Glass. 
 Book. 
 
THE TWO BOOKS 
 
 OF FRANCIS BACON, 
 
 OF THE PROFICIENCE 
 AND ADVANCEMENT 
 
 OF LEARNING, 
 
 DIVINE AND HUMAN. 
 
 Em -red 
 
 5+*J» q^THE KING. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED BY J. M<CREERY ? 
 FOR T. PAYNE, PALL MALL, 
 
 1808. 
 
{? 
 
 ^ 
 
 W est. Bob. H^.Soc. 
 
 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 BOOK 1. 
 
 Page 
 LEARNING, HOW DISCREDITED ... 9 
 
 1 Objections of Divines ...... — 
 
 2 Objections of Statesmen ...... 18 
 
 3 Objections from Learned Men .... 31 
 THREE DISTEMPERS OF LEARNING . 45 
 
 1 Of Delicate Learning, or Vain affecta- 
 
 tions 47 
 
 2 Of Contentious Learning, or Vain alter- 
 
 cations .... 51 
 
 3 Of fantastical Learning, or Vain Imagi- 
 
 nations . 56 
 
 VARIOUS ERRORS IN THE PURSUIT 
 
 OF LEARNING .62 
 
 OF THE DIGNITY OF KNOWLEDGE . 72 
 
 Divine Proofs . 73 
 
 Human Proofs 85 
 
 1 It's influence on Martial Virtues ... 97 
 
 2 It's importance to the Moral and private 
 Virtues . . . . 111 
 
 BOOK II. 
 
 DEFECTS OF LEARNED INSTITUTIONS 128 
 
 Distribution of the parts of Learning . 139 
 
 HISTORY 140 
 
 1 Literary History — — 
 
 2 Natural History 142 
 
 S Civil History 148 
 
 4 Ecclesiastical History • 162 
 
 POESY 166 
 
 PHILOSOPHY .... 172 
 I. DIVINE PHILOSOPHY, OR NATURAL 
 
 THEOLOGY . ... 179 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 In the year 1605 Francis Bacon revealed to the 
 world his great scheme for rebuilding the Sciences, 
 in these two books dedicated to James I. 
 
 He was now in the 44th year of his age ; and it 
 appears by some of his imperfect pieces, and by his 
 letters, that he had long conceived the design of thi3 
 work : for in a letter to the Lord Treasurer Burghley, 
 in 159 J, he thus solicits his patronage. — " Again 
 the meanness of my estate doth somewhat move 
 me : for though I cannot accuse myself that I am 
 either prodigal or slothful, yet my health is not to 
 spend, nor my course to get : Lastly, I confess that 
 I have as vast contemplative ends as I have mode- 
 rate civil ends : for I have taken all knowledge to 
 be my province j and if I could purge it of two sorts 
 of rovers, whereof the one with frivolous disputa- 
 tions, confutations, and verbosities, the other with 
 blind experiments, and auricular traditions and im- 
 postures, hath committed so many spoils, I hope I 
 should bring in industrious observations, grounded 
 conclusions, and profitable inventions and disco- 
 veries, — the best state of that province. This, 
 whether it be curiosity, or vain-glory, or nature, 
 or, if one take it favourably, philanihropia, is so 
 fixed in my mind as it cannot be removed. And I 
 do easily see that place of any reasonable counte- 
 nance doth bring commandment of more wits than 
 a man's own ; which is the thing I greatly affect." (a) 
 — and in a letter to Lord Essex, in 1596, he 
 declares his purpose not to follow the practice of 
 
 (a J Birch's Edit. 1765. pa. 178. vol. Hi. 
 
 b 
 
the law — u because it drinketh too much time, 
 which I have dedicated to better purposes." (a) 
 
 Yet under Elizabeth he never ceased to aspire to 
 civil honors ; for which he exhausted in vain all the 
 arts of obsequiousness and adulation. His abilities 
 were thought too great for high place ; they were 
 commended with envy, and employed without pro- 
 motion. 
 
 Even after the accession of James I. he seems 
 disposed to abandon the pursuit of power : as ap- 
 pears by a letter, dated July 1603, the very year of 
 his knighthood : — " My ambition now I shall only 
 put upon my pen, whereby I shall be able to main- 
 tain memory and merit of the times succeeding." ( b) 
 — This work however, appearing two years after, 
 was too well calculated to please a pedant King : 
 and Bacon, by his unrivalled talents and unexampled 
 servility, deserved and obtained the favor of his 
 master. In the course of 17 years he wound his way, 
 by nine successive steps in dignity and office, to 
 the highest place of a subject, (c) 
 
 During all this time, though immersed in civil 
 business, he applied himself to Philosophy with un- 
 abated vigour. Wishing to publish his work to all 
 nations, and to perpetuate it through all ages, he 
 desired a Latin version of it; and some time before 
 the year 1608, (for the letter is not dated) sent the 
 following request to his friend, the Margaret Pro- 
 fessor of Divinity in the University of Cambridge. 
 
 Mr. Dr. Playfere. (d) 
 
 A great desire will take a small occasion to hope 
 and put in trial that which is desired. It pleased 
 you a good while since, to express unto me the good 
 liking which you conceived of my Book of the 
 Advancement of Learning; and that more signifi- 
 cantly, (as it seemed to me) than out of courtesy 
 
 (a) Vol. iii. p. 194. (b) Vol. Hi. p. 401. 
 
 (c) Letter to the King, vol, iii. p. 406. 
 
 (d) Vol. iii. p. 230. 
 
¥ 
 
 or civil respect. Myself, as I then took content- 
 ment in your approbation thereof, so I should esteem 
 and acknowledge not only my contentment in- 
 creased, but my labours advanced, if I might obtain 
 your help in that nature which I desire. Wherein 
 before I set down in plain terms my request unto 
 you, I will open my self what it was which I chiefly 
 sought and propounded to my self in that work • 
 that you may perceive that which I now desire to 
 be pursuant thereupon. If I do not much err, (for 
 any judgment that a man maketh of his own doings 
 had need be spoken with a Siniinquam fallit Imago,) 
 I have this opinion, that if I had sought mine own 
 commendation, it had been a much fitter course for 
 me to have done as Gardeners used to do, by taking 
 their seed and slips, and rearing them first into 
 plants, and so uttering them in pots, when they are 
 in flower, and in their best state. But for as much 
 as my end was Merit of the State of Learning (to 
 my power) and not Glory ; and because my purpose 
 was rather to excite other men's wits than to magnify 
 mine own, I was desirous to prevent the uncertain- 
 ness of mine own life and times, by uttering rather 
 seeds than plants ; nay and further, (as the Proverb 
 is) by sowing with the basket, rather than with the 
 hand : wherefore, since I have only taken upon me 
 to ring a bell, to call other wits together, (which is 
 the meanest office) it cannot but be consonant to 
 my desire to have that bell heard as far as can be. 
 And since they are but sparks which can work but 
 upon matter prepared, I have the more reason to 
 wish that those sparks may fly abroad, that they 
 may the better find and light upon those minds and 
 spirits which are apt to be kindled. And therefore, 
 the privateness of the language considered, wherein 
 it is written, excluding so many readers ; as on the 
 other side, the obscurity of the argument in many 
 parts of it excludeth many others ; I must account 
 it a second birth of that work, if it might be 
 translated into Latin, without manifest loss of the 
 sense and matter. For this purpose I could not re- 
 present to my self any man into whose hands I do 
 
 b 2 
 
more earnestly desire that work should fall than 
 your self; for by that I have heard and read, T know 
 no man a greater master in commanding words to 
 serve matter. Nevertheless, I am not ignorant of 
 the worth of your labours, whether such as your 
 place and profession imposeth, or such as your own 
 virtue may upon your voluntary election take in 
 hand. But I can lay before you no other persuasions 
 than either the work it self may affect you with ; or 
 the honour of his Majesty, to whom it is dedicated ; 
 or your particular inclination to my self; who, as I 
 never took so much comfort in any labours of mine 
 own, so I shall never acknowledge my self more 
 obliged in any thing to the labours of another, than 
 in that which shall assist it. Which your labour, if 
 I can by my place, profession, means, friends, travel, 
 work, deed, requite unto you, I shall esteem my self 
 so straitly bound thereunto, as I shall be ever most 
 ready both to take and seek occasion of thankful- 
 ness. So leaving it, nevertheless Salva Amicitia, as 
 reason is, to your good liking, I remain. 
 
 Archbishop Tenison informs us, in his Baconiana, 
 that Playfere sent a specimen of such superfine 
 Latinity, that Bacon did not encourage him to pro- 
 ceed. Still he did not relinquish his purpose ; 
 though too much occupied with civil affairs, and 
 with the other parts of his great plan to accomplish 
 it himself: but he repeats his wish in a letter to his 
 friend Tobie Matthew — " I must confess my desire 
 to be that my writings should not court the present 
 time, or some few places, in such sort as might 
 make them either less general to persons, or less 
 permanent to future ages." (a) — and in another to 
 the same, dated 1609, on sending him part of the 
 Instauratio Magna, he says—" It doth more fully 
 lay open that the question between me and the an- 
 tients is not of the virtue of the race, but of the 
 Tightness of the way." (b) — In his letter to Casau* 
 bon, Oct. 1609, he says — " magis videor cum anti- 
 quis versari quam cum his quibuscum vivo, (c) 
 
 (a) Vol. iii. p. 247. (b) Vol. iii. p. 245. 
 
 (c) Vol. iii. p. 462, 
 
vii 
 
 Before the Latin version of this work appeared, 
 he presented to the King, in 1620, the second part 
 of his Instauratio Magna, entitled Novum Organum, 
 
 with a letter, in which he says- " I hear my 
 
 former book of the Advancement of Learning is 
 well tasted in the Universities here, and the English 
 Colleges abroad ; and this is the same argument 
 sunk deeper." (a) 
 
 The next year, in the full sunshine of reputation 
 and power, he was suddenly overclouded with dis- 
 grace. In his malpractices originates the jurisdic- 
 tion of the House of Lords in Appeals. The first 
 petition preferred, and the first heard and deter- 
 mined, were both levelled against the Lord Chan- 
 cellor Bacon, for corruption and other misbehaviour. 
 (b) He made no defence against the charge of having 
 sold the decrees of equity. In his memorial of access 
 to the King, in 1622, his confession is full — " of 
 my offences far be it from me to say — dat veniani 
 corns, vexat censura columbas — but I will say that I 
 have good warrant for — u they were not the 
 greatest offenders in Israel, on whom the wall of 
 Shilo fell." (c) — As he had been the willing tool, he 
 was now the unpitied victim of a capricious tyrant 
 and an insolent minion ; from whom he was reduced 
 to beg the remission of a just sentence. 
 
 To estimate the severity of his punishment, we 
 must remember not only his exalted place, but his 
 great name, — " who can see w r orse days than he that 
 yet living doth follow at the funerals of his own 
 reputation." (d ) 
 
 He fell, like Antaeus, only to renew his strength : 
 and the labours of the last five years of his life, 
 under ignominy and want, have almost obliterated 
 the memory of his misdeeds. 
 
 He quitted a dangerous authority to become 
 indeed the " Servant of Posterity," and to perfect 
 for their lasting benefit his immortal works. In a 
 letter to Tobie Matthew, he says, — " It is true my 
 
 (a) Vol. iii. p. 584. (b) Blackstone. Chap. 27- Book iii* 
 (c) Vol. iii. p,630. (d) Bacons Essay on Death. 
 
viii 
 
 labours are wow most set to have those works which 
 I had formerly published, as that of Advancement 
 of Learning, that of Henry VII. that of the Essays, 
 being retractate and made more perfect, well trans- 
 lated into Latin by the help of some good pens^ 
 which forsake me not: for these modern languages 
 will at one time or other play the bankrupt with 
 books; and since I have lost much time with this 
 age, 1 would be glad, as God shall give me leave, 
 to recover it with posterity." (a) 
 
 Accordingly in 1623 came out the De Augmentis 
 Scientiarum, being a Latin Version of these Two 
 Books, much enlarged; in which he was assisted by 
 Mr. George Herbert, and the famous Philosopher of 
 Malmesbnry. (b) It consists of nine books: the first 
 is nearly a literal translation of the first book of 
 this work; the other eight, divided into 46 Chapters, 
 comprise the second book : but great additions are 
 made throughout, especially to the subjects of Rhe- 
 toric, Laws, and Government. 
 
 In 1640, was published a translation of the De 
 Augmentis by Dr. Gilbert Wats, at Oxford ; which, 
 Dr. Tenison tells us, was considered by many as 
 so defective and spiritless a performance, that Dr. 
 Rawley, Lord Bacon's chaplain, was solicited to 
 give a better. No other appeared till Dr. Shaw, in 
 1733, published his abridgment of Bacon's Philoso- 
 phical works; in which he professes to give not a 
 " direct translation, but a kind of open version in 
 modern English," and to omit "certain personal 
 addresses, compliments, exordiums, and the fi&ef, 1 ' 
 in order to shorten the works: yet he encumbers 
 his translation with frivolous notes.— He does not 
 observe the method of the original; but divides the 
 introductory matter, the first book, and the proem 
 to the second book, into four preliminary sections, 
 and the eight remaining books into 28 sections. 
 
 While the De Augmentis Scientiarum spreads the 
 fame of Bacon among the learned of all nations, this 
 the original draught of that immortal work is almost 
 
 (a) Vol. iii. p. 642. (b) See Tenison's Baconiana 
 
 and the Life of Hobbes. 
 
IX 
 
 neglected; and the illustrious Author is known to 
 the greater part of his own countrymen only by 
 his Essays. — We find but three separate editions of 
 this work ; — the 1st at London, in 1605 :— the 2d 
 at London, in 1629, (three years after the death 
 of Bacon,) and the 3d at Oxford, in 1633. 
 
 This is corrected from the original edition of 1605 ; 
 numerous errors having crept into many of the later 
 editions, especially in the Latin quotations. 
 
 In the first edition, the subjects are distinguished 
 by Capitals or Italics introduced into the text, with 
 a few marginal notes in Latin : in this, the more 
 convenient method of General Titles and a per- 
 petual marginal Index will facilitate a comparison 
 with the Latin Version and the Translations. 
 
 An important interval of 18 years preceded it's re- 
 publication in Latin ; during which the author fell 
 from the height of prosperity into the abyss of 
 wretchedness ; and in which he found leisuf e to 
 make many improvements. Yet does he say (in 
 his memorial of access to the King,) " My story is 
 proud. I may thank your Majesty: — for I heard 
 him note of Tasso, that he could know which poem 
 he made when he was in good condition, and which 
 w ? hen he was a beggar. I doubt he could make no 
 such observation of me." — Nor do the subsequent 
 alterations much diminish the value of this work ; 
 which will ever be esteemed as a composition of 
 extraordinary elegance, at an early period of our 
 literature ; and as the first production of so great a 
 genius, in his native tongue, and in the maturity 
 of his years ; every page of which is stamped with 
 the character of it's author— of a man of wondeiful 
 endowments, uniting in a rare degree experience 
 with learning, the active with the contemplative 
 life. 
 
 Conscious of great failings and great performances, 
 in humility mixed with dignity, he thus puts himself 
 upon posterity — " for my name and memory, I 
 leave it to men's charitable speeches, and to foreign 
 nations, and the next ages." (a) — The consenting 
 
 (a) See his Will. 
 
voice of all the studious and the wise justifies the 
 noble confidence of this appeal. We cite only 
 the learned and witty Ben Jonson, the elegant 
 and judicious Addison, the scientific and ingenuous 
 d'Alembert. 
 
 u One, though he be excellent, and the chief, is 
 not to be imitated alone : for never no imitator ever 
 grew up to his author : Likeness is always on this 
 side Truth. Yet there happened in my time one 
 noble Speaker, who was full of gravity in his speak- 
 ing, (a) His language, (where he could spare or 
 pass by a jest) was nobly censorious. No man ever 
 spake more neatly, more prestly, more weightily, or 
 suffered less emptiness, less idleness in what he 
 uttered. No member of his speech but consisted 
 of his own graces. His hearers could not cough, 
 or look aside from him without loss. He command- 
 ed where he spoke ; and had his judges angry and 
 pleased at his devotion. No man had their affec- 
 tions more in his power. The fear of every man that 
 heard him was lest he should make an end. 
 
 Cicero is said to be the only wit that the people of 
 Rome had equalled to their empire : — ingenium par 
 imperio. — We have had many ; and in their several 
 ages, (to take \a but the former seculum) Sir Thomas 
 More, the elder Wyat, Henry Earl of Surrey, 
 Chaloner, Smith, Eliot, B. Gardiner, were for their 
 times admirable ; and the more, because they began 
 eloquence with us. Sir Nic. Bacon was singular, 
 and almost alone, in the beginning of Q. Elizabeth's 
 time. Sir Philip Sidney and Mr. Hooker, in dif- 
 ferent matters, grew great masters of wit and lan- 
 guage; and in whom all vigour of invention and 
 strength of judgment met : the Earl of Essex noble and 
 high ; and Sir Walter Raleigh not to be contemned 
 cither for judgment or style: Sir Henry Savile grave 
 and truly lettered; Sir Edwin Sands excellent in 
 both; Lord Egerton, the Chancellor, a grave and 
 great orator, and best when he was provoked. But 
 his learned and able, though unfortunate successor, 
 h he who hath filled up all numbers ; and performed 
 
 (a) Lord Verulam. 
 
that in our tongue which may be compared or pre« 
 ferred either to insolent Greece, or haughty Rome. 
 In short, within his view, and about his times, were 
 all the wits born that could honour a language, or help 
 study. Now things daily fall : wits grow downward, 
 and Eloquence grows backward : so that he may be 
 named and stand as the mark and ax^n of our 
 Language. — 
 
 I have ever observed it to have been the office of 
 a wise patriot, among the greatest affairs of the 
 state, to take care of the Commonwealth of Learn- 
 ing. For schools, they are Seminaries of state ; and 
 nothing is worthier the study of a statesman, than 
 that part of the republic which we call the Advance- 
 ment of Letters. Witness the care of Julius Caesar, 
 who in the heat of the civil war writ his books of 
 
 Analogy, and dedicated them to Tully. This 
 
 made the late Lord St. Albans entitle his work 
 Novum Organum : which though by the most of 
 superficial men, who cannot get beyond the title of 
 Nominate, it is not penetrated or understood, it really 
 openeth all defects of Learning whatsoever, and is a 
 book Qui longum noto scriptori prorogat avum. — 
 
 My conceit of his person was never increased 
 toward him by his place or honours ; but I have and 
 do reverence him for the greatness that was only 
 proper to himself; in that he seemed to me ever, 
 by his work, one of the greatest men, and most 
 worthy of admiration, that had been in many ages. 
 In his adversity I ever prayed that God would give 
 him strength; for greatness he could not want: 
 neither could I condole in a word or syllable for 
 him; as knowing no accident could do harm to 
 Virtue, but rather help to make it manifest." 
 
 Ben. Jonson. Discoveries, p. 701. 
 
 " I shall, in this paper, only instance Sir Francis 
 Bacon, a man who, for greatness of genius, did 
 honour to his age and country ; I could almost say to 
 human nature itself. He possessed at once all those 
 extraordinary talents, which were divided amongst 
 
the greatest Authors of Antiquity. He had the 
 sound, distinct, comprehensive knowledge of Aris- 
 totle, with all the beautiful lights, graces, and em- 
 bellishments of Cicero. One does not know which 
 to admire most in his writings, the strength of reason, 
 force of style, or brightness of imagination." 
 
 Tatler, No. c 267. 
 
 a One of the most extensive and improved geniuses 
 we have had instance of in our own nation, or in any 
 other, was that of Sir Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam. 
 This great man, by an extraordinary force of nature, 
 compass of thought, and indefatigable study, had 
 amassed to himself such stores of knowledge as we 
 cannot look upon without amazement. His capacity 
 seemed to have grasped all that was revealed in 
 books before his time • and, not satisfied with that, 
 he began to strike out new tracks of science, too 
 many to be travelled over by any one man, in the 
 compass of the longest life. These therefore he 
 could only mark down, like imperfect coastings on 
 maps, or supposed points of land, to be further 
 discovered and ascertained by the industry of 
 after-ages, who should proceed upon his notices or 
 conjectures." 
 
 Spectatw, No. 554. 
 
 Pendant que des adversaires pen instruits on mal- 
 intentionnes faisoient ouvertement la guerre a la Phi- 
 losophic, elle se refugioit, pour aiusi dire, dans les 
 ouvrages de quelques grands hommes, qui sans avoir 
 Pambition dangereuse d'arracher le bandeau des yeux 
 de leurs contemporains preparoient de loin dans 
 l'ombre et le silence la lumiere dont le monde devoit 
 etre eclaire peu a peu et par degres insensibles. A 
 la tete de ces iilustres personnages doit etre place 
 rimmortel Chancelier d'Angleterre, Francois Bacon, 
 dont les ouvrages si justement estirnes, et p'us estimes 
 pourtant qu'ils ne sont connus, meritent encore plus 
 notre lecture que nos eloges. A considerer les vuei 
 
xiii 
 
 sanies et 6tendues de ce grand homme, la multitude 
 d'objets sur lesquels son esprit s'est porte, la hardiesse 
 de son style, qui reunit par-tout les plus sublimes 
 images avec la precision la plus rigoureuse, on seroit 
 tente de le regarder comme le plus grand, le plus 
 universel, et le plus eloquent des Pirilosophes. Bacon, 
 ne dans le sein de la nuit la plus profonde, sentit que 
 la Philoscphie n'etoit pas encore, quoique bien des 
 gens sans doute se flattassent d'y exceller ; car plus 
 un siecle est grossier, plus ii se croit instruit de tout 
 ce qu'il peut savoir. II commenca done par envisage? 
 d'une vue generate les divers objets de toutes les 
 Sciences naturelles : il partagea ces Sciences en dif- 
 ferentes branches, dont il tit l'enumeration la plus 
 exacte qu'il lui rut possible : il examina ce que Ton 
 savoit deja sur chacun de ces objets ; et fit le cata- 
 logue immense de ce qui restoit a deeouvrir; e'est 
 le but de son ouvrage, — De la dignite et de l'accroisse- 
 ment des connoissances humaines. Dans son Nouvel 
 Organe des Sciences il perfectionne les vues qu'il avoit 
 donnees dans le premier ouvrage ; il les porte plus 
 loin, et fait connoitre la necessite de la Physique ex- 
 perimentale, a laquelle on ne pensoit point encore. 
 Ennemi des systemes, il n'envisage la Pliilosophie que 
 comme cette partie de nos connoissances qui doit 
 contribuer a nous rendre meilleurs ou plus heureux : 
 il semble la borner a la science des choses utiles, et 
 recommande pai-tout Petude de la nature. Ses autres 
 Merits sont formes sur le meme plan ; tout, jusqu'a leurs 
 titres, y annonce l'homme de genie, l'espiit qui voit 
 en grand. II y recueille des faits, il y compare des ex- 
 periences, il en indique un grand nombre a faire ; il 
 invite les savans a etudier et a perfectionner les arts, 
 qu'il regarde comme la partie la plus releveeetla 
 plus essentielle de la Science humaine : il expose 
 avec une simplicity noble ses conjectures et ses 
 pensees sur les differens objets dignes d'interesser les 
 hommes ; et il eut pu dire, comme ce vieillard de 
 Terence, que rien de ce qui touche l'humanite ne lui 
 etoit etranger. Science de la nature, morale, poli- 
 tique, oeconomique, tout semble avoir ete du ressort de 
 cet esprit lumineux et profond ; et Ton ne sait ce qu'on 
 
doit le plus admirer, ou des richesses qu'il repand 
 sur tous les sujets qu'il traite, ou de Ja dignite avec 
 laquelle il en parle. Ses ecrits ne peuvent etre 
 mieux compares qu'a ceux d'Hippocrate sur la m£de- 
 cine ; et ils ne ser6ient ni moins admires ni moins lus, 
 si la culture de Pesprit 6toit aussi cher aux hommes 
 que la conservation de la sante\ Mais il n'y a que les 
 chefs de secte en tout genre, dont les ouvrages puis- 
 sent avoir un certain eclat : Bacon n'a pas ete du 
 nombre ; et la forme de sa Philosophic s'y opposoit : 
 elle 6toit trop sage pour £tonner personne. La Scho* 
 lastique qui dominoit de son terns ne pouvoit £tre 
 renvers£e que par des opinions hardies et nouvelles ; 
 et il n'y a pas d'apparence qu'un Phiiosophe qui se 
 contente de dire, aux hommes, " Voila le peu que 
 vous avez appris." — " Voici ce qui vous reste a cher- 
 cher"— soit destine a faire beaucoup de bruit parmi 
 ses contemporains. Nous oserions meme faire quel- 
 que reproehe au Chancelier Bacon d'avoir et6 peut- 
 £tre trop timide, si nous ne savions avec quelle re- 
 tenue, et pour ainsi dire, avec quelle superstition, 
 on doit juger un genie si sublime ; Quoiqu'il avoue 
 que les Scholastiques ont 6nerve les Sciences parleurs 
 questions minutieuses, et que l'esprit doit sacrifler 
 l'£tude des £tres gene>aux a celle des objets particu- 
 liers, il semble pourtant par l'emploi frequent qu'il 
 fait des termes de l'6cole, quelque fois meme par 
 celui des principes Scholastiques, et par des divisions 
 et subdivisions dont l'usage etoit alors fort a la mode, 
 avoir marque un peu trop de management ou de 
 deference pour le gout dominant de son siecle, Ce 
 grand homme, apres avoir brise tant de fers, £toit 
 encore retenu par quelques chaines qu'il ne pouvoit 
 ou n'osoit rompre. 
 
 Discours Priliminaire de V Encyclopidie* 
 
XV11 
 
 II. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY .... 183 
 1 Of Natural Science, or Speculative Phi- 
 losophy 185 
 
 g Of Natural Prudence, or Operative Phi- 
 losophy 203 
 
 III. SELF KNOWLEDGE, OR HUMA- 
 
 NITY 215 
 
 1 Of Discovery . ; 217 
 
 2 Of Impression 219 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BODY .... 222 
 
 1 Medicine 223 
 
 2 Cosmetic 237 
 
 3 Athletic 
 
 4 Sensuality 238 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND .... 239 
 
 1 Of the nature of the Soul or Mind . . 
 
 2 Of the faculties of the Soul or Mind . . 244 
 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY ..... 247 
 
 1 Art of Enquiry, or Invention .... 249 
 
 2 Art of Examination, or Judgment . . . 262 
 
 3 Art of Custody, or Memory .... 273 
 
 4 Art of Elocution, or Tradition .... 275 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY 307 
 
 1 Of the nature of Good 310 
 
 The Christian Law determines most of 
 
 the Controversies in Morals .... 314 
 Of Good with respect to Society, or of 
 
 Duty 326 
 
 2 Of the Culture of the Mind . . . . 334 
 CIVIL KNOWLEDGE . 353 
 
 1 Of Conversation 360 
 
 2 Of Negotiation, or Business .... 362 
 Of Prudential Wisdom, or the Art of 
 
 rising in Life 37 6 
 
 Of marshalling our pursuits ..... 400 
 
 3 Of Government 409 
 
 DIVINITY 417 
 
 1 The nature of the Revelation .... 425 
 
 2 The Matter revealed ....... 437 
 
 Conclusion of this General Survey of 
 
 Learning 441 
 
 c 
 
TO SIR THOMAS BODLEY. 
 
 SlK, 
 
 I think no man may more truly say, with the 
 Psalm, Multum incola fuit anima mea, than myself; 
 for I do confess since I was of any understanding, 
 my mind hath in effect been absent from that I have 
 done : and in absence are many errors, which I do 
 willingly acknowledge ; and amongst the rest, this 
 great one that led the rest ; that knowing myself by 
 inward calling to be fitter to hold a book than to 
 play a part, I have led my life in civil causes ; for 
 which I was not very fit by nature, and more unfit 
 by the preoccupation of my mind. Therefore calling 
 myself home, I have now for a time enjoyed myself; 
 whereof likewise I desire to make the world partaker. 
 My labours (if I may so term that which was the 
 comfort of my other labours) I have dedicated to the 
 King ; desirous if there be any good in them, it may 
 be as the fat of a sacrifice, incensed to his honour : 
 and the second copy I have sent unto you, not only 
 in good affection, but in a kind of congruity, in 
 regard of your great and rare desert of learning. 
 For Books are the Shrines where the Saint is, or 
 is believed to be : and you having built an Ark to save 
 Learning from Deluge, (a) deserve propriety in any 
 new instrument or engine, whereby Learning should 
 be improved or advanced. 1605. 
 
 (a) The Bodleian Library. 
 
XIX 
 
 TO THE EARL OF SALISBURY. 
 
 It may please your Good Lordship, 
 
 I present your Lordship with a work of my vacant 
 time ; which if it had been more, the work had been 
 better. It appertained to your Lordship (besides 
 my particular respects) in some propriety ; in regard 
 you are a great Governour in a province of Learn- 
 ing, (a) And (that which is more) you have added to 
 your place affection towards Learning; and to your 
 affection, judgment. Of which, the last I could be 
 content were (for the time) less, that you might the 
 less exquisitely censure that which I offer unto you. 
 But sure I am, the argument is good, if it had lighted 
 upon a good author. But I shall content myself to 
 awake better spirits ; like a bell-ringer, which is first 
 up to call others to church. So with my humble 
 desire of your Lordship's good acceptation, I re- 
 main. 1605. 
 
 («) Chancellor of the University of Cambridge. 
 
THE TWO BOOKS 
 
 OF FRANCIS BACON, 
 
 OF THE PROFICIENCE 
 
 AND ADVANCEMENT 
 
 OF LEARNING, 
 
 DIVINE AND HUMAN. 
 
 TO THE KING. 
 
THE 
 
 FIRST BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON: 
 
 OF THE 
 
 PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT 
 OF 
 
 LEARNING, DIVINE AND HUMAN. 
 TO THE KING 
 
 There were under the law, excellent king, 
 both daily sacrifices, and freewill offerings \ 
 the one proceeding upon ordinary observ- 
 ance, the other upon a devout chearfulness : 
 in like manner there belongeth to kings from 
 their servants both tribute of duty, and pre- 
 sents of affection. In the former of these! 
 hope I shall not live to be wanting, accord- 
 ing to my most humble duty, and the good 
 pleasure of your majesty's employments : for 
 the latter, I thought it more respective to 
 make choice of some oblation, which might 
 b 2 
 
rather refer to the propriety and excellency 
 of your individual person, than to the business 
 of your crown and state. 
 
 Wherefore representing your majesty many 
 times unto my mind, and beholding you not 
 with the inquisitive eye of presumption, to 
 discover that which the Scripture telleth me 
 is inscrutable, but with the observant eye of 
 duty and admiration ; leaving aside the other 
 parts of your virtue and fortune, I have been 
 touched, yea, and possessed with an extreme 
 wonder at those your virtues and faculties, 
 which the philosophers call intellectual ; the 
 largeness of your capacity, the faithfulness 
 of your memory, the swiftness of your ap- 
 prehension, the penetration of your judg- 
 ment, and the facility and order of your 
 elocution : and I have often thought, that of 
 all the persons living that I have known, your 
 majesty were the best instance to make a 
 man of Plato's opinion, that all knowledge is 
 but remembrance, and that the mind of man 
 by nature knoweth all things, and hath but 
 her own native and original notions (which 
 by the strangeness and darkness of this ta- 
 bernacle of the body are sequestered) again 
 
revived and restored : such a light of nature 
 I have observed in your majesty, and such a 
 readiness to take flame, and blaze from the 
 least occasion presented, or the least spark of 
 another's knowledge delivered. And as the 
 Scripture saith of the wisest king, That his 
 heart tuas as the sands of the sea; which though 
 it be one of the largest bodies, yet it con- 
 sisteth of the smallest and finest portions ; so 
 hath God given your majesty a composition 
 of understanding admirable, being able to 
 compass and comprehend the greatest mat- 
 ters, and nevertheless to touch and apprehend 
 the least ; whereas it should seem an impos- 
 sibility in nature, for the same instrument 
 to make itself fit for great and small works. 
 And for your gift of speech, I call to my 
 mind what Cornelius Tacitus saith of Augus- 
 tus Caesar ; August o prqfluens^ et quw prin- 
 cipem deceret, eloquentia fait : For, if we note 
 it well, speech that is uttered with labour 
 and difficulty, or speech that savoureth of 
 the affectation of art and precepts, or speech 
 that is framed after the imitation of some 
 pattern of eloquence, though never so excel- 
 lent ; all this has somewhat servile, and hold- 
 
ing of the subject. But your majesty's man* 
 ner of speech is indeed prince-like, flowing 
 as from a fountain, and yet streaming and 
 branching itself into nature's order, full of 
 facility and felicity, imitating none, and ini- 
 mitable by any. And as in your civil estate 
 there appeareth to be an emulation and con- 
 tention of your majesty's virtue with your 
 fortune ; a virtuous disposition with a fortu-^ 
 nate regiment ; a virtuous expectation, when 
 time was, of your greater fortune, with a 
 prosperous possession thereof in the due 
 time ; a virtuous observation of the laws of 
 marriage, with most blessed and happy fruit 
 of marriage ; a virtuous and most christian 
 desire of peace, with a fortunate inclina- 
 tion in your neighbour princes thereunto : 
 so likewise, in these intellectual matters, 
 there seemeth to be no less contention be- 
 tween the excellency of your majesty's gifts 
 of nature, and the universality and perfec- 
 tion of your learning. For I am well as- 
 sured that this which I shall say is no am- 
 plification at all, but a positive and measur- 
 ed truth ; which is, that there hath not been 
 since Christ's time any king or temporal 
 
monarch, which hath been so learned in all 
 literature and erudition, divine and human. 
 For let a man seriously and diligently revolve 
 and peruse the succession of the emperors 
 of Rome ; of which Caesar the dictator* who 
 lived some years before Christ, and Marcus 
 Antonjus, were the best learned ; and so de- 
 scend to the emperors of Graecia, or of the 
 West ; and then to the lines of France* Spain, 
 England* Scotland and the rest, and he shall 
 find this judgment is truly made* For it 
 seemeth much in a king, if, by the com- 
 pendious extractions of other men's wits and 
 labours, he can take hold of any superficial 
 ornaments and shews of learning ; or if he 
 countenance and prefer learning and learned 
 men : but to drink indeed of the true foun- 
 tains of learning, nay, to have such a foun- 
 tain of learning in himself, in a king, and 
 in a king born, is almost a miracle. And 
 the more because there is met in your ma- 
 jesty a rare conjunction, as well of divine 
 and sacred literature, as of profane and 
 human ; so as your majesty standeth invest- 
 ed of that triplicity, which in great venera- 
 tion was ascribed to the ancient Hermes ; 
 the power and fortune of a king, the know- 
 
ledge and illumination of a priest, and the 
 learning and universality of a philosopher. 
 This propriety, inherent and individual at- 
 tribute in your majesty, deserveth to be ex- 
 pressed not only in the fame and admiration 
 of the present time, rior in the history or 
 tradition of the ages succeeding;' but^also in 
 some solid work, fixed memorial, and im- 
 mortal monument, bearing a character or 
 signature both of the power of a king, and 
 the difference and perfection of such a 
 king. 
 object of this Therefore I did conclude with myself, that 
 
 work. . 
 
 1 could not make unto your majesty a better 
 oblation, than of some treatise tending to 
 that end, whereof the sum will consist of 
 these two parts ; the former, concerning the 
 excellency of learning and knowledge, and 
 the excellency of the merit and true glory in 
 the augmentation and propagation thereof: 
 the latter, what the particular acts and works 
 are, which have been embraced and under- 
 taken for the advancement of learning; and 
 again, what defects and undervalues I find in 
 such particular acts : to the end, that though 
 I cannot positively or affirmatively advise 
 your majesty, or propound unto you framed 
 
particulars ; yet I may excite your princely 
 cogitations to visit the excellent treasure of 
 your own mind, and thence to extract parti- 
 culars for this purpose, agreeable to your 
 magnanimity and wisdom. 
 
 LEARNING, HOW DISCREDITED. 
 
 In the entrance to the former of these, to 
 clear the way, and, as it were, to make si- 
 lence, to have the true testimonies concern- 
 ing the dignity of learning to be better heard, 
 without the interruption of tacit objections \ 
 I think good to deliver it from the discredits 
 and disgraces which it hath received, all from 
 ignorance, but ignorance severally disguised ; 
 appearing sometimes in the zeal and jea- 
 lousy of divines, sometimes in the severity 
 and arrogancy of politicians, and sometimes 
 in the errors and imperfections of learned 
 men themselves. 
 
 I hear the former sort say, that knowledge objections of 
 is of those things which are to be accepted 
 of with great limitation and caution ; that 
 the aspiring to overmuch knowledge, was 
 
,10 
 
 the original temptation and sin, whereupon 
 ensued the fall of man ; that knowledge hath 
 in it somewhat of the serpent, and therefore 
 where it entereth into a man it makes him 
 swell; Scientia inflat : that Solomon gives a 
 censure, That there is no end of making books* 
 and that much reading is a iveariness of the 
 flesh) and again in another place, That in 
 spacious knowledge there is much contristation, 
 and that he that increaseth knoivledge increaseth 
 anxiety ; that St. Paul gives a caveat, That 
 we be not spoiled through vain philosophy ; that 
 experience demonstrates how learned men 
 have been arch-heretics, how learned times 
 have been inclined to atheism, and how the 
 contemplation of second causes, doth dero- 
 gate from our dependance upon God who is 
 the first cause, 
 No danger To discover then the ignorance and error 
 quantity of of this opinion, and the misunderstanding in 
 the grounds thereof, it may well appear these 
 men do not observe or consider, that it was not 
 the pure knowledge of nature and universali- 
 ty, a knowledge by the light whereof man 
 did give names unto other creatures in para-- 
 dise, as they were brought before him, ac- 
 
11 
 
 cording unto their proprieties, which gave 
 occasion to the fall; but it was the proud 
 knowledge of good and evil, with an intent 
 in man to give law unto himself, and to de- 
 pend no more upon God's commandments, 
 which was the form of the temptation* Nei- 
 ther is it any quantity of knowledge, how 
 great soever, that can make the mind of man 
 to swell ; for nothing can .fill, much less ex* 
 tend the soul of man, but God, and the con- 
 templation of God ; and therefore Solomon, 
 speaking of the two principal senses of inqui- 
 sition, the eye and the ear, affirmeth that the 
 eye is never satisfied with seeing, nor the ear 
 with hearing ; and if there be no fulness, then 
 is the continent greater than the content: so 
 of knowledge itself, and the mind of man, 
 whereto the senses are but reporters, he de- 
 fineth likewise in these words, placed after 
 that calendar or ephemerides, which he 
 maketh of the diversities of times and sea- 
 sons for all actions and purposes ; and con- 
 cludeth thus : God hath made all things beau+ 
 tiful, or decent, in the true return of their sea- 
 sons: Also he hath placed the world in man's 
 heart, yet cannot man find out the work which 
 
12 
 
 God ivorketk from the beginning to the end: 
 declaring, not obscurely, that God hath fram- 
 ed the mind of man as a mirror, or glass, ca- 
 pable of the image of the universal world, and 
 joyful to receive the impression thereof, as 
 the eye joyeth to receive light; and not only 
 delighted in beholding the variety of things, 
 and vicissitude of times, but raised also to 
 find out and discern the ordinances and de- 
 crees, which throughout all those changes are 
 infallibly observed. And although he doth 
 insinuate, that the supreme or summary law 
 of nature, which he calleth, The ivork which 
 God worketh from the beginning to the end, is 
 not possible to be found out by man ; yet that 
 doth not derogate from the capacity of the 
 mind, but may be referred to the impedi- 
 ments, as of shortness of life, ill conjunction 
 of labours, ill tradition of knowledge over 
 from hand to hand, and many other incon- 
 veniencies, whereunto the condition of man 
 is subject. For that nothing parcel of the 
 world is denied to man's inquiry and inven- 
 tion, he doth in another place rule over, 
 when he saith, The spirit of man is as the 
 lamp of God, wherewith he searcheth the in- 
 
13 
 
 wariness of all secrets. If then such be the 
 capacity and receipt of the mind of man, it is 
 manifest, that there is no danger at all in the 
 proportion or quantity of knowledge, how 
 large soever, lest it should make it swell or 
 out compass itself; no, but it is merely the 
 quality of knowledge, which be it in quan- 
 tity more or less, if it be taken without the 
 corrective thereof, hath in it some nature of 
 venom or malignity, and some effects of that 
 venom, which is ventosity or swelling. This 
 corrective spice, the mixture whereof maketh 
 knowledge so sovereign, is charity, which the 
 apostle immediately addeth to the former 
 clause ; for so he saith, knowledge bloiveth up, 
 but charity buildeth up; not unlike unto that 
 which he delivereth in another place : If I 
 spake, saith he, with the tongues of men and an- 
 gels, and had not charity, it voere but as a tink- 
 ling cymbal; not but that it is an excellent 
 thing to speak with the tongues of men and 
 angels, but because, if it be severed from 
 charity, and not referred to the good of men 
 and mankind, it hath rather a sounding and 
 unworthy glory, than a meriting and sub- 
 stantial virtue. And as for that censure of 
 
14 
 
 Solomon, concerning the excess of writing 
 and reading books, and the anxiety of spirit 
 which redoundeth from knowledge ; and that 
 admonition of St. Paul, That we be not seduced 
 hy vain philosophy ; let those places be rightly 
 understood, and they do indeed excellently 
 set forth the true bounds and limitations, 
 whereby human knowledge is confined and 
 circumscribed; and yet without any such 
 contracting or coarctation, but that it may 
 comprehend all the universal nature of things ; 
 The proper f or these limitations are three ; the first, that 
 
 bounds of 
 
 knowledge. W e do not so place our felicity in knowledge, 
 as to forget our mortality. The second, that 
 we make application of our knowledge, to 
 giye ourselves repose and contentment, and 
 not distaste or repining. The third, that we 
 do not presume by the contemplation of na- 
 ture to attain to the mysteries of God. For 
 as touching the first of these, Solomon doth 
 excellently expound himself in another place 
 of the same book, where he saith ; / satv well 
 that knowledge recedeth as far from Ignorance, 
 as light doth from darkness ; and that the wise 
 man's eyes keep watch in his head, whereas the 
 fool roundeth about in darkness : but withal I 
 
15 
 
 learned, that the same mortality involveth them 
 both. And for the second, certain it is, there, 
 is no vexation or anxiety of mind, which re- 
 sulteth from knowledge, otherwise than mere- 
 ly by accident; for all knowledge, and won- 
 der (which is the seed of knowledge) is an im- J 
 pression of pleasure in itself: but ...when men 
 fall to framing conclusions out of their know- 
 ledge, applying it to their particular, and mi- 
 nistring to themselves thereby weak fears, 
 or vast desires, there groweth that carefulness 
 and trouble of mind which is spoken of: for 
 then knowledge is no more Lumen siccum, 
 whereof Heraclitus, the profound, said, Lu-. 
 men siccum optima anima; but it becometh 
 Lumen madidum, or maceratum, being steeped 
 and infused in the humours of the affections; 
 And as for the third point, it deserveth to be The contem- 
 
 ,.-,-, t iTii plation of se- 
 
 a little stood upon, and not to be lightly pass- cond causes 
 
 does not lea<l 
 
 ed over : for if any man shall think by view to atheism. 
 and inquiry into these sensible and material 
 things to attain that light, whereby he may 
 reveal unto himself the nature or will of God, 
 then indeed is he spoiled by vain philoso- 
 phy: for the contemplation of God's crea- 
 tures and works produceth (having regard to 
 
16 
 
 the works and creatures themselves) know- 
 ledge ; but having regard to God, no perfect 
 knowledge, but wonder, which is broken 
 knowledge. And therefore it was most aptly 
 said by one of Plato's school, — " That the 
 " sense of man carrieth a resemblance with 
 " the sun, which, as we see, openeth and 
 " revealeth all the terrestrial globe; but 
 <* then again it obscureth and concealeth the 
 " stars and celestial globe: so doth the sense 
 " discover natural things, but it darkeneth 
 <f and shutteth up divine." And hence it is 
 true, that it hath proceeded, that divers great 
 learned men have been heretical, whilst they 
 have sought to fly up to the secrets of the 
 Deity by the waxen wings of the senses : and 
 as for the conceit that too much knowledge 
 should incline a man to atheism, and that 
 the ignorance of second causes, should make 
 a more devout dependence upon God who is 
 the first cause ; Firsts it is good to ask the 
 question which Job asked of his friends: 
 Will you lie for God, as one man will do for 
 another, to gratify him ? For certain it is, that 
 God worketh nothing in nature but by se- 
 cond causes ; and if they would have it other- 
 
17 
 
 wise believed, it is mere imposture, as it were 
 in favour towards God ; and nothing else but 
 to offer to the author of truth the unclean 
 sacrifice of a lie. But farther, it is an as- 
 sured truth, and a conclusion of experience, 
 that a little or superficial knowledge of phi- 
 losophy may incline the mind of man to 
 atheism, but a farther proceeding therein 
 doth bring the mind back again to religion ; 
 for in the entrance of philosophy, when the 
 second causes, which are next unto the 
 senses, do offer themselves to the mind of 
 man, if it dwell and stay there, it may in- 
 duce some oblivion of the highest cause ; but 
 when a man passeth on farther, and seeth the 
 dependence of causes, and the works of pro- 
 vidence; then, according to the allegory of 
 the poets, he will easily believe that the 
 highest link of nature's chain must needs be 
 tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair. To con- 
 clude therefore: let no man, upon a weak 
 conceit of sobriety, or an ill-applied modera- 
 tion, think or maintain, that a man can 
 search too far, or be too well studied in the 
 book of God's word, or in the book of God's 
 works; divinity or philosophy; but rather 
 
18 
 
 let men endeavour an endless progress, or 
 proficience in both; only let men beware 
 that they apply both to charity, and not to 
 swelling; to use, and not to ostentation ; and 
 again, that they do not unwisely mingle or 
 confound these learnings together. 
 ob ecdons of ^ n< ^ as ^ or tne disgraces which learning 
 Teamhf 11 10 rece ^ vetn from politicians, they be of this na- 
 ture ; that learning doth soften mens minds, 
 and makes them more unapt for the honour 
 and exercise of arms ; that it doth mar and 
 pervert mens dispositions for matter of go- 
 vernment and policy, in making them too 
 curious and irresolute by variety of reading, 
 or too peremptory or positive by strictness 
 of rules and axioms, or too immoderate and 
 overweening by reason of the greatness of 
 examples, or too incompatible and differing 
 from the times, by reason of the dissimili- 
 tude of examples ; or at least, that it doth 
 divert mens travels from action and business, 
 and bringeth them to a love of leisure and 
 privateness; and that it doth bring into states 
 a relaxation of discipline, whilst every man 
 is more ready to argue, than to obey and ex- 
 ecute. Out of this conceit, Cato, surnamed 
 
19 
 
 the Censor, one of the wisest men indeed Jjjj^yj 
 that ever lived, when Carneades the philoso- and Socrates - 
 pher came in embassage to Rome, and that 
 the young men of Rome began to flock about 
 him, being allured with the sweetness and 
 majesty of his eloquence and learning, gave 
 counsel in open senate, that they should give 
 him his dispatch with all speed, lest he should 
 infect and inchant the minds and affections 
 of the youth, and at unawares bring in an 
 alteration of the manners and customs of the 
 state. Out of the same conceit, or humour, 
 did Virgil, turning his pen to the advantage 
 of his country, and the disadvantage of his 
 own profession, make a kind of separation 
 between policy and government, and be- 
 tween arts and sciences, in the verses so 
 much renowned, attributing and challenging 
 the one to the Romans, and leaving and yield- 
 ing the other to the Grecians ; Tu revere im- 
 perio populos, Romane, memento, Hce tibi erunt 
 artes, etc. So likewise we see that Anytus, 
 the accuser of Socrates, laid it as an article 
 of charge and accusation against him, that 
 he did, with the variety and power of his dis- 
 courses and disputations, withdraw young 
 c2 
 
20 
 
 men from due reverence to the laws and cus- 
 toms of their country ; and that he did pro- 
 fess a dangerous and pernicious science, 
 which was, to make the worse matter seem 
 the better, and to suppress truth by force of 
 eloquence and speech. 
 Arms and But these, and the like imputations, have 
 
 letters flourish 
 
 together. rather a countenance of gravity, than any 
 ground of justice : for experience doth war- 
 rant, that both in persons and in times, there 
 hath been a meeting and concurrence in 
 learning and arms, flourishing and excelling 
 in the same men, and the same ages. For, 
 as for men, there cannot be a better, nor the 
 like instance, as of that pair, Alexander the 
 Great and Julius Caesar the dictator ; whereof 
 the one was Aristotle's scholar in philosophy, 
 and the other was Cicero's rival in eloquence : 
 or if any man had rather call for scholars that 
 were great generals, than generals that were 
 great scholars, let him take Epaminondas the 
 Theban, or Xenophon the Athenian ; whereof 
 the one was the first that abated the power of 
 Sparta, and the other was the first that made 
 way to the overthrow of the monarchy of Per- 
 sia. And this concurrence is yet more visible 
 
21 
 
 in times than in persons, by how much an age 
 is a greater object than a man. For both in 
 iEgypt, Assyria, Persia, Grsecia, and Rome, 
 the same times that are most renowned for 
 arms, are likewise most admired for learn- 
 ing ; so that the greatest authors arid philo- 
 sophers, and the greatest captains and gover- 
 nors, have lived in the same ages. Neither 
 can it otherwise be: for as, in man, the ripe- 
 ness of strength of the body and mind cometh 
 much about an age, save that the strength of 
 the body cometh somewhat the more early ; 
 so in states, arms and learning, whereof the 
 one corresponded to the body, the other to 
 the soul of man, have a concurrence or near 
 sequence in times. 
 
 And for -matter of policy and government, ^ eaT ^s 
 
 r J ° * equally use- 
 
 that learning should rather hurt, than enable ful in Go r 
 
 ° vernment as 
 
 thereunto, is a thing very improbable : we ^ a11 other 
 see it is accounted an error to commit a na- 
 tural body to empiric physicians, which com- 
 monly have a few pleasing receipts, where- 
 upon they are confident and adventurous, but 
 know neither the causes of diseases, nor the 
 complexions of patients, nor peril of acci- 
 dents, nor the true method of cures : we see 
 
m 
 
 it is a like error to rely upon advocates or 
 lawyers which are only men of practice, and 
 not grounded in their books, who are many 
 times easily surprised, when matter falleth 
 out besides their experience, to the prejudice 
 of the causes they handle: so, by like rea- 
 son, it cannot be but a matter of doubtful 
 consequence, if states be managed by em- 
 piric statesmen, not well mingled with men 
 grounded in learning. But contrariwise, it 
 is almost without instance contradictory, that 
 ever any government was disastrous that was 
 in the hands of learned governors. For how- 
 soever it hath been ordinary with politic men 
 to extenuate and disable learned men by the 
 names of pedants ; yet in the records of time 
 it appeareth, in many particulars, that the 
 governments of princes in minority (not- 
 withstanding the infinite disadvantage of that 
 kind of state) have nevertheless excelled the 
 government of princes of mature age, even 
 for that reason which they seek to traduce, 
 which is, that by that occasion the state hath 
 been in the hands of pedants : for so was the 
 state of Rome for the first five years, which 
 are so much magnified, during the minority 
 
## 
 
 of Nero, in the hands of Seneca, a pedant: 
 so it was again, for ten years space or 
 more, during the minority of Gordianus the 
 younger, with great applause and contenta- 
 tion in the hands of Misitheus, a pedant: so 
 was it before that, in the minority of Alex- 
 ander Severus, in like happiness, in hands 
 not much unlike, by reason of the rule of the 
 women, who were aided by the teachers and 
 preceptors. Nay, let a man look into the 
 government of the bishops of Rome, as by 
 name, into the government of Pius Quintus, 
 and Sextus Quintus, in our times, who were 
 both at their entrance esteemed but as pe- 
 dantical friers, and he shall find that such 
 popes do greater things, and proceed upon 
 truer principles of state, than those which 
 have ascended to the papacy from an educa- 
 tion and breeding in affairs of state and 
 courts of princes ; for although men bred in 
 learning are perhaps to seek in point of con- 
 venience, and accommodating for the pre- 
 sent, which the Italians call ragioni di stato, 
 whereof the same Pius Quintus could not 
 hear spoken with patience, terming them in- 
 ventions against religion and the moral vir- 
 
24 
 
 tues; yet on the other side, to recompense 
 that, they are perfect in those same plain 
 grounds of religion, justice, honour, and mo- 
 ral virtue, which if they be well and watch- 
 fully pursued, there will be seldom use of 
 those other, no more than of physic in a 
 sound or well- dieted body. Neither can the 
 experience of one man's life furnish exam- 
 ples and precedents for the events of one 
 man's life : for as it happeneth sometimes 
 that the grandchild, or other descendent, re- 
 sembleth the ancestor more than the son ; so 
 many times occurrences of present times may 
 sort better with ancient examples, than with 
 those of the latter or immediate times : and 
 lastly, the wit of one man can no more coun- 
 tervail learning, than one man's means can 
 hold way with a common purse. 
 Learning af And as for those particular seducements, 
 
 fords greater . t ... r».i • -1 •» t t 
 
 strength of or indispositions ol the mind tor policy and 
 cause of in- government, which learning is pretended to 
 insinuate; if it be granted that any such 
 thing be, it must be remembered withal, that 
 learning ministreth in every of them greater 
 strength of medicine or remedy, than it of- 
 fereth cause of indisposition or infirmity ; for 
 
25 
 
 if, by a secret operation, it makes men per- 
 plexed and irresolute, on the other side, by 
 plain precept, it teacheth them when and 
 upon what ground to resolve ; yea, and how 
 to carry things in suspense without prejudice, 
 till they resolve ; if it makes men positive 
 and regular, it teacheth them what things 
 are in their nature demonstrative, and what 
 are conjectural ; and as well the use of dis- 
 tinctions and exceptions, as the latitude of 
 principles and rules. If it misleads by dis- 
 proportion, or dissimilitude of examples, it 
 teacheth men the force of circumstances, 
 the errors of comparisons, and all the cau- 
 tions of application ; so that in all these it 
 doth rectify more effectually than it can per- 
 vert. And these medicines it conveyeth into 
 mens minds much more forcibly by the quick- 
 ness and penetration of examples. For let a 
 man look into the errors of Clement the 
 seventh, so lively described by Guicciardine, 
 who served under him, or into the errors of 
 Cicero, painted out by his own pencil in his 
 epistles to Atticus, and he will fly apace from 
 being irresolute. Let him look into the er- 
 rors of Phocion, and he will beware how he - 
 
26 
 
 Learning 
 does not in- 
 duce sloth- 
 fulness. 
 
 be obstinate or inflexible. Let him but read 
 the fable of Ixion, and it will hold him from 
 being vaporous or imaginative. Let him 
 look into the errors of Cato the second, and 
 he will never be one of the Antipodes, to 
 tread opposite to the present world. 
 
 And for the conceit, that learning should 
 dispose men to leisure and privateness, and 
 make men slothful; it were a strange thing 
 if that, which accustometh the mind to a 
 perpetual motion and agitation, should in- 
 duce slothfulness ; whereas contrariwise it 
 may be truly affirmed, that no kind of men 
 love business for itself, but those that are 
 learned ; for other persons love it for profit, as 
 an hireling, that loves the work for the wages ; 
 or for honour, as because it beareth them up 
 in the eyes of men, and refresheth their re- 
 putation, which otherwise would wear ; or 
 because it putteth them in mind of their 
 fortune, and giveth them occasion to plea- 
 sure and displeasure ; or because it exer- 
 ciseth some faculty wherein they take pride, 
 and so entertaineth them in good humour and 
 pleasing conceits towards themselves ; or be- 
 cause it advanceth any other their ends. So 
 
27 
 that, as it is said of untrue valours, that some 
 mens valours are in the eyes of them that 
 look on; so such mens industries are in the 
 eyes of others, or at least in regard of their 
 own designments : only learned men love bu- 
 siness, as an action according to nature, as 
 agreeable to health of mind, as exercise is to 
 health of body, taking pleasure in the action 
 itself, and not in the purchase : so that of all 
 men they are the most indefatigable, if it 
 be towards any business which can hold or 
 detain their mind. 
 
 And if any man be laborious in reading 
 and study, and yet idle in business and ac- 
 tion, it groweth from some weakness of body, 
 or softness of spirit ; such as Seneca speaketh 
 of : Quidam tarn sunt umbratiles, ut putent in 
 turbido esse quicquid in luce est; and not of 
 learning : well may it be, that such a point 
 of a man's nature may make him give him- 
 self to learning, but it is not learning that 
 breedeth any such point in his nature. 
 
 And that learning should take up too much ah men have 
 
 , . T .. . leisure for 
 
 time or leisure : I answer ; the most active some learn, 
 or busy man that hath been or can be, hath, 
 no question, many vacant times of leisure, 
 
28 
 
 while he expecteth the tides and returns' of 
 business (except he be either tedious and of 
 no dispatch, or lightly and unworthily ambi- 
 tious to meddle in things that may be better 
 done by others :) and then the question is 
 but, how those spaces and times of leisure 
 shall be filled and spent ; whether in pleasures 
 or in studies; as was well answered by De- 
 mosthenes to his adversary iEschines, that 
 was a man given to pleasure, and told him, 
 that his orations did smell of the lamp : " In- 
 " deed," said Demosthenes, " there is a great 
 " difference between the things that you and 
 " I do by lamp-light." So as no man need 
 doubt that learning will expulse business ; but 
 rather it will keep and defend the possession 
 of the mind against idleness and pleasure, 
 which otherwise at unawares may enter, to 
 the prejudice of both. 
 Learning Again, for that other conceit, that leam- 
 
 does not ° 
 
 favor sedi; j n g should undermine the reverence of laws 
 
 tion. ° 
 
 and government, it is assuredly a mere de- 
 pravation and calumny, without any shadow 
 of truth. For to say, that a blind custom of 
 obedience should be a surer obligation than 
 duty taught and understood ; it is to affirm, 
 
<29 
 that a blind man may tread surer by a guide 
 than a seeing man can by a light. And it is 
 without all controversy, that learning doth 
 make the minds of men gentle, generous, 
 amiable and pliant to government ; whereas mjuuailc 
 ignorance makes them churlish, thwarting, 
 and mutinous : and the evidence of time doth 
 clear this assertion, considering that the most 
 barbarous, rude, and unlearned times have 
 been most subject to tumults, seditions, and 
 changes. 
 
 And as to the judgment of Cato the Cen- Conjunction 
 
 •I ° or power 
 
 sor, he was well punished for his blasphemy ? vi ^ h learn ~ 
 against learning, in the same kind wherein 
 he offended ; for when he was past three- 
 score years old, he was taken with an ex- 
 treme desire to go to school again, and to 
 learn the Greek tongue, to the end to peruse 
 the Greek authors ; which doth well demon- 
 strate, that his former censure of the Grecian ' 
 learning was rather an affected gravity, than 
 according to the inward sense of his own 
 opinion. And as for Virgil's verses, though 
 it pleased him to brave the world in taking 
 to the Romans the art of empire, and leaving 
 to others the arts of subjects; yet so much 
 
30 
 
 is manifest, that the Romans never ascended 
 to that height of empire, till the time they 
 had ascended to the height of other arts. 
 For in the time of the two first Caesars, which 
 had the art of government in greatest per- 
 fection, there lived the best poet, Virgilius 
 Maro ; the best historiographer, Titus Livius ; 
 the best antiquary, Marcus Varro ; and the 
 best, or second orator, Marcus Cicero, that 
 to the memory of man are known. As for 
 the accusation of Socrates, the time must be 
 remembered when it was prosecuted; which 
 was under the thirty tyrants, the most base, 
 bloody, and envious persons that have govern- 
 ed; which revolution of state was no sooner 
 over, but Socrates, whom they had made a 
 person criminal, was made a person heroical, 
 and his memory accumulate with honours 
 divine and human ; and those discourses of 
 his, which were then termed corrupting of 
 manners, were after acknowledged for sove- 
 reign medicines of the mind and manners, 
 and so have been received ever since till this 
 day. Let this therefore serve for answer to 
 politicians, which, in their humorous seve- 
 rity, or in their feigned gravity, have pre- 
 
31 
 
 sumed to throw imputations upon learning ; 
 which redargution, nevertheless, (save that 
 we know not whether our labours may ex- 
 tend to other ages) were not needful for the 
 present, in regard of the love and reverence 
 towards learning, which the example and 
 countenance of two so learned princes, queen 
 Elizabeth, and your majesty, being as Cas- 
 tor and Pollux, lucida sidera, stars of excel- 
 lent light and most benign influence, hath 
 wrought in all men of place and authority in 
 our nation. 
 
