of Pythagoras, (composed probably by some of his followers), bear testimony to a high state of moral and reli- gious feeling among this sect of philosophers. Plato seems to have fully imbibed their ardour in respect to these matters, by being conversant with them. — Superbo, i.e. Tarquinius Superbu?, the last of the ancient Romish kings ; as just stated above. — In Italiam venisset, i. e. to the south part of it, which was usually called Magna Grecia; where, particularly at Metapontum and Crotona on the Tarentine Bay, he effected a great moral and political reformation. All this line of coast w T as filled, in those days, with Grecian colo- nies. Hence the name, Magna Grecia ; which is mentioned in the next clause. — Tenuit, lit. restrain- ed, held hi ; but here it seems to mean, exercised influence over. — Cum . . . auctcritate, as well by the credit of his learning, as by his weight of character. § 14. (67) P. 31. 1. 29. Redeo ad antiquos here means, that he reverts from the saecula postea which he had just named, to those individuals whom he had been previously mentioning. — Non fere reddebant, 124 NOTES ON § 14. they scarcely rendered. — Nisi . . . explicandum, unless what might be explained either by numbers or by im- agery. He refers here to the Pythagorean nu- merical harmony of the universe (as stated in Note 38); and as to descriptionibus, I understand it to mean, the mythic stories which were told concern- ing the souls of men after their decease, their transformations, appearances, etc. — Nisi quid dicis, unless you have some objections to make. — Et hanc .... relinquamus, and relinquish the whole of this topic in regard to the hope of immortality. Cicero seems to say this, rather for the sake of whetting the curiosity of his Collocutor, or for the sake of ascertaining whether he had succeeded so as to create in him an interest in the subject proposed. — Macte virtute, bravo! well done! lit. elevated in virtue ; used by way of exclamation. Macte seems to be a participle, from the obsolete rnago, maxi, mactum, to enlarge, to elevate, etc. (68) P.* 32. I. 13. Num . . . hoc, shall we then doubt this also, as we do most other things ? Quam- quam . . . minime etc., certainly this least of all, for mathematicians etc. Quamquam, to be sure, for- sooth, German freilich. — Terram . . . vocant, that the earth, situated in the midst of the universe, in re- spect to the compass of the whole heaven, acquires as it were the likeness of a point, which they [the math- ematicians] call tcsvtqov, the centre. Cicero seems plainly to refer here to the astronomical and mathe- matical speculations of the Pythagoreans, who pla- ced the earth in the centre of the universe, and made the planets and stars revolve around it in con- centric oii>its, which were circumscribed at inter- vals from each other that corresponded, as to their NOTES ON § 14. 125 respective distances, with the tones in an octave of music; the seven planets (including the moon) making seven of these tones, and the fixed stars the eighth. — Quatuor . . . corporum, i. e. water, earth, fire, and air. — Ut. . .momenta, that they have powers anions: themselves, separate (as it were) and discrepant. — Terrena . . . ferantnr, that earthly and humid substances, by their own inclination and weight, tend, at equal angles, toward the earth and sea. As he had just said that the earth was a point in the center of the universe, so all ponderous substances in the atmosphere must converge toward it. Hence they do not move in a perpendicular direction, (one absolutely so considered), but be- ing convergent, they make angles (although equal ones, when compared with each other), in their descent toward the earth. If this be not the ex- planation, I do not understand the passage ; which, indeed, is quite possible ; dicat meliora, qui intelli- git! (69) P. 32. I. 23. Altera animalis, i. e. airy, at- mospheric ; for as anima often means air, so anima- lis may mean airy ; and clearly it does so here. — Illae superiores, viz. the earthy and humid sub- stances before mentioned. — Hae, viz. fire and air. — Rectis lineis, peipendicidarly, in distinction from the angidos above. — Sive . . . repellantur, either their nature itself seeking the upper regioiis, or because those substances which by nature are light, are repel- led by those which are heavy. (70) P. 32. I. 31. Animates is explained here by the author himself, i. e. spirabiles, lit. that which may be breathed, viz. 'air. Numerus here refers to the numerical harmony of the Pythagoreans. 126 NOTES ON §§ 14, 15. — Quinta ilia, viz. that fifth principle maintained by Aristotle, as mentioned above (in § 8), and which, he there says, is vacans nomine. Cicero here means to say, that the principle is well un- derstood, although it is not called by a specific name. — Multo . . . efferant, they are much the more incorrupted and pure, so that they must recede to the greatest possible distance from the earth. But integ- riora and puriora, are of the neuter gender, and so do not agree with animi, in form ; the concord, there- fore, is made out by things implied after these adjec- tives, and things means souls ; just as in varium et mutabile semper femina. He means, that if we allow the soul to be either harmony or Aristotle's^/*^ prin- ciple, it is still more remote from ponderous matter, than if we maintain it to be air or fire. — Nee . . . . ja- ceat, and not such a mind as vegetates in the heart or in the brain, or as lies merged, in the blood of Umpedoc- les, i. e. in the blood surrounding the heart, as Empedocles maintained ; see § 7. §15. (71) P. 33. Z. 8. Quorum alter ... sen ti at, the one of whom [Dicaearchus], who could not perceive that he had a soul, seems never to hoive been affected with grief. Alter etc. ; see the mention of these, §§8, 9. — Quorum varia .... plures, whose various composition [viz. of intervals of sounds] may also constitute a variety of harmonies. — Membrorum . . . non video. The mere placing of the limbs, and the form of the material body, destitute of a soul, ( [quod corpus] vacans animo), I see not hoio they can make OUt a HARMONY. Sed hie etc., i. e. Aristoxenus had better yield NOTES ON §§ 15, IG. 127 the point concerning the soul to Aristotle; and busy himself with teaching music rather than phi* losophy. — Praecipitur, is he admonished* — Quam pviaque norit etc. ; the originaJ Greek to which ■) refers, is in Aristophanes (Vesp. 1422): "JmSzi t/.' tjv fxaoroQ udslr) TB/vrp, — Quam tanicn. . . volnit, which [concourse], as Dcmocritus ivould 7, becomes warm and spirable, that is animate ; i. e. Dcmocritus supposes that warmth and breath- ing animation result from a fortuitous concourse of atoms. — Ex inflammata . . . constat, consists of ignited air. — Superiora . . . est, must necessarily tend towards the upper regions ; i. e. it must so do, be- cause of its rarified state. — Haec duo genera, viz. heat and air. — Hoc etiam, even on this account, viz. because they have the nature of heated air. — Ab his, i. e. warmth and air combined. — Aer, viz. the common atmosphere. — Ardentior, of a more igne- ous nature. — Ardore animi, with the glowing heat of the soul. §16. (72) P. 34. I. 19. Naturamque . . . agnovit, and attains to a native like its own, (i.e. to an element of the same nature), and discerns it. — Junctis . . . insistit, it takes its station among the f res, which are compounded of thin air and the tempered ardour of the sun. — Examinatus, weighed off,h(danced. — Et susten- tabitur etc. i. e. it is nourished by the pure ether and the genial warmth of the upper regions ; which also feed the stars. The planets, it will be recollected, were looked upon by Cicero and his cotempora- ries as animated beings, nourished by the warmth and etherial fluid of the upper regions. 128 NOTES ON § 16. (73) P. 34. L 30. Facibus, lit. torches, i. e. pas- sions, warm desires. — Aemulemur, we envy. — Quo faciliorem . . . dabunt, in proportion as that ivill af- ford a more easy knowledge of heavenly things, in the like measure will they impart to us stronger de- sires of knowing them. (74) P. 35. I. 13. Patriam . . . excitavit, roused up that ancient philosophy, (as Theophrastus says), kindled ivith the desire of knowledge. Patriam et avitam, belonging to sire and grand-sire, i. e. ancient. — Fruentur ea, i. e. ea cognitione. Ostium Ponti, the mouth of the [Black] Sea. — Ea, i. e. ea navis. Cicero adverts to the ship, in which Jason and his companions sailed, in order to obtain the golden fleece at Colchis, which lies at the east end of the Black Sea. — Europam, etc. ; Europe and Lybia are divided by the Mediterranean Sea. The Greek and Roman poets often called Africa by the name of Lybia ; a name usually given, in later times, only to one province of Africa, on the confines of Egypt ; while on the other hand, Africa was often used only to designate Carthage. Hence rapax unda refers to the waters in the straits of Gibraltar or Fretum Gaditanum, which flow with great vio- lence ; for so the preceding freta ilia leads us to conclude. What is meant, is, to describe a remote country ; and this was reputed to be at the west- ern extremity of the earth. Circumscriptionem, compass. — Nos enim etc., for now we do not discern with our [bodily] eyes, those things which we see. — Ullus sensus, any sensa- tion, perception. — Viae quasi, etc. ; he means to describe the conformation of the external senses, which are a kind of inlet or road to the internal NOTES ON §§ 16, 17. 129 ones. — Itaque etc., when buried in thought, or pre- vented by the power of disease, we neither see nor hear, although our eyes and ears are open and in a healthy condition; a remarkable fact, which shews, that what recent philosophy names attention, is neces- sary, in order that the mind should perceive ; and that perception does not belong to the bodily or- gans alone. This whole subject, (and a deeply interesting one 1 deem it to be), is finely developed by Dr Abercrombie, in his recent excellent work on the Intellectual Powers. — Quibus . . . adsit, by which, however, the mind cannot perceive any thing, unless it is itself present and performs the work. — Quinque nuntiis, i. e. the five senses. Cum quo . . . pervenerit, when the mind, set at liberty, shall have come thither where its nature tends. — Intersepta, hindered, obstructed. — Quale quidque sit, what every thing is. §17. (75) P. 36. I. 25. Quamvis copiose etc., how copi- ously could we descant on these matters, etc. — Tnsolen- tiam, the strange conduct, viz of the Epicureans, to whom he here adverts. — Naturae . . . admirantur, who wonder at- the knowledge of nature, which Epi- curus displayed. — Inventori et principi, i. e. to Ep- icurus as inventor, etc., of such advanced knowl- edge. — Ut Deum ; so Lucretius calls him, once and again, Lib. V. 8. — Terrore etc., i. e. from all fear of the future. Acherusia templa, the Acherusian temples, means, the infernal palaces or temples of Pluto, which stands for the domains of Pluto, i. e. Hades. Ache- rusia is an adjective formed from the noun Ache- 130 NOTES ON § 17. rusia, which is the name of a lake near the mouth of the river Acheron, a sluggish stream, with an unhealthy country around it. In consequence of this, Homer, by a somewhat natural figure, repre- sented the river and lake as communicating with Hades. Popular superstition and poetic [tv&og confirmed and perpetuated this fiction. The river Acheron, thus made the subject of fable, is on the north-east part of ancient Greece, and flows into the Ionian Sea near the promontory of Chimerium, in Thesprotia, a province of the ancient Epirus, and a part of modern Albania. The adjective Acherusia means the same as belonging to Acheron (i. e. to heli), because of the connexion between the river Acheron and the lake Acherusia. Befeides the Achetton here mentioned, there was another river of the same name in Campania, on the west side of Italy, flowing into the sea between Misenum and Cumae ; also a lake Acherusia in Egypt, near Memphis, over which the bodies of the dead were conveyed, in order that sentence might be passed on them according to the life which they had lived. The poetic fiction of Ho- mer, however, seems to have arisen from the Ma- laria which surrounded the Grecian river Acheron, in its course through the lake Acherusia. (76) P. 37. I 6. Alta Orci, the depths of Hell— Palatia etc. ; so I read with Nobbe. I do not see how the usual reading : Orci pallida . . . ohnubila tenebris, etc. can agree together. — Ex quo etc. ; i. e. if the Epicureans must be first taught by their divine master (as they call him), before they can disbelieve these things ; then we can see what great geniuses they must have been. Of course, NOTES ON §§ 17, 18. (31 this is said ironically. — Adepti sunt, i. e. i J l their own view they bave made some ihmous attain- ments, etc, — Quod ut ita sit, which, although it may be so, or which, granting it to be so, etc. — Ui enim, for although. — Frangeret, he would make me yield, subiiiir me, — Wile . . . videatur, he seems desirous ofptrsua iingothers, certainly to have persuaded him- sdf. § 18. (77) P. 37. /. 2*2. Animosque . . . mulctant, and thus inflict the punishment of death upon souls, as if were condemned to capital punishment. — His, viz. to these persons who so think concerning the soul. — Vacans corpore, when destitute of a body. — Quasi vero etc., just as if they could understand ivhat [the soul] is, when in the body, ivhat Us shape, its magnitude, its place ; an observation replete with good sense, by way of reply to the skeptics in ques- tion ; who surely were no better acquainted with any of these things, than they were with the con- dition of the soul after it leaves the body. — Ut, si . . . aciern, so that, in case every thing in a living man which is now concealed, could be subjected to in- spection, [they could understand] whether the soul would become visible, or whether its tenuity is so great as to escape our sight. For vivo (according to Bentley and Rath), the editions in general read uno ; to no tolerable purpose. — Haec reputant isti, these considerations let those weigh well. (78) P. 33. I. 5. Quails . . . sit, what the soul in the body can be. — Tamquara doini, as in a strange home, i. e. in a home which is not congenial to its proper nature. Domi in the Gen. ; for, in the sense 132 NOTES ON § 19. which here belongs to it, this is the common con- struction ; it is even doubtful whether it has a Nom. case, in this sense. — Q,uam qualis, thorn [the ques- tion], what etc. — Domum here in the Ace, because it means to its home. In answer to the question, zchither ? domum is employed. — Nisi enim . . . pos- sum us, for unless we are destitute of ability to under- stand what that is, which we have never seen, surely etc. After complecti, most editions insert non; which disturbs the sense. It is omitted by Rath, and a number of manuscripts. — Est illud . . . vi- dere, this indeed is the greatest thing of all, that the mind should he able to contemplate itself — Et nimi- rum . . . Apollinis, and in fact the direction given by Apollo [yvco&v osavTov] has the same force. — Cor- pora, mere physical bodies. — Non esset . . , sit, this precept would not belong to a mind of shrewdness so superior, that it would be attributed to a god. — Hoc est . . . cognoscere, probably a gloss from the mar- gin, and marked as suspicious in all the editions before me. §19. Having finished his remarks on the metaphysical nature of the soul, and the place where it is finally to dwell, Cicero returns to his main object, viz. to shew that the soul is eternal. This, he says, must be allowed, when we consider the fact that it is self- moved ; for that which is so, must have its original principles within itself, and can be affected by nothing extraneous. ^ Conse- quently, as such is plainly the case with the soul, it must be inde- structible and eternal, having neither origin nor end. The soul ia conscious of the fact, in respect to its being self-moved. On this third argument of Cicero, to prove the immortal- ity of the soul, (which seems to be a favourite one with Plato and with him), T shall make some strictures in the Appendix. For the present I would say merely, that it seems partly to be petitio prin- cipii, and partly to prove too much. NOTES ON § 19. 133 )) P. 38. /. 30. Ne esse . . , sciet, can it [the soul] knoir that it does not exist f Ne . . . se ? Thai it is ?iof moved . } — Ratio, mode of reasoning, ratiod- nation. — Phaedro. i. e. the Phacdrus of Plato. — Quod autem . . . aliunde, what communicates mo- tion, or ichat receives it from an external cause. — Vivendi rincm etc., stews that the quod, at the be- ginning of the sentence, relates to an animated being. — Hie fons, i. e. this self-moving being is the source, etc. — Siquidcm, since. — Ut motus . . . mo- vetur, that motion is an original principle, inasmuch as it is self-moved, i. e. self- created or originated. — Id autem, i. e. id principium. (80) P. 39. /. 