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 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. 
 
RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS 
 
 AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS, CONDUCTED BY WAY OF 
 QUESTION AND ANSWER 
 
 FOR USE IN CLASSES OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 
 
 BY X 
 
 WILLIAM POLAND 
 
 Professor of Rational Philosophy in St. Louis University 
 
 SILVER, BURDETT & CO., PUBLISHERS 
 Ni.w York BOSTON Ch» 
 
 [894 
 
^ 
 
 xo-* 
 
 s*v 
 
 Copyright, 1894, 
 By SILVER, BURDETT & COMPANY. 
 
 Novtoooti 39rr33 : 
 
 J. S. Cushing & Co. — Berwick & Smith. 
 
 Boston, Mass., U.S.A. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 The following pages contain a condensed treatise on the 
 general philosophy of morals. The character of the work is 
 fully indicated in the title " Fundamental Ethics." 
 
 An endeavor has been made, throughout, i. To give short, 
 clear definitions of all essential terms ; 
 
 2. To force into prominence the groundwork and princi- 
 ples of practical ethical science ; 
 
 3. To illustrate the abstract principles, when necessary, 
 by examples from which their practical application in other 
 cases may be readily inferred ; 
 
 4. To concentrate attention upon the fact that there are 
 fixed principles of conduct. 
 
 In the method employed, that of question and answer, 
 the convenience, if not the need, of beginners has been con- 
 sulted. Students of ethics often spend much time upon 
 concrete questions whilst devoting very little to the princi- 
 ples that are necessary for the solution of those questions. 
 Thus it is that in spite of their study they may remain with 
 very vague views regarding many serious matters ; whereas, had 
 they but acquired a thorough understanding of the principles, 
 their mastery of practical problems would have been at once 
 easy, rapid, and secure. The direct question calls attention 
 3 
 
4 PREFACE. 
 
 to important points which, in an undue haste to leave the 
 abstract and take up the concrete, are too frequently accepted 
 without examination. Yet the study of the concrete can 
 never be scientific, and must always be uncertain in its con- 
 clusions, if the worthiness of the principles upon which it is 
 based has not been subjected to the proper test. With these 
 truths in view, it has been judged that the method here 
 applied to the ethics is the one that holds out greatest hope 
 of ensuring most widely the aim of the book; since there is 
 no scrutiny so exhaustive as the questioning analysis. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. ETHICS AND MAN. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Article I. Nature and Requirements of Ethics. 
 
 Nature of Ethics — Previous truths to be admitted — The 
 will of man, though free, is responsible to its Creator . . n 
 
 Article II. Standard of Good and Evil. 
 
 Good and evil — Right and wrong — How to find the 
 standard — A fundamental fact and a consequence — The 
 purpose of creation — The system of the universe — 
 The order of nature — The order broken 13 
 
 Article III. Man. 
 
 .Man — Body and soul a unit — Reason and free will in 
 right and wrong 16 
 
 Article IV. The End and the Good. 
 
 The end of anything — How found — Proximate, ulti- 
 mate, and intermediate end — The "good 11 — The high- 
 est good — All goods, for man, subordinated to the 
 highest good, as all man's acts are subordinated to the 
 highest exercise of the act peculiar to human nature . . 17 
 
 CHAPTER II. THE HUMAN ACT. 
 
 Article I. The Human Act and the Innate Tendency. 
 
 The human act — The act of the man -Knowledge and 
 free will — The purpose The filial purpose — The mis- 
 taken purpose The good of reason The good of the 
 
 will The innate tendency 20 
 
 5 
 
6 CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Article II. The True and the Apparent Good. 
 
 The choice of the will — The true good and the apparent 
 good — Evil, as evil, never chosen — Two guiding rules . 24 
 
 Article III. Perfect Happiness. 
 
 Perfect happiness — Desired by all — Attainable — Found 
 in the possession of the highest good — Not attainable in 
 this life — How to arrive at it 26 
 
 Article IV. The Voluntary and the Free. 
 
 Spontaneous action — Voluntary and involuntary act — 
 Elicited and commanded act — The voluntary, indirect 
 and virtual — Distinction between free and voluntary . . 30 
 
 Article V. Circumstances Affecting the Voluntary. 
 
 Ignorance and concupiscence — Violence and fear — In- 
 vincible, vincible, and studied ignorance — A forced act 
 — The voluntary in the habit 35 
 
 CHAPTER III. MORALITY. 
 
 Article I. Moral Good and Moral Evil. 
 
 Morality — It belongs to the human act — Moral good 
 and moral evil — The keeping or disturbing of the natural 
 order of things — Moral good and moral evil for man — 
 The human act, morally good, keeps man directed towards 
 his last end — The word " moral " 41 
 
 Article II. Determinants of Morality. 
 
 Determinants of morality — Purpose, means, circum- 
 stances — Circumstances : relevant, irrelevant, aggravating, 
 extenuating, specifying — Act : when materially or formally 
 bad — The intention or the desire not accomplished — 
 The indifferent act 44 
 
 Article III. False Views. 
 
 Opinion or human law does not affect the intrinsic morality 
 of an act — No rule of morality in atheism, pantheism, 
 materialism — The so-called " moral sense " 49 
 
CONTENTS. 7 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Article IV. Imputability. 
 
 Imputability — Attributable and imputable — An act im- 
 putable in so far as voluntary 50 
 
 CHAPTER IV. LAW. 
 
 Article I. The Moral Law. 
 
 Law — The moral law — Its binding force — Law, rule, 
 precept — Characters of law — Law binding only when 
 promulgated 52 
 
 Article II. The Natural Law. 
 
 The natural law — Its existence — Readily known — A 
 special testimony — The natural law is divine — It is that 
 part of the eternal law which applies to man's free acts — 
 Natural law irrevocable, unchangeable 54 
 
 Article III. Promulgation of the Natural Law. 
 
 Natural law promulgated by reason — Reason is not the 
 law — False position of Kant — How rectified — What is 
 meant by the expression *• law of reason " 57 
 
 Article IV. Obligation. 
 
 Obligation — Physical and moral freedom — Foundation 
 of obligation — Mistake of rationalists — Office of reason 
 
 — Law prior to obligation 60 
 
 Article V. Knowledge of the Natural Law. 
 
 Knowledge of the natural law — Fundamental principles 
 
 — Immediate and remote conclusions — The first prin- 
 ciple 63 
 
 Article VI. Command and Prohibition. 
 
 Affirmative and negative precepts — How they oblige . . 65 
 
 Article VII. Sanction of Law. 
 
 Sanction — Sanction of the natural law — Natural conse- 
 quence Of violated law — Partial and complete sanction — 
 Sanction known — Threefold sanction 66 
 
$ CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Article VIII. Positive Law. 
 
 Positive law — Its possibility — Divine and human — 
 How known — Ultimate basis — Presupposes natural law 
 — The unjust law — Ignorance in the transgressor of hu- 
 man law 69 
 
 Article IX. A Summary. 
 
 Summary — Essential difference between natural and pos- 
 itive law — Natural law enforced by the civil law .... 73 
 
 CHAPTER V. MORAL CONSCIENCE. 
 
 Article I. Moral Conscience. 
 
 Moral conscience — True and false conscience — Culpa- 
 bility and false conscience 75 
 
 Article II. Moral Certainty and Doubt. 
 
 Moral certainty — Inquiry — Invincible ignorance — 
 Doubt — Examination — The unpromulgated law — An 
 important restriction — Example — Education of con- 
 science — " Feelings " are not conscience jj 
 
 CHAPTER VI. AIDS AND HINDRANCES TO 
 OBSERVANCE OF MORAL ORDER. 
 
 Article I. The Passions. 
 
 The passions — Of the sensitive order — An instrument 
 of the will — Not our guide — Why called bad — The 
 primary passions 81 
 
 Article II. Habits: Virtues, Vices. 
 
 Habits — An act and a habit — A moral habit — Virtue 
 and vice — The cardinal virtues : prudence, justice, forti- 
 tude, temperance . 86 
 
 CHAPTER VII. SOME ERRORS. 
 
 Sentimentalism — Sensism — Sensualism — Positivism — Util- 
 itarianism 90 
 
CONTENTS. 9 
 
 CHAPTER VIII. DUTY AND RIGHT. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 Duty and right — Moral obligation and moral power — Free 
 
 will under law — Our essential relations 93 
 
 CHAPTER IX. RIGHTS. 
 
 Article I. Basis and Nature of Rights. 
 
 Law the principle of right and duty — Enforcing of rights 
 — Impeded right — Inviolable moral power — Subject, 
 term, matter, and title of right 96 
 
 Article II. Partition of Rights. 
 
 Innate and acquired rights — Alienable and inalienable 
 rights 98 
 
 CHAPTER X. DUTIES. 
 
 Duty — Its source — Natural and positive duties — Negative 
 and affirmative duties — Motive of duty — Perfect and im- 
 perfect duties — Term of a duty 101 
 
 CHAPTER XI. COLLISION OF RIGHTS. 
 
 Article I. Collision 106 
 
 Article II. Summary of Cases 108 
 
 Article III. Some Principles 112 
 
 CHAPTER XII. VINDICATION OF RIGHTS. 
 
 Vindication — Perfect rights — Repelling the aggressor — The 
 use of force — The rule of defence — Reparation of an 
 injury — The use of force — Appeal to authority .... 118 
 
 CHAPTER XIII. ARGUMENT OF THE WORK. 
 
 Argument of the Work 123 
 
 Index 133 
 
FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 CHAPTER I. ETHICS AND MAN. 
 
 Article I. Nature and Requirements of Ethics. 
 
 Nature of Ethics — Previous Truths to be known — The Will of 
 Man, Free and Responsible. 
 
 i. Q. What is ethics ? 
 
 A. The science of the rule of right and wrong. 
 
 2. Q. Why is it called a science ? 
 
 A. Because it gives the rule and the reason for the 
 
 rule. 
 
 3. Q. What truths must be taken as a foundation by 
 one who would study ethics ? 
 
 A. Sound ethics must be based on sound metaphys- 
 ics. Sound ethics, therefore, must start by recognizing, 
 especially, — 
 
 ( 1 ) The existence of one God, omnipotent, creator, 
 infinitely wise and just; 
 
 (J) The finite nature of man, composed of animal 
 body and rational soul, which form one person ; 
 
 (3) The veracity of the faculties; 
 
 (4) The immortality of the human soul; 
 
 (5) The liberty of the human will. 
 
12 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 4. Q. Are these truths proved anywhere in philoso- 
 phy ? 
 
 A. Yes : they are proved in logic and in general and 
 special metaphysics. 
 
 5. Q. Why are these truths required as a basis in 
 ethics ? 
 
 A. Because (1) To deny the existence of God would 
 be to deny the binding force of all law upon the will of 
 man. 
 
 (2) To deny man's finite composite nature would be 
 to deny him to be what he is and hence to deny the 
 purpose of ethics. 
 
 (3) To deny the truthfulness of the faculties would 
 be to doubt everything and thus render all reasoning 
 useless. 
 
 (4) To deny the immortality of the soul would be to 
 take away the final safeguard for the observance of the 
 rule of right and wrong. 
 
 (5) To deny human liberty would be to deny all re- 
 sponsibility on the part of man ; and hence to deny the 
 very distinction between right and wrong in the human 
 act. 
 
 6. Q. Do we here treat ethics, right and wrong, from 
 the side of supernatural revelation ? 
 
 A. No : we treat it as it is knowable by natural means, 
 as natural knowledge. And we do not enter into the 
 question how far our natural knowledge has been pre- 
 served free from error by supernatural revelation. 
 
 7. Q. For whom or for what is this rule of which we 
 speak ? 
 
 A. For the human will. 
 
 8. Q. Is this rule a law ? 
 
 A. Yes : as we shall see later on. 
 
ETHICS AND MAN. 1 3 
 
 9. Q. But, if the human will is free, how can it be 
 subject to a law ? 
 
 A. That question touches the keynote of ethics. 
 
 10. Q. How does it touch the keynote of ethics ? 
 
 A. Because there is no such thing as ethics unless 
 we recognize man to be both free and responsible, at the 
 same time : free with the physical power to use his will 
 one way or another, responsible for the way in which he 
 uses it. 
 
 11. Q. To whom can a free will be responsible for 
 the use of its free choice ? 
 
 A. To the one sole Being who has authority over a 
 free created will, to its Author, God. 
 
 Article II. Standard of Good and Evil. 
 
 Good and Evil; Right and Wrong — How to find the Standard — A 
 Fundamental Fact and a Consequence — The Purpose of Crea- 
 tion—The System of the Universe — The Order of Nature — 
 The Order Broken. 
 
 12. Q. Is the rule of right and wrong, then, simply 
 the will of God in such sense that no matter what a 
 thing is in itself, it can become good to-day and evil 
 to-morrow, merely as God orders or forbids it ? 
 
 A. Not so fast. There are things which are in 
 themselves good, and things which are in themselves 
 evil. That which is in itself good can never become in 
 itself evil. That which is in itself evil can never become 
 in itself good. There is a standard of good and evil — 
 right and wrong, — an unfailing standard. God cannot 
 but wish us to choose the good and reject the evil. His 
 will, however, is law for the created will. Hence the 
 
14 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 rule of right and wrong becomes law for the human 
 will. 
 
 13. Q. How shall we find the standard of good and 
 evil — right and wrong ? 
 
 A. By studying the nature of things. 
 
 14. Q. Does "good and evil" mean the same as 
 " right and wrong " ? 
 
 A. Not precisely. " Good " and " evil " refer to that 
 to which the will may be directed, which the will may 
 choose. " Right " and " wrong " refer to the act of the 
 will, willing, choosing the good or the evil. Still the 
 words are often substituted for one another. We are 
 accustomed, in conversation, to call "good" "right," 
 and "evil" "wrong," because it is right to will the 
 good and wrong to will the evil. 
 
 15. Q. How then shall we discover what is good and 
 what is evil ? 
 
 A. By studying the nature of things. 
 
 16. Q. Will not this be an endless study ? 
 
 A. No. What we want is a standard ; and this we 
 can get by taking account of some general principles. 
 
 17. Q. How must we begin ? 
 
 A. By recognizing the fact of creation. In laying 
 the foundation of ethics, it is absolutely necessary to 
 keep steadily in mind the fact of creation by a Creator 
 infinite in wisdom and in justice. 
 
 18. Q. What follows from this fact ? 
 
 A. It follows that an infinitely wise Creator must 
 have had a purpose in creating ; for it is not the part of 
 wisdom to act without a purpose. 
 
 19. Q. What is the general final purpose of the 
 whole creation ? 
 
 A. The general final purpose of the whole creation 
 
ETHICS AND MAN. 1 5 
 
 must be something that refers to the Creator himself ; 
 for there is nothing beneath him that could be counted 
 worthy of his action. Moreover, this same final pur- 
 pose of the whole creation, taken as a unit, must of 
 course be the final purpose of the existence of each 
 individual being in the creation. 
 
 20. Q. How can each individual thing in creation 
 tend to this final purpose ? 
 
 A. Each individual thing in creation has its own 
 peculiar special nature, with a special kind of action 
 adapted thereto, and it can tend to the final purpose 
 only by the orderly exercise of that peculiar nature 
 placed in it by the Creator. 
 
 21. Q. What do we call the combination of the 
 various beings of the created universe in their various 
 relations to one another ? 
 
 A. We call it the system of the universe. 
 
 22. Q. What do we call the proper subordination of 
 these various parts of this system, and the subordinated 
 harmony of these multifarious natures ? 
 
 A. We call it the order of nature. 
 
 23. Q. How does each being contribute to the order 
 of nature ? 
 
 A. By acting according to its own nature. 
 
 24. Q. Are there beings that can act contrary to 
 their own nature ? 
 
 A. \ 
 
 2 5- Q- What beings are they ? 
 
 A. Those that have free will that is ourselves — 
 human beings. 
 
1 6 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 Article III. Man. 
 
 Man — Body and Soul a Unit — Reason and Free Will in Right and 
 Wrong. 
 
 26. Q. What is a human being ? 
 
 A. The human being, called man, is a composite 
 being, made up of a material animal body and a 
 spiritual soul. This spiritual soul is endowed with 
 reason and free will. 
 
 27. Q. Is not man then two beings ? 
 
 A. No. Spiritual and animal nature conspire in im 
 to form the person, the unit, the man, governable by- 
 reason and free will. 
 
 28. Q. When does man act according to his natu - e ? 
 A. When he acts according to reason with free will ; 
 
 that is, when he acts freely, deliberately, according to his 
 reason. 
 
 29. Q. What is it to act according to reason ? 
 
 A. It is to do that which reason points out to be in 
 keeping with the nature of things. 
 
 30. Q. What is it to act according to reason with 
 free will ? 
 
 A. It is to will deliberately that which reason points 
 out to be in keeping with the nature of things. 
 
 31. Q. What, then, once more, do we mean by ri: ht 
 and wrong ? 
 
 A. Right and wrong refer to the direction of the will. 
 We are said to do right when, after reason has pointed 
 out something to be in keeping with the nature of things, 
 we deliberately direct our wills towards that something 
 whether by choice, desire, approval, command, etc. 
 We are said to do wrong, when we deliberately direct 
 
ETHICS AND MAN. 1 7 
 
 our wills by choice, desire, approval, command, etc., to 
 that which reason shows us to be a perversion of the 
 order of things. 
 
 Article IV. The End and the Good. 
 
 The End of Anything — How Found — Proximate, Ultimate, Inter- 
 mediate End — The "Good"— The Highest Good — All Goods, 
 for Man, subordinated to the Highest Good, as All Man's Acts are 
 subordinated to the Highest Exercise of the Act Peculiar to 
 Human Nature. 
 
 32. Q. It has been said that the final purpose of each 
 individual in the creation is the same as the final pur- 
 pose of the whole creation. Has each individual in the 
 creation also an immediate or proximate end of its ex- 
 istence ? 
 
 A. Yes. Since each individual in the creation has 
 its own peculiar nature, this was given to it by the 
 Creator to be exercised in its own peculiar manner : 
 and the exercise of this nature or activity is the imme- 
 diate or proximate end of its existence. 
 
 33. Q. What is meant by an aid oi anything? 
 A. The purpose for which it exists. 
 
 34. Q. How can this purpose be discovered ? 
 
 A. By studying the nature of the thing in question. 
 
 35. Q. Whose purpose is this ? 
 
 A. The purpose of the Creator who gave things 
 their nature. 
 
 36. Q. Are there various divisions of ends or pur- 
 poses ? 
 
 ./. Yes. For, one purpose intended may be intended 
 
1 8 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 for another purpose ; and this for a third ; and the third 
 for a fourth ; and so on. 
 
 37. Q. What is the first one intended (the nearest) 
 called ? 
 
 A. The proximate end. 
 
 38. Q. What is the last one intended (the farthest 
 off) called ? 
 
 A. The ultimate end. If there be but one end in- 
 tended, it is of course first and last, or proximate and 
 ultimate. 
 
 39. Q. What do we call any purpose which is di- 
 rected to a further purpose ? 
 
 A. An intermediate end or a means. 
 
 40. Q. What do we call the object which serves as 
 the material upon which any natural power or activity 
 exercises itself ? 
 
 A. We call it the good of that power. Thus light is 
 the good of vision ; sound, of hearing ; truth, of intelli- 
 gence, etc. Sound cannot be called good for sight, nor 
 light for hearing. 
 
 41. Q. When an object is found which fills the high- 
 est capacity for action of a being, what is such object 
 called ? 
 
 A. Such object is called the highest good of that being, 
 its summum bonum. 
 
 42. Q. How then is it with man ? Since he pos- 
 sesses within himself so many faculties of different 
 orders, — of the animal order and of the purely spiritual 
 order, — has each of them its own good ? 
 
 A. If we consider the separate faculties or capacities 
 for action independently of one another, and independ- 
 ently of the person, man, to whom they belong, then of 
 course each one has its own peculiar object upon which 
 
ETHICS AND MAN. 19 
 
 it is good for such faculty to exercise itself. But we 
 must remember that the faculties are not things inde- 
 pendent and by themselves, but are for the person, the 
 compound, man, taken as a unit, to whom they belong. 
 They are subordinated to the compound in their exist- 
 ence. Hence they are naturally subordinated in their 
 exercise, to the exercise of the compound, man, taken as 
 a unit. Hence their exercise upon their objects will be 
 good even for them only as subordinated to the exercise 
 of the activity peculiar to the compound being, man. 
 
 43- Q- What is the proper, peculiar action of the 
 composite being, man, called ? 
 
 A. A human action — a human act. 
 
CHAPTER II. THE HUMAN ACT. 
 
 Article I. The Human Act and the Innate 
 Tendency. 
 
 The Human Act — The Act of the Man — Knowledge and Free Will 
 
 — The Purpose — The Final Purpose— The Mistaken Purpose 
 
 — The Good of Reason — The Good of the Will — The Innate 
 Tendency. 
 
 44. Q. What is a human act ? 
 
 A. A human act is an act performed by man with 
 knowledge and free will. 
 
 45. Q. Is every act of man a human act ? 
 
 A. Not every act of man. is a human act, because 
 not every act of man is performed with knowledge and 
 free will. 
 
 46. Q. It was said that the final purpose of the 
 existence and action of man is a purpose that is in the 
 will of the Creator. Now as man is endowed with 
 intelligence and free will — to know and to choose — 
 can he also set himself a purpose in his acts ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 47. Q. When man acts without a purpose can we 
 call his act a human act ? 
 
 A. No. Because he does not bring into play those 
 very faculties, intelligence, and free will, which charac- 
 terize him as a human being. 
 20 
 
THE HUMAN ACT. 21 
 
 48. Q. What then do you call such an act performed 
 without a purpose, that is, performed without intelli- 
 gence or free will ? 
 
 A. It is called simply an act of the man, but not a 
 human act. This is the case whenever either knowledge 
 or free will is wanting. Thus, when persons talk in 
 their sleep, they do not perform human acts because 
 they do not know what they are doing. On the other 
 hand, a person may stumble and fall. He really falls. 
 He knows at the time that he is falling, but the falling 
 is not the result of his free will ; it is against his will. 
 The act is not a human act. Again, a person may drink 
 poison, thinking it to be pure water. He knows that he 
 is drinking and drinks of his own free will. In so far, 
 therefore, as the mere drinking is concerned, there may be 
 said to be a human act. But he neither knows that he is 
 drinking poison nor does he will to drink poison. Hence 
 his drinking poison is not a human act. He knows and 
 wills the drinking, but not the drinking poison. 
 
 49. Q. What is the purpose for which man acts in a 
 human action ? 
 
 A. Always something which the will chooses to 
 attain as presented to it by the understanding. 
 
 50. Q. Can the will aim at one purpose for the sake 
 of attaining a further end, and this for a third, and so 
 on ? 
 
 A. Yes, the will can keep on intending a further pur- 
 pose, a fourth, a fifth, and a sixth, and so on, until there 
 is no further purpose, that is, until it reaches a final end 
 or purpose. 
 
 51. Q. What end or purpose does the will propose 
 to itself in willing ? 
 
 A. The will is free and can intend various purposes. 
 
22 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 52. Q. But is there not some common purpose in- 
 tended by all the acts of the will ? 
 
 A. Yes, the will always proposes some good of the 
 person willing. 
 
 53. Q. Is this good always the good of the whole 
 man, the person taken as a unit ? 
 
 A. No. It may be the good of a single faculty, of a 
 single capacity, whose action, at the time or in the man- 
 ner chosen, may be detrimental to the whole man taken 
 as a unit. Just as in the case of the animal body, a man 
 may will the satisfaction of his palate in a degree or at 
 a time that will make the acquisition of such local and 
 partial good, really detrimental to the whole body ; so 
 in regard to the entire man, the will may choose some 
 individual good of a particular faculty that will be 
 detrimental to the unit, the human being, the composite 
 personality of the man. 
 
 54. Q. When does the willing of a particular good 
 become detrimental to the good of the human being ? 
 
 A. Whenever it interferes with the acquisition of the 
 goods that are suitable for the activities that character- 
 ize the human being as a human being. 
 
