* v »: ^ ^ £ o« °o / 4* % iPXb, ,*^ xO 49* *bi? »& ^ «* ♦ *> *•«•, "^ o^ ^i» # "*b A*" o«"»# ^ o^ • \ • v ^o^ / /\ : 3g&- /\ -OT?- y\ b - ^-J&bfcS A^% A-^&.% o^ %-™V %"v \*™V v^ 5 '*' ^^ 4,* ^ ^> 4 » a o ^..^ » ^ Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2011 with funding from The Library of Congress http://www.archive.org/details/attacksuponspaniOOhart W^t Attarka upon tty ^jratuslj Mmn bg Admiral Hmum BT FRANCIS RUSSELL HART W^t Attarka upon tlje ^>pa«tal| iUattt bij Anmtral Itemon FRANCIS RUSSELL HART Reprinted from The Journal of American History, Volume II, Number II- — Copyright assigned to the Author Associate -PttbUsljrrfl uf Amrrtrau JRwor&fl NEW HAVEN, CONNECTKM T Aimiral l^rnim 'HE somewhat uncertain '^ i peace brought about in j| Europe in 1736, largely ■ L through the efforts of Sir • Robert Walpole, served to strengthen the family compact between the Bourbon courts of France and Spain and to give time for the increase of the naval forces of these countries rather than to encourage, as Walpole had hoped, a continued tranquility. The great sea power of England had made possible the development of a large English trade with Spanish America during the alliance of Eng- land and Spain in the war against France. This growing commercial supremacy of England was naturally unwelcome to Spain, and both by en- forcing the limitations placed upon trading, inserted in the Treaty of Utrecht, and by annoying restrictions in the Spanish ports of America, Philip endeavored to reduce to almost a disappearing point English inter- course with the Spanish colonies. English trading vessels, always at that time partially armed, were hav- ing frequent encounters with Spanish vessels, and on neither side were the agreed upon stipulations duly respect- ed. Walpole, more prudent than the adventurous traders of England be- lieved consistent with the honor of his country, vainly tried to hold down the clamorers for war in Parliament. The final event which made the efforts of Walpole wholly powerless for peace was the seizure off the Spanish Main by the ship "Isabel," of an English merchant ship loaded with contraband stuffs, under Captain Jenkins. The commander of the "Isabel" appears to have treated Captain Jenkins with un- usual cruelty, and, before releasing ^ him, cut off one of his ears. In the spring of 1739, Jenkins appeared, amid great excitement, at the Bar of the House of Commons, displaying his mangled ear and telling the story of his misfortunes. The pressure was too great, Walpole had to give way, and on June 13, 1739, war was de- clared against Spain. 1 Among the members of Parliament, in the opposition, violently opposed to the ministry, and equally violently urging a war of reprisal against Spain, was Captain Edward Vernon, a naval officer, who urged that an imme- diate expedition be sent out against Porto Bello, and vigorously asserted that the place would not only be cap- tured, but pledged himself to take it with six ships only. In order to more clearly appreciate the bearing of the influence of Vernon upon the events of this time, and more particularly upon the expedition associated with his name, it is necessary to glance at the record of his previous career. He appears to have had an amount of in- fluence in the House of Commons and a popular favor outside, which made it impossible for the minister to whom he was violently opposed to ignore either the plans he proposed or his own offer to command the expe- dition. Edward Vernon was the second son of James Vernon, Secretary of State to William III. and was born in West- minster the twelfth of November, 1684. After a thorough study of the classics and the mathematical sciences, he was allowed by his family to yield to a natural taste for the sea, and en- tered the navy in 1 701. He was with Admiral Hopson in the "Torbay" at Vigo, the twelfth of October, 1702, and was second lieutenant on the "Resolu- tion" in the expedition against Hispaniola, commanded by Captain Walker. Afterwards he served with distinction with Admiral Sir George Rook and with Sir Cloudesley Shovel. His first command as captain was of the "Jersey," in which he was sent to Port Royal, Jamaica, and for three years had a successful career on the West Indian station, capturing many prizes. This was followed by many years of more important commands, chiefly in the Battle, interspersed with intervals of serving in the House of Commons. It was the belief in Eng- land that if Porto Bello and Cartagena were taken, that Spanish power in Admiral B^rnott the New World would be irredeem- ably broken, and shortly after the declaration of war Vernon was given a commission as vice-admiral of the Blue, and placed in command of a squadron of ships of war to be sent to the West Indies. His instructions were "to destroy the Spanish settle- "ments in the West Indies and to dis- "tress their shipping by any method "whatever." The squadron consisted of the "Burford" of 70 guns and 500 men, "Lenox" of 70 guns and 480 men, "Elizabeth" of 70 guns and 480 men, "Kent" of 70 guns and 480 men, "Worcester" of 60 guns and 400 men, "Strafford" of 60 guns and 400 men, "Princess Louisa" of 60 guns and 420 men, "Norwich" of 50 guns and 300 men, and "Pearl" of 40 guns and 240 men, in all nine ships carrying a total of 550 guns and 3,700 men. Admiral Vernon sailed from Ports- mouth the twenty-third of July, 1739, and after some delays and digressions, occasioned chiefly by an unsuccessful search for a squadron of the enemy near the Spanish coast, arrived at Port Royal, Jamaica, the twelfth of Octo- ber. With this as a base the Admiral proposed to attack Porto Bello and Cartagena, with such of his squadron as he had remaining, several vessels having been detached for special ser- vice in harassing the Spanish mer- chantmen. The ships remaining were the "Burford," "Princess Louisa." "Worcester," "Strafford," and "Nor- wich," and to these the Admiral was able to add at Port Royal the "Hamp- ton Court" of 70 guns and 495 men, and "Sheerness" of 20 guns and 300 men, together with 200 marines ob- tained from Governor Trelawney. On the fifth of November, this squadron set sail, the "Sheerness" be- ing sent as a scout in the direction oi Cartagena, while the rest headed for Porto Bello. off which porl they lay to on the twentieth of thai month. On the twenty-first, he attacked the Iron Fort, so called, al the harbor's entrance, with his full strength at close range, and with such vigor that, after a short but spirited resistance, Admiral Hrrnnn it surrendered. The next morning, while instructions were being given to govern the attack upon the remaining fortresses of San Jeronimo and Gloria Castle, a boat with a flag of truce came to the admiral's ship, the result of which was a speedy capitulation on terms dictated by Admiral Vernon. 