 Now therefore we come to that third sort 0b j ect ^ ns 
 of discredit, or diminution of credit, that f° mYearne& 
 groweth unto learning from learned men men ' 
 themselves, which commonly cleaveth fastest : 
 it is either from their fortune, or from their 
 manners, or from the nature of their studies. 
 For the first, it is not in their power ; and 
 the second is accidental; the third only is 
 proper to be handled : but because we are 
 not in hand with true measure, but with 
 popular estimation and conceit, it is not- 
 amiss to speak somewhat of the two former. 
 The derogations therefore, which grow to 
 learning from the fortune or condition of 
 
m 
 
 learned men, are either in respect of scarcity 
 of means, or in respect of privateness of life, 
 and meanness of employments. 
 Poverty of Concerning want, and that it is the case of 
 
 learned men. . 
 
 learned men usually to begin with little, and 
 not to grow rich so fast as other men, by rea- 
 son they convert not their labours chiefly to 
 lucre and increase : It were good to leave 
 the common place in commendation of po- 
 verty to some frier to handle, to whom much 
 was attributed by Machiavel in this point; 
 when he said, " That the kingdom of the 
 " clergy had been long before at an end, 
 tc if the reputation and reverence towards 
 " the poverty of friers had not borne out 
 "'the scandal of the superfluities and ex- 
 " cesses of bishops and prelates." So a man 
 might say, that the felicity and delicacy of 
 princes and great persons had long since 
 turned to rudeness and barbarism, if the 
 poverty of learning had not kept up civi- 
 lity and honour of life : but, without any 
 such advantages, it is worthy the observa- 
 tion, what a reverend and honoured thing 
 poverty of fortune was, for some ages, in 
 the Roman state, which nevertheless was a 
 
53 
 
 state without paradoxes : for we see what 
 Titus Livius saith in his introduction : Ccete- 
 rum aut me amor negotii suscepti failit, aut 
 nulla unquam respublica nee major, nee sane- 
 tior, nee bonis exemplis ditior fuit; nee in 
 -quam lam serce avaritia luxuriaqus immigra- 
 verint ; nee ubi tantus ac tarn diu paupertati 
 ac parsimonies honos fuerit. We see like- 
 wise, after that the state of Rome was not 
 itself, but did degenerate, how that person, 
 that took upon him to be counsellor to Julius 
 Csesar after his victory, where to begin his 
 restoration of the state, maketh it of all 
 points the most summary to take away the 
 estimation of wealth: Verum hcee, et omnia mala 
 pariter cum honore pecunice desinent, si neque ma~ 
 gistratus, neque alia vulgocupienda, venalia erunt. 
 To conclude this point, as it was truly said, 
 that rubor est virtutis color, though sometimes 
 it comes from vice ; so it may be fitly said 
 that paupertas est virtutis fortuna; though 
 sometimes it may proceed from misgovern - 
 ment and accident. Surely Solomon hath 
 pronounced it both in censure, Qui festinat 
 ad divitias non erit insons ; and in precept; 
 Buy the truth; and sell it not ; and so of wis- 
 
 D 
 
34 
 
 dom and knowledge ; judging that means 
 were to be spent upon learning, and not 
 learning to be applied to means. And as for 
 the privateness, or obscureness (as it may 
 be in vulgar estimation accounted) of life 
 of contemplative men; it is a theme so com- 
 mon, to extol a private life not taxed with 
 sensuality and sloth, in comparison and to 
 the disadvantage of a civil life, for safety, 
 liberty, pleasure, and dignity, or at least 
 freedom from indignity, as no man handleth 
 it, but handleth it well : such a consonancy 
 it hath to mens conceits in the expressing, 
 and to mens consents in the allowing. This 
 only I will add, that learned men forgotten 
 in states, and not living in the eyes of men, 
 are like the images of Cassius and Brutus 
 in the funeral of Junia; of which not be- 
 ing represented, as many others were, Ta- 
 citus saith, Eo ipso pratfulgehant, quod non 
 visebantur. 
 Meanness of And for meanness of employment, that 
 
 their iroploy-. 
 
 meat. which is most traduced to contempt is that 
 
 the government of youth is commonly al- 
 lotted to them; which age, because it is 
 the age of least authority, it is transferred 
 
35. 
 
 to the disesteeming of those employments 
 wherein youth is conversant, and which are 
 conversant about youth. But how unjust 
 this traducement is (if you will reduce things 
 from popularity of opinion to measure of 
 reason) may appear in that, we see men are 
 more curious what they put into a new ves- 
 sel, than into a vessel seasoned; and what 
 mould they lay about a young plant, than 
 about a plant corroborate ; so as the weakest 
 terms and times of all things use to have the 
 best applications and helps. And will you 
 hearken to the Hebrew Rabbins? Your young 
 men shall see visions, and your old men shall 
 dream dreams: say they, youth is the wor- 
 thier age, for that visions are nearer appari- 
 tions of God than dreams. And let it be 
 noted, that howsoever the condition of life of 
 pedants hath been scorned upon theatres, as 
 the ape of tyranny; and that the modern 
 looseness or negligence hath taken no due 
 regard to the choice of school-masters and 
 tutors ; yet the ancient wisdom of the best 
 times did always make a just complaint, that 
 states were too busy with their laws, and too 
 negligent in point of education : which ex- 
 d2 
 
36 
 
 cellent part of ancient discipline hath been 
 in some sort revived of late times by the col- 
 leges of the Jesuits; of whom, although in 
 regard of their superstition I may say, quo 
 meliores, eo deter tores; yet in regard of this, 
 and some other points concerning human 
 learning and moral matters, I may say, as 
 Agesilaus said to his enemy Pharnabasus, 
 Talis quum sis, utinam noster esses. And thus 
 much touching the discredits drawn from the 
 fortunes of learned men. 
 Manners of ^ s touching the manners of learned men, 
 
 learned men. & 
 
 it is a thing personal and individual : and no 
 doubt there be amongst them, as in other 
 professions, of all temperatures : but yet so 
 as it is not without truth, which is said, that 
 abeunt studia in mores, studies have an influ- 
 ence and operation upon the manners of 
 those that are conversant in them. 
 
 But upon an attentive and indifferent re- 
 view, I for my part cannot find any dis- 
 grace to learning can proceed from the man- 
 ners of learned men not inherent to them as 
 they are learned ; except it be a fault (which 
 was the supposed fault of Demosthenes, 
 Cicero, Cato the second, Seneca, and many 
 
37 
 
 more) that, because the times they read of 
 •are commonly better than the times they 
 live in, and the duties taught better than the 
 duties practised, they contend sometimes too 
 far to bring things to perfection, and to re- 
 duce the corruption of manners to honesty 
 of precepts, or examples of too great height. 
 And yet hereof they have caveats enough in 
 their own walks. For Solon, when he was 
 asked whether he had given his citizens the 
 best laws, answered wisely, "Yea, of such 
 as they would receive :" and Plato, finding 
 that his own heart could not agree with the 
 corrupt manners of his country, refused to 
 bear place or office ; saying, " That a man's 
 f country was to be used as his parents were, 
 " that is, with humble persuasions, and not 
 ff with contestations." And Caesar's counsel- 
 lor put in the same caveat, Non ad Vetera 
 instituta revocans quce jampridem corruptis mo- 
 ribus ludibrio sunt : and Cicero noteth this 
 error directly in Cato the second, when he 
 writes to his friend Atticus; Cato optime 
 sentit, sed nocet interdum reipublicce; loquitur 
 enim tanquam in republica Platonis, non tan- 
 quam in face Romuli. And the same Cicero 
 
aotii excuse and expuga- the philosophers for 
 going too far, and being too exact in their 
 prescripts, when he saith, Isti ipsi pmceptores 
 ■virtutis et magistri viderdur fines qfficiorum paulo 
 longius quam natura vellet protulisse, ut cum 
 ad ultimum animo contendissemus, ibi tamen, 
 ubi oportet, consisteremus : and yet himself 
 might hav r e said, Monitis sum minor ipse meis; 
 for it was his own fault, though not in so ex* 
 treme a degree. 
 disinterested Another fault likewise much of this kind 
 
 counsels of 
 
 learned men. hath been incident to learned men ; which 
 is, that they have esteemed the preservation, 
 good and honour of their countries or masters 
 before their own fortunes or safeties. For 
 so saith Demosthenes unto the Athenians: 
 " If it please you to note it, my counsels 
 " unto you are not such whereby I should 
 c< grow great amongst you, and you become 
 <* little amongst the Grecians : but they be 
 " of that nature, as they are sometimes not 
 €t good for me to give, but are always good 
 <e for you to follow." And so Seneca, after 
 he had consecrated that Quinquennium Nero- 
 nis to the eternal glory of learned governors, 
 held on his honest and loyal course of good 
 
39 
 
 and free counsel, after his master grew ex- 
 tremely corrupt in his government. Neither 
 can this point otherwise be ; for learning en- 
 dueth mens minds with a true sense of the 
 frailty of their persons, the casualty of their 
 fortunes, and the dignity of their soul and 
 vocation : so that it is impossible for them to 
 esteem that any greatness of their own for- 
 tune can be a true or worthy end of their be- 
 ing and ordainment ; and therefore are de- 
 sirous to give their account to God, and so 
 likewise to their masters under God (as kings 
 and the states that they serve) in these words; 
 Ecee tibi lucrefeci, and not Ecce mihi lucrefeci: 
 whereas the corrupter sort of mere politicians, 
 that have not their thoughts established by 
 learning in the love and apprehension of duty, 
 nor ever look abroad into universality, do refer 
 all things to themselves, and thrust themselves 
 into the centre of the world, as if all lines 
 should meet in them and their fortunes; 
 never caring, in all tempests, what becomes 
 of the ship of state, so they may save them- 
 selves in the cockboat of their own fortune : 
 whereas men that feel the weight of duty, 
 and know the limits of self-love, use to make 
 good their places and duties, though with 
 
40 
 
 peril; and if they stand in seditious and 
 Violent alterations, it is rather the reverence 
 which many times both adverse parties do 
 give to honesty, than any versatile advantage 
 of their own carriage. But for this point of 
 tender sense, and fast obligation of duty, 
 which learning doth endue the mind withal, 
 howsoever fortune may tax it, and many in 
 the depth of their corrupt principles may de- 
 spise it, yet it will receive an open allowance, 
 and therefore needs the less disproof or ex- 
 cusation. 
 
 Learned men Another fault incident commonly to learn- 
 not sycophan- J 
 
 tlc * ed men, which may be more probably de- 
 
 fended than truly denied, is that they fail 
 sometimes in applying themselves to particu- 
 lar persons : which want of exact application 
 ariseth from two causes ; the one, because 
 the largeness of their mind can hardly con- 
 fine itself to dwell in the exquisite observa- 
 tion or examination of the nature and cus- 
 toms of one person : for it is a speech for a 
 lover, and not for a wise man : Satis magnum 
 alter alteri iheatrum sumus. Nevertheless I 
 shall yield, that he that cannot contract the 
 sight of his mind, as well as disperse and 
 dilate it, wanteth a great faculty. But there 
 
41 
 
 is a second cause, which is no inability, but 
 a rejection upon choice and judgment; for 
 the honest and just bounds of observation, 
 by one person upon another, extend no far- 
 ther but to understand him sufficiently, 
 whereby not to give him offence, or whereby 
 to be able to give him faithful counsel, or 
 whereby to stand upon reasonable guard and 
 caution in respect of a man's self: but to 
 be speculative into another man, to the end 
 to know how to work him or wind him or 
 govern him, proceedeth from a heart that is 
 double and cloven, and not entire and inge- 
 nuous ; which as in friendship it is want of 
 integrity, so towards princes or superiors is 
 want of duty. For the custom of the Levant, 
 which is, that subjects do forbear to gaze or 
 fix their eyes upon princes, is in the outward 
 ceremony barbarous, but the moral is good : 
 for men ought not by cunning and bent ob- 
 servations to pierce and penetrate into the 
 hearts of kings, which the scripture hath de- 
 clared to be inscrutable. 
 
 There is vet another fault (with which I } e f rned m ™ 
 
 J v fail 111 small 
 
 will conclude this part) which is often noted j^ 8 of con ' 
 in learned men, that they do many times fail 
 
42 
 
 to observe decency and discretion in their 
 behaviour and carriage, and commit errors 
 in small and ordinary points of action, so as 
 the vulgar sort of capacities do make a judg- 
 ment of them in greater matters by that 
 which they find wanting in them in smaller. 
 But this consequence doth often deceive men, 
 for which I do refer them over to that which 
 was said by Themistocles, arrogantly and 
 uncivilly being applied to himself out of his 
 own mouth ; but, being applied to the gene- 
 ral state of this question, pertinently and 
 justly ; when, being invited to touch a lute, 
 he said, " he could not fiddle, but he could 
 " make a small town a great state." So, no 
 doubt, many may be well seen in the pas- 
 sages of government and policy, which are 
 to seek in little and punctual occasions. I 
 refer them also to that which Plato said of 
 his master Socrates, whom he compared to the 
 gallypots of apothecaries, which on the out- 
 side had apes and owls and antiques, but con- 
 tained within sovereign and precious liquors 
 and confections; acknowledging that to an 
 external report he was not without superficial 
 levities and deformities, but was inwardly re- 
 
43 
 
 plenished with excellent virtues and powers* 
 And so much touching the point of manners 
 of learned men. 
 
 But in the mean time I have no purpose Morigeratiaa 
 
 of the leam- 
 tO give allowance to some conditions and ed to the 
 
 great, how 
 
 courses base and unworthy, wherein divers fer allowable. 
 professors of learning have wronged them- 
 selves* and gone too far ; such as were those 
 trencher philosopers, which in the later age 
 of the Roman state were usually in the houses 
 of great persons, being little better than so- 
 lemn parasites ; of which kind, Lucian maketh 
 a merry description of the philosopher that the 
 great lady took to ride with her in her coach, 
 and would needs have him carry her little 
 dog, which he doing officiously and yet un- 
 comely, the page scoffed, and said, " That 
 " he doubted, the philosopher of a Stoic 
 " would turn to be Cynic." But above all 
 the rest> the gross and palpable flattery, 
 whereunto many not unlearned have abased 
 and abused their wits and pens, turning, as 
 Du Bartas saith> Hecuba into Helena, and 
 Faustina into Lucretia, hath most diminished 
 the price and estimation of learning. Nei- 
 ther is the modern dedication of books and 
 
44 
 
 writings, as to patrons, to be commended: 
 for that books, such as are worthy the name 
 of books, ought to have no patrons but truth 
 and reason. And the ancient custom was, 
 to dedicate them only to private and equal 
 friends, or to intitle the books with their 
 names ; or if to kings and great persons, it 
 was to some such as the argument of the 
 book was fit and proper for : but these and 
 the like courses may deserve rather repre- 
 hension than defence. 
 
 Not that I can tax or condemn the mori- 
 geration or application of learned men to 
 men in fortune. For the answer was good 
 that Diogenes made to one that asked him in 
 mockery, " How it came to pass that philo- 
 " sophers were the followers of rich men, 
 " and not rich men of philosophers?" He 
 answered soberly, and yet sharply, " Be- 
 " cause the one sort knew what they had 
 " need of, and the other did not/' And of 
 the like nature was the answer which Ari- 
 stippus made, when having a petition to 
 Dionysius, and no ear given to him, he fell 
 down at his feet 5 whereupon Dionysius staid, 
 and gave him the hearing, and granted it ; 
 
45 
 
 and afterward some person, tender on the 
 behalf of philosophy, reproved Aristippus, 
 that he would offer the profession of philo- 
 sophy such an indignity, as for a private suit 
 to fall at a tyrant's feet : but he answered, 
 " It was not his fault, but it was the fault of 
 Dionysius that he had his ears in his feet." 
 Neither was it accounted weakness, but dis- 
 cretion in him that would not dispute his 
 best with Adrianus Csesar; excusing him- 
 self, " That it was reason to yield to him 
 " that commanded thirty legions." These 
 and the like applications, and stooping to 
 points of necessity and convenience, cannot 
 be disallowed : for though they may have 
 some outward baseness, yet in a judgment 
 truly made, they are to be accounted submis* 
 sions to the occasion, and not to the person. 
 
 THREE DISTEMPERS OF LEARNING. 
 
 Now I proceed to those errors and vani- 
 ties which have intervened amongst the stu- 
 dies themselves of the learned, which is that 
 which is principal and proper to the present 
 argument ; wherein my purpose is not to 
 
4G 
 
 make a justification of the errors, but, by a 
 censure and separation of the errors, to make 
 a justification of that which is good and 
 sound, and to deliver that from the asper- 
 sion of the other. For we see, that it is the 
 manner of men to scandalize and deprave 
 that which retaineth the state and virtue, by 
 taking advantage upon that which is corrupt 
 and degenerate : as the heathens in the pri- 
 mitive church used to blemish and taint the 
 Christians with the faults and corruptions of 
 hereticks. But nevertheless I have no mean- 
 ing at this time to make any exact animad- 
 version of the errors and impediments in 
 matters of learning, which are more secret 
 and remote from vulgar opinion, but only to 
 speak unto such as do fall under or near 
 unto a popular observation. 
 
 There be therefore chiefly three vanities in 
 studies, whereby learning hath been most 
 traduced. For those things we do esteem 
 vain, which are either false or frivolous, those 
 which either have no truth, or no use : and 
 those persons we esteem vain, which are either 
 credulous or curious ; and curiosity is either 
 iu matter or words : so that in reason, as well 
 
47 
 
 as in experience, there fall out to be these 
 three distempers, as T may term them, of 
 learning ; the first, fantastical learning ; the 
 second, contentious learning ; and the last, 
 delicate learning ; vain imaginations, vain 
 altercations, and vain affectation ; and with 
 the last I will begin, 
 
 Martin Luther, conducted no doubt by an of de ^' cate 
 higher providence, but in discourse of reason, ^^affecS 
 finding what a province he had undertaken Uons * 
 against the bishop of Rome and the degene- 
 rate traditions of the church, and finding his 
 own solitude, being no ways aided by the 
 opinions of his own time, was enforced to 
 awake all antiquity, and to call former times 
 to his succour, to make a party against the 
 present time. So that the ancient authors, 
 both in divinity and in humanity, which had 
 long time slept in libraries, began generally 
 to be read and revolved. This by conse- 
 quence did draw on a necessity of a more 
 exquisite travel in the languages original, 
 wherein those authors did write, for the bet- 
 ter understanding of those authors, and the 
 better advantage of pressing and applying 
 their words. And thereof grew again a delight 
 
48 
 
 in their manner of style and phrase, and an 
 admiration of that kind of writing ; which 
 was much furthered and precipitated by the 
 enmity and opposition that the propounders 
 of those primitive, but seeming new opi- 
 nions had against the schoolmen ; who were 
 generally of the contrary part, and whose 
 writings were altogether in a differing stile 
 and form, taking liberty to coin and frame" 
 new terms of art to express their own sense, ^ 
 and to avoid circuit of speech, without regard^ -o 
 to the pureness, pleasantness, and, as I may 
 call it, lawfulness of the phrase or word. 
 The study And again, because the great labour then was 
 
 of eloquence 
 
 promoted by w ith the people, (of whom the Pharisees were 
 
 four causes. A 
 
 wont to say, Execrabilis ista turba, quiz non 
 novit legem } ) for the winning and persuading 
 of them, there grew of necessity in chief 
 price and request eloquence and variety of 
 discourse, as the fittest and forciblest access 
 into the capacity of the vulgar sort : so that 
 these four causes concurring, the admiration 
 of ancient authors, the hate of the school- 
 men, the exact study of languages, and the 
 efficacy of preaching, did bring in an affect- 
 aftfectionxte ed study of eloquence and copia of speech, 
 
49 
 
 which then began to flourish. This grew 
 speedily to an excess ; for men began to hunt 
 more after words than matter ; and more 
 after the choiceness of the phrase, and the 
 round and clean composition of the sen- 
 tence, and the sweet falling of the clauses, 
 and the varying and illustration of their 
 works with tropes and figures, than after the 
 
 ^> weight of matter, worth of subject, sound- 
 ness of argument, life of invention, or depth 
 
 ^ of judgment. Then grew the flowing and 
 watry vein of Osorius, the Portugal bishop, 
 to be in price. Then did Sturm ius spend 
 such infinite and curious pains upon Cicero 
 the orator, and Hermogenes the rhetorician, 
 besides his own books of periods, and imi- 
 tation, and the like. Then did Car of Cam- 
 bridge, and Ascham, with their lectures and 
 writings, almost deify Cicero and Demosthe- 
 nes, and allure all young men, that were 
 studious, unto that delicate and polished kind 
 of learning. Then did Erasmus take occasion 
 to make the scoffing echo ; Decern annos con* 
 sumpsi in legendo Cicerone : and the echo an- 
 swered in Greek, "ovs, Asine. Then grew the 
 learning of the schoolmen to be utterly de- 
 
 E 
 
m 
 
 spised as barbarous. In sum, the whole in- 
 clination and bent of those times was rather 
 towards copid than weight. 
 
 Here therefore is the first distemper of 
 learning, when men study words, and not 
 matter : whereof though I have represented 
 an example of late times, yet it hath been, 
 and will be secundum majus et minus in all 
 time. And how is it possible but this should 
 have an operation to discredit learning, even 
 with vulgar capacities, when they see learn- 
 ed men's works like the first letter of a pa- 
 tent or limned book ; which though it hath 
 large flourishes, yet it is but a letter? It 
 seems to me that Pygmalion's frenzy is a 
 good emblem or portraiture of this vanity : 
 for words are but the images of matter; and 
 except they have life of reason and inven- 
 tion, to fall in love with them is all one as 
 to fall in love with a picture. 
 How far eio« But yet, notwithstanding, it is a thing not 
 fee useful. hastily to be condemned, to clothe and adorn 
 the obscurity, even of philosophy itself, with 
 sensible and plausible elocution ; for hereof 
 we have great examples in Xenophon, Cicero, 
 Seneca, Plutarch, and of Plato also in some 
 
51 
 
 degree; and hereof likewise there is great use : 
 for surely, to the severe inquisition of truth, 
 and the deep progress into philosophy, it is 
 some hindrance ; because it is too early satis- 
 factory to the mind of man, and quencheth 
 the desire of farther search, before we come 
 to a just period: but then if a man be to 
 have any use of such knowledge in civil oc- 
 casions, of conference, counsel, persuasion, 
 discourse, or the like ; then shall he find it 
 prepared to his hands in those authors which 
 write in that manner. But the excess of this 
 is so justly contemptible, that as Hercules, 
 when he saw the image of Adonis, Venus' s 
 minion, in a temple, said in disdain, Nil 
 sacri es ; so there is none of Hercules's fol- 
 lowers in learning, that is, the more severe 
 and laborious sort of inquirers into truth, but 
 will despise those delicacies and affectations, 
 as indeed capable of no divineness, And thus 
 much of the first disease or distemper of 
 learning. 
 
 The second, which followeth, is in nature $• 
 
 ^ Of content!- 
 
 worse than the former : for as substance of °us learning, 
 
 or vain alter 
 
 matter is better than beauty of words, so, cations. 
 contrariwise, vain matter is worse than vain 
 
52 
 
 words; wherein it seemeth the reprehen- 
 sion of St. Paul was not only proper for those 
 times, but prophetical for the times follow- 
 ing ; and not only respective to divinity, but 
 extensive to all knowledge : Demta profanas 
 vocum novitates, et oppositiones falsi nominis 
 scientice. For he assigneth two marks and 
 Marks of badges of suspected and falsified science : the 
 
 raise science. 
 
 one, the novelty and strangeness of terms ; 
 the other, the strictness of positions, which 
 of necessity doth induce oppositions, and so 
 questions and altercations. Surely, like as 
 many substances in nature, which are solid, 
 do putrify and corrupt into worms; so it is 
 the property of good and sound knowledge, 
 to putrify and dissolve into number of subtle, 
 idle, unwholesome, and, as I may term them, 
 vermiculate questions, which have indeed a 
 kind of quickness, and life of spirit, but no 
 soundness of matter, or goodness of quality. 
 This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly 
 reign amongst the schoolmen ; who having 
 sharp and strong wits, and abundance of lei- 
 sure, and small variety of reading, (but their 
 wits being shut up in the cells of a few au- 
 thors, chiefly Aristotle their dictator, as their 
 
53 
 
 persons were shut up in the cells of monas- 
 teries and colleges,) and knowing little history, 
 either of nature or time, did out of no great 
 quantity of matter, and infinite agitation of 
 wit, spin out unto us those laborious webs 
 of learning, which are extant in their books. 
 For the wit and mind of man, if it work 
 upon matter, which is the contemplation of 
 the creatures of God, worketh according to 
 the stuffy and is limited thereby : but if it 
 work upon itself, as the spider worketh his 
 web, then it is endless, and brings forth in- 
 deed cobwebs of learning, admirable for the 
 fineness of thread and work, but of no sub- 
 stance or profit. 
 
 The same unprofitable subtilty or curiosity Two kinds 
 
 r J J of unprofit- 
 
 is of two sorts; either in the subject itself able subtlety. 
 that they handle, when it is a fruitless specu- 
 lation or controversy, whereof there are no 
 small number both in divinity and philosophy ; 
 or in the manner or method of handling of a 
 knowledge, which amongst them was this ; 
 upon every particular position or assertion 
 to frame objections, and to those objec- 
 tions, solutions ; which solutions were for the 
 most part not confutations, but distinctions ; 
 
54 
 
 whereas indeed the strength of all sciences 
 is, as the strength of the old man's faggot* 
 in the band* For the harmony of a science* 
 supporting each part the other, is and ought 
 to be the true and brief confutation and sup- 
 pression of all the smaller sort of objections. 
 But> on the other side, if you take out every 
 axiom, as the sticks of the faggot, one by 
 one, you may quarrel with them, and bend 
 them, and break them at your pleasure : so 
 that as was said of Seneca, Verhorum minutiis 
 rerum frangit ponder a : so a man may truly 
 say of the schoolmen, Qucestionum minutiis 
 scientiarum frangunt soliditatem. For were it 
 not better for a man in a fair room to set 
 up one great lights or branching candlestick 
 of lights* than to go about with a small watch 
 candle into every corner ? And such is their 
 method, that rests not so much upon evi- 
 dence of truth proved by arguments* author 
 rities, similitudes> examples, as upon parti- 
 cular confutations and solutions of every scru- 
 ple, cavillation, and objection ; breeding for 
 the most part one question, as fast as it solveth 
 another ; even as in the former resemblance, 
 when you carry the light into one corner* 
 
you darken the f est : so that the fable and 
 fiction of Scylla seemeth to be a lively image 
 of this kind of philosophy or knowledge ; who 
 was transformed into a comely virgin for the 
 upper parts ; but then, Candida succinctam, 
 latrantibus inguina monstris: so the generali- 
 ties of the schoolmen are for a while good and 
 proportionable ; but then, when you descend 
 into their distinctions and decisions, instead 
 of a fruitful womb, for the use and benefit of 
 man's life, they end in monstrous altercations 
 and barking questions. So as it is not possible 
 but this quality of knowledge must fall under 
 popular contempt, the people being apt to 
 contemn truth upon occasion of controversies 
 and altercations, and to think they are all out 
 of their way which never meet : and when 
 they see such digladiation about subtilties, 
 and matters of no use or moment, they 
 easily fall upon that judgment of Dionysius 
 of Syracuse, Verba ista sunt senum otiosorum* 
 
 Notwithstanding, certain it is that if those 
 schoolmen, to their great thirst of truth 
 and unwearied travel of wit, had joined va- 
 riety and universality of reading and con- 
 templation, they had proved excellent lights, 
 
56 
 
 to the great advancement of all learning and 
 knowledge ; but as they are, they are great 
 undertakers indeed, and fierce with dark 
 keeping t but as in the inquiry of the divine 
 truth, their pride inclined to leave the oracle 
 of God's word, and to vanish in the mixture 
 of their own inventions ; so in the inquisi* 
 tion of nature, they ever left the oracle of 
 God's works, and adored the deceiving and 
 deformed images, which the unequal mirror 
 of their own minds, or a few received authors 
 or principles, did represent unto them. And 
 thus much for the second disease of learn- 
 ing, 
 s. For the third vice or disease of learning, 
 
 Of fantastical > m 
 
 learning or which concerneth deceit or untruth, it is of 
 
 vain imagina- 
 tions, all the rest the foulest; as that which doth 
 
 destroy the essential form of knowledge, 
 
 which is nothing but a representation of 
 
 truth ; for the truth of being and the truth 
 
 of knowing are one, differing no more than 
 
 the direct beam and the beam reflected. 
 
 This vice therefore brancheth itself into two 
 
 sorts ; delight in deceiving, and aptness to be 
 
 deceived; imposture and credulity; which, 
 
 although they appear to be of a diverse na- 
 
57 
 
 txire, the one seeming to proceed of cun* 
 ning, and the other of simplicity, yet cer- 
 tainly they do for the most part concur : for 
 as the verse noteth, 
 
 Percontatorem fugito, nam garrulus idem est : 
 an inquisitive man is a prattler : so upon the 
 like reason, a credulous man is a deceiver t 
 as we see it in fame, that he that will easily 
 believe rumours, will as easily augment ru- 
 mours, and add somewhat to them of his 
 own ; which Tacitus wisely noteth, when he 
 saith, Fingunt simul creduntque : so great an 
 affinity hath fiction and belief. 
 
 This facility of credit, and accepting or Two kinds of 
 
 , . . -, . , , , . f credulity. 
 
 admitting things weakly authorized or war* 
 ranted, is of two kinds, according to the sub- 
 ject: for it is either a belief of history, as the 
 lawyers speak 3 matter of fact ; or else of mat- 
 ter of art and opinion. As to the former, we 
 see the experience and inconvenience of this 
 error in ecclesiastical history ; which hath too 
 easily received and registered reports and 
 narrations of miracles wrought by martyrs, 
 hermits, or monks of the desart, and other 
 holy men, and their relicks, shrines, chapels, 
 and images: which though they had a pas- 
 
58 
 
 sage for time, by the ignorance of the peo* 
 pie, the superstitious simplicity of some, and 
 the politic toleration of others holding them 
 but as divine poesies ; yet after a period of 
 time, when the mist began to clear up, they 
 grew to be esteemed but as old wives' fables, 
 impostures of the clergy, illusions of spirits, 
 and badges of antichrist, to the great scan- 
 dal and detriment of religion* 
 
 So in natural history, we see there hath 
 not been that choice and judgment used as 
 ought to have been ; as may appear in the 
 writings of Plinius, Cardanus, Albertus, and 
 divers of the Arabians, being fraught with 
 much fabulous matter, a great part not only- 
 untried, but notoriously untrue* to the great 
 derogation of the credit of natural philosophy 
 with the grave and sober kind of wits: 
 Diligence and wherein the wisdom and integrity of Aris- 
 Aristotie. totle is worthy to be observed, that, having 
 made so diligent and exquisite a history of 
 living creatures, hath mingled it sparingly 
 with any vain or feigned matter: and yet, 
 on the other side, hath cast all prodigious 
 narrations, which he thought worthy the re- 
 cording, into one book : excellently discern- 
 
59 
 
 ing that matter of manifest truth, (such, 
 whereupon observation and rule was to be 
 built,) was not to be mingled or weakened 
 with matter of doubtful credit; and yet 
 again, that rarities and reports that seem in- 
 credible are not to be suppressed or denied 
 to the memory of men. 
 
 And as for the facility of credit which is Undue credit 
 
 given to arts. 
 
 yielded to arts and opinions, it is likewise of 
 two kinds ; either when too much belief is 
 attributed to the arts themselves, or to cer- 
 tain authors in any art. The sciences them- 
 selves* which have had better intelligence 
 and confederacy with the imagination of 
 man than with his reason, are three in 
 number; astrology, natural magic, and al- 
 chemy; of which sciences, nevertheless, the 
 ends or pretences are noble. For astrology 
 pretendeth to discover that correspondence 
 or concatenation, which is between the su- 
 perior globe and the inferior : natural ma- 
 gic pretendeth to call and reduce natural phi- 
 losophy from variety of speculations to the 
 magnitude of works: and alchemy pre- 
 tendeth to make separation of all the unlike 
 parts of bodies, which in mixtures of nature 
 
60 
 
 are incorporate. But the derivations and 
 prosecutions to these ends, both in the theo- 
 ries and in the practices, are full of error 
 and vanity ; which the great professors them-* 
 selves have sought to veil over and conceal 
 by enigmatical writings, and referring them* 
 selves to auricular traditions and such other 
 devices, to save the credit of impostors : and 
 yet surely to alchemy this right is due, that 
 it may be compared to the husbandman 
 whereof iEsop makes the fable ; that, when 
 he died, told his sons, that he had left unto 
 them gold buried under ground in his vine- 
 yard ; and they digged over all the ground, 
 and gold they found none ; but by reason of 
 their stirring and digging the mould about 
 the roots of their vines, they had a great vin- 
 tage the year following: so assuredly the 
 search and stir to make gold hath brought to 
 light a great number of good and fruitful in* 
 ventions and experiments* as well for the 
 disclosing of nature, as for the use of man's 
 life, 
 trndue credit Aftd as to the overmuch credit that hath 
 Suthor^. been given unto authors in sciences, in mak- 
 ing them dictators, that their words should 
 
61 
 
 stand ; and not consuls, to give advice ; the 
 damage is infinite that sciences have re- 
 ceived thereby, as the principal cause that 
 hath kept them low, at a stay, without growth 
 or advancement. For hence it hath come, 
 that in arts mechanical the first deviser 
 comes shortest, and time addeth and per- 
 fecteth: but in sciences the first author 
 goeth farthest, and time loseth and cor- 
 rupted]. So we see, artillery, sailing, print- 
 ing, and the like, were grossly managed at 
 the first, and by time accommodated and re- 
 fined : but contrariwise, the philosophies and 
 sciences of Aristotle, Plato, Democritus, 
 Hippocrates, Euclides, Archimedes, of most 
 vigour at the first, are by time degenerate 
 and imbased ; whereof the reason is no other, 
 butf that in the former many wits and indus- 
 tries have contributed in one; and in the 
 latter many wits and industries have been 
 spent about the wit of some one, whom 
 many times they have rather depraved than il- 
 lustrated. For as water will not ascend higher 
 than the level of the first spring-head from 
 whence it descendeth, so knowledge derived 
 from Aristotle, and exempted from liberty 
 
62 
 
 of examination, will not rise again higher 
 than the knowledge of Aristotle. And there- 
 fore although the position be good, Oportet 
 discentem credere; yet it must be coupled 
 with this, Oportet edoctum judicare; for dis- 
 ciples do owe unto masters only a temporary 
 belief, and a suspension of their own judg- 
 ment till they be fully instructed, and not 
 an absolute resignation, or perpetual cap- 
 tivity : and therefore, to conclude this point, 
 I will say no more, but so let great authors 
 have their due, as time, which is the author 
 of authors, be not deprived of his due, which 
 is, farther and farther to discover truth. 
 
 VARIOUS ERRORS IN THE PURSUIT OF 
 LEARNING. 
 
 Thus I have gone over these three diseases 
 of learning; besides the which, there are 
 some other rather peccant humours than 
 formed diseases ; which nevertheless are not 
 so secret and intrinsic, but that they fall un- 
 der a popular observation and traducement, 
 and therefore are not to be passed over. 
 
63 
 
 The first of these is the extreme affecting: „ *•. 
 
 Affectation of 
 
 of two extremities; the one antiquity, the antiquity; osl 
 other novelty : wherein it seemeth the chil- 
 dren of time do take after the nature and ma- 
 lice of the father. For as he devoureth his 
 children, so one of them seeketh to devour 
 and suppress the other ; while antiquity en- 
 vieth there should be new additions, and no- 
 velty cannot be content to add, but it must 
 deface : surely, the advice of the prophet is 
 the true direction in this matter, State super vias 
 antiquasy et videte quamam sit via recta et bona, 
 et ambulate in ea. Antiquity deserveth that re- 
 verence, that men should make a stand there- 
 upon, and discover what is the best way; 
 but when the discovery is well taken, then to 
 make progression. And to speak truly, An- 
 tiquitas mculi juventus mundi: These times 
 are the ancient times, when the world is an- 
 cient, and not those which we account an- 
 cient ordine retrograde, by a computation 
 backward from ourselves. 
 
 Another error, induced by the former, is 2. 
 
 Despair of 1 
 
 a distrust that any thing should be now to new truths. 
 be found out, which the world should have 
 missed and passed over so long time ; as if the 
 
6i 
 
 same objection were to be made to time, that 
 Lucian maketh to Jupiter and other the hea~ 
 then gods ; of which he wondereth that they 
 begot so many children in old time, and begot 
 none in his time ; and asketh whether they 
 were become septuagenary, or whether the 
 law Papia, made against old men's marriages, 
 had restrained them. So it seemeth men 
 doubt lest time is become past children and 
 generation; wherein, contrariwise, we see 
 commonly the levity and inconstancy of 
 men's judgments, which till a matter be done* 
 Wonder that it can be done ; and, as soon as 
 it is done, wonder again that it was no 
 sooner done ; as we see in the expedition 
 of Alexander into Asia, which at first was 
 prejudged as a vast and impossible enter- 
 prise : and yet afterwards it pleaseth Livy to 
 make no more of it than this ; Nil aliud qudm 
 bene ausus est vanq contemnere : and the same 
 Jiappened to Columbus in the western navi* 
 gation. But in intellectual matters it is much 
 more common ; as may be seen in most of 
 the propositions of Euclid: which till they be 
 demonstrated, they seem strange to our as- 
 lent j but being Remonstrated, our mind ac«* 
 
65 
 
 cepteth of them by a kind of relation, as the 
 lawyers speak, as if we had known them 
 before. 
 
 Another error, that hath also some affinity „ ,. 3 - 
 
 ' J Reliance on 
 
 with the former, is a conceit that of former received opi 
 opinions or sects, after variety and examina- 
 tion, the best hath still prevailed, and sup- 
 pressed the rest : so as, if a man should be- 
 gin the labour of a new search, he were but 
 like to light upon somewhat formerly re- 
 jected, and by rejection brought into obli^ 
 vion : as if the multitude, or the wisest, for 
 the multitude's sake, were not ready to give 
 passage rather to that which is popular and 
 superficial, than to that which is substantial 
 and profound : for the truth is, that time 
 seemeth to be of the nature of a river or 
 stream, which earrieth down to us that which 
 is light and blown up, and sinketh and 
 drowneth that which is weighty and solid. 
 . Another error, of a diverse nature from all 4. 
 
 . Reducing 
 
 the former, is the over early and peremptory knowledge 
 
 A J into methods. 
 
 reduction of knowledge into arts and me- 
 thods ; from which time commonly sciences 
 receive small or no augmentation. But as 
 young men, when they knit and shape per- 
 
fectly, do seldom grow to a farther stature ; 
 so knowledge, while it is in aphorisms and 
 observations, it is in growth ; but when it 
 once is comprehended in exact methods, it 
 may perchance be farther polished and illus^ 
 trated, and accommodated for use and prac- 
 tice ; but it increaseth no more in bulk and 
 substance. 
 5. Another error w 7 hich doth succeed that 
 
 TSTeglect of . 
 
 universal phi- which we last mentioned, is, that after the 
 
 losophy. 
 
 distribution of particular arts and sciences, 
 men have abandoned universality, or philoso- 
 pliia prima; which cannot but cease and 
 stop all progression. For no perfect disco- 
 very can be made upon a flat or a level : nei- 
 ther is it possible to discover the more re- 
 mote and deeper parts of any science, if you 
 stand but upon the level of the same science, 
 and ascend not to a higher science. 
 6. Another error hath proceeded from too 
 
 inteiiectu- 16 great a reverence, and a kind of adoration 
 of the mind and understanding of man ; by 
 means whereof, men have withdrawn them- 
 selves too much from the contemplation of 
 nature, and the observations of experience, 
 and have tumbled up and down in their own 
 reason and conceits. Upon these intellect 
 
 alists. 
 
67 
 
 tualists; which are, notwithstanding, com- 
 monly taken for the most sublime and divine 
 philosophers, Heraclitus gave a just censure, 
 saying, " Men sought truth in their own 
 i( little worlds, and not in the great and com-^ 
 " mon world ;" for they disdain to spell, and 
 so by degrees to read in the volume of God's 
 works ; and contrariwise, by continual medi^ 
 tation and agitation of wit, do urge and as 
 it were invocate their own spirits to divine, 
 and give oracles unto them, whereby they 
 are deservedly deluded. 
 
 Another error that hath some connexion y 
 
 . , , . , "i i t Intermixture 
 
 wvth this latter, is tnat men have used to in- of favourite 
 feet their meditations, opinions, and doc^ 
 trines, with some conceits which they have 
 most admired, or some sciences which they 
 have most applied ; and given all things else 
 a tincture according to them, utterly untrue 
 and improper. So hath Plato intermingled 
 his philosophy with theology, and Aristotle 
 with logic ; and the second school of Plato, 
 Proclus and the rest, with the mathematics, 
 For these were the arts which had a kind of 
 primogeniture with them severally. So have 
 the alchemists made a philosophy out of a 
 f2 
 
6S 
 
 8. 
 
 Bogmatism, 
 
 Perempto- 
 
 ffiacss. 
 
 few experiments of the furnace ; and Gilber- 
 tus, our countryman, hath made a philoso- 
 phy out of the observations of a loadstone. 
 So Cicero, when, reciting the several opi- 
 nions of the nature of the soul, he found a 
 musician that held the soul was but a har- 
 mony, saith pleasantly, Hie ab arte sua non 
 recessit, etc. But of these conceits Aristotle 
 speaketh seriously and wisely, when he 
 saith, Qui respieiunt ad pauca de facili pro* 
 nunciant. 
 
 Another error is an impatience of doubt, 
 and haste to assertion without due and ma- 
 ture suspension of judgment. For the two 
 ways of contemplation are not unlike the two 
 ways of action, commonly spoken of by the 
 ancients; the one plain and smooth in the 
 beginning, and in the end impassable; the 
 other rough and troublesome in the entrance, 
 but after a while fair and even : so it is con- 
 templation ; if a man will begin with certain- 
 ties, he shall end in doubts ; but if he will be 
 content to begin with doubts, he shall end in 
 certainties. 
 
 Another error is in the manner of the tra- 
 dition and delivery of knowledge, which is 
 
69 
 
 for the most part magisterial and peremp- 
 tory, and not ingenuous and faithful; in a 
 sort as may be soonest believed, and not 
 easiliest examined. It is true, that in com- 
 pendious treatises for practice, that form is 
 not to be disallowed. But in the true hand- 
 ling of knowledge, men ought not to fall 
 either, on the one side, into the vein of Vel- 
 leius the Epicurean : Nil tain metuens, qudm 
 ne dubitare aliqua de re videretur : nor, on the 
 other side, into Socrates his ironical doubting 
 of all things ; but to propound things sin- 
 cerely, with more or less asseveration, as they 
 stand in a man's own judgment proved more 
 or less, 
 
 Other errors there are in the scope that iu-judged 
 men propound to themselves, whereunto they 
 bend their endeavours : for whereas the 
 more constant and devote kind of professors 
 of any science ought to propound to them- 
 selves to make some additions to their science, 
 they convert their labours to aspire to cer- 
 tain second prizes : as to be a profound in- 
 terpreter or commentator; to be a sharp 
 champion or defender; to be a methodical 
 compounder or abridger ; and so the patrr* 
 
70 
 
 inony of knowledge cometh t'6 be sometimes 
 improved, but seldom augmented. 
 Mistake of ^ ut ^ e £ reatest error of all the rest, is 
 pur "scT^ 3 ^ e m i s ^ a,Km g or misplacing of the last or 
 farthest end of knowledge i for men have 
 entered into a desire of learning and know^ 
 ledge, sometimes upon a natural curiosity, 
 and inquisitive appetite ; sometimes to en- 
 tertain their minds with variety and delight ; 
 sometimes for ornament and reputation; and 
 sometimes to enable them to victory of wit 
 and contradiction ; and most times for lucre 
 and profession ; and seldom sincerely to give 
 a true account of their gift of reason, to the 
 benefit and use of men : as if there were 
 sought in knowledge a couch, whereupon to 
 rest a searching and restless spirit ; or a terras, 
 for a wandering and variable mind to walk 
 up and down with a fair prospect ; or a tower 
 of state, for a proud mind to raise itself upon ; 
 or a fort or commanding ground> for strife 
 and contention; or a shop* for profit or 
 sale ; and not a rich storehouse, for the 
 glory of the Creator, and the relief of man's 
 iiowtbpur^ estate. But this is that which will indeed 
 
 sue know- 
 
 ledge. dignify and exalt knowledge, if contenipla- 
 
71 
 
 lion and action may be more nearly and 
 straitly conjoined and united together than 
 they have been; a conjunction like unto 
 that of the two highest planets, Saturn, the 
 planet of rest and contemplation* and Jupi- 
 ter, the planet of civil society and action : 
 howbeit, I do not mean> when I speak of 
 Use and action, that end before-mentioned 
 of the applying of knowledge to lucre and 
 profession ; for I am not ignorant how much 
 that diverteth and interrupteth the prose- 
 cution and advancement of knowledge, like 
 unto the golden ball thrown before Atalanta, 
 which while she goeth aside and stoopeth 
 to take up, the race is hindered; 
 
 Declinat cursus, aurumque volubile tdllit. 
 
 Neither is my meaning, as was spoken of 
 Socrates* to call philosophy down from heaven 
 to converse upon the earth ; that is, to leave 
 natural philosophy aside, and to apply know- 
 ledge only to manners and policy. But as 
 both heuven and earth do conspire and 
 contribute to the use and benefit of man; 
 so the end ought to be* from both philoso* 
 phies to separate and reject vain speculat- 
 ions, and whatsoever is empty and void^ 
 
n 
 
 and to preserve and augment whatsoever .is 
 solid and fruitful : that knowledge may not 
 be, as a courtesan, for pleasure and vanity 
 only, or as a bond-woman, to acquire and 
 gain to her master's use ; but as a spouse^ 
 for generation, fruit, and comfort. 
 
 OF THE DIGNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 
 
 Thus have I described and opened, as by 
 a kind of dissection, those peccant humours, 
 the principal of them, which have not only 
 given impediment to the proficience of learn- 
 ing, but have given also occasion to the tra- 
 ducement thereof : wherein if I have been 
 too plain, it must be remembered, Fidelia 
 bulnera amantis, sed dohsa oscida malignantis. 
 
 This, I think, I have gained> that I ought 
 to be the better believed in that which I 
 shall say pertaining to commendation; be- 
 cause I have proceeded so freely in that 
 which concern eth censure. And yet I have 
 no purpose to enter into a laudative of learn- 
 ing, or to make a hymn to the muses ; though 
 I am of opinion that it is long since their 
 
73 
 
 rites were duly celebrated: but my intent 
 is, without varnish or amplification, justly to 
 weigh the dignity of knowledge in the ba- 
 lance with other things, and to take the 
 true value thereof by testimonies and argu- 
 ments divine and human. 
 
 First therefore, let us seek the dignity i. 
 
 Divine 
 
 of knowledge in the archetype or first plat- proofs. 
 form, which is in the attributes and acts of 
 God, as far as they are revealed to man, and 
 feisty be observed with sobriety ; wherein we 
 may not seek it by the name of learning ; for 
 all learning is knowledge acquired, and all 
 knowledge in God is original : and therefore 
 we must look for it by another name, that 
 of wisdom or sapience, as the Scriptures 
 call it. 
 
 It is so then, that in the work of the crea- in the attri. 
 
 butes and 
 
 tion we see a double emanation of virtue acts of God. 
 from God ; the one referring more properly 
 to power, the other to wisdom : the one ex- 
 pressed in making the subsistence of the 
 matter, and the other in disposing the beauty 
 of the form. This being supposed, it is to 
 
74 
 
 be observed, that, for any thing which ap- 
 peared! in the history of the creation, the 
 confused mass and matter of heaven and 
 earth was made in a moment; and the order 
 and disposition of that chaos or mass was 
 the work of six days ; such a note of dif- 
 ference it pleased God to put upon the works 
 of power, and the works of wisdom : where^ 
 with concurreth, that in the former it is not 
 set down that God said, Let there be heaven 
 and earth, as it is set down of the works fol- 
 lowing ; but actually, that God made heaven 
 and earth : the one carrying the stile of a 
 manufacture, and the other of a law, decree> 
 or council. 
 in the order To proceed to that which is next in or* 
 der, from God to spirits* We find, as far as 
 credit is to be given to the celestial hie- 
 rarchy of that supposed Dionysius the sena- 
 tor of Athens, the first place or degree is 
 given to the angels of love, which are termed 
 Seraphim ; the second to the angels of light, 
 which are termed Cherubim ; and the third, 
 and so following places, to thrones, princi- 
 palities, and the rest, which are all angels 
 "of power and ministry ; so as the angels of 
 
15 
 
 knowledge and illumination are placed before 
 the angels of office and domination. 
 
 To descend from spirits and intellectual f" r ™ s aterial 
 forms to sensible and material forms ; we 
 read the first form that w T as created was light, 
 which hath a relation and correspondence in 
 nature and corporal things to knowledge in 
 spirits and incorporal things. 
 
 So in the distribution of days, we see, the 
 day wherein God did rest, and contemplate 
 his own works, was blessed above all the days 
 wherein he did effect and accomplish them. 
 
 After the creation was finished, it is set 
 down unto us, that man was placed in the 
 garden to work therein ; which work, so ap- 
 pointed to him, could be no other than work 
 of contemplation ; that is> when the end of 
 work is but for exercise and experiment, not 
 necessity ; for there being then no relucta- 
 tion of the creature, nor sweat of the brow, 
 man's employment must of consequence have 
 been matter of delight in the experiment, 
 and not matter of labour for the use. Again, 
 the first acts which man performed in pa- 
 radise consisted of the two summary parts 
 of knowledge ; the view of creatures, and 
 
76 
 
 the imposition of names. As for the know- 
 ledge which induced the fall, it was, as was 
 touched before, not the natural knowledge 
 of creatures, but the moral knowledge of 
 good and evil ; wherein the supposition was, 
 that God's commandments or prohibitions 
 w r ere not the originals of good and evil, 
 but that they had other beginnings, which 
 man aspired to know ; to the end to make 
 a total defection from God, and to depend 
 wholly upon himself. 
 intiiepH- To pass on : in the first event or occur- 
 
 mitive occu- 
 pations of rence after the fall of man, we * see, (as the 
 
 Scriptures have infinite mysteries, not vio- 
 lating at all the truth of the story ot letter,) 
 an image of the two estates, the contempla- 
 tive state and the active state, figured in 
 the two persons of Abel and Cain, and in the 
 two simplest and most primitive trades of 
 life; that of the shepherd, (who, by reason 
 of his leisure, rest in a place, and living 
 in view of heaven, is a lively image of a 
 contemplative life,) and that of the husband- 
 man : where we see again the favour and 
 election of God went to the shepherd,, and 
 ttot to the tiller of the ground. 
 
 man. 
 
77 
 
 So in the age before the flood, the holy 
 records, within those few memorials which 
 are there entered and registered, have vouch- 
 safed to mention arid honour the name of 
 the inventors and authors of music and works 
 in metal. In the age after the flood, the first 
 great judgment of God upon the ambition of 
 man was the confusion of tongues ; whereby 
 the open trade and intercourse of learning 
 and knowledge was chiefly imbarred. 
 
 To descend to Moses the lawgiver, and In the c J ia - 
 
 ° racter or 
 
 God's first pen : he is adorned by the Scrip- Moses * 
 tures with this addition and commendation, 
 that he was seen in all the learning of the 
 ^Egyptians ; which nation, we know, was one 
 of the most ancient schools of the world: 
 for so Plato brings in the ^Egyptian priest 
 saying unto Solon : " You Grecians are 
 " ever children; you have no knowledge 
 " of antiquity, nor antiquity of know- 
 iC ledge." Take a view of the ceremonial 
 law of Moses ; you shall find, besides the 
 prefiguration of Christ, the badge or diffe- 
 rence of the people of God, the exercise and 
 impression of obedience, and other divine 
 ajses and fruits thereof, that some of the 
 
7a 
 
 most learned Rabbins have travelled profit- 
 ably and profoundly to observe, some of 
 them a natural, some of them a moral sense, 
 or a reduction of many of the ceremonies 
 and ordinances. As in the law of the le- 
 prosy, where it is said, If the ivhiteness have 
 overspread the flesh, the patient may pass abroad 
 for clean ; hut if there he any whole flesh re* 
 maining, he is to he shut up for unclean ; one 
 of them noteth a principle of nature, that 
 putrefaction is more contagious before matu- 
 rity than after: and another noteth a posi- 
 tion of moral philosophy, that men aban- 
 doned to vice do not so much corrupt man- 
 ners, as those that are half- good and half- 
 evil. So in this, and very many other places 
 in that law, there is to be found, besides 
 the theological sense, much aspersion of 
 philosophy. 
 In the writ- ^° hkewise in that excellent book of Job, 
 ingsof job, jf j t -fog revolved with diligence, it will be 
 found pregnant and swelling with natural 
 philosophy j as for example, cosmography, 
 and the roundness of the world: Qui ex-* 
 tendit aquilonem super vacuum, et appendit ter^ 
 ram super nihilum ; wherein the pensileness 
 
79 
 of the earth, the pole of the north, and 
 the finiteness or convexity of heaven are 
 manifestly touched: So again, matter of 
 astronomy ; Spiritus ejus ornavit ccelos, et ob- 
 stetricante manu ejus eductas est Coluber tor-* 
 tuosus. And in another place ; Nunquid con* 
 jungere valebis micantes Stellas Pleiadas, aut 
 gyrum Arcturi poteris dissipare ? Where the 
 fixing of the stars, ever standing at equal 
 distance, is with great elegancy noted. And 
 in another place, Qui facit Arcturum, et Oriona, 
 et Hyadas, et interiora Austri ; where again 
 he takes knowledge of the depression of the 
 southern pole, calling it the secrets of the 
 south, because the southern stars were in 
 that climate unseen : Matter of generation ; 
 Annon sicut lac mulsisti me, et sicut caseum 
 coagulasti me, etc. Matter of minerals ; Habet 
 argentum venarum suarum principia : et aaro 
 locus est in quo corvflatur, ferritin de terra tol- 
 litur, et lapis solutus colore in as vertitur ; 
 and so forwards in that chapter. 
 
 So likewise in the person of Solomon the ln the perS0J ^ 
 king, we see the gift or endowment of wis- of Solomou ' 
 dom and learning, both in Solomon's peti- 
 tion, and in God's assent thereunto, preferred 
 
80 
 
 before all other terrene and temporal feli- 
 city. By virtue of which grant or donative 
 of God, Solomon became enabled, not only 
 to write those excellent parables, or apho- 
 risms concerning divine and moral philoso- 
 phy ; but also to compile a natural history of 
 all verdure, from the cedar upon the moun- 
 tain to the moss upon the wall, (which is 
 but a rudiment between putrefaction and an 
 herb,) and also of all things that breathe or 
 move. Nay, the same Solomon the king, 
 although he excelled in the glory of trea- 
 sure and magnificent buildings, of shipping 
 and navigation, of service and attendance, 
 of fame and renown, and the like, yet he 
 maketh no claim to any of those glories, 
 but only to the glory of inquisition of truth ; 
 for so he saith expressly, The glory of God 
 is to conceal a tiling, hut the glory of the king 
 is to find it out ; as if, according to the in- 
 nocent play of children, the Divine Majesty 
 took delight to hide his works, to the end to 
 have them found out ; and as if kings could 
 not obtain a greater honour than to be God's 
 playfellows in that game ; considering the 
 ^jreat cornmandment of wits and i means^ 
 

 
 81 
 
 whereby nothing needeth to be hidden from 
 
 them. 
 
 Neither did the dispensation of God vary in the cha- 
 racter of 
 in the times after our Saviour came into the Jesus. 
 
 world ; for our Saviour himself did first 
 shew his power to subdue ignorance, by 
 his conference with the priests and doctors 
 of the law, before he shewed his power to 
 subdue nature by his miracles. And the 
 coming of the Holy Spirit was chiefly figured 
 and expressed in the similitude and gift of 
 tongues, which are but vehicula scientiw. 
 
 So in the election of those instruments, j n the apos- 
 which it pleased God to use for the planta- 
 tion of the faith, notwithstanding that at the 
 first he did employ persons altogether un- 
 learned, otherwise than by inspiration, more 
 evidently to declare his immediate work- 
 ing, and to abase all human wisdom or 
 knowledge ; yet, nevertheless, that counsel 
 of his was no sooner performed, but in the 
 next vicissitude and succession, he did send 
 his divine truth into the world, waited on 
 with other learnings, as with servants or 
 hand-maids : for so we see St. Paul, who 
 was only learned amongst the apostles, had 
 
fathers . 
 
 82 
 
 his pen most used in the Scriptures of the 
 New Testament, 
 in the early $0 again, we find that many of the an- 
 cient bishops and fathers of the church were 
 excellently read, and studied in all the learn- 
 ing of the heathen ; insomuch, that the edict 
 of the emperor Julianus, whereby it was 
 interdicted unto Christians to be admitted 
 into schools, lectures, or exercises of learn- 
 ing, was esteemed and accounted a more 
 pernicious engine and machination against 
 the Christian faith, than were all the san- 
 guinary prosecutions of his predecessors ; 
 neither could the emulation and jealousy of 
 Gregory the First of that name, bishop of 
 Rome, ever obtain the opinion of piety or 
 devotion ; but contrariwise received the cen- 
 sure of humour, malignity, and pusillani- 
 mity, even amongst holy men ; in that he 
 designed to obliterate and extinguish the 
 memory of heathen antiquity and authors. 
 But contrariwise it was the Christian church, 
 which, amidst the inundations of the Scy- 
 thians on the one side from the north-west, 
 and the Saracens from the east, did pre- 
 serve, in the sacred lap and bosom thereof^ 
 
the precious relicks even of heathen learn- 
 ing, which otherwise had been extinguished, 
 as if no such thing had ever been. 
 
 And we see before our eyes, that in the i n the re- 
 age of ourselves and our fathers, when it orma 
 pleased God to call the church of Rome 
 to account for their degenerate manners and 
 ceremonies, and sundry doctrines obnoxious, 
 and framed to uphold the same abuses ; at 
 one and the same time it was ordained by 
 the divine providence, that there should at- 
 tend withal a renovation, and new spring 
 of all other knowledges : and, on the other 
 side, we see the Jesuits, (who partly in them^ 
 selves, and partly by the emulation and pro- 
 vocation of their example, have much quick- 
 ened and strengthened the state of learn- 
 ing,) we see, I say, what notable service 
 and reparation they have done to the Roman 
 see. 
 
 Wherefore, to conclude this part, let it be Two chief 
 observed, that there be two principal duties learning to 
 
 , . , religion. 
 
 and services, besides ornament and illustra- 
 tion, which philosophy and human learn- 
 ing do perform to faith and religion. The 
 g 2 
 
84 
 
 one, because they are an effectual induce- 
 ment to the exaltation of the glory of God. 
 For as the Psalms and other Scriptures do 
 often invite us to consider, and magnify the 
 great and wonderful works of God ; so if 
 we should rest only in the contemplation 
 of the exterior of them, as they first offer 
 themselves to our senses, we should do a 
 like injury unto the majesty of God, as it 
 we should judge or construe of the store of 
 some excellent jeweller, by that only which 
 is set out toward the street in his shop. 
 The other, because they minister a singular 
 help and preservative against unbelief and 
 error : for our Saviour saith, You err, not 
 knoiving the Scriptures, nor the power of God; 
 laying before us two books or volumes to 
 study, if we will be secured from error; 
 first, the Scriptures, revealing the will of 
 God ; and then the creatures expressing his 
 power : whereof the latter is a key unto the 
 former : not only opening our understand- 
 ing to conceive the true sense of the Scrip- 
 tures, by the general notions of reason and 
 rules of speech ; but chiefly opening our 
 belief, in drawing us into a due medita- 
 
85 
 
 tion of the omnipotency of God, which is 
 chiefly signed and engraven upon his works. 
 Thus much therefore for divine testimony 
 and evidence, concerning the true dignity 
 and value of learning. 
 
 As for human proofs, it is so large a field, ^oofs* 
 as, in a discourse of this nature and brevity, 
 
 it is fit rather to use choice of those things of an immor- 
 which we shall produce, than to embrace the 
 variety of them. First, therefore, in the de- 
 grees of human honor amongst the heathen, 
 it was the highest to obtain to a veneration 
 and adoration as a God. This unto the 
 Christians is as the forbidden fruit. But we 
 speak now separately of human testimony; 
 according to which, that which the Grecians 
 call apotheosis, and the Latins, relatio inter 
 divos, was the supreme honour which man 
 could attribute unto man ; especially when it 
 was given, not by a formal decree or act of 
 state, as it was used among the Roman em- 
 perors, but by an inward assent and belief. 
 Which honour being so high had also a de- 
 gree or middle term : for there were reckoned, 
 above human honors, honors heroical and 
 divine : in the attribution and distribution of 
 
which honors, we see, antiquity made this 
 difference : that whereas founders and uniters 
 of states and cities, lawgivers, extirpers of 
 tyrants, fathers of the people, and other 
 eminent persons in civil merit, were honor- 
 ed but with the titles of worthies or demi- 
 gods ; such as were Hercules, Theseus, Minos, 
 Romulus, and the like : on the other side, 
 such as were inventors and authors of new 
 arts, endowments, and commodities towards 
 man's life, were ever consecrated amongst 
 the gods themselves : as were Ceres, Bacchus, 
 Mercurius, Apollo, and others ; and justly : 
 for the merit of the former is confined with- 
 in the circle of an age or a nation ; and is 
 like fruitful showers, which though they be 
 profitable and good, yet serve but for that 
 season, and for a latitude of ground where 
 they fall; but the other is indeed like the be- 
 nefits of heaven, which are permanent and 
 universal. The former, again, is mixed with 
 strife and perturbation ; but the latter hath 
 the true character of divine presence, com- 
 ing in aura leni, without noise or agitation. 
 Se S pas d siin?. Neither is certainly that other merit of 
 learning, in repressing the inconveniencies 
 
87 
 
 which grow from man to man, much inferior 
 to the former, of relieving the necessities 
 which arise from nature ; which merit was 
 lively set forth by the ancients in that feign- 
 ed relation of Orpheus's theatre, where all 
 beasts and birds assembled, and, forgetting 
 their several appetites, some of prey, some 
 of game, some of quarrel, stood all sociably 
 together listening to the airs and accords of 
 the harp ; the sound whereof no sooner 
 ceased, or was drowned by some louder noise, 
 but every beast returned to his own nature : 
 wherein is aptly described the nature and 
 condition of men, who are full of savage and 
 unreclaimed desires of profit, of lust, of re- 
 venge ; which as long as they give ear to pre- 
 cepts, to laws, to religion, sweetly touched 
 with eloquence and persuasion of books, of 
 sermons, of harangues, so long is society 
 and peace maintained; but if these instru- 
 ments be silent, or that sedition and tumult 
 make them not audible, all things dissolve 
 into anarchy and confusion. 
 
 But this appeareth more manifestly, when in its use- 
 
 . . fulness to 
 
 kings themselves, or persons of authority un- princes. 
 der them, or other governors in common- 
 
wealths and popular estates, are endued with 
 learning. For although he might be thought 
 partial to his own profession, that said, 
 " Then should people and estates be happy, 
 r ? when either kings were philosophers, or 
 " philosophers kings 5" yet so much is ve- 
 rified by experience, that under learned 
 princes and governors there have been ever 
 the best times : for howsoever kings may 
 have their imperfections in their passions 
 and customs ; yet if they be illuminated by 
 learning, they have those notions of religion, 
 policy, and morality, which do preserve 
 them, and refrain them from all ruinous and 
 peremptory errors and excesses ; whispering 
 evermore in their ears, when counsellors and 
 servants stand mute and silent. And se- 
 nators or counsellors likewise, which be 
 learned, do proceed upon more safe and sub- 
 stantial principles, than counsellors which 
 are only men of experience; the one sort 
 keeping dangers afar off, whereas the other 
 discover them not till they come near hand> 
 and then trust to the agility of their wit to 
 ward off or avoid them. 
 
 Which felicity of times under learned 
 
princes, (to keep still the law of brevity, by Exemplified 
 
 •. , . in the hap- 
 
 using the most eminent and selected exam- piest period 
 
 _ , -i i • i of the Roman 
 
 pies,) doth best appear in the age which empire- 
 passed from the death of Domitian the em- 
 peror until the reign of Commodus; com- 
 prehending a succession of six princes, all 
 learned, or singular favourers and advancers 
 of learning; which age, for temporal re- 
 spects, was the most happy and flourishing 
 that ever the Roman empire, which then was 
 a model of the world, enjoyed: a matter re- 
 vealed and prefigured unto Domitian in a 
 dream, the night before he was slain ; for he 
 thought there was grown behind upon his 
 shoulders a neck and a head of gold : which 
 came accordingly to pass in those golden 
 times which succeeded ; of which princes 
 we will make some commemoration : wherein 
 although the matter will be vulgar, and may 
 be thought fitter for a declamation than 
 agreeable to a treatise enfolded as this is, yet 
 because it is pertinent to the point in hand, 
 neque semper arcum tendit Apollo, and to name 
 them only were too naked and cursory, I 
 will not omit it altogether. 
 
 The first was Nerva ; the excellent temper in Neiva. 
 
90 
 
 of whose government is by a glance in Cor- 
 nelius Tacitus touched to the life : Postquam 
 divus Nerva res olim insociabiles miscuisset, im- 
 perium et libertatem. And in token of his 
 learning, the last act of his short reign, left 
 to memory, was a missive to his adopted son 
 Trajan, proceeding upon some inward dis- 
 content at the ingratitude of the times, com- 
 prehended in a verse of Homer's : 
 
 Telis, Phcebe, tuis lacrymas ulciscere nostras. 
 in Trajan. Trajan, who succeeded, was for his per- 
 
 son not learned : but if we will hearken to 
 the speech of our Saviour, that saith, He 
 that receiveth a prophet in the name of a pro- 
 phet, shall have a prophet's reward, he de- 
 serveth to be placed amongst the most learn- 
 ed princes ; for there was not a greater ad- 
 mirer of learning, or benefactor of learning; 
 a founder of famous libraries, a perpetual 
 advancer of learned men to office, and a fa- 
 miliar converser with learned professors and 
 preceptors, who were noted to have then 
 most credit in court. On the other side, how. 
 much Trajan's virtue and government was 
 admired and renowned, surely no testimony 
 of grave and faithful history doth more lively 
 
91 
 
 set forth, than that legend tale of Gregorius 
 Magnus, bishop of Rome, who was noted 
 for the extreme envy he bore towards all 
 heathen excellency : and yet he is reported, 
 out of the love and estimation of Trajan's 
 moral virtues, to have made unto God pas- 
 sionate and fervent prayers for the delivery 
 of his soul out of hell : and to have obtained 
 it, with a caveat that he should make no 
 more such petitions. In this prince's time 
 also, the persecutions against the Christians 
 received intermission, upon the certificate of 
 Plinius Secundus, a man of excellent learn- 
 ing, and by Trajan advanced. 
 