 55. Q. Which activities are these? 
 
 A. Reason, and free will under the guidance of 
 reason. 
 
 56. Q. What object constitutes the good of reason ? 
 A. Truth. 
 
 57. Q. Is it this or that particular truth regarding 
 the things about us ? 
 
 A. No. Because this or that particular truth will not 
 fill the capacity of the mind for knowing. 
 
 58. Q. Will it then be the collection of truths reasoned 
 out one after another ? 
 
THE HUMAN ACT. 23 
 
 A. No, for thus we should never get through. There 
 would always be something more to know and our 
 capacity would ever remain unsatisfied. Now, we can- 
 not admit that an infinitely wise Creator gave man an 
 endless tendency which could not possibly attain its 
 object. 
 
 59. Q. What then ? 
 
 A. Then it follows that there must be some one ob- 
 ject which of itself constitutes the good of reason ; which 
 must be attainable by reason ; and which, being known, 
 will fill the capacity of the mind for knowing. 
 
 60. Q. But is such object attainable by reason ? 
 
 A. It must be, or we shall have to admit that an 
 infinitely wise Creator created man without an object, 
 that is to say, put in him a tendency at once inevitable 
 and insatiable. 
 
 61. Q. What constitutes the good of the will ? 
 
 A. The real good of the will must be that which is 
 the good of the person to whom the will belongs. The 
 will is a blind faculty. It has nothing to do but to 
 choose, and to command the other faculties in keeping 
 with its choice. 
 
 Every being in the Creation has an innate tendency 
 to its own peculiar good, and no innate tendency to 
 any other good. No being in creation can act directly 
 against this tendency for the simple reason that it is not 
 endowed with the power so to act. 
 
24 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 Article II. The True and the Apparent Good. 
 
 The Choice of the Will — The True Good and the Apparent Good — 
 Evil, as Evil, never chosen — Two Guiding Rules. 
 
 62. Q. If every being in the creation has an innate 
 tendency to its own peculiar good, and if no being can 
 act directly against this tendency, how does it come to 
 pass that man does, sometimes, choose that which is not 
 the good of the entire personality of man, taken as a 
 unit ? 
 
 A. To understand this we must remember that the 
 will does not see for itself. It chooses only upon the 
 representation of the intelligence. Now ignorance, 
 prejudice, passion, may go far towards giving a bias to 
 the mind and putting out in strong light the good of a 
 part of the man, of a single faculty, and hiding the good 
 of the whole being. 
 
 We must distinguish between the true good and the 
 apparent good of anything. The true good is the object 
 suited to perfect the whole being by giving play to 
 the faculties in whose exercise lies the perfecting of 
 such being ; or we may say that their very exercise is 
 the true good of such being. Hence if we have a 
 being composed of various parts which conspire to 
 make one specific entity, the true good of that being 
 cannot be the good of any particular part or faculty, 
 but it must be that which is the good of the whole 
 being. Hence as in such a being each particular part 
 will have its own special nature, hence its own special 
 mode of action, and hence its own special proximate 
 end, and hence its own special suitable good ; and just as 
 these special natural modes of action must be subordi- 
 
THE HUMAN ACT. 2$ 
 
 nated to one another to produce the proper resultant 
 which is the true natural action of the whole being, so 
 in like manner are the respective goods subordinated to 
 one another. The true good of the being will be what 
 perfects the being considered as a unit. That which 
 perfects only one or another part or faculty, considered 
 separately and apart from the view of the whole, is but 
 an apparent good. Hence it is, that the natural special 
 end of any being and its highest good must be sought 
 from the knowledge of the complete specific nature of 
 that being ; from the sum of all its faculties in proper 
 subordination ; from the natural resultant tendency which 
 is the specific tendency of that being. 
 
 6$. Q. Does the will then never choose evil under 
 the aspect of evil ? 
 
 A. Never. When that which it chooses is really 
 detrimental to the person, it chooses the same under 
 the aspect of good, "as an apparent good, the reason 
 being averted whether wilfully or not from the consid- 
 eration of the true nature of the thing as evil. 
 
 64. Q. But if the reason is averted wilfully, is not 
 there then a direct choice of evil as evil ? 
 
 A. Not even then. For the attraction to the lower 
 -nud may be so powerful on account of habit formed 
 by yielding to passion, etc., that the will to avoid resist- 
 ance may permit or order the reason to present the par- 
 ticular good in the strongest light. 
 
 65. (?• What two guiding rules may be drawn from 
 what has been said thus far ? 
 
 A. First : that the nature of a being, whether a tree 
 being or not, is the immediate rule for the correct action 
 of that being, to make the continuous existence of that 
 being in harmony with the system of the universe and 
 
26 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 not a disturbance in the order of nature. Second : That 
 as there is wisdom in the system of the universe, there 
 must be an object for each specific being; and each 
 being following the rule of its specific nature can attain 
 its object, its suitable good, its last end, its highest good. 
 
 Article III. Perfect Happiness. 
 
 Perfect Happiness — Desired by All — Attainable — Found in the 
 possession of the Highest Good — Not attainable in This Life 
 — How to arrive at it. 
 
 66. Q. When man, acting as man, attains the object 
 which constitutes the good of reason, that is, truth be- 
 yond which there is no enquiring, and the object that 
 constitutes the good of the person, what is the result ? 
 
 A. Perfect happiness, the ultimate perfection of the 
 free rational nature by its exercise upon an object ade- 
 quate to its capacity. 
 
 67. Q. Is there a standard of happiness, that is to 
 say, is it the same in kind for all men ? 
 
 A. Yes ; because human nature is the same in kind 
 in all men, and happiness is the final perfection of 
 human nature. 
 
 68. Q. Is perfect happiness desired by all men ? 
 
 A. Yes. This desire is natural. It is simply the 
 natural tendency of human nature, as everything in the 
 universe has its natural tendency. We use the word 
 happiness simply as a special word expressing the object 
 of the tendency of human nature. This inevitable ten- 
 dency is proved by each one's experience and by the 
 unanimous consent of mankind. We may indeed turn 
 
THE HUMAN ACT. 2J 
 
 our minds away from the consideration of perfect hap- 
 piness, but considering it we cannot have a feeling of 
 aversion to it, for this would require that there would 
 be in it something which could be presented to us as 
 disagreeable to possess. 
 
 69. Q. Can this perfect happiness be attained in this life ? 
 A. No; because no thing nor any combination of 
 
 things as attainable in this life, can fully satisfy this 
 essential, radical, primary tendency of human nature. 
 
 70. Q. Must this perfect happiness nevertheless be 
 attainable by all men ? 
 
 A. Yes; unless we wish to say that the Creator has 
 given to man an inevitable tendency towards an impos- 
 sibility. It would be absurd to hold this even with re- 
 gard to one man, for human nature is the same in kind 
 in all men. 
 
 71. Q. How long will such state of happiness last? 
 A. It must be a state that will last forever. And the 
 
 one who reaches it must possess it with a certainty that 
 it shall not end. For if in the possession of a happiness 
 there were even a suspicion that it might end, this would 
 take away from it the character of perfect happiness, 
 since something beyond would be desired. 
 
 72. Q. What do we call that object the possession of 
 which will constitute man in the state of perfect happi- 
 ness ? 
 
 A. It is called his highest good. It is also called his 
 last end, because he cannot tend to anything beyond, 
 nor propose to himself anything beyond. 
 
 73. Q. Cannot riches constitute this last end or 
 highest p;ood ? 
 
 A. No ; because, as we said, the highest good must 
 be attainable by all men and tew can acquire riches. 
 
28 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 Then, even though all might acquire them, the mere 
 possession of them cannot constitute happiness ; they 
 are, at best, only a means to a further purpose. Besides 
 they are not permanent with any one. They must be 
 resigned at death ; and even whilst they are possessed, 
 their possession is attended with anxiety. 
 
 74. Q. Could not honor be the highest good ? 
 
 A. No: it is not in the power of all men; it is a very 
 unreliable possession ; and it is altogether external and 
 adds nothing to the possessor. 
 
 75. Q. Could human science be the highest good ? 
 A. No; it is not within the reach of all. And then 
 
 how little even one great mind can master ! 
 
 76. Q. Can pleasure itself be called the highest good ? 
 A. Certainly not sense-pleasure. This debases the 
 
 rational nature of man. Besides, pleasure, even intel- 
 lectual pleasure, is something that folloivs from the 
 possession of the good, and does not constitute it. 
 
 yj. Q. Cannot virtue constitute the highest good ? 
 
 A. No; not even virtue. Virtue is only the right 
 direction of the will and the other powers, in keeping 
 with the two great rules (No. 65). Hence it cannot be 
 that to which they are directed. 
 
 78. Q. What conclusion have we to draw from all 
 this ? 
 
 A. This conclusion: that, as perfect happiness must 
 be attainable, yet is not attainable in this life, it must 
 be attainable in another life. 
 
 79. Q. What is this highest good ? 
 
 A. It must be an object which contains truth, beyond 
 which there is no knowing; and good, beyond which 
 there is no willing. 
 
 80. Q. What is this object ? 
 
THE HUMAN ACT. 20, 
 
 A. God alone, infinite truth and infinite good. 
 
 81. Q. Could there not be two highest goods or last 
 ends ? 
 
 A. No; for, either one would leave something be- 
 yond, and thus would not be highest or last. The one 
 highest good is absolutely necessary and fully sufficient 
 to constitute happiness. 
 
 $2. Q. What then is the relation between this life 
 and the other life in which man can obtain that perfect 
 possession of the highest good which constitutes perfect 
 happiness ? 
 
 A. Since we cannot have perfect happiness here, 
 then the absence of it must be either a privation incurred 
 by some act of each one of us ; or it must be, that, 
 as we are free beings, we are to do something by our 
 own free action towards the obtaining of perfect happi- 
 ness. The first cannot be said, therefore the second 
 remains to be held. The relation of this life towards 
 the other is therefore that of a journey towards the 
 terminus. 
 
 83. Q. What then have we to do ? 
 
 A. To act up to the dignity of human nature. We 
 must observe freely what reason points out to be the true 
 order of things; keep our purposes in proper subordina- 
 tion ; subject ourselves freely, as created beings, to the 
 will of the Creator. 
 
 84. Q. But can we not attain partial happiness in 
 this life? 
 
 J. Yes. Hut we must not forget the distinction be- 
 tween the true and the apparent good. True, partial 
 happiness will be only in the choice of the true good ; 
 
 in the direct, deliberate tendency to such possession ol 
 
 the highest good as cannot ever have an end. 
 
30 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 Article IV. The Voluntary and the Free. 
 
 Spontaneous Action — Voluntary and Involuntary Act — Elicited 
 and Commanded Act — The Voluntary, Indirect, and Virtual — 
 Distinction between Free and Voluntary. 
 
 85. Q. What have we seen thus far ? 
 
 A. We have seen that the final purpose of the exist- 
 ence of man is a purpose of the Creator. This purpose 
 must be something which regards the Creator. It can- 
 not be anything to be added intrinsically to the Creator 
 who is infinite. It must therefore be extrinsic. It is 
 called the external glory of God, the knowledge and 
 love of him, infinite Truth and infinite Good, by the 
 created intelligence and will. Thus God's purpose, his 
 external glory, is found precisely in that which consti- 
 tutes the perfect happiness of man, the exercise of the 
 distinctively human faculties upon the highest good of 
 the human being. This perfect happiness cannot be 
 attained in this life. We cannot know the highest truth 
 =as we would wish to know it ; we cannot, on account of 
 the attraction of lower goods, fix our will on the highest 
 good in such way as to be sure that some time we shall 
 not turn away from it. However, the highest good 
 must be absolutely attainable in such way as to produce 
 perfect happiness. This must be in another life. The 
 immediate purpose of man's existence here is to tend 
 to the final purpose by his own free will. This he has 
 to do by acts distinctively human, by human acts. We 
 shall have to make a further investigation of the human 
 act. 
 
 86. Q. What, once more, is the human act ? 
 
 A. That act is called a human act which is per- 
 
THE HUMAN ACT. 3 1 
 
 formed by a human being, with knowledge of the nature 
 of the act and with free will. 
 
 87. Q. What is a spontaneous action ? 
 
 A. A spontaneous action is one that is performed 
 without intellectual deliberation ; as when a person 
 draws his hand rapidly away from fire. It was an 
 action performed, as we say, by instinct, and may be 
 found in the brute animals. Man might, however, 
 after deliberating, apply his hand again to the fire : the 
 brute is incapable of any such action. Man, so apply- 
 ing his hand, would perform a voluntary act. 
 
 8S. Q. What is a voluntary act ? 
 
 A. It is an act performed with intellectual knowledge 
 of the case in question ; and with the direction of the 
 will to it as so understood. 
 
 89. Q. When is an act involuntary ? 
 
 . /. An act is involuntary when it is done either with- 
 out knowledge of the case in question ; or, if with 
 knowledge, still against the choice of the will. Thus 
 one man may take another's umbrella, thinking it to 
 be his own. He does not voluntarily take another s 
 umbrella ; because, not knowing it to be another's, his 
 will is not directed to the taking of another's umbrella. 
 Or, again, a man may wish to close his eyes and not 
 to see. Somebody may keep his eyes open by force, 
 and oblige him to see. He sees; he knows lie is 
 
 ing: but it is against his will. The act of seeing 
 is not voluntary. 
 
 90. Q. Can an act from which there is no escape 
 me voluntary ? 
 
 ./. Yes ; so soon as the will approves, tin- art 
 
 becomes voluntar) . 
 
 91. Q, Car au act be voluntary and yet be performed 
 
 with some reluctance ? 
 
32 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 A. Yes; as when a merchant, in a storm at sea, to 
 escape from shipwreck, throws his cargo overboard. 
 He knows fully what he is doing ; and chooses to do 
 it under the circumstances. He wills to make the sacri- 
 fice in view of what he considers a greater good — the 
 saving of his life. The same happens when one takes 
 a bitter potion to free himself from sickness. He has 
 a repugnance for the medicine ; still he ac^ts with 
 knowledge and consent. 
 
 92. Q. How are voluntary acts divided ? 
 
 A. Into elicited and commanded acts. An act which 
 is in the will alone — which is performed solely by the 
 will, as an act of love or hatred, is called an elicited act. 
 An act that is performed by some other power, under 
 the command of the will, is called a commanded act. 
 
 93. Q. Does the voluntariness of an act admit of 
 degrees ? 
 
 A. We may say that it does admit of degrees in the 
 sense that there may be degrees of advertence to the 
 nature of the act. Thus one who is half asleep or dis- 
 tracted will not have so clear a perception as will one 
 who is perfectly attentive or wide awake ; and his acts 
 will not be regarded as in the same degree voluntary. 
 
 94. Q. Can an act be indirectly voluntary ? 
 
 A. Yes. For though it may not be either elicited or 
 commanded, directly, by the will, it may be foreseen as 
 following from a voluntary act or omission. Thus the 
 casting of the cargo overboard was directly voluntary ; 
 the consequences foreseen as resulting, indirectly vol- 
 untary. 
 
 95. Q. When is an act said to be virtually voluntary? 
 A. When it continues to be performed by virtue of, 
 
 that is, by reason of a prior act of the will, even though 
 
THE HUMAN ACT. 33 
 
 we may have forgotten that the act is still being per- 
 formed. We start out with a companion to walk to a 
 certain place. We get into a conversation, and forget 
 whither we are going. Still, we continue on the way 
 in virtue of the act of the will previously made. 
 
 96. Q. Which are the elicited acts of the will ? 
 
 A. Love, desire, hope, content; and their opposites, 
 hatred, aversion, despair, sadness. 
 
 Love is mere complacency in the good. 
 
 Desire is the wish for that good. 
 
 Hope is the elation of the will, when the desired good 
 is seen to be attainable. 
 
 Content is what follows the possession of the good. 
 
 Hatred is displeasure at the sight or remembrance of 
 evil. 
 
 Aversion is the turning of the will from evil, or it is 
 desire to escape the evil. 
 
 Despair is depression of the will, at seeing the evil to 
 be unavoidable, or at seeing the desired good to be un- 
 attainable. 
 
 Sadness is the condition of the will when the impend- 
 ing evil befalls or the desired good is lost. 
 
 97. Q. Which are the commanded nets ? 
 
 A. All those acts are called commanded acts, which 
 the human person can perform at the command of the 
 will. The will can command the intellect, the imagina- 
 tion, the memory, the external senses, the power of loco- 
 motion, etc. The will cannot command the vegetative 
 powers of the body. 
 
 98. Q. Does "free act" mean precisely the same as 
 " voluntary act " ? 
 
 A. Not precisely. Wo can understand how an act 
 
 might be entirely voluntary, that is, altogether accord 
 
34 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 ing to the inclination of the will, yet not so free that the 
 will could choose to have it omitted, or to do the con- 
 trary. Thus by the very necessity of our nature we 
 must have a sort of general tendency towards our 
 highest good and hence towards perfect happiness, so 
 much so that it is not in our power to really wish delib- 
 erately to be absolutely miserable. This general wish 
 for happiness motives all our acts. It is not free ; we 
 cannot choose misery as such. Yet though not free, it 
 is voluntary ; for it is an act of the will, is approved of 
 by the will with knowledge of the case. It is to be 
 specially noted, however, that, with the exception of 
 this one particular instance, every voluntary act in our 
 present state of existence is also a free act. This does 
 not contradict what was said in No. 90. There the act 
 up to the moment of approval was a purely forced act. 
 From that moment it became equivalent by acceptance 
 to a free commanded act. If we consider that other life 
 with the highest good once attained and perfect happi- 
 ness secured, then the enjoyment of that happiness will 
 certainly be voluntary, for it will be an act of the will 
 with full approbation and full knowledge of the case. 
 Yet it will not be free. And why ? Because then the 
 will shall not be able to choose otherwise. The happi- 
 ness will be perfect with the knowledge that it is per- 
 fect; so that the intellect cannot present to the will 
 anything as containing an element wanting to its highest 
 good or to its perfect happiness. 
 
 Having called attention to these two exceptions it 
 will be understood that henceforth we use the word 
 "voluntary" and "free" in the same sense. For in 
 every other case the will is free to approve or not. 
 
THE HUMAN ACT. 35 
 
 Article V. Circumstances Affecting the 
 Voluntary. 
 
 Ignorance and Concupiscence — Violence and Fear — Invincible, 
 Vincible, and Studied Ignorance — A Forced Act — The Voluntary 
 in the Habit. 
 
 99- Q- What circumstances can affect or diminish 
 the voluntariness or freedom of an act ? 
 
 A. Those that can affect either element required in 
 the free act : namely, knowledge or free inclination of 
 the will. 
 
 i oo. Q. What can affect the knowledge? 
 
 A. Ignorance and concupiscence. 
 
 i or. Q. W 7 hat can affect the free inclination of the 
 will ? 
 
 A. Violence and fear. 
 
 102. Q. What is ignorance ? 
 A. Absence of knowledge. 
 
 103. Q. What knowledge may be wanting ? 
 A. (1) Knowledge of the nature of an act; 
 
 (2) Knowledge of a law commanding or prohibiting 
 the act ; 
 
 (3) Knowledge of a penalty for doing or omitting the 
 act. 
 
 104. Q. When is ignorance said to be invincible? 
 
 A. When it cannot be overcome by an investigation 
 proportioned to the importance of the matter in ques- 
 tion ; or, when a suspicion of truth to be searched for 
 does not enter the mind. 
 
 105. O. When is ignor to be vincible ? 
 
 A. When the lack of knowledge is adverted to, 
 and can be corrected by, taking such time and pains 
 
36 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 in searching, as may be due to the gravity of the 
 case. 
 
 1 06. Q. What effect has invincible ignorance upon 
 an act ? 
 
 A. The act, so far as this invincible ignorance ex- 
 tends, cannot be voluntary. Such act, to the extent of 
 the invincible ignorance, is not a human act. It lacks 
 the two elements of the human act. It is neither known 
 nor willed. 
 
 107. Q. Can you give an easy illustration of this ? 
 A. Yes. We will suppose that a man makes an 
 
 engagement for a certain hour. Other things, of course, 
 occupy his attention in the meantime ; and, without his 
 fault or guilty neglect, the engagement passes entirely 
 out of his mind. He has not a suspicion of the engage- 
 ment or the hour. Or, again, he makes an engagement, 
 say, for ten o'clock. He looks at his watch, a correct 
 time-piece. It is half-past nine. He looks again. It 
 is twenty minutes to ten. He has ample time, needing 
 but ten minutes. He starts off, but he arrives too late. 
 His watch had already been stopped five minutes. The 
 mainspring had been broken. He thought he had lei- 
 sure and took his time. He had exercised sufficient 
 care to meet his engagement. In both cases there was 
 invincible ignorance. The breaking of the engagement 
 was not a human act in either case. 
 
 108. Q. Does the same hold for the positive act ? 
 
 A. The same holds for the positive act as well as for 
 the omission. A man shoots at a bear. The bear is 
 just about to climb a slanting tree. It does not occur 
 to the man to examine whether any one is in a danger- 
 ous position. It is a wild, uninhabited place, where he 
 has not met any one for a week. Or, he does indeed 
 
THE HUMAN ACT. 37 
 
 examine carefully and finds no one near. He calls out 
 and gets no answer. In each case (in the second, 
 for greater security,) he determines to send the ball 
 through the bear and into the tree. The ball kills the 
 bear, and it also kills a man hidden in the tree, which, 
 though apparently sound, was decayed and hollow. In 
 either case the killing of the man was not a human act. 
 Invincible ignorance prevented it from being voluntary. 
 
 109. Q. Does vincible ignorance prevent an act from 
 being voluntary ? 
 
 A. No. For when one adverts to his ignorance, and 
 does not take such measures to correct it as the gravity 
 of the case demands, he thereby voluntarily accepts the 
 consequences that follow from neglect of the care due 
 to the gravity of the case. 
 
 1 10. Q. Docs vincible ignorance diminish the volun- 
 tary nature of an act ? 
 
 A. Vincible ignorance may be affected, studied, aimed 
 at, for the sake of not knowing the case, and this cer- 
 tainly does not diminish the voluntariness of an act 
 done in such ignorance. Vincible ignorance may, how- 
 ever, not be studied, it may be the result of slothfulness ; 
 one does not want to go to the trouble of an investiga- 
 tion. We do not suppose that the person here has the 
 will to cl way or the other. If he knew the 
 
 right he would do it ; but he is too lazy to examine. 
 Hence, if he does wrong, it is voluntary in his voluntary 
 ignorance. In the previous case of affected ignorance 
 we suppose the person's will to be fixed upon acting in 
 one particular way. He suspects, indeed, that it may 
 be wrong, but he keeps himself in ignorance that he 
 may not act with the certainty that he is doing wrong. 
 It is easy to see that if the wrong is done in this studied 
 
38 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 ignorance it is fully voluntary. If wrong is done simply 
 because a person is too slothful to find out the right, 
 the ignorance is also fully voluntary ; still the wrong 
 done in it is not so voluntary as in the case of affected 
 ignorance. For the man would choose what is right if 
 he knew it, but he is too slothful to enquire. 
 
 in. Q. What is concupiscence ? 
 
 A. It is the tendency of the senses towards sensible 
 pleasures. 
 
 112. Q. Does this tendency diminish voluntariness 
 in the choice of sensible pleasure ? 
 
 A. Certainly not, if the tendency is stimulated by a 
 free act of the will. But when the tendency is stimu- 
 lated independently of the will, against the will, then 
 the will finds itself confronted by a resistance not of its 
 own creation, and which requires an effort on the part 
 of the will to master. In proportion as the vehemence 
 of the unsought tendency grows greater, in the same 
 proportion is the effort required to resist, greater ; and 
 in this sense is the voluntariness of an act of the will 
 yielding, said to diminish. However, the liberty of the 
 will is never totally destroyed, unless the solicitation be 
 so strong as to hinder the free use of reason. 
 