19. Vel concidat moveatur, should even edl heaven and earth rush together, it [the mass] must necessarily stand still, nor could it acquire any force, impelled by which it could be moved; i. e. so flu* as these consist of inert matter, they are wholly destitute of this self-moving power. — Motu . . . suo, its own interior [self-moving] power. — Quae . . . moveat, which [moves of itself], if there be any one of all [the objects of nature] that always moves of itself . — Neque . . . est, nor is it born, sure- ly ; it is eternal. — Plebeii, of the lower sort. — Una, at the same time, or at once. — Nisi . . . haec, unless you have some objections to make to these things. § 20. The internal powers and attributes of the soul shew it to be partaker of a divine nature. If one could explain how such attri- butes originated, ho might then explain how they could perish. Or if the mere principle of animal life were all that is to be accounted for, then we might explain this, by comparing it with the principle of life in the vine or in a tree. Or if animal appetency alone were to be accounted for, then we might compare it with that of brutes. 7 134 NOTES ON §20. But it has qualities very different from all these. It has a memory, or a power of recollecting, which is houndless. Question a child in such a manner as to elicit his powers; and he will shew that ho has in himself the elements of all knowledge. These must be in- nate, belonging to the nature of the soul, and depending on the knowledge which it acquired in a pre-existent state. Its connection with the body would, in itself, never render it able to exhibit such powers. Nay, for a time this connection actually hinders the de- velopment of those powers. To learn, then, is nothing more than to recollect. Simonides, Theodectes, Cyneas, Charmadas, and others, have shewn to what a prodigious extent the powers of memory may go ; and so they have displayed the lofty attributes of the soul. (81) P. 40. I. 15. Videor posse dicere, I seem to he able to tell. Animum ipsum, [as to] the mind it- self. Tam . . . arboris, J should suppose the life of man to be supported by nature, as well as [the life] qf a vine, or of a tree. (82) P. 40. I. 23. Habet primum, [but] it [viz. the soul] has, first of all, etc. — Inscribituiyw entitled. — Pusionem, a little boy. — Eodem . . . didicisset, he comes to the same conclusions, as he would if he had studied geometry. — Sed . . . recognoscere, but recog- nizes them by recollection. — A pueris, from childhood. — Cumque nihil esset, and since it would be noth- ing ; i. e. provided it had not a previous existence, it would be nothing,' as the sequel shews. — Non potuit .... agnoscere ; the soul, pent up in the body, could discern none of these things, i. e. if it had not enjoyed a prior existence. — Cognita attulit, it [the soul] adduces things already known, i. e. [ergo] cognita attulit, viz. when it calls up its ivvolag. (83) P. 41. 1 19. Cum tam etc. , i. e. when it first comes to dwell in the body, its unwonted and confused habitation. — Sed cum etc. , i. e. after a while, when it becomes wonted to its place of abode, then it begins the process of recollection, etc. NOTES ON §20. 135 These things arc ingeniously said, in order to ac- count for it, how children, in very early years, manifest so little knowledge. Whether the alle- gations will abide the test of philosophical scrutiny, is another question. (84) P. 41. 1.27. Simonicles, a celebrated poet of ( tog, who flourished about 538 B. C. He com- I elegies, dramas, and epic poems. He is re- ported to have added the letters ??, co, J, ip, to the Greek alphabet. He was famed, as it seems, for his memory. (85) P. 41. I 28. Thodectes (flor. c. 340 B. C), a Greek orator and poet, of Phaselis in Pamphyha, and a disciple of Isocrates. He was greatly re- nowned for an extraordinary memory. (8l>) P. 41. /. 30. Cyneas, of Epirus, (flor. c. 280 B. C), the prime minister, and ambassador to the Romans, of Pyrrhus the famous king of Epirus. (87) P. 41. I. 30. Charmadas, I do not find particularly described. Metrodorus, here named, a friend of Mithridates king of Pontus, and sent by him as an ambassador to Tigranes king of Arme- nia. He died about 72 B. C. He was distin- guished for learning, and for his moral virtues. (88) P. 41. I. 32. Hortensius, a famous Roman orator, who left the stage of action not long after Cicero came upon it ; who took the place of Hor- tensius. The latter died B. C. 50. §21. Do such powers then belong to the brain, blood, heart ; to atoms, or earthly substance? Or lias the soul capacity, like a vessel, which holds all these things that it treasures up ? Or is it like wax, capable of receiving impressions .' Would a power, derived 136 NOTES ON §21. in this way, be adequate to investigate hidden matters ; to in* vent names for things ; to bring men into civil society ; to invent literature ; to note the courses and stations of the planets and stars; to invent agriculture and the arts of life, to cultivate the more refined arts as matters of taste and improvement l The mind that can do all this, is like the mind of him who formed the heav- ens and the earth ; for such things cannot be done, except by those who bear his likeness. (89) P. 42. I 4. Ilia vis, i. e. that power of memory. — Amma. . . nescio, whether the soul is air or fire, I know not. — Nee me . . « nesciam, nor do I blush, like those [philosophers], to confess my igno- rance, when 1 am ignorant. — Capacitatem, power vf containing or holding. — Fundus, the ground, the ori- ginal substratum. (90) P. 43. 1.5. Institiones, stationary positions, standing still. — Omnes magni, L e. all who have done such things, are great.— Nam et etc, , the na- ture of sounds being discovered, and their variety well joined together, great delight is afforded to the ear, viz. by music. (91) P. 43. Z. 12. Et astra suspeximus, and we look up to the stars. — Non re . . . errantia, not wan- dering in reality, but merely in name. This refers to the astronomical views of the Platonists, viz. that the planets were guided by certain fixed and in- variable laws, in all their motions, although they were unable to tell what these laws were. Hence non re . . . errantia. — Is docuit . . . caelo, he teaches that his own mind is like that of him, who made those heavenly bodies, i. e. that man, is man in the im- age of God ; a truly noble sentiment, a gleam of the true doctrine of immortality ! — Nam cum etc. , when Archimedes reduced the movements of the moon, sun, and five planets to a circular one. — Ut . . . con- versio, so that one revolution would govern motions NOTES ON § 22. 137 very unlike in respect to slowness or siviflness. — Si Vm .fieri sine (Jed Don potest, if ... nothing can be done tv it h out divine aid. § 22. The higher flights of poetry and oratory, also, seem to require some divine efficiency. Philosophy, likewise, which teaches the worship of the gods and the rights of man, and modesty and mag- nanimity, and dispels darkness from our eyes as to the past and the future, in regard to things above or below — this must be a pow- er that is of a divine nature. I give no credit to the fable3 of the poets, concerning nectar, ambrosia, Ganymede, etc. |TV> live, to in- vent, to be wise, to remember, IS DIVINE ; and as the soul does this, it must be of a nature like to that of the gods. (92) P. 43. I. 25. Mihi vero etc., to me indeed it does not seem, that any of these more notable and il- lustrious achievements can be wanting in a kind of di- vine power ; so that I can scarcely imagine a poet to pour forth etc. The exact shape of the latter part of this, ill Latin, is thus : can be wanting in divine power, so that I can imagine etc. , i. e. can be so wanting in divine power, that I could even imagine a poet to be able to pour forth his sublime strains without such a power, etc." It is the shape only of the Latin sentence which makes any difficulty. The sense I have given in the first version. Haec nos etc. ; means that philosophy first taught religion to men. — Juventate, Hebe, i. e. youth, the goddess of youth. Mythology represents her as the daughter of Jupiter and Juno, and the cup-bearer to the gods ; also as blooming in per- petual youth. — Xec Homerum etc. ; i. e. he does not regard the mythological fables of the poets, as things worthy of credibility. — Ganymede is com- monly reckoned, in mythology, as the son of Dar- 138 CONTENTS OF §§22 24. danus ; but there are discrepancies of opinion on this point. Cicero here makes him the son of La- omedon. — Diviaa . . . nos, i.e. 'it would have been more becoming, to have exalted us to a likeness with the divinity, than to have lowered him to our standard ;' a truly noble sentiment, a spark of im- mortal fire ! — Aut anima, either air. — Ilia natura, sc. deus. — Primum haec . . . animorum, this belongs especially to the gods and to soids. §23. The soul is a simple substance ; not concrete or mixed, and there- fore terrene. It is not even humid, or atmospheric, or igneous; for none of these elements can think, understand, or remember. It has a power peculiar to itself, and distinguished from all others, which must necessarily be divine, and therefore eternal. For of the di- vinity itself we predicate a mind free from all mortal composition, omniscient, and endowed with an eternal self-moving power. Like to this is the soul of man. (93) P. 44. I. 28. Consolatione, i. e. his treatise entitled Consolatio, written soon after the death of his daughter Tullia, and which contained most of the sentiments exhibited in this Disputatio. — Fla- bile, airy, atmospherical. — Concretione, composition, or materiality. — Motu sempiterno, i. e, with the perpetual power of voluntary motion, self-moving, i. e. having spontaneity. §24. If you inquire now, where the mind dwells, and of what form it is ; my reply is, that it matters not. If we cannot answer these questions, still we do know that it possesses sagacity, memory, power of motion, and celerity. Compare our knowledge of God, with that of our own souls. When we see the splendour and beau- ty of the sky; the changes of days and seasons ; the measured rev olutions of the sun ; the waxing and waning of the moon ; the courses of the planets ; the sky adorned on all sides with stars , NOTES ON § 21. 139 the earth with its variety of climates, cold and hot, cultivated and uncultivated, barren and fruitful; the multitude of (locks and herds, for feeding anil clothing us, and assisting in our labours; man himself, contemplating the heavens and worshipping the gods ; and all the fields and seas ministering to his com fort— when ind numberless other like things, can wo doubt whether there is a Maker ami Goveruour of trie Universe 1 In like manner, when you seo memory, invention, celerity of motion, and all the beauty oi' virtue in man, you must acknowledge the di- vine efficiency of the mind. This passage reminds us forcibly of the statement made by Paul, in Rom. 1:20, viz. that "the invisible things of God, from the creation of the world, are seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead." What bet- ter commentary on this could be offered, than the passage in Cice- ro, the contents of which 1 have just stated. (94) P. 45. /. 22. Per te uti, to use with your liberty. — Ut se ipse videat, that it can see itself. — Non videt.. . suam, it does not see (ivhat is least of all) its own form, I take to be the language of the in- quirer or objector ; in answer to which is the se- quel. — Fortassc, it may be so. — Quamquam id quo- que, although [I might maintain] this also, viz. , that it does see itself. — Sed relinquamus, but let us pass this by. (95) P. 45. I. 32. Speciem . . . coeli, in the first place, let us look at the beauty and splendour of the sky. — Deinde . . . non possumus, then the great cel- erity of its revolution, so great that it exceeds our thoughts. — Commutationes .... quadripartitas, the changes of the seasons distributed into four. — Ad temperationem, to the appropriate condition — Qua- si .. . dies, designating the days as it were with cal- endar-marks. — Stellas, planets, as here used, i. e. Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn. — In medio mundi universi, in the midst of the whole uni- verse ; vide supra, p. 32.— -Sub axe . . . septem, placed under the axis towards the seven stars, i. e. placed in the northern hemisphere. The seven stars here named, are the septem Triones, as the Latins 140 NOTES ON § 24. called them, which make up the constellation of the Great Bear. The Triones appear to revolve around the axis of the north-star; but whether Cicero was acquainted with this fact, I do not know. Axe means here the north pole ; so that sub axe posita ad stellas septeni, is as much as to say, placed under that pole, which is in the direc- tion of the seven stars, i. e. of the Great Bear. If Ave suppose axe here to mean the extremity or northern part of the axis, just as north pole does in English, (a supposition which is altogether proba- ble), then all those, in the view of Cicero, lived under (sub) the axis, who lived in the northern hemisphere ; for the north pole was above them. Or if we suppose Cicero to have had the idea, that the north star marks the direction of the earth's axis, then all in the northern regions live under it (in a literal sense), as it passes over them. In ei- ther case, we get the generic idea here aimed at, viz., the northern [temperate] zone. — Oris, regions; i. e. the two temperate zones. — *Avil%&ova, the op- posite or corresponding land or country. 3 AvtI%&o)v, among the Greeks, literally meant an inhabitant of a corresponding and opposite zone; e. g. to those who live in the northern temperate zone, the inhabitants of the southern one are axlx&o- v$g. So Tatius (cap. XXX) : roug zartx didfisTgov iv ralg ofioioug '£wrcug oixovvrag, i. e. those who live opposite to each other in the like zones, viz. the two temperate ones. So Pomponius Mela (c. 1): " Re- liquae zonae [the temperate ones he now speaks of] paria agunt anni tempora, verum non pariter. An- tichthones alteram, nos alteram incolimus." In a like sense Antoeci (aviowoi,) is employ edi NOTES ON § 21. 141 by the ancients. But, although most of the en- lightened men among the Greeks and Romans held the earth to be round, yet as they had a knowledge of only a small part of its surfa< < being habitable, and had no proper idea of its true motion, they in general strenuously denied the pos- sibility of . Intipodes. Some few only admitted it. In theory* according to their views, it might be pos- sible ; i ji fact it was deemed altogether improba- ble. See Cellarius, Orbis Antiq. I. 7. Ceteras partes etc. , as to other regions unculti- vated, because etc. ; i. e. the two frigid zones and the torrid one are uninhabitable ; for such was the view of Cicero and his cotemporaries. — Pampinis, with tendrils. Convestirier, i. e. convestiri with the antique termination. — Tanti operis et muneris, of so great a work and exhibition. The public shows given by individuals, the Romans often called mu- nera. The term as here used, alludes to these. Hence Moderator, in reference to muneris. The whole paragraph is a protracted and composite sen- tence, although not difficult to be understood. The grammatical and rhetorical construction of it, how- ever, as to accuracy, it would not be easy to vindi- cate. But the sentiment is exceedingly fine and noble. Indeed, I know of nothing which equals it, in the whole extent of the heathen classics, when considered in a religious point of view. 7* 142 NOTES ON § 25. §25. It matters not at all, then, as to the place or form of the soul. It cannot be concrete, or made by a combination of different substan- ces, and so it is not divisible, dissoluble, or perishable. Socrates, persuaded of this, sought not to avert death. He be- lieved that there are two ways in which the soul may depart; the one for souls contaminated with vices and crimes, a devious path, which leads to seclusion from the assembly of the gods ; the other for the upright and pure, who, having imitated the gods in this life, are associated with them in the next. The good man, therefore, should anticipate death with joy. Nor can he doubt that such should be the case, unless, like those who look steadily at the sun and lose their sight, he shouid dim his mental vision by too long and steadily contemplating the glories of his own mind. But still, we should not so desire death, as prematurely to seek it and procure it for ourselves. (96) P. 47. I. 9. In quo etc., i, e. you will ask: In quo etc. — Alias, elsewhere, or at another time. — Ubi sit, wherever it may be ; i. e. whether in the head, or heart, etc. — Quae est etc., language of the inquirer. — Propria . . . sua, peculiar, I think, and belonging only to itself, — Sed fac etc., but suppose it to be either igneous, or airy, etc. — In . . . cogni- tione, in acquiring a knowledge of the soul, however, etc. — Quin, but that — Nee . . . igitur, consequently it cannot perish. — Liberam contumaciam, a noble dis- regard. (97) P. 48. I. 17. Ut cygni, that as swans, etc. — Qua providentes etc., by ivhich [power of divina- tion] they foresee what good results from death. — De- ficientem solem, the departing or setting sun.- — In- jussu . . . demigrare, that we should depart hence without his order. — Nae, surely. Ille vir sapiens, the man who is wise. — Nee . . . ruperit, nor will he break off those chains of the goal, i. e. he will not try to escape from death. — Ut ait idem, i. e, Socrates. — Commentatio mortis, is a reflecting upon death, i. e. continued meditation upon this subject. NOTES ON §2G. 143 § SA Let Dl loam, then, by frequently abstracting find separating (as it were) the mind from the body, to prepare for death. What is thi* ce, but a kind of dying ? If we accustom ourselves to thin, when we are loosed from the body, we shall ascend with easier and more rapid flight, as we shall not be encumbered by bodily chain*. Should this be oar happy lot, then is it c-isy to show, not only that death will be no evil, but that it will be the highest good. - P. 49. /. 