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Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2011 with funding from
The Library of Congress
http://www.archive.org/details/attacksuponspaniOOhart
W^t Attarka upon tty ^jratuslj Mmn
bg Admiral Hmum
BT
FRANCIS RUSSELL HART
W^t Attarka upon tlje ^>pa«tal| iUattt
bij Anmtral Itemon
FRANCIS RUSSELL HART
Reprinted from The Journal of American History,
Volume II, Number II- — Copyright
assigned to the Author
Associate -PttbUsljrrfl uf Amrrtrau JRwor&fl
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTKM T
Aimiral l^rnim
'HE somewhat uncertain
'^ i peace brought about in
j| Europe in 1736, largely
■ L through the efforts of Sir
• Robert Walpole, served
to strengthen the family
compact between the
Bourbon courts of France and Spain
and to give time for the increase of
the naval forces of these countries
rather than to encourage, as Walpole
had hoped, a continued tranquility.
The great sea power of England
had made possible the development of
a large English trade with Spanish
America during the alliance of Eng-
land and Spain in the war against
France. This growing commercial
supremacy of England was naturally
unwelcome to Spain, and both by en-
forcing the limitations placed upon
trading, inserted in the Treaty of
Utrecht, and by annoying restrictions
in the Spanish ports of America,
Philip endeavored to reduce to almost
a disappearing point English inter-
course with the Spanish colonies.
English trading vessels, always at
that time partially armed, were hav-
ing frequent encounters with Spanish
vessels, and on neither side were the
agreed upon stipulations duly respect-
ed. Walpole, more prudent than the
adventurous traders of England be-
lieved consistent with the honor of his
country, vainly tried to hold down the
clamorers for war in Parliament. The
final event which made the efforts of
Walpole wholly powerless for peace
was the seizure off the Spanish Main
by the ship "Isabel," of an English
merchant ship loaded with contraband
stuffs, under Captain Jenkins. The
commander of the "Isabel" appears to
have treated Captain Jenkins with un-
usual cruelty, and, before releasing ^
him, cut off one of his ears. In the
spring of 1739, Jenkins appeared,
amid great excitement, at the Bar of
the House of Commons, displaying
his mangled ear and telling the story
of his misfortunes. The pressure was
too great, Walpole had to give way,
and on June 13, 1739, war was de-
clared against Spain. 1
Among the members of Parliament,
in the opposition, violently opposed to
the ministry, and equally violently
urging a war of reprisal against
Spain, was Captain Edward Vernon, a
naval officer, who urged that an imme-
diate expedition be sent out against
Porto Bello, and vigorously asserted
that the place would not only be cap-
tured, but pledged himself to take it
with six ships only. In order to more
clearly appreciate the bearing of the
influence of Vernon upon the events
of this time, and more particularly
upon the expedition associated with
his name, it is necessary to glance at
the record of his previous career. He
appears to have had an amount of in-
fluence in the House of Commons
and a popular favor outside, which
made it impossible for the minister
to whom he was violently opposed to
ignore either the plans he proposed or
his own offer to command the expe-
dition.
Edward Vernon was the second son
of James Vernon, Secretary of State
to William III. and was born in West-
minster the twelfth of November,
1684. After a thorough study of the
classics and the mathematical sciences,
he was allowed by his family to yield
to a natural taste for the sea, and en-
tered the navy in 1 701. He was with
Admiral Hopson in the "Torbay" at
Vigo, the twelfth of October, 1702, and
was second lieutenant on the "Resolu-
tion" in the expedition against
Hispaniola, commanded by Captain
Walker. Afterwards he served with
distinction with Admiral Sir George
Rook and with Sir Cloudesley Shovel.
His first command as captain was of
the "Jersey," in which he was sent to
Port Royal, Jamaica, and for three
years had a successful career on the
West Indian station, capturing many
prizes. This was followed by many
years of more important commands,
chiefly in the Battle, interspersed with
intervals of serving in the House of
Commons. It was the belief in Eng-
land that if Porto Bello and Cartagena
were taken, that Spanish power in
Admiral B^rnott
the New World would be irredeem-
ably broken, and shortly after the
declaration of war Vernon was given
a commission as vice-admiral of the
Blue, and placed in command of a
squadron of ships of war to be sent to
the West Indies. His instructions
were "to destroy the Spanish settle-
"ments in the West Indies and to dis-
"tress their shipping by any method
"whatever."
The squadron consisted of the
"Burford" of 70 guns and 500 men,
"Lenox" of 70 guns and 480 men,
"Elizabeth" of 70 guns and 480 men,
"Kent" of 70 guns and 480 men,
"Worcester" of 60 guns and 400 men,
"Strafford" of 60 guns and 400 men,
"Princess Louisa" of 60 guns and
420 men, "Norwich" of 50 guns and
300 men, and "Pearl" of 40 guns and
240 men, in all nine ships carrying a
total of 550 guns and 3,700 men.
Admiral Vernon sailed from Ports-
mouth the twenty-third of July, 1739,
and after some delays and digressions,
occasioned chiefly by an unsuccessful
search for a squadron of the enemy
near the Spanish coast, arrived at Port
Royal, Jamaica, the twelfth of Octo-
ber. With this as a base the Admiral
proposed to attack Porto Bello and
Cartagena, with such of his squadron
as he had remaining, several vessels
having been detached for special ser-
vice in harassing the Spanish mer-
chantmen. The ships remaining were
the "Burford," "Princess Louisa."
"Worcester," "Strafford," and "Nor-
wich," and to these the Admiral was
able to add at Port Royal the "Hamp-
ton Court" of 70 guns and 495 men,
and "Sheerness" of 20 guns and 300
men, together with 200 marines ob-
tained from Governor Trelawney.
On the fifth of November, this
squadron set sail, the "Sheerness" be-
ing sent as a scout in the direction oi
Cartagena, while the rest headed for
Porto Bello. off which porl they lay
to on the twentieth of thai month.
On the twenty-first, he attacked the
Iron Fort, so called, al the harbor's
entrance, with his full strength at
close range, and with such vigor that,
after a short but spirited resistance,
Admiral Hrrnnn
it surrendered. The next morning,
while instructions were being given to
govern the attack upon the remaining
fortresses of San Jeronimo and Gloria
Castle, a boat with a flag of truce
came to the admiral's ship, the result
of which was a speedy capitulation on
terms dictated by Admiral Vernon. 2
As a result of this capitulation the
English fleet secured two Spanish
men-of-war of 20 guns each, one
other vessel, 40 brass cannons, 4 brass
mortars, 18 smaller brass guns, a
quantity of ammunition and about ten
thousand dollars. The fortifications
and some 80 iron cannons were ren-
dered useless before the departure of
the squadron, which shortly returned
to Jamaica.