 113. Q. What is fear? 
 
 A. Fear is a disturbance of the mind arising from 
 impending evil. 
 
 114. Q. Does an act done through fear cease to be 
 voluntary ? 
 
 A. Not unless the fear destroys the right use of 
 reason. 
 
 115. Q. In what sense or when can fear be said to 
 affect the voluntariness of an act ? 
 
 A. In this sense : that, were it not for the fear, the 
 
THE HUMAN ACT. 39 
 
 act would not be willed. The act is not at all desired 
 in itself, but only as a means to escape from an evil 
 that is feared. Thus, a merchant in a storm at sea 
 throws his cargo overboard. He knows fully what he 
 is doing, and chooses to do it under the circumstances. 
 He makes the sacrifice in order to avoid what he regards 
 as a greater loss, the loss of his life. So also one will 
 take a bitter medicine to avert a dangerous illness. In 
 both cases there remains an aversion to the thing which 
 is done — the throwing away of the goods and the tak- 
 ing of the medicine. Still both are voluntary, as the 
 person retains the power not to do them. In the sense 
 then that a thing is done only through fear, and would 
 not otherwise be done, fear is said to diminish the vol- 
 untariness of an act. 
 
 116. Q. Does force render an act involuntary ? 
 
 A. An act that is simply forced is purely involuntary ; 
 and it remains purely involuntary, so long as the will 
 stands in opposition. 
 
 1 17. Q. What kind of acts may be forced ? 
 
 A. Only such as may be commanded acts. The 
 elicited act — that is, the pure act of the will — can 
 never be forced ; for, to be a pure act of the will, it 
 must be purely voluntary. 
 
 1 i.S. (). Whal is required that an act may be said to 
 be forced ? 
 
 A. That an act may be said to be purely forced, it 
 must be brought about by a power altogether external 
 to the will; and — in case it be adverted to — also 
 against the choice of the will. Thus a person may be 
 toned to see by having his eyes kept open by some one 
 else, against his will and in spite of all resistance. Or, 
 a person may Ik: Forced to stand still -though he de- 
 
40 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 sires to walk, and tries to walk, — because a stronger 
 person holds him fast. The seeing and the standing 
 still are purely involuntary. 
 
 119. Q. What is to be said of acts that are performed 
 unconsciously, through mere habit ? 
 
 A. If the habit was voluntarily acquired, such acts 
 are voluntary in the cause. However, if a person ap- 
 plies himself to overcome a habit, and, nevertheless, 
 some acts escape him, through inadvertence, these acts 
 can hardly be so voluntary as they would be were he 
 not striving to overcome the habit he had voluntarily 
 formed or continued. 
 
CHAPTER III. MORALITY. 
 
 Article I. Moral Good and Moral Evil. 
 
 Morality — It belongs to the Human Act — Moral Good and Moral 
 Evil — The Keeping or Disturbing of the Natural Order of Things 
 — Man's Relations in the Natural Order of Things — Moral Good 
 and Moral Evil for Man — The Human Act, Morally Good, keeps 
 Man directed towards his Last End — The Word " Moral." 
 
 120. Q. What is meant by morality. 
 
 A. That which constitutes a thing good or bad, in 
 the sense that it is right or wrong to will it. 
 
 121. Q. How do we here limit the application of the 
 terms, good and bad? 
 
 A. We here limit the terms, good and bad, to the 
 extent in which they are applicable to the human being, 
 so that for the act in question the individual acting may 
 be called a good or bad man. One may be a good man 
 and not be a good mechanic ; and one may be a very 
 good mechanic, etc., and yet be a very bad man. Moral 
 good and moral evil characterize the acts of the man as 
 man, that is, the free acts of a free rational being. 
 What might be good for the man, considered merely in 
 his animal nature, might be bad for the entire personal- 
 ity, matt, taken as a unit. 
 
 122. Q. Are there some things, sonic acts, which in 
 themselves without further consideration, are morally 
 
 41 
 
42 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 good or morally bad, m the sense that it is right or 
 wrong to do them ? 
 A. Yes. 
 
 123. Q. What easy argument have we to prove this ? 
 A. (1) The uniform, universal, and constant testimony 
 
 of the whole human race ; 
 
 (2) The special testimony of our own minds which 
 naturally and always approve or condemn certain acts ; 
 
 (3) The peculiar testimony of pagan nations which, 
 though they were practically given up to vices in general, 
 retained the names good and bad for certain acts. Thus 
 they never approved of blasphemy, theft, calumny ; and 
 always praised religion, justice, filial piety, etc. 
 
 124. Q. Wherein then do moral good and moral evil 
 consist ? 
 
 A. In conformity with or discrepancy from the 
 natural order of things. Though whole nations have 
 been sunk in vice, no nation has ever entirely lost the 
 idea of a certain fitness of certain actions and a certain 
 unfitness of other actions for the free choice of the will. 
 Their agreement upon these actions shows that they 
 judged from the nature of things. And they rewarded 
 or punished, as good or bad in themselves, the one kind 
 or the other. 
 
 125. Q. How does man stand in this natural order of 
 things ? 
 
 A. He stands, — 
 
 (1) As a created being dependent upon his Creator ; 
 
 (2) As part of the created universe ; 
 
 (3) As a being endowed with various faculties, sensi- 
 tive, and purely spiritual. 
 
 126. Q. What relations arise from this position of 
 man in the general order of things ? 
 
MORALITY. 43 
 
 A. The following relations : — 
 
 (i) Towards God, a relation of total dependence ; 
 
 (2) Towards the created beings of the universe, a 
 relation of superiority and dominion as regards the 
 irrational part ; and a relation of equality as regards the 
 rest of men ; 
 
 (3) Between the faculties, certain relations of order — 
 subordination of the lower to the higher, and between 
 the lower faculties a certain co-ordination as tending to 
 their general subordination. 
 
 127. Q. Upon what are all these relations founded ? 
 A. Upon the very nature, essences of things. Hence 
 
 these relations are as unchangeable as the essences of 
 things. 
 
 128. Q. What then is good for man or morally good ? 
 A. The conformity of his actions, as man, with these 
 
 his essential relations. 
 
 129. Q. What is morally bad for man ? 
 
 A. The non-conformity of his human acts with these 
 his essential relations ; that is, with the order established 
 by his essential relations. 
 
 130. Q. Has moral good or moral evil anything to do 
 with the reaching of man's last end, his highest good, 
 and with the attaining <>f perfect happiness? 
 
 ./. Yes; lor morality is simply the right direction of 
 our actions to the last end or highest good. Man can 
 tend to his perfection not otherwise than by acting in 
 harmony with these established essential relations which 
 he cannot destroy ; and by regulating the use of his 
 faculties according to that natural subordination which 
 exists between them. Anything else would be a dis- 
 turbance, would be in opposition to the very demands 
 of human nature; and hence, not conducive to the 
 
44 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 perfection of human nature, not conducive to happi- 
 ness. 
 
 131. Q. What then is the meaning of the word 
 moral ? 
 
 A. The word moral comes from the Latin word 
 moralis. The word moralis comes from the word mores 
 (mos, moris) which means habits. However, it does not 
 mean habits in the sense in which we say the habits of 
 the bee, the habits of the seal, etc. The irrational ani- 
 mals have their habits by nature, from the time of birth. 
 These habits they do not change, nor are they capable 
 of making a deliberate change. Man, however, can 
 acqitire habits of his own free will. Moral philosophy 
 is the study of those habits which are befitting to 
 human nature, to man ; which tend to preserve his 
 essential relations and keep him directed to his last end. 
 Such habits are said to be morally good ; the opposite 
 habits are said to be morally bad. And as these habits 
 are acquired by a repetition of individual acts, so also 
 the individual act is said to be morally good or morally 
 bad, as tending to establish the good or bad habit. 
 
 Article II. Determinants of Morality. 
 
 Determinants of Morality — Purpose, Means, Circumstances — End 
 does not justify Means — Circumstances: Relevant, Irrelevant, 
 Aggravating, Extenuating, Specifying — Act: when Materially 
 or Formally Bad — The Intention or Desire not accomplished — 
 The Indifferent Act. 
 
 132. Q. In determining the morality of an act of the 
 will, how many things have to be taken into considera- 
 tion ? 
 
MORALITY. 45 
 
 A. Three things : — 
 
 (i) The purpose of the will; 
 
 (2) The nature of all the acts commanded or elicited 
 towards that purpose ; 
 
 (3) The circumstances of all these purposes or acts 
 intended finally or intermediately. These three elements 
 taken together form one complex object to which the 
 will is directed. If any one of these violates the essen- 
 tial relations of the individual willing, the act of the will 
 is morally bad. 
 
 133- Q- What then is required that the act of the 
 will be morally good ? 
 
 A. It is necessary that the final purpose, all the in- 
 termediate purposes (or the means willed) and the cir- 
 cumstances of all the purposes be in keeping with man's 
 essential relations or be morally good. 
 
 1 34. Q. What is sufficient to make an act of the will 
 morally bad ? 
 
 A. It is sufficient that there be a defect in any of the 
 requisites just mentioned. 
 
 E35. Q. Which is the chief determinant of the mo- 
 rality of the act of the will ? 
 
 . /. The final purpose, because it is the chief thing on 
 which the will is fixed, to which it directs all else, unci 
 without which it would not act 
 
 a bad means, or intermediate purpose, 
 be< ome good by reason of being directed to a good end 
 or good further pur] 
 
 A. Never. The end and the means directed towards 
 it become one complex object as willed by the will. So 
 that if the means be evil, the will cannot aim, even at a 
 
 ■•[ end through such means, without performing an 
 
 act that is morally bad. Furthermore, if the final pur- 
 
46 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 pose be evil, this purpose vitiates the act of the will 
 choosing any means to arrive at it, even though said 
 means, in itself considered, would not be bad ; for, the 
 will, so choosing, chooses such means, not as in itself 
 considered, but, complexly, as means — to — a — bad — 
 end. A good end cannot justify a bad means. A bad 
 end vitiates the use of even a good means. 
 
 137. Q. What is meant by the circumstances ? 
 
 A. Something peculiar in the person acting or the 
 thing done, the place, time, or manner of the action ; 
 from which there may sometimes arise even special 
 relations which would not exist in other circumstances. 
 
 The person acting. Thus : a man has been fairly tried 
 and rightfully condemned to death on the clearest evi- 
 dence which he himself substantiates by his own confes- 
 sion. If he be executed by a lawfully autJiorized person, 
 the killing will be an act of justice. But if he be put to 
 death by a private individual, through motives of ven- 
 geance, the killing will be murder. 
 
 The thing done. The giving away of money can be 
 an alms if it be one's own money. It will be theft if it 
 be another's money. 
 
 The place. Thus : an evil deed may contract a new 
 species of evil by the place in which it is done ; a sacred 
 or public place, for instance, adding to it the character 
 of sacrilege or scandal. 
 
 138. Q. What is a relevant circumstance ? 
 
 A. One that affects the morality of an act as good or 
 bad. Thus, in the giving of money, the giving to a 
 poor man who wants to buy bread ; or the giving to an 
 intemperate man who asks it that he may intoxicate 
 himself. 
 
 139. Q. What is an irrelevant circumstance ? 
 
MORALITY. 47 
 
 A. One that does not affect the morality of an act as 
 good or bad. Thus it does not affect an act, to make it 
 good or bad, whether one gives alms at the door or 
 through the window, or whether one intoxicates himself 
 in the east room or the west room. 
 
 140. Q. What is an aggravating circumstance ? 
 
 A. One that increases the degree of moral goodness 
 or moral badness of the act in the same kind ; as if one 
 makes a greater alms or nurses his anger longer. 
 
 141. Q. What is an extenuating circumstance ? 
 
 A. One that diminishes the moral goodness or moral 
 badness of the act in the same kind. 
 
 142. Q. What is a specifying circumstance ? 
 
 A. One that carries with it a new kind or species of 
 moral goodness or moral evil. Thus to be charitable is 
 good. Charity to our enemies adds a new kind of moral 
 goodness, i.e. forgiveness. 
 
 143. Q. Has the knowledge or ignorance of the 
 exact nature of the whole case anything to do with the 
 morality of the act of the will willing ? 
 
 A. Yes. The act of the will is morally good or bad 
 and in such species of goodness or badness, not pre- 
 cisely according to the exact nature of the thing done 
 as it is in itself, and of the circumstances as they are in 
 themselves ; but as they are known to be or even, 
 through mistake, thought to be. We must here call to 
 mind all that has been said about ignorance as affecting 
 the human act of which we are always speaking. An 
 ad may be materially bad, that is, in itself, and at the 
 same time it may not be formally bad, as a human act, 
 because the element "f knowledge <>f its badness is 
 
 inculpably lacking. 
 
 144. (}. Will the act <>i the will be nevertheless 
 
48 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 morally good or bad, according to the nature of the 
 act intended, though the effect it intends to bring about 
 does not follow ? 
 
 A. The consequent or non-consequent effect does 
 not change the nature of the act of the will really will- 
 ing or intending. He who really wills to kill another, 
 and yet does not kill simply because he does not find 
 an opportunity, is guilty, so long as his will lasts, of the 
 same kind of moral evil as he who wishes to kill and 
 does kill. His will has been deliberately directed to 
 the same kind of moral evil. Commonly, however, the 
 actual doing indicates greater intensity and persever- 
 ance on the part of the will. 
 
 145. Q. Is every human act in itself either morally 
 good or morally bad ? 
 
 A. No. There are acts which, in themselves con- 
 sidered, are neither to be styled morally good nor 
 morally bad. They are styled indifferent actions. To 
 speak or to walk or to read cannot be styled morally 
 good or morally bad, considered apart by itself ; but it 
 may become one or the other by reason of the circum- 
 stances. It will make quite a difference what a person 
 speaks or reads, or why he speaks or reads or walks. 
 Walking, in itself, is not bad ; walking-for-tJie-purposc-of 
 committing-a-tJieft is bad, by reason of the purpose run- 
 ning through the act; and he does wrong who walks 
 for the evil purpose. 
 
MORALITY. 49 
 
 Article III. False Views. 
 
 Opinion or Human Law does not affect the Intrinsic Morality of an 
 Act — No Rule of Morality in Atheism, Pantheism, Material- 
 ism—The So-called " Moral Sense." 
 
 146. Q. Can the opinion of men change the morality 
 of an act, so that, opinion changing, what was wrong, 
 for instance, may become right? 
 
 A. The opinion of men has nothing to do with the 
 nature of good and evil ; and hence nothing to do with 
 the nature of right and wrong. The difference between 
 good and evil, right and wrong, is founded on the very 
 nature of things ; and the nature of things cannot be 
 changed by any opinions of men. 
 
 147. Q. Can the law of a State make an act right or 
 wrong ? 
 
 A. No law of any State can affect the nature of an 
 act as it is in itself, so as to make good evil ; or evil, 
 good. But there are certain indifferent acts whose 
 omission, and certain others whose performance, may be 
 detrimental to the true public welfare. These the law 
 may prohibit or command. The nature of the act does 
 not change. But it becomes intimately connected with 
 an order of things which it is right to keep and wrong 
 to disturb. 
 
 148. Q. What about the morality of Atheists, Pan- 
 theists, Materialists ? 
 
 A. They can form no settled notions of morality, of 
 right or wrong. The Atheist denying, in words, the 
 existence of God, denies the basis of morality. The 
 Pantheist, making himself God, denies all obligation. 
 The Materialist, denying the spiritual soul, denying 
 
50 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 free will, puts an end to all morality, to all distinction 
 between good and evil. 
 
 149. Q. By what faculty are we to distinguish moral 
 good or moral evil in an action ? 
 
 A. By our intellect, just as we perceive other truths. 
 Moral good is the conformity, moral evil the non-con- 
 formity of an act with our essential relations. The 
 truth of this conformity is to be perceived by the intel- 
 lect only. 
 
 150. Q. Why then do we sometimes speak of a 
 moral sense ? 
 
 A. We do so merely by a transfer or rather a misuse 
 of terms. When we say a person has no moral sense or 
 sense of morality, we mean that such person does not 
 show sensibly the horror that good persons usually 
 exhibit outwardly at the presence of evil, or that the 
 person does evil so readily as not to seem to distin- 
 guish between good and evil. And just as we transfer 
 the word see (which implies the sensible ocular vision) 
 to express intellectual perception of truth, saying that 
 we see a truth, so do we employ the words, moral sense, 
 when we mean the intelligence, as the means we possess 
 of perceiving, appreciating the morality of an action. 
 
 Article IV. Imputability. 
 
 Imputability — Attributable and Imputable — An Act Imputable in 
 so far as Voluntary. 
 
 151. Q. When is an action attributable to an agent? 
 A. Any action that proceeds from an agent is attrib- 
 utable to the agent, whether the agent act with liberty 
 
MORALITY. 51 
 
 or not. Thus heat is attributable to the sun ; health to 
 a climate. Any effect is attributable to any of its causes, 
 entire or partial, to the extent to which they are causes 
 of the effect. 
 
 152. Q. Is every action also said to be imputable to 
 the agent from which it proceeds ? 
 
 A. No. Though in common discourse, the words 
 attributable, imputable, to attribute, to impute, are some- 
 times used synonymously, still in the strict philosophi- 
 cal sense, the word imputable is the more limited. It is 
 applied only where the agent acts with knowledge and 
 liberty. A headache may be attributed to overwork. 
 It will not be imputed to overwork. It may be imputed 
 to the person who has knowingly strained himself by 
 overwork. In the strictest philosophical sense, the word 
 imputable is applied to actions (whether elicited or com- 
 manded) which are regarded as morally good or morally 
 bad. And these actions are said to be morally imputa- 
 ble to the person who by his free will elicits or com- 
 mands them. 
 
 153. Q. In how far is moral good or moral evil im- 
 putable to a person ? 
 
 A. In so far as it proceeds from or is adopted by the 
 person knowingly and willingly. 
 
 154. Q. Do ignorance, fear, concupiscence, force, 
 affect the imputability of an act? 
 
 A. They do just in so far as they affect the voluntari- 
 ness of an act. 
 
 r 55- Q- Can the acts of one person be morally im- 
 putable to another ? 
 
 A. Yes; whenever and in so far as the Other is 
 knowingly and willingly the cause of the act, whether 
 by counsel, command, consent, praise, blame, participa- 
 tion, etc. 
 
CHAPTER IV. LAW. 
 
 Article I. The Moral Law. 
 
 Law — The Moral Law — Its Binding Force — Law, Rule, and 
 Precept — Characters of Law — Binding only when Promulgated. 
 
 156. Q. What do we understand by the word law ? 
 A. By law we understand some constant and uniform 
 
 method of procedure followed or to be followed by a 
 class of beings ; and to which that class is in a sense 
 bound. 
 
 157. Q. Do all laws bind in the same way ? 
 
 A. No. When, for instance, we speak of the lazes 
 of falling bodies we mean the. constant, uniform method, 
 according to which bodies fall, to which they are bound 
 by a certain necessity, and from which they cannot 
 escape. When on the other hand we speak of the laws 
 of grammar we refer to constant methods which men 
 follow in speech, but to which they feel bound only by 
 convention. 
 
 158. Q. What kind of law do we speak of in ethics? 
 A. The moral law. 
 
 1 59. Q. What is the moral law ? 
 
 A. A constant uniform method of action, which, if 
 followed, will keep man's essential relations undisturbed. 
 
 160. Q. Why do you say if followed? 
 
 A. Because though it is a law and really binds, still 
 
 52 
 
law. 53 
 
 man has it in his power by his own free will to go 
 against it. His will is, as we say, physically free. 
 
 161. 0. Why is this law called the moral law ? 
 
 A. Because it regards the keeping of the moral order, 
 the doing of moral good, and the avoidance of moral evil. 
 
 162. Q. As law is said to bind, from whom does it 
 get its binding force ? 
 
 A. From some one who has power to give it binding 
 force. 
 
 163. 0. What is such a one called ? 
 A. A Superior. 
 
 164. Q. How is the binding force of a law measured ? 
 A. By the power the Superior has to bind and by his 
 
 will to use that power. 
 
 165. Q. But if the human will is physically free, 
 who has power to define the limits within which that 
 physical liberty is to be used ? 
 
 A. The Creator of the human will, who made it 
 what it is. 
 
 166. Q. What is the difference between a law and 
 a rule ? 
 
 A. Rule is a general term which is sometimes used 
 to signify law. Strictly speaking a rule is given for 
 direction ; law is given to oblige. 
 
 \G~. Q. What is the difference between a law and a 
 precept ? 
 
 i I. The word law means the same as the word precept. 
 But law is employed only to signify what has a public 
 character; and precept is applied to commands given to 
 individuals. Law is, indeed, a public general precept ■ 
 and precept is a private personal law. 
 
 168. Q. What therefore are the characters of law, 
 as we used the word ? 
 
54 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 A. The following : — 
 
 (i) Law comes from the will of the superior of a 
 public body, as of the human race or of a nation. 
 
 (2) Law is intended for the whole community. 
 
 (3) It is intended for the good of that whole com- 
 munity. 
 
 (4) It is intended to have permanency. 
 
 169. Q. What circumstance is necessary that law 
 shall have its binding force, and that its violation may 
 be imputable to the will ? 
 
 A. It is necessary that the law be promulgated, that 
 is, so published that it may be known by those for whom 
 it is intended. For, one who is invincibly ignorant of 
 a law cannot will to violate the law. And if the law 
 is not sufficiently published to him, he is certainly in- 
 vincibly ignorant of it. Hence, although he may do 
 the deed prohibited by the law or omit the deed com- 
 manded by the law, yet his will is not directed to such 
 deed or omission as a violation of the law. 
 
 Article II. The Natural Law. 
 
 The Natural Law— Its Existence — Readily Known — A Special 
 Testimony — The Natural Law is Divine— It is that Part of 
 the Eternal Law which applies to Man's Free Acts — Natural 
 Law is Unchangeable, Irrevocable. 
 
 170. Q. What is the natural law ? 
 
 A. The natural law is a body of precepts which are 
 founded upon the very nature of things, which tend to 
 the natural perfection of man (are the rule of man's 
 perfection), and which can be — and are in more or less 
 definite outline — naturally known to all men. 
 
law. 55 
 
 171. Q. Have we indications that the human race 
 has recognized the existence of such law ? 
 
 A. Yes. For, (1) All mankind have always judged 
 certain actions to be good ; certain others to be bad. 
 
 (2) All men have judged that there existed and ex- 
 ists a certain obligation of doing the good and avoiding 
 the bad. Hence they have recognized the existence of 
 a superior imposing this obligation. 
 
 (3) All men have always judged this obligation to 
 exist for all mankind, and to extend even to internal 
 elicited acts. 
 
 172. Q. Is this law, then, so readily known ? 
 
 A. Yes; in its more general precepts. For we can 
 readily know by the light of reason (1) That certain 
 actions are good and certain others bad, and that certain 
 omissions are bad; (2) That there is an All-wise Crea- 
 tor ; (3) That he wishes the order of his Creation to be 
 observed by each being according to its nature ; that is, 
 necessarily by those beings that have not free will, and 
 freely by those to whom he has given liberty of action. 
 
 173. O. Have we also in the judgment of men a very 
 strong special testimony to the existence of the natural 
 law ? 
 
 A. Yes. We have it in the judgments even of men 
 of depraved lives, who, though they look on the law as 
 a burden, and would gladly be rid of it to follow, with- 
 out reproach, the lives of brutes, still do not deny the 
 existence of the law, and, in their hearts, look up to 
 those who keep it. 
 
 174. Q. Is this law a divine law ? 
 
 A. It is a divine law because it is the command of God. 
 
 175. Q. Should it be called an eternal law, or a tem- 
 poral law ? 
 
56 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 A. It is an eternal law in the sense that it was willed 
 from eternity, though to be observed in time. It is a 
 temporal law in the sense that it could be known and 
 kept by man only after his creation. 
 
 176. Q. Do we, then, mean the same thing by the 
 expressions eternal law and natural law ? 
 
 A. Not precisely. The expression, eternal law, has 
 the wider signification. 
 
 God wills to bind his creatures to certain lines of 
 action, in keeping with the nature he has given them. 
 Decreeing from eternity to create, this, also, from eter- 
 nity he willed. Hence his will, or decree, that they 
 should so act is called the Eternal Law. It extends to 
 every created being, whether free and intelligent or not. 
 With regard to all physical effects through the universe, 
 where the action of a free will is not concerned, this law 
 is executed by the necessary action of the nature of 
 things. But free beings, in so far as their freedom 
 goes, it does not necessitate ; otherwise they would not 
 be free. Them it obliges. It binds them without forc- 
 ing them. Hence, the term "eternal law," is used to 
 signify the divine will with reference to the whole crea- 
 tion. The "natural law," considered as contained in 
 the eternal law, signifies the divine will, in reference to 
 the physically free acts of man, and as such will is 
 naturally knowable by reason. 
 
 l 77- Q- Can the natural law change ? 
 