 Adrian, his successor, was the most curi- In Adnam 
 ous man that lived, and the most universal 
 inquirer ; insomuch as it was noted for an 
 error in his mind, that he desired to compre- 
 hend all things, and not to reserve himself 
 for the worthiest things ; falling into the like 
 humour that was long before noted in Philip 
 of Macedon ; who, when he would needs 
 over-rule and put down an excellent musi- 
 cian, in an argument touching music, was 
 well answered by him again, " God forbid, 
 " Sir," saith he, " that your fortune should 
 
92 
 
 " be so bad, as to know these things better 
 " than I." It pleased God likewise to use 
 the curiosity of this emperor as an induce- 
 ment to the peace of his church in those 
 days. For having Christ in veneration, not 
 as a God or Saviour, but as a wonder or no- 
 velty ; and having his picture in his gallery, 
 matched it with Apollonius, with whom, in 
 his vain imagination, he thought he had 
 some conformity; yet it served the turn to 
 allay the bitter hatred of those times against 
 the christian name, so as the church had 
 peace during his time. And for his govern- 
 ment civil, although he did not attain to that 
 of Trajan's in the glory of arms, or per- 
 fection of justice, yet in deserving of the weal 
 of the subject he did exceed him. For Tra- 
 jan erected many famous monuments and 
 buildings ; insomuch as Constantine the Great 
 in emulation was wont to call him Parieta- 
 ria, wall-flower, because his name was upon 
 so many walls: but his buildings and works 
 were more of glory and triumph than use 
 and necessity. But Adrian spent his whole 
 reign, which was peaceable, in a perambu- 
 lation or survey of the Roman empire ; giv- 
 
93 
 ing order, and making assignation where he 
 went, for re-edifying of cities, towns, and 
 forts decayed, and for cutting of rivers and 
 streams, and for making bridges and pas- 
 sages, and for policying of cities and com- 
 monalties with new ordinances and consti- 
 tutions, and granting new franchises and 
 incorporations ; so that his whole time was 
 a very restoration of all the lapses and decays 
 of former times. 
 
 Antoninus Pius, who succeeded him, was in Antoni- 
 nus Pius, 
 a prince excellently learned; and had the 
 
 patient and subtle wit of a schoolman ; inso- 
 much as in common speech, which leaves no 
 virtue untaxed, he was called cymini sector, 
 a carver, or a divider of cumin seed, which 
 is one of the least seeds ; such a patience he 
 had and settled spirit, to enter into the least 
 and most exact diiFerences of causes, a fruit 
 no doubt of the exceeding tranquillity and 
 serenity of his mind ; which being no ways 
 charged or incumbered, either with fears, 
 remorses, or scruples, but having been noted 
 for a man of the purest goodness, without 
 all fiction or affectation, that hath reigned 
 or lived, made his mind continually present 
 
94 
 
 and intire. He likewise approached a de- 
 gree nearer unto Christianity, and became, 
 as Agrippa said unto St. Paul, half a Chris- 
 tian; holding their religion and law in good 
 opinion, and not only ceasing persecution, 
 but giving way to the advancement of 
 Christians. 
 _ _ _ Tr There succeeded him the first dim fr aires, 
 
 In L. C. Ve- u ' 
 
 rus, and m. j-]^ ^- wo a( j ptive brethren, Lucius Commo- 
 wus dus Verus, (son to iElius Verus, who delight- 
 
 ed much in the softer kind of learning, and 
 was wont to call the poet Martial his Virgil,) 
 and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus ; whereof 
 the latter, who obscured his colleague and 
 survived him long, was named the philoso- 
 pher : who as he excelled all the rest in learn- 
 ing, so he excelled them likewise in perfec- 
 tion of all royal virtues ; insomuch as Ju- 
 lianus the emperor, in his book intitled 
 Casares, being as a pasquin or satire to de- 
 ride all his predecessors, feigned that they 
 were all invited to a banquet of the gods, 
 and Silenus the Jester sat at the nether end 
 of the table, and bestowed a scoff on every 
 one as they came in ; but when Marcus Phi- 
 losophies came in, Silenus was gravelled, and 
 
95 
 
 out of countenance, not knowing where to 
 carp at him, save at the last he gave a glance 
 at his patience towards his wife. And the 
 virtue of this prince, continued with that of 
 his predecessor, made the name of Antoni- 
 nus so sacred in the world, that though it 
 were extremely dishonoured in Commodus, 
 Caracalla, and Heliogabalus, who all bore 
 the name, yet when Alexander Severus re- 
 fused the name, because he was a stranger 
 to the family, the Senate with one acclama- 
 tion said, Quo modo Augustus, sic et Antoninus. 
 In such renown and veneration was the name 
 of these two princes in those days, that they 
 would have had it as a perpetual addition in 
 all the emperor's stiles. In this emperor's time 
 also the church for the most part was in 
 peace ; so as in this sequence of six princes 
 we do see the blessed effects of learning in 
 sovereignty, painted forth in the greatest 
 table of the world. 
 
 But for a tablet, or picture of smaller vo- In Queen 
 lume, not presuming to speak of your ma- Ellzabetkk 
 jesty that liveth, in my judgment the most 
 excellent is that of queen Elizabeth, your 
 immediate predecessor in this part of Britain ; 
 
96 
 
 a princess that, if Plutarch were now alive 
 to write lives by parallels, would trouble 
 him, T think, to find for her a parallel 
 amongst women. This lady was endued with 
 learning in her sex singular, and great even 
 amongst masculine princes; whether we 
 speak of learning, of language, or of science, 
 modern or ancient, divinity or humanity r 
 and unto the very last year of her life she 
 accustomed to appoint set hours for reading j 
 scarcely any young student in an university 
 more daily, or more duly. As for her govern- 
 ment, I assure myself, I shall not exceed, if 
 I do affirm that this part of the island 
 never had forty -five years of better times; 
 and yet not through the calmness of the 
 season, but through the wisdom of her re- 
 gimen. 
 
 For if there be considered of the one side, 
 the truth of religion established ; the con- 
 stant peace and security; the good admi- 
 nistration of justice ; the temperate use of 
 the prerogative, not slackened, nor much 
 strained; the flourishing state of learning, 
 sortable to so excellent a patroness ; the con- 
 venient estate of wealth and means, both 
 
97 
 
 of crown and subject ; the habit of* obedi- 
 ence, and the moderation of discontents: 
 and there be considered, on the other side, 
 the differences of religion, the troubles of 
 neighbour countries, the ambition of Spain, 
 and opposition of Rome ; and then, that she 
 was solitary, and of herself: these things, 
 I say, considered, as I could not have chosen 
 an instance so recent and so proper, so, 
 I suppose, I could not have chosen one 
 more remarkable or eminent to the purpose 
 now in hand, which is concerning the con- 
 junction of learning in the prince with feli- 
 city in the people. 
 
 Neither hath learning an influence and 1. 
 
 i Its influence 
 
 operation only upon civil merit and moral on martial 
 
 virtues. 
 
 virtue, and the arts or temperature of peace 
 and peaceable government ; but likewise it 
 hath no less power and efficacy in en- 
 ablement towards martial and military vir- 
 tue and prowess; as may be notably re- 
 presented in the examples of Alexander the 
 great, and Caesar the dictator, mentioned be- 
 fore, but now in fit place to be resumed ; of 
 whose virtues and acts in war there needs 
 no note or recital, having been the wonders 
 
 H 
 
9S 
 
 of time in that kind : but of their affec- 
 tions towards learning, and perfections in 
 learning, it is pertinent to say somewhat. 
 in Aiexan* Alexander was bred and taught under 
 Aristotle the great philosopher, who dedi- 
 cated divers^ophisCbooks of philosophy unto 
 him : he A attended with Callisthenes and 
 divers other learned persons, that followed 
 him in camp, throughout his journeys and 
 conquests. What price and estimation he 
 had learning in doth notably appear in these 
 three particulars : first, in the envy he used 
 to express that he bore towards Achilles, 
 in this, that he had so good a trumpet of 
 his praises as Homer's verses: secondly, in 
 the judgment or solution he gave touching 
 that precious cabinet of Darius, which was 
 found amongst his jewels; whereof question 
 was made what thing was worthy to be 
 put into it, and he gave his opinion for 
 Homer's works : thirdly, in his letter to 
 Aristotle, after he had set forth his books 
 of nature, wherein he expostulate th with him 
 for publishing the secrets or mysteries of 
 philosophy ; and gave him to understand 
 that himself esteemed it more to excel other 
 
£9 
 
 men in learning and knowledge,, than in 
 power and empire. And what use he had of 
 learning* doth appear, or rather shine, in all 
 his speeches and answers, being full of sci- 
 ence and use of science, and that in all 
 variety. 33^^ ' 
 
 And here again it may seem a thing 
 scholastical, and somewhat idle, to recite- 
 things that every man knoweth; but yet, 
 since the argument I handle leadeth me 
 thereunto, I am glad that men shall per- 
 ceive I am as willing to flatter, if they 
 will so call it, an Alexander, or a Caesar, 
 or an Antoninus, that are dead many hun- 
 dred years since, as any that now liveth : 
 for it is the displaying the glory of learn- 
 ing in sovereignty that I propound to myself, 
 and not an humour of declaiming in any 
 man's praises. Observe then the speech he 
 used of Diogenes, and see if it tend not 
 to the true state of one of the greatest 
 questions of moral philosophy ; whether the 
 enjoying of outward things, or the contemn- 
 ing of them, be the greatest happiness : for 
 when he saw Diogenes so perfectly con- 
 tented with so little, he said to those that 
 h 2 
 
100 
 
 mocked at his condition; "Were I not 
 Alexander, I would wish to be Diogenes.'* 
 But Seneca inverteth it, and saith ; Plus 
 eratj quod hie nollet accipere, qudm quod 
 ilk posset dare. " There were more things 
 f l which Diogenes would have refused, than 
 " those were, which Alexander could have 
 H. given or enjoyed." 
 
 Observe again that speech which was usual 
 with him, " That he felt his mortality chiefly 
 " in two things, sleep and lust;" and see 
 if it were not a speech extracted out of the 
 depth of natural philosophy, and liker to 
 have come out of the mouth of Aristotle* 
 or Democritus, than from Alexander. 
 
 See again that speech of humanity and 
 poesy ; when upon the bleeding of his 
 wounds, he called unto him one of his flat- 
 terers, that was wont to ascribe to him 
 divine honor, and said, " Look, this is very 
 " blood; this is not such liquor as Homer 
 " speaketh of, which ran from VenusVhand, 
 " when it was pierced by Diomedes." 
 
 See likewise his readiness in reprehension 
 of logic, in the speech he used to Cassander, 
 upon a complaint that was made against 
 
101 
 
 his father Antipater: for when Alexander 
 happened to say/ *' Do you think these men 
 " would have come from so far to complain, 
 55 except they had just cause of grief?" 
 And Cassander answered, f € Yea, that was 
 " the matter, because they thought they 
 " should not be disproved." Said Alexander 
 laughing : " See the subtilties of Aristotle, 
 " to take a matter both ways, pro et con- 
 " tra," etc. 
 
 But note again how well he could use 
 the same art, which he reprehended, to 
 serve his own humour: when bearing a se- 
 cret grudge to Callisthenes, because he was 
 against the new ceremony of his adoration, 
 feasting one night where the same Callis- 
 thenes was at the table, it was moved by 
 some after supper, for entertainment sake, 
 that Callisthenes, who was an eloquent man, 
 might, speak of some theme or purpose, at 
 his own choice : which Callisthenes did ; 
 choosing the praise of the Macedonian na- 
 tion for his discourse, and performing the 
 same with so good manner, as the hearers 
 were much ravished : whereupon Alexander, 
 nothing pleased, said, " It was easy to be 
 
102 
 
 46 eloquent upon so good a subject. But/* 
 saith he, " turn your stile, and let us hear 
 ff what you can say against us :" which 
 Callisthenes presently undertook, and did 
 with that sting and life, that Alexander in- 
 terrupted him, and said, « The goodness of 
 4C the cause made him eloquent before, and 
 f* despite made him eloquent then again." 
 
 Consider farther, for tropes of rhetoric, 
 that excellent use of a metaphor or trans- 
 lation, wherewith he taxed Antipater, who 
 was an imperious and tyrannous governor : 
 for when one of Antipater's friends com- 
 mended him to Alexander for his modera- 
 tion, that he did not degenerate, as his other 
 lieutenants did, into the Persian pride in 
 use of purple, but kept the ancient habit 
 of Macedon, of black : " True," saith Alex- 
 ander, " but Antipater is all purple within." 
 Or that other, when Parmenio came to him 
 in the plain of Arbela, and shewed him the 
 innumerable multitude of his enemies, espe- 
 cially as they appeared by the infinite num- 
 ber of lights, as it had been a new firma- 
 ment of stars, and thereupon advised him 
 to assail them by night : whereupon he 
 
103 
 
 answered, " That he would not steal the 
 victory." 
 
 For matter of policy weigh that significant 
 distinction, so much in all ages embraced, 
 that he made between his two friends, He- 
 phsestion and Craterus, when he said, '* That 
 " the one loved Alexander, and the other 
 " loved the king : describing the principal 
 difference of princes best servants, that some 
 in affection love their person, and others in 
 duty love their crown. 
 
 Weigh also that excellent taxation of an 
 error, ordinary with counsellors of princes, 
 that they counsel their masters according to 
 the model of their own mind and fortune, 
 and not of their masters; when, upon Da- 
 rius's great offers, Parmenio had said, " Surely 
 " I would accept these offers, were I as Alex- 
 " ander ;" saith Alexander, " So would I, 
 " were I as Parmenio." 
 
 Lastly, weigh that quick and acute reply, 
 which he made when he gave so large gifts 
 to his friends and servants, and was asked 
 what he did reserve for himself, and he an- 
 swered, " Hope :" weigh, I say, whether he 
 had not cast up his account right, because 
 
104 
 
 hope must be the portion of all that resolve 
 upon great enterprises. For this was Caesar's 
 portion when he went first into Gaul, his 
 estate being then utterly overthrown with 
 largesses. And this was likewise the portion 
 of that noble prince, howsoever transported 
 with ambition, Henry duke of Guise, of 
 whom it was usually said, that he was the 
 greatest usurer in France, because he had 
 turned all his estate into obligations. 
 
 To conclude therefore : as certain critics 
 are used to say hyperbolically, <( That if all 
 " sciences were lost, they might be found 
 " in Virgil;" so certainly this may be said 
 truly, there are the prints and footsteps of 
 all learning in those few speeches which are 
 reported of this prince : the admiration of 
 whom, when I consider him not as Alex- 
 ander the great, but as Aristotle's scholar, 
 hath carried me too far. 
 in Caesar. As f° r Julius Caesar, the excellency of his 
 
 learning needeth not to be argued from his 
 education, or his company, or his speeches ; 
 but in a farther degree doth declare itself 
 in his writings and works ; whereof some 
 are extant and permanent and some unfor- 
 
105 
 
 Innately perished. For, first, we see, there 
 is left unto us that excellent history of his 
 own wars, which he intitled only a com- 
 mentary, wherein all succeeding times have 
 admired the solid weight of matter, and the 
 real passages and lively images of actions 
 and persons, expressed in the greatest pro- 
 priety of words and perspicuity of narra- 
 tion that ever was ; which that it was not 
 the effect of a natural gift, but of learn- 
 ing and precept, is well witnessed by that 
 work of his, intitled, De analogia, being a 
 grammatical philosophy, wherein he did la- 
 bour to make this same vox ad placitum to 
 be become vox ad licitum, and to reduce 
 custom of speech to congruity of speech ; 
 and took, as it were, the picture of words 
 from the life of reason. 
 
 So we receive from him, as a monument 
 both of his power and learning, the then 
 reformed computation of the year ; well ex- 
 pressing, that he took it to be as great a 
 glory to himself to observe and know the 
 law of the heavens, as to give law to men 
 upon the earth. 
 
 £o likewise in that book of his, Anti-^ 
 
106 
 
 Cato, it may easily appear that he did as- 
 pire as well to victory of wit as victory of 
 war; undertaking therein a conflict against 
 the greatest champion with the pen that 
 then lived, Cicero the orator. 
 
 So again in his book of Apophthegms, which 
 he collected, we see that he esteemed it 
 more honor to make himself but a pair of 
 tables, to take the wise and pithy words 
 of others, than to have every word of his 
 own to be made an apophthegm or an 
 oracle ; as vain princes, by custom of flat- 
 tery, pretend to do. And yet if I should 
 enumerate divers of his speeches, as I did 
 those of Alexander, they are truly such as 
 Solomon noteth, when he saith, Verba sa~ 
 pientum tanquam aculei, et tanquam clavi in 
 altum defixi : whereof, I will only recite 
 three, not so delectable for elegancy, but 
 admirable for vigour and efficacy. 
 
 As first, it is reason he be thought a 
 master of words, that could with one word 
 appease a mutiny in his army, which was 
 thus : The Romans, when their generals 
 did speak to their army, did use the word 
 Militcs, but when the magistrates spake to 
 
107 
 
 to the people, they did use the word Quirites. 
 The soldiers were in tumult, and seditiously 
 prayed to be cashiered ; not that they so 
 meant, but by expostulation thereof to 
 draw Caasar to other conditions ; wherein 
 he being resolute not to give way, after 
 some silence, he began his speech, Ego, 
 Quirites : which did admit them already 
 cashiered ; wherewith they were so sur- 
 prised, crossed, and confused, as they would 
 not suffer him to go on in his speech, but 
 relinquished their demands, and made it 
 their suit to be again called by the name 
 of Milites. 
 
 The second speech was thus: Caesar did 
 extremely affect the name of king ; and 
 some were set on, as he passed by, in popu- 
 lar acclamation to salute him king; where- 
 upon, finding the cry weak and poor, he 
 put it off thus, in a kind of jest, as if they 
 had mistaken his sirname ; Non rex sum, 
 sed C&sar ; a speech, that if it be searched, 
 the life and fulness of it can scarce be ex- 
 pressed : for, first, is was a refusal of the 
 name, but yet not serious : again, it did 
 signify an infinite confidence and magna- 
 
108 
 
 nimity, as if he presumed .Caesar was the 
 greater title; as by his worthiness it is come 
 to pass till this day: but chiefly, it was a 
 speech of great allurement toward his own 
 purpose; as if the state did strive with him 
 but for a name, whereof mean families were 
 vested ; for Rex was a surname with the 
 Romans, as well as King is with us. 
 
 The last speech which I will mention, was 
 used to Metellus ; when Caesar, after war de- 
 clared, did possess himself of the city of 
 Rome ; at which time entering into the inner 
 treasury to take the money there accumu- 
 lated, Metellus, being tribune, forbad him : 
 whereto Caesar said, " That if he did not 
 f desist, he would lay him dead in the 
 '£ place," And presently taking himself 
 up, he added, " Young man, it is harder 
 " for me to speak it, than to do it ;" Ado- 
 lescens, durius est mihi hoc dicere qudm fa- 
 cere. A speech compounded of the greatest 
 terror and greatest clemency that could pro- 
 ceed out of the mouth of man. \ 
 
 But to return, and conclude with him : it 
 is evident, himself knew well his own per- 
 fection in learning, and took it upon him ; 
 
103 
 
 as appeared when, upon occasion that some 
 spake what a strange resolution it was in 
 Lucius Sylla to resign his dictature ; he scof- 
 fing at him, to his own advantage, answered, 
 ee That Sylla could not skill of letters, and 
 ec therefore knew not how to dictate." 
 
 And here it were fit to leave this point, Extraordinary 
 
 instance in 
 
 touching the concurrence of military virtue Xenophon. 
 and learning, for what example would come 
 with any grace after those two of Alexander 
 and Caesar? were it not in regard of the 
 rareness of circumstance, that I find in one 
 particular, as that which did so suddenly 
 pass from extreme scorn to extreme wonder ; 
 and it is of Xenophon the philosopher, who 
 w r ent from Socrates's school into Asia, in the 
 expedition of Cyrus the younger, against 
 king Artaxerxes. This Xenophon at that 
 time was very young, and never had seen the 
 wars before ; neither had any command in 
 the army, but only followed the war as a vo- 
 luntary, for the love and conversation of 
 Proxenus his friend. He was present w r hen 
 Falinus came in message from the great king 
 to the Grecians, after that Cyrus was slain in 
 the field, and they a handful of men left to 
 
no 
 
 themselves in the midst of the king's territo- 
 ries, cut off from their country by many na- 
 vigable rivers, and many hundred miles. 
 The message imported, that they should de- 
 liver up their arms, and submit themselves 
 to the king's mercy. To which message be- 
 fore answer was made, divers of the army 
 conferred familiarly with Falinus: and 
 amongst the rest Xenophon happened to 
 say, " Why, Falinus, we have now but these 
 " two things left, our arms and our virtue ? 
 " and if we yield up our arms, how shall we 
 " make use of our virtue ?" Whereto Falinus, 
 smiling on him, said, " If I be not deceived, 
 " young gentleman, you are an Athenian, 
 " and, I believe, you study philosophy, and 
 " it is pretty that you say; but you are 
 " much abused, if you think your virtue can 
 " withstand the king's power." Here was 
 the scorn : the wonder followed ; which was, 
 that this young scholar, or philosopher, after 
 all the captains were murdered in parley by 
 treason, conducted those ten thousand foot, 
 through the heart of all the king's high coun- 
 tries, from Babylon to Graecia in safety, in 
 despite of all the king's forces, to the asto- 
 
Ill 
 
 nishment of the world, and the encourage- 
 ment of the Grecians in time succeeding to 
 make invasion upon the kings of Persia ; as 
 was after purposed by Jason the Thessalian, 
 attempted by Agesilaus the Spartan, and at- 
 chieved by Alexander the Macedonian, all 
 upon the ground of the act of that young 
 scholar. 
 
 To proceed now from imperial and mili- T . . 2 - 
 
 * * its import- 
 
 tar y virtue to moral and private virtue : ^ ce al t0 ^ he 
 
 first, it is an assured truth, which is contain- ^ ate vk " 
 ed in the verses : 
 
 Scilicet ingenuas didicisse fiddlier artes, 
 Emollit mores, nee sinit esseferos. 
 It taketh away the wildness and barbarism 
 and fierceness of men's minds : but indeed 
 the accent had need be upon fideliter : for a 
 little superficial learning doth rather work a 
 contrary effect. It taketh away all levity, 
 temerity, and insolency, by copious sugges- 
 tion of all doubts and difficulties, and ac- 
 quainting the mind to balance reasons on 
 both sides, and to turn back the first offers 
 and conceits of the mind, and to accept of 
 nothing but examined and tried. It taketh 
 away vain admiration of any thing, which 
 
112 
 
 is the root of all weakness: for all things 
 are admired, either because they are new, or 
 because they are great. For novelty, no 
 man that wadeth in learning or contempla- 
 tion throughly, but will find that printed in 
 his heart Nil novi super terrain. Neither can 
 any man marvel at the play of puppets, that 
 goeth behind the curtain, and adviseth weP 
 of the motion. And for magnitude, as Alex- 
 ander the Great after that he was used to 
 great armies, and the great conquests of the 
 spacious provinces in Asia, when he received 
 letters out of Greece, of some fights and ser- 
 vices there, which were commonly for a pas- 
 sage or a fort or some walled town at the 
 most, he said, ec It seemed to him, that he 
 " was advertised of the battle of the frogs 
 " and the mice, that the old tales went of." 
 So certainly, if a man meditate upon the uni- 
 versal frame of nature, the earth with men 
 upon it, the divineness of souls excepted, will 
 not seem much other than an ant-hill, where 
 some ants carry corn, and some carry their 
 young, and some go empty, and all to-and- 
 fro a little heap of dust. It taketh away or 
 mitigate th fear of death, or adverse fortune j' 
 
113 
 
 which is one of the greatest impediments of 
 virtue, and imperfections of manners. For 
 if a man's mind be deeply seasoned with the 
 consideration of the mortality and corruptible 
 nature of things, he will easily concur with 
 Epictetus, who went forth one day and saw 
 a woman weeping for her pitcher of earth 
 that was broken ; and went forth the next 
 day, and saw a woman weeping for her son 
 that was dead; and thereupon said, Heri 
 vidi fragilem frangi, hodie vidi mortalem morL 
 And therefore Virgil did excellently and pro- 
 foundly couple the knowledge of causes and 
 the conquest of all fears together, as concomi- 
 tantia : 
 
 Felix 3 qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, 
 Quique metus omnes, et inexorabile fatum 
 Subjecit pedibus, strepitumque Acherontis 
 
 a van. 
 It were too long to go over the particular 
 remedies which learning doth minister to all 
 the diseases of the mind ; sometimes purging 
 the ill-humours, sometimes opening the ob- 
 structions, sometimes helping digestion, some- 
 times increasing appetite, sometimes healing 
 the wounds and exulcerations thereof, and 
 
1.14 
 
 the like ; and therefore I will conclude with 
 that which hath rationem totius, which is, 
 that it disposeth the constitution of the mind 
 not to be fixed or settled in the defects there- 
 of, but still to be capable and susceptible of 
 growth and reformation. For the unlearned 
 man knows not what it is to descend into 
 himself, or to call himself to account ; nor 
 the pleasure of that suavissima vita, indies 
 sentire se fieri meliorem. The good parts he 
 hath he will learn to shew to the full, and 
 use them dexterously, but not much to in- 
 crease them: the faults he hath he will 
 learn how to hide and colour them, but not 
 much to amend them : like an ill mower, 
 that mows on still, and never whets his 
 scythe. Whereas with the learned man it 
 fares otherwise, that he doth ever intermix 
 the correction and amendment of his mind 
 with the use and employment thereof. Nay 
 farther, in general and in sum, certain it is 
 that Veritas and bonitas differ but as the seal 
 and the print : for truth prints goodness ; and 
 they be the clouds of error which descend 
 in the storms of passions and perturbations, 
 From moral virtue let us pass on to matter 
 
115 
 ©f power and commandment, and consider its help to 
 
 T>QTITpr 
 
 whether in right reason there be any com- 
 parable with that, wherewith knowledge in- 
 vested! and crowneth man's nature. We see 
 the dignity of the commandment is accord- 
 ing to the dignity of the commanded : to 
 have commandment over beasts, as herdmen 
 have, is a thing contemptible ; to have com- 
 mandment over children, as schoolmasters 
 have, is a matter of small honor; to have 
 commandment over galley slaves is a dispa- 
 ragement rather than an honor. Neither is 
 the commandment of tyrants much better, 
 over people which have put off the genero- 
 sity of their minds : and therefore it was ever 
 holden, that honors in free monarchies and 
 commonwealths had a sweetness more than 
 in tyrannies, because the commandment ex- 
 tendeth more over the wills of men, and not 
 only over their deeds and services. And 
 therefore, when Virgil putteth himself forth 
 to attribute to Augustus Cassar the best of 
 human honors, he doth it in these words : 
 
 victor que volentes 
 Perpopulos datjura, viamque affect at Qtympo* 
 
116 
 
 But yet the commandment of knowledge is 
 higher than the commandment over the will ; 
 for it is a commandment over the reason, 
 belief, and understanding of man, which is 
 the highest part of the mind, and giveth 
 law to the will itself : for there is no power 
 ©n earth which setteth up a throne or chair 
 of state in the spirits and souls of men, and 
 in their cogitations, imaginations, opinions, 
 and beliefs, but knowledge and learning. 
 And therefore we see the detestable and ex- 
 treme pleasure that arch-heretics, and false 
 prophets, and impostors are transported 
 with, when they once find in themselves 
 that they have a superiority in the faith 
 and conscience of men ; so great, as, if they 
 have once tasted of it, it is seldom seen that 
 any torture or persecution can make them 
 relinquish or abandon it. But as this is what 
 the author of the Revelation calleth the depth 
 or profoundness of Satan; so by argument 
 of contraries, the just and lawful sovereignty 
 over men's understanding, by force of truth 
 rightly interpreted, is that which approacheth 
 nearest to the similitude of the divine rule. 
 To fortune. ^ f or fortune and advancement, the bene- 
 
117 
 
 licence of learning is not so confined to give 
 fortune only to states and commonwealths, 
 as it doth not likewise give fortune to particu- 
 lar persons. For it was well noted long ago, 
 that Homer hath given more men their liv- 
 ings, than either Sylla, or Caesar, or Augus- 
 tus ever did, notwithstanding their great 
 largesses and donatives, and distributions 
 of lands to so many legions; and no doubt 
 it is hard to say, whether arms or learning 
 have advanced greater numbers. And in case 
 of sovereignty we see, that if arms or descent 
 have carried away the kingdom, yet learning 
 hath carried the priesthood, which ever hath 
 been in some competition with empire, 
 
 Again, for the pleasure and delight of To Pleasure. 
 knowledge and learning, it far surpasseth all 
 other in nature : for, shall the pleasures of 
 the affections so exceed the pleasure of the 
 senses, as much as the obtaining of desire 
 or victory exceedeth a song or a dinner; and 
 must not, of consequence, the pleasures of 
 the intellect or understanding exceed the 
 pleasures of the affections ? We see in all 
 other pleasures there is satiety, and after 
 they be used, their verdure departeth ; which 
 
118: 
 
 sheweth well they be but deceits of pleasure* 
 and not pleasures; and that it was the no- 
 velty which pleased, and not the quality: 
 and therefore we see that voluptuous men 
 turn friers, and ambitious princes turn me- 
 lancholy. But of knowledge there is no sa- 
 tiety, but satisfaction and appetite are per- 
 petually interchangeable ; and therefore it ap- 
 peareth to be good in itself simply, without 
 fallacy or accident. Neither is that pleasure 
 of small efficacy and contentment to the 
 mind of man, which the poet Lucretius de- 
 scribeth elegantly, 
 
 Suave mari magno, turbantibus aquoraventis, etc. 
 
 (' It is a view of delight," saith he, " to stand 
 " or walk upon the shore side, and to see 
 " a ship tossed with tempest upon the sea ; 
 " or to be in a fortified tower, and to see two 
 " battles join upon a plain ; but it is plea- 
 " sure incomparable, for the mind of man 
 " to be settled, landed, and fortified in the 
 <e certainty of truth ; and from thence to 
 f* descry and behold the errors, perturbations, 
 " labours, and wanderings up and down of 
 a other men*" 
 
119 
 
 Lastly, leaving the vulgar arguments, that To immortal 
 by learning man excelleth man in that 
 wherein man excelleth beasts ; that by learn- 
 ing man ascendeth to the heavens and their 
 motions, where in body he cannot come, 
 and the like : let us conclude with the 
 dignity and excellency of knowledge and 
 learning in that whereunto mar/s nature 
 doth most aspire, which is, immortality or 
 continuance : for to this tendeth genera- 
 tion, and raising of houses and families ; to 
 this tend buildings, foundations, and monu- 
 ments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, 
 fame, and celebration, and in effect the 
 strength of all other human desires. We 
 see then how far the monuments of wit and 
 learning are more durable than the monu- 
 ments of power, or of the hands. For have 
 not the verses of Homer continued twenty- 
 five hundred years, or more, without the 
 loss of a syllable or letter ; during which 
 time, infinite palaces, temples, castles, cities, 
 have been decayed and demolished ? It is 
 not possible to have the true pictures or 
 statues of Cyrus, Alexander, and Caesar; 
 no, nor of the kings or great personages of 
 
im 
 
 much later years ; for the originals camiot 
 last, and the copies cannot but lose of the 
 life and truth. But the images of men's 
 wits and knowledges remain in books, ex- 
 empted from the wrong of time, and ca- 
 pable of perpetual renovation. Neither are 
 they fitly to be called images, because they 
 generate still, and cast their seeds in the 
 minds of others, provoking and causing in- 
 finite actions and opinions in succeeding 
 ages : so that, if the invention of the ship 
 was thought so noble, which carrieth riches 
 and commodities from place to place, and 
 consociateth the most remote regions in par- 
 ticipation of their fruits ; how much more 
 ai?e letters to be magnified, which, as ships, 
 pass through the vast seas of time, and 
 make ages so distant to participate of the 
 wisdom, illuminations, and inventions, the 
 one of the other ? Nay farther, we see, 
 some of the philosophers which were least 
 divine, and most immersed in the senses, 
 and denied generally the immortality of the 
 soul ; yet came to this point, that whatso- 
 ever motions the spirit of man could act 
 and perform without the organs of the 
 
121 
 
 body, they thought, might remain after 
 death, which were only those of the under- 
 standing, and not of the affections ; so im- 
 mortal and incorruptible a thing did know- 
 ledge seem unto them to be. But we, that 
 know by divine revelation, that not only 
 the understanding but the affections puri- 
 fied, not only the spirit but the body 
 changed, shall be advanced to immortality, 
 do disclaim these rudiments of the senses. 
 But it must be remembered both in this 
 last point, and so it may likewise be need- 
 ful in other places, that in probation of the 
 dignity of knowledge or learning, I did in 
 the beginning separate divine testimony from 
 human, which method I have pursued, and 
 so handled them both apart. 
 
 Nevertheless I do not pretend, and I know Conclusion, 
 it will be impossible for me, by any pleads 
 ing of mine, to reverse the judgment, either 
 of iEsop's cock, that preferred the barley- 
 corn before the gem ; or of Midas, that 
 being chosen judge between Apollo presi- 
 dent of the Muses, and Pan god of the flocks, 
 judged for plenty; or of Paris, that judg- 
 ed for beauty and love against wisdom and 
 
122 
 
 power ; or of Agrippina, oceidut matrem, 
 modo imperet, that preferred empire with 
 any condition never so detestable ; or of 
 Ulysses, qui vetulam prcetulit immortalitati, 
 being a figure of those which prefer custom 
 and habit before all excellency; or of a 
 number of the like popular judgments. For 
 these things must continue as they have 
 been : but so will that also continue where- 
 upon learning hath ever relied, and which 
 faileth not : justificata est Sapientia d filiis 
 mis. 
 
THE 
 
 SECOND BOOK OF FRANCIS BACON: 
 
 OF THE 
 PROFICIENCE AND ADVANCEMENT 
 OF 
 
 LEARNING, DIVINE AND HUMAN. 
 TO THE KING. 
 
 It might seem to have more convenience, 
 though it come often otherwise to pass, ex- 
 cellent king, that those, which are fruitful 
 in their generations, and have in themselves 
 the foresight of immortality in their de- 
 scendants, should likewise be more careful 
 of the good estate of future times, unto 
 which they know they must transmit and 
 commend over their dearest pledges. Queen 
 Elizabeth was a sojourner in the world, in 
 respect of her unmarried life, and was a 
 
124 
 
 blessing to her own times : and yet so as 
 the impression of her good government, be- 
 sides her happy memory, is not without some 
 effect which doth survive her. But to your 
 majesty, whom God hath already blessed with 
 so much royal issue, worthy to continue and 
 represent you for ever ; and whose youthful 
 and fruitful bed doth yet promise many the 
 like renovations ; it is proper and agreeable 
 to be conversant, not only in the transi- 
 tory parts of good government, but in those 
 acts also which are in their nature perma- 
 nent and perpetual: among the which, if 
 affection do not transport me, there is not 
 any more worthy than the farther endow- 
 ment of the world with sound and fruitful 
 knowledge. For why should a few received 
 authors stand up like Hercules's columns, 
 beyond which there should be no sailing or 
 discovering, since we have so bright and 
 benign a star as your majesty, to conduct 
 How learn- and prosper us ? To return therefore where 
 advanced, we left, it remaineth to consider of what 
 kind those acts are, which have been un- 
 dertaken and performed by kings and others 
 for the increase and advancement of learn- 
 
125 
 
 ing : wherein I purpose to speak actively, 
 without digressing or dilating. 
 
 Let this ground therefore be laid, that 
 all works are overcome by amplitude of re- 
 ward, by soundness of direction, and by 
 the conjunction of labours. The first mul- 
 tiplieth endeavour, the second preventeth 
 error, and the third supplieth the frailty of 
 man ; but the principal of these is direc- 
 tion : for claudus in via antevertit cursor em 
 extra viam ; and Solomon excellently setteth 
 it down, If the iron be not sharp, it re- 
 quireth more strength ; but wisdom is that 
 which prevaileth : signifying that the inven- 
 tion or election of the mean is more effec- 
 tual than any inforcement or accumulation 
 of endeavours. This I am induced to speak, 
 for that (not derogating from the noble in- 
 tention of any that have been deservers 
 towards the state of learning) I do observe 
 nevertheless, that their works and acts are 
 rather matters of magnificence and memory, 
 than of progression and proficience ; and tend 
 rather to augment the mass of learning in 
 the multitude of learned men, than to rec- 
 tify or raise the sciences themselves. 
 
126 
 
 Three objects The works or acts of merit towards learn- 
 
 important to 
 
 learning. ing are conversant about three objects : the 
 places of learning, the books of learning, 
 and the persons of the learned. For as 
 water, whether it be the dew of heaven, or 
 the springs of the earth, doth' scatter and 
 lose itself in the ground, except it be col- 
 lected into some receptacle, where it may 
 by union comfort and sustain itself, (and 
 for that cause the industry of man hath 
 made and framed spring-heads, conduits, 
 cisterns, and pools, which men have accus- 
 tomed likewise to beautify and adorn with 
 accomplishments of magnificence and state, 
 as well as of use and necessity) so this ex* 
 cellent liquor of knowledge, whether it de- 
 scend from divine inspiration, or spring from 
 human sense, would soon perish and vanish 
 to oblivion, if it were not preserved in books, 
 traditions, conferences, and places appoint- 
 ed, as universities, colleges, and schools, for 
 the receipt and comforting of the same. 
 Plans for its The works which concern the seats and 
 a vancement. pj aces f learning are feur-f founda tions, en- 
 dowments with revenues, endowments with 
 franchises and privileges, institutions and or* 
 
1£7 
 
 dinances for government ; all tending to 
 quietness and privateness of life, and dis- 
 charge of cares and troubles ; much like 
 the stations which Virgil prescribeth for the 
 hiving of bees : 
 
 Principio sedes apibus statioque petenda, 
 Quo neque sit vends aditus, etc. 
 
 The works touching books are two ; first 
 libraries, which are as the shrines where all 
 the relicks of the ancient saints, full of 
 true virtue, and that without delusion or 
 imposture, are preserved and reposed : se- 
 condly, new editions of authors, with more 
 correct impressions, more faithful transla- 
 tions, more profitable glosses, more dili- 
 gent annotations, and the like. 
 
 The works pertaining to the persons of 
 learned men, besides the advancement and 
 countenancing of them in general, are two : 
 the reward and designation of readers in 
 sciences already extant and invented ; and 
 the reward and designation of writers and 
 inquirers concerning any parts of learning 
 not sufficiently laboured and prosecuted. 
 
 These are summarily the works and acts, 
 wherein the merits of many excellent princes 
 
128 
 
 and other worthy personages have been con- 
 versant. As for any particular commemo- 
 rations, I call to mind what Cicero said, 
 when he gave general thanks ; Difficile non 
 aliquem, ingratum quenquam prceterirc. Let 
 us rather, according to the Scriptures, look 
 unto that part of the race which is before 
 us, than look back to that which is already 
 attained. 
 
 DEFECTS OF LEARNED INSTITUTIONS. 
 
 1. First therefore, amongst so many great 
 
 jects studied, foundations of colleges in Europe, I find 
 strange that they are all dedicated to pro- 
 fessions, and none left free to arts and 
 sciences at large. For if men judge that 
 learning should be referred to action, they 
 judge well; but in this they fall into the 
 error described in the ancient fable, in which 
 the other parts of the body did suppose the 
 stomach had been idle, because it neither 
 performed the office of motion, as the limbs 
 do, nor of sense, as the head doth ; but 
 yet, notwithstanding, it is the stomach that 
 
129 
 
 digesteth and distributed! to all the rest : 
 so if any man think philosophy and uni- 
 versality to be idle studies, he doth not 
 consider that all professions are from thence 
 served and supplied. And this I take to 
 be a great cause that hath hindered the 
 progression of learning, because these fun- 
 damental knowledges have been studied but 
 in passage. For if you will have a tree 
 bear more fruit than it hath used to do, it 
 is not any thing you can do to the boughs, 
 but it is the stirring of the earth, and 
 putting new mould about the roots, that 
 must work it. Neither is it to be forgotten, 
 that this dedicating of foundations and do- 
 nations to professory learning hath not 
 only had a malign aspect and influence 
 upon the growth of sciences, but hath also 
 been prejudicial to states and governments. 
 For hence it proceedeth that princes find 
 a solitude in regard of able men to serve 
 them in causes of state, because there is no 
 education collegiate which is free ; where 
 such as were so disposed might give them- 
 selves to histories, modern languages, books 
 
 K 
 
130 
 
 of policy and civil discourse, and other the 
 like enablements unto service of state. 
 2 And because founders of colleges do plant, 
 
 nesfo/re 11 " and founders of lectures do water, it fol- 
 sdianes. loweth well in order to speak of the defect 
 which is in public lectures ; namely, in the 
 smallness and meanness of the salary or 
 reward which in most places is assigned 
 unto them ; whether they be lectures of 
 arts, or of professions. For it is necessary 
 to the progression of sciences that readers 
 be of the most able and sufficient men, as 
 those which are ordained for generating 
 and propagating of sciences, and not for 
 transitory use. This cannot be, except their 
 condition and endowment be such as may 
 content the ablest man to appropriate his 
 whole labour, and continue his whole age 
 in that function and attendance ; and there- 
 fore must have a proportion answerable to 
 that mediocrity or competency of advance- 
 ment, which may be expected from a pro- 
 fession or the practice of a profession. So 
 as, if you will have sciences flourish, you 
 must observe David's military law, which 
 was, " That those which staid with the 
 
131 
 
 " carriage should have equal part with those 
 " which were in the action ;" else will the 
 carriages be ill attended. So readers in sci- 
 ences are indeed the guardians of the stores 
 and provisions of sciences, whence men in 
 active courses are furnished, and therefore 
 ought to have equal entertainment with 
 them ; otherwise if the fathers in sciences 
 be of the weakest sort, or be ill -maintained, 
 Et patrum irwalidi referent jejunia nati. 
 Another defect I note, wherein I shall 3 - 
 
 In the appa- 
 
 need some alchemist to help me, .who call ratus for ex * 
 
 i penments. 
 
 upon men to sell their books, and to build 
 furnaces, quitting and forsaking Minerva 
 and the Muses as barren virgins, and relying 
 upon Vulcan. But certain it is, that unto 
 the deep, fruitful, and operative study of 
 many sciences, especially natural philoso- 
 phy and physic, books be not the only in- 
 strumental ; wherein also the beneficence 
 of men hath not been altogether wanting : 
 for we see spheres, globes, astrolabes, maps, 
 and the like, have been provided as appurte- 
 nances to astronomy and cosmography, as 
 well as books ; we see likewise that some 
 places instituted for physic have annexed 
 K 2 
 
1§P 
 
 the commodity of gardens for simples of all 
 sorts, and do likewise command the use of 
 dead bodies for anatomies. But these do 
 respect but a few things. In general, there 
 will hardly be any main proficience in the 
 disclosing of nature, except there be some 
 allowances for expences about experiments ; 
 whether they be experiments appertaining to 
 Vulcanus or Daedalus, furnace or engine, or 
 any other kind; and therefore as secreta- 
 ries and spies of princes and states bring 
 in bills for intelligence, so you must al- 
 low the spies and intelligencers of nature 
 to bring in their bills, or else you shall be 
 ill advertised. 
 
 And if Alexander made such a liberal 
 assignation to Aristotle of treasure for the 
 allowance of hunters, fowlers, fishers, and 
 the like, that he might compile an history 
 of nature, much better do they deserve it 
 that travel in arts of nature. 
 
 ** Another defect which I note, is an ki- 
 
 ln neglect 
 
 ©fconsuita- termission or neglect, in those which are 
 
 tions and ° 
 
 visitations, governors in universities, of consultation ; 
 and in princes or superior persons, of visi- 
 tation : to enter into account and conside- 
 
ia* 
 
 ration, whether the readings, exercises, and 
 other customs appertaining unto learning, 
 anciently begun, and since continued, be 
 well instituted or no ; and thereupon to 
 ground an amendment or reformation in 
 that which shall be found inconvenient. For 
 it is one of your majesty's own most wise 
 and princely maxims, " That in all usages 
 " and precedents, the times be considered 
 i( wherein they first began ; which if they 
 " were weak or ignorant, it derogateth from 
 u the authority of the usage, and leaveth it 
 " for suspect." And therefore in as much 
 as most of the usages and orders of the 
 universities were derived from more obscure 
 times, it is the more requisite they be re- 
 examined. In this kind I will give an in- 
 stance or two, for example sake, of things 
 that are most obvious and familiar : the one 
 is a matter, which though it be ancient and 
 general, yet I hold it to be an error ; which 
 is, that scholars in universities come too 
 soon and too unripe to logic and rhetoric, 
 arts fitter for graduates than children and no- 
 vices : for these tw r o, rightly taken, are the 
 gravest of sciences, being the arts of arts ; 
 
134 
 
 the one for judgment* the other for orfla* 
 ment ; and they be the rules and direc- 
 tions how to set forth and dispose matter ; 
 and therefore for minds empty and un- 
 fraught with matter* and which have not 
 gathered that which Cicero calleth sylva and 
 supellex, stuff and variety, to begin with 
 those arts, (as if one should learn to weigh, 
 or to measure, or to paint the wind,) doth 
 w r ork but this effect, that the wisdom of 
 those arts, which is great and universal, is 
 almost made contemptible, and is degene- 
 rate into childish sophistry and ridiculous 
 affectation. And farther, the untimely learn- 
 ing of them hath drawn on, by consequence, 
 the superficial and unprofitable teaching and 
 writing of them, as fittest indeed to the ca- 
 pacity of children. Another is a lack I find 
 in the exercises used in the universities, 
 which do make too great a divorce between 
 invention and memory; for their speeches 
 are either premeditate, in verbis conceptis, 
 where nothing is left to invention ; or 
 merely extemporal, where little is left to 
 memory ; whereas in life and action there 
 is least use of either of these, but rather 
 
iS5 
 
 of intermixtures of premeditation and inven- 
 tion, notes and memory ; so as the exercise 
 fitteth not the practice, nor the image the 
 life; and it is ever a true rule in exer- 
 cises, that they be framed as near as may 
 be to the life of practice, for otherwise 
 they do pervert the motions and faculties of 
 the mind, and not prepare them* The truth 
 whereof is not obscure, when scholars come 
 to the practices of professions, or other ac- 
 tions of civil life ; which when they set into, 
 this want is soon found by themselves, and 
 sooner by others. But this part, touching 
 the amendment of the institutions and or- 
 ders of universities, I will conclude with the 
 clause of Caesar's letter to Oppius and Balbus, 
 Hoc quemadmodum fieri possit, nonnulla mihi 
 in mentem veniunt, et multa reperiri possunt ; 
 de Us rebus rogo vos ut cogitationem suscipiatis. 
 
 Another defect, which I note, ascendeth 5. 
 
 Tii-i i i i n * n Tfant °f 
 
 a little higher than the precedent; for as correspond- 
 
 ence with 
 
 the proficience of learning , consisteth much foreign uni- 
 
 . versities. 
 
 in the orders and institutions of universi- 
 ties in the same states and kingdoms, so it 
 would be yet more advanced, if there were 
 more intelligence mutual between the uni- 
 
136 
 
 versities of Europe than now there is. We 
 see there be many orders and foundations, 
 which though they be divided under several 
 sovereignties and territories, yet they take 
 themselves to have a kind of contract, fra- 
 ternity, and correspondence one with ano- 
 ther, insomuch as they have provincials and 
 generals. And surely as nature createth 
 brotherhood in families, and arts mechani- 
 cal contract brotherhoods in commonalties, 
 and the anointment of God superinduceth 
 a brotherhood in kings and bishops; so in 
 like manner there cannot but be a frater- 
 nity in learning and illumination, relating 
 to that paternity which is attributed to God, 
 who is called the father of illuminations or 
 lights. 
 innofap- ^ e ^ ast defect which I will note is, that 
 
 ?uirers g into the re hath not been, or very rarely been, 
 of rt know- arts an y Public designation of writers or in- 
 Jedge. quirers concerning such parts of know- 
 
 ledge as may appear not to have been 
 already sufficiently laboured or undertaken ; 
 unto which point it is an inducement to 
 enter into a view and examination what 
 parts of learning have been prosecuted, 
 
137 
 and what omitted : for the opinion of 
 plenty is amongst the causes of want, and 
 the great quantity of books maketh a shew 
 rather of superfluity than lack ; which sur- 
 charge, nevertheless, is not to be remedied 
 by making no more books, but by making 
 more good books, which, as the serpent 
 of Moses, might devour the serpents of the 
 enchanters. 
 
 The removing of all the defects formerly 
 enumerated, except the last, and of the ac- 
 tive part also of the last, (which is the de- 
 signation of writers,) are opera basilica ; 
 towards which the endeavours of a private 
 man may be but as an image in a cross - 
 way, that may point at the way, but cannot 
 go it : but the inducing part of the latter, 
 which is the survey of learning, may be set 
 forward by private travel. Wherefore I will Purpose of 
 
 this book. 
 
 now attempt to make a general and faithful 
 perambulation of learning, with an inquiry 
 what parts thereof lie fresh and waste, and 
 not improved and converted by the indus- 
 try of man ; to the end that such a plot, 
 made and recorded to memory, may both 
 minister light to any public designation, and 
 
138 
 
 also serve to excite voluntary endeavours : 
 wherein nevertheless, my purpose is at this 
 time to note only omissions and deficien- 
 cies, and not to make any redargution of 
 errors, or incomplete prosecutions ; for it is 
 one thing to set forth what ground lieth un- 
 manured, and another thing to correct ill 
 husbandry in that which is manured. 
 
 In the handling and undertaking of which 
 work I am not ignorant what it is that I do 
 now move and attempt, nor insensible of mine 
 own weakness to sustain my purpose ; but my 
 hope is that, if my extreme love to learning 
 carry me too far, I may obtain the excuse of 
 affection ; for that " it is not granted to man 
 " to love and to be wise." But, I know well, I 
 can use no other liberty of judgment than I 
 must leave to others ; and I, for my part, 
 shall be indifferently glad either to perform 
 myself, or accept from another, that duty of 
 humanity ; Nam qui erranti comiter monstrat 
 viam, etc. I do foresee likewise, that of those 
 things which I shall enter and register as 
 deficiencies and omissions, many will con- 
 ceive and censure that some of them are 
 already done and extant; others to be but 
 
139 
 
 curiosities* and things of no great use ; and 
 others to be of too great difficulty, and al- 
 most impossibility to be compassed and 
 effected : but for the two first> I refer myself 
 to the particulars ; for the last, touching im- 
 possibility, I take it those things are to be 
 held possible which may be done by some 
 person, though not by every one ; and which 
 may be done by many, though not by any 
 one ; and which may be done in succession 
 of ages, though not within the hour-glass of 
 one man's life ; and which may be done by 
 public designation, though not by private 
 endeavour. 
 
 But, notwithstanding, if any man will take 
 to himself rather that of Solomon, Dicit piger, 
 Leo est in via, than that of Virgil, Possunt, 
 quia posse videntur ; I shall be content that 
 my labours be esteemed but as the better 
 sort of wishes ; for as it asketh some know- 
 ledge to demand a question not impertinent, 
 so it requireth some sense to make a wish not 
 absurd. 
 
 THE parts of human learning have re- Distribution 
 
 of the parts 
 
 ference to the three parts of man's Under- of Learning. 
 
140 
 
 standing, which is the seat of learning : His- 
 tory to his Memory, Poesy to his Imagina- 
 tion, and Philosophy to his Reason. Divine 
 learning receiveth the same distribution ; for 
 the spirit of man is the same, though the 
 revelation of oracle and sense be diverse : so 
 as theology consisteth also of history of the 
 church ; of parables, which is divine poesy ; 
 and of holy doctrine or precept : for as for 
 that part which seemeth supernumerary, 
 which is prophecy, it is but divine history; 
 which hath that prerogative over human^ as 
 the narration may be before the fact as well 
 as after 
 
 HISTORY. 
 
 History is Natural, Civil, Ecclesiastical^ 
 and Literary ; whereof the three first I allow 
 1. as extant, the fourth I note as deficient. For 
 tory. no man hath propounded to himself the ge- 
 
 neral state of Jearning to be described and 
 represented from age to age, as many have 
 done the works of nature, and the state civil 
 and ecclesiastical ; without which the history 
 
141 
 
 of the world seemeth to me to be as the statue 
 of Polyphemus with his eye out ; that part 
 being wanting which doth most shew the 
 spirit and life of the person : And yet I am 
 not ignorant that in divers particular sciences, 
 as of the jurisconsults, the mathematicians, 
 the rhetoricians, the philosophers, there are 
 set down some small memorials of the schools, 
 authors and books; and so likewise some 
 barren relations touching the invention of 
 arts or usages. 
 
 But a just story of learning, containing the 
 antiquities and originals of knowledges and 
 their sects, their inventions, their traditions, 
 their diverse administrations and managings, 
 their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, 
 depressions, oblivions, removes, with the 
 causes and occasions of them, and all other 
 events concerning learning, throughout the 
 ages of the world, I may truly affirm to be 
 wanting. 
 
 The use and end of which work I do not so 
 much design for curiosity, or satisfaction of 
 those that are the lovers of learning, but 
 chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose ? 
 which is this in few words, that it will make 
 
142 
 
 learned men wise in the use and administra- 
 tion of learning. For it is not St. Augustine's 
 nor St. Ambrose's works that will make so 
 wise a divine as ecclesiastical history tho- 
 roughly read and observed; and the same 
 reason is of learning. 
 
 ^ a t U rai His- History of Nature is of three sorts ; of na- 
 
 t0ly * ture in course, of nature erring or varying, 
 
 and of nature altered or wrought; that is 
 
 history of creatures, history of marvels, and 
 
 history of arts. 
 
 The first of these, no doubt, is extant, and 
 
 that in good perfection ; the two latter are 
 
 handled so weakly and unprofitably, as I am 
 
 moved to note them as deficient. 
 
 History of ;p or j £ n( j no sufficient or competent col- 
 
 marvels den- r 
 
 dent. lection of the works of nature which have a 
 
 digression and deflexion from the ordinary 
 course of generations, productions, and mo- 
 tions ; whether they be singularities of place 
 and region, or the strange events of time and 
 chance, or the effects of yet unknown pro- 
 perties, or the instances of exception to ge- 
 neral kinds : it is true, I find a number of 
 books of fabulous experiments and secrets, and 
 frivolous impostures for pleasure and strange- 
 
143 
 
 ness ; but a substantial and severe collection 
 of the heteroclites or irregulars of nature, well 
 examined and described, I find not, especially 
 not with due rejection of fables and popular 
 errors: for as things now are, if an untruth 
 in nature be once on foot, what by reason of 
 the neglect of examination, and countenance 
 of antiquity, and what by reason of the use 
 of the opinion in similitudes and ornaments 
 of speech, it is never called down. 
 
 The use of this work, honoured with a 
 precedent in Aristotle, is nothing less than 
 to give contentment to the appetite of curi- 
 ous and vain wits, as the manner of mira- 
 bilaries is to do ; but for two reasons, both 
 of great weight ; the one, to correct the par- 
 tiality of axioms and opinions, which are 
 commonly framed only upon common and 
 familiar examples; the other, because from 
 the wonders of nature is the nearest intelli- 
 gence and passage towards the wonders of 
 art : for it is no more but by following, 
 and as it were hounding nature in her wan- 
 derings, to be able to lead her afterwards to 
 the same place again. 
 
 Neither am I of opinion, in this history of 
 
144 
 
 marvels, that superstitious narrations of sor- 
 ceries, witchcrafts, dreams, divinations, and 
 the like, where there is an assurance and 
 clear evidence of the fact, be altogether ex- 
 cluded. For it is not yet known iu what 
 cases and how far effects attributed to super- 
 stition do participate of natural causes : and 
 therefore howsoever the practice of such 
 things is to be condemned, yet from the spe- 
 culation and consideration of them light may 
 be taken, not only for the discerning of the 
 offences, but for the farther disclosing of na- 
 ture. Neither ought a man to make scruple 
 of entering into these things for inquisition 
 of truth, as your majesty hath shewed in 
 your own example ; who with the two clear 
 eyes of religion and natural philosophy have 
 looked deeply and wisely into these shadows, 
 and yet proved yourself to be of the nature of 
 the sun, which passeth through pollutions, 
 and itself remains as pure as before. 
 
 But this I hold fit, that these narrations, 
 which have mixture with superstition, be 
 sorted by themselves, and not be mingled 
 with the narrations which are merely and 
 sincerely natural. 
 
145 
 
 But as for the narrations touching the pro- 
 digies and miracles of religions, they are 
 either not true, or not natural ; and there- 
 fore impertinent for the story of nature. 
 
 For history of nature wrought or mecha- History of 
 
 • ", T > t « • 1 O ArtS defiCi " 
 
 meal, I hnd some collections made ot agn- ent. 
 culture, and likewise of manual arts; but 
 commonly with a rejection of experiments 
 familiar and vulgar. 
 
 For it is esteemed a kind of dishonour unto 
 learning to descend to inquiry or medita- 
 tion upon matters mechanical, except they 
 be such as may be thought secrets, rarities, 
 and special subtilties ; which humour of vain 
 and supercilious arrogancy is justly derided 
 in Plato; where he brings in Hippias, a 
 vaunting sophist, disputing with Socrates, a 
 true and unfeigned inquisitor of truth; where 
 the subject being touching beauty, Socrates, 
 after his wandering manner of inductions, 
 put first an example of a fair virgin, and then 
 of a fair horse, and then of a fair pot well 
 glazed, whereat Hippias was offended ; and 
 said, " More^ than for courtesy's sake, he 
 " did think much to dispute with any that 
 if did aliedge such base and sordid in- 
 
146 
 
 te stances :" whereunto Socrates answered, 
 " You have reason, and it becomes you well, 
 " being a man so trim in your vestments." 
 etc. And so goeth on in irony. 
 
 But the truth is, they be not the highest 
 instances that give the securest information ; 
 as may be well expressed in the tale so com- 
 mon of the philosopher, that while he gazed 
 upwards to the stars fell into the water ; for 
 if he had looked down he might have seen 
 the stars in the water, but looking aloft he 
 could not see the water in the stars. So it 
 cometh often to pass, that mean and small 
 things discover great, better than great can 
 discover the small ; and therefore Aristotle 
 noteth well, " that the nature of every thing 
 " is best seen in its smallest portions." And 
 for that cause he inquireth the nature of a 
 commonwealth, first in a family, and the sim- 
 ple conjugations of man and wife, parent 
 and child, master and servant, which are in 
 every cottage. Even so likewise the nature of 
 this great city of the world, and the policy 
 thereof, must be first sought in mean con- 
 cordances and small portions. So we see how 
 that secret of nature, of the turning of iron 
 
147 
 
 touched with the loadstone towards the north, 
 was found out in needles of iron, not in bars 
 of iron. 
 
 But if my judgment he of any weight, the 
 use of History Mechanical is of all others 
 the most radical and fundamental towards 
 natural philosophy ; such natural philosophy 
 as shall not vanish in the fume of subtile, sub- 
 lime, or delectable speculation, but such as 
 ■shall be operative to the endowment and be- 
 nefit of man's life : for it will not only mi- 
 nister and suggest for the present many in- 
 genious practices in all trades, by a connexion 
 and transferring of the observations of one 
 art to the use of another, when the experi- 
 ences of several mysteries shall fall under the 
 consideration of one man's mind; but far- 
 ther, it will give a more true and real illumi- 
 nation concerning causes and axioms than is 
 hitherto attained. 
 
 For like as a man's disposition is never 
 well known till he be crossed, nor Proteus 
 ever changed shapes till he was straitened 
 and held fast ; so the passages and variations 
 of nature cannot appear so fully in the liberty 
 l2 
 
148 
 
 of nature, as in the trials and vexations of 
 art. 
 
 ^ ., 3 - For Civil History, it is of three kinds; 
 
 Civil History. J 9 
 
 not unfitly to be compared with the three 
 kinds of pictures or images : for of pictures 
 or images, we see, some are unfinished, some 
 are perfect, and some are defaced. So of 
 histories we may find three kinds, Memorials, 
 Perfect Histories, and Antiquities; for me- 
 morials are history unfinished, or the first or 
 rough draughts of history ; and antiquities 
 are history defaced, or some remnants of his- 
 tory which have casually escaped the ship- 
 wreck of time. 
 Of Memo- Memorials, or preparatory history, are of 
 
 ~~ two sorts ; whereof the one may be termed 
 Commentaries, and the other Registers. Com- 
 mentaries are they which set down a con- 
 tinuance of the naked events and actions, 
 without the motives or designs, the counsels, 
 the speeches, the pretexts, the occasions and 
 other passages of action : for this is the true 
 nature of a Commentary ; though Caesar, in 
 modesty mixed with greatness, did for his 
 
149 
 
 pleasure apply the name of a Commentary 
 to the best history of the world. Registers 
 are collections of public acts, as decrees of 
 council, judicial proceedings, declarations 
 and letters of state, orations and the like, 
 without a perfect continuance or contexture 
 of the thread of the narration. 
 
 Antiquities? or remnants of history, are, ^o* 
 as was said, tanquam tabula naufragii ; when 
 industrious persons, by an exact and scrupu- 
 lous diligence and observation, out of monu*- 
 ments, names, words, proverbs, traditions, 
 private records and evidences, fragments of 
 stories, passages of books that concern not 
 story, and the like, do save and recover 
 somewhat from the deluge of time. 
 
 In these kinds of imperfect histories I do 
 assign no deficience, for they are tanquam im~ 
 perfecte mista ; and therefore any deficience 
 in them is but their nature* 
 
 As for the corruptions and moths of his- Epitomes, 
 tory, which are Epitomes, the use of them 
 deserveth to be banished, as all men of sound 
 judgment have confessed ; as those that have 
 fretted- and corroded the sound bodies of many 
 
150 
 
 excellent histories, and wrought them into 
 base and unprofitable dregs. 
 Perfect His- History, which may be called Just and Per* 
 
 tory of three * J 
 
 kinds. f ec t History, is of three kinds, according to 
 
 the object which it propoundeth, or pre- 
 tendeth to represent: for it either repre- 
 sented a time, or a person, or an action. 
 The first we call Chronicles, the second Lives, 
 and the third Narrations or Relations. 
 
 Of these, although the first be the most 
 complete and absolute kind of history, and 
 hath most estimation and glory, yet the se- 
 cond excelleth it in profit and use, and the 
 third in verity and sincerity : for history of 
 times representeth the magnitude of actions, 
 and the public faces and deportments of per- 
 sons, and passeth over in silence the smaller 
 passages and motions of men and matters. 
 