2 As a result of this capitulation the English fleet secured two Spanish men-of-war of 20 guns each, one other vessel, 40 brass cannons, 4 brass mortars, 18 smaller brass guns, a quantity of ammunition and about ten thousand dollars. The fortifications and some 80 iron cannons were ren- dered useless before the departure of the squadron, which shortly returned to Jamaica. As had been predicted^ Porto Bello was taken with six ships, and when the news, which had been despatched to London, reached there, the thanks of both Houses of Parliament were voted to the admiral. The English reports of this victory state the number of men taken to have been five officers and thirty-five men "out of three hundred, the rest "being either killed or wounded or "having made their escape ;" the Span- ish accounts, however, declare that Porto Bello was defended by a total of thirty men and five cannons, and Spanish historians point with amuse- ment to the celebration of this victory in London. The actual record of the numbers of cannons taken away, how- ever, and other circumstances, make it appear improbable that the popular Spanish version is strictly correct, although it is equally probable that the English account exaggerates the strength of the Spanish garrison. The official report of the governor of Panama to the king of Spain is in- definite as to the number of troops employed, but corroborates in the main Vernon's own account, and re- fers in complimentary terms to the courtesy and moderation of the Eng- lish admiral. On the twenty-fifth of February, 1740, Admiral Vernon, after refitting his ships, sailed again from Jamaica for the Spanish Main, and from the sixth to ninth of March bombarded Cartagena, doing some damage, but also receiving enough injuries to his smaller craft to make it expedient to sail to Porto Bello to effect repairs. On the twenty-second of March, he attacked Chagres, laying off that place and keeping up a moderate but con- tinual bombardment until, on the twenty-fourth, the garrison capitu- lated. 3 The ships engaged in the ■bombardment were the "Strafford," "Norwich," "Falmouth" and "Prin- cess Louisa." After seizing a consid- erable quantity of goods of value from the Custom-house stores and taking on board all serviceable brass cannons and other grins, the Custom-house was destroyed by fire, and on the thirtieth the squadron sailed again for Jamaica. That the strength of the Cartagena fortifications was fully realized is clear from the fact that before again assaulting that place, Admiral Vernon remained almost constantly for months at Jamaica, re-enforcing his squadron with ships and men. Late in the year his squadron was joined by a number of store ships under con- voy, and by transport ships with troops. In January, 1741, he was further re-enforced by a squadron un- der Rear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle, consisting of thirty ships of the line and some ninety other vessels, the ships being manned by fifteen thou- sand sailors. The land troops sent out from England amounted to about 12,000, these latter being augmented at Jamaica by 3,600 troops from the American colonies.* *These American troops were made up as follows: from Massachusetts, five com- panies; Rhode Island, two companies; Con- necticut, two companies: New York, five companies; New Jersey, three companies; Pennsylvania, eight companies; Maryland, three companies; Virginia, four compa- nies; North Carolina, four companies. Among other American officers was Colo- nel Lawrence Washington, and it was on account of his association with Admiral Vernon that Mount Vernon subsequently received its name. Admiral Burnett SENTRY BOX ON WALL OVERLOOKING THE SEA AT CARTAGENA The command of all the land troops had been given to Major-General Lord Cathart, who unfortunately died before reaching Jamaica, and the com- mand fell upon Brigadier-General Thomas Wentworth,' who appears to have been particularly unsuited for the great responsibility thrust upon him. The causes which led to the later practical failure of this expedition against Cartagena cannot be attribu- ted to the lack of proper preparations or equipments, nor to the haste em- ployed ; indeed, the expedition appears to have been planned with the most careful regard to all details. Vessels were engaged in scout service to de- termine as clearly as possible the whereabouts of the French squadron under Admiral the Marquis d'Antin, and careful observations had con- stantly been made of the fortifications about Cartagena, the prevalent weather conditions, currents, etc., as well as the depths of water off the town and at the Boca Chica forts. The instructions given to the fleel on sailing from Jamaica divided the fighting vessels into three divisions, one under Vice-Admiral Vernon (commander-in-chief), one under Rear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle, and one under Commodore Lestock, and comprised some thirty line-of-battle ships, twenty-two frigates and a large miscellaneous squadron of transports, fire-ships, bomb-ketches and tenders. In all there were one hundred twenty- four sail. 1 Not unnaturally the rumors of these preparations for the attack mi Cartagena readied that place weeks before the news became a certainty, through the definite reports of a French ship which appears to have been sent to Cartagena by the French admiral ex- pressly to warn the inhabitants ^\ the impending attack. During the last week in January, 1741, the three divisions sailed from Port Royal, a few days apart, effect- ing a junction at sea on the thirty- first, and making Cape Tiberon, on the Western extremity of Hispaniola i ni iw tin- I -land of 1 laili and San Domingo) on the seventh of February. Vfter several clays of careful recon- A&mtral Bentnn noitering to make certain whether or not the French fleet had sailed for Europe as reported, the three divi- sions came to anchor in the bays near the cape. On the twenty-fifth of February, the fleet left for Cartagena under easy sail, and came to anchor on the fourth of March a few leagues to windward (i. e., to the eastward) of the town of Cartagena, between that place and Punta Canoas. Dur- ing several days, detailed preparations for the attack were made, and various councils of war held, one of which settled the important matters relative to the distribution of the expected booty 5 and one confirming the admir- al's plan of attack. Great care seems to have been taken to obtain as com- plete plans as possible of the forts at Boca Chica, and careful soundings were made by some of the smaller vessels all along the Tierra Bomba shore and at the entrance to the har- bor. A feint at landing on the shore side of the town was made by some of the smaller vessels, apparently for the purpose, and probably to some ex- tent successful, of engaging the attention of the enemy from the real landing point at Boca Chica." On the morning of the ninth, Sir Chaloner Ogle, with his division, moved forward to the attack, followed by Admiral Vernon with his division and all the