 A. No. Because it is founded upon the very nature 
 of things. That which is of its nature good cannot be- 
 come of its nature bad ; and that which is of its nature 
 bad cannot become of its nature good. Hence, the 
 law commanding according to the nature of things can- 
 not change. Human nature remains always the same; 
 
law. 57 
 
 hence, also, the law by which it must be guided to its 
 unchangeable end. 
 
 178. Q. Cannot man be freed from the observance 
 of the natural law ? 
 
 A. Xo. Because the natural law contains those pre- 
 cepts without which man cannot fulfil the object of his 
 existence. 
 
 179. Q. May it not happen that a person be ignorant 
 of the natural law, and thus be excused from its observ- 
 ance ? 
 
 A. Invincible ignorance, of course, excuses always 
 from culpability, but no one can be invincibly ignorant 
 of the fundamental precepts of the natural law. 
 
 180. Q. Still, how does it happen that what is good 
 in one instance may be bad in another? 
 
 A. This only seems to happen. The thing is not 
 really the same in the two cases. Thus, the killing of 
 a man is evil, if it be done by a private individual taking 
 vengeance on his enemy. But it is not evil if it be done 
 by the proper public official, in carrying out a just law 
 in the execution of a criminal. 
 
 Article III. Promulgation of the Natural Law. 
 
 Natural Law promulgated by Reason — Reason not the Law — False 
 Position of Kant — How Rectified — What is meant by the Expres- 
 sion, "Law of Reason." 
 
 181. (]. How is this natural law promulgated? 
 A. ' It is promulgated by reason to the will. 
 
 182. Q. How does reason make known the existence 
 of such a law ? 
 
 A. As has often been stated, — 
 
58 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 (i) By pure reason we can learn the existence of God. 
 
 (2) By pure reason we can learn that God is our last 
 end and highest good. 
 
 (3) Pure reason can teach us that the natural aim and 
 purpose of our existence is to tend to that last end and 
 highest good. Hence also does it teach us that God, the 
 author of our existence, wishes us to aim at this highest 
 good. God, therefore, wishes us to adopt that line of 
 conduct which is necessary to the end. But we know 
 that there are certain actions which we must perform, and 
 others which we must avoid, in order to keep our lives 
 directed to the last end. This being so, we know that 
 God wishes us to do the one kind and to avoid the other. 
 
 183. Q. Can we say then that reason is the natural 
 law? 
 
 A. No. Reason is not a law ; nor does it make a law. 
 Reason only points out the law. Reason does not 
 impose an obligation ; it merely makes known the obli- 
 gation. A law can be imposed by no other than a 
 superior. But our reason is not our superior. Reason 
 is only one of our faculties. Moreover, the imposing 
 of the law is an act of will ; hence law cannot be 
 reason nor an act of reason. 
 
 184. Q. What false position has been assumed by 
 some writers in this regard ? 
 
 A. The false position taken by Immanuel Kant, in 
 the last century, that there can be what is called 
 "independent morality." Kant assumed reason to be 
 the ultimate basis of obligation ; the final sole source of 
 any obligation thus being that the contrary, opposite, or 
 contradictory is against reason — or, in other words, 
 unreasonable. . This is a false position because it makes 
 man a law-giver to himself ; whereas man cannot give 
 
LAW. 59 
 
 a law to himself, because he is not his own superior — 
 jurisdiction demanding distinction of persons. Besides, 
 reason does not constitute the source of the obligation ; 
 it merely recognizes the existence of the obligation. 
 Law must be imposed by the will of a person, and of a 
 person distinct from the one upon whom the obligation 
 is imposed. Hence, according to the assumption of 
 Kant and his followers, there can be no obligation of 
 any kind at any time. Whence, it would follow that 
 there could be no right or wrong in human action, and 
 therefore no practical morality. The dictate of reason 
 pointing out the obligation does not create the obliga- 
 tion, or in other words, there is no such thing as 
 " independent morality," — that is, morality without the 
 law-giver prescribing the natural law. Under the 
 assumption of Kant, if a man chooses to go against his 
 reason, or, in other words, to do what we all recognize 
 as evil, he can be called to account by no one ; for the 
 Kantian doctrine releases man from all authority, making 
 him amenable to his own reason only, which is not 
 and cannot be a law-giver. Thus there could be at 
 most what is called a " philosophical " sin ; and the most 
 that could be done to any wrong-doer would be to say to 
 him that he has not acted reasonably ; it being impos- 
 sible for him to become strictly a law-breaker, in a 
 theory which takes no account of the essence of law 
 as coming from a real law-maker. 
 
 185. Q. How are we to rectify the Kantian position ? 
 
 A. By recognizing that there can be no obligation 
 which is not from a will, and that will even the will of 
 the Creator, whose will is that we should act according 
 to onr reason. Thus what in K;mtism, if in regard to 
 the human act, is said to be merely unreasonable, or 
 
6<D FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 " philosophical " wrong, is seen to be theological wrong. 
 It is sin. It is the violation of the law proper — the 
 violation of the ordination of a superior. 
 
 1 86. Q. But do we not sometimes call the natural law 
 the law of reason ? 
 
 A. Yes. But we mean by this that it is discoverable 
 by reason ; not that it is made by reason. 
 
 187. Q. But if a law requires a superior, how does it 
 happen that man can and does, really, sometimes, bind 
 himself ? 
 
 A. We repeat it, a man is not his own superior; he 
 cannot bind himself. He may freely put himself in a 
 position where he will be bound by a law which he has 
 not made. Thus when a man gives his solemn word or 
 signs a just contract, he is bound not by the word 
 or writing, but he is bound by the natural law to keep 
 his solemn promise given. He merely puts a condition, 
 the giving of his solemn promise, whereby he places 
 himself in the circumstances where this particular law 
 previously existing — the law of keeping one's word — 
 finds an application. 
 
 Article IV. Obligation. 
 
 Obligation — Physical and Moral Freedom — Foundation of Obliga- 
 tion — Mistake of Rationalists — Office of Reason — Law Prior to 
 Obligation. 
 
 188. Q. What is an obligation? 
 
 A. An obligation is a certain necessity under which the 
 will may lie of acting in one way rather than in another. 
 
 189. Q. Does the will still remain free to act in the 
 other way ? 
 
LAW. 6 1 
 
 A. Yes, it remains physically free ; but not, as it is 
 said, morally free. By the physical power it is able to 
 choose the contrary ; by reason of the moral obligation 
 it may not. Thus a man may have the physical power 
 to steal or not to steal, but he is not morally free ; he is 
 under an obligation not to steal. 
 
 190. Q. On what is obligation founded ? 
 
 A. On the will of the Creator. And when one 
 human will is morally bound to obey another, this obli- 
 gation exists only because such obedience is according 
 to the essential relations of the will obeying, and is, 
 thus, the will of the Creator. 
 
 191. Q. How do those who call themselves " ration- 
 alists " go astray on the question of obligation ? 
 
 A. In the same manner as those who follow the 
 doctrines of Kant ; that is, by deriving the binding force 
 of all law from reason. 
 
 192. Q. How, again, is this incorrect? 
 
 A. (1) In deriving the binding force of law from 
 reason instead of from will. 
 
 (2) In making each man at the same time the 
 superior commanding and the subject obeying; whereas 
 a man can be only just equal to himself. 
 
 (3) In making each man thus appoint his own neces- 
 sary end. This no man can do, for he has the end 
 appointed for him by the Creator of human nature. 
 Neither can he appoint, as he pleases, the means 
 necessary to the end ; for these again would involve an 
 obligation, and he cannot impose an obligation upon 
 himself. 
 
 i93- (2- What then does reason do ? 
 
 A. Reason merely perceives and proclaims the law. 
 
 194. Q. But if reason simply proclaims a law which 
 
62 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 comes from God, how is it that we do not think of God 
 commanding ? 
 
 A. It is not necessary that we should, at each moment, 
 think explicitly of God commanding. We have what is 
 called habitual knowledge. It is so in all the affairs 
 of life. When we make complicated calculations with 
 numbers we do not reduce everything back to the funda- 
 mental rules of arithmetic on which these calculations 
 are based. Neither, when we speak correctly, do we 
 keep our minds fixed upon the rules of grammar; 
 though, at the same time, we are conscious of what we 
 have done, when at any time we may have violated 
 them. We eat to live and to be strong enough to per- 
 form our duties ; yet we do not always call this to mind 
 when we sit down to dinner. 
 
 195. Q. But can we not conceive of an obligation to 
 do certain actions and to avoid certain others even prior 
 to the existence of law ? 
 
 A. No. The necessity of doing certain actions and 
 of avoiding certain others to reach the last end, is the 
 foundation for the law. Law is not constituted by>the 
 nature of an action nor by the perception of its nature ; 
 though the nature of the action serves as the foundation 
 for the law. Even in civil matters, for instance, the 
 needs of a city are the reason for making city laws, still 
 neither the needs of the city, nor the knowledge of these 
 needs, separate or together, suffice to make a law. The 
 law must come from a will. 
 
63 
 
 Article V. Knowledge of the Natural Law. 
 
 Knowledge of the Natural Law — Fundamental Principles — Imme- 
 diate and Remote Conclusions — The First Principle. 
 
 196. 0. Are all the precepts of the natural law 
 known by us with the same readiness ? 
 
 A. No. We can perceive directly certain general 
 fundamental principles or precepts. Such are the pre- 
 cepts : " Do good and avoid evil," " Keep the essential 
 order," " Be by your free will what the perfection of 
 human nature requires." 
 
 From these general precepts we can very readily 
 reason to certain other precepts, as immediate conclu- 
 sions. Some such immediate conclusions are : " Wor- 
 ship God," " Honor your parents," " Do not to others 
 what you would not have them do to you." 
 
 From the preceding we can still go on reasoning to 
 further or more remote conclusions, thus going into the 
 details of the law. 
 
 197. Q. Are the general principles so easily known? 
 
 A. Yes. The history of peoples proves it. All peo- 
 ples have recognized these principles. If it were possi- 
 ble for them to be totally unknown some race of people 
 would have been ignorant of them. They are recog- 
 nized even by children. 
 
 198. Q. What of the more immediate conclusions? 
 
 A. They comprise such precepts as are in the deca- 
 logue. They are easily deduced from the fundamental 
 precepts. Experience proves that they cannot be in- 
 vincibly unknown for a long time. 
 
 (]. What argument againsl so-called atheists can 
 be drawn from this ? 
 
64 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 A. These men, so-called atheists, do admit moral 
 obligation, at least in words ; therefore they must admit 
 the existence of a superior imposing the obligation, God. 
 
 200. Q. If the law is so clear, why are there so many 
 disputes about good and evil, right and wrong ? 
 
 A. The dispute is not about the general principles, 
 but about certain applications which reason has to make 
 in certain particular complicated circumstances. 
 
 201. Q. Still if the law is so universally known, why 
 is it that we often find large bodies of people sometimes 
 violating one or another precept ? 
 
 A. This happens not for want of knowledge, but in 
 spite of knowledge : it comes from a wilful choice of 
 evil. 
 
 202. Q. Is there any first principle of the natural 
 law? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 203. Q. Which one is it ? 
 
 A. The one from which all others are deduced, and to 
 which they are all reducible. 
 
 204. Q. How is this principle expressed ? 
 
 A. It may be expressed in various terms. The sim- 
 plest expression of it is in the following form : " Do 
 good and avoid evil." 
 
 205. Q. What, once more, is good with reference to 
 man ? 
 
 A. Whatever is necessary to preserve his essential 
 relations. 
 
 206. Q. What is evil with reference to man ? 
 A. Whatever disturbs his essential relations. 
 
 207. Q. Which, or of what kind, are these essential 
 relations ? 
 
 A. Relations towards God, towards other men, 
 towards himself. 
 
65 
 
 Article VI. Command and Prohibition. 
 Affirmative and Negative Precepts — How they Oblige. 
 
 208. Q. How many kinds or classes of precepts are 
 there in the natural law? 
 
 A. Two classes ; negative and affirmative precepts. 
 
 Negative precepts of the natural law prohibit actions 
 which are bad in themselves, such as blasphemy, par- 
 ricide, etc. 
 
 Affirmative precepts of the natural law command 
 actions which are necessary for the preservation of 
 man's essential relations, and whose opposites are, 
 therefore, in themselves bad. 
 
 209. Q. How do the negative precepts of the natural 
 law oblige ? 
 
 A. They oblige all persons, always, and at all times ; 
 that is to say, there is no occasion when the actual ful- 
 filment of the precept, which is one of abstention, 
 ceases. Such is the precept, not to steal. 
 
 210. Q. How do the affirmative precepts of the 
 natural law oblige ? 
 
 A. They also oblige always, in the sense that they 
 arc never revoked and that they may not be violated at 
 any time ; but they do not oblige in the sense that they 
 must be put into execution at every moment as must the 
 negative precepts of abstention. Thus by a negative 
 ept we must abstain from theft continually ; but 
 the affirmative precept, which ordains that external 
 honor be shown to parents, docs not oblige us to be 
 constantly performing external actions that indicate 
 respect. Such actions arc to be performed when the 
 occasion calls for them. However, affirmative precepts. 
 
66 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 do bind at every moment in the sense in which they 
 may be construed as negative; thus, there is no mo- 
 ment when we may dishonor our parents. 
 
 Article VII. Sanction of Law. 
 
 Sanction — Sanction of the Natural Law — Natural Consequence 
 of Violated Law — Partial and Complete Sanction — Sanction 
 known — Threefold Sanction. 
 
 211. Q. What is the sanction of a law ? 
 
 A. By the sanction of a law we mean the safeguard 
 put by the legislator for the observance of the law. 
 It is the reward for its observance and the punishment 
 for its violation. Very often, however, we apply the 
 word, sanction, simply to the punishment appointed for 
 transgressors of the law. 
 
 212. Q. Is there a sanction for the natural law ? 
 A. Reason tells us there must be a sanction. 
 
 (i) We know that a just and wise superior will act 
 differently with those who observe and those who despise 
 his law. 
 
 (2) We know that though the human will should obey 
 through the pure motive of obligation, still a sanction 
 is necessary for the generality of men, especially when 
 they are moved by strong passion. Hence the Supreme 
 Legislator will take such means, present such motives 
 as may and should be deemed sufficient or necessary to 
 urge the generality of men to keep the law. 
 
 (3) Moreover, we know by experience that it is only 
 the conviction of the existence of such sanction that 
 does keep the generality of men within the law ; and 
 
LAW. 67 
 
 that if the sanction were removed they would, in pas- 
 sion, throw off the observance of the law. 
 
 213. Q. Does the violation of the natural law carry 
 with it its own sanction ? 
 
 A. Yes. The law of any nature is to tend to its own 
 perfection. If this tendency be impeded, that perfec- 
 tion will not be reached. Man's perfection lies in that 
 which also constitutes his happiness. If he abjures 
 the law of his nature he will not reach happiness. Thus 
 far, misery is a natural result of the violation of the 
 law; and being according to the nature of things, 
 is the will of the Author of human nature. And men, 
 as a fact, do not consider that there is a law, where 
 there is no sanction. 
 
 214. Q. Is the sanction for the natural law found in 
 the present life ? 
 
 A. Partially. We must say that it is in keeping with 
 the nature of things, that it should be found partially 
 in this life. The sanction must begin, though unnoticed, 
 with the violation of the law. We know, even by ex- 
 perience, that virtue, or the observance of the law, 
 brings peace of mind ; and that vice brings bitterness 
 of soul, however much men may dissemble. Temper- 
 ance in all things very naturally brings health and 
 strength of body; whilst intemperance is followed by 
 disease and accelerates death. Virtue is followed by 
 esteem, and vice by contempt. Even amongst nations, 
 those are happy where virtue is fostered and flourishes; 
 those tend rapidly to dissolution where vice is un- 
 checked. 
 
 215. Q. Is the sanction, here referred to, a perfect 
 
 and complete sanction ? 
 
 A. No. For, it is not of itself sufficient to safeguard 
 
68 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 the law. It has not been and is not so regarded by- 
 men generally. 
 
 216. Q. What are we to conclude from this ? 
 
 A. That as there must be a perfect sanction, its 
 execution must be sought in another life. The sanction 
 in the present life is not sufficient. And the justice 
 and sanctity of the Creator and Law-giver demand that, 
 at the end, due retribution be meted out to those whose 
 wills are fixed in contempt for his law. 
 
 217. Q. Is the existence of such sanction generally 
 known ? 
 
 A. Yes. All peoples, ancient and modern, civilized 
 and uncivilized, have always professed their belief in it. 
 
 218. Q. What is this sanction in another life ? 
 
 A. It must be, at least, the privation of perfect hap- 
 piness — the innate tendency to happiness still remain- 
 ing together with the knowledge that the possibility of 
 reaching happiness has been deliberately rejected. 
 
 219. Q. But does the sanction, the punishment, ter- 
 minate here ? 
 
 A. There must be something else connected with the 
 not reaching the end. The wrong-doing contains two 
 things : the turning from the true end and the turning 
 to something which is not the end, and for which the 
 true end is rejected. It is natural that this very adop- 
 tion of the false for the true should bring with itself 
 its own punishment. This holds throughout all nature. 
 The substitution of the false for the true implies not 
 only the loss of the true, but also the pain necessarily 
 attendant upon the insufficiency of the false for the 
 purpose aimed at, and the absolute impossibility of 
 adapting it to said purpose. A false end chosen, one 
 unfitted to human nature, must bring its pain with it. 
 
LAW. 69 
 
 The principle holds universally, for choice of means 
 and for choice of end. The purpose of food is to sus- 
 tain the body. Now if one rejects what is true food 
 and takes instead what may gratify a disordered palate 
 but is not food, he will not only be deprived of bodily 
 strength but he will also suffer diseases, and eventually 
 even death as a natural consequence of his unnatural 
 mode of action. 
 
 220. Q. Can we count upon a still further punish- 
 ment as a sanction for the violation of the natural law ? 
 
 A. Yes. It is only reasonable to recognize a special 
 punishment for contempt shown to the law-giver by the 
 rebellious will. 
 
 221. Q. Is such punishment just ? 
 
 A. Most just. Is a fine for contempt of court just, 
 over and above the fine and imprisonment for the break- 
 ing of the law ? No one denies its justice. Then, if 
 so, all the more just is a sanction for contempt of God, 
 who is at once Creator, Law-giver, and Supreme Judge 
 of the universe. 
 
 Article VIII. Positive Law. 
 
 Positive Law — Its Possibility — Divine and Human — How known 
 — Ultimate Basis — Presupposes Natural Law — The Unjust 
 Law — Ignorance in the Transgressor of Human Law. 
 
 222. Q. What is a positive law? 
 
 A. A positive law is one which prohibits something 
 that is not, in itself, evil ; or commands something that 
 
 is not, in itself considered, a necessary means to a neces- 
 sary end. 
 
JO FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 223. Q. Since the positive command or prohibition 
 is not given so directly by reason of the nature of the 
 thing commanded or prohibited, upon what is it directly 
 based ? 
 
 A. Upon the free will of the legislator. 
 
 224. Q. Is this a possibility ? 
 
 A. Certainly. The Creator has a right to give such 
 laws, not only immediately, himself; but also through 
 men whom he may constitute superiors of other men 
 in regard to matters that are intimately connected with 
 the welfare of mankind. 
 
 225. Q. How many kinds of positive law are there ? 
 A. Two kinds, divine positive law, and human posi- 
 tive law. 
 
 226. Q. How can divine positive law be known ? 
 A. By divine revelation only. 
 
 227. Q. How can human positive law be known ? 
 
 A. By promulgation or proclamation proceeding from 
 the human law-giver. 
 
 228. Q. What is the ultimate basis of human posi- 
 tive law ? 
 
 A. The ultimate basis of human positive law is this : 
 that society amongst men is in the nature of things. 
 But human society cannot exist without some direction 
 from authority existing in it. This authority cannot 
 guide it to its end without legislation for particular cases 
 and circumstances. 
 
 229. Q. But is not all this provided for by the 
 natural law ? 
 
 A. Only in a general way. To give an illustration, 
 we may say that we are bound by the natural law to 
 support our lawful government. Now, though there 
 may be a best way of doing this, this best way is not 
 
LAW. 71 
 
 made known, by reason, to every one, with the same 
 clearness as is the general precept, " Do good and avoid 
 evil." So, in the vast, complicated machinery of a city 
 or a nation, for instance, if each individual were to 
 undertake, with his very limited knowledge, to deter- 
 mine the best way, we should have almost as many 
 methods as individuals, and not one in a thousand would 
 be of any value. The confusion would be indescriba- 
 ble ; and the conduct of the civil society would be an 
 impossibility. It being necessary, therefore, to have 
 something determined and uniform, this uniform method 
 being once fixed upon, must, for the very existence of 
 the society, be imposed as a positive law by the person 
 or persons in whom the authority resides. 
 
 230. Q. What, therefore, does the positive law pre- 
 suppose ? 
 
 A. Positive law necessarily presupposes the natural 
 law as a foundation upon which to rest. 
 
 2 3 l - (?• Can the divine positive law ever be in con- 
 tradiction to the natural, essential law ? 
 
 A. No ; for this would be to put a contradiction in the 
 wisdom and justice of the Creator of the order of nature. 
 
 232. 0. Can a human legislator or superior command 
 whatever he pleases, and thus impose upon his subjects 
 an obligation of doing whatever he chooses to order ? 
 
 A. Not at all. A human legislator has no real 
 authority beyond what he needs to fill the position he 
 holds, as the guide ot the society over which he pre- 
 sides. His authority is limited by the natural law to 
 the purposes for which authority itself exists in society. 
 
 233- (2« When is a human positive law, that is, the 
 command of a human superior, to be regarded as, in 
 itself, unlawful ? 
 
72 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 A. (i) When it is opposed to the natural law. 
 
 (2) When it is opposed to the divine positive law. 
 
 (3) When it is contrary to the good of the commu- 
 nity upon which it is imposed. 
 
 (4) When it prescribes what is impossible. 
 
 234. Q. Is it lawful to obey the command or law of 
 one thus legislating unlawfully ? 
 
 A. If the human so-called law be opposed to the 
 natural law or to the divine positive law, it may not be 
 obeyed. 
 
 2 35- Q- What is to be done if we find the law unjust 
 for other reasons : for instance, if it be directed, not 
 to the common good but to private good ; or, if it be 
 not equally distributed over the subjects; or, if the 
 legislator exceed his power in certain matters ? 
 
 A. If the law is certainly unjust for any of these 
 reasons, it has no binding power in itself. It is to be 
 remarked, however, that there are cases where the 
 human law, having no binding power in itself, must, 
 nevertheless, be obeyed for reasons springing from the 
 natural law. For, the thing commanded being in itself 
 an indifferent matter, that is, neither obligatory nor 
 prohibited by reason of its very nature, the circum- 
 stances may be such that to avoid positive evil, as public 
 scandal, great civil disturbance, or even bloodshed, etc., 
 we may be bound by the natural law to obey. And, in 
 general, whenever there is not moral certainty that the 
 law is unjust, it must be obeyed, because the law has 
 the presumption in its favor ; and there may readily be 
 hidden reasons which are not apt to be, and need not 
 be, open to each individual subject. 
 
 236. Q. How does it happen that persons trans- 
 gressing civil laws, in invincible ignorance as to the 
 
law. 73 
 
 existence of the law, are sometimes punished as though 
 they were culpable ? 
 
 A. The reason of this is, that, otherwise, the conduct 
 of civil society would be impossible. The civil authority 
 having taken all the means necessary to make the law 
 known to the citizens, cannot take into account every 
 subsequent plea of ignorance ; since all transgressors 
 might claim invincible ignorance, and there would be 
 no possibility of enforcing the law. This is a matter 
 well understood, and there are very few who do not 
 acquaint themselves of the laws that concern them, in 
 the society in which they live. 
 
 Article IX. A Summary. 
 
 Summary— Essential Differences between Natural and Positive 
 Law — Natural Law enforced by the Civil Law. 
 
 2 3 7- Q- Give a summary of what has been said about 
 the natural law. 
 