As had been predicted^ Porto Bello
was taken with six ships, and when
the news, which had been despatched
to London, reached there, the thanks
of both Houses of Parliament were
voted to the admiral.
The English reports of this victory
state the number of men taken to
have been five officers and thirty-five
men "out of three hundred, the rest
"being either killed or wounded or
"having made their escape ;" the Span-
ish accounts, however, declare that
Porto Bello was defended by a total
of thirty men and five cannons, and
Spanish historians point with amuse-
ment to the celebration of this victory
in London. The actual record of the
numbers of cannons taken away, how-
ever, and other circumstances, make
it appear improbable that the popular
Spanish version is strictly correct,
although it is equally probable that
the English account exaggerates the
strength of the Spanish garrison.
The official report of the governor of
Panama to the king of Spain is in-
definite as to the number of troops
employed, but corroborates in the
main Vernon's own account, and re-
fers in complimentary terms to the
courtesy and moderation of the Eng-
lish admiral.
On the twenty-fifth of February,
1740, Admiral Vernon, after refitting
his ships, sailed again from Jamaica
for the Spanish Main, and from the
sixth to ninth of March bombarded
Cartagena, doing some damage, but
also receiving enough injuries to his
smaller craft to make it expedient to
sail to Porto Bello to effect repairs.
On the twenty-second of March, he
attacked Chagres, laying off that place
and keeping up a moderate but con-
tinual bombardment until, on the
twenty-fourth, the garrison capitu-
lated. 3 The ships engaged in the
■bombardment were the "Strafford,"
"Norwich," "Falmouth" and "Prin-
cess Louisa." After seizing a consid-
erable quantity of goods of value from
the Custom-house stores and taking
on board all serviceable brass cannons
and other grins, the Custom-house was
destroyed by fire, and on the thirtieth
the squadron sailed again for Jamaica.
That the strength of the Cartagena
fortifications was fully realized is
clear from the fact that before again
assaulting that place, Admiral Vernon
remained almost constantly for
months at Jamaica, re-enforcing his
squadron with ships and men. Late
in the year his squadron was joined
by a number of store ships under con-
voy, and by transport ships with
troops. In January, 1741, he was
further re-enforced by a squadron un-
der Rear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle,
consisting of thirty ships of the line
and some ninety other vessels, the
ships being manned by fifteen thou-
sand sailors. The land troops sent
out from England amounted to about
12,000, these latter being augmented
at Jamaica by 3,600 troops from
the American colonies.*
*These American troops were made up
as follows: from Massachusetts, five com-
panies; Rhode Island, two companies; Con-
necticut, two companies: New York, five
companies; New Jersey, three companies;
Pennsylvania, eight companies; Maryland,
three companies; Virginia, four compa-
nies; North Carolina, four companies.
Among other American officers was Colo-
nel Lawrence Washington, and it was on
account of his association with Admiral
Vernon that Mount Vernon subsequently
received its name.
Admiral Burnett
SENTRY BOX ON WALL OVERLOOKING THE SEA AT CARTAGENA
The command of all the land troops
had been given to Major-General
Lord Cathart, who unfortunately died
before reaching Jamaica, and the com-
mand fell upon Brigadier-General
Thomas Wentworth,' who appears to
have been particularly unsuited for
the great responsibility thrust upon
him.
The causes which led to the later
practical failure of this expedition
against Cartagena cannot be attribu-
ted to the lack of proper preparations
or equipments, nor to the haste em-
ployed ; indeed, the expedition appears
to have been planned with the most
careful regard to all details. Vessels
were engaged in scout service to de-
termine as clearly as possible the
whereabouts of the French squadron
under Admiral the Marquis d'Antin,
and careful observations had con-
stantly been made of the fortifications
about Cartagena, the prevalent
weather conditions, currents, etc., as
well as the depths of water off the
town and at the Boca Chica forts.
The instructions given to the fleel on
sailing from Jamaica divided the
fighting vessels into three divisions,
one under Vice-Admiral Vernon
(commander-in-chief), one under
Rear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle, and
one under Commodore Lestock, and
comprised some thirty line-of-battle
ships, twenty-two frigates and a large
miscellaneous squadron of transports,
fire-ships, bomb-ketches and tenders.
In all there were one hundred
twenty- four sail. 1 Not unnaturally
the rumors of these preparations
for the attack mi Cartagena readied
that place weeks before the news
became a certainty, through the
definite reports of a French ship
which appears to have been sent to
Cartagena by the French admiral ex-
pressly to warn the inhabitants ^\ the
impending attack.
During the last week in January,
1741, the three divisions sailed from
Port Royal, a few days apart, effect-
ing a junction at sea on the thirty-
first, and making Cape Tiberon, on
the Western extremity of Hispaniola
i ni iw tin- I -land of 1 laili and San
Domingo) on the seventh of February.
Vfter several clays of careful recon-
A&mtral Bentnn
noitering to make certain whether or
not the French fleet had sailed for
Europe as reported, the three divi-
sions came to anchor in the bays near
the cape. On the twenty-fifth of
February, the fleet left for Cartagena
under easy sail, and came to anchor
on the fourth of March a few leagues
to windward (i. e., to the eastward)
of the town of Cartagena, between
that place and Punta Canoas. Dur-
ing several days, detailed preparations
for the attack were made, and various
councils of war held, one of which
settled the important matters relative
to the distribution of the expected
booty 5 and one confirming the admir-
al's plan of attack. Great care seems
to have been taken to obtain as com-
plete plans as possible of the forts at
Boca Chica, and careful soundings
were made by some of the smaller
vessels all along the Tierra Bomba
shore and at the entrance to the har-
bor. A feint at landing on the shore
side of the town was made by some
of the smaller vessels, apparently for
the purpose, and probably to some ex-
tent successful, of engaging the
attention of the enemy from the real
landing point at Boca Chica."
On the morning of the ninth, Sir
Chaloner Ogle, with his division,
moved forward to the attack, followed
by Admiral Vernon with his division
and all the transports, leaving the
division under Commander Lestock
at anchor. As the ships moving to
leeward approached Boca Chica, the
small fort of Chamba (on Tierra
Bomba, east of Boca Chica Castle)
fired a few shots, but was soon
silenced and deserted. Three of the
8o-gun ships were anchored close to
the Forts of San Jago and San Felipe
and maintained a very hot fire, so that
these forts were soon deserted, and
the evening of that day grenadiers
were landed and took possession of
them without meeting any resistance.