14. A re familiari, from onr domes- tic affairs. — Hoc commentemur, let us meditate on these things. — Disjungamus . . . mori, and let us sep- arate ourselves [i. e. our souls] from our bodies, [viz. by drawing them away from the objects of sense, and employing them in reflection] ; that is, let us accustom ourselves to die. Death is the separation of soul and body. Now as the soul, when it is abstracted from attention to the bodily senses by reflection, is as it were separated from the body ; so Cicero here calls this habitude of mind, dying or death. What was imperfectly effected by reflection, j. e. the abstracting of the soul from the body, is, according to him, only completed by what is usu- ally called death; an ingenious thought, if not a solid one. (99) P. 49. /. 23. Hoc et etc., this, viz. this practice of meditating, and living as it were abstract- ed from the body. — Erit . . . simile, trill be like our living in the celestial regions ; i. e. it w r ill be a state in which the soul lives by itself. — Minus etc., i. e. the soul, disencumbered of corporeal propensities, will wing its way to the upper regions with more ease and speed ; as the next sentence shews. — Ut ii, qui etc. , refers to such as have been bound with chains in prison, for many years, and who, when first set at liberty, are unable to w r alk with any facility. — Quo, etc. when we shall have come 144 notes on §§ 26, 27. thither, i.e. into the celestial regions. — Vivemus, shall really and truly live, the word being emphatic here. — Haec vita, i. e. our present life on earth. — Si liberet, if circumstances permitted, or if it should he desired, (100) P. 50. I. 1. Nihil . . . relinquere, J wish for nothing more than to quit these present scenes, i. e. to die. — Veniet . . . properabis, the time will come and speedily too, [viz. when you will quit them], and [this], whether you delay or hasten it, — Ab eo, after abest is unusual in Cicero, and is here mark- ed as suspicious. — Ut verear . . . potius, that I sus- pect there cannot happen to man, not indeed any other evil, but no other good which is preferable, — Siqui- dem . . . sumus, since ive shall either become gods y or be associated with them. §27. But there are many objectors to the doctrine of the souPs immor- tality. Among these are the whole race of Epicureans and espe- cially my favourite Dicaearchus. The Stoics also allow us mere- ly a long life, like that of the crows. But as they allow the most difficult part of our problem, viz. that the soul can survive the body, it is not worth while to contend with them. More to our purpose is it, to consider the arguments of Panaetius, who, in other respects a zealous Platonist, differs from his master in regard to the soul, and strenuously denies its immortality on two grounds, viz., (1) The soul is procreated ; as is evident from the resemblance of children to their parents, both in body and in mind: and whatever is pro- created, is perishable. (2) The soul is affected with grief and dis- ease ; and whatever can be thus affected, is perishable. (101) P. 50. 1. 10. Adsunt enim, there are some, — Ego . . . posset, but I will never let you off, in this discussion, so that (uti) death can, with any shew of reason, appear to you as an evil. — Qui potes, how can you ? — Acerrime . . . disseruit, most strenuously, how- ever, has my favourite. Dicaearchas, descanted against NOTES ON §27. 145 this immortality. — Lesbian, Lesbian, i. e. belonging to the island of Lesbos, the capita] of which was Mytilene, \\ here the discourses of* Dicacarchus were delivered. — Stoici . . . cornicibus, the Stoics, moreo- ver concede to us an enjoyment [of life], like that Ufkich belongs to the crows, (102) P. 51. I. 1. Labamus, we stand in doubt. — Id, viz. the changing of our sentiment, or rather, doubting in regard to immortality. — Simus armati, let us be armed, i. e. prepared to repel such doubts. Num quid . . .dimittamus, is there any reason ivhy we should not dismiss our friends, the Stoics ? i.e. omit auy longer discussion of their sentiments. — Istos vero ; them surely [we may dismiss]. — Posse animum etc., viz. that the soul, when disengaged from the body, can continue to exist. — Utse, inasmuch as etc. (103) P. 51. I. 17. Panaetius, a philosopher of Rhodes, about 138 B. C. He taught philosophy in Rome; and Laelius and Scipio Africanus were among his pupils. He wrote a treatise on the duties of man. Lempriere calls him a Stoic philosopher ; Cicero here makes him a Platonist, one point on- ly excepted. (104) P. 51. I. 20. Homerum philosophorum, the Homer of philosophers, i. e. of such a rank among philosophers, as Homer was among poets. — Nasci . . . appareat, that souls are produced, [he main- tains], because a likeness in those who are procreated, shews this ; which [likeness] appears, indeed, in the temper of the mind, and not in their bodies only. — Nihil esse etc., viz. that there is nothing ivhich suffers pain etc. — Quod . . . interiturum, that which may be sick, may die t 146 NOTES ON § 28. §28. The answer to the above objections, is not difficult. (1) When we speak of the mind, we do not mean the seat of passions and de- sires and antipathies ; for these spring from the body. [So Plato ; who expressly distinguishes the rational soul from the animal one ; making the latter only to be the origin and seat of all such affec- tions.] (2) The similitude to parents, which appears in children, may be accounted for on the ground of animal or corporeal resem- blance only. For in the first place, the similitude is chiefly phys- ical. Secondly, what is not so, but apparently mental, has its origin in the manner in which the body affects the soul, and is owing entirely to this influence, which in various respects is great. We need not suppose, then, that similitude of mind arises from pro- creation. In fact, one might easily shew that ^the dissimilitude between parents and children, is even more strikingjthan the resem- blances ; e.g. this was the case with the nephew of Scipio Africa- nus, and the sons of many other famous men. (105) P. 51. I. 31. Sunt enim . . . dicatur, for they belong to a person who does not recognize, that ivhen one speaks respecting the eternal nature of souls, he speaks of the mind, ivhich is free etc. — Quas etc., which he [who defends the immortality of the soul], against whom these things are said, supposes to be removed and separated from the mind. — Jam similitudo, the similitude, now, [ahove spoken of] appears etc. — Et ipsi . . . sint, and as to souls themselves (Nom. independent), it is of great conse- quence in what body they are placed. — Multa enim . . . obtundant, for many things are derived from the body, which sharpen the powers of the mind ; and many, which blunt them. (106) P. 52. I. 11. Ingeniosos, men of genius, of distinguished talents. — Ut . . . feram, so that I, [who am not melancholy], must bear with it, to be called somewhat stupid. — Idque . . . constet, and as if the thing might be proved. — Quod si . . . similitudo, but if there is so much efficacy, in regard to cast of mind, in those things which spring from the body, (and these are the very things, whatever they are, which make notes on §§ 28, 29. 147 similitude), this likeness of the soul creates no neces- sity why it should be produced by birth. (107) J'. ,V2. /. 21. Quaererem .... ncpos, / should like to inquire of him, which of his progeni- tors, Uw son of Africanus* brother resembled. This brother of [Scipio] Africanus was named Paullus. Nothing special is known concerning him. — Facie . . . similis, in appearance, so like his father ; in his manner of life, [like] all prodigals. — Cujus etc., whom did the grand-son of Crassus, that wise, elo- quent, and distinguished man, resemble ? §29. Having now accomplished tht most important object of this dis- cussion, viz., that of establishing the immortality of the soul, let us return to the first question with which our discussion commenced, viz., Whether death is an evil ? On the supposition, that we have not established our point in regard to the soul's immortality, and granting, for the sake of discussion, that the soul perishes with the body; still, death is not an evil. On the ground now taken, there is 710 sensation after death. If you say, that dying is in itself an evil ; I reply, that this is momentary ; that it is often attended with little or no pain; and sometimes even with pleasure. Then again, if you say : It is a departure from good ; my answer would be, that it is a departure from evil. Indeed, one might well weep overliuman life; as Hegesias and others have shewn. Many, convinced of this, have voluntarily procured their own death. In my own case, de- prived a9 I am of domestic comfort and public employment and honour, would not death loug since have been a deliverance from evil I (108) P. 52. I 28. Hoc nunc etc., we have pro- posed, that when enough may have been said respect- ing the immotiality of the soul, [we should then consider] whether there is any evil in death, even in case the soul does not survive, Alte spectare, are looking upwards. — Mali . . . sententia, what evil does even such a sentiment bring upon us ? — Insimulat, accuses, viz. he accuses Democritus of asserting it. 148 NOTES ON §29. — Ut, although, or however. — Et falsum etc. , lit. J both think this to be false, and that it takes place, generally, etc.; where the first and second et answers to our in the first place, in the second place, etc. — Discessus ab etc. viz. departure, etc. — Quid ego etc., what, now, if I should mourn over the life of man ? I could do this truly, and of good right. — Etiam . . . miseriorem, also to make life itself more wretched, by mourning over it. (109) P. 53. 1. 33. Hegesias is called a Cyre- naican, because be was of the Cyrenian school of philosophy, i. e. the school established by Aristip- pus of Cyrene, about 392 B. C. Hegesias was the pupil of the younger Aristippus, son of the one just named. The character of his philosophy is described in the sequel. (110) P. 54. I. 3. Callimachus, a historian and satirical poet of Cyrene, who lived in the age of Ptolemy Philadelphus. — Lecto . . . libro, viz. Plato's Phaedo, on the immortality of the soul. — * Ano~ %aQTSQwv means, one destroying himself by inanition or starving. — Id facere, do the same thing, i. e. re- count the miseries of life. — Ille qui . . . putat, who thinks, that in general it is expedient for no one to continue in life. Etiamne . . . expedit, was not [death] desirable for us [me], who etc. — Certe . . . abstraxisset, death surely, if we had fallen before this, would have taken us from evils, not from enjoyments ; i. e. deprived of social and public enjoyments, as I have been, the evils of life, on the whole, have more than counterbalanced the good. NOTES ON § 30. 149 § 30. I and then a solitary instance occurs, liko that of MetelltM, in which \vc may say, that death is a departure from good. But how low ai Look at the examples of Priam, of Pom- pey ; and indeed noet examples arc of a similar nature. (Ill) P. 54. 1.16. Sitigitur . . . aeceperit, let there be, then, some one who has no evil to endure, who has received no wound from fortune. — Metellum etc., i.e. a numerous progeny honoured the peace- ful funeral rites of Metellus. — Hie si, i. e. Pria- mus. — Astante . . . laqueatis, while barbarian wealth continued, the carved and wainscoted walls. — The term barbarica we should hardly expect ; as the Trojans appear to have spoken the same language with the Greeks. Nevertheless Homer, Ovid, Lu- cian, and Euripides apply the epithet fia.Qjaoov to the Trojans; and this, because they were foreign- ers, and enemies to the combined body of the Greeks. — At certe . . . evenisset, but surely matters turned out better with him, i. e. better than is usual- ly suppossed or estimated. — Nee . . . canerentur, nor should those [words] be sung in such a doleful way, viz. , Haec etc. — Ista, i. e. ista fortuna ; see fort una above, in the first sentence of this section. — Tamen eventum etc. , a passage which has greatly troubled the critics. " Quid hoc est," says Ernesti, "nemo intelligat ; quis dicit eventum amit- tere ?" I construe it thus : If Priam had soon- er died, he would have escaped the occurences of life in general ; and even at this very time, he lost all sen- sation of evil. (112) P. 55. I. 8. Aegrotasset, hadbeen sick, but was now convalescent. — Coronati, viz. in token of joy. — Puteolani, the inhabitants of Puteoli. — Vulgo 150 NOTES ON §§30,31. ex oppidis, in crowds from the towns. — Ineptum etc., a foolish business, to be sure, and savouring somewhat of the manners of the Greeks ; yet [one which is deemed] fortunate. — Utrum igitur etc. , had he died even then, would he have been taken away, etc. ? — Non liberi defleti, his children would not have been mourned for. §31. Let us examine the accuracy of the language which is applied to the dead, i. e. to the dead, on the supposition that the soul does not survive the body. Many say, mortuos vitae commodis carere, that the dead are deprived of the blessings of life. But thi3 can be truly and correctly said, only of those who have sensation ', and therefore it is incorrectly applied to the present case. (113) P. 56. I. 3. Quia. . .vis, because this mean- ing is connected ivith it. — Liberis, i. e. caret liberis. — Valet . . . vivis, this will apply to the living.— Qui rmlli sunt, i. e. who, (according to the opinion above stated) are non-entities. — Confirm ato . . . re- linquatur, that being confirmed, from which {if our souls are mortal) we cannot doubt but that destruction in death will be so great, thai not the least ground of suspecting any sensation is left. — Hoc . . . fixo, this then being well established and fixed. — Ut sciatur, viz. that it may be known. — Nisi . . . verbi, unless ivhen it is employed as saying carere febri (to be free from fever), with a tropical sense of the word. — Quod est malum, which [being deprived of good] is an evil. — Non indiget, does not stand in need of it. (114) P. 56. I. 30. Sed in vivo etc., but in re- gard to a living man, it is intelligible to say, that he is deprived of a kingdom. — In te, in regard to you- Satis subtiliter, with any good degree of accuracy. — - NOTES ON §§31,32. 151 Potuisset in Tarquinio, it might [have been said] in respect to Tarquin, when etc. — Carere . . . est, for to he in want of (carere), has respect to a sentient §32. In accordance with my views concerning death, have nil the :mJ good men of ancient times acted, who put their lives in peril, or sacrificed thorn, for their country. If there he no exist- ence after death, then surely death was no evil to them. It mat- ters no more to as, what will take place centuries to come, than it does what took place centuries ago. (115) P. 57. I. 7. Quae, i. e. quae mors. — Ar- C5CM etc. , hindering that tyrant in his return, [viz. Tarquin the Proud], whom he had driven away. — Decius (Mus), a celebrated Roman Consul, who was slain in a battle with the Latins, 338 B. C. His son, Decius, fell in like manner, when fighting against the Gauls and Samnites, B. C. 296 ; Cice- ro says — decertans cum Etruscis. His grandson did the same, when fighting against Pyrrhus and the Tarentines, B. C. 280. (116) P. 57. /. 20. Cum vero, but since. — Quamquam . . . saepe, however, [I have already said] this quite too often. — Sed . . . mortis, hut [I have done so] because in this is the very ground of all the pusillanimity, zvhich arises from the fear of death. — Nee pluris . . . captain, nor is M. Camillus any more affected with the recent civil war, than lam affected until the capture of Rome, which took place while he was living:. L. Furius Camillus (B. C. 365) appears to be the person here designed ; for it was he that drove away the Gauls under Bren- nus, who had invested Rome, and conquered the country. Cicero calls him Marcus Camillus ; it would seem by mistake. 152 NOTES ON § 33. §33. But the brevity and uncertainty of life, and even the fact that we may be insensible after death, should not deter us from doing good to our friends and country, nor from love to virtue. If sleep, as some suppose, be an image of death; than is death an insensibility to evil. Why then should we deplore the time of our departure I Those who die in youth, suffer much less then those who die in advanced years. Priam wept oftener than Troilus. Old age takes away knowledge, which is the highest good of life ; and therefore it is not desirable. Even the longest life, is a mere nothing, compared with eternity. (117) P. 58. I. 12, Quo minus . .. consulat, that he should exert himself less, at all times, for the republic and for his friends. Quare lieet . . . consequatur, wherefore let it be that the mind is mortal, which deter- mines to strive for the attainment of eternal things ; not vnth a thirst for glory which you will never enjoy, but [with a thirst] of virtue, which glory necessarily follows, even when one does not desire it. — Alteri, i. e. mortui •; alteros, i. e. vivos. — Quam, i. e. quam mor- tem. — Ne sues . . . ipse, the very swine do not desire this ; not to speak of him or myself, i. e. of the quis quam just mentioned. Non modo ipse literally means, not he only, or not myself only and in the sense which I have given to it above, non modo is fre- quently employed by Cicero. (118) P. 58. LSI. Caria lies near the south- west extremity of Asia Minor. The fable is, that Endymion was loved by Diana, i. e. the moon or Luna, who paid him nightly visits, in order to kiss him while he was asleep. Some make his sleep to last a great number of years. The fable is mod- ified in a great variety of ways, among the ancients : and probably it had its origin in the fact that En- dymion, being a shepherd, cultivated astronomy, and spent much of his time in observing the moon ; notes on §§33, 34. 