 A. (i) God is its Author. 
 
 (2) Reason is the herald proclaiming the law in his 
 name. 
 
 (3) Reason proclaims the law to the will, which is a 
 blind faculty needing a rule to distinguish between good 
 and evil, as well as a law with a sanction to serve it as 
 a rein and a stimulus. 
 
 (4; God is the superior; the will is the immediate 
 subject. 
 
 (5) Through the will the execution of the law passes 
 to the other faculties which the will can command. 
 
 (0) Actions in themselves bad, a wise Creator will 
 
74 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 prohibit; actions in themselves good, and, at the same 
 time, necessary for the preservation of man's essential 
 relations, the wise Creator of the order of nature will 
 command. 
 
 238. Q. Which are the essential differences between 
 the natural law and positive law ? 
 
 A. The following : — 
 
 (1) The natural law regards what is good or bad in 
 itself ; positive law regards that which is in itself indif- 
 ferent. 
 
 (2) Natural law must be imposed ; positive law de- 
 pends upon the free will of the superior. That is to 
 say, natural law is necessary, positive law is contingent. 
 
 (3) Natural law comes from God as immediate 
 superior; positive law may be imposed by a mediate 
 superior commissioned to legislate. 
 
 (4) The whole natural law is for all men; a given 
 positive law may be for a part of the human race. 
 
 (5) Natural law is unchangeable; positive law is 
 revocable. All purely human laws are positive laws. 
 
 (6) Natural law may be known by the light of rea- 
 son ; positive law, as coming from the free will of 
 the superior, must be made known by some special 
 sign. 
 
 239. Q. Are not some human laws unchangeable, 
 as, for instance, the civil laws which forbid theft and 
 murder ? 
 
 A. Such laws, though written in the civil code, are 
 not human laws. They are parts of the natural law. 
 They exist and oblige prior to the existence of any 
 human law. The human law merely calls attention to 
 them as especially necessary for the welfare of society, 
 and declares its intention of punishing transgressors. 
 
CHAPTER V. MORAL CONSCIENCE. 
 
 Article I. Moral Conscience. 
 
 Moral Conscience — True and False Conscience — Culpability and 
 False Conscience. 
 
 240. Q. What is meant by moral conscience ? 
 
 A. The name, moral conscience, is given to any 
 judgment of the mind which declares the existence 
 or absence of a moral obligation in a particular case. 
 When we say, with conviction, " I am morally obliged 
 to do this," "I am morally obliged to omit this," "I 
 am morally free to do or omit this," such judgments 
 are called acts of conscience. 
 
 241. Q. Whence comes our conviction of the truth 
 of these judgments ? 
 
 A. From the fact that they are conclusions which 
 reason draws from known truths. 
 
 242. Q. Which are these known truths ? 
 
 A. They are, always, a judgment announcing the 
 general law, and a judgment announcing that a par- 
 ticular case comes under the law or docs not come 
 under the law. From these we draw our conclusion 
 as to our own obligation in the particular case. A 
 single example will suffice to make this clear. For 
 
 instance, in the first judgment we declare the general 
 
 law, "Theft is forbidden, is evil." The second judg- 
 75 
 
76 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 ment pronounces, "The taking of this money to use 
 as my own is theft." Then the third judgment, which 
 we call conscience, declares as a conclusion drawn from 
 the preceding, " I may not take this money to use as 
 my own." 
 
 243. Q. Does the mind always go through this proc- 
 ess in passing judgment on particular cases ? 
 
 A. It does so, at least implicitly, but the process, 
 through habit, becomes so rapid as not to be noticeable 
 in ordinary matters. 
 
 244. Q. What is a true conscience ? 
 
 A. A true conscience is a judgment uttering a true 
 practical conclusion as drawn from two true premises 
 which declare the law and its application. 
 
 245. Q. What is a false conscience ? 
 
 A. A false conscience is one which draws a false 
 practical conclusion by reason of some error regarding 
 the general law or its application to the case in ques- 
 tion. A true conscience judges right to be right and 
 wrong to be wrong. A false conscience judges right 
 to be wrong and wrong to be right. 
 
 246. Q. Can a person be held as culpable when 
 acting under a false conscience ? 
 
 A. That will depend altogether upon the culpability 
 of the ignorance from which this conscience (erroneous 
 practical judgment) proceeds. 
 
MORAL CONSCIENCE. J J 
 
 Article II. Moral Certainty and Doubt. 
 
 Moral Certainty — Enquiry — Invincible Ignorance — Doubt — Exam- 
 ination — The Unpromulgated Law — An Important Restriction — 
 Example — Education of Conscience — " Feelings " are not Con- 
 science. 
 
 247. Q. What then is required that we may safely, 
 lawfully, follow this practical conclusion, which we call 
 conscience ? 
 
 A. It is necessary that we be morally certain of its 
 truth. 
 
 248. Q. What is moral certainty ? 
 
 A. Conviction that excludes a prudent doubt ; to 
 have it, the practical judgment must be such as would 
 deserve the assent of a prudent man. 
 
 249. Q. How can we obtain this moral certainty ? 
 
 A. By such enquiry into the existence of the law and 
 the matter in question, as will be proportionate, in its 
 diligence) to the gravity of the case. 
 
 250. Q. Does a person do wrong when acting upon 
 a conscience invincibly and inculpably erroneous ? 
 
 A. No ; for, though what is willed in this case be 
 really evil, it is not known as such, and hence is not 
 willed as such. And, as there is no culpability in the 
 ignorance, so is there no culpability in the will acting 
 upon the erroneous judgment or conscience invincibly 
 trusted in as correct. 
 
 25 r. Q. What is one to do when a doubt arises cither 
 as to the existence of a law, or as to a present case com- 
 ing under a known law ? 
 
 t /. Any one so doubting must examine before drawing 
 a practical conclusion upon which to act. He must en- 
 
78 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 deavor to acquire moral certainty regarding the exist- 
 ence or non-existence of the law, and also regarding the 
 case in question as to whether it is or is not included in 
 the law. 
 
 252. Q. But suppose sufficient examination to have 
 been previously made, or that it be made ; what is one 
 to do if the ignorance still remains ? 
 
 A. A person in this difficulty may reason as follows : 
 " When a general law or the comprehension of a particu- 
 lar case under a general law cannot be discovered after 
 sufficient examination, such law cannot be regarded as 
 sufficiently promulgated as to the general law itself or 
 at least as to the comprehension of the present case. 
 But a law that is not sufficiently promulgated has not 
 yet its binding force. Therefore, there is no binding 
 law in this case." 
 
 2 53- Q- But suppose that, after serious examination, 
 we find, for each side, reasons which carry weight and 
 cannot be disproved, and we find ourselves thus in the 
 impossibility of arriving at a conclusion — what is to be 
 done ? 
 
 A. If these powerful reasons stand, some for the ex- 
 istence, the others for the non-existence of the general 
 law itself, such law (should there be such) is undiscov- 
 erable, is not promulgated, has no binding force. 
 
 If the law itself be certain, but there are grave reasons 
 for and against deciding a given act or omission to be 
 comprehended within the scope of the law, then again 
 may we say that the law has not been sufficiently pro- 
 mulgated with regard to the case in question. For 
 instance, let us say that we are bound to do some posi- 
 tive acts of benevolence to our neighbor. There may 
 be strong reasons for and against some one particular 
 
MORAL CONSCIENCE. 79 
 
 act being comprehended in the law. The law is not 
 promulgated with reference to that particular act. We 
 may omit that act. The law, however, still remains. 
 We must find other ways of fulfilling it. Or again, the 
 law forbids and we are in the same kind of doubt as to 
 whether some particular omission is included. We may 
 act as if the law regarding that omission were not pro- 
 mulgated. 
 
 254. Q. IS THERE SOME RESTRICTION TO BE OB- 
 SERVED IN SO DEALING WITH A DOUBT EVEN THUS 
 WELL GROUNDED ? 
 
 A. Yes ; a very important and serious restric- 
 tion. 
 
 2 55- Q- What is this restriction? 
 
 A. The following : Whenever there is an end 
 which we are absolutely bound to attain, and there is a 
 means by which we can surely attain that end, we may 
 not reject this sure means in order to try one that is 
 only probable, no matter how strong the probability 
 may be. For this would be deliberately to risk the end 
 to which we are absolutely bound and which it is in our 
 power to secure. 
 
 256. O. But suppose that in the same case, we have 
 no absolutely sure means, but only possible or truly 
 probable means, what is to be done ? 
 
 . •/. Of course the law does not oblige beyond possi- 
 bilities. But, in this case, it binds as far as the possi- 
 bilities go, and the means that are known to be mere 
 secure will have to be taken. Only when the proba- 
 bilities are equal will there here be liberty of choice. 
 
 2 57- Q> Can you give an illustration that will make 
 this clear ? 
 
 ./. ¥es A very common, every-day example IS lound, 
 
80 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 for instance, when a physician is summoned by one who 
 is dangerously ill. The physician accepts the call. He 
 is bound from that moment to aim at the cure of the 
 sick person. Having understood the case, he sees that 
 there is one method of treatment which will certainly 
 effect a cure, whilst there are others which may be 
 equally serviceable, but of which he is not certain. Ac- 
 cording to the principles laid down above, he is obliged 
 to choose the sure method. If there is no sure method, 
 he is bound to elect, among probable methods, the one 
 that holds out greatest hope of success. All this, of 
 course, is under the presumption that those interested 
 are ready to follow his advice. 
 
 258. Q. Can conscience be educated ? 
 
 A. Yes, conscience can be educated in the sense that 
 the intellect can, by practice, acquire readiness in the 
 application of primary principles to particular cases. 
 
 2 59- Q- Is the education of conscience important? 
 
 A. It is the most important education, because it 
 relates immediately and directly to the final destiny of 
 man. It is the one important, practical education. 
 
 260. Q. Will it not do to trust to our feelings in re- 
 gard to right and wrong ? 
 
 A. No. Feelings are not conscience. Conscience is 
 reason judging according to principles. If the feelings 
 constituted conscience, right and wrong would change 
 with every varying mood, and what reason declares to be 
 essentially evil might be declared good when it happened 
 to suit one's momentary feelings. In this way there is 
 no crime that could not be justified by saying that it 
 was according to the person's feelings. 
 
CHAPTER VI. AIDS AND HINDRANCES TO 
 OBSERVANCE OF MORAL ORDER. 
 
 Article I. The Passions. 
 
 The Passions — Of the Sensitive Order — An Instrument of the Will 
 — Not our Guide — Why called Bad — The Primary Passions. 
 
 261. Q. What aids have we for the more ready ob- 
 servance of the moral order ? 
 
 A. The passions. 
 
 262. Q. But are not the passions evil ? Are they 
 not always spoken of as incentives to wrong-doing, in 
 fact, as bad passions but never as good passions ? 
 
 A. These questions show that there is a great mis- 
 understanding regarding the true nature of a passion. 
 A passion may, indeed, be misused just as one of our 
 faculties may be misused ; as sight, hearing, the powers 
 of speech and movement may be employed for ill. The 
 hand may be commanded by the will to do theft or 
 murder. But the hand is not therefore evil. So, also, 
 the passions are not evil, though they may be used for 
 evil as for good. 
 
 263. Q. What then do we mean by a passion ? 
 
 .1. A passion is that emotion, feeling, exaltation, 
 which manifests itself in our sensitive nature upon the 
 
 apprehension of good or evil. 
 
 264. Q. Is passion then something of the purely sen- 
 sitive order ? 
 
 81 
 
82 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 A. Passion is something of the purely sensitive order, 
 and is found in the mere animal as well as in man. But 
 in man a passion may be, as it should be, an aid or an 
 instrument to the ready action of the will proper to man, 
 the spiritual will. 
 
 265. Q. How can passion be an aid to the action of 
 the spiritual will or be used by it as an instrument ? 
 
 A. This will explain itself by an example. Take, for 
 instance, the state of anger or the state of hope or of 
 any passion in which any one may be. In so far as these 
 belong purely to the will, they are the attitudes of the 
 will toward good and evil as presented in certain phases 
 by the intellect to the will. These phases of good or 
 evil are, that they are present, absent, attainable, avoid- 
 able, etc. For each of these phases, as presented by the 
 intellect, we may say there is an attitude of the will ; 
 and for each attitude of the will there is a possible cor- 
 responding exaltation, emotion in the sensitive nature, 
 that is, a corresponding passion. Now, when the passion 
 of hope or of anger is roused, as corresponding respec- 
 tively to the attitude of the will towards good (presented 
 as being attainable) or evil (as being unbearable), the 
 position taken by the will is fortified, the continuance of 
 the position or act of the will becomes easier, and the 
 act itself is intensified, since the whole man, soul and 
 body, is roused to the same effort. 
 
 266. Q. Why then is it said to be wrong to follow 
 passion ? 
 
 A. Because our guide is reason and not passion. 
 
 267. Q. Can the passions be awakened independently 
 of the act of the will ? 
 
 A. Yes ; because being of the sensitive order they 
 may, in us as in the mere animal, be awakened by the 
 sensitive perception of sensible good or evil. 
 
OBSERVANCE OF MORAL ORDER. 83 
 
 268. Q. Is it wrong to follow passion in this case ? 
 A. It is always wrong to follow passion as a guide. 
 
 It may be, however, that passion in this case shall hap- 
 pen to be directed to the real good of man. This, reason 
 will decide. And then, though we may act according to 
 the passion, still we will not be following passion but 
 reason. 
 
 269. Q. How is it that the passions are commonly 
 called bad ? 
 
 A. This comes simply from the fact that passion, 
 being something of the sensitive order, may indeed be 
 roused, independently of and prior to the act of the free 
 will. It may be thus roused at the mere perception of 
 some partial and purely sensible good which the free 
 will, acting under the guidance of the intellect, should 
 reject as not being conducive to the good of the whole 
 man taken as a unit. When passion is thus roused, it 
 is easy to see that the will, besides having to reject the 
 partial and apparent good apprehended, has also to make 
 a special effort to overcome the tendency made active 
 by the rousing of the passion. Thus it is that passions 
 are called "bad," because it is wrong to follow them as 
 the guide of human conduct, and because, when passion 
 accompanies, the movement of the will towards evil is 
 readily intensified. But we must remember, that with 
 passion accompanying, there are the same conditions 
 established for increase of intensity in the movements 
 of the will towards good. 
 
 270. Q. How many passions are there ? 
 
 A. It would not be easy to enumerate them all with 
 any kind of precision. There are combinations, com- 
 plexities of sensible emotion, which it is not always 
 easy to analyze or to designate by a specific name, and 
 
84 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 which respond to varying attitudes of the spiritual will 
 towards good and evil apprehended in various phases, 
 as attainable, as present, as difficult to reach or to 
 avoid, etc. 
 
 271. Q. Can we nevertheless distinguish some pri- 
 mary or elementary passions ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 272. Q. Are there some that we can regard as fun- 
 damental, as leading to or forming an element in all the 
 others ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 273. Q. Which are they ? 
 
 A. Love and its contrary, hatred. 
 
 274. Q. What is love ? 
 
 A. Love is the passion that arises on the mere con- 
 templation of good. 
 
 275. Q. What is hatred ? 
 
 A. Hatred is the passion that arises on the mere con- 
 templation of evil. 
 
 276. Q. What passions directly follow love ? 
 A. Desire and delight. 
 
 277. Q. What is desire ? 
 
 A. Desire is the tendency or inclination to possess 
 the good which has been apprehended as absent. 
 
 278. Q. What is delight or joy ? 
 
 A. Delight is the actual pleasure consequent upon 
 the possession of good. 
 
 279. Q. What passions directly follow hatred ? 
 A. Abhorrence and sadness. 
 
 280. Q. What is abhorrence ? 
 
 A. Abhorrence is the tendency, the inclination, to be 
 separated from the evil that has been apprehended and 
 regarded with hatred. 
 
OBSERVANXE OF MORAL ORDER. 85 
 
 281. Q. What is sadness ? 
 
 A. Sadness is the pain or suffering consequent upon 
 the actual union with, possession of, the evil appre- 
 hended. 
 
 282. Q. Are there other passions readily discernible 
 and easily analyzed as being immediately associated with 
 the preceding ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 283. Q. Which are they ? 
 
 A. Hope and despair ; fear and daring (courage) ; 
 anger. 
 
 284. Q. What is hope ? 
 
 A. Hope is the passion which arises when a good 
 desired is seen to be difficult yet possible to attain, or 
 when an evil that is abhorred is seen to be "difficult yet 
 possible to avoid. It corresponds to the attitude which 
 the will takes on, when the good or evil is thus presented 
 by the intellect, with special prominence given to the 
 possibility of attaining or avoiding — with special light 
 thrown upon this possibility. 
 
 285. Q. What is despair ? 
 
 A. If in the previous case the intellect is occupied 
 chiefly with the difficulties, makes them prominent, puts 
 them in a strong light, neglects the consideration of the 
 possibilities, the will takes on a different attitude, and 
 the corresponding passion is despair. 
 
 286. Q. What is daring or courage ? 
 
 A. Courage is the passion that follows hope. It arises 
 when we go out bravely to overcome the obstacles that 
 stand in the way of our attaining the good or avoiding 
 the evil. 
 
 287. Q. What is fear' 
 
 A. Fear is the opposite of courage or daring. It is 
 
86 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 the shrinking at the view of the obstacles to be encoun- 
 tered in an attempt to reach the good or escape the evil. 
 
 288. Q. What is anger ? 
 
 A. Anger is the rising up against present evil which 
 is upon us, which has overtaken us. 
 
 Article II. Habits: Virtues; Vices. 
 
 Habits — An Act and a Habit — A Moral Habit — Virtue and Vice — 
 The Cardinal Virtues — Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance. 
 
 289. Q. What other aids may we employ for the bet- 
 ter observance of the moral order ? 
 
 A. Habits. 
 
 290. Q. What is a habit ? 
 
 A. We use the word, habit, to express the facility, 
 readiness, promptness, ease, together with the constant 
 inclination, which any given power or faculty may pos- 
 sess of performing a given act. 
 
 291. Q. Is habit, then, the same as power ? 
 
 A. No. One may possess the power of doing a cer- 
 tain act, and yet not have the habit of doing it. In fact, 
 a power may be so far from the condition called habit 
 that it may not be in the condition to be used for even 
 a single act. One may also possess a power and have 
 never exercised it. 
 
 292. Q. Does a single act indicate the existence of 
 a habit ? 
 
 A. No. 
 
 293. Q. How is a habit formed ? 
 
 A. By a sufficiently frequent repetition of the same 
 act. 
 
OBSERVANCE OF MORAL ORDER. 87 
 
 294. Q. What is a moral habit ? 
 
 A. A moral habit is one that inclines to an act mor- 
 ally good or evil, and is, moreover, imputable for its for- 
 mation as a habit to the person who possesses it. 
 
 295. Q. What name is given to a moral habit inclin- 
 ing one to the performance of an act that is morally 
 good ? 
 
 A. Such habit is called a virtue. 
 
 296. Q. What name is given to a moral habit inclin- 
 ing one to an act that is morally bad ? 
 
 A. Such habit is called a vice. 
 
 297. Q. Are there certain fundamental, guiding vir- 
 tues under which we can classify all the good habits 
 that go to make up the perfect human life ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 298. Q. Which are they ? 
 
 A. They are Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Tem- 
 perance, commonly known as the Cardinal Virtues. 
 
 299. Q. Why are they called cardinal virtues ? 
 
 A. They are so called from the Latin word cardo, 
 a hinge, because human conduct, if pivoted upon them 
 and upheld by them, will move upright as a door upon 
 its hinges. 
 
 300. Q. What is justice ? 
 
 A. Justice, as a cardinal virtue, is the acquired gen- 
 eral tendency or ease of choosing good and rejecting 
 evil. This genera] case results from the formation and 
 exercise of many habits of different particular virtues, as 
 each particular habit results from the repetition of acts. 
 
 301. (}. Hut is there not an act of justice, thus im- 
 plied in every act of virtue ? 
 
 A. Yes. For, as justice is the general habit of doing 
 
 good and avoiding evil, an act of justice is, necessarily, 
 
55 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 implied in every act of virtue, because every act of vir- 
 tue is a choice of good. So, also, in every particular 
 virtue, which is the habit of a particular good act, there 
 is a partial habit of justice. But that habit which rules 
 the whole life, and which we call the cardinal virtue of 
 justice, cannot be said to be possessed until many par- 
 ticular virtues have been acquired, so that it may be 
 said that the will is directed generally to good. 
 
 302. Q. What is prudence ? 
 
 A. Prudence, as a cardinal virtue, is the general habit 
 of readily discerning the right and the good to be pre- 
 sented to the will. Every habit of particular virtue is 
 accompanied by prudence in regard to the acts of that 
 virtue. But the cardinal virtue of prudence covers the 
 same ground as the cardinal virtue of justice. It is 
 a general habit, implying the possession of many par- 
 ticular habits. In it is included the habit of caution in 
 new circumstances and of investigation before action 
 in doubtful cases. As justice is a habit of the will 
 inclining it to the right and the good, so prudence is 
 a habit to which the intellect is formed, under the obedi- 
 ence of the will, to seek out the right and the good. 
 
 303. Q. What is the cardinal virtue of temperance ? 
 A. It is a habit, residing in the sensitive nature, 
 
 whereby sense is rendered readily obedient to the will 
 and kept within the bounds prescribed by reason as 
 necessary to the co-ordination and subordination of the 
 various faculties. Every restraint of passion within its 
 due limits is an act of temperance. The cardinal virtue 
 finds its special exercise in moderating the use of gross 
 sensual pleasures. 
 
 304. Q. What is the cardinal virtue of fortitude ? 
 
 A. As temperance is the virtue which holds the 
 
OBSERVANCE OF MORAL ORDER. 89 
 
 senses in restraint, so fortitude is the habit of going 
 forward and of not shrinking at the view of obstacles 
 and difficulties that have to be met and overcome in the 
 pursuit of good and the avoidance of evil. 
 
 305. Q. Are not the names, justice and temperance, 
 often used to signify particular virtues ? 
 
 A. Yes. Justice is often used in the limited sense of 
 what is called commutative justice, which is the giv- 
 ing to every one his due. Temperance is very widely 
 taken in but one of its applications ; i.e. moderation in 
 the use of alcoholic drink. 
 
CHAPTER VII. SOME ERRORS. 
 
 Sentimentalism — Sensism — Sensualism — Positivism— Utilita- 
 rianism. 
 
 306. Q. What errors are common regarding the 
 fundamental ethics ? 
 
 A. As was stated previously, there will always be 
 errors regarding conduct where there are errors con- 
 cerning the true nature, origin, destiny, and relations 
 of man. The errors of to-day may be reduced to 
 (1) Sentimentalism and Sensism, which err respecting 
 the faculty with which we perceive morality ; (2) Sen- 
 sualism, Positivism, and Utilitarianism, which err in 
 starting from a false definition of morality. 
 
 307. Q. What is sentimentalism ? 
 
 A. Sentimentalism is the error of those who say that 
 the perception of and the discrimination between good 
 and evil is all a matter of instinct, of which we can 
 render no rational account. Good, say the sentimental- 
 ists, is recognized by its producing a certain internal 
 satisfaction in us, a certain unaccountable sympathy of 
 which we become aware. It is clear that according to 
 this system there could never be any standard of 
 morality. Good and evil would change with every fickle 
 mood. Mere inclination would be the only test of good 
 and right, and could be appealed to as justification for 
 any crime. 
 
 90 
 
SOME ERRORS. 9I 
 
 308. Q. What is sensism ? 
 
 A. Sensism is the error of those who say that we 
 have a special sensitive faculty to perceive good and 
 evil; as the eye is intended to perceive color, and the 
 ear, sound. That there is no special faculty for this 
 purpose and that it is the intellect that judges of good 
 and evil, as it does of anything else, has been shown. 
 Moreover, it is absurd to say that moral good and evil 
 can be perceived by a mere sense. Only intelligence 
 can perceive moral evil as such. Only intelligence can 
 perceive the meaning of the abstract law, the knowl- 
 edge of which must precede the perception of the moral 
 good and evil in the individual case. 
 