transports, leaving the division under Commander Lestock at anchor. As the ships moving to leeward approached Boca Chica, the small fort of Chamba (on Tierra Bomba, east of Boca Chica Castle) fired a few shots, but was soon silenced and deserted. Three of the 8o-gun ships were anchored close to the Forts of San Jago and San Felipe and maintained a very hot fire, so that these forts were soon deserted, and the evening of that day grenadiers were landed and took possession of them without meeting any resistance. Also during the evening, from the bomb-ketches and from those of the ships which could comfortably ap- proach, a continual fire was kept up against Boca Chica Castle, which was returned with some spirit, under cover of which firing troops and artillery were landed during the night and next forenoon. The troops were en- camped under the protection of a woody growth near, but apparently somewhat protected from Boca Chica Castle. It was during and immedi- ately after the landing of these troops that the serious differences of opinion between General Wentworth and Ad- miral Vernon began to arise, differ- ences which afterwards were to prove to a large extent the cause of the fail- ure of the expedition, and which served at once to create a most unfor- tunate feeling of antagonism between the sea and land forces. The admiral complained of the delays of the troops to press the attack upon the castle, and on the eleventh he and Sir Chal- oner Ogle joined in a letter to Gen- eral Wentworth, urging immediate action. That delays somewhat diffi- cult to understand did take place is evident from the fact that on the nineteenth, owing to complaints from General Wentworth, several vessels undertook successfully, but with some difficulty, to silence the Baradera Bat- tery on the opposite side of the har- bor entrance, the fire from which reached the encampment of the troops, and on the twenty-first of March, at a council of w)ar of the naval com- manders, complaint as to the slow progress of the troops was formally made. 7 Finally, on the days from the twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth, by the joint co-operation of the vessels and troops, both Boca Chica Castle and that of San Jose were taken, as also was one of the Spanish ships. San Jose appears to have been almost deserted when taken, and it is probable that this fort was not actively defended. That the defence of Boca Chica Castle itself was gallant and spirited is certain from the clear rec- ord of the extensive operations against it. Before being taken, however, the defenders had largely made their es- cape, and had found time to par- Aftmtrai Berttntt VIEW OF CITY OF CARTAGENA FROM TOP OF THE OLD FORTRESS OF SAN LAZARO (From a photograph taken 1S92) tially block the channel up the bay by sinking the Spanish ships "Africa" and "San Carlos/' besides burning the ship "San Felipe" on the shore. During the next few days, the fleet was able to enter the bay, the batteries at the small Passo Caballos entrance were easily destroyed and a safe an- chorage established. The forts at Boca Chica were adequately garri- soned, the troops re-embarked, and preparations were made for the real attack upon the city. The Spanish viceroy, Lieutenant- General D. Sebastian de Eslaba, was resident at Cartagena, together with the military governor of the city, D. Bias de Leso. According to contemporary Spanish accounts, the forces at the disposal of the vice- roy and governor were eleven hun- dred veteran soldiers, three hundred militia, six hundred Indians, and two companies of negroes and free mu- lattoes. The naval forces in the har- bor were six ships with six hundred seamen and four hundred soldiers, making about four thousand men in all. These are probably accurate es- timates of the actual Spanish forces, and it is certain that the strength of the defense of the place was due to its well-built fortifications rather than to the number of its defenders, whose numbers were undoubtedly much fewer than the attacking forces. The viceroy had ample notice of the com- ing of the attacking expedition and concentrated his small forces at im- portant points on the walls of the city itself and at San Lazaro, a strong for- tress, built "ii a slight elevation, out- side the walls, and guarding the ap- proach to the city from the land side. ddie strategic importance of this for tress and a veneral idea of the walls. rf^ Jatitud cJjoivaljyen ->oi y. J_yc/«i JG cTea^dtrJowdaa^Cbntada del Cfleridiand dc Jcnerjfe, ^ s= __ 8 dhoauite del J\qt m$0£&r**& cj ■•JlllJli12CncU dolbo' ondeJ (Jtana n dela Cruz onde d Carlo r ion dela dnereea on de cf. fa Clara )n cUtf. Catharina •ton de J n Jucaj on dc <5 tPundrhr lo KMyiicr ton de -J tos ton de V '^V* *W-E/Zi*rr/M> -*«**. x£? rf^fei^ vKA :tf* v-32 HL1 -& .<&? ?&>,£ /-fe ,^ /' / cHJN j ,37 **: ..». »-JSr- ^^i. iSSSi - r ^ ^ rV *_ *-*• ^. A *»- *. ^> '^ \ 5 ^ -V s x \ K' A "■'•'i- * *- v ,< C* A»4_" ■'~K * u '-■^> J l-S A <*, ^. j.' ISH MAP OF CARTAGENA, IN 1735 r J , C aranot)ct Cjc* Admiral lernntt and other fortifications of Cartagena can best be obtained by a glance at the map. It was considered essential by the attacking forces to first occupy San Lazaro, and indeed, if this had been accomplished, it is probable that the remaining Spanish troops would have been insufficient to have made any long effective resistance to an en- trance into the city. At a council of war held on board the "Princess Car- oline," March 30, in Cartagena Har- bor, in which the division command- ers of both the sea and land forces took part, it was resolved to land the troops at a convenient point on the south side of the harbor, under pro- tection of the guns of the ships, the first duty of the troops to be to cut off all land communications from the city. s On the first few days of April, troops were landed at Isla de Gracias close to Mansanilla Castle, from which a fairly good road reached into the town passing under the walls of San Lazaro. This landing was made without opposition, the guns from the ships sweeping the country between Isla de Gracias and San Lazaro, and the landing-place being beyond the range of the guns at Castillo Grande ; the relative positions of these places and others referred to in this account are clearly indicated on the maps. With the landing of the troops the dissensions between the commanders of the land and sea forces began anew ; Admirals Vernon and Ogle appear to have constantly condemned the procrastination of General Went- worth and urged the necessity for im- mediate action if serious ravages of sickness among the troops were to be avoided, and General Wentworth as constantly urged the necessity for more efficient co-operation on the part of the fleet, asserting that the ships should be brought into the inner har- bor, where the town itself and, more particularly, San Lazaro, would be within effective ransre of fire. The experiment of sending one of the