Also during the evening, from the
bomb-ketches and from those of the
ships which could comfortably ap-
proach, a continual fire was kept up
against Boca Chica Castle, which was
returned with some spirit, under cover
of which firing troops and artillery
were landed during the night and next
forenoon. The troops were en-
camped under the protection of a
woody growth near, but apparently
somewhat protected from Boca Chica
Castle. It was during and immedi-
ately after the landing of these troops
that the serious differences of opinion
between General Wentworth and Ad-
miral Vernon began to arise, differ-
ences which afterwards were to prove
to a large extent the cause of the fail-
ure of the expedition, and which
served at once to create a most unfor-
tunate feeling of antagonism between
the sea and land forces. The admiral
complained of the delays of the troops
to press the attack upon the castle,
and on the eleventh he and Sir Chal-
oner Ogle joined in a letter to Gen-
eral Wentworth, urging immediate
action. That delays somewhat diffi-
cult to understand did take place is
evident from the fact that on the
nineteenth, owing to complaints from
General Wentworth, several vessels
undertook successfully, but with some
difficulty, to silence the Baradera Bat-
tery on the opposite side of the har-
bor entrance, the fire from which
reached the encampment of the troops,
and on the twenty-first of March, at
a council of w)ar of the naval com-
manders, complaint as to the slow
progress of the troops was formally
made. 7 Finally, on the days from
the twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth,
by the joint co-operation of the
vessels and troops, both Boca Chica
Castle and that of San Jose were
taken, as also was one of the Spanish
ships. San Jose appears to have been
almost deserted when taken, and it is
probable that this fort was not actively
defended. That the defence of Boca
Chica Castle itself was gallant and
spirited is certain from the clear rec-
ord of the extensive operations against
it. Before being taken, however, the
defenders had largely made their es-
cape, and had found time to par-
Aftmtrai Berttntt
VIEW OF CITY OF CARTAGENA FROM TOP OF THE OLD FORTRESS OF SAN LAZARO
(From a photograph taken 1S92)
tially block the channel up the bay by
sinking the Spanish ships "Africa"
and "San Carlos/' besides burning the
ship "San Felipe" on the shore.
During the next few days, the fleet
was able to enter the bay, the batteries
at the small Passo Caballos entrance
were easily destroyed and a safe an-
chorage established. The forts at
Boca Chica were adequately garri-
soned, the troops re-embarked, and
preparations were made for the real
attack upon the city.
The Spanish viceroy, Lieutenant-
General D. Sebastian de Eslaba,
was resident at Cartagena, together
with the military governor of the
city, D. Bias de Leso. According
to contemporary Spanish accounts,
the forces at the disposal of the vice-
roy and governor were eleven hun-
dred veteran soldiers, three hundred
militia, six hundred Indians, and two
companies of negroes and free mu-
lattoes. The naval forces in the har-
bor were six ships with six hundred
seamen and four hundred soldiers,
making about four thousand men in
all. These are probably accurate es-
timates of the actual Spanish forces,
and it is certain that the strength of
the defense of the place was due to
its well-built fortifications rather than
to the number of its defenders, whose
numbers were undoubtedly much
fewer than the attacking forces. The
viceroy had ample notice of the com-
ing of the attacking expedition and
concentrated his small forces at im-
portant points on the walls of the city
itself and at San Lazaro, a strong for-
tress, built "ii a slight elevation, out-
side the walls, and guarding the ap-
proach to the city from the land side.
ddie strategic importance of this for
tress and a veneral idea of the walls.
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ISH MAP OF CARTAGENA, IN 1735
r J , C aranot)ct Cjc*
Admiral lernntt
and other fortifications of Cartagena
can best be obtained by a glance at
the map.
It was considered essential by the
attacking forces to first occupy San
Lazaro, and indeed, if this had been
accomplished, it is probable that the
remaining Spanish troops would have
been insufficient to have made any
long effective resistance to an en-
trance into the city. At a council of
war held on board the "Princess Car-
oline," March 30, in Cartagena Har-
bor, in which the division command-
ers of both the sea and land forces
took part, it was resolved to land the
troops at a convenient point on the
south side of the harbor, under pro-
tection of the guns of the ships, the
first duty of the troops to be to cut off
all land communications from the
city. s On the first few days of April,
troops were landed at Isla de Gracias
close to Mansanilla Castle, from which
a fairly good road reached into the
town passing under the walls of San
Lazaro. This landing was made
without opposition, the guns from the
ships sweeping the country between
Isla de Gracias and San Lazaro, and
the landing-place being beyond the
range of the guns at Castillo Grande ;
the relative positions of these places
and others referred to in this account
are clearly indicated on the maps.
With the landing of the troops the
dissensions between the commanders
of the land and sea forces began
anew ; Admirals Vernon and Ogle
appear to have constantly condemned
the procrastination of General Went-
worth and urged the necessity for im-
mediate action if serious ravages of
sickness among the troops were to be
avoided, and General Wentworth as
constantly urged the necessity for
more efficient co-operation on the part
of the fleet, asserting that the ships
should be brought into the inner har-
bor, where the town itself and, more
particularly, San Lazaro, would be
within effective ransre of fire. The
experiment of sending one of the cap-
tured ships into the inner harbor was
tried by Admiral Vernon, but the ship,
although apparently finding sufficient
water, was finally of necessity aban-
doned, as, unsupported, it could not
stand the close fire from the city walls.
This incident, which furnished one of
the prime causes of dispute among
the respective partisans of Admiral
Vernon and General Wentworth both
then and later in England, is easily
understood by those familiar with the
harbor of Cartagena. The water in
the inner harbor is now, and undoubt-
edly was then, too shallow to hold
ships of the size of Vernon's fighting
vessels, but owing to a very narrow
and winding channel it is quite possi-
ble that one or two ships might, with
careful piloting, enter the inner har-
bor.
The friends of General Wentworth,
in charging Admiral Vernon with
neglect in this instance, were clearly
in the wrong, as were also those
who supported General Wentworth's
claim that the fleet did not give its full
support to his requests by preventing
communication with the town from
the shore to the eastward. Admiral
Vernon, when requested to do so by
General Wentworth, appears to have
kept, so far as possible, the stretch
of shore to the eastward under the
guns of some of his ships, but it could
not have been an easy matter with the
sailing craft of that day to remain off
a lee shore at times of high wind and
with a strong westerly current, ready
night and day to fire upon a small strip
of sand overgrown with mangroves.