 309. Q. What is sensualism ? 
 
 A. Sensualism is the error that puts moral good in 
 what is pleasing to sense, and moral evil in what is 
 painful to sense. It is broader in its error than what 
 we called sensism. It does not assume a special sense 
 for the perception of good and evil, but makes any 
 sense capable in its own way. This is the only ethics 
 of the materialistic philosophy. According to it, man 
 cannot be considered reprehensible for any crime which 
 he takes pleasure in committing. 
 
 310. Q. What is positivism as a system of morality? 
 A. The positivist defines good to be that which is 
 
 commanded by law ; and evil that which is forbidden 
 by law. The mistake, here, lies in making law the test 
 of morality in an act ; whereas, the morality of the act 
 is the test of the justice of the law. 
 
 311. Q. What is utilitarianism? 
 
 A. Utilitarianism begins by defining the morally good 
 to be that which is useful. Upon a limited and, hence, 
 false application of this definition, the utilitarians try to 
 
92 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 build up a system of morality. Their first care is to 
 exclude the consideration of a Creator and of a future 
 life. They will not directly deny either, but simply 
 reject the consideration, saying flippantly that what is 
 good for time is good for eternity. As well might one 
 discuss a triangle, assuming that it has but one angle. 
 
 However, even when limiting the consideration to 
 this life, the utilitarians have never been able to agree 
 upon what was to be regarded as useful. Some have 
 defined the useful to be whatsoever can give pleasure in 
 this life. This at once drags the theory down to the 
 lowest depths of the grossest sensualism. Others, fear- 
 ing to go so far, have defined good as that which is use- 
 ful to society at large. Still, even here, with temporal 
 benefit their standard, they make no distinction between 
 the intrinsic morality of any two acts. They leave the 
 decision of good and bad to the alternate triumphs of 
 political disturbers. Besides, there is another danger- 
 ous false principle involved in this kind of utilitarian- 
 ism : namely, that the individual exists simply for the 
 temporal welfare of that very vague thing called the 
 state, or for as vague a thing, the general good of 
 the greater number. The absurdity of the principle is 
 manifest if we but remember that the welfare of the 
 state means nothing but the welfare of the individuals 
 who compose it ; that the state is for the members and 
 not the members for the state. The principle is a most 
 dangerous one. It lies as the foundation stone of the 
 two extremes of despotism and communistic socialism. 
 It lays wide open the avenue to every species of tyranny 
 which those who obtain power may choose to exercise. 
 
CHAPTER VIII. DUTY AND RIGHT. 
 
 Duty and Right — Moral Obligation and Moral Power — Free Will 
 under Law— Our Essential Relations. 
 
 312. Remark. We have, indeed, brought out in the 
 preceding pages all the fundamental principles of right 
 conduct. But between these fundamental principles 
 and the concrete affairs of life there is one point which 
 has to be considered if we wish to make the application 
 of the principles correctly. We may consider it here 
 without departing from the abstract character we have 
 imposed upon our book. We refer to the question of 
 right and duty. The solution of every question of ethi- 
 cal practice is reduced eventually to the task of deter- 
 mining the limits of rights and duties in the concrete 
 circumstances of life. In speaking of rights and duties, 
 we use the word " right " in a sense different from that 
 which we gave to it when speaking of right and wrong. 
 The term " right," as opposed to wrong, was employed 
 to characterize the act of the will when choosing the 
 >od." A "right," as distinguished from a duty", sig- 
 nifies the moral freedom of the will to choose that which 
 is not evil. In this sense we say "to have a right." In 
 the other sense we say "to do right." Of course, we 
 cannot have a right to do what is wrong. Our rights 
 are necessarily limited by the circle of what is right. 
 1 lenee, 
 
 93 
 
94 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 313. Q. What further knowledge is necessary before 
 we can begin to make the application of the fundamen- 
 tal ethics to human conduct in the conditions of actual 
 life ? 
 
 A. It is necessary to have a very correct and definite 
 knowledge of two things. 
 
 314. Q. What are these two things ? 
 A. Duty and right. 
 
 315. Q. What is duty? 
 
 A. Duty is the moral obligation which law imposes 
 upon the will of man. 
 
 316. Q. What is right? 
 
 A. Right is the liberty of action, the moral power 
 left to the will to do or omit an act when there is no 
 law to the contrary. 
 
 Note. — Though long treatises are required to exhaust the sub- 
 ject of duty and right considered in the abstract and in their various 
 applications to the circumstances of practical human life, still every- 
 thing that can be said must be reducible to what has just been 
 stated ; namely, where there is a moral obligation there is a duty ; 
 where there is no moral obligation there is a right. 
 
 317. Q. Why do we say moral power, moral obli- 
 gation ? 
 
 A. Because duty and right have no reference to 
 one's being physically bound or free. Duty is what we 
 may not violate though we can. But by a right we may 
 do something though it should happen that we can not. 
 
 318. Q. Is this in keeping with what was said about 
 acting according to the nature of things ? 
 
 A. Perfectly so. For it is strictly according to the 
 nature of things for even a free will to be limited mor- 
 ally in its exercise by a law proceeding from one who 
 has authority over that free will in the matter in ques- 
 
DUTY AND RIGHT. 95 
 
 tion. And again, it is strictly according to the nature 
 of things that a will which is by its very nature free, 
 should retain its liberty of choice in all matters where 
 there is no law from its superior restricting its liberty 
 of action. The limitation implies duty ; the liberty of 
 choice, right. 
 
 319. Q. What important conclusion follows from 
 this ? 
 
 A. It follows that where one has a right, others have 
 a duty. For, if the superior having authority wishes to 
 leave to an individual will the free exercise of its liberty, 
 this wish of the superior becoming known to others is 
 a law to them, imposing upon them a duty of not inter- 
 fering with the free exercise of that liberty. 
 
 320. Q. What, then, is the best way to prepare our- 
 selves for the true ethical life, for correct conduct ? 
 
 A. The proper way, as well as the most expeditious, 
 is to study our duties, to seek for the laws by which we 
 are bound. Outside of these we are free, we have 
 rights. 
 
 321. Q. How may we know these duties ? 
 A. By studying our essential relations. 
 
 322. Q. How may these relations be classified ? 
 
 A. As relations towards God, relations towards our 
 fellow-men, and relations towards ourselves. We have 
 a relation of dependence upon God ; of equality to our 
 fellow-men; of identity (stricter than equality) with our- 
 selves. God wishes us to make our free acts in keep- 
 ing with our essential relations. 11 is will is law; law 
 imposes obligation ; this obligation is duty. 
 
 A comprehensive development of the consequences 
 of these three relations would give us a detailed rule ol 
 right conduct. 
 
CHAPTER IX. RIGHTS. 
 
 Article I. Basis and Nature of Rights. 
 
 Law the Principle of Right and Duty — Enforcing of Rights — Im- 
 peded Right — Inviolable Moral Power — Subject, Term, Matter, 
 and Title of Right. 
 
 323. An Explanation. All right is based ultimately 
 on the natural law. For the natural law is the law of 
 our nature. By our very nature we are free beings, with 
 the capacity of willing a thing or of not willing it, or of 
 willing the opposite. Now, if the choice is not pointed 
 out to us by a superior will which has the rightful 
 authority to point out to us a choice and impose upon 
 us the duty of making that choice, we remain free or 
 unbound. And we remain free by the law of nature, 
 just precisely in the same way as in the other case we 
 are bound by the law of nature. That is to say, rights 
 as well as duties proceed from the law of nature ; and 
 they proceed thus simultaneously, by the same indivisi- 
 ble law, the will of the Creator willing that man should 
 freely act up to his dignity as man, freely doing the 
 good and avoiding the evil. Now, where of two acts, 
 neither one is demanded, whether by man's own essen- 
 tial perfection, or by the relations in which he stands 
 towards the rest of the universe and towards his Creator, 
 man is herein proclaimed free by the very law of nature, 
 96 
 
RIGHTS. 97 
 
 by the will of the Creator. In other words, by the law 
 of nature he is endowed with rights. It is the will of 
 the Creator that he should freely act according to his 
 nature, preserving his essential relations. But in the 
 case proposed there are no essential relations demand- 
 ing for his perfection and for the harmony of the uni- 
 verse, the free action of his will in one way or in the 
 other. Hence he is left with the free disposal of his 
 will. He is so left by the very law of nature. This 
 privilege of free disposal we call a "right." 
 Right and duty, therefore, are created by law. 
 
 324. Q. Since law, in conferring a right, confers the 
 free power of free action, does it also confer the right 
 or moral power of forcing others to respect that right, 
 and of taking the means necessary to hinder others from 
 impeding the exercise of that right ? 
 
 A. Certainly. For otherwise the right would be 
 illusory. It would be a freedom impeded by the very 
 law which confers it. For, if the law allows to others 
 the freedom to impede my right, it cannot simultaneously 
 confer upon me the freedom to act. 
 
 325. Q. Does the law conferring upon me the right, 
 allow me, then, to take any means, whatsoever, to pur- 
 sue my right ? 
 
 A. No. For no law can confer upon me the right to 
 take means which are in themselves evil. 
 
 326. Q. Is not my right, then, destroyed ? 
 
 ./. No. The right remains morally inviolable, 
 though it may be physically impeded or violated. 
 
 327. Q. How can this be? 
 
 A. This is because light, as we have SO often said, is 
 a moral power and confers the right to physical means 
 only in so far as these means may not be evil. In the 
 
98 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 same manner, another person may possess the physical 
 means of violating my right, but this does not confer 
 upon him the moral power or right to do so. 
 
 328. Q. How may we, now, briefly define " right " ? 
 A. Right is an inviolable moral power. 
 
 329. Q. What four things must we consider in a right ? 
 A. The subject, the term, the matter, and the title of 
 
 the right. 
 
 The subject of the right is the person who possesses 
 the inviolable moral power. 
 
 The term includes all those who are morally bound, 
 that is, whose will is bound by law to respect that right, 
 and leave it inviolate. 
 
 The matter is the peculiar act which the law confers 
 the power of performing. 
 
 The title is the fact determining the particular subject 
 of a right. 
 
 330. Q. Who can be the subject of a right ? 
 A. Only an intelligent free being. 
 
 331. Q. Can demented persons have rights ? 
 
 A. Yes. They possess rights radically, though by 
 accident they happen to be impeded in the use of them. 
 Hence others have the moral obligation of respecting 
 their rights. 
 
 Article II. Partition of Rights. 
 
 Innate and Acquired Rights — Alienable and Inalienable Rights. 
 
 332. Q. How many kinds of rights are there ? 
 A. All rights may be divided into the two general 
 classes of innate and acquired rights. 
 
RIGHTS. 99 
 
 333- Q- What are innate rights ? 
 
 A. Innate rights are those whose title is human 
 nature itself. Hence, they are the same in all men. 
 Such are the rights of tending to one's last end, of pre- 
 serving one's life, of self-defence, of acquiring posses- 
 sions. Innate rights are also called natural or primitive 
 or absolute. 
 
 334. Q. What are acquired rights ? 
 
 A. Acquired rights are those which the law confers 
 by reason of an acquired title ; that is, by reason of some 
 fact, circumstance, adjunct, state, condition, etc., in 
 which an individual may be found, and which fact, 
 condition, etc., is not common to human nature as such 
 and wherever found. Such, for instance, are the rights 
 of possessing something in particular, of demanding 
 protection from a particular government, etc. These 
 rights are also called positive or secondary or hypo- 
 thetical. 
 
 335- Q- How, again, may all rights be divided ? 
 
 A. All rights may also be divided into inalienable 
 and alienable rights. 
 
 336. Q. What are inalienable rights ? 
 
 A. Inalienable rights are those of which a person 
 may not divest himself and of which he may not forego 
 the exercise. They are obligatory. We are not free 
 in regard to the exercise of them. They are, in fact, 
 strictly speaking, duties. 
 
 337. Q. How, then, do they come to be called rights ? 
 A. In this way. Whenever any one has a duty to 
 
 perform, the same law that imposes this duty upon him 
 imposes, at the same time, upon all others, the duty of 
 
 leaving him free in the performance <>i that duty, <>t 
 
 not hindering him in the use oi the means necessary 
 
100 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 for the performance of that duty. Thus, though he 
 himself is not free before the law to use or not to use such 
 means, yet the law binds others to leave him unhin- 
 dered in the use of those means. There is a duty im- 
 posed upon them in his regard, and in him resides a 
 corresponding right. Thus the duty imposed upon all 
 men of tending to their last end implies the duty of 
 using the means necessary to reach that end. Hence 
 each man's duty of using those means is also a right 
 which others are bound not to interfere with. This, his 
 right, is inalienable, because he may not divest himself 
 of it ; he may not willingly allow himself to be interfered 
 with in the use of the means. 
 
 338. Q. What are alienable rights ? 
 
 A. Alienable rights are those whose exercise is not 
 obligatory, or of which one may divest himself, or which 
 he may transfer to another. If, for instance, you 
 possess a gold piece which you are not obliged to use 
 to support your own life, or to maintain persons depend- 
 ing upon you or to pay a debt, you are absolutely free 
 to use that gold piece for whatsoever purpose that is 
 not evil. Your right to the possession of the gold piece 
 is alienable. You may throw the gold piece into the 
 sea. You may give it to your friend or to a stranger, 
 and this, with such perfect transfer, that all your rights 
 will pass over to him. The piece may be taken from 
 you, and you will not be obliged to do so much as to 
 reach out your hand to recover it. 
 
CHAPTER X. DUTIES. 
 
 Duty — Its Source — Natural and Positive Duties — Negative and 
 Affirmative Duties — Motive of Duty — Perfect and Imperfect 
 Duties — Term of a Duty. 
 
 339- Q- What is duty ? 
 
 A. Duty is the moral obligation of doing or omitting 
 anything. 
 
 340. O. What, again, is the source of duty ? 
 A. Law. 
 
 341. Q. How may we classify duties ? 
 
 A. In the same way that we classify laws. Law is 
 natural and positive. Hence duties are natural and 
 positive. A duty arising from the natural law is called 
 a natural duty. A duty arising from a positive law 
 is called a positive duty. From the natural law, we 
 have, for instance, the natural duties of worshipping 
 God and of not injuring another's reputation. From 
 the divine positive law (old law), for example, arose 
 the duty of the particular observances of the Jewish 
 Sabbath. An illustration of obligation coming from 
 human positive law is found in the duty of giving testi- 
 mony, when called upon, in courts of justice. 
 
 342. Q. What other classification of duties have we 
 from the classification of lav. 
 
 A. As laws are either negative or affirmative, prohibit 
 
102 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 or command, so the duties arising are, respectively, 
 negative or affirmative. 
 
 Negative duties are always wider than affirmative 
 duties which proceed from a law of the same order. 
 That is, they cover a greater extent of time and affect 
 a greater number of persons. Thus, among duties of 
 the natural order, i.e. proceeding from the natural law, 
 the negative duty, not to commit murder, binds all men 
 and at all times. On the other hand, in the same 
 natural law, the affirmative duty of aiding the poverty- 
 stricken cannot bind at every moment, nor does it bind 
 every human being with regard to every other human 
 being. 
 
 Note. — What we have called affirmative law and affir?native 
 duty, we sometimes see termed positive law and positive duty. Of 
 course, it is very consistent to use the term positive, as opposed 
 to the term negative. But when we have once used the term 
 positive to express the law which comes from the free will of the 
 legislator, as distinguished from the natural law, it can only be con- 
 fusing to employ the same expression positive law, again, in con- 
 tradistinction to negative law. For this reason, we have used the 
 term affirmative in contradistinction to the term negative. 
 
 343. Q. What is the motive of a duty ? 
 
 A. The motive of a duty corresponds to the title to 
 a right. Law is the source. The title to a right is the 
 reason — why of the law conferring the right ; and the 
 motive of the duty is the reason — why of the law impos- 
 ing the duty. We might use the words title and motive, 
 indiscriminately, or adopt either one exclusively, to 
 express the reason — why of the particular effect of the 
 law in both cases. But we employ the two words for 
 the sake of clearness, just as we employ the words, 
 right and duty, to make another convenient distinction 
 
DUTIES. 103 
 
 in the resultant of law. If we regard the natural law, 
 our rational nature considered in the abstract or in 
 some concrete circumstance is the title to the rights 
 conferred upon us by the natural law ; and the same 
 rational nature is the motive of duty imposed upon us 
 by the same natural law. 
 
 344. Q. What is meant by perfect and imperfect 
 duties ? 
 
 A. A perfect duty is one whose matter, subject, and 
 term are so clearly defined that the term, the person 
 to whom the duty is due, has a clear title whereon to 
 proceed against the subject of the duty to force him to 
 perform it. It is also called a juridical duty and corre- 
 sponds to the perfect or juridical right. An imperfect 
 duty is one whose matter, subject, or term is not thus 
 clearly defined. It corresponds to the imperfect right, 
 which is called a claim. We will understand this from 
 an example. A man who is starving has a right to some 
 food that is in the city where he is starving ; for, without 
 it he will die, and he has the right to live. The rich 
 man, therefore, who may be appealed to for a loaf from 
 his superabundance, is under the obligation of giving 
 that loaf to the starving man. But if the rich man 
 refuses, the starving man cannot bring him before 
 the authorities of the city to force him to give the 
 bread. The rich man may say that the obligation lies 
 equally upon his next door neighbor, who has likewise 
 a superabundance. The starving man may indeed 
 assert his right by abstracting from superabundance, 
 wherever he may find it ; but he has no recourse by city 
 authority against any particular individual. His right 
 is a purely moral right. It is a claim upon the rich 
 man's will, a claim upon his charity, generosity, human- 
 
104 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 ity. The rich man's duty is called a purely moral duty ; 
 it is also called an imperfect duty ; but this expression 
 is very ill chosen, for he has a very clear, serious duty 
 that is very plain to his conscience, and he commits a 
 great crime in refusing the bread. 
 
 On the other hand, if a man borrows a sum of money 
 on a " promise to pay " at a certain time, and when that 
 time arrives, refuses to pay, the creditor has the right to 
 proceed against him, individually, to recover that par- 
 ticular sum of money. The duty of the debtor is called 
 a perfect duty. It is also called a juridical duty ; and 
 the right of the creditor, a juridical right; because the 
 tribunal of justice can be appealed to in the case. 
 
 The violation of an imperfect duty constitutes what is 
 styled an offence against the person who has the claim. 
 The violation of a perfect duty is not only an offence, 
 but also an injury. These are the terms employed in 
 this matter. Yet, who does not see how very unsatisfac- 
 tory they are ? For what injury in money would not be 
 more tolerable to the starving man than the offence of 
 being refused the needed loaf? What perfect right in 
 money would he not forego, to have his claim or imper- 
 fect right honored? Nay, the imperfect right, in the 
 case proposed, he is even bound to secure by taking from 
 abundance where he may find it ; whereas, the perfect 
 right to the sum of money which he has loaned is alien- 
 able, and he need not pursue it. 
 
 345. Q. What is meant by the term of a duty ? 
 
 A. The term of a duty is the person towards whom one 
 is bound. It is the person upon whom law confers a right 
 by reason of a title, which title is identical with the motive 
 on account of which the same law imposes the duty on 
 the subject of the duty. The motive and title are the 
 
DUTIES. 105 
 
 same, as we have said, though looked at from different 
 directions. This term may be God; it may be my fellow- 
 man ; it may be myself. I owe obedience to God 
 because I am created and he is Creator. God has a 
 right to my obedience because he is Creator and I am 
 created. I have duties towards my fellow-man, and he 
 has rights to my performance of them by reason, first, 
 of the general equality of human nature ; and, secondly, 
 by reason of the particular relations that may have 
 arisen between us of family, country, business, etc. I 
 have duties towards myself by reason of the identity of 
 self with self. I have inalienable rights by reason of 
 my individual nature ; and by reason of that same indi- 
 vidual nature I have a duty to respect those rights ; I 
 may not abdicate those rights. 
 
 It is to be noted that, in the strict sense of the word, 
 we cannot be said to have rights in respect to God. 
 This would destroy the essential inferiority, with respect 
 to God, which pervades our whole being. Even in 
 trd to the attainment to our last end, God owes it 
 not to us, but to himself, not to hinder us in the prose- 
 cution of the very end for which he himself has 
 created us. 
 
CHAPTER XL COLLISION OF RIGHTS AND 
 DUTIES. 
 
 Article I. Collision. 
 
 346. Q. What is meant by collision of rights ? 
 
 A. There is said to be collision of rights when one 
 person possessing a right cannot exercise it without vio- 
 lating a right possessed by another person. 
 
 347. Q. When is there collision of duties ? 
 
 A. There is said to be collision of duties when the 
 performance of one duty would necessitate the violation 
 of another. 
 
 348. Q. When is there collision of laws ? 
 
 A. There is said to be collision of laws when two 
 laws simultaneously impose upon the same person con- 
 tradictory duties, or endow different persons with rights 
 that mutually exclude one another. 
 
 349. Q. Can there be such collision of laws, rights, 
 or duties ? 
 
 A. Practically, there cannot be a real collision. But 
 the term collision is useful to express a condition of 
 things that very often arises, a state of doubt which re- 
 quires investigation to discover the truth. Whenever, 
 in a given circumstance, one of the colliding laws, duties, 
 or rights is found to be real, the other must necessarily 
 be only apparent. You will see this in the following : — 
 106 
 
COLLISION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 107 
 
 Take the case of collision of two rights conferred by 
 the natural law, your right and the right of another 
 person. Upon investigation, you find your right to be 
 certain. Your right is declared by the natural law, by 
 the will of the Creator. Now, you cannot be bound by 
 the same law of nature simultaneously not to do that 
 which it declares you free to do. But if another pos- 
 sessed, simultaneously, by the natural law, a right which 
 impeded your freedom, which really collided with your 
 right, you would, at the same time and by the same law, 
 be both bound and free. For the right of the other 
 being declared by law, the same law declares you bound 
 not to impede such right. Thus you would be both 
 bound and free in the same respect and by the same 
 law. The impossibility of real collision is evident. 
 Hence, in the case of conflict between two rights or two 
 duties under the natural law, if one of the rights or 
 duties is found to be real, the other certainly does not 
 exist. 
 
 Let us take a case where there is a conflict between 
 a right which seems to be conferred by the natural law 
 and a right which seems to be conferred by some posi- 
 tive law. It is clear that if the natural right be found 
 to be certain, the positive law in question must be only 
 supposed or apparent or misunderstood ; or, if none of 
 these, then certainly unjust, and, hence, null and void 
 If it be positive divine law, it certainly must be misin- 
 terpreted in the present application. For the positive 
 divine law cannot come into conflict with the natural 
 law, which is also divine. God is supreme intelligence ; 
 and it is not the part of intelligence to demand the 
 simultaneous existence of two incompossiblo things. If 
 the positive law which seems to conflict with the certain 
 
108 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 natural law be a human positive law (all human laws are 
 positive), then either it has been misinterpreted in its 
 application ; or, if it be really intended to conflict with 
 the natural law, it is unjust, and is null and void, because 
 no human statute can come in the way of the natural 
 law, which is divine. 
 
 Article II. Summary of Cases. 
 
 350. Q. How may we summarize the possible cases 
 of collision of rights ? 
 
 A. All the more difficult cases may be found exem- 
 plified in the following : — 
 
 If the rights be equal, that is, conferred by laws 
 of the same order, then the right which is first carried 
 into execution holds, and the other falls away. A good 
 illustration of this will be found in the opening up of 
 new territory, such as Oklahoma, to the citizens of the 
 United States. The government confers equal rights to 
 the territory upon all. But, so soon as one has asserted 
 his right by putting down his stake, the rights of the 
 others fall away. We will have the same in the right 
 conferred by the natural law upon two men, starving on 
 a desert island, to a loaf of bread washed ashore by the 
 waves. Whilst the loaf is on the sand the right of each 
 is equal. But when one has picked up the loaf the 
 other has no longer any right to it. The first one has 
 acquired the concrete right of primi occupant is, as it is 
 called ; that is, the right of the first occupier. 
 