cap- tured ships into the inner harbor was tried by Admiral Vernon, but the ship, although apparently finding sufficient water, was finally of necessity aban- doned, as, unsupported, it could not stand the close fire from the city walls. This incident, which furnished one of the prime causes of dispute among the respective partisans of Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth both then and later in England, is easily understood by those familiar with the harbor of Cartagena. The water in the inner harbor is now, and undoubt- edly was then, too shallow to hold ships of the size of Vernon's fighting vessels, but owing to a very narrow and winding channel it is quite possi- ble that one or two ships might, with careful piloting, enter the inner har- bor. The friends of General Wentworth, in charging Admiral Vernon with neglect in this instance, were clearly in the wrong, as were also those who supported General Wentworth's claim that the fleet did not give its full support to his requests by preventing communication with the town from the shore to the eastward. Admiral Vernon, when requested to do so by General Wentworth, appears to have kept, so far as possible, the stretch of shore to the eastward under the guns of some of his ships, but it could not have been an easy matter with the sailing craft of that day to remain off a lee shore at times of high wind and with a strong westerly current, ready night and day to fire upon a small strip of sand overgrown with mangroves. In his criticism of the land opera- tions under General Wentworth, Ad- miral Vernon, somewhat overbearing by nature, appears to have been, to some extent unjust, and that he clearly under-estimated the strength of San Lazaro is evident from letters which he wrote at the time. It ap- pears doubtful whether, in attacking San Lazaro, its weakest and most approachable side was accurately de- termined in advance, but whether this Admiral B^rnntt PART OF THE CARTAGENA WALLS WITH SAN LAZARO IN DISTANCE was so or not, General Wentworth de- cided that, without effecting a breach, an attack would be impracticable, and much time was consumed in attempt- ing to raise a battery for the pur- pose, as well as in correspondence with Admiral Vernon, already re- ferred to, respecting the use of the vessels of the fleet for effecting the breach. During this time the bulk of the American colonial troops had been left in the ships, their usefulness be- ing doubted, more particularly on account of a large proportion of them being believed to be Papists ; by direc- tion of General Wentworth, these were landed on April 6, and after- wards are credited by the land offi- cers as having rendered gallant ser- vices. On April 9, pressed by the re- proaches of Admiral Vernon for the long delays, and threatened day by day with a lessening power of attack due to the rapidly increasing sickness among his troops, General Wentworth, with the consent of a council of war of the land officers, at- tempted to carry San Lazaro by storm. The attack was intended to be by night, but owing either to the trickery of native guides or to badly formed plans on the part of General Wentworth, the attack was begun upon the almost precipitous southern side of the fortress, with scaling lad- ders of insufficient length. This un- fortunate error served to warn the Spanish troops, and the real attack hardly began before the broiling hot tropical sun shone relentlessly upon the attacking forces. With a bravery deserving better guidance, the troops stood their ground, enduring for hours the terrible fire from above their heads and the burning rays of the sun, but the ramparts were not car- Admiral H^rnnn ried,and finally the troops were forced to retire leaving, it is said, half their number either dead or wounded at the foot of the walls of the fortress. At a council of war of the naval com- manders, Vernon, Ogle, and Le- stock, on April 12, it was recom- mended that in view of the land forces having been unable to erect a battery for effecting a breach in the walls of San Lazaro, and their having failed to storm it otherwise, and also in view of the great sickness prevailing, that "it will be for the King's service to "desist from the enterprise as imprac- ticable." At a council of war of the land officers on April 13, the blame for the failure to carry San Lazaro was attributed to the failure of the fleet to adequately co-operate, but the failure of the undertaking was ad- mitted and definite plans for the em- barkation of the troops were sug- gested. On the fifteenth, the stores were taken on board the ships, and on the day following the troops, sadly re- duced in numbers, and many very ill, were re-embarked. So great were the losses to the troops through disease and battle that not over one-third of the land troops appear to have re- turned with the fleet to Jamaica. For about a fortnight after the troops were re-embarked, the admiral kept the fighting vessels employed in destroying the forts and batteries, the structural strength of some of which, particularly of Castillo Grande, ap- pears to have been so great as to have made the work both difficult and tedi- ous. Also during the interval before sailing, an arrangement was made by means of courteous letters exchanged - under flags of truce between the ad- miral and the viceroy for an exchange of prisoners. On April 24, at a Gen- eral Council of War, it was deter- mined to sail for Jamaica as soon as possible, and by May 8, 1741, the great fleet had left Cartagena, having, it is true, rendered useless the de- fenses of the harbor and destroyed six heavy ships and some minor craft, but having failed to enter the city or to obtain any substantial booty. The earlier successes of Vernon made the news of his failure all the more distressing to the English peo- ple, and the expedition and the causes leading to its failure played a not unimportant part in English politics for some time. ■ HARBOR AND BAY or CARTAGENA IN 1741 om confenmoErarjr map? and, rds corrected!