In his criticism of the land opera-
tions under General Wentworth, Ad-
miral Vernon, somewhat overbearing
by nature, appears to have been, to
some extent unjust, and that he
clearly under-estimated the strength
of San Lazaro is evident from letters
which he wrote at the time. It ap-
pears doubtful whether, in attacking
San Lazaro, its weakest and most
approachable side was accurately de-
termined in advance, but whether this
Admiral B^rnntt
PART OF THE CARTAGENA WALLS WITH SAN LAZARO IN DISTANCE
was so or not, General Wentworth de-
cided that, without effecting a breach,
an attack would be impracticable, and
much time was consumed in attempt-
ing to raise a battery for the pur-
pose, as well as in correspondence
with Admiral Vernon, already re-
ferred to, respecting the use of the
vessels of the fleet for effecting the
breach. During this time the bulk of
the American colonial troops had been
left in the ships, their usefulness be-
ing doubted, more particularly on
account of a large proportion of them
being believed to be Papists ; by direc-
tion of General Wentworth, these
were landed on April 6, and after-
wards are credited by the land offi-
cers as having rendered gallant ser-
vices.
On April 9, pressed by the re-
proaches of Admiral Vernon for
the long delays, and threatened day
by day with a lessening power of
attack due to the rapidly increasing
sickness among his troops, General
Wentworth, with the consent of a
council of war of the land officers, at-
tempted to carry San Lazaro by
storm. The attack was intended to
be by night, but owing either to the
trickery of native guides or to badly
formed plans on the part of General
Wentworth, the attack was begun
upon the almost precipitous southern
side of the fortress, with scaling lad-
ders of insufficient length. This un-
fortunate error served to warn the
Spanish troops, and the real attack
hardly began before the broiling hot
tropical sun shone relentlessly upon
the attacking forces. With a bravery
deserving better guidance, the troops
stood their ground, enduring for
hours the terrible fire from above their
heads and the burning rays of the
sun, but the ramparts were not car-
Admiral H^rnnn
ried,and finally the troops were forced
to retire leaving, it is said, half their
number either dead or wounded at
the foot of the walls of the fortress.
At a council of war of the naval com-
manders, Vernon, Ogle, and Le-
stock, on April 12, it was recom-
mended that in view of the land forces
having been unable to erect a battery
for effecting a breach in the walls of
San Lazaro, and their having failed
to storm it otherwise, and also in view
of the great sickness prevailing, that
"it will be for the King's service to
"desist from the enterprise as imprac-
ticable." At a council of war of the
land officers on April 13, the blame
for the failure to carry San Lazaro
was attributed to the failure of the
fleet to adequately co-operate, but the
failure of the undertaking was ad-
mitted and definite plans for the em-
barkation of the troops were sug-
gested. On the fifteenth, the stores
were taken on board the ships, and on
the day following the troops, sadly re-
duced in numbers, and many very ill,
were re-embarked. So great were the
losses to the troops through disease
and battle that not over one-third of
the land troops appear to have re-
turned with the fleet to Jamaica.
For about a fortnight after the
troops were re-embarked, the admiral
kept the fighting vessels employed in
destroying the forts and batteries, the
structural strength of some of which,
particularly of Castillo Grande, ap-
pears to have been so great as to have
made the work both difficult and tedi-
ous. Also during the interval before
sailing, an arrangement was made by
means of courteous letters exchanged -
under flags of truce between the ad-
miral and the viceroy for an exchange
of prisoners. On April 24, at a Gen-
eral Council of War, it was deter-
mined to sail for Jamaica as soon as
possible, and by May 8, 1741, the
great fleet had left Cartagena, having,
it is true, rendered useless the de-
fenses of the harbor and destroyed six
heavy ships and some minor craft, but
having failed to enter the city or to
obtain any substantial booty.
The earlier successes of Vernon
made the news of his failure all the
more distressing to the English peo-
ple, and the expedition and the causes
leading to its failure played a not
unimportant part in English politics
for some time.
■
HARBOR AND BAY
or
CARTAGENA
IN 1741
om confenmoErarjr map? and,
rds corrected!^ recent surveys.
^^^ SsnLazari
■J
CD
HI"
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Admiral Tfernnn
APPENDIX
i
Declaration of War in 1739
Trusty and well Beloved — We greet you Well—
Whereas several unjust seizures have been made and depredations carried on in the
West Indies by Spanish Guarda Costas and Ships acting under the Commission of the
King of Spain or his Governors contrary to the Treatys subsisting between us and the
Crown of Spain and to the Law of Nations to the Great prejudice of the lawfull Trade
& Commerce of our subjects; and many crueltys and barbaritys have been exercised
on the Persons of such our subjects whose vessels have been so seized by the said Span-
ish Guarda Costas ; And whereas frequent complaint has been made to the Court of Spain
of these unjust practices and no satisfaction or Redress been procured; and whereas a
Convention for makeing reparation to our subjects for the losses sustained by them on
account of the unjust seizure & Captures above-mentioned was concluded between Us and
the King of Spain on the 14th day of January last, N. S., by which convention it was
stipulated that a certain sum of money should be paid at London within a Term specified
in the sd. Convention as a ballance due on the part of Spain to the Crown and subjects
of Great Britain which Term did expire on the 25th day of May last and the paymt of
the said sum agreed by the sd. Convention has not been made according to the Stipulation
for that purpose, by which means the Convention above-mentioned has been manifestly
violated & Broke by the King of Spain and our Subjects remain without any Satisfaction
or reparation for the many Great & Grievous losses sustained by them : We have tho't
fit for ye vindicating the Honour of Our Crown & for procuring Reparation and Satis-
faction for our Injured subjects to order Reprisals to be made upon the Crown & sub-
jects of Spain. And We do therefore by virtue of these presents authorize & impower you
to issue forth and grant Commissions of Marque & Reprisals to any of our loveing sub-
jects or others who shall apply to you for the same and whom you shall deem fitly quali-
fied in that behalf, For Armeing and fiting out Private Ships of War for the apprehend-
ing, seizing and taking the Ships, vessels & goods belonging to the King of Spain, his
vassals & subjects or any inhabiting within his Countrys Territories & Dominions in the
West Indies.