153 in doing which he would of course very frequent- ly fall asleep. — Nonduni . . . experrectus, has not, as I imagine, yd waked up ; i. e. lie sleeps the sleep of death. — Cum luna laboret, when the moon is in tj'ouble. 5 34. (119) P. 50. /. 8. Ante tempus mori, to die before one's time. — nulla praestituta die, no particular day [of giving it up] being fixed. — Quid est etc., why then should you complain, etc. ? — Ab hoc, i. e. from the child that perishes in the cradle. — Acerbius, more severely, sternly ; i. e. this is what such persons allege. — Hie etc. he too [i. e. puer parvus] was just hoping for great things, ivhich he was beginning to enjoy. — Aliquam . . . secus, that some part should be obtained rather than none ; why should it be otherwise in respect to life ? (120) P. 59. I. 22. Callimachus, see Note 110.— Multo saepius etc. Priam lived to a great age, and to endure many sorrows ; Troilus, his son, was slain by Achilles, in early life. — Nullis . . . jucundior, to none, if life should be still further prolonged, could it be more agreeable. — Prndentia, knowledge, science. — A tergo insequens, following on behind. — Nee opinantes, not at all expecting it. (121) Rata parte, /or his proportionate part. — The Hypanis was in Thrace (Roumelia), on the Euro- pean side, and is now called the Bog, and empties into the Borysthenes, and with it finally into the Euxine or Black Sea ; which last is the meaning of Pontus here, as indeed it commonly is. — Eo ma- gis, still more would such an insect die in decrepid old age, if the day w T ere solstitial, i.e. at the time of the summer solstice in J line, when the days are the longest. 154 NOTES ON § 35. §§ 35—37. Let us then despise all fears of death, and place our chief happi- ness in contempt of human things and in the love of virtue. Let us not anxiously place our hopes on visionary expectations of happi- ness in the present world. The example of Theramenes, so loftily despising death, fills me with delight. The plea of Socrates also, before his judges, is quite to my pur- pose. He maintained, that whether death is an end of all sensa- tion, or a migration to another place, it is a great good. In the first case, it puts an end to our multiplied evils and sufferings ; in the second, it brings us into the society of the illustrious dead, and extends the circle and the means of knowledge. Others of the like character I might mention; e. g. the Spartan who treated with disdain the condemning sentence of the Ephori ; the Lacedemonians at Thermopylae ; Theodorus ; the woman of Sparta. (122) P. 60. I. 20. Si ante . . . sumus, if death comes before we have obtained ivhat teas promised by the Chaldeans, i. e. the fortune tellers or soothsayers, who predicted much prosperity to us. — Pendemus animis, toe keep our minds in a state of suspense, — Quam iter etc., how pleasant must be that journey, which being finished, no care remains, etc. (123) P. 60. /. 28. Theramenes, an Athenian philosopher, of the age of Alcibiades, about 420 B. C. He was one of the thirty tyrants (so called) of Athens ; but he was opposed to the views of his colleagues. On this account he was accused by Critias, one of them who was exceedingly bitter against him ; and he was condemned to death by his inexorable judges, although Socrates interceded for him. — Non miserabiiiter, not in a manner that claims our pity. — Venenum . . . obduxisset, he had swallowed down the poison, with the greediness of one who is thirsty. — Ut id resonaret, that it made an echo, i. e. when striking the floor of the prison, upon which it was thrown. — Propino . . . Critiae, / drink health to the beautiful Critias. — Taeterrimus, most inimical. notes ox §§ 35, 3G. 155 (134) P. 61. /. (>. Extremo spiritu, wUh his last breath. — Cum . . . contineret, when he already held, in his bowels, death commencing. — El, i.e. to Critias. I 36. (125) P. 61. /. 13. Eodcm . . . Theramcnes, [condemned] by the same wickedness of the judges, as T'taremenes by the tyrants. — Minoem, i. e. ad Minoem. — lie anil Rhadamanthus were the sons of Jupiter by Europe, and were Cretans ; Aeacus was the son of Jupiter and Aegina, and king of the island Oenopia, to which he gave the name of his mother, .legina. — Triptolemus, the son of Ce- reus king of Attica, hy Neraea. He became a fa- vourite of Ceres ; taught men agriculture exten- sively ; and after his death was advanced to di- vine honours. Socrates here reckons him as a fourth judge in Hades. (1*25) P. 0*2. I. 10. Judicio iniquo circumventos, etc. Palamedes, son of Nauplius king of Euboea, by Clymene. It was he who detected the feign- ed madness of Ulysses ; feigned in order to avoid going to the Trojan war. Ulysses afterwards, at Troy, caused money to be buried in the tent of Palamedes ; forged a letter as from Priam to Pal- amedes, requesting the latter to betray the Grecian army, and stating that he had stipulated to do so for the sake of the money. In this way Palame- des came to be unjustly condemned and put to death, by the Grecian chiefs. He is said to have invented the letters &, £, /, qp, of the Greek alpha- bet. — Ajax, after Achilles' death, contested with Ulysses for the armour of the hero ; and judgment being unjustly rendered in favour of Ulyses, Ajax killed himself. 156 NOTES ON § 37. §37. (126) P. 62. I. 11. Tentarem etc., I should put to the test the knowledge etc. ; a thing in which Socrates, during his life-time, greatly delighted. — Summi regis, i. e. Agamemnon. — Ulysses is well known, in fable, for his skill and cunning. — Sysi- phus, see Note 22. (127) P. 62. I 28. Nae ego . . . malim, surely I should much prefer this state of mind, to the wealth of all those etc. — Etsi etc., however, as to his denying that any one besides the gods can know, he himself cbes know, viz. which is the best. — Suum illud, his own peculiarity. — Finis . . . potest, there can be no end, — Ephori, magistrates at Sparta, first created about 760 B. C, by Lycurgus, resembling the tribunes*, at Rome, i. e. supreme censors of all public pro- ceedings. — Sine versura, without lending or borrow- ing. — Ut, inasmuch as. (128) P. 63. I. 28. Leonidas, the brave king of Sparta, and leader of the three hundred Lace- demonians who fell at the battle of Thermopylae, only one of them escaping. — Vigebant ; from this word, back to quid, included in brackets, the text has been suspected by some, and condemned by Bentley and others. 1 do not perceive any solid ground for difficulty with it. — Fortes et duri, rigid and severe. — Theodorus of Cyrene, a teacher of Plato in geometry. — Ista .... purpuratis tuis, threaten those dreadful things to your effeminate courtiers, clothed in purple. — Humine . . . putrescat, whether he rots on the earth, or in the air. NOTES ON §38. 157 §38. (129) P. G4. /. 14. Cujus hoc dicto, viz. putres- cat. — In quo moritur, i. e. in the Phaedo of Plato, where his death is described. — Sicubi, i. e. si ali- cubi. — Durior, sterner. — Asperius, more roughly, — Sed . . . ponitote, but give me a staff ivith which I mcty go off. — Illi, [said] they. — Quid igitur, i. e. he replied : Quid etc. (130) P. 65. /. 8. Si quid ei accidesset, if any thing should befal him, i. e. in case he should die. — At ilia, i. e. she (Hecuba) who mourns over Hec- tor, in the play. — Passa aegerrime, / have suffered most wretchedly. — xiccius, the ancient Roman tragic poet, represents it better. — Et .... Achilles, and Achilles sometimes considerate. — Pressis . . .modis, in well-adjusted and mournful modulations. — Ne com- bustis, non extimescit, he fears not lest his burned [members should be abused]. — Siris for siveris, you will [not] let. — Cum . . . tibiara, when he pours forth such fine heptameter verses, at the modulation of the pipe. (131) P. 66, I. 11. Cum, when, or rather here, although. — Execratur, falls to uttering imprecations, — See the story of Thyestes and Atreus in Lem- priere. — Primum . . . Atreus, specially that Atreus may perish by shipwreck. §39. I am aware that burial and the corruption of the body, are shud- dered at by the multitude. But in respect to these things, mine are the sentiments and feelings of Socrates, Diogenes, and Anaxagoras. The plays are full of errors and lamentations, on these subjects; but without any good ground. How can a dead body be sensible of anj sufferings I 8 158 notes on §§39,40. (132) P. 67. I. 3. Magorum, of the magi.—Ryr- cania, in middle Asia, bordering on the Caspian Sea. — Optimates, domesticos, the nobles [feed] private domestic ones. — Cum suis . . . potest, when declining life is able to console itself ivith its own praises. — Ne- mo . . . munere, no one was ever short lived, who fully performed the duties of perfect virtue. — Parum diu, not a very long time ; which, with nemo, makes the sense above given. — Multa . . . fuerunt, many sea- sons, opportune seasons, for my death have occurred. — Quam . . . obire, which I could ivish I had under- gone. — Nihil . . „ vitae, for now nothing was to be gained ; the duties of life were accumulating. (133) P. 67. I. 32. Tamen . . . sequitur, yet it follows virtue, as a shadow [follows a substance]. — Verum . . . beati, but the judgment of the multitude concerning the good, is to be praised, rather than [ihat we can say] these are happy on this account, viz. on account of being praised. §40. The glory of the illustrious dead can never be taken away. Le4 us not suppose, then, that to die is to lose this good. (134) P. 68. I. 4. Ante enim etc, for sooner will the sea overflow Salamis itself etc. — Salaminii tropaei refers to the trophy of the great naval vic- tory at Salamis, gained by the Greek fleet over that of Xerxes; in which the Persian fleet was nearly ruined, and the whole plans of Xerxes frustrated. — Boeotia Leuctra was famous for the victory there achieved by Epaminondas, the celebrated Theban general, over the army of Cleombrotus king of Sparta, B. C. 371 ; in which 4000 Spartans, NOTES ON § 40. 159 with their king, wore kitted. This hattle took from the Spartans the power of ruling over Greece. (136) P. 68. /. 17. vScundis.. ; mori, Ml pros- perity, also, let him be ivilling to die. — Non enim . . . -si<>, /or the (((cumulation of good things cannot be so agreeable, as the giving of them up will be troublesome. — Laeonis (Gen.), of a Lacedemonian. — Olvmpioniees nobilis, a noble victor in the Olym- pian games. — Accessit ad senem, i. e. ad Diago- ram. — Non . . . es, for you cannot ascend to heaven, i. e. without dying ; and nothing else is now want- ing that you should go there. So, in substance, Ernesti. But I do not see the point of the dis- course in this w r ay. I understand it thus : Die, for you can expect nothing beyond this. Heaven, however, will be no ascent for you ; i. e. you are already higher than it can make you. Quod in . . . maxime, because that in dist?°ess and trials, this is the greatest of consolations. §41. The immortal gods have added their testimony, that death is a good, and no evil. So the cases of Cleobis and Biton, of Trophoni- us an I Agamedes, of Midas and Silenus and Terinaeus, shew. Consider, too, the examples of Codrus, Menocaeus, etc.; to all of whom death appeared glorious. (13(3) P. 69. I. 23. Nee vero . . . ipsi, nor are they [the teachers] wont to feign these things, but etc. — Primuni etc. , in the first place , Cleobis and Biton, so?is of the Grecian priestess are mentioned. — Satis. . .jumenta, a long way from the town to Die temple, and the beasts [which drew her] stopped. — Precata . . . dicitur, is said to have asked of the god~ dess. — Pietate, their filial respect. — Judicavisse etc., 160 NOTES ON § 41. they say that the god did so decide ; and even that god, to whom the other gods concede that he can di- vine beyond the rest. (138) P. 70. I. 16. Silenus, according to fable, was the nurse and preceptor of Bacchus. Midas was a king of Phrygia, who shewed him great hospitality. — Missione, dismission, liberation. — Nam nos etc. , for it becomes us assembling together, to mourn over the house, etc. (132) P. 70. I. 28. Elisium, of Elis— Psycho- mantium, the place of necromancy, i. e. for consult- ing the Manes of the dead. — Euthynous, the name of the son who was mourned for. — Rebus . . . ju- dicatam, decided by things from the immortal gods. (139) P. 71. 1. 10. Repetunt ab Erechtheo, they derive an example from Erechtheus. This person was, according to tradition, the sixth king of Athens, and died about 1347 B. C. He was the father of Cecrops 2nd ; and in a war against Eleu- sis, he sacrificed his daughter Othyania (or Chtho- nia), to obtain a victory which was promised by an oracle, on such a condition. Cicero, in using the plural (filiae) here, seems to imply that more than one of his children were devoted to death ; and this, by a voluntary act on their part, cupide mo?*- tem expetiverunt. (140) P. 71. I. 12. Coclrum, i. e. [they appeal to] Codrus etc. Codrus was the 17th king of Athens, and died about 1070 B. C. When the Heraclidae attacked Athens, and an oracle declared that the party should be victorious whose king was killed in battle, they gave strict orders to their troops to spare the life of Codrus. But he put on the dis- guise of a common soldier, and then, attacking the NOTES ON §41. 1G1 tommy, he was slain, and Athens became victori- ous. (141) P. 71. /. 16. Menoeceua, a son of Creon king of Thebes, who, when the prophet Tiresias ordered the Thelmns to sacrifice one of those who Sprang from the dragon's teeth, (see the article Cadmus in Lempriere), in order that they might obtain the victory over the Argive forces, came forward, and voluntarily devoted himself to death; and thus the victory was ensured. (142) P. 71. /. 18. The story of Iphigenia, the daughter of Agamemnon is well known. The Greek fleet, on their way to Troy, were detained by contrary winds at Aid is, in the straits of Euri- pus ; and on consulting the oracles, they were told that the sacrifice of Iphigenia was necessary, in or- der that they might have a favourable voyage. This accordingly took place, as some say ; and so Cicero here seems to consider it. But see Iphi- geuia in Lempriere. (143) P. 71. I. 20. Harmodius . . . et Aristogiton, two intimate friends, at Athens, who delivered their countrymen from the tyranny of the Pisistratidae, B. C. 510. They received the honours of immor- tality from the Athenians, and had statues erected to their memory. — Leonidas, see Note 128. — Ep- amiuondas of Thebes is too well known to need description. (144) P. 71. Z. 22. Nostros non norunt, our countrymen they are not acquainted with; i. e. they, the Greek philosophers, who appeal to such exam- ples as I have mentioned, are not acquainted with our countrymen. 