 But let us take the case where the rights are, as 
 above, of the same order, but where the concrete exer- 
 cise of the right is simultaneous on the part of both 
 
COLLISION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES. IO9 
 
 individuals. Suppose that they had grasped the loaf 
 simultaneously. Or, as the loaf might break, let us 
 substitute for it something that could not be divided. 
 Take the case of two men in the open sea, who are 
 swimming for a plank. They lay their hands upon the 
 plank at the same moment. The plank is sufficient to 
 keep one man afloat, but it will not support two men. 
 As they cling to the plank, it goes down with both of 
 them. They release their hold. They come to the sur- 
 face, and so does the plank. They grasp it once more 
 simultaneously. Who has the right to it ? The case is 
 a very difficult one, and any solution of it will, at the 
 first view, seem cruel. Are they both to leave it alone 
 and drown ? Or are they both to cling to it and drown ? 
 We have not supposed that either one is bound by any 
 outside reason to yield the plank to the other. Each 
 retains his right. Hence each one may defend his 
 right. The plank will go to the stronger. This may 
 seem hard, as a decision, in the abstract. But each one 
 must allow to the other, in the circumstances, the right 
 which he would evidently and justly claim for himself. 
 This is not the same as saying that might is right. It 
 is merely allowing the exercise of might for the assertion 
 of right. But is there not here a real collision of 
 rights, a thing which we have pronounced impossible in 
 the concrete 3 We answer that there is not. The final 
 circumstance necessary to give either one an inviolable 
 concrete tight to the plank is the possession of the 
 plank. Whilst they are Struggling, each one lias a right 
 ie. But when one has secured the plank it is 
 his by the right of first occupier. 
 
 What it the rights are unequal? When the rights 
 are not equal, the decision is to be given in favor ol the 
 
IIO FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 better right. The same is to be said of duty and law. 
 We shall consider some principles for the precedence 
 of rights in the next article. Here we wish to pre- 
 pare for their more easy comprehension by examples. 
 Therefore, — 
 
 There is a natural law, which is divine, by which we 
 are bound to help our neighbor when he is in extreme 
 need and requires our personal help. We will suppose 
 that he has been shipwrecked and is on a rock in the 
 sea in sight of land. His companion has gained the 
 shore and says that the man on the rock will die by 
 night if he does not get relief. It is nine o'clock on 
 a Sunday morning. In the hamlet by the shore there 
 is no boat fit to put to sea. Some one in the listening 
 crowd suggests that in about five hours he could put one 
 of the boats in condition to reach the rock and return. 
 At once, a long-faced man near by is ready with the 
 precept, "Thou shalt not labor on the Lord's day." 
 Here is a precept conflicting with the precept of 
 charity mentioned above. What is to be done ? 
 The law of abstention from labor is a positive law. 
 The duty of abstention arises neither from the nature 
 of labor nor from the nature of any particular day. 
 The duty of charity in the present case is a duty im- 
 posed by the natural law, and it is in regard to what 
 man holds as his highest temporal possession, his life. 
 The duty is imperative at this very moment. Now, the 
 positive law of rest from labor on a given day, regard it 
 as you will, whether as a human (ecclesiastical) or as a 
 divine law, could not, in the mind of the legislator, have 
 been intended to come in conflict with the universal and 
 essential duty of charity to our neighbor in his extreme 
 need. The law of charity is irrevocable. The law of 
 
COLLISION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES. I I I 
 
 rest from labor can be changed according to the will of 
 the legislator from whom it originally proceeds. The 
 positive law of rest from labor does not embrace the 
 case proposed. The right of the sufferer to assistance 
 remains. The legislator has not wished that the com- 
 mand of rest should extend to a case where it would 
 conflict with the grave and permanent right to assist- 
 ance conferred by the natural law upon the sufferer. 
 
 Here is another example. By the natural law every 
 man has a right to his justly acquired possessions. By 
 the same natural law every man has a right to preserve 
 his own life. Now, a certain individual happens to be 
 pursued by enemies who are bent on taking his life. 
 He sees a horse standing in the road. The owner is in 
 a field, thirty feet away. The man who is pursued asks 
 for the use of the horse. The owner objects, saying 
 that he is going on a visit. The fugitive leaps on the 
 horse and escapes. What is the justice of the case? 
 The matter of the fugitive's right is the saving of a 
 human life. The matter of the owner's right is the 
 making of a visit. The use of a certain piece of prop- 
 erty, the horse, is necessary for the execution of both 
 rights. Which right carries with it the right to the use 
 of the horse ? The right of the fugitive. For, though 
 the owner's right, if there were no fugitive, would be the 
 right to the use of his own property, the right to 
 superfluous property is not conferred by the natural 
 law upon any man to the extent that another may be 
 thereby deprived of what is necessary for life. Hence 
 the natural law did not confer upon the owner the right 
 to the use of the horse at that moment and under those 
 circumstances. 
 
112 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 Article III. Some Principles. 
 
 Principles — Suspension of Law — Natural Law the Basis — Degrees 
 of Difficulty. 
 
 351. Q. What general principles have we, then, to 
 determine the real right in case of an apparent col- 
 lision ? 
 
 A. We must study the source of the rights, their 
 matter, title, subject, and term. It is out of these that 
 we are to determine which right, law, or duty is the one 
 that does not extend to the case in question. 
 
 If we regard the source of right and duty, which is 
 law, we may lay it down, in general, that a right or 
 duty which can be shown to be upheld in given circum- 
 stances by the natural law, takes precedence of any 
 other right or duty not of the natural law ; that is, of any 
 right or duty coming from positive law whether human 
 or divine. 
 
 In the case of a collision of rights or duties proceed- 
 ing from the same source, the negative takes precedence 
 of the affirmative. Thus, in the natural law we have 
 the negative precept which prohibits murder, and the 
 affirmative precept which commands obedience to 
 parents. Should a father and mother, therefore, order 
 their child to commit murder, such order is not author- 
 ized by the law commanding obedience ; for the order 
 is in direct opposition to the natural law which forbids 
 murder absolutely, at all times and under all circum- 
 stances. The affirmative precept which, after all, by 
 the nature of things, can be exercised only at times, 
 must necessarily be interpreted as not calling for exer- 
 cise in such a way or at such a time as would bring 
 
COLLISION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 113 
 
 about a violation of the negative law which binds the 
 human race, all men, at all times. 
 
 In the case of a collision of rights coming from the 
 matter, the more important matter takes precedence. 
 The question of the use of the horse, given above, sup- 
 plies us with an example. The opposition is between 
 the use of the horse as the essential means to a visit, 
 and the use of the horse as the essential means for the 
 preservation of a human life. The matter of the first 
 right is a mere trifle in comparison to the matter of the 
 second. By the very law of nature the first right does 
 not exist for the moment. We cannot conceive of the 
 law of nature conferring upon any man the use or hold- 
 ing of any of the goods of earth which are absolutely 
 necessary for the existence of another man, except in 
 the event of the use or holding of the thing being neces- 
 sary for the existence of the actual possessor. 
 
 If we consider the title to the right, we have the 
 innate right and the acquired right. An innate right 
 may be inalienable or alienable. If it be inalienable, it 
 takes precedence of any acquired right. If an innate 
 right which is alienable comes into collision with an- 
 other's acquired right, we must take into consideration 
 the circumstances of the case, such for instance, as give 
 occasion to a multitude of our civil laws. Any man has 
 a right to build a large chimney on his own property; 
 and even to build a large fire under the chimney. 
 But his neighbors may declare that his chimney is an 
 intolerable nuisance to them, and they may so report it 
 to the city authorities. The city authorities may make a 
 law about chimneys, and order him to abate the nuisance 
 in some way or other. lie may argue that by the law 
 of nature he has a right to build a chimney and also to 
 
114 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 build a fire under it. The city authorities will tell him 
 that this is an alienable right. They will tell him that 
 every man who becomes a citizen acquires a right to 
 protection from nuisances, and that he also agrees to 
 forego the exercise of any alienable right which would 
 be an intolerable nuisance to his fellow-citizens. Hence 
 the right to build such chimneys and to build such fires 
 under them does not extend to that locality and must 
 not be exercised in it. 
 
 We must consider the subject of the right. We have 
 said that the subject of a right is a person. A person 
 may be a physical person, that is to say, one individual 
 human being ; or a moral person, that is to say, a family, 
 a city, a province, a whole nation. What is to be done 
 when there is a conflict between the rights of an individual 
 and those of a moral person ? The inalienable rights of 
 the individual stand before any rights of any moral per- 
 son, of any community, be it family, city, or nation. 
 The individual is first in the order of things. The fam- 
 ily is for the individual. The nation is for the family 
 and the individual. Again, in the family, itself, between 
 the whole and the individual members and between the 
 separate members there arise from the very nature and 
 constitution of the family mutual, reciprocal, and re- 
 spective rights and duties. Some of these are inalien- 
 able and may not be relegated, to be exercised at will, to 
 any other person, whether individual or moral, to another 
 family, to the city or the nation. Neither can any other 
 family nor can the city or the nation usurp the rights or 
 exact the duties that lie essentially in the family and 
 between its members. And we may remark that when- 
 ever a body of national legislators tries to glorify the 
 national power by usurping the inviolable rights of the 
 
COLLISION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES. I I 5 
 
 family and of the individual, the ultimate decadence of 
 the nation is certain if the process of usurpation be per- 
 severed in. For, in the order of things, the strength of 
 the nation lies in the strength of its individuals and 
 of its families; and the strength of the individuals and of 
 the families as factors of national progress lies in the free 
 exercise of the rights that come within their scope. Of 
 course, there are alienable rights which the family must 
 forego when it elects to live within the limits of the city 
 or the state, as we saw in the case of the man with the 
 chimney. But civil legislators must be very prudent not 
 to interfere with those family rights which hold prior to 
 and in absolute independence of any purely civil law. 
 
 Finally, with regard to the term of right or duty we 
 have to say the same thing that we have just said about 
 the subject. The term of my right is the person or per- 
 sons who are bound to respect my right. The term 
 of a duty of mine is the person or persons who have 
 a right to exact of me the performance of that duty. 
 Term is simply the correlative of subject, as duty is 
 the correlative of right. The subject of a right is the 
 term of the corresponding duty. The subject of a duty 
 is the term of a corresponding right. Hence, in colli- 
 sion, where precedence was given to the subject of a 
 right, obligation will rest upon the term of the same 
 right ; that is, upon the subject of the corresponding duty. 
 
 352. Q. What is meant by suspension of law ? 
 
 A. The expression, "suspension of law," is a con- 
 venience of speech employed to represent briefly what 
 takes place in a collision of rights and duties. As we 
 have seen, whenever there is collision, one of the laws, 
 rights, and duties will be found, upon investigation, not 
 to extend to the case in question. It would extend to 
 
Il6 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 the case were the case other than it is. But it does 
 not embrace, nor was it intended to embrace, the actual 
 situation. For brevity and convenience the law is said 
 to be suspended. 
 
 A father is obliged by the natural law to provide 
 necessary food for his young children. But suppose 
 that for two or three days he can obtain no food that 
 is not poisoned. The law is said to be suspended. The 
 general law of providing food still exists, but as a law it 
 is not intended to embrace a case where the fulfilling of 
 the letter of the law would defeat the very aim and pur- 
 pose of the law. The purpose of the law is the preser- 
 vation of the lives of the children. This end is to be 
 attained under the present circumstances by depriving 
 them of food. 
 
 353- Q- Is every right and duty ultimately reducible 
 to the natural law ? 
 
 A. Yes ; every right and duty must be ultimately 
 reducible to the natural law, in the sense of such right 
 or duty being the will of the Creator prohibiting, com- 
 manding, counselling, or permitting. For if it were 
 against the will of the Creator, it could not be a real 
 right or duty. 
 
 The complicated circumstances of human life some- 
 times make it difficult to trace back to the natural law 
 certain rights and duties, through the multiplying rela- 
 tions of men during long centuries. It is this that has 
 caused, for instance, so many disputes about the origi- 
 nal title to the right of property in land. 
 
 354. Q. Does difficulty in the execution sometimes 
 exempt from the fulfilment of duty ? That is to say, do 
 all laws bind under whatever degree of difficulty we may 
 experience in the observance of them ? Or, if they do 
 
COLLISION OF RIGHTS AND DUTIES. 117 
 
 not so bind, how can we determine the degree of difficulty 
 in the execution to which the lawgiver may be reasonably 
 judged not to extend the obligation imposed by the law ? 
 
 A. This is a matter which requires a great deal of 
 prudence ; for there is question of interpreting the 
 mind of the legislator in many circumstances when the 
 legislator himself cannot be appealed to. 
 
 Without doubt, no law can embrace an impossible 
 case. Law comes from intelligence; and intelligence 
 cannot command an impossibility. 
 
 On the other hand, the fulfilment of duty imposed by 
 law is always attended with some difficulty, with some 
 exertion. Hence the mere fact of some difficulty 
 attending the performance of what is prescribed does 
 not at once and universally put it outside the scope of 
 the law. 
 
 But between impossibility and ordinary exertion, 
 ordinary difficulty attending any exertion, there are 
 many grades of difficulty. 
 
 Our common prudence will tell us that a slight head- 
 ache which might excuse a man from keeping a very 
 insignificant engagement will not excuse him from going 
 to the top of his house to take down his little boy, who, 
 if left there, will very probably roll off into the street. 
 
 The constant exercise of prudence in particular cases, 
 and the practice of studious inquiry when there is a 
 doubt, are the best means of developing a habit of cor- 
 rect judgment in regard to the degree of difficulty in 
 execution intended by the mind of the legislator. 
 
 It is to be noted, however, that the negative precepts 
 of the natural law bind all men at all times and under 
 
 all circumstances. There is no degree of difficulty in 
 
 abstention which will authorize any one to put an act 
 forbidden by the natural law. 
 
CHAPTER XII. VINDICATION OF RIGHTS. 
 
 Vindication — Perfect Rights — Repelling the Aggressor — The Use 
 of Force — The Rule of Defence — Reparation of an Injury — 
 The Use of Force — Appeal to Authority. 
 
 355- Q- What is meant by the expression, "vindica- 
 tion of a right" ? 
 
 A. It stands both for the protection of a right against 
 an aggressor and for the exacting of reparation from 
 one who has violated a right. 
 
 356. Q. Which rights are accompanied by the right 
 of vindication ? 
 
 A. Those rights which are called perfect; that is, 
 those whose violation constitutes an injury in the strict 
 sense. 
 
 357. Q. How may these rights be classified ? 
 
 A. They may be classified as right to property, right 
 to reputation, and right to life and bodily safety. 
 
 Right belongs to a person. A person is physical or 
 moral ; that is, an individual or a society. We shall speak 
 of the individual only. The question of the individual 
 being once established, we can readily infer the right of 
 a society of individuals, of a family, a city, a state. To 
 proceed gradually, we ask first — 
 
 358. Q. Is it at all lawful to repel an unjust ag- 
 gressor ? 
 
 A. Yes. We have for this the unanimous consent 
 11S 
 
VINDICATION OF RIGHTS. II9 
 
 of all mankind and of all civil legislators. Cicero in his 
 defence of Milo says upon the subject : " This is not 
 a written law, but a natural law ; we do not learn it, for 
 we are born with it ; we are not taught it, for we are 
 endowed with the knowledge of it. . . . Nature has 
 proclaimed it. . . ." 
 
 Moreover, nature ordains society amongst men. But 
 society is impossible without the means of securing 
 peace. Hence, nature grants the right to the means 
 necessary to secure peace. Now, one necessary means 
 is the right to repel an unjust aggressor. For if wicked 
 men might not be frustrated in their attempts at crime, 
 all peace would be at an end ; society could not exist. 
 
 359. Q. In repelling an unjust aggressor, is it lawful 
 to use necessary force which may result in damage to 
 him ? 
 
 A. Yes. We have for this, again, the universal con- 
 sent of all mankind and of all civil legislators. 
 
 Besides, it is seldom possible to repel an aggressor 
 without inflicting some damage upon him. Hence, if 
 the natural law did not allow us to run the risk of this 
 consequence, our right of repelling an aggressor would 
 be illusory. It would be no right at all. 
 
 Again, the natural law is just. Now, when there is 
 an attack, either the aggressor or the one attacked must 
 suffer; and we cannot suppose the natural law to be 
 on the side of the aggressor, and against the peaceful 
 defender. 
 
 360. Q. What must be observed in the defence ? 
 
 A. He who defends himself must have a just inten- 
 tion ; that is, his intention must be simply to defend his 
 
 right. He must not inflict damage through vengeance, 
 
 but merely as a necessary means of defence. If, for 
 
120 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 instance, to defend his property, a blow will suffice, 
 it will not be lawful for him to mutilate. 
 
 There must, also, be a proportion between the injury- 
 repulsed and the damage done in repulsing it. To 
 defend a dollar or recover possession of it, killing or 
 cutting, as being out of all proportion with the injury, 
 would, certainly, be unlawful. 
 
 361. Q. When the injury has been completed, when 
 we have been maimed, or defamed, or robbed, have we 
 a right to demand complete reparation for the injury ? 
 
 A. Certainly. The violation of a right does not de- 
 stroy the right. Because a man steals your watch it 
 does not cease to be yours. 
 
 362. Q. But may physical force be employed, if 
 necessary, to secure this reparation, to recover the 
 exercise of the right ? 
 
 A. Yes. For, as the right has not been lost, it is 
 perfectly lawful to use the means necessary to secure its 
 exercise, provided such means be in themselves lawful 
 and violate no right of another. But the use of neces- 
 sary force to recover the exercise of a right is no more 
 unlawful than the use of force to defend a right that is 
 attacked. Moreover, it violates no right of another. If 
 it violated the right of any one, it would violate the right 
 of the one who has done the injury. And if it violated 
 any right of his, this would be his right to continue the 
 injury which he has done. But he has acquired no 
 right to continue the injury. The mere fact of his hav- 
 ing done the injury does not create in him a right to 
 perpetuate it. Hence neither does it even justify him 
 in defending himself against you when you proceed to 
 recover what you have lost. If he puts himself in your 
 way, he undertakes to stand the consequences. 
 
VINDICATION OF RIGHTS. 121 
 
 363. Q. May every individual, therefore, at all times 
 and under all circumstances, undertake, by persoiial 
 force, the vindication of his right which another has 
 violated ? 
 
 A. No. In a constituted civil society the individual 
 may not take the matter into his own hands to set- 
 tle it by means of his own personal physical force. 
 He must have recourse to the authorities established in 
 the society for the vindication of violated rights. Of 
 course, there are certain cases in which the established 
 authorities may be powerless to act by the regular 
 methods, and in these cases the society authorizes the 
 individual to act for himself. Thus, if a man seizes 
 your watch whilst you are walking along a dark and 
 lonely street, you are authorized to seize him, in turn, 
 and recover your watch. But the rule is that when the 
 case comes within the action of the civil power, this 
 power must be appealed to as the constituted guardian 
 of the rights of the citizens. 
 
 The reason of this is sufficiently evident and is fully 
 appreciated by all who live in civil society. If every 
 man were allowed in all circumstances to undertake the 
 personal vindication of his violated rights, there would 
 be an end to all peace and security in society. Men 
 prejudiced in their own favor might readily attack 
 their neighbors who were really in the right. Many, 
 using the advantage of might or of an obscure case, 
 would do so under a false plea. Numbers, again, 
 through anger and vengeance, would take greater com- 
 pensation than was due to them. And not a few, 
 through the same motives, would use more violence than 
 necessary, or use it when it might not be necessary at 
 all. Thus society would be delivered up to terrorism 
 
122 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 and bloodshed. Hence, the law of nature, urging men 
 to live together in society, demands the establishment 
 in that society of an authority to which those who think 
 they are injured may appeal, — an authority which shall 
 enquire into the injury and its authors and bring about 
 reparation without respect of persons. 
 
CHAPTER XIII. ARGUMENT OF THE 
 WORK. 
 
 The purpose of this work on the fundamental ethics 
 has been to treat, from a philosophical standpoint, the 
 basis of correct human conduct. To accomplish this 
 purpose, therefore, it was necessary to begin with the 
 conclusions of the sound, universal, common-sense phi- 
 losophy regarding man. Some of these conclusions 
 are given in the first article. Out of these conclu- 
 sions, by a questioning analysis, we deduce the princi- 
 ples that preside over human activity. 
 
 There are two philosophical conclusions which taken 
 together seem to form a paradox, and yet which must 
 enter in combination into every ethical solution. They 
 are these : — 
 
 ( i ) Man is free ; that is, he has the physical power 
 to will a thing, not to will it, or to will the opposite. 
 
 (2) Man, as a created being, is dependent in his entire 
 being upon his Creator; hence, even in the use of his 
 free power of willing, he is subject to the will of his 
 Creator. 
 
 Everything in creation has its own peculiar nature. 
 Hence it is the will of the Creator, who made things 
 what they are, that they should act according to their 
 nature. Man is intelligent and free. Hence it is for 
 him to act with liberty according to intelligence. If 
 123 
 
124 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 knowledge or free will be absent from his act, this act 
 will not be a human act. 
 
 The object which serves as suitable material for the 
 natural activity of any being is called the " good " of 
 that being. The purpose for which a being exists, and 
 which it may reach by the exercise of its natural activity, 
 is called the end of that being. The object which will 
 supply material for the utmost capacity for action of a 
 being is called the highest good of that being. Action, 
 also, upon such object, will constitute the last end of 
 that being. 
 
 Every being in creation has an innate tendency to 
 action upon its own peculiar good. Beings that have 
 not intelligence and free-will act by necessity. They 
 cannot set to themselves a purpose. The free intelli- 
 gent being, man, can set to himself a purpose and select 
 means to the end. He may choose a good and an end 
 which, being only a good and an end of a part of him, 
 and being chosen out of time and without regard to the 
 natural subordination of that part to the entire person- 
 ality of the man, may be in opposition to the real end 
 of the man, and be not good, but bad, for the entire per- 
 sonality taken as a unit. However, even when man 
 thus chooses what is evil, he does not select it under the 
 aspect in which it is evil. He tries to blind himself to 
 this view and to bring out, in strong light, the phase 
 in which it is seen as partial good. Thus it is that, 
 though man's perfect happiness can consist only in the 
 highest exercise of his distinctive powers of intelligence 
 and will upon his highest good, and though he has 
 an innate tendency to perfect happiness, still he does 
 choose deliberately that which is evil for himself as 
 man. 
 
ARGUMENT OF THE WORK. 1 25 
 
 In Articles 4 and 5 of Chapter II. we considered the 
 element of the voluntary in the human act and the cir- 
 cumstances that can affect the voluntary in an act. 
 Then in discussing the action of the human will upon 
 those objects that can come under its free appetition, 
 we saw that the terms moral good and moral evil were 
 applied to such things as should or should not respec- 
 tively be made the object of the free choice of the will, 
 as being respectively in or out of keeping with the 
 reaching of the last end and the highest good of 
 the entire personality of the man taken as a unit. 
 The morality of a human act, therefore, is the right 
 direction of that act towards man's highest good. There 
 are some acts that are in themselves good, and others 
 that are in themselves bad. There are some acts which 
 are in themselves indifferent. In determining the mo- 
 rality of an act, we must consider the nature of the act, 
 that is the final purpose of the will ; also the nature of 
 all acts directed to that purpose, and the circumstances 
 of all these acts. The act will be morally bad if a single 
 bad element enters. A good end will never justify a 
 bad means. 
 
 The voluntary act, only, is imputable to the free 
 agent, as of this alone does he adopt the responsibility, 
 whatever such responsibility may be. 
 
 The moral order — that is, the order which is in keep- 
 ing with the nature of things, and which man can by 
 his freewill disturb — becomes obligatory upon a free 
 will when its observance is imposed by one having power 
 to bind that free will. The observance which, before, 
 was befitting as being according to the nature of things, 
 now becomes law as being imposed by the will of the 
 superior. 
 
126 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 The binding force of a law is measured by the power 
 of the superior to bind, and by his will in the concrete 
 case to use that power. The power to bind the human 
 will belongs to the Creator of the human will. 
 
 The term, law, is employed to express, not an isolated 
 precept given to an individual ; but it is reserved to 
 indicate precepts that affect whole classes of individuals. 
 A command given to an individual is called a precept. 
 Precept is also often used to signify the separate enact- 
 ments of a code of laws. Thus we speak of the pre- 
 cepts of the natural law. 
 