Provided always that before any such Commission or Commissions be Issued forth,
security be given upon such Commission as hath been used in such cases. And you shall
insert in every Commission to be so granted by you all such clauses and give such Direc-
tions & Instructions to the Person or Persons to whom you shall grant such Commissions
as have been usual in cases of the like nature. And for so doing this shall be your war-
rant. And so we bid you farewell.
Given at our Court at Kensington the fifteenth day of June 1739, in the thirteenth
year of our Reign.
By his Majesty's Command,
PIollis Newcastle.
Superscribed "To our Trusty & Well Beloved Jonathan (Belcher) Esq., our Capt.
General & Govt in chief of our Provinces of the Massa. Bay and New Hampshire in
America & in his Absence to our Commander in Chief or to the President of Council
of our said Province for the time being.
Admiral B^rnntt
ii
Transcript from Original Articles of Capitulation granted by Edward Vernon, Esq.,
Vice-Admiral of the Blue and Commander-in-Chief of His Majesty's Ships and Vessels
in the West Indies, and Commodore Brown; to Don Francisco Martinez de Retey, Gov-
ernor of Porto Bello, and Don Francisio de Albaroa, Commandant of the Guarda Costas
at the same place, the 22nd November, 1739, O. S.
"1st Article. That the garrison be allowed to march out, as desired, upon condition
the King of Great Britain's troops be put into possession of Gloria Castle, before four
of the clock this evening, and the garrison to march out by ten of the clock to-morrow
morning.
"That the inhabitants may either remove or remain, under the promise of security
for themselves and their effects.
"2nd. That the Spanish soldiers may have a guard, if they think it necessary.
"3rd. They may carry off two cannons mounted with ten charges of powder for
each, and their match lighted.
"4th. The gates of the Gloria Castle must absolutely be in possession of the King
our master's troops by four of the clock, and the Spanish garrison shall remain in all
safety for their persons or effects till the appointed time of their marching out, and to
carry with them provisions and ammunition necessary for their safety.
"5th. That the ships with their apparel and arms, be absolutely delivered up to the
use of his Brittanic Majesty; but that all the officers, both soldiers and crew, shall have
three days allowed them to retire with all their personal effects ; only one officer being
admitted on board such ship and vessel, to take possession for the King our master, and
see this article strictly complied with.
"6th. That provided the Articles above mentioned are strictly complied with, and
that possession be given of Castle St. Jeronimo in the same manner as is stipulated for
the Castle Gloria, then the Clergy, the Churches and Town shall be protected and pre-
served in all their immunities and properties, and that all prisoners already taken
shall be set at liberty before our leaving the port.
"Given under our hands on board his Majesty's ship "Burford" in Porto Bello har-
bour, the 22nd day of November, 1739, O. S.
"E. Vernon,
"Chas. Brown."
Ill
Transcript from Original Articles of Capitulation granted by Edward Vernon, Esq.,
Vice-Admiral of the Blue, and Commander-in-Chief of his Brittanic Majesty's Ships and
Vessels in the West Indies, to Don Juan Carlos Gutures de Zavollos. Captain of Fool and
Castellano of the Castle of St. Lorenzo, at the mouth of the River Chagre.
"1st. That upon his Brittanic Majesty's troops being put into immediate possession
of the Fort St. Lorenzo, at the mouth of the river Chagre, the said Castellano and all his
garrison be at free liberty to march out without any molestation, and may retire into the
village of Chagre, or where else they please.
"2nd. That the inhabitants of Chagre may remain in safety in their own houses,
under a promise of security to their persons and houses.
"3rd. That the Guarda Costa sloops be delivered up to the use of his Brittanic
Majesty in the condition they are, and the King of Spain's Custom house.
"4th. That the Clergy and Churches in the town of Chagre shall be protected and
preserved in all their immunities.
"Given under my hand, on board his Brittanic Majesty's ship, the 'Strafford, 1 al
anchor before the river Chagre, this 24th of March, 1740.
"E. Vernon."
Afcmiral l^rnott
IV
Sailing and Fighting Instructions to British Fleet on Sailing from Jamaica
Issued by Edward Vernon, Vice=Admiral of the Blue, and
Commander=in=Chief of all His Majesty's Ships
and Vessels in the West Indies
LINE OF BATTLE
The "Princess Amelia" to lead with the Starboard, and the "Suffolk" with
the Larboard Tacks on Board. But if I shall find it necessary from the differ-
ent Motions of the Enemy, to change our Order of Battle, to have those who
are now appointed to lead on the Starboard Tack, to continue to lead the fleet
on the Larboard Tack on our going about, or those now to lead on the Lar-
board Tack, on the contrary to do the same, as the Exigency of the Service
may require ; I will, with my Signal for Tacking, hoist a Dutch Jack on the
Flag Staff, under the Union Flag, the usual Signal for Tacking, when they are
to continue to lead the Fleets on their respective Tacks accordingly.
REAR-ADMIRAL OF THE BLUE, SIR CHALONER OGLE
FRIGATES.
RATES.
SHIPS NAMES.
CAPTAINS.
MEN.
GUN!
3d,
Princess Amelia,
Hemington,
600,
80.
Experiment,
Sheerness.
4th,
3d,
Windsor,
York,
Norfolk,
Berkley,
Coates,
Graves,
400,
4OO,
GOO,
60.
60.
80.
Vesuvius Fireship,
Terrible Bomb,
Russell,
Sir C. Ogle, )
Capt. Norris, f
615,
80.
Phseton,
Shrewsbury,
Townsend,
GOO,
SO.
Goodley,
4th,
Rippon,
Litchfield,
Jolley,
Cleveland,
400,
300,
60.
50.
Jersey,
Tilbury,
Lawrence,
Long,
400,
4OO,
60.
60.
VICE-ADMIRAL OF THE BLUE, VERNON
FRIGATES.
RATES.
ships' names.
CAPTAINS.
MEN.
GUN!
Squirrel,
3d,
Orford,
Ld.Aug. Fitzroy,
480,
70.
Shoreham,
4th,
Princess Louisa,
Stapleton,
400,
60.
Eleanor,
Augusta,
Denuison,
400,
60.
Seahorse,
Worcester,
Perry Mayne,
400,
60.
Strombolo,
3d,
Chichester,
Robert Trevor,
too,
80.
Success,
Princess Caroline,
Adm. Vernon, )
Capt. Watson, j
620.
SO.
Vulcan,
Torbay,
Gascoigne,
600,
SO.
Cumberland,
4th,
Strafford,
Tho. Trevor,
400,
60.