^ recent surveys. ^^^ SsnLazari ■J CD HI" placer Geographical Mi/es ■■■IB ill 'rt.Msn'zani/Ii # \ I 3 U 'k 'U o 2 Admiral Tfernnn APPENDIX i Declaration of War in 1739 Trusty and well Beloved — We greet you Well— Whereas several unjust seizures have been made and depredations carried on in the West Indies by Spanish Guarda Costas and Ships acting under the Commission of the King of Spain or his Governors contrary to the Treatys subsisting between us and the Crown of Spain and to the Law of Nations to the Great prejudice of the lawfull Trade & Commerce of our subjects; and many crueltys and barbaritys have been exercised on the Persons of such our subjects whose vessels have been so seized by the said Span- ish Guarda Costas ; And whereas frequent complaint has been made to the Court of Spain of these unjust practices and no satisfaction or Redress been procured; and whereas a Convention for makeing reparation to our subjects for the losses sustained by them on account of the unjust seizure & Captures above-mentioned was concluded between Us and the King of Spain on the 14th day of January last, N. S., by which convention it was stipulated that a certain sum of money should be paid at London within a Term specified in the sd. Convention as a ballance due on the part of Spain to the Crown and subjects of Great Britain which Term did expire on the 25th day of May last and the paymt of the said sum agreed by the sd. Convention has not been made according to the Stipulation for that purpose, by which means the Convention above-mentioned has been manifestly violated & Broke by the King of Spain and our Subjects remain without any Satisfaction or reparation for the many Great & Grievous losses sustained by them : We have tho't fit for ye vindicating the Honour of Our Crown & for procuring Reparation and Satis- faction for our Injured subjects to order Reprisals to be made upon the Crown & sub- jects of Spain. And We do therefore by virtue of these presents authorize & impower you to issue forth and grant Commissions of Marque & Reprisals to any of our loveing sub- jects or others who shall apply to you for the same and whom you shall deem fitly quali- fied in that behalf, For Armeing and fiting out Private Ships of War for the apprehend- ing, seizing and taking the Ships, vessels & goods belonging to the King of Spain, his vassals & subjects or any inhabiting within his Countrys Territories & Dominions in the West Indies. Provided always that before any such Commission or Commissions be Issued forth, security be given upon such Commission as hath been used in such cases. And you shall insert in every Commission to be so granted by you all such clauses and give such Direc- tions & Instructions to the Person or Persons to whom you shall grant such Commissions as have been usual in cases of the like nature. And for so doing this shall be your war- rant. And so we bid you farewell. Given at our Court at Kensington the fifteenth day of June 1739, in the thirteenth year of our Reign. By his Majesty's Command, PIollis Newcastle. Superscribed "To our Trusty & Well Beloved Jonathan (Belcher) Esq., our Capt. General & Govt in chief of our Provinces of the Massa. Bay and New Hampshire in America & in his Absence to our Commander in Chief or to the President of Council of our said Province for the time being. Admiral B^rnntt ii Transcript from Original Articles of Capitulation granted by Edward Vernon, Esq., Vice-Admiral of the Blue and Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels in the West Indies, and Commodore Brown; to Don Francisco Martinez de Retey, Gov- ernor of Porto Bello, and Don Francisio de Albaroa, Commandant of the Guarda Costas at the same place, the 22nd November, 1739, O. S. "1st Article. That the garrison be allowed to march out, as desired, upon condition the King of Great Britain's troops be put into possession of Gloria Castle, before four of the clock this evening, and the garrison to march out by ten of the clock to-morrow morning. "That the inhabitants may either remove or remain, under the promise of security for themselves and their effects. "2nd. That the Spanish soldiers may have a guard, if they think it necessary. "3rd. They may carry off two cannons mounted with ten charges of powder for each, and their match lighted. "4th. The gates of the Gloria Castle must absolutely be in possession of the King our master's troops by four of the clock, and the Spanish garrison shall remain in all safety for their persons or effects till the appointed time of their marching out, and to carry with them provisions and ammunition necessary for their safety. "5th. That the ships with their apparel and arms, be absolutely delivered up to the use of his Brittanic Majesty; but that all the officers, both soldiers and crew, shall have three days allowed them to retire with all their personal effects ; only one officer being admitted on board such ship and vessel, to take possession for the King our master, and see this article strictly complied with. "6th. That provided the Articles above mentioned are strictly complied with, and that possession be given of Castle St. Jeronimo in the same manner as is stipulated for the Castle Gloria, then the Clergy, the Churches and Town shall be protected and pre- served in all their immunities and properties, and that all prisoners already taken shall be set at liberty before our leaving the port. "Given under our hands on board his Majesty's ship "Burford" in Porto Bello har- bour, the 22nd day of November, 1739, O. S. "E. Vernon, "Chas. Brown." Ill Transcript from Original Articles of Capitulation granted by Edward Vernon, Esq., Vice-Admiral of the Blue, and Commander-in-Chief of his Brittanic Majesty's Ships and Vessels in the West Indies, to Don Juan Carlos Gutures de Zavollos. Captain of Fool and Castellano of the Castle of St. Lorenzo, at the mouth of the River Chagre. "1st. That upon his Brittanic Majesty's troops being put into immediate possession of the Fort St. Lorenzo, at the mouth of the river Chagre, the said Castellano and all his garrison be at free liberty to march out without any molestation, and may retire into the village of Chagre, or where else they please. "2nd. That the inhabitants of Chagre may remain in safety in their own houses, under a promise of security to their persons and houses. "3rd. That the Guarda Costa sloops be delivered up to the use of his Brittanic Majesty in the condition they are, and the King of Spain's Custom house. "4th. That the Clergy and Churches in the town of Chagre shall be protected and preserved in all their immunities. "Given under my hand, on board his Brittanic Majesty's ship, the 'Strafford, 1 al anchor before the river Chagre, this 24th of March, 1740. "E. Vernon." Afcmiral l^rnott IV Sailing and Fighting Instructions to British Fleet on Sailing from Jamaica Issued by Edward Vernon, Vice=Admiral of the Blue, and Commander=in=Chief of all His Majesty's Ships and Vessels in the West Indies LINE OF BATTLE The "Princess Amelia" to lead with the Starboard, and the "Suffolk" with the Larboard Tacks on Board. But if I shall find it necessary from the differ- ent Motions of the Enemy, to change our Order of Battle, to have those who are now appointed to lead on the Starboard Tack, to continue to lead the fleet on the Larboard Tack on our going about, or those now to lead on the Lar- board Tack, on the contrary to do the same, as the Exigency of the Service may require ; I will, with my Signal for Tacking, hoist a Dutch Jack on the Flag Staff, under the Union Flag, the usual Signal for Tacking, when they are to continue to lead the Fleets on their respective Tacks accordingly. REAR-ADMIRAL OF THE BLUE, SIR CHALONER OGLE FRIGATES. RATES. SHIPS NAMES. CAPTAINS. MEN. GUN! 3d, Princess Amelia, Hemington, 600, 80. Experiment, Sheerness. 