162 NOTES ON §42. §42. These things being true, we ought to use every effort to persuade men the rather to wish for death ; certainly not to fear it. Let us regard the day of our departure as a joyful day; for we are not made by chance, but the gods who consult the welfare of the human race, have made us; and this, not that we may endure la- bours and sufferings, and then come to a state of eternal wretched- ness. Let us believe that there is a refuge prepared for us, where we may be eternally happy. (145) P. 71. I. 25. Quae cum ita sint, magna tamen etc., which things although they are thus, yet much eloquence must be employed, etc. — Ita conni- ventem, thus closing our eyes. — Mel i or . . . oratio, the saying of Ennius is better than that of Solon. — Noster, i. e. Ennius, who was a Roman poet. — Sapiens ille, i. e. Solon. — Velis passis, with sails wide spread; passis from pando. Habes epilogum, you have the epilogue, i. e. the concluding part of my discourse. — Optime, in- quam ; for the best reason, I should say. — Quot dies, so long as. — Tusculanum means, a country house of Cicero, in the vicinity of Tusculum. This latter place was about 12 miles from Rome ; and is reported to have been founded by Telego- nus, a son of Ulysses and Circe. It is now called Frescati ; and is famous for the magnificent vil- las in its neighborhood, APPENDIX. § 1. Immateriality of the soul. In order rightly to judge of the weight which should be allowed to the arguments of Cicero in favour of the immortality of the soul, it will be in a measure necessary, in the first place, to consider the real state of this subject, as it is now presented before the public in Christian lands. If by due consideration we can find ground which is solid and tenable, we may then proceed to the examina- tion of Cicero's arguments, applying to them the tests which have previously been established. In this way, and in this only, can we learn to put a just estimate upon the nature and importance of the arguments which the Roman philosopher employ- ed, or upon those which are usually employed at the present time, in order to establish the immor- tality of the soul. Every human being, in the appropriate use of his faculties, is conscious of what he calls internal and mental operations. He forms ideas or notions of things, he thinks, he reasons, he remembers, he compares, he judges, he desires, he fears, etc. ; and of all these and the like actions and emotions, he is perfectly conscious. He can no more doubt the reality of these mental actions and emotions, than he can doubt whether he exists. Indeed, they are themselves the certain, and (to him) in- 164 IMMATERIALITY dubitable evidences, that he does exist. A con- sciousness of them, is consciousness both of exist- ence and of mental action. Most men are agreed in calling these phenome- na mental action or mental development ; i. e. they trace every thing of this nature to a cause or be- ing, which they name mind. If the doing of this be not a simple dictate of the first, spontaneous, and elementary principles of our nature, (and I am inclined to believe it is), still it is something which results almost of course from even a very limited acquaintance with external things, i. e. with the material world. We are in part composed of an element which we call matter. We are every where surrounded by this same element. To this, in consequence of the senses which are given us, and as a result of ex- amination, we assign the qualities of solidity, exten- sion, ponderosity, disvisibility, colour, figure, etc. These qualities enter essentially into our idea of matter ; and without them matter, in the proper sense of this word, cannot be supposed to exist. The qualities which we assign to matter, are of such a kind, that we are unable to perceive any necessary connection between them, and thinking, willing, reasoning, judging, etc. A great portion of the matter which we daily see, is plainly desti- tute even of sensation ; and a fortiori it must be destitute of thought and reason and spontaneity. But the matter of which our bodies are compos- ed, is matter placed in a peculiar state; it is high- ly and most skilfully organized. If matter, i. e. brute and common matter, such as we see in most of the terrestrial objects around us, cannot think OF THE SOIL. 165 and reason and will ; yet may not matter, organ- ized with more than human skill, be susceptible of thinking and reasoning and willing? A deeply interesting question ; and one that leads ro the very gist of our subject. In answer to it, I would remark, (1) That all organized bod- ies are not capable of thought and volition and spontaneous motion ; at least, we have not the slightest evidence that such is the case ; since many of them do not exhibit any of the phenomena which accompany developments of this nature. For example ; trees and vegetables, i.e. every ob- ject which exhibits merely what we call vegeta- ble life, afford not the slightest evidence of any thing like thought, volition, or reason. (2) When we ascend one gradation higher, and come to a class of beings that exhibit animal but not rational life, it is natural to inquire, whether this be merely the result of the structure or pe- culiar organization of matter. And here we are at a loss. Our sources of evidence are inadequate. What secret properties may be in matter, which do not develope themselves unless in consequence of a peculiar organization, but which may and will develope themselves when such an organization takes place, is more than we can possibly tell. It lies beyond the boundaries of our present knowl- edge. We must either have a consciousness of the living power of the brute animal, or must witness some external phenomena that would develope this power, in order to settle the question respecting it on the real ground of knowledge. As matters now are, and since we can have no access to either of those sources of knowledge, all we can do is, to 8* 1 66 IMMATERIALITY judge of probabilities on the ground of analogy. And here, too, we are encompassed with no small difficulty. Has a brute most analogy with vegeta- ble organized matter, or with human beings ? If a brute has thoughts, desires, fears, pleasures, pains, and even consciousness ; if, in a low degree, it may be said to reason, i. e. to deduce certain conclusions from certain premises, and so is wide- ly distinguished from the vegetable world ; still it is not capable of indefinite improvement in knowl- edge and reasoning ; it has no moral sense ; it is limited, and forever and irresistibly limited, to a very narrow circle, in all its susceptibilities, emotions, and powers of improvement ; while man, so far as can be known from his present nature, is suscepti- ble, in almost every respect, of improvement that is unlimited and endless. A difference heaven- wide, like this, between man and brute, seems to bring the latter nearer to the vegetable than to the rational creation. But we dismiss this subject, because, as I have already said, it is beyond the boundary of human knowledge. Let us come, (3) To man. Here we have a source of knowledge, which is out of our power when we strive to become acquainted with the nature and properties of the brutes. We are not only conscious that we think and will and rea- son and remember, but we do spontaneously feel, while we are conscious of these and the like things, that they are not properties or results of matter. We assign to them as a cause, that living intelligent, rational principle or essence, which we call mind or soul. And this is so universally and spontaneously done, that I hesitate not to number OF THE SOUL. 1G7 it, as Dr. Abererombie in his recent and admirable work on the intellectual Powers has done, among the tirst or elementary and intuitive principle! of knowledge; and consequently I must regard the fact in question, as one incapable of demonstration by a pr o oeftS of reasoning, No elementary truth is capable of demonstration. It has higher evidence in its favour. It is the spontaneous dictate of the very nature of our minds ; and unless they are so formed as to mislead and deceive us, this dictate must be truth. J cannot help feeling a conviction, that the ac- tions of our minds can never be traced to the mere organization of matter ; and this conviction is of the like tenor as the conviction, that the apparent ex- ternal objects of nature around us have a real ex- istence. We cannot prove this last fact. No less a philosopher than Berkeley, undertook to prove the contrary. But after all, it is a universal law of our nature, which determines that the real existence of external objects is matter of fact. Every body believes it ; always has believed it ; and always will. And so, a conviction that mind is not mat- ter, and vice versa, seems to be at least as widely extended among men, as thought and reason and moral consciousness are. So much for the truth itself of the immateriality of the soul. It is not a subject of direct demon- stration, because it is a truth that lies out of the boundaries of demonstration, and is of a higher and more satisfactory nature. The reader will observe here, that I speak now merely of the immateriality of the soul, and not of its immortality. These two things, sometimes 1 68 IMMATERIALITY confounded, (as indeed they are by both Cicero and Plato), may be perfectly distinct, and immeas- ureably diverse. We should therefore consider them separately from each other. (4) But although I have supposed the immate- riality of the soul to be a first principle of our knowledge, and therefore to rank higher than demonstrative truth ; yet J am by no means satis- fied, that on the score of reasoning we may not be compelled, as it were, to concede the immateriality of the soul. If I ask the question : Whether the phenomena of mind proceed from the same cause as the phenomena of matter ? I am constrained, in order to make out an answer, to take into consid- eration a number of particulars, which seem to render the affirmative of this question quite im- probable. (a) The developments of matter and mind are exceedingly different. Thinking, willing, reason- ing, etc. , it must be admitted, are very diverse from solidity, extension, gravity, divisibility, etc. These last properties are the developments of mat- ter. They are essential to our notion of it. These are effects of some cause, or at least quali- ties of some substance, which, appropriately to its own nature, makes such developments. (b) All our knowledge of matter comes through the medium of the senses ; all our knowledge of mind comes only by consciousness. The sources of knowledge, then, are exceedingly diverse, in the respective cases under consideration. It is very natural now to ask : Must not the sources of mental and material phenomena be dif- ferent, when the phenomena themselves are so OF THE SOUL. 1G9 widely different, and when our means of becom- ing acquainted with them are so very diverse? I Bee not li«>\v we can well avoid the conclusion, that the causes of each set of phenomena, must be different in themselves. (c) Divisibility is an invariable quality of matter, in all irs modifications of which we have, or can at present have, any conception. But how am 1 to divide thought, will, consciousness? If you say, that these are only phenomena of the mind, and not the mind itself; and that some of the phenom- ena of matter are equally indivisible, e. g. solidity ; my reply is, that of all the acts of the mind divisi- bility is an impossible predicate. You may increase or diminish the intensify of thought or affection. Other changes the nature of these things does not admit. But we can divide a solid piece of matter ; we can separate its form, i. e. divide it into several forms of the like kind, or of different kinds, etc. And although quality, in the abstract, cannot be divided, the matter which possesses it may be modified, so that this quality, as belonging to it, may receive changes of a nature very different from that of greater or less intensity. The phe- omena of matter in this respect, therefore, are very different from those of mind ; and conse^ quently, as we may infer with probability, they proceed from a different cause. (d) All our sensations are dependent on extern nal causes for their origin or continuance. For example ; we could not see without light, let our physical organs of vision, or our minds, be in ever so perfect a state. IVe could not hear with- out a vibration of the atmosphere, or of some other 170 IMMATERIALITY body which is capable of percussion. And when we had once seen and heard, we should cease to do so, provided these external causes were never more to influence us. On the other hand ; what the mind has once received, it can continue, by the aid of memory, ever to use and appropriate. It recals ; reflects ; makes new combinations of its own thoughts; and produces new results. It can, when once furnish- ed with a store of ideas, so combine and arrange them, as to invent or imagine new ideas, such as correspond to no actual existences. In this state, if all the external universe were shut out from it, or absolutely annihilated, it could, for aught we can see, go on with these mental processes unem- barrassed, or at least without being obliged to cease from them. Can that be material, then, which is so indepen- dent of matter, in a multitude of its operations ? (e) On the supposition that the soul is material, how can we account for consciousness of identity, or memory of the past ? Nothing is more certain, than that every part of our material bodies, all their organic structures, are changing, and chang- ing every hour and moment, from the cradle to the grave. All the organic matter in my bodily frame has been completely shifted, a great many times, since my physical being commenced. One and all of the physiologists agree in the absolute cer- tainty of this. How then can identity have been transmitted ? If I am matter merely, or skilfully organized matter merely, and this is all that I am ; then it is certain that there never has been any two moments in my whole life, in which personal OF THE SOUL. 171 identity could with truth be asserted; for there never has been any two moments, in which entire material identity existed. How, moreover, can a consciousness of such an identity he transmitted, provided we are wholly material ? In the first place, it would be a con- sciousness of what is not true ; and how can this be allowed ? And secondly. I see not how to ac- count for it, that with the full knowledge, that no material particle now in me is what once belonged to me, I yet can, in no way possible, resist the con- viction, that I am the very same being that I was forty years ago. Shall we resort to the old atomic philosophy and say, that the movements of our atomic particles are all intelligent ; and that while some of the worn out particles of our bodies are moving off by means of the blood, and others com- ing in by the same medium, the former communi- cate to the new comers a consciousness that they are the same as the old residents ? This would be to make the atoms of Democritus" a pseudologous race ; of which character that philosopher never suspected them to be. We come by a kind of necessity to the conclu- sion, then, that a nature different from a material one exists within us ; one wiiich remains unchanged as to its essential or constitutional being, through all the different stages of our existence, and svhich, by the aid of consciousness and memory, spontane- ously decides upon its own identity. The fact it- self, that it does so decide, is known to every human being, and needs no proof; and this decision is plainly to be classed among the elementary or intuitive principles of the knowledge of our ow r n nature. 1 72 IMMATERIALITY For these reasons, now, we may justly regard it as highly probable, that our minds cannot be the result of any organized combination of matter. But after all, I apprehend that the full persuasion of this truth, as I before said, is one of the intuitive principles to which our very nature leads us. How- ever, we may justly, perhaps, regard the thing itself as the more certain, if other considerations, as above stated, all combine to render it probable. Thus far, then, we seem to have found our way clear ; the soul is not material. But this proposi- tion, it will be remembered, is merely negative. We have not said what the soul is ; but what it is not What I have said goes to shew, that thinking, willing, reasoning, and other mental phenomena, proceed from a cause different from matter, how- ever ingeniously or skilfully this may be organized. Even this was felt by some ancient philosophers, who lived in the depth of heathen night. Aris- toxenus represented the soul as a species of har- mony ; Xenocrates and Pythagoras ascribed a kind of numerosity (numerus) or melody to it; while Plato and Cicero are most clear and strenuous, on the point of its absolute immateriality. I may now venture to add, (5) That the certainty of the existence of the mind, is as great as we have, or can have, of any fact or truth whatever. So say Stewart and Abercrombie ; men who are ex- ceedingly well qualified to judge of the force of ar- gument. The former adds, that "even the system of Berkeley, concerning the non-existence of matter, is far more conceivable, than that nothing but mat- ter exists in the universe." Why must not this be true ? The man who thinks, and reasons, and OF THE SOUL. 1 73 wills, does by these very acts create the most per- fect and irresistible conviction of which ho is sus- ceptible, that his mind twists and acts. He lias a perfect conviction, that the matter of which his body is composed, and which is every moment changing, cannot love and hate, suffer and enjoy, hope and fear, reason and investigate, explore the heavens and measure the earth, as he does. He knows that when he loses an arm, or a leg, or both, and other parts also of his body, his men- tal powers may remain, and usually do remain, in undiminished vigour. How can he feel, then, that matter is his only self? He cannot. In the madness of sensual intoxication, he may affirm this. From the love of paradox, he may dispute in favour of it ; but to feel an abiding conviction that his. mind and body are one and the same substance, is what cannot well be imagined to be within the power of any rational being, who is in any tolerable degree enlightened. § 2. Immortality or endless duration of the mind or souL This is a question of higher moment and deeper interest to us, than any other, I had well nigh said, than all others, which can be raised. Of what great consequence can it be, that we can think and reason and will, that we can survey and measure the heavens and the earth, and that all our mental powers are capable of indefinite im- provement, if, after a few days or years, the exis- tence of all these splendid attributes is to come to a final end ? To inanimate matter, and to the vegetable and brute creation, has a lot fallen, which 174 IMMORTALITY is enviable compared with our own, in case that death is the end of our being. All the inferior cre- ation suffer comparatively little, and hope for or expect nothing. We suffer much, and hope for every thing ; and if we must endure the one, and the light of the other be forever quenched, then is the lot of the inferior creation greatly prefera- ble to ours. Even the question, whether there is a God, al- though of deeper interest to the universe in gener- al, is one of less interest to us individually, than the question whether we are to live forever. For if there is a God, and yet death is the end of our being, of what consequence will it be to us, at last, who or what