Alderney Bomb,
Weymouth,
Knowles,
400,
60.
Pompey,
Deptford,
Moyston,
400,
60.
Brig. Tender,
3d.
Burford,
Griffen,
480,
70.
Ahmtral Uernon
COMMODORE LESTOCK'S DIVISION
FRIGATES.
RATES.
SHIPS NAMES.
CAPTAINS.
MEN.
GUN.
4th,
Defiance,
John Trevor,
-lOO,
60.
Dunkirk,
Cooper,
4OO,
do.
Astrea,
Lyon,
Cotterel,
4OO,
60.
Wolf Sloop,
3d,
Prince Frederic,
Ld. A.Beauclerc,
480,
70.
^Etna,
Boyne,
Com. Lestock, )
Capt. Colby, [
60O,
80.
Firebrand,
Hampton Court,
Dent,
480,
70.
Virgin Queen,
4th,
Falmouth,
Douglass,
300,
SO.
Montague,
Chambers,
300,
60.
3d.
Suffolk,
Davers,
480,
70.
SIGNALS
When the Admiral would speak with the Captain of any Ship undermen-
tioned, he will raise a pendant, as against the Ship's name, and of the Colour
set above it ; if a Lieutenant, the Same Signal with a Weft of the Ensign ; and
if a Boat without an Officer, the Weft will be hoisted but half Staff up. Mem-
orandum, when I would have any of the Fireships, Bombs or Tenders, taken
in tow at the same Time I make the Signal for the Ship that is to tow, and for
the Ship that is to be tow'd, I will hoist up a Flag Blue and White, at the
Flag-staff of the Main-top-mast-head.
RED.
WHITE.
BLUE.
YELLOW.
Boyne.
Norfolk.
Pss. Amelia.
Suffolk.
Chichester.
Shrewsbury.
Terrible.
Eleanor.
* Iain j Top-mast.
l ore j Head.
Mizen (
Worcester.
Lyon.
Defiance.
^Etna.
Tilbury.
Squirrel.
Torbay.
Firebrand.
Starbd \ Main-topsail.
Windsor.
Pss. Louisa
Falmouth.
Vesuvius.
Larbd / Yard-arm.
Burford.
P. Frederic.
Strafford.
Phaeton.
Starbd \ Fore-topsail.
Montague.
Orford.
Weymouth.
Strombolo.
Larbd j Yard arm.
Shoreham.
Augusta.
Pss. Caroline.
Success.
Starbd ( Mizen-topsai
HamptonCourt
Dunkirk.
Jersey.
Vulcan.
Larbd"/ Yard-arm.
Litchfield.
Lud. Castle.
Deptford.
Cumberland.
Starbd ( Main-yard-
Larbd ) arm.
Experiment.
Rippon.
York.
Alderney.
Sea Horse.
Sheerness.
Russell.
Brig. Tender.
Starbd \ Fore-Yard-
Astrea.
Wolf.
Virgin Queen.
Pompey.
Goodley.
Larbd / arm.
Starbd \ Cross-jack-
Larbd { yard-arm.
When the Ships are in Line of Battle, the Frigates, Fireships, Bombs and
Tenders are to keep on the opposite Side of the Enemy, when I make the Signal
in Line of Battle, for the Van of the kleet to lack lirsi in order to gain the
Windward of the Enemy, then each Ship is to tack in the Headmost Ships
wake, for losing no Ground. For all other Signals they arc refer'd to the
General printed Sailing and Fighting Instructions, and such other additional
instructions as you received from me.
Admiral l^rttntt
V
Resolution of a Council of War to Settle Distribution of Booty — Held
on Board " Princess Carolina," March 5, 1741
Whereas, it appears by my Lords Justices additional Instructions of the 22nd of July,
1740, to be his Majesty's Royal Pleasure, that for preserving that Harmony and good
Understanding between his Majesty's Sea and Land Forces, which is so necessary for
the carrying on his Majesty's Service with Success, that it should be settled by a Council
of War, to consist of Sea and Land Officers, in what Manner and Proportion, Booty
taken from the Enemy at Land, during the recent Expedition, shall be distributed between
his Majesty's Sea and Land Forces, in all Cases where the said Sea and Land Forces shall
be jointly engaged, in the attacking and taking of any Place, Fort, or Settlement, from
the Enemy.
And a Paper accompanying the said Instructions, and said to have been prepared in
Conformity to the two preceding Settlements in 1694 and 1702, being laid before your
Council of War.
Your Council of War, to shew their entire Disposition to conform to our Royal Mas-
ter's Inclinations, by studying to preserve that Harmony recommended to us, have taken the
said Paper into Consideration, and to avoid the Risk of disagreeing Opinions in prepar-
ing a new one, resolve to make that the Plan of their present Regulation.
And your Commanding Officers in Chief by Sea and Land, desirous to preserve that
good Harmony recommended to us by his Majesty, and pleased with an Occasion of
contributing to it, by giving up, of their own Motive and free Will, for procuring so desir-
able an End, a fifth part of what was by the said Distribution, allotted to them, in order
to divide the whole into Sixteenths, and to have the said Sixteenths distributed, where
the Council of War should think them most wanted.
Your said Council of War accordingly proceeded to the Consideration of it, and do
agree that the whole amount of such Booty shall be divided into sixteen equal Parts, or
Portions.
Whereof four Sixteenths shall be given to the Commanders in Chief of the Sea and
Land Forces, to be equally divided between them.
To the other Admiral, General Officers, and Commodore, to be equally divided
amongst them, in proportion to their respective Salaries, two Sixteenths.
To the several Colonels, Captains of Ships of the Line of Battle, Lieutenant Colo-
nels, Captains of Ships of War giving Rank, Quarter-Master General, Adjutant General,
Commissary General, Paymaster General of the Land Forces, Judge Advocate, Secreta-
ries to the Admiral and General, Provost Marshal, Surgeons and Chaplains General by
Sea and Land, Majors of Regiments and of Brigades, Masters and Commanders of Fire-
ships, Bomb-ketches, Sloops and other Ships of War not giving Rank, Aid du Camps
upon the Establishment, Captains at Land, Lieutenants at Sea, Masters of Ships giving
Rank, Lieutenants at Land, Gunners, Pursers, Boatswains, Carpenters, Ensigns, Adju-
tants, Quarter-Masters of Regiments, Chaplains and Surgeons of Ships and Regiments,
Masters, Mates, Directors of the Hospital, and their Surgeons four Sixteenths, to be
divided amongst them in proportion to their respective Salaries.