4th, 3d, Windsor, York, Norfolk, Berkley, Coates, Graves, 400, 4OO, GOO, 60. 60. 80. Vesuvius Fireship, Terrible Bomb, Russell, Sir C. Ogle, ) Capt. Norris, f 615, 80. Phseton, Shrewsbury, Townsend, GOO, SO. Goodley, 4th, Rippon, Litchfield, Jolley, Cleveland, 400, 300, 60. 50. Jersey, Tilbury, Lawrence, Long, 400, 4OO, 60. 60. VICE-ADMIRAL OF THE BLUE, VERNON FRIGATES. RATES. ships' names. CAPTAINS. MEN. GUN! Squirrel, 3d, Orford, Ld.Aug. Fitzroy, 480, 70. Shoreham, 4th, Princess Louisa, Stapleton, 400, 60. Eleanor, Augusta, Denuison, 400, 60. Seahorse, Worcester, Perry Mayne, 400, 60. Strombolo, 3d, Chichester, Robert Trevor, too, 80. Success, Princess Caroline, Adm. Vernon, ) Capt. Watson, j 620. SO. Vulcan, Torbay, Gascoigne, 600, SO. Cumberland, 4th, Strafford, Tho. Trevor, 400, 60. Alderney Bomb, Weymouth, Knowles, 400, 60. Pompey, Deptford, Moyston, 400, 60. Brig. Tender, 3d. Burford, Griffen, 480, 70. Ahmtral Uernon COMMODORE LESTOCK'S DIVISION FRIGATES. RATES. SHIPS NAMES. CAPTAINS. MEN. GUN. 4th, Defiance, John Trevor, -lOO, 60. Dunkirk, Cooper, 4OO, do. Astrea, Lyon, Cotterel, 4OO, 60. Wolf Sloop, 3d, Prince Frederic, Ld. A.Beauclerc, 480, 70. ^Etna, Boyne, Com. Lestock, ) Capt. Colby, [ 60O, 80. Firebrand, Hampton Court, Dent, 480, 70. Virgin Queen, 4th, Falmouth, Douglass, 300, SO. Montague, Chambers, 300, 60. 3d. Suffolk, Davers, 480, 70. SIGNALS When the Admiral would speak with the Captain of any Ship undermen- tioned, he will raise a pendant, as against the Ship's name, and of the Colour set above it ; if a Lieutenant, the Same Signal with a Weft of the Ensign ; and if a Boat without an Officer, the Weft will be hoisted but half Staff up. Mem- orandum, when I would have any of the Fireships, Bombs or Tenders, taken in tow at the same Time I make the Signal for the Ship that is to tow, and for the Ship that is to be tow'd, I will hoist up a Flag Blue and White, at the Flag-staff of the Main-top-mast-head. RED. WHITE. BLUE. YELLOW. Boyne. Norfolk. Pss. Amelia. Suffolk. Chichester. Shrewsbury. Terrible. Eleanor. * Iain j Top-mast. l ore j Head. Mizen ( Worcester. Lyon. Defiance. ^Etna. Tilbury. Squirrel. Torbay. Firebrand. Starbd \ Main-topsail. Windsor. Pss. Louisa Falmouth. Vesuvius. Larbd / Yard-arm. Burford. P. Frederic. Strafford. Phaeton. Starbd \ Fore-topsail. Montague. Orford. Weymouth. Strombolo. Larbd j Yard arm. Shoreham. Augusta. Pss. Caroline. Success. Starbd ( Mizen-topsai HamptonCourt Dunkirk. Jersey. Vulcan. Larbd"/ Yard-arm. Litchfield. Lud. Castle. Deptford. Cumberland. Starbd ( Main-yard- Larbd ) arm. Experiment. Rippon. York. Alderney. Sea Horse. Sheerness. Russell. Brig. Tender. Starbd \ Fore-Yard- Astrea. Wolf. Virgin Queen. Pompey. Goodley. Larbd / arm. Starbd \ Cross-jack- Larbd { yard-arm. When the Ships are in Line of Battle, the Frigates, Fireships, Bombs and Tenders are to keep on the opposite Side of the Enemy, when I make the Signal in Line of Battle, for the Van of the kleet to lack lirsi in order to gain the Windward of the Enemy, then each Ship is to tack in the Headmost Ships wake, for losing no Ground. For all other Signals they arc refer'd to the General printed Sailing and Fighting Instructions, and such other additional instructions as you received from me. Admiral l^rttntt V Resolution of a Council of War to Settle Distribution of Booty — Held on Board " Princess Carolina," March 5, 1741 Whereas, it appears by my Lords Justices additional Instructions of the 22nd of July, 1740, to be his Majesty's Royal Pleasure, that for preserving that Harmony and good Understanding between his Majesty's Sea and Land Forces, which is so necessary for the carrying on his Majesty's Service with Success, that it should be settled by a Council of War, to consist of Sea and Land Officers, in what Manner and Proportion, Booty taken from the Enemy at Land, during the recent Expedition, shall be distributed between his Majesty's Sea and Land Forces, in all Cases where the said Sea and Land Forces shall be jointly engaged, in the attacking and taking of any Place, Fort, or Settlement, from the Enemy. And a Paper accompanying the said Instructions, and said to have been prepared in Conformity to the two preceding Settlements in 1694 and 1702, being laid before your Council of War. Your Council of War, to shew their entire Disposition to conform to our Royal Mas- ter's Inclinations, by studying to preserve that Harmony recommended to us, have taken the said Paper into Consideration, and to avoid the Risk of disagreeing Opinions in prepar- ing a new one, resolve to make that the Plan of their present Regulation. And your Commanding Officers in Chief by Sea and Land, desirous to preserve that good Harmony recommended to us by his Majesty, and pleased with an Occasion of contributing to it, by giving up, of their own Motive and free Will, for procuring so desir- able an End, a fifth part of what was by the said Distribution, allotted to them, in order to divide the whole into Sixteenths, and to have the said Sixteenths distributed, where the Council of War should think them most wanted. Your said Council of War accordingly proceeded to the Consideration of it, and do agree that the whole amount of such Booty shall be divided into sixteen equal Parts, or Portions. Whereof four Sixteenths shall be given to the Commanders in Chief of the Sea and Land Forces, to be equally divided between them. To the other Admiral, General Officers, and Commodore, to be equally divided amongst them, in proportion to their respective Salaries, two Sixteenths. To the several Colonels, Captains of Ships of the Line of Battle, Lieutenant Colo- nels, Captains of Ships of War giving Rank, Quarter-Master General, Adjutant General, Commissary General, Paymaster General of the Land Forces, Judge Advocate, Secreta- ries to the Admiral and General, Provost Marshal, Surgeons and Chaplains General by Sea and Land, Majors of Regiments and of Brigades, Masters and Commanders of Fire- ships, Bomb-ketches, Sloops and other Ships of War not giving Rank, Aid du Camps upon the Establishment, Captains at Land, Lieutenants at Sea, Masters of Ships giving Rank, Lieutenants at Land, Gunners, Pursers, Boatswains, Carpenters, Ensigns, Adju- tants, Quarter-Masters of Regiments, Chaplains and Surgeons of Ships and Regiments, Masters, Mates, Directors of the Hospital, and their Surgeons four Sixteenths, to be divided amongst them in proportion to their respective Salaries. To the Non-Commission and Warrant Officers at Sea and Land, such as Midshipmen, Carpenters Mates, Boatswains Mates, Gunners Mates, Masters at Arms, Sergeants. Bom- bardiers, Gunners of the Train, Yeomen of the Sheets, Cockswains, Quarter-Masters, Quarter-Masters Mates, Surgeons Mates, Yeomen of the Powder-Room, and Corporals, two Sixteenths, to be divided equally amongst them. To the Cooks of Ships, and all others enumerated with them, in the Proclamation for the Distribution of Prizes at Sea, Seamen and