 The natural law is the body of precepts which are 
 founded on the nature of things, and which tend to the 
 natural perfection of man. The existence of the natu- 
 ral law has been recognized by all men, and is readily 
 known in its more general precepts. It is a divine, 
 eternal law, and is promulgated by reason to the will of 
 man. That is to say, it is discoverable by reason which 
 sees its precepts to be according to the nature of things, 
 and, hence, to be according to the will of the Creator of 
 all. Though it is often called the law of reason, reason 
 is not the law, nor can reason make a law. Law arises 
 from a will, and from the will of one who is the superior 
 of the person for whom the law is made. From this is 
 seen the insufficiency of the doctrine of Kant for the 
 efficiency of law. 
 
 It is the will of the lawgiver that binds the free will 
 of man. Man is left with the physical power to disobey, 
 but he is under obligation not to disobey. 
 
 The most general precept of the natural law may be 
 expressed in these words, " Do good and avoid evil." 
 
 Some precepts of the natural law are more readily 
 inferred from the nature of things than are others. 
 
ARGUMENT OF THE WORK. 127 
 
 The precepts of the natural law are either affirmative 
 or negative. The negative precepts bind all men always 
 and at all times. The affirmative precepts do not call 
 for direct positive exercise at every moment. 
 
 There is a sanction for the natural law ; a reward for 
 its observance, and a punishment for its violation. Rea- 
 son teaches this ; and it teaches, moreover, that the 
 sanction must extend beyond the present life. The fact 
 of the sanction has been recognized by all peoples, just 
 as all peoples have recognized the existence of the natu- 
 ral law. 
 
 Positive law is distinguished from the natural law 
 as being law that depends upon the free will of the 
 legislator. Natural law must be imposed. Any given 
 positive law, considered in itself, need not be imposed. 
 Positive law is called divine or human according as 
 the legislator is, respectively, God or man. All purely 
 human laws are positive laws. A positive law may 
 never be in opposition to the natural law which is 
 essential. When a human so-called law is found to 
 be in opposition to the certain natural law, such so- 
 called positive law is no law at all. It is null and void, 
 and to follow it is to violate the unchangeable natural 
 law. 
 
 The name, moral conscience, is employed to signify 
 that act of the mind which declares a given law to be 
 binding in a given case. This judgment is always, at 
 least implicitly, the conclusion of an argument When 
 the conclusion is true and correctly drawn, the judg- 
 ment is a true conscience; when the conclusion is false, 
 the judgment is a false conscience. Culpability in 
 acting upon a false conscience depends upon the culpa- 
 bility of the ignorance involved. The judgment of 
 
128 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 conscience may be followed — and then only — when 
 we have moral certainty of its truth. Moral certainty is 
 such as excludes a prudent doubt. Whenever there 
 is a prudent doubt about the lawfulness of an act, we 
 must investigate the case before putting the act. If 
 after having made the investigation befitting the gravity 
 of the case we find ourselves still in doubt, we may — 
 observing the very important restriction mentioned on 
 page 79 — conclude that the law, if there be any in 
 the matter, has not been sufficiently promulgated, and 
 hence has not yet its binding force. The important 
 restriction refers to obligations of justice, charity, and 
 religion which we know to be certain and whose fulfil- 
 ment we may not imperil by acting upon a doubt which 
 still remains after a prudent investigation. Thus, for 
 instance, I have been depositing money in my friend's 
 safe, and I doubt whether a certain sum there is mine. 
 My friend says that it is not mine. Nevertheless, I 
 have a very serious doubt ; and my doubt remains after 
 investigation. I may not take the money ; for my 
 obligation of justice to my friend is something that is 
 positively certain ; and my taking of the money may 
 imperil the fulfilment of this most certain obligation. 
 Mere feelings are not conscience. Conscience is a 
 matter of intellect, and hence is susceptible of being 
 developed to a high degree of acuteness in discrimina- 
 tion and of rapidity in action. 
 
 The passions are not in themselves evil. They may 
 be used for evil ; but their purpose is to serve us as 
 aids in the observance of the moral order. They are 
 the capacities our sensitive nature possesses of being 
 roused upon the apprehension of good or evil. They 
 correspond in the sensitive order to the various attitudes 
 
ARGUMENT OF THE WORK. I 20, 
 
 which the spiritual will can assume towards good and 
 evil. Thus, when our sensitive nature is brought into 
 play in harmony with the line of action adopted by the 
 spiritual will, the work of the will is lightened because 
 passion overrides the sluggishness of the body which 
 might oppose itself to the will's commands ; and, besides, 
 the effort is intensified, since soul and body are stirred 
 up to action. The passions, by a misuse of terms, are 
 very commonly called bad. This comes from the fact 
 that very many persons too often take passion instead 
 of reason for their guide. 
 
 Other aids that we may employ for the better ob- 
 servance of the moral order, are habits. A habit is the 
 ease and inclination for a certain act which is acquired 
 by the frequent repetition of that act. The habit of 
 a good act is styled a virtue. The habit of a bad act is 
 styled a vice. Four wide-reaching virtues, called cardi- 
 nal virtues, preside over the movements of a thoroughly 
 upright life. 
 
 There are two chief classes of errors to be guarded 
 against by the student of the principles of ethics : 
 errors that ascribe the perception of morality to the 
 wrong faculty, and errors that start upon a false defini- 
 tion of morality. 
 
 The meaning of the word, right t as opposed to duty, 
 is different from the meaning of the word, rights as 
 opposed to wrong. Our duties are our obligations. 
 Our rights are the liberties left to us outside of our 
 duties. Duties are moral obligations; that is to say, 
 they rest upon the free will, leaving it, nevertheless, 
 with the physical power not to conform to the obliga- 
 tion. We can learn our duties by Studying the nature 
 of man and the essential relations of his status in the 
 
130 FUNDAMENTAL ETHICS. 
 
 creation. Rights and duties are correlative things. 
 They are both based upon law. 
 
 Rights are innate or acquired, alienable or inalienable. 
 Duties are natural or positive, affirmative or negative. 
 Rights and duties are perfect and imperfect. A dis- 
 tinction is made between an injury and an offence. 
 The motive of a duty is the reason why the law 
 imposes the duty. The title to a right is the reason 
 why the law confers the right. 
 
 Though sometimes there may seem to be a contradic- 
 tion between two laws, rights, or duties, we shall find, 
 upon consideration, that, practically, there can be no 
 real collision. We shall find that one of the rights, 
 laws, or duties is real, and that the other is only 
 apparent. When, in the case of an apparent collision, 
 we wish to discover which of the two rights or duties 
 is real, and which of the two laws really extends to the 
 matter in question, we must take into consideration 
 the order of the apparently conflicting laws, the mo- 
 tives of the duties, the titles to the rights, and the 
 matter, subject, and term of both rights and duties. 
 The expression, " suspension of law," is, like " col- 
 lision," a convenience of speech. Great prudence is 
 often required to determine the degree of difficulty in 
 execution under which a law is intended to bind. 
 
 The vindication of perfect rights is a lawful proceed- 
 ing. This vindication may be of two kinds. It may 
 be simply to defend a right by repelling an unjust 
 aggressor, or it may be to recover a right that has 
 already been violated. Speaking in general, force may 
 be used in both cases. In repelling the unjust aggres- 
 sor, certain rules of defence must be observed. In 
 a constituted civil society an individual may not — 
 
ARGUMENT OF THE WORK. I 3 I 
 
 except in a few obvious cases — take into his own 
 hands the vindication by force of a right that has 
 been violated. He must have recourse to the authori- 
 ties established in that society for the vindication of 
 violated rights. 
 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 
 
 Numbers refer to pages. 
 
 Abhorrence, 84. 
 
 Act, human (see Human act) ; of man, 
 20, 21 ; voluntary and involuntary, 
 31; free and voluntary, distinction, 
 33, 34; commanded, 32, 33, 39; 
 morally good and bad, 41, 42; 
 materially and formally bad, 47; 
 indifferent, 48; when attributable, 
 
 • when imputable, 50; and habit, 86. 
 
 Action, subordination in modes of, 
 proper resultant of, 24; spontane- 
 ous, 30. 
 
 Aggressor, repelling unjust, Cicero on 
 unjust, damage to, 118, 119. 
 
 Aids to moral order, 81 sq., 86 sq. 
 
 Anger, 86. 
 
 Apparent good, 24, 29. 
 
 Atheist and obligation, 64. 
 
 Aversion, an elicited act, 33. 
 
 Bonum, summum, 18. 
 
 Cardinal virtues, why so called, 87. 
 1,1], 77; requi,'-.! in 
 moral conscience, how obtained, 
 
 Cicero on unjust aggressor, 119. 
 Circumstances, as determinants of 
 morality, .j 
 
 gravating, extenuating, 
 
 specifying, 47. 
 m, 103, 104. 
 Coercion, and rights, 97. 
 
 Collision, of rights, duties, and laws, 
 not real, 106; of natural laws, of 
 natural and positive laws, 107, 108 ; 
 summary of cases of, between rights 
 of the same order, between unequal 
 rights, duties, and laws, 109-111; 
 general principles for solution of 
 cases of, 112. 
 
 Command, 65. 
 
 Commanded act, 32, 33. 
 
 Conscience, moral, it is a conclusion, 
 how arrived at, 75 ; rapid through 
 habit, true, false, culpability in false, 
 76; demands moral certainty, 77; 
 if invincibly and inculpably erro- 
 neous, jj ; and doubt, 77 ; educa- 
 tion of, 80 ; not feelings, 80. 
 
 Content, an elicited act, 34. 
 
 Courage, 85. 
 
 Creation, importance of fact in ethics, 
 14 ; there is a purpose in, final pur- 
 pose of whole, purpose of each part, 
 how this latter is obtained, 14, 15, 17. 
 
 Creator, 12; and endless tendency, 
 23; his purpose, 30; his externa] 
 glory and the happiness of man, 30. 
 
 Daring, 85. 
 Decalogue, 63. 
 
 , rule of, 119. 
 '. 84. 
 Desire, 84; an elicited art, 33; in 
 
 morality, 47, 48. 
 
134 
 
 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 
 
 Despair, 85 ; an elicited act, 33. 
 
 Determinants of morality, 45. 
 
 Doubt, examination in, fruitless exam- 
 ination in, restriction of liberty in, 
 77-80. 
 
 Duties and rights, 94 ; correlative, 95 ; 
 based on natural law, 96, 116. 
 
 Duties, study of important, how 
 learned, 95 ; what are, source of, 
 classification of, natural, positive, 
 negative, affirmative, 101 ; motive 
 of, 102 ; perfect, imperfect, judicial, 
 103, 104; violation of, threefold 
 term of man's, 104, 105 ; collision 
 of, 106; degree of difficulty in ob- 
 servance of, 116. 
 
 Elicited act, 32, 33. 
 
 End, immediate, of the creature, 17 ; 
 and nature of things, 17; proxi- 
 mate, ultimate, intermediate, 18 ; 
 special proximate, 24; last, 26; last 
 and happiness, 27; last not riches, 
 27; not honor, not science, not 
 pleasure, not even virtue, 28 ; end 
 does not justify means, 45. 
 
 Errors regarding fundamental ethics, 
 90. 
 
 Ethics, a science, its foundation truths, 
 sound metaphysics its basis, 11 ; 
 treated from the standpoint of natu- 
 ral knowledge, 12 ; keynote of, 13 ; 
 errors regarding fundamental, 90. 
 
 Evil never chosen as evil, how 
 chosen, 25 (see Good and Evil). 
 
 Examination in doubt, 77-80. 
 
 Faculties, veracity of knowing, 11, 
 12; each faculty has its peculiar 
 good, each is for the man and should 
 be subordinated in its exercise to 
 the human act, 18, 19; the will a 
 blind, 23. 
 
 Fear, 85; and the voluntary, 35, 38; 
 and imputability, 51. 
 
 Feelings, not conscience, 80. 
 
 Force, and the voluntary, 39 ; and im- 
 putability, 51 ; to repair injury, 120. 
 
 Fortitude, 87, 88. 
 
 Freedom, physical, 53,94; obligation 
 and physical, moral, 61. 
 
 Free will (see Will). 
 
 Good and Evil, some things in them- 
 selves, unfailing standard of, how it 
 is found, 13, 14; and right and 
 wrong, 14 ; in that which is chosen, 
 14 ; and morality, 41 ; man, moral 
 
 — characterizing the man, 41, 42; 
 moral — , and the nature of things, 
 and the last end, and the highest 
 good, and perfect happiness, 42, 43 ; 
 moral — , how far imputable, 51; 
 disputes about, 64. 
 
 Good of a power, 18 ; highest, 18, 25, 
 26 ; — of a faculty subordinated to 
 
 — of the man, 19; partial, 22, 24; 
 
 — partial as chosen by the will, — 
 that is detrimental, — of human 
 being, — of reason, 22 ; — of rea- 
 son, how attainable, 23 ; — of will, 
 23; — of person, 23, 24; true and 
 apparent — , 24, 25, 29; subordina- 
 tion of — , 25 ; suitable — , 26 ; 
 highest — and happiness, highest 
 
 — not riches, not honor, not science, 
 not pleasure, not virtue, what is 
 highest — , there can be but one 
 highest — , 27, 28, 29; highest — 
 and moral — , 43. 
 
 God, existence of — to be recog- 
 nized in ethics, n, 12; — wills us 
 to choose good and to reject evil, 
 will of — is law, 13 ; — and human 
 rights, 105. 
 
 Habit, voluntary in the — , 40; — and 
 animal, — and man, morally good 
 and bad — ,44; — of knowledge, 
 62 ; the name — , — and power and 
 act, how formed, 86; moral and 
 imputable — , 87. 
 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 
 
 135 
 
 Happiness, perfect — , — the perfec- 
 tion of human nature, standard of 
 — , — desired by all, — the object 
 of the inevitable tendency, perfect 
 — cannot be absolutely rejected, 26 ; 
 perfect — attainable, but not in this 
 life, and must be perpetual, and its 
 permanency must be known, object 
 of — , 27 ; where attainable, 28 ; one 
 object suffices, and is necessary, 
 how this is attainable, 29 ; — and 
 the order of nature, 29; partial — , 
 29 ; — and the purpose of the Crea- 
 tor, 30 ; — and good and evil, 43. 
 
 Hatred, 84. 
 
 Hindrances to observance of moral 
 order, 81 sq., 86 sq. 
 
 Honor, is not last end or highest 
 good, 28. 
 
 Hope, 85 ; an elicited act, 33. 
 
 Human act, 19, 20, 30; — implies 
 knowledge and freewill, 20; distin- 
 guished from act of the man, 20, 21 ; 
 purpose in — , 21. 
 
 Human Being, can act against his own 
 nature, 15; good of — , 22; — char- 
 acterized by reason and free will, 22. 
 
 Human nature and perfect happi- 
 ness, 26. 
 
 Ignorance, 24 ; — and the voluntary, 
 35; vincible and invincible — ,35; 
 effect of vincible — on an act, 36; 
 vincible — affected and slothful, 37 ; 
 vincible — and imputability, 51. 
 
 Indirect voluntary, 32. 
 
 Injury, 104 ; — repaired by force, 120. 
 
 Instinct, 31. 
 
 Intellect distinguishes morality, 50. 
 
 Intention in morality, 47, 48. 
 
 Involuntary act, 31 ; — lacks knowl- 
 edge or free will, 31. 
 
 Joy, 84. 
 
 t cardinal virtue, 87; limited 
 
 meaning of -, 89. 
 
 Kant and independent morality, 58 ; 
 his theory eliminates law, correc- 
 tion needed, 59; — and rationalism, 
 61. 
 
 Keynote of ethics, 13. 
 
 Knowledge, habitual, 63. 
 
 Law, rule for human will a — , 11 ; how 
 it binds, 52; moral — , measure of 
 its binding force, rule and precept, 
 characters of — , 52, 53; violation 
 of — , when imputable, 54 ; — de- 
 mands distinction of persons, 59; 
 obligation supposes — , 62 ; sanc- 
 tion of — (see Sanction) ; positive 
 
 — (see Positive) ; collision of — (see 
 Collision); suspension of — , 115; 
 
 — and difficulty of observance, 116 ; 
 natural — (see Natural law). 
 
 Life, relation of present to future, 29. 
 Logic, truths proved in, 12. 
 Love, 84; an elicited act, 33. 
 
 Man, finite and composite, has body 
 and soul, has reason and free will 
 by which he is to be governed, is 
 free and responsible, is a unit, when 
 does he act according to his nature, 
 11, 12, 16; has animal and spiritual 
 faculties, 18 ; can set himself a pur- 
 pose, 20 ; purpose of his existence, 
 30; — in the order of nature, a 
 created being, a part of the created 
 universe, faculties of — , relations of 
 — , 42, 43 ; good and bad for — , 43 ; 
 essential relations of — , 64. 
 
 Matter of a right, 98. 
 
 Means, 18; — not justified by the 
 end, 45. 
 
 Metaphysics, truths proved in, 12. 
 Moral, the word, 44; — philosophy, 
 44 ; — sense, 50; — consc 1 
 sq. ; — order and aids and hin- 
 drances to, 81 sq. ; — habit, 87; — 
 Ration, 94; — 
 1, 118. 
 
136 
 
 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 
 
 Morality, 41 ; determinants of — , 44; 
 chief determinant of — , 45 ; in the 
 intention, 47, 48 ; not a matter of 
 opinion, — and civil laws, and athe- 
 ism and materialism and panthe- 
 ism, and indifferent act, 49 ; — dis- 
 tinguished by the intellect, 50; 
 independent — , 58 ; errors regard- 
 ing definition and perception of — , 
 90. 
 
 Motive of a duty, 102. 
 
 Natural law, 54; is recognized by 
 human race, is readily known in 
 general precepts, special testimony 
 to its existence, it is divine, 55 ; — 
 is not reason, 58 ; why called the 
 law of reason, is proclaimed by 
 reason, 60, 61 ; knowledge of — , 
 fundamental precepts of — are 
 known directly and easily, imme- 
 diate and remote conclusions of — , 
 63 ; first principle of — , 64 ; affirm- 
 ative and negative precepts of — , 
 65; sanction of — ,66; partial and 
 complete sanction of — , 67 ; perfect 
 sanction of — known, and to be 
 found in another life, 68; — and 
 positive law, 70-72; summary on 
 — . 73 '. now differs from positive 
 law, how enforced by positive law, 
 
 74- 
 
 Nature of things, study of necessary 
 in ethics, 14; — and right and 
 wrong, 16 ; — and end, 17. 
 
 Nature, order of — , how this is con- 
 tributed to and how acted against, 
 IS- 
 
 Obligation, 60; — leaves physical 
 freedom, 61; — and rationalism, 
 61 ; proceeds from law, 63 ; — and 
 atheism, 64; moral — , 94. 
 
 Offence, 104. 
 
 Opinion does not make right and 
 wrong, 49. 
 
 Order of nature, 15 ; moral — , aids 
 and hindrances to observance of 
 moral — , 81 sq. 
 
 Passion and the choice of evil, 24. 
 
 Passions, the, what are, — not evil, 
 may be misused, 81, 82; how — 
 are an aid, why wrong to follow — , 
 how passions are independent of 
 the will, — not our guide, why — 
 are called bad, 82, 83; number of 
 — , primary — , 83-85. 
 
 Person, good of, 23; individual and 
 moral — , 118. 
 
 Pleasure, not the last end or the high- 
 est good, 28. 
 
 Positive law, basis of, Creator and — , 
 divine and human — , ultimate basis 
 of human — , certain applications 
 of natural law determined by — , 
 69-71 ; presupposes natural law, 
 cannot conflict with natural law, 
 human — may not be imposed 
 through caprice, human — and 
 invincible ignorance, 71-73; dif- 
 fers from natural, sometimes en- 
 forces natural law, 74. 
 
 Positivism, 91. 
 
 Power, moral, 94. 
 
 Prejudice and the choice of evil, 24. 
 
 Prohibition, 65. 
 
 Prudence, 87, 88. 
 
 Purpose of will, 21 ; common purpose 
 of will, 22. 
 
 Rationalism and obligation, 61. 
 
 Reason, to govern man, 16; — char- 
 acterizes human being, 22; the 
 good of — and how attainable, 
 22, 23; — proclaims the natural 
 law, 61. 
 
 Relations, essential — of man, 64, 95. 
 
 Revelation, supernatural not brought 
 in, 12. 
 
 Riches, not the last end or highest 
 good, 27. 
 
ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 
 
 157 
 
 Right, as opposed to wrong and as 
 opposed to duty, 93. 
 
 Right and Wrong, rule of — , 11, 14; 
 standard of — ,13; — and good and 
 evil, 14 ; — are in the act of the will, 
 14 ; — and the nature of things, and 
 reason, and free will, 16 ; — not a 
 mere matter of opinion, 49; dis- 
 putes about — , 64. 
 
 Rights, and power of coercion, 97 ; — 
 may not be pursued by evil means, 
 are morally inviolable though physi- 
 cally impeded, are moral powers, 
 97, 98; subject, term, matter, and 
 title of — , — of demented persons, 
 98 ; innate, acquired, alienable, in- 
 alienable — , 98-100; perfect, im- 
 perfect, purely moral — , 103, 104; 
 collision of — not real, 106 ; vindi- 
 cation of — , classification of perfect 
 — , 118; — not destroyed by viola- 
 tion, 120. 
 
 Rights and duties, 94 ; — are correla- 
 tive, 95: — are based on natural 
 law, 96, 116. 
 
 Rule of right and wrong, 11 ; — for 
 human will is a law, 12. 
 
 Rules, two guiding — , 25. 
 
 Sadness, 85 ; — is an elicited act, 33. 
 
 Sanction, of law and of natural law, 
 66; — follows violation of natural 
 law naturally, partial and complete 
 — , 67; the Creator and — of the 
 natural law, — is in privation and 
 punishment, — is just, 68, 69. 
 
 • the last end or the 
 highest good, 28. 
 50. 
 
 ID, 91. 
 
 Sin, philosophical. 59 ; theolog 
 
 ■ ••I by natu. 
 11 —.119; — assumes vindi- 
 cation of violated rights, tax. 
 
 Soul, immortality of, 11, 12. 
 
 Spontaneous action, 30. 
 
 Standard, of right and wrong, of good 
 
 and evil, 13; how found, 14; — ol 
 
 happiness, 26. 
 Subject of a right, 93. 
 Summura bonum, 18. 
 Superior, and the force of law, 53. 
 Suspension of law, 115. 
 System of the universe, 15 ; harmony 
 
 with the — , 25. 
 
 Temperance, a cardinal virtue, 87, 88 ; 
 limited application of the term, 89. 
 
 Tendency, endless, inevitable, innate, 
 23 ; natural resultant of — , specific 
 — , 25 ; inevitable — and happiness, 
 26 ; — not towards the unattainable, 
 27- 
 
 Term, of a right, 98 ; — of duty is 
 threefold, 104. 
 
 Title of a right, 98, 102. 
 
 True good, 24, 29. 
 
 Truth is the good of reason, how, 22, 23. 
 
 Universe, system of, 15, 25. 
 Utilitarianism, 91, 92. 
 
 Vice, 87. 
 
 Vindication, of aright is limited to the 
 perfect right, 118; — of a violated 
 right to be left to the authority in 
 society, 121. 
 
 Violence and voluntary, 35 (see 
 
 Virtual voluntary, 32. 
 Virtue, is not the last end or highest 
 a8; what is — , cardinal — , 
 87 sq. 
 Voluntary act, requii. 
 •ind free will, approval an I 
 
 n — , 31 ; elicited and com- 
 UHd virtual — , 
 in —.32; - 
 33; tircumstaa 
 
 35; — and habit, 4 
 
138 
 
 ALPHABETICAL INDEX. 
 
 Will, human, liberty of, rule for — is 
 law, how — is subject to law, — to 
 be used according to reason for the 
 government of man, 11-13, 16; 
 — acts for a purpose, may have 
 various subordinated purposes, 21 ; 
 common purpose of — , — proposes 
 some good of the person, 22. 
 
 Will, choosing partial good, — char- 
 acterizes human being, 22 ; good of 
 the — , the — a blind faculty, 23 ; — 
 is free and voluntary, 31 ; — physi- 
 cally free, 53; — subject to Creator, 
 53 ; — and passions, 82 ; exercise 
 of — limited by law. 
 
 Wrong (see Right and Wrong). 
 
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