 But such being the workmanship of God, 
 as he doth hang the greatest weight upon 
 the smallest wires, maxima e minimis sus- 
 pendens, it comes therefore to pass, that such 
 histories do rather set forth the pomp of busi- 
 ness than the true and inward resorts there- 
 of. But Lives, if they be well written, pro-* 
 pounding to themselves a person to repre- 
 
151 
 
 sent, m whom actions both greater and 
 -smaller, public, and private, have a commix- 
 ture, must of a necessity contain a more true> 
 native, and lively representation. So again 
 narrations and relations of actions, as the 
 War of Peloponnesus, the Expedition of 
 Cyrus Minor, the Conspiracy of Catiline, 
 cannot but be more purely and exactly true 
 than histories of times, because they may 
 choose an argument comprehensible within 
 the notice and instructions of the writer: 
 whereas he that undertaketh the story of a 
 time, especially of any length, cannot but 
 meet with many blanks and spaces which 
 he must be forced to fill up out of his own 
 wit and conjecture. 
 
 For the History of Times, I mean of civil of 
 history, the providence of God hath made the 
 distribution: for it hath pleased God to, or- 
 dain and illustrate two exemplar states of the 
 world for arms, learning, moral virtue, po- 
 licy, and laws; the state of Graecia, and the 
 state of Rome ; the histories whereof, occu- 
 pying the middle part of time, have more an- 
 cient to them, histories which may by one 
 common name be termed the Antiquities of 
 
\5t 
 
 the world; and after them, histories which 
 may be likewise called by the name of Mo* 
 dern History. 
 Heathen An- Now to speak of the deficiencies. As to 
 
 tiquities. x 
 
 the heathen antiquities of the world, it is in 
 vain to note them for deficient: deficient 
 they are no doubt> consisting mostly of fables 
 and fragments ; but the deficience cannot be 
 holpen ; for antiquity is like fame, caput inter 
 nubila condit, her head is muffled from our 
 sight. For the history of the exemplar states, 
 it is extant in jgood perfection. Not but I 
 could wish there were a perfect course of 
 history for Graecia from Theseus to Philo- 
 pcemen, (what time the affairs of Graecia 
 were drowned and extinguished in the affairs 
 of Rome ;) and for Rome from Romulus to 
 Justinianus, who may be truly said to be 
 ultimus Romanorum. In which sequences of 
 story the text of Thucydides and Xenophon 
 in the one, and the text of Livius, Polybius, 
 ' Sallustius, Caesar, Appianus, Tacitus, Hero- 
 dianus in the other, to be kept intire with- 
 out any diminution at all, and only to be 
 supplied and continued. But this is matter 
 of magnificence, rather to be commended 
 
153 
 
 than required : and we speak now of parts of 
 learning supplemental, and not of superero- 
 gation. 
 
 But for modern Histories, whereof there Unworthi- 
 
 ness of the 
 
 are some few very worthy, but the greater histories of 
 
 J < J to England and 
 
 part beneath mediocrity, (leaving the care Scotland. 
 of foreign stories to foreign states, because I 
 will not be curiosus in aliena republica,) I 
 cannot fail to represent to your majesty 
 the unworthiness of the history of England 
 in the main continuance thereof, and the 
 partiality and obliquity of that of Scotland 
 in the latest and largest author that I have 
 seen : supposing that it would be honour 
 for your majesty, and a work very me- 
 morable, if this island of Great Britain, as 
 it is now joined in monarchy for the ages 
 to come, so were joined in one history for 
 the times passed ; after the manner of the 
 sacred history, which draweth down the 
 story of the ten tribes and of the two tribes, 
 as twins, together. And if it shall seem that 
 the greatness of this work may make it less 
 exactly performed, there is an excellent 
 period of a smaller compass of time, as to 
 the story of England ; that is to say, from 
 
154 
 
 the uniting of the roses to the uniting of 
 the kingdoms ; a portion of time, wherein, 
 to my understanding, there hath been the 
 rarest varieties that in like number of suc- 
 cessions of any hereditary monarchy hath 
 been known : for it beginneth with the mix- 
 ed adeption of a crown by arms and title ; 
 an entry by battle, an establishment by mar- 
 riage ; and therefore times answerable, like 
 waters after a tempest, full of working and 
 swelling, though without extremity of storm ; 
 but well passed through by the wisdom of 
 the pilot, being one of the most sufficient 
 kings of all the number. Then followeth 
 the reign of a king, whose actions, howso- 
 ever conducted, had much intermixture with 
 the affairs of Europe, balancing and in- 
 clining them variably ; in whose time also 
 began that great alteration in the state ec- 
 clesiastical, an action which seldom cometh 
 upon the stage. Then the reign of a minor : 
 then an offer of an usurpation, though it 
 was but as febris ephemera: then the reign 
 of a queen matched with a foreigner : then 
 of a queen that lived solitary and unmar- 
 ried, and yet her government so masculine 
 
155 
 
 as it had greater impression and operation 
 upon the states abroad than it any ways re^- 
 ceived from thence. And now last, this most 
 happy and glorious event, that this island 
 of Britain, divided from all the world, should 
 be united in itself : and that oracle of rest, 
 given to iEneas, Antiquam exquirite ?natrem, 
 should now be performed and fulfilled upon 
 the nations of England and Scotland, being 
 now reunited in the ancient mother name 
 of Britain, as a full period of all instabi- 
 lity and peregrinations : so that as it cometh 
 to pass in massive bodies, that they have 
 certain trepidations and waverings before 
 they fix and settle ; so it seemeth that by 
 the providence of God this monarchy, be- 
 fore it was to settle in your majesty and 
 your generations, (in which, I hope, it is 
 now established for ever,) it had these pre- 
 lusive changes and varieties. 
 
 For Lives, I do find strange that these of Lives, 
 times have so little esteemed the virtues of 
 the times, as that the writing of lives should 
 be no more frequent. For although there 
 be not many sovereign princes or absolute 
 commanders, and that states are most col- 
 
156 
 
 lected into monarchies, yet there are many 
 worthy personages that deserve better than 
 dispersed report or barren eulogies. For 
 herein the invention of one of the late 
 poets is proper, and doth well enrich the 
 ancient fiction : for he feigneth that at the 
 end of the i thread or web of every man's 
 life there was a little medal containing the 
 person's name, and that Time waited upon 
 the shears ; and as soon as the thread was 
 cut, caught the medals, and carried them 
 to the river of Lethe ; and about the 
 bank there were many birds flying up and 
 down, that would get the medals and carry 
 them in their beak a little while, and then 
 let them fall into the river : only there were 
 a few swans, which if they got a name, 
 would carry it to a temple where it was 
 consecrated. 
 
 And though many men, more mortal in 
 their affections than in their bodies, do 
 esteem desire of name and memory but as 
 a vanity and ventosity, 
 
 Animi nil magna laudis egentes ; 
 which opinion cometh from the root, non 
 prius laudes contempsimus, quam laudanda fa* 
 
157 
 
 cere desivimus ; yet that will not alter Solo- 
 mon's judgment, Memoria justi cum laudi- 
 bus, at impiorum nomen putrescet : the one 
 flourisheth, the other either consumeth to 
 present oblivion, or turneth to an ill odour. 
 
 And therefore in that stile or addition, 
 which is and hath been long well received 
 and brought in use, felicis memories, pi& 
 memoriae, bonce memories, we do acknowledge 
 that which Cicero saith, borrowing it from 
 Demosthenes, that bona fama propria possessio 
 defunctorum ; which possession I cannot but 
 note that in our times it lieth much waste, 
 and that therein there is a deficience. 
 
 For Narrations and Relations of particu- of Nan*. 
 lar actions, there were also to be wished a 
 greater diligence therein ; for there is no 
 great action but hath some good pen which 
 attends it. 
 
 And because it is an ability not eommon 
 to write a good history, as may well appear 
 by the small number of them ; yet if par* 
 ticularity of actions memorable were but 
 tolerably reported as they pass, the com- 
 piling of a complete history of times might 
 be the better expected, when a writer should 
 
158 
 
 arise that were fit for it : for the collection 
 of such relations might be as a nursery- 
 garden, whereby to plant a fair and stately 
 garden, when time should serve. 
 Annals and There is yet another partitionSrf history 
 
 Journals. 
 
 which Cornelius Tacitus maketh, which is 
 not to be forgotten, especially with that ap- 
 plication which he accoupleth it withal* 
 Annals and Journals : appropriating to the 
 former matters of state, and to the latter 
 acts and accidents of a meaner nature. For 
 giving but a touch of certain magnificent 
 buildings, he addeth, Cum ex dignitate populi 
 Romani repertum sit, res illustres annalibus, 
 talia diurnis urbis actis mandare. So as there 
 is a kind of contemplative heraldry, as well 
 as civil. And as nothing doth derogate from 
 the dignity of a state more than confusion 
 of degrees ; so it doth not a little embase 
 the authority of an history, to intermingle 
 matters of triumph, or matters of ceremony, 
 or matters of novelty, with matters of state. 
 But the use of a journal hath not only been 
 in the history of time, but likewise in the 
 history of persons, and chiefly of actions ; 
 for princes in ancient time had, upon point 
 
159 
 
 of honor and policy both, journals kept of 
 what passed day by day : for we see the 
 Chronicle which was read before Ahasuerus, 
 when he could not take rest, contained 
 matter of affairs indeed, but such as had 
 passed in his own time, and very lately be- 
 fore : but the journal of Alexander's house 
 expressed every small particularity, even 
 concerning his person and court ; and it is 
 yet an use well received in enterprises me- 
 morable, as expeditions of war, navigations, 
 and the like, to keep diaries of that which 
 passeth continually. 
 
 I cannot likewise be ignorant of a form Ruminated 
 
 « . . l • i i or philoso- 
 
 ot writing, which some grave and wise men pnicai his- 
 have used, containing a scattered history of 
 those actions which they have thought worthy 
 of memory, with politic discourse and ob- 
 servation thereupon ; not incorporated into 
 the history, but separately, and as the more 
 principal in their intention ; which kind of 
 ruminated history I think more fit to place 
 amongst books of policy, whereof w r e shall 
 hereafter speak, than amongst books of his- 
 tory : for it is the true office of history to 
 represent the events themselves together with 
 
the counsels, and to leave the observations 
 and conclusions thereupon to the liberty and 
 faculty of every man's judgment ; but mix- 
 tures are things irregular, whereof no man 
 can define. 
 History of So also is there another kind of history 
 phy. ° manifoldly mixed, and that is History of 
 Cosmography; being compounded of natural 
 history, in respect of the regions themselves ; 
 of history civil, in respect of the habitations, 
 regimens, and manners of the people ; and 
 the mathematics, in respect of the climates 
 and configurations towards the heavens : 
 which part 01 learning of all others, in this 
 latter time, hath obtained most proficience # 
 For it may be truly affirmed to* the honour 
 of these times, and in a virtuous emulation 
 with antiquity, that this great building of 
 the world had never thorough lights made 
 in it, till the age of us and our fathers : 
 for although they had knowledge of the 
 antipodes, 
 Nosque ubi primus equis oriens afflavit anhelis, 
 . Iilic sera rubens accendit lumina Vesper : 
 yet that might be by demonstration, and 
 not in fact; and if by travel, it requiretk 
 
161 
 
 the voyage but of half the globe. But to 
 circle the earth, as the heavenly bodies do, 
 was not done or enterprised till these latter 
 times: and therefore these times may justly 
 bear in their word, not only plus ultra, in 
 precedence of the ancient non ultra, and imi- 
 tabile fulmen, in precedence of the ancient 
 non imitabile fulmen , 
 
 Demens qui nimbos et non imitabile fulmen, etc. 
 but likewise imitabile codum; in respect of the 
 many memorable voyages, after the manner 
 of heaven, about the globe of the earth. 
 
 And this proficience in navigation and dis- 
 coveries may plant also an expectation of the 
 farther proficience and augmentation of all 
 sciences ; because it may seem they are or- 
 dained by God to be coevals, that is, to meet 
 one age. For so the prophet Daniel, speak- 
 ing of the latter times, foretelleth, Plurimi 
 pertransibunt, et multiplex erit scientia; as if 
 the openness and thorough passage of the 
 world and the increase of knowledge were 
 appointed to be in the same ages, as we see 
 it is already performed in great part; the 
 learning of these latter times not much giv- 
 ing place to the former two periods- or re- 
 
162 
 
 turns of learning, the one of the Grecians, 
 the other of the Romans. 
 
 Ecclesiastical 
 History. 
 
 History of 
 the Church. 
 
 History of 
 2 5 rophecy. 
 
 History ecclesiastical receiveth the same 
 divisions with history civil: but farther, in 
 the propriety thereof, may be divided into 
 the History of the church, by a general 
 name; History of prophecy ; and History of 
 providence. 
 
 The first describeth the times of the mili- 
 tant church, whether it be fluctuant, as the 
 ark of Noah ; or moveable, as the ark in the 
 wilderness ; or at rest, as the ark in the 
 temple ; that is, the state of the church in 
 persecution, in remove, and in peace. This 
 part I ought in no sort to note as deficient, 
 only I would that the virtue and sincerity of 
 it were according to the mass and quantity. 
 But I am not now in hand with censures, 
 but with omissions. 
 
 The second, which is history of prophecy, 
 consisteth of two relatives, the prophecy, and 
 the accomplishment; and therefore the na- 
 ture of such a work ought to be, that every 
 prophecy of the scripture be sorted with the 
 event fulfilling the same, throughout the ages 
 
163 
 
 of the world; both for the better confirma- 
 tion of faith, and for the better illumination 
 of the church touching those parts of prophe- 
 cies which are yet unfulfilled : allowing- never- 
 theless that latitude which is agreeable and 
 familiar unto divine prophecies; being of 
 the nature of their author, with whom a 
 thousand years are but as one day; and 
 therefore are not fulfilled punctually at once, 
 but have springing and germinant accom- 
 plishment throughout many ages; though 
 the height or fulness of them may refer to 
 some one age. 
 
 This is a work which I find deficient ; but 
 is to be done with wisdom, sobriety, and re- 
 verence, or not at all. 
 
 The third, which is history of providence, History of 
 containeth that excellent correspondence 
 which is between God's revealed will and 
 his secret will : which though it be so ob- 
 scure, as for the most part it is not legible to 
 the natural man; no, nor many times to 
 those who behold it from the tabernacle; 
 yet at some times it pleaseth God, for our 
 better establishment, and the confuting of 
 m 2 
 
164 
 
 those which are as without God in the world, 
 to write it in such text and capital letters/ 
 that as the prophet saith, he that runneth by 
 may read it; that is, mere sensual persons, 
 which hasten by God's judgments and never 
 bend or fix their cogitations upon them, are 
 nevertheless in their passage and race urged 
 to discern it. Such are the notable events 
 and examples of God's judgments, chastise- 
 ments, deliverances, and blessings ; and this 
 is a work which hath passed through the la- 
 bours of many, and therefore I cannot pre- 
 sent as omitted. 
 of the Ap- There are also other parts of learning 
 ffi»toiy. which are Appendices to history : for all the 
 exterior proceedings of man consist of words 
 and deeds ; whereof history doth properly 
 receive and retain in memory the deeds; 
 and if words, yet but as inducements and 
 passages to deeds : so are there other books 
 and writings, which are appropriated to the 
 custody and receipt of words only; which 
 likewise are of three sorts ; Orations, Letters, 
 and brief Speeches or Sayings. 
 
 Orations are pleadings, speeches of conn- 
 
165 
 
 sel, laudatives, invectives, apologies, repre- 
 hensions, orations of formality or ceremony, 
 and the like. 
 
 Letters are according to all the variety of 
 occasions, advertisements, advices, directions, 
 propositions, petitions, commendatory, ex- 
 postulatory, satisfactory; of compliment, of 
 pleasure, of discourse, and all other passages 
 of action. And such as are written from 
 wise men, are of all the words of man, in 
 my judgment, the best; for they are more 
 natural than orations and public speeches, 
 and more advised than conferences or pre- 
 sent speeches. So again letters of affairs 
 from such as manage them, or are privy to 
 them, are of all others the best instructions 
 for history, and to a diligent reader the best 
 histories in themselves. 
 
 For Apophthegms, it is a great loss of that 
 book of Caesar's ; for as his history, and those 
 few letters of his which we have, and those 
 apophthegms which were of his own, excel 
 all mens' else, so I suppose would his collec- 
 tion of apophthegms have done ; for as for 
 those which are collected by others, either I 
 have no taste in such matters, or else their 
 
166 
 
 choice hath not been happy. But upon these 
 three kinds of writings I do not insist, be- 
 cause I have no deficiencies to propound con- 
 cerning them. 
 
 Thus much therefore concerning history ; 
 which is that part of learning which an- 
 swereth to one of the cells, domiciles, or of- 
 fices of the mind of man ; which is that of 
 the memory. 
 
 POESY. 
 
 The nature Poesy is a part of learning in measure of 
 
 of Poesy : it's L ° 
 
 two senses. WO rds for the most part restrained, but in all 
 other points extremely licensed, and doth 
 truly refer to the imagination ; which, being 
 not tied to the laws of matter, may at plea- 
 sure join that which nature hath severed, 
 and sever that which nature hath joined; 
 and so make unlawful matches and divorces 
 of things ; Pictoribus atque poetis, etc. It is 
 taken in two senses, in respect of words, or 
 matter; in the first sense it is but a charac- 
 ter of stile, and belongeth to arts of speech, 
 and is not pertinent for the present : in the 
 
167 
 
 latter, it is, as hath been said, one of the 
 principal portions of learning, and is nothing 
 else but feigned history, which may be stiled 
 as well in prose as in verse. 
 
 The use of this feigned history hath been Use of Poesy. 
 to give some shadow of satisfaction to the 
 mind of man in those points wherein the na- 
 ture of things doth deny it, the world being 
 in proportion inferior to the soul ; by reason 
 whereof there is, agreeable to the spirit of 
 man, a more ample greatness, a more exact 
 goodness, and a more absolute variety, than 
 can be found in the nature of things. There- 
 fore, because the acts or events of true his- 
 tory have not that magnitude which satis- 
 fieth the mind of man, poesy feigneth acts 
 and events greater and more heroical : be- 
 cause true history propoundeth the successes 
 and issues of actions not so agreeable to the 
 merits of virtue and vice, therefore poesy 
 feigns them more just in retribution, and 
 more according to revealed providence : 
 because true history representeth actions 
 and events more ordinary, and less inter- 
 changed, therefore poesy endueth them 
 with more rareness, and more unexpected 
 
168 
 
 and alternative variations : so as it appeareth 
 that poesy serveth and conferreth to mag- 
 nanimity, morality, and to delectation. And 
 therefore it was ever thought to have some 
 participation of divineness, because it doth 
 raise and erect the mind, by submitting the 
 shews of things to the desires of the mind ; 
 whereas reason doth buckle and bow the 
 mind unto the nature of things. 
 
 And we see, that by these insinuations 
 and congruities with man's nature and plea- 
 sure, joined also with the agreement and 
 consort it hath with music, it hath had access 
 and estimation in rude times and barba- 
 rous regions, where other learning stood ex- 
 cluded. 
 Poesy, nar- The division of poesy, which is aptest in 
 
 rative, repre- f ,'.,... 
 
 sentathe, and the propriety thereof, (besides those divisions 
 
 allusive. 
 
 which are common unto it with history, as 
 feigned chronicles, feigned lives, and the 
 appendices of history, as feigned epistles, 
 feigned orations, and the rest) is into Poesy 
 Narrative, Representative, and Allusive. 
 
 The Narrative is a mere imitation of his- 
 tory, with the excesses before remember- 
 ed; choosing for subject commonly wars and 
 
169 
 
 love, rarely state, and sometimes pleasure or 
 mirth. 
 
 Representative is as a visible history ; and 
 is an image of actions as if they were present, 
 as history is of actions in nature as they are, 
 that is past. 
 
 Allusive or parabolical is a narration ap- 
 plied only to express some special purpose 
 or conceit: which latter kind of parabolical 
 wisdom was much more in use in the ancient 
 times, as by the fables of iEsop, and the brief 
 sentences of the Seven, and the use of hiero- 
 glyphics, may appear. And the cause was, 
 for that it was then of necessity to express 
 any point of reason, which was more sharp 
 or subtile than the vulgar, in that manner ; 
 because men in those times wanted both va- 
 riety of examples and subtilty of conceit : 
 and as hieroglyphics were before letters, so 
 parables were before arguments. And never- 
 theless now, and at all times, they do retain 
 much life and vigour ; because reason cannot 
 be so sensible, nor examples so fit. 
 " But there remaineth yet another use of 
 poesy parabolical, opposite to that which we 
 last mentioned : for that tendeth to demon- 
 
170 
 
 strate and illustrate that which is taught or 
 delivered, and this other to retire and ob- 
 scure it : that is, when the secrets and mys- 
 teries of religion, policy, or philosophy, are 
 involved in fables and parables. 
 Exposition Of this in divine poesy we see the use is 
 
 of certain 
 
 febies. authorised. In heathen poesy we see the ex- 
 
 position of fables doth fall out sometimes 
 with great felicity ; as in the fable that the 
 giants being overthrown in their war against 
 the gods, the Earth their mother in revenge 
 thereof brought forth Fame : 
 
 Illam terra parens ira irritata deorutn, 
 Extremam, ut perhibent, Cceo Enceladoque 
 sororem Progenuit. 
 
 Expounded, that when Princes and mo- 
 narchies have suppressed actual and open 
 rebels, then the malignity of people, which 
 is the mother of rebellion, doth bring forth 
 libels and slanders, and taxations of the state, 
 which is of the same kind with rebellion, but 
 more feminine. So in the fable, that the 
 rest of the gods having conspired to bind Ju- 
 piter, Pallas called Briareus with his hun- 
 dred hands to his aid : expounded, that mo- 
 
171 
 
 narchies need not fear any curbing of their 
 absoluteness by mighty subjects, as long as 
 by wisdom they keep the hearts of the peo- 
 ple, who will be sure to come in on their 
 side. So in the fable, that Achilles was 
 brought up under Chiron the Centaur, who 
 was part a man and part a beast ; expound- 
 ed ingeniously, but corruptly by Machiavel, 
 that it belongeth to the education and disci- 
 pline of princes to know as well how to play 
 the part of the lion in violence, and the fox 
 in guile, as of the man in virtue and jus- 
 tice. 
 
 Nevertheless, in many the like encounters, 
 I do rather think that the fable was first, 
 and the exposition devised, than that the mo- 
 ral was first, and thereupon the fable framed. 
 For I find it was an ancient vanity in Chry- 
 sippus, that troubled himself with great con- 
 tention to fasten the assertions of the Stoics 
 upon fictions of the ancient poets ; but yet 
 that all the fables and fictions of the poets 
 were but pleasure and not figure, I inter- 
 pose no opinion. 
 
 Surely of those poets which are now ex- 
 tant, even Homer himself, notwithstanding 
 
172 
 
 he was made a kind of Scripture by the lat- 
 ter schools of the Grecians, yet I should with- 
 out any difficulty pronounce that his fables 
 had no such inwardness in his own meaning ; 
 but what they might have upon a more ori- 
 ginal tradition, is not easy to affirm, for he 
 was not the inventor of many of them. 
 
 In this third part of learning, which is 
 poesy, I can report no deficience. For be- 
 ing as a plant that cometh of the lust of the 
 earth, without a formal seed, it hath sprung 
 up and spread abroad more than any other 
 kind : but to ascribe unto it that which is 
 due, for the expression of affections, pas- 
 sions, corruptions, and customs, we are be- 
 holden to poets more than to philosophers' 
 works ; and for wit and eloquence, not much 
 less than to orators' harangues. But it is 
 not good to stay too long in the theatre. Let 
 us now pass to the judicial place or palace 
 of the mind, which we are to approach and 
 view with more reverence and attention. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The knowledge of man is as the waters, 
 some descending from above, and some 
 
173 
 
 springing from beneath ; the one informed 
 by the light of nature/ the other inspired 
 by divine revelation. 
 
 The light of nature consisteth in the no- 
 tions of the mind and the reports of the 
 senses : for as for knowledge which man 
 receiveth by teaching, it is cumulative and 
 not original ; as in a water that, besides his 
 own spring-head, is fed with other springs 
 and streams. So then, according to these 
 two differing illuminations or originals, 
 knowledge is first of all divided into Divi- 
 nity and Philosophy. 
 
 In Philosophy, the contemplations of man Three enqui- 
 do either penetrate unto God, — or are cir- lophy. * °" 
 cumferred to nature, — or are reflected or 
 reverted upon himself. Out of which seve- 
 ral enquiries there do arise three know- 
 ledges, Divine philosophy, Natural philoso- 
 phy, and Human philosophy or Humanity. 
 For all things are marked and stamped 
 with this triple character, of the power of 
 God, the difference of nature, and the use 
 of man. 
 
 But because the distributions and parti- Primitive or 
 
 niii summary 
 
 tions ot knowledge are not like several lines Philosophy, 
 
1.74 
 
 that meet in one angle, and so touch but 
 in a point; but are like branches of a tree, 
 that meet in a stem, which hath a dimen- 
 sion and quantity of intireness and conti- 
 nuance, before it come to discontinue and 
 break itself into arms and boughs ; there- 
 fore it is good, before we enter into the 
 former distribution, to erect and constitute 
 one universal science, by the name of Phi- 
 losophia prima, primitive or summary phi- 
 losophy, as the main and common way, 
 before we come where the ways part and 
 divide themselves ; which science whether 
 I should report as deficient or no, I stand 
 doubtful. 
 
 For I find a certain rhapsody of natural 
 theology, and of divers parts of logic ; and 
 of that olbw part of natural philosophy 
 which concerneth the principles; and of 
 that other part of natural philosophy which 
 concerneth the soul or spirit; all these 
 strangely commixed and confused; but be- 
 ing examined, it seemeth to me rather a 
 depredation of other sciences, advanced and 
 exalted unto some height of terms, than any 
 thing solid or substantial of itself. 
 
175 
 
 Nevertheless I cannot be ignorant of the 
 distinction which is current, that the same 
 things are handled but in several respects. 
 As for example, that logic considereth of 
 many things as they are in notion ; and 
 this philosophy as they are in nature ; the 
 one in appearance, the other in existence: 
 but I find this difference better made than 
 pursued. For if they had considered quan- 
 tity, similitude, diversity, and the rest of 
 those external characters of things, as phi- 
 losophers, and in nature, their inquiries must 
 of force have been of a far other kind than 
 they are. 
 
 For doth any of them, in handling quan- 
 tity, speak of the force of union, how and 
 how far it multiplieth virtue ? Doth any 
 give the reason, why some things in nature 
 are so common, and in so great mass, and 
 others so rare, and in so small quantity ? 
 Doth any, in handling similitude and di- 
 versity, assign the cause why iron should 
 not move to iron, which is more like, but 
 move to the loadstone which is less like? 
 Why in all diversities of things there should 
 be certain participles in nature, which are 
 
176 
 
 almost ambiguous/ to which kind they should 
 be referred ? But there is a mere and deep 
 silence touching the nature and operation 
 of those common adjuncts of things, as in 
 nature ; and only a resuming and repeat- 
 ing of the force and use of them in speech 
 or argument. 
 Meaning of Therefore, because in a writing of this 
 
 primitive ° 
 
 Philosophy. na ture I avoid all subtilty, my meaning 
 touching this original or universal philoso- 
 phy is thus, in a plain and gross descrip- 
 tion by negative ; " That it be a receptacle 
 " for all such profitable observations and 
 " axioms as fall not within the compass of 
 " any of the special parts of philosophy or 
 " sciences, but are more common and of 
 <c a higher stage." 
 
 Now that there are many of that kind, 
 need not to be doubted. For example; is 
 not the rule Si incBqualibus cequalia addas, 
 omnia erunt incequalia, an axiom as well of 
 justice as of the mathematics? And is there 
 not a true coincidence between commuta- 
 tive and distributive justice, and arithme- 
 tical and geometrical proportion ? Is not 
 that other rule Quce in eodem tertio conve- 
 
177 
 
 niunt, et inter se conveniunt a rule taken from 
 the mathematics, but so potent in logic as 
 all syllogisms are built upon it ? Is not the 
 observation Omnia mutantur, nil interit a 
 contemplation, in philosophy thus, that the 
 quantum of nature is eternal ? in natural theo- 
 logy thus, that it requireth the same omni- 
 potence to make something nothing, which 
 at the first made nothing something ; ac- 
 cording to the scripture, Didici quod omnia 
 opera, qucz fecit ~Deus, per sever ent in perpetuum; 
 non possumus eis quicquam addere nee auferre. 
 
 Is not the ground, which Machiavel wisely 
 and largely discourseth concerning govern- 
 ments, that the way to establish and pre- 
 serve them, is to reduce them ad principia, 
 a rule in religion and nature, as well as 
 in civil administration ? Was not the Per- 
 sian magic a reduction or correspondence 
 of the principles and architectures of nature 
 to the rules and policy of governments ? Is 
 not the precept of a musician, to fall from 
 a discord or harsh accord upon a concord or 
 sweet accord, alike true in affection ? Is not 
 the trope of music, to avoid or slide from 
 the close or cadence, common with the trope 
 
178 
 
 of rhetoric, of deceiving expectation ? Is 
 not the delight of the quavering upon a stop 
 in music, the same with the playing of light 
 upon the water? 
 
 Splendet tremulo sub lumine pontics. 
 Are not the organs of the senses of one 
 kind with the organs of reflection, the eye 
 with a glass, the ear with a cave or strait de- 
 termined and bounded ? Neither are these 
 only similitudes, as men of narrow obser- 
 vation may conceive them to be, but the 
 same footsteps of nature, treading or print- 
 ing upon several subjects or matters. 
 
 This science therefore, as I understand it, 
 I may justly report as deficient; for I see 
 sometimes the profounder sort of wits, in 
 handling some particular argument, will now 
 and then draw a bucket of water out of this 
 well for their present use; but the spring- 
 head thereof seemeth to me not to have been 
 visited; being of so excellent use, both for 
 the disclosing of nature, and the abridge- 
 ment of art. 
 
 This science being therefore first placed 
 as a common parent, like unto Berecynthia, 
 which had so much heavenly issue, Omnes 
 
179 
 
 c&licolas, omnes supera alta tenentes, we may 
 return to the former distribution of the three 
 philosophies, divine, natural, and human. 
 
 1. OF DIVINE PHILOSOPHY 
 OR NATURAL THEOLOGY. 
 
 And as concerning Divine Philosophy or 
 Natural Theology, it is that knowledge or 
 rudiment of knowledge concerning God, 
 which may be obtained by the contempla- 
 tion of his creatures ; which knowledge may 
 be truly termed divine in respect of the 
 object, and natural in respect of the light. 
 
 The bounds of this knowledge are, that 
 it suffice th to convince atheism, but not to 
 inform religion : and therefore there was 
 never miracle wrought by God to convert 
 an atheist, because the light of nature might 
 have led him to confess a God : but mi- 
 racles have been wrought to convert idola- 
 ters and the superstitious, because no light 
 of nature extendeth to declare the will and 
 true worship of God. 
 
 For as all works do shew forth the power 
 n 2 
 
180 
 
 and skill of the workman, and not his 
 image ; so it is of the works of God, which 
 do shew the omnipotency and wisdom of 
 the maker, but not his image : and there- 
 fore therein the heathen opinion differeth 
 from the sacred truth ; for they supposed 
 the world to be the image of God, and man 
 to be an extract or compendious image of 
 the world ; but the Scriptures never vouch- 
 safe to attribute to the world that honor, as 
 to be the image of God, but only the work 
 of his hands ; neither do they speak of any 
 other image of God, but man : wherefore 
 by the contemplation of nature to induce 
 and inforce the acknowledgment of God, 
 and to demonstrate his power, providence, 
 and goodness, is an excellent argument, and 
 hath been excellently handled by divers. 
 
 But on the other side, out of the contem- 
 plation of nature, or ground of human know- 
 ledges, to induce any verity or persuasion 
 concerning the points of faith, is in my judg- 
 ment not safe : Da fidci qu<z fidei sunt. For 
 the heathens themselves conclude as much in 
 that excellent and divine fable of the golden 
 chain ; " That men and gods were not able 
 
1SI 
 
 " to draw Jupiter down to the earth; but 
 " contrariwise, Jupiter was able to draw 
 " them up to heaven." 
 
 So as we ought not to attempt to draw 
 down or submit the mysteries of God to our 
 reason ; but contrariwise, to raise and advance 
 our reason to the divine truth. So as in this 
 part of knowledge, touching* divine philoso- 
 phy, I am so far from noting any deficience, 
 as I rather note an excess ; whereunto I have 
 digressed, because of the extreme prejudice 
 which both religion and philosophy have re- 
 ceived and may receive, by being commixed 
 together ; as that which undoubtedly will 
 make an heretical religion, and an imaginary 
 and fabulous philosophy. 
 
 Otherwise it is of the nature of angels and 
 spirits, which is an appendix of theology, 
 both divine and natural, and is neither in- 
 scrutable nor interdicted; for although the 
 Scripture saith, Let no man deceive you in 
 sublime discourse touching the worship of an- 
 gels, pressing into that he knoweth not, &c. yet, 
 notwithstanding, if you observe well that pre- 
 cept, it may appear thereby that there be 
 two things only forbidden, adoration of them, 
 
182 
 
 and opinion fantastical of them ; either to 
 extol them farther than appertaineth to the 
 degree of a creature, or to extol a man's 
 knowledge of them farther than he hath 
 ground. But the sober and grounded in- 
 quiry, which may arise out of the passages 
 of holy Scriptures, or out of the gradations 
 of nature, is not restrained. So of degene- 
 rate and revolted spirits, the conversing with 
 them or the employment of them is prohi- 
 bited, much more any veneration towards 
 them : but the contemplation or science of 
 their nature, their power, their illusions, ei- 
 ther by Scripture or reason, is a part of spi- 
 ritual wisdom. For so the apostle saith, We 
 are not ignorant of his stratagems. And it is 
 no more unlawful to inquire the nature of 
 evil spirits, than to inquire the force of poi- 
 sons in nature, or the nature of sin and vice 
 in morality. But this part touching angels 
 and spirits, I cannot note as deficient, for 
 many have occupied themselves in it ; I may 
 rather challenge it, in many of the writers 
 thereof, as fabulous and fantastical. 
 
183 
 
 % OF NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Leaving therefore divine philosophy or na- 
 tural theology (not divinity or inspired theo- 
 logy, which we reserve for the last of all, as 
 the haven and sabbath of all man's contem- 
 plations) we will now proceed to Natural Phi- 
 losophy. 
 
 If then it be true that Democritus said, 
 <e That the truth of nature lieth hid in cer- 
 ' ' tain deep mines and caves ;" and if it be 
 true likewise that the alchemists do so much 
 inculcate, that Vulcan is a second nature, 
 and imitateth that dexterously and compen- 
 diously, which nature worketh by ambages 
 and length of time ; it were good to divide speculative 
 
 and operative, 
 
 natural philosophy into the mine and the fur- 
 nace; and to make two professions or occu- 
 pations of natural philosophers, some to be 
 pioneers, and some smiths ; some to dig, and 
 some to refine and hammer : and surely I do 
 best allow of a division of that kind, though 
 in more familiar and scholastical terms; 
 namely, that these be the two parts of na- 
 
 
184 
 
 tural philosophy, — the inquisition of causes, 
 and the production of effects ; speculative, 
 and operative ; natural science, and natural 
 prudence. 
 
 For as in civil matters there is a wisdom of 
 discourse, and a wisdom of direction ; so is 
 it in natural. And here I will make a re- 
 quest, that for the latter, or at least for a 
 part thereof, I may revive and redintegrate 
 the misapplied and abused name of Natural 
 Magic ; which, in the true sense, is but natu- 
 ral wisdom, or natural prudence ; taken ac- 
 cording to the ancient acceptation, purged 
 from vanity and superstition. 
 
 Now although it be true, and I know it 
 well, that there is an intercourse between 
 causes and effects, so as both these know- 
 ledges, speculative and operative, have a great 
 connection between themselves ; yet because 
 all true and fruitful natural philosophy hath a 
 double scale or ladder, ascendent and de- 
 scendent; ascending from experiments to the 
 invention of causes, and descending from 
 causes to the invention of new experiments ; 
 therefore I judge it most requisite that these 
 
185 
 two parts be severally considered and hand- 
 led. 
 
 Natural Science or Theory is divided into 1. 
 
 t~u- i^yr i- ti- Of Natural 
 
 rnysic and Metaphysic : wherein 1 desire it science or 
 
 . Speculative 
 
 may be conceived that I use the word meta- Philosophy. 
 physic in a differing sense from that that is 
 received: and in like manner, I doubt not 
 but it will easily appear to men of judgment, 
 that in this and other particulars, whereso- 
 ever my conception and notion may differ 
 from the ancient, yet I am studious to keep 
 the ancient terms. 
 
 For hoping well to deliver myself from mis- 
 taking, by the order and perspicuous ex- 
 pressing of that I do propound ; T am other- 
 wise zealous and affectionate to recede as 
 little from antiquity, either in terms or opi- 
 nions, as may stand with truth and the pro- 
 ficience of knowledge. 
 
 And herein I cannot a little marvel at the Procedure of 
 
 Aristotle. 
 
 philosopher Aristotle, that did proceed in 
 such a spirit of difference and contradiction 
 towards all antiquity; undertaking not only 
 to frame new words of science at pleasure, 
 but to confound and extinguish all ancient 
 wisdom : insomuch as he never nameth or 
 
186 
 
 mentioneth an ancient author or opinion, but 
 to confute and reprove ; wherein for glory, 
 and drawing followers and disciples, he took 
 the right course. 
 
 For certainly there cometh to pass, and 
 hath place in human truth, that which was 
 noted and pronounced in the highest truth ; 
 Veni in nomine Patris, nee recipitis me; si quis 
 venerit in nomine suo, eum recipietis. But in 
 this divine aphorism, (considering to whom 
 it was applied, namely to Antichrist, the 
 highest deceiver,) we may discern well that 
 the coming in a man's own name, without 
 regard of antiquity or paternity, is no good 
 sign of truth, although it be joined with the 
 fortune and success of an Eum recipietis. 
 
 But for this excellent person, Aristotle, I 
 will think of him that he learned that hu- 
 mour of his scholar, with whom, it seemeth, 
 he did emulate ; the one to conquer all 
 opinions, as the other to conquer all nations: 
 wherein nevertheless, it may be, he may at 
 some men's hands, that are of a bitter dispo- 
 sition, get a like title as his scholar did : 
 
 Felix terrarum pr&do, non utile mundo 
 
 Editus exemplum, etc. 
 
187 
 
 Felix doctrince prcedo. 
 But to me, on the other side, that do desire 
 as much as lieth in my pen to ground a soci- 
 able intercourse between antiquity and pro- 
 ficience, it seemeth best to keep way with an- 
 tiquity usque ad aras ; and therefore to retain 
 the antient terms, though I sometimes alter 
 the uses and definitions : according to the 
 moderate proceeding in civil government; 
 where although there be some alteration, yet 
 that holdeth which Tacitus wisely noteth, 
 eadem magistratuum vocabida. 
 
 To return therefore to the use and accept- Meaning of 
 
 Metaphysic. 
 
 ation of the word Metaphysic, as I do now 
 understand the word ; it appeareth, by that 
 which hath been already said, that I intend 
 philosophia prima, Summary Philosophy, and 
 Metaphysic, which heretofore have been con- 
 founded as one, to be two distinct things. 
 Tor, the one I have made as a parent or 
 common ancestor to all knowledge ; and the 
 other I have now brought in as a branch or 
 descendent of natural science. It appeareth 
 likewise that I have assigned to Summary 
 Philosophy the common principles and 
 
188 
 
 axioms which are promiscuous and indif- 
 ferent to several sciences : I have assigned 
 unto it likewise the inquiry touching the 
 operation of the relative and adventitious 
 characters of essences, as quantity, simili- 
 tude, diversity, possibility, and the rest ; 
 with this distinction and provision ; that they 
 be handled as they have efficacy in nature, 
 and not logically. It appeareth likewise, that 
 Natural Theology, which heretofore hath 
 been handled confusedly with Metaphysic, I 
 have inclosed and bounded by itself. 
 Difference ft * s therefore now a question what is left 
 
 sfcTnd P Me- remaining for Metaphysic ; wherein I may 
 *p ysic without prejudice preserve thus much of the 
 conceit of antiquity, that physic should con- 
 template that which is inherent in matter, 
 and therefore transitory ; and metaphysic 
 that which is abstracted and fixed. 
 
 And again, that physic should handle that 
 which supposeth in nature only a being and 
 moving; and metaphysic should handle that 
 which supposeth farther in nature a reason 
 understanding, and platform. But the differ, 
 ence, perspicuously expressed, is most fami- 
 liar and sensible. 
 
189 
 
 For as we divided natural philosophy in 
 general into the inquiry of causes, and pro- 
 duction of effects ; so that part which con- 
 cerneth the inquiry of causes we do subdi- 
 vide according to the received and sound di- 
 vision of causes ; the one part, which is 
 physic, inquireth and handleth the material 
 and efficient causes; and the other which is 
 metaphysic, handleth the formal and final 
 causes. 
 
 Physic, taking it according to the deriva- 
 tion, and not according to our idiom for me- 
 dicine, is situate in a middle term or dis- 
 tance between natural history and metaphy- 
 sic. For natural history describeth the va- 
 riety of things; physic the causes, but vari- 
 able or respective causes ; and metaphysic, 
 the fixed and constant causes. 
 
 Limus ut hie durescit, et h&c ut cera Uqnescit, 
 
 Una eodemque igne. 
 Fire is the cause of induration, but respec- 
 tive to clay ; fire is the cause of colliquation, 
 but respective to wax : but fire is no con- 
 stant cause either of induration or colliqua- 
 tion: so then the physical causes are but 
 the efficient and the matter. 
 
190 
 
 Three enqui- Physic hath three parts ; whereof two re~ 
 sic. -spect nature united or collected, the third 
 
 contemplateth nature diffused or distributed. 
 
 Nature is collected either into one entire 
 total, or else into the same principles or 
 seeds. So as the first doctrine is touching 
 the contexture or configuration of things, as 
 de mundo, de universitate rerum. 
 
 The second is the doctrine concerning the 
 principles or originals of things. 
 
 The third is the doctrine concerning all 
 variety and particularity of things ; whether 
 -it be of the differing substances, or their 
 - differing qualities and natures ; whereof 
 there needeth no enumeration, this part be- 
 . ing but as a gloss, or paraphrase, that at- 
 . tendeth upon the text of natural history. 
 
 Of these three I cannot report any as de- 
 
 : ficient. In what truth or perfection they are 
 
 handled, I make not now any judgment : 
 
 but they are parts of knowledge not deserted 
 
 t by the labour of man. 
 
 Two enqui- For Metaphysic, we have assigned unto 
 
 physic. e a " it the enquiry of formal and final causes ; 
 
 which assignation, as to the former of them, 
 
 may seem to be nugatory and void ; because 
 
191 
 
 of the received and inveterate opinion, that 
 the inquisition of man is not competent to 
 find out essential forms or true differences: 
 of which opinion we will take this hold, 
 that the invention of forms is of all other 
 parts of knowledge the worthiest to be sought, 
 if it be possible to be found. 
 
 As for the possibility, they are ill disco- 
 verers that think there is no land, when they 
 can see nothing but sea. 
 
 But it is manifest that Plato, in his opi- Error of 
 
 ' r Plato. 
 
 nion of ideas, as one that had a wit of ele- 
 vation situate as upon a cliff, did descry, 
 " That forms were the true object of know- 
 f< ledge ;" but lost the real fruit of his opi- 
 nion, by considering of forms as absolutely 
 abstracted from matter, and not confined and 
 determined by matter ; and so turning his 
 opinion upon theology, wherewith all his 
 natural philosophy is infected. 
 
 But if any man shall keep a continual Enquiry int# 
 
 , n , ! . formal 
 
 watctiiul and severe eye upon action, opera- causes, 
 tion, and the use of knowledge, he may ad- 
 vise and take notice what are the forms, the 
 disclosures whereof are fruitful and import- 
 ant to the state of man. For as to the forms 
 
192 
 
 of substances, man only except, (of whom 
 it is said, Formavit hominem de limo terra, et 
 spiravit infaciem ejus spiraculum vita, and not 
 as of all other creatures, Prodncant aqua, 
 producat terra,) the forms of substances, I 
 say, as they are now by compounding and 
 transplanting multiplied, are so perplexed 
 as they are not to be enquired; no more 
 than it were either possible or to purpose to 
 seek in gross the forms of those sounds which 
 make words, which by composition and 
 transposition of letters are infinite. 
 
 But, on the other side, to enquire the 
 form of those sounds or voices which make 
 simple letters is easily comprehensible ; and 
 being known, induceth and manifested! the 
 forms of all words, which consist and are 
 compounded of them. In the same manner 
 to enquire the form of a lion, of an oak, of 
 gold ; nay, of water, of air, is a vain pur- 
 suit : but to enquire the forms of sense, of 
 voluntary motion, of vegetation, of colours, 
 of gravity and levity, of density, of tenuity, 
 of heat, of cold, and all other natures and 
 qualities; which, like an alphabet, are not 
 many, and of which the essences, upheld by 
 
:-l.93 
 
 matter, of all creatures do consist ; to in- 
 quire, I say, the true forms of these, is that 
 part of metaphysic which we now define of. 
 
 Not but that physic doth make inquiry, 
 and take consideration of the same natures : 
 but how ? Only as to the material and effici- 
 ent causes of them, and not as to the forms. 
 For example ; if the cause of whiteness in 
 snow or froth be inquired, and it be ren- 
 dered thus, that the subtile intermixture of 
 air and water is the cause, it is well render- 
 ed; but nevertheless, is this the form of 
 whiteness ? No ; but it is the efficient, which 
 is ever but vehiculum format. 
 
 This part of metaphysic I do not find la- 
 boured and performed ; whereat I marvel 
 not : because I hold it not possible to be in- 
 vented by that course of invention which hath 
 been used; in regard that men, which is 
 the root of all error, have made too untimely 
 a departure and too remote a recess from 
 particulars. 
 
 But the use of this part of metaphysic, Two uses of 
 
 • • n _ this part of 
 
 which I report as deficient, is or the rest the Metaphysic. 
 most excellent in two respects : the one, be- 
 cause it is the duty and virtue of all know- 
 
 o 
 
194 
 
 ledge to abridge the infinity of individual 
 experience, as much as the conception of 
 truth will permit, and to remedy the com- 
 plaint of vita brevis, ars longa ; which is per- 
 formed by uniting the notions and concep- 
 tions of sciences : for knowledges are as py- 
 ramids, whereof history is the basis. So of 
 Natural Philosophy, the basis is natural his- 
 tory ; the stage next the basis is physic; the 
 stage next the vertical point is metaphysic. 
 As for the vertical point, Opus quod operatur 
 Deus d principio usque ad finem, the summary 
 law of nature, we know not whether man's 
 enquiry can attain unto it. But these three 
 be true stages of knowledge, and are to 
 them that are depraved no better than the 
 giants' hills, 
 
 Ter sunt conati imponere Velio Ossam, 
 Scilicet, atque Ossce frondosum involverc 
 Olympum. 
 
 But to those which refer all things to the 
 glory of God, they are as the three acclama- 
 tions, Sancte, sancte, sancte ; holy in the de- 
 scription or dilatation of his works ; holy in 
 the connection or concatenation of them ; 
 
19*5 
 
 and holy in the union of them in a perpetual 
 and uniform law. 
 
 And therefore the speculation was excel- 
 lent in Parmenides and Plato, although but 
 a speculation in them, that all things by 
 scale did ascend to unity. So then always 
 that knowledge is worthiest, which is charg- 
 ed with least multiplicity ; which appeareth 
 to be Metaphysic ; as that which consi- 
 dered the simple forms or differences of 
 things, which are few in number, and the 
 degrees and co-ordinations whereof make 
 all this variety. 
 
 The second respect, which valueth and 
 commendeth this part of metaphysic, is that 
 it doth enfranchise the power of man unto 
 the greatest liberty and possibility of works 
 and effects. For physic carrieth men in 
 narrow and restrained ways, subject to many 
 accidents of impediments, imitating the ordi- 
 nary flexuous courses of nature ; but latce tin- 
 dique sunt sapientibus vice : to sapience, which 
 was anciently defined to be rerum divina- 
 rum et humanarum scientia, there is ever 
 choice of means : for physical causes give 
 o 2 
 
196 
 
 light to new invention in simili materia. But 
 whosoever knoweth any form, knoweth the 
 utmost possibility of super-inducing that na- 
 ture upon any variety of matter ; and so is 
 less restrained in operation, either to the 
 basis of the matter, or the condition of the 
 efficient : which kind of knowledge Solomon 
 likewise, though in a more divine sense, ele- 
 gantly describeth ; Non arctabuntur gressus 
 tui, et currens non habebis offendiculum. The 
 ways of sapience are not much liable either 
 to particularity or chance. 
 Enquiry into The second part of Metaphysic is the en- 
 
 nnal causes. 
 
 quiry of final causes, which I am moved 
 to report not as omitted, but as misplaced ; 
 and yet if it were but a fault in order, I 
 would not speak of it : for order is mat- 
 ter of illustration, but pertaineth not to the 
 substance of sciences. But this misplacing 
 hath caused a deficience, or at least a great 
 improficience in the sciences themselves. 
 For the handling of final causes, mixed 
 with the rest in physical enquiries, hath en- 
 tercepted the severe and diligent enquiry of 
 all real and physical causes, and given men 
 
197 
 
 the occasion to stay upon these satisfactory 
 and specious causes, to the great arrest and 
 prejudice of farther discovery. 
 
 For this I find done not only by Plato, Error of 
 
 J J Plato, Aris 
 
 who ever anchoreth upon that shore, but totie, &c. 
 by Aristotle, Galen, and others, which do 
 usually likewise fall upon these flats of dis- 
 coursing causes. For to say that the hairs 
 of the eyelids are for a quickset and fence 
 about the sight; or that the firmness of the 
 skins and hides of living creatures is to de- 
 fend them from the extremities of heat or 
 cold ; or that the bones are for the columns 
 or beams, whereupon the frame of the bodies 
 of living creatures is built ; or that the leaves 
 of the trees are for protecting of the fruit ; 
 or that the clouds are for watering of the 
 ^arth ; or that the solidness of the earth is 
 for the station and mansion of living crea- 
 tures, and the like, is well enquired and col- 
 lected in metaphysic ; but in physic they are 
 impertinent. Nay, they are indeed but remo- 
 ras and hinderances to stay and slug the ship 
 from farther sailing ; and have brought this 
 to pass, that the search of the physical causes 
 hath been neglected, and passed in silence. 
 
193 
 Better theory And therefore the natural philosophy of 
 tus, &c. Democritus and some others, (who did not 
 suppose a mind or reason in the frame of 
 things, but attributed the form thereof, able 
 to maintain itself, to infinite essays or proofs 
 of nature, which they term fortune,) seemeth 
 to me, as far as I can judge by the recital 
 and fragments which remain unto us, in 
 particularities of physical causes, more real 
 and better inquired than that of Aristotle 
 and Plato ; whereof both intermingled final 
 causes, the one as a part of theology, and 
 the other as a part of logic, which were the 
 favourite studies respectively of both those 
 Relation be- P ersons » Not because those final causes are 
 and^hyskii llot true * anc ^ worthy to be inquired, being 
 kept within their own province ; but be- 
 cause their excursions into the limits of phy- 
 sical causes hath bred a vastness and soli- 
 tude in that tracfc For otherwise, keeping 
 their precincts and borders, men are ex- 
 tremely deceived if they think there is an 
 enmity or repugnancy at all between them. 
 For the cause rendered, that the hairs about 
 the eye-lids are for the safe-guard of the 
 sight, doth not impugn the cause rendered, 
 
 causes. 
 
199 
 
 that pilosity is incident to orifices of moisture ; 
 Muscosi forties, etc. Nor the cause rendered, 
 that the firmness of hides is for the armour 
 of the body against extremities of heat and 
 cold, doth not impugn the cause rendered, 
 that contraction of pores is incident to 
 the outwardest parts, in regard of their ad- 
 jacence to foreign or unlike bodies; and so 
 of the rest : both causes being true and 
 compatible, the one declaring an intention, 
 the other a consequence only. 
 
 Neither doth this call in question, or de- 
 rogate from divine providence, but highly 
 confirms and exalts it. For as in civil ac- 
 tions he is the greater and deeper politician, 
 that can make other men the instruments 
 of his will and ends, and yet never ac- 
 quaint them with his purpose, so as they 
 shall do it, and yet not know what they 
 do, than he that imparteth his meaning to 
 those he employeth ; so is the wisdom of 
 God more admirable, when nature intendeth 
 one thing, and providence draweth forth 
 another, than if he had communicated to 
 particular creatures and motions the charac- 
 ters and impressions of his providence. And 
 
matic. 
 
 300 
 
 thus much for metaphysic; the latter -pan 
 whereof I allow as extant, but wish it con- 
 fined to it's proper place, 
 of Mathe- Nevertheless, there remaineth yet another 
 part of natural philosophy, which is com- 
 monly made a principal part, and holdeth 
 rank with physic special and metaphysic, 
 which is mathematic ; but I think it more 
 agreeable to. the nature of things, and "to 
 the light of order, to place it as a branch 
 of metaphysic : for the subject of it being 
 quantity, (not quantity indefinite, which is 
 but a relative, and belongeth to philosophia 
 prima, as hath been said, but quantity de- 
 termined or proportionable,) it appeareth to 
 be one of the essential forms of things ; 
 as that that is causative in nature of a 
 number of effects; insomuch as we see, 
 in the schools both of Democritus and of 
 Pythagoras, that the one did ascribe figure 
 to the first seeds of things, and the other 
 did suppose numbers to be the principles and 
 originals of things : and it is true also, that 
 of all other forms, as we understand forms, 
 it is the most abstracted and separable from 
 "matter,, and therefore most proper to me* 
 
201 
 
 taphysic; which hath likewise been the cause 
 why it hath been better laboured and enquired 
 than any of the other forms which are more 
 immersed in matter. 
 
 For it being the nature of the mind of 
 man, to the extreme prejudice of know- 
 ledge, to delight in the spacious liberty of 
 generalities, as in a champain region, and 
 not in the inclosures of particularity ; the 
 mathematics of all other knowledge were 
 the goodliest fields to satisfy that appetite. 
 
 But for the placing of thcs. science,, it 
 is not much material; only we have en- 
 deavoured, in these our partitions, to ob- 
 serve a kind of perspective, that one part 
 may cast light upon another. 
 
 The Mathematics are either pure or mix- Mathema- 
 
 _ . matics pure 
 
 ed« To the pure mathematics are those and mixt. 
 sciences belonging which handle quantity de- 
 terminate, merely severed from any axioms of 
 natural philosophy ; and these are two, Geo- 
 metry and Arithmetic ; the one handling 
 quantity continued, and the other disse- 
 vered. 
 
 Mixed hath for subject some axioms or 
 parts of natural philosophy, and considered! 
 
202 
 
 quantity determined, as it is auxiliary and 
 incident unto them. 
 
 For many parts of nature can neither be 
 invented with sufficient subtilty, nor demon- 
 strated with sufficient perspicuity, nor ac- 
 commodated unto use with sufficient dex- 
 terity, without the aid and intervening of 
 the mathematics : of which sort are perspec- 
 tive, music, astronomy, cosmography, archi- 
 tecture, enginery, and divers others. 
 
 In the mathematics I can report no 
 deficience, except it be that men do not 
 sufficiently understand the excellent use of 
 the pure mathematics, in that they do re- 
 medy and cure many defects in the wit 
 and faculties intellectual. For, if the wit 
 be too dull, they sharpen it; if too wan- 
 dering, they fix it; if too inherent in 
 the sense, they abstract it. So that as 
 tennis is a game of no use in itself, but 
 of great use in respect it maketh a quick 
 eye and a body ready to put itself into all 
 postures ; so in the mathematics, that use 
 which is collateral and intervenient is no 
 less worthy than that which is principal 
 and intended* 
 
£03 
 
 And as for the mixed mathematics, I may 
 only make this prediction, that there cannot 
 fail to be more kinds of them, as nature 
 grows further disclosed. 
 
 Thus much of natural science, or the part 
 of nature speculative. 
 
 For Natural Prudence, or the part opera- p^encefor 
 tive of natural philosophy, we will divide it^g^J_ < 
 into three parts, experimental, philosophical, 
 and magical; which three parts active have 
 a correspondence and analogy with the three 
 parts speculative, natural history, physic, and 
 metaphysics for many operations have been 
 invented, sometimes by a casual incidence 
 and occurrence, sometimes by a purposed 
 experiment; and of those which have been 
 found by an intentional experiment, some 
 have been found out by varying or extending 
 the same experiment, some by transferring 
 and compounding divers experiments the one 
 into the other, which kind of invention an 
 empiric may manage. 
 
 Again, by the knowledge of physical caus- 
 es there cannot fail to follow many indica- 
 tions and designations of new particulars, if 
 men in their speculation will keep one eye 
 
£04 
 
 upon use and practice. But these are but 
 coastings along 1 the shore, premendo liitus ini- 
 quum : for, it seemeth to me, there can hardly 
 be discovered any radical or fundamental al- 
 terations and innovations in nature, either by 
 the fortune and essays of experiments, or by 
 the light and direction of physical causes, 
 of Natural If therefore we have reported metaphysic 
 deficient, it must follow that we do the like 
 of natural magic, which hath relation there- 
 unto. For as for the natural magic whereof 
 now there is mention in books, containing 
 certain credulous and superstitious conceits 
 and observations of sympathies, and antipa- 
 thies, and hidden properties, and some fri- 
 volous experiments, strange rather by dis- 
 guisement than in themselves, it is as far 
 differing in truth of nature from such a 
 knowledge as we require, as the story of king 
 Arthur of Britain, or Hugh of Bourdeaux, 
 differs from Caesar's commentaries in truth 
 of story. For it is manifest that Ccesar did 
 greater things de vero than those imaginary 
 heroes were feigned to do; but he did them 
 not in that fabulous manner. Of this kind of 
 learning the fable of Ixion was a figure, who 
 
£0.5 
 
 designed to enjoy Juno, the goddess of power ; 
 and instead of her had copulation with a 
 cloud, of which mixture were begotten cen- 
 taurs and chimeras. 
 
 So whosoever shall entertain high and va- 
 porous imaginations, instead of a laborious 
 and sober enquiry of truth, shall beget hopes 
 and beliefs of strange and impossible shapes. 
 And therefore we may note in these sciences 
 which hold so much of imagination and be- 
 lief, as this degenerate natural magic, alche- 
 my, astrology, and the like, that in their 
 propositions the description of the means is 
 ever more monstrous than the pretence or 
 end. 
 
 For it is a thing more probable, that he 
 that knoweth well the natures of weight, of 
 colour, of pliant and fragile in respect of the 
 hammer, of volatile and fixed in respect of 
 the fire, and the rest, may superinduce upon 
 some metal the nature and form of gold by 
 such mechanic as belongeth to the production 
 of the natures afore rehearsed, than that 
 some grains of the medicine projected should 
 in a few moments of time turn a sea of quick- 
 silver or other material into gold : so it is 
 more probable, that he that knoweth the na- 
 
206 
 
 ture of arefaction, the nature of assimilation 
 of nourishment to the thing nourished, the 
 manner of increase and clearing of spirits, 
 the manner of the depredations which spirits 
 make upon the humours and eolid parts, shall 
 by ambages of diets, bathings, anointings, 
 medicines, motions, and the like, prolong 
 life, or restore some degree of youth or viva- 
 city, than that it can be done with the use of 
 a few drops or scruples of a liquor or receipt. 
 To conclude therefore, the true natural ma- 
 gic, which is that great liberty and latitude 
 of operation which dependeth upon the 
 knowledge of forms, I may report deficient, 
 as the relative thereof is. 
 Use of a ca- To which part, if we be serious, and in- 
 thmgs known cline not to vanities and plausible discourse, 
 sought. g besides the deriving and deducing the opera- 
 tions themselves from metaphysic, there are 
 pertinent two points of much purpose, the 
 one by way of preparation, the other by way 
 of caution : the first is, that there be made a 
 calendar, resembling an inventory of the 
 estate of man, containing all the inventions 
 being the works or fruits of nature or art 
 which are now extant, and whereof man is 
 already possessed; out of which doth naturally 
 
207 
 
 result a note, what things are yet held im- 
 possible or not invented : which calendar will 
 be the more artificial and serviceable, if to 
 every reputed impossibility you add what 
 thing is extant which cometh the nearest in 
 degree to that impossibility ; to the end that 
 by these optatives and potentials man's en- 
 quiry may be the more awake in deducing 
 direction of works from the speculation of 
 causes : and secondly, that those experiments 
 be not only esteemed which have an immedi- 
 ate and present use, but those principally 
 which are of most universal consequence for 
 invention of other experiments, and those 
 which give most light to the invention of 
 causes ; for the invention of the mariner's 
 needle, which giveth the direction, is of no 
 less benefit for navigation than the invention 
 of the sails, which give the motion. 
 
 Thus have I passed through natural philo- conclusion, 
 sophy, and the deficiences thereof ; wherein 
 if I have differed from the ancient and re- 
 ceived doctrines, and thereby shall move con- 
 tradiction, — for my part, as I affect not to 
 dissent, so I purpose not to contend. If it 
 be truth, 
 
208 
 
 Non canimus surdis, respondent omnia sylvct: 
 The voice of nature will consent, whether the 
 voice of man do or no. And as Alexander 
 Borgia was wont to say of the expedition of 
 the French for Naples, that they came with 
 chalk in their hands to mark up their lodg- 
 ings, and not with weapons to fight: so I 
 like better that entry of truth which cometh 
 peaceably, with chalk to mark up those minds 
 which are capable to lodge and harbour it, 
 than that which cometh with pugnacity and 
 contention. 
 Use of a ca- But there remaineth a division of natural 
 Boubts°and philosophy according to the report of the en- 
 rols!* a * x quny> and nothing concerning the matter or 
 subject ; and that is positive and considera- 
 tive ; when the enquiry reporteth either an 
 assertion or a doubt. These doubts or non 
 liquets are of two sorts, particular and total. 
 of particular F° r the first, we see a good example thereof 
 in Aristotle's Problems , which deserved to 
 have had a better continuance ; but so never- 
 theless, as there is one point whereof warn- 
 ing is to be given and taken. The registering 
 of doubts hath two excellent uses : the one, 
 that it saveth philosophy from errors and falsr 
 
209 
 
 hoods, when that which is not fully appear- 
 ing is not collected into assertion, whereby 
 error might draw error, but reserved in 
 doubt : the other, that the entry of doubts 
 is as so many suckers or spunges to draw use 
 of knowledge ; insomuch, as that which, if 
 doubts had not preceded, a man should never 
 have advised, but passed it over without note, 
 by the suggestion and solicitation of doubts 
 is made to be attended and applied. But 
 both these commodities do scarcely counter- 
 vail an inconvenience which will intrude it- 
 self, if it be not debarred; which is that, 
 when a doubt is once received, men labor 
 rather how to keep it a doubt still, than how 
 to solve it, and accordingly bend their wits. 
 Of this we see the familiar example in law- 
 yers and scholars, both which, if they have 
 once admitted a doubt, it goeth ever after au- 
 thorised for a doubt. But that use of wit and 
 knowledge is to be allowed, which laboreth to 
 make doubtful things certain and not those 
 which labor to make certain things doubtful. 
 Therefore these calendars of doubts I com- 
 mend as excellent things ; so that there be this 
 caution used, that when they be thoroughly 
 p 
 
210 
 
 Of popular 
 Errors. 
 