exists? It follows, therefore, that we have a deeper interest in the question con- cerning the perpetuity of our own being, than in any other. But how shall this be solved ? Can the proof, or the entire conviction, that the soul is immateri- al, i. e. that it is not matter, satisfy us that it is also immortal ? I am unable to see how this conse- quence necessarily follows. I am speaking now of investigation independently of the Scriptures. On this ground, I cannot see what hinders, that the origin of the being or action of our mental powers, may not be an invariable concomitant of the organization of our bodies ; for thus it appears to be : and so, it is like a multitude of other concomi- tant existences and powers in the kingdom of na- ture. And if our mental structure (sit venia verbo) first arose cotemporaneously with our bodily one, i.. e. when the latter was so joined together as to OF THE SOUL. 175 make a human frame, why may it not ceaso to ho an organized mental structure, when the body dies? I know of no process of reasoning, which can disprove this. The argument of Plato and Cicero, that because the mind is immaterial, it is there* lore immutable and immortal, I acknowledge is striking and specious ; and it has been adopted by a multitude of reasoners on the subject of the soul's immortality. But Plato and Cicero, who were both very sensible to the force of argument, having once reasoned in such a way on this point, felt themselves obliged to be consistent, and to go the whole length to which the argument would natur- ally carry them. If the soul is immutable and eternal in itself, said they, it must have existed from eternity a parte ante, as truly as it will exist in eternity a parte post Consequently (for so they concluded) all human souls must be absolutely exist- ent, i. e. they have always existed. Of course, as we must now see, the number of them, according to this, is incapable of increase or diminution. Trans- migration naturally comes along in the train of such ratiocination, in order to answer the question, where has the soul hitherto been? And this, Pla- to, with his teachers the Pythagoreans, fully em- braced ; Cicero, hesitatingly aud with apparent re> luctance, for he generally keeps it out of sight, I need not stop here to refute the doctrine of trans- migration, or the anterior existence of human souls ; although the latter is, at the present time, strenuous- ly affirmed by Beneke of Heidelburg, a living and recent commentator on the Epistle to the Romans. But allowing that souls came into being as souls, cotemporaneously with the organization of matter 176 IMMORTALITY into a human body ; what is there to prove that, as souls, i.e. as possessed of their present powers and attributes, they may not perish, or undergo an en- tire change at death, like to that which we see in the body ? I know of no direct proof of this, in- dependently of revelation, and in the way of ratio- cination. I do not see how we are to get at mate- rials, out of which we may construct an argument No one comes back from the invisible world to tell us what the soul is there ; so that we cannot de- rive any knowledge of this kind from direct testi- mony. And as to knowledge from experience ; we ourselves have never been in a state of death ; we have had no experience. Whence, then, is our proof to come ? A truly difficult question, independently of Scrip- ture and our moral sense. Yet some things may perhaps be said on this subject, which will serve to render it probable, that the substance which we call mind, does not perish by the death of the body. But we can reason on this point, only from anal- ogy ; because, as I have already hinted, the state of the soul after death is neither a matter of con- sciousness, nor of experiment, nor of observation, nor of testimony. Of course, I lay the Scriptures out of the question, for the present. How then stands the matter of analogy, according to the light of nature ? The body, when death occurs, loses its organized state ; and consequently the physical powers that were connected with, and dependent on, this state, are also destroyed. But in regard to the existence of the matter itself which composes the body, con- sidered simply as matter, this surely does not cease OF THE SOUL. 177 to exist after death. Every physiologist and chem- ist well knows, indeed, that matter may be end- lessly modified and diversified in its combinations; but he knows equally well, that there is not one particle more or less of matter now, than there was on the day that the creation was finished. Matter is indestructible by any power, save that which called it into being. By analogical reasoning, then, we must of course be led to say, that the substance or essence of tho mind or soul, whatever this may be, can never be at all affected in the way of annihilation, by the i Union of the body. We may easily believe, that the actions and affections, i. e. the phenomena of the soul as connected with the body, may be modified, in some degree, by the dissolution of the material organs of sense, through the medium of which the soul obtained all its sensitive ideas. But such a modification merely, not annihilation, is all which can in any degree be rendered probable, in the way of argument from analogy. In no other way can any argument be made to bear upon the subject. But does the substance mind, retain, after the death of the body, those powers which it exercised independently of the senses ? As the disorganization of the body has destroyed its active physical pow- ers ; and as the soul came into being cotemporane- ously with the organized body, and in connection with it began the development of its powers — may not this development cease, when the organized body is destroyed ? Nodus vindice dignus — who can solve it ? When we are told with the strongest confidence 178 IMMORTALITY by Plato and Cicero, and have been told by multi- tudes of others, that spontaneity of action in the soul necessarily proves the eternity of it, can we consistently receive this as sound and legitimate argument ? For myself, I must say that I cannot perceive why, so far as arguments of this nature can go, we may not as well render it probable, that souls may cease to act, or (so to express myself) be disorganized, as that they begin to act. The latter we fully believe, because we cannot adopt the theory of a pre-existent state, and a metempsycho- . sis. And the subject of possibility in the nature of things, as known to us without the light of revela- tion, being the only one which we now have in view ; who is able to produce any solid argument ill this way to shew, why the disorganization of the mind or soul may not take place simultaneously with physical dissolution ; or at least, why it may not speedily and certainly follow it ? How can spontaneity of action in the soul, (which Plato calls xlvrjvig, and Cicero motus), be a certain evidence of eternal existence ? Can it be shewn that God, or (if you will) Nature, can not form a human being with powers of spontaneous action ? When it can, then of course it must be proved, that the souls of men have never been formed at any period, but have existed from all eternity ; and consequently that neither God nor Nature is their Maker. This Plato does maintain, when he is urging the argu- ment for immortality; although he contradicts it elsewhere. And the like is implied in what Cicero says, although he seems fearful of the consequences that will result from pressing this argument. 1 see no way then in which, by the simple light OF THE SOUL. ( 179 itarc and ratiocination, ire ran prove the im- partiality of the soul. The two great sources of knowledge respecting a future state, eoaaeiouei Kperience, and testimony (independently of Revelation), are wholly wanting, or are at least inaccessible. Consequently the materiel for argu- ment, (if I may he allowed the expression), cannot be supplied; and therefore au argument cannot be constructed. The utmost, indeed, which can be done in this way, is to shew that the dissolution of the body cannot be supposed to annihilate the substance of the mind : since it does not at all annihilate the substance of even the body itself. But still we are obliged to admit, that the dissolution of the body must modify the actions and affections of the soul, in some degree ; because, when all our bodily or- gans are dissolved, one great inlet of ideas to the soul is dissolved. That class of mental phenom- ena which are strictly denominated sensations, must of course cease. But the purely mental phenomena — what of these ? They may cease, or may not ; who can assure us the one or the other ? It is indeed as clear as noon-day, that the most inveterate skeptic never can bring a single argument to prove that * phenomena do cease, when the body is dis- solved. This is utterly beyond his power. If there is any probability on this subject, it is in fa- vour of the other side of the question ; inasmuch as the purely mental phenomena seem to be very little connected with the body, and in a manner to be independent of it ; as we have seen under § 1 above. 180 IMMORTALITY Here then, as it seems to me, must unassisted reason, or rather, ratiocination, leave the subject. Demonstrative or argumentative power is not suf- ficient, of itself, to remove the obstacles which im- pede our vision into futurity; and the simple ground of this is, that demonstrative arguments cannot be constructed, for want of materials. How then did Socrates, Plato, Cicero, and many others of the most eminent heathen philosophers, persuade themselves that the soul is immortal ? I answer, that it was not, I apprehend, merely by the force of the arguments which they employed ; for on a critical examination of them, it will be found that few of these will abide the test ; but it was because a moral feeling or nature within them gave to their apparent arguments most, if not all, of their real weight. To this principle I must now advert, in order to complete what I have to say on the doctrine of the soul's immortality. My own apprehension relative to this great sub- ject, is, that the evidence which satisfies us of a future state, is derived from the moral constitution of our nature. It is like the feeling, that there is a right and a wrong in morals. This last sensa- tion brings along with it an apprehension of ac- countability ; and this connects itself with a fu- ture state. If you say, that multitudes of the hea- then have no clear views of this point ; this will prove nothing. The tendency of all the systems of heathen religion notoriously is, to support the notion of an existence in a future state. A future state, a reward for those who please the gods, and punishment for those who do not, seem to be interwoven, in some form or other, with the Of THE SOUL. 181 nature and essence of all religion. What is this but a development of thai very principle in our naiuiv, to which I have just been adverting? If I should affirm, that men are rational beings; and an opponent should reply, that multitudes act in a manner which gives Kittle or no evidence of their possessing reason ; should 1 be satisfied, even if I admitted this, that men are not rational beings? No; 1 might concede the full truth of his allega- tion, and reply merely, that men, being free agents, could and did abuse their reason, and pervert and extinguish it. And so in the case before us. Be it that multi- tudes of the heathen have little or no belief in a future state, or little or no knowledge of it; then we DMg sny of them, that they have perverted their moral nature ; they have extinguished the light which Heaven had kindled in their breasts ; just as the apostle charges them with having done, in respect to a knowledge of the eternal pow r er and godhead of the Creator. But perverted or ex- tinguished moral feelings can never prove that such feelings have no existence, i. e. no well grounded basis, in our moral nature. I caunot hope to do better justice to this part of my subject, than Dr. Abercrombie has already done, in his excellent book to which I have mor» than once referred. I must beg the liberty, there- fore, of making a quotation from him. This I shall do, merely remarking, that I know not how my own sentiments could be more exactly express- ed, than in his words. "Our speculations respecting the immateriality of the rational human soul have no influence on 9 182 IMMORTALITY our belief of its immortality. This momentous truth rests on a species of evidence altogether dif- ferent, which addresses itself to the moral consti- tution of man. It is found in those principles of his nature by which he feels upon his spirit the awe of a God, and looks forward to the future with anxiety or with hope ; by which he knows how to distinguish truth from falsehood and evil from good, and has forced upon him the conviction that he is a moral and responsible being. This is the power of conscience, that monitor within, which raises its voice in the breast of every man, a wit- ness for -his Creator. He who resigns himself to its guidance, and he who repels its warnings, are both compelled to acknowledge its power ; and, whether the good man rejoices in the prospect of immortality, or the victim of remorse withers be- neath an influence unseen by human eye, and shrinks from the anticipation of a reckoning to come, each has forced upon him a conviction, such as argument -never gave, that the being which is es- sentially himself is distinct from any function of the body, and v/ill survive in undiminished vigour when the body shall have fallen into decay. " When, indeed, we take into the inquiry the high principles of moral obligation, and the moral gov- ernment of the Deity, this important truth is en- tirely independent of all our feeble speculations on the essence of mind. For though we were to sup- pose, with the materialist, that the rational soul of man is a mere chemical combination, which, by the dissolution of its elements, is dissipated to the four winds of heaven, where is the improbability that the Power which framed the wondrous compound OF THE SOUL. 163 may collect these elements again, and combine them anew, for the greet purposes of his moral administration. In our speculations on such a momentous subject, we arc too apt to be influenced by our eoneeptions of the powers and properties of physical things; but there is a point where this principle must be abandoned, and where the sound- est philosophy requires that we take along with us a full recognizance of the power of God. "There is thus, in the consciousness of every man, a deep impression of continued existence. The casuist may reason against it, till he bewilder himself in his own sophistries ; but a voice within - the lie to his vain speculations, and pleads with authority for a life which is to come. The sincere and humble inquirer cherishes the impres- sion, while he seeks for further light on a subject so momentous ; and he thus receives, with absolute conviction, the truth which beams upon him from the revelation of God, — that the mysterious part of his being, which thinks, and wills, and reasons, shall indeed survive the wreck of its mortal tene- ment, and is destined for immortality." 1 have only to add, that a conviction of such a nature appears to be deeper, more uniform, more operative, than any which could possibly be pro- duced on untutored men by nicely refined argu- ments, or indeed by any arguments. God, by giv- ing us a constitutional feeling that there is a judg- ment to come, has implanted in our very souls a fundamental knowledge of the first great law of moral restraint, viz. that we are accountable for all our actions ; and what of the account is not adjusted here, we may naturally apprehend, will be adjusted 184 IMMORTALITY in a future state. The skeptic and the scoffer may as well destroy the very being of the soul, as de- stroy this apprehension. It will return, after it has been driven off. It will come back with aw- ful power, when they are upon a dying bed. It will cling to them forever and ever, in that world the existence of which they have denied, but which ere long will open upon them with all its dread realities. It will be acknowledged by all, that there are first truths of a purely intellectual nature ; and there are first truths of a moral nature. On these all processes of ratiocination, both intellectual and moral, are built. My view of the doctrine of the soul's immortality, as established by the light of nature, is, that it is one of those first truths, which are impressed on our moral constitution by its Maker. It was the feeling that springs from this, which gave weight and power to the arguments employed by Plato and Cicero, in order to estab- lish the doctrine of a future state. More time and more improvement in moral and religious philoso- phy were needed, before this could be fully de- veloped ; and so these philosophers have given us but an imperfect development of it. Still, we shall see in the sequel, that Cicero did not overlook so important a consideration ; although his develop- ment of it is in a way somewhat indirect. It is important to keep these remarks in view, when we come to examine the arguments which Cicero has adduced in favour of the soul's immor- tality. We shall be able, then, to account for it, that some of them appear to have had more weight in his mind, than we can well allow them to have, considered simply as arguments. OF THE SOUL. 185 We come now, In the coiicIikI'ii^ part of this dissertation, to advert to 'he Scriptures, as having tauirht im fully and explicitly the doctrine of a fu- ture state. This Lies 80 upon the i'aec of the whole New Tesfrmiant, that to prove it by quotations, would he quite superfluous. But plain and expli- eit and often repeated as the declarations of the Micred writers are, in regard to this subject, it is remarkable that they have no where once attempt- ed to establish the doctrine of the soul's immortal- ity by ratiocination or argument. They seem every where to take it for granted ; in other words, they do plainly regard it as one of the indisputable truths, which lie in the elements of our moral na- ture. If any one doubts or denies this statement, let him produce a single passage from sacred writ, which contains a demonstrative argument in favour of the soul's immortality. Paul asserts that the gospel has brought life and immortality, i. e. immortal life, to light. Is not this true ? Will it be said, that I have already admitted this truth to be one of the dictates of our moral "nature ? I have so. But this does not hinder a full recognition of the fact (which is equally plain), that men, by their evil passions and pursuits, have perverted and darkened this truth ; just as they have that, which respects the eternal power and godhead of the Creator.