To the Non-Commission and Warrant Officers at Sea and Land, such as Midshipmen,
Carpenters Mates, Boatswains Mates, Gunners Mates, Masters at Arms, Sergeants. Bom-
bardiers, Gunners of the Train, Yeomen of the Sheets, Cockswains, Quarter-Masters,
Quarter-Masters Mates, Surgeons Mates, Yeomen of the Powder-Room, and Corporals,
two Sixteenths, to be divided equally amongst them.
To the Cooks of Ships, and all others enumerated with them, in the Proclamation
for the Distribution of Prizes at Sea, Seamen and Soldiers, Drummers, Marshals Men.
Pioneers, or Persons working to clear Grounds, and assist at Sieges, four Sixteenths, to
be equally divided amongst them.
But no Officer to be allowed to share in two Capacities ; and whenever any Person
shall hold two different Employments, he shall chuse in which of them he will take his
Dividend. But it is not hereby intended, to exclude Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels, and
Majors, from receiving their shares as Captains, as well as Field Officers; and Sea Cap-
tains Pay to be accounted upon King William's Establishment.
And that every Officer under the Rank of a Commission, or Warrant Officer, Sea-
man, or Soldier, that shall happen to be wounded in any siege, or Action, whose Booty
shall be taken, shall have a double share in Proportion to his Rank, in Consideration of
his Wounds.
Given under our Hands, on Board his Majesty's Ship the "Princess Carolina," at
Anchor off Carthagena, the 5th day of March, 1740.
E. Vernon, J. Guise, E. Wolfe,
Thomas Wentworth, Richard Lestock. J. Hemington.
C. Ogle, Wm. Blakeney,
Admiral H^rtton
VI
Instructions from Vice=Admiral Vernon to Sir Chaloner Ogle, Issued on
Board the «« Princess Carolina" at Anchor off Cartagena,
the 6th of March, 1741
Whereas it has been determin'd in a Council of War, vigorously to attack Cartagena
both by Sea and Land; a Resolution which the Inclemency of the Country manifests the
Prudence of, as our Forces are decreasing daily by Sickness, so that slow Measures are
certain Ruin.
And as the first Point Judg'd material to secure the Success of the Enterprize, is to
render ourselves Masters of Boca Chica Castle, and all the Fortresses and Batteries
erected for defending the Entrance of the Harbour, for the more closely blocking up the
Town, and cutting it off from all Communication by Sea, either within or without the
Harbour, and above all for securing our Transports a safe Harbour to ride in, who will
lay too much exposed without.
And as the most probable, as well as most proper Place to secure a Descent in, is in
the Little Bay, under the Command of the two Forts St. Philip and St. Jago, where, I
am inform'd ships can come safely to an Anchor in good Ground, and within less than
Musket-shot of the Shore, and may lay to batter and command those two Forts, without
having Occasion to open the Castle of Boca Chica, in which Case I apprehend the Fire of
Three Eighty Gun Ships, if there be room for them to anchor there a-head of each other,
will be amply sufficient for demolishing the said Fort, commanding all the said Bay, and
securing there a safe landing of the Troops, under the Fire of their Guns; the Point, I
apprehend, of the utmost Importance, for securing the Success of this Expedition, it being,
as I apprehend, the very Spot on which M. Pontis made his Descent, when he took Car-
thagena, and began with taking Boca Chica, and as to the northward of the said two
Forts on Terra Bomba the Enemy are said lately to have erected a considerable Fascine
Battery of eighteen Pounders, which there is said to be deep water enough to approach
within Musket-shot of, but that the anchoring Ground so near in, is foul and stony, and
would cut the Cables, and to anchor in clean Ground would hardly be within point blank
Cannon Shot ; you must in employing the rest of your Ships in silencing that Battery, and
one of little consequence to the Northward of that called Chamba, govern yourself in it
as you shall judge most prudent, either by anchoring them, if you can find clean Ground
near enough, or by ranging close to them one after another, and then standing off, and
plying to Windward, to renew the Fire in the same manner of them, for clearing all that
Coast from the Enemies, as it is said there is likewise a good little Bay for a Descent
under Chamba Battery, and it might divide the Enemy's Force the better, to make a
Descent at both places at once, and expose their Troops the more to the Fire of our
Ships.
Having thus informed and instructed you according to the best Intelligence I have
received, and furnished you with Pilots of the best Ability and Experience I could pro-
cure, I rely on your Judgment and Resolution for the due Execution of my Orders.
And you are hereby required and directed to proceed with your whole Division of
Ships of the Line of Battle, for demolishing the said Forts and Batteries, and securing
all the Country between them, so as to secure a Descent for the Forces, in the most
convenient Parts for it, between the said Fort of St. Philip's and Chamba Battery.
And the better to secure the Success of your enterprize, you are to give ciders in
Writing to every respective Captain of your Division, not to suffer any [mprudent and
hasty firing from their Ships, which only serves to embolden an Enemy, instead of dis
couraging them; but to give strict orders not to suffer any gun to be fired from any of
its Decks, till the respective Officers appointed to command on each respective Batt< i
has seen to the pointing each Gun he is appointed to have the inspection over, and directed
Afttturai $£rtt0tt
the firing of it, that all possible Care may be used, to secure the Success of this first
Attempt, on which the Success of the Whole so much depends ; and they are to endeavor
to persuade and convince their Men, of the Folly and Imprudence of hasty firing, which
serves only to encourage the Enemies, and expose themselves : And you are likewise, in
your Orders in Writing, to assign to each particular Captain the Post he is to take, and
the Orders he is to execute, that no one may have the least Pretence to plead Ignorance
of your orders, which you are to enjoin the due Execution of, at the utmost Peril.
And you are to order your respective Captains, to acquaint their respective Ships
Companies, that the Whole of all Booty to be made upon the Enemies at Land, is gra-
ciously granted by his Majesty, to be distributed among his Sea and Land Forces, as shall
be agreed on by a Council of War of Sea and Land Officers, which have accordingly met
and regulated the Distribution thereof, and have allotted a double Share to any Non-
Commission or Warrant Officer, and private Man, that may happen to be wounded in the
Service; and to assure of a further Reward from me, out of my Share, all who shall
eminently distinguish themselves by any extraordinary actions of Prudence and Reso-
lution, besides a secured Advancement proportionable to their Zeal and Resolution,
exerted on so signal an Occasion, for the Honour of the Crown and future Prosperity
of our Country.