Soldiers, Drummers, Marshals Men. Pioneers, or Persons working to clear Grounds, and assist at Sieges, four Sixteenths, to be equally divided amongst them. But no Officer to be allowed to share in two Capacities ; and whenever any Person shall hold two different Employments, he shall chuse in which of them he will take his Dividend. But it is not hereby intended, to exclude Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, and Majors, from receiving their shares as Captains, as well as Field Officers; and Sea Cap- tains Pay to be accounted upon King William's Establishment. And that every Officer under the Rank of a Commission, or Warrant Officer, Sea- man, or Soldier, that shall happen to be wounded in any siege, or Action, whose Booty shall be taken, shall have a double share in Proportion to his Rank, in Consideration of his Wounds. Given under our Hands, on Board his Majesty's Ship the "Princess Carolina," at Anchor off Carthagena, the 5th day of March, 1740. E. Vernon, J. Guise, E. Wolfe, Thomas Wentworth, Richard Lestock. J. Hemington. C. Ogle, Wm. Blakeney, Admiral H^rtton VI Instructions from Vice=Admiral Vernon to Sir Chaloner Ogle, Issued on Board the «« Princess Carolina" at Anchor off Cartagena, the 6th of March, 1741 Whereas it has been determin'd in a Council of War, vigorously to attack Cartagena both by Sea and Land; a Resolution which the Inclemency of the Country manifests the Prudence of, as our Forces are decreasing daily by Sickness, so that slow Measures are certain Ruin. And as the first Point Judg'd material to secure the Success of the Enterprize, is to render ourselves Masters of Boca Chica Castle, and all the Fortresses and Batteries erected for defending the Entrance of the Harbour, for the more closely blocking up the Town, and cutting it off from all Communication by Sea, either within or without the Harbour, and above all for securing our Transports a safe Harbour to ride in, who will lay too much exposed without. And as the most probable, as well as most proper Place to secure a Descent in, is in the Little Bay, under the Command of the two Forts St. Philip and St. Jago, where, I am inform'd ships can come safely to an Anchor in good Ground, and within less than Musket-shot of the Shore, and may lay to batter and command those two Forts, without having Occasion to open the Castle of Boca Chica, in which Case I apprehend the Fire of Three Eighty Gun Ships, if there be room for them to anchor there a-head of each other, will be amply sufficient for demolishing the said Fort, commanding all the said Bay, and securing there a safe landing of the Troops, under the Fire of their Guns; the Point, I apprehend, of the utmost Importance, for securing the Success of this Expedition, it being, as I apprehend, the very Spot on which M. Pontis made his Descent, when he took Car- thagena, and began with taking Boca Chica, and as to the northward of the said two Forts on Terra Bomba the Enemy are said lately to have erected a considerable Fascine Battery of eighteen Pounders, which there is said to be deep water enough to approach within Musket-shot of, but that the anchoring Ground so near in, is foul and stony, and would cut the Cables, and to anchor in clean Ground would hardly be within point blank Cannon Shot ; you must in employing the rest of your Ships in silencing that Battery, and one of little consequence to the Northward of that called Chamba, govern yourself in it as you shall judge most prudent, either by anchoring them, if you can find clean Ground near enough, or by ranging close to them one after another, and then standing off, and plying to Windward, to renew the Fire in the same manner of them, for clearing all that Coast from the Enemies, as it is said there is likewise a good little Bay for a Descent under Chamba Battery, and it might divide the Enemy's Force the better, to make a Descent at both places at once, and expose their Troops the more to the Fire of our Ships. Having thus informed and instructed you according to the best Intelligence I have received, and furnished you with Pilots of the best Ability and Experience I could pro- cure, I rely on your Judgment and Resolution for the due Execution of my Orders. And you are hereby required and directed to proceed with your whole Division of Ships of the Line of Battle, for demolishing the said Forts and Batteries, and securing all the Country between them, so as to secure a Descent for the Forces, in the most convenient Parts for it, between the said Fort of St. Philip's and Chamba Battery. And the better to secure the Success of your enterprize, you are to give ciders in Writing to every respective Captain of your Division, not to suffer any [mprudent and hasty firing from their Ships, which only serves to embolden an Enemy, instead of dis couraging them; but to give strict orders not to suffer any gun to be fired from any of its Decks, till the respective Officers appointed to command on each respective Batt< i has seen to the pointing each Gun he is appointed to have the inspection over, and directed Afttturai $£rtt0tt the firing of it, that all possible Care may be used, to secure the Success of this first Attempt, on which the Success of the Whole so much depends ; and they are to endeavor to persuade and convince their Men, of the Folly and Imprudence of hasty firing, which serves only to encourage the Enemies, and expose themselves : And you are likewise, in your Orders in Writing, to assign to each particular Captain the Post he is to take, and the Orders he is to execute, that no one may have the least Pretence to plead Ignorance of your orders, which you are to enjoin the due Execution of, at the utmost Peril. And you are to order your respective Captains, to acquaint their respective Ships Companies, that the Whole of all Booty to be made upon the Enemies at Land, is gra- ciously granted by his Majesty, to be distributed among his Sea and Land Forces, as shall be agreed on by a Council of War of Sea and Land Officers, which have accordingly met and regulated the Distribution thereof, and have allotted a double Share to any Non- Commission or Warrant Officer, and private Man, that may happen to be wounded in the Service; and to assure of a further Reward from me, out of my Share, all who shall eminently distinguish themselves by any extraordinary actions of Prudence and Reso- lution, besides a secured Advancement proportionable to their Zeal and Resolution, exerted on so signal an Occasion, for the Honour of the Crown and future Prosperity of our Country. And you will have a Report from Captain Knowles, and the other Captains appointed for Viewing, Sounding, and making all necessary Observations, for your further Infor- mation and facilitating the Success of the said Attack. And you may remove your Flag on board any Ship of your Division, as you may judge most expedient for your more carefully directing and inspecting the due Execution of the