* It was reserved for the gospel to scatter the darkness which evil passions and sensuality had spread over the moral world. This it has fully done. The testimony that the l'< «pel is true, cannot be resisted by a candid mind ; and if so, then the credibility of all which it asserts respecting a future state, is established. And es- 186 IMMORTALITY pecially may we admit this, when it falls in with the current of our moral nature. Moreover, what the light of nature could not do effectually, the gospel has done. It has given au- thority and awful sanction to the doctrine of a future state ; such as never could exist without it. Who that duly considers this, will not look up to the great and glorious Author of the gospel, with unfeigned gratitude and thankfulness ? The mere child in Christian lands, now knows more fully, and believes with more assurance, that the soul is immortal, than Socrates, Plato, or Cicero did. Hear what Cicero makes his respondent say, in his first book of Tusculan Questions. The Roman philosopher had referred his Collocutor to the Phaedo of Plato, as containing arguments sufficient to establish the existence of the soul after the death of the body. The Collocutor replies : I know not how it is, hut so it is, that while I read, I give my assent ; but when I have laid aside the book, and be- gin to reflect upon the immortality of the soul by my- self, all my assent glides away. So, no doubt, it was with most of the minds of the heathen. They had variable, indistinct, unimpressive notions of a future state. They saw it by twilight. They looked to ratiocination to establish it; but they could find none which did not, at least sometimes, seem capable of being contradicted. Consequently their convictions were not, in general, of a solid and lasting nature. It is after all, then, "the glo- rious gospel of the blessed God," which "has brought life and immortality fully to light." OF THE SOUL. 187 §3. Examination of Cicero's arguments for the im- mortality of the soul. The way is now prepared for a review of Cice- ro's ratiocination. It will be necessary, in general, to make only a brief statement ; for I may now refer to what has already been said, as the test by which I should desire the weight of his arguments to be examined. 1. His first argument is, that the gods, both su- perior and inferior, were once human beings or men ; and as ail allow their present existence, they must of course allow the continued existence of the soul after death ; § 10. It is unnecessary to make any remark on this argument, except merely, that it could avail, of course, only as an argumentum ad hominem. Those who believed in the immortal existence of the gods, that once were men, could not reject the conclu- sion, that the soul exists after death. But while we may admit the ingenuity of this appeal, how can we help deploring that moral state, in such a man as Cicero, which could admit the idea of a plurality of gods ; and of gods, who in their origin were merely human ? 2. It is a law of our nature to believe in, or to anticipate, a future state; §§ 11, 12. Here the very essence of the evidence in regard to a future state, is in some measure developed by the Roman philosopher. But observe how much in the twilight he is, with respect to it. He illus- trates it by saying, that when we grieve for the dead, we grieve at their deprivation of the comforts of life ; and that when men engage in great and 188 cicero's arguments glorious undertakings, it is with reference to future fame, and implies some sensation of it after death. And this is all : not a word of the judgment to come; of accountability ; of heaven or hell. The gospel must needs throw light on these things, in order that they should be fully developed. But still, who does not feel himself delighted, that some sparks of immortal fire are here emitted ? The image of God within the human breast does here exhibit, although in a manner indistinctly, some of its true features. It is a lovely image, even in obscurity. 3. Self-motion, i. e. spontaneous action, is the third argument of Cicero, in favour of his position. The power of self-motion, he says, cannot be traced to any external cause. It exists in and of itself; and therefore it must have always existed, and will always exist ; § 19. But this proves a great deal too much. It proves, that souls were not created, but are self- existent and eternal ; a thing which, on other oc- casions, neither Cicero admits, nor Plato, from whom he has directly quoted the whole argument. It never can be shewn, that Cod cannot create a free-agent, i. e. a being which possesses spontaneity of action. 4. The powers of the soul, its native knowledge, its capacity for improvement, its memory, its faculty of invention and unlimited acquisition and investi- gation, shew that it is like the gods in its origin and nature. What it executes in art, poetry, ora- tory, philosophy, and the like, helps to confirm this same truth; §§20—22. It cannot be denied, that there is some weight EXAMINED. 189 in nil this. All nature discloses benevolent design, on the part of its Creator. For what purpose has the Divinity given such (walled powers to man? The beasts reach the highest point of which their limited nature is capable. Man only begins to de- velope himself, in the present world. Is he then the most imperfect of all created things, in regard to the full development of his powers? It is diffi- cult to believe this, and yet to maintain the doctrine of henevolent design. It would seem, that there must he another state of 'being, where this develop- ment can he more fully completed. 5. The soul is a simple, unmixed substance ; not concrete ; consequently it is not material, and not subject to dissolution; §23. But this is a petitio principii. The substance of the soul, it may be satisfactorily shewn, is not ma- terial. But to prove that it is simple and unmixed — how can this be done, unless we become experi- mentally acquainted with the nature and properties of spiritual substance or essence ? As this is im- possible, so such an acquaintance is out of question. And even if we could establish the position, that the soul is of simple element; how could we prove that a simple element may not undergo some change, analogous to the death or dissolution of the body ? It is manifest, therefore, that this whole argu- ment is a petitio principii. 6. From the works of creation and providence we argue the existence of the gods, as immortal beings ; from similar works, then, we may conclude that man, as to his nature, is like to them ; § 24, seq. There is something so attractive and delightful 9* 190 cicero's arguments in what Cicero says upon this point, that I cannot forbear asking the reader to turn to the passage and reperuse it. I know not, in the whole com- pass of heathen writings, a passage so noble on the subject of the Godhead, as the one which the Ro- man philosopher here exhibits. What an admira- ble proof of the correctness of that which Paul has alleged, in the sublime and beautiful passage in Rom. I. 19, 20! But after all, the argument, merely as argument, is liable to exception. That our works are like those of the Divinity, does indeed prove resem- blance. But how will our present resemblance, in this respect, prove that our existence will be eter- nal ? I see no certain ground to conclude, that a being, which is in some respects like the Divinity at present, may not exist, and yet this existence be temporary. The probability is, indeed, highly in favour of his continued existence ; as may be seen by adverting to the fourth argument above exhib- ited. But the certainty we can hardly think to be capable of adequate proof, by considerations of this nature. Such are the principal considerations urged by Cicero, in favour of our continued existence after the death of the body. It is a remarkable circum- stance, and a most deplorable one too, that through- out his whole dissertation, the Roman philosopher scarcely adverts to the distinction in a future state, between the righteous and the wicked. The apos- tle states such a belief as one of the first principles of religion, and as standing by the side of the great truth, that there is a God: "He that cometh to God, must believe that he is, and that he is the re- i MINED. 191 warder of those who diligently seek him." And who air the diligent seekers ? The righteous, surely. But what is to become of ihe wicked, then, i.e. those who do not seek him? The implication necessarily is, that they are to receive punishment. Indeed this must he regarded as one of the ele- mentary principles of all religion. Men may differ about the time, and manner, and measure of retri- bution to the wicked ; but the fact itself, none but atheists can consistently deny. Yet plain and important as the doctrine of retri- bution in a future state is, when the existence of the soul is once granted, Cicero does not appear to have directed many of his thoughts toward it. My impression from a frequent perusal of his whole treatise on the soul, is, that he took it for granted, that all men of a tolerably decent character will be happy in another world. Now T and then he adverts to the punishment of the wicked ; but he seems to mean, by them, only persons of a most profligate and debased character. Near the commencement of his dissertation, he holds the following conversation with his Collocu- tor : " M. Quid, si [animae] maneant ? A. Beatos esse, concede" And what Cicero makes his re- spondent here say, viz., that if the soul does survive the body, it will be happy, this author seems, in all parts of his treatise, to have taken for granted. One passage, however, shews, that when he thus speaks, he has such characters in view as have been, on the whole, what he deems to be virtuous. The passage to which I refer is in § 25. p. 48, seq. The substance of it is, ' that Socrates taught the doctrine, that there are two ways in which souls 192 go, when they depart from the body. Those " qui se humanis vitiis contaminavissent, et se totos libi- dinibus dedi dissent, quibus caecati ; vel domesticis vitiis atque flagitiis se inquinavissent ; vel repub- lica fraudes inexpiabiles concepissent ; to these there is a devious path to be trodden, and one which leads away from the council of the gods. But to those who had been upright and chaste ; to such as had contracted the least possible contagion from their bodies, and had always been prone to abstract as it were the soul from them ; to those who, during their physical life, had studiously imi- tated the gods ; to all such an easy return would be granted to that upper world from which they originally came.' To this sentiment of Socrates and Plato, the Roman philosopher seems to yield his entire ap- probation ; " nee vero de hoc quisquam dubitare potest." Yet all important as such a sentiment is, in the light of moral retribution ; and infinitely in- teresting as this retribution is to every individual ; it seems to have had but little practical influence or interest in the mind of Cicero. Once only, in his whole dissertation, has he distinctly brought it to view, as above stated. Every where else he seems to go upon the ground, that if we exist at all after death, we shall of course be happy. Yet I doubt not, that justice requires us to consider him as speaking, in all such cases, of those whom he deems to be reputable and virtuous. How immeasurably different ail this is from tho tenor of the gospel, must be evident even to the most superficial reader. There, a judgment to come ; a reward of every man according to the EXAMINED. 193 a done in the body ; a heaven and a hell ; are the all-absorbing, all-important topics. " Knowing the terrors of the Lord," the Christian preachers wciv lad M to persuade men." But the philosopher at. the bead of heathen Rome, scarcely makes any of these matters a subject of thought ; certainly not rious interest How true the exclamation of the Psalmist: "The entrance of thy word giveth light ; it giveth understanding to the simple !" And equally true, the asseveration of Paul : " The world by wisdom knew not God." Cicero, after the brief account of Socrates' views given above, quits the subject, without once ad- verting to the surprising, and (I think we may truly say) revolting, [ivfrog, which Socrates, or rather Plato, introduces near the close of the Phaedo, in order to shew the future condition of the soul. We can scarcely doubt, that Cicero considered the whole of it as a mere play of the imagination. There is one passage, however, in which he has disclosed to us what kind of a heaven for the soul he did suppose to exist ; and it is a deeply interesting matter to learn, how the mind of an enlightened and philosophizing heathen could and did think on such a subject. The sum of his views may be found in § 16, and is as follows : ' Whether we allow the soul to be fire, or air, or melody, or the fifth principle of Aris- totle, it is obvious that it is lighter and more buoy- ant than the moist atmosphere which surrounds the earth. On the death of the body, it must of course mount upwards, until it reaches the etherial regions, which are tempered like itself; and there, as in equilibrio, it stops, and dwells in the upper 194 sphere among the stars, and is nourished by the same etherial aliment which supports them.' Such is the provision for the future abode of the soul, and its continued existence; an evident ad- vance, and a great one, upon the fiv&og of Socrates and Plato, as exhibited in the Phaedo. But what are its state, its occupations, its enjoyments ? They may be summed up in two things; (1) Freedom from corporeal appetites and passions. (2) The boundless and endless pursuit and attainment of knowledge. The first of these considerations, in Cicero's mind, sprung, no doubt, from the moral principle which belongs to the soul, and which longs after something that will raise it above carnal and phys- ical appetites and pleasures. In this, we recognize an irradiation from the eternal light that beams above. The second consideration originated from the unquenchable thirst which Cicero felt, and every kindred soul must feel, for pursuing the acquisition of knowledge, through ages that have no end. "If the gods," said Lessing, '' should make me the offer of the actual knowledge of all things, I must decline the boon ; should they proffer me the eternal and successful pursuit of it, I would accept it with the highest gratitude." In this sen- timent we may discern the same feelings, which led Cicero to represent his heaven as consisting mainly in the pursuit of knowledge. The society of the great and virtuous he does indeed reckon as one ingredient in the cup of future blessedness ; but the enjoyment of even this, consists principally in receiving and communicating knowledge. How many a Christian face should be covered EXAMINED. 