 Of total 
 Doubts. 
 
 sifted and brought to resolution, they be from 
 thenceforth omitted, discarded, and not con- 
 tinued to cherish and encourage men in 
 doubting. To which calendar of doubts or 
 problems, I advise to be annexed another ca- 
 lendar, as much or more' material, which is 
 a calendar of popular errors ; I mean chiefly 
 in natural history, such as pass in speech 
 and conceit, and are nevertheless apparently 
 detected and convicted of untruth ; that 
 man's knowledge be not weakened nor im- 
 based by such dross and vanity. 
 
 As for the doubts or non liquets general or 
 in total, I understand those differences of opi- 
 nions touching the principles of nature, and 
 the fundamental points of the same, which 
 have caused the diversity of sects, schools, 
 and philosophies, as that of Empedocles, Py- 
 thagoras, Democritus, Parmenides, and the 
 rest. For although Aristotle, as though he 
 had been of the race of Ottomans, thought 
 he could not reign, except the first thing he 
 did he killed all his brethren; yet to those 
 that seek truth and not magistrality, it can- 
 not but seem a matter of great profit, to see 
 before them the several opinions touching the 
 
alii 
 
 foundations of nature; not for any exact 
 truth that can be expected in those theories ; 
 for as the same phenomena in astronomy 
 are satisfied by the received astronomy of the 
 diurnal motion, and the proper motions of 
 the planets, with their eccentrics and epi- 
 cyles, and likewise by the theory of Coper- 
 nicus, who supposed the earth to move, and 
 the calculations are indifferently agreeable 
 to both; so the ordinary face and view of 
 experience is many times satisfied by several 
 theories and philosophies ; whereas to find the 
 real truth requireth another manner of seve- 
 rity and attention. For as Aristotle saith, 
 that children at the first will call every wo- 
 man mother, but afterward they come to 
 distinguish according to truth; so experi- 
 ence, if it be in childhood, will call every 
 philosophy mother, but when it cometh to 
 ripeness, it will discern the true mother. 
 
 So as in the mean time it is good to see A collection 
 
 of the Philo- 
 
 the several glosses and opinions upon nature, sophies of the 
 
 ° '4 l A Antients se- 
 
 whereof it may be every one in some one veraiiy desi- 
 
 J J rable. 
 
 point hath seen clearer than his fellows; 
 therefore I wish some collection to be made 
 painfully and understanding^ de antiqvds 
 
 p2 
 
212 
 
 phUosophiis, out of all the possible light which 
 remaineth to us of them : which kind of work 
 I find deficient. But here I must give warn- 
 ing, that it be done distinctly and severally, 
 the philosophies of every one throughout by 
 themselves, and not by titles packed and fag- 
 gotted up together, as hath been done by 
 Plutarch. For it is the harmony of a philo- 
 sophy in itself which giveth it light and cre- 
 dence ; whereas if it be singled and broken, 
 it will seem more foreign and dissonant. For 
 as when I read in Tacitus the actions of Nero 
 or Claudius, with circumstances of times, in- 
 ducements and occasions, I find them not 
 so strange ; but when I read them in Sueto- 
 nius Tranquillus, gathered into titles and 
 bundles, and not in order of time, they seem 
 more monstrous and incredible ; so is it of 
 any philosophy reported entire, and dismem- 
 bered by articles. Neither do I exclude opi- 
 nions of latter times to be likewise repre- 
 sented in this calendar of sects of philoso- 
 phy, as that of Theophra^us Paracelsus, elo- 
 quently reduced into an harmony by the 
 pen of Severinus the Dane ; and that of 
 Tilesius, and his scholar Donius being as 
 
213 
 
 a pastoral philosophy, full of sense, but of 
 no great depth ; and that of Fracastorius, 
 who though he pretended not to make any 
 new philosophy, yet did use the absolute- 
 ness of his own sense upon the old ; and 
 that of Gilbertus our countryman, who re- 
 vived, with some alterations and demonstra- 
 tions, the opinions of Xenophanes; and any 
 other worthy to be admitted. 
 
 Thus have we now dealt with two of the 
 three beams of man's knowledge, that is Ra- 
 dius directus, which is referred to nature ; 
 Radius refractus, which is referred to God, 
 and cannot report truly because of the ine- 
 quality of the medium : there resteth Radius 
 reflexus, whereby man beholdeth and con- 
 templated himself. 
 
215 
 
 3. OF SELF-KNOWLEDGE, 
 OR HUMANITY. 
 
 We come therefore now to that know- 
 ledge whereunto the ancient oracle directeth 
 us, which is the knowledge of ourselves ; 
 which deserveth the more accurate handling, 
 by how much it toucheth us more nearly. 
 This knowledge, as it is the end and term of 
 natural philosophy in the intention of man, 
 so notwithstanding, it is but a portion of 
 .natural philosophy in the continent of na- 
 ture : and generally let this be a rule, that 
 all partitions of knowledges be accepted ra- 
 ther for lines and veins, than for sections and 
 separations ; and that the continuance and in- 
 tireness of knowledge be preserved. For 
 the contrary hereof hath made particular 
 sciences to become barren, shallow, and er- 
 roneous, while they have not been nourished 
 and maintained from the common fountain. 
 So we see Cicero the orator complained of 
 
216 
 
 Socrates and his school, that he was the 
 first that separated philosophy and rhetoric ; 
 whereupon rhetoric became an empty and 
 verbal art. So we may see that the opinion 
 of Copernicus touching the rotation of the 
 earth, which astronomy itself cannot correct, 
 because it is not repugnant to any of the 
 phenomena, yet natural philosophy may 
 correct. So we see also that the science of me- 
 dicine, if it be destitute and forsaken by na- 
 tural philosophy, it is not much better than 
 an empirical practice. 
 
 With this reservation therefore we pro- 
 ceed to Human Philosophy, or Humanity, 
 which hath two parts: The one considereth 
 man segregate or destributively ; the other 
 congregate or in society. So as human phi- 
 losophy is either simple and particular, or 
 conjugate and civil Humanity particular 
 consisteth, of the same parts whereof man 
 consisteth that is of knowledges which re- 
 spect the body, and of knowledges that re- 
 spect the mind ; but before we distribute so 
 i far, it is good to constitute. For I do take 
 the consideration in general, and at large, 
 of human nature to be fit to be emancipated 
 
 Its Divisions 
 and Sub-di- 
 
 Kature ge- 
 nerally. 
 
217 
 and make a knowledge by itself; not so 
 much in regard of those delightful and ele- 
 gant discourses which have been made of the 
 dignity of man, of his miseries, of his state 
 and life, and the like adjuncts of his com- 
 mon and undivided nature ; but chiefly in 
 regard of the knowledge concerning the sym- 
 pathies and concordances between the mind 
 and body, which being mixed cannot be pro- 
 perly assigned to the sciences of either. 
 
 This knowledge hath two branches : for as 
 all leagues and amities consist of mutual in- 
 telligence and mutual offices, so this league 
 of mind and body hath these two parts ; 
 how the one discloseth the other, and how 
 the one worketh upon the other ; Discovery, 
 and Impression. 
 
 The former of these hath begotten two of Dis- 
 covery. 
 
 arts, both of prediction or prenotion ; where- 
 of the one is honored with the enquiry of 
 Aristotle, and the other of Hippocrates. 
 And although they have of later time been 
 used to be coupled with superstitious and 
 fantastical arts, yet being purged and re- 
 stored to their true state, they have both of 
 
£18 
 
 them a solid ground in nature, and a pro- 
 fitable use in life. The first is physiognomy, 
 which discovereth the disposition of the mind 
 by the lineaments of the body : the second 
 is the exposition of natural dreams, which dis- 
 covereth the state of the body by the ima- 
 ginations of the mind. In the former of 
 these I note a deficience ; for Aristotle hath 
 very ingeniously and diligently handled the 
 features of the body, but not the gestures of 
 the body, which are no less comprehensible 
 by art, and of greater use and advantage. 
 For the lineaments of the body do disclose 
 the disposition and inclination of the mind 
 in general; but the motions of the counte- 
 nance and parts do not only so, but do far-, 
 ther disclose the present humor and state of 
 the mind and will. For as your majesty saith 
 most aptly and elegantly, " As the tongue 
 " speaketh to the ear, so the gesture speaketh 
 4( to the eye." And therefore a number of 
 subtle persons, whose eyes do dwell upon the 
 faces and fashions of men, do well know the 
 advantage of this observation, as being most 
 part of their ability ; neither can it be de- 
 
219 
 
 rued, but that it is a great discovery of 
 dissimulations, and a great direction in bu- 
 siness. 2 
 
 The latter branch touching impression, hath Im re ° f ion 
 not been collected into art, but hath been 
 handled dispersedly; and it hath the same 
 relation or antistrophe that the former hath. 
 For the consideration is double; '5 Either 
 " how, and how far the humors and effects 
 " of the body do alter or work upon the 
 " mind; or again, How and how far the 
 " passions or apprehensions of the mind do 
 " alter or work upon the body." The former 
 of these hath been enquired and considered 
 as a part and appendix of medicine, but much 
 more as a part of religion or superstition : 
 for the physician prescribeth cures of the 
 mind in frenzies and melancholy passions ; 
 and pretendeth also to exhibit medicines to 
 exhilarate the mind, to confirm the courage, 
 to clarify the wits, to corroborate the me- 
 mory, and the like: but the scruples and 
 superstitions of diet and other regimen of 
 the body, in the sect of the Pythagoreans, 
 in the heresy of the Manicheans, and in 
 the law of Mahomet do exceed. So like- 
 
220 
 
 wise the ordinances in the ceremonial law, 
 interdicting the eating of the blood and fat, 
 distinguishing between beasts clean and un- 
 clean for meat, are many and strict. Nay 
 the faith itself, being clear and serene from 
 all clouds of ceremony, yet retaineth the 
 use of fastings, abstinences, and other ma- 
 cerations and humiliations of the body, as 
 things real and not figurative. The root 
 and life of all which prescripts is, besides 
 the ceremony, the consideration of that de- 
 pendency which the affections of the mind 
 are submitted unto upon , the state and dis- 
 position of the body. And if any man of 
 weak judgment do conceive that this suf- 
 fering of the mind from the body doth 
 either question the immortality, or dero- 
 gate from the sovereignty of the soul, he 
 may be taught in easy instances, that the 
 infant in the mother's womb is compatible 
 with the mother, and yet separable ; and the 
 most absolute monarch is sometimes led by his 
 servants, and yet without subjection. As 
 for the reciprocal knowledge, which is the 
 operation of the conceits and passions of 
 the mind upon the body, we see all wise 
 
221 
 
 physicians, in the prescriptions of their re- 
 gimens to their patients, do ever consider 
 accidentia animi as of great force to further 
 or hinder remedies or recoveries ; and more 
 especially it is an enquiry of great depth 
 and worth concerning imagination, how and 
 how far it altereth the body proper of the 
 imaginant. For although it hath a manifest 
 power to hurt, it followeth not it hath the 
 same degree of power to help ; no more 
 than a man can conclude, that because there 
 be pestilent airs, able suddenly to kill a man 
 jn health, therefore there should be sove- 
 reign airs, able suddenly to cure a man in 
 sickness. But the inquisition of this part 
 is of great use, though it needeth, as So- 
 crates said, " a Delian diver," being dif- 
 ficult and profound. But unto all this know- 
 ledge de communi vinculo, of the concord- 
 ances between the mind and the body, that 
 part of enquiry is most necessary, which 
 considereth of the seats and domiciles which 
 the several faculties of the mind do take 
 and occupate in the organs of the body ; 
 which knowledge hath been attempted, and 
 is controverted, and deserveth to be much 
 
222 
 
 better enquired. For the opinion of Plato, 
 who placed the understanding in the brain, 
 animosity (which he did unfitly call anger, 
 having a greater mixture with pride) in 
 the heart, and concupiscence or sensuality 
 in the liver, deserveth not to be despised, 
 but much less to be allowed. So then we 
 have constituted, as in our own wish and 
 advice, the enquiry touching human nature 
 entire, as a just portion of knowledge to 
 be handled apart. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE BODY. 
 
 The knowledge that concerneth man's 
 Body is divided as the good of man's body 
 is divided, unto which it referreth. The 
 good of man's body is of four kinds, health, 
 it's four beauty, strength, and pleasure : So the know- 
 ledges are medicine, or art of cure ; art of 
 decoration, which is called cosmetic; art of 
 activity, which is called athletic; and art 
 voluptuary, which Tacitus truly calleth eru- 
 ditus luxus. The subject of man's body is 
 of all other things in nature most suscep- 
 
 parts 
 
223 
 
 tible of remedy ; but then that remedy is 
 most susceptible of error. For the same sub- 
 tility of the subject doth cause large possi- 
 bility and easy failing ; and therefore the 
 enquiry ought to be the more exact. 
 
 To speak therefore of medicine, and to Medicine 
 resume that we have said, ascending a little 
 higher ; the ancient opinion that man was 
 microcosmus, an abstract or model of the world, 
 hath been fantastically strained by Paracelsus 
 and the alchemists, as if there were to be 
 found in man's body certain correspond- 
 ences and parallels, which should have re- 
 spect to all varieties of things, as stars, pla- 
 nets, minerals, which are extant in the great 
 world. But thus much is evidently true, that 
 of all substances which nature hath pro- 
 duced, man^s body is the most extremely 
 compounded : For we see herbs and plants 
 are nourished by earth and water ; beasts 
 for the most part by herbs and fruits; man by 
 the flesh of beasts, birds, fishes, herbs, grains, 
 fruits, water, and the manifold alterations, 
 dressings, and preparations of these several 
 bodies, before they come to be his food and 
 aliment. Add hereunto, that beasts have a 
 
224 
 
 more simple order of life, and less change 
 of affections to work upon their bodies : 
 whereas man in his mansion, sleep, exer- 
 cise, passions, hath infinite variations ; and 
 it cannot be denied but that the body of 
 man of all other things is of the most com- 
 pounded mass. The soul on the other side 
 is the simplest of substances, as is well ex- 
 pressed : 
 
 Purumque reliquit 
 JEthereum sensum aique aiirdi simplicis ignein. 
 So that it is no marvel though the soul so 
 placed enjoy no rest, if that principle be 
 true, that Biotas rerum est rapidus extra lo- 
 cum, placidus in loco. But to the purpose : 
 this variable composition of man's body hath 
 made it as an instrument easy to distemper ; 
 and therefore the poets did well to conjoin 
 music and medicine in Apollo ; because the 
 office of medicine is but to tune this cu- 
 rious harp of man's body, and to reduce it 
 to harmony. 
 An art parti- So then the subject being so variable 
 
 cularly con- .. .. 
 
 jecturai and hath made the art by consequence m^re 
 
 fit for impos- . . . 
 
 ture. conjectural ; ana the art being conjectural 
 
 hath made so much the more place to be 
 
225 
 
 left for imposture. For almost all other arts 
 and sciences are judged by acts or master- 
 pieces, as I may term them, and not by the 
 successes and events. The lawyer is judged 
 by the virtue of his pleading, and not by 
 the issue of the cause. The master of the 
 ship is judged by the directing his course 
 aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage. 
 But the physician, and perhaps. the politi- 
 cian, hath no particular acts demonstrative 
 of his ability, but is judged most by the 
 event; which is ever but as it is taken : 
 for who can tell, if a patient die or re- 
 cover, or if a state be preserved or ruined, 
 whether it be art or accident ? And there- 
 fore many times the impostor is prized, 
 and the man of virtue taxed. Nay, we see 
 the weakness and credulity of men is such, 
 as they will often prefer a mountebank or 
 witch before a learned physician. And 
 therefore the poets were clear-sighted in 
 discerning this extreme folly, when they 
 made iEsculapius and Circe brother and 
 sister, both children of the sun, as in the 
 verses ; Mu. vii. 772. 
 a 
 
226 
 
 Ipse repertorem medicince talis et artis 
 Fulmine Phcebigenam Stygias detrusit ad 
 undas : 
 And again, 
 
 Dives inaccessos ubi Solis filia lucos, etc. 
 
 JEn. vii. 11. For in all times, in the opinion 
 
 of the multitude, witches and old women 
 
 and impostors have had a competition with 
 
 Physicians physicians. And what followeth ? Even this ; 
 
 usually cul- r J 3 
 
 tivatesome that physicians say to themselves, as Solo- 
 other ait. J J 
 
 mon expresseth it upon an higher occasion ; 
 
 If it befal to me as befalleth to the fools, ivhy 
 should I labour to be more wise ? And there- 
 fore I cannot much blame physicians, that 
 they use commonly to intend some other 
 art or practice, which they fancy more 
 than their profession. For you shall have of 
 them, antiquaries, poets, humanists, states- 
 men, merchants, divines, and in every of 
 these better seen than in their profession ; 
 and no doubt, upon this ground, that they 
 find that mediocrity and excellency in their 
 / art maketh no difference in profit or repu- 
 
 tation towards their fortune ; for the weak- 
 ness of patients, and sweetness of life, and 
 
227 
 nature of hope, maketh men depend upon 
 physicians with all their defects. 
 
 But, nevertheless, these things, which we Causes of it's 
 
 uncertainty* 
 
 have spoken of, are courses begotten between 
 a little occasion, and a great deal of sloth 
 and default ; for if we will excite and awake 
 our observation, we shall see in familiar in- 
 stances what a predominant faculty the sub- 
 tilty of spirit hath over the variety of matter 
 or form : nothing more variable than faces 
 and countenances, yet men can bear in me- 
 mory the infinite distinctions of them ; nay, 
 a painter with a few shells of colours, and the 
 benefit of his eye, and habit of his imagi- 
 nation, can imitate them all that ever have 
 been, are, or may be, if they were brought 
 before him. Nothing more variable than 
 voices, yet men can likewise discern them 
 personally ; nay, you shall have a buffoon, 
 or pantomimus, will express as many as he 
 pleaseth. Nothing more variable than the 
 differing sounds of words, yet men have 
 found the way to reduce them to a few 
 simple letters. So that it is not the insuf- 
 ficiency or incapacity of .man's mind, but 
 it is the remote standing or placing thereof 
 *2 
 
22S 
 
 that breedeth these mazes and incompre* 
 hensions : for as the sense afar off is full of 
 mistaking, but is exact at hand, so it is 
 of the understanding ; the remedy whereof 
 is not to quicken or strengthen the organ, 
 but to go nearer to the object ; and there- 
 fore there is no doubt but if the physi- 
 cians will learn and use the true approaches 
 and avenues of nature, they may assume as 
 much as the poet saith : 
 
 ' Et quoniam variant morli, variahimus artes ; 
 \Mille mall species, mille salutis erurit. 
 Which that they should do, the noble- 
 ness of their art doth deserve ; well sha- 
 dowed by the poets, in that they made iEs- 
 culapius to be the son of the Sun, the one 
 being the fountain of life, the other as the 
 second stream : but infinitely more honour- 
 ed by the example of our Saviour, who 
 made the body of man the object of his 
 miracles, as the soul was the object of his 
 doctrine ; for we read not that ever he 
 vouchsafed to do any miracle about honor 
 or money, except that one for giving tribute 
 to Csesar, but only about the preserving, 
 sustaining, and healing the body of mam 
 
229 
 
 Medicine is a science which hath been, Deficiencies 
 
 in medicine. 
 
 as we have said, more professed than la- 
 boured, and yet more laboured than ad- 
 vanced; the labour having been, in my 
 judgment, rather in circle than in progres- 
 sion. For I find much iteration, but small 
 addition. It considereth the causes of dis- 
 eases, with the occasions or impulsions ; the 
 diseases themselves, with the accidents ; and 
 the cures, with the preservations. The defi- 
 eiences which I think good to note, being 
 a few of many, and those such as are of a 
 more open and manifest nature, I will enu- 
 merate and not place. 
 
 The first is the discontinuance of the an- J. n a n f ra * 
 
 . tive of spe- 
 
 cient and serious diligence of Hippocrates, cial cases> 
 who used to set down a narrative of the 
 special cases of his patients, and how they 
 proceeded, and how they were judged by 
 recovery or death. Therefore having an 
 example proper in the father of the art, I 
 shall not need to allege an example fo- 
 reign, of the wisdom of the lawyers, who 
 are careful to report new cases and deci- 
 sions for the direction of future judgments. 
 This continuance of Medicinal History I 
 
230 
 
 find deficient; which I understand neither 
 to be so infinite as to extend to every com- 
 mon case, nor so reserved as to admit none 
 but wonders ; for many things are new in 
 the manner which are not new in the kind ; 
 and if men will intend to observe, they 
 shall find much worthy to observe. 
 des^f tmT* -* n * ne en( l u i r y which is made by anatomy 
 tomy. j f m( j mucQ deficience : for they enquire of 
 
 the parts, and their substances, figures, and 
 collocations; but they enquire not of the 
 diversities of the parts, the secrecies of the 
 passages, and the seats or the nestling of 
 the humours, nor much of the footsteps and 
 impressions of diseases : the reason of which 
 omission I suppose to be, because the first 
 enquiry may be satisfied in the view of one 
 or a few anatomies ; but the latter being 
 comparative and casual must arise from the 
 view of many. And as to the diversity of 
 parts, there is no doubt but the facture or 
 framing of the inward parts is as full of 
 difference as the outward, and in that is the 
 cause continent of many diseases ; which 
 not being observed, they quarrel many times 
 rwith the humours, which are not in fault; 
 
231 
 
 the fault being in the very frame and me- 
 chanic of the part, which cannot be moved 
 by medicine alterative, but must be accom- 
 modated and palliated by diets and medi- 
 cines familiar. And for the passages and 
 pores, it is true which was anciently noted, 
 that the more subtile of them appear not 
 in anatomies, because they are shut and 
 latent in dead bodies, though they be open 
 and manifest in live : which being supposed, 
 though the inhumanity of anatomia vivorum 
 was by Celsus justly reproved, yet in regard 
 of the great use of this observation, the en- 
 quiry needed not by him so slightly to have 
 been relinquished altogether, or referred to 
 the casual practices of surgery ; but might 
 have been well diverted upon the dissection 
 of beasts alive, which, notwithstanding the 
 dissimilitude of their parts, may sufficiently 
 satisfy this enquiry. And for the humours, 
 they are commonly passed over in anato- 
 mies as purgaments ; whereas it is most ne- 
 cessary to observe, what cavities, nests, and 
 receptacles the humours do find in the parts, 
 with the differing kind of the humour so 
 lodged and received. And as for the foot- 
 
£32 
 
 steps of diseases, and their devastations of 
 the inward parts, imposthumations, exulcera- 
 tions, discontinuations, putrefactions, con- 
 sumptions, contractions, extensions, convul- 
 sions, dislocations, obstructions, repletions, 
 together with all praeternatural substances, 
 as stones, carnosities, excrescences, worms, 
 and the like ; they ought to have been 
 exactly observed by multitude of anatomies, 
 and the contribution of men's several expe- 
 riences, and carefully set down, both his- 
 torically, according to the appearances, and 
 artificially, with a reference to the diseases 
 and symptoms which resulted from them, 
 in. case where the anatomy is of a defunct 
 patient ; whereas now upon opening of bo- 
 dies, they are passed over slightly and in 
 silence. 
 in the de- In the enquiry of diseases they do aban- 
 
 spair pi . 
 
 cures. don the cures of many, some as in their na- 
 
 ture incurable, and others as past the period 
 of cure ; so that Sylla and the triumvirs 
 never proscribed so many men to die, as 
 they do by their ignorant edicts ; whereof 
 numbers do escape with less difficulty than 
 they did in the Boman proscriptions. There- 
 
233 
 
 fore I will not doubt to note as a deficience", 
 that they enquire not the perfect cures of 
 •many diseases, or extremities of diseases ; 
 but pronouncing them incurable, do enact 
 a law of neglect, and exempt ignorance from 
 discredit. 
 
 Nay farther, I esteem it the office of a of the office 
 
 of a Physi- 
 
 physician not only to restore health, butcian.. 
 to mitigate pain and dolors; and not only 
 when such mitigation may conduce to re- 
 covery, but when it may serve to make a 
 fair and easy passage : for it is no small 
 felicity which Augustus Caesar was wont to 
 wish to himself, that same euthanasia, and 
 which was specially noted in the death of 
 Antoninus Pius, whose death was after the 
 fashion and semblance of a kindly and plea- 
 sant sleep. So it is written of Epicurus, 
 that after his disease was judged desperate, 
 he drowned his stomach and senses with 
 a large draught and ingurgitation of wine ; 
 whereupon the epigram was made, Hinc 
 Stygias ebrius hausit aquas ; he was not sober 
 enough to taste any bitterness of the Sty- 
 gian water. But the physicians, contrari- 
 wise, do make a kind of scruple and re- 
 
es4 
 
 ligion to stay with the patient after the 
 disease is deplored; whereas, in my judg- 
 ment, they ought both to enquire the skill, 
 and to give the attendances for the faci- 
 litating and assuaging of the pains and 
 agonies of death. 
 •Tradition of In the consideration of the cures of dis- 
 
 particular 
 
 cures defi- eases, I find a deficience in the receipts 
 
 .cjent. 
 
 of propriety, respecting the particular cures 
 of diseases : for the physicians have frus- 
 trated the fruit of tradition and experience 
 by their magistracies, in adding, and taking 
 out, and changing "quid pro quo in their re- 
 ceipts, at their pleasures ; commanding so 
 over the medicine, as the medicine cannot 
 command over the disease : for except it 
 be treacle and mithridatum, and of late 
 diascordium, and a few more, they tie them- 
 selves to no receipts severely and religiously : 
 for as to the confections of sale which are 
 in the shops, they are for readiness and 
 not for propriety ; for they are upon ge- 
 neral intentions of purging, opening, com- 
 forting, altering, and not much appropriated 
 to particular diseases: and this is the cause 
 why empirics and old women are more 
 
£35 
 
 happy many times in their cures than 
 learned physicians, because they are more 
 religious in holding their medicines. There- 
 fore here is the deficience which I find, that 
 physicians have not, partly out of their own 
 practice, partly out of their constant proba- 
 tions reported in books, and partly out of the 
 traditions of empirics, set down and deli- 
 vered over certain experimental medicines 
 for the cure of particular diseases, besides 
 their own conjectural and magisterial de- 
 scriptions. For as they were the men of 
 the best composition in the state of Rome, 
 which either being consuls inclined to the 
 people, or being tribunes inclined to the 
 senate ; so in the matter we now handle, 
 they be the best physicians, which being 
 learned incline to the traditions of expe- 
 rience, or being empirics incline to the 
 methods of learning. 
 
 In preparation of medicines, I do find of artificial 
 
 mineral 
 
 strange, especially considering how mineral baths, 
 medicines have been extolled, and that they 
 are safer for the outward than inward parts, 
 that no man hath sought to make an imita- 
 tion by art of natural baths and medicinable 
 
236 
 
 fountains ; which nevertheless are confessed 
 to receive their virtues from minerals; and 
 not so only, but discerned and distinguished 
 from what particular mineral they receive 
 tincture, as sulphur, vitriol, steel, or the like ; 
 which nature, if it may be reduced to com- 
 positions of art, both the variety of them 
 will be increased, and the temper of them 
 will be more commanded. 
 Prescriptions But lest I grow to be more particular than 
 
 too compen- 
 dious, is agreeable either to my intention or to pro- 
 portion, I will conclude this part with the note 
 of one deficience more, which seemeth to me 
 of greatest consequence; which is, that the 
 prescripts in use are too compendious to attain 
 their end : for to my understanding, it is a 
 vain and flattering opinion to think any 
 medicine can be so sovereign or so happy, 
 as that the receipt or use of it can work any 
 great effect upon the body of man. It were 
 a strange speech, which spoken, or spoken 
 oft, should reclaim a man from a vice to . 
 which he were by nature subject : it is order, 
 pursuit, sequence, and interchange of ap- 
 plication, which is mighty in nature ; whic ii 
 although it require more exact knowledge in 
 
237 
 
 prescribing, and more precise obedience in 
 observing, yet is recompensed with the mag- 
 nitude of effects. And although a man would 
 think by the daily visitations of the phy- 
 sicians, that there were a pursuance in the 
 cure ; yet let a man look into their prescripts 
 and ministrations, and he shall find them 
 but inconstancies and every day's devices, 
 without any settled providence or project ; 
 not that every scrupulous or superstitious 
 prescript is effectual, no more than every 
 straight way is the way to heaven ; but the 
 truth of the direction must precede severity 
 of observance. 
 
 For Cosmetic, it hath parts civil, and parts Cosmetic 
 effeminate : for cleanness of body was ever 
 esteemed to proceed from a due reverence to 
 God, to society, and to ourselves. As for 
 artificial decoration, it is well worthy of the 
 deficiencies which it hath; being neither fine 
 enough to deceive, nor handsome to use, nor 
 wholesome to please. 
 
 For Athletic, I take the subject of it larger Athletic. 
 ly, that is to say, for any point of ability, 
 whereunto the body of man may be brought^ 
 whether it be of activity, or of patience ; 
 
S38 
 
 whereof activity hath two parts, strength and 
 swiftness; and patience likewise hath two 
 parts, hardness against wants and extremi- 
 ties, and indurance of pain or torment; 
 whereof we see the practices in tumblers, in 
 savages, and in those that suffer punish- 
 ment: nay, if there be any other faculty 
 which falls not within any of the former di- 
 visions, as in those that dive, that obtain a 
 strange power of containing respiration, and 
 the like, I refer it to this part. Of these 
 things the practices are known, but the phi- 
 losophy that concerneth them is not much 
 enquired ; the rather, I think, because they 
 are supposed to be obtained, either by an 
 aptness of nature, which cannot be taught, 
 or only by continual custom, which is soon 
 prescribed ; which though it be not true, yet 
 I forbear to note any deficiencies ; for the 
 Olympian games are down long since, and 
 the mediocrity of these things is for use ; as 
 for the excellency of them, it serveth for the 
 most part for mercenary ostentation. 
 Sensuality. For arts of Pleasure sensual, the chief defi- 
 cience in them is of laws to repress them. 
 For as it bath been well observed, that the 
 
239 
 
 arts which flourish in times while virtue is in 
 growth, are military ; and while virtue is in 
 state, are liberal ; and while virtue is in de- 
 clination, are voluptuary; so I doubt that 
 this age of the world is somewhat upon the 
 descent of the wheel. With arts voluptuary 
 I couple practices joculary ; for the deceiv- 
 ing of the senses is one of the pleasures of 
 the senses. As for games of recreation, I 
 hold them to belong to civil life and educa- 
 tion. And thus much of that particular hu- 
 man philosophy which concerns the body, 
 which is but the tabernacle of the mind. 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF THE MIND. 
 
 For Human Knowledge which concerns 
 the Mind, it hath two parts; the one that 
 enquireth of the substance or nature of the 
 soul or mind, the other that enquireth of the 
 faculties or functions thereof. 
 
 Unto the first of these, the considerations of of the Na- 
 the original of the soul, whether it be native soul or Mind. 
 or adventive, and how far it is exempted from 
 
240 
 
 laws of matter, and of the immortality there- 
 of, and many other points, do appertain ; 
 which have been not more laboriously en- 
 quired than variously reported; so as the 
 travel therein taken seemeth to have been 
 rather in a maze than in a way. But although 
 I am of opinion that this knowledge may be 
 more really and soundly enquired even in 
 nature than it hath been ; yet I hold that in 
 the end it must be bounded by religion, or 
 else it will be subject to deceit and delusion : 
 for as the substance of the soul in the crea- 
 tion was not extracted out of the mass of 
 heaven and earth by the benediction of a 
 producat, but was immediately inspired from 
 God ; so it is not possible that it should be, 
 otherwise than by accident, subject to the 
 laws of heaven and earth, which are the sub- 
 ject of philosophy; and therefore the true 
 knowledge of the nature and state of the soul 
 must come by the same inspiration that gave 
 the substance. Unto this part of knowledge 
 touching the soul there be two appendixes; 
 which, as they have been handled, have ra- 
 ther vapoured forth fables than kindled truth > 
 divination and fascination. 
 
Ml 
 Divination hath been anciently and fitly Two kinds of 
 
 w v Divination. 
 
 divided into artificial and natural; whereof 
 artificial is when the mind maketh a pre- 
 diction by argument, concluding upon signs 
 and tokens ; natural is when the mind hath 
 a presention by an internal power, with- 
 out the inducement of a sign. Artificial is 
 of two sorts; either when the argument 
 is coupled with a derivation of causes, 
 which is rational ; or when it is only ground- 
 ed upon a coincidence of the effect, which 
 is experimental; whereof the latter for the 
 most part is superstitious: such as were the 
 heathen observations upon the inspection of 
 sacrifices, the flights of birds, the swarming 
 of bees, and such as were the Chaldean as- 
 trology, and the like. For artificial divina- 
 tion, the several kinds thereof are distri- 
 buted amongst particular knowledges. The 
 astronomer hath his predictions, as of con- 
 junctions, aspects, eclipses, and the like. 
 The physician hath his predictions of death, 
 of recovery, of the accidents and issues of 
 diseases. The politician hath his predictions ; 
 O urbem venalem, et cito perituram, si emp- 
 tor em invenerit ! which stayed not long to be 
 
 R 
 
performed in Sylla first, and after in Caesar ; 
 so as these predictions are now impertinent, 
 and to be referred over. But the divination 
 which springeth from the internal nature of 
 the soul, is that which we now speak of, 
 which hath been made to be of two sorts, 
 primitive and by influxion. Primitive is 
 grounded upon the supposition that the 
 mind, when it is withdrawn and collected 
 into itself, and not diffused into the organs of 
 the body, hath some extent and latitude of 
 prenotion; which therefore appeareth most 
 in sleep, in extasies, and near death, and 
 more rarely in waking apprehensions ; and 
 is induced and furthered by those absti- 
 nences and observations which make the 
 mind most to consist in itself: by influxion, 
 is grounded upon the conceit that the mind, 
 as a mirror or glass, should take illumination, 
 from the foreknowledge of God and spirits; 
 unto which the same regimen doth likewise 
 conduce. For the retiring of the mind with- 
 in itself is the state which is most suscep- 
 tible of divine influxions; save that it is ac- 
 companied in this case with a fervency and 
 elevation which the ancients noted by fury, 
 
and not with a repose and quiet, as it is in 
 the other. 
 
 Fascination is the power and act of imagi- of Fastina- 
 
 tion. 
 
 nation intensive upon other bodies than the 
 body of the imaginant ; for of that we spake 
 in the proper place; wherein the school of 
 Paracelsus, and the disciples of pretended 
 natural magic, have been so intemperate, as 
 that they have exalted the power of the ima- 
 gination to be much one with the power of 
 miracle-working faith; others, that draw 
 nearer to probability, calling to their view 
 the secret passages of things, and especially 
 of the contagion that passeth from body to 
 body, do conceive it should likewise be agree- 
 able to nature, that there should be some 
 transmissions and operations from spirit to 
 spirit, without the mediation of the senses : 
 whence the conceits have grown, now almost 
 made civil, of the mastering spirit, and the 
 force of confidence, and the like. Incident 
 unto this is the enquiry how to raise and for- 
 tify the imagination : for if the imagination 
 fortified have power, then it is material to 
 know how to fortify and exalt it. And here- 
 in comes in crookedly and dangerously a pal- 
 *2 
 
244 
 
 liation of a great part of ceremonial magic. 
 For it may be pretended that ceremonies, 
 characters, and charms, do work not by any 
 tacit or sacramental contract with evil spirits, 
 but serve only to strengthen the imagination 
 of him that useth it ; as images are said by 
 the Roman church to fix the cogitations, and 
 raise the devotions of them that pray before 
 them. But for mine own judgment, if it be 
 admitted that imagination hath power, and 
 that ceremonies fortify imagination, and that 
 they be used sincerely and intentionally for 
 that purpose ; yet I should hold them unlaw- 
 ful, as opposing to that first edict which God 
 gave unto man, In sudore vultus comedes panem 
 tuum. For they propound those noble effects, 
 which God hath set forth unto man to be 
 bought at the price of labour, to be attained 
 by a few easy and slothful observances. De^ 
 ficiencies in these knowledges I will report 
 none other than the general deficience, that 
 it is not known how much of them is verity, 
 and how much vanity, 
 of thelaeui- The knowledge which respecteth the facul- 
 soui°or mind, ties of the mind of man is of two kinds; the 
 one respecting his understanding and reason, 
 
245 
 
 the other his will, appetite, and affection; 
 whereof the former produceth position or de- 
 cree, the latter action or execution. It is 
 true that the imagination is an agent or nun- 
 cius in both provinces, both the judicial and 
 the ministerial. For sense sendeth over to 
 imagination before reason have judged, and 
 reason sendeth over to imagination before the 
 decree can be acted: for imagination ever 
 precedeth voluntary motion, saving that this 
 Janus of imagination hath differing faces; 
 for the face towards reason hath the print of 
 truth, but the face towards action hath the 
 print of good ; which nevertheless are faces^ 
 
 Quales decet esse sororum. 
 Neither is the imagination simply and only a 
 messenger, but is invested with, or at least- 
 wise usurpeth no small authority in itself, be- 
 sides the duty of the message. For it was 
 well said by Aristotle, " That the mind hath 
 " over the body that commandment, which 
 " the lord hath over a bondman ; but that 
 " reason hath over the imagination that com- 
 " mandment which a magistrate hath over a 
 " free citizen ;" who may come also to rule 
 in his turn. For we see that in matters of 
 
44B 
 
 faith and religion we raise our imagination 
 above our reason ; which is the cause why re- 
 ligion sought ever access to the mind by si- 
 militudes, types, parables, visions, dreams. 
 And again, in all persuasions that are 
 wrought by eloquence, and other impres- 
 sions of like nature, which do paint and dis- 
 guise the true appearance of things, the 
 chief recommendation unto reason is from 
 the imagination. Nevertheless, because I 
 find not any science that doth properly or 
 fitly pertain to the imagination, I see no 
 cause to alter the former division. For as 
 for poesy, it is rather a pleasure, or play of 
 imagination, than a work of duty thereof: 
 and if it be a work, we speak not now of 
 such parts of learning as the imagination 
 produceth, but of such sciences as handle 
 and consider of the imagination ; no more 
 than we shall speak now of such knowledges 
 as reason produceth, for that extendeth to all 
 philosophy, but of such knowledges as do 
 handle and enquire of the faculty of reason ; 
 so as poesy had its true place. As for the 
 power of the imagination in nature, and the 
 manner of fortifying the same, we have men- 
 
247 
 
 tioned it in the doctrine De anima, whereun- 
 to most fitly it belongeth: and lastly, for 
 imaginative or insinuative reason, which is 
 the subject of rhetoric, we think it best to re- 
 fer it to the arts of reason. So therefore we 
 content ourselves with the former division, 
 that Human Philosophy, which respecteth 
 the faculties of the mind of man, hath two 
 parts, Rational and Moral, 
 
 RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The part of Human Philosophy which is 
 Rational is of all knowledges, to the most 
 wits, the least delightful, and seemeth but a 
 net of subtilty and spinosity: for as it was 
 truly said, that knowledge is pabulum animi; 
 so in the nature of men's appetite to this 
 food, most men are of the taste and stomach 
 of the Israelites in the desert, that would fain 
 have returned ad ollas camium, and were 
 weary of manna ; which though it were ce- 
 lestial, yet seemed less nutritive and com- 
 fortable. So generally men taste well know- 
 ledges that are drenched in flesh and blood, 
 
248 
 
 civil history, morality, policy, about the 
 which men's affections, praises, fortunes, do 
 turn and are conversant ; but this same lu- 
 men siccum doth parch and offend most men's 
 watery and soft natures. But to speak truly 
 of things as they are in worth, rational know- 
 ledges are the keys of all other arts ; for as 
 Aristotle saith aptly and elegantly, " That 
 " the hand is the instrument of instruments., 
 " and the mind is the form of forms;" so 
 these be truly said to be the art of arts : nei^ 
 ther do they only direct, but likewise con- 
 firm and strengthen; even as the habit of 
 shooting doth not only enable to shoot a nearer 
 shoot, but also to draw a stronger bow. 
 Four intei- The arts intellectual are four in number ; 
 
 Jectual arts. 
 
 divided according to the ends whereunto they 
 are referred; for man's labour is to invent 
 that which is sought or propounded; or to 
 judge that which is invented ; or to retain 
 that which is judged; or to deliver over that 
 which is retained. So as the arts must be 
 four ; art of enquiry or invention ; art of ex-* 
 animation or judgment ; art of custody or me« 
 tnory; and art of elocution or tradition* 
 
249 
 Invention is of two kinds, much differing; Artof Euqui- 
 
 i n -1 • i i i O t or inven- 
 
 the one of arts and sciences ; and the other tion. 
 of speech and arguments. The former of 
 these I do report deficient ; which seemeth to 
 me to be such a deficience as if, in the mak- 
 ing of an inventory touching the state of a 
 defunct, it should be set down, That there 
 is no ready money. For as money will fetch 
 all other commodities, so this knowledge is 
 that which should purchase all the rest. And 
 like as the West-Indies had never been dis- 
 covered, if the use of the mariner's needle 
 had not been first discovered, though the one 
 be vast regions, and the other a small motion; 
 so it cannot be found strange, if sciences be 
 no farther discovered, if the art itself of 
 invention and discovery hath been passed 
 over. 
 
 That this part of knowledge is wanting, to 
 my judgment standeth plainly confessed : for 
 first, logic doth not pretend to invent sci- 
 ences, or the axioms of sciences, but pass- 
 eth it over with a cuique in sua arte credendum. 
 And Celsus acknowledged it gravely, speak- 
 ing of the empirical and dogmatical sects of 
 physicians, " That medicines and cures were 
 
£50 
 
 " first found out, and then after the reasons 
 " and causes were discoursed ; and not the 
 f* causes first found out, and by light from 
 ? them the medicines and cures discovered." 
 And Plato, in his Thecetetus, noteth well, 
 " That particulars are infinite, and the high- 
 " er generalities give no sufficient direction ; 
 Jf and that the pith of all sciences, which 
 tc maketh the artsman differ from the inex- 
 ff pert, is in the middle propositions, which 
 " in every particular knowledge are taken 
 " from tradition and experience." And 
 therefore we see that they, which discourse 
 of the inventions and originals of things, re- 
 fer them rather to chance than to art, and 
 rather to beasts, birds, fishes, serpents, than 
 to men. 
 
 Dictamnum genetrix Cretcea carpit ab Ida, 
 Puberibus caulem foliis, etjlore comantem 
 Purpureo: non ilia feris incognita capris 
 Gramina, cum tergo volucres hasere sagitta. 
 So that it was no marvel, the manner of anti-? 
 quity being to consecrate inventors, that the 
 Egyptians had so few human idols in thei* 
 temples, but almost all brute. 
 
251 
 
 Omnigenumque Deum monstra, et latrator 
 Anubis > 
 
 Contra Neptunum, et Venerem, contraque Mi- 
 new am, etc. 
 And if you like better the tradition of the 
 Grecians, and ascribe the first inventions to 
 men, yet you will rather believe that Prome- 
 theus first struck the flints, and marvelled at 
 the spark, than that when he first struck the 
 flints he expected the spark ; and therefore 
 we see the West-Indian Prometheus had no 
 intelligence with the European, because of 
 the rareness with them of flint, that gave the 
 first occasion : so as it should seem, that hi- 
 therto men are rather beholden to a wild goat 
 for surgery, or to a nightingale for music, or 
 to the ibis for some part of physic, or to the 
 potlid that flew open for artillery, or gene- 
 rally to chance, or any thing else than to h> 
 gic, for the invention of arts and sciences. 
 Neither is the form of invention which Vir- 
 gil describeth much other; 
 
 Ut varias usus meditando extunderet artes 
 
 Pauiati?n. 
 For if you observe the words well, it is no 
 
£52 
 
 other method than that which brute beasts are 
 capable of, and do put in use ; which is a 
 perpetual intending or practising some one 
 thing, urged and imposed by an absolute ne- 
 cessity of conservation of being : for so Ci- 
 cero saith very truly, Usus uni rei deditus et 
 naturam et art em scepe vincit. And therefore 
 if it be said of men, 
 
 Labor omnia vincit 
 Improbus, et duris urgens in rebus egestas; 
 it is likewise said of beasts, 2uis psittaco docuit 
 suum xoupz : Who taught the raven in a 
 drought to throw pebbles into an hollow tree, 
 where she espied water, that the water might 
 rise so as she might come to it ? Who taught 
 the bee to sail through such a vast sea of air, 
 and to find the way from a field in flower, a 
 great way of£ to her hive ? Who taught the 
 ant to bite every grain of corn that she buri- 
 eth in her hill, lest it should take root and 
 grow? Add then the word extundere, which 
 importeth the extreme difficulty, and the 
 word paulatim, which importeth the extreme 
 slowness, and we are where we were, even 
 amongst the iEgyptians' gods; there being 
 
U53 
 
 little left to the faculty of reason, and no- 
 thing to the duty of art, for matter of in- 
 vention. 
 
 Secondly, the induction which the logicians The induction 
 speak of, and which seemeth familiar with the Logicians 
 
 incompetent, 
 
 Plato, (whereby the principles of sciences 
 may be pretended to be invented, and so the 
 middle propositions by derivation from the 
 principles,) their form of induction, I say, 
 is utterly vicious and incompetent ; wherein 
 their error is the fouler, because it is the duty 
 *of art to perfect and exalt nature ; but they 
 contrariwise have wronged, abused, and tra- 
 duced nature. For he that shall attentively, 
 observe how the mind doth gather this excel- 
 lent dew of knowledge, like unto that which 
 the poet speaketh of, Aerei mellis ccekstia do- 
 na, distilling and contriving it out of parti- 
 culars natural and artificial, as the flowers of 
 the field and garden, shall find that the mind 
 of herself by nature doth manage and act an 
 induction much better than they describe it. 
 For to conclude upon an enumeration of par- 
 ticulars, without instance contradictory, is no 
 conclusion, but a conjecture; for who can 
 assure, in many subjects, upon those parti- 
 
254 
 
 culars which appear of a side, that there are 
 not on the contrary side which appear not. 
 As if Samuel should have rested upon those 
 sons of Jesse which were brought before him, 
 and failed of David which was in the field. 
 And this form, to say truth, is so gross, as it 
 had not been possible for wits so subtile as 
 have managed these things to have offered 
 it to the world, but that they hasted to their 
 theories and dogmaticals, and were imperious 
 and scornful toward particulars; which their 
 manner was to use but as lictores and viatores, 
 for Serjeants and whifflers, ad summovendam 
 turbam, to make way and make room for their 
 opinions, rather than in their true use and 
 service. Certainly it is a thing may touch a 
 man with a religious wonder to see how the 
 footsteps of seducement are the very same in 
 divine and human truth: for as in divine 
 truth man cannot endure to become as a 
 child; so in human, they reputed the attend- 
 ing the inductions whereof we speak, as if it 
 were a second infancy or childhood. 
 Nature can- Thirdly, allow some principles or axioms 
 
 not be exa- J 7 r r 
 
 Srn^oFs 11 ? w ere rightty m ^ uce d> yet nevertheless certain 
 logism, j t j s that middle propositions cannot be de- 
 
£55 
 
 duced from them in subject of nature by syl- 
 logism, that is by touch and reduction of 
 them to principles in a middle term. It is 
 true that in sciences popular, as moralities, 
 laws, and the like, yea and divinity (because 
 it pleaseth God to apply himself to the capa- 
 city of the simplest) that form may have use ; 
 and in natural philosophy likewise, by way 
 of argument or satisfactory reason, 3uce assen- 
 sum parity operis effceta est ; but the subtilty 
 of nature and operations will not be inchain- 
 ed in those bonds : for arguments consist of 
 propositions, and propositions of words; and 
 words are but the current tokens or marks o 
 popular notions of things ; which notions, if 
 they be grossly and variably collected out of 
 particulars, it is not the laborious examina- 
 tion either of consequences of arguments, or 
 of the truth of propositions, that can ever 
 correct that error, being, as the physicians 
 speak, in the first digestion : and therefore it 
 was not without cause, that so many excellent 
 philosophers became sceptics and academics, 
 and denied any certainty of knowledge or 
 comprehension; and held opinion, that the 
 knowledge of man extended only to appear- 
 
256 
 
 aftces and probabilities. It is true that hi 
 Socrates it was supposed to be but a form of 
 irony, Scientia?n dissimulando simulavit; for 
 he used to disable his knowledge, to the end 
 to enhance his knowledge; like the humour 
 of Tiberius in his beginnings, that would 
 reign, but would not acknowledge so much : 
 and in the later academy, which Cicero em- 
 braced, this opinion also of acatalepsia, I 
 doubt, was not held sincerely : for that all 
 those which excelled in copia of speech seem 
 to have chosen that sect, as that which was 
 , fittest to give glory to their eloquence and 
 
 variable discourses ; being rather like pro- 
 gresses of pleasure, than journeys to an end. 
 Error of the But assuredly many scattered in both acade- 
 
 Sceptics and ° 
 
 Academics. m ies did hold it in subtilty and integrity: 
 but here was their chief error ; they charged 
 the deceit upon the senses ; which in my 
 judgment, notwithstanding all their cavilla- 
 tions, are very sufficient to certify and report 
 truth, though not always immediately, yet 
 by comparison, by help of instrument, and 
 by producing and urging such things as are 
 too subtile for the sense to some effect com- 
 prehensible by the sense ; and other like as- 
 
257 
 
 sistance. But they ought to have charged 
 the deceit upon the weakness of the intel- 
 lectual powers, and upon the manner of 
 collecting and concluding upon the reports 
 of the senses. This I speak not to disable 
 the mind of man, but to stir it up to seek 
 help: for no man, be he never so cunning 
 or practised, can make a straight line or 
 perfect circle by steadiness of hand, which 
 may be easily done by help of a ruler or 
 compass. 
 
 This part of invention, concerning the in- 
 vention of sciences, I purpose, if God give me 
 leave, hereafter to propound, having digested 
 it into two parts ; whereof the one I term ex- 
 perientia literata, and the other, interpretatio 
 naturae : the former being but a degree and 
 rudiment of the latter. But I will not dwell 
 too long, nor speak too much upon a pro- 
 mise. 
 
 The invention of speech or argument is of invention 
 
 of Speech or 
 
 not properly an invention ; for to invent is to Argument. 
 discover that we know not ; and not to re- 
 cover or resummon that which we already 
 know : and the use of this invention is no 
 
258 
 
 other but, out of the knowledge whereof our 
 mind is already possessed, to draw forth or 
 call before us that which may be pertinent 
 to the purpose which we take into our consi- 
 deration. So as, to speak truly, it is no inven- 
 tion, but a remembrance or suggestion, with 
 an application ; which is the cause why the 
 schools do place it after judgment, as subse- 
 quent and not precedent. Nevertheless, be- 
 cause we do account a chace, as well of deer 
 in an inclosed park, as in a forest at large, 
 and that it hath already obtained the name, 
 let it be called invention ; so as it be per- 
 ceived and discerned that the scope and end 
 of this invention is readiness and present use 
 of our knowledge, and not addition or am- 
 plification thereof, 
 of prepara. To procure this ready use of knowledge 
 there are two courses, preparation and sug- 
 gestion. The former of these seemeth scarce- 
 ly a part of knowledge, consisting rather of 
 diligence than of any artificial erudition. 
 And herein Aristotle wittily, but hurtfully, 
 doth deride the sophists near his time, say- 
 ing, " They did as if one that professed the 
 " art of shoe-making should not teach how to 
 
 tioa". 
 
259 
 
 " make up a shoe, but only exhibit in a 
 " readiness a number of shoes of all fashions 
 " and sizes." But yet a man might reply, 
 that if a shoe-maker should have no shoes in 
 his shop, but only work as he is bespoken, he 
 should be weakly customed. But our Sa- 
 viour speaking of divine knowledge, saith, 
 that the kingdom of heaven is like a good hons- 
 holder, that hringeth forth neiv and old store : 
 and we see the ancient writers of rhetoric 
 do give it in precept, that pleaders should 
 have the places, whereof they have most 
 continual use, ready handled in all the va- 
 riety that may be; as that, to speak for^ the 
 literal interpretation of the law against equi- 
 ty, and contrary; and to speak for pre- 
 sumptions and inferences against testimony, 
 and contrary. And Cicero himself, being 
 broken unto it by great experience deli* 
 vereth it plainly ; that whatsoever a man 
 shall have occasion to speak of, if he will 
 take the pains, he may have it in effect 
 premeditate, and handled in thesi : so that 
 when he cometh to a particular, he shall 
 have nothing to do, but to add names, and 
 times, and places, and such other circum- 
 s2 
 
£60 
 
 stances of individuals. We see likewise the 
 exact diligence of Demosthenes ; who, in re- 
 gard of the great force that the entrance and 
 access into causes nath to make a good im- 
 pression, had ready framed a number of pre- 
 faces for orations and speeches. All which 
 authorities and precedents may overweigh 
 Aristotle's opinion, that would have us change 
 a rich wardrobe for a pair of shears. 
 
 But the nature of the collection of this pro- 
 vision or preparatory store, though it be 
 common both to logic and rhetoric, yet hav- 
 ing made an entry of it here, where it came 
 first to be spoken of, I think fit to refer over 
 the farther handling of it to rhetoric, 
 of sugges- The other part of invention, which I term 
 suggestion, doth assign and direct us to cer- 
 tain marks or places, which may excite our 
 mind to return and produce such knowledge 
 as it hath formerly collected, to the end we 
 may make use thereof. Neither is this use, 
 truly taken, only to furnish argument to 
 dispute probably with others, but likewise to 
 minister unto our judgment to conclude 
 aright within ourselves. Neither may these 
 places serve only to prompt our invention, 
 
 lion. 
 
<26l 
 
 but also to direct our enquiry. For a faculty 
 of wise interrogating is half a knowledge. 
 For as Plato saith, " Whosoever seeketh, 
 " knoweth that which he seeketh for in a 
 " general notion, else how shall he know it 
 " when he hath found it ?" And therefore the 
 larger your anticipation is, the more direct 
 and compendious is your search. But the 
 same places which will help us what to pro- 
 duce of that which we know already, will 
 also help us, if a man of experience were be- 
 fore us, what questions to ask : or, if we have 
 books and authors to instruct us, what points 
 to search and resolve : so as I cannot report 
 that this part of invention, which is that 
 which the schools call topics, is deficient. 
 
 Nevertheless topics are of two sorts, gene- of Topics, 
 ral and special. The general we have spoken fpedS. an 
 to, but the particular hath been touched by 
 some, but rejected generally as inartificial 
 and variable. But leaving the humour which 
 hath reigned too much in the schools, which 
 is to be vainly subtile in a few things which 
 are within their command, and to reject the 
 rest, I do receive particular topics, (that is, 
 places or directions of invention and enquiry 
 
262 
 
 in every particular knowledge) as things of 
 . great use, being mixtures of logic with the mat- 
 ter of sciences : for in these it holdeth, Ars in- 
 veniendi adolescit cum inventis; for as in go- 
 ing of a way, we do not only gain that part 
 of the way which is passed, but we gain the 
 better sight of that part of the way which 
 remaineth, so every degree of proceeding in 
 a science giveth a light to that which fol- 
 loweth; which light if we strengthen, by 
 drawing it forth into questions or places 
 of enquiry, we do greatly advance our 
 pursuit. 
 Art of ex- Now w r e pass unto the arts of judgment, 
 judgment. ° r which handle the natures of proofs and de- 
 monstrations ; which as to induction hath a 
 coincidence with invention: for in all induc- 
 tions, whether in good or vicious form, the 
 same action of the mind which inventeth, 
 judgeth; all one as in the sense : but other- 
 wise it is in proof by syllogism; for the proof 
 being not immediate, but by mean, the in- 
 vention of the mean is one thing, and the 
 judgment of the consequence is another ; the 
 one exciting only, the other examining. 
 Therefore, for the real and exact form of 
 
£63 
 
 judgment, we refer ourselves to that which 
 we have spoken of interpretation of nature. 
 
 For the other judgment by syllogism, as it of Syllogism. 
 is a thing most agreeable to the mind of 
 man, so it hath been vehemently and excel- 
 lently laboured ; for the nature of man doth 
 extremely covet to have somewhat in his 
 understanding fixed and immoveable, and as 
 a rest and support of the mind. And therefore 
 as Aristotle endeavoureth to prove, that in all 
 motion there is some point quiescent; and 
 as he elegantly expoundeth the ancient fable 
 of Atlas, that stood fixed, and bore up the 
 heaven from falling, to be meant of the poles 
 or axle-tree of heaven, whereupon the con- 
 version is accomplished ; so assuredly men 
 have a desire to have an Atlas or axle-tree 
 within, to keep them from fluctuation, which 
 is like to a perpetual peril of falling; there- 
 fore men did hasten to set down some prin- 
 ciples about which the variety [of their dis- 
 putations might turn. 
 
 So then this art of judgment is but the re- 
 duction of propositions to principles in a 
 middle term. The principles to be agreed by 
 all, and exempted from argument ; the mid- 
 
264 
 
 die term to be elected at the liberty of every 
 man's invention ; the reduction to be of two 
 kinds, direct and inverted; the one when 
 the proposition is reduced to the principle, 
 which they term a probation ostensive ; the 
 other when the contradictory of the proposi- 
 tion is reduced to the contradictory of the 
 principle, which is that which they call per 
 incommodum, or pressing an absurdity; the 
 number of middle terms to be as the propo- 
 sition standeth degrees more or less removed 
 from the principle. 
 it's two me- But tn ^ s art natn * wo several methods of 
 Poctrine. doctrine, the one by way of direction, the 
 other by way of caution : the former frameth 
 and setteth down a true form of consequence, 
 by the variations and deflections from which 
 errors and inconsequences may be exactly 
 judged: toward the composition and struc- 
 ture of which form it is incident to handle 
 the parts thereof, which are propositions, and 
 the parts of propositions, which are simple 
 words; and this is that part of logic which 
 is comprehended in the analytics. 
 
 The second method of doctrine was intro- 
 duced for expedite use and assurance sake ; 
 
265 
 
 discovering the more subtile forms of so- 
 phisms and illaqueations with their redargu- 
 tions, which is that which is termed elenches. 
 For although in the more gross sorts of fallacies 
 it happeneth, as Seneca maketh the compari- 
 son well, as in juggling feats, which though 
 we know not how they are done, yet we 
 know well it is not as it seemeth to be ; yet 
 the more subtile sort of them doth not only 
 put a man besides his answer, but doth many 
 times abuse his judgment 
 
 This part concerning Elenches is excel- The doctrine 
 lently handled by Aristotle in precept, but W eii handled 
 more excellently by Plato in example, not and piato. e 
 only in the persons of the sophists, but even 
 in Socrates himself ; who professing to affirm 
 nothing, but to infirm that which was affirm- 
 ed by another, hath exactly expressed all the 
 forms of objection, fallacy, and redargution. 
 And although we have said that the use of 
 this doctrine is for redargution; yet it is ma- 
 nifest, the degenerate and corrupt use is for 
 caption and contradiction, which passeth for 
 a great faculty, and no doubt is of very 
 great advantage ; though the difference be 
 good which was made between orators and 
 
£66 
 
 sophisters, that the one is as the greyhound, 
 which hath his advantage in the race, and 
 the other as the hare, which hath her ad- 
 vantage in the turn, so as it is the advantage 
 of the weaker creature. 
 Extent of this But yet farther, this doctrine of Elenches 
 
 doctrine. . 
 
 hath a more ample latitude and extent than 
 is perceived; namely, unto divers parts of 
 knowledge ; whereof some are laboured and 
 others omitted. For I first conceive, though 
 it may seem at first somewhat strange, that 
 that part which is variably referred, some- 
 times to logic, sometimes to metaphysic, 
 touching the common adjuncts of essences, 
 is but an Elench; for the great sophism of 
 all sophisms being equivocation or ambi- 
 guity of words and phrase (especially of such 
 words as are most general, and intervene in 
 every enquiry) it seemeth to me that the true 
 and fruitful uses, leaving vain subtilties and 
 speculations, of the enquiry of majority, mi- 
 nority, priority, posteriority, identity, di- 
 versity, possibility, act, totality, parts, ex- 
 istence, privation, and the like, are but wise 
 cautions against ambiguities of speech. So 
 again, the distribution of things into certain 
 
£67 
 
 tribes, which we call categories, or predica- 
 ments, are but cautions against the confu- 
 fusion of definitions and divisions. 
 
 Secondly, there is a seducement that 
 worketh by the strength of the impression, 
 and not by the subtilty of the illaqueation ; 
 not so much perplexing the reason, as over- 
 ruling it by power of the imagination. But 
 this part I think more proper to handle when 
 I shall speak of rhetoric. 
 
 But lastly, there is yet a much more im- Fallacies 
 
 J J founded on 
 
 portant and profound kind of fallacies in the general 
 
 1 x nature of thfc 
 
 the mind of man, which I find not ob- mind * 
 served or enquired at all, and think good 
 to place here, as that which of all others 
 appertaineth most to rectify judgment: the 
 force whereof is such, as it doth not dazzle 
 or snare the understanding in some parti- 
 culars, but doth more generally and in- 
 wardly infect and corrupt the state thereof. 
 For the mind of man is far from the na- 
 ture of a clear and equal glass, wherein 
 the beams of things should reflect accord- 
 ing to their true incidence ; nay, it is ra- 
 ther like an inchanted glass, full of super- 
 stition and imposture, if it be not deliver- 
 
^d and reduced. For this purpose, let us 
 consider the false appearances that are im- 
 posed upon us by the general nature of 
 the mind, beholding them in an example 
 or two ; as first in that instance which is 
 the root of all superstition, namely, that to 
 the nature of the mind of all men it is 
 consonant for the affirmative or active to 
 affect more than the negative or privative : 
 so that a few times hitting, or presence, 
 countervails oft-times failing, or absence ; as 
 was well answered by Diagoras to him that 
 shewed him in Neptune's temple the great 
 number of pictures of such as had escaped 
 shipwreck, and had paid their vows to Nep- 
 tune,, saying, " Advise now, you that think 
 " it folly to invocate Neptune in tempest:" 
 " Yea, but, saith Diagoras, where are they 
 "painted that are drowned?" Let us be- 
 hold it in another instance, namely, " That 
 " the spirit of man, being of an equal and 
 ft uniform substance, doth usually suppose 
 " and feign in nature a greater equality 
 " and uniformity than is in truth." Hence 
 it cometh that the mathematicians cannot 
 satisfy themselves, except they reduce the 
 
269 
 
 motions of the celestial bodies to perfect 
 circles, rejecting spiral lines, and labouring 
 to be discharged of eccentrics. Hence it 
 cometh, that whereas there are many things 
 in nature, as it were monod'ica, sui juris ; yet 
 the cogitations of man do feign unto them 
 relatives, parallels, and conjugates, whereas 
 no such thing is ; as they have feigned an 
 element of fire to keep square with earth, 
 water, and air, and the like ; nay, it is not 
 credible, till it be opened, what a number 
 of fictions and fancies the similitude of 
 human actions and arts, together with the 
 making of man communis mensura, have 
 brought into natural philosophy ; not much 
 better than the heresy of the Anthropo- 
 morphites, bred in the cells of gross and 
 solitary monks, and the opinion of Epicurus, 
 answerable to the same in heathenism, who 
 supposed the gods to be of human shape- 
 And therefore Velleius the Epicurean needed 
 not to have asked, why God should have 
 adorned the heavens with stars ; as if he 
 had been an JEdilis, one that should have 
 set forth some magnificent shews or plays. 
 For if that great work-master had been of 
 
270 
 
 an human disposition, he would have cast 
 the stars into some pleasant and beautiful 
 works and orders, like the frets in the roofs 
 of houses ; whereas one can scarce find a 
 posture in square, or triangle, or straight 
 line, amongst such an infinite number ; so 
 differing an harmony there is between the 
 spirit of man and the spirit of nature. 
 Fallacies of Let us consider again the false appear- 
 
 individual -, , , 
 
 nature. ances imposed upon us by every man s own 
 
 individual nature and custom, in that feign- 
 ed supposition that Plato maketh of the 
 cave ; for certainly if a child were conti- 
 nued in a grot or cave under the earth 
 until maturity of age, and came suddenly 
 abroad, he would have strange and absurd 
 imaginations. So in like manner, although 
 our persons live in the view of heaven, yet 
 our spirits are included in the caves of our 
 own complexions and customs, which mi- 
 nister unto us infinite errors and vain opi- 
 nions, if they be not recalled to examina- 
 tion. But hereof we have given many ex- 
 amples in one of the errors or peccant 
 humors which we ran briefly over in our 
 first book. 
 