And you will have a Report from Captain Knowles, and the other Captains appointed
for Viewing, Sounding, and making all necessary Observations, for your further Infor-
mation and facilitating the Success of the said Attack.
And you may remove your Flag on board any Ship of your Division, as you may
judge most expedient for your more carefully directing and inspecting the due Execution
of the whole Attack, which you are carefully and diligently to see to the due Execution
of, and give all such additional Orders in, as you shall find to be necessary, from the
Motions and Dispositions of the Enemy, and other Events that may arise in the' vigor-
ous Execution of these Orders : For all and every part of which, this shall be your suffi-
cient Warrant. Given under my Hand on board his Majesty's Ship "Princess Carolina,"
at Anchor off of Carthagena, this 6th of March, 1740.
E. Vernon.
To Sir Chaloner Ogle, Rear Admiral of the Blue Squadron of his Majesty's Fleet.
By Command of the Admiral. Wm. Pearse.
Abmtral Hernutt
VII
Resolution of a Council of War Held on Board the "Weymouth,"
March 21, 1741
The Council of War taking into serious Consideration the slow Progress made by
the Army since their landing, who have had everything landed for them since Monday
last, and all done entirely by the Seamen; to leave them more at Liberty for' raising
their Battery and cutting off the Enemy's Communication by Land, which, to us, is a
great Surprize why it has not yet been done, in regard to the great Advantages given the
Enemy by it.
And as we cannot but entertain uneasy Apprehensions from such slow Proceedings,
and being determin'd to do all in our Power to prevent them, have taken into serious
Consideration what could possibly be done by Sea, more than has been done already, for
securing the first Attempt, to be Masters of the Entrance into the Harbour.
And though our being on a Lee-Shore and liable to great Hazards, for getting our
Ships back, which shall be Considerably damaged in their Masts and Rigging, are such
forcible Arguments, that we must in some sort act against our Judgments, as Seamen, in
exposing his Majesty's Ships to Battering of Castles with them; yet as the Danger of
a Disappointment might be more fatal to our Royal Master's Honour and Interest, we
have chosen even to act against our Judgments, as Seamen, for securing the Success of
the present attempt, that appears to us so very doubtful without it.
And having called before us Captain Knowles, Capt. Rentone, and Lieut. Forrest,
on whose Judgments we thought we could best depend, and had all the Information we
could likewise gather from the Spanish Pilots (Prisoners with us) of what could possi-
bly be attempted by Shipping.
Your Council of War have, as the Necessity of the Case seemed to press it upon
them, come to unanimous Resolution, to do the most that we can judge to be practicable.
to secure the Success of this first Attempt, on which the Whole depends.
Which we think may be to attempt to anchor four Ships as close to the Shore as
possible, between the Castle of St. Jago (we are in Possession of) and the Castle of
Boca Chica.
Which four Ships shall be the "Boyne," "Suffolk," "Prince Frederick," and "Hampton-
Court," of Commodore Lestock's Division, to be under his particular Orders and Direc-
tions, for the posting them accordingly, and carrying on the Attack at Boca Chica Castle.
And that the "Princess Amelia'' and the "Norfolk" shall take Post after them, so
as to lye most commodious to batter the Castle of St. Joseph, and endeavor to destroy
that, and direct their fire from raking Mr. Lestock's Ships, which we apprehend they
would be otherwise liable to; and these two Ships to follow Sir Chaloner Ogle's Orders,
of whose Division they are, for the Execution of the said Service.
And as Sir Chaloner Ogle lies innermost, with his Division, that he shall order such
other Ships of his Division in, to support the others, and employ any Fire he may observe
to gall them, that cannot be come at by the Ships first anchor'd. which, must he left to
his Prudence to direct, as shall appear to be necessary on the Enemy's Motions, when we
come to Execution.
And as we hope the Battery from the Shore will be got ready to play this nighl
at farthest, that all necessary Orders shall he immediately issued in it. to the Ships who
are to prepare for Service, to get themselves in Condition on the first Notice; and that
if our Battery begins playing To-morrow, our Ships shall nunc to the said Attack, upon
the first of the Sea-Breeze on Monday morning.
To all which Resolutions we have unanimously agreed, and resolved to have put in
Execution accordingly.
Given under our Hands on Board the "Weymouth," this 2is1 of March. 1710,
E. Vernon,
C. 1 '..1 1
Ricnn. Lestoi k.
Abmtral Hrrntftt
VIII
Council of War Held on Board the •« Princess Carolina " in Carthagena
Harbour, March 30, 1741
Your Majesty's Forces being in full Possession of all the Castles, Forts, and Bat-
teries, for defending the entrance into the Harbour of Carthagena, your Council of War
took into Consideration what would be next advisable for them to proceed in.
And as the Communication by Sea to Carthagena, by the Men of War being advanc d
so near as within Gun-Shot of Castillo Grande, is now effectually cut off, it was adjudged
proper that all possible Expedition should be used in embarking the Forces and Artillery,
and that the Transports, as fast as they are embarked, should be moving off to the next
general Rendezvous off the Bocandina, between the Shore and the "Burford, in order
to make a Descent on the most convenient Place for their landing, to cut off the Com-
munication of the Town of the Land Side, by running a Line from the Lake at the
Back of the Popa, to the Bay, which is said to be about a quarter of a Mile ; and that the
Artillery should be embarked with all possible Expedition, to proceed after them to the
general Rendezvous; and that all possible means should be put in Use for procuring the
best Intelligence in the Meantime, how to put this Resolution in Execution with the best
Success
And as General Wentworth represented they should want a greater Number of Men
to be landed with them, in order effectually to invest the Town, it was resolved he should
be supplied from the Men of War, with all such of the American forces, as he should
judVe proper to be trusted on Shore; and likewise of the Detachments that were on
Boar-d of Lord James Canendish's and Col, Bland's, whenever the rest of the Forces
were landed and General Wentworth should represent it to be necessary.
And your Council of War referred to the Transports being got up to the next general
Rendezvous and taking such further resolutions as shall be judg'd most adviseable to
secure the Success of this Expedition in taking the Town of Carthagena, which it has
pleas'd God so wonderfully to favour the Success of his Majesty's Forces in hitherto. ^
Given under our Hands, on Board his Majesty's Ship the "Princess Carolina, in
Carthagena Harbour, the 30th day of March, 1741.
E. Vernon,
Tho. Wentworth,
C. Ogle,
J. Guise,
Richd. Lestock,
Wm. Blakeney,
E. Wolfe,
J. Hemington.
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