195 with Mushes, to see t heathen outstrip most persons in such noble desires! Paul could say : *Jf©W we know in pari . . . but then shall we sec and know, even as \vc arc seen and known." And the He- brew prophet could say: " Then shall we know, if we follow on to know the Lord." And while Paul and this prophet, and all others enlightened as they were, expected tbe joys of heaven to be some- thing more and higher than those which consist in the acquisition of knowledge ; yet they by no means underrate the pursuit of this. It was doubtless viewed by them, as it in fact is, as one of the means by which we approximate to a greater likeness with the omniscient Author of our being. To be freed from sin — all sin, either of thought, word, or deed — to be holy, to be like God, to love him, and serve him, and praise him, and thank him, forever and ever, is, after all, the most essen- tial part of the Christian's heaven. But here Cicero did not sympathize with the Christian. He had no knowledge, such as the Bible gives, of the only living and true God. The gods whom he wor- shipped, had once been men ; or if we may suppose him to have risen above this, in his speculations, (as he sometimes appears to do), still holiness as developed in the Scriptures, was not .an object of his contemplation. The gods w r ith whom he hoped to reside, were of a mixed, I might say of an atro- cious, character. Hence he does not once think of heaven, as a place where moral resemblance to them is the grand point of happiness. Truly, we may say once more : " Life and immortality are brought to light in the gospel !" We have now seen what kind of a heaven the 196 highest speculations of reason, without a Revela- tion, will form. It will scarcely be pretended, that Cicero is not as favourable an example of this na- ture, as can be selected from the whole heathen world. He has evidently improved upon the spec- ulations of Plato and Socrates. And after all, what is there in his Elysium, which will bear any comparison at all with the heaven which the Bible discloses ? We come next to the objections against the doc- trine of immortality, which Cicero discusses and answers. In §§ 13 — 18, he introduces and descants upon the objection, which is raised by asking the ques- tion : * How and where does the soul exist ? ' As to the place of its existence, what has already been said, discloses his views. In regard to the ques- tion, How do souls exist in a future state ? he says, very rightly, that this can serve the objector no good purpose ; for if the question be asked : How do souls exist in our present state, in union with the body ? it is just as difficult to answer this, as it would be to answer the objector's question ; nay even more so, inasmuch as the body is a kind of heterogeneous tenement for them, alien from their real nature. Then again, he suggests, we may just as well ask how the gods exist ; whom all do allow to exist. More to the purpose are the objections raised by Panaetius, §27, seq. These are, (1) The soul is procreated ; therefore it may be destroyed. The evidence that it is procreated, lies in the resem- blance of children to their parents. (2) The soul can be affected with grief and pain ; and that EXAMINED. 197 which can thus be affected, must be perishable in its nature. To the first of these objections he replies, that most of the similitude arises from mere physical conformity ; and even where there is a like dispo- sition of mind, it springs, in a great degree, from similar external circumstances and from physical similitude. Then again, there are multiplied cases of entire dissimilitude of disposition, between pa- rents and children, which would afford equal proof of the contrary proposition. The second objection he answers, by stating that all the passions of grief, vexation, fear, anger, etc., must be predicated merely of the body and the animal soul ; but not of the intellectual and rational soul, which is wholly free from all such emotions ; §28. On this we may remark, that it is clearly a pe- titio principii, borrowed from the speculations of Plato, respecting the transcendental and immuta- ble nature of the soul. That this cannot be estab- lished by argument or proved by a priori consid- erations, we have already seen. Such then is the treatise of Cicero, on the im- mortality of the soul. Such is the highest point, to which reason (unenlightened by revelation) did attain, in the heathen world. " The world by wis- dom knew not God ;" it is equally true, that they did not know themselves. The rest of Cicero's dissertation, from § 27 to the end, consists of various considerations, designed to shew that we ought not to fear death. ! It is effem- inate to cherish such fears ; the great and good have always despised it ; it is a deliverance from 198 cicero's arguments innumerable and intolerable evils ; it introduces us to the society of the great and good ; it frees us from fleshly passions and infirmities ; it is a small, thing in itself, and has been rendered terrible only by the exaggerations of the poets ; and finally, if it is the extinction of being, it is no evil, because it delivers us from all suffering ; if it be not an ex- tinction, it must be a great good.' Such are the considerations, by which one of the greatest men who ever adorned the heathen world, labours to cheer himself and his friends, when looking forward to the hour of dissolution. Are they props on which we can lean ? Are most of them any thing more than the result of a Sto- icism, which appears in a higher measure still, among the Aborigines of our western wilds ? God be thanked, that the Christian, while walking through the dark valley of the shadow of death, has a rod and a staff to lean upon, which will hold him up in a very different manner! Who can bring the example of a moral triumph in a dying hour, on the part of a heathen ? The death of Socrates comes the nearest to it, of any thing I have ever read or heard. Yet this falls immeasur- ably short of such a triumph as the humblest Christian may enjoy. All the darkness of the heathen system seems to be concentrated about the dying bed of a heathen ; while all the glories of the upper world are opened upon the dying Christian. One question more remains of deep and affect- ing interest. To what height of assurance or con- fidence, did the hope of a heathen that he should exist and be forever happy beyond the grave, ever arise ? EXAMINED. 199 Interesting as this question is, the manner in which Cicero philosophizes, makes it difficult to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, in respect to his real subjective conviction. The Athenian schools of philosophy, as is well known, became, in several of their branches, quite inclined to skepticism. The Epicureans and Acatalepties, in particular, were of this character ; and generally, the later Platonists were inclined to admit only subjective certainty, as the result of inquiry and argument, without undertaking to decide that any thing was objectively certain. This skeptical position of mind they honoured with the names of modesty and diffi- dence ; and they held that any thing aside from this, savoured of dogmatism and arrogance, and was unworthy the name and office of a philosopher. Cicero takes great pains to confine himself, as to the general tone of his discussions, within the boundaries w T hich the later Platonists had pre- served to themselves ; and which, indeed, Socrates himself seems to have not unfrequently commend- ed by his example. Thus, near the commence- ment of his discussion (in § 1), Cicero, in reply to his Collocutor, who requests him to shew that death is not an evil, says : " I will unfold this mat- ter, according to the best of my ability ; yet not like the Pythian Apollo, so that what I may utter, will be certain and established ; but like a man of small capacity, one of the multitude, seeking out by conjecture the things that are probable." This we might well put merely to the score of modesty, and regard the writer as designing simply not to raise great expectation in the reader, provided the passage were the only one of its kind. But this is not the case, 200 In § 4, after recounting various opinions respect- ing the sou], he says: "Which of all these opin- ions is the true one, let some god determine ; which is the most probable, is a great question." So then probability was all he expected to arrive at, by his inquiries. Understood in one way, this might in- deed be all that we need to ask for, on the ground of satisfactory assurance; but construed in another and philosophic way, it would seem to amount merely to a subjective conviction or balance of the mind, on the whole, in favour of the doctrine that the soul is immortal. That Cicero alternated between the first and sec- ond of these states of mind, is altogether probable. In § 9, he makes his Collocutor request him to prove, that the soul survives the death of the body. Cicero replies, that Plato has already done this in such a way as admits of no improvement. The respondent then says (as before quoted), that 'he knows not how it is ; yet such is the fact, that whenever he is reading Plato [the Phaedo], he gives his assent ; but when he lays it aside, and begins to meditate on the immortality of the soul, the arguments seem to glide away from him.' Was not this Cicero's own case ? And does he not make known to us a very common state of his own mind, in developing that of his Collocutor? I cannot doubt that such is the fact. In the midst of the perpetual hurry and confusion of business, in which Cicero was nearly all his life engaged, he could think but very little of Plato's Phaedo, or of any other arguments of the like nature. But when he was exiled from the forum and the Senate, and dared not mingle with the distinguished citizens of ^iiM'i). 201 the capital, in order to enjoy their Bociety, then he turned inwards upon himself, and began seriously to consider what he was, and whither he was go- ing. The result of tins consideration he lias set be f ore us, in the delightful treatise which has giv- en occasion b marks. Once more, let iia see how the fashion of the times wrought upon his mind, in regard to the expression of his convictions. In § 36, he gives us a long extract from the speech of Socrates to the judges, who had condemned him to death. In this speech Soeral that 'whether death be the end of our being, or not, it is deliverance from great evil, and altogether desirable.' After giving such a turn to his discourse as to show, that his predominant belief was in a continued existence, the Athenian philosopher subjoins: "But it is time for me to go hence, in order that I may die ; for you, that you may live : yet which of these is best, the immortal gods know, but no man can well de- cide." "Nothing," says Cicero, "in his whole speech, is better than this." This same writer afterwards subjoins, however, a hint in what man- ner we are to understand declarations of this na- ture, by such men as Socrates and Cicero. " As t to what he [Socrates] says," adds Cicero, "viz. that no one besides the gods knows which would be best, this same thing he himself does know ; for he had already affirmed it. Nevertheless he abides by his own maxim even to the last, which was, to make no categorical assertions." Such, I would hope, was the case wkh Cicero ; in particular, during the latter part of his life. My meaning is, that I would hope his belief was more 202 cicero's arguments firm and abiding, than his expressions at times would seem to indicate. The noble passage at the close of the present treatise, would seem to develope a state of mind like to that which he ascribes to Socrates ; although, like this philosopher, he is careful to avoid all categorical assertions. The passage is in § 42, and runs thus : We did not come into being without some purpose ; we did not spring from chance ; but there was some Power, who exer~ cised an oversight respecting the human race, JVor would such a Poiver bring that into being, or continue to support it, ivhich, when it had endured so many labours, should sink down in everlasting death. No ; THERE IS SOME HAVEN OF REST, SOME ASYLUM PREPARED FOR US. It is delightful to think, that there were times, when the mind of Cicero could rise to such an ap- parent degree of assurance as this. That such was really the fact, would seem probable, from his occa- sional declarations in regard to the sufficiency and strength of the argument to prove the immateriality and immortality of the soul ; for he united these indissolubly together. In §25 he says: "Whether the soul is igneous, or aerial, matters nothing as to the object now in view. At present you must I simply consider, that as you know the existence of I a God to be certain, although you are ignorant ofl his dwelling-place and of his appearance ; so thef existence of your own soul ought to be considered! as a matter of certainty, although you know nothingl of its dwelling-place or its form." He then goesl on to say, that "unless we are absolutely leaden in I physics, we must acknowledge that there is in thel soul nothing mixed, concrete, copulate, augmented,! EXAMINED. 203 or duplicate ; and consequently, that the soul can neither he separated, divided, cut in pieces, nor torn asunder; and therefore it cannot perish." It matters not, whether the argument will ahide the test of philosophy at the present day. Plain- ly it will not; as there can he no proof a pri- ori, that a simple substance may not he temporary, as well as a compound one ; nor can we prove in the way ot* ratiocination simply, that the soul may not die as well as the bod}', although in entirely a different way. Enough that Cicero expresses himself without any doubt, in regard to the point in question. A man must be, in his estimation, absolutely a leaden-headed fellow (plumbeus), to believe that the soul is otherwise than immaterial and imperishable. So in § 19 ; after producing the argument of Plato respecting the spontaneous motion of the soul, as establishing its eternity, he says, that 'al- though all the plebeian philosophers, (for so he may call all those who differ from Socrates and Plato), should join together, they could never produce any thing so elegaut and so acute as this.' Hence he concludes, that 'as the mind is self-moved, it is never deserted by itself. Hence too, it follows that it is eternal.' Once more ; in § 24, after that most noble pas- sage which argues, from the works of creation and providence, the existence of a Creator and Govern- or of all things, Cicero subjoins: "So the soul of man, although you do not see it, (and in like man- ner you do not see God), yet, as you acknowledge the being of a God, from the consideration of his works, so you should acknowledge the divine en- 204 ergy of the soul, from its memory, invention, celer- ity of motion, and every kind of virtue adorned with beauty." After considering these and the like passages, in Cicero's works, we cannot doubt, that in the hour of cool reflection and sober argument, he had an overwhelming conviction of the reality of a future existence ; although in his sportive or skeptical hours he might act, and probably did act, the part which he assigns to his Collocutor. That he ex- presses "himself occasionally in a manner somewhat partaking of cryJipig, may, on the whole, be fairly put to the same account, as that to which he as- signs the seemingly skeptical expressions of So- crates. See now, as a confirmation of this, the manner in which he expresses himself, when, looking away from philosophical argument, his mind was filled with other views and other sympathies. In his Cato Major or De Senectute, where he endeavours to defend old age against the objections made to it, he labours, near the close of the treatise* to shew that the certain nearness of death is no valid objec- tion. His reason is, that death is no evil ; for the soul is immortal, and will survive the body, and be happy. When speaking of the various powers and capacities of the soul, he says, in the conclu- sion : " It is not possible that what contains such divine powers, should be mortal." After recapitu- lating, very briefly, a great part of the arguments used in the first book of the Tusculan Questions, in favour of the immortality of the soul, he thus exclaims in view of a future state: "O praeclarum diem, cum ad illud divinum animorum concilium EXAMINED. 205 coetumque proficiacar, cumque ex hae turba et col- luviooe discedam ! Proficiscar, cnini, non ad eos solum viros, de quibus ante dixi ; set etiam ad Ca- tonam meum,quo nemo vir melior natus est, nemo pietate praestantior." He moans, that he shall, after death, be with ( Jato Major, whose body he had burned, but whose soul was gone to the world of spirits. This Cato, whom Cicero so highly valued, lived to a very old age : retained the full vigour of his faculties, so as udy Greek at the age of eighty; and was a remarkable example of cheerfulness and happiness, in the decline of life. On this account, Cicero gives his treatise on old age the title of Caio Major. Thus we see, that " God has not left himself without witness." Even among the heathen, he has enstamped his own image upon our nature. But while we cheerfully and gratefully recognize this truth, it is equally plain, on the other hand, that perverse as men are, and estranged from God, this image has been distinctly discerned by very few, who were not enlightened by revelation. Even those who have seen it most clearly, have not been able to free themselves from doubts and fears. It must be so. More light is needed, to afford an overwhelming conviction to minds darkened like ours. Simple, unperverted, unadulterated reason, might be well satisfied that the soul is immortal ; but where is such reason to be found among the heathen ? A revelation, therefore, was needed, in order to confirm and impress this great truth. We rise, then, from the perusal of Cicero's au- reus libellus, with gratitude to God, that he has so made human minds, as to emit, in every condition, 10 206 some sparks of the celestial fire of which they are composed. We thank him that the heathen were prompted to look upwards, and to long and sigh after immortality. But our souls should overflow with still higher gratitude, so often as we call to mind that the path of happiness is now made plain ; that light from heaven is beaming with full radiance upon it; that life and immortality are erought TO LIGHT IN THE GOSPEL. rr B -I L,l Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide Treatment Date: August 2006 PreservationTechnologies A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive Cranberry Township, PA 16066 (724)779-2111