271 
 
 And lastly, let us consider the false ap- Fallacies in*. 
 
 J posed by 
 
 pearances that are imposed upon us bywords. 
 words, which are framed and applied accord- 
 ing to the conceit and capacities of the vulgar 
 sort ; and although we think we govern 
 our words, and prescribe it well, Loquen- 
 dum ut vulgus, sentiendum ut sapientes ; yet 
 certain it is that words, as a Tartar's bow, 
 do shoot back upon the understanding of 
 the wisest, and mightily entangle and per- 
 vert the judgment ; so as it is almost ne- 
 cessary in all controversies and disputations 
 to imitate the wisdom of the mathemati- 
 cians, in setting down in the very begin- 
 ning the definitions of our words and 
 terms, that others may know how we accept 
 and understand them, and whether they 
 concur with us or no. For it cometh to 
 pass, for want of this, that we are sure to 
 end there where we ought to have begun, 
 which is in questions and differences about 
 words. To conclude therefore, it must be 
 confessed that it is not possible to divorce 
 ourselves from these fallacies and false ap- 
 pearances, because they are inseparable from 
 our nature and condition of life ; so yet 
 
Iff 
 
 nevertheless the caution of them, (for all 
 elenches, as was said, are but cautions,) 
 doth extremely import the true conduct of 
 human judgment. The particular elenches 
 or cautions against these three false appear- 
 ances I find altogether deficient. 
 Four kinds of There remaineth one part of judgment of 
 
 demonstra- 
 tion, great excellency, which to mine understand- 
 ing is so slightly touched as I may report 
 that also deficient ; which is the applica- 
 tion of the differing kinds of proofs to the 
 differing kinds of subjects : for there being 
 but four kinds of demonstrations, that is 
 i by the immediate consent of the mind or 
 sense, by induction, by syllogism, and by 
 . congruity (which is that which Aristotle 
 calleth demonstration in orb or circle, and 
 not d notioribus,) every of these hath certain 
 subjects in the matter of sciences, in which 
 respectively they have chiefest use ; and 
 certain others, from which respectively they 
 ought to be excluded : and the rigour and 
 curiosity in requiring the more severe proofs 
 in some things, and chiefly the facility in 
 contenting ourselves with the more remiss 
 proofs in others, hath been amongst the 
 
2<o 
 
 greatest causes of detriment and hindrance 
 to knowledge. The distributions and assig- 
 nations of demonstrations, according to the 
 analogy of sciences, I note as deficient. 
 
 3. 
 
 The custody or retaining of knowledge is Art of cu?* 
 
 ... . „ tody or me- 
 
 either in writing or memory ; wnereot writ- mo ry, 
 ing hath two parts, the nature of the cha- 
 racter, and the order of the entry : for the 
 art of characters, or other visible notes of 
 words or things, it hath nearest conjuga- 
 tion with grammar ; and therefore I refer 
 it to the due place : for the disposition and 
 collocation of that knowledge which we 
 preserve in writing, it consisteth in a good 
 digest of common-places, wherein I am not 
 ignorant of the prejudice imputed to the 
 use of common-place books, as causing a 
 retardation of reading, and some sloth or 
 relaxation of memory. But because it is but 
 a counterfeit thing in knowledges to be for- 
 ward and pregnant, except a man be deep 
 and full, I hold the entry of common -places 
 to be a matter of great use and essence 
 in studying, as that which assureth copia 
 of invention, and contracted! judgment to 
 strength. But this is true, that of the me- 
 
274 
 
 tTiods of common-places that I have seen,, 
 there is none of any sufficient worth ; all 
 of them carrying merely the face of a school, 
 and not of a world ; and referring to vulgar 
 matters and pedantical divisions, without all 
 life, or respect to action. 
 of the faculty For the other principal part of the cus- 
 
 of memory. . . 
 
 tody of knowledge, which is memory, I find 
 that faculty in my judgment weakly en-* 
 quired of. An art there is extant of it ; but 
 it seemeth to me that there are better pre- 
 cepts than that art, and better practices of 
 that art than those received. It is certain 
 the art, as it is, may be raised to points 
 of ostentation prodigious : but in use, as it 
 is now managed, it is barren, (not burden- 
 some, nor dangerous to natural memory, as 
 is imagined, but barren,) that is not dex- 
 terous to be applied to the serious use of 
 business and occasions. And therefore I 
 make no more estimation of repeating a 
 great number of names or words upon onee 
 hearing, or the pouring forth of a number 
 of verses or rhimes ex tempore, or the making 
 of a satirical simile of every thing, or the 
 turning of every thing to a jest, or the fal- 
 
275 
 
 sifying or contradicting of every thing by 
 cavil, or the like, (whereof in the faculties of 
 the mind there is great copia, and such as 
 by device and practice may be exalted to an 
 extreme degree of wonder,) than I do of 
 the tricks of tumblers, funambuloes, bala- 
 dines ; the one being the same in the mind 
 that the other is in the body ; matters of 
 strangeness without worthiness. 
 
 This art of memory is but built upon 
 two intentions ; the one prenotion, the other 
 emblem. Prenotion dischargeth the indefi- 
 nite seeking of that we would remember, 
 and directeth us to seek in a narrow com- 
 pass, that is, somewhat that hath congruity 
 with our place of memory. Emblem reduceth 
 conceits intellectual to images sensible, which 
 strike the memory more ; out of which axioms 
 may be drawn much morej^ractical than that ^ J^ 
 in use ; and besides which axioms, there 
 are divers more touching help of memory, 
 not inferior to them. But I did in the be- 
 ginning distinguish, not to report those things 
 deficient which are but only ill managed. 
 
 There remaineth the fourth kind of ra- Art of°Eio~ 
 tional knowledge, which is transitive ; con- Tradition. 
 t 2 
 
£76 
 
 eerning the expressing or transferring our 
 knowledge to others, which I will term by 
 the general name of tradition or delivery. 
 Tradition hath three parts : the first con- 
 cerning the organ of tradition ; the second 
 concerning the method of tradition ; and the 
 third concerning the illustration of tradition, 
 of the organ For the organ of tradition, it is either 
 
 of Tradition. . . . 
 
 speech or writing : tor Aristotle saith well, 
 U Words are the images of cogitations, and 
 " letters are the images of words ;" but yet 
 it is not of necessity that cogitations be ex- 
 pressed by the medium of words. For what- 
 soever is capable of sufficient differences, 
 and those perceptible by the sense, is in 
 nature competent to express cogitations. 
 And therefore we see in the commerce of 
 barbarous people, that understand not one 
 . another's language, and in the practice of 
 divers that aTe -dumb and deaf, that men's 
 minds are expressed in gestures, though not 
 exactly, yet to serve the turn. And we 
 understand farther that it is the use of China,, 
 and the kingdoms of the high Levant, to 
 write in characters real, which express nei- 
 ther letters nor words in gross, but things 
 or notions ; insomuch as countries and 
 
277 
 
 provinces, which understand not one ano- 
 ther's language, can nevertheless read one 
 another's writings, because the characters 
 are accepted more generally than the lan- 
 guages do extend; and therefore they have 
 a vast multitude of characters, as many, I 
 suppose, as radical words. 
 
 These notes of cogitations are of two sorts ; Two kinds of 
 
 , . . . notes of our 
 
 the one when the note hath some similitude Thoughts. 
 or congruity with the notion ; the other ad 
 placitum, having force only by contract or 
 acceptation. Of the former sort are hiero- 
 glyphics and gestures. For as to hieroglyphics, 
 tilings of ancient use, and embraced chiefly 
 by the ^Egyptians, one of the most ancient 
 nations, they are but as continued impresses 
 and emblems. And as for gestures, they are 
 as transitory hieroglyphics, and are to hiero- 
 glyphics as words spoken are to words writ- 
 ten, in that they abide not : but they have 
 evermore, as well as the other, an affinity 
 with the things signified; as Periander, 
 being consulted with how to preserve a 
 tyranny newly usurped, bid the messenger 
 attend and report what he saw him do; 
 and went into his garden and topped all 
 his highest flowers : signifying, that it con- 
 
£78 
 
 sisted in the cutting off and keeping low of 
 the nobility and grandees. Ad placitum are 
 the characters real before mentioned, and 
 words: although some have been willing by- 
 curious inquiry, or rather by apt feigning, to 
 have derived imposition of names from reason 
 and intendment ; a speculation elegant, and 
 by reason it searcheth into antiquity, reve- 
 rent; but sparingly mixed with truth, and 
 of small fruit. This portion of knowledge, 
 touching the notes of things, and cogitations 
 in general, I find not enquired but deficient. 
 And although it may seem of no great use, 
 considering that words and writings by let- 
 ters do far excel all the other ways ; yet be- 
 cause this part concerneth, as it were, the 
 mint of knowledge, (for words are the tokens 
 current and accepted for conceits, as moneys 
 are for values, and that it is fit men be not 
 ignorant that moneys may be of another kind 
 than gold and silver,) I thought good to pro- 
 pound it to better enquiry, 
 of Speech Concerning speech and words, the consi- 
 
 deration of them hath produced the science 
 of Grammar ; for man still striveth to reinr 
 tegrate himself in those benedictions, from 
 which by his fault he hath been deprived ; 
 
 and Words. 
 
279 
 
 and as he hath striven against the first gene- 
 ral curse by the invention of all other arts, so 
 hath he sought to come forth of the second 
 general curse, which was the confusion of 
 tongues, by the art of grammar: whereof 
 the use in a mother tongue is small, in a fo- 
 reign tongue more ; but most in such foreign 
 tongues as have ceased to be vulgar tongues, 
 and are turned only to learned tongues. The 
 duty of it is of two natures ; the one popular, 
 which is for the speedy and perfect attaining 
 languages, as well for intercourse of speech 
 as for understanding of authors; the other 
 philosophical, examining the power and na- 
 ture of words, as they are the footsteps and 
 prints of reason : which kind of analogy be- 
 tween words and reason is handled sparsim, 
 brokenly, though not intirely ; and therefore 
 I cannot report it deficient ; though I think 
 it very worthy to be reduced into a science 
 by itself. 
 
 Unto grammar also belongeth, as an ap- 
 pendix, the consideration of the accidents of 
 words; which are measure, sound, and ele- 
 vation or accent, and the sweetness and harsh- 
 ness of them ; whence hath issued some cu^ 
 
280 
 
 rious observations in rhetoric, but chiefly 
 poesy, as we consider it, in respect of the 
 verse, and not of the argument: wherein 
 though men in learned tongues do tie them- 
 selves to the ancient measures, yet in modern 
 languages it seemeth to me as free to make 
 new measures of verses as of dances ; for a 
 dance is a measured pace, as a verse is a 
 measured speech. In these things the sense 
 is better judge than the art; 
 
 Camce fercula nostras 
 Mallem controls qudm placuisse cocis. 
 And of the servile expressing antiquity in an 
 unlike and an unfit subject, it is well said, 
 Quod tempore antiquum videtur, id incongruitate 
 est maxime novum. 
 of ciphers. For ciphers, they are commonly in letters 
 or alphabets, but may be in words. The 
 kinds of ciphers, besides the simple ciphers, 
 with changes, and intermixtures of nulls and 
 non-significants, are many, according to the 
 nature or rule of the infolding; wheel-ci- 
 phers, key-ciphers, doubles, etc. But the 
 virtues of them, whereby they are to be pre- 
 ferred, are three ; that they be not laborious 
 to write and read; that they be impossible to 
 
decipher; and in some cases, that they be 
 without suspicion. The highest degree there- 
 of is to write omnia per omnia ; which is un- 
 doubtedly possible with a proportion quin- 
 cuple at most of the writing infolding to the 
 writing infolded, and no other restraint what- 
 soever. This art of ciphering, hath for re- 
 lative an art of deciphering, by supposition 
 unprofitable, but as things are, of great use. 
 For suppose that ciphers were well managed, 
 there be multitudes of them which exclude 
 the decipherer. But in regard of the raw- 
 ness and unskilfulness of the hands through 
 which they pass, the greatest matters are 
 many times carried in the weakest ciphers. 
 
 In the enumeration of these private and 
 retired arts, it may be, thought I seek to 
 make a great muster-roll of sciences, naming 
 them for shew and ostentation, and to little 
 other purpose. But let those which are skil- 
 ful in them judge whether I bring them in 
 only for appearance, or whether in that which 
 I speak of them, though in few words, there 
 be not some seed of proficience. And this 
 must be remembered, that as there be many 
 of great account in their countries and pro- 
 
£82 
 
 vinces, which when they come up to the seat 
 of the estate, are but of mean rank, and 
 scarcely regarded; so these arts, being here 
 placed with the principal and supreme sci- 
 ences, seem petty things ; yet to such as have 
 chosen them to spend their labours and stu- 
 dies in them, they seem great matters. 
 of the me- For the method of tradition, I see it hath 
 
 thod of Tra< 
 
 ^ition. moved a controversy in our time. But as in 
 
 civil business, if there be a meeting, and men 
 fall at words, there is commonly an end of 
 the matter for that time, and no proceeding 
 at all; so in learning, where there is much 
 controversy, there is many times little in- 
 quiry. For this part of knowledge of method 
 seemeth to me so weakly enquired as I shall 
 report it deficient. 
 
 Method hath been placed, and that not 
 amiss, in logic, as a part of judgment ; for 
 as the doctrine of syllogisms comprehendeth 
 the rules of judgment upon that which is in*- 
 vented, so the doctrine of method containeth 
 the rules of judgment upon that which is to 
 be delivered; for judgment precedeth deli- 
 very, as it followeth invention. Neither is 
 the method or the nature of the tradition ma- 
 
2S3 
 
 terial only to the use of knowledge, but like- 
 wise to the progression of knowledge : for 
 since the labour and life of one man cannot 
 attain to perfection of knowledge, the wisdom 
 of the tradition is that which inspireth the 
 felicity of continuance and proceeding. And of method 
 
 1 ° magisterial 
 
 therefore the most real diversity of method is andproba- 
 
 * tionary. 
 
 of method referred to use, and method refer- 
 red to progression ; whereof the one may be 
 termed magisterial, and the other of proba- 
 tion. 
 
 The latter whereof seemeth to be via de- 
 serta et interclusa. For as knowledges are now 
 delivered, there is a kind of contract of er- 
 ror between the deliverer and the receiver : 
 for he that delivereth knowledge, desireth to 
 deliver it in such form as may be best believed, 
 and not as may be best examined; and he 
 that receiveth knowledge, desireth rather pre- 
 sent satisfaction than expectant enquiry; 
 and so rather not to doubt than not to err : 
 glory making the author not to lay open his 
 weakness, and sloth making the disciple not 
 to know his strength. 
 
 But knowledge, that is delivered as a thread of the syn- 
 
 thetic method 
 
 to be spun on, ought to be delivered and in- 
 
284 
 
 timated, if it were possible, in the same me- 
 thod wherein it was invented: and so is it 
 possible of knowledge induced. But in this 
 same anticipated and prevented knowledge, 
 no man knoweth how he came to the know- 
 ledge which he hath obtained. But yet ne- 
 vertheless, secundum majus et minus, a man 
 may revisit and descend unto the foundations 
 of his knowledge and consent ; and so trans- 
 plant it into another, as it grew in his own 
 mind. For it is in knowledges as it is in 
 plants, if you mean to use the plant, it is no 
 matter for the roots ; but if you mean to re- 
 move it to grow, then it is more assured to 
 rest upon roots than slips : so the delivery of 
 knowledges, as it is now used, is as of fair 
 bodies of trees without the roots; good for 
 the carpenter, but not for the planter. But 
 if you will have sciences grow, it is less mat- 
 ter for the shaft or body of the tree, so you 
 look well to the taking up of the roots: of 
 which kind of delivery the method of the ma- 
 thematics, in that subject, hath some shadow; 
 but generally I see it neither put in ure nor 
 put in inquisition, and therefore note it for 
 deficient. 
 
£85 
 Another diversity of method there is, which of the E ™.g- 
 
 * matical me- 
 
 hath some affinity with the former, used in thod - 
 some cases by the discretion of the ancients, 
 but disgraced since by the impostures of ma- 
 ny vain persons, who have made it as a false 
 light for their counterfeit merchandises ; and 
 that is, enigmatical and disclosed. The pre- 
 tence whereof is to remove the vulgar capa- 
 cities from being admitted to the secrets of 
 knowledges, and to reserve them to selected 
 auditors, or wits of such sharpness as can 
 pierce the veil. 
 
 Another diversity of method, whereof the Of Apho- 
 risms and 
 consequence is great, is the delivery of know- Methods. 
 
 ledge in aphorisms, or in methods; where- 
 in we may observe, that it hath been too 
 much taken into custom, out of a few axioms 
 or observations upon any subject, to make a 
 solemn and formal art, filling it with some 
 discourses, and illustrating it with examples, 
 and digesting it into a sensible method; but 
 the writing in aphorisms hath many excellent 
 virtues, whereto the writing in method doth 
 not approach. 
 
 For first it trieth the writer, whether he 
 be superficial or solid : for aphorisms, except 
 
236 
 
 they should be ridiculous, cannot be made 
 but of the pith and heart of sciences ; for 
 discourse of illustration is cut off; recitals of 
 examples are cut off; discourse of connection 
 and order is cut off; descriptions of practice 
 are cut off; so there remaineth nothing to fill 
 the aphorisms but some good quantity of ob* 
 servation : and therefore no man can suffice, 
 nor in reason will attempt to write aphorisms, 
 but he that is sound and grounded. But in 
 methods, 
 
 Tantum series juncturaque pollet, 
 Tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris ; 
 as a man shall make a great shew of an art, 
 which if it were disjointed, would come to 
 little. Secondly, methods are more fit to win 
 consent or belief, but less fit to point to ac- 
 tion; for they carry a kind of demonstration 
 in orb or circle, one part illuminating an- 
 other, and therefore satisfy : but particulars, 
 being dispersed, do best agree with dispersed 
 directions. And lastly, aphorisms, represent- 
 ing a knowledge broken, do invite men to 
 enquire farther ; whereas methods, carrying 
 the shew of a total, do secure men as if they 
 were at farthest. 
 
287 
 Another diversity of method, which is of the me- 
 
 J tbod of Asser- 
 
 likewise of great weight, is the handling of tionandQues- 
 knowledge by assertions and their proofs, or 
 by questions and their determinations ; the 
 latter kind whereof, if it be immoderately 
 followed, is as prejudicial to the proceeding 
 of learning, as it is to the proceeding of an 
 army to go about to besiege every little fort 
 or hold. For if the field be kept, and the 
 sum of the enterprise pursued, those smaller 
 things will come in of themselves : indeed a 
 man would not leave some important place 
 with an enemy at his back. In like manner, 
 the use of confutation in the delivery of sci- 
 ences ought to be very sparing ; and to serve 
 to remove strong preoccupations and pre- 
 judgments, and not to minister and excite dis- 
 putations and doubts* 
 
 Another diversity of method is according of method 
 
 -i i . i • i • i ii -i according to 
 
 to the subject or matter which is handled ; the matter. 
 for there is a great difference in the delivery 
 of the mathematics, which are the most ab- 
 stracted of knowledges, and policy, which is 
 the most immersed ; and howsoever conten- 
 tion hath been moved, touching an uniformi- 
 ty of method in multiformity of matter ; yet 
 
288 
 
 we see how that opinion, besides the weak- 
 ness of it, hath been of ill desert towards 
 learning, as that which taketh the way to re- 
 duce learning to certain empty and barren 
 generalities; being but the very husks and 
 shells of sciences, all the kernel being forced 
 out and expulsed with the torture and press 
 of the method : and therefore as I did allow 
 well of particular topics for invention, so do 
 I allow likewise of particular methods of tra- 
 dition, 
 of methods Another diversity of judgment, in the de- 
 o^simiii- livery and teaching of knowledge, is accord- 
 ing unto the light and presuppositions of that 
 which is delivered ; for that knowledge which 
 is new and foreign from opinions received 
 is to be delivered in another form than that 
 that is agreeable and familiar ; and therefore 
 Aristotle, when he thinks to tax Democritus, 
 doth in truth commend him, where he saith, 
 ge If we shall indeed dispute, and not follow 
 " after similitudes," etc. For those, whose 
 conceits are seated in popular opinions, need 
 only but to prove or dispute: but those, 
 whose conceits are beyond popular opinions, 
 have a double labour; the one. to rnake them- 
 
selves conceived, and the other to prove and 
 demonstrate : so that it is of necessity with 
 them to have recourse to similitudes and 
 translations to express themselves. And there- 
 fore in the infancy of learning, and in rude 
 times, when those conceits which are now 
 trivial were then new, the world was full of 
 parables and similitudes ; for else would men 
 either have passed over without mark, or else 
 rejected for paradoxes that which was offer- 
 ed, before they had understood or judged. 
 So in divine learning, we see how frequent 
 parables and tropes are : for it is a rule, 
 <c That whatsoever science is not consonant 
 iC to presuppositions, must pray in aid of 
 %c similitudes." 
 
 There be also other diversities of methods, of other art* 
 vulgar and received : as that of resolution or of metbod * 
 analysis, of constitution or systasis, of conceal- 
 ment or cryptic, etc. which I do allow well of, 
 though I have stood upon those which are 
 least handled and observed. All which I have 
 remembered to this purpose, because I would 
 erect and constitute one general enquiry, 
 which seems to me deficient, touching the 
 wisdom of tradition. 
 
£90 
 As to the n- But unto this part of knowledge, concern- 
 manner of ing method, doth farther belong not only the 
 architecture of the whole frame of a work, 
 but also the several beams and columns there- 
 of; not as to their stuff, but as to their quan- 
 tity and figure : and therefore method con- 
 sidered not only the disposition of the argu- 
 ment or subject, but likewise the proposi- 
 tions ; not as to their truth or matter, but as 
 to their limitation and manner. ,For herein 
 Ramus merited better a great deal in reviv- 
 ing the good rules of propositions, KaOaAs 
 wfurov KUTce, wavTosy etc. than he did in in- 
 troducing the canker of epitomes ; and yet, 
 (as it is the condition of human things, that, 
 according to the ancient fables, " The most 
 ss precious things have the most pernicious 
 " keepers ;") it was so, that the attempt of 
 the one made him fall upon the other. For 
 he had need be well conducted, that should 
 design to make axioms convertible; if he 
 make them not withal circular, and non pro- 
 movent, or incurring into themselves : but yet 
 the intention was excellent. 
 As to their The other considerations of method con- 
 
 iatitude and . .'■'. , . -, -, . 
 
 longitude, cerning propositions, are chiefly touching 
 
291 
 
 the utmost propositions, which limit the di- 
 mensions of sciences; for every knowledge 
 may be fitly said, besides the profundity 
 (which is the truth and substance of it that 
 makes it solid) to have a longitude and a 
 latitude; accounting the latitude towards 
 other sciences, and the longitude towards ac- 
 tion ; that is, from the greatest generality to 
 the most particular precept : The one giveth 
 rule how far one knowledge ought to inter- 
 meddle within the province of another, which 
 is the rule they call xaQavro ; the other giveth 
 rule unto what degree of particularity a 
 knowledge should descend : which latter I 
 find passed over in silence, being in my judg- 
 ment the more material ; for certainly there 
 must be somewhat left to practice ; but how 
 much is worthy the enquiry. We see remote 
 and superficial generalities do but offer know- 
 ledge to scorn of practical men, and are no 
 more aiding to practice than an Ortelius's 
 universal map is to direct the way between 
 London and York. The better sort of rules 
 have been not unfitly compared to glasses of 
 steel unpolished, where you may see the 
 images of things ; but first they must be 
 v2 
 
%9% 
 
 filed: so the rules will help, if they be la* 
 boured and polished by practice. But how 
 chrystalline they may be made at the first, and 
 how far forth they may be polished afore* 
 hand, is the question ; the enquiry whereof 
 seemeth to me deficient. 
 m technical There hath been also laboured and put in 
 
 xnethod. 
 
 practice a method, which is not a lawful me- 
 thod, but a method of imposture ; which is> 
 to deliver knowledges in such manner as men 
 may speedily come to make a shew of learn- 
 ing who have it not : such was the travel of 
 Raymundus Lullius, in making that art which 
 bears his name ; not unlike to some books of 
 typocosmy which have been made since, be- 
 ing nothing but a mass of words of all arts, 
 to give men countenance, that those which 
 use the terms might be thought to understand 
 the art; which collections are much like a 
 fripper's or broker's shop, that hath ends of 
 every thing, but nothing of worth. 
 
 of Rhetoric, Now we descend to that part which Con- 
 or the art of 
 
 Eloquence, cerneth the illustration of tradition, compre- 
 hended in that science which we call Rheto- 
 ric, or art of eloquence ; a science excellent, 
 and excellently well laboured. For although 
 
293 
 
 m true value it is inferior to wisdom (as it is 
 said by God to Moses, when he disabled 
 himself for want of this faculty, Aaron shall 
 be thy speaker, and thou shalt he to him as 
 God) yet with people it is the more mighty : 
 for so Solomon saith, Sapiens corde appellabi- 
 tur prudens, sed duicis eloquio major a reperiet; 
 signifying, that profoundness of wisdom will 
 help a man to a name or admiration, but 
 that it is eloquence that prevaileth in an 
 active life : and as to the labouring of it, the 
 emulation of Aristotle with the rhetoricians 
 of his time, and the experience of Cicero, 
 hath made them in their works of rhetorics 
 exceed themselves. Again, the excellency of 
 examples of eloquence in the orations of De- 
 mosthenes and Cicero, added to the perfec- 
 tion of the precepts of eloquence, hath 
 doubled the progression in this art: and. 
 therefore the deficiences which I shall note 
 will rather be in some collections, which may 
 as hand-maids attend the art, than in the 
 rules or use of the art itself. 
 
 Notwithstanding, to stir the earth a little purpose «? 
 about the roots of this science, as we have 
 done of the rest; the duty and office of rhe- 
 
£94 
 
 toric is to apply reason to imagination for 
 the better moving of the will: for we see 
 reason is disturbed in the administration 
 thereof by three means ; by illaqueation or 
 sophism, which pertains to logic ; by imagi- 
 nation or impression, which pertains to rhe- 
 toric ; and by passion or affection, which 
 pertains to morality. And as in negotiation 
 with others, men are wrought by cunning, 
 by importunity, and by vehemency; so in" 
 this negotiation within ourselves, men are 
 undermined by inconsequences, solicited and 
 importuned by impressions or observations, 
 and transported by passions. Neither is the 
 nature of man so unfortunately built, as that 
 those powers and arts should have force to 
 disturb reason, and not to establish and ad- 
 vance it ; for the end of logic is to teach a 
 form of argument to secure reason, and not 
 to intrap it : the end of morality is to pro- 
 cure the affections to obey reason, and not to 
 invade it : the end of rhetoric is to fill the 
 imagination to second reason, and not to op- 
 press it : for these abuses of arts come in but 
 ex ohliquo, for caution. 
 o^Rhetoric. And therefore it was great injustice in 
 
295 
 
 Plato, though springing out of a just hatred 
 of the rhetoricians of his time, to esteem of 
 rhetoric but as a voluptuary art, resembling 
 it to cookery, that did mar wholesome meats, 
 and help unwholesome by variety of sauces, 
 to the pleasure of the taste. For we see 
 that speech is much more conversant in 
 adorning that which is good, than in colour- 
 ing that which is evil ; for there is no man 
 but speaketh more honestly than he can do 
 or think : and it was excellently noted by 
 Thucydides in Cleon, that because he used 
 to hold on the bad side in causes of estate, 
 therefore he was ever inveighing against elo- 
 quence and good speech, knowing that no 
 man can speak fair of courses sordid and 
 base. And therefore as Plato said elegantly, 
 " That Virtue, if she could be seen, would 
 & move great love and affection :" so seeing 
 that she cannot be shewed to the sense by 
 corporal shape, the next degree is to shew 
 her to the imagination in lively representa- 
 tion : for to shew her to reason only in sub» 
 tilty of argument, was a thing ever derided 
 in Chrysippus and many of the Stoics ; who 
 thought to thrust virtue upon men by sharp 
 
296 
 
 disputations and conclusions, which have n© 
 sympathy with the will of man. 
 
 Again, if the affections in themselves were 
 pliant and obedient to reason, it were true, 
 there would be no great use of persuasions 
 and insinuations to the will, more than of 
 naked proposition and proofs : but in regard 
 of the continual mutinies and seditions of the 
 affections, 
 
 Video meliora, proboque, 
 Deteriora sequor ; 
 
 Reason would become captive and servile, if 
 eloquence of persuasions did not practise and 
 win the imagination from the affections' 
 part, and contract a confederacy between 
 the reason and imagination against the af- 
 fections ; for the affections themselves carry 
 ever an appetite to good, as reason doth. The 
 difference is, that the affection beholdeth 
 merely the present, reason beholdeth the fu- 
 ture and sum of time. And therefore the 
 present filling the imagination more, reason 
 is commonly vanquished ; but after that force 
 of eloquence and persuasion hath made things 
 future and remote appear as present, then 
 
297 
 
 upon revolt of the imagination reason pre- 
 vailed. 
 
 We conclude therefore, that rhetoric can 
 be no more charged with the colouring of the 
 worse part, than logic with sophistry, or mo- 
 rality with vice. For we know the doctrines 
 of contraries are the same, though the use be 
 opposite. It appeareth also that logic dif- Difference 
 
 rr rr ° between Rhe- 
 
 fereth from rhetoric, not only as the fist from tone and Lo- 
 gic. 
 the palm, the one close, the other at large ; 
 
 but much more in this> that logic handleth 
 reason exact, and in truth; and rhetoric 
 handleth it as it is planted in popular opi- 
 nions and manners. And therefore Aristotle 
 doth wisely place rhetoric as between logic 
 on the one side, and moral or civil knowledge 
 on the other, as participating of both: for 
 the proof and demonstrations of logic are to- 
 wards all men indifferent and the same ; but 
 the proofs and persuasions of rhetoric ought 
 to differ according to the auditors : 
 
 Orpheus in sylvis, inter delphinas Arion. 
 Which application, in perfection of idea, 
 ought to extend so far, that if a man should 
 speak of the same thing to several persons, 
 he should speak to them all respectively, and 
 
£98 
 
 several ways : though this politic part of elo» 
 quence in private speech it is easy for the 
 the greatest orators to want ; whilst by the 
 observing their well graced forms of speech, 
 they lose the volubility of application : and 
 therefore it shall not be amiss to recommend 
 this to better enquiry, not being curious 
 whether we place it here, or in that part 
 which concerneth policy. 
 Refects of n ow therefore will I descend to the defi- 
 
 Aristotle. 
 
 ciences, which, as I said, are but attend- 
 ances: and first, I do not find the wisdom 
 and diligence of Aristotle well pursued, who 
 began to make a collection of the popular 
 signs and colours of good and evil, both 
 simple and comparative, which are as the 
 sophisms of rhetoric, as I touched before. 
 For example : 
 
 SOPHISMA. 
 
 Quod laudatur, bonum ; quod vituperatur, malum. 
 
 REDARGUTIO. 
 
 Laudat venales qui vult extrudere merces. 
 Malum est, malum est, inquit emptor : sed cum 
 recesserit, turn gloriahitur. 
 The defects in the labour of Aristotle are 
 three ; one, that there be but a few of many ; 
 
299 
 
 another, that their clenches are not annexed ; 
 and the third, that he conceived but a part 
 of the use of them: for their use is not only 
 in probation, but much more in impression. 
 For many forms are equal in signification, 
 which are differing in impression; as the 
 difference is great in the piercing of that 
 which is sharp, and that which is flat, though 
 the strength of the percussion be the same : 
 for there is no man but will be a little more 
 raised by hearing it said ; " Your enemies 
 " will be glad of this ?" 
 
 Hoc lthacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridce ; 
 than by hearing it said only, " This is evil 
 " for you/' 
 
 Secondly, I do resume also that which I of antithets 
 
 and lesser 
 
 mentioned before, touching provision or pre- forms, 
 paratory store, for the furniture of speech 
 and readiness of invention, which appeareth 
 to be of two sorts ; the one in resemblance 
 to a shop of pieces unmade up, the other 
 to a shop of things ready made up ; both 
 to be applied to that which is frequent 
 and most in request : the former of these 
 I will call antitheta, and the latter formula. 
 Antitheta are theses argued pro et contra; 
 
300 
 
 wherein men may be more large and la- 
 borious : but in such as are able to do it, 
 to avoid prolixity of entry, I wish the seeds 
 of the several arguments to be cast up into 
 some brief and acute sentences, not to be 
 cited, but to be as skains or bottoms of 
 thread, to be unwinded at large when they 
 come to be used ; supplying authorities 
 and examples by reference. 
 
 Pro Verbis Legis. 
 
 Non est interpret atio, sed divinatio, quce rc- 
 
 cedit d lit era. 
 Cum receditur d litem, judex transit in legis- 
 
 latorem. 
 
 Pro Sententia Legis. 
 Ex omnibus verbis est eliciendus sensus qui in- 
 
 terpretatur singula. 
 
 Formula are but decent and apt passages 
 or conveyances of speech, which may serve 
 indifferently for differing subjects ; as of 
 preface, conclusion, digression, transition, 
 excusation, etc. For as in buildings, there 
 is great pleasure and use in the well-cast- 
 ing of the stair-cases, entries, doors, win- 
 dows, and the like; so in speech, the con- 
 
301 
 
 veyances and passages are of special ornament 
 and effect. 
 
 A Conclusion in a Deliberative. 
 
 So may we redeem the faults passed, and pre- 
 vent the inconveniences future. 
 There remain two appendices touching Two appen» 
 the tradition of knowledge, the one critical, art of Tradi 
 the other pedantical ; for all knowledge is 
 either delivered by teachers, or attained by 
 men's proper endeavours : and therefore as 
 the principal part of tradition of knowledge 
 concerneth chiefly writing of books, so the 
 relative part thereof concerneth reading of 
 books : whereunto appertain incidently these 
 considerations. The first is concerning the The critical. 
 true correction and edition of authors; 
 wherein nevertheless rash diligence hath 
 done great prejudice. For these critics 
 have often presumed that that which they 
 understood not is false set down. As the 
 priest, that where he found it written of 
 St. Paul, Demissus est per sportam, mend- 
 ed his book, and made it Demissus est per 
 portam ; because sporta was an hard word, 
 and out of his reading : and surely these er- 
 rors, though they be not so palpable and ri:- 
 
302 
 
 diculous, are yet of the same kind. And 
 therefore as it hath been wisely noted, the 
 most corrected copies are commonly the 
 least correct* 
 
 The second is concerning the exposition 
 and explication of authors ; which resteth 
 in annotations and commentaries; wherein 
 it is over usual to blanch the obscure places 
 and discourse upon the plain. 
 
 The third is concerning the times, which 
 in many cases give great light to true in- 
 terpretations* 
 
 The fourth is concerning some brief cen« 
 sure and judgment of the authors ; that men 
 thereby may make some election unto them- 
 selves what books to read. 
 
 And the fifth is concerning the syntax 
 and disposition of studies ; that men may 
 know in what order or pursuit to read. 
 ThePedan- ^ or P e dantical knowledge, it contained! 
 ticai. that difference of tradition which is proper 
 
 for youth, whereunto appertain divers con- 
 siderations of great fruit. 
 
 As first the timing and seasoning of know- 
 ledges ; as with what to initiate them, and 
 from what for a time to refrain them. 
 

 Secondly, the consideration where to begin 
 with the easiest, and so proceed to the more 
 difficult; and in what courses to press the 
 more difficult, and then to turn them to the 
 more easy ; for it is one method to prac- 
 tice swimming with bladders, and another 
 to practise dancing with heavy shoes. 
 
 A third is the application of learning ac- 
 cording unto the propriety of the wits ; for 
 there is no defect in the faculties intellec- 
 tual but seemeth to have a proper cure con- 
 tained in some studies : as for example, if a 
 child be bird-witted, that is, hath not the 
 faculty of attention, the mathematics giveth 
 a remedy thereunto ; for in them, if the 
 wit be caught away but a moment, one is 
 to begin anew : and as sciences have a pro- 
 priety towards faculties for cure and help* 
 so faculties or powers have a sympathy to- 
 wards sciences for excellency or speedy pro- 
 fiting ; and therefore it is .an enquiry of 
 great wisdom what kinds of wits and na- 
 tures are most proper for what sciences. 
 
 Fourthly, the ordering of exercises is 
 matter of great consequence to hurt or 
 help : for, as is well observed by Cicero* 
 
304 
 
 men in exercising their faculties, if they 
 be not well advised, do exercise their faults 
 and get ill habits as well as good ; so there 
 is a great judgment to be had in the 
 continuance and intermission of exercises. 
 It were too long to particularize a number 
 of other considerations of this nature ; things 
 but of mean appearance, but of singular 
 efficacy : for as the wronging or cherish- 
 ing of seeds or young plants is that that 
 is most important to their thriving ; (and 
 as it was noted that the first six kings, 
 being in truth as tutors of the state of 
 Rome in the infancy thereof, was the prin- 
 cipal cause of the immense greatness of 
 that state which followed;) so the culture 
 and manurance of minds in youth hath 
 such a forcible, though unseen, operation, 
 as hardly any length of time or conten- 
 tion of labour can countervail it afterwards. 
 And it is not amiss to observe also, how 
 small and mean faculties gotten by educa- 
 tion, yet when they fall into great men or 
 great matters, do work great and important 
 effects ; whereof we see a notable example 
 in Tacitus of two stage players, Percennius 
 
305 
 
 and Vibulenus, who by their faculty of play- 
 ing put the Pannonian armies into an ex- 
 treme tumult and combustion : for there 
 arising a mutiny amongst them upon the 
 death of Augustus Caesar, Blaesus the lieute- 
 nant had committed some of the mutineers, 
 which were suddenly rescued ; whereupon 
 Vibulenus got to be heard speak, which he 
 did in this manner : — " These poor inno- 
 " cent wretches, appointed to cruel death, 
 €€ you have restored to behold the light : 
 " but who shall restore my brother to me, 
 *' or life unto my brother, that was sent 
 f hither in message from the legions of 
 " Germany, to treat of the common cause ? 
 " And he hath murdered him this last night 
 " by some of his fencers and ruffians, that 
 " he hath about him for his executioners 
 " upon soldiers. Answer, Blaesus, what is 
 " done with his body ? The mortalest ene- 
 <c mies do not deny burial : when I have 
 " performed my last duties to the corpse 
 " with kisses, with tears, command me to 
 " be slain beside him ; so that these my 
 " fellows, for our good meaning, and our 
 " true hearts to the legions, may have leave 
 x 
 
306 
 
 " to bury us." With which speech he put 
 the army into an infinite fury and uproar; 
 whereas truth was he had no brother, nei- 
 ther was there any such matter ; but he 
 played it merely as if he had been upon the 
 stage. 
 Conclusion. ]j u ^ t re turn, we are now come to a 
 period of rational knowledges; wherein if I 
 have made the divisions other than those 
 that are received, yet would I not be thought 
 to disallow all those divisions which I do 
 not use : for there is a double necessity im- 
 posed upon me of altering the divisions ; 
 the one, because it differeth in end and 
 purpose, to sort together those things which 
 are next in nature, and those things which 
 are next in use ; for if a secretary of state 
 should sort his papers, it is like in his study or 
 general cabinet he would sort together things 
 of a nature, as treaties, instructions, etc. but 
 in his boxes or particular cabinet he would 
 sort together those that he were like to use 
 together, though of several natures; so in 
 this general cabinet of knowledge it was ne- 
 cessary for me to follow the divisions of the 
 nature of things ; whereas if myself had been 
 
307 
 
 to handle any particular knowledge, I would 
 have respected the divisions fittest for use, 
 the other, because the bringing in of the 
 deficiences did by consequence alter the 
 partitions of the rest ; for let the knowledge 
 extant, for demonstration sake, be fifteen ; 
 let the knowledge with the deficiences be 
 twenty ; the parts of fifteen are not the 
 parts of twenty ; for the parts of fifteen are 
 three and five ; the parts of twenty are 
 two, four, five and ten : so as these things 
 are without contradiction, and could not 
 otherwise be. 
 
 MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 We proceed now to that knowledge which 
 eonsidereth of the Appetite and Will of Man; 
 whereof Solomon saith, Ante omnia, fili, cus- 
 todi cor tnum, nam inde procedunt actiones 
 vitcc. In the handling of this science, those 
 which have written seem to me to have 
 done as if a man, that professeth to teach 
 to write, did only exhibit fair copies of 
 alphabets and letters joined, without giving 
 x 2 
 
308 
 
 any precepts or directions for the carriage 
 of the hand and framing of the letters ; so 
 have they made good and fair examplars 
 and copies, carrying the draughts and por- 
 traitures of good, virtue, duty, felicity ; pro- 
 pounding them well described as the true 
 objects and scopes of man's will and desires ; 
 but how to attain these excellent marks, and 
 how to frame and subdue the will of man 
 to become true and conformable to these 
 pursuits, they pass it over altogether, or 
 slightly and unprofitably : for it is not the 
 disputing that moral virtues are in the mind 
 of man by habit and not by nature, or the 
 distinguishing that generous spirits are won 
 by doctrines and persuasions, and the vul- 
 gar sort by reward and punishment, and 
 the like scattered glances and touches, that 
 c&ft excuse the absence of this part. 
 
 The reason of this omission I suppose 
 to be that hidden rock whereupon both this 
 and many other barks of knowledge have 
 been cast away; which is, that men have 
 despised to be conversant in ordinary and 
 common matters, (the judicious direction 
 whereof nevertheless is the wisest doctrine, 
 
309 
 
 for life consisteth not in novelties nor sub- 
 tilities,) but contrariwise they have com- 
 pounded sciences chiefly of a certain re- 
 splendent or lustrous mass of matter, chosen 
 to give glory either to the subtility of dis- 
 putations, or to the eloquence of discourses. 
 But Seneca giveth an excellent check to 
 eloquence ; Nocet Mis eloquentia, quihus non 
 rerum cupiditatem facit, sed sui. Doctrine 
 should be such as should make men in love 
 with their lesson, and not with the teacher ; 
 being directed to the auditor's benefit, and 
 not to the author's commendation ; and 
 therefore those are of the right kind, which 
 may be concluded as Demosthenes con- 
 cludes his counsel, Quce si feceritis, non ora- 
 torem duntaxat in prcesentia laudabitis, sed 
 vosmetipsos etiam, non ita multo post statu re- 
 rum vestrarum meliore. Neither needed men 
 of so excellent parts to have despaired of 
 a fortune, which the poet Virgil promised 
 himself, and indeed obtained, who got as 
 much glory of eloquence, wit, and learn- 
 ing, in the expressing of the observa- 
 tions of husbandry as of the heroical acts 
 of iEneas : — 
 
310 
 
 Nee sum animi dubius, verbis ea vincere mag- 
 num 
 Qudm sit, et angustis hunc addere rebus honorem. 
 Georg. iii. 289. 
 Two parts And surely, if the purpose be in good 
 
 of moral . , . _ . . 
 
 knowledge, earnest not to write at leisure that which 
 men may read at leisure, but really to 
 instruct and suborn action and active life, 
 these georgics of the mind, concerning the 
 husbandry and tillage thereof, are no less 
 worthy than the heroical descriptions of 
 virtue, duty, and felicity. Wherefore the 
 main and primitive division of moral know- 
 ledge seemeth to be into the Exemplar or 
 Platform of Good, and the Regiment or 
 Culture of the Mind ; the one describing 
 the nature of good, the other prescribing 
 rules how to subdue, apply, and accom- 
 modate the will of man thereunto. 
 
 of the nature The doctrine touching the Platform or Na- 
 ture of Good considereth it either simple or 
 compared; either the kinds of good, or the 
 degrees of good : in the latter whereof those 
 infinite disputations which were touching the 
 supreme degree thereof, which they term fe- 
 licity, beatitude, or the highest good, the 
 
311 
 
 doctrines concerning which were as the hea- 
 then divinity, are by the christian faith dis- 
 charged. And, as Aristotle saith, " That 
 ?f young men may be happy, but not other- 
 <( wise but by hope;" so we must ail ac- 
 knowledge our minority, and embrace the 
 felicity which is by hope of the future 
 world. 
 
 Freed therefore and delivered from this doc- Method of 
 trine of the philosophers' heaven, whereby *Ttht" 
 they feigned an higher elevation of man's quiry * 
 nature than was (for we see in what an height 
 of stile Seneca writeth, Vere magnum, habere 
 fragilhatem hominis, securitatem Dei) we may 
 with more sobriety and truth receive the rest 
 of their enquiries and labours; wherein for 
 the nature of good, positive or simple, they 
 have set it down excellently, in describing 
 the forms of virtue and duty with their situa- 
 tions and postures; in distributing them into 
 their kinds, parts, provinces, actions, aud 
 administrations, and the like : nay farther, 
 they have commended them to man's nature 
 and spirit, with great quickness of argument 
 and beauty of persuasions ; yea, and fortified 
 and intrenched them, as much as discourse 
 
312 
 
 can do, against corrupt and popular opi- 
 nions. Again, for the degrees and compara- 
 tive nature of good, they have also excel- 
 lently handled it in their triplicity of good, 
 in the comparison between a contemplative 
 and an active life, in the distinction between 
 virtue with reluctation and virtue secured, 
 in their encounters between honesty and 
 profit, in their balancing of virtue with vir- 
 tue, and the like ; so as this part deserveth 
 to be reported for excellently laboured. 
 
 Notwithstanding, if before they had come 
 to the popular and received notions of virtue 
 and vice, pleasure and pain, and the rest, 
 they had stayed a little longer upon the en- 
 quiry concerning the roots of good and evil, 
 and the strings of those roots, they had given, 
 in my opinion, a great light to that which 
 followed ; and especially if they had consult- 
 ed with nature, they had made their doc- 
 trines less prolix and more profound : which 
 being by them in part omitted, and in part 
 handled with much confusion, we will en- 
 deavour to resume and open in a more clear 
 manner. 
 
 There is formed in every thing a double 
 
313 
 
 nature of good ; the one as every thing is a of Good, po - 
 
 , . • • ir» i i • sitive ami 
 
 total or substantive in itself, tne other as it relative. 
 
 is a part or member of a greater body ; 
 whereof the latter is in degree the greater and 
 the worthier, because it tendeth to the con- 
 servation of a more general form : therefore 
 we see the iron in particular sympathy 
 moveth to the loadstone, but yet if it exceed 
 a certain quantity, it forsaketh the affection 
 to the loadstone, and like a good patriot 
 moveth to the earth, which is the region and 
 country of massy bodies : so may we go for- 
 ward, and see that water and massy bodies 
 move to the centre of the earth, but rather 
 than to suffer a divulsion in the continuance 
 of nature they will move upwards from the 
 centre of the earth, forsaking their duty to 
 the earth in regard of their duty to the world. 
 This double nature of good and the compa- 
 rative thereof is much more engraven upon 
 man, if he degenerate not, unto whom the 
 conservation of duty to the public ought to 
 be much more precious than the conser- 
 vation of life and being ; according to that 
 memorable speech of Pompeius Magnus, 
 when being in commission of purveyance for 
 
314 
 
 a famine at Rome, and being dissuaded with 
 great vehemency and instance by his friends 
 about him, that he should not hazard him- 
 self to sea in an extremity of weather, he 
 said only to them Necesse est ut earn, non ut 
 vivam. But it may be truly affirmed that 
 there was never any philosophy, religion, or 
 other discipline, which did so plainly and 
 highly exalt the good which is communica- 
 tive, and depress the good which is private 
 and particular, as the holy faith : well de- 
 claring, that it was the same God that gave 
 the christian law to men, who gave those laws 
 of nature to inanimate creatures that we 
 spake of before ; for we read that the elected 
 saints of God have wished themselves anathe- 
 matized and razed out of the book of life, in 
 an extasy of charity and infinite feeling of 
 communion. 
 The christi- This being set down and strongly planted, 
 termines doth judge and determine most of the con- 
 
 most of the . . . 
 
 controversies troversies wherein moral philosophy is COn- 
 irc Morals. . 
 
 , versant. ror hrst, it decidem the question 
 
 storie St An " toucmn g tne preferment of the contempla- 
 tive or active life, and decideth it against 
 Aristotle : for all the reasons which he 
 
315 
 
 bringeth for the contemplative are private, 
 and respecting the pleasure and dignity of a 
 man's self, in which respects, no question, 
 the contemplative life hath the pre-emi- 
 nence ; not much unlike to that comparison, 
 which Pythagoras made for the gracing and 
 magnifying of philosophy and contemplation; 
 who being asked what he was, answered, 
 " That if Hiero were ever at the Olympian 
 " games, he knew the manner, that some came 
 " to try their fortune for the prizes, and some 
 " came as merchants to utter their commo- 
 " dities, and some came to make good cheer 
 f and meet their friends, and some came to 
 " look on : and that he was one of them that 
 " came to look on." But men must know 
 that in this theatre of man's life it is reserved 
 only for God and angels to be lookers on : 
 neither could the like question ever have 
 been received in the church (notwithstanding 
 their Pretiosd in oculis Domini mors sanctorum 
 ejus, by which place they would exalt their 
 civil death and regular professions) but upon 
 this defence, that the monastical life is not 
 simply contemplative, but performeth the 
 duty either of incessant prayers and suppli- 
 
316 
 
 cations, which hath been truly esteemed as 
 an office in the church, or else of writing or 
 taking instructions for writing concerning 
 the law of God ; as Moses did when he abode 
 so long in the mount. And so we see Enoch 
 the seventh from Adam, who was the first 
 contemplative, and walked with God, yet 
 did also endow the church with prophecy, 
 which St. Jude citeth. But for contempla- 
 tion which should be finished in itself, with- 
 out casting beams upon society, assuredly 
 divinity knoweth it not. 
 That be- ^ decideth also the controversies between 
 
 and 6 socrates, Zeno and Socrates, and their schools and 
 &c ' successions on the one side, who placed feli- 
 
 city in virtue simply or attended; the actions 
 and exercises whereof do chiefly embrace 
 and concern society ; and on the other side, 
 the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, who placed 
 it in pleasure, and made virtue (as it is used 
 in some comedies of errors, wherein the mis- 
 tress and the maid change habits) to be but 
 as a servant, without which pleasure cannot 
 be served and attended, and the reformed 
 school of the Epicureans, which placed it in 
 serenity of mind and freedom from perturba- 
 
317 
 
 tion, (as if they would have deposed Jupiter 
 again, and restored Saturn and the first age, 
 when there was no summer nor winter, 
 spring nor autumn, but all after one air and 
 season,) and Herillus, who placed felicity in 
 extinguishment of the disputes of the mind, 
 making no fixed nature of good and evil, 
 esteeming things according to the clearness 
 of the desires, or the reluctation ; which opi- 
 nion was revived in the heresy of the Ana- 
 baptists, measuring things according to the 
 motions of the spirit, and the constancy or 
 wavering; of belief : all which are manifest to 
 tend to private repose and contentment, and 
 not to point of society. 
 
 It censure th also the philosophy of Epic- Against the 
 tetus, which presupposeth that felicity must Epictetus^ °* 
 be placed in those things which are in our 
 power, lest we be liable to fortune and dis- 
 turbance; as if it were not a thing much 
 more happy to fail in good and virtuous ends 
 for the public, than to obtain all that we can 
 wish to ourselves in our proper fortune ; as 
 Gonsalvo said to his soldiers, shewing them 
 Naples, and protesting, " He had rather die 
 " one foot forwards, than to have his life se- 
 
318 
 
 rr cured for long by one foot of retreat." 
 Whereunto the wisdom of that heavenly 
 leader hath signed, who hath affirmed that a 
 good conscience is a continual feast ; shewing 
 plainly that the conscience of good inten- 
 tions, howsoever succeeding, is a more con- 
 tinual joy to nature than all the provi- 
 sion which can be made for security and 
 repose. 
 Against mak- It censnreth likewise that abuse of philoso- 
 
 ing Philoso- x 
 
 phyanoccu- phy, which grew general about the time of 
 
 pation. r J & & 
 
 Epictetus, in converting it into an occupa- 
 tion or profession ; as if the purpose had been 
 not to resist and extinguish perturbations, 
 but to fly and avoid the causes of them, and 
 to shape a particular kind and course of life 
 to that end ; introducing such an health of 
 mind, as was that health of body of which 
 Aristotle speaketh of Herodicus, who did no- 
 thing all his life long but intend his health : 
 whereas if men refer themselves to duties of 
 society, as that health of body is best, which 
 is ablest to endure all alterations and extre- 
 mities; so likewise that health of mind is 
 most proper, which can go through the great- 
 est temptations and perturbations. So as 
 
319 
 
 Biogenesis opinion is to be accepted, who 
 commended not them which abstained, bat 
 them which sustained, and could refrain 
 their mind in prcecipitio, and could give unto 
 the mind, as is used in horsemanship, the 
 shortest stop or turn. 
 
 Lastly, it censureth the tenderness and Against a re- 
 
 J tired life. 
 
 want of application in some of the most an- 
 cient and reverend philosophers and philoso- 
 phical men, that did retire too easily from 
 civil business, for avoiding of indignities and 
 perturbations ; whereas the resolution of men 
 truly moral ought to be such as the same 
 Gonsalvo said the honour of a soldier should be, 
 e tela crassiore, and not so fine as that every 
 thins: should catch in it and endanger it. 
 
 To resume private or particular good, it of Active 
 falleth into the division of good active and good. 
 passive : for this difference of good, not un- 
 like to that which amongst the Romans was 
 expressed in the familiar or houshold terms of 
 Promns and Condus, is formed also in all 
 things, and is best disclosed in the two seve- 
 ral appetites in creatures; the one to preserve 
 or continue themselves, and the other to di- 
 late or multiply themselves ; whereof the lat- 
 
320 
 
 ter seemeth to be the worthier : for in nature 
 the heavens, which are more worthy, are the 
 agent ; and the earth, which is the less wor- 
 thy, is the patient : in the pleasures of living 
 creatures, that of generation is greater than 
 that of food : in divine doctrine, Beatius est 
 dare qudm accipere : and in life, there is no 
 man's spirit so soft but esteemeth the effecting 
 of somewhat that he hath fixed in his desire, 
 more than sensuality. Which priority of the 
 active good is much upheld by the considera- 
 tion of our estate to be mortal and exposed to 
 fortune : for if we might have a perpetuity 
 and certainty in our pleasures, the state of 
 them would advance their price; but when 
 we see it is but Magni cestimamus mori tardius, 
 and Ne glorieris de crastino, nescis partum diei, 
 it maketh us to desire to have somewhat se- 
 cured and exempted from time, which are 
 only our deeds and works ; as it is said Opera 
 eorum sequuntur eos. The preeminence like- 
 wise of this active good is upheld by the af- 
 fection which is natural in man towards va- 
 riety and proceeding; which in the plea- 
 sures of the sense, which is the principal 
 part of passive good, can have no great la- 
 titude : Cogita quamdiu eadem feceris; cibus. 
 
521 
 
 somnus, ludus per hunc circulum curritur; niori 
 velle non fantum fortis, aut miser, aut prudens, 
 sed etiam fastidiosus potest ; but in enter- 
 prises, pursuits, and purposes of life, there 
 is much variety, whereof men are sensible 
 with pleasure in theit inceptions, progres- 
 sions, recoils, re-integrations, approaches 
 and attainings to their ends. So as it was 
 well said, Vita sine proposito languida et vaga 
 est. Neither hath this active good any iden- 
 tity with the good of society, though in 
 some case it hath an incidence into it : for 
 although it do many times bring forth acts of 
 beneficence, yet it is with a respect private 
 to a man's own power, glory, amplification, 
 continuance ; as appeareth plainly, when it 
 findeth a contrary subject. For that gigan- 
 tine state of mind which possesseth the trou- 
 blers of the world (such as was Lucius Sylla, 
 and infinite other in smaller model, who would 
 have all men happy or unhappy as they 
 were their friends or enemies, and would give 
 form to the world according to their own hu- 
 mours, which is the true theomachy) pre- 
 tendeth and aspireth to active good, though 
 
 Y 
 
322 
 
 it recedeth farthest from good of society, 
 
 which we have determined to be the greater. 
 
 Passive good, To resume passive good, it receiveth a sub- 
 Conservative ,. . . n !_• J n A -n 
 
 and Perfect- division ot conservative and perfective, .ror 
 let us take a brief review of that which we 
 have said ; we have sjpoken first of the good 
 of society, the intention whereof embraceth 
 the form of human nature, whereof we are 
 members and portions, and not our own pro- 
 per and individual form ; we have spoken of 
 active good, and supposed it as a part of pri- 
 vate and particular good: and rightly, for 
 there is impressed upon all things a triple de- 
 sire or appetite proceeding from love to them- 
 selves ; one of preserving and continuing their 
 form ; another of advancing and perfecting 
 their form ; and a third of multiplying and 
 extending their form upon other things ; 
 whereof the multiplying, or signature of it 
 upon other things, is that which we handled 
 by the name of active good. So as there re- 
 maineth the conserving of it, and perfecting 
 or raising of it ; which latter is the highest de- 
 gree of passive good. For to preserve in 
 state is the less, to preserve with advance- 
 ment is the greater. So in man,— 
 
323 
 
 Igneus est ollis vigor, ct codestis origo. 
 His approach or assumption to divine or an- 
 gelical nature is the perfection of his form ; 
 the error or false imitation of which good is 
 that which is the tempest of human life ; 
 while man, upon the instinct of an advance- 
 ment formal and essential, is carried to seek 
 an advancement local. For as those which 
 are sick, and find no remedy, do tumble up 
 and down and change place, as if by a re- 
 move local they could obtain a remove inter- 
 nal, so is it with men in ambition, when fail- 
 ing of the means to exalt their nature, they 
 are in a perpetual estuation to exalt their 
 place. So then passive good is, as was said, 
 either conservative or perfective. 
 
 To resume the good of conservation or com- Fruition esti- 
 fort, which consisteth in the fruition of that b^ts sincere. 
 which is agreeable to our natures ; it seem- vigour* * 
 eth to be the most pure and natural of plea- 
 sures, but yet the softest and the lowest. And 
 this also receiveth a difference, which hath 
 neither been well judged of, nor well enquir- 
 ed : for the good of fruition or contentment 
 is placed either in the sincereness of the fru- 
 y 2 
 
ition, or in the quickness an4 vigour of it ; 
 the one superinduced by equality, the other 
 by vicissitude ; the one having less mixture 
 of evil, the other more impression of goodi 
 Whether of these is the greater good, is a 
 question controverted ; but whether man's 
 nature may not be capable of both, is a ques T 
 tion not enquired. 
 Debate be- The former question being debated between 
 
 tween So- l & 
 
 crates and a Socrates and a sophist, Socrates placing; feli- 
 Sophist. ; r r b 
 
 city in an equal and constant peace of mind> 
 
 and the sophist in much desiring and much 
 enjoying, they fell from argument to ill 
 words : the sophist saying that Socrates's fe- 
 licity was the felicity of a block or stone ; and 
 Socrates saying that the sophist's felicity 
 was the felicity of one that had the itch, who 
 did nothing but itch and scratch. And both 
 these opinions do not want their supports 3. 
 for the opinion of Socrates is much upheld 
 by the general consent even of the Epicures 
 themselves; that virtue beareth a great part 
 in felicity : and if so, certain it is, that vir-? 
 tue hath more use in clearing perturbations 
 than in compassing desires. The sophist's 
 opinion is much favoured by the assertion we 
 
last spake of, that good of advancement is 
 greater than good of simple preservation; 
 Because every obtaining a desire hath a shew 
 of advancement, as motion though in a cir- 
 cle hath a shew of progression. 
 
 But the second question decided the true 
 way maketh the former superfluous: for can 
 it be doubted but that there are some who 
 take more pleasure in enjoying pleasures, 
 than some other; and yet nevertheless are 
 less troubled with the loss or leaving of them : 
 so as this same, Non uti ut non appetas, non 
 appetere ut non rnetuas, sunt animi pusilli et 
 diffideniis. And it seemeth to me that niost Doctrines of 
 of the doctrines of the philosophers are more phe™^ * 
 fearful and cautionary than the nature of tndtoouui, 
 things requireth: so have they increased the fomi * 
 fear of death in offering to cure it : for when 
 they would have a man's whole life to be but 
 a discipline or preparation to die, they must 
 needs make men think that it is a terri- % 
 ble enemy against whom there is no end of 
 preparing. Better saith the poet, 
 
 • Quifinem vitce extrerhum inter munera ponat 
 
 { Natura : 
 
 So have they sought to make men's minds 
 
326 
 
 too uniform and harmonical, by not breaking 
 them sufficiently to contrary motions: the 
 reason whereof I suppose to be, because they 
 themselves were men dedicated to a private, 
 free, and unapplied course of life. For as 
 we see, upon the lute or like instrument, a 
 ground, though it be sweet and have shew of 
 many changes, yet breaketh not the hand to 
 such strange and hard stops and passages, as 
 a set song or voluntary; much after the same 
 manner was the diversity between a philoso- 
 phical and a civil life. And therefore men 
 are to imitate the wisdom of jewellers ; who 
 if there be a grain, or a cloud, or an ice 
 which may be ground forth without taking 
 too much of the stone, they help it ; but if 
 it should lessen and abate the stone too much, 
 they will not meddle with it : so ought men 
 so to procure serenity, as they destroy not 
 magnanimity. 
 %h7£pect Having therefore deduced the good of man, 
 ^ihay,* ° r which is private and particular, as far as 
 seemeth fit, we will now return to that good 
 of man which respecteth and beholdeth So- 
 ciety, which we may term duty ; because the 
 term of duty is more proper to a mind well 
 
327 
 
 framed and disposed towards others, as the 
 term of virtue is applied to a mind well form- 
 ed and composed in itself: though neither 
 can a man understand virtue without some 
 relation to society, nor duty without an in- 
 ward disposition. This part may seem at 
 first to pertain to science civil and politic ; 
 but not if it be well observed : for it con- 
 cerneth the regimen and government of every 
 man over himself, and not over others. And 
 as in architecture the direction of the fram- 
 ing the posts, beams, and other parts of build- 
 ing, is not the same with the manner of join- 
 ing them and erecting the building; and in 
 mechanicals, the direction how to frame an 
 instrument or engine is not the same with the 
 manner of setting it on work and employing 
 it, (and yet nevertheless in expressing of the 
 one you incidently express the aptness to- 
 wards the other) so the doctrine of conjuga- 
 tion of men in society differeth from that 
 of their conformity thereunto. 
 