whole Attack, which you are carefully and diligently to see to the due Execution of, and give all such additional Orders in, as you shall find to be necessary, from the Motions and Dispositions of the Enemy, and other Events that may arise in the' vigor- ous Execution of these Orders : For all and every part of which, this shall be your suffi- cient Warrant. Given under my Hand on board his Majesty's Ship "Princess Carolina," at Anchor off of Carthagena, this 6th of March, 1740. E. Vernon. To Sir Chaloner Ogle, Rear Admiral of the Blue Squadron of his Majesty's Fleet. By Command of the Admiral. Wm. Pearse. Abmtral Hernutt VII Resolution of a Council of War Held on Board the "Weymouth," March 21, 1741 The Council of War taking into serious Consideration the slow Progress made by the Army since their landing, who have had everything landed for them since Monday last, and all done entirely by the Seamen; to leave them more at Liberty for' raising their Battery and cutting off the Enemy's Communication by Land, which, to us, is a great Surprize why it has not yet been done, in regard to the great Advantages given the Enemy by it. And as we cannot but entertain uneasy Apprehensions from such slow Proceedings, and being determin'd to do all in our Power to prevent them, have taken into serious Consideration what could possibly be done by Sea, more than has been done already, for securing the first Attempt, to be Masters of the Entrance into the Harbour. And though our being on a Lee-Shore and liable to great Hazards, for getting our Ships back, which shall be Considerably damaged in their Masts and Rigging, are such forcible Arguments, that we must in some sort act against our Judgments, as Seamen, in exposing his Majesty's Ships to Battering of Castles with them; yet as the Danger of a Disappointment might be more fatal to our Royal Master's Honour and Interest, we have chosen even to act against our Judgments, as Seamen, for securing the Success of the present attempt, that appears to us so very doubtful without it. And having called before us Captain Knowles, Capt. Rentone, and Lieut. Forrest, on whose Judgments we thought we could best depend, and had all the Information we could likewise gather from the Spanish Pilots (Prisoners with us) of what could possi- bly be attempted by Shipping. Your Council of War have, as the Necessity of the Case seemed to press it upon them, come to unanimous Resolution, to do the most that we can judge to be practicable. to secure the Success of this first Attempt, on which the Whole depends. Which we think may be to attempt to anchor four Ships as close to the Shore as possible, between the Castle of St. Jago (we are in Possession of) and the Castle of Boca Chica. Which four Ships shall be the "Boyne," "Suffolk," "Prince Frederick," and "Hampton- Court," of Commodore Lestock's Division, to be under his particular Orders and Direc- tions, for the posting them accordingly, and carrying on the Attack at Boca Chica Castle. And that the "Princess Amelia'' and the "Norfolk" shall take Post after them, so as to lye most commodious to batter the Castle of St. Joseph, and endeavor to destroy that, and direct their fire from raking Mr. Lestock's Ships, which we apprehend they would be otherwise liable to; and these two Ships to follow Sir Chaloner Ogle's Orders, of whose Division they are, for the Execution of the said Service. And as Sir Chaloner Ogle lies innermost, with his Division, that he shall order such other Ships of his Division in, to support the others, and employ any Fire he may observe to gall them, that cannot be come at by the Ships first anchor'd. which, must he left to his Prudence to direct, as shall appear to be necessary on the Enemy's Motions, when we come to Execution. And as we hope the Battery from the Shore will be got ready to play this nighl at farthest, that all necessary Orders shall he immediately issued in it. to the Ships who are to prepare for Service, to get themselves in Condition on the first Notice; and that if our Battery begins playing To-morrow, our Ships shall nunc to the said Attack, upon the first of the Sea-Breeze on Monday morning. To all which Resolutions we have unanimously agreed, and resolved to have put in Execution accordingly. Given under our Hands on Board the "Weymouth," this 2is1 of March. 1710, E. Vernon, C. 1 '..1 1 Ricnn. Lestoi k. Abmtral Hrrntftt VIII Council of War Held on Board the •« Princess Carolina " in Carthagena Harbour, March 30, 1741 Your Majesty's Forces being in full Possession of all the Castles, Forts, and Bat- teries, for defending the entrance into the Harbour of Carthagena, your Council of War took into Consideration what would be next advisable for them to proceed in. And as the Communication by Sea to Carthagena, by the Men of War being advanc d so near as within Gun-Shot of Castillo Grande, is now effectually cut off, it was adjudged proper that all possible Expedition should be used in embarking the Forces and Artillery, and that the Transports, as fast as they are embarked, should be moving off to the next general Rendezvous off the Bocandina, between the Shore and the "Burford, in order to make a Descent on the most convenient Place for their landing, to cut off the Com- munication of the Town of the Land Side, by running a Line from the Lake at the Back of the Popa, to the Bay, which is said to be about a quarter of a Mile ; and that the Artillery should be embarked with all possible Expedition, to proceed after them to the general Rendezvous; and that all possible means should be put in Use for procuring the best Intelligence in the Meantime, how to put this Resolution in Execution with the best Success And as General Wentworth represented they should want a greater Number of Men to be landed with them, in order effectually to invest the Town, it was resolved he should be supplied from the Men of War, with all such of the American forces, as he should judVe proper to be trusted on Shore; and likewise of the Detachments that were on Boar-d of Lord James Canendish's and Col, Bland's, whenever the rest of the Forces were landed and General Wentworth should represent it to be necessary. And your Council of War referred to the Transports being got up to the next general Rendezvous and taking such further resolutions as shall be judg'd most adviseable to secure the Success of this Expedition in taking the Town of Carthagena, which it has pleas'd God so wonderfully to favour the Success of his Majesty's Forces in hitherto. ^ Given under our Hands, on Board his Majesty's Ship the "Princess Carolina, in Carthagena Harbour, the 30th day of March, 1741. E. Vernon, Tho. Wentworth, C. Ogle, J. Guise, Richd. Lestock, Wm. Blakeney, E. Wolfe, J. Hemington. ;*\ /<£&>* /.-^fe-S «<°^*.% /<-*A .* .4*V <*% o > ^6* jP«^ .:--\ ;* # ^ -'\/ %.^Si*j>' V*^^\/ ^'i^'Ao' v™V .v HECKMAN BINDERY INC. MAY 91 \s\u=j/s' N. MANCHESTER, N 5»-*£ / INDIANA 46962 v^.'-^-"*«v