 This part of duty is subdivided into two of. a man's 
 
 r J duty to the 
 
 parts ; the common duty of every man, as a state, and to 
 man or member of a state ; the other the re- siou * 
 spective or special duty of every man, in his 
 
3<28 
 
 profession, vocation, and place. The first 
 of these is extant and well laboured, as hath 
 been said. The second likewise I may report 
 rather dispersed than deficient ; which man- 
 ner of dispersed writing in this kind of ar- 
 gument I acknowledge to be best : for who 
 can take upon him to write of the proper du- 
 ty, virtue, challenge, and right of every se- 
 veral vocation, profession, and place? For 
 although sometimes a looker on may see more 
 than a gamester, and there be a proverb 
 more arrogant than sound, " That the vale 
 best discovereth the hill ;" yet there is small 
 doubt but that men can write best, and most 
 really and materially in their own profes- 
 sions ; and that the writing of speculative 
 men of active matter, for the most part, 
 doth seem to men of experience, as Phor- 
 mio's argument of the wars seemed to Han- 
 nibal, to be but dreams and dotage. Only 
 there is one vice which accompanieth them 
 that write in their own professions, that they 
 magnify them in excess ; but generally it 
 were to be wished, as that which would make 
 learning indeed solid and fruitful, that active 
 men would or could become writers. 
 
329 
 In which I cannot but mention, honoris of the King'* 
 
 own Book. 
 
 causa, your majesty's excellent book touching 
 the duty of a king : a work richly compound- 
 ed of divinity, morality, and policy, with 
 great aspersion of all other arts ; and being 
 in mine opinion one of the most sound and 
 healthful writings that I have read ; not dis- 
 tempered in the heat of invention, nor in the 
 coldness of negligence ; not sick of business, 
 as those are who lose themselves in their or- 
 der, nor of convulsions, as those which 
 cramp in matters impertinent; not savouring 
 of perfumes and paintings, as those do who 
 seek to please the reader more than nature 
 beareth ; and chiefly well disposed in the spi- 
 rits thereof, being agreeable to truth and apt 
 for action ; and far removed from that natu- 
 ral infirmity, whereunto I noted those that 
 write in their own professions to be subject, 
 which is, that they exalt it above measure : 
 for your majesty hath truly described, not a 
 king of Assyria or Persia in their external 
 glory, but a Moses or a David, pastors of 
 their people. Neither can I ever lose out of 
 my remembrance, what I heard your majesty 
 in the same sacred spirit of government de- 
 
330 
 
 liver in a great cause of judicature, which 
 was, " That kings ruled by their laws as God 
 " did by the laws of nature; and ought as 
 " rarely to put in use their supreme prero- 
 C( gative, as God doth his power of working 
 " miracles." And yet notwithstanding, in 
 your book of a free monarchy, you do well 
 give men to understand, that you know the 
 plenitude of the power and right of a king, 
 as well as the circle of his office and duty. 
 Thus have I presumed to alledge this excellent 
 writing of your majesty, as a prime or emi- 
 nent example of Tractates concerning spe- 
 cial and respective duties ; wherein I should 
 have said as much if it had been written a 
 thousand years since : neither am I moved 
 with certain courtly decencies, which esteem 
 it flattery to praise in presence; no, it is 
 flattery to praise in absence, that is, when 
 either the virtue is absent, or the occasion is 
 absent ; and so the praise is not natural but 
 forced, either in truth or in time. But let 
 Cicero be read in his oration pro Marcello, 
 which is nothing but an excellent table of 
 Caesar's virtue, and made to his face ; be- 
 sides the example of many other excellent per- 
 
331 
 
 sons wiser a great deal than such observers, 
 and we will never doubt, upon a full oc- 
 casion, to give just praises to present or 
 absent. 
 
 But to return, there belongeth farther to onhe fraud* 
 
 ° and vices of 
 
 the handling of this part, touching the du- Professions. 
 ties of professions and vocations, a relative 
 or opposite, touching the frauds, cautels, im- 
 postures, and vices of every profession, which 
 hath been likewise handled : but how ? ra- 
 ther in a satire and cynically, than seriously 
 and wisely: for men have rather sought by 
 wit to deride and traduce much of that which 
 is good in professions, than with judgment 
 to discover and sever that which is corrupt. 
 For, as Solomon saith, he that cometh to 
 seek after knowledge with a mind to scorn 
 and censure, shall be sure to find matter for 
 his humour, but no matter for his instruc- 
 tion : Qucerenti derisori scientiam ipsa se abs- 
 condit; sed studioso fit obviam. But the ma- 
 naging of this argument with integrity and 
 truth, which I note as deficient, seemeth to 
 me to be one of the best fortifications for ho- 
 nesty and virtue that can be planted. For, 
 as the fable goeth of the basilisk, that if he 
 
332 
 
 see you first, you die for it; but if you see 
 him first, he dieth : so is it with deceits and 
 evil arts; which, if they be first espied, lose 
 their life ; but if they prevent, they endanger. 
 So that we are much beholden to Machiavel 
 and others, that write what men do, and not 
 what they ought to do: for it is not possible 
 to join serpentine wisdom with the columbine 
 innocency, except men know exactly all the 
 conditions of the serpent; his baseness and 
 going upon his belly, his volubility and lu- 
 bricity, his envy and sting, and the rest; 
 that is, all forms and natures of evil: for 
 without this, virtue lieth open and unfenced. 
 Nay, an honest man can do no good upon 
 those that are wicked, to reclaim them, with- 
 out the help of the knowledge of evil : for 
 men of corrupted minds presuppose that ho- 
 nesty groweth out of simplicity of manners, 
 and believing of preachers, school-masters, 
 and men's exterior language : so as, except ' 
 you can make them perceive that you know' 
 the utmost reaches of their own corrupt opi- 
 nion s, they desp i se all moral i ty ; Nori recipit 
 siultus verba prudentift, nisi ea dixeris quczver~ } 
 wntur in corde ejus. 
 
323 
 Unto this part touching respective duty doth of relative 
 
 r & ■* J duties in ge» 
 
 also appertain the duties between husband nerah 
 and wife, parent and child, master and ser- 
 vant : so likewise the laws of friendship and 
 gratitude/ the civil bond of companies, col- 
 leges; and politic bodies, of neighbourhood, 
 and all other proportionate duties ; not as 
 they are parts of government and society, 
 but as to the framing of the mind of parti- 
 cular persons. 
 
 The knowledge concerning good respecting 
 society doth handle it also not simply alone, 
 but comparatively ; whereunto belongeth the 
 weighing of duties between person and per- 
 son, case and case, particular and public : as 
 we see in the proceeding of Lucius Brutus 
 against his own sons, which was so much ex- 
 tolled; yet what was said ? 
 
 InfeliX) utcunque ferent eafata minor es. 
 So the case was doubtful, and had opinion 
 on both sides. Again, we see when M. Brutus 
 and Cassius invited to a supper certain whose 
 opinions they meant to feel, whether they 
 were fit to be made their associates, and cast 
 forth the question touching the killing of a 
 tyrant being an .^usurper? they were divided 
 
334 
 
 in opinion ; some holding that servitude was 
 the extreme of evils, and others that tyranny 
 was better than a civil war: and a number 
 of the like cases there are of comparative 
 duty amongst which that of all others is the 
 most frequent, where the question is of a 
 great deal of good to ensue of a small injus- 
 tice, which Jason of Thessalia determined 
 against the truth: Aliqua sunt injuste facknda, 
 ut multa juste fieri possint. But the reply is 
 good, Auctorem prcesentis justitice habes, spon- 
 sorem futurcz non habes; men must pursue 
 things which are just in present, and leave 
 the future to the divine providence. So then 
 we pass on from this general part touching 
 the exemplar and description of good. 
 ©tthecui- Now therefore that we have spoken of this 
 
 ture of the 
 
 mind. fruit of life, it remaineth to speak of the hus- 
 
 bandry that belongeth thereunto; without 
 which part the former seemeth to be no better 
 than a fair image, or statua, which is beauti- 
 ful to contemplate, but is without life and 
 motion : whereunto Aristotle himself sub- 
 scribeth in these words, Necesse est scilicet de 
 virtute dicere, et quid sit, et ex quibus gignatur. 
 Inutile enim fere fuerit virtutem quidem nosse, 
 
S35 
 
 acquirendce autem ejus modos et vias ignorare : 
 non enim de virtute tantum, qua specie sit, quce- 
 rendum est, sed et quomodo sui copiam faciat ; 
 utrumque enim volumus, et rem ipsam nosse, et 
 ejus compotes jieri ; hoc autem ex voto non sue* 
 cedet, nisi sciamus et ex quibus et quomodo : in 
 such full words, and with such iteration doth 
 he inculcate this part : so saith Cicero in 
 great commendation of Cato the second, 
 that he had applied himself to philosophy, 
 non ita disputandi causa, sed ita vivendi. And 
 although the neglect of our times, w r herein 
 few men do hold any consultations touching 
 the reformation of their life, (as Seneca excel- 
 lently saith, De partibus vitce quisque deliberat, 
 de summd nemo) may make this part seem 
 superfluous ; yet I must conclude with that 
 aphorism of Hippocrates, Quigravi morbo cor- 
 repti dolores non sentiunt, Us mens wgrotat ; 
 they need medicine not only to assuage the 
 disease, but to awake the sense. 
 
 And if it be said, that the cure of men's philosophy 
 minds belongeth to sacred divinity, it is most maid to £>i- 
 true : but yet moral philosophy may be pre- vim y ' 
 ferred unto her as a wise servant and hum- 
 ble handmaid. For as the Psalm saith, that 
 
336 
 
 the eyes of the handmaid look perpetually to* 
 wards the mistress, and yet no doubt many 
 things are left to the discretion of the hand- 
 maid, to discern of the mistress's will ; so 
 ought moral philosophy to give a constant 
 attention to the doctrines of divinity, and yet 
 so as it may yield of herself, within due limits, 
 many sound and profitable directions. 
 
 This part therefore, because of the ex- 
 cellency thereof, I cannot but find exceed- 
 ing strange that it is not reduced to written 
 enquiry ; the rather, because it consisteth 
 of much matter, wherein both speech and ac- 
 tion is often conversant ; and such wherein 
 the common talk of men, (which is rare, 
 but yet cometh sometimes to pass,) is wiser 
 than their books. It is reasonable there- 
 fore that we propound it in the more parti- 
 cularity, both for the worthiness, and because 
 we may acquit ourselves for reporting it 
 deficient ; which seemeth almost incredible, 
 and is otherwise conceived and presupposed 
 by those themselves that have written. We 
 will therefore enumerate some heads or points 
 thereof, that it may appear the better what 
 it is, and whether it be extant. 
 
337 
 First, therefore, in this, as in all things what can be 
 
 done in this 
 
 which are practical, we ought to cast up our art. 
 account, what is in our power, and what 
 not; for the one may be dealt with by way 
 of alteration, but the other by way of appli- 
 cation only. The husbandman cannot com- 
 mand, neither the nature of the earth, nor 
 the seasons of the weather; no more can the 
 physician the constitution of the patient, nor 
 the variety of accidents : so in the culture 
 and cure of the mind of man, two things are 
 without our command; points of nature, and 
 points of fortune : for to the basis of the one, ' 
 and the conditions of the other, our work is 
 limited and tied. In these things therefore, 
 it is left unto us to proceed by application. 
 
 Vincenda est omnis fortuna ferendo : 
 and so likewise, 
 
 Vincenda est omnis natura ferendo. 
 But when that we speak of suffering, we do 
 not speak of a dull and neglected suffering 
 but of a wise and industrious suffering, which 
 draweth and contriveth use and advantage 
 out of that which seemeth adverse and con- 
 trary ; which is that properly which we call 
 accommodating or applying. Now the wis- 
 
338 
 
 dom of application resteth principally in the 
 exact and distinct knowledge of the prece- 
 dent state or disposition, unto which we do 
 a PPty y f° r we cannot fit a garment, except 
 we first take measure of the body. 
 ofthecha- So then the first article of this knowledge 
 
 racters and & 
 
 tempers of is to set down sound and true distributions, 
 
 men. I * 
 
 and descriptions of the several characters 
 and tempers of men's natures and disposi- 
 tions ; especially having regard to those dif- 
 ferences which are most radical, in being the 
 fountains and causes of the rest, or most fre- 
 quent in concurrence or commixture ; where- 
 in it is not the handling of a few of them in 
 passage, the better to describe the mediocri- 
 ties of virtues, that can satisfy this inten- 
 tion: for if it deserve to be considered, 
 €< that there are minds which are proportion - 
 " ed to great matters, and others to small/* 
 (which Aristotle handleth or ought to have 
 handled by the name of magnanimity,) doth 
 it not deserve as well to be considered, " that 
 " there' are minds proportioned to intend 
 " many matters, and others to few ?" So 
 that some can divide themselves ; others can 
 perchance do exactly well, but it must be but 
 
S3£ 
 
 in few things at once : and so there cometh 
 to be a narrowness of mind, as well as a pu- 
 sillanimity. And again, " that some minds 
 " are proportioned to that which may be dis- 
 u patched at once, or within a short return 
 " of time ; others to that which begins afar 
 " of£ and is to be wofn with length of 
 " pursuit," 
 
 Jam turn tenditque fovetque. 
 So that there may be fitly said to be a longa* 
 nimity, which is commonly also ascribed to 
 God as a magnanimity. So farther deserved 
 it to be considered by Aristotle ; " that there 
 <c is a disposition in conversation, (supposing 
 " it in things which do in no sort touch or 
 " concern a man's self,) to sooth and please; 
 ** and a disposition contrary to contradict 
 " and cross:" and deserveth it not much 
 better to be considered, " that there is a 
 " disposition, not in conversation or talk 
 < ( but in the matter of more serious nature, 
 " (and supposing it still in things merely in- 
 9 different,) to take pleasure in the good of 
 " another, and a disposition contrariwise, to 
 " take distaste at the good of another ?" 
 which is that properly which we call good- 
 
340 
 
 nature or ill-nature, benignity or malignity: 
 and therefore I cannot sufficiently marvel 
 that this part of knowledge, touching the 
 several characters of natures and disposi- 
 tions, should be omitted both in morality and 
 policy, considering it is of so great ministry 
 and suppeditation to them both. A man shall 
 find in the traditions of astrology some pretty 
 and apt divisions of men's natures, accord- 
 ing to the predominances of the planets ; 
 lovers of quiet, lovers of action, lovers of vic- 
 tory, lovers of honour, lovers of pleasure, 
 lovers of arts, lovers of change, and so forth. 
 A man shall find in the wisest sort of these 
 relations, which the Italians make touching 
 conclaves, the natures of the several cardi- 
 nals handsomely and lively painted forth: 
 a man shall meet with, in every day's con- 
 ference, the denominations of sensitive, dry, 
 formal, real, humourous, certain, huomo di 
 prima impressione, huomo di ultima impressione f 
 and the like : and yet nevertheless this kind 
 of observations wandereth in words, but is 
 not fixed in enquiry. For the distinctions are 
 found, many of them, but we conclude no 
 precepts upon them : wherein our fault is the 
 
341 
 
 greater, because both history, poesy, and 
 daily experience are as goodly fields where 
 these observations grow ; whereof we make a 
 few posies to hold in our hands, but no man 
 bringeth them to the confectionary, that re- 
 ceipts might be made of them for the use 
 of life. 
 
 Of much like kind are those impressions of of inherent 
 
 x and external 
 
 nature, which are imposed upon the mind impressions. 
 by the sex, by the age, by the region, by 
 health and sickness, by beauty and deformity, 
 and the like, which are inherent, and not ex- 
 ternal ; and again, those which are caused 
 by external fortune ; as sovereignty, nobility, 
 obscure birth, riches, want, magistracy, pri- 
 vateness, prosperity, adversity, constant for- 
 tune, variable fortune, rising per saltum, per 
 gradus, and the like. And therefore we see 
 that Plautus maketh it a wonder to see an old 
 man beneficent, benignitas Jaijiis ut adoles- 
 centuli est. St. Paul concludeth, that severity 
 of discipline was to be used to the Cretans, 
 Increpa eos dure, upon the disposition of their 
 country, Cretenses semper mendaces, malce bes- 
 tice, ventres pigri. Sallust noteth, that it is 
 usual with kings to desire contradictories ; 
 Sed plerumque regicc voluntates, ut vehementes 
 
 l 
 
342 
 
 sunt, sic mobiles, scepeque ipsce sibi adverser 
 Tacitus observeth how rarely raising of the 
 fortune mendeth the disposition, Solus Vespa- 
 sianus mutatus in melius, Pindarus maketh an 
 observation, that great and sudden fortune 
 for the most part defeateth men, Qui mag* 
 nam felicitatem concoquere non possunt. So 
 the Psalm sheweth it is more easy to keep a 
 measure in the enjoying of fortune, than in 
 the increase of fortune ; Divitia si affluant, 
 nolite cor apponere. These observations, and 
 the like, I deny not but are touched a little 
 by Aristotle, as in passage, in his Rhetorics, 
 and are handled in some scattered discourses : 
 but they were never incorporated into moral 
 philosophy, to which they do essentially ap- 
 pertain ; as the knowledge of the diversity of 
 grounds and moulds doth to agriculture, and 
 the knowledge of the diversity of complexions 
 and constitutions doth to the physician ; ex- 
 cept we mean to follow the indiscretion of 
 empirics, which administer the same medi- 
 cines to all patients. 
 of the affec- Another article of this knowledge is the 
 enquiry touching the affections: for as in 
 medicining of the body, it is in order first to 
 know the divers complexions and constitu- 
 
343 
 
 tions ; secondly, the diseases ; and lastly, 
 the cures : so in medicining of the mind> 
 after knowledge of the divers characters of 
 men's natures, it followeth, in order, to know 
 the diseases and infirmities of the mind, 
 which are no other than the perturbations 
 and distempers of the affections. For as the 
 ancient politicians in popular states were 
 wont to compare the people to the sea, and 
 the orators to the winds, (because as the sea 
 would of itself be calm and quiet, if the 
 winds did not move and trouble it ; so the 
 people would be peaceable and tractable, if 
 the seditious orators did not set them in 
 working and agitation;) so it may be fitly 
 said, that the mind in the nature thereof 
 would be temperate and stayed, if the affec- 
 tions, as winds, did not put it into tumult 
 and perturbation. 
 
 And here again I find strange as before, Bad method 
 
 b b of Aristotle; 
 
 that Aristotle should have written divers 
 volumes of Ethics, and never handled the 
 affections, which is the principal subject 
 thereof j and yet in his Rhetorics, where 
 they are considered but collaterally, and in 
 a second degree, as they may be moved 
 
344 
 
 Poets and 
 Historians 
 the best 
 teachers of 
 this know- 
 ledge. 
 
 by speech, he fmdeth place for them, and 
 handleth them well for the quantity ; but 
 where their true place is, he pretermitteth 
 them. For it is not his disputations about 
 pleasure and pain that can satisfy this en- 
 quiry, no more than he that should ge- 
 nerally handle the nature of light can be 
 said to handle the nature of colours ; for 
 pleasure and pain are to the particular af- 
 fections, as light is to particular colours. 
 Better travels, I suppose, had the Stoics 
 taken in this argument, as far as I can ga- 
 ther by that which we have at second hand. 
 But yet, it is like it was after their man- 
 ner, rather in subtilty of definitions, (which, 
 in a subject of this nature, are but curiosi- 
 ties,) than in active and ample descriptions 
 and observations. So likewise I find some 
 particular writings of an elegant nature, 
 touching some of the affections ; as of anger, 
 of comfort upon adverse accidents, of ten- 
 derness of countenance, and other. 
 
 But the poets and writers of histories are 
 the best doctors of this knowledge ; where 
 we may find painted forth with great life 
 how affections are kindled and incited; and 
 
 i '■ 
 
345 
 
 how pacified and refrained ; and how again 
 contained from act and farther degree ; how 
 they disclose themselves ; how they work ; 
 how they vary, how they gather and fortify ; 
 how they are inwrapped one within another; 
 and how they do fight and encounter one 
 with another ; and other the like particu- 
 larities : amongst the which this last is of 
 special use in moral and civil matters ; how, 
 I say, to set affection against affection, and to 
 master one by another ; even as we use to 
 hunt beast with beast, and fly bird with 
 bird, which otherwise perhaps we could not 
 so easily recover : upon which foundation 
 is erected that excellent use of pr&mium and 
 pcena, whereby civil states consist ; employ- 
 ing the predominant affections of fear and 
 hope, for the suppressing and bridling the 
 rest. For as in the government of states 
 it is sometimes necessary to bridle one fac- 
 tion with another, so it is in the govern- 
 ment within. 
 
 Now come we to those points which are °f things 
 
 r within our 
 
 within our own command, and have force j^^^tfi 
 and operation upon the mind, to affect the and a PP etlte * 
 will and appetite, and to alter manners: 
 
346 
 
 wherein they ought to have handled cus- 
 tom, exercise, habit, education, example, imi- 
 tation, emulation, company, friends, praise, 
 reproof, exhortation, fame, laws, books, stu- 
 dies : these as they have determinate use 
 in moralities, from these the mind suffereth ; 
 and of these are such receipts and regimens 
 compounded and described, as may serve to 
 recover or preserve the health and good 
 estate of the mind, as far as pertain eth to 
 human medicine ; of which number we will 
 insist upon some one or two, as an ex- 
 ample of the rest, because it were too long 
 to prosecute all ; and therefore we do re- 
 sume custom and habit to speak of. 
 Unsound I opi- The opinion of Aristotle seemeth to me 
 
 nion of Aris-j r 
 
 iotie. a negligent opinion, that of those things 
 
 which consist by nature, nothing can be 
 changed by custom ; using for example, 
 that if a stone be thrown ten thousand 
 times up, it will not learn to ascend ; and 
 that by often seeing or hearing, we do not 
 learn to hear or see the better. For though 
 this principle be true in things wherein na- 
 ture is peremptory, (the reason whereof 
 we cannot now stand to discuss,) yet it is 
 
347 
 
 otherwise in things wherein nature admitteth 
 a latitude. For he might see that a straight 
 glove will come more easily on with use > 
 and that a wand will by use bend other- 
 wise than it grew ; and that by use of the 
 voice we speak louder and stronger ; and 
 that by use of enduring heat or cold, we 
 endure it the better, and the like : which 
 latter sort have a nearer resemblance unto 
 that subject of manners he handleth, than 
 those instances which he alledgeth. But 
 allowing his conclusion, that virtues and 
 vices consist in habit, he ought so much 
 the more to have taught the manner of 
 superinducing that habit : for there be many 
 precepts of the wise, ordering the exercises 
 of the mind, as there is of ordering the 
 exercises of the body ; whereof we will re- 
 cite a few. 
 
 The first shall be, that we beware we take Precepts ho^ 
 
 to exercise 
 
 not at the first either too high a strain, or the mind. 
 too weak : for if too high, in a diffident 
 nature you discourage ; in a confident na- 
 ture you breed an opinion of facility, and 
 so a sloth ; and in all natures you breed 
 a farther expectation than can hold out, 
 
348 
 
 and so an in satisfaction in the end : if too 
 weak, of the other side, you may not look 
 to perform and overcome any great task. 
 
 Another precept is to practise all things 
 chiefly at two several times, the one when 
 the mind is best disposed, the other when 
 it is worst disposed ; that by the one you 
 may gain a great step, by the other you 
 may work out the knots and stones of the 
 mind, and make the middle times the more 
 easy and pleasant. 
 
 Another precept is that which Aristotle 
 mentioneth by the way, which is, to bear 
 ever towards the contrary extreme of that 
 whereunto we are by nature inclined : like 
 unto the rowing against the stream, or 
 making a wand straight, by bending him 
 contrary to his natural crookedness. 
 
 Another precept is that the mind is 
 brought to any thing better, and with more 
 sweetness and happiness, if that whereunto 
 you pretend be not first in the intention, 
 but tanquam aliud agendo ; because of the 
 natural hatred of the mind against neces- 
 sity and constraint. Many other axioms 
 there are touching the managing of exer- 
 
349 
 
 cise and custom; which being so conduct- 
 ed, doth prove indeed another nature ; but 
 being governed by chance, doth commonly 
 prove but an ape of nature, and bringeth 
 forth that which is lame and counterfeit. 
 
 So if we should handle books and studies, of Books 
 
 . ... . and Studies. 
 
 and what influence and operation they have 
 upon manners, are there not divers precepts 
 of great caution and direction appertaining 
 thereunto ? Did not one of the fathers in 
 great indignation call poesy vinum dcemo- 
 num, because it increaseth temptations, per- 
 turbations, and vain opinions ? Is not the 
 opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded, 
 wherein he saith, " That young men are 
 no fit auditors of moral philosophy, be- 
 cause they are not settled from the boil* 
 ing heat of their affections, nor attemper- 
 " ed with time and experience }" And 
 doth it not hereof come, that those excel- 
 lent books and discourses of the ancient 
 •writers (whereby they have persuaded unto 
 virtue most effectually, by representing her 
 in state and majesty, and popular opinions 
 against virtue in their parasites' coats, fit 
 to be scorned and derided,) are of so little 
 
350 
 
 effect towards honesty of life, because they 
 are not read, and revolved by men in their 
 mature and settled years, but confined almost 
 to boys and beginners ? But is it not true 
 also, that much less young men are fit 
 auditors of matters of policy, till they have 
 been thoroughly seasoned in religion and 
 morality ; lest their judgments be corrupted, 
 and made apt to think that there are no 
 true differences of things, but according to 
 utility and fortune, as the verse describes 
 it? 
 
 Prosperum et felix scelus virtus vocatur 
 And again, 
 
 Ille crucem pretium scekris tulit, hie 
 diadema : 
 which the poets do speak satirically, and 
 in indignation on virtue's behalf; but books 
 of policy do speak it seriously and posi- 
 tively : for it so pleaseth Machiavel to say, 
 " that if Caesar had been overthrown, he 
 " would have been more odious than ever 
 P was Catiline :" as if there had been no 
 difference, but in fortune, between a very 
 fury of lust and blood, and the most ex- 
 cellent spirit (his ambition reserved) of the 
 
S51 
 
 world ? Again, is there not a caution like- 
 wise to be given of the doctrines of mora- 
 lities themselves, some kinds of them, lest 
 they make men too precise, arrogant, in- 
 compatible, as Cicero saith of Cato In 
 Marco Catone hcec bona quce videmus divina 
 et egregia, ipsius scitote esse propria ; quce 
 nonnunquam requirimus, ea sunt omnia non a 
 natura> sed d magistro ? Many other axioms 
 and advices there are touching those pro- 
 prieties and effects, which studies do infuse 
 and instil into manners. And so likewise 
 is there touching the use of all those other 
 points, of company, fame, laws, and the 
 rest, which we recited in the beginning in 
 the doctrine of morality. 
 
 But there is a kind of culture of the The culture 
 
 of the mind 
 
 mind that seemeth yet more accurate and , to b f jegu- 
 
 J lated by the 
 
 elaborate than the rest, and is built upon st ^ of the 
 this ground ; that the minds of all men are 
 sometimes in a state more perfect, and at 
 other times in a state more depraved. The 
 purpose therefore of this practice is to fix and 
 cherish the good hours of the mind, and 
 to obliterate and take forth the evil. The 
 fixing of the good hath been practised by 
 
352 
 
 two means, vows or constant resolutions, and 
 observances or exercises ; which are not to 
 be regarded so much in themselves, as be- 
 cause they keep the mind in continual 
 obedience. The obliteration of the evil hath 
 been practised by two means, some kind of 
 redemption or expiation of that which is 
 past, and an inception or account de novo, 
 for the time to come : but this part seemeth 
 sacred and religious, and justly ; for all good 
 moral philosophy, as was said, is but an 
 handmaid to religion. 
 The shortest Wherefore we will conclude with that 
 
 and most ef- 
 fectual way last point, which is of all other means the 
 
 of training x 
 
 the mmd to m0 st compendious and summary, and again, 
 the most noble and effectual to the reducing: 
 of the mind unto virtue and good estate ; 
 which is the electing and propounding unto 
 a man's self good and virtuous ends of his 
 life, such as may be in a reasonable sort 
 within his compass to attain. For if these 
 two things be supposed, that a man set 
 before him honest and good ends, and again 
 that he be resolute, constant, and true unto 
 them, it will follow that he shall mould 
 himself into all virtue at once. And this 
 
353 
 
 is indeed like the work of nature ; whereas 
 the other course is like the work of the hand : 
 for as when a carver makes an image, he 
 shapes only that part whereupon he worketh ; 
 (as if he be upon the face, that part which 
 shall be the body is but a rude stone still, 
 till such time as he comes to it ;) but, con- 
 trariwise, when nature makes a flower or 
 living creature, she formeth rudiments of 
 all the parts at one time : so in obtain- 
 ing virtue by habit, while a man practise th 
 temperance, he doth not profit much to for- 
 titude, nor the like ; but when he dedicateth 
 and applieth himself to good ends, look, 
 what virtue soever the pursuit and passage 
 towards those ends doth commend unto him, 
 he is invested of a precedent disposition to 
 conform himself thereunto. Which state of 
 mind Aristotle doth excellently express him- 
 self, that it ought not to be called virtuous 
 but divine : his words are these ; Immanitati 
 autem consentaneum est opponere earn, quce 
 supra humanitatem est, heroicam sive divinam 
 virtutem : and a little after, Nam ut fer<x 
 neque vitium neque virtus est, sic neque Dei : 
 sed hie quidem status altius quiddam virtute 
 
 A A 
 
354 
 
 est, ilk aliud quiddam a vitio. And there- 
 fore we may see what celsitude of honour 
 Plinius Secundus attributeth to Trajan in 
 his funeral oration ; where he said, " that 
 " men needed to make no other prayers 
 " to the gods, but that they would con- 
 " tinue ,as good lords to them as Trajan 
 " had been '"■ as if he had not been only an 
 imitation of divine nature, but a pattern 
 of it. But these be heathen and profane 
 passages, having but a shadow of that divine 
 state of mind, which religion and the holy 
 faith doth conduct men unto, by imprint- 
 ing upon their souls charity, which is ex- 
 cellently called the bond of perfection, be- 
 cause it comprehendeth and fasteneth all 
 virtues together. And as it is elegantly 
 said by Menander of vain love, which is 
 but a false imitation of divine love, Amor 
 melior sophist a Ueoo ad hamanam vitam, that 
 love teacheth a man to carry himself bet- 
 ter than the sophist or preceptor ; which 
 he calleth left-handed, because, with all his 
 rules and precepts, he cannot form a man 
 so dexterously, nor with that facility to 
 prize himself and govern himself, as love 
 
355 
 
 can do : so certainly, if a man's mind be 
 truly inflamed with charity, it doth work 
 him suddenly into greater perfection than 
 all the doctrine of morality can do, which 
 is but a sophist in comparison of the other. 
 Nay farther, as Xenophon observed truly, 
 that all other affections, though they raise 
 the mind, yet they do it by distorting and 
 uncomeliness of ecstasies or excesses ; but 
 only love doth exalt the mind, and never- 
 theless at the same instant doth settle and 
 compose it : so in all other excellencies, 
 though they advance nature, yet they are 
 subject to excess ; only charity admitteth 
 no excess : for so we see, by aspiring to be 
 like God in power, the angels transgressed 
 and fell ; Ascendam, et ero sijnilis Altissimo : 
 by aspiring to be like God in knowledge, 
 man transgressed and fell ; Eritis sicut Dii, 
 scientes bonum et malum : but by aspiring to 
 a similitude of God in goodness or love, 
 neither man nor angel ever transgressed, or 
 shall transgress. For unto that imitation we 
 are called ; Diligite inimicos vestros, benefa- 
 cite eis qui oderunt vos, et orate pro perse- 
 quentibus et calumniantibus vos ; ut sit is filii 
 
 A A 2 
 
336 
 
 Patris vestri qui in ccelis est, qui solem suwn 
 oriri facit super bonos et malos, et pluit super 
 justos et injustos. So in the first platform 
 of the divine nature itself, the heathen re- 
 ligion speaketh thus, Optimus Maximus; and 
 the sacred Scriptures thus, Misericordia ejus 
 super omnia opera ejus. 
 Conclusion. Wherefore I do conclude this part of moral 
 knowledge, concerning the culture and re- 
 gimen of the mind ; wherein if any man, 
 considering the parts thereof, which I have 
 enumerated, do judge that my labour is 
 but to collect into an art or science that 
 which hath been pretermitted by others, as 
 matters of common sense and experience, 
 he judgeth well : but as Philocrates sported 
 with Demosthenes, " You may not marvel, 
 " Athenians, that Demosthenes and I do 
 (( differ ; for he drinketh water, and I drink 
 " wine :" — and like as we read of an an- 
 cient parable of the two gates of sleep, 
 Sunt gemincB somni portce, quarum altera fertur 
 Cornea, qua veris facilis datur exitus umbris : 
 Altera candenti perfecta nitens elephanto, 
 Sed falsa ad caelum mittunt insomnia manes. 
 so if we put on sobriety and attention, we 
 
Vol 
 
 shall find it a sure maxim in knowledge, 
 that the more pleasant liquor of wine is 
 the more vaporous, and the braver gate of 
 ivory sendeth forth the falser dreams. 
 
 But we have now concluded that gene- 
 ral part of human philosophy, which con- 
 templated! man segregate, and as he con- 
 sisted! of body and spirit. Wherein we 
 may farther note, that there seemeth to be 
 a relation or conformity between the good 
 of the mind and the good of the body. 
 For as we divided the good of the body 
 into health, beauty, strength, and pleasure ; 
 so the good of the mind, inquired in ra- 
 tional and moral knowledges, tendeth to this, 
 to make the mind sound, and without per- 
 turbation ; beautiful, and graced with de- 
 cency ; and strong and agile for all duties 
 of life. These three, as in the body, so 
 in the mind, seldom meet, and commonly 
 sever. For it is easy to observe, that many 
 have strength of wit and courage ; but have 
 neither health from perturbations, nor any 
 beauty or decency in their doings : some 
 again have an elegancy and fineness of car- 
 riage ; which have neither soundness of 
 
358 
 
 honesty, nor substance of sufficiency : and 
 some again have honest and reformed minds ; 
 that can neither become themselves, nor 
 manage business. And sometimes two of 
 them meet, and rarely all three. As for 
 pleasure, we have likewise determined that 
 the mind ought not to be reduced to stu- 
 pidity, but to retain pleasure ; confined ra- 
 ther in the subject of it, than in the strength 
 and vigour of it. 
 
 CIVIL KNOWLEDGE. 
 
 Civil Knowledge is conversant about a 
 subject which of all others is most immersed 
 in matter, and hardliest reduced to axiom. 
 Nevertheless, as Cato the censor said, " that 
 " the Romans were like sheep, for that a 
 " man might better drive a flock of them, 
 " than one of them ; for in a flock, if you 
 " could get but some few to go right, the rest 
 " would follow :K so in that respect moral 
 philosophy is more difficult than policy. 
 Again, moral philosophy propoundeth to 
 
3.59 
 
 itself the framing of internal goodness ; but 
 civil knowledge requireth only an external 
 goodness ; for that as to society sufficeth. 
 And therefore it cometh oft to pass that 
 there be evil times in good governments : 
 for so we find in the holy story, when the 
 kings were good ; yet it is added, Sed adhuc 
 populus non direxerat cor suum ad Domimtm 
 Deum patrum suorum. Again, states, as great 
 engines, move slowly, and are not so soon 
 put out of frame : for as in Egypt the seven 
 good years sustained the seven bad ; so go- 
 vernments, for a time well grounded, do 
 bear out errors following : but the resolu- 
 tion of particular persons is more sud- 
 denly subverted. These respects do some- 
 what qualify the extreme difficulty of civil 
 knowledge. 
 
 This knowledge hath three parts, accord- Ift three 
 ing to the three summary actions of so- parts * 
 ciety ; which are Conversation, Negotiation, 
 and Government. For man seeketh in 
 society comfort, use, and protection : and 
 they be three wisdoms of divers natures, 
 which do often sever ; wisdom of behavi- 
 our, wisdom of business, and wisdom of 
 state. 
 
360 
 
 of conversa- The wisdom of Conversation ought not to 
 be over much affected, but much less de- 
 spised : for it hath not only an honor in 
 itself, but an influence also into business 
 and government. The poet saith, Nee vultu 
 destrue verba tuo. A man may destroy the 
 force of his words with his countenance : 
 so may he of his deeds, saith Cicero, re- 
 commending to his brother affability and 
 easy access, Nil interest habere ostium aper- 
 tum, vultum clausum. " It is nothing won 
 (i to admit men with an open door, and 
 " to receive them with a shut and reserved 
 " countenance." So, we see, Atticus, be- 
 fore the first interview between Caesar and 
 Cicero, the war depending, did seriously 
 advise Cicero touching the composing and 
 ordering of his countenance and gesture. 
 And if the government of the countenance 
 be of such effect, much more is that of 
 the speech, and other carriage appertaining 
 to conversation ; the true model whereof 
 seemeth to me well expressed by Livy, 
 though not meant for this purpose ; Ne 
 out arrogans videar, aut obnoxius ; quorum 
 alterum est alienee libertatis obliti, alterum 
 suce : " The sum of behaviour is to retain 
 
361 
 
 " a man^s own dignity, without intruding 
 " upon the liberty of others." On the other 
 side, if behaviour and outward carriage be 
 intended too much, first it may pass into 
 affectation, and then Quid deformius qudm 
 scenam in vitam transferre, to act a man's 
 life ? But although it proceed not to that 
 extreme, yet it consumeth time, and em- 
 ployeth the mind too much. And there- 
 fore as we use to advise young students from 
 company keeping, by saying, Amid fures 
 temporis ; so certainly the intending of the 
 discretion of behaviour is a great thief of 
 meditation. Again, such as are accomplished 
 in that form of urbanity please themselves 
 in it, and seldom aspire to higher virtue ; 
 whereas those that have defect in it do seek 
 comeliness by reputation ; for where repu- 
 tation is, almost every thing becometh ; but 
 where that is not, it must be supplied by 
 punctilios and compliments. Again, there 
 is no greater impediment of action than an 
 over-curious observance of decency, and the 
 guide of decency, which is time and season, 
 For as Solomon saith, Qui respicit ad ventos, 
 n on seminat ; et qui respicit ad nubes, non 
 
362 
 
 metet : a man must make his opportunity as 
 oft as find it. To conclude ; behaviour seemeth 
 to me as a garment of the mind, and to 
 have the conditions of a garment. For it 
 ought to be made in fashion ; it ought not 
 to be too curious ; it ought to be shaped so 
 as to set forth any good making of the mind, 
 and hide any deformity; and above all, it 
 ought not to be too straight, or restrained for 
 exercise or motion. But this part of civil 
 knowledge hath been elegantly handled, and 
 therefore I cannot report it for deficient. 
 „ 2 - . The wisdom touching Negotiation or Bu- 
 
 Of negotia- b & 
 
 tionorbusi- s i n ess hath not been hitherto collected into 
 writing, to the great derogation of learning, 
 and the professors of learning. For from 
 this root springeth chiefly that note or opi- 
 nion, which by us is expressed in adage to 
 this effect, '• that there is no great concur- 
 \ rence between learning and wisdom/ For 
 of the three wisdoms which we have set down 
 to pertain to civil life, for wisdom of beha- 
 viour, it is by learned men for the most 
 part despised, as an inferior to virtue, and 
 an enemy to mediation ; for wisdom of go- 
 vernment, they acquit themselves well when 
 
 a ess. 
 
363 
 
 they are called to it, but that happeneth to 
 few ; but for the wisdom of business, wherein 
 man's life is most conversant, there be no 
 books of it, except some few scattered adver- 
 tisements, that have no proportion to the 
 magnitude of this subject. For if books were 
 written of this, as the other, I doubt not but 
 learned men with mean experience, would far 
 excel men of long experience without learn- 
 ing, and outshoot them in theirown bow. 
 
 Neither needeth it at all to be doubted Custom of 
 
 the Romans. 
 
 that this knowledge should be so variable 
 as it falieth not under precept ; for it is 
 much less infinite than science of govern- 
 ment, which, we see, is laboured, and in 
 some part reduced. Of this wisdom, it 
 seemeth, some of the ancient Romans, in 
 the sagest and wisest times, were professors ; 
 for Cicero reporteth that it was then in 
 use for senators that had name and opinion 
 for general wise men, as Coruncanius, Cu- 
 rius, Laelius, and many others, to walk at 
 certain hours in the place, and to give au- 
 dience to those that would use their advice ; 
 and that the particular citizens would resort 
 unto them, and consult with them of the 
 
 ■ 
 
364 
 
 marriage of a daughter, or of the employ- 
 ing of a son, or of a purchase or bargain, 
 or of an accusation, and every other occa- 
 sion incident to man's life. So as there is a 
 wisdom of counsel and advice even in private 
 cases, arising out of an universal insight 
 into the affairs of the world ; which is used 
 indeed upon particular cases propounded, 
 but is gathered by general observation of 
 cases of like nature. For so we see in the 
 book which Q. Cicero writeth to his bro- 
 ther, De petitione consulatus, (being the only 
 book of business, that I know, written by 
 the ancients,) although it concerned a par- 
 ticular action then on foot, yet the sub- 
 stance thereof consisteth of many wise and 
 politic axioms, which contain not a tempo- 
 rary, but a perpetual direction in the case 
 of popular elections. 
 Aphorisms But chiefly we may see in those apho- 
 
 of Solomon. . , . •, «, i j . . 
 
 risms which have place amongst divine 
 writings, composed by Solomon the king, 
 {of whom the scriptures testify that his heart 
 was as the sands of the sea, encompassing 
 the world and all worldly matters,) we see, 
 I say, not a few profound and excellent 
 
365 
 
 cautions, precepts, positions, extending to 
 much variety of occasions ; whereupon we 
 will stay awhile, offering to consideration 
 some number of examples. 
 
 Sed et cunctis sermonibus qui dicuntur ne 
 accommodes aurem tuam, ne forte audias ser- 
 vum tuum maledicentem tibi. 
 
 Here is recommended the provident stay 
 of enquiry of that which we would be loth 
 to find : as it was judged great wisdom in 
 Pompeius. Magnus that he burned Sertorius's 
 papers unperused. 
 
 Vir sapiens, si cum stulto contenderit-, she 
 irascatur, sive rideat, non inveniet requiem. 
 
 Here is described the great disadvantage 
 which a wise man hath in undertaking a 
 lighter person than himself; which is such 
 an engagement as, whether a man turn the 
 matter to jest, or turn it to heat, or how- 
 soever he change copy, he can no ways quit 
 himself well of it. 
 
 Qui delicate d pueritia nutrit senium suum, 
 postea sentiet eum contumacem. 
 
 Here is signified that if a man begin too 
 high a pitch in his favours, it doth commonly 
 end in unkindness and unthankfulness. 
 
366 
 
 Vidlsti virum velocem in opere suo ; coram 
 regibus stabit, nee erit inter ignobiles. 
 
 Here is observed that of all virtues for 
 rising to honour quickness of dispatch is 
 the best ; for superiors many times love not 
 to have those they employ too deep or too 
 sufficient, but ready and diligent. 
 
 Vidi cunctos viventes qui ambulant sub sole, 
 cum adolescent e secundo qui consurgit pro eo. 
 
 Here is expressed that which was noted 
 by Sylla first, and after him by Tiberius; 
 Plures adorant solem orientem qudm occiden- 
 tem vel meridianum. 
 
 Si spiritus potestatem habentis ascendent 
 super te, locum tuum ne dimiseris, quia cu- 
 ratio faciei cessare peccata jnaxima. 
 
 Here caution is given that upon displea- 
 sure retiring is of all courses the unfittest ; fo>* 
 a man leaveth things at worst, and depriveth 
 himself of means to make them better, 
 
 Erat civitas parva, et pauci in ea viri ; venit 
 contra earn rex magnus, et vadavit earn, instruxit- 
 que munitiones per gyrum, et perfect a est obsidio ; 
 inventusque est in ea vir pauper et sapiens, et 
 liber avit earn per sapientiam suam ; et nullus 
 deinceps recordatus est hominis illius pauperis. 
 
367 
 
 Here the corruption of states is set forth, 
 that esteem not virtue or merit longer than 
 they have use of it. 
 
 Mollis responsio frangit iram. 
 
 Here is noted that silence or rough answer 
 exasperateth ; but an answer present and tem- 
 perate pacifieth. 
 
 Iter pigrorum quasi sepes spinarum. 
 
 Here is lively represented how laborious 
 sloth proveth in the end; for when things 
 are deferred to the last instant, and nothing 
 prepared beforehand, every step findeth a 
 brier or an impediment, which catcheth or 
 stoppeth. 
 
 Melior est finis orationis qudm principium. 
 
 Here is taxed the vanity of formal speakers, 
 that study more about prefaces and induce- 
 ments than upon the conclusions and issues 
 of speech. 
 
 Qui cognoscit injudiciofaciem, non benefacit; 
 iste et pro buccella panis deseret veritatem. 
 
 Here is noted that a judge were better be 
 a briber than a respecter of persons ; for a 
 corrupt judge offendeth not so lightly as a 
 facile. 
 
368 
 
 Vir pauper calumnians pauperes similis est 
 imbri vehementi in quo par atur fames. 
 
 Here is expressed the extremity of neces- 
 sitous extortions, figured in the ancient fable 
 of the full and the hungry horse -leech. 
 
 Fons turbatus pede, et vena corrupt a, est Justus 
 cadens coram impio, 
 
 Here is noted that one judicial and ex- 
 emplar iniquity in the face of the world 
 doth trouble the fountains of justice more 
 than many particular injuries passed over 
 by connivance. 
 
 Qui subtrahit aliquid a patre et a matre, et 
 dicit hoc non esse peccaium, particeps est ho- 
 micidii. 
 
 Here is noted that whereas men in wrong - 
 ing their best friends use to extenuate their 
 fault, as if they might presume or be bold 
 upon them, it doth contrariwise indeed ag- 
 gravate their fault, and turneth it from in- 
 jury to impiety. 
 
 Noli esse amicus homini iracundo, nee ambu- 
 lato cum homine furioso. 
 
 Here caution is given that in the election 
 of our friends we do principally avoid those 
 
y(k) 
 
 which are impatient, as those that will 
 espouse us to many factions and quarrels. 
 
 Qui conturbat domwn suam, possidebit ventum. 
 
 Here is noted that in domestical separa- 
 tions and breaches men do promise to them- 
 selves quieting of their mind and content- 
 ment ; but still they are deceived of their ex- 
 pectation, and it turneth to wind. 
 
 Filius sapiens Icetificat pair em : films vero 
 stultus mcestitia es matri suce. 
 
 Here is distinguished that fathers have 
 most comfort of the good proof of their sons, 
 but mothers have most discomfort of their ill 
 proof; because women have little discerning 
 of virtue, but of fortune. 
 
 Qui cdat delictum, qucerit amicitiam ; sed qui 
 altere sermone repetit, separat fcederatos. 
 
 Here caution is given that reconcilement 
 is better managed by an amnesty, and pass- 
 ing over that which is past, than by apologies 
 and excusations. 
 
 In omni opere bono erit abundantia ; ubi autem 
 verba sunt plurima, ibi frequenter egestas. 
 
 Here is noted that words and discourse 
 abound most where there is idleness and 
 want. 
 
 B B 
 
370 
 
 .Primus in sua causa Justus; sed venit altera 
 pars, et inquirit in eum. 
 
 Here is observed that in all causes the first 
 tale possesseth much, in such sort, that the 
 prejudice thereby wrought will be hardly re- 
 moved, except some abuse or falsity in the 
 information be detected. 
 
 Verba bilinguis quasi simplicia, et ipsa per - 
 veniunt ad interior a ventris. 
 
 Here is distinguished that flattery and in- 
 sinuation, which seemeth set and artifi- 
 cial, si nketh not far; but that entereth deep 
 which hath shew of nature, liberty, and sim- 
 plicity. 
 
 Qui erudit derisorem? ipse sibi injuriam facit ; 
 et qui arguit impiiwi, sibi maculam general. 
 
 Here caution is given how we tender re- 
 prehension to arrogant and scornful natures, 
 whose manner is to esteem it for contumely, 
 and accordingly to return it. 
 Da sapienti occasionem, et addetur et sapientia. 
 
 Here is distinguished the wisdom brought 
 into habit, and that which is verbal, and 
 swimming only in conceit; for the one upon 
 the occasion presented is quickened and re- 
 doubled, the other is amazed and confused. 
 
37 1 
 
 JZuomodo in aquis resplendent vultus prospi- 
 cientium, sic corda hominum manifesto, sunt pru- 
 dentibus. 
 
 Here the mind of a wise man is compared 
 to a glass, wherein the images of all diver- 
 sity of natures and customs are represented, 
 from which representation proceedeth that 
 application, 
 
 Qui sap it, innumeris moribus aptus erit. 
 
 Thus have I staid somewhat longer upon 
 these sentences politic of Solomon than is 
 agreeable to the proportion of an example ; 
 led with a desire to give authority to this 
 part of knowledge, which I noted as deficient, 
 by so excellent a precedent ; and have also 
 attended them with brief observations, such 
 as to my understanding offer no violence to 
 the sense, though I know they may be ap- 
 plied to a more divine use : but it is allowed 
 even in divinity that some interpretations, 
 yea and some writings, have more of the 
 eagle than others ; but taking them as in- 
 structions for life, they might have received 
 large discourse, if I would have broken them 
 and illustrated them by deducements and ex- 
 amples. 
 
 bb2 
 
372 
 Antiquity Neither was this in use only with the He* 
 
 and use of 
 
 aphorisms, brews, but it is generally to be found in the 
 wisdom of the more ancient times ; that as 
 men found out any observation that they 
 thought was good for life, they would gather 
 it and express it in parable, or aphorism, or 
 fable. But for fables, they were vicegerents 
 and supplies where examples failed: now 
 that the times abound with history, the aim 
 is better when the mark is alive. And there- 
 fore the form of writing, which of all others 
 is the fittest for this variable argument of ne- 
 gotiation and occasion, is that which Machia* 
 vel chose wisely and aptly for government ; 
 namely, discourse upon histories or exam- 
 ples: for knowledge drawn freshly, and in 
 our view, out of particulars, knoweth the way 
 best to particulars again * and it hath much 
 greater life for practice when the discourse 
 attendeth upon the example, than when the 
 example attendeth upon the discourse. For 
 this is no point of order, as it seemeth at 
 first, but of substance : for when the exam- 
 ple is the ground, being set down in an his- 
 tory at large, it is set down with all circum- 
 stances, which may sometimes control the 
 
373 
 
 discourse thereupon made, and sometimes 
 supply it as a very pattern for action; 
 whereas the examples alledged for the dis- 
 course's sake are cited succinctly, and with- 
 out particularity, and carry a servile aspect 
 toward the discourse which they are brought 
 in to make good. 
 
 But this difference is not amiss to be re- Use of Let- 
 
 ters above 
 
 membered, that as history of times is the best either chr °- 
 
 J nicies Qr 
 
 ground for discourse of government, such as Lives » 
 Machiavel handleth, so history of lives is the 
 most proper for discourse of business, because 
 it is more conversant in private actions. 
 Nay, there is a ground of discourse for this 
 purpose fitter than them both, which is dis- 
 course upon letters; such as are wise and 
 weighty, as many are of Cicero ad Atticum, 
 and others. For letters have a great and 
 more particular representation of business 
 than either chronicles or lives. Thus have 
 we spoken both of the matter and form of 
 this part of civil knowledge, touching nego- 
 tiation, which we note to be deficient. 
 
 But yet there is another part of this part, Difference 
 
 of wisdom in 
 
 which dilFereth as much from that whereof counsel and 
 
 in conduct, 
 
 we have spoken as sapere and sibi say ere; 
 
>?4 
 
 the one moving as it were to the circumfer- 
 ence, the other to the centre: for there is a 
 wisdom of counsel, and again there is a wis- 
 dom of pressing a man's own fortune; and 
 they do sometimes meet, and often sever: 
 for many are wise in their own ways that 
 are weak for government or counsel ; like 
 ants, which are wise creatures for them- 
 selves, but very hurtful for the garden. This 
 wisdom the Romans did take much know- 
 ledge of: Nam pol sapiens, saith the comical 
 poet, fingit fortunam sibi; and it grew to an 
 adage, Faber quisque fortunes proprice : and 
 Livy attributeth it to Gato the first, in hoc 
 viro tanta vis animi et ingenii incrat ut quocun- 
 que loco natus esset, sibi ipse fortunam facturus 
 videretur. 
 
 This conceit or position, if it be too much 
 declared and professed, hath been thought a 
 thing impolitic and unlucky, as was observed 
 in Timotheus the Athenian ; who having done 
 many great services to the estate in his go- 
 vernment, and giving an account thereof to 
 the people, as the manner was, did conclude 
 every particular with this clause, " and in 
 this fortune had no part." And it came to 
 
37«5 
 
 pass that he never prospered in any thing he 
 took in hand afterwards ; for this is too high 
 and too arrogant, savouring of that which 
 Ezekiel saith of Pharaoh, Bids, Fluvius est 
 meus, et ego feci memetipsum ; or of that which 
 another prophet speaketh, that men offer-sacri- 
 fices to their nets and snares; and that which 
 the poet expresseth, 
 
 Dextra mihi Deas,et telum, quod missile libro, 
 
 Nunc ads hit : 
 for these confidences were ever unhallowed, 
 and unblessed : and therefore those that were 
 great politicians indeed ever ascribed their 
 successes to their felicity, and not to their 
 skill or virtue. For so Sylla surnamed him^ 
 self Felix not Magnus : so Ceesar said to the 
 master of the ship, Ccesarem portas etfortunam 
 ejus. ' 
 
 But yet nevertheless these positions, Faber 
 quisque fortune suaz : Sapiens dominabitur as* 
 tris: Invia virtuti nulla est via, and the like, 
 being taken and used as spurs to industry; 
 and not as stirrups to insolency, rather for 
 resolution than for presumption or outward 
 declaration, have been ever thought sound 
 and good; and are, no question, imprinted 
 
376 
 
 in the greatest minds, who are so sensible of 
 this opinion, as they can scarce contain it 
 within : As we see in Augustus Caesar, (who 
 was rather diverse from his uncle, than inferior 
 in virtue,) how when he died, he desired his 
 friends about him to give him a Plaudite, as if 
 he were conscious to himself that he had 
 played his part well upon the stage. 
 o/pruden- This part of knowledge we do report also 
 
 tial wisdom ° 
 
 or the art of a s deficient ; not but that it is practised too 
 
 rising in the. x 
 
 world. much, but it hath not been reduced to writ* 
 
 ing. And therefore lest it should seem to 
 any that it is not comprehensible by axiom, 
 it is requisite, as we did in the former, that 
 we set down some heads or passages of it. 
 
 Wherein it may appear at the first a new 
 and unwonted argument to teach men how 
 to raise and make their fortune ; a doctrine 
 wherein every man perchance will be ready 
 to yield himself a disciple, till he seeth diffi- 
 culty : for fortune layeth as heavy imposi- 
 tions as virtue ; and it is as hard and severe 
 ft thing to be a true politician, as to be truly 
 moral. But the handling thereof concerneth 
 learning greatly, both in honour and in sub- 
 stance : in honour, because pragmatical men 
 
377 
 
 may wot go away with an opinion that learn- 
 ing is like a lark, that can mount, and sing, 
 and please herself, and nothing else ; but 
 may know that she holdeth as well of the 
 hawk, that can soar aloft, and can also de- 
 scend and strike upon the prey : in sub- 
 stance, because it is the perfect law of en- 
 quiry of truth, " that nothing be in the globe 
 " of matter, which should not be likewise 
 in the globe of chrystal, or form;" that is, 
 that there be not any thing in being and ac- 
 tion, which should not be drawn and col- 
 lected into contemplation and doctrine. Nei- 
 ther doth learning admire or esteem of this 
 architecture of fortune otherwise than as of 
 an inferior work: for no man's fortune can 
 be an end worthy of his being ; and many 
 times the worthiest men do abandon their 
 fortune willingly for better respects : but ne- 
 vertheless fortune, as an organ of virtue and 
 merit, deserveth the consideration. 
 
 First therefore, the precept which I con- The highest 
 ceive to be most summary towards the pre- ^aSt. ° f 
 vailing in fortune, is to obtain that window 
 which Momus did require ; who seeing in 
 the frame of man's heart such angles and re- 
 
373 
 
 cesses, found fault there was not a window 
 to look into them; that is to procure good 
 informations of particulars touching persons, 
 their natures, their desires and ends, their 
 customs and fashions, their helps and advan- 
 tages, and whereby they chiefly stand; so 
 again their weaknesses and disadvantages, 
 and where they lie most open and obnoxious ; 
 their friends, factions, and dependencies ; 
 and again their opposites, enviers, competi- 
 tors, their moods and times, Sola viri molles 
 aditus et tempora noras ; their principles, rules, 
 and observations, and the like ; and this not 
 only of persons, but of actions ; what are on 
 foot from time to time, and how they are 
 conducted, favoured, opposed, and how they 
 import, and the like. For the knowledge of 
 present actions is not only material in itself, 
 but without it also the knowledge of persons 
 is very erroneous : for men change with the 
 actions, and whilst they are in pursuit they 
 are one, and when they return to their na- 
 ture they are another. These informations 
 of particulars, touching persons and actions, 
 are as the minor propositions in every ac- 
 tive syllogism ; for no excellency of obser- 
 
370 
 
 vations, which are as the major propositions, 
 can suffice to ground a conclusion, if there 
 be error and mistaking in the minors. 
 
 That this knowledge is possible Solomon is 
 our surety ; who saith, Consilium in corde 
 viri tanquam aqua profunda, sed vir prudens 
 exhauriet Mud : And although the knowledge 
 itself falleth not under precept, because it is 
 of individuals, yet the instructions for the 
 obtaining of it may. 
 
 We will begin therefore with this pre- instructions 
 
 for obtaining 
 
 cent, according to the ancient opinion, that a knowledge 
 
 1 3 ° .:•■'-. of men. 
 
 the sinews of wisdom are slowness of belief 
 "and distrust : that more trust be given to 
 countenances and deeds than to words ; and 
 in words, rather to sudden passages and 
 surprised words than to set and purposed 
 words. Neither let that be feared which is 
 said, fronti nulla fides ; which is meant of a 
 general outward behaviour, and not of the 
 private and subtile motions and labours of 
 the countenance and gesture ; which, as Q. 
 Cicero elegantly saith, is animi janua, " the 
 " gate of the mind." None more close than 
 Tiberius, and yet Tacitus saith of Gallus, 
 JEtenim vultu offensionem conjectaverat. So 
 
380 
 
 again, noting the differing character and 
 manner of his commending Germanicus and 
 Drusus in the senate, he saith, touching his 
 fashion wherein he carried his speech of 
 Germanicus, thus ; Magis in speciem adorna* 
 tis verbis, qudm ut peniius sentire videretur ; 
 but of Drusus thus, Paucioribus, sed inten- 
 tior, et fidd oratione : and in another place, 
 speaking of his character of speech, when 
 he did any thing that was gracious and po- 
 pular, he saith, that in other things he was 
 velut eluctantiiim verborum : but then again, 
 solutius zero loquebatur quando subveniret. So 
 that there is no such artificer of dissimu- 
 lation, nor no such commanded countenance, 
 vultus jussus, that can sever from a feigned 
 tale some of these fashions, either a more 
 slight and careless fashion, or more set and 
 formal, or more tedious and wandering, or 
 coming from a man more drily and hardly, 
 of Deeds. Neither are deeds such assured pledges, 
 
 as that they may be trusted without a ju- 
 dicious consideration of their magnitude and 
 nature : Fraus sibi in parvis Jidem prxstruit, 
 ut majore emolumento fallat : and the Italian 
 thinketh himself upon the point to be bought 
 
381 
 
 and sold, when he is better used than he 
 was wont to be, without manifest cause. For 
 small favours, they do but lull men asleep, 
 both as to caution and as to industry, and 
 are, as Demosthenes calleth them, Alimeiita 
 socordice. So again we see how false the nature 
 of some deeds are, in that particular which 
 Mutianus practised upon Antonius Primus, 
 upon that hollow and unfaithful reconcile- 
 ment which was made between them : where- 
 upon Mutianus advanced many of the friends 
 of Antonius : simul amicis ejus prctfecturas et 
 tribunatus largitur : wherein, under pretence 
 to strengthen him, he did desolate him, and 
 won from him his dependences. 
 
 As for words, though they be like waters of Words. 
 to physicians, full of flattery and uncer- 
 tainty, yet they are not to be despised, spe- 
 cially with the advantage of passion and 
 affection. For so we see Tiberius, upon a 
 stinging and incensing speech of Agrippina, 
 came a step forth of his dissimulation, when 
 he said, " You are hurt, because you do 
 " not reign ;" of which Tacitus saith, Audita 
 hcec raram occulti pectoris vocem elicuere, cor- 
 reptamque Grceco versu admonuit : ideo l<zdi, 
 
33% 
 
 quia non regnaret. And therefore the poet 
 doth elegantly call passions, tortures, that 
 urge men to confess their secrets : 
 
 Vino tortus et ira. 
 And experience sheweth, there are few men 
 so true to themselves and so settled, but that, 
 sometimes upon heat, sometimes upon bra- 
 very, sometimes upon kindness, sometimes 
 upon trouble of mind and weakness, they 
 open themselves ; specially if they be put 
 to it with a counter-dissimulation, accord- 
 ing to the proverb of Spain, Di mentira, 
 y sacams verdad, " Tell a lie, and find a 
 '{. truth;' 
 or knowing As f or t ne knowing of men, which is at 
 
 men by Re- ° ' 
 
 port., secondhand from reports ; men's weaknesses 
 
 and faults are best known from their ene- 
 mies, their virtues and abilities from their 
 friends, their customs and times from their 
 servants, their conceits and opinions from their 
 familiar friends, with whom they discourse 
 rnost. General fame is light, and the opi- 
 nions conceived by superiors or equals are 
 deceitful ; for to such men are more masked, 
 Verior fama e domesticis emanat. 
 , But the soundest disclosing and expound- 
 
SS3 
 ing\ of men is by their natures and ends ; Different 
 
 . Tests to try 
 
 wherein the weakest sort of men are best the wise and 
 
 the weak. 
 
 interpreted by their natures, and the wisest 
 by their ends. For it was both pleasantly 
 and wisely said, though I think very un- 
 truly, by a nuncio of the pope, returning 
 from a certain nation where he served as 
 lieger ; whose opinion being asked touching 
 the appointment of one to go in his place, 
 he wished that in any case they did not 
 send one that was too wise ; because no very 
 wise man would ever imagine what they in 
 that country were like to do : and certainly 
 it is an error frequent for men to shoot over, 
 and to suppose deeper ends, and more com- 
 pass-reaches than are : the Italian proverb 
 being elegant, and for the most part true, 
 Di danari, di senno, e di fede, 
 C'e ne manco che non credi : 
 " There is commonly less money, less wis- 
 " dom, and less good faith, than men do 
 11 account upon." 
 
 But princes, upon a far other reason, are Test of 
 best interpreted by their natures, and pri- priVa^raen. 
 vate persons by their ends: for princes be- 
 ing at the top of human desires, they have 
 
384 
 
 for the most part no particular ends whereto 
 they aspire, by distance from which a man 
 might take measure and scale of the rest 
 of their actions and desires ; which is one 
 of the causes that maketh their hearts more 
 inscrutable. Neither is it sufficient to in- 
 form ourselves in men's ends and natures, 
 of the variety of them only, but also of the 
 predominancy, what humour reigneth most, 
 and what end is principally sought. For so we 
 see, when Tigellinus saw himself out-stripped 
 by Petronius Turpilianus in Nero's humors 
 of pleasures, metus ejus rimatur, he wrought 
 upon Nero's fears, whereby he broke the 
 other's neck. 
 Three Rules But to all this part of enquiry the most 
 b^obierved. compendious way resteth in three things : 
 the first, to have general acquaintance and 
 inwardness with those which have general ac- 
 quaintance and look most into the world; and 
 especially according to the diversity of busi- 
 ness, and the diversity of persons, to have pri- 
 vacy and conversation with some one friend 
 at least, which is perfect and well intelligenced 
 in every several kind. The second is, to keep 
 a good mediocrity in liberty of speech and 
 
385 
 
 secrecy : in most things liberty ; secrecy 
 where it importeth : for liberty of speech 
 inviteth and provoketh liberty to be used 
 again, and so bringeth much to a man's 
 knowledge ; and secrecy, on the other side, 
 nducetli trust and inwardness. The last is 
 the reducing of a man's self to this watchful 
 and serene habit, as to make account and 
 purpose, in every conference and action, as 
 well to observe as to act. For as Epicteius 
 would have a philosopher in every particu- 
 lar action to say to himself, Et hoc volo x 
 et etiam institutum servare ; so a politic man 
 in every thing should say to himself, Et 
 hoc volo, ac etiam aliquid addiscere. I have 
 stayed the longer upon this precept of ob- 
 taining good information, because it is a 
 main part by itself, which answereth to all 
 the rest. But above all things caution must 
 be taken that men have a good stay and hold 
 of themselves, and that this much knowing 
 do not draw on much meddling ; for nothing 
 is more unfortunate than light and rash in- 
 termeddling in many matters. So that this 
 variety of knowledge tendeth in conclusion 
 but only to this, to make a better and freer 
 c c 
 
386 
 
 How men 
 should exa- 
 mine and 
 learn to un- 
 derstand 
 themselves* 
 
 choice of those actions which may concern 
 us, and to conduct them with the less error 
 and the more dexterity. 
 
 The second precept concerning this know- 
 ledge, is for men to make good information 
 touching their own persons, and well to 
 understand themselves : knowing that, as 
 St. James saith, though men look oft in 
 a glass, yet they do suddenly forget them- 
 selves ; wherein as the divine glass is the 
 word of God, so the politic glass is the state 
 of the world, or times wherein we live, in 
 the which we are to behold ourselves. 
 
 For men ought to take an impartial view 
 of their own abilities and virtues ; and again 
 of their wants and impediments; account- 
 ing these with the most, and those other 
 with the least ; and from this view and 
 examination to frame the considerations 
 following. 
 
 First, to consider how the constitution 
 of their nature sorteth with the general 
 state of the times; which if they find agree- 
 able and fit, then in all things to give them- 
 selves more scope and liberty ; but if dif- 
 fering and dissonant^ then in the whole 
 
387 
 
 course of their life to be more close, re- 
 tired, and reserved : as we see in Tiberius, 
 who was never seen at a play, and came 
 not into the senate in twelve of his last 
 years ; whereas Augustus Csesar lived ever 
 in men's eyes, which Tacitus observeth ; 
 Alia Tiberio morum via. 
 
 Secondly, to consider how their nature 
 sorteth with professions and courses of life, 
 and accordingly to make election, if they 
 be free; and, if engaged, to make the de- 
 parture at the first opportunity : as we see 
 was done by duke Valentine, that was de- 
 signed by his father to a sacerdotal pro- 
 fession, but quitted it soon after in regard 
 of his parts and inclination; being such 
 nevertheless as a man cannot tell well whe- 
 ther they were worse for a prince or for a 
 priest. 
 
 Thirdly, to consider how they sort with 
 those whom they are like to have compe- 
 titors and concurrents ; and to take that 
 course wherein there is most solitude, and 
 themselves like to be most eminent : as Julius 
 Caesar did, who at first was an orator or 
 pleader; but when he saw the excellency of 
 c c 2 
 
38& 
 
 Cicero, Hortensius, Catulus, and others, for 
 eloquence, and saw there was no man of 
 reputation for the wars but Pompeius, upon 
 whom the state was forced to rely, he forsook 
 his course began toward a civil and popu- 
 lar greatness, and transferred his designs to 
 a martial greatness. 
 
 Fourthly, in the choice of their friends 
 and dependences, to proceed according to 
 the composition of their own nature ; as we 
 may see in Caesar ; all whose friends and 
 followers were men active and effectual, but 
 not solemn, or of reputation. 
 
 Fifthly, to take special heed how they guide 
 themselves by examples, in thinking they can 
 do as they see others do; whereas perhaps 
 their natures and carriages are far differ- 
 ing. In which error it seemeth Pompey 
 was, of whom Cicero saith, that he was wont 
 often to say, Sylla potuit, ego non potero f 
 Wherein he was much abused ; the natures 
 and proceedings of himself and his exam- 
 ple being the unlikest in the world ; the one 
 being fierce, violent, and pressing the fact j 
 the other solemn, and full of majesty and cir- 
 cumstance ; and therefore the less effectual. 
 
389 
 
 But this precept touching the politic 
 "knowledge of ourselves/ hath many other 
 branches whereupon we cannot insist. 
 
 Next to the well understanding and dis- How men 
 
 should open 
 
 cerning of a man's self, there followeth the and reveal 
 
 # themselves, 
 
 well opening and revealing a man's self; 
 wherein we see nothing more usual than 
 for the more able man to make the less 
 shew. For there is a great advantage in 
 the well setting forth of a man's virtues,, 
 fortunes, merits ; and again, in the artificial 
 covering of a man's weaknesses, defects, dis- 
 graces ; staying upon the one, sliding from 
 the other; cherishing the one by circum- 
 stances, gracing the other by exposition, and 
 the like ; wherein w T e see what Tacitus saith 
 of Mutianus, who w 7 as the greatest politician 
 of his time, Omnium quce dixerat feceratque 
 arte quadam ostentator ; which requireth in- 
 deed some art, lest it turn tedious and ar- 
 rogant ; but yet so, as ostentation, though 
 it be to the first degree of vanity, seemeth 
 to me rather a vice in manners than in 
 policy : for as it is said, Audacter calum- 
 niarc, semper aliquid hceret ; so, except it be 
 in a ridiculous degree of deformity, Audac* 
 
390 " 
 
 ter te vendita, semper aliquid hasreU For it 
 will stick with the more ignorant and in- 
 ferior sort of men, though men of wisdom 
 and rank do smile at it, and despise it; 
 and yet the authority won with many doth 
 countervail the disdain of a few. But if 
 it be carried with decency and government, 
 as with a natural, pleasant, and ingenuous 
 fashion ; or at times when it is mixed with 
 some peril and unsafety, as in military per- 
 sons ; or at times when others are most 
 envied ; or with easy and careless passage 
 to it and from it, without dwelling too long* 
 or being too serious; or with an equal 
 freedom of taxing a man's self, as well as 
 gracing himself; or by occasion of repelling 
 or putting down others injury or insolence; 
 it doth greatly add to reputation: and 
 surely not a few solid natures that want 
 this ventosity, and cannot sail in the height 
 of the winds, are not without some prejudice 
 and disadvantage by their moderation. 
 •How Virtue But for these flourishes and enhancements 
 
 is d is valued 
 
 -and imbased. of virtue, as they are not perchance unne- 
 cessary, so it is at least necessary that virtue 
 be not disvalued and imbased under the just 
 
391 
 price ; which is done in three manners : by 
 offering and obtruding a man's self; wherein 
 men think he is rewarded, when he is ac- 
 cepted : by doing too much ; which will 
 not give that which is well done leave to 
 settle, and in the end induceth satiety : and 
 by finding too soon the fruit of a man's 
 virtue, in commendation, applause, honour, 
 favour ; wherein if a man be pleased with 
 a little, let him hear what is truly said; 
 Cave ne insuetus rebus majoribus videaris, si 
 hcec te res parva sicuti magna delectat. 
 
 But the covering of defects is of no less How to co- 
 
 ver Defects 
 
 importance than the valuing of good parts : 
 which may be done likewise in three man- 
 ners, by caution, by colour, and by con- 
 fidence. Caution is, when men do inge- 
 niously and discreetly avoid to be put into 
 those things for which they are not proper : 
 whereas contrariwise, bold and unquiet spi- 
 rits will thrust themselves into matters with- 
 out difference, and so publish and proclaim 
 all their wants: colour is, when men make 
 a way for themselves, to have a construc- 
 tion made of their faults or wants, as 
 proceeding from a better cause, or intended 
 
392 
 
 for some other purpose : for of the one it 
 is well said, 
 
 ScBpe latet vitium proximitate boni. 
 and therefore whatsoever want a man hath, 
 he must see that he pretend the virtue 
 that shadoweth it; as if he be dull, he 
 must affect gravity : if a coward, mildness ; 
 and so the rest : for the second, a man must 
 frame some probable cause why he should 
 not do his best ; and why he should dissem- 
 ble his abilities ; and for that purpose must 
 use to dissemble those abilities which are 
 notorious in him, to give colour that his 
 true wants are but industries and dissi- 
 mulations. For confidence, it is the last 
 but surest remedy ; namely, to depress 
 and seem to despise whatsoever a man 
 cannot attain ; observing the good principle 
 of the merchants, who endeavour to raise 
 the price of their own commodities, and to 
 beat down the price of others. But there 
 is a confidence that passeth this other ; 
 which is, to face out a man's own defects, 
 in seeming to conceive that he is best in 
 those things wherein he is failing ; and, 
 to help that again, to seem on the other 
 
393 
 
 side that he hath least opinion of himself 
 in those things wherein he is best ; like 
 as we shall see it commonly in poets, that 
 if they shew their verses, and you except 
 to any, they will say, " that that line cost 
 
 them more labour than any of the rest ;" 
 and presently will seem to disable and sus- 
 pect rather some other line, which they know 
 well enough to be the best in the number. 
 But above all, in this righting and helping 
 of a man's self in his own carriage, he 
 must take heed he shew not himself dis- 
 mantled, and exposed to scorn and injury, 
 by too much sweetness, goodness, and faci- 
 lity of nature ; but shew some sparkles of 
 liberty, spirit, and edge : which kind of 
 fortified carriage, with a ready rescuing of a 
 man's self from scorns, is sometimes of ne- 
 cessity imposed upon men by somewhat iri 
 their person or fortune ; but it ever suc- 
 ceedeth with good felicity. 
 
 Another precept of this knowledge is, by of Pliancy 
 
 r r & J and Versati. 
 
 all possible endeavour to frame the mind lit; y« 
 to be pliant and obedient to occasion ; for 
 nothing hindereth men's fortunes so much 
 as this ; Idem manebat, neque idem decebat ; 
 men are where they were, when occasions 
 
394 
 
 turn : and therefore to Cato, whom Livy 
 maketh such an architect of fortune, he 
 addeth, that he had versatile ingeniwn. And 
 thereof it cometh that these grave solemn 
 wits, which must be like themselves, and 
 cannot make departures, have more dignity 
 than felicity. But in some it is nature to 
 be somewhat viscous and inwrapped, and 
 not easy to turn : in some it is a conceit, 
 that is almost a nature, which is, that men 
 can hardly make themselves believe that 
 they ought to change their course, when 
 they have found good by it in former ex- 
 perience. For Machiavel noteth wisely, how 
 Fabius Maximus w r ould have been tempo- 
 rizing still, according to his old bias, when 
 the nature of the war was altered, and re- 
 quired hot pursuit. In some other it is 
 want of point and penetration in their judg- 
 ment, that they do not discern when things 
 have a period, but come in too late after 
 the occasion ; as Demosthenes compareth 
 the people of Athens to country fellows, 
 when they play in a fence school that if 
 they have a blow, then they remove the 
 w r eapon to that ward, and not before. In 
 some other it is a lothness to lose labours 
 
395 
 
 passed, and a conceit that they can bring 
 about occasions to their ply ; and yet in 
 the end, when they see no other remedy, 
 then they come to it with disadvantage : 
 as Tarquinius, that gave for the third part 
 of Sibylla's books the treble price, when he 
 might at first have had all three for the 
 simple. But from whatsoever root or cause 
 this restiveness of mind proceedeth, it is a 
 thing most prejudicial ; and nothing is more 
 politic than to make the wheels of our mind 
 concentric and voluble with the wheels of 
 fortune. 
 
 Another precept of this knowledge, which of the mode. 
 hath some affinity with that we last spoke of, occasions. 
 but with difference, is that which is well ex- 
 pressed, fatis accede deisque; that men do not 
 only turn with the occasions, but also run 
 with the occasions, and not strain their cre- 
 dit or strength to over-hard or extreme 
 points; but choose in their actions that 
 which is most passable : for this will preserve 
 men from foil, not occupy them too much 
 about one matter, win opinion of modera- 
 tion, please the most, and make a shew of a 
 perpetual felicity in all they undertake ; 
 
Of making 
 and follow- 
 ing occa- 
 sions. 
 
 S96 
 
 which cannot but mightily increase reputa* 
 tion. 
 
 Another part of this knowledge seemeth to 
 have some repugnancy with the former two, 
 but not as I understand it; and it is that 
 which Demosthenes uttereth in high terms; 
 Et quemadmodum receptum est, ut exercitum 
 ducat imperator, sic et a cordatis viris res ipsce 
 ducendce; ut qua, ipsis videntur, ea gerantur, et 
 nan ipsi eventus tantum persequi cogantur. For, 
 if we observe, we shall find two differing 
 kinds of sufficiency in managing of business : 
 some can make use of occasions aptly and 
 dextrously, but plot little ; some can urge 
 and pursue their own plots well, but cannot 
 accommodate nor take in; either of which is 
 very imperfect without the other. 
 
 Another part of this knowledge is the ob- 
 and openness. servm g a good mediocrity in the declaring, 
 or not declaring a man's self: for although 
 depth of secrecy, and making way, qualis est 
 via navis in mari, (which the French calleth 
 gourdes menees, when men set things in work 
 without opening themselves at all,) be some- 
 times both prosperous and admirable, yet 
 
 Of reserve 
 
397: 
 
 many times Dissimuldtio errores parit, qui dis~ 
 simulatorem ipsum illaqueant. And therefore> 
 we see the greatest politicians have in a na- 
 tural and free manner professed their desires, 
 rather than been reserved and disguised in 
 them : for so we see that Lucius Sylla made 
 a kind of profession, " that he wished all 
 men happy or unhappy, as they stood his 
 <c friends or enemies." So Caesar, when he 
 first went into Gaul, made no scruple to pro- 
 fess, " that he had rather be first in a village, 
 " than second at Rome," So again, as soon 
 as he had begun the war, we see what Cicero 
 saith of him, Alter (meaning of Caesar) non 
 recusat, sed quodammodo postulat ut, ut est, sic 
 appelletur tyrannies. So we may see in a letter 
 of Cicero to Atticus, that Augustus Caesar., 
 in his very entrance into affairs, when he 
 was a darling of the senate, yet in his ha- 
 rangues to the people would swear, — Ita pa- 
 rends honores consequi liceat, which was no 
 less than the tyranny ; save that, to help it, 
 he would stretch forth his hand towards a 
 statue of Caesar's, that was erected in the 
 place : and men laughed, and wondered, and 
 said, — Is it possible, or did you ever hear 
 
593 
 
 the like ? and yet thought he meant no hurt ; 
 he did it so handsomely and ingenuously. 
 And all these were prosperous : whereas Pom- 
 pey, who tended to the same end, but in a 
 more dark and dissembling 1 manner, (as Ta- 
 citus saith of him, Occultior, non melior, 
 wherein Sallust concurreth, ore probo, ammo 
 inverecundo,) made it his design, by infinite 
 secret engines, to cast the state into an abso- 
 lute anarchy and confusion that the state 
 might cast itself into his arms for necessity 
 and protection, and so the sovereign power 
 be put upon him, and he never seen in it : 
 and when he had brought it, as he thought, 
 to that point when he was chosen consul 
 alone, as never any was, yet he could make 
 no great matter of it, because men under- 
 stood him not ; but was fain in the end to go 
 the beaten track of getting arms into his 
 hands, by colour of the doubt of Csesar's de- 
 signs: so tedious, casual, and unfortunate 
 are these deep dissimulations; whereof, it 
 seemeth, Tacitus made this judgment, that 
 they were a cunning of an inferior form in 
 regard of true policy ; attributing the one to 
 Augustus, the other to Tiberius, where, 
 
399 
 
 speaking of Li via, he saith, Et cum artibus 
 mariti simulatione filii bene composita ; for 
 surely the continual habit of dissimulation is 
 but a weak and sluggish cunning, and not 
 greatly politic. 
 
 Another precept of this architecture of of the pro. 
 
 A portion and 
 
 fortune is to accustom our minds to iud^e of valueof 
 
 & things to par- 
 
 the proportion or value of things, as they ticuiar ends. 
 eonduce and are material to our particular 
 ends ; and that to do substantially and not 
 superficially. For we shall find the logical 
 part, as I may term it, of some men's minds 
 good, but the mathematical part erroneous ; 
 that is, they can well judge of consequences, 
 but not of porportions and comparisons, 
 preferring things of shew and sense before 
 things of substance and effect. So some fall 
 in love with access to princes, others with 
 popular fame and applause, supposing they 
 are things of great purchase ; when in many 
 cases they are but matters of envy, peril, and 
 impediment. 
 
 So some measure things according to the 
 labor and difficulty, or assiduity, which are 
 spent about them ; and think if they be ever 
 moving, that they must needs advance and 
 

 400 
 
 proceed : as Caesar saith in a despising man* 
 ner of Cato the second, when he describeth 
 how laborious and indefatigable he was to no 
 great purpose ; Htfc omnia magno studio age* 
 bat. So in most things men are ready to 
 abuse themselves in thinking the greatest 
 means to be best, when it should be the 
 fittest. 
 of marshal- As for the true marshalling of men's pur- 
 pursuits. suits towards their fortune, as they are more 
 or less material, I hold them to stand 
 thus : first, the amendment of their own 
 minds ; for the remove of the impediments 
 of the mind will sooner clear the pas- 
 sages of fortune, than the obtaining for- 
 tune will remove the impediments of the 
 mind, In the second place I set down wealth 
 and means; which I know most men would 
 have placed first, because of the general use 
 which it beareth towards all variety of occa- 
 sions : but that opinion I may condemn with 
 like reason as Machiavel doth that other, that 
 moneys were the sinews of the wars; where- 
 as, saith he, the true sinews of the wars are 
 the sinews of men's arms, that is, a valiant* 
 populous, and military nation : and he vouch., 
 
401 
 
 eth aptly the authority of Solon who, when 
 Croesus shewed him his treasury of gold, said 
 to him, that if another came that had better 
 iron, he would be master of his gold. In 
 like manner it may be truly affirmed that it 
 is not moneys that are the sinews of fortune, 
 but it is the sinews and steel of men's minds, 
 wit, courage, audacity, resolution, temper, 
 industry, and the like. In the third place I 
 set down reputation, because of the peremp- 
 tory tides and currents it hath; which, if 
 they be not taken in their due time, are sel- 
 dom recovered, it being extreme hard to 
 play an after-game of reputation. And lastly 
 I place honour, which is more easily won 
 by any of the other three, much more by 
 all, than any of them can be purchased by 
 honour. 
 
 To conclude this precept, as there is order 
 and priority in matter, so is there in time, 
 the preposterous placing whereof is one of 
 the commonest errors ; while men fly to their 
 ends when they should intend their begin- 
 nings, and do not take things in order of 
 time as they come on, but marshal them ac- 
 cording to greatness, and not according to 
 p p 
 
402 
 
 instance ; not observing the good preeept, 
 Quod nunc instat agamus. 
 
 Another precept of this knowledge is not 
 to embrace any matters which do occupy 
 too great a quantity of time, but to have 
 that sounding in a man's ears, Sedfugit in- 
 terea,fugit irreparabile tempus: and that is the 
 cause why those which take their course of 
 rising by professions of burden, as lawyers, 
 orators, painful divines, and the like, are 
 not commonly so politic for their own for- 
 tune, otherwise than in their ordinary way, 
 because they want time to learn particulars, 
 to wait occasions, and to devise plots. 
 To interlace Another precept of this knowledge is to 
 no? mind To imitate nature, which doth nothing in vain ; 
 ^ons seve- ^y c |i sure ly a man may do if he do well in- 
 terlace his business, and bend not his mind 
 too much upon that which he principally in- 
 tendeth. For a man ought in every particu- 
 lar action so to carry the motions of his mind, 
 and so to have one thing under another, as if 
 he cannot have that he seeketh in the best de- 
 gree, yet to have it in a second, or so in a 
 third : and if he can have no part of that 
 which he purposed, yet to turn the use of 
 
403 
 
 it to somewhat else ; and if he cannot make 
 any thing of it for the present, yet to make 
 it as a seed of somewhat in time to come ; 
 and if he can contrive no effect or substance 
 from it, yet to win some good opinion by it, 
 or the like. So that he should exact an ac- 
 count of himself of every action, to reap 
 somewhat, and not to stand amazed and con- 
 fused, if he fail of that he chiefly meant : 
 for nothing is more impolitic than to mind 
 actions wholly one by one ; for he that doth 
 so loseth infinite occasions which intervene, 
 and are many times more proper and propi- 
 tious for somewhat that he shall need after- 
 wards than for that which he urgeth for the 
 present; and therefore men must be perfect 
 in that rule, Hcec oportet facere, et ilia non 
 omittere. 
 
 Another precept of this knowledge is not To keep a re- 
 to engage a man's self peremptorily in any 
 thing, though it seem not liable to accident, 
 but ever to have a window to fly out at, or a 
 way to retire; following the wisdom in the 
 ancient fable of the two frogs, which consult- 
 ed when their plash was dry whither they 
 should go ; and the one moved to go down 
 pd2 
 
404 
 
 into a pit, because it was not likely the water 
 would dry there ; but the other answered, 
 " True, but if it do, how shall we get out 
 li again?" 
 To be cauti- Another precept of this knowledge is that 
 derate in " ancient precept of Bias, construed not to any 
 
 friendship. . n „ , . . . 
 
 point oi pertidiousness, but only to caution 
 and moderation, Et ama tanquam inimicus 
 futurus, et odi tanquam amaturus: for it utter- 
 ly betrayeth all utility for men to embark 
 themselves too far in unfortunate friendships, 
 troublesome spleens, and childish and hu- 
 morous envies or emulations. 
 importance But I continue this beyond the measure of 
 
 of these pre- 
 cepts, an example ; led, because I would not have 
 
 such knowledges, which I note as deficient, 
 to be thought things imaginative, or in the 
 air, or an observation or two much made of, 
 but things of bulk and mass, whereof an end 
 is hardlier made than a beginning. It must 
 be likewise conceived that in those points 
 which I mention and set down, they are far 
 from complete tractates of them, but only as 
 small pieces for patterns: and lastly, no 
 man, I suppose, will think that I mean for- 
 tunes are not obtained without all this ado ; 
 
405 
 
 for I know they come tumbling into some 
 men's laps ; and a number obtain good for- 
 tunes by diligence in a plain way, little in- 
 termeddling, and keeping themselves from 
 gross errors. 
 
 But as Cicero, when he setteth down an 
 idea of a perfect orator, doth not mean that 
 every pleader should be such ; and so like- 
 wise, when a prince or a courtier hath been 
 described by such as have handled those sub- 
 jects, the mould hath used to be made ac- 
 cording to the perfection of the art and not 
 according to common practice; so I under- 
 stand it, that it ought to be done in the de- 
 scription of a politic man, I mean politic for 
 his own fortune. 
 
 But it must be remembered all this while, of dishonest 
 that the precepts which we have set down are Arts ' 
 of that kind which may be counted and called 
 bonce artes. As for evil arts, if a man would 
 set down for himself that principle of Ma- 
 chiavel ; " that a man seek not to attain vir- 
 " tue itself, but the appearance only thereof; 
 " because the credit of virtue is a help, but 
 <* the use of it is cumber :" or that other of 
 his principles; " that he presuppose that 
 
406 
 
 i€ men are not filly to be wrought otherwise 
 iC but by fear ; and therefore that he seek to 
 ff have every man obnoxious, low, and in 
 " strait," which the Italians call seminar 
 spine, to sow thorns : or that other principle, 
 contained in the verse which Cicero citeth, 
 Cadant amici, dummodo inimici iutercidant, 
 as the Triumvirs, which sold, every one to 
 other, the lives of their friends for the deaths 
 of their enemies : or that other protestation 
 of L. Catilina, to set on fire and trouble 
 states, to the end to fish in droumy waters, 
 and to unwrap their fortunes, Ego, si quid in 
 fortunis meis excitatum sit incendium, id non 
 aqua, sed ruind restinguam: or that other 
 principle of Lysander, ci that children are 
 " to be deceived with comfits, and men with 
 (C oaths :" and the like evil and corrupt posi- 
 tions, whereof, as in all things, there are 
 more in number than of the good : certainly, 
 with these dispensations from the laws of 
 charity and integrity, the pressing of a man's 
 fortune may be more hasty and compendi- 
 ous. But it is in life as it is in ways, the 
 shortest way is commonly the foulest, and 
 surely the fairer way is not much about. 
 
407 
 But men, if they be in their own power, To observe 
 and do bear and sustain themselves, and be general' plan, 
 
 . -, . . , . ! but particular 
 
 not carried away with a whirlwind or tern- directions. 
 pest of ambition, ought, in the pursuit of 
 their own fortune, to set before their eyes 
 not only that general map of the world, that 
 all things are 'vanity and vexation of spirit, but 
 many other more particular cards and direc- 
 tions : chiefly that, — -that being, without 
 well-being, is a curse, — and the greater be- 
 ing the greater curse ; and that all virtue is 
 most rewarded, and all wickedness most 
 punished in itself: according as the poet 
 saith excellently : 
 
 Quce vobis, quce digna, viri, pro laudibus istis 
 Pmmia posse rear solvi f pulcherrima pri* 
 
 mum 
 Di moresque dabunt vestri. 
 And so of the contrary. And, secondly, To look up 
 
 , iii i i • to Provi- 
 
 they ought to look up to the eternal provi- dence. 
 dence and divine judgment, which often sub- 
 verteth the wisdom of evil plots and imagi- 
 nations, according to that Scripture, He hath 
 conceived mischief, and shall bring forth a vain 
 thing. And although men should refrain 
 themselves from injury and evil arts, yet this 
 
408 
 
 incessant and Sabbathless pursuit of a man J s 
 fortune leaveth not that tribute which we owe 
 to God of our time ; who we see, demandeth 
 a tenth of our substance, and a seventh, 
 which is more strict, of our time : and it is 
 to small purpose to have an erected face to- 
 wards heaven, and a perpetual groveling 
 spirit upon earth, eating dust, as doth the 
 serpent, Atque affigit humo divince particulam 
 aura. And if any man flatter himself that 
 he will employ his fortune well, though he 
 should obtain it ill, as was said concerning 
 Augustus Ceesar, and after of Septimius Seve- 
 rus, " that either they should never have 
 " been born, or else they should never have 
 " died," they did so much mischief in the 
 pursuit and ascent of their greatness, and 
 so much good when they were established; 
 yet these compensations and satisfactions 
 are good to be used, but never good to be 
 purposed. 
 Kot to court And lastly, it is not amiss for men, in 
 
 Fortune too J 
 
 assiduously, their race towards their fortune, to cool 
 themselves a little with that conceit which is 
 elegantly expressed by the emperor Charles 
 the fifth, in his instructions to the king his 
 
409 
 
 son, i€ that fortune hath somewhat of th€ 
 u nature of a woman, that if she be too 
 <e much wooed, she is the farther off*" But 
 this last is but a remedy for those whose 
 tastes are corrupted : let men rather build 
 upon that foundation which is as a corner- 
 stone of divinity and philosophy, wherein 
 they join close, namely, that same Primum 
 qucerite. For divinity saith, Primum qu&rite 
 regnum Dei, et ista omnia adjicientur vobis : 
 and philosophy saith, Primum qucerite bona 
 animi, ccetera aut aderunt, aut non oberunt. 
 And although the human foundation hath 
 somewhat of the sands, as we see in M. 
 Brutus, when he brake forth in that speech, 
 
 Te colui, virtus, ut rem ; ast tu nomen 
 inane es : 
 yet the divine foundation is upon the rock. 
 But this may serve for a taste of that know- 
 ledge which I noted as deficient. 
 
 Concerning Government, it is a part of of Govern- 
 
 ° . merit. 
 
 knowledge secret and retired, in both these 
 respects in which things are deemed secret ; 
 for some things are secret because they are 
 hard to know, and some because they are 
 
410 
 
 not fit to utter : we see all governments are 
 obscure and invisible : 
 
 Totamque infusa per artus 
 
 Mens agitat molem,et magno se corpore miscet. 
 
 such is the description of governments. We 
 see the government of God over the world is 
 hidden, insomuch as it seemeth to parti- 
 cipate of much irregularity and confusion : 
 the government of the soul in moving the 
 body is inward and profound, and the pas- 
 sages thereof hardly to be reduced to demon- 
 stration. Again, the wisdom of antiquity, 
 (the shadows whereof are in the poets,) in 
 the description of torments and pains, next 
 unto the crime of rebellion, which was tire 
 giants' offence, doth detest the offence of fa- 
 cility, as in Sisyphus and Tantalus. But 
 this was meant of particulars : nevertheless 
 even unto the general rules and discourses 
 of policy and government there is due a 
 reverent and reserved handling. 
 How Gover- But contrariwise, in the governors towards 
 demeaJTtiJem- the governed, all things ought, as far as the 
 wards the frailty of man permitteth, to be manifest 
 and revealed, For so it is expressed in the 
 
411 
 
 Scriptures touching the government of God, 
 that this globe, which seemeth to us a dark 
 and shady body, is in the view of God as 
 crystal, Et in conspectu sedis tanquam mare 
 vitreum simile crystallo. So unto princes and 
 states, specially towards wise senates and 
 councils, the natures and dispositions of the 
 people, their conditions and necessities, their 
 factions and combinations, their animosities 
 and discontents, ought to be, in regard of 
 the variety of their intelligences, the wis- 
 dom of their observations, and the height 
 of the station where they keep centinel, in 
 great part clear and transparent. Where- 
 fore, considering that I write to a king that 
 is a master of this science, and is so well 
 assisted, I think it decent to pass over this 
 part in silence, as willing to obtain the cer- 
 tificate which one of the ancient philoso- 
 phers aspired unto ; who being silent, when 
 others contended to make demonstration of 
 their abilities by speech, desired it might 
 be certified for his part, " that there was 
 <c one that knew how to hold his peace." 
 
 Notwithstanding, for the more public part of Laws. 
 of government, which is laws, I think good 
 to note only one deficiency ; which is that 
 
412 
 
 all those which have written of laws, hav£ 
 written either as philosophers or as lawyers* 
 and none as statesmen* As for the philoso- 
 phers, they make imaginary laws for imagi- 
 nary commonwealths, and their discourses 
 are as the stars, which give little light, because 
 they are so high. For the lawyers, they 
 write according to the states where they 
 live, what is received law, and not what 
 ought to be law : for the wisdom of a law- 
 maker is one, and of a lawyer is another* 
 For there are in nature certain fountains 
 of justice, whence all civil laws are derived 
 but as streams : and like as waters do take 
 tinctures and tastes from the soils through 
 which they run, so do civil laws vary ac- 
 cording to the regions and governments 
 where they are planted, though they proceed 
 from the same fountains. Again, the wis- 
 dom of a lawmaker consisteth not only in 
 a platform of justice, but in the applica- 
 tion thereof ; taking into consideration by 
 what means laws may be made certain, and 
 what are the causes and remedies of the 
 doubtfulness and incertainty of law ; by 
 what means laws may be made apt and 
 easy to be executed, and what are the im- 
 
413 
 
 pediments and remedies in the execution 
 of laws ; what influence laws touching pri- 
 vate right of meum and tuum have into the 
 public state, and how they may be made apt 
 and agreeable ; how laws are to be penned 
 and delivered, whether in texts or in acts, brief 
 or large, with preambles, or without ; how 
 they are to be pruned and reformed from 
 time to time, and what is the best means to 
 keep them from being too vast in volumes, or 
 too full of multiplicity and crossness ; how 
 they are to be expounded, when upon causes 
 emergent and judicially discussed, and when 
 upon responses and conferences touching ge- 
 neral points or questions ; how they are to be 
 pressed rigorously or tenderly ; how they 
 are to be mitigated by equity and good 
 conscience, and whether discretion and strict 
 law are to be mingled in the same courts, 
 or kept apart in several courts; again, how 
 the practice, profession, and erudition of 
 law is to be censured and governed ; and 
 many other points touching the administra- 
 tion, and, as I may term it, animation of 
 laws. Upon which I insist the less, because 
 I purpose, if God give me leave, (having 
 
414 
 
 begun a g mt work of this nature in apho- 
 risms,) to propound it hereafter, noting it 
 in the mean time for deficient. 
 of the Laws And for your majesty's laws of England, I 
 
 of England. J J J & 
 
 could say much of their dignity, and some- 
 what of their defect ; but they cannot but 
 excel the civil laws in fitness for the govern- 
 ment : for the civil law was Non hos qucesitum 
 munus in usus ; it was not made for the coun- 
 tries which it governeth : hereof I cease to 
 speak, because I will not intermingle matter 
 of action with matter of general learning. 
 
 General con. Thus I have concluded this portion of 
 
 elusion, 
 
 learning touching civil knowledge; and with 
 civil kn6wledge have concluded human phi- 
 losophy • and with human philosophy, phi- 
 losophy in general. And being now at 
 some pause, looking back into that I have 
 passed through, this writing seemeth to 
 me, (si nunquam fallit imago) as far as 
 a man can judge of his own work, not 
 much better than that noise or sound 
 which musicians make while they are in 
 tuning their instruments; which is nothing 
 pleasant to hear, but yet is a cause why 
 
415 
 
 the music is sweeter afterwards : so have I 
 been content to tune the instruments of the 
 muses, that they may play that have better 
 hands. 
 
 And surely, when I set before me the Advantages 
 
 ^ of model a 
 
 condition of these times, in which learning times. 
 hath made her third visitation or circuit in 
 all the qualities thereof— as the excellency 
 and vivacity of the wits of this age ; the 
 noble helps and lights which we have by 
 the travels of ancient writers ; the art of 
 printing, which communicateth books to 
 men of all fortunes ; the openness of the 
 world by navigation, which hath disclosed 
 multitudes of experiments, and a mass of 
 natural history ; the leisure wherewith these 
 times abound, not employing men so gene- 
 rally in civil business, as the states of Grsecia 
 did, in respect of their popularity, and the 
 state of Rome in respect of the greatness 
 of their monarchy ; the present disposition 
 of these times at this instant to peace ; the 
 consumption of all that ever can be said 
 in controversies of religion, which have so 
 much diverted men from other sciences ; the 
 perfection of your majesty's learning, which 
 
416 
 
 as a phoenix may call whole vollies of wits 
 to follow you ; and the inseparable pro- 
 priety of time, which is ever more and more 
 to disclose truth — I cannot but be raised to 
 this persuasion, that this third period of time 
 will far- surpass that of the Graecian and 
 Roman learning : only if men will know 
 their own strength, and their own weak- 
 ness both ; and take one from the other 
 light of invention, and not fire of contra- 
 diction ; and esteem of the inquisition of 
 truth as of an enterprise, and not as of a 
 quality or ornament ; and employ wit and 
 magnificence to things of worth and excel- 
 lency, and not to things vulgar and of po- 
 pular estimation. 
 
 As for my labours, if any man shall please 
 himself or others in the reprehension of them, 
 they shall make that ancient and patient 
 request, Verbera, sed audi; Let men repre- 
 hend them, so they observe and weigh them : 
 for the appeal is lawful, though it may be it 
 shall not be needful, from the first cogitations 
 of men to their second, and from the nearer 
 times to the times farther off. Now let 
 us come to that learning, which both the 
 
417 
 
 former times were not so blessed as to 
 know, sacred and inspired Divinity, the 
 sabbath and port of all men's labours and 
 peregrinations. 
 
 DIVINITY. 
 
 The prerogative of God extendeth as well 
 to the reason as to the will of man ; so 
 that as we are to obey his law, though 
 we find a reluctation in our will, so we 
 are to believe his word, though we find a 
 reluctation in our reason. For if we be- 
 lieve only that which is agreeable to our 
 sense, we give consent to the matter, and 
 not to the author; which is no more than 
 w r e would do towards a suspected and dis- 
 credited witness : but that faith which was 
 accounted to Abraham for righteousness was 
 of such a point as whereat Sarah laughed, 
 who therein was an image of natural reason. 
 
 How r beit, if we will truly consider it, more 
 w r orthy it is to believe than to know as we 
 now know. For in knowledge man's mind 
 sufFereth from sense ; but in belief it suf- 
 
 E E 
 
418 
 
 fereth from spirit, such one as it holdeth 
 for more authorised than itself; and so suf- 
 fereth from the worthier agent. Otherwise 
 it is of the state of man glorified ; for then 
 faith shall cease, and xve shall know as ice 
 are knoivn. 
 what sacred Wherefore we conclude that sacred tlieo- 
 
 -Tbeology 
 
 strictly is. logy, (which in our idiom we call divinity,) 
 is grounded only upon the word and oracle 
 of God, and not upon the light of nature : 
 for it is written, Cceli enarrant gloriam 
 Dei; but it is not written, Cceli enarrant 
 voluntatem Dei: but of that it is said, Ad 
 legem et testimonium, si non fecerint secundum 
 verbum istud, etc. This holdeth not only in 
 those points of faith which concern the great 
 mysteries of the Deity, of the creation, of 
 the redemption, but likewise those which 
 concern the law y moral truly interpreted ; 
 Love your enemies : do good to them that 
 hate you : be like to your heavenly Father, 
 that svffereth his rain to fall upon the just and 
 unjust. To this it ought to be applauded; 
 Nee vox hominem sonat, it is a voice beyond 
 the light of nature. So we see the heathen 
 poets, when they fall upon a libertine pas- 
 
419 
 
 8ion, do still expostulate with laws and mo- 
 ralities, as if they were opposite and ma* 
 lignant to nature ; Et quod natura remittit, 
 Invida jura negant. So said Dendamis the 
 Indian unto Alexander's messengers ; " That 
 u he had heard somewhat of Pythagoras, 
 u and some other of the wise men of Grae- 
 " cia, and that he held them for excellent 
 ff men : but that they had a fault, which 
 " was, that they had in too great reve- 
 " rence and veneration a thing called law 
 " and manners." So it must be confessed that 
 a great part of the law moral is of that 
 perfection, whereunto the light of nature 
 cannot aspire : how then is it that man is 
 said to have, by the light and law of nature, 
 some notions and conceits of virtue and vice, 
 justice and wrong, good and evil ? Thus, 
 because the light of nature is used in two 
 several senses ; the one, that which springeth 
 from reason, sense, induction, argument, ac- 
 cording to the laws of heaven and earth ; 
 the other, that which is imprinted upon the 
 spirit of man by an inward instinct, according 
 to the law of conscience, which is a sparkle 
 of the purity of his first estate : in which 
 e e 2 
 
420 
 
 latter sense only he is participant of some 
 light and discerning touching the perfec- 
 tion of the moral law : but how ? sufficient 
 to check the vice, but not to inform the 
 duty. So then the doctrine of religion, as 
 well moral as mystical, is not to be attained 
 but by inspiration and revelation of God. 
 The use of The use, notwithstanding, of reason in 
 
 Reason in 
 
 Religion. spiritual things, and the latitude thereof, is 
 very great and general : for it is not for 
 nothing that the apostle calleth religion our 
 reasonable service of God ; insomuch as the 
 very ceremonies and figures of the old law 
 were full of reason and signification, much 
 more than the ceremonies of idolatry and 
 magic, that are full of non-significants and 
 surd characters. But most especially the 
 Christian Faith, as in all things so in this, de- 
 serveth to be highly magnified, holding and 
 preserving mediocrity in this point between 
 the law of the heathen and the law of Maho- 
 met, which have embraced the two extremes. 
 For the religion of the heathen had no constant 
 belief or confession, but left all to the liberty 
 of argument ; and the religion of Mahomet, 
 on the other side, interdicteth argument al- 
 
421 
 
 together : the one having the very face of 
 error, and the other of imposture ; whereas 
 the faith doth both admit and reject dis- 
 putation with difference. 
 
 The use of human reason in religion is 
 of two sorts : the former, in the concep- 
 tion and apprehension of the mysteries of 
 God to us revealed ; the other, in the in- 
 ferring and deriving of doctrine and direc- 
 tion thereupon. The former extendeth to 
 the mysteries themselves ; but how ? by way 
 of illustration, and not by way of argument : 
 the latter consisteth indeed of probation 
 and argument. In the former, we see, God 
 vouchsafed! to descend to our capacity, in 
 the expressing of his mysteries in such sort 
 as may be sensible unto us ; and doth graft 
 his revelations and holy doctrine upon the 
 notions of our reason, and applieth his inspi- 
 rations to open our understanding, as the 
 form of the key to the ward of the lock : 
 for the latter, there is allowed us an use 
 of reason and argument, secondary and re- 
 spective, although not original and absolute. 
 For after the articles and principles of reli- 
 gion are placed and exempted from exami*- 
 
422 
 
 nation of reason, it is then permitted unto 
 us to make derivations and inferences from, 
 and according to the analogy of them, for 
 our better direction* In nature this holdeth 
 not; for both the principles are examinable 
 by induction, though not by a medium or 
 syllogism ; and besides, those principles or 
 first positions have no discordance with that 
 reason which draweth down and deduceth 
 the inferior positions. But yet it holdeth 
 not in religion alone, but in many know- 
 ledges, both of greater and smaller nature, 
 namely, wherein there are not only posita 
 but placita ; for in such there can be no 
 use of absolute reason : we see it familiarly 
 in games of wit, as chess, or the like : the 
 draughts and first laws of the game are posi- 
 tive, but how ? merely ad placitum, and not 
 examinable by reason ; but then how to 
 direct our play thereupon with best advan- 
 tage to win the game, is artificial and rational. 
 So in human laws, there A may -be grounds 
 and maxims which are placita juris, posi- 
 tive upon authority, and not upon reason, 
 and therefore not to be disputed: but what 
 is most just, not absolutely but relatively, 
 
423 
 
 and according to those maxima that afford- 
 <eth a long field of disputation. Such there- 
 fore is that secondary reason/ which hath 
 place in divinity, which is grounded upon 
 -the placets of God. 
 
 Here therefore I note this deficiency, that 
 there hath not been, to my understanding, 
 sufficiently enquired and handled the true 
 limits and use of reason in spiritual things, 
 as a kind of divine dialectic : which for 
 that it is not done, it seemeth to me a thing 
 .usual, by pretext of true conceiving that 
 which is revealed, to search and mine into 
 that which is not revealed; and by pretext 
 of enucleating inferences and contradicto- 
 ries, to examine that which is positive : the 
 one sort falling into the error of Nicode- 
 mus, demanding to have things made more 
 sensible than it pleaseth God to reveal them, 
 Quoinodo possit homo nasci, cum sit senex<? 
 the other into the error of the disciples, 
 which were scandalized at a shew of con- 
 tradiction, Quid est hoc, quod dicit nobis ? 
 Modicum et non videbitis me, et iterum mor 
 dicum, et videbitis me, etc. 
 
 Upon this I have insisted the more, in 
 
424 
 
 regard of the great and blessed use thereof; 
 for this point, well laboured and defined of, 
 would in my judgment be an opiate to stay 
 and bridle not only the vanity of curious 
 speculations, w T herewith the schools labor, 
 but the fury of controversies, wherewith the 
 church laboureth. For it cannot but open 
 men's eyes, to see that many controversies 
 do merely pertain to that which is either 
 not revealed, or positive ; and that many 
 others do grow upon weak and obscure in- 
 ferences or derivations : which latter sort, 
 if men would revive the blessed stile of that 
 great doctor of the Gentiles, would be car- 
 ried thus ; Ego, non Dominus ; and again, 
 Secundum consilium meum ; in opinions and 
 counsels, and not in positions and opposi- 
 tions. But men are now over-ready to usurp 
 the stile, Non ego, sed Dominus; and not so 
 only, but to bind it with the thunder and 
 denunciation of curses and anathemas, to 
 the terror of those which have not suffi- 
 ciently learned out of Solomon, that the 
 causeless curse shall not come. 
 Two princi- Divinity hath two principal parts ; the 
 Divinity. matter informed or revealed, and the nature of 
 
425 
 
 the information or revelation: and with the 
 latter we will begin, because it hath most 
 coherence with that which we have now 
 last handled. 
 
 The nature of the information consisteth The Nature 
 of three branches ; the limits of the infor- Tation? 
 mation, the sufficiency of the information, 
 and the acquiring or obtaining' the informa- 
 tion. Unto the Limits of the information 
 belong these considerations ; how far forth 
 particular persons continue to be inspired ; 
 how far forth the church is inspired; and 
 how far forth reason may be used : the 
 last point whereof I have noted as deficient. 
 Unto the Sufficiency of the information be- 
 long two considerations ; what points of re- 
 ligion are fundamental, and what perfective, 
 being matter of farther building and perfec- 
 tion upon one and the same foundation ; and 
 again, how the gradations of light, accord- 
 ing to the dispensation of times, are mate- 
 rial to the sufficiency of belief. 
 
 Here again I may rather give it in advice 
 than note it as deficient, that the points fun* 
 damental, and the points of farther perfec- 
 tion only, ought to be with piety and wisdom 
 
426 
 
 distinguished ; a subject tending to much 
 like end as that I noted before ; for as that 
 other were likely to abate the number of 
 controversies, so this is like to abate the 
 heat of many of them. We see Moses when 
 he saw the Israelite and the ^Egyptian fight, 
 he did not say, Why strive you ? but drew 
 his sword and slew the ^Egyptian : but when 
 he saw the two Israelites fight, he said, You 
 are brethren, why strive you ? If the point 
 of doctrine be an Egyptian, it must be 
 slain by the sword of the Spirit, and not 
 reconciled : but if it be an Israelite, though 
 in the wrong, then, Why strive you ? We 
 see of the fundamental points, our Saviour 
 penneth the league thus, He that is not with 
 us, is against us; but of points not funda- 
 mental, thus ; He that is not against us, is 
 with us. So we see the coat of our Saviour 
 was in tire without seam, and so is the doc- 
 trine of the Scriptures in itself; but the 
 garment of the church was of divers colours, 
 and yet not divided : we see the chaff may 
 and ought to be severed from the corn in 
 the ear, but the tares may not be pulled 
 yp from the corn in the field. So as it 
 
427 
 
 is a thing of great use well to define what, 
 and of what latitude those points are, which 
 do make men merely aliens and disincor- 
 porate from the church of God. 
 
 For the obtaining of the information, it Two kinds 
 
 * J J of Interpret 
 
 resteth upon the true and sound interpre- tat ion of 
 
 1 Scripture ; 
 
 tation of the Scriptures, which are the foun- 
 tains of the water of life. The interpreta- 
 tions of the Scriptures are of two sorts ; 
 methodical, and solute or at large. For this 
 divine water, which excelleth so much that 
 of Jacob's well, is drawn forth much in the 
 same kind as natural water useth to be out 
 of wells and fountains ; either it is first 
 forced up into a cistern, and from thence 
 fetched and derived for use ; or else it is 
 drawn and received in buckets and vessels 
 immediately where it springeth : the for- 
 mer sort whereof, though it seem to be the 
 more ready, yet in my judgment is more 
 subject to corrupt. This is that method 
 which hath exhibited unto us the scholas- 
 tical divinity ; whereby divinity hath been 
 reduced into an art, as into a cistern, and the 
 streams of doctrine or positions fetched and 
 derived from thence. 
 
423 
 
 The methodi- In this men sought three things, a sum- 
 mary brevity, a compacted strength, and 
 a complete perfection ; whereof the two 
 first they fail to find, and the last they 
 ought not to seek. For as to brevity, we 
 see, in all summary methods, while men 
 purpose to abridge, they give cause to dilate. 
 For the sum or abridgment by contraction 
 becometh obscure ; the obscurity requireth 
 exposition, and the exposition is deduced 
 into large commentaries, or into common 
 places and titles, which grow to be more 
 vast than the original writings, whence the 
 sum was at first extracted. So, we see, the 
 volumes of the schoolmen are greater much 
 than the first writings of the fathers, whence 
 the master of the sentences made his sum or 
 collection. So, in like manner, the volumes 
 of the modern doctors of the civil law exceed 
 those of the ancient jurisconsults, of which 
 Tribonian compiled the digest. So as this 
 course of sums and commentaries is that 
 which doth infallibly make the body of 
 sciences more immense in quantity and 
 more base in substance. 
 
 And for strength, it is true that know* 
 
429 
 
 ledges reduced into exact methods have a 
 shew of strength, in that each part seemeth 
 to support and sustain the other ; but this 
 is more satisfactory than substantial : like 
 unto buildings which stand by architecture 
 and compaction, which are more subject to 
 ruin than those that are built more strong 
 in their several parts, though less compacted. 
 But it is plain that the more you recede 
 from your grounds, the weaker do you con- 
 clude : and as in nature, the more you re- 
 move yourself from particulars, the greater 
 peril of error you do incur ; so much more 
 in divinity, the more you recede from the 
 Scriptures by inferences and consequences, 
 the more weak and dilute are your positions. 
 And as for perfection or completeness in 
 divinity, it is not to be sought ; which makes 
 this course of artificial divinity the more 
 suspect. For he that will reduce a know- 
 ledge into an art, will make it round and 
 uniform : but in divinity many things must 
 be left abrupt, and concluded with this ; 
 altitudo sapientice et scientice Dei ! qudm 
 incomprehensibilia sunt judicia ejus, et non in- 
 vestigabiles vies ejus! So again the apostle 
 
430 
 
 saith Ex parte scimus: and to have the form 
 of a total, where there is but matter for a 
 part, cannot be without supplies by suppo- 
 sition and presumption. And therefore I 
 conclude that the true use of these sums 
 and methods hath place in institutions or 
 introductions preparatory unto knowledge ; 
 but in them, or by deducement from them, 
 to handle the main body and substance of 
 a knowledge, is in all sciences prejudicial, 
 and in divinity dangerous. 
 The solute. As to the interpretation of the Scriptures 
 solute and at large, there have been divers 
 kinds introduced and devised ; some of them 
 rather curious and unsafe than sober and 
 warranted. Notwithstanding, thus much 
 must be confessed, that the Scriptures be- 
 ing given by inspiration, and not by human 
 reason, do differ from all other books in 
 the author ; which by consequence doth 
 draw on some difference to be used by the 
 expositor. For the inditer of them did know 
 four things which no man attains to know ; 
 which are the mysteries of the kingdom of 
 glory, the perfection of the laws of nature, 
 the secrets of the heart of man, and the 
 
431 
 
 future succession of all ages. For as to the 
 first, it is said, He that presseth into the 
 light . shall be oppressed of the glory. And 
 again, No man shall see my face and live. 
 To the second, When he prepared the heavens, 
 I was present, when by law and compass he 
 inclosed the deep. To the third, Neither was 
 it needful that any should bear witness to him 
 of man, for he knew well what was in man. 
 And to the last, Vrom the beginning are known 
 to the Lord all his ivorks. 
 
 From the former of these two have been 
 drawn certain senses and expositions of 
 Scriptures, which had need be contained 
 within the bounds of sobriety ; the one ana- 
 gogical, and the other philosophical. But as to 
 the former, man is not to prevent his time ; 
 Videmus nunc per speculum in mnigmate, tunc 
 autem facie ad faciem ; wherein, nevertheless, 
 there seemeth to be a liberty granted, as far 
 forth as the polishing of this glass, or some 
 moderate explication of this enigma. But 
 to press too far into it, cannot but cause 
 a dissolution and overthrow of the spirit of 
 man : for in the body there are three de- 
 grees of that we receive into it, aliment, 
 
432 
 
 medicine, and poison ; whereof aliment is 
 that which the nature of man can perfectly 
 alter and overcome ; medicine is that ^hi cn 
 is partly converted by nature, and partly 
 converteth nature ; and poison is that which 
 worketh wholly upon nature, without that, 
 that nature can in any part work upon it : 
 so in the mind, whatsoever knowledge rea- 
 son cannot at all work upon and convert, 
 is a mere intoxication, and endangereth a 
 dissolution of the mind and understanding. 
 
 But for the latter, it hath been extremely 
 set on foot of late time by the school of Pa- 
 racelsus, and some others, that have pre- 
 tended to find the truth of all natural phi- 
 losophy in the Scriptures ; scandalizing and 
 traducing all other philosophy as heathenish 
 and profane. But there is no such enmity 
 between God's word and his works ; neither 
 do they give honour to the Scriptures, as 
 they suppose, but much imbase them. For 
 to seek heaven and earth in the word of 
 God, (whereof it is said, heaven and earth 
 shall pass but my ivord shall not pass,) is to 
 seek temporary things amongst eternal ; and 
 as to seek divinity in philosophy is to seek 
 
433 
 
 the living amongst the dead, so to seek phi- 
 losophy in divinity is to seek the dead 
 amongst the living : neither are the pots 
 or lavers, whose place is in the outward 
 part of the temple, to be sought in the 
 holiest place of all, where the ark of the 
 testimony was seated. And again, the scope 
 or purpose of the Spirit of God is not to ex- 
 press matters of nature in the Scriptures, 
 otherwise than in passage, and for appli- 
 cation to man's capacity, and to matters 
 moral or divine. And it is a true rule, 
 Auctoris aliud agentis parva auctoritas : for it 
 were a strange conclusion, if a man should 
 use a similitude for ornament or illustration 
 sake, borrowed from nature or history ac- 
 cording to vulgar conceit, as of a basilisk, 
 an unicorn, a centaur, a Briareus, an Hydra, 
 or the like, that therefore he must needs be 
 thought to affirm the matter thereof posi- 
 tively to be true. To conclude therefore, 
 these two interpretations, the one by re- 
 duction or enigmatical, the other philoso- 
 phical or physical, which have been received 
 and pursued in imitation of the rabbins and 
 
 FF 
 
434 
 
 cabalists, are to be confined with a noli 
 ahum sapere, seel time. 
 True ground But the two latter points, known to God. 
 
 of difference 
 
 in interpret- and unknown to man, touching- the secrets 
 
 mg Scripture 
 
 and profane f the heart, and the successions of time, do 
 
 books. v 
 
 make a just and sound difference between 
 the manner of the exposition of the Scrip- 
 tures and all other books. For it is an ex- 
 cellent observation which hath been made 
 upon the answers of our Saviour Christ to 
 many of the questions which were pro- 
 pounded to him, how that they are imper- 
 tinent to the state of the question demanded : 
 ed : the reason whereof is because, not being 
 like man, which knows man's thoughts by 
 his words, but knowing man's thoughts im- 
 mediately, he never answered their words, 
 but their thoughts : much in the like man- 
 ner it is with the Scriptures, which being 
 written to the thoughts of men, and to the 
 succession of all ages, with a foresight of all 
 heresies, contradictions, differing estates of 
 the church, yea and particularly of the elect, 
 are not to be interpreted only according to 
 the latitude of the proper sense of the place, 
 
435 
 
 and respectively towards that present occa- 
 sion, whereupon the words were uttered, or 
 in precise congruity or contexture with the 
 w r ords before or after, or in contemplation 
 of the principal scope of the place ; but 
 have in themselves, not only totally or col- 
 lectively, but distributively in clauses and 
 words, infinite springs and streams of doc- 
 trine to water the church in every part. 
 And therefore as the literal sense is, as it 
 were, the main stream or river, so the moral 
 sense chiefly, and sometimes the allegorical 
 or typical are they whereof the church hath 
 most use : not that I wish men to be bold 
 in allegories, or indulgent or light in allu- 
 sions ; but that I do much condemn that in- 
 terpretation of the Scripture which is only 
 after the manner as men use to interpret a 
 profane book. 
 
 In this part, touching the exposition of the 
 Scriptures I can report no deficience ; but by 
 way of remembrance, this I will add, in 
 perusing books of divinity ; I find many 
 books of controversies, and many of common 
 places and treatises, a mass of positive divi- 
 nity, as it is made an art, a number of ser- 
 
 F F 2 
 
436 
 
 mons and lectures, and many prolix com- 
 mentaries upon the Scriptures, with harmo- 
 nies and concordances : but that form of 
 writing in divinity, which in my judgment 
 is of all others most rich and precious, is po- 
 sitive divinity, collected upon particular texts 
 of Scriptures in brief observations ; not di- 
 lated into common places, not chasing after 
 controversies, not reduced into method of 
 art ; a thing abounding in sermons, which 
 will vanish, but defective in books which 
 will remain 5 and a thing wherein this age 
 excelleth. For I am persuaded, (and I may 
 speak it with an Absit invidia verbo, and no 
 ways in derogation of antiquity, but as in a 
 good emulation between the vine and the 
 olive,) that if the choice and best of those 
 observations upon texts of Scriptures, which 
 have been made dispersedly in sermons with- 
 in this your majesty's island of Britain by the 
 space of these forty years and more, leaving 
 out the largeness of exhortations and appli- 
 cations thereupon, had been set down in a 
 continuance, it had been the best work in 
 divinity which had been written since the 
 apostles' times. 
 
437 
 The matter informed by divinity is of two The matter 
 kinds; matter of belief and truth of opinion ; 
 and matter of service and adoration ; which is 
 also judged and directed by the former ; the 
 one being as the internal soul of religion, 
 and the other as the external body thereof. 
 And therefore the heathen religion was not 
 only a worship of idols, but the whole reli- 
 gion was an idol in itself; for it had no soul, 
 that is, no certainty of belief or confession; 
 as a man may well think, considering the 
 chief doctors of their church were the poets : 
 and the reason was, because the heathen gods 
 were no jealous gods, but were glad to be ad- 
 mitted into part, as they had reason. Nei- 
 ther did they respect the pureness of heart, 
 so they might have external honor and rites. 
 
 But OUt Of these tWO do result and issue Four main 
 
 four main branches of divinity ; faith, man- Divinity. 
 ners, liturgy, and government. Faith con- 
 taineth the doctrine of the nature of God, of 
 the attributes of God, and of the works of 
 God. The nature of God consisteth of three 
 persons in unity of Godhead. The attributes 
 of God are either common to the Deity, or 
 respective to the persons. The works of God 
 
438 
 
 summary are two, that of the creation, and 
 that of the redemption ; and both these 
 works, as in total they appertain to the unity 
 of the Godhead, so in their parts they refer 
 to the three persons: that of the creation, 
 in the mass of the matter, to the Father \ in 
 the disposition of the form, to the Son ; and 
 in the continuance and conservation of the 
 being, to the Holy Spirit: so that of the re- 
 demption, in the election and counsel, to the 
 Father ; in the whole act and consummation, 
 to the Son ; and in the application, to the 
 Holy Spirit : for by the Holy Ghost was 
 Christ conceived in flesh, and by the Holy 
 Ghost are the elect regenerated in spirit, 
 This work likewise we consider either effect 
 tually, in the elect ; or privately, in the re^ 
 probate ; or according to appearance in the 
 visible church. 
 
 For Manners, the doctrine thereof is con^ 
 tained in the Law, which discloseth sin. The 
 Law itself is divided, according to the edition 
 thereof, into the law of nature, the law moral, 
 and the law positive ; and according to the 
 stile, into negative and affirmative, prohibi- 
 tions and commandments. Sin, in the mat*- 
 
4sg 
 
 ter and subject thereof, is divided according 
 to the commandments ; in the form thereof, 
 it referreth to the three persons in Deity : 
 Sins of infirmity against the Father, whose 
 more special attribute is power ; sins of ig- 
 norance against the Son, whose attribute is 
 wisdom ; and sins of malice against the Holy 
 Ghost, whose attribute is grace or love. In 
 the motions of it, it either moveth to the 
 right hand or to the left ; either to blind de- 
 votion, or to profane and libertine transgres- 
 sion ; either in imposing restraint where God 
 granteth liberty, or in taking liberty where 
 God imposeth restraint. In the degrees and 
 progress of it, it divideth itself into thought, 
 word, or act. And in this part I commend 
 much the deducing of the law of God to cases 
 of conscience ; for that I take indeed to be a 
 breaking, and not exhibiting whole of the 
 bread of life. But that which quickeneth 
 both these doctrines of faith and manners, is 
 the elevation and consent of the heart; 
 whereunto appertain books of exhortation, 
 holy meditation, christian resolution, and the 
 like. 
 
 For the Liturgy or service, it consisteth of 
 
440 
 
 the reciprocal acts between God and man ; 
 which, on the part of God, are the preaching 
 of the word, and the sacraments, which are 
 seals to the covenant, or as the visible word ; 
 and on the part of man, invocation of the 
 name of God; and, under the law, sacri- 
 fices ; which were as visible prayers or con- 
 fessions : but now the adoration being in 
 spiritu et veritate, there remaineth only vituli 
 labiorum; although the use of holy vows of 
 thankfulness and retribution may be account- 
 ed also as sealed petitions. 
 
 And for the government of the church, it 
 consisteth of the patrimony of the church, 
 the franchises of the church, and the offices 
 and jurisdictions of the church, and the laws 
 of the church directing the whole ; all which 
 have two considerations, the one in them- 
 selves, the other how they stand compatible 
 and agreeable to the civil estate. 
 
 This matter of divinity is handled either in 
 form of instruction of truth, or in form of 
 confutation of falsehood. The declinations 
 from religion, besides the primitive, which 
 is atheism, and the branches thereof, are 
 three j heresies, idolatry, and witchcraft : He- 
 
441 
 
 resies, when we serve the true God with a 
 false worship ; Idolatry, when we worship 
 false gods, supposing them to be true ; and 
 Witchcraft, when we adore false gods, know- 
 ing them to be wicked and false : for so your 
 majesty doth excellently well observe, that 
 witchcraft is the height of idolatry. And 
 yet we see though these be true degrees, 
 Samuel teacheth us that they are all of a na- 
 ture, when there is once a receding from the 
 word of God : for so he saith, Quasi peccatum 
 ariolandi est repugnare, et quasi scelus idolola- 
 trice nolle acquiescere. 
 
 These things I have passed over so briefly 
 because I can report no deficiency concern- 
 ing them : for I can find no space or ground 
 that lieth vacant and unsown in the matter 
 of divinity; so diligent have men been, 
 either in sowing of good seed, or in sowing 
 of tares. 
 
 Thus have I made as it were a small Globe Conclusion 
 of the Intellectual world, as truly and faith- rai surteylf 
 fully as I could discover ; with a note and 
 
 G G 
 
442 
 
 description of those parts which seem to me 
 not constantly occupate, or not well converted 
 by the labour of man. In which, if I have in 
 any point receded from that which is com- 
 monly received, it hath been with a purpose 
 of proceeding in melius, and not in aliud ; a 
 mind of amendment and proficience, and 
 not of change and difference. For I could 
 not be true and constant to the argument I 
 handle, if I were not willing to go beyond 
 others ; but yet not more willing than to have 
 others go beyond me again : which may the 
 better appear by this, that I have propound- 
 ed my opinions naked and unarmed, not 
 seeking to preoccupate the liberty of men's 
 judgments by confutations. For in any thing 
 which is well set down, I am in good hope, 
 that if the first reading move an objection, 
 the second reading will make an answer- 
 And in those things wherein I have erred, I 
 am sure, I have not prejudiced the right by 
 litigious arguments ; which certainly have 
 this contrary effect and operation, that they 
 add authority to error, and destroy the autho- 
 rity of that which is well invented : for ques- 
 tion is an honor and preferment to falsehood. 
 
44S 
 
 tis oil the other side it is a repulse to truth. 
 But tie errors I claim and challenge to my- 
 self $ my own : the good, if any be, is due 
 tanqipm adeps sacrificii, to be incensed to the 
 honour first of the Divine Majesty, and next 
 of y<ur majesty, to whom on earth I am 
 mostbounden. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 Printed by J. M'CREERY, 
 Black-Horse Court, Fleet-Street. 
 

 
Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
 Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
 Treatment Date: August 2004 
 
 PreservationTechnoIogies 
 
 A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 
 
 1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
 Cranberry Township, PA 1 6066 
 (724)779-2111